



Hacettepe University Graduate School of Social Sciences
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Political Science Program

**CONCENTRATION OF EXECUTIVE POWER AND
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS: EXAMINING
PLEDGE-POLICY CONGRUENCE UNDER THE JUSTICE
AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY (AKP) RULE**

Emre TAŞKIRAN

Master's Thesis

Ankara, 2022

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ETİK BEYAN

Bu alıřmadaki bütn bilgi ve belgeleri akademik kurallar erevesinde elde ettiđimi, grsel, iřitsel ve yazılı tm bilgi ve sonuları bilimsel ahlak kurallarına uygun olarak sunduđumu, kullandığım verilerde herhangi bir tahrifat yapmadığımı, yararlandığım kaynaklara bilimsel normlara uygun olarak atıfta bulunduđumu, tezimin kaynak gsterilen durumlar dıřında zgn olduđunu, **Do. Dr. řebnem YARDIMCI-GEYİKİ** danıřmanlığında tarafımdan retilildiđini ve Hacettepe niversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstits Tez Yazım Ynergesine gre yazıldıđını beyan ederim.

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ABSTRACT

TAŞKIRAN, Emre. Concentration of Executive Power and Government Responsiveness: Examining Pledge-Policy Congruence Under The Justice and Development Party (AKP) Rule, Master's Thesis, Ankara, 2022.

The main purpose of this thesis is to shed light upon the effect of institutional change on the responsiveness of an elected government to its electoral mandate. Examining pledge-policy congruence across policy domains, it is intended to elucidate how agenda congruence between proposed electoral pledges and subsequent government actions varies under different institutional arrangements. In order to do so, this thesis focuses on periods of the governing Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP*) covering approximately six legislative tenures over more than twenty years. Using a novel data set, it is found that excessive dominance of the executive power in the hands of a popularly elected president decreases government incentive to respond to its electoral mandates between elections

Keywords

Responsiveness, mandate theory, presidential government system, justice and development party.

ÖZET

TAŞKIRAN, Emre. Yürütme Gücünün Yoğunlaşması ve Hükümet Duyarlılığı: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Döneminin Taahhüt-Politika Uyumunun Analizi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara, 2022.

Bu tezin temel amacı, kurumsal değişimin, seçilmiş bir hükümetin seçim yetkisine karşı duyarlılığı üzerindeki etkisine ışık tutmaktır. Politika alanları arasında taahhüt-politika uyumu incelenerek, önerilen seçim vaatleri ve müteakip hükümet eylemleri arasındaki gündem uyumunun farklı kurumsal düzenlemeler altında nasıl değiştiğinin açıklanması amaçlanmaktadır. Bunu yapmak için, bu tez, iktidardaki Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin (AKP) yirmi yıldan fazla, yaklaşık altı yasama periyodunu kapsayan dönemlerine odaklanmaktadır. Yeni bir veri seti kullanılarak, halk tarafından seçilmiş bir başkanın elindeki yürütme gücünün aşırı yoğunlaşmasının, hükümetin seçimler arasındaki seçim yetkilerine olan cevap verebilirliğini azalttığı ileri sürülmektedir.

Anahtar Sözcükler

Duyarlılık, yetki kuramı, cumhurbaşkanlığı hükümet sistemi, adalet ve kalkınma partisi.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACCEPTANCE AND APPROVAL	i
YAYIMLAMA VE FİKRİ MÜLKİYET HAKLARI BEYANI.....	ii
ETİK BEYAN.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iv
ABSTRACT	v
ÖZET.....	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	x
LIST OF FIGURES	xi
LIST OF TABLES	xii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW.....	6
1.1. UNDERSTANDING OF CONCEPTUAL BOUNDARIES	8
1.2. REPRESENTATION AND RESPONSIVENESS.....	10
1.2.1. Classical Approaches.....	11
1.2.2. Existing Explanations	13
1.3. GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS.....	15
1.3.1. Past Use of Government Responsiveness.....	16
1.3.2. Current Use of the Government Responsiveness	18
1.3.3. Operationalization of the Government Responsiveness	19
1.4. OPINION TO POLICY NEXUS.....	22
1.4.1. Indicators and Methods for The Nexus	24
1.4.2. Measuring Public Opinion.....	26
1.4.3. Measuring Public Policy.....	28
1.5. MANDATE THEORY	30
1.5.1. Mandate Theory in Practice.....	31
1.5.2. The Role of the Election Manifestos	32
1.6. PLEDGE FULFILMENT	35
1.6.1. Program to Policy Nexus	37
CHAPTER 2: CASE, DATA AND METHOD	40
2.1. CASE: THE RULE OF JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY IN TURKEY	40

2.1.1. Justice and Development Party (AKP) Term	41
2.1.1.1. The first three legislative tenures of the AKP Rule: 2002-2007, 2007-2011, 2011-2015.....	44
2.1.1.2. The Post-2015 Period: Popularly Elected President and the Concentration of Executive Power	47
2.2. DATA AND METHOD	50
2.2.1. Comparative Agendas Project (CAP).....	53
2.2.2. Election Manifesto.....	55
2.2.3. Legislative Agenda	57
CHAPTER 3: FINDINGS: POLICY RESPONSIVENESS IN THE FIRST THREE LEGISLATIVE TENURES OF THE AKP RULE.....	60
3.1. 22nd LEGISLATIVE TENURE (2002 - 2007).....	61
3.1.1. Legislative Agenda	62
3.1.2. Election Manifesto.....	65
3.1.3. Results	67
3.2. 23rd LEGISLATIVE TENURE (2007- 2011)	72
3.2.1. Legislative Agenda	73
3.2.2. Election Manifesto.....	75
3.2.3. Results	76
3.3. 24th LEGISLATIVE TENURE (2011- 2015)	81
3.3.1. Legislative Agenda	82
3.3.2. Election Manifesto.....	85
3.3.3. Results	86
CHAPTER 4: THE POST-2015 PERIOD: POPULARLY ELECTED PRESIDENT AND THE CONCENTRATION OF EXECUTIVE POWER	92
4.1. THE 25th AND THE 26th LEGISLATIVE TENURES (2015- 2015; 2015-2018).....	93
4.1.1. Legislative Agenda	94
4.1.2. Election Manifesto.....	98
4.1.3. Results	100
4.2. 27th LEGISLATIVE TENURE	104
4.2.1. Legislative Agenda	106
4.2.2. Election Manifesto.....	109
4.2.3. Results	112

CONCLUSIONS	118
REFERENCES.....	121
ANNEX 1. ORİJİNALLİK RAPORU	131
ANNEX 2. ETİK KOMİSYON MUAFİYETİ FORMU	132



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party
CAP	: Comparative Agendas Project
CHP	: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People Party
DYP	: Doğru Yol Partisi, True Path Party
EU	: European Union
GİGM	: Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, Directorate General of Migration Management
HSK	: Hâkimler ve Savcılar Kurulu, Council Of Judges And Prosecutors
HSYK	: Hâkimler ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu, Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors
MENA	: Middle East and North Africa
MG	: Milli Görüş, National Outlook
MGK	: Milli Güvenlik Konseyi, National Security Council
MII	: Most Important Issue
MIP	: Most Important Problem
MNP	: Milli Nizam Partisi, National Order Party
MP	: Member of Parliament
MSP	: Milli Selamet Partisi, National Salvation Party
PAP	: Policy Agenda Project
RP	: Refah Partisi, Welfare Party
TBMM	: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Turkish Grand National Assembly
TSK	: Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, Turkish Armed Force
US	: United States
YSK	: Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, Supreme Election Council

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Stages of the Representation.....	9
Figure 2. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 22 nd . Legislative Agenda.....	64
Figure 3. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 2002 Election Manifesto	66
Figure 4. Agenda Congruence Between Electoral Pledges and Government-sponsored Bills.....	68
Figure 5. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 22 nd . Legislative Agenda.....	74
Figure 6. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 2007 Election Manifesto	76
Figure 7. Agenda Congruence Between Electoral Pledges and Government-sponsored Bills.....	77
Figure 8. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 24 th . Legislative Agenda	84
Figure 9. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 2011 Election Manifesto	86
Figure 10. Agenda Congruence Between Electoral Pledges and Government-sponsored Bills	88
Figure 11. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 25 th . Legislative Agenda	96
Figure 12. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 2015 June Election Manifesto	99
Figure 13. Agenda Congruence Between Electoral Pledges and Government-sponsored Bills.....	101
Figure 14. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 27 th . Legislative Agenda	108
Figure 15. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 2018 June Election Manifesto	111
Figure 16. Agenda Congruence Between Electoral Pledges and Enacted Bills.....	113

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. CAP Coding Scheme.....	54
Table 2. Sample Coding of Electoral Pledges in accordance with the CAP Coding Scheme	57
Table 3. Sample of Coding the Legislative Outputs Enacted between 2007-2011	59
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Laws Enacted Between 2002-2007.....	62
Table 5. Frequencies and Percentage of Natural Sentences in the 2002 Election Manifesto	65
Table 6. Interpretation for Correlation Values	69
Table 7. Correlation Between the Proportion of Electoral Pledges and Laws on the Policy Domains 2002-2007.....	69
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Laws Enacted Between 2007-2011.....	73
Table 9. Frequencies and Percentage of Natural Sentences in the 2007 Election Manifesto	75
Table 10. Correlation Between the Proportion of Electoral Pledges and Laws on the Policy Domains Between 2007-2011.....	78
Table 11. Descriptive Statistics for Laws Enacted Between 2011-2015.....	83
Table 12. Frequencies and Percentage of Natural Sentences in the 2011 Election Manifesto	85
Table 13. Correlation Between the Proportion of Electoral Pledges and Laws on the Policy Domains Between 2011-2015.....	88
Table 14. Omnibus Bills that Enacted during the 25th. Legislative Tenure	95
Table 15. Descriptive Statistics for Laws Enacted Between 2015-2018.....	96
Table 16. Frequencies and Percentage of Natural Sentences in the 2011 Election Manifesto	98
Table 17. Correlation Between the Proportion of Electoral Pledges and Laws on the Policy Domains Between 2015-2018.....	102
Table 18. Descriptive Statistics for Laws Enacted Between 2018-2022.....	107
Table 19. Frequencies and Percentage of Natural Sentences in the 2018 Election Manifesto	110
Table 20. Correlation Between the Proportion of Electoral Pledges and Laws on the Policy Domains Between 2018-2022.....	114

INTRODUCTION

The policy agenda of an elected government generally includes prioritized issue domains faced by the people in their daily lives. To this end, governments need to attend to prioritized policy domains by behaving responsively and responsibly to public policy expectations. This normative requirement has already been justified through the democratic representation theory which posits that consistent government responsiveness to mass preferences is an extremely vital step of democratic governance between the principal and agent (R. Dahl, 1961; Pitkin, 1967). In accordance with this theoretical assumption, a considerable degree of correspondence between what people want and what a government does is required for this relationship to be considered democratic responsiveness.

When for the first time Dahl (1961) argued this causality between public opinion and public policy, an appreciable amount of scholarly attention turned towards the representation linkage between electoral constituents and popularly elected officials. Initially, analysis of the opinion-policy nexus at the beginning of an elected government's tenure to ascertain whether or not assumed requirements were fulfilled by elected officials was lagging. However, scholarly attention to test this normative nexus through quantitative methods has emerged in the US by comparing the political behaviors of congressmen with the desires or expectations of their constituents (Burststein, 2003; Erikson et al., 2012; Stimson et al., 1995). In a basic sense, there has been an aim to measure the degree of correspondence between constituents' policy preferences and congressmen's political activities on specific policy domains and the extent to which these different policy veins correlate.

Following this empirical effort, to test the normative requirement of democratic representation, in the 1990s, cross-national and cross institutional accounts have been developed to understand whether different political cultures or institutional aggrandizement influence a government's incentive to respond to public policy preferences. Thus, a considerable amount of literature has empirically investigated the effect of the political institutions on the causality between public opinion and public

policy beyond the US (Arnold & Franklin, 2012; Burstein, 2003; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; Quarterly, 2014; Soroka & Wlezien, 2004; Spoon & Klüver, 2014). It has been widely observed that different variables such as time, the type of electoral system, the pattern of the government system, the level of checks and balances between governmental branches and the vertical and horizontal divisions in the administrative structure all considerably affect the degree of correspondence between public and government agendas.

Besides these scholarly efforts, to analyze whether popularly elected government responds to the desires of the general public, party-based explanations have also gained academic attention in the last two decades (Klüver & Spoon, 2014; Moury & Fernandes, 2018; Spoon & Klüver, 2014; Stokes, 1999; Toshkov et al., 2020; Yardımcı-Geyikçi, 2015). In these studies, however, as based on the narrow constituents' policy preferences, both mainstream and niche political parties' electoral pledges or subsequent policy actions have been analyzed causally. Of the determinants affecting a party's responsiveness to its constituents, it is emphasized that the ideological standpoint in the political spectrum for both voters and representatives is a significant factor for a well-functionalized responsiveness mechanism. In addition, when looking at the time variable, it was detected that political parties positioned in the ruling coalition increase their policy attention towards the constituents' desires when approaching an election (Duval & Pétry, 2019). Similarly, recent investigations for party responsiveness has determined that the pattern of the ruling coalition, whether a majority or minority, determines the level of correspondence between public and government agendas (Artés & Bustos, 2008; Matthieß, 2019; Moury & Fernandes, 2018; Naurin, 2014; Vodová, 2020).

In terms of methodological preferences, responsiveness theory has been divided into two groups: opinion to policy or program to policy nexuses. Formerly, the focus was on measuring public policy expectations and subsequent government policy actions between elections by relying heavily on the aggregated answers to the Most Important Problem (MIP) survey. However, later research compared the stated electoral pledges of political parties' election manifestos with their specific policy outputs. For the theoretical ground to justify the latter methodological approach, the mandate theory of democracy, which postulates that the elected government is mandated by the voters to put their electoral

program into the force after being elected, is used (Hofferbert & Budge, 1992, p. 152). In pursuing this approach, this thesis aims to focus on the program to policy nexus to test the mandate responsiveness of the Turkish government to the people by comparing electoral pledges in its election manifesto with the legislative outputs as a channel for policy-making.

When the abovementioned details are taken into consideration, it is obvious that empirical investigations to test the normative requirement of democratic representation, which is called responsiveness, have narrowly focused on Western and well-institutionalized cases. Except for a few studies (Bulut, 2014, 2017; Toros, 2015; Yildirim et al., 2020), Turkey's case, in which the rules of the game have been firmly changed to make the political system more autonomous and to centralize power in the hands of the popularly elected president, has never been scrutinized. Although conducted studies throughout the last three decades have provided reliable indicators and accounts to measure the effect of institutional aggrandizement on democratic responsiveness, Turkey has remained under investigated in testing this causality. This thesis, by using a novel data set, seeks to address this gap in the literature through analyzing the program to policy nexus under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP).

The AKP, a successor of the National Outlook tradition (MG), has been ruling the country by its own legislative and executive majority throughout the six legislative tenures from 2002 onwards. Although the initial periods under the rule of the party showed substantial progress in many indices like civil rights and liberties, human-oriented foreign policy activism, economic development and the European Union integration process, after 2015, due to the rise of competitive authoritarianism (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016), the party has gradually lost its momentum in these domains.

By abolishing free-competitive conditions in the electoral scene, creating a highly skewed playing field, the opposition's access to the ruling mechanism has gradually decreased to the ruling party's benefit. Although this blazing political pattern has widely been observed by many scholars (Aslan Akman & Akçalı, 2017; Aslıhan Çelenk, 2016; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; Özbudun, 2015; Taş, 2015), the party's democratic responsiveness has received little scholarly attention. When the gradual centralization of power in the

hands of Turkey's popularly elected president is taken into account, the effect of the institutional setup on the government's responsiveness to mass preferences requires empirical analysis. Utilizing the central tenets of responsiveness literature, this thesis aims to address how concentration of power around the presidency affects the government's incentive to respond to its mandate between elections.

To test abovementioned causality, an original data set has been created through Python programming language. The obtained data set covers government-sponsored bills extracted from the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) web site and five election manifestos. By using the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) common coding scheme, I content coded 2.450 government-sponsored bills and more than fifteen thousand natural sentences from election manifestos across 21 major policy domains. After calculating the percentage rate of policy domains in each data set, Pearson's correlation test was conducted to measure whether given electoral pledges corresponded with subsequent government actions across policy domains from 2002 to the present. Thus, this thesis provides a novel data-driven approach throughout the six legislative tenures under the rule of the AKP to formulate further research questions and identify possible causalities. To this end, the thesis proceeds as follows.

In the first chapter, a general overview of the literature is presented, covering cross-national and cross-institutional cases. Conceptual boundaries between representation and responsiveness, past and previous operationalization of government responsiveness, the mandate theory of democracy and the pledge-fulfillment theory is succinctly overviewed by examining country-based examples. After overviewing detailed perspectives presented in the literature, the few studies which analyze the Turkish case are introduced.

The second chapter pays specific attention to the case, data and method used in the thesis. Factors contributing the concentration of power around presidency is explained through the institutional perspective. To do so, AKP period is divided into two categories as pre-2015 and post-2015 periods and several institutional and constitutional regulations that entailed more concentrated power around the presidency is presented. Main reason lagged behind this preference relates to the changing characteristic of the political system and absence of data-based explanation to analyze this re-arrangement since 2015 . Pursuing

general argument of the literature which posits that there has been an institutional evolution from electoral democracy to the competitive authoritarian regime (Aslan Akman & Akçalı, 2017; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016) ruling periods under the rule of party is separately analyzed.

Finally, the third and fourth chapters discuss the findings of the examined legislative tenures by measuring agenda congruence between proposed electoral pledges and subsequent legislative outputs. To clarify the alterations in the level of correspondence of government ability to respond to its mandate, these six legislative tenures are divided into two parts, the pre-2015 and post-2015 periods. For each term of analysis, two hypotheses are introduced and then tested. Whereas the first seeks to address whether government-sponsored bills correspond with electoral pledges through the correlation test, the second measures the effect of the gradual centralization of power around the presidency on government responsiveness by analyzing several legislative and institutional regulations from 2002 to the present.

CHAPTER 1

LITERATURE REVIEW

Responsiveness as a concept is often confused with the relevant terms such as representation, accountability, congruence, and correspondence. In the mainstream literature, researchers referenced the normative models of the democratic theory to prevent conceptual ambiguity between these terms. Pursuing general tendency in this literature, the first task of this chapter is to draw the boundaries between the responsiveness and the representation in particular. This will allow us to attain conceptual clarity to analyze responsiveness in the Turkish case. Moving from this point, this chapter proceeds as follows.

The first chapter defines what responsiveness is and how responsiveness can be separated from the relevant concept such as representation, congruence, and correspondence to prevent conceptual confusion by implying previous and existing explanations and theoretical frames. In this regard, Robert Dahl's (1961) and Hannah Pitkin's (1967) definitions are commonly quoted to define responsiveness and representation. For this reason, firstly, these traditional definitions are presented within these concepts' meanings in Dahl's and Pitkin's theoretical standpoint. After making theoretical ground for the separation between these terms, the recent explanations of these concepts will be given by referencing new approaches over the two decades.

The mandate theory of the electoral competition is the second theoretical determinant of this study. When responsiveness is rigorously omitted from the representation in an abstract sense, the mandate theory will try to be explained by firstly following the model's owner Antony Downs's (1957) theoretical and empirical approach. Following this, why mandate theory is chosen to set the program to policy linkage instead of using opinion to policy nexus between the government and public agenda will be explained. To carry out this purpose, the electoral theory of democracy, pledge fulfillment approaches, and the program to policy linkage will be discussed in this chapter.

What kind of responsiveness is aimed to be measured in the cases is another contentious topic in the literature. This chapter will investigate how to elaborate on improved models in this line and justify the most appropriate ones to conduct upon the Turkish case. Whether the governments are more responsive to the public when elections are approaching is one of the most significant determinants in the literature. Different empirical models have been developed to analyze this causality, like the time-lag series, which assumes that public opinion should be measured before public policy. Additionally, scholars improved the different subsets of the responsiveness to analyze whether government substantially or descriptively responds to the public policy expectations in a specific historical period. In this categorization, the most studied ones can be ranked as rhetorical responsiveness, symbolic responsiveness, and substantial responsiveness. Different equations in this respect have been formulized to measure symbolic congruence through public opinion and the executive speeches; substantial congruence through the government program, and policy outputs or budgetary behavior.

Similarly, to measure changing effects of some institutional arrangements on the responsiveness, scholars paid colossal attention to the electoral systems, institutional settings, government system typologies, and the balance between executive and legislative branches of the governmental structure. In this study, the last one is firmly scrutinized and emphasized as a primary determinant of the decreasing level of government responsiveness of the AKP between 2002, when the party the first time came to power, and 2022 when the analysis ended. Looking at the constitutional amendments which were overwhelmingly implied for expanding executive office law-making and implying abilities against the legislative office and therefore diminished the balance between these organs, the study will aim to investigate how getting centralization of state power in executive office decreases the level of government responsiveness in Turkish case following this chapter. This chapter, for this reason, will provide the conducted causalities regarding the institutional arrangements' effect on the responsiveness in the literature.

When the abovementioned practical and theoretical detections are considered, this chapter also will investigate different models of responsiveness through opinion-policy or program to policy nexuses. The institutional settings' effects on the responsiveness are

also required to analyze for the Turkish case in which the incumbent AKP has firmly changed the rules of the game. In this respect, findings of the existing researches for this causality will be presented in this chapter. But, first things first, what responsiveness is and is not should be explained as a firstly prioritized matter in the following section.

1.1. UNDERSTANDING OF CONCEPTUAL BOUNDARIES

There is a significant disagreement about what responsiveness is and is not in the literature. Scholars and experts have commonly confused the concept of responsiveness with the neighbor concepts such as representation, accountability, congruence, and correspondence. The most common way nearly every study defines exactly the concept moved from the traditional definitions of responsiveness in Robert Dahl's (1961) and Hannah Pitkin (1967) terminology. Similarly, to measure the conceptual distance between the responsiveness and its closest neighbor representation, Hannah Pitkin's methodology has also been used by scholars. However, neither for the first case nor the second, it is vital to distinguish the responsiveness from the related concepts such as congruence, correspondence, representation, and accountability.

The first crucial point to distinguish the concept of responsiveness and its neighbors requires a well-understanding of the sides of the causality. In responsiveness relation, the sides are elected officials who may include either government or political parties and the people who contain citizens or voters. Although one can quickly put forward that these sides are also the same for representation, congruence, and correspondence relations, it is obvious to remind that responsiveness involves both of them. Although the relationship is constituted through the representatives and the represented in each conceptualization, it is vital to scrutinize two essential elements; the sides of the relationship and its direction.

One of the most appropriate ways to prevent the conceptual uncertainty for the boundaries between the responsiveness and its close neighbors is more likely to look at the macro and micro extent of these concepts. In terms of comprehensiveness, the representation is probably at the upper macro level rather than the related concepts such as responsiveness, congruence, correspondence, and accountability. In order to objectify what

comprehensiveness means, we need to look at the traditional schematization of these concepts in Pitkin's (1967) and Dahl's (1961) theories. In this manner, it is noteworthy to argue that each of the following concepts is any stage of the representation relationship.

The principal-agent relation has already been emphasized as the fundamental axis of democratic representation by Pitkin (1967). In this manner, the voter's behavior to vote for politicians, then the politician's policy-making behavior to fulfill the electoral mandate, and finally, the voters' re-thinking of the whether h/she vote again the same politician by considering its mandate responsiveness during its legislative period symbolizes each stage of the representation relationship between the voter and the politician. In this respect and according to the mandate theory of the electoral democracy (Manin et al., 2012), voters either vote for the same politician again only if the politician fulfills the electoral mandate, which refers to the policy proposal of the politician in the manifesto, or will not vote him/her if a politician ignores electoral pledges that given by politician himself/herself during the electoral campaign. To understand each of these stages and their boundaries, the following figure will help us.




Figure 1. Stages of the Representation

As seen in Figure 1, the macro extent between the voter and the politician is aroused in the electoral process. When the voter elects a politician, the first and vital linkage emerges

as a representation. After this linkage is constituted via free election, the politician must fulfill his/her electoral pledges that were given by him/her during the electoral contestation. Similarly, another pole of the second stage is for voters to monitor what politicians proposed and to which extent these offerings were fulfilled. Thus, responsiveness is born between the voter and politician in the second stage. By depending on the second stage, in the third stage, there should be a substantive level of congruence between the electoral pledges and the policy outcome of the government, which is argued in mandate theory (Artés & Bustos, 2008; Bevan & Jennings, 2014; Manin et al., 2012; Stokes, 1999) or public opinion and public policy literature (Franklin & Wlezien, 1997; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; Soroka & Wlezien, 2005). If congruence or correspondence is well-provided, voters re-elect the same politician. Otherwise, the politician is more likely punished by the voter itself due to accountability of relation like in the fourth stage. Thus representation chain is completed. Moving from this proportionality, related theoretical frames are presented with their previous and existing reflections over the last decades for further conceptual clarity between these concepts.

1.2. REPRESENTATION AND RESPONSIVENESS

As one would expect, it is so necessary to distinguish the concept of responsiveness from the concept of representation. Although it is assumed that these are the essential components of normative democratic governance, in the emerging literature, studies have employed different methods to examine whether these concepts are fulfilled in democratic countries. The scholars' divergent paths about the essential meanings of these similar concepts and which method should be preferred to find them display the reasons for why we should make a distinction between these concepts.

As Pitkin (1967) argued earlier, the notion of representation is that “representatives are authorized in advance to act conjointly on behalf of their constituents” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 43). From this point of view, it has been claimed that representing can be modeled as a principal-agent relationship between elected representatives and elected ones (Pitkin, 2004). The gift point in this definition with the lens of the Pitkin relates to the democratic

requirements of the representation. This also provides conceptual synthesis through representation and responsiveness. Pitkin, in this line, argued that political representation could be defined as “acting interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 44). At this point, the conceptual boundary for both the representation and responsiveness needs to be clarified.

When we look at the mainstream literature, it needs to be emphasized that the primary division about the meanings of these concepts among the scholars relates to the type of responsiveness and representation. For the former conceptual discussion, the general outline of the debates is whether dynamic or linear congruence should be between the elected representatives and the people. For some, in this regard, the existence of the reciprocal congruence between the elected’s policy behaviors and the public policy preferences is sufficient to talk about responsive government (Franklin & Wlezien, 1997; Page, 1994; Page & Shapiro, 1983; Soroka & Wlezien, 2004, 2005). However, according to others, the reciprocal change between the constituencies’ policy preferences and the elected officials’ policy-making procedures should not be accepted as a reflection of responsive government since the policy agenda of government needs to be driven by the public agenda (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Morales, 2014). Nevertheless, in any case, there would be some level of congruence between these variables. But, it is so significant to find which of these variables shapes the other. In this formula, it should be underlined that a responsive government requires the existence of elected officials’ constant responsiveness to the public policy demands. However, this necessity had already been stressed by the classical thinkers of normative democracy.

1.2.1. Classical Approaches

As noted before, the key characteristic of democratic theory is continuing responsiveness of the government to the people’s policy demands (R. Dahl, 1961, 1971). Pitkin (1967) also stressed the same principal obligation on a different path. The categorization of representation as a conceptual variation in Pitkin’s ground-breaking study should be considered. When considering the different kinds of representation, this complexity is more understandable. Pitkin’s (2004) perspective on the belonging of the representation

to the modern era curbs this logical sophistication. In her approach, representation must be admitted as belonging to the modern period when democratic institutions and actors are determined by the general will (Pitkin, 2004). Accordingly, considering the King's sending the delegates to the feudal lords to compromise about the amount of the additional revenue on the taxes in the pre-modern period, why the modern period should be preferred to position the representation relation becomes more understandable (Pitkin, 2004, p. 337).

There must be causality between the elected officials and the electorates for the substantive compromise between these actors. In this compromising procedure, the kind of representation seems determined vertically by the central hierarchy of the kingdom, and this concentrates on why representation needs to be considered since the modern period. In the modern period, it is only provided when elected representatives respond to the electorates' policy desires, not vice versa. Therefore, both responsiveness and representation are required of the elected officials depending on the electoral mandate and public opinion. Therefore, neither a substantive representation nor democratic responsiveness needs to be considered with the emergence of the modern period. When overall theoretical assumptions are considered, it needs to be suggested that the first debatable lens on the nexus between representation and responsiveness can be grasped through the fact that these two concepts belong to the modern democratic period.

Here, it is vital to turn back to the classical comment of the normative democratic theory by analyzing Pitkin's view. She rigorously distinguishes the classical Greek form of democracy and modern democracy by functionalizing their anatomies. In this manner, accordingly, the Greek form of democracy as pure cannot be imagined through the existing appearance of the modern representative version since each citizen could participate in the Polis's issues. By quoting from James Madison's rationalist approach to the matter, she argued that democratic governance -in the modern period- only allows the limited views of the electorates since it needs to be filtered and enlarged by the chosen elites (Pitkin, 2004, p. 339). Like the delegate version of this approach (Guillermo, 1994), she emphasized partial answering to the people's demands instead of exact translating their proposals into the political arena. The emerging trajectories of both party and

government responsiveness across Europe become more understandable if one considers the different types of responsiveness in the literature.

Another crucial point that needs to be clarified on the nexus between the representation and responsiveness is about the causality among these normative requirements. Powell (2004a), at this point, tried to shed light on the causal mechanism between citizens' demands and government policy behavior. By mapping a 'theoretical chain' whose linkages are causally connected, he emphasized that democratic responsiveness should be evaluated due to the well-connected representation between elected ones and the citizens (Powell, 2004, p. 93). As suggested, in this chain, people's policy preferences are translated into the policy outcome by fulfilling some of the pre-conditions of democratic representation. Firstly, electorates select the best option of the political alternatives as a governing party in the elections; then, elected officials build a policy-making structure, and finally, they aim to behave coincidentally to fulfill their constituencies' policy desires by producing public policy since they are office-seekers for the further elections. As it seems through this chain, it needs to be suggested that governing parties or actors' responsiveness cycle to the citizens' demands entirely depends on the existence of democratic representation linkage between the representatives and represented. In this line, responsiveness can be seen as a result of the representation. However, it also needs to be stressed that what kind of responsiveness is provided as a result of democratic representation not solely depends on the existence of primary conditions of the democracy but also relies on the institutional arrangements. For this reason, the existing explanations about both the responsiveness and representation are presented below.

1.2.2. Existing Explanations

Over the last decade, several studies were carried out beyond Europe and other well-institutionalized countries to measure what kind of responsiveness emerged by depending on some institutional features. In some cases, for instance, with the entering of the niche political parties into the parliament, citizen-based responsiveness has been replaced by the constituency-based one (Ezrow et al., 2011). Similar differences are also observed in some cases by looking at the components of the governing coalitions about whether

minority or majority governing coalition shape the kind of responsiveness in the democratic governance (Toshkov et al., 2020).

Responsiveness to which policy domain is another debatable issue in the forthcoming responsiveness literature. Accordingly, this divides the issues into two categories: most salient and non-salient, by scrutinizing the overall effects of the emerging policy or public opinion on the policy-making process (Rasmussen et al., 2019; Toshkov et al., 2020; Wlezien & Soroka, 2012). Therefore, examining the existence of responsiveness and the degree cannot be differentiated from the kind of representation and the size of the electorates' aggregated reactions.

In some studies, on the other hand, the conceptual ambiguity between the representation and responsiveness has been curbed by integrating these into each other. In this respect, Bevan and Jennings (2013) have preferred the 'dynamic agenda representation' instead of using responsiveness as a central empirical theme to measure the normative necessity of democratic theory. According to their definition, the transmission of the public policy preferences into the government policy-making procedures can be described as a form of responsiveness (Bevan & Jennings, 2014, p. 4). Like Wlezien and Soroka's (2012) measurement method (Soroka & Wlezien, 2005; Wlezien & Soroka, 2012), they focused on the causality between the changing behaviors in government agenda and public's issue priorities by expecting the changes in the issue priorities of the public are correlated with changes in the government policy actions simultaneously (Bevan & Jennings, 2014).

Addressing whether there is a correspondence between the Congress agenda-setting and the American public agenda, Jones and Baumgartner (2004) also depicted this causality as an outcome of the representational process (Jones & Baumgartner, 2004). The calling of responsiveness as a form of representation –in a broad sense- is also chosen by Wlezien (2004) to identify their boundaries. In his definition, representation can occur twofold. In the first form, which refers to the indirect form of representation, representatives are elected by the represented in the elections. As an essential function of the first pattern, the second form can only occur when elected representatives respond to the represented policy preferences by translating these into their agenda (Soroka & Wlezien, 2004, p. 2).

For this reason, there is a considerable literature in which responsiveness is accepted as either an outcome or the form of the representation.

In a nutshell, it is observed that conceptual complexity and methodological differences between the responsiveness and representation have created a research venue. Even though there are many different sorts of both responsiveness and representation, it needs to be put forward that there is a semantic association between these notions. When considering broad definitions of these concepts, it should be argued that responsiveness and representation are vital components of normative democratic governance. For this reason, claiming that the former needs to be accepted as an outcome of the latter or vice versa would not change their vitality for the democratic theory. By departing from this normative point, in the following section, the government's fulfilment of responsiveness to the people – in a democratic representative manner- is figured out by reviewing the literature.

1.3. GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS

Previous sections of this thesis aimed to address what responsiveness is and is not. Separation of the boundaries of the responsiveness from those of its closest neighbors was also theoretically made by relying on the past and existing conceptualizations. This section aims to operationalize government responsiveness and solve several questions. For this purpose, the following questions are aimed to be addressed by overviewing the responsiveness literature. What makes the differences between existing and present use of the government responsiveness in the political science literature? How can government responsiveness be operationalized? To which extent do the institutional features determine the level of government responsiveness? Which the academics have preferred data venues and methods, and finally, why do different institutional settings directly change the responsiveness alignment between citizens and elected officials?

As Powell (2004) said, government responsiveness occurs when democratically elected politicians are induced to imply policies that the citizens want (Powell, 2004, p. 91). Indeed, for this chain, it is required to establish the principal values of democracy like universal suffrage, free and fair competitive elections, multiple political parties, and civil

and political rights. Additionally, a more responsive government to the people does not necessarily mean a more democratic government because other vital elements of the democracy like vertical and horizontal accountability, the rule of law, economic welfare, and social equality collectively foster democracy. In this thesis, however, the only first significant requirement of democracy is to be operationalized to address how a well-structured responsiveness chain affects a country's democratization process. For this purpose, conceptualization and operationalization of the responsiveness are central theoretical references.

1.3.1. Past Use of Government Responsiveness

Although government responsiveness studies have been traced back to the 1980s by some scholars (Morales, 2014), it should be noted here that agenda congruence between citizens and elected officials has recently received academic attention. While scrutinizing the first operationalization of the responsiveness mechanism in the literature, Page and Shapiro (1983) were referenced as the most comprehended study for the opinion-policy nexus (Page & Shapiro, 1983). Over the two decades, more reliable estimations and voluminous datasets have been employed by scholars (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; Soroka & Wlezien, 2004, 2005).

Coding salient issues among the public opinion into policy domains and comparing the relative weight of each salient issue with the policy outcomes, the authors focused on the narrow model of the responsiveness theory. Previous use of government responsiveness as a theoretical base were legitimized through Dahl's (1971) polyarchy. The central mandate of the elected officials was accepted as constant responsiveness of the elected officials to the people's preferences. Moving from this point, American political system was determined as a peculiar case to investigate the responsiveness mechanism of the congressional behaviors of the representatives. Congressman's linear response to the constituent policy preferences and reciprocal relations between principal and agent (Pitkin, 1972) have been established as the main variables of the statistical equations (Brooks, 1987, 1990; Miller & Stokes, 1963; Monroe, 1998; Page, 1994; Page & Shapiro, 1983).

One of the remarkable findings of the related theory implies that foreign policy outcomes are most salient in the governmental agenda-setting, where as this occupied a short-size position in the public mind (Monroe, 1998; Page & Shapiro, 1983). Nevertheless, most of these researches concluded that policy congruence between individual legislators and core constituencies is remarkable (Monroe, 1998; Page, 1994). To operationalize what constituents want and what individual legislators do, survey-based measurements and total hearings of the congressman have been selected. The detection of the salient issues in the public mind was commonly correlated with those reflections in the policy venues in Congress. This, in particular, is legitimized through the fact that more congruent policy responsiveness does only occur for the high salient issues (Erikson et al., 2012; Monroe, 1998; Stimson et al., 1995). On the other hand, the limitations of the developed equations were justified through the two critical institutional features of the American political system. Thereby, first, the legislator's vote on the bills may not necessarily reflect what most people wish on this given issue. Second, principal-agent relation cannot easily be captured because of the gift anatomy of the US political system, which has been characterized as partisan control of the government, bicameral legislature, presidential vetoes, and strong congressional committees (Monroe, 1998, p. 7).

In the previous explanations, the congruence and consistency between public opinion and policy are grounded to measure whether the government is responsive to mass preferences. Hereof, if the direction of the opinion and policy change in the same way for a given issue, policy congruent- and hence responsiveness- can be argued. Studies in which such a method was conducted put forward that a high level of consistency was proved, with 90 percent in Page and Shapiro's study (1983) and 68 percent in Monroe's (1979) for the American case (Monroe, 1998; Page et al., 1984; Page & Shapiro, 1983). Different determinants and policy channels have been involved in the responsiveness equations for varied theoretical models. For the first time, by developing the thermostatic model of the responsiveness, methodological and operationalization use are changed in the equations. Wlezien (1995) hypothesized that the public behaves like a *thermostat* when tangible policy outcomes are not equal to the preferred level of those in the public mind by sending the signal to the government (Wlezien, 1995). Applying time-series regression analysis to the spending data of the government and spending

preferences of the people on the defense, he concluded that the thermostatic model works quite well because when more signals come to policymakers to either decrease or increase spending level on defense, policymakers react to changes in policy (Wlezien, 1995, p. 998). Although measurement way of the public policy preferences was problematized by himself later (Soroka & Wlezien, 2005), it should be noted here that the classical assumption for principal-agent relation is entrenched with the more reliable outcomes of the thermostatic model of responsiveness.

1.3.2. Current Use of the Government Responsiveness

When comparing the recent methodological implications of the concept with those conducted in the 1980s and 1990s, several remarkable alterations come to the fore. First, the ideological congruence between constituencies and representatives has replaced the public's and government's agenda congruence. Second, the congruence level is no longer studied solely through the ideological standpoints of both represented and representatives. Instead, more substantial policy channels like legislative and statutory decrees, oral/written questions, and policy spending behaviors have started be scrutinized the government's agenda-setting (Bulut, 2014, 2017; Bulut & Yildirim, 2020; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005). Additionally, the responsiveness variable has not only been limited to the incumbent or governmental officials but has also expanded through the opposition, niche, and mainstream parties level (Klüver & Spoon, 2014; Spoon & Klüver, 2014; Toshkov et al., 2020). From these fragmentations, government responsiveness should be overviewed from the several headings like symbolic/substantial responsiveness, party/government responsiveness, and binomial/multinomial responsiveness.

In each case, a considerable degree of association between citizens' policy preferences and government subsequent policy actions has been admitted depending on the connectivity between opinion and policy. Thus a remarkable size of the preceded studies had focused on the opinion-policy nexus by assuming there should be an association between public and governmental officials through the policy positions of the constituents and political activities of the congressman (Golder & Lloyd, 2014; Jones & Baumgartner, 2004; Monroe, 1998; Page, 1994; Page & Shapiro, 1983; Powell, 2004). Recent studies

expanded previous use of government responsiveness and considered more substantive policy venues for the nexus between citizens and elected officials. In terms of observed policy channels, congressional hearings have been enhanced to the oral/written questions, beginning speeches, executive/legislative decrees, spending preferences, and so forth (Bulut & Yildirim, 2020; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008). Additionally, new indicators and determinants that encompass the position of the political institutions, vertical/horizontal accountability, and sort of the electoral system received scholarly attention to measure their effects on the political outcomes stemmed from the opinion-policy nexus (Golder & Stramski, 2010; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; Rasmussen et al., 2019; Soroka & Wlezien, 2004). Finally, as an alternative account for the nexus between citizen and government, program to policy linkage has started to be examined either through the narrow constituent's preferences and niche parties' reactions (Ezrow et al., 2011; Klüver & Spoon, 2014) or pledge fulfilment ability of the government on a given or whole electoral promises between elections (Matthieß, 2020; McMillan, 2020; Moury & Fernandes, 2018; Naurin, 2014; Özerdem & Whiting, 2019; Vodová, 2020).

1.3.3. Operationalization of the Government Responsiveness

Robert Dahl firstly explained the normative demand for democratic governance by portraying the polyarchy as an appropriate term for a modern approximation of democracy (Dahl, 1971). Robert Dahl, in essence, sought to find more operational theoretical concepts that can be tested in the real world. Responsiveness is one of these concepts. In his ground-breaking study he defines responsiveness as a crucial characteristic of democracy, encouraging elected officials to respond to public policy desires.

Pursuing Dahl, many scholars from American academic tradition started to investigate how the primary themes of democratic governance or polyarchy can be operationalized in the existing political system. Dividing each stage of the governmental responsiveness into four categories as citizens' preferences, citizens' voting behavior, selecting policymakers, and public policies, Powell (2004a) schematized how causality between

citizen preferences and government policy actions works between elections (Powell, 2004, p. 92). This determined the operationalization of the government responsiveness mechanism for further studies. By relying on institutional aggregation, a couple of scholars developed some models by which the effect of the institutional arrangements on the government responsiveness is measured. As an illustrative example of this series, the effect of the electoral system on the responsiveness mechanism was studied through proportional Denmark and majoritarian Britain by the Hobolt and Klemmensen (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005).

Designed theoretical assumptions paid colossal attention to the sort of the electoral system by measuring their effect on the government incentives to the policy responsiveness. According to the general argument, a proportional electoral system creates a more responsive government because single district voting increases the number of the representation. However, this is not the only case. The main reason for a high level of responsiveness in the proportional electoral systems was explained through a high level of electoral contestability between politicians, which forced them to be more responsive to the people (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005, p. 380). Contrary to the proportional electoral system, the majoritarian system created a less responsive government because ‘first-past-the-post’ decreased electoral contestability among candidates and disappeared the electoral sanctions for unresponsive policy practice (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005, p. 384). All of the assumptions and tested hypotheses in this study operationalize the chain of the responsiveness whether elections are a good proxy in creating a more or less responsive government (Powell, 2004).

Just as the thermostatic model of responsiveness, a different category was established by Hobolt and Klemmensen (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008). They separately categorized the government responsiveness concerning policy channels. Accordingly, the responsiveness in the symbolic policy venues like executive speeches and party programs methodologically creates different results from those analyses for some institutional venues like budgetary behaviors. For the former equation, rhetorical responsiveness, and for the latter, effective responsiveness can be employed (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008: 310). Quantitatively content-coding prime ministers’ and presidents’ speeches into prioritized policy domains based on the survey data they measured the rhetorical

responsiveness (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008, p. 311). Effective responsiveness is, on the other hand, was measured by comparing budgetary preferences of the governments of Denmark (proportional), the United Kingdom (majoritarian), and the US (presidential) with the survey data. The study also took the role of the constraints on the executive into consideration by arguing that more constraints on the executive discretion create a more responsive government (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008, p. 311). Thus, the role and effects of the government system on the responsiveness mechanism started to be considered in the literature. Several studies for this purpose accounted for the government systems on the responsiveness by arguing that more insulated decision-making creates a more or less responsive government (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; McMillan, 2020).

As mentioned earlier, recent approaches in the government responsiveness studies developed different equations, incorporated various determinants into the models, and considered several institutional settings through many cases. In addition to these variations, recent studies developed a standardized policy scheme in which vital policy domains for the citizens and government range from macroeconomics to culture. For the first time, this method was carried out by Jones and Baumgartner (1993) to measure prioritized issue domains in the government agenda for the US. Describing Policy Agendas Project (PAP), the authors established a novel data set, including newspaper front pages and executive speeches covering the post-1946 period (F. Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). Designing a standard coding scheme first allowed Baumgartner and Jones to evaluate dramatic policy changes across years and other studies to extend recent finding through comparative cases. With these scholarly efforts, the CAP, which include 21 major policy domain and more than 200 minor policy fields, has been created for comparative analyses. Today, many scholars have established more than 26 country-based datasets to expand data-driven policy analysis in the political science literature (Comparative Agendas Project)¹.

One of the analyzed cases through the CAP coding scheme was carried out in Turkey. Using the CAP coding scheme, the responsiveness ability of the government was

¹ For further information and deep insight into the country-based analyses, please follow the relevant link: <https://www.comparativeagendas.net/>

operationalized through the clientelistic and patronage linkage between citizens and government in the Turkish case (Bulut & Yildirim, 2020). Theory pushed a new agenda to the government responsiveness studies by asking how electoral bargaining between the dominant party and the voters changes the government policy's attention towards citizens. Incorporating the inherent features of the Turkish party system, which include party fragmentation, political polarization, and clientelistic linkage into the equation (Sayari, 2011; Sayari, 2014), the authors examined the role of the electoral institutions on the issue prioritization of the government. It is found that the commercialization of the vote between the patron and the client, which concurrently equals the voter and electoral candidate, firmly changes the direction of the responsiveness of the government. Research results in this respect confirmed this hypothesis by showing a decreasing level of responsiveness between public policy priorities and three policy channels (laws, bills, questions) covering the period between 2002-2013 (Bulut & Yildirim, 2020, p. 60).

The following section examines the opinion-policy nexus, one of the standard methods to capture issue attention and government responsiveness. Moving from the normative demand of the democracy mentioned above, congruence between public opinion and government policy actions is scrutinized through the conducted cases. In addition to US-based accounts, European and non-European cases are also presented in the section below.

1.4. OPINION TO POLICY NEXUS

The growing size of literature investigated the agenda congruence between opinion and policy. Ranging from macro domains to micro fields, researchers measured the correspondence level of agenda-setting with the public policy expectations. Employing different metaphors like the 'thermostatic model' (Wlezien, 1995; Wlezien & Soroka, 2012), reciprocal changes in the subsequent policy actions through the spending preferences dataset and government responsiveness have been measured. In each case, it has been widely pronounced that the reasonable level of association between opinion to policy nexus is vital for democratic governance. Existing explanations about this linkage

are given throughout this section by overviewing theoretical and methodological approaches.

Since the 1960s, empirical investigations towards the linkage between public opinion and public policy have created an enormous size of literature. The most comprehensive studies on the opinion-policy nexus emerged in the US when empirical political theory has risen among academic circles. For the first time, several studies developed a different paradigm to test whether the political behaviors of Congressman corresponded with their constitutional districts in the US (Miller & Stokes, 1963; Page & Shapiro, 1983). Although a considerable amount of these studies contextualized the US Congress as a case through correspondence rate between the roll call voting of representatives and constituencies' policy preferences, forthcoming approaches either pursued the same methodological path (Mansbridge et al., 2016) or suggested the research deficiencies of these methods (Achen, 1977; Burstein, 2003). However, in either case, it is observed that the aggregate level of individual or collective surveys was commonly preferred to measure public or narrow constituency's policy agenda.

In a basic sense, opinion to policy nexus measures the agenda congruence between the government's policy outcomes and public policy preferences. As repeatedly mentioned, this literature's first and foremost task is to determine whether consistency exists between the representatives' agendas and their constituencies' political preferences (Page, 1994). This, in essence, has been described as a scientific effort to operationalize the normative demand of the democratic theory since the 1960s. Considering the tangible policy outcomes of the government during their fixed term and comparing these with the people's policy expectations, empirical investigations have been carried out by several researchers (Mansbridge et al., 2016; Miller & Stokes, 1963; Page et al., 1984). Different research venues have been scrutinized to test whether agenda congruence between public opinion and public policy is the norm across different system designs, which include legislative outputs, budgetary behavior (Wlezien & Soroka, 2012), executive decrees, oral/written questions (Bulut, 2014, 2017) and congressional hearings (Page et al., 2012). Conducted studies in this line predominantly reached a considerable agenda congruence between these variables (Brooks, 1987, 1990, 2014) but by relying on the effect of institutional set-up.

The impact of public opinion on the government's subsequent policy actions is one of the central tenets in the opinion-policy literature. Elected governments' incentives to respond to highly salient issues or general public opinion have been a fundamental research point by stressing the importance of the substantive level of congruence between government and people policy agenda. For approximately 20 years, researchers from different academic standpoints have aimed to measure this nexus. Whereas some reached a substantive level of consistency between government agenda-setting and people's policy preferences (Page & Shapiro, 1983), others have detected a moderate level of consistency between these variables (Burstein, 2003). From this complicated point, it is necessary to say that studies to shed light on the opinion-policy nexus vary in terms of methodological preferences, examining cases, and theoretical models. For this reason, throughout this section, different theoretical models, empirical analyses, and cases on the opinion-policy nexus are overviewed.

1.4.1. Indicators and Methods for The Nexus

In their seminal work, Page and Shapiro (1983) scrutinized the opinion-policy nexus in the US to find the consistency between government agenda and people's policy preferences. Research results confirmed that there had been a most excellent level of consistency between public policy preferences and government subsequent policy actions between 1935 and 1979 in the US (Page & Shapiro, 1983). Conducted empirical models that developed to test whether agenda congruence is more pronounced between the congressional roll call votes and constituency's policy preferences have also turned their academic attention to the US through micro or macro level analyses (Monroe, 1998). It should be noted here that practical efforts to test whether the elected governments fulfill the normative principle of the democratic theory have overwhelmingly been studied in the US and other well-institutionalized countries across Europe. As Brooks (2014) and Burstein (2003) mentioned, almost all research on the opinion on policy nexus has concentrated solely on the US (Brooks, 2014; Burstein, 2003). From this point of view, we can deduce that as a methodological way of the government responsiveness, the nexus between opinion and policy had stemmed from the data-driven perspective of the US academic tradition.

Another common tendency in the mainstream literature in which opinion-policy nexus is examined is the issue of saliency. It has been widely stressed that the saliency of an issue brings representatives policy positions as aligned with the those have by the people during the electoral contestation (Burstein, 2003, p. 29). As a vital component of the democratic responsiveness of the government, the degree of the saliency of an issue determines the more or less responsive government. If the saliency of an issue increases in a specific period, it is expected that government incentives to respond to this salient issue should increase. In contrast, however, decreasing the level of public policy attention should diminish the government agenda behavior towards the same issue. Overall, research conclusions have already confirmed this assumed hypothesis by implying micro (Miller & Stokes, 1963) and macro (Brooks, 1987, 1990) level analyses.

It is widely stressed that except in some cases, governments from different countries have commonly prioritized the exact policy domains, including economy, foreign policy, civil rights, and law and crime-based matters in their policy agenda. Related literature and reached results in this thesis also confirmed this general tendency. In the foreign policy domain, this traditional tendency has been more visible. Accordingly, the government's foreign policy agenda is more autonomous and substantively clarified from the public pressure (Burstein, 2003, p. 31). Weakly informed citizens in this respect were admitted that rarely intervene in the route of the country's foreign policy.

On the other hand, economy-based matters have widely been captured as the most salient issue in government and public agendas. The most robust answer to why the public saw the economy as the most problematic policy domain stems from several methodological points. For this concern, several authors (Jennings & Wlezien, 2011; Soroka & Wlezien, 2005) mentioned the methodological deficiencies of the survey-based measures in which people were asked about the most important problem facing their country. It is emphasized that respondents overwhelmingly perceived such surveys as a measurement of the aggregate level of economic concerns that the public does not satisfy for the government macroeconomic agenda-setting. For this reason, many studies in which public policy preferences are measured through such the most important problem surveys concluded that economy-based matters are the most salient issue in public opinion (Page, 1994; Page & Shapiro, 1983; Soroka & Wlezien, 2005). Furthermore, this entails

methodological risks by ignoring other elements of the unsatisfied policy domains in the public agenda. Thanks to the preferred method in this thesis, this research deficiency is aimed to be solved by examining the pledge-policy nexus.

In terms of the methodological approaches, mainstream literature in which opinion to policy linkage is measured commonly uses survey-based methods (Page, Benjamin; Shapiro, 1983; Soroka & Wlezien, 2005). Consistency levels between the public policy preferences and the politicians' own agenda have been addressed by comparing the aggregate level of the public opinion surveys with the several policy-making instruments on a given policy domain. It is legitimized that a public opinion survey is a vital element to enlighten which policy domains are desired or prioritized by the people in a specific historical period. For this reason, a couple of scholars employed the MIP questions survey to learn the prioritization level of policy domains in the public mind (F. R. Baumgartner & Jones, 2001; Bevan & Jennings, 2014; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Jennings et al., 2011; Jones & Baumgartner, 2004). Through nationwide surveys conducted annually, people were asked about the most important problem facing their country to obtain the aggregate level of prioritized policy domains. Results obtained from the MIP surveys either compared with the government's political attention on the same issues (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; Soroka & Wlezien, 2004, 2005; Wlezien & Soroka, 2012) or causally matched with the government subsequent policy actions (Brooks, 1987, 1990; Monroe, 1998; Page, 1994; Page & Shapiro, 1983). According to general findings, politicians have relatively responded to the public policy agenda (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005, p. 381).

1.4.2. Measuring Public Opinion

One of the essential components of the responsiveness equation is the public opinion variable. To find any congruence between public policy and public opinion, scholars widely preferred the public opinion surveys. Although the survey-based measurement is almost the same for the opinion-policy nexus, the research-poll companies ask people their policy agenda has varied across cases. By periodically asking the American people about the most important problem facing their country, George Gallup's organization

enables researchers to assess American Public Agenda (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; Jones & Baumgartner, 2004). Similarly, Eurobarometer surveys have been employed to detect issue saliency among the public opinion (Ezrow et al., 2011; Franklin & Wlezien, 1997). On the other hand, the method is so straightforward by assigning each respondent's answer to the related policy category in a coding scheme. For the coding scheme, PAP (Jones & Baumgartner, 2004) and Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) (Bevan & Jennings, 2014; Bulut, 2017; Yildirim et al., 2020) have commonly preferred in the opinion-policy literature. Nevertheless, the scholars have employed different models and equations in terms of the research methods, conclusions, and estimations.

Although methods used to find public policy agendas have commonly been carried through the MIP surveys, the kind of the surveys and their analyzing method can be distinguished categorically (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005, p. 380). Mainstream literature in this line is divided into two categories as individual level and collective level surveys to measure public policy preferences. While some scholars compared the individual representatives' votes with the preferences of the constituencies by scrutinizing the several issue domains (Miller & Stokes, 1963; Page & Shapiro, 1983), other scholars used the macro level of analysis to obtain an aggregate level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction about any policy domain through the nation-wide public opinion surveys (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; Soroka & Wlezien, 2005).

Similar to this division, another categorization measures the static or dynamic relationship between public opinion and public policy in a specific legislative tenure (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005, p. 379). While the former category assumes the static linkage between public policy preferences and government policy outputs, the latter tends to apply reciprocal changes between government policy attitude and public opinion. For the second approach, Wlezien's (1995) study should be considered as pioneered perspective in which public preferences for the government spending on the defense issue is matched with the government spending preferences on the same issue domain in its budgetary behavior thermostatically (Wlezien, 1995). Instead of the using the linear and static relationship between public and government policy agenda, Wlezien preferred the reciprocal changes between these variables as to whether upward (downward) in the level of the government spending affects downward (upward) in the spending preferences of

the people (Wlezien, 1995, p. 983). Similar hypothesis is also chosen for the European cases (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008). Research results considerably confirmed the reciprocal changes between public policy preferences and government policy outputs in the US (Soroka & Wlezien, 2005) and Europe (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005).

Several studies stressed the importance of the outside factors' effects on the linkage between opinion and policy. By considering different institutional settings and cross-national comparisons, Hobolt and Klemmensen (2005) tested the effect of the electoral system and legislative decision-making (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005, pp. 382-384). For each institutional variable, the authors concluded that proportional democratic systems in which power concentration is disturbed relatively balanced and re-election concerns of the elected representatives are norms that entail more responsive government than those in the majoritarian electoral system (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005, p. 396). In addition to these institutional factors, horizontal accountability, executive-legislative relations, and legislatures' effect on the executive office emerged as some of the independent variables that affect the government's responsiveness to the mass preferences (Rasmussen et al., 2019; Toshkov et al., 2020).

1.4.3. Measuring Public Policy

The second task of the opinion-policy nexus literature is exploring the government policy agenda. Scholars selected different policy venues to compare each policy domain's aggregate level of attention in the public opinion survey with the government's subsequent policy actions. While some scholars tended to scrutinize the rhetorical responsiveness of the government to the mass preferences by content-coding executive speeches (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008, p. 310), others measured the substantive responsiveness by matching public spending preferences on defense issues with those of the government budgetary spending levels (Soroka & Wlezien, 2005).

Just like coding each response to the policy coding scheme for the MIP surveys, to detect prioritized policy domains across years, scholars content coded the governmental documents, including laws, decrees, spending datasets, and so forth, by using a coding

scheme. By exploring the government policy agenda, researchers coded several institutional venues and various documents that pointedly reflect the government's political intention. Thanks to the aggregated level of analysis, they reached essential results.

Accordingly, if executive frictions are more in the policy-making process, the government's ability to respond to the people tends to increase (Jones & Baumgartner, 2004, p. 52). Another crucial finding has confirmed that proportional democracies create more responsive governments since re-election concerns for the nearest election are more pronounced in these systems, and therefore politicians need to behave coincidentally with the median voters to be reelected (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005, p. 396). This, in essence, stems from the technical features of the proportional electoral system, which tends to produce either coalition or minority governments. During the governmental period, the stakeholders of the cabinet tend to be aligned with the people's policy preferences because coalitional bargaining for the executive cabinet encourages the elected officials to be more aligned with the voter preferences (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005, p. 397). Controversially, in majoritarian democracies called as Westminster model, elected officials rarely respond to the electorate's policy expectations because 'first-past-the-post' enables them to control the whole governmental system and alienate their voters. This system is emphasized, which potentially leads to ignoring the people's policy agenda by the elected officials.

Overall, research for the opinion-policy nexus accounted for the effects of the institutional features in the existing political system. This modeling stemmed from the deficiencies of the classical equations, which only measure the primary causality between public opinion and public policy (Burstein, 2003). The absence of the institution-based approach for the equations in which the opinion policy nexus is examined encourages researchers to incorporate the institutional arrangements into the models. Due to the effect of the 'New Institutionalism' perspective (J. G. March & Olsen, 1984) in political science, scholars paid considerable attention to the effects of political institutions on political outcomes (Taşkıran, 2022). It is pronounced that less institutional frictions (Bevan & Jennings, 2014), type of the electoral system (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008), vertical division of powers (Wlezien & Soroka, 2012), and

horizontal division of powers (Rasmussen et al., 2019) have significantly affected the government incentives to respond to the public policy agenda.

Once overall indicators about the opinion to policy nexus are considered, another important method to find government incentives to respond to the public needed to be presented relying on the literature. The following section presents the second critical approach in the government responsiveness literature for two important reasons. Whereas opinion to policy nexus is studied through the public opinion surveys and symbolic/substantive political outcomes, the program to policy nexus is explored through the congruence between election manifestos and legislative or executive outcomes. To justify conducted method in this thesis, it is beneficial to look at how and why the program to policy nexus is vital for government responsiveness. Similarly, what factors have been ignored in the opinion of policy nexus for the strong reliability of models encourage us to scrutinize exploring the program to policy nexus. Before this, it is required to discover the theoretical basis of this linkage through the mandate theory of democracy.

1.5. MANDATE THEORY

Difficulties for meaningfully detecting public policy attention forced researchers to find different alternatives (Wlezien, 2005). Survey-based measurements have been problematized for more reliable estimations about what people want. As a result of this intention, a different paradigm is used to justify why electoral promises of the political parties which are essential mandates to fulfill between elections, should be used instead of public opinion surveys. With this paradigmatic alteration, since the 2000s, the responsiveness ability of the government or political parties to the voters has been studied by considering the mandate approach of the 'An Economic Theory of Democracy' (Downs, 1957).

According to Antony Downs, the central component of the mandate theory is the rationale used to justify why sides of the electoral trade-off look after one's benefit (Downs, 1957). Similar to the meaning of the concept in the traditional economic theory, the rationale is simplistic reason lagged behind the electoral competition. As economic actors, firms and customers have been assumed to behave rationally to maximize their interests by

supplying profitable products to the markets and demanding more uncostly goods and services (Downs, 1957, p. 10). A political individual in this respect should be accepted as a rational man who tends to maximize his role in the political system. Whether h/she is a politician or a voter, each maneuver of both voters and politicians lags behind a political rationale (Downs, 1957, p. 13).

Then how do political parties in the government depict their role in the political system? Downs (1957) for this question portrays the primary goals of the actors in politics. Before this, he counts three important actors in the political structure; political parties, individuals, and interest groups (Downs, 1957, p. 28). For political parties, he said, “formulate policies to win elections rather than elections in order to formulate policies” (Downs, 1957, p. 29). He modeled political parties as agents who serve people’s interests to be elected in the competitive electoral scene. The same rationale that lagged behind the voting behavior is also assumed for the voters. Accordingly, voters are motivated to choose the best option among politicians who serve constituent self-interest more than other candidates (Downs, 1957, p. 29). Thus electoral competition utilizes both sides of the struggle as more support among voters and new electoral triumph in the election.

1.5.1. Mandate Theory in Practice

Theoretical justifications made by the Downs give three important research venues for further studies. First, whether elected officials fulfill their mandates between elections has been studied by the several researchers as a central purpose of the mandate theory (Duval & Pétry, 2019, 2020; Mansergh & Thomson, 2017; Matthieß, 2020; McMillan, 2020; Thomson, 2001; Thomson et al., 2017). Second, scholars changed the dominant methodological approach to test the normative demand of the democratic theory by observing program to policy nexus instead opinion to policy, by scrutinizing electoral promises given by the governing parties as central mandates (Artés & Bustos, 2008; Harmel, 2018; Mansergh & Thomson, 2017; Naurin, 2014; Thomson, 2001; Toros, 2015). Moreover finally, similar to the opinion-policy nexus research, for the empirical assessment of the mandate theory of democracy, several causalities have been employed to test the effects of the institutional setup on the mandate responsiveness (Artés &

Bustos, 2008; Blais & Bodet, 2006; Matthieß, 2019, 2020; Moury, 2011; Rasmussen et al., 2019; Vodová, 2020).

Methodological preference for testing mandate theory is simple. Like the responsiveness literature, the program to policy nexus explorations measures the association between party-specific emphases on policy domains in its program and subsequent policy spending in the exact domains (Thomson et al., 2017, p. 528). The offered pledge in the manifesto text is considered to assign it to the related policy category. Pledge in this line is described as the party's electoral commitments, which will occur when it is held in the office (Thomson, 2001). Thus, election manifestos are primary data to measure pledge fulfilment through the program to policy nexus. In the following heading, the importance and operationalization of the electoral pledges to measure the government's pledge fulfilment ability are overviewed.

1.5.2. The Role of the Election Manifestos

Empirical assessments have posited that election manifestos are a reliable proxy to evaluate whether the winning party fulfilled electoral mandates between elections. Each research venue realizes that election manifestos are preferred to analyze the public policy agenda or the pledge-fulfilment ability of the governments. This enables the scholar to assess natural or quasi-based content-coding of election manifestos for establishing meaningful causality between public and government policy agendas.

Pledge-based political parties' proposals are another central component of the mandate theory. Accordingly, manifestos reflect the main policy intentions of the political parties to set their agenda. In this context, the history of the election manifestos can be traced back to 1834, when Robert Peel published Tamworth Manifesto (Quinn, 2010, p. 6). It was widely argued that election manifestos are a central part of the mandate responsiveness in which detailed policy proposals are presented by the candidate party to gain the elections. On the other hand, the mandated formula for the election manifesto acquired the winning party to enjoy an electoral mandate to implement proposed policies. The voters check the electoral mandate's fulfilment to determine whether the governing party enjoyed policy proposals. If so, re-election chances for the nearest election would

increase for the party. However, if not, by the next election, voters would punish the party by choosing another political party whose policy proposals in its manifesto are most compatible with the constituents' policy preferences. Thus manifestos are an excellent proxy to monitor government responsiveness to the mass preferences through retrospective accountability.

Although pledge-based accounts to detect public policy agenda through mandate theory are substituted instead of public opinion surveys for several methodological concerns, whether manifestos can be accepted as actual documents for mandates and, therefore, public policy agenda is dubious. Two important criticism for this causality were argued by Thomas Quinn (2010). One of the most contentious dimensions of the manifesto coding for mandate responsiveness is the reading of the manifestos by the voters. It can be argued that only a few people have troubled to read manifestos for what policies are offered by the political parties (Quinn, 2010). This, in turn, undermines the central assumption of the mandate theory in determining prioritized issue domains for the public between elections. Second, on the other hand, relates to the assumed causality between the winner party's election manifesto and the whole policy agenda of the people. In other words, whether the winner party's electoral promises, which represent only its constituents, can be accepted as the actual policy agenda of the general public is contentious. Nevertheless, the same concern can be emphasized for the representative democracy itself, which assumes of the people, by the people, and for the people but only appoints representatives of the people. If it is impossible to mention pure democracy regarding the Madison, governing party's manifesto should be justified as the median voters' policy agenda.

Theoretical assumptions of the British mandate theory justify why policy proposals in the government's election manifesto should be considered the preferences of the 'center-ground voters.' The reason for choosing such a methodology is stemmed from the voters' dispersions across the political spectrum in the European consensual democracies (Hofferbert & Budge, 1992). A growing body of research focused on the European democracies scrutinized election manifestos of the governing parties/coalitions to measure median voters' policy preferences. It has been argued that the ideological standpoint of the voters across European consensual democracies has dispersed more

balanced (Quinn, 2010, p. 16). For this reason, prepared manifestos for the elections mainly reflect the median voter's policy position. In addition, pledge-based explanations in the manifestos are argued more in line with the center-inclined voter's preferences. Thus why election manifestos have been preferred for the agenda-setting for the public opinion can be explained through the size of the median voter in the political spectrum, at least for the European democracies.

One of the main disadvantages of considering election manifestos are an excellent tool to assess median voter policy preferences –as mentioned before- is less reading of these documents by the people. Although manifestos technically contain a considerable size of text and complicated headings, parties insist on declaring their policy agenda to establish indirect nexus between people and the party itself. It is argued that indirect contact of the political parties with the general voters is only possible by declaring their policy intentions through the election manifesto (Harmel, 2018). However, if voters rarely prefer to read manifestos to evaluate voting behavior as a presumption of fact, why are manifestos deliberately published by the political parties. At this point, Harmel (2018) argues that intermediary groups like media, civil society organizations, and party-affiliated groups are so efficient in mobilizing median voters with their political and social activism (Harmel, 2018, p. 230). Media, in particular, is argued that the most efficient way to mobilize voters by using manifesto items declared by the political parties. In this regard, they were challenged to read extensive manifesto documents to learn that prioritized policy issues or general pledges do not remove the link between the party and voters by employing indirect relations through media and other organizations' campaigns that advertise the party's manifesto items during the electoral competition.

Moving from the theoretical justification of why election manifestos and pledge-based explanations should be established as policy preferences of the median voter between elections, conducted studies through the program to policy nexus are overviewed below. By coding either specific issue areas or sentence-based pledges in the manifestos, researchers modeled the program to policy nexus as an alternative for the opinion to policy. In general, research results considerably confirm the agenda-setting through the manifestos by the government across Europe.

1.6. PLEDGE FULFILMENT

As noted earlier, the normative demand of democratic theory is the constant responsiveness of the representatives to the represented. The different pattern of this causality has also been stressed in the mandate literature. According to the general argument of the mandate theory by quoting from the ground-breaking work of the Antony Downs (1957), elected officials should behave coincidentally with their core representatives since they are both office and vote-seekers. The result of this comment in the pledge fulfilment theory is also crucial. Accordingly, elected officials must make the electoral pledges they promised during the campaign. Therefore, translating the promised electoral pledges into the legislative or executive policy output means fulfilling a mandate responsively.

The general tendency of the mandate fulfilment or the pledge fulfilment studies in the literature is related to seeking the congruence between the promised electoral pledges and the extent to which these offerings translated into the tangible policy outcome. Departing from the mandate view of electoral theory, scholars have paid attention to the causal chain between these variables. The electoral trade-off between the political parties and the voters has been portrayed as a mutual-interest relationship if all other things are accepted as being equal. In this model, which has also been described as the responsible party model, while political parties pursue new electoral achievements in the nearest election, voters are motivated to choose the best alternative, which is thought to be fulfilled their political expectations in a responsive manner (Thomson, 2001, p. 173). Moving from this mutuality, it should be argued that analyzing the correspondence degree of promised electoral pledges by the parties who formed a government and produced political outcomes by the targeted line is a good proxy for the empirical testing of the government responsiveness.

When looking at the conducted studies on the pledge fulfilment theory, it is noticed that cross-national and institutional-based approaches constitute the vast size of the literature. Mainly, whether the government form is a coalition or a single party; whether the electoral system is single-member based proportional or the multi member-based proportional, and finally, whether minority or the majority government constituted the executive office

have been familiar focus in the literature. Implementing cross-national analysis based on the institutional settings of the countries examined, scholars reached valuable conclusions about whether a single party or coalition form of government fulfilled its promises during its legislative period (Matthieß, 2019; McMillan, 2020; Moury & Fernandes, 2018; Naurin, 2014; Thomson, 2001; Vodová, 2020). A first huge-scale comparative study in this line also stressed that political parties in government have more incentives to fulfill their electoral pledges as a requirement of the mandate theory (Thomson et al., 2017). Nevertheless, the conclusions obtained in this study have shown that the fulfilment degree of the governing party directly depends on the form of the government as to whether the single party with or without a legislative majority and whether to whom the position of chief executive in a coalition form of government (Thomson et al., 2017, p. 528). As firmly stressed in these studies, the power-sharing arrangements are the leading indicator to measure whether governing party fulfills its mandate requirement as a normative demand of the democratic theory. However, some cross-national studies in which the same institutional frictions were analyzed indicated that power-sharing arrangements are only one matter to measure pledge fulfilment, the ideological standpoint of the governing party, the technical quality of the leader, and the external environment of the decision-making process such as international conjuncture are also crucial assumptions for the same empirical investigation (Royed, 1996).

The new trends in the electoral process are accepted as a determinant of the pattern for the pledge fulfilment theory. In Håkansson and Naurin's (2016) study, for instance, the mediatization of politics, marketization of political contestation, and increasing volatility of voters instead of class-based electoral support had been indicated as important variables to consider the exact reason for the rising number of electoral promises in Sweden (Håkansson & Naurin, 2016). Like these hypothetical inferences, another comparative case study's results have shown that since pledge fulfilment is a normative necessity for the promissory representation, both the elected and the voters have incentives to monitor whether proposed or expected policy targets are fulfilled (Matthieß, 2020). Retrospective voting behavior has been detected as a crucial indicator of the pledge fulfilment ability of the governing parties in this study (Matthieß, 2020, p. 776).

1.6.1. Program to Policy Nexus

Some single-case studies (Artés & Bustos, 2008; Thomson, 2001) have demonstrated that pledge fulfilment caused by the mandate theory is well operated in the Netherlands and the Spain. Examining the formation of incumbent parties in these countries, the authors had reached valuable results to consider the apparent effect of the government formation on the pledge fulfilment. The standard testable estimation of these studies is related to institution's effects on the program to policy linkage. Accordingly, it would be expected that the government's incentives to fulfill its pre-election pledges during the electoral contestation are robustly associated with the form of the government. In this respect, the high level of fulfilment in these cases is more pronounced in the single-party government than in minority government (Artés & Bustos, 2008, p. 329; Thomson, 2001, p. 174). In addition to these indicators, the ministerial portfolios of the parties, which are the stakeholders of the coalition, policy agreement of the coalition partners on a given policy domain are also meaningful to imagine causality between the institutional form of government and pledge fulfilment.

Many cross-national studies have indicated that parties tend to keep their electoral promises when the people elect them to enter into government (Artés & Bustos, 2008; McMillan, 2020; Moury & Fernandes, 2018; Naurin, 2014; Royed, 1996; Thomson, 2001; Thomson et al., 2017; Vodová, 2020). However, according to some, explanatory variables to measure the linkage between program and policy have remained limited to observing their effects on the mandate responsiveness. Monitoring discrete-time effect in the fulfilment period as an explanatory variable has been called so vital by Duval and Petry (2019). Conducted analysis in Quebec by these researchers has demonstrated that if governing parties do not fulfill their promises during the half of their total tenure, it is more likely drops drastically over another period (Duval & Pétry, 2020). This empirical finding has been attributed to the theoretical assumption of the policy-making and legislative behavior literature. Indeed, empirical results have confirmed that while the pledge fulfilment degree is high in the first period of the power, it has dramatically decreased throughout the party's tenure (Duval & Pétry, 2019). Accordingly, the policy-making process is not continuous; for this reason, the time variable must be accounted.

It is realized that studies in which theoretical assumptions about the mandate approach were tested empirically overwhelmingly had turned their attention to the pledge-policy congruence. Citizen perception of this linkage in this respect has received little attention in the pledge fulfilment theory. By considering this research gap, some studies sought to address the methodological blank by incorporating citizen evaluation measurement into the equations in Canada (Duval & Pétry, 2020) and Ireland (Thomson, 2011). They investigated that whereas a massive number of studies in the pledge fulfilment literature have confirmed that parties partially or fully fulfilled their policy promises between the elections, recent surveys have not been in the same line. A survey that detects whether respondents agree or disagree with the fact that their elected representatives fulfill the electoral promises between elections has shown up blazing results. In Great Britain, for instance, where researchers measured a high level of congruence between election promises and subsequent policy action (Royed, 1996, p. 67), survey results demonstrated that 46% of the total respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with this empirical implication (Thomson, 2011, p. 188). For this reason, the authors stressed the importance of the citizen aspect in this linkage and consider it a missing variable.

Before ending this section, it would be beneficial to mention an important study in which the existing indicators for the pledge fulfilment are discussed in the Turkish context. Toros (2015) found that three critical variables are significant for the three decades of Turkish electoral history. Accordingly, in a governmental form, the government, either single-party or coalition, the causality between economic performance and pledge fulfilment has been left blank in the literature. Finally, whether the governing parties fulfill pledges, the author has scrutinized three crucial decades of Turkish politics. Dividing these decades such the first decade, when the military term ended and the first single-party government started with the Turgut Ozal, the second decade, which is characterized as coalitional governments and the rising of political Islamism in the electoral scene are principal, and the third decade which begin with the electoral triumph and single-party government of the AKP, he had reached meaningful results (Toros, 2015, p. 242). Accordingly, like the previous studies' findings, a governmental form of the political system is essential for statistical robustness. Compared with the coalition governments in the 1990s, single-party governments performed better in fulfilling

electoral pledges. The economic context is also meaningful for the Turkish context in this study. That is to say a one-point increase in the economic indicators entails a four-point increase in the pledge fulfilment level (Toros, 2015, p. 249).

When overall theoretical implications and empirical findings are taken into consideration, it can be argued that manifesto coding is so essential proxy for several reasons. To identify electoral promises of the governing parties, find whether the mandate is fulfilled, and finally, whether there is a meaningful correspondence between election promises and policy outcome, coding of election manifestos enables us many opportunities. Grounding on this methodological way, in the following section, the Turkish context, which remains under-investigated in both responsiveness and pledge-fulfilment theory, is introduced with its historical and institutional background.

CHAPTER 2

CASE, DATA AND METHOD

Responsiveness literature focuses on Western and well-institutionalized political systems to analyze how different political arrangements affect governments' incentives to respond to public policy expectations. Although, after the 1960s, this literature has expanded existing hypotheses and comparative arguments through cross-national and cross-institutional cases, the Turkish context has remained understudied. In this chapter, the ultimate purpose is to offer a justification for studying the case of Turkey and provide a detailed account of the data and methodology.

Substantial elaborations are required to make empirical ground to test improved hypotheses for the AKP case. For this purpose, the second section of the chapter looks at the existing data-based and methodological preferences to test the responsiveness either through the opinion to policy or program to policy nexuses. Within the scope of the data-oriented approach preferred in this thesis, three important venues are properly provided as different sub-sections as CAP, legislative agenda, and election manifesto. After giving a short insight into the general tendency to test responsiveness, collection, organization, and content coding of the data set for legislative outputs and election manifestos will rigorously be presented. Finally, the chapter will introduce the developed hypotheses to test the effect of concentration of executive power on the responsiveness and pledge-policy congruence.

2.1. CASE: THE RULE OF JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY IN TURKEY

Although the concentration of power has been a central characteristic of the political institutions from the Ottoman period onward, the presidential system introduced in 2017 has re-characterized the political system significantly in that for the first time since the beginning of multi-party politics one party overwhelmingly control all state institutions. In this section, how the process of increasing concentration of power in the hands of the

President Erdogan and the AKP unfolded will be discussed in two periods. While the section on the pre-2015 era looks at first, second and third legislative periods from 2002 to 2015, the post 2015 one elaborates on the fourth, fifth and sixth ones from 2015 onwards. These two sections will justify what makes the case of Turkey noteworthy for studying the congruence between proposed electoral pledges and subsequent legislative outputs.

While introducing the findings of each term under the party rule, the post-2015 period including one short-sized (June 2015-November 2015) and two ruling tenures (2015-2018; 2018-2022) are separately examined to contribute to the literature in responsiveness in Turkish case. As suggested earlier, data-based explanations for the nexus between government's electoral program and subsequent policy actions have mostly focused on the period before 2015. Analyzing the post-2015 period, this thesis aims to fill this gap by covering a novel data set for both governing party's electoral pledges and bills initiated by the President and its party in this period.

2.1.1. Justice and Development Party (AKP) Term

In this part of the chapter, the AKP is scrutinized by looking at its historical origin, social base, political position, and current trajectories, emphasizing their effects on the institutional determinants of the executive presidency. This thesis covers the AKP periods, which for the first time came to power in the 2002 general elections and lasted its incumbency except for a short-sized period (from June 2015 to November 2015) to the present as a single party majoritarian government. It is a unique example for the Turkish center-right because, for the first time in the history of the center-right in Turkey, a successor of the political tradition succeeded in ruling the country uninterruptedly.

To substantially elaborate on the current political and institutional trajectories of the AKP, it is necessary to look at the party's ideological legacy inherited from the MG movement. The first political representative of the MG was established, labeled as National Order Party (MNP), under the leadership of the Necmettin Erbakan, who was an independent deputy from Konya (Hale & Ozbudun, 2009). Party mainly reflected the voice of the political-Islamist communities in Turkey by proposing an Islamic model of democracy

by ignoring pluralist integration with the adversaries of Muslims in the world. Party's radical position around the center-right and Islam-friendly perspective ultimately led to its closure by the constitutional court primarily because of the 12 March Memorandum (1971) declared by the military. Following unsuccessful progress for the reconciliation between Islam and democracy, the second representative of the MG was established as the National Salvation Party (MSP) on 11 October 1972.

Contrary to its predecessor, the MSP gained electoral momentum and participated in different coalitions either together with the center-left or nationalist front during the 1970s. But, because of the 1980 military coup and the closing of all political parties to curb civilian intervention in the constitution-making process, the MSP was outlawed, and its cadres were politically banned till the 1983 general elections. Following the MSP, another but more radical successor of the MG was established, labeled Welfare Party (RP) by the old cadres of the MSP with the head of Erbakan again. Although the party lasted the average poll rate like other predecessors of the MG in general elections, the local elections brought political triumph to the party by taking mayoralties of many metropolitans like Istanbul and Ankara in 1994 (Hale & Ozbudun, 2009). Following this, by taking 21.4 % vote from the 1995 general elections, the party involved in a coalition government with the True Path Party (DYP) called '*RefahYol*' and stayed in the government only for 11 months. By well-known National Security Council (MGK)'s meeting on the 28 February 1997, the party was forced to resign from the government and finally outlawed by the constitutional court in 1998 because it followed anti-secular political activities like the other representatives of the MG movement.

At this time, some of the MG's elite cadres proposed a more moderate line for the MG by advocating central tenets of the democracy but reconciling these with the Islamic virtues. Controversially, another wing of the MG continued a radical position and ignored democratic pluralism by imitating Westernized values. Thus, in the aftermath of the closure of the RP, two radical camps emerged from the MG Movement. While the former group was called modernist (*Yenilikçiler*), the latter was considered traditionalist (*Gelenekçiler*). The moderate line of the MG ultimately became dominant and led to the establishment of a new political party, the AKP, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. That is to say, for the first time in the history of the MG, a successor party

gained nationwide electoral support from a wide political spectrum and gained an almost two-thirds majority in the parliament with 34 % votes in the 2002 general elections.

In understanding the social base of the AKP, there have been made different explanations. The Party's neighborhood strategy to protect community solidarity in the poor segments of the urban is argued that consolidate the poor masses to support the political-Islamist alternative under the leadership of AKP (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; Esen & Gümüşçü, 2017; Hale, 2008; Hale & Ozbudun, 2009; Taydas et al., 2012). Throughout the electoral campaigns, for instance, the party's members formed close connections with the voting district either through the clientelist relations (Hale & Ozbudun, 2009; Sayari, 2011; Sayari, 2014) or with the help of the devout bourgeoisie (Gumuscu & Sert, 2009). This political strategy enabled the party to catch electoral support of the poor neighborhood in the big urban cities. However, different survey results implied that party's social base could not be solely explained by considering Islamic virtues because party also gained the electoral support of the different parts of the political spectrum (Çarkoğlu, 2007; Hale & Ozbudun, 2009).

The most substantial reason lagged behind the electoral triumph of the party in the poor urban districts should be explained by the AKP's more moderate policy in reconciling Islam and democracy. Contrary to its predecessor in the MG movement, the Party's political commitment to the democracy, its further efforts to integrate the economic structure with the free-market capitalism, and close relations with the international organizations to conduct developmental economic policy brought a land-slide electoral support to the party in three successive elections. However, this political and economic stability has considerably changed after the political turmoil emerged during the Gezi-park protest and following coup-attempt by the *Gülenist* movement in the military.

The periods before 2015 and after 2015 are examined separately. This is so because in 2014 then-prime minister Erdogan became the first popularly elected president of the country when de facto presidentialism has begun in Turkey. Although the country experienced a regime change from a parliamentary system into a presidential one with the 2017 constitutional referendum which put into practice with the 2018 presidential elections, the process of centralization and concentration of executive power began from

2014 onwards. As such, a separate analysis of the legislative tenures before and after 2015 give us idea on how concentration of executive power has affected the pledge-policy congruence.

2.1.1.1. The first three legislative tenures of the AKP Rule: 2002-2007; 2007-2011; 2011-2015

The first incumbent period under the rule of AKP showed substantial progress in many indices of democracy like human rights, social peace, freedom of thought and expression, and so forth. Contrary to the predecessor of the MG, the party's political vision has created a more pluralistic form of democracy by expanding current rights and freedoms envisaged by the different regional and international conventions such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and European Convention Human Rights. Much tolerance has been paid to the minority groups in the country by defending the right to information, free trial, and right to seek justice during the first period of the party. The subject of secularism is also much different from the other representatives of the MG, by advocating it as a *sine qua non* condition for the well-operated democracy party adopted a so-called passive secularism (Heper, 2003). According to the party vision, religion should not be used for the political purposes or to obtain privileged benefits from the state; instead, each citizen should be allowed to live in accordance with its religious attitudes and conditions by protecting the secularist principle of the democracy (Hale & Ozbudun, 2009, p. 21).

Privatization of public property and encouragement of the local and foreign investors for further investments across domestic and international sectors were supported during the first period under the rule of AKP. As a continuing factor from the 1980s, free-market capitalism was also promised by the party both in its election manifesto and subsequent policy activism in the economic domain (Hale & Ozbudun, 2009; Özbudun, 2007; Özpek, 2012). From this point, it can be argued that the party's economic policy is significantly different from its predecessors, those who advocated the '*just order*' by emphasizing Islamic unification in the economy through abolishing interest and unfair distribution of goods and services (Çarkoğlu, 2007).

The foreign policy vision of the party was also different from the precedent actors of the MG. The party expanded close ties with the European, American, and Central Asian countries and pursued an open foreign policy in different policy domains. The issue of European integration was a fundamental characteristic of the party's foreign policy between 2002 and 2007. Adopting central requirements of the Helsinki Act and Copenhagen Criteria, domestic law was arranged as suitable for the EU integration process and European candidacy (Bozkurt, 2019; Özpek, 2012; Selçuk, 2016; Selçuk et al., 2019; Turunc, 2007). Indeed, the party improved close relations with the Islamist countries, particularly with the Middle East and Northern African (MENA) region. The details of the foreign policy activism with these countries are presented through the frequency distribution of the international agreements in chapter 3.

Enacted law packages concerning the Copenhagen Criteria allowed the AKP to follow a more optimistic foreign policy activism with the European countries and gradually dismantled the leverage of the army as a veto player (Selçuk, 2016, p. 576). Liberal reform movements to consolidate human rights and freedoms at home entailed the re-regulation of the civil-military relations between regime protectors and civilian government. Thus, the party in its first incumbency has decreased veto players' incentives to intervene in the governing process in the name of the regime guardianship role. Party also implied different legal and constitutional arrangements on the judiciary and military organizations to meet international requirements by giving more room for the minorities and the more diminutive vein for the military and judiciary's political control on the civilian government (Özpek, 2012, p. 154). Removing the military member from the High Board of Education and eliminating the exemption of the military from the court of accounts were introduced in the seventh harmonization package with the EU, and then the constitutional amendment which put into force in 2004 (Hale & Ozbudun, 2009; Özbudun, 2007, 2015).

The seventh harmonization package is also essential to examine the decreasing role and effect of the military on civilian politics. Several articles of the package mainly targeted the civil-military relations between the army and government. The meeting period of the MGK, for instance, decreased from once a month to every two months. Similarly, the secretary-general of MGK before the package was determined by the high military

officials; with the package, high-ranked officials in the civilian bureaucracy were authorized to appoint him/her (Hale & Ozbudun, 2009, p. 62). Thanks to the central requirements of the EU candidacy, a civilian government could gradually dismantle the leverage of the military on the politics.

Another milestone in dismantling veto players' role and effect on the civilian government was the 2007 constitutional amendment that introduced the popularly-elected presidency. In the aftermath of the deadlock between the constitutional court and the governing AKP about the scheduled presidential election in 2007, the AKP deputies proposed the amendment package to introduce a new presidential office which elected popularly and a new quorum for the parliamentary negotiations. With this amendment, the president is no longer elected by the parliament; instead, it is elected by the voters. Thus, many concerns have been raised by the main opposition, Republican People Party (CHP), because it may increase the political weight of the president in politics (Hale & Ozbudun, 2009, p. 63).

By the end of 2010, precursor implementations to restrict military tutelage on civilian politics have continued through the constitutional amendment, which was held as a referendum (Çinar & Sayin, 2014, p. 373). Changing the composition of the Constitutional Court in favor of the presidency enabled the president to dismantle the veto player's effect and accumulate relative power to determine high judges in the court (Özpek, 2012, p. 154). The articles which regulate the duties and functions of the military courts firmly changed to restrict discretions of these branches (Article 15). Therefore, the policy-making room monitored by the judicial and military officers as regime protectors considerably changed in favor of the elected government's control. These regulations, in essence, have already been proposed in the party manifesto by implying that the politicization of the judiciary is not compatible with the democratization of politics.

To sum up, three consecutive periods under the rule of the AKP as a successor of the MG brought new rooms to the Turkish democratization process. First, contrary to its predecessor, the party's moderate position to catch mainstream voters in the spectrum was required to dismantle the tutelary veins of the politics through using plebiscitarian tools such as referendums. By dismantling the military and judiciary – which have been portrayed as the guardians of the regime since the establishment of the republic- the party

introduced open-space dialogs between social segments. Particularly embracing the peripheral segments of the society, liberal reforms in the democratic scene have brought nationwide electoral support from the different wings of the political spectrum. Similarly, dismantling the political discretions of the veto players in the game through the constitutional amendments, executive concentration became the fundamental characteristic of the party's agenda. The possible outcomes of these institutional initiatives, whether creating a more open space for the social negotiations or leading to a more concentration of power could only be observed in the following periods.

2.1.1.2. The Post-2015 Period: Popularly Elected President and the Concentration of Executive Power

Current explanations for analyzing democratization efforts in Turkish politics tended to separate the party's first three consecutive periods from the last three ones. The main reason that lagged behind this scholarly effort is the changing paradigm of the democratization around the popularly-elected presidency and the plebiscitarian manner of the politics since 2015. It has been emphasized that, following the Gezi-park protest and the military coup attempt, the excessive dominance of power around presidency entailed regime breakdowns from electoral democracy to the competitive authoritarian regime (Çinar & Sayin, 2014; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; Esen & Gümüşçü, 2017; Özbudun, 2015; Özpek, 2012).

In addition to these accounts, last three consecutive terms under the party rule are separately analyzed in order to introduce a new data-set for the responsiveness theory. As mentioned in chapter 1, only few studies have developed data-driven perspective to examine how democratic decay has been norm under the rule of party covering pledge-policy or program-policy nexuses. Using legislative and MIP dataset, these studies have mostly focused on the first three legislative tenures of the party rule either until 2013 (Bulut, 2017) or 2015 (Esen et al., 2021). With a new dataset introduced in this thesis, it is possible to test the principal-agent relation after 2015 with the increasing concentration of executive power – first through the 2014 popularly elected presidency and then through the regime change from parliamentary system into a presidential one.

With particular reference to Levitsky and Way (2002), the changing characteristics of the electoral playing field has been experienced after 2015. Four elements of the modern democratic regimes include free and fair elections, possessing universal suffrage for the adults, political and civil rights, and finally, the absence of alternative power to rule the country (clerics, military) were partly manipulated in favor of the party's political purposes (Levitsky & Way, 2002, p. 53). Thus, the uneven playing field primarily for the electoral competition characterized the post-2015 periods under the party's rule.

Indeed, these paradigmatic alterations not only emerged through the dismantling of the veto player's effect on civilian politics but also occurred through the excessive control of the presidency over the elected branches. Following the coup attempt on 15 July 2016, the declaration of the state of emergency regime created excessive political control by the presidency to curb possible interventions coming from the Gulenist bureaucracy. In this way, executive decrees became the central policy channels to rule the country, bypassing parliamentary negotiations in the policy-making process. This practice inspired the re-opening of the well-known debate in Turkish political life: presidentialism. The presidential regime has been firmly advocated by the former presidents, including Demirel and Ozal, in their incumbent periods with the claim that a double-headed executive office would create a deadlock between the prime minister and president (Özpek, 2012; Taş, 2015; Uslu, 2015). Following the AKP's plebiscitarian control over the politics through the constantly implied referendums, this vicious cycle has been changed to enact the Turkish-style presidential system into the force (Esen & Gümüşçü, 2017). Although the de-facto implementations for the presidential regime have been introduced through the executive decrees since the state of emergency regime (2016), de jure alteration was firstly approved on the 16 April 2017 referendum, which dismantled the prime minister and created a chief executive presidency.

The constitutional amendment carried out in 2017 is the historical turning point for the democratization history of Turkey. For the first time, the check and balances between the executive and legislative branches of the government were arranged in accordance with the presidential system. Many instruments of the legislative office to check the executive's functions, such as the vote of confidence and motion of censure, were outlawed through the amendment. Similarly, the judiciary control or the approval by the legislative

assemblies of the high-ranking members of the bureaucracy is transferred to the president without any control and approval by the different elected assemblies. This indicator is considered essential to differentiate the Turkish presidential government system from the classical pattern of the presidential system implied in the US. Whereas approval and check over the appointments of these members are given to the Senate in the US presidential system, in the presidential government system, appointments and dismissals of the high-ranking officials in the bureaucracy are fulfilled by the president itself. Thus, the president was able to accumulate some considerable authority in his hands to run the government's executive and particularly legislative functions. For the legislative function of the presidency, the presidential decrees were introduced through the constitutional amendment to regulate specific policy domains, including appointments and dismissals of ministers; high-ranking officers, vice-presidents; General Secretary of Presidency, central and provincial organizations of the ministries, and so forth.

Another critical indicator to label a presidential government system with a high concentration of power stems from the partial identity of the president. With the constitutional amendment held on 16 April 2017, the impartial characteristic of the presidency was also abolished to increase his/her control over both executive and legislative bodies of the government. Contrary to its regulation in the classical parliamentary system, the president can also represent his party as a chairperson in the new system. A partial president, in this regard, may also manage the party's legislative activities as a chairperson. If the president's party also represented the majority of the seats in the parliament, the agenda-congruence for both executive and legislative office would be higher. Thus, the president may dominate the whole branch of the political system.

In sum, with enacting the presidential government system into the force, the de facto presidentialization of politics since 2007 became de jure (Uslu, 2015). The partial identity replaced the impartial characteristic of the president to dominate both executive and legislative branches of the government. Powers of the veto-players, including high judiciary branches, constitutional court, military court, and other public institutions, were dismantled. Last but not least, all of these treats were legitimized through the institutional regulations with a plebiscitarian characteristic of the referendums.

2.2. DATA AND METHOD

After discussing theoretical base for the empirical analysis in the previous chapter, this part introduces the conducted method in this thesis to measure agenda congruence between electoral mandates and subsequent government actions. Before this, I present the general tendencies in the responsiveness literature to measure opinion to policy or program to policy nexus by stressing their limitations and reliability for this analysis.

Scholars who analyze the responsiveness ability of governments to the public policy agenda overwhelmingly focused on either program to policy or opinion to policy linkage to measure whether selected cases predict the level of responsiveness. In the first measurement method, by looking at the correspondence level between the electoral pledges or party program and the enacted laws, scholars (Artés & Bustos, 2008; Duval & Pétry, 2019; Matthieß, 2019; McMillan, 2020; Moury & Fernandes, 2018; Naurin, 2014; Pétry et al., 2020; Pétry & Collette, 2009; Toros, 2015; Vodová, 2020) tested several hypotheses. By analyzing this linkage, the model of the government; coalition, or single party (Naurin, 2014; Thomson, 2001), vertical division of power (Duval & Pétry, 2019; Pétry & Collette, 2009), and sharing of power between coalition partners (Thomson et al., 2017) have widely been accounted as significant determinants of the responsiveness. For the second causality, to measure the policy congruence between the public issue priorities and the government policy agenda, scholars (Brooks, 1987, 1990, 2014; Erikson et al., 2012; Franklin & Wlezien, 1997; Miller & Stokes, 1963; Monroe, 1998; Page, B; Shapiro, 1983; Page & Shapiro, 1983; Soroka & Wlezien, 2004; Wlezien, 2005) analyzed the quality of the linkage between the voters and the elected officials. In these studies, the type of government; presidential /parliamentary (Bevan & Jennings, 2014; Rasmussen et al., 2019), the model of the electoral system; proportional/majoritarian (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008) and the degree of check and balances between legislative and executive office (Burstein, 2003; Şaşmaz et al., 2022; Stimson et al., 1995) have been analyzed as independent variables.

The main reason for choosing such a different path derives from several factors. This thesis predominantly focuses on the program to policy nexus to analyze whether elected officials fulfill proposed electoral pledges given by the parties before the elections after

they enter into government based on the mandate theory of democracy (Hofferbert & Budge, 1992). As shaped in the previous chapter of this study, in the studies which analyze the opinion to policy nexus, the public policy attention or preferences were measured through the Most Important Problem (MIP) or Most Important Issue (MII) surveys. Thanks to the aggregated level of answers, those who asked, “What is the most important problem facing your country?” researchers detected the prioritized issue domains in the public mind.

Wlezien (2005) stressed that relying on MIP-based surveys that aim to measure ‘the most important problem facing in a country’ has created two very key measurement errors. (Wlezien, 2005, p. 556). These problems were explained the different or close meanings of issue and problem. While the former is regarding the policy itself, the latter intensely spells the varied conditions of the issue. Considering, for instance, the economy as a salient issue, the dynamics that caused the economy as a mostly salient issue among public opinion show differences. The economy, in general, is perceived by the people as the most important problem facing their country, but which economic indicators are relatively more important than others remains blurred. When the inflation rate is high, but the unemployment level is low in a country, it most likely would be perceived by the respondents that the economy is still the most salient issue. In this regard, the specific policy domain that ranked in the MIP-based survey’s questions to choose by the people does not enable them to gesture their main policy concerns since sub-indicators in a specific policy domain are not listed. This tendency would be understood more clearly when looking at such cases (Brooks, 1987; Rasmussen et al., 2019).

Data availability is another research scarce in the survey-based approach highlighted by the author (Wlezien; 1995, p. 987). The typical bias has been constantly ascertained in many studies in terms of unavailable survey data to compare policy channel data set at a particular time (Spoon, Külüver; 2014 & Bulut; 2017 & John, Bevan, Jennings) or inappropriate question battery for research (Rasmussen et al., 2019; Toshkov et al., 2020). Turkish context constitutes one of the particular examples in terms of data scarcity for the public opinion surveys. Bulut (2017) emphasized the data scarcity for the public opinion survey that covers the pre-2003 period in Turkey (Bulut, 2017, p. 719).

The absence of well-constructed data set to measure the public's mostly prioritized policy domains that cover our period via public opinion surveys in this respect forces us to measure the same variable through the election manifesto by coding each natural sentence of the whole text as a one policy domain in the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) coding scheme (F. R. Baumgartner & Jones, 2001; Berkhout, 2008; Bulut, 2017; Jones & Baumgartner, 2004). The mandate theorists have already recommended this established method as an excellent proxy to test the democratic responsiveness of the elected governments (Hofferbert & Budge, 1992; Quinn, 2010). Hofferbert and Budge (1992), in this line, argued that if party democracy means translating promised policies into the government action, checking the linkage between the electoral pledges and policy-making should be accepted as a crucial test for the governmental responsiveness (Hofferbert & Budge, 1992, p. 153). This thesis tries to justify the method used to measure government responsiveness by heavily relying on the mandate theory.

Mandate theory of democracy enables scholars to test rational motives lagged behind political behaviors. Exploring principal-agent relation through the electoral mechanism, Antony Downs (1957), for the first time, developed an alternative theory for electoral behavior. After this theoretical ground, several scholars measured electoral dynamics to test whether mandate-based assumptions are generalizable for the country cases (Duval & Pétry, 2020; Grossback et al., 2005; Håkansson & Naurin, 2016; Naurin, 2014; Pétry et al., 2020). In these investigations, election manifestos have not only been preferred to detect constituencies' electoral stand in the political left-right spectrum (Dassonneville et al., 2021; L. March, 2017) but also theorized to test whether mandate requirements of the elected officials are fulfilled by the governing parties or elites (Artés & Bustos, 2008; Vodová, 2020). During these scholarly efforts, it is realized that policy-making venues have generally been arranged by employing pledge-based offerings between elections.

Furthermore, scholars have argued that such a level of compromise between principal and agent depends on the several dynamics of the electoral competition. According to one of these theoretical assertions, elected officials tend to address policy-based issues by relying on the electoral pledges given themselves during the electoral competition to be re-elected in the nearest election (Duval & Pétry, 2019; Golder & Lloyd, 2014; Golder & Stramski, 2010; Pétry et al., 2020; Royed, 1996). For this reason, the mandate theory of

democracy and its main apparatus election manifesto is accepted as a strong tool to monitor the electoral representation of the politicians and pledge-fulfilment ability of the parties, which is the central requisite of modern representative democratic theory (Dahl, 1971).

2.2.1. Comparative Agendas Project (CAP)

To assess the issue of attention of the government and public, the first project was developed by Jones and Baumgartner (2002), considering policy-making channels and a broad range of veins for the agenda-setting under the name of Policy Agendas Project (PAP) in the US. By covering different legislative activities, including oral/written questions, private-sponsored bills, government-sponsored bills, congressman's roll call votes, and media news through the front page of the newspapers, prioritized issue domains in the government agenda-setting have been examined. Similarly, to assess the congruence between prioritized issue domains in the government agenda and public policy agenda, MIP and MII surveys are used (Bevan & Jennings, 2014; Jennings & Wlezien, 2011; Jones & Baumgartner, 2004). Following the PAP, the CAP database was developed to expand research geography from the US to the European countries. From European countries to the third world region, scholars improved the standard coding scheme of the CAP by extending existing data venues through their project findings (Bevan & Jennings, 2014; Jennings & Wlezien, 2011). Now, the geographical scope of the CAP database reaches 26 countries².

The operationalization of the data set is quite simple. Each data set is content-coded based on its textual content (Bevan, 2014). For this purpose, a standard coding scheme was developed to assign each policy activity of both government and the public to one of the ranked policy domains in the standard coding scheme. CAP coding scheme, in this respect, contains 21 major policy domains and more than 200 minor policy fields, which are shown in table 1. To involve specific issue areas in the coding scheme, the project has

² For more information about the dataset developed by the scholars, please see <https://www.comparativeagendas.net/>.

consistently been revised in accordance with the new data set coming from the different countries (Bevan, 2014, p. 12).

Table 1. CAP Coding Scheme

Major Policy Domains in the CAP scheme	Code
Macroeconomics	1
Civil Rights	2
Health	3
Agriculture	4
Labor	5
Education	6
Environment	7
Energy	8
Immigration	9
Transportation	10
Law and Crime	12
Social Welfare	13
Housing	14
Domestic Commerce	15
Defense	16
Technology	17
Foreign Trade	18
International Affairs	19
Government Operations	20
Public Lands	21
Culture	23

By relying on this coding scheme, a novel data set including government and party-sponsored bills and electoral pledges given in the election manifestos were coded (Bevan, 2014; Bulut, 2017; Esen et al., 2021; Jones & Baumgartner, 2004). Although TBMM's archiving for legislative documents gives clear definitions to understand which policy domain it regulates, to increase the reliability of the coded observations, CAP coding guidelines covering different projects including Turkey (Bulut & Yildirim, 2020) scrutinized observantly. But in some cases, the given data was not clear to assign it to the related policy category in the CAP codebook. In that case, different coders specialized in CAP were consulted to tackle with this methodological problem. To this end, the

collecting and coding process of both legislative outputs and electoral pledges is presented below.

2.2.2. Election Manifesto

In the Turkish electoral system, political parties prepare their policy agenda to offer the general electorate to be elected or re-elected (Aytaç, 2017). For the empirical method, this study uses the electoral pledges of the governing AKP by coding each natural sentence of the manifesto text in accordance with the CAP coding scheme. To do so, each manifesto text of the party is analyzed as each policy-based mandate of the party for each legislation period. Thus, the manifesto text becomes the political agenda of the public. This normative way, in particular, pushed the manifesto writer to stand the same political position of the median voters and therefore makes election manifesto a primary document in which political expectations or prioritized policy domains of the median voters are presented.

The responsiveness and representation literature have preferred the election manifestos as a guided text to monitor the public agenda (Hofferbert & Budge, 1992; Royed, 1996). Pledge-fulfilment theory also operationalizes manifesto text as the main political agenda of the political parties to test whether these pledges are essential references of the elites to be compromised with the public agenda by fulfilling them between elections (Artés & Bustos, 2008; Toros, 2015). Thus, pledge fulfilment literature has focused on the policy offerings of the political parties by using election manifestos.

As mentioned before, this study assigns each natural sentence of the text to a policy category in the CAP coding scheme to detect the frequency distribution of policy domains. This method enables us to find mostly prioritized policy domains in the election manifestos and, therefore, public policy agenda between elections. On the other hand, pledge fulfilment scholars deal with the election manifestos to detect whether specific electoral pledges given by the political parties in the manifesto text are fulfilled between elections (Duval & Pétry, 2020; Moury & Fernandes, 2018). Case studies which overwhelmingly considered European political parties put forward that electoral pledges given by the parties are generally fulfilled depending on the several factors of the electoral

democracies (Thomson, 2001; Thomson et al., 2017). Re-election concerns for nearest election, technical factors of the electoral systems, constituency-based accounts, mainstream or niche model of parties, executive constraints in the policy-making processes, and check-balances between governmental branches are explored as some of these technical dynamics that affect the pledge-fulfilment model of responsiveness. Similar independent variables –as mentioned before- have also been tested for the responsiveness ability of the government in the representation and responsiveness literature (Bartels, 1991; Miller & Stokes, 1963; Page, 1994). Moving from these similarities, it is noticed that using election manifestos to test whether the governing parties fulfill mandates (policy expectations of the median voters) is the same tendency for both research traditions. For these purposes, natural-based coding of the election manifestos enables us to assess the responsiveness ability of government across legislative tenures for the Turkish case.

Therefore, this thesis study justifies why the election manifesto is operationalized for the issue of the saliency of public opinion through the mandate theory of electoral democracy. However, how the manifesto text is dealt with to detect government policy agenda should be explained methodologically. As can be seen through the below example, natural-based coding of the sentence is preferred to find the cumulative frequency of each policy domain in the manifesto text. Some scholars for this methodological preference have argued that the human-guided coding method is more valuable and reliable than computer-guided content analyses because the latter ignores the context of the sentence and generalizes the same strings or word clouds superficially organized policy categories (Däubler et al., 2012). However, in some studies, it is argued that human-coders reliability is blurred methodological deficiency because the subjective evaluation of the sentence might manipulate research outcomes (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008). Nevertheless, by pursuing former methodological guidance, I carefully coded each natural sentence of the manifesto text by focusing on the central intention of the pledge, whether it contains a policy offering or puts a partisan/ideological standpoint. For each natural sentence, CAP coding scheme with its 21 major and more than 200 minor policy domains, I considered. Below the example of a coded natural sentence of the 2007 manifesto text of the governing AKP is shown.

Table 2. Sample Coding of Electoral Pledges in accordance with the CAP Coding Scheme

Electoral Sentence	CAP Main Code	CAP Sub-Code
In the fishing sector; we will encourage field fisheries by giving importance to the development of alternative species.	4 (Agriculture)	408 (Fisheries and Fishing)
The AK Party will make comprehensive legal arrangements to combat domestic violence, which it sees as a bleeding wound of our society.	12 (Law and Crime)	1208 (Family Issues)
Our goal in the new period is to ensure price stability and make it permanent.	1 (Macroeconomics)	104 (Monetary Policy)

Source: AKP's 2007 election manifesto

As noticed in table 2, three electoral pledges given by the party in its 2007 election manifesto are assigned both to the major and minor policy domains in the CAP coding scheme. To code such sentences, the substantive focus of the manifesto text is taken into consideration. For the first sentence, it was evident that the pledge focuses on the fishing sector to develop for an upcoming session. This sentence, in this regard, is assigned to the major agriculture domain and fishing & fisheries minor domain.

Moving from this example and the theoretical base of the method, I content-coded more than fifteen thousand natural sentences for five election manifestos. Legislative tenures were noticed to compare the frequency distribution of each policy domain pledged in the manifesto text. This analysis's descriptive results and empirical findings are introduced in chapter third and fourth, respectively.

2.2.3. Legislative Agenda

After coding each natural sentence in the election manifestos, legislative outputs are examined to compare the weight of policy domains in the manifesto with the subsequent government actions across the years. To do so, bills proposed by the government party

and enacted by the parliament are considered. It was emphasized that government-sponsored bills, in a majoritarian single-party government system, substantially reflect the main policy agenda of the government (Bulut, 2017; Esen et al., 2021). Because the governing party dominates both the executive and legislative bodies of the system, whatever it wants as a policy, it can quickly be passed by the parliament. Many studies, in this regard, analyzed the legislative outputs to scrutinize political parties' attention allocation to the different policy domains (Berkhout, 2008; Hazama & Iba, 2017; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Jones & Baumgartner, 2004). For this reason, to classify prioritized issue domains in the government agenda, government-sponsored bills and those proposed by the governing party are content coded across years under the party's rule.

As mentioned earlier, the governing AKP ruled the country since 2002 as a single-party majoritarian government. This electoral power enabled the party to dominate both legislative and executive assemblies. Thus, the party, either through the government-sponsored bills proposed by the cabinet (in parliamentary term) or through the private-sponsored bills proposed by the party's group itself (particularly after the transition to the presidential government system), can pass any legislation that it desires (Bulut, 2017, p. 721). For these reasons, coding the bills as an indicator for the legislative agenda-setting of the government enables us to assess prioritized issue domains across the party's legislative tenures.

To catch the time-series distribution of agenda-setting, each legislative tenure of the governing AKP is analyzed separately. In this respect, by using algorithmic code through the Python programming language, 2,450 bills were gathered from the TBMM's website. A short summary of the law is used to assign each bill to the CAP coding scheme. From this point of view, below, the sample of coding legislative outputs in the second legislative tenure of the party (2007-2011) is presented.

Table 3. Sample of Coding the Legislative Outputs Enacted between 2007-2011

Short Summary of Bill	CAP Main Code	CAP Sub-Code
Bill amending the Law on Technology Development Zones	17 (Technology)	1798 (R&D)
Bill amending the Law on the Organization of Higher Education Institutions and Some Laws and Decrees	6 (Education)	601 (Higher Education)
Bill on the Biosafety	7 (Environment)	709 (Species & Forest)

Source: Extracted from the TBMM's website and tabulated by the author.

As we can see from this sample coding, the short summaries of the bills are pretty helpful for the content-coding of law in accordance with the CAP coding scheme. Nevertheless, in some cases, the coding of the bills would be relatively complicated because of the incoherent titles. Similarly, in some cases, the bill may regulate more than one policy field under a single regulation called omnibus bills. To cope with such cases, the bill's original text is scrutinized. If the bill regulates more than one policy domain, additional lines are added to the sheet to assign each of them to one code in the CAP codebook.

In a nutshell, by covering the six legislative tenures under the party's rule, the agenda congruence between electoral pledges and subsequent government actions through the bills proposed by the government is addressed. As much suggested earlier, the mandate theory of democracy requires a significant association between electoral offerings of the government and subsequent policy activities (Hofferbert & Budge, 1992). From this point of view, each legislative tenure of the party is analyzed by comparing the percentage weight of each policy domain in both the election manifesto and bills through chapter 3 and chapter 4, respectively. Two important hypotheses are introduced for each analysis in these chapters to measure whether there is an agenda congruence between electoral pledges and government bills and to what extent, second how the concentration of power around the executive presidency has affected this congruence from 2002 to the present.

CHAPTER 3

FINDINGS: POLICY RESPONSIVENESS IN THE FIRST THREE LEGISLATIVE TENURES OF THE AKP RULE

Previous chapters provide theoretical background and several methodological approaches to test agenda congruence between public and government. Additionally, the justification for the case selection was provided by referring to the existing explanations in the literature. This approach was strengthened by the use of a novel data set. While analyzing the case in chapter 2, it was realized that studies through the opinion-policy or program to policy nexus have generally focused on the pre-presidential period of the governing AKP. Although some of these studies had taken into consideration the authoritarian U-turn of the political system under the rule of the party by either focusing on the clientelist linkage mechanism between the party and its constituencies (Bulut, 2017) or skewed playing field through the competitive authoritarian regime dynamics (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016), the situation about the democratic responsiveness with the transition to the presidential system have rarely been investigated. Moving from these research gaps, the findings of the thesis are aimed to be presented separately by dividing whole legislative periods into two chapters pre-2015 and post-2015 periods. In this chapter, three legislative tenures of the party (2002-2007, 2007-2011, and 2011-2015) are presented separately. Following this, to observe incremental alterations in both the institutional characteristics of the system and the responsiveness ability of the government to its electoral pledges, post-2015 periods are analyzed in a different chapter. In the light of this categorization, the proceeding method of chapter 3 is explained below.

Each of the three legislative tenures under the rule of the AKP is presented with three sub-sections. In the first sub-section, the frequencies and the descriptive findings of the legislative outputs enacted by the government in related tenure are presented. In the second, descriptive findings of the election manifesto with its figures and frequencies are visualized to construct causality between electoral pledges and legislative outputs across policy domains by employing the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) coding scheme. The third sub-section measures the policy congruence between the enacted laws and

proposed electoral pledges by heavily relying on the percentage weight of each policy domain in both data sets. Following the recommendations of several scholars (Bulut, 2017; Jones & Baumgartner, 2004) about the probable methods to measure pledge-policy congruence in the context of government responsiveness, the third sub-section employs the Pearson's correlation test on the causality between electoral pledges and subsequent government-sponsored bills by firstly visualizing charts of each data and then scrutinizing the institutionalist background of the related legislative tenure. Each chapter also seeks to measure agenda congruence between government actions and electoral pledges through testing two important hypotheses in the results. While the first is tested through the Pearson's correlation test quantitatively, the second is examined qualitatively observing different legal, institutional and constitutional regulations carried in two decades: To this end, hypotheses are presented below.

H1- Government-sponsored bills depend on the electoral pledges given by the government party itself.

H2- Pledge-policy congruence is more pronounced in a less centralized executive office than in a more centralized executive one.

3.1. 22nd LEGISLATIVE TENURE (2002 - 2007)

For the first time in its political history, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power on the 3 November 2002 general election. According to the Supreme Election Council (YSK) statistics, by receiving 34.29 percent of the total valid votes, the party achieved the majority to form the government independently with its 363 MPs. Because of the 10% electoral threshold, only two-party; governing AKP and the main opposition CHP, gained representation in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM).

Throughout the first term, the party positioned itself in the moderate position of the political spectrum and aligned with the median voter. With this distinguishing feature, the party has pursued a more moderate line to respond to the center of the political spectrum and diverged from the National Outlook tradition. The EU-integration pathway, more open foreign policy activism worldwide, and human rights-oriented policy agenda

brought the AKP nationwide electoral support. For continuing success in the nearest election, the government's legislative agenda has been aimed to fulfill the abovementioned mandates. The following sections portray the general features of the party's first tenure to measure whether the proposed policy agenda was fulfilled through the comprehensive legislative outputs.

3.1.1. Legislative Agenda

In 22nd legislative tenure, one of the central policy tenets of the governing AKP, was the EU integration process. As a result of this policy target, the party's first task was to harmonize the domestic law in accordance with the EU standards. To fulfill this process and consolidate country relations with Western and other countries, the party proposed many bilateral or multilateral international agreements to the parliament. As suggested in Chapter 2, the Turkish constitution authorizes the TBMM to ratify the international agreements signed by the cabinet with one country or any international organization.

As a consequence of this constitutional principle, in each legislative tenure, the proportionality of the international affairs category in the coding scheme constitutes the highest frequency among the other policy domains. To precisely measure the government agenda and prevent statistical error in calculating the correlation between electoral pledges and laws across policy domains, the frequency distribution of each policy domain is shown by omitting the international affairs category from the calculation. Before displaying the percentage distribution of each policy domain in the CAP coding scheme, the number of laws proposed as government-sponsored bills by the governing AKP during the party's first tenure is given in Table 4.

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Laws Enacted Between 2002-2007

	N	Missing	Minimum	Maximum
Law Number	783	31	4776	5687
CAP Main-Code	783	31	1	23

During the first tenure of the party, 783 government-sponsored bills were enacted. The third and fourth columns show that this law series starts with Law Number 4776 and ends with 5687. Although the total laws enacted in this period are 849 according to the TBMM data archive since private-sponsored bills are not included to measure only the government agenda, 66 of them enacted as private-sponsored bills are excluded. On the other hand, the second column implies missed government-sponsored bills in the data set. This value represents the overridden bills by the president. A detailed explanation of these bills is mentioned below. The second row, on the other hand, shows min. and max. values of the CAP main codes. While 1 represents the “Macroeconomic Issues” in the CAP coding scheme, the 23 means the “Culture”.

The general method to capture the frequencies of the policy domains in the literature is one-to-one coding. However, many policy fields may be regulated through one single bill in some cases. This methodology is mainly observed in coding omnibus bills which regulate different policy domains under a single legislative bill. Although some scholars argue that the policy-coding process for data sets requires assigning each element to one code number (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; Hofferbert & Budge, 1992), it is necessary to suggest that this way should be followed except omnibus bills. For this purpose, Law numbers 4916 and 4928, as omnibus bills, are assigned more than one policy domain in the codebook.

Another challenge encountered in coding this term's data set is vetoed laws. As may be recalled, in parliamentary systems, the legislative bills ratified by the assembly can be vetoed thanks to the president's "overriding veto" right (Gözler, 2010). The overridden bills are omitted from the calculation and indicated through the missing variable in table 2. When overall coding details are considered to analyze each policy domain's frequency distribution for the legislative outputs enacted between 2002-and 2007 as government-sponsored bills, Figure 2 is visualized.




Figure 2. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 22nd. Legislative Agenda

Undoubtedly, during this period, the international affairs category made up 49% of the parliament's total laws with 253 government bills. However, as justified through some above-mentioned constitutional principles, the international affairs category is omitted from the calculation to obtain the meaningful statistical relation between electoral pledges and government actions. As a result of this methodological preference, and as shown in figure 2, the most salient issue is the macroeconomics in the government agenda during the 22nd legislative tenure. In terms of the government-sponsored bills, many economic issues, including annual budget and settlement; wage policies, tax codes, monetary policies, and the regulations for the central bank, make up the macroeconomics policy category as a mostly prioritized policy domain in the government agenda. Followed this; law and crime, government operations, defense, and domestic commerce constituted the other prioritized policy domains in the same legislative tenure. Additionally, it is observed that the policy issues regarding the public lands, culture, and migration have received little political attention in the government legislative agenda in the same tenure.

3.1.2. Election Manifesto

During the 22nd legislative tenure, governing AKP's election manifesto is summarized in this sub-section. A different method is pursued to measure the party's electoral pledges and subsequent policy points' weight in the manifesto text. First, each natural sentence in the manifesto text is coded whether it contains policy pledges/points with code 1 or with code 0 if they do not contain any political intentions. For non-policy codes, sentences that emphasize the party's ideological explanations, spiritual approaches, and motivating speeches are chosen. Consequently, the descriptive statistics that summarize the total observations with policy and non-policy sentences and their percentage weights in the 2002 Election Manifesto are presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Frequencies and Percentage of Natural Sentences in the 2002 Election Manifesto

Levels	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
Policy Sentences	901	94.3 %	100.0 %
Non-policy Sentence	54	5.7 %	5.7 %

As shown in Table 4, almost 95 % of the total text is assigned as a policy sentence, while the remaining 5 % of the text is coded as non-policy sentences. This confirms why the election manifesto is a good proxy to measure prioritized policy domains for both party and public agenda based on the mandate theory.

After summarizing the descriptive findings of the electoral pledges of the governing AKP, to learn which domains are prioritized mainly by the party during the 22nd legislative tenure, figure 3 is shown. Like the analyzing method for the legislative agenda, to measure well-balanced policy domains through a CAP coding scheme, the international affairs category is excluded from the calculation in both percentage weight and frequencies. For this reason, the electoral sentences like stressed international cooperation with countries, including economic, trade, agricultural, and cultural issues, are not considered. In this respect, the 69 sentences assigned to the international affairs category are excluded from the calculation. As a result of this method, the distributions for frequencies and percentage

of the remaining policy categories in the 2002 election manifesto are displayed in figure 3.




Figure 3. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 2002 Election Manifesto

According details of figure 3, the 2002 election manifesto overwhelmingly focused on macroeconomic issues like in the legislative agenda. However, while the election manifesto tended to stress administrative issues such as appointments, civil services, property management, branch relations, and bureaucracy as secondly prioritized policy domains; the legislative agenda predominantly attended the law and crime category, including crime control, family issues, civil code, and some domestic policy issues for secondly prioritized policy category. This can be understood through the cyclical conditions. As suggested earlier, governing AKP was forced to harmonize the domestic law following the EU standards during this period. For this purpose, the government's legislative agenda mainly turned its attention toward the civil code. Another crucial point of the 2002 election manifesto is about civil rights. Accordingly, this category constitutes the thirdly prioritized policy domain in the manifesto text. The housing, migration, and defense issues are remarked as the other policy domains that received less political attention.

3.1.3. Results

After giving descriptive details about each data set containing election manifesto and government-sponsored bills, in this section, the correlation test is conducted to measure the degree of responsiveness between the frequencies of electoral pledges and the government-sponsored bills. This method has already been considered as a good proxy in both statistics and public policy literature to analyze whether one score increase (decrease) in one variable positively/negatively affects the same weight decrease (increase) in another variable. Statistical meaning of the correlation that is much compatible with the analyzed hypotheses, which aim to test whether agenda congruence exists between public and government (Bulut, 2017; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Jones & Baumgartner, 2004). In this manner, looking at the degree of correspondence between the government and public agenda through government-sponsored bills and election manifestos will enable us to assess pledge-policy congruence across years. This, in particular, is the first hypothesis of this thesis.

H1- Government-sponsored bills depend on the electoral pledges given by the government party itself.

To measure this hypothesis, figure 4 illustrates the agenda congruence between electoral pledges and legislative outputs by heavily relying on the percentage rate of each policy domain in both election manifesto and legislative data.




Figure 4. Agenda Congruence Between Electoral Pledges and Government-sponsored Bills

In figure 4, it is observed that almost all policy domains approached each other in terms of electoral pledges and legislative outputs during the first incumbent period of the governing AKP. While macroeconomics, energy, and government operations were more pronounced in the electoral pledges by 3-10 %, law and crime, defense, and civil rights were more dominant in the legislative agenda than in the election manifesto. Except for these tiny policy distances in some policy domains, it can easily be argued that agenda congruence between proposed electoral pledges and subsequent policy actions was provided at a sufficient level.

However, to statistically measure the abovementioned hypothesis, it is required to conduct Pearson's correlation coefficient, which is used for the bivariate equations to test whether linear relation exists. Considering hypothesis 1, it is estimated that the increase in the number of electoral pledges leads to an increase in the number of enacted laws. If this is the case for the agenda congruence between electoral pledges, which equals public agenda and government-sponsored bills, it should be expected that the correlation coefficient value must be bigger than ($r > 0.5$), which means that moderately correlated. If magnitude changes between 0.7 – and 1.0, it should be indicated that correlation is high between these variables. But before analyzing the relationship between these variables, it is required to give correlation coefficients and threshold values in table 6.

Table 6. Interpretation for Correlation Values

Magnitude of Correlation	Interpretation
0 to 0.3	Weakly correlated
0.3 to 0.7	Moderately correlated
0.7 to 1.0	Strongly correlated

Not: Values are taken from (Ratner, 2009) and tabulated by the author.

By heavily relying on these thresholds, the following table 6 presents the correlation test for the agenda congruence between electoral pledges and government-sponsored bills. This test confirms hypothesis 1 by obtaining the 0.79 r value for the relationship between these variables with strongly correlated linkage. Accordingly, the government's mostly prioritized policy domains in both the legislative agenda and the election manifesto corresponded to each other in a strong association.

Table 7. Correlation Between the Proportion of Electoral Pledges and Laws on the Policy Domains 2002-2007

		Government Bills	Electoral Pledges
Government Bills	Pearson's r	—	
	p-value	—	
Electoral Pledges	Pearson's r	0.793***	—
	p-value	<.001	—

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

After measuring the degree of correspondence between public and government agendas, the following hypothesis is introduced and then interpreted from the institutional set-up perspective during this period. Although such causality mentioned in hypothesis 2 was generally measured through logistic regression or multivariate models in many studies (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2005; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; Soroka & Wlezien, 2005; Wlezien & Soroka, 2012), throughout this thesis the effect of the institutional pattern on the responsiveness mechanism will be explained through the constitutional and institutional alterations which have gradually increased the power concentration in the

hands of the presidential office. Moving from this point, the following hypothesis is explained by scrutinizing the institutional appearance of the first tenure of the party.

H2- Pledge-policy congruence is more pronounced in a less centralized executive office than in a more centralized executive one.

To analyze whether the developed hypothesis is suitable for the first tenure of the governing AKP in terms of agenda congruence, it is beneficial to scrutinize the constitutional appearance in this term. A constitutional perspective is given to measure the effects of the institutional structure on the responsiveness degree between pledges and policies. To do this, the several amendments that have taken place by the TBMM are analyzed to determine whether changed principles in the constitution concentrate the power in the executive or not. Özbudun (2007), for this linkage, observed that constitutional amendments overwhelmingly bolstered the rule of law, protected fundamental human rights, and prevented the military's prerogatives on the governmental agenda between 1987 and 2004 (Özbudun, 2007, p. 180). Moreover, the remarkable point was the inter-party agreements to ratify related amendments in the parliament since no party has a two-thirds majority to change the constitution directly. This, in particular, confirms the more balanced distribution of power in the legislative and robust indicator for the less-centralized executive office for the 22nd legislative tenure.

Alevi Opening in 2007, negotiation for Kurdish minority rights, and several human rights-oriented policy agendas have been put into practice by combining moderate values of the political Islam and liberal democracy by the party (Özerdem & Whiting, 2019, p. 63). Mainstream discussions in which the party's political identity is scrutinized, particularly emphasizing its origin through the National Outlook (*Milli Görüş*) tradition, posited that human rights and vital freedoms of the democratic liberalization were central concerns under the rule of the predecessor wing of the political Islamism. Despite its successors in the 1970s and 1990s, the party's moderate political standpoint in the spectrum, which embraced economically liberal and politically conservative veins, signaled to the median voters for the representative politics under the parliament.

Party's moderate political standpoint was the central path to secure successor legacy from the newly emerging party's program and establishing catch-all politics across the nationwide electoral circle. As a result of this mandate, the first period of the party turned its route to Westernization by particularly emphasizing economic aspects of the integration through the pro-EU law regulations. In addition to this ideological re-mapping, the party also aimed to arrange existing anti-humanitarian law order by proposing several liberty-oriented amendments. However, this is not the only case to make law order in compliance with the democratic liberal order; the EU harmonization process also shaped the party policy agenda to remove such obstacles from the political system. As a result of this intention, the death penalty and State Security Courts were abolished via the 2004 Constitutional Amendment (Hale & Ozbudun, 2009, p. 56).

Similar articles against the pro-EU vision have gradually been abolished via several constitutional and legal amendment packages. This effort was accelerated through the nine harmonization packages, which reflect Copenhagen criteria, during the EU-integration process between 2002 and 2004. In the light of these policy agendas, which particularly emphasized the protection of civil liberties, inter-party negotiations became more visible. For instance, the article 72 of the 1982 constitution, which requires the political candidate shall not make speeches containing 'anarchic and ideological' was replaced with the 'terrorist actions' put into practice by the consensus between governing AKP and main opposition CHP to make Recep Tayyip Erdogan as an eligible candidate for the parliament (Hale & Ozbudun, 2009, p. 55). On the other hand, this particular example illustrates how inter-party reconciliation was operated during the first term of the party.

Some of the alterations in the 1982 constitution to make law order compatible with the Copenhagen Criteria also balanced the power between central and local authorities by emphasizing the freedom of association and freedom of assembly. For instance, the seventh harmonization package limited the role and authority of the provincial governments to ban or postpone collective marches. Similarly, several aspects of civil and military relations have been regulated to decrease the effect of the military tutelage on the civilian government. Instead of military dominance over the minister of the cabinet, a compromise was encouraged to give more authority to the prime minister.

Consequently, power distribution between governmental branches was aimed to be provided more balanced in the first incumbent period of the party.

In a nutshell, the centralization level of decision-making is not the explanatory variable in determining the agenda congruence during the first legislative tenure of the AKP. Gradual regulations made during the EU harmonization process strengthened the rule of law and gave voice to the alternative opinions in the society. Utilizing democratization reforms, power was distributed more balanced between governmental branches to make the political system compatible with the prerequisites of the EU integration. In the light of these observations, it should be emphasized that hypothesis 2 is also confirmed for this tenure because the centralization level of power was not a constitutional norm in the hands of the executive office during the 22nd legislative tenure.

3.2. 23rd LEGISLATIVE TENURE (2007- 2011)

Pursuing the abovementioned design, in this section, the 23rd legislative tenure of the governing AKP is presented. Contrary to analyzed tenure in the previous section, the second period of the party led to alterations in some principles of the constitutional structure. One of the significant changes in the following tenure was transitioning towards the semi-presidential system. For this reason, with the second legislative tenure of the AKP, the balance between executive and legislative office in terms of concentration of power will begin to deteriorate.

The 23rd legislative tenure was started with the general election, which was held on 22 July 2007 as a snap election. Since the assembly did not elect the President of Turkey because of the absence required majority; the regular schedule of the general election was pushed forward by the assembly itself. As a result of this snap election, the previous incumbent AKP gained the electoral majority of total votes again and established the executive cabinet of government thanks to its parliamentary majority. According to the formal statement of the YSK, taking 46.52 % of the total votes in the country, AKP has maintained its previous electoral triumph.

3.2.1. Legislative Agenda

For the 23rd legislative tenure of the governing AKP, the most remarkable point is the colossal proportionality of the international agreements and other government-sponsored bills. In the light of the relevant data, it is noticed that the government has proposed 309 international agreements to the TBMM for its approval to ratify. This rate illustrates the highest level of international agreements signed by the government in the six legislative tenure of the party itself. The Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) have been the forefront targeted- region for international cooperation, including agriculture, technology, culture, economy, foreign trade, and customs tariffs. In addition to these, the EU integration process was still dominant foreign policy activism for the 23rd legislative tenure. However, it is justified more previously, for the statistical meaningfulness, such international agreements are not considered due to their asymmetrical distribution among the other policy domains and require a simple way to pass in the parliament.

In Table 8, the total observation for the legislative data set is presented by showing descriptive findings of government-sponsored bills and two missing data assigned for the vetoed laws. Despite a large number of such data in the previous period, only two laws, one of which is about accounting and the other is about the field of electronic communication, were vetoed by the president for re-negotiation. As made before, no code has been assigned for these laws, and therefore descriptive analysis captured these as missing variables. The legislative agenda in this term was started with Law Number 5688 and ended with Law Number 6235.

Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Laws Enacted Between 2007-2011

	N	Missing	Minimum	Maximum
Law Number	494	2	5688	6235
CAP Main-code	494	2	1	23

Compared to the previous tenure's legislative performance, it is realized that the number of government-sponsored bills decreased by 0,63. This decrease might be explained by

the fact that the domestic law arrangements required to be made within the scope of the European Union harmonization laws were completed to a large extent in the previous period. Based on this, it might be debatable that foreign policy activism mainly shaped the government agenda between 2007-and 2011.




Figure 5. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 22nd. Legislative Agenda

It is deemed necessary to mention the mostly prioritized policy domains in this legislative term. Accordingly, like in the previous tenure, macroeconomics was still mostly prioritized policy field in the government legislative agenda. In this wake, issues regarding the law and crime and government operations have received the same attention. Despite civil rights as a topic had been taken its place in the coding scheme as the thirdly prioritized policy area between 2002 and 2007, the same policy domain, to a lesser extent, has received policy attention and is ranked 16th in this tenure. Another remarkable finding of the legislative agenda in this tenure is the degree of importance of social welfare. Interestingly, social welfare as a policy domain that includes low-income assistance, elderly assistance, and volunteer associations have never been regulated through government-sponsored bills according to coded data set in this period.

3.2.2. Election Manifesto

Electoral promises given by the governing AKP during the 2007 General Election have different trajectories than the previous election manifesto. First, the size of the manifesto text is more significant than the 2002 Election manifesto. Moreover, the number of sentences predominantly assigned to any code in the CAP coding scheme addresses the forthcoming legislative session and contains the party 2023 political agenda. However, as a requirement of the mandate approaches, these sentences are also considered policy sentences.

Approximately ninety-four percent of the total text in the 2007 manifesto contains policy stress, issue saliency, or public policy implications towards many different issue categories in the coding scheme. In terms of this indicator, it can be argued that governing AKP overwhelmingly perpetuated to design of its policy visions and missions through the election manifesto without paying more attention to the ideological explanations and similar rhetoric. Considerably to a lesser extent, with 6.8 % of the total text, such natural sentences were not calculated for both agenda congruence and measuring responsiveness.

Table 9. Frequencies and Percentage of Natural Sentences in the 2007 Election Manifesto

Levels	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
Policy Sentences	2119	93.2 %	100.0 %
Non-policy Sentence	155	6.8 %	6.8 %

When we looked at the frequency distribution of each policy category in the 2007 election manifesto, several points caught our attention. First, unlike the proportionality of distribution in the 2002 election manifesto, the distribution chart in this manifesto was more balanced except for the macroeconomics category. Second, almost all policy categories received pledge or promise-based attention by the governing party except for migration, similar to the 2002 manifesto. At this point, it is so beneficial to investigate why migration and related issues had remained to a lesser extent in these two manifesto texts and, therefore, government and public policy agenda. This is—just like the other

issues related to the cyclical conditions as well-known migration-based matters have been brought into the government agenda as a most salient issue since the 2014 Syrian crisis. Up to this date, in this respect, it can be deduced that the immigration issue has only just begun to enter Turkey's political agenda in the last few years.




Figure 6. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 2007 Election Manifesto

The prioritization level of the domestic commerce category in this frequency distribution is another crucial factor that should be considered. In the 2007 manifesto, the party overwhelmingly paid political attention to the commercial activities of the different sectors, including small businesses, tourism, corporates, and insurance. Issues regarding copyrights and patents for intellectual property, insurance regulations for private and public sectors, and consumer finances which encompass mortgages, credit cards, and other financial assets, have been politicized in different weights in this manifesto text. For this reason, for the second incumbency government, it must be noted here that the relationship between the public and private sectors gained political importance.

3.2.3. Results

After making sufficient analysis about mostly prioritized policy fields in both electoral and governmental agendas, the abovementioned hypotheses are introduced and measured

in this section. To measure whether government wide-volume electoral pledges are correlated with the legislative outputs for hypothesis 1, the correlation test is applied by showing first, percentage distributions of each policy domain in both manifesto text and government-sponsored bills in figure 7.




Figure 7. Agenda Congruence Between Electoral Pledges and Government-sponsored Bills

As shown in figure 7, the distance between electoral pledges and the government-sponsored bills is close to each other in many policy areas except for public lands, civil rights, agriculture, and social welfare. For these domains in which the percentage distribution range between proposed or promised electoral pledges and subsequent government activities have aroused so distant from each other. The direction of the lines also seems to progress against each other. In other words, while the government gave more pledges for agricultural productivity or subsidization to the farmers, agricultural policy venues have rarely been regulated through government-sponsored bills. Similarly, while governing AKP has politicized more about the public lands, including regulations through water resources, water management, national parks, and other territorial issues in its legislative agenda, pledge-based explanations about this policy domain are considered lesser in the 2007 election manifesto. To measure these distances or proximity between electoral pledges and government-sponsored bills following hypothesis is aimed to be tested.

H1- Government-sponsored bills depend on the electoral pledges given by the government party itself.

Like the first measurement method, a correlation test is conducted to capture agenda congruence between government-sponsored bills and electoral pledges given by the party itself. The first incumbent period of the party shows a significant association between these agendas. However, how this value changed in the second period of the party is blurred. To answer this question, Pearson's correlation coefficient value is measured by considering the percentage weight of each data-set across policy domains in accordance with the CAP coding scheme in Table 10.

Table 10. Correlation Between the Proportion of Electoral Pledges and Laws on the Policy Domains Between 2007-2011

		Government Bills	Electoral Pledges
Government Bills	Pearson's r	—	
	p-value	—	
Electoral Pledges	Pearson's r	0.584**	—
	p-value	0.007	—

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

According to the instruction about the interpretations and numerical thresholds for the correlation coefficient values presented in table 3, the degree of government responsiveness to its mandate is measured at 0.584, which is moderately correlated. As it is understood, the ability of the government to respond to the public policy agenda, which is measured through the electoral mandates, decreased by 0.209 from a strong correlation to a moderate correlation. To explain this considerable decrease in the responsiveness coefficient, another general hypothesis of the thesis is introduced and then explained via the constitutional anatomy of this term.

H2- Pledge-policy congruence is more pronounced in a less centralized executive office than in a more centralized executive one.

According to hypothesis 2, agenda congruence between the public and government depends on the institutional body of the constitutional structure. The gradual decrease in

the correlation coefficient value from the first to the second tenure of the governing AKP is, in this context, more understandable. Because power-sharing arrangements between vital institutions of the governmental structure were well-balanced due to the presidential office's veto-player effect on another wing of the executive branch and inter-party reconciliation in the first tenure, the government's ability to respond to the public agenda was more robust. This, in essence, was explained through the double-centered anatomy of the constitutional structure according to Akman and Akçalı (2017) (Aslan Akman & Akçalı, 2017, p. 581). Similarly, studies on the Western and well-institutionalized countries have indicated that the government's responsiveness depends on the executive discretion (Soroka & Wlezien, 2004) and re-election concerns of the incumbents (Thomson et al., 2017; Toshkov et al., 2020). For instance, Arnold and Franklin (2012) argued that elected officials' re-election concerns lead to strongly-associated opinion-policy linkage (Arnold & Franklin, 2012, p. 1223). Although the popularly elected center-right politicians have insisted on this issue for abolishing, each forthcoming one among these elites wanted to extend the presidential office's executive authority towards the legislative office and has more desires for the crumbling double-headed appearance of the administrative structure.

Indeed, getting centralization in the executive office cannot be explained only by looking at the changing pattern of the constitutional structure. Although the double-centered executive wing has been the norm for a long time –at least since transitioning to a multi-party period- the veto player role of the presidential office was more dominant till the expiration of former president Ahmet Necdet Sezer. After a controversial process for the election of the forthcoming president, which called as 367 crisis, the supra-political identity of the presidency had been decayed with the election of incumbent candidate Abdullah Gül. In this respect, the veto-player effect on the executive discretion was abolished in favor of the popularly-elected wing of the executive office. The changing effect of the presidency's prerogatives and tutelary on the legislative and executive activities can be observed in the number of bills overridden by the president himself. This indicator is given above in Table 5 as a missing variable. This, in particular, was the historical turning point of the power concentration practice for Turkey.

CHP application to the Constitutional Court because of the absence of a quorum for the presidential election led to changes in the election style of the presidency. As a result of this controversial debate on the electoral style of the presidency, a constitutional amendment was held in a referendum. The constitutional amendment is the second crucial point of getting the concentration of power in the executive office. One of the most important provisions of the constitutional amendment held on October 21, 2007, was the changing of the presidential election style. With the new amendment, the president would no longer be elected by the TBMM; instead, the public is acquired to vote on who will be president. Thus, both wings of the executive branch became popularly elected, and the veto player's effect on the executive and legislative discretion began to disappear.

The possible risk of the candidacy declaration by the governing AKP without any compromised process with the other party in the parliament CHP has also threatened the dissents to be confronted with the excessive control of the executive branches by the party itself. Consequently, Republican Rallies started to protest the new election for the presidency and spread to three major cities in the country. After controlling this political turmoil, the election of the presidency was aimed to prevent by appealing to the constitutional court because the necessary quorum was not provided. When CHP's application to the court was founded correctly, all of these events and polarized society have been transformed into a new era in which seizing the executive office to dissolve secularist domination in the bureaucracy became a political priority through the plebiscitarian characteristic of the presidency.

When looking at the then-president Ahmet Necdet Sezer's warnings about the amendment bill, which regulates the election style of the president, further scenarios in the case of the popularly-elected president would become more understandable. By returning the related bill to the parliament, Sezer anticipated that changing the method of the presidency not only abolish the impartial characteristic of the presidency but also may create a dominant figure in the political system who represent the power of the majority in parliament and extinguish the parliamentary check and balances (Hale & Ozbudun, 2009, p. 63). Moreover, this possible scenario was argued that might lead to the politicization of the presidency in favor of the narrow constituent of the candidate (Hale, 2008). Additionally, the primary regime protector role of the presidency under the rule of

a neutral president was feared would be disappeared with the partial president's dominance on the several branches and functions of the presidential office like appointive rights over vital public institutions of the system (Hale & Ozbudun, 2009, p. 65).

When the abovementioned background is considered, the second hypothesis of the study, which argues that the government's ability to respond to its mandate depends on the level of concentration in power, constitutionally fits the second legislative tenure under the rule of the AKP. One of the central purposes of this thesis posits that the second incumbent period of the party is a pretty crucial point to observe how the centralization tendency in the executive branch emerged in the context of political turmoil. Although the tenure began to continue the Westernization tendency through the additional harmonization packages, towards the due of the term, the party's moderate position in the political realm deteriorated with the polarized political turmoil and institutional expansion by the popularly elected president via election. From this tenure, it should be noted here that executive expansion through the partisan control in the constitutional structure was gradually put into practice. Following this, although the correlation value between the government's agenda and its pledges is measured at a moderate level, to precisely answer the question of how dramatic and gradual decreases in the agenda congruence have been carried towards the last tenure, these institutional developments should be considered as essential determinants.

3.3. 24th LEGISLATIVE TENURE (2011- 2015)

Up to so far, two legislative periods under the AKP's dominance on both the executive and legislative branches of the government were measured through the pledge-policy nexus as a venue for governmental responsiveness to the mass preferences. The concentration of power as a de facto has come into force for the first time in the second legislative period of the governing party. Since the second tenure of this executive presidency practice, the following periods will provide more robust indicators to observe the extent to which governmental power-sharing has been gathered through the presidential office and how electoral mandates have been affected by this changing political pattern system.

The transitioning toward the semi-presidentialism that allows the president -who is no longer elected by the MPs- to dominate both the executive and legislative agenda seems like had started to undermine the check and balances between the government's branches. Judicial appropriations, the composition of the different political institutions such National Security Council (MGK), appointments for high-senior public officials, and other vital instruments have also been gradually transferred from the TBMM to the presidential office in terms of authorization. Thus, the indicators to observe the centralization of power in the executive office will become more visible after the 24th legislative tenure of the governing AKP. Moving from this point of view, this period will be understood more clearly in terms of pledge-policy congruence as a mandated requirement.

In accordance with the constitutional amendment carried out in the previous legislative term, the first general elections were held on 12 June 2011 at the scheduled time. This was a unique development for Turkish electoral history because the forthcoming general election was not held as a snap election for the first time. The general election, with its high turnout, was also historically significant in Turkey's electoral legacy. According to YSK statistics, by polling 49.80 % of total cast ballots, AKP won a landslide victory again on the 24th legislative tenure.

3.3.1. Legislative Agenda

To sum up, along with the first and second legislative tenure of the governing AKP, the legislative agenda predominantly turned its attention toward the three policy domains. Although one of them, which implies the international affairs category is not considered as a policy venue because legislative procedures to enact bilateral or multilateral international agreements do not require systematic negotiations, unlike those for the other government-sponsored or private-sponsored bills continue its highest frequency among the other policy domains in both three legislative periods of the governing AKP. Macroeconomic issues, if the international affairs category is omitted from the calculation, have still protected its firstly prioritized policy rank in the third period under the AKP rule. Similarly, the other prioritized policy domains for both the first and second

legislative period under the party perpetuates its secondary, tertiary, or quaternary positions among the policy categories in the CAP coding scheme. Overall indicators show that legislative outputs enacted by the government generally focus on the same vital policy domains in each legislative tenure.

Legislative agenda-setting in the third period of the party indicates that the international affairs category still dominates both the executive and the legislative agenda. According to descriptive findings of the coded data set in this period, 265 of the total 413 laws enacted as government-sponsored bills belonged to this category. The government had signed various international treaties for various policy subjects with MENA, Gulf, and European countries. However, statistical details show that the MENA region is still the prioritized destination for foreign policy activism, like in the previous terms. Table 8 illustrates the total observations on the 24th legislative tenure of the governing AKP by dropping the international affairs category from the calculation. During this term, 393 government-sponsored bills had been acted by the TBMM, which range from Law Number 6237 to 6652. No missing variable had been caught in this term as well.

Table 11. Descriptive Statistics for Laws Enacted Between 2011-2015

	N	Missing	Minimum	Maximum
Law Number	393	0	6237	6652
CAP Main-code	393	0	1	23

To observe prioritized policy domains throughout the third legislative period under the AKP rule, like in the previous analyses, figure 8 shows the frequency distributions of each policy venue following the CAP coding scheme. Like in the previous tenures, the government still protected the importance of the economic issue in the legislative agenda-setting. By proposing 22 economic-related bills, including budget plans, monetary policy, interest and inflation regulations, and so on, the government has considerably responded to the economic issues in the public agenda by making up this policy category is the highest frequency among other fields. Similar to the 23rd legislative period, the law and crime category, including judiciary appropriations, civil and criminal code, judgement

procedures, court administration, family protection and violation against women, and relevant policy segments, became the secondly prioritized policy venue in the legislative agenda.




Figure 8. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 24th. Legislative Agenda

Another privileged feature in this tenure's legislative agenda is the migration issue. When analyzing the second legislative tenure, it was emphasized that migration as a salient issue would be dominant in policy-making when the Syrian crisis became more salient in 2014. For this reason, the government subsequently turned its political attention toward the migration issue to regulate immigrants' accession to the country and their accommodations by employing varied government-sponsored bills. As a result of this salient issue's effect on the government agenda, with Law number 6458, the Directorate General of Migration Management (GİGM) was established. In this regard, public lands and housing-related issues remained less on this legislative agenda than in the previous periods.

In terms of civil rights-related issues, the legislative agenda in this period rarely paid policy-based attention. Although an important bill was initiated and then enacted in this period with Law Number 6459 regulating human rights and freedom of speech, it was not adequate to consider that this policy domain received a considerable amount of policy attention.

3.3.2. Election Manifesto

Once overall indicators for the government mostly prioritized policy domains in its legislative agenda are presented, in this section, the same indicators are observed through the party's 2011 election manifesto. Moving from this point, like the previous two legislative tenures, policy positions and the pledge patterns in the 2011 election manifesto of the governing AKP is analyzed.

Table 12 illustrates the overall percentage distribution between policy and non-policy sentences in the 2011 election manifesto. Accordingly, like the previous election manifesto of the party, almost whole sentences have been devoted to one policy category in the CAP coding scheme. For non-policy sentences, party ideological standpoint and other emotional-based explanations have been chosen. Thus, 91 % of the entire text has been coded as policy-based promises or political pledges.

Table 12. Frequencies and Percentage of Natural Sentences in the 2011 Election Manifesto

Levels	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
Policy Sentences	3069	91.01 %	100.0 %
Non-policy Sentence	303	8.09 %	8.09 %

After, in figure 9, the percentage-weight distribution of each policy domain in the 2011 election manifesto is shown. Not surprisingly, the party prioritized the macroeconomics issues as the most salient issue among the public opinion and therefore intensely focused on this category in the manifesto text. Nevertheless, contrary to the previous manifesto texts, for the 2011 general election, governing AKP turned its policy route towards the social welfare category and prioritized this domain secondarily in its manifesto text. On the other side, law and crime as a policy category protected its importance level among the other policy areas as ranked the third.




Figure 9. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 2011 Election Manifesto

Cultural issues in the manifesto text also gained political importance contrary to previous manifestos. On the other hand, foreign trade and similar sub-policy categories lost their volume in the manifesto text compared to previous periods and became a less prioritized policy area. Public lands and migration-based political pledges have remained the least prioritized policy categories based on policy commitments, maintaining their order of importance in this manifesto text. As a result, the most salient issues in the government's electoral pledges mainly were associated with those in the previous tenures.

3.3.3. Results

Arguing Downsian approach to the electoral competition and mandate standpoint through the pledge-policy linkage, political parties or the politician's constant responsiveness to public policy preferences have been assumed to refer democratic responsiveness. Numerous studies in this line have accounted for different perspectives to measure whether this normative requirement has been the norm for the Western or the other well-institutionalized countries. This study assumed linkage is considered a vital source of democratic responsiveness between government and the public. Although literature either pursued this linkage through opinion to policy or vice versa, as seen in the dynamic

representation model (Stimson et al., 1995; Wlezien, 2004; Wlezien & Soroka, 2012), this study operates pledge to policy linkage as a kind of government responsiveness because voters tend to vote the political parties or politicians those who only pledged policy alternatives which correspond with their expectations and similarly, politicians or political parties are office-seekers forthcoming elections if they translate their pledges into tangible policy outcome. Depending on this causality, measure the correspondence value between proposed electoral pledges in the 2011 manifesto text and the government-sponsored bills during the 24th legislative period hypothesis 1 is introduced and then tested.

H1: Government-sponsored bills depend on the electoral pledges given by the government party itself.

The government's ability to respond to its mandate in its first and second legislative tenure is measured through the causality presented in hypothesis 1. Accordingly, the correlation coefficient value for the first and second legislative tenure in which the centralization level of power in executive office gradually increased thanks to several constitutional amendments and the abolishing veto players' effect on the decision-making bodies of the governmental structure decreased from ($r=0.793$) to ($r=0.584$). This implies that while the government's incentives to respond to its mandate are many high in its first legislative period, which is characterized as a less-centralized executive setup, for the second tenure in which power-sharing between governmental branches has been decayed in favor of the popularly-elected wing of the executive this value is low in comparison with the first. To find the value for the third legislative tenure of the government, table 13 shows the statistical relation between government bills and electoral pledges by employing a correlation test. However, before this, figure 10 visualizes the policy congruence between electoral pledges and government-sponsored bills by calculating the percentage weight of each policy domain in both data sets.




Figure 10. Agenda Congruence Between Electoral Pledges and Government-sponsored Bills

As seen in figure 10, the distance between proposed electoral pledges and government-sponsored bills increased in many policy venues compared with the first and second legislative periods of the government. The highest distances are observed in law, crime, and social welfare by 0,08. As mentioned before, the government's electoral agenda has paid more attention to issues about social welfare, whereas legislative outputs have less prioritized this domain in this tenure. In contrast, the issue of foreign trade has received an essential level of policy importance in the government's legislative agenda but received little attention in the 2011 election manifesto 0,07. Additionally, the distance in many policy domains, including civil rights, labor, environment, housing, defense, and government operations, tended to increase in this legislative period.

Table 13. Correlation Between the Proportion of Electoral Pledges and Laws on the Policy Domains Between 2011-2015

		Government Bills	Electoral Pledges
Government Bills	Pearson's r	—	
	p-value	—	
Electoral Pledges	Pearson's r	0.523**	—
	p-value	0.018	—

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Observing differences across policy domains can be deduced from the visualized chart and can be analyzed through the correlation test. Accordingly, while the correlation coefficient value is high in the first (with 0.793) and second (with 0.59) legislative tenure of the government, in the third period, we can realize a downward trend in the congruence level between electoral pledges and government-sponsored bills are still the norm. The second hypothesis, which aims to find the effects of the concentration of power in the executive office on pledge-policy congruence, is introduced and then interpreted to evaluate this trend via institutional arrangements.

H2: Pledge-policy congruence is more pronounced in a less centralized executive office than in a more centralized executive one.

When the downward trend in the congruence level between the electoral and legislative agenda of the government and the increasing level of concentration of power as an institutional tendency is taken into consideration, it is required to look at changing institutional setup throughout the 24th legislative tenure.

Following debatable issue about the election style of presidency called *367 crisis*, Turkish political system has involved in the new era which considerably changed the check and balances between governmental branches and plebiscitarian veins became more visible. The presidency's tutelary and regime protector role has gradually been abolished after transitioning to the semi-presidential system, which enables the popular vote to elect the president. During this process, it was put forward that changing the electoral style of the presidency not only abolished the neutral characteristic of the office but also led to more dominance of the majoritarian wing in the parliament. For this reason, the gradual transformation of the authority from parliament to the presidential office can be considered in the light of the second legislative tenure's constitutional achievements. This lens seems considerably important to analyze the situation in the third legislative tenure and so on.

At the beginning of the third legislative tenure under the party's rule, the legislative agenda was predominantly shaped with the intention of a new constitutional structure. Acquired matter from the previous term, which relates to the headscarf ban, led to the re-

building of the constitution with the themes of religious equality and secularist preventions. Party's attention to the issue gained political momentum at the beginning of the term. Although secularist veins of the political system acted with deliberation on the headscarf matter for lifting the ban, the party's prominent figures argued that although there is a social consensus to lift the ban, the absence of an institutional consensus delays the process (Hale & Ozbudun, 2009, p. 74). Widespread conflict on the several matters continued throughout the third legislative tenure, but these principally converged on the one point: institutional structure should be regulated.

Pursuing the central arguments for hypothesis 2 in the previous periods' analyses, to measure the centralization degree of the power in executive office during this tenure, it is beneficial to scrutinize the constitutional amendment proposal drawn by the party and then hold a referendum on 12 September 2010. With the tendency to decrease the veto players' role in the decision and policy-making structure in the governmental branch, the government substantially desired to change the existing constitution, which is believed to legalize the positions of the regime protector role in these mechanisms. One of these regime protectors –according to the government- was the Constitutional Court.

To decrease the effect of these institutions on policy-making, one of the central tenets of the constitutional amendment package was reflected in Article 16, which aimed to regulate the composition of the Constitutional Court in favor of the government's candidate preferences. Additionally, articles in this amendment package were proposed to prevent secular-oriented institutions' role in the civilian government, such as the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK). Prominent figures in the party have firmly advocated a correlation between democracy and constitutional amendment, which enable the civilian government to use political power by purging the veto player's role (Özpek, 2012, p.158). That is to say that, If the popular vote passed the amendment package, it would be a triumph for the rule of law, according to these political figures.

On the other side, opposition parties criticized this amendment package because this may lead to civilian authoritarianism and damage the separation of powers (Özpek, 2012). Despite these counter-arguments, by receiving % a 57.88 yes vote, the constitutional amendment package was adopted into the force by the popular vote. This high turnout in

the referendum and percentage of yes cast are, on the other hand, considered essential to understanding how plebiscitarian characteristics of the new government became a norm under the rule of the party. Although several power elites and secular-backed public institutions' prerogatives on the civilian government dominated the elected officials' autonomy for decision and policy-making since the 1980s, after the second term of the party, nation-wide electoral support created a popular-backed decision and policy-making process and relation between the tutelary regime and civilian government decayed in favor of latter.

From this point of view, the relationship between the civilian government and military forces can be considered the several provisions of the constitutional amendment package. That is to say, that enacted constitutional amendment prevented the political role of the secular-oriented institutions' in the decision and policy-making procedures of the civilian government and immune the judiciary's disposal towards the elected wing of the executive. This, in particular, was the second target of the party to abolish the executive discretion of the secular-backed institutions on the civilian government. Consequently, the preceding autonomy of such institutions was transferred into the civilian government, which ultimately created more autonomy for the elected wing of the governmental system. Although this central purpose will be provisioned in the subsequent constitutional amendment, which refers to the 2017 referendum, governing AKP politicized this issue in its 2011 election manifesto by stressing that the judiciary's neutrality is an essential component of the democratization process in Turkey.

When overall indicators can be considered, it might be argued that the 2010 constitutional amendment was another milestone in the concentration of power practice in the Turkish political structure. By eliminating the role and political effect of the veto-players on the governmental structure, the party aimed to transfer the political autonomy into the elected wings of the executive office. On the other hand, this practice has already been carried out thanks to a previous constitutional amendment to form an executive office of which all wings were elected by popular vote. In this respect, the tendency to gather political power in executive office seems to be continue

CHAPTER 4

THE POST-2015 PERIOD: POPULARLY ELECTED PRESIDENT AND THE CONCENTRATION OF EXECUTIVE POWER

Chapter 3 dealt with the first, second, and third legislative periods of the governing AKP by accounting for the effects of the institutional arrangements on the government's responsiveness to its electoral pledges by relying on the mandate theory of democracy. As mentioned before, this chapter is deliberately separated from the overall findings for the whole legislative period. It is aimed that the post-2015 period should be analyzed critically by considering recent accounts on the democratic backsliding of the country and possible trajectories in the near future with the absence of data-driven analyses covering the aftermath of the post-2015 period in the literature. The previous chapter, in this manner, confirmed both this perspective and existing explanations of the political performance of the party by suggesting that the party followed a more human-right oriented, Westernized, and economically-developed political route (Aslan Akman & Akçalı, 2017; Gumuscu & Sert, 2009; Özbudun, 2007). However, recent studies provide valuable insights to evaluate the authoritarian U-turn in Turkey, particularly after 2015. Transition to the presidential system must be considered in the post-2015 period since the country has changed its political system. The gradual centralization of power in the hands of a popularly-elected president is one of the remarkable reasons why this research analyzes the last three legislative agendas separately. For this purpose, chapter 4 deals with the 25th, 26th, and 27th legislative periods when the country is conceptualized as a rising competitive authoritarian regime (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016; Özbudun, 2015).

Throughout the last chapter of this thesis, like the previous analyses, each legislative period of the party is presented with its legislative agenda, electoral pledges, and statistical results. While doing so the 25th and the 26th periods of the party are separately analyzed from the last 27th period because a snap election called after June 2015 election created two short-sized legislative tenures between 2015 and 2018. After June 2015 general election, because no party could form a government and after the failure of coalition talks, the president called a snap election in the same year. In November 2015,

the snap election took place, and governing AKP re-obtained the majority of parliament. Thus the 25th and the 26th legislative tenures have lasted only three years until a new government system was put into force in the 2018 presidential and general elections. Pursuing these electoral separations, the post-2015 period is analyzed through the two different sections. The first section examines the 25th and 26th terms of the party with the 2015 election manifesto and government-sponsored bills enacted between 2015 and 2018. The second section focuses on the 27th term in which the presidential government system was put into force, and the concentration of power in the hands of the popularly-elected president peaked at its zenith through the 2017 constitutional amendment. For the last term analysis, the 2018 election manifesto and party group's private-sponsored bills are used to measure pledge-policy congruence between 2018 and 2022.

As noticed, this is a different analysis because private-sponsored bills preferred to detect government agenda instead of government-sponsored bills for the first time. This practice is stemmed from the presidential government system, which enables the president to make legislation through executive decrees instead of government-sponsored bills. Because the prime-ministerial office was abolished with the 2017 constitutional amendment, the government agenda started to be determined by the presidential office and its legislative majority in the parliament. Using the parliamentary data set again, pledge-policy congruence is measured only through the bills proposed by the party group in the parliament. For this reason, the second section of this chapter analyzed the 27th legislative tenure of the party through the private-sponsored bills and electoral pledges of the 2018 election manifesto. But before this, the first 25th and 26th legislative tenures are presented below.

4.1. THE 25th AND THE 26th LEGISLATIVE TENURES (2015- 2015; 2015-2018)

Throughout the 25th tenure, Turkish political history witnessed several significant developments that either undermined the democratization process (Aslan Akman & Akçalı, 2017; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016) or transformed the de facto presidential into a de jure one (Özsoy Boyunsuz, 2016; Taş, 2015). The accelerating conflicts in the country,

polarized civil society, failed coup attempts by the Gulen Movement, and new agenda-setting to put presidential system into force enabled many researchers to discuss the possible effects of this period on the democratization or democratic backsliding process of the country. Although the considerable literature accounted for this tenure from different perspectives, the issue of what the government did and what people wanted in terms of substantial government responsiveness had remained blurred. Although several studies have taken place to measure this quest (Bulut, 2017; Esen et al., 2021; Yildirim et al., 2020), the post-2015 period received little scholarly attention. This research aims to fill this gap.

Under these circumstances, the legislative agenda has been overwhelmingly dominated by the subject of rearranging the institutional setup and regulating new kinds of checks and balances between vital branches of the governmental structure. To closely scrutinize the changing pattern of the institutional structure through a constitutional amendment that legalized *de facto* presidentialization as a *de jure* political regime, it is beneficial to provide a data-oriented approach to account for whether the proposed and then enacted executive presidency has stabilized democratic consolidation and provided people-friendly executive practice. This enables us to ask two crucial questions about the newly enacted presidential government system. First, has the new government system increased the government incentives to respond to the publicly prioritized and salient issues, and second, has mandate responsiveness of the government to the narrow constituency or general electorate been affected by transitioning to the presidential government system? To precisely answer these questions, below the agenda-setting appearance of this tenure is given with a data-set and analysis.

4.1.1. Legislative Agenda

With several alterations in the institutional arrangements, the checks and balances between governmental branches had also kept going in this term. Although emerged peculiar events mentioned above when presenting the political atmosphere of the tenure significantly obsoleted policy agenda-setting of the government, the responsiveness to the people's policy expectations was still an unchanged requirement. To look at this

reciprocity between government actions and the people's policy expectations, it was required to match legislative outputs with the electoral mandates given by the party during the 2015 general election. As we may be recalled, since no party has the required seats to set the executive cabinet in the parliament according to the results of the June election, coalition bargaining was negotiated between AKP and other opposition parties in the parliament. When negotiations had not concluded with the coalition agreement, a snap election for November was called by the president Erdoğan. For this reason, the party mandate to the general electorate and public policy agenda were considered as same for the upcoming election. The same election manifesto was used by relying on this fact to match legislative outputs with the public policy agenda.

The descriptive findings of these tenures are shown in table 15. The most remarkable feature of the descriptive findings in these tenures was the considerable size of the omnibus bill. Contrary to previous terms, during the state of emergency regime that was declared on July 21, 2016, to deal with the political order for the post-coup term, the government changed existing laws and regulated many policy domains under the one single bill defined in the Law as an omnibus bill. Below, the three such omnibus bill is shown in table 14.

Table 14. Omnibus Bills that Enacted during the 25th. Legislative Tenure

Law No	Title	Regulated Domains
6661	Draft Law Amending the Military Service Law and Some Laws and Decrees	Defense, Macroeconomics, Government Operations
6663	Draft Law Amending Income Tax Law and Some Laws	Macroeconomics, Labor, Health, Housing
6745	Draft Law on Establishment of Turkey Wealth Fund and Amending Certain Laws and Decrees	Macroeconomics, Public Lands, Domestic Commerce

To code such omnibus bills, each comma-separated sentence in the bill's short summary is assigned to the related policy category. As seen in Table 14, Law Number 6661 is assigned to the three policy categories in the CAP coding scheme because it regulates military personnel, teacher appointments, and Central Bank's monetary policy. Moving

from this point, the following table shows the overall observations throughout these periods.

Table 15. Descriptive Statistics for Laws Enacted Between 2015-2018

	N	Missing	Minimum	Maximum
Law Number	540	0	6654	7139
CAP Main-code	540	0	1	23

During the 25th and 26th legislative tenures of the governing AKP, the prioritized policy domains in the legislative agenda, are visualized in figure 11. The most privileged feature of this tenure in terms of prioritized issue domains is the highest frequency of the government operations category. Although this policy category is also ranked one out of three binding domains in the previous legislative tenures, as shown in figure 11, the order of importance is changed significantly and is located top of mind in the legislative agenda.




Figure 11. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 25th. Legislative Agenda

As mentioned in the different parts of this thesis, when analyzing the political atmosphere of this tenure, governing AKP needed to tackle the 'parallel state organization,' characterized as a pro-putschist and anti-government group. The most possible answer to

such policy attention towards the government operations is about the civil servants' appointments and dismissals. Civil servants' positions in different vital institutions, including the judiciary, universities, bureaucracy, and Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), are dismissed or appointed. To carry out this purpose, many institutions and organizational structures of these bureaus have been transformed in terms of human resources management, organizational dependency, and functionality. Additionally, to harmonize the domestic law about the governmental structure according to the presidential government system design, much attention has been paid to the system's administrative structure. Moreover, all of these functions are categorized under the title of government operations in the CAP coding scheme as subtitles, including appointments, intergovernmental relations, bureaucracy, etc. The highest frequency of the government operations category is more understandable in light of these developments.

Another crucial point about the frequency distribution of each policy domain in these tenures is the law and crime category's prioritized level. When the coup attempt was prevented, many putschists from the military junta or pro-putschists civil personnel, and other suspicious persons were arrested and sentenced. Thus juridical regulations became the main agenda of the government to deal with the excessive number of prisoner's situations and related other legal gaps to evaluate emerging problems in case of a state of emergency. For this purpose, different kinds of regulations, including the effectiveness of defense and policy forces against terrorist attacks, crime-oriented matters, and so on, have been made via government-sponsored bills. And this increased the frequency of the law and crime category rather than other policy domains in these tenures. The energy, culture, and housing can be seen when looking at the other issues that received less political attention in these periods. Whereas two of them, the culture and housing, have received less political importance almost in each legislative tenure, the degree of importance of the energy-based matters is another prominent feature of this tenures. It can be argued that energy-based issues have never been politicized via government-sponsored bills throughout these terms.

4.1.2. Election Manifesto

As mentioned before, to determine which policy domains were mainly prioritized in the 2015 electoral agenda of the governing AKP, the manifesto prepared for the June General Election was used. Although the party prepared a new election manifesto because of snap election was called for November 2015, each of both problematized the exact domains under the same headings. To measure publicly prioritized policy issues between 2015- and 2018, the former election manifesto is preferred to match legislative outputs with the electoral pledges.

Table 16 illustrates each natural sentence's overall frequency and percentage weight in the June 2015 election manifesto. Accordingly, the party substantially politicized each policy issue in its electoral agenda. Policy distributions have been reflected in each policy category in the CAP coding scheme in a broad sense. This explains why the electoral agenda of the government is also rationalized as a publicly prioritized issue set by relying on the mandate theory.

Table 16. Frequencies and Percentage of Natural Sentences in the 2011 Election Manifesto

Levels	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
Policy Sentences	3711	93.45 %	100.0 %
Non-policy Sentence	260	6.55 %	6.55 %

Figure 12 shows the frequency distribution of each policy domain in the legislative agenda of the governing AKP. Accordingly, like the other term's party's electoral agenda, macroeconomic issues make up 14% of the total text. Following this domain, government operations and domestic commerce received considerable electoral attention in this tenure. When we compare the importance of these policy domains by looking at both the manifesto and legislative agendas of the government, we ought to admit that administrative issues, including intergovernmental relations, public employee

appointments, civil service, and bureaucratic issues received similar policy attention in this tenure.




Figure 12. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 2015 June Election Manifesto

Such congruence in this domain in both agendas can be explained by the AKP's intention to prepare a new and *sine qua non* government system for the Turkish democratization process. Due to amending the 1982 constitution, to change the government system from semi-presidentialism (or de facto presidentialism) to the presidential a la Turca, the party needed to harmonize existing domestic law following the proposed government system (Uslu, 2015). From bureaucratic rules and procedures to the authority realms of the governmental branches, an enormous level of alterations in the existing law order was required. In doing so, the government also needed to tackle the 'parallel state organization' to regulate bureaucratic stages of the government, both for party government and presidential system expectations. For this reason, the government operations category in the CAP coding scheme was another prioritized policy domain in the 2015 June Election Manifesto of the governing AKP.

In addition to mostly prioritized policy domains in the 2015 election manifesto, it is beneficial to look at the rarely prioritized policy issues. Most surprisingly, despite many terrorist attacks that have been encountered before and after the coup attempt in this period, the party did not give a sufficient level of pledges for the defense issue. Similarly, cultural issues in the manifesto text changed its low-level attention and became the

thirteenth prioritized policy domain by 0.04 weight in the 2015 electoral agenda. However, policy areas such as migration and public lands did not receive sufficient policy attention in this period and remained the least prioritized policy areas in the 2015 manifesto.

The results and discussion are presented to match percentage weight and analyze the agenda congruence of these data sets. Whether several unexpected events, including governmental instability, coup attempt, terrorist attacks, and a state of emergency regime, affected this congruence as external variables, it is required the look at the centralization level of power in the hands of the popularly elected president within the constitutional background.

4.1.3. Results

While explaining the most possible answer for the congruence level between government-sponsored bills and the electoral pledges, the constitutional background, and institutional arrangements have been preferred for the governing party's first, second, and third legislative terms. Although there has been no sufficient level of indicators to evaluate the centralization of power in the hands of the popularly elected president during the first tenure of the party, several constitutional amendments that have taken place since the party's second tenure, robust symptoms to measure the effects of this variable on the responsiveness became more visible. 2007 Constitutional Amendment, which enables the citizens to vote president directly, 2010 Constitutional Amendment in which the judiciary branch of the government had considerably been removed from decision-making process have decreased the veto players' role and effect on the civilian politics. Although the constituent power's tendency to expand presidential power supra-political and regime protector identity via the 1982 constitution has been the norm (Çinar & Sayin, 2014; Özsoy Boyunsuz, 2016), several arrangements employed by the governing AKP changed its status from. Thus, the presidential office became a field where the veto player's role disappeared, and populist tones became more visible.

Pursuing the general pattern and explaining how and why expanding the power of the presidential office hindered the government incentives to fulfill its electoral pledges

throughout the 25th and 26th legislative tenures, the 2017 Constitutional Amendment will be firmly scrutinized in this section. However, before this, the agenda congruence between enacted government-sponsored bills and electoral pledges during these periods with its descriptive details and statistical results must be presented. For this reason, figure 13 shows the agenda congruence between these variables by comparing the percentage weight of each policy domain in both datasets. As noticed through the gradual decrease in the congruence level between government legislative agenda and electoral pledges from the first tenure to the existing term, the distance between these variables in percentage weight continues to increase. Although the government's ability to respond to its electoral pledges in macroeconomic issues was still considerably fulfilled, mandate responsiveness was not the norm for other policy domains.




Figure 13. Agenda Congruence Between Electoral Pledges and Government-sponsored Bills

As shown in figure 13, the distance of the percentage weight in each policy domain for both the legislative outputs and the election manifesto increased in some categories. Civil rights, law and crime, social welfare, housing, domestic commerce, defense, and government operations are some of the policy domains in which the government's legislative attention and electoral pledges differ from each other. It should be noted here that the number of policy domains in which the difference rate is higher between proposed electoral pledges and legislative outputs than other policy categories increased. This, in particular, refers to the government losing its incentives to respond to the mandate in

many policy domains. To statistically measure this comment, the below hypothesis is presented and then tested in table 17.

H1: Government-sponsored bills depend on the electoral pledges given by the government party itself.

Table 17. Correlation Between the Proportion of Electoral Pledges and Laws on the Policy Domains Between 2015-2018

		Government Bills	Electoral Pledges
Government Bills	Pearson's r	—	
	p-value	—	
Electoral Pledges	Pearson's r	0.491*	—
	p-value	0.028	—

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

According to the result of the correlation test, which measures the correspondence degree between electoral pledges and the government-sponsored bills seen in the second row and second column, these variables are moderately correlated. In other words, the government's ability to respond to its mandate moderately occurred during the 25th and 26th legislative tenures. Accordingly, the downward trend in the coefficient value of Pearson's correlation continues from 0.79 to 0.52. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy here that there is a positive relationship between the government's legislative outputs and the electoral pledges, whereas the association degree continues to decrease. On the other hand, the institutional reason for this downward trend is explained by employing the second hypothesis of this thesis.

H2: Pledge-policy congruence is more pronounced in a less centralized executive office than in a more centralized executive one.

The value of the correlation coefficient between electoral promises and the legislative outputs of the governing AKP occurred from a strong association to a moderate association. At least from the second tenure of the party, this trend has been the norm. However, as can be seen in the test results for this tenure, the downward trend for the

agenda congruence between electoral mandate and legislative outputs continues, whereas centralization tendency to strengthen executive power is going to increase.

Although the constitutional practice of the regime protectors has been developed as strengthening the presidential office dominance in both legislative and executive bodies of the system as an impartial position, the new tendency of the governing AKP changed the presidential status from tutelary to delegative form (Taş, 2015). This enabled the elected president to dominate both the legislative and executive agenda of the government but not in favor of the secularist values instead of on behalf of narrow constituents. Thus, the presidential office became the central realm for decision-making, particularly the 2017 constitutional amendment (Law Number 6771). Thanks to this amendment, several alterations in the political system have been legitimized. The number of MPs was increased from 550 to 600 (Article 2), the period for parliament and president became the same length (Article 4), and the council of ministers with the head of the prime minister was outlawed (Article 8).

Additionally, the president's legislative and executive acts were increased in many policy domains like budget, appointments for high public seniors without the approval of TBMM, declaration of a state of emergency, and so on. TBMM's checks and balances apparatuses also were outlawed due to this constitutional amendment. TBMM no longer uses the motion of censure (*gensoru önergesi*), which requires a re-confidence vote for the executive office to continue its incumbent period. In addition, TBMM's ability to aggravate the overridden bills by the president by accepting with the same rate as in the previous quorum was changed. Thus, overridden bills by the president are only ratified with the absolute majority of the total MPs (Article 5). Thus legislative prerogatives of the president to hinder the functionality of the TBMM continued to increase.

It is not the central intention of this thesis to evaluate the political background of the 25th and 26th legislative tenures, but it should be argued that cyclical conditions expedited the centralization of power in the hands of the president. This process has overwhelmingly been fulfilled through abovementioned constitutional amendment and several provisions that scrutinized. As a concluding remark, it can be argued that the possible effect of the new government system on the Turkish democratization process and the responsiveness

of the elected officials to the people's policy expectations (the central purpose of this thesis) will be more understandable with the findings for the subsequent tenure.

4.2. 27th LEGISLATIVE TENURE

With the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016, the Turkish democratization process has involved a different paradigm in which societal consensus on the policy-making procedures has gradually been transformed from a broad sense to the narrow one. Declaration of state of emergency, in this regard, to curb the negative effects of the coup attempt on the existence of the regime has been perceived as a democratic U-turn because it gave more autonomy to the executive office without any pressure from the parliament (Cilliler, 2021; Özsoy Boyunsuz, 2016). Following this, thanks to this new presidential government system, the rules of the game have been firmly changed, administrative and military tutelage have disappeared, and the check and balances between political institutions have become more politicized in favor of the popularly-elected president. In addition, state-owned media had become more dominant in the broadcast channels, and public institutions and enterprises had firmly been politicized in accordance with political perceptions of the executive office with the head of the president.

Although conducted studies that explored the changing dynamics of the political system with the presidential government system have created a considerable size of literature, none of them investigated the situation of the democratic requirements through the empirical assessment in the new pathway. To which extent the government incentives to respond to the publicly prioritized issues have been affected by the new presidential government system, one of the central research questions of this thesis, had never been problematized in the literature, for instance. However, widespread concerns for the party government model and single-headed executive practice have been more pronounced among the public opinion through several events like withdrawing from the Istanbul convention, expanding the role of the presidential decrees, and ever-changing of high senior officials without consultation.

All of the indicators, in essence, need to be required to watch the responsiveness of the government to the priorities of the public in the new government system. The main reason

for this scholarly attention stemmed from the monopolization of the state power in the hands of the president. Although enacted constitutional amendment (Law Number 6671) authorizes both the president and legislative office to make the decision and rule the country on its own fields in theory because the president is also able to represent his/ her party and bargain for the party's electoral achievement in the general election, in practice all of these offices to be dominated with the same political option. As both the general election and the presidential election is held on the same day strengthens this possibility. Thus both the legislative and executive agenda-setting might be determined by the strong wing of the system: the president.

The centralization level of executive power in the hands of the popularly elected president reached its peak after the 2018 elections. Because the Constitutional Amendment allowed both the presidential and the MPs General Elections are held on the same date (Law No. 6771, Article 4), all foreseen possibilities started to be carried out via the 2018 elections. Since the president may also be the chairman of his/her party, in practice, both branches of the government would be dominated by the view of the president. The president's dominance over the political party represented by him/her is also one of the important outputs of the party system in Turkey. Some scholars in this regard have argued that, like in Turkey where strong party discipline or an institutionalized party system is the norm, the legislative agenda of the political parties are dominated by the party leader (Aytaç et al., 2017; Bulut, 2014; Esen & Gümüşçü, 2017). In the light of this argument, we can conclude that a partial president dominates both executive and legislative agenda-setting because h/she is also the leader of the political party, which has the parliamentary majority in the TBMM.

The new presidential government system may also lead to the politicization of the judiciary branch of the system. That is to say, many senior positions in the judiciary branch are allowed to appoint by the president. Minister of Justice and six out of thirteen members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) are allowed to appoint by the president. According to Cilliler (2021), this amendment increased the appointments by the president at the expense of European standards, which implies that at least half of the senior judicial members must be appointed by the judiciary branch to hinder extreme politicization (Cilliler, 2021, p. 9). Thus referring to the fact that both the presidential and

MPs elections were held on the same date, it can be emphasized that all of the governmental branches were determined the winner of the zero-sum elections.

In this section, the abovementioned indicators and the emerging developments in the new presidential government system are analyzed by accounting policy responsiveness. Like in the analyses for the previous terms, pledge-policy congruence is measured through the mandate theory of democracy. This particular point is believed that will contribute to the longstanding debates about the presidential government system's functionality and effectiveness in the democratization process in Turkey. Whether the changing pattern of the government system enables elected governments to be more or less responsive to the public enables academics and citizens to assess the presidential government system with a different lens. Thus, the presidential government system is presented through the mandate responsiveness of the elected government. To do this, firstly legislative agenda of the incumbent AKP is given. Aftermath, to scrutinize prioritized issue domains in the 2018 election manifesto, the party's electoral pledges are analyzed through the CAP coding scheme. Finally, the congruence level of the enacted bills was proposed by the AKP party group to the parliament, and electoral priorities or mandates were measured through the correlation test in the results.

4.2.1. Legislative Agenda

With the transition toward the presidential government system, the first form of the government was determined by the winning party AKP and its leader president Erdoğan. Although both of the governmental branches are rigorously separated from each other in theory, the presidential and MPs elections were held on the same day, enabling the winning presidential candidate to dominate both executive and legislative branches of the government. These indicators were already detected through the decreasing number of legislative instruments to check the executive wing of the government from the parliamentary term to the presidential system and also the number of private-sponsored bills rejected in the TBMM (Cilliler, 2021, p.10).

For the analysis of this tenure, a different method was pursued. Instead of monitoring the government agenda-setting through the bills proposed by the cabinet to the parliament,

since the transition to the presidential government system, bills only proposed by the governing party AKP were chosen because the minister of cabinet with the head of prime minister was dissolved. (Law no. 6671, Article 4). Although the time series is generally determined by the limit of the related legislative tenure, For the 27th legislative term, the deadline of the analysis is preferred as the first day of 2022 because the thesis needs to be ended before the new general elections. This is one of the research limitations of this study. For this reason, 205 bills from 25 June 2018 to 1 January 2022 are extracted from the TBMM website and then coded in accordance with the CAP coding scheme. Below, the descriptive details of the bills are shown.

Table 18. Descriptive Statistics for Laws Enacted Between 2018-2022

	N	Missing	Minimum	Maximum
Law Number	237	0	7145	7349
CAP Main-code	237	0	1	23

Like the previous terms, the legislative office still regulates more than one policy domain under the one single bill called omnibus bills. Through the time series, 13 omnibus bills were enacted by the TBMM. While coding such data, each comma-separated piece of the sentences in the abstract of the bill is considered the preferred method for the previous terms. As a result, it is reached more than 40 observations. Law no. 7148, for instance, is one of these omnibus bills entitled “‘Law Proposal on the Amendment of the Highway Traffic Law and Some Laws”” which assigned into law and crime, domestic commerce, and housing. Once the assignment of this kind of omnibus bill was made, the total observation number increased from 205 to 237. In Figure 14, the distribution of policy domains among the enacted laws between 2018 and 2022 is shown.




Figure 14. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 27th. Legislative Agenda

The last legislative tenure of the governing AKP has several peculiar features when compared with the other terms. For the first time, the importance level of the economic issues lagged behind the law and crime and domestic commerce. The excessive size of the law and crime issues in the legislative Agenda can be explained by the gradual normalization after the coup attempt. Particularly, the government tried to abolish the state of the emergency regime and its wreckage in the country by changing several decrees having force the laws enacted to curb terror and economic-based problems. Similarly, to harmonize the existing government system's components and bureaucratic rules and procedures in accordance with the presidential government system's institutional arrangements, various regulations were needed to arise. Consequently, law and crime have become one of the most prioritized policy domains in the 27th legislative agenda of the government.

Energy-based issues, on the other hand overwhelmingly dominated by the other policy domains in the party's previous legislative tenures. But for the new legislative agenda, the government has considerably allocated political attention to the energy issue. Energy conversion and preservation systems, regulations for nuclear energy, and market components of electricity and natural gas have been some of the sectoral dynamics in the energy industry throughout the last four years. In addition, the banking sector, small

businesses, customary administration, and tourism sector have been allocated to domestic commerce.

Another peculiar point of this tenure is about civil rights. For the first time in the ruling history of the government, the civil rights domain has received the least political attention. Although culture and migration issues have usually remained in the subset throughout the party's legislative agenda, civil rights have never been considered at such a level. Thusly, civil rights as a policy category have become the eighteenth domain in the party's agenda-setting.

At this point, it is required to stress that contrary to previous legislative tenures, the last term of the party has not completed yet. 27th legislative tenure will be ended with the 2023 general elections if no snap election would be declared until normal schedule. Therefore, it is unlikely to make a decisive cloze in terms of the least prioritized policy domains in the existing legislative agenda because the government might allocate political attention on these issues for the nearest election. Nevertheless, it is necessary to compare prioritized policy domains in the legislative agenda with the electoral pledges of the government throughout this tenure. In the following section, the general outline of the 2018 election manifesto is given by describing the frequency distribution of each policy domain.

4.2.2. Election Manifesto

Once the government's legislative agenda is presented by heavily relying on the percentage distribution of private-sponsored bills proposed by the party MPs, the same indicators are required to find the considerable size of correspondence between the government's pledges and the actions. To do so, like the previous analyses, the 2018 election manifesto of the governing AKP is presented with its descriptive findings, frequency distribution, and most or least prioritized policy domains in the text.

As a distinguished feature, the 2018 manifesto text is considerably voluminous. To detect attention allocations across policy domains in this manifesto text, approximately 5300 natural sentences are assigned to different policy categories in the CAP coding scheme. By relying on this fact, it should be argued that the manifesto size of the governing AKP

has gradually increased in terms of policy attention. In this respect, almost whole policy categories in the CAP scheme have received political importance throughout the last legislative tenure of the party. For instance, when looking at the number of sentences that contain electoral pledges or not through table 15, approximately 95% of the total text was politicized as being policy sentences in the manifesto text. From civil rights to the migration issue, all 21 major and 220 minor policy domains received policy-based or pledge-driven attention in this manifesto. For this rate, it may be considered the role and effect of the twin elections in which both the presidential and parliamentary were carried out simultaneously.

Table 19. Frequencies and Percentage of Natural Sentences in the 2018 Election Manifesto

Levels	Counts	% of Total	Cumulative %
Policy Sentences	5003	94.19 %	100.0 %
Non-policy Sentence	309	5.81 %	5.81 %

As it can be understood from Table 19, governing AKP pledged many policy domains for the forthcoming legislative tenure in its manifesto. Although the number of sentences in which policy-based explanations constitute a relative weight in the manifesto, it is necessary to look at the other components associated with the political attention and pledge orientation of the party. After giving descriptive details about the 2018 manifesto text, the questions, including the extent to which policy domains mattered, is there well-balanced frequency distribution between policy domains, and which policy domains are most/less prioritized by the government, should be addressed. To precisely answer these questions, figure 15 illustrates the policy-based distribution in the 2018 election manifesto.




Figure 15. Frequencies of Each Policy Domain on the 2018 June Election Manifesto

Similar to the frequency distribution of the policy domains in the legislative agenda, macroeconomics, domestic commerce, and law and crime are in the top three places in the election manifesto. But interestingly, the importance of domestic commerce reached its peak and became the most prioritized policy domain in the 2018 election manifesto. Although macroeconomics has generally been received as the most salient issue among the public opinion over the last decade, it seems like commercial activities among sectors gained considerable size in the public agenda. This can be explained through the presidential government system's dynamics. Although privatization of the public property has been the norm throughout the AKP's rule, the transition to the new government system enabled the devout bourgeoisie to be explicitly involved in the vital markets in the economic sphere (Gumuscu & Sert, 2009, p. 958). Thus, commercial activities, including tourism, banking, and insurance in the domestic context, made up the majority of the total text in the manifesto. From the perspective of the mandate theory, we can explicitly argue that the increasing demand of the devout bourgeoisie created a prioritized policy list to fulfill in the government agenda venues.

Migration, and public lands, as they were in the previous mandates, received less political attention in the manifesto. But for foreign trade activities, this is not the case. Whereas this category has been ranked one of the ten prioritized policy domains in the past mandates, the 2018 election manifesto rarely pledged this domain. Thus foreign trade is

involved in the less prioritized policy domains in the manifesto and, therefore public policy agenda.

4.2.3. Results

With this sub-section, the ultimate goal of this thesis is aimed to be reached by looking at the correspondence degree of the public agenda and the government's subsequent policy intentions to respond to the public. The main crucial point to consider this tenure analysis as significant by explaining the decreasing value in the responsiveness relates to the central component of this thesis. It is widely argued that government incentives to fulfill its electoral pledges considerably depend on the executive prerogatives of the presidency. Although this is not the first case in the related literature, no one considered the getting centralization of power in executive office as a significant and continuing indicator to measure executive prerogatives' effect on the responsiveness. Except for a few studies, this indicator has been neglected (Aslan Akman & Akçalı, 2017; Şaşmaz et al., 2022). This thesis, with this ultimate analysis, aims to address this research gap by scrutinizing the indicators that strengthen the centralization tendency of executive office under the president's dominance since 2002.

In the last legislative tenure of the party, the rules of the game have been firmly changed in favor of popularly elected presidential office. Although –as mentioned before- this is not new institutional practice in Turkish constitutional history, identity and the power of the presidential office against the other branches of the governmental system have been transformed. Decreasing the level of horizontal accountability among the different branches of the government on behalf of the veto-player position of the president has already been the norm in practice. But in terms of the executive presidency and partisan politics, this tendency has never been experienced under the presidential roof. With the transition to the presidential system, one of the ultimate goals of its supporters of it is a strong connection between citizens and the president. Depending on this proposal, it is required to look at whether assumed linkage is provided through the strong responsiveness of the government to the public policy preferences.

To measure the correspondence degree on the policy domains in both the 2018 election manifesto and the enacted bills proposed by the party members of the governing AKP, the correlation coefficient value is preferred, as for the previous analyses. Before this, the section firstly shows the congruence chart between the percentage weight of both election manifesto and enacted bills. After visualizing the line fluctuations across policy domains in both agendas, hypotheses regarding the responsiveness are introduced and then tested. It is estimated that the value of the coefficient will be carried out at a low level, which means moderately correlated. But first things first, below figure 16 displays the congruence level between these variables across policy domains in the last legislative tenure of the governing AKP.




Figure 16. Agenda Congruence Between Electoral Pledges and Enacted Bills

Figure 15 catches the increased distances in some policy domains, including education, health, labor, and energy, between proposed electoral pledges and enacted bills between 2018 and 2022. But it is noticed that the highest distances are measured in law and crime by 0.08 and civil rights by 0.06. Although the government had more incentives to regulate law order through presidential decrees and strengthens the civil rights domain, the percentage rate of the legislative outputs to fulfill these electoral mandates has remained low.

H1: Government-sponsored bills depend on the electoral pledges given by the government party itself.

Four legislative tenures of the governing AKP are scrutinized in terms of government incentives to respond to the public policy agenda. Measured hypotheses had shown that the degree of responsiveness of the government's legislative agenda to its mandate had gradually decreased from the first term ($r=.793$) to the ($r=.491$) 2018 when the last legislative tenure of the party started. Below, the first hypothesis of this study is tested by employing the correlation coefficient value, which is explained through the intersection between electoral pledges and government bills. It can easily be observed that a gradual decrease in the value of the correlation is continuing from the party's second tenure to the last one. In this line, the correlation coefficient is calculated as ($r=.428$), implying a moderately correlated on the 27th legislative tenure of the governing AKP. For this finding, it should be underlined that the government's ability to respond to its mandate has decayed in the last legislative tenure. Nevertheless, for this case, it should also be indicated that the last legislative tenure of this analysis has not been completed yet.

Table 20. Correlation Between the Proportion of Electoral Pledges and Laws on the Policy Domains Between 2018-2022

		Government Bills	Electoral Pledges
Government Bills	Pearson's r	—	
	p-value	—	
Electoral Pledges	Pearson's r	0.428*	—
	p-value	0.049	—

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

For each legislative tenure's analysis, to put precisely answers to the question of how the concentration of power, which has been the norm in the last decade, constrains the executive incentives to respond to the public policy agenda, several institutional arrangements enacted by the governing AKP for re-mapping the center of the power is analyzed. By going through the constitutional structure, executive-legislative imbalances and power concentration practice has been preferred as the main determinants of the decreasing level of government responsiveness during the last few tenures of the party. A similar venue is also preferred for this tenure's analysis. By succinctly scrutinizing the changing dynamics in the government branches through the last constitutional referendum and then twin elections held for both presidential and MPs, the abovementioned questions are aimed to be addressed. In this manner, hypothesis 2 is

assumed to be confirmed because more concentration of power in the executive office reached its peak level during the 2018 twin elections.

H2- Pledge-policy congruence is more pronounced in a less centralized executive office than in a more centralized executive one.

Recent trajectories in the political scene across the world have confirmed that institutional aggrandizement may influence political outcomes. In some studies, this line has been argued that executive aggrandizement enabled the incumbents to dismantle constitutional constraints through voters' approval which the elected leaders manipulated during the political campaign (Şaşmaz et al., 2022). Democratic backsliding, on the other hand, may occur as a result of this excessive seizing of the power through the plebiscitarian political tools by the leaders. From recent evidence via the referendums, we can easily conclude that such backsliding fits into the example of Turkey's institutional aggrandizement to concentrate more power and dismantle executive constraints on the presidential office through the plebiscitary control. From this perspective, the last legislative tenure under the rule of AKP and partial presidential practice should be analyzed within the presidential *a la Turca* context.

Although several studies have already put forward that de-facto presidentialism has been the central norm in Turkey's relations between legislative and executive bodies (Bozkurt, 2019; Uslu, 2015), with the %51.41 yes vote, de facto presidentialism became the de jure. After the 2018 twin elections, on the other hand, with the election of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the presidential government system was put into force. The acquired process in this line has shown that the elected leaders have already adopted concentration of power. When the semi-presidential practice of the incumbent was taken into consideration, the double-headed executive practice was transformed into single-headed executive one in practice because all of these figures came from the same political party.

The constitutional referendum held on 16 April 2017 was voted on whether the transition from semi-presidentialism to the presidential government system created two-tailed political polarization. While the first side, with the head of President Erdogan and his party AKP, campaigned for a 'yes' vote, the other side, with the head of opposition parties, ran the 'no' vote. Focusing on this political polarization, a critical study has found

that partisan choices predominantly determined the taking side to vote on the constitutional amendment in Turkey (Aytaç et al., 2017). On the other hand, the rationality of electoral choice has been a complicated issue in the literature. While some argue that voters genuinely preferred the strongest executives in the case of national security, public health, and other unforeseen events, others ignore electoral rationale, lagged behind the choice, and prioritize the elastic opportunism which justifies whatever voter wants to vote political proposals come from the adopted leaders (Şaşmaz et al., 2022). In any case, the electoral perceptions of the voters to determine the best way for political interest enabled executive leaders to dismantle constitutional constraints in policy-making. In this manner, the last constitutional amendment is more understandable, which enhanced presidential functionalities to concentrate more power in the hands of the popularly-elected president. Here these functions are scrutinized.

Due to the centralization tendency for the presidential office has become de facto through the 2017 Constitutional Referendum, de jure alterations to put presidential a la Turca into the force were carried out with the promulgation of the first presidential decree on July 10, 2018. In this respect, the first presidential decree is essential to grasp how various administrative authorities were involved in the presidency. The decree, in turn, portrays the presidency structure with its general secretary, policy committees, ministries, and vice presidents. However, several articles of this decree offer the president a pivotal role in ruling the country by centralizing the entire decision and policy-making apparatuses under the presidential authority.

The accepting of the constitutional amendment that changed the country's governmental system from semi-presidentialism to the presidential government system made several alterations in the 1982 constitution. Some of these alterations are considerably important to observe how executive power coalesced in possession of the president. For instance, article 16 of Law No. 6771 omitted the minister of the cabinet for the possession of the executive office by enacting that all powers in the executive body are operated by the president itself (Article 8, Law No. 6771). This, in turn, concentrated more power in the hands of the popularly elected president and dismantled the double-headed executive practice, which has been the norm since the semi-presidential government system enacted through the 2007 constitutional amendment.

It can be understood that many executive prerogatives of the presidential office exceed with the transition to the presidential government system. For instance, the principality of the legislature has been slightly swiped through the presidential domain. Contrary to its implication in the classical form of presidentialism, the appointments of the high senior officials are served by the president without requiring the approval of the legislative branch (Article 8). The president's ability to legislate under the rule of a state of emergency regime is authorized by exceeding the constraints mentioned in the seventeenth paragraph of Article 104 of the Turkish Constitution.

Check, and balances have not only been weakened between legislative and executive branches of the government but also spread out to the judiciary. After corruption charges emerged between 17 and 25 December 2013 process, existing laws regulating the HSYK were intended to limit the board's relative autonomy by strengthening the role and position of the minister of justice. Although the 2010 constitutional amendment gave more autonomy to the HSK to be represented entirely by the judiciary itself, bills proposed by the incumbent party, which rearranged the role of the minister of justice by strengthening him against plenary branches, went into force after corruption allegations (Özbudun, 2015). Thus, executive control of the governmental institutions was enlarged towards the independent judiciary.

Political attacks in a plebiscitarian manner not only weakened the horizontal accountability between governmental branches but also eliminated the veto players' traditional role in civilian politics. In such a way, constitutional attacks, thanks to extensive public support, did not trigger the modern liberalization in whole political spheres; instead began to gradually polarize the society through Islamist tones and monopolize the state power in the hands of the popularly elected president (Selçuk, 2016, p. 576). As a result, tutelage-backed partial ownership beyond politics has replaced by plebiscitarian-backed one-man rule by de-institutionalization of democratic values and ignoring the opponents' alternatives in the skewed playing field. Nevertheless, in either case, the principal-agent relationship between voters and elected officials has been decayed, and as a result, the government's responsiveness has been narrowed to the core constituency.

CONCLUSIONS

Consistent government responsiveness to mass preferences is one of the central tenets of the modern democratic theory. After this conceptualization first emerged in 1960s, resulting largely from the scholarly efforts of prominent political scientists Dahl (1961, 1971) and Pitkin (1967), empirical attention has broadly turned towards the agenda dynamics of elected governments. Although initial efforts to test this normative principle have been applied to the US and other advanced democracies, the third world remained under investigated. Turkey, for instance, provides strong indicators to evaluate whether democratically elected political institutions are responsive to their electorate. Although many developed hypotheses to measure different aspects of responsiveness equations could be tested with the Turkish case, only few considerably important studies have been carried out.

Literature has predominantly asserted that two different forms of aggrandizement affect the levels of government responsiveness to the public. The first one is mostly characterized by proportional electoral systems with more opposition pressures upon the incumbency and re-election concerns forcing governments to align with public policy expectations between elections, whereas the second has less institutionalized checks and balances between the legislative and executive offices and thus a government less responsive to the desired agenda of the public. It has been shown that opinion-policy or program to policy congruence operate better in a well-institutionalized political system. However, whether or not this is also true for less-institutionalized systems has rarely been considered empirically.

Throughout this thesis, by focusing on both the theoretical and methodological gaps in extant literature, the Turkish case is examined by covering the AKP periods from 2002 to the present. The main reason for choosing this historical interval is to address the commonly assumed hypothesis that implies majoritarian and single party governments with high executive discretions and less oppositional pressure are more responsive to the people rather than those of minority and coalition governments. Contrary to this widespread argument, this empirical analysis shows that high executive autonomy might not create a government highly responsive to the people's policy expectations between elections. Although political parties in highly centralized executive offices have the same

re-election concerns due to the technical requirements of electoral democracies, responsiveness ability to the general electorates might not operate well in the absence of public and opposition pressures on the office. This is why in the last legislative tenure of the AKP, when a presidential government system was instituted, decreased the government's incentive to respond to the general electorate.

The chapter two introduced case, data and methodology. The AKP, as a successor of MG, changed the principal aspect of the 1982 constitution by replacing the tutelage model of democracy with a plebiscitarian one. The concentration of power under the autonomy of the executive presidency, however, has not changed in theory. Controversially, with several constitutional and legal amendments, executive discretions have gradually been increased by the party from its second legislative tenures to 2018, when the presidential government system was put into force as *de jure* political practice. This thesis has observed these constitutional alterations, which strengthened executive autonomy against the other governmental branches, and tested the effect of executive aggrandizement on government responsiveness by examining agenda dynamics in Turkey. By examining the agenda congruence between proposed electoral pledges and subsequent government actions through government-sponsored bills over six legislative tenures, this research aims to contribute to both agenda-setting and responsiveness theory literature empirically.

To test the abovementioned causality, an original data set was constituted by content coding government-sponsored bills as a political outcome and election manifestos as a political mandate. In this regard, the thesis justifies the mandate theory of democratic responsiveness through the program to policy nexus. Using the CAP common coding scheme, an abstract based analysis for bills, and a natural sentence-based coding scheme for election manifestos were utilized to test agenda congruence between electoral mandates and subsequent political outcomes. Research results indicate that the first incumbent period (2002-2007) under the rule of AKP created a strong association between legislative outputs and electoral pledges with a ($r=.79$) coefficient value, yet in its recent term (2018-present), the correlation degree shifted from a strong association to only moderate association with a ($r=.42$) coefficient value.

The decreasing level of correlation has occurred in tandem with changing institutional arrangements enacted over the last twenty years. In respect to this, the second hypothesis

of the thesis institutionally measures the effect of growing executive aggrandizement around the popularly elected presidency on the government's mandate responsiveness. Accordingly, a considerable size of executive aggrandizement around the presidency began during the second incumbent period, when for the first time in the political history of Turkey, the president, as an impartial figure of the political structure, was popularly elected. Astonishingly, the degree of correspondence between proposed electoral pledges and subsequent policy actions started to decrease from a strongly associated to moderately associated congruence.

Following the party's second legislative period, the 2010 constitutional amendment was put into force by referendum. With this plebiscitarian move, many institutional regulations were enacted to immunize the civilian government from the veto-player's penetration. Thanks to these regulations, the composition of the constitutional court was changed to safeguard the civilian government's privileges. Thus, the power to determine the greater part of officers in the judiciary branch, which had been one of the most important veto players in the political system since the 1960s, was transferred to the cabinet. Another milestone to concentrate more power in the hands of the popularly-elected president was reached through the 2017 constitutional amendment, when the de-facto presidential regime became de jure. Thus, the executive office separated from the legislative branch by abolishing the confidence vote for the cabinet by the parliament. Therefore, the executive office, under the leadership of a popularly-elected president, became an autonomous realm protected from legislature pressure in the case of a deadlock.

All abovementioned changes have gradually been put into force to make the executive office increasingly autonomous. This, in fact, is one of the central tenets of responsiveness literature, which postulates that a more independent executive office might be less responsive to the general electorate because no legitimized pressure exists to check it. This conclusion is confirmed by the correlation test conducted on the AKP's last legislative tenure. Accordingly, the highly responsive government of the first legislative period considerably lost its responsiveness to its electoral mandate by its most recent term. This empirical outcome may contribute to existing and future assertions that rationalized or strengthened government systems should provide justice in representation and stability in administration.

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ANNEX 1. ORJİNALLİK RAPORU



**HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ORJİNALLİK RAPORU**

**HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
SİYASET BİLİMİ ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA**

Tarih: 07/06/2022

Tez Başlığı : Yürütme Gücünün Yoğunlaşması ve Hükümet Duyarlılığı: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Döneminin Taahhüt-Politika Uyumunun Analizi

Yukarıda başlığı gösterilen tez çalışmamın a) Kapak sayfası, b) Giriş, c) Ana bölümler ve d) Sonuç kısımlarından oluşan toplam 120 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 08/06/2022 tarihinde şahsım/tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda işaretlenmiş filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı % 5 'tür.

Uygulanan filtrelemeler:

- 1- ☒ Kabul/Onay ve Bildirim sayfaları hariç
- 2- ☒ Kaynakça hariç
- 3- ☒ Alıntılar hariç
- 4- ☐ Alıntılar dâhil
- 5- ☒ 5 kelimeden daha az örtüşme içeren metin kısımları hariç

Hacettepe Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Tez Çalışması Orijinallik Raporu Alınması ve Kullanılması Uygulama Esasları'nı inceledim ve bu Uygulama Esasları'nda belirtilen azami benzerlik oranlarına göre tez çalışmamın herhangi bir intihal içermediğini; aksinin tespit edileceği muhtemel durumda doğabilecek her türlü hukuki sorumluluğu kabul ettiğimi ve yukarıda vermiş olduğum bilgilerin doğru olduğunu beyan ederim.

Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

07/06/2022

Adı Soyadı: EMRE TAŞKIRAN

Öğrenci No: N19231541

Anabilim Dalı: SİYASET BİLİMİ VE KAMU YÖNETİMİ

Programı: SİYASET BİLİMİ

DANIŞMAN ONAYI

UYGUNDUR.

Doç Dr. Şebnem YARDIMCI-GEYİKÇİ



**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
MASTER'S THESIS ORIGINALITY REPORT**

**HACETTEPE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT**

Date: 07/06/2022

Thesis Title : Concentration of Executive Power and Government Responsiveness: Examining Pledge-Policy Congruence Under The Justice and Development Party (AKP) Rule

According to the originality report obtained by myself/my thesis advisor by using the Turnitin plagiarism detection software and by applying the filtering options checked below on 08/06/2022 for the total of 120 pages including the a) Title Page, b) Introduction, c) Main Chapters, and d) Conclusion sections of my thesis entitled as above, the similarity index of my thesis is 5 %.

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07/06/2022

Name Surname: EMRE TAŞKIRAN
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Department: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Program: POLITICAL SCIENCE

ADVISOR APPROVAL

APPROVED.

Assoc. Prof. Şebnem YARDIMCI-
GEYİKÇİ

ANNEX 2. ETİK KOMİSYON MUAFİYETİ FORMU



**HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ETİK KOMİSYON MUAFİYETİ FORMU**

**HACETTEPE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
SİYASET BİLİMİ ANABİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI'NA**

Tarih: 07/06/2022

Tez Başlığı: Yürütme Gücünün Yoğunlaşması ve Hükümet Duyarlılığı: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Döneminin Taahhüt-Politika Uyumunun Analizi

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1. İnsan ve hayvan üzerinde deney niteliği taşımamaktadır,
2. Biyolojik materyal (kan, idrar vb. biyolojik sıvılar ve numuneler) kullanılmasını gerektirmemektedir.
3. Beden bütünlüğüne müdahale içermemektedir.
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Gereğini saygılarımla arz ederim.

07/06/2022

Adı Soyadı: EMRE TAŞKIRAN
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Statüsü: * Yüksek Lisans ☐ Doktora ☐ Bütünleşik Doktora

DANIŞMAN GÖRÜŞÜ VE ONAYI

Doç. Dr. Şebnem YARDIMCI-GEYİKÇİ



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GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT**

Date: 07/06/2022

Thesis Title: Concentration of Executive Power and Government Responsiveness: Examining Pledge-Policy Congruence Under The Justice and Development Party (AKP) Rule

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1. Does not perform experimentation on animals or people.
2. Does not necessitate the use of biological material (blood, urine, biological fluids and samples, etc.).
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07/06/2022

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Student No: N19231541

Department: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Program: POLITICAL SCIENCE

Status: *MA ☐ Ph.D. ☐ Combined MA/ Ph.D.

ADVISER COMMENTS AND APPROVAL

Assoc. Prof. Şebnem YARDIMCI-
GEYİKÇİ