

AN ASSESSMENT OF GERMAN FASCISM AS A MASS MOVEMENT IN
RELATION TO THE RULING CLASSES AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR
THE CONTEMPORARY RISE OF RIGHT-WING POPULISM: THE
PROCESS OF FASCISATION

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

UMUT DEVRİM ÖZBİDECİLER

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION

OCTOBER 2022

Approval of the thesis:

**AN ASSESSMENT OF GERMAN FASCISM AS A MASS MOVEMENT
IN RELATION TO THE RULING CLASSES AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE
FOR THE CONTEMPORARY RISE OF RIGHT-WING POPULISM:
THE PROCESS OF FASCISATION**

submitted by **UMUT DEVRİM ÖZBİDECİLER** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration**, the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University by,

Prof. Dr. Sadettin KİRAZCI
Dean
Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. H. Tarık ŞENGÜL
Head of Department
Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Galip YALMAN
Supervisor
Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Examining Committee Members:

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet OKYAYUZ (Head of the Examining Committee)
Middle East Technical University
Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Galip YALMAN (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar BEDİR HANOĞLU
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations

Prof. Dr. Filiz ZABCI
Ankara University
Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Prof. Dr. Mehmet YETİŞ
Ankara University
Department of Political Science and Public Administration



I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Umut Devrim ÖZBİDECİLER

Signature:

ABSTRACT

AN ASSESSMENT OF GERMAN FASCISM AS A MASS MOVEMENT IN RELATION TO THE RULING CLASSES AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE CONTEMPORARY RISE OF RIGHT-WING POPULISM: THE PROCESS OF FASCISATION

ÖZBİDECİLER, Umut Devrim

Ph.D., The Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Galip YALMAN

October 2022, 511 pages

This thesis examines German fascism as a mass movement in connection with ruling classes. The term ‘fascisation’ is used to denote different instances of fascism as a process. Particularly the co-evolution of authoritarian state and business interests and reactive, non-democratic mass mobilisation is elaborated. With these insights, the research also tries to shed light on the contemporary rise of far-right and right wing populism.

Keywords: Fascism, Fascisation, Authoritarianism

ÖZ

BİR KİTLE HAREKETİ OLARAK ALMAN FAŞİZMİ'NİN YÖNETİCİ SINIFLARLA İLİŞKİSİ İÇİNDE DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ VE BUNUN SAĞ POPULİZMİN GÜNCEL YÜKSELİŞİ AÇIŞINDAN ÖNEMİ

ÖZBİDECİLER, Umut Devrim

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Galip YALMAN

Ekim 2022, 511 sayfa

Bu tez, bir kitle hareketi olarak Alman Faşizmini yönetici sınıflarla ilişkisi içinde inceler. Faşistleşme terimi bir süreç olarak faşizmin farklı anlarını tanımlamak için kullanılır. Özellikle otoriter devlet ve sermaye çıkarlarının reaktif, demokratik olmayan kitle mobilizasyonu ile birlikte evrimini irdeler. Araştırma aynı zamanda aşırı sağ ve sağ popülizmin güncel yükselişine ışık tutmaya çalışır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Faşizm, Faşistleşme, Otoriterizm



TO MY FAMILY,

ESPECIALLY TO MY MOTHER AND MY LITTLE NEPHEW JULIDE

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author shows his greatest gratitude to Assoc. Dr. Galip Yalman for his valuable contributions, constructive criticism and encouragements.

The author also thanks Assoc.Dr. Mehmet Okyayuz, Prof.Dr. Filiz Zabcı, Prof.Dr. Mehmet Yetiş and Assoc.Dr. Pınar Bedirhanoglu for their critical insights that they have provided throughout the research project.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ.....	v
DEDICATION	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	viii
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. THEORETICAL REMARKS ON FASCISM AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM.....	22
2.1. The Liberal Conceptualisation of Fascism	22
2.2. Marxist Theories of Fascism and National Socialism:	29
2.2.1. Comintern's View of Fascism:	29
2.2.2. Thalheimer, Bonapartism and The Rise of Fascism in Germany.....	33
2.2.3. Trotsky's Contribution to the Class Analysis of Fascism.....	39
2.2.4. Poulantzas' Exceptional State and the Fascist State:	44
2.3. Marxist Debates in the 1960's and 1970's about Fascism and the Appraisal of Mass Conception of Fascism by Critical Theorists	54
2.4. Recent Contributions to the Fascism Studies From the Marxist and Critical Perspectives: The Re-Evaluation of Classical Fascism and The Perspectives on New Fascist Tendencies	64
3. MASS FOUNDATIONS OF GERMAN FASCISM	73
3.1. Introduction: The Condition of Nationalism in Imperial Germany	73
3.2. Conservative Revolution and New Nationalism in the Weimar Period ...	76
3.3. The Emergence of NSDAP (The National Socialist German Workers' Party)	88
3.4. Mass Propaganda	96
3.5. The Analysis of The Mass Nature of the NSDAP As a Movement	103
3.6. Mass Psychology of Fascism?	111

3.7. The American Agitator and the Seeds of the Fascism in Bourgeois Society	121
3.8. Conclusion	130
4. THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF THE LEFT VIS A VIS THE MASS GROWTH OF FASCISM	132
4.1. Introduction.....	132
4.2. Pre-First World War Social Democratic Movement and the Debates on Revisionism and Nationalism.....	134
4.3. The Effect of The November Revolution on the German Left.....	146
4.4. The Rise of Fascism and The KPD's Resistance Strategy	150
4.5. The Reception of the Fascism by SPD	156
4.6. Anti-Fascism and Democracy.....	164
4.7. Conclusion	170
5. FASCIST CONFIGURATION OF POWER: THE FASCISATION PROCESS AS A CO-EVOLUTION OF THE NSDAP AS A MASS MOVEMENT AND THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY AMBITIONS OF THE STATE AND BUSINESS..	173
5.1. Introduction.....	173
5.2. The Economic and Political Background Before the Fascisation Process	175
5.3. Bourgeois Parties in the Weimar Period and Their Transformation	179
5.4. The Effect of the World Economic Crisis	186
5.5. The Political Crisis Intertwined with the Economic Crisis: "Being Above the Parties"	189
5.6. The Main Actors of the Political Offensive and Their Political Strategies	191
5.6.1. The Capital.....	191
5.6.2. The Military	194
5.7. The Brüning Period and The External Conditions that Gave Impetus to the "Breakthrough of the NSDAP"	200
5.8. The Power Strategy of the NSDAP and the Fascisation of the State	202
5.8.1. The Politicisation of 'Bourgeois Apoliticism'	202

5.8.2. The Form of the Use of Political Violence	206
5.8.3. Instrumentalisation of the Formal Democratic Institutions by the NSDAP-Elections as Plebiscites.....	209
5.8.4. The Relationship of the NSDAP with the Non-republican State and Economic Elite.....	213
5.9. The Papen Government and the Prussian Intervention: A typical case of the Fascisation of the State.....	214
5.10. Beyond the Dichotomy of ‘Authoritarian State’ and ‘Fascist State’: ‘A Failed Authoritarianism’	239
5.11. The Extent of the Involvement of the Economic Elite in Shaping the Governments Papen and Schleicher Respectively	248
5.12. Conclusion: The Seizure of Power or the Delegation of the Power: How to conceive of the fascisation process?	254
6. UNCOVERING THE FASCIST TYPE OF POLITICAL DOMINATION: NATIONAL SOCIALISM AS A REGIME	265
6.1. Introduction.....	265
6.2. The Gleichschaltung (Bringing into Line the state and society) and Its Connotations for the deepening of the ‘Fascisation’ in the Regime Phase	266
6.3. The Legal Foundation of the New Regime and the Emergence of ‘Prerogative State’ in National Socialist Rule	275
6.4. National Socialist Conceptualisation of the Total State	282
6.5. German Fascism as a Non-State	286
6.6. German Fascism as an Alliance.....	288
6.7. German Fascism and Big Industry	293
6.8. The Alliance Theory, Fascisation and the Mass Aspects of the German Fascism	302
6.9. The Mass Appeal of the Regime to the Dominated Classes.....	305
6.10. The Labour and The Middle Classes	308
6.11. Recent Debates on ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ and the Resistance in the Third Reich: The Role of the ‘Masses’ at the Intersection of Class Rule and ‘Governing through ‘National/Racial Community’	317

6.12. Conclusion	335
7. FASCISATION: FASCISM AS A PROCESS AND DIFFERENT AMALGAMATIONS OF REACTIONARY 'MASS' MOVEMENTS AND COUNTER- REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL RULE	338
7.1. The Use of the Terms of 'Counter-Revolutionary', 'Reactionary' and 'Authoritarianism: The Conceptualisation of 'Fascisation'	338
7.2. Different Cases of Fascist and Authoritarian Ruling Departing from German Fascism and overlapping with it in terms of 'Fascisation'	345
7.3. A Short Reevaluation of 'Fascism' within the context of 'Fascisation' to Evaluate the Contemporary Tendencies of Fascism.....	364
8. CURRENT DEBATES ON RIGHT EXTREMISM, RIGHT- WING POPULISM AND FASCISM: THE REVIVAL OF THE FASCIST TRADITION?.....	368
8.1. Introduction.....	368
8.2. The debates on how to assess the current fascist tendencies and their implications for the concept of the fascisation	369
8.3. The Evolving Meanings of the Right Extremism towards the Hegemony of Right Wing Populism.....	376
8.4. The Right Wing Populism and The Current Tendencies towards Fascism	385
8.4.1. The Dissolution of the Liberal Democracy	389
8.4.2. Incorporation of Fascist Techniques of Power and the Role of Political Violence	401
8.4.3. Capitalism and Right-Wing Populism	412
8.4.4. New Mass Faces of Fascism: National/Religious Communities.....	428
8.4.5. Thoughts on a New Anti-Fascist Politics.....	446
8.4.6. Conclusion.....	451
9. CONCLUSION	454
REFERENCES	470

APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE	502
B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET	504
C. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU	511



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Adorno (1959), while emphasising the ‘continuity’ of fascism, makes a distinction between the ‘working through the past’ (Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit) and ‘coming to terms with the past’ (Vergangenheitsbewältigung). The first one necessitates a critical thinking about the past that includes ‘conscious act of critical self-reflection, direct confrontation, thorough-going working through and public enlightenment. In contrast to that, ‘coming to terms with the past’ tends to create a social conformity based on a proper forgetting of the past. It requires “disavowal and deflection of guilt, willful denial and justification of past misdeeds, selective remembering and fuzzy universalism”. He insists on the fact that the conditions that brought about fascism is not absent in the post-war period. The reception of democracy as a ‘working proposition’ also includes the persistence of nationalist way of thinking, the possibility of economic crisis with aspects of unemployment and rising welfare dependency and the socio-economic conditions that do not protect the ‘self-autonomy of the individual but constantly demand the self-adaptation and subjugation to the system. In that sense, “past lives on but one has not worked through the past” (Adorno, 1998:98-102).

Benjamin (1940), in his theses on history, points at the inability of the oppositional forces to satisfactorily comprehend the meaning of fascism that should be counteracted by an ‘immediate resistance instead of convincing themselves of its historical necessity and inevitability. The threat is imminent: “The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that accords with this insight. Then we will clearly see that it is our task to bring about a real state emergency, and this will improve in the struggle

against the fascism. One reason Fascism has a chance is that, in the name of progress, its opponents treat it as a historical norm. The current amazement that the things we are experiencing are “‘still” possible in the twentieth century is not philosophical. This amazement is not the beginning of the knowledge- unless it is the knowledge that the view of history which gives rise to it is untenable”’. Benjamin implies that the passive trust in the progress of the humanity tends to view fascism as an exception, as a parenthesis. Fascism should be opposed with a view of the conditions that give rise to it. Those are intrinsically linked to the current forms of social and political domination that continuously breaks off the unilinear view of history. Thus, in Benjamin’s terms, what is necessary is to ‘brush history against the grain’ i.e. not sacralise the modern current and the official history of the oppressors (Löwy, p.85-8)

Heinrich Mann (1932), in his article on the dominance of nationalism, militarism and irrationalism in German political space even before the Nazi’s coming to power, pictures an atmosphere of ‘being active of the reactionary thinking coupled with the imperialism and the contemporaneity of the danger if it is not resisted by the progressive and democratic forces: “It depends on the people and their readiness and their will that an age of reason dawns. The irrationalism took place easily but the reason never wins spontaneously; no automatic cause paves way for the event, it has to be fought”’.

The defeat of irrationalism is not guaranteed and it takes place so massive and complete. The century determined irrationally did not bring about something other than destruction, impoverishment, hatred and a big nothing in culture. It will not prevent it to sink deeper, endlessly deeper because a specific part of the humanity can sink endlessly just as it can rise without an end, why not a couple of countries stretching from the Russian border to the Atlantic coast. One should not count in the least that a convalescence will follow every exhaustion and that one will be on top again without knowing how. Without the more strained determination, it is impossible start anew- *particularly if the powers of the decline and the decadence are on their side so active and full of hatred* (Mann, 1987:25-26).

What do these quotations say to us about the nature of fascism? Firstly, they signify that the basic tenets of fascism were derived from a particular political

formation of capitalist societies and its ideological presuppositions were a product of these relations. There are always the seeds of fascism that wait to be politicised when historical circumstances and political conjunctures allow its becoming a political power alternative. Secondly, fascism does not come in one night. It necessitates a process that functions in the middle of a co-existence of a variety of factors that prepare the way for it to flourish. Thirdly, though we have two ‘complete’ experiences of fascism in Germany and Italy, however, it can take different ‘forms’ in different historical contexts that would conform to its function and ambitions. Actually, different combinations of reactionary mass support and the presence of rightist political elites can correspond to different roads to fascism combined with a political violence that is dependent on the interaction of state’s repression mechanism and the militant paramilitary organizations. Fourthly, the answer to the question of what the fascism is against is decisive in the ways in which it could be counteracted. Is it simply the liberal democracy, the working class organizations or all democratic formations that are ‘the focus of the attack’? Actually, this question is complemented by another question. What kind of an alternative does it bring about beyond its negative connotations like anti-Marxism, anti-capitalism or anti-Semitism? The analysis of fascism as a specific form of political power should also give us clues about the efficient forms of political resistance and political practices that could play the role of antidote to the ‘fascist’ tendencies even in today’s world.

This thesis primarily concentrates on the analysis of the German fascism with respect to its origins, the conditions of development and its political ruling. Our particular focus will be on the analysis of its ‘mass’ appeal and its relationship to the ruling elite in Germany both in the pre-fascist period and in the consolidation of the fascist regime. We will preponderantly rely on the Marxist analyses and the theoretical contributions of some Critical Theorists that are integral to the understanding both flourishing fascist ideas and practices at the micro-level, hence its material social basis and the class struggles that made the rise of fascism possible. We will locate it in a process of ‘attack of capital, state elites and ‘social segments of population’ that are mobilized by a special blend of

‘socio-economic interests, the ideological attraction of a new nationalism and the decline of the political left and working class movement.

Alongside the specificities of the German fascism, we will try to distract its trans-epochal aspects that are applicable to other capitalist societies. What is at stake is also the elaboration of the contemporary revivability of the fascism by the lessons taken from the example of the German fascism. Although current fascist tendencies are evidenced mostly explicitly in right-wing populist movements and governments, there are both differences and correspondences in terms of modes of organizations, ways of mass mobilization and their incorporation into specific forms of state re-structuring. The historical context that covered the fascist movements and regimes in the 1930’s was referring a distinct phase of monopoly capitalism and favoring ‘protectionist’ policies in the face of declining world trade and the international economic crisis. Currently, though we are referring to a constant crisis of the global capitalism, the protectionist policies that would characterize a clear diversion from the current mode of neoliberal policy making are not in sight. However, insofar as the democratic rights and freedoms of the working classes are concerned, there is a definitive retreat that had accelerated in the last decade with the increasing burden of the crises directed towards the oppressed classes. Despite the fact that the crisis of capitalism does not necessarily produce fascist inclinations in the masses and ruling classes, it would naturally provide a fertile soil for flourishing fascist mass formations and the possibility of instrumentalization of them by the implicit or explicit consent of the states and capitalists. In contrast to the liberal conceptualization that relies on the assumption of the end of the fascism in the post-II.World War era, we observed the political strategies that are associated with the fascisation in the German fascism was not absent from the political scene. The analyses solely depending on current specific ‘regimes’ and the essential features of the ‘fascism as such’ inevitably ignored the ‘growth phases of German fascism’ and their current reflections, though they are variegated and uneven. In this sense, it is of paramount importance for us to link the

implications of German fascism to the newly arisen phenomena of rise of far-right and right-wing populism.

If we look at the mass growth of fascism, its communication with the ruling class between 1930 and 1933 and its establishment of the regime, we observe that the ideological and political crisis of the ruling classes and its relationship to the dominated classes is an important aspect of the process. However, this crisis does not expose a 'self-containing process' that mechanically finds the solution to the crisis. It is not an actor-less process. This crisis-prone situation at the end of the 1920's should be located in the domain of the 'offensive of the bourgeoisie' and 'defense of the working class'. Within this specific context' the political strategies of the relevant actors particularly of the NSDAP and the 'counter-revolutionary ambitions of the state and business had a decisive effect on the political events between 1930 and 1933. Within this conjecture, the mass formation of the fascism and the inability of the political left to find alternatives to this process was an important determinant in the acceptance of the fascist technics of power and its socio-economic project. It is also imperative to shed light on the relationship between particular political strategies that unfolded in the fascisation process and its direct effect on the mass formation of it. The specific characteristics of the process directly impacted on how the democratic rights and practices of the working classes has been eroded and finally abolished in this specific manner. Thus, rather than simply leaning on the 'social' function of the fascism, it seems to be necessary to focus on specific forms of domination that are peculiar to fascism and how this new formation in turn affected the whole social structure and the political resistance capacities of the dominated classes.

Within the thesis, we will avoid from making 'a generic definition' of German fascism and will not attribute some 'prevailing essential ideological' dispositions that were finally decisive in the action of the NSDAP. Naturally, the NSDAP as a party was an outcome of a German Rightist scene that ideologically gained momentum throughout the years of Weimar Democracy. However, the most

distinctive feature of the NSDAP was not its commitment to its programmatic aspects or a unchanging set of ideological aspects. What became distinctive about it at the end of the 1920's was its adaptability to its 'target' mass base and changing strategies according to the different stages of fascisation. At the end of the 1920's, there were many parties and groups that relied on the 'völkish' nationalism, anti-Semitic political goals and reactionary sentiments of the middle classes. However, it was evident that the ideological commitment was not sufficient for a movement to achieve a mass mobilisation. In that sense, it was imperative to anchor the ambitions of the party to receptibility of the masses to those ambitions in a specific historical context.

In our understanding, German fascism as a multi-faceted phenomenon could better be evaluated around the concept of 'fascisation'. The conceptualization of it refers to three distinct instances, though they are interrelated. The first phase of the fascisation process covered the NSDAP's emergence as a mass, reactionary social protest movement that was also a product of the crisis of Weimar Republic at the end of the 1920's. On the side of the NSDAP, their political strategy was affected by the ideological currents of the 'conservative revolution' and 'new nationalism'. If loosely defined, they mainly targeted the strengthening of the 'nationalist thought' in a manner of covering all the oppressed classes, including the working class. The NSDAP, having embraced the leadership principle within the party, organizational activism and the prevalence of the mass mobilization as the parties' main motto began to find echo particularly among the peasants and old middle classes between 1928 and 1930. Naturally, these segments of people prone to the nationalist, reactionary ideas were not created in one year. They were a part of the middle classes that began to already steer to the political right beginning from the first years of the Weimar democracy. Indeed, the 'nationalisation of the masses' was already gaining stronghold among these segments of the population before the NSDAP's emergence as a political force. On this fertile ground, The NSDAP took two critical steps in terms of gaining the allegiance of the masses. One was the formulation of the 'social discontent' in nationalist/reactionary terms. Indeed, the first reactions of the economic crisis

began to find its expression in such a context. Secondly, this 'social protest' was aligned with an 'anti-systemic' (mainly against the institutions of the Weimar democracy) and anti-democratic but a popular form. Thirdly, there were parties like the DNVP that more or less shares the same programmatic aspects with the NSDAP. However, the NSDAP was not involved in the Weimar politics and provided a truly new alternative. Additionally and importantly, it was trying both to combine the sectional interests of social classes with a vision of national unity and will.

It is a common attitude to treat the NSDAP solely as the carrier of specific middle class interests without referring to the reactionary social structures within which it has been expressed. The NSDAP as a mass movement greatly differs from any democratic mass movement. Roughly, it can be defined as a movement that stirs a 'conformist rebellion', a combination of the 'social protest' and 'the yearning for a social and political order', the amalgamation of the 'internal passivity of the population' and its 'susceptibility to the populist political currents. That is why it is very important for the movements like the NSDAP to activate the nationalist/religious feelings of its target population that contains both social expectations having modern traits and also a 'reactionary' confrontation with the democratic aspects of public life and the political organisations of the working classes. While the third chapter of the thesis deals with these questions, the fourth chapter focuses on the political strategies of the political left whose evolution was decisive in the creation of mass base upon which German fascism could easily flourish. Particularly, their flawed treatment of the issue of the 'nationalism', their failure or unwillingness to foster the democratic practices coming from below and most importantly losing the oppositional culture on the side of the SPD in a manner of identifying itself with the Weimar State left a large space for a nationalist opposition. In that sense, the mass growth of the German fascism could not be properly understood if we don't analyse the political strategies of the SPD and KPD in relation to the political discussions on the meanings of socialism and democracy and the concomitant evaluations of nationalist wave and its culmination in the rise of fascism.

As for the second phase of the fascisation, we can argue that German fascism as a mass protest movement wouldn't achieve its seizure of political power if it did not collaborate with a ruling class that was determinate to reverse the formal democratic system and parliamentarism by involving in a political offensive against the working class and its political organisations. Only in such a context favoring the 'exclusion' of the working classes from the state affairs could the NSDAP appear as a new political elite with a mass backing. However, it should be admitted that the mass power of the NSDAP was not a static element throughout the fascisation process. While in the initial phases the issues of the social protest was on the foreground, in this phase the NSDAP largely infiltrated the 'mainstream nationalist bourgeois strata' and began to activate these segments by portraying itself as 'the protector of the public order' against the 'communist terrorists'. Alongside its more deep rooted reasons for the mass consent of the NSDAP, the co-operation of the NSDAP with the monarchist state elite particularly in the Papen period reveals us how it began to 'construct' a 'state within the state' by means of the variety of political strategies. In the literature, It is a commonplace to 'disregard' these political strategies as a means to the end, hence the final seizure of the power. However, these strategies and their materialisations should be seen endemic to the fascist configurations of political power which have already started before the regime phase. What we call 'politicisation of bourgeois apoliticism, the form of the usage of the political violence against the mass constituents of the Weimar Democracy, the deformation of the 'elections' as plebiscites and the public imposition of cleavage between the 'national' and 'un-national' and the dilemmas of public security/insecurity are characteristics of fascist politics. These political techniques were deliberately fostered by the political and economic ruling classes which tried to exercise a counter-revolutionary restructuring of the state. Indeed, these political instruments were critical in raising the mass support of the bourgeois strata for the new state and providing new means of 'paralysing the working class and neutralising the mostly legal and parliament-based opposition of the working class organisations. Thus, they had a direct impact on the class struggles that were on-going during the presidential governments. During this

process, the introduction of the ‘unpopular economic policies’ such as the ones in June 1932 and September 1932 that put the social burden of economic crisis on the backs of the working class could be resisted more easily if there wouldn’t exist the NSDAP as a mass movement that was hostile to the political organisations of the working class and physically and morally attacked them with the assistance of the non-Republican state forces.

To the end of the fascisation process, the issue becomes more about the ‘nature of the counter-revolutionary regime. In this phase, the democratic forces were excluded from the state structure, however, they continue to be existing despite the constant attacks stemming from the fascist para-military forces and the state repressive apparatus. However, these unfavorable conditions for the anti-fascist forces do not signify the ‘irreversibility of the fascisation process’. There is still the potentiality to organise the democratic forces particularly in extra-parliamentarian sphere to be effective enough. The conflicts among the ruling classes could provide a extra-sphere of political opposition. In the case of the German fascism, after the 13 August 1932, we faced with the conflicts among the ranks of the state and business that brought forward the options of military intervention, state intervention or ‘monarchical restoration’ as an alternative to the fascist rule. Here, it seems that the ‘mass power of the fascist movement’, the prior experiences of formal democratic development, the weakness of the pre-modern authorities (Church and Monarchy) and the relevant incapacity of the state and the army authority to rule against all the mass forces of the society including the NSDAP were decisive factors in the furthering the fascisation process.

Nazi’s seizure of power should be evaluated within this framework. From the start, it was a power coalition between the ‘authoritarians of the state bureaucracy and fascist movement. Ideologically, it was also relying on the ‘national re-concentration, a government without and against the parties and the veneration of the traditional values of the society –nationalism and religion. While the fascist political rule was backed by the authoritarian state forces and

bourgeois social strata, it triggered 'fascisation of the state' that relied on the co-working of the SA and state forces to destroy the political organisation of the working classes. In essence, anti-Marxism was the main weapon of the NSDAP and its source of political legitimacy. One should notice that through this way the NSDAP has constantly avoided from an authoritarian re-consolidation. The events of 'Reichstagsfire' and the 'Enabling Act' were also the means of 'locating its power in its mass base' and preventing an excessive reliance on a state agency like the army. In the same vein, the Röhm action against the SA is typical of the counter-revolutionary nature of the regime in terms of the ambition of eradicating any 'disorderly and quasi-anti-capitalist forces' that could threaten the political and economic status-quo. In that sense, it was a 'defense of the state'. However, predictably it was also a coup against the right-authoritarian claims for 'monarchical restauration'. The increasing emphasis on the leadership principle and 'mass political organisation' in the sense of 'moral/racial regulations of the society can be held as new indications of political legitimacy. On the other hand, the specifics of the fascist political rule has a direct impact on its 'social function' and the character of the class struggles since the re-shaping of the mass structures has special implications for the potentiality of the political discontent and resistance.

Why did we choose German fascism as our object of study? First of all, German fascism helped us illuminate different facets of fascism in its clarity. Here, different phases of fascism were more explicit. In German fascism mass mobilization was more important in comparison to Italian fascism. In Italian example of fascism, the effect of authoritarian institutions such as church and monarchy was still influential. However, German fascism was more capable to construct truly fascist institutions relatively immune to the effect of these authoritarian sources. Most importantly, the constitution of fascist regime in Germany was preceded by a transition period of 1930-33 that signified a large space for the concept of fascisation. Apart from these, we analyse today's fascist tendencies, to concentrate on the period prior to the seizure of power helps us properly analyse contemporary emergent state institutions in some countries

which are on the way of being constructed. The interrelationship between mass mobilisation and authoritarian state structures in German fascisation provides with clear insights on the transitional forms of the state and the mass movement which are still in progress.

In post-second-Second war era, the European public tended to embrace a misleading view of German fascism as the ideological radicalism of a fascist party without assessing the role of its collaborators within the state and rightly comprehending the origins of its mass basis. The liberal scholars mostly defended the view that the danger of fascism was radically eradicated once and for all when the German troops were defeated by the allied powers. Indeed, an anti-fascist political climate was experienced for a while in late 1940's, however, as the Cold-war conflict began to exert its influence, the wave of anti-communism preceded over the concerns of anti-fascism. This changing nature of the public sphere prevented a real political settlement with the fascism. In Germany, the state elite that actively participated in the administration of NS State retained their status without being affected by early anti-fascism. In fact, the ex-Nazis increasingly became the allies of the Western powers, primarily USA as their interests overlapped in their common hostility to the Soviet communism (Kühnl,1996). The dominant paradigm of fascist studies in 1950's actually, totalitarianism portrayed a picture of fascism that can be paralleled to the repressive state mechanisms of the Soviet regime. However, the social basis of fascism and its relation to the ruling classes went increasingly unheeded.

However, the effect of the lessons taken from the inter-war period was not entirely absent. The counteracting force mainly coming the political left is, as we have said before, critical in thwarting any fascisation process. The increasing influence of democratic movements with transformatory visions in 1960's and 70's has, inevitably shaped the public agenda with an explicit alertness against any actions of fascist popular mobilisation. The new right extremist parties with an adherence to a fascist past remained highly marginal during this period (like NPD in Germany). We should also pinpoint that especially among the Marxist

circles a new debate has erupted regarding the neo-fascist tendencies primarily rooted in the successive military putsches for instance in Brasil (1966), Greece in (1967), Chile (1973). Committing to the definition of fascism of Dmitroff's as the terrorist domination of the monopoly capital mainly directed against 'political presence of the working class, most Marxist theoreticians agreed on the 'fascist nature' of these military regimes by using new terms like 'dependent fascism' and 'military-fascism' (Opitz (1974), Weissbecker (1980), Hackethal (1980)). It was true that the organisation of the military interventions was tied to the interests of US imperialism and found a support in the military elites and big bourgeoisie depending on the foreign capital. It was also a reaction against the mass influence of the leftist ideas that posed systemic threats to these groups in the Allende's case. However, as Kühnl (1990:299-230) argues, these military interventions differed from classical fascism in the sense that firstly their drive was the protection of the foreign interests, not a strengthening a purely nationally-based power structure.

Beginning from the 1980's and 1990's we have witnessed a different set of social and political determinants that gave a different shape to the 'fascist tendencies' that have resemblances to the pre-conditions of German fascism but there were also different appearances of them in relation to the new global political and socio-economic context. However, we can state some of the related common tendencies mainly in Europe and USA that have fermented new rightist formations that could give us a clue about their potential for fascisation, though these trends were not necessarily covering all the Western countries unequivocally.

- A turn to the right beginning from the 1980's- the hegemony of liberal and conservative solutions to the social problems, the allegedly 'ultimate' triumph of the liberal democracy-free market-globalisation- as the dominant social vision
- The dissolution of the 'East Communist Regimes, a crisis in the socialist left, decline of its effect on mobilising the masses

- Emergence of new nationalisms in Eastern and South-East ex-Communist countries- in a manner that culminates in the practices of the ‘ethnic cleansing’
- The proliferation of right-extreme parties, ‘respectibilisation’ of the far-right in the form of ‘right-wing populist parties’ and their constant interaction with the mainstream right

Given these transformations, during the first and second decade of the 21st century we faced with a disenchantment of the liberal democracies and ‘transnational political organisations like EU. The technocratic decisions determined the destinies of the populations without democratic will formation. To these, one should add the widespread social inequalities, mass unemployment and proliferation of ‘precarious and flexible work patterns that sustain the ‘economic insecurity, fear of the loss of the social status and poverty among the working classes. Out of it, there emerged a ‘continuing distrust in the liberal democratic mechanisms and in the mainstream parties that did not differ from each other, whether from the left or right, in exercising the neo-liberal policies. That inevitably led to the intensification of the social protests that are desperately seeking a relief from these conditions that seem to be dictated on them. This situation created an environment where the far-right and right-populism could provide a shelter for reactionary feelings of the suffering populations.

Why the debate on the fascism is still up-to-date? Why there is a renewed in the interest in the history of the fascism? It becomes common to make allusions from bitter experiences of fascism to shed light on the current political development. It is true that the inflationary use of fascism can also divert us from its distinctiveness as a movement and as a regime. However, what we are experiencing are processes that are not simply discardable when it does pass to a static schemata or a generic definition of fascism. There are tangible events that also make us rethink on the issue of fascism again and deepen its meaning in view of its contemporary reflections. Undoubtedly, we are not observing ‘paramilitary organisations’ marching in uniforms around, a terrorist regime

paralleled to the political violence that the Nazis have exercised. However, as Eco (1995:9) points out, “We must keep alert, so that the sense of these words will not be forgotten again. Ur-fascism is still around us, sometimes in plainclothes. It would be so much easier, for us, if there appeared in the world scene somebody saying ‘I want to reopen Auschwitz, I want the Black Shirts parade again in the Italian squares’”. Life is not that simple. Ur-Fascism can come back under the most innocent disguises...”. For instance, can this disguise be the ‘democracy’ itself which simply points at the “will of a homogenous people” according to some right-wing populists, who want derive their legitimation from ‘a crude nationalist or religious-oriented vision of society which is enveloped by a ‘democratic’ mantle? What happens then to the real democratic gains of the working people, to a variety of social groups and segments which are ethnically and socially in minority or to transformatory visions of political collectivities that inevitably stand in stark contrast to that ‘sublime will of people’?

There seems to be a range of dimensions to the far-right and right-wing populism in regard of its implications for a reevaluation of the fascism.

In the wake of the inability of the political left, the social protest is voicing itself through the rightist forms that take an ‘anti-systemic’ form which most of the time create reactionary subjects. This condition does not necessarily turn to a revolutionary or progressive solution to the problems of unemployment, social inequalities or poverty. Given the political atomisation of the populations in the face of ‘declining collective effect of the trade unions, political parties and civil society institutions, these developments pave way for seeking compensation through ‘nationalist or religious communities’ that also create material bases for the political organisation of ‘reactionary attitudes’. Mass formation of the right-wing populism inevitably depends on the ‘demonisation’ of certain segments of people, usually the ethnical minorities or refugees, political dissidents that do not conform to the unity of ‘Volk and State, sexual minorities and social aliens in the sense of ‘welfare dependents or undeserving poor’. Actually, the new enemy

portraits can be extended. The critical issue here is not simply the protection of the traditional social values in a conservative way but constantly activation of 'the reactionary segments', giving them some 'pseudo-ideals' of community and also, importantly support them materially at the expense of the social policies that should take a public function or reinforce real social solidarity. In that sense, nation or people becomes 'a group of people' that took a privilege of being member of 'endogamic community', constituting a 'Spartan elite' that promotes 'forms of social subjugation' and 'loss of individual identity' as a political asset that is expected to yield political and economic power.

The crisis of liberal democracy turns into a form that considerably threatens the democratic rights and freedoms of working classes that could not simply be confined to the framework of the liberal democracy. Any democratic attempt coming from below is, on the one hand, blocked by the technocratic regulation of neo-liberal orthodoxy or it was suppressed by a reference to the 'unified will of the people' in a right-wing populist fashion. The crisis of political representation leaves a large segment of people which do not belong to the 'privileged or legitimate part of the nation' entirely defenseless in democratic terms. 'Constitutional changes' in some countries where the right-wing populists are in charge of the state indicate general erosion of constitutional anchor-points of democratic gains by the name of a 'leader-democracy' that is supposed to being the only representative of the 'people' in a way of preventing the operation of the formal aspects of the democracy. The strengthening of executive embodied by one-person, elimination of check-and balances, the distaste with the rule of law, consequently leads to the outbreak of 'de-constitutionalisation process' which exerts aspects akin to the pre-fascist presidential dictatorships in Germany between 1930-33. In that sense, the issue is not simply the self-destruction of liberal democracy but an attack by the actors like state elites, party organisations and business elite that seems to be a part of national coalitions on the main bastions of democratic policy making and constantly narrowing down its space. If we look at the stance of the far-right and right-wing populists in Europe, we also see that they are inclined to 'embrace a form of strong state' that according

to them should specifically focus on 'the internal threats' and eliminate the deficiencies of the globalisation only for the 'ethnically and culturally' domestic ones. Thus, it seems to be critical to make firm to what extent the 'fascisation of the state' occurs that appears to be reinforcing 'its order and security' policy with the assistance of mass groupings that are inclined to put 'plebian' elements to such a policy. In correlation to that, to what extent these reactionary groups and parties transform themselves in a way that turns its ideological components into an explicit preference for the political violence? This should not be a party with paramilitary organisations but it could be political groups that could incite the mass structures overwhelmed by the constant hate rhetoric and 'ethnic aggression' patterns.

The relationship between the neo-liberal policies that are increasingly being losing its legitimacy in the eyes of the masses and the right-wing populist movements should also be in focus. In contrast to their external appearances, neoliberals have many common points with the right-wing populists in terms of 'their hostility towards the 'political' as a transformatory praxis, the praising of the traditional values in the background of the promotion of the 'market man', their apathy to any question of social re-distribution or equality. Despite the deep economic crises during the first and second decades of 21th century, global business elite with its high technocratic means persistently stucked to the strict 'neo-liberal hardcore policy orientations'. It is still questionable whether they gave assent to the right-wing populist policies. If we look at the real policy decisions, the contrast between the globalisation-anti-globalisation, transnational organisations versus nation-states and the technocratic policy making and nationalist ones seem to be not representing 'an overt contradiction containing anti-capitalist choices. It seems to be rather a conflict within the capitalists themselves in terms of the direction that capitalist production will take and how it would be legitimised and socially reproduced. Their 'let them die' logic against the oppressed classes should remind us how the capitalists in the Nazi period became generally indifferent to the 'political terror and racial discrimination and extermination as long as their high profits were guaranteed by

the new regime. In that sense, it would be a grave mistake to believe that they have an essential loyalty to their 'liberal values'. One should also not forget that it is an on-going process over what the hegemonic set of policy making and its ideological content will be a 'cementing' force within the ruling classes, if we use Poulantzas' terminology.

In this configuration, the condition of the left and of the democratic movements that advocate a range of political interests from the ethnic minority rights to the women movements are crucial. We will show the history of the German left as an internal process to the political domination of the fascism even before it reaches at the political power. The insufficiency of resistance had mainly two effects: the acceleration of the mass consent to fascism and wasting the chances of unitedly breaking off the nationalist coalitions. These immediate organisation of political resistance could be real bulwarks against the 'fascisation process' in terms of disproving its inevitability. Today, alongside the fragmentation of the political oppositions, there are also questions about the 'quality' of them. We are not only facing with the pressures of the neo-liberalism or globalisation but also their culmination in the composition of the 'reactionary' social structures that feed the ground within which the fascist protests are organised. It is clear that neither an 'identity politics' that suffices with the recognition of 'ethnic diversity' in a multi-culturalist perspective nor any sectarian socialist political stance that ignore the multi-faceted nature of the problem of social reaction permeated by the religion and nationalism is effective. The simple complacency with the latter ones can easily broaden the mass acceptance of the far-right-fascist tendencies. In that sense, what is missing is not the 'social reaction' per se but 'its insistence on its reactive being that can not cause the materialisation of a transformatory political project. The fragmentedness and temporariness of the political resistance seem to be stemming from the 'lack of positive common values and principles' that would increase the 'responsibility and freedom' of the oppressed political subjects and their own democratic organisations as an antidote to the desperate search for a leader, Führer or strong state. If it is achieved, these could also be an opportunity go beyond the limits of 'liberal

democracy'. Otherwise, the attack of the ruling classes will be more daring and aggressive as it has been seen before in German fascism.

Given these trends, how can we re-conceptualise fascism, by not simply comparing the past and the present but by taking into consideration the changing power relationships in time that also gave way for different forms of realisation of the fascist politics? Thus, we are not talking about the 'recurrence of the same' but trying to treat the German fascism in particular, fascism in general in a manner of highlighting its trans-epochal aspects that could give a clear picture of today's trends, if not a overall correspondence between the past experiences and its contemporary reflections.

II. Chapter of the thesis will cover the theoretical debates on the fascism general and the German fascism in particular. By differentiating itself from the 'liberal' conceptualisation of the fascism which excessively depended on the strivings for grasping the 'essence of the fascism' or 'generic fascism', our theoretical treatment of the fascism will primarily take into account the Marxist analyses in the inter-war period, in the 1960's and 1970's. Our particular focus will on the mass formation of fascism and its relationship with the formation of the interests of the capitalists and the conservative/authoritarian state elite. A class analysis of the fascism will be combined with some Critical Theorists' concerns for the 'social formation of the fascism' that goes beyond its embeddedness in a specific class structure. Lastly, the contemporary reception of the classical fascism and the theoretical possibilities of the relocating 'fascism' in our contextually distinct world with regard to 'far-right' and 'right-wing populist' political tendencies will be examined.

III. Chapter will try to handle the issue of evaluation of the first growth dynamics of German fascism around the themes of 'new nationalism' and 'conservative revolution'. Afterwards, the specificities of the NSDAP as a movement will be assessed with a view of its internal organization and its ideological premises. In a manner of refuting the 'middle class theories' and totalitarian approaches, the

class structuration behind the NSDAP will be enlightened. This approach will be complemented by the analysis of the specificities of 'fascist mass basis' that reveals characteristics that are firmly rooted in the bourgeois societies themselves.

IV. Chapter will strive to shed light into the distinct political strategies of the German left in particular case of the SPD that dates back to the end of the 19th century. Actually, the SPD's stance towards democracy, nationalism and socialism before and after the I. World War and in the aftermath of the November Revolution had an effect on the shaping of the Weimar Republic. The anti-fascist strategies of the SPD and KPD during this period and their failure to provide an alternative socio-economic and political project against the rise of fascism were very decisive in the mass success of fascism.

V. Chapter will concentrate on the period between 1930-33 on the basis of the interrelationship between the mass formation of fascism, the specific political strategy of the NSDAP and the vested interests of non-Republican political and economic elite. The main aim is to draw out the process of 'fascisation' which is so crucial to understand the fascism itself. We will see the mass appeal of the fascism is not a 'independent variable' that is simply converted into the political sphere. In fact, it is changing and evolving through a specific interaction between the NSDAP as 'state-constructing force' and the non-democratic ambitions of the project of the state transformation designed by the traditional state elite and business. The fascisation in that sense is not only a process that precedes the fascist regime but a set of political relationships that lead to the crystallization of the fascist form of political power through its distinct reception of 'mass effect' of fascist political strategies, the use of the political violence and forms of institutionalisation overlapping with the authoritarianism in some respects but diverting from that in some other ones.

VI. Chapter will try to evaluate the process of 'Gleichschaltung' (bringing into line) of the state and society in the first year of the fascist regime and reveal the

specific aspects of ‘fascist domination’ in its consolidation phase until the end of 1934. This chapter should be read in a continuity with the former one. The fascist political strategies, while backing up the nationalist/authoritarian tendencies and common counter-revolutionary goals, are also inclined to locate its legitimacy somewhere between the ‘authoritarian visions of the state elite’ and the ‘anti-systemic elements of the NSDAP. The fascist political domination endorsed a certain mood of ‘reactionary and system-conforming’ mobilisation of its own mass power around the ‘racial divides’ and the idea of ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ with a charismatic leadership above. This strategy paved way for the constitution of a state that insisted on distancing itself from the authoritarian visions of the state and at the same time provided a political model in ‘repressing further the ‘dominated classes’ socially and economically and handled the ‘social question’ in novel ways.

VII. Chapter will be dedicated to the clarification of the concept of ‘fascisation’ itself with regard to ‘different cases with ‘fascist’ and ‘authoritarian’ traits in the inter-war years and the Cold-War era and their distinguishing factors from the German fascism and their commonalities shared with it. In fact, the term of fascisation denoting a special form of disintegration of the liberal democracy with counter-revolutionary aims of the mass forces of fascism and the decisive turn away of the ruling elite from all the democratic mechanisms will give us clues about the ‘new faces of the fascism’ in our contemporary world.

VIII. Chapter will first involve the analysis of the evolution of the ‘far-right’ parties into ideological hegemony of right-wing populism particularly in recent decades. Though a fully-fledged fascism like German fascism is not a contemporary phenomenon, we will handle new formulations of fascist tendencies both in terms of the mass parties that began to take ground in Europe and USA and the regime appearances of the right-wing populism. The issue will be treated from the standpoints that we have crucially emphasised with regard to the concept of the ‘fascisation’ i.e. ‘the disintegration of the liberal democracy, the extent of the integration of the fascist political strategies of the political

violence, the relationship of the right-wing populism with the capitalist elite and the new mass forms of 'fascisation' integrally related to the success or failure of the counter-strategies of the political left and broadly of the democratic movements in a new global configuration of political power.



CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL REMARKS ON FASCISM AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM

2.1. The Liberal Conceptualisation of Fascism

The liberal approach held fascism mainly as an idea that corresponds with the programmatic sides of the fascist movements. Taking them at the face value- it means that 'subjective' side of the ideology takes precedence over the function and institutional form that fascism took in a specific historical era.

Using a Weberian approach to the analysis of fascism, the liberal thinkers like Eatwell, Griffin, Sternhell and Payne, concentrated on creating an 'ideal fascist' by presenting a list of carefully selected ideas of fascism out of which they then construct a 'fascist minimum' (Renton, 1999:22). Griffin attempted to define fascism as such: "Fascism is a political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism" (Griffin, 2008:86). This new consensus was widely shared by the liberal theoreticians as the ideological core of fascism. This definition tended to view fascism mainly as 'an ultra-nationalist myth, as a sacralised version of politics that paved the way for the perception of the fascism as a 'political religion'. There are a number of points relevant to this definition of 'fascism' that could enrich our analysis of National Socialism.

Payne (1980:10) proposed that "Fascist ideology and culture deserve more attention than they normally receive, for fascist doctrine, like all others, stemmed from ideas, and the ideas of fascists had distinct philosophical and cultural basis, despite frequent assertions on the contrary." He associated the philosophical nature of fascism with the "fascist anti-materialism, its emphasis on

philosophical vitalism and the metaphysics of the will”. In the same vein, Sternhell (2014:3) traced the roots of the fascism to the Anti-Enlightenment tradition where “the nation was considered as a living organism, not a collection of individuals, it had a soul and this soul was both a natural phenomenon and entirely individual. All cultures were organic and unique totalities, with unique inimitable languages, values, traditions, institutions and customs”. In this tradition, these unique features of the subject of ‘organic nation’ were counterpoised to the universalist ideals of the republican citizen. Additionally, Sternhell (2017:119) connected the emergence of the fascism to a kind of revision of Marxism predominantly represented by the figures of Sorel, Deat and De Man. In this conception, there were real socialist ingredients in the new forms of nationalism that had paved the way for the philosophical foundations of fascism. Especially by placing an emphasis on the Sorellian notion of myth for the mobilisation of the masses, in Antliff’s terms (2002:150), Sternhell’s thesis depended on the proposition that “the fascist ideology had its geneology in the anti-materialist revolt against parliamentary politics forged by Sorel and his followers before World War I”. Sternhell in that sense pointed at the ‘alliance formed between the anti-parliamentary nationalists, anarchists, Sorellian syndicalists, noting that the doctrine of national socialism was first developed when Sorel and his followers forged links with members of the monarchist Action Français (including future fascist Valois) before 1914. For Sternhell, ideological construction of fascism was already complete before I. World War before fascism emerged as a mass movement (Mann, 2004:10)

George L. Mosse was keen on finding out the intellectual origins and the cultural tenets of the fascism and its primary role in the foundation of the fascism. Griffin (2001:2-3) points out the contribution of Mosse to the search for the genesis of fascism in five basic items: “his belief in methodological empathy as the cornerstone, the centrality of culture in the sense of values, mind-set, world view of the agents of the historical processes, the crucial role played by myth as a causal factor in the historical process, a dialectical view of how the inner and outer worlds of human beings interact in the form of myth of social forces and

the belief that fascism constituted a national revolution with its own ideology and its own goals''. Mosse (1981) found the intellectual roots of the fascism in the spread of the Völkisch thought which also began to be institutionalised to the end of the 19th century. Völkisch thought as a direct product of the Romanticism, in Mosse's words (1981:17), was closely tied to the popularisation of one its central ideals: 'the peculiar and unique concept of the nature and the associated idea of rootedness''. This idea was inherently inimical to the bourgeois society whereby the Jews were representing the rootlessness. Fascism, in that sense, revealed the resurrection of the Völkisch thought which had unique characteristics to the cultural values of German society. Mosse (1989:9-10) exceptionally gave importance to the political liturgy that the Nazis have adopted in line with the aim of the national resurrection: 'German nationalism used the Christian terminology to express itself, a trend which was to reach its climax in National Socialism. There was "the resurrection of the Greater German Reich, the blood of martyrs and constant appeals to providence. This world, which the Nazis has adopted as their own was a rural, not urban world like that of the revolution, one in which a mythical German past had remained alive, pointing to a better future. Most nations represented themselves through pre-industrial symbols like the native landscape, projecting a feeling of an order and harmony in contrast to the modern age''.

First of all, the evaluation of fascism as a mere ideology suffered from the misconception of it as a set of ideas that could only be grasped by a careful investigation of fascism as a movement embodying a definite programmatic body. This strand of view largely neglected the alliances the fascists entered into with the conservative groups within the state. In fact, there were wide differences between fascism as a movement and as a regime. Understanding fascism in a way in which it described itself can lead us to 'perceive the fascist ideology' in its own right and without its function and material basis in a capitalist society. If we closely investigate the relationship of the fascism to the state apparatus in Germany, we can see that even in its period as a movement, National Socialism has engaged in a close cooperation with the state elite and the big industry. Far

from being simply as an instrument of them, the movement had involved in the para-military organisations considered to be a part of defending the political order and security. In that sense, fascism was not simply representing an ideological body of a distinct party but pointing at a public sphere that was increasingly 'fascised' involving a range of political actors outside the fascist party. The history of NSDAP shows us that the authoritarian governments prior to the seizure of power proves that the authoritarian tendency to undermine the Weimar democracy heavily contributed to the rise of the NSDAP and triggered new dynamics of fascist understanding of the state. Thus, it is impossible to analyse National Socialism without taking into account the power relationships that provided the political context within which the fascist movements can flourish.

Second controversial point relating to liberal conception of the fascism is their continuous emphasis on the 'revolutionary aspect of fascism. They insistently tended to locate a 'socialist' motive in the fascist movement. For Sternhell, fascism produced a 'synthesis of organic nationalism, a revolutionary ideology based on a simultaneous rejection of liberalism, Marxism and democracy' (Renton, 1999: 20). In a similar vein, Griffin (2008: 191) constantly mentioned about 'the revolutionary, anti-conservative right' as 'a genuinely revolutionary critical mass that built up the core of the fascist movements. Regarding 'the 'revolutionary side of fascism', they pointed at a new nationalism depending on rebirth of the nation and the dissolution of the social hierarchies. This version of nationalism is closely associated with a reformulation of the social relations in an egalitarian way. Here, seemingly socialist side of fascism is taken too seriously that the attitudes of the fascist regime towards the dominated classes, particularly the working class were largely ignored. The anti-capitalist jargon of the fascist political strategy was taken as an integral part of the fascist movements that predetermined its subsequent actions. However, the most important quality of the National Socialism was its counter-revolutionary stance towards working class organisations and political parties since their main strategy relied on the effort to reverse the democratic achievements of the November Revolution and eliminate

the remnants of so-called “Marxism” in the state. It should also be stated that National Socialism’s ‘socialist’ wing was to a large extent distanced away from the party though there remained some anti-capitalist elements in its discourse. Before everything, the fascist parties belonged to the right of political spectrum. Thus, any political resistance to fascism should be aware of the fact that the counter-revolutionary goals of the fascism was derived from a rightist political agenda that also explains the symbiosis between the fascist parties and conservative politics.

There is also a trend to assess the rise of fascist movement as a ‘parenthesis’, as an exceptional period in the linear growth of the liberal-democratic societies. The ‘moral disease’ theory depended on the assumption that the disenchantment of the world and constant striving for the material well-being inscribed in the modernity led the masses to integrate irrational elements as a reaction to modernity (De Felice, 1977:15). Against the materialism of modernism, the need for creating a national community and the loyalty to a national myth was advocated as exemplifying ‘the rejection of reason’ and emancipatory ideals of the Enlightenment. In that sense, fascism represented a deviation from the normal path of Western civilisation and a temporary phenomenon in the Western modernity. However, it seemed quite controversial to treat fascism as being external to bourgeois society as if it was totally alternative to the liberal democratic traditions. The main elements of fascism, of National Socialism in particular, were inspired from the nationalist trends in the modern era and its conformist attitude towards social reproduction of modern capitalism. In that sense, fascism can not be isolated from the modernity itself (Woodlley, 2010). It rather built up a radicalisation of some aspects of modernity. The moral-disease thesis corresponded with the liberal theses on the priority of ideas, hence ideologies as determining factor in the development of fascist politics.

The other side of liberal approaches was to exceptionalise the National Socialism as a ‘Sonderweg’, as an exceptional case which was derived its power from distinct qualities of German culture. Accordingly, the ultra-nationalism, anti-

Semitism, authoritarianism and the lack of a democratic tradition have greatly contributed to the emergence of the fascism and directly caused the mass reception of it. According to this view, as Renzo De Felice (1977:24) stated, 'fascism was the logical and the inevitable consequence of a set of obstacles characteristic of the historical development of certain countries, particularly Italy and Germany'. The appearance of fascism was limited to the nation-specific straits of each country. National Socialism, for instance, was distinguished by its heavy reliance on the importance of völkisch racism and biological determinism that had antecedents in the nation-making process of Germany. The privileged position of the 'blood' rather than the state in the construction of nation or the anti-Semitic roots of fascism embedded in the 19th century German history were counted as the origin of the National Socialism of the 1930's. Undoubtedly, a kind of continuity can be found in the nationalist tradition of the countries that have culminated in the later development of fascism. However, to confine the basic characteristics of the National Socialism to the distinct political culture of Germany can easily blur the common points of 'a fascist phenomenon emerged in the inter-war period and rule out 'the potential revival of fascism in different national contexts. As we will examine, the 'motives' and 'seeds' of fascism and their institutional construction had a special affinity to the premises of capitalist modernity that cannot be limited to the case of National Socialism.

The relationship between fascism and capitalism went increasingly unheeded. Especially the class formation of the fascist regime were not analysed at all. Evaluating fascism as an epochal existence, hence confining it to specific circumstances of the inter-war era from the start disregards the emergence of continuities of fascist elements in the post- Second World War period and in our contemporary society.

The relationship of the above-mentioned culturalist approach led to the totalitarian theories as its inevitable route. Given an over-arching role to the party unilaterally shaping all social and political relations according to its own visions, no social area remains outside of the absolute control of party according

to totalitarian conception of fascism. Gentile (2014:319), in an effort to justify the intrinsic relationship with the political religion and totalitarianism defines fascism:

as a modern phenomenon, which is nationalistic and revolutionary, anti-liberal and anti-Marxist, organised in the form of a militia party, with a totalitarian conception of politics and the State, with an ideology based on myth; virile and anti-hedonistic, it is sacralised the absolute primacy of the nation as an ethnically homogenous organic community, hierarchically organised into a corporative State, with a bellicose mission to achieve grandeur, power with the ultimate aim of creating a new order and a new civilization.

The view of totalitarianism was greatly inspired from the equation of the fascism with the communist regimes in the Cold War era. The totalitarian theory ignored the wide differences between two types of rule and lost sight of the counter-revolutionary character of the fascism.

The theses on totalitarianism conceived a totalitarian society as the 'perversion of democracy' where the liberal democracies of Europe and USA was viewed as the ultimate champion of democracy (Kitchen, 1978:27). Thus, all the regimes diverting from this model was increasingly seen as 'totalitarian'. Apart from these, the totalitarian regimes were assessed as totally depending on a decisive influence of an ideology which was seen all-encompassing. However, the ideologies of fascist regime have an eclectic nature whose interaction with the conservative ideologies could not be easily dismissed. Hence, ultimate decisiveness of the ideology is very debatable. Moreover, the monopoly of power in the party hierarchy that is supposed by the totalitarian theory is also questionable. As we will see in German fascism, in regime construction period, there appeared a coalition between the ruling classes and fascist party that negates the unilateral power of the party.

Arendt's theses on the 'breakdown of the class system' required a conception of the 'mass' which was characterised by the 'atomisation and individualisation of the society' (De Felice, 1977:64). Thus, in theory the mass that adhered to the

fascist rule was conceived as being devoid of the 'class interests', indeed of any interest at all. This structureless understanding of the fascist mass which is supposed to be blindly loyal to the fascist party hid the class structure behind fascism and 'differentiated' reaction of the masses against the propaganda of party. In that sense, fascism should be evaluated according to the ways in which it interacted with the 'mainstream values and institutions of the capitalist society characterised by its class differences. Woodley describes the culturalist pattern in fascism theories as such:

The weakness of much contemporary scholarship lies in the assumption that generic fascism exists in its own right as if the philosophical ideas and cultural values articulated in fascist ideologies existed independently of objective conditions. Fascism is not a consistent doctrine but a form of mobilization which develops to a certain extent from philosophical and cultural sources, but which is more closely bound up with the acquisition of power, the ruthless use of force, and the expansion of its support base (Woodley, 2010:20).

We have to add that the descriptive stance of these scholars also had no room for an anti-fascist position. Hence, this standpoint fostered a value-neutral conception of the investigated phenomena regarding the authoritarian and fascist regimes and the obsession with the mere categorisation of the ideology. As a result, fascism's conception as an all-encompassing phenomenon undermined the possibilities of political resistance among the anti-fascist forces. Surely, the success of the fascism was not an inevitability. The composition of the fascist 'mass' consisted of 'divergent social interests' that contained space for other forms of social mobilisation than the ones provided by fascism.

2.2. Marxist Theories of Fascism and National Socialism:

2.2.1. Comintern's View of Fascism:

During the 1920's, Comintern's understanding of fascism suffered from economist, mechanist and evolutionary view of of fascism that widely affected the German Communist Party and led to the incomprehension of the imminent

danger. Poulantzas' criticism of the Comintern decisions proved to be fruitful in terms of further assessing the fascist rise under the specific conditions of class struggle. Additionally, we will shortly rely on the views of Dimitrov and Clara Zetkin whose views avoided from the errors of Comintern and gave a special importance to the mass character of fascist movements and the corresponding class strategies of proletariat.

Comintern first of all underestimated the danger of fascism as it viewed the fascist rise as a temporary phenomenon whose existence would not last long. This temporary character of the fascism prevented the Communist Parties to formulate a stable, coherent policies to counteract the fascist rise. It was considered as a passing episode that was another form of bourgeois rule whose qualities did not differ from the former period. Secondly, it was regarded as a passing episode which was determined by the automatic process of "economic crises-evolution-catastrophe-revolution" and will come to its end automatically by its internal contradictions. Here, the economist view that predicted the inevitability of an economic catastrophe and accordingly a revolutionary situation became apparent and put its stamp on the decisions of Comintern. Thirdly, fascism in that context was understood as a positive development that intensified 'the internal contradictions of the German capitalism to the limit and leading Germany to a catastrophe'. Thus, fascism was the necessary preceding epoch before the proletarian revolution. This mechanist view presupposed that fascism was a result of the weakness of the bourgeoisie, hence the defensive strategy of capitalism. According to it, bourgeoisie was applying to fascist measures as they have no other option in the face of economic crisis. Correspondingly, this situation gave way for the offensive strategy of proletariat. Thus, the economic crisis was equated to the working class offensive (Poulantzas, 1976:49-50) Fascism in its strict sense was counter-revolutionary movement that was a response to the proletarian offensive. Accordingly, 'it has to be the last political form of the dictatorship of bourgeoisie to be necessarily and immediately followed by the revolutionary establishment of the dictatorship of proletariat (Poulantzas, 1976:51). In this configuration, fascism was the last

step before the revolution which constituted the fatalistic view of Comintern. Fighting against such an inevitable event was also meaningless as it was deemed to be a necessary step towards the revolutionary offensive.

In the Seventh Congress of Comintern, Dimitrov has distinguished its position from the above-mentioned economist view and emphasised on the mass foundations of fascism and the importance of the class struggle in a united front which meant a radical departure from the ultra-left policies of the Sixth Congress of Comintern. According to Dimitrov, The Social Democratic view saw a form of state power in fascism that stood above both classes or a government of petite bourgeoisie that dominated the finance capital. In contrast, he saw the rule of finance capital itself as decisive in the rise of fascism. However, a nuanced understanding of fascism was provided by Dimitrov who at the same time pointed at the mass character of the fascist movement. “Fascism became successful in gaining consent of the petite bourgeoisie which is dislocated by the economic crisis and of the most backward strata of the proletariat” (Dimitrov, 2016).

Dimitrov argued that fascism’s coming to power was not a succession of a bourgeois government by another one that is similar to the former one. As a form, fascism was qualitatively different from the bourgeois democracy. The former one suffered from internal conflicts that also characterised its peculiarity regarding any bourgeois domination. On the one hand, “fascism acted in the interests extreme imperialists but it presented itself to the masses as the protector of national unity”. According to Dimitrov (2016), fascists aimed at the increase in the economic exploitation of the masses but they used an anti-capitalist demagogy to attract the masses to the fascist movement. Although they were in favor of the interests of the ‘most reactionary circles of bourgeoisie’, fascists were successful in ideologically affecting the “disappointed masses who deserted old bourgeois parties”. Thus, we faced a unique mass phenomenon which distinguished itself from other bourgeois state forms.

In contrast to the Comintern's early assumptions on fascism that necessitated a working class offensive after fascism comes to power, Dimitrov mentioned about an attack of bourgeoisie that were linked with the defeat of the working class which was unable to prevent the creation of National Socialist government. It became possible primarily due to the policy of class collaboration of Social Democrats and political and organisational fragmentation within the proletariat that isolated itself from its natural allies, hence from the peasantry, urban petite bourgeoisie, the youth and the intelligentsia. Fascists' domination in these classes could only be broken down by the militant activity of the working class in the construction of a united front that would create the largest anti-fascist bloc and the unity of all the dominated classes. Thus, fascism could only be defeated by the joint struggle to gain the consent of the mass base of fascism. It would be a joint struggle against all forms of fascist offensive "in defense of gains and rights of the working people against the abolition of bourgeois democratic liberties". As a consequence, Dimitrov was linking fascism to the interests of the financial capital and as far as the social composition of the fascism is concerned, he created a different conception of anti-fascist struggle that directly opposed to the Comintern's economist views (Dimitrov, 2016).

Clara Zetkin shared with the Comintern the idea that fascism is a by-product of 'the on-going dissolution of the capital economy and decomposition of the bourgeois state'. Within this framework, however, she pointed at the relation of the fascism to the masses which are dislocated in the period of economic crisis. These layers of classes were small and middle bourgeoisie, the small peasantry and the intelligentsia. These social layers were distanced from the working class as 'the reformist parties and trade union leaders betrayed the revolution and allied with the bourgeoisie under the banner of democracy' (Zetkin, 2017:68). As these classes lost their belief in the working class in terms of a radical social change, they joined to the ranks of the bourgeoisie. Rather than a revolutionary situation of the working class, it was a general offensive of the bourgeoisie that instrumentalised the fascism 'in its struggle to beat down and permanently enslave the proletariat'. For Zetkin, fascism was "an amalgam of brutal, terrorist

violence together with deceptive revolutionary phraseology''. Its danger came from its contradictory position between its mass discourse and its task to annihilate all working class organisations. In contrast to the Comintern's view of 'strength of the working class' in the rise of fascism, Zetkin attributed the development of fascism to the weakness of the working class, hence to 'inability of the party and unions' to heighten the proletarian class struggle in the 1920's (Zetkin, 2017).

2.2.2. Thalheimer, Bonapartism and The Rise of Fascism in Germany

Thalheimer (2011), in his article 'On Fascism', made a thorough analysis of Bonapartism mainly relying on Marx's 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte and asserted that Bonapartism and fascism were related phenomena but not identical. His conceptualisation of Bonapartism provides a useful tool for understanding particularly the Italian Fascism. Additionally, it could also give us the opportunity to draw general lessons of fascism in relation to the Bonapartist experience in 19th century.

In Bonapartist coup d'état, the bourgeoisie was the main actor in the sense that "in order to save its social existence in a specific historical situation it abandoned its political power, thus it subordinated itself to the executive authority which has made itself an independent power". One precondition of the Bonapartism was that it appears to reign in the face of 'a serious defeat for the proletariat in a deep social crisis. The proletariat should be exhausted and incapable to make a revolution. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie should not be powerful enough to keep its political power intact and constitute its class hegemony over ruled classes. There should be a fragmentation within the bourgeoisie that gives way for the emergence of an 'independent executive power'. This power represented common interest of the bourgeoisie as separate strata as it cannot create this unity itself.

The paramilitary organisation of Bonapartism, 'Society of December 10' was composed of first the lumpenproletariat of Paris with a Bonapartist general at the head. Moreover, it included "decayed bourgeoisie elements, declassed nobility and declassed elements from the country side. These fractions were 'natural tools of 'independent executive authority' that represented 'the counter-revolutionary abolition of class differences, including class principles of bourgeoisie. Bonapartist army which consists of declassed elements from the country side entered into political scene as the most critical actor.

Marx defined Bonapartism as the ultimate form of bourgeois state power, as the most degenerate, rotten form. It is the last refuge for the bourgeoisie before proletarian revolution. Thalheimer (2011), on the other hand, provided us with another definition of Bonapartism in which it was conceived as a 'form of bourgeois state power in a situation of defense, a fortification and reinforcement against proletarian revolution. It was a form of open dictatorship of capital. He judged that fascism was also another form of open dictatorship of capital, a specific form of bourgeois state power.

In comparing Italian fascist state with the Bonapartist form of dictatorship, Thalheimer (1981) ascertained some commonalities that characterised the relatedness of these two forms. These were first of all 'the independence of executive power', 'the political subjugation of all the masses, including bourgeoisie itself, beneath the fascist state power, along with the social domination of big bourgeoisie and the landlords'. On the other hand, the fascist state 'wanted to be joint benefactor of all classes, thus constant setting of one class against the other and the constant movement of its internal contradictions. Thalheimer saw fascist party as a counterpart to Louis Bonaparte's December gang. It was also socially composed of 'the declassed of all classes, the nobility, bourgeoisie, urban petite bourgeoisie, peasantry and workers. Regarding the working class, the fascist party included 'the lumpenproletariat' from below, and labor aristocracy and bureaucracy from 'above'.

The condition of class struggle in the rise of Italian fascism greatly corresponded to the schema of Bonapartism. Shortly, it meant “unsuccessful revolt of proletariat, a consequent disappointment among the working class and ‘an exhausted, confused, and prostrated bourgeoisie looking for a savior who would reinforce its social power’”. Ideologically, a kind of nationalism that pretended to fight against ‘parliamentarian and bureaucratic corruption’ and the excesses of capital was created. Thalheimer pointed at the fact that ‘fascism and Bonapartism have promised ‘peace and order’ to the bourgeois society. However, he insisted on the inevitability of contradictions inside the fascism that made it vulnerable to the internal conflicts. For instance, while fascism pursued ‘peace and order’ in internal affairs, its terroristic excesses tended to destroy the system favored by bourgeoisie. There was an inevitable contradiction between fascist militia and regular army or between the demands of the declassed social composition of the party and the traditional state apparatus. As a consequence, neither Bonapartism nor fascism was conflict-free and completely stable. In order for the working class to reverse this trend, what was needed was to combine subjective and objective factors such as ‘the real power and maturity of the working class, its relationship to the other laboring classes, the state of the international class struggle and the strength and maturity of the Communist party’. We could state that this trend of fascisation can be stopped only by the strong revolutionary organisations.

Writing on fascism in 1928, Thalheimer saw a general trend in fully developed countries to ‘dismantle and restrict the parliamentary system, to create stronger political guarantees. For him, the movement was in the direction of fascism. In 1930, as a part of KPD-Opposition, he analysed the creation of presidential government of Brüning as a stepping stone to the fully fledged fascism. Actually, Thalheimer’s concentration on the pre-fascist governments indicated that the process of fascisation took ground before fascist regime has been built up and had necessary links to a particular kind of transition in governmental forms which was naturally a qualitative change in the rule of capital.

In 1930, Thalheimer extended his analysis to the condition of the Germany in Brüning government and tended to see this shift in the government towards Presidential regime as a direct road to fascism. He made a distinction between the 'majority in Parliament' and parliamentary majority as the former one did not indicate the strength of the parliamentary regime. For him, the crucial issue was whether the government, its constitution and its politics have been determined by the body of parliament or by the power locations outside the parliaments. Accordingly, the composition of the Brüning government was arranged by the executive power and particularly by the Reichspresident. It is not bound by a Parliamentary coalition, hence it meant that it was not bound by the parliament. Secondly, in case of any conflict, the President has the full power to dissolve the parliament and single-handedly rule with the power of Article 48. Thus, the will of the Executive power openly exceeded the existence of the parliament. These were preliminary signs of a new political order. Lastly, the majority in the parliament showed anti-parliamentarian tendencies, especially German nationalists and Volkconservatives seemed to be exclusively loyal to the Reichspresident. In this new system, the form was parliamentary but the content was not parliamentary as the main political forces, the main bourgeois actors were tending to utilise non-parliamentarian measures (Thalheimer, 1981:78-9).

Thalheimer (1981:81) made a distinction between the formal and real constitution. Though the contemporary constitution was formally a parliamentary democracy, however, the real power constellation, the real constitution tended to be fascistic as the executive power seemed to be the only determining power location within state. Thalheimer insisted that in that context the transition from the bourgeois democracy to fascist dictatorship was inevitable. And fascistic executive power, though it was not a complete fascism, with its actions tended to destroy the bourgeois democracy and abolish it totally. Thalheimer's insistence on the 'inevitability' of the transition towards fascism can rightly be questioned on the basis of new possible alliances within the ruling bloc that could have ignored the mass basis of fascism. The option of a military

intervention was still open during the presidential regimes. Thus, the crisis of the parliamentary democratic system could well be responded by the dictatorship of the traditional elites of the state without resorting to a fascist solution. However, the important point is the way in which the reconstruction of the state in an authoritarian fashion facilitated the rise of the Nazism and how they constructed a symbiotic relationship that made the shifts from the authoritarian regimes to a fascist rule possible.

Thalheimer gave a series of preconditions that are related to the transition from bourgeois democracy to fascist dictatorship. First, German bourgeoisie made certain concessions to the working class under the conditions of parliamentary democracy. They should be retreated and additionally democratic rights of working class were found as unbearable by the bourgeoisie. To prevent not only the electoral rights, freedom of press, collective rights but also right for coalition and strike, the existence of trade unions, and political organizations of the working class were crucial for the bourgeoisie to increase the rate of economic exploitation. The dissolution of the social policy and the general decrease of the wage levels should be added to these future prospects (Thalheimer, 1981:82-83)

Secondly, the bourgeoisie did not deliberately give its political power to fascism out of free will. However, its actions, the destruction of the labor organisation, required the development of the fascist organisations, their financing, their military equipment. Their active protection by the state officials speeded up the fascistisation process as objectively determined in contrast to the plans of bourgeoisie only to instrumentalise the fascist organisation. Their coming to power was regarded as the inevitable result of the actions of bourgeoisie. In fact, the march of the fascists to Rome was not initially desired but it was the 'inevitable result' of their action (Thalheimer, 1981:84)

According to Thalheimer, the Presidential dictatorship is the first step in the way of the fascism. Fascists are now in a war of abrasion and will smash the

democratic parliamentary elements. He adds that the fascists also wanted the strengthening of Presidential power, Presidential Dictatorship as this type of government meant, on the one hand rightist and nationalist shift in the government and, on the other hand, mobilisation of their political forces outside the parliament. Thalheimer (1981:85) quotes Georg Bernard from the *Vossische Zeitung* who argues that ‘with all these actions (anti-parliamentarian ways) one knows how it begins, but one does never know how it finishes’. Democrats and parts of German Volkparty appeared to be defending parliament but at the same time they desired a strong government. On the other hand, conservative parties and Centrum were also favoring a kind of Hindenburg party, a State party which essentially has an anti-parliamentarian nature.

Whether such a crisis of parliamentary regime and the constitution of Presidential regime necessarily gives way for a fascist regime is still questionable, however, there are signals where the strategy of National Socialists conforms to the re-construction of the regime. On the one hand, they were mass organisations which increased their electoral bases. They exercised ‘abrasion’ wars against parliamentary democracy while the state apparatus and mainstream parties did the same. National Socialists also strengthened their SA as an anti-parliamentarian force with a special relationship to the state forces. They also embraced ‘nationalist demagogy’ in common with the ideology of the state apparatus as if they are protectors of national awakening and guarantors of ‘peace and order’ in a nationalist sense (Thalheimer, 1981:87).

In such an environment, Thalheimer pointed at the necessity of Communists to get into action to reverse this trend of fascisation. He insisted that the only movement that could stop this seemingly inevitable trend was the Communist movement which should be prepared to introduce mass organisation and action outside the parliament. Parliamentary regime should be defended in so far as it also means defending the democratic rights of the working class which are crucial to keep intact in order to fight for a proletarian dictatorship. Thus, the ‘objective’ inevitability was conditioned by the subjective factors that

Communist movement could actively affect by its policy and actions (Thalheimer, 1981:89-90).

All in all, in contrast to the conception of the fascism as a direct agent of the monopoly capitalism, Thalheimer's analysis of Bonapartism introduces a space to political autonomy of the state in the ultimate aim of constructing the capital dictatorship. However, as Poulantzas (1976:84) puts out, the Bonapartist moment corresponds to a 'relation of equilibrium between the equals depending on the weaknesses of the bourgeoisie and labor which leads to the emergence of a third power, the independent executive to retain the bourgeois hegemony. However, as Poulantzas (1976:81) suggests, it would be more reasonable to associate the fascist rise with the moment of the 'attack of the bourgeoisie and the defense of the working class''. It should be interpreted as a further retreat of the working class and its democratic resistance compared to its condition in the previous formal democratic structure. The capitalist rule in the formal democracy is qualitatively different from the Bonapartist or fascist rule from the perspective of the democratic gains of the working class. Lastly, although Thalheimer rightly points at the 'fascisation process' in the state with the general crisis of the parliamentary democracy, he predicts that it evolve into 'a fascist state intervention' while he underestimates the political capacity of the fascist mass movement to come to the political power through seemingly constitutional ways, though the fascist violence and the state's involvement in it cannot be ignored.

2.2.3. Trotsky's Contribution to the Class Analysis of Fascism

One of the leading theorist of fascism, Trotsky made invaluable contributions to the analysis of the fascism by the instant evaluation of the Nazi's coming to power and then partly of the constitution of the regime. It was a dialectical and dynamic analysis of the class forces that led to the rise of fascism. In contrast to Comintern's static objectification of the historical process, he provided a concrete analysis of the class dynamism, of the policies and choices that characterise contemporary class fractions.

Undoubtedly, Trotsky believed that the emergence of fascism was directly and instrumentally linked to the choices of the finance capital. By this feature, he did not divert from the mainstream Marxist view on fascism. However, he saw a petite bourgeois mass movement in National Socialism that entered into collaboration with finance capital. The uniqueness of this situation did not reside in the inevitability of the fascism. Rather, this collaboration was a direct result of the incapability of the revolutionist vanguard and the proletariat in general to gain the petite bourgeois masses to the possibility of the revolutionary uprising. Thus, the relationship between bourgeoisie, petite bourgeoisie and proletariat was critical in the determination of the class struggle and in the rise of fascism. In Trotsky's words (1933a), "the economically powerful bourgeoisie, in itself, represented an infinitesimal minority of the nation. In the age of decline of the capitalism, where bourgeois democratic parliamentarism including Social Democracy was discarded, the bourgeoisie was destined to take the support of petite bourgeoisie and through its mediation of the proletariat. In this age, the issue was no longer to make new reforms, but to cut down and abolish the old ones. Trotsky assured that 'bourgeoisie came into conflict not only with the institutions of proletarian democracy including trade unions and parties but also with the parliamentary democracy'". There was two sided task of finance capital, one is the campaign against 'Marxism', the other one is directed against democratic parliamentarism. In this vein, finance capital could not constitute its desired government or state according to their will alone. According to Trotsky, in order to reach their goals, 'they needed the support of petite bourgeoisie'. However, this relationship was not unproblematic. The petite bourgeoisie should be 'whipped up, put on its feet, mobilised and armed. This process had its own dangers as the bourgeoisie did not particularly like plebian solutions to its tasks. However, in the age of decline of capitalism, it inclined towards authoritarian, Bonapartist and lately fascist solutions to their problem of fighting against the proletariat. For Trotsky, it was true that 'petite bourgeoisie is incapable of an independent policy as it is economically dependent and politically atomised'. It either chose to join the proletariat on the road of revolution or made an alliance with big bourgeoisie with the illusory hope of having an independent policy.

For Trotsky, ‘the alliance between the petite bourgeoisie and big bourgeoisie was not indissoluble (Trotsky, 1933). The example of Paris Commune and Bolshevik revolution indicated that a political alliance between working class and petite bourgeoisie was possible as long as the policy of the vanguard party attracted the scattered masses of petite bourgeoisie to its revolutionary aims. Otherwise, the possibility of the fascism was quite probable as “fascism unties and arms the masses of petite bourgeoisie out of human dust, organises combat detachments and gives them the illusion of being an independent force” (Trotsky, 1934).

In line with these theoretical premises, Trotsky evaluated the rise of National Socialism as ‘a deep social crisis, throwing the petite bourgeois masses off balance and the lack of revolutionary party that would be regarded as the acknowledged leader’. Thus, it was directly associated with the inability of the Communist Party to mobilise the masses. In Trotsky’s words,

If the Communist party is the party of revolutionary hope, then, fascism, as a mass movement, is the party of counterrevolutionary despair. This counter-revolutionary despair embraced the petite bourgeois mass with such a force that it drew behind it many sections of proletariat’. According to him, ‘fascism has become a real danger’ due to a range of factors like ‘an acute expression of the helpless position of the bourgeois regime, the conservative role of the social democracy and the accumulated powerlessness of the Communist party to abolish it (Trotsky, 1969).

Trotsky fiercely criticised the ‘social fascism’ thesis of the Comintern since this theory was the main reason for the misguided policies of German Communist party. According to this theory, the main enemy of Communist party was ascertained as the social democratic opportunism instead of fascism. This policy stance did not make any distinction between a range of different political actors such as ‘Italian Socialist leaders Turati and D’Aragona, Pilsudski in Poland and the leader of British Labour Party Ramsay MacDonald and labeled all of them as ‘Fascist Social Democrats’. Naturally, in line with this view, they underestimated the rise of National Socialism as it was regarded just as another form of fascism and its difference as a mass movement from other forms of political currents was blurred by these statements. Additionally, this political position presumed that even if fascism came to the power, it would not last long and prepare the ground

for the proletarian revolution. Accordingly, KPD saw two wings of fascism, one was the National Socialists, the other one was Social Democrats. However, the most dangerous current was 'Social Democrats' as they were 'more active elements in the fascisation process as well as the chief social support of the bourgeoisie'. So according to the theory of social fascism, before everything the SPD should be defeated in order to overcome the National Socialists claim on political power (Wistrich, 1976:164)

According to Trotsky, this 'social fascism' thesis explicitly blurred the real danger of fascism. In order to overcome the rise of fascism, the united front which would bring together all parts of proletariat regardless of their political inclination was needed. Trotsky too believed that the reformist policies of Social Democracy has contributed to the demoralisation of the working class, hence the strengthening of the counterrevolutionary current. However, it did not mean that Social Democrat workers should be isolated or excluded from the revolutionary policies of Communist party. It is certain that the goal of fascism was not only the abolition of bourgeois democracy, but also all the institutions of trade unions and Social Democracy that were the democratic gains of the working class. In that sense, Trotsky argued that "as Social Democracy saved the bourgeoisie from the proletarian revolution, fascism came in turn to liberate the bourgeoisie from the Social Democracy". He was well aware of the fact that fascism aimed at the destruction of class power of the proletariat without regarding the political divisions within it. In that vein, a united front was the first precondition of the collective defense of the working class in the face of capital offensive through fascist means (Trotsky, 1933b).

Regarding the political condition in Germany between 1930-33, Trotsky defined the presidential governments as the variants of Bonapartist governments. While the Brüning government was regarded as a half Bonapartism, Papen and Schleicher governments were seen by Trotsky as a fully-fledged Bonapartism. Accordingly, "the task of Papen-Schleicher is to avoid civil war by amicably disciplining the National Socialists and chaining the proletariat to police fetters."

(Trotsky, 1932). In that understanding, German Bonapartism meant relative weakness of proletariat and inability of the bourgeoisie to constitute its political power. To avoid a civil war between fascist forces and proletariat, Hindenburg as president was chosen by the ruling class 'as a superarbiter, as an arbitration judge of the nation. Bonapartism in that form "raised itself over two struggling camps in order to preserve property and order"'. Fascism in Trotsky's conception was a reaction of bourgeois society to the threat of proletarian revolution. However, as the threat was not emergent, ruling classes sufficed with a Bonapartist dictatorship (the government of Hindenburg-Papen-Schleicher) without requiring an option of civil war. The Papen government took the active consent of the great land owners, finance capitalists and generals. Trotsky defined this government as 'preventive Bonapartism' and viewed it as an unstable rule as it has no mass support neither from petite bourgeoisie nor from the working class (Trotsky, 1934). Fascism's coming to power was the last reserve of the bourgeoisie and was only possible by a coup d'état of fascism. Trotsky mistakenly believed that the National Socialists' rise to power was only possible as a result of civil war. Nonetheless, the Nazis joined the government through constitutional means and in a relatively peaceful manner. On the other hand, the policies of them were quite like a coup d'état that exceeded all the limits of the constitution. According to Trotsky, Nazis succeeded in putting the petite bourgeoisie at the service of capital. In the first period, the petite bourgeoisie aspirations were effective in the composition of the government. Sublimation of nation standing over class conflicts, petite bourgeois' need for 'higher authority' which stood above matter and history was satisfied by the ideological formation of National Socialists. Trotsky insisted that "Nazis required its program to assume power but power served Hitler not at all for the purpose of fuming the program'. His tasks were determined by the needs of monopoly capital. Thus, the disappointment of the petite bourgeoisie was conditioned by the absorption of the party by the new state apparatus. Trotsky defined it as 'a Bonapartism of the fascist origin' which was more stable compared to the 'preventive Bonapartism' of Papen (Trotsky, 1934). In any case, the fascist state was not invincible and contained a variety of contradictions

which was always remained vulnerable to any revolutionary uprising. Trotsky did never leave this option out even in his late essays on the question.

2.2.4. Poulantzas' Exceptional State and the Fascist State:

The specificity of Poulantzas's thought regarding fascism lies in his following assertion: "In contrast to the prevailing view of the Comintern, the rise of fascism corresponds to a decisive turn in the relation between forces present, it corresponds to an offensive step and offensive strategies on the part of the bourgeoisie and a defensive step by the working class" (Poulantzas, 1976:78). However, fascism was still an answer to the political and ideological crises of the dominant class. There was an explicit political crisis in the sense that the link of the bourgeois parties with their mass base was broken. There was also a 'deep crisis in the dominant bourgeois ideology' in terms of permeating its class base. Thus, what was observable was the turning away from the main principles of parliamentary democracy and the increasing propensity of the bourgeois parties towards a more rightist stance. In Poulantzas terms (1976:78), there appeared a "spectacular turn of the power blocs' watchdogs towards fascist ideology with a systematic attack on traditional bourgeois society". However, this was not a response to the rise of the working class. The process of the rise of fascism corresponded to a range of defeats of the working class that were set into motion after the ineffectiveness of the offensive strategies that covered the period between the November Revolution and the uprisings in 1923. Poulantzas particularly concentrated on the errors of the policies of Third International. Nevertheless, it seems to be more important to analyse the general decline of the political left and its incapacity to provide a democratic mass movement as an alternative to the consolidation of the fascist movements. According to Poulantzas (1976:143), the crisis of Marxist-Leninist ideology was exerted by the effect of the 'petite bourgeois ideology' on the working class in the forms of 'anarchism, spontaneism and putschist elements'. Accordingly, "fascist demagoguery with its populist aspects and its illusionary promises" accomplished to neutralise the working class (Poulantzas, 1976:146). Apart from these

‘impurities of the Marxist-Leninist ideology’, we should also take into account the factor of how to deal with the democracy and how to practice it in a way to provide an social alternative to the nationalist wave that gained momentum during the 1920’s and early 1930’s.

Other important side of the Poulantzas’ analysis of the rise of the fascism is the condition of the petite bourgeoisie. According to this conceptualisation, during the first period of the fascist rise between the 1928 and 1932, the NSDAP represented the real interests of the petite bourgeoisie, ‘catalogue of petite bourgeois grievances’ (Poulantzas, 1976:249). However, during the period between the ‘point of no return’ which was 1932 in German case and the fascist seizure of the power in 1933, we observed an alliance between the petite bourgeoisie and big capital (Poulantzas, 1976:250). It was a period when the NSDAP tried to combine its popular promises integral to its being a mass movement and its inclination to ally with the conservative elites of the state and the big capital. Actually, this was the essential contradiction of the NSDAP that could not completely be resolved even by its coming to power. Ideologically, while there was some anti-capitalist elements in the NSDAP that would gradually be eliminated, there was also a kind of ideological convergence between the militaristic and expansionist logic of the capital and the state-based nationalist allegiances of the petite bourgeoisie that was combined with the ‘authoritarian, leader-cult and the legitimisation of using political violence against the assumedly non-national political opposition (Poulantzas, 1976:256). The rage against the political assertions of the working class had a cementing nature in gluing together the ruling classes including the army and the bureaucracy and the petite bourgeoisie. Fascist seizure of the power also meant “‘openings for an important part of the petty bourgeois masses”’ in the sense that “‘there was an excessive growth of the State apparatus, what was termed as the fascist bureaucracy”’ (Poulantzas, 1976:257).

Poulantzas analysed the fascist state under the general principles of a concept of exceptional state. His form of exceptional state was common to military

dictatorship, Bonapartism and fascism. The exceptional state constituted the 'border' form of capitalist state. Poulantzas gave its general features that also covered his understanding of fascist state.

In 'normal' capitalist states, 'the differentiation between the public and private status is a derivative of the relative autonomy of the ideological state apparatuses. In exceptional state, the relative autonomy of ideological state apparatuses is seriously limited or suppressed. We observe 'a decisive limitation on the distribution of power within the apparatuses' and 'strict control of the whole of the State system by one branch. Within this branch, the repressive state apparatus co-exists with the dominant ideological apparatus in the sense that 'the increased role of the physical repression is necessarily accompanied by a particular intervention of the ideology to legitimize this repression. In exceptional state, as a result of ideological and political crisis, hegemonic class loses 'its direct links with both its political and its ideological representatives'(Poulantzas: 1979:317) Internal ideology of the dominant branch becomes the dominant ideology covering all the state apparatus. Accordingly, when the army is dominant, the militarisation of the society can be observed, in the case of the domination of administration, the bureaucratisation is the current trend within the state.

In the exceptional state form, there is a considerable increase in organised physical repression. However, the new state also means the reorganisation of ideological hegemony. In Poulantzas' words, "the reorganization of the State system can sometimes go so far as to let an ideological apparatus dominate the whole system"(Poulantzas, 1976:319). In this restructuring, the principal aspect of a branch or apparatus (of the army or the administration) becomes ideological. It becomes political police in the case of fascism.

In the case of exceptional state form, "Law no longer regulates: arbitrariness reigns". We cannot mention a system as 'it lacks a system for predicting its own transformation'. As there is no limit of law, it is possible to talk 'an 'unlimited'

exercise of power'. In the face of non-distinction between 'public' and private, every sphere of life falls within the scope of State intervention. In this context, the judiciary becomes dependent on the dominant branch or apparatus. There is one of sphere of law where the private law still functions as in another interventionist state. These are 'sanctioning the relations of production in the juridical forms of property, organising the sphere of circulation of capital and of goods as 'contractual' and 'commercial' Law and regulating the forms of state intervention in the economic domain' (Poulantzas, 1976:323) Hence, Fraenkel's formulation of dual state (2017) corresponds to the Poulantzas' conception of law in exceptional state.

Another quality of the exceptional state is the lack of electoral principle and the existence of the single-party system. The rise of the exceptional state is linked to the crisis in the representation of parties. The suspension of the electoral principle is directly related to a range of factors such as 'conjuncture of the crisis of hegemony, the complete upsetting of the power bloc and the crisis of party representation'. As such, 'the reorganisation of the relation of forces within the state system falls directly on apparatuses other than the traditional parties'. Competition between the political parties is replaced by the competition in a different form among and within the state apparatuses. Secondly, in the capitalist states, universal suffrage is an important right of the working class to challenge the dominant classes. However, this right is suppressed in the exceptional state. The exceptional state is highly bureaucratised. Bureaucratisation in the exceptional state is directly related to its internal ideology which is derived from petty-bourgeois ideological system. This class has entered in the State apparatus in massive numbers as a supporting class and has a strong influence on the internal ideology of the State apparatus (Poulantzas, 1976:327-8). Lastly, we can mention about a duplication and overlapping of the state apparatuses that responds to the new risks. The distinction between formal and real power gives the dominant branch a right to maneuver in case of excessive bureaucratisation. For instance, the hierarchical relations within the state apparatuses can be criss-

crossed by the principle of leadership which can provide a distinct, horizontal power networks within the state apparatuses.

Poulantzas evaluated the fascist state within the framework of these prerequisites of 'exceptional state' and emphasised its difference with regard to military intervention and Bonapartism. He did this task by looking at both the rise of fascism and its established system. Firstly, in its rise to power, fascism came to power 'in a perfectly constitutional way', by particularly respecting the forms of 'parliamentary democratic state' and its juridical background. However, we should be aware of the fact that although some writers perceived it as a 'legal revolution', National Socialism pursued a pseudo-legalism that undermined the constitutional rules of Weimar Republic especially with the help of conservative elites who were no less hostile to a democratic constitution. Prussian intervention was the most explicit of example of this pseudo-legalism.

Secondly, and importantly, Poulantzas argued that 'fascism comes to power with the collusion of State apparatus. This infiltration to the repressive state apparatus was realised as fascism received considerable support from the state officials. In Poulantzas' words, 'fascism would never have to come to power without decisive help from the repressive State apparatus in the struggle against masses' (Poulantzas, 1976:334). Thus, in the rise to power, the state was not a neutral force as Social Democrats assumed. The main strategy of fascism to get into the state apparatus was the neutralisation of the division within the repressive state apparatus. This neutralisation would not be possible if the masses haven't experienced a series of defeats. The National Socialists as a mass movement gained the support of the power bloc as it was the only force remaining that would wholly destroy the labour organisation and give mass consent to the unstable Presidential regimes.

Lastly, we observe the dislocation between formal power and real power which was directly related to crisis of parliamentarism and the emergence new political organisations and militia that built up a state within the state. This change was

characterised by a series of factors such as ‘instability and lack of hegemony; the duplication of political parties by parallel power networks, varying from pressure groups to private militia; the resurgence of the role of ‘executive’ and the repressive state apparatus and the increasingly important role of police; deterioration of the juridical system and the direct infiltration of judiciary by fascism’ (Poulantzas, 1976:334). In that context, however, it does not denote the ‘disintegration’ of the state, rather, it was a ‘dismembering’ that would be determined by the introduction of an exogenous factor like fascism. In the collusion of State apparatus and the militia, we observe an alliance ‘further legitimized by the judiciary rather than a clash of interests that would otherwise give way for a disintegration of the repressive apparatuses (Poulantzas, 1976:335)

Poulantzas’ analysis of the rise of fascism and its establishment closely resembles the theories of alliance (Kühnl, 1990). According to it, there was a decisive collaboration between the traditional authorities of the state and fascist forces of NSDAP. During the presidential regimes, as we have said, the distinction between the real and formal power locations became important as the new parallel networks began to precede the executive power of the government. The principal actor during this phase was the army that has a real control of the repressive apparatuses of the state. Poulantzas (1976:337) exerted that National Socialists couldn’t completely win the support of the army but they were successful in neutralising the power of the army and made use of internal conflicts within the dominant classes. Their main power in the state apparatus was their infiltration into the judiciary, the administration and the police. The petite bourgeois origins of the party facilitated their increasing dominance in state authorities which were also of the same class formation. As a consequence, there was a two-sided quality of NSDAP. It was both ‘a mass movement from below’ and ‘penetration from outside’ the repressive State apparatus (Poulantzas, 1976:338). In the established system, the SS as the political police which was controlled by the National social leaders became the dominant branch that has involved not only in security matters but also in the functioning of the other

branches such as administrative and military questions. Importantly, the idea of political police has dominated the core actions of the judiciary. The courts were no longer bound to apply laws but to protect 'the healthy sentiments of the people' and reinforce the will of leader. Thus, the state authorities took a police function that was directed at creating a new political order mainly by arbitrary means (Poulantzas, 1976:343). We can say that the staff of NSDAP while occupying the state institutions was explicitly bureaucratised which has diminished the function of the party within the state though the party was not totally fused with the state apparatuses.

There are a number of points in Poulantzas' conception of the fascist state to be questioned critically. The first one is the 'relevant autonomy of the fascist state vis-a-vis the interests of the capital particularly in the form of the relative autonomy from "internal contradictions among the classes and fractions of classes in the power alliance necessary to reorganise this bloc to establish the hegemony of big monopoly capitalists"', and from the contradictions between the dominant classes and fractions and the dominated classes'' (Poulantzas, 1976: 86). In contrast to this position, a range of scholars (Mason, 1995; Caplan, 1977; Rabinbach, 1976) advocated the complete autonomy of fascist state that functioned purely in political terms independent from the immediate interests of the capital. Given the complementarity between the rising rates of economic exploitation and the patterns of political domination in fascist system, this view does not seem to be accurate. However, what is missing in most of the Marxist theories is the unique sides of the fascism as a mass movement. This feature constantly feeds the contradictions in the fascism even after it comes to power. The tension between the Nazi party and the state apparatus, the petite bourgeois interests and the capitalist interests always brings about discontents that challenge the ultimate stability of fascist system. Additionally, Rabinbach (1976:159) criticises Poulantzas's formulation of the fascism on the grounds that it eventually pursues 'its own secret teleology' that falls into the trap of instrumentalism of the Comintern that he initially wants to avoid. That implies that the ultimate functionality of the fascism to the hegemony of the monopoly

capital should not blind us to the variants of the political domination that are not directly the outcome of the capitalist interests. We also should be aware of the fact that the specificity of the fascist regimes in the exceptional regimes comes from its mass base that the fascists had developed from the start as an important force to legitimise their existence in the power bloc and gave a priority to consolidate it in the regime phase.

In Poulantzas' approach, we face with an alliance between big capital and petite bourgeoisie interests during the period between 1930 and 1933. However, he does not substantiate this argument and takes it simply as a macro necessity in relation to the micro-diversity of the state restructuring (Jessop, 1985:134). In German fascism, it is questionable when the interests of the big capital actually put its stamp on the transformation of the state. The 'bourgeois' interests deeply impacted on the policies of Brüning and particularly of Papen who exerted a parallelity between the interests of the NSDAP and the general interests of the bourgeoisie in terms of integrating the fascist forces into the state apparatus and strictly ruling out any return to parliamentarism and any participation of democratic forces of the working classes in the state affairs. However, it is still questionable whether it was a hegemony of big capital that was maintained during this period. The stance of the capital regarding the form of the regime that would be constructed was very ambivalent until the seizure of the Nazi power though they were certain about what it should not be. Secondly, the evaluation of the middle classes by Poulantzas is questionable since the ideological content of the fascism is simply attached to the class location of the middle class in a manner of 'class reductionism' (Jessop, 1985:140-1) Ideological effect of the collaboration of counter-revolutionary state forces and fascist movements exceeded any confinement of ideological connotations of the new state merely to the middle class aspirations. In fact, during this process the demands of the middle classes were embedded within a reactionary social structure that formed both its meaning and direction that was highly manipulated by the diverse political strategies of the NSDAP trying to attract working classes, peasants, middle classes and upper middle classes into the same political project. Another

critical point concerning Poulantzas understanding of fascism is his periodisation of the growth of fascism. Accordingly, The period of the growth of the fascism began in 1927 and lasted until June 1932 when Brüning government fell and the Papen government was established. Certainly, it was a crucial turning point. However, the period between the 1927 and 1932 covers a long period of time during which the alliance between the big capital and the petite bourgeoisie could not easily be verified. Additionally, the period covering the 'point of no return' of June 1932 lasted until the seizure of power in January 1933 was closed to the probability of the political resistance of the working classes. Actually, The most problematic side of Poulantzas' approach is his inclination to underestimate the effect of the popular classes on the state transformation process and overemphasize the state's role providing 'a favourable terrain for political maneuver by the hegemonic fraction (Jessop, 1985:124). Thus, in Jessop's words, "he considers how the fascist parties and states established the structural preconditions for the hegemony of the big capital; and he also indicates how the fascist ideology helped to secure its political, intellectual and moral leadership. But Poulantzas does not really explain how specific programs and policies consolidated support and neutralized resistance during the various stages of the fascist period (Jessop, 1985:141).

Lastly, we can argue that Poulantzas understanding of fascism is very much inspired from Gramsci's concept, thus it could be appropriate to mention about his conceptualisation of fascism. Although he did not develop a fully-fledged theory of fascism and his writings were fragmented on that issue, he elaborated some theoretical concepts that are relevant to our research.

As far the main approaches of fascism among the Italian political left are concerned, in the 1920's roughly they could be divided into two. One was Bordiga's ultra-left position in the leadership of Italian Communist Party that saw fascist rule as an instrument of bourgeoisie and being not different from any other bourgeois rule. So the unique sides of fascism were totally ignored (Renton, 1999:90). On the other side, there was 'right' conception of fascism that

was represented by Zibordi. According to him, the discontented middle classes should be tamed and won over to the anti-fascist cause. Accordingly, “the working class should present itself as the supporter friend of all non-fascist layers” (Renton, 1999:98). In Renton’s understanding, the 4th Congress of Comintern pursued a ‘dialectical theory’ in-between these two extremes. In this sense, any anti-fascist movement should take into account the ‘mass’ character of fascism, evaluate fascism’s close alliance with the ruling classes and try to build up ‘United Front’ policies to counteract this trend (Renton, 1999:102-104). In this theoretical setting, Gramsci viewed the emergence of fascism as an outcome of the ‘failure of liberalism and socialism’ (Renton, 1999:124). The landed aristocracy had a preponderant role in the Italian economy and had distaste for the working class militancy and liberal experiences. For Gramsci, fascists have collaborated with the landowners and constructed a mass base mainly consisted of “rural petty bourgeoisie and sub-proletariat” (Renton, 1999:126). Fascism in that configuration was a response to the ‘organic crisis’ lasting from about 1910 to 1921. In this process, in an inspiring manner for Poulantzas’ conceptualisation of crisis, Gramsci ascertained “a crisis of representation” whereby “social classes became detached from their traditional parties” (Simon, 1999:46). He used the term “Caesarism” to refer to a condition of balance of two forces in conflict, namely the working class and the bourgeoisie. Any move on the either side would catastrophically lead to the “reciprocal destruction” (Simon, 1999:46).

Renton (1999:127) states that Caesarism resembles Bonapartism, however, the main difference is that Caesarism presupposes a hegemonic crisis and is more dependent on mass formations that strengthen its durability. Hegemony in Gramsci’s view denotes “spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group, consent “historically” caused by the prestige accruing to the dominant group because of its position and function in the world of production” (Femia, 1981:42). We can argue that prior to fascism’s seizure of power, both in Italy and Germany, the bourgeoisie had a fragile hegemony in

terms of providing the ‘moral and intellectual leadership’, hence was unable to develop a national will transcending its economic-corporate interests. Fascism was a reaction to this situation with the help of the consent of particularly the middle classes. However, one should not forget the contradictory character of fascism. “Caesarism” in Gramsci’s sense can stimulate its mass foundations, however, the tension between fascism’s dependence on the ruling classes and its mass base will continue and threaten the bases of hegemonic system. Apart from these, Gramsci’s special emphasis on “the active man-in-the-mass” refers to his “contradictory consciousness” between its verbal identification which is affected by the dominant world view and its practical condition that necessitates its solidarity with other people exposed to same social inequalities (Femia, 1981:44). So hegemony is in no sense guaranteed. This understanding of ‘contradictory consciousness’ also has an affinity to the Wilhelm Reich’s formulation of ‘fascist masses’ having both reactionary and revolutionary social contents.

2.3. Marxist Debates in the 1960’s and 1970’s about Fascism and the Appraisal of Mass Conception of Fascism by Critical Theorists

To begin with, in order to rightly understand the direction of the debates, it is imperative to shortly analyse the Monopoly Group theory in response to which a variety of responses were given by a range of Marxist scholars. The main proponents of this theory (Gossweiler (1980), Opietz (1974), Eicholtz (1980) and Patzold (1980) conceived German imperialism as the main source of the emergence of fascism as a structure of political domination. According to them, as Togliatti said, one can not assess the nature of the fascism without a proper conceptualisation of imperialism (Gossweiler and Eicholtz et al. 1980:12). This reception of imperialism highly depended on Lenin’s analysis of the rising growth of monopolist capitalistic structures and its requirements of ‘reactionary political power constellations’ and the extension of the role of the state in ensuring the profit maximisation of the monopoly capital. In framing fascism, the theoreticians of the Monopoly-Group theory remained tied to the ‘fascism

definition of Dimitroff in 1935, that detected the power of the finance capital behind fascism, particularly 'the open, terroristic dictatorship of the most reactionist, chauvinist, the most imperialist elements of the finance capital (Gottschling, 1980:58). Deriving their main theoretical assumptions from these categories, Gossweiler pointed at the primacy of class conflict between the bourgeoisie and labour as decisive and put out that the 'class-determined' task of fascism was 'the heightening of profit production' and 'the strengthening of the power position of the finance capital (Eicholtz, 1980:32). He tended to see fascists simply as 'agents of rulers' (Gossweiler, 1980:82) in control of the 'wire-pullers and financiers of the monopoly capital just from the beginning of the establishment of the NSDAP even before it became a mass force. Inevitably, any autonomous role of 'fascist party' and its mass basis was ruled out in this theoretical framework. Not simply the rule of bourgeoisie but the sole reign of a particular group of bourgeoisie came into front with a view of achieving its imperialist interests. Thus, in such a formulation, we observe the 'unification of monopoly power and state power' that has exclusively focused on building the 'huge exploitation mechanisms and a limitless terror system that is rigorously resorted to 'oppress all the not-monopolistic social segments (Eicholtz, 1980:34). The state does not assume a role of a 'arbitrator' between the different branches of the capital but solely embodies the interests of monopol capital.

Gossweiler (1980:82) insisted on the fact that the National-Socialist party from the start was entrusted with two objectives: the destruction of all the working class organisation and the winning over of the working class to the 'national cause'. The allegedly socialist motives, 'revolutionary mimicry' was predominantly used to divert the working class from the orbit of its Marxist adherences. As they were not successful in exercising this task, the fascist movement began to organise the petite bourgeoisie as a mass basis aligning with the monopoly capitalistic interests as an alternative to the Social democratic encapsulation of the working class in the bourgeois democratic regime of the Weimar Republic. In the face of the economic crisis of 1929, the monopolistic capital turned towards 'fascism' not simply as an act of helplessness but a

conscious attack with the search of huge profits while making 'the working class politically defenseless and economically open to high rates of exploitation (Kühnl, 1991:234). A mono-causal explanation becomes apparent within which the transition from the liberal democracy to fascism is viewed from the standpoint of the interests of the monopoly capital as a merely change of political form. The actors of the big capital were considered as the main decision makers in the 'transference of Hitler to the political power'. Wolfgang Ruge (1980:114) points at the general mood of the big bourgeoisie by quoting from the words of the banker Schröder as such: "The general struggle of the men of business is directed at seeing 'a strong man' come to the political power in Germany. The general interest of the business lies in the fear of the Bolshevism and in the hope that the National Socialists will create a sound economic and political structure in Germany. Another desire was to put into practice the economic programme of NSDAP in a manner that the economy will be regulated by its own mechanisms". The mass basis of the NSDAP without having a separate autonomous power was seen simply as an instrument in the hands of the ruling class. The predominant view in the Monopoly-Group regarding the masses was their functionality as the object of mass 'manipulation' with the double use of terror and propaganda (Eicholtz, 1980:34).

In line with the main propositions of this line of view, Opitz (1974:178) states that the transformation of the capitalism from the free competition to the monopoly capitalism was connected with the extension of state's role. According to it, the 'new 'state-monopolistic' structures were coupled with the loss of function of the parliaments and democratic mechanisms. In contrast to Gossweiler, he expresses that this transition is not simply one-way road to the fascism (Kühnl, 1991:293). During the period of 1930-1933, monopoly capital evaluated different possibilities of getting out of the economic crisis, ranging from the alternative of the presidential dictatorship to the option of the military rule. However, fascism becomes a real alternative when the need for the majority consent to the monopoly capitalistic interests and the 'integration methods' of the population outside the sphere of these interests failed. In this conjecture, the

fascist party cannot produce an autonomous entity with specific goals that would develop in a contrasting way to the monopoly capitalist structure. “The only way remaining to the fascist party is to construct its mass base on a population entangled in the false consciousness and adapt to the political programme dictated by the monopoly capitalist structure” (Opitz, 1974:182). Thus, to defend the interests of the monopoly capitalist interest is the primary task. Second element is ‘the use of the unrestricted, also terroristic violence’ to protect that structure. Lastly, this violence should be directed against every movement that politically exerts the objective interests of the non-monopolistic majority, particularly ‘the genuine political organisation of the working class’ (Opitz, 1974:186-7).

As Kühnl (1991:254) asserts, fascism as a mass movement was intentionally omitted from the definition of the fascism as a secondary factor wholly subjugated to the primary imperialist ambitions of the monopoly capital. Expectedly, this view inevitably blurs distinctions between the different kinds of the reactionary regimes such as military rule, presidential dictatorship or fascism. Thus, it also leads to the elimination of different forms of possible resistance strategies towards each of these regimes by subsuming all of them under one theoretical formula. Second criticism relates to ‘their personalistic-voluntaristic’ tone (Kühnl 1991:248) of the explanation and overreliance on ‘inside stories’ (Schaefer, 1974:204) that come short in fully comprehending the complicated relationship between the state, the economy and the fascist movement. Another opposing view comes from Eike Hennig (1974:148) who states that “The monopoly group theory does not allow space for the empirical-historical social search: it avoids radical moments constituting the materialist historical explanations in the way of questioning the reasons for the content and the form of historical appearances. Rather, the reason as ‘capitalism’ is already preassumed and deduced from”. This stance prevents us from grasping social and political specificities of fascism that cannot simply be derived from the ‘absolute logic of capitalism’ standing in transcendence to the empirical phenomena. While making us aware of the implicit imperialist aims immanent to

the practice and ideology of fascism, it also loses sight of a range of determinants that were imprinted in the process of fascisation that is not confined to the exact moment of the full establishment of the regime.

Within this debate, the main focus was on the relationship between the big business and fascist state after take-over of the political power. The analyses diametrically opposed to Monopoly Group theory was the ones which emphasise on the role of the 'state capitalism which increasingly operated in opposition to the interests of the capital, revealing the political irrationalities that run counter to the main tenets of capitalism itself i.e. the abolition of 'free labour' and 'free competition of capitalists' (Schaefer, 1974:205). This view was very close to the analysis of 'state capitalism' of Friedrich Pollock (1982) who had seen the excessive regulatory role of the fascist state as a factor undermining basic institutions of capitalism. If we look at the period of the post-1933 period within which profit mechanisms were not dissolved but were protected and strengthened in a new collaboration of the state agencies and big business, this view does not seem viable to hold. On the other hand, Tim Mason's theses on the 'Primacy of Politics' (1996) claimed that after 1936, the political objectives of the fascist state prevailed over the long-term interests of the capitalists which were caught within a self-destructive capacity of the economy itself.

Actually, this debate obsessed with the dualism of the fascist politics and big business does not seem to be productive as it forgets the 'reciprocal dependence' of a variety of political actors including fascist party, conservative state elite, big business and the army in the larger power constellation of German fascism. The theory of 'alliance' between the different parts of the ruling elite (Kühnl, 1991; Kühnl, 1996; Kühnl, 2000) around some common objectives provides a more viable option to highlight the above-mentioned power constellation. The dissolution of the institutions of Weimar democracy, the oppression of the working class movement, the pursuit of an imperialist policy, the earlier tendency towards rearmament, the indispensability of a strong, expansive industry to this objective and 'the elimination of the seemingly 'anti-capitalist

and unruly forces of SA were actually the basic components of the consolidation of the fascist regime in Germany in which the old ruling elite entered into a collaboration with the 'new elites of the fascist party. Not only in the regime period, but also in the pre-fascist presidential regimes we observe a co-working of the state agencies, conservative elite and the NSDAP that also found its exertions in a nationalist ideological setting against the common enemy. In this sense, in contrast to view fascism as a self-containing political force that had dictated its will on the political structure unilaterally, it seems more appropriate to give importance both to the 'system-maintaining power and its 'moulding political effect' stemming from its mass basis that characterises 'fascism' as a distinct form of political rule. It also necessitates to make a distinction between the movement phase of the fascism embodying heterogeneous social interests and the phase of the regime formation in a specific relationship to the priorities of state elite and business. Indeed, the social 'function' of the fascism does not necessarily correspond to its social basis though the latter can contain 'reactionary' elements aligning with the political status-quo as well as the with the anti-systemic sentiments. The affinities between the conservative-authoritarians and fascists in practical and ideological terms should be closely elaborated in order to fully discern the fascist form of power.

Kühnl's research agenda is inspiring for us in the sense that it gives an equal importance to both the power constellation of fascism prior to and after its coming to power and its formation as a mass movement. Regarding the first aspect, although the 'social' function of the fascism relates to its role as the reproduction of the capitalist relations at the expense of the increased exploitation of 'oppressed classes' including the petite bourgeoisie, the political form it incorporates requires a more complicated analysis that regards its distinctiveness both from any authoritarian rule or military rule. There are two statements crucial to these aspects: Although the mass movement or base is not the 'cause' of the fascist regime, it is the primary condition of it. Thus, without an analysis of its mass background, it is impossible to contextualise it both in its movement and as a regime. On the other hand, it is equally true that the fascist movement

could not come to power and sustain its rule without the active participation of the ruling classes. In this respect, first, the content of the alliance should not lead us to only describe simply the aspects of the fascism once it has been consolidated. It is equally necessary to lean on 'the socio-economic and political conditions that made the fascist rise possible. In Clemenz's terms, the 'genesis' of the fascism should be related to its historical framework that created the conditions of the effectiveness of the fascist option. From the start, it was not an inevitable process that is destined to its necessary culminated in the fascist state. Take the disintegration of liberal democracy or retreat of socio-economic rights of the working class beginning from the end of 1920's. These were not 'actorless', teleological sequence of events. They are permeated by the class struggles that made the fascisation process proceed with leaps, retreats or ultimate attack.

What is alarmingly missing in most of the Marxist studies is first, the analysis of the ideological standpoint of the political left including SPD, KPD and trade unions, their respective anti-fascist strategies and finally their political practices specifically directed against the rise of fascism particularly in post-1918 period (Hennig, 1974:149, Poulantzas, 1976). Only in such a context can one understand the historical objectives of fascism targeting the gains of the working class and its correspondence to a period of the decline of the political power of the left in terms of deterring the boldness of the ruling bloc with the collaboration of the fascist party. Apart from the immediate political effects, the declining receptibility of the socialist/democratic ideas among the wider masses provided a productive ground inciting the mass consent to the authoritarian-fascist solutions to the 'socio-economic inequalities and lack of the channels of the political 'exertions'. Actually, this situation implies a long process of the fascisation within which the political struggles had a decisive impact on the final moment where the establishment of the fascist regime seems to be irreversible. Second important point concerns the general misconception of the fascist mass movement either as something exclusively confined to the interests of middle

classes or as a passive object subjugated to manipulation, seduction or oppression of the ruling classes.

In fact, as Kühnl (1991:12-13) states that 'ideological content of different ideas' can only be successful when it meets certain 'material' needs within the masses, when it provides a practical solution to the elementary concerns of the individuals or groups. Given the capitalist relations of production, the people are under the constant pressure of economic and social insecurity, the unpredictability of their future and the inclination to embrace egoist/self-interest seeking behaviors that make them susceptible to the ideologies that predominantly emphasise on the 'natural inequality of the people', the perception of the social events as 'a destiny' and the ceaseless competition between the people. In this sense, these tendencies can easily be turned into ideologies that presuppose the 'irreconcilability of the different ethnic/racial groups, the existential fight between them, the legitimization of them in the form of militarism and imperialism. These are not simply overarching process to which the people are simply responding but they are reproduced in materiality of the 'reactionary social institutions' that build up real social barriers to any pattern of social solidarity. Kühnl (1991:27) insists on the fact that fascist values are "radicalisation of the reactionary-anti-democratic, Social Darwinistic and imperialist elements of bourgeois ideology and its reckless practice stripped of its humanist and liberal elements". According to Okayayuz (2015:417-8), believing in the 'unchangeability of social order', fascist movements tries to base their ideology on the "Volk and the unity of the Volk, family and private property, authority and fight for the survival in life". These objectives create a 'discourse-practice' with its 'eclectic' ideological complex and ambiguities. In any case, what distinguishes fascism from 'bourgeois democracies' or other military/conservative regime where a condition-based violence is applied is the extensive use of political violence that gains a form of much higher comprehensiveness and durability with mass involvement alongside the traditional repressive state apparatus. Also it functions with very modern instruments that give a new breath to the ideological formation of fascism. In his

analysis of ‘old’ and ‘new’ racism, Okyayuz (2014:15) emphasises on the intrinsic relationship between the ‘new racism’ that began to cover a larger segment of people in the 19th century and the evolving interests of the bourgeoisie that left aside its ‘progressive’ ambitions during this period. Basically, it had two functions: one was the deployment of the racism by the bourgeoisie to divide the organisational strength of the working class and attain an internal unity against the external ones (including other competing national bourgeoisies and the ‘internal working migrants). At this moment, we are not facing with a primitive reaction in the form of racist outburst but the institutionalised forms of racism used against the ‘others’ of bourgeoisie, the “‘unsuccessful elements of the society, the ‘have-not’s and the uneducated people. Here, Okyayuz (2014:16-17) pinpoints the ‘societalization, scientification and cultural connection’ of the new racism. The new racism in that sense was supported by a correlation of a ‘political discourse, institutional framework and a scientific background’. In fact, we know the fact that the racist prejudices and aggressiveness could be more effective and prone to be more violent when the subjects of it feel that they are in the ‘legitimate’ part of the national community. In such a manner, the national community asserts and puts into practice the ‘mainstream view’ which is approved politically and scientifically.

This view actually resembles the fascism analyses of Wilhelm Reich (1970), Eric Fromm 1994) , (Löwenthal and Guterman, 1949). These scholars saw the main mass base of fascism in the petite bourgeoisie. There are also other ‘material’ processes at work that transgress the limits of this class. In general, the researches relate to the ways in which a specific type of a ‘conformist-rebellion’, a ‘reactive social protest’ has politically been organised by the NSDAP that provided a sound alternative to the mass conception of the political left. Actually, this typology and its integrity to some reactionary social institutions was not a phenomenon restricted to the inter-war era but it always consists of a set of social relations embedded within the bourgeois societies. The role of patriarchal family, the sexual suppression of the woman, the presence of

religious or nationalist-oriented communities could be a real place of fermentation of fascist ideas. In fact, the forms of social subjugation mediated by the market mechanisms promoting 'a ceaseless individualism' without leaving room for 'an autonomous, self-sustaining individuality and the 'ascetic' ideals', we use Nietzsche's terms (2015:2953), that requires 'willed and unconditional sacrifice of the self' actually complement each other. This combination creates active 'reactive subjects' that are not simply driven from 'a metaphysical idea' or allegiance to an transcendence, but which primarily interested in the regulation of 'this side of the world', the immediate materiality actually shaped by pseudo-ideals of fascism. This is also a point where the 'mass' of fascism differs from any democratically organised collectivity. It concerns more with the 'mobilisation' rather than 'participation', less with the 'revolutionary or reformist change than 'the restoration of political and social order with new political actors or technological means, less with the reliance on its own power than the vision of all-empowered leader or any authority that stands above itself as the savior of the nation. Here, it is impossible not to see 'a social will that derives its spiritual inclination as well as its material interest from its 'active endorsement of the mainstream social and political 'givens' of the status-quo and 'activate' them against the racially/nationally impure ones, the 'socially degenerate ones or 'revolutionary or transformatory parts of the political opposition which creates a legitimation for both the 'presence of a national/religious community and political violence that is necessarily used to defend it.

From this perspective, Reich's analysis of fascism presupposes, though seems to be abstract, a structural unwillingness or incapacity of the masses to pursue 'freedom, equality or democratic organisation. It is both reductionist to view fascism as 'consciously willed by the masses unanimously as Deleuze (2009) implied as if a progressive or revolutionary organisation of the society is not essentially possible or there are not resistant parts in this mass, on the one hand, to underestimate the mass social base of fascism by evaluating it simply as a product of propaganda and terror which are instrumentalised by the ruling

classes (Poulantzas, 2008) on the other hand. Even today, the following question is waiting to be answered: How is a fascist party capable of attracting a social consent, though the subjects of this consent can not simply be defined as ‘fascist’, how millions of people suffering from widespread unemployment and poverty in a state of acute economic and political crisis do not necessarily flock to the political organisations that tends to foster the ideas of social equality or solidarity or do not rely on its own democratic organisations but assents to the convincibility of nationalist/authoritarian solutions in the leadership of the overarching communities, the state or the Führer? Actually, the history of the political left in the face of the fascist rise and mass acceptance of fascism are two faces of the same coin that would be analysed in the third and fourth chapters of the thesis.

2.4. Recent Contributions to the Fascism Studies From the Marxist and Critical Perspectives: The Re-Evaluation of Classical Fascism and The Perspectives on New Fascist Tendencies

Undoubtedly, recent perspectives on classical fascism can be viewed both as an exertion of the need of the re-evaluation of its basic premises and as an instrument of analysing the current state of thing related to detecting ‘fascist tendencies’ in the recent rise of the far-right. Actually, considering the framework of the thesis, we concentrated on the selective usage of the research material that tends to reevaluate the theoretical gains of the inter-war and post-war period. Leaving aside the strictly ‘culturalist’ readings of the fascism, the revival of old concerns for the generic definition of the fascism or confinement of the subject to the ‘fascism as an ideology’ in the strictest of the term, we are rather receptive to the works of a variety of social scientists, political scientists and historians whose interests are oriented towards giving a material and critical picture of fascism without losing sight of fascism’s current appeal. There are a set of issues concerning the recent assessment of fascism that requires to be questioned in a new fashion.

Firstly, in understanding the ideological background of the National Socialism, we observed that the NSDAP was not simply a party that strictly alleged to its programmatic principles but a culmination of a variety of rightist currents ranging from 'völkish' 'mythical' dedication to a past idyllic life or aristocratic truly 'racist' political standpoints to the more conservative movements that relies more on the protection of traditional social and political patterns (Breuer, 2010). However, the most explicit outcome of this process was the creation of 'new nationalism' that is mass-oriented especially targeting receiving the consent of the lower classes including the working class (Neocleaus, 1997; Herf, 2009). This was one of the characteristic feature of the NSDAP as a mass party inclined to give response to a heterogeneous set of social demands that prevented its becoming a factional or interest-based party. This quality was combined with the embracement of most updated technological instruments to further its mass attractivity both in the movement and regime phase. From this point of view, fascism did not represent a regressive attitude in terms of returning to a nostalgic way of life though it mentioned about it as a way of fostering a 'mythical' belief among the population. In Eley's words (2013:211), "it embraced the new technologies of industrial expansion, the imperialist entailments of a powerful economy and the new conditions of mass political action, even as it lamented the lost world of tradition", only in that sense, 'it was a dynamic and forward-looking synthesis'. The supposed 'progressiveness' in the welfare policy, in supposedly maintaining socio-economic 'equality of opportunity' and the perfect use of the modern means of communication was dependent on the unity of the racially formulated 'Volk' and the state. As Woodley (2010) puts out, 'the rhetoric of unity and identity in fascism appeals to individuals not as agents but as a mythic collective: despite embracing elements of populist socialism, fascism conceals the objectification of labour necessary for the rationalisation of commodity production in an aesthetic idealisation of labour ('beauty of labour', 'work makes freedom', etc.) where emancipation is reduced to a simulation of class collaboration and the production of useful citizens for the national work community'. In this form, fascism cannot be detached from the main bastions of capitalist modernity as its new nationalism that could be mobilised for the

productive national community brought about new opportunities and new challenges for the capitalist social relations.

Alongside the ‘phenomenology and genesis’ of the fascism Okyayuz (2004:203) points out its ‘functional’ aspect and adds that “‘in reality, neither in Germany nor in Italy fascists could not come to power by ‘themselves simply by relying on their own mass basis. Fascists represents a supply and in certain historical moments (in times when they could not solve the social crises through normal mechanisms legitimated through super-structural norms of parliamentary rule of law) expresses its supply to this demand. Fascist masses do not change the essence of this relationship that the function of the fascism is to serve the capitalist interests but *complicates* it” (Okayayuz, 2004:201). Instead of ‘pure instrumentality’ of the fascist movement for the capitalists interests, we are facing with mass movement that was originated in ‘petite-bourgeois protest movements’ (Okayayuz, 2004:207) and that could assume its own dynamics in certain sense (Okayayuz, 2004:202) by differentiating itself from military and authoritarian regimes. However, the question is how that ‘complication’ mentioned above functions in the rise of fascism and the regime phase of it.

Renton (1999) proposed to hold the fascism as ‘a specific form of reactionary mass movement’. Pointing at the counter-revolutionary role of the fascism as Neocleaus (1997) did, he conceives the ‘reactionary’ nature of fascism in his role in ‘crushing the working class movement’ which resulted in the assurance of the ‘hierarchy of people who already have power-the landlords, the factory owner and purging the elements of social democracy (the vote, the welfare state) from contemporary capitalism (Renton, 1999:200). In this formulation, ‘fascism is also a mass movement in the sense that it ‘promises to rule against the capitalism; insofar as it is a reactionary movement, however, it rules against the interests of the class that provides the bulk of the fascist party’s members’’. While pointing to a well-known ‘dual and contradictory’ nature of fascism, this view also reveals some problematic aspects. Should we think of the ‘mass’ movement simply as a vehicle of ‘petite bourgeois’ interests, can’t it turn into a ‘reactive’ form that necessitates the analysis of other social factors that are not

confined to the 'strict interest basis of a particular social group'. We know that 'beyond its social function', there are 'positive' features of 'national mobilization and institutionalization' that contributes to the wide spread reception of consent without forgetting the use of physical force. In essence, fascism can flourish in the highest levels of 'economic inequality, poverty and social coercion'. That is why it is baseless to rely on the foresight that fascism is destined to collapse eventually only because of its inner contradictions. Renton admits this fact and he further claims that "the relationship between its reactionary ambitions for power and its mass style of organizing made the parties of Mussolini and Hitler both unstable and dynamic. This relationship was the source of fascism's spectacular success, its hubris and its doom" (Renton, 1999:212). The same thesis can be found in the fascism analysis of Paxton (2004) who also signifies a range of tensions embedded in the fascist rules, between the state and party, between the leader and party, between fascists and conservatives that provide 'dynamic shapelessness' that 'strengthens its radicalism. This feature inaugurates a process of self-destruction that seems to be inevitable in this formula.

This vantage point reveals a commonly seen deficiency that could lead to a retreat to the 'totalitarian claims' that regards the 'fascist party' as a distinct unit apart from its alliances within the power bloc and attribute the radicalism of the regime to the unique features of the party members that are supposedly acting against the 'state reason'. First of all, it is very important to distinguish the fight between the cliques of the state power from any potential of anti-fascist attitude even within the mass organizations. Secondly, neither for the pre-fascist period nor for the regime phase the effect of class struggles including between the 'oppressed classes' and the ruling class was not made subject of the research as if 'fascism' is a 'self-containing unit' that contains 'disruptive forces' that could allegedly only stem from its own intrinsic logic and mechanism. These aspects are crucial in the sense that 'any form of fascisation' cannot be comprehended in a manner of isolating the implicit or explicit anti-fascist struggles from the political scene. Thirdly, if we are in favour of analysing fascism beyond its

limited scope in the inter-war period, though making a distinction between the fascist regimes and the 'so-called' authoritarian regimes seems to be plausible, it is also imperative to point at the possible co-habitations of them and their ideological affinities. As Kallis (2003:225) has denoted for the establishment of the conservative-authoritarian regimes in the inter-war period, there was to a 'successful commodification of fascism' to solve "the problem of strengthening the executive, promoting national unity and effectiveness, crushing the socialist and communist left". We have to bear in mind the possibility of hybrid forms of fascist-conservative political rulings. Beyond the duality between the authoritarianism and fascism, it seems to be more appropriate to evaluate them on the general spectrum of political right that 'could differ from each other on the basis of 'their understanding of the physical violence, ideological conservatism/radicalism or the extent of the mass organisations. However, the possible transivities between these types of the political rule should not easily be discarded.

As for the contemporaneity of the fascism, Kühnl (1991:31) determined the 'conditions of the success of the far right' as such: While it gains the mass effectiveness, it also gains the support from the ruling segments including the business, the state and the military. Among the wider population there appears 'feelings of the threat', not only material suffering but also 'fears of losing social status' that threatens the accustomed life forms. The parliamentary democracy begins to lose its legitimacy in such a way that the 'disturbed population' tends to seek new political alternatives. It also refers to a moment when 'authoritarian thinking tradition gains ascendancy with the incorporation of the rights-oriented ideas mostly imprinted by the 'nationalistic, Social Darwinist, militarist ideologies. The drawing of enemy portraits in the form of 'Marxists, Jewish i.e. un-national elements permeates the political landscape. Above everything, the success of the far-right heavily depends on the question whether the left provides 'convincible answers' to the urgent social problems and whether it shows 'material power to handle these social problems in an ensuring way of removing

the social inequalities, anxieties and the pessimism regarding the unpredictability of the future.

Evaluating today's fascist tendencies inevitably leads to the socio-economic and political conditions where fascism can thrive. It is intrinsically linked to the 'a crisis of representation' and 'a crisis of hegemony and popular consent' both within the ruling classes and in the relationship between the ruling classes and the dominated classes (Poulantzas, 1976; Renton, 1999). Considering the distinctiveness of historical context within which today's rightist trends are unfolding, Eley (2013:214-216) concentrates on extracting out 'fascism-producing crisis' conditions in relation to the novelties of our age. One is 'still unfolding consequences of fundamental capitalist re-structuring' that includes a range of factors such as "the dismantling of Western capitalism's historic; Post-Fordist transition, the transnationalising of labour-markets and the re-proletarianising of labour; a new regime of accumulation ordered around the mobility of capital and the spectacle of the consumption". This process was further elaborated by a variety of scholars like Streeck (2016), Brown (2019), Harvey (2019), Callison and Manfredi (eds.) (2020) with a specific focus on the constant crisis of neoliberalism. Second point that Eley arouses in relation to the first point is the 'class re-composition where the relative post-war prosperity of the working class has dissolved, the precariousness became a norm and the insecurity the middle classes and working class heightened. We have to add that the ethnically mediated forms of labour market exclusion co-existed with the general degradation of socio-economic rights and political organisations of labour. Thirdly, particularly with regard to the American case, he speaks of a 'broken polity' associated with "the continuing thinning-out proceduralism at all level of institutional and the conduct of elections; the growing curtailments of civil liberties and the growth of carceral state; the entrenchment among the citizenry of a default presumption that government is defined with the burdensomeness, incompetence and non-accountability" (Eley, 2013:216).

In this conjecture of the general continuing crisis of neo-liberalism in tandem with the liberal democracy makes us question to what extent the rise of far-right and the right-wing populist currents can provide an answer, an alternative or an alliance partner to the neo-liberal technocratic elite. The new right movements and regimes exemplify some peculiarities that make allusions to the classical fascist parties possible and also drives us to distinguish them from the fascist phenomenon on multiple grounds. Some authors conceive this new trend as the exertion of 'post-fascism' that contains both continuities and discontinuities between the original fascist elements and the 'inclinations of the far-right or right-wing populists. They are mainly limiting their research to the movements in western world. According to Traverso (2019:13-14), post-fascism is a "phenomenon in transition, a movement still in transformation and has not crystallized yet...Post-fascism belongs to a particular regime of historicity-21th century which explains its erratic, unstable and often ideological content in which antinomic political philosophies mix together". Its important difference from the classical fascism lies in the replacement of the left as the main enemy by the Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. Instead of 'strict racist concepts, these movements are inclined to pretend to be protecting the 'national identity and culture' against the disruptive effects of globalisation and fight against the main internal threat personalised in migrants, refugees or financiers as representatives of the speculative capital. Traverso (2019:20) asserts that "the collapse of the communism and social democratic parties' embrace of the neo-liberal governmentality" paved the way for the radical right to fill the oppositional vacuum by its anti-systemic-nationalist stance. In line with Eley's point, the representative democracy suffers from a gap between the 'elitist' of the elected and the demands of the electors that results in the 'triumph of impolitical'. However, in Traverso's thought, there are many ideological and contextual differences between classical fascism and post-fascism. The latter has no sound ideological base defined on the spectrum of conflictual relations between the left and right (p.29). It has no intention or a project to create 'a new civilisation', a 'new man' as the fascists tried to establish. Moreover, he signifies the trend of the far-right to incorporate some aspects of the modernity, the

equality of women, the rights of the sexual minorities or the secularism as a weapon against the 'reaction' of 'anti-Western' ethnical and cultural entities (Traverso, 2019:40-3). Moreover, it seems that in contrast to the classical fascists' coming to power consented by the ruling class, today's far-right movements are far from being accepted by neo-liberal global elite (p.29) in the face of their strict attitude in favour of anti-globalisation, the protection of national sovereignty and anti-multiculturalism.

Finchelstein (2019), in his study on the historical relationship between the populism and fascism, gives a definition of 'post-fascism' embodied in the populist movements in the post-war period. Relying on the Latin American examples and conceptualising 'populism' in itself without attaching a right-wing adjective to it, he saw the distinctive features of the fascism which are lacking in populists in the following points: the sacralisation of 'physical violence and war', a mythical identity between the leader and the people, the total abolition of the democracy with the physical detention or elimination of political opponents, the colonisation of private lives and civil society (Finchelstein, 2019:58-60). In contrast to these, populists put into practice their policies within the formal frames of democracy; they habitually demonise their opponents but it does not turn into a overt violence against them. The elections and also the possibility of changing the government still exist though all the propaganda and state repression mechanisms are unequally used by the political power. In this form, populism represents an 'authoritarian formulation of democracy' and at the same time a 'democratic renunciation of dictatorship' (p.72). Finchelstein admits the tendency of the populists to 'corrupt constitutional democracy' (p.73) from within as well as its possible drive to extend and improve it. In conformity with Mudde's (2010) definition, here populism is conceived as a 'thin ideology' without a substantial political content and the synthesis of the nationalistic/religious-oriented values with a populist discourse in the right-wing populist politics are excluded from the comparison between the populism and fascism in Finchelstein's research.

Renton (2019) also denotes that ‘the contemporary rise of the far-right does not necessarily mean the revival of the fascism as their historical contexts greatly differ from each other. However, against these cautious approaches, there is a range of recent literature that sees tangible fascist tendencies under new formulas having historical connections to classical fascism. Monbiot (2020), Pelhata (2021), Gandesha (ed.) (2020) are the ones who try to formulate ‘new fascism’ with its own distinctive appearances providing an answer to the need of the legitimisation of the neo-liberalism. Their point is that there are important parallels between classical fascism and current rise of the right that provide new forms of political violence with assistance of the state forces and the creation of a modern ‘reactionary’ mass that could find relief neither in the pure neo-liberal orthodoxy and in the leftist opposition to it. The role of the right-wing populist parties should be elaborated within this complex. In reality, the right-wing popular parties in power in today’s world give examples of incorporating fascist elements that in a way respond to the enlarging of socio-economic inequalities, loss of democratic rights and the legitimacy crisis of the liberal democracy. It is a way of containing anti-systemic social reactions, dividing them on racial, ethnic or religious grounds, making an asset out of them that could violently be used against the real democratic movements. Morelock (ed.) (2018) also shows us how this ‘mass’ can be created with a new array of ‘agitators, bigots and demagogues’ that are talented in inciting the national/religious feelings of the population that are directed against the refugees, sexual minorities and ‘socially undeserving ones’ in a manner that makes the use of political violence increasingly possible.

CHAPTER 3

MASS FOUNDATIONS OF GERMAN FASCISM

3.1. Introduction: The Condition of Nationalism in Imperial Germany

By the end of the 19th century, the essential weakness of the German liberalism was critical in the development of the interventionist, autocratic ruling of the Germany. Conservatives and Centre party of Catholics were against the economic liberalism and free competition. Under the rule of Bismarck, there were no possibility of parliamentarisation of the Reich's politics. For instance, the attempts to kill the Wilhelm II was used by Bismarck to apply to 'extraordinary laws' that primarily targeted the decrease of the popularity of liberalism and socialism. While the Socialist law's first aim was to crush organisational power of the left, it was at the same time an opportunity to disregard the parliamentary understanding and the premises of rule of law. National Liberal's failure to resist these laws was decisive in the extension of the repressive rule of Bismarck.

Against the liberals and socialists, a union of 'rye and steel' came into front which represented the collaboration of the agrarian power of Junkers and industrial elites in favour of protectionist policies. It was also reflection of a redefinition of the nationalism itself. While opposing to the free trade, nationalists were pointing at the 'protection of national work'. To be national did no longer mean the emancipation of bourgeoisie or the worker. Rather, it meant the protection of 'established national system' against all forms of internationalism. With this transformation, the leading groups of nationalism has also changed. While Prussian conservatives claimed to be representative of this 'reactionary nationalism', it was also observable that nationalist thought attracted the middle classes to their milieu. Interestingly, the urban Mittelstand, hand

workers and small property owners began to be kernel of anti-Semitic and anti-liberal ideas. Thus, nationalism was not part and parcel of the ruling elite. It became a mass phenomenon that began to mobilise the wide sections of the society in the direction of the national goals (Eley, 1991:161).

The other side of the socialist law was an attempt to establish social policy as a compensatory mechanism. The social problem was dealt with the organisation of 'social insurance and social assistance schemes which was designated outside the reach of the social democratic movement. As an example to that, the 'Association for the Social Policy' was founded in order to alleviate the social inequalities rather than eliminating them. As a consequence, the protective tariffs and social policy were the different sides of the same coin.

Additionally, to shed light on the nature of the nationalism, it seems to be inevitable to touch upon the colonial movement as a corollary to it. Even the 'Freisinnigen' and the national liberals supported the colonial politics of 1884-85. On the one hand, the Germanisation of Polish soil was seen as the indispensable part of the colonial policy. On the other hand, Germany began to apply to power politics in the world arena as a potential hegemonic power alternative to the Great Britain.

To the end of the century, nationalists applied to a 'Sammlungspolitik' which supposed to collect all the national forces under one-single banner in order to counteract the Social Democratic movement and to defend the political status quo. Projects like the 'navy programme' created a nationalist wave and contributed to the creation of an association of navy (Flottenverein). This association brought together a variety of political forces and interests ranging from the interest of the high industry, over-seas trade and export branch to the wide sections of political parties such as free conservatives, national liberals, free spirit party as well as the bourgeois and petty bourgeois strata of the society. To defend the navy programme was perceived as a patriotic task (Fischer, 1986:44).

During this period, a wide range of nationalist association began to shape the public sphere. These provided the environment within which the national feelings intermingled with the sectoral interests. 'All Deutsche Verband' was founded in order to enhance the interests of heavy industry by its emphasis on the transition of Germany from a great power status to a world power which necessitated an aggressive foreign policy. The national liberals together with free conservatives were in favour of such a policy shift combining these interests with a nationalist cover. In the same vein, The Ostmarken Verein was an association that aimed at the endorsement of Germanisation of the Eastern territories and strengthening the national consciousness in terms of constructing a German national identity. War associations became mass organisations that would also include wide sections of the society who inclined to define the nation as 'defense community' of the German men. It was also a shift from the types of statue of monarchical origin to the statues of national collection (Sammlungspolitik). Thus, being national gained a secular meaning. In line with the collaboration of the agrarian and industrial elite, there was a current trend towards what we can call 'becoming a bourgeois of the Wilhelmian society and the Junkertum and a 'becoming feudal of the existing bourgeoisie (Verjunkerung). What was certain in any case was the failure of the German liberalism. Industry elite and agrar elite entered into cooperation with regard to tariff policies and protectionist controls and the intensification of an aggressive nationalist stance. Apart from these, 'Bund der Landwirte' gave to the agriculture a special priority as the embodiment of 'being German' and followed a strict Anti-Semitic understanding. 'Deutsche Handlungsgehilfen Verband' came into being as the advocator of the old Mittelstand and new middle classes particularly white-collar workers as against being proletariat and internationalism of social democratic movement. Thus, the delimitation of the national and non-nation was redefined by the middle-classes which were previously oriented towards liberalism. Now they began to be the sound base of the new, rightist nationalism (Eley, 1991:169).

We have to admit that the Anti-Semitic parties did not particularly fare better in the elections. The German Reform Party or Adolf Stoecker's Christian German Party gained a relatively small portion of total votes in 1898, 1903 and 1907. However, the failure of these splitter parties did not indicate a decrease in the Anti-Semitic popular thought. For instance, the Tivoli Programme of the German Conservatives in 1892 had clear Anti-Semitic tones complaining about the influence of the Jewish on the 'life of the people'. Instead of a 'Radau-antisemitism' that aimed at the 'physical elimination of the Jewish from the German soil, German Conservatives recognised 'the Jewishness' as a cultural, modern phenomenon that have to be fought against in a brighter scope.

National Social Association (Nationsozialen Verein) which was founded by the Friedrich Naumann advocated the initiation of the social reforms in a conservative fashion. This attempt was signifying a nationalist version of dealing with the social question as an alternative to the working class movement. These reforms aimed at the 'political fight for the German work, the enforcement of patriotic education and culture and the increase in the German soil through war'. The distinguishing feature of National Association was its view of the Kaiser as a 'social Kaiser' who are deemed to be the representative and executor of the will of the people. So the ultimate goal was to give a mass base to the monarchical nationalism through a kind of Christian Socialism and to donate the Kaiser with a social legitimacy. Inevitably, these non-aristocratic forms of nationalism brought about a concept of nation as a secular religion and in a constant need of mass consent (Winkler, 2014:568).

3.2. Conservative Revolution and New Nationalism in the Weimar Period

Although it is not possible to subsume all the nationalists under one single motto, we can some common themes recurred in a variety of writers. To summarise the common points that characterise the relevant theoreticians that have blended conservatism and nationalism in a new fashion, we can talk about five issues on the current theme.

First, they initiated a new nationalist current emphasising on the 'Volk' as a superior being that defines the society and rejecting the social effect of the West in terms of 'Americanism, materialism, the presence of the parliaments, political parties and the Weimar republic. Pinning down the opposition between 'Kultur and Zivilisation', they implied that the former constituted the real, spiritual essence of the Nation while the latter was conceived as the expression of a cosmopolitan culture which denoted the alienation of local culture with the destructive influence of the 'soulless modernity'. Thus, in order to counteract such an effect, it seemed to be necessary to embrace the idea of 'Volk' as a mobilised organism directed at the nationalist goals.

Secondly, Herf (2009:35-6) argues that the principal actors of conservative revolutionaries did not centralise the Anti-Semitic views in their theories. It was rather a secondary phenomenon that gave way for the differentiation of their stance from the fiercely Anti-Semitic arguments of Völkisch nationalism. Social problems in that sense did not exclusively relate to the existence of the Jewish people but according to it, the Volk should first be saved from other more alarming effects of liberalism or Marxism.

Thirdly, conservative revolutionaries adhered to a concept of community (Gemeinschaft) which was thought to be pre-given and unified in contrast to the current 'divided and fragmented Gesellschaft'. Their understanding of 'Volksgemeinschaft' was designed to attain the prospective unity of the people that on the one hand was under the threat of the atomising influence of liberalism and on the other hand, it has been kept open to the socialist arguments on class divisions. Consequently, to refer to a Volksgemeinschaft (people's community) as an organic entity meant to get rid of the divisive connotations of other two ideologies.

One of the leading theoreticians of the right in the Weimar period was Arthur Möller van den Bruck who could be counted as the predecessor of the main ideas of NSDAP. With his book 'Third Reich' he gave the clues for the current of

‘conservative revolution’ and also inspired practical conduct of the conservative thought. Arthur Möller’s main aim was to produce a ‘German revolution’ based on the unity of German nation. The Socialist Revolution of 1918 was not a ‘revolution’ in its strictest sense as it depended on ‘western-parliamentarian’ change which was given a liberalist color. Liberalism was seen as the principal enemy of any nationalist understanding as it generally meant a fragmentation of the society under the concept of Gesellschaft in contrast to the ‘Gemeinschaft’ which was supposed to symbolise the wholist understanding of the Nation. According to Möller, the tradition of Germany was not in conformity with the Western type of democracy which advocated a layer of intermediary institutions that provided an indirect representation for the people. The bureaucrats, the party officers and the parliamentary channels were not open to the participation of the individuals. Indeed, they were obstacles to the expression of the will of the Volk. As an antipode to the parliamentary idea, Arthur Möller stuck to a form of ‘closely knit community’ which was in line with a conservative thought directed to the ‘security for the nation, maintenance of family values, order and discipline and protection of life through authority’ (Herf, 2009:91).

However, it is important to emphasise the main differences of the conservative revolutionaries from the mainstream conservatism. In contrast to a back-ward looking pastoralism, they approved the necessities of the modern life like technical development as a corollary to the ideas of spirituality. Möller in that sense used the contemporary trends such as revolution or masses in order to mobilise them to the advantage of conservative ends. First, he embraced the revolution as a fact that cannot be made retrospective in the sense that to return to a monarchical was out of question. Secondly, he conceived of the 1918 revolution as an ‘half-revolution’ which was un-German in essence. This revolution was determined by the pacifist-international ideas that overlooked the unique characteristics of the German nation. Thirdly, he presupposed the creation of a ‘New Front’ which would bring together all the national forces inside to the disadvantage of the liberal system whose main carriers were ‘parties, associations and parliaments’. Hence, there was an explicit hostility in

Moeller's thinking to all of the intermediary institutions that make the representation of the people more oblique (Breuer, 2010:179-180).

Interestingly, as the outstanding quality of the new nationalism, Moeller did not exclude the working class from the body of the nation. It was considered as 'a new and productive' class which should be added to the national forces. Instead of relying on a reactionary politics or signifying a national history which remained in the past, the new nationalism of Moeller tended to construct an 'exclusive, organic nation' whose existence is directly related to the efforts to eliminate the liberal system, the 'nationalisation of the nation' and the mobilisation of all the productive forces for a kind of imperialism that would primarily focus on gaining new political spaces in order to solve population problem of Germany (Breuer, 2010:181) Accordingly, Moeller considered the German people as a 'young Volk' that was on the rise in contrast to the population of Romanistic origin that was in the phase of decline.

Moeller spreaded his ideas in the association of young conservatives of 'Juni Club' which tried to collect all the constructive forces of the German people. He embraced a national programme which was a synthesis of anti-liberalism and anti-Marxism which was devoid of all concerns of equality or emancipation. A specific kind of national socialism was created which reflects the unique features of German Nation in line with the principles of 'rootedness, disposition and grading'. The result was the formulation of an authoritarian corporative state which gave precedence to the idea of Volk as the determining factor in the shape of the state (Weiss, 2020).

Arthur Moeller insisted on the fact that the nationalist movement should not particularly follow 'negative and defensive ambitions, rather it should focus on 'positive offensive mobilisation of the productive forces of working class, in short on directing the 'social problem' into the national channels. Ernst Jünger, another theoretician of the new nationalism, has also shared similar arguments with Arthur Moeller on the question of Volk and Nation. He pointed at the

experience of August 1914 when German people as a whole expressed their national feeling and national consciousness in an profound manner. However, Jünger stated that the presupposed unity of the nation does not mean a strong base in itself, that is, to attain such a unity required a will to power, a fight for the state which should be exercised with revolutionary means. Such a conduct cannot be achieved by the help of political parties. There should be ‘allegiances’ (Gefolgschaften) that are tied to a Führer idea which is deemed to be embodying the will of the Volk. These ideas had affinities to dissemination of ‘fight associations’ (Kampf Bünde) in the Weimar period that provided shelter to the creation of new collective organisations alternative to the political parties (Breuer, 2010:183).

Ernst Jünger followed a heroic idealisation of the war. He gave a philosophical-world view substance to the solidarity-based war experience (Kriegserlebnis) which was not bound by the norms of the moral but by the necessities of heroic life. In Jünger’s view, modern war technic was juxtaposed against democratic pacificism. He signified a war-time community which contains the ur-power of the people and combined violence and technics in a specific form. Jünger explicitly advocated anti-humanist and anti-liberal views that adhered to an authoritarian-imperialist state. Such a state should aim at the ‘militarisation of the society, the endorsement of non-bourgeois ‘allegiance associations’ and the creation of an authoritarian (Führer) Leader-State which was opposed to the parliamentary form of conservatism. The emergence of authoritarian-imperial state was linked to the decline of the bourgeois culture, bourgeois security thinking and its rational and moral understanding (Von der Lühe, 2020). In his book, ‘The Worker’ (der Arbeiter), Jünger described the worker not as a proletarian or as a distinct working class but a collective whole. Its authority and ascetism built up a life mood that appeals to the total mobilisation of the earth, to a closed totalitarian society entailing an organic construction. While the democratisation was associated with the feminisation of the society and the decadence of the state, the manly power was praised as the only force that would occupy the state with its fighting organisation and turn ‘the functional

democracy' into a Führer democracy. As a consequence, Jünger tried to construct a 'classless society' which would not pursue an anti-modern view but mobilise the forces of the urban life, machine, mass and the worker and win them over to the cause of the nationalist unity (Breuer, 2010:186-7).

Not only individual writers but also some popular journals have also provided an important forum for the ideas of conservative revolutionaries. For instance, the journal 'Die Tat' was greatly inspired by Jünger and Arthur Moeller van den Bruck in the sense that it took a stance against old nationalism and stated that the oppressed social segments should be taken into consideration to build up a mass basis to the conservative ideas. Hans Zehrer from the Tat defended the following measures: the state monopoly of the foreign trade, the socialisation of the banks and subventioned parts of the industry, a radical reorganisation of the property ownership through a strict wealth and inheritance tax reform. They have advocated an anti-capitalism that reduced its scope to the defense of the urban and agrarian middle classes against big capital ownership though they did not pose an anti-systemic attitude targeting the capitalism as a whole. Instead of its inclusionary discourse, die Tat revealed a class specific position that pit the cooperation of the middle class and intelligence against the cooperation of the mass and capital. As Herf (2009:25) pointed out, "the Tat advocated a middle class capitalism directed against the materialism of both capital and organised labor and favored an authoritarian state intervention that was supposed to free the state from the fetters of parliamentary delay".

We can argue that conservative revolutionaries had a social base in the middle classes. According to Herf (2009:22), the German Mittelstand was composed of the 'small- and middle sized farmers, artisans and shopkeepers, the white collar workers in big industry and civil service and the professional middle class'. These groups tended to react to the 'rapid development of industrial capitalism in Germany' and found in the concept of nation a 'redemptive unity' that would eradicate the existing class conditions in the country. Radical nationalism of the Weimar period concentrated on these class groups as the main receiver of the

nationalist discourse. They have always been keen on embracing national idealism against all the disruptive effects of the 'Marxist, Jewish, French or English materialism. The place of the Mittelstand was quite controversial. In line with the analysis of Ernst Bloch (1977:25-6) we can argue that Mittelstand revealed a class composition that was discursively derived from a kind of untimeliness (Ungleichzeitigkeit) and combined 'the modern, capitalist and industrial experience with the 'traditional, precapitalist and preindustrial life'. Middle-classes, on the one hand, entered into the modern life and benefited from the modern experience. On the other hand, they complained about the 'appearance of the capitalism' and began to endorse a quasi-revolutionary attitude to eradicate these appearances instead of a radical overturn of the system. In that sense, Herf claims that this relation of the conservative revolutionaries to the middle classes signified an attempt at a 'renewal of the soul in a modern setting' which also illuminated the contradictory character of the middle classes themselves. This idea of conservatism necessitated a 'quasi-revolutionary construction of 'counter-revolutionary regime', in Herf's terms, it was 'an old-new world of revolutionary reaction'.

These contradictory terms could also be found in the evaluation of the 'völkisch nationalism' in the Weimar era which provided similar political beliefs to that of the NSDAP. Völkisch nationalism represented both a social protest against the 'system' of Weimar republic and a fanatical radical right position which prioritised the ethnic homogeneity of the Volk and defended a strict Anti-Semitic view like the völkisch movements in the Kaiser time. Völkisch politics primarily focused on the emancipation of the Mittelstand that was associated with a series of social measures such as inner colonisation in agriculture, bans on the fusion in industry and trade and the restriction of the capital of big banks. The main proposition of völkisch nationalists was the desire for the disintegration of the 'compulsory economy' (Zwangswirtschaft) which contained both the capital concentration and working class organisations understood as functioning to the detriment of the Mittelstand. Instead of the 'destruction of capitalism', their main point was to prevent the so-called abuse of the capitalism which could only be

overcome by the restoration of the free market and the enforcement of the self-help of every economic actor.

Born out of a work community in DNVP (German National Volk Party), DVFP (German Völkische Freedom Party) provided a völkisch, political party that constituted a platform for a variety of völkisch, splitter organisations and incorporated primarily a great number of soldiers, officials and members of Freikorps which was a paramilitary organisation of Reichswehr soldiers in the post-war era. Actually, DVFP propagated a combination of the typical interests of the middle classes and counter-revolutionary ambitions. It defended 'the independence of the Mittelstand' against the competition of big companies and big stores. Accordingly, the speculative, unproductive capital should be tamed by a public preference to the small property owners. The confiscation of the Jewish capital should be allowed and the 'freedom of jewish people should be abolished. DVFP foresaw a radical reorganisation of mainstream national and international policy. As can be predicted, it was strictly against the dictates of the Versailles treaty and in favour of the re-institutionalisation of the German sovereignty. In internal affairs, the party assumed that the Reichstag be replaced by a corporative occupational parliament and in this structure the executive will be handed over to the single will of a Völkisch dictator. The programmatic measures that covered the prevention of all the 'socialist experiments' and unity of all the 'völkisch' forces were signs of explicit counter-revolutionary aims of the völkisch party (Breuer, 2010:256).

Although there was a favorable environment for the dissemination of the völkisch ideas, the political organisations chronically suffered from the fragmentation of the relevant milieu. They joined the Reichstag elections of 1924 under the banner of völkisch social block and took the 6.5 % of the votes cast, however, afterwards this block dissolved again. In 1925 DVFP changed its name as DVFB (German Völkisch Freedom Movement). As it was before, this new party excluded any putschist elements from its policy agenda and in conformity with that, it presumed a legal path which followed a deepening and diffusion of

völkisch world view above all individual interests. As the difference from the previous party, there was more weighted influence of social issues on the policy making and an obvious attempt to win larger masses beyond a strict Mittelstand allegiance. In contrast to a pre-war restoration of the old regime, they tried to conduct a new political order which had also a social dimension though the latter was not a genuine anti-capitalism. The party uttered the following as its political motto: “We völkisch ones don’t want a return of the old order, we don’t want a class state that was experienced in the old, authoritarian state, we want a social Volksstaat” (Breuer, 2010:262). For a while, particularly Rewentlow’s anti-capitalism became effective in the party though it was not against private property but against the Jewish big capital. However, this seemingly ‘social’ revolutionary arguments did not surpass the conservative, pro-capitalist nature of the party. It did not gain any mass appeal and in the election of 1928, Völkisch-nationalist block faced with a great failure that led to its further fragmentation.

Though organisationally not united, both the conservative revolution and völkisch ideas were a public attraction for the right-wing movements. They could be counted as the forerunner and the milestone of the rise of the NSDAP. Surely, NSDAP’s ideological framework was flexible enough to absorb a variety of the nationalist ideas and organisational forms. Nevertheless, there were also some social conditions unique to the history of Weimar Republic that built up the background of the NSDAP’s coming to power.

We can easily argue that the First World War itself has been a common experience for the German society which precipitated feelings of ‘inner transformation’, a deepening of the national emotions and an apparent erosion of class conflicts and social inequalities in favour of a quasi-national unity. The ‘Burgfrieden’ in 1914 meant a national consensus on the necessity of war including even the consent of the Social Democratic party. The nationalist euphoria of the Burgfrieden continued to be a nationalist ideal shared by a wide range of conservative-national revolutionary movements. According to Broszat (1984, 1984:69), sociological prototype of these movements were the soldiers

who turned their home and who couldn't adapt to the civilian life. Instead, they joined the paramilitary organisation such as Freikorps which revived the war experience among the ex-soldiers and carried the fried-foe criteria and the methods of war to the civilian life. In fact, all the fascist organisations benefited from the weakness and toleration of the liberal-democratic constitutional states that could not exactly treat them as illegal though their actions were in clear violation of the existing laws. Rather, they have been considered by the conservative elites as a 'force of the public order', as a fighting organisation for the restoration of the 'national and social order' instead of the 'corrupt parliamentary party state'. Thus, these organisations have been an instrument of the ruling classes which were in a constant fight against the newly emerged democratic and liberal elements of the state.

Some of the common features of these paramilitary organisations can be summarised as follows: a charismatic leader, pseudo-religious, missionistic conception of propaganda and rhetoric and finally a habitus of youth with a high degree of activism. They incessantly placed emphasis on a heroic past and national greatness and a social-völkisch kind of a renewal mainly based on the ethnic core of the nation. However, it should be stated that they were above all counter-revolutionaries in the sense of enmity against the international socialism and Marxism and the humiliation of the liberal democratic government system. Instead of that, a new version of elite cult and authoritarian education based on the principle of leader and allegiance have been followed by the radical right (Broszat, 1984:70)

On the other hand, the stab-in the back legend was common among the rightist public sphere that primarily presumed that the German army at the end of the First World War was not defeated by the enemies but it has faced with the treason of Social Democrats, in short of all Republic politicians who accepted the ceasefire with the allies without authorisation of the Reichswehr. Actually, this legend was used as a necessary excuse for spreading the völkisch-nationalist ideas and destructing the basis of the new liberal-democratic Republican regime.

It was also a way of not questioning the earlier demise of the authoritarian Kaiser regime though the monarchy has been abolished. Additionally, the Versailles Treaty that was signed in 1920 gave a unifying power to the nationalist movement as the treaty was conceived as a shame among the wide sections of the population. The Republican government was held responsible for the acceptance of the harsh measures of the 'Versailles Dictate'. In Broszat's (1984:74) terms, we can say that 'national energies have not yet exhausted itself' but found in Versailles treaty a negative pole of the nationalist claims and tried to construct a new 'Burgfrieden' around which all nationalist forces would be collected. In fact, the Republican government pressed by the popular weight of the Versailles Treaty did not take a radical action against nationalist-völkish forces. They even tolerated their para-military actions in order to fight against the leftist uprisings in the earlier period of Weimar and appealed to the popular legitimacy of the nationalism among the wide social strata of the German society.

There was a clear contradiction between the existence of the Republic and the vested interests of the ruling elite. These were Junker land owners, militarists and the industrialist allies which were hostile to the democratic liberalism. This elite which had its roots in the Kaiser period could not accept a 'government acquiesced in Germany's disarmament and the reduction of the army to 100.000 men'. Junker landowners knew that a democratic government in the end would challenge 'the subsidies and special economic advantages given previously to the rulers of the eastern provinces of Germany'. The industrialists, on the other hand, felt threatened by the 'fear of high wages, increased union activity, progressive tax policies and perhaps ultimately nationalisation itself' (Weiss, 1967: 50). Consequently, there was an insolvable conflict between the democratic meaning of the republic and the unchallenged social power of the ruling strata. Although the Republic led to the recognition of some social rights for the poor masses, it did not follow a socialisation of the means of production. Neither did it pursue a radical overturn of the dominant relations and their reflection in the organisation

of the state. The army, the police and the civil bureaucracy did largely remain loyal to the pre-war authoritarian policies.

Undoubtedly, after the November revolution, to govern strictly by the repressive measures was no longer available for the ruling elite as the effects of mass democracy required even the conservatives to link their interests to the mass approval. Even though it was related with the counterrevolutionary aims, the new nationalist-conservatives have to be based on a mass character as a legitimate opposition to the socialist threat. Rosenberg (2012:148) argues that ‘the great bourgeois of mass movement of more recent European history belonged to two specific types- liberal and anti-liberal. Fascism was not only confined to the nationalist movement but it provided a movement though fragmented as an important rise of the social base of the ruling classes. Fascism was thus ‘the most recent example of this second category of anti-liberal bourgeois mass movement. Rosenberg rightly detected that the fascist movements were considered as ‘mysterious creatures’ that could not be easily categorised with regard to the workers and capitalist classes. This veil of fascism was presented as the expression of their inevitability and irresistible political force. However, its character came “neither from the ranks of the youth nor from the mass of petite bourgeoisie, even if he was an expert at deceiving both these groups. It was the counter-revolutionary capitalist, the born enemy of all class conscious workers. Fascism was nothing but a modern form of the bourgeois capitalist counter-revolution wearing a popular mask” (Rosenberg, 2012:48). Consequently, the fascists were not composing a third strata between the capitalists and workers. Indeed, there was capitalists and fascists, on the one side, and democrats and workers on the other side. Being an anti-liberal mass movement should not make us blind to the mass character of the fascism and prevent us from taking account of the process of how a mass power has been constructed in opposition to the social vestiges of the working class.

Neocleous (1997) also pointed at the counter-revolutionary character that covers both the Italian and German fascism. Accordingly, fascism aimed at “integrating

the class into the nation through the nationalisation of the masses’’ and in its discourse it ‘ended the class struggle in ‘this’ society that is in class society by dissolving the question of the class per se’’. Völkisch thought provided a unified class in a racial form in a mystified sense, it did not only incorporate the working class but also subdued it. According to it, the working class more than any other class represented ‘modern rootlessness and restlessness’; in this form it posed a threat to their imagined social order. Fascism’s mission had nothing to do with the material interests of the working class but it primarily focused on the ‘taming of the masses’. With this nature, fascism functioned in conformity with the ‘tradition of reactionary thought’ which embodied a quasi-anti-capitalist face that attacks money and finance capital rather than capitalist commodity production. This quality of fascism revealed the fact that while retaining a socialist face and mobilising the masses behind it, it above all directed its energy to the defending of the private property. However, it fulfilled this task by endorsing a revolutionary attitude which only meant a radical change in the political classes but not a social transformation. Fascism in the first place ‘set itself against the possibility of a communist revolution. Fascist political revolution was counter-revolutionary in two senses. First, “it was a revolution against the November revolution of 1918”. Second, “it was a revolution against the coming of any future communist revolution”’ (Neocleous, 1997:56).

Our understanding of the NSDAP should also concentrate on how it could succeed in gaining the mass consent of the people, what this mass power meant in terms of its class character and how this movement achieved to incorporate counter-revolutionary ideas without losing its mass appeal.

3.3. The Emergence of NSDAP (The National Socialist German Workers’ Party)

When it was established, on 24 February 1920, the NSDAP launched its party programme including 25 points. Its content was not so different from other splinter völkisch parties which reformulated the nationalism in race and blood

terms and incorporated a middle-class based anti-capitalism. Like other völkish parties, the NSDAP advocated the right of the German people to be a great nation (Point 1) and targeted the elimination of Versailles Treaty (Point 2). While the Point 3 was praising land and soil to feed the nation and settling of population excess, the Point 4 was prescribing the enlistment of war gains. The point 18 was bringing the death sentence to the Volkstraitors. Relating to the religion issue, the freedom of the religion confession was recognised but the confessions threatening the state security or moral life of the race was strictly forbidden. The Points 13-14-15 were covering the aim of the nationalisation (but not socialisation) of trusts, profit sharing in big enterprises, extension of the old-age pension scheme. For the middle classes, the communisation of the big stores and rental of them with low prices to the small proprietors was defended. For the farmers a land reform tailored to the national needs was predicted. A law that is directed in favour of a free confiscation of the land for charitable purposes. This measure was revised and it has been decided that the confiscation plan is limited to the Jewish property, against the accusation of 'socialism' and in favour of the private property. In Point 11, depending on the idea of 'breaking interest slavery' which was the title of Gottfried Feder's book, it has been promoted that the unproductive income basing on the interest should be eliminated. The Point 10 stated that the actions of the individuals should serve for the public good, thus a kind of collectivism was targeted by the motto of 'Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz', 'public good precedes individual good'. The programme concentrated on the creation of a völkisch, Anti-Semitic People's community. According to the Point 8, The migration of the non-German should be prevented and the non-Germans who had immigrated before the first World War should be excluded again. The Point 4 was a clear revelation of the proposition that only Volksgenossen can be state citizens and 'Volksgenossen' are those that are originated from the same blood, irrespective of the religious confessions. Thus, a Jew could not be a state citizen (Wollstein, 2013:108-114).

By this time, as we can see, the programme of the NSDAP had common themes with other völkisch, Anti-Semitic splitter political groups. By 1921 Hitler

became the chairman of the NSDAP and began to focus on propaganda. It meant a call for action and demonstration of the power through violence. Above all, Röhm began to organise a paramilitary organisation that would be called as S.A (Sturmabteilung) which was composed of the experienced Freikorps teams (Kellerhof, 2007:9)

Mussolini's March to Rome was seen as the model that should be copied to the German framework. Rightist, putsch-ready groups saw the possibility of grasping the political power by the help of paramilitary organisations. The central figure of the putsch plans was Eric Ludendorff who was a prominent military figure of the First World war and Hitler also gained a reputation that began to spread across the country. The counter-revolutionary elements of the intervention plans came into being as on October 1923 the revolution attempts of the communist became a real danger. And the rightist propaganda embraced the idea of 'Bolshevik danger' and based their intervention plans on this argument. At the same time, the assignment of a counter-revolutionary, Gustav Ritter von Kahr to the State commissioner of Bayern with full dictatorial powers led to the deepening of the putsch rumors. The state intervention attempt of Hitler in 1923 failed and a high treason process was initiated against Hitler, Ludendorff and other putschists (Kellerhof, 2007:137).

The defendants were lucky in the sense they succeeded in turn the judgment process into an arena of the nationalist propaganda. And they got rid of the process with mild sentences. During this process, Hitler openly rejected the foundation of the Weimar constitution, made provocations against the lawfully elected Reich's government and glorified the state intervention. In the public opinion, the National Socialists were regarded as the patriots who wanted to defend the fatherland in the wake of the communist threat.

The new political environment, the stabilisation process that the Weimar republic entered from the 1924 onwards necessitated a new political strategy. His imprisonment in Landsberg provided Hitler with an opportunity to re-organise

the NSDAP and adapt it to the newly arisen conditions. There was one advantage of Hitler while he was in the prison. He had gained an aura of a Leader (Führer) both within the party and across the völkisch scene. On the other hand, he took a distinct position towards day-to-day problems of the party and did not get involved in it. After the return to the politics, first thing that Hitler did was try to reconcile the northern national socialists and Bayern-based center, to eliminate all the confessional conflicts and in general to maintain a unity of segregated völkisch scene.

Although the party still retained its allegiance to the 25 point programme of 1920, it entered into a period of re-organisation in which subjection to the Führer was important over every secondary issues. The new direction gave up the idea of putschism in a strict manner, however, this did not mean to avoid from regarding violence as a part of propaganda, and the propaganda as a part of violence. The new tactic was to undermine the state through propaganda within the limits of the existing law. What would be pursued was a legality tactic that did not exclude use of violence against the 'legitimate' enemy, namely the communists.

The party, as the other fascist movements, actively tried to 'portray itself as 'the most vigorous and effective force against the communists and portray the liberal state as incapable of preserving public security' (Paxton, 2014:84) .It deliberately attempted to create a political environment in which a democratic government could not prevent the chaotic situation primarily associated with the communists and 'save the nation from the anti-national terrorists' (Paxton, 2014:85). To create a polarisation between the seemingly 'national' and 'un-national forces' was an explicit tactic to convince the wide segments of the society of the necessity to legitimate partly 'illegal' actions against the communist threat. This distinctive form of the party was also a result of its double character as it wants to unite in its body two ambitions. One was its primary character of 'suppressing the institutions of the organised labour with its terroristic civil war army and eliminating all the bulwarks of the democracy. The

other ambition was to mobilise the masses in favour of the fascist ideals. Consequently, the fascist party should contain civil war troops, propaganda troops, terror guards and mission society at the same time and unify in its own body. We have not to forget that these paramilitary organisations were involved in the alliance with the reactionary parts of state apparatus which actively supported the fascist formations in their battle against the communist and social democratic organisations as well as the trade unions (Zenker, 2016:112)

The S.A. (Sturmabteilung) as an underground organisation of the NSDAP played an exceptional role particularly recruiting the unemployed young people which have lost their social orientation during the economic depression years. As there were no state support to these segments, the S.A built up a social net that provided social support including meal, shelter and an environment of socialisation for the youth. The main aim was to give a concrete order to the lives of the youth suffering from being without an social orientation. The number of members of the S.A. troops reached 80.000 in the beginnings of 1931. The disciplined actions of the S.A was effective in drawing public attention to the demonstrations of the NSDAP by which the S.A. presented itself as a factor of public order against any leftist uprisings supposed to be threatening the integrity of the society. Their actions depended on the ambitions like the intimidation of the dissenters and the politic and symbolic occupation of the streets. Although the S.A. principally avoided from coming face to face with the state authorities, it posed a serious threat to the public security in the last years of the Republic. The S.A and the NSDAP have profited from the condition that the governments of Reich and regions did not embrace serious precautions against the right-wing paramilitary organisation. Indeed, they tolerated and some times supported the valuable 'national' elements of the S.A. as a useful security apparatus helping the police and the Reichswehr (Marcowitz, 2009:98)

Apart from that, the NSDAP was very capable of utilising the occupational and economic associations as the underground organisation of the party. For instance, agrarpolitische Apparat (rural political apparatus), der Kampfbund für

die Deutsche Kultur (Fighting Alliance for the German Culture) or Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Bund were the organisations through which the NSDAP can extend its appeal to divergent parts of the social stratification. Indeed, since the disintegration of the liberal and right political milieus had also brought the loss of their social organisational base, the NSDAP began to fulfill the emergent vacuum by its own occupational groups or by its infiltration to the already existing associations (Marcowitz, 2009:98). In line with its strategic aim of addressing the working class, The NSDAP has founded National Socialist enterprise-cells organisation (NSBO) that amounted to 100.000 members till the midst of the 1932. Although it remained a side-issue compared to the power of the free trade unions, the NSBO constituted an integral part of the party with its recognition of the right to strike and its active participation in the local strikes like the common public transport strike organised together with the communists from 3 November to 8 November 1932. This type of the organisation was indeed the sign of the NSDAP's active struggle to connect divergent interest directions to the mass party. In that sense, The NSDAP was on the way of becoming a Volksparty (a people's party) by responding to seemingly diverse social demands while at the same time protecting its quality of being 'a party beyond the classes and castes'. The nationalism of the NSDAP was flexible in the sense that it could easily contain the Darre's agricultural programme, socialist expression of the NSBO or 'Fight-organisation for commercial middle class' could take place within the same organisational structure (Broszat, 1984:118)

New party predominantly depended on the Führerprinzip (leader principle) according to which Hitler monopolised inner power by subjugating the other officers to the personal loyalty and in other issues by letting them to have a right to local decision making without necessitating the direction of central order. The energies of the members were exclusively channeled into the 'political advertisement campaigns'. The intermediary organisation between the leader and the members was totally eliminated so that an institutional will formation around an advisory body became materially impossible (Mommensen, 2010: 81). Within this structure, political discussion or advise was virtually ruled out in favour of a

programmatic flexibility and a new political strategy that prioritized the ways in which heterogeneous electorate demands were mobilised with a view of maximising political power in its utmost sense. While this system was successful in responding to the electoral differences, the lack of a representative body or conciliatory institutions led to the dissemination of the political fractions that were not bound by an hierarchical system and stood side by side in a constant tendency to conflict with each other. The NSDAP, in that sense, avoided from becoming a parliamentary party with a distinct political programme or party institutions. It was rather a movement that abstained from making concrete decisions on the political objectives so as to attract heterogeneous protest votes, be it anti-socialist or anti-capitalist, under the rubric of the party. Instead of referring to the 'political contents or value orders', political attitudes, dispositions or moods became the primary object of the propaganda. The party was in that sense a means to the end which necessitated an organisational flexibility that purports to use every opportunist method to take hold of the divergent electoral interests (Mommsen, 2010:87).

In spite of this orientation, we cannot simply argue that the NSDAP lacked any set of political ideas or that there was no specific anchor points that the NSDAP's propaganda has directed at. The Nord-western fraction of the party mainly composed of Otto-Gregor Strasser and Goebbels praised concrete policy guidelines that were the outcome of practical combination of national ambitions with a socialist form. In contrast to 'völkisch' fraction that defended an ethnic stance with a fierce anti-semitic resonance, the northern group embraced an inclusionary rhetoric particularly for the socially oppressed segments of the population including the workers, the farmers or the women. Gregor Strasser openly advocated the authority of the trade unions, approved the tariff rights and accepted the necessity of the social policy even though in a limited form. In order to discard social inequalities, a kind of corporative state that depends on the social performance of the workers was foreseen by the theoreticians of the party. In the rural policy, a partial appropriation of the big agricultural ownership, long-term state credits and lowered taxes for the rural economy were

integral part of the social measures that had to be planned to exercise by the leaders of this political wing. Whereas in the domestic policy a presidential regime with the federative and corporative structures was proposed, in foreign policy an alliance with the Soviet unions was prescribed with a view to extending the power of the 'oppressed' nations (Breuer, 2010:271). In short, Strasser wanted to produce a coherent political programme and ascertain well defined criteria for the party action. Apart from these principles, north-western fraction also had the backing of a 'young' generation that shaped the character of the party as a fight organisation combining both the movement and party elements.

It is open that this dynamism of the north greatly contributed to the electoral victories of the party from 1930 on, however, a socialist sect that acts autonomously of the center was unthinkable in a party strictly depending on the leader principle. As Hitler began to actively involve in mainstream party politics of Germany and seek conservative alliances with the support of the bourgeoisie, it led to the discontents among this fraction which expected the course of the political action to correspond with the national-socialist principles of the party. Thus, in 1930 Otto Strasser and in 1932 Gregor Strasser have left the party. However, it would be mistaken to claim that the NSDAP had totally distanced from the premises of the new nationalism. Hitler definitely departed from the old nationalism that had primarily concentrated on conceiving 'the nation' as the expression of the interests of upper classes. Instead, he mentioned the 'nationalisation of the masses' that prescribed to overcome the class or stand differences within the society, hence an inclusionary discourse mainly targeting winning the workers to the cause of the nationalism. On the other side, the socialist arguments remained simply as an appendage to the nationalist fervor in the sense that a corporative state mediated by worker's representative institutions was not seriously taken into consideration by Hitler since he simply equated socialism with the welfare of the Volk and limited the appeal of the socialism to the narrow anti-capitalist arguments against the international capital (Breuer, 2010: 282).

3.4. Mass Propaganda

In the new organisation of the party, the propaganda was given an incredible importance instead of the discussions on the 'world view' within the party. Goebbels's strategy was to produce spectacular, violence-based political action which was mainly directed against the Communists. He wanted to push both the state and the KPD to give reactions to the political action of the NSDAP and find a public resonance in the press for the party (Wildt, 2008). After a range of violent clashes between the NSDAP and the Communists, the state initiated public bans on the SA and SS and banned Goebbels from speaking in public. In response to that, Goebbels invented the slogan of 'Despite the ban, not dead' (Trotz Verbot Nicht Tot) as against the decision of government and published a new, national socialist journal called the *Angriff* (The Attack). The journal was used as the means of fierce propaganda of the party. Within the journal, the hatred-based, Anti-Semitic propaganda was expressed by a magical combination of being a Jew and belonging to the so-called Weimar 'System'. Stereotypical figures in caricatures were used to support the provocation campaigns.

As a propaganda means, the vituperative name of 'Isidor' was attributed to the social democratic police chief of Berlin (Wildt, 2008:44). The so-called Isidor campaign revolved around anti-Semitic stereotypes and gained prominence among wide sections of the society, especially among the students. It was actually an example of a propaganda technic that did not exercise a content critique of propaganda material but that mobilised feelings of hatred in an effect-seeking discourse. In this public situation, the Weimar state bound by the principles of the rule of law was caught in a dilemma that hindered its action against these provocative campaigns. On the one hand, it has to deal with the political groups that explicitly attack the institutions of the Republic and challenge the monopoly of state power. On the other hand, it should respect freedom of opinion which should be protected by the democratic concerns of the constitution.

After 1928 election, though the NSDAP showed a low profile in terms of gaining only %2.6 of the votes cast, it has been realised that the party gained important strongholds in the rural areas. In order to enhance the situation further, the NSDAP directed their propaganda towards winning the consent of farmers and showing presence and power in the rural regions. As a result, Goebbels furthered its propaganda strategy as such: first, terrorise the political enemies by the instruments of violence and practice 'Anti-Semitism of action' (Anti-Semitismus der Tat) (Wildt, 2008:21).

National Socialist propaganda primarily focused on violence and 'means of media', such as speaking and pictures. It was not a political enlightenment that led the citizens to possess their own point of view but it was a relation of subjection around emotionally driven slogans. Hitler programmatically feminised the masses and said that 'like a woman, the mass has no emotional inclination towards the abstract reason, however, it had an indefinable longing for the power that subjugates. Instead of a 'begging figure', the dominating ones who do not tolerate a competitor beside themselves were thought to be preferable for the masses (Kellerhoff, 2017: 194).

Speaker's events were the core of the political work of the NSDAP. In 1928 alone there was 300 speakers across the country that organised 20.000 meeting in only one year. Second important propaganda form was street demonstrations in the cities and the marches organised by the S.A in the rural areas. The S.A. as an instrument of propaganda was one of the powerful features of NSDAP. Besides the leaflets, slogans, manifestations, the S.A. men was thought as the embodiment of the young Germany. S.A should represent the unfolding of the power and discipline and show the strength of national socialist forces and their intimate relation to the Volk itself (Kellerhoff: 2017:202).

Mass meetings and demonstrations were not simply political manifestations but also 'carefully thought and organised 'productions' (Inszenierungen) which should communicate the power and the superiority of the party. Complex

contents of the political problems were reduced to the simple slogans. Not only the NSDAP, but also other parties of the Weimar politics invented a new propaganda method, namely the placates in order to affect the voters. One can combine picture and text, slogan and symbol, form and color on the placate in an effective manner. On this issue, Goebbels argued that 'our battle was primarily waged by speakers and placates' (Wildt, 2008:48-49).

If we look at the content of the propaganda in the elections of 1928 and 1930, we could understand that the propaganda was directed against SPD and the alleged treason and corruption of 'Marxist's in the government. Particularly, the NSDAP mobilised the anti-communist fears of the bourgeois strata in its battle against Marxism. Although the Anti-Semitism was in the foreground of the propaganda, the Jews, Weimar republic and democracy were inseparably connected in the discourse of the NSDAP. On the other hand, Hitler as the Führer figure was increasingly fostered as the symbol of the unity of the völkisch movements and the nation in the broadest sense. Joseph Goebbels and Rudolf Hess actively strove to build up and enhance the Führer myth among the population.

Undoubtedly, anti-Marxism was an integral part of the propaganda tactics. Marxism was clearly associated with the Social Democratic governors of the Weimar republic. The main propaganda technic was to prove the treason of the 'Marxists' that was revealed by the signing of the Versailles Treaty. All the negative implications of the Weimar republic were integrated to the treacherous receptions of the Marxists in the rightist scene. Actually, NSDAP did not invent this picture of Marxists, these were already in circulation among the counter-revolutionary movements of the Weimar era. What the NSDAP has succeeded was to radically mobilise these feelings and lead them to spread among the masses, particularly among the middle-classes. Marxism was seen as 'völkish' disintegration.

The followers of the National Socialism were not simply directed against the 'negative aims', the inner enemies of the republic, there was also propaganda in

favour of the positive construction of a 'Volksgemeinschaft', a people's community which stands above all the social classes and castes. It was not simply a future projection of the desired regime, it was also an inner experience exemplified by the relations of the believers of the movement. A community which is purged of the un-German elements and whose model was based on the 'collectivism and solidarity in the war trenches. It was a 'Frontgemeinschaft' where the class conflicts and limitations were eliminated. That paved the way for the national conception of 'socialism'. National socialism is mediated through a Volksgemeinschaft where to serve for the Volk, subjection to a Volk and the fight for a Volk but not for a class or caste is seen as the primary objective by the adherents of the party (Wildt, 2008:72).

We can argue that the Hitler's propaganda was not simply a result of the overarching plan of the NSDAP that deceived the masses in a unidirectional way. The content of the propaganda was also closely related to the specific social structures that correspond with some specific messages of the propaganda activities. Hitler boasted of his knowing the social needs of the masses and providing an unchangeable political programme and an unshakable political belief. The masses should begin to realise their own power as "a small worm learning to fight for a greater ideal" (Kershaw, 1998:353). While in the 1925-6 the propaganda was mainly premised on the Anti-Semitic arguments, in 1926-28 the main theme became the 'space question' and land policy which was followed by the nationalist and racist values that shaped the recurrent themes of the propaganda. Simple formulations around these themes were prone to attract a wider audience that was mainly open to the strength of the nationalist views. For instance, in line with his Social Darwinist assumptions, Hitler ascertained the 'fate of the people' in three words: "the blood value' or racist value, the personality value or fighting spirit or self-protection of the Volk". In response to them, there were three dangers that were threatening the self-preservation of the Volk: "democracy, pacifism and internationalism". It was an attempt at keeping an idea of acute danger that required an incessant strive for the national protection and revival. Characteristically, he concentrated on the far-reaching

ambitions without clarifying how to reach them in a concrete manner. Having evaluated the 'social question', Hitler touched upon the necessity to win the consent of the workers for the nationalism, destroy the Marxism and overcome the separation of the nationalism and socialism through the constitution of a gigantic 'Volksgemeinschaft' that depends on racist purity and idea of nationalist struggle. The question of how he would achieve this aim remained unresponded. In the similar vein, despite the abundance of the Anti-Semitic suppositions, he did not give a clue for the solution of Jewish question (Kershaw, 1998:357). In that sense, rather than relying on political ideas that would enlighten the people or providing a set of measures to be exercised, the insistence on the inner determination and an over-reaching character of a political vision was deemed to be far more 'demandable' by the masses who wanted to believe in something that transcend the miserable social and cultural condition of the average citizen.

In order to unfold the way in which the national revival was realised, it was necessary to mobilise the masses, grasp the state power, elimination of the inner enemies and preparation of territorial occupations. In that direction, all the energy of the party focused on the agitation and propaganda for the 'nationalisation of the masses' through which a messianic and visionary character of a leader has actively been promoted (Kershaw, 1998:318). The 'objective' conditions of the economic depression and the concomitant state crisis was quite effective in the negative reception of the Weimar state by the masses. While the liberal-conservative parties were deemed to be bound by 'the repercussions of the system', the NSDAP provided a radical alternative to that system as they did not involve in day-to-day, interest-based politics of the Weimar. Within the given fragmentation of the political sphere, the NSDAP promised the people to overcome the conglomerate of the parties, associations, alliances, world views that belongs to the party-state in favour of a national unity and belief. Thus, the longing for social change and 'völkish' unity was not simply the result of a skillful propaganda. The Abel Collection which researched the auto-biographical life experiences of the national socialists in the post-war era interestingly indicated that 31.7 % of the adherents of National Socialism

was primarily attracted to their cause by the idea of 'harmonious Volksgemeinschaft'. The 22.5 % of them chose to be a National Socialist due to the party's extreme nationalism while the 18.1 % of them subscribed to the Führer cult as the main center of gravity. These shows us that the ideological effect of the Volksgemeinschaft could not be underestimated as it was the real expression of wide social segments in demand of a social harmony associated with being an equal member of a nation even though it was not a social equality in the socialist sense (Rohkraemer, 2014:142). Particularly, the socially and economically oppressed Germans found in this discourse a compensatory point of attraction to be on the right side of the community and to legitimise their hatred towards non-national, alien elements supposed to be destructive to the health of the community.

Some of the scholars gave a special meaning to the entity of 'Volk' (people) as this concept in relation to the 'Volksgemeinschaft' has been regarded as the distinguishing feature of the Nazism from the fascism (Wildt, 2008). Such a view treated 'Volk' as something definable by the 'ethnos' rather than 'demos'. Here, the Anti-Semitism was held as the most revealing part of the Volk which fed the radicalism and destruction capacity of the movement. It depended on the racial mobilisation of the community which has been characterised by the indispensability of 'blood' to the idea of Volk. Additionally, the concept of the nation was associated with its intrinsic relation to the presence of the state. Volk was thought to be prioritised by the Nazism as a peculiarity of the German society that made a distinction between the Italian fascism's reliance on the 'ethical state' and the merely instrumental understanding of the state in Nazism in line with the interests of the blood community (Wildt, 2008:25). However, it should be stated that this conception of the uniqueness of the German experience blurred first of all the explicit commonalities shared by the Italian fascism and Nazism. In the mass appeal of the Nazism, the idea of the nation was so crucial as the movement intended to deliberately go beyond the völkisch thought that represented a sectarian stance on the spectrum of right. Secondly, the idea of ethnic homogeneity was a derivative of the nationalism intermingled with the

populist expressions of the party. As we have mentioned before regarding the implications of the new nationalism, around nationalism there appeared an ideological ground which was shared by the Nazi party and the conservative, reactionary and counter-revolutionary forces on the political right (Neocleaus, 1997:30). Thirdly, the emergence of the Anti-Semitism and racist attitudes could also be evaluated not in its own terms but mainly as the result of the nationalism as can be seen in the historical development of nationalism. Racism and xenophobia were integrally related to the “‘ascribed character of nationhood and naturalness of the national entities”’ (Neocleaus, 1997:32). Also while grounding the Anti-Semitism in a nationalistic logic, Nazism tended to view the Jews as a ‘nationless people’ in a world of the nations which insisted to perpetuate its existence as a community within other nations. Furthermore, the Jews were accused of intellectually committing to the universal values like the liberal values of the Enlightenment and reason or Marxist internationalism. Such an elaboration of the Jews was in direct contrast with ‘mythical status of the national borders’ that conferred on a sacralised conception of the nation-state. As Neocleaus argued (1997:31), in Nazism the nation is filled with blood’ but in a strong relationship to the mainstream nationalist current of the German society that was not confined to the limits of the NSDAP as a movement.

The rise of the NSDAP to a mass party represented before all ‘the integration of heterogeneous interests’ and ‘representative parts and sub-organisations of the party’. Here, the binding force became the ‘leader cult’ of the Hitler that compensated the lacking coherence of the ideological and organisational elements in the party. ‘The naive belief in a political emancipator’ in the society which was a product of the economic crisis paved the way for the increasing attractiveness of the Hitler as a figure that began to evolve into a unifying force behind the nationalist wave. Even the national conservative and national liberal newspapers contributed to the widespread acclamation of the leader cult of Hitler. In this phase, the radicalism of the NSDAP did not decrease, however, this condition did not endanger the emotional mass appeal of the party. Broszat (1984:120) asserted that the fight on the streets between the ‘Rotfront’ of the

Communist Party and the S.A. of the NSDAP was tolerated by the 'educated bourgeoisie' that attributed a legitimated function to the NSDAP as the latter was viewed as purging the society of the Marxist and Jewish Volkstraitors. It should be emphasised that around the 'hard core' of a 'fanatical ideology and activism', a heterogeneous spectrum composed of the 'emotionally motivated supporters' has emerged which was derived from the broad layer of the anti-republican national opposition. In this sense, the influx to the NSDAP did not mean the widespread affirmation of an ideologically extremist party. Rather, particularly among the youth there were the social expressions of a desire for more social equality and mobility, for more approximation to the Volk and the rejuvenation of the existing political institutions and interests. For Broszat (1984:121), the idea of Volksgemeinschaft entailed not a recourse to a past, corporative social order but a call for the overcoming of the pre-bourgeois, pre-industrial social hierarchies and norms, a call for the establishment of a more modern, more mobile bourgeois-national mass society. Inevitably, the specific amalgamation of the propulsive force of social innovation and modernisation with the mythical traditionalism of the political culture played a crucial role in the mass success of the NSDAP.

3.5. The Analysis of The Mass Nature of the NSDAP As a Movement

In this part, we would focus upon a range of theoretical attitudes that conceived the term of the mass under different points of view, ranging from the 'classless' conceptions of the mass to the middle-class theories, from the psychological aspect of fascism to its function in the constellation of power. While dealing with the issue closely, we saw that the concept of mass had no unequivocal meaning in the attempt to enlighten general 'mass' conduct of the NSDAP. Rather, the term referred to a partial meaning concerning one side of the mass character while ignoring other implications in the broad picture of the mass in a class driven society. It is especially true for the middle-class theories which had concentrated on the fascist movements in its own sense without regarding the broader relationship of the fascists with the dominating social classes or

traditional elites which should build up the core structure of fascisation in a liberal, democratic state. Thus, we will critique these theoretical standpoints with a special respect to their local reception of fascism and their originalities in a specific sense but without losing attention to their lack of expression of overall picture of fascism.

An autonomic function was attributed to the fascism by the middle-class theories. In these theories, “fascism was seen as an independent movement of ‘the disgruntled middle and lower middle classes in which the close relationship between the fascism and capitalism is simply denied’”. For instance, Talcott Parsons’ theory tended to see the emergence of fascism as a reaction to the process of modernisation to which neither liberalism nor socialism could respond adequately. Thus, the ‘imperfect structural integration’ in the society was related to a ‘historical process reduced to being little more than the gradual debunking of established social values’ which in the German case referred to ‘militarism, feudalism, authoritarianism, bureaucratisation and a rigid sense of hierarchy. Germany in that sense faced with a threatening modernisation process which initiated ‘a loss of status and particularly proletarianisation because of this firmly reinforced sense of hierarchy. Furthermore, as a result of industrialisation, the place of ‘patriarchal father’ as an economic subject has been seriously undermined since ‘productive process has radically been transformed by the process (Kitchen, 1976:62-63). At the face of these challenges, according to Parsons, ‘middle classes were attracted to the fascist emphasis on ‘traditional values and its blurred reactionary anti capitalism’. Parsons did not lose sight of the role of the elites in this process as he underlined the involvement of Junkers and militarists in the fascisation process as they saw that they could further their interests by collaborating with the fascists (Kitchen, 1976:67).

Lipset’s well-known theory of middle classes also refers to the emergence of a middle-class movement under the cloak of fascist phraseology, a movement that is ‘threatened by big capital from above and organised labour movement from below’. Squeezed by this two-sided pressure, fascism came to represent ‘a

middle class movement designed to guarantee the status and the property of the middle classes. Within this framework, fascism was considered to be a response of the middle classes to a social and political crisis within which a middle policy in the form of national unity and strong national state was required to counteract against both the extremes of big capital and organised labour (Kitchen, 1976:69). The democratic system did not prove an appropriate solution to the protest and 'extremism of the middle' and fascism provided a convenient shelter to these classes outside the pendulum swinging between capitalism and socialism.

As Kühnl (1990:100) points out, fascist movements according to this theory protected the craftsmen against capitalism in the form of big stores and retail salesmen against the threat of socialism. Indeed, the concentration of capital and the subsequent dispossession and the proletarianisation of small proprietor was the result of the competition principle of capitalism. The protest of the middle classes did not only cover the small proprietor but also the small and new middle classes (Angestellten) which constantly tried to distance themselves from the proletariat. Particularly the disillusionment with the Social Democrats and the trade unions, decrease in their wages as a result of devaluations during the 1920's and increasing levels of unemployment among them made the new middle classes susceptible to the penetration of fascist ideology into their social ranks. The longing for a pre-industrial, pre-capitalist rural-small trade based social form, the negative attitude towards working class movement and big capital and the desire for a strong state that would repair their fragile social conditions and the identification with the whole nation that would create security were elements that pushed the middle classes to wholeheartedly embrace the fascist discourse. Middle-class theories also tried to derive the political choices of the middle class from an unchanging social condition which directly shapes the ideology of them. Turning away from voting for liberal center and moderate right, the middle classes according to the theory did not simply protest against the economic crisis but revealed a structural tendency in terms of the 'ideology of a reactionary class' which is thought as an 'unchanging element with regard to the affinity of the middle classes to the fascism (Kühnl, 1990:102-3).

First of all, it should be stated that there is not an absolute necessity or a causal relationship between the social situation of the middle classes and their political expressions. The revolutionary era in 1918-9 shows us that the middle classes can also act in line with the interests of the working classes. The issue is that this stratum cannot create a separate social class as a third way between the capitalists and socialists. It seems not possible to construct a realizable social model which exclusively depends on the needs of the middle classes. Their aim at creating a society composed of the small property owners or pre-industrial social structure proved to be 'objectively illusionary' (Kühnl, 1990:105). The fact is that fascism tried to win over the middle classes and make them the core of the conservative-reactionary force in their primary objective of eliminating the working classes and their organisations. The original aim of the fascism was to seize the whole of the working class from the hands of the Marxism and integrate them to the 'national' social body. The middle classes were not an exception to that aim. Kühnl (1990:108) is right while stating that despite its discursive adherence to that end, fascism did not imply something revolutionary that tries to establish the dictatorship of the middle classes but it was strictly counter-revolutionary in the sense that from the start they attacked the gains of November revolution including eight-hour day, co-determination of the workers or the social rights to organise in trade union or parties. Fascist movements also represented the counter-revolution in its broader sense with its explicit assault on the social and political rights associated with the Enlightenment and French Revolution. As a consequence, we can say that fascism was a phenomenon that overrides the sectional interests of the middle classes though it gained ground most intensely within these classes.

According to the occupational data of Rosenberg (2012) relating to the social composition of the population, in 1925, 'out of hundred citizens, about 28 belonged to the propertied classes (in the broadest sense of the word' while 72 out of them belonged to the paid employees and proletarians (also in the broad sense). Among the latter group, 32 of them consisted of the factory workers while 40 were employed outside the factories. These data revealed that there are

wide sections of the wage-earning groups (Arbeitnehmerschaft) which should be taken into consideration by any mass movement aiming at winning of the middle classes. Rosenberg (2012:172) assures that while the vast majority of the factory workers were strong electorates of the German left i.e. Social Democrats and Communists, the majority of wage earning groups including white collar workers, government employees, agricultural workers, apprentices etc. were drawn into the bourgeois parties. While the support of these parts of middle classes was in favour of the Republican parties during the years of Revolution, this consent has weakened and beginning from the elections of 1920, the right wing parties hostile to the Republic began to enlarge their range of voters particularly among the wage-earning groups (Rosenberg, 2012:173). In 1920, out of 28 million votes cast, the pro-Weimar parties gained only 18 million votes, whilst ‘the various anti-democratic, monarchist and nationalist parties of the Right succeeded in acquiring 10 million of the votes. Thus, there was already a trend of the wage-earning groups towards the bourgeois and right-oriented political parties and away from the strongholds of the Republic in the party system. During the Weimar years, as Rosenberg (2012:174) asserts, “the great masses of the Protestant middle class, right-wing Office employees (Angestellten), civil servants etc remained racist (völkisch) and Anti-Semitic”. Even before the breakthrough of the NSDAP, there was already a rising mass movement among the middle classes that was strictly averse to the Republic. From 1924 to the times of depression, the ‘average Protestant’ within these classes voted for the DNVP, DVP or Wirtschaftspartei (Economic Party) which were like an amalgamation bourgeois and rightist tendencies. However, with the onset of the depression, the Republic itself with its party system became intolerable while völkisch anti-Republican sentiments reached its peak with the rising radicalism of the petite-bourgeois masses.

From the 1928 onwards, there appeared a disintegration of the bourgeois and right parties as they have gradually been associated with the failures of the Republic. NSDAP’s double character, meaning its strong relationship to the pro-market forces that prioritised the premises of the Anti-Marxism over anything

else and its pseudo-anti-capitalist features that voiced middle-class enmity towards the so-called excesses of the big capital led to the rise of its political appeal among the middle classes. In Rosenberg's words (2012:185), "the various strata of the wage earning population whose class consciousness was less firmly established, less tried and tested-the younger elements, apathetic layers, white collar workers, the lower civil servants, craft apprentices, agricultural workers- all rushed to the Swastika". Despite these qualities, however, it is not appropriate to define the NSDAP as a middle class party since after coming to the power it did not exclusively pursue the middle-class interests. The promises the party made during the elections were to a great extent unrealised while the party did not specially regard the white collar workers as superior to the production-line worker or it did not show any slightest intention to protect the old middle classes against monopoly capital. In that sense, the *völkisch* nationalism could not be diverted from its origins in the 'legacy of bourgeois nationalism as an instrument to win over the consent of large-masses of wage earners' (Rosenberg, 2012:189).

It also seems to be important to provide a differentiated view of middle classes under the guidance of the recent studies. Childers' analysis (1983) exposes that 'the new middle classes especially salaried employees were not the stable basis of the Nazi electorates. Rather, the party was firmly anchored to the old middle classes including the small property owners in urban areas and farmers in the agriculture. While affecting the middle classes, the NSDAP has utilised both the interest-based propaganda and the wider issues relating to the fight against Marxism, Jewish capital or Weimar Republic. Within the propaganda targeting the middle classes, the party proposed that the Weimar Republic was controlled by international socialism and Jewish stock capital which led to the greater proletarianisation of this stratum. In view of them, the traditional parties of bourgeois center and right could not be potent to "protect the interests of small business from Bolshevik challenge and actually delivered the small merchant and craftsman into the hands of Jewish finance capital"' (Childers, 1983: 254). The Nazis prescribed that the only healthy response to the middle class demands

could be to allege to “free German trade, an honourable handicraft, the reestablishment of loyalty and trust”. While the liberals and conservatives were preoccupied with the formation of a Bürgerblock or middle class party, the NSDAP gained strongholds in the ranks of the middle class. It tried to discard the DNVP or DVP as the classic bourgeois parties representing merely the vested interests of the big capital both in the cities and in the country side. While still praising the private property, the NSDAP pointed to a specific way for defending this population against both “the bourgeois and proletarian internationalism which were thought to be eroding the traditional German values of Volk, nation, marital virtue, personality and blood”. From these, it can be derived that the NSDAP benefited from the anti-systemic feeling of the middle classes while clearly distancing itself from the traditional parties of bourgeoisie and right in terms of using pseudo-socialist forms of propaganda.

In addition to the small property owners, the NSDAP made strong inroads to the farmers as under Darre’s leadership it insisted to ‘win the grassroots support from farmers all over the Reich’ and take control of the current interest organisations in rural areas. Indeed, the NSDAP’s main aim was to bridge the urban-rural divide and to become ‘the long-sought party of middle class integration’ (Childers, 1983:266) in which it became quite successful. In fact, the electoral diversion from the bourgeois parties started in 1924 when interest-based middle class parties which embraced strictly an anti-Marxist and anti-Semitic discourse. These middle class parties splintered according to the specific interests were later to be united in the body of the NSDAP.

Alongside the pensioners, veterans and rentiers, the attraction of the white collar workers to the NSDAP was observable. However, Childers (1983:291) pointed out that even in 1930 when the votes of the NSDAP were exploded, the affinity of the white-collar workers to the NSDAP was not exceptionally strong. According to him, the NSDAP has never developed a consistent political strategy to lure this stratum into the party. Additionally, the institutions that the party has furiously attacked such as department stores or consumer cooperative

were the basis of the white collar employment. This distinct strata mainly composed of the salaried employees was badly hit by the on-going economic crises that revived the constant threat of unemployment or proletarianisation among this part of the population. Despite these developments, there was not a concrete tendency towards NSDAP unlike the urban and agricultural Mittelstand. However, in contrast to the salaried employees, there was a firm attachment of the civil servants to the rising party. This strata characterised by its closeness to the ruling classes, greater job security, higher level of education and greater social prestige than the lower middle classes continued to be a distinct social caste. Challenged by the democratisation in the Weimar years and republican reconstruction, the civil servants considerably supported the NSDAP's anti-systemic stance in contrast to inherent pro-order social codes of this strata. This consent on the side of the civil servants also proved that the NSDAP's social foundations were not simply an outcome of the lower middle classes or social de-classes. By 1930, Nazis deliberately aimed at transcending its lower middle class origins and turning into a 'genuine people's party' (Volkspartei) that appeared to overcome existing social, regional or confessional divides embedded within the German electoral politics. Indeed, there were limitations to the extension of the range of the electorates. The working class political convictions remained firm as it could be observed in the unchanging allegiance of the workers to the SPD or KPD. Despite the NSDAP's insistent effort to infiltrate the blue-collar constituency, the support to the NSDAP within the working class is reduced to the unorganized labour in handicrafts and small scale manufacturing. On the other side, the Center Party retained its constituency among the Catholic electorates as the premium bulwark against the aggressive electoral policy of the NSDAP.

The important point emphasised by Childers is that the rise of the NSDAP cannot simply be attributed to the social classes which is 'uneducated, economically devastated or socially marginal' (Childers, 1983:436). In addition to the lower parts of the Mittelstand, The NSDAP was quite capable of reaching out to the established elites of the German society within the upper middle

classes that led to its having a broader constituency than the traditional bourgeois parties or Marxist left. It was the party's asset to pragmatically combine the general issues like the national fight against 'Marxism, Jewishness and Big Capital' with the heterogeneous social interests of the masses that prevented its narrow identification with the lower middle classes.

3.6. Mass Psychology of Fascism?

Hanna Arendt (1958), in its book on the Totalitarianism, endorses a view of the masses which the totalitarian movement 'aims at and succeeds in organising, which has no relationship to the classes or the citizens who have opinions and interest in handling public affairs'. In this conception, the emergence of the masses is closely related with the breakdown of the class system and disintegration of bourgeois dominance. Out of this development, that have accelerated from the beginnings of the 20th century on, there appeared a mass that was composed of the 'atomised and structureless' individuals who was marked by their indifference to the public affairs or any social filiation with a political interest group. In that sense, Arendt (1958.310) argues that "the term 'masses' applies only when we deal with people who either because of the sheer number or indifference or a combination of the both cannot be integrated into an organisation based on common interest, into the political parties or municipal governments, professional organisation or trade unions". Arendt tends to evaluate fascism as standing outside of the bourgeois society, indeed as a reaction to it. She shows that the masses were governed by the mob leaders which have a special relationship with the political and intellectual elites who willingly wants to distance away from all 'the social ramifications and political representation' in a bourgeois society. In this framework, fascism becomes a protest against the all established values of the bourgeois rule. Two subjects in alliance are effective in this process: the masses of isolated individuals flocked by the mob leader and the elites who are morally and intellectually isolated from the rest of the society. The apolitical character of the masses is related to the dissolution of the class system and its result as the emergence of 'one great

unorganised, structureless, mass of furious individuals based on no common interest except their expression of their dissatisfaction and desperateness. According to Arendt, the principal element of the masses is that they are not bound by any social interests and most importantly they reveal a 'selflessness' in which 'the feeling of being expendable is no longer the expression of individual idealism but a mass phenomenon'. Actually, a nihilistic form of the masses that contain purely reactive and negative elements in its structurelessness comes into light in this conception. The mass in this sense could not evolve into a progressive or emancipatory effort that would mean a re-shaping of the society in line with the organised interests. Thus, the in-born powerlessness of the masses is closely associated with 'total, unrestricted and unalterable loyalty of the individual member to the mob leader who is simply thought as the embodiment of the masses. "Without the masses the leader is non-entity"' in the sense that totalitarian movement abolishes the distance between the ruled and the ruler.

The main quality of the movement is the permanent action within which the content of the ideology is simply unimportant. The permanent mobilisation is possible only with a durable propaganda that is composed of the 'consistent' and 'useful' materials which foster the mobilisation of the masses in the sake of mobilisation. The propaganda functions as the promotion of a fictitious world which aims at radically eliminating the heterogeneous world of reality. It is not simply negation but a production of world of mass domination where the propaganda does not concentrate on building 'idealist projections of government for the future but it initiates a pseudo-classless society right now in order to maintain present consent and subjection of the individuals. For Arendt (1958:349), 'anti-utilitarian behavior of the totalitarian movement and their complete indifference to mass interest is like a shock to the 'interest-based bourgeois society'. The mass movement with all their force constructs a 'selfless mass' which is surrounded by a world of mysteriousness and at the same time by 'the language of prophetic scientificity'. The Anti-Semitist world of the Nazis was such a construction that was shaped by the givenness and precision of the

arguments that are supposed to unveil a hidden conspiracy relating to the 'objective' conditions of the races. Such a fictitious world is more preferable for the masses than any other content based critical analysis of the contemporary world. A similar reception can be found in the Nazi's use of the term of 'Volksgemeinschaft' (People's community' in their propaganda activities. It meant 'absolute equality of all Germans, an equality of not rights but that of their nature and their absolute difference from other people'. As Arendt (1958: 361) states, 'it could be realised immediately in the fictitious world of the movement'. In that sense, the NSDAP did not invent a set of ideological materials for the guidance of their action, a doctrine that determines the core of the propaganda activity. It is 'the visible reality and power of a living organisation' that attracts the masses to the movement', hence self-delusion of the masses that gained a structural character in the propaganda world of the movement.

There are a number of points in Arendt's understanding of mass that should be raised in a critical fashion. Firstly, the totalitarian movement is considered as having no specific programme or ideology but resting on the usefulness of the propaganda materials that are prone to mobilise the masses. In fact, the content of the propaganda is not something accidental in fascist movement. The discursive fight against the Marxism, Jewishness or democracy is integral to the reactionary form of the fascism though it utilised a range of propaganda technics that saw the content of the propaganda as a means to an end, simply to grasp political power. Arendt continuously refers to the 'movement' for the sake of the movement itself so that she is not able to explain why a specific body of propaganda was insistently used by the leader of the movements while the others were ignored by them. Secondly, the mass in her frame of mind was purged of any class connotations to such an extent that she supposed that the class system is really abolished as it has been celebrated by the Nazi propagandists. However, even in the society which was exposed to the totalitarian actions of the Nazi party in the regime period, the class relations were far away from dissolving unlike Arendt had promoted. Thirdly, fascism was given an autonomous force which was independent of the vested interests in the society. The alliance

between the fascist and conservative elite which was a part of the bourgeois society was simply disavowed by Arendt while the concept of elite was reduced to a specific intellectual milieu which is dissatisfied with the social stratification of the bourgeois society. In reality, the elites which were the integral part of the bourgeois rule were in close partnership with the fascists in terms of ambitions pursued and the means used by the party. Thus, fascism in Arendt's formulation was located somewhere outside of the capitalist social relations as if they were mass risings directed against established social relations and its relevant strata.

Reich's understanding of the mass psychology is worth analysing as it is on the one hand resembles the middle class theories but on the other hand, it differs from the narrow social base of fascism and it opens up a new moral-social-sexual ground upon which the ideology of the National Socialism was based and whose effect also transgressed the limits of the social stratification. According to Reich (2011:29), theories and practice of fascism were relentlessly reduced to the 'objective processes of economy or state politics that they underestimated the subjective factors, the ideology of the masses. The so-called vulgar Marxism claimed that the overreaching effect of the economic crises between the 1929-33 would autonomically lead to the crisis of capitalism and the subsequent revolutionary uprisings. However, according to him, there is a wide divide between the necessities of the economic structure and ideological structure. Reich mentions about a backlash of the ideological forces to the economic base. The falling apart of these two sectors prevents the correspondence between the economic situation and psychic condition of the masses. On the other hand, it is also untrue to attribute all the evils of the fascism to the psychological condition of the leader of the movement.

The original side of Reich on these debates is not only his emphasis on the reproduction of the ideology within the psychic structure of masses but also on its becoming an 'active force', a material entity which should not be ignored by an economic and political analysis. Accordingly, there is both reactionary and progressive elements in the social life of the masses. The important question

relates to what it has been expressed by the following words. Why does not the majority of the hungry people steal or why does not the majority of the exploited people go on strike? Of course, one of the possible answer could be the lack of political organisation of the working classes in a specific historical process. However, Reich points to the already existing contradictions between the reactionary and revolutionary tendencies within the masses. If the reactionary elements gain ascendancy within them, it is not simply due to the 'smoke-screening, seduction or hypnotisation of the masses by the propaganda of some political elites. Rather, if there are irrational elements pertaining to the ideology, these are not simply reproduced as false consciousness' but they function on the material structures of the masses as producing the reality itself. Thus, if we are talking about the 'authoritarian family', it means that the ideology of the authoritarian state is firmly and materially embedded within the mass psychological structure and that they have to be analysed separately on their own terms.

The authoritarian family ideology and the sexual repression practices related to it are the main cultural drives by which the fascism actually operates among the masses. Hitler's success was his ability to connect his own world view, his ideology or his programme to the average structure of wide range of mass individuals who suffers from the conflict between the need to rebel against the authority and the recognition of and subjugation to it (Reich, 2011: 24). The social strata that fascism primarily targeted was the petite bourgeoisie. Reich asserts that the social condition of the petite bourgeoisie was determined by its location in capitalist production process, by its location in authoritarian state apparatus and by its special family condition. In contrast to premises of the middle class theories that presuppose the 'rebellion of the middle classes' by anti-capitalist and revolutionary ambitions, Reich underlines the parallel movement of the extreme imperialistic measures of the big capitalistic economic order and the reactionary family order which was governed by the small property of owners and the farmers who enters into economic competition with other families, who are in constant need of 'feeding and expansion' as it has been

put out by the motto of 'Lebensraum' and who are living under a real threat of proletarianisation. Interestingly, Reich saw the core elements of the fascist ideology as individualistic in the sense that it is tailored to the family politics that seems to be encapsulated under the personified version of the nation itself. Thus, the authoritarian position of the father who is surveilling the sexual repression and forced marriage and who is suffering from its intermediate economic condition but compensating it with the feelings of the 'honor, duty, boldness and self-control' represents economic and political imperialism in the family. Reich (2011: 73), in that sense, points to the protection of authoritarian families with many children as the base of the fascist cultural politics.

Although the reactionary policy is prone to penetrate into the middle classes, there is no simple mechanical relationship between the social location and the character structure of the masses. The same features that have been borrowed from the petite bourgeoisie can also be effective in the ranks of the working class under appropriate conditions. For Reich (2011: 79), fascism can infiltrate the working class by the so-called lumpenproletariat or by the material corruption of labour aristocracy as well as through ideological effect. The working class is not immune to the 'reactionary way of life' as, according to Reich, has been observed in the condition of Social Democracy during the years of Weimar. The revolutionary mass movements in Germany exclusively focused on the propaganda 'against hunger', however, missed the crucial role of the dissemination of the conservative social forms among the working classes. Whilst they celebrated the gains of working hours, election rights and social insurance as the strength of the social democratic movement, the uplifting social standards of the working class led to its approximation to the middle classes which was summarised by Reich as the 'embourgeoisement' of the working class in the absence of a revolutionary organisation primarily promoting the social responsibility and democratic development of the average workers. Consequently, the above mentioned reactionary social structure and the tendency towards social conservatism gained stronghold which necessarily paved way for

the political inaction of Social Democracy in the face of rising fascist forms of political rule (Reich, 2011: 83-4).

Erich Fromm's understanding of the masses is also similar to the analyses of Reich in the sense that it depended on the description of the lower middle class as the primary base of the mass appeal of fascism, although the social interests pursued by the party at the end was not in conformity with the original interests of the middle classes. Like Reich, Fromm (1994: 213) revealed two mistaken points of view as such: While the one tends to evaluate fascism as the outcome of an exclusively economic dynamism, spurred by the expansive tendencies of German capitalism or as the expression of a political clique's grasping of power backed by the industrialists or Junkers, the other one was prone to view all the appeal of the masses to the party as the derivative of the psychological features of the leader. Fromm's point is that 'Nazism was a psychological problem but the psychological factor themselves have to be understood as being moulded by socio-economic factors'. According to it, Nazi ideology relied on lower strata of the middle classes which were primarily composed of the small shopkeepers, artisans, white collar workers which found 'a tremendous' social appeal in the Nazi ideology. The social character of the lower middle class is shaped by the feelings of 'love of the strong, hatred of the weak, the petiteness, hostility and thriftiness'. These emotionally laden characteristics of the lower middle-class is not simply limited to those classes but they can be dominant in the working class ranks too. In the Kaiser time, the authority of the monarchy was a secure shelter for the middle classes in terms of providing a conservative direction according to which the authority of religion and traditional morality found reliable forms of social support as a stable social and cultural system (Fromm, 1994:218). However, in post-war period, these conditions changed drastically as the economic decline of the old-middle class accelerated as a result of the destructive effect of the inflation and this class has been squeezed between the upper classes and workers acquiring a character of a real social decline and loss of social prestige in the form of proletarianisation. However, instead of "being aware of the economic and social fate of the old middle class, the members of

this segment consciously thought of their fate in terms of the nation” (Fromm, 1994:221). “The nationalistic resentment was a rationalization, projecting social inferiority to national inferiority”. “Majority of population was seized with the feeling of individual insignificance and powerlessness as typical for monopolistic capitalism”. Though it was not the cause of Nazism, it was deemed to be the human basis upon which Nazism could reliably depend. In this configuration, socio-economic elites, i.e. representatives of the big industry and the agrarian elite ‘expected that Nazism would shift the emotional resentment which threatened them other channels and at the same time harness the nation into their service of their economic interests” (Fromm, 1994:224). Thus, the decline of the middle classes is corresponded with the rising power of the monopolistic capital which fostered a political ideology within which the psychological forces within the lower middle class run opposite to the organised economic interests of that class. As a result, this ideology “mobilised emotional energies to become an important force in the struggle for the economic and political aims of German imperialism” (Fromm, 1994: 225-6).

Kühnl’s understanding of the mass support of the NSDAP is also an important contribution to the attempts at illuminating the relationship between fascist’s mass base and social structures of the capitalism. He focuses upon analysing ‘the social ground upon which fascism as an ideology and movement extend its sphere of influence. It is also an important task to hold in order to point at the main social structures that makes possible the danger of the revival of the fascism in our contemporary society.

Kühnl (1991) posits that the attitudes of the people grow on the basis of experiences which the people in a given society internalise in a mass form. There is an affinity between the major social structures and the major experiences of the people. Therefore, the social experiences of the people are not something that was unilaterally determined by the ‘given social structures’ or ideological apparatuses. Any ideology that wants to be effective among the masses should take into account these subjective perceptions of people and its dynamic mood in

terms of its susceptibility to the ideological formations and their organisational forms.

According to Kühnl, the society that we are living in is characterised by the 'ground mechanisms' that we can define as capitalist. The economy was controlled by the private ownership of a minority and there is a competition between different capital owners. Regarding the mass forms of the capitalist social relations, there are two points that should be emphasised concerning the reciprocity between the capitalists and workers. What is at stake is, first of all, the general political and social rights of 'dependent workers' against the dispositions of the capital. Secondly, there is also a struggle of the workers against the interests that give way for the armament, ideologically expressed militarism, racism and nationalism. The critical point in terms of the 'rights of people' against these ideological elements is the fact that "the social protection rights and political co-determination rights which was fought for by the bourgeois revolution and then by working class movement have not been completely guaranteed and preserved. In Kühnl's words, "fascism is the movement and ideology that negate and destroy everything that has been acquired by the dominated class since the bourgeois revolution. It is a movement that wants to eliminate the social protection rights and the political ability of the organised labour in protecting itself (Kühnl, 1991:15).

The ideology of the fascism that precipitated after the First World War depended on the main tenets of the nationalism. One of the main theses is the conviction that 'the nation' as an homogenous entity is in a battle of existence with other nations to such an extent that to improve the interests of the nation should regulate every political action in a society. Fascism has incorporated this ideology and exercised it with brutal methods. On the other side, the nationalist current presumed that there are mainly people of different qualities that were divided into 'high valued' and 'low-valued' ones within which 'high-valued' one has the exclusive right to realise himself and subjugate the low-valued ones (Kühnl, 1991:8). Regarding its implications for the social structure, we should

state that 'there is always an 'under' and 'above' in nationalist form which meant that 'there is no room for an ideal of equality in the society' but the dominant element is a hierarchy organised according to 'naturally given differences'. The central motive is to legitimate the existing social inequalities under the cover of an overarching concept of the nation. Nationalism claims the existence of a national community whose constituents are deemed to have identical interests in such a framework that class conflicts and interest differences are made invisible by the circulation of an image of a 'homogenous nation'. In such a form, any critique of this image is labeled as the sign of being 'an enemy of the state' or the enemy of the people'.

There are two main social experiences that are effective in the endorsement of the fascist ideology. One is "the experience of elementary insecurity". Out of it, a world view emerges that revolves around 'the struggle for existence' which was naturally given and in this condition egoism was regarded as the most realistic response. Second, there is the widespread conviction that the individual has no control over its own life. The natural result of this conviction is the view that the emancipation of the individual is only possible with an unconditional loyalty to 'God, King or the Leader'. Kühnl argues that major elements of the reactionary-fascist ideology are not simply a product of ideology makers but they are embedded in the daily practice of this society. Fascism, in that sense, is not external to the social relations of the capitalism but they are composed of the elements of the above-mentioned bourgeois world view that are taken up, put together and used by the fascism. The radicalisation of some bourgeois elements occurs when the reactionary, anti-democratic, Social Darwinistic and imperialistic elements were captured, made absolute and put into practice by fascist ideology. And this ideology is purged of their humanist and liberal elements (Kühnl, 1991:29).

We have to emphasise that the mass base of the ideologies has a dual nature in the sense that it can move into an understanding of a society that promotes 'social solidarity or cooperation' and put forward democracy and self-

determination of the individuals as the binding force of the society. These are the values that are predominantly embraced by the leftists who subscribes to the motto of 'free self-realisation of everyone as the condition of the free self-realisation of everyone'. As Reich (2011) has implied before, the increasing democratic participation of the individual in the socio-economic relations and the active preservation of the social and political rights are factors that will counteract the pseudo-communities of the rightist form that build up its social project around the ascriptive criteria like common origin and common blood or the ideas of Volk, Nation or 'Blood or Soil'. Historically, the emergence of the NSDAP was also a result of the masses that found adequate responses in NSDAP to their growing feelings of insecurity, loss of identity and the fear of material and social deprivation. The masses increasingly shifted to the right by complying with the authoritarian forms of ideas including nationalist, Social Darwinist and militarist ideological elements. Enemy portraits was consisted of 'trade unions, Marxists, Jewish people', shortly of all un-German elements. In the case of the NSDAP, it is also crucial to denote that fascism mobilised the masses by celebrating 'a rebelling-populist' image that necessitated the protection of the interests of the 'ordinary' men against the ones there 'above' and against the internal and external enemies. In that sense, the feelings of the social rebellion stemming from the variety of social equalities were encapsulated by the 'projection of discontent and fear' to the fabrication of the enemies formulated by a strict nationalist logic.

3.7. The American Agitator and the Seeds of the Fascism in Bourgeois Society

In this part, we will rely on the work of Leo Lowenthal and Norbert Guterman (1948), 'Prophets of the Deceit', which has concentrated on drawing out the typology of the conservatist American agitators in the 1930's and the 1940's. Although they depended on the anti-establishment feelings of the American citizens, they could not arrive at the level of a widespread movement that would shape the mainstream American policies. However, though its popularity

remained limited, the characteristics of the interaction between the agitator and followers are indicative of how a pseudo-social protest organised by the agitator can create the necessary mass social basis upon which the fascist ideas and techniques can flourish in a country which was characterised by its strong liberal democracy. Indeed, the mass basis of fascism can be organized and mobilised when the external conditions were met like the economic crisis, high unemployment or high dissatisfaction with the political establishment. And the internal conditions like the propensity of the masses to give nationalist-racist-xenophobic reactions to the increasing social inequalities could exert the social protest not in a revolutionary or reformist form but in reactionary ways that focus on the expression of social discontent that has no meaningful vision of social improvement or radical re-organisation of the society. In that sense, the techniques used by the American agitators are very much resembling the methods that imprinted the rise of German fascism in the early 1930's. The analysis of them can illuminate the existing seeds of the fascist way of thinking in the bourgeois society within which the emergence fascism is always a possible danger.

First and foremost, 'unlike the usual advocate of social change, the agitator, while exploiting a state of discontent, does not try to define the nature of the discontent by means of rational concepts'. He does not attribute the existence of the social discontent to the deficiencies within the social structure, 'he always suggests that what is necessary is the elimination of the people rather than a change in the political structure (Löwenthal and Guterman, 1948:6-7). He, more than anything else, deals with the outburst of the protest feelings of the citizens instead of formulating a rational conceptualisation of the social problems. In contrast to the reformers or revolutionaries that try to lead to an heightened awareness of the social problems among the masses, the agitator's main occupation is 'to exaggerate and intensify the irrational elements in the original complaint' (Löwenthal and Guterman, 1948:8). Löwenthal and Gutermann (1948:9) argue that 'the primary function of the agitator's words is to release reactions of the gratification or frustration whose total effect is to make the

audience subservient to his personal leadership'. The agitator makes no attempt to give the necessary answers to the social ills and cure them by means of a political programme or vision. The main aim is the 'aggravation of the emotion itself' which projects the social discontent in a 'fantastic and extraordinary image'.

Löwenthal and Gutermann (1948:13-14) insists on the fact that the social discontent is not an invention of the agitator itself, they are real products of the modern society. The agitator's power comes from its abuse of the 'emotional sub-stratum' that the modern man suffers from. The main elements of this sub-stratum can be summarised as follows:

Distrust: The agitator plays on his audience's suspicions of all social phenomena impinging on its life in ways it does not understand.

Dependence: The agitator seems to assume that he is addressing people who suffer from helplessness and passivity.

Exclusion: The agitator suggests that there is an abundance of the material and spiritual goods but that the people don't get what they are entitled to.

Anxiety: This complex manifests itself in a general premonition of disasters to come, a permanent part of which seems to be the middle class fear of dislocation of its life by revolutionary action and its suspicion of the moral mainstays of social life are being undermined.

Disillusionment: The agitator's characterisation of the politics as 'make-believe, pretense, pretext, sham, fraud, deception, dishonesty, falsehood and hypocrisy'. Indeed, these feelings are integral part of the modern society and constitute the general trend of the social malaise. These symptoms also correspond with the 'de-individualisation' that Fromm (1994) detects in the modern man or 'the inherent inability of the modern man to take 'social responsibility' and realise

the individual and social freedom. The mass base that the agitator works on is a constant tendency of the individual to give up its individuality and to seek the emancipation in subordinating itself to a higher authority, such as God or Führer and simply in expressing its discontent in reference to an enemy that was seen as the source of all the individual and social problems. As Löwenthal and Gutermann (1948:16) point out, “those afflicted by the malaise ascribe the social evil not to an unjust or absolute form of society but rather to activities of the individuals or groups motivated by innate impulses’.

According to the imagination of the agitator, the follower of the agitator is surrounded by a hostile world which consists of a variety of the enemies. In this world, the follower is an ‘eternal dupe’ which is ‘systematically, consistently, and perpetually cheated’ (Löwenthal and Gutermann, 1948:21). The plain ordinary people with their supposed innocence represents ‘the mass ignorance of the people’. People are ‘helpless victims’ mostly under the influence of a comprehensive and carefully planned political conspiracy (Löwenthal and Gutermann, 1948:24). The followers are keen on ‘ascribing their misfortunes to secret enemy machinations’, ‘mysterious invisible rulers’ which pose a constant threat to the existence of the follower. The agitator, instead of diagnosing an illness, attributes the symptoms to the presence of ‘evil natured’ conspirators who ‘acts in a lawless nature and with complete impunity’. It means that the existing legal norms or institutions are incapable of handling with such lawless force and ‘urgent measures are needed’ (Löwenthal and Gutermann, 1948:26).

The agitator has a rich imagination in terms of inventing ‘enemies’ which range from ‘Communists, Plutocrats, Jews’ to the refugees, immigrants or criminals. The agitator use them interchangeably without making meaningful differences between them. The enemy is designed as both ‘ruthless’ and ‘helpless’ insofar as the followers are exposed to an enemy who has an overarching and threatening power that is the source of the continuous alertness of the followers against a vicious, never-sleeping enemy. Actually, Jewishness is mostly the connection point between all the enemies. The Jew is ruthless in terms of manipulating

capitalism by making use of the 'usurious money system and instrumentalising the communism in order to undermine the Christian-American way of life. Behind all the conspiracies, it is possible to find an impact of 'Jewishness'. On the other hand, it is a helpless creature because of its nationless and stateless existence which was supposed to be destined to live a parasitic life. The metaphors of 'low animal' are constantly used against the Jews and the refugees. They are posing a threat to the life of the nation mostly as a result of both their 'ruthlessness' and 'helplessness' (Löwenthal and Gutermann, 1948:38-52). They are alien elements that cannot be compromised due to their immutable nature. Blurring the social identity of the enemies is important in terms of mobilising the follower's anger and fear that confirm and make absolute the condition of the enemy as an existential threat. The ones that are 'foreign' to the American way of life were legitimised to be isolated, deported or exterminated as there remains no other solution to the problem which concerns the self-preservation of the people. The American agitator's portrait of the enemy bears close resemblances to the themes of Nazi agitators as they also utilised the social stereotypes of the Communists, Jews or bankers and finance capitalists. These visions of 'enemy' became the legitimating source of purging of the society of all the supposedly un-German elements which went beyond simply being a rhetorical device for an agitator in the German case.

As far as the political programme of the agitator is concerned, we can say that he does not make a special reference to the material needs which are the characteristic goal of the liberal and democratic movements. 'His main concern is a sphere of frustration' which includes 'the area of moral uncertainties and emotional frustration which are the immediate manifestations of the malaise. Instead of subscribing to 'a concrete political programme', 'emotional satisfactions' or 'a verbal discharge of emotion' are far more important. Explicitly distancing himself from the universal set of ideas or moral imperatives, the agitator designates 'an either or' world which is splitted into 'two irreconcilable camps'. In this framework, the primary aim of the agitator

and his followers is to pursue its self-preservation which overrides every moral standards or ethical problems.

The agitator presents his vision of this Either-Or world not as the logical outcome of his deprecation of values but as a given and unquestionable existential insight. Actually the Either-Or situation is an unavoidable corollary of a world without universal values-without the hope of final redemption which is an integral part of Western religious and philosophical thought (Löwenthal and Gutermann, 1948:95).

It is certain that the prevalence of the 'existential fight' will inevitably legitimise every kind of lawless and amoral action which would foster the inherent nihilism of the agitator when it comes to embrace the universal ideals. It leads him 'to shift the emphasis from a defense of the ethical values to biological self-defense. Concerning the ultimate goals of the agitator, it has nothing to do with 'establishing a fair or better society and making the necessary reforms accordingly. He suffices with the aim of "rededication of the established institutional and ideological framework of the American republic as it has persisted since the founding fathers"' (Löwenthal and Gutermann, 1948:96). The agitator continuously promotes 'free enterprise, individualism, protective tariffs or simply flagwaving', however, the ultimate goal is not something 'material'. He rather deals with founding 'endogamic community' which consists of an endogamic elite of Christian Americans'. It relates to the right of the Americans having a vague permission to participate in the coercive functions of the society. There should be no expectation from the agitator in favour of a revolutionary uprising or a radical reorganisation of the society.

Throughout his remarks, there runs a strong current of respect for institutionalised force. It is not accidental that the agitator who attacks the executive, the legislative and even branches of the government with indiscriminate virulence will invariably identify himself with the forces of law and order, especially the police and occasionally discover quite imaginative arguments to take to their side (Löwenthal and Gutermann, 1948: 99-100).

What the society needs is not a reconfiguration of the socio-economic structure but a 'housecleaning', that is purging the society of the 'unwanted elements' associated with the enemies such as refugees, Jews or plutocrats. Politically, in terms of putting into practice its prevalent ideas, the individuals are essentially passive. The only thing they can do is to keep the social order in tact simply by getting rid of the foreigners and aliens within the society. In terms of the government, the agitator simply offers the change of the personnel with a 'competent' one that would better watch the social order at the face of the rise of the inner enemies. Indeed, there seems to be no appeal to a more participation of the people in the government issues or the implementation of the popular demands. The citizens are confined to expressing their social discontent simply to replace the political elite with a new one that would privilege 'the housecleaning' as the main motto of its politics. The agitator frequently uses the hygienic metaphor within which the idea of 'housecleaning' serves as a substitute for genuine political activity. In Löwenthal and Gutermann's words (1948:102), "the great decisions are made by the heads of the family, while the rest of the family (that is the audience) can busy itself with keeping the place clean, picking up the mess and protecting the house from foreign burglars"

Just as the Nazis tried to build up 'Volksgemeinschaft' (people's community), the American agitator talks about 'a community of simple Americans' which is a pseudo-community like the one of the Nazis. He tries to ignore all the traditional political and social divisions and to call out to 'the great common body of American people', 'these seventy-five to one hundred million real, plain and simple folks' (Löwenthal and Gutermann, 1948: 107). Thus, the agitator promises its adherents to be part of a general trend, of a 'nationally advertised product which legitimises itself its weight of being the majority. 'Mass following helps emphasise the basic weakness of the helplessly outnumbered enemy' (p.107). With such an identification, the follower has the feeling of belonging to an elite whose most outstanding characteristics is to be a part of common people, 'middle-of-the road stereotype'. Nevertheless, this identification has only negative elements, he is a Christian nationalist because he is not a Jew, he is part

of the community as he is in a contrasting relationship to enemies mentioned before. In that framework, what connects the people in the community is not some positive attitudes such as 'love, solidarity, or friendship' but the 'drive to survive'. As a result of a lack of vision of 'a better society' or an identifiable material goal, the follower should suffice with being a part of national community, not question its social lot and show an ultimate loyalty to the leader. Their only privilege is to get access to the power and get a temporary relief of its social frustration. Löwenthal and Gutermann (1948:109) calls them as belonging to a 'proletarian elite' having no substantial benefits from engaging in the national community. Additionally, the agitator pursues an explicit anti-intellectual attitude which pits 'the plain folk' with little sophistication against the 'wise guys' who are sunk into the 'academic mind' being uninformed of the feelings of the common man. Revealing 'the modern disappointment with rationality', the agitator fiercely rejects 'theory, discussion, and interchange of opinion' which are thought to be harmful to 'the primary aim of self-preservation' (Löwenthal and Gutermann, 1948:110). In the case of a constant alertness against the enemy, what is the meaning of taking into consideration the plurality of the intellectual views other than being an impediment to the 'action' within which the social truth is singled out and made absolute?

Interestingly, what we have described as the main discourse of the American agitator and its interaction with its followers does obviously correspond with the analysis of Umberto Eco's analysis on Ur-fascism (1995). Accordingly, fascism is not simply a movement or a regime that strictly adheres to a political programme that was easily transmitted to the masses. It is not simply an epochal emergence that can not re-emerge later in other historical or national contexts. Indeed, fascist politics depended on a set social and political power relations whose roots are embedded within the capitalist modernity. Ur-fascism in that sense can express its influence on shaping the mass basis of fascism in variety of forms, such as right-wing extremism or populism. Though they can differ from the original fully-fledged type of the fascism, they function in a more or less similar ways when it comes to the relationship between the fascist agitator and

the social-economic foundations that positively respond to the discourse of the agitator. That is why there are explicit similarities between the basic features of the Ur-fascism and the imaginations of the American agitator.

According to Eco (1995:6), while the traditionalism basically characterises the Ur-fascism, it also denotes its in-born rejection of the spirit of 1789, the Enlightenment, the Age of Reason. In that sense, 'Ur-fascism can be defined as the irrationalism. The irrationalist thought expresses itself in a bitter hostility towards the rational and critical thinking that could challenge the fascist's one-dimensional truth, i.e. the goal of self-survival. In that imagination, the possibility of a diversity or plurality which should be considered as characterising the democratic society means the treason in the Ur-fascism. As seen in the functioning of the agitator's techniques, Ur-fascism also depends on the individual or social frustrations.

That is why one of the typical features of the historical fascism was the appeal to a frustrated middle class, a class suffering from an economic crisis or feelings of political humiliation and frightened by the pressure of the lower social groups. In our time, when the old proletarians are becoming petite bourgeois (and the lumpens are excluded from the political scene), the fascism of tomorrow will find its audience in this majority (Eco, 1995:6-7).

Like the endogamic community of the agitator, in Ur-fascism the people who are deprived of a clear social identity has the only privilege of belonging to the most common one, to be born in the same country. The most outstanding feature of its nationalism is its negative position towards an enemy which acts according to a plot or in the direction of conspiracy theories. The follower faces with an enemy which is both too strong and too weak. The follower living in constant alertness should only fight against the enemy in the sense that "there is no struggle for life but rather life is lived for struggle. This pacifism is trafficking with the enemy. It is bad because life is permanent warfare" (Eco, 1995:7).

As far as the elitism of the Ur-fascism is concerned, the followers are under the influence of a popular elitism according to which 'every citizen belongs to the

best people, the members of the party are the best among the citizens, every citizen must/can become a member of the party''. Indeed, the followers constitute a Spartan elite, whose self-sacrifice or the giving up of the individuality are characteristics of an ascetic life that strengthens its loyalty to the one at the above, to the leader which stands at the top of a hierarchy. Thus, a heroic life is suggested for the follower. Being a part of the elite does not mean access to the material gains or social privilege, but the will to a heroic life which is intrinsically related to cult of death. In the same vein, the American agitator also encourages violence as a natural result of the fight for the self-survival 'by consistent use of images which condition the audience to accept violence as natural and respectable' (Löwenthal and Gutermann, p.115). Basically, the adherent of the agitator is not more than 'an anonymous member of characterless mass-a lonely cipher in an army of regimented ciphers'. As a complementary to such an elitism, Eco (1995:8) mentions about a 'selective populism' within which the individual has no right in itself, but expresses its existence only in the form of common will as a part of a 'monolithic entity'. The individuals are essentially passive and unable to constitute separate forms of political movements or autonomous political participation which would be an integral part of a democratic society. However, in Ur-fascism individual does not act in its own terms but 'they are only called to play the role of the people' and 'the people is only a theatrical fiction'. In this co-existence of the elitism and populism, we can find the following common points: the loss of the individuality of the followers and the rejection of the formation of any political movements outside the endogamic national community.

3.8. Conclusion

The traces of the fascism can be found in the general trend of the nationalism that began to unfold to the end of the 20th century and revealed itself in the nationalist movements of the Weimar Period. The tradition of new nationalism prepared the ground for the spread of fascism that began to become effective in the rightist public sphere. The new nationalism distinguished itself both from the

old nationalism that primarily relied on the old ruling classes and also from the strict völkisch nationalism that subscribed to pure racist tendencies. The new nationalism was intrinsically related to the nationalism of the NSDAP and it embodied both a modernist and reactionary content. On the one hand, the NSDAP was open to modern developments in terms of adapting itself to the 'technological progress and incorporating modern technics of communication. On the other hand, it was reactionary and counter-revolutionary in the sense that it was politically a sharp rejection of the tradition of the French revolution and the traces of 'liberal-democratic heritage. However, it should be stated that fascism is not something external to the bourgeois society. The elements of the nationalism were already there and they were increasingly 'mobilised' by the rightist groups in the Weimar era and later by the NSDAP. Though it found its expression in the racist terms, the nationalism was at the core of the ideology of the NSDAP. Its distinctive feature was its abuse of the 'social question' mainly by integrating a populist anti-capitalist discourse and the creation of a nationalist alternative to the leftist parties. The mass mobilisation primarily targeted 'giving vent to the reactionary feelings of the population' rather than envisaging a 'socialist vision of transforming the society. This discourse was not without effect in reaching out to the old middle classes and going beyond that segment. The NSDAP took support from a wide range of social groups what we today call as the 'mainstream'. With this mass appeal, the NSDAP made use of the inability of the leftist opposition including the SPD and KPD to create an alternative revolutionary project that would reverse the so-called nationalisation of the masses. In the next chapter, we will deal with the strategies of the left developed to counteract the 'attractivity' of the fascism among the masses. Certainly, the 'failure' of the left opposition and its passivity made great contributions to the success of the NSDAP whose rise was not inevitable in political terms.

CHAPTER 4

THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF THE LEFT VIS A VIS THE MASS GROWTH OF FASCISM

4.1. Introduction

The development of fascism in Germany cannot be understood properly without analysing the history of the left in Germany. It seems to be imperative to take into account the political strategies of the left parties beginning from the evolution of the SPD in the pre-First World Period. The debates on socialism and nationalism were particularly important in terms of giving the clues for the later reactions of the SPD and KPD against fascism in the 1920's and in the early 1930's. These were debates that relate both the future of socialism and the alternative forms of mass resistance against the ruling classes in Kaiser period. They were at the same time the expression of political conflicts between the political forces that were content with the mere parliamentarism as the main bastion of an evolutionary strategy of revisionists and the socialist circles that rather gave priority to the mass education and action of the working class in an extra-parliamentary sphere. The Burgfrieden of 4h August 1914 that revealed the SPD's approval of work credits and the process of the November Revolution were turning points within which the mainstream political direction of SPD was shaped in a conservative way and reflected itself in the loss of oppositional culture in the Weimar Period. These tendencies inevitably made great impacts on their attitude towards the fascist development. In the same vein, the KPD's own resistance strategy in the post-war period was mostly shaped by the foreign policy preferences of the Soviet Union and by their controversial relationship to the SPD which eventually perpetuated the fragmentedness of the working class.

There seems to be a positive relationship between the retreat of the revolutionary forces beginning from the November Revolution which would later wind up in the defeat of the working class and the incrementally rising power of counter-revolutionary forces which would at the end culminate first in the presidential regimes and then in the direct fascist rule. Alongside the mistakes of the political strategies of the left parties, the issue was also how to materialise the democratic yearnings of the masses and turn them into substantial experiences which would go beyond seemingly radical discourses of the left parties. It appears that the disillusionment with the revolution and democracy in Germany was a good reason for the fascist mobilisation of the social protest and the nationalist reformulation of the social question. Undoubtedly, the helplessness of the masses given the lack of the channels of democratic self-regulation and their alienation from the political scene strengthened the victory of the authoritarian structures both in the society and the state. Even today we are witnessing the fact that the vacuum created by the political left was filled with the pseudo social protests manipulated by the nationalist or religious-based political forces. In that sense, the bitter lesson of the German left is instructive in terms of giving answer to the question of how an anti-fascist politics should be constructed and combined with a political strategy that would efficiently counter-act the fascist infiltration into the working class and middle classes. Just as the fascisation begins before the fascist party comes to power, an anti-fascist politics should also concentrate on eliminating the signs of fascist development in bourgeois society before it takes a ripe form in a fascist regime. It seems to be inevitable to pit the search for a genuine democracy against the nationalist waves that essentially serve for the disguise of the repression of the democratic rights of the working classes and the emasculation of the democratic participation of masses.

4.2. Pre-First World War Social Democratic Movement and the Debates on Revisionism and Nationalism

The initial characteristics of the labour movement was primarily affected by the ‘take-off of the German industry, the failure of the bourgeois liberals to achieve the unification of Germany on liberal principles and the formation of a German state under the Prussian hegemony by 1871’ (Lidtke, 1966:19) The outstanding feature of the Bismarckian policies were ‘the feudalization of the upper bourgeoisie, fusion of aristocratic and industrial interest’ that underlyed the ‘social and economic base for the dominating classes. In this context, ‘German bourgeois classes lacked unanimity in terms of national unity’ (Lidtke: 1966: 7) However, there was a division within the bourgeoisie in the sense that there appeared the political will of the petite bourgeoisie and that led to the foundation of the National Society (National Unity Verein) in 1859. The emergent socialist movement in the sixties and seventies was of a petite bourgeois origin. Socialism meant ‘equalizer’ in the society as the common denominator of social deprivation. The issue of social estrangement was the main question that the socialist movement would respond to and consisted of the foundation of an independent political labour movement. To establish the constitutional structure of North German Confederation (1867) was an attempt to ‘build a new political structure between old Prussian government and liberal bourgeoisie.

Lassalle’s socialist vision did not specially concentrate on creating ‘a politically conscious labour movement but he gave a special organisational form. General Association of German Working Men (Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiters Verein) (ADAV) ‘fashioned a non-democratic constitution’. Lassalle was a social and political revolutionary but his Hegelian conception of the state was ready to compromise with the anti-democratic Bismarckian militarist state (Lidtke, 1966: 18) The Statist tradition of the Lassallean movement exposed a ‘fragmented program of thought that basically focused on the ‘education for cultural advancement and cooperative self-help for economic improvement’. For instance, the creation of ‘Workmen’s Educational Societies’ was a clear sign of

the transition from the bourgeois liberal framework to the aspirations of the working class. Particularly, they were against political interventions. Lassalle's great impact was the 'organisational break with the bourgeois liberals' and ADAV's reorganisation along the lines of working class aspirations. 'Worker's estate as against 'bourgeois conception' was conducted in a Hegelian fashion that 'views the state at any time as the embodiment of abstract principles associated with particular dominant estates'. The 'practical principle of the worker's estate was the 'universal suffrage' whose aim was to enter into the union with the state. (Lidtke, 1966:21). Financial support of the state was the main goal of the Lassallean Movement within which to pressure the government to provide state-help on a vast scale was necessary for the political emancipation of the working class. Within this strategy, the compromise with the Bismarckian reactionary policies was an important option in the fight against the interests of the bourgeoisie.

On the other front, Eisanacher tradition which came into existence under the name of 'A Union of German Workmen's and Educational Societies' advocated the 'People's State'. The main proponents of the movement, Liebknecht and Bebel were anti-Prussian democrats who strictly opposed to the ruling class of the dynastic state. International Association of Working Men known as the I. International was organised in 1868 and the Union transformed itself into the Social Democratic Party in 1869. The main asset of the Eisanachers known as 'Marxists' was its emphasis on the international nature of the labour movement and its trade union orientation. Its economic elements were the same as the Lassaleans, namely 'state advancement of the cooperative system and state credit for voluntary productive cooperations with democratic guarantees' (Lidtke, 1966:30). In the programme of Eisanachers, the 'Free People's State (Freie Volkstaat) was the main objective of the movement, however, the aim of the foundation of the Republic was not voiced by the proponents of the movement. According to them, a Free State should be created in order to amalgamate 'political rights', social needs and economic equality. This process was related to the decline of capitalism and intensified forms of class struggle. The outstanding

feature of the movement was its vision of the social transformation which would not be created by the orientation of the ruling class from above but by the people itself. According to Bebel, the party should above all attempt to enlighten the masses. “They were hostile to the bourgeoisie but for them the feudal aristocracy was greater enemy”.

In 1875, The Lassalleans and Eisanachers constituted a political union and led to the emergence of the Gotha Programme. Like the earlier ascriptions, the advocacy of the Free People’s state was on the agenda. Marx criticised the programme on the grounds that it accepted the already assumed elements of old ‘democratic litany’ and did not emphasise on the need for a socialist struggle with a view of acquiring political power (Lidtke, 1966:44). While Liebknecht asserted that ‘the Free State can implement socialist objectives, Engels pointed at the necessity of using the term Commune instead of state. Indeed, Marx’s and Engels’ critical point was that the opposition to the Prussian state was not explicitly underlined within the framework of the Gotha Programme. Instead, ‘Social Democrats prescribed the foundation of a democratic republic based on a parliamentary system within which using parliamentary and legal means and ‘the task of strengthening the party organisation and its affiliates were determined as the primary focus of its political project (Lidtke, 1966:54)

In the earlier years of its establishment, SPD was viewed as ‘unpatriotic’ and ‘atheist’ by the nationalist and monarchist public sphere which tended to define the SPD as the symbol of rebellion in a clear contradiction to the established religious and national values of the society. In order to tame the SPD movement, first, there was the ameliorative socio-economic measures to be exercised by Bismarck. There also appeared new forms of state socialism in order to counteract the internationalist side of the labour movement. The ‘Verein für Sozialpolitik (Association for the Social Policy’ was a response of the liberal and conservative academicians to the social question. For the Katheder Socialists, an interplay of state socialism and social democracy was needed to give currency to the socialist collectivism as ‘a state principle’ and mobilise reformist tendencies

in contrast to the revolutionary implications of the Social Democratic movement. In line with this view, Bismarck's social policy would require state involvement in social issues with a direct preference to the protectionist policies. Secondly, Bismarck introduced an anti-Socialist Law that tried to make 'violent revolutionaries' out of the Social Democrats. (Lidtke, 1966: 77) There were mainly three options that left to the Social Democrats. First one was 'to abandon oppositional political activity as the representatives of the working class'. Second one was to apply to the 'extreme radicalism'. These options were ruled out by the Social Democratic leaders. Instead, they chose to 'maintain themselves as an opposition party pursuing parliamentary work in the interest of the working class and avoid both the use of violence and a capitulation to Bismarck' (Lidtke, 1966:106).

From there on, Social Democrats tried to convince the public of their peaceful intentions 'in order to give the reaction no possibility of describing Social Democracy as representing the Red Terror'. Especially Bebel adopted a peaceful and legalist tactic with a view of calming the popular fear of Social Democracy. The main objective behind this tactic was also the intention to maintain its revolutionary principles without destroying its electoral base, especially the party's appeal for the peasants and petite bourgeoisie. Indeed, the legality embraced by the party and the predominantly parliamentary focus of the political leaders made the party distance itself from the anarchist currents within the movement. The most outstanding anarchists Johann Most and Wilhelm Hasselmann took an aggressive stance against parliamentarism and favoured a political route intermingled with the principles of 'illegal agitation, flamboyant propaganda and violent revolution'. The 'propaganda by deed' requiring individual acts of violence was inimical to the mass basis of the SPD within the industrial working class and its dominance in the trade unions (Lidtke,1966:123-5).

Excluding the anarchist elements from the party, the SPD did not take a 'revolutionary route' though its continuous use of revolutionary rhetoric. Two

factors was effective in this choice. First reason was 'the passive conception of the revolution that would be achieved only through a self-dynamics of the economic process which would be imminent and objective. In that sense, an automatic understanding of revolution contained ambivalences in terms of the direction of the political strategies. Second reason was the 'hard realities of the party's existence' that prioritised the practical necessities and parliamentary activities over the theoretical questions. It could be argued that 'throughout the 1880's, Marxism was presented and understood chiefly as a system of economic analysis with no immediate consequence for the politics of Social Democratic party'. Kautsky as the 'purest Marxist of the time' wrote articles in the *Neue Zeit* which would concentrate on the 'actual process of concentration' with a special regard to the technological advancement, the emergence of the urban center and turmoil of industrial growth' (Lidtke, 1966:281). *Die Neue Zeit* developed an 'economistic and deterministic' conception of Marxism with a bold scientific tone. An abstract economic theory was not able to shape the political course of the Social Democratic Party. According to Maximilian Schlesinger, 'the economic slogan of the Marxist school is 'to wait peacefully with folded arms' (Lidtke, 1966:284). The critique directed against the economic theory by the radicals was that it did provide no theoretical basis and programme for political action. In general, Bebel tended to put special emphasis on the parliamentarism and endorsed the view that 'economic development of the capitalist society would necessarily lead towards a socialist society. The task of the Social Democrats was above all to engage in the improvement of the conditions of the working class. The role of the SPD was reduced to the promotion of the legislative action within the limits of legal work. The exclusive focus on parliamentary politics was conceived as clearly consistent with the deterministic course of economic and social development (Lidtke, 1966:288).

The Erfurt Programme of 1891 was also an affirmation of the general political orientation of the party. It consisted of 'two quite distinct part', namely 'a theoretical part and a practical political part. As the primary objective, the emancipation not only of the proletariat but also of the whole humanity was

envisaged within the programme. While the first part demanded the socialisation of the means of production, the second part was built on the 'practical demands in the direction of democratisation of state and society and the social betterment of the working class. The working class orientation of the programme was complemented by the democratic implications that had a great appeal to the wider sections of the society. "Universal, equal suffrage under a proportional representation system for all parliament, the election of public authorities and self-government at every level, equality for women, secular education, free justice and medical attention, a change in fiscal and economic policy, the introduction of labour exchanges, the safeguarding of freedom of opinion and association and eight hour standard working day"' can give clues about the extent of the democratic demands of the programme (Reschke, Krell and Dahm et al., 2013:39-40). However, Engels have criticised the programme on the grounds that it suggested 'peaceful evolution of Germany towards socialism without violent overthrow of the imperial constitution and the establishment of 'one indivisible republic'. In Engels' view, 'the aim of the SPD was not to overthrow Kaiser's absolutism' but to enhance socio-economic conditions of the working class within the framework of capitalism. In that respect, there was no vision of democratic or socialist revolution which would challenge existing social codes of the established order (Fowkes, 1984:16).

We can assert that there were two important debates that Social Democrats engaged in which would also enlighten the response of the SPD to the rise of fascism in the 1920's and 30's. These debates were intrinsically linked to the direction of the mainstream political strategy of the SPD. The first one revolved around the question of reformism that was also viewed by the radicals as the logical outcome of the policy implications of the Erfurt Programme. Second important debate was related to the issues of the rising tide of nationalism and imperialism whose expansion was evaluated diversely within the circles of the party. The political consequences of these debates were undoubtedly effective in the positions taken by the party leaders at the critical moments of the history

such as the processes leading to the the First World War and its aftermath conditions.

To begin with, the revisionists like Vollmar and Bernstein envisioned a policy shift in favour of designing a determined policy of social and democratic reform. Vollmar (Potthoff and Miller:1983:46) stated that the proletariat's focus on the struggle for emancipation should be assisted by the concentration of the forces on the practical task of the reform. Having revealed their distaste for the theoretical analysis, revisionists tended to collaborate with the Free Trade Unions which channeled their energy to the improvement of the socio-economic conditions of the working class within the confines of the present day society. It seems that the revisionists feared that the SPD with its exclusive focus on the industrial working class would be alienated from the mainstream German politics and the politics of middle classes. According to Bernstein, 'the middle classes were not disappearing as the theory implies, but merely changing its character'. It was necessary to conduct necessary democratic reforms which would extend the electoral base of the SPD and its grasping of the parliamentary majority in a peaceful and incremental form. This line of thought had also a close affinity to the reformist choices of the Free Trade Unions that under the leadership of Carl Legien found in trade unions not only 'an effective instrument for improving wages and working conditions but also the means of attaining 'recognition of worker's right of co-determination with respect to the conditions of the labour (Potthoff and Miller: 1983:50)

Rosa Luxembour (2010) in her article 'Revolution and Reform', assumed that revisionist theses of Bernstein viewed the existence of the democratic movement as the cause of the elimination of revolution from the lexicon of the SPD. According to it, 'the daily struggles for reforms and the amelioration of the conditions of workers replaced the need for revolutionary conquest of the political power. Luxembour pointed at the fact that the outstanding characteristics of Bernstein's thought was not its understanding of the practical tasks of Social Democracy but of its total rejection of 'objective development of

capitalist society' as a system bound to collapse. In line with this assumption, Bernstein presumed that 'capitalism proved to be capable of using of means of adaptation to prevent the capitalist crisis from turning into a general collapse of the system. This feature revealed the 'tenacity of the middle classes' with the growing differentiation of branches of production and the elevation of wide sections of the proletariat to the level of middle class. Thus, capitalism as a stable economic system made the socialism improbable as a result of a political and social crisis. Socialism as the end point of the movement was thought to be an automatic culmination of a series of reforms and the gradual application of the principle of cooperation. Though they constantly avoided from posing a direct challenge to the Marxist theory, the crux of their argument was not the evaluation of the 'rapidity of the development of the capitalist society' but to question 'the march of the development' and hence the very possibility of a change to socialism itself' (Luxembourg, 2010:51-2). For Luxembourg, it is not possible to define the reforms as the long drawn-out revolution and revolution as a condensed series of reforms. Although reforms and revolution are complementary to each other in the course of history, their contents differ from each other. Likewise, we should not confuse the conquest of political power and social revolution with the method of the legislative reform as if the latter was a peaceful transition to the same goal. Rather, they had different goals.

Luxembourg's conception of democracy is also illuminating in terms of its rejection of the praising the formal democracy in itself. According to it, If the bourgeoisie finds the democratic gains as detrimental to its cause, the working class should embrace it as the necessary and indispensable instrument of political conquest of the power, not the replacement of it by the final goal of bourgeois democracy. While warning proletariat of the premature acquisition of political power, Bernstein's stance in that sense led to the 'practical conclusion of 'going to sleep', to inactivity and passive betrayal of its own course' (Luxembourg, 2010:61). In advocating direct political action and the use of the general strike as the most revolutionary means to that end, Luxembourg pointed at the necessity of the political leadership of the Social Democratic movement which would

mobilise the real class struggle of the working masses. The revolutionary route of that struggle does not correspond to the mechanical understanding of the social transformation that foresees an 'ideal of peaceful, beerlike, uninterrupted process' (Luxembourg, 2010: 113). Rather, the route required a 'lightening like zigzag' (Luxembourg, 2010: 124) as in the case of Russian revolution of 1905 which contained both the offense and retreat of the working class as the different moments of the revolutionary movement. As the most critical point of Luxembourg, through revisionism the opposition to the established social order by an active political struggle would replace a conception of integration of the working class into the capitalist system by the democratic cooperation.

Beginning from the first years of the 1900's, there was a clear shift to the colonial and imperialist politics on the side of German state. Chancellor von Bülow defined the Social Democracy as an anti-national and anti-patriotic forces (Salvadori, 2016:184). At the same time, large sections of the petite bourgeoisie were receivers of the imperialist propaganda of the ruling classes. There was also a fear of the revolution in those sections of the society which was sparked off by the Russian revolution of 1905. Within this conjecture, the right wing of the SPD began to dominate the scene of the party in order to depict the movement as a national force. Richard Claver asserted that the party should break with liberalism and anti-colonialism and 'avoid from adopting a policy of opposition to the government' in order to prevent the social isolation of the party. Bernstein found the party's approach to the struggle against colonial expansion as mistaken. Noske who was one of the most important figure of the right wing, explicitly stated his patriotism in this speech in Reichstag by endorsing the view that 'Social Democracy would repel any aggression against their country with greater determination than any bourgeois party, that the SPD wanted Germany to be armed as well as possible and the entire German people had an interest in the military institutions for the defence of the fatherland'' (Salvadori, 2016:188-9). Bebel also advocated the position of Noske by arguing that the party should be prepared to shoulder arms in the event of a defensive war against Russia as Russia was thought as 'the bulwark of the reaction' (Salvadori, 2016:193). As

can be seen from these statements, there was a deliberate attempt of the center of the party to prove itself as a national reality complied with the political status quo.

Blick (1975:104) said that leaders of the Social Democracy was able to 'adopt militant-sounding an even correct policy on the eve of a crisis while at the same time adapting to social forces which made capitalism inevitable. The acceptance of the war credits on 4 August 1914 was such a critical moment that it was at the same time an outcome of the previous debates on revisionism and imperialism. It was also a forerunner of the stance taken by the SPD in the postwar era. Trade unions also complied with the dominant current of the SPD by exerting 'an end to the class struggle and suspension of the all strikes in progress. This was a critical turning point in the history of the party that was the sign of not simply a tactical adjustment but also a new stage in the party's evolution into a new basis. According to one view, the bourgeoisie affirmed their collaboration with the SPD right wing as a way of 'splitting the working class' and establishing a new basis in the masses for capitalist rule' (Blick, 1975:112). Accordingly, to give assent to the Kaiser's imperialist war meant to 'legitimate both nationalism and national solidarity among the wide strata of the working class especially those whose class consciousness at a low level' (Blick, 1975:109).

Indeed, the opposition of Luxembourg was a radical rejection of the SPD's attitude towards war. According to her, the Burgfrieden of 4th August was not simply an accident or tactical manoeuvre of the leaders but had objective causes that led to the final decision of the cooperation with the rising imperialism. First of all, the party viewed the ensuing forms of the war as the sign of the protection of the fatherland, as self-preservation of the people against the Russian attack on the existence, culture and freedom of the people (Luxembourg, 1955:372). Against it, Luxembourg (1955:374) emphasised that there is an explicit contradiction between the international solidarity of the workers and the freedom and the national existence of the people. Social democrats, by trying to harmonise the class interests and national interests intentionally covered the on-

going class conflicts that was hardened by the imperialist tendencies. Secondly, Social Democrat's second attempt to legitimise the war was its endorsement of the defensive national war against the Russian Despotism (Luxembourg, 1955:383). However, Luxembourg contended that such a strategy was misleading as at that time Germany already had the strongest cartel development of Europe and the greatest banking sector of the world. The Bismarck's aim of founding a continental hegemony had already paved way for an imperialist policy that began to compete with France and England over the colonial territories. In that sense, to acquiesce with the war credits actually meant the subjugation to the Prussian militarism that depended on the expansionary ambitions of the dynastic ruling class. By 'suspending the class conflicts' which was indeed an impossibility and giving up its opposition to the power bloc, Social Democrats guised and denied the real class conflict between the wide masses on the one hand and the reactionary power bloc composed of the east-Elbian Junkertum, the heavy industry, reactionary centre and the national-liberal forces on the other hand. Luxembourg implies that instead of trying to bridle the imperialist fervor, SPD undermined its own existence and played the role of the 'gendarme of the working class' with an expectation of gaining some social and political rights after the war. In fact, in view of Luxembourg (1955:368), 'the passive let it go tactic' could not be a part of revolutionary party. Surely, imperialism represented a particular stage in the world development of capital which discarded 'its bourgeois democratic programme' which had been embraced in the free trade era. In such a context, the task of a revolutionary party was neither to comply with the militarist and nationalist conduct nor simply to 'make a revolution' as a result of the technical receipt of the party officials'. The revolutionary capacity of a party was intrinsically linked to a range of the economic, political and psychological factors including 'the intensity of class conflicts, the grade of the enlightenment of the workers and ripeness of the fighting spirit of the masses' (Luxembourg, 1955:375)

We could argue that the Luxembourg's opposition to the party's mainstream strategy and Liebknecht's anti-militarism was bound to remain isolated as 'all

the central party institutions are dominated by opportunist elements and all opposition is dashed to pieces as the masses cannot revolt” (Fowkes, 1984:9). Indeed, the SPD’s passive and sometimes complacent attitude towards militarism and war was also giving the clues for the positions later to be taken by them particularly on the questions of ‘alliance with the bourgeoisie’ when ‘the national interest’ is deemed to be at stake.

The second opposition to the policy of the SPD on war was raised by Kautsky who took rather a moderate position whose practical implications at the end culminated in the same result, hence the passivity of the party. According to Kautsky, the imperialism was not representing the ultimate form of world capitalism as the radicals implied. Surely, imperialism meant “a systematic policy of external zones, the ineradicable economic exigency of capitalist development” within which the finance capital took the leadership in the expansionary ambitions of the imperialism. In contrast to the ‘irrationality’ of the destructive competition among the worldwide cartels, there was also another tendency among the capitalists, especially among the industrial capital to transform imperialism into a higher form, ultra-imperialism in Kautsky’s terms, where the capitalist production would take a peaceful and cooperative route and the working class would again find the opportunity to make its democratic organisation flourish. In that sense, imperialism was not the last phase of capitalism but a specific form of economic policy that was found by Kautsky as in contradiction with the incremental development of the capitalist production. The political implication of this view was a pacific propaganda of the world peace according to which the task of the proletariat was confined to the ‘struggling to break out of the imperialist strategy, to foster an era of international peace and intervention in capitalist contradictions in a context of economic, social and political normality’. In this context, the ‘necessity of the democracy’ was thought as the inevitable product of the laws of the motion of capitalist production itself (Salvadori, 2016:309). The most revealing element of Kautsky’s view was its insistent emphasis on the coupling of the capitalist development with the democratic mass base of the working class. Indeed, the

possibility of the creation of a militarist-nationalist mass movement by the ruling class was totally discarded by Kautsky. The imperialist phase could only be overcome by the reassertion of democratic tendencies within capitalism and by a 'strategy of alliances' between the non-imperialist sectors of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat'. However, this endorsement of the democracy and socialism was simply confined to the formal parliamentary institutions as if 'a defensive strategy of simply protecting the organisational basis of the working class was sufficient to counter-act against the imperialist wave. Indeed, this view later became symptomatic of the social democratic movement which exclusively focused on a legalistic promotion of the bourgeois democracy while ignoring the questions of the political mobilisation of the masses with clearly defined socialist objectives.

4.3. The Effect of The November Revolution on the German Left

At the end of the war, SPD was not representing the whole of the working class as it was split into two parties, MSPD (Majority Social Democratic Party) and USPD (Independent Social Democratic Party). At the end of September 1918, MSPD founded a government with the liberals under the leadership of Prince Max of Baden and took the confidence of the majority of the Reichstag (Miller and Potthoff, 1983:62-3). MSPD was planning to introduce parliamentary government in Germany. During this process, the soldiers and workers weary of the results of the war revolted against militarism and military authority with the slogans of 'peace, freedom and bread' and created a mass movement that was not the outcome of preparation and control of the leadership, rather it was a spontaneous rebellion of war-weary masses. Council movement as the prototype of the direct democracy was the fruit of these revolts, however, this organisation was not a fully-fledged core of a future political structure of the worker movement but 'an interim solution born of revolution'.

The potential choice between the 'a National Assembly' and a 'true Soviet government was an important problematic that the November Revolution has

brought about (Rosenberg, 2016:12). The emergence of the workmen's and soldier's council constituted a real power center on 10 November 1918. As such, they were focus of the direct democratic experience as an alternative to the 'Council Representatives' that was mainly dominated by the MSPD in the direction of the parliamentary democracy. The soviets were an attempt to overcome the separation of powers pursued in the middle class state and a search for founding 'the absolute and unrestricted self-government of the people' (Rosenberg, 2016:13). The most outstanding feature of the councils in Germany was the fact that they were not directed by a dominant revolutionary party as implied in the Bolshevik style of political organisation. They were an important challenge for the working classes to manage their own affairs independently of an overarching bureaucracy or indirect representational organs. As Rosenberg (2016:14) puts out, the working classes were not experienced to be really capable of creating of the channels of the democratic self-regulation. The state's power was over extensive and the bureaucracy was not leaving a free public sphere that would create space for the democratic participation of masses. Rosenberg (2016:14-5) adds that 'true democracy' was intrinsically linked to the 'abolition of the bureaucracy' with the ultimate aim of the self-government of the masses. Furthermore, as there was an intense desire for the socialisation after the November Revolution, the realisation of this desire in favour of 'any form of planned or communal economy' was also necessitating an 'active cooperation of the masses' in order to be efficient and long-lasting.

During this process, there was even the possibility of combining the councils with the parliamentary institutions. However, this potentiality for direct democracy did not develop into a sound political project that would give a permanent status to the councils. There were mainly two reasons for the dissolution of the councils in time. First, the working class was divided into two camps. The majority of them was giving assent to a middle class state and democracy even at the expense of losing the self-initiative of the councils. Only a minority of them was embracing the councils as the principal units for a thorough-going socialisation and democracy (Rosenberg, 2016:37). Secondly,

there was an explicit fragmentation in the political left concerning the issue of the councils. As has been expected, the MSPD was averse to the councils as according to it, the councils were representing the Bolshevism and public disorder. The USPD was giving importance to the councils and implying the necessity of building up an organic connexion between the National Assembly and the councils. On the other side, the radical left wing of the USPD called as 'revolutionary Obleute' and the Spartacus Union under the leadership of Rosa Luxembourg and Karl Liebknecht were pointing at the centrality of the councils in the political organisation of the working class. Rosenberg (2016:52) assumes that 'Rosa Luxembourg was well aware of the fact that to create a socialist republic necessitated a long process of development as far as the participation of the large part of the working class is concerned. However, most of the members of the Spartacus Union were consisting of 'radical utopians' that favour an 'immediate violent action' without any political compromise. In this conjecture, as the fight between the right-wing of the MSPD and wild utopians put its stamp on the public sphere, the political formations that aim at giving a concrete role to the councils vis-a-vis the National Assembly did not emerge as a viable alternative.

In the direction of the parliamentary democracy, The Council of Representatives possessed extensive powers which concentrated on the demands of political democracy and some moderate social improvements in industry. These can be counted as 'the introduction of universal, equal suffrage, the proportional system for all parliamentarians and voters and equal voting rights for women, and the legal establishment of eight-hour maximum working day' (Miller and Potthoff, 1983:65-6). Though these reforms were praised by the SPD as the important achievements, there was no radical re-organisation of the state. The traditional structures in civil service, in the army and in the economy stayed alive. The demands for the democratisation of the state and the socialisation of the economy which were implicitly or explicitly raised by the mass revolts were remained unachieved. Indeed, the MSPD as a part of the government entered into alliance with the counter-revolutionary forces in the Reichswehr in order to

the repress the revolutionary attempts as exemplified by January Spartacus Revolt and the March Movement in Ruhr. The MSPD exerted its hostility towards the mass worker movements labeled as 'communist' and 'Bolshevist' and tended to regard the maintenance of the 'law and order' and the creation of bourgeois democratic regime as the main objective of the revolution. Hence, a second revolution was ruled out. During this time, The USPD was effective in the Council Movement and had also a stronghold in the Reichstag as a result of the 1919 elections. "USPD was on the way of becoming the protest party of the disillusioned masses and their representatives were leaders of the 'shoe-maker union and textile-workers union'" (Miller and Potthoff, 1983:84). Although the Council Movement began to lose power, the hopes of the working class on the objectives of democratisation and socialisation did not completely disappear. At the end, a labor management law (Work Council Law) passed on 4 February 1920 and legally introduced "worker representation at their place of work and a right of co-determination in laying down working times and working arrangements, in regulations governing leave and in introducing new methods of payment'. This law was far away from meeting the expectations of the working class which primarily demanded a radical re-structuring of the work relations in terms of the introduction of real democratic measures to eliminate the social inequalities (Miller and Potthoff, 1983:85).

In addition to these limitations to the extent of the November Revolution, the counter-revolutionary tendencies began to gain strength particularly within the Reichswehr as the Freicorps units were frequently used with the aim of smashing the revolutionary mass movements. Though it failed to conquest the governmental power, the Kapp putsch attempt was an indication of the recovery of the rightist forces This putsch was resisted by the 'determined actions of the organised labour' embodied by a general strike supported by the Free Trade Unions, USPD and KPD. Strict position taken by the trade unions was the leading factor behind the retreat of the putsch attempt. The aftermath of the putsch could have led to the rejuvenation of revolutionary attempts of the left. In accordance with this view, Carl Legien was the pivotal figure between the

central government and coalition parties on the one side and the USPD and the mobilising working population on the other. Trade unions proposed a series of political demands particularly ‘guaranteeing a decisive say in the reform of central and state governments, the swift disarmament and punishment of all involved in the putsch, the immediate resignation of Army Minister Noske (MSPD) and the Prussian Ministers and the purging of the political and economic administration of all reactionary elements’ (Miller and Potthoff: 1983:89). However, the government had no intention to exercise these demands as it was bound by the alliance with the middle class liberal parties and it exclusively involved in the establishment parliamentary democracy without creating any room for the direct mass action. Moreover, the result of the general election of June 1920 indicated a shift in voter preferences to the middle class and right-wing parties adversely affected by the civil war-like conditions seen in the aftermath of the revolution (Miller and Potthof, 1983:91).

4.4. The Rise of Fascism and The KPD’s Resistance Strategy

After the unsuccessful revolts in 1919, KPD, a newly arising party taking a communist stance as against the revisionism of the SPD, decided to evolve into a mass party with the participation of the left of the USPD. Paul Levi, the leader of the party, stated that ‘revolution is not a mad, blind process of running amok but a clear weighting up and examination of the given social forces’. In accordance with that objective, the party distanced itself from the ‘syndicalist opposition’ since it is regarded as seeing the revolution as a purely economic progress, rejecting the political means of struggle as harmful and respecting the general strike as ‘Alpha and Omega’ of revolution’. The party’s Marxist view was based on the conviction that ‘the revolution could not be made mechanically with a single patent recipe’ but it should be the child of the ‘organic process of the liberation of the whole working class’ (Fowkes, 1984:38). With these views, the KPD tried to clearly differentiate its stance from the experiences of Spartacus revolt which according to the party had a character of ‘anarchist and terroristic actions’ devoid of a mass base within the working class.

During the period when the counter-revolutionary movements began to increase their strength and the fascism was in a preliminary stage of emerging out of the reactionary right-wing organisations, the KPD embraced united front tactics in order to further its influence within the working class. Lenin argued that 'it is necessary to fight unceasingly and systematically to win the majority of the working class at the outset within the old trade unions' (Fowkes, 1984:74). Whereas there appeared a trend of capitalist stabilisation after 1920, accordingly Third Congress of Comintern proposed that now the communist party should put emphasis on the need to secure mass support, definitive removal of the KPD (Communist Worker's Party of Germany) from the political scene which advocated an immediate frontal attack for the establishment of proletarian dictatorship and a renewed attempt at incorporating a 'united front policy'.

A critical test for the policy shift in the KPD was the Ruhr crisis in the 1923 which was initiated by the occupation of the Ruhr by the French and Belgian military forces. A direct result of this crisis was the rise of German nationalism which was directed against both the local worker organisations and foreign occupiers. The KPD endorsed a two-edged attitude that prescribed a fierce action against the rising fascism and at the same time a view of entering into alliance with it with respect to the 'the liberation of Germany from the French imperialism' (Fowkes, 1984: 96-7). It was called 'Schlageter line of fight' as Schlageter was a German nationalist killed by the French forces. The Brandler leadership at that time envisioned a policy depending on 'a defensive revolutionary struggle to form a 'united front' which would lead to action for a workers and peasants government' (Fowkes, 1984:98). However, these objectives raised important questions regarding the will of the working class for an armed uprising. Thalheimer, one of the leaders of the KPD, put out that 'the coming of Stresemann government after Cuno's resignation brought about a relative appeasement of the working class action that diminished the working class' intention to 'fight for a workers and peasants government', not to mention of a proletarian dictatorship. While the leaders of the Soviet Union was quite optimistic in terms of 'forthcoming revolution', the center of the KPD after the

meeting on 21 October 1923 decided to give up the idea of 'planned insurrection' since in Brandler's words, 'the present situation a general strike would be bound to turn into an armed insurrection' and 'hence, the political inactivity was the main result of the process due to the unwillingness of the working class to revolt. On the other side, the Soviet leadership condemned the 'rightist approach of Brandler's leadership and claimed that despite the objectively favourable conditions for an uprising in October, strategic and tactical errors of Brandler and Thalheimer led to the defeat of the working class. The left within the party also accused them of embracing 'the reformist tactic of the united front and the search for an alliance with the Left Social Democrats' (Fowkes, 1984:110-1).

In fact, the failure of the October revolt in 1923 was the end of an era when the offensive of the working class was clearly on the agenda and direct socialist uprisings were quite a possibility in relation to the vulnerabilities of the Weimar government and the weakness of the fascist movements which paved way for the suppression of the mass protests by the military forces. Indeed, it was a specific period of time when the mass in case of the unity of the working class could have pushed the government for practising the objectives of democratisation and socialisation. It can be said that the lack of the unity within the political will of the working class and the increasing strength of nationalist current particularly among the middle classes have led the attempts at materialising the socialist demands to stagnate.

In the period following the October defeat one could observe that the KPD decided to endorse a left route that necessitated the reconsideration of the previous united front tactics. Now the party revealed a more hostile attitude towards the SPD counting it as the bulwark of fascism, as a factor creating room for the fascist development. From then on, only a 'united front from below' was regarded as the only viable option to reach the working class base of the SPD. As the task of the party in terms of the final objective, now the proletarian dictatorship was more openly accentuated by the proponents of the party.

Regarding the relationship with the trade unions, the independent organisation of the workers was more fiercely sought in contrast to the previously compliant attitude towards working class with the free trade unions. Particularly the unorganised workers were said not to enter in the trade unions, instead their organisation in the Factory Councils were supported by the left leadership. It can be argued that the years of 1924 and 1925 witnessed a semi-independent leftist policy of the KPD leadership that gave importance to protect its distance to the Moscow (Fowkes, 1984:122). The left wing within the party was now split into two groups as the moderates and the ultra-leftists. In order to prevent a deviation towards ultra-left, the fifth enlarged ECCI proposed a change in the policy of KPD. While it objected to any rightist turn, the ultra-left objectives were also to a great extent discarded by the ECCI. According to it, the 'left errors in the trade unions should be eliminated, the united front tactics should be applied and the propagation of the slogan of 'a workers and peasants government should be given priority'. In the same vein, the Tenth Party Congress prescribed that in view of 'the temporary stabilisation of capitalism, the access to the working class base of the SPD and the middle class strata should not be blocked by a strict ultra-left policy. A 'deliberate, flexible and powerful employment of the united front tactics were to be pursued by the party (Fowkes, 1984:125-6).

The real change in the policy towards the SPD and the fascism was achieved as a result of the Eleventh Party Congress which objected to the search for creating a wider mass base in favour of defending the interests of the Soviet Union (Fowkes, 1984:142). The pro-Comintern left under Thalmann and Dengel took precedence over the Center Group around Meyer which advocated a moderate position against the SPD. Indeed, the Ninth ECCI Plenum in February 1928 explicitly indicated the policy shift in the Comintern which determined the 'most dangerous enemy of the communism' as 'the left leadership of the opportunism' (Fowkes,1984:146). According to Comintern, the world capitalism was now living the 'third period' of the postwar era. The first one was that of revolutions, the second one covering the period between 1924 and 1928 was characterised by the gradual and partial stabilisation of capitalism. In contrast, the beginning of

the third period represented the intensification of the contradictions of the world capitalism and sharpening class conflicts which would also give way for a new wave of revolutions. Thus, an aggressive stance against the rightist policies combined with the evaluation of the SPD as the embodiment of the 'social fascism' was the main characteristics of the ultra-left shift in the policies of the KPD (Arbeiterpolitik, 1981:172). According to theoretical conceptualisation of social fascism, fascism was on the rise, however, the cause of the fascist movements should be sought in the central role played by the SPD in fostering the fascist dictatorship under the guise of the 'pure democracy'. The KPD pointed at the emergence of a new labour aristocracy within the SPD that implied that the leadership of the SPD was integrated into a specific configuration of party, trade unions and state and lost its status as an oppositional power. Apart from these, the KPD has also elevated to being the defender of Soviet foreign policy by rejecting the Young Plan which signified that the 'complete insertion of the German bourgeoisie and the German government into the anti-Soviet front'. Consequently, any attempt at facilitating the rapprochement between the SPD, government and the Western allies was found as inimical to the pro-Soviet policy route of the party.

At this point, it should be stated that giving a preponderant role to the 'social fascism' meant an underestimation of the 'genuine fascism' that showed clear signs of ascension to the end of the 1920's. The response of the KPD to the success of the NSDAP was an interesting combination of the communism and nationalism. The KPD took a position clearly opposed to the Young Plan and the 'robber peace of Versailles'. It advocated a 'national and social liberation of the German people' in a way reminiscent of the NSDAP nationalist discourse. Instead of providing an alternative project to deal with the national question, it began to compete with the NSDAP when it came to use the national demagoguery and extending its electoral base within the middle classes (Arbeiterpolitik, 1981:162). Indeed, a collaboration with the SPD was limited to the calls for a united front from below, hence an attempt at isolating the leadership of SPD. Surprisingly, they condemned the left wing of the SPD which was eager to ally

with the KPD as the 'most dangerous enemy' within the SPD. In contrast, the KPD entered into a real alliance with the Nazis, in the 'Red Referendum' in 1931 in the case of demanding the resignation of the Prussian diet and going on strike with the NSDAP in the protest of Berlin transport worker before the November elections in 1932.

Like the most critics of the left, the KPD did not evaluate the breakthrough of the fascist movement in a proper way. Rather, it tended to disregard the NSDAP as a temporary phenomenon and an unstable form of political structure bound to collapse due to its internal contradiction. In the age of the 'assumed revolutionary moment', the coming of the fascism was assessed as a prelude to the upcoming revolution. Thus, it was not a movement that have to be fought against in a unity of the working class but a transitional stage which would mechanically intensify the class struggles in favour of the communist's rise in the political sphere. Though their insistence on the militant political action, the lessons they have drawn from their theoretical standpoints were leading the communists to clearly adopt fatalist conclusions. The same mistaken attitude was endorsed with regard to the evaluations of the economic crisis. The KPD viewed the result of the economic crisis mechanically leading to a revolutionary moment. At the same time, it neglected the fact that 'there was not only a revolutionary exit from the crisis, there was also a 'counter-revolutionary solution to the crisis. As the critique of the KPD, KPD-Opposition (*Arbeiterpolitik*, 1981:170) revealed, 'fascism was not simply the sum of the principal factors of the monopoly capitalist crisis, it was also a result of a specific relations of class struggle where the working class is weakened, disoriented and devoid of revolutionary aims. To treat the fascist dictatorship as the inevitable result of the monopoly capitalistic development directly meant the 'fatalism' and 'passivity' of the working class in the face of overarching economic situation that it cannot counteract. It should also be stated that KPD's understanding of Weimar democracy as the embodiment of the fascism itself blurred the essential contradiction between democracy and fascism as the latter was not simply the extension of the former but the strict negation of it. Fascism

put into practice the open brutal violence and the elimination of the working class organisations including the SPD which was viewed by the communists as another variant of fascism. In that sense, it brought about a misinterpretation of the fascist threat and unnecessary attacks on the SPD that overall deepened the continuing division within the working class.

During the last years of the Weimar Republic, the KPD took a militant attitude towards the rise of fascism by promoting 'Anti-Fascist actions'. Especially after the Papen's coup in Prussia, the KPD called for general strikes that would be directed by its trade union organisation RGO and intended to include all sections of working class ranging from the Communists and Social Democrats to the National Socialists and non-party workers. However, it was not a radical break with its policies that contributed to its own political isolation. The Free Trade Unions and 'revisionist' leadership of the SPD was excluded from the 'Anti-Fascist Actions' and the workers were allowed to join the actions individually. Only for a short period after the Prussian coup, the KPD offered a 'united front from above' to the SPD which would be responded by the rejection of the SPD leadership (Fowkes, 1984:167). After the Hitler's coming to power, despite the aggressive rhetoric of the party, the actions of the KPD was seriously shattered by the suppression of the legal activity of the party by the Nazis and consequently its existence as a mass movement came to a halt due to detentions of its members and its cadre (Fowkes, 1984:171).

4.5. The Reception of the Fascism by SPD

At the end of the 1920's as the NSDAP began to be closing to the electoral breakthrough, the first response of the SPD to the enlarging political influence of the NSDAP has been one of underestimation. Firstly, this party was seen as an example of the unsuccessful Anti-Semitic parties of the Wilhemine period. Secondly, the SPD tended to regard the NSDAP simply as a 'capitalist tool' which was composed of the 'underclass elements' having no mass appeal. Social Democrats were keen on classifying them as 'radical opponents of the Weimar

democracy' like the KPD. In Magdebourg Congress of 1929, the SPD became aware of the fact that there was a rising anti-constitutional mood and a kind of the anti-republicanism that swayed the political sphere of the rightists. There were mainly two forms of expression of this trend: one was a putschist element of the violent street groups and the other one was its popular element targeting mass support particularly among the middle classes. The Nazis were bringing together these elements within their parties. In spite of this description, not until the results of the 1930 elections became apparent did the SPD take the rise of the NSDAP seriously. After that date, for instance, Carlo Mierendorff tried to analyse the organisational, sociological and the ideological roots of the 'new Nazism'. According to him, the electoral success of the NSDAP was not a mere accident but a result of a strong national organisational foundation of the party machine which did organise both in urban and rural areas. The party concentrated primarily on the 'middle classes, white collar employees, small and middle farmers and students. The issue of the 'fear of proletarianization' was predominant in the direction of these social segments towards Nazi party. In terms of propaganda, the NSDAP tried to affect the emotional side of the electorate while the SPD was concerned with the enlightenment and education of the voters. Undoubtedly, the NSDAP was containing elements that would directly challenge the mass base of the SPD as a 'people's party' alongside the working class as the core supporter of the SPD (Harsh, 1993:139).

As one of the leading figures of the neo-revisionists in the party, Theodor Geiger asserted that the SPD has distanced away from the new middle classes by assuming that the proletarianisation of these segments as an indication of the final equalisation of them with the working class. One of the revisionists Erik Nölting stated that 'under the National Socialism's banner there appeared a 'petite bourgeoisie' as a great political power (Harsh, 1993:230) According to this view, the SPD excessively concentrated on preserving and improving the interests of the working class and could not provide a concrete programme that would attract the new middle classes to the mass structuring of the party. While the economic assumption of the party did not create any room for the inclusion

of the middle classes and peasants, the free trade unions were also disdainful of integrating the new middle classes into the framework of the party as they have been seen as the competitors of the working class interests.

Indeed, the stagnation in the SPD membership could be connected to the intensifying process of a social restratification which led to the emergence of a service sector and the growth of the white-collar workers which was corresponded with the decreasing ratio of the blue collar workers in proportion to the employed population (Mommensen, 1991:50). In this context, to extend its scope of its base in the mass electorate, the SPD should not suffice with the mere protection of the working class but go beyond its 'political isolation' among the non-proletarian sectors of the society. As a matter of the fact, as the election results showed, the MSPD combined with the USPD has been able to gain the consent of those parts of the society and helped the revolutionary mood spread among the broader sections of the masses. However, this integration flawed as the middle classes from the early 1920's, shifted their support mainly to the bourgeois and rightist parties.

Neo-revisionists presupposed novel ways of making propaganda as observed in the modern style of communication techniques of the NSDAP. Instead of the 'realist and rational' policy making of the party officials depending on illumination of the voters by concrete and rational arguments, there appeared a right wing attitude in the party favouring a more simple and pragmatic techniques of propaganda that would rather appeal to the emotions of the electorate. These recommendations on the style of policy making were complemented by the calls for accommodating to the nationalist trend in the public sphere. Geiger posited that 'nationalism was the major barrier separating the party from the middle classes' (Harsh, 1993: 233). Eduard David pointed at the increasing frustration among these parts of the society regarding the strict requirements of the Versailles Treaty. In the same vein, Hermann Heller put emphasis on the necessity of the party to call itself 'national' without giving up its party principles. Although the theses of neo-revisionists was quite in parallel

to the mainstream route of the party since the Burgfrieden of the 1914, the bureaucratic rigidity and organisational inertia did not allow any space for a renewal of the party even in a revisionist direction.

In contrast to the revisionists, the leftists in the party were in favour of reinvigorating the Marxist principles. They complained about the obsession of the party with the legalist, parliamentary ways of policy making and prioritised the extra-parliamentary sphere as the main location of meeting the challenge of the NSDAP especially in streets. In fact, in 1931, the establishment of the Iron Front was an extra-parliamentary response to the anti-republican Harzburg Front that was organised by the NSDAP and conservative right of Germany. Regarding the creation of Iron Front, Wells called for the combination of the extra-parliamentary action with the natural involvement with the elections. He emphasised on Social Democratic unity and working class solidarity and linked the 'the social rights and cultural goals of the working class' to the existence of republic and international peace. Lastly, Wells promoted that the passivity of the party should be challenged by a more dominant role played by the extra-parliamentary organisation. However, we could not argue that the Iron Front was a successful project since the primary motive of the leadership was to play down the critiques of the toleration policy of the SPD and appease the leftist's adherence to a fiercer oppositional policy. Additionally, the Iron Front was not designed on its own right but as an appendage to the existing policies. While the rank and file of the party intended to establish a real defense movement, the leaders believed that 'neither the Reichsbanner nor the Iron Front could save the republic from dissolution if it faces with a situation of civil war. Indeed, such organisations were standing in a stark contrast to the anti-militarist and legalist position of the leaders (Harsh, 1993:289)

Surely, the toleration policy of the SPD concerning Brüning's and then Papen's presidential governments was the most controversial issue in the circles of the party. The SPD saw the rise of the National Socialism as a more dangerous phenomenon than the presidential regime of the Papen. The main point of the

leadership in this policy was to prevent any rapprochement between the bourgeois parties and the NSDAP or any alliance between Hindenburg, conservatives and the NSDAP. The main deficiency of the toleration policy was the SPD's necessary decision to forego its position as an oppositional party and its uncritical acceptance of an authoritarian regime under the presidency. The NSDAP and the KPD constantly made use of propaganda material out of the moderate attitude of the SPD against Papen. Furthermore, the leftists in the party criticised the SPD's aversion from relying its social bases to change the regime and its excessive dependence on the forces of the state while defending the Weimar democracy (Harsh, 1993:338). Particularly, the Prussian intervention of the state on 20 July 1932 was clearly an affirmation of the weakness of the SPD's policy. In the aftermath of the coup, the SPD did not make a call for an active resistance of the working class and applied to the rule of law, hence to the legal means to reverse the situation which was an hopeless attempt while the forces of counter-revolution including the NSDAP was very active in using extra-legal means of repression.

This situation created a widespread discontent among the leftists of the party. As a resistance to the rise of the NSDAP, the leftists emphasised on the need to achieve the working class unity and also a United Front that would appeal the communist workers if not the leaders of the KPD. However, the leaders like Hilferding, Wells and Arthur Crispien preferred an 'aggressively antagonistic line against the KPD' and an extra-parliamentary action became a taboo for the leaders. It should be stated that the leftists also signified the inadequacy of the political democracy for a radical transformation of the society. An application to the social and economic democracy which was not completely embraced by the makers of the November Revolution was needed in order to further the revolutionary aims of the working class. On the other hand, it is crucial to refer to the lack of the internal democracy within the party which caused especially left opposition of the youth to be isolated from the party executive. The party officials had an adverse attitude towards the Young Socialist which was deemed to be suffering from 'political idealism' and their lack of initiatives in the realist

day-to-day politics. However, the issue of democratisation was crucial in the sense of raising a meaningful resistance against the fascism. As Mommsen (1991:56) put out, ‘rebelliousness of Weimar generation’ was an integral part of the KPD and NSDAP that gave a new zeal to each party. “‘The anti-modernist sentiments and the community syndrome was so popular in youth culture” that the stagnation and self-isolation of the SPD could not give enough response to this change in the political culture (Mommsen, 1991:58).

It should be stated that Kautsky’s account of fascism was typical of the mainstream social democracy’s view and in essence was also forerunner of the flawed anti-fascist political strategy. Kautsky viewed fascism as a parenthesis, an epiphenomenon in the long-march of the capitalist mode of production. The fascist movement was regarded as the culmination of irrational political forces that were not in line with the long-term interests of the capitalism. Kautsky pointed out that ‘the institutional form most natural to industrial society was democracy’ (Salvadori, 2016: 540). He had a firm conviction that ‘democracy was the integral part of the working class movement’ and the oppressed people under capitalism was the natural defenders of the democratic rights against which any ‘paid executer of the capitalist class’ like the fascists could not impose their rule. The incremental development of the power of the working class under the appropriate conditions of democracy was tied to the normal growth of capitalist production as the two were seen as intrinsically linked to each other. In the face of these convictions, the fascism with its subsequent conditions of civil war and disorder was incapable of establishing a new system incorporating its own order that could be compatible with the re-organisation of capitalism. In this context, the ‘advance of the democracy in the modern state could not be halted and the advance of democracy was irresistible’ as the parliamentary system was the privileged location of ‘a concrete representation of the classes and social groups’ including the working class (Salvadori, 2016: 543). As observed in the official policy of the SPD, Kautsky’s preassumption was that the given and unchallenged organisational strength of the working class and its high interest in the formal democratic measures was deemed to be sufficient enough to counter-

act the rising fascist attacks. This baseless trust in the invincibility of formal democracy and the conception of political and social progress as an irreversible process paved the way for the downplaying of a fascist threat and the ill-formed designation of an anti-fascist resistance. Since the coupling of industrial development with political democracy was a predestiny, then simply embracing a strict legalist and parliamentary route as before was to be repeated, hence the democracy was to be conquered by maintaining formal framework of parliamentary democracy. But a redefinition of democracy in terms of mobilising a direct political action within the masses fell victim to the SPD's passive reliance on democratic progress and its over-optimism about the inevitable prevalence of the democratic development over the irrational forces of history.

Walter Benjamin's critique of the Social Democracy also provides us with an accurate assessment of the SPD's general view on the historical development of capitalism and its conception of labour within that trajectory:

Their stubborn faith in progress, their confidence in their 'men basis' and finally their servile integration in an uncontrollable apparatus have been three aspects of the same thing. The conformism which has been part and parcel of the Social Democracy from the beginning attached not only its political tactics but to its economic views as well. Nothing has corrupted the German working class so much as the notion that it was moving with the current. It regarded technological developments as the fall of the stream with which the thought it was moving....Social Democratic Theory and even more its practice, have been formed by a conception of progress which did not adhere to reality but made dogmatic claims. Progress as pictured in the minds of the Social Democrats, first of all, the progress of the mankind itself. Secondly, it was something boundless, in keeping with the infinite perfectability of mankind. Thirdly, progress was regarded as irresistible, something that automatically pursued a straight or spiral course (Benjamin,1968:283).

This argument is indeed a recurrence of Luxembourg's views on the mechanical and vulgar determinism of revisionist current which blurred the presence of oppositional culture of early Social Democracy and neglected the subjective element in the revolutionary thinking depending on the active promotion of mass politics and rigorous questioning of the established socio-economic order. The integrity of the working class to the working class organisations was standing in

a clear contrast to the inherently complacent attitude towards capitalist development which was found as 'good' and 'progressive' as a whole and which necessitated a specific kind of conception of the masses represented by the working class denying the existence of the mass base of fascist movements which could well be compatible with the capitalist mode of production.

It is also true that 'the immobility of the SPD in the face of ascendant forces of fascism cannot be isolated from the general crisis of European democracy in the inter-war period. From the end of the 1920's, the defenders of the democracy and the advocates of its improvement in the mainstream politics were quite rare since most of the bourgeois parties have shifted to the right and increasingly incorporated anti-democratic attitudes. Most of them was hostile to the main tenets of the Weimar Republic. Being truly isolated in his position defending the Republic, the SPD was not on the way of producing an alternative political project that could have challenged the NSDAP. Even in the discourse of the party, democracy represented a means to end, a useful instrument to improve the living standards of the working class. As Mommsen (1991: 43) rightly pinpoints, "democracy had to be positively asserted, rather than merely defended and existing economic freedom expanded, instead of merely preserved". It seems to have been necessary to deepen 'a positive consciousness in the people' and conflate the promotion of democratic rights with a concrete political project targeting socio-economic inequalities exacerbated by the economic crisis.

We should not forget that the creation of an anti-fascist resistance has also its own dynamics which could enhance and produce new ways of the democratic participation of the masses. Despite ideological flaws and strategic errors of the SPD, the coming of the German fascism should not be evaluated as inevitable.. Indeed, the working class could have been the strongest bulwark against the Nazi growth particularly since it began to gain ground within the masses long before its seizure of power. Gluckstein (1999:100) argued that there were two explanations regarding the defeat of the working class movement: Either the strength of the working class was an illusion or it was never used. It seems that

the latter was more accurate as despite their organisational strength, the negative attitudes of the respective leaderships towards the idea of united front was not a natural consequence of the inherent weakness of the working class but the result of the political choice. However, it should also be added that the emphasis put on the 'great potentiality' of the working class without any test of power was used as an excuse for the inactivity of especially the SPD as long as the constitutional rule of parliamentary democracy continued to exist formally. Undoubtedly, that potentiality could not be activated overnight as the process of the resistance could not simply be equated with the exact moment of Nazi's coming to power. The NSDAP began to turn into a mass movement beginning from the late 1920's. In contrast to the fascist rise to power, a united strategy against fascism became a realistic possibility only in 1933 when the defeat of the working class became absolute. Apart from these, the lack of real democratic practices was also decisive in this defeat as there wasn't any democratic project that had the potentiality to bring together different political fractions of working class.

4.6. Anti-Fascism and Democracy

Being anti-fascist in the 1930's did not necessarily mean being 'democratic' in the truest sense. There were conservative and reactionary forms of anti-fascism which was specifically directed against German Nazism. However, democratic discourse had a unifying element in itself that could possibly unite the variety of political groups against the threat of the fascism. Particularly in Spanish civil war and French Popular Front, the rank and file of the anti-fascist movement was containing 'genuine passion for democracy'. The defense of the democracy was associated with the strengthening of the ideals that gave priority to the liberty, democracy and democratic rights. According to such an attitude, building up an anti-fascist front should have to go beyond mere political coalitions and turn into constructing substantial democratic entities that would involve greater democratic political participation of the masses. Principally, the French Popular Front was created not only to fight against fascist assault but materialise the extension of the democracy. In the same vein, in Spain there was apparent

political struggle for a democratisation that would go beyond the strict boundaries of liberal democracy and parliamentarism. Buchanan (2002:50) points at the essential aim of the International Brigades that “‘gave their lives in the service of democracy that meant concrete things, economic and political rights and liberties for the workers and the mass people’”. Alongside the anti-fascist rhetoric, there also appeared a concrete tendency to realise democratic forms of administration directly and in a revolutionary way. For instance, French factory occupation of June 1936 and the attempts at creating forms of anarchistic direct democracy in the civil war was the reflection of these yearnings for the democracy arisen out of the anti-fascist struggle. However, these tendencies could not convert into a fully-fledge democratisation of the society in both Spanish and French experiences. While mentioning about ‘the lack of democracy’ in wartime Spain, Togliatti reported that the Spanish communists could not be able to overcome their sectarianism and integrate into its ideology the materialisation of the democratic participation of the masses. This aim required much more political action than simply mentioning about democracy as an objective (Buchanan, 2002:53). Thus, practices of the direct democracy-self-regulation of the people by the people- were not given enough attention while the Soviet democracy was praised as the ‘only true form of the democracy which led to undermine their own confidence on their own people’s initiative. In that sense, the actual appearances of anti-fascism was confined to a problematic of a political alliance with the Soviet Union. On the other side, though French Popular Front stopped the rise of fascist coalition around the themes of ‘national unity’, it could never reach to a point of ‘putting into practice’ the elements of democratisation regarding for the issues of women and colonies. The international solidarity with the Spanish anti-fascist movement was also lacking while the priority of keeping the political alliance created space for only partial social reforms. Thus, a radical re-configuration of the society by the direct political participation were beyond the vision of the members of the Popular Front (Buchanan,2002:43-4). Although one can not ignore the substantial gains of the working class after the general strikes of the 1936, as La Botz (2011) stated, “‘the Communist Party hesitated to lead the working class in taking steps

to further worker's power because it feared that that might have threatened its alliance with the Socialists and Radicals. While a de facto workers' power existed in many large factories, the Communists did not call for creating worker factory committees to run the factories nor did they take the more radical step of beginning to create workers' councils, institution of workers' economic and political power on the model of Russian Revolution in its first few years.

It is important to note that the conception of the 'United Front' by Dimitrov in 1935 had a sweeping impact on the way in which the anti-fascist politics should be designed. First of all, the comprehensiveness of the strategy in terms of including 'all strata of the working people, the peasantry, the urban petite bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia' in the anti-fascist struggle was an undeniable contribution to the unity of the anti-fascist front. Additionally, this conception tried to visualise an international form of solidarity that would foster the alliance between the oppressed nations of the colonies and semi-colonies and oppressed people of the imperialism under the banner of the anti-imperialist struggle (Dimitrov, 2016:13). Before everything it was an attempt at mobilising the masses, in Dimitrov's terms (2016:22), 'enjoying the confidence of the masses' that would presupposedly try to undermine the fascist propagation among the wide groups of masses. Its inclusiveness in terms of giving an appropriate place to the political groups like Catholics, Anarchists or unorganised working in the anti-fascist alliance was sign of 'united front from below' without discriminating the working masses on the basis of political attachment (Dimitrov, 2016:13). The united front in that sense tried to find common points among the masses in order to facilitate political mobilisation against the imminent fascist threat. The defence of immediate economic and political interests of the working class 'without the abolition of the bourgeois-democratic liberties, the ruling out of any alliance with the bourgeoisie as the Social Democrats did before the fascist's coming to power and the preponderance of the mass action in political strategy were the points that positively responded to the need for the enhancement of democratic potentialities of the masses (2016:16). For instance, according to Dimitrov (2016:18), "the Communists and all the reactionary workers must

strive for the formation of electoral nonparty class bodies of the united front, at the factories, among the unemployed, in the working class districts, among the small town folk and in the villages''. Even there was no guarantee of putting them into practice without any disruption, these ambitions were at least the indication of the possibility of building up political alliances from the below without being trapped by the petite political conflicts of the sectarian political leaderships.

However, there are also apparent deficiencies in Dimitrov's conception when it comes to the issue of 'ideological struggle against fascism'. What does he actually mean by putting out the aim of 'enjoying the confidence of the masses'? Especially on the fighting back against the fascist nationalist demagogy', he proposes a middle –of –road policy between 'bourgeois nationalism and national nihilism' (Dimitrov,2016:19). He encourages the Communists to take into account 'national sentiments of broad masses of working people' referring to the importance of the 'national pride' as an idea that is intrinsically linked to the unity of the working class. According to him, 'proletarian revolution depends on a 'truly national culture' which is 'national in form and socialist content' as exemplified by the Soviet Socialism at that time. The question is 'while fascism directly takes its power from the nationalist reactionary social structures and mobilise its mass base in that manner, is it viable to develop an anti-fascist politics without interfering with 'national feelings of the masses' which was always prone to be susceptible to the fascist manipulation. Is it possible to give a clear path to the anti-fascism without necessarily questioning the authoritarian and reactionary social institutions that also stand on the way of and above the direct democratic participation of the masses and their own self-regulation?

Surely, anti-fascist politics cannot simply be restricted to fighting against a 'fascist movement' or fascist programme. It should also orient itself towards fighting against the reactionary social structures even when there is no fascist party in power. The 'nationalisation of the masses' took root in a set of social relationships stamped by the mystical way of thinking, 'authoritarian forms of

social domination in family, education, culture' and religious/ethnic prejudices that could be said to be the bedrock of the spread of the fascism among the masses. It was not only the presence of the 'mystical dictator' or bourgeoisie rule that made possible the unconditional subjugation of the masses to an overarching authority but the so-called irrational structures in masses have facilitated and opened the door for the intrusion of the fascist demagoguery. That is why any anti-fascist movement should not praise 'the so-called sacred values of the society' that have indeed essentially a reactionary nature. Any democratic attempt to strengthen the social responsibility of the masses should also engage in transforming the irrational structures in the masses itself.

Reich (1970:318) mentions about a socialist yearning among the European people that fuelled the democratic attempts of the working class movements. However, he saw a contradiction between an 'intense desire for freedom' and a 'structural fear of responsibility of self-government'. There was the example of the failure of the November Revolution which at the end led to the dissolution of 'work councils' in favour of a representative democracy that did nothing to change reactionary forces of the monarchist state. Again in Soviet Union case, the principal place of the soviets in the social revolution in time turned into the domination of authoritarian state structures and even into a Soviet type of nationalism. First, as a reason for it, there was a pseudo-internationalism that characterised the degeneration 'the Workers International into a chauvinistic national socialism' that was totally at odds with the soul of socialism. Second, the political movements were unable to respond to the yearnings of the socialism'. In Reich's (1970:328) terms, the Anarchists were advocating the dissolution of the state and all authoritarian state structures but they were saying nothing about the 'human incapacity for freedom' and the necessary guidance of social development to eliminate this incapacity. Catholicism was reinforcing 'the helplessness in the masses' by making them praise the authorities, mundane or divine, that stand above the own strength of the society. In Social Democracy, as we have analysed before, the frequently mentioned 'education in socialism' was not converted into 'concrete life tasks' which would emanate the people from the

repressive social relations and make them capable 'governing themselves' in a democratic way. They were conservative in practice though ideologically revolutionary (Reich,1970:329). In the same vein, liberals were very far away from giving a meaningful answer to the freedom based efforts of the masses apart from maintaining 'decorative' democratic institutions that had no relationship with the 'strengthening the channels of the direct participation of the people.

Actually, one of the main tenets of fascism gives us a clue about how to find out an antidote to it. "In fascism, the Fascist Führer ideology rests upon the mystical hereditary idea of man's immutable nature, upon the helplessness, craving for authority and the incapacity for freedom of the masses of people" (Reich, 1970:332). Against such an intrinsic nature of fascism, Reich (1970:333) inspired from Lenin's conception of the communism to exert his alternative. That conception required first a transitory stage that would signify a 'transition from an authoritarian society to a non-authoritarian, self-regulating social order requiring neither police force nor compulsive morality'. Such a proletarian state was not an end itself but a state organisation that 'sets itself the task of undermining itself, of replacing the authoritarian government of society by social self-regulation (Reich, 1970:334). Hence, instead of constructing a bureaucratic apparatus that would determine the socialisation of production single-handedly, the ultimate aim was to make the working class to determine 'production, distribution of products, social regulation, education, sex, international relations etc. in a living and concrete way'. However, as far as the Soviet Union of the 1930's is concerned, 'the transition from authoritarian state government to self-administration of society' did not take place, in contrast, in Russia a re-consolidation of the authoritarian state apparatus was at issue which stood in a stark contrast to the self-management initiatives of the masses.

In an alternative democratic vision, the masses do not necessarily denote a nameless crowd within which the existence of the individual is simply repressed. Rather, the anti-fascist struggle should ally itself with a vision of the democracy

that would guarantee the realisation and expansion of the individual potentiality to the full extent. As Fromm (1994:272) argued, the fascist ideals required a self-sacrifice of the individuality, hence the annihilation of the individual self and the utter submission to a higher power. In contrast to it, democratic social practices ideally necessitate the social responsibility of the individual which would contribute to the self-regulation of the society. It is not a viable option to suspend the transformation of the economy, the politics and culture until when a revolutionary situation arises or the state power is grasped by the socialists. Anti-fascist politics is embedded in the political strategies that aim to create 'political practices' within the society that would fight against the reactionary social structures without giving up its anti-capitalist ambitions. Alongside the defense of modern democratic rights, anti-fascist struggle necessarily demands 'actual, tangible substance of the social activity' (Reich, 1970:347) that would immediately materialise ways of democratic expression. In that sense, the battle against the poverty, economic inequalities or unemployment should be complemented by the practices of 'positive freedom of the self' based on social solidarity with an uncompromising attitude towards 'mystical-nationalistic' sentiments within the society if any anti-fascist movement is insistent on removing the social bases of fascist mobilisation.

4.7. Conclusion

The nationalist discourse has been widespread to the end of the Weimar period. SPD diverted from revolutionary aims and could not keep its distance from the nationalisation of the population. Masses have been shaped by the nationalist discourses and demagoguery. It was also a shift in the dominant political sphere towards more authoritarianism and more 'nationalist' options in the bourgeois politics. What we have said as the expansion of the mass bases of fascism already started before the NSDAP came to power. The establishment of the presidential governments between the 1930 and 1933 and the 'radicalisation of the political right in terms of endorsing a nationalist treatment of the social problems were the signs of the fascisation of the public sphere against which the

leftist and Marxist parties could not develop viable strategies. First and foremost, the SPD and the KPD could not know how to deal with the national question. Actually, their response was most of the time one of the adaptation to the ongoing trend of nationalism. The prior political strategy of the SPD towards nationalism which has been developed to the end of the 19th century and the strategic decisions like the Burgfrieden was indicative of the 'revisionist theses of the center of the party. Instead of keeping the revolutionary mood of the masses alive, the political strategy of the party was to conform to the liberal-democratic regime of the Weimar years in a formal way and restrict itself to the 'improvement of the living conditions of the labour. The system conformity of the party undermined its role of political opposition. Hence, the political discontent of the masses has been expressed and put into practice under the fascism's cloak. The promises of the democratisation and socialisation did not come true and this led to the continuity of existence of the ruling class having 'nationalist and conservative traits. In fact, the inability of the political organisation of labour movement to organise first the workers and then win over the middle classes in favour of a political project created a large sphere for the counter-revolutionary movements to extend their sphere of influence and their mass basis. The increasing authoritarian characteristics of the 'state apparatus' has matched with the push from the fascist organisations to 'seize the state power. The SPD's reaction to this process was the 'toleration policy' that reduced its task to 'legally protecting the formal features of the democratic regime while the masses, particularly the middle classes were flocking to the NSDAP. One should also not forget the inability of the left, of the SPD to organise any meaningful 'extra-parliamentary' resistance while the so-called national opposition involved in every means including political violence by nationalist para-military organisations.

We should also emphasise on the vulgar Marxist view that believed that the widespread social inequalities would inevitably lead to the rise of the socialist revolt. This view tended to view the 'economic crisis' and the rise of the fascism as a parenthesis that would necessarily and automatically pave way for the

socialist revolution. This view that the ruling class under fascism would dissolve as a result of its contradiction was a very common mistake among members of the political left. There was always a fascist exit from the economic crisis and delving into barbarism was always a strong option among the ruling classes. As a consequence, the inadequacy of a political resistance and the lack of unity in labour organisations was quite helpful in 'the mass acceptance of fascism and 'attack of the bourgeoisie' that made the establishment of the national socialism as a regime possible. It meant the retreat of the democratic rights of the citizens and the destruction of the socio-economic entity of the labour in favour of a fascist regime that actively constructed an ethnically oriented community. The racist character of the regime did not prevent it from complying with the rising levels of the economic exploitation that intensified in the face of the lack of any political protest.

CHAPTER 5

FASCIST CONFIGURATION OF POWER: THE FASCISATION PROCESS AS A CO-EVOLUTION OF THE NSDAP AS A MASS MOVEMENT AND THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY AMBITIONS OF THE STATE AND BUSINESS

5.1. Introduction

Until now, in the previous chapter chapters, we tried to carve out the mass movement of the NSDAP with its specific features in Post-First World War era. We have touched upon particularly the class basis of the NSDAP movement and its specific anchorage to the non-democratic sentiments of the specific social strata that became more prone to the reception of the nationalist/religious currents. We indicated how a movement like the NSDAP could be capable to mobilise the inherent 'social discontent' in the bourgeois societies in combination with the politically reactionary premises. In fact, the rise of fascism in that sense was not an issue of one day. It evolved throughout the Weimar period and constantly built its mass background. Within this conjecture, as we have indicated in the previous chapter, the political left mainly represented by the KPD and SPD's political choices and the content of their anti-fascist political strategies heavily contributed to the popular acceptance of the fascist option. Especially, the impenitent fragmentation within the left of the political spectrum, the inability of providing a socio-economic project that would have a transformatory vision of the society and the inability to give response to a democratic and social renewal mainly relying on a democratic participation from below beyond the pillars of formal Weimar democracy were the factors that characterised the 'disillusionment with the left' among wider segment of the society. In this particular context, a general turn towards the political right among the public, the stagnation of the working class movement, the increasing

preference of the middle classes for a rightist opposition to the Weimar republic were the building blocs of policy making in Germany. Undoubtedly, this process was complemented by the anti-parliamentarian and anti-democratic route that was explicitly taken by the ruling classes to the end of the 1920's.

The NSDAP's coming to power could not be tied to the mere existence of its mass power. The unfolding of the fascist power should be incorporated into a fascist strategy of power that has evolved through 'a distinct strategy of the NSDAP' that kept a relative autonomy from the political dictates of the ruling classes and the political priorities of the economic and state elites. Without such a process, no fascist option could realise itself even when it has an enormous mass backing. Between the 1930-33, the NSDAP became a political actor that began to actively involve in the birth of the 'new state' in a constant and 'context-dependent' cooperation with the presidential government of the period. In that sense, the claim for state power necessitated an 'occupation of the state' through building up the 'state within the state' through the active support of the state bureaucracy particularly of the Papen government. On the other side, this strategy would proceed with the usage of the 'democratic/parliamentarian and extra-parliamentarian spheres through SA violence and the fascist inclinations of the police forces. The NSDAP's infiltration into the state could only be considered within the context of a state transformation that was insisted to regularize 'the anti-parliamentarian and anti-democratic politics that became much more determined to exclude the political effect of working classes wholly from the public affairs. The technics of political power grown out of this interaction between the NSDAP's route and the state and economic elite could not simply be evaluated as 'instruments' in the way of fascist domination, rather they were the building blocs of the Third Reich that increasingly became evident as a new sort of political rule. This process has also a distinguishing effect on the shaping the masses that would enlighten the dynamic relationship between the social strata that was consolidated in the process and the choices of the policy makers. In short, this state of affairs triggerred a fascisation process that should be viewed as integral to the regime period and a new deployment of political power

that in the end discarded both the options of the 'authoritarian rule' and 'military intervention.

5.2. The Economic and Political Background Before the Fascisation Process

The Weimar Stability between the 1923 and 1929 greatly depended on the class collaboration between the labour and capital (Abraham, 1989:49). The dominant bloc was composed of landed aristocracy, the heavy industry and export-based industry. Within the range of the dominated classes, class compromise bloc incorporated the salaried employees, the proletariat and rural labor (Abraham, 1989:40). Export-oriented industry was in a hegemonic position. In a condition of steady economic growth, it was able to found a system of class compromise that also benefited a large segment of the dominated classes. The export industry can be defined as 'the dynamic, technologically more advanced and prosperous sector of industry'' (Abraham, 1989:34). Predominantly relying on the external trade mostly with the northern and western countries, these sectors (machine, electric and chemical industries) were working with high profit rate as long as the international trade was alive and the external credit mechanisms were favorable. In contrast to the heavy industry, the export industry was less dependent on the wage costs and more willing to collaborate with the labour which was thought to be the legitimate partner in drawing out the framework of the capital-labour relations. Actually, the labour gained a new position throughout this period. From Abraham's point of view (1989:50), the labour with the representation of the free labour unions and SPD had assumed a three-fold role: They have gained a status that has been recognised by the 'state, industrialists and the public'. They ascribed to 'a quasi-official public status' that required its being responsible for the national issues that transcend the narrow interest base. They became 'institutions' that have the potentiality of triggering economic change. With these features in mind, stripped of its revolutionary zeal, the organized labour has reached incredible gains in collective bargaining, the social policies and the unemployment benefits. This position seemed to be vindicating the reformist current of the SPD that at the expense of the political

struggle concentrated on furthering economic conditions of the working class within the capitalist framework, indeed within the 'organised capitalism'. In this context, a peaceful transition to a 'economic democracy' (Wirtschaftsdemocratie) was to be seen in prospect for optimist left commentators. However, this system was excessively volatile that could shatter Social Democratic vision. First of all, the system was highly maintained by the influx of the American credit as a result of the Dawes Plan (Marcowitz, 2009:15-6). Increasing indebtedness of the German economy was tolerated by the favorable international conjecture and rising economic growth rates. In fact, the willingness of the power bloc to cooperate with the labour was actually depending on this conjecture. Secondly, the so-called 'corporatist equilibrium' depending on the active cooperation of state, the business and the labour had the possibility to make the labour blind to the real political relations both in parliament and in extra-parliamentary sphere.

There were important cleavages within the power bloc. From the start, the heavy industry was complaining about high production costs and social security contribution to which it was more sensible as a sector. It was hostile to the 'export and parliamentary constraint' and its main economic target was the 'imperial market of Eastern and Southern Europe'. Its profit maximisation necessitated first 'a revision of socio-economic structure at home in favour of retreating the social costs of production and pursuing an imperial expansion (Abraham, 1989:36). Surely, the heavy industry was essentially in contradiction with the main tenets of the class collaboration, though it also, like the export sector, usurped the advantages of the economic growth by enhancing the modernisation, rationalisation of its production and was on the way of catching up with its pre-war production levels. On the other hand, we have to refer to the 'landed aristocracy' (Junkers) as an important part of the ruling bloc though not dominant between 1925-30. Although its power was to a great extent broken with the onset of the Weimar Republic, the inability of the bourgeoisie to unite itself in terms of political ruling led to the persistence of the links of the Junkers with the state bureaucracy and army in a manner unproportionate to their

economic power (Abraham, 1989:32-3). From the 1925 onwards, they found themselves in a disadvantageous position triggered by the “trade treaties unfavourable agriculture, growing agricultural imports, disadvantaged access to capital, widening pricesscissors and lately the agricultural depression” (Abraham, 1989:35). However, despite the conflicts in the ruling bloc, these conditions did not prevent the agricultural elite to collaborate particularly with the heavy industry, in terms of undermining the institutions of the Weimar democracy and follow protectionist and autarkic agenda in line with its counter-revolutionary ambitions.

Winkler (2018:358) defines the Weimar society as ‘a divided society’ in many respects in spite of the much mentioned class consensus. Referring to a social research led by Frankfurt School theoreticians like Erich Fromm, in contrast to the Marxist intellectuals, the proletariat contains segments who express ‘petite-bourgeois’ prejudices and authoritarian thinking patterns. This does not actually mean that the Republican culture did not positively affect the self-identity of the proletariat in terms of their democratic rights and freedoms. There are indications of the continuity of the ‘labour culture’ as an alternative form to the bourgeois life, though its quality can be debatable. The disunity within the working class began to be apparent as the ones belonging to the SPD circle were living in a better-off neighbourhoods close to the bourgeois locations when compared with the ‘political ghettoisation’ of the Communist sympathisants and the largely growing unemployed in the ‘closed’ communities with the worst material conditions (Evans and Geary, 2015). Although we can not simply assure the ‘embourgeoisement of the working class with the SPD tendencies’, there appeared important cleavages within the working community both spatially and politically. On the other hand, concerning the Catholic milieu, there was a two-fold transformation: while one part of the milieu began to exert ‘anti-capitalist views’ that brought them close to the ‘working-class solidarity’ with the SPD, the conservative sections of the political group tended to embrace a more nationalist stance as a reaction to the growing secularisation and materialism in the daily-life (Winkler, 2018:360). Though the Catholic part of the society

constituted an integral part of the 'Weimar Coalition', their attitude towards the democratic republican culture was ambivalent and volatile as we will see later. As we have discussed in the third chapter of the thesis, the peasants and the old middle classes were politically 'homeless' in the Weimar period that extensively cleared the way of the rise of the NSDAP (Abraham, 1989). Feeling 'pressed' by the 'industrialists and trade unions', they developed a distance to the Weimar consensus by taking a 'conservative and anti-democratic' position against the institutions of the state including the parliament. The splitter middle class interest parties and the bourgeois parties did not provide any meaningful answer to their demands. In the same vein, the peasants which could not simply be assumed as antagonistic to the interests of the landed aristocracy were helplessly exposed to the agricultural depression which has intensified to the end of the 1920's.

Although there is rapprochement between the capital and labour in a pragmatic alliance, at the bottom different bourgeois milieus were radically delimited from the working class communities. The white collar-workers (die Angestellten), though benefitted from the increase of the mass consumptions, kept their distance to the political left and their democratic organisations. On the other side, the civil servants and the academicians which felt 'Wilhelmian state' as an indispensable part of their social life did not give up their strong objection to the 'Republican ideas', to the Revolution' and 'Jewishness' as a social antagonist to them. We have add to this 'dividedness of the society' the special condition of the youth, that in the face of the rising unemployment began to alienate from the mainstream society. As a 'redundant generation', they were reacting both against 'the ritualised bourgeois life of their 'Wilhelmian parents house' and the 'Americanisation of the daily life' (Winkler, 2018:370).

In this context, the 'market society' of the Weimar and the political democratic liberalism did not necessarily provide a cementing force among different social strata and indeed exacerbated the inherent social clashes in the form of 'political polarisation'. As Winkler (2018:381) implied, the Weimar consensus, being

fragile even in its success, did not abandon the “internal challenge to the democracy but simply cooled it down”.

5.3. Bourgeois Parties in the Weimar Period and Their Transformation

- Excerpts from the programmes of the main bourgeois parties:

The Guiding Principles of the German Centrum Party: 30 December 1918

Through the ‘revolution by force’, the old order of the Germany has been destroyed and the carriers of the order until now have been partly eliminated, partly dysfunctionalised. Given the new situation, a new order should be constructed: After the downfall of the monarchy, it should not take the form of a socialist Republic but it should be a democratic Republic.

It is the social right of the every citizen to get his job in conformity with the duty and his property in a fair manner protected.

It is important, within the framework of the Christian guiding principles and public rights of the bourgeois freedom, to enable everyone to lead ‘a decent life’ that excludes every dictation and arbitrariness on the side of a ‘bureaucracy, class or party domination’...

An orderly construction of the ‘people’s economy’ in the service of social equality and public welfare on the basis of the productive work. Predominantly depending on the preservation of the private property, a private economy made dependent on the ‘public good’ according to the solidarity principle (Kühnl, 2000:42)

The Baselines of the Programme of the German Centrum Party: 16 Januar 1922

The organic development of the German ‘People’s Economy’ depends on the solidarity of all social segments and professions. The Centrum party wants to develop the ‘naturally given commonalities Christian-social life understanding into a strong community consciousness and through this to make itself serving to the state. She fundamentally rejects class conflict and instead prefers the impact of the social driving force of the ‘corporation-thought’ and corporative community. As the basis of the corporative construction, the organised self-help and free cooperative community should reign...

The Centrum Party with all its strength will stand against the threat of the spiritual and moral breakdown of the ‘People’s Life’ (Volksleben). The ‘People’s Morality’ is the source of the people’s health and the breeding ground of the culture-creating forces. The family should be kept ‘healthy’ as the nucleus of the human community and the most crucial life condition of the culture. The motherly and ‘home creating’ forces of the woman in the family should be protected as the irreplaceable people’s asset (Kühnl, 2000:43-4).

The Programme of the German Democratic Party of December 1919

In the greatest 'exceptional moment' of the German Volk, the DDP is born. She wants to lead all the people forwards and upwards in a constant rise.

All the people-without any difference of class, profession and religion. The only way to the internal unity is democracy. She means the 'reconciliation of the interests' and the abandonment of all concepts of the 'domination and subjugation', means the equal right to the arrangements of the state and society.

The German Democratic Party is a party of work. Its target in the economic domain is the state of social rights.

The collectivisation of the production means in a manner of the public statisation would be a deadly 'bureaucratization of the economy' and inevitable decrease in returns. We are rejecting it and committing to the private economy as a regular business form. More than any time else, we need the productivity of the work and the increase of the generated 'useful goods'...

For that reason, we are claiming first: The monopoly-type of domination force in the hands of a handful of groups should not be tolerated.

Secondly, we are claiming: Social unfairness in the distribution of the property and income should be removed. The state can not deliver the same income to every one. Everyone's work should be rewarded according to his or her performance.

Thirdly, the mechanisation of the people in the work process should be counteracted. The division of labour threatens the work to strip it of 'its soul'. That is why the artisanship and small trade should be protected and enforced. In them, there lies a direct relationship of the worker to his product; in big firms the employees lose their contacts to the overall result of work process.

The departure point and content of the German foreign policy is for the next time the revision of the peace treaties of the Versailles and St.Germain since in the relations of different nations the dominant component should be 'equality and freedom' instead of the power and repression. In no way are we accepting the dictation of the force as the 'permanent order of law'. In no way are we accepting the split-off of the parts of the 'fatherland'. In no way are departing from the self-determination of the nations'...

Germany's lot in the spiritual development of mankind guarantees her the colonial activity and also we do not recognize the robbery of our colonies (Kühnl, 2000:44-5).

The Building Principles of the German People's Party (Deutsche Volk's Party)-October 1919

On the basis of the national state attitude, The German People's Party represents the deepening and the conciliation of the liberal and social thoughts. She called all the spiritual and moral forces of the German people to work together in the

name of the internal renewal of the people's life and state on the basis of 'full equal status, fulfillment of the tasks and a real love for the fatherland'.

A strong and stable state force-relying on the care of the consciousness of duty of citizens, also on the indispensable power means in the last instance- is the first precondition of the prosperous unfolding of the German people's force nationally and internationally. The lesser the power means are available, the more important is to keep alive the consciousness of duty against the state until the end of the life, the discipline and the comradeship and the keystones on which the German people was built...

She claims for the equal status for all the state citizens, she founds in the freely-chosen, trust-based allegiance that the people showed against its leader (Führer), the main precondition of the freedom and rise of Germany.

The German people have the right to co-work in the spiritual and moral lifting of the people which stands in a lower cultural level.

The deepest source of our people's force lies in the German family. The more the schools are affected by the influence, that are foreign to our 'German existence', the more there is a need in the family for a strong backing of the care of the German history and love of fatherland. The German people's party will further the protection and strengthening of the German family, particularly through the soil-habitation-dwelling politics.

To care for and enhance the 'people's health' both biologically and morally is the most serious task of the German People's Party. She wants to keep the German people as German and for this reason fights against the 'flooding of the Germany through 'foreign-originated' persons since the Revolution... (Kühnl, 2000:46).

The German People's Party strongly commits to the right to the private property and the law of succession of the 'nuclear family'. The ownership is an entrusted good that is obliged to a fruitful production, this concerns the inherited goods in a highest sense...

The German People's Party sees the solution of the 'social question' not *in external forms of the economic life* that with the increased force reduce its performance but in the equal recognition of all 'Volkscomrades' and the moral overcoming of all the antagonisms between the state and land, between employers and employees. She discards the socialisation of the German economy. The balance between the economic claims of the different professional groups should be maintained peacefully and through legal arbitration.

The belief that one People's class is working to the advantage of the other should not be dealt with the social welfare but through the close cooperation of the employer and the employees. 'Freely chosen' trust-men (Vertrauensleute) of the workers and employees should respond to the questions relating to the work duty and worker welfare with the assistance of the employer. The business-related and the technical administration of the plant should left to the initiative of the entrepreneur...

To the justified demands of the workers and employees should be referred responsibly within the framework of the economic and social policy. The German People's Party wants to arrive at this target within a 'work community' that is composed of employer and employee associations.

In a free and impartial community work, a corporatist representation of all the productive work ranging to the 'Reich's economic council' should be enhanced on the basis of the equality of status between the employers and their co-workers.

In a flourishing agriculture and a strong and self-conscious peasantry lies the most important basis of the people's force. It is necessary to strive for the increase in production and also the independence of the nourishment of the people from the foreigners. The stock farming should be specially promoted. The German People's Party praises the meaningful national and economic value of an autonomous middle-class (Mittelstand) and conceive the artisanship, the small trade and business as the assets that should be emergently protected just as it has been done for the agriculture, industry and big business. For that reason, it is one of the distinguished goals of the party to reconstruct the commercial Mittelstand both in urban and rural area with all its strength.

The German People's party will spend all its energy to regain its colonial land satisfying its economic demands (Kühnl, 2000:47-8).

Basic Principles of the German National People's Party-1920

For the third time in our history, we are on the verge of re-building the nation, the state, the economy and the spiritual life in Germany. The empireship (Kaisertum) has led us to the zenith of the state power. It has been dissolved by the 'over-power' of the foreigners and our own faults. Within it lies its disappointing tragedy of its destiny.

In the last instance, the Revolution is the greatest criminal that shattered the morality, the state order and the economy and exposed us to the humiliation of the world.

For the challenging task that our people confront, they need higher forces that are to be given to the morally deserted world. The German thought contains its deep moral content within the gravity of its Christian conscience. German morality and all real German spiritual life rests on the thousand year lasting, indissolvably intertwinement of these two (Germanness and Christianity). Our people can find 'its self-protecting and building power' that they need in the state, school and house only in this living Christianity.

The Freedom of the German people from the foreign tyranny is the prerequisite for the national re-birth. To create a newly strengthened Reich on a free land that will unite all the fragmented parts of Germany is and remained the only aim of the German policy. Accordingly, we are demanding the change of the Versailles Treaty, the reconstitution of the German unity and the re-acquisition of the colonies that are necessary for the economic development.

Only a strong German Nation that consciously preserves its character and existence and keep itself immune to the foreign influence can be the reliable stronghold of a strong state. For this reason, we are fighting against the corroding un-German spirit, may it come from the Jewish or another circle. We are decidedly against the predomination of Jewishness in the government and in the public since the Revolution. The inrush of foreign-originated ones through our borders should be prevented.

We are expecting from the deepening of the Christian consciousness the moral rebirth of our people that is the precondition of its political rise. Religion is a people's issue. The pureness of the family, the development of the youth, the reconciliation of the social antagonisms and the health of the state hinges on the lively acceptance of Christian-religious forces. A people without religion lack the moral attitude and also the power to resist the troubles and hardships of the contemporary time. In a state without religion, the structure of the strong moral criteria and also the authority and trust through which a lively state thought can unfold does not exist any more...

Every viable People's economy depends on the private property and self-contained economy. The business spirit and the acquisitiveness of the individuals are the basis of our economic work. We are demanding that this spirit remains within the limits of public welfare and should be directed against every open or disguised communism.

Work council law should be so designed that would serve the economic peace and the promotion of the producer. Employer and employee union should understandingly co-work, as it has been intended in the central Work Community, with the consciousness that they as Germans should involve in the patriotic re-construction of the economy, not conflictually but in a communitarian way. We are rejecting the Marxist idea of class conflict as the destroyer of the culture. Our aim is not class conflict but the peaceful and duty-based work (Kühnl, 2000:49-50).

The most common point among the programmes of the bourgeois parties is their non-conformity with the so-called Weimar Consensus that presupposes a class society within which the capital and the labor as distinct classes enter into cooperation in a way that affirms the potential class conflicts. Nearly all made reference to the implied concept of 'Volksgemeinschaft' (People's Community) that was taken as the base of the social order by the NSDAP. That means the cooperation of the different segments of the society under the umbrella of 'community', instead of the class compromise. In this manner, especially DVP and DNVP foresees the future NSDAP concept of the 'peaceful industrial relations' by the 'national' and 'patriotic' unity and the sublimation of the 'work' itself as the producer of the general welfare of the society. In the business issues,

the entrepreneur was seen as 'the leader' of the plant within which rights of the co-determination or welfare issues were unmentioned. Under the influence of the counter-revolutionary mood after the uprisings of the post-revolutionary era, all right-wing parties feared a possible impact of the Communism and Bolshevism and strictly rejected the 'collectivisation' and 'socialisation' production.

The interesting point is that even though a liberal democratic regime is on the way of being constructed, there is a very rare or no reference to democracy as a concept and as a social praxis. If we overview the political events of the Weimar Republic, the mainstream politicians only with the exception of the SPD were unwilling adherents of the democracy tending to underestimate it as an unintended result of the revolution. The links to the old order was preponderantly emphasised especially by the DNVP. The sensitivity to the German state, German Volk and German culture prevailed over any other issues that concern the advancement of the democratic freedoms and material development of the living conditions of the people.

The constant reference to the unity of the state, family and people (Volk) reveals the classical conservative characteristics of these parties that resisted any 'foreign' cultural and political effect on cultural uniqueness of German way of life. In a nationalist formula, all parties were in favour of the revision of the Versailles Treaty, the maintenance of the equal status of the nations and importantly the re-acquisition of the colonies as indices of long-lasting colonial ambitions. The economic revival of the country is indispensably linked to the mobilisation of the colonial resources and the continuity of an imperialist state. While the democracy is the catchword of the post-world war order, the main bourgeois political actors were containing a different political agenda that is directed first for the retreat of the social gaining of the working class and further engaged in the possibilities of creating a new social and political order with the inspiration of the Wilhelmian state that would unchain the democratic and parliamentary bonds. In this framework, the rise of the NSDAP did not take place out of blue and most of the policy features already existed in the political

agenda of bourgeois parties and this inevitably impacted upon the dominant trends in the public sphere.

In this direction, there were two trends that became explicit during the coalition governments explicitly to the end of the 1920's: the implicit intention of the bourgeois parties to block and make dysfunction the fragile coalition governments particularly in their hostility towards working class in line with the SPD's social policy agenda and the constant shift to the right within the party leaderships that openly intended to undermine the Weimar institutions and its constitution.

The ideal political form for the ruling bloc was the coalition of the bourgeois parties (Sammlung) as a sound base against the effect of the SPD. As the coalition governments between the 1925-8, the bourgeois parties were far from being united, though they have many overlapping ideological elements. Their status of being advocates of strictly factional and class interests were making them incapable of constructing a hegemonic force alternative to the mass base of the SPD. Especially for this reason, beside the fragmentation in the bourgeois circles, there were also a constant decline in their votes since they were strongly associated with the political instability of the Weimar democracy. The anti-systemic demands of the masses were also revealing the critique of the dominant bourgeois parties. As they were aware of the fact that they are losing their electoral bases, they grew more uncollaborative towards SPD. The Unemployment Insurance System that has been founded in 1927 became a contentious issue regarding the clashing interests between capital and labour. In conformity with the interests of the heavy industry, The German People's Party (DVP) took a militant attitude against any increase in the contributions to cover more unemployed people and advocated a welfare retrenchment to the extent that their proposals would be unacceptable to the SPD. Actually, after the death of Stresemann, the DVP's policy, though they entered in the Big Coalition between 1928 and 1930, was to sharpen their disagreements with the SPD that would

disrupt any parliamentary majority to sustain the Weimar consensus (Winkler, 2018:430).

On the other side, in December 1928 Ludwig Kaas became the general secretary of the Center party which began to shift more to the right of the political spectrum. According to Kaas, the Catholicism should be more emphasised in the party and there should be deep changes in the parliamentary form of political order in favour of more authoritarianism (Marcowitz, 2009:56). In the same vein, the DNVP (German National People's Party), already representing a ultra-nationalist and pro-business political stance, became more radicalised with the election of the Hugenberg as the leader of the party. Being a part of rural business elite, Hugenberg was strictly against any collaboration with the SPD, instinctively rejecting any single compromise given in the reparation agreements and using this issue as an arsenal of the intensified 'nationalist opposition' as seen in their response to the Young Plan in 1929 (Winkler, 2018:428).

All in all, while the bourgeois parties were active in undermining the main pillars of the Weimar democracy, they were not talented enough to replace it with an alternative political order having a mass consent. However, as it can be understood from their programmes, they had already developed a counter-revolutionary concept that would prepare the ground for the regime change and the rise of the NSDAP even before the economic and political crisis set in.

5.4. The Effect of the World Economic Crisis

First of all, it should be stated that the Versailles Treaty with its harsh conditions had weakened the German economy. According to it, Germany had lost %13 of its territory, %10 of its population, %75 of its iron ore and %20 of the coal supply. The left Rhein area was occupied by the allied powers, the Saar area was affiliated to France for 15 years and the German colonies were shared among the victorious powers. Additionally, there was the problem of the reparation payment that was making the German economy more fragile and the opposition

of the Weimar Republic more aggressive (Kühnl, 2000:26). The 'Black Friday' experienced in the New York stock market triggered the German economic crisis whose forecurrents had already been seen in German economy which revealed by the 1 million unemployed in 1928 and the growing indebtedness of the economy. In its expansion phase, the German economy incorporated many infrastructure processes, the spread of legally ensured welfare benefits and the political protection of wage structure through organised labour. Public debts were in no way referring to gold and exchange reserves of the country. In such a context, the parliamentary governments had strictly avoided from initiating 'financial reconstruction' and 'unpopular socio-economic policies' (Marcowitz, 2009:17). However, the Weimar consensus was constructed on the basis of the continuous economic growth and a healthy international trade, hence the precondition of overall economic activity since the labour's material stance was also made dependent on the capital's expansion. With the international crisis that disturbed the international financial and economic transactions and the immediate drawback of the international credits have produced both a fiscal crisis and a stagnation of the private accumulation.

If we shortly take a glance at the general economic indicators of Germany especially from the 1929 on, we can have an idea how deeply it has cut the main bastions of the socio-economic order.

While the national income per capita in 1928 was %94 of its 1913 level, in 1932 this was %72 of the same year. The index of the industrial production as 100 in 1928 became 59 in 1932. The gross social product in terms of RM Billion was 91 billion in 1928 and decreased to the 72 billion in 1932. The most radical change was seen in the number of the unemployed throughout these years. While the percentage of the unemployed in the working people in 1928 was %9.7, it increased to the %44.4 in 1932. The proportion of the 'short-term work' in the overall work has increased from %5.7 to the %22.6 in the same period (Kühnl, 2000:28). In comparison to the other developed countries, in 1932 in Germany the proportion of the unemployed to the entire working population was %43.8

while this number was %22 in Great Britain and %32 in USA (Kühnl, 2000:29). When we compare the 'net weekly wage with the 'existence minimum per week, the former in 1928 was 42.20 RM and the latter 49.65 RM the same year. However, the cleavage has deepened in 1932; while the net weekly wage was 21.75 RM, the existence minimum was 39.05 RM. Alongside the rise of the unemployment, there appeared also an explicit immiseration among the working population (Kühnl, 2000:30). The depression of the wages has stemmed either from the 'contractual wages determined by the emergency degrees or from the 'wage undercutting of the employers'. During the same period, consumer prices has also dropped from the index of 100 in 1928 to 67 in 1932. However, despite this decrease in consumer prices along with nominal wages, the real wages have also declined to the %87 of the 1928 level (Peukert, 1987:251-2).

As the number of the unemployed rose and the need for the welfare assistance was high, it inevitably put pressure on the scope of the unemployment insurance and other welfare benefits in the face of the fiscal crisis of the state. The political conflict between DVP and SPD over the 'social retrenchment' was the most important issue that caused the dissolution of the Great Coalition. If we gloss over the 'average protection benefits' for the unemployed, we face with the fact that this amount was 16.44 billion RM in the big cities, 13.36 billion RM in middle-sized cities and 13.14 billion RM in small communities in 1932. As the state expenditure on the 'welfare benefits' declined, there appeared a public tendency to transfer these tasks to local communities though they had also insufficient resources to deal with such a gigantic problem. In 1932, %14 of the unemployed, above all the women and the youth, were not protected by any of the welfare scheme of the state at all (Kühnl, 2000:30).

Peukert (1987:253) points at the fact that the blue-collar workers and white collar workers were the ones who were the most sharply affected ones by the crisis as the industrial stagnation and closing of the plants stimulated mass firings that also shattered the self-confidence of the organised labour and fragmentation within the working class in terms of socio-economic status . Apart

from them, the women and the youth in the ages between 18 and 30 were the most vulnerable segments to the effects of unemployment. While the women were publicly blamed as the ‘double-earners’, the youth which is excluded from the unemployment schemes and made dependent on the income of the parents were also a sign of lack of social and political orientation.

If we analyse the change in the income of the middle classes, we can argue that the turnover of wholesale trade dropped from 36.3 billion RM to the 23.1 billion RM in 1932, the turnover of the artisanship from 20.1 billion RM in 1928 to 14 billion RM and the turnover of the eating-sector from 6.3 billion RM to the 4.5 billion RM (Kühnl, 2000:31).

To this picture, we have to add that the agricultural crisis already began to exert its influence before the great economic crisis. Marcowitz (2009:17) explains the reason for the crisis and its results in a concise manner as such:

The cause of the misery was the ‘over-production and sales problems particularly of the producers of grain. These problems resulted from the opening of the new use areas as well as the intensification of cultivation and yield. These further led to the high level of stocks and low redeems. The spectacular symptom of the agricultural crisis was both the systematic annihilation of agricultural products and the dramatically increasing number of the expropriation since the affected peasants could not pay back their credits. Politically, this situation paved the way for the departure of the rural voters from the traditional national-liberal or authoritarian-conservative parties to the more splitter parties and lately to the NSDAP.

5.5. The Political Crisis Intertwined with the Economic Crisis: “Being Above the Parties”

How can we exactly conceptualise the end of the parliamentary regime in favour of a presidential rule mainly depending on the use of ‘decrees’ that rests on Article 48? Was it an inevitability that was the result of the internal contradictions of Weimar Democracy? Abraham (1989:29) refers to the Borchart’s thesis that presumes that “the functions of private accumulation and

guaranteeing wage legitimacy could not be reconciled''. This view envisages that the costs of the social protection inevitably led to the 'arrangements of the industry' that would like to 'survive' in the face of the economic crisis. The problematic side with this argument is that its economic determinism leaves aside the political decisions and interests of the ruling classes that were being shaped before the economic crisis started. At best, we can regard that the 'economic crisis' gave these interests the opportunity to unfold in a way that will 'suspend' the already shattered political power of the working class. It was an anti-democratic, anti-republican political will that could not simply be reduced to the immediate interests of capital. In terms of destroying the 'social and political bases' of the democracy, there appeared a consensus among the capital, the military and state bureaucracy and increasing 'nationalist opposition' that strictly acted against the 'parliamentarian party politics'. It was a political offensive that were determined to 'exclude the working class and the democratic forces in large from the political decision making mechanisms in the name of 'national interests' that was presumed to be prescribed by the 'political dictates' of economic crisis. 'Being above the parties' gained importance in such a context. On the other hand, it was still a political crisis that the bourgeois disunity in the political sphere and the conflict between the different class fractions of ruling class was also a reflection of 'a search for a political order' that would put into place of the parliamentary regime. The option of the 'authoritarian rule' with a 'limited democratic back-up', keeping the election in tact while strengthening the elite rule was also co-existing with the dreams of 'national dictatorship' of the parties like the DNVP. In short, there were a disunity within the political forces in offensive although their enemies was clear-cut.

We would like to enlighten how this hostile attitude towards Republic and democracy are interrelated with the 'vested interests' of bloc of ruling classes and how the economic crisis became the opportunity for them to further their interests in a more convenient atmosphere. Actually, their political plans are also giving us the clues for the fascist rule in terms of their institutional trial and error and experiencing the political conduct that would inspire the fascist political rule

later on. This process is both a breeding ground for the power road of the NSDAP and also the first 'implementation field' of the fascist regime. When we are using the term of 'fascisation', we are referring the reciprocal transformation and interaction of the state, capital and the fascist movement. The 'vested' interests of the ruling class has both conditioned the NSDAP breakthrough and also gave shape to its claim for the political domination. In turn, the 'authoritarian ambitions of the ruling elite has also been evolved into new political channels by the impact of the NSDAP as a mass movement.

5.6. The Main Actors of the Political Offensive and Their Political Strategies

5.6.1. The Capital

As we have pointed out before, the heavy industry was against the Weimar system since its beginning. From 1924 on, their relation to the economic and political conservatism was explicit. They had integral links to the bourgeois parties, including financial support, particularly to the DVP and DNVP, the latter being the most extremist nationalist representative of the big industry. As Stegman (1973:408) states, from 1926 on the big industrialists 'Reusch, Vögler, Poensgen and Springorum i.e. the leading representatives of the Western iron and steel industry as well as coal mining had special relations to the Reichslandbund (RLB) not only in terms of strengthening their economic interests but also in terms of having an effect on the 'social and constitutional political area'.

For instance, the managing director of the association of the 'German Iron and Steel Industrialists' (VdEstI), the parliamentarian Reichert was arguing that "the government should rule with the help of the Article 48 and call back the parliament when the year has 13 months". In the same vein, the big industrialists, Groebler and Ernst von Borsig mentioned that "one should impact on Hindenburg in order to win him over this aim".

The most radical one in these circles was Hugenberg, the president of the specialised group Bergbau im Reichsverband der Deutsche Industrie (RDI) until 1928 and then the leader of the DNVP, who was strictly against any compromise against the working class organisations and the parliamentary system, was in favour of a 'reorganisation and alteration of the State life' and demanded a 'New State' on an authoritarian basis (Stegman, 1973:408).

The Memorial of the 'Reichsfederation of German Industry (RDI), "Rise or Decline?", 2 December 1929,

The German Economy stands at the crossroads. If it is not possible to put round the tax and give a decisive direction to the financial-economic and social policy, the decline of the German economy is sealed".

II. The Guiding Principle of The Changeover of the German Economy

-The Capital Accumulation

1. The Departure Point for all the measures of the economic-financial and social policy is the enhancement of the capital accumulation. It is the precondition of the increasing production and is in the interest of all of the German people.

5. The German economy should be freed from all the obstacles. The production being handicapped by the taxes should be counteracted by the necessary measures.

B. State and Economy

-The intervention of the state in the economy should be restricted by the guarantee of the freedom of the private property.

-Discussion contributions of the extraordinary member meeting of RDI on 12 December 1929

Herr Director Willy Witke, Secretary of the Saechsische Industrial Association

To put it into practice, a stable and long-lasting government is required. 'Stable and long-lasting' is no longer the attribute of the state power as by us the democracy is misunderstood as 'party business'. One always demands 'a compromise' from the parties in order to abolish the misery of the German people, at best a half-measure. The half measures are not serving our interests any longer. The compromise that would be created by the parliament does not suffice to eliminate the poverty of our people and our economy. In case that the parliament is not up to that task, in case that it cannot master the situation, then as seen in 1923-4 period, the rule by the decrees is an available and 'constitution-conform' option. I am not isolated when I say that an 'Enabling Act' can provide us a help that would get us through this misery. In order to

pass that road, before everything one should have ‘a civil courage’ and also a daring to a temporary unpopularity’. If our rulers do have these characteristics, then we should not be afraid of the implementation of ‘emergently necessary measures (Kühnl, 2000:66).

The Financial Report of Tilo von Wilmowsky, the President of the Middle Europe Economy Meeting (MWT) in the Member Reunion on 22 November 1938 regarding the plans of the German industry in the years between 1929 and 1931 regarding the South-east Europe:

In the years between the 1929 and 1931, the circles of industry, especially the Ruhr Industry, the chemical and electro-Industry began to direct their attention to the intensification of the trade opportunities with the South-East Europe. With a strong autonomy and strike power, one planned to construct a private-economic personal and economic relations to the lands of Donau-regions...Today the society has been carried by the same industrial circles that strived for the economic development between 1929-31 :the Ruhr industry and the chemical and electro industry...Besides them, they have 60 companies and single persons...

The MWT very early recognised the raw material problem for the German economy. Seen from this standpoint, the work of the MWT provided fruitful results...Particularly, it related to the *war material business* whose conclusion in Romania could not be possible without diligently, secretly performed pre-work...’ (Kühnl, 2000:67).

From these statements, we can deduct that the heavy industry had different kind of political visions that preponderantly culminated in an authoritarian direction with the ambitions of the colonial economic expansion. Stegman (1973:409) confirms that there was a consensus on the following guidelines: ‘the sidelining of the parliament, the strengthening the power of the ‘Reichspresident’, the transformation of the existing ‘Reich economic council’ into a corporative entity and the reformulation of the Imperial Assembly as a corporative chamber in an equal status to the parliament’’. However, such plans had series of difficulties that should be taken into consideration such as the risk of ‘civil war’ in case of a state intervention, the possibility of the resistance from the side of the trade unions, SPD and KPD with all variants of political left and the erosion of the economic credibility of the German economy (Stegman, 1973:410) . However, with the negative effect of the economic crisis on the political unity of the working class and the requirement of the ‘financial reconstruction’ at the expense of the social gains of the masses was playing into the hands of the anti-

parliamentarian stance of the industrialists. In this conjecture, instead of a 'violent overthrow' of the constitution, the pseudo-legal means were used to legitimate the rule by the Article 48 by taking into account the 'mass reactions' that could have resulted from the social bases of the Weimar consensus i.e. the trade unions and the SPD. We have to add that there was no overall correspondence between the heavy industrialists, the electro-chemical industrialists and the landed aristocracy (Junker) about what kind of a regime would be created around the common denominator of 'anti-parliamentarism and authoritarianism'.

We have to keep in mind that the ultra-nationalist stance on the side of the industrialists was not the only option. There was also a trend to unite the fragmented bourgeois forces. "Paul Reusch (Gutehoffnungshütte), Krupp von Bohlen and Ernst Poensgen (Vereinigte Stahlwerke) were still trying to design 'the collection of all bourgeois parties' ranging from DVP to the DNVP including middle right and left splittler parties that would evolve into a 'liberal-conservative collection party' (Sammlungspartei). As Stegmann (1973:415-6) specifies, such a 'middle-right' coalition did not mean a decision to turn to a political system based on the 'parliamentary majority' but a stepping stone "for perpetuating the inaugurated Presidential System and accelerating the transformation of the constitution into an authoritarian form".

5.6.2. The Military

As far as the effect of the military on the ruling class is concerned, the preparation for the re-armament, regaining of the lost territories in a direction of the revision of the Versailles Treaty, its intrinsic relation to the necessity for the economic expansion were the leading priorities of the army officials. From the documents indicated below, one can understand the 'eagerness of the army to reconstruct itself and reattain its imperialist policy while their political views to a large extent resembles the ones of the industrialists. On 16 December 1926, in the parliament Philip Scheidemann exerted that 'there is a secret financial

support to the re-armament by the bourgeois forces and the interaction between the Reichswehr and right radical organisations. Beside DVP and DNVP, Centrum and Democrats were also tending to cover the illegal armament (Winkler, 2018:398). These attempts were also combined with the almost instinctual rejection of the constitution of the Weimar Republic by the army which institutionally preferred a political rule 'above the parties' and by decrees that is supposed to be required to overcome the 'extra-ordinary situation' in Germany. Additionally, we should not forget the integral relation of the landed aristocracy (Junkers) to the leading positions of the Reichswehr.

The Decree of General von Seeckt of 9 January 1924:

The reorganisation of the German Economy will lead to a bitter conflict between the employers and employees.

The situation can be summarised as such: The employer side strives for the extension of the work time, wage cuts, the rejection of the conciliation experiments and the abolition of the privileges of the annual leave...

The workers were pushed into the conflict with the business administrations and calamitous slogans were created. It is the task of the state authority to take necessary measures when the atmosphere is strained.

From this vantage point, I am trying to convince the military leaders to talk to the business men privately and to remind them of the danger of their strategy both for the state and plant by appointing a 'tested conciliator' to the industrial conflicts"... (Kühnl, 2000:74)

From the Memories of Carl Severing (SPD), Prussian Ministry of Internal Affairs for a long time, about the events in 1925:

The General Major von der Goltz who was appointed to the top of the 'patriotic associations' harshly criticised the foreign policy of Stresemann. According to him, it should be the common aim of the propaganda to prevent '*any coalition with the SPD neither in the state and nor in the land governments*' and make the 'Ost-Locarno' impossible. In line with the guidelines of the Prussia and the Foreign Land, they 'de-construct' everything that they have built up before.

He blamed the Reichswehr for taking money from the private sources, however, it was not regulating the associations that are critical for the private money lenders. Von Goltz oversaw the fact that a 'Black Reichswehr' requires black money...He wrote that private sources of money wanted this money to be mainly transferred to the 'patriotic associations' through the Reichswehr. We can not only rely on the 'voluntary expenditures (Kühnl, 2000:75).

The Secret Memorandum of the Military Chamber of 'Reichswehr Ministry' on March 1926-The Armament Issue treated from a perspective of real politics:

The Next Aim of the General German Politics:

The next aim of the German politics should be the 're-acquisition of the regions from which Germany had drawn, a strong reintegration of these regions to the fatherland and the annexion of the regions which are inevitable for the German Economy i.e.

The Liberation of the Rheinland and Saarland

The Removal of the Corridor and Re-Acquisition of the Polish Oberschlesien

The Union of Germany and Austria

The Abolition of the De-Militarised Zone

The above-mentioned ambitions of German politics are revealing that in the next stage Germany should retain its European position and then very later on search for its world hegemony (Kühnl, 2000:77)

As the number of the soldiers of Reichswehr was limited to 100.000 men, the Reichswehr developed a special relationship to the para-military organisation. 'Frei-Corps' units of the army was used by the Social Democratic government to repress the post-1918 revolutionary uprisings. Later on, the Stahlhelm provided para-military force having an organic relationship to the Reichswehr. The below-mentioned guidelines of the Stahlhelm are also instructive in underlining the political standpoint of the Reichswehr in terms of the internal and external issues.

Berlin Stahlhelm Embassy, 8 May 1927

We declare a war against any 'mushiness and cowardice' that wants to weaken and destroy the 'honour-consciousness' of the German People through giving up its 'right to defend' and the 'will to defend'.

Stahlhelm explains that it does not recognise the Versailles Dictate and its recent complements...The economic and social misery of the people is caused by the lack of space of 'life and work'. The Stahlhelm supports every foreign policy that opens up the regions of settlement and work to the 'excess of German population' and keeps its economic, cultural and political connection to the

motherland alive. Stahlhelm does not want the German people to be 'prey' and 'source of fire' to the Bolshevism through its misery...

Stahlhelm rejects the idea of class conflict. Under a full recognition of the 'interest connection' between the work, employer and employee, the Stahlhelm does not prevent a fair, determinate handling of the interest conflicts. It claims the reservation of its legally allowed and morally-justified means of battle and the protection of *the 'overarching interests of the People's Community' (Volksgemeinschaft)...*

The Stahlhelm saw with anxiety the detachment of the healthy forces of 'German people' from its 'land' through the intensification of the industrialisation and demands an agricultural policy which enables the settlement. The inner colonisation and settlement policy through the strengthening of the Eastern regions with the filling the border areas with German peasant villages are the weapons of the 'Allegation Battle' of the German people and Stahlhelm can give help in that direction.

The Stahlhelm demands 'measures' against the alienation of 'our political, economic and cultural life' through foreign elements that increased since the Revolution and the wildness of the moral world-views (Kühnl, 2000:50-1).

During the period of the Weimar Republic, in its official exertions, we observe that the Reichswehr tended to protect 'its status above the parties' as a neutral force. However, as the documents above indicate, the Reichswehr also represented a position not only 'above the parties' but also 'against them'. Especially its counter-revolutionary nature with regard to the November Revolution is easy to decipher. Furthermore, the leaders of the army, especially General Schleicher with its interaction with Hindenburg played an active role in the destruction of the Weimar Democracy. At the end of the Great Coalition, Schleicher tried to concentrate on creating a 'Bourgeois Right' (Bürgerblock) that would rely on the 'confidence of Reichspresident'. According to it, the essence of the Presidential cabinet would be 'anti-parliamentary' and 'anti-Marxist' as well as in a deep sense of hostility towards the SPD-led Prussian government (Mommsen, 1989:519). The more involvement of the army in the form of striving for the presidential government also meant the more insertion of the interests of the landed aristocracy. While the Müller government launched its financial assistance for "the East in its desperate struggle for survival" in a view of 'modernising the agricultural sector, Hindenburg insisted that this assistance should be delivered through "the agricultural representatives and spokesman

from the eastern provinces, hence through the National Rural League within which Junkers are dominant (Mommsen, 1989:522). An over-extensive aid package to the East particularly in the direction of the rural elite was in contrast with the government's sensitivities to the fiscal crisis (Mommsen, 1989:523). Hindenburg tried to extend the scope of the financial aid programme and include all the regions of the East, not simply of the Prussia, "in all of its forms whether it be large estates or small peasant holdings". This view was holding the sword of the 'presidential decree' in case there is no parliamentary approval.

The aims of the economic expansion and the re-gaining the lost colonial regions were the critical ambitions that the army and the big business would be sharing. Though there were inner conflicts within them relating to the amount of the agricultural tariffs and the extent of the autarchy, the big capital and Junker class had a shared interest in the 'removal of parliamentary democracy' and the elimination of the SPD from the governing process through a 'Führer' standing above the parties. 'Unpopular' measures of the fiscal reform that are acclaimed as "in the national interest but whose cost would be paid mainly by the working classes" were also leading to the use of the presidential decree as a weapon against the parliamentary or extra-parliamentary social protest. On the other hand, the army cannot dare to 'restitute the monarchy' immediately as it would publicly provoke the opposition from the political right and left. As Schleicher argued, the best course in that sense was to steer towards right through the 'emergency decrees' (Winkler, 2018:398). Thus, Hindenburg's role as the arbitrator of the interests of the army and the big industrialists would increase in contradiction to the initiative of the democratic mass organisations from the trade unions to the parties.

Peukert (1987:228-9) points at the 'challenge of the elites' in the end of the Weimar Republic that was also revealed by the anti-republican mood of 'civil servants, judiciary, universities'. Bearing in mind this adverse attitude to the Republic, we have every reason to take into account the newly arisen 'national opposition' that began to be taking a mass character in the end of the 1920's.

While the national opposition was converging on the 'anti-parliamentarism' and 'anti-Marxism' with the business and state elites, they were also holding ground as 'a challenge to the elites themselves'. Before the electoral breakthrough of the NSDAP and also as the basis of its rise, there appeared a combination of 'national protest' and 'social protest' in the same pot of the ideological attack. 'Discontent of the masses', especially of the middle classes and peasants began to be formulated in nationalist terms and gained an extra-parliamentary form alongside 'the fighting against the parliament from within'. A range of political organisations such as DNVP, Stahlhelm, a variety of radical right and conservative communities and NSDAP consisted in a political bloc that has arrived at a capacity to affect the decisions of the German elites. Typically, the acceptance of the Young Plan on 7 Juni 1929 by the coalition was used by the radicals as a vehicle of political mobilisation. In fact, through the Young Plan, Germany has won its full sovereignty over the economic issues. However, it has lost the transfer protection by the reparation agents. This clause was requiring Germany to pay reparation even in a condition of economic depression. Germany should pay reparations 58 years long. While the evacuation of the Rheinland was decided to put into practice, the decision about the future of the Saarland was left to a 'people's referendum' to be organised in 1935 (Winkler, 2018:434). On 09 Juli 1929, the components of the national opposition constitute the 'Reichscommitee For the Referendum'. Heinrich Class for the 'All Deutsche Verband', Franz Seldte for 'Stahlhelm', Alfred Hugenberg for the DNVP and Adolf Hitler for the NSDAP signed a declaration that called the German people for the battle against the 'lie of the war guilt' and introduced a pattern of the referendum. Despite a pretentious campaign by the financial assistance of Hugenberg, the result of the referendum of the "Law Against the Enslavement of the German Volk" that took place on 22 December 1929 was a failure on the side of the 'national opposition' (Winkler, 2018:450). However, it led to three important lessons to be taken from such a nationalist mass mobilisation. First, 'national opposition' proved that outside the circle of 'state and business' elite, they can organise the mass anger against the Versailles Treaty and meaningfully connect it with the 'economic misery' of wide segments of society, thus be an

autonomous political actor. Second, the inclusion of the NSDAP to the nationalist bloc backed up by the financial opportunities of DNVP provided the NSDAP to spread its ideas to the masses and attract a large segment of 'anti-capitalist' and nationalist voters to the party. Third, this campaign was also giving clues for the further political strategy of the NSDAP, in terms of encapsulation of the 'social protest' by channeling it into a 'nationalist fever' against the 'party politicians, 'corrupt' SPD bureaucrats and financial speculators and at the same time 'collaborating with the elites' in terms of eradicating the last remnants of the Weimar Democracy.

5.7. The Brüning Period and The External Conditions that Gave Impetus to the "Breakthrough of the NSDAP"

The Chancellorship of Brüning in 1930 after the elections was undoubtedly a turning point in the history of Weimar Republic, in other sense it was representing the end of Weimar's parliamentary democracy. Instead of a government with a majority of the Reichstag, a presidential government with the toleration of the SPD has been constituted. It was a government that had still a connection with the parliament as otherwise it would be a harsh u-turn, however, it largely depended on the trust of the president Hindenburg and its small circle that was close to the main power elites, namely the landed elites and industrialists. The presidential decrees that should normally be used in case of a 'threat against state authority' became an ordinary means of the executive that was applied nearly to every sphere of public policy. The government was preassuming 'the continuity of an emergency situation' both economically and politically. Against the exacerbating unemployment and economic stagnation, Brüning concentrated on the rehabilitation of the public finances with a deflationary economic policy. According to Brüning, Germany was living in 'a military dictatorship' in terms of public budget. The economic issues were increasingly dealt with outside the influence of the parliament. 'Anti-parliamentarian mood' became explicit with the creation of the institutions like 'Supreme Economic Command' that was appointed to handle the economic

problems outside the 'fractionalism of party politics' (Mommsen, 1989:726). However, this 'emergency' condition was to a great extent instrumentalised to further 'the retrenchment of the welfare state'. From the point of view of the heavy industry, they were willing to cooperate with the government as long as it expresses a will to 'reform the existing collective bargaining system' and they were non-compromising in terms of not making concessions to the trade unions (Mommsen, 1989:679). Actually, new presidential arrangements were providing 'an appropriate environment' to exclude the political will of the working class by sidelining the parliamentary mechanisms and by paying lipservice to the demands of the organised labour. Although SPD tried to exercise a 'control function' over the government's policies through its toleration policy, when one examines the social content of the 'emergency decrees', the influence of the SPD on the direction of the policies remained limited.

In reality, Brüning's insistent attitude towards not applying anti-cyclical policies had exacerbated the existing misery of the working masses and led to his popular reputation as 'Hunger Chancellor'. Actually, the priority of the Brüning was not a decisive battle against the unemployment or specifically subscribing to the work-creation programmes but the foreign policy according which he targeted the 'revision of the reparation payment', hence the revision of the Versailles Treaty through exposing the inability of the German economy to repay its loans. Thus, the socio-economic effects of the deflation policy were not the leading concern of the government. This policy stance inevitably created a social protest potential as the anxiety of the middle classes and real immiseration of the working classes has reached to unprecedented levels that could not be repressed simply by state forces or tamed by a blind adherence to the authoritarian measures (Neebe, 1981:114). Ironically, the SPD which was supposed to fiercely oppose this course of the events was 'thought' to be 'a tolerating partner' of these policies while the 'national' opposition increasingly gained ground by channeling this social protest into 'criticism of the system' that targeted both the Weimar institutions within which the SPD was deemed to have played the role of a governing agent and Brüning's unpopular economic policies. Particularly, the

creation of the Harzburg Front which was composed of DNVP, Stahlhelm, NSDAP and the industrialists and Junkers preferring a further shift to the political right began to be effective both in terms of mobilising the ‘socially discontented’ masses and pushing the presidential government to a more authoritarian position that would positively respond to fascist temptations. Within this framework, the NSDAP appeared to be the advantageous one which had an autonomous capacity to mobilise ‘a popular anti-parliamentarism’ (Winkler, 2018:111) that overlaps with the aims of the ruling elite and still pretending to be an ‘anti-systemic’ opposition that tries to portray itself independent of the vested interests of the business and state elites.

Politically, we can say that the implicit ambition of Brüning with the aid of the President Hindenburg was to ‘legally restore the monarchy’ through a success in foreign policy concerning the issue of reparations (Neebe, 1981:112) and was to abandon the legislative functions of the parliament. However, it was evident that a mere technocratic government that aroused a widespread opposition both from the right and left’ cannot survive by simply relying on the authoritarian powers of the President. As Mommsen (1989:782-3) puts out, ‘in the final analysis, the decisive fact was that not only had Brüning cleared the way for the exclusive role of German Right, but also he has helped lay the legal or pseudo-legal foundation for its rise to power.

5.8. The Power Strategy of the NSDAP and the Fascisation of the State

5.8.1. The Politicisation of ‘Bourgeois Apoliticism’

While Allen (1965:81-82) examines the ‘the Nazi Seizure of Power’ in a town like Norheim, he emphasises the role of the religion, nationalism and militarism as the sources of political mobilisation and the NSDAP’s special emphasis on the ‘traditional values’ of the Volk as a means of fighting against the democracy, party politics and class conflicts. He states that

Northheim's Nazis had established themselves as both respectable and radical. They were seen as patriotic, anti-socialist and religious. They enjoyed the apparent blessings of the conservatives. But at the same time the Nazis appeared to be vigorous, determined and above all ready to use radical means to deal with the crucial problem-depression.

In the first chapter, we have already pointed at how the mass foundations of the German fascism have been created. In its materialisation, both the infiltration in the state institutions and the local bourgeois networks played an incredible role. While referring to the freedom of the 'German Volk' or 'German Nation' as the main solution of all the economic problems including unemployment and poverty, they were targeting the 'sectional interest politics' that were exercised both by the working class or bourgeois parties. Being above the party politics, actually above the politics in its proper sense was presented by the NSDAP as an antidote to the 'national and economic slavery' embodied by the Weimar Republic. However, this did not simply mean a political apathy or diversion from the political issues. Indeed, it was representation of a one-way politics that tries to put an end to all the political strifes which is in the nature of the politics in the name of 'national interest', the 'public good' or 'common cause'. Not only parliamentary democracy but the democracy itself stands in a stark contrast to such a blurring of all the existing social cleavages in the name of 'supra-political ambitions'. Creating 'bread and work' was also not tied to a systematic social programme in the NSDAP's agenda but to a political action that was primarily directed against a 'repressive' and 'weak' state, a political pluralism associated with the democracy and 'economic and political misery of the Volk.

Goebbels (1935:89) in his article from '31 August 1930' in 'Angriff', calls the electors to vote for the NSDAP in the forthcoming elections for the below-mentioned reasons:

Now against the democracy, which is synonymous with the mass stultification and tribute tyranny in the foreign policy, against the parliamentarism that is not more than the organisation of the stupidity 'towards above' and irresponsibility 'towards below', against the passivism that waves palm leaves to the outside and rules by the nightstick inside, against the domination of the parties that led to the Farhat and Sklarek corruption (corruption associated with the SPD), against the

devilment and insanity that conducts its sacreligious play since 1918 under the password of 'Politics over Germany', the entire German people protect yourself under the umbrella of National Socialism! The Front of the youth and the workers get into action! And they will stop not until they conquer the Reich.

According to Goebbels (1935:105), 'the German people should be governed decently'. It implies that the problematic is not the State itself, but its deformation by the rulers. Actually, Goebbels' conception of socialism also gives a clear idea about the 'apolitical' politicism of the NSDAP that exemplifies a 'social protest' primarily aimed at restoring the 'order and peace' by a fierce political activism. He states that "it is a mistake if we take it granted that revolutions change 'the things in themselves'. The things in their essence always remain the same. What is changed is the relationship of the men to the things".

Socialism is a spiritual revolution. For this reason, it has not a task of reshaping the existence of the things around us but bring the people into a different relationship to things. What we fight against is the 'wrong association' of the people 'with the given facts: We are not against the cinemas but against the abuse of the cinemas, we are not against the radio but against the abuse of the radio, we are not against money but against the abuse of the money, we are not against the capital but against the abuse of the capital...In property we see the basis of the human culture. The elimination of the concept of property is synonymous with all the elimination of all and each social connection. The search for a propertyless economic system results in the most unsocial praxis that one can ever think of (as experienced in the last fifteen years of in Russia). The drive for the property in man is natural...Property is also for us sacred (Goebbels, 1935:227).

The ambition was to reconstruct 'the 'lost' state' and 'misguided Volk' which was 'poisoned' by the 'democratic politics', by 'fractured and foreign-influenced' politics.

These visions greatly overlapped with the ambition of the ruling elite to transform the state from within, by battling against the 'un-German' and the elements 'hostile to the state', namely the KPD and SPD and their mass basis. The NSDAP as a seemingly mass 'anti-systemic force' was treated both as a 'threat' to be tamed and as an instrument to be used by the ruling classes.

It was an offensive 'apoliticism' that tried to turn the 'reactive' into an active one. Indeed, the supra-political is easily connected with the already existing nationalism that has grown with the political activism of the NSDAP that concentrated on gaining strength in the local provinces. While depicting the political tendencies of the Norheim, Allen (1965:125) points at the fact that "the persistent nationalism showed in the years of depression must be taken as a political constant but one which few could exploit as skillfully as Nazis. Even entertainment was affected by it". Actually, this shows that before delving into the sphere of 'big politics', the NSDAP has gained ground in the local areas of the social life that was conventionally thought to be immune to the politics, particularly where the signs of the bourgeois life style with an inherent apoliticism have dominated. In reality, these social networks turned into the bedrocks of the NSDAP's power accumulation. However, this apoliticism did no way exclude the 'peasants and the workers', indeed they were tried to be integrated into 'decent life of German Volk'.

Koshar (1986:293) pinpoints, while evaluating the effect of the NSDAP on the local life in Marburg, a 'bourgeois asymmetry with a tendency of 'strong social network and weak political parties'. Indeed, the bourgeois parties of the Weimar period was totally exhausted both in electoral sense and in terms of their influence on the social life. Within such a conjecture, the NSDAP intended to and to a large extent succeeded in combining sectional material interests of the social groups with a nationalist logic 'above and critical' of the parties. Voluntary organisations, social clubs or Student Leagues became the object of the NSDAP's infiltration. These was not simply one-sided subjugation of the local life to the priorities of the Nazi politics. It was rather a politicisation' of "a moralistic and national consensus' driven by bourgeois non-party organisations" (Koshar, 1986:309). The explicit target was to give shape to the 'bourgeois' segments with a politically unified vision. If one side of this strategy was to envelop the givens of the social customs within a political symbolism and action, the other side was to mobilise them against the political mass structure of the Republic. Koshar (1986:315) argues that "the NSDAP attached social

trajectories of many local organisations to a mass party. It was a moral-political coalition integrating sociability, special interest and general concerns for all non-socialist, non-Communist and strata”.

5.8.2. The Form of the Use of Political Violence

It was not a coincidence that the Nazis have regularly resorted to the words like ‘conquest, election wars or work ‘battles’. They really think that their country is conquered by the un-German elements-Jewish people, Social Democrats or Communists, it is ‘colonised’, ‘exploited’ and ‘enslaved’. The terms like the ‘national unity’ never responded to a conceptualisation ‘publicness’, welfare of the all or an over-arching authority that stands over the people as ‘a recognised’ entity. Indeed, fascist violence appeared when there was a clear loss of authority and legitimacy. If we try to shortly describe the authority, we can take Arendt’s following definition. “The hallmark of the authority is unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey; neither coercion nor persuasion is needed...To remain in authority requires respect for the person or the office. The greatest enemy of authority, therefore, is contempt and the surest way to undermine it is laughter” (Arendt, 1970:41-2). Of course, it is an ideal form of ‘authority’, if we take word by word, it is not easy to find a meaningful authority in modern times particularly when the politics is concerned. However, the ‘loss of the authority’ could become so discernable that a stable political rule could be a farce if the ‘ruled’ is convinced of the inability of the government to rule even when it applied to the elements of force or persuasion in every possible manner. Indeed, in the eyes of the Nazis, the Weimar State and its institutions were being losing its appeal even among its advocates in the face of ungovernable conditions of economic depression, unemployment and persistent political instability.

Goebbels (1935:99-100) in his article of ‘Is this a State?’ of 8 August 1927 in ‘Angriff’ criticises the Weimar State both in terms of ‘its failure’, ‘weaknesses’ and as well as its ‘atrocities’ before the economic depression set in. His critique

ends with praising ‘a German free state’ which seems to be a future projection, not simply a restoration of the past.

On 9 November 1918 the state has been established, not under the thunder of the big guns, in contrast under the coward gun crackles of the traitors and deserters...On 28 Juni 1919 it signed a peace treaty with its foes. This peace had a bad sign with the name of Versailles: It meant: the enslavement of the German working class for half a century, retreating from the production areas which belonged to us for centuries, the recognition of the lie that we have faulted the war and have to be pay all the costs...On 29 August 1924 one gave it the bible of the economy: Dawes. It meant: nearly for half a century we have to transfer 2.5 Billion to our oppressor...A result of it is that 3 million cannot find a job. Another result of it is that the middle class and the business of our people should automatically be ruined. They should capitulate against the limitless, insatiable will of the high finance...No, this is not a state, it is a slave colony, the object of the exploitation of the stock exchange finance...Why do you talk about statesman while there is no state? Over us, not the state but the colonial administrator is ruling. Now they cry that we are dangerous to the state. Where is the state to which we can pose a threat? We are dangerous for the colony because we want the state!.

Actually, according to the NSDAP, the state should be ‘freed’ and ‘regained’ from the ‘inner enemies’ in the name of the ‘German Volk and State’. However, the Nazis do not mention an ‘authoritarian state’ (Obrigkeitsstaat) that would replace the Weimar democracy. The unpopular reception of the presidential governments with authoritarian overtones and the ‘aristocratic’ personalities seemed to be void in terms of the ‘recognition by the ruled’. Fascist violence became effective where the democratic legitimacy was highly eroded and the ‘state reason’ was not capable to rule by itself-as in the case of the military intervention- but necessarily inclined to feed the fascist uprisings and collaborate with the fascist militia to transform the state in a non-democratic direction.

In fascist studies, it became like a common sense to define the fascists’ use of violence as violence for its own sake. However, if we take the Arendt’s definition of ‘violence’, “violence is distinguished by its instrumental character. Phenomenologically, it is close to strength, since the implements of violence, like all other tools, are designed and used for the purpose of multiplying natural strength until, in the last stage of its development, they can substitute for it” (Arendt, 1970:42). Violence is not an isolated phenomenon but stands in a

strong relationship to the power behind it, both in terms of its 'object' and 'intensity'. According to Arendt (1970:44), "where commands are no longer obeyed, the means of the violence are of no use and the question of this obedience is not decided by the command-obedience relation but by opinion and, of course, by the number of those who share it. Everything depends on power behind the violence". It means that there should be a political community having a source of power, seeking a legitimacy in its founding principles, not in its subsequent form of action'. Accordingly, in Arendt's words (1970:47), "violence can be justifiable but it never will be legitimate. Its justification loses in plausibility the farther its intended end recedes into the future. No one questions the use of violence in self-defense, because the danger is not only clear but also present and the end justifying the means is immediate".

Then, what or who is speaking behind the fascist violence and against whom? Fascists speak for a political community which was supposed to be 'subjugated' by the deeds of the Republic and 'internal foes' including the Jewish ones, Social Democrats or Communists. The threat is imminent in that sense. Thus, every act of them against the enemies is necessarily an act of self-defense, hence justifiable. Fascists speak in a strict friend-foe logic where a conciliation, a compromise or another kind of rapprochement are clearly ruled out. Goebbels (1935:73) argues that 'We are not coming as friends and also not as neutral ones but as 'foes'. They acted as the 'German Volk' itself, not simply a bunch of men in S.A and NSDAP. To be on the right side of the community, in the national one and to be fighting against the ones which are responsible for the 'disorder and chaos' easily justified the violence. Bourgeois segments of the society was more inclined not only to tolerate but also to approve the fascist violence. As Allen (1965:133) puts out in his analysis of the Northeim, "the middle class had never accepted the SPD as an institution, now with the rise of Nazism it was offered a method of destroying Social Democracy". In the same vein, regarding the erosion of the legitimacy of the Weimar State, for instance, the security forces of the Prussian state which was under the control of the Social Democratic government was seen 'as an enemy' against which the Nazi violence was

justifiable. However, the SA was strictly avoided from attacking the military force and police units that are still 'national'. In fact, as we would analyse, the violence of the Nazis would not be possible without the assistance of the state elites that were vowed to undermine and finally eliminate the Weimar institutions. All in all, we can say that as Koshor (1986:300) puts out, the drive behind the SA was not a pathological need for violence but a reasoned tactic designed to portray the NSDAP as the most decisive opponent of the Republic. One should also not forget that the so-called 'blind terror and violence' had a deterring effect on the 'peaceful' or democratic meetings and organisations that would mean their ultimate passification. In such a context, the mass basis of Republic relying on the legal means of political mobilisation would necessarily be paralysed.

5.8.3. Instrumentalisation of the Formal Democratic Institutions by the NSDAP-Elections as Plebiscites

The Nazis were very straightforward in evaluating the parliament, the elections and the democracy. They regarded the formal institutions of the democracy as 'political instruments' that would be utilised to undermine and abandon the system from within. However, the humiliation of the parliamentarism, its system-conformism, the meaning of the 'majority vote, political dialogue, concern for the publicness or general welfare does not necessarily denote the proposition that they have distanced themselves from deploying the means that the democracy had provided them with. In contrast, their political arena where they have increased their mass strength was exactly the places which are normally regarded the privileged areas of democratic policy making. Indeed, a 'distorted' democracy seemed to be a pre-condition of a fascist politics that still not only saw a source of legitimacy particularly in the elections but also gave impetus to political mechanisms that would dynamite the very bases of those institutions. The NSDAP in its new form after 1928 had clearly given up its putschist ambitions. Instead, they have put into practice a 'pseudo-legal' strategy of power that, on the one hand, gave them the opportunity to blur the boundaries

between violence and legality by formally recognising the decisiveness of elections but in a form that turns the elections into a 'real battle' where every means to discard the 'enemies' was justifiable. On the other hand, their opponents especially SPD was mistaken by expecting 'a state intervention' from the NSDAP, however, their pseudo-legal strategy accompanied by successive electoral victories has morally created an incapacity to resist as the rising power of the Nazis seemed to be 'democratically justified'. On the other side, the ruling elite of the presidential governments were also sensitive to the existence of the elections as the total lack of elections would create 'anxiety' in the people and the government would face with the 'intensified resistance of all the political forces (Blasius, 2006:111). Thus, for the NSDAP to use and abuse of the democratic channels were not only a disturbing force against its political opponents but also a potential weapon and means of bargaining towards the state elite controlling the presidential governments.

Goebbels (1935:71-72) in his article "What do we want in the Parliament?" of 30 April 1928 in *Angriff* reveals his attitude towards the parliament and the elections in a very precise manner:

We are an anti-parliamentarian party, we are rejecting the Weimar constitution and the republican institutions ruled by it for good reasons, we are the opponents of a 'falsified democracy', we see in today's system of 'majority vote' and 'organised irresponsibility' the main reason for our gradual decay. Then what do we want in the parliament?

We are going into the parliament to rearm ourselves with the weapons of the democracy in the weapon arsenal of the democracy. We would be the members of the parliament to paralyse the Weimar constitution with its own support. If the democracy is so stupid that it gives free tickets and parliamentary allowance for this disservice, it is their problem...Every legal means is right to revolutionise the current situation.

The below mentioned words of Goebbels before the 1928 elections explains well to what extent it is important for a fascist party to combine the legality (under the parliamentarian mantle) and illegality in such a form that would supposedly de-

construct the democratic and republican foundations of the system in the direction of a new state:

On 20 May it will be decided whether we are capable of encountering them (the Republicans) effectively in the parliament. If we succeed in inserting into the 'High House' a group that has the ability to battle and sabotage, so it would be found means and way to counteract the 'official terror'. It revolves around everything. If our supporters delegate the 'immune' fighters to the Reichstag as much as possible, if these fighters make use of all parliamentary and extra-parliamentary instruments which would make them able to show their teeth to the 'Marxist persecution mania', then we should not be afraid of our further development... This decision would be made beyond the parliamentary area and 'in the developing historical sense'... Who loves his party and saw in it *the already growing state in the current non-state* will understand what the matter is (Goebbels, 1935:77-8).

After the election victory of the 1930, Goebbels (1935:95) explains the value of this result also regarding the role of them assigned to them by the voters:

Now our task is to form the reality of the day out of the mystic of the political wonder. The widest masses that found a departure point in our movement. They expressed an avowal against today's Germany and for the tomorrow's Germany. They demand that one should radically break with the ruling course that has dominated until now, economically, politically and culturally. It was a manifestation against a system that can not be thought more threatening and demanding than it has been perceived today. In this manifestation, the will that negates the parties and their ideas in Germany and that not a narrowly limited party but the entire awakening people avow is expressed.

Not only the NSDAP but every party having fascist tendencies are inclined to conceive the elections as a strict 'either-or' situation where the 'destiny of the nation' is at stake. The fascist party is the 'authentic and the only representation of the 'national will' against the sectional interests of other democratic parties. The slogans like 'the Rise or the Fall', 'The Order or the Chaos' would be heard more than regularly. While meticulously avoiding from entering into 'objective discussion' or programmatic debate, the members of the fascist party appeared to be in an 'existential fight' through which the destiny of the nation would be decided. The main strategy behind it was to push the voters to make an immediate choice between the security/insecurity, national/unnational or domestic/foreign and thus to strip the democratic politics of its other bases like

the use of rights and freedoms, the importance of the democratic participation and organisation or politicisation of social demands. The latter ones would readily be suspended in the face of the 'pretended emergency situation'. In this way, an overemphasis on the elections became the means of eradicating the very possibilities of democratic expression and ruling out the organised will particularly of the working classes. If we keep in mind the elections held between the 1930-33 where the NSDAP increased its share of the votes, we face with a real state of the emergency situation through which the presidential governments put a set of restrictions on the freedoms of the press and assembly by the justification of protecting the state authority. Within such a conjecture, the groups that appealed to violence and terror but with a 'national' form gained ascendancy in terms of receiving mass consent where the feelings of 'fear' and anxiety of the people were manipulated in favour of 'national' forces capable to maintain the public order that was supposed to be broken by the Republicans even if it would necessarily materialise through force. Indeed, any victory of the party would be a blank-check to the further phases of the political violence under the formal 'protection of constitution and parliament'.

Shaping the human material in a demagogic, provocative fashion was also integral to the fascist politics that fitted very well to the 'either-or logic that they are promoting. According to it, The citizen in a democratic sense should be made small, unaware of his or her rights and freedoms, easily manipulated, open to 'simplified picture of political events and big lies' and affirming 'their inability to act positively beyond reaction and destined to seeking the redeemers, savers and the 'Führer's. As we have emphasised in the third chapter, the immiseration of the people economically and politically had an adverse effect on its will to act autonomously by relying on its own force with power of the self-trust. The so-called discontent with 'outward appearances of democracy' created a passive-reactive typology that fell easily prey to the purely negative propaganda of the NSDAP or any NSDAP-type political organisation that assaulted not only its institutions but the idea of the democracy itself.

5.8.4. The Relationship of the NSDAP with the Non-republican State and Economic Elite

It is impossible to conceive the NSDAP as a mass movement in its own terms, using its power resources outside and against the state that was on the way of transforming the Weimar State. While appearing to be radical, non-compromising and aggressive towards the political left and the republican state institutions, their attitude towards the 'state barones', industrialists and the state bureaucracy especially the members of the army was being 'a potential ally against the common enemy'. As we will see next in the evaluation of the historical events, the relationship was not overall correspondence. It was not a conflict-free in terms of giving shape to the seeds of the new state. However, aside their internal disputes, as much as there appeared a converging line in terms of the non-parliamentarism, the clearance of the SPD from the state, the general erosion of the democratic rights and freedoms through 'emergency declarations, bans on the leftist political organisation, the creation of the special courts and the social retreat in the welfare state, there was an inclination on the both sides to cooperate and to form the new state as partners. On the one hand, the NSDAP tried to keep the distance from the presidential governments defining them as an 'unpopular clique' (Vorwaerts, 29.11.1932) and try to protect its anti-systemic pretension like in the case of economic programme 'Sofortprogramm in 1932' (Immediate Programme) that was found by the economic elite as threatening. On the other hand, there was an explicit tendency to enter into the 'big politics' since it was not a 'revolutionary movement' in its proper sense that aims at the transformation of the socio-economic bases of the society but the 'reconstruct the state' that was supposed to be destroyed by the post-November revolutionary uprisings from below and the Republican state elite from above. In such a conjecture, the NSDAP never would be able to exert its mass power into politics without the assistance of the non-Republican state elite. As much as this elite revised their conception of the state, the NSDAP also presented itself as having the capacity to rule, to be an alternative elite, not simply unlimited excess

of a 'plebian movement' that could only be instrumentalised in specific circumstances by the state forces. Nagle (1989:196) points at the strategy of the NSDAP to be recognised mainly by being a political actor in national issues, hence to be more visible in the national sphere. It was followed by the strategy of the 'normalisation' according to which "the fascist elite will overtime settle down and transform its behaviour to confirm to more 'normal standards for a political elite'. Of course this did not mean an 'overall taming' of the movement but being open to the concern over gaining acceptance particularly 'in the social milieu of dominant Protestant establishment (Nagle, 1989:200). Regarding the local level, Koshar (1986:345) argues that 'whereas Nazism attracted disaffected groups throughout society, its success was based ultimately on attracting these contact persons, opinion makers and mobilisers for grass-roots infrastructures. In that sense, the 'Nazi elite joiners were particularly well-connected'. Lastly, as Nagle (1989:203) points out, there was also the issue of 'reassurance' implying that the NSDAP will avoid from 'putschist adventures', put a bridle on the excesses of the SA violence and limit the coercion against the 'bourgeois party institutions and meetings'. However, the reassurance did not denote an unconditional conformity with the non-Republican establishment. As we observe in the next section, the NSDAP remained as 'a transforming factor in constituting the 'state within the state' and constantly led to the revision of the elite strategies. Above all, the fascist state began to be formed out of the ruins of the Weimar state long before the formal seizure of the power by the Nazis.

5.9. The Papen Government and the Prussian Intervention: A typical case of the Fascisation of the State

The year 1932 can be characterised by the increase in the violence of the SA selectively against the leftist forces and institutions in the country. The rise of the mass support that would be confirmed by the election victories in 1932 was accompanied by the emergence of the 'a latent civil war' that was owed its presence primarily to the aggressiveness of the SA. Peukert (1987:263) defined

the year of 1932 as the sign of 'disintegration of power followed by a power vacuum'. However, it would be more correct to conceive of the 'increasing threat to the public security' as the necessary pains for the transformation of the state that was shaped both by the non-republican state elite and fascist violence. It is legitimate to talk of 'formation of a state within the state' if we would use a phrase that would be used to point at the 'every illegal formation within the state later on. What distinguishes the shift in the state was the increasing collaboration of the new state elite around Papen and Schleicher with 'fascist forces' as an alternative to the Brüning and Groener (the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Minister of Defence). Undoubtedly, this new clique was also approved by Hindenburg as the Reichspresident who has put out a decisive will towards creating a 'more rightist government' which would appear as more independent of the parliament and if necessary function against the initiative of the parliament. One should take into account that heavy industrialists and agrarian elites have contributed to this shift in the course of the government. However, these ambitions could not be achieved without the violation of the constitution and 'fait accomplie's. Not only on the side of the NSDAP but also on the side of the state there was a preference for 'quasi-legal' way that would combine the forces of legality and illegality in a specific manner. It can be described as going around the constitution, making use of its internal inconsistencies (the condition of Article 48 or the election of the Reichspresident and the parliament through popular vote, so creating two conflicting 'bodies of legislation to the advantage of the former during the presidential governments) and openly violating it in the case of political expediency. This strategy avoiding 'from direct assault on every democratic institution in a radical way corresponded to the fascist violence to a great extent tolerated by the state and 'election battles' that were primarily instrumentalised as receiving public consent through 'deformed' democratic mechanisms where the violence and the plebiscitarian elements co-existed. Primarily, there were two targets of this strategy: one was to strengthen the mass basis of the new state and the other one was to pacify the Republican public and especially deter them from getting into action in the face of the constant insecurity of 'terror affairs' specially targeting to hit them too. So this course of

events though justified in the name of ‘fighting communist threat’ actually tried to eliminate the ground upon which the democratic politics in a parliamentary way and also the democratic uprising from below could flourish. ‘The war against the terror’ has also justified a series of bans on democratic rights and freedoms without a plausible public resistance. These anti-democratic measures also created a necessary climate to erode the economic gains of the working masses (general reduction in wages, elimination of the wage bargaining possibilities, retrenchment in social insurance and assistance and the lack of any sound work creation programme that could be assured by the public role of the state).

The event that we would touch upon regarding the political environment before and after the Prussian intervention could also be evaluated as a ‘test case’ or an important part of a series of experiments that first of all intended to gauge the effect of the non-democratic steps on the Republican mass. Further, willingly or unwillingly, these were the first attempts of creating the institutions of the Third Reich. Even if we can not simply argue that there was a unilinear and ‘conflict-free’ road towards the Third Reich, we can safely claim that the collaboration of Papen-Schleicher-Hindenburg with the NSDAP on the way of constructing the ‘new state’ gives us clues of the political system that would later be crystallised in the Third Reich and highlights an overarching process of the fascisation of the state beyond the immediate decisions of political actors. There were basically two standpoints that gave shape to the process: one was the consensus between the NSDAP and the state and economic elite to liquidate the Republic institutions particularly the Prussian government and the NSDAP’s relative autonomy in terms of sharpening its oppositional forces when the issue comes to any plan of military intervention or ‘a general emergency situation’ that would be directed against its political existence and ‘when there arises a situation that would create ‘presidential government with a parliamentary backing’. Thus, their main formula was to attain ‘a presidential government’ outside and against the parliament but with the mass basis of the NSDAP under the chancellorship of Hitler.

Even beginning from the end of the 1931 and the beginning of the 1932, we can observe the NSDAP's infiltration in the state institutions conquering the main power locations in the society in addition to the intensification of its criticism of the Brüning government that would yield in the election results. Mommsen (1989:754) signified the renewed significance of the 'extra-parliamentarian struggle in the NSDAP's path to power. In his words, "The use of violence had received Hitler's express approval for it had a propaganda function that was all the more palpable because significant sectors of German bourgeoisie looked upon the deployment of violence against the political left with considerable sympathy". Though Brüning and Groener strove for keeping their distance to the SA, the political left was still considered as the main danger to the state authority. During this period, the army was praised as the main protector of the state that was still being largely located against the Republican institutions (Blasius, 2006:28). Thus, the prescribed state reform against the Weimar democracy was thought to be exercised by the 'legal state forces' under the leadership of Hindenburg. A political clique in the Reichswehr and state institutions in line with the NSDAP were not content with such a strategy that wanted to use a more radical means through extra-parliamentarian struggle and integrate the national opposition of the NSDAP into this scene.

At the end of 1931, Goebbels was treating himself as the representative of this 'government within the government'. "Brüning has the legitimacy in the foreign affairs. Beside it, an oppositional quasi-government has been established. By the world, the opposition is found more legitimate". According to the news of the 'Vorwaerts', Goebbels found this development very positive. According to him, the maneuvering capacity of this quasi-government was greater than the regular one" (Vorwaerts, 23.02.1931)

Wagener, commenting on the meaning of the 'Third Reich' in NSDAP's Dusseldorf meeting on 7 November 1931, was revealing what kind of role in the state he attributed to the SA forces. There was also an echo of pushing the state forces towards an either-or decision that would strengthen its own inevitability.

“The decision should be made between the right and the left, between national and international before the uprising of the left. The National Socialists have created a force called as S.A and S.S whose only task is to partake in the necessary fight against the left. We are sure that they are immune to the ‘hostile bacteries’, more than the Police and much more than the army”. He also foresaw the future employee-employer relations in the Third Reich: “We wish that in the future the wage be firmly determined that would be tied to the ‘existence minimum’ but apart from that there should be no binding regulation...All other things should be agreed within the plant. The plant council should be advised by the employer. Making the final decision should always be left to the employer.” (Vorwaerts, 19.01.1932). Indeed, Goebbels had launched before a ‘wave of attacks’ on the industrial plants ‘to expel the Marxist pest and make the factories the ‘the high castles of the Nazis’. The phrase that would more popular in the Third Reich began to be pronounced as an alternative to the legally protected workers’ interests: “Interest harmony instead of class contradictions” (Vorwaerts, 06.01.1932).

During this period, the NSDAP has also penetrated into the security forces of the state including the army and the police and legal institutions that also had a composition of officials which were at odds with the Republican regime and inclined to favour the political right and monarchist allegiance. A news of Vorwaerts on 07.02.1932 had the title of the ‘Nazis in the Army’ within which it has been reported that General Schleicher who would be an active element in the fall of the Brüning government abandoned the decree that bans the entrance of the Nazis into the army. In this way, the Nazis seemed to be legalised. According to the news, Goebbels in the ‘Angriff’ has praised Schleicher for his decision and revealed “his expectation of more favours from him”.

On the other side, the SA was also very active in the police department of the Reich. Through the so-called Boxheimer documents, there appeared a network of espionage activities of the NSDAP within the police and their putsch plans. Even though such a putsch did not take place, it was evident that the SA and the

NSDAP has already involved to co-opt the non-Republican security officials. Braun, the Social democratic president of Prussia claimed that 'The confiscated documents of the NSDAP prove the nature of the party as the 'high traitor' and its 'threatening position' vis-a-vis the public security. He quotes from a speech of Hitler who assumedly argued that he would not mobilise his forces to protect border security of the country in case of war situation. He would not sacrifice his forces for the system. If the carriers of today's system were eliminated, then he would protect the border (Vorwaerts, 12.04.1932).

In fact, what he mentions as the system was a system that has already been undermined and attacked in favour of new state within which democratic force could not have a legitimate place. In that sense, these seemingly anti-systemic view of Hitler did not cover the active elements within the state elite which were already at work in terms of allowing the SA and the NSDAP to engage in 'national' cause.

For instance, the article of Erich Kuttner in Vorwaerts on 19.04.1932 gave an idea about the judges and the courts that were being transforming to a platform of the political sympathizers of the NSDAP and signified how the Prussian government has been the strategic target of the new state elite and the NSDAP in order to bring the institutions of the law into line with their political projects. Kuttner states that

Under the catchword of 'confined justice', the political right tried to smash every attempt of reform. In Kaiserreich, the justice has been instrument of the 'Authoritarian State' that acted against every understanding of law when responding to the oppositional forces. After Magdeburg case, the justice functioned relatively without problem for a while. With the wave of Nazis, everything changed again. Where the judge was overwhelmed by the fanaticism of the Nazis, the non-political attitude has evaporated...When a Nazi agitator has repeated the 'slandering' in a variety of meetings, for the judge he has been punished only for one act, the others remained without the punishment...The most serious danger now comes from the National Socialists. Through an 'unheard' terrorism, the Nazi newspapers are intimidating the judges and the district attorneys who dares to punish Nazi acts...The attorneys in Italy are not persecuting the blood acts of the fascists...If they were able to grasp the Prussian government, then the law would really be 'confined' and the independence would be over...For this reason, the battle over the Prussia is also a battle over the justice (Vorwaerts, 19.04.1932).

Indeed, their claim to be a 'national force' in a strict non-communist environment was the principal factor behind the acceptability of the SA members among the representatives of law. The authoritarian tradition going back to the Bismarck period was also in the way of redefining the 'national' not only in terms of overarching role of the state but the presence of 'active' national social forces fighting against the common enemy i.e. communism including the Social Democracy. Undeniably, this 'preferential treatment' has contributed to the organisational strength in the extra-parliamentary efforts of the NSDAP.

News that belongs to 15.05.1932 in Vorwaerts pinpointed the increasing power of the NSDAP not only within the state but also across the wide range of the 'mainstream' bourgeois society and also summarised the bourgeois' view of the 'patriotic attitude of the NSDAP'. The title of the news was 'Kreuz and Hakenkreuz'. Shortly it commented as follows:

With the brutal will to power and with an instinct that smells every source of power, the NSDAP aims to conquer the 'Evangelist Church'. The one who has the church in his hand, he has a propaganda instrument of first class. Up to the smallest village, they have an influence...The hostile attitude of the largest part of the church against the Republic created an obstacle to the spread of the democracy. The Catholic population is mostly Republican, however, the entire bourgeoisie on the Protestant ground is National Socialist. They think that the National Socialist will recognise the autonomy of the Evangelian Church. D.Schian view the National Socialist movement as such that 'their "essential patriotic position can be treated only sympathetic by the ones who love their country (Vorwaerts, 15.05.1932).

Undoubtedly, the NSDAP's insistent emphasis on its role as the sole representative of the nation and its consistent attitude towards the power elite in terms of sometimes withdrawing their collaborative steps in the name of being purely 'national' has enormously stimulated its opposition potential. In short, they were not simply instruments of the state elite.

Two specific events that implied this position of the NSDAP was first the election of the Reichspresident in the end of the March 1932 in a plebiscitary manner as an alternative to the parliamentary election. From the outset, it can

be said that the election of the president by popular vote has created a legitimate power location for it to compete with the parliament and put the political personalities as the 'leaders' in front of any programmatic or party-based seeking of the votes. The emergence of Hitler as the candidate for the presidency was an attempt on the side of the NSDAP to deepen the personal-charismatic popularity of Hitler as the embodiment of the national will. In his own way, he was representing 'the new young Germany' as against the 'old, outmoded' authoritarian figure of Hindenburg. In the second round, Hitler has lost by taking 37 % of the votes while Hindenburg was reaching beyond the 50 percent threshold. Indeed, the SPD's support for Hindenburg as a lesser evil against the rise of fascism, notwithstanding its being ideologically a very questionable tactic in view of its short-term cooperation with a monarchist, anti-parliamentarian president was also playing into the hands of the NSDAP by the way of leaving all the area of the political opposition to the NSDAP claiming to be the real 'national alternative. Göring's words about Hindenburg in his speech on 13.03.1932 before the elections are enlightening in the sense of its critical distance to Hindenburg's position:

If we are electing the new president, it should imply a change of the course. We demand that the current president should break with the today's system...We follow you if you seek 'help' on the side of traitors..Herr President, you should decide. Whether you would allege to the today's system associated with Brüning or to the new, young Germany represented by Adolf Hitler...There is only two options: The one who relies on the parties that are the creators and carriers of today's system or the man who will save Germany from its deep disgrace and misery (Vorwaerts, 13.03.1932).

Typically, Goebbels also raised his voice against the Hindenburg's course and politically benefitted from his 'assumed' dependence on the SPD as an enemy force. He emphasised and reinforced the essential and unbridgeable divide between the 'Social Democratic state officials and anti-Republic state elite:

Marxist state governments are abusing the 'emergency decrees' to repress our movement...Herr Löbe argued that 'the legal seizure power of the NSDAP' would denote the 'civil war'. However, in the current situation, you would not face with a 'coward bourgeoisie' but the 'awakening Germany'...Hindenburg

left the national politics, now the electors will leave him. The Berlin's 'Asphalt Press' and the Party of the Deserters (referring to SPD) are praising him (Vorwaerts, 24.03.1932).

After this conflict between the NSDAP and Hindenburg, on 13 April 1932 Hindenburg initiated an emergency degree for the 'protection of the state authority' and according to it, the SA was banned and the justification of the ban was the SA's existence of the 'civil war army' and its formation of 'state within the state as the confiscated materials of the SA has put out (Vorwaerts, 18.04.1932). Groener as both the Defense Minister and Minister of the Internal Affairs tried to draw the lines between the state having the sole monopoly on the security apparatus and the fascist formations. He argued that "Neither to the advantage nor nor to the disadvantage of one political group, (about the issue of the ban), one should take the decision only with regard to the 'state reason'" (Blasius, 2006:41). However, the conflict within the state between the ones supporting the restoration of the old authoritarian state under monarchical grounds and the ones putting forward the inclusion of the NSDAP into state-making process went on. According to Mommsen (1989:776), "Brüning and Groener underestimated the emotional resistance against the ban against the SA encountered at the upper echelons of the Reichswehr and in the presidential entourage". New generation of the army officials were appealed by the modern face of 'new nationalism and the idea of 'national rebirth' preferring a modern and national face for the Reichswehr instead of simply alleging to the old hierarchies. Additionally, the factor of General Schleicher should not be forgotten as the main political intriguer against the Brüning government. Schleicher's criticism against Brüning was based on his conviction that the NSDAP should be "won over to a politics of constructive cooperation with the state" and 'the Reichswehr and the NSDAP wanted the same thing' (Mommsen, 1989:776). According to Peukert (1987:262), Brüning's action against NSDAP had no 'anti-fascist meaning. He with Hindenburg was trying to 'tame' the NSDAP in order to gain hegemony in the newly created state of an anti-Republican kind.

In addition to the protests against the ban within the state, there appeared another determinant that strengthened the national opposition against Brüning and led to the reformulation of Hindenburg's course. As a result of the elections of Prussian parliament held on 24.04.1932,

The number of the votes that NSDAP has increased and NSDAP became the strongest party in the protestant areas of Germany. The Bourgeois Collection (Sammlung) became successful and faced with a 'fragmented proletariat'..the Center is the only right-wing party that could resist the Nazi infiltration. But whether they are willing to coalesce with the Nazis is doubtful (Vorwaerts, 25.04.1932).

This election result was the precursor of the further NSDAP victories. It was an indication that the mass base of the Republic has been seriously eroded in favor of a new mass base around the NSDAP that the mainstream political parties sought to attain for the unification of the bourgeois votes. Alongside it, Prussia as the bulwark of the Social Democratic administration began to be seriously questioned by the national opposition and became the essential target of the ones wishing a transformation of the state beyond the confines of the Brüning government. The mass popularity of the NSDAP fueled the attacks on the Prussian government whose elimination began to be thought as a stepping stone for a new political restructuring within the state.

The signs of the course change began to be felt as the national opposition including the DNVP and the NSDAP with the support of the economic elite with the Junkers and the big industrialists had its reflection on the fragility of the Brüning government and its backing by Hindenburg. According to the news in Vorwaerts on 03.05.1932, Bayern state government warned the Brüning government about a possible military intervention. According to the claim, 'General Schleicher and Hammerstein target the Defence Minister Groener. A circle around Hindenburg was trying to replace Brüning with Schleicher. Furthermore, it was commented by the newspaper that "For today's system, one cannot say that it makes the army weak. The Defence Ministry and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are in the hands of generals...The plans

attributed to two generals are also related to the ambitions of the National Socialists. After the rejection of a ban on the Social Democratic Reichsbanner, the NSDAP sees the position of the Groener as 'intolerable' and with the fall of Groener, the NSDAP tries to push for the fall of the Brüning government''.

At the same time, despite the ban on the SA, the incidents of violence directed against 'Republicans and Social Democrats continued. On 04.05.1932, one 'Social Democrat' representative of the state parliament in Danzig was killed by an SS-leader (Vorwaerts 04.05.1932). On 05.05.1932 (Vorwaerts), first hit against the Brüning government came with Groener's leaving the office of 'Defense Minister' but he continued to hold the Ministry of the Internal Affairs. This can be interpreted as the first compromise given to the national opposition that tried to facilitate the fall of Brüning government and stimulated the revision of the 'ban on the SA' on the side of Hindenburg.

Again the Bayern state government by warning Brüning revealed the power shift within the state elite. According to it, the replacement of Groener by another in the Defence Ministry meant a new stage in the process of the seizure of power by the Nazis. It was much more important for them than any participation in government. General Schleicher was eager to put a pressure –that is not in line with the constitution- on the government (Vorwaerts, 19.05.1932).

Vorwaerts complained about the policy attitude of Brüning government by blaming it with not giving enough attention to strengthening social consciousness of the citizens and maintaining public order. Without bread and work, securing the public order seemed impossible. According to them, Brüning excessively relied on the old elites and the conservatives. The moral and material needs were in contrast to the 'daring to the unpopularity' of Brüning (Vorwaerts, 22.05.1932).

In fact, during this period the political violence against the political left gained ascendancy in contrast to the intentions of the few in the government that tried to

keep intact 'the state reason. The titels of 'Hall Battle in State Parliament: the Nazis are hitting communists, many wounded'' (Vorwaerts, 26.05.1932) and "Roughnecks at work: Social Democratic Speaker heavily wounded" (Vorwaerts, 27.05.1932) were indicating the persistence of the political violence and the increase of the political tension and presaging a strategic shift in the power balance of the state.

On 30.05.1932, Brüning withdrew from its governmental responsibilities and it has been accepted by Hindenburg (Vorwaerts, 30.05.1932). Stegmann (1973:423) asserts that Brüning was blamed for its overdependence on SPD and trade unions up to the Christian trade unions of Stegerwald and its total failure in the economic and financial area. Vorwaerts (31.05.1932) commented that the fall of Brüning was pointing to a number of economic and political actors at work:

For the first time in German history the government was discarded by the extra-parliamentary means. 'Certain Reichswehr generals were discontented with the ban on the SA and its support by Groener, certain east-Elbian big landowners did not want the payment for the subvention of the landowner to be directed for settlement purposes, for certain politicians, it was necessary to trigger a shift to the right in the government in line with the election results, it was valid not only for the NSDAP but also for the big industrialists, these affected the Reichspresident and on Sunday, Brüning was a dead man as a chancellor..We see only a danger in the unchaining of these extra-parliamentarian forces''. There appeared an aggressive reactionary elite that was discontented with relatively moderate policy in economic and social area taking into account the social base of the SPD and Centrum.

On 31.05.1932 Papen was appointed to the office of Reichskanzler with the 'Cabinett of Barons' composed of mainly the figures of having aristocratic landowner origin. Papen called the cabinet as the 'national concentration'. The distinguishing feature of the Papen's government was its determination to rule outside and against the parliament and its heavy reliance on the sectional interests of the landowners and big industrialists (Mommsen, 1989:855). However, this decisiveness to retrench the gains of the working class was interacting with the mass power of the NSDAP as a supporting force to facilitate the social acceptability of their policies. It is common to describe the Papen

government as authoritarian trying to 'tame' the NSDAP for its own purpose, hence instrumentalise it. However, even though they called themselves authoritarian, from the start they were devoid of a complete recognition neither from the mass base of NSDAP nor from the SPD. They could not reconstruct the state on their own in an authoritarian manner. Indeed, at this point the concept of the 'fascisation of the state' comes into being as an active will to cooperate with the 'national forces' outside and within the state. It is something more than an authoritarian state. Social reactionary ambitions of the government could not be imposed on the society unilaterally. An ally of mass political party with extra-parliamentary power resources could be integrated into the new state. As such, three quotations from the members of the Papen's government is revealing in terms of their attitude towards the NSDAP and the SA:

Papen in his declaration of the government programme delivered a speech which comes very close to the specific ambitions of the NSDAP itself:

In the heaviest hour of the history, the government came into office. The German Volk stands in a moral and material crisis without any past example. The internal and external freedom can only be achieved when we are capable of finding the moral prerequisites through *the unity of the 'willing to construct and 'state-conserving' forces, shortly national forces.*

The financial bases of the Reich, Prussia and the State are shattered. The main reforms-Administration reform, Finance Reform.. The social insurances are on the verge of bankruptcy. The constantly rising unemployment insurance undermine the will to work among the productive force for the German people.

The post-war governments believed that the state socialism will alleviate the material condition of both the employer and employees. They have tried to transform the state into a welfare state and through this they have weakened the moral forces of the nation. They have attributed the task to the nation that it can not fulfill. That is why the unemployment soared.

The moral decay of the nation was sharpened by the 'the community-hostile' class conflicts. These are deepened by the 'culture bolshevism' that tried to destroy best sources of the nation...This '*Atheist-Marxist*' style of thinking infiltrated the society because of the 'compromise willingness' of the Christian forces. '*The purity of the public life*' cannot be maintained and reconstructed by the compromises or on the basis of parity. One should decide that 'which forces' are needed to construct the Germany on the 'unchanging' basis of Christian world-view.

The basis and precondition of an effective foreign policy about whose direction there is no opinion differences is the implementation of clarity in the domestic policy. Due to all these reasons, the Reichpresident has given the authority to the government for the dissolution of the parliament. The Nation stays in front of the deciding on through which forces it will create the future. The government, *independent of the parties*, will strive for the 'spiritual and economic health of the Nation' and the rebirth of the new Germany (04.06.1932, Abend).

If we shortly analyse this text, the affinity to the political vision of the NSDAP becomes more visible. Papen tried to completely negate the Weimar democracy and blamed it for being 'Atheist-Marxist' corrupting the organic existence of the nation and creating a welfare state. Now, the Republican thought and institutions turned into an 'internal enemy' along a strict friend-foe axis. Thus, Prussian government could not be imagined as an acceptable part of the state. In the same vein, a narrow definition of the nation 'without including the working classes supporting the SPD and KPD' was visible. Secondly, there was a heavy emphasis on the non-parliamentarian and anti-party stance of the government that was deemed to be praised as a virtue of the nation. Thirdly and most importantly, the new state did not only trust in the state apparatus to pave way for the 'national rebirth' but needed the participation of the forces that are 'willing to construct' and 'state-conserving', i.e 'national' ones. Actually, with these expressions Papen did not stand somewhere far from the political vision of the Third Reich developed by the NSDAP. In fact, a complementarity between the 'new state' and the NSDAP becomes clearly visible.

In a way affirming Papen, the words of the New Minister of the Internal Affairs von Gayl pointed at the necessary integrity of the NSDAP into the new state. Even while he was not disguising his monarchist adherence, he necessitated an alteration in the authoritarian vision of the state by "intending to allow SA and SS to function and embrace the task of praising and using the 'powerful national movement of today as the 'state and Volk preserving' national force'" (Vorwaerts, 10.06.1932)

In the same vein, the New Defence Minister General Schleicher put emphasis on the necessity of a 'mass consent' to a possible repressive regime and recognised the formation of the national will (embodied in the NSDAP) through both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary methods as the basis of the new state:

Reichswehr should be 'apolitical' and 'above parties', however, the power of the *bajonett* is not enough for a government, a government whose mass basis incessantly decreases and whose parliamentary basis does not correspond to the 'real behaviours in the people' cannot have claim on the army. A long-lasting and productive government is only possible if it does not turn against the currents which fulfill the demands of the mass and if it is capable to *build a trust basis out of the 'living and future-oriented' forces*. These considerations are so imperative that they are sufficient enough to justify the course change (Vorwaerts, 19.06.1932).

There were two decisions of the Papen government that were revealing the main tenet of newly emerging state: one was 'the abolition of the ban on the SA' and the other one was the economic emergency decree' that disproportionately relied on the 'employer's preferences at the expense of the large working classes. According to the news of the 'Vorwaerts',

Alongside the unemployment insurance, pension of the 'war victims', insurance of the invalids, the insurance of the civil servants and 'accidence insurance' were retrenched, all nearly by 15 percent. There appeared also an increase in the taxes that were predominantly concerning the working classes. The wide masses should shoulder the 1.5 Milliarden while the business has been awarded by 50 Millionen, there is no bonds for the work creation, no support for the construction of buildings and street construction programme. Welfare state retrenchment was characterised by shortening the unemployment insurance from 20 weeks to 5 weeks, the introduction of means-test mechanism, the introduction of sales tax and salt tax (15.06.1932).

According to Winkler (2018:598), while Brüning was foreseeing the reduction of the process of care of the unemployment insurance from 20 to 13 weeks, Papen government determined it as 6 weeks after which the means-test mechanism will be used which is wide below the 'existence minimum'. Thus, the social care function of the state in a dramatic situation of the unemployment was seriously dropped and 'wide segments of society' remained without any social protection.

The people that could not pay their rents faced with a problem of settlement for their families while the hunger became widespread (Winkler, 2018:600)

On the other side, the ban on the SA was abolished by the Papen government (Abend, 16.06.1932). This decision actually was indicating the willingness of the government to integrate the 'constructive national forces' embodied in the NSDAP to the body of the new state. However, it was also officially paving the way for a security challenge to the state authority as the former emergency decree in April had banned the SA because of its 'para-military forces that could lead to the 'civil-war like conditions'. In any case, this decision represented a deliberate attempt to unfold the 'national forces' as 'auxillary forces' for the security apparatus of the state in the fight against the communists and the SPD. Indeed, the SPD officers and Vorwaerts pointed at the internal link between the 'unsocial' economic emergency decree and the abolition of the ban on the SA and claimed that the Papen government having a narrow mass base was tolerated by the NSDAP (Vorwaerts, 21.06.1932). Thus, according to them, the social effects of the decree were tried to be made disguised by the implicit assent of the NSDAP. Actually, we are discerning here one of the main elements of the fascist politics that tried to reconfigure the social protest stemming from the unemployment and hunger into an 'anti-communist' hysteria that was stimulated both by the government and NSDAP. Although NSDAP did not forego the opportunity of agitating against the 'capitalist-reactionary' Papen government (Vorwaerts 21.06.1932), Goebbels admitted that they were not dealing with the small economic issues while the 'national rebirth' and 'SA march against the 'communists' were at stake (Rote Fahne, 01.07.1932). On the other hand, Mommsen (1989:789) claims that the 'NSDAP refrained from attacking the new chancellorship directly because it did not want to jeopardize the dissolution of the Reichstag or the suspension of the ban against the SA'. According to him, apart from that NSDAP did not give any written assurance of toleration of the Papen government after the election. According to this formulation, behind the Papen government, there was the support of the Reichswehr, the Reichspräsident

and a variety of the business groups. However, it seemed impossible to exclude the NSDAP as an active ally in the design of the new state.

Although the political violence has intensified generally among different political sections, the provoking role of the SA was evident. They were expressing an 'uninhibited reign' of terror that was not simply directed against the 'armed' forces of the KPD, but specifically and primarily against the legal foundations of the political left. That strategy was quite in line with the security policy of the Papen government. Insisting on their position of 'self-defence against the communism', the NSDAP 'portrayed itself as the only reliable force that could maintain public order in the face of Communist terrorism and sought to substantiate this claim through the disciplined public behaviour of the SA' (Mommensen, 1989:795). Undoubtedly, it was also an attempt to appeal to the anti-communist fears of all sections of the bourgeoisie. However, now what is meant by communism began to also cover all the republican elements being an obstacle to the new state.

According to Vorwaerts (22.06.1932), The National Zeitung on 18.06.1932, a newspaper supporting the NSDAP, argued that

We, National Socialists, have no doubts about the fact that there is no return to the methods of Brüning, the times have also past when the Centrum and the Marxism can be effective..There is only one movement that is organised up to the last village: National Socialism. Today there is only two big power factors in Germany that can reinforce the rebuilding of the Fatherland: Reichswehr and half million S.A. If the development goes on in this direction, then the future of the Germany will be in the hands of SA and Reichswehr..The Centrum and Marxism can only be ruled by the whip.

In the same vein, Goebbels also stood for a hostility against the SPD and Centrum: "Our politics goes its own way. Our press and the party should take the party from a defensive position and locate it in an offensive front vis-a-vis the Marxist parties and the Centrum. The Parties of the fourteen years bankrupt-policies can not accomplish it. Black-red parties are not able to make a

mass base out of the situation and turn from 'complained ones' into 'complainers' (Vorwaerts, 19.07.1932).

Actually, the collaboration between the NSDAP and Papen can be viewed from a interrelationship between the security/insecurity problematics caused by the SA provocation and the readiness of the Papen government to enter into undemocratic steps against 'unnational groups' and justify it under the disguise of re-consolidating the state authority and maintaining 'peace and order'. The Prussian government led by the Social Democrats was regarded by two parties- NSDAP and Papen Government- as the common enemy that stands as an autonomous, democratic bulwark but which has suffered from its erosion of its popular appeal as they lived serious losses in Landtag elections on 24 April 1932. In this context, the will of the Papen government to 'dispel' SPD from state affairs to a great extent overlapped with the NSDAP's struggle to strengthen its power with an 'anti-communist' alarm that would prove its indispensability to the state forces. Additionally, the concern for its propaganda effect for the elections of 31 July 1932 should not be underestimated.

We can say that the Prussian police was trying to be equally preventive to the Communist or SA armed groups. Even this too extended neutrality was criticised within the circles of the political left as it was revealed in the KPD's 1 Mai 1929 demonstrations that brought about the ban of RGO, paramilitary organization of the KPD. However, given this state of affairs, the NSDAP was complaining about the harsh attitude of the Prussian police against the SA and propagating the idea of an 'secret collaboration between the SPD and the KPD'. On the other side, for Mommsen (1989:802) the Schleicher-Papen-Gayl triumvirate began to target the Prussian government from the start. Particularly, the 'increasing violence' in Prussia that exceeded the 'reasonable' limits' provided the Reichsgovernment with the pretext to intervene in the Prussia. First the clashes in Ohlau on 10.07.1932 between the Reichsbanner elements of the SPD and the SA that came to the city for a sport festival was publicly viewed as an 'event' that was cursed as an offence of the left groups against SA since the deaths and

the wounded ones were mostly from the SA side. As a result, this event gave the SA the opportunity to take revenge and support the thesis that the Prussian police is unable to prevent the political violence (Blasius, 2006:63-64). On 11 July 1932, the minister of the Internal Affairs, von Gayl said that 'in reality the authority of the state is greatly shattered. The police experience that the National Socialist movement grows but receives orders from the Prussian government to fight against this movement'. For Gayl, the 'psychological' moment to appoint a 'Reichscommissioner' to the Prussian government has already arrived (Winkler, 2018:609).

Already on 12 July 1932, the Papen government has decided to appoint a 'Reichscommissioner' to the Prussian government and declare military 'emergency' situation. However, as Winkler (2018:611) argues, Severing gave his police officers the task of 'controlling all the outdoors demonstrations and if there is a security deficiency, of banning the relevant demonstration. He gave the order of oppressing every militant armed organisation and also called the population for 'peace and order'. Upon this decree, the Minister of the Internal Affairs decided to wait for the effect of this decree.

According to the article of the Vossische Zeitung on 15.07.1932 evaluating the exceptional and normal condition, 'Some are in favour of the announcement of the 'exceptional condition' as if it has the magical force. Legal resource of it is the Article 48. They will intend to use the Article 48 clause 2 (the case of the exceptional threat to the 'peace and order' to use it for the Prussia).

The situation of the 'exceptional situation' and the appointment of the Reichscommissioner will make everything worse.. 'Harzburg Brotherhood is now revived'. The NSDAP also wants to push the Papen-government to the 'inevitable happenings' as Groener was blamed before for not exercising the 'state necessities'. Although Gayl has done many favours to NSDAP, the NS wants to portray him 'as a weak person', through Kerrl- the Reichspräsident of Prussian parliament—the NSDAP sabotages every attempt to elect new president (Vossische Zeitung, 15.07.1932).

In line with this foresight, on 17 July 1932, later called as 'Bloody Sunday', the insistence of the SA units to march through Altona which was known as populated by its 'communist' sympathisers and the KPD's social influence led to a social tumult. As a result of the 'armed' clashes between the SA and the communists and the involvement of the police in the shootings by a counter-action, there was 12 dead and 54 wounded people remaining out of the clashes (Blasius, 2006:65). There were also interesting facts relating to the incident. According Winkler (2008:611-3), "it was a real mistake of Wilhelm Abegg's (state secretary of the Prussian ministry of Internal Affairs) to exempt Altona from the demonstration ban. Interestingly, in the day of incident the police president Eggerstedt participated in a meeting of the election competition and their most important co-employees were on vacation. It was already known that the SA would provoke one of the red 'high castles' of the communists and the communists would not accept it passively". On 18 July 1932, the National Socialist president of the Prussian Parliament Kerrl wrote a letter to Papen complaining about the deficit of the security in Prussia and calling Papen to act in response to it:

With growing anxiety, I am observing that as the communist and social-democratic propaganda rose without any obstacle, the increase in the insecurity in the state became evident, the attacks and crimes increased. I am not convinced that the current administration is using the 'power mechanisms' that are available to it, in a way of preventing the 'loss of state authority'. Under my responsibility toward the 'majority of the people', which also do not approve the current situation, I feel personally obliged to request from the Reich's government that the police power in Prussia should be governed from the Reich until the restoration of the 'constitutional conditions has been reached (Vorwaerts, 19.07.1932).

On 20 July 1932, the so-called Prussian state intervention happened. Papen declared the emergency decree of 'relating to the re-construction of the public security and order in the area of Prussia'. On the basis of the first and second clause of the Article 48, the Reichspräsident approved the appointment of the Reichschancellor as the Reichskommissioner to the Prussian government and Essen Bracht as the 'representative of Reichskommissioner (Blasius, 2006:70). Thus, the president of the Prussian government Braun and the minister of

Internal Affairs Severing were ousted from the office. The same day, the martial law has been announced for the area of Berlin and Brandenburg where General Rundstedt as the military commander took over the authority of the Prussian police (20.07.1932, Abend). Severing to whom the declaration of the intervention has been made did 'avoid from applying to violence' (Vorwaerts, 21.07.1932) while stating the invalidity and unconstitutionality of the decree. Instead of 'using security apparatus of Prussia or Reichsbanner of the SPD against this unconstitutional decision, Severing chose the option of bringing the case to the 'State Constitutional Court.

Papen replied to the assertions of Severing by pointing at the 'state reason' that led him to take the relevant measures. However, the 'state' reason that Papen was mentioning was quite different from the 'state reason' of Groener who has justified the ban on the SA by using the same term. Papen, in his speech on radio, underlined the close relationship between the 'communists' and the Prussian government as the political justification of the intervention and praised the SA as a national force that can in no way be equaled to the communists: "Because of the fact that some political circles cannot give up the idea of treating the National Socialists and the Communists on equal footing, they (SPD and Prussian government) engaged in a coalition with the 'state-enemy' communist forces against the 'rising movement' of the NSDAP. The Reich government is free of the political connections to the parties but it is not freed from the moral duty of making decision that 'such an equal treatment of the 'state-enemy' forces would undermine the state authority severely' (Blasius, 2006:72).

From these words, it is not plausible to derive the conclusion that the state as a neutral authority entered into scene in order to prevent the civil-war like conditions. From the start, the ambitions of Papen government and the NSDAP overlapped in eliminating the effect of the SPD in the state affairs. Mommsen (1989:817-8) rightly asserts that "Prussian intervention was an example of "class conflict from above" conducted by administrative means and rested upon

the indirect but extremely effective cooperation between ,on the one hand, the deeply conservative entourage and the Reichswehr and ,on the other hand, NSDAP, SA and SS''. Both for the NSDAP and the Papen government, the Prussian intervention proved to be a test case through which the response of the political left against any unconstitutional action was gauged. Actually, the republican forces failed in that sense in the sense of raising a meaningful resistance, in the form of a general strike or through Prussian police force or Reichsbanner. Goebbels thought that 'the reds missed the great opportunity, it wouldn't come again'' (Mommssen, 1989:815)

Actually, it was a green light for the experiments of the Papen government. Firstly, the acceptability of the reactionary social retrenchment measures and economic policies favoring the business outside the control of the parliament was assured through the rise of the NSDAP which was attacking the SPD and KPD as the main source of dissent towards such policies. As Severing in his article in *Vorwaerts* put out, "the decree of 16 Juni (economic decree of Papen) could not be possible without shocks in 'public order and security'" (27.07.1932). Thus, the physical and moral assault on the opposition to a large extent paralyzed its concentration on mobilising the social protest against hunger and unemployment. Secondly, instead of the 'social immiseration', the question of 'public security/insecurity' consisted in the first issue of the public debate. The Papen government devoid of a meaningful mass basis tried to justify its existence by utilising the security apparatus of the state against the 'communist insurgency' and disguise its unconstitutional action. On the other hand, it was also explicitly trying to enlarge the mass basis of the NSDAP as an alternative to the republican forces namely SPD and the Centrum.

In fact, the fascisation of the state functions in two ways. While the government pays lip service to the 'fascist' 'national' forces, hence legalising their terrorism, it also makes a 'large definition' of 'state-enemy forces' in a way covering the legal political parties and groups being portrayed as in association with the communism, thus 'terrorising' these segments, making them an 'easy' prey to

the fascist attacks. On the other side, this fascisation process was enforced by the fascisation of the society on which regularly a security dilemma is imposed. 'Either you are on the side of the 'state-protecting' and 'nation-protecting' forces, consequently on the side of the 'state order' or you are on the side of the 'un-national forces' demanding a chaos and instability in parallel to the 'communist' ambitions. Whereas it is a way of making the social question invisible, it is also a strategy to turn formal elements of the democracy (such as elections) into a plebiscite fashioned with the 'legitimacy' of violence by the nationalists. This push for an 'either-or' decision is being supported by the 'bloody' clashes between the 'national' forces and 'un-national' ones. In fact, the relation of the Prussian intervention to the 'bloody' elections of 31 Juli 1932 can properly be understood in this context. Though there were more deep-rooted reasons for the emergence of the mass base of the NSDAP, specific incidents fostered by the fascisation of the state created a favourable climate for NSDAP's appeal to the 'bourgeois voter through 'anti-communist' hysteria, through spreading the feelings of fear and anxiety among those social segments. Consequently, NSDAP did not leave its role as an 'opposition to the (republican) system', hence gave vent to feelings of social reaction, however, its active role in the newly emerging state made it an 'indispensible protector of 'public order'. This role could be politicised further as long as they involved in the elimination of 'Marxist' elements in the society now covering a large political spectrum ranging from the SPD to the Center party.

The results of the 'bloody election' of 31 July 1932 can be viewed as a victory of the NSDAP taking %37.3 of the total votes and being the largest mass party in Germany. The party achieved the bourgeois unification in votes long wished by the conservatives and liberals. However, the troublesome issue for the NSDAP was their inability to reach the 'absolute majority' in order to guarantee the 'sole reign' of the NSDAP in the state. There were symptoms indicating the limits of the mass mobilisation through election campaigns. Hence, the NSDAP cannot infiltrate the voter pool of the 'SPD' and 'Centrum' which stayed relatively stable (Mommsen, 1989:827). From another point of view that was supported by

Vorwaerts, “the German with a clear majority did not want fascism” (Vorwaerts, 01.08.1932). On the other side, however, this election score of the NSDAP was proving that NSDAP or SA were not simply a ‘paramilitary organisation’ under the command of the state but had a mass basis that led it to claim for representing the ‘national will’ mainly stemming from the voters from the right of the political spectrum and providing the party with a real bargaining power towards the Papen government that suffered from the lack of such a popular support.

Mommsen (1989:829) asserts that after the elections the National Socialists intensified their wave of terror mainly against the SPD to convince the society and the state of the proposition that “the only way in which law and order could be restored was through Hitler’s appointment as chancellor”. For instance, the assassination series on 02.08.1932 (Vorwaerts) created a widespread horror among the Republican circles which brought up the ideas of self-help in an environment of ‘public security’. In Braunschweig, Oldenburg and Anhalt where the national socialist governments rule, SA and Stahlhelm has officially assumed the role of ‘auxiliary police’. Vorwaerts was rightly complaining about the ‘preferential treatment of the NSDAP in matters of police and justice. “On the one side, attendants, murder, arson perpetrated by the SA. “On the other side, the use of the SA as the protector of ‘life and property” (Vorwaerts, 06.08.1932).

We can argue that ‘the structure of the police and law’ of the Third Reich was already being shaped under the Papen government. This institutional structure was also paving way for a formation of ‘a justice’ typically formulated in a fascist manner. The Angriff argued that “who wants to be treated as ‘an equal citizen’ before the state, then he should live accordingly. With this view, according to the state reason, the ‘state-preserving elements’ should be protected from the ‘Mordterror’ of this people. State-preserving elements are not the KPD, their paramilitary organisation or Reichsbanner..Then they should be treated not as ‘a decent citizens’ but ‘Marxist terrorists” (Vorwaerts, 06.08.1932) Thus, not

the 'murder' but the political view of the murderer began to be decisive in the evaluation of violence. Again in 'Angriff' it was said that "Our one SA man is ten times more important for us than any other 'party bigwig' (Social Democrat official or party leaders' (Vorwaerts, 09.08.1932). On 07.08.1932 in Vorwaerts, it has been reported that "The ban on the civil servants to be a member of NSDAP is abolished. The propaganda can go on without interruption in the police, military and in the bureaucracy. If this process continues in this way, the Reichwehr that 'stands fast in its Führer' can do nothing to 'protect the 'state order'...Everybody knows that the 'Reichswehr is not over-willing to 'give its blood' to protect 'constitutional order'. Schleicher can also lose control of it... Fascism will proceed, will play for 'everything' until it crushes with 'another will'..It is not the the will of Papen-Schleicher government".

From the above facts, one can deduct that the NSDAP and the SA has already taken stronghold within the state and has mobilised the election results to justify their claims for the monopoly of power in the state. However, this overtly exaggerated self-confidence hit to the rejection of Hindenburg to grant Hitler with full presidential powers independent of any majority in the parliament. On 13.08.1932, Hindenburg proposed Hitler to participate in a Papen government without taking the chancellorship, however, from the outset Hitler rejected this option. As a result, Hindenburg stated that 'giving full powers to the NSDAP would amount to "giving all the government power to a movement that insisted to use it unilaterally i.e. in the interest of his party. Hindenburg was sorry because the will that has been formed by the electors would not be a part of the government..Hindenburg wanted Hitler to do the job of **opposition knightly and to be aware of its task before the fatherland and the German people** (Vorwaerts, 14.08.1932).

5.10. Beyond the Dichotomy of ‘Authoritarian State’ and ‘Fascist State’: ‘A Failed Authoritarianism’

Against the rejection of the chancellorship of Hitler by Hindenburg, Goebbels claimed that they were representing the ‘German nation’ that could not be kept in chains by a clique that has no mass basis:

A government that called itself ‘national concentration’ will face with the resistance of the ‘entire national Germany’ that we are representing...We should not be afraid of the result of the fight. If one rejects to give us the power today, tomorrow he will have to give it. Not because of the sympathy within the government but because it is unshakably embedded in the inevitability of the German development..(Against Papen). It can be good for some to depend on the Bajonett but one can not sit on it long-lastingly (Abend, 15.08.1932).

In the aftermath of the 13 August 1932, Hitler defined Papen as a ‘chancellor without people’. Actually, alongside the self-confidence of the NSDAP, these words are meaningful in terms of drawing attention to the necessity of a government claiming to be authoritarian to base itself on a mass consent and an institutional structure that revealed the recognition of the ‘authority’. However, the Papen government could not be defined in this way and their reliance on the Reichspresident as an overarching authority as an ‘entity over parties’ has seriously been eroded by involvement of the government in the close cooperation with a party, namely the NSDAP.

However, it would be mistaken to regard the conflicts between the NSDAP and the Papen government as an essential contradiction or an insolvable dilemma. Rather, they have many commonalities that would attract them to each other later on.

It is a fact that the Papen government went on to apply to the power mechanisms that would be taken over later on by the Third Reich. To prove its power, the government introduced much sharper imprisonments against the ‘political clashes’, brought about the ‘death sentence’ to the political crimes and conducted

‘extra-ordinary’ courts (Sondergerichten) to deal with the ‘terrorist’ acts. Of course, to deter the further escalation of ‘terrorism’ was found as appropriate to ‘renew the public security’ and legitimate its existence and give a lesson to the NSDAP by implying that the ‘free hand’ given to the SA in terrorist attacks was not limitless. However, these decisions primarily strengthened the political oppression against the republican political groups and communists. Vorwaerts (09.08.1932) rightly warned that “‘Papen talks about using ‘every possible means brutally against terrorism but actually against whom?’”. They imply that the measures like reviving the death-sentence and the extra-ordinary court could easily become a whip against the democratic forces of the country in the hands of current police and courts. Indeed, “‘Dr.Bracht (Reichscommissioner in Prussia) argued that ‘whipping the passions’ through the press should be stopped, otherwise they should expect ‘sharp attacks’ on the freedoms” (Vorwaerts, 09.08.1932). The bans on the Social Democratic and Communist press became more regular and under the pretext of the terror, even the peaceful demonstrations were banned during the August what Hindenburg explained as the ‘extension of Burgfrieden’ (Vorwaerts, 10.08.1932). Thus, these measures seriously restricted the domain of the Republican forces that can assert their power legitimately and effectively. The relevant conflict between the NSDAP and government began to turn itself into a vehicle of ‘dismantling the democratic rights and freedoms.

In this context, the Potempa murder case within which a land worker sympathizing with the communism was murdered by five SA men was exemplary in terms of indicating to what extent the rule of law dominates in Germany. The ‘extra-ordinary court in Beuthen decided on execution of 5 death sentences. This decision became an issue of ‘great agitation among the nationalist circles. On the day of the decision, “‘Heines from the NSDAP made provocations in the court room...There appeared turmoil in the city...The Reichpresident was the final decision maker about ‘life and death’ in the country.”. According to the comment of the newspaper, “‘The rejection of the ‘clemency’ would cause further conflicts between the government and the

NSDAP. However, 'the clemency' of death sentence unilaterally for the NSDAP would mean the end of rule of law and return to the ur-state of the 'first-law'. Fanatical supporters of the death-sentence was threatening its opponents with death sentence (Vorwaerts, 23.08.1932). Papen asserted that "the critics of the Beuthen decision in the press should not target the 'state authority' but the 'bloody acts' themselves. The Reichsgovernment will counteract every attempt to distort the basis of the 'rule of law'" (Vorwaerts, 24.08.1932). However, at the end in September, the Papen government granted clemency to the perpetrators. This case shows that how the political decisions can shape the use of the 'extraordinary courts' or 'death-sentence when legally uncontrolled president is the last decision maker on the specific cases. Anti-terror measures can easily degenerate into political punishments particularly against the so-called 'un-national' forces.

In the political process following 13 August 1932, there appeared a constant state crisis that allowed the establishment of neither a sound presidential government nor an alternative parliamentary government. Against the arguments that claimed that the internal dynamics of the political process made the political actors 'helpless' in finding a solution to the problem of government-making, we can say that the specific characteristics of both the Reichspresident-Papen government and the NSDAP was the main reason for the deadlock. They were both strictly anti-parliamentarian and eager for presidential powers that would function without any legal and political control mechanisms.

The most radical proposal in the government came from the Minister of Internal Affairs, von Gayl who stood for declaring 'martial law', creating a 'total state' that would be positioned brutally against both the parliament and the political forces including NSDAP and SA (Mommssen, 1989:833). However, Papen and Schleicher were not convinced of 'a total break with the constitution'. As they have previously put out, a military regime against any political affiliation could not provide a long-lasting government while all the political forces stood strictly against it. According to the ideologues of the new state like Schotte, "the new

state was an authoritarian Presidential state with corporatist elements. It was supposing the plebiscitarian election of 'Reichspresident'. He was embodying the general will of the people and constituting the center of the political power'' (Winkler, 2018:65). Papen, instead of initiating 'a state of emergency', used the threat of coup d'etat to "keep the oppositional forces in the German party system in line" (Mommsen, 1989:857).

The Papen government and the Reichspresident was uncompromising if there appeared a return to the parliamentary system since it would mean the loss of the privileges of the Presidential power and the exclusion of Presidential entourage. For instance, when the Center offered Schleicher to build a government under his chancellorship basing on the consent of a parliamentary majority, he responded as "unwilling to lend a hand in adulteration of an independent presidential government by assuming the leadership of a cabinet formed in effect by the parties" (Mommsen, 1989:846). On the other side, Papen was paying lip service to the search for an alliance between the Center and the NSDAP by describing it as 'an unnatural and unstable alliance' (Mommsen, 1989:844). On the other side, the position of the NSDAP towards the parties and the parliament was not so different from the one of the Papen government. Indeed, Hitler also pointed at the uselessness of the 'plurality of the parties' or parliamentary coalitions. He was obsessed with the presidential powers as much as Papen government did. The Center was willing to cooperate with the NSDAP to save the power of the parliament and the appeal of the constitution. Their ambition was not a decisive return to the parliamentary system, however, especially Brüning was advocating an 'authoritarian democracy' that would still rely on a parliamentary majority but have a 'a status of being above parties' with the trust of the Reichspresident. The NSDAP insistently rejected any spurs of 'parliamentarian revival' that would make it a system party and make it devoid of wide ranging powers of presidential government that would cancel the effect of political opposition entirely.

During the fascisation phase, the NSDAP could be treated as the 'natural' ally of the Papen government. This fact did not exclude the NSDAP's willingness to be oppositional force when it comes to the power conflict with the government. Typical for this case is their attitude towards the economic 'extra-ordinary' decrees that Papen government has issued. While the 'social reactionary' nature of the Juni decree was obvious, the NSDAP had treated it with a relative ease due to its immediate political objectives. Now after 13 August 1932 they began to criticise the 'clique of barons' which was turned into a confession by the words of Goebbels who claimed that 'these Herrs (government of barones) took the office on our back'. Indeed, the caricature in Vorwaerts on 08.09.1932 was portraying the businessmen and the state elite responsible for the "the loss of the wage bargaining, the welfare retrenchment, 'exceptional courts-death sentence', 100%Capitalism, Gifts to the Business'" on the back of a SA man. To be honest, there was a grain of truth in this description. While on the one hand trying to exclude the SPD and KPD from the public affairs, Papen was an 'anti-democratic' and 'anti-parliamentarian' ally to NSDAP to gain the consent to its 'socially unbearable economic policies'. The economic 'exceptional decree' called as the 'revival of the economy' was also the outcome of a mentality that wanted to put into practice a range of economic policies that remains out of political scrutiny of large masses. In contrast to the Brüning's strict deflationary policy, it contained elements of the 'anti-cyclical' interventions for the job creation like 'tax exemption and wage subventions' to the business (Vorwaerts, 04.09.1932). However, as before, the decree was put all the burden of the crisis on the shoulders of the working classes. It was undermining the right of collective bargaining and foreseeing a 'rigorous cut-back in social spending'. In fact, while Papen could hold an 'Enabling Act' in political matters, he was donated with an 'enabling' authorisation by the President who freed the chancellor from all fetters in labour and social law (Mommensen, 1989:852-4). Now the NSDAP was in opposition and overwilling to expose the 'social-reactionary' nature of the decree. The day of 12 September 1932 when the parliament convened to discuss the Papen government programme, Papen intended to 'dissolve the parliament' before it enters into discussion. However,

the Parliament President Goring upon the demand of a KPD representative immediately shifted to the voting of the 'mistrust' against the government. 512 votes were registered as against Papen government while only 52 seat was in favour of it. By the way, the 'economic decree' was also voted and rejected by the same number of seats (Vorwaerts, 12.09.1932). Ironically, while the NSDAP as non-parliamentarian party was pretending to be supporting the parliamentary means and the constitutionality, Papen claimed that the decisions of the parliament did not enter into force as the parliament has been dissolved beforehand and Hindenburg stood for these 'un-constitutional' and 'non-democratic' decision (Vorwaerts, 14.09.1932). On the side of Papen, the date of 12.09.1932 was symbolising a defeat as the voting explicitly made evident that his 'authoritarian' government was rejected by a 'very large majority of parliament' (Winkler, 2018:651). It proved that the policies designed for the sectional interests of a small business and state elite which are devoid of 'any mass appeal' were not viable and sustainable in the long-run. This situation was inevitably underlining the indispensability of the NSDAP's support to such a government that claims to be using presidential powers on a legitimate ground.

The same incapacity of the Papen government to be 'authoritarian' also became visible in its proposal of the reform of the constitution. According to the plan, a semi-monarchist retreat of the democratic rights was put forward by the government by a transparent vigor to give the Reichspresident a semi-monarchical status and lessen the effect of the parliament on the vital policy issues. The reform was aiming at solving the dichotomy between Reich and Prussia by creating 'united German state', hence eliminating federalism, foreseeing a first chamber like a senate that could vote against the decisions of the parliament, overthrowing Article 54 in the constitution that makes the existence of the Reichschancellor upon the votes of the parliament and replacing the 'equal voting right' by a limited one that grants the right to vote only to the 'married ones, the fathers and the war participants excluding the youth entirely (Vossische Zeitung, 05.10.1932). These demands were in a clear contrast to a mass society that has already overcome the 'authority of monarchy' both

mentally and institutionally. With regard to the limiting the right to vote, Winkler (2018:65) argues that this proposal would be protested by nearly the whole range of political parties from communist and democratic parties to the national socialist party. To exclude the masses entirely from the public affairs was an attempt destined to fail. One should admit that there was a monarchist current in the Center party, in Bayern Volk party and of course in DNVP, however, there should be a 'authority' that was recognised by the people, there should be tangible policy successes –like eliminating unemployment- or well-founded institutions that attract respectability among the parties. Even the status of the Reichspresident above parties was seriously damaged during the beneficial treatment of the NSDAP during the fascisation process.

Two articles of known historian Meinecke illustrates well how the 'authority of the presidential governments was regularly eroded and why. After the Prussian intervention, he was using the following words to denote the dependence of the government on the NSDAP as a factor eliminating its 'authoritarian stance':

Some of the bourgeois strata says that the fortune helps the courage ones, the patronage of the (SPD) bureaucracy is over, Prussian president and police president are ousted. Others speak of a 'state intervention'.. 'State's idea' – party's idea..Some sees in Article 48 a corrective to the pure parliamentarism..However, the last state decisions would stimulate the 'south-Centrum's particularism, radicalisation of the SPD workers. Papen to justify himself puts forward the idea of state reason. However, he should distance from any party understanding..It is rather the implementation of what the NS Landtagspresident had proposed before..Schleicher is 'too smart', he can cooperate today with NS tomorrow with SPD:'Man of the pure state reason'.Schleicher wants to channel a wave into a specific direction instead of stopping or put a dam on it. Groener-Ebert-Hindenburg counteracted the events of 1918 by 'capturing' the Bolshevik Revolution..However, the second success is not guaranteed. At that time, SPD and trade union were very organised..(Today) How can you protect the state from a wild and numerically strong Hitlerism? If you radicalise or exclude the SPD, the remaining bourgeoisie is not strong enough to tame Hitler in a coalition government..There remains the army..When the legitimacy of the authority of 'monarchy' or republican-democratic government eroded, then the authority goes to the 'owner of the military resources', the army... There is no state reason in pure culture..It is associated with personal or political prejudices and obstacles The military medium is not the most efficient medium (Vossische Zeitung, 29.07.1932).

Regarding the proposals of the constitutional reform, Meinecke argues that

(This reform) is possible or wishful if this reform does not turn one chaos into another... This anxiety was also derived from the structure of Papen-Schleicher-Gayl.. This government lives on a 'borrowed capital' and dares to do 'big things'.. They have come to power with the drive of an 'irrational movement'.. . Now the NSDAP is grim.. They have done the 'dirty jobs' and now they are pushed aside.. They want to 'divide' the NSDAP to make them adaptable to a government.. 'Borrowed capital' of the government can go on until when?.. Think of the Reichspräsident... A turn away from the Nazi voters to the 'government-conform' parties can be expected when there is an economic growth and the reduction of the unemployment. The economic conjuncture cannot change so swiftly.. Not only the German nationals but also the Communists are looking forward to the coming of the voters from the Nazi allegiance.. .. This government is not dependent on the parties and living on 'borrowed capital', however, it has a moral force to 'defend the state from the NS through an 'conservative-authoritarian regime', to cure the poisoned body of the Volk through a serum that is made by the same material. However, the base of the government out of the fragmentation of NS would have a small (mass) basis in order to reform the constitution in an authoritarian manner'' (Vossische Zeitung, 12.10.1932).

Actually, Meinecke asserts that the Papen-government was too involved in the assistance of the NSDAP and too much distanced from the republican mass basis represented by the SPD and Center that it cannot arrange 'an authoritarian government' that was already fascised.

On 13.10.1932 in Vossische Zeitung, in the article 'Quo Vadis' regarding the constitutional reform it has been said that

Authority can mean to have the means of the state apparatus-however, another meaning of the authority is the administration through 'smart and good' administration. No clause of the constitution allows an 'incapable' government to rule 'independent of the parties'.. Political life can only be possible through parties.. In Bismarckian state, there was the 'first chamber' that can block the decisions of the political parties. Who can guarantee that 'egoistic intentions' will play no role in the decisions? Every word of Papen has 'a second meaning' beside it. The Centrum and the Bayern gives assent to the constitution reform, but do they really know what it means?

Carl Misch writes that

There are now two authorities in Germany: the Reichspräsident and the Constitution.. 'However, the authority could not add something to the power.

However, the 'misuse' of authority could wear out the power..Our 'authoritarian state' stands on a 'small base'..The 'marketisation' of the already existent ones has a disturbing effect.. There are 'prophets of deceit' saying that the Presidents powers are unlimited as long as it functions in the interest of the nation..German bourgeoisie is so weakened that it accepts every one showing 'the strong hand'..Oh dear citizens, if you can not find yourselves, if you can not depend on your powers, there is no 'revival' or 'growth' (Vossische Zeitung, 16.10.1932).

Even the liberals are in a search for saving the 'state' one way another, however, they could not return to Weimar state or construct a 'new one' in an 'authoritarian manner', then what was the remaining option?

After the November 6 elections, it became evident that the votes of the NSDAP suffered from a considerable decrease, from 37.3 % to the %33. The parties of the bourgeois right, particularly DNVP were the gainers, the share of the votes of the communists in the parliament rose but before everything it was understood that the NSDAP has already passed the zenith of its power in terms of mass mobilization. The demoralisation of the members of the NSDAP and SA and the internal party conflicts concerning Strassers position erupted as far as the attitude of Hitler towards Hindenburg in terms of his claim for monopoly of governmental power has not changed. On 18 November 1932, the Papen cabinet resigned and the resignation was accepted by Hindenburg (Vossische Zeitung, 18.11.1932). However, Hitler still wanted to rule through Article 48 and build a presidential government with his chancellorship (Vorwaerts, 21.11.1932). On the other hand, Hindenburg wanted a parliamentary majority for a Hitler government. According to Vossische Zeitung (22.11.1932), there were a series of Hindenburg's preconditions:

No change in the army administration, no change in the administration of the foreign ministry, no abolition of the economic 'exceptional decrees' that Papen had launched, no election experiments, constitutional reform that does not change the current status of the Prussia vis-a-vis the Reich, the ruling through normal procedures, not through the Article 48, no confinement of the Presidential powers.

Hitler rejected this proposal and insisted on a presidential government under his leadership (Vossische Zeitung, 24.11.1932). Actually, this scene is like the expression of conflict of 'two forces' that are equally hostile to the democratic procedures and equally unwilling to return to the Weimar state system tolerating the legal existence of SPD, KPD and trade unions.

However, governmental deadlock remained. If the state elite wanted to exclude the NSDAP, there appeared two options: an 'authoritarian government' *a la* Papen which proved to be a dead end as explained above or a 'state intervention' through the army. However, in spite of the fears of the SPD of such an intervention (Vorwaerts, 27.11.1932), the unfeasibility of a military intervention was approved by the 'war play' of army that was organised by the end of the November. According to the official report, the army was not powerful enough to maintain a 'state of emergency' from a perspective of public security: "As the result of our study, we have reported to the army that every preparations were completed to turn into practice the state of emergency expeditiously. Nevertheless, our careful assessments indicated that the 'forces of public order' in Reich and in the states are not sufficient enough to keep the constitutional order intact against the National Socialists and Communists and to protect the borders. Thus, it is the duty of the Defence Ministry to prevent the Reich government to take refuge in a military state of emergency" (Kühnl, 2000:156). It was the point when the options for a 'state emergency' by the traditional state elite and the military intervention was practically ruled out in a way of opening the road to the NSDAP to the political rule in one way or another.

5.11. The Extent of the Involvement of the Economic Elite in Shaping the Governments Papen and Schleicher Respectively

It was undeniable that the big industry and land aristocracy was primarily standing behind Papen's economic policies including an anonymous support for the 'extra-ordinary' decrees of 16 Juni and of 04 September 1932 (Winkler, 2018). It was strict social reactionary position formed by the hostility to the trade

unions and SPD and revealed by the deliberate attempt at deconstructing the Weimar welfare system and socio-economic rights of the working classes.

The condition of the NSDAP was problematic particularly its ambivalent attitude towards their economic project and its pseudo-socialist rhetoric that has found its most outstanding expression in Strasser's economic 'Sofortprogramme' ('Immediate Programme') that concentrated on the 'work-creation' schemes with a heavy involvement of the state in the direction of economy (Weimar). Implicit 'state socialist' tendencies within the programme had an effect of leading to discontent among all segments of big capital. After 13 August 1932 when Hitler's claim for the monopoly of political power has been rejected by Hindenburg, the NSDAP's limits of mobilisation became evident and the necessity to compromise with the state and economic elite made an undeniable effect on the economic policy projects of the NSDAP. The 'Arbeitsstelle' of Schacht and the Keppler Circle mainly composed of the businessmen that strongly supported the Hitler chancellorship like Thyssen began to convince the big industrialists of NSDAP's conformity with the 'private property' and 'anti-trade union and anti-parliamentarian stance of the heavy industry and 'export-oriented' industry (Stegmann, 1973:426). On 20 Juni 1932, in a meeting of the Keppler circles, Hitler emphasised on his being a politician and giving free hand to the 'crisis' conception of the businessmen. However, during the meeting according Keppler he had also said that he would crash the trade unions and dissolve the parties (Stegmann, 1973:427).

Surely, there was an 'anti-capitalist, anti-monopolist' wing in the NSDAP that gives assent to the co-functioning with the trade unions. This wing mainly organised by Strasser was endorsing the interests of small and middle-sized businesses wholeheartedly. In time, the economic orientation of the party began to be shaped more by the 'Keppler circle' and Schacht's group which stood close to the interests of the industrialist to the disadvantage of the NSDAP's state socialist elements (Stegmann, 1973.429). However, this shift in the economic policy direction did not guarantee the support of the industrialists who had

exerted their doubts about the 'anti-capitalist' preferences of some party members and a 'complete' elimination of the effect of that wing. SA's 'unorderly' action in terms of security of the private property and its social-revolutionary aspirations having still validity was being questioned by the big business. For instance, on 02.10.1932 the NSDAP's participation in the 'traffic strike' ironically in corporation with the communists was still providing a challenge both to the state and economic elite which were understandably averse to the 'anti-systemic' trends in the party which according to them even Hitler might not be able to control.

However, after 6 November 1932, the Keppler Circle sent a letter to Hindenburg for his appointment to the Chancellorship. The letter has been signed by a variety of industrialists, middle-sized firms, bankers and landowners including Schacht, Kurt von Schröder and Hecker. To these, one should add the presidents of 'Reichlandbund', the main organisation that was representative of the landowner class, Eberhard Graf von Kalckreuth and Thyssen who are already closely associated with the National Socialists (Winkler, 2018:670). Although this letter was not responded positively by Hindenburg and did not unite the entire industry behind Hitler, it was also a sign of the fact that the business was not so much enthusiastic as it has been in September and October about the stance of the Papen government (Winkler, 2018:671).

The Schleicher presidential government can be viewed as 'an emergency government' that came into being as a result of the widespread loss of legitimization of the Papen government. Its basic premise was to reach at a 'consensus politics' (Verständigungspolitik) that would build a 'Queer-Front' that would incorporate the trade unions from the ADGB to Christian trade unions, from the Strasser wing of the NSDAP to the paramilitary organisation of the army, Stahlhelm. Indeed, it intended to construct a 'mass base' that is brought together with the initiative of the state and designed to be loyal to the presidential government (Mommensen, 1989:898). This stance was criticised by the 'heavy industrialists' mainly on three grounds: social policy, state

intervention and the disruption of the state reform (Neebe, 1981:143). According to this view, Schleicher, willingly or unwillingly was creating an atmosphere for the 're-parliamentarisation' and the revival of party politics. Actually, though there are intense conflicts between the landowners and industrialists and among the industrialists themselves, the common denominator was their 'anti-parliamentarian' and 'anti-trade union' position that in their eyes was ruling out any return to the 'old socio-economic system'. However, there was no widespread consensus on the alternative system. While Papen's concern for protecting and enhancing the business interests in socio-economic policy was appreciated unanonymously by the business circle, the attitude of the 'moderate' industrialists and the landowners towards the 'trade policy' has diverted from each other. The 'moderate' industrialists commonly organised around the RDI and DHIT were strictly positioned against the autarkic tendencies in the economy as the heavy involvement of the Reichslandbund in policy making was disturbing the interests of export-oriented industry and the newly emerging industries. Papen's idea to compensate the losses of the position in world markets through their gainings in wage policy and social policy was not entirely endorsed by the industry. Schleicher's emphasis on the 'free trade' and 'internal social consensus' has received a positive response by the DHIT and particular by Kastl and Krupp in RDI government (Neebe, 1981:149-150). Actually, there was also tensions within the RDI regarding the Schleicher's tendency to follow the main line of the Papen government and also to initiate potential socio-economic experiments to strengthen its mass basis. Neebe (1981:151) questions the thesis that during the Schleicher period, the coalition of 'landowner' and 'the big industrialists' has already been constructed for the chancellorship of Hitler. According to him, while the 'moderate' heavy industrialists around Reusch and Springorum (Lagnam-Verein) were favoring the reorganisation of the Papen government with the inclusion of the Strasser from the NSDAP, the RDI and DHIT administrations were advocating the continuity of the Schleicher's government and strictly opposing the 'the revival of the Harzburg front' with the incorporation of the NSDAP (Neebe, 1981:152). However, Papen has already realised the 'ineffectiveness of Strasser' within the NSDAP and opted for

‘framing’ Hitler in the ruling coalition. According Stegmann (1973:433), in the face of the failure of the Papen government alone and the threatening danger of a parliamentary majority between the NSDAP and Center for which Strasser stands for, a ‘controlled’ Hitler government was regarded as the ‘smaller nuisance’ for the ruling state elite.

However, ‘authoritarian and anti-parliamentarian stance’ of the entire business was not irreconcilable with the Hitler’s intentions of ‘eliminating the trade unions, SPD and KPD’, discarding the parliament through an ‘Enabling Act’ and re-regulation of ‘employer-employee’ relations in a way giving new mass basis and legitimacy for the capitalist social relations. This point is important in the sense that despite the internal strives within the business circles, there were some common points such as the need to construct a new social basis which would replace the Social Democracy and its working class forces integrated into the Weimar consensus. Silverberg, one of the leaders of the West industrialists and his publishing organ, ‘Deutsche Führerbriefe’ was one of the main industrialists that properly analysed the need of the mass support for the unpopular economic policies. During the 1920’s Silverberg was in a position of defending ‘the inevitability of the Social Democracy’ for the German capitalism. At the same time, he was in favour of strengthening of the private sector with regard to the state interventions. Understandably, he was advocating a unity of the bourgeois political parties. However, as it appeared to be impossible to arrive at such a target since the electoral breakthrough of the NSDAP became evident, his position has changed (Neebe, 1981:157). He began to emphasise on the necessity of integrating the NSDAP into the political system and the inability of Papen government to create a mass basis for the acceptability of its economic policies. If we borrow the quotation of Neebe from Silverberg’s comments on the government of the national concentration, we would point at the following words as critical:

We fear that the government, in order to have a support, would wholly identify itself with the business. However, it would mean that the government would

face with an opposition composed of three or four mass parties which could together attack on the presidential government from a perspective of the social policy, state socialism and trade-union favoritism...*It would be better for us that the unpopular measures like the inevitable wage decreases was made acceptable under the mantle of a mass party* (Neebe, 1981:159).

It is interesting that Silverberg was more foresighted in terms of long-term interests of the business in order to disguise the adverse effects of the economic policies of Papen with the assistance of a mass party like the NSDAP. According to him, the Social Democracy was no longer able to fulfill its function to create a 'unity of the working class with an organic relationship with the trade unions. In a process of dissolution of representative organisation of the SPD and parliamentary democracy, National Socialism could be in place to provide an alternative mass basis for the current capitalist re-structuring. Naturally, he connected the needs of the business to the willingness and capacity of the NSDAP to cooperate with them. On 20 Juni 1932, he expressed the following words in 'Deutsche Führerbriefe:

The economy needs to take five million unemployed from the street and integrate them into the workforce, before everything it demands 'peace, order and a political situation remaining the same. The business is ready to work with the National Socialism. However, until now the movement has not satisfied the need of the economy for order. That is why there is the possibility for the business to depart from the National Socialism and follow the Papen course because his programme promises the security of the order and the avoidance from the socialism and Marxism...Without the enterprises and the economy, the National Socialism would be in no position to bring the unemployed into the plants, to provide bread and work to the people and in this way to reach its national goals'' (Neebe, 1981:162).

These words indicate the inherent reciprocity between the interests of the NSDAP and the business interests. While the most of the business centers were frightened by the Strasser's 'Immediate Programme', the 'Deutsche Führerbriefe' was finding a 'rational and reliable' logic behind Strasser's position that on the one hand regards the necessity of the mass effect of the programme in terms of responding to the needs of the working classes and on the other hand satisfies the requirements of the business interests (Neebe, 1981:163-4). It was what was expected from a mass party that knows how to combine the

‘popular promises’ and economic necessities in a unique way. ‘Deutsche Führerbriefe’ was also praising Strasser for his and his parties’ decisive turn from its ‘socialist’ ambitions. By September 1932, Strasser was arguing that “‘We recognise the private property, we recognise our debts and our responsibility to pay them. We are against the “nationalization of the industry”’. We are against the nationalization of trade. We are against the planned economy in the Soviet sense. If we come to power, we would not involve in ‘forceful’ changes in the economy”’ (Neebe, 1981:164). Silverberg was in favour of incorporation of the NSDAP entirely including the Strasser wing to the government. However, the internal conflict within the NSDAP between Hitler and Strasser and Strasser’s resignation from its party positions was evaluated as a failure by Silverberg (Neebe, 1981:170). While “‘Deutsche Führerbriefe’ was criticising the NSDAP leadership for its overreliance on the demagogic stance, total claim for power and generally unordered behaviour, the decision of Papen to build the government with the NSDAP and the Hitler’s Reichschancellorship was welcomed by them (Neebe, 1981:172-3). However, the contradictions between the autarchy and export-oriented trade and state intervention and the need to de-couple the economy clearly from the state (Silverberg’s position inspite of its support for Hitler) was not totally resolved.

5.12. Conclusion: The Seizure of Power or the Delegation of the Power: How to conceive of the fascisation process?

Apart from the disinclination of the state and economic elite for a return to a parliamentary regime or for a possible socio-economic control of the economic policies by the working masses, there were also specific events that caused the fall of the Schleicher. The so-called ‘East Aid scandal’ proved the abuse of the public money for strengthening of the landed aristocracy (Winkler, 2018:715). The involvement of the name of the Hindenburg in the scandal aggravated the scope of the corruption. Actually, such events were indicating how a parliamentarian control over the government and the Reichspresident could be disastrous for the ruling elite. The elimination of the political organisations of the

working classes and the 'ineffectiveness of the parliament' was paramount to the sustainability of the anti-social decrees of Brüning and Papen period. While Hindenburg was insisting on his presidential powers and rejecting Hitler's chancellorship or any other parliamentary majority, he was not simply protecting 'his status above the politics but was revealing a kind of ruling without any public oversight and democratic participation. Hindenburg was strictly against the abolition of the decree of 20 July 1932 called as 'Prussian state intervention' and 'social-reactionary' economic decrees of June-September 1932 (Winkler, 2018:706).

German Nationals around the DNVP were articulating their blames on the government by claiming that 'the economic policy' of the government was increasingly becoming 'socialist and internationalist' that contains the danger of the Bolshevism'. According to them, Schleicher was steering towards 'the liquidation of the authoritarian regime' (Winkler, 2018:717). Schleicher's intention to integrate Strasser from the NSDAP was conceived by the conservative circles as an attempt to maintain a 'socialist and parliamentary' link with the mass basis of the Weimar regime. It was certain that Strasser was advocating a 'constructive social-economic programme' that stands against both the 'terroristic destruction of Marxism' and mere reliance on propagandistic mobilisation of the masses (Mommsen, 1989:918). In this context, Hitler and Papen, throwing their previous internat strives aside, began to negotiate for building a new government in response to the Schleicher-Strasser flirt from the beginning of the January 1933. In Kurt von Schroeder's house, Hitler and Papen came together on 4 January 1933. According to the revealings of Kurt von Schröder, 'Papen asserted that he purported to build a government within which the conservative and national elements with the inclusion of the NSDAP would be represented (Kühnl, 2000:158). Hitler expressed this intention to purge the Social Democrats, Communists and Jewish of all the public affairs (Kühnl, 2000:159). According to Kurt von Schroeder, 'the men of business' were preferring the government of a strong man who would stay in power a long time (Kühnl, 2000:159). On 7 January, Papen met with leading industrialists such as

Reusch, Krupp, Springorum to strengthen 'bourgeois right' as a counter-weight to the NSDAP by discarding Hugenberg in DNVP (Mommsen, 1989:928). Heavy industry was not against the inclusion of the NSDAP as long as the 'isolation of the radical elements within the party is accomplished (Mommsen, 1989:921) While seemingly supporting the Schleicher government as he saw it as the continuation of the Papen economic policies, Paul Reusch was treating the initiatives of the Schleicher as a 'danger of relapse' into parliamentarism (Mommsen, 1989:927).

At the end of the January, there were four possible scenarios for the aftermath of the Schleicher government. On 16 January 1933, the option of 'military state of emergency' came into being, however, as we denoted before, such endeavors were destined to fail as the insurgency of Communists and National Socialists were highly possible in terms of signaling 'civil-war like conditions'. Additionally, the political parties from the Center to the SPD and free trade unions strictly opposed it (Winkler, 2018:714). Hence, such an option would pave way for a 'legitimised approach of political resistance so that it was ruled out by Schleicher and Hindenburg. However, especially SPD's fierce opposition to a military state of emergency or proposal of Schleicher for the 'unconstitutional postponement' of the elections till the next autumn was also disguising their misguided 'constitutional fetishism'. They were acting as if a 'quasi-constitutional' Hitler government was 'tolerable' compared to a 'state emergency' or a return of Papen government (Winkler, 2018:720). Indeed, it was indicating how well the pseudo-legal tactic of the NSDAP was functioning. Second, a possible 'Fight Cabinet' composed of Papen-Hugenberg-Sendte from Stahlhelm was another option (Mommsen, 1989:930). However, the unpopularity of such an option among the masses was already proved. The third option was a Hitler government with a parliamentary majority or a minority government of the Hitler. Actually, Hitler gave up his claim for the full presidential powers. However, he was still insisting on the 'Chancellorship' with a conservative form of cabinet. There appeared an agreement among Papen and Hitler on the building of the government "with Hitler as chancellor and Papen as

vice-chancellor with unification of all nationalist parties' capable of 'enabling legislation' in the Reichstag (Mommsen, 1989:938). Indeed, Hindenburg was not against the 'Enabling Act'. At last, a 'national front with Hitler's chancellorship' as long as "Hitler is kept in check by a strong conservative counterweight" capable of taking consent for an Enabling Act was accepted by Hindenburg as a more viable alternative to the Papen-Hugenberg 'Fight Cabinet' (Mommsen, 1989:942-4).

It is commonplace in the mainstream literature to regard this process of 'seizure of power' by giving priority to the primary aims of persons and the intrigues that was effective in the last days of the Weimar Republic. It was as if simply the immediate decisions of the political characters were the most decisive factor. Though we can not simply ignore the political intrigues as irrelevant, we have to embrace a much broader perspective to understand the fate of the German fascism properly. Secondly, it is also a mistake to take the authoritarian-conservative front as having clearly divergent interests with the NSDAP and to conceptualise the former simply as a force 'trying to tame' the NSDAP and as a force 'deceived' by the NSDAP later on. The political process between 1930-33 gives us rather a more complicated picture regarding the relationship between the state elite and the fascist movement, a specific type of interaction. Thirdly, the vested interests of the state and economic elite and their ideological formation in its affinity to the NSDAP was crucial in terms of impacting on this interaction. Fourthly, the mass rise of the NSDAP's power and its relative autonomy vis-a-vis the state and economic elite was what ascertained the special character of the fascisation process. Fifthly, the type of reaction stemmed from the political left was another determinant that should be taken into account as a force that would be able to resist the rise of the German fascism and its coming to power.

Peukert (1987:265) asserts that 'at the end of year, Hitler needed power and the old elites needed mass support'. According to him, 'the growth of the mass political movement' reached at the greatest extent and sharpened the political politicisation so that a return to a reactionary solution seemed to be infeasible

(Peukert , 1987:272). This view rightly emphasises the mass character of the NSDAP as a decisive factor in the decision-making process. It also takes into account the reciprocity of interests between the NSDAP and ruling elite at the moment of the Hitler's coming to power. On the other side, the Marxist scholars tended to focus on the overarching of interests of the ruling elite that was primarily effective in the 'delegation of the power' to the NSDAP. Typically, Gossweiler (1989:166-7) claimed that the decision of the giving the governmental power to Hitler was 'economically motivated' but not simply determined by it and it represented 'guaranteeing higher profits' in place of the parliamentarism. In Gossweiler's words, "the decision was taken above all by the top levels of the most important German companies, the leaders of landed aristocracy and the Reichswehr generals' which unanimously agreed on the issuing of an Enabling Act. The ruling elite avoided from an open 'illegal attempt' to repress any right or left wing movement as it would stimulate the radicalism and 'illegality from the below' (Gossweiler,1989:167). The 'rollback of the working class gains, a solution to the fractional struggles inside the dominant bloc and some settlement with the supporting classes' were all considered by the decision-makers but the 'fascist option was not an inevitability' and so their interests could also be furthered by finding out other ways of attaining them. Thus, the decision was politically determined though economically motivated. According to this logic, It was the strength of the attack of the 'ruling elite' that was decisive in the delegation of the power to the NSDAP.

Abraham (1989:56) pointed at the relative weakness of the dominant classes to master the 'political and fiscal crisis' combined with the economic crisis. The disunity of the bourgeoisie was preventing it from implementing a sustainable national policy while performing an offensive against the working classes (Abraham, 1989:54). Thus, the industrialists and landed aristocracy with the political help of the middle classes applied to construct the missing hegemony within the ruling class and this hegemony would only be achieved at the expense of the socio-economic interests of the peasants and working classes (Abraham,

1989:56). Shortly, the hegemonic position of the export-oriented industry in Weimar consensus has been replaced by the new hegemonic constellation of heavy industrialists through the political power of the NSDAP.

Surely, as we have tried to indicate in this chapter, the economic and political interests of the elites considerably contributed to the seizure of the power by the NSDAP. Naturally, as we repeated before, NSDAP and German fascism can not be viewed simply as ‘agents’ of those interests. The ‘functionality’ of the NSDAP to the prior goals of the state and business was evident. However, the process of the fascisation can not simply be evaluated as ‘inevitability’ or a ‘moment’ that represents the final days of the Weimar republic. Rather, in this chapter we tried to concentrate to carve out the process where the elite interests with a counter-revolutionary logic has interacted with the NSDAP’s power strategy. This reciprocity had both ideological and strategic connotations. It is discernable that the state conception of the authoritarians transformed into a fascist type of state while the NSDAP had also increased its mass power through ‘bloody elections’ and infiltrated into security organisations of the state. The commonalities between two parts and their internal conflict put their stamp on the state transformation process. The break with the constitutional system, disintegration of formal democratic procedures, hence ‘‘ruling both outside the parties and parliament’, the exclusion of the political left, the Center and ‘moderate’ parliamentary parties from the ruling circles, hence totally putting aside the ‘political expressions’ of working classes, the repression of their political organisations were the parallelities that led to the cooperation of the ruling elite with the NSDAP particularly during the Papen period. Naturally, the counter-revolutionary aims of the state and political elite can not be exercised fully under a mechanism of democratic control and participation. Thus, whenever there appeared a possibility of weakening of the presidential powers, the state elite automatically took a hostile attitude to the parliamentary and democratic interventions and proceeded with an ‘emergency situation’ of political and economic crisis that legitimated its rule while seeming to be not violating the constitution. However, it was not the case as we know from Prussian

intervention and other non-democratic measures to repress the democratic public formation. Nevertheless, as we put out several times during the chapter, it was not possible to rule with the bajonett and without mass consent sustainably. Especially in a country where the democratic procedures in one way or another rooted in the public life and in a country where the return to a pre-modern rule through 'authorities' like 'church, military and monarchy' seemed not feasible, the only way to 'authoritarian' rule was not only to have a mass basis but also 'a working consent' and 'mass participation' in 'distorted' forms of democracy. Beginning from the end of Brüning era, to integrate "living, national forces" into the state apparatus was the motto of the day and represented a clear divergence from an 'authoritarian politics' in its strictest of the term.

The relationship of the NSDAP to the state elite and its bourgeois mass basis was determined mainly by its special combination of 'respectability' and 'violence against the selected 'un-national targets was a strategy to gain strongholds in the population and in the state. The party should convince them by its acts that anti-Marxism' and 'anti-parliamentarism' are the issues that should be treated by force and legitimised' by the subsequent violence from the state or fascist party'. In collaboration with the state forces, the fascist movement was also trying to prove its 'indispensability of its being an auxiliary forces against the common enemy, not only communists themselves, but 'disguised communists' like the SPD, trade unions, Center and moderate right and left. By its acts, it was also shaping the route of the state policy. Not only an external support for the state force, but also building practically a 'state within the state' was one of indispensable feature of fascist movement that solidly characterised the fascisation process. As we have emphasised before, the Prussian intervention against the Social Democratic government was a typical case for extending non-democratic measures (martial law or state of emergency) to a further step through fascist attacks on the moderate left or communists, creating a 'civil-war like conditions' and finally leading to the intervention of the security forces. It would be a power practice that we would observe later in different countries at different times. Hence, creating a security deficiency, armed social tumult,

massacres that served for the reinforcing of the non-democratic state interventions. What makes the fascisation process exceptional is not its 'mere state repression' on the democratic forces in the country. Rather, its inclusion of the mass popular support into state security apparatus and taking on a 'quasi legal' mantle that operates through the deformation of the democratic mechanisms like using the elections or the parliament in the direction of the non-democratic aims. Incorporating an 'either-or logic' into the elections in terms of public security, aggravating 'the nationalistic or religious' feelings among the population and extracting mass consent through a series of violent and seemingly legal events. We regard it a special fascist technique of power that could also be applied to a variety of contemporary political events as a framework of reference.

Given these facts, it would be a fault to take the NSDAP as 'mass movement' simply translating a variety of social and political demand into the political sphere. As we have analysed in the third chapter, the fascist movements are movements of 'rule and protest' and 'order and reaction' at the same time relying on the political mobilisation of 'nationalist and religious sentiments of the population' and reframing the 'social question' only in that framework. Their 'anti-systemic' tendencies, while posing a challenging to the established and elite order, should in one way or another be tamed and directed into 'reliable, nationalist' channels. With this feature, the mass fascist movements had an integral interest in the 'rescuing the state from 'republican and democratic rules' and realise 'its assumed inherent essence, preserving the 'nation and the state'. Thus, they radically divert from revolutionary or reformist movement having substantial socio-economic demands. Although the mass ingredients had real social roots that had a reactionary origin and petite-bourgeois traits, this 'mass power' could not be taken as 'a static element' but as being open to be shaped by the power politics implemented during the fascisation process. For instance, it is interesting to point at the incredible victory of the NSDAP in July 30 1932 election after the security fears of the bourgeois strata and their anxiety about 'the communist danger' created by the events before and after the Prussian

intervention had positively impacted on the strengthening of the mass power of the NSDAP and preceded the concerns over the poverty and unemployment or reformulated these problems more in national terms through widespread demagoguery and propaganda.

As we have analysed in more detail in the fourth chapter, the problematic response of the SPD and KPD to the fascisation process had deep ideological roots and practical deficiencies in receiving and counteracting the rise of the fascism that can be traced back to the post-November Revolution period. Alongside the fragmentation in the political scene of the left, the 'passivity of the SPD' obsessed with the 'constitutionalism' and the armed clashes of the KPD with the state forces and with SA without any concern of 'strengthening the democratic practices on a mass basis' has considerably contributed to the collaboration of the state elite and the NSDAP in constructing the new state. As for the SPD, while their analysis on the fascisation was very much founded in Vorwaerts, the 'unity and discipline' of the working class was used simply as a form of 'defensive position' anchored in the parliament and legalism while the fascist forces and security forces were applying to an 'extra-parliamentarian sphere to unfold their political interests. The SPD tactical choices in line with the 'avoiding the worst one' made it close to a position stripped of oppositional culture. By supporting Hindenburg during the presidential elections, giving an implicit assent to the presidential regime by insisting on 'its being above the parties' and most importantly by 'excessively relying on its state power in Prussia', the SPD portrayed itself as the 'defender of the Weimar State' while the social and political forces under its leadership have lost their capacity to put into action their 'oppositional rhetoric'. Even though they have organised various mass meeting against Papen and fascism, they have incredibly lost their 'detering power' vis-a-vis the ruling classes and NSDAP. The intention to distance itself from the 'provocations of the SA and KPD' and the fear of civil war led to a 'political inaction' that was specially targeted by the events like the Prussian intervention. After that event, the SPD became a simple spectator of the conflicts and cooperation between the ruling classes and the NSDAP.

Winkler (2018:736) argues that the contradiction between the SPD and the KPD was ideologically deeply rooted rather than tactical. According to him, 'the communists approved the 'revolutionary violence' and civil war while the SPD preferred strict reliance on the legality. While the KPD was at odds with the Weimar Democracy, the SPD was representing the 'state-preserving' force of the Weimar Republic. Their mass basis was also different. KPD's main mass support was coming from the 'unemployed' whereas the SPD was appealing to a sphere of working class that was more advantaged in terms of social welfare and more integrated into the state institutions. Actually, Winkler's view tends to see the SPD's role destined to the 'bourgeois parties' and Weimar Consensus. In his view, a turn towards left on the side of the SPD would "pave way for the loss of its supporter, stimulate the fears of the middle classes and strengthen the mass standing for the NSDAP" (Winkler, 2018:737).

In fact, such a view is so mistaken that it does not take into account the working class aspirations for the unity coming from below in the face of rising fascist political power. Indeed, there were such attempts that were not 'seriously considered and made politically materialisable by the leaders of the two left parties. The fascisation process was in no way inevitable. Rather, it was seriously stamped by the actions and inactions of the two left parties. It was a crucial mistake for any left party to go with 'nationalist current' when the middle classes were steering towards that side. An adaptation to the current conditions as inevitable processes does not denote the 'tactical vigilance' of the political leaders but their incapacity to provide an alternative political project instead of the rising fascist hegemony. The SPD's strict adherence to the 'constitutionality' while Weimar constitution has practically disappeared left an 'extra-parliamentary' but truly legitimate sphere of political action unused. On the other side, the 'militant and radical rhetoric' of the KPD when it was simply reduced to the street fights with the SA and it disregarded the mass organisation of the working class has provided a proper pretext for the 'anti-communist fever' that is 'welcomed' by the ruling classes and the concomitant unification among the bourgeois strata around the NSDAP.

Given these 'favorable conditions', during the fascisation process, the institutions of the Third Reich have already been in the process of construction. The 'exceptional courts', the introduction of the death-sentence, deep politicisation of the law around the crude distinction between the national and 'un-national' elements, the elections like plebiscites, the Reichspresident as a political leader above and against the political parties and parliament, the search for an 'Enabling Act' being popular among the ruling elite for a long time were pointing at the continuity of power relations that was shaped by the fascisation process and their internal linkage to the building of the main institutional blocs of the Third Reich. The next chapter would enlighten that process and give clues about the specificities of the fascist political rule that can still be treated as another stage in the fascisation process rather than the implementation of the NSDAP's political programme unilaterally without involvement of the vested interests of the economic and political elite. This analysis would also include the description of the socio-economic condition of the dominated classes which are thought by the new ruling configuration as an indispensable factor to legitimate the newly emerging regime and also a potential threat of political dissent.

CHAPTER 6

UNCOVERING THE FASCIST TYPE OF POLITICAL DOMINATION: NATIONAL SOCIALISM AS A REGIME

6.1. Introduction

In connection with the fascisation process analysed in the last chapter, the aim of this chapter is figure out new ‘forms of fascisation’ that brought about the fascist technics of power into the regime phase. Naturally, the regime phase differs from the rise of fascism in terms of political power constellation and the attitude of the NSDAP towards its ‘anti-systemic’ and ‘anti-capitalist elements within itself. It actually corresponds to our conceptualisation of the fascist movement that incorporated both the ‘social discontent’ and ‘the concerns for the political order’. The Gleichschaltung process (bringing into line) that was put into action in the first months of the regime is crucial to understand the relationship of the NSDAP’s political strategy and the wider ambitions of the state and business. The mass mobilisation of the NSDAP first against the ‘Marxist elements’ in the society and then against the ‘socially and racially’ undesirable ones indicated a new of political domination, not completely to the disadvantage to the authoritarian state elite, and new forms of political legitimation that distanced themselves both from the ‘authoritarian route’ and the ‘quasi-revolutionary ambitions of the NSDAP. This strategy implied a new constellation of ruling classes and a new attitude towards the masses including the working classes and middle classes.

While the National Socialist theoreticians tended to observe a kind of political totality that was against any kind of fragmentation in the political rule of National Socialism, those who defined the new state as a polycentric state of an political alliance inclined to point at the illegality and de-institutionalisation of

the system as a de-stabilising factor. It is obvious that the latter view had more explanatory power in terms of underlining the real power relations beyond the ideological phraseology of National Socialism. However, while the politics of alliance showed the specific coalition in the power structure of Third Reich, to reduce everything to aimless struggle of power can blur the specific meaning of German fascism in terms of a new type of political domination. It is also crucial to conceptualise the regime change not simply as a shift from the authoritarian rule to totalitarianism. It is imperative to encapsulate the counter-revolutionary ambitions of the old state elite and business and the NSDAP in the same pot and analyse the connection of the Third Reich with the main institutions of the bourgeois society. The lawless nature of the new regime and its hostile position against the premises of the democracy was also an integral part of the expectations of the conservatives. At the same time, it was a response to the needs of capitalism. In that sense, German Fascism was not simply a movement with an 'extreme ideology' that shaped the society single-handedly according to its totalitarian conception. It was rather a new constellation of power relationship within the ruling elite that brought about a specific relationship to the 'dominated classes'. Despite the populist elements within the ideology of National Socialism, the institutional structure of the regime in its essence represented an attack on the democratic rights of the people. Indeed, the populism inherent in the regime functioned as a justification of the deepening of the social inequalities.

6.2. The Gleichschaltung (Bringing into Line the state and society) and Its Connotations for the deepening of the 'Fascisation' in the Regime Phase

From the perspective of the NSDAP's political strategies of the 'seizure of the power', we see explicit continuities in terms of using the mechanisms of political violence and its attitude towards the social strata that are entangled in nationalist ideology with a more hostile stance towards the 'parliamentarian/democratic' political organisations and their mass basis. Naturally, while in the new cabinet they have only two ministries-Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of

‘Prussia’-,these were critical ministries with direct link to the police forces and the chancellorship with ‘presidential’ powers whose institutional configuration has been completed between 1930-33. The NSDAP was now formally in charge of the state. However, the conquest of the NSDAP did not cease here. In order to prove their ‘political power’, they have to re-conquest the state vis-a-vis the ‘conservative establishment. This process did not necessarily mean totally discarding the conservative political priorities. In contrast, the NSDAP fully used the elements of ‘nationalism, anti-democratic/parliamentarian political position and ‘anti-Marxism’ of these segments of the state. It incorporated these premises into its own project. On the other hand, it also did not forget to deploy its internal organisational force like SA and the ‘mass power’ mainly in bourgeois circles of the society. This mobilisation is critical to outpace but not totally exclude the authoritarian elements in the state and society and also ascribe to constructing new forms of popular legitimacy.

As we have seen in the previous chapters, what made the NSDAP credible in the eyes of the public with rightist stance was its inexhaustible ‘anti-Marxism’ and its ‘anti-systemic’ stance against the Weimar Democracy. Now they have to be put into practice more fiercely to ‘re-consolidate and sustain’ its mass consent in these circles and connect the ‘authoritarians’ to its own political agenda. If we shortly oversee the reactions of the ‘nationalist establishment’ to the seizure of power of the NSDAP, we can easily capture the same political themes are at work.

On 20 February 1933, Hitler made a speech in front of the principle industrialists and argued the following words on the common basis that the new government has been constructed:

With the year of 1918 an entire system broke down...The Revolution that was brought to us was only conditional. In any case, it did not bring the ‘overthrowings’ of the Russian revolution but led to a ‘new spiritual world’ that slowly undermined the ‘existing order’. Bismarck’s claim that “the liberalism is the pacemaker of the Social Democracy” was scientifically founded and proven in our case. A specific ‘spiritual world’ can unwillingly lead to the destruction

of the state' that could be the pacemaker of the Bolshevism'...' We are standing now in the concomitant situation: Weimar had imposed on us a specific form of constitution that was configured on a democratic basis. Through this, we were not provided with a 'functioning state power'. In contrast, communism penetrated into the German people more deeply with the democracy. The result was the internal tension through which the courts are unaffected. There appears two fronts for our choice: either Marxism in 'pure culture' or the other side. One can not simply take the standpoint and say that 'the other side would automatically reinforce itself again'. It would be a defeat. "When we actively collect our forces and act accordingly against Communism, only then the second action against the communists begins (Kühnl, 2000: 182-4).

Like the 'national concentration' government of Papen, the words of the 'national revival or rise' is very popular in the public. On 1 April 1933, in the meeting of the Catholic Teacher Association, the following speech was held:

Like in August days of 1914, a new German and national feeling and rebellion has been endorsed. The 'radical change' of what exists and the destination route towards a newly emerging German Volk and German state are being materialised. In this transformation, the Catholic leaders and forces have involved in the process as little as it has in the construction of Bismarckian regime. Now through the call of Hitler and his movement, the breakthrough of the 'un-German' spirit that succeeded in the Revolution of 1918 has been overcome (Kühnl, 2000:191).

The capitalists were also praising the possibility of sustaining the 'political order and stability' that is promised by the 'nationalist wave' and clearing away the remnants of the Weimar socio-economic order and its political setting. On 24 March 1933, Krupp von Bohlen and Halbach in the name of RDI (Reichsassociation of German Industry) sent a letter to Hitler covering their assent to the new government: "Through the elections, the basis for a stable government has been created and the disturbances that stemmed from the 'political fluctuations' of the past and paralysed the economy have been eliminated. The necessary and energetic rebuilding depends on the collection and collaboration of all constructive forces. The German industry, as an 'inevitable and indispensable factor' for the national re-construction is ready to actively endorse this task and contribute to the government in its heavy responsibilities" (Kühnl, 2000: 185).

In the same vein, on 2 February 1933 the military under the leadership of Blomberg who was in charge of 'Ministry of Army' was saluting the new government by the same reasons expressed above: "the Cabinet is the expression of the 'largest sections of the national will and the realization of the one who strived for it for years. Indeed, it represents a minority of the people but a minority covering millions of people which are determined to live and when necessary die for their idea. Out of it, there appears many great opportunities if the ruling men prove their courage and talent'" (Kühnl, 2000:190)

While 'attracting the support of the authoritarian visions under the banner of 'national revival', the NSDAP also had its own strategy that it had exercised during the fascisation process. Now, not only the exclusion of the working class organisations and parties from the state but the complete suppression of them was on the agenda that would further ensure the 'legitimacy of the fascist rule'. There are already presidential decrees that are in the hands of the NSDAP to employ 'non-democratic' rule making through various bans on the political left and the police force that could be mobilised to deepen the pressure on the political opposition. However, the NSDAP's strategy never depended on 'purely depending on the military forces or police' that would resemble a 'state intervention' that would place more weight on the political power of the old state elite and stir the already weakened political left to resist against the 'illegal state intrusion' or a military state of emergency. Typically, the NSDAP resorts to 'quasi-legal' ways that would operate on the back of 'formal democratic institutions' and combine it with a 'permanent state of emergency'. The Reichstagfire that came about in dubious ways and attributed to a communist perpetrator and the concomitant decree of Reichspresident 'to protect the Volk from the Volk and State' on 28 February 1933 in many ways resembles the Prussian Intervention of 1932. To plan and provoke the 'attack of communists' to provide a pretext to trigger a non-democratic step was already one of the NSDAP's classical methods. The other ambition seemed to be provoking the bourgeois circles around 'anti-Marxist hysteria and public security deficit to further its mass basis before the election of the 5 March. On February 1933,

Göring claimed that “communist threat was so menacing that the police lacked the manpower to meet the challenge and he announced the creation of an auxillary police force to be staffed by the ‘volunteers’” (Childers, 2018:342). Expectedly, these ‘volunteers’ would be composed of the “SA, SS and Stahhelm”. According to the NSDAP, the “God gives the signal for the Communist insurrection”. Actually, it was a signal for the political eradication of the political organisation of all of the opponents that would not be confined to the ‘hunt of the communists’ but extend to all ‘moderate part of the left including the SPD and the free trade unions’. Actually, through the decree of 28 February 1933, the suspension of all civil and political rights is accomplished (Childers, 2018:353). The ‘active role of the SA’ in the pursuits and attacks on the communists was crucial as it would be a means of ‘fascising the state, obtaining mass legitimacy for Hitler and the party and the taking place of 5 March election under a terror environment. This strategy had two-fold ambitions: to re-consolidate its bourgeois voters through elections and ‘deter and demoralise the working classes by directly assaulting on their organizations.

As far as the results of the 5 March elections are concerned, the %43 of the total votes obtained by the NSDAP was not indicating a clear majority in the majority, however, the elections were creating a legitimacy basis for the NSDAP. Kitchen (2007:46) notes that the “astonishing high voter participation of 88.8 per cent showed how important these elections were to average German”. However, concerning the outcomes of the decree of 28 February, the curtailment of democratic rights and freedoms “provokes little public outcry and no sustained resistance” (Childers, 2018:339). According to Süß (2017:28), “the majority of ‘bourgeois-national’ population was at least indifferent if not approving to the outburst of the violence against the communists”. While the ‘suppression of the Marxism’ has gained ground as an ideological objective among those strata, there were also demands for the ‘disciplining and giving order to the attacks. However, at the end, the lack of resistance to the non-democratic measures and unlawful events was revealing the fact that “the friend-foe thinking and the readiness to overlook the violation of the constitutional guarantees for a ‘fictive

state of emergency' has anchored in the hearts of German bourgeoisie'' (Süss, 2017:30). Interestingly, these measures have contributed to the popularity of the NSDAP as seen in the case 'March violets'. There appeared an explosion in the applications for a membership in the NSDAP during the March. By 1 Mai, the members of the party amounted to 1.6 Million people. The NSDAP functioned like an 'inclusion machine' which mainly drew its force from the 'national-conservative German bourgeoisie (Süss, 2017:42-3).

Another important quasi-legal attempt of the NSDAP was to rule outside the control of the parliament but with the 'enabling' of the parliament. The 'Enabling Act' whose official expression was 'the Law for Removing the Distress of the People and Reich' is actually striven for by the 'authoritarian state elite' itself to rule stripped of any parliamentary or democratic check and balance. It was a widespread ideal for the nationalist opposition including the NSDAP, the presidential entourage and a large part of the industrialists and landowners. In that sense, there was a consensus on the right of the political spectrum and that was also in line with the political strategies of the presidential governments. According to the first article of the new law, 'the executive could be source of the law outside the procedures declared in the constitution'. Second Article was stating that "the laws determined by the government can 'avoid' from the constitution as long as they are not directed against the parliament and the Reichscouncil. The rights of the Reichspresident remain untouched'' (Kühnl, 2000:177). This law was a free-check for the government to be immune to any legal or parliamentary control for four years time that could be extended further. This law should be accepted by a 'two-thirds' majority by the parliament to be brought into force (Childers, p.367). However, within the conditions of 'arrests, torture and murder' of the communists by the SA and police, the fraction of the KPD was already non-existent. The NSDAP needed the Center party to vote for the 'Enabling Act'. The leader of the Center, Ludwig Kaas, most probably under the influence of the Vatican acceded to voting for the Act in the expectation that the Catholic organizations would not be touched by the new state (Childers, p.368). On 20 Juli 1933, the Vatican would sign a 'concordat' revealing the

assent of the catholic circles to the regime in return for their 'organisational and religious freedom' (Kühnl, 2000:201-2).

The success of the quasi-legalism of the NSDAP showed itself explicitly in the reactions of the political leaders of the SPD, the Center and the Free Trade Unions that together consisted in the creation of the mass basis of the Weimar democracy. They were prone to 'retreat from action' when a 'nationalist wave under pseudo-democratic mantle was operating. They were implicitly approving the legitimacy of the government and showing no concern for the unlawful repression of the communists and the 'complete violation of democratic rights and freedom' if it assumedly depended on the 'democratic and popular will of the nation'. SPD voted against the Enabling Act, however, SPD representative Wels' evaluation of the 'Enabling Act' is enlightening in the sense that it regarded the results of the NSDAP's strategy in the elections of the 5 March as 'constitutionally viable' and represented a text 'determined to protect' a constitution that did not virtually exist any more: "The elections of 5 March gave the majority to the government to rule strongly in line with the constitution". While criticising the 'Enabling Act', he argued that 'we, Social Democrats know that "the fact of power politics could not be eliminated merely by protecting the rights. We see the power political side of your domination (of NSDAP). However, the consciousness of rights of the people is a political power and we will not cease to appeal to this consciousness...No 'Enabling Act' gives you the power to destruct the 'ideas' that are eternal and indestructible'. The Socialist law has not removed the Social Democracy and out of the new attacks the Social Democracy will gain a new power" (Kühnl, 2000:214). The same illusions to have 'a place' in the new state also much more dramatically pervaded the free trade unions. Leaving aside any potential resistance, the ADGB joined the 1 May organisation of the NSDAP as a national day. An article in the official ADGB journal celebrates the day of 1 Mai with the following words: "We believe we have shown that the promotion of May Day, the proletarian workers' holiday into a national holiday is no defeat but means a victory of the proletarian thinking...That might be so for a small group of utopian internationalists who

have not been influenced by the plain reality of the German labour movement. An anti-national internationalism has never had a foothold in the mass of the German working class.” (Gluckstein, 1999.125) Despite this attitude of the ADGB, on 2 Mai 1933 all trade union offices of the ADGB was occupied by the SA forces and they were legally abolished.

In the efficiency of the process of ‘Gleichschaltung’ (bringing into line), this special combination of ‘legality’ and ‘political violence’ has played a considerable role particularly in terms of paralysing the already declining tendency of the political opposition to resist. However, the violence of the SA was not ‘limitless’ in terms of ‘priorities of the regime for the political stability. While the SA proved to be useful in terms of eliminating the ‘political organisations of the left’, the conservative right which has also willingly brought itself into line and the business began to complain about the ‘unruly behaviours of the SA and the ‘unauthorised concentration camps’ that stood completely outside the state control. Childers (2018:388) explained the situation by the following words: “Although Hitler was sympathetic to the radicals, he, too, desired to shift power away from the SA to the Nazi-controlled state apparatus. Unconstraint SA violence not only endangered Germany’s economic resources, it ran the risk of alienating those members of the public, who had initially viewed NS as a force of restoration of the law and order”. Upon the bringing into line the liberal and national parties and the ban on the SPD and other democratic organisation, on 6 July 1933, Hitler declared that ‘the revolution is over’ (Childers, 2018:388) Actually, this situation corresponds to our conceptualisation of ‘fascisation’ by revealing the co-functioning of the state and the movement and the latter’s ‘political violence’ and social protest was also balanced by the concerns for the political order and stability. The NSDAP should not only take into account the political and economic interests of the ruling classes, it also should give response to the mass’ concerns for ‘a politically conflict-free society’, need for the work creation and also nationalist ambitions in a ‘reframed’ order, but not in a ‘revolutionised’ one at all.

On the other side, it does not mean simply truly complying with the 'authoritarian visions'. While incorporating their co-ambitions, the fascist rule had to go beyond it to locate its legitimacy somewhere between the authoritarians culminated in the state offices and 'anti-systemic trends of the party'. Fascisation in the state (the Law for the Reconstruction of the Civil Servants having non-Aryan paragraphs on 17 April 1933 (Kühnl, 2000:179) and fascisation of the society (introducing the antisemitic measures on 28 March 1933 (Kühnl:2000:178) and laws for 'eugenics, sterilisation and racial hygiene (Süss, 2017:90)' is in reality creating a new sphere of legitimacy for the fascist rule. To extend the organisation of the mass 'according to the 'ascribed racial criteria' to legitimate its rule beyond authoritarian consolidation and create new 'internal enemies' to avoid any socio-economic protest or the establishment of any social solidarity pattern on that basis. A large scale of the mass organisations of the fascist rule and its constant mobilisation and the party's moral/racial penetration into the society was providing a political sphere where the NSDAP could hide the 'social question' around the racial themes of practices and conduct its specific conduct of mass political domination by 'relying on the 'values' and 'practices' of the society that were mostly 'reactionary' even they took on 'pseudo-scientific and modern' shield. In this formation, the 'Führer cult' has also intrinsically linked to these mass formations which escape the 'authoritarian consolidation' and provide a viable antidote to the 'concerns of the socio-economic inequality and exploitation. In any case, as Kitchen (2007:67) assures that "the idea of 'Volksgemeinschaft' (the People's community in racial terms) was not an empty slogan. It was one of components of a new type of political rule that relied in its own assumption on the 'the untouchable and Volk-representing leader and the supporters in the state and society that are horizontally linked to each other 'working towards the leader'. Although 'many in the military, civil service and industrial elite agreed with Hitler's schemes of 'conquest, expansion and racial purification' (Kitchen, 2007:68), this power constellation was implying a new form of political domination that diverts from the hierarchical 'authoritarian structures' in the state though it does not mean a complete break with the latter.

6.3. The Legal Foundation of the New Regime and the Emergence of 'Prerogative State' in National Socialist Rule

The Prussian intervention of 1932 was a singular example reminding Carl Schmitt's concept of the political which precedes legal foundation of the state (Neocleous, 1996). In that sense, what was decisive was state-constituting social energy. The meaning of law has also been transformed by this understanding of the 'political'. The political couldn't be tamed or shouldn't be tamed. According to Schmitt, the political oneness of the people came before any institutionalisation. He made a distinction between 'Verfassung' (constitution) and 'Verfassungsgesetz' (rule of the constitution). What constituted the core of the political was not 'Verfassungsgesetz' but 'unharmful unity of the people'. It is clear that there is an ambiguity in such a formulation. However, Schmitt tried to overcome this ambiguity by linking the discretion of the constitution to some mass democratic elements. What he was talking about was not a parliamentary representation which in his words gave way for 'unstable party coalitions and temporary parliamentary majorities'. This inevitably led to the fragility of political order and multiplicity of competing public agencies. Instead of that, he wished to replace the parliamentary fragmentation, first, with a homogeneous understanding of the 'people' within which all the heterogeneous elements were excluded and an 'ethnic and cultural unity' was constituted. Secondly, the President of the Reich was considered as 'the protector of the constitution' and the representative of the political unity. In this configuration, the political unity of the people was directly connected to a one-man rule. Interestingly, Schmitt gave a special importance to a concept of democracy which radically diverted from liberal democracy. It was based on plebiscitary democracy which necessitated the public 'consent' to the existence of President. However, the will of the people had totalitarian connotations in which the durable existence of the President was intrinsically linked to the 'self-preservation' of the people, hence the unity of political order and security. Schmitt envisaged a 'democratic dictatorship' where the President was the embodiment of the people and constitution (Neocleous, 1996:14-15).

The Prussian intervention in July 1932 was considered as a similar experience. The expression of the real constitution in the body of President necessitated the elimination of plurality of the system and the isolation of the system-hostile forces (in this condition SPD government) by the protector of the constitution. The civil war conditions stemming from the fight between Communists and S.A. forces justified the use of Article 48 that suspended the basic human rights and gave the president to take necessary measures to secure public peace and order. However, the Presidential regime did not apply to the emergency rule as a temporary phenomenon. It was rather a permanent emergency that introduced a new form of political rule and made the emergency situation as the intrinsic part of the new system.

It was a kind of ‘martial law’, a siege where the rule of law has seriously been suspended.

Carl Schmitt argued:

Martial law is characterised by its practically unlimited authority i.e. the suspension of the entire hitherto prevailing legal order. It is characterised by the fact that the state continues to exist while the legal order is inoperative. This situation can not be branded as anarchy and chaos. The order in juristic sense still exists even though it is not a legal order. The existence of the state is accorded priority over the continual application of the legal norms. The decisions of the state are freed from normative restrictions. The state becomes absolute in the literal sense of the word. In an emergency situation, the state suspends the existing legal system in response to the so-called ‘higher law of self-preservation (Schmitt, 2005:12).

In ‘“Legality and Legitimacy”’, Carl Schmitt (2004) mentioned about an extra-ordinary law. ‘Norms are valid only for the normal situation and the presupposed normalcy of the situation is a positive-legal component of its validity. According to Carl Schmitt, ‘extra-ordinary law maker determined the presupposition of his extra-ordinary law makers (danger for public security and order and the content of the necessary ‘measures’ (Massnahmen). In that sense, Schmitt proposed that ‘extra-ordinary law maker could create accomplished facts in opposition to the ordinary legislature.

Thus, this extra-ordinary authority led to the emergence of a dictator. “In the case of the dictator, by contrast, it emerges that he is actually a special commissioner and not legislator. The practice that was only a groundless theory became self-evident in the dictator and legislative power became a weapon useful for completing his mission. Instead of issuing a general degree, therefore, the dictator could issue an individual order, even immediately and directly, such as prohibiting an assembly or declaring an organisation illegal and disbanding it. In Schmitt’s terms, the extra-ordinary law of Article 48 blurred the distinction between statute and statutory application. Accordingly, the extra-ordinary law maker combined both legislative and executive in his person. (Schmitt, 2004:112)

In that configuration, the President was endowed with the right ‘to intervene in the entire system of existing statutory norms. He had also the capacity ‘issue general norms and order and on this authority new special institutions and create extra-ordinary enforcement organs for their application and execution (Schmitt, 2004:113)

According to the Schmitt, when the extra-ordinary law maker entered into the sphere of decision-making, the distinction between statute and measure were no longer possible. In that context, ‘the fact that the dictator is empowered to issue measures also entails extra-ordinary legislative right. The legislature can put forth measures and the dictator empowered to issue measures can also pass statutes. In that configuration, the dictatorship fitted to the identity of the administrative state (Massnahmenstaat) which predominantly endorsed to use measures while the practice of the parliament diverted from the executive and concentrated on producing general, preestablished, enduring norms (Schmitt, 2004:125).

Actually, Schmitt’s most important side was to base its criticism of the liberal democracy on a ‘democratic claim of the homogenous Volk’ as a pre-

constitutional entity. That 'democracy' simply meant the embodiment of the singular will of the Volk in the body of the ruler.

In place of parliamentary democracy, Carl Schmitt proposed a truly 'democratic' leader, one who wins the acclaim of the people through his articulation of a unifying vision of the substantive homogeneity of the people. That leader will create a normal situation out of chaos of pluralism by making a genuinely political, sovereign decision. Such a decision must distinguish clearly between friend and foe; it attempts to establish a society composed only of the friends and of those who fit for substantive homogeneity. One can, it seems, know nothing in advance about such criteria other than the fact that the content of the political ideology they prescribe will be anti-thetical to liberalism. The ultimate test for success of the decision is simply the acclaim of the people—das Volk (Dyzenhaus, 1998:2).

The importance of this thought lies in the exact point where conservative's concern for more authoritarian defense of the economic and political status quo and the need for the idea of Volk as the legitimisation of the disintegration of the liberal democracy meets. In that sense, it is not coincidence that the concept of the 'political' is purged of all their socio-economic contents and plurality of the democratic exertions. Carl Schmitt's thought also predicts the necessary alliance between the conservative state elites and fascists in constant need of striking a balance between the political stability as against the real 'democratic threats' and the incorporation of the 'plebeian elements' of the fascists as a form of receiving mass consent to the system.

It can be said that the preference of the conservatives for Presidential Regime in Brüning, Papen and Schleicher regime have enormously contributed to the rise of the NSDAP. First, these regimes directly aimed at the eradication of leftist and republican forces which are primarily organised in SPD and the Marxist base in the KPD. These common aims of conservatives and NSDAP had an impact of legitimisation of the S.A violence and an increase in its mass base. Secondly, the right-wing measures of the Presidential regime, especially of Papen, led to the 'nationalisation of the masses'. That strategy attributed every evil of the Republic to the 'old system' and favoured a new state whose mass base could be fed by the rise of the NSDAP.

The NSDAP's coming to power was also a sign of the emergence of the Prerogative state that went beyond a series of administrative acts of an authoritarian state. It was an attempt of fusing the state with the society around the so-called will of political Volk which gave the priority to political legitimacy over any kind of legal restraints. This conception of Prerogative State was very close to the Schmitt's administrative state. Fraenkel (2017:2) formulated the Prerogative State as such:

The political sphere is a vacuum as far as the law is concerned. Of course it contains a certain element of factual order and predictability but only in so far as there is a certain regularity or predictability in the behaviour of the officials. There is, however, no legal regulation of the official bodies. The political body in the Third Reich is governed neither by objective law nor by subjective law neither by legal guarantees nor jurisdictional qualifications. There are no legal rules governing the political sphere. It is regulated by arbitrary measures (Massnahmen), in which dominant officials exercise their discretionary prerogatives. Hence, the expression 'Prerogative State'.

According to Fraenkel, martial law was the basis of the Third Reich and this constitutional charter has been provided by the emergency decree of 28 February 1933. Instead of describing it as a legal revolution like National Socialists, Fraenkel (2017:17) conceived it as a 'an illegal coup d'etat' and claimed that its illegality did not drive from the fire nor from the decree itself but from the exercise of it. With the Enabling Act accepted in parliament in 24 March 1933 under conditions of terror and the complete exclusion of the KPD from the process, the constitution has been changed in a concrete sense although the constitution of Weimar was not formally abolished. Thus, this condition created a kind of fait accomplie that had nothing common with any constitutional bounds.

The Enabling Act of 24 March 1933, 'An Act to Relieve the Distress of the People and Reich' has also been considered as 'the constitution of the Reich' (Neumann:2017:3). This act gave unlimited legislative power with the right to depart from the constitutional provisions and to interfere everywhere except the parliamentary institutions and Reichsrat. It further decreed that the powers of the

president were not to be curtailed. A new and simplified legislative procedure was introduced. Although the Reichstag was not abolished, its power became obsolete. In that sense, The Enabling Act represented the most radical departure from the liberal constitutionalism.

The legal system of the present-day Germany that there is no matters safe from the intervention of the political authorities who, without any legal guarantees, are free to exercise discretion for political ends (Fraenkel, 2017:43).

The Prerogative state, in that sense, meant the fact that law should be eliminated from the 'political'. The demarcation of the boundary lines between the two was determined by the political authorities themselves. The difference between Rechtsstaat and Third Reich became clearly defined. While 'in a Rechtsstaat 'the courts control the executive branch of the government in the interest of legality, in the Third Reich, the police power controls the courts in the interest of political expediency' (Fraenkel, 2017:40). In this system, the distinction between the political and the non-political became important. New criteria like 'citizen's devotion to the leader' or the right of the 'community to protect itself' was used as a justification of political decisions which were outside the formal justice of the rule of law. Additionally, the former private spheres of life were transformed into the object of the political rule and increasingly evaluated according to the political principles. For example, opposing to the taxi regulations became sufficient to be 'an enemy of the state in the wider sense', hence the systematic extension of the sphere of the 'political' under the Prerogative State (Fraenkel, 2017:43). We could tell that this point represented the distinction of the Prerogative State from any type of authoritarian rule as nearly every part of the society was linked to the cause of 'the preservation of the Community'.

After the Reichstagfire, the threats to the state were determined in an extensive fashion. Fraenkel assumed that regarding the decree of 28 February 1933 the sole motive was the overthrowing Communism. Afterwards, the scope of the threats were extended and 'the theory of indirect Communist danger has been invented. For instance, the Jehova Witnesses were assessed as providing a solid base for

the indirect Communist activities. Thus, 'all the so-called attacks on public safety and order are to be regarded as 'communist' in a broader sense'. In such a condition, the political opponents were deprived of all legal protection and judicial review. This broad security- based understanding gave to the police, in general to the Gestapo a completely discretionary power. And the judges were accorded a position of 'political police' in terms of implementing the political orders rather than regarding the norms of rule of law (Fraenkel, 2017:47-48).

In that sense, the Reichstag fire was merely an instrument to extend the dictatorial powers of the government. Fraenkel argued that "Even National Socialists occasionally admit that the Reichstag fire came at an opportune time and the ensuing temporary dictatorship was a welcome occasion for the abolition of civil rule of law. The mouthpieces of National Socialism themselves state that the threat of Communism was an excuse for breaking the old laws" (Fraenkel, 1941:12)

According to Fraenkel, 'the history of illegal coup d'etat made the public order identifiable with the person of Hitler and this attempt to veil the true character of the martial law dictatorship with legalistic tricks was brought about by the means of plebiscitary democracy'(Fraenkel, 1941:13).

However, Neumann considered that those plebiscites in the system of National Socialists were merely propaganda rather than constitutional law. 'In a one-party system, lacking the liberal guarantees, plebiscite was something entirely different from the democratic referendum'. (Neumann, 1944:52) It simply represented the confirmation of the will of the leader rather modification or rejection of it.

Fraenkel (2017:57-8) asserted that the present ideology as 'Gemeinschaft' (community) was on the one hand 'a mask hiding still existing capitalistic structure and was also instrumentalised for the existence of the Prerogative State operating by arbitrary measures'. Fraenkel proposed that it is possible to talk about a dual state where the Normative State still applies to the organisation of

capitalist structures while a Prerogative State with its arbitrary measures relates to the necessities of political expediency. However, Fraenkel (2017:58) stated that Prerogative State was always primary in terms of delienating the limits of Normative-State. Thus, the political expediency determined which parts of the state, which sectors of the economy would be left to the norms that are independent of the political power.

The theoretical assumptions of National Socialist scholars actually pointed at their ambition to base their understanding of the state on the prior existence of the 'Volk' in its racial forms and the subordination of all the spaces of the civil society hitherto being deemed to be autonomous to this configuration of the total state.

6.4. National Socialist Conceptualisation of the Total State

In connection with the emergency understanding of Carl Schmitt, Ernst Rudolf Huber (2014:332) mentioned about 'the totality of the state'. It meant 'unceasing and unlimited' mobilisation of every 'völkische' living forces for the outside preservation. It was an emergency situation of the total mobilisation. According to the Huber, the totality of the state and Volk was also different from the authoritarian rule as in this system, the social life ceases to be 'state-free' and deeply politicised in which the distinction between state and society is abolished. Huber referred to a 'political Volk' which is deemed to be an 'objective, historical life-rule which is a real, natural existence different from the simple democratic masses. In that respect, the law ceased to be an 'abstract, state-ascending natural law or an individualistic interest-based law but a people's law within which Führer (the leader) as representing the will of Volk stood above any limitation of normative legal order.

Huber (2014:335) argued that 'the freedom of the society from the state is overcome by the state itself'. This art of 'political totality' found its resonance in absolute, fascist state. We can define it as the 'Führerstaat' where the original

power of the political Volk determined the unity of the state and society in a way that constituted a political total system. It rejected the existence of the instrumental state. Völkische State was not a corporative state either. Plurality has been transformed into a völkische unity which has also been intrinsically linked to the political party. Huber mentioned that the movement had a dual quality. On the one hand, it was a revolutionary, völkische community, on the other hand, it was state-carrying leadership core. As we could observe, through the mediation of political movement the state intended to form the 'political' Volk.

Hans Franzen (2014) in 'Gesetz und Richter' defined the political side of the Volk relying on the Schmitt's distinction of the foe and friend. Apart from the criteria good and bad, right and wrong, useful or not useful, what matters was the fight against the foe which was deemed to be threatening the whole existence of the Volk. Jews, high traitors, Communists were state's and Volk's foe and no matter what is their intention or rightfulness, their existence was objectively treated as a threat. For this reason, Huber said that we don't treat them as wrong or illegal, they are rather our enemies which deserves to be fiercely punished. (Franzen, 2014:372) From this point of view, the punishment decision in such a state neither aimed at the requirements of fight against the crime or social prevention nor the betterment of the behaviour. "The state used the punishment in order to make its existence apparent to all the world. (Franzen, 2014: 373)

In contrast to the normative limits of the law, it was political principles what were decisive in the application of the punishment. Although lower offices inclined to embrace the discretionary decisions, they should be in conformity with the expression and the will of the Führer which stood above all norms and decision as the embodiment of the Volk. Völkische principle should be in line with the Führer expression. The judge should comply with the right-finding and rule-giving Führer and rely on its order without any reservation. It involved a special kind of authority that strictly depended on the obedience of the lower offices and the responsibility of them to the above.

Koellreuter (2014:359) analysed the emergence of a Führerstate by distinguishing it from authoritarian state. It is not a 'soulless state and power apparatus that stands outside the society. Instead, their aim is to preserve racist Volk condition as well as its organisational structure and its political development. In that sense, the law serves to the Volk, not vice versa. In this state, the distinction between law-making and its application has lost its meaning. What is at stake was the distinction between simple and constitution-changing lawmaking. In that configuration, there appeared theoretically no difference between law and decree.

What we call 'Gleichschaltung' (bringing into line) process took place in order to connect all the independent public institutions and civil organisations to the aims of National Socialist government. Many national socialist-oriented ideologues tended to see this process as complete as if there remained no public or private sphere that functioned outside the circle of National Socialist organisation, hence a political totality.

In the same vein, Eric Becker (2014:318-21) asserted that the political rule was no longer an expression of the will of a state person but an act of leadership. It was not expression of state domination which externally suppresses the masses. Accordingly, all political ruling stemmed from the 'Volk' and 'Community' which were embodied in the person of the leadership. In this structure, faithfulness, honour and trust constituted the elements of the allegiance to the leadership. As the rule of the leadership was exactly what represents the values of the community, there was no reason for questioning the mediation of the leader in every sphere of life. There were two orders in this totality. One was a vertical order where the leader's rule was applied without any question. The second order was horizontal where all the parts of the totality works towards the Leader, they acted as if they were following the orders of the Leader. In Carl Schmitt's terms, all legality of this totality stemmed from the right of the community to live, hence all legality was connected to the existential question of the 'Volk' people. This was a 'concrete order' which was truly political and to

which all the norms or values should be subordinated even by the political violence (Müller, 2003: 471).

The extension of the 'political' in the society was real, hence the extent of the political domination has widened. Though it did not reach to a level of total state, it was also not simply the maintenance of an authoritarian order but an attack on the side of the ruling elite with the collaboration of the fascist party on the democratic gains of the masses. The leadership principle and its relation to the Volk went beyond a subject of mere propaganda and provided a new technics of political domination. It is interesting to note that the lack of democratic rights and legal protection was compensated by a pseudo-democracy where belonging to an ethnic identity supported a community-based social structure. The populist usage of the 'Volk' and 'community' led to the justification of the 'political repression'. A specific form of political will depending on a specific portion of the society was considered to be the expression of the whole nation. However, some 'democratic' colours used by the National Socialist discourse should be treated cautiously. The populist aspects of National Socialist rule created an identification of the people's will with the Leader that connotate no form of 'will formation' or 'will representation'. The participation of the democratic citizens was totally ruled out. However, regular references to the 'political Volk' was legitimising the political expediency that the Nazis trying to conduct. The 'masses' were constantly referred to in order to legitimate the elimination of the democratic rights of the citizens in the name of 'völkisch democracy' where the social and ethnic aliens were deprived of all political and social rights and above all of the right to exist. Only real members of the community, the ones of the Aryan descent had the right to determine the fate of the community and form a 'political will'. It was still mass politics that the Nazis wanted to exercise as they made the existence of the state dependent on the prior existence of a Volk. However, it was truly undemocratic since the political system did not allow any participation of the people in the policy making except in nationalist propaganda. The homogeneity of the nation in terms of its ethnic components was clearly in contradiction with any pluralistic conception democracy. 'Volk' was rather a

concrete community that did not recognise the individuals as containing a specific set of rights or collective entities having divergent interests. It was an act of will of unified Volk that destroyed all the democratic elements in the society once and for all.

6.5. German Fascism as a Non-State

In his *Behemoth*, Franz Neumann (1944) portrays a different picture of the National Socialism from the ones that was promoted by the claims for a totalitarian rule. Neumann has attempted to disenchant the given features of the National Socialist propaganda around the concepts of community or Volk. He claimed that the totality propagated by the National Socialist theoreticians did not exist at all.

Neumann insisted that National Socialism could not be made compatible with any rational political theory. Although it borrowed a series of concepts from different ideologies, there was no unified element that combined divergent concepts that make up the propaganda apparatus. According to him, ‘theory’ was a mere ‘arcanum dominationis’, hence a technique of domination outside right or wrong, a simple instrument to gain political power. This feature did not indicate that their ideological structure was totally ineffective. National Socialists came to power with the support of the masses. Neumann argued that National Socialists invented a kind of ‘a ceremonial and magical democracy’ that was akin to control all aspects of public and private lives of the people. The main aim was to control, atomise and terrorise the masses through ‘infinitely elastic ideology’ (Neumann, 1944:380).

According to Neumann, if we look at the emerging state in National Socialist rule, it is not possible to mention about a ‘state’ given the fact that the state is characterised by the rule of law, if not, by rationally operating machineries disposing of the monopoly of coercive power and unity of political power’ in its

strict sense. Neumann argued that such a unity was not observable in the National Socialist regime:

The party is independent in matters pertaining to the police and youth but everywhere else state is above the party. The army is sovereign in many fields; the bureaucracy is uncontrolled; and the industry has managed to conquer many positions (Neumann, 1944:382).

In such a system, there were four solid groups- party, bureaucracy, industry and army- that had their own ruling code functioning separately in their own spheres of influence. And their compromises between themselves were not regularised or institutionalised. Thus, we could not conceive of a state standing above these sectors. Only charismatic position of the Leader can help settle the conflicts. But it will not be in a universally binding manner (Neumann, 1944:383). This condition, however, did not affect the suppression of the ruled by the ruler in the monopoly capitalism, indeed this chaos facilitated the exploitation of workers in the face of lack of any meaningful institutions to organise any resistance.

From a constitutional perspective, Neumann asserted that 'German constitutional life was characterised by its utter shapelessness... Under National Socialism, the state per se has ceased to exist and without the state there was a decisionistic, situation-specific, deformed or dematerialised law. (Kelly, 2002: 483-5) Decisionism of National Socialist rule did not correspond to a sovereign. The law was nothing but an arcanum for the maintenance of power. In this sense, this kind of thinking directly challenged the 'concrete order' conception of Schmitt and corresponding sovereignty stemming from the 'real constitution of political will'. Of course, there was the unifying figure of the leader, however, 'neither element-party or state- controls the other, so there is no realm of law, although there are thousands of technical rules that are calculable. Thus, the co-existing power of the four sectors mentioned above are not institutionalised but personalised (Kelly, 2002:491).

6.6. German Fascism as an Alliance

The crucial question seems to be whether the multiplicity of power sources in National Socialist's coming to power and its state formation created a chaotic situation in which competing power sectors co-existed within the same state structure. In contrast to the theories of totalitarianism, pluralist theories preassumed that military, industry and bureaucracy have separate spheres of influence and they have commonalities in institutional aims but most of the time it was the contradictions that were underlying the Third Reich. In this theoretical formation, it has been accepted that the competing political agencies was destined to create a 'cumulative radicalisation' which was the natural result of the dominant organisational chaos and the sign of the internal weakness of the system.

According Mommsen (1991:170), the state apparatus of National Socialism had no bureaucratically structured hierarchy but a competitive leadership system. In the short-term, the explicit result of this process was a 'tremendous level of political mobilisation'. Like in the movement phase, Hitler avoided from setting 'policy guidelines' for clearly defined instructions. In such a construction, all the authorities within the state had 'a thorough knowledge of particular problem' they have to face with but the coordination between them was quite inadequate and made in an causal and ad hoc manner (Mommsen, 1991:176). On the one hand, the bureaucratic authorities were duplicated by the parallel networks which paralysed a rational structuring of state apparatus. On the other hand, National Socialist leaders deliberately made a parasitic usage of the existing institutions which gave way for the increasing level of polycentrism of the system and the growth of secondary bureaucratic structures. Mommsen (1991:186-187) insisted on the fact that this system was bound to disintegrate as 'the institutional, legal and social foundations of the political system at first merely coordinated with the new regime were progressively dismantled and finally destroyed'.

While providing a general view of how the power relationships in the Third Reich functioned, the theories pointing at the 'polyarchy' in National Socialism suffered from their blindness to the common grounds on which different power centers have implicitly or explicitly agreed. Kühnl (1990) rightly argued that different policy differences or individual power conflicts could not disguise their actual correspondence on the strategic targets of the National Socialism both as a regime and as a movement.

According to Kühnl (1990:186), the fascist party and the leading figures of the industry and society agreed on specific aims that formed the basis of their alliance. First, the working class movement has been destroyed. The trade unions and parties of Social Democrats and Communists have been eliminated from the public life. The opportunities to defend the interests of the workers and employees have been totally abolished. The 'peace in the work place' has been created at the expense of high level of economic exploitation. With the introduction of 'The Law on the regulation of national work' in 1934, the employers were regarded as the leaders of the industry and the workers were degraded to simply obey to the commands of the leader. Thus, mottos like 'elimination of Marxism' or 'abolition of class Conflict' were common strategic aims of the capital in large and the middle class based movement of National Socialists. Secondly, the anti-capitalistic elements of the SA and its middle class aspirations have been excluded from the state which directly served for the interests of capitalists and the army.

To depict the main position of conservatives, Paxton (2004:90) argued that "the Conservatives wanted order, calm, and the inherited hierarchies of wealth and birth. They shrank both from fascist mass enthusiasm and from the sort of total power fascists grasped for. They wanted obedience and deference, not dangerous popular mobilization, and they wanted to limit the state to the functions of a night watchman" who would keep order while traditional elites ruled through property, churches, armies, and inherited social influence. Most conservatives,

however, were sure that communism was worse. They would work with fascists if the Left looked otherwise likely to win”.

In the NSDAP's road to power, the positive effect of the conservatives was undeniable. The criticism of Weimar Republic and parliamentarism, their emphasis on the need of a 'strong state', the desire to revise Versailles dictates were the goals that conservatives and NSDAP was sharing. In the civil war conditions between 1930 and 1933, the paramilitary organisation of NSDAP, S.A. were favored by the conservative state officials in the fight against Communists and SPD. Although S.A was dissolved for a short period of time on 13 April 1932, the ban on S.A was lifted on May 1932 after Prussian elections. Especially the government of 'national concentration' launched by Papen explicitly saw the existence of the SA and NSDAP as the forces of public order and as a counterweight against the threat of Marxism. In the context of the turn towards rightist policies of Papen, NSDAP was seen as a state within the state and an important part of national forces. In that sense, the fight between S.A and Communists was used by the conservatives as an opportunity to re-constitute the 'state reason' which presumed a 'presidential dictatorship' that in time went far away from the bounds of Weimar Constitution and the majority consent of the parliament. This change of the political regime described as 'the new state' and 'new course' was building the ground on which a Leadership State (Führerstaat) could further be constituted by the NSDAP. Thus, the choices of conservatives became quite effective in the further experiments of the dictatorship.

In the regime phase, we faced with the cooperation between the military, the police, the judiciary and senior civil servants. The National Socialist rule was not only the embodiment of unleashing destructive energies, but also an inclination towards 'peace and order' in a conservative fashion. Paxton (2004:130) rightly argued that 'the problem of fascist regimes was to keep boiling without troubling public order and upsetting conservative allies'. For instance, National Socialist did not face with a particular problem of gaining the consent of the civil servants as they kept their professional identity intact. In the Weimar time, civil servants

were already favoring ‘authority and order’ as against the parliamentary regime and the Left (Paxton, 2004:133). The police was a ‘privileged institution’ that National Socialists succeeded to infiltrate before they came to power. In the regime phase, they took a special role being exempted from any restriction of law as ‘the final arbiters of their own form of unlimited police justice. In the same vein, the judiciary has actively joined in the emergence of Prerogative State that destroyed the constitutional restraints of the regime and made the arbitrary political rule dominate in its sphere of competence (Paxton: 2004, 133-34).

We can argue that the theory of ‘alliance’ fitted better to the actual condition in the Third Reich. Constitutionally, it was radically different from the previous liberal state. A new configuration of the state in authoritarian forms were introduced during the period of Presidential regimes. In the regime phase, an exceptional state with its own codes of political domination completely distanced itself from the rule of law and pushed the National Socialist leaders with the conservative forces to build up a political system which was hostile to any democratic representation in the policy making. It is true that real power constellation was not identical with the prerequisites of ideological formation of the total state. On the other hand, it is also not possible to conceive of the condition of the power relations in the Third Reich as completely chaotic as if it was a continuous fight of every one against every one.

According to Kershaw (1998:553), it was the weakness of the established elites of the ‘old order’ that caused the Nazi’s accession to power. The traditional power groups helped the Nazis undermine and destroy the democracy that was totally undesirable for that elite. However, they were not in a position to realise the counter-revolution in their own fashion. ‘Hitler needed them to reach the power and in response the conservative elites made use of the NSDAP to create ‘a necessary mass base for their counter-revolutionary aims. These premises constituted the core of the ‘Entente’ between the party and the traditional state apparatus.

Regarding the role of the army in this 'Entent', the army was ready for an approval of 'brutally exercised state violence' as a means of avoiding a civil war, guaranteeing domestic peace and giving impetus to the attempts at the re-armament. In this context, the maintenance of the domestic peace and order was directly linked to the so-called eradication of the 'Marxism' i.e. the suppression of the working class organisation, from free trade unions to the SPD and KPD (Kühnl, 1990). In view of the army, only such a mass organisation of NSDAP could be successful in the control of the streets and in the realisation of the counter-revolution. Additionally, the political ambitions like the eastern expansion and intensification of the re-armament were the points over which the objectives of the NSDAP and the army converged. Surely, we can argue that the army was not completely subjugated to the demands of the party and 'there were limits beyond which the army cannot allow party interference'. A specific rationality of its own type dominated inner relations of the army which did not bow down to the party when it came to its internal regulations. However, as regards its ideological stance against the 'weakness of the Weimar Republic' and the flaws of the party system led the army to give consent to the 'symbolisation of the NSDAP as the protector of 'law, order and security''. In the course of the Third Reich, there were also disputes regarding the direction and scope of the military expansion but it should be not forgotten that these were not on the main objectives of fascist politics. Different vantage points on the technical issues or personal conflicts should not be sanctioned as a real anti-fascist resistance grown out of the army leadership. There were also vested interests in the army which was for a long time treated as the representative of big land owners (Junkers) and an authoritarian Prussian tradition. In time, the army has also developed internal ties with the big capital in which the industrial magnates provided the economic power that was necessary for the articulation of the military ambitions. In that vein, modernised parts of the army tried to get rid of the narrow cycle of Junkers and appeared in the supervisory boards of the big industry.

The date of 30 June 1934 called as 'Night of the Long Knives' was absolutely a turning point in the composition of the power alliance of ruling classes. With this

purge primarily resulted in the assassination of SA Chef Röhm, old general and chancellor Streicher, and the left-wing leader of NSDAP Strasser, the army was relieved due to the overthrow of the SA's intention to compete with the army as an alternative party militia. The petite bourgeois elements within the party were pushing towards launching 'a second revolution' that would challenge the bastions of the traditional elite within the state. The possibility of such a 'plebian revolt' (Guerin, 2016:207) was prevented from the start. It strengthened the alliance between the army and the NSDAP around concerns of the 'state reason' and also fostered the alliance between the state and big capital since the potentially dangerous anti-capitalistic features of the party were to a great extent discarded. It was not only the army but also the big banks and industrialists which took advantage of the situation by stiffening the anti-monopolistic social interests of the middle classes. The SA was also representing antagonistic interests to the big capital and its repression was legitimised by the general direction of the NS economic policy in accordance with the big capital. Although we can rightly assure that the interests of the middle classes on which the voter base of the NSDAP largely depended were victimised in favour of the big capital, we should be cautious about the 'loss of the mass bases' of the NSDAP. The party insisted on their monopoly of purging 'unwanted elements' within the party, however, it did not mean a complete neglect of the social strata upon which the recruitment of NSDAP state policy was based. Though objectively not fulfilling the demands of the middle strata, the NSDAP avoided from losing its mass basis without which it could not resist the over-empowerment of the traditional rightist elites. In that sense, the never ending tension between the party and the state continued to be an integral part of fascist regime as the mass mobilisation should be compromised with the concerns of the elites for the social order and security.

6.7. German Fascism and Big Industry

The real power structure was divided into two main groups: on the one side, there was the ruling strata composed of the industry, banks, military and the state

bureaucracy. On the other, there was the ruling cadre of the fascist party. The power cartel was based on the mutual compromises between the party and other sectors of ruling class. To what extent did the party have an independence from the traditional elites? Especially regarding the relationship between the party and the big capital, the main controversy among the scholars revolved around the issues of the party's evaluation of the principal engagements of the big capital, around the question of whether the party had an overarching influence over the economic policy. If taken in strict terms, the discussions of the 'primacy of politics' and 'primacy of economics' are not productive and have no explanatory power. However, to clarify the complexities of the power alliance in National Socialism, it seems to be necessary to touch upon some basic tenets of divergent approaches relevant to the debate.

According to the theses of Friedrich Pollak on state capitalism (Rabinbach 2005: 50-1), the National Socialist state pointed at a clear-cut diversion from the market competition. It was thought that the main institution of the capitalism was replaced by the tendencies of 'planning, state control and manipulation'. In such a context, there were mainly four dimensions to the establishment of the state capitalism. In most of the socio-economic areas, the relations of state capitalism replaced private capitalism. The state played a crucial role in absorbing the functions of a private capitalist. 'The sale of labour and the pursuit of profit still had an important role in the functioning of the system. Lastly, the state capitalism had nothing to do with the socialist experiments (Rabinbach, 2005:51). In such a system, market as the principal institution is not able to reproduce itself. 'The primacy of the politics over economy' gains ascendancy while all the aspects of the socio-political life are regulated by the pure administrative measures. Growing forms of bureaucratisation and the emergence of the pseudo-collectivities promotes the end of the central role of egoistic individuals inherent in the market mechanism. According to it, the same trend towards state collectivism can also be observed in the so-called 'non-totalitarian' societies. However, in the case of National Socialism, it could easily be asserted that theory of the state capitalism underestimated the effective role of the

monopolistic nature of capitalism. Its dependence on the state intervention was falsely interpreted as the absolute domination of the state as an alternative to the market mechanisms. In fact, as will be seen, in the National Socialist system, the motive of the profit making and the centrality of the market (though in a controlled and monopolised way) were not left aside to the advantage of 'pure administrative control' of the economics for the realisation of the politically determined ambitions. In contrast, the competition among the capitalists continued to exist, albeit at a higher level, and took a new form within which the factor of the state regulation became an important ingredient in determining the course of economic competition. Overall, this did not mean an absence of the markets and the unimportance of the economic interests of the private capitalists.

Tim Mason's idea of the 'primacy of politics' in National Socialist domination is also supportive of views of the state capitalism. He insisted that faced with its own contradiction in the end of the Weimar Republic, 'the bourgeoisie, old and new petty bourgeoisie and rural population sought a way out of the crisis in surrendering to the implications of the pure politics such as 'propaganda, national exaltation, the cult of the leader, anti-Semitism and anti-communism'. During this process, the state apparatus gained its independence from social pressures and ceased to function as the representative of the propertied classes as a whole (Mason, 1996: 57). For Mason, National Socialist state achieved 'a new consensus, a new social and economic compromise and a new general representation of people by political means' that provided the state with an opportunity to 'maintain its independence from the old ruling classes'. It was true that ways of economic thinking was incompatible with the political leadership of the National Socialism. Mason admits that 'from 1933 until 1936, the propertied class played an important role in shaping the economic policy including social policy and benefited from the common imperialist programme of the NSDAP (Mason,1996:62). Mason's conviction is that the 'apparent harmony' between the business and the party came to dissolve as the 'direct links between them' weakened compared to the times of the Weimar Republic. The exclusive focus on the armament with the Four Year Plan in 1936 and the

confinement of the private business to the domestic production of raw materials (Mason, 1996: 64) led, according to the Mason's claim, the heavy industry to realise that its interests were not in parallel to the imperialistic ambitions of the party. Undoubtedly, the huge armament firms saw their interests fulfilled, however, it was also the fact that overall economic system was left to the political decisions of Hitler as the final arbiter according to whom 'the economy was merely a means for attaining political goals, the objectives of foreign policy and war aims that were not determined by economic considerations' (Mason, 1996:69). Lastly, we can add that the autonomy of the political sphere was something pointing at the 'irrationality' and 'destructive capacity' of the political decisions that did in the last instance not comply with the overall concerns of the economic system. Reminding of the theses on the 'polyarchy' in the National Socialist system, Mason underlined the presence of a "blind goalless activism in all spheres of public life, a tendency to which the capitalist economy, based as it was on competition and maximisation of profit, was particularly susceptible" (Mason, 1996:75).

However, if we elaborate the relationship between the party and industry after the seizure of the power, we can detect an imminent logic, a specific rationality that stands behind the industrial relations of National Socialism. The links between the state and the monopolistic powers were not simply a result of irrational political mobility of the party adverse to all the economically defined interests. Kühnl (1990:216) insists on the fact that there should be a clear demarcation between the 'social interests and content' of the National Socialist policy and its forms of political and ideological organisation. The ruling strata of the party consisted of those segments of the population which were socially threatened and downwards oriented. These social groups saw in the establishment of the dictatorship an opportunity to get access to a secured income and social privileges (Kühnl, 1990:217). Nevertheless, it does not denote that the policies of the state corresponded to the interests of the middle classes. The social content of the fascist politics was to a great extent in accordance with the capitalist interests. The binding force between the party and the state was 'the

destruction of the working class movement, the dissolution of the political organisations of the middle classes, the promotion of the economic institutions of business men. The allocation of the state assistance primarily served for the well-being of the big business and above all, the preparation and exercise of a brutally designed expansion programme targeting the domination and looting of the Europe (Kühnl, 1990: 216). Naturally, there was competition between the party and the state in terms of the political competencies of each sector, however, the different opinions on the realisation of some specific policies were not an expression of a dispute on the basic orientations of the fascist politics as defined above. In such a system, the distinctive feature of the National Socialist policy was the lack of any democratic mechanisms that can normally function as a limitation to the unfolding of the interests of the ruling classes. However, in National Socialism, we do not face with the 'norm-based' competition of the divergent interests especially located in the representative institutions. What is at stake is rather 'a permanent competition of the political cliques within the ruling classes.

Kühnl asserts that there was 'a relative autonomy of the fascist state from the partial interests of the business groups so as to attain an holistic political concept for the competing interests of the big industry and banking sector and function, if necessary, as an arbiter between these interests. Thus, the collective interest of the capital was assured even if the economic policies of the Nation Socialism ran counter to the short-term interests of the some factions of the capitalist class. Whereas the executive represented by the fascist state cannot simply be viewed as 'the mere instrument of the ruling classes', it would be also be wrong to assume that the 'relative autonomy of the fascist state' implied the 'anti-fascist action of the rest of the ruling classes. As the 'relative autonomy of the state in a strengthened form compared to the democratic regime was self-evident, so was the active stance of the overlapping interests of the big capital, state bureaucracy and the army in cementing the composition of the power alliance (Kühnl, 1990:220).

If we look at the structural components of the German economy during the National Socialist rule, we observe that a monopolistic economy did function reliably with a 'political organisation which lacked autonomous mass organisations and freedom of criticism'. Thus, the suppression and the elimination of the political and economic liberty was an integral part of the National Socialist economic system within which the economic activity was made compatible to the demands of the industrial magnates.

Surely, democratic mechanisms were truly dangerous for the monopolistic powers as it would mean increasing public control over the high profits that the industrialist stuck to. Neumann (1944: 290) explains the relationship between the Nazi state and big business as follows:

In short, the democracy would endanger the fully monopolised system. It is the essence of totalitarianism to stabilise and fortify it. This of course is not the sole function of the system. The National Socialist Party is solely concerned with the thousand year rule, but to achieve this goal, they can not but protect the monopolistic system which provides them with the economic basis for political expansion...It is the aggressive, imperialist and expansionistic spirit of the German big business unhampered by considerations for the small competitors, for the middle classes, free from the control of the banks, delivered from the pressure of the trade unions, which is the motivating source of the economic system. Profits and more profits are the motive power.

In fact, it is understandable that the monopolists fear the possibility of democratic planning that would care for the welfare of the masses and lead to the cut down of the profits. Alfred Sohn Rethel also sees 'the mutual dependency' of the state and big business in a novel way. His thesis depends on the assumption that the response of the German capital to the falling rate of profit in crisis was not an expectation from other capital or from the world market but 'a forced raising of the rate of surplus value by the slashing of the workers' wages' (Neumann, 1944:91). The economy was characterised by its over-reliance on non-reproductive values and non-marketable goods as seen in the armament industry. Instead of depending on the 'relative surplus value' whose extraction is intrinsically connected with the increasing of the labour productivity, big business dwelled more on the 'absolute surplus value'. It exclusively related to

the 'changes in the social conditions of the labour, namely to the increased length of the working day or depressed levels of the wage earnings. Alfred Sohn-Rethel (1998:96) points out that the compulsory labour service was also a good illustration of the Nazi System's preference for the 'absolute surplus value', for reducing the wages when there appears a sign of economic crisis. He adds that

The switch to the terroristic control of absolute surplus value production by the state meant that the bourgeois elite had to smash not only proletarian political organizations but also the mass basis appropriate to their own previous control through surplus value production, namely the unions and social democracy: these they had to replace with a different mass basis, that of the National Socialism (Alfred Sohn Rethel, 1998: 70).

In such a framework, the proletariat is excluded from real power relationships but the bourgeoisie remained alone with 'the objective, blind power embodied in the party dictatorship of its fascist class vanguard. Although it is an integral part of the extraction of the surplus value, it is not simply 'an obedient tool' of the bourgeoisie. Alfred Sohn-Rethel (1998:71) defines this situation as the 'dialectics of fascism' according to which the cost of giving up the 'genuine profitability', hence 'the rules of the competition' in favour of 'guaranteed monopolistic profits' by the terroristic means also the unpredictability of the fascist vanguard that the bourgeoisie should take into consideration seriously. But the bourgeois forces can not get rid of this situation as they are trapped in the profit and loss calculations of its class interests.

It can be said that 'the economic policy of the National Socialism fostered and reinforced the already existing mechanisms in the economy driven towards the monopolisation and centralisation. Compulsory cartellization brought by the decree of 15 July 1933 was a way of responding to the already undergoing process of centralisation in the economy. This decree used the public force to eliminate 'unreliable competitors' whereby especially small retailers, wholesalers and handicraftsmen who consisted in the social base of the National Socialism were seriously destroyed. 'The creation of new compulsory cartels, the attachment the outsiders to existing cartels and the prohibition both of new

establishments and of the extension of existing plant capacity' served for 'the maintenance and solidification of the existing organisational patterns'. It was also easier for the state apparatus to deal with a few big businesses instead of the large number of small enterprises. The non-conformists were brought into line with the use of state coercion (Guerin, 2016:289). On the other hand, the Aryanisation and Germanisation processes put into practice by the fascist government were also conducive to the further expansion and centralisation of the German business. Additionally, it should be stated that internal transformation of the big business in the direction of the indispensability of the technological progress made the big firms more dependent on the state help (Neumann, 1944:230). In that sense, Germany has inclined to develop new methods of financing the technological progress such as 'community financing' which depended on the 'compulsion of the small and middle entrepreneur to finance the expansion of the big ones. As the 'fascist state helped the industrialists to raise their sale prices artificially by forbidding, through legislation, the establishment of the new industries and new forms of the competition', the consumers and the masses with small producers were the social groups most adversely affected by the compulsory cartellisation (Guerin, 2016:289).

The other most important pillar of the National Socialist system was growing autarchy and the war economy. The policy makers were trapped in a dilemma that characterised the system's functioning. On the one side, there was a lack of purchasing power of the private customers necessary for the revival of a domestic market. On the other side, the industrialists were refraining from such big armament projects due its high risks and costs. In such a conjecture, the state came to the front 'replacing the missing customers and the missing investments' (Guerin, 2016:296). State orders depended on two pillars: 'great public works for the sake of prestige and works for 'national defense' including high ways and rail road projects. In time, the public work programmes began to be replaced by the armament projects. If we ask the question of how the fascist state became able to finance these huge projects and support the big business, as Guerin

(2016: 301) put forward, the answer would be that 'it issued paper and ruined the national currency at the expense of all the people who live on fixed incomes and also the working class whose wages remained stable at the face of rising cost of living'. Overall, the hidden inflation, the taxes like 'National Defense Tax that was disproportionately exercised to the detriment of the small producers. The controls of foreign trade made the necessities of the life more scarce and expensive so that it destroyed the standard of the living of the popular masses with regard to the economic expansion of the big capital aided by the favourable state interventions. Goering's preferences for the necessity of the armament investment were revealed by his following words: "Either we would buy butter and give up our freedom or we would choose freedom and give up butter"' (Guerin, 2016:319).

We can say that the alliance within the power bloc did not mean there was not an equality of political power. Fascist party's occupation of the state apparatus and the increasing hegemony of monopoly capital prevailed over the interests of the old state elite (Poulantzas, 1976:94). On the one hand, the contradictions between the medium capital and big capital were neutralised. Poulantzas asserts that "although Nazi economic policy massively favoured big capital, medium capital was not thereby sacrificed. Far from it, it made economic gains. Besides the masses, the main victims of the measures in favour of big capital were the small entrepreneurs" (Poulantzas, 1976:96). Thus, fascist state with massive state interventions involved in the 'regulation' of the domination of the monopoly capital with a view to 'smoothing' the contradictions within the ruling classes while "promoting reproduction of the conditions of the capitalist production, that is, reinforcing class exploitation and domination" (Poulantzas, 1976:98). This process went hand in hand with the occupation of the state by the petite bourgeoisie cadre of the fascist party. According to Poulantzas (1976:112), with the increasing 'subordination of the party to the state, the petite bourgeoisie began to detach from its representational links to its class origin. Consequently, a new fascist state elite has emerged as an alternative to the old bureaucracy. The question here is how to understand the continuing tension between the popular

promises of the fascist party and the interests of the ruling classes. Although in National Socialist regime it seems that this tension have been resolved by means of terror, propaganda and mass mobilisation, great sacrifices demanded from the masses have also contained the possibilities of resistances among the dominated classes and exerted potential contradictions immanent to the fascist regimes.

6.8. The Alliance Theory, Fascisation and the Mass Aspects of the German Fascism

The Night of Long Knives, when the leaders of the SA including the Röhm, the leader of the NSDAP 'socialist' wing and also a range of authoritarians and military chiefs like Schleicher are murdered is illuminating in the sense of how fascist political power strategy basically functions. While the 'anti-capitalist' and 'anti-systemic elements of the movement favoring 'second revolution' are eradicated from the political scene in line with the demands of the business and authoritarian state elites particularly the military, the fascist leaders immediately avoided from a possible 'authoritarian consolidation'. Frei (2013:27) depicted this development as 'double coup' within which the action against the SA was an act of the deterrence against the 'anti-systemic' attempts that would envisage a 'social restructuring' against the vested interests of the economic and political elites, it was also a 'bloody terrorist act' against any authoritarian visions implicitly or explicitly intending to restore the monarchy. The comments tending to view this 'double coup' as the revelation of 'Führer dictatorship' put emphasis on the increasing strength of the SS that is personally loyal to the Führer as an alternative to the SA (Frei, 2013:36). Accordingly, the SS functioned as a 'totalitarian organization' directed against 'new criminal offences', against the 'Acts contrary to the Healthy Feelings of the Volk' (Kitchen, 2017:77). So the 'political police', the Gestapo under the leadership of Göring and SS under the leadership of Himmler was tied to Hitler as the 'populist 'people's chancellor' (Childers, 2018:394) the SS was now building up a parallel network of social and political control surveying the formal functioning of the state institutions (Poulantzas). According to the new political constellation, while the 'charismatic

authority' as the last arbiter of the power relations was put above every institutional autonomy, this power shift also corresponded to the diffusion of a wide range of 'mass political organisations' from the Hitler Youth to the Labour Front or National Socialist Welfare Organization that works towards 'Führer' in a form of 'organised chaos' and 'institutional Darwinism' (Childers, 2018:389). However, it would be mistaken to receive these developments as paving way for the establishment of a Führer dictatorship and it would mean the underestimation of the long term political objectives that glue the military, the bureaucracy and the business to the fascist rule . The elimination of the 'Marxist' political organisations, the extension of re-armament industry, external military expansion and the plundering of the Eastern 'Slavic countries' with racial motives continued to be the cementing force beyond the ruling bloc. In that sense, the dichotomy between 'radicalised' party under the rule of Hitler and the authoritarians that was constantly trying to brake this radicalisation proves to be incorrect. 'The reciprocal dependence' (Kühnl, 1990:219) continued as the theorists of the alliance implies. It was not a coincidence that after the Röhm action, the army expressed its 'personal oath' to the Führer. The secondary position of the authoritarians and business elite in politics did not mean their lack of allegiance to the wider goals like the 'national revival and growth', an enlargening bureaucracy, increasing economic exploitation of the working class in the name of monopoly capital's benefits from the armament industry. They gave consent to shaping of the society in a non-democratic manner that has de-politicised the society in terms of their class-political organisations and mobilised it in a militarist fashion through an understanding of 'class-less national homogeneity'. These nationalist ambitions kept its continuing influence in the sustainment of the ruling bloc.

However, the missing point in this conceptualisation is the analysis of the relationship between the mass base of the regime and the new political reconfiguration. Typically, the mass effect of the fascism and the social demands and ideological positions of the supporters of the regime was made a derivative of the political relations as an interplay of dominating classes. Kühnl (1990:215)

quotes Abendroth's comment on the necessity to "clearly differentiate the fascist 'social' content and function from the 'technics, forms of organisations and institutions. According to it, the 'social' content of the regime, hence the 'eradication of the working class institutions, the guaranteeing the monopoly profits and high level of socio-economic exploitation do not change according to quality and form of the political domination of the regime. In such a sense, in the last instance any distinction between different counter-revolutionary regime could only be made in term of their 'forms'. However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the incorporation of fascist technics of power had specific effects on the mass formation of the regime, the 'political expressions' of social discontents that can not simply be attributed to the 'false consciousness' or deception through propaganda.

First of all, from our previous arguments especially on the mass bases of German fascism, we remember that the fascist mass basis expresses itself both by its 'social discontent and frustration' in a nationalist form and also through the desire for a political order and stability, for a strong state that would be embodiment of the 'real national will'. Such concerns were also decisive in the positive attitude of the bourgeois segments towards the 'criminal' and 'anti-systemic' elements of the SA. It is revelation of the difference between the NSDAP as a 'mass movement' and the mass base of fascist regime itself. As the first years of the regime indicated, the 'march violets' (Marzgefallenen) of the party was not in line with a National Socialist ideological formation at all. As we have indicated before, to conceive the mass support for the regime and the NSDAP as 'the sole representative of the material middle class interests is really problematic. There are different variants that were at issue. We observed that while in the period of pre-fascist period, hence the first phase of fascisation, the 'oppositional culture' and 'anti-systemic' demands (against the Weimar democracy and financial plutocrats) were more frequently pronounced, in the regime phase the 'social discontent' began to be directed in a more ethnical/racial terms against the social outsiders and racial aliens. It was not simply an outcome of 'manipulation' of the ruling classes but a specific

reciprocity between the social strata having 'bourgeois, national and conservative traits' and the policies of the fascist regime. In that sense, the practices of social and political exclusion of the Jewish people, social outsiders from the public sphere had specific effects on the 'social' content of the regime that requires us to analyse how the new forms of political domination around fascism shaped its mass consolidation that is very critical for any fascist regime. In any case, it was not a conflict-free process that also contained political resistance possibilities, though in a very limited sense for a variety of reasons.

6.9. The Mass Appeal of the Regime to the Dominated Classes

As we have indicated in the third chapter, evaluating the mass reception of the National Socialism necessitates avoiding two main mistakes in the formulation of the term 'masses'. Poulantzas (2008:259) rightly emphasised that the 'conception' of the masses as 'an indivisible unity' as if it is not divided into the different classes, class fractions and social groups can lead us to the mistaken result that 'the fascist propaganda unequivocally shaped and won over the masses. According to this view, the masses were brought into line and completely made compatible with the ideology of National Socialism. Particularly if we look into the organisation of the National Socialism in power, it seems that the effect of the National Socialism, 'the popular impact of the fascism' on the masses should be assessed in a differentiated fashion which would pay special attention to the different classes and class fractions. To give an example, the poor rural peasantry remained relatively immune to the attempts of the National Socialist State at making the poor peasants reliable basis of mass domination. Indeed, it is also questionable whether the blue-collar workers were totally incorporated into the National Socialist system. Poulantzas (2008:261) asserts that though it was not turned into an wholesale political resistance that would challenge the new established order, a range of worker's reactions to the system such as 'the sabotage and the lowering of the production levels of absenteeism or unofficial strikes' should be considered as the culmination of the disaffection of the workers. The view that in terms of the overall condition of the

regime, there is no difference between the passive resignation and active adhesion proves unconvincing as at the face of the totalitarian ambitions of the regime, the 'non-participation' in the mass euphoria could connote a meaningful position against the exigencies of the regime. In addition, we have to stay away from treating the National Socialist propaganda as a monolithic programmatic unit that mainly depends on an 'idea' or a discourse that has a mass appeal due to its internal consistency or its content that 'reveals a uniformity'. In fact, there were divergent National Socialist strategies that aimed to refer to a multiplicity of the purposes whose success largely depended on the strength of their institutional mediations and receptibility of the subjects to a specific form of propaganda.

Apart from these, it should be stated that 'terror' i.e. the use of violence was an integral part of the National Socialist politics that was firstly used to eradicate the possibility of the political opposition, and then it was deployed against its subjects in order to discipline the population. Naturally, it was a 'selective violence' that constantly reminded the people of the social costs of the disloyalty and subjugated them artificially into the main tenets of the National Socialist ideology. Thus, to receive mass consent was not a result of the 'free choice' of the people. It was rather a process in which propaganda and violence co-functioned. Patzold (1989:236) argues that 'the terror did not only act as a deterrent, it also had a propagandizing effect. This quality of the regime manifested itself in the message of the terror that presumably showed the 'strong-willed leaders as the 'owner of the country and state' and as the guarantee of maintaining the public order. The harsh treatment of the opponents in the name of the 'national myth' in that sense had a disciplinising effect on the population which seemed to be obligated to act on the right side against the internal and external enemies that are legitimately demonised and dispelled from the supposed 'racial community'. In that framework, the use of terror with its coupling with the propaganda served as an instrument of integrating the community.

However, it is not possible to equate the fascist regime with an authoritarian one that exclusively focuses on the physical repression as the only form of the domination of the masses. To gauge the public mood and to manipulate it in the desired direction was of course an important part of the fascist regime. However, it did not function as if the population was in a condition of *tabula rasa* (Welch, 1993: 59). In that vein, instead of imposing its political programme on the people in a uni-directional way, the National Socialists resorted to the ‘prevailing opinions and prejudices of the German people’ in the sense that nationalism, Anti-Semitism or xenophobia was not an invention of the Nazis. Rather, lived experiences of the German people like the national humiliation in the aftermath of the First World War, the inflation, the economic depression and the subsequent mass unemployment undoubtedly created a mass of people which were vulnerable to the nationalistic demagoguery of the Nazis. Although deception was one of the basic factors of the propaganda, the susceptibility of the population to a specific form of propaganda was also what matters in its public acceptance. In this sense, we can say that while the class analysis of the mass appearance of the fascism certainly gives us clues for different reflections of the propaganda on the population, the concerns of the regime for building up ‘a national community’ should not simply be discredited as a deceptive invention of the propaganda. As we shall see, the institutional expressions of the community building in the National Socialism could fulfill an integrating function that went beyond the limited terrain of the specific classes. The idea of ‘racial community’ had real social consequences creating alternative institutional formations that tried to legitimise the existing socio-economic order fraught with the social inequalities.

What we see as the main ingredient of the National Socialist regime is a ‘naturalisation of the existing socio-economic order’ which created populist imaginations that are exclusively tied to a conception of the ‘national community’. The exclusion of the ‘political opponents’, asocials and non-conformists were in essence not incompatible with the creation of a ‘work community’ that principally meant a deepening of the ‘capitalist social relations.

The enemies of the capitalism and national community did not widely differ from each other. If we look at the social policy of the National Socialism and its labour relations, we can easily state that the ideal of achieving a 'productive labour community' was in many ways complementary to the social requirements of capitalist mode of production. The Social Darwinist implications of the regime for the members of the community was a counterpart of fostering individual competition in the work relations. Instead of enhancing the solidarity among the 'dominated classes', the National-Socialistic mode of government first paved way for the 'atomisation of individuals' and then attempted at creating 'a productive community of these competing individuals' which were necessarily differentiated from the 'unproductive' labour. In that vein, the biological references of the National Socialism to the 'healthy body' of nation was to a large extent a derivative of the 'social model' of the capitalism that was purged of its liberal-democratic content.

6.10. The Labour and The Middle Classes

After the abolishment of the trade unions, the Nazis established a new form of labour organisation called as 'Labour Front'. The Labour Front was an organisation having 25 million members including 'every independent and every gainfully employed person outside the civil service. It was composed of sixteen federal plant communities. The workers did not organise according to the requirements of their occupation. All workers were member of a total unit around the Labour Front and there were no natural organisation that depended on the initiative of the local units. Differentiation among the workers was completely ruled out. In this form, the primary objective of the Labour Front was 'the indoctrination of the German working class and the destruction of last vestiges of Socialism, Marxism, of Catholic and democratic trade unionism'. Even though there was no legal obligation to become a member of the Labour Front, there was an informal pressure put on the workers to become a part of the Labour Front. Within the organisation, the bureaucratisation reached its

maximum limits and contained large elements of fraud that had also caused a widespread discontent among the workers (Neumann, 1944: 341).

Actually, the economic crisis and the mass unemployment already had many repercussions on the labour movement whose internal solidarity was eroded due to these structural reasons. It was also evident that the disintegration of the political organisations of the working class made the workers defenseless at the face of the unified attack of the bourgeoisie which would question the democratic foundations of the working class. The initial aim of the left wing of the NSDAP was to replace the free trade unions with the National Socialist trade union of the NSBO which was planned to 'determine wages and salaries, present the government with new labour protection measures and take over the union's social functions'. However, the leaders of the NSDAP were not in favour of a growth of a militant trade union like NSBO that would revive the 'class struggle' and challenge the superiority of the entrepreneurs at the plant level. For this reason, the NSBO has been dissolved and all the trade union activities were connected to the Labour Front which fulfilled a function of atomising the working class and giving priority to the demands of the entrepreneurs.

On 19 May 1933, a Law on the Trustees of Labour was initiated. Trustees of Labour was composed of twelve state officials whose main job was 'to regulate wages, conditions of work and labour contracts in each of their respective districts and to maintain peace among workers and employers. With this act, the co-determination rights given to the workers in the Weimar system were left aside. The new regime rather presumed the close collaboration between the employers and the Trustees of Labour that legitimised the superior position of the employer in the name of the 'peace at the plant' (Evans, 2004: 461) . On January 1934, the Law on the ordering of the National Labour was enacted. Shirer (1960: 263) described the new forms of labour administration as the 'Serfdom of Labor':

Deprived of his trade unions, the collective bargaining and the right to strike, the German worker became an industrial serf, bound to his master, the employer, much as the mediaval peasants had been bound to the Lord of manor.

The new law created 'the ethical idea of faith' according to which the worker did not only work but shows loyalty to the entrepreneur as well as to the state itself. The entrepreneur became the leader of the enterprise to whose orders the workers should be subjected without any reservation. In the new system, a plant community ideology was established which made the workers devoid of any substantial rights with respect to the 'requirements of the plant community'. The faith of the workers in the plant and the leader meant that 'the worker is obliged to accept any work the employer demands within reason, he must work at any place the employer determines within reason, he must accept any wages that the employer equitably fixes, unless they are fixed in trustee or plant regulation (Neumann, 1944: 346).

The words of Dr.Ley, the leader of the Labour Front were indicative of the Nazi's attitude towards meaning of the work. He said that "We are all soldiers of labour, amongst whom some command and the others obey. Obedience and responsibility have to count amongst us again" (Evans, 2004: 462).

The work was the central ingredient of the community design of the Nazis. It was the 'measure of 'man', the personality itself'. Certainly, it has a disciplining function. It served for the 'breaking bodies and souls' which can be observed in the slogan of 'Work sets free' (Burleigh, 2000:243). The public scheme programmes like motorway construction was a way of dealing with the problem of mass unemployment. It was really 'a battle for work' in Evans' words. "Getting Germans, especially German men, back to work would toughen them up and turn them from unemployed layabouts into potential fighters, hence it was more important to discipline them than to pay them well" (Evans, 2004: 338) It is certain that the living conditions of the workers did not prove better during the 1930's, however, the inclusion of the unemployed into workforce has been achieved by cutting the wages of those who are already in employment. There

was a low degree of permanent jobs. In addition, 'forced' labour which made 'welfare payments dependent on the acceptance of the work, which is comparable to today's workfare policies became so widespread that most of the unemployed must work under very poor work conditions, with insufficient wages. The Voluntary Labour Service was one means of bringing the unemployed back into work by the use of force. It was not an invention of the Nazis. Already in 1932, 250.000 men have involved in the Labour Service. It was also one of the modern technics to discipline the workforce by obliging 'unproductive labour' to join the public work projects. The Nazis' speciality in mobilising the unemployed was to use a 'militaristic and nationalistic terminology to integrate the workforce into the national community and purge it of the Marxist conception of the class struggle. The workers in their essence were not subject of the class divisions but a precious participant in a national cause that also required a great extent of sacrifices on the part of the workers. Again Dr.Ley's statements are revealing on the nature of the Nazi's strategy on the work community: 'We had to divert the attention of the masses from material to moral values..It is more important to feed the souls of man than their stomachs' (Shirer, 1960:263).

Neumann (1944: 352) argues that 'the full employment and the social security have been made an important part of the Nazi social policy by the replacement of class wage of the socialist trade unions with the 'performance wage' (Leistungslohn). It prescribed that the rise in the hourly wages would be permitted only in the case that there is a rise in the performance of the worker. It was a way of fostering the competition among the individual workers as any rise in the wages was made dependent on the longer work hours. Actually, it was a social policy which was in conformity with the dominant capitalist social relations that prefigure the worker as a competitor among others and downplay the possibility of worker's solidarity as exemplified in the free trade unions. Instead of subscribing to a socialist egalitarian redistributive taxation, the Nazis tried to establish a 'notion of equality of opportunity' that was created within the limits of racial community. The aim was to manifest the right of the workers to

climb up the ladders of the social hierarchy if they show enough performance. While the 'alienated workers' were turned into the 'national comrades of German workers', there also appeared the chance of an 'upward mobility' of the enterprises and the young workers that was from now on able to 'better themselves through enhanced vocational training'. Deprived of its trade union protection and co-determination rights, the workers became the focus of 'an egalitarian bonding' that to a great extent individualised the work relations.. The National Socialist policy made them truly compatible with the requirements of the modern capitalist conception of the 'worker' (Burleigh, 2000:247-8).

Given the increased rate of economic exploitation and low level of living conditions, the National Socialist regime tried to compensate it by building up new social institutions to make the integration of the workforce possible. For instance, the project of 'Strength through Joy' aimed at 'organising worker's leisure time rather than allow them to organise it for themselves'. The main result of this programme was the regimentation of the leisure activity and its appendage to the needs of the work. 'The Strength through Joy' was known of its many leisure time cruises that made the middle-class tastes available for the ordinary workers. Its main point was to 'civilise the masses', to overcome the class divides and to put an ideological content into the forms of leisure. Indeed, the indoctrination of the workers in terms of the National Socialist world view was crucial to these activities. Another reason for controlling 'free time' of the worker was to divert it from militant political ideologies that could be harmful to the enterprise and the state itself. Ley justified the loss of the freedom of the labour in the following way: "From boredom spring stupid, heretical, yes, in the end criminal ideas and forms of thought. Gloomy dullness makes people complain, gives them a feeling of homelessness, in a word, the feeling of absolute superfluidity. Nothing is more dangerous to State than that" (Burleigh, 2000: 250). Evans (2004:473) posits that in contrast to its initial aims, the Strength through Joy served for the appearance of the social inequalities instead of bridging them. It did not have a substantial effect on the existing social differences between the rich and the poor. However, its symbolic meaning was

far more important than its actual content of the programme. It brought about an atomisation and loss of individuality, occupational therapy and surveillance for the people. At the same time, it was an alternative to the educative cultural tradition of the SPD and KPD. The 'Strength through Joy' provided the workers with a taste of the 'consumer society' that above all had a populist direction rather than any socialist or reformist attempt at improving the working conditions. Thus, the symbols of newly growing consumerist choices allied with the increasingly apolitical, hardworking workforce that developed a conformist nature with regard to the capitalist formulation of work relations.

Similarly, the institution of 'Beauty of Labour' was also another device for the integration of the workers. Its main objective was to conduct labour activities of maintaining 'washing facilities and toilets, changing rooms, lockers and showers and generally improved hygiene and cleanliness in factories, proper work clothing, tidiness and order'. However, it should be stated that the improvement of such working conditions were not achieved as a result of the assistance of the state or the entrepreneur's financial support. Rather, all the facilities relevant to the 'Beauty of Labour' was constructed by the workers after long hours of work at no additional pay (Evans, 2004: 375). Thus, the elements of the 'forced labour' were quite decisive in the programmes subordinating the workers to a strict work regime and a productive community.

If we shortly evaluate the welfare policy of the National Socialists, we again face with the modern notions of the welfare. Instead of the Christian type of welfare policy that depended on a universal attitude towards the needy, the National Socialists activated an economic differentiation between the 'productive' and the 'degenerate'. No one had a primary entitlement to the welfare. Nazi's charity activities exclusively focused on the social assistance to the ones being of Aryan descent and 'economically productive' ones. The mentally and physically handicapped were not deserving any welfare help since they were not thought as a part of the national community. The racial aliens or socially excluded ones like the work-shy or criminals were dangerous elements in the organism of the

society. They were considered as 'undeserving' segments of the population to which it was legitimate to use force in order to keep them distant from the 'healthy feelings of the society. Incarceration of them in the concentration camps or total extermination of the 'economically useless categories of people' was one of the harshest experiments that Nazi welfare regime had put into effect. However, aid to the members of the national community was used as an integrating force for the solidarity of the national comrades. The Winter-Aid was such a social programme that did not depend on the state assistance but directly on the charity of the rich to the poorest sections of the community. It was designed as a 'form of racial self-help run by the German people for the German people'. The contributions to the Winter-Aid were compulsory for every German individual. Although it created certain discontents among the population particularly regarding the fraud allegations associated with the organisers of aid activities, participation in the Winter Aid was considered as a form of giving consent to the regime and making the racial solidarity with other members of national community visible (Evans, 2004:485). Thus, the coercion was combined with voluntarism that constantly tested the people's loyalty to the regime and mobilised them with a view of creating a real Volksgemeinschaft which did not contain socially divergent interests, status or classes. In the similar vein, 'One-pot Sundays' which aimed at receiving 'the difference between 50 Pfennig and the normal cost of a family meal as a contribution to the 'People's Welfare', acted as the harbinger of mass mobilisation that the Nazis continuously resort to in order to legitimise the 'negative tenets of the regime such as political repression or intensified forms of economic exploitation with the racially-oriented social integration measures (Burleigh, 2000:225). As a matter of fact, this community imagination did not fit into the social reality of the National Socialist system, however, even its symbolic meaning was effective in creating an over-arching nationalistic atmosphere that gives a sense of equality to all members of the nation. In that sense, the National Socialist welfare was modern in terms of delienating the 'productive' individuals deserving the welfare aid from the 'unproductive ones' and at the same time racist in terms of making the charity conditional on the belonging to a racial community. Hence, an

amalgamation of 'productivist' notions of the workers or welfare recipients with a racially aligned national community.

Alongside the fact that their trade union activities were dissolved, the workers were politically helpless at the face of the use of force by the regime and propagandistic attacks of it. Although the workers did not completely adhere to the regime, the lack of political opposition and the workers' acquiescence and lip-service to the demands of the regime was characteristic of the political situation of the labour. Moreover, we should not ignore the effect of the social, economic and political stability. In spite of the poor living conditions and the long hours of work, the job stability was a factor that was preferable for the workers in comparison to the experiences of inflation and mass unemployment in the Weimar period.

The situation of the middle classes in the Third Reich was not different from the workers. At the beginnings of the seizure of the power of the National Socialists, the expectations of the middle classes were high as they were main supporters of the NSDAP and putting pressure on the cadres of the party to initiate economic policies that would protect the small property. The Law for the Protection of the Individual Trade passed on 12 May 1933 (Evans, 2004:436). Dr. Schacht, the economic leader of the NSDAP in first three years of the NSDAP's power, gave importance to the protection of the small workshops and their owners. This policy emphasised on the attempts of the middle classes to differentiate themselves from the proletariat. What we call as the old middle classes rejected to organise themselves under the framework of the Labour Front. However, the policies favouring the small property owners came to an end as it became evident that the rearmament efforts as the primary aim of the regime were mostly advantageous to big business. Thus, the contradictions between the interests of the middle classes and the big capital sharpened in contrary to the initial demands of the former. Apart from these, the purchasing power of the people was low and there was a stagnation in consumer goods industry and the service sector that badly affected the businesses of the small property owners. The

discontent with the economic situation was expressed by these segments as a part of practical politics rather than in the form of political opposition. As in the case of the workers, the middle strata also believed that the overall economic condition was better than the catastrophic economic conditions of the Weimar years. There was also the fact that these parts of the population were most susceptible ones to the 'right wing nationalism, Anti-Semitism and antidemocratic sentiment'. In this sense, it was difficult to turn the economic discontent into a fully-fledged criticism of the political regime (Evans, 2004:441). The same was true of the white-collar workers that were characteristically absorbed by the 'fear of proletarianisation and strictly separated itself from the socialist ideals of the workers. The white-collar workers were the ones which are mostly vulnerable to the regime's objectives of atomisation and terrorisation. The abolishment of the trade union organisations and the destruction of the Marxism in all its forms was treated by the white-collar workers as a favourable development (Evans, 2004: 442). During the Third Reich, some professions such as lawyers, civil servants, schoolteachers and professors were downgraded due to the 'anti-intellectualism' of the National Socialists, while the doctors were praised since they were the ones who were supporters of the politics of eugenics.

Regarding the relationship between the middle classes and the regime, the Aryanization process and the relevant activities of fraud, expropriation and embezzlement created large opportunities for the members and leaders of the party most of whom were of the middle class origin. The absence of any sort of legal protection or financial control relating to the expenditure of the state sources gave a free rein to the new ruling elite. Particularly the hatred against the racial enemies like the Jewish People was a prominent excuse for plundering the wealth of the ethnic minorities. At the same time, the seizure of the state power has created large employment opportunities for the party members who were largely jobless before the Nazis came to power. Thus, according to the logic of 'Jobs for our boys' (Evans, 2004: 403), the creation of a power network within the state apparatus served for the integration of some of the middle class interests

into the state institutions. Though individual corruption was widespread among the new members of ruling class, it also meant a collective claim on the economic and political power to demonstrate who are the new masters of the country and who are legitimately entitled to make decisions on the national economic and political resources. As a consequence, 'corruption' was legitimised by a discourse of 'articulation of the national will' in the state apparatuses. It was indispensable for the Nazis to disguise the individual forms of corruption with a strong emphasis on the leadership cult and nationalist demagoguery.

On the other side, we have to underline the fact that occupation of the state by the middle-class aspirations was not a conflict-free zone without any contradictions. Despite there was an alliance between the party and old ruling elite, there was always a pressure arising from the mass base of the NSDAP in the direction of the realisation of the initial objectives of the party. There was a constant tension between middle class demands of exercising 'true fascism' and a conformist attitude towards the ruling elite. In Poulantzas' words (2008:267), it was a part of the mass impact of the fascism that made the conflicts possible between the supporters of the party who were mainly in favour of making a 'second, anti-capitalist revolution and those who entered into the state and the party exclusively by concerns of profit, power and status. However, the political course of the Third Reich indicates that the latter ones were more dominant in shaping the party and state since there was a constant revulsion from putting into practice the 'programmatic aspects of the fascist doctrine in a consistent manner.

6.11. Recent Debates on 'Volksgemeinschaft' and the Resistance in the Third Reich: The Role of the 'Masses' at the Intersection of Class Rule and 'Governing through 'National/Racial Community'

Recently, there appeared academic debates on the meaning and practice of the 'Volksgemeinschaft' in the Third Reich. The 'culturalist turn' in studies of fascism produced a large body of the research that primarily concentrated on the

‘daily life of the Third Reich, ‘subjective receptions of the Third Reich’ and the issues of ‘racial formation of community, promotion of ‘social equality’ among the racially pure ones and an emphasis on the extent of the ‘consent of the masses to the regime’. For some scholars, The idea of ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ (people’s community), though not conceived of as ‘a fully accomplished vision’, pointed at an integrating social function of ‘racial community’ in the Third Reich (Wildt, 2014; Herbert 2014). Frei (2013:87) underlined the National Socialist’s attempts at fostering a ‘feeling of social equality’ by giving chances to the people, irrespective of their class origins, for an upward social mobilisation on the basis of merits and performance. On the other hand, the NS idea of community was also pioneering the strengthening of the mass consumerist culture among the population. In fact, there were explicitly ‘modernising effects’ of the NS economic and social policies that to a great extent overlapped with the social reproduction of Fordist capitalist reconfiguration of production. Given these propositions, Götz Aly (2007:44) mentioned about ‘an agreed integration’ that tied the NS policies intrinsically to the social consensus of large masses of German population that materially benefitted from these policies. He summarised the situation as follows: “The Third Reich was not a dictatorship mentioned by force. Indeed, the Nazi leadership developed an almost fearful preoccupation with the mood of the populace, which they monitored carefully, devoting considerable energy and resources toward fulfilling consumer desires, even to the detriment of the country’s rearmament programme”. He also argues that “after many years of civil strife, class hatred and political obstructionism, Germans were united in their yearning for popular community” (Aly, 2007:47). Reichardt, while sharing with Aly that a racial community was in construction, held that the Third Reich was an exemplification of a ‘Participation Dictatorship’ that was fostered both by the ‘violence and mobilisation’. He quotes of Riley’s definition of the Third Reich as embodying ‘an authoritarian democracy’ based on the ‘mystical unity of the ‘Führer and Volk’ (Reichardt, 2014:139). He tends to see the ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ as ‘a myth of the NS Propaganda’, as a sense of social equalisation and as a social promise (Reichardt, 2014:147). From the start, the racist ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ was a ‘norming performance society’ that

excluded the 'Jewish, racial aliens, asocial etc.' (Reichardt, 2014:148). The participation and the concerns for the social equality were embedded in this essential formation.

In the above mentioned comments, it was presupposed that the social economic inequalities were in reality not eliminated but a 'consensus' or in its limited term 'a complaisance' (Gefälligkeit) emerged in the community visions of the people that inevitably contributed to the construction of mass consent to the regime. On the other side, another range of scholars preferred to explain the mass reception of the regime in the widespread effect of terror and deterrence exercised both by the state and security apparatus of the party. Evans, while criticising the 'volontarist turn' in the literature (2015:117), pinpoints the political environment within which the 'repressive apparatus of the state' through 'Gestapo, protective custody, revocation of citizenship and concentration camps' actually controlled the population (Evans, 2015:102). While the terror was primarily directed against the political organisations of the working class and the working class itself, it had also a disciplining function in terms of bringing the middle classes into line with NS regime and reminding them what they would face with in case of any protest against the new rulers. Blockwards composed of the 'low-level officials of the Nazi Party had enormous powers of control and surveillance at the local level (Evans, 2015:105). Kershaw (2014:33-34), on the other side, gives importance to the mobilising effect of the 'Volksgemeinschaft' by stating that "the dynamism and vitality, the enormous unleashed energy, constructive as violent, that permeated German society in those years can not be explained simply or even mainly by Nazism's negatives-its attacks on the enemies of the Volk, or lambasting of Bolshevism or western plutocracy, important strands though these were of the Nazi's popular appeal. It surely had to do with what seemed a highly attractive vision of a future Volksgemeinschaft, strong, prosperous, dominant and united against the enemies at home and abroad. However, he complained about the "inflationary and undifferentiated usage of the concept of the Volksgemeinschaft" that widely ignores the social protest and discontent, though they are weakly expressed and the condition of the 'repressed

and silenced' ones within the regime (Kershaw, 2014:36). According to him, while the concept of the Volksgemeinschaft was demanding 'a commitment', 'compliance' or 'passive acceptance' that were visible in the social reactions of the people was at odds with the concept itself (Kershaw, 2014:38). Both Evans (2015:95-96) and Kershaw (2014:38) indicated the 'implicit' resistance of the Catholic population to the idea of the Volksgemeinschaft as a way of life, though it had praised the anti-Bolshevism of the regime and the purging of the Jews from the public sphere. The idea that the Anti-Semitism of the regime was unequivocally embraced by the majority of the population was also dubious. In Evans' terms (2015:116), "it had proved extremely difficult to persecute the mass of Germans to ostracise the Jewish minority". A similar stance against the thesis of the 'Volksgemeinschaft' was also shared by Mommsen (2010:137) who insisted that the social inequalities and class differences remained unchanged during the Third Reich. The original side of his views were that he specially emphasised on the specific position of the middle classes towards the regime. According to him, while the lower and upper middle class particularly Protestant social strata were quite decisive in the election victories of the NSDAP between 1930-1933, in the regime period they did not approve the NS policies unconditionally. While the mobilisation of the bourgeois civil-society organisation undeniably contributed to the NS success, afterwards the prevailing dominance of the NS officials in local affairs led to the retreat of bourgeois organisations and triggered a depolitisation process and an anger against the 'NS bigwigs' (Bonzen) (Mommsen, 2010:135). Thus, the policies of 'Gleichschaltung' (bringing into line) did not achieve the desired 'social integration' as seen in the 'rejecting attitude of the majority of the population against the violent attacks against the Jewish people. Accordingly, he presupposes a remaining distance between the mass base of the regime and NS policies. In this view, the 'bourgeois culture' was eroded by the 'amoral vitality and violence' NS officials within a terroristic regime where the expression of the public discontent was quite limited. However, it was also true that a part of the lower and upper middle classes actively involved in the 'amoral' enrichment and corruption through confiscation of Jewish wealth (Mommsen, 2010:141).

First of all, the first standpoint claiming for the creation of the ‘Consensus or Complaisance’ Dictatorship seems to be lurking in the preassumptions of the theory of the totalitarianism by trying to complete it with the ‘mass participation’ of the German population coming from below. While the totalitarian theory depends on the ‘overarching power of the NS cadre to manipulate and dominate the passive masses through propaganda and terror, the standpoint focusing on the degree of social consent to the ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ nearly gives a ‘democratic’ content to the social integration through racial policies, pre-assuming a parallelism between the totalitarian claims of the NSDAP and the yearnings of the population for social equality and opportunity, if not a an overall correspondence between them. They constantly conflate the connotations of ‘democratic participation’ coming from below with the mass mobilisation of the NSDAP that in no way allows any ‘independent political subject’ that can actively shape the NS policies. The mass mobilisation in fascist terms stands in a stark contrast to any patterns of social solidarity that can politicise around some ‘material or social demands’ or any rapprochement between the classes. In this system, any middle class or working class organisation in its own right is strictly excluded from the public affairs. In addition to these, the defenders of the concept of ‘Consensus or Complaisance’ dictatorship insistently use the term of ‘Germans’ as a monolithic entity instead of analysing differentiated impacts of the NS policies on different classes. In this sense, they are also not doing justice to ‘different reactions’ to the regime stemming from specific class positions and presupposing a ‘common social and political attitude’ towards the ‘given’s of the regime, mainly the declared ‘racial’ ideology of the NSDAP.

In analysing the racial ideology, one strand of the researchers tended to conceive the effect of the ideology as the direct reflection of the NSDAP’s programme or Hitler’s ideas that became symptomatic of the regime’s ideological quality. The ones who supposed the establishment of the ‘Führer Dictatorship’ ignored the socio-economic condition that brought the NSDAP to the power and assumed that the party and its leader gained the capacity to carry out its full programme shaped by the racial theory after they outstripped all other power locations and

imposed it on the population in a unilateral way. Thus, the relation of the NSDAP's ideology to other ideologies that are a part of the other sections of the ruling classes, i.e nationalist/authoritarian trend that in fact continued to influence on the ideological formation of the population. Other than this, the 'mass' reception of the ideology as different from the abstract core of the ideology is largely remained out of question. A strand of the Marxist theoreticians like Georg Lukacs (1980) put forward the 'irrational nature of the racial theory' which was primarily designated by the fascist leaders inspiring from the mystical nature of the 19th and 20th century German philosophy and serving it for the imperialist purposes of the German capitalism. While the connection between the needs of the imperialism and the main prepositions of racial theory is obvious in terms of the racial 'natural' need of subjugating the 'racial aliens', this kind of view reduced the 'mass reception of the ideology' to the prevalence of the terroristic mechanisms and propaganda functions of the regime so that the interaction between the social material life of the masses and the implementation of the ideology is largely unquestioned.

From the start, we have to argue that the simplistic explanation for the function of the racial theory basically seems to be true. It served for the moral/racial encaptualisation of the 'social question'. In contrast to the claims for the 'Volksgemeinschaft', the ideological dispositions tried to enlarge and sharpen the class divides through isolating the suppressed classes from each other by the mottos of 'racial hygiene' and 'moral protection'. Any possibility of the politicisation of the social solidarity among the dominated classes was dammed by the shields of the racial/moral distinctions. For instance, the stigmatisation of the 'social outsider's, i.e work-shy, alcolics, homosexuals, mentally disturbed ones as 'social parasites' was both a biological and moral statement that drew clear demarcation lines between the 'working class and middle classes' and the 'socially excluded ones'. On the other side, especially by pointing the 'political organisations of the working classes' as contrasting with the 'German morality' and the description of the working class communities as the location of 'rough people' (Mc Elligott, 2004), the NSDAP reproduced the already existing social

cleavages between the middle classes and the working classes in biological/moral terms. Again in the attack on the Jewish properties, the 'anti-capitalist feelings' of the suppressed classes were stripped of its 'material social content', hence the prevention of rapprochement among the dominated classes and coloured with the biological/moral traits that again stimulated the members of the middle classes to demonise and dehumanise the people that are socially of the same origin as they are. Lastly, the biological/moral assessment of the social classes also contributed to the legitimization of the imperialist ambitions of the big bourgeoisie as long as they serve for the 'national cause' that are also at least in theory tied to the interests of the middle classes themselves.

It should also be stated that in the regime phase the NSDAP tended to emphasise more its aspect of the maintenance of the 'political and social order' than its anti-systemic rhetoric in its growth phase. Actually, the 'opposition culture' to the system (Weimar democracy) has been transformed into racial/moral regulation of the society which was directed against the objects of social 'hatred and resentments' as inner and the outer enemies of the national community. At this point, we will remind of some of our analyses that we have put out in delienating the mass formation of German fascism in the third chapter. Reich (1970:95) had already implied the intrinsic relationship between the authoritarian/patriarchial family and nationalist feelings that are prone to the imperialistic ambitions. Indeed, the existence of a patriarchial family with multiple children mainly stemmed from moral/sexual inhibition was endemic to the social ground where fascism has flourished. According to it, the economic situation of the lower middle classes has an 'objective function' for the formation of the ideology, there was also a subjective structure of the ideology that are 'conditioned' but not necessarily determined by the social location. As Reich (1970:88) argues,

If the subjective interests in the mass basis of a reactionary movement are not distinguished from the objective reactive function-the two contradict one another but reconciled in the totality of the Nazi movement in the beginning-it is not possible to reach an understanding. The former pertains to the reactionary interests of the fascist masses, while the latter pertains to the reactionary role of fascism.

In a simplistic but interesting fashion, Reich (1970:73) asserts that while the 'suppression of one's material interests evokes emotions of the social rebellion, the suppression of its sexual needs and the moral inhibition prevent the rebellion against both social/material deprivation and sexual deprivation. In fact, this process functions mainly in moral terms through institutions of familial ties and the expression of the 'mystical thinking' which also had many religious connotations. According to Reich (1970:101), sexual repression of men, women and children in the patriarchal family gives rise to 'substitute gratifications' (1970:74) that culminated in 'duty and honour' like 'personal honour, family honour, racial honour, national honour'. As mainly seen in middle class or peasant families, the familial ties co-exist with an 'individualistic' economy that unproblematically corresponds to the capitalist economy. This situation brings about the 'individualistic' competition of large families without any notion of the social solidarity neither among themselves nor with other classes. It reveals a mystical thinking having a real material basis. The moral values of 'duty, obedience, honour and identification with the 'Führer' are the values that guarantee the existence of the lower middle classes in an insecure economic world and in an environment of the threats to the moral unity of the family. This view can not simply be stamped as a view of psychologising or reductionist in terms of sexuality. Indeed, there are real 'religious-like' reactionary communities that are structured in a manner of the 'national community'. It is not coincidence that race, religion or nation in reactionary thinking prone to fascism was conceived as 'communities that you are born into, that you can not easily change and that are not referring to your socio-economic position that could become a source of democratic demands and its concurrent politicization.

One objection to this reasoning could be arguing that the authoritarian structures of the society are not peculiar to the fascist political rule. However, German fascism differed from Wilhelmian imperialism in the sense that its mass basis depended on a 'pauperised middle class' rather than 'a prosperous middle class (Reich, 1970:179). The democratisation of social life and the partial dissolution of the class barriers constituted a real threat to the 'authoritarian structures' of

the society. Additionally, the economic crisis associated with the democratic experience led to an 'active restructuring of these elements' through the politicisation of them in the body of the NSDAP. Thus, the details of the 'apolitical' private life, its nationalistic/religious constitution/reconstitution and its use as an antidote to the 'social question' had a decisive influence on the supporting mass structure of the NSDAP. In contrast to the ones regarding the ideology as 'the deception, befogging or pure propaganda', Reich (1970:109) claims that "ideologically fascism was the resistance of a sexually as well as economically deadly sick society to the painful but resolute revolutionary tendencies toward sexual as well as economic freedom, a freedom the very thought of which instills the reactionary man with a mortal terror".

The overemphasis on the sexuality can of course be questioned in Reich's arguments. However, fascism's material basis ensembled with a relevant moral reconfiguration can not simply be discarded. Then about what kind of morality are we talking about? We attach a prominence to the situation of 'a member of the working class', conscious of its skills and its social position with its capacity of the democratic self-regulation in the socio-economic sphere. In its 'revolutionary zeal', he or she is prone to cooperate with its colleagues in the sense of furthering his or her social and individual freedom. Reich contrasts this type of man with the 'reactionary subject' whose ideology is based on the negation of his natural and social tendencies via self-worthlessness and its ascetic submission to a mystical thinking. At this point, the structure of this kind of reactionary subject reminds us of Nietzsche's conceptualisation of 'slave morality' that primarily functions on the terrain of social resentment against the non-identicals. When we are talking about 'aristocratic' and 'slave' we are not of course denoting the 'aristocrats' or 'slaves' as social classes. We are trying to illuminate the nature of 'morality of the reactionary subject' where we can benefit from Nietzsche's handling of the situation. Nietzsche (2015:2806) claims that

While every aristocratic morality springs from a triumphant affirmation of its own demands, the slave morality says “no” from the outset to what is ‘outside itself’, ‘different from itself’ and ‘not itself’ and this “no” is its creative deed. This volta-face of the valuing standpoint- this inevitable gravitation to the objective instead of back to subjective-is typical of resentment. The slave morality requires as the condition of its existence an external and objective world, to employ physiological terminology, it requires objective stimuli to be capable of action at all-its action is fundamentally a reaction.

In the aristocratic perception of ‘enemy’, the latter one is not something to despise but to honour. It is something secondary to its own existence, an ‘extra’. However, the resentful man handles the ‘enemy’ as the primary force of creativeness, “he has conceived the ‘evil enemy’, the ‘evil one’ and indeed that is the root idea from which he now evolves as a contrasting and a corresponding figure, a ‘good’ one, himself-his very self” (Nietzsche, 2015:2810). Indeed, here we can understand how German fascism constructed itself through its ‘anti-‘s, anti-Marxism, anti-liberalism, anti-parliamentarism etc. as the founding core of its ideology. It does not say anything ‘positive’ about the socio-economic situation of its mass base or anything valuable in itself which sets itself apart from its opposition to natural and democratic trends already going on the social terrain. Its creativeness, its activeness resides in reversing these trends through the ‘necessary falsification of social facts’ and replace it with a ‘secondary order of racial rank’ which is non-existent in reality. The regulation of social resentment and hatred of its mass base mainly culminated in the middle classes and the personalisation and the moralisation of the social issues is the main talent of the fascist politics. Here, we just want to sketch a parallelism between the ‘religious’ administration of the ‘sufferers’ by the ‘ascetic priest’ and the use of mysticism by fascism in the treatment of ‘social and political depression’. According to Nietzsche (2015:2803), we as modern men, “like the poison apart from the Church”. There are three facets of ‘ascetic ideals’ that interests us particularly in valuing the fascist moral dispositions. In parallel to the ascetic priest who has no interest in revealing the causes of depression of the sufferer and relieving it, in our case the fascists, have no intention of solving the socio-economic inequalities of ‘suppressed classes or responding to their democratic yearnings which were the real source of their sufferings. In contrast, their

concern is to transpose the reality into a fictive world made of 'races' and 'alleviate the suffering' on a new plane while in fact deepening it. One way of doing it is 'the mechanical activity'. It diverts the attention of the individual from the source of the 'suffering' and consists of 'absolute regularity, punctilious unreasoning obedience, the chronic routine of life, the complete occupation of time, a certain liberty to be impersonal, nay, a training in impersonality, self-forgetfulness...' (Nietzsche, 2015:2926). Indeed, the exaltation of 'work' in itself and for itself in German fascism, the atomised individual competing with each other in the market place and 'apoliticism and indifference' intrinsic to that type are features of the 'mechanical regulation of 'unthinking individuals' that are also required for the militaristic education of the population. Interestingly, this 'mechanical man' also fits well to the 'mystical thinking'. What Nietzsche (2015:2931) calls as 'emotional excess' is a method used by the ascetic priests to 'alleviate the pain'. It consists of 'thorough unswitching of the human soul, the plunging of it into terror, frost, ardour, rapture, so as to free it, as through some lightening shock, from all the smallness and pettiness of unhappiness, depression and discomfort'. The mass rallies, the stimulating 'demagogic speeches' and the physical attacks on 'racially and socially alien ones' belong to this sphere of the mysticism. Thirdly, Nietzsche's concept of the 'herd organization' gives us an idea about how a 'religious or nationalistic community constructs itself. The virtues that are promoted by the 'herd organisation' could be sorted as follows: "inertia is active 1) Inconfidence because mistrust makes suspense, reflection and observation necessary 2) In veneration where the gulf separates power and submission necessary...the relationship to the powerful no longer has anything revolting in it 3) truth is that explanation of things which causes us the smallest amount of mental exertion 4) It is a relief to know one's self on the same level with all, to feel as all feel, and to accept a belief which is a current; it is something passive beside the activity which appropriates and continually carries into practice the most individual rights of valuation 5) people scout the strain of being moved and prefer to be detached and objective 6) people prefer to obey a law which is to hand rather than to create a new one-it is better to submit rather

to rebel 7) The fear of exercising a right or of enforcing a judgement (Nietzsche, 2015: 3540-1).

The race theory provides a blueprint for these reactionary tendencies. It is a stable point of reference, the most visible one that can not supposedly be changed by the individuals or group initiatives. In that sense, it does not require any critical thinking, any different opinions or any reference to the socio-economic situation of the people. Let's take the organisation of the 'Hitler Youth', what is the driving force behind such a community other than the veneration of the 'Führer', self-negation and eternal submission to what is already required by the race theory?. It is certain that there would be no individual or group initiative to evaluate the NS policies from the perspective of the youth or there won't be any independent initiative to give answer to the concrete problems of the youth. What is 'democratic' or 'natural' or 'spontaneous' would be perceived as a huge danger to the prerequisites to the 'community' that tolerates only the warmth of the 'identical ones' that is strengthened by the racial, indeed irrational arguments. Thus, the matter is not simply the 'imposition of a specific ideology' on the population, not even its internal consistency but the way in which this ideology has been received by the already existing reactionary social structures. In this sense, it is also not a process without contradictions and without elements of 'discontent' or 'resistance' as the natural processes of rational regulation of social life or socio-economic situation of the masses constantly collides with the 'fictive and irrational processes of community building.

We have to state that mystical absorption around the race and individual opportunities go hand in hand, in fact they are two sides of the same coin. Kershaw (2014:85-6) argues that "there is no need to choose between idealistic feelings of belonging to a Volksgemeinschaft that excluded Jews as a basic principle and the type of integration through material benefits at the expense of Jews. The two fit easily together". However, the individual striving for material gains under the racist arguments was not only a result of the capitalist system.

Actually, there should be a regulation to sustain that specific type of the individualisation. The term of 'Cultural Bolshevism' as a negative term was attached to the 'educated, professional and cultural parts of the bourgeoisie' (Mason, 1996:258) that was exercising the 'free, independent, creative and critical thinking and action'. The social resentment was intentionally directed at these segments that could foster the social freedom and the closeness of the suppressed classes. Hence, the potentiality of the critical thinking was essentially inimical to the system. Secondly, 'Bolshevism' was associated with the terms of 'like inter-breeding, sexual hybridisation and democratisation of political life' that contrasted with the 'purity of the race'. Indeed, the attempt was to prevent any intercourse among the suppressed classes and put moral/biological barriers to the 'natural and social relations between socially subjugated classes. Inspiring from the 'regulation of the races between the Greeks and Romans, Reich (1970:151) asserts that

Thus, even a democratization of a political system brought about the intermarriages is interpreted as a racial decline. It is here that the reactionary character is exposed, for now the sexual discourse for now sexual discourse between Greeks and Romans belonging to different classes is looked upon as ruinous racial interbreeding. Members of the suppressed class are equated with those who are racially alien.

Particularly the protection of moral and familial situation of the lower middle classes is crucial to maintain for the ruling classes to prevent from the start any idea of the solidarity among the ones who are exposed to the same social inequalities and exploitation. In that sense, the worker's movement was seen as the "ascending asphalt humanity of the big cities" by Rosenberg, who was one of the main theoreticians of race theory and accordingly the sexual interbreeding was assessed as 'demoralization and proletarianisation of the 'aristocratic youth' (Reich, 1970:151). That is why a typical middle class woman was terrified by the false idea of 'Bolshevism' as 'sexual chaos and immorality (Reich, 1970:172). Consequently, this cultural formation of morality was also another stimulant for the individualisation within the confines of class/race affiliations. Lastly, the abolition of all the political institutions that depend on the democratic

individual or collective will was essentially contributing to the 'moral/racial encapsulation of the individuals. This factor was also effective in the atomisation of the society contrary to the claims of so-called of social equality or solidarity within the 'Volksgemeinschaft'.

This type of 'individual struggles' within the community was far away from producing its desired utopian results. While only small minority of the middle classes were materially benefiting from the 'Aryanisation, corruption and crime', the 'objective' social position of the middle classes against the newly emerged 'embourgeoised' NS elite and the 'big business' that enlarged their wealth in unprecedented proportions remained the same as the members of the working class. Thus, the potentiality of social discontent within the middle classes continued to exist despite the partially benevolent 'welfare and family policies of the regime. The same condition was valid for the 'contradictory location of the women' especially in the middle classes. While they generally committed to the 'security of the family' and the 'moral regulation' against the 'racially alien' elements, they were also suffering from the high degree of 'suppression' within the family and also from the 'social exploitation' in the production process. These were inevitably leading to the 'social frustrations' that are waiting to be expressed in one way or another. The Journal for Political Psychology and Sexual Economy dated 1934 provides us with a real picture of the masses during the first years of the NS dictatorship. Parrell (1934) mentions an 'abstruseness' in the condition of the women. Some parts of women are protesting against being a 'house herd' and advocating their rights though not very precisely. However, they also define themselves as 'German fighters like Brünhilde'. Thus, their intrinsically 'revolutionary' demands were reflected in a 'reactionary form'. However, These contradictory situations should not simply be discarded as 'without effect', indeed they are pointing at the soft spots of the regime in terms of their ambiguous ambitions and their susceptibility to the 'protests' coming from within their own supporters. Parrell (1934:96) argues that after the seizure of the power, the NS government introduced a wide range of the reactionary measures, the laws against the abortion were sharpened, the education of the

children was delivered to the religious and military organisations. For instance, Goebbels' statement that 'the German women do not smoke' were taken very seriously by the functionaries and there appeared tendencies to establish 'courts of morality and chastity'. However, Goebbels also senses that in practice an overall suppression of women would not be logical and stirring and argues that 'if they smoke one cigarette within the life of the family or society, they shouldn't be condemned. We are not 'a pietist movement', one should not strip the people of 'life enjoyment', there should be more 'life-affirmation' and less pietism, more moral and less moralin'' (Parrel, 1934:97). Leaving aside the distinction between the moral and moralin, Goebbels tries to preempt the rebellious feelings that was evoked by the 'reactionary morality' that they have exercised. Parrell (1934:97) concludes from this speech that 'the NS cultural policy evokes an anger among the women and that the anger should be so great that he can speak in a manner of violating his own ideological principles. According to him, the Nazi leaders are very talented mass psychologically that they could give compromises out of their world view not to risk their mass basis. This situation also indicates that the 'revolutionary' and 'reactionary' elements in a movement could contradict each other that the NS leaders could not solve the problem in an optimal way. In the war time, the women protests in Witten and Rosenstrasse in Berlin, the latter being the protest of 'Aryan women' about the situation of their Jewish husbands and the former being a reaction against the 'compulsory return of rationing cards' was treated as 'protests' that were not non-fascist in their essence but for that reason not less dangerous to the regime (Stephenson, 2017:55). The 'protests' from within could not be dealt with with the same terroristic instruments as was used against the underground resistance. To keep 'the public morale and loyalty' intact even in a sense of contradicting their world view would be given priority. The same 'protests' were seen in the issues of 'attacking of NS functionaries on the 'sacredness of church' and its role in education (Stephenson, 2017:63) Additionally, the emphasis on the centrality of the family and the ideological indoctrination of the youth in the organisations of the Hitler youth was also leading to a widespread dissatisfaction among the authoritarian milieus.

This picture shows us that the mass effect of the NS ideology particularly on its supporting kernel, middle classes was more complicated than it has been propagated by the NS state. The NS welfare policy particularly by family allowances, tax-exemptions or direct social assistance were critical in containing the public discontent within its mass base and the leading cadre was extraordinarily sensitive to the condition of public mood particularly during the war time (Aly, 2004). However, in the last instance these facts do not run counter to the existence of a huge propaganda and terror mechanism from which the middle classes were not exempted though they were also constituting the main building-bloc of the mass base of the National Socialism.

The condition of the working class with regard to their resistance possibility was more limited and hopeless. In the face of the 'abolition of all its political organisation and the successful pursuance and persecution of its underground organisation, Mason (1996:273) describes the environment with which the working class should live was both of a 'political prison' and 'workhouse'. The harsh working conditions were combined with the political repression and the concurrent atomisation of the working class members. Though there were many indices of the non-cooperation and hostility against the NS regime, these feelings of the discontent were not turned in well-defined opposition or further a political resistance. Mason (1996:238) primarily explains this situation by the regime's measures to contain the working class, through 'terroristic actions, the neutralisation of resistance potentially by division within the working class and possible elements of integration of the class within the system'. For Mason (1996:252), these three pillars of the containment of the working class functioned all at the same time and were not 'mutually exclusive'. Actually, the social divisions within the working class was already existent before the Nazi seizure of power such as the increase of the number of the socially-upward looking white-collar workers and the 'fragmentation within the working class' according to the religious/political affiliations. We would like to concentrate on the measures that tried to 'integrate the workers' into the system. For instance, for Mason (1996:262) the 'modern small family' that needs to be

protected by the state began to become regular for a working class family and this situation is directly contrasted with the large, economically insecure, semi-public families which were also supported by the working class communities and neighborhoods. Thus, the concessions of the regime to the working class in the form of the welfare schemes and family allowances were decisive in the implicit acceptance of the regime. However, the most critical issue was the infiltration of 'personal popularity of Hitler, the patriotism and the use of the national feelings into the ranks of the working class that legitimised new worker designed to totally subjugate the working class and eliminate their democratic rights (Mason, 1996:262). According to Reich (1970:126), the 'emotional tie to the Führer' was related to the Social Democratic tradition of belief in the 'infallibility of the political leadership'. Accordingly, the Social Democratic worker was thoroughly paralysed in times of economic crisis so that they were severely distanced from the direct democratic practices and resistance arising from below. Additionally, a large part of the working classes were incorporated into the familial-moralistic affiliations of the lower middle classes (Reich, 1970:126). Parell's observations dating from 1934 are also illuminating in terms of the reception of the labour and welfare policies of the regime by the working class. He claims that even though 'socially conscious' workers were suspicious of these policies, a large segment of the Social Democratic workers could have been 'intoxicated' by the slogans of "the honour of work, the equality of the employer and the employee, the unity of the plant as well as the nation" (Parell, 1934:99). Indeed, in the fourth chapter we had handled the susceptibility of the Social Democratic movement to the nationalist waves. In that sense, in the context of lack of political organisations and the social deprivation, the workers became more receptive to the 'national enthusiasm' and the 'Führer idea' for a potential alleviation of their socio-economic conditions. Furthermore, Parell (1934:100) denotes the 'material force' of ideology implicated in the 'gifts of potato sacks from Hitler or discount in tram journey'. Although these favours seem minor things, the workers tended to think of the way that 'it is better to have a potato sack than sitting on the street'. These policies were typical of the fascist policies that prevented the full apprehension of the social situation of individual workers by themselves and

soothed the rebellion potentials within the working class. For Parell (1934:100), the workers accepted these 'alms' without any consciousness that "they are the master of the production process and no one can donate something that he can legitimately gain throughout the production process". However, in the face of economic and political helplessness, it should be admitted that it was not an easy thing to resist in a determinate manner. Parell (1934:100) also emphasised on 'the family responsibility of workers' that distorted their willingness to 'strike' or enter into 'underground organisations' that were illegal, unreliable and very risky. We have to add that the disillusionment with the previous political organisation like the ADGB and SPD was widespread among the former of members of the Social Democratic movement.

Mason (1996:269-273) also indicated three main factors entangled with the structural and psychological conditions of the working class. These factors unraveled specific strategies of fascism to paralyse the working class as a political force and distinguished the NS regime from other counter-revolutionary regimes. Just as the SPD was bewildered at the 'quasi-legal' strategies that the fascists and the authoritarian elite had resorted to in the fascisation process, in the regime phase the capacity of the working class to resist was seriously retarded by the 'complexity of the fascist regime'. According to Mason (1996:269), "the gradual fusion of the Nazi movement with the machinery of administration and the corporation of big business and the army with this new political formation put the working class in a position of complete subjugation". If it intended to fight against the new regime, they wouldn't know where the enemy resides. Was the enemy the business, the 'authoritarian state institutions that collaborated with the fascist cadre or the unlawfully acting S.A? The co-existence of state reason with its new codification of the law as a legally binding force with the 'constant and insistent' abuse of the state power by the fascist leaders and cadre was making the situation of the working class more perplexing. Mason (1996:270) cogently describes the specificity of the regime in terms of reinforcing relationship between the authoritarian repression and terroristic repression. However, even this double apparatus could have effectively been

resisted if there would be any solidarity pattern among the dominated classes. The originality of German fascism lies in its ability to discard such possibilities through racial/moral divides. Alongside the effect of the repression of the security apparatus, the political isolation of the working class was also resulted from 'the hostility and indifference' of the middle classes towards the socialist cause of the working class. The so-called 'anti-left consensus' maintained through the relatively successful combination of the interests of the bourgeois classes around the NS policies was the element that furthered the extent of the political isolation of the working class (Mason, 1996:271). To these factors, we have to add the 'psychology of the political disillusionment with the strategies of the SPD and ADGB that proved totally impotent in the face of both the growth of fascism and the consolidation of the fascist regime. Given this kind of political alienation and the individualisation process that the workers went through, Mason (1996:272) held that the workers were faced with selecting 'consumer' choices they were provided with by the regime, comparing the positive and negative aspects of the NS policies without drawing out an overall picture of the regime in a manner of developing a critical political thinking and action.

6.12. Conclusion

The emergence of the 'Prerogative State' in the Third Reich depending on the requirements of the political expediency was not simply the lack of legal control of the government. Above all, it represented the loss of fundamental rights of the citizens. As Neumann (1944:363) argued, 'the generality and the abstractness of law together with the independence of judge guarantee a minimum of personal and political liberty'. Fascism meant for the large section of the masses a retreat of the 'democratic rights of the citizens including workers. The individual as embodying a set of inviolable political rights has disappeared. Instead of it, there appeared a leader which speaks on behalf of the 'Volk' as the source of all the legal claims and the existence of a national community that was supposed to be represented in the body of leader. Thus, 'National Socialist legal theory replaced

the legal person with the 'concrete personality'. This divergence from the liberal constitutional principles was not simply a sign of a change of political system. This lack of legal protection has coupled with a regression of socio-economic situation of the workers and the dissolution of the trade unions, left political parties and interest associations. Consequently, this process signified an attack of the bourgeoisie and an intensification of the exploitation in the workplace. If we evaluate the labour measures of the National Socialists, we can draw the conclusion that the labour became devoid of many social and political rights which led to the reformulation of its status as 'modern serfdom'. As a corollary to this process, an alliance of the ruling classes under the leadership of the monopoly capital was dominant in the direction of National Socialist government. This type of government negates the totalitarian claims for the 'unidirectional rule of the party' in line with its 'fascist doctrine and programme' and unconditional subordination of the masses. The National Socialist government was an issue of coalition of the big business with the conservative forces within the state, especially in army, bureaucracy and conservative political parties.

However, it would be misleading to define the National Socialist Rule simply as a repressive force of totalitarian imagination. The extensive use of force went hand in hand with a 'propaganda machine' which primarily aimed at keeping and enlarging the mass ground of the party by constantly resorting to nationalist demagoguery. The creation of 'Volksgemeinschaft' (national community of people) was not only a discursive element within the propagandist activities of the party. A new institutional structure ranging from the Labour Front to the 'Strength through Joy' or 'Beauty of Labour' was set up and mobilised in order to attract the individuals to the circles of the national community. These attempts were the materialisation of the initial slogan of the party in favour of 'the nationalisation of the masses'. To what extent these attempts have succeeded can rightly be questioned with regard to its effect on the 'dominated classes and one can argue that the absorption of the masses by the ruling ideology remained partial. However, it is also crucial to understand the meaning of the Nazi institutions given the lack of a discernable political opposition.

The National Socialist welfare policy and labour administration imply that most of the measures and their organisational form were consistent with the institutional trajectory of the modern capitalism. The lack of political rights, the atomisation and the apolitisation of the labour and integrative schemes trying to bring the labour into line with the capitalist form of industrial relations were indicative of active stance of the Nazis in ‘taming the proletariat’ and incorporating them into a pseudo national community. Indeed, the community formation of the National Socialism was not at odds with the ‘capitalist thinking of ‘competing individuals in a market society. Social Darwinist assumptions and the relevant atomisation of the society was basic to what meant the community in the eyes of the National Socialists. First the individualisation of the phenomenon of class solidarity and then the integration of individual strictly under the framework of ‘a productive community’. The leaders of the National Socialists were keen on using ‘modern forms of political domination that strictly differentiates the ‘productive’ from the unproductive, the ‘healthy and deserving’ from the ‘degenerate’ and combines it in a national community framework. As Frei (2013:64) puts out, the political domination of the Nazis was not the ‘unintended result’ or the adverse effect of an atavistic, reactionary policy but the sign of a struggle, of a modern project that brought together the racist thinking of ‘völkisch order’ with a bureaucratic government that gave the individuals no right to exist in so far as they stayed outside the mainstream ‘productive community’. The Jewish people as an ethnic minority, the Jehova witnesses as a religious minority and the ‘work-shy’ as a social minority were subjected to the same forms of political domination and violence. This ‘community-building’ around the exclusion of ‘racial and social aliens’ was also a reflection of the nation as an homogenous entity. In this sense, we can conclude that the religious, ethnic or social divisions are the fruitful sources for the construction of the mass base of any fascism in power that continues to use the soft-spots in the society to prevent any form of social solidarity which would be developed outside the limits of ‘national order’.

CHAPTER 7

FASCISATION: FASCISM AS A PROCESS AND DIFFERENT AMALGAMATIONS OF REACTIONARY ‘MASS’ MOVEMENTS AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL RULE

7.1. The Use of the Terms of ‘Counter-Revolutionary’, ‘Reactionary’ and ‘Authoritarianism: The Conceptualisation of ‘Fascisation’

In its broad sense, the term ‘counter-revolutionary’ structures itself as against the democracy, the republicanism or socialism. What we mean by ‘revolutionary’ can be attributed both to the French revolution and November Revolution. However, fascism most of the time operates on the background of a revolutionary uprising and its social and political gains. Even though it targets the liberal democratic institutions both as stepping stone to a fascist regime, beyond the aspects of liberalism, the real enemy always covers all the real democratic movements coming from below or social-democratic structure that legally allows the formation of these movements. That are primarily conceived as having the potential to threaten the main pillars of political and socio-economic order. They are really anti-systemic one in its true sense. That is why ‘Bolshevism’ and ‘communism’ was cursed even though they did not pose an immediate threat. In reality, the democratic institutions both politically and socially were perceived as the culminating arena to further the socio-economic bastions of the working classes primarily. In that context, the counter-revolutionary movement aims at the retrenchment and in a further phase the elimination of the democratic rights and freedoms anchored in a constitution that has been fought for politically by the dominated classes. Of course, the ‘term of ‘counter-revolutionary’ is a very broad term to cover all the non-democratic attacks that is associated with the interests of traditional state elite and economic elites that run counter to the interests of the working classes. Naturally, a conservative-authoritarian

dictatorship, a military intervention or a fascist regime can be encapsulated under the banner of 'counter-revolutionary'. On the one hand, there are significant differences between these regimes in terms of its institutional composition and ideology. There are also important similarities between them regarding their 'negative' aims- anti-socialism, anti-liberal and broadly anti-democratic attitude. In general, the idea of republic or democracy including the participating and transformatory power of the masses and individual is strictly negated and this negation has been put into practice. Thus, not only the formal aspects of the democracy, but its practical implications are tried to be reversed.

What does the term of 'reactionary' denote? On the one hand, it points at the resistance of the traditional political and social classes to the modernity. In this sense, it can cover all the feudal and semi-feudal classes like Junkers in Germany and monarchist circles. On the other hand, in a fully capitalists society with pre-capitalist residues, 'reactionary' can also mean the collaboration of the new bourgeois classes with the semi-feudal landowners to expand their interests in a way that exclude the masses entirely from the ruling circles. The 'intentions' of the Papen government can be given as an example of these attempts to rule with the help of the 'reactionary' classes at the expense of the political participation of a large segment of the dominated classes. Thirdly, however, we can also use the term 'reactionary' to describe some segments of the society, like the lower middle classes or upper middle classes or lumpen-proletariat that can assert their 'social protest' in a reactionary way. Indeed, these segments of the people that are staying outside and turning against the democratic movements of the working class is naturally welcomed by all the counter-revolutionary movements. However, we have seen that the role of the reactionary sentiments in German fascism was not indicating a construction of 'nationalist community' in a fundamentalist way but they are integrated into a social and political project that had a modern and capitalist background. In fact, the mobilisation of the reactionary social forces in the fascist scene was not a reflection of ambitions of a 'sectarian nationalist/religious community' but mass mobilisation of them into the realistic objectives of the 'occupation of the state' and a new configuration of

society that is not disconnected from the material concerns of this world. Thus, to treat fascism as a 'political religion' does not seem viable though there were some religious elements in the ideology of it. It is also undeniable that a fascist movement that would necessarily involve into the collaboration with the state elite in the second and third stage of the fascisation would not tolerate any 'disorderly or anti-systemic' parts of it as observed in the Röhm action in the course of consolidation phase of fascist regime in Germany.

The term 'authority' and 'authoritarianism' has also ambivalent uses in the literature. Especially, the attempts at 'authoritarianism' are from the start assumed as the successful use of the 'authority' in practice. However, there are many examples in the history that indicates 'failed authoritarianism' in spite of their 'authoritarian' aims. In the modern age, the 'traditional' authorities- family, church, monarchy' were in a constant erosion that began to be replaced by new power structures whose existence can not be evaluated simply by repression, domination or a traditional 'authority' that have anonymously been accepted and 'recognised' by the ruled ones. Inevitably, 'the sense of democracy' and the use of the modern technologies had adversely affected the 'traditional' values and questioned the 'necessary' gap between the ruler and the ruled. The norms of the 'legitimacy' and the right to rule was no longer tied to a transcendent ruler, be it God, the king or state, especially when it comes to dare to rule without any consent in the masses. Especially, in societies that had a real democratic experience, the 'authoritarianism per se' without any ingredient of the mass demands increasingly clashed with social resistance. To reverse the existence of the political parties with an understanding of civil society, the necessity of the transparent and fair elections, the establishment of the parliaments as the expression of the popular will, the citizenship rights for workers and women including the right to vote, socio-economic strongholds of working classes emerged as something that can be limited, contained, oppressed but not 'eliminated' eternally in a mass democratic society. We have to add that progress also required the individuation of the people not only within social groups but endowed it with a capacity to have an autonomous, free life outside the necessity

of the market, state or tradition. Actually, the possibility of the freedom outside the 'given's of the traditional and modern societies, indeed the transformatory power of man itself has also brought about another dimension to the political and social rights of the people whose implication went beyond merely acquiring some democratic rights and any entitlement to these. This fear of transformation in masses or in individuals is endemic to every conservative or authoritarian attitude.

Actually, the dominant conceptualisation of the 'authoritarianism' is largely affected by the theories of the totalitarianism that originated from the 1950's and heavily influenced the reception of the fascism in Western mainstream political science literature (Linz, 2000) . There was a widespread orientation among the Western scholars, especially in USA to ignore the socio-economic foundations of fascism on the one hand and to break off the linkages between the conservative-authoritarian state forces and fascist leaders. It necessarily led them to regard the newly founded regime as the unmediated ideological reflection of the NSDAP's political course. Thus, the ideology in that sense was tied to the intentions of party and it has been regarded that that ideology was unilaterally imposed on the masses and the conservative-authoritarian elite. However, the German experience shows us that there are practical and ideological affinities between the two political strands that have collaborated in the construction of the new regime.

Apart from these problems, there is a 'formal' understanding of the authoritarianism and liberal democracy that is prone to blur the political quality of the regimes. Excessively depending on the criteria of 'the extent of the civil society', the degree of 'politicisation', the opportunities of mass participation, this vantage point also praised the 'liberal democracy' as a set of procedures but did not say anything about the political capacity of the working classes, indeed all the suppressed classes to directly shape the public policies in a democratic way (Linz, 2000:175-6) . Indeed, all the attempts of the right-wing authoritarianism and fascism was directed at the exclusion of these segments

from the state structures permanently. On the other hand, there are cases of the 'liberal democracy' backed by 'an authoritarian setting' that relies on for instance on the leading and decisive role of the 'state bureaucracy or military'. As Poulantzas tried to describe the trend of 'authoritarian statism' that began to crystallize in the institutionalisation of a whole of 'technocratic-authoritarian complex', "in the strengthening of executive in relation to the parliament and in the end of a certain form of political democracy", the façade of liberal democracy could also disguise a decisively authoritarian state-business network that virtually narrows down the representation and participation of the popular classes in the state relations (Poulantzas, 1976:159-160) There could be formal democracies whose civil society structures were dominated by the reactionary political movements that again have no intention of constructing democratic collectivities but capturing the state power that would again rule out the active power of the dominated classes. In this situation, the appearances of a vibrant democratic life could be misleading. The overemphasis on the 'participation' or 'mass content of the political power' per se also leads some scholars to mistake the fascist regimes as 'totalitarian democracies'. In this form, the rulers are explicitly hostile to the liberal procedures, however, the references made to the integral relation between the ruler and ruled, the Führer and Volk or mass participation opportunities were mistakenly assumed as reflections of 'democratic qualities'.

In our view, in the inter-war era the authoritarians with a decisive step to repress the political organizations of the working classes was resorting either to a pre-modern authority structure characterised by the 'Church or monarchy' or to a 'preponderant' role of the state bureaucracy or the army. These authorities should have a political ascendancy over any fascist movement coming from below to sustain an authoritarian regime. The authoritarian regimes are not necessarily less ideological as 'the theoreticians of the totalitarianism' imply. Neither are they less violent or extremist when the issue comes to 'eradicate the political dissidents'. To spare the 'depoliticisation' and apathy exclusively for the authoritarianism is also very problematic. As we have seen, the fascist

regimes are also triggering a process of de-politisation in accordance with the compulsory forms of mass mobilisation. In German fascism, the distance with the fascist elite and its mass base in the decision-making processes was kept intact despite the contrary claims of the rulers.

Three meanings of German fascism give us clues about what the fascisation is:

- German fascism as a mass non-democratic movement-having both a content of a 'reactionary' character that is open to modern technology and prerequisites of modern capitalism and a 'social protest' in a mantle of pre-given racial/ethnic attributes. However, these initial features of the movement are not static and isolated phenomena. Firstly, such movements radically differ from the democratic group formations as beyond any substantial democratic demands, they claim to be the 'authentic' owners of the state and society. Secondly, the mass formation of fascism is prone to be shaped by the co-evolution of state forces and fascist militia in second stage of the fascisation.
- German Fascism as techniques of power that include hybrid strategies from violence to distortion of the formal democratic practice that imply the role of the fascist party 'state within the state' in a close affinity to the military and state security forces denoting an open-ended process of state transformation.. (martial law, state of emergency). It is here that the 'counter-revolutionary' ambitions of the state elite and business intertwine with the fascist mass movement having a paramilitary base. Although this process seems to be solely as a 'disintegration of liberal democracy', beyond that façade, it rather represents the distancing of political organisation of the working classes, or the democratic organisations in general from the public affairs and their regular harassment by the fascist militia and state forces. There are two sides to this process. One is to legitimise the 'socially unpopular policies' that are directly targeting the democratic and socio-economic gains of the working classes. The other one is to re-consolidate the mass base of fascism through diverse political strategies like leading to 'bloody elections', hence the use of

‘procedural forms of democracy as weapons against the democratic collectivities themselves, campaigns against the ‘communist’ and ‘terrorist’ elements within the society, including the ‘moderate right’ and left within the definition of terrorism and thereby the justification of using ‘political violence against them. At this point, these are also strategies of receiving mass consent from the mainstream bourgeois strata referring their concerns of ‘security and political order’. These political strategies should not be underestimated as they reveal the building blocks of the concomitant fascist regime as different from other counter-revolutionary regimes and has a direct effect on the ‘re-consolidation of the mass basis’ that has been outlined in the first stage of the fascisation.

- German fascism as an alternative socio-economic and political project openly differentiated from other ‘exceptional’ state forms. However, the experience of German fascism, before and after the seizure power showed us that there is also internal conflict among the ruling classes to determine the nature of the state. Hence to the end of the 1932, there appeared different options of ‘exceptional regimes’ from ‘monarchical restauration to the military intervention and ‘state intervention’. The balance of power between ‘fascist forces’ and state security apparatus and the power of their mass structure after the discarding the democratic power of the popular classes is decisive in the route of the new state formation. However, the establishment of the fascist regime also carries with itself references to the ‘authoritarian visions’ of state and society. The elimination of ‘anti-systemic’ elements within the fascist forces, on the one hand, underlines the concerns of the business and state for political stability. On the other hand, the fascist leaders also strive to avoid from an authoritarian consolidation by using the instruments of first two pillars of the fascisation process. For instance, the mass mobilisation around racial divides and its concomitant institutionalisation strengthen the position of the fascist cadre via authoritarian state elite. Moreover, it also provides them with new tools to neutralise the political expression of oppressed classes.

7.2. Different Cases of Fascist and Authoritarian Ruling Departing from German Fascism and overlapping with it in terms of 'Fascisation'

Just as the German fascism in a broad sense was a reaction to the November Revolution and its concomitant institutions of Weimar Democracy, Italian fascism gained strength as a reaction to the 'red years' between 1918 and 1920 throughout which a labour insurgency was observed. However, like German fascism, Italian fascism's rise corresponded to the decline of the political left and enlarging unity in the political right and old state elite. In that sense, it was an attack on the side of the ruling classes. Before the fascist's coming to power, the period of Giolitti tried to depend on a social and political consensus and to soften and include the 'moderate' parts of the left in the government with a range of liberal measures. "Co-option of the socialists, the extension of the suffrage, the creation of the welfare state" (Sassoon, 2007:78) were the ambitions that can be paralleled to the period of Weimar democracy. The intention to incorporate national Catholic Party (PPI), hence Social Catholics and Socialist Party were successful in the election of the 1919. He deliberately attempted to renew the former practice of 'transformismo' that tried to integrate the moderate parts of the political left and right into a liberal scheme (Sassoon, 2007:69). The Italian fascist movement turned into an active force between 1920-2, when the landowners began to use the 'fascist squads' to break the 'resistance of agricultural workers and employed them against any attempt of 'socialisation of the land'. Fascist option became effective in the eyes of landlords as a viable counter-force against the socialists (Sassoon, 2007:94)

According to Eatwell (2003:76), Italian fascists subscribed to a "syncretic legitimation" that confirmed "their ability both to appeal to 'affective and more individualistic' voters and to convince at least a section of the mainstream elites that it could serve their purposes better than existing parties". Primarily, the Italian fascists did not depend on an electoral victory or mass basis that precedes their political appeal within the ranks of the ruling classes (Sassoon, 2007:16). In contrast to NSDAP, the Italian fascists were much more dependent on the

support of the state and business elite and had to prove itself 'functional' and 'efficient' in repressing the socialists. 'Violence' and 'legality' were keywords for the rise of the fascist forces (Sassoon, 2007:101). The anti-socialist climate raised by the fascist forces in collaboration with the state security forces was also the flourishing ground of the fascist mass basis. Giolitti's inclusion of some fascists in its national government had also provided a political legitimacy for the fascist movement. On its side, it led to the unification of 'the political right' including the ANI (an important organisation advocating the new nationalism that was stripped of upper-class nationalist elements and favouring a mass based nationalism). The cooperation of liberals and Catholics based on the common objective of departing from liberal democracy and sought more authoritarian forms to resist both the 'moderate' left, socialists and communists (Payne, 1980:64). Within this environment, Italian left was much more fragmented in order to develop a sustainable, unified anti-fascist strategy (Sassoon, 2007:122).

Towards the main domestic power locations, the fascists presented themselves as a continuation of the Italian tradition than a "complete break with the past" (Eatwell, 2003:80). Violence was selective as in the case of SA and more controlled than it has been experienced in Germany. Gaining 'respectability' in the eyes of traditional authorities of the state was primary in Mussolini's political route. Mussolini was expressing the following sentence as an indication of its willingness to cooperate with the king "We must have the courage to be monarchist". To obtain the support of the Church, he also declared that he had left anti-clericalism and Vatican turned away from the 'socially moderate PPI towards fascists (Sassoon, 2007:112-3). In addition to that, the business and the liberal circles had a positive view of the fascists in terms of 'lowering the wages, eliminating militant trade unions, banning the strikes and discarding political representation of the working classes" (Sassoon, 2007:107).

As Eatwell (2003:79) pointed out, the March on Rome was like a 'coup-theater' that hides the compromising nature of the fascism towards the establishment. Payne (p.86) also asserted that Mussolini's becoming the prime minister was a

result of a parliamentary government that did not rely on the sole power of the fascists. Actually, a process of ‘fascisation’ since 1921 was accelerated with the introduction of anti-democratic laws that went hand in hand with the rise of fascist even after their coming to power. During the period between 1922-25 that would similarly be followed by the period between the 1930-33 in Germany, one witnessed the disintegration of the institutions of the liberal democracy. Constitutional guarantees for political representation of the working classes were left aside, parliament became dysfunctional and as Sassoon (2007:17) asserts, “the existing system of proportional representation-the cause of parliamentary fragmentation-was abolished in 1923 and a new electoral system was devised aimed at an overwhelming majority to the victorious coalition”. New anti-democratic laws and institutions were specially designed to isolate the ‘real losers’, the working class organisations and ‘moderate’ left, socialists and communists from the main bulwarks of state power (Sassoon, 2007:20). On the other side, during this period, in parallel to the defeat of the left, there was also constant growing of the mass basis of the Italian fascism, apart from the peasantry, according to Eatwell (2003:80), the main support to fascism came from the white collar middle classes who seemed to have discovered an “alternative to either the old political class and a renewed threat from the left”. It was also a fact that the middle-classes were widely excluded by the liberals who gave a primary importance to the consensus between the industrialists and the workers in post-war period. This fact led to a hostility among this strata against parliamentary forms of representation and the lack of any commitment to democratic mechanisms and organisations (Sassoon, 2007:122)

Regarding the syndicalist tradition in Italy, it is commonplace to signify the corporatist character of the fascist system and overemphasise the nationalist syndicalist tradition within the Marxist trade union to denote the specificity of the Mussolini’s leftist, syndicalist stance. By such a view, the rise of the fascism was at least theoretically associated with a leftist current that shaped a specific combination of ‘socialism and nationalism’ (Sternhell, 1994). However, if we analyse the ‘fascist syndicalism’, we can affirm that the fascist corporations gave

the means to the 'conservative fascists and Industrialists to control the workers better and 'free themselves from much of the government and party interference of which they complain bitterly today'' (Salvemini, 1936:571). According to new arrangements, "the unity of the local and national organisation among the working class" was maintained (Salvemini, 1936:575). Any possibility of a militant union action with an anti-systemic demand was crushed through "forbidding the strikes, outlawing autonomous unions and creating nation-wide 'company unions' (Salvemini, 1936:600-1). Kitchen (1976:49) points at the fact that "the regime ended the independent unions and the eighth hour day, forced the wages down and increased per capita output. By these means, labour costs were reduced by 30 per cent between 1927-29. With the onset of the Depression wages were forced down still further". In contrast to the illusions of Turati who believed that "the corporations would shift the power to the workers" (Eatwell, 2003:87), with the dismissal of the fascist syndicalist leader, Rossini in 1928 and the incorporation of the PNF and squads into the state institutions, the fears of the business about the fascism were greatly soothed (Eatwell, 2003:92). In 1930, National Council of Corporations was established. The organisations like "National After-Work Leisure Organisation" (DND), called as Dapolovoro, (Eatwell, 2003:92) was used to extend the mass support to the regime and discipline the labour as well. These were also the predecessors of the organisation of 'Strength through Joy' in the Nazi Germany.

Though the fascist government pursued a liberal policy in 1925, however, even before the start of the Depression, Italy entered into a stage of autarchy, growing tendency of monopolisation and the superiority of the industrialist and their interest association 'confidustria' in the route of the economic policy (Kitchen, 1976:49-50). The primary aim was "to protect the Italian industry from external competition and the preparation of the economy for the war" (Kitchen, 1976:51). Internally, the result was the exclusion of the lower and middle classes entirely from the political representation in the economic policy. Additionally, the increasing state intervention in the period of autarchy has nothing to do with the 'state capitalism'. The state intervention was highly employed to keep the big

capitalists intact. According to Salvemini (1936:584-5) the economic imperative functioned as such: ‘‘a) profit is private and individual. Loss is public and social b) the intervention of the Government has invariably favoured big business c) to avert the bankruptcy, public institutions took over the shares of the received companies and to supervise the companies in question until they are again in a healthy condition’’.

When compared to German fascism, one can observe that the same fascisation process was in motion in Italy. It is not easy to cover all the parts of state and economic elite under the term of ‘authoritarians’. However, the counter-revolutionary aims of them have explicitly conformed with the fascist hostility towards the political left and the gains of the working class. Expectedly, the Church, the monarchy, the old state bureaucracy, the business and liberals co-worked with the fascists to disintegrate the ‘parliamentary democracy, political institutions of the working class with a constant fear of ‘revolutionary uprisings’ that would foster democratic attempts from below. The exclusion of the working classes from political decision making process and the destruction of their power basis, both in mass structure and in its political formation were the common denominators that triggered the fascisation process in Italy. However, we have to underline that the strength of mass basis of the Italian fascism was comparatively low in proportion to the German fascism and this factor negatively affected its relative autonomy towards the establishment. Equally, it is important to denote that the mass basis of the regime began to be shaped in the process of anti-socialist fever and the violence implemented against all ranks of the political left. In fascisation process, however, we could not simply say that it was unilaterally created from above. There should be disillusionment with the left and an aggravation of the nationalist or religious sentiments and societal structures. In that sense, the fascisation in the mass base had both long-lasting roots in the society and also was shaped by the political mobilisation of the fascists and the authoritarians.

According Payne (1980:64), 'in an organised central European state with institutions still largely intact, a violent coup d'état or revolutionary insurrection was not feasible''. On the other hand, as Sassoon (2007:125) promptly puts out, the conservatives had not enough power to impose their own rule without any assistance from a popular movement as seen in the case of the German fascism. Actually, it was not simply a bargaining process between the fascists and the authoritarians but a consensus on the re-structuring the society together after the return to liberal democracy was ruled out and the democratic organisations of the working class was substantially paralysed. In this post-democratic era, the limits put on the 'range of the maneuver of fascist movement were more extensive in comparison to the German case. The party had less autonomy and Mussolini was held as a person that eliminated the anti-systemic demands of the fascist movement as a state-preserving factor. Inasmuch as this issue is concerned, the Italian fascism had a much more rule-based and statist tradition which narrowed down the independent actions of the fascist movement. A set of institutions like Fascist Grand Council or National Council of Corporations and a large and effective bureaucracy indicated that the fascist rule was implemented under the guidance of the state which relied both on its own institutional basis and the popular support of certain strata for the charismatic leadership of Mussolini. These factors were substituted for the relative weakness of the mass support for the regime.

It should be stated that as in the case of German fascism, the fascisation process was put into action in a country like Italy which had one way or another had an experience of 'representative/parliamentary democracy' and 'revolutionary/democratic' uprising coming from below. This was a country like Germany that was relatively modernised and industrialised where the traditional authorities like the family, the church or the monarchy while still strong were in a process of erosion where the old state elite was obliged to resort to other options than simply re-imposing old authoritarian institutions on the society from above. In that sense, the fascisation process was also indicating a revision of the authoritarianism itself.

In inter-war period, a variety of regimes in Spain, Portugal, Austria, Hungary, Romania have also been affected from the fascist wave. It was not only a tendency to select, imitate, adapt the Italian and German experiences, it was also a reformulation of the authoritarianism to give meaning responses to the 'rightist critique of the regimes under the fascist tendencies. Undoubtedly, they were no less counter-revolutionary in view of their adverse position towards the democracy, socialism or revolution than the Italian fascism and German fascism. Their basic difference from the fascist regimes was the sustainment of the pre-modern socio-economic structures and the strength of some traditional strata-monarchy, church and army- compared to the 'democratic movements coming from below' and the fascist movements that are critical of the traditional notions of 'law and order'. For instance, in Franco regime, the church, the army and the conservatives around CEDA (a confederation of regional Christian Democratic and populist parties played a considerable role in the construction of the regime (Mann, 2004:325). According to Mann (2004:331), 'CEDA was not fascist but reactionary authoritarian Catholicist'. However, this situation did not prevent the ruling strata to employ the fascist forces to counteract the leftists and all 'un-national' elements. The 'unification of Carlists (anti-liberal and anti-parliamentary right) and Falange (truly fascist forces) came into being under the command of Franco (Mir and Luque, 2014:179). Again, the collaboration of the Falangist Youth Front and Catholic Action (AC) was mobilised by the state to violently repress any sign of insurgency against the regime (Mir and Luque, 2014:187). Thus, these organizations did not have any autonomy within the state and were easily put aside when their function ended. In a similar vein, Salazar's 'New State' under the motto of 'God, Fatherland, Family and Work' depended on the traditional Catholicism and corporatist institutions in order to provide the basis of the legitimacy for the regime (Mir and Luque, 2014:171). The prospects for a fascist mobilization from below was very limited. In Austria, Dolfuss regime between March 1933 and Februar 1934, endorsing similar objectives with fascists such as 'the liberation of Austria from godless socialism and the miseries of attending modernity and a class society', endeavored to construct 'a backward looking corporatist order'' (Botz, 2014:135). The paramilitary organisation of

the state, Heimwehr assumed a role similar to the position of Stahlhelm loyal to the army in Germany. They were simply 'reactionary' organizations integral to a public authority and devoid of any independent power.

The Romanian and Hungarian cases are interesting as there appeared 'real fascist movements' whose difference from the authoritarian right is clearly discernable. In Romania, the 'Fascist Legion Archangel Michael' that showed 'fascist traits' such as 'romantic principle of national rebirth, militant spirit with an anti-systemic orientation, Judeo-Bolshevik world conspiracy, apocalyptic thinking with a paramilitary organisation and charismatic spirit' (Iordachi, 2014:240) fitted well to the seekers of the 'generic fascism' among the scholars. The Legionary did not only against the Jews and Hungarians but also targeted the 'Romanian elites because of their diversion from the national cause. This movement also had a proletarian background that fared well in the national elections. According to Iordachi, the King Carol's attempts to co-opt the fascist movement were not successful and in the end the real anti-systemic rightist stance of Legion led to the inevitable conflicts between the nationalist elite and Legion. After the coup d'état of Carol II, the 'decree of state order' that outlaws any 'activity would lead to a change of the existing political regime or would propagate the principle of class struggle or the abolition of the private property' (Iordachi, 2014:245). While the Legion has violently been crushed, the new system preferred to incorporate some fascist elements like the establishment of the 'Front of National Rebirth' (FRN) with the slogan of 'the King, the Nation, Work and Faith' (Iordachi, 2014:250, Mann, 2004:238).

In Hungary, the Arrow Cross movement with its highly populist, proletarian and anti-Jewish standing as a mass movement coming from below coupled with elitist, militarist and statist upper social strata. According Mann (2004:258), this brought up a fascist colouring of the authoritarian regime within which the ethnic/class tensions intertwined. While the economic discontent fed the basis of the fascist movements, the new owners of the state were hostile to the 'international and Jewish' capitalism deemed to be a product of old democratic

pluralist experience. The rightist, popular push of the Arrow Cross from below assumingly led to the radicalisation of the regime both in terms of its anti-Jewish policy and ethnic nationalism. In this case, according to Mann (2004:257), 'influenced greatly in the 1930's by Nazi Germany, Hungarian authoritarian rightists were busy stealing fascist cloths while repressing the self-declared fascism'.

Kallis uses the term of 'fascistisation' to denote the above-mentioned phenomenon as a 'fascism from above' that inspired mainly from the Italian and German models. The rulers involved in 'borrowing or adapting selective features from the fascist rule in Italy and Germany, praising effective solutions to common perceived problems (Kallis, 2014:15). In a 'anti-democratic, anti-socialist ad post-liberal political space', they are constant interactions between different regimes indicating the transnational character of the fascism in the inter-war period. The outstanding feature of the conceptualisation of 'fascistisation' is the primacy of the elite interests in selecting the fascist assets to be incorporated, the lack of autonomy of the fascist movements vis-a-vis the state elites, the lack of the necessary mass power for the transformation of the still strong authoritarian structures, hence not a co-evolution of fascist movements and the authoritarians in repressing the political left and construction of a new regime that goes beyond any authoritarian visions. The Falange has been incorporated effortlessly into the state structure of Franco because it has no independent mass power and political strategy. It was reduced to an instrument of applying violence against the dissidents of the regime under the leadership of the state. On the other side, Legion in Romania has been crushed because of its unwillingness to cooperate with the state elite and its insistence on its anti-systemic, unordered features that might provide a threat to the established order. Actually, in this form, 'fascistisation' functions something as 'external' to the regimes, simply as a revision of the authoritarian regimes in the face of new challenges coming from a possible rightist movement from below and new formations of gaining mass consent without allowing the main authoritarian

positions to be fragile to any fascist movement. The national specificities of those regimes are also effective in the reception of the fascism itself.

However, these experiences are instructive in the sense that the ‘fascisation process’ that we have elaborated in the case of German fascism can not go on without a mass power or movement that claims the state power autonomously, the cooperation or possible conflicts between the state elite and fascist forces in the direction of ‘seeking together counter-revolutionary ambitions out of and through the democratic procedures (hence, there should be experience of formal liberal democracy to be liquidated), anti-communist or anti-democratic euphoria that would unite the bourgeois classes, the relative weakness of the pre-modern or authoritarian structures and the decline of the leftists or democratic movements increasingly unable to counteract this process. Shortly, as we pronounced before, there are three moments of the fascisation process: the mass mobilisation, that could be reactive both in political and social terms, a fascist power technics that primarily defines the fascist form of ‘eliminating the constitutional pillars of a liberal democratic regime and constantly constructing the new regime in an interaction of fascist and authoritarian elements through violence and quasi-legalism and the consolidation of a new socio-economic project under the fascist banner, however, not in the sense of putting into practice a fascist programme fully but being conditioned by the vested interests of the economic and political elite. This regime phase is also associated with the ‘destruction’ of the ‘anti-systemic’ elements of the fascist movement and the exclusion of the petite bourgeoisie social interests in favour of big capital and the total repression of the political organisations of the working classes.

If we use this theoretical framework and take into account of these three instances of fascisation, we could detect the ‘place of fascism’ in the post-II World war era more easily though we cannot discern a full-fledged fascism covering all three pillars we have mentioned.

Given these features of fascism, in the post-second world era it is not possible to assume that the 'fascist ideological tendencies and the fascist practices did withdraw from the historical scene totally. In the last chapter, we primarily will concentrate on the 'far-right and right-wing populist parties' as a potential mass basis of the fascist mobilisation and its exchange with the contemporary state and economy relations. Here, to enlighten the concept of 'fascisation', we would like to touch upon the relationship of the military interventions that were very common in Latin American countries and experienced in Greece (1967) and Turkey (1980) and fascist practices that has not disappeared but turned into new forms. Some Marxist scholars in the 1960's and 70's tended to see these regimes as a new form of fascism that was adapted to the 'anti-communist' political climate of the Cold War and the economic and political interests of the U.S. imperialism. Weissbecker defined these military interventions as neo-fascist in the sense that they were primarily directed at preventing the 'action unity of the working class and the development of the anti-imperialist political mass organizations. The interests of the nationally organised big bourgeoisie and world imperialism were decisive in the organization of military coup d'états in Greece (1967) and Chile (1973) (Weissbecker, 1980:163-4). Hackenthal (1980:184) used the term of the 'dependent fascism' and argued that the 'fascist variant of imperialist domination' mainly took place because of the impossibility of oppression of the revolutionary wave through the democratic means of the 'bourgeois reformism'. Oligarchy in Latin America depended on the conflation of the interests of agrarian oligarchy, the multinational monopoly groups and international finance-oligarchy (Hackenthal, 1980:185). Hackenthal (1980:187) used the term of 'fascism from above' and Weissbecker (1980:166) employed the term of 'fascisation' in the sense that 'the state fascised the society and there appeared a phenomenon of a 'statisation' of the fascist parties. Both agreed on the emergence of the fascist formations directly under the control of the state and business elite that were not rooted in any substantial mass basis.

Kühnl (1990:299-300) insisted that just these features of military dictatorships indicate the impossibility of using the term of 'fascist' for these regimes. They

were radically different from the inter-war fascism as they were basically subordinated to the foreign capital interests without any real 'national' content, they were not established by a politically organised mass movement embracing the interests of the 'small and middle bourgeoisie' but by the army itself and 'their economic and political sphere was mainly codified according to the requirements of the international dependency.

While briefly analysing the results of the military intervention in Greece (1967), Kühnl (1990:291-2) asserts that 'the social function of this military intervention was the "a) the protection of the domination structure of the ruling class –the trade bourgeoisie in Greece- and the involvement of its natural guarantor, the army. It had a reactionary character. On the other hand, it served for the U.S. interests and had a monopoly-capitalist character b) Regarding the domination method, instead of a 'limited and corrupted' parliamentary-constitutional state, the ruling class preferred a 'terrorist dictatorship' negating the constitutional guarantee and bourgeois rights c) such dictatorships exercise the stripping the masses of their rights and their repression through different ways. While the military and police dictatorships stems from a military or state intervention and relies on a strong repressive state apparatus, the fascist dictatorships tried to mobilise the masses and integrate them into the usage of the violence. The ideological and organisational infiltration of the society was one of the main ambitions of the regime. According to Kühnl, while 'both dictatorships' are identical according to their *social function*, their 'genesis, their 'conditions of success' and their domination structure differs from each other (Kühnl, 1990:292).

In a similar vein, Rouquie (1986:274), while conceiving of the Chilean coup d'état, claims that "these regimes had a 'preventive character' (against the left), they were authoritarian rather than totalitarian, these regimes having neither one-party nor any apparatus for the mass mobilization contains no mass character". According to him, instead of bringing the society together around a common doctrine, they were prone to 'de-politicise' the society and pushed them into their

private lives. Accordingly, Though the classic fascist regimes endorsed a 'populist and anti-capitalist rhetoric, the army had no such concerns and 'unlawfulness of the violence' is more evident (Rouquie, 1986:275). In that sense, different 'similar and social conflicts' could lead to different 'counter-revolutionary' regimes according to the specificities of the countries. Rouquie claims that a military intervention like the Chilean one represented 'a substitutional hegemony' within which instead of an 'organized and productive' consensus, the 'apparatus-state' replaces the state itself. He adds that it did not mean that the army took on a 'status above the parties' or it simply became the instrument of the bourgeoisie but it indicated that it could play both of these roles in a certain autonomy against the bourgeoisie and U.S. imperialism themselves (Rouquie, p.276) In this understanding, the military interventions are not long-standing solutions to the intra-ruling class conflicts and the ultimate repression of the democratic forces.

In order to explain the relationship between fascism and military interventions, we would like to shortly analyse the period before the military intervention in Turkey by 1980 and describe how the fascist techniques of power could be used with a view of 'creating an anti-democratic environment that would prepare the ground for military intervention. First of all, even though there external influences on the countries' politics, we have to conceive of the fascist tendencies taking into account their domestic roots. No external power like US imperialism or national state forces can impose 'fascist relations' where there are no mass political divides and socio-economic reasons upon which these relations can flourish.

In Turkey after the 1960 military intervention and the constitution of 1960 that had a 'modern, democratic and freedom-based content, the ideas of political left particularly among the students, the political parties like Turkish Workers Party (TIP) and the main organisation of labour, DISK (Revolutionary Trade Union Federation) began to impact on the public sphere and the leftist-socialist ideas began to take on a mass character as the worker uprisings in 15-16 June 1970 has

indicated. This wave was tried to be stopped by the ‘military memorandum of 12 March 1971 and its constitutional amendments that would restrict the democratic freedoms and rights contained in the 1960 constitution. However, despite the army’s serious efforts, the political representation of the working masses in the parliament and their political organisation revived after the period of army intervention between the 1971-1973. Thus, the rise of political left gained a new momentum. The elections of 1974 indicated that the CHP (Republican People’s Party) with its new programme of ‘democratic left’ and its ‘anti-systemic rhetoric’ created a climate of democratic hope and progress among the working masses (Tanilli, 2009:65). In the same vein, the socialist left with mass trade union organizations began to get rid of its limits of the student movements and strengthened its mass basis. Particularly CHP succeeded in attracting the support of the poor peasants, the working class and urban middle classes against the rising domination of ‘monopoly’ capital. The social effect of the industrial relations became more transparent in terms of class relations (Tanilli, 2009:66).

After the elections, the coalition government between CHP (Republican People’s Party) and MSP (National Salvation Party) which had Islamist orientations became a short-term political attempt due to the conflict between the political parties and Ecevit’s (CHP’s leader) insistence on politically benefitting from the ‘victory of Cyprus intervention’. However, afterwards the result was not a new election but a government called itself as ‘Nationalist Front’ composed of the AP (Justice Party) formally representing the moderate right, MSP (National Salvation Party) and MHP (Nationalist Movement Party). This bloc brought about a militant formation which was specially designed to ‘counteract’ the leftist/socialist wave through legal and illegal ways and seeking an alternative political project with its own reactionary ideological connotations. We have to draw a special attention to the MHP and its paramilitary organisation ‘‘Ülkü Ocakları’ that represented the entity that educated and armed the ‘nationalist youth’ to fight against the ‘communism’ through terroristic acts. Originally, the ‘commandos began to be trained in special camps in the end of 1960’s under the leadership of the leader of MHP, Alpaslan Türkeş and provided with ‘counter-

guerilla technics'. The relationship of the state security forces to the MHP and 'Ülkü Ocakları' as a typical fascist formation was also under serious question. One decision of the court of the martial law during the military intervention of 1971 was describing the 'Ülkü Ocakları' as an auxiliary force to the security officials (Mumcu, 2021a:12).

After the foundation of the Nationalist Front, the 'Ülkü Ocakları' became activated in the terrorist attacks first on the leftist leaders of the student movement, then on the democratic writers and members of the press and the representatives of the CHP and finally igniting ethnic/religious massacres that lasted until the military intervention of 1980. These fascist assaults cannot be simply isolated from the environment within which the military intervention became possible. The Nationalist Front government first, began to fascistise 'the state bureaucracy that took on a strict 'nationalist' attitude against any movement of the left, be it moderate or socialist. 'Anti-communism' was the catchword that labeled every democratic right and freedom that is constitutional legal as the expression of 'state enemies'. This whole spectrum of the left should not only be against but virtually destructed through state forces or paramilitary units of the 'Ülkü Ocakları'. The policies of the Nationalist Front were pointing at a real fascist route. Ideologically, they represented a clearly 'counter-revolutionary stance that had an anti-socialist, anti-democratic and anti-constitutionalist stance that was considerably shared by the concerns of the military clique of 1971. In a drastic contradiction to the idea of 'democracy' and 'republic', the Nationalist Front promoted the reactionary idea of 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis' that would also be stimulated as a dominant political and cultural formula by the perpetrators of the military intervention in 1980. Regarding the formal principles of liberal democracy, the Prime Minister asserted that 'one cannot rule with this constitution' (Mumcu, 2021a:21). There were indications that The Nationalist Front was also clearly against the 'rule of the law' and the 'separation of powers' within the state by giving direct orders on the judges (Mumcu,2021a:74) or not recognising the decisions of the upper state courts. Actually, the Nationalist Front knew that it cannot rule with this parliament within which it has a fragile

majority. While it 'tolerated' the fascist terror to curb the rise of the political left, it also tended to create an insecure political environment where the 'martial law' in a collaboration of the military and the Nationalist Front parties would be declared (Mumcu, 2021a:126).

However, despite these plans, the Nationalist Front governments have failed in terms of building-blocs of a new regime that would have the signature of their ideological premises. First of all, it should be a mistaken view to assume that 'fascist policies' have no mass basis, however, these mass construction mainly composed of 'reactionary sentiments' of the old middle classes and some parts of the peasants in the mid-regions of Turkey having a pre-modernised character was not able to build a feasible alternative to the widespread acceptance of 'anti-systemic' and 'leftist' ideas in modern and industrial part of the countries. These ideas and practices were not expression of a radical change but were implying ways being open to the socialist tendencies in a democratic, constitutional state. Although they were antagonists of the current constitution, The Nationalist Front has never formulated a meaningful response to the 'social question'. They were too much embedded in the sectional interests of the bourgeoisie that made them averse to the truly modern, anti-systemic demands of the masses. Secondly, in line with the first argument, the Nationalist Front was purely a defensive front that tried to stop the left and with this trait, they were mainly instrumentalised by the ruling classes. They had never gained the autonomy needed for a fascist movement to have 'high bargaining power' vis-a-vis the big bourgeoisie or military. Thirdly, behind 'their nationalist' flag and their 'anti-communist' fever, there were indices of the corruption that was linking the private interests of these politicians to the capitalist class. Rather than being an alternative, by wider segments of the population they were regarded as the product of this system interwoven with the terror and economic crisis.

In spite of these factors, it is not possible to ignore the fascist aggression during this period that tried to scare, deter and pacify the population having progressive tendencies by applying a systematic violence to their political organisations. It

was also a strategy to provoke the ‘individual terrorism’ within the ranks of socialist left that would require extra-ordinary measure on the security of the state. Regarding this objective, they could be assessed as successful.

Between 1975 and 1977, this strategy could not yield substantial results. The electoral victory of the CHP in 1977 was indicating that the popular hope associated the left did not retreat. However, CHP could not reach the parliamentary seats that it needed to have a majority. Upon that, Second Nationalist Front government has been established. However, the second one has greatly suffered from the loss of legitimacy in the face of mass support given to the CHP. In the first months of 1978, CHP succeeded in reaching the number of the parliamentary seats required for a new cabinet by transferring 16 independent parliamentarians. Ecevit government lasted 1.5 years and led to a complete disillusionment among the masses that were expecting substantial changes from the party. First, there was an incredible pressure from the Nationalist Front parties and the bourgeoisie that was totally discontented with the existence of the government. CHP was in the government, however, it was explicitly not in control of security bureaucracy. The ‘terror’ primarily organised by the paramilitary organisation of ‘Ülkü Ocakları’ and their centers in police and army continued and created civil war-like conditions. Additionally, CHP could not provide a viable solution to the economic crisis. Lastly, there were grave internal conflicts within the party and the leader’s insistence to isolate the party from the political organisation of the working class like DISK or socialist left in order not ‘to be linked with the communists’ in the terminology of the nationalist opposition.

The ‘Kahramanmaraş Massacre’ on December 1978 that came about apparently ‘as a result of ‘religious-sect’ divide in the city between the people of ‘Alevite’ and ‘Sunni’ origin became the turning point on the way of the military intervention and the CHP government had to declare the ‘martial law’ in 13 cities because of the ‘widespread terror events’. This bloody event in many ways resembles the ‘Prussian Intervention’ of 1932 particularly as regards its results.

Before the massacre, at the face of the rising ‘terror incidents’ the leaders of AP and MHP urges the government to initiate ‘martial law’ so that the government would willingly and unwillingly enter into a phase of ‘disintegration of democracy and constitutional rule’. The leader of MHP, Turkes mentioned about ‘the right to resist’ to the government which was in their eyes organically related to the ‘communist organisations’ (Tuleylioglu, 2013:148). While the mainstream press tended to see the massacre as ‘a fight between rightist and leftist groups or an ethnic conflict between the Alevite and Sunni population, from the reports and comments of the witnesses it seemed that it was a ‘planned and organised’ fascist attack involved by the ‘Ülkü Ocakları’ that intentionally stirred the ethnic/religious conflict in the city between 19-25 December 1978. 111 people most of whom were belonging to the Alevite people were cruelly massacred by the Sunni people ‘under the leadership’ of fascist attackers (Tuleylioglu, 124-5). The state forces could or would not intervene in the massacre and the forces of army arrived at the city after the fascist mission was accomplished. ‘A civil-war like condition appears that obliged the government to settle for the ‘martial law’.

Actually, alongside the incapacity of the government to handle the general problem of terrorism and public insecurity, the government had no control of the bureaucracy, security forces and the intelligence agency of the state (Mumcu, 2021b:48). Such a ‘horrible event’ could not be organised merely by the initiative of the fascist forces. The debates ‘on ‘state within the state’ and on ‘counter-guerilla’ operations which is directly linked to the ‘Special War Organisation’ of the army and the claim that ‘the paramilitary organisations of the MHP are collaborating with these centers of ‘counter-guerilla’ do not seem to be unfounded (Mumcu, 2021a:205) Given their being ‘tolerated’ by the police and justice institutions radically configured by the Nationalist Front governments, the cooperation between the state forces and fascist groups on the way of ‘loss of legitimacy of the democratic institutions became more evident. The new era within the martial law would naturally trigger the suspension of the most of the democratic rights and freedom, the repression of the legal left

political organisation and most importantly the diminishing effect of political will of the working classes on the route of the state affairs.

If we do not only focus on regimes but on the processes, one can see transivities, exchanges and complementarities between the ruling elite and fascist movements or organisations in the way of termination of the democratic rule, however, after the democratic institutions were discarded the balance of power between the military, the state elite and bourgeoisie and mass political forces of fascism decides on the nature of the concomitant counter-revolutionary regime. In the Turkish case, before and after the military intervention, a partial fascisation was at stake. The end was associated with the wearing down of the democratic forces and a political exhaustion among the petite bourgeoisie but not a mass power of the fascism as an alternative to the mass effect of the 'counter-revolutionary military intervention. However, this case indicates that the results of the military intervention was in no sense neutral in terms of new capital accumulation regime, neoliberal economic policies devoid of any democratic control of the masses. Indeed, the policies of 'de-politisation' similar to the one of Pinochet regime was also giving new ways of 're-politisation' that would prepare a new ground on which the fascist ideas and practice might easily flourish. First, putting into practice of 'Turkish-Islamist' synthesis as an ideological tool to re-shape the society was on the one hand supported by the 'Islamization' of the economy and society by the spread of the power of religious political sects that are integrated into the capitalist relations, a 'religious-oriented re-formulation of the social question' in the face of the declining force of political left. In addition, Nationalist/security based state activities particularly against the Kurdish question for decades sustained a reactionary mass basis that is open to the fascist tendencies.

7.3. A Short Reevaluation of ‘Fascism’ within the context of ‘Fascisation’ to Evaluate the Contemporary Tendencies of Fascism

We can argue that in terms of their anti-democratic stance, anti-parliamentary vision and their determination of ‘distancing the political organisations’ of the working classes from the ruling circles could bring together ‘authoritarian’ tendencies and ‘fascist political formations’ having a mass basis in the political sphere. There could be clear affinities both ideologically and in terms of using political methods including the use of political violence. In that sense, The dichotomies between the ‘authoritarianism’ and ‘totalitarianism’ or the authoritarian’s concern for the ‘political status quo’ and the ‘radicalism’ of fascism could easily obscure their constant interaction in the process of the disintegration of formal liberal democracy and the repression of the democratic political organisations. German fascism indicated us that they could easily co-evolve into a ‘new state’ whose main pillars have emerged in the process of destruction of democracy. Purely concentrating on the essence of ‘their ideologies’ does not enlighten us in terms of catching real, on-going processes. Though a clarification of different sorts of political rule is an important asset to distinguish the fascist rule from other counter-revolutionary regimes, simply comparing the regimes do not deepen our understanding of the specific configuration of ‘vested economic and state interests and fascist mass formations.

Roberts (2016:109) puts out how ‘the interaction between the ‘authoritarians’ and ‘fascists’ can provide ‘complex, fluid and subtle’ relationships that could provide a kind of symbiosis and synergetic results’ that could go beyond ‘an either or logic’ (Roberts, 2016:57). According to him, “the traditional right has itself transformed throughout the interaction with the fascism” (Roberts, 2016:112). Thus, the matter is not simply a matter of ‘conservatives taming of the ‘authentic’ fascism’ (Roberts, 2016:119). However, while putting weight on the interactions, Roberts, however, says not so much about the nature of this interaction and reduces this relationship to its ‘open-endedness, contingency and

fluidity'. However, this interaction could not be confined to 'pure power relationships' that are stripped of any ideological connotations.

Our concern is rather, while taking into account the 'experimental side of the fascisation', to find out the main prerequisites of socio-economic interests of the ruling classes and their political expressions and the specific feature of mass movements of fascism both containing a character of 'reactionary/political status-quo orientedness' and 'social protest' with non-democratic elements.

If we return to the prerequisites of the rise of the fascism, we can borrow from Kitchen (1976:83-87) the socio-economic and political condition upon which fascism depends itself. Fascism is an outcome of the 'industrialised states' with an organised working class and a large petite bourgeoisie that stands at the face of the threat of social status and socio-economic ruin in the face of an economic crisis. Fascism is basically directed against the working class and its political organisations. However, it is an attack on the side of bourgeoisie and state elites to politically 'destruct' the working class that is 'already defeated and demoralised' (Kitchen, 1976:84). Inevitably, the 'social' function of the fascism to 'stabilise, strengthen and to a certain degree, transform capitalist property relationships and to ensure the social and economic domination of the capitalist class (Kitchen, 1976:85). In classical fascism, the 'fascism-producing crisis' in Eley's words (2013) is considered to be 'a crisis of political representation and economic crisis that led to the fragmentation among the working classes through unemployment and poverty and the tendency among the petite bourgeoisie to flock to the rightist tendencies and to encapsulate the 'social problem' more in nationalist/religious terms. However, those crises are most of the time a result of the choices of the ruling classes and perpetuated by their decisiveness to retrench the gains of the working class in an offensive form. The 'mere economic crisis or political crisis' without a turn towards anti-democratic/anti-parliamentarian right and the politicisation of a 'mass movement that grew out of it' is not endemic to fascism (Kitchen, 1976:84). As we have shown before, the alliance between the authoritarians and fascists was conditioned by the parallelity and potential

conflict between 'relative independent strategies of the mass movement and traditional economic and political elite (Kitchen, 1976:85). These were what gave colour to the fascisation process, the incorporation of fascist techniques of power, political violence+state forces and a wave of terror that include even the 'moderate left and right' as the enemy of 'state and nation'. In the regime phase, a fascist political domination distances itself from the 'authoritarian visions' and purges the 'quasi-revolutionary, anti-systemic, unorderedly elements' of the movement.

Given these conceptualisation, how could we reformulate the fascist tendencies and practices in contemporary world that seems to correspond to 'different instances' of the fascisation process that we have drawn out in the beginning of this chapter?

Firstly, It seems that the fascisaton process seems to be an active force in countries which had an experience of institutionalised parliamentary democracy and potential or active democratic demands that are much more grassroots and had a 'transformatory' tendency, be it from the working class movement to the different 'democratic' organisations based on class/ethnic/gender terms that could put pressure, shape and check the state affairs. While the working class is considered to be the basic enemy of the fascism, it is not coincidence that in different periods of time, the anti-Bolshevism in the interwar period, the 'anti-communism' in the Cold War period and 'anti-terrorism' in the contemporary world has been made the pretext for eradicating the democratic rights and freedoms and demonising a wide segments of social strata that are constitutionally and democratically organised as the 'enemies of the Nation and State'. In such a view, it is not possible not to see the inimical hostility towards the democratic and transformatory subjects in the society that are also linked to the constitutional and parliamentary democracy. In this context, the fascisation process targets the political dissidents that could pose an enourmous threat to the ruling classes through democratic possibilities. In such a sense, we have to extend the political organisation of the working class as a potential enemy to the

potential politicisation of “women, ethnically disadvantaged and repressed persons, the unemployed, the progressive students etc.”, hence the ones that can potentially go outside the confines of the formal liberal democracy.

Secondly, fascisation is firmly anchored to a ‘state transformation process’ from ‘liberal democracy’ to a non-democratic form whose end is not predetermined. The two instances of the process are at work here. On the one hand, the question is whether the ‘fascisation of the mass basis’ could be got rid of the ‘decisiveness of a particular political leadership’ from the start in its evolution that is thought as ‘truly exogenous to the state’ with a fascist origin (Poulantzas, 1976:335). The fascisation of the masses through anti-terror measures, religious/nationalist hatred against the minorities, reactionary social protests that was in the beginning expressed through by ‘quasi-democratic’ forms can match with a ‘radicalisation of conservative or right-wing populist parties. Within this framework, another question is whether this transformation could be integrated into a new route of state building that was stimulated by the big bourgeoisie’s preference for an anti-democratic rule making and the incorporation of ‘fascist techniques of power’ into the state apparatus that prescribes new forms of political violence. In turn, third question is whether this new power constellation has in turn force that has the capacity to shape its mass basis further.

CHAPTER 8

CURRENT DEBATES ON RIGHT EXTREMISM, RIGHT-WING POPULISM AND FASCISM: THE REVIVAL OF THE FASCIST TRADITION?

8.1. Introduction

Undoubtedly, the concept of the fascism should be considered in a such a way that it would have implications beyond the limits of its epochal appearance. As we have experienced, the end of the Second World War did no means denote the end of the phenomenon of the fascist phenomenon. As a movement stemming from the right wing of the political spectrum, it was not an issue that was completely confined to the specific conjecture of the interwar era. In the previous chapters, while we have concentrated on the unique face of the National Socialism and its location under a general concept of the fascism, it was also important to focus on the aspects of the fascism that are immanent to any bourgeois society. These aspects always exist and wait to be politicised under the appropriate socio-economic conditions. Surely, today fascism should not arise in the exactly same form if it appeared in the forms of classical fascism. However, there appears some general tendencies that point at an on-going process of fascisation but not simply a potentiality of it. Though unevenly developed in different national contexts, the rise of far-right and the growing hegemonic discourse of the right-wing populism should be assessed as integral to the process. Rather than from the marginal, neo-fascist groups, the imminent danger stems from these right-wing movements that expose a comprehensive strategy in terms of extending their mass base. On the one hand, the ‘respectabilisation’ of the right-wing populist parties in the mainstream political sphere leads them to appear as ‘democratic alternatives’ to the global socio-economic crisis. On the

other hand, their declared policies in the form of the movement and their institutional configuration in the regime form show signs of their proximity to a range of the fascist values, programmes and institutions. In this chapter, by relying on our theses on National Socialism and fascism, the emphasis will be placed first on the popularisation of the right-wing extremism in the form of right-wing populism. Secondly, given the continuing symbiosis between the far-right and right-wing populism, we will try to figure out what kind of a process of fascisation takes place with respect to the main tenets of the fascism. The resemblances of the classical fascism to the today's rise of the right will be extracted mainly by referring to the following aspects: The critique of the liberal democracy, the current conditions of the capitalist relations under the hegemony of neoliberalism and its discontents and the intrinsic relationship of the rise of political right to the crisis of capitalism, the mass exertions of the fascist tendencies and the inability of the political left to provide a viable alternative to the forms of socio-economic and political crises which further fuel the positive appeal of fascist solutions among the ruling elites as well as among the masses.

8.2. The debates on how to assess the current fascist tendencies and their implications for the concept of the fascisation

First of all, there is a tendency to use the terms of the 'illiberal democracy' or 'competitive authoritarianism' to signify the movements and the regimes that are averse to the 'liberal democratic procedures but have also a mass basis (former one) or the ones that have an authoritarian structuring of the state that still allow some procedural prerequisites of the liberal democracy. The problematic issue in these conceptualisation is their uncritical commitment to the typologies that are formulated by the theoreticians of the totalitarianism like Linz and Stepan. Typically, their understanding of the political appearances are cut off from the social forces that are constructing the regimes and tries to bring forward a misleading homogenisation of highly divergent political regimes. Secondly, like the ones who tend to define fascism as 'a totalitarian democracy', their viewpoint

of 'democracy' is to a great extent tied to the fulfillment of the 'procedural' sides of the liberal democracy.

On the other side, there is the widespread effect on the Weberian conceptualisation of the fascism that primarily focused on the 'generic definition' of fascism that makes us difficult to comprehend the fascist tendencies while they stick to a static scheme of fascism grown out of generalisations of the inter-war fascism (Eatwell, 2003; Griffin, 2006, Renton, 2019). Some attributes attached to the ideology of the classical fascism such as 'its revolutionary content', its 'utopian vision on the way of creating a new civilisation, its commitment to its anti-Semitic ambitions. Indeed, by looking at these aspects, fascism was gradually confined to a status of most extremist position of the right political spectrum. Such a perspective still contains the heavy impact of the theory of the totalitarianism. This view presupposed fascism as a 'thick ideology' that has been controlled by the fascist party and put into practice by the party in order to 'shape the masses' under the guidance of this 'unshakable' ideological position. In this sense, being a fascist means the uncontrolled violence for the sake of violence, the non-compromising attitude toward the state elites and other parties and a fanatical imposition of its ideology on the population. However, as we have seen in the previous chapters, the historical development of German fascism draws out a different picture of the movement. It is true that the origins of the programmatic aspects of the German fascism point at an 'extremist position'. Nevertheless, it is almost a rule for a fascist party to leave its sectarian position to communicate with the masses. Its emergence as mass political force depends its capacity to politically organise and mobilise the reactionary social forces that are mostly disillusioned with the current democratic politics. The population that they are depending on could begin to voice the anti-systemic demands that could be radical compared to the previous eras. These demands are not simply the inventions of the fascist party. The success of the fascist party lies in its talent to use the modern means to exert these 'reactionary demands' through instruments of the mainstream politics, in parliament, in elections as well as in extra-parliamentary sphere through para-

military organisations. The latter point is not simply the sole reason for its mass support. The claim of the fascist parties for state power frequently leads it to proceed through 'distorted' forms of the democratic mechanisms. In the first phase of fascisation, it concentrates on strengthening its mass power by an oppositional rhetoric against the system (democratic system) but seems to be in conformity with the formal aspects of liberal democracy. In contrast to it, in the second phase of fascisation, its paramilitary organisations in alliance with the state power enters into a new space of politics where the democratic organisations of the working classes are made of the target of both the fascist party and counter-revolutionary state elite. It is the point where the fascist party with a mass power was incorporated into a state transformation process that aims at the permanent removal of the democratic forces from the state affairs.

In this sense, in order to properly understand the current fascist tendencies, the far-right movements that embrace an 'ideological fanaticism' and the immediacy of the use of physical violences against the racial others should not be primarily focused on. The reason is that they have no chance of infiltrating into the mainstream society and gain a mass support from there by their closed political sect or group orientation. That is why we prefer to refer to the 'right-wing populism' where the contemporary fascist tendencies reside. From the start, we have to admit that there is no simple uniformity among the right-wing movements and regimes in terms of their organisation and ideology. However, we can capture some commonalities in terms of their political strategies. First of all, they are not completely hostile to the democratic procedures but see them as essential means of stimulating their mass power. The use of modern media, modern propaganda techniques and the socialisation of their political ideas are of paramount importance. Even in their preliminary stages, they are eager to integrate into capitalist relations to gain an economic power and legitimise themselves among the state and business elite. As for its mass base, typically they are relying on racial/nationalist/religious concerns of the 'majority of the population. Particularly, the problems of social inequalities and poverty are reformulated in a nationalist/racist manner (welfare chauvinism) or in a religious

framework (communitarian social assistance and charity with a religious rage against 'the ethnic others and their 'supposed' wealth). This point is very critical in the mobilisation of the masses as they give a new form to the social oppression of the people and portray themselves as defending the interests of the dominated classes. However, we have to be cautious in order not to conflate the right-wing populist movements with any 'communitarian fundamentalism'. The former ones could be effective only when they get rid of the boundaries of a community and subscribe to a new social project of state and society. Nonetheless, this project is not directed at the 'public welfare' or some public policy orientations. While referring to the 'reactionary' sentiments of the majority, this type of the movements could consolidate only a specific segment of the people at the expense of demonisation of mostly progressive or democratic social strata. Very much in accordance with classical fascism, the right-wing populists benefit from the 'social and national' anger against the globalisation and EU and their stance towards a real anti-capitalism or working class rights is very much negative. They do not problematise the objective social conditions of working class, in fact they try to develop a new 'national' business elite that is clearly at odds with the democratic rights of the working classes. However, this 'nationality' should not mislead us that they stand for 'national independence' economically, in contrast as far as the regimes that we would analyse are concerned, principally this new business elite has no problem with the basic tenets of the global capitalism.

There are two problematic viewpoints that affect the conceptualisation of the contemporary fascist tendencies. First relates to the 'personalisation' of the fascism that tends to capture the fascist seeds in the discourse of the new type of leaders and confine the phenomenon of fascist to the public appearance of these leaders. Just as there is a strand of the scholars that tie the emergence of German fascism to the personality and intentions of its leader, today political figures such as Trump, Bolsonaro or Orban were conceived as 'self-assuring' elements upon which we have to decide whether he is fascist or not. However, the issue is not simply labeling a leader as fascist and solve all the problems relating to them

once and for all. The matter is rather why at a specific moment of history they appear as political leaders and what kind of mass power stands behind them that made such a politics prone to fascism possible. To regard Hitler as political psychosis that has a power to deceive, hypnotise and mobilise the masses led to conceptualisation of fascism as a 'pathology' that are directly associated with the wider ambitions of imperialism, hence as an agent of the capitalism or the overarching role of the National Socialist Ideology and 'Führer dictatorship' that made all of its alliances invisible. Thus, we have to avoid from such a standpoint that would blur specific characteristics of fascism and its contemporary reflections.

Secondly, there is a widespread trend to confuse the fascist trends with the authoritarianism itself. One strand of thought inclines to regard any deviance from the 'formal liberal democracy' as the reflection of an authoritarian attitude (Renton, 2019; Brown et.al, 2018, Morelock ed. 2018). First of all, we have to reiterate that the fascist movement cooperated with the 'anti-democratic' and anti-parliamentarian state elite which had a clear authoritarian vision but could not achieve its objective because of the fascisation itself. The question of 'what kind of authoritarianism' is crucial to understand their capacity to collaborate with the fascist forces in a state transformation process. Secondly, both ideologically and practically, the fascist configuration did never leave the wider ambitions of the authoritarians (economic and political imperial expansion, exclusion and finally the destruction of political organisations of the working classes, the politics without parliaments and parties). They incorporated these shared objectives, however, there were an explicit determination on the side of the fascist movement to prevent any 'authoritarian consolidation' and locate their legitimacy in its mass structure and the leadership without losing the support of the authoritarians to the regime. Today, in some countries such as the USA behind the façade of formal liberal democracy there are authoritarian state structures like the Ministry of Defence, the police or the army that are active in the policy-making as independent institutions. Trump while trying to construct a mass movement out of the 'white male supremacy in USA, the hatred against the

immigrants, blacks or independent women and 'religious/nationalist connotations', he is also voicing the real ideological background of these authoritarian structures. Although they are not overlapping in every policy issue, Trump does not represent a movement that is external to the US state but try to portray itself the 'real defender of the people and the state' and to shape their long-term policies, especially in favour of a direct exit not only from the liberal democratic procedures but the exclusion of the democratic power of the oppressed classes from the public affairs in favour of 'national/religious community. Here, the fascist ingredient resides not in the restoration of the 'strong state institutions' or 'family and church' as seen in the authoritarian policies of Reagan and Thatcher in liaison with the neoliberal policies but in the insistence of right-wing populist actors on the 'mass structuration of these ambitions' that would get rid of the bonds of 'party politics' and 'unilateral determination by the state institutions. Whether it would succeed or not in the long-run is still unknown, however, we are facing with a political phenomenon that escapes from an authoritarian framework while still constantly referring to them.

According to our previous elaboration of the stages of the fascisation, we locate the movement of Trump, Bolsonaro, Afd (Alternative für Deutschland) in Germany and 'Front National' in France in the phase of 'constructing a mass 'reactionary protest' movement that was not still translated into a state transformation process in a counter-revolutionary direction. Even though Trump was in charge of the presidency, he could not be able to receive the consent of the 'establishment' of the USA. It is also dubious that he consolidated a mass movement outside the confines of the conservative party and the general liberal procedures of the American democracy. As for the right-wing populist parties in Europe, the same question is also relevant to them. Their seemingly 'democratic' discourse is quite misleading as their ideological standpoint (their understanding of homogenous Volk, their claim for being the sole representative of the 'national will', their understanding of the 'social problem' by the nationalist/racist terms) contains clear fascist traits and their political strategies

are also indicating that their first priority is to further their mass support by playing the 'rules of the game' (liberal democracy). However, these movements like fascist movements are containing elements of both 'social protest' and 'political order' on a reactionary basis and in that sense they radically differ from the 'democratic collectivities or movements that are structured around particular political and economic demands. With these features, they are very close to the internal ideology of the state institutions like the police and army and they are very much open to the collaboration with them. Additionally, though they do not declare it openly in conformity with liberal political correctness, they are prone to 'political violence' in consolidating their mass power particularly when they are tolerated or assisted by the state security forces. However, at this moment they could not reach at that stage.

On the other side, in our view, the AKP-MHP coalition between 2014-2022 in Turkey, Modi Government of BJP in India between 2014-2022 and Orban government of Fidesz in Hungary are representing the examples of the second stage of the fascisation where the mass formation of the movements gained a new face with the introduction of a variety of measures- the more frequent use of mass political violence with the state violence, more reactionary structuring of the mass base which is sustainable beyond the party politics, a decisive step to retrench the democratic gains of the working people permanently and attempts to outlaw the democratic opposition through the combination of violence and 'administrative and pseudo-legal measures'. Surely, they are functioning in different paces and using some political strategies and mechanisms in different degrees, however, they have already entered into a state-transformation process that shows signs of 'a point of no return'. It means that these are projects that try to destruct 'republican and democratic bases' of the existing regimes with a consolidation of mass basis that is active in this restructuring. While they are referring to 'authoritarian structures of the state' ideologically, they are clearly diverting from such an authoritarian ending both to 'paralyse the political opposition with its mass power and not to rely on certain sectors of the state, the army or bureaucracy to prevent an independent power concentration in those

locations. In essence, they are also the ones to have undermined the reliability and the legitimacy of the state institutions that could have been main tenets of an authoritarian regime.

8.3. The Evolving Meanings of the Right Extremism towards the Hegemony of Right Wing Populism

Right extremism can be defined as ‘a collection concept’ (Sammelbegriff) for different socially appeared forms which is essentially right oriented and undemocratic.

The basic characteristics of the right extremism can summarised as follows:

- a) Within right extremism we observe a combination of ‘outgrowing nationalism’ with the implication for ‘great power claims’ that necessitated an adverse attitude towards ‘other nations and people.
- b) Right extremism negates the universal right of the people for freedom and equality. Especially it has problems with the principal human rights
- c) Right extremism is tendentially directed against ‘parliamentary pluralistic system’ that depends on the people’s sovereignty and majority principle.
- d) Its imagination of the society is related to the existence of an ‘ethnically homogenous people’s community’ (Volksgemeinschaft). People and the state is fused into an organic unity which was most of the time reflected in the personality of a leader (Führer) and indoctrination of the masses in the form of ‘racist, völkisch ideology’. (Stöss, 2010:25)

Surely, right extremism did not remain simply as a movement or as a collection of ideas. Rather, It struggled for the political power and searched for the means of the mass mobilisation in order to fulfill its objectives (Stöss, 2010:28) . The strategies of ‘popularisation of its objectives’ was frequently used to extend the mass basis of its adherents. The immanent idea in right extremism is that the conservatism cannot give substantial answers to the socio-economic problems

and there is only one way remaining: that is seeking an ‘authoritarian solution’ that is intrinsically related to the seizure of the political power. Accordingly, the people (Volk) should stay behind the premises of the leading political elite once the political power is achieved.

Right extremism can also be understood as a form of political reaction against the political connotations of industrial revolution. A pluralist society composed of the parties, association, trade unions and interest groups was in essence incompatible with the formulation of the people (Volk) as an indivisible unity. In that sense, all the diversity relating to the modern popular institutions was directly contrasted to the pre-modern existence of a Volk and its over-arching interests (Stöss, 2010:33).

According to Peham (2021:4), right extremism assumes a concept of the ‘inequality’ of naturally given ethnic qualities that take a form of anti-universalism and anti-egalitarianism positioned against all the modern forms of social and political emancipation and the core assumption of humanism. A kind of thinking in terms of ‘peoples’ (Völker) or nations became effective in the formulation of the right-extremist ideas that was tied to the ‘unchanging quality of an ethnic identity’

It should also be stated that from the beginning of the 1970’s, the right extremism tended to incorporate a concept of the ethno-pluralism that gave importance to the ‘cultural traits’ of a people rather than its ethnic origins as the departure point for an idea of ‘co-existence’ of cultures as against the mixture of their autonomous existence. As can be understood, this re-formulation of right extremism is used against the increasing migration in Europe. Thus, the race has been redefined according to the diversity of cultures and their exclusive claims for the national identity (Stöss, 2010:44).

The term ‘right extremism’ can imply that we are facing with a phenomenon that is primarily related to the margins of the society, an extremist discourse that is

excluded from the mainstream society. However, as Peham (2021:4) argues that there is continuity between the 'right-extremist' margin and the democratic middle. The term 'right extremism' is also a reflection of exaggeration of the social normality. The core ideas of the right extremism are closely linked to an effort of 'ethnicising' the mainstream social problems like the social migration or the retrenchment of social welfare system. Existing social inequalities were responded by an imaginative social integration around the themes of 'nation, ethnicity or culture' at the expense of 'aliens of the community'. The quasi-religious feature of the right-extremism and its security promises derived its attractiveness from its concern of 'providing a stable and secured' identity with regard to the 'malaises of modernity'. In that sense, right extremism can easily infiltrate into the mainstream by problematising the popular problems like 'living conditions, functioning schools, the security of the cities, integration of the migrant or the protection of its own culture' in a new fashion that could be called as 'authoritarian rebellion'. Right extremism in its ideology did not avoid from pointing at the social repercussions of the modern society. It channelled them into the contours of identity questions (Peham, 2021:6).

In Germany, the right extremism sought to extend its mass basis at the post-war period mainly by organising a variety of campaigns. First, in the aftermath of the war, the right-extremist launched a campaign of 'revival of German Reich' and of the creation of national unity around nationalist terms. They also initiated a 'revisionism campaign' that made possible a re-reading of the Nazi past in a positive way. It can't be said that these campaigns gained enough credence given the anti-fascist mood of the post-war era. However, the 'alienation campaign' (Überfremdungskampagne) that primarily concentrated on the migration process as the greatest danger for the existence of the 'people' (Volk) became successful in luring the voters and the members into the right-extremist party, namely the NPD (National Democratic Party) in the end of the 1960's and during the 1970's. This campaign depended on the ethno-pluralist theses that rejected the universalism and egalitarianism and embraced the primacy of the cultural distinctiveness of German people against the threat of the other cultures and

traditions. In the 1990's, this campaign evolved into a 'globalisation' campaign which was a reaction to the alleged or real threats to the nations like the dependency on the world market, immigration, social abuse or immigrant criminality. Right extremists saw among the 'globalisation losers' a real opportunity to enlarge their influence by incorporating some anti-capitalist jargon at the face of mass unemployment and the retreat of the welfare state. It is not a coincidence that the NPD used the slogan of 'Multi-culturalism means social retrenchment', revealing the conviction that the 'global neo-liberalism' and the free mobilisation of people directly undermines the social wealth of the nation. It is apparent that the right-extremists entered into a terrain where the Social Democratic policies could not give an adequate response to the social discontents and 'under the banner of 'there is no alternative'', they fulfilled the neo-liberal structural reforms. These reforms, as observed in Hartz welfare reforms in 2004, provided a vast space for the nationalist expressions of social problems, making use of the 'social strains of the reforms' as an instrument of the 'nationalisation of the masses', if we would use a fascist terminology (Stöss, 2010: 42-51)

Actually, in the post-war period, the triumph of the liberal democracies was regarded as an eventual success over the fascist tendencies. Fascism was viewed as an epochal phenomenon, a temporary instance that can not recur given the strength of the liberal democracies. In this period, the 'extremist' parties were excluded from the political sphere by the surrounding of them by the 'cordon sanitaire' of the liberal parties. Nevertheless, beginning from the 1990's, this cordon sanitaire seems to be eroded as the so-called 'mainstream parties began to incorporate 'extremist views and ideas. Even when the right-extremists did not achieve a substantial electoral success, the mainstream parties could arrive at their objective by utilising the discourse of the right extremism. In that sense, the radicalisation of beliefs and values among the mainstream parties was defined by Mudde (2010) as a 'pathological normalcy'. Thus, a widespread endorsement of the right-extremist views is also sign of the transformation in the right-extremist parties themselves that reformulate their core principles in a 'new, less

objectionable and more appealing way' representing 'a series of ideological transformations and 'calibrated communication practices'. These tactics have coincided with 'a stronger populist, anti-establishment and anti-immigration/anti-Islam profile (Kallis, 2014:11)

In this context, populist politicians appeared to dominate the political scene with a special mix of the populist discourse and the extreme right terminology. Although it has often been stated that there was both a left-wing and right-wing populism in history, our research relies on the specification of a right-wing populist current which formulated a special form of 'critique of the liberal democracy' and claimed for the expression of the 'democratic will' in a rather undemocratic ways. This special relationship between the right-extremism and populism created a pseudo democratic legitimacy to the newly emerging European populist parties and regimes. However, their adverse attitude towards forms of democratic representation and institutions is what makes them incompatible with the main necessities of democratic participation which was blocked by an understanding of an 'ambiguous conception of 'Volk' (people) itself. Indeed, to define the right-populist wave as a form of 'illiberal democracy' falsely attributes them a 'democratic claim for the people's will and blurs its nationalistic and authoritarian content and its connection to a fascist past with which it has quite obvious similarities.

In its classical definition, Mudde (2004:543) defined populism as 'an ideology that considered society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the 'pure people' versus 'corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonte general* (general will of the people). It is not enough for a populist to be an anti-elitist in order to elevate to a populist position. He or she should also be anti-pluralistic. According to Müller (2016:43), populism depends on the assumption that 'only the populist are representing the will of the 'real people' and as this is the case, other democratic institutions and actors are deemed to be illegitimate at the face of the 'single, homogenous unity of the people which stands in contrast to the 'amoral, corrupt

and parasitic' political elite. In its own imagination, the populism fulfills a 'legitimate' role against this elite as the most vindicated stipulation of the 'people's demands. Müller states that the 'populists think themselves as the advocates of the 'main street', 'small people' or 'silent majority' against the financial elites of 'Wall Street'.

Although populists represent a trend towards the eradication of basic tenets of the liberal democracy such as rule of law, separation of powers or a pluralistic civil society, they are not strictly against the representation itself. They suppose that other forms of 'mediated representation' than theirs do not necessarily correspond to the desires of the 'real people'. Its moralistic claim for the exclusive identification with the 'real people' is what makes its democratic assumption inconvincible. It has something to do with a 'symbolic representation of the 'real people' which is rather the materialisation of a 'spirit of the people (Volksgeist) than the 'volonte general'. Thus, it is not coincidence that in the populist mind a pluralistic institution like the Parliament would inevitably clash with the necessities of the regulation by the people if they are not used as an instrument of making the homogeneity of the people reign. That is why even if the populism loses an election battle, they will instinctively deny the empirical results of the election as for them the majority principle in democracy is not necessarily the guarantee of maintaining 'the spirit of the people'. Müller (2016:53) asserts that this specific moralistic content of the populism is what contradicts with the diversity implicated in the democratic participation. As there is only one will of the people that should be reflected in the state, then what is the meaning of presence of the parties, trade unions and civil associations? As in fascist views of the political parties, the populist parties wants to distance themselves from the mainstream political parties as a carrier of interests of the real people and discursively negates the rest of political sphere. Although in contemporary world we are not observing the creation of the paramilitary organisation tied to the populist parties, they tend to imagine and organise themselves as a 'movement' or as a 'front' as the sole representing body of the people as seen in the case of 'Front National' or 'Alternative for Germany'. It is

also not absolutely out of question that the claim for totality of the people necessarily relates to the violent means of political action when it comes to the use of state power.

We should emphasise that in the current literature there is a tendency to define the rise of populism as a 'democratic re-definition of the fascism' in a post-fascist context. According to Finchelstein (2017:43), both fascism and populism wanted to get rid of liberal, constitutional democratic representation. However, while fascism was insistent on the eradication of the political opposition by violent means, populists sufficed with the 'demonisation of the them mainly by discursive instruments. In this view, whereas democracy was an alien element to the fascism, populism represented a modern phenomenon that re-defined the democracy in an illiberal fashion. Finchelstein gives the example of the Peronism as the first appearance of populism in the post-war era. Peronism pointed at a post-fascist, authoritarian and anti-liberal version of democracy that saw a chance in the democracy to legitimise an authoritarian rule. Peron as the leading figure was presented as the 'optimal interpreter' of the will of the people as he was regarded as knowing what the people will better than the people itself. The political minorities were branded as 'traitors on the people' or 'instruments of the foreign economic and political power centres' in contradiction to the authenticity of the people. However, unlike the fascist rule of power, Peronism favoured the continuity of the democratic elections as the basis of its political power. Fascism leaned into the 'idealisation of the violence and war' as the main value of the nation. Finchelstein's view (2017:44) is that fascism succeeded in mobilising the masses in military terms, however, tended to de-mobilise them socially. In contrast, the Peronist populism incorporated 'a democratic strategy against the left, tried to overcome the dichotomy of the cold war between the communism and liberalism and also contained elements of the social reforms as a significant factor in the social integration of the population. Finchelstein (2017:45) concludes that populism can bring about diverse effects on the democracy, it can revive, narrow down or destroy it. Thus, populism's definition as a 'thin ideology' by Mudde found a resonance in these words.

However, there are two contentious issue regarding the academic reception of the populism. First, it is the over-emphasis on the moralistic claim of the populism that most of the time neglects its nationalist Manichean world view. However, if we look at the populist movements in Europe or populist regimes in Hungary, India or Turkey, the populist discourse has made use of a bold nationalistic or religious oriented rhetoric. Thus, mainstream political assets, mostly reactionary ones, were constantly exploited in order to suppress the political opposition or the political rights of minorities. To play the mainstream nationalist values against the opposition is the basic instrument of the populist parties or regime to consolidate its mass basis. In this form, populism took a right-wing route and did not only appear as an ideology but as a reactionary set of practices that directly undermine the democratic foundations of the countries. Secondly, If we conceive of the populist regimes as ‘a form of illiberal democracy, it will necessarily serve for the attempts at whitewashing the authoritarian temptations in populism under the cloak of democracy. Even the term of ‘populism’ without its right-wing connotations can be misleading in terms of enlightening its ‘thick’ ideological expressions.

Mudde (2004:557) indicates that there are fundamental differences between the populist aspects of the New Left and Green Movement of the 1960’s and 1970’s and the right-wing populism of the 21th century. According to it, the former depended on the democratic participation of an ‘active, self-confident, well-educated, progressive people with a view of extending the democratic ground to the ‘oppressed people’ and democratic consciousness of those segments which are politically isolated. In that framework, there is also a progressive side to the mostly left-wing attempt at enriching the perspectives to ‘enhance’ civil-society bases of democracy. However, in today’s right-wing populism we see a bold emphasis on the ‘rebellion of the silent majority’ which is composed of ‘the hard-working, slightly conservative, law-abiding citizens’ who see themselves as surrounded by the ‘progressives, criminals and aliens’. This form of social protest resembles the demagogic right-wing politicians of the 1950’s America who primarily tried to give vent to the feelings of discontent rather than putting

forward a revolutionary or reformist social project (Löwenthal and Guterman, 1949). It is a political agenda which sees itself contradicted with the progressive social formulations that requires a democratic uplift of the citizens. Mudde (2004:558) adds that ‘while the populists of the silent revolution wanted more participation and less leadership, the populists of the silent counter-revolution wants more leadership and less participation’. This reactionary attitude of the right-wing populists requires the re-shaping of the citizens as passive recipients of ‘reactionary ideologies’, protesting the social inequalities only under the guise of nationalistic or religious-oriented discourses. Ironically, the anti-elite approach of the populism is also not sincerely a consistent rejection of elitist assumptions. A populist politician should not automatically be an ‘ordinary citizen’ or defend the participation of ‘silent majority’ as long as he or she expresses the single, already-known political will of the people. Thus, the use of ‘technocratic means’ was not excluded from the populist policy making since in the alleged populist state, the ‘corrupt’ elite will be replaced by the ‘populist elite’ itself who identifies and concretises the ‘will of the people’ better than anyone else without projecting a wide space for the democratic participation of the ordinary citizens.

Particularly, populism in state power can also be indicative of its undemocratic stance against the participation of the citizens. It is not true that the populist form of the administrative technics is limited to the protest parties of the opposition. Populist logic could come to power and shape the masses of its supporters in a specific way. It is not certain that their ‘protest’ against the ‘established system’ will necessarily be disenchanted. They can continue to claim for representing the ‘real people’ by positing their defense of the majority as if they are advocating an ‘oppressed minority’, victims of a ‘corrupt elite’. This polarisation is still a major source of gaining mass consent among the populists. In addition, particularly right-wing populists are keen on consolidating their mass base around integrating one particular segment of the population- mostly a nationalist or religious majority into the organic unity of the ‘people’ while demonising a variety of minority groups that do not conform to the mainstream socio-

economic groups. Thus, the enemies of the populists can contain homosexuals, welfare dependents or immigrants as well as the national or religious minorities. Thus, the anti-elite image of the populists can provide them with a shield to cover their intrinsic undemocratic attitude against the social groups excluded from the 'legitimate' participants in the organism of the nation or people.

8.4. The Right Wing Populism and The Current Tendencies towards Fascism

Recently, there has been a widespread trend to compare the newly emerging fascist trends in the European countries with the classical fascism as if the former is a kind of reincarnation of the latter with some continuities and divergences. Some scholars defined this process as 'post-fascism' (Finchelstein, 2019; Traverso, 2019), some of them sufficed with associating it with 'convergence around far-right' (Renton, 2019) and further some defined it as the 'neo-fascism of 21st century' with its distinctive traits in a general fascist form (Robinson, 2011). Actually, as far as the connection of the rise of 'right wing-parties and above all the construction of regimes with the classical fascism is complex issue that necessarily require some conceptual ambiguities. First of all, we are treating a phenomenon that is novel in some respects and open-ended which means that it did not reach its ripened form yet. Secondly, there are also tendencies that quite resemble with the fascist experience of 1920's and 1930's implying that the fascist phenomenon is not simply epochal, historically unique and unrepeatable. The main shortcoming of the current interpretations relates to the confinement of the analyses to the debates on how to exactly call the rise of the right in fully-fledged categories and the exclusion of the processes that are still at work from the research agenda as far as they do not fit the general scheme that the scholars have conjured up. Though it is not feasible to equate all of them within a single political form, the issues of the right-extremism, right-wing populism and the rise of the far-right are all related phenomena that could help us comprehend better their relevance to the revitalisation of fascist tendencies. Thus, it seems to be crucial to catch some evident developments in the public sphere that will

avoid any ‘conceptual fetishism’ or the search for an over-arching formula that tries to homogenise the issue in question as if it is expressing a unilinear path without uneven patterns depending on the historical context and country-specific conditions. In some countries of Europe, the advance of the right-wing movements is still in opposition, tending to act at least in appearance within the limits of constitutional democracy. The right-wing populist parties ranging from National Front in France to the ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ in Germany are certainly crucial to analyse to give an idea of how these political movements can challenge the established liberal-democratic systems in their own ways. On the other hand, in some countries of Eastern Europe like Hungary, in India and in Turkey these trends took a regime form that poses some similar traits but is still undergoing a process whose final form is unpredictable yet. Furthermore, there are political leaders like Trump in USA and Bolsonaro in Brazil who were democratically elected and tended to put into practice right-wing policies but whose ability of mass mobilisation and their complicity with the state and capital elites are still in question. All in all, we are facing with a variegated pattern, though there are explicit commonalities between these different right-wing formations.

Secondly, the question of how to locate these developments within a conceptual framework of fascism to a large extent depends on what we understand from fascism itself. To relate the above-mentioned phenomena to the debates on fascism, I will use the term of ‘fascisation’ that would encompass the fascism as a process, fascist tendencies in politics and society and relevant political strategies that are on the way of institutionalisation.

We can express the tendency that the rise of ‘right-wing populism both as a movement and a regime match with a corresponding ‘fascisation’ process that should be examined by referring to a variety of ‘convergences’ around the main tenets of classical fascism and a concept of fascism also having transhistorical aspects. We can classify the main point of continuities around the subjects mentioned below.

- a) Fascism as an attack on the main facets of 'liberal democracy', especially constitutional rights that correspond to the retreat of democratic rights and freedoms in general. The inherent lawlessness within fascism, the lack of any abidance by any constitutional rule co-exists with a turn away from basic human rights, rule of law, separation of powers and any democratic accountability and control. The strengthening of executive, personalisation of political power and a general de-constitutionalisation are also aspects that characterise right-populist regimes and the claims of the relevant political parties. This is an important part of the 'fascisation' process. The construction of 'nation' as a particular type of exclusive identity depending on the sublimation of 'a monolithic, organic and indivisible unit' at the expense of ethnic/religious minorities and political dissidents. This aspect had an important connotation for the hostile attitude on the side of the right wing populism towards 'any conception of democratic plurality'
- b) The dissolution of working class movements and organisations, the trade unions, the left political parties. These strategic targets can be furthered to any political emancipatory or progressive movement deemed to be a threat to the 'unity of the nation'. Through they have some pseudo-anti-capitalist elements or 'the sensitivity' towards social question, in reality both the right-wing populists and the fascists adhere to the enforcement of the existing capitalist relations. Within today's neo-liberal economic agenda, there seems to be arising some critical voices among the right-wing populist parties against globalisation and EU, however, this happens mainly for ethnicising/racialising working class and social protection schemes, not questioning the capitalist mode of production. In the similar movements which were turned into a regime, we witness that neo-liberal agenda can go hand in hand with the 'fascist' tendencies.
- c) The incorporation of fascist technics of power into the state apparatuses had already been accomplished in one way or another in different countries. However, for us the crucial point is how the use of the political violence outside the state security forces and the instrumentalisation of

‘elections’ for the reactionary mass formation is being integrated into the ‘counter-revolutionary form of state transformation process. The nature of the political violence is also changing. While the political campaigns against the political dissidents and ethnic/religious minorities with the concomitant hate mongering are fostering the mass basis of fascism, the political violence backed by the ideas of ‘national/religious’ communities is gaining ground with a special reference to the states’ security approach to sustain the arbitrary dichotomies between ‘national’ and ‘un-national’, ‘terrorist’ and ‘anti-terrorist’.

- d) Mass foundations of fascism is an important asset in the ‘fascisation’ process in the sense that reactionary forms of social relations, patriarchal family, male domination in every public sphere are intrinsically connected with the aim of ‘nationalisation of the masses’. To channel ‘social protest and frustration’ into ‘religious/national’ domains and institutions is also one among the successes of the right-wing populist parties. The construction of ‘national or religious communities’ defined according to ascriptive criteria even though they are still a myth are replacing ‘political collectivities’ based on universal ideas and the civil democratic formations.
- e) The lack of leftist, democratic alternative projects is one of the factors that create a favorable climate for the extension of the fascist ideas. Just as the rise of fascism was historically tied to the defeat of the political left, today’s right-wing populism functions on a terrain where a unifying emancipatory political formation does not exist in the face of fragmentation of identity-based political groups and the general weakness of the political left. Surely, the end point of the fascisation process is dependent on the power of the political resistance that would grow out of the anti-fascist movements.

8.4.1. The Dissolution of the Liberal Democracy

As we indicated before, the rise of the right in 1920's and early 1930's came about as a result of the constant criticism of the Weimar Democracy. In Schmittien terms, representative democracy was seen as an arena where the endless political discussion was made and 'pluralism' was associated with the 'political chaos' that is not unable to reach a compromise and make a true decision in a form of unified will. All the disasters stemming from the economic crisis and the inability of the political parties to find solutions to those problems were unanimously connected to the shortcomings of the Weimar democracy. To the end of 1920's, there appeared a widespread of protest against the mainstream parties, i.e. exposed to the blames of 'system parties' particularly by the NSDAP which was talented in mobilising the 'anti-systemic feelings of the people' into the nationalist formulation of politics depending on a monolithic view of the nation standing beyond the petite political conflicts. Apart from its ideological uses, there was also a grain of truth in the 'anti-systemic' protest in the sense that the gap between the representatives and the represented was widened in the face of the lack of alternative projects of democracy that would increase the popular participation of the citizens. Unfortunately, the answer of the German politics under the leadership of German right to the democracy deficit was to erode further the gains of democracy 'in the name of people, people as a nation.

Today, we are witnessing a similar process of the dissolution of the liberal democracy which is furthered by its own faults and also by the attacks of the right-wing populism. It is a common sense that the citizens are no longer trusting in the virtues of the system, in the functioning of the political parties and the forms of representation available to them. As Martinelli (2016:26) puts out, "Mainstream political parties have become less and less able to mobilize voters, declining voter turnout, declining party identification and membership, increasing volatility of election outcomes and the percentage of voters who choose mainstream parties". While the mainstream parties are transforming into 'catch-all parties', they are more and more stripping of their ideological position

that should normally differentiate them from other parties. Actually, the evolution of the Social Democrat parties can be conceived as an example to how they lost their appeal to the citizens as a progressive and emancipatory force by aligning with the political decisions of right-wing parties. Political parties are constantly becoming 'cartel parties' which are linked to a variety of factors such as "the growing rift between party organisations and citizens, the weakening of their intermediation role, widespread corruption and by political scandals, the impact of mass media and the personalisation of politics" (Martinelli, 2016:27). These factors inevitably provide a fertile ground for the emergence of 'anti-systemic' reactions that are not always in a democratic form but also, perhaps more often, in an authoritarian form reinforcing the need of the 'law and order' in spite of any further democratic development.

We have to add that current liberal democracy depended on the assumption of a social compromise, presumably between the left and the right and the limitation of the power of the executive and legislative by the power of constitutional courts that was planned to limit the excesses of political sovereignty and also the protection of collective and individual rights and freedoms. Deeply rooted in the bitter experiences of fascism, the liberal democracy rested on a 'constrained democracy', within which 'parliaments in Europe were systematically weakened, checks and balances strengthened, and institutions without electoral accountability (again, constitutional courts serving as the prime example' tasked not just with defending individual rights, but with securing the democracy as a whole" (Müller, 2016:103-5). Such a system, while bringing about constitutional guarantees for the democratic rights and freedoms, was at the same time producing a barrier to the more direct forms of democratic participation and continuously creating a crisis of representation if there is no assumed political stability that sustains the main pillars of the system.

We have to add to this picture the emergence of new transnational actors such as global financial elite as a result of globalisation process and the EU elites as a technocratic force that strictly follows the requirements of the neo-liberal

governance. Traverso (2019:16) claims that EU paved the way for the “birth of a neoliberal political elite that transcends between left and right”. Its condition as an entity exercising the demands of the financial elite unconditionally, has no democratic legitimacy depending on the citizens’ decisions. Technocratic regime of the global economic actors and the EU elite enforce a one-sided form of making politics, in fact exclude the politics itself since the political requirements of the neo-liberal globalisation were considered as a unilinear path that discards any democratic intervention. This condition has a dual effect: It, on the one hand, undermines the promises of representation itself, hence rendering their institutional expression totally inconsequential. It also empties the concept of the democracy itself by confining it to a range of administrative processes where the formality of governance precedes over the search of seeking alternative means of popular participation. Within such a conjecture, EU is not a “barrier to the rise of the far right but a factor that fuels it” (Traverso, 2019:19). By constantly depoliticising the public sphere and undermining the possibilities of constructing democratic collectivities, it leads to a kind of populism that is no more democratic than the technocratism of the EU. Pointing out this fact, Müller (2016:107) asserts that “In a curious way, the two mirror each other. Technocracy holds that there is only one correct policy solution; populism claims that there is only one authentic will of people...For neither technocrats nor populists is there any need for democratic debate. In a sense, both are curiously apolitical”. In other words, the slogans of ‘neither right nor left’ of neo-liberal politicians create a political atmosphere within which the reaction of ‘anti-politics’ under the guise of populist discourse seems to be the only way of ‘re-politicisation’ in a contradictory manner.

We should be cautious about the ‘anti-establishment’ character of right-wing populism just as the anti-systemic character of the NSDAP was misleading in its rise to the power and more evidently in its regime phase. The disintegration of the liberal democracy was not accomplished free of the ideologies. It was a clear shift towards the superiority of rightist/nationalist forces that had a strong collaboration with the state elite. What they have criticised as the ‘systemic

forces' were the weak elements of the Weimar democracy but not the reactionary constituents of the state apparatus. As we have shown before, the NS regime was a product of an alliance of conservatives, state bureaucracy, the capitalists, the military and the fascist party to liquidate the work-class movement and political left, to maintain an authoritarian rule outside any constitutional control and to embrace nationalist/militarist ambitions. In a similar vein, it is not possible to analyse today's rise of the right-wing populism without focusing on its specific relationship to the state. The ideological rapprochement between the state's repressive forces and the nationalist/security based solutions of the right-wing populist to the social questions does not only contribute to the disintegration of the liberal democracy but also direct against any democratic resistance to the political status quo. Although there is no longer any threat of 'communism' that ties the traditional elites and the fascists together, the democratic rights and freedoms of the oppressed and the high probability of the emergence of real 'anti-systemic' movements is a constant danger that stands in front of the ruling classes.

There are three tendencies that characterise our epoch in terms of the dissolution of the liberal democracy: the replacement of the centre-right/conservative political agenda by the policy guidelines of the far right/right-wing populism, the parallel development of the 'state reason' and repressive mechanisms in line with the right-wing current and the constitutional changes towards 'more authoritarianism' in the regimes where the right-wing populists are in power.

For Renton (2019), in recent years there appeared a 'convergence on the far-right' that put its distinctive stamp on the political sphere. In the election of Trump, the shift in the conservative's policy towards right-wing populism was decisive. It was the ability of the conservatives to absorb the right-wing populist rise with its instinct 'to stay in permanent power' and alignment of its main programmatic base with more rightist trends. The common denominator in the coalition was the 'the shared policy goals like privatisation, cutting taxes for the wealthy, appointing anti-Worker Supreme Court justices, repealing the

Affordable Care Act, targeting of immigrants and refugees, increasing the military budget and voter suppression” (Wilson, 2020:36). In France, the mainstream parties, while demonising the Front National at the leadership level, tried to gain the confidence of the Front National voter and did not differentiate from the FN in terms of policy promises (Renton, 2019:10). In fact, according to Brossat (2019), Sarkozy’s ‘security and repressive programme’ was not different from the policy propositions of the FN. Hollande’s and later Macron’s policy on the issue of immigrants also had a FN colour. In Hungary, the Fidesz party has incorporated nationalist/nativist discourse of the fascist Jobbik particularly as regards the harsh attitude towards ethnic/religious minorities. Fidesz copied the pseudo-anti-systemic stance of the Jobbik in order to outweigh it electorally (Antal, 2019:129). This shift to the right was also observable in the alliance AKP and MHP in Turkey on the basis of exclusive nationalism and the revival of Turkish-Islamic synthesis that took an aggressive stance towards political dissidents and ethnic and religious minorities. Thus, there is a widespread trend that the bases of the liberal democracy relying on the social and political compromise of mainstream parties have been extensively eroded by the increasing public acceptability of the far-right policies.

In parallel to this trend, the electoral victories of right-wing populists had provided a ground of mass support for the more repressive state policies. New right-wing populist leader of Brazil, Bolsanaro has threatened the democratic protesters against the imprisonment of previous prime minister Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva with a martial law, paid tribute to the previous military dictatorships and gave the police the right to shoot down the suspected criminals (Monbiot, 2020). It was an explicit exertion of state security forces as a factor to deter any democratic opposition. Löwy (2019) also pointed at the common points between the right-wing populist leaders and European far-right in terms of state policies: “authoritarianism, adherence to a strong man, a leader, capable of ‘restoring order, a repressive ideology, cult of police violence, the call for the restoration of death penalty and the distribution of weapons to the population for their defence against criminals’”. Particularly under the name of fighting against the

refugees/immigrants or Islamic terrorism, some European states legitimised the extension of their repressive mechanisms with populist overtones. For instance, the Orban regime combined the hate campaign against refugees, gypsies or homeless with the criminalisation of those segments under the rule of strict penal state (Antal, 2019:155). ‘Xenophobic, racist and Anti-Semitist’ prejudices were mobilised in order to sustain a ‘permanent state of exception’ and the limitation of the space of democratic expressions justified by an imagination of a constant terrorist threat. Hate rhetoric against the minorities, political dissidents or immigrants began to take an institutionalised form in state’s policies. Brossat (2019) argues that “‘fascism today is something that proliferates at the point of confluence of collective mechanisms, mass emotion (the people) and political calculations that play on two combined terms: law and order and cleansing or elimination of the undesirables, of too many’”.

On the other side, the process of a constitutional change under the right-wing populist regime came into being almost in the same manner. Within this process, a strict differentiation between the liberalism and democracy has been made quite in a Schmittian sense. According to it, liberalism negates the democracy within which the latter is seen as the expression of ‘homogeneity of the people’ defined in the racial/ethnic terms (*Artgleichheit*) (Johal, 2020:164). A special formulation of ‘democracy’, that is the emergence of ‘unmediated will of people’ whose preservation constitutes the unwritten constitution and a sovereign, a dictator who stands beyond the realm of any restriction of law and acts as the embodiment of the will of the people without any intermediation of a representative organ or administrative unit. This conception inevitably rules out any ‘plural’ entities that operate on the democratic terrain or any attempt at the self-regulation of people. There is an organic relationship between the represented and the representative that is not bound by the parliamentary majorities. Within this configuration, there is a reciprocal relationship between the state’s concern for law and order and its indispensable role in the existential fight of the ‘Volk’ against inner and outer enemies. Thus, ‘the political’ and ‘the democratic’ is confined to its negation of the liberalism but the aim of the

disintegration of the liberal democracy and its political justifications are used as an instrument to repress real expressions of the democratic rights and freedoms and its inherently pluralist content. We have previously elaborated how the attack of the National Socialists on the liberal constitutionalism which was justified in the name of the will of Volk became the stepping stone for the total destruction of the democracy itself. This process had already begun by the constitution of the authoritarian presidentships from 1930 on that were also basically concerned with protecting the 'unified entity of nation' at the expense of constitutional guarantees of individual and collective democratic rights.

A similar process is at work in the constitutional transformation of the regimes where the right-wing populists are in power. The deficiencies of the liberal democracy were used as an excuse for the overall elimination of democratic demands of a variety of political actors. The state of 'exception' within which the homogenised will of the people/nation is considered to be threatened by the assumed enemies exemplified by the political opposition, religious/ethnic minorities or external financial or military actors has become the norm. Actually, the imagined existential fight of the nation is the ground upon which the actions of the governors are exempted from any legal or democratic accountability. The so-called 'oppressed' status of the nation against the 'corrupt bureaucratic or liberal elite' legitimises the transformation of the state which took more repressive and authoritarian forms. We will give a brief account of Hungarian and Turkish cases in terms of these constitutional changes which have immediate political impacts. They are illuminating in terms of revealing the materialisation of the right-wing populist discourse in a regime.

In Hungary, in the 1990's there was a general trend towards adopting the formal features of liberal democracy within which the legal constitutionalism was tried to be founded on the basis of rule of law and the control of the executive by the Constitutional Court. After the failure of social-liberal governments stuck to the 'austerity' policies imposed by the EU and global financial actors, the Fidesz party after 2010 constructed its mass basis by employing an 'anti-establishment'

logic that seemed to be critical of all liberal institutions and EU's technocratic governance (Antal 2019:98). There were mainly three pillars of the Orban regime: Firstly, it was reintroduction of the 'political' again in the face of the 'depoliticising' effect of the liberal institutions. However, the content of this 'political' was at least discursively of a nationalist kind that was defensive both against the supra-national authorities and against the so-called 'juristocracy' that is supposed to prevent the reflection of will of the people on the state policies. Secondly, the fight against the de-politicisation did not mean a more democratic participation of the decision-making processes or self-rule of the people. The intellectual defenders of the regime invented the term of 'leader democracy'. Political representation was directly tied to the leadership. The leader as a 'post-modern' prince was praised as the direct embodiment of the will of the people, hence the personalisation of the political power that precedes over any system of checks and balances and the decline of the importance of the parliament as the primary organ of political representation. The restriction of the Constitutional Court was combined with a concentration of power in the executive which is marked by a personalisation of political rule (Antal, 2019:113). Thirdly, the legal constitutionalism turned into a 'populist constitutionalism' that heavily depended on the 'nationalist' reformulation of the constitution which became more and more devoid of any universal attachments to the human rights or rule of law.

The Fundamental Law that entered into force on January 2012 had introduced into legal framework a set of 'unconstitutional pillars' that exemplified right-wing populist world view. Apart from the undemocratic way of its adoption devoid of any widespread public consensus, primarily it redefined the political community in a nationalist/religious manner. "The elevation of the 'single Hungarian nation to the status of constitutional subject'" left no place for the 'other nationalities living within the territories of the Hungarian state'. In the same vein, the nation was redefined as a Christian community in a way that excludes other religious groups or non-religious groups from the nationhood (Arato et.al., 2011:7). The inviolable individual rights were indispensably connected to the duties to the national community. For instance, according to

new law, “every one’s right to choose one’s employment and profession freely was made dependent on their duty to contribute to the welfare of community” (p.14). By obligating moral framework for the ‘good life’, it violated the 1989 Constitution in terms of “equal recognition of the plurality (freedom) of forms of life, the neutrality of (tolerance by) the state and respect for personal autonomy” (p.15). Particularly the sixth amendment to the Fundamental Law which was adopted on 14 June 2016 and the seventh amendment which was adopted on 20 June 2018 were instructive of how ‘nationalist’ outlook has been incorporated into the Constitution. According to Dironiczi (2018:18-19), the sixth amendment to the fundamental law introduced ‘a special legal order’ that is associated with ‘the state of terrorist threat’, however, “it vaguely defines what a state of terrorist threat means, which organ, on what conditions can introduce, extend and terminate the situation, what other organs participate in the decision-making during this emergency and what special competencies are allocated to state organs”. It appeared to be an attempt to give a permanent status to the ‘state of exception’ where the executive is empowered to act freely at the face of the blurred definition of ‘terrorist threat’. The seventh amendment to the Fundamental Law defined the constitutional identity and it has been stated that “the protection of this identity and the Christian culture is the obligation of all state institutions” (Dironiczi, 2018:19). Another statement in the amendment provided a restriction of the freedom of expressions by stating that “exercising the right to freedom of expression and assembly shall not impair the private and family life and home of others”. In the amendment, there was also an attempt at the criminalisation of the homeless by saying that “using public space as a habitual dwelling shall be illegal” (Antal, 2018:141).

The constitutional changes of 16 April 2017 in Turkey that constituted ‘Presidential Government System’ instead of parliamentary democracy had a special brand of right-wing populism. It has grown out of the evaluation of the Turkish history as an arena of conflict between the Kemalist ‘tutelary’ bureaucracy that are primarily found as responsible for a series of military interventions and the ‘democratic will’ of the Turkish people as ‘Millet’.

According to such a reading, the ‘democracy’ simply meant the ‘unrestricted will of the nation’ as an homogenous entity that was pitted against the other state organs like the judiciary, the Constitutional Court, the state bureaucracy including the army which are not elected and supposedly acted against the interests of the people. According to it, national sovereignty was not divisible and could not be shared by the tutelary state structures (Uçum 2018:50). After the unsuccessful coup attempt of 15 July 2016, this version of democracy was defined by the ruling party the AKP (Justice and Development Party) as ‘national’ and ‘domestic’. Being ‘national’ referred to the will of nation as an undivided unity. Being ‘domestic’ was closely associated with the traditional, cultural and religious values of the Turkish people (Uçum, 2018:158). However, it was evident that the ‘nation’ was a reflection of a specific ‘Turk, Muslim, Sunnite’ identity that excludes all other religious and national identities and also the political oppositional actors that could pose a threat to the ‘unharmful unity of the nation’.

The process of constitutional change has been put into practice under the rule of emergency following the coup attempt and was not opened to the democratic debate in a way including the participation of the democratic partners. The social compromise that should characterise the ‘constitution-making’ was ruled out from the start and the amendments of the constitution was in a way imposed on the public by the majority votes of the ruling coalition. The aim of the constitutional change was, according to its defenders, to end the bureaucratic tutelary structures in the state and to remove the political instabilities connected with the parliamentary democracy by introducing a more powerful executive in defense of political stability. The result of the constitutional changes of 16 April 2017 could be summarised as follows: The priority of ‘one-man rule’, hence the leadership over the constitutional check and balances, the declining status of the parliament as a representation organ and as a legislative force depending on the plurality of the democratic actors, a process of de-constitutionalisation (Kaboğlu, 2017:156). Indeed, the law was adjusted to the legitimisation of government acts which are in a way exempted from any constitutional binding. As we have

shown before in the case of National Socialist regime, there appeared a space of the 'Prerogative State' that operated purely on the basis of 'political expediency'. As an alternative to the power of the parliament as legislating force, the increasing use of 'presidential decree-laws' was the sign of the emergence of a 'decree-state' (Massnahmenstaat) that primarily contributed to the limitation of democratic rights and freedoms and the partisan redesigning of the state within which all the separate and autonomous pillars of the state were subjugated to the control of the government which is actually composed of one person. In such a framework, we had to admit that the constitutional changes occurred in an environment of security-based actions of the state in the face 'threat of terrorism'. The alignment of the ruling coalition with these policies incredibly limited the area of democratic politics. In parallel to these developments, the nationalist/religious-based mass mobilisations of people were viewed by the state-AKP coalition as an instrument to pacify the political opposition and preempt the construction of any democratic collectivities that would have the potentiality to shatter the political status quo.

In the same vein, Modi Government in India also pursues a line of 'de-institutionalisation' that bypasses the bureaucratic structures within the state and organisationally made them wholly dependent on the 'single line of command'. The bureaucracy is functioning not on the basis of the public service any more but on the 'extra-curricular considerations' that primarily tied to the private interests with the 'political agenda of the government' (Chandel, 2021). The same is true of the judiciary. In addition to the cast and class bias that have been pervasive before the Modi Government, the Supreme Courts have been controlled more in line with the current agenda of the government. Even though they have enormous powers to act autonomously, they seem to be willing to embrace a kind of judicial populism (Daniyal, 2020). Besides that, recently the BJP government introduced a range of laws that meant the retreat of citizenship rights on the religious basis. Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), the Indian government accepted "persecuted Hindus, Zoroastrians, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains and Christians arriving before December 2014 from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and

Pakistan as Indian citizens with the exception of Muslims’’ (Shida, 2020). By repealing Article 370 of the Constitution, the government abolished the administrative autonomous status of the ‘Jammu and Kashmir’ and tried to connect that land to the mainstream India both geographically and ethnically (Shida, 2020:61) The Supreme Court of India legally recognised Aydhoyain Utter Pradesh as the birth place of Hindu God Rama and prescribed the re-building of the Hindu Temple of Rama on the place where the Babri Mosque was totally destroyed by the Hindu Nationalists in 1992 (Shida, 2020:61-2). These steps could be evaluated as the reflections of the broad political agenda of the BJP that was imprinted by the desires to sharpen the religious divides in the country and continuously consolidate its mass basis through Anti-Muslim sentiments. Religious Nationalism of BJP whose essence we will explain later on in this chapter also led to the measures like the ‘strict ban on ‘cow slaughter’ and ‘the establishment of anti-romeo-teams that regulates the relationships between men and women in the street (Shida, 2020:62). The Modi government also regularly undermines the authority of the ‘elected state governments’. The amendment of the ‘‘Border Security Act’’ (BSE) by the Modi government was an attempt to centralise all the governmental power that blocks any initiatives of the local governments (UNI India, 2021).

Thus, in India, Turkey and Hungary we are talking about a political power structure that restructures the state in the image of the political expediency without any checks and balances, undermine the autonomy and inner organisation of any state agency and show no tolerance for any independent local government or democratic organisation in the civil society that would challenge its monopoly of power. For instance, as the municipalities that are held by the opposition, the Orban government by the pre-text of the Coronovirus tried to strip the municipality of Budapest of its administrative powers and then tied their financial autonomy to the discretionary power of the centre, thus the municipalities’ involvement into public projects on the their own initiatives is seriously hindered (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p.31-2). A much more offensive stance against opposition-based municipalities were observed in Turkey. While

the elected HDP-led municipalities were regularly replaced by the government appointed ‘trustees’ (Freedomhouse, 2021) the Istanbul municipality governed by a mayor of CHP origin as a result of the 2019 local elections was constantly obstructed by the Centre, particularly their public policies and social assistance schemes became a competitive model and alternative to the policies of government. Recently, to counter-attack this trend and preempt a possible presidency candidacy of the popular mayor, the government has launched a criminal investigation alleging that a part of the municipality personnel is related to terrorist organizations (Atalayar, 2021).

8.4.2. Incorporation of Fascist Techniques of Power and the Role of Political Violence

In this context, it is crucial to re-conceptualise the role of the political violence associated with fascism and its contemporary reflection. Primarily relying on the case of Macron in France, Pelhata (2021) points at the lesser inclination of the neo-fascist movements and right-wing populist parties to embrace violent methods due to the “delegitimation of the violence, the political strategies of these parties to ‘distance themselves’ from the fascist past, the weakness of the working class organization and the increased capacity of the state forces to repress the political dissidents”. He makes a definition of ‘fascisation’ that primarily focuses on the extent of the autonomy of the police from the political leaders and their ‘intrinsic racist attitude that also finds its resonance in the far-right parties. He mentions about the ‘savageification of the dominant class’ that resonates both with the practices of the ‘penal state’ and ‘the power of the far-right parties’ that are together directed against the working class and the immigrants. Actually, the growth of the penal state in the face of so-called ‘terrorist’ threats and its organic relation with the racist and colonial supremacy began to exert its influence on the formation of contemporary states (Figueira, 2018:8). Supposedly, whatever the political leadership or ‘democratic institutional framework’ expresses, this ‘autonomy’ of the state forces towards practically ‘violating democratic rights and freedoms’ enlarges its extra-judicial

sphere. It is true that anti-terror laws and the implicit state of emergency situations are not value-free terrains, they have specific affinities with the construction of 'reactionary mass population' that pays lip service to the suspension of democratic and constitutional guarantees. However, keeping in mind these facts, it is problematic to associate it with a 'fascisation of the state' by simply pointing at the 're-organisation of the state' without any reference to its relation to the 'para-military organisations' and 'the mass base of the fascisation' as the critical factors in the rise of fascism. Palheta (2021) claims that "neither the constitution of the armed bands nor even the use of political violence is the hallmark of fascism, either as a movement or as a regime". He also underestimates fascist's relationship with the masses and confine both the political violence and the masses to the 'instruments of the fascist leaders to repress the masses. Thus, it totally diverts from our conceptualisation of 'fascisation' that depends on the co-evolution of the mass basis of fascism, the fascist political strategies and the vested economic and political interests.

On the other side, Renton (2021) rightly emphasises the indispensability of the 'political violence' to the fascist parties but by referring to Robert Paxton he argues that "In their initial stage, fascists won recruits through mass demonstrations, through military training and attacks on their opponents. In the second stage, when fascist parties were contending for power, they needed to challenge the state's monopoly of violence. Yet fascism, at this stage, also typically sought to govern in an alliance with other right-wing parties, hence there was a tension between the interests of the party and of its militia. On taking power, both fascist parties partially relegated their militia structures and promised to rely on the existing structures of the state to punish any remaining left-wing opponents". This view misses the point in the sense that the 'SA violence' was not only a power on its own but gained its strength with its toleration and support by the state forces and the backing of the presidential governments, especially of Papen in German case. Indeed, the decisive anti-democratic stance of the ruling classes to exclude the political parties and organisation of the working class from the state affairs and their attempt at

creating the 'new state' made the SA and the NSDAP as the 'constructive, national forces' indispensable to these new mechanisms that are destined to the total disintegration of Weimar Democracy. Additionally, the usage of the 'political violence' with deformation of the 'democratic' institutions seen in the case of the 'bloody elections of 1932, the Reichstag fire and 'Enabling Act', they pursued to create a new form of 'legitimacy', a new political domination that made possible the use of the political violence and mass formation through quasi-legal and pseudo-democratic mechanisms that insistently escapes from an 'authoritarian consolidation'. Political violence 'only in this form' was not only an instrument of the fascist leaders but an integral part of fascism itself.

Traverso (2021), in his response to Palheta (2021), firstly, relies on the discourses of the right-wing populist parties and make deductions from 'their ideological standpoint' like their unwillingness to create a 'new man' or provide a 'new order'. According to him, these parties are 'exposed to a kind of normalisation vis-a-vis the economic elites and the democratic framework though they pursued 'authoritarian and xenophobic' rhetoric for political ends. This view is problematic in the sense that it regards this type of leaders as 'pathologies' of liberal democracy and underestimate the mass power behind it that could play a political role aside from its strong supporters. It disregards the 'possibility of changing nature of the parties and leaders' in case of any 'decisive' step in the ruling classes towards truly creating an anti-democratic political structure. Although we are not observing a 'complete savageification of the dominant class' in Palheta's words in Europe and USA, the cases of Trump and Bolsonaro could not simply be framed within a concept of 'authoritarianism' that corresponds to the 'restoration of a past political structure or mere culmination in some state organisations like military or bureaucracy but they are representing attempts to go beyond the authoritarian sources of legitimacy with a popular but 'reactionary' involvement of the masses. In this sense, on the side of Traverso (2021) it is also problematic to completely discard the term of 'counter-revolutionary' to depict today's far-right movement since he supposes that this side of the fascist movements were confined to the 'revolutionary' inter-war era

and are not applicable today. However, where the democratic rights and freedoms of the 'working classes' are not guaranteed and threatened continuously, the reformulation of the 'social question in ethnic/racial terms in Kühnl's terms is widespread, the possibility of 'reactionary attitude both in the population and in the ruling circles in terms of 'retreating not only the liberal democracy but all democratic organisations stemming from below is a possibility, then it is not unfounded to use the terms of 'counter-revolutionary' for the movements that are decisively on that road though they do not declare themselves as such. Thus, to use the term does not necessarily mean to delve into the mistakes of the Third International that reduces the fascist movement simply to its 'counter-revolutionary dimension'. The same problem holds true for Renton's words in the way of 'negating the term of fascisation' by pointing at "a form of leadership which charges itself as an emergency regime necessary to prevent what would otherwise be the rise of fascism, and uses the threat of the far right to justify its own form of authoritarian rule has a very obvious counterpart in history, not in fascisation (i.e. Third Period Comintern fantasies about the authoritarianism concealed in liberalism and social democracy), but in the failed "preventative" dictatorships of Papen and von Schleicher in Germany. It is explicitly a misreading of the period of Papen during whose term the SA and the NSDAP has elevated to an integral part of the 'new state' by Schleicher and Papen themselves and the institutional practices of fascism began to be shaped. After such a involvement of the fascist movement in the state, Papen's government was 'not a 'preventative' but a failed 'authoritarianism' in the face of a process of fascisation that had already gained ground by the contribution of 'willful acts of the state elites themselves including Papen.

The most outstanding side of these comments is their 'excessive' reliance on the European cases especially on the ideological and discursive content of the 'far-right and right-wing populist parties, emphasising the soundness of the liberal democratic framework and the 'assessment of all the anti-systemic rightist elements within the convenient scope of 'authoritarianism'. However, if we look at the other cases like Turkey, India and Hungary, we can understand that neither

the political strategies of the right-wing parties neither of the state elite nor the mass formation grown out of their interactions remain static.

The evolution of the AKP from 'conservative democratic' presentation and 'moderate Islamist' vision that was praised by the West and EU throughout 2000's and the beginnings of 2010's to a 'strict non-democratic route with its growing reactionary mass formation is instructive. Indeed, the year of 2014 was a year of 'shifting away from the attempt to finding a 'peaceful solution' to the Kurdish problem both in the AKP and in the state forces. Above everything the 'partial democratisation' was opening space for an independent democratic politics outside the AKP not only in the Kurdish question but also in other social questions involving the democratic forces in the policy making process. However, before the election of 2015 this course began to change and the new inner security law (Anadolu Ajansı, 27 March 2015) and the systematic attacks on the HDP before the elections functioned as preventive measures on the side of the state to diminish the popularity of the HDP (T24, 18.05.2015). The results of the election of 7 June 2015 was disappointing for the AKP as it has lost its governing majority in the parliament and HDP gained %13 of the votes which was also promising for the future under the 'normal democratic procedures. However, the route of building up a coalition government was intentionally obstructed by the presidential entourage. After this failure, new elections were set for the date of 2 November 2015. Actually, the 'wave of violence' during this period altered the political mood of the state and the electorate fundamentally. Apart from that, during this period there were massacres perpetrated by the DEAS against the meetings of legal democratic forces of HDP and other Turkish left, as seen in Suruc massacre and the massacre of the 'Peace Meeting' in Ankara (Deutsche Welle, 28.08.2019). These massacres should be in focus as they had twofold results: They demoralised and 'deterred' the democratic opposition from applying to the practice of its rights and freedoms and sustained a dilemma of security/insecurity, 'terror/anti-terror and national/anti-national among the potential voters of the AKP. This 'effect' on the election results was in many way reminiscent of the 'bloody elections of 1932' in Germany that

turned the elections into a plebiscite where the contradiction between the ‘communist terror’ and ‘anti-communists’ (SA and NSDAP) was used to consolidate and unify the bourgeois voters around nationalist banner. Similarly, AKP after the 2 November 2015 held the %48 of the total votes and maintained its nationalist+religious oriented mass basis.

It was the beginning of a political strategy that would instrumentalise ‘the ‘distorted’ democratic mechanisms’ for the ends of anti-democratic transformation of the state and the political violence as a pretext for the mass mobilisation. What we were observing was actually a coalition between the AKP and the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) which already had organic links with the state agencies and fascist ideological elements. In fact, there appeared a consensus between the state forces and AKP in terms of eradicating ‘democratic parliamentary system’ and ‘keeping away the political organisations of the working classes, broadly democratic and progressive masses from the state affairs. This coalition was like a ‘revival’ of the ‘Nationalist Front’ in the 1970’s but it was stronger than that in terms of its popular mass base and the relative weakness of the current organised democratic movements. It was truly counter-revolutionary in terms of undermining the ‘idea of Republic and Democracy’ and its ideological background towards a ‘presidential regime’ was built on a de-constitutionalised state structure and a reactionary mass base. Thus, ‘fascisation’ was embedded in a counter-revolutionary state transformation process.

The conflicts of AKP with Gülen movement (the former ally of AKP which was another anti-democratic force with Islamic and nationalist tendencies, having a weak mass basis but specially targeted the occupation of the state in bureaucracy, police and the military for decades and became much more effective network in the state and society during the AKP governments) appeared to be belonging to a conflict between two forces equally ‘non-democratic’ and ‘reactionary’ in its mass formations. The outward power conflict for the post-democratic era of Turkey between these two forces which were supported by the Western allies, particularly by USA as ‘moderate Islamists’ standing for advocating ‘liberal

democratic institutions' (Fuller, 2017) gave a new impetus for the AKP to strengthen its stance within the state and re-consolidate its supporters. The 'constant bombings' that are associated with the PKK and DEAS within the year of 2015 and the 2016 and the following 'failed military coup d'etat' (15 July 2016) attempted by the Gulenist cadres within the army gave the opportunity to the AKP to proceed with the re-structuring of the state by its own forces and MHP cadres (Gültekin, 2020:91-2). While on 20 July 2016 the state of emergency was announced, rule by decrees became a common method that would seriously curtail the democratic freedoms, purge the state of not only Gulenist supporters but of all the democratic elements and make up the base of the constitutional amendments in 2017 (Gültekin, 2020:96).

The 'partisan' occupation of the state has coupled with a 'de-institutionalisation of the state' within the authoritarian structures in the bureaucracy and military. The 'autonomy' of the institutions as a potential danger to the governing coalition was weakened in favour of a presidential rule devoid of any parliamentary or democratic check and balances. It is actually the point where the fascisation prevails over any authoritarian restructuring of the state. The ruler in that sense should make a solid source of political power out of its mass consent. While the authoritarian state structures like the military's preponderant role in Turkish politics became politically more loyal to the presidency, the AKP and MHP coalition were very careful in terms of preventing any 'concentration of political power' in any state institutions and any kind of autonomy in state affairs. That is the point where the any authoritarian re-consolidation of political power seems to be improbable. The attempt to locate the political legitimacy more in the mass structures in a direct relationship to the presidency shaped the political strategy of the coalition. While the capital accumulation in control of the presidency through public procurements that are delivered to the 'big business' being politically and economically tied to the existence of the presidency reached to the unprecedented levels (Medyascope, 14.12.2020), special agencies within the state like the 'Department of Religious Affairs' and 'Department of Communication' directly accountable for the presidency began

to assume political roles that are unproportionate to their previous role in the bureaucracy. The propaganda in conventional media and social media and mass indoctrination through religious organisations was exercised by these new institutions that are now perhaps a more valuable asset for the new state when compared to ,for instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the same vein, the effect of the ‘religious sects’ in the Islamisation of the education (Birgun, 21.10.2019) and a variety of ‘seemingly education-related ‘associations’ that are directly in charge of the presidency, financed by its new economic elite and exempted from the financial control of the state institutions (Birgun, 14.10.2019) were another source of social and political power. These new institutional configuration is a typical indication of parallel power networks outside the formal state institutions. Actually, it is a development of a ‘state within state’ that is special characteristics of a fascisation process. It is not simply signifying ‘illegal activities of the state’ that are ultimately subject to the authoritarian structures of the state (Green and Ward, 2004) which were very common in the recent political history of Turkey but indices of a wholesale restructuring of the state and society in a counter-revolutionary manner that gives a preponderant role to the mass anchorage of the political domination.

The same process is directly relevant to re-organisation of security forces. In order to strengthen a mass legitimacy for the new state outside the traditional state forces but in collaboration with them, there is an attempt to legitimise the role of ‘auxiliary forces’ that are in touch with the mass basis of the governing coalition. The law of ‘Wardens’ (Diken,05.06.2020) that are local security forces as an auxiliary force to the police, the indications of ‘armament of AKP supporters’ after the failed military coup d’etat (Sol Haber, 29.09.2016) and the re-activation of the ‘Ülkü Ocakları’ which was the paramilitary forces of MHP in the 1970’s as seen in the physical attack on the CHP’s opposition leader (Sol Haber, 24.04.2019), the physical attacks on oppositional party cadres (Sozcu, 10.02.2021), on the ‘leftist parliamentarians’ (Baris Atay, 31 August 2020), on the press members (Birgun, 26.03.2021) and the killing of one office worker in

HDP's İzmir Office (BBC News, 18 July 2021) are recent appearances of the political violence which continues to be regularised.

Surely, the paramilitary violence exercised through the Hindutva ideology of the Modi Government is harsher and more explicit compared to the cases of Hungary and Turkey. Particularly, the political violence inspired by the 'Hindutva ideology' that is the most extreme form of Hindu nationalism has a long history in India. "1984 persecution of the Sikhs in Delhi, 2002 massacre of the Muslims in Gujarat, 2008 killings of the Christians Odisha" were examples of the attacks of the Hindu nationalism on the religious minorities (Akbar, 2020:227). Under the government of Modi, this situation is aggravated by the hate rhetoric of the government and its turning blind-eye to the communal violence, indeed its stirring of such violent scenes. The Human Rights watch emphasised on the intensification of these events in 2019 mainly triggered by the pretext of 'defending the faith of the people by 'protecting the cows and put out that a 'culture of impunity' has been created by the favorable of treatment of the perpetrators by the state forces (Shida, 2020:63). These acts of violence can not simply be treated as 'spontaneous'. The organisations embracing the Hindutva ideology, particularly the grass-roots mass movement RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) that has organic links with the BJP government and the Bajrang Dal which is a radical Hindu nationalist groups having paramilitary units are also active in provoking the communal violence (Sangh Parivar is the sum of the all Hindu-nationalist groups affiliated with Hindutva). Apart from the tolerance and support of the security forces in relation to these events, Banaji (2018) mentions about the emergence of 'vigilante public' which is also prone to regard the 'violence against the Muslims and Dalits (poor, lowest caste Hindus)' as justified as the public also increasingly tends to see the 'violent mobs' as the 'victims of provocation' and 'defenders of the faith'. Banaji (2018:337) argues that "it is the fascist consciousness of the 'vigilante public' that is called upon and mobilised by the BJP in its attempt to secure electoral victory and immunity from all charges". While this kind of political violence around the religious/ethnic divides is primarily aimed at the strengthening of the reactionary

mass base of the movements, it was also employed against all the political opponents in broadest term to compel them to make an ‘either/or’ decision on the issue of being stigmatised as ‘defending the Muslims’ or not. The constant reference of the fascism to the distinction between the ‘national’ and ‘unnational’ or ‘terrorist/anti-terrorist’ groups is also conducive to the political strategy of the state to paralyse the political opposition and present it as antagonistic to the ‘national/religious cause.

As far as the political violence is concerned, the Hungarian case seems to be less radical in terms of a constant paramilitary violence. It is evident that the rise of the Jobbik party, far-right nationalist party having a paramilitary unit, ‘Hungarian Guard’ in the end of 2000’s had a sweeping effect on the Fidesz party in power to adapt far-rightist policies to counter-act the rising trend of Jobbik. In its foundation, Jobbik has incorporated anti-Roma and anti-Semitist elements into its discourse, it also had an anti-systemic approach that frequently used the social demagoguery to lure the poor and the marginalised Hungarian into a ‘nationalist coverage of the social question’. In a familiar manner to any successful fascist party, this discourse is directed against “‘multinational enterprises, foreign banks, financial institutions, and the European Union and the post-communist domestic businesses” (Kreko and Majer, 2015:193). Seemingly, we could say that the Fidesz began to steal the role of the Jobbik and steered towards more far-rightist policies that would strengthen its mass basis. However, this issue does not seem that simple. Fidesz increasingly took that route as the main vehicle of ‘extending its power base’ in the population and willingly constructed its political legitimacy in such an ethnically exclusive, xenophobic and anti-democratic discourse and combine it with the state violence. This turn of Fidesz was not simply a tactic to take the wind out of the Jobbik’s sail but a long-term strategy to solidify its mass support. From the 2015 onwards, while the Jobbik began to shift to the centre-right ideologically, Fidesz grew closer to the far-right-induced policies that began to draw out the main characteristic of Fidesz’s policy making (Kreko and Majer, 2015:193).

The case in question for us is how Fidesz has utilised the ‘problem of migrants and refugees’ from 2015 on to manipulate its public through its xenophobic statements and resort to state violence especially through sharpening the border controls and creating detention centers on the Serbian border. The main motto of the government’s anti-immigration policy that was marketised in the media was to ‘defend European Christian culture from outside cultures, mainly ones of the Muslims and attribute such a leading role to the Hungarian nation in this ‘sacred’ fight. As against the ‘quota system’ that was promoted by the European Union to handle the refugee crisis, in 2016 Orban government fiercely advocated no toleration against the refugees to defend the ‘Hungarian and European national, cultural and religious identity’. The ‘Referandum on migrants’ conducted in 2016 was also indicating Fidesz’s desire to extend its mass appeal through its harsh anti-immigration policies (Ilikova, 2020:326). Though one can not speak of ‘a considerable Muslim minority’ in Hungary, a cultural demonisation of the asylum-seekers began to gain ground in public. According to (Kreko *et.al*, 2019), Fidesz endorsed the anti-immigration to restructure the authoritarian state further and through the divide between the government’s policies and the EU, the government portrayed itself as the sole defender of the nation while tried to discard any criticism against the government policies as ‘un-national’, ‘pro-European’ or ‘collaborationist’. This divide actually paid off and the anti-immigration campaign boosted its popular support from 24 per cent in March 2015 to the 38 percent in January 2019 (Kreko *et.al*, 2019). It is interesting to denote that the violence exercised through ‘hate-speeches’ and the demonisation of the Roma population or refugees goes hand in hand with the public ‘acceptance’ of the violent approach to those groups as a legitimate self-defense. Thus, the criminalisation of the minorities justifies any violent intervention on the side of the state or far-right social groups or communities. Although the paramilitary forces in Hungary are not as strong as it is in the case of India, national community-based justifications of political violence have also an undeniable effect on the mass spread of the reactionary feelings. The political groups such as Jobbik, Our Homeland (which represents Jobbik-originated cadre rejecting the moderate turn in Jobbik) and ‘Identity Generation’ underlines the incompatibility

of the Muslim culture and Christian culture, foster the anti-Roma and anti-refugee feelings among the masses and already carry seeds of ‘political violence’ that is affirmed by the transforming political culture and state policies (Kreko et.al, 2019)

8.4.3. Capitalism and Right-Wing Populism

The relationship between fascism and capitalism has always been a contested issue. Some saw ‘direct rule of the bourgeoisie’ in the fascism according to which the former simply instrumentalised the latter from the beginning to further its interests. Some scholars like Tim Mason (1996) emphasised the ‘autonomy of the political’ against the business interests. Surely, there were many political elements particularly in National Socialism such as a nationalism combined with the racial configuration of the society, militarist/nationalist goals stemming from the anger of the Versailles Treaty or the specific ambitions of the fascist party having a middle class origin in ‘grasping the state power’. We cannot simply assume that all these particular goals were a mere product of a over-arching plan of the capitalists. However, we can speak of an alliance that at one historical moment led to the convergence of interests of the fascist and big capital in Germany. As we have stated in the fifth chapter, the first common denominator was the ‘fear of the political left’ and the need to destruct all the trade unions, political organisations of the working class and democratic institutional framework that were always a social barrier to the limitless expansion of the capitalism. The NSDAP in that sense accomplished its mission in a perfect way that cleared the path of the capitalists by making the labour politically defenseless against the continuing and increasing impact of the capitalists on the policy making. Secondly, in the regime phase, the economic policies were designed in a way that gave impetus to the centralisation and expansion of the monopolistic powers of the big capital. Before coming into power, the NSDAP had already purged the seemingly socialist elements within the party that might have posed a threat to the interests of the business. Although there were some anti-capitalist and ‘middle class’ aspirations of the NSDAP in its propaganda

activities, they to a large extent remained unfulfilled. Thirdly, the labour policies of the NSDAP served first for the 'atomisation of the workforce' and then for the 'nationalisation' of working class ideals in a new institutional structure that was dedicated to the 'naturalisation' of social inequalities as an 'inevitable' result of market relations. The NSDAP was highly specialised in disciplining the workforce in a vision of 'productive community' that embodied the nationalist and capitalist elements in a harmonious manner. The ambition of the construction of a national community at the expense of the racially aliens provided the necessary legitimacy to the capitalist social relations that also stigmatise and exclude the 'unproductive' and 'the undeserving'. Racialising social inequalities was a way of absorbing the anti-capitalist reactions which had been caused by the economic depression and structural unemployment and steering them into acceptable, reliable and secure channels when looked from the perspective of the general interests of the capitalist class.

Surely, the rise of fascism and its subsequent economic policies were also an answer to the crisis of capitalism in the inter-war years that was mainly achieved by more protectionism, autarky, the strengthening of the national monopoly capitals and a strict adherence to the imperialist/militarist expansion. The case of National Socialism showed us that the re-structuring of the capitalist relations was coupled with the huge public programmes exclusively focused on the stimulation of the armament industry as a way of solving internal economic problems like economic stagnation, discontent of the labour and the widespread unemployment. We shouldn't lose sight of the specific historical context that made fascism as an option to the capitalist crisis that had already eliminated the options of class compromise or collaboration of imperialist powers in a transnational scale. However, all in all, it was a product of a crisis situation that had both political and economic foundations, namely the political crisis of liberal democracy and the crisis of market society that put its stamp on the economic liberalism and aims of international economic integration rooted in the Weimar democracy. Similar trajectories of political and economic crisis are discernable today though fascist tendencies as an alternative are not still phenomena

absolutely decided by the national and global elites. Currently, we are living in an environment of still on-going process of globalisation within which its discontents were becoming more and more apparent. It is a 'structural crisis of capitalism, economic instability, deepening social antagonisms (class, race, gender) and identity panic (Pelhata, 2021). In the 1970's and 1980's, according to Streeck (2016:79), there appeared a transformation from the post-war Keynesian economic policies to the hegemony of the neoliberalism that took a form of transition from a political formula for economic growth "redistribution from top to bottom, to one expecting growth through redistribution from bottom to the top". In this process, the regression of trade unions and moderate left as the integral part of the system was the result of the neoliberal policy making that praised the ideals of competitiveness, productivity and efficiency on their own terms in a way of making redundant the systemic or anti-systemic expression of egalitarian democracy. The disintegration of the working class organisations is a given fact now after years of neo-liberal policy making. However, there appeared a legitimacy crisis of the neo-liberalism itself symbolised by the constant economic crises like 2008 financial crisis, the low rates of economic growth, the structural unemployment, rising public debts and above all widening economic inequalities made the reception of the neo-liberal discourse by the masses increasingly unpopular. According to Streeck (2016:86), "in contrast to the 1930's, there is today no political formula on the horizon, Left and Right, that might provide capitalist societies with a coherent new regime of regulation". Some scholars such Traverso (2019) and Schmidt (2020) claims that the new ascendancy of the right-wing populism though its increasing mass base is not able to receive consent from the global economic elite in a dissimilar way that had occurred in the inter-war era. Schmidt (2020:66-67) asserts that "the dominant factions of the capital are far from seeking an alliance with the new right and its mass support basis to consolidate the counter revolutionary victories" since at the face of the lack of a leftist challenge, they do not see a reason for such an alliance. Additionally, some tenets of the right-wing populism like the protectionist discourse against the adverse effects of globalisation and deepening xenophobic social trends are found inimical to the neo-liberal social

project. According to this view, instead of seeking an alternative, the re-enforcement of the same neo-liberal policies in a technocratic fashion still seems more viable to the global elite. Again Traverso (2019) emphasises on the de-stabilising trend of rise of the right in terms of its uncertainties arisen from its mass mobilisation as the reason for the disapproval of the ruling classes. In contrast to these views, there is an extending literature on the relation of the capitalism with the ‘contemporary fascism’. David Harvey (2019) in a report argues that “neo-liberalism could not survive without entering into alliance with state authoritarianism. It now is moving towards an alliance with neo-fascism because as we see from all the protest movement around the world, everyone sees neo-liberalism is about lining the pockets of the rich at the expense of the rich”. Robinson (2011:4) views the ‘neo-fascist insurgency’ as a popular alternative aiming to disguise the growing economic inequalities and give a mass base to the repressive, security-based commodification exercised by military/industrial/financial complex by ‘fusing the transnational capital with reactionary political power’.

Given the de-stabilising potentialities of fascism towards capitalism, its advantages in terms of retaining ‘political and economic order’ clearly outweighed its ‘disorderly effects’ in the 1930’s that had been seen as governable. (We do not use the term the ‘neo-fascism’ in its own right as it makes us concentrate solely on the movements having ‘a clear fascist programme and organisation’ that are quite similar to the fascist parties of 1930’s. However, we propose that today’s fascist tendencies are primarily lurked in the ‘far-right’ and ‘right-wing populism’ that are coming closer to and also re-shaping the mainstream society). In that sense, the ‘fascisation’ process put into effect by the right-wing populist movements and regimes reveals close affinities between neo-liberalism and right-wing populism regarding their political mentality and policy guidelines.

From the earlier experiences in a range of Latin American countries, we already know that the ‘authoritarianism’ or ‘the military dictatorships’ had provided the

most appropriate environments for the introduction of the neo-liberal policies by repressive forces that have been directed against all the leftist forces that could pose a real friction to the capital accumulation. Thus, authoritarian governments were not something external to the discourse of the neo-liberal policy making. Hayek, while touching upon the conflictual relations between liberalism and democracy, was justifying the necessity of an “authoritarianism compatible with a liberal society” that has to be steered into policies that would maintain ‘the respect for private property, gender norms and other traditional beliefs’ for a ‘free, moral and orderly’ society (Brown, 2019:72-3 and p.85). In this society, while freedom was simply reduced to ‘being an entrepreneur’, the references made to the traditional norms of the society, to ‘the society as it is’, were pointing at an attempt to making the social inequalities invisible and uncritically accepting the ‘religious, national or gender’ prejudices as the ‘given facts’ of traditional society. The democratic attempts at the ‘economic equality’ and in corollary to this, emancipatory efforts to transform the so-called ‘traditional values of the society’ were simply erased from the neo-liberal political agenda. In Brown’s words (2019:75-6), “by de-democratising the state and removing it from equality business, not only markets but commonly held principles of a people from racial norms to religious ones may be legitimately protected from state interference”. Surely, it was not only about state policies but about a general naturalisation of the ‘society as it is’ and the market transactions in a way of making the ‘community norms’ and economic freedoms of the individuals co-extensive. Interestingly, the same mechanism operated in classical fascism and right-wing extremism. The ‘social question’ and its exacerbating situation was completely discarded by referring to ‘one organic nation’ which was deemed to be devoid of any ‘socio-economic divides and contradictions’. A concept of the nation with harmonious relations within itself necessarily excluded all the democratic struggles relating to the social field. The end of the ‘social’ as in the case neo-liberalism co-opted with the end of the political. Although nowadays right-wing populist movements present themselves as the ‘repoliticisation’ of the masses as against the technocratic neo-liberal actors, in fact it seems to be a political resetting of de-politicisation. As Müller (2016:81)

said, in populists, we observe a ‘kind of final claim, a kind of closure’ where the will and identity of the people is not questioned at all. Thus, ‘democracy’ in this variant is simply the reflection of this will as a whole onto the state where any other democratic participation which requires pluralism and diversification of interests was totally ruled out. On the other side, not simply the protection of ‘traditional values of the society’ but the sublimation of them is preferred by the right-wing populists as if these values can not be interfered with and made the subject of democratic politics. Thus, the ‘market man’ could have easily be made compatible with the ‘reactionary man’ as long as they are both hostile to any emancipatory effort targeting the social and political transformation of the society. The inherent passivity of the individuals and political collectivities in the name of the nation and the market is what both right-wing populism and neo-liberalism aim at as the ultimate end of politics.

On the other side, we have observed before that ‘the National Socialists praised the capitalist virtues like ‘work’ as a means of creating a disciplined, hard-working and apolitical workforce. It has been maintained by the isolation and extermination of the ‘racial’ and ‘social’ others which gave a further impetus to strengthen the feeling of the national community among the masses. This tenet of fascism was not only the result of its middle class origins which was much more inclined than any other class to embrace such ideas but also a strategy to divide the working class along the racial lines and prevent its potential will to unite around the terms of social inequality. Nowadays, at the face of welfare cut-backs, the spread of the insecure and precarious jobs and structural unemployment, we again face with a ‘disarray’ of the working classes in terms of building up united political collectivities. According to the Robinson (2011), as a result of current capitalist accumulation,

Displacement and exclusion has accelerated since 2008. The system has abandoned broad sectors of humanity, who are caught in a deadly circuit of accumulation-exploitation-exclusion. The system does not even to incorporate this surplus population, but rather tries to isolate and neutralise its real and potential rebellion, criminalising the poor and the dispossessed with tendencies towards genocide in some cases.

Thus, alongside the regression of the working class organisations and its political consciousness, there is also the issue of 'racialised' and 'ethnicised' forms of labour market exclusion that were overtly stigmatised by both neo-liberal social policies and 'right-wing populist discourse of welfare chauvinism. Hosking (2019:306-7) ascertains that there are two types of people in our globalised world. One is 'Marktvolk' (Market people) that are 'anywhere' people which are mostly integrated into global market flawlessly. Another one is 'Staatsvolk' that are 'somewhere people' which are in reality politically and economically oppressed but endorsed a 'decent populist logic' as a means of declaring its political support for the system while still suffering from poverty, socio-economic inequalities and insecurities. We have to add to the schematic view of global population, another type: The real others, the ones in nowhere, having no home or work, the totally de-territorialised people who are the ethnically cursed, socio-economically excluded and politically silenced ones.

Originally, the National Socialist movement primarily relied on the 'middle class' support that lived in a constant fear of 'becoming a proletarian' at the face of economic crises and inflationary booms. However, the mass consent given to the NSDAP was not only the result of the material deprivations but also the reflections of the fear of the loss of social status among the wider segments of the population including the civil servants, white collar workers or disorganised segments of the working class. Although the blue-collar workers having a left trade union history and a previous engagement in the SPD or KPD organisation were to some extent resistant to the nationalist propaganda of the NSDAP, their neutralisation and passification were eventually maintained by the NSDAP. The NSDAP was skillful in the mobilisation of the economic discontent not against the capitalism itself, but against the supposedly 'Jewish-originated financial capital' at the top and against the racial/religious others including the Jews, the Jehova witnesses, the gypsies and the political opponents having a communist or social democrat origins at the bottom.

Today's right wing populists are applying a similar strategy though the 'enemy' actors have differed a little bit from the ones seen in the classical fascism. They are trying to appeal to the feelings of the insecurity and anxiety among the middle classes that are positioned "as being squeezed by both the "ruling elite or global corporatists (often liberal, secular) and the undeserving poor (those on welfare, ethnic scapegoats)" (Wilson, 2020:39). We have to add to this middle class base, a 'racialised/ethnicised working class' that had suffered from patterns of disorganisation already created by the neo-liberal policies that lasted decades long without facing with a viable left alternative. The precarious and flexible jobs becoming the rule in the labour markets created a constant pressure on the relatively secure segments working class. In addition to that, there appeared a fragile population swinging back and forth between the social assistance schemes and instable jobs. Actually, besides the middle classes, these segments are also within the target of the right-wing populist movements which continuously connects 'the economic inequalities' and social discontent to the foreigners, mostly to immigrants and refugees and constructs a nationalist or religious based attachments (for instance white supremacist discourse in USA) for the 'insecure populations'. Given the continuous erosion of social solidarity patterns among the different segments of the working class, it is becoming easier for the right-wing populists to deepen the already existing social divides and displace the real source of the social protest embedded in the capitalist socio-economic relations. Even among the poor that primarily rests on the social assistance, the racist/nationalist/religious prejudices can easily flourish as an indication of their allegiance to the 'mainstream society', as a way of lessening the impact of their poverty which is found as 'a crime' by the neo-liberals by being a part of national community. Actually, in this condition the poverty becomes something governable, something to be endured by the poor, given the 'naturalised' laws of the markets and the popular expectations of an eventual relief in community feelings.

While the National Socialist employed 'anti-capitalist sentiments' to come to power but forgot its main promises by entering into alliance with big capitalists,

it was the internal political weakness of the working classes that made the passive or active acceptance of 'populist discourses' co-existing with the policies that directly run counter to the interests of the masses. It is not coincidence that the Hungarian right-wing populist leader presented himself 'as a modern Robin Hood' fighting against 'Brussels, Hungarian human rights NGO's, George Soros and other inner enemies while introducing economic policies that are not challenging the neo-liberal status quo (Antal, 2019:156). Orban intended to construct the 'autocracy within the neoliberal framework' by creating a viable environment for the multinational corporations through state aid and very low corporate tax. These neo-liberal tendencies matched with a new Labour Act that was committed to the creation of a workfare society, retreat of the trade union rights, retrenchment of the welfare state entitlement particularly the unemployment insurance (Antal, 2019:172-4). When the right-wing populists talks of 'the national', most of time they are referring to building up new big national companies working closely with the government in conformity with global rules of the game. The same trend is observable in Turkey where governmental initiatives were mostly used to strengthen a couple of national big capitalists particularly in the construction sector, while the social and labour market policies are strictly tied to the neo-liberal orthodoxy in favour of 'the flexibility, insecurity and deregulation'. Trump in the same way adopted a strategy of criticising the specific actors of global financial capital staying away from an understanding of questioning the capitalism itself. He and his team intended to revive the real spirit of the 'free enterprise' (Wilson, 2020:40), while feeding among the masses 'the nostalgia for the image of a moment, that of the post-war affluence of 'trente glorieuses' for a racialised and gendered image of the socially-recognised patriotic industrial workers' (Toscano, 2017). In this vision, it is not the free market that causes the frictions in capitalism but the 'irresponsible' transnational actors per se. Actually, the nationalist, protectionist and anti-globalisation rhetoric of the European right should also be treated cautiously since they simply complained about the 'unjust results of globalisation' by misusing the leftist rhetoric whereas they are clearly hostile to

the real attempts of eliminating social inequalities or promoting social solidarity patterns impervious to the nationalist formulations.

If we look at our three examples of the right-wing populist government in terms of their stance regarding the contemporary capitalism, the similarities between them are striking. To summarise them, we could count following points.

Firstly, Turkish, Indian and Hungarian governments came into power with the help of the social discontents with the results of the neoliberal policies that were governed by 'liberal-left governments' or mainstream right-wing governments. However, instead of leaning on a policy with redistributive aims or social reformist policies, they chose to act within the neoliberal framework and did not divert from pro-business stance but their originality resided in their rejection of 'neoliberal regulation institutions such as a variety of the 'independent public institutions' that are entrusted with the implementation of the structural market reforms (Boratav, 2021:57). Such a mechanism was primarily structured to give priority to the transactions of the transnational capital whose exclusive interests could clash with the domestic bourgeoisie. It is also proven that these policies are highly unpopular in terms of their results in the voter preferences in the elections. Thus, an agenda of pure neo-liberalism has the very capacity to lead to the widespread social protests among the popular classes.

In terms of the 'public policy', they are inherently averse to the public policies that are exercised indiscriminately even if in a neoliberal framework. Mainly, there are two objects of the economic and social policies: to give rise to the small and middle sized firms and 'domestic' capital that are economically tied to the opportunities created by the government. These policies are essentially not in contradiction with the prerequisites of the transnational capital, in contrast, the governments took a conciliatory role between different fractions of capital. As for the relations of the government to the dominated classes, we observed a trend of dividing the possibilities of the solidarity between different parts of the working class and middle classes. In a manner of reminiscent of the strategies of

the fascist parties, they insistently tried to convert the conceptualisation of social inequalities and poverty, the outcomes of long-lasting neoliberal policies in an 'ethnic and religious' terms. It has nothing to do with a constructive will to remove these problems but asserted an inclusionary rhetoric for 'politically and ethnically/religiously engaged' parts of the dominated classes to integrate them into its power network. It is not a nation-based or public response to the social question but a reinforcement of a 'national/religious community' based on social assistance and protection. The 'unemployed', the 'poor' or the 'disadvantaged' segments as such has no meaning for the government in its policy priorities. What is decisive is the anchorage of the quasi-public policies in its strict mass base and the common perception of the economic and social policies while the citizens claiming for welfare rights or asserting their democratic rights and freedoms are strictly out of agenda even within a neoliberal framework.

We have to add that the movements that stand behind the relevant governments are ideologically flourished in the Cold War era. Their position was strictly anti-socialist which meant being strictly against 'national independence-based semi-socialist' states of the Third World which were entering into 'non-capitalist' modern planning experiences. In dependent capitalist countries, these movements were in cooperation with the 'reactionary, feudal' economic classes. Reform attempts of the socialist or center-left governments were objected by the defenders of 'economic status-quo' that are ideologically supported these religious/'nationalist' movements. Interestingly, the issue of 'economic independence' in its strict sense of the term and an 'anti-imperialist stance' was anathema to these movements. Most of the time, in order to counteract the structure of 'nationalist and secular' sides of the domestic regimes, they were eager to collaborate with the imperialist ambitions of the Western countries. Thus, their 'anti-systemic' image that they have developed later on was not referring to a substantial content apart from its rhetorical and populist objectives. In the Indian case, throughout the 70's and the 80's, we have witnessed the introduction of the globalisation of the economy. In the 1960's, the Green Revolution under the leadership of Gandhi relied on a model of the co-existence

of the 'Private Sector' and 'Public Sector' that carried a modern planning stance for industrialisation. However, with the on-set of the 1980's, the investments in the 'Public Sector' declined, the sub-contraction and de-centralisation of the production gained ground while the unity of working class and its political organisation gradually began to decline. It was also a period of high unemployment and precarisation of the work conditions (Puniyani, 2013:38). While the working class was marginalising through a process of de-industrialisation and the spread of small production units, an affluent middle class was emerging that would constitute the social base of the Sangh Parivar and later of BJP. Regarding the globalisation, there were two trends among the factions of the capital. One was 'the liberal capitalists' which were more or less adapted to the new global production networks and which may tolerate 'liberal and democratic values' but in a way of 'eroding the worker's rights'. Second fraction was a growing domestic bourgeoisie that are not principally against the globalisation but favouring 'protecting' policies in terms of global integration. In this stage, while the latter discursively promoted 'swadeshi' (self-development of the domestic bourgeoisie in smaller units outside the effect of the foreign capital resorted to in the national independence process), it was not 'national protectionist policies' what they cried for but finding 'public channels' to strengthen the domestic capital. What is interesting is the working conditions of the proletariat was very harsh in this so-called 'swadeshi's (Puniyani, 2013:38). These sectors were also highly permeated by the 'pre-modern social hierarchies' and were discontented with the 'liberal and democratic values'. The originality of the Sang Parivar that began to take stronghold in these sectors stemmed from its providing an alternative to regulate the 'dominated classes' and incorporate them into the power network of the Hindu Rashtra on a communal basis.

Formerly, the workers movement in India was organised through communists and expectedly they were in favour of criticising and transforming large social inequalities that are both a result of the capitalist relations and rigid social caste system. As the political movement of the working class began to fade away in the 1980's, the communal religious groups began to infiltrate into the ranks of

the working class whose picture seemed much more scattered. 'Bharatiya Majdoor Sangh' as a labour organisation was founded by the BJP to provide an alternative 'employer-employee' relation to the leftist conflictual approach. In that sense, BMS tried to 'cultivate harmonious relations' between the labour and capital, did not problematise the dismal working conditions in swadeshi's and functioned like the 'arm of the management'. Threats of the closure was used by industrialists to undermine any wage bargaining from the start and dissipate the unity of unions (Puniyani, 2013:54). This typical stance in favour of the capitalists were tried to be mitigated by the propagation of a communal identity which would supposedly erode 'class conflicts' or make them 'invisible'. The conception of the caste system by the Sangh Parivar and its attitude toward 'dalits' (belonging to the lowest stratum of caste system called as 'untouchables') is indicative of how Sangh Parivar re-formulated the social question.

Whereas the Sangh Parivar stands for the interests of the 'upper social castes', it is prone to embrace a rhetoric of all embracing social force that discards the caste differences and backs up for the formal equality. By ignoring the caste differences, the Sangh Parivar also endeavours to lose sight of the actual caste-based social inequalities and disguise the physical/social attacks on 'dalits'. Instead, the movement tries to substitute the 'unifying communal identity' for the caste conflicts. The political strategy of Sangh Parivar is the employment of the 'unity of Hindus' as the only solution to the socio-economic inequalities. Accordingly, the defenders of the movement advocate the idea that the current situation of the dalits did not stem from the 'caste system' or systemic social contradictions but from the Muslim invasion that destructed 'the harmonious social relations within the homogenous Hindu nation (Puniyana, 2013:60-1). Thus, in this way they explicitly rechannelled the social anger of the dalits against the upper castes into the communal hatred against Muslims. Ambedkar who stood for the democratic rights and freedoms of dalits criticised the caste system not on the ground of the religion but promoted the freedom quite in secular terms. Thus, the emphasis on the caste system could be a key to the emancipatory projects whose reference point is socio-economic disparities. In

contrast to that, BJP emphasised on the priority of communal solidarity to 'appease' the discontent of the lower castes.

The same mechanism of 'de-coupling' of the working class interest from its political organisation' and 'religious reformulation of social problems was experienced in Turkey throughout last four decades. Initially, in the 1960's and 1970's first Islamist party MSP (National Welfare Party) was mainly representing a part of the Anatolian bourgeoisie that is ideologically conservative in nature. Although this bourgeoisie did seem to be contrasting with the Istanbul based bourgeoisie in a strong relationship with the international capital, their representatives were not providing an 'anti-systemic' alternative to the economic status quo. In contrast, they were a part of reactionary economic forces that were voiced by the center-right political parties (Avcioğlu, 1981:218-9). However, particularly after the 1980 military intervention, the effect of the trade unions and leftist parties on the working class was seriously hindered. Although there was a partial revival of the left political scene, it did not culminate in the constitution of a meaningful political subject covering the demands of the working class and the urban poor. Since in the 1980's the religious sects, communities and parties began to strengthen their hold in the civil society to a great extent due to the 'favourable treatment' by the government and junta leaders, they also accomplished to extend their influence to the working class ranks in urban ghettos (Boratav, 2021:20). Especially from the beginnings of the 1990's, the protest against the destructive effects of the neoliberal policies was asserted in religious formulas particularly in the populist rhetoric of Islamist Welfare Party (RP). The Welfare Party's campaign of 'fair order' was hijacking a lot from the leftist phraseology to attract the urban poor into the orbit of the party. According to the party, 'the fair order' will replace the 'slave order' that the people are living in, within the fair order, there would not be no 'interest', no 'unfair taxation', no instability of the prices. Supposedly, the fair order will "prevent inflation, increase production and abolish unemployment" (Çınar, 2021:215). Actually, it was evident that without a structural transformation of relations of production, such a project with desired results was not realisable. However, the

positive ‘popular’ effect of these promises was seen in municipality election in 1994. This strategy reminds us of the NSDAP’s ‘pseudo-anti-systemic’ stance against the political and economic elite of the Weimar Republic. In a similar manner, the Welfare Party essentially had no objection to the free market economy or capitalist relations but to their ‘unfair social outcomes’. Even the sincerity of their emphasis on the social justice was quite debatable. For instance, the MUSIAD (Islamist business organisation) invented a term of ‘Homo Islamicus’ which subscribes to the market rationality and free market without any economic reservation with the aim of creating a ‘Green Civilisation’. According to it, to found an Islamic society with regard to the prescriptions of religious morality and rules, the Muslims should play the rules of the game and should be ‘competitive’ in every field of life. Thus, the ‘sacred’ objective justifies all the evils of market and the cultural and moral re-arrangement of the society would eliminate all the vicissitudes of the market society (Çınar, 2021:234). This ‘Muslim bourgeoisie is strictly against the strikes and independent trade unions and it presupposes that ‘there is no material conflict between the employer and the employee’ (Çınar, 2021:238). According to it, the employee should suffice with its economic lot, praise the work as it is and further the interests of the business owned by the Muslims (Akdağ, 2011:69-70). In this sense, ‘Homo Islamicus’ did not provide an alternative model but a new form of legitimization of the capitalist social relations (Akdağ, 2011:68; Çınar, 2021:239). During the AKP period, this discourse has been fully endorsed by the government. Additionally, the class inequalities/conflicts were converted into the domain of cultural clashes between the ‘secular, Western, elitist’ owners of the state and the ‘victimised’ Muslim majority. Indeed, the AKP government even though it followed aggressive neoliberal policies in the form of ‘privatisation, de-unionisation and marketisation of the social policy’, it acted like an ‘political opposition’ that pretend to be revealing the ‘anti-systemic’ demands of the ‘oppressed Muslims’. The social assistance policies that tailored to the poor was not thought as ‘right-based entitlements of the citizens’ but as the reinforcement of the religious community based solidarity having the special stamp of the AKP.

Orban governments' rising popularity was also greatly a reaction on the side of the workers and middle classes to the two decades of neoliberal policies. During this time, the indebtedness of the households rised, "the access to public services, subsidised company and trade union holidays were no longer available, social housing was destroyed, worker's hostels were abolished, local cultural and sports clubs were closed down" (Sheiring, 2020:5-6) The Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) with his neo-liberal approach during the alliance with the Liberals have completely lost its appeal among the working classes. 'The drift of the working classes' towards Fidesz and Jobbik has inevitably contributed to the strenghtening of the Orban government. Even though the social inequalities explicitly grew, the conditions of the health care worsened, the business-favouring policies boosted, the cultural framing of the 'social anger' in the demonisation of the EU, transnational NGO's, ethnic minorities and migrants had also a damming effect on the social solidarities based on class location. Sheiring (2020:11) asserts that "institutional authoritarianism is aimed at pre-empting organised dissent by political parties, trade unions and NGO's, while authoritarian populism reframes distributive grievance into cultural hierarchies to hinder the emergence of a broad social coalition among the material losers of illiberalism".

Yıldızoğlu (2021: 78-82) points out that in the face of the growing crisis of the global capitalism, some countries like Russia, China and Iran prefers to opt for more protectionist policies that reminds us of a route towards state capitalism. Although there could be traces of stimulating the national production, hence inclining towards protectionist policies, it is still questionable whether it signifies a decisive turn from the neo-liberal agendas. If we look at our cases of Turkey, India and Hungary, we observe that a 'deepening' of neoliberalism with a kind of 'plundering economies' that completely left aside the 'regulated forms of neoliberalism'. Corruption, clientelism and the co-operation of the state officials and the rent-seeking business class without any notion of public policy or economic planning is paving way for a kind of 'savageification of the ruling classes' that prefer to disguise the growing income inequalities, widespread

poverty and unemployment by national/religious type of demonisation of the political dissidents, ethnic minorities etc.. The supposed dichotomies between the ‘national’ bourgeoisie and ‘transnational’ bourgeoisie does not hold true in our cases. Despite its ‘nationalist discourse’ against EU, the Hungarian economy is largely dependent on the EU transfers and the investments of the transnational capital particularly of German origin. The government fosters its ‘oligarchic national bourgeoisie’ in this framework (Szombati, 2018). The Modi government’s economic policy in line with the priorities of the big business subscribed to ‘deregulation of private businesses, privatisation of government businesses, granting of permission to foreign capital to own businesses in India, enactment of tax cuts and other incentives for businesses, reduction and complete withdrawal of government benefits for the poor’’ (Das, 2015). The economic growth project depending on the construction and domestic consumption is way of ‘speedy and easy’ enrichment in correlation to the spending of the ‘public resources into these projects’. It has an effect of ‘influencing the mass base of the AKP’ and a ‘redistributive effect in its own political and socio-economic network (Ekinici, 2021:270). However, regarding huge social inequalities and poverty it has produced, the ambition of the exclusion of the popular classes from the decision-making process seems to be endemic to any fascisation process. In this context, the consent of the bourgeoisie, national or not, to this process is an important ingredient in the form that the state transformation process takes. Authoritarian settings of the neoliberal policy making processes are well-known, however, the question of whether it would evolve into a policy stance that would totally reverse the gainings of the working classes and create an ‘exceptional’ state form in a fascist setting is still an on-going debate.

8.4.4. New Mass Faces of Fascism: National/Religious Communities

Fascism could not be conceived simply as the direct rule of the bourgeoisie or the implementation of a political programme of a fascist party without giving reference to the mass roots of the fascism, i.e. the materialisation of reactionary

thinking within the society. The fascist discourse carefully and successfully worked out the already existent nationalist/religious prejudices and gave a political form to them by organising a form of politicisation that depended on the incessant use of the 'traditional values of the society. The patriarchal family, the male domination over the women who are excessively restricted to its mother role in the family, sexual repression have always been critical points on which fascists constructed the bases of their cultural politics. These features coupled with processes of 'social subjugation' where the freedom and creativity of the individual and collectively the democratic potentiality of the masses were castrated by the repressive social mentalities and institutions that required the individual sacrifice in the form of the annihilation of the individuality and the longing of some segments of the society for an 'overarching authority', be it the God, the leader or the state as the savior of the people. The spread of the fascist thinking is necessarily related to the processes of giving up 'individual and collective will to democratically determine their own future. We have already shown these processes in the last part of the third chapter. Like the neo-liberal slogan of 'there is no alternative', fascism exerts a kind of social nihilism that reveals the mentality implying that current dominant codes of socio-economic relations cannot be changed by the efforts of the autonomous individual or by the self-regulation of people. Fascism, in that sense, incorporates a logic that elevates the social and political status with its moral connotations to a political absolutism, an 'active' reactionary power that condemns and tries to exterminate any deviation from the religiously/nationally ascribed social constants. Notwithstanding its embodiment in a form of mass political party, these 'organised' power of reactionary collectivities could express itself in a variety of forms and institutions that are no less fascist in content than in its crystallisation in a party.

From the start, it was clear that fascism put into practice a 'pseudo-social protest' that deformed the already existing social inequalities, frustrations and despair primarily to 'give vent to the feelings', to lead to the outburst of reactionary emotions (Löwenthal and Guterman, 1949) without implying a 'reformist' or

‘revolutionary’ conduct in favour of more equal society or more equal social redistribution. Then what is the social effect of the fascism if it is not to build up a new social order? It seems to be creating ‘pseudo-collectivities’ like an endogamic community within which the ‘ordinary little men’, ‘simple Americans’ or the ‘hard-working, apolitical, decent citizen’ belonging to the majority of the society become a political force that is specifically directed against the ‘internal’ and external threats that are supposed to be challenging their secure but in fact mythical shelter which consists of a national/religious or cultural identity. The status of this man against the ‘existential threat’ is both of a defensive and offensive nature. While this man feels that they are ‘oppressed’ in the face of these monstrous enemies like ‘Jewish financial capital, communist plans to destroy the unity of the Volk or racial others threatening the purity of the blood, this ‘oppressed’ status is easily turned into a justification of an aggression, an inevitable use of violent means to protect their authentic presence against the irreconcilable interests of ‘the racial and social others’. In its nature, this side of the fascism also not only represents the language of the violence but underlines its material indispensability to the protection of the pure Volk against any ‘democratic’ intrusion in the form of autonomous, self-sustaining and emancipatory social forces. These are identified in the same status as the racial others.

Although we are not facing today with a complete form of a fascist party with paramilitary organisations, it does not mean that the mass base of the ‘fascisation’ process is not taking shape. There are three important phases of this mass mobilisation. First of all, particularly in countries where the right-wing populists are in power, we observe transformation of the education and culture by the state policies towards more nationalist-oriented or religiously formed patterns of the institutionalisation that are clearly in violation of the aims of cultivation ‘progressive, emancipatory and critical thinking’ among the students. It has something to do with raising new generations that are instructed to uncritically embrace reactionary patterns of ‘social subjugation’, implant the dependence on the authority, not to be aware of developing ‘an autonomous

individuality' and above all to give up the 'emancipatory' political aims in the face of the complete subservience to the so-called traditional values of the society (Toscano, 2017). This was also one of the important tenets of the fascist cultural politics that explicitly aimed at rooting out the democratic tendencies of the masses and to create new generations which are totally accustomed to being devoid of any democratic and critical thinking, to being a part of a static and passive conjuncture of the society.

Secondly, the dissemination of the reactionary ideas and the consequent institutionalisation became also discernable in the civil society that represents a counter-acting force against the social movements that have elements of 'real social protest' and an ambition of resisting socio-economic inequalities, ethnic repression or gender discrimination. In countries where the Muslim population are in the majority, the explicit reality is the growing effect of the religious sects or communities that are candidates of being a strong bulwarks of the mass organisation on which fascist thoughts can easily flourish. In the Western countries, the communitarian/nationalist or religious social groupings are also on the way of triggering a kind of reactionary subjectification. Undoubtedly, these are the results of the 'identity' politics that increasingly incorporated an exclusionary and aggressive rhetoric (Traverso, 2019:38-9). Two trends are reinforcing each other. In the Muslim countries, the popular acceptance and politicisation of 'nationalist/religious sentiments are justified by the 'assault of the Western culture, its cosmopolitan deviations and its essential 'Islamophobia'. These were used as an excuse of stabilising the traditional society. No matter how oppressing they are in their essence, the nationalist/religious communities base their existence on an 'eternally oppressed status'. This is also a way of being immune to any universalist and progressive values including the human rights and the rights of ethnic/religious/sexual minorities. On the other side, the reactionary communities in Western countries are also undergoing a similar identification process where the defence of the European or Western way of life is considered to constantly be threatened by the influx of the immigrants, refugees and their 'alien culture'. This is also interesting to denote that how

‘some progressive concepts can take reactionary forms in a certain social context, while the same concept can be a weapon of social resistance in another one. Pelhata (2021) holds that the far-right groups are ‘hijacking rhetoric of the left and social movements for use against ‘foreigners’ in fact against racial minorities. The political use of the secularism by the Dutch Far-Right and National Front is extended to affirm their ‘oppressed identity’ in the face of ‘Muslim seperatism’ or communalist rising. Concepts like ‘femo-nationalism’ or ‘homo-nationalism’ are defensive concepts which seek the oppression of a sexual minority in the threatening existence of ‘an alien culture’ which is actually oppressed ones but not in the dominant prejudices of the mainstream society. In the same vein, Traverso (2019:43) points out that the ‘enlightening’ and ‘civilising’ aspects of ‘laicite’ have been an instrument of disguising the colonial past of France which had contributed to the fostering a variety of dichotomies: “‘civilised versus primordial, white versus coloured, European versus non-European and finally citizen versus indigene’”. Thus, the repression of ethnic minorities was increasingly made invisible and their social marginalisation trivialized at the face of the primary task of defencing the republican culture’. It is also a way of creating ‘a reactionary subject’ that is in constant interaction with the elites of the country. This subject in the French case, as Brossat (2019) argues, ascribes to a “‘nostalgia for the military, for hymns, for young people who march and toe the line- the law and order right who dream aloud of schoolchildren in uniforms, of raising the flag each morning in the schoolyard, restoring military service etc.. The old Petainist unconscious of this indestructible spawn is at work here’”.

However, in order to be cautious against the interpretation of fascism as ‘a fully-fledged ideal’ that perfectly appeared in the political party programme, we had taken attention to the ‘pseudo-ideals’ of fascism which easily co-existed with pragmatic and eclectic aspects integral to the articulation of fascist ideology. The intense use of demagogy, no concern for the discursive consistency and its inclination to produce ‘big lies’ matched with a particular attempt to refer to the ‘little man’ in a direct and popular fashion. Umberto Eco (1995:9), in his *Ur-*

fascism, had emphasised on this aspect of fascism by arguing that “Ur-fascism speaks Newspeak. Newspeak was invented by George Orwell as the official language of the Engsoc, English Socialism. But elements of Ur-fascism are common to different dictatorships. All the National Socialist or Fascist textbooks made use of an impoverished vocabulary, in order to limit the limits for complex and critical reasonings”. It is true that anti-intellectualism is one of the basic components of fascism that facilitates its appeal to the masses in simplified, direct and effective way, in fact in a humiliating way that rests on the ‘lowest common denominator of the society. This feature is also crucial for the ‘organisation of hatred’ around easy stereotypings of the ‘racial’ other. Contemporarily, we are encountering the same language in the right-wing populists and far-right that put into circulation a kind of “insult politics” which defines “a certain campaign rhetoric that is not centered on criticism per se, but on ad hominem attacks of a disparaging nature aimed at an individual or group” (Winberg, 2017). Surely, this style of politics is not confined to the election campaigns but became a regular means of ‘demonising others’ including all parts of the political opposition or the ethnic minorities. These factors are also completed by the usual distortion of truth in an age of post-truth. Ahmad (2020) asserts that right wing populists usually base their discourse on ‘false assertions, that frequently go unchallenged or needs a tremendous effort at fact-checking whose results emerge too late to expose the falsehoods and undermine the leader’s credibility’. It is not a uni-dimensional manipulation of the people. This style is firmly anchored in the propensity of some segments of the society to endorse this simple and hostility-based political style. Indeed, the growing dominance of the new social media is also a perfect means of ‘expressing social anger, frustration and hatred’ in nationalist/religious-based formulations. A culture within which a long scientific or intellectual elaboration of facts goes unnoticed and simply offensive slogans towards some ‘irreconcilable enemies’ gain currency perfectly corresponds to the reactionary nature of fascism in its truest sense. This current does not function without its practical implications, i.e. without its constant call for the use of violence against the ones who are deserving to be oppressed. Organising ‘hatred’ and ‘destruction’ is not simply

based on the well-defined political ideals but a pure logic of power relations that combines the social reaction in a relatively modern setting justifying ‘advertisement, propaganda and market power’ that right-wing populists make use of in order to further their mass base. In that sense, we are facing with a phenomenon that seems to be ‘fragmented and disorganised’ in terms of having well-defined fascist principles. However, this does not mean that they are without effect or harmless insofar as that this type of mobilisation is primarily destined to repress the democratic uprisings and consolidate the political and economic status-quo. In this form, they are qualitatively different from other political collectivities that have specific democratic demands in a reformist or revolutionary manner.

For instance, Gordon (2018:93), while conceiving the Trumpism, points at its role as ‘masquerading society’s rebellion against its own unfreedom’ and it represents “not an actual rebellion but the standardization of the rebellion and the saturation of consciousness by media forms”. According to him, “mere performance of publicity” that prioritises ‘expression’ over any ‘critical or rational thinking fits to the eventual ‘inactivism of its supporters’ (Gordon, 2018:94). However, it was observed in the attack of the Trump supporters on the Congress in line with the Trump’s aim to reverse the election results (New York Times, 9.01.2021) that these ‘social-media manipulations’ and ‘hate speech’ can build ‘real’ reactionary collectivities that purports to be representing ‘the national will’ irrespective of what the democratic election results reveal. Thus, it is impossible to lose sight of the constant effect of the right-wing populist discourse on the masses.

One can easily object to us by pointing at the constitutional security of democratic rights and freedoms in a country and the formally functioning liberal democracy. However, if there is not an active population that reinserts its will to put into practice these rights and freedom, the formal existence of the democratic institutions would amount to nothing vis-a-vis active reactionary political groups and state elites that could be more determined to ‘undermine, paralyse and

destruct those democratic guarantees. The question is that why certain segments of the population are becoming more prone to the 'lies and demagoguery' and why they excessively need to apply to 'untruth' and 'hate language' while they seemed to be willing to 'enter into violent actions against the 'undesirables' and 'real victims of the society. If there was no such a social need, an agitator's nonsense could have not created such an audience. In our view, to link every 'reactionary social attitude' to a mastery of the public deception seems to be not viable and appropriate. There are specific socio-economic factors and their political expressions that are at work in the reciprocity of the agitator and masses.

Brown (et.al) (2018:17) puts forward a 'concept of 'authoritarian freedom' that was shaped both "the marketization and moralization" that stimulates an 'aggressive nihilism'. For the U.S case, he mentions about a 'new ethics of the nation' that 'replaces a public, pluralistic, secular democratic imaginery with a 'private, homogenous and familial one' (Brown et.al, 2018:31). Thus, a two-fold process is functioning here: one is that was created by the neo-liberalism that fosters the 'political indifference' to social question and solidarity and the other one is the 'active destruction of the public sphere' and politics itself in the name of a 'nationalist/religious route' that increasingly becomes politically aggressive. While these trends are clearly visible, the use of the term of 'authoritarian' should not be treated as a framework 'returning to the assumed traditional way of life. Despite the fact that the name of the 'authoritarian' is used to denote 'the reactionary political groups', these groups are aware of the fact that there are not many moral and political 'authorities' remaining to rely on confidently. In fact, the fascist tendencies in the reactionary social outbursts became more visible when there are characterised by their typical non-democratic attitude and loss of the traditional authority that could have normally ended in a conservative imaginery. Thus, we are rather speaking of 'pseudo-ideals or pseudo-values' that are instrumentalised to further 'specific political interests and material expectations. The political violence does not appear in a void. The National Socialists applied to violence not only because of their 'pure anti-communist'

ideals but also because of the opportunities with which the movement had provided them to legitimately 'loot and steal the goods of the 'undesirables' i.e. Jewish people, Social Democrats etc. and occupy the state offices for their own ambition of money, power and prestige. Given these factors, The fascisation of the masses becomes most explicit when the relationship 'mob' and 'the agitator' within a specific political group mentioned above turns into a social norm that was embraced by the wide segments of the society.

Above everything, the power of these political groups is most of the time strengthened by the inherent political passiveness and incapacity of the seemingly democratic strata of the population. The problem is not simply the inner pathologies of the 'liberal democracy' as a system but widespread indifference to the ideas of 'democracy' and 'freedom' themselves and the unwillingness to practice them as a willful act rather than taking them 'as 'given' and 'already achieved' propositions and institutions. The search for 'truth', 'freedom' or 'democracy is losing ground in the face of a 'commonalisation of 'a reactive man' that even infiltrates the segments that call themselves 'modern, progressive and democratic'. Giving simply a reaction to 'political reaction' does not automatically make one 'democratic'. While the 'fascist subject' receives every social reality as an 'inevitable' destiny, the 'democratic subject' today is in reality increasingly tending to see the 'political events' determined by socio-economic processes that he or she as a subject can not interfere. Exposed to the 'inevitability of the overarching social processes, he or she also suffers from losing the sense of being a political subject and the confidence through which he or she could enter in new fields of individual and collective freedom and experience them beyond the socio-economic and political boundaries that seem to be set as 'inviolable'. The meaning of the 'individual freedom' is widely ignored both in the current political literature and in the lives of the people. While the hostility to the 'social' among the neoliberal and 'reactionary' current can not be underestimated, the inner resistance to the search for the 'individual freedom' among the so-called democratic public should also be taken into account. Disguised 'conservative' visions of society that can go along with the

common morality under a politically correct terminology has only the name of freedom attached to it.

On the other side, 'de-politicisation' in the name of the neo-liberalism and 're-politicisation' in the name of right-wing populism does not only threaten the 'publicness' that could pave way for democratic mobilisation, the 'private' lives and 'individualities' are also not immune to these processes. Actually, 'anonymity' instead of 'public life' deeply impacts on private lives very much imprinted by the anonymous social codes and new versions of morality. Neoliberal vision of 'individualism' is widely accepted as the only form of 'individuality', however, it is not 'amoral, self-seeking individual' that was the result. Leaving aside the concerns or drives for individual freedom and collective ones, this 'individualism' has also taken very 'reactive' overtones that is very much 'socially and morally controlled' or 'self-subjugated' to the 'anonymous' mass judgements and decisions and market 'choices' that he or she is not a part of. Thus, faced with a series of 'mass stimulants' through new technologies, the 'reactive' man that stands in a secondary position to the 'external actions' and that is increasingly incapable of 'self-autonomy and self-realisation' is also shaping itself more profoundly in today's world. The 'anonymous man' or the 'average man' is very much prone to the fascist attractions or being indifferent to this process. The 'common sense' in terms of morality or 'general ideas' that could claim for the name of 'democracy' can easily run counter to the 'individual and collective freedom itself'. Pensky (2018:138) argues that "as a character of post-democratic world, the 'mature and calm' social formation of individualism is likewise compatible with, and may even require the confused jumble of affects characterised by 'xenophobic populism' (itself a group affect wholly dependent on general ideas) and what postdemocratic individuals tends to see when they look for modes of the practice of political liberty".

If we look at our three cases, we faced with similar trajectories on the issues of 'identity' and concomitant mass organisation that had also striking parallelities with the experience of German fascism. First of all, in India, Turkey and

Hungary, we could not simply speak of a 'national regeneration' in its truest sense based on 'Sunni-Turk' identity in Turkey, on 'Hindu nationalism' in India and 'Hungarian-Christian' concept in Hungary. Rather, if we closely elaborate their type of mass organisation and ideological assertions, we could detect the fact that the new ideological status-quo depends on a specific construction of 'national/religious community' that radically differs from any nation-building process. Surely, the construction of nation is necessarily referred to the exclusion of certain groups or ethnic minorities from the 'legitimate actors of the nation' and had many authoritarian connotations. However, if we sketch the developments in the above-mentioned countries that the governments and the mass movements behind them willingly avoids from subsuming the population under an over-arching concept of the 'nation' even at a theoretical level. The mentioned governments exercise a 'de-nationalisation' process that restructures their political basis on the model of 'a community that is projected to the level of nation, however, because of their *raison d'être*, they constantly point to a 'particular political identity formation' that exclusively and constantly positions itself against a large segment of society that is found at odds with this identity. The governments in regard of their concern of the consolidation of their mass base tend to reproduce this identity clash. Historically, they are hostile to the modern secular nationalism tied to the borders of the nation-state and also distastes with the anti-imperialist nationalism which was found by them as inimical to their anti-socialist stance fostered in the Cold War era. Within this structure of 'community-based mobilisation of society', they are also very much open to the imperialist ambitions. As far as the different 'nationalism's are concerned, we can simply compare the nationalist 'euphoria' created before the I. World War in Germany that had an authoritarian character but included the SPD's nationalist position as well and the Nazi's nationalism that depended on the 'racial', anti-Marxist, anti-Jewish connotations that deprived the large segment of the population of their citizenship status. They have symbiosis with each other in terms of imperialist expansion but the differentiation should be made regarding the issue how of their mass basis was created.

Secondly, as far as the ideological basis of the mass organisation behind the governments in India, Turkey and Hungary is concerned, their typical ‘undemocratic’ community-based organisational codes and the dominance of what we called the ‘politicisation of the ‘bourgeois apoliticism’ in German fascism over any democratic demands and collectivities is evident. The mass organisations that are tied to their religious/nationalist cause function on a basis of strict obedience and ‘unchanging set of values’ as the exclusive cement of the members. However, they typically divert from any strict ‘fundamentalism’ that is closed to its own communal identity. In contrast, the members think of themselves as the real owners of the state and society. Thus, the main target becomes the occupation of the civil society and party scene, on the one hand, and the conquering the state from within. Their ideological and political stances are very much adapted to the modern conditions and strategically usurps the legitimate channels provided by the formal liberal democracy. For this reason, they are mistakenly viewed as ‘civil society’ institutions in their period of growth. With these features, they come very close to the political strategies that were frequently used by the German fascism as we have analysed in the previous chapters.

In India, Hindutva ideology emerged with the ambition of building up ‘a homogenous Hindu nation’ out of the diverse, multiple practices of the Hinduism. Hindutva is an ideological construct that necessarily turns a blind eye to the internal diversity of the Hinduism and constructs the Hindu nationalism on the strictly communal basis mainly directed against Muslims. Interestingly, the ideological founders of the Hindutva ideology, Golwalkar and Savarkar was against ‘anti-British nationalism’ advocated by Mahatma Gandhi and condemned ‘religious-tolerance based’ secular nationalist tradition mainly fostered by the Indian Congress Party. In ‘We or Nationhood’, Golwalkar was inspired by the Nazi ideas and endorsed “‘racial pride, brutal methods to deal with the other, calls for adoption of Hindu culture as national culture, exhorting people to glorify Hindu race and nation”’ (Puniyani, 2013:18). Again Savarkar took on a pro-British and anti-Gandhi stance that ultimately served for the divide-and-rule

policy of the colonisers and according to it, the nationalism should be primarily directed against Muslims and Christians (Puniyani, 2013:25-6-32).

As far as the organisational content of the RSS (grass-roots organisation of the Hindutva) is concerned, they can not be typically described as 'religious fundamentalist movement. They aimed at the expansion of their power from within the society and also building cadres within the state. Puniyani (2013:41) explains this fact as such: "They win over the people by 'manufacturing traditions. They adopt the gains of modernity, science, technology, weaponry and industrial production. It wants a modern apparatus of life without the necessary relations between human beings which would give them space for struggle for their rights". This point is very crucial to enlighten their organisational connotation to the fascism. They do not reject 'modern means of technology and mass indoctrination and the prerequisites of dominant capitalist relations, however, reproduce feudal hierarchies, patriarchal domination and the religious/national discrimination on this very modern domain. While the pure expansion of the 'right' ideology does not recognise any space for the democratic subjects around the citizenship, externally it seems to be a 'grass-roots movement' within the trajectory of liberal democracy. For instance, The 'apoliticism' of the organisation in RSS in terms of the lack of any 'democratic representation' or 'substantial public policies' make it a social force that restores the socio-economic status quo by religiously-formed infiltration into the state and the organisation of the 'religious hatred' within the society. Actually, these movements are not simply ideologically external to the state. Hindutva ideology re-frames the concepts of 'nation' and 'religion' inscribed in the state reason and necessarily purge its internal organisations of the anti-systemic elements possible to rise during their growth period. This co-existence of the 'ethnicised/religious-based social protest' and concerns for maintaining political order is what characterises any fascisation process.

The ideological tenets of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis that constructs one of the background of today's AKP-MHP coalition were flourished in the Cold War

period. Its defenders was very much under the influence of the ‘anti-communist’ rethoric that saw the special mix of ‘Turkness’ and ‘Islam’ as the indispensable part of the Turkish identity. While the ‘secular, national independence-based pillars of Kemalism was viewed as the ‘key to the entrance of the Western-based ideologies into Turkish society and commonly negated, their anti-socialist stance did not problematise particularly American imperialism. Even the ideological founders were open to collaboration with the American interests to fight against their existential enemies; the ‘secular nationalism still having progressive and left ingredients and naturally the leftist-socialist movements. Against the political assumptions of a line of thought that tends to see the constant fight between the ‘secular-authoritarian’ state and ‘oppressed Muslim majority’ and interprets Turkish political history in these terms, the 1971 military intervention and 1980 coup d’etat promoted the spread the ideas of the ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ to reform the society against the political left and incorporated the cadres ideologically shaped by these ideas into the state apparatus (Yaşlı, 2017). In the 1980’s, it was evident that despite their internal strifes ,the religious communities and sects began to dominate a large space of the social domain and shaped it according to the reactionary social views. It was also the period when the political Islam began to exerts its influences mainly through two channels: the revolutionary aspects of Iran-based Islamic Movements and the Wahhabi-style of Islamic organisation that gives importance to occupying the civil society through mosques, education and other social institutions, an approach from bottom-up organisation that tried to align with the politicians and religious persons in touch with the state (Mumcu, 2021:). The first way has no chance in terms of finding acceptance among the state and business and also on the side of imperial forces particularly USA. The destiny of the Welfare Party in the 1990’s showed that a militant Islamic movement which is clearly in contraction with the necessities of global capital and imperial interests of USA could not gain support domestically. Alongside its anti-secular attitude, the Welfare Party’s relatively ‘anti-systemic’ position in the Kurdish question and the socio-economic issues was strongly resisted by the political status quo (Bulut, 2016:333-8) .

We would like to draw attention particularly to the ideological formation of the the Gulen religious community and AKP as political Islamist party and why they succeeded in the transformation of the society and state despite their later conflict. First of all, they both defended full integration into global capitalism and neoliberal economic constituency and expanded their power network in full cooperation with the EU and USA. The ideological support given to the concept of the ‘moderate Islam’ increased their bargaining power against still one ‘secular-Kemalist current’ within the state, though the latter was not hegemonic in its truest sense within the state. Secondly, the cultural and socio-economic hegemony developed at the bottom of the society was translated into the successes of the mass political party in the form of AKP that deeply affected the increasing legitimacy of the political Islam. Lastly, instead of exercising a frontal attack on the state, these movements pretended to be not clearly diverting from ‘national sensitivities of the state’ in terms of domestic and foreign policy, though they were re-shaping it according their own political agenda.

In contrast to the proposition that the Gulen movement and AKP endeavored to construct an overarching ‘Sunni-Turk’ identity (Özbey, 2016:131; Yaşlı, 2014), we would like to argue that this view is misleading since they predominantly gave priority to fostering their community-based identity coupled with their social and political power network. What is characteristics of these movements is a typical pursuit ‘apoliticism’ in the name of religion and nation in the mass mobilisation, organisationally the relations of strict obedience giving no space for a democratic structuring, the sharpened form of friend-foe mentality and special missionary role to restructure state and society within their own image (Bulut:2016: 106-42). However, these features explicitly contradict any ‘comprehensive, overarching concept of the nation or religion. In that sense, the nation is ‘a particular communal group that is connected to each other by specific religious codes and socio-interdependence at the expense of a large segment of population that are politically and religiously/nationally excluded from this dominant power network. The constant reproduction of ‘hatred’ between the dominant political-social group and the ‘others’ ranging from political opponents

to the religious/ethnic minorities is what makes these movements closer to the reactionary mass mobilisation rather than any authoritarian re-consolidation. The supposed continuity between the ‘Kemalist’ nationalism and ‘Islamist’ nationalism in terms of their adherence to the neo-liberalism and authoritarianism (Aydın, 2018:184-5) is also highly questionable.

In the case of the AKP, we are witnessing their constant reference to the ‘national interests’ and ‘traditional values of the society’, however, the party is also shaping its distinctive Islamist ideology and shapes its mass base according to that formation in order to clearly differentiate its supporters from the rest of the society and from the mainstream authoritarian trajectories of the state. For instance, AKP’s insistence on incorporating the Muslim Brotherhood ideology into its identity is striking as it fosters its mass structure that relied on a specific community that differentiate itself from the Turk-Islam synthesis. Typically, the political Islamists of AKP are discontented with the current borders of Turkey and seeks an expansionist logic in a neo-Ottoman framework (Yavuz, 2020:11-2). Particularly Turkey’s direct involvement in Syrian civil war and Egyptian politics could be understood in this framework. Originally, it relies on some of the common concepts of the Islamist movements, the ambition of the revival of Islam, Islam as a social and political order, the conception of ‘Jihad’ against the influence of Western values (Jahilliye). However, the originality of the movements like AKP and Muslim Brotherhood is the flexible use of political strategies to attain the final goal of the mission (Da’wa). Moreover, we should not simply imagine a ‘set of idealists’ that are uncompromisingly stuck to their ultimate objectives. The ideological assets of Islamism are most of the time instruments of mass mobilisation and motivations for extending their enormous socio-economic power network. For instance, the ‘Tamkin’ principle of the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ is very close to the organisational principle of many bottom-up Islamist movements. According to it, the hierarchical social and political domination is so strict that can not leave any space of disconcert, transformation or democratic will. Tamkin covers the mutual relationship and responsibility between ‘lordship’ and ‘servant-hood’, between God and its

constituencies, however, this concept also regulates the relationship between a 'person and his/her body, between husband and wife, parents and children, teacher and student...Thus, the leader must serve its constituencies based on righteousness and truth and the constituencies have a responsibility to accept the authority'' (Laytous and Van Laerre, 2021:12). Away from being an 'isolated' community, infiltration into the society and state is primary first through seemingly apolitical means like 'building mosques, buying properties, building private schools and even businesses' and underlining the ideological content more intensely as they gain foothold within the state and society (Laytous and Van Laerre, 2021:13).

The same use of a specific 'nationalist/religious' discourse can be witnessed in Hungarian case. The conceptualisation of 'religion' and 'nation' in Fidesz movement and its organisational patterns gives us clues about the on-going fascisation process that can not simply be confined to the 'authoritarian structuring of the state'. Surely, the relationship of these movements with the 'election's as the main tenet of the formal liberal democracy and as the principal means of political legitimacy is very effective in their mass mobilisation. It is also a factor behind their inability to construct an over-arching national/religious identity though in an authoritarian form. Exactly these factors contribute to their inclination to the reactionary mass mobilisation. After the 2002 election defeat, Orban settled for creating its mass base in a form of movement that goes beyond party politics. The creation of 'Civic Circles' served for a specific type of mass organisation. While the national/religious sentiments in combination of the social protest put its stamp into the route of mobilisation while the Fidesz was in opposition, in its governmental phase what we called the 'politicism of bourgeois apoliticism' was effective in its mass consolidation. Civic Circles initially tried to construct a reliable power network on the basis of fostering "a cultural and social community which relied on civic initiatives to mobilise its voter base" (Metz and Varnagy, 2021:320) . However, it would be mistaken to take the Civic Circles as a democratic will formation coming from below. The organisation was highly imprinted by the centralised decision making in the party, which was on the one hand shaped by the 'personal leadership' and on the other hand by the direction of the combination of party-state when they

are in government (Metz and Varnagy, 2021:324). The first task attributed to the Civic Circles was to “reunite the right by reintegrating politicians, activists and voters of other right wing parties”. Ideologically, the movement aimed at ‘re-establishing and re-vitalising the bond between voters, supporters, members by building a community that, in the party’s rhetoric, embodies the nation and people’. Within community-based restructuring of the mass movement, the ideological unity was also enhanced by the mass rallies and festivals that reassure the personal leadership of Orbán as representing the will of the nation and people (Metz and Varnagy, 2021:321).

Orbán describes the election victory of 2010 as a ‘national revolution’ in the name of ‘national values’, namely ‘work, home, family, health and order’. According to him, the elections have showed the need for the establishment of a ‘national center’ and ‘a system of national cooperation’ under the leadership of Fidesz (Müller, 2011:7). Actually, this statement very much resembles the Papen’s declaration of the government for the ‘national concentration’ in Germany in June 1932. This concept, while trying to refer to the classical themes of ‘right authoritarian politics’, presumed the concentration of all the ‘living, constructing national forces’ primarily signifying the SA and the NSDAP. It was an important turning point in the fascistisation process that combined the authoritarian state agencies and mass far-right movements in their crusade for the exclusion of the oppressed popular class from the state affairs. In Fidesz’s case, we are witnessing the ambition to be the leader of the all right or far-right groups including Jobbik and integrate this mass base into the structuring of the ‘new state’. However, if we look at the evolution of the party throughout 2010’s, ideologically his populist politics in the form of campaigns against the Roma, refugees, Soros-based NGO’s, Brussels etc. contribute to the fact that mass mobilisation through the social polarisation prevails over the authoritarian consolidation and prepares the way for the creation of the ‘national community’ equated to the Fidesz’s social and political network. In that sense, it is too divisive to be assumed as ‘nation-building’. It gives itself the mission of defending the Christian civilisation, the ‘community of Christianity’ that was

also combined with the community of ‘ethnic Hungarians’ (Halmai, 2018). However, it is certain that these ideological materials are used very flexibly and opportunistically that is very far away from positively constructing a national identity. These themes are most of the time used to demarcate the lines of Fidesz community itself and directed against the internal enemies, hence ‘un-national’ forces in the political opposition. Additionally, as seen in the case of Turkey and India, this community-based identity was complemented with an expansionist logic that problematises the current borders of the nation-state and stimulates its mass base for a yearning for the return to the borders of the Hungary before the Trianon treaty in 1920. In a similar manner to the Ottomanist vision of ‘new Turkey’, Fidesz and Orban try to attract the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and Rumania into its own orbit (Benyik, 2019). In a similar way to the treatment of the Versailles Treaty by the German right throughout the 1920’s, the new official ideology also embraces an anti-republican stance that condemns both the first ‘Republic of the Hungary and Kadar Socialism that was characterised by its national political and economic achievements after the Stalinist period (Benyik, 2019).

8.4.5. Thoughts on a New Anti-Fascist Politics

The rise of the National Socialism was inextricably linked to the lack of political left being a material alternative political project that transcends the limits of the Weimar democracy. Additionally, the fascist’s grasp of the state power was not a sign of a revolutionary moment but an outcome of defeat of the working class whose starting point could be traced back to the early years of the Weimar Republic. The growing domination of the rightist/nationalist political agenda went in parallel to the ever increasing disillusionment of the masses relating to the inability of the left to respond to the socialist demands that had gained momentum during and after the November Revolution. Apart from the fragmentation of the working class in terms of its political organisation, there was also a clear loss of its oppositional culture and revolutionary spirit and a convergence on the economic and ideological status quo of the state that

increasingly took a nationalist brand. To that, we have to add that a blind trust in the main formal democracy and its parliamentary face on the side of the SPD made them highly unresponsive to the alliance of the state elites with the fascists which were very offensive in utilising illegal and extra-parliamentary sphere to destroy the working class movement. Typically, the passive and 'legality-based' response of the SPD in the face of Prussian state intervention was the sign of their 'unwillingness' to organise an extra-parliamentary resistance which made the working classes highly vulnerable to the fascist attacks.

Moreover, our analysis of anti-fascism in the 1930's implied that 'anti-fascist organisation should not only confine to the fighting against street-based paramilitary organisations of the fascist parties but also require an immediate materialisation of the democratic practices among the oppressed segments of the people and a long-term strategy to disrupt and transform authoritarian/reactionary social structures that had affinity to the main tenets of the fascist politics. In that sense, fascism was not only an organisation aiming at the dissolution of the political articulation of the working class but also a harsh political impediment to any kind of democratic and emancipatory project that has a real, social basis among the people without referring to a mythical notion of people, nation or Volk. From this perspective, fascism was counter-revolutionary in terms of overthrowing the democratic rights and freedoms of the citizens that were gained by the previous revolutionary attempts. It was also preventive in a determinate way to rule out any future revolutionary struggle or democratic uprising.

Today, the rise of the far-right and the right-wing populism should also be linked to the conformism of the mainstream left parties with regard to trends of globalisation and neoliberalism and their apathy towards the social discontents of these trends. There is also the marginal status of the revolutionary movements that suffer from the lack of mass base and a comprehensive political vision that would counteract the right-wing impact on the middle classes and the working class itself (Pelhata, 2021). However, the globalisation process and the impacts

of the austerity policies were not without its resistance. Anti-globalisation and anti-capitalist responses like the 'Occupy Wall Street' in USA, the Indignados (indignants and outraged) against the all the systemic forces in Spain, Square Movement in Greece can be counted as the direct reaction of the masses which were discontented with political and economic establishment (Duncan, 2019:333). There also appeared left populist parties like Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain which accomplished electoral victories in their own countries. However, these sprouting movements, though positively assessed as a reaction to the inevitabilities of the globalisation, could not turn into taking a universal trait mainly because of their inclination to reformism as in the case of Syriza and Podemos and secondly, the inability of the actors of the resistance to mould the social protest into a long-lasting political projects as in the case of anti-globalisation movements. This inefficacy in terms of creating a counter-hegemony was an important determinant in the intensification of the overall rise of the right wing populism.

Safatle's (2020) analysis of the Brazilian case is instructive in the sense that it indicates how the mass uprisings in 2013 was, though threatening to the ruling classes, unable to constitute a clearly identifiable political subject. He argues that Brazilian public arena observed "an uninterrupted series of demonstrations in 2013 in which "visibility of the invisible became clear. Vulnerable groups (such as women, LBGTQ, Blacks etc.) demanded legal guarantees, showing how the profile of the patterns of the existence within the Brazilian society tended to change; added to this, an explicit rebellion in the world of work" expressing itself in wide range of wildcat strikes (Safatle, 2020:290-1). However, these anti-systemic outbursts remained unable to evolve into stable unified political subjectification faced with the consolidation of the reactionary subjects 'demanding "their country back, wrapped in the national flag and dreaming of the military intervention"' (Safatle, 2020:292). In the recent rise of Bolsanaro to the power, we saw the alliance of the neoliberalism, the right-wing populism and the state forces which fulfilled 'preventive counter-revolutionary' role. On the one hand, it was an attempt to 'destruct the main pillars of the liberal democracy'

as been observed in the imprisonment of the Lula by a judicial coup (Monbiot, 2020). It also mobilised repressive forces of the state to criminalise any democratic demands to be raised in the future.

If we summarise the potentialities of anti-fascist politics today, there are a set of issues that should be held up critically. One is the issue of 'liberal and parliamentary' democracy that is also under attack of the right-wing populists. Actually, to give up constitutionally guaranteed democratic gains by 'blaming the bourgeois democracy as a whole' would be a great mistake for the leftist forces, that would mean giving a blank cheque to the de-democratisation process put into practice by the 'fascisation' of the state. On the other side, it would also be a strategic error to confine the anti-fascist politics to the parliamentary politics insofar as the right-wing populists are trying to limit the political opposition to a public space that is increasingly narrowed down. Thus, it seems to be indispensable to resort to the 'extra-parliamentary sphere' that will maintain direct political participation of the people and strengthen the patterns of the democratic self-regulation as an antidote to the fascist tendencies. There is also the issue of dissemination of a wide range 'ethnic or gender based social groupings that are specifically interested in their own political agenda as an end itself. While resisting to the trends of globalisation and the rise of far-right, they remain firmly attached to their communitarian cleavages that seek no common projects with other groups of the 'oppressed people'. This inevitably creates a fragmentation in the sphere of the anti-fascist politics that is increasingly becoming devoid of 'organising common platform and practices' that would promote universalist and emancipatory ideals. In this sense, it seems to be important to get rid of the terrain of culturalism and identity politics without losing sight of the specific ethnic/racial/gender-based repression practices (Traverso, 2019:49-50). By being aware of the overlapping forms social repression in the case of combination of social exclusion practices with ethnic and racial discrimination, the anti-fascist struggle should incorporate the anti-capitalist ambitions with a special regard to the local and ethnic or gender specific exertions of political resistance. In Pelhata's words (2021), it does not

simply mean “forging alliances with activities of other causes that leave each partner unchanged but to redefine and enrich anti-fascism from the perspectives that emerge within trade union, anti-racist, feminist or ecological struggles”. Additionally, in our current forms of resistance, it seems to be indispensable for the left to politicise the relatively unorganised, politically invisible segments of the society such as the unemployed, the immigrants and refugees which are continuously becoming the target of the fascist tendencies. Lastly, maybe the most difficult question is to how to treat and prevent the mass mobilisation of the right-wing populism and fascism. Without transformatory/emancipatory/educative perspectives, it is impossible to break the link with the reactionary subjects and state and economic elites. Conforming with the nationalist tendencies or showing indifference to the nationalist waves simply contributes to the consolidation of the power of right-wing movements. Besides, the intersection of ‘reactive’ social protests with the right-wing politics is not without contradictions. Even though the fascist parties in history or right-wing populist parties has always purged their cadre of its anti-systemic or anti-capitalist elements, there always remains the tension between the ultimate reliance of the fascist movements on the big capital and state elites and the social demands of their mass base though still expressed in nationalist forms. Given the fact that these segments are also exposed to a variety of forms of socio-economic exploitation, the mass consent to the reactionary political organizations should not be treated immutable and unchangeable. As Reich (2011) asserts, just as there are reactionary tendencies in the masses, there are also intrinsic revolutionary elements in democratic practices that are waiting to be politicised which seems to be integral to any mass appeal of the political left, if it has a vision in that direction.

Kühnl *et.al* (1998:177), while underlining the importance of building up ‘the counter-strategies’ of the left against the ‘fascist tendencies’, emphasised that ‘the latter is exercising a fight against the democracy and freedom, against the political and social rights of the working classes with a militant attitude towards the working class movement’. He sees it imperative to foster a ‘political

education' regarding the causes of the 'unemployment, poverty and lack of democratic freedoms' and bring into light among the wide masses that these are not 'events of destiny' but 'a result of socio-economic power relationships and political choices' (Kühnl *et.al.*, 1998:178). It should be made evident that these movements represent a 'radical negation of freedom and democracy, humanity and tolerance and peace and the 'peaceful relations between different people' (Kühnl *et.al.*, 1998:181). Additionally, the political enlightenment should cover the prevention of the 'ethnisation of the social question' and re-formulation of the social inequalities in a manner of 'providing sound practical alternatives to the them (Kühnl *et.al.*, 1998:187). While Kühnl's point towards counter-strategies are well founded, it should also be connected to the development of new ways of democratic and individual freedom that fits to the requirements of our new age. It should be reminded that the SPD and the KPD was purely pointing at the 'poverty, unemployment and social inequalities' in the elections between 1930-33. In spite of that, they could not divert a large segment of bourgeois voters from flocking to the NSDAP. The response to it was naturally not the endorsement of 'nationalism and religious feelings' of the people. What is needed is something else. The aim should be to consolidate and strengthen the democratic mass itself. Besides pointing at the social question, the counter-strategy should rely on its own sources and from now on begin to 'practice' the individual and collective freedoms themselves in a new social and political project that depends on the constructiveness of the democratic subject itself. Not being blinded by the overwhelming influences of the social-economic and political events and not postponing the practice of freedom whose road is not clearly determined by clear-cut political formulas for an 'other world' of socialism, the democratic potentialities of the social groups and individuals for freedom should be activated in a real sense.

8.4.6. Conclusion

As we have put out in the last chapter, there are different instances of the fascisation process, the mass formation of it that are conditioned by a wide

variety of reasons, the development of fascist type of political strategies that correspond to a range of non-democratic, state-transforming strategies of the state and economic elite that culminate in a special use of political violence, the use of 'formal democratic institutions for un-democratic ends and the strengthening of the mass power further throughout this process if the democratic forces are not active enough to politically resist such an attack both through parliamentary and extra-parliamentary means. The instance of fascist regime also denotes a new form of 'fascisation' that concerns the position of the fascist cadres, the authoritarian elites and the 'anti-systemic' and 'system-conserving' inclinations of the masses, especially bourgeois and national ones and creates new sources of political legitimation that in the end goes in parallel to the ultimate ambitions of the 'authoritarians' in 'suppressing the political organisations of the working class and other democratic collectivities but invents a new form of political and social domination.

In today's world, naturally we are in a new historical context compared to the one of the inter-war years. However, as we have signified before, although 'there is no indication of a 'universal fascism' (Renton, 2021), there are many explicit fascist tendencies that could not be easily encapsulated within the framework of authoritarianism. A new mass politics that depends on the 'capturing the social discontent' within the framework of 'ethnic/racial divides' combined with the 'anti-elite' rhetoric is primarily revealing itself in the progress of the 'far-right and right-wing populist parties' in Europe and USA. Connected to the legitimacy crisis of liberal democracy, this development seems to be far from a temporary phenomenon or a simple pathology of liberal democracy that would cease to be effective automatically. It is evident that the mass reception of the 'fascist tendencies' is gaining ground in the face of the insufficiency of the political resistance of the left and democratic movements. Although there is no convergence in terms of diverting from 'formal democratic mechanism' on the side of the ruling elites particularly in Europe and USA, however, as we have indicated before, the determinants of the fascisation-the mass power, the fascist political strategies and political violence and the decisiveness of the dominant

classes to radically reverse the democratic gainings of the working classes are not 'static' features that could simply be interpreted according to the ideological dispositions of each elements but they are co-evolving in a specific historical setting that facilitates the fascist formations of political power. In that sense, we are facing with different 'appearances' of fascist elements and different instances of it that are no less threatening than a 'outward fascist movement' declaring itself 'fascist'. The question seems to be to what extent we can assess the new mass faces of fascism, the incorporation of the fascist technics of power in some countries and the changing nature of the strategies of the ruling class in such a conjecture. It is also an open-ended process in the sense of the political strategies of the democratic movements and their capacity to anchor in providing alternative political projects against these tendencies.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

Undeniably, Poulantzas has made a great contribution to the assessment of bourgeois state in his research on the normal (bourgeois democratic) and exceptional forms (fascism, Bonapartism and military dictatorships. He conceived the liberal democracy as the most efficient form of bourgeois domination since the latter depended on the ventilation of the mass demands and the negotiated settlement of the social contradiction. On the other side, military dictatorship was the least flexible exceptional state form as 'the dictatorship can not meet the upsurge of mass struggle with concentrated purge, for fear of total disorganization of the state (Poulantzas, 1976:153). For him, in order to gain a flexible form, the exceptional state should create 'a political opportunity to concentrate and channel mass support', 'duplicate transmission belts and parallel networks to infiltrate and interconnect the various branches and power branches in the state system' and 'an ideology that permeates the dominated class(es) and thus acts as the cement of social formation' (Jessop, 1985). While he handled the form of the transition from the 'normal' form of bourgeois state to exceptional state form of fascism in his 'Fascism and Dictatorship', he later on concentrated on the transition from military rules to the 'liberal democracy' particularly in Greece, Spain and Portugal. However, what he envisaged was not a kind of 'democratisation' that was foreseen by most of the liberal writers. Rather, he invented the term of 'authoritarian statism' to signify that some elements of the 'exceptional state form' became permanent features of the 'normal' bourgeois state. These could summarised as 'a transfer of power from legislature to the executive, an accelerated fusion between three branches of the state (legislature-executive-judiciary) accompanied by a decline of rule of law, the functional decline of political parties and the growth of parallel power networks cross-cutting the formal organization of the state and holding a decisive share in its

various activities (Poulantzas, 1976:98). It can be said that these authoritarian features can be observed in the route of the neoliberalism itself as both its economic institutional structures and the state form within which it has been embedded was inherently following an authoritarian structuring beyond the appearance of the liberal democracy. From the onset, neoliberalism was representing an attack of bourgeoisie that necessarily limited the so-called democratisation because of its internal reasons to degrade the rights and freedoms of the working class, to undermine its political organisations and strengthen an 'authoritarian-technocratic' complex that is immune to the control of the popular classes. In that sense, the political regime of a specific country as the revelation of its outward political institutionalisation can differ from the state form that characterises the real functioning of the neoliberal state.

Our aim in this thesis was the attempt to conceptualize the transitional form that the state takes on, roughly from the 'normal' state form that is authoritarian in content to a fascist exceptional form. The fascisation process depended on a complex interaction between a reactionary mass movement and the counter-revolutionary route of the state and business to totally displace the working class and democratic forces by narrowing down and further eliminating the space of democratic politics through a variety of political strategies. In contrast to the 'stable' authoritarian state vision of Poulantzas, inspiring from the growth of German fascism, we tried to carve out the basic contours of an 'unstable' state transformation that may or may not culminate in a fascist regime. Partly, it was a response to the conceptual confusion that permeates the discussion on how to comprehend the rise of far-right and right-wing populism in its material form particularly throughout the 2010's. There is a wide range of concepts that are used to formulate it such as 'authoritarian populism', 'neoliberal populism', 'illiberal democracy' etc.. First of all, the basic deficiency in these formulations is to subscribe to these concepts for understanding largely divergent political experiences as if it has uniform logic that can be applied to a variety of cases unequivocally. For instance, as for populism, in history there has been series of populist experiences which should be differentiated from each other in nature.

Narodniks in Russia and early American populist experiences can not simply be taken as a part of the same family tree with the post-war Latin American experiences of Peronism and Vargasism. In the same vein, though there are similar populist elements in each of it, the post-war modernising populist routes had an authoritarian character. However, they were strengthening, though limitedly, the social rights and gains of the working class. They should clearly be delinked from the contemporary right-wing populism which has a completely reactionary character determined to reverse the democratic achievements of the working class. Though we know the inadequacy of the term in the last instance, what we can call as the right-wing populism today both as a movement and as a regime typically resembled the fascist-type of mass mobilisation with an intention to collaborate with the state and business elite in a non-democratic fashion i.e. to the disadvantage of the popular classes and their real political organisations. Thus, firstly, it seems to be imperative to concretise and historicise each political emergence though it seems to be that they have a common thin connection to the 'populism as such'.

The same problem holds true for the concept of 'authoritarianism'. Nearly every deviance from the liberal democracy was categorised under the banner of 'authoritarianism', though there were many visible differences in terms of their historical experiences, institutional framework, their attitude towards the dominated classes and their mass structuring. It is not easy to regard authoritarianism of today's Russia with Chavez's left authoritarianism. In a similar manner, the authoritarianism of Putin which reliably depends on a long history of state tradition and well-founded bureaucratic setting can not conveniently be equated to the authoritarianism of Modi or Orban who necessarily hinges on 'mass reactionary mobilisation' faced with the constant threat of 'democratic forces' that are still alive though within the constantly weakening framework of liberal democracy. Fascist tendencies seem to thrive on the background of a liberal democratic experience, reactionary non-democratic mass formations and the declining role of the political authorities like the state and army or traditional authorities like the Church to the advantage of the

‘presidential authorities’ anchored on a mass basis with an alternative institutional framework functioning as ‘transmission belts’ in Poulantzas’ terms alongside the formal bureaucratic structuring.

Roughly, there are two problematic conceptualisations on the relevance of fascism to the increasing hegemony of the right-extremism and populism. One strand of thought relies on the ultimate uniqueness of the inter-war fascist experience in terms of historical conditions that gave way to it. According to it, any racist and fascist extremism can not take root in a similar form in today’s liberal democracies. Just as fascism was a pathology of the Western democracies, the right-wing populism should be treated as an ‘authoritarian’ drift at best which is deemed to be a temporary phenomenon diverting from the mainstream liberal path. Secondly, a range of scholars mainly stemming from Marxist circles do not concentrate on the inter-war fascism as their pivotal subject of research. They tend to use the adjective of fascist as for any field of political repression immanent to the liberal democracies. In this form, fascism is disguised and inscribed in the bourgeois state whose racial and penal practices already have a fascist character. The main deficiency of this approach is the indiscriminate use of the concept to denote institutionally divergent non-democratic regimes or forms of transitions to them. Especially the mass bases of fascism are regularly ignored by the implication that fascism is just a means of the ruling classes already imposed by the capitalist state on the dominated classes. The advocates of this approach made a very broad of the term got rid of the dependence on the inter-war connotations of the term.

From the outset, we have to admit that the emergence of German fascism was a result of a set of historical conditions. Firstly, it refers to a multi-faceted crisis in the formation of the capitalist state, particularly in the ability of the bourgeoisie to govern economically, politically and ideologically. In the stability period of the Weimar Republic, mainly between 1925-1929, a interclass cooperation was visible between the bourgeoisie and proletariat. Instead of stimulating the class antagonisms, the labour took a reformist route and became an integral part of the

capitalist economy through a variety of corporatist institutions, such as collective bargaining, mediation and compulsory arbitration in the workplace. These democratic gains were complemented by welfare legislation like unemployment insurance. During this period, the working class mainly organised in the ADGB and SPD became a partner in the economic structure. While these organisations to a great extent lost their political militancy, they targeted the democratisation of the economy through piece-meal reforms. On the side of bourgeoisie, the heavy industry and the export-oriented sector constituted the ruling bloc within which the latter constituted the hegemonic fraction (Abraham, 1989). Among the dominated classes, ‘‘rural labour, proletariat, salaried employees’ were integrated into the system, while the peasantry and the old middle classes were left outside the scene of interclass cooperation.

To the end of the 1920’s, this structure entered into crisis due to a variety of reasons. In contrast to the export oriented industry, the domestic heavy industry was averse to the democratic gains of the working class and was seeing the welfare contributions and high wages as a direct attack on their profits. Even before the onset of the economic depression, the political expression of these demands began to be heard in the bourgeois parties and the collaboration between SPD and other center bourgeois parties became increasingly problematic. We can argue that the economic crisis provided the bourgeoisie with an opportunity to attack the working class bastions. Additionally, we have to admit that the center bourgeois parties lost incredible vote throughout this period and there appeared a representational crisis. The main outcome of this crisis was the losing of the representational links between the ruler and the ruled. It was a hegemonic crisis in the sense that parties became the representatives of ‘purely sectional interests’ whereby a national will that transcends this fragmentation was out of sight. If we put out by Abraham’s words, ‘‘the internal political crisis of the dominant bloc and its class offensive were intertwined’’.

While the rural landowners and the heavy industry voiced their discontent more explicitly, the old middle classes and the white collar workers became politically

homeless. The emergence of German fascism was in a certain sense a response to this crisis. Alongside the economic factors, there were also political ones that was derived from the historical specificities that Germany experienced after World War I. The working class insurgency particularly between 1917-1923 had important implications for the design of the rightist parties. The more radical formations among the circles of the right with the construction of paramilitary organisations provided new forms of violence that prevised the NSDAP (Eley, 2016:100-1). This demonisation of the political left was combined with the adversity directed against nearly all the institutions of the Weimar Republic. The experiences of economic crises, inflation and unemployment were easily turned into mass protests against the idea of Republic and the democracy itself. The constitutional and parliamentary framework began to be questioned and lost its political legitimacy while 'anti-systemic' movements against the Weimar system found considerable mass appeal in this conjuncture. Additionally, we have to specify that the middle classes which were more sympathetic towards the political left particularly in the beginning of the 1920's, began to seek new political alternatives that stand on far-right wing of the political spectrum. The 'nationalisation of the masses' functioned on this background that gave a particular stimulus to the emergence of NSDAP as a political option to end the crisis on multiple terrains.

Our concept of fascisation was derived specifically from the German fascism that had specific qualities. First of all, the fascisation of the state did presuppose not a 'perfect democracy' that stood prior to this process. Fascisation did not simply mean the authoritarian deformation of a well-functioning liberal democracy. In fact, it developed upon the basis of the already existing authoritarian structures in relation to the big industrialists and state elite which are not only discontented with the liberal democracy but also with the democratic gains of the working classes which should be reversed in collaboration with the fascist mass organisation.

First connotation of fascisation referred to mass mobilisation of NSDAP. We have ascertained the creation of 'reactionary, non-democratic mass movement that could be labelled as 'conformist rebellion'. In contrast to old nationalist current that had relatively an elitist approach, the new nationalism embodied by the NSDAP embraced a populist route that tried to cover the dominated classes (mainly, working class, peasants and middle-classes). It tried to exploit the social question by ethnicising/nationalising it. In this sense, the NSDAP was both an organiser of social protest and advocate of political order. With these features, the NSDAP was able to borrow from the socialist rhetoric of social and economic equality and integrate it into its 'endogamic national community'. Although the main social base of German fascism was middle-classes, it would be wrong to evaluate it simply as a middle class phenomenon. The NSDAP was successful in becoming 'mass party' that responded a heterogeneous social interests from different social strata. It was able to develop a discursive framework of national community that combined material interests of diverse social groups with an understanding of 'people's community' (Volksgemeinschaft). Actually, any 'ideological analysis sufficed with the analysis of programmatic aspects of fascism can be misleading in terms of understanding of its mass appeal. While exposing historical specificities, as we have put out before in the third chapter, the mass foundations of fascism had a transhistorical nature. As we have analysed, in the case of 'American Agitator', the seeds of fascist ideas are existent in bourgeois societies. It relied on an idea of activating the reactive sentiments of population in a manner of avoiding from any reformatist or revolutionary programme. With the help of specific theoreticians of Critical Theory, we have tried to comprehend the social causes of flourishing fascist ideas within modern society. A variety of factors, such as patriarchal family, sexual repression, modern forms of alienation, economic and social insecurity play an important role in the fermentation of reactionary mass mobilisation. These factors are combined with the effects of capitalist competition that originally atomises the workforce and divides the society into 'high-valued' and the low-valued ones. Within such an environment, it is certain that the population is susceptible to the movements that could take a counter-

revolutionary tone in terms of reversing the democratic gains of the working people permanently. In the regime period, we have observed that the social divisions that are enforced by the fascist policies were complementary to the capitalist social relations.

Undoubtedly, this mass rise of fascism did not occur in a vacuum. The ideological and practical setbacks that the political left has experienced had an enormous impact on the extent of fascist infiltration into society. In the fourth chapter, we have delineated the political strategies of SPD and KPD that they have developed against the mass rise of fascism. Concerning SPD, we can say that its losing of its oppositional culture, its new status as 'state party', its bureaucratic centerism averse to the young cadres proved non-functional in every turning point that enlarged the space of fascist politics particularly in extra-parliamentarian sphere. With regard to KPD, despite their fierce anti-fascist fighting in the street, by their isolationist policies they could not evaluate the mass power of German working class, especially of the ones who are involved in social democratic organisation without which an anti-fascist movement was not feasible. Consequently, fascism's rise and seizure of power was not an inevitability. However, the general fragmentation of political left and its inability to construct a united front against fascism particularly between 1930 and 1933 deepened the severity of the defeat of the working class.

Fascisation referred to a mass non-democratic reactionary mobilisation that was directed against the political left, even its moderate parts. This mass formation also corresponded to the decline of the political left in terms of its revolutionary attachments. The fascist mass formation primarily depended on the disappointed middle classes and disorganised segments of the working class. Before everything, fascisation meant the 'racial/national' reformulation of the social question which, however, avoided from embracing any reformist or revolutionary programme. Within the dissertation, we tried to comprehend the mass formation of fascism both in its rise to power and in its regime period.

We should admit that the mass power of NSDAP on its own was not sufficient to reach at the state power. In this respect, the fascisation also denotes a set of political mechanisms that emerged out of the special interaction between the power of strategy of NSDAP and the state and business elite. These mechanisms include 'the politisation of bourgeois apoliticism, selective use of political violence mainly targeted at the Communists and the Social Democrats and abuse of democratic mechanisms and the pursuit of 'quasi-legalism''. These mechanisms constituted the integral part of fascisation process and distinguished the fascist politics from other exceptional state forms. The power techniques employed during the rise of fascism in correlation to the interests of the ruling classes also constituted the preliminary forms of regime construction. As we have analysed in the issue of Prussian intervention in July 1932, the main aim of these mechanisms was to exclude all democratic forces from the state affairs completely with a special combination of 'force and consent'. Alongside stimulating social rebellion, the NSDAP was talented in appealing to the mainstream values of the society. The bourgeois voters that constituted the mass base of NSDAP constantly faced with the dilemmas of national security and insecurity, national forces and un-national forces. The political opposition is not only demonised but also began to be the object of legitimate attack of public security forces and paramilitary forces of S.A. In this process, we have also witnessed how authoritarian elements in the state and business elite were complemented by the reactionary mass mobilisation. Despite the widespread unemployment and hunger, the effect of SPD's and KPD's concentration purely on the social inequalities remained limited while the security-based, nationalistic wave had an enormous impact on the bourgeois base of NSDAP, mainly on Protestant social strata. On the other side, these political mechanisms also indicated that there is reciprocity between the increase in mass mobilisation and unpopular economic policies. The drastic welfare retrenchment and anti-labour policies in June and September 1932 became possible with the constant attacks of S.A. on the working class organisations. In this sense, paramilitary formations deepened the state repression. Throughout this period, the NSDAP has also pursued to increase its respectability among business circles in exchange of

compromise like eradicating seemingly socialist elements from its economic programme.

The third stage of fascisation pertains to the new forms of the political domination that appeared in the construction of the new state. Before the seizure of power, different options of non-democratic regime forms began to be thought within the ruling circles particularly after the non-republican and non-parliamentarian content of the new regime was sealed off. A military intervention or a state intervention in the name of monarchical restoration was ruled out since there is a widespread of political opposition in militarised forms that were determinate to resist such an authoritarian fait accompli. The experience of liberal democracy with the plurality of political parties and the erosion of traditional authorities like the Church or the monarchy was indicating the impossibility of acquiring authoritarian forms of political legitimacy. For this reason, we have used the term 'failed authoritarianism' to denote the inability of the ruling classes to govern without a mass consent. Thus, what we have described as 'seizure of power' by NSDAP was in fact a coalition of fascist movement with the authoritarian claims of the state and business elite. Although there were still conflicts between heavy industry and export-oriented sector or between industrialists and agricultural elite, the newly constituted regime adhered to the economic policies that was primarily favorable to monopoly capital. Despite the fact that the regime made some concessions to the working class and middle classes in terms of some welfare benefits, an enhancement of their socio-economic condition was not foreseen in the face of the rearmament project according to which the big capital turned out to be the main beneficiary. There also appeared an alliance between fascist party and the state bureaucracy, the military and business elite whose common denominator was the destruction of all working class organisations with a combination of state suppression and paramilitary attacks of S.A. The ambitions of imperialist expansion were also another important factor behind this political alliance. Surely, there are many scholars pointing at the factor of terror as the main determinant of the mass subjugation to the NS rule. It was an important ingredient of NS policies

atomising the workforce and re-constructing it for the newly created institutions. However the originality of NSDAP also resided in its constant shaping of its mass base through racial divides and in disguising the social question in this manner. The newly designed institutions like 'Labour Front', Strength through Joy or Beauty of Labour aimed at disciplining the workforce and making it adaptable to the harsh capitalist social relations. The regime's counter-revolutionary character became most explicit with the assassination of Röhm, the leader of S.A through which any anti-systemic movement even with some mild socialist tones was not tolerated and it was advocated as a 'defense of the state'. However, though NSDAP has received consent from the authoritarian beginning from the seizure of power, the party was very careful not to pave way for 'an authoritarian consolidation that would increase the power of the state bureaucracy or then military on their own. In this conjecture, the mass mobilisation was conflictual location for the maintenance power in a fascist regime. It constitutes a privileged status for acquiring political legitimacy beyond an authoritarian vision. On the other side, the fascist politics is susceptible to the discontents of its mass base in terms of popular demands compared to any authoritarian regime.

We can say that the fascisation pertained to the crossroads where mass mobilisation intersected with the authoritarian elites of state and economy. While collaborating around the objectives of non-parliamentarism and the removal of democratic pillars, they also entered into constant conflict that put its stamp on the regime formation. During the fascisation process, the mass formations of the process gained an autonomous character that prevented the path of a military rule or a monarchical authoritarian reconsolidation. Specifically, Reichstag fire, Enabling Act and the purge of Röhm were instances of conflict between mass mobilisation vis-a-vis authoritarian interests. While any potentiality of anti-systemic movement within the fascist party was ruled out, there was also an orientation to escape from any surrender to an authoritarianism pursued by some state and economic elite. In that sense, the fascisation process also covered the power conflicts within the ruling classes that could be made use by the popular

classes. In German fascism, the tension between the ruling class interests and the interests of the disillusioned middle classes and the largely de-politicised working class lasted till the end of the regime and built up sources of conflict both between the dominant and dominated classes and also among dominant classes themselves.

While we are analysing today's fascist tendencies, we have benefitted from the conceptual framework that German fascism has provided us with. Instead of exact correspondence of the inter-war fascist experience and contemporary right-wing extremism and populism, we have witnessed a re-appearance of fascisation process in new forms.

The concept of 'post-fascism' is being used regularly for describing the continuities and the transformations of fascism in our contemporary world. For instance, Finchelstein (2019) describes 'populism' as an 'authoritarian form of democracy that has been in the post-war period. Today populism also shows traits that could be differentiated from classical fascism. The first difference is the glorification of war and the use of violence as the principal source of political war in classical fascism. While populism also denounces the political opposition, it does not view it as an existential enemy that should be eliminated. There are still democratic elements in a populist world view and that is deeply contrasted to the ultra-violent dictatorship of fascism. Traverso (2019:29) speaks of a 'metamorphosis of fascism' in the form of post-fascism. The ideological certainties of the 1920's and 1930's are not existing today, particularly fascism's deep antagonism against the left and its 'revolutionary' ambition of new civilisation. Today's new right populists are a result of anti-politics directed against the new technocratic elites of the transnational institution like EU. Now the right has acquired a xenophobic trait that targets primarily the immigrants, the refugees and the foreigners that have an Islamic identity. In Europe and USA, the right-wing populism and far-right had a civilisational perspective that also affects the forms of racism that had a rather cultural tone in contrast to the biological racism of classical fascism. Traverso (2019:43) touches upon the ideas

of Western values and Enlightenment as the new ingredients of far-right politics and its co-existence with relatively progressive ideas as seen in the cases of homo-nationalism or femo-nationalism. Eley (2016) also mentions about the new importance of the concerns for 'cultural identity' which functions as a meta-identity of the Europeans and contrasted with the Islamic identity. The increased security politics of the states against the 'intruders' also gained a harsh authoritarian dimension that has an affinity to the mass reactionary movements. Thus, today's fascist tendencies revolved around these concepts and new political formations took new strategies that should clearly be delienated from the inter-war fascist experience.

While there were global exertions of economic crisis, new intensified imperialist conflicts and declining legitimacy of the liberal democracies, the effect of these general trends on local conditions differed according to the specificities of divergent social formations. There is also a crisis of liberal democracy whereby the neo-liberal elite had difficulties in the sense of having a 'moral and intellectual leadership, hence in being hegemonic in its truest sense. In this context, the visions of 'anti-globalisation', anti-EU attitudes and propagation for protectionism on the side of far-right and right-wing populism should be taken seriously, although there is no overt consent of the neoliberal elites to favour such kind of policies. However, the prolonged crisis situation, particularly the representational crisis in terms of center left and right parties aligning with a neoliberal consensus leaves a large segment of political forces without a political voice. Intensification of social inequalities can also increase the demand for egalitarian, democratic mass formations. Certainly, the role of the political left is critical in protesting the neoliberal ruin by integrating the losers of this process, namely the working poor, the unemployed, the women and the ethnically disadvantaged ones into its project. In case of its failure, it is very probable that the reactive social and political collectivities would fulfill the vacuum. Thus, the democratic gains of the working people are in a constant danger of being reversed both by the technocratic neo-liberal institutions and reactive mass constituencies.

In terms of the creation of 'mass, reactionary, non-democratic movements' characteristic of fascisation, we have detected a two-fold trend. On the one hand, what was popularly called as right-wing extremism began to get rid of its sectarian stance and to win electoral victories. Right-wing populism could be evaluated as the 'respectabilisation' of the far-right in a sense. However, in contrast to Finchelstein, we would argue that this does not mean 'an authoritarian, democratic' form which could be situated within the framework of liberal democracy. These parties can reject political violence as a difference from classical fascism, however, their action could nominally act on 'a liberal democratic' terrain in a way that stands in contrast to the democratic expressions of the people. Their racist and xenophobic attitudes also carry a violence potential that should not be ignored as seen in Capitol Attack of Trump supporters. On the other hand, mainstream conservative parties began to have a symbiosis with reactionary mass mobilisation. The relationship between Front National and Sarkozy, the Conservatives and Tea Party and Orban's Fidesz and Jobbik can be given as examples. This trend leads us to reason that we should not be deceived by the programmatic aspects of political movements or their self-expressions. Comprehending their mass aspects should be given priority and one should not forget that they are static phenomena.

What is distinctive about today's forms of fascisation is the rapprochement of the mass reactionary movement and the internal repressive/authoritarian internal ideology of the capitalist state whereby the former appears to be the 'real owner of the state'. Most of the studies that concentrate on right-wing populism and far-right leans on Euro-centric analyses. However, there are regime forms of right-wing populism that could enrich understanding of 'fascisation' as incorporating a range of political mechanisms and strategies that goes beyond mere mass mobilisation. Although the specificities of German fascism are not simply mirrored in the new phenomena, we observe that the political developments in countries such Hungary, Turkey and India refer to new forms of political domination very much resembling our analysis of the second stage of fascisation. Though in different forms and paces, the construction of reactive mass

mobilisation is connected to a state transformation process which is both anti-Republican and anti-democratic, particularly against democratic will formations coming from below. It is also a terrain where the authoritarian visions of the state enter into interaction with seeds of mass formations that are supposed to be constituting the basis of a new state. Although fascisation in that sense does not signify the inevitability of a fascist regime as such, the effect of political mechanisms that exceed the framework of right-wing populism as a mere discursive construction are striking. More or less common features of the same process could be summarised as follows: the erosion of rule of law and separation of powers in a manner of strengthening of authoritarian presidential regimes, new forms of political violence that began to base themselves on mass organisations outside the state apparatus, the construction of parallel networks alongside the state bureaucracy, the increasing role of national/religious communities in terms of mass mobilization and ‘distorted’ democratic forms like ‘elections as plebiscites’. The space of democratic politics is seriously narrowed down. Although this form of fascisation is an open-ended process, the constant endorsement of the dichotomies between security/insecurity and national/un-national directs against even the moderate parts of the political opposition. The end of this process also depends on the route that the opposition takes both in parliamentary and extra-parliamentary sphere.

In general, decades long neo-liberal policies created a working population that suffers from ‘pauperisation and segmentation’ (Amin, 2014:41-2) and the extension the ranges of the working class as well, though largely in unorganised manner. In this context, there seems to be two possible results- there is a larger social economic basis for expressing social discontent but regarding the weak condition of the political left, there is also favorable conditions for mass reactionary mobilisation with ethnic and religious re- formulations of the social question . It is certain that there is a need for a new definition of anti-fascism and a re-setting of anti-fascist practices that would not confine itself to the fight against Neo-Nazi groups or overtly racist political movements. The mass side of fascisation reminds us of its broad applicability in its reactionary forms with new

names different from 'fascism'. While after 2009 economic crisis there appeared an anti-systemic and anti-capitalist political mood, it is undeniable that a counter-revolutionary response to the crisis also gained stance in different forms. While the majority of working people are suffering from economic degradation, political suppression and social/moral attacks on the concerns of political and social freedoms, any form of anti-fascism should take into account multiple terrains of domination and politicise them in complementarity to its anti-capitalist stance against the neoliberal policies. We have to keep in mind that mass reactionary mobilisation only allows people to come together in terms of their national/religious or racial attachments. This situation could only be overcome by including the rational and conscious unity of diverse democratic political groups and the incorporation of a large segments of population that is de-politicised into a renewed framework of anti-fascism.

REFERENCES

- Abraham, D. (1989). State and Classes in Weimar Germany. in M. N. Dobkowski and I. Walliman (eds.). *Radical Perspectives on the Rise of Fascism in Germany*. pp.21-69. New York: Monthly Review Press
- Adorno, T. W. (1998) *Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords*. New York: Columbia University Press
- Ahmad, T. (2020) *Self-Absorbed, Uncaring, Incompetent: Covid Has Exposed Populist Leaders For What They Are*. Retrieved from <https://thewire.in/politics/trump-bolsonaro-jognson-modi-populist-leaders-covid>. 23.01.2022
- Akbar, M. (2020) Rising Fascism in India: Case Study of Modi's Regime. *Journal of Indian Studies*, Vol. 6, No:2 ,July-December, pp.273-284, Retrieved from http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/indianStudies/PDF/10_v6_2_20.pdf. 24.01.2022
- Akdağ, Y. (2011). *Din, Kapitalizm ve Gülen Cemaati*. İstanbul: Evrensel Basın Yayın
- Allen, W. S. (1965). *The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single German Town: 1930-1935*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books
- Aydın, U. U. (2018). Lanetli Süreklilik: Neoliberal Militarizmden Otoriter Muhafazakarlığa'', In İsmet Akça, Ahmet Bekmen, Barış Alp Özden (eds.), *Yeni Türkiye'ye Varan Yol: Neoliberal Hegemonyanın İnşası*, pp.31-66. İletişim: İstanbul
- Aly, G. (2007). *Hitler's Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War and The Nazi Welfare State*. New York: Metropolitan Books Henry Holt and Company
- Amin, S. (2014). *The Implosion of Capitalism*. London: Pluto Press

- Anadolu Ajansı, 27.03.2015, *İç Güvenlik Yasası Resmi Gazete’de*, Retrieved from <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/ic-guvenlik-yasasi-resmi-gazetede/60789>, 19.03.2021
- Antliff, M. (2002). *Fascism, Modernity and Modernism*. Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/document/437838141/Antliff-Mark-Fascism-Modernism-and-Modernity-pdf>, 20.01.2020
- Antal, A. (2019). *The Rise of Hungarian Populism: State Autocracy and the Urban Regime*. UK: Emerald Publishing
- Arato, A., Halmai G. and Kis J. (2011). *Opinion on the Fundamental Law of Hungary*. Retrieved from <https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/amicus-to-vc-english-final.pdf>. 15.06.2021
- Arendt, H. (1958). *The Origins of Totalitarianism: Totalitarianism*, New York: The World Publishing Company
- Arendt, H. (1970). *On Violence*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company
- Atalayar (28.12.2021). *Istanbul Major Ekrem İmamoğlu questions the Erdoğan’s government’s judicial manoeuvres*. Retrieved from <https://atalayar.com/index.php/en/content/istanbul-mayor-ekrem-i%CC%87mamo%C4%9Flu-questions-erdo%C4%9Fan-governments-judicial-manoeuvres>. 22.03.2022
- Avcıoğlu, D. (1981). *Devrim ve Demokrasi Üzerine*. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi
- Banaji, S. (2018). *Vigilante Public: Orientalism, Modernity and Hindutva Fascism*. Retrieved from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13183222.2018.1463349>. 09.04.2022
- Bauman, Z. (1991). *Modernity and Holocaust*. New York: Polity Press

BBC Türkçe (18.06.2021) *HDP İzmir İl Binası'na Yapılan Saldırı Hakkında Ne Biliniyor?*. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-57531906>. 30.05.2022

Benyik, M. (2019). *Growing Social Inequalities*. Retrieved from <https://www.socialwatch.org/node/18290>. 30.04.2022

Benjamin, W. (1968). *Illuminations: Essays and Reflections*. New York: Houghten Mifflin Harcourt

Birgün (21.10.2019). *Ülkede Eğitim Tarikat Kışkacında*. Retrieved from <https://www.birgun.net/haber/ulkede-egitim-tarikat-kiskacinda-273226>. 12.03.2022

Birgün (26.03.2019). *Levent Gültekin: Saldırıyı Organize Edeni Buldum*. Retrieved from <https://www.birgun.net/haber/levent-gultekin-saldiri-yi-organize-edeni-buldum-338918>. 12.03.2022

Birgün (14.10.2021). *AKP vakıfları hiç yalnız bırakmadı*. Retrieved from <https://www.birgun.net/haber/akp-vakiflari-hic-yalniz-birakmadi-362015>. 12.03.2022

Burleigh, M. (2000). *The Third Reich: A New History*. New York: Hill and Wang

Blasius, D. (2006). *Weimar's Ende*. Germany: Vandenoek and Ruprecht

Bloch, E. (1977) .Non-Synchronism and its Dialectics. *New German Critique*, No:11, (Spring 1977), pp.22-38

Blick, R. (1975). *Fascism in Germany: How Hitler Destroyed the World's Most Powerful Labour Movement*. Retrieved from <https://www.marxists.org/subject/fascism/blick/germany.pdf>. 22.03.2020

Boratav, K. (2021). *Türkiye'nin Faşizmleri ve AKP*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi

Buchanan, T. (2002) . *Anti-Fascism and Democracy in the 1930's*. Retrieved from <https://library.fes.de/libalt/journals/swetsfulltext/13937517.pdf>. 11.02.2020

Bulut, F. (2016). *Kim Bu Fethullah Gülen*. İstanbul: Berfin Yayınları

Breuer, S. (2010). *Die Radikale Rechte in Deutschland 1871-1945*. Stuttgart: Philip Reclam

Brossat, A. (2019). *Thinking About Fascism*. Retrieved from <https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/4245-thinking-about-fascism-today>. 10.03.2021

Broszat, M. (1984). *Die Machtergreifung: Der Aufstieg der NSDAP und die Zerstörung der Weimarer Republik*. München: DTV

Brown, W., Gordon, P.E., Pensky M. (eds.) (2018). *Authoritarianism: Three Inquiries in Critical Theory*. Chicago: The University of Chicago

Brown, W, Gordon, P.E, Pensky, M. (2018). Introduction: Critical Theory in an Authoritarian Age. in W. Brown, P. E. Gordon and M. Pensky, *Authoritarianism: Three Inquiries in Critical Theory*. pp.9-15. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press

Brown, W. (2019). *In the Ruins of Neoliberalism: The Rise of Anti-Democratic Politics in the West*. New York: Columbia University Press:

Callison, W. and Manfredi, Z. (eds.) (2020). *Mutant Neoliberalism: Market Rule and Political Rupture*. New York: Fordham University Press

Caplan, J. (1977). Theories of Fascism: Nicos Poulantzas as a Historian. *History Workshop*, No:3, pp.83-100

Chandel, S. S. (2021). *Under Modi govt, civil servants have lost initiative and drive. India is paying the price*. Retrieved from <https://theprint.in/opinion/under-modi-govt-civil-servants-have-lost-initiative-and-drive-india-is-paying-the-price/664867/>. 01.03.2022

Childers, T. (1983). *The Nazi Voter: The Social Foundations of the Fascism in Germany:1919-1933*. North Carolina: The University of North Carolina

Childers, T. (2018). *The Third Reich: A History of the Nazi Germany*. USA: Simon and Schuster

Çınar, M. (2021). *Siyasal bir Sorun olarak İslamcılık*. Ankara: Nika Yayınevi

Daniyal, S. (2020) . *The Indian judiciary didn't suddenly decline in the Modi years- it was always broken*. Retrieved from <https://scroll.in/article/979369/the-indian-judiciary-didnt-suddenly-decline-in-the-modi-years-it-was-always-broken>. 03.03.2022

Das, R.J. (2015). *Critical Observatons on Neo-liberalism and India's New Economic Policy*. Retrieved from <https://content.csbs.utah.edu/~mli/Economies%205430-6430/Das-Neoliberalism%20and%20India s%20New%20Economic%20Policy.pdf>. 04.03.2022

De Felice, R. (1977). *Interpretations of Fascism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Der Abend (30.05.1932). *Rücktritt Brünings*. <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 09.07.2021

Der Abend (04.06.1932). *Papens Kriegserklaerung*. <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 10.07.2021

Der Abend (15.08.1932). *Hitlers Mussolini-Wahn*. <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 11.07.2021

Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (2009). *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. New York: Penguin Classics

Deutsche Welle (28.08.2019). *Türkiye'yi Sarsan Beş Ay: 7 Haziran 2015-1 Kasım 2015*. Retrieved from <https://www.dw.com/tr/t%C3%BCrkiyeyi-sarsan-be%C5%9F-ay-7-haziran-1-kas%C4%B1m-2015/a-50204527>, 20.06.2021

Die Rote Fahne (01.07.1932). *Die Papen-Nazis in der Defensive*. Retrieved from <https://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/list/title/zdb/24352111/>. 01.08.2021

Diken Online (05.06.2021). *AKP'nin Yeni Kolluk Gücü: 9 soruda Bekçi Yasası Teklifi*, Retrieved from <https://www.diken.com.tr/akpnin-yeni-kolluk-gucu-9-soruda-bekci-yasasi-teklifi/>. 07.02.2022

Dimitrov, G. (2016). *The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of Communist International in the Struggle of the Working Class Against Fascism*. Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/document/361072122/A-Marxist-Leninist-Study-on-Fascism>. 08.03.2021

Drinoczi, T. (2018). *Formal and Constitutional Amendments in Hungary*. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/336956959_Formal_and_Constitutional_Amendments_in_Hungary. 01.04.2022

Duncan, P. J.S. (2019). Political alternatives on the Western left: Podemos, Syriza, Sanders and Corbyn. in P. J.S. Duncan and E. Schimpfössl (eds.), *Socialism, Capitalism and Alternatives*. pp.328-379. London: UCL Press

Dyzenhaus, D. (1998). *Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt's Critique of the Liberalism*. London: Duke University Press

Eatwell, R. (2003) *Fascism: A History*, London: Vintage

Eco, U. (1995) "Ur-Fascism", Retrieved from <https://sites.evergreen.edu/politicalshakespeares/wp-content/uploads/sites/226/2015/12/Eco-urfascism.pdf>. 12.07.2021

Eicholtz, D. (1980). Faschismus und Ökonomie: Zu Problemen der Entwicklung der Produktionsverhältnisse unter der faschistischen Diktatur. In D. Eicholtz and K. Gossweiler (eds.), *Faschismus Forschung-1: Positionen-Probleme-Polemik*, pp.31-50 Berlin: Akademie Verlag, Retrieved from http://www.max-stirner-archiv-leipzig.de/dokumente/Eichholtz_Gossweiler_Faschismusforschung.pdf. 16.04.2021

Eicholtz, D. and Gossweiler, K. (eds.) (1980). *Faschismus Forschung-1: Positionen-Probleme-Polemik*. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, Retrieved from http://www.max-stirner-archiv-leipzig.de/dokumente/Eichholtz_Gossweiler_Faschismusforschung.pdf. 23.04.2021

Ekinci, İ. (2021). *AKP Ekonomide Ne Yaptı?*. İmge Yayınevi: Ankara

Eley, J. (1991). *Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck*. USA: University of Michigan Press

Eley, G. (2013). *Nazism as Fascism: Violence, Ideology and the Ground of Consent in Germany: 1930-1945*. New York: Routledge

Eley, G. (2016). Fascism Then and Now. *Socialist Register 2016: The Politics of The Right Vol:52*, pp.91-117

Evans, R. J. (2004). *The Coming of the Third Reich*. New York: Penguin Books

Evans, R. J. (2015). *The Third Reich in History and Memory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Evans, R.J. and Geary D. (eds.) (2015). *The German Unemployed: Experiences and Consequences of Mass Unemployment from the Weimar Republic to the Third Reich*, New York: Routledge

Fauser, M. (2014). Das Gesetz im Führerstaat. In Pauer-Studer and J. Fink (eds.). *Rechtfertigungen des Unrechts* pp.353-369, Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag

Femia, J.V. (1981). *Gramsci's Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness and the Revolutionary Process*. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Figuera, D. (2018). *Biopower, Racism, State Racism and the Modern/Post-Modern North Atlantic State*. Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/read/388011635/Biopower-Racism-State-Racism-and-The-Modern-Post-Modern-North-Atlantic-State-Michel-Foucault-s-Genealogy-of-the-Historico-Political-Discourse-of-Ra>. 20.03.2020

Finchelstein, F. (2017). *Populismus als Postfaschismus: Essay*. Retrieved from <https://www.bpb.de/apuz/257672/populismus-als-postfaschismus>. 14.05.2021

Finchelstein, F. (2019). *From Fascism to Populism in History*. California: University of California Press

Fischer, F. (1986). *From Kaiserreich to the Third Reich: Elements of continuity in Third Reich*. UK: Allen and Unwin

Forsthooff, E. (2014). Der Totale Staat. In H. Pauer-Studer and J. Fink (eds.) *Rechtfertigungen des Unrechts*, pp.268-279, Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag

Fowkes, B. (1984). *Communism in Germany under Weimar Republic*. London: MacMillan Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/document/402306511/Ben-Fowkes-auth-Communism-in-Germany-under-th-z-lib-org-pdf>. 03.08.2020

Fraenkel, E. (2017). *The Dual State*, New York: Oxford University Press

Franzen, H. (2014). Gesetz und Richter. In H. Pauer-Studer and J. Fink (eds.) *.Rechtfertigungen des Unrechts*, pp.369-387, Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag

Freedom House, (2021). *Freedom in the World: Turkey*. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2021>. 04.03.2022

Frei, N. (2013). *Der Führer Staat: Nationalsozialistische Herrschaft 1933-1945*. München: C.H.Beck

Fromm, E. (1994). *Escape from Freedom*. New York: Henry Holt

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (01.02.2021). *Hungarian Politics in 2020*. Retrieved from <https://budapest.fes.de/veranstaltung-detail/hungarian-politics-in-2020>. 14.04.2022

Fulbrook, M. (2001). *A Concise History of Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Fuller, G. E. (2017). *Yeni Türkiye Cumhuriyeti*. Ankara: Eksi Kitaplar

Gandesha, S. (ed.) (2020). *Spectres of Fascism: Historical, Theoretical and Historical Perspectives*. London: Pluto Press

Gegneranalyse (20.01.2020). *Gegenmedien als Radikalisierungsmaschine*. Retrieved from <https://gegneranalyse.libmod.de/>

Gentile, E. (2014). *Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion: Definitions and Critical Reflections on Criticism of an Interpretation*. Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/document/232012003/Gentile-Fascism-2C-Totalitarianism-and-Political-Religion>. 25.01.2021

Gluckstein, D. (1999). *The Nazis, Capitalism and the Working Class*. London: Bookmarks

Goebbels, J. (1935). *Der Angriff: Aufsätze aus der Kampfzeit*. München: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/DerAngriff-AufsätzeAusDerKampfzeit/page/n3/mode/2up>. 18.07.2021

Gossweiler, K. (1980). Faschismus und Arbeiterklasse. In D. Eichholtz and K. Gossweiler (eds.). *Faschismus Forschung-1:Positionen-Probleme-Polemik*. pp.71-91 Berlin: Akademie Verlag, Retrieved from http://www.max-stirner-archiv-leipzig.de/dokumente/Eichholtz_Gossweiler_Faschismusforschung.pdf. 26.04.2021

Gossweiler, K. (1989). Economy and Politics in the Destruction of Weimar Republic. In M. N. Dobkowski and I. Walliman (eds.). *Radical Perspectives on the Rise of Fascism in Germany*. pp.150-172. New York: Monthly Review Press

Gottschling, E. (1980). Der Faschistische Staat: Das Deutsche Beispiel. In D. Eichholtz and K. Gossweiler (eds.). *Faschismus Forschung-1:Positionen-Probleme-Polemik*. pp.50-71. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, Retrieved from http://www.max-stirner-archiv-leipzig.de/dokumente/Eichholtz_Gossweiler_Faschismusforschung.pdf. 26.04.2021

Gordon, P. E. (2018). The Authoritarian Personality Revisited: Reading Adorno in the Age of Trump. In Wendy Brown, P. E. Gordon and M. Pensky (eds.). *Authoritarianism: Three Inquiries in Critical Theory*. pp.62-112. Chicago:The University of Chicago Press

Green, T. and Ward T. (2004) *State Crime: Governments, Violence and Corruption*, London: Pluto Press

Griffin, R. (2001). *Withstanding the rush of time: The Prescience of Mosse's Anthropological View of Fascism*. Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/document/323286358/Griffin-Roger-Mosse-s-Anthropological-View-of-Fascism-pdf>. 06.02.2021

Griffin, R. (2006). *The Nature of Fascism*. New York: Routledge

Griffin, R. (2008). *A Fascist Century: Essays by Roger Griffin*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan

Gruppe Arbeiterpolitik (1981) *Der Faschismus in Deutschland: Analysen und Berichte der KPD-Opposition 1928-1933*, Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/document/44923014/Der-Fa-Schism-Us-in-Deutschland-Analysen-Und-Berichte-Der-KPD-Opposition-1928-1933>. 07.05.2020

Guerin, D. (2016). *Fascism and Big Business*. Canada: Pathfinder Press

Gültekin, B. (2020). *AKP'nin Veda Senfonisi*. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi

Hackethal, E.(1980). Faschismus in Lateinamerika. In D. Eichholtz and K. Gossweiler (eds.). *Faschismus Forschung-1:Positionen-Probleme-Polemik*. pp.179-197 Berlin:Akademie Verlag, Retrieved from http://www.max-stirner-archiv-leipzig.de/dokumente/Eichholtz_Gossweiler_Faschismusforschung.pdf. 27.04.2021

Halmai, G. (2018). *Fidesz and Faith: Ethno-Nationalism in Hungary*. Retrieved from <https://verfassungsblog.de/fidesz-and-faith-ethno-nationalism-in-hungary/>. 15.02.2022

Harsch, D. (1993). *German Social Democracy and The Rise of Nazism*. London: The University of North Caroline Press

Harvey, D. (2019). *Spaces of Global Capitalism*. London: Verso

Hennig, E. (1974). Zum Verhaeltnis von Industrie und Faschismus in Deutschland. In R. Kühnl (ed.). *Texte zur Faschismus-diskussion I*. pp.140-164. Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag

Herbert, U. (2014). Echoes of the Volksgemeinschaft. In M. Steber and B. Gotto (eds.), *Visions of Community in Nazi Germany: Social Engineering and Private Lives*. pp.60-73. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Herf, J. (2009). *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, culture, politics in Weimar and Third Reich*. New York: Cambridge University Press

Heywood, A. (2019). *Politics*. Red Globe Press: UK

Hosking, G. (2019). Neoliberalism, Keynesianism and the current crisis. In J.S. Duncan and E. Schimpfössl (eds.). *Socialism, Capitalism and Alternatives*. pp.293-328 London: UCL Press

Huber, E. R. (2014). Verfassungsrecht des Grossdeutschen Reiches. In H. Pauer-Studer and J. Fink (eds.). *Rechtfertigungen des Unrechts*, pp.332-347, Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag

Iordachi, C. (2014). A Continuum of Dictatorships: Hybrid Totalitarian Experiments in Romania, 1937-44. In A. C., Pinto and A. Kallis (eds.). *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe*. pp.233-272 New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Jessop, B. (1985). *Nicos Poulantzas: Marxist Theory and Political Strategy*. Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/document/195968243/Bob-Jessop-Nicos-Poulantzas-Marxis-Theory-and-Political-Strategy>. 11.03.2022

Johal, A. (2020). The Post-Democratic Horizon: Friend and Enemy in the Age of New Authoritarianism. In S. Gandesha (ed.). *Spectres of Fascism: Historical, Theoretical and International Perspectives*. pp.156-173. London: Pluto Press

McElligott, A. (2004). Dangerous Community: the judiciary, Nazis and the rough people 1932-1933. In T. Kirk and A. McElligott (eds.). *Opposing Fascism: Community, Authority and Resistance in Europe*. pp.33-48. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Kaboğlu, İ. Ö. (2017). *15 Temmuz Anayasası: Nedenleri, Süreci ve Olası Sorunları*. İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi

Kallis, A. (2003). Fascism, Para-Fascism and Fascistization: On the Similarities of Three Conceptual Categories. *European Historical Quarterly*, Vol:33/2, pp. 219-249

Kallis, A. (2014) *The Radical Right in Contemporary Europe*. Retrieved from https://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20150102163845_the-radical-right-in-contemporary-europe-pdf.pdf. 11.10.2021

Kallis, A. (2014). The Fascist Effect: On the Dynamics of Hybridization in Inter-War Europe. In A.C. Pinto and A. Kallis (eds.). *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe*. pp.13:42. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Kellerhoff, S. F. (2017). *Die NSDAP: Eine Partei und Ihre Mitglieder*. Stuttgart: Klett Cotta

Kelly, D. (2002). Rethinking Franz Neumann's Route to Behemoth. *History of Political*

Thought, Vol.23 No:3, Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/document/271150153/f-Neumann-Behemoth>. 30.10.2020

Kershaw, I. (1998). *Hitler:1889-1936*. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt

Kershaw, I. (2014). Volksgemeinschaft: Potential and Limitations of the Concept. In M. Steber and B. Gotto (eds.). *Visions of Community in Nazi Germany: Social Engineering and Private Lives*.pp.29-43. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Kitchen, M. (1976). *Fascism*. London: Palgrave Macmillan

Kitchen, M. (2007). *The Third Reich: A Concise History*. UK: The History Press

Kreko, P. and Mayer, G. (2015) *Transforming Hungary-together?: An analysis of the Fidesz-Jobbik Relationship*. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/283878114_Transforming_Hungary_-_together_An_analysis_of_the_Fidesz-Jobbik_relationship. 24.02.2022

- Kreko, P., Hunyadi, B., Szicherle, P. (2019). *Anti-Muslim Population in Hungary: From the margins to the mainstream*. Retrieved from <https://www.brookings.edu/research/anti-muslim-populism-in-hungary-from-the-margins-to-the-mainstream>. 01.03.2022
- Koshar, R. (1986). *Social Life, Local Politics and Nazism*. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press
- Kühnl, R. (1990). *Faschismus Theorien: Ein Leitfaden*. Distel Verlag, Heilbronn, Retrieved from <https://tr.scribd.com/document/175699703/48991467-Kuhnl-Faschismustheorien-pdf>. 04.02.2021
- Kühnl, R. (1991). *Gefahr von Rechts: Vergangenheit und Gegenwart der Extremen Rechten*. Heilbronn: Distel Verlag
- Kühnl, R. (1996). *Deutschland seit der Französischen Revolution: Untersuchungen zum deutschen Sonderweg*. Heilbronn: Distel Verlag
- Kühnl, R. and Wiegel G. (1998). Die Extreme Rechte und Anti-Faschismus. In R. Kühnl, Gerd Wiegel, S. Klittich and J. Renner (eds.). *Die Extreme Rechte in Europa: Zur Neueren Entwicklung in Deutschland, Österreich, Frankreich and Italien*. pp.172-190. Heilbronn: Distel Verlag
- Kühnl, R. (2000). *Der Deutsche Faschismus in Quellen und Dokumenten*. Bonn: Papy Rossa Verlag
- La Botz, D. (2011). *The Popular Front, A Social and Political Tragedy: The Case of France*. Retrieved from https://newpol.org/issue_post/popular-front-social-and-political-tragedy-case-france/. 10.03.2021
- Laytouss, B. and Van Laere, W. (2021). Islamism and Muslimbrotherhood in a new European social frame. Retrieved from <https://www.bic-rhr.com/sites/default/files/inline-files/Islamism%20and%20the%20Muslim%20Brotherhood%20%20in%20a%20new%20European%20social%20frame..pdf>. 12.02.2021
- Lidtke, V. L. (1966). *The Outlawed Party: Social Democracy in Germany: 1878-1890*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press

Linz, J. J. (2000). *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers

Löwenthal, L. and Guterman, N. (1949). *Prophets of Deceit: A Study of Techniques of the American Agitator*. New York: Harper and Brothers, Retrieved from [https://libcom.org/files/Leo%20Lo_wenthal%20and%20Norbert%20Guterman%20-%20Prophets%20of%20Deceit%20-%20A%20Study%20of%20the%20Techniques%20of%20the%20American%20Agitator%20\(1949\).pdf](https://libcom.org/files/Leo%20Lo_wenthal%20and%20Norbert%20Guterman%20-%20Prophets%20of%20Deceit%20-%20A%20Study%20of%20the%20Techniques%20of%20the%20American%20Agitator%20(1949).pdf). 14.10.2020

Löwy, M.(2016). *Fire Alarm: Reading Walter Benjamin's 'On the Concept of History'*. London: Verso

Löwy, M. (2019). *The Far-Right: A Global Phenomenon*. Retrieved from <https://mronline.org/2019/09/25/the-far-right-a-global-phenomenon/>. 20.05.2022

Lukacs, G. (1980). *The Destruction of Reason*. London: Merlin Press

Luxembourg, R. (1955). *Ausgewaelte Reden und Schriften I.Band*. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, Retrieved from <https://archive.org/stream/ausgewhlteredenu01luxe#page/n7/mode/2up>. 20.11.2019

Luxembourg, R. (2010). *Socialism and Barbarism: Selected Writings*. New York: Pluto Press

Mann, H. (1987). *Der Hass: Deutsche Zeitgeschichte*. Frankfurt: Fischer

Mann, M. (2004). *Fascists*. New York: Cambridge University Press

Martinelli, A. (2016). *Beyond Trump: Populism on the Rise*. Milan: Edizioni Epoke

Marcowitz, R. (2009). *Die Weimarer Republik: 1929-1933*. Darmstadt: WBG

- Mason, T.(1996). *Nazism, Fascism and The Working Class*. New York: Cambridge University Press
- Metz, R. and Varnagy, R. (2021). 'Mass', 'Movement', 'Personal', 'Cartel' 'Party'? *Fidesz Hybrid Organisational Strategy*. Retrieved from <https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/4416>. 14.04.2022
- Miller, S. and Potthoff H. (1983). *A History of German Social Democracy: From 1848 to the Present*. New York: St. Martin's Place
- Mir, M. J. and Luque, J. (2014). State and Regime in Early Francoism, 1936-1945: Power Strutures, Main Actors and Repression Policy. In A. Costa Pinto and A. Kallis (eds.) *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe*. pp.176-198. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Mommsen, H. (1989). *The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy*. London: University of North Carolina Press
- Mommsen, H. (1991). *From Weimar to Auschwitz: Essays in German History*. UK: Polity Press
- Mommsen, H. (2010). *Zur Geschichte Deutschlands im 20. Jahrhundert*. München: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt
- Monbiot, G. (2020). *The Roots of Fascism*. Retrieved from <https://www.monbiot.com/2020/02/11/the-roots-of-fascism/>. 15.04.2021
- Morelock, J. (eds.) (2018). *Critical Theory and Authoritarian Populism*. London: University of Westminster Press
- Mosse, G. L. (1980). *The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich*. New York: Schockenbooks

- Mosse, G. L. (1989). Fascism and the French Revolution. *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.24, No.1, pp.5-26. Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/document/424036019/George-L-Mosse-Fascism-and-the-French-Revolution-ENG>. 14.07.2011
- Mudde, C. (2004). *The Populist Zeitgeist*. Retrieved from <https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=0Yxem2kAAAAJ&hl=en>. 16.05.2021
- Mudde, C. (2010). The Populist Radical Right: A Pathological Normalcy. *West European Politics*, 33 (69), pp.1167-1189
- Mumcu, U. (2021a). *Yolsuzluk, Şiddet, Bağımlılık*. İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları
- Mumcu, U. (2021b). *Milliyetçilik A.Ş.*. Ankara: Umag
- Müller, J.W. (2003). Myth, Law and Order: Schmitt and Benjamin read reflections of violence. *History of European Ideas*, No:29, pp.459-473
- Müller, J.W. (2011). The Hungarian Tragedy. Retrieved from <https://www.princeton.edu/~jmueller/DISSENT-Hungary-JWMueller.pdf>. 10.02.2022
- Müller, J.W. (2016a). *Was ist Populismus?*. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag
- Müller, J.W. (2016b). *What is Populism?*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press
- Nagle, J. D. (1989). The NSDAP: An Alternative Elite for Capitalism in Crisis. In M. N. Dobkowski and I. Walliman (eds.). *Radical Perspectives on the Rise of Fascism in Germany*. pp.194-215. New York: Monthly Review Press
- Neebe, R. (1981). *Grossindustrie, Staat und NSDAP: 1930-33*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht

Neocleous, M. (1996). Friend or Enemy? Reading Schmitt Politically. *Radical Philosophy* 79, September/October. pp.13-23

Neocleous, M.(1997). *Fascism*. Buckingham: Open University Press

Neumann, F. (1944). *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*. London: Oxford University Press, Retrieved from <https://archive.org/stream/behemothstructur00neum#page/n667/mode/2up>. 23.02.2020

New York Times (09.01.2021) *Our President Wants Us Here: The Mob that Stormed the Capitol* Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/issue/todayspaper/2021/01/09/todays-new-york-times>. 19.02.2022

Nietzsche, F. (2015). *Complete Works*. UK: Delphi Classics

Okuyayuz, M. (2004). (Klasik) Faşizmin Kavramsallaştırılması Üzerine Bir Deneme. In 'Dün Bugün Yarın İdeolojiler', *Doğu-Batı:Üç Aylık Düşünce Dergisi*, Kasım-Aralık-Ocak 2004/5 ISSN: 1303-7242, pp.191-209

Okuyayuz, M. (2014) 'Alte' und 'Neue' Formen des Rassismus. In H. Beutin, W. Beutin and U. Praefke (eds.). *Rassismus: Ursprung-Funktion-Bekaempfung*, pp.9-19
https://beckassets.blob.core.windows.net/product/preamble/14050029/9783631647080_intro_005.pdf. 15.03.2022

Okuyayuz, M. (2015) .Faşizm. in G. Atılgan and E.A. Aytekin (eds.). *Siyaset Bilimi: Kavramlar, İdeolojiler, Disiplinlerarası İlişkiler*. pp.429-443. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap

Opitz, R. (1974) .The Faschistische Massenbewegung. In Reinhard Kühnl (ed.).*Texte zur Faschismus-diskussion I*. pp. 176-190. Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag

Özbey, K. (2016). Muhafazakar İslamci İktidarın Yeni Ulus İnşası. In İ. Kaya (ed.), *Yeni Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı*. pp.131-179 İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi

- Paetzold, K. (1989). Terror and Demagoguery in the Consolidation of the Fascist Dictatorship in Germany 1933-34. In M.N. Dobkowski and I.Walliman (eds.) *Radical Perspectives on the Rise of Fascism in Germany 1919-1945*. pp.231-247. New York: Monthly Review Press
- Parell, E. (1934). *Zeitschrift für Politische Psychologie und Sexualökonomie*. Band:1, Heft:2. Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/document/175015633/ZfpPuS-1934-2-Text>. 23.02.2022
- Paxton, R. O. (2004). *The Anatomy of Fascism*. New York: Borzoi Books
- Payne, S. G. (1980). *Fascism: Comparison and Definition*. London: University of Wiscon Press
- Pauer-Studer, H. and Fink, J. (eds.) (2014). *Rechtfertigungen des Unrechts: Das Rechtsdenken im Nationalsozialismus in Originaltexten*. Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag
- Pelhata, U. (2021). *Fascism, Fascisation and Anti-Fascism*. Retrieved from <https://www.historicalmaterialism.org/blog/fascism-fascisation-antifascism>. 23.01.2022
- Peham, A., (2021). *Rechtsextremismus als Paedagogische Herausforderung*. Retrieved from https://www.doew.at/cms/download/5gm50/peham_rechtsextremismus_paedagogik.pdf. 13.05.2021
- Pensky, M. (2018). Radical Critique and Late Epistemology: Tocquville, Adorno and Authoritarianism. In W. Brown, P. E. Gordon and M. Pensky. *Authoritarianism: Three Inquiries in Critical Theory*. pp.112-161 Chicago: The University of Chicago Press
- Peukert, D. J.K. (1987). *The Weimar Republic: The Crisis of Classical Modernity*. New York: Hill and Wang

Pollock, F. (1982). State Capitalism: Its Possibilities and Limitations. In A. Arato and E. Gebhardt (eds.) *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*. pp.71-95 New York: Continuum

Poulantzas, N. (1976). *The Crisis of Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece, Spain*. Great Britain: Verso

Poulantzas, N. (1979). *Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism*. London:Verso

Poulantzas, N. (2008). On the Popular Impact of Fascism. In J. Martin (ed.). *The Poulantzas Reader: Marxism, Law and the State*. pp.258-270. London: Verso

Puniyani, R. (2013). *Fascism of Sangparivar*. Retrieved from <https://archive.org/details/FascismOfSanghparivar>. 09.03.2022

Rabinbrach, A. G. (1976). Poulantzas and The Problem of Fascism. *New German Critique*, No.8 (Spring 1976), pp.157-170

Rabinbrach, A. G. (2005) “Towards a Marxist Theory of Fascism and the National Socialism”, in M. Köves and S. Mazumdar (eds.). *The Resistable Rise: A Fascism Reader*, Left Word

Reich, W. (1970). *Mass Psychology of Fascism*. New York: MacMillan, Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/read/182577109/The-Mass-Psychology-of-Fascism-Third-Edition>. 01.03.2021

Reich, W. (2011). *Die Massenpsychologie des Faschismus*. Köln: Anaconda Verlag

Reinhardt, S. (2014) *Faschistische Beteiligungsdiktatoren: Anmerkungen zu einer Debatte*. Retrieved from http://humanities1.tau.ac.il/german_history/images/Files/Yearbook_Files/TAJB_2014_Reichardt.pdf. 13.05.2021

Reschke, M., Krell C., Dahm J. (2013). *History of Social Democracy*. Bonn:Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

Renton, D. (1999). *Fascism: Theory and Practice*. London: Pluto Press

Renton, D. (2019). *The New Authoritarians: Convergence on the Right*. London: Haymarket Books

Renton, D. (2021). *On Violence: A Reply to Ugo Pelhata's 'Fascism, Fascisation and Anti-Fascism'*. Retrieved from <https://www.historicalmaterialism.org/blog/violence-reply-to-ugo-palhetas-fascism-fascisation-antifascism>. 13.05.2021

Roberts, D.D. (2016). *Fascist Interactions: Proposals for a New Approach to Fascism and its Era,1919-1945*. New York: Berghahn

Robinson, W. I. (2011). *Global Capitalism and 21th century fascism*. Retrieved from <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/131290/Global%20capitalism%20and%201st%20century%20fascism.pdf>. 12.05.2021

Rouquie, A. (1986). *Latin Amerika'da Askeri Devlet*. İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık

Rohkraemer, T. (2014). Die fatale Attraktion des Nationalsozialismus in der Weimarer Republik. In G. Bockhaus (ed.). *Attraktion der NS Bewegung*. pp.132-160 Essen:Klartext Verlag

Rosenberg, A. (2012). Fascism as a Mass Movement. *Historical Materialism*, 20/1 pp.144-189

Rosenberg, A. (2016). *A History of German Republic*. Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/document/270094677/A-History-of-the-German-Republic-Arthur-Rosenberg-1936>. 13.03.2020

Ruge, W. (1980). Monopolbourgeoisie, fascistische Massenbasis und NS Programmatik in Deutschland vor 1933. In D. Eichholtz and K. Gossweiler (eds.). *Faschismus Forschung-1: Positionen-Probleme-Polemik*, pp.91-116 Berlin: Akademie Verlag, http://www.max-stirner-archiv-leipzig.de/dokumente/Eichholtz_Gossweiler_Faschismusforschung.pdf. 27.03.2021

Safatle, V. (2020). Fascist Neoliberalism and Preventive Counter-Revolution: The Second Round of the Latin American Laboratory. in S. Gandesha (ed.). *Spectres of Fascism: Historical, Theoretical and International Perspectives*. pp.277-295. London: Pluto Press

Salvadori, M. (2016). *Karl Kautsky and the Socialist Revolution: 1880-1938*. London: Verso Books

Schaefer, G. (1974). Ökonomische Bedingungen des Faschismus. In R. Kühnl (ed.). *Texte zur Faschismus-diskussion I*. pp.204-219. Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag

Scheiring, G. (2020) . *Orbanomics*. Retrieved from <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/budapest/16303.pdf> . 21.02.2022

Schida, W. (2020). *The Powerful Rise of Hindu Nationalism and Its Impact*. Retrieved from <http://www.cicir.ac.cn/UpFiles/file/20200722/6373101417069247845885050.pdf>. 12.02.2022

Schmitt, C. (2004). *Legality and Legitimacy*. London: Duke University Press, Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/document/212035322/Legality-and-Legitimacy>. 12.03.2019

Schmitt, C. (2005). *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Schmidt, I. (2020). The Hope of the Hopeless: Contemporary Lessons from Marxist Struggles against Hitler and Mussolini. In S. Gandesha (ed.) *Spectres of Fascism: Historical, Theoretical and International Perspectives*. pp.51-77 London: Pluto Press

Shirer, W. J. (1960). *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany*. New York: Simon and Schuster

Simon, R. (1999). *Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction*. London: Lawrence and Wishart

Sohn Rethel, A. (1998). *Economy and Class Structure of German Fascism*. London: CSE Books

Sol Haber (29.09.2016). *AKP'nin Silahlı Sivilleri*. Retrieved from <https://haber.sol.org.tr/toplum/iste-akpnin-silahli-sivilleri-170610>. 19.01.2022

Sol Haber (24.04.2019). *Ülkü Ocakları'ndan Tehdit Dolu Kılıçdaroglu Açıklaması*. Retrieved from <https://haber.sol.org.tr/turkiye/ulku-ocaklarindan-tehdit-dolu-kilicdaroglu-aciklamasi-chp-ikazi-anlamamis-261593>. 19.01.2022

Sözcü (31.08.2020). *Barış Atay'a Saldırı: Beş Kişilik Grup Yerlerde Tekmeledi*. Retrieved from <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2020/gundem/baris-ataya-saldiri-bes-kisilik-grup-yerlerde-tekmeledi-6014851/>. 20.01.2022

Sözcü (10.02.2021). *Selçuk Özdağ'a Saldırı Davası: Yaralama değil Öldürmeye Teşebbüs*. Retrieved from <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2021/gundem/selcuk-ozdaga-saldiri-davasi-yaralama-degil-oldurmeye-tesebbus-6252925/>. 20.01.2022

Stegman, D. (1973) *Zum Verhaeltnis von Grossindustrie und National Sozialismus*. Retrieved from http://library.fes.de/jportal/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/jportal_derivate_00021608/afs-1973-399.pdf. 12.07.2021

Stephenson, J. (2017). Women and Protest in Wartime Germany. In N. Stoltzhus and B. Maier-Katkin (eds.). *Protest in Hitler's 'National Community': Popular Unrest and the Nazi Response*. pp.43-78 New York: Berghahn Books

Sternhell, Z. (1994). *The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press

Sternhell, Z. (2014). *From Anti-Enlightenment to Fascism*. Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/document/244181889/From-Antienlightenment-to-Fazcism-Zeev-Sternhell>. 21.03.2020

Sternhell, Z. (2017). *The Idealist Revision of Marxism: The Ethical Socialism of De Man*. Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/document/345078963/Zeev-Sternhell-the-Idealist-Revision-of-Marxism-the-Ethical-Socialism-of-Henri-de-Man-1979>. 12.03.2021

Stöss, R. (2010). *Rechtsextremismus im Wandel*. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Retrieved from <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/do/08223.pdf>. 17.04.2021

Streeck, W. (2016). *How will capitalism end? Essays on a failing system*. London: Verso

Süss, D. (2017). *Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer*. München: C.H.Beck

Szombati, K. (2018). Victor Orban's Authoritarian Regime. In Stephani Ehmsen and Alfred Scharenberg (eds.). *The Far-Right in Government: Six Cases from Across Europe*. Retrieved from <https://www.rosalux.de/en/publication/id/39160/the-far-right-in-government>. 18.03.2022

T24 (18.05.2015). *İşte 7 Haziran Seçimi Öncesinde Türkiye Çapında HDP'ye Yapılan Saldırıların Kronolojisi*. Retrieved from <https://t24.com.tr/haber/iste-7-haziran-secimi-oncesinde-turkiye-capinda-hdp-ye-yapilan-saldirilarin-kronolojisi,297012>. 19.01.2022

Tanilli, S. (2009). *Nasıl Bir Demokrasi İstiyoruz?*. İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları

Thalheimer, A. (1930). *On Fascism*. Retrieved from <https://www.marxists.org/archive/thalheimer/works/fascism.htm>. 12.01.2020

Thalheimer, A. (1981). Grundlagen und Wege Der Faschistischen Entwicklung In Deutschland. In *Faschismus in Deutschland: Analysen und Berichte Der KPD-Opposition: 1928-1933*, Band:1 , pp.92-111 Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/document/44923014/Der-Fa-Schism-Us-in-Deutschland-Analysen-Und-Berichte-Der-KPD-Opposition-1928-1933>. 28.03.2019

Toscano, A. (2017). *The Notes on Late Fascism*. Retrieved from <https://www.historicalmaterialism.org/blog/notes-late-fascism>

Traverso, E. (2019). *The New Faces of Fascism: Populism and Far-Right*. London: Verso

Traverso, E. (2021). *Universal Fascism? A Response to Ugo Pelhata*. Retrieved from <https://www.historicalmaterialism.org/blog/universal-fascism-response-to-ugo-palheta>. 19.04.2021

Trotsky, L. (1932). *German Bonapartism*. Retrieved from <https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/germany/1932/321030.htm>. 11.03.2019

Trotsky, L. (1933a). *What is National Socialism?*. Retrieved from <https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/germany/1933/330610.htm>. 11.03.2019

Trotsky, L. (1933b). *Bourgeoisie, Petite Bourgeoisie and the Proletariat*. Retrieved from <https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1944/1944-fas.htm>. 20.03.2019

Trotsky, L. (1934a) *Does The Petty Bourgeoisie Fear the Revolution?*. Retrieved from <https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/works/1944/1944-fas.htm>. 20.03.2019

Trotsky, L. (1934b). *Bonapartism and Fascism*. New International Vol.1 No:2, Retrieved from <https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/germany/1934/340715.htm>. 20.03.2019

Trotsky L. (1969). *Fascism: What is it and How to Fight it*. Pamphlet Introduction by George Lavan Weissman, Retrieved from http://users.skynet.be/bk335835/trotsky_leon_-_what_is_fascism.pdf. 12.05.2019

Tuleylioglu, O. (2013). *Kahramanmaras Katliamı*. Ankara: Umag

Uçum, M. (2018). *16 Nisan: Türkiye'nin Demokratik Birliği Mücadelesinde Yeni Aşama*. İstanbul: Alfa

UNI India (14.10.2021). *Modi govt attacking 'federal structure': Surjewala on extending BSF's jurisdiction*. Retrieved from <http://www.uniindia.net/modi-govt-attacking-federal-structure--surjewala-on-extending-bsf-s-jurisdiction/india/news/2534018.html>. 04.02.2022

Von der Lühe, I. (2020). *Ernst Jünger: Amoralismus des Aesteten*. Retrieved from <https://gegneranalyse.de/personen/ernst-juenger/>. 12.03.2020

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (06.01.1932) *Braungelbe im Betriebe*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 23.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (19.01.1932) *Nationalsympathische Justiz: Auf dem Wege zum Dritten Reich*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 23.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (07.02.1932). *Die Nazis in der Reichswehr*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 25.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (13.03.1932). *Schlagt Hitler, Waehlt Hindenburg*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 25.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (24.03.1932). *Land Braunschweig unter Terror*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 26.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (12.04.1932). *Braun Entlarvt Hitler*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 26.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (18.04.1932). *Kreuzergeld für Hitler?*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 27.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (19.04.1932). *Kampf ums Recht: Die Justiz in Preussen*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 27.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (25.04.1932). *Auf das Messers Schneide: Die Rechte nahe an der Mehrheit*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 27.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (03.05.1932). *Durch Hakenkreuz ums Brot gebracht*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 27.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (04.05.1932). *SS Mord in Danzig*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 28.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (05.05.1932). *Justizskandal in Schlesien*. <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 28.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD, (15.05.1932). *Kreuz und Hakenkreuz: Die Evangelische Kirche und National Sozialismus*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 28.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (19.05.1932). *Eine Ernste Mahnung an Brüning*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 29.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (22.05.1932). *Vor den Entscheidungen: Was wird im Reich- Was wird in Preussen*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 29.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (26.05.1932). *Saalschlacht im Landtag*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 30.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (27.05.1932). *Was wird im Reich? Brüning und Hindenburg- Vor wichtigen Entscheidungen*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 30.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (10.06.1932). *Das Gesicht der Reaktion*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 30.07.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (15.06.1932). *Hitlerstaat als Elendsanstalt*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 01.08.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (19.06.1932). *Schleicher verteidigt sich*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 01.08.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (21.06.1932). *Um Rande des Bürgerkriegs*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 01.08.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (22.06.1932). *Tag der Entscheidungen*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 01.08.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD. (19.07.1932). *Hitler toleriert Papen*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 01.08.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (21.07.1932). *Volk, Richte: Kampf gegen Unrecht und Gewalt*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 02.08.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (27.07.1932). *Severing packt aus*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 02.08.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (01.08.1932). *SA-Aufruhr in Königsberg*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 02.08.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (06.08.1932). *Ende des Rechtsstaates: Parteijustiz als "Deutsches Recht"*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 05.08.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (09.08.1932). *Vor der Todesnotverordnung*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 05.08.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (10.08.1932). *Hitler will regieren*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 06.08.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (14.08.1932). *Hindenburgs Nein*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 06.08.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (23.08.1932). *Todesurteile in Beuthen*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 06.08.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (04.09.1932). *Gegen Junker und Schlotbarone*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 08.08.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (12.09.1932). *Reichstag ausgelöst*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 10.08.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (21.11.1932). *Zwischen Zuchthaus und Reichskanzlei*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 10.08.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (27.11.1932). *Nie wieder Papen*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 11.08.2021

Vorwaerts, The Main Newspaper of SPD (29.11.1932). *Kabinett Schleicher?*. Retrieved from <https://fes.imageware.de/fes/web/>. 11.08.2021

Vossische Zeitung (15.07.1932). *Bedrohte Pressefreiheit*. p.3 Retrieved from <https://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/list/title/zdb/27112366/>. 15.08.2021

Vossische Zeitung (29.07.1932). *Staatsraeson*. Retrieved from <https://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/list/title/zdb/27112366/>.
16.08.2021

Vossische Zeitung (05.10.1932). *Plaene zur Verfassungsreform*. Retrieved from <https://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/list/title/zdb/27112366/>.
16.08.2021

Vossische Zeitung (12.10.1932). *Ein Wort zur Verfassungsreform*. Retrieved from <https://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/list/title/zdb/27112366/>.
16.08.2021

Vossische Zeitung (13.10.1932). *Quo Vadis?*. Retrieved from <https://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/list/title/zdb/27112366/>.
17.08.2021

Vossische Zeitung (16.10.1932). *Drohung mit Bewaffnung*. Retrieved from <https://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/list/title/zdb/27112366/>.
17.08.2021

Vossische Zeitung (18.11.1932). *Kabinett Papen zurückgetreten*. Retrieved from <https://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/list/title/zdb/27112366/>.
18.08.2021

Vossische Zeitung (22.11.1932). *Hitler antwortet mit Fragen*. Retrieved from <https://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/list/title/zdb/27112366/>.
18.08.2021

Vossische Zeitung (24.11.1932). *Hitler lehnt den Auftrag ab*. Retrieved from <https://zefys.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/list/title/zdb/27112366/>.
18.08.2021

Weiss, J. (1967). *The Fascist Tradition: Radical Right-Wing Extremism in Modern Europe*. New York: Harper and Row

- Weiss, V. (2020). *Arthur Moeller van den Bruck: Der Prophet des Dritten Reiches*. Retrieved from <https://gegneranalyse.de/personen/arthur-moeller-van-den-bruck/>. 14.03.2019
- Weissbecker, M. (1980). Der Faschismus in der Gegenwart. Grundlagen-Erscheinungsformen-Aktivitäten-Organisationen. In D. Eichholtz and K. Gossweiler (eds.). *Faschismus Forschung-1: Positionen-Probleme-Polemik*. pp.156-179. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, Retrieved from http://www.max-stirner-archiv-leipzig.de/dokumente/Eichholtz_Gossweiler_Faschismusforschung.pdf. 28.03.2021
- Welch, D. (1993). *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda*. London: Routledge
- Wildt, M. (2008). *Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht
- Wildt, M. (2014). Volksgemeinschaft: A Modern Perspective on the National Socialist Society. in M. Steber and B. Gotto (eds.). *Visions of Community in Nazi Germany: Social Engineering and Private Lives*. pp.43-60. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Winberg, O. (2017). *Insult Politics: Donald Trump, Right-Wing Populism and Incendiary Language*. Retrieved from <https://journals.openedition.org/ejas/12132>. 13.04.2021
- Wilson, F. A. (2020). *Enough Already! A Socialist Feminist Response To The Re-emergence of Right-Wing Populism and Fascism In Media*. Leiden: Brill
- Winkler, H. A. (2014). *Der Lange Weg Nach Westen: Deutsche Geschichte I*. München: C.H.Beck
- Winkler, H. A. (2018). *Weimar: 1918-1933: Die Geschichte der Ersten Deutsche Demokratie*. München: C.H.Beck

Wistrich, R. S. (1976). Leon Trotsky's Theory of Fascism. *Journal of Contemporary History*, No: 11, pp. 157-184

Woodley, D. (2010). *Fascism and Political Theory: Critical Perspectives on Fascist Ideology*. New York: Routledge

Wollstein, G. (2003). *Das Dritte Reich: 1933-1945*. Stuttgart: WBG

Yavuz, M.H. (2020). *Erdoğan's Soft Power Arm: Mapping the Muslimbrotherhood's Networks of Influence in Turkey*. Retrieved from <https://crik.sa/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Erdogans-Soft-Power-Arm.pdf>. 18.02.2022

Yaşlı, F. (2014). *AKP, Cemaat, Sünni-Ulus*. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap

Yaşlı, F. (2016). *Türkçü Faşizmden 'Türk-İslam Ülküsü'ne*. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap

Yıldızoğlu, E. (2020). *Yeni Faşizm*. İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları

Zenker, T. (2016). *Was ist Faschismus?*. Wien: Der Drehbuchverlag

Zetkin, C. (2017). *Fighting Fascism: How to Struggle and How to Win*. Chicago: Haymarket Books

C. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

- Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences** ☐
- Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences** ☒
- Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics** ☐
- Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics** ☐
- Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences** ☐

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : Özbideciler
Adı / Name : Umut Devrim
Bölümü / Department : Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi / Political Science and Public Administration

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (İngilizce / English): AN ASSESSMENT OF GERMAN FASCISM AS A MASS MOVEMENT IN RELATION TO THE RULING CLASSES AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE CONTEMPORARY RISE OF RIGHT-WING POPULISM: THE PROCESS OF FASCISATION

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: Yüksek Lisans / Master ☐ Doktora / PhD ☒

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.** ☒
2. **Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of two years. *** ☐
3. **Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır. / Secure the entire work for period of six months. *** ☐

** Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir. /*

A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.

Yazarın imzası / Signature

Tarih / Date

APPENDICES

A. CURRICULUM VITAE

Personal Information

Surname, Name: Özbideciler, Umut Devrim

Nationality: Turkish (TC)

Date and Place of Birth: 01.03.1977, Gölbaşı

Marital Status: Single

Phone: 0312 222 22 22

E-mail: ume@ozbideciler.com

Education

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MA	University of Amsterdam Social Sciences	2006
MS	METU European Studies	2003
BS	METU International Relations	2000
High School	Büyükçekmece Lisesi	1995

Work Experience

Year	Place	Enrollment
2020-Present	Gökşin İnşaat	Translator
2011-2017	Asmin Hotel	Manager
2008-2009	Gökşin İnşaat	Project
Coordinator		

Foreign Languages

Advanced English, Fluent German

Scholarship

Jean Monnet Scholarship 2005-2006

Conference

Historical Materialism Conference, April 2022, Istanbul.

Conference Presentation: “The Political Strategies of SPD and KPD against German Fascism: Lesson for Contemporary Anti-Fascist Politics”

B. TURKISH SUMMARY / TRKE ZET

Bu tezin amacı Alman Faşizminin kitlesel olarak yapılandırılmasını yönetici sınıflarla ilişkisi içinde incelemektir. Ulusal bir topluluk oluşturma'nın teorik temellerini Marksist ve Eleştirel Teorinin kavramlarını kullanarak bulmaya çalıştık. İkinci bölümdeki teorik çıkarımlarımız temelinde, NSDAP nin diğer burjuva partilerden farklı olarak ezilen sınıfların bir çok çıkarını bir ulusal topluluk vizyonu'yla birleştirdiğini tespit ettik. Bu anlamda parti, toplumsal protestonun ve politik düzen özelemlerini organize etme rolünü benimsemiştir.

Faşizmin teorik anlamlandırmaları üzerinde durduğumuz ikinci bölümde, ilkin faşizmin liberal kavramsallaşmasına odaklandık. Son dönemde özellikle jenerik faşizm tanımlamasına yoğunlaşan bu anlayış faşist hareketlerin özellikle hareket aşamasını konu edinmiş, bu noktadan hareketle İtalyan ve Alman faşizmde vücut bulanan örneklerin de karşılaştırmasına yönelmiştir. Bu anlayışlardaki en önemli eksiklik, ideolojik örtüşmeler/farklılaşmaları ortaya çıkarırken bu ideolojik özelliklerin somutlaşma pratiklerini büyük ölçüde ihmal etmiş olmasıdır. Marxist teorilere yönelmemiz, faşizmi sınıf çıkarları çerçevesi içinde irdeleme imkanı bulabilmek amacıyla ve böyle bir temeli oluşturma isteğiyle mümkün olmuştur. Komintern'in faşizm tanımlaması daha çok emperyalizmin geldiği aşamanın bir tezahürü olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. 1920'li yıllarda bu tanımlamalar değişikliklere uğrasa da 1928'deki 'sosyal faşizm' tezi, bir burjuva devlet biçimi olarak faşizmin diğer devlet biçimlerinden temelde farklı olmadığı düşüncesini işlemiştir. Buna göre, komünistler 'sosyal demokrasi' yi temel düşman olarak belirlemiştir. Faşizmin gelişi, bir tür kaçınılmazlık anlayışına büründürülmüş, bu an burjuvazinin çaresizliği, işçi sınıfının devrimci atılımına bağlanmıştır. Bu anlayışta belirgin eksiklik, faşizmi kitleselliğinin büyük ölçüde ihmal edilmesi ve faşizmin yönetici sınıfların elinde bir tür araç olduğu düşüncesine dayanmasıdır. İki savaş arası dönemde, Thalheimer Bonapartizm analiziyle faşist devlete görece bağımsız bir yer tanımış, 'ekonomist' yaklaşımlardan kaçınmanın gerekliliğini dile getirmiş, faşizmin daha çok işçi sınıfının gerilediği bir

konjonktüre ait olduğunu belirtmiştir. Troçki ise, faşizmin oluşumunda ‘orta sınıfların’ önemini vurgularken yönetici sınıfların, özellikle finans kapitalin kendi politik yönetimini pekiştirirken bu sınıflarla işbirliğine girdiğini ima etmiş, proleterya önderliğinde bir devrimci birleşik cephenin gerekliliğini vurgulamıştır. Teorik bölümde, ikinci dünya savaşı sonrası düşünürlerden Poulantzas’ın görüşlerine daha fazla yer almıştır. Poulantzas’ın en büyük özgüllüklerinden biri, faşizmin yükseliş aşamasına da teorisinde yer vermiş olmasıdır. Faşizmi ‘olağan-dışı devlet biçimleri içerisinde (Bonapartism, askeri müdahale) konumlandırmış, bu bağlamda faşizmin iktidara geliş sürecinde ‘devlet elitiyle’ işbirliğine girdiğini, kitleselliğini bu işbirliğiyle büyüttüğünü belirtmiştir. Büyük sermayeyle koalisyon kuran küçük burjuvazinin iktidarın ilk yılında yönetici sınıf konuma yükselmiş, sonrasında özellikle S.A.’nin anti-sistemik elementler tasfiye edildikten sonra ‘destekleyici’ sınıf konumunda kalmıştır. Ancak Poulantzas küçük burjuvazinin istemleriyle faşizmin toplumsal işlevi, yani büyük sermayenin çıkarlarının korunması arasındaki gerilimin rejimin sonuna kadar devam ettiğini de söylemiştir. İkinci dünya savaşı sonrası dönemde, bazı Eleştirel Teori mensupları, örneğin Wilhelm Reich, Eric Fromm, Leo Löwenthal faşizmin modern burjuva toplumuna içkin özellikleri durmuştur. Yakın dönemde ise Reinhard Kühnl, faşizmin kitleselliği ve bunun kapitalist toplumla bağlantısına dair önemli teorik katkılar yapmıştır.

Üçüncü Bölümde Alman Faşizmin kitlesel temelleri odak noktası olarak alınmıştır. Yeni Milliyetçiliğin gelişimiyle birlikte 1920’lerde artık ezilen sınıflar da Alman sağ örgütlerin hedefine girmiştir. Milliyetçilik artık sadece elit bir ideoloji olmaktan çıkıyor, populist bir güzergah izlemeye başlıyor. Bu nokta, Herf’in de belirttiği gibi reaksiyoner duyguların ‘modern’ bir bağlamda yeniden tanımlanması, Alman sağ cenahını şekillendirmeye başlıyor. Teknolojik gelişmelere açıklık, militarist görüşlerin emperyal özlemlere tahvil edilmesi ve bunların gerici toplumsal amaçlarla birleştirilmesi yeni bir milliyetçiliğin yapı taşlarını oluşturuyor. NSDAP bir parti olarak böyle bir ortamın eseridir. 1930’dan sonraki seçimlerdeki yükselişi düşünüldüğünde NSDAP’ın en büyük özelliği, hem Weimar kurumlarının yetersizliğinin hem de ekonomik buhranın

ateşlediği toplumsal tepkiyi sınıf çatışmalarının olmadığı bir ‘ulusal topluluk’ anlayışıyla birlikte yoğurabilme başarısıdır. Elbette ki NSDAP bu seçimlerde yeni organizasyonel teknikler kullanmış, yazılı ve görsel propaganda araçlarını yetenekli bir şekilde harekete geçirmiş ve kendisini Weimar Cumhuriyeti’yle ilişkili bütün diğer burjuva partilerine alternatif olan anti-sistemik bir parti olarak yansıtmıştır. Bu noktada, NSDAP bir kitle partisi olmayı başarmış, oldukça heterojen bir kitleye hitap etme becerisini göstermiştir. NSDAP temelde ortasınıfları kitlesel temel olarak almış olsa da gücü sadece bu kesimle sınırlı kalmamıştır. İşsiz gençlerden, savaş gazilerinden, devlet bürokratlarından ve işçi sınıfının örgütsüz kesimlerinden de destek görmüştür. Bu yanıla NSDAP’nin sınıfsal bölünmeleri aşan bir söylem geliştirdiği söylebilir. Üçüncü bölümün sonunda ağırlıklı olarak bu söylemin temel bileşenlerini ayırt etmeye odaklandık. Amaç, kitlesel mobilizasyonun önemli ölçüde kapitalist toplumlardaki ekonomik güvensizliklerden, rekabetten, toplumsal yabancılaşmadan kaynaklanan bir bireyselleşmenin temelinde ‘ulusal topluluk’ ideolojisinin bir tür toplumsal savunma geliştirdiğini gördük. Toplumsal olarak gerici kurumların, örneğin patriark ailenin faşist düşüncelerin oluşması için verimli bir alan sağladığını tespit ettik. Son bölümde Leo Löwenthal’ın ‘Amerikan Ajitator’ adlı çalışmasına odaklanarak gerici kitlesel mobilizasyonun burjuva toplumlarında her zaman bir olasılık olduğunu gördük.

Dördüncü bölüm, faşizmin kitlesel gelişimi sürecinde solun geliştirdiği politik stratejilere ayrılmıştır. Elbette ki ondokuzuncu yüzyıl sonu ve yirminci yüzyıl başındaki özellikle milliyetçilik ve revizyonizm özelindeki ideolojik evrimi, sonradan faşizmin alımlanışındaki stratejileri de etkilemiştir. Özellikle SPD’nin 1920’lerdeki durumunun özgüllüğü solun yönelişinde önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Bu süreçte, SPD parti olarak büyük ölçüde milliyetçilik ile positif bir ilişki kurmuş, Weimar Cumhuriyeti’nin kurumlarıyla büyük ölçüde özdeşleşerek bir devlet partisi haline gelmiş ve ilk yıllarındaki düzen-karşıtı toplumsal konumundan büyük ölçüde ayrılmıştır. Bürokratikleşen parti örgütü, gençler kadroların alttan gelen taleplerine duyarsız kalmıştır. Bu anlamda, toplumsal yenilenme ve alternatif oluşturma özelliklerini ağırlıklı olarak NSDAP’ye

kaptırmıştır. SPD faşizmin yükselişi sürecinde NSDAP'nin kitlesel gücünü geç fark etmiş, buna karşılık 'kitlelerin milliyetçileşmesi' diyebileceğimiz sürece karşılık alternatif demokratik toplumsal yaşam biçimlerini oluşturamamış, 'büyük politik' alanında 'kötünün iyisini seçme' politikası gütmüş ve büyük toplumsal direnme gücünü büyük ölçüde atıl bırakmıştır. KPD'ye kısaca bakarsak, faşizm'e karşı en sokaktaki en militan güç olmasına rağmen yukarda bahsettiğimiz Komintern'in ideolojik etkisi ve yönlendiriciliğinden fazlasıyla etkilenmiş, bu doğrultuda aşağından gelen 'Birleşik Cephe' isteklerine kulaklarını tıkamıştır. Elbette KPD'nin SPD'yle olan kavgasında Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası sosyal demokrat hükümetin karşı-devrimci Freikorps birliklerini komünist kalkışmalara karşı kullanmış olması gibi tarihsel süreçler de etkili olmuştur. Ancak şurası kesindir ki iki partinin de birleşme yönündeki isteksizlikleri faşizmin yükselişini kolaylaştıran faktörlerden biri olmuştur. Belirtmek gerekir ki 1920'lerin ve 1930'ların sol deneyimleri de anti-faşizmi demokratik bir özyönetim anlayışıyla birleştirmenin yollarını açma konusunda başarısız kalmıştır.

Beşinci bölüm, 1930-33 periyoduna odaklanıp bir kitle hareketi olarak NSDAP'nin yönetici sınıfların çıkarlarıyla nasıl bir etkileşime girdiğini sorguladık. Bu süreci 'faşistleşme süreci' olarak adlandırdık. Faşistleşme sürecinin bir yanı toplumsal tepkilerin 'gerici, demokratik olmayan kitlesel mobilizasyonu ise diğer yanı bu mobilizasyonun yönetici sınıflar lehine ne tür politik stratejiler ve mekanizmalara denk düştüğünü belirlemektir. Kuşkusuz, Alman faşizminin gelişiminde özgüllükler vardır. Örneğin, Versailles Antlaşması ve bunun getirdiği toplumsal hınç, emperyal isteklerin sürekliliği, dünya ekonomik krizinin Almanya'ya yansması ve emek-sermaye uzlaşmasına dayalı korporatist dengenin bozulması ve en önemlisi kriz durumunun özellikle ağır sanayi sermayesinin işçi sınıfına karşı bir saldırıya geçmesi 'siyasal saldırının' temel koşulları olmuştur. Ekonomik alandaki bu durum, devlet içindeki otoriteryan bürokrasinin, sermayenin ve ordunun partilerin baş rolü oynadığı bir parlamentarizmin yerine 'partiler-üstü' başkanlık hükümetleri lehine ağırlık koyduğu bir sürece denk gelir.

Bu süreçte NSDAP bir dizi strateji uygulamıştır. Bunlardan birincisini, ‘burjuva apolitikliğinin’ politikleştirilmesi olarak adlandırabiliriz. Bu noktada NSDAP milliyetçi yerel burjuva dayanışma örgütlerini ele geçirmiş, özellikle Protestan sosyal kesiminde din ve milliyetçilik duyguları kullanarak bir taban elde etmiştir. İkinci olarak, NSDAP özel bir siyasal şiddet biçimi uygulamıştır. Çokça söylenildiği gibi bu kör bir politik şiddet değildir. Şiddetin nesnesi, özellikle ulusal topluluğun dışında görülen KPD ve SPD’nin üyeleridir. NSDAP’nin görüşüne göre, ulusal topluluğun dışında olmak her türlü şiddete açık olmayı da meşru hale getiriyordu. Özellikle burjuva kesimlerdeki ‘anti-Marksizm’ duygularını hareket geçirmeye yönelik bu strateji, diğer yandan S.A. birliklerinin devlet güçlerine yardımcı bir güç olarak algılanmasını hedefliyordu. Bu sayede, şiddet kitlesel gücü artırmanın bir yolu olarak görülüyordu. Üçüncü olarak, NSDAP formal demokratik araçların özel bir kullanımına yoğunlaşarak, özellikle seçimler öncesi şiddet hareketleriyle birlikte her seçimi ‘ulusal’ ve ‘ulusal’ olmayanın ayırdedildiği, ulusal güvenliği her şeyin önüne geçtiği ve burjuva kesimlerdeki politik düzen özlemlerinin belirginleştiği bir referanduma dönüştürüyordu. Bu anlamda seçimler politik meşruiyetin elde edildiği alanlardı aynı zamanda. Son olarak NSDAP bir yandan yönetici sınıflar karşısında görece özerkliğini sağlarken diğer yandan yeni bir elit oluşumuna yolaçıyordu. Özellikle kendi içindeki sosyalist görünümlü öğeleri yavaş yavaş dışlarken sermaye kesimi ve devlet bürokrasisi karşısında da ‘saygınlığını’ sağlama çabası içerisine giriyordu.

Papen’in hükümete gelişi yeni devletin oluşması sürecinde bir dönüm noktası olmuş, birçok yönden bizim faşistleşme süreci dediğimiz sürecin yoğunlaşmasını getirmiştir. Haziran 1932’de Papen hükümeti S.A. konan gösteri yasağını kaldırmış, bu grupların sol cenaha olan saldırıları artmıştır. Aynı zamanda bu zamanda uygulamaya konan ekonomi politikaları da işçi sınıfı açısından büyük bir gerilemeye işaret etmiş, büyük çaplı refah devleti kesintileri söz konusu olmuştur. Temmuz 1932 seçimleri öncesi özellikle Nasyonal Sosyalistlerin kışkırtmaları sonucunda kanlı çatışmalar meydana gelmiştir. Bunun sonucunda Prusya’da sıkıyönetim ilan edilmiş, Prusya eyaletinin Sosyal Demokrat başkanı

yerinden edilmiş, yerine merkez hükümetin komutasında bir hükümet komiseri atanmıştır. Prusya darbesi olarak adlandırılan bu olay, kitlesel bir parti olarak NSDAP ile cumhuriyetçi olmayan devlet elitinin çıkarlarının örtüşmesiyle meydana gelmiştir. İki tarafça da Sosyal Demokratlar artık meşru toplumsal aktör olmaktan çıkmıştır. İstenen ‘demokrat olmayan, parlamenter olmayan, cumhuriyetçi olmayan bir rejim inşasıdır. Ancak bunun biçimi belirlenmiş değildir. Temmuz 1932 seçimlerinden NSDAP büyük bir başarıyla çıkmıştır. Aldığı oy oranı ve kitlesel desteği sonraki aşamalarda yönetici sınıflara karşı görece bir özerklik sağlamasına imkan verecektir. Ağustos’tan NSDAP’nın iktidara geldiği tarihe kadar yönetici sınıflar arasında ‘rejimin’ nasıl bir biçim alacağına dair çatışmalar belirecektir. Askeri bir müdahale söz konusu olsa da partilerin canlı olması ve paramiliter güçlerle donatılmış olması büyük bir politik direniş potansiyelini barındırır ve bu nedenle bu seçenekten vazgeçilir. Diğer yandan kısa bir süre Papen hükümeti ‘monarşik restorasyon’ gibi bir amaç gütse de liberal demokratik bir tecrübe yaşamış, partilerin hala etkili olduğu bir ortamda böyle bir geriye dönüş mümkün olmaz. Bunlara ek olarak, herhangi bir kitlesel destek olmadan sırf devlet bürokrasisine ve devletin silahlı güçlerine sahip olmak iktidarda kalmaya yetmemektedir. ‘Faşistleşme’ süreci başarısızlığa uğramış bir otoriteryanizmin de sonucudur. Artık NSDAP olmadan bir cumhuriyetçi olmayan, parlamenter olmayan bir hükümeti ayakta tutmak mümkün gözükmemektedir. NSDAP’nin iktidara gelişi bahsettiğimiz bu odakların sistemli çalışması olarak mümkün olmuş ve otoriter ve faşist öğelerin birlikte olduğu bir koalisyon olarak ortaya çıkmıştır.

Rejimin kuruluşu, faşistleşme dediğimiz sürecin üçüncü aşaması olarak belirir. Elbette en büyük fark, artık NSDAP’nin devletin başında olmasıdır. Ancak 1933’ün ilk aylarında verilen demeçlere bakıldığında devletin otoriter odakları da ‘milli bir hükümetin kurulmuş olmasına destek veriyor, NSDAP’nin ‘milli devrimi’ kiliseler dahil geniş bir kesimden destek almaktadır. Toplumun ve devletin uyumlulaştırılması süreci (Gleichschaltung) özellikle işçi sınıfının örgütlerinin ve partilerinin tasfiyesine yöneliyor, S.A. birlikleri devlet güçlerine yardımcı olarak özellikle şiddetini bu kesimlere yöneltiyor, bu grupların bazı

aşırılıkları tasvip edilmese de burjuva kesimler genel olarak bu stratejiyi onaylıyorlar. Bu noktada meydana gelen devlet biçiminin ne olduğuna dair teorik tartışmalar yapılmıştır. Hukuki açıdan Ernst Fraenkel ‘İkili bir Devlet’in ortaya çıktığını öne sürmüş, ‘Ayrıcalıklı Devlet’ politik gereklilik istediği ölçüde her türlü hukuk ihlalinin meşru gösteren bir anlayışı ifade ederken ‘Norm Devleti’ bu politik alanın dışında kalan alanında geçerli kılınmıştır. Hiç şüphesiz, Nasyonal Sosyalist Devlet’in kuruluşuyla politik alan ciddi bir şekilde genişlemiş, daha önce sivil toplumun içinde görülen toplumsal pratikler politik gerekliliğin konusu haline gelmiştir. Nasyonal Sosyalist yazarlara göre bu ‘total devlet’in ortaya çıkışını muştulayan ırksal topluluğu liderin gövdesiyle bütünleştiren bir yapı söz konusudur. Ancak Bazı yazarlar Nasyonal Sosyalist devletin bütün disiplinli görünüşüne rağmen poliarşik bir yapı ortaya koyduğunu, bürokrasinin, partinin, ordunun, sermayenin ayrı organizasyonel faaliyetler içine girdiğini belirtmiş, en büyük birleştiricinin ‘lidere sadakat’ olduğunun altını çizmiştir. Hans Mommsen Nasyonal Sosyalist Devlet’te ‘kümülatif bir radikalliğin’ belirttiğini, bunun da irrasyonel, kendi kendisini yıkıcı bir ilişkiler zincirini doğurduğunu ifade etmiştir. Ancak görünüşteki bu duruma rağmen, “İşbirliği Teorisi”, faşist partiyle, devletin diğer organları arasında bir işbirliğinin varlığına dikkat çekmiş, bu işbirliğinin ortak noktasının işçi sınıfının örgütlerinin dağıtılması ve dışta emperyal bir politika izlenmesi olduğunu belirtmiştir.

Yedinci Bölüm faşistleşme kavramının teorik açılanması üzerine kurulmuştur. Son bölümde ise Alman faşizmi deneyimi ışığında günümüz aşırı sağın ve sağ popülizmin yükselişi incelenmiştir. Bu yapılırken liberal demokrasinin çözülüşü, yeni siyasal şiddet biçimleri, sağ popülizmin kapitalizmle ilişkisi, faşizmin yeni kitlesel görünüşleri olarak dini/ulusal topluluklar temel alınmıştır. Elbette yeni bir anti-faşizm anlayışının oluşması da ancak bu çözümlemeler ışığında inşa edilebilir.