COGNITIONS AND AFFECTS: TOWARDS A SPINOZISTIC THEORY OF EMOTIONS

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ABSTRACT

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During the last several decades, Spinoza became one of the rediscovered philosophical masters in the academia. However, this rekindled interest is mostly confined to political philosophy. My intended work area in my dissertation focuses on Spinoza's theory of emotion and a possible Spinozistic theory of emotion. The study will have two main parts. The first part (Chapters 2, 3) will consist of unpacking problems of the contemporary theory of emotions in virtue of the main tension between cognitive and noncognitive theories. Cognitive theories lack bodily changes that are essential to our emotional experience, or they lack unity. Noncognitive theories (or embodied/somatic theories) lack intentionality or richness of intentionality. Although there is a wide range of views among contemporary theories, I start with the James-Lange theory and investigate its contemporary ramifications, starting with criticisms and moving on to contemporary adaptations. In the second part (Chapters 4, 5, 6), my main intention is to read and modify Spinoza's *Ethics* to introduce a theory of emotions that can respond to some problems of contemporary theories, including the cognitive and noncognitive divide. Therefore, this work will try to produce a novel reading of Spinoza's emotion theory and attempt to answer this contemporary tension in the light of this Spinozistic picture.

Keywords: emotion, affect, Spinoza, cognitive

ÖZ

BİLİŞLER VE AFEKTLER: SPINOZACI BİR DUYGU KURAMINA DOĞRU

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Geçtiğimiz birkaç on yılda Spinoza akademide yeniden keşfedilen felsefecilerin başında yer aldı. Ancak bu yeniden keşfedilen ilgi çoğunlukla siyaset felsefesiyle sınırlı kaldı. Tezimdeki çalışma alanım Spinoza'nın duygu teorisine odaklanıyor ve Spinoza'dan çıkabilecek muhtemel bir duygu kuramına bakmaya çalışıyor. Çalışma iki ana kısımdan oluşacaktır. İlk kısım (Bölüm 2, 3) çağdaş duygular teorisinin bilişsel ve bilişsel olmayan ayrımının yarattığı gerilimin çerçevesinde incelenmesinden oluşacaktır. Bilişsel duygu kuramları ya duygu deneyimimiz açısından zaruri olan bedensel/fizyolojik değişimleri açıklayamamakta ya da bir birlikten yoksun olmaktadır. Bilişsel olmayan (ya da bedensel) duygu kuramları da yönelimsellikten ya da yönelimsel zenginlikten yoksun kalmaktadır. Çağdaş teoriler arasında geniş bir görüş yelpazesi olmasına rağmen, bu çalışmaya James-Lange teorisi ve onun eleştiri ve çağdaş uyarlamaları ile başlayarak sonuçlarına değineceğim. İkinci bölümde (Bölüm 4, 5, 6), asıl niyetim, bilişsel ve bilişsel olmayan ayrımı da dahil olmak üzere çağdaş teorilerin bazı sorunlarına cevap verebilecek bir duygu teorisi tanıtmak için Spinoza'nın *Etik* kitabının yeni bir okumasını yapmak ve gerekli yerlerde değişikliklerde bulunmaktır. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma Spinoza'nın duygu teorisinin yeni

bir okumasını üretmeye ve bu çağdaş ikilemi bu Spinozacı tablo ışığında yanıtlamaya çalışacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: duygu, afekt, Spinoza, bilişsel

For my parents

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

All the abbreviations from *Ethics* started with the letter E and were followed by a Roman numeral that indicates the number of the part in the *Ethics*. The abbreviations after E and number indicate the following.

app	appendix
ax	axiom
c	corollary
dem	demonstration
doe	definition of emotions
def	definition
exp	explication
le	lemma
p	proposition
post	postulate
pref	preface
s	scholium

For example, EIIIdoe2 refers to the second definition in the Definition of Effects section at the end of Part 3 of *Ethics*. EIVp27s refers to scholium to Proposition 37 in Part 4 of *Ethics.*

Spinoza's other works are abbreviated in the following way.

KV	*Korte Verhandeling van God, de Mensch, en deszelfs Welstand (Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well-Being)*
PPC	*Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae (Principles of Cartesian Philosophy)*
TdIE	*Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione (Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect)*
TP	*Tractatus Politicus*
TTP	*Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (Theologico-Political Treatise)*

For example, TdIE, para. 29 refers to paragraph 29 in *Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect.* KV, Part II, Chapter 23 refers to Part 2, Chapter 23 of *Short Treatise on God, Man, and his Well-Being.*

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND AIM

Emotions are one of the primary aspects of our lives, whether in daily life, philosophical or scientific settings. They are ubiquitous but also challenging to explicate. However, despite their significance and prevalence, they are either unattended or, at best, deemed secondary. In the book *Valuing Emotions*, on the significance of emotions, Stocker recounts one of his talks with Buecher, who worked on theories of emotion in her doctoral and postdoctoral studies. Buecher's position was clear: "there was no need to argue for their importance" (1996, p. xiii). It is the apparent reason for studying emotions since it is prevalent and intuitively significant. However, the reason behind it still begs for a justification. From psychology, clinical neuroscience, psychoanalysis, artistic fields (such as painting, music, and cinema), and communication theories, the use of theories of emotion is widespread. All these areas presuppose some emotion theory to function well so that a slight change in the understanding of emotions might bring forth a domino effect in these disciplines. Where does a proper understanding of emotions lead us? In a way, emotions are crucial but elusive; they are inescapable dimensions of our experience that pervade almost every aspect of our lives.

Nevertheless, mostly, emotions are seen as unfavorable or even hostile to a good decision. They are sometimes considered enemies of rationality or barriers to good decisions. This negative connotation for emotions and desire appears early in Plato's dialogues. Plato wards off the body's needs and relates them to "wants, desires, fears, all sorts of illusions and much nonsense…". He blames desire and body for all wars (66b-c; 1997, p. 57).[1] Because the body is conceived as the root of all irrationalities,

[1] Plato has three claims about emotional states. First is that reason and emotion are antagonistic. Second is that emotions are inferior to reason. Third is that emotions *have to be* controlled, ideally, by reason. All three puts emotions to an inferior place and leaves it outside the boundaries of philosophy. Kenny

emotions (including desires) are hard to include in philosophy. According to Thagard and Zhu, it is a false view to see emotions as irrational, involuntary, or insignificant. They conclude that "the neglect of the role of emotion in contemporary theories of action is unjustified and that the concept of emotion deserves a distinctive position in our understanding of human action" (Zhu & Thagard, 2002, p. 20). They try to evade this criticism by saying that "even though emotions are typically not the result of deliberative, intellectual calculations, they are not *necessarily* irrational or nonrational. Emotions are evaluative and responsive patterns that emerge through the evolution of the species and the development of the individuals" (Zhu & Thagard, 2002, p. 20). It was one example of both sides of the discussion about emotion. However, in philosophy today, the odds are not stacked against emotions. Even before today, some philosophers did not see emotions in a detrimental manner. One of these philosophers was Spinoza.

In this work, I will concentrate on philosophers and psychologists only with respect to cognitive and noncognitive theories.[2] These two camps are, in fact, instantiations of the perennial mind-body problem in the history of philosophy. Discussing the cognitive and noncognitive divide through the mind-body problem would require a much broader perspective, and it might leave no space for investigating the cognitive and noncognitive divide. I do not aim to expose all theories in their entirety but only insofar as they are related to the resolution of cognitive or noncognitive views about emotions. This study will focus on whether and how a pertinent philosophy of emotions can be derived from Spinoza's philosophy or his general framework. The first half (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) will grapple with modern and contemporary developments in theories of emotion. The second half (Chapters 4, 5, 6) will try to answer how Spinoza's philosophy may respond to a possible theory of emotion.

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emphasized that condescending emotions is not peculiar to Plato. "Knowledge rather than action, belief rather than emotion, the intellect rather than the will have been the central topics of philosophical concern" (Kenny, 1963, p. 1). Apart from that, as a historian, Dixon stated that emotions were thought to be bodily and irrational and they need to be controlled by reason (2003, pp. 2–3).

[2] For the noncognitive theories, it is possible to encounter many names such as somatic, bodily, and embodied.

There has always been an ongoing debate on the definition and nature of emotions. Moreover, there is also diversity in the methodology, intentions, ontology, and structure. For the aim of this thesis, I shall focus on one of the central and visible questions that not only intersect but also underlie other presuppositions when studying such a vast and multi-faceted phenomenon. This question concerns what emotions are and indicates two opposing positions, especially in the contemporary philosophy of emotions.[3] These camps have many names, but they are coreferential or coextensive: cognitive-noncognitive, cognitive-affective, cognitive-bodily/somatic, cognitive-embodied (of course, all these dualities do not entirely have the same meaning, but in the context that I will refer to they are the same).[4] By noncognitivism, I mean the umbrella term for theories that (1) deny that cognition is necessary for eliciting an emotional response and (2) claim that emotions, as well as most affective states, are capable of being induced by distinct developmental ways or interventions.

On the contrary, for cognitive theories, cognitions, appraisals, thoughts, or judgments are not only necessary but also sufficient.[5] I will try to find an alternative framework to untangle the current tension between them in the scope of emotion theories. One might ask why there is such tension. No matter which perspective you take, there is always a compromise, and there seems to be no way to avoid it. However, whenever we have to look at emotions, either from a cognitivist or an affectivist/bodily perspective, there seems to be an essential yet unsatisfied element. Prinz elegantly

[3] Cognitive and noncognitive distinction is among five axes of tension in the study of emotions; other four are positivism-interpretivism, universalism-relativism, individual-social, and romanticism-rationalism (Lutz & White, 1986, pp. 408–409).

[4] Furtak asks "how might some of the disputed examples appear in a different light if we were to give up the assumption that emotions must be *either* bodily *or* cognitive, but not both?". And, his response to that is "in order to do justice to the complex phenomena we are dealing with, we must jettison theoretical prejudices which encourage us to pay selective attention to either the cognitive *or* the bodily aspect of emotion" (Furtak, 2010, p. 59). Here, I would like to step outside of this "either…or…".

[5] Ben-Ze'ev suggests prototypical categories rather than binary categories in the study of emotions which admit of sufficient and necessary conditions. This is simply because emotions do not have clear-cut boundaries and equal degree difference or similarity with emotional states (for instance fear and dread are closer than anger and surprise). Ben-Ze'ev calls this membership criterion that has degrees of similarity; it is graded by degrees of belonging to a certain category. In fact, it is a much less strained perspective to see them as aspects rather than entities (2001, pp. 175–176). For the time being, we will stick with that reasoning because the domain that we want to survey (emotion theories) is also dependent on such distinction.

expresses this concern: “The fact that emotions are meaningful, reason sensitive, and intentional suggests that they must be cognitive” (2003, p. 78).

On the other hand, some emotions stem from non-meaningful, arational, unintentional sources. So, at least some emotions are noncognitive. These emotions seem to be meaningful for us. However, it would then result in that meaningfulness may occur without cognition. Prinz calls this tension the emotion problem, which he summarizes in the following words: “Noncognitive states are explanatorily anaemic and cognitive states are explanatorily superfluous. Noncognitive theories give us too little, and cognitive theories give us too much. Call this the Emotion Problem” (2003, p. 78). The former comprised noncognitive states, skip representations, or intentionality. The latter, which consists of cognitive states, lacks some essential aspects of the affective phenomena, such as bodily/physiological changes, according to our common sense.

Even though the cognition-affect distinction is relatively modern, it is possible to see their development and correspondents in the history of philosophy and psychology. One central source of this distinction is mind-body dualism, which stems from viewing mind and body as manifestations of separate and mutually exclusive substances. In that sense, various philosophers are already arguing about the priority of the mental (i.e., idealists) or the extended (i.e., materialists). However, as mentioned before, I will not delve into these problems. Instead, I will follow a narrower frame. Contemporary philosophers and psychologists have debated for over a hundred years whether cognition or affect, thinking (i.e., evaluations or judgments about objects or events), or bodily changes (i.e., physiological changes that occur in our bodies) are primary.

Nevertheless, more recently, it has been agreed that neither of these sides approaches emotions faithfully, and neither an unmodified, purely cognitive nor a standard affective theory of emotion can capture the richness and diversity of our affective lives.[6] Hence, the third type of explanation, hybrid theories of emotions, emerged. These theories hold that emotions are constructs of thoughts or judgments (or beliefs)

[6] By saying this, I do not mean our inability to exhaust wide range of emotions in a numerous categories. Not even the striving to define each specific emotion is among the adversities that I try to express here.

on the one hand and affective make-up on the other, both distinct and necessary objects for eliciting emotions. According to them, neither bodily reactions/affective elements nor thought is sufficient to indicate emotions. There are two *kinds* of components; both are necessary but neither one alone is sufficient. However, what is the relation between these components? In other words, what is the relation between evaluations and bodily changes in virtue of emotion formation? The question remains unanswered.
Furthermore, without a satisfactory answer, the conjunct of these components cannot be simple and elegant. As a result, the explanandum (i.e., emotions) becomes significantly more intricate since it has numerous essential (or necessary) elements composed of multiple components without any relation to each other. This intricacy robs a theory of its elegance.

My point is that the way we pose the question about the extent of the role of bodily reactions or thoughts, and the progress made thus far is prone to change, and there is no pressing reason to perceive our current framework as ineludible. We do not have to be limited to this bipolar spectrum (i.e., cognitivist, affective, and in between). Instead, I will propose that we pose a different question to conceive the problem; consequently, I think we may be better with another framework. As a starting point, it is perfectly plausible to utilize Spinoza's expressive framework and find a better way to formulate a theory of emotion.

This work may seem anachronistic at first; the domain of study (i.e., emotions and affects) would be misplaced if the source of that study is not investigated in its proper period. On the one hand, we have a contemporary debate packed with data and complexities from numerous areas, such as psychology, sociology, neuroscience, anthropology, cognitive science, and even robotics.[7] On the other hand, there are

[7] Especially anthropology gave much room for philosophy and linguistics in contemporary study of emotion. One of the most important is about emotion words. Unlike the previous relatively uniform view about emotions (that is emotion words signify the same state in every location), especially after 1970s, indigenous focus on emotional words are studied under anthropological research (Lutz & White, 1986, p. 406). After this shift, dominant view in anthropology was based on materiality but it goes hand in hand with cognitive theories, i.e. material conditions structure our cognitive and evaluative background (Lutz & White, 1986, p. 407). This shift was rather to rationalism from empiricism in emotions research according to Harre. At first he seem to have an anti-psychologist attitude (Harré, 1986, p. vii).

historical and philosophical sources full of folk psychological explanations and rich conceptual distinctions. Even though this short list is far from exhausting the pertinent areas, it might still be sufficient to confuse where to start, how to proceed, and, most importantly, how to make sense of both.

My intuition is that Spinoza's specific philosophical contribution, nonetheless, puts it among a host of candidates that is worthwhile to explore. This contribution comes from his attempt to clarify the mind-body problem and his rejection of free will. I will claim that this solution also has essential repercussions in thinking about cognition and affect. I will claim this is consistent with Spinoza by making some arrangements and by addressing several commentators on Spinoza.

Our contemporary yet common ways of understanding emotions are full of early modern concepts. The common ways of understanding emotions are generated on strata of assumptions, which are neither directly in tune with scientific findings nor with older folk psychological forms of explanations about the nature of emotions. Given individual and group differences in the immediate experience, identifying what emotions are, as we understand them today, gets even more difficult. So, one of the most crucial criticisms of my attempt comes from a historical and contextual standpoint. We have already seen some of these common ways embedded in our dealing with affects, which is one reason why it is still relevant to our contemporary understanding. The same is applicable no matter what profession we are in or which text we are reading. Therefore, whenever we read an early modern work such as *Ethics* or *Passions of the Soul*, we are already bringing in our current conceptualizations, even without conscious deliberation.

Nevertheless, why would that be a philosophical problem? Firstly, and most importantly, there seems to be a discontinuity between the social contexts in which the term (e.g., emotion) is used. Today, we are projecting senses onto the terms and concepts appropriate to our context. However, when we take older terms as if they exist presently, we risk distorting the meanings as if they were in their original context. Secondly, there is the potential problem that the tools we use today, regardless of discipline, which we employ to invigorate the study of emotions, were unavailable in

past periods. In the history of psychology, for instance, introspection in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and brain imaging only in the late 80s were widely used. However, they were not available in the 17th and 18th centuries. Then, any conclusion drawn from earlier times might be pointless in understanding today's problems because their findings are replaced with more detailed and accurate ones owing to these new tools.

It is vital to address this complaint. Although our way of understanding emotion cannot be explicated only by employing the current scientific data that have been laid out to that day, there are still valuable elements that we can seek and incorporate. Within that perspective, we can say that this encounter comes with an understanding that current theories depend on grasping some of their philosophical commitments, most of which were interjected in the discussions and against the background of previous thinkers.[8] Secondly, with contemporary knowledge, I think we can enrich how we interpret early modern philosophical views.[9] In that vein, the critical point I will deal with in this

[8] In this study, nonetheless, I have not focused on this background in its entirety. Spinoza will stay at the forefront and only some names such as Descartes (especially in Chapter 5) will be mentioned.

[9] This intention for effective dialogue is already expressed in *Truth and Method*. Here, Gadamer introduces the term "fusion of horizons" (*Horizontverschmelzung*) to underline two inevitable directions in reading a text to ensure the inevitability of historical horizons and a sane sense of understanding (Gadamer, 2004, p. 305). Thus, Gadamer's pre-judgments or commitments are necessary ingredients and, in fact, motors behind the shifts and new fits to provide and promote successful communication between two texts (Vessey, 2009, p. 531). Moreover, in a similar vein, Cook also agrees that Spinoza qualifies as a philosopher whose philosophy includes some salient features of both scholastic and naturalistic philosophies, and that point makes Spinoza among one of the more suitable figures to bridge the traditional and the contemporary (Cook, 1990, p. 93).[9] Briefly, both our current understandings and the text itself are transformed, and Spinoza's texts lend themselves readily to this approach to generate fruitful results. The second defense against anachronism comes from a pragmatic outlook. That is, whatever works or is useful, can be accepted. Diversity and details in emotion studies are still progressing and we cannot demand an encapsulating picture from Spinoza or any earlier thinker but I believe that we can ask for a more useful scheme for making sense of them. Thus, if Spinoza's system allows us to properly resolve some of the current issues (albeit not without a different set of questions), then we may pass on the criticism based on anachronism. A third defense is simply that the philosophy of emotions still operates on some of the writings of Aristotle, the Stoics, James or Hume.[9] So, why not Spinoza? Even if we draw a line based on the timescale, this line would be arbitrary and begs for a justification. So, even if there should be an explanation, this burden of explaining lays at the side of that arbitrary line that neglects early modern literature on emotions. A final defense may come from the history of the keyword "emotion". The understanding of the word emotion (yet not the entire understanding of the emotional phenomena) follows a continuous line with some breaks. These breaks, nonetheless, do not stop us from being inspired by those early modern (and even older) traditions. Therefore, the anachronism complaint may better be substituted with a demand for clarification of the keyword emotion (as a starting point) and how it is evolved and changed its meaning, even though it would be brief. However, such as clarification deserves more space as much as it is needed. So, I will reserve this defense and clarification for the final section of this chapter.

work is this: How can *Ethics* be read as providing a ground for overcoming the difficulties of contemporary emotions theories? Of course, it would be impossible to exhaust all the literature on the philosophy and psychology of emotions or Spinoza. In that, I will limit my scope just to examining some of the crowning representatives of contemporary theories of emotion that are explained in the emotion theories literature.

One important point to clarify before moving on to the methodology and scope sections is Spinoza's place in general contemporary understanding of the mind. A philosopher, Marshall, says, "Spinoza has something importantly informative to say about the nature of the mind, then it would be helpful if we had an accurate and comprehensive account of it" (2013, p. 7). Another philosopher, England, sees Spinoza's philosophy as an opportunity to overcome mind-body dualism (2018, p. 1). This view parallels what we have seen about the cognitive-noncognitive divide being an instantiation of the mind-body problem. A neuroscientist, Damasio, states that Spinoza gets central features of the mind right (2003, p. 8). However, the main issue is to unpack which points were informative and what these central features were right. Our guiding problems about emotions start with the first part of this study, and our source will mainly be *Ethics* in the second part.

1.1. Methodology and Scope

Dąbrowski claims that emotions are essential for theoretical and practical concerns (Dąbrowski, 2016, p. 17). Here, our scope is narrowed to the theoretical. As this work aims to be philosophically and conceptually relevant, it does not necessarily seek any of the detailed answers, responses, or case studies required by (affective) neuroscience, psychology, cognitive science, psychiatry, anthropology, and related areas, since all of these areas demand analysis on a different scope and a different level than philosophical work.[10] In other words, the level of explanation and the literature are

[10] All in all, emotions might be said to be philosophically relevant without even any further justification. "From what used to be considered a relatively unimportant and extremely messy terrain likely to defeat any attempts at systematic theorizing, emotions have become one of the favorite playgrounds of philosophers, who have recognized the importance of deepening our understanding of this fundamental

targeted to the theories of emotion and philosophy of emotions.[11] Of course, there are certain overlaps since the nature of the question is intricate, and this is not only much needed but also necessary.

Nevertheless, the specific domain of the discussion will be left at the conceptual level. I will borrow various concepts from other disciplines to develop a theory of emotion (e.g., representation, intentionality, and relational theme).[12] Additionally, this work neither intends to pinpoint and resolve different tendencies in the disciplines above nor compare their relative strengths and weaknesses. However, that would be a different and worthwhile project to follow. Instead, I will examine the concepts and resources inherent to the history and practice of philosophy and psychology.

The general scope of the target of this work is enormous, as any emotion study would require (Scarantino, 2012, p. 361). It is because of "the difficulty in encompassing the heterogeneity of a category that ranges from blind panic to joy in complex music" (England, 2018, p. 2). My objective is to find a solution to debates about whether appraisals, affectivity, or body are fundamental to explicating emotions. So, my guiding questions are the questions posed when trying to explain affective phenomena in general (such as which aspects of the emotions this theory/perspective included or left out). I believe that Spinoza's texts (*Ethics*, in particular) can respond to the posed questions about the nature of emotions for a better understanding.

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aspect of human life. This is manifest in the variety and richness of the debates around which the contemporary philosophical discussions are structured" (J. Deonna et al., 2015, p. 203).

[11] Philosophers mainly rely on reflection on personal experiences, thought experiments and texts on history of philosophy and literature. Affective scientists do not consider preserving this as a worthwhile pursuit, yet both of these areas can benefit from reasoning in different types of conceptual frameworks. That does not entail philosophers of emotions and affective scientists have mutually exclusive views. One subset of their thinking similarly is observed under naturalism. Still, there might be some difference regarding their objectives: "Unlike specialized affective scientists, who favor depth over breadth, naturalistic philosophers of emotions tend to become conversant in a variety of empirical literatures, learn to translate their disciplinary concerns and terminologies into a common language, and try to mediate among competing scientific viewpoints, often with the ultimate objective of integrating them into a coherent whole" (Scarantino, 2016, p. 4).

[12] Nash claims that even for a general framework, a unified theory on nature of emotion is hard to suggest. A plural account might be a more tenable approach (1989, pp. 501–502).

Nevertheless, one might question what can be gained from such a study. Saying that emotions are ubiquitous does not qualify it among candidates for a good topic. Emotions do certain things, such as augmenting or hindering our powers of cognition. One may ponder the necessity or usefulness of an emotion theory, and Solomon answers quite well why we need one.

> As we theorize about emotions, what we should want is the best theory, that is, not just a theory that confirms our own folk psychology nor just a theory that embraces the fast-coming findings of the sciences, but a theory that we can use to understand, guide, and take responsibility for our emotional lives. A good theory of emotions, in other words, should make us not just smarter but better people as well. (Solomon, 2007, p. 126)

They can make individuals more (or less) powerful and give their interpersonal relations meaning. Even for some, they give life color and its specific shade. Emotions are also of immense importance in clinical settings (Plutchik, 2000, pp. 3–4). There is a wide range of affective disorders and a plethora of symptoms that are related to emotional well-being. From this, we can grasp that the functions and effects of emotions make them a worthwhile domain to research.

My concern is not whether Spinoza anticipated some recent scientific findings. Scientific findings in their entirety are another enterprise. However, to form a well-rounded roadmap, it is crucial to note some similarities or symmetries between his and current theories. One of the most successful and popular works that bring light to this issue is Damasio's *Looking for Spinoza,* with the subtitle *Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain* (2003). He shows similarities with the neuroscientific data and what Spinoza has predicated on the nature of the mind-body. Less known but still similar paths are followed by Heidi Ravven (2003). My view involves taking into account their viewpoints, and I still hold that Spinoza has not just anticipated the findings of modern neuroscience. Still, his framework allowed us to alter the basis of how we think about emotions in emotion theories in philosophy and psychology literature.

As I have laid down the place of emotions and which domains and methods will be important in this work, I include the specific points addressed in each chapter. In this introductory chapter, I highlight the importance of emotions and emotions theories. I also address one essential tension in emotions theories, which is cognitive and

affective. Spinoza's framework resolves this tension and offers a more elegant ontology for emotions bringing both cognitive elements (such as intentionality) and bodily elements (such as visceral changes) without introducing different concepts and methods.[13] In the criteria and desiderata section, I focus on numerous criteria for a proper emotion theory from the contemporary and modern theories of emotions studies. It must be accepted that neither theory can answer them satisfactorily, and Spinoza is no exception.

Nevertheless, here I pick out some of the most important ones. In the last section of this chapter, I aim to briefly clarify the words “affect” and “emotion” with an eye on history. It can also be read as a defense against anachronism because there is still continuity. In the second chapter, I will introduce James' understanding of emotion and the James-Lange theory, which is the starting point of modern theories of emotion both in philosophy and psychology, although there were ideas and opinions about emotions before. I will include its criticism and defense, which mostly revolve around the problem of intentionality (i.e., the James-Lange theory lacks intentionality). Chapter 3 will focus on the first strand of reactionary emotion theories (against the James-Lange). After surveying the most elaborate attempts in psychology (appraisal theories), I will move on to embodied theories among contemporary theories of emotions. As they try to incorporate what is lacking most in the prior theories (such as intentionality and evaluation), they become more successful but, at the same time, more intricate and complex. In Chapter 4, the spotlight will be turned to Spinoza's ontology and the three main concepts in his ontology.

Along with the view of human nature (an expression of nature), his ontology is vital because it lays the groundwork for bridging the gap between cognitive and noncognitive, first in terms of extended and thinking attributes and later in terms of body and mind. This movement does not only overcome the Cartesian split view but also overcomes it with a simple but layered ontology. In Chapter 5, I will concentrate on Spinoza's theory of ideas, which stems from his substance as an expression, as a

[13] This claim is not against plurality of concepts and methods but the extraneouty of concepts and methods.

mode. Here, his understanding of the mind (which is an idea) will also be explicated. In the last section of this chapter, I will aim to represent features of ideas and minds so we can see how directedness, aboutness, and intentionality will be addressed. However, this is insufficient to situate him in a theory of emotion. In Chapter 6, I plan to show how his representational view of ideas formed a different flavor of cognitivism along with the expressive and assertive force of each idea apart from its content. Among the sections of this chapter, I will propose a more nuanced reading of Spinoza in which his basic/primitive emotions are construed as affective dimensions to model more complex emotions. In this vein, this chapter will strive to unveil how the relation between idea, affect, *conatus,* and activity can be unraveled. The outcome of this reading is intended to address the cognitive and noncognitive divide by overcoming both difficulties.

As the last chapter demonstrates, the route in this work requires modifying some aspects of Spinoza's framework, in the light of contemporary theories, without distorting it. My central aim is, in general, to clarify how Spinoza would serve as a foundation for an emotion theory. To understand Spinoza in terms of current modern emotion research comes only as a by-product. Thus, there would be a fusion of horizons, but this perspective emphasizes deliberating on achieving a pertinent contemporary understanding of emotions with an elegant framework.

However, one might ask, why Spinoza rather than someone else? One of the reasons is that the relation between emotion and Spinoza is not entirely left unattended (S. B. Duffy, 2009, p. 125). However, my intuition is that intrinsic aspects put Spinoza among a group of candidates for this topic. Firstly, unlike most early modern philosophers who underlined the importance of reason to the exclusion of all else, Spinoza emphasized the importance of body and emotions in building a social and individual life, albeit his system can be interpreted as a strictly rational one. This rationality can transform passive emotions, or passions, into active ones, only insofar as reason is considered an emotion. This transformative power of reason marks an essential turn in Spinoza's understanding of self-transformation and improvement of well-being.

Moreover, emotions also become rational, but they stem from either inadequate or adequate ideas (Lloyd, 1998, p. 38). This emphasis does not only indicate a rupture from the early modern period but from the enlightenment as well. This rupture is the view championed by Israel (2001, Chapter 2). Secondly, he has written about emotions. Part III of the *Ethics* is devoted to developing a theory of emotions and analysis of 48 different emotions.[14] Not only that, but Part III is also the fundamental bridge between what a human mind is and how humans act in nature and society.

So, which methods would gain a prominent place in this inquiry? First, the question we try to answer should be aimed at the correct resolution, that is, at the right scale for that phenomenon (Lyons, 2001, pp. 228–230). In affective situations, the descending signaling from the ventromedial prefrontal cortex would not be interesting. Instead, we should aim at a functional level of explanation and framework. As Mun states:

> Alpha-Omega Principle of Interdisciplinary Enquiry: Any object of enquiry can be understood from various perspectives, which may each yield a distinct view, theory, or language, and the truths of each perspective are ultimately *united by the shared object of enquiry.* (Mun, 2019, p. 43)

Although there are various perspectives, we will focus on a distinct one that can be identified as a Spinozistic one in which we deal with conceptual clarifications and synthesis between several frameworks about emotions in philosophy and psychology.[15] For Walker, this method can be contrasted with Descartes'. The Cartesian style is based on an analysis of concepts and intuitions, whereas Spinoza's method can be called a synthetic method in *Ethics* (Walker, 1985, pp. 16–17).[16] Another methodological feature is that there is a distinction between prescriptive and descriptive accounts. As we will see, Spinoza seems primarily descriptive, but his use

[14] He also acknowledges that this list is far from being exhaustive.

[15] In his psychology chapter, Della Rocca says that "Spinoza nowhere takes up these puzzles about increase in power of acting, and so it is hard to be sure whether he would try to solve them in the ways I have just suggested. But these answers are clearly Spinozistic, even if not Spinoza's." (Della Rocca, 2008b, p. 172) This is what I will try to do in this work.

[16] Geometrical method (beware that it is not the same as the form of exposition) is clear and concise and "its conclusions can then contested legitimately only by those who can produce counter-arguments similarly supported" (Harris, 1992, p. 18). Despite this, Walker claims that if Spinoza had to live long enough, "we should have had from Spinoza a work analogous to Descartes' *Meditations*; and perhaps Spinoza would have had a juster appreciation from his philosophical successors" (1985, p. 18).

of revisionary metaphysics, as Strawson would call it, has some prescriptive elements (including radical new definitions for old concepts such as substance or mode). This prescription makes it hard to map a Spinozistic definition of emotions and any folk category as natural kinds (Scarantino, 2012, p. 365).[17] Here, I will not follow the question of whether emotions are natural kinds, but the reading of Spinoza allows the questions to dissolve since it implies that categories such as universality, naturality, and activity stay in a spectrum. Furthermore, this reasoning discards the separation of the categories, such as higher and lower emotions, because these states all take place in an affective spectrum (England, 2018, p. 3).

1.2. Criteria and Desiderata for a Proper Theory of Emotion

This chapter will look at what an emotion theory should accomplish. The question of what an emotion theory is can be thought of as what an emotion theory should consist of because the elements of emotion theories (i.e., emotions, moods, sentiments, and other affective states) are hard to pinpoint in nature or hard to witness in interpersonal space. Rather, it is still the concern of a smaller group when compared to society and all humans at large. It was the obvious case, but do we know what emotion is? Although emotions are thought to be more natural phenomena than emotion theories, they are still hard to define and suffer from problems in definition (Matravers, 2005, p. 3).

What an emotion is has many answers from many theorists, thinkers, and researchers. One of the things it has to achieve is distinguishing emotions from other affective states, such as moods and sentiments, and non-emotional states, such as sensations and perceptions. We can see that even definitional issues require many discernments and cannot be answered without referring to other phenomena. Considering that there are numerous other aspects than definitional issues of a proper emotion theory, there is an

[17] "The emotion debate is structured by an underlying philosophical anthropology in which mind and body are separate, primarily in terms of a separation between higher and lower functions of the brain, so that cognition is understood as necessarily "cool," deliberate, mentalistic, and linguistically sophisticated, while paradigmatic "basic" emotions are understood as bodily processes, "hot," involuntary, primitive, and devoid of intelligence" (England, 2018, p. 3).

even harder condition to satisfy completely. So, it would not be inconvenient to downregulate our expectations for a proper theory of emotion.

Nonetheless, we might distinguish two parts in defining what emotion is. They are constituent and causal parts. The former refers to an emotion's essential parts (or affective state). In other words, constituent parts of emotion are only the parts or components that necessarily take place in the definition of emotion. On the other hand, the latter would be one of those parts of analyzing an emotion (or an affective state). Imagine a fearful scenario in which we hear a buzzing sound coming closer at night in an unknown land. Surely, our heart begins to beat harder and faster. Our minds fill with fearful thoughts, or we might even feel panic. We might evaluate that our situation would worsen if we did not leave that place. All of these can *describe* an emotional event, but what *defines* fear in that case? This example shows us what criteria focus mostly on (i.e., definitional and explanation issues).[18] The main distinction for this work's first part (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3) is between the cognitive and affective emotion theories. Cognitive theories, for example, include all the thoughts and evaluations *in* the definition of emotion. Those evaluations of the situation do not just elicit emotions but constitute them. An increase in heart rate or body temperature does not necessarily mark an emotional episode; thus, cognitivists disregard these as constitutive factors in affective phenomena in general. For cognitivist theories, evaluations or cognitive activity usually both constitute and elicit an emotional period. In our example, fear might be caused and constituted by evaluations of the impending danger of the immediate situation.

On the other hand, for affective or noncognitive theories, the constitutive components of emotion consist of bodily changes such as vasodilation, visceral changes, body temperature, and heart rate changes. According to these theories, cognitive evaluations are not essential, necessary, and sufficient to constitute an emotion. These evaluations

[18] Of course, explanations of emotions are multi-layered. For example, a physiological level may involve neurotransmitter releases, somatic activities, blood pressure and arousal changes, heart rate shifts, alterations in the muscle tone and so on and so forth. On the psychological side, however, we may talk about feeling, cognition or motivating components. The philosophical level may consist of functionality, intentionality and/or rationality of emotions and how they will result in a social setting (Ben-Ze'ev, 2001, p. 175).

can, at best, be causally relevant, which might make them sufficient conditions for saying that the situation reliably elicits an emotional episode. In that fearful case, as we will see in James' theory, the immediate and constitutive factor in the fear episode might result in an increase in heart rate, even though the causal component does not have to be composed of just bodily changes.

In light of this caveat, we may look at several attempts. However, it is not necessary to accomplish our aims. Rather we may compare Scarantino's and the compressed form in the appendix to provide a short checklist for criteria. Although I am aware that Spinoza's emotion theory might not achieve all of them, the basis I propose might be a good basis to achieve them all. Here is the condensed list.

i. Definitions, distinctions, and explanatory issues[19]
ii. Origins and development
iii. Functions, consequences, and their relationship to well-being
iv. Intentionality, phenomenology, and representation
v. Elicitation, causal contexts, and normativity

As we can see, all of these points overlap with Scarantino's to a certain degree. Contemporary emotion researchers share these concerns because a fulfilled criteria list would ensure a satisfactory account of emotion. Although more diverse and comprehensive lists can be made, I will now focus on what a Spinozistic theory of emotion (not Spinoza's) can address and fulfill provisionally. The list is too vast to be responded to by an early modern philosopher in general and by Spinoza in particular.

We need to establish desiderata so we do not get overwhelmed while covering all these criteria. When we look at these questions, most of them, if not all, are not relatable to early modern philosophy directly. In other words, in order to fairly and effectively evaluate our Spinozistic theory against the other contemporary theories, we must see how well it accounts for these five criteria. Here, we will zoom in on (i), (ii), and (iv) within a Spinozistic framework and, hopefully, a Spinozistic theory of emotion. Both (iii) and (v) are, in fact, largely related to Spinoza's philosophical project, especially

[19] For more details on this and a more comprehensive list, see Appendix A.

in Part V of *Ethics.* However, they deserve a distinct project; such focus would go off on a tangent. Chapter 4 will deal with the origin (ii), bodily, according to a Spinozistic framework. Chapter 5 will focus on compensating for noncognitive theories' lack of intentionality (iv). Chapter 6 will combine those aspects and carve them into a theory of emotion, where affects and emotions can be distinguished concerning a dimensional understanding (i).

1.3. A Note on Conceptual Clarification

This section will include a very brief clarification of the word "emotion" and "affect," which will be used pervasively in this work but especially in Chapter 6. Most of the time, however, in Spinoza and contemporary psychology literature, they are used synonymously (see Oatley, 2004, pp. 3–4). For specific and novel distinctions in Spinoza, we have to wait until Chapter 6, where he pushes those definitions for a more scientifically apprehendable basis underneath the surface of early modern terminology. The reason for this clarification is to show that there is still continuity in using "emotion" through different periods. Although there are differences in the use of the term emotion and other affective terms (like moods, sentiments, and affects), the variety can be attributed to different uses in various domains and worldviews rather than changes in the timeframes *per se*. Also, I will briefly focus on the first instances of its scientific use in the 19th century to show similar concerns with Spinoza.

Emotion is used to capture many other terms such as "passion," "sentiment," "affection," "affect," "disturbance," "movement," "perturbation," "upheaval," "appetite," and their Greek, Latin, German, or French cognates" (Scarantino, 2016, pp. 4–5). The first meaning, according to the OED, is generally "movement; distance; perturbation; or an instance of this" . That means, still today, our current use of the word emotion demonstrates some aspects of this definition. Take a more contemporary one in the Oxford Dictionary (2010) which states "a strong feeling deriving from one's circumstances, mood, or relationships with others". Unlike the older definition, it gets more refined and limited during this period. This definition is the closest to the rawest understanding of emotions. Depending on the context, it can capture several or even all of them. It is hard to deny its continuity if we take it to encapsulate all of them (Schmidt, 2014, p. 85). It is not the case that emotions do not exist before the 19th

century, unlike the reasoning that links the existence of emotions just to labels. There were various lexicons for emotional experience before positing “emotions” (Frevert, 2014, p. 16). The word “emotion” was chosen as an umbrella term (Dixon, 2012, p. 338). However, the current understanding of emotions is different from its earlier sense because it cannot be attributed to something beyond the mind or, at least, some mindedness. If one difference can be attributed to changing periods in the use of the term “emotion”, then this would be the restriction of its use within the domain of the mind. Although emotions are better used in the widest sense possible, a more comprehensive term would be “affectivity”. As we will see in the last chapter, affectivity includes not only emotions but also states such as moods, sentiments or even temperaments. Therefore, while keeping “affectivity” as a more comprehensive term, we will piece apart the differences in the last chapter.

According to OED, the term “affect” means “senses related to the mind” in general and “feeling towards or in favor of a person or thing; kindly feeling, affection; (also) an instance of this” in particular. Another Oxford Dictionary (2010) reads “emotion or desire as influencing behaviour”. For Solomon, affects, unlike emotions, are unruly and primitive (Solomon, 2007, p. 50). Along with passions, affects are mainly used as ineffable and indescribable mental phenomena in religious literature, including concepts such as salvation and damnation. As we will see, in *Ethics*, there are two translations for the term *affectus.* The first one is affect, and the second is emotion. However, given Spinoza's efforts in the definitions in Part III of *Ethics*, both affect and emotion seems plausible translations insofar as they are expressed in that particular sense mentioned above.

Nevertheless, I will revisit these definitions in the second part of this work. Another term is affection. Again in Oxford Dictionary (2010), affection is first defined very broadly; as “the action or process of affecting or being affected”, although it has another meaning which reads “a mental state; an emotion”. Most literature sticks with affection as the most broadly construed term followed by emotions, and the most primitive is affects. Rather than investigating the root of those general discriminations between affections, emotions, and affects, I will focus on their distinctions only insofar as they are related to Spinoza's philosophy in Chapter 6.

Because it has one of the most generalized use, we may continue with the word emotion unless it is specifically meant otherwise. When we take a look at the semantic and etymological properties, we see that the word is imported from French (*émotion*); it means physical disturbance, and it can include not just individual disturbances but "anything at all, from the weather, or a tree, to the human body" (Diller, 2010; Dixon, 2012). Although the word emotion appeared first around the 16th century, only in the mid-19th century did it become a full-fledged scientific term, especially through the influence of two physicians, Charles Bell and Thomas Brown (Dixon, 2012, p. 338).[20] These two figures contributed to emotion becoming a distinct and secular area of study for medical purposes. In that sense, their views about the concept of emotion are important because it supports the view that "emotion" term is used continuously. Bell influenced Darwin and James and became a prominent figure in the physiology of expression, which he defined as the study of "serviceable associated habits". He allocated a specific constitutive role of bodily movements for various functions in the body (Dixon, 2012, p. 341). Changes in the individual nerves, Bell says, might elicit changes in the mind, particularly as emotional expressions (1824, pp. 4–5). Further, according to him, the operation of the organs of expression preceded "the mental emotions with which they are to be joined" and strengthened and directed them (Bell, 1824, p. 20). All people experienced the same "internal feelings and emotions or passions" because of the uniform operation of the bodily organs (Bell, 1824, p. 21). So, we can assume that Bell thinks a common blueprint of emotions can be found in our bodily structures and functions. The second important figure is Brown. For Dixon, Brown is the inventor of emotions, and he subsumed "appetites", "affections," and "passions" into the category of emotion (2003, p. 109, 2012, p. 340).[21] At first, the term "emotion" was a combination of two categories, affections and passions, especially after it was introduced into moral philosophy by Thomas Brown (Dixon,

[20] Dixon expressed the idea elsewhere; "A variety of terms have been used over the centuries to designate what we now call 'emotion,' a term that came into use in the English language during the 17th and 18th centuries as a translation of the French term *émotion* but did not designate 'a category of mental states that might be systematically studied' until the mid-19th century" (Dixon, 2003, 2012, p. 338; Solomon, 2008).

[21] Diller criticizes Dixon for using invention and creation indiscriminately. The word emotion had already been in the use at the time Brown redefined it (Diller, 2010, p. 127).

2012, pp. 340–341). Brown purports that emotions can be distinguished from sensations because they are not as immediate. Emotions, according to him, result from mental consideration. One of the methodologically reasons for taking them with such distinction would be that Brown treats emotions boldly, as he could any mental phenomena. He says:

> The exact coincidence, in this respect, of the physics of mind and of matter, it is important that you should have constantly before you, that you may not be led to regard the comparative indistinctness and vagueness of the mental phenomena as a warrant for greater boldness of assertion, and looseners of reasoning with respect to them. (T. Brown, 1822, p. 65)

Both Bell and Brown agree that emotions are mental, but they disagree about the constituents of emotions. Bell offered that the mental experience of emotions is physiologically induced, whereas Brown, as understood from the passage above, defended mental effects in mental experience.

We can only elaborate on the scope of continuities from the past to now only insofar as the term emotion would prove to be useful in diverse areas, such as political philosophy and psychology. Otherwise, some may take another extreme path which includes the claim: "No one really felt emotions before about 1830s" (Watt Smith, 2015). However, this would be loading too much on the keyword rather than the phenomena it refers to. If we were to accept this claim, then we might even doubt the usage of the word emotion today.[22]

On the other hand, I agree with Scarantino in stating that these concepts, including emotions, do not *completely* map unto our uses today. In his words:

> None of these terms was used precisely as we use it today, none overlaps completely with our contemporary "emotion" category, and none was used in the exact same way by different authors. In the interest of simplicity, I disregard the nuances of translation between alternative terminologies, and count as emotion theories all theories that focus on affective categories that are "close enough" to what we call emotions today, in the sense that they comprise a sufficient number of the more specific states (e.g., joy, anger, fear) we count as emotions in contemporary taxonomies. (Scarantino, 2016, p. 5)

[22] This skeptical is not unheard of. For communicative and methodological reasons some researchers follow this path (see E. Duffy, 1941; see P. E. Griffiths, 2013). On the other hand, it might be useful in everyday circumstances but not in an academic setting (see Ben-Ze'ev, 2001, p. 167).

Here, the middle way would be this: to the extent that we take emotions to refer to a more detailed phenomenon, the less historical continuity (of the term emotion) we observe. This continuity applies to any broadly defined term.[23] It forces us to narrow our scope to the contexts in which emotions are used. This context is Spinoza, for our case.

To expect an in-depth historical analysis would lead us astray from philosophical use and how that study can benefit a contemporary understanding. Although the "emotion" or "emotions" as a concept is not a unanimous translation in *Ethics*, several remarks make the project worthwhile of reading them as analogs to today's understanding.[24] Unlike the connotations of scholarly works and early modern notices on mental science, emotions can be opened up for various types of investigation, including morality, religion, and natural science (Dixon, 2012, pp. 341–342). As Spinoza is infamous for taking a scholastic term and redefining it in terms of his own philosophy, it is hard to discern whether there is a continuity between less debatable words such as affection and passion. For this reason, we have to look at how he describes the emotion and how he defines specific affective phenomena. There are at least two reasons to put Spinoza among those who break from moralist and religious forms of explaining emotions. The first takes its roots in the preface to Part II of *Ethics*. Spinoza says, without hesitation, that he will treat "human actions and appetites just as if it were an investigation into lines, planes, or bodies" (EIIpref). The second one is that we see an actual attempt at charting an incomplete list of emotions comprised of 48. Even this attempt is sufficient to consider Spinozistic theories when studying emotions. In addition, Spinoza was an inheritor of the former and narrower concepts, namely affections and passions. Nevertheless, his conceptualization involves contrasting active affections with passive affections, which parallel "affections" and "passions" to "emotions" (Dixon, 2012, p. 342). In Chapter 6, we will look at" active and passive" and provide further distinction for classifying aspects of emotions such as valence.

[23] Dixon responds that categorizing all discrete feeling states under a single conceptual definition. "How could anyone possibly devise a single theory, or a simple conceptual definition, that could cover such a wide range of different mental states? The answer is that no one could" (Dixon, 2012, p. 340).

[24] I have supplied Chapter 6 with several definitions of Latin *affectus*, as it is read in original *Ethics*.

Still, for some theorists, this may indicate a necessity to divide emotion theories on the basis of active and passive or complex and simple. Historically "theorists distinguished especially between 'passions' on the one hand and 'affections' on the other" (Dixon, 2012, p. 339). In the contemporary scene, this perspective of two kinds reemerges into the scene once again (Hutchinson, 2009, p. 64; Johnson, n.d.). One instance is Paul Griffiths. According to him, emotions are not natural kinds (P. E. Griffiths, 2013, pp. 219–220).[25] The importance of that claim is that it stratifies the emotion concept so that further study should take care of these different concepts within separate domains of study with different methods (e.g., social emotions and natural emotions). For this claim, in other words, what we call "emotions" in its entirety does not map onto a single category. They are better off being contained in at least two classes, such as basic and complex.[26] However, there is ample reason to stick with the word emotion (and affect) because, as we have seen, they have historical continuity without much deviation, even though it is rather a broad category. Otherwise, we should inquire into a subclass of emotion from a different perspective with different methods, resulting in a diminished connection between different domains of emotions studies and between everyday life and research on emotion(s). Perhaps, one might think that it is a better idea to abandon the concept altogether. However, again, then, the social use of the word emotion and the current research beg explanation. It seems that because there is a complexity, we have to bridge philosophical understanding, general public discourse, and to a certain extent, scientific understanding.

> If the science of emotion is supposed to provide an explanation of a widely experienced kind of mental state, and in terms that can be communicated to the general public, then it might be better to stick with the complexity, fuzziness, and overinclusivity of "emotion" than to retreat still further from the world of everyday concerns into new scientific jargons. (Dixon, 2012, p. 343)

Moreover, to discard the word emotion would be to pull the ground underneath affective sciences. After all, they would be devoid of conceptual unity or a common

[25] There is a vast literature of natural kinds status of emotions in both philosophy and psychology literature. I will not delve into these discussions, but for more information see Barrett, 2006; Charland, 2002, 2005; England, 2020; P. E. Griffiths, 2013; Scarantino, 2012.

[26] This is also reverberated in James' understanding of emotions since in his early article he starts by examining emotions in two groups, which are standard and non-standard (W. James, 1884).

domain, leaving the field clueless about why and how they are working on the *same* phenomenon. This lack of a common domain might pose an even greater danger for affective sciences.

In the next chapter, we will move our attention to the first modern theory of emotion, the James and Lange theory, which lays the groundwork for further studies in the contemporary scene of emotion studies. James' emotion theory influenced both strands of contemporary emotion theories (cognitive and noncognitive) since it showed what has to be remedied (intentionality/representation) and what has to be incorporated.

CHAPTER 2

A PARADIGM CASE IN MODERN THEORIES OF EMOTIONS: THE JAMES-LANGE THEORY OF EMOTION

This chapter will focus on early emotion theories in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, starting mainly with William James. The reason for including him is that "James's theory has arguably had a more profound impact on 20th-century emotion theory and research than any other previous theory, either as an inspiration or as a foil" (Scarantino, 2016, p. 12). And the motivation for analyzing the latter is that it sets the stage for situating what we understand when we talk about cognition.

Separately both James and Lange put emphasis on the bodily nature of emotion. The relation of emotions and moods to the body started a new dimension of thinking. Before them, the focus on the body is not properly refined and articulated.[27] But as said before, their theories do not extinguish the power of cognitive interventions; they only emphasize the body as the primary aspect of forming emotions, feelings, or states that can be derived from the body. Thus, for *most* (but not all) of the theories in this group, we can have emotions without making any judgments at all (Prinz, 2012, p. 243).

Simply put, judgments are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions to elicit an emotional response. On the other hand, one might ask whether it is tenable to contend that physiological responses are necessary and sufficient. In addition, one might rightfully ask whether blood flow to a face or simply tension in the orbicularis oculi,

[27] For this reason, as I mentioned before, to read an early modern text on emotions only in terms of contemporary concepts and terminologies is at best anachronistic. However, to a certain extent it is unavoidable.

for instance, would suffice us to call it an emotion, say surprise or joy.[28] After all, sensations in the body that create a feeling, whether conscious or not, are different from sensations in general (Ellsworth, 1994, p. 224).

This type of forming emotions is a paradigmatic case in the emotion theories because they include the presuppositions about two basic entities in constructing emotions in terms of the constitution (i.e., what is essential to call an experienced emotion in particular or affective in general) and temporal order (i.e., whether a mental cause or a bodily cause appear to trigger the emotion).

2.1. The James-Lange Theory of Emotion and the Intentionality Problem

In this section, I will focus on the James and Lange Theory. Modern theories of emotions start with William James (Redding, 1999, p. 7). At least, it is accurate to say its impact is unrivaled hitherto. In the last quarter of the 19th century, William James (and later Carl Lange) exposed a rather uncommon way of thinking about emotion.[29] Their theory, which is named the James-Lange theory in the literature thereafter, is derived from several articles and books, starting from James' "What is an emotion?" (1884) and continuing with the compilation book *The Emotions* (1922), which includes articles by both James and Lange.[30] Although they emphasized bodily effects greatly, their views on the source of bodily influence differed.

The main provocative idea behind the James-Lange theory is the following overturning (reversal of the order of events), as James summarized:

> Our natural way of thinking about these standard emotions [*emotions such as surprise, curiosity, rapture, fear, anger, and lust that can be characterised both with mental and bodily states*] is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives

[28] Even cognitive theories does not totally deny that bodily effects should be present. It is not surprising that these effects can be among necessary conditions for emotion.

[29] After Brentano, psychology included not just consciousness but also with "intentional or representational states" (Scarantino, 2016, p. 26).

[30] In between, Carl Lange's influential work *On Emotions: A Psycho-Physiological Study* in 1885 and James' modifying article to his former work *The physical basis of emotions* in 1894 have solidified their views and made a lasting impact. Last but not the least, there is also a chapter on emotions in James' epitome, *Principles of Psychology* which is first published in 1890.

> rise to the bodily expression. My thesis, on the contrary, is that *the bodily changes follow directly the* PERCEPTION *of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur* IS *the emotion.* (1884, pp. 189–190)

James tried to present a view that *prioritizes* bodily changes only after perceiving a competent stimulus. James' emphasis on perception is largely neglected by the common view attributed to him. Ellsworth pointed out that in spite of a century of fame, the understatement of perception in James' theory of emotion is one of its most crucial misunderstandings, and in fact (as it stays in the passage above), it does not play just a subsidiary role (1994, pp. 223–224). His identification with extreme reliance on bodily processes is based only on a *prima facie* judgment. This prejudice, however, is not entirely unwarranted.[31] In an example, he states that stage fright, for instance, affects each person in some measure and "as soon as he feels the eyes of a number of strangers fixed up him, even though he be inwardly convinced that their feeling towards him is of no practical account" (W. James, 1884, pp. 195–196). Thus, there is hardly any role for judgment once the context and body are set to produce a specific emotion.[32] That he totally neglects judgment can be seen as an expression of his aim. According to him, we regard emotions as "products of more general causes (as 'species' are now regarded as products of heredity and variation)", and the mere distinguishing and cataloging becomes of subsidiary importance (W. James, 1983, p. 449).

[31] According to Reisenzein, Meyer and Schützwohl, the traditional view that interprets James's theory as "emotions are bodily feelings" does more justice than Ellsworth (1995, pp. 758–759). Nevertheless, I think authors do not take into account the causal relation of perception to other physiological activities. It is certainly true that emotions are defined as mentioned by James but perception is also among one of modifiers of (despite not being a source or cause) emotion. Whether this interpretation is wholly consistent with James' writings on emotion is another topic of investigation.

[32] A Darwinian selection on the population scale cannot account for individual variety in organisms, especially when the level of intricacy of the organism gets high up the ladder. James is aware that connate adaptation or "signature of special relations stamped on nervous system" cannot wholly explain minute variations in emotional expression (W. James, 1884, pp. 191, 194). They are rather contextual. Evolutionary principles is well-embedded into his system of thought. This missing link must not be left unattended since without such an explanation our emotional machinery would be woven with the same piece of equipment (W. James, 1884, p. 195). There is, nonetheless, so much to learn and adapt in a lifetime in terms of emotional responses—in modern terms it is met with the word ontogenetic. James puts the effects of learning in emotion to consideration only to the extent that it modifies individual sensitivities in sensations and perceptions.

Carl Lange, however, had a different motive; he arrived at a similar conclusion in the interest of practical medicine, following the results from objective bodily expressions (Titchener, 1914, p. 427). Lange's project begins with medical and even pathological concerns but still relies on a similar reversal. The question is which bodily effects follow emotions and what effects they produce on the body (1922, p. 35). Like James, this question presupposes that the origin of the cause-effect chain flows from the origination of emotion *to* bodily changes. The scientific pursuit of forming an understanding of emotions, for him, falls short due to at least two reasons: physiological assumptions are insufficient, and "examinations of the affections have never been based upon these bodily manifestations, but always considered these to be secondary phenomena, which might perhaps be interesting and important, but which, nevertheless, possessed only subordinate significance".[33] As a result, the question should turn into this: "What bodily manifestations accompany each of the affections?" (Lange, 1922, pp. 37–38). Without starting with accompanying bodily manifestations, the result would be a cold cognition or a purely mental affection, and they can be neither necessary nor sufficient to explain emotions such as turning pale and trembling in the case of fear. In his work, he gets into expressional and physiological details of emotions such as joy, sorrow, fright, and rage. Another difference between Lange and James is that Lange emphasized the vasomotor process, whereas James thought of it more as a dispersed process throughout the body (Lang, 1994, pp. 212–213).[34]

Despite the differences, however, they meet in a common ground: they agree that "emotion did not begin with the conscious experience of an effect" (Lang, 1994, p. 212). Emotions occur with bodily events, yet only after that do conscious states emerge. And as James pointed out, "the neural machinery is but a hyphen between determinate arrangements of matter outside the body and determinate impulses to inhibition or discharge within its organs" (W. James, 1884, p. 190). Lange also retains the secondary position of the nervous system. As the physical expression and perception of an emotionally significant event is emotion, refusal of it (or I think a

[33] Problem with subjective conceptions is that they cannot be inside the scope of any definition thus prone to scientific investigation (Lange, 1922, p. 36).

[34] Henceforth I will rely only on James' theory or commonalities between James and Lange.

better choice would be the absence of expression) results in the extinction of that emotion. James, thus, makes a pedagogical point: in the light of the relation between bodily expression and emotion, children's repression of emotion results not in feeling more but, on the contrary, in feeling less (W. James, 1884, p. 197).[35]

The James-Lange theory of emotion alludes to an inherent dualism on cognitive and emotive levels (1884, p. 190). The term "cold cognition" is not used by James or Lange, but it still has its conceptual correlate with the theory. James identifies emotions not only as having bodily concomitants; there are cognitive elements that are disregarded as "cold". In other words, he presupposes some elements that can be correctly called an emotion but deny residual elements in emotional experience as cognitive later. It forms the basis of James' subtraction argument in which he claims that without bodily manifestation, emotions become "a feelingless cognition," and he further argues that "purely disembodied human emotion is a non-entity":[36]

> The rage is as completely evaporated as the sensation of its so-called manifestations, and the only thing that possibly be supposed to take its place is some cold-blooded and dispassionate judicial sentence, confined entirely to the intellectual realm, to the effect that a certain person or persons merit chastisement for their sins. In like manner of grief what would it be without its tears, its sobs, its suffocation of the heart, its pang in the breast-bone. (W. James, 1884, p. 194)

James resorts to a basic dualism, and it is embedded in his thinking about emotions. For him, without bodily sensations, cognitive judgments are neutral or are just activities without any emotional content. The philosophical problem here is that James placed it axiomatically in his system without any justification, which leaves him devoid of any argumentative upper hand. However, the unjustified position does not

[35] His statements and intents, nevertheless, are not clear regarding the point mentioned above. He appeals to abreactive or cathartic theory in the following passage: "On the other hand the ponderous and bilious 'slumbering volcano', let him repress the expression of his emotions as he will, will find them expire if they get no vent at all; whilst if the rare occasions multiply which he deems worthy of their outbreak , he will find them grow in intensity as life proceeds" (W. James, 1884, p. 198). Cannon pointed out this confusion by pointing out that James denied felt-emotion but, "on the other hand, he appears to admit that a pent emotion may operate disastrously" (Cannon, 1927, p. 122).

[36] This apparent duality (purely cognitive and emotional significance) relies partly on rejection of other parts of emotion such as beliefs and desires which may at first sight occur in the absence of emotion, "and this leaves the problem of understanding how emotions function as *distinctive explanations of action* [emphasis added]*"* (1989, p. 486). Yet, such dualism can be seen both in cognitive and embodied theories.

leave his theory unacceptable or weak. His view of the primacy of emotion in terms of bodily response to cognitive judgments is still testable.

With that cognitive and bodily separation in mind, James seems to be undeniably Cartesian, a feeling theorist, in his account of emotions.[37] "However, James' emphasis on the physiological uniqueness of each and every emotion merits some discussion", says Power and Dalgleish (2008, p. 27). James suggests that "no shade of emotion, however slight, should be without a bodily reverberation as unique when taken in its totality, as is the mental mood itself" (W. James, 1983, p. 743; Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 27). According to him, two things are required: unique physiology and the involvement of specialized brain centers (Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 28). According to the authors, there is a renewed interest in feeling theories to incorporate the physiology and localization of emotions (2008, p. 29).

James did not ascribe a special center in the body responsible for emotions in *Principles of Psychology*. Even it is possible to say that he is among the first to mention this. According to LeDoux and Rogan,

> James had asserted a century ago that there is no special brain system mediating emotional experience. Instead, he held, the bodily changes brought about by a stimulus are themselves experienced through interoceptive pathways that project to the sensory cortex; the latter somatic sensations 'are' emotional experiences. (1999, p. 272)

However, he mentions some areas even though they cannot be named as centers (Ellsworth, 1994, p. 224; 1983, pp. 1086–1087). His common use of some muscles, viscera (including glands, hearts, kidneys, etc.), throat, and skin are among them (W. James, 1884, pp. 190, 192). Seeking a special center in the body responsible for emotions might have some credence for standard or coarser emotions (such as joy,

[37] There is a wide variety of ways to categorize emotion theories. One of them is proposed by Scarantino. He traced "the origin of the three ideas that have historically constituted the primary attractors in the project of defining emotions: the idea that emotions are *feelings*, the idea that emotions are *motivations*, and the idea that emotions are *evaluations* (2016, p. 4). They "identify emotions with, respectively, distinctive conscious experiences, distinctive motivational states, and distinctive evaluations of the eliciting circumstances" (Scarantino, 2016, p. 5). Hence, feeling theorists claim that emotions are, in fact, feelings.

anger, and fear), but such an effort is as obviously applicable to intellectual or subtler emotions. Lange also opts for reading them with distinction.

Their theory is crucial because the emphasis on the body had never been made in such a robust manner. Here, it is important to remember that James's theory can be considered among feeling theories of emotions. Both Alston and Ryle, after him, indicated different kinds of feelings (Alston, 1969, p. 4; Ryle, 1951). To start with, emotions and feelings are not the same. Emotions can also be regarded among emotional feelings along with mood feelings, feelings of general bodily conditions, and feelings of behavioral tendencies (Alston, 1969, p. 5). If we were to accept that identification of emotions and feelings (as any feeling theory of emotion would hold), then, for Alston, "feelings are conscious states that are in the special relation we have dubbed 'immediate awareness' to other states of the person that are *not* conscious states" (1969, p. 27).[38] On the other hand, for another analytic philosopher, emotions, unlike feelings, suggests a conceptual connection (Bedford, 1957, p. 296). In alignment with this, feelings are conceptually important for a feeling theory of emotions. Lange emphasizes this point by saying that "it is important to have as pure a concept as possible, by which I mean a concept that only covers items that are homogenous from a psychological point of view" (Livingston, 2019, p. 43).[39]

Although the James-Lange theory seems to cover the link between feeling and body, and the James-Lange points out the conceptual importance of that link, there are serious criticisms from philosophers and psychologists as well. They are mostly because either the link between feeling and body is ambiguous, or there is no conceptual sensitivity altogether. In the next section, we will look at the criticisms from physiological and conceptual standpoints.

2.2. Criticism of the James-Lange Theory

[38] James would not appeal to the special relation between feelings and other unconscious states because James hold that perception of the exciting fact and immediate feelings are required for emotions *in a constitutive sense.*

[39] Feeling theory of emotions can be classified under embodied theories of emotion.

The James-Lange theory of emotions is still alive and well, although it is not as influential as it was for the first fifty years after its formation. The loss of influence can be attributed to the lack of physiological findings. The James-Lange theory is generally embraced for holding that there are physical centers in the body for emotions. However, he is mainly criticized for failing to identify proper centers, to distinguish between emotions and non-emotions, to differentiate between different emotions, and to recognize different factors (such as cognitive and intellectual) in generating emotions. Here, we will focus on Cannon's criticisms and the differentiation problem because they cover almost all oppositions to the James-Lange theory.

Walter Cannon, the first strong opponent of the James-Lange theory, criticizes the theory's absence of an emotion center in the body. According to him, there are falsely identified processes in James' theory rather than the general framework in which emotions appear through bodily influences. He examines visceral and postural factors in constructing emotions (Cannon, 1927, pp. 106–107).[40] While he disregarded most of these factors with respect to the recent findings of his time (mainly from experiments of Woodward, Sherrington, and Marañon), he proposed another theory.[41]

[40] Sometimes he chose involuntary for visceral which is unlike its common meaning today.

[41] Cannon's first concern was about the role of viscera in emotions. He proposed a lesser role for it. In case of fear, for example, most of the signs of emotional expression were intact, although most of the viscera is removed. The second objection by Cannon is more serious. Most of the postural and visceral change occur both in emotional and non-emotional states. If this is correct, then James-Lange theory falls short on distinguishing an emotion from a neutral state. He lists several physiological effects such as acceleration of heart rate, widening of the pupils and contraction of branches from arteries (Cannon, 1927, p. 110). Third objection is weaker than the previous ones. Viscera include less sensory nerve fibers, and Cannon notes that "in the nerves distributed to the viscera the afferent (sensory) fibers may be only one-tenth as numerous as the efferent" (1927, p. 111). In summary, viscera do not provide information, not just for affective systems. Cannon further expresses the problem with the effect of viscera on emotional experience by saying that "even when changes are induced in them" it seems that those sensations are "mainly attributable to effects on the cardiovascular system" (Cannon, 1927, p. 111). Another objection by Cannon is based on the insufficient speed of viscera when emotional expressions are observed. Wells found that latency in affective responses to male and female pictures often within 0.8 seconds. Comparing this to James-Lange theory, given that long duration for visceral effects to occur and responses to travel back to efferent system after receiving signals from central or peripheral nervous system, this picture is highly unlikely (Cannon, 1927, p. 112). The last objection made by Cannon entails a failure in backward engineering. If visceral changes have a major influence on emotional experience, then "artificial induction of the visceral changes typical of strong emotions" should have produced that type of experience. Unfortunately, it is not the case (Cannon, 1927, p. 113). The failure of satisfying this central expectation may be considered as an extension of third objection which expresses the concern for discerning an emotional state from a non-emotional state in terms of bodily responses. Marañon reported subjective experiences in normal and abnormal subjects such as palpitation and dryness of the mouth (Cornelius, 1991, pp. 67–68; Cupchik, 2016, p. 91) . To the

Nevertheless, we can divide the reception of James-Lange theory into two headings. The first is about physiological findings. He criticized James and Lange and offered another theory more in accord with evidence at that time. Mainly, he asserts that several subcortical structures, especially the (optic) thalamus, give rise to affective states.[42]

As mentioned before, Cannon's criticisms were directed at the so-called visceral, and postural factors pointed out by James and Lange. More accurately, Cannon thinks that neither vasomotor centers nor other parts, such as muscles, skin, and viscera are responsible for eliciting emotions (1927, p. 107). Of course, the main concern is the identification of necessary bodily centers for emotional responses.

It might be seen that Cannon's technical criticisms are just details that do not contribute to his main argument in viewing emotions. To a certain extent, this observation is right, although it seems Cannon takes the James-Lange theory as unpalatable. Here, to underline this main scheme, we have to portray James' acceptance of bodily reactions (whether or not they are limited to the central nervous system or brain) rather than the details of the parts about which the effects are brought. More specifically, Cannon agrees with the bodily effects on affective responses even though he denounces vasomotor or visceral factors in eliciting emotional experience and expression. This disagreement at the physiological level brings up a more abstract level of commonality, and Cannon's ideas and the James-Lange theory do not exhibit conflict at this level, which is more philosophically relevant. In fact, one could easily defend that they can be subsumed under the same theoretical commitment. However, there is one side that Cannon's criticisms are also directed at James' main argument. It is because he hints at the difficulty of localizing emotions throughout the body and, more importantly, the shift from the body to the cranium in locating the source of emotions (which tends towards a physiological explanation of cognitive theories).

chagrain of James-Lange theory of emotion, the remarks were embroiled with "as if". This amounts to a distinction between perception of the bodily changes which qualifies as emotion and "psychical emotion proper" without involving genuine feelings (Cannon, 1927, p. 113).

[42] It is likely to be observed unless these responses are repressed by cortex (Cannon, 1927, pp. 115–116).

Thus, hereafter, I will proceed at this theoretical level and investigate how this framework applies.

I will use the term Jamesian in order to signify merely the theoretical aspect of the James-Lange theory of emotions and any other theory that shares the same commitments, which are usually expressed in James' writings. Hence, this label will also include modified versions of the James-Lange theory. The next chapter will discuss some of these Jamesian theories in emotion research. The most fundamental claim in any Jamesian theory is that emotions are necessarily and sufficiently somatic. In other words, emotions are elicited by bodily phenomena. At first sight, being somatic means that Jamesian theory lacks any cognitive element (Ratcliffe, 2005, p. 179). As a result, the theory lacks any object to be identified as the cause of the emotion, apart from the body. However, we get angry *at* Harold, fear *from* a blazing fire, or jealous *of* a close friend. It is called the *intentionality* or *directedness* of emotions (Nissenbaum, 1985, p. i). Emotions beg for an object, but in the absence of that fine-grained perception of the surroundings, an object to emote is hard to come by. Curbing cognition brings about a lack of emotionally significant objects. In this picture, one of the most resistant criticisms of Jamesian theories is that the theory lacks intentionality.

One answer might be to underline that the James-Lange theory does not neglect the object of emotion as it has been initially thought. Although the object of emotion seems to be missing, a less refined type of object that is shaped by natural selection is present. Take the example of an imminent danger on a safari. Imagine that there is a lion only 50 meters away, and it notices your presence. Even after a partial evaluation of the situation, either a fight-or-flight or freeze response kicks in. The lion is the particular object, and the property representing danger is the formal object in this circumstance.[43] The point here is not to decide whether the unconscious response is affective but to signify that the condition does not lack either type of object. Whether or not any unconscious response is taken as affective is another issue. Selection pressure in the

[43] Definitions of formal and particular objects can be found in 3.2. Roughly, the objects that indicate particular physical objects are particular objects and objects that are classified under a concept and can invoke a theme are formal objects. Here, lion is a particular object insofar as it is taken as an animal. But, the fear that it invokes is a formal object.

evolutionary process has probably delimited some responses in the face of some objects in order to increase the chances of surviving. In virtue of that, at least, despite being less refined, Jamesian emotions can still take objects such as art pieces (W. James, 1884, pp. 202–203).

Another reply could be that the absence of an object, and thus intentionality, relies on a clear-cut cognition and affect distinction (Ratcliffe, 2005, p. 180). The fundamental reason is this: cognition involves deliberation, and deliberation requires more or less specification of this or that item or an object. On the other hand, affect is not thought to involve deliberation and judgment; hence; as a result, affectivity can be, and usually is, free from an object. Solomon, for instance, takes affects as feelings and nothing else (1976, p. 102). Later, he conceived objects as the causes of emotions (1976, p. 106).

It seems we can definitely speak of emotions and focus on emotions, but we cannot do so for bodily sensations "at any rate" (Pitcher, 1965, p. 329). This lack is based on the meaninglessness of the sensations in general. The traditional view "does not allow the notions of reasonableness and justifiability to gain any foothold in the concept of an emotion" (1965, p. 330).

Perhaps, we may ask for another concept, such as emotional feelings that have intentional objects, unlike other feeling types. Alston defends such a view. It requires a "schema analysis," which is "supplemented by the requirement of certain beliefs in cases where this is necessary" (1969, p. 5). A continuation of this view, Alston stacks two related views. Special Quality View is based on the empiricist tradition of elementary psychology. This psychological view saw feelings as an extension of sensations which are just basically phenomenal qualities. According to him, the Sensation View presents an indifferentiable framework about emotions in terms of cognitive qualities. For example, feeling angry *only* involves "sensations of the tightening of certain muscles and feeling sleepy a sensation of heaviness in the eyelids" (1969, p. 9). Pitcher addressed another argument in the same period with Alston and Bedford. He criticized the view that "to have an emotion is just to have a certain unique inner feeling or group of inner feelings, to undergo a special inner experience"

(Pitcher, 1965, p. 326).[44] For Pitcher, the traditional view cannot be true because cognition should accompany emotions "in order to account for the emotion's having an object" (Pitcher, 1965, p. 327).

In the Bodily Sensation View, feelings are just bodily sensations (Alston, 1969, p. 7). This view is controversial and is vulnerable to criticisms about James-Lange emotions theory. Mainly, it needs to answer, "would fear be anything like the emotion that it is if we took away any sense of danger and left behind only physical symptoms, such as elevated pulse rate and so forth?" (Furtak, 2010, p. 57). The main problem is both in the Special Quality View and the Bodily Sensation View. And, it is, as Alston argues, that feelings are unanalyzable, either in terms of cognitive or motivational elements (1969, p. 8). Both the Special Quality View and the Bodily Sensation View fail to satisfy an analysis of feelings in terms of dependence thesis (i.e., feeling of emotion is a derivative of the concept of that emotion) and autonomy thesis (i.e., there are independent but interrelated categories, such as cognition, conation, and feeling) (1969, p. 8).

On the other hand, both views can explain emotional recalcitrance to a certain degree. The Special Quality View can be analyzed in multiple dimensions with multiple intensities attached to each dimension. But, as Alston says, they are both vulnerable to the private language argument (1969, pp. 9–10). Private Language, in that context, means that these feelings are left unjustified except for a valented remark (e.g., "yeay" for positive and "neah" for negative). By valented remark, I mean that reaction to a particular event is either wanted and positive or avoidable and negative. According to Alston, this remark is the only alternative for an analysis (Alston, 1969, p. 11). He employs a pragmatic criterion for choosing a proper account of feeling, and the Special Quality View definitely falls short. "The Special Quality construal of feeling concepts lies on the low end of the continuum of usefulness" (1969, pp. 11–12).

On the other hand, Bedford says, "it is, after all, notorious that we can be mistaken about our own emotions, and that in this matter a man is not the final court of appeal

[44] Pitcher (1965) also reads inner and mental can be used interchangeably (p. 326).

in his case; those who are jealous are often the last, instead of the first, to recognize that they are" (Bedford, 1957, p. 285). This view is in stark contrast to Special Quality View, and introspection as a method to study the mind. However, Bedford further says "each of us is in a better position to understand himself than anyone else is" (1957, p. 285). The statement "I am in pain but I do not feel pain" is self-contradictory only if the subject does not pretend to feel that he feels a particular emotion because pretense is, by definition, insulation from reality (1957, p. 286).[45] Also, Bedford claims that there is a behavioral limit to pretense. After going beyond that limit (e.g., anger hitting people and trying to damage a close environment), the purported state is assumed to be real; thus, the subject does not pretend to be in that state (e.g., angry). "Our difficulty in resolving the question 'Is he really in pain?' on the other hand, arises from the fact that the only decisive evidence is evidence that he alone is in a position to give" (1957, p. 287).

The noncognitive theory of James and Lange cannot account for the richness and diversity of our emotions. Apart from that, the philosophers demonstrated the drawbacks of the sort of feelings and sensations that James-Lange adopted. However, as we will see in the next chapter, there were attempts to enliven the James-Lange theory by introducing causally relevant cognitive richness into the picture. In the next section, we will focus on the centerpiece of what is missing in the James-Lange theory of emotion.

2.3. Intentionality in the James-Lange Theory

In this chapter, we will take a closer look at the problem of intentionality through the lens of the James-Lange theory. There is a striking difference between the paradigmatic sensation of the body and emotional experiences. But, it is not entirely

[45] That claim might be backed up from a contemporary emotion theorist."One plausible claim is that we need not be conscious of an emotion in the sense of being aware *of* it in order to undergo it. One need not realize one is afraid to be afraid, as one's attention in fear is typically directed toward what one is afraid of". Parallel with that, "in psychology, however, some have found it helpful to distinguish feeling an emotion and having it, as there may be behavioural or neuropsychological evidence of an emotion's occurrence without any evidence that the subject is feeling it" (J. Deonna et al., 2015, p. 194).

clear whether the intentionality of the latter "is or is not purely *derivative* from these thoughts that accompany these emotions" (J. Deonna et al., 2015, p. 195). One challenge about the intentionality of the emotional states is that we title some emotional states as lacking any *evaluative judgments*. A spider phobic does not fear spiders because she judges them as dangerous (2015, p. 196). But it is not the case that evaluative judgments should all require a subjective endorsement. "Perhaps *thinking* of the object in the relevant evaluative terms is enough" (2015, p. 196). But a fortiori, evaluative judgments, or any judgments, do not need to entice an emotional episode. Another problem with this type of intentionality is that some nonhuman animals may be unable to have evaluative thoughts but can still perfectly be conceived as expressing and undergoing emotional episodes. For Scarantino, there are two problems of intentionality. The first is aboutness: intentionality is about objects, and the second is correctness: intentionality is correct or incorrect with regard. All in all, "emotions are about objects in the sense that they *represent* them in a particular way and can do so correctly or not" (Scarantino, 2016, p. 14). The lack of an object and its appropriateness is primarily why evaluative or cognitive theories emerge in the first place.

Before starting, we need to notice a distinction between two philosophically important concepts. These are intensional and intentional. Kenny, for example, used the former to indicate that the connection between the object and our experience is essentially linguistic and mental (logical relation between emotion and its target). This view takes its roots from Frege in his distinction between sense and reference, in which sense takes the intension of a word in contrast to reference. However, when made, the difference between intentionality and intensionality denotes a specific change in perspective. As de Sousa (1987) states, intentionality does not need to be related to the meaning of a word or a mental item, as typically understood in what the term intensionality in the philosophy of language usually refers to. As de Sousa suggests, we may use intentionality to process information flow without indicating a linguistic component. By using intensionality, Kenny, with respect to an emotion study, "mentalized" (making it logical or linguistic in a formal sense) the term intentionality. His primary unit of explanation in his framework is mental attitudes.

In contrast, de Sousa "explicated his notion of an emotions' formal object in terms of the logical property and causal relations between an emotion and its target, of the normative condition that is given by its formal object" (Mun, 2019, p. 26). Kenny was against causal explanations, which, after all, indicate naturalistic tendencies. The difference may be rendered in thinking the following way. For instance, it is meaningful to talk about the intentionality of a perceptual event, whereas it does not make sense to take such an event as intensional.

In this sense, we can further bifurcate intentionality.[46] One is that there is a specific object about which the emotion came. We are afraid *of* a tiger or a lion on a savannah, or we are mad *at* our partner even though we may not be mad for the right reasons. Another is that rather than a specific object, there is a formal object which elicits an affective response. Here, the essential properties of events or objects, in a given sense and not as particular objects, set off affective responses.[47] For Kenny, the object under the description of that specific activity, say stealing, must take "other people's property" in order to be an act of stealing (1963, p. 132). The former is called *a particular object,* and the latter is called *a formal object*. Any embodied theory, including the James-Lange theory, fails to identify and discern these objects.

When we inquire into the motivations of the intentionality criticisms of the James-Lange theory in general and a feeling theory in particular, one motivation behind intentionality criticisms was the differentiation problem, which is common to all feeling theories and involves the difficulty in distinguishing among different emotions (Scarantino, 2016, p. 13). To be angry at your cat and to be angry with your landlord are definitely different both in terms of sensation and subsequent expression. Another motivation to embrace intentionality criticisms is to satisfy the demand to explain why that specific emotion emerged in the first place. We know what one feels even though

[46] Of course, there are multiple ways to conceptually divide intentionality. We may think of another distinction in terms of an example. A compass indicates the North Pole regardless of our purposes. In other words, the direction of the pointer shifts in accordance with the arctic pole and "this dependency exists whether or not we know it exists, whether or no anyone ever exploits this fact to build and use compasses (Dretske, 1994, p. 471). This is natural intentionality, as opposed to the mental intentionality. Mental intentionality may make a false representation whereas natural intentionality cannot.

[47] The distinction was also invoked in scholastic philosophy, especially in Aquinas' writings.

we do not know why or for what reason he or she experiences this way (J. Deonna & Teroni, 2012, p. 2; Roberts, 2003, p. 146). We more accurately account for the differences in emotions with differences in intentionality.[48] In alignment with intentionality, some criticisms are directed at the failure of Jamesian theories to signify important information about us. Sartre, for example, pointed out that "physiological facts…taken by themselves and in isolation…signify almost nothing" (1993, p. 17). In the Jamesian sense, emotions fail to signify and guide us in a specific direction, aim, or goal (Sartre, 1993, p. 32).

Although the James-Lange theory of emotions does not have a satisfactory answer to the differentiation problem, some of the followers of the James-Lange theory (i.e., Jamesian theories of emotions) worked on how an embodied theory (such as James and Lange) would overcome this difficulty.[49] Bodily sensations seem to mold how things and matters of fact appear to us (Ratcliffe, 2005, p. 187). The details of embodied and Jamesian theories will be one of the topics of the next chapter.

From now on, I will use the terms "cognitivism" and "embodied theories" to classify contemporary theories of emotion both in philosophy and psychology. The former is most frequently related to propositional attitudes and later appraisal theories that incorporate perceptual representations, and the latter usually goes with somatic or Jamesian theories. In the next chapter, we will explore how the discussions evolve, which takes their departure from the James-Lange theory.

[48] This is applicable both for understanding our own actions as well as others. It is called intentional stance. With evolutionary pressure, intentional stance might be claimed as a successful strategy to predict the intentionality of other people (Lyons, 1995, pp. 27–28).

[49] Deonna and Teroni states two distinct problems; they are specificity and constitution problems but they both converge under the title of problem of differentiation. Specifitiy refers to association of different emotions with different bodily feelings. Constitution, on the other hand, refers to the fact that "emotions are constituted by patterns of bodily feelings" (J. A. Deonna & Teroni, 2017, pp. 55–56). So, it is better to stick with the differentiation problem.

CHAPTER 3

A SKETCH OF THE CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF EMOTIONS

This chapter will consist of developed forms of contemporary views about the ends of a spectrum between cognitive and embodied. To situate this spectrum, we will first look at how the definition of cognition became a primary issue in psychology and philosophy literature in the 20th century. Later, we will proceed to the contemporary incorporation of cognitive theories, which have evolved into general appraisal and embodied theories. After these two general sections, I will focus on the broader framework on which they largely operate.

3.1. The Meaning of Cognition and Early Cognitivism

This section concerns various cognitive activities, such as judgments and evaluations that elicit emotions. The driving question behind this section is, what kind of judgment or evaluation is an emotionally relevant judgment or evaluation (J. Deonna et al., 2015, p. 193)? This question might be pragmatically crucial in two senses: emotions can be modified by those evaluations, and also, emotions are capable of modifying evaluations (e.g., overvaluation) and intensifying the focus of attention (Nash, 1989, p. 483).[50] For the modifying emotions property, we can say that even though it has not

[50] Although we will not closely examine emotions' effect on attention, it should be mentioned that there might be a positive modulation of attention via changes in the emotional states. An analogy to understand the relation between emotion and attention is given by Evans. Evans thinks that spotlight serve as a good analogy for the workings of attention. As spotlights get more focused, they illuminate a very narrow area but with an intense, bright light. On the other hand, when the spotlight broadens the focus, the illumination is dispersed into a larger area but with a lower intensity. The same reasoning is applicable to attention mechanisms. For Evans, "when an emotion occurs, however, our mental spotlight suddenly contracts, focusing on one small thought to the exclusion of all others" (Evans, 2001, p. 77). Sometimes, an emotional period or mood in general may catch us without explicitly forcing us to focus on anything particular. Overwhelming emotional phenomena of all kinds modulate attention. "One study found that, compared to other people, rape victims were much slower at saying what the colour of the ink [in a modified Stroop test] was when the words were related to rape. It appears that the anxiety generated by seeing a word connected with a traumatic experience focuses the attention on the meaning of the word, making it harder to pay attention to peripheral details like the colour of the ink in which the word is printed" (Evans, 2001, p. 79). Another one is about recall, more specifically mood-congruent

been justified that emotions are evaluative judgments, they still give rise to evaluative judgments. It is straightforward and does not lead to much controversy.

Nevertheless, "what is much disputed is whether emotions can do more than just causally bring about these judgments", whether it is in the form of helping in our understanding or serving as reasons for our judgments (J. Deonna et al., 2015, p. 197). But in this section, we will just take the meaning of cognition and the early cognitivists' interpretation thereof.[51] And, only later will we see how a Spinozistic framework can remedy the flaws of cognitivism and the James-Lange theory.

Before delving into the meaning of cognition, I should describe two flavors of cognitivism about emotions. Both flavors are an offshoot of essentialist thinking; however, this thinking is still useful in understanding most cognitive theories of emotion. We may identify weak and strong accounts of cognitivism by virtue of their necessary and sufficient components (Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 49). The weak version indicates that cognitions are necessary but insufficient components of emotions. Additional components such as behavioral, motivational, and somatic/bodily components might be added to satisfy the condition of being an emotion. Simply having an idea of a demeaning offense, even directed to an individual's own, does not suffice to constitute or cause anger. On the other hand, the strong version states that cognitions are sufficient conditions; thus, whenever judgments, evaluations, interpretations, appraisals, and beliefs occur, there is also an emotional state. In other words, cognitions are enough to label a phenomenon as emotion. For Power and Dalgleish, the strong cognitive theory would include a "belief (cognition) that an insult has occurred that *causes* the boiling of the blood around the

recall. "When we recall events from memory, those that are tagged with a marker that is compatible with the current emotional state are given more salience. Keith Oatley and Jennifer Jenkins have suggested that this may help us to deal with a current situation more easily by bringing to mind incidents comparable to the one that provided the current mood" (Evans, 2001, p. 84). Evans, again, follows a form of adaptationism.

[51] Cognitivism has a widespread allure beyond psychologists and philosophers. In a research, "a total of 303 U.S. participants were recruited" and the research results states that most people think cognitive evaluations makes the most significant difference in emotion attribution (Díaz, 2022, pp. 438, 442). It is followed by bodily changes, and later, action tendencies.

heart and is causal in the propensity for retaliation" (2008, p. 37).[52]

When we come to the meaning of cognition in the cognition and emotion debate, one of the central issues is their independence (Leventhal & Scherer, 1987, p. 4). Both Zajonc and Lazarus agree with that to a certain extent; their respective circuits in the nervous system are relatively separate. Lazarus admits Zajonc's empirical points but not the definition of emotion (Salmela, 2014, pp. 3–8).[53] The history of that debate started after an influential and criticized article written after a proceeding of Zajonc in 1980, and several articles on both parts follow it.[54] This exchange marks an important point in contemporary discussions about theories of emotions.[55] Apart from empirical objections, Zajonc points out a conceptual problem about the definition of cognition in cognitive theories of emotion (i.e., precedence of cognition by expanding the definition of cognition), as conceived by Lazarus. This expansion is called the elastic strategy, which will be described below.

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[52] For some theorists both cognitive constituents and bodily constituents are necessary and essential Tye 1995 p. 126 and Redding 1999 pp. 17-21, Lyons 1980 p. 60. However, it is outside the scope of this study because we are striving to explain the contrasts.

[53] The discussion between Zajonc and Lazarus is largely definitional, that is Zajonc and Lazarus disagreed on both the definition of emotion and cognition. This issue being definitional is accepted by most commentators (Kappas, 2006, p. 954).

[54] The article that started the debate was "Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences". After its publication, the ground for contemporary emotion theories had much changed. Zajonc defended that emotions are not just cognitions, deliberations, or evaluations. To him, "preferences, attitudes, impression formation, and decision making, as well as some clinical phenomena, suggest that affective judgments may be fairly independent of, and precede in time, the sorts of perceptual and cognitive operations commonly assumed to be the basis of these affective judgments" (R. B. Zajonc, 1980, p. 151). In 1984, he published another article titled "On the Primacy of Affect" and, in the same year, Zajonc took into account many of its criticisms and tried to address them while forming a structure for future research. Lazarus replies to his article with an opposing one titled "On the Primacy of Cognition".

[55] Addressing Lazarus, Zajonc criticized cognitive theories in general and Lazarus in particular in five distinct empirical points; these are distinct phylogenetic and ontogenetic primacy of affectivity, separate structures devoted to appraisals and affects, independent affective reaction formation without appraisals and induction of appraisal states without noncognitive procedures (R. Zajonc, 1984, pp. 118–120). They all boil down to developmental, structural and functional differences between cognitions/appraisals and emotions/affects. The most important evidence for the affective primacy is the so-called independence of the affective and cognitive processes. Alongside Zajonc, Murphy and Zajonc also point out distinct neuroanatomical structures (especially between the visual system and the limbic system) which still support the affective primacy (1993, pp. 736–737). As with later evidence, Dalgleish and Power state that the Zajonc-Lazarus debate is based on a false dichotomy. They think that the two are inseparable, as waves are from the water (Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 59).

Lazarus replies by underlining that definitions are integral to starting and advancing theory formation (Lazarus, 1984, p. 124).[56] One reply from Lazarus instantiates this issue. He notices that Zajonc conflates being conscious and related to cognition (Lazarus, 1984, p. 128; Prinz, 2004, p. 37). In other words, Lazarus indicates that a state such as nausea (even though he did not believe nausea was an emotional state) could be induced unconsciously *and* cognitively. Or, we can say Lazarus notices that cognition does not need to be conscious or automatic. This notice was an important conceptual distinction (1982, p. 1019; Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 58).

Zajonc defines cognition as a specific form of transformation, but unlike feelings, cognitions involve "information transformations" rather than "energy transformation" (1980, p. 154; also see 1984, p. 118). He means that the former is structured and includes content, whereas the latter does not have a structure and does not include content. In fact, Zajonc's claim is right because, otherwise, we would not distinguish cognitions from sensations, which, obviously, do not have sensory input that much.[57] However, Zajonc does not articulate the differences between these two types of transformations. Lazarus agrees but still stretches the limits of this definition to include additional phenomena under cognition. This strategy of stretching the definition of cognition is called the elastic strategy (Scarantino, 2010, pp. 729–730). England also states that in the case of cognitive theories of emotions, cognition or what is counted as cognitive is expanded to include reflective, explicit evaluations, conscious appraisals, on the one hand, and non-reflective, implicit evaluations and semi- (or un-) conscious appraisals, on the other (England, 2018, p. 2).[58] However, the elastic strategy lacks accuracy and definiteness in what consists of an emotion. Expanding the definition of judgment, theorists may use unconscious cognitions or bodily changes as examples of an emotion. For a noncognitivist, the same pitfall occurs but in the opposite direction. For a noncognitivist theorist, almost all emotional phenomena can

[56] In that sense, Lazarus' position tends to be more philosophically inclined because most contemporary philosophers of science agree on the theory ladenness of scientific enterprises in general. More specifically, Zajonc accuses him of being unfalsifiable, and he defends himself by pointing out that Zajonc misrepresents his epistemological stance (Lazarus, 1984, p. 124).

[57] Here, I am referring the common understanding of the 1980s.

[58] Also see Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 19–23; Solomon, 2003, p. 7, 2007, p. 206.

be modelled in affective terms, and even bodily changes consist of information-processing functions. When a cognitivist encounters the question of whether a startle response is an emotion or not, she would answer in the negative. In light of these strategies, Scarantino sums up the Zajonc-Lazarus debate in the following manner. "Lazarus labeled as 'cognitive' even simple and 'nonintellectual' forms of information processing, whereas Zajonc reserved the label of "cognition" for more sophisticated varieties of information processing" (2016, pp. 33–34).

Still related to the definition of cognition in terms of emotions, Scarantino identifies two different conceptual strategies. The first is the hidden unity, which involves appealing to an obscure source that unites a variety of phenomena under a single emotion. The opposite strategy is the *ex cathedra* strategy. This latter strategy involves omitting all processes that do not fit the scientific definition of emotion, and most of the cases are classified under other types of affective processes (Scarantino, 2012, pp. 362–363). Both cognitive and noncognitive theories might employ these strategies to mitigate their own drawbacks. The hidden unity strategy fails to engender a genuine unity, or the unity it purports does not produce an adequate prediction or explanation. In contrast to that, the *ex cathedra* strategy "risks precluding the possibility of falsification (any conflicting data is excluded), and more broadly because it seems to separate the scientific definition of emotion too far from the established view" (Scarantino, 2012, p. 362).

Philosophical literature about emotions emphasized cognition and, even more specifically, propositional attitudes.[59] This era can be called early cognitivism in the theory of emotions. Bedford and Pitcher defend one sort of belief-desire theory. However, belief-desire theories take "emotions themselves to be intentional states which may cause, but are not constituted by, non-intentional phenomena such as affective and bodily agitation" (Green, 1992, p. 77). Despite being a cognitivist theory, belief-desire theories can be distinguished from strong cognitivist theories regarding

[59] Here we should remember that proposition is not a sentence; it is what the sentence expresses. "We should not expect an exact correspondence between concepts of snow held by people in Canada and France, but just something close enough that we can attribute approximately the same belief to them" (Thagard, 2008, p. 182).

desires. According to the belief-desire theory, desires cannot be exhausted by cognitive representations such as evaluative beliefs (Green, 1992, pp. 77–78).

Broad was the first analytic philosopher from the Anglo-Saxon world who saw emotions as cognitions (Scarantino, 2016, p. 27). Broad puts emotion among cognitions because they have epistemological objects (1925, pp. 141–143).[60] In other words, emotions must take objects that concern knowledge to a certain extent. Along with many others, some psychologists, such as Nissenbaum, also agreed that emotions' conjunction with the object is constant and requires directedness (Nissenbaum, 1985, pp. 3, 17).[61] Broad's conceptualization implies that emotions are not only cognitive but also crucial for our epistemic stance. An easier way to see this cognitive/epistemic stance is to look at two possibilities for normatively assessing emotions. According to Broad, it might involve two types. The first is that "an emotion is *misplaced* just in case it is felt toward an object that either does not exist or does not exist with the attributes under which it is emotionally responded to" (Scarantino, 2016, p. 27). The object of emotion might be non-existent, or it may be misidentified with something else. Pathological anxiety, for example, usually takes a non-existent or unlikely event such as a terrible accident. The second is that "an emotion is *inappropriate* just in case it is felt toward an object that the emotion does not fit, either in kind or in intensity" (Scarantino, 2016, p. 27). Later, Broad and early cognitivist philosophers take these two forms of assessment as useful in analyzing propositional attitudes behind emotions to determine whether it is a phobic response (Greenspan, 1988, pp. 17–20), imaginary (Matravers, 2005, p. 57) or tacit racism (Roberts, 2003, p. 228). These propositional attitudes concerning emotions involve states such as hoping, being afraid, getting angry and wishing with objects to which these states are directed. So, propositional attitudes have a state and an object they are directed at. It is commonly asserted that propositions are the meaning of the sentences (Richard, 1990, pp. 1–2). In this light, we can conceive cognitions as determining the meaning of emotions.

[60] Here, we can talk about two kinds of object directedness: object directedness of cognitive states and object directedness of affective states. The former seems to carry more deliberate information than the latter.

[61] Originally, Nissenbaum wrote passions rather than emotions but what she meant by them are one and the same.

Most early cognitivist philosophers think we can analyze emotion using a propositional component and an affective component, where the former stands for the conceptual analysis of the emotion and the latter for the phenomenological profile of emotions (Matravers, 2005, p. 16). Although the propositional content of emotion is important, how the propositional content is conceived is more important. Matravers argues against equating propositional content with belief. In other words, emotions do not require belief in the form of propositional statements.

Under the influence of propositional attitudes, Bedford claims that "to feel angry" and "to be angry" can sometimes be used synonymously.[62] However, they are not always identical. He says, "one cannot understand what it is to feel angry without first understanding what it is to be angry" (Bedford, 1957, p. 283). This necessity is not just a linguistic necessity; rather, it is a method to enable one to grasp the meaning of anger. He further says, "the only possible method open to us would seem to be this: to make him angry, *e.g.,* by insulting him, and then to say to him, 'Well, feeling angry is feeling as you feel now'" (Bedford, 1957, p. 284).

Nevertheless, Bedford does not only argue for the logical priority of being in an emotional state (when compared to feeling a certain state). *A fortiori*, he claims that there is no necessary entailment between being in an emotional state and feeling that emotion (Bedford, 1957, p. 284). The former is logically prior to the latter, and we might have difficulty grasping the behavioral outcomes of that feeling. He means that "if we have good grounds for the assertion that a person is jealous, we do not withdraw this assertion on learning that he does not feel jealous, although we accept this as true" (Bedford, 1957, pp. 284–285). In summary, the meaning of anger is cognitive, and it is prior to feeling that emotion. In addition to that prior cognitive constituent, Bedford also thinks that the meaning of emotion concepts is rather fixed in the social context

[62] Of course, there are also serious attacks against the view that propositional attitudes carry which emotions fit to the situation and how selves feel it. Thagard, for instance, claims neither propositional attitudes nor selves are useful for epistemology (Thagard, 2008, p. 167). For an alternative and more elaborate theory of cognitive-emotional theory see Thagard, 2006. Thagard is against the claim that propositional attitudes are primary in determining the meaning of emotions although he agrees that they provide reason and reference in some contexts. "When we say that someone believes or desires that P, a proposition that the reference of *that* clause" (Thagard, 2008, p. 169). We can provide explanations and find good reasons for postulating things that "we cannot perceive".

and “emotion concepts…are not purely psychological: they presuppose concepts of social relationships and institutions, and concepts belonging to systems of judgment, moral, aesthetic and legal” (1957, pp. 303–304). A certain emotion is necessarily given in a particular context rather than staying the same under all circumstances. Bedford underlines embarrassment in terms of its connection with blame and responsibility. And even the cause of embarrassment “may impute a fault to someone else, but not to the person whom it is said” (Bedford, 1957, p. 291).

Another example can be given about expectation and hope. I can expect a bad event, but I cannot hope for a bad event; the latter (i.e., hope) has to be more or less favorable. We might have more disagreements regarding the object of hope, but we would have less disagreement about what desires to be hoped for. The verdict Bedford arrives at is this: the meaning of emotion is determined based on the context, and “emotion words form part of the vocabulary of appraisal and criticism, and a number of them belong to the more specific language of moral criticism” (1957, p. 294). Here, the traditional theory defines behavior by emotion words, and they specify them with a cause. This cause is a kind of a certain feeling or inner experience. However, unlike the traditional theory, feelings or inner experiences seem to be unilluminating because they lack the power to be conveyed properly, which is an injustice to the explanatory power of emotions words. Bedford is inclined toward a “behavior-trend” with a particular emphasis on social context (Bedford, 1957, p. 302).[63] Emotion words, for Bedford, express more than individual behavior.[64]

Pitcher focuses more on the individual aspects of behavior (compared to Bedford) and inclination about emotions. He distinguished between occurrent and dispositional emotions and thus occurrent and dispositional evaluations. He explains in the following terms:

[63] By behavior trend, I mean study programme that is initiated by Ryle and especially elaborated on *The Concept of Mind* (Ryle, 1951, pp. 300–303).

[64] In a more contemporary article, Hinde states that “the supposed internal state may be thought of as closely associated with a particular type of behaviour and as lasting only so long as that behaviour, or it may refer to a state of longer duration (mood) involving a proneness to respond in particular ways; or it may refer to more permanent characteristics of an individual” (Hinde, 1985, p. 986). Here he prepares us to the distinction between occurrent and dispositional emotions and evaluations.

> Modes of behaviour and inclinations to them are typical of occurrent emotions, while wants, desires, beliefs, and so on, are typical of dispositional emotions; but these correlations are anything but perfect. Thus a want, or desire, or belief often figures in occurrent emotions: when Paul is frightened of falling, it is certainly true that he wants not to fall, and in some circumstances it may be true to say that he thinks falling would be a bad (horrendous, disastrous) thing. Again, certain dispositional emotions—and perhaps all—can become occurrent: that is, there will be times when the person *feeds* them, when they "well up" inside him. And then certain typical modes of behaviour, or inclinations to behave, will arise, as in the case of pure occurrent emotions (Pitcher, 1965, p. 333).

The occurrent type of evaluation is more automatic and momentous. As Pitcher calls it, the dispositional type is an evaluative judgment or evaluative belief (Pitcher, 1965, p. 334).[65] But above all, for both occurrent and dispositional evaluations, "an evaluation requires some 'cognition', or to use the artificial portmanteau term already introduced, some apprehension, on the part of the person who makes the evaluation" (Pitcher, 1965, p. 335). Hence, for Pitcher, it is not the case that reasonable emotion ensues unless it is both generally or specifically apprehended first (Pitcher, 1965, p. 340). Spinoza would explain these affects in terms of active or passive rather than reasonable or unreasonable. Without any exceptions, unreasonable emotions are passive; nevertheless, unreasonable emotions can also be interpreted as reasonless. Reasonableness and unreasonableness are inappropriate categories only for love because they include "evaluations for which, in the end, and like the case, there can be, within wide limits, neither standards of criticism nor justifying reasons" (Pitcher, 1965, p. 342). Pitcher exemplifies love in stark opposition to hate because there would be "general agreement, on the part of disinterested observers, as to whether or not *Q* had done something *evil* against *P,* and if so as to how bad, how serious, it was" (Pitcher, 1965, p. 342). As we will see, according to a Jamesian theorist, this and other early cognitivist analyses lack essential colors of emotions that come from a body as if emotions are disembodied phenomena.

On the other hand, Alston engages feelings and reflects on the link between the experience of feeling *f* and the concept of feeling *f* (1969, p. 28). Yet, he acknowledges

[65] Pitcher takes modes of behavior as a type of evaluation, so he accepts that the term evaluation is more like a conceptual umbrella (Pitcher, p.334).

that paradigm cases require conceptualizing a particular private feeling. This phenomenal requirement of feeling is called the Privatist Proposal, according to Alston (1969, p. 29). Alston argues that only after feeling a strong tendency toward a particular feeling one can acquire a proper verbal label (1969, p. 30). Still, inferring phenomenal qualities of others' internal state by using the same concept is not a given (call this intersubjective inference).

A contemporary trend in the theory of emotions involves cognition and perception. However, in the philosophical literature of emotion, the emphasis on taking emotions as evaluative judgments is still more robust. Sorabji exemplifies the following emotions in the evaluative judgment vein:

> Distress is the judgment that there is bad at hand and that it is appropriate to feel a sinking. Pleasure is the judgment that there is good at hand and that it is appropriate to feel an expansion. Fear is the judgment that there is a bad at hand and that it is appropriate to avoid it. Appetite is the judgment that there is good at hand and that it is appropriate to reach for it (Sorabji, 2000, p. 30).[66]

Even though there are famous contemporary judgmentalism theorists such as Nussbaum and Solomon, some of them (e.g., Solomon, de Sousa, Gordon, and Lyons) claim emotions are *sui generis*.[67] In other words, as Charland says, many philosophers and psychologists defend that emotions involve representation/intentional states about objects, events, and states of affairs, which are also not irreducible to physiological or other physical states (2002, p. 522). In the psychology literature, mainly cognitive involvement is expressed as appraisals or evaluations (e.g., Lazarus, 1991, p. 19). In philosophy literature, it is expressed as normative or evaluative judgments (e.g., Solomon, 2007, pp. 204–209). Philosophers also tend to focus on either logical structure (Gordon, 1990; Solomon, 1976) or generalizations (Ben-Ze'ev, 2001).[68]

[66] Ancient origins of evaluative judgment tradition can be traced back to Stoics (more specifically Chrysippus and Seneca). These theories, however, does not tell much about how emotions are constituted but how they are caused (Scarantino, 2016, pp. 25–26). To cause these emotions, as Scarantino says, one has to have reasoning.

[67] Related works are De Sousa, 1987; Gordon, 1990; Lyons, 1980; Nussbaum, 2001.

[68] For the former, both de Sousa and Kenny agree that there is a logical relation between the emotional utterance (i.e. propositional statement about emotion events) and rationality of the speaker. The English word "overjoyed" might be used, for example, inappropriately when a man says he is afraid of winning 10,000 pounds (Kenny, 1963, p. 134). Still, the sentence can be uttered sincerely, yet this time an English speaker would doubt the rationality of the utterer.

Some of those emotion theorists, such as Solomon, adopt a view based on a juxtaposition between perception and emotion (2007, pp. 123–124).

Regardless of being *sui generis* or not, with evaluation judgments and the need for an object, we can distinguish two ways to see an object; these are particular and formal.[69] The objects that indicate particular physical objects can be named particular objects, and the objects that indicate the groups or classes of objects which can be subsumed under a concept can be named formal objects.[70] Hence, particular objects overlap with the extensional definitions, and it can be instantiated with a particular item in a list of possible emotion elicitors. On the other hand, formal objects overlap with intentional definitions because it captures a theme but not particular instantiations. So, the latter puts definitional constraints when it elicits an emotion. Borrowing the distinction from Kenny (1963, pp. 132–133), Prinz elaborates on them in the following passage:

> A formal object is the property in virtue of which an event elicits an emotion, and a particular object is the event itself. The death of a child can be a particular object of one's sadness, but it causes sadness in virtue of being a loss. Being a loss is the formal object of sadness. Emotions represent their formal objects, not their particular objects. An episode of sadness may concern any number of distinct particular objects, but the sadness in each episode represents loss (2004, p. 62).

Prinz argues that formal objects can be long-lasting because the representation itself (such as death or demeaning offense) does not fade away (2004, p. 227). In this sense, formal objects can leap the gap from occurrent to dispositional emotions. Apart from that, Teroni states that formal objects have three outcomes in the philosophy of emotions. These are "individuating different emotions, making emotions intelligible from the point of view of the emoter, and accounting for the conditions of epistemic appropriateness for emotions" (2007, p. 29). Especially the last point is deemed by Scarantino as the most challenging question in the contemporary philosophy of emotions scene, that is, "to articulate a clear and principled distinction between these varieties of appropriateness, a project that is at the core of the contemporary debate on

[69] The distinction is a reflection of the Scholastic distinction between material and formal objects (Kenny, 1963, p. 132).

[70] The benefit of proposing cognitive aspect in defining emotions is to ease discernment between different emotional states. Distinctiveness can be defined in this context as "the processing of difference in the context of similarity" (Hunt, 2006, p. 11).

emotions and values" (2016, p. 28). However, it is outside the boundaries of this study.

In this section, we looked at early cognitivist theories. They all concentrate on several aspects of emotions, but one thing remains constant: cognitive activity is a must for emotions, according to early cognitivism. As a result, they all have difficulty combining the cognitive and affective aspects of emotions.

3.2. Appraisal Theories

Especially after the cognitive revolution and overthrowing of behaviorism, a keen interest in cognitive factors in emotion resurfaced (Lazarus, 1999, pp. 94–95). Appraisal theories stem from cognitions but still hold that these cognitions are not wholly developed judgments. They are immediate and might have less intervention from higher faculties. In this section, I intend to articulate the status quo of appraisals and whether it is more similar to perception than cognition. Along with the previous section, the intentional object of emotions will be examined. At the end of this section, we will shortly survey their drawbacks.

Appraisals are first applied in theories of emotions in *Emotion and Personality* by Magda Arnold. In her work, appraisals are cognitive but not necessarily mediated or deliberate; in that sense, appraisals are not full-blown evaluations of a situation. Rather, they emphasize the meaning of an event or the personal significance of a situation. Conversely, if there is no personal significance attached to a situation or object, then it is fair to say there is no appraisal and, as a result, no emotions. So, appraisals can both be conscious or unconscious; in Zajonc's terms, they might require minimal transformations of the sensory input.[71] So, at first, appraisals seem closer to Lazarus' conceptualization of cognition.

[71] In that sense, Arnold's original theory of appraisals might be considered immune to some of the Zajonc criticisms (such as that emotions are automatic whereas cognitions are not). Only after Lazarus, conscious appraisals become central in cognitive theories in general, thus Zajonc directed a rightful criticisms to him.

What is different with Arnold's definition is that, in alignment with formal objects, we appraise not physical objects but objects' relation to us (Kappas, 2006, p. 955).[72] It is "direct, immediate, intuitive" (Arnold, 1960, p. 172). Moreover, one additional aspect of Arnold's theory of appraisals is that they form a causal force for emotions; they elicit emotions. Especially after Zajonc and Lazarus debate, appraisal theories of emotions, with various flavors, begin to dominate psychology circles even though not all of these theories take appraisal in the same sense as Arnold (Shields & Kappas, 2006, p. 899).

Arnold, at first, proposed three appraisal dimensions (i.e., different ways of continual classification): good or bad, present or absent, and attain or avoid.[73] Further analysis along these dimensions requires breaking them down into even smaller dimensions (i.e., from molar appraisals to molecular appraisals). Lazarus suggests combining partial meanings derived from molecular appraisals "into a terse, integrated gestalt or whole", called a molar appraisal (2001, p. 65). Arnold's dimensions were not numerically sufficient to achieve that level of resolution. Lazarus, for example, distinguished between primary and secondary appraisals, where the former determines how the individual is affected by an event, and the latter determines how to cope with the event. Scarantino analyzed Lazarus's appraisals:

> (1) the appraisal of *goal relevance*, (2) the appraisal of *goal congruence or incongruence*, and (3) the appraisal of type of *ego involvement*. The secondary appraisal also comprises three components: (1) the appraisal of *blame or credit*, (2) the appraisal of *coping potential*, and (3) the appraisal of *future expectancy*. On this view, guilt is caused by the appraisal of an event as goal relevant, goal incongruent, involving a moral transgression, and one for which the self is to blame (coping potential and future expectancy appraisals are left open).[74]

[72] Arnold's theory owes much to Aquinas' understanding of passions and even goes further."Aquinas' theory of emotions (*passions animae*) is cognitivist, somatic, and taxonomical: cognitivist because he holds that cognition is essential to emotion; somatic because he holds that their physiological manifestations are partially constitutive of emotions; taxonomical because he holds that emotions fall into distinct natural kinds which are hierarchically ordered" (King, 2011, p. 209). But in this study, devoting a whole section to Aquinas' theory of passions would lead us astray.

[73] Dimensional theories of emotions purport that rather than distinct categories, emotions can be construed as broader dimensions such as valence, arousal level, approach-avoidance (Fox, 2008, pp. 119–120). Although Arnold does not distincly presented a dimensional theory, meaning of the dimensions are borrowed from this class of theories.

[74] A more streamlined summary is the following: "Primary appraisal refers to an initial evaluation of whether an encounter is irrelevant, benign, positive, or stressful; thus, the conclusion that an encounter is stressful occurs in situations in which there is an appraisal of threat, challenge, harm, or loss.

(Scarantino, 2016, p. 34)

A more elaborate instance of appraisal theory involves stimulus evaluation checks (SECs). It has no less than 16 dimensions, grouped into four different appraisals categories: "appraisals of relevance, appraisals of consequences, appraisals of coping potential, and appraisals of normative significance" (Scherer, 2001, p. 94).

According to Agnes Moor, there is no need for a larger gestalt that makes its way into a molar synthesis. This view assumes "that the appraisal process can have a wide range of combinations of appraisal outputs, only some of which will lead to familiar, discrete emotion categories" (cited in Scarantino, 2016, p. 34). Since Scherer's component theory also relies on the net effect of the changes in all subsystems, it can be taken as an instance of flavor two of the appraisal theories.

Appraisals answer a specific problem in thinking about emotions.[75] This problem is not previously unheard of; it is thought out even in other cognitive theories and crystallized after bodily and feeling theories such as the James-Lange theory. We have hinted at other theories previously, but appraisals manage to address this problem. We may call this the "event problem," and Power and Dalgleish describe it in the following passage.

> It seems Descartes is saying that the movements of bodily spirits that are experienced as fear are excited by an external danger, but he provides no means by which this appraisal of danger can occur. It is just inherent in the exciting cause, in this case the bear. However, bears are not inherently threatening, it is what they mean to us that makes them threatening. Similarly, eating raw liver is not inherently disgusting, we merely appraise it as being so. This difficulty of trying to distinguish emotions on the basis of their exciting causes (or events as we shall call them from now on) with no reference to our understanding of

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Secondary appraisal refers to the individual's subsequent evaluation of coping resources and options that may be available. Primary appraisal and secondary appraisal processes work in conjunction with each other. For example, if coping resources are seen to be adequate for dealing with a threat, then the threat will be seen to be of less significance, whereas if the individual thinks that a threat will overwhelm coping resources, then the threat may become of catastrophic proportions" (Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 88).

[75] In fact, as Scarantino notes, while "philosophers focused on the inability of previous theories of emotions to explain how they can be object-directed and normatively assessable… psychologists focused on the inability of previous theories to explain how emotions are caused. The first project led to the emergence of modern evaluative theories of emotions in philosophy, and the second project led to the emergence of appraisal theories in psychology" (Scarantino, 2016, p. 27).

> those events is one that crops up again and again, and we shall refer to it as the *event problem*.[76] (2008, p. 24)

As we see, appraisal theory directs attention to a special object (i.e., the relation between the significant event and us). Thus, the object of emotion is not the external object but the relation. Another emphasis in Arnold's understanding of appraisal is that appraisal can be direct, immediate, and even beyond conscious awareness. A broadly defined cognition that can encapsulate appraisals may help us solve the event problem by introducing different components of appraisal, both conscious and unconscious, that assess our relation with the object. Without that assessment and reassessment, "it is not possible to distinguish different emotions solely on the basis of events, interpretations, physiological change, or overt behavior, then it becomes difficult to see how any distinctions between emotions can be drawn" (Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 44).

Even though we have previously noted that appraisal theories elicit emotion by causing them, it is possible to ask how an appraisal (similarly perception or judgment) gives rise to a felt emotion. The problem based on this question is called by Scarantino the "problem of causation". Arnold and other appraisal theorists tried to solve this problem by suggesting that the object of perception or judgment has been appraised in terms of my experience or my aims (Scarantino, 2016, p. 33). Here, experience and aims can be modeled as components of appraisal. For example, Lazarus incorporated goals by introducing a component called goal-congruency (Lazarus, 1993, pp. 12–13; Lazarus & Smith, 1988, p. 284). Lazarus calls the specific themes in eliciting emotions through a variety of appraisal components (i.e., molecular appraisals) which, in combination, is called a molar appraisal.[77] The relational meaning that is constituted by appraisals

[76] It can further be explicated by Power and Dalgleish in the following way: "(1) that the same event and/or interpretation can be appraised in different ways at the same time thus leading to different and even conflicting emotions; (2) that initial emotional reactions can be reappraised and themselves be the impetus to further emotional experiences that are either congruent with the initial emotion (e.g., depression about depression) or in conflict with it (e.g., anger with yourself about being happy at somebody's downfall)" (Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 53).

[77] It might be asked what a theme is. In that context, theme refers to any type of higher order conceptualization of appraisals that are modeled on appraisal dimensions. A relation theme underlines the relational nature of that conceptualization.

is called core relational themes. Take fright, for example.[78] The respective core relational theme for fright (along with fear) is "concrete and sudden danger of *imminent physical harm*" (Lazarus, 1991, p. 235). Whenever we experience fright, we unconsciously appraise that we may suffer harm, which indicates goal relevance but also goal incongruency. However, we may not experience fright if the object or the event we think we will undergo "seems vague and a long way off" (Lazarus, 1991, p. 235).

Here appraisal theories in psychology literature do a few things that judgmentalism theories fail to accomplish. In the following paragraphs, I will list several drawbacks of judgmentalism theories that appraisals successfully circumvent. According to Scarantino, "recent philosophy of emotions has been largely focused on replacing judgments with other evaluative constructs capable of solving judgmentalism's flaws while preserving its two main assets: the ability to provide solutions to the problems of intentionality and differentiation" (Scarantino, 2016, p. 30). Evaluative feelings and evaluative perceptions are two alternatives in the evaluative tradition. In both senses, the activity is linked to evaluative properties (see Scarantino, 2016, pp. 30–31).

The first failure is that it fails to address the motivational aspect of emotions, so it lacks an account of how emotions motivate actions.[79] They have a mind-to-world direction of fit, whereas an account of motivation requires a world-to-mind direction of fit.[80] Even if judgmentalism says that emotions drive motivational desires and have conceptual connections to motivations, "no convincing explanation is given for why emotion judgments are conceptually or causally connected with action desires by virtue of their content" (Scarantino, 2016, p. 30). It is useful to unpack the relation

[78] He uses fear and fright almost in the same sense in *Emotion and Adaptation.* The only difference between them is that fright emphasizes concreteness and suddenness, which is not necessary conditions for fear.

[79] We will see that a Spinozistic framework is capable of motivating action, but we will not address the specifics of how

[80] Velleman defines mind-to-world directed intentionality as "grasped as patterned after the world" such as representing (1992, p. 8). Whereas world-to-mind directed intentionality is defined "as grasped as a pattern for the world to follow", that means that it is made to generate an impact in the world. Emotions are mostly reactions or expressions *towards* other people.But, this aspect of emotions (i.e. dependence to social context) is often neglected.

between judgments/beliefs and desires. One of the most successful theories addressing the relation above between emotions and judgments is the belief-desire theory of emotions. For Reisenzein, it accommodates three different views. The causal view requires beliefs and desires as "causal preconditions of emotions but not constituents of them" (Scarantino, 2016, p. 40). The part-whole view states that both beliefs and desires are constituents of emotions. Lastly, the fusion view holds that emotions arise as a fusion of beliefs and desires, as mentioned before. Appraisals resolve this issue by introducing action tendencies and goal relevance.

Another problem for judgmentalism's view about emotions arises due to rational recalcitrance. Rational recalcitrance is a "phenomenon when instantiated when emotions are in tension with one's judgments, as when a snake-phobic subject experiences fear of a snake picture while at the same time holding the belief that the snake picture is not dangerous" (Scarantino, 2016, p. 30). These are the emotions our judgments, affections, or feelings may part ways (D'Arms & Jacobson, 2003, p. 129). Recalcitrance poses a problem because our cognitive elaboration may recognize the change of events faster than affective processes. Hence, emotional residues of a cognition that is thought to lead to an intensive emotion would persist even if the cognition that leads *and* constitutes it in the first place (according to a judgmentalism theory of emotion) would reliably be cognized as misleading, false, or disproportional. As a result, we may *feel* angry even if it was a prank, or we may be under the grip of terror even we are in a safe place. Appraisals, however, can resolve the problem of recalcitrance in virtue of (sometimes) being intuitive and automatic.

The third problem with the judgmentalism theory of emotions is that they leave non-linguistic creatures out because they cannot make judgments in the usual meaning of the term. As a result, the judgmentalism theory of emotion conflates judgments with only linguistic abilities and lacks "distinctive subjective quality of emotions, most significantly their 'hotness' and their 'bodily' dimension" (Scarantino, 2016, p. 30). Appraisal theories are specialized in solving this issue by incorporating non-linguistic evaluations as cognitions in their conceptual framework.

There are several aspects that appraisal theory borrows from early cognitive theories. One of them is the ordering of events in an emotionally significant period. Unlike the

James-Lange theory and any Jamesian theory, cognitive activity (such as cognitive evaluation, appraisal, or judgment) might happen first after an emotionally significant event occurs. Only after that a physiological change follows the initial cognitive activity. This cascade of events may explain a variety of contexts better. (Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 42). Take the scenario in which you encounter a bear. The likely appraisal is that the bear is dangerous. If the bear catches me, it can eat me. The situation is dangerous *for me*, and I do not want such danger. I feel fear and run away from the bear. An alternative scenario, nevertheless, might be seeking adventure and finding the bear approaching. This alternative scenario might elicit exhilaration. The flexibility of those appraisals allows Power and Dalgleish to conclude that "only a theory based on cognitive appraisals can provide a convincing account of emotions" (2008, p. 43).[81] Another possibility is that the event is not emotionally significant in the first place, and I do not feel anything. For sensations and unemotional changes, "it is unlikely that there are any particular physiological changes which are to be linked conceptually with any particular emotion" (Lyons, 1980, p. 127; also Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 44).

One problem is that, as de Sousa states, there are no criteria for distinguishing bodily (such as physiological) reactions that enable us to distinguish between an emotion and a non-emotion (De Sousa, 1987, p. 55). This point restates why James had proposed the subtraction argument as a criticism. It is important to bear in mind that without bodily changes (e.g., musculoskeletal, visceral, or facial), there would be no difference left between any cognitive (such as making a cold judgment or an abstraction) and emotional activity. For most appraisal theories, although appraisals are considered a constituent, not an antecedent, part of emotion, considering them as antecedent and causally relevant parts of an emotional episode would help us overcome this criticism. Secondary or more deliberate appraisals might be considered more causal rather than constituent parts of emotions. Hence, the interpretation of Arnold's and Lazarus' automatic and primary appraisals as emphasizing "cognitive interpretation of a

[81] The term cognitive appraisals is used synonymously with appraisals. However, there is also a term called affective appraisals in emotion studies literature. Jenefer Robinson, for example, mentions affective appraisals and they are distinct from cognitive appraisals in which a whole repertoire of intelligent beliefs are involved (2005, pp. 114–115).

physiological state" (Shields & Kappas, 2006, pp. 898–899) would resolve the problematic relation between appraisals and physiological changes because it would be easier to discern appraisals and emotions in that picture.

Appraisal theories seem to incorporate physiological changes, but physiological changes can lead us to feel, on the one hand, and act, on the other. Action tendencies are inevitable pieces of the puzzle; they lead us to act. But the first candidate in this lead is the body. "Why could we not have a system that involves appraisals of, say, danger and leads to an action potential to avoid the danger without actually having the experience of emotions?" In fact, appraisals might also be expressed as both the part and the articulation of an emotional experience. Therefore, appraisals are usually thought of as causal and constitutive of emotions. For an appraisal theory, the meaning behind emotion might be to prepare us for action or communicate that particular experience. If we assume a constitutive role for appraisals, taking it as an essential component of emotion, then bodily feelings arising from physiological changes and discerning between emotions become a possible and meaningful act. "It is only meaningful to distinguish one emotion from another on the basis of the *appraisal component*" (Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 62).

Appraisal theories are successful in discerning emotions and can also explain how the body enters into an experience of an emotional episode. Appraisals can take, along with many other things, the form of core relational themes or stimulus evaluation checks, as mentioned. In that sense, they can be measured. Also, appraisal theories do not unanimously agree on whether appraisals can merely cause emotions or both causal and constitutive in an emotional episode. Even though appraisal theories try to incorporate bodily changes as constitutive, they are still cumbersome because they have to make numerous presuppositions for each aspect (i.e., cognitive and somatic aspects). In the next section, we will explore how the body fits into the center stage while leaving the advantages of the appraisal theories intact.

3.3. Embodied and Jamesian Theories

This section bridges a certain strand of contemporary theories of emotion and Spinoza's theory of emotions. Also, this section will explore contemporary attempts

to resolve the tension between cognition and physiological change in eliciting emotions, mainly as two flavors of Jamesian theories and the affect programme. This exploration will only involve broad and conceptual developments in those theories rather than experimental details.

From the outset, we should note that cognitive and appraisal theories match social constructionist theories of emotions (Prinz, 2004, p. 133), and noncognitive theories are mostly naturalist. Social constructionism about emotions argues that emotions are constituted by social interactions and scripts, so they are constructed in social spaces. Interestingly, embodied appraisal theory moves toward constructionism. This relation is interesting because the core of this thesis stems from bodily changes. However, neither appraisal theories in particular nor cognitive theories in general entirely overlap with constructionist theories of emotions (Salmela, 2014, p. 62).[82]

Somatic (bodily) theories of emotion began to emerge after the influence of the James-Lange theory. They, nevertheless, did not take most aspects of the James-Lange theory but only *some* of it. These common aspects are essential to most but *not all* somatic theories. Some theories take the perception of bodily changes as just one of the constituents of emotions, called an impure somatic theory (Barlassina & Newen, 2014, pp. 640–641). In other words, an emotion theory may have an essential somatic component but still not be Jamesian. The most important yardstick for labeling a Jamesian theory is that, either primarily or secondarily, the source of emotion is based on a distributed network of systems. This distributed network is bodily, but it can be both intra-cranial or extra-cranial because, by definition, the body also includes the brain and nervous system. However, the extent to which the intra-cranial has a more privileged position than the extra-cranial is worth discussing. Damasio presents one of the most prominent emotion theories, emphasizing how extra-cranial structures

[82] Social constructionism about emotions is associated with the cultural scripts and they emphasize the context in which a specific emotional state evolved. The main culprit to social constructionism is that they mostly reject innate and universal emotions. On the other hand, naturalist theories about emotions assert the existence of a set of emotions in our congenital repertoire, although they diversify about what these emotions are and how they come to be. Psychological constructionism also takes core affects (the affects that are construal to other affective states) at the center, which does not contain separate sets of emotions and occur in a fundamental and continuous way. Since, it is continuous (not discrete) the theory is able to explain a wider number of emotional states (Salmela, 2014, pp. 56, 60).

provide a relatively *independent* and *dominant* status in eliciting emotions (Damasio, 1994, p. 66). It is independent since the system relies on body maps rather than bodily sensations.

After this caveat, we may turn our attention to Prinz's noncognitive theory of emotion. Prinz proposes an appraisal theory with the involvement of bodily changes. He calls this embodied appraisal theory. In that sense, it might seem hard to classify him as a pure somatic theorist, but he claims his theory is a Jamesian theory of emotion "with smarts" (2004, p. viii). We will see why Prinz places himself as a pure somatic theorist in several paragraphs. As mentioned, Lazarus introduced core relational themes as a combination of multiple appraisals among various dimensions. Prinz interprets this relation between organism and environment "with respect to well-being" and takes this relation as representational (2004, p. 52). Prinz further argues that "such representations can be inextricably bound up with states that are involved in the detection of bodily changes" (2004, pp. 52–53). He borrows from Dretske that these representations are set off by certain things.

Prinz thinks that these triggers, like in the James-Lange theory, affect bodies and initiate physiological changes (such as increased heart rate, blushing, vasodilation, and flexing of the muscles). James's formulation was that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes. So, representation should register some information.[83] The interplay between registering perceptual information and representation can be likened to the visual system's capturing of light and shape. "One might say that a state in the visual system *registers* a particular luminance discontinuity, but it *represents* an edge" (Prinz, 2004, p. 58).

Similarly, Prinz extends the analogy to capture emotions such as anger representing certain situations (e.g., offense to me) while registering bodily changes (e.g., increased heart rate). Anger represents offense, and sadness represents loss because these

[83] For such a register a more popular and contemporary view is Barrett's. According to Barrett (2017) affects signal how a body registers a specific condition (as a combination of internal and external environments) in relation to the resources it has. Therefore, affects are currency (or barometer) of the body budgeting market. It has two dimensions (energy/arousal and positive-negative valence).

emotions reliably track (e.g., anger tracks attacks and sadness tracks losses) certain situations (i.e., core relational themes) rather than bodily changes (e.g., emotions do not track heart rates or blood pressure). He further delves into an explanation of an important distinction between unstructured representations (i.e., indicators) and structured representations (i.e., detectors). The former is similar to beeps or sirens that indicate a problem or signal, say, a danger. We cannot divide indicators into meaningful subpieces (Prinz, 2004, p. 67). The latter has meaningful subpieces. Prinz explains them in the following lines:

> Consider, for example, a letter-detecting device that identifies letters by identifying lines and edges. It may have inner states that serve as indicators for horizontal lines (of various lengths and positions), vertical lines, diagonal lines, and curved lines. Clusters of these indicators serve as letter detectors. Two converging diagonal lines with a horizontal line between them serves as an "A" detector. This detector detects As by having parts that indicate A parts. (2004, p. 67)

Prinz further calls the things that detect essential properties of events or things essence-tracking detectors. They reliably track the concept by matching it with the essential properties of events or things. For him, what the essence-tracking detectors track is the real content. The other features can be labeled "nominal contents". Prinz states that "detectors represent their real contents by *registering* their nominal contents" (2004, p. 68). Yet, what does that mean for an embodied theory of emotion? It means that real contents are, in a sense, dependent on these nominal contents. Still, what is nominal content, then? The nominal content superficially indicates the features by which we detect a concept (here, a relational theme). In terms of an emotion theory, he concludes, "core relational themes are the real contents of emotions, and bodily changes are their nominal contents" (2004, p. 68).[84] Prinz proposes two different kinds of intentional objects and contents.[85] Embodied appraisals represent those real contents but register

[84] This term is borrowed from Richard Lazarus. According to Lazarus, the personally significant events form appraisals. The complex abstraction of multiple appraisals constitute themes and if they happen to partake commonly in multiple situations, then we can reliably call them core relational theme such as anger, joy or jealeousy.

[85] Here, I have only mentioned emotions. Other affective states such as moods and sentiments are left out. But according to Prinz, they only differ in terms of the broadness or narrowness of its intentional object. "A creature with moods, but no emotions, would not experience fear when it faced an immediate physical threat, but it might experience an apprehensive mood after a series of threats in its environment." (Prinz, 2004, p. 187). The whole situation concerning different types of affective states are about the horizon of the organism. This horizon has to do with the differentiation of the intentional

nominal content. In other words, they *represent* external events but *register* physiological events. In that respect, Prinz can be called an embodied theorist.[86] Prinz sticks with separate uses for representing and registering without much further clarification. He does not elaborate on which type of ontology can bear that conceptual load.

Overall, Prinz's theory is a pure somatic theory, which means that bodily changes play a causal and constitutive role. These two assumptions bring us to this conclusion: bodily changes are sufficient for emotions. The evidence from bodily feedback suggests that bodily changes can be sufficient for emotions, and the evidence from neuroimaging suggests that emotions co-occur with and may ordinarily be constituted by states in brain systems that register bodily changes.

There is strong evidence in favor of the pure somatic theory described by Prinz that James and Lange expounded. But critics of this tradition may complain that, while perceptions of the body are sufficient for emotions, they are not necessary. They may argue that some emotions arise without bodily changes and perceptions thereof.[87] In response, defenders of the pure somatic theorists could either concede that some emotions are disembodied, as it were, or they could dig in their heels and argue that all emotions are perceptions of bodily states and emotions are perceptions of concern (Prinz, 2008, pp. 144, 149). It is particularly a problem of Prinz's version of a Jamesian theory.

Damasio is a famous Jamesian neuroscientist who circumvents some of the problems of a pure somatic theory. He advanced the bodily basis of emotion mainly in 1994,

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object (e.g., broader object for moods and specific objects for emotions). Organism projects and expects but only within the capability of the body, although permutations are virtually limitless.

[86] Furtak even thinks that Prinz is not always right in claiming that cognitive theorists all hold that mental components of emotions are disembodied (2010, p. 58).

[87] Prinz tries to overcome this problem by introducing another concept called calibration files. "Calibration files are data structures in long-term memory" that can match a set of representation and body responses (Prinz, 2004, pp. 100–102). The problem with that is calibration involves a heavy reliance on appraisals which make his theory vulnerable to problems in appraisal theories.

1996, and 1999.[88] Damasio pointed out that emotions activate what was previously labeled as "somatosensory areas" (1999, pp. 67–71).[89] But unlike the James-Lange theory, there is no one-on-one matching between bodily or physiological changes and emotional states. Rather, the leap is breached by maps generated in somatosensory areas, according to Damasio. Damasio thinks the James-Lange theory lacks a clear distinction between feeling and emotion (Damasio, 2005). But Damasio suggests that we do not identify emotions unless the bodily changes are coupled with evaluations (Prinz, 2004, pp. 59–60). For Prinz, Damasio confuses the causal role of evaluation (i.e., emotion elicitor) with the constitutive role of the body for emotions. Damasio, however, conjectures that several layers are responsible for immune responses, basic reflexes, metabolic regulation, pain and pleasure behaviors, drives and motivations, primary emotions, and social emotions (2003, pp. 44–45).[90] All the subsequent items in the list of these phenomena are not only more complex than the former ones, but also the more complex ones depend on the simpler ones. In this nested hierarchy, social emotions, for example, are built on top of primary emotions, and "a whole retinue of regulatory reactions along with elements present in primary emotions can be identified as subcomponents of social emotions in varied combinations" (2003, p. 45).[91] Primary emotions first capture an emotionally competent stimulus (ECS), which can be extended in a lifetime (Damasio, 2003, p. 53). Although Damasio believes in a broad repertoire of emotions, there are still certain low-level innate states. Nevertheless, he

[88] Some of them exclusively concern the somatic marker hypothesis. This hypothesis basically predicts that there are emotional or affective undertones in most decision making and reasoning processes. This hypothesis is developed by the neuroimaging (especially of the prefrontal cortex) when emotional responses are experienced (Damasio et al., 1996, p. 1413).

[89] Somatosensory area refers to the part of the cortex that is specialized about touch, movement, pain, temperature etc. register that come from organs, muscles and skin.

[90] That ordering reflects the complexity of the processes; the list starts with simple and progresses into more complex phenomena. Here, primary emotions are what comes to mind first. Those are the ones we shar with nonhuman species (from *C. elegans* to chimpanzees) as well. Social emotions, on the other hand, include "sympathy, embarrassment, shame, guilt, pride, jealousy, envy, gratitude, admiration, indignation, and contempt" (Damasio, 2003, p. 45).

[91] Damasio calls "secondary emotions" to indicate feelings that are attuned to "internally generated representations and recollections" rather than externally stimulated states (1994, p. 134). We construct (and base on) moral analogies between a variety of situations. It is undeniably cognitive "but it also evokes feelings that are similar to those evoked by the past case, and this is important in aiding the cortical network to relax into a solution concernin what to do next" (Churchland, 1996, p. 196).

does not separate these processes; on the contrary, even "higher" faculties, such as reasoning, are embedded on lower structures. In his words,

> The apparatus of rationality, traditionally presumed to be neocortical, does not seem to work without that of biological regulation, traditionally presumed to be subcortical. Nature appears to have built the apparatus of rationality not just on top of the apparatus of biological regulation, but also from it and with it. The mechanisms for behavior beyond drives and instincts use, I believe, both the upstairs and the downstairs: the neocortex becomes engaged along with the older brain core, and rationality results from their concerted activity. (1994, p. 128)

Damasio's theory is robust since it can explain the existence of emotional states without the immediate intervention of bodily changes. Once they are carved in somatosensory cortices, these changes can be triggered without needing a somatic trigger. These can account for as-if states and experiences of emotions without the full-blown phenomenal signature.[92] In other words, they can be triggered from within (i.e., endogenously) the organism. These states are called as-if states (Damasio, 1994, pp. 155–156; Prinz, 2004, p. 6). As-if loops allow emotions (and feedback to emotions) to be triggered by simulating somatosensory cortices without actually undergoing accompanying physical changes in the body.[93] With those as-if loops, emotions become more amenable to cognitive evaluations in general and rationality, according to Damasio, in particular.[94] Because Damasio argued for the existence of brain structures that map the previous emotional experiences, it seems that he can account for occurrent emotions without immediate elicitors. This retrieval aspect strengthens his theory against cognitive theories because he could explain the common-sense bodily nature of emotions without direct environmental impact. However, one problem with Damasio's schema is that emotions depend on some somatic markers, as in Prinz. However, the mechanism that elicits the experience through somatic markers is not articulated.

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[92] For more information about "as if" angry states facilitated originally by body .

[93] Hereafter, he argues the importance of prefrontal cortex in emotion elicitation and emotional experience with reference to an older Phineas Gage case and newer Elliot case (Damasio, 1994, Chapters 2–3). However,

[94] For this reason, it is also the case that "cognitivists tend to highlight Damasio's research as proof that emotions are indeed an essential component of rational thought, while non-cognitivists are more likely to emphasize LeDoux's assertion that emotions are thoughtless bodily reflexes, divorced from 'higher' and supposedly *slower* modes of cognition" (2010, p. 52)

Other embodied theories are more biologically inclined, especially after the affective turn by Silvan Tomkins (2008, p. 4). As a follower of Tomkins, both Ekman and Plutchik introduced the evolutionary twist into accounts of emotions. Emotions are rather advantageous selections in our evolution to repeating environmental pressures (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011, p. 364). For Plutchik, "an emotion is a patterned bodily reaction of either protection, destruction, reproduction, deprivation, incorporation, rejection, exploration or orientation, or some combination of these, which is brought about by a stimulus" (1970, p. 12). Plutchik defined eight primary emotions: fear, anger, joy, sadness, acceptance, disgust, anticipation, and surprise. Ekman also refined and proposed a list of basic emotions, which are pancultural and innate. I will describe Ekman's theory of basic emotion. In fact, the basic emotion theories (BET) form a class of emotion theories. And they have different flavors of basic emotions, each of which can be classified as a basic emotion theory.[95] In this paragraph, we will concentrate more specifically on Ekman's version of basic emotions (1992) with the main tenets of basic emotion theories.[96] Ekman uses the adjective *basic* to denote two things. The first is that a limited number of emotions significantly differ from the others on the list.[97] The second is that evolution plays a crucial role in forming their uniqueness. Many researchers identify lists for basic emotions, but each is a "separate, discrete, emotional state, such as fear, anger, and enjoyment" (Ekman, 1992, p. 170).[98]

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[95] So, there is no complete agreement of the list of basic emotions and what should be included (Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 59).

[96] Ekman (1980) termed his research program neurocultural. On the other hand, these pathways trigger the specific affect program which are innate but can interfere with cultural display rules. Affect program is another name for his work and is a term for a distinctive collection of muscle, facial, vocal, behavioral, autonomic and central nervous system responses (Lutz & White, 1986, p. 410). But bear in mind that these triggers are not universal. "The specific situational *elicitors* of emotion are also culturally variable", indeed. Yet, the following question is still unanswered: how those facial gestures "are incorporated into larger cultural and linguistic signaling systems" (Lutz & White, 1986, p. 411).

[97] For this reason Power and Dalgleish provides a view that progresses from basic to complex. Basic emotions are like first-order emotions and later there are more complex, higher-order factors "onto which all basic emotions loaded" (Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 71).

[98] According to Charland, there seems to be an emerging consilience of emotion theories both in psychology and neuroscience in two senses. "First, both psychology and neuroscience appear to be converging on a small set of basic affective representational posits that appear to be universally shared among mammals. Second, both psychology and neuroscience appear to be converging on the existence of a small set of regularities that govern the working of those basic posits and tie them to distinct classes of behaviors. Taken together, these claims mean that psychology and neurobiology appear to be converging on the autonomy of emotion as a distinct natural explanatory domain" (2002, p. 524). And, he adds that "for it is only in virtue of the higher and more abstract principles of brain organization that

They are all universal, and most have a separate biological basis (Ortony & Turner, 1990, p. 316).[99] For Ekman, multiple physical changes (such as skeletal muscles, alterations in vocal expression, changes in the autonomic nervous system, and changes in the underlying presence of polarity or valence) are involved in emotional states; nevertheless, one stands out, and this is facial expressions.[100] Without delving into the history of his original research, with some changes along the way, Ekman claims that there are six basic emotions; these are fear, anger, joy, sadness, disgust, and surprise (Gu et al., 2019, p. 2). All of them can be expressed and understood through the face.[101] These basic emotions can be combined to form more complex emotions. The basic emotions differ from those more complex states in terms of distinctive universal signals, emotion-specific physiology, automatic appraisal mechanisms,[102] and universal antecedent events (Ekman, 1999, pp. 47–56).[103]

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define emotion that the various basic emotions are tied together in the manner they are, and develop in the manner they do" (2002, p. 524).

[99] Basic emotions have two meanings: one is that it is found universally and the other is, which is accommodated by most neuroscientists, that it is hard-wired in the brain (Boros, 2006, p. 133). In that sense, there were many criticisms and to some the entire process is "fraught with arbitrariness" because we can also find even more basic emotions for those so-called basic emotions and devise criteria for stating basicness (Colombetti, 2014, p. 26).

[100] The study of facial movements in emotional responses, especially after Ekman, has become one of the mainstream movements in emotion studies, although it is severely criticized and classified among only primitive scientific pursuits by Lange (1922, p. 38). Lately, this face centralism in theory of emotions is also seriously criticized since it downplays areas that might be of immense importance for emotions (de Gelder, 2009).

[101] On the other hand, it is not only the case that change of emotion is expressed through face; we can also move facial muscle to provide a feedback about our emotional state. "When the musculature of the face is manipulated toward an open-mouth smile, subjects are more likely to be amused by a cartoon" (Strack et al., 1988). When facial configurations associated with negative affects are induced, subjects tend to have a more disagreeable emotional response to the same narrative (R. Zajonc et al., 1989). Other studies are not decisive, they conclude that "the contribution of facial feedback to emotional experience is less than convincing" (Matsumoto, 1987, p. 773). So, the effect is at most some kind of facilitation albeit it is a weaker version of the relation between somatic feedback and emotion.

[102] This automaticity is a usual theme in later emotion theories and it is influential still in affective science circles. These basic emotions are set off by certain external stimuli faster (i.e., they are conditioned). Fear conditioning, or instance, can happen quite rapidly when compared with a more deliberate activity since they are implemented through different routes (Debiec et al., 2014, p. 168; LeDoux, 1998, Chapter 6).

[103] Russell says that methodological foundations of universal facial expressions are weak (1994, pp. 102–103). When they did not use forced-choice recognition, they had lower scores. Thus, Russell concludes that "those who wait until the evidence compels them to decide must seek further evidence" (Russell, 1994, p. 136). For further problems in Ekman's methodology see Barrett, 2006, pp. 38–39.

Ekman's theory suffers from a conceptual problem. In fact, he does not manage to incorporate intentionality. Rather, his theory assumes that intentionality is a trigger. This reasoning robs off intentionality of its essential plasticity (i.e., ability to take and adapt to various objects). In other words, in Ekman's theory in particular and affect programme in general, emotions are left meaningless and do not respond to contextual changes (i.e., lack contextual sensitivity).

Although he does not posit a set of basic emotions, as a naturalist philosopher, Griffiths argues that only basic emotions in this affect programme can satisfy the requirements of real emotions. For him, other affective phenomena should be called something else (also see Charland, 2002, p. 531; 1997, Chapter 4). Damasio (1994, pp. 131–134) and James (1983, pp. 1064–1066) also make similar distinctions. Damasio separates primary and secondary emotions, and James distinguishes between coarse and subtle emotions. For Damasio, secondary emotions still rely on the structures that generate primary emotions but require additional intervention from the cortex and supplementary cortical structures (1994, p. 137). To Charland, in this sense, secondary emotions can be explained as a homeostatic extension of the primary/basic emotions. Charland summarized this in the following lines: "In short, although there may be important differences between basic and cognitive emotions and the neurobiological mechanisms that generate them, both are fundamentally affective representational phenomena" (2002, p. 532).

According to Ekman, these basic emotions are discrete rather than continuous.[104] An alternative to discrete basic emotions is to see emotions as a complex of various dimensions, as we see in the appraisal theories. Although there might be some additional dimensions, the most important ones are pleasant-unpleasant (i.e., valence) and active-rest (i.e., arousal). Fear, for instance, is identified with high arousal and unpleasantness (i.e., negative valence) in the two-dimensional plane with the addition

[104] Discreetness or continuity of emotions is also related to the debate on whether emotions are cognitive and noncognitive. Commonly, theories that defend existence of discreteness are studied with a physiology methods and theories that claim emotions as a result of combination of different dimensions are cognitive theories that are studied with linguistic and psychology methods. Dimensional view originated from Wundt at the end of the 19th century (Gu et al., 2019, p. 2). Although these two views are not entirely compatible, they are neither mutually exclusive; hence, there are attemps to integrate these two (Gu et al., 2019, pp. 3–4).

of the feared object. Whether emotions are seen as discrete or continuous provides us the opportunity to unpack emotions in multiple ways. Yet, we need a conceptual distinction between core affects and emotions. Core affect is "a neurophysiological state that is consciously accessible as a simple, nonreflective feeling that is an integral blend of hedonic (pleasure-displeasure) and arousal (sleepy-activated) values" (Russell, 2003, p. 147). These core affects are free-floating or object-free and related to the individual's homeostasis. Rather than a basic emotion approach, a general affect system constitutes the most fundamental building block of our emotional life (Barrett, 2006, p. 46). The term "core" in core affects signifies the individual's homeostasis. It can be represented as perturbations in the internal milieu. It also signifies the core of the experience (Barrett, 2006, p. 48). In emotion formation, however, these core affects either attach or modulate an object's affective quality, so the experience becomes describable "in terms of the same two dimensions as core affect", and in that sense, it is mental but not necessarily cognitive (Russell, 2003, pp. 147–148).

Although Prinz and Damasio approach basic emotions with initial sympathy, they do not embrace them wholeheartedly.[105] Prinz thinks that it is too "early to identify the basic emotions with complete certainty" (Prinz, 2004, p. 91), but he conjectures a mechanism for building up nonbasic emotions from basic emotions such as Plutchik's wheel of emotion (2001, pp. 349–350). Damasio only hints at basic emotions while explicating his somatic marker theory of decision-making. He thinks basic emotions might help bridge the gap between emotions, feelings, and rationality (1994, pp. 200–201). However, he underlines the collaborative work of both cognitive and affective systems (1999, pp. 147–149); thus, it can be thought that he leaves the priority of a set of basic emotions aside. Pessoa also agrees with Damasio and states that emotional responses involve 'coalitions' rather than distinct dedicated parts of the brain; these coalitions cannot be "thought of as exclusively affective or cognitive" (Pessoa, 2008, p. 148).

[105] Basic emotions are complex. One of the main characteristic is to "orchestrate and coordinate a large number of output systems in response to specific inputs" and another one is to "generate characteristic internal feeling states" (Panksepp, 1994, pp. 23–24). For this, it is hard to pin down a list of basic emotions.

Many of the separations between philosophers can be boiled down to the relative importance they give to cognitive and bodily processes. The prime tension that starts in the last chapter between cognition and body is the following: “if emotions are mental states, then it is puzzling that they seem to involve a ‘more conspicuous participation of the body’ than other mental states; if they are states of bodily agitation, then we might expect them to lack intentionality” (Furtak, 2010, p. 52). With these conflicting positions, we have seen early cognitivism turn its attention to the primacy of evaluations, although they are usually judgment based. After appraisal theories come into the scene, evaluations and cognitions are more broadly construed, and they manage to find a stable solution to the intentionality problem. On the other hand, embodied theories tried to incorporate intentionality by introducing embodied appraisals (by Prinz) and nested hierarchies (by Damasio). But the most famous biological solution to this tension is the basic emotion theory of Ekman.

In Chapter 3, we will attempt to answer how Spinoza’s philosophical system might be a ground for resolving this tension and even understanding some basic tenets of both cognitive and noncognitive theories.

CHAPTER 4

SPINOZA'S ONTOLOGY

After the exposition of the James-Lange theory, its critics, and its influence, we focused on certain strands of cognitivism and other embodied theories to fill the gaps of cognitivism. There were many attempts to overcome the cognitive and noncognitive tension in theories of emotions, although only a few can be deemed successful. In this chapter, I will try to revisit Spinoza's main ontological claims that lay the ground for a new possible theory of emotion that can resolve cognitive and noncognitive tension. As we saw, we need to adopt different presuppositions for bridging the cognitive and noncognitive gap. The following chapters will revolve around multiple aspects (ontology, ideas, and emotions) of Spinoza's metaphysics to show that this gap can be bridged with fewer elements than any theory that presupposes a Cartesian split-view (i.e., the cognitive-noncognitive divide that is based on two substance worldview). While striving for the resolution of this tension, Spinoza has an additional advantage; as Cook states, "one of the most interesting characteristics of Spinoza's philosophy is the fact that it lends itself to plausible interpretation in contemporary terms as well as in terms of Stoicism and Neoplatonism" (1990, p. 93). Hence, we will also look at some details of his ontology that can make its way into contemporary thought.

Spinoza's ontology is important in finding a way out of an impasse in one of the central watersheds in emotion theories. The first is his ontology, one of the most elegant factors to overcome the drawbacks of split self. His exposition of ontology starts with the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) and naturalism. In this section, I would rather explain PSR and its relation to naturalism in Spinoza's understanding rather than explain PSR. This relation will be important because PSR demonstrates a distinct way of how Spinoza not only constructs his ontology but also how he understands the relation between ideas and affects. The second is his view on affects and emotions.

With slight modifications, it can provide a ground for a more contemporary and robust theory of emotion. I would like to accomplish the former in this chapter and the latter in the next.

In the next three chapters, the main source of Spinoza's philosophy will be *Ethics*; however, rather than disassembling it and indulging in a close analysis, we will very briefly concentrate on the relevant sections and only scrutinize when needed in response to our guiding questions. In addition, we shall exploit other sources such as TdIE and KV.

4.1. Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) and Naturalism

PSR is the principle that insists there *must* be a cause for things coming into being or events happening, even if it does not seem to be so (Pruss, 2006, p. 3). It goes even further to say that each event *should* be explainable in principle. In other words, PSR assumes that even if we do not yet have an answer, there is a reason for things happening.[106] According to PSR, contingent facts have some explanations, so we can at least foresee their necessity. For Spinoza, since "our nature and the natures of things, in general, are shot through with intelligibility, what is good for, and morally required, of each person or thing" , it "is a function of that person's or thing's intelligibility" (Della Rocca, 2008b, p. 175). According to Della Rocca, Spinoza's understanding of the world brims with intelligibility.

Most proponents of the PSR principle consider it self-evident (Pruss, 2006, p. 14). At first, this might seem odd because there has to be a reason for accepting PSR, according to PSR. Yet, it can be quickly realized that to accept a brute fact in question is less justifiable than a fact with PSR because justification involves the presentation of reasons. Accepting the brute facts can be called the inexplicability argument.[107]

[106] Spinoza usually suggests there has to a reason *or* justification. But, in general, Spinoza champions reason but reason is never in the hands of a single community such as scientists or religious sects (2016, p. 474). The same point is expanded on in L76.

[107] This labelling alludes to Della Rocca where he defines explicability argument. According to explicability argument, "a certain state of affairs is said not to obtain simply because its obtaining would be inexplicable, a so-called brute fact. Here the state of affairs rejected because of its inexplicability is the motion of the balance" (Rocca, 2010, p. 2).

What inexplicability arrives at is that there are brute facts, leading to a dead-end in justifying our position. According to Della Rocca, consciousness, for example, might be explicable or not. And "if consciousness were not dependent on more fundamental features" , then "consciousness would be inexplicable" (2010, p. 4).[108] However, any theory about consciousness points out at least a way to explain what it is and how it might come to be.[109] *Ergo,* consciousness depends on more fundamental features.

Spinoza was one of those renegades, and his views were usually counter-intuitive. He utilized PSR relentlessly in all cases and applied PSR mainly to his ontology, psychology, and ethics. [110] One of the clearest addresses to PSR in the first part can be seen in the second proof of EIp11 (i.e., EIp11dem2), that is, "for each thing there must be assigned a cause, *or* reason, as much for its existence as for its nonexistence" , even though he did not introduce it formally (Schneider, 2014, p. 110).[111] Another more comprehensive exposition of PSR is seen in the EIax3, which says, "from a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily; and conversely, if there is no determinate cause, it is impossible for an effect to follow" . In this case, Spinoza only acknowledges the determinate cause (*ex data causa determinata*) but not the reason. In the EIax3 version of the principle, there are two accounts, positive and negative; positive because, insofar as there is a sufficient reason, effects follow necessarily, and negative because, if there is no reason for an effect to follow, then it does not happen. In that sense, PSR is Spinoza's commitment to intelligibility, which is firmly related to his naturalism (Della Rocca, 2008b, p. 4).

PSR also allows Spinoza to be univocal. It means there are no different senses or uses of the same thing/concept. In the history of philosophy, this is frequently associated with Duns Scotus, and mainly it purports to describe that God's properties refer to the

[108] In other words, it would be a brute fact.

[109] Della Rocca does not refer to a specific theory of consciousness in this example. The significant thing is that one commits to at least one kind of explanation of consciousness.

[110] Except in his religious views about Jesus and the difference between free-speech and action. However, these are outside the scope of this work.

[111] Bennett did not identify Spinoza's reasoning as PSR, but rather he called in explanatory rationalism (Bennett, 1984, Chapter 2).

same things/concepts. Duns Scotus sets out to accept a full univocal account of being in which "concepts of being and absolute perfection can be predicated of God and creatures in the same, univocal sense" (2016, pp. 11–12). Through a PSR lens, there would be no reason to distinguish the properties of God and the properties of the rest apart from differences in degree. When we apply PSR, it is inevitable to defend univocity *at least partially*. Considering natural laws, for example, we have to investigate further whenever we see a bifurcation of incompatible laws or equivocal use of concepts. Such cues indicate a deeper view, a deeper law or pattern; the rest of those elements are manifestations.

We grasped Spinoza's use of PSR as a method, but he also had a more robust use of PSR. For Spinoza, to be intelligible and to exist are one and the same (see EIdef1).[112] Spinoza's rationalism is, in fact, PSR working at a fundamental level. This rationalism makes him both a methodological and an ontological monist. Spinoza utilizes PSR to substantiate his claims about existence, which we will focus on in the next section. More specifically, as we will see, his understanding of substance involves PSR and how he is committed to explanatory closure of the mental and physical (i.e., a ban that explains noninteractionism between extended and mental attributes). This point ensures that he is not falling into the same problems that Descartes faced.

This discussion about PSR brings us to his thoroughgoing naturalism and immanence because all things take place in a single plane with infinite kinds of expressions.[113] For Spinoza, it is the single substance, which is also God and which is also nature (EIVpref and EIVp4). The concept of immanence is first referred to in a distinction between immanent cause (*causa immanens*) and transient cause (*causa transiens*) in *Ethics* (EIp18).[114] While immanent cause does require proximity to the effect, the transient

[112] Cook argues that Spinoza's view about the necessity of having a singular method for understanding the nature of all things is consonant with our current view of science, although the concept of method is thought less broadly than contemporary science anticipates (1986, p. 191).

[113] Harris calls God as the indwelling cause, which underlines the everpresent causal role of the substance (1992, p. 41).

[114] Even Spinoza mentioned them in his earlier works (Spinoza, 1985, Chapters 2 and 3 in KV).

cause does not need to be ontologically close to its effect.[115] The immanent cause is also permanent; without it, the effects do not have any other opportunity to be brought about, whereas the transient cause does not have to be continually effective on the outcome, and there may be several causes for a single effect.[116] What are the outcomes of immanence? Since there are no hierarchies of being, each is of the same kind. Here, Spinoza's commitment to naturalism in connection to immanence can be observed. The following passage is taken from EIIIpref.

> Most of those who have written about the Affects, and men's way of living, seem to treat, not of natural things, which follow the common laws of nature, but of things which are outside nature. Indeed they seem to conceive man in nature as a dominion within a dominion. For they believe that man disturbs, rather than follows, the order of nature, that he has absolute power over his actions, and that he is determined only by himself. And they attribute the cause of human impotence, not to the common power of nature, but to I know not what vice of human nature, which they therefore bewail, or laugh at, or disdain, or (as usually happens) curse. And he who knows how to censure more eloquently and cunningly the weakness of the human Mind is held to be Godly.[117] (1985, p. 491, cf. 2002, p. 277)

There can be no legitimate multiplicity of laws in reality. If there were, then they would have been explainable, according to the PSR. Human beings do not deserve a special place in nature apart from their complexity; they abide by the same rules. They are all rules of nature. The PSR does not allow us to accept unnatural phenomena without explanation. This explanation does not have to be complete and detailed, but it has to allow a logical possibility. The need for that logical possibility is why he has been deemed a rationalist at heart (see Della Rocca, 2008b, pp. 6–8).

Another outcome of his immanence (and naturalism alike) is to open the way to a radically practical philosophy. Each encounter can change both sides. In that sense, Miller writes that "the attitude of immanence reflects a clear-eyed pragmatism, stripped of nostalgia in reducing the poetics of life to the mechanisms by which the individual not only survives but also thrives under daily conditions of threat and fear"

[115] This is the exact point which Deleuze distingusihed immanent and emanative cause (1990, p. 173)

[116] But causes might not be effective at the same time. That would result in overdetermination problem.

[117] Here, I used the Curley translation, and affects and emotions are used interchangeably. However, in Chapter 6, I will propose a different interpretation and conceptual distinction.

(I. S. Miller, 2022, p. 98). If there is not that same level of being (without hierarchies) with infinite expressions, then it would be hard to conceive practicality because each element would fail to interact.

Overall, Spinoza's understanding of univocity, immanence, and naturalism overlap. Some interpretations (e.g., Della Rocca's) collect them under his rationalism.[118] I think it is perfectly plausible to say that all of them are guided by his commitment to PSR. However, this overlap seems nonviciously circular, and it is hard to pinpoint a more fundamental starting point. This general scheme in this section paves the way for his ontology, starting with substance.

4.2. A Preamble to Spinoza's Metaphysics

In light of naturalism, this section will examine Spinoza's three main concepts in his ontology. Rather than discussions directed to Spinoza's ontology, I will try to concentrate on a specific reading and only respond to criticisms if relevant to that interpretation.

For some, Spinoza is a great panpsychist with no privileged place for humans (Skrbina, 2009, pp. 11–12). For some, Spinoza is considered an atheist in the history of philosophy (LeBuffe & Gourdon, 2019, pp. 35–36).[119] On the other hand, for some, Spinoza is by no means irreligious (Spinoza, 2016, p. 616; also L43). He is even called a God-intoxicated man by Novalis. Bayle degraded and praised Spinoza in his dictionary (see Bunge, 2019, p. 34). Even for some, both views hold water; in a charitable and unsuspicious reading of the first part of the *Ethics*, Carlisle grants that

[118] For this reading and alike, Spinoza's method can sometimes be labelled as logicist dogmatism. Della Rocca uses terms "to represent", "to explain", "to make intelligible" and "to understand" as rougly equals (EIIp43s; Della Rocca, 2008b, p. 132). It is one expression of his Spinoza's thoroughgoing naturalism.

[119] It was not just used in a historically pejorative sense. Nadler thinks that Spinoza was an atheist because his understanding of God does not bear a similar quality to theistic understanding of God (2007). On the other hand, Carlisle takes the concept of God in Spinoza seriously invigorated contemporary metaphysics as well as become a "brilliant theories of emotion and embodiment". She further states that "If we were to adopt Spinoza's own conception of theology, we would have to say that he offers a philosophy of God without theology" (Carlisle, 2021).

Spinoza can be interpreted as a religious or secular thinker (Carlisle, 2021).[120] He is remembered under a variety of labels. Here, nevertheless, we will not examine his religious position but his metaphysical outline to understand how affects are formed. Before moving on to his understanding of substance, Spinoza's metaphysics is closer to a revisionary metaphysics in Strawson's terms because he does not merely explain but reinterprets and introduces some new elements (see Perler, 2018, p. 229; 2003, p. 9).[121]

4.2.1. Substance

The substance is one of the main ingredients of his trilogy in his ontology. He starts with the definition and denies God's purposiveness and moral character even at the beginning (Mussett, 2022, p. 67). According to Spinoza, the substance is single, and that is God (EIp11 and EIp14).

EIp2 and EIp4 are especially crucial in deriving the singleness of the substance (i.e., substance monism). We should bear in mind that Spinoza is a substance monist, but he did not take this monism as an axiom. In EIp2, Spinoza states that "two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another" because the definition of substance says that it is conceived in itself and, in EIp3, that they cannot be understood through another. The result is EIp5, i.e., there is only one substance.

At first, Spinoza defines what he means by substance: "By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed" (EIdef3).[122] Spinoza calls any

[120] While agreeing with two positions to a certain extent, Carlisle remarks that the latter reading would risk precluding some important aspects of Spinoza's philosophy. For a stronger position, see Huenemann, 2014

[121] Strawson compares them in the following words: "Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure. The productions of revisionary metaphysics remain permanently interesting, and not only as key episodes in the history of thought. Because of their articulation, and the intensity of their partial vision, the best of them are both intrinsically admirable and of enduring philosophical utility. But this last merit can be ascribed to them only because there is another kind of metaphysics which needs no justification at all beyond that of inquiry in general. Revisionary metaphysics is at the service of descriptive metaphysics" (2003, p. 9).

[122] Spinoza differs from Aristotelian conception of substance: "sth can be said but that is not itself said

distinguishing change in a substance with regard to attributes (EIdef4) or affections (that is, modifications).[123] So, two distinct things can be distinguishable via their attributes or affections (EIp4) but not through substance because it is self-caused.[124] But, since affections do not precede substance, we may disregard it as a distinguishing factor. The remaining option is to differentiate substances based on attributes, which puts a further constraint on a substance: "there is only one of the same attribute" (EIp5).[125] Even though this proposition eliminates most of the probabilities of multiple substances, there is still the option to consider one substance causing another. However, in order to have this causal relationship, there has to be a common nature to affect or cause. This commonality is impossible since we have already eliminated common attributes. Then, there has to be one substance, and since any other substance cannot cause that, that must be self-caused (EIdef1 and EIp7).

Furthermore, he argues for the substance's infinity because there would be no limiting thing (i.e., another substance) of the same nature or negation for the substance (EIp8dem and EIp8s). He shows that there must be infinite ways to conceive the essence of that substance (i.e., attributes, EIp9). And later, he calls this substance God (EIp11). This understanding of God includes all the ways his essence can be understood, so, as Spinoza says, he carries all the perfection.[126]

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of sth else" (Perler, 2018, p. 229). In Aristotle, substance has property attribution asymmetry; however, in Spinoza, substance has a precedence relation to other affections. Moreover, Spinoza also adds a self-causation property to the substance.

[123] Jonas formulated this point in the following words: "Since distinctness of an individual body cannot lie in its substance (by which on the contrary it is one with all), it must lie in its modal *determinations*, such as figure and motion, and in their interaction with other instances of determination in the same attribute" (1965, p. 47).

[124] Della Rocca opens up what Spinoza means by self-caused as the following: "To say that a thing is self-caused is nothing more than saying that it is self-explanatory, and this is indeed how Spinoza views substance" (Della Rocca, 2008b, p. 50).

[125] Spinoza utilizes PSR at this point. There cannot be many substances exactly with the same structures and type of structures because, then, there would be no reason left to distinguish them. Here, we can see PSR in action. In conclusion, all structures are taken and there are no reason to presume additional ones (Perler, 2018, p. 234).

[126] By perfection, Spinoza understands reality (2002, p. 322; EIp11s and EIVpref).

Now, we should remember that although Spinoza named the substance as such, it is nowhere similar to a conventional view of God.[127] As mentioned, Spinoza can even be interpreted as an atheist. Bennett conceives two different strains in the concept of substance; one is to see the substance as a subject to predication(s), and the other is to define it "as items which are causally self-sufficient and indestructible" (Curley, 1991, p. 48). Curley is closer to the latter because the former permits a traditional theological view of God. The teleological view, for example, is indispensable for any theological variant, but Spinoza directly and openly rejects a teleological understanding.[128] We will briefly touch upon this point again in the next section.

Without teleology, God is the same as nature (EIVpref). Unlike the common understanding of nature, which is inert and dead, Spinoza conceives that as active and passive at the same time. As two different sides of the same reality, he called them respectively as *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*. Spinoza defined *natura naturans* as "what is in itself and is conceived through itself, *or* such attributes of substance as express an eternal and infinite essence" (EIp29s). By *natura naturata*, on the other hand, he means

> whatever follows from the necessity of God's nature, *or* from any of God's attributes insofar as they are considered as things which are in God, and can neither be nor be conceived without God. (EIp29s)

The former expresses the dynamic and constantly manifesting nature; the latter, *natura naturata*, is the whole creation and the manifestation of all things.[129] Since, for some,

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[127] For James, the definition of substance has repercussions in terms of explanation. For her, "the process of arriving at ever more powerful and inclusive explanations would come to a stop if we could arrive at explanatory principles powerful enough to explain everything, to remove all sense of puzzlement about nature, and this, according to Spinoza, is what substance does. It consists in the explanatory principles that govern and explain everything there is" (S. James, 1997, pp. 137–138). This definition of substance has another advantage in explaining an important affect, that is curiosity. As James points out substance is not static and, in fact, it is the actual instantiation of the natural operation in work. In including all explanatory and non-static principles, substance has all and more than capable of satisfying our curiosity because it is totally intelligible. And, in that way, it has nothing to do with an irrational or arational will of a creator (S. James, 1997, p. 138). This intelligibility and its relation to causal and essence requirement also enables tracing infinitely many causal chains to an immanent cause.

[128] At most, as Boros stated, we can say "Spinoza elaborated on an idea of teleology, without a transcendental creator and maintainer of a *telos*, which seems closer to what contemporary neuroscientists and biologists either call for, or practice, in a new form" (2006, p. 138).

[129] As much as anything, this duality is an offshoot of a duality at the heart of Spinoza's writings (Yovel, 1989, p. 28).

it was not clear, these definitions led to controversies. As *causa sui,* what substance encompass is more than the whole created things, *natura naturans* has more potential than *natura naturata* (Knaup, 2018, pp. 71–72). It is the nature of substance to fill that gap with creativity (Harris, 1973, p. 48). The whole substance is *natura naturans,* and the respective states of the substance are *natura naturata* (Perler, 2018, p. 232). I think the latter two interpretations are fitter for Spinoza because he does not compare *natura naturans* and *natura naturata* in terms of their number of elements, as if they were sets.

Spinoza's understanding of substance (God or nature, as he called it) is monistic; that is, there is only one substance. As Nadler says,

> For Spinoza the world is not best understood as built up out of particular things populating it, each with their own independent natures, which then stand in determinate causal relation to each other. Rather, Nature is one unified substance, characterized by the causal order structuring it, no matter which of its infinitely many infinite attributes under which it is conceived. (2006, p. 103).

Spinoza has a special use for phrases such as "insofar as", "with regard to," or "to the extent that" to address the multiplicity of contexts that a single substance can be understood and explained. This use of phrases is also related to how he makes sense of attributes.

4.2.2. Attribute(s)

Spinoza defines the attribute as "what the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting its essence" (EIdef4). It means that we can only understand the essence of the substance via attributes. A question we may ask is the following: Does an attribute really constitute the essence of substance, or does it merely concern one way of intelligibility of substance (Melamed, 2018, p. 90)? One answer to that is to distinguish between viewpoints. One is from the viewpoint of the substance, and the other is from the attributes. From the point of view of substance, the essence is single, and it is convertible to other viewpoints. However, from the attribute's viewpoint, essences are really distinct (Deleuze, 1990, pp. 42–43). He further contrasts "attributed" and "attributive" views about the attributes. He says

> As long as we conceive the attribute as something attributed, we thereby conceive a substance of the same species or genus; such a substance then has in itself only a possible existence, since it is dependent on the goodwill of a transcendent God to give it an existence conforming to the attribute through which we know it. On the other hand, as soon as we posit the attribute as "attributive" we conceive it as attributing its essence to something that remains identical for all attributes, that is, to necessarily existing substance. (1990, p. 45)

Deleuze was right in going after the "attributive" interpretation of attributes because Spinoza definitely disapproves of a transcendentalist outlook in his ontology. With the attributive view of attributes and the double conception of the essence from the viewpoint of substance and attributes, we may adopt a realist view; that is, attributes really form different ways of being of the substance.[130] However, this thinking still leaves the floor for various contexts, and our use of concepts might change according to these contexts. For example, Spinoza talks about extended substance, but what he means is that the essence of the substance is considered insofar as it is conceived as extended (see EIp14s1). This context change is useful since Spinoza's philosophy allows us to conceive multiple contexts simultaneously. One time an object can be subsumed under the extended attribute, and another time the same object can be taken as an expression of the mental attribute, yet different properties are highlighted at each instant.[131] Spinoza mentions only two of them, but for him, there are an infinite number of attributes (EIp9 and EIp11). Both extension and mental attributes are coextensive, but in order to construct the human mind, Spinoza explicates extension before mental attribute. More accurately, extension is the basis on which the mind depends to conceive and have a conception. I will return to this issue in the next chapter.

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[130] Similarly, we can also identify them as subjective and objective views. The former is based on words such as conceive and comprehend to highlight both extended and mental attributes are rather ways of understanding rather than real featueres of the substance. The latter, on the other hand, treats these attributes as real features of the substance. Nadler says that the former "interpretation of the ontological status of the attributes has been well refuted in the literature" (Nadler, 2006, p. 130). He points out that there is no textual evidence that forces us to accept this view and use of the words such as conceive and comprehend, in fact, refers to grasping what is *really* out there. For Spinoza, he says, these denominations are pluralities that "indicates real and distinct aspects of the substance" (Nadler, 2006, p. 130).

[131] Bennet called this kind of viewing properties as trans-attribute properties (Bennett, 1984, para. 36). Rather than a division between some other properties and trans-attribute properties, we have to see it as a way to conceive properties.

For Spinoza, space or the extended substance does not comprise the totality of the physical objects. Nor is the mental substance the collection of all ideas. The extended and mental substances (here, he uses it synonymously with attributes) are generative, although the totalities of all expressions under them are not. This distinction can be identified as one aspect of modal/substance distinction. In fact, Spinoza responds to criticism, explaining the difference in his ontology. In L83, Tschirnhaus assumes extension as inert, as Descartes did, and questions the validity of Spinoza's understanding of the extended attribute since it does not require an external mover. Spinoza pointed out his confusion about a Cartesian understanding of inert matter and extended substance. Spinoza agrees with Tschirnhaus that such an understanding of the extended attribute cannot explain motion. According to Spinoza, the extended attribute "must necessarily be explained by an attribute which expresses eternal and infinite essence" (2016, p. 487). Unfortunately, the rest of the letter does not give us a proper justification. However, we can derive that the extended substance has an active force embedded in it.[132]

The question of how the attributes interact has been unanswered until now. In fact, the answer for Spinoza is negative; attributes do not interact with each other, and all attributes include modes in which they are woven into a causal strand. That strand has an explanatory flow but is closed to all external elements (i.e., those that come from other attributes). The core proposition that provides the ground for this view is EIIp7 and its demonstration. As Nadler puts it: "In God or Nature, the causal order of things is the same as the causal/logical order of ideas" (2006, p. 127; EIIp7). These propositions both bans explanatory flow and causal flow between attributes. Hübner also calls this the attribute barrier. By attribute barrier, she means upholding total explanatory closure or completely forbidding "explanatory flow" (also see Bennett, 1984, sec. 19; 2022).[133] With universal intelligibility, an impossible conceptual

[132] This discussion comes with a metaphysical baggage, and it is outside the scope of this work. But Bennett provided a model and Curley wrote on it. Here, Curley identified his view on substance trying to overcome the same problem."On Bennet's model metaphysic, the world considered under the attribute of Extension is not the totality of physical objects in space, but space itself. Space has different regions which may be differently qualified, but what we think of as things in space are best thought of as differently qualified regions of the one space" (Curley, 1991, pp. 37–38).

[133] As we will see the causality of attributes and their modes differ. "It would not rule out the possibility that the conception of the mind involves conception of its object, namely, the body" (Mark, 1979, p. 415). As Mark states, nevertheless, this line of reasoning is not promising due to EIIp6. A reply would

relation would imply impossible metaphysical relation. As mental and physical are causally closed to each other, conceptual relations between them are also impossible.[134] Harris gives the following example.

> The best kind of analogy is the way in which modern physics describes elementary particles. Virtually a complete description can be given of them as waves of some sort (standing waves, wave-pockets, or the like) and at the same time a similarly consistent account can be given of them as particles. But the wave account is not appropriate to the particle behavior nor the particle description to the wave behavior. Waves are diffracted, particles collide and are deflected; waves spread, particles follow trajectories. Nevertheless, the physicists are describing the same entities in each case, which manifest themselves in two different and incommensurable ways. (Harris, 1992, p. 39)

Although the example might be controversial, most commentators unanimously agree on the incommensurability of the attributes.[135] Still, we could not pin down a proper label for the kind of relation between attributes in general and extended and mental attributes in particular. Parallelism, equality, and synchrony are the common labels. Jaquet prefers equality rather than parallelism and summarizes the problem in the following passage.

> Despite the precautions he takes and his avowed mistrust of the word 'parallelism', Deleuze again leans on this crutch that in the end prevents him from focusing on elucidating the basic concept of equality, whose importance he has highlighted. In fact, he asserts that 'parallelism is given its strict sense by the equality of attributes, which guarantees that the connection is the same between things whose order is the same'. While recognising that, contrary to Leibniz, 'Spinoza [. . .] does not use the word "parallelism" ,' he maintains that 'the word suits his system as he does suppose the equality of the principles from which independent and corresponding series follow'. This word, however, ends up being a barrier, because it has obscured the word 'equality',

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be to underline that EIIp6 concerns "*causes* of modes" (Mark, 1979, p. 415). But, formal talk can be delimited/restricted "without entailing that the *content* (the "objective" nature) of the idea need be so restrictive" (Mark, 1979, p. 415). (Again, the distinction between space of reasons and space of causes is invoked). Consequently, "the mind might be the idea of a body, though its cause is a mode of thought" (Mark, 1979, p. 415).

[134] This causal leaks into explanations, which is mentioned as explantory barrier (see EIIIp2). Regarding to this, Alanen states that "far from being supervenient on the physical, the mental is a self-contained expression of the whole of nature which can be understood only through itself, for example, through other ideas that can be conceived only through the attribute of thought" (Alanen, 2011, p. 12).

[135] The following passage from EIIp7s leaves no doubt for the attribute barrier: "Hence, so long as things are considered as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature, ***or*** the connection of causes, through the attribute of Thought alone. And insofar as they are considered as modes of Extension, the order of the whole of nature must be explained through the attribute of Extension alone. I understand the same concerning the other attributes".

> which Spinoza expressly refers to, and has at times become the sanctuary of ignorance. It would therefore be more prudent to henceforth ban the term 'parallelism' and replace it with 'equality'. (Jaquet, 2018, p. 19)

In addition to Jaquet's reasons, it seems that parallelism expresses synchrony from an external source; however, extended and mental attributes have a kind of equality that emphasizes their *substantial* identity, which comes from an internal source. The latter requires an intensional definition and is more aligned with textual evidence. Jaquet purports that there is an alternating discourse between mind and body, and it "conceptualises the powers of thinking and acting as equal: asserting the primacy of the mind while making the body the primary object of knowledge" (Jaquet, 2018, p. 152). She continues to underline that it is problematic to interpret EIIIp13s as ontologically on par, and she supports equality between the mental and extensional. For her, "equality, consequently, does not exclude priority and is based here on the primacy of the body, for it is true that an idea cannot exist without an object" (Jaquet, 2018, p. 95). Her view supports the ontological priority of the body and treating them as equals.

This alleged synchrony between extended and mental attributes "sets the scene for Spinoza's discussion of the relation between the human body and the human mind" (S. James, 1997, p. 140). According to Spinoza, the human body and mind are expressions of substance. As all human beings are modes, in the next section, we must inquire into what a mode is and how it is formed.

4.2.3. Mode(s)

The Latin word for mode is *modus*. It stands for "way" in Latin. Modes are "the ways that substance is" (Lin, 2018, p. 135). Bearing the definition of Spinoza in mind, anything or object, whether concrete, abstract, physical, or mental, is a way of the substance's being. Considering Spinoza's monistic ontology, all of these things are expressions of substance through certain attributes. We are only receptive to two types, which are extended and mental.

A formal definition is made in EIdef5: "By mode I understand the affections of a substance, *or* that which is in another which it is also conceived" .[136] We can derive that since modes are affections of the substance, they are also *in* substance (see EIax1).[137] So, modes are not independent entities; they are merely states dependent on the substance. Spinoza does not explicate much about modes early in *Ethics*, but as the reader progresses, he elaborates on some of a mode's features.

Although mode a might be thought of as a state of a thing at first, Spinoza used it idiosyncratically. For Spinoza, modes stand for things, which are affections of substance, as they are considered under different attributes. Each mode can range from simpler to more complex individuals and aggregates. In terms of a physical mode, take this example:

> Consider, for example, my dining room chair which is made up of several different pieces of wood, nails, etc. Or consider my telephone which is made up of a receiver, buttons, etc. In each case, the members of a certain collection of physical objects unite to form another, unified physical individual. (Della Rocca, 2008b, p. 207)

This stable relation is called the ratio of motion and rest (or their idea counterpart; see EIIp13le1 and EIIIp2). These motion and rest ratios can come into contact with other ratios to bring nourishing or destructive relationships. Each of these complex individuals responds to changes that occur in each of its constituent pieces. The fact that complex individuals have many constituent parts can account for why some complex individuals may seem to cease self-preservation or, even worse, initiate self-destruction (Della Rocca, 2008b, p. 208).

Things are distinguished based on their activity in connection to motion and rest ratio. What a being is its activity (A. V. Garrett, 2003, p. 140). Both activity and existence are determined because the power to act and to exist arise from the same concept

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[136] Spinoza underlines bodies and objects for a redefinition which is in tune with a revisionary metaphysics (S. D. Brown & Stenner, 2001, p. 103).

[137] Here, what I mean by this preposition is an inherence and dependence relation rather than a spatial relation/containment (Della Rocca, 2008a, p. 42).

With the use of PSR, causation, explanation and inherence of a property "amount to the same phenomenon" (Della Rocca, 2008b, p. 7).

(EIp34).[138] According to Marshall, *causa sui* and existence is the most liminal and elegant concept where existence and power to act coincide (2013, p. 62). For modes, existence is contingent because their essence does not involve existence. However, this does not mean that modes are altogether devoid of essence. Their essence entirely boils down to the motion and rest ratio. According to Cook, "the essence of an individual is that particular constellation of the fixed and eternal things which defines the characteristic structure and mode of activity which is that individual" (1986, p. 201). He also adds that "the essence is the immanent cause of the individual in the sense that the individual just is a manifestation of the structurally and dispositionally regular ways in which God acts extendedly" (Cook, 1986, pp. 201–202). Here, this regularity is, in fact, constituted by its relation to other modes because "Spinoza's general point here is that any body, human or otherwise, is a part of Nature and thus exists only through a network of causal relations with other bodies" (Nadler, 2006, p. 170; also see EIIpost4).[139] This network (or causal chain) is necessarily infinite (EIp22). Hence, Spinoza's relational ontology (and essences of modes) is dependent on infinite relations between those modes which also happen to be what Spinoza meant by causal chain.[140]

[138] An addition would be this. Each thing, regardless of whether it is mental or physical, *has* an essence and essence of each thing is power (EIp11). So, each thing *has* power. As those propositions are also necessary expressions of Spinoza's system, we can say each thing expresses (and exercises) power and to exist is to express (and to exercise) power (Marshall, 2013, p. 60). Although that each idea (as a subset of things) has power seems to be a metaphysical thesis, it has immediate psychological consequences in his system. Necessity tells us a story about a thing's power of existing, that is it has unlimited amount of power to exist. It also results in God's infinity.

[139] Here, two different causality can be asserted but they are not that different. There are two fundamental types of causal relations for Spinoza. One is horizontal and the other is vertical, as Yovel states (Yovel, 1989, pp. 167–168). We will not delve into the details of this causalities. For the time being, they refer to the same phenomena through different perspectives because Spinoza's philosophy does not allow for different uses of the same term.

[140] To elaborate on the necessary entailment between modes, Spinoza propounds that there are infinite modes and he further divides them into immediate infinite modes (e.g., natural laws and principles both in extended and mental substance) and mediate infinite modes (e.g., face of whole universe [*facies totius Universi*] for extended substance and totality of ideas for mental substance). Moreover, Curley is right in that an explanation about the causal relation between substance and modes is needed. Curley thinks that it is not very helpful to deal with this relation or "to think of substance as the whole of reality and a subject on which particular finite things are 'adjectival'" (Curley, 1991, p. 48). If we identify substance with the totality of attributes and conceive "attributes as general structural features of the universe, as fixed and eternal things which have laws of nature very closely associated with them", then "attributes are the most general structural features of the universe which are captured by the most general laws of nature" (Curley, 1991, p. 49). Following those most general structures, that are attributes, the infinite modes are "the less general structural features of the universe which are captured by the lower level laws of nature which a unified science would deduce from the most general laws" (Curley, 1991, p. 49).

We shall revisit a theme in the attributes section: viewing modes as transattribute or not. To respond to this, we need to describe two views. The first is that a mode might be a composite structure with two parts: extended and thinking structures. The second is that a mode is a simple and unitary structure that can both be defined as physical and extended depending on the current consideration. The first definition violates EIIp7s because, otherwise, there would be two different domains, and identity would not be preserved. Perler gave an example of a volcano. He says we may consider a volcano's physical and chemical structure manifested as two different aspects of the same entity (Perler, 2018, p. 235). In that analogy, modes refer to the volcano's physical or chemical structure. One outcome of this is to explain both efficacy of modes and the context of that efficacy. And another, and even more important, is that all things can be expressed in both ways, which means we can conceive in both ways. Harris states, "if the mind forms an intention to act in a certain way the body moves appropriately because that movement is the physiological manifestation of the mind's action" (Harris, 1992, p. 38). Yet, we should bear EIp9 in mind, which says, "the more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes belong to it" . As existence is intelligible for Spinoza, a complete description of a mode requires more attributes, and a self-evident description would require all attributes.[141]

Thus, we can conceive things as also having *conatus*.[142] For Spinoza, *conatus* does not increase or decrease in the face of duration. In other words, *conatus* might only be affected by a limitation of another mode. Imagine a candle that shrinks with each minute (each moment), and finally, it burns out and extinguishes. Furthermore, imagine that we extend the height of the candle infinitely, so either its height remains stable, or it does not even actually burn out. Both scenarios do not suggest that the

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We may call that a cascading causality model. Spinoza's causal model is also called the entailment model of causation (Sayre, 1976, p. 65). This model and details of causality of modes, however, are outside the scope of this work but I have referred to immediate and mediate infinite modes somewhere else, that is in Yaylım, 2015, pp. 37–38.

[141] Bennett discusses whether substance includes infinite attributes and substance includes all attributes can be used interchangeably (1984, para. 19).

[142] *Conatus* is striving to affirm and continue the existence of a body. Curley claims any translation of *conatus* would be contentious. There are numerous alternatives, including endeavor, effort, exertion, struggle, attempt and tendency (1985, p. 657).

candle ceases to be a candle because it stops burning out. These scenarios can be generalized by the following formula: a durational intervention does not end up changing this essential aspect of an individual. In other words, "the power (and perfection) of the *conatus* should be considered without regard to duration; instead, each thing's *conatus* is perfect and real to the extent that it exercises its power in a particular, self-sustaining way" (Marshall, 2013, p. 85). That means each physical mode is besouled or beminded within an ever-increasing complexity of things (Harris, 1973, pp. 77–78), and, again, the difference in modes are rather differences of degrees rather than separate ranks in the hierarchy of being.

We shall look at one of those important essences to lay the ground for a theory of emotions. For Spinoza, among many other things, these are not distinct substances in themselves but modes of the single substance (see EIIp10, including demonstrations, scholiae, and corollaries). These modes are human beings, and we can mention human nature only insofar as we have in mind the specific forces that affect individual human beings, not as a universal notion (EIapp and EIIp40s1). So, in the next section, we will turn our attention to human nature.

4.3. Human Nature in Spinoza

The introductory part of this section will include the metaphysical framework at the beginning of Part II and substance monism from Part I of Spinoza's *Ethics*. Even though one might claim that the human and nature connection is wholly exposed in Part II, the human and nature relationship is between substance and modes in its essence. As Della Rocca says, we can only see "Spinoza's psychology only by seeing it as emerging from his metaphysics" (1995, p. 192). As we will see in the next chapter more clearly, Spinoza's ontology provides an escape from traditional ontologies that previous emotion theories depend upon (which rely on a Cartesian mind-body split). Hence, Spinoza's understanding of human nature allows us to overcome the problem of intentionality in the James-Lange theory, the lack of bodily changes in the early cognitivism (e.g., Bedford, Pitcher, and Alston), appraisal theorists (e.g., Lazarus and Scherer) and further intentionality problems of some embodied theorists (e.g., Ekman) and the (neo-)Jamesian theorists (e.g., Prinz and Damasio).

Bennett claims that Spinoza's view is that mind and body—as modifications of substance—are identical, which allows us to think of Spinoza as an identity theorist (1981).[143] Here, without rejecting this identity theory claim, I will try to construe Spinoza's *Ethics* (especially Part II) as an attempt to put the body in an ontologically primary position.[144] I will try to show this by relying on textual evidence from Spinoza and some prominent Spinoza scholars such as Lloyd (1986). However, there are other numerous scholars such as Curley (1988), Cook (1990, p. 83), Nadler (2006, pp. 200–201), De Dijn (2010, pp. 72–73), Hübner (2019, p. 2), Koistinen (2018, p. 277) and Alanen (2020, p. 110) who clearly refers to the ontological primacy of the extended attribute. And even Spinozists from other walks, such as Damasio, defend the priority of an existent thing that is extended (2003, pp. 212–213).[145] In *Ethics*, although thinking and extension are identical insofar as we say that they are conceived as constituting the single infinite essence of substance, in EIIp11, he states that the human mind is an idea of an actually existing thing which turns out to be the human body as it is stated in EIIp10-13 (2002, pp. 250–255).[146] Moreover, in *Ethics*, there is no expression that parallels his demonstration in EIIp13. If there were, we had to read at least a similar line such as "body of an idea" ; the body does not presuppose a mind but only the opposite.[147] This point will be of immense importance when dealing with adequate and inadequate ideas (i.e. in EIIp24-30). Take one of the aforementioned scholars, Genevieve Lloyd. She says:

> Ideas in the mind of God are correlates of individual bodies; but they are not their exemplars. In fact, given mind's status as idea of body, bodies are, in a

[143] This Spinozist identity claim will further be contrasted with Ryle's unified mind-body thinking with remarks from Renz (2009).

[144] However, Spinoza does not accept central state materialism which refers to the mid-twentieth century thesis of mind-body identity and the specific totality of mechanisms of the body as conceived by names such as Place, Smart and Armstrong. Each mode (either extensional or thinking) can be further explicated by the other side. More clearly, property dualism breaks "nature up into two distinct and irreducible ways of being but which does not rule out the functioning of one side of the divide being explained or understood by the functioning of the other side" (Nadler, 2006, p. 148).

[145] Cook reads mind as "the intentional object of the body" (Cook, 1990, p. 83). And Nadler put it even more robust: "Spinoza never suggests that the direction of understanding can go from mind to body, it is always from body to mind" (Nadler, 2006, p. 147).

[146] And as Harris states "object of which it is the idea is the human body and nothing else" (Harris, 1992, p. 35).

[147] I am grateful that Asst. Prof. Dr. Corry Shores helped me to formulate this point.

> sense, "prior" to minds in Spinoza's system; although the priority is not of course a causal one. (1986, p. 221)

Spinoza hints at the priority of the body, but it cannot be causal since neither the mind nor the body can move across attributes. Otherwise, this movement would violate the explanatory barrier between two attributes.[148] Overcoming this barrier would require Spinoza to overthrow his entire view of substance and the identity of mind and body. This trespassing of the barrier would also put him in the same position as Descartes (i.e., dealing with the interactionism problem between mind and body mentioned in EIIp7).[149] So, there has to be a priority of the body with a non-causal priority (i.e., prioritization in the cascade of derivations of ontological elements). We may call this ontological priority; the body is *primus inter pares* (i.e., first among equals). This ontological priority is not limited to humans; thus, it is not particularly about human nature.

Spinoza defines that ontologically prior concept in the following words: "By body I understand a mode that in a certain and determinate way expresses God's essence insofar as he is considered as an extended thing" (EIIdef1). Spinoza also addresses EIp25, in which he states that substance is the efficient cause of both the existence and essence of things. A mind can apprehend this extended thing (not *of someone* yet) only via its affections and changes (EIIp19, EIIp22, and EIIp23). Yakira calls this apprehension an act of sensing or thinking directed at the body itself (2015, p. 162; also EIIax4).[150] But as we will take a closer look at it in the next chapter, it would also lead to inevitably inadequate ideas.

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[148] In order not to violate the explanatory barrier, in terms of Spinozistic view, an idea cannot be explained outside of mental items. However, there are some counter textual evidence to *Ethics* in which Spinoza bridged that explanatory barrier. For example, in KVII Chapter 19 para. 13, he says "the body causes the soul to perceive it, and thereby to perceive other bodies also". He does not sustain that usage any further.

[149] In other words, mind and body refer to the same thing and thus they are only two ways of understanding the same thing. As a result, their relation is *acausal* (England, 2018, p. 4). Yet, this does not means that Spinoza is devoid of a philosophical problem and totally resolved the Cartesian problem. He rather transformed it. The main question, for Spinoza, is in what sense mind and body are identical.

[150] We are not aware of all affections of our body and Spinoza understands the concept of body *functionally*, that is only if parts of a body communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed manner they maintain the fact that they are part of that body. In other words, we feel or sense those

After this caveat, we may move towards the meaning of "nature" as in human nature. As a mode, humans are amenable to the limitations of other modes. So, the nature of an individual human being is constrained by the same rules of being a mode, according to Spinoza. Although this thinking fits well into Spinoza's ontological framework, there have been secular and religious criticisms. As a secular one, Wilson says:

> In the first place, the ideas *are* in God, whereas existing (finite) particulars are merely God's *creatures* (and not "in" him as their metaphysical subject). In the second place, there is in God the idea of every *possible* entity–and according to Leibniz the realm of possibles is much wider than the realms of actual entities... Third, God's ideas and particular entities belong to different ontological categories: at least some particular finite existing entities are *substances*, whereas (I take it) Leibniz did not think of God's ideas of substances–the "complete concepts" –as themselves substances. (1999, p. 127)

However, for Spinoza, God's ideas are "metaphysically closer to their objects" than Leibniz's (Wilson, 1999, p. 127). For Spinoza, firstly, both ideas and physical objects resemble insofar as they inhere in God. Secondly, the ideas of God are not more populous than the objects that correspond to them. If "realms of the possible and actual are coextensive", in other words, there are ideas for each object and vice versa. Then one may expect that both realms should have the same number of elements. But also, as Spinoza says, there are ideas of non-existent objects, and they "have correspondents in the attributes other than thought" (Wilson, 1999, p. 127).[151] Their elements are the same; by objects, Spinoza is not delimited by just physical objects (more accurately for things we call physical objects). Wilson points out a "lack of metaphysical space between God's ideas and their objects" (Wilson, 1999, p. 128). But this identification, according to Wilson, results in Spinoza's incoherence. God does not lack a particular object and its idea (EIIp3). She says, "the drawbacks of identifying the human mind with God's idea of the human body are too fundamental to be outweighed by the advantages" (Wilson, 1999, p. 138). Spinoza's understanding fails in mind-body and the relation between sentient and material existence. A religious criticism involves equating the properties of God with properties of its expression, i.e., modes. Bayle attacks Spinoza because he thinks Spinoza misapplied modes' properties to God (or

affects insofar as that specific change "that bears on the whole body's ability to function as an integrated organism" (Hübner, 2022).

[151] This proposition does not refer to cardinalities of infinities in each attribute but rather the fact that there are ideas for things that we are not aware of.

substance), then certain changes (such as behaviors) of human beings also apply to God. Curley states that "all kinds of moral enormities must be predicated directly of God" (1969, p. 12). For example, Bayle thinks, what if God "hates himself" or "asks favors of himself and refuses them, he persecutes himself…". Bayle further ridiculed and rejected Spinoza (1965, p. 312).[152] His objection highlights particular things as properties of God which would be to confuse qualities with particular things. The meaning behind "one thing is predicated of another" has to be solved (Curley, 1991, p. 37). Bayle's main concern is that

> properties of God which are unworthy of him (we would have to ascribe directly to God every odious action that man performs); that we would have to predicate contradictory properties of God (since to take only one of many examples, one man may want what another man does not want); and that we would have to think of God as changeable (since every time a man changes his mind, it would be God who was changing his mind). (Curley, 1991, p. 37)

But, this results in starting with a rejection of anthropomorphism and ending with a hallmark expression of anthropomorphism. This result is sufficient to abandon Bayle's interpretation. In fact, the whole criticism is an unexpected and hasty objection because Spinoza addressed this problem as early as in EIp8s2: "So also, those who confuse the divine nature with the human easily ascribe human affects to God, particularly so long as they are also ignorant of how those affects are produced in the mind".

For Garber, Spinoza's understanding of an individual thing requires grasping that it has a nature; it is not just a bunch of random stuff. He continues to say that "to have a nature for him means to have a stable structure, one that is sufficiently robust to maintain itself in the face of disruption" (Garber, 2013, p. 26). This stable structure can be called a homeostatic conception of the individual.[153] According to Jonas, the

[152] Substance is the grand subject and it is the true subject of all predication. This interpretation is very persistent within analytically minded philosophers (Curley, 1991, p. 36). Unlike Bayle, "on Bennett's version of this interpretation, at least, it is clear that the one thing on which everything else is adjectival may be referred to as either God or the whole of reality" (Curley, 1991, p. 36). This interpretation also makes God changeable which is clearly in contradiction with EIp20c2.

[153] Cook underlines this homeostatic nature in the following words. "Our desire or will to bring about states of affairs which we love is but the mental reflection of the body's natural homeostatic endeavor to realize that which increases its power of self-preservation" (Cook, 1990, p. 85). This homeostatic endeavor, given the close environment and endeavor to thrive in changing situations (i.e., allostatis),

continuity of identity is maintained only insofar as that configuration is preserved (1965, p. 47).

We can see this homeostatic conception has mental outcomes through EIIp7 (parallelism of extended and mental attributes) and EIIp13 (physics of the body). More specifically, for our investigation of human nature, how can this homeostatic conception give rise to a mind?[154] Although it is an agreed-upon interpretation that Spinoza is an identity theorist, Spinoza is not clear about the exact kind of identity between mind and body.[155] So, we only have conjectures; the most elegant one (and closest to what Spinoza says) is to take these two attributes (extended and mental, thus body and mind) as the same thing *substantially.*[156] With this assumption, we can see traces of Spinoza hinting at different aspects of organic life. According to Jonas, each lemma in EIIp13 points out a specific aspect of organic life. In fact, he says that "Lemma 4 refers to metabolism, 5 to growth, 6 to movement of limb, 7 to locomotion" (Jonas, 1965, p. 49). The scholium after lemmata in EIIp13 underlines the interplay

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are virtually endless and depend on the numerous possibilities of the organism-environment coupling.

[154] Here also lies the problem of emergency, however the problem is outside the scope of this chapter and work in general. Jonas hints at the problem of emergence by denoting an increasing degree of complexity which puts it apart from a mechanical performance by a self-contained automaton (Jonas, 1965, p. 48).

[155] Nevertheless, it has to mentioned that such an identity relation cannot be reduced to a class of resemblance. "The idea of a part of the human body is the idea *of* that part of the body not because it resembles or otherwise represents an independent reality. Rather, as we now know, the idea and the bodily state of which it is the idea are ultimately identical -- they are one and the same thing being expressed through two different attributes" (Nadler, 2006, p. 157). On the other hand, for Mark, Spinoza's description of mind is necessarily considered under one aspect of reality. "That mind and body are one and the same does not tell us what the mind is, nor what the body is, but what *there* is: there is, Spinoza says, just one thing. That thing is neither mind nor body--or else it is both mind *and* body; in any case it is not more truly one than the other". And, "it must be described, however, in one way or the other; there can be no neutral description: whatever can be conceived must be conceived under some attribute or other" (Mark, 1979, p. 415).

[156] By substantially, I mean with reference to the substance. Both attributes express the substance, so they are the same thing but only insofar as they are taken substantially. Here, following Jonas' thinking, it can be stated that "it would even be too disjunctive to say that each material event has its 'counterpart' in a mental event, since what externally may be registered as a parallelism of two different series of events is in truth, that is, in the reality of God or nature, *substantially* identical" (Jonas, 1965, p. 46). Yet, I would not call the mental "counterpart" of the material event; it evokes as if they are two different events in reality. Jonas purports that teleology is replaced by self-explication. It cannot be teleological because it does no longer rely on a purpose but rather a causal necessity immanent to the substance. Although oxidation and combustion was not known by Descartes, his mechanical framework complies with these physical theories.

between homeostasis (the regulation of the organism itself) and allostasis (regulation through external means so that the organism, while saving its identity, attains new regulative set points).[157] As with any regulator, in cybernetics parlance, a more suitable word can be requisite variety in which the organic system has to achieve greater variety or complexity in the external environment than in the internal systems. A complementary principle is that the organism can withstand more perturbations if it has a larger variety of actions in the external environment. It is defined by Ross Ashby (1957, pp. 206–207).

Does this kind of substantial identity mean that human beings do not have a peculiar and privileged place in the order of creation? Spinoza answers this question affirmatively. In Spinoza's framework, every mode, including humans and other organisms, is an expression of the substance. In that sense, although human beings might have some peculiarities, all of those take place in a plane of immanence, and different living beings (and even nonliving things) only differ in the complexities and capabilities of their bodies' corresponding minds.[158] Ontologically, for Spinoza, all beings occupy the same place and are co-extensive in their being. However, this thinking is far from mainstream ideas in the history of thinking in general and philosophy in particular. Spinoza rejects any transcendence for humans, even with additional faculties (as Aristotle or Descartes did) or divine order (as Judeo-Christian theology did) (Perler, 2018, p. 225). However, it is not the case that, as he says in EIIp13s, qualities of the human mind can be extended to all beings. "On the contrary,

[157] If we take the identity of an organism beyond these set points, then we have reasons to purport that the identity is still maintained with new set points. As a result, I claim, allostasis is a more suitable concept for Spinoza, compared to homeostasis. Why is it actually more suitable? Because the organism grows and it has a *conatus*; its essence is a specific *conatus*. Jonas lists EIIpost1, EIIpost3, EIIpost4, EIIpost6. Especially postulate 4 is curious; it says: "The human body needs for its preservation many other bodies by which it is, as it were, continually regenerated" (p. 50). There are always reciprocal needs between bodies since these variances occur only through certain physiological, behavioural and affective changes. "...identity in Spinoza's theory of individuality is the identity of a whole which is so little the mere sum of its parts that it remains the same even when the parts continually change" (Jonas, 1965, p. 50). Also, it is important to bear in mind that there are different qualitative grades of individuality which depend on the degree of differentiated order and quantitative grades of individuality which depend on the number of included individuals. To me, there are two different expressions.

[158] Spinoza's infamous saying at the end of Preface to Part II is an attest to this. "Therefore, I shall treat the nature and power of the Affects, and the power of the Mind over them, by the same Method by which, in the preceding parts, I treated God and the Mind, and I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a Question of lines, planes, and bodies".

his point is to show that, at least ontologically speaking, there is nothing so special about the human mind that distinguishes it from what corresponds to all bodies" (Nadler, 2006, p. 137).

The human body, as well as any other body, is composed of smaller particles (see also Jonas, 1965, p. 50). Each small part is composed of even smaller parts, but they are modeled as motion and rest rather than indivisible parts. With each bundle of motion and rest, the parts enter into nourishing or degenerating relationships (Deleuze, 1988, pp. 19–22). The communication of motions in a certain fixed manner underlines a relational ontology. But how is it that "a plurality of individuals may be so united that all together from a larger (and higher-order) individual"? (Jonas, 1965, p. 48). This question is a tough one. A Spinozistic answer seems to be the total formation of all inner relations (i.e., relations that take place within the individual) insofar as they maintain a functional "compound with the outside world" (Jonas, 1965, p. 48; Wilson, 1999, p. 130). The word fixed and inner relations emphasize the ratio between motion and rest (mainly EIIp13L5). As Nadler remarks, this ratio is by no means perfectly stable. Depending on the position, it is only relatively stable in a given context and duration. And "something is external to that body, by contrast, because it does not share in that relatively stable relationship" (Nadler, 2006, p. 140). In other words, external bodies are external because they do not stay in the homeostatic tendency of the individual.

A common thought is that human beings are usually distinguished by their mental abilities compared to other creatures.[159] All in all, even Spinoza says that "man thinks" (EIIax2). But, for Spinoza, this thinking is deeply related to the body. In fact, thinking might be taken as an identical movement activity in the mental attribute.[160] We will

[159] Spinoza does not think human beings are unique in having minds, which is a collection of ideas with a relatively fixed structure. Mindedness or having a mental counterpart for each body is not limited to being human. This principle allows that all bodies include minds, even though they are not entirely or particularly relevant to human beings (Wilson, 1999, p. 128).

[160] Hampshire summarizes this point in the following words: "Given Spinoza's account of the mind-body relation, which is itself inseparable from the conception of Thought and Extension as two attributes of the single substance, there can in principle be no intellectual progress without a corresponding extension of what we would distinguish as the physical powers of the organism" (1956, p. 81).

see its repercussions in constructing a theory of emotions in Chapter 6. Here, the question is how understanding the body can give us an idea about human nature. Nadler briefly responds to that Spinoza's view that "the capacities of the mind are a function of the capacities of the body, and that to understand the mind requires one first to understand the body" (Nadler, 2006, p. 146). For Nadler, then, like Curley, Spinoza's program is essentially a body-primary one. If we combine this status of the body with his method (i.e., treating actions and appetites as lines, planes, and bodies) and EIIIp2 (i.e., we still do not know entirely what the body can do), then we arrive at a pragmatic ontology – a body is only defined by a set of possibilities concerning what it is capable of doing or on what it is acting. Ideas are also practical because they can be conceived *of* bodies. Nadler says, "strictly speaking, the idea is only *of* the state of the human body. But because that state of the human body *qua* effect bears reference to its cause, so too the idea of that state will bear some reference to that cause" (2006, pp. 158–159).[161] However, there are other alternatives to thinking that bodies are affected by other bodies whose ideas affect those ideas. According to Delahunty, since ideas are not being generated by external bodies owing to the mind-body parallelism (or equality) of Spinoza, all adequate ideas are innate according to (Delahunty's) Spinoza (Delahunty, 1985, p. 24; also see Marshall, 2013, Chapter 2). He abides by the explanatory barrier by disallowing any *corresponding* changes in the mental attribute.

As mentioned before, the individual unit is a form of determinateness of substance, and it has a specific *conatus* that is "evidenced by the survival of that form in a causal history" (Jonas, 1965, p. 48).[162] The idea of a determinate body is composed of a series of ideas (as of concomitant bodies) that are influenced by internal and external causes. These causes act on the body to a certain extent, so "what is represented in the idea is

[161] The nature of the relation with that cause is not entirely clear but we can speculate on that. "In terms of epistemology, Spinoza further tried to prove that while minds *think of* the bodies whose minds they are, they can think of objects different from their own bodies in so far as they, being bodies, are *affected by* other bodies (things) that they encounter physically, through sensory *perception"* (Brandt, 2020, p. 18 see EIIp16c2 and EIIp26c). Here, Brandt connects cause and perception with his epistemology very briefly.

[162] *Conatus* is translated as striving or perseverance in one's being. Although there are different translations, it can be unarguably put as the first and central principle of the mind which strives "to affirm the existence of our Body" (Spinoza, 1985, p. 500 see footnote 18).

the total state of the body at each given instant" (Jonas, 1965, p. 53) also changes the dynamic constitution of the body. In other words, as the body is not only internally determined, what is represented in the idea "at each moment itself and those bodies of the surrounding world which do affect it at the moment" (Jonas, 1965, p. 53). As a result, those shifts translate into discriminatory sensitivity, that is, the body (and mind) increase in the ability to discern external things.[163] As discriminatory abilities improve, human beings invent derivative appetites (*appetitus*) and desires (*cupiditas*), such as the urge to build a shelter and invest in the stock market.[164] Therefore, Spinoza continues,

> the need for a habitation insofar as it is considered as a final cause is nothing but this particular urge, which is, in reality, an efficient cause, and is considered as the prime cause because men are commonly ignorant of the causes of their urges; for, as I have repeatedly said, they are conscious of their actions and appetites but unaware of the causes by which they are determined to seek something. (2002, p. 321)

This reasoning shows that teleology is not entirely missing in Spinoza's system. Both humans and bees have their group or individual purposes. These purposes may be conflictual, as shown in KV, Part II, Chapter 24 (Spinoza, 1985, pp. 143–144).

This conception of human nature in Spinoza leaves the floor for his theory of mind and his theory of ideas. The next chapter will focus on his views about emotions and affects.

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[163] By sensitivity, Sterelny claims that "there can be no informational sensitivity without representation". And all "flexible and adaptive response to the world without representation" (Sterelny, 1990, p. 21). In Spinoza's particular system of emotions, we suffer or undergo emotions only to the extent that we are affected by other objects (Perler, 2018, p. 244). We will see activity and passivity according to Spinoza in the last chapter and sensitivity also makes it way into possibilities of action and passion. "Only by being sensitive can life be active, only by being exposed can it be autonomous" (Jonas, 1965, pp. 56–57).

[164] Spinoza claims that body is more capable than what we first think it can. "Because human bodies are capable of a great many things, there is no doubt but what they can be of such a nature that they are related to minds which have a great knowledge of themselves of itself . . . On the other hand, he who has a body capable of a great many things, has a mind which considered only in itself is very much conscious of itself" (EVp39s). We consider these people fortunate but also Spinoza formulates this as a prescription: "we…should develop into a body that is capable of a great many activities and is related to a mind that is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things, and in such a way that everything relating to its memory or imagination should be of scarcely any importance in comparison with its intellect…" (EVp39s, Spinoza, 2002, p. 380). This paves the way for an eternal mode of thinking (EVp40s, Spinoza, 2002, p. 381).

CHAPTER 5

SPINOZA'S THEORY OF IDEAS

In this chapter, we will briefly explore Spinoza's theory of ideas to arrive at an understanding of Spinoza's understanding of epistemology and emotions. For a Spinozistic theory of mind, ideas and affects are two of the most crucial concepts. Moreover, in this chapter, we will not work directly with Spinoza's theory of emotion; rather, I will examine underlying concepts such as idea, mind, and representation that we will need for the next chapter, where I discuss a Spinozistic account of emotion in detail.

Part II of the *Ethics* focuses on the nature and origin of the mind. It does not necessarily refer to the human mind or human nature. Spinoza strives to answer what the mind is in general. However, for Spinoza, neither mind in general nor the human mind, in particular, is a given; there are certain constituent elements of the mind. These are ideas, but Spinoza has a slightly different view of the mind which he defines from the outset at the beginning of the second part. In EIIdef3, it reads, "by idea I understand a concept of the Mind that the Mind forms because it is a thinking thing". As aforementioned, modes are activities, and since minds are modes, minds are also activities. The simpler parts are ideas of minds. Yet, Spinoza calls them concepts. He explicates this notion in the same definition: "I say concept rather than perception, because the word perception seems to indicate that the object acts on the Mind. But concept seems to express an action of the Mind".[165] For Jaquet, Spinoza wanted to

[165] We falsely assume that we see things without our own intervention and "we confusedly think that the ideas of the ways in which our bodies are affected by things around us are ideas of those things themselves" (Cook, 1990, p. 84). So, for us, "understanding of the mind requires a greater understanding of the body (whose idea the mind is) and of the ways in which that body is affected by things in the natural environment" (Cook, 1990, p. 84). Furthermore, this distinction between concept and perception is acknowledged in contemprary emotion theory literature. Here is an example: "The percept is not a concept, because it is under exogenous control" (Prinz, 2004, p. 50).

emphasize the "active, dynamic nature of the power of thought operating in the production of ideas" (2018, pp. 9–10). He is striving to emphasize the active rather than passive nature of ideas. What is that activity, then? The activity is the unfolding of substance through a specific mode. The dynamic nature of Spinoza's ontology can be conceived in the first part and L83, as mentioned. Hereafter, I will refer to cognitions and cognizing as activities.[166]

For Spinoza, there are two kinds of relations between mind and body. Firstly, we can say that the relation consists of two elements, an idea, and its object, i.e., *ideatum*. The first type of relationship involves the relation between the idea and its related object. Secondly, two different elements, the idea and its object are related as the mode of the mental corresponds to a mode of the physical (Mark, 1979, p. 401). Adequacy of ideas deals with the former relation, and his theory of the mind deals with the latter relation. We shall concentrate on them both in this chapter.

Spinoza takes minds as integrated ideas; as in the case of a body, a relatively stable relation between ideas constitutes the mind. It is important to bear in mind that minds can be explained by both ideas and bodies. As aforementioned, minds are, in fact, ideas of bodies. Here, Spinoza denotes the idea of tracking the changes in the body.[167] Thus, this follows that "any human mind is the idea of a human body, an idea that is itself, in turn, a collection of ideas of the parts of that body" (Nadler, 2006, p. 156).[168] In the section about representation, I will delve deeper into different kinds of relations of which ideas are capable.

Spinoza inherits some of Descartes' concerns, including value-free inquiry and explanation of emotions (Boros, 2006, p. 129). He also adopted Cartesian views to a

[166] Also Hübner thinks that *cognitio* is better addressed by cognition rather than knowledge since it includes "not just true and adequate ideas, but also inadequate and false ones" (2022) . This choice is also more suitable for taking knowledge as a state of mind (Bricker, 2022, p. 1461).

[167] Spinoza uses the phrase "idea of" almost as a function that relates body to the mind (EIIp11, EIIp12 and EIIp13).

[168] Regarding that point, there are also numerous works (Bennett, 1984, para. 84; Della Rocca, 1996, pp. 48–64; Radner, 1971, p. 71; Wilson, 1999, pp. 131–133).

certain extent, but we may look at some of their contrasts on the basis of epistemology to open a path to view Spinoza's theory of affects. Boros states, "while the Cartesian theory was modeled primarily on physics, Spinoza's approach is modeled on geometry" (2006, p. 130). However, it is important to bear in mind that, to a common view, "geometry does not call for anything really extended in the explanation for the connection between thinking and extension, a connection which exists despite their distinct nature" (Boros, 2006, p. 130). As commonly conceived, physical models such as Descartes' have difficulties explaining the intentionality of thinking. On the other hand, for Spinoza, intentionality can be incorporated, and each act of thinking is directed towards an object, whether physical or mental.[169] Also, apart from conceptual dissimilarities, Spinoza's view can be contrasted with Descartes regarding his physical findings. Spinoza does not think that the pineal gland forms the interaction between mind and body, nor is it "found to be so placed in the middle of the brain that it can be driven about so easily and in so many ways, and that not all the nerves extend to the cavities of the brain" (EVpref).

After this short note, we will examine Spinoza's view on the (in)adequacy of ideas, his theory of mind, and his views on consciousness and representation. So, we can better understand how his theory of emotion can be built upon his theory of ideas.

5.1. Adequate and Inadequate Ideas in Spinoza

This section will concentrate on the main division in Spinoza's theory of ideas. Compared to other early modern philosophers, his philosophy of mind and epistemology are indistinguishably close since, for him, the mind is an idea itself (Nadler, 2006, pp. 18, 21–24). Both adequate and inadequate ideas are also crucial for Spinoza's theory of affects and emotions because all emotions and affects are ideas

[169] Regarding intentionality of ideas, Spinoza calls nonphysical references of ideas *ideatum.* In *ideatum,* he further explicates the essence in two senses: formal essence and objective essence. Harris defines them in the following words. "What the object really is in itself he calls its 'formal' essence…" "..., and he asserts that in a true idea the objective (ideal) essence and the formal (real) essence are identical" (Harris, 1992, p. 15). Complete ideatum follows from complete object and can be formulated as idea of God's objective essence is equal to God's formal essence. A similar stance is defended by Mark. "Cognition, for Spinoza, is a two-term affair, a direct relation between the mind and what it knows; it is not something mediated by representational entities having a distinct metaphysical status from the things they represent. We could describe this by saying that there is no separation for Spinoza between the content and the object of an idea" (Mark, 1979, pp. 406–407).

too, and ideas have affective properties. Moreover, the activity and passivity of emotions depend on whether they stem from our nature, which is the direct expression of the (in)adequacy of the ideas, as we will see.

We should note one caveat. As we have seen, Spinoza started with an explication of substance and its expressions. For Spinoza, we cannot understand any mode before understanding substance. This direction is not the correct order of philosophizing. "Given this explanatory priority of substance, to understand what it means to think or to have a mind we also cannot simply extrapolate from our own case (for example, from introspection, or from observing the behavior of fellow humans)" (Hübner, 2022). God produces infinite intellect, which is the right point to start philosophizing since it is both ontologically and explanatorily prior to the representation or idea of everything. If we start at the right point with the right inference, there is no reason to doubt. Thus, for Spinoza, global skepticism is meaningless.[170]

Adequacy is used in at least two senses. The first is that Spinoza talks about adequacy as pertaining to causes and essences. Even in his early writings (TdIE, para. 29), he utilized the term adequacy to denote a proper essence. In terms of his epistemology, it might also denote causal adequacy.[171] In fact, they both require situating the object's relation to its internal parts and the general causal nexus. To fulfill this requirement, Spinoza thinks we do not have distinct faculties such as reason. In fact, for him, reason can be properly established only with regard to adequate ideas. In order to attain that level, we have to look at what adequate ideas are and how they come from inadequate ideas, which are prior in our epistemic processes.

[170] Walker thinks that we may avoid skepticism in Spinoza's framework of idea. "The problem of sceptical doubt is not avoided unless the coherence that constitutes truth is a coherence accessible to us, and it is therefore essential to Spinoza that rational reflection should be capable of leading us to a clear awareness of the truth as such–which will require that we come to understand the difference between strict and colloquial truth-conditions in the manner indicated" (Walker, 1985, p. 15).

[171] Again, Spinoza has used causal adequacy to explain physical processes early in his exposition of Descartes' philosophy in *Descartes' Principles of Philosophy.* His early writings aside, *Ethics* is full of mentions

For Spinoza, the first state we happen to be in is dominated by inadequate ideas, but first, he starts defining adequate ideas in EIIdef4.[172] He says, "by adequate idea I understand an idea which, insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to an object, has all the properties, *or* intrinsic denominations of a true idea". This definition leaves us with further questions about the properties of a true idea in general and intrinsic denominations thereof in particular. The first thing that should come to mind is that there is at least a type of intrinsic property that has to be satisfied without reference to an object. The object here might be other ideas or physical objects towards which they are directed. Although it is debatable whether Spinoza can be labeled as a pure internalist, Harris proposed that we read adequacy as internal coherence (1992, p. 17).[173] Della Rocca thinks pure internalism is untenable. It can only be applied given a specific context. Thus, for him, Spinoza's position can be called restrictive internalism (Della Rocca, 1996, p. 102). The only reference to that context is a mind, whether it be the mind of God or individual minds.[174] This type of internal coherence should refer to both essences and causal relata; otherwise, it would be incomplete. Nadler points this out in the following passage.

I know the thing adequately under these conditions because my conception of

[172] Adequate and inadequate ideas are also called unconfused and confused ideas, respectively.

[173] Walker thinks that Spinoza is closer to coherence theory of truth rather than correspondence theory of truth. According to this, the only way to justify a truthful statement is just by checking whether the new candidate is coherent with the rest of the others. "The coherence theory of knowledge holds that knowledge claims require justification, but also that no belief can be justified except by reference to other beliefs" (Walker, 1985, p. 2). The ultimate justification can only be with regard to the whole system of beliefs. However, "The coherence theorist can accept that there are facts, and that true beliefs correspond with them, provided he can give his own account of what the facts and the correspondence ultimately consist in: they ultimately consist in coherence" (Walker, 1985, p. 4). In that they are not polar opposites. Coherence theory requires the whole of belief/ideas. This is holism with regard to theory of knowledge and the most famous formulation is put forward by first Duhem and later Quine.

[174] It seems that Spinoza holds the idea which forms an effect in the human mind and the idea corresponding to an effect in God's mind differs in context, and thus in adequacy. One might question the foundation of the relation between cause and effect as well as the ideas about cause and effect for Spinoza. It is a valid question but Spinoza does not provide an explicit answer to this question. We can see the same robust connection between cause and effect in nearly all important figures in early modern philosophy. If we take that for granted, then it directly follows that since God's mind does not have any outsider idea and it includes *all* ideas, it also includes any idea that is causally required for the idea of an effect due to dictates of equal in the extension. In EIIp35, Spinoza holds that "falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate, or [*sive*], or mutilated and confused, ideas involve". At first sight this seems to show that *all* inadequate ideas are confused whereas not all confused ideas are inadequate necessarily; nevertheless, it is both the case that Spinoza used confused and inadequate interchangeably in EIIp36d and that it is hard to make sense of it. Both the absence of any reason and the textual evidence pushes us further into the latter view and it is "a mind-relative feature of ideas" (Della Rocca, 1996, p. 58).

> the thing is properly situated causally *and* logically among my ideas [emphasis mine]. On the other hand, if my idea of an external body is generated in me not by other ideas in my intellect but by my sensory experiences – that is, by the interaction of the idea of my body (i.e., my mind) with the idea of that external body, which ideal interaction is simply the reflection in Thought of the interaction of my body with another body – then the idea of the external body essentially comes disconnected from true and adequate understanding.[175] (Nadler, 2006, p. 167)

The stress in the causal and logical addresses adequacy criteria both in causal nexus and essence.[176] Spinoza does not give us an idea or a method yet about how to attain them; however, it seems that, at least in some sense, "every 'mind' of every body must like the human mind be said to *have* adequate, or clear and distinct, knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God" (Wilson, 1999, p. 138). It is because each mind, as a finite expression of the single substance, provides a way of explicating the substance as a clear and distinct idea (EIIp38c). These expressions are only true in one context since all ideas are not true intuitively. This problem is tried to be resolved both from the standpoint of causal relata and essence (that are from causal and logical). I will explore two of Marshall's theses to overcome this problem. They are important for a Spinozistic emotion theory because, as we will see, a Spinozistic mind, which is a composite relation between ideas, explains under which conditions these relations gain affective properties.

These two theses are proposed to satisfy adequacy criteria. The first is the containment thesis, or CON (Marshall, 2013, p. 26). According to this thesis, the mind must *contain* the *entire idea of x* to have adequate knowledge of *x*. This requirement is impossible to satisfy for a finite mind. This adequacy criterion can be fulfilled only in the aforementioned restricted contexts, such as in a given mind. If we embrace the finite expression of the substance *in a given context*, then it would be possible to accept

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[175] Spinoza accounts for the progression in small steps. He asserts that humans advance "gradually form the simplest works to the making of tools, and from tools to other works and other tools, they have reached a point where they can make very many complex things with little labour". He likens the whole process to tool making and he continues "the intellect by its inborn power makes intellectual tools for itself by which it acquires other powers for other intellectual works, and from these works still other tools–or capacity for further investigation–and thus makes steady progress until it reaches the summit of wisdom" (2002, pp. 9–10; para. 31 in TdIE).

[176] Davidson makes a distinction between causal relations and causal explanations. The former are between events regardless of our descriptions and explanations thereof, whereas, the latter "depend on the vocabulary or concepts used to describe events and formulate them" (Davidson, 1999, p. 106).

CON, but this containment can only "appear as manifestly or self-evidently true".[177] This condition leads to the dominant presupposition behind CON: that adequate ideas must be innate (see LeBuffe, 2010a; see Marshall, 2013).

Additionally, it also means that more adequate ideas are available only when they are connected with a larger context that takes its foundations in innate ideas. In Spinozistic parlance, for containment thesis, ideas are *more* adequate insofar as they are contained in a larger context. Completeness might not be achieved, and CON has to incorporate without a further requirement for completeness if it has to be satisfiable. As a result, clarity and distinctness can be reconciled with the containment thesis by only allowing premises "that are contained in a given mind can also appear as manifestly or self-evidently true" (Marshall, 2013, pp. 51–52). The other main thesis is called causal requirement thesis (or CR). In this thesis, the mind must include *the idea of x's cause* to have adequate knowledge of *x* (Marshall, 2013, p. 28). Spinoza's framework depends more or less on representing the right causality, so the causal requirement seems less negotiable when fulfilling adequacy.

CON and CR can be integrated. As we have seen, the substance has an inherence relation to its modes, and modes express substance in a specific way.[178] This containment relation must be accompanied in terms of ideas, and each mind, as an idea itself, is composed of other ideas. This formation is a result of the causal chain, according to Spinoza. Having the idea of an adequate cause *x* does not conflict with containing an entire idea *x* because the idea *x* itself also contains its own causes. The only caveat here is to see the limit in this "entirety", that is, only in a given context. We may even further claim that these two theses provide two ways to conceive, in fact, two expressions of an adequate idea.

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[177] Della Rocca defends an earlier version of containment thesis. As he says "the containment thesis underlies Spinoza's view that the content of that very same idea insofar as it is in the human mind". This is called the context sensitivity of an idea (Della Rocca, 1996, p. 44).

[178] Della Rocca sees Spinoza as "assimilating inherence to causation or dependence generally: inherence just is the relation whereby one thing depends on another" (Della Rocca, 2008a, p. 47). For example, Spinoza says substance is in itself because it does not depend on anything else beyond itself to exist and in the same vein, modes exist only in a dependence relation, that is they need other modes in order to exist.

We settled Spinoza's understanding of adequate ideas. But how does inadequacy arise? Or, how does inadequacy arise prior to adequate ideas? These questions amount to how we explain falsity. In fact, as said before, this analysis is prior in the order of progression in *Ethics*, Part II. The central propositions for the necessary inadequacy of human ideas start with EIIp25 and EIIp26 and continue towards EIIp40. Especially the latter gives an idea about the source of inadequacy. He says, "insofar as the human Mind imagines an external body, it does not have adequate knowledge of it" (EIIp26c). This inadequacy is because the human mind only knows the human body insofar as the body is affected, and, correspondingly, the mind has those ideas (EIIp19), *and*, at the same time, these affections represent the body confusingly. The former is already clarified, but the latter demands more attention. Nadler explicates this point in this passage.

> However, the idea that the human mind has of itself is no more adequate than its object. And its object – which is the idea of the body – is, we know, not itself an adequate idea of its object. Spinoza's conclusion is that to the extent that the human mind's knowledge of itself is a function of the mind's knowledge of the body, "the human mind does not know itself "(IIp23). That is, insofar as the mind's knowledge of itself is stimulated and determined by ordinary experience, insofar as it is nothing but the mind's reflection upon its own sensory awareness of the body, it is only a knowledge of the various ways in which the mind is being affected, just as the same experience provides the mind only with a knowledge of the various ways in which the body is affected. (Nadler, 2006, p. 171)

In that sense, the mind cannot discern between different objects, one being the body. At best, knowledge (or cognition) of the body through affections will lead to an incomplete account of the body, and in that sense, that idea might result in an inadequate idea.[179] Another type of confusion in inadequate ideas is what Bennett calls the time-lag kind of inadequate ideas (1984, p. 171). According to Bennett, in Spinoza's epistemology, this kind of inadequacy stems from representing an object or an idea as present even though it is imagined to be in the future or remembered as in the past.

[179] One might even say after a closer reading of both TdIE and *Ethics*, one can hardly come up with a *genuine* account of falsity. This is right to a certain extent because falsity "consists in nothing more than incompleteness" (Walker, 1985, p. 14). For the interchangeability of knowledge and cognition see L72.

A more directly related problem is imagination.[180] At first sight, it seems Spinoza always uses imagination in a negative sense. In EIapp, he talks about imagination to refer to nonexistent beings or false ideas. At best, imagination refers to a superficial opinion of things. Not until EIIp40s2 Spinoza introduces imagination as a kind of knowledge (i.e., the first kind).[181] He further states that both sensory knowledge and imagination (i.e., the first kind of knowledge) are the only causes of falsity.[182] But if things do not relate to us, we cannot yield any information in the first place (S. James, 1997, p. 141). In that sense, we have to rely on that kind of inadequate knowledge with which adequate knowledge shares the same ground. Apart from this uncommon use of the term imagination, a more familiar use can still be referred to as a source of error.[183] Nadler points out how an imaginary being's source correlates to an external thing. "Thus, there is a mode in Extension that corresponds to my idea of a unicorn, but it is not a real unicorn; rather, it is a state of my body, viz., the motions in my brain that correlate to the imaginative idea in my mind" (2006, p. 162). It seems that causal information that is supposed to represent the relevant idea is either missing or incomplete in an inadequate idea (Nadler, 2006, p. 164). Yet, the main problem here is distinguishing the source of knowledge (or cognition). There seems to be no reliable

[180] Hübner warns us not to confuse imagination with what we use today. What Spinoza means is that sense and related experience with the addition of derivative mental processes such as memory and imagery in multiple sensory modalities (Hübner, 2022). Spinoza's understanding differs from the modern use of the term first in cognition of the external bodies as present and second cognition as acquired through affections (see EIIp17s).

[181] Here, he makes a division between sensory knowledge (*vaga experientia*) and knowledge through signs (*ex signo*). Both can be categorized under inadequate knowledge. He also calls the latter as imagination *or* opinion (EIIp40s2). Spinoza also made an alternative distinction between different types of knowledge in TdIE, para. 19.

[182] As we will see "unlike in the case of knowledge of the first kind, this order of ideas is rational but remains unaware of the immanent necessity of this rationality" (Johnston & Malabou, 2013, p. 44).

[183] In one interpretation error lies in the absence of an excluding idea about the non-existent thing, not because the mind is capable of imagining or remembering. In summary, Steinberg says that "such misrepresentation is error if I have no other ideas that exclude or weaken the belief that the person I see is Sara, as, for example, the idea or belief that Sara is now out of the country or that the distance of the person I see is sufficiently far that I should be wary of assuming that I can correctly identify him or her" (D. Steinberg, 2013, p. 7).

yardstick for us to make that distinction. Spinoza offers common notions to solve this problem, which will be important for us in Spinoza's theory of affects.[184]

In EIIp17, Spinoza tells us that imagination deals with images of things.[185] When we are liberated, we move towards reason and timelessness (that is, we tend to give up temporality, see EIVp62).[186] Spinoza calls this *sub specie aeternitatis*; it can be literally translated as "under an aspect of eternity" or "under a kind of eternity" (Spinoza, 1985, p. 636).[187] Eternity is important and has to be distinguished from the infinite time that extends in the direction of the past or future.[188] In other words, the former refers to timelessness, whereas the latter does not (Garber, 2013, p. 32). Harris phrases another distinction between eternity and timefulness. "Duration, Spinoza says, is a certain quantity of existence abstractly conceived, and it is the measure of this quantity that we call time, whereas eternity characterizes 'existence itself'" (Harris, 1992, p. 53). That means infinite power to exist, and it exists at all times. Its knowledge is connected to different kinds of knowledge because essences are subsumed under the species of eternity (*sub specie aeternitatis*), but the existence of a thing occurs in a duration. Nadler summarized the relation of time and knowledge (or cognition) in the following words. "The contrast is with knowing things as they are truly—i.e., logically

[184] Della Rocca reminds us that, however, common notions are not knowledge or the particulars. So, adequacy that arise out of that, that is reason, is concerned with the common relations between things (1996, pp. 85–86).

[185] There is always the risk of false images leading to other false images piling up (Della Rocca, 1996, p. 63). But, the risk is inevitable. According to Steinberg, human mind has three aspects which arise from the same feature. First, it can imagine and recollect. The former requires combining certain aspects of previous images that are not present right now. The latter requires recapturing a previously caused bodily correlate. Second, "it is the idea of the recurring state (the fluid parts being reflected from the surfaces in a certain way) that carries the content in question or represents the external body" (D. Steinberg, 2013, p. 5). Spinoza, here, means the image of things. Third, the idea of that recurring state is abstracted from its initial conditions (i.e. initial causation) and set stable. As a result, it is no longer dependent on the object causing a certain effect on the body (i.e., a recurring effects without a cause being present). So, imagination takes place as a stepping stone for the third level, according to Steinberg.

[186] However, imagination might not be entirely useless. Unlike common view, for Shapiro, according to Spinoza's understanding, "the knowledge imagination affords us is essentially an approximation, but one that helps us to make our way through the world" (Shapiro, 2012, p. 104).

[187] It is also referred in TdIE, para. 108.

[188] The latter is called sempiternity. Della Rocca does not explicitly mention the concept of sempiternity but devotes a whole chapter to discern Spinoza's view of eternity. Especially, he tries to distinguish it from traditional and religious understanding of eternity (2008b, Chapter 7).

and causally—ordered from a non-temporal perspective and thereby coming to have a mind whose ideas represent a proper finite subset of the infinite ideas in the infinite intellect" (2006, pp. 173–174).

For Spinoza, "whole and part is really a notion used only by the imagination. The eternal things are not divisible into parts" (Harris, 1992, p. 48). The parts, though distinguishable, are integral to the wholes as the wholes are determinants of the parts. Calling the parts moments within a complex unity would be more accurate. For Spinoza, we should remember that the whole is always prior (KV, pt. 1, Chapter 2, para. 19; 1985, p. 71).

This timeless and holistic view can be attained with common notions (*notiones communes*). We can also think of them as the necessary and sufficient condition to attain adequate ideas, either through a grasp of the essences or an idea of the adequate cause. In EIIp38dem, Spinoza says,

> Let A be something which is common to all bodies, and which is equally in the part of each body and in the whole. I say that A can only be conceived adequately. For its idea (by p7C) will necessarily be adequate in God, both insofar as he has the idea of the human Body and insofar as he has ideas of its affections, which (by p16, p25, and p27) involve in part both the nature of the human Body and that of external bodies. That is (by p12 and p13), this idea will necessarily be adequate in God insofar as he constitutes the human Mind, *or* insofar as he has ideas that are in the human Mind. The Mind therefore (by p11c) necessarily perceives A adequately, and does so both insofar as it perceives itself and insofar as it perceives its own or any external body. Nor can A be conceived in another way, q. e. d.[189]

Then, common notions can help us grasp the essences of things and causal relata between things because they take place at all levels and for both sides in relata.[190] Spinoza labels them as common notions because they are "common to all men" and

[189] All references belong to Spinoza and addresses the same part of *Ethics*, that is the second part.

[190] We should bear in mind that Spinoza does not trace a Cartesian path to clear and distinct idea. He had only a little sympathy for skepticism (Bunge, 2003, p. 6). For him, certainty is a matter of power that is inherent to ideas. That means "we harbor some doubt as to its existence and, therefore, its power is weaker than if we took the thing to be existing in the present with us" (Marshall, 2013, p. 181). This leads to weakening of the idea with ever increasing number and/or power/intensity of negating ideas. We built up tools out of true ideas to attain true knowledge or better cognition from ground up, with ever increasing complexity of tools (see Parkinson, 1954, Chapter 1).

"for all bodies agree in certain things, which (by p38) must be perceived adequately, *or* clearly and distinctly, by all" (EIIp38c). Thus, common notions provide us a framework for holistic (i.e., concerning knowledge of the whole) and particularistic (i.e., concerning the knowledge of singular things) knowledge (or cognition) (Nadler, 2006, p. 180).

Common notions and eternity are also connected. In Part V, Spinoza exposes two ways of understanding the existence of things: the durational sense, and the atemporal or purely ontological sense, as Hübner would call it. The latter has the actual existence of the mind as a correlate of actually existing physical essence, i.e., "a certain determinate functional pattern of physical activity". In other words, for each bodily essence, there is an idea that "expresses the essence of the body *sub specie aeternitatis*" (Hübner, 2022). With regard to what we have seen before, intellect, for Spinoza, is not a distinct faculty; it is rather a "certain type of cognition" which is adequate and true. This type of cognition is the same for everybody, describing things through their first causes (EIIp18s). Adequate ideas should follow from other clear and distinct ideas but not from mutilated or confused ideas (EVp28d).

> This would seem to preclude any possibility of progressing from imagination to intellect. Fortunately Spinoza leaves an escape hatch in the form of "common notions" , which he calls, appropriately, the "foundations" of reason, i.e., of the first of two kinds of intellectual cognition (E2p40s1). We may not be able to generate clear and distinct ideas from confused ideas, but not all is yet lost, because according to Spinoza even brute sense experience furnishes us with some necessarily true and adequate ideas" . In addition to that, there are common properties for all physical and mental things. "For Spinoza, all such properties that are both universally instantiated ('common' to all things) and non scalar ('equally in the part and in the whole') are necessarily grasped correctly by any mind. And all ideas of such properties – all 'common notions' – are necessarily adequate. (Hübner, 2022)

Since we have laid the foundations of rationality and adequate ideas for Spinoza, we can return to the distinction between the two types of adequate ideas. The second kind of knowledge is usually called reason, and the third kind is intuition. Intuition was hidden behind rationality because it is also one type of adequate idea. Spinoza describes intuitions regarding an analogy.

> Suppose there are three 20 numbers, and the problem is to find a fourth which is to the third as the second is to the first. Merchants do not hesitate to multiply the second by the third, and divide the product by the first, because they have

> not yet forgotten what they heard from their teacher without any demonstration, or because they have often found this in the simplest 25 numbers, or from the force of the Demonstration of p7 in Bk. VII of Euclid, viz. from the common property of proportionals. But in the simplest numbers none of this is necessary. Given the numbers 1, 2, and 3, no one fails to see that the fourth proportional number is 6— and we see this much more clearly because we infer the fourth number from the ratio which, in one glance, we see the first number to have 30 the second. (EIIp40s2)

The everyday use of intuition shares some common ground with what Spinoza meant by it. Intuition captures the whole instantly, and Spinoza's third kind of knowledge also gains knowledge in an instant. This instantaneous activity is different from the second kind of knowledge but as Nadler states,

> Both the second and third kinds of knowledge involve adequate knowledge of individuals and thus lead to an idea of a thing that situates it in its proper causal context. Both ways of knowing, that is, consider a particular thing independently of its durational and changing relationships to other things and place it explicitly in relation to an attribute and to the eternal principles that govern all the modes of that attribute, such that one sees not only that the thing is necessitated, but how. (2006, p. 179)

In that sense, both kinds of knowledge are based on understanding and explaining necessities. However, they have an important difference.

> Reason, or knowledge of the second kind, is discursive and involves inferring the effect from its causes – and especially the higher, eternal causes – much as a conclusion is logically derived from premises. Intuition, or knowledge of the third kind, by contrast, seems to be an immediate perception of the connection between causes and effect, resulting in a singular conception of the essence of a thing (which, as Spinoza has told us, must include knowledge of the thing's cause). Intuition represents a kind of epistemic compression of information. (Nadler, 2006, p. 181).

Common notions might not be derived from experiences. If they were, mental correlates of the affections of the body should have elicited adequate ideas. However, this does not align with Spinoza's previous thoughts (EIIp26 and EIIp27). As mentioned before, the source of adequate knowledge might be thought of as following from the mind's nature (Nadler, 2006, p. 176).

Both the three kinds of knowledge and the difference between adequate and inadequate ideas suggest a gulf between reason and imagination. In fact, it is hard to deny their difference, and they are mostly the results of different cognitive/epistemic processes. Nonetheless, imagination and reason cooperate to bring about certain effects in the

mental life of beings. First things first: imagination plays a pivotal role in the affective life of human beings (van Bunge et al., 2011, p. 232). In Spinoza's framework, the human mind is inevitably composed of many inadequate ideas because the mind has ideas insofar as the body is affected by the external object (EIIp26 and EIIp27). In order to transform inadequate ideas in a given context (here, mind), a mind has to be formed first, regardless of having inadequate or adequate ideas. On the other hand, imagination forms expectations and reason, which stem from adequate ideas, and acts to regulate and transform other inadequate ideas. We have an interplay of imagination and reason (as Spinoza would take them), and they are mutually dependent (Cook, 1986, p. 197).

Shapiro points out another area in that imagination serves an epistemic role in Spinoza's framework. She interprets Spinoza as reversing the order of explanation from the object to our body. The key epistemic function is played by imagination. We feel differently to the extent that we imagine the object differently, which means we take that object as different from the previous one. This point is also important for his understanding of the affects. Here, nonetheless, there is a more ontologically relevant point. For Spinoza, "it is not the case that we first take things to exist and then find ourselves affected by them. Rather we take as existing the things we do because of how we are affected" (Shapiro, 2012, p. 97). Spinoza does not postulate that things exist insofar as they are related to us. That would be either too subjectivist or solipsistic. However, as modes of the substance have certain capabilities to affect and be affected, we regard certain things as present but not others. Shapiro thinks imagination plays a role in this relation because it fixes objects.[191] Shapiro sums up this issue as follows: "A particular thing, a human body, say, is causally connected not only with all the things currently impacting it but also with the various things that have made it what it now is" (2012, p. 98). Although we might have inadequate ideas about those objects, imagination still constitutes these objects as stable objects.

In the next section, we will strive to answer how this theory of ideas fits into a view of

[191] Shapiro contrasts Spinoza's way of representing an object with Cartesian way of representing things, objects. Although Descartes also agrees that sensation are only clear and distinct to the extent that they are beneficial or harmful, Spinoza drives this line of reasoning further to claim that they exist (for us) only insofar as they come into a causal relationship with us (Shapiro, 2012, pp. 90–91).

the mind and mental functions, especially for will and consciousness.

5.2. Theory of Mind in Spinoza

Armed with the theory of ideas in the previous section, we will move from ideas to minds. In this section, activity and passivity with respect to (in)adequacy will be articulated. Here also, I would like to show that activity is not only confined to physical behavior. Adequacy requirements affect a wider area than expected (see. Marshall, 2013, pp. 93–96). Another thing we will see in this section is Damasio's neuroscientific interpretation of Spinoza's insight into the mind-body problem and how the mind can be understood as the idea of the body.[192] We do not delve into the details of each one but try to weave a consistent Spinozistic theory of mind to help us figure out a Spinozistic theory of emotion.

At first sight, Spinoza's epistemology is almost the same as his philosophy of mind, as they both depend on the expressions of the substance. He devoted the whole of Part II of *Ethics* to forming ideas and minds. Mind is an idea and the idea of the body, so cognition of the body "is the foundation of all cognition whatsoever" (Hübner, 2022).[193] Concerning his theory of mind, Marshall says what Spinoza is to Galileo is the same as Hume to Newton (2013, p. 3). But, he does not fill in the details of how it relates to his theory of mind and how his epistemology or theory of mind determines "his entire ethical and political project" (Marshall, 2013, p. 4).

As Spinoza states, the mind is active (see EIId3). This activity comes with the inherent power of ideas that express the essence of substance.[194] Adequate ideas, which also

[192] Having an idea of the body, which is necessarily so, does not entail that this would be genuine understandine. Mark illustrates this point well. He says "having an idea of a body means not to have an understanding of the body but to have a direct awareness" (Mark, 1979, p. 411). This direct awareness is peculiar to the proportions of that body (that is the essence of that body). For Mark, "we can describe this by saying that the mind of a given body is the apprehension of that body in the first person, and that the occurrence of such an apprehension constitutes the 'actual being' of the mind" (Mark, 1979, p. 411).

[193] About the idea between body and mind relation Mark thinks in the following way. "Given this conception of idea, to define the mind as the idea of the body is not to say that it is the concept of the body, nor that it is the affirmation of truths or the forming of judgments about the body; it is to say that the mind is the apprehension of a body" (Mark, 1979, p. 402).

[194] This point does not remain uncriticized. Minds are rather certain instances of God's thoughts. By this movement, Spinoza manages to shift from infinite to finite (EIIp11c). This time, yet, the parts that

form true ideas, can dominate certain minds, yet it does not entail that these minds are more powerful than the rest. Nor does it suffice to have a powerful mind. Carriero expresses this thought well.

> A mind is not more powerful simply because it knows more truths; it is more powerful because it *understands*, that is, because it sees how things fit together. For Spinoza, the movement from a weak mind to a strong mind is the movement from the fragmentary and confused (the first kind of cognition) to the rationally ordered (the second kind of cognition) and ultimately to an intuitive appreciation of essences and how things follow from them (the third kind of cognition). (2020, p. 87).

The crux is to have that mind integrated so that it can lead to the production of more adequate ideas in principle.[195] In fact, the mind can also be identified as an integrated bundle of ideas. In this perspective, it is possible to think of two ways of looking at ideas in two different contexts. The context-bound philosophy of Spinoza makes one idea a *genetivus objectivus* (the idea of this body) in one context while making the same idea a *genitivus subjectivus* (this body's thought) in another (Jonas, 1965, p. 55).[196] This distinction makes Spinoza's philosophy more common sense and also more consistent because the distinction saves his theory of ideas from falling into creating equivocal meanings. Another strength is that it can incorporate common sense opinions of *having* ideas and *being* a bundle of ideas (insofar as we have taken ourselves as minds). One of the overall interpretations of Spinoza's systematic thinking is that we can consider the mind as a collection of ideas (i.e., bundle theory of mind). According to this theory, as it occurs in Hume, minds and intellects are nothing more than a collection of ideas of different complexities. Yet, as a collection, each mind does not include faculties "such as will or intellect" (EIIp48). These

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are themselves mind but in what sense? Wilson's objection addresses a specific difficulty under this heading: how can the mind just be God's ideas of something (1999)? According to her, there seems to be a confusion of categories.

[195] As we will see, having *more* adequate ideas are not sufficient to have an integrated mind. However, having an integrated mind would lead to production of more adequate ideas.

[196] This *genitivus subjectivus* also highlight the first-person nature of having ideas (Mark, 1979, pp. 404–405). And it is two main questions that a proper philosophy of mind has to respond. According to Mark, Spinoza does not only point out but also tries to put his reasoning into use in Part III "where the propositions describing emotions are, in general, given in the first-person perspective--from the point of view of what the emotions are like--and the demonstrations are given in the third-person perspective--they offer a scientific explanation, saying what the emotions are like--and the demonstrations are given in the third-person perspective--they offer a scientific explanation, saying what the emotions *are*, and the presumption is that this knowledge will enable us to control them" (Mark, 1979, p. 413).

faculties are at most abstractions, and they do not carve nature at its joints.[197] What makes a mind different from another is, thus, its objects (their intentional objects or what they represent) (Hübner, 2022).[198]

At this point, it is better to attend to one of the most used categories, that will and volition. Spinoza has an uncommon understanding of will and volition. In order to see this, a good way is to zoom in on the Cartesian understanding of will as viewed by Spinoza.[199]

Descartes considers will, *or* volition, as one of the two main faculties of the mind than makes judgments (Ariew et al., 2003, p. 260). The other is intellect. He defines will as the faculty of choice that accepts or denies it (Descartes, 1984, pp. 42–43). Intellect determines the content of ideas without the intervention of sensation and imagination and will determine whether the thought will assent to or not. Thus, Descartes thinks that we can form judgments and beliefs with both intellect and will. According to Descartes, will is both above and beyond passions (as well as actions) and it has ultimate power over passions so that it can alter the course of animal spirits that determine how and which passions will ensue.

For Spinoza, this picture does not reflect the correct picture of ideas and the mind. Any affect can be changed with the power of understanding rather than will. In that sense, "Spinoza reproaches Descartes for being ignorant of the power of the mind and its true nature" (Jaquet, 2018, p. 45). He starts rejecting a distinct will that affirms or denies ideas even as early as in KV. But, here, Spinoza takes it in a practical sense of good will. But only in EIIp48 and EIIp49, he takes it theoretically as a faculty to be analyzed.

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[197] Spinoza rejects distinct faculties; "there are no general powers or faculties of any kind" (Rorty, 1990, p. 198). This view can be called extreme particularism. In fact, such a distinction is based on confusing images and ideas.

[198] In alignement with that, Miller says that the basic tenets in considering his working model of the representational mind are: "(1) from the idea of mind itself, animated through self-preservative willing; (2) to perception of self and others; and (3) through our representational capability for generating mental images, to the functionality of imagination" (2022, p. 177). His theory of mind, insofar as the mind is an idea of the body, can be read as an example of systems perspective because Spinoza account of body entails a systems approach (I. S. Miller, 2022, p. 179; EIIp13s2).

[199] The Cartesian division between volitions and ideas still remains in contemporary thought as the distinction between perspective/form and content.

EIIp48 denies the existence of absolute, *or* free, will that is external to the content of an idea and only to appear as a determining power for accepting these contents because the mind, itself, is a determinate form of thinking (EIIp11) which "must be determined to willing this or that by a cause". In fact, Spinoza does not deny will altogether but only defies its special, free, or absolute status. Another thing that Spinoza strongly disagrees with the traditional conception of will is that it is titled as a distinct faculty of the mind.[200] Here, Spinoza's criticism targets not only will but also other so-called absolute faculties, such as desiring and loving (EIIp48s). However, if Spinoza does not entirely reject the functions of will (or volition), how are these functions executed? Spinoza elaborates on the answer to this question in the next proposition. He further claims that, in EIIp49, "in the Mind there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, except that which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea". Ideas carry out the function of will; that is, they carry affirmation or negation. For instance, consider the idea of a triangle.

> This affirmation involves the concept, *or* idea, of the triangle, i.e., it cannot be conceived without the idea of the triangle. For to say that A must involve the concept of B is the same as to say that A cannot be conceived without B. Further, this affirmation (by A3) also cannot be without the idea of the triangle. Therefore, this affirmation can neither be nor be conceived without the idea of the triangle. (EIIp49dem)

This logical chain of ideas entails that the idea (or triangle) must be affirmed. In other words, Spinoza "proposes that we see the volitional element as intrinsic to representation…" (Hübner, 2022). So ideas, for Spinoza, can also carry the affirmative function of will. Unlike Descartes, Spinoza does not think of any distinct faculties that are over and above ideas. Nadler summarizes this point.

> The reason why every idea involves activity is because every idea includes some kind of affirmation or negation. To have an idea of a red ball is not just casually to entertain some thought without making any positive or negative assertions. To have an idea of a red ball is actively to affirm in the mind that the ball is red. (Nadler, 2006, p. 160)

Another line of confuting absolute (or free) will is appealing to PSR. If we take will

[200] As we will see emotions/affects do not constitute a distinct faculty. Ben-Ze'ev takes "an emotion as a general mode of the mental system" and he states that "instead of considering an emotion as a single entity, we should understand it as a mode of the mental system" (Ben-Ze'ev, 2001, p. 170). As a general mode, "emotions affect our experience and our performance at virtually every level of analysis" (De Sousa, 1990, p. 434).

as a distinct and undetermined faculty, then there would be no reason to explain why it desires, loves, and chooses certain things over others and how it is made intelligible in the first place. This line of reasoning makes absolute (or free) will a brute fact. According to PSR, it should be eliminated if there is an alternative intelligible explanation.

It seems that Spinoza also attacks the common act of denying or negating an idea with an external cause.[201] As Shapiro says, "Spinoza is denying the possibility of merely entertaining an idea of a thing without regarding that thing as present to us, that is, without affirming the existence of that thing" (2012, p. 97). Yet, how could we explain thinking false ideas without believing them? For Spinoza, as there is no distinct faculty of will that affirms, there is no distinct faculty to negate. The content of ideas does not change unless it is forced by any other idea which is more powerful and carries opposition to the former. In that sense, as stated in EIIp49c, the intellect and the will are the same. And true ideas, which we are certain, are true because there are no possible negating ideas in mind. On the other hand, a mind can be ignorant, and some of its ideas may be false because there are no negating true ideas. To solve that, Spinoza says that

> insofar as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we say that a man rests in false ideas, and does not doubt them, we do not, on that account, say that he is certain, but only that he does not doubt, or that he rests in false ideas because there are no causes to bring it about that his imagination wavers. Therefore, however stubbornly a man may cling to something false [NS: so that we cannot in any way make him doubt it], we shall still never say that he is certain of it. For by certainty we understand something positive (see P43 and P43S), not the privation of doubt. But by the privation of certainty, we understand falsity.

Spinoza distinguished certainty and ignorance. The former is always used affirmatively, and the latter arises due to the privation of doubt.[202] We cannot appeal

[201] As James points out, "philosophers who deny the existence of volitions as a distinct and self-generating kind of thought therefore challenge a deeply rooted understanding of the mind's creative power, of its ability to go its own way independently of the world around it" (1997, p. 289). Although Spinoza did not distinguish voluntary and involuntary, he made a distinction between active and passive and he attached "this difference not to kinds of thought but to the character of the judgments that constitute our thinking: when we think with inadequate or partial ideas we are acted on, but in so far as our ideas are adequate we act" (S. James, 1997, p. 289).

[202] More accurately, we can formulate the privation of doubt as absence of negating ideas for the previous cognitive state.

to a higher court, that is a free will because, as mentioned before, “the human mind cannot be, within Spinoza’s metaphysics, a free agent, or an agent of any kind, in affirming or denying; for an individual mind simply consists of ideas of the modifications of that finite mode which is my body; and these ideas occur in an order which is determined within the order of Nature as a whole” (Hampshire, 1956, p. 82).

Spinoza’s attack on absolute freedom has one more aspect. For Spinoza, the idea that a separate ground exists for objective introspection, which produces true ideas, is severely compromised. Because we can rely on inadequate ideas and absolute will to *perceive* what there really is, the results would result in further inadequate or false ideas. For Mark, “there remains an unbridgeable gap between ourselves and what we would most like to know about ourselves” (Mark, 1979, p. 416). We can only overcome it with adequate ideas with an integrated mind. The only way, then, is pointed out by Alanen: “Increased cognitive perfection, and so increased activity, is a matter of reducing the impact of sense perception and imagination that tie the human mind to the present affections of the singular body by seeing these in a larger context from the perspective of some greater whole” (2020, p. 113).

Not having an absolute will or having a will that only carries the composite force of ideas in mind does not rob the mind of having intentionality or *genitivus subjectivus* ideas. The concern can be summed up as the following. If there are only causal relations between bodies and ideas as mental correlates of bodies, then “how could the mind have an intentional structure if it is identical with physical states which are not intentionally structured?” (Cook, 1990, p. 92). In fact, this has already been addressed. As there is one way of conceiving “ideas of” that it represents one’s body, it is not the only way. With its intrinsic properties and effects from other ideas, an idea can be *about* other ideas and other things. Hence, rather than will, Spinoza’s theory of mind relies on the inherent forces of ideas that can represent in multiple ways. In addition to the will, there is another important term for a theory of mind. And this brings us to what consciousness is for Spinoza.

Before starting, there is one caveat about the term consciousness because consciousness is thought to be related to being important both for Spinoza’s theory of

ideas and for his theory of affects and emotions. For our case, a particular interpretation of consciousness in Spinoza's framework could help us with its role in his further explanations about affectivity. Block distinguished several types of consciousness, such as phenomenal and access consciousness (1995). But, in Spinoza, two words are translated as "conscious". These are "conscious" and "*conscientia*" (LeBuffe, 2010b, p. 535). Neither terms like perception, knowing, and imagination (*percipere*, *noscere*/*cognitio*, and *imaginatio*, respectively) nor consciousness is coherently incorporated into the text (J. Miller, 2007, p. 203). Again, Descartes, from whom Spinoza took many of these concepts, used these terms incoherently as well. Mostly moral conscience and consciousness are, again, used inconsistently. Mostly, the 17th-century use of *conscientia* referred to something closer to conscience. The failure of a complete match between *conscientia* and consciousness is that only after the 17th century did consciousness begin to take a modern form (Jorgensen, 2010).

Having said that, Spinoza's theory of consciousness is usually one of the most debated features of his philosophy. It is even argued that his general framework does not permit forming a complete understanding of consciousness. Spinoza did not actually try to explain what consciousness is and what its essential aspects are. The first mention of consciousness in *Ethics* is in EIIIp9s, which describes the nature of desire as an appetite with consciousness thereof. He added it as an epiphenomenal feature at first. In EIIIp30, however, Spinoza gives a role for consciousness in recognizing oneself as an agent, i.e., as the cause of the action, although we should note that nobody is the complete cause regarding the causal nexus and still consciousness does not play an active role in being a cause.[203] Yet, a theory of consciousness in Spinoza might still serve a purpose; it might explain the ground of our awareness of certain ideas even though it is to expect too much that he elaborates on the details of a complete account

[203] Jonas contends that consciousness has both active and passive effects: "on the active side, higher degree of consciousness with its affirmation and enjoyment of *self*, and, on the passive side, greater distinctness of perception with its understanding (and possible mastery) of *things*" (Jonas, 1965, p. 56). On the active side, each organism enjoys a certain degree of autonomy and on the passive side each enjoys a certain openness for the world. One important note should be made: "increase in *passive* power is asserted by Spinoza together with increase in active power to be the mark of higher fitness of an organism and thus of its perfection" (Jonas, 1965, p. 56).

of consciousness. The opposite is more explicitly true: certain affections affect consciousness or being conscious of oneself (self-consciousness). This assertion suggests an affective account of (self-) consciousness (EIIIp30 and EIIIdef).

There is not a single agreed theory of mind among Spinoza scholars. Even worse, some, such as Miller, see the prospects as "dim" (also see Marshall, 2013, p. 6; J. Miller, 2007, p. 203). Hübner identifies two different theories of consciousness in the literature. The first is the theory of higher-order ideas, and the second is the complexity of ideas theory. The former group's most famous proponent is Curley, whose theory of consciousness states that conscious ideas are necessarily ideas of ideas (i.e., *ideae idearum*). Curley thinks that consciousness is constituted by relations not between ideas but between ideas of ideas. It is why we may call it the theory of higher-order ideas. Ideas about ideas ensure that there is a kind of reflexivity, and a sort of reflexivity is needed for consciousness (Curley, 1969, p. 128). Commonly, ideas about ideas can account for certainty because to be certain, there has to be at least one idea about the idea that tells us that it is true. Nevertheless, this may elicit infinite regress. A certainty would require another idea (or a group of ideas) to ascertain the lower-ordered idea(s). Another criticism would point out different types of representations of the idea, that is form and content. Mark summarizes this criticism in the following words.

> ...although the mind possesses ideas of all that occurs in the body, it has ideas of ideas only some of the things that occur in the body. To serve its intended purpose, this line of interpretation must hold that *only* ideas of ideas are conscious. But that certainly is *not* the case, for it would mean that we could not be conscious of our bodies *at all* since the idea of an idea is a grasp of the form, *not* the content, of the object idea (by E, 2, 21, [EIIp21] note), whereas Spinoza (as must surely be conceded) does grant us *some* consciousness of our bodies. (Mark, 1979, p. 409)

A third reason would be failing to differentiate different levels of consciousness altogether. The idea of idea account does not only fail to differentiate conscious beings from unconscious beings, but it also fails to differentiate them in terms of having different levels of consciousness since there is nothing in the idea of idea account of consciousness to stop certain ideas from being reflexive and all ideas seem to engender the same level of consciousness in that respect. "Finally, Spinoza is committed to there being a distinction between the conscious and the non-conscious or, at least, ideas

being conscious to greater and lesser degrees" (Marshall, 2013, p. 110; also see Wilson, 1999, p. 136).

For these reasons and lack of textual evidence, this theory can be counted as Curley's rather than Spinoza's, although it had to be admitted that Curley interpreted Spinoza's philosophy to come up with a coherent account of consciousness.

The second group of consciousness theories is more crowded than the first. We will look at a few of them. Nadler's theory forms the basis for most of the second group of theories. According to him, consciousness is "nothing but the mental correlate of the superlative complexity of the human body" (Nadler, 2008, p. 587). The thesis depends on a reading of EVp39s. Here, Spinoza seems to admit degrees of consciousness.[204] The relevant passage reads that

> And really, he who, like an infant or child, has a Body capable of very few things, and very heavily dependent on external causes, has a Mind which considered solely in itself is conscious of almost nothing of itself, or of God, or of things. On the other hand, he who has a Body capable of a great many things, has a Mind which considered only in itself is very much conscious of itself, and of God, and of things.

He further states that

> In this life, then, we strive especially that the infant's Body may change (as much as its nature allows and assists) into another, capable of a great many things and related to a Mind very much conscious of itself, of God, and of things. We strive, that is, that whatever is related to its memory or imagination is of hardly any moment in relation to the intellect (as I have already said in P38S).

Here, Spinoza highlights both the development of the body's and mind's capabilities. As the complexity of the body increases, so too do its capabilities. Since mind and body are equals, the same progress can be thought of for the mind. But, in general, the theory might be thought to fall short of explaining conscious from unconscious mental states (Marshall, 2013, p. 112). This drawback can be overcome with support from thinking in terms of power. For Garrett, consciousness occurs "when it has a sufficient

[204] This view has still proponents from diverse areas such as psychology and neuroscience. Consciousness has variety of degrees (Pally & Olds, 2000, p. 143).

degree of power" (Marshall, 2013, p. 112).[205] Also, if we remember that minds are also ideas, then minds are also conscious insofar as it, as an idea, is powerful. However, according to Garrett's theory, every idea has some degree of consciousness because it has a certain degree of power. This degree-based view is compatible with Spinoza's naturalism, or more accurately, as Garrett states, incremental naturalism (D. Garrett, 1980, p. 23). In addition to EIIp13s and EVp39s, he cites EVp31s, pointing directly proportional nature of consciousness and the third kind of knowledge. With that in mind, we can also explain why some minds are more conscious than others (i.e., inter-state differences). As Marshall points out, an additional advantage in Garrett's interpretation about consciousness in Spinoza is that it can easily distinguish between conscious and unconscious mental states (i.e., intra-state differences). Still, consciousness comes in degrees but being more powerful is directly translated into being more conscious. Marshall thinks that Garrett's theory is more encompassing than Nadler's since the power of thinking also reflects an organism's complexity in demonstrating its level of consciousness, i.e., an increase in power of thinking results in an increase in consciousness (Marshall, 2013, p. 115). In that sense, for Garrett, it is metaphysically deeper and more relevant.

Of course, in general, Nadler's degree view and Garrett's theory, in particular, do not remain uncriticized. Michael LeBuffe offers a counterexample for Garret's theory of consciousness in Spinoza. He claims that we encounter a counterintuitive view about being conscious when we imagine a mind with powerful ideas, but it becomes weak when combined. Such a mind's construal is possible for Spinoza. But then, isn't it weird to assume a mind that is more conscious than a mind whose parts are more powerful? Per Spinoza's general framework, the problem can also be put in the following sentence: Some intensely conscious ideas might not qualify as adequate (LeBuffe, 2010b, pp. 559–560). I guess we can easily see how this criticism can be bypassed because the criticism includes the solution in itself. Indeed, a mind can be more conscious but less powerful *in its parts.* Spinoza's metaphysics requires

[205] For Wilson, ideas and minds can be compared in terms of superiority. About EIIp12s, Wilson tries to summarize Spinoza's reasoning about superiority of ideas. She says "Spinoza goes on to explain that one idea is superior to another when the body that is the object of the former 'contains more reality! than the body that is the object of the latter" (Wilson, 1999, p. 129).

conceiving any whole as not as a totality. He warns us against confusing both views both in terms of different views of substance (i.e., *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*) and different affections of substance (i.e., modes as a ratio of motion and rest or coherence). Since the mind as an idea is composed of and includes a ratio of other ideas (i.e., the integrity of the mind), the counterexample really does not address a problem at this point. In fact, this reply also opens a path to understanding why some passions can sometimes overpower the active affects, although it is not frequent, according to Spinoza (e.g., EIVp49s).

Marshall remarks on a final issue of Nadler's theory. This issue concerns common notions, which are the basis of adequate ideas. A common notion is simple, so they do not seem to be "objects of consciousness, in virtue of their simplicity" (Marshall, 2013, p. 113).[206] This simplicity leaves us with the question of whether adequacy and being conscious are mutually exclusive. How can we be conscious of simple ideas, then? For instance, an adequate idea of God could bring about affections of the body (EVp14); this is not in alignment with what Nadler says, according to Marshall. But, that criticism, I think, is based on a false assumption, and if we accept that criticism as a valid one, then we would also accept that we are adhering to an equivocal "consciousness" concept. The first meaning we have dealt with so far is applied not to individual ideas but to the whole idea *or* idea of a body, that is mind. As Marshall refers, the second meaning of consciousness concerns singular ideas rather than the integration of all ideas in one mind. So, this criticism, again, addresses just singular ideas or, at best, the totality of singular ideas.

Overall, a degree view of consciousness is definitely ahead of opposing theories of consciousness in Spinoza. As aforementioned, it can explain several levels of

[206] This point can further be explicated by referring to Rorty. "To the extent that two individuals have increasingly adequate ideas, they are decreasingly differentiated. This is not because they have identical general ideas, but because they come to have the same nexus of particular co-determining ideas" (Rorty, 1990, p. 205). It can be explained as the following: as the number of adequate ideas get higher in numbers (and thus activity), appropriate causal nexus of both events get closer and at some point they start to coincide at the level of individual histories. Thus, a greater heterogeneity in individual causal lines would result in experiencing "greater difficulty integrating and systematically inter-connecting their determinants" (Rorty, 1990, p. 205). Complexity comes at a cost in that sense; it gets harder to generate a larger explanatory framework involving adequate ideas. Although the resultant is a more powerful individual, the process is proportionately harder.

consciousness, but we can ask whether there is an end at which consciousness bottoms. In other words, since there are degrees of consciousness that can be understood as different layers, is there any other concept that these layers ultimately depend on for their existence? Here, we can only speculate within Spinoza's framework. The most plausible hypothesis is that there are layers of consciousness that end up in the body. In other words, we can speculate that the existence of layers of consciousness ultimately depends on the body for its existence. This view aligns not only with what Spinoza's framework allows for us but also what a prevalent contemporary idea offers. According to Damasio, for example, several maps first stem from a body image and are later formed through this first layer of maps. This neural mapping is involved not just in consciousness but also in self-consciousness.[207] Once the second layer of the neural map is set, there is no need for actual signaling from the body (Damasio, 1994, pp. 231, 235). This model explains phantom limb phenomena and gradation from consciousness to self-consciousness (Damasio, 1999, pp. 172–176).[208]

Spinoza does not seem to assert a privileged place for the human mind to have consciousness. A common expectation from a theory of consciousness would be to account for the existence of consciousness in humans and the non-existence of consciousness in infra-human beings.[209] The summary of what I claimed is that Spinoza signs up for a broader account of consciousness because of his PSR and naturalism. At this point, we have to bite the bullet and accept Spinoza's uncommon view if we accept his previous premises about extension and thinking because, unlike theories in Chapters 2 and 3, the resulting framework ends in a simple but deep ontology. I also think that this uncommon result can be reconciled with the affects. By affects, as I will claim, Spinoza's conceptualization allows us to conceive a broader category of mental phenomena than emotions, as we mostly conceive today, that

[207] "For events to be consciously perceived, they must be significant to the 'self'. The 'self system' is as essential to consciousness as an intact perceptual system is to perception" (Pally & Olds, 2000, p. 146). This significance can be modeled with affectivity in Spinoza's framework.

[208] Although it is outside the scope of this work and we will not delve into the details of Damasio's own theory, we have to mention that Damasio labels the levels of the embedded hierarchy as proto-self, core self and autobiographical self. The last is how we gain our self-consciousness. According to Damasio, each levels are affective which we shall focus on in the next chapter.

[209] Some even think that it is a drawback. Commentators such as Wilson says that EIIp20 fails to justify why consciousness only applies to a human mind and not to any mind (Wilson, 1999, p. 135).

includes all changes. Marshall does not make a broad definition as I do; he purports that some ideas, such as wonder or disdain, share affectivity. “An idea becomes affective just when its power becomes causally involved in the *conatus* to increase, decrease, move, or *fix* its degree of power” (Marshall, 2013, p. 119). Marshall claims that similar to ideas with affectivity, an idea can also be conscious if it is “involved in the *conatus* of the mind” (Marshall, 2013, p. 120). *A fortiori*, “they become affects in virtue of their having a certain impact on the mind” (Marshall, 2013, p. 119).

In a nutshell, Marshall disagrees with most of the consciousness theories in Spinoza and proposes that, in fact, for Spinoza, consciousness is affectivity. I agree with him but also with a minor difference; since, as mentioned before and will elaborate on later, all ideas are affective to a certain extent, and every organism has consciousness to a certain extent too. He did not argue the pervasiveness of affectivity and consciousness. As we will see, emotions and affects relate to ideas that are in degrees (i.e., ideas that are more affectively loaded or less affectively loaded); similarly, consciousness has degrees in relation to affects (primarily affective ideas). This thinking largely overlaps with Marshall’s reasoning, but not entirely because Marshall does not take affectivity as I do.

For Spinoza, a theory of mind is not limited to human beings because all life is minded (from EIIIp6 and EIIIp7). It also means that there is an affective life for all beings. Affectivity, then, can also be understood in the sense that emotions, sentiments, and moods do not completely exhaust affectivity. Rather, affectivity generally can be identified as a “lack of indifference” (2014, pp. 1–2). In light of that “lack of indifference”, we will explore how a more contemporary Spinozistic understanding of emotions is possible. However, before that, we have to revisit a previous theme: representation relations in Spinoza, which turns out to be central for linking ideas and affects in Chapter 6.

5.3. Representation and Mind-Body Dualism

We have seen two types of relation about the “idea of”. We may both mean the relation between an idea with its body and a mind’s intention on an object. In this section, we will look at how Spinoza accounts for two types of relations and how the

representational functions of the mind operate. Regarding the latter, I will briefly focus on variations in the representational content.

Before starting, a note with previous discussions about extension, body, ideas, and the relationship between representation and PSR would be helpful. I stated that the body was a type of expression of that single substance. This expression, as well as its mental correlate, is extremely complex for human beings. This complexity is reflected in terms of intentional complexity. And this intentional complexity is representational as all other ideas. But what is a representation, then? "For Spinoza, to represent something is simply to appreciate the reasons for its existence; it is simply to be able to explain the thing, to understand it in terms of its causes" (Della Rocca, 2008a, p. 34). As all mental complexity is representational for Spinoza, according to Della Rocca, "body provides a point of view from which one represents anything else" (2008b, p. 106). We should consider the pivoting role of the body in representation in both types of relations. When we come to the relationship between representation and PSR, it would be better to think of will from the previous section to highlight the total rejection of the nonrepresentational nature of ideas. Della Rocca sums it up elegantly:

> If there were both representational features of an idea and independent non-representational features of an idea, then in virtue of what would these rather different features be features of the same idea? So given that ideas are representational, then all features of ideas must, on pain of violating the PSR, somehow derive from their representational features. Again, this is a fully representational account of the mind and its contents (Della Rocca, 2008b, p. 122).

For Della Rocca, every mental state is a representation or idea, and will does not exert an assertive force (Della Rocca, 2008b, pp. 123–124).[210] More accurately, as stated before, there is not a distinct faculty of will to exert that force. Otherwise, we would need to answer which features would allow us to distinguish these two states sufficiently.

[210] This can be contrasted with Cartesian philosophy. Cartesian view of will and understanding presupposes in the independence of them and also propositional attitudes and propositional contents (Rorty, 1990, p. 197).

Spinoza's two types of "idea of" can also be named as two types of intentionality from two different standpoints. If we are to conceive through the substance and attributes, then the intentional object of the body, as we have seen, would be the mind. After the formation of mind and body, if we are to conceive through the mind (or modes in general), then the intentional object would be external. Here, by external, I mean external to the boundaries of my body and my mind alike. The first sense Spinoza used extensively in Part II of *Ethics* (such as EIIp11). The second sense is used extensively in Part III of *Ethics* (such as EIIIp15). Both of these views carry the same meaning but from different perspectives. Both can be called representations, bearing in mind those two different perspectives.[211] Since the mind only perceives the body through its affections and also affections about the cause of the affections, according to EIIp16, "the idea of any mode in which the human body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human body and at the same time the nature of the external body". So, we are left with a single (and whole) context and many contexts interpretation. In the context of substance (i.e., in God's mind), all ideas are correlates of the extended modes which can be called to have a single meaning, but in our minds, ideas are both about "extended counterparts and also of the causes, external to the human body, of those counterparts" (Della Rocca, 1996, p. 48). The latter can be said to have multiple contexts. Both single and dual contexts underline the mind relativity of ideas in Spinoza's system. And this latter does not seem to provoke a problem because, according to EIIp16c, Spinoza admits that "the human mind perceives the nature of a great many bodies together with the nature of its own body".

From the first standpoint, intentionality seems to be confusing correspondence and representation relations. About this, Barker states that Spinoza

> fails apparently to see that the *ideae* which occur in the mind when the *affectiones* occur in the body need not have the *affectiones* or the body for their object. *Ideae affectionum* may mean either ideas which correspond to the *affectiones,* or ideas which are aware of the *affectiones,* but Spinoza apparently identifies the two meanings, that is, identifies correspondence and cognition. (1972, p. 142)

[211] In fact two types of "idea of", and thus representation, cannot be unrelated and it seems the perspectives taken here might deserve attention in another study. Della Rocca gives us a clue for this relation. Spinoza thinks that "my representation of things is a function of the content of those ideas of God's that are contained in my mind. Those ideas of God's that are in my mind are simply God's ideas of states of my body." (Della Rocca, 2008b, p. 111).

It is hard to agree with this position since we have already cleared out the suspicion of equivocality behind from the point of view of two things. If they were to be conceived as equivocation, then any change of perspective would need to be called equivocal, which is absurd. There is even an equivocation in what an idea means; it either refers to an individual's mind or the idea of that mind of an individual. Della Rocca thinks that criticizing Spinoza based on this equivocality, rather than looking for alternatives to that interpretation, would be to underestimate Spinoza's intelligence. Perhaps Spinoza would be properly understood only by considering alternatives. Della Rocca proposes that Spinoza's two senses of the "idea of" might be thought of as deliberate (1996, p. 50).

Radner's analysis depends on the first use of the term "idea of". For Radner, the distinction between correspondence and cognition, as Barker calls it, can further be explicated by the distinction between objective and formal reality (1971, p. 346). Being an idea of a counterpart (e.g., a part of the mind is the idea of a part of the body) does not mean that the idea represents its bodily counterpart. She says "x is the idea of" has the same use as "x takes the object of". Yet, she suggests that it is hard to label the latter (that is, "object of") as representational. Thus, the feature of being called representational is not symmetric for her. In that way, Radner made a trade-off by rejecting wholesome representationalism to avoid equivocality of the "idea of" (because the scope of "idea of" would be limited) while saving Spinoza from the hands of Cartesian dualism (Radner, 1971, p. 342). However, Della Rocca criticizes Radner for the untraditional use of the term representation in general and "objectively" in particular. For Radner, being objectively contained in an idea does not entail it being represented (Della Rocca, 1996, p. 51). But, according to Della Rocca, Spinoza's use of having an "idea of" perceiving and knowing interchangeably. The main problem in Radner's account is that representation does not have to be symmetric (i.e., applicable in the same sense to "idea of" and "object of") although she assumes to be so without giving a justification. A better alternative is to think of representation in relation to the mental regardless of it being a representation of the body (that is, mind) or a representation of another object or idea.

This alternative brings us to the more common use of those representations made by

and in mind. The first distinction we are forced to make is between the representation of an idea (which is itself an idea) and the representation of a cause of an idea. Della Rocca's main claim is that Spinoza's theory of representation does not depend only on the representation of the physical correlate as an idea and the representation of the cause to that object insofar as it is an idea. According to Steinberg, via EIIp17, this interpretation is not correct. This view is based on simple causation: "according to Spinoza, an idea *i* in a mind *m* represents an external object *o* if and only if *o* causes the bodily state *b* that is the physical correlate of *i*. In other words, *o*'s causing *b* is necessary and sufficient for *i* to represent *o*" (D. Steinberg, 2013, p. 3). Bennett assumes that indirect relation (which is between *o* and *i*) also holds. So, the idea of an object is an idea indirectly of the cause, and the idea of that object "involves the nature of" the cause (Bennett, 1984, p. 171). Although this indirect relation is true, it is not necessarily true, and most of the time it is not because a mind does not usually have adequate ideas. And as they are inadequate, they will only represent directly; that is, these representations will be about the states of the mind or correlates of the states of the body. If it had been only adequate ideas, then the simple causation claim would be correct.

We should look for an alternative that can also incorporate inadequate ideas and falsity. In that sense, Spinoza's theory of representation is similar to Dretske's because it involves intentionality or representationality.[212] Given the specific context of a particular mind, ideas carry information (in mentalistic terms) about a particular object, a collection of objects, or states of affairs in a way that it has the capacity to misrepresent. Although their ontological commitments are widely different, one commonality is that they try to account for the mental in naturalistic terms, and "they share a view of organisms, including human beings, as self-maintaining mechanisms" (D. Steinberg, 2013, p. 12). The self-maintaining mechanism behind an organism is like the following.

> For an individual to succeed in continuing in existence requires that it registers information about its environment and be able to use that information to direct its behavior. It must have states whose function is to carry information about

[212] Here only in one of the main Spinoza interpretation these two terms can be used interchangeably. In some other domains in philosophy of mind, they can be oppose and might refer to distinct faculties of the mind.

how things are in its environment. (D. Steinberg, 2013, p. 13)[213]

This passage highlights the dynamic representation formation. Each representation (as an idea) expresses a finite content, and this condition is not limited to humans. When we combine it with the *conatus* of the individuals, the result is a teleological-functional representation structure (Dretske, 1994, p. 15).[214] It is more appropriate and closer to the view that Spinoza proposed when compared to the simple causal view (D. Steinberg, 2013, p. 1). Steinberg thinks that the simple causation interpretation cannot explain the misidentification errors and recollection or the imagination of absent events/objects. According to her, Spinoza does not skip this fact but is left unattended by the simple causation interpretation.

For Bennett, both of these senses correspond to two different representational contents. His point is compatible with Steinberg's because inadequacy cannot be accounted for if the contents are identical. In Bennett's interpretation, it would be either two different senses of representation or just two different contents. It seems better to agree with the latter since Spinoza already eliminates the possibility of two different senses. An alternative would be this. As Della Rocca says, we might even represent two things with the same idea. For example, "I may catch a glimpse of John and Mary at the same moment". Thus, "in order to explain such a case, there is no need to bring in two different senses of representation or two separate thought contents" (Della Rocca, 1996, p. 53). Della Rocca's view holds water, but unless two representations address

[213] This idea is also important from the perspective of affective and emotional sciences. LeDoux's *The Emotional Brain* demonstrates at least two points where Spinoza's insights can capture modern scientific understanding of emotions. One of these themes that LeDoux notifies us that runs throughout *The Emotional Brain* is that "the proper level of analysis of a psychological function is the level at which that function is represented in the brain". He further notes that this boils down to a "bizarre" conclusion "that the word emotion does not refer to something that the mind or brain really has or does" (1998, p. 16). Since its physiological referent is absent, definitions and functional pieces in textbooks does not carve nature at its joints. Another theme is that "the conscious feelings that we know and love (or hate) our emotions by are red herrings, detours, in the scientific study of emotions" (1998, p. 18). LeDoux makes his point by expanding what we take it as emotions. An experience of anger does not seem to be more than the subjective register of anger. However, this seems illusory and it is a result of our over-reliance on introspection, although it does not eliminate first person point of view of the organism. Apart from the deceiving nature of introspection, there are also documented clinical cases such as alexithymia, o inability to identify emotions of one's own.

[214] For Spinoza, action is always oriented towards life itself rather than a transcended aim (Armstrong, 2018, p. 38). In that sense, an action is always practical in contrast to mere technical. To underline this, Marshall states that "desire, on this account, is intentional, but not strongly teleological, because the desire is formed as a result of a present joy, not a future goal" (2013, p. 89).

two different contents, we would have to identify each content without referring to a context (i.e., at least one mind). This point is hard to swallow; it is hard to substantiate that content and context distinction. With this minor adjustment to the context sensitivity of the content, the teleological-functional interpretation also allows us to make sense of Spinoza's account of confusion, especially when we have unclear ideas via haphazard connections.

Steinberg's terminology in the following passage gives us a clue about how to proceed for those distinctions that are in mind and by the mind. For the first, correspondence and cognition relation, she says that "two occurrent ideas are tokens of the same *direct type* or *type$_d$,* if and only if their physical correlates are individual modes of extension that are qualitatively identical with respect to their intrinsic properties" (D. Steinberg, 2013, p. 6).[215] All of these tokens instantiate the same content directly because they have the same contexts insofar as their physical correlates are the same. If we take the represented external cause as an idea, this idea expresses indirect content. Thus, "what Spinoza seems to be saying in 2p17c-dem [EIIp17c] is that different tokens of the same idea *type$_d$* can represent the same external object (have the same indirect content) even though they are brought about by different causes or have different causal histories" (D. Steinberg, 2013, pp. 6, 14). When represented indirectly, tokens of *type$_d$* are not dependent on the initial conditions of their causal history (etiology) because their content is already fixed, and they are the same. So, the *indirect type* refers to representations that are outside the limits of a particular mind. In other words, it would address external objects and point out to them but not their effects on an individual body or pertaining ideas of that body.[216]

We have seen so far that there were two kinds of "ideas of," which can also be called representations. These representations in the human mind and the substance (i.e., in God's mind) have two major differences. The first difference is about the boundaries

[215] By *direct type*, or *type d*, she refers to a borrowed concept from Bennett in which he claims the tokens of representation in identical properties.

[216] We saw a similar line of reasoning from Prinz in Chapter 3. We have two kinds of representation, that serves two different purposes and tracks two different properties. Representation of external objects clearly and distinctly is analogous to real content of representation. Representation of body clearly and distinctly is analogous to nominal content of representation.

of intentionality. In the human mind, each idea is both the extended counterpart and the cause of that counterpart. Whereas insofar as ideas are in substance (i.e., in God's mind), those ideas are only of their extended counterparts (Della Rocca, 1996, p. 46). The second difference lies in the link between an idea and an external object. As a result, the latter, the indirect one, plays a role in the adequacy of an idea. While the human mind *mostly* contains inadequate ideas, and thus it is confused, the substance does not include any inadequate or confused ideas (Della Rocca, 1996, p. 46).

What if we go one step further and ask what an adequate idea represents in our mind? Does it represent a thing's essence, or does it represent the cause of that thing? In fact, we have already touched on this point earlier in this chapter. In L9, Spinoza says, "a definition is concerned solely with the essence of things or their affections" and he also says, "the idea or definition of a thing should express its efficient cause" in L60. Yet, in light of these two passages, Spinoza does not explain how cause and essence should be combined and how they are related. In TdIE, para. 101, Spinoza includes only the infinite causes in defining an essence. Della Rocca states, "to say that the definition of a thing includes or expresses its cause cannot imply that the cause is the essence or is a part of it" (Della Rocca, 1996, p. 88).[217] This separation between cause and essence is not a necessary implication, but Della Rocca does not also say that they are unrelated. Since they do not overlap, according to Della Rocca, Spinoza proposed two requirements: causal and essence. The causal requirement is the type of requirement that the causal history should address in order to bring up that specific effect. As the causal history should be true, the ideas must be adequate if they satisfy the causal requirement. For the essence requirement, both necessary and sufficient conditions have to be satisfied. In EIIdef2, Spinoza says that the thing would not exist without its essence (necessity condition) and that when the essence is present, the thing is present too (sufficiency condition). However, if we assume that essences are not unique, this means two things may have the same essence. And if two things had the same essence, then it entails that one of these things might exist without an essence.

[217] A counter textual evidence can be found in TTP, Chapter 4, Sect. 2. It says "since knowledge of an effect through its cause is nothing but knowing some property of the cause". Della Rocca says that it is, to some extent, that the effect is in the (efficient) cause. And, in some contexts, Spinoza does not take essence into account. However, this is not the pervasive view of Spinoza; he does not repeat that constantly.

This conclusion would violate the sufficiency condition because having the same essence may permit *only one or both* of these things.

Conversely, if two things had the same essence, then two essences might have entailed the same thing. The other things would not necessarily have an essence, which would violate the necessity condition. In light of this, both cause and essence representations can be satisfied even though their criteria might differ. If I adequately represent object A, it has conceptual antecedents involved in its definition. As, for Spinoza, conceptual involvement and causal involvement are equals, we can derive that essence and cause requirements are convertible, although they do not refer to the same discourses. We will see a similar move in a Spinozistic theory of affects and emotions, and the adequacy of ideas plays a role in having active affects and emotions.

Representation can be based on adequate and inadequate ideas. And both can represent directly or indirectly (as Steinberg calls type$_d$ or indirect type, respectively).[218] Under normal circumstances, indirect representation refers to external objects and thus is more informative and communicable. On the other hand, type$_d$ captures the effects on the body, so it is less transparent in terms of the teleology-function. Yet, both (in)adequacy and (in)directness also change with regard to context. In other words, as mentioned before, Spinoza thinks sensitively to context. His context sensitivity might propel us to be interested in the least changing context (i.e., *sub specie aeternitatis*), but, at least in terms of an individual mind, we can still address a holistic look.

Considering a single mind, Searle says that holism requires numerous intentional states to determine the content of each intentional state (Searle, 1983, p. 200). Searle agrees with the general position that mental contents are not themselves determined unless there are other mental contents (i.e., collections or clusters of ideas). Spinoza would hold this general position of holism that Searle defined because intention (or

[218] One addition source with the same terminology summarizes this point well. According to Perler, for Spinoza, "emotions are always subjective representations that indicate the properties our body is momentarily perceived to have" (Perler, 2018, p. 246). "External objects are only *indirect* objects of representations: they are represented to the extent that they are the causes of our own physical states" (Perler, 2018, p. 247). Our perceptions and affections are always mediated by our own body, even though we perceive or become affected by external objects.

representation) is also a mental activity that can be expressed as a mechanism (of causes) between ideas.

> For Spinoza, in order to have an idea with a particular content, one that makes the idea an unconfused idea of e[ffect], one must have ideas with certain other contents; in particular, the content of these other ideas must be such as to enable the mind to represent (unconfusedly) the finite causes of e[ffect]. (Della Rocca, 1996, p. 74)

For Della Rocca, the answer lies in how the content of an idea is determined. "By tying the content of an idea to the content of the other ideas in a mind that has that idea, the causal requirement fastens on a feature we intuitively regard as relevant to the content of an idea in yielding the verdict of mind-relativity" (Della Rocca, 1996, pp. 74–75). A further and more practical question would be in virtue of what varies the content of an idea in different contexts (i.e., in different minds). When the content of an idea is variable, Della Rocca calls them variant contents. But, there are also contents of ideas that do not change from mind to mind, and he calls them invariant (Della Rocca, 1996, p. 75). But what would be the point of mind-relativity if there are invariant contents? If the contents of ideas are not sensitive to their contexts, then it would be meaningless to defend the mind-relativity of contents in the first place. These invariant contents can exist insofar as these human minds are embedded in a divine one or at least in a more expansive one. Spinoza's response to "what does holism have to do with the mind-relativity between God's mind and the human mind?" can be given in this vein. We may think of the divine mind (God's mind) as the largest context; it is things under which are seen *sub specie aeternitatis*.[219] Only in that sense can we make sense of the mind's invariability of ideas between different individual minds and individual minds related to divine minds. Here, holism in both minds ensures that they are integrated, and the adequacy of a single idea is given in terms of the whole.[220]

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[219] Della Rocca explicates this change in context in the term mind-relativity. He says "the mind-relativity of content is an expression of Spinoza's holism about the mental. If, as a holist about content would have it, the content of an idea is determined in part by the content of other ideas in the mind that has the idea, and if, as Spinoza holds, a single (token) idea can be in two or more minds, minds of greatly different sizes with very many different other ideas to determine the content of the idea in question, it follows and seems natural that the content of this idea varies insofar as it is in the different minds" (Della Rocca, 2008a, p. 41).

[220] According to Della Rocca, Spinoza's and Quine's holism are parallels. We can say that they hold holism about meaning and mental contents as well as their assertion that relativity and holism are closely linked. On the other hand, as Della Rocca states, "for Spinoza, mental content is relative to *different minds* that contain the mental state; whereas for Quine, mental content is relative to *different*

The representational view of Spinoza could account for expressions in terms of cognitions and affects, unlike the previous theories mentioned in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. Recall from before that embodied theorists (such as Ekman and Prinz) had difficulty accommodating intentionality. That emotions stem from bodily changes is either too shallow in their explanatory power or too rigid in their mechanisms to elicit emotions. Here, this representative picture in Spinoza can help us explain the bodily changes with more plastic intentionality because both are representations and these two types of representations are, in fact, the same, which depends on Spinoza's ontology as we described in the previous chapter.

In alignment with Spinoza's representationalist theory, two types of "idea of" are classified as representations. A corresponding mind for a body, cognition of an object, and having an idea (in mind) are all representations. We have delved into some details of both and how causal relations are integrated into different contexts (or minds) to give rise to adequate and inadequate ideas. This context/mind sensitivity of the content is an important feature of Spinoza's philosophy in general and his theory of idea in particular. This theory of ideas and representation will help overcome the intentionality problem that haunts the embodied camp in the contemporary theories of emotions. In the next chapter, we will focus on the affects and emotions to arrive at a more modern interpretation of Spinoza's understanding of affectivity with minor modifications and reinterpretations.

translational manuals" (Della Rocca, 1996, p. 81). Although holism does not necessarily entail a relativity of content (whether it be semantic or about mental content), it can be "combined with that view that a given (token) mental state is contained in more than one mind", and, as a result, it can generate mind-relativity about content (Della Rocca, 1996, p. 83). Quine also explicates his holism with indeterminacy of translation and his behaviorism (1960, p. 72, 1968, p. 29).

CHAPTER 6

SPINOZA'S SYSTEM OF AFFECTS AND EMOTIONS

The chapter will primarily take place on the idea-affect axis. It will be the chapter where I will argue that Spinoza's system of affects can be construed in the sense that it can address some of the issues in the contemporary philosophy of emotions. But firstly, we will zoom in on the relationship between the theory of mind (especially ideas) and emotions to account for the relationship between cognitions and affects because knowledge of causes, essences, or natures makes us capable of action and enables us to act. Then I will explain what affects are, as defined by Spinoza, starting from the simplest ones: desire, pleasure, and pain.[221] Here, I will propose a different reading of Spinoza, focusing on his so-called basic emotions as dimensions and temporality. Thirdly, we will turn our attention to the relation between affects and *conatus*. And lastly, Spinoza's two valenced (bivalent) spectra will be revisited, which are positive-negative and active-passive, in light of this new reading.

In this chapter, the underlying factor in Spinoza's theory of affect will be affectivity. It can be asked what the difference is between affects, emotions, and affectivity.[222]

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[221] There are different translations of these words. The original Latin words are *laetitia* and *tristitia*. While Shirley's translation, to which I have mostly been faithful, approves the terms pleasure and pain along with Elwes, the most frequent use belongs to Curley—joy and sadness—which is also welcomed by Della Rocca (2008, p. 153; 1994, p. 161, 2002, p. 285). The term joy is also kept by White but changed sadness into sorrow (2001, pp. 107–8). Bennett proposes more general but uncommon names; these are pleasure and unpleasure (1984, p. 254). From now on, I will mainly stick to Shirley's translation—pleasure and pain to emphasize simplicity of the shifts in an individual.

[222] As I will try to show every idea in some contexts (or minds) are affective. Affects and emotions encompass large range of phenomena. In the first half of the modern psychology literature, Duffy criticized the term emotion for this lack discerning quality. She says "extremes of the continuum are readily identified as 'emotion'; intermediate points offer difficulty in identification" (for example boredom and interest vs. anger). So emotion does not have proper characteristics that allows us to identify it rather than something else (E. Duffy, 1941, pp. 291–292). This view alludes to the position that there is no need for a separate field of study of emotions in psychology because no individual character of emotion is entirely idiosyncratic. Furthermore, she remarks that it is unworthy to study

Although we will touch on the distinction between affects and emotion, we can define affectivity as an umbrella term for any overall increase or decrease in an organism's power to act. Affectivity can include affects, emotions (both occurrent and dispositional), sentiments, and moods.[223] This reasoning will be clarified and explicated in this chapter.[224]

Since we have set Spinoza's theory of ideas in perspective, the broader aim of this chapter is to refine the position of ideas in a Spinozistic framework and, more narrowly, construe them as affective. In fact, reading between the lines gives us an idea about how affectivity in his philosophy is pervasive.[225] As we proceed, this pervasiveness will be demonstrated more clearly.

What is an affect for Spinoza? We can answer that with a provisional definition of affect made by Spinoza in EIIIdef3 (through EIIIpost1 and EIIIpost2)[226]: "By affect I understand affections of the Body by which the Body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections" (also see Marshall, 2013, pp. 58–59). Again, Spinoza's starting point is body; as in his ontology, he uses the term "affection" (*affectio*). The term affection is broadly defined unlike affects or emotions. It may be a modification of substance, a change in the body or the mind (Jaquet, 2018, p. 93). In such a definition of affection, any affect is affection but not vice versa. Affections mean those changes in question, so these

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emotions just by watching their effects since the outcome is based on the energy levels that behavior is executed not by the special characteristics of the emotion per se (E. Duffy, 1941, p. 293).

[223] It seems that Spinoza does not only include "momentarily occurring states, such as shame, but also states of long duration or character traits, such as the sense of shame, but also states of long duration or character traits, such as the sense of shame" (Perler, 2018, p. 260).

[224] In the previous chapter, we took a look at theories of consciousness, among them, there was also Marshall's theory of consciousness. For him, consciousness can be identified in terms of affectivity (Marshall, 2013, p. 4). I did not attempt to explain his theory of consciousness because that would both be focusing too much on consciousness, or Marshall's interpretation in general, and derail us from discussing affectivity and Spinoza's theory of affect. So, I deliberately left it for another work.

[225] Affectivity is ubiquitious for Spinoza although not every philosopher appreciates that. "Just as Hegel saw Spinoza's substance as too rigid in its apparent elimination of the finite, so, too, Nietzsche saw Spinoza as eliminating the affective." (Della Rocca, 2008b, p. 296).

[226] Spinoza's note to this postulate is to remind that the shift relies on a physical framework as it is exposed in EIIp13.

affections first refer to changes in the body and, only with an equality relation, as Jaquet calls it, Spinoza thinks of the ideas of these changes.[227] Although there is no temporal priority, there is still an ontological priority of bodily changes. In the second part, we see Spinoza expressing a shift of power of acting either from lower to higher or from higher to lower. The former is called an increase, and the latter one a decrease.[228] The accompanying idea is expressed along with this shift. As we will see, this accompaniment is a change of *conatus* in its core.

One curious thing is that *affectus* is sometimes translated as affect (e.g., Curley), sometimes as emotion (e.g., Shirley, Elwes, Silverthorne, and Kisner), and sometimes used interchangeably (e.g., Bennett, Shapiro, and England). Scholars like Della Rocca argue that Spinoza's apt term for *affectus* is affect rather than emotion (2008a, p. 27). According to Della Rocca, "the phenomenon Spinoza is considering is fundamentally one in which a mind has certain *affections*, is *affected* either from without or from within, and so the term 'affect' is more suggestive of the notion Spinoza wants to convey" (2008a, p. 30). As mentioned, in contemporary use, especially in cognitivist and constructionist theories, affects refer to raw and unprocessed bodily changes that can be appraised and combined with other affects. On the other hand, emotions were processed, and they can be formed only in relation to (re)appraisals.[229] Here, while derailing from what we interpret from textual evidence, I propose that we can read Spinoza's framework for affects/emotions with a distinction between affects and

[227] For Alanen, Spinoza sometimes constrains the term affections to the sensory impressions (2018, p. 319).

[228] Although I will not continue the following reasoning further, it is important to mention that. A more refined distinction is made by Jaquet. Jaquet categorizes four types of affect as the following under two pairs of opposites. The first pair involves increasing (*augetur*) and diminishing (*minuitur*) powers of acting, as aforementioned whereas the second pair involves the aiding or helping (*juvatur*) and constraining or repressing (*coërcetur*) powers of acting. To translate *coërcere* as "contain" or "constrain" as Elwes and Parkinson did. First pair can be demonstrated with EIIIp11 and EIIIp11s. However, there is no one-to-one match between the first pair and second pair. More accurately, affections that increase or diminish the power of acting does not necessarily entail affections that diminish or constrain, respectively but affections that aid or constraint the power of acting "express the passage from a lesser to a greater perfection or, conversely, from a greater to a lesser one, since they produce the affects of joy and sadness respectively (Jaquet, 2018, pp. 109–110).

[229] Again, I am referring here only to some group of emotion theories rather than all contemporary theories. The theories that I refer to can be classified as cognitivist, constructionist and/or dimensionalist.

emotions. In the same vein with contemporary theories, we can make a conceptual distinction between affects and emotions yet still admit both as transattribute modalities.[230] Affects can be read as referring to Spinoza's building blocks for emotions. More accurately, as we will concentrate on the following sections, Spinoza's so-called basic emotions (i.e., joy, sadness, and desire *or* pain, pleasure, and desire) can be reconstrued as affects because they are unprocessed shifts of mind (and body at the same time, as a result of his ontology or equality).[231]

While Spinoza talks about this shift (i.e., affects) and its different configurations (i.e., emotions), he mainly refers to mental discourse. However, "although there are not only affects of mind *and* body but also affects of mind *or* body, we must not accentuate the difference between the two and think that the mixed discourse boils down to a long physical or mental monologue" (Jaquet, 2018, p. 143).[232] When affects are considered in terms of their ontological origin, they can primarily be mentioned as bodily. Nevertheless, when considered in terms of their effects on the powers of thinking and acting, they can be related to both mind and body. This change of perspectives has been most succinctly mentioned in EIIIdoe48; each emotion is explained with the primary affects, or primary triad for Jaquet (i.e., joy, sadness, and desire, in her use)

[230] Silverthorne and Kisner remind us EIIIdef3 that "because of Spinoza's parallelism, all of these emotions comprise both mental and bodily states" (Spinoza, 2018). Thus, I do not maintain the distinction between emotions and affects in terms of one being bodily and the other being mental. By transattibute modalities, I underline the interpretation in which dual reference of that single mode and the view that both affects and emotions are modes of modes (Perler, 2018, p. 231).

[231] Jaquet calls these basic set as three primitive or primary affects (*primitivos, seu primarios*) and ideas (2018, p. 136).

[232] More accurately, Jaquet thinks that there are three discourses: "psychophysical, mental or physical, depending on whether they are related at the same time to the mind and the body, to the mind alone or to the body alone" (2018, p. 134). But mostly, Spinoza "clearly explains that his plan is not to define the affects in all their aspects but only as they are related to the mind" (Jaquet, 2018, p. 87). But, there are some kind of affects that "are related to the mind without relating to the present existence of the body" (Jaquet, 2018, p. 142). Glory and intellectual love of God can both be given as examples, according to Spinoza. There are also states that pertain to both. Take humility. Humility involves *sadness* from acknowledging one's own weakness (EIIIdoe26). Adding to this definition, in EIIIdoe29, humility has physical accompaniments such as blush or bowed head. Now we can either form these affects under bodily, mental or both terms according to EIIIdoe26. For Jaquet, affects that can be ascribed to more than one part equally such as cheerfulness and melancholy "concern the body above all" (2018, p. 138). As mentioned in EIIIdoe3, there is a reason for omission from the definitions. There is the adverb *potissimus* in Latin which can be translated as "chiefly", "most of all" or "preferably"; both Shirley and Curley preferred chiefly in their translations. All of these terms underline the bodily nature of these affects.

and the pointed objects or accompanying ideas. “The many kinds, in fact, since their essence is fundamentally the same, but it is explained and named differently according to the objects it refers to” (2018, p. 144). Spinoza says, “the names of the affects [emotions] are guided more by usage than by nature” in EIIIdoe31. These terms fix their meaning and serve as a foundation for their differentiation. It is plausible to perceive this difference even for the effects within the same category. The difference between *amor erga Deum* and *amor intellectualis* demonstrates this well. The difference is that while the former is related to God as imagined presently, the latter is related insofar as God is conceived under the view of eternity. So, the result is that “when related to the body, it is characterised by its constancy, when related to the mind, by its eternity” (Jaquet, 2018, p. 146). As we can see, the discourse might change, and each aspect can be highlighted depending on the context. As a result, “its physical and mental aspects do not always have the same importance and do not overlap on a one-to-one basis according to a correspondence” (Jaquet, 2018, p. 147). Some affects might have more physical hue (considered *sub specie corporis*), whereas others have mental hue (considered *sub specie mentis*). Moreover, some descriptions of affects have physical and mental hues. Take the example of cheerfulness (*hilaritas*, EIIIp11s) and melancholy (*melancholia*, EIIIp11s). Both terms pertain to body and in equal proportions (EIIIdoe3).[233]

Although Spinoza aims to explain all affects (also called basic emotions, primary/primitive affects), he does not try to classify all configurations of affects and pertaining ideas under a single label (i.e., emotions) to establish their connections and their direction of push and pull of the individual. He explicitly avoids hair-splitting by discerning numerous emotions by saying, “it is enough to have a general definition of each affect [emotion]. It is enough, I say, for us to understand the common properties of the affects” (EIIIp56s). For example, he refrains from defining jealousy and other vacillations of the mind simply because he limits himself to general knowledge of the affects (EIIIdoe48) rather than Hence when investigating emotions, we read only the common characteristics without focusing on “particular features of each on the basis of the idea of the essence of the attributes of extension and thought” (Jaquet, 2018, p.

[233] By equal proportions, I mean that cheerfulness affects the body in all its parts equally, so it cannot be harmful for the individual’s well-being.

90).

In the next sections, we will see that Spinoza can incorporate intentionality in his representationalist framework, resolve the cognitive-affective divide with his ontology, and provide an elegant relation between affects and emotions within his affective theory of mind. Spinoza is not far from thinking in degrees and shades rather than separate types and equivocal definitions. We have already seen his commitment to PSR (for Della Rocca, naturalism, and rationalism) and univocity.[234] The underlying tone in this chapter is to apply this thinking to emotion theories to overcome the aforementioned contemporary problems. This thinking is compatible with dimensions in contemporary theories with more elegance.

6.1. Spinoza's Cognitivism and Dimensionality

Even though Spinoza is put among cognitivists (among theories of emotion), this conclusion is fraught with ambiguities.[235] In this section, we will attempt to clarify these ambiguities and revisit Spinoza's cognitivism in light of the contemporary problems of emotion theories. While Spinoza can account for intentionality, he can also incorporate the embodied nature of what we commonly assign to emotions. In that sense, as we will see, Spinoza subscribes neither to cognitive theories nor to embodied (or somatic) theories entirely. Also, Spinoza's framework allows going beyond a hybrid combination of both cognitive and noncognitive theories because his ontology shows the equality of mind and body. This equality means that both being cognitive and being affective are different expressions of the same phenomenon. In addition, Spinoza's ontology can help us combine these two features deeply and simply. As we see in the first part (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3), the other two camps, along with all the

[234] For Allison, his thoroughgoing naturalism is the most central piece in his dealing with affects and emotions (2022, p. 120).

[235] Gilead finds Spinoza's envisioning cognitive theories and their flexibility as a remarkable achievement of Spinoza's philosophy (Gilead, 2020, p. 100). Gilead calls this the cognitive essence of emotions and it provides an entry point which also opens up a space for therapy. More radically, Perler sees Spinoza as having a theory that is attuned to body. Because of that, Perler states that "it would be misleading to ascribe to Spinoza the cognitivistic position that an emotion refers only to external objects or consists only in a judgment about such objects" (Perler, 2018, p. 256).

theories subsumed under them, fail to encompass both of these aspects within a simple framework.

In the introduction to this chapter, we looked at the definition of affect and a proposal to read affects and emotions distinctly, although Spinoza does not explicitly do so. Now, we shall focus on what these affects, which are changes in the power to act of the organism, are. In EIIIp9s and EIIIp11s, Spinoza makes the following definitions:

> When this striving is related only to the Mind, it is called Will; but when it is related to the Mind and Body together, it is called Appetite. This Appetite, therefore, is nothing but the very essence of man, from whose nature there necessarily follow those things that promote his preservation. And so man is determined to do those things. Between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that desire is generally related to men insofar as they are conscious of their appetites. So *desire* can be defined as *appetite together with consciousness of the appetite.* (EIIIp9s)

Desire is intricately related to will and appetite.[236] In fact, we have seen how Spinoza radically redefines the concept of the will to withstand Cartesian difficulties that a free-will fails to overcome. Insofar as desire calibrates the *conatus* of the individual, it is the essential property of man as well as any other organism. What that means is that desire comes from the very nature of men. The following passage is the ground of all emotions.[237]

> So in what follows I shall understand by pleasure "the passive transition of the mind to a state of greater perfection," and by pain "the passive transition of the mind to state of less perfection." The emotion of pleasure when it is simultaneously related to mind and body I call Titillation [*titillatio*] or Cheerfulness [*hilaritas*]; the emotion of pain when it is similarly related I call Anguish [*dolor*] or Melancholy [*melancholia*]. But be it noted that titillation

[236] Consciousness in the definitio of desire influences Marshall to see the connection between consciousness and affectivity stronger. "When we think specifically of the fact that the mind is aware of its impulse to act, when we specifically refer to its being conscious, then we use the term 'desire,' the term Spinoza uses for one of the fundamental affects" (Marshall, 2013, p. 134). According to Marshall, reference to consciousness in explaining a fundamental affect is crucial in interpreting how Spinoza actually thought about consciousness.

[237] Contrast the following passage with the following Curley translation: "By *Joy*, therefore, I shall understand in what follows that *passion by which the Mind passes to a greater perfection.* And by *Sadness,* that *passion by which it passes to a lesser perfection.* The affect of *Joy which is related to the Mind and Body at one* I call *Pleasure* or *Cheerfulness,* and that of *Sadness, Pain or Melancholy"* (EIIIp11s).

> and anguish are related to man when one part of him is affected more than others, cheerfulness and melancholy when all parts are equally affected.[238]

This passage explicates what he had addressed in an earlier definition (EIIIdef3). EIIIp11s and EIIIdoe consist of the names of the shifts that an organism can undergo. Here, we see that both Spinoza and the related literature stick to mental discourse because he is interested in explaining the relations or relational themes in terms of the mental. As I mentioned in the previous footnote, desire, pleasure, and pain are more apt uses. Spinoza does not stop there and continues to provide a first-order of these derivatives. EIIIp13s includes these definitions and ideas.

> From what has been said we clearly understand what are Love [*amor*] and Hatred [*odium*]. Love is merely "pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause," and hatred is merely "pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause." Again, we see that he who loves necessarily endeavors to have present and to preserve the thing that he loves; on the other hand, he who hates endeavors to remove and destroy the thing that he hates. (EIIIp13s)

Spinoza manages to combine not just ideas but also affects and ideas. But given the primacy of the idea, what is the real difference between an affect and an idea? One might say that an affect is an idea, which is true for Spinoza (see EIIp11dem). This point will be clarified and elaborated on in the next section; however, we can highlight this beforehand. The relation between affect and idea remains arbitrary since the extent to which ideas have affect-like properties remains unanswered. An arbitrary assertion or brute fact, according to PSR, is unacceptable between idea and affect. In fact, closer attention to PSR in his theory of ideas would show that each idea has to include affect-like properties. These building blocks can be considered to operate on a dimension to identify numerous emotions. Per what Spinoza told, then, affects *are* shifts; they do not *cause* those shifts. Also, since ideas are concentrations of power in the mental attribute and have inherent force (see EIId3), we may interpret ideas as having inherent

[238] Here, I cited Shirley translation. There is a stark contrast of concepts between two of the most notable translations of *Ethics.* But firstly, let me give the original, Latin, forms. The original terms are *cupiditas, laetitia* and *tristitia.* In Shirley, these terms are desire, pleasure and pain. In Curley's translation, it reads desire, joy and sadness. Apart from these basic ones, Shirley states that when mind and body are affected the correspondent term for pleasure is titillation or cheerfulness and for pain is anguish or melancholy. On the other hand, the mind-body discourse in Curley for joy is translated as pleasure or cheerfulness and for sadness as pain or melancholy. There seems to be confusion, especially for the term pleasure. For the rest of the text, we shall stick with Shirley's terminology for the affects (primitive/primary emotions which are comprised of pleasure, pain and desire) and emotions, which is also the same as Bennett's and Elwes', although for the rest of parts of *Ethics*, we depended on Curley's translation. This point has to be elaborated although there was another footnote at the beginning of this chapter.

affective push or pull, which can be identified as affects under certain contexts.

Since the conceptual position of derivative emotions (i.e., the relation of affects and complex emotions) is not entirely clear, several attempts are made to classify Spinoza's first three affects: desire, pleasure, and pain. They were called primitive/primary emotions, as mentioned before. Sometimes, Spinoza is put among basic emotions theorists. For instance, Prinz takes him as a basic emotion theorist having "joy (pleasure), sadness (pain), and desire" (2004, p. 87). Basic emotions have to be innate and universal. All affects (desire, pleasure, pain) seem to be innate and universal phenomena. However, when we look closely, they do not form a sufficiently distinctive state as such, as in the case of BET (such as Ekman's happiness [joy], anger, fear, disgust, sadness, and surprise). Rather in Spinoza's description, we see abstractions of changes or shifts in the powers to act. In that sense, Spinoza's states are aspects or features of another state rather than a complete one. As Shapiro suggests, desire, pleasure, and pain can be thought of as manners and "valences which weight the information we receive about the world, and which as such are structurally necessary to any affect, and so not distinguishable or separate from other (non-primitive) affects" (2012, p. 101). I think that Shapiro gets the indistinguishability right, but to be pervasive and effective in all emotions, we may think of affects as dimensions.[239] In other words, rather than complete building blocks, these dimensions give us two ends or poles.[240] Pleasure and pain are polar opposites; they are two valences, but, also, they can be differentiated in degrees. On the other hand, for desire, again, we can tell that the differences of degree in intensity or change in intentionality (i.e., change in the directed object) might form another axis. Of course, all these alterations are reflected in the perfection (*perfectio*) of the individual because they all

[239] A contemporary example is Evans' thinking about emotions. He defends that there are different shades of universalism (and innateness) about our common emotional repertoire. On the least side of it, think of Gururumba of New Guinea in which people think that they become a wild pig (Evans, 2001, p. 13). Dylan Evans states that "the distinction between basic emotions and culturally specific emotions is one of degree rather than of kind. There is a spectrum of innateness, with basic emotions being located at the 'very innate' end, and culturally specific emotions at the 'least innate' end...Higher cognitive emotions are less innate than basic emotions, but more innate than culturally specific ones" (Evans, 2001, p. 19).

[240] For this reason, it is possible to place and model numerous emotions in that state space. Dimensions improve granularity of emotions (or we can say it allows more nuanced labelling) and allows us to articulate on differences between them.

consist of changes in how a corresponding activity (either physical or mental) shifts the power of acting and thinking. The next section will examine how these three affects unfold more closely.

Dimensions are perfectly compatible with PSR since PSR deflates arbitrary distinctions between concepts, including affects. Only reasonably justifiable distinctions remain, according to PSR (see EIax2). Because of that compatibility, Della Rocca's main claim concerning Spinoza's theory of emotions is that emotions are inherently rational and, as a corollary, are inferior to the rationalist view (2008a). "Further, these two dimensions are compatible: one can hold that the emotions are inherently rational, but not perfectly so *and* that other, more purely rational, responses to a given situation are somehow superior" (Della Rocca, 2008a, p. 26).[241] His main argument is to defend that Spinoza holds an "extremely rationalist version of the view that emotions are inherently rational and of the view that they are somehow inferior to reason" (Della Rocca, 2008a, p. 27). It is almost exactly the opposite of my view. He appeals to a new view about the relation between causation and inherence. The coextension of intelligibility and being are not just justifiable on metaphysical grounds but also on conceptual grounds (Della Rocca, 2008a, p. 38). He links this to the debate about affects. "So we can see why, for Spinoza, to have an affect is simply to have a certain kind of representation which, in turn, is simply to engage in a certain kind of explanatory activity" (Della Rocca, 2008a, p. 39).[242] "What does the idea that is my affect represent insofar as it is in God's mind?" (Della Rocca, 2008a, p. 40). He points out the mind-relativity of content (for this or that person but for one mode or God). Hence, the important question for Della Roca is what a passive affect is *in* or what makes a passive affect intelligible (2008a, p. 47). Insofar as my mind is the cause of these affects, those affects are *in* my mind. But, my mind is a partial cause because I

[241] For a comparison, we can compare Spinoza's philosophy with Hume's: For Hume, to have an unreasonable emotion, the emotion has to be accompanied by some false judgment (Hume, 1960, p. 416). Spinoza could solve his problem by addressing reason acting on affect only insofar as it is affective. So, unlike Hume's conceptualization of emotions, Spinoza asserts that reason is active, rather than inert (1960, p. 458).

[242] For Spinoza, "different kinds of representations lead to different kinds of emotions--indeed, different emotions are nothing but different representations" (Perler, 2018, p. 250; see EIIIp56dem).

cannot fully cause the affect; it is also *partially* caused by an external factor. Ultimately, the causal line ends up in God.

Nonetheless, "no idea insofar as it is in God can be confused or inadequate" (Della Rocca, 2008a, p. 48). Passive affects, then, cannot be made intelligible through God. "And because, as we have seen, for something to be intelligible it must be in something, it follows that passive affects are not fully intelligible" (Della Rocca, 2008a, p. 49). Della Rocca concludes that "affects, for Spinoza, literally strip us of our existence, or at least strip us of our existence to some degree" (Della Rocca, 2008a, p. 52). Della Rocca rightfully points out how passive affects can lead to decreasing powers to act and being acted on, and thus to existence.

To sum up, according to Della Rocca, the existence of passions has an ontologically descending effect. He says:

> For the state that, insofar as it is in my mind, is a passive affect and a confused and inadequate idea, is also, insofar as it is in God, an action (of God) and an unconfused and adequate idea. This is a manifestation of the mind-relativity of content. Insofar as this state is unconfused, adequate and active, it is *fully* in God and thus is fully intelligible and fully exists. (Della Rocca, 2008a, p. 50).

Della Rocca adds this type of nonexistence is expressed in a continuum.

> ...if something is not intelligible, then it does not exist *and* it follows that if something is not *fully* intelligible, then it does not *fully* exist. Just as Spinoza's rationalism opens up the possibility that being-in or inherence is not an all-or-nothing affair, so too it opens up the possibility that existence itself is not an all-or-nothing affair; it is not a switch that is either on or off. Instead, for Spinoza, there are degrees of existence, and affects insofar as they are passive do not fully exist. (Della Rocca, 2008a, p. 49)

My mind contains passive emotions and can be conceived as non-intelligible, but it does not fully exist. More accurately, the mind loses the essential feature of integrating certain ideas or being a context regardless of being adequate or inadequate. But, the less overall inadequacy increases, the less it happens to exist or has a lower degree of existence and perfection.

I agree with Della Rocca's first claim (i.e., Spinoza's emotion theory is rational) about Spinoza's theory of affects but not with the second (i.e., emotions are inferior). On the one hand, Spinoza had an inherently rational theory of emotion; on the other hand, he

had an affective understanding of rationality. It means neither affective nor rational aspects are superior or inferior to another. In Spinoza, examples of both can be found. The reason may seem inferior in one sense in EIVp14. Spinoza says, "no affect [emotion] can be restrained by the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as it is true, *but only insofar as it is considered as an affect* [*emotion*]" (emphasis mine).[243] The efficacy of true knowledge or adequacy does not suffice; it does not bring out a wanted change. In that sense, reason falls short. On the contrary, in EVp7, Spinoza states that it is superior *when* we consider temporality. Hence, the perspective on superiority and inferiority relation between reason and affects/emotions is flawed. A more accurate formulation that connects both reason and affects/emotions would be that affects and emotions are rational insofar as reason itself is affective.[244] The contrast between reason and affects/emotions gets stronger if we focus *only* on pain and passive emotions.

One advantage of Spinoza's rationalism about affects/emotions is that his theory can explain intentional and normative aspects of emotions that we commonly think of (e.g., whether we are justified in being in fear or feeling sadness). According to a rational theory, at least in principle, we can evaluate conditions, bring about certain emotions and justify them because there are enough cognitive tools (such as conceptual analysis, deliberating, and talking) at our disposal regarding reason.[245] The dual talk allows Spinoza to go beyond traditional cognitivism since it can account for both talks within

[243] Thus, a false understanding would end up in labelling Spinoza as an hedonist (Carriero, 2020, p. 102). However, this is not a thesis about axiology.

[244] Reason has more affective power (Naaman-Zauderer, 2020, p. 201). Along the same lines, Lloyd says that active emotions are rational (1986, p. 226). As the pinnacle of love, Spinoza proposes intellectual love but the distinction between intellectual love and individual love is not sufficiently articulated. For this reason, it may form the future of Spinoza research because love cannot an equivocal concept (Friedman, 1986, p. 399).

[245] According to Power and Dalgleish, Aristotelian functionalism about emotions is sufficiently accurate (2008, p. 17). For comparison, Aristotle had a cognitive theory of emotions and Spinoza had a loosely cognitive perspective (Harré, 1986, p. 2). Spinoza also adopts a physical discourse, albeit it is significantly less frequent when compared to mental discourse. Trembling, paleness, tears and laughter are examples of physical expressions of the body in addition to obvious mental activity. Spinoza can explain both depending on the demands of the context. After all, Spinoza does not claim that the basic emotions [and affects] are nothing but physical states that could be completely described in the frame of a neurobiological theory. Nor does he advocate a purely cognitivistic approach, although he is occasionally classed in the cognitivistic camp" (Perler, 2018, p. 244).

a single framework.[246] However, "no matter whether we are examining an emotion under its physical or its mental aspect, a clause such as 'insofar as' or 'in regard to' must always be specified, even though it is one and the same emotion that we examine in either case" (Perler, 2018, p. 236).

Unlike Descartes' physical approach to emotions, Dąbrowski and Prinz claimed that Spinoza's is a purely cognitive emotion theory.[247] But we have to take into account two notes from Damasio. "Spinoza does not hesitate to privilege body or mind in certain circumstances. In most of the proposition discussed thus far, the body quietly wins, of course" (Damasio, 2003, p. 214).[248] Damasio cites EIIp22 (and EIIp23 and EIIP26 further this line of thought). For this reason, Damasio further says, "he [Spinoza] suggested that the body shapes the mind's contents more so than the mind shapes the body's, although mind processes are mirrored in body processes to a considerable extent. On the other hand, the ideas in mind can double up on each other, something that bodies cannot do" (2003, p. 217). We have investigated the doubling aspect of ideas in dealing with theories of (self-)consciousness.

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[246] Jaquet thinks that consciousness and affective life of the individual are strongly related. "If, in order to be formed, affects involve a state of mind as well as a bodily state, it is clear that affective life is characterised above all by the consciousness of emotions" (Jaquet, 2018, p. 128). Here, according to Jaquet, consciousness is used in the same meaning as knowledge. A reason for not to take consciousness seriously in terms of having an effect: EIIIdoe1, even without consciousness the appetite remains the same. From this, we can derive that some affects (at least the ones that contain the primitive affect of desire) might not need us to be conscious of them. And, in fact, in his article *Nostri Corporis Affectus*, Beyssade implies that affects are not necessarily defined by consciousness. *A fortiori*, he argues that affects do not necessarily need to be mental, which means that Spinoza might follow another affect discourse (Beyssade, 2000). In general, for Spinoza, we can say, consciousness is rather an emergent property that can be identified with overall affective activity. Jaquet says "consciousness is, in fact, less constituent than constituted, since it emerges through ideas of the body's affections" (Jaquet, 2018, p. 131).

[247] Although it is outside the scope of this work to zoom in on Descartes' theory of affect and emotion, we can very briefly look at Jaquet's remarks. She says that "the first part of the *Passions of the Soul* thus combines three approaches: a purely physical approach, in Articles VII to XVI where Descartes analyses our body as a machine; a mental approach in Articles XVII to XXIX where the functions of the soul are defined; and, finally, a psychophysical approach in Articles XXX to L where the union is conceptualised, in turn, as an interaction or in the form of a 'parallelism' between the soul's inclinations and the body's movements" (Jaquet, 2018, pp. 28–29). Spinoza praised and denigrated Descartes at the same time when he considered affects with the traditional and scholastic view in which a powerful will could change and choose, without any reason, what to experience and what to feel. Spinoza mentions Descartes' *ingenium* to point out his insightful acute imagination and clever way to put out how the mind and affects work.

[248] Damasio's emphasis on body can be read as praising the role of emotion in terms of homeostatic regulation (Johnston & Malabou, 2013, p. 32).

In the next section, we will attempt to answer the relation between ideas and affects in particular and emotions in general. As ideas are dynamic, it has some outcomes for affectivity and emotions.

6.2. The Connection between Ideas and Affects

This section points out the cognitive connection, and the next will address conatic connection. So, in this section, we will look at how Spinoza's views about affects and emotions stem from relations between ideas. This relation with ideas is based on a representational view of the mind. Spinoza's theory of emotions both expresses content and essential force (i.e., *conatus*). The latter aspect of shifts in the states and *conatus* will be examined in the next section.

The most direct relation between ideas and affects/emotions is that emotions change with respect to changes in ideas and relations between ideas. "The task of replacing our inadequate ideas with adequate ones is, however, at the same time a process of affective change, in which our passions give way to stronger, non-passionate emotions [affects] of joy and desire" (S. James, 1997, p. 201). Still, this does not explain how the changes are reflected in affectivity.

An interesting theory that strives to explain how certain affects tend to causal features of ideas in mind in Spinoza's framework can be asserted. Each idea represents, but the groundwork is laid necessarily with inadequate ideas (see EIIp26, EIIp27, and EIIIp1c). As mentioned before, inadequate ideas as imagination are not useless. Spinoza expounded on different types of ideas in EIIp40s; imagination is among the first type of knowledge (cognition). This type of cognition arises from an unavoidable confusion between an external object and the idea of the body. The confused idea produces a first step in the fixation of the object. Affects that pertain to this kind of imagination can be called affective imagination because the shifts caused by ideas are affective. Affective imagination helps us explain how we fix our awareness and how we represent particular things. In other words, as Shapiro states, "imagination is the means through which we become aware of objects as objects" (2012, p. 102). Imagination tends to affect and incorporate its relation to objects in his philosophical system (Shapiro, 2012, p. 89). This fixing does not entirely remain confused; it can

further help explain causal nexus and "affords us ideas of particular things insofar as our imaginings contain within them a principle for ordering experience" (Shapiro, 2012, pp. 101–102). In Spinoza's parlance, imagination fixes and lays the ground for common notions. Shapiro introduces a possible way that imagination opens a path for common notions. For her, it is that imaginative affect "that focuses in attention on a particular part of the causal order" (Shapiro, 2012, p. 100).[249] Since rationality stems from common notions, for Spinoza, we can say reason has affective roots. This type of affective imagination is the cloth that makes our world tangible.

We may establish a deeper connection between ideas and affectivity at this point. Everything that exists (as a mode) has a cause and an effect simply because they are in a causal network (see. EIax3).[250] When an idea exists (or is contained) in the mind, this immediately or mediately increases or decreases the capability to act and thus allows the transition to a state of greater or lesser perfection in a given mind. One can think of another alternative, that is, an idea might exist but does not have an effect in terms of increasing or decreasing the overall power to act *in all contexts* (*in all minds*)/*at any scale*. However, this reasoning is flawed because if it were true, then we should conclude that an idea exists and does not have an effect for better or worse *in all contexts and all perspectives.* So, in that respect, we may say that each change is related either to pleasure or pain (see EIIIp59); this shift *can* readily be construed as affect-like (if they are simple enough, pleasure and pain).[251] For some, this interpretation involves modification since it challenges (or perhaps overrides) EIIax3.[252] Nevertheless, it is not entirely possible to override neutrality *in all contexts*

[249] There is a common contemporary opinion is that *attention is important in terms of enhancing the power of an idea* (Pally & Olds, 2000, pp. 32–33).

[250] This is called universal causation by Schneider and it is based on two claims; these are "all causes necessarily produce their effects" and "all effects are necessarily produced by their causes". They conclude in that "everything is an effect" (Schneider, 2014, p. 112).

[251] I say "can" because definition of pleasure and pain implies transition from lesser to greater and greater to lesser degrees of perfection respectively, but not necessarily vice versa.

[252] EIIax3, in conceptual thinking paragraph as a footnote: "There are no modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or whatever is designated by the word affects of the mind, unless there is in the same Individual the idea of the thing loved, desired, etc. But there can be an idea, even though there is no other mode of thinking. For Jonas, Spinoza was successful in avoiding equivocity in terms of emotion, perception and thinking. There is still variation between individuals as well as species in terms of their

since multiple ideas are interconnected that constitute the mind which may result in vacillation (EIIIp17s).[253] And secondly, the substance has metaphysical power (i.e., its essence is power, EIP34) that is not static (as we will touch upon shortly). Any idea is capable of being directed by its intrinsic properties to another. This connectivity, with its bare relation to the increasing-decreasing of the overall well-being of the organism, depends on ideas that are paralleled by affects because, according to his definition, each idea, either by its power or by its connectivity, produces a certain tendency to be *affected*. This increase-decrease, hence, is never isolated.

Affects and emotions are cognitions, but they only differ in their expressions. Hence, contents are expressed cognitively, and inherent forces are expressed conatively. In addition, if all ideas can have an effect on conatus (and it seems to be insofar as they exist), then there would be no categorical gap between ideas that evoke emotions and those that do not insofar as they are taken singularly. In that sense, we can distinguish cognitive and affective representations. On the one hand, a cognitive representation expresses a representation resulting from causally relevant states of affairs. On the other hand, an affective representation addresses only causally relevant affectivity or causes an affective shift in a given context (i.e., mind).[254] All ideas are not *emotions*, but they have an *affective dimension*; that is, they have an affective aspect.[255] To have an affective dimension and being an affect/emotion are two different things. Emotions are more elaborate than just being an affective state; they are combinations of affects and ideas in a given mind. Furtak emphasizes the same viewpoint from the perspective

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mental and physical configurations. This does not obviate PSR because the variation between individual and species are based on the same principles (Jonas, 1965, p. 55).

[253] Of course, this response presupposes action only in physical terms. But this is the topic of next section.

[254] Jaquet points this point well in the following passage. "Thus a certain number of affects that are kinds of desire and love, such as gluttony (*luxuria*), drunkenness (*ebrietas*), greed (*avaritia*) or lust (l*ibido*) are differentiated not only according to their objects but also according to the manner in which they involve mind and body" (Jaquet, 2018, p. 148). These are further exemplified in EIIIdoe46-50.

[255] Along the same lines with the distinction that we have made, Protevi says that "affect has two registers. First, it is being affected, that is, undergoing the somatic change caused by encounter with an object; this aspect of affect can also be called 'affection' as the composition or mixture of bodies, or more precisely the change produced in the affected body by the action of the affecting body in an encounter. Second, affect is the felt change in power of the body, the increase or decrease in perfection, felt as sadness or joy" (Protevi, 2012, p. 31).

of contemporary theories of emotion. He says, "rather, the cognitive and the bodily are bound together as two aspects of a single, unified experience" (Furtak, 2010, p. 58). It seems that Spinoza succeeds in achieving it with these minor modifications.

The formulation until now was the following.

> Ideas are not necessarily affects but they are affective; they are shifts/relations rather than objects" . This way of reading the relation between ideas and affects is also in alignment with the proposition that "affects are nothing but ideas related to the other constituents of the mind, and to the mind itself, in a particular way. [256] (Marshall, 2013, p. 92)

Affects can be read as aspects of the ideas because all ideas exert a causal effect on one another.[257] These changes, thus, necessarily change *conatus* in two directions along each dimension or each continuum. As this change in the continuum is reflected in *conatus,* the perfection of each thing changes, too. Spinoza elaborated on this kind of perfection regarding the mind's power of thinking (EIIIp11 and EIIIp11s).[258]

As a corollary, we may add that affects require at least a relation between ideas, whereas ideas can only be conceived as relations that are equals of the ratio of motion and rest in extension. In other words, affects exist with regard to relations between ideas, which, when combined, shift the individual towards increased or decreased power to act/think. Hence, each combination of ideas can entertain a greater or lesser force existing than before, but they can also cancel each other and become neutral in a given context/at a given scale (Gilead, 2020, p. 99; EIIp11dem). However, when taken singularly, ideas have this conative force. Spinoza says:

> For all the ideas that we have of bodies indicate the actual constitution of our own Body (by IIP16C2) more than the nature of the external body. But this

[256] Affects are classified as passions (i.e., passive affections) in the last part of EIIIdoe. But later, in EIIIp1c and rest of the *Ethics*, it seems that there can be active affects or emotions. It is usually encompassive to take affects to be both active and passive depending on the circumstances.

[257] Beyssade addressed this efficacy of any change in body. The sentence reads that "every affection of the body is *de jure* an effect" (Beyssade, 2000, pp. 121, 123). His claim can be supported by merely looking at EIIIp14 in which Spinoza used the term "the affects of our Body".

[258] LeBuffe explains two kind of perfection in Spinoza. One of them refers to what we commonly understand from the term. This is rather in terms of ideals and models that people "create for themselves". On the other hand, he also treats perfection in terms of a genuine property (LeBuffe, 2010b). Here, he appeals to the latter sense. Marshall used that understanding of perfection alongside power (see Section 4.2.3) and Alanen also it in terms of cognitive perfection (see Section 4.3).

> [idea], which constitutes the form of the affect, must indicate or express a constitution of the Body (or of some part of it), which the Body (or some part of it) has because its power of acting, *or* force of existing, is increased or diminished, aided or restrained. (EIIIgen. def.)

As mentioned here, Spinoza distinguishes between two aspects, one regarding content and the other to force. Overlooking this distinction leads to confusion about taking Spinoza's ontology as dead and inert. According to Segal, Spinoza's understanding is a pure cognitive theory (or strong cognitive theory). He points it out by showing that his pure cognitive theory does not explain the phenomenal or qualia-like property behind affects.[259] He claims that this reading can be enhanced by taking into account how Spinoza explains the possibility of scientific and adequate knowledge via common notions (EIIp29s and EIIp40s2). He states that "by making Common Notions the basis of all rational thinking, Spinoza introduces a universal requisite for scientific knowledge, including that of the affective realm" (Marshall, 2008, p. 14). This formulation does not exclude the same mode (*modus*) being "simultaneously a representation, an affirmation, and an affect" but only its feel (2008, p. 19).

Furthermore, this universality results in neglect of phenomenal and subjective qualities of the affect. Marshall's reply can be hinted at as a return to Spinoza's basic metaphysical framework. He signifies Letter 83, which denotes a dynamic understanding of extension which expresses God's essence, that is, power (Marshall, 2008, p. 19). So the interpretation follows: as affects involve an increase or decrease in power (e.g., EIVp41) and that shift in power involved in judgment is the motor behind the difference between affective and non-affective idea combinations (in a given context or mind), the change in power of an organism, then, is expressed as "*a felt change in power*" (2008, p. 20). However, this felt change is not derived from merely being an organism but from the power of the substance (EIp11 and EIp34, in

[259] Segal propounds that Spinoza models a Cartesian method in making psychology scientific. Furthermore, Segal claims that this project comes at a price—quantification as a necessity for scientific investigation (2000, p. 7). Della Rocca agrees with Segal and disagrees with Eugene Marshall in affects not holding a qualitative character, qualia. Moreover, "representations can enter into the space of reasons in a way that irreducible qualia cannot" (Della Rocca, 2008a, p. 32). Same point is acknowledged by Gordon because emotions are thought to be insulated from such implicit causality (in space of reasons) because they tend to be identified with "feelings", and feelings have traditionally been thought to be states that lack causal depth, states that are identifiable by their intrinsic qualities and without regard to their causes. (1990, p. ix).

addition to Letter 83).[260] To support Spinoza's understanding further, we may look at EIp14s2 with footnote 36 in Curley's translation. Spinoza warns us against confusing extended substance with corporeal substance because the latter implies finiteness. Most of the criticisms could fail to incorporate this point into their criticisms.

With that last reply of Marshall and dimensions (i.e., desire and pain-pleasure as dimensions) from the previous section, we have seen that rather than separate categories, affects (i.e., desire, pleasure, and pain) can be interpreted to stay in two continua. Each of these affect-conjuncts, together with other ideas, can be thought of as emotions (both actions and passions). However, another dimension colors the intensity of these affects and, thus, emotions. It is the temporal dimension. Spinoza elaborates on the effects of the temporal dimension on ideas and emotions more explicitly at the beginning of EIV. In EIVdef6, he says that we can have affects/emotions towards things in the past, present and future. Here, he marks the operational limitations of this temporal dimension by saying:

> … just as we can distinctly imagine distance of place only up to a certain limit, so also we can distinctly imagine distance of time only up to a certain limit. I.e., we usually imagine all those objects which are more than 200 feet away from us, *or* whose distance from the place where we are surpasses what we can distinctly imagine, to be equally far from us; we therefore usually imagine them as if they were in the same plane; in the same way, we imagine to be equally far from the present all those objects whose time of existing we imagine to be separated from the present by an interval longer than that we are used to imagining distinctly; so we relate them, as it were, to one moment of time. (EIVdef6)

After he emphasized that a temporal dimension influences the intensity of affects/emotions, he moves on to different effects. Closeness in time affects both degree and intensity of all affects and emotions. In EIVp9, Spinoza explicates this with a different feature of imagination.

> An imagining [*imaginatio*] is an idea whereby the mind regards a thing as present (see its definition in Sch. Pro 17, II), but which indicates the disposition of the human body rather than the nature of the external thing (Cor. 2, Pr. 16 , II). Therefore, an emotion (by the General Definition of Emotions) is an imagining insofar as it indicates the disposition of the body. Now an imagining

[260] EIIIp7 links *conatus*, which is the essence of the individual, to power (and in turn knowledge in EIIp11) (Gilead, 1999, p. 171). Hence, only as a mode conceived through the attribute of thinking, this individual has a sense of "feel". This also leaves some question marks on what an organism is or the possiblity of reading him as a panpsychist. Nevertheless, it is likely to be left off until my further studies.

> (Pr. 17, II) is more intense as long as we think of nothing that excludes the present existence of the external thing. Therefore that emotion, too, whose cause we think to be with us in the present, is more intense or stronger than it would be if we did not think the said cause to be with us. (EIVp9dem)[261]

On this basis, EIVp9c and EIVp10 further tell us the temporal dimension's dynamics. In summary, objects that are closer in time tend to elicit more intense affects and emotions and vice versa. On the other hand, as mentioned in EIVp11, along with the temporal dimension, when we think of an event or thing as inevitable (*necessarius*), the affect and emotion evoked would be more intense. Closeness in time and probability, as well as their combination, plays a role in all affects and emotions.[262]

As we see, the objects we represent and become intentional objects for us can be in the past, present, or future. In that sense, this reading of Spinoza responds to the fact that we are directed toward certain objects and appraise them both cognitively and affectively. Thus, the event problem mentioned in Chapter 2 is also resolved. In Furtak's words, "one's own body is not the object of a typical emotion, any more than one's retina is the object of a typical visual perception" (Furtak, 2010, p. 57). Here, changes in our body represent affectively, whereas the object of typical visual perception represents cognitively in this example. Perler expresses a similar interpretation but in different words.

> To have a certain feeling, or a phenomenal experience, means nothing other than to relate to oneself and perceive physical changes in oneself. Thus Spinoza by no means denies the phenomenal dimension of emotions; he only explains it in a representationalist frame. Experiencing joy or sadness [pleasure or pain] is nothing other than representing changes of one's own body. (Perler, 2018, p. 256)

Taking the representation in two senses is also an outcome of Spinoza's monistic metaphysics. We have finite power as a finite expression of mind, yet we can still attain adequate ideas in a given limited causal nexus. In relation to this adequacy, it is possible to locate affects/emotions since they also respond to changes. So, even if an

[261] This is taken from Shirley's translation (Spinoza, 2002, pp. 326–327).

[262] Think of a possible earthquake in Istanbul. Since it is neither certain nor, according to common sense, is it likely to happen in the near future. As a consequence, the power of the affect that an idea produces is relatively weak in most minds and it is not highly likely to produce a desire or action (either active or passive).

affect denotes a decrease in power to act (i.e., pain), the same movement can be described or cognized by minds in two radically different ways. For Rorty, "to form an idea of an affect-idea just *is* to locate it within a nexus of related ideas, moving it towards (what might loosely be called) a common notion" (1990, p. 201). Dimensional thinking, made available by PSR, saves us from falling into separate categories, which are problematic to bridge. England sums up what we have been striving to explain:

> A Spinozist rejection of any crucial metaphysical distinction between the cognitive and the bodily shows that higher and basic emotions sit at opposite ends of a continuum of psychosomatic phenomena, thereby precluding the need to determine whether emotions are essentially cognitive or noncognitive; it furthermore reveals the "hidden unity" amongst emotions and supports an "elastic" understanding of both cognition and bodily processes, without precluding rigor. (2018, p. 4).[263]

England is among the first to put Spinoza's theory of affect/emotion on the table in a contemporary lens. Her interpretation of affect/emotion can encompass a variety of cognitive and affective states but only with that expressive model. Both representation types act with a mind on a single substance, and each mind (as itself an idea) is "couched in functional/intentional terms, with little direct attention to the physical states and processes in which the functionally-described states are realized" (Cook, 1990, p. 82). This connection brings us to intentional and teleological explanations, as mentioned in Chapter 5.

The functional-teleological approach is deeply related first to survival/self-preservation and later to the organism's well-being.[264] Adequate cognition helps us more accurately manipulate internal and external milieu to attain these goals (see

[263] Both "hidden unity" and "elastic understanding" are described in Section 3.1.

[264] As a Spinozist, Frijda addresses goal driven approach to self-preservation. He states that there are two aspects of functionality of emotion which, basically, are of emotional responsivity and emotional response. The former gives specific valence to an emotional circumstance whereas the latter serves a more direct goal. That is they "have a function within the actual individual-environment interaction, or one's immediate goal achievement" (1994, pp. 113–114). Further he notifies that function and usefulness are not always the same. Emotion, he says, "is useful; nonetheless, this does not necessiate every single emotion should serve a specific purpose. He states that "grief is not useful; the capacity that enables grief is" (Frijda, 1994, p. 117). One soft spot of this line of reasoning is that it evokes in the mind of the reader what that mysterious capacity is or where it underlies. However, it seems that Frijda can get rid of this problem by relegating to an earlier distinction made between functionality of emotional reponsivity and response. In other words, grief is still functional in terms of emotional responsivity because it stems from a concern or a relevance signal to organisms well-being.

Cook, 1986, p. 195). These manipulations include extending and approximating the view of the causal nexus to *sub specie aeternitatis*, which brings in thinking in dimensions (specifically, temporal dimension).[265] Here, a sense of reflexivity is embedded in affects/emotions. The hierarchy looks like this: The mind is necessarily of the body, and the mind only feels that body (Harris, 1973, p. 81). There are changes of power to act in the body and reflections of them in the mind. But, as an idea itself, the mind can produce further ideas about the felt changes. These ideas about affects/emotions might seem to be cognitive properties rather than emotive properties (Gilead, 2020, p. 101). This possibility would be inconsistent with our previous construal of Spinoza's framework. As the ideas of affects/emotions also have a higher order of effect (although not necessarily more powerful) on other ideas, they will also have accompanying effects in affects/emotions in particular and *conatus* in general. Apart from Gilead's purported cognitive properties, the idea can provide an affective representation, which comes from the increase or decrease of power to act of body and mind.[266]

Our interpretation so far indicates a strong link between body and feeling (i.e., affectivity of that body). From this point, then, it can be concluded that Spinoza's system does not only put an emphasis on the body but also on the *felt change* or *affective force* (1999, pp. 1–3). But, the main objective of self-preservation of the individual is always in tune with what Spinoza stated in Part II of *Ethics.*[267] For Spinoza, body, mind, ideas, and consciousness determines the kind of feeling, and it "is that subjective feelings depend very much on the kind of body you have" (Evans, 2001, p. 117). In the next section, we will see how and in what sense this feeling, which

[265] Hereafter, what I am referring by thinking in dimensions or dimensional thinking is thinking in terms of degrees in a given dimension along a spectrum.

[266] Two things need to be mentioned here. First is Spinoza's framework paves the way for transformation via self-determination, although (self-) transformation is beyond the scope of this work but in the last section the most relevant feature of self-determination (i.e., active affections vs. passive affections) will be analyzed. Second is that with imitation of affects almost all of the socially relevant emotions can be described (see EIIIp27s, EIIIp34, EIIIp40 and EIIIp43). Again, this deserves another full length study. But for more on imitation of affects in Spinoza through a contemporary lens see Ravven, 2003.

[267] Furthermore, for Spinoza, self-determination is followed by self-expansion. "Because the interaction of an individual with others modifies it in a way that can affect its functioning, self-preservation requires self-determination; and self-determination in turn requires self-expansion" (Rorty, 1990, p. 203).

is related to affectivity in general and affects in particular, generates changes in *conatus*.

6.3. The Connection between Affects and *Conatus*

In this section, we will move on to the conatic aspect as well as affective representation, as mentioned in the previous section. This section will first examine how different dimensions (of affects) alter *conatus*. Earlier in that chapter, we claimed that so-called basic emotions can be read as different dimensions and can be understood to differ in degrees in that continuum in each dimension. To explore this idea deeper, we can investigate how affects (desire, pleasure, and pain) are located in those dimensions. The aim of locating affects is to see how *conatus* fluctuates in accordance with the affects.

First, take a look at the definition in Curley's interpretation. He listed several translations of the term we touched on in Chapter 4. Curley addresses two views that endorse and deny the term tendency. In favor of the term tendency, he sees that *conatus* "is a central concept in Spinozistic-Cartesian physics, where the *conatus ad motum* refers to the tendency of things to 'obey' the principle of inertia" (Spinoza, 1985, p. 657). Whereas, unlike this tendency, *conatus* is used by Spinoza in a way that *conatus* has mental properties.[268] Nonetheless, Curley thinks that conatus, which is striving to persevere in one's own being, can be read as a metaphysical generalization of a physical concept, inertia. In this first sense, we can classify inanimate objects *and* living organisms as having *conatus*. But in the second sense, we can take some things with mental properties or everything with mental properties. Insofar as both attributes are equal for Spinoza, we have a reason for imagining that every mode carries psychic features regardless of degree, as mentioned in Chapter 4. In *Ethics*, *conatus* first occurs in EIIIp7; it says, "the striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing". In EIIIp8, the same *conatus*, for Spinoza, "involves no finite time, but an indefinite time". It is given, *or* actual essence, according to Spinoza. He means that *conatus* does not expire by itself and only wears

[268] Under the extended attribute, *conatus* might be read as field of force. See EIIL3d, EIIp13ax1' and ax2'. And, under the thinking attribute, *conatus* might be read as strivings, impulses, appetites and volitions. See EIIIdoe1, EIIIp11.

down *if it encounters a counteracting force* (e.g., EIIIp10).[269] Although each thing has *conatus*, striving to persevere in its being, this general principle might change in accordance with physical and corresponding mental complexity. As aforementioned, Spinoza can be considered a naturalist, and this hierarchy of complexity reflected in *conatus* can be called "incremental naturalism" (Perler, 2018, p. 243).

As it can be understood from the previous paragraph, each *conatus* changes with respect to bodily composition and powers of thinking.[270] Any affection that causes an overall change in the body's power to act is equally reflected in the mind's power to think. So, the change at any level has to be felt according to Spinoza's framework.

> In Spinoza's view, we must have awareness of any changes that affect *conatus*, so every affect must be registered phenomenologically at some level however, our awareness of particular affects may entail one attribute having greater significance depending on the specific level of awareness, how explicitly the idea aspect is articulated, and whether or not it is accompanied by strong sensations. In short, affects that entail significant reflective awareness will be experienced primarily as mental, and affects with prereflective mental content and numerous or strong attendant sensations will be felt more bodily. (England, 2018, p. 6)

Della Rocca points out two problems regarding Spinoza's view about awareness in general (2008b, pp. 108–118). These are pan and pancreas problems. The former is thought of as a challenge to his panpsychism which is mentioned briefly in Chapter 4. Since some features of the mind that he had mentioned "do not pertain more to man than to other Individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate" (EIIp13s), then each individual can entertain a degree of mindedness to a certain extent. If we accept that framework, then we should also accept that a pan has some degree of mental features, including some degree of consciousness and awareness. We have already fixed it and given reasons for biting the bullet and accepting such a conclusion, which is in accordance with PSR. The second is the pancreas problem. Spinoza writes in EIIp12 that "whatever happens in the object of

[269] "It is the amount of reality or perfection that a thing contains and so is its power of existing" (Harris, 1992, p. 58). To Harris, Spinoza used emotions and affects interchangeably. "So far as it is in itself, therefore, a finite thing endeavors to preserve in its own being; but so far as it comes into conflict with other finite things, its *conatus* is limited and may, if theirs is more powerful, be overcome" (Harris, 1992, p. 57).

[270] Here, powers of thinking is used broadly to include diverse mental phenomena such as sensing, feeling, deliberating and judging.

the idea constituting the human Mind must be perceived by the human Mind, or there will necessarily be an idea of that thing in Mind". Since, under normal circumstances, our body consists of a pancreas, and as a result, our mind has the idea of that pancreas, Della Rocca questions the representationability of the pancreas. He says:

> Yes, I am certainly aware of some of the changes occurring in my body (just consider hunger or pain), but it seems absurd to say that I represent *all* the states of my body. Margaret Wilson presses this worry, and suggests that a view that allows this much scope to the mental will "simply fail to be a theory of the mental." Is there any way to make Spinoza's claim less unpalatable? This is the pancreas problem. (Della Rocca, 2008b, p. 109)

It is hard to think that it causes a problem assuming that there are both consciousness and awareness levels, as we see in the previous chapter. Certainly, there is a corresponding idea in mind, but that does not have to be in our awareness. The things we are most aware of do not always persist or are represented in our minds *at the same level*; we can see a mismatch between much repeated, mundane tasks (that have a large network of ideas in our minds) and awareness thereof. Imagine walking down the same route to a bus stop every day for a decade. The details of these trips will begin to fade away in each iteration. Thus, awareness does not correlate with representability in mind.[271] As a corollary, such a scope does not fail to be mental. In fact, this criticism stems from conflating mental to being aware.

Regarding this point, Spinoza's framework lacks a distinct yardstick for discerning levels of awareness.[272] Originally, we started with an ontologically prior body, then the mind to arrive at an awareness of both body and mind. Harris calls the "idea of" relation that we have previously referred to as "awareness of". Hence, he says, "this idea [the idea of the body], as experience grows, becomes elaborated into a world of objects in relation to one specially intimate and ever-present body, which we identify as our own" (Harris, 1992, pp. 36–37). Although this experience might have elicited

[271] For a similar reason, Marshall thinks that "Nadler was correct that complexity tracks consciousness, but wrong to claim that complexity constitutes consciousness" (2013, p. 130). Instead, Marshall puts affectivity as the first candidate for consciousness and even, as mentioned before, he thinks Spinoza's subtraction of appetite from the list of affects shows that there is an inherent connection between being an affect and being conscious. Thus, a human being who is ignorant of the causes of her actions is considered to experience appetite rather than desire.

[272] However, it is both outside the scope of this work and highly debatable whether a lack of such discernment would be problematic for Spinoza's general framework.

adequate or inadequate ideas, this identification is still formed, regardless of our level of awareness.

We started investigating feeling (mentioned by England), then moved on to awareness (mentioned by Della Rocca). It is fair to say that Spinoza has not yet given us a satisfactory answer. But there seems to be a clue; the first affect, desire, provides a space for awareness of the changes in *conatus*.[273] This change can be distinguished from Marshall's consciousness as affectivity because only desire provides a way to understand the (conscious) feeling of change in *conatus*.[274] Nevertheless, as Marshall states, the idea must also "exercise its power in such a way it impacts the *conatus* of the mind of which it is a part" (2013, p. 130). These ideas, insofar as they make an overall impact, become affects and emotions. Regardless of the level of awareness, it might alter *conatus* following individual differences (see EIIIp57).

Why did we revisit consciousness? It is one of the first gateways to desire in *Ethics.*[275] Although we have investigated its definition in the first section of this chapter, we left its relation to awareness and *conatus*. If we fix this correlation of desire and *conatus* (i.e., desire reliably tracks *conatus* [via EIIIp9s]), then we can understand different shades of intensity both in desire and *conatus*. If we regard that intensity merely in quantity, then it is fair to use desire and appetite interchangeably.[276] On the other hand, if the awareness of change in *conatus*, that is, desire, is left intact, then we can also explain self-consciousness since affects (desire, pleasure, and pain) can take another

[273] Since desire can track *conatus* which is our essence (EIIIp9s). "Desire as the essence of the mind is not a power over and above the mind's particular ideas: it just *is* the set of ideas actively endeavoring to move to greater adequacy, as self-explanatory" (Rorty, 1990, p. 203).

[274] Since Marshall do not explicity distinguished between consciousness and awareness, I used them here interchangeably.

[275] Marshall sums it up in the following words: "When we think specifically of the fact that the mind is aware of its impulse to act, when we specifically refer to its being conscious, then we use the term 'desire,' the term Spinoza uses for one of the fundamental affects" (Marshall, 2013, p. 134).

[276] An alternative formulation of appetite by Harris states "Appetite is the nisus of the body towards some condition of itself and this is felt in the mind as a drive or impulse. Idea, however, is an awareness not only of the body but also of itself, and being aware of itself the desire in the mind is *also an idea of the object towards which the urge is felt*" (Harris, 1992, p. 59). This means the awareness of the object and its idea of the object.

affect as its object (Marshall, 2013, p. 131).[277] This formulation fulfills the basic necessity of self-consciousness through affective means. Also, notice that such a self-consciousness account is not all-encompassing and can evade many difficulties, including the self-consciousness of inanimate objects.

In EIIIp56, Spinoza says that

> There are as many kinds of pleasure, pain, desire and consequently of every emotion that is compounded of these (such vacillation) or of every emotion that is derived from these (love, hatred, hope, fear etc.), as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected.

Although it might be hard to discern different kinds of pleasure, pain, desire, and emotions, there are numerous phenomenologically distinct conscious mental states at first sight. Marshall takes the effort of linking affectivity and those conscious mental states via finer distinctions (more discernments between different instances) as evidence for Spinoza's identifying consciousness with affectivity. Affectivity is one of "the best candidate[s] for a concept of consciousness in Spinoza's thought" (Marshall, 2013, p. 123).[278] As affects are similar to ideas in terms of discernibility, consciousness about mental content is similar to affectivity.[279] We resolved this issue in the previous chapter.

As aforementioned, we can experience pleasure and pain before anything else (see EIIIp15). Spinoza says that also desire can follow numerous objects and events at different times by different individuals (see EIIIp51s). Combining these two with EIIIp37, which says that "the Desire that arises from Sadness or Joy [pain or pleasure], and from Hatred or Love, is greater, the greater the affect is", desire can have

[277] "For Spinoza, desire is the self-preservative extension of internal states, directed outward as action" (I. S. Miller, 2022, p. 91). And, according to Miller, self-knowledge that expands upon self-preservation is the precursor idea of *Bildung*. But, as expected, not all desires are beneficial to self-preservation in the long-run. Understanding involves the utilization of power to overcome harmful emotional patterns which decreases the necessary *conatus*. In other words, Cook says that "among the greatest hindrances to one's self-preservation are certain emotional states which work at odds with one's essential conative endeavor to persevere in being--call them destructive passions" (Cook, 1986, p. 197).

[278] Other candidates are ideas of ideas view, power, and complexity.

[279] Marshall states that "finally, this interpretation of consciousness in Spinoza may be historically appropriate; the claim that it does not straightforwardly map onto our 21st-century conception of consciousness may not, therefore, be a significant objection" (Marshall, 2013, p. 40).

intensified effect on both ends.[280] Either way, we strive to increase our perseverance (i.e., conatus) as much as possible (that is, given the power of adequacy, thus reason). As a result, desire improves our *conatus insofar as it pertains to our nature* (EIIIp4 and EIIIp6). Then, if we assume that there are only ideas that follow from our nature (i.e., active affects/emotions), the desire would compound our odds of survival and well-being.[281] We may only speculate on the reason for desire having this effect. One of the best options for this is that desires do not have valence but attach only to pain and pleasure. So, Spinoza might have thought that the desire to seek or to avoid was about the dynamics of the body. Apart from desire, pleasure and pain can form another dimension in which they are relative terms in a spectrum.[282] This dimensionality means that the states of an individual are not labeled as pleasurable or painful; rather, the changes of states from better to worse or vice versa can be named affects of pain and pleasure. As Johnston and Malabou say, affects are "variations of intensity in and of the *conatus*" (2013, p. 38).

One final point concerns imagination in general and the temporal dimension in particular. Imagination, especially the anticipation of some future events, elicits further ideas that turn out to be effective in changing *conatus* and desire. Shapiro states that "the ways in which our own power to act is differentially impacted, that is, the affects, serve to focus our attention" (2012, p. 99). As we expect, there is a chain of further ideas in our minds that further regulates our affective and bodily state because the ideas that turn out to be affects interact (i.e., that they overpower or cancel out, see EIVp10s). As we have seen, imagination is one kind of cognition and the ground for the other two kinds of cognition (i.e., reason and intuition). As the complexity of the

[280] Rather than have a valence function in itself, desire acts as elicitor of action. For this reason, desire is named "oddball of the troika" among three affects (see J. Steinberg, 2016, p. 67).

[281] This is linked in homestasis by England. In her own words, "*conatus* therefore manifests in an individual as a variety of specific 'forces' and 'appetites' that maintain physical and mental integrity, and the external fields of force and appetite that determine the ongoing state of an individual's *conatus* reflect the influence of surrounding entities. In contemporary terms, *conatus* can be understood as a fundamental systemic 'desire' or capacity for maintaining organic and psychological stability via physiological mechanisms of homeostasis or homeodynamics ('forces') and psychological mechanisms that relate most broadly to developing and expressing our individual identities in an ongoing way" (England, 2018, p. 4).

[282] This idea of dimensional spectrum takes place in modern theories as well (see Green, 1992, Chapter 9).

organism increases and *conatus* differentiates, the possibilities of both adequacy and inadequacy increase (i.e., both active [see Harris, 1992, p. 77] and passive capacity to act changes). If we combine these two, one of the most crucial features of striving to persevere in one's being and improve well-being as its offshoot would be an anticipation of (future) events (see Ravven, 2003, p. 72; Article 12). The ability to imagine and anticipate might be thought of as a threshold, but things only differ in their ability to act; imagination and anticipation are two of those powers. To sum up:

> We will make progress on both of these puzzles much later in the chapter after we have explained some of Spinoza's views on anticipation. The crucial ideas will be (1) that, because we can anticipate future threats to our well-being, it is in our interest to increase our power now and not just to do the bare minimum to stay in existence, and (2) that simpler objects such as the pan which are not capable of anticipation to the degree that we are do not, for that reason, strive to increase their power. (Della Rocca, 2008b, p. 156)

In fact, we can see how anticipation and perception are blended in that temporal dimension. It will be regarded as a sensation if we are to respond to what is happening right now. If we are to extend that quantity to the immediate future (say two seconds), we say that we *perceive* that event is coming.[283] However, if we extend it even further up in scale, we need a higher capability to anticipate these events (regardless of whether our imaginations are accurate). So, within a Spinozistic framework, there are no sharp distinctions between sensing, perceiving, and imagining. Hence, the pan does not anticipate *as we do.*

In the next section, we will see how the change in *conatus* is elicited, and *conatus* itself changes. In other words, we will investigate two valences of affects/emotions and the criterion of active affects/emotions.

6.4. Valence and Activity of the Affects

This section will include two axes on which Spinoza divides affects/emotions. These are positivity-negativity and activity-passivity. Miller also hints along several dimensions, including pleasure/unpleasure and desire (I. S. Miller, 2022, p. 119). By

[283] Here, I am skipping Spinoza's apprehension of perception which is an idea. Although it can be seen as passive, perception is also active *insofar as* it is in alignment with our nature.

attaining a more contemporary emotion theory, each affect or emotion can be situated along these two axes with a certain degree of their properties in the spectrum.

As we have seen, the affects that increase or diminish our powers to act and think (i.e., pleasure and pain) boost the effect of an initial desire. What does "boosting" here mean? Desires push us to action, and boosting might mean pushing us to act in a certain way. In that sense, Spinozistic desire can trigger action-readiness and as a kind of mental state which includes both our experience of ourselves and the objects in our environment (Boros, 2006). Desire, for Spinoza, functions in the way contemporary emotion theories think about arousal functions. Both increase the former states' efficacy and drive them toward a more actionable state. In that sense, Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988) stated that positive and negative should be placed orthogonal to the arousal dimension. Sangiacomo says:

> The relevant feature of desire is its asymmetrical behavior with respect to causal interactions. From the point of view of desire, not all causal interactions are equal or demand the same response. Desire is intrinsically determined to seek what can increase the individual's power of acting or prevent a decrease of power.[284] (Sangiacomo, 2021, pp. 329–330)

Of course, desire is not something over and beyond causal interactions. In fact, it is embedded in these causal interactions. However, we saw that desire shifts with imagination, especially anticipation. As imagination is molded by the mind's desiderative nature, with increased interactions and affects, the affective field expands "to include everything that falls within the aural horizon of the individual" (Sangiacomo, 2021, p. 331). He gives praise and blame as examples for imagining others' perspectives. As life unfolds, we acquire a new repertoire of objects and combinations of these objects and primary affects (as England calls it). As a result, England says:

> the initially simple sadness/joy (or pain/pleasure) axis of the experience of personal striving is widely transformed by the incorporation of innumerable acquired personal and cultural associations, as *conatus* manifests itself in various ways in response to the complex and multifaceted sociocultural and

[284] Following EIIIp9s, for Marshall, "an idea in a human mind is an affect of desire just when it moves the *conatus* as a whole to have a particular effect. In other words, when an idea pushes a human being toward some action, that idea qualifies as a desire" (Marshall, 2013, p. 90).

> natural environment with which we are confronted. The result is a large, complicated, and idiosyncratic repertoire of secondary affects.[285] (2018, p. 5)

What England writes as secondary affects is what we have already named as emotions. The crucial thing here is the individual variation in this emotional repertoire. This variation entails a unique connection between each individual's imagination, desire, and conatus.

In the first part of this section, we will start with ideas' representational and intentional nature and how pleasure and pain represent both cognitively and affectively. Here, we will look at how to construe a functional-teleological view on the basis of a positive and negative axis. In the second part of this section, we will look at the features of an active mind and the differences between passivity and activity without delving into how passive affect/emotions are transformed into active affects/emotions. According to EIIIp53, the mind not only rejoices when it conceives its power of acting but also has more adequate ideas. Also, with the help of the increasing number and intensity of adequate ideas, the mind starts to imagine its power to act more clearly. "So, whenever the mind uses an adequate idea, it also becomes aware of itself as the cause of this idea" (Marshall, 2013, p. 121). In this perspective, activity can be examined with oneself as the cause (i.e., via self-determination).

6.4.1. Positive and Negative Affects

Pleasure and pain are two of the affects that are also named basic or primitive emotions/affects.[286] We identified how a Spinozistic understanding of desire might be situated but barely touched the valence of pleasure and pain. Both pleasure and pain are inherently valenced (England, 2020, p. 4). The connection of pleasure and pain to *conatus* tracks the depletion and animation of the perseverance to survive (and even thrive) (Sharp, 2011, p. 30). For Spinoza, these two shifts (transitions) result from relations between ideas. These relational ideas represent either pleasure or pain affectively. On the other hand, they might represent pleasure and pain cognitively.

[285] She addresses Frijda, 1999, p. 239; Ravven, 2003, p. 261.

[286] Yovel calls this and other ideas having an affective tone. Increase and decrease of "affective tone of knowledge" is pleasure and pain respectively (Yovel, 2018, p. 542).

Affective representation emphasizes the shift of power to act from worse to better or reverse. The latter, cognitive representation, highlights the content of ideas.[287] Where does imagination get into the picture? Imagination requires an amalgamation of ideas regardless of whether them being adequate or inadequate. As Spinoza states, imagination represents inadequately at first (EIIp40s), but with common notions, ongoing ideas might be adequate. Contents answer "what?" of the imagination, whereas affective representation gives us the direction of how the individual fares. Here, both the intellectual and physical are equals and reflect each other.[288] As Rorty says, "whatever changes occur intellectually are registered physically; indeed, only those increases in self-determination and power that occur physically have really occurred intellectually" (1990, p. 202).[289] Therefore, affective representations culminate in power that occurs physically, and cognitive representations are reflected in intellectual power that occurs mentally. They ultimately refer to the same phenomena: a transition to increase.

Spinoza can also name different types of transitions. For example, when an individual undergoes a painful affect, aid does not immediately result in pleasure. It stops the pain or brings it into stagnation; this leads to a reduction in powerlessness rather than directly gaining power. In Jaquet's words, "it does not increase the power of acting; it favours it instead by counteracting the sad affects [painful affects]" (2018, p. 116). Conversely, constraining involves a relation of opposition, whether a passive affect or "a desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil". In addition, "that which constrains is distinguished, however, from that which diminishes, since it holds back but does not suppress the power it opposes" (Jaquet, 2018, p. 117). Diminishing power,

[287] Della Rocca summarizes affect trilogy in the following words. "So, in making the transition which is constitutive of joy [pleasure], the mind simply moves from one representation to another. That's all. Similarly, sadness [pain] is simply the mind's transition from one representation to another. Desire, on the part of the mind, is simply the mind's tendency to go from one representation to another" (2008b, p. 157).

[288] Good increases intellectual capacity, bad decreases it. As ideas are both cognitive and affective; both transitions have physical and mental repercussions (Harris, 1992, p. 77). Some emotions like hope, fear, pity are signs of weakness. Overestimation and contempt are always bad (Harris, 1992, pp. 91–92).

[289] Not all positive affects (pleasures) are determined by self; in other words, they might not be self-determined. On the other hand, it is warranted that no negative affects (pains) are self-determined. We will come to acting from one's own nature and self-determination in the next part.

thus, takes a complete realization when it is pushed to full power. Such diminishing would be equal to the elimination of the thing. On the minimum diminishing, the thing began to decline. With that in mind, we can see a counterintuitive example in which sadness or pain can be good overall. Since pain can counteract excess pleasure (*titillatio*) by constraining, the progress is good for the organism, increasing moderation (Jaquet, 2018, p. 119). Because immediate pleasure and pain do not always match with overall increases or decreases of power in longer terms, we need to clarify what transitions mean and how they are carried out. Jaquet says, "these affection are subsequent to the real or imaginary increase or decrease in the power of things we love, hate or that are similar and express their indirect consequences on us" (Jaquet, 2018, p. 119). So, aid and constraint operate on another dimension, although they are not irrelevant.

Spinoza is also a revisionary (in Strawson's meaning of the term) in defining pleasure and pain as transitions rather than the final states of affective processes, as mentioned in the previous paragraph. Perler says, "rather, we must observe the being over a certain period and describe how it feels progressively better and increase both its physical and its mental powers" (2018, p. 245). Yet, in virtue of which timescale do we call that a transition? In fact, Spinoza does not give an explicit answer, but we can make some comments. It seems that only under a temporal resolution in a certain scale is it meaningful to talk about pleasure and pain or any combination thereof. Apart from stressing the need for a temporal resolution, we can also tell that Spinoza's framework explains the difference between occurrent and attitudinal emotions, an emotional response to an immediate stimulus, and a repeating stimulus. We can also explain short-term emotions (such as surprise and fear) and long-term affective states (such as sentiments and moods in general) if, in Spinoza's framework, we observe the difference between the initial point of the power of acting or thinking of an individual and compare it to a respective time in the future or the past. Assume we say that Alice is feeling sad at the moment. Probably upon hearing, from a Spinozistic standpoint, we will see that she suffers from a decreased power to act because we compare her current state with how she was about, say, five minutes ago. However, if we assume that Alice is grieving, we will think both that she suffers from a decreased power to act and this decreased state had been persisting, say, for more than five minutes.

There are more durable positive and negative affects/emotions on the body. These are considered *sub specie aeternitatis*. Jaquet gives an example of this affective state and its dual expressions of it. Jaquet asserts that beatitude has origins in this kind of affective state. Thus, one way to elaborate beatitude is to look at whence it emerged. She says this is love towards God, but this love is expressed either as *amor erga Deum* or *amor intellectualis Deum*. "One applies to the love of God related to both mind and body, and the other to the love of God related to the mind alone" (Jaquet, 2018, p. 111). Both are definitely affects but for Spinoza, EVp20s, it is the most constant of all affects, and even in the body, it subsists "unless it is destroyed with the Body itself". Moreover, when the latter is concerned, as the mind enjoys beatitude, the greater power has it over other affects (EVp32). In that sense, for this blend of subsistence and bodily change, I agree with Scrijvers in considering beatitude to be an affect because it expresses a transition to more powerful acting or vice versa.

This blend of transition (valences, both increase and decrease) and temporal dimension provides us with an arsenal to improve affective vocabulary via intentional richness. What we can understand from this is that (1) as the intended object changes, the respective affect changes, and (2) as the degree of transition (intensity of affect) changes, the related emotion also changes. (1) can further be divided into distinctions about formal objects (i.e., property of the particular objects that elicits affect/emotion) and length of temporal episodes (i.e., how long the relevant shift in increase or decrease in power to act persists). In terms of representativity, both cognitive and affective representations have the power to change the emotional experience because they are, in fact, two facets of the same type of experience, so there are two entry points for this phenomenon. Any sudden attack would elicit an intense and short shift in the power to act or think of the individual. On the other hand, a chronic stressor or a constant feeling of insecurity would elicit a less intense but durable transition from better to worse.

A change in the formal objects is allowed by Spinoza's philosophy. Since the combination of affects and ideas gives rise to different emotions or affective states, he can explain the differences in terms of content and change in power. We may refer to

changes in power via affective representation.[290] But how does this affective representation work? As we have seen, this works in terms of bodily changes, but how we articulate these changes can only be understood with a formal object. Spinoza thinks pleasure might come from many things (EIIIp15). One of those things might be the unfortunate situation of what we hate (i.e., Schadenfreude). Spinoza talks about this in EIIIp20, which says, "he who imagines that what he hates is destroyed will rejoice" . In fact, the pleasure of the thing we hate might be unexpected. However, for Spinoza, and under common experience, we feel an immediate increase of power *to the extent that* we hate, although the immediate experience of the hate stems from pain (see EIIIp16). This content indicates how Spinoza's combination of affects elicits a transition in powers to act or think.

As Spinoza accounts for the change in formal objects, we can see his emphasis on integrating these cognitive representations to arrive at a grand causal network. This change in the groups of representations gives rise to increasing adequacy of the ideas reflected by affective representations in the body. Perler gives us an example of mourning after a friend. The intense grief might be insurmountable, but by understanding the causes and putting them into a larger network to understand more generally and adequately, we can counteract the effects of mourning by an increase in our mental power (i.e., pleasure).[291] At that point, Spinoza points out,

> Whenever two opposite emotions coexist, the stronger one impedes or completely cancels out the weaker one (EIVp7). Thus, if the grieving person reflects more and more intensely how the death came about after a long illness, and if he comes to understand more and more about the medical details, then the knowledge and hence the joy, or at least contentment, about this knowledge increasingly takes the center stage. (Perler, 2018, pp. 253–254)

[290] Overall affective changes in body can elicit either increase or decrease but at the bodily changes in themselves cannot be classified as positive and negative (i.e., valenced) at the implementational level (Cacioppo et al., 1999, pp. 839–840). At behavioral level, however, Harris sees a connection. He says that "pleasure and pleasant objects excite desire as attraction; pain and appleasant objects excite desire as aversion. These are the three *primary affects*: desire, pleasure, and pain; and the last two are really only differentiation of the first; attraction and aversion" (1992, p. 59).

[291] A larger framework with adequate ideas requires reasoning or intuition in Spinoza's senses. "The knowledge that this is what reasoning is gives rise to a joy [pleasure], stemming this time from the capacity to blur the boundaries of the self, and become a part of the greatest totality of all. Our joy [pleasure] comes not from hearing the harmony of a whole distinct from us, but from our incorporation in the harmonious whole itself" (S. James, 1997, p. 195).

These practical uses will be reserved for another work because we are only concerned with the basis of a Spinozistic theory of emotion at that point.

As we will see, even though we encounter pleasurable encounters or create active affects (mainly active desires), there are always forces that can surpass our own powers (EIVp6). In other words, the adequacy of some ideas does not guarantee to have more power. But defeating pain can be either through external objects or through our own powers. As Marshall says:

> Adequate knowledge *can* be overpowered by the *passions*, because adequate knowledge is only as powerful as our minds, while our passions have their power determined by their external causes, many of which exceed our own power. And when that adequate knowledge concerns future events, it is even weaker, which means that it is even more vulnerable to being overturned by passions [emphasis mine]. (Marshall, 2013, p. 183)

However, there is still the upper hand of adequate knowledge (cognition) with regard to the power it exerts in the mind. This cognition is the same as knowing, and knowing requires action (active affection). On top of that, James claims that for a seventeenth-century philosopher, "the presence of certain emotions (typically love) can be evidence for the correctness of a particular view" (1997, p. 225). According to her, for Spinoza, knowledge as will in mainly religious thinking is transformed into knowledge as understanding, which includes "causal laws that constitute both the natural order and the mind of God" (1997, p. 242). This transformation points out what we have defended in the previous paragraph about a larger causal network.

In the next section, through the lens of *conatus* and valenced affects, we will focus on the distinction and relation between active and passive affections. Activity and passivity are important terms for Spinoza's understanding of ethics and psychology. Active and passive affects and emotions are crucial for Spinoza both in understanding his conception of emotions more completely *and* for putting forward a Spinozistic theory of emotion.

6.4.2. Active and Passive Affects

As early as in the Introduction, I stressed the importance of the active and passive distinction both with regard to his ontology and his theory of ideas. Here, activity and

passivity are more directly related because this distinction serves as a preamble for how his theory of affect and emotion can be applied to improve well-being. Along this vein, my aim in this section is to bridge the theoretical and practical without underscoring the details of his views about therapy.

Spinoza starts with the distinction between activity and passivity in his definition of an act in EIIIdef2. We can concentrate on the following passage:

> I say that we act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause, i.e. (by def1), when something in us or outside us follows from our nature, which can be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone. On the other hand, I say that we are acted on when something happens in us, or something follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause.

"In us" refers to what happens inside us, from our own nature, through us.[292] On the other hand, "outside us" means that the effects come either from outside or from our ideas that are not necessitated by our nature. Spinoza names the former group actions; they are called active affections in general, active affects (for desire and pleasure), and active emotions (for more their combinations) or actions.[293] The latter group is called passions, and they are the same as passive affections; however, they are disproportionately attended in *Ethics* (Allison, 2022, p. 147).[294] This group is more crowded than active ones, and except for the end of EIIIdef3, Spinoza does not talk about active affects/emotions until the beginning of EIV. All affects can be passive (desire, pleasure, and pain, as we have defined at the beginning of this chapter). Furthermore, as Harris states, passions fail "to increase our autonomy" (1992, p. 88).

Spinoza does not explicitly focus on the distinction between internal and external. But

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[292] One may be inclined to include essence among similar expressions but Spinoza's use of essence is not uniform throughout EII and EIII. In EIIIp9dem, he says "the essence of the Mind is constituted by adequate and by inadequate ideas". So, it is better to leave it out to avoid confusion. And when he talks about the essence of human mind, "he is referring to the essence of each particular human being, and he denies emphatically that the general idea of man or humanity is anything but an aid to the imagination such as philosophers might excogitate [means to think or devise] but which corresponds to nothing real" (Harris, 1992, p. 85). This makes it even harder to make a generalization.

[293] The word "actions" is used differently from the everyday use. The original Latin is *actio*, which is contrasted with *passio*. Spinoza reserved it only for active affections/emotions/affects.

[294] Reactive or passive emotions can still be called passions in psychological parlance (Oatley, 2004, pp. 3–5).

we can tell that internal is the necessary but not sufficient reason for action (i.e., active affection). When an adequate idea comes from our nature (that is, internal) and it is adequate, it becomes an action. On the other hand, external factors would result in passions in all cases because we are not the cause of the idea/affect/emotions that is not elicited by ourselves, even though it increases our capabilities of acting and thinking. Nevertheless, the source of what is internal is confused. Since, as mentioned in Chapter 4, our body is the source of the ideas with regard to intentionality/representationality (for Spinoza). As we have mostly confused ideas because we simultaneously represent our own body and an external body, our image of a body is also confused. This confusion between our bodies and external bodies also indicates a confusion between internal and external. It seems that both insofar as we have an adequate image of our body and external things and an adequate account of causal relations in the broader causal network, we can attain an accurate picture of what is internal and what is external. We will return to a probable solution for Spinoza in the following paragraphs.

Here, we see the asymmetry between active and passive affects/emotions. In other words, not all affects/emotions have active and passive variations but only positive ones. So, it is not "correct to equate lack of passion with lack of emotion, thereby concluding that reasoning is unemotional" (S. James, 1997, p. 205). If we take the most basic combinations, we can form a matrix out of these positive-negative and active-passive. The interesting differences in such a matrix would be the absence of active *and* negative at the same time. Spinoza disallows the use of pain and any pain-based emotions that could not come from one's own nature. It is a contradiction based on his metaphysics, as we have seen in Chapters 4 and 5 in general and in EIIIp10 in particular. On the contrary, passive affects/emotions are more encompassing because they can either be positive or negative. For example, take EIIIdoe31.[295] Spinoza defines shame as "pain accompanied by the idea of some action of ours that we think that others censure". Obviously, for Spinoza, neither shame nor bashfulness can stem

[295] I am taking the Shirley translation here because Curley translates the difference between two distinct states as shame and sense of shame, although the latter may seem to address qualitative properties of the former. In fact, they refer to two different senses. So, I stick with the latter commonly indicates timidity or bashfulness, as Shirley.

from our own nature because it involves denying our power to act in a given context. Spinoza also stated that each thing tries to persist in its own being *insofar as* it is in itself, that is, in its own nature, through internal resources (see EIIIp6-10). *Ergo*, we cannot be shameful and active at the same time.

On the other hand, Spinoza does not think of passions as bad or useless. In EIVp54s, he claims that even though repentance and humility were not species of actions or reasonable emotions, he says, along with hope and fear, "bring more advantage than harm; and thus, if sin we must, it is better to sin in their direction". Under some conditions, for Spinoza, it might be reasonable to choose the lesser between two fires.

Another example that can be given for Spinoza's case is that passive affects/emotions are not useless. Although passive emotions cannot warrant living in conformity with a reasonable community, which is reserved for a life guided by reason (EIVp35), these emotions might elicit a peaceful communal environment. In his recent book, Flanagan criticizes this with losing a sense of truth. He says:

> Simultaneously, there is also a loss of a shared sense of shame. People ought to be ashamed if they disregard what's true, good, and beautiful. But they aren't. Shamelessness is common, and it reflects a situation in which many values are weakly held, and in which norms suited for a common life that aims at the common good yield to precepts for winning friends and influencing people, gaming, and getting ahead.[296] (2021, p. xi)

Actually, Flanagan's point demonstrates two points. With the loss of a common idea network, there would be holes in the social fabric. The other is that even there is a connection between the least affective idea (i.e., truth) and affects/emotions (here, pain and shame). However, we should remember that this does not apply to so-called negative emotions. For example, according to Spinoza, melancholy and anguish cannot be good; it is absolutely bad (EIIIp11s).

As we mentioned, Spinoza has a reason (and intuition) in mind when talking about affects and emotions. On the one hand, he links active affections, active affects, and

[296] Flanagan gives a more concrete and recent example. After the last election, Flanagan exemplifies the behaviors of some Trump supporters and says that they lack sense of shame. Thereafter, he concludes that "it calls for recalibrating our emotions, specifically doing something different with the emotions of anger and shame" (2021, p. 4).

adequate ideas. On the other hand, he claims that inadequate ideas are responsible for passions. There are no asymmetries at this point; active and passive maps well unto adequate and inadequate ideas. That means insofar as there are adequate ideas, there are also relations between ideas that are conducive to increasing our power to act and think. There is a further outcome of adequate ideas determining positive (pleasurable) affective representations through the body. At the beginning of this section, actions are defined in virtue of reference to our own nature. Adequate cognition requires us to be the cause of a certain idea (i.e., an adequate idea). Hence, as far as we are the cause, we are the cause, which comes from an internal locus. In the Introduction to a new translation of *Ethics,* Kisner says that "similarly all forms of sadness [pain], as decreases in our power, must have some external cause (EIIIp59) and, consequently, must consist of ideas that belong to the first kind of cognition" (2018, p. xxxi). As aforementioned, for Spinoza, there is no free self. Thus, there is no free will, only a will that stems from the relations of inherent forces in ideas. As a result, the only alternative source of that internal locus is our nature. In EIIIp3, Spinoza writes:

> Therefore, whatever follows from the nature of Mind and has Mind as its proximate cause, through which it must be understood, must necessarily follow from an adequate idea or an inadequate one. But insofar as the Mind has inadequate ideas (by EIIIp1), it necessarily is acted on. Therefore the actions of the Mind follow from adequate ideas alone; hence,the Mind is acted on only because it has inadequate ideas.

He does not leave any doubt about whether any inadequate ideas might end up in action. So, a larger network of causal chains would ensure that ideas are not distorted and inadequate because, otherwise, there could be either inconsistencies or contradictions in the network. James sums this up well in the following passage.

> Although Spinoza does not explicitly describe deliberation as an alternation of passions, he shares Hobbes's view that it consists in a dynamic sequence of ideas. In so far as our ideas are inadequate, and hence passionate, our deliberations are based on a partial and to some extent distorted picture of the world. In so far as our ideas are adequate, they are more likely to result in actions that are well judged, both in that they realize the ends at which they were aimed, and in that they are aimed at ends which will effectively increase our power.[297] (1997, p. 285)

[297] She also adds elsewhere that passions led us astray by wrongly putting the order of events. Moreover, by putting ourselves in a passive position in terms of ordering these events, we think that we simply reflect the world. "To rid ourselves of this deep and pervasive kind of misunderstanding, we must first recapture the relational, situated character of our experience by learning to think of other people and things as frightening, hateful, or whatever in relation to ourselves" (S. James, 1997, p. 165). On the other hand, for James, "we empower ourselves by way of understanding, however gloomy the news we

As we are more composed of inadequate ideas or ideas that are inadequately construed, our power begins to decrease and vice versa. So the more integrated and consistent the causal network we conceive of, the more our ideas get adequate. Yet, we may ask what this causal network refers to. Perler describes it more as an explanatory framework since to explain and to cause are coextensive in Spinoza's philosophy. Perler says that "Spinoza's thesis that we have active emotions only when we connect representation with one another and thereby construct explanatory frameworks is yet another expression of his thoroughly representationalist approach" (2018, p. 254).

So far, we have explored the relations between activity/passivity, adequacy, valence, and explanatory frameworks. Spinoza's theory of ideas and mind, in general, and his understanding of adequacy, in particular, is the hub that connects all themes in his theory of affects.[298] Adequate ideas bring about active affects, and insofar as we have adequate ideas, we are also the adequate causes of active affects. EIIIdef2 hints at a contextual understanding of the activity and affect. Active affect means rational affect. As Marshall sums "if the adequate ideas of God or of the common notions in my mind brings my mind to some further idea, then I am right to say that *I* am the adequate cause of that idea" (Marshall, 2013, p. 96). With the accumulation and synergy of these adequate ideas, the mind itself becomes an adequate cause of a certain effect. We can experience joy, desire, and their combinations when we are active. This activity ensures the striving to persevere in one's own being, which warrants that one acts by its own nature. It is the definition of self-determination, freedom, and activity.

We have already addressed common notions as the ground for adequate ideas (or adequate cognition), which is mentioned in Chapter 5. Besides our previous discussion of common notions, Marshall brings about a different concern about them. He asks

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come to understand. In this account, our dim impression of the totality to which knowledge belongs and the prospect of immersing ourselves in it function as an inspiration—or perhaps as a passionate, desirous hope" (1997, p. 205).

[298] As we will also see how Spinoza's thinking about activity and passivity can be interpreted in a spectrum, this reasoning can be put into work in other areas as well. I agree with extending the limits of this reasoning. For example, Marshall says that although it is not entirely possible for all ideas to be converted in to adequate ones, *all of them* would have a certain degree of self-knowledge (Marshall, 2013, p. 196).

whether we are conscious of them being in every idea (Marshall, 2013, p. 133). To this, Marshall says, "only when the common notion or logical principle causes an affect *by itself*, as could happen if the principle serves as a premise of a deductive argument, can we be said to be conscious of it" (2013, p. 134). Here, both types of consciousness enter the picture because, for Marshall, we become aware of reflected representational adequacy (cognitive representation is equal to affective representation). Since Marshall linked affectivity and consciousness, he might be more inclined to see the mediation of consciousness between common notions and affectivity. However, to understand the link between common notions and affectivity, there is a more immediate and direct route; we can circumvent consciousness. Common notions are comprised of commonalities within all ideas or, more accurately, they highlight the common relations/aspects between all ideas. If we accept that those common notions carry this commonality aspect, they represent all ideas better than any other. This success in cognitive representation brings increased power to act/think via affective representation. In the long run, it is felt as pleasure (or a derivative of pleasure).

Jaquet summarizes the fluctuation of perfection with regard to activity and passivity.

> As instant reflections of humanity's power of acting, affects bear witness to its variations and its greater or lesser perfection, depending on whether the cause producing them is adequate or inadequate. Human perfection manifests itself at its highest point through active affects based on reason and intuitive knowledge. By contrast, it is diminished according to the weakness of the body's aptitudes, which reaches its peak in death. (Jaquet, 2018, p. 159)

Now this diminishing results in weakness in the body. The opposite is also true: a sensitive and strong body is capable of many great things. Spinoza pushes this idea further in EVp39s, where he says:

> Because human Bodies are capable of a great many things, 15 there is no doubt but what they can be of such a nature that they are related to Minds which have a great knowledge of themselves and of God, and of which the greatest, *or* chief, part is eternal. So they hardly fear death.

The most important point for activity and passivity is to conceive that they take place in a continuum as previously defined in dimensions (desire as intensity and pleasure-pain as valence dimensions). Similarly, activity and passivity are in a spectrum. They are always relative motions, and this relativity towers on the ratio between the intrinsic

and extrinsic forces acting on the individual/organism (Alanen, 2020, p. 121). An action has to be caused wholly by internal factors. In that sense, action is caused either by its nature alone or free *insofar as and to the degree that* internal factors determine it. Likely, passions are caused wholly or partially by external factors or objects. Again, we can say that passions are active *only insofar as and to the degree that* their own nature determines them. Of course, this transformation will make them cease to be a passion; they will become actions. Self-determination is still in a stringent causal line due to internal order.[299] Yet, "the external order is only supplemented by an inner one" (Perler, 2018, p. 242). This effect is also carried over to the active and passive emotions, respectively, and, as a result, to the effect on the power to act.

We should open parenthesis at this point. Spinoza does not explicitly fix the meaning of the phrase power of acting. Schrijvers remarks that the phrase power of acting is ambiguous and leads to confusion (1999, pp. 63–64). As Jaquet states, "this double meaning, however, is not a sign of negligence or confusion". And "it is fully in line with the ontological status of the modes and makes it possible to express it" (Jaquet, 2018, p. 102). In that sense, the original term *potentia agendi* may refer to reality, and frequently in EI, as perfection because all things inherently strive to persist and even expand themselves (EIp29). The inherent nature of each thing is only realized insofar as it acts alone or with others to persevere in existing.

By this definition, both active and passive affects might involve an increase in the powers of acting. However, all passive affects consist of only partial activity since the individual "contributes to the production of affects with the aid of external causes" (Jaquet, 2018, p. 105). In that sense, humans cannot be self-causing or a complete cause of anything (including EIdef7) and are passive to some degree. Although human beings cannot be absolutely free, as mentioned in EIdef7, they might be free to a certain degree regarding actions. "So, we cannot be absolutely free or free with regards to our existence, but we can perhaps be free in some of our actions" (Marshall, 2013, p. 94). We have adequate ideas of these actions, but our minds are neither adequate

[299] For Spinoza, self-determination and freedom can be used interchangeably and they both mean to act in accordance with one's nature.

ideas nor fully composed of adequate ideas. Marshall remarks that the same rebuttal applies to human passivity too. "Human beings are passive to some degree, but they cannot be entirely passive; there must be some degree to which they are active" (Marshall, 2013, p. 94). Moreover, if they were not, at least, to a certain extent active, then that would mean that they do not have a nature which would mean that they do not exist.

> He [Spinoza] believed that human freedom was not, as was commonly held, indeterminacy of choice, but was self-determination, entirely by one's own nature, free from external compulsion. This, for him, was action proper, while determination by extraneous causes was passion, the subjection to which he called bondage. (Harris, 1992, p. 6)

In addition to elaborating on self-determination, Harris defined what Spinoza really meant by bondage in this passage. Thus, for Spinoza, we can say to be free and active, a complete demand of self-determination and self-causation (in the case of substance) is unnecessary. This requirement is based on a false premise for freedom or self-determination (i.e., freedom or self-determination requires the possibility of action without limitation). In light of this understanding of self-determination, each thing can determine itself *to a certain extent.*[300] Hence,

> Each thing asserts itself, but all things around it assert themselves, and in the case of the very simple, low-grade individual (illustrated perhaps by the atom), completely at the mercy of external impingements, the compound assertion of all others in its dynamic condition all but submerges its self-assertion, so that the active aspect will be at a minimum; and correspondingly, the very experience of otherness (its "affects") will not rise beyond an indiscriminate fusion of mere passivity: its perception will be as indistinct as its selfhood. (Jonas, 1965, p. 56)

This quotation shows us that, as in *conatus*, everything can be active and passive *in varying degrees* in accordance with the capabilities of its body (and mind). This chapter's thinking in degrees and dimension fits together by spreading the emphasized features (such as activity-passivity or increase-decrease in power). These features fluctuate *conatus* (England, 2018, p. 5).

As we move from activity to *conatus*, we have also touched upon self-determination.

[300] Self-determining action does not consist of any divine *intervention* or religious activity either (Baier, 2010, p. 513).

Self-determination is indirectly made possible by the adequacy of ideas. Although we can feel elevated from external factors, which are passions out of inadequate ideas, these states are not sustainable. We are left at the mercy of external factors that drag us from one state to another and push us into ambivalence. For this reason, the action triggered by reason would be an antidote to overpower these external factors. James says,

> Freed from affective ambivalence, the true philosopher is so absorbed in the joy [pleasure] of understanding that it encompasses all his feelings for individual things. Rather than regretting pleasures that fail to fit into his way of life, he takes delight in cultivating insights that entirely free him from sadness. (S. James, 2020, p. 183)

This pleasure of representing this larger causal network brings pleasure, and the body accompanies it. Throughout this work, I tried to visit the idea that "affects [and emotions] are only opposed by other affects; ideas considered apart from their power as affects cannot change the mind" (Marshall, 2013, p. 169; also see EIVp7). To be active, we have to adequately represent the best we can to counteract inadequate ideas and overcome passions without eliminating them.

This chapter looked at various concepts Spinoza introduces regarding affects and emotions. I introduced some distinctions that are not found in Spinoza's writings (such as affect and emotion distinction) to make Spinoza's emotion theory closer to contemporary ones. Both Spinoza's and my modification terms (e.g., *conatus*) are not necessarily eligible for an emotion theory, and these terms need not be stated with the exact labels as Spinoza did. In other words, these terms are themselves replaceable, yet they are inevitable as conceptual placeholders. The place of these concepts should be in one sense filled (e.g., *conatus* can be replaced with an innate drive, or active emotions can be interchanged with wise emotions) successfully in virtue of Spinoza's ontology and theory of ideas.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Spinoza's philosophy was highly influential in many areas, including political philosophy, metaphysics, and psychology. In this study, I focused on his view on psychology in general and on emotion theory in particular.[301] This focus can be considered one step further in "unearthing a transatlantic", as Frank and Wilson say, reflecting on indirect connections between Tomkins and Spinoza (2020, p. 73). We have investigated a variety of concepts in Spinoza's philosophy, such as ideas, emotions, and *conatus* (especially in the last chapter). These are necessary for a Spinozistic understanding of affects and emotions that might help us in thinking about points (i), (ii), and (iv) that were explained in the Introduction chapter *effectively and elegantly* in terms of the cognitive and noncognitive divide.

In the first half, we started by exposing one of the main divisions in the theory of emotions. This division was based on the mind-body distinction (Cartesian split-view), and there are two camps, cognitive and noncognitive/affective camps. This duality is not the only duality among emotion theories but one of the most entrenched and pervasive. This entrenched and pervasive duality can be investigated in various ways (e.g., through the lenses of anthropology or psychiatry).[302] Here, I have chosen a more direct route and zoomed in on the arguments and frameworks. We have started with

[301] Spinoza explains and understands that affects (and emotions) concern both mind and body but his main interest is more about mental aspects and changes thereof. It is "of the greatest importance in Spinoza's moral, psychological and ethical project" (Marshall, 2013, p. 59).

[302] Other areas, however, depend upon such a conceptual framework. England rightfully states that an anthropology that depends on traditional mind-body dualism (i.e., a substance dualism) provoked a mind-body separation that is based on a Cartesian metaphysical framework (England, 2020, p. 1). According to her, a Spinozistic framework is more suitable. A Spinozistic framework "accords with the recent shift to a hierarchical approach to homology, which recognises that the evolutionary lineage of complex biological units should be traced via relational qualities rather than physical characteristics" (England, 2020, p. 1).

the James-Lange theory and how it fared well unless a need for an object or a need for an event rose. We have called that the intentionality problem, although there were different varieties of its reception in the philosophy of mind and phenomenology. Cognitive theories that respond to this need were successful, especially in philosophy, because they capitalized on some ingrained philosophical tools such as conceptual and logical analysis. Early cognitivism achieved a finer emotional distinction but could not account for the specific feeling and bodily changes that accommodated emotions. One of the most successful candidates in the history of emotion theories has been appraisal theories, but this set of theories also had to introduce many different constituent components in order to model and name emotions. Although this is not a fatal flaw, these theories are far from elegant and simple.

In the second half, the focus shifted to Spinoza's framework and his theory of affects in particular to construct an elegant and simpler framework for emotion theories. The main aim following the exposition of contemporary theories in the first half was to show how a Spinozistic monistic framework could help us overcome this cognitive and noncognitive duality and provide a ground for a novel ontology of emotion theories.[303] In this ontology, we cannot expect an early modern philosopher to provide a detailed emotion theory that can respond to all of the demands of the current theories.

To overcome this difficulty, I have proposed that Spinoza's expressivity might be read through his theory of ideas and representationalism. I have explained ideas' nature and adequacy criteria and how minds, as ideas themselves, are constituted.[304] Being inherently active, being a concept (EIIdef3), an idea could both represent an object and represent a body, which it is the idea of, at the same time. This representational view could do justice to, first, substance's, and second, individual's expressivity in both cognitive and affective terms. The former could track the content of what is represented, and the latter could track how the body and *conatus* shifts/changes.

[303] Brown and Stenner think that Spinoza had already conceived beyond the emotion and cognition opposition. They say that "although affect seems here to be the prior term ("for each one manages according to his [sic] emotion"), Spinoza avoids what we moderns would understand as the opposition of emotion and cognition, by insisting that affects are emergent orderings of the relational field made up in the encounter between manifold finite beings" (S. D. Brown & Stenner, 2001, p. 89).

[304] For Spinoza, according to Malabou, "affects do not belong to the human mind as such but appear as *natural ontological phenomena,* the causes of which can be rigorously determined" (2013, p. 36).

However, for Spinoza, these representations have not been neutral, as all ideas have effects; since it is equal to have power to cause and power to exist, those representative qualities also correspond to shifts in an individual's striving to perseverance in being (i.e., *conatus*). The basic two directions of shifts have been either to a greater power to act/think or to a lesser power to act/think. The former was called pleasure, and the latter was called pain, even though there are other translations for these two terminologies. These terms give each emotion its specific valence, whether it is to be embraced or avoided *at first sight.* These three have formed affects along with desire, which is the conscious realization of appetite. I have proposed a terminological distinction between affects and emotions and have claimed that only with certain ideas and affective aspects we could come up with emotions. This terminological distinction brings Spinoza's terms closer to contemporary understanding and shows how his framework is capable of allowing finer distinctions.

In this picture, all emotions could be modeled as ideas and affective dimensions of affects (i.e., desire, pleasure, and pain) that take place in a spectrum rather than categories. All three affects generate changes in *conatus*, but regarding their locus of control, whether their cause is internal or external to the individual, all affects and emotions can be read as shades of activity or passivity.[305] The more adequate our ideas get *overall*, the more we become adequate causes of things, which means that we are active, and, as a result, rational. This reason behind adequacy clarifies why Spinoza was both a philosopher of affection and reason (Protevi, 2012, p. 88). The two axes (positive and negative, valence and activity and passivity) gave the specific affective tone for each emotion. Each of these axes was not categorical but continuous. Desire, pleasure-pain, and active-passive dimensions take place in a spectrum that depends on the context.

In the Introduction, I have noted several important criteria for a proper emotion theory.

[305] In EIVp60, Spinoza says that "desire that arises from the pleasure or pain that is related to one or more, but not to all, parts of the body takes no account of the advantage of the whole man" (2002, p. 352). Here, the inconstant nature of the passions (i.e., passive affects) seriously disrupt self-determination of the individual because she cannot act from her own nature; she becomes bounded by passions. Marshall claims that the first seventeen propositions of Part IV of the *Ethics* is best understood as this type of akrasia.

These criteria were (i) explanation of affective states and discerning them, (ii) accounting for the origin of emotions, (iii) functions of emotions, (iv) their intentional/representational structure and phenomenology, and (v) causal efficacy and normativity. Furthermore, I mentioned that (i), (ii), and (iv) were the focus of this study, although a Spinozistic framework is perfectly capable of producing satisfactory outcomes for (iii) and (v). It can be claimed that Spinoza's philosophical project is more amenable to (iii) and (v). Especially, (iii) is responded to successfully in Part V of *Ethics*. The following quote expresses the same idea:

> Spinoza's motive in seeking to gain understanding of the mind was not that of a disinterested philosophical or scientific inquirer. On the contrary, his efforts to understand our cognitive powers were rooted in his conviction that full knowledge of one's own mind is identical with the attainment of 'beatitude'. (Cook, 1990, p. 82)

Again, Cook also states that:

> Two factors help to explain Spinoza's emphasis upon functional descriptions of the bodily states whose ideas constitute the mind. First, and most obviously, his knowledge of the fine structure of physiology was primitive at best…Secondly, his primary purpose was therapeutic, and for this purpose he needed states which corresponded neatly with the passions as commonly referred to in 'folk-psychology'. (Cook, 1990, p. 86)

Some recent works focus on these aspects both from cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis perspectives (see Miller, 2022).[306] However, these are topics for another study, and each deserves wholesome attention.[307] Along with their functions/effects on well-being and therapy, emotions also have epistemic values and multiple effects on triggering actions.[308] I omitted these domains from this current

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[306] One curious work should be mentioned. Some modern psychoanalysis literature follow the same steps of what we have been elaborating on in this work. A Lacanian psychoanalysis is heavily against a purely cognitive understanding of affects. For Lacan, in order to elaborate affect, "one must include the body" (Soler, 2016, p. 51). Soler furthers that Lacanian hypothesis entails "signifier affects something other than itself: it affects the bodily individual that is thereby made into a subject" (2016, p. 53).

[307] It should also be reminded that affects and emotions are the hubs for these further discussions that had to be reserved for future studies. For example, affects and his ethical projects are so close that it is hard to analyze one without touching on the other. In EIVp8, he says "knowledge [*cognitio*] of good and evil is itself an affect of joy or sadness insofar as we are conscious [*sumus conscii*] of it". In terms of good and evil, Spinoza has a very practical criteria; good consists of what is beneficial for us and bad consists of what is harmful to us. This knowledge is also expressed as pleasure or pain.

[308] For more information on the relation between epistemic values and emotions see Brun & Kuenzle, 2008; De Sousa, 2008; Elgin, 2008; Morton, 2010; Tanesini, 2008; Wild, 2008. And for more information on actions (especially social actions) and emotions see Della Rocca, 2020; Fischer &

study, but they can be evaluated for future Spinozistic studies.

In response to (i), the main related chapter was Chapter 6. I did not totally deny that Spinoza's philosophy has cognitivist tendencies (which can be identified as weak cognitivism). In this chapter, I have revealed how different affective states can be discerned rather than demonstrating and classifying each emotion. In response to (ii), we have looked at Spinoza's ontology and how his monistic ontology of substance and plurality of modes (mainly including bodies) constitute affects and emotions in Chapter 4. Lastly, for (iv), the central figures were ideas. Here, I streamlined Spinoza's representational understanding of ideas and explicated how it explained the intentionality problem of the noncognitive/affective theories. This concern is addressed largely in Chapter 5.

Given the current intricacy of contemporary theories of emotion, we can still ask why Spinoza. From a historical standpoint, he is among the first proponents in the western philosophical tradition to underline the role of emotions and desire in (rational) decision-making processes (Lloyd, 1998, p. 38). His revisionist metaphysics forces us to grapple with novel definitions for older concepts and ideas.[309] We can give examples from his novel descriptions of substance, attributes, modes, God, emotions, and many others. With supplementary distinctions and modifications, we see that the Spinozistic framework can fare in a contemporary world of emotion theories if the general aim is to go beyond the cognitive and noncognitive duality. England expressed in succinctly:

> All affects constitute a response to changes in our sociocultural and natural surroundings that are relevant to the central concern we have to persist and flourish, and as they are manifested in every aspect of our psychophysical existence, there is great heterogeneity in the particular form they take. However, since this is not metaphysically significant under the Spinozist view,

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Manstead, 2008; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Fischer & van Kleef, 2010; Wilutzky, 2015; Zhu & Thagard, 2002.

[309] Some thinkers argue that Spinoza was one of the as we set our understanding apart from the usual folk psychological understanding (which is consonant with the lineage starting from Sellars and continuing through Churchland) and use of concepts. "We feel threatened by the prospect of an understanding of human beings and, more specifically, of ourselves, which makes no mention of our hopes and dreams , our struggles and conquests, our efforts, intentions, goals and purposes" (Cook, 1986, p. 208).

> contrary to the splitself view, emotions need not be construed primarily as a judgment, or cognition, or bodily process, but as a psychosomatic registering of the most personally salient aspects of our natural and sociocultural environment that motivates us to respond in an appropriate manner. (England, 2018, p. 6)

The unitary view under this body and mind continuum is that they *all* register the changes in the organism and environment to different extents of complexity. According to England, for this reason, the Spinozist approach offers a unified theory of emotions to overcome the mind-body (and thus cognitive-noncognitive) distinction (England, 2018, p. 6). Here, the elastic strategy is used for both cognitive and noncognitive sides. This view can "incorporate Solomon's notion of emotions as judgments and also the broader cognitivist views, as well as Prinz's theory of emotions as bodily appraisals and other noncognitivist approaches" (England, 2018, p. 7). Because a Spinozistic approach to emotions is based on basic affective elements (desire, pleasure, and pain), they also track salient changes in an individual organism and its environment, which are important for survival and well-being. This Spinozistic framework also succeeds in accommodating cognitive activities and emotions. Thus, a Spinozistic approach melts both elastic and hidden unity strategies in a single pot because he stretches the definition of cognition to a certain extent so that a strong separation between them is avoided (i.e., elastic strategy) and appeals to a broad and encompassing conceptualization of emotion which links diverse phenomena such as social and primitive emotions (i.e., hidden unity). Also, England reminds us that "Obviously, precise definitions of emotion are important, but if these impose, rather than reveal, a separation of 'higher' and 'lower' biological processes, then scientific rigor will not illuminate the emotion debate but simply further entrench the problematic cognitive and noncognitive divide" (England, 2018, p. 8).

All in all affects and emotions are ubiquitous and important aspects of our lives. It can even be claimed to give color to our experiences, lives, and values. The attempts to understand them entail, at least, a theoretical grasp rather than generating a comprehensive classification of each affective state. A Spinozistic framework can respond to the drawbacks mentioned above in contemporary emotions theories. Moreover, even if some solutions among contemporary theories exist, especially regarding the cognitive and noncognitive divide, a Spinozistic intervention would

benefit the whole field with a simpler and more elegant look at emotions and how the cognitive and noncognitive spectrum can be understood.

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APPENDICES

A. COMPLETE LIST OF CRITERIA LIST FOR A PROPER THEORY OF EMOTIONS

In looking at criteria for a proper theory of emotion, we saw that there are mostly disagreements between cognitive and noncognitive emotion theories. Although cognitive and affective camps seem to assert mutually exclusive components in terms of constitutive factors, there might be some room for agreement in causal factors. Scarantino has one list of agreements between emotion theorists, and it is as follows:

> The majority of emotion theorists currently agree that (1) emotion episodes involve, at least in prototypical cases, a set of expressive, behavioral, physiological and phenomenological features diagnostic of emotions; (2) each diagnostic feature has a range of variability; (3) evolutionary explanations can be given for at least some emotions and/or their components; (4) most aspects of emotions are affected by sociocultural factors; (5) the physical seat of emotions is the brain; (6) emotions motivate actions in distinctive ways; (7) emotions are generally object-directed; (8) emotions have a cognitive basis, consisting of other mental states they presuppose (e.g. memories, perceptions, etc.); (9) emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate with respect to their objects; (10) there are different forms of appropriateness for emotions (e.g., epistemic, moral, prudential); (11) appraisals can help differentiate emotions; (12) appraisals range from primitive to sophisticated forms of information processing; (13) at least some emotions are present in infants and animals; (14) emotions can be in tension with our reflective judgments; and (15) emotions play a functional role in a variety of domains (e.g., rational deliberation, morality, aesthetics).[310] (Scarantino, 2016, pp. 36–37)

As we can see, the explanatory issues and variability in terms of different components (1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 11), consequences and appropriateness (9, 10), origins (5, 13), intentionality and effects (6, 7, 12, 14, 15) as main concerns. Although Scarantino sees the list as a list of agreements, we could read it as an overlap of concerns. Along with

[310] For others such as Izard, still there is little consensus about what emotions are (2010, p. 363). Also, there is a moderate support for abondoning the term emotion (2010, pp. 367–368). His offer to solve is to improve the semantic precision of emotion (Izard, 2010, p. 368).

this overlap, we can think of a condensed criteria list of a proper theory of emotions, which also takes place in the Introduction. The list was the following.

i. Definitions, distinctions, and explanatory issues (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 18, 19, 20, 21, 27, 28, 29, 30)
ii. Origins and development (6, 8, 9, 22, 25)
iii. Functions, consequences, and their relationship to well-being (7, 17, 23)
iv. Intentionality, phenomenology, and representation (10, 11, 12, 15, 26)
v. Elicitation, causal contexts, and normativity (13, 14, 16, 24)

As much as we need a reason for an emotion theory, we also have to provide a list of what we request from an account of emotion. The following is the comprehensive list whose items correspond to the previous condensed list.

1) It has to explain diversity in duration so that an emotion theory can account for classes of phenomena, from emotional experience to emotional disturbance (J. Deonna et al., 2015, p. 194; Goldie, 2007, p. 1).
2) It has to explain diversity in intensity or focus, which, for instance, ranges from highly focused contempt to long-ranging despair (Goldie, 2007, p. 1).
3) It has to explain diversity in emotional complexity. Take the surprise at a sudden noise, which obviously takes place on the bottom parts of an emotional sophistication scale and highly elaborate experience such as feeling guilty at delight at making fun of a specific position (Goldie, 2007, p. 1).
4) It has to explain diversity at the level at which it is realized. Imagine sensations that arise from disgust at a rotting corpse on the one hand and physiological realization of very cerebral anger at the erosion of civil rights on the other (Goldie, 2007, p. 2; Moors, 2010, pp. 6–8). It is also related to emotional specificity (Lazarus, 1991, p. 35).
5) It has to account for the level of consciousness involved in manifesting that emotion (Goldie, 2007, p. 2; Lazarus, 1991, p. 35). By level of consciousness, what is meant is conscious deliberation or high cognition involved in emotion.
6) It has to provide a picture of the developmental process of emotions. Are these emotions slowly growing or suddenly bursting? (Goldie, 2007, p. 2). Are there any universal emotions? Does culture play a role in forming emotions? (J. Deonna et al., 2015, p. 193)

7) It has to explain to what degree it promotes action, whether they are standard or not in the Jamesian sense. They can be classified as immediate uncontrollable actions on the one hand and intellectual, aesthetic or refined emotions on the other (J. Deonna et al., 2015, p. 193; Goldie, 2007, p. 2).

8) It has to form an evolutionary account and thus serve to distinguish whether they are universal or not (Goldie, 2007, p. 3; Lazarus, 1991, p. 35; Prinz, 2004, p. 20).

9) It has to do justice to various creatures' emotions and should not leave them outside (Goldie, 2007, p. 3). This point directly correlates with Deigh and Prinz's observations (Deigh, 1994, pp. 839–842; Prinz, 2003, pp. 77–78).

10) It has to explain the extent and spectrum of intentional structure or intentionality of emotions. Questions include whether emotions have propositional content, objects (formal or particular), conceptual structure, or ineffable nature (J. Deonna et al., 2015, p. 193; Goldie, 2007, p. 3).

11) It has to accommodate under which circumstances feelings or phenomenology need to be considered (Goldie, 2007, p. 4; Prinz, 2004, p. 20).

12) It has to illuminate the connection between emotions and importance, which are valuable to us. It has to show why, in a sense, specific events matter to us (Goldie, 2007, p. 5).

13) It has to show us how our emotions are linked to justifications or reasons that we provide (Goldie, 2007, p. 5).

14) It has to explain to what extent we are responsible for our emotions (Goldie, 2007, pp. 5–6).

15) It has to answer whether we can think of emotions as discrete categories such as anger, guilt, shame, or a set of factor dimensions across spectrums. Along with it, differences between positive and negative emotions need to be integrated into any new emotion theory (Lazarus, 1991, p. 35; Moors, 2010, p. 5; Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 18).

16) It has to accommodate the conditions under which emotions are reliably elicited (Moors, 2010, pp. 6–8).

17) It has to clarify the functions of emotions and how these are functionally interrelated (Forgas, 2008; Lazarus, 1991, p. 45; Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 51).

18) It has to bridge the gap between folk psychological theory and scientific theory.

19) It has to define an emotion (Lazarus, 1991, p. 35).

20) It has to point out how we can distinguish emotion from non-emotion (Lazarus, 1991, p. 35; Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 17).

21) A decent theory of emotion should articulate the relationship between emotion, motivation, and cognition. To what extent do emotion, motivation, and cognition affect each other, and can they be differentiated? The cognition and emotion debate lies at this point (Lazarus, 1991, p. 35). The same is addressed in Prinz (2004, p. 20).

22) It has to account for emotional development and the sources behind the influence (Lazarus, 1991, p. 35).

23) It should highlight emotions' role in subjective well-being, social functioning, etc., as well as its use in psychotherapy and diagnosing emotional disorders (Lazarus, 1991, p. 36; Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 18). In addition to that, we may ask how emotions are related to their objects and what their relation to values is. How can they best be characterized in psychological terms (J. Deonna et al., 2015, p. 193)?

24) It has to explain why certain emotions arise in specific conditions but not others (Johnson, n.d.).

25) It has to provide a satisfactory answer to why emotions are expressed in a certain way but not others and also why there are emotions at all (Johnson, n.d.; Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 17).

26) It has to clarify what they represent if they represent anything (Prinz, 2004, pp. 19–20).

27) It has to respond to whether emotions have multiple parts or are irreducible (Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 17; Prinz, 2004, pp. 19–20).

28) It has to answer how many emotions and their relationship with each other (Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 18).

29) It has to provide criteria to distinguish and understand the differences between emotions and other similar affective phenomena such as moods and temperament. (Power & Dalgleish, 2008, p. 18). Deonna, Tappolet, and Teroni also express this concern. They say, "how different are emotions from moods, sensations, and affective dispositions?" What are the differences between mental disposition and episodes, experiences and other mental states, and intentional and nonintentional states? (J. Deonna et al., 2015, p. 193).

30) It has to explain how emotions function in interpersonal and communicational dimensions to incorporate them into a broader natural and social view (Garber, 2017,

pp. 22–23). This movement requires incorporating unformalizable and culture-sensitive folk theorization (Oatley, 1992, p. 5).

Of course, not any single theory is expected to satisfy all of these criteria. At least I can enumerate some points that drive toward a more complete, more accurate emotion theory. Apart from Solomon's response to why we need an understanding concerning emotions, there are still reasons that make investigating this worthwhile since, at some of the following crucial points, most contemporary emotion theories fall short.

B. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Yaylım, Berk
Nationality:
Date and Place of Birth:
Marital Status:
Phone:
Email:

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
PhD	METU Philosophy	2022
MA	METU Philosophy	2015
BS	METU Sociology	2011
BA	METU Philosophy	2010
High School	Ankara Atatürk Anadolu High School, Ankara	2005

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2014- Present	METU Philosophy Department	Research Assistant

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Intermediate German, Beginner Spanish, Beginner Latin

PUBLICATIONS

Tümkaya, S. & Yaylım, B. Eleyici Materyalizm Zihnin Tüm İçeriğini Elemeyi Mi Önerir? Felsefe Dünyası 2017/Kış Sayı: 66 ISSN 1301-0875

PRESENTATIONS

Biliş/Duygu Tartışması Üzerine - Ankara Üniversitesi DTCF Felsefe Öğrencileri Kollokyumu. 20 Nisan 2018
Yirminci Yüzyılda Duygu Teorileri: Bilişsel ve Bedensel - 3. Uluslararası Felsefe,

Eğitim, Sanat ve Bilim Tarihi Sempozyumu - Giresun. 10-13 Ekim 2018

Doğal Bir Tür Olarak Duygular - 4. Uluslararası Felsefe, Eğitim, Sanat ve Bilim Tarihi Sempozyumu - Muğla (Online). 14-18 Nisan 2021

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Assisted Courses
Aesthetics
Introduction to Philosophy I
Introduction to Philosophy II
Medieval Philosophy
Contemporary Philosophy I
History of 17th and 18th Century Philosophy I
Existential Philosophy
Introduction to Ancient Philosophy I
Introduction to Ancient Philosophy II
Philosophy of Morality and Beyond
Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy

PROFESSIONAL SERVICE

Organizing Commitee
ODTÜ Metafelsefe Kongresi
ODTÜ Lisans Kongreleri

MEMBERSHIPS

Türkiye Spinoza Çevresi (Spinoza Circle in Turkey)
North American Spinoza Society

C. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

İster günlük yaşamda ister felsefi veya bilimsel bir ortamda düşünün, duygular hayatımızın temel yönlerinden biridir. Her yerde bulunurlar, ancak açıklanması da zordur. Bununla birlikte, önemine ve yaygınlığına rağmen, ya gözetimsizdirler ya da en iyi ihtimalle ikincil sayılırlar. Stocker doktora ve doktora sonrası çalışmalarında duygu teorileri üzerinde çalışan Bücher ile yaptığı konuşmalardan birini anlatıyor. Bücher'e göre duyguların önemini tartışmaya gerek bile yoktur. Yaygın ve sezgisel olarak önemli olduğundan, duyguları incelemenin açık nedeni budur. Psikoloji, klinik sinirbilim, psikanaliz, sanatsal alanlar (resim, müzik ve sinema gibi) ve iletişim teorilerinden başlayarak, duygu teorilerinin kullanımı yaygındır ve tüm bu alanlar, iyi işlemesi için bir tür duygu teorisini varsayar. Öyle ki duyguların anlaşılmasında ufak bir değişiklik bu disiplinlerde domino etkisi yaratabilir. Duyguların doğru bir şekilde anlaşılması bizi nereye götürür? Bir bakıma, duygular açıkça çok önemli ama aynı zamanda anlaşılması zordur; bunlar hayatımızın neredeyse her yönünü kaplayan deneyimlerimizin kaçınılmaz boyutlarıdır.

Duyguların tanımı ve doğası üzerine her zaman devam eden bir tartışma olmuştur. Bu tezin amacı için, böylesine geniş ve çok yönlü bir fenomeni incelerken yalnızca kesişen değil, aynı zamanda diğer varsayımların altında yatan temel ve görünür sorulardan birine odaklanacağım. Bu soru, duyguların ne olduğuyla ilgilidir ve özellikle çağdaş duygu felsefesinde, iki karşıt konumu gösterir. Bu kampların pek çok adı vardır, ancak bunlar eş-gönderimsel veya birlikte-kapsamlıdır: bilişsel-bilişsel-olmayan, bilişsel-duygusal, bilişsel-bedensel/somatik, bilişsel-bedensel (elbette tüm bu ikilikler tamamen aynı anlama gelmez, ancak atıfta bulunacağım bağlamda) onlar için aynıdır). Bilişsel olmayancılıkla, (1) duygusal bir tepkiyi ortaya çıkarmak için bilişin gerekli olduğunu reddeden ve (2) çoğu duygulanım halinin yanı sıra duyguların farklı gelişim yolları veya müdahalelerdir. Bilişsel kuramlar için ise bilişler, değerlendirmeler, düşünceler ya da yargılar sadece gerekli değil, aynı zamanda yeterlidir. Aralarındaki mevcut gerilimi duygu teorileri kapsamında çözmek için

alternatif bir çerçeve bulmaya çalışacağım. Neden böyle bir gerilim var diye sorulabilir. Hangi bakış açısına sahip olursanız olun, her zaman bir uzlaşma vardır ve bunun başka bir yolu yok gibi görünüyor. Ancak, duygulara ne zaman bakmamız gerekiyorsa, bilişselci ya da duygulanımcı ya da bedensel bir perspektiften bakıldığında, temel ancak tatmin edilmemiş bir unsur var gibi görünüyor. Prinz'e göre duyguların anlamlı, mantığa duyarlı ve amaçlı olması, bilişsel olmaları gerektiğini düşünülür. Öte yandan, bazı duygular anlamsız, rasyonel, kasıtsız kaynaklardan kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu, tam tersini, yani en azından bazı duyguların bilişsel olmadığını gösterir. Yine de bu duygular bizim için anlamlı görünüyor.O zaman anlamlılığın biliş olmadan gerçekleşebileceği sonucunu doğuracaktır. Prinz, bu gerilimi şu sözlerle özetlediği duygu sorunu olarak adlandırır: Bilişsel olmayan teoriler bize çok az bilgi verirken, bunun yanında bedensel değişimleri ifade eder. Diğer tarafta bilişsel teoriler bize çok fazla bilgi verir ancak bedensel değişimler konusunda eksik kalır. Prinz'e göre buna duygu problemi denir. Önceki, bilişsel olmayan durumlar, temsilleri veya kasıtlılığı göz ardı eder; ikincisi, bilişsel durumlar, sağduyumuza göre bedensel değişimler ve bunların nerelerde yaşandığı gibi duygusal fenomenlerin bazı temel yönlerinden yoksundur.

Böylesi bir bilişsellik ve bilişsel olmayan ayrımı kıskacında Spinoza'yı anmak akla tarihler arasındaki uçurumun ne kadar problem yaratabileceği ile ilgili soru yaratır. Bu ilişkinin problemli ve temellendirilmediği durumlarda anakronizme düşme riski vardır. Ben bu çalışma içerisinde dört argüman sundum. Bunlar hermeneutik okuma, pragmatik bakış, felsefe tarihinde benzerlerinin olması ve "duygu" kelimesinin tarihsellik içerisinde açıklanması şeklinde ilerliyor.

Bu çalışmanın amacının genel kapsamı, herhangi bir duygu çalışmasının gerektireceği gibi oldukça geniştir. Bunun nedeni, içinde basit bir duyumsamadan karmaşık ve ifade edilmesi zor bir hisse kadar uzanan heterojenliği açıklamanın zorluğudur. Amacım, duyguları açıklamak için değerlendirmelerin ve yargılamaların mı yoksa bedenin mi temel olduğu etrafında dönen tartışmalara bir çözüm bulmak. Bu yüzden, benim yönlendirici sorularım, genel olarak duygusal fenomenleri açıklamaya çalışırken ortaya çıkan sorulardır (örneğin, bu teori/perspektifin duyguların hangi yönlerini içerdiği veya dışarıda bıraktığı gibi). Benim kanaatim, Spinoza'nın metinlerinin

(özellikle *Etik*'in) duyguların doğasını daha iyi bir anlayış için hakkında sorulan soruları yanıtlama potansiyeline sahip olduğudur. Yine de böyle bir çalışmadan ne elde edilebileceği sorgulanabilir. Deneyimsel ve günlük dağarcığımızın bir parçası olarak duyguların her yerde olduğunu söylemek, onu önemli bir konunun adayları arasına sokmak için yeterli olmayabilir; bunun yerine duyguların nelere yol açtığına bakılması gerekebilir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında duygular, biliş gücümüzü artırmak veya engellemek gibi belirli şeyler yapar. Bir duygu teorisinin gerekliliği veya yararlılığı üzerine kafa yormak yararlı olabilir ve Solomon gibi felsefeciler de bunun üzerine oldukça yoğun biçimde yazmışlardır. Ancak buradaki amacım bu etkilerin kendisinden ziyade duygu kuramının nasıl mümkün olduğuna dair düşünmektir.

Tezde teorik bakış açısına uygun olacak biçimde bazen kavramsal analiz bazen de yeniden yorumlama ve sentetik bir bakışı kullandım. Her soruna uygun çözünürlükte bir bakış gerektiğinden ben de burada fizyolojik detaylara girmekten öte işlevsel ve kuramsal açıdan bir incelemeyi uygulamaya çalıştım. Bu çalışmada duyguların yerini, hangi alanların ve yöntemlerin önemli olacağını belirttiğim için, her bölümde ele alınan belirli noktaları burada veriyorum. Bu giriş bölümünde, duygu ve duygu teorilerinin önemini vurguladım. Ayrıca, diğer isimlerle birlikte, duygu teorilerinde bilişsel ve duyuşsal olan temel bir gerilimi ele aldım. Spinoza'nın çerçevesi bu gerilimi çözecek ve ek kavram ve yöntemler sunmadan hem bilişsel öğeleri (örneğin niyet gibi) hem de bedensel öğeleri (iç organlarda meydana gelen değişimler gibi) getiren duygular için daha zarif bir ontoloji getirecektir. Giriş bölümünün kriterler ve istenen şeylerin olduğu kısmında, çağdaş ve modern duygu çalışmaları teorisinden uygun bir duygu teorisi için çok sayıda kriterden bahsettim. Her iki teorinin de onlara tatmin edici bir şekilde cevap veremeyeceği ve Spinoza'nın bir istisna olmadığı kabul edilmelidir. Ama burada en önemlilerinden bazılarını seçerek bunlara Spinozacı bir kavramsal çerçevenin rahatlıkla cevap verebileceğini iddia ettim. Bunlar duygusal kavramların açıklanması ve aralarındaki ayrımların ortaya koyulabilmesi, duyguların çıkış noktasına dair bir açıklama sunabilmesi ve yönelimselliğe/temsiliyete bir açıklama getirebilmiş olmasıdır. Bu bölümün son kısmında ise tarihe bir göz atarak "duygu" ve "duygu" kelimelerini çok kısaca açıklamayı amaçladım. Bu aynı zamanda anakronizme karşı bir savunma olarak da okunabilir çünkü hala bir süreklilik vardır. İkinci bölümde, daha önce duygular hakkında fikir ve görüşler olmasına rağmen hem

felsefede hem de psikolojide modern duygu teorilerinin çıkış noktası olan James'in duygu anlayışını ve James-Lange teorisini tanıttım. En çok yönelimsellik sorunu etrafında dönen eleştirisini ve savunmasını dahil ettim (yani, James-Lange teorisi yönelimsellikten yoksundur). Bölüm 3'te ilk olarak (James-Lange'e karşı) gerici duygu teorilerinin ilk koluna odaklandım. Psikolojideki en ayrıntılı girişimleri (değerlendirme teorileri) inceledikten sonra, çağdaş duygu teorileri arasında somutlaşan teorilere geçtim. Önceki teorilerde en çok eksik olan şeyler (yönelimsellik ve değerlendirme gibi) birleştirmeye çalıştıkça, daha başarılı ama aynı zamanda daha karmaşık hale gelirler. Dördüncü bölümde, odak noktası Spinoza'nın ontolojisine ve ontolojisindeki üç ana kavrama çevrilmiştir. Doğanın bir ifadesi olan insan doğası görüşünün yanı sıra, onun ontolojisi önemlidir, çünkü önce uzamlı ve düşünen sıfatlar açısından, daha sonra beden ve zihin açısından bilişsel ve bilişsel olmayan arasındaki boşluğu doldurmak için zemin hazırlar. Bu hareket sadece Kartezyen görüşün basit ama katmanlı bir ontolojiyle de üstesinden gelir. Beşinci bölümde, Spinoza'nın bir ifade, bir kip olarak özünden kaynaklanan fikirler teorisine odaklandım. Burada onun (bir fikir olan) zihin anlayışı da açıklanmıştır. Çoğunlukla bu bölümün son bölümünde, yönelimsellik, ilgililik ve hakkındalığın nasıl ele alındığını görebilmemiz için fikirlerin ve zihinlerin temsili özelliğini hedefledim. Ancak bu onu bir duygu kuramı içine yerleştirmek için yeterli değildir. Altıncı bölümde, onun fikirlere ilişkin temsili bakış açısının, içeriğinden ayrı olarak her bir fikrin ifade edici ve içeriksel gücüyle birlikte nasıl farklı bir bilişselcilik kavrayışı oluşturduğunu göstermeye çalıştım. Bu bölümün kısımları arasında, Spinoza'nın temel/ilkel duygularının daha karmaşık duyguları modellemek için duygusal boyutlar olarak yorumlandığı daha incelikli bir okuma önermeye çalıştım. Bu bağlamda, bu bölüm fikir, afekt, conatus ve etkinlik arasındaki ilişkinin nasıl çözülebileceğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu okumanın sonucu, her ikisinin de zorluklarını aşarak bilişsel ve bilişsel olmayan ayrımı ele almayı amaçlamaktadır.

Tüm bunlara bakıldığında duygu kuramları ve felsefeleri açısından Spinoza'nın ayrıcalıklı bir yeri olduğunu söylememiz mümkündür çünkü duygular üzerine doğrudan yazmıştır ve bunun dışında duyguları anlamamıza elverişli bir kavramsal çerçeveyi hali hazırda bırakmıştır. Biz de bu çerçeveyi kullanarak ve üzerine detaylandırmalar yaparak günümüz duygu kuramlarındaki bilişsel ve bilişsel olmayan

ayrımında bir çözüm getiremeye çalışabiliriz ki burada da amaçladığım budur. Duygunun ne olduğu birçok teorisyen, düşünür ve araştırmacı tarafından verilen birçok yanıta sahiptir. Başarması gereken şeylerden biri, duyguları, ruh halleri ve duygular gibi diğer duygusal durumlardan, duyumlar ve algılar gibi duygusal olmayan durumlardan ayrıştırabilmektir. Gördüğümüz gibi, tanımsal konular bile diğer fenomenlere atıfta bulunmadan cevaplanamaz. Uygun bir duygu teorisinin sayısız başka yönleri olduğunu hesaba katarsak, bunların her biri ile tamamen tatmin edilmesi daha da zordur. Dolayısıyla, uygun bir duygu teorisi için beklentilerimizi aşağı çekmek rahatsız edici olmaz. Bununla birlikte, bir duygunun ne olduğunu tanımlarken iki kısım ayırt edebiliriz. Bunlar kurucu ve nedensel parçalardır. İlk kısım, bir duygunun (veya duygusal durumun) temel kısımlarını ifade eder. Başka bir deyişle, bir duyguyu oluşturan parçalar, yalnızca duygunun tanımında zorunlu olarak yer alan parçalar veya bileşenlerdir. Öte yandan, ikinci kısım, bir duyguyu (veya duygusal bir durumu) analiz etmenin görece önemli kısımlarından biri olacaktır. Bilinmeyen bir yerde gece vaktinde yaklaşmakta olan bir uğultu sesi duyduğumuzda elbette, kalbimiz daha hızlı atmaya başlar ve zihnimiz korku dolu düşüncelerle dolar. Hatta bunları üstüne bir de paniğe kapılarak davranışlarımızda bile ciddi değişiklikler olabilir. Tüm bunların ardından oradan ayrılmazsak durumumuzun daha da kötüleşeceği değerlendirmesinde bulunabiliriz. Bunların hepsi duygusal bir olayı tanımlayabilir ama bu durumda bunlardan hangisi korkuyu tanımlar ya da onun kurucu öğesi olarak yer alır? Bu örnek bize hangi kriterlerin daha çok odaklandığını gösterir (yani, tanımsal ve açıklayıcı konular). Bu açıdan da bakıldığında, bu çalışmanın ilk kısmı (Bölüm 2 ve Bölüm 3) için temel ayrım, bilişsel ve bilişsel olmayan duygu teorileri arasındadır. Bilişsel teoriler duygunun tanımında tüm düşünce ve değerlendirmeleri içerir. Bu tür değerlendirmeler sadece duyguları ortaya çıkarmakla kalmaz, aynı zamanda onları oluşturur; yani onların kurucu öğesidir. Kalp atış hızı veya vücut sıcaklığındaki bir artış mutlaka bir duygusal sürece işaret etmez, bu nedenle bilişselciler bunları genel olarak duygusal fenomenlerde kurucu faktörler olma olasılığını göz ardı eder. Bilişsel teoriler için, değerlendirmeler veya genel olarak bilişsel etkinlik, genellikle duygusal bir dönemi hem oluşturur veya kurar hem de ortaya çıkarır. Örneğimizde, korku, yakın durumun engelleyici tehlikesine ilişkin değerlendirmelerden hem kaynaklanabilir hem de oluşturulabilir. Öte yandan bilişsel olmayan teoriler için, genel olarak, bir duygunun kurucu bileşenleri hormonlara dair değişiklikler, vücut ısısı ve kalp hızı değişiklikleri

gibi bedensel değişikliklerden oluşur. Bu teorilere göre bilişsel değerlendirmeler bir duyguyu oluşturmak için ne gereklidir ne de yeterlidir. Bilişsel olmayan teorilere göre bilişsel değerlendirmeler ya da değer biçmeler, en iyi ihtimalle, nedensel olarak alakalı olabilir ve bu da onları, durumun güvenilir bir şekilde duygusal bir olayı ortaya çıkardığını söylemek için yeterli koşullar haline getirebilir. Bu korkulu durumda, James'in ve Prinz'in teorisinde bahsedildiği gibi, nedensel bileşenin sadece bedensel değişikliklerden oluşması gerekmese de korku durumlarındaki ani ve kurucu faktör kalp atış hızındaki artış olabilir.

Daha önce bahsettiğim beş kıstasta (tanımsal ve açıklamasal meseleleri açığa kavuşturmak, duyguların çıkış noktasına dair bir açıklamada bulunmak, işlevsel ve esenlik açısından anlayış sunmak, yönelimsellik ve temsil açısından bir karşılık verebilme ve nedensellik hakkında söz söyleyebilme) tanımlamalar, duyguların çıkış noktası ve yönelimsellik ile ilgili noktalarda Spinozacı bir çerçevenin günümüz duygu kuramlarındaki problemlere açılım sağlayabileceğine dair iddialarda bulundum. Yine de diğer noktalara da Spinozacı bir çerçeve cevap sunabilmesine rağmen bunlar için ayrı ayrı çalışmalar yürütülmesi gerekmektedir.

Bazı teorisyenler için bu, duygu teorilerini aktif ve pasif ya da karmaşık ve basit temelinde ayırmanın gerekliliğini gösterebilir. Genellikle felsefe tarihinde duygular tutkular olarak alınmıştır. Çağdaş sahnede, bu iki tür perspektif bir kez daha ortaya çıkıyor. Bunun en başlıca örneği Paul Griffiths'tir. Ona göre duygular doğal türler değildir. Bu iddianın önemi, duygu kavramını katmanlaştırmasıdır, böylece daha sonraki bir çalışma, bu farklı kavramları farklı çalışma alanları içinde farklı yöntemlerle (örneğin, sosyal duygular ve doğal duygular) ele alınmasını önermesidir. Bu iddia için, bir başka deyişle, kendi bütünlüğü içinde "duygular" dediğimiz şey tek bir kategoriye sığmaz. Temel ve karmaşık gibi en az iki farklı sınıfta yer almaları daha iyidir. Bununla birlikte, duygu (ve duygulanım) sözcüğüne bağlı kalmak için yeterli neden vardır, çünkü gördüğümüz gibi, oldukça geniş bir kategori olmasına rağmen, çok fazla sapma olmaksızın tarihsel sürekliliğe sahiptirler. Aksi takdirde, duygu alt sınıfını farklı bir bakış açısıyla farklı yöntemlerle sorgulamamız gerekir ki bu da hem duygu araştırmalarının farklı alanları arasında hem de günlük yaşam ve duygu araştırmaları arasındaki bağlantının azalmasına neden olacaktır. Belki de kavramı

tamamen terk etmenin daha iyi bir fikir olduğu düşünülebilir. Bununla birlikte, yine, o zaman, duygu kelimesinin sosyal kullanımı ve mevcut araştırma, açıklama talep ediyor. Öyle görünüyor ki bir karmaşıklık olduğu için felsefi anlayışla genel kamusal söylem arasında ve bir dereceye kadar bilimsel anlayış arasında köprü kurmamız gerekiyor. Eğer duygu biliminin, geniş çapta deneyimlenen bir tür zihinsel durum için ve genel halka iletilebilecek terimlerle bir açıklama sağlaması gerekiyorsa, o zaman duygu kavramının kullanım ve karmaşıklığına, bulanıklığına ve aşırı kapsayıcılığına bağlı kalmak daha iyi olabilir. Günlük duygular dünyasında yeni bilimsel terminoloji duygusal fenomenlere karşı daha da yabancılaşmamıza sebep olabilir.

Bunun yanında bir alternatif de duygu kelimesini bir kenara bırakmaktır, ancak bu hamle duygu bilimlerinin altındaki zemini çekmek olacaktır. Bunun sonucunda afektif bilimler ve genel olarak duygu kuramları kavramsal bütünlükten ve iletişimden yoksun olacaklar ya da aynı fenomen üzerinde neden ve nasıl çalıştıkları konusunda temelsiz kalacaklardır. Böyle bir hamlenin getirileri olabilse bile afektif bilimler için daha da büyük bir tehlike oluşturabilir. O yüzden bu yolun takip edilmemesi duygu teorileri açısından daha sağlıklı olacaktır.

Ayrı ayrı hem James hem de Lange, duyguların bedensel doğasına vurgu yaptılar. Duyguların ve ruh hallerinin bedenle ilişkisi, yeni bir düşünme boyutunu başlattı. Onlardan önce duygular açısından bedenin anlamı ve önemi düzgün bir şekilde rafine edilmemiş ve eklemlenmemiştir. Ancak daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, bedensel/bilişsel olmayan teoriler bilişsel müdahalelerin gücünü söndürmez ancak bedene vurgu yaparlar, çünkü duyguların oluşumunda birincil unsur bedenden türetilebilen duygu veya durumlardır. Bu nedenle, bu gruptaki teorilerin çoğu (hepsi değil) için, herhangi bir yargı ya da değerlendirme olmasa da duygularımızın ortaya çıkabileceği şeklinde olabilir. Basitçe söylemek gerekirse, yargılar duygusal bir tepki ortaya çıkarmak için ne gerekli ne de yeterli koşullardır. Öte yandan, fizyolojik tepkilerin gerekli ve yeterli olduğunu iddia etmenin makul olup olmadığı sorulabilir. Buna ek olarak, bir yüze kan akışı mı yoksa yüzdeki bir kas grubunda (mesela *orbicularis oculi* kasında) gerilim mi diye sorabiliriz. Bilişsel olmayan teorilerin bir duygu (mesela sevinç) olup olmadığı kanısına varmak için bedensel değişimler yeterli olur. Ancak bir diğer yandan bedende bir duygu yaratan duyumsamalar, bilinçli olsun ya da olmasın, genel olarak duygusal durumlardan farklıdır ve farklı deneyimlenirler.

Zaten diğer türlü olsa duyumsamalar ile duygular arasında bir ayrım yapma ihtiyacımız olmazdı. Bu, duygu teorilerinde paradigmatik bir durumdur, çünkü bunlar, oluşum (yani, bir deneyimi duygu ya da genel olarak duygulanım olarak adlandırmak için esas olan unsurları) ve zamansal açıdan duyguları inşa ederken iki temel varlık hakkındaki ön varsayımları içerir. Bilişsel bir neden veya bedensel bir neden duyguyu tetikliyor gibi görünüyor. Ancak bir duygunun kuruluşu söz konusu olduğunda iki duygu teorisi kanadı da farklı tutumlar sergilemektedir. Yani bilişsel duygu kuramları bir değerlendirmenin ya da değer biçmenin kendisini zorunlu olarak ortaya atarken bilişsel olmayan duygu kuramları bu tür bilişsel etkinlikleri yeterli ve zorunlu olarak kabul etmeyecektir.

Walter Cannon'un ve diğerlerinin fizyolojik eleştirilerindeki ince ayrıntılara değinmeden bahsettim. Burada ayrıntılı bir tartışma bizi daha çok fizyoloji ve anatomi tarihi içerisinde duyguların açıklanmasına yönelik sorunlara yöneltecektir. O yüzden Cannon'un eleştirilerinden kısaca bahsettikten hemen sonra daha çok teorik eleştirilere yöneldim. Bunların da başında James-Lange kuramının bedensellik vurgusunun çok merkezi olmasına gelen eleştiriler yer almaktadır. En başında gelen konu bedensel duygu kuramı olarak James ve Lange'in bir his teorisi olarak, koşullar karşısındaki görüşlerimizi, algılarımızı ve düşüncelerimizi göz ardı etmesidir. Bu eleştirilere de en kapsayıcı başlık olarak yönelimselliği ele alabiliriz. Her ne kadar farklı tanımları olsa da yönelimselliği genel olarak zihinsel faaliyetlerin, bu durumda ise duyguların, güdülendiği ya da yöneldiği nesne ile analiz edilebilmesini ifade eder. Yönelimselliği içerisine yerleştiremeyen bir James-Lange kuramı ise bu açıdan çok eleştirilmiştir. Hem üzerine konuşabilme açısından hem de sağduyumuza daha yakın olması açısından bayrak bilişselci duygu kuramlarına geçmiştir diyebiliriz çünkü erken dönem bilişsel olmayan duygu kuramları yönelimselliği kendi bünyesinden açıklayabilme açısından çok geride kalmıştır.

İlk başta erken dönem bilişselci kuramların birçoğunun felsefe ve dilbilim yazını içerisindekiler tarafından beslendiğini söylemek mümkündür. Bunun sebebi kullanılan kelimelerin ve kavramların analizlerinden duyguların özsel özelliklerine ulaşabileceğinin varsayılmasıdır. Açıkçası bu varsayım dönemsel sağduyuyla da örtüşür. Ancak öncesinde duygu tanımlarında bahsettiğim zorunlu ve yeterli sebep

kavramlarını biraz daha açımakta fayda vardır, o yüzden bilişin anlamını incelemeden önce, duygularla ilgili bilişselliğin iki çeşidinden bahsetmeliyim. Her ikisi de özcü düşüncenin bir dalıdır; bununla birlikte, bu düşünce, çoğu bilişsel duygu teorisini anlamada hala yararlıdır. Bilişselciliğin zayıf ve güçlü versiyonalarını, gerekli ve yeterli bileşenleri sayesinde tanımlayabiliriz. Zayıf versiyon, her türlü bilişin gerekli olduğunu, ancak duyguların yeterli bileşenleri olmadığını gösterir. Duygu olma koşulunu yerine getirmek için davranışsal, motivasyonel, somatik/bedensel bileşenler gibi ek bileşenler eklenebilir. Bireyin kendisine yönelik olsa bile, sadece küçük düşürülmek, öfke oluşturmak veya kızdırmak için yeterli değildir. Bunun için diğer bileşenler de zorunludur ve hiçbiri tek başına yeterli değildir. Öte yandan, güçlü versiyon, her türlü bilişsel etkinliğin yeterli koşul olduğunu ve bu nedenle, yargılama, değerlendirme, yorumlama, inanç vb. etkinliklerin yer aldığı bir fenomeni duygu olarak etiketlemek için bilişsel faaliyet yeterlidir.

1980 ve sonrasında yaşanan Zajonc ve Lazarus tartışmasının ana noktasında da yine en can alıcı kısım bilişselliğin tanımı ve sınırları üzerine yapılan kısmıdır. Zajonc 1980'deki makalesinde afektif olan özelliklerin bilişsel olanlardan bağımsız olduğu, farklı bir oluşum izlediği ve bilişsel faaliyete öncelikli olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Bunun üzerine Lazarus ise tüm bu deneysel bulguları reddetmemekle birlikte bazılarındaki deneysel sorunları işaret ederek, daha da genel olarak bilişsel olanın tanımlanmasında Zajonc'un hata yaptığını savunmaktadır. Buradan hareketle bilişselliğin yeniden tanımlanması üzerine sonraki kuramlar bilişselliğe daha çok eğilmeye ve böylece bilişsel duygu kuramlarına daha çok benimsemeye başladılar. Böylece bilişselliğin bilinçdışında bile etkin olarak değerlendirilebileceği bir düşünce akımı ortaya çıktı.

Burada önceden de adını andığım güçlü bilişsel duygu kuramları arasında anılabilecek değer biçme kuramlarından bahsetmem gerekir. İlk olarak Magda Arnold tarafından ortaya atılan bu kuram belirli bir olay ya da nesne karşısında bizim ona ne değer biçtiğimiz, bizim için öneminin ne olduğunun ya da değerlendirilmesinin önemli olduğu bir değerlendirmeye dayanır. Bu tür bir değerlendirme ortada duygunun ya da ruh hali değişikliğinin var olduğunu söylemek için yeterli olacaktır. Bu değerlendirme bir kaç boyutta yapılabilir. Bunların her birine değer biçme boyutu denilir. Mesela bir

boyutta bir değer biçmenin kişinin esenliğini nasıl etkilediğine bilinçli ya da bilinç dışı bir cevap verilir. Mevcut durum eğer kişinin lehine ise bu durumda sevindirici ya da arkasından gidilebilecek (takip edilecek) duygular uyanır. Ancak bu kuramlar da duygular ya da duygulanımlar esnasında bedende eş zamanlı olarak gerçekleşen fenomenlere uzak kalır. Bu yüzden hem felsefenin içinden hem de bilimsel sahalardan bilişselliğin karşısında çeşitli kuramlar ortaya atılmıştır. Özellikle 1960lar ve sonrasında bu bedensel (somatik) kuramlar James-Lange kuramının temel varsayımına adeta bir geri dönüş yapmıştır. Bu noktada ise bir etnolog ve psikolog olan Paul Ekman'ın, bir sinirbilimci olan Antonio Damasio'nun ve bir felsefeci olan Prinz'in kuramlarına bakmak bize bir fikir verebilir. Paul Ekman'ın projesi otomatik olarak değer biçmelerin bizim sinir sistemimizce işlendiği ve bunun sonucunda farklı bedensel değişimlere yol açtığıdır. Özellikle de yüzde kendini belli eden ve ona eşlik eden bedensel değişimlerin evrensel olarak her insanda gözlemlenebileceği burada savunulur. Ekman yedi tane bu tipte evrensel duygu durumu olduğunu söyler; daha sonraki araştırmalarında bunu altıya indirir. Damasio'nın duygu kuramında, olaya verilen tepkilerin hiyerarşik bir biçimde kurgulandığı bedenin ve bedenin haritalanmasına özel bir vurgu vardır. Temel düzeyde organizmanın varlığını sürdürmek için sağlamak zorunda olduğu homeostatik dengenin dışarıdan gelen izlenimlerle gelişmesine bağlı olarak daha karmaşık ve farklı seviyelerde haritalar oluşur. Damasio'ya göre bu haritalar, duyumsamalarda olduğu gibi doğrudan bir uyaran yokluğunda bile etkinleşebilir ve adeta bir uyaran varmışçasına bir deneyime yol açabilir. Prinz bedensellik açısından Damasio'ya katılmasına rağmen onun daha farklı bir afektiflik tanımı vardır. Ona göre dışarıya verilen tepki ve olayın temsilinin içeriği hakkında bedensel bir değişim gözlenmese bile duyguyu kuran ve olayın içeriğinin temsillerinin bedensel değişimler yaptığını söyler. Bu tür çağdaş bedensel duygu kuramlarını inceledikten sonra yönelimselliği eksik bırakan bir bedensellik vurgusunun ve bedenselliği eksik bırakan bir değerlendirmeci ya da bilişsel kuramın iş göremeyeceğini göstermiş oluruz. Bu noktada farklı bir ontolojiye ve çerçeveye ihtiyacımızın var olduğunu görürüz. Spinoza'nın sunduğu felsefe, tamamıyla olmasa da çerçeve olarak, belirli değişiklikler ile birlikte bize farklı bir bakış sunacaktır. Spinoza'nın ontolojisinden bahsetmemin sebebi ise daha önceki kuramlarda uzlaşamayan noktaları uzlaştırmak için Spinoza'nın metafiziğinden gelecek cevaplara ihtiyaç duyulmasıdır.

Spinoza’nın çerçevesine giriş yaparken öncelikle yeter sebep ilkesinin sık sık kullanımından söz etmek gerekir. Kısaca YSİ olarak kısaltabileceğimizi bu ilke görünmese bile, şeylerin meydana gelmesinin veya olayların meydana gelmesinin bir nedeni olması gerektiğinde direten ilkeye verilen isimdir. Kısaca her olayın ilkesel olarak bir açıklamasının olmasını ve başka bir deyişle, YSİ’ye göre henüz bir cevabımız olmasa bile, olayların bir nedeni olduğunu varsaymalıyız. Nedeni olduğunu varsaymak ise bu olayı, nesneyi ya da olaylar örgüsünü anlaşılabilir kılar ve anlaşılabilirlik için henüz anlaşılmış olması zorunlu değildir. Onun yerine ilkesel olarak ve insan merkezli olmayan bir biçimde anlaşılabilirliği savunarak Spinoza’nın dünyasının anlaşılabilirlike dolu olduğunu görebiliriz.

YSİ ayrıca Spinoza'nın tek anlamlı olmasına izin verir. Tek anlamlılık aynı şeyin/kavramın farklı anlamları veya kullanımları olmadığı anlamına gelir. Tek anlamlılık felsefe tarihinde sıklıkla Duns Scotus ile ilişkilendirilir ve esas olarak Tanrı'nın özelliklerinin aynı şeylere/kavramlara atıfta bulunduğunu açıklama iddiasındadır. Duns Scotus, varlığın ve mutlak mükemmelliğin kavramlarla açıklanmaya çalışıldığında Tanrı ve yaratıklarda aynı biçimde ve tek anlamlı anlamda yüklenebileceğini savunur ve böylece tam bir tek anlamlı varlık açıklamasını kabul etmeye başlar. YSİ merceğinden, derece farklarından ayrı olarak, Tanrı'nın özelliklerini ve geri kalanın özelliklerini ayırt etmek için hiçbir neden olmazdı. Dolayısıyla, YSİ uyguladığımızda Tanrı ve diğer yaratıklar arasındaki sıfatlar sadece ve sadece derecesel olarak birbirinden ayrılabilir. Bu açıdan, göreceğimiz gibi tez töz ve içkinlik düşünüşü içerisinde tek anlamlılığı savunmak kaçınılmazdır. Örneğin, doğa yasalarını göz önünde bulundurduğumuzda, ne zaman bağdaşmayan yasaların çatallandığını veya kavramların belirsiz kullanımını gördüğümüzde daha fazla araştırmamız gerekir. Bu tür ipuçları bize daha derin bir bakış açısı, daha derin bir yasa veya model olduğunu ve geri kalanın tezahürler olduğunu gösterir.

Böylece YSİ kullanımıyla, doğalcılık, rasyonalizm, tekanlamlılık ve içkinlik tek bir paket halinde gelir. Ardından bunu aklımızda tutarak Spinoza’nın üç temel felsefi kavramına giriş yaparız. Bunlar töz, sıfat ve kiptir. Spinoza için töz, kendinde var olan ve kendisi vasıtasıyla anlaşılabilen şeydir (Spinoza için var olmak ve kavranılabilir olmak—anlaşılmak ya da anlaşılmış olmak değil—bir ve aynı şeydir). Spinoza’ya

göre töz sadece aynı türden bir başka şey tarafından sınırlandırılabilir ancak onun ayrışabilmesi için gereken farklılıklar (sıfat ve kipler) töze ardıl olacağından kendisi türünden bir başka şeyden ayrılma olasılığı yoktur. Burada YSİ'ni kullanarak tek töz olması gerektiği sonucu ile birlikte her şeyin aslında aynı tözün doğasında olduğunu ve bu tözün sonsuz olduğu sonucu çıkar. Sıfatlar ise tözün kavranılabilme yollarıdır. Bu noktada öznel ve nesnel yorumlamalar mümkündür ancak Spinoza yazınında nesnel yorumlar daha ön planda yer almaktadır. Öznel yoruma göre sıfatlar bir algılayanın algısına bağlı olarak değişebilir ancak nesnel yoruma göre sıfatlar, her ne kadar Spinoza tarafından kavranılabilme yolları olarak tanımlansalar da, aslında tözün var olma biçimleridir. Yani, nesnel yoruma göre, tözün belirli bir biçimde kavranılması onun belirli bir biçimde var olması demektir. Spinoza'nın açıklamasına göre töz ile Tanrı'dan aynı şeyi anlar ve tekçi (monistik) bir töz anlayışını benimser. Sıfat ise tözün farklı açılardan algılanmasının her birine verilen isimdir. Spinoza, sıfatı "aklın bir tözün özünü oluşturan olarak algıladığı şey" olarak tanımlar. Tözün mahiyetini ancak sıfatlar vasıtasıyla anlayabiliriz. Sorabileceğimiz bir soru da şudur. Bir sıfat gerçekten tözün özünü mü oluşturuyor yoksa tözün anlaşılırlığının sadece bir yolu mudur? Bunun bir cevabı, bakış açıları arasında ayrım yapmaktır. Biri töz açısından, diğeri ise sıfatlar açısından. Töz açısından öz tektir ve başka bakış açılarına dönüştürülebilir. Ancak sıfatlar açısından özler gerçekten farklıdır. Kiplere geldiğimizde felsefe tarihinde kiplerin kullanımından çok daha değişik bir tanımlama ve kullanımla karşılaşırız. EIdef5'te resmi bir tanım yapılır: "Kip ile bir tözün etkilerini veya başka bir maddede bulunan ve onun da tasarlandığını anlıyorum" . Kiplerin tözün duygulanımları olduğu için onların da tözde olduklarını çıkarabiliriz. Yani kipler bağımsız varlıklar değil, sadece töze bağımlı olan durumlardır. Spinoza, *Etik*'in başlarında bir kipin ne olduğu hakkında pek fazla açıklama yapmaz, ancak okuyucu ilerledikçe, bir kipin bazı özelliklerini detaylandırmaya devam eder.

İşte insanların her biri bir kiptir yani tözün dışavurumunun ya da ifadesinin sonlu ve belirli parçalarıdır. İnsan doğası ise Kartezyen görüştekinin aksine özgür ve sınırsız bir irade ile açıklanamaz. Onun yerine Spinoza'da sınırlı ve anlayış ile özdeş olan bir irade kavramı hakimdir. Aynı zamanda irade kavramının çıktığı anlayış bizi onun nasıl bir tür fikir kuramı olduğu konusunda da bilgilendirir çünkü ona göre, aslında zihin bir fikirdir ve daha az kapsamlı fikirler tarafından oluşturulan daha kapsamlı

fikirlerden biri olan zihin tüm fikirlerin olduğu bir içkinlik düzleminde doğal etkileşimler sonucunda oluşmuştur.

Fikirleri ve zihinleri incelemeye başlamadan önce her ikisinin de bir kip olduğunu belirtmekte fayda vardır. *Etik* Bölüm 2'de zihnin doğası ve kökenine odaklanılır. Bu mutlaka insan zihnine veya insan doğasına atıfta bulunmaz. Spionoza, genel olarak zihnin ne olduğunu yanıtlamaya çalışır. Ancak Spinoza için ne genel olarak zihin ne de özel olarak insan zihni verilidir; zihnin belirli kurucu unsurları vardır. Bunlar fikirlerdir, ancak Spinoza'nın ikinci bölümün başında tanımladığı biraz farklı bir zihin görüşü vardır. Burada fikrin zihin tarafından çıkarılmasına rağmen aslında zihnin de bir fikir olduğu tekrar vurgulanır. Ancak fikirler durağan bir algıdan ziyade kavrayışlar olarak tanımlanır. Yani, daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, kipler faaliyetlerdir ve zihinler kipler olduğu için zihin de faaliyetlerdir. Esas olarak vurgulanmaya çalışılan şey, fikirlerin pasif doğasından ziyade aktif doğasıdır. Nedir o aktivite peki? Spinoza burada daha da derin bir noktaya doğru ilerler gibi duruyor. Etkinlik, maddenin belirli bir kip aracılığıyla açılmasıdır. Spinoza'nın ontolojisinin dinamik doğası, ilk bölümde ve belirtildiği gibi Mektup 83'te düşünülebilir. Burada hem uzamsal hem de düşünsel sıfatların aslında içsel olarak dinamik olduğu söylenir.

Fikirler upuygun olan ve olmayanlar olarak ikiye ayrılır. Yeterlilik en az iki anlamda kullanılır. Birincisi, Spinoza'nın nedenler ve özlerle ilgili olarak yeterlilikten bahsetmesidir. İlk yazılarında bile uygun bir özü belirtmek için yeterlilik terimini kullanır. Oysa onun epistemolojisi açısından nedensel yeterliliği de ifade edebilir. Aslında her ikisi de nesnenin ilişkisini hem onun iç parçalarıyla hem de genel nedensel bağ içinde konumlandırmayı gerektirir. Bu gerekliliği yerine getirmek için Spinoza, akıl gibi farklı yetilere sahip olmadığımızı düşünür. Aslında, ona göre akıl, ancak yeterli fikirlerle ilgili olarak uygun bir şekilde kurulabilir. Bu seviyeye ulaşmak için, yeterli fikirlerin ne olduğuna ve epistemik süreçlerimizde öncelikli olan yetersiz fikirlerden nasıl ortaya çıktıklarına bir göz atmalıyız. Bu bölümde yeterliliğe tersten bakacağız.

Buradan Spinoza'nın bilgi (ya da bir bağlamda biliş) türlerine geçmemiz mümkün. *Etik*'in ikinci kitabının 40. önermesinde üç bilgi türünden bahseder. Bunların ilki

upuygun olmayan ve kendi içinde rastgele bağlantılardan ve işaretlerden oluşan bilgi türüdür. Bu bilgi türünden benzeri bilgi türleri de zorunlu olarak çıkmasına rağmen, yine upuygun olamayacaktır çünkü olaylar ve şeyler arasında nedenselliği sağlaması mümkün olacak ortak mefhumlardan bağımsız biçimde bir araya gelmiştir. İkinci bilgi türüne hayal gücü de dahildir. İkinci bilgi türü ise upuygun bilgi türüdür ve Spinoza tarafından ortak mefhumlara dayandığından rasyonel olarak adlandırılır. Peki, bu ilk iki bilgi türünün ayrılmasını mümkün kılan ortak mefhumlar nelerdir? Ortak mefhumlar şeylerde ortak olarak ve ölçeğe bakılmaksızın yer alan noktaların bir tür soyutlanmasıyla oluşan mefhumlardır. Şeylerde ortak olarak bulunduklarından onlara dair bilginin nedensellik zinciri hakkında doğru bilgi vermesi gerekmektedir. Ortak mefhumlar zorunlu olarak upuygun bilgiyi oluşturur ve buna eşlik edildiği derecede zihinler de upuygun sebep olmuş olur. Buradan iki şey çıkar; ilki zihnin etkin olmasıdır, ikincisi ise ikinci ya da üçüncü bilgi türünden birine yol açmasıdır. İkinci bilgi türü rasyonel bilgi türüdür. Üçüncü bilgi türü ise sezgisel bilgi türüdür. Her ne kadar mistik bir bilgiye işaret ediyor gibi gözükse de upuygun fikirlerin çok daha işselleştirilmiş bir biçimde üretilmesinin mümkün kılındığı bir fikir türü olarak da ele alınabilir. Dolayısıyla ikinci ve üçüncü bilgi türü ortak mefhumların yarattığı zemine dayanır. Ancak bazı yorumlara göre bu zemini ve ortaklığın görülmesini sağlayan ortak mefhumlar da, bir anlamda, hayal gücü gibi birinci türdeki bilgilerin nesneleri ve olayları sabitlemesi ile meydana gelmektedir.

Bir fikir olarak zihin ele alındığında, Spinoza'nın içsel kuvvetlere ve itkilere sahip fikirlerinin olduğu kuramına girmiş oluruz. Burada Della Rocca'nın yorumuna göre temsiller vardır ve Spinoza'nın fikirlerinin içsel kuvvetlerinden biri de temsil edebilmesidir. Bu temsil gücüne sahip fikirlerin birleşiminden oluşan zihnin farklı melekeleri (yetenekleri) yoktur. Onun yerine fikirlerin bileşkesi olarak hareket eder. Temsil etme gücü ise kendi aralarındaki bağlantılardan oluşan bu bileşke kuvvetten faydalanarak ortaya çıkar. Burada "bir şeyin fikri olma" , "bir şeye yönelen fikir olma" ve "bir şeyi temsil etmeyi" aynı anlamda kullanıyorum. Aslında özünde aynı etkinlik olmasına rağmen, fikirlerin oluşturduğu bu temsil etme gücü iki farklı şekilde yorumlanabilir. Bunlar hem zihni bir fikir topluluğu hem de bedenin fikri olarak ifade etmemizi sağlayan türdeki bağlantı biçimi ve dışarıdaki bir şeyi temsil etme, "onun fikri" olma bağlantı biçimidir.

Buradan bakıldığında Spinoza temsiliyet ve fikri olma özellikleri ile bilişsel duygu kuramlarının yönelimselliğini karşılamaktadır. Bir yandan da ontolojisi öncelikli olarak uzamsal sıfatın bir ifadesi olarak bedeni ön plana koyar. Bu zamansal ya da nedensel bir öncelik değil, ontolojik bir önceliktir. Bu şekilde bedenin öncelenmesi, bedensel değişikliklerin temsili ile bedensel duygu kuramlarının yakaladığı his ve sağduyusal olarak duygulardan talep edilen sıcaklığı da açıklamış olur.

Spinozacı bir duygu kuramına geldiğimizde yukarıda bahsedildiği şekilde iki eksik noktayı da kapatma özelliğine sahip bir çerçeveyi görebiliriz. Çağdaş duygu kuramlarına da daha uygun hale getirmek için öncelikle Spinoza'da duygular ve afektler arasında kavramsal bir ayrım koymayı öneriyorum. Spinoza yazınında temel duygular ya da primitif duygular olarak bahsedilen üç duyguyu aslında çağdaş duygu kuramlarında daha çok afekt olarak geçen kavramla karşılayabiliriz. Böylece daha önceden temel duygular olarak alınan arzuyu şiddetine ve değerliğine (olumlu-olumsuz ya da etkin-edilgin) göre derecesel bir sınıflandırma boyutu olarak ele alabiliriz. Bunun yanında diğer iki temel duygu olarak alımlanan neşe ve keder (ki başka çevirilerde de alındığı üzere, sırasıyla zevk ve acı da diyebiliriz) de bir başka boyutun iki farklı uçtaki kutupları olarak ele alınabilir. Bunun Spinoza'nın yazdıkları ile açıkça çelişen bir yeri olmadığı ve daha önce söylediğim gibi çağdaş duygu kuramları ile çok daha uyumlu hale getirebilmek için yerinde bir hamle olarak düşünülebilir. Duygular ise bu afektler ve fikirlerin birleşiminden oluşan bir hali ifade eder.

Burada tanımlandığı haliyle üç afekte gelelim. Spinoza haz ile zihnin daha yetkin bir hale edilgin bir geçişini ve acı ile de zihnin daha düşük bir yetkinlik durumuna edilgin bir geçişini anladığını söylüyor. Bu duygu durumlarının hemen üzerine Spinoza fikirleri ekleyerek melankoli, acı, sevgi ve benzeri diğer duyguların türetilmesini açıklayarak *Etik*'in üçüncü kitabında geçen 48 duygu durumuna ulaşıyor. Burada yine her duygunun bir fikir olduğunu ve fikirlerin de dinamik özelliklere sahip olduğundan, duyguların ve daha da özelinde afektlerin de dinamik olduğunu belirtmekte fayda var. Aslında burada Spinoza afektler ile bedensel ve zihinsel yetkinliklerin değişimini kast ediyor. Böylece aslında etkide bulunan her tür fikrin (ya da kısaca her tür fikrin) de afektif özelliği bulunmalıdır. Ancak belirli durumlarda diğer fikirler ile birleştiğinde,

birleşik olan fikirlerin kendileri beden ve zihin yetkinliklerine etkide bulunmayabilir. Bunu biraz daha şöyle açabiliriz. Fikirler diğer etkisi olan her şey gibi vardırlar. Var oldukları sürece de etkide bulunurlar, zaten bunları Etik'in ilk kitabından ve YSİ'nden çıkarmak mümkün. Fikirler var oldukları müddetçe ve etkide bulundukları müddetçe bulundukları bağlamı (gerek yer gerek zaman) bir şekilde değiştirmeleri gerekir. Eğer bu değişim bir birey içindeyse ve etkinlik düzeyinde rol oynuyorsa o halde bu afekt benzeri bir özelliktir. Yani bu özelliklere sahip olan bir fikri afektif olarak değerlendirebiliriz. Birey içerisinde yer alan her fikir de kabaca bu tür bir yetkinlik değişiminde rol oynuyor gibi durur, o yüzden bütün fikirlerin doğası gereği afektif olmasına rağmen onu oluşturan daha küçük fikirlere ve birleşimlerine bakarak yetkinlik düzeylerinde doğrudan rol oynamama olasılıkları da vardır. İşte bu yüzden her fikir afekt veya duygu değildir. Bu yüzden ilk başkta olumlu ya da olumsuz değişikliğe sebep olmadığı düşünülen fikirler belirli bağlamlarda yetkinlik üzerinde olumlu ya da olumsuz değişikliklerde bulunurlar. Yani Spinoza'nın da belirttiği haliyle nötr fikirler vardır ve bundan dolayı her duygu ve afekt bir fikir olmasına rağmen tersi mümkün değildir. Ancak nedensel etkisi olması ve bunun da hem zihinsel hem de bedensel olarak dışa vurulması sebebiyle sadece ona karşı koyan etkiler olduğu (ya da onu nötrleştiren etkiler olduğu) için belirli ölçeklerde ve bağlamlarda afektif özellik taşımayan fikirler vardır.

Tahmin edileceği üzere her tür afekt ve duygu doğrudan yetkinlik üzerinde bir değişikliğe sebep olduğundan var olma çabası üzerinde de etkide bulunurlar. Yani var olan her şey bir bütünü oluşturma ve onu etkilediği ölçüde bu var olma çabasını da değiştirir. Spinoza bu var olma çabasına conatus der. Aslında bu Curley'e göre ilk görüşte Kartezyen bir doğa kavrayışındaki eylemsizliğe uyma ilkesini temsil ediyordur. Spinoza ise bunu genişleterek bir metafizik ilke haline dönüştürür. İlk anlamda cansız nesneleri, canlı organizmalarla birlikte conatus sahibi olarak sınıflandırabiliriz. Ama ikinci anlamda, zihinsel özellikleri daha karmaşık olanların conatus sahibi olma durumunda da daha karmaşık biçimde var olma çabalarını arttırabileceklerini ya da azaltabileceklerini öngörmemiz bundandır. Spinoza için her iki sıfat da birbirine koşut bir biçimde gittiği için birbirini yansıtan yapıda olmalıdırlar.

Özetle Spinoza'yı bir doğalcı olarak ele aldığımızda conatus da karmaşıklık hiyerarşisini yansıtır. Bu akıl yürütmenin bir sonucu da bir önceki paragraftan da

anlaşılacağı gibi conatus, vücut kompozisyonu ve düşünme yetilerine göre değişmektedir. Bedenin hareket etme gücünde genel bir değişikliğe neden olan herhangi bir duygulanım, zihnin düşünme gücüne de aynı şekilde yansır. Dolayısıyla her düzeydeki değişim onun çerçevesine göre hissedilmelidir.

Haz ve acı sırasıyla bizim eylem gücümüzü arttırır ya da azaltır. Bununla paralel olarak Spinoza'nın sunduğu bir diğer ayrım da etkin ve edilgin afektler ve duygulardır. Zevk ve acı ilk ikiliği karşılarken ikinci ikilik biraz daha farklıdır. Spinoza'ya göre etkinlik kişinin ya da organizmanın kendi doğasının içinden gelen ve dışarıdan etkilenim ile gerçekleşmediğinden etkinlik tamamen kişinin ya da organizmanın kendisinin upuygun neden olduğu bir nedenselliğe işaret eder. Tam tersine edilginlik ise kişinin ya da organizmanın kendi doğasında olmayan ya da onu dışlayan bir yerden ya kendisinin kısmi neden olduğu ya da tamamen dış kuvvetlerin etkisi altında olduğu bir durumu işaret eder. Görüldüğü üzere özgür iradeye ihtiyaç duymadan kişilerin kendi doğalarının etkinliği ölçüsünde tanımlanabilecek bir kendini belirleme felsefesi burada yer almaktadır. Bu açıdan özgür iradenin sağduyusal kavrayışına sırt dönmüş olduğunu söyleyebiliriz.

Etkinlik ve edilginliği de aynı afektlerde olduğu gibi bir sürekliliğin dereceli değişiminde iki farklı yön olarak görebiliriz. *Etik*'in birçok yerinde bu tür okumaya imkân sağlayabilecek "müddetçe" ya da "sürece" ile belirtilen ifadelere yer verir. Yani tözün, yer kaplama ile ifade ettiği müddetçe uzamsal töz ya da tözün fikir ifade ettiği sürece düşünsel töz olarak ele alınabilmesinde kullanıldığı gibi derecesel bir kullanım mümkündür. Tıpkı olumluluk ya da olumsuzluğun dereceli ve etkilenilen oranda ve "sürede" etki etmesi gibi etkinlik ve edilginlik de mutlak değil göreceli durumlardır. Daha somut bir kullanımla Spinoza'nın anladığı etkinlik ifadesinde A'nın kendi doğasından gelen güç doğrultusunda hareket ettiği müddetçe ya da sürece etkin, etmediği müddetçe ya da sürece de edilgin olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Burada ve bundan önceki bölümlerde ve kısımlarda da Spinoza'nın bu dereceli görüşünün ilk iki bölümde bahsedilen bilişsellik ve afektiflik arasındaki gerilimi çözebileceğini düşünüyorum. Gösterdiğimiz gibi Spinozacı bir çerçeve üzerinde yapılan ufak değişiklikler ile çağdaş duygu kuramlarına uyarlanabilecek bir çerçeve sunmada başarılı olabilir.

Böylece Spinoza'nın iki tane ikiliğine süreklilik ve derecelilik perspektifinden bakarak daha önceki bölümlerde bahsedilen duygu teorilerindeki problemlerin çözümü için gerekli koşulları sağlamış oluruz. İlk yarıda, duygular teorisindeki ana bölümlerden birini açığa çıkarmakla başladık. Bu ayrım, zihin-beden ayrımına (Kartezyen bölünmüş görüş) dayanmaktadır ve bilişsel ve bilişsel olmayan/duygusal kamplar olmak üzere iki kamp vardır. Bu ikilik, duygu teorileri arasındaki tek ikilik değil, en köklü ve yaygın olanlardan biridir. Bu yerleşik ve yaygın ikilik çeşitli yollarla (örneğin, antropoloji veya psikiyatri aracılığıyla) araştırılabilir. Burada daha doğrudan bir yol seçtim ve argümanlara ve çerçevelere yakınlaştım. James-Lange teorisiyle ve bir nesne ihtiyacı ya da bir olaya duyulan ihtiyaç artmadıkça bunun nasıl iyi sonuç verdiğiyle başladık. Zihin felsefesinde ve fenomenolojide farklı alımlanma biçimleri olmasına rağmen buna yönelimsellik sorunu adını verdik. Bu ihtiyaca cevap vermeyi başaran bilişsel teoriler, özellikle felsefede başarılı oldu, çünkü kavramsal ve mantıksal analiz gibi felsefede bazı kökleşmiş araçlardan yararlandı. Erken bilişselciler daha ince bir duygusal ayrım elde etmeyi başardılar, ancak bu, duyguları barındıran bedensel değişiklikleri açıklayamadı. Duygu teorileri tarihindeki en başarılı adaylardan biri değer biçme teorileriydi, ancak bu teoriler kümesi aynı zamanda duyguları modellemek ve adlandırmak için birçok farklı bileşenini ortaya atmak zorunda kaldı. Bu, çok yıkıcı bir zaaf olmasa da eldeki değer biçme teorilerini hantallaştırarak zarif ve basit olmaktan uzaktlaştırır.

İkinci yarıda odak, duygu teorileri için zarif ve daha basit bir çerçeve inşa etmek için Spinoza'nın çerçevesine ve özellikle duygulanımlar teorisine kaydı. İlk yarıda çağdaş teorilerin açıklanmasının ardından asıl amaç, Spinozacı monistik bir çerçevenin bu bilişsel ve bilişsel olmayan ikiliğin üstesinden gelmemize nasıl yardımcı olabileceğini ve yeni bir duygu teorileri ontolojisi için bir zemin sağlayabileceğini göstermektir. Bu ortaya konulan ontolojide, erken modern bir filozoftan, mevcut teorilerin tüm taleplerine cevap verebilecek ayrıntılı bir duygu teorisi sağlamasını bekleyemeyiz. Ancak yine de bu araştırma sonucunda Spinoza belirlenmiş olan kriterlerin çoğunu karşılamayı başarabilmiş olarak görünüyor.

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