

LOVE, REASON AND TRANSCENDENCE:
'INEFFABLE' LOVE AND THE LIMITS OF SENSE



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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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- I am the sole author of this thesis and that I have fully acknowledged and documented in my thesis all sources of ideas and words, including digital resources, which have been produced or published by another person or institution;
- this thesis contains no material that has been submitted or accepted for a degree or diploma in any other educational institution;
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ABSTRACT

Love, Reason and Transcendence:

‘Ineffable’ Love and the Limits of Sense

Love is one of the greatest phenomena if not the greatest. Thus, in my MA thesis, I am investigating the concept of Love in its connections to transcendence, to the divine in contrast to the limits of “sense” both as the empirical world and linguistic expression. Through the comparative close reading of Plato’s *Symposium* in connection with *Phaedrus* and *Phaedo*, and İlham Dilman’s *Love: Its Forms, Dimensions and Paradoxes*, I am arguing for a normative understanding of Love. Particularly I am focusing on the account of Love (Greek *erôs*) as in between human and divine, mortal and immortal, as an ascent from bodily love to the Form of Beauty. Within this framework, I am claiming that the ethical is the foundation of love as a transcendence which is an “ineffable” personal inner experience, and that Socrates, as the main character of the Socratic dialogues, is a fictitious character and the main argument of Plato’s account of Love as in between Reason and Transcendence, in person. He [Socrates] serves the purpose of illustrating, via personification, the embodiment of taking ‘no particular standpoint’ but instead being in an active and dynamic state of inquiry, operating within various dialogues as contexts. I am arguing that this is to reveal the ethical dimensions of the particular way of life Plato finds as worth living, that is a philosophical life.

ÖZET

Aşk, Akıl ve Aşkınlık:

“Anlatılamaz” Aşk ve Anlamanın/Duyumun Sınırları

Aşk, en harika fenomenlerden biridir eğer ki en harikası değilse. Bu nedenle Yüksek lisans tezimde hem ampirik dünya olarak “duyu(m)” hem de dilsel ifade olarak “anlam, algı” tanımlarını barındıran ‘sense’ kavramının ifade ettiklerinin sınırlarına zıt olarak aşkınlık, İlahi olan ile münasebetiyle aşk kavramını inceliyorum. Platon’un *Phaedrus* ve *Phaedo* ile ilintili olarak *Sempozyum*’unun ve İlham Dilman’ın *Aşk: Formları, Boyutları ve Paradoksları*’nın karşılaştırmalı yakın okumasıyla, Aşk’ın normatif bir anlayışını savunuyorum. Özellikle Aşk (Yunanca erôs) anlayışına insan ve İlahi, ölümlü ve ölümsüz arasında olan; bedensel aşktan Güzellik Formu’na yükseliş olarak odaklanıyorum. Bu çerçevede, aşkın “anlatılamaz” öznel bir içsel deneyim olan aşkınlık olarak etik bir temeli olduğunu iddia ediyorum, ve Sokratik diyalogların ana karakteri olarak Sokrates’in kurgu bir karakter olduğunu ve Platon’un Akıl ile Aşkınlık arasındaki Aşk’ı açıklamasının ana argümanı olduğunu savunuyorum. O [Sokrates], kişileştirme yoluyla, "belirli bir bakış açısı" almamanın, bunun yerine çeşitli diyaloglar içinde bağlamlar olarak faaliyet gösteren aktif ve dinamik bir sorgulama durumunda olmanın somutlaşmasını gösterme amacına hizmet eder. Bunun, Platon'un yaşamaya değer bulduğu özel ve belirli bir yaşam biçiminin, yani felsefi bir yaşamın ahlaki boyutlarını ortaya çıkarmak için olduğunu savunuyorum.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to Burcu Holmgren and Chryssi Sidiropoulou, the two heroic women in my life by whose Love I am inspired, compassion and courage, and look up to learn the matters of making contact with myself, the others and Life. Their embrace, faith and stance for Love made the difference in me to grow into the person I choose to be. And they made me capable of understanding the matters I discuss in this thesis.

Burcu Holmgren, my Landmark Forum leader who showed me what it means to commit being Love, and midwifed me to give birth to Self beyond my little self. It was her faith in people, her commitment to “listen them as big persons” capable of anything, as subjects who are actively choosing and are responsible, that enabled me to have faith in my Resurrection in the sense of becoming from an object as the mere machinery of the physical body to an autonomous subject by learning to let go of “the ego” and be out there in the world, with people, in Love. Landmark is an education, a performance coaching program that has nothing to do with religion or spirituality; the following passage of Wittgenstein for me expresses what Burcu Holmgren made possible for me, here I take the word ‘Resurrection’ to mean to have the capacity of choosing to have faith in Love, in Life, and in myself as if I was born again:

[A]nd once more we are orphaned and alone. So we have to content ourselves with wisdom and speculation. We are in a sort of hell where we can do nothing but dream, roofed in, as it were, and cut off from heaven. But if I am to be REALLY saved, — what I need is *certainty* — not wisdom, dreams of speculation — and this certainty is faith. And faith is faith in what is needed by my *heart*, my *soul*, not my speculative intelligence. For it is my soul with its passions, as it were with its flesh and blood, that has to be saved, not my abstract mind. Perhaps we can say: Only *love* can believe the Resurrection. Or: It is *love* that believes the Resurrection. We might say: Redeeming love

believes even in the Resurrection; holds fast even to the Resurrection. What combats doubt is, as it were, *redemption*. (Wittgenstein, 1980, 33e)

Chryssi Sidiropoulou as I abovementioned was always there. At times of despair, sorrow, self-doubt, injustice when I was about to give up on whatever matter it was, when I looked into her eyes, heard her voice, read her texts, in her presence I recalled...

If only there were a way to start a city or an army made up of lovers and the boys they love! Theirs would be the best possible system of society, for they would hold back from all that is shameful, and seek honor in each other's eyes. Even a few of them, in battle side by side, would conquer all the world, I'd say. For a man in love would never allow his loved one, of all people, to see him leaving ranks or dropping weapons. He'd rather die a thousand deaths! And as for leaving the boy behind, or not coming to his aid in danger—why, no one is so base that true Love could not inspire him with courage, and make him as brave as if he'd been born a hero. When Homer says a god 'breathes might' into some of the heroes, this is really Love's gift to every lover. (Plato, *Symposium*, 178e-179b)

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words.
They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.”
Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 6.522

Love, Reason, Transcendence... Heavy! To specify what I take those huge concepts to be in my way of seeing within the framework of how they relate to each other, I tried to “narrow my scope” by paradoxically adding three more of those huge concepts as ‘ineffable’ love and the ‘limits’ of ‘sense’. This attempt is a good start for painting the view, as I see it of course, of a nature of Being and its contact to human experience so abstract that reducing it to words would be a violence, a disrespect to its way or mode of existing, making it something it isn’t. Thus, I will start by letting these concepts unfold in themselves as different colors of paint, to then discover what can and cannot be made of their various combinations and orderings.

The dictionary meaning of ineffable is “causing so much emotion, especially pleasure, that it cannot be described, synonymous to indescribable.” (Ineffable, 2022) It refers to the entities, experiences, ideas, emotions that are indescribably beyond expression. Limit means “the greatest amount, number, or level of something that is either possible or allowed.” (Limit, 2022)

Even before the third concept, that of ‘sense’ is introduced, it is already clear that my thesis starts from a contradiction created by the very existence of two such words. Leaving aside for later chapters the effect of it causing an emotion or the kind of emotion that can be specified as pleasure, the concept “ineffable” verbally expresses in mere pointing out to “what is indescribable” in other words to an ontology accepting that there is, exists, a “what” beyond description while informing

about “what’s” nature -not in itself but in its contact with human existence, experience and intellect- of being “indescribable”, not allowing its description. The concept of “limit” while having the focus on what is within that limit, what is either possible or allowed, on the other hand points out to “what exceeds or is beyond” it. My thesis, thus, seems like an oxymoronic attempt. After all what else can be “said” about what cannot be put into words, apart from it being beyond and exceeding the limits of sense in the form of linguistic expression?

This attempt still seems valuable to me and its worth perhaps reveals itself with the third concept, that of ‘sense’. For it has started many philosophical inquiries about the relationship of ontology to epistemology, from bodily sensations to linguistic expression of “meaning” and to know, the criteria of that meaning as “good judgment”. Dictionary definitions of ‘sense’ in the order that I believe humans process the empirical world are as follows:

- (4) one of the five powers (sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch) that your body uses to get information about the world around you
- (1) sense (of something) an understanding about something; an ability to judge something
- (2) good understanding and judgement; knowledge of what is sensible or practical behaviour
- (3) the meaning that a word or phrase has; a way of understanding something
- (5) a feeling about something important. (Sense, 2022)

A lot can be said about ‘sense’ yet as abovementioned I will focus on its connection with the concepts Love, Reason, Transcendence, ineffable and limit. I am arguing that Plato’s theory of love as ascension to The Forms of Good and Beauty as specified in the *Symposium*, starts with the physical as bodily sensations (4) and those senses are directed towards the environment, active in the presence of an empirical content such as something or someone good or beautiful. Thus, it is the ‘sense of’ something (1) as an entity, a particular, an individual. From concrete to

abstract, perceiving the good people or beautiful things as the individual instances enables to understand the relationship between those instances and, by virtue of “good judgment” about those relations, to knowledge the concepts “Good” and “Beauty”. The good judgment and understanding of the abstract relations via providing a way of looking at and viewing things or the world around us enable meaning as “making sense” (3). This is the ‘limit’ of Reason, both the empirical since the physical experience supplies the content of the concepts, binding or grounding them to a cognitive reference and the abstractions of logic.

Beyond the limits of Reason, logic, rational lies madness and beyond the limits of the empirical mortal body lies the immortal soul as in Plato’s *Phaedrus* and *Phaedo*. It is helpful to see that *Phaedrus* is the only dialogue in which Socrates walks out of the city and city can be read here as Reason since the Polis allowed the formation of rules and regulations, laws made by humans to attain a state of order in living together, in the presence of plurality or chaos. It is another motive that although the dialogue is about the art of rhetoric, Lysias the rhetorician is absent. *Phaedrus* starts with a direct contact of Socrates to Phaedrus and the dialogue, or the experience is firsthand. These I will interpret in later chapters with more detail as the “ineffable” in the sense that mere rhetoric or the ordering of words does not mean anything if it lacks the truth, and the truth necessitates the direct contact of the divine in the absence of words and presence of a certain way of life, the philosophical life. Such a contact can be allowed in Love for it enables transcending the ego and opening oneself to the outer to give oneself to another, as Dilman (1998) argues. The kind of love that Dilman argues is a mature love, starting with the sexual, erotic love which is personal in the sense that it is directed to a specific person for her/his physicality, character, etc. Such a mature love is exclusive for it requires a loyalty to

each other in a way that the love and relationship is shared with no other but only the two of the lovers, no third. Making a center of the relationship together, both lovers commit to keeping the other as the center of his/her own life, as if the other is one's own self. This is not a way of fusion or collapsing into each other as comically presented by Aristophanes in the *Symposium*, there is an important distinction of 'integrity', that is each person is independent from yet interdependent with the other for discovering one's capacities of love, affection, compassion, forgiveness and many others that will be revealed or uncovered in such a state of loving. To attain that state of love, however, goes beyond the bodily attraction or physical basis of being in a psychological state of love. It requires dedication, discipline, willingness to commit to a certain other, an ethical way of life. The sexual, erotic love allows one to feel what it means to love another as oneself, with the capacity of recognizing his/her otherness. Rather than longing for the other with the impossibility of unification and suffering from their separateness, acknowledging and appreciating the other as a subject. In other words, respecting the independency and individuality of the other via having an appreciative pleasure from what separates them as the very condition of being human, in Dilman's words the human separateness.

While sexual, erotic love makes it easier to attain that state of mature Love, generalizing that way of loving another as oneself and making it impersonal for not a particular person but for everyone regardless of who they are and are not, seems similar to the Christian doctrine of "loving one's neighbour". The latter allows one to feel and make contact with the Divine Love itself, Grace, God.

Dilman is a Turkish philosopher, educator and author who was Professor Emeritus and Honorary Fellow, Department of Philosophy, University of Wales Swansea. In *Love: Its Forms, Dimensions and Paradoxes* Dilman argues that Love is

a trial for the lover to keep one's heart open in the face of difficulty. It is an ethical training of the person from being an object, operating based on mere physical bodily needs and appetitive desires, or passive subject as a selfless baby longing for the union with the whole as in that case the mother was not yet separate and distinct individual or having a weak sense of self incapable of recognizing other people's autonomy and subjectivity; to being a fully grown mature subject, self-moving without needing an external being or depending on a first mover, being the creator, the source and being at the source of other's nurturing, nourishment, wellbeing, growth and maturity.

In this sense Love is the highest form of Intellect an ascend to God, The Divine, Love itself, an ethical choice that requires a subject deliberately and actively taking the responsibility of choosing to commit being Love itself as embodied empirical representation of it; choosing humility to accept the dependence on making contact with others and through it, allowing The Divine Love to contact us. This requires an intention of being in a state of active inquiry, open to learn that enables us to grow in our subjecthood, to be more than mere body and to teach others willingly with Love. Such ascend to the Form of Beauty is by Diotima in the *Symposium*. Also, a certain way of life, the ethical training is conveyed by the Myth of The Chariot Allegory in the *Phaedrus* and the philosophical life which makes that ascend and transcendence possible is the focus of the *Phaedo*. Although I will not discuss in detail, becoming a teacher of this way of life by living it is what the words are incapable of describing thus the "ineffable". Which is The Allegory of The Cave in the *Republic* and this state of being in between the prisoners in the cave and truth as The Divine is how I will frame the account of Erōs in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*. I will argue that Socrates is the personification of Plato's argument to

show Erōs beyond written text, calling for the active engagement of the reader, inviting us to see the dialogues as a network that provides an inter-textual meta discourse.



CHAPTER 2

DILMAN ON LOVE

Dilman's *Love: Its Forms, Dimensions and Paradoxes* is concerned with two types of questions on Love: conceptual and existential. Conceptual questions are on our understanding of what Love is whilst existential ones are about Love's connection to its experiencer, the lover's existence. Dilman finds the latter in close connection with the former, thus within his philosophical attitude of inquiry, he includes existential questions in his conceptual analysis of Love. Dilman investigates Love both conceptually and existentially through a variety of people, i.e., Freud, Eric Fromm, Simone Weil, C.S. Lewis, Balint, Sartre, D. H. Lawrence, Kierkegaard, Plato, etc., from different disciplines such as psychology, philosophy, theology and literature. Evaluating and criticizing those different perspectives and looking for the commonalities, Dilman develops his own theory of Love. He argues that "there is an inherent connection between love and generosity, between love and creativeness" (Dilman, 1998, p. xi).

According to him, love is a natural inclination to open oneself up to and make connection with the outer world (ibid, p. xiii). Through this opening up, Love allows learning, growth as well as pruning, of the individual from self-preservation and defenses against potential dangers, to gain maturity. Dilman's conception of 'affective maturity', despite having its foundation on the physical as well as psychological maturity, moves beyond to a non-physical level of ethics, transcending the body via the purification of the soul. Considering Dilman's book on *Phaedo* and his interpretations of Plato, his theory of Love is closely in alignment with that of

Plato's and provides a conceptual framework as a compass for reading Socratic dialogues. I will put this to use in revealing the inherent connections between the dialogues while viewing them as an intertextual meta-discourse. By this, I mean that although Socratic dialogues seem separate subjects, I view them as a network of narratives to embed a character into different settings and contexts. This provides a meta-story, an overarching narrative for Plato to show Socrates as a character in connected ideas between the texts.

In the following sections I will provide some definitions along with the conceptual mappings of Dilman's suggested bipolarity of the human soul, immature and mature love. Then I will use this in order to argue for my thesis that Socrates is the personification of Plato's argument transcending beyond knowledge and logic transcending to Love requires a purification of the Soul which means a philosophical attitude and an ethical life.

2.1 Bipolarity of human soul

Dilman (1983, 1998) takes the human soul to be bipolar. One of the poles is the ego-centric self-interest, having defenses for self-preservation in terms of closing oneself to protect against a potential danger or threat. Although such inclination is natural for evolutionary purposes, it might easily turn into self-seeking and manipulation in which one cannot see, know the other as the other but instead as a means to one's own ends such as fulfilling one's needs, pleasures and desires. In such a case, one loses contact with the outer and is shut down in one's own world and repeats oneself. The other pole is love, the selflessness as a natural propensity to open oneself up to the other, make contact with the outer world, what exists, other than oneself. This is a natural tendency of human nature to take an interest in the outer, the other and give

oneself to it. Love thus provokes or initiates learning, development and growth via promoting curiosity and courage to take risks of being vulnerable before another. In this sense, it is a trial of the lover in giving oneself to keep one's heart open in the face of difficulty, pain, disappointment, resistance, non-reciprocity, betrayal, anger, etc.

Indeed, Dilman argues that lovelessness puts a person to a mode of deprivation, vindictiveness, hatred, anger, jealousy, envy, malice and prisons one to be stuck whereas love is creative and its characteristics such as courage, trust, patience, mercifulness, generosity, forgiveness, humility are the constituents of goodness (Dilman, 1998, p. xii-xiii). Dilman investigates different types of love within this spectrum of bipolarity of the human soul along with human separateness as the existing condition of being an individual separate from others, to argue that the oscillations between the poles in different relations, by revealing aspects of oneself that need to be purified, provide a better self-knowledge, growth, psychological and ethical maturity.

2.2 Primitive ego and immature love

Dilman defines an ego-centric person as someone who solely is interested in oneself, one's own needs and desires, viewing the others as objects or satellites revolving around oneself, as mere means to one's ends. Thus, one is incapable of recognizing the others as individuals, subjects. Such person's affective apprehension of the others is confined to how they serve, fulfill their purposes as whatever is expected or needed from them. Otherwise, they are real to the extent they resist fulfilling needs or be against manipulations. They exist and are real not as subjects but as mere obstacles for the ego-centric person, or else they do not exist at all in one's emotions

(Dilman, 1998, p. 7). To further explain, Dilman specifies what he means by affective apprehension of others as:

Here we need to be clear that our apprehension of other people's reality is affective, that is through our emotions. I mean the reality they have in their own individual lives, separate from mine. For the reality so apprehended - that is affectively - is one which each person lives for himself, a reality he lives in his relations with them, in his sympathy and concern for others or in his hostility and resentment. (Dilman, 1998, p. 7)

Dilman considers that although he never visited China, he knows there are real people there. If he were to read in the papers that one of them got hurt, he would feel sorry for what happened, yet this is an impersonal way of relating with the others, as he would feel sorry for anyone. His 'feeling sorry for' is not particularly for that person. In this case, his apprehension of that person's reality is severely limited by his knowledge and his capacity to sympathize. Since the contact with that person is missing, that person remains a total stranger. Dilman deepens the ego-centric person's experience of the other as resembling this case of the other 'remaining total stranger':

For the ego-centric person the reality of others is curtailed in the same way even when his life and theirs are interwoven in many ways. They come into contact constantly, but he makes no contact with them. This applies equally to one's own reality *for oneself*. If others constantly ignored me, wanted to have nothing to do with me, evaded any kind of engagement with me, refused either to give or accept anything from me, I would begin to doubt my own existence as a person. Unless I already had inner resources on which I could fall back, inner resources derived from an earlier time when I was treated with care and regard, I would begin to lose all those convictions which give me substance and a sense of my own reality. Having no reality for others I would begin to feel I was nothing and end up by having no reality in myself. (Dilman, 1998, p. 7)

Dilman here makes an important point that reveals the quality of relations in terms of maturity in relatedness, in intimacy, in the characteristics and choices of the people

that shape the relationship. I will examine further what is meant by ‘contact’ in the later sections of this chapter. Here I will distinguish these two types of contact, i.e. coming into it or making it. I believe that it is crucial for Dilman to determine the maturity of the relationship as well as the person. Coming into contact does not generate an intention of the experiencer for initiating the contact. It is as if bumping up to an object or coming across with someone. Making contact, however, has the contact’s origin in the subject, individual. The direction of the contact as merely external or intentionally initiated by the people in the relationship then determines how much people are willing to be out there in the relationship, leaving their own “selves” in order to give themselves to each other.

Dilman makes use of Freud’s, Sartre’s and especially Balint’s, Proust’s and C.S. Lewis’ perspectives to characterize his conception of immature love. It is in Lewis’ words ‘need-pleasure’ based, goal oriented of the lover to take something from the beloved in order to fulfill a need in the lover and manipulation is often at play. Lover has a weak sense of self and projection onto, idealization of the other makes the beloved merely an object of desire, lust, immature love.

Dilman’s highlighting of Balint’s seven fold characterization of a primitive love is worth quoting fully as follows:

- (i) The person has a weak sense of self and feels insecure in herself. As a result she needs the reassurance of love, affection and attention. When, in the separateness of his existence the other cannot meet the absolute demands she makes on him the result is cataclysmic. Anything other than fusion is felt by her as a let down, a betrayal. She feels abandoned and condemned to nothingness for having been denied the confirmation of love and affection.
- (ii) The more desperate her need for confirmation the less she is able to be realistic both in her expectations and in her assessment of the other's response to her. She expects from the other something he cannot give her, or at least something he cannot sustain, and her disappointment is out of all proportion to reality: her idealization turns into an equally unrealistic disappointment followed by denigration.

(iii) Given her weak sense of self and feeling of inner deprivation she cannot avoid envying those who feel at home and secure in their own skin, and is therefore charged with the destructiveness which belongs to her envy. 'Such people [Balint writes] can only have ambivalent relations...' and their love is 'easily smothered by their destructive tendencies.'

(iv) She cannot form a realistic picture of the other and tends to split him into two: the loving, caring person who will fulfil all her expectations and the selfish, feckless person who is unable to care. He thus tends to oscillate in her apprehension between these two irreconcilable aspects. Similarly so do her feelings towards him oscillate between love and anxiety, and at times, a defensive hatred. She cannot feel at home with him, nor with herself in her need for confirmation.

(v) Balint points out the possibility of strong narcissistic tendencies in such a person which she has failed to outgrow. She loves herself in him. This makes her intolerant of any fault or blemish in him and also makes her demanding: he must be perfect in his love and attention towards her.

(vi) A sixth possibility is what Balint, after Freud, calls 'oral greed'. She looks for sustenance in the love she expects and demands, and she can never have enough of it. Such greed is rooted in her absolute dependence that goes back to her very early childhood - indeed babyhood. This is dependence which she has been unable to grow out of and which in the way she has approached personal relationships she has perpetuated. On the one hand it makes the other person all-important to her and, on the other hand, it stands in the way of her considering his interests, needs, sensitivities and well-being. He is seen as being there to cater to her needs.

(vii) A seventh characteristic of this primitive, immature love relationship from which she cannot escape is her need to control it unconditionally. This need to control the relationship, to impose her own terms on it, is a defence against her own helplessness. (Dilman, 1998, p. 13-15)

Dilman finds this character as immature in the sense that similar to Freud's theory of longing for union, the lover is a primitive person; thus the love she is capable of is confined to her character and is a very early form. Such a lover is unable to outgrow from oneself and phantasy world to face with and meet up to reality. To me, this "outgrowing" resembles a birth going through the situations and emotions as pregnancy to result in giving birth to a new formation if one allows the experience or the other to contact oneself. As long as one fails to outgrow such emotions and grow up affectively, one cannot make contact to the adult world especially in such situations which bring those emotions. The existence of an immature lover, thus, lacks self-reliance and needs confirmation, validation. The

immature lover cannot tolerate and suffers from the separateness of the other since it seems like a threat to him/her. Nevertheless, the separateness as the human condition of being “other” to another is necessary for reminding independent individuals to shape an intimate relationship. Thus immature lover can never tolerate real, authentic intimacy. Such love is in alignment with the character of the lover then and “individuality is an enemy of immature love” (ibid, p. 113). It is possessive in the sense of dominating, narcissistic, demanding, draining, and conditional in one’s controlled ways of being with the other and the other being in the way one wants (ibid, p. 15-16).

Even if it is possible that both individuals in the relationship are in this state thus it seems like the love can be said to be “reciprocal”, this still would not qualify as Love, it would merely be a symbiotic relationship. Both parties remain to each other as objects and not loved in-being-themselves as they are. They remain as an individual incapable of seeing the other as “the other” and making a contact. Real unification in the sense of being different individuals “I” to form a connection to create what is beyond these “I”s, the interrelation between them to form a “WE” is not possible and thus would not qualify as Love but instead remains as based on what Lewis calls 'need-pleasure' (ibid, ch9). It is not sustainable either; since the love is based on a need when the need is fulfilled and pleasure is experienced, the lover is satisfied and either stops loving or directs the so-called love to another need or another one. When one drinks water to satisfy one’s thirst, one becomes aware of the hunger for instance. The direction (arrow) of the immature love, thus, is and remains one sided.

I have characterized the kind of union which is the object of the longing at the heart of the love depicted by Proust as 'symbiotic'. It is a union in which the identities of lover and loved one are fused much in the way Aristophanes in

Plato's *Symposium* says they were in what he calls our 'original state' before we were split apart. What Plato puts into Aristophanes' mouth is a myth, much in the sense of the myths Socrates expounds at the end of the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedo*. I have suggested that such union is to be found in physical form in the mother's womb where the foetus and the mother form an organic whole - are part of the same organism. It is to be found psychologically, again between mother and child, in the first few months of the baby's life. (Dilman, 1998, p. 73)

Thus, immature love might not always be characterized as “narcissistic, selfish, ego-centric” self-seeking. The lover might at times see the other and direct the attention, love and the elements of love to the other, yet may remain fearful and in defense, closed in the mode of self-preservation. If, however, one does not put oneself at the stake, open fully and give one's heart courageously and willingly regarding the risk of getting hurt by not getting one's love reciprocated or used and exploited or betrayed by the beloved, one is incapable of outgrowing the primitive aspects of one's character to experience mature love and intimacy in the sense of making contact.

2.3 Mature Love: Human separateness, integrity, contact

Dilman (1987, 1993) focuses on what it means to be an individual separate from others, its existing conditions and in such separateness, he investigates the possibility or difficulties of making contact with what is out of oneself, especially the other people. What he calls human separateness may be best defined as follows:

What it means for two people to be separate individuals, for each to be who he is, shows itself in the impossibility of *your* taking *my* decisions, facing *my* difficulties, feeling *my* distress, loving or dying in *my* place and vice versa. (Dilman, 1987, p. 97)

Dilman quotes Simone Weil speaking of the distance needed by a person to remain autonomous both for one's own sake and for the sake of the people whom one relates

to and is in a relationship with. To know the other, one must recognize the boundaries of the other so that one does not interfere with the autonomy and freedom of the other, to keep the other as s/he is.

Simone Weil speaks of this as the need to 'respect the distance which the fact of being two distinct creatures places between them' - between two friends or lovers. I call this distance 'human separateness' or 'the separateness of human beings'. (Dilman, 1998, p. 45)

Unlike Weil's quote above, Dilman additionally brings to the discussion of 'human separateness' and love a distinction of friendship or liking someone and sexual love. This I will discuss further in Section 3.4.

Dilman brings Fromm to the discussion in order to bring forth the existing condition of being human as a separate individual, and potential solutions to overcome this problem of human separateness. Unlike animals whose actions are determined by instinct, human beings use reason to develop, make one's own mind, make choices, judge for themselves. Thus, they are responsible for the way they are and how they behave, irrespective of the outcomes. Even if they take advice from someone else, follow another person's suggestion, they are still responsible judging any other opinion, advice, suggestion and account for their validity and soundness and accept them accordingly. It is always up to them and in this sense, by relying on their own resources and capacities of judgment they are a separate center, thinking and acting for themselves with the burden of responsibility irrespective of the consequences and outcomes. Awareness of oneself in such a state, additionally being aware of one's lifespan that one was born and will die against one's will, makes one acknowledge one's loneliness and separateness. Along with being helpless before nature and the society at times, this separateness makes one's existence isolated like

an 'unbearable prison' (Dilman, 1998, p. 118-119). Dilman mentions some of

Fromm's solutions to this problem and quotes the following passage from him:

The unity achieved in productive work is not interpersonal; the unity achieved in orgiastic fusion is transitory [the sexual act without love never bridges the gap between two human beings, except momentarily - p. 18]; the unity achieved by conformity is only pseudo-unity. Hence they are only partial answers to the problem of existence. The full answer lies in the achievement of interpersonal union, of fusion with another person in love (p. 22). (Dilman, 1998, p. 120)

After considering Fromm's opinion about how to overcome this separateness, i.e.

fusion without integrity and fusion with integrity, Dilman makes an important distinction about the motive, the intention of the fusion which determines the direction of the contact. If it aims at gaining something from another for oneself, feeling good and satisfied, then one needs the other to be complete or to have the approval one seeks. In this sense one is dependent on the other. Collapsing to the other or to one's needs, one loses one's integrity and autonomy. Dilman reserves the word 'fusion' for what Fromm calls the fusion without integrity since he [Dilman] understands this as two entities, things, people becoming one without retaining their distinct identities. Whereas if one acts out of concern for the other, in this concern one finds oneself. Although one would miss and is most definitely attached to the loved one, these come from one for the other and thus one remains as a separate individual. Fromm calls this the fusion with integrity, whereas Dilman prefers the word "union". (Dilman, 1998, p. 123)

In the case of what I called human separateness, as embedded in human existence, which often constitutes an obstacle for lovers, I argued there is something which needs accepting, namely the separateness of the beloved as an individual in her own right - accepted and, indeed, respected. In one's own case there is something which needs to be preserved, namely, one's integrity as an individual - if one is to be any good to the person one loves. The lovers can then find communion with each other, as opposed to fusion, provided

there is integrity on both sides and mutual respect. But this takes emotional maturity. (Dilman, 1998, p. 98-99)

For Dilman, Love is a solution to the problem of human separateness, not as a remedy to resolve a tension or conflict. Rather, Love provides a framework in which human separateness is no longer a problem, it becomes something that allows individuals to be distinct centers and the appreciation of their otherness. In this sense, Love becomes a training of Lover to gain psychological and ethical maturity, growing from bodily appetite and self-seeking to the capacities of keeping the integrity of their separateness, respecting the freedom and autonomy of the beloved, appreciating the other as a subject, taking responsibility for the sustenance and committing oneself to having an ethical life. Mature love, thus, enables one of the greatest human experiences of Love and through that ascent The Good, Beauty.

Dilman (1998) argues that mature love “is the source of what constitutes goodness in human life” (p. xii) and has characteristics which are constituents of goodness. It is not a fusion in which both individuals melt into each other or in Love. What generates the diversity of mature love is that both individuals protect their distinct identity in the sense of not dissolving in the other or in the togetherness. They remain autonomous, independent, and willing to commit to the discipline of an ethical life which requires the responsibility to learn and discover the other as the other, allow the other to be as s/he is while discovering oneself in the presence of the other as oneself. Lover learns to open oneself up more and more, to let go of fear of getting hurt. Choosing to open instead of closing oneself allows the sharing and making contact with the other, the outer, as well as making contact with oneself, that forms the interdependency.

I said that it takes two to make contact and that this is primarily an affective matter. The other person must be *there* to me, his responses through which I come in contact with him must be authentic, come from him – he must be in them. I on my part must *meet* them, not flinch from them or draw back, nor must I pretend that they are something other than what they are. That is I, in turn, must be honest, clear-sighted, and myself. Just as I must not be simply the accidental object of his responses, so equally my responses must be directed to him *as he is* – I must not project my phantasies on him or treat him as a mere instrument. (Dilman, 1987, p. 135)

Through discovering oneself in that independent and interdependent state, one gains self-knowledge, psychological and ethical maturity. Both individuals are subjects and see each other as such. It is a reciprocal, mutual commitment of respecting the other's otherness while each individual sees, accepts, loves the other as oneself. It is not goal-oriented towards reaching a purpose of fulfilling a need in "I", it does not involve manipulations to make the other in the way "I" want him/her to be. Instead, being a source of nourishment and growth of the other, thus Love is generated by both lovers. So, the beloved retains charm, attractiveness, beauty for the lover and in this case a mature love is sustainable.

Fromm points out, 'the ability to love [with maturity] depends on one's capacity to emerge from... the incestuous fixation to mother and clan' (p. 100). This is something we have already considered. He points out that all this takes faith, courage, the ability to take risk, the readiness to accept pain and disappointment (p. 104). The faith in question I take to be faith that there is goodness to be found in 'the outside world'. The courage is the courage it takes to expose oneself in one's vulnerability. The faith again is the trust that one will not be taken advantage of or used. In short to love and to be loved one has to be able to give up one's defences, to trust others and in particular the loved one, and to trust one's own capacity to bear pain and to weather difficulties. As Fromm puts it well: To love means to commit oneself without guarantee... Love is [therefore] an act of faith' (p. 105). In short, in active, mature love, a person is 'fully awake', fully there for the beloved, accessible, receptive and attentive to her (p. 106). (Dilman, 1998, p. 128)

Viewing the human soul as bipolar allows Dilman, via a conceptual mapping, to argue for Love as a form of learning within a spectrum of maturity. Lover learns

from Love and is transformed in one's relation to and capacity for Love. Lover, by purifying one's heart and soul to recognize The Good, thus through the mediation of the body in becoming ethical, transcends the empirical and ascends to Love. What Dilman calls "affective maturity" is conceptually close to what comes with living an ethical life and are the constituents of The Good such as trust, commitment, loyalty, gratitude, forgiveness, compassion, humility, courage, generosity, patience. Dilman argues that these open a person up to be in contact with the outer world and to create. This conclusion I find to be closely in alignment with Plato's theory of Love as expressed in the *Symposium* by Diotima's speech. Additionally, Dilman throughout the book argues that remaining in the individualistic ego-centric pole that is self-preserving may easily turn into self-seeking. This, then, prevents the developmental process of a person to become a mature subject to discover one's ethical capacities, thus is the enemy of spirituality (Dilman, 1998, p. xvii-xviii).

CHAPTER 3

SOCRATES: PLATO'S ARGUMENT IN PERSON

Regarding Plato, the dialogues I am mainly focusing on are *Symposium*, *Phaedo*, and *Phaedrus*. I am defending that Socrates, as the main character of the Socratic dialogues, is a fictitious character and the main argument of Plato's account of Love as in between reason and transcendence, in person. He [Socrates] serves the purpose of illustrating, via personification, the embodiment of taking 'no particular standpoint' but instead being in an active and dynamic state of inquiry, operating within various dialogues as contexts. I am arguing that this is to reveal the ethical dimensions of the particular way of life Plato finds as worth living, that is a philosophical life. From this perspective, it is interesting to see Socratic dialogues as a network that unveils Plato's account, in the sense that the plurality of standpoints as various ways of being are embodied by different persons in a dialogue, then each dialogue is given a theme -person's name- as if the dialogues are the subjects/persons in an intertextual meta-discourse, a meta-dialogue between the texts and its reader.

Socrates, in contrast with the plurality of ways of being, establishes the minimum relative stability. This stability is the one way of being within a plurality and a variety of contexts. The journey of transcendence, in the sense of going from logical argumentative form to using myths and finally just before his death getting into contact with the messages in his dreams about pursuing arts¹, portrayed by this network of Socratic dialogues is harmonized with and carried by him living a

¹ "The dreams were something like this: the same dream often came to me in the past, now in one shape now in another, but saying the same thing: 'Socrates,' it said, 'practice and cultivate the arts.'" (Plato, *Phaedo*, 60e)

"After that I realized that a poet, if he is to be a poet, must compose fables, not arguments." (ibid, 61b)

philosophical life portrayed in the dialogues. Such a fictitious character, then, is necessary for Plato not to contradict some of his views on matters such as ethics, the good, beauty, immortality, love which go beyond what can neither be known nor can be expressed within the limits of reason, language, and the empirical world; while illustrating them via inquiring the contact of language and reality to the point that we understand that we do not “know”.

Particularly I am focusing on the account of Love (Greek *erôs*) as in between human and God, mortal and immortal as an ascend from bodily love to the Form of Beauty. Within this framework, I am claiming that the ethical is the foundation of love as a transcendence which is an “ineffable” personal inner experience. In the *Symposium*, Diotima of Mantinea, who taught Socrates the art of love, explains that since love wants to possess the Good forever and the mortals contact or experience immortality in a form of reproduction, love’s object is reproduction, “It is giving birth in beauty, whether in body or in soul.” (Plato, *Symposium*, 206b) while adding “Beauty, however, is in harmony with the divine.” (ibid, 206d)

Socrates portrays a lover of wisdom by living a philosophical life of inquiry without taking any fixed standpoints of claiming to know. Such love enables him to come into contact with The Divine to contact and to make contact with himself and others, to be open to learn, discover, outgrow as well as to teach and to inquire with others to the extent that the other is revealed in one’s ignorance of “not knowing” in order to make them come into contact with the unknown with curiosity and appreciate the “ineffable” Love. His contact with others is from his impersonal Love, concern and care for the individuals. Although embodied to be able to communicate in human form, some of his features indicate his contact or being in harmony with The Divine such as him occasionally standing in a single spot, being the same way

he is even in war area, being barefoot without getting cold, drinking heavily without getting drunk or being able to continue his day without any rest or sleep. With such mythical features that are unusual for other humans, Socrates seems to be an embodiment of purification for a proper death.

3.1 *Phaedo* “On the soul”

Phaedo is the dialogue about Socrates’ last hours, his conversations with friends and his death in the jail. Although his friends are distressed, sad and sorrowful due to his approaching execution, Socrates is calm and no different than his usual ways even happy, noble and dignified. When asked about the source of his equanimity in the face of death, he tells his faith in the immortality of the soul, ‘purification of the soul’ and that he has been living his whole life as a preparation for, a practice of dying. Just like any other day or dialogue, Socrates gives his account, however, while his arguments unfold, he emphasizes clearly that if one is to have faith in the immortality of the soul, it should be because they see it is the truth, not do so for the gifts it would bring such as the consolation, the relief, the pleasure. In this sense, “putting the truth before the self, not only in this matter but in everything, is what the practice of philosophy means for Socrates.” (Dilman, 1992, p. 1)

The dialogue revolves around the questions on life and death which are the two sides of the same coin and synthesize into the ethical question of “How one ought to live?”. There is no direct answer to this question, rather what we get as an answer is Socrates himself in his attitude as philosophical. Argumentation and taking sides to shed the questions and potential answers from the controversies surrounding them in order to reveal the truth (Dilman, 1992, p. 130).

It is noteworthy and interesting that the dialogue starts with what seems to be a trivial question of Echecrates about why it took so long between Socrates' trial and condemnation to death and about his "actual death" (Plato, *Phaedo*, 58-58c). This I believe is a miniature, a portrait of Socrates' life as his practice of dying to reveal a framework to view the body, the soul and life.

I take the 'trial' to be the fall of the soul to earth, condemnation of it to a body as the myth in the *Phaedrus*, thus the beginning of souls' death in mortality if not purified. *Phaedo* answers that it was 'by chance' which I believe can be taken for the Life itself, to live is a chance. *Phaedo* continues to explain that there is an annual mission in reminiscence of Theseus saving the Athenians who were going to be sacrificed to the Minotaur. In the name of Theseus' legendary ship, the annual mission to Delos has started by the priest of Apollo crowning the prow of the ship.

They have a law to keep the city pure while it [the mission] lasts, and no execution may take place once the mission has begun until the ship has made its journey to Delos and returned to Athens, and this can sometimes take a long time if the winds delay it. The mission begins when the priest of Apollo crowns the prow of the ship, and this happened, as I say, the day before Socrates' trial. That is why Socrates was in prison a long time between his trial and his execution. (Plato, *Phaedo*, 58b-58c)

The ship of Theseus, in Ancient Greek philosophy, is a thought experiment about the relationship between the ontology and the identity of an entity. It asks if the ship remains as the same entity when all its original parts are replaced. This ship of Theseus mentioned in the *Phaedo*, I take to represent the human body as body parts also are renewing and always changing. The priest crowning the prow of the ship resembles the baptizing of a baby with a priest blessing, to sanctify the body with The Divine. The mission of the ship might be best revealed in The Chariot Allegory in the *Phaedrus* by unrevealing Socrates as embodiment of an ethical life, the

individual living on the mission of ‘purification of the soul’ which is the focus of the next section.

3.2 *Phaedrus*: Erōs and madness

Phaedrus is the dialogue on Erōs, madness and the art of rhetoric. Socrates tries to win over Phaedrus to get him interested in philosophy rather the rhetoric as “A rhetorical composition does not actually convey the truth; the truth is known only through philosophical study” (Plato, 1997, p. 506-507) How philosophy is the attitude to seek the truth may best be defined through the question at the beginning of the dialogue:

I am still unable, and it really seems to me ridiculous to look into other things before I have understood that. This is why I do not concern myself with them. I accept what is generally believed, and, as I was just saying, I look not into them but into my own self: Am I a beast more complicated and savage than Typhon² or am I a tamer, simpler animal with a share in a divine and gentle nature? (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 230)

The question of “Who/What am I?” is present. The philosophical way of life to purify the soul as suggested in the *Phaedo*, I believe is because the philosophical attitude rather than taking any fixed answers allows to remain with this question always keeping an active mode of inquiry and curiosity. The divine mission “as the Delphic inscription orders, to know myself” (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 230), is thus not taking the mere bodily or empirical worldly appearances as the Truth for this would only be the animalistic component of thyself and is a partial representation and reduction that may lead to a misrepresentation, not its whole. Body as the animalistic, appetitive part of the individual meets with the regulations and laws.

² Typhon is a fabulous multiform beast with a hundred heads resembling many different animal species

City is representing the social animal aspect of human nature. In order to live together, subjects must acknowledge and recognize each other as subjects and the laws, rules and regulations as the authority. The city thus necessitates the consideration of the others in an ethical sense. It might also be the first realization of the soul as the self-mover in empirical world since humans became responsible and autonomous in terms of creating the rules, regulations, laws that they will obey. It is interesting to see how Plato uses the city as a symbolic representation of the relation between the individual and the collective, the particular and the universal, and even the body and the soul. Particularly I consider the following passage:

PHAEDRUS: And you, my remarkable friend, appear to be totally out of place. Really, just as you say, you seem to need a guide, not to be one of the locals. Not only do you never travel abroad—as far as I can tell, you never even set foot beyond the city walls.

SOCRATES: Forgive me, my friend. I am devoted to learning; landscapes and trees have nothing to teach me—only the people in the city can do that. But you, I think, have found a potion to charm me into leaving. For just as people lead hungry animals forward by shaking branches of fruit before them, you can lead me all over Attica or anywhere else you like simply by waving in front of me the leaves of a book containing a speech. (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 230d-230e)

Socrates being out of the city I take as him being out of Reason while giving an account of Erōs. Socrates demonstrates its effect first, due to his desire to engage in a dialogue with Phaedrus, by giving a speech nearly repeating the impiety of Lysias in his mere rhetoric absence both in person and in Truth, then is stopped by the divine signs:

SOCRATES: My friend, just as I was about to cross the river, the familiar divine sign came to me which, whenever it occurs, holds me back from something I am about to do. I thought I heard a voice coming from this very spot, forbidding me to leave until I made atonement for some offense against the gods. In effect, you see, I am a seer [...] (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 242b-242d)

I will talk in more detail about Socrates defining himself as a seer [of Truth] in Chapter 5. As soon as he sees the Truth by coming into contact with the divine, he reveals:

SOCRATES: You'll have to understand, beautiful boy, that the previous speech was by Phaedruss, Pythocles' son, from Myrrhinus, while the one I am about to deliver is by Stesichorus, Euphemus' son, from Himera.

'There's no truth to that story'—that when a lover is available you should give your favors to a man who doesn't love you instead, because he is in control of himself while the lover has lost his head. That would have been fine to say if madness were bad, pure and simple; but in fact the best things we have come from madness, when it is given as a gift of the god. (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 244)

In the dialogue we see the account of Lysias about convincing one to give oneself to a non-lover rather than a lover. We have a list through 231-233b of the characteristics of a lover from Lysias' perspective which is in alignment with Balint's seven characteristics of a primitive lover in Section 2.2. Following Lysias' account on what he takes love to be and its effects on the lover, the inevitable conclusion is that one "should feel sorry for lovers, not admire them" since their judgment is impaired by their desire (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 233b).

Socrates then gives an account of Erōs starting with appreciating that desire out of rational, leading to Madness enables us to come into contact with The Divine, Love itself, and through that, to make contact with the others in love. Socrates gives "The prophetess of Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona [...] Sybil and the others who foretell many things by means of god-inspired prophetic trances and give sound guidance to many people" (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 244b) to exemplify the advantages, goodness of madness and to appreciate it. Socrates finds the linguistic motif worth adding, that might be counted as a Palinode to Madness as follows:

The people who designed our language in the old days never thought of madness as something to be ashamed of or worthy of blame; otherwise they would not have used the word ‘manic’ for the finest experts of all—the ones who tell the future—thereby weaving insanity into prophecy. They thought it was wonderful when it came as a gift of the god, and that’s why they gave its name to prophecy; but nowadays people don’t know the fine points, so they stick in a ‘t’ and call it ‘*mantic*.’ Similarly, the clear-headed study of the future, which uses birds and other signs, was originally called *oionoïstic*, since it uses reasoning to bring intelligence (*nous*) and learning (*historia*) into human thought; but now modern speakers call it *oiōnistic*, putting on airs with their long ‘*ō*’. To the extent, then, that prophecy, *mantic*, is more perfect and more admirable than sign-based prediction, *oiōnistic*, in both name and achievement, madness (*mania*) from a god is finer than self-control of human origin, according to the testimony of the ancient language givers. (ibid, 244b-d)

Madness of the healers, mentors, mystics is Divine wisdom of being a passage, a channel in between the Divine and human. Madness in this sense enables a capacity to know, see, detect, diagnose the ancient crimes along with their remedies, antidotes and to deliver relief, protection and safety from the hardship that might have transferred (ibid, 244e). From the madness of the Muses that is the divine inspiration the artists come in contact with while producing their works of art, in specific literature especially poetry and songs in a form of giving birth in Beauty (ibid, 245). “And we, for our part, must prove the opposite, that this sort of madness is given us by the gods to ensure our greatest good fortune.” (ibid, 245b-c) Love thus in its madness supplies divine protection, safety, teaching and healing. However, in order to see Erōs as a demon, a mediator between human and divine, humans first have to acknowledge themselves as what they are which can never be answered fully. Ethical training of the appetite, the body is required. Thus, Plato brings the Chariot Allegory and Socrates tells the Truth in the form of a myth to make it intelligible for human reasoning.

We must realize that each of us is ruled by two principles which we follow wherever they lead: one is our inborn desire for pleasures, the other is our

acquired judgment that pursues what is best. Sometimes these two are in agreement; but there are times when they quarrel inside us, and then sometimes one of them gains control, sometimes the other. Now when judgment is in control and leads us by reasoning toward what is best, that sort of self-control is called 'being in your right mind'; but when desire takes command in us and drags us without reasoning toward pleasure, then its command is known as 'outrageousness'. (ibid, 237d-238)

The downside of Erōs when it is not aligned with Reason, then, is dangerous and causes falsehood in ethical sense. It is important to recall the question of Socrates about who he is at the beginning of the dialogue. This is also what Lewis says when Dilman talks about him on our two-way nature:

'One of the first things Eros does is to obliterate the distinction between giving and receiving' [...]. The lover receives pleasure in giving it and gives pleasure to the beloved in receiving it from her. It is often thought, Lewis writes, 'that the spiritual danger of Eros element' arises almost entirely from its carnal [...]. The idea is that surrender to the senses is soul-destroying. Lewis believes that this is a mistake which comes from taking Venus, the carnal element of eros, too seriously. This leads him to write at some length about the body [...] : 'we are composite creatures... akin on one side to the angels, on the other to tom-cats' [...]. (Dilman, 1998, p. 152)

Surrendering to the senses as the two horses without a chariot to ride and rule them would be turning Erōs into a god. To this I will come back to in the next chapter. For now, it is important to emphasize that 'purification of the soul' with the ancient rite that starts with 'there is no truth in that story' in order to turn to seek the appreciation of The Divine rather than humans (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 242e-243b), is the ethical pruning from the falsehood by the Reason acting as the chariot in alignment with the force of the Divine that pulls it towards Heavens.

The unreasoning desire that overpowers a person's considered impulse to do right and is driven to take pleasure in beauty, its force reinforced by its kindred desires for beauty in human bodies — this desire, all-conquering in its forceful drive, takes its name from the word for force (rhōmē) and is called erōs. (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 238c)

There is hint for the direction of looking to see the Truth. It is the bodily senses, the black horse that draws us towards earth, to seek appreciation of other human beings. Such a move makes a person an immature lover for one is dependent on the others to the level one loses one's autonomy which is developed by reasoning and judging for oneself. That causes falsehood:

Let us turn to what causes the shedding of the wings, what makes them fall away from a soul. It is something of this sort: By their nature wings have the power to lift up heavy things and raise them aloft where the gods all dwell, and so, more than anything that pertains to the body, they are akin to the divine, which has beauty, wisdom, goodness, and everything of that sort. These nourish the soul's wings, which grow best in their presence; but foulness and ugliness make the wings shrink and disappear. (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246e)

3.3 *Symposium* revisited: Sexual Love Erōs and ethical development

Symposium is the dialogue of a formal drinking party in Agathon's house to celebrate him for winning the first prize for his tragedy. There are six speeches in praise of Love (Greek erōs). The elevated Erōs is that of a mature man and a young boy in which Love's characteristics are portrayed as the ethical and intellectual stand of an educator to nurture the pupil. In Socrates' speech Diotima touches upon Love's characteristics starting from sexual attraction moving up to a more symbolic state of Love. I will use the conceptual framework Dilman provides for the maturity of Love and in order to uncover the ethical foundation and requirement of Love I will focus on Aristophanes' speech in which he delivers a myth of the human origins. For the sake of revealing the direction of the contact I mentioned earlier specifically in Section 2.3, I will focus on the relation between Alcibiades and Socrates, and between Socrates and Diotima.

It is worth mentioning that Apollodorus, a young friend of Socrates' in his

last years who has taken the trouble of learning about what happened in Agathon's, starts his interaction with the unnamed man. As given in the beginning of the dialogue between them, the man was making his way behind Apollodorus, talking behind his back and being nice to his face. I interpret this as the man was unethical—so the man was in a distance at the beginning of the dialogue while he was calling Apollodorus to tell the story about what happened in Agathon's house. That man heard the story from a man who heard it from Phoenix yet it was 'badly garbled'. Apollodorus starts his dialogue with him by stating:

[I]t's been less than three [years] that I've been Socrates' companion and made it my job to know exactly what he says and does each day. Before that, I simply drifted aimlessly. Of course, I used to think that what I was doing was important, but in fact I was the most worthless man on earth—as bad as you are this very moment: I used to think philosophy was the last thing a man should do. (Plato, *Symposium*, 173)

Then he says that he was not present at the event and heard the story from Aristodemus who might have been in the event due to his obsession with Socrates. This I read as one way of Erōs for his desire allowed the conveying of the story to us. As they are walking to the city taken as a metaphor for the relation of human to Reason and Ethics, the unknown person referred to in the dialogue becomes an unnamed "friend" informing that Apollodorus is called "the maniac" (ibid, 173d) as he is furious with everyone except Socrates. Thus, in terms of madness mentioned in *Phaedrus*, Plato gives us that we are in the presence of Erōs.

Aristodemus came across Socrates and got invited to Agathon's dinner, as they walk Socrates started to think something and was behind. When Aristodemus waited for him, Socrates urged him to go ahead and finally he arrives at Agathon's without Socrates. Although in his story he narrated it as an embarrassing situation that he was taken to the dining room without the person who invited him, this was in

fact an opportunity and I believe a deemonic divine sign of Socrates to let him arrive there first, alone, for Aristodemus to hear without his presence that he was already invited by Agathon. Agathon when he saw him welcomed him and invited him right away explaining that he was looking for him all over to invite him and asks for Socrates. Agathon sends a slave to look for Socrates, another slave comes to inform that Socrates is standing in the neighbor's porch although he called him several times. As Agathon was about to send him back ordering him to bring Socrates, Aristodemus stops them saying:

Leave him alone. It's one of his habits: every now and then he just goes off like that and stands motionless, wherever he happens to be. I'm sure he'll come in very soon, so don't disturb him; let him be. (Plato, *Symposium*, 175b)

I read this as Socrates not being forced and moved by anyone or anything external, but he is a self-mover just like the soul which I will talk about what I mean by soul in more detail in Chapter 4 and 5.

When Socrates enters, Agathon calls him, and this exchange follows:

"Socrates, come lie down next to me. Who knows, if I touch you, I may catch a bit of the wisdom that came to you under my neighbor's porch. It's clear *you've* seen the light. If you hadn't, you'd still be standing there." Socrates sat down next to him and said, "How wonderful it would be, dear Agathon, if the foolish were filled with wisdom simply by touching the wise. If only wisdom were like water, which always flows from a full cup into an empty one when we connect them with a piece of yarn—well, then I would consider it the greatest prize to have the chance to lie down next to you. I would soon be overflowing with your wonderful wisdom. (ibid, 175d-175e)

There is a reference to The Cave Allegory as Socrates being out of it to see the light, the Truth by coming into contact with a deemonic stillness and coming back to make contact with the others. The type of contact that would transfer the wisdom however cannot be merely physical. In fact, the inherent theme is that wisdom is not a skill, it

cannot be transferred. In Chapter 4, however, I will come back to this point for evaluating in more detail on what I and Dilman means by contact along with its relation to epistemology and a transcendental grasp or understanding.

In Sufism, the word “wine” has a transcendental meaning for the unity of Divine “Love” and it is filled from heaven to the cup, that is the heart. As the speeches will be on Love, I take the talk about drinking as getting high on Love. Sexual love limited to physicality thus is insufficient. One of the characteristics of Socrates, exceeding the human ‘limit’ in terms of getting affected by the bodily or physical activities, is given by Eryximachus while he is conveying medical information. Talking about the nature of intoxication he says that “inebriation is harmful to everyone” yet he said earlier that “Of course I don’t include Socrates in my claims: he can drink or not, and will be satisfied whatever we do.” (ibid, 176d) It is also another interesting point Plato reveals about Socrates that when it was proposed that there be speeches on Love to praise the god was suggested, he [Socrates] who acknowledges his ignorance and accepts that he does not know, says “How could I vote ‘No,’ when the only thing I say I understand is the art of love?” (ibid, 177e) I will investigate the distinction between knowing and understanding in Section 4.2.

Aristophanes’ speech portrays a myth on the human nature. His first point is on the genders as he claims there were three kinds, male, female and their combination ‘androgynous’. His second point is about their shape: their sides and back in a circle they were completely round and had four hands, four legs, one head with two faces on the opposite sides, four ears and two sets of sexual organs. In their strength and power, they attempted to ascend to heaven in order to attack the Gods. Thus, Zeus cut them into two as their punishment. Zeus ordered Apollo to turn their

faces to the other side so that they could see they have been cut off and behave themselves in order. Apollo healing the rest of the scar by covering skin from all sides and fastening it to stomach which is now called navel as the reminder of their origin and what happened to them. One half seeking the other, they did not do anything without the other half, and they kept dying. Zeus pitied them and turned their reproductive organs to the front and so invented “interior reproduction, *by the man in the woman*”. (Plato, *Symposium*, 189e, 191c)

Love is born into every human being; it calls back the halves of our original nature together; it tries to make one out of two and heal the wound of human nature. Each of us, then, is a “matching half” of a human whole, because each was sliced like a flatfish, two out of one, and each of us is always seeking the half that matches him. (ibid, 191d)

Dilman is inclined to say that “sex, in human life, is an impulse to make contact with another human being” for physically discovering the other and that physical contact is the embodiment of the emotions aroused by the other (Dilman, 1998, p. 58-59). He finds Aristophanes’ parody as representing the problem human separateness constituted by the very existence of being human. Referring to Fromm about his saying on the mature love “the paradox occurs that two beings become one and yet remain two” along with his conception of the mature love, I believe he would find Aristophanes’ parody, when taken as the Love between two individuals, as a form of immature love since its origin is founded on being a whole in a state of “fusion” which lacks integrity and cannot appreciate the separateness of the other as one would see the other as one’s half, thus is not an independent individual, always seeks an external completion.

I find this point of the difference between fusion -losing one’s individual integrity in the other or dissolving in their togetherness- and union -in the integrity of

the individuals- a convenient place to introduce Alcibiades as the immature lover. He longs for Socrates in physical desire, his passion is for a type of “fusion”, and it is not for Socrates but instead to take something from him for fulfilling himself.

“I beg you, Agathon,” Socrates said, “protect me from this man! You can’t imagine what it’s like to be in love with him: from the very first moment he realized how I felt about him, he hasn’t allowed me to say two words to anybody else—what am I saying, I can’t so much as look at an attractive man but he flies into a fit of jealous rage. He yells; he threatens; he can hardly keep from slapping me around! Please, try to keep him under control. Could you perhaps make him forgive me? And if you can’t, if he gets violent, will you defend me? The fierceness of his passion terrifies me!” (Plato, *Symposium*, 213d)

Alcibiades is overthrown by his emotions and thus is attached to the physical, lacks ‘self-mastery’ in Socrates’ sense. He cannot see Socrates while sitting on the couch and he cannot see him as he is, placing some ribbons on him by saying if he appreciates Agathon but not Socrates, he knows that he will make a scene (ibid, 213e). His affective apprehension of the other, in this case Socrates, is limited and confined to his own immaturity, jealousy and seeking external validation or appreciation. When Socrates is in the position of the Lover and Alcibiades of the beloved, he turns the direction the other way around and pursues on becoming a lover of Socrates, “So what I did was to invite him to dinner, as if *I* were his lover and he my young prey!” (ibid, 217c-217d). Seeing Love as a hunt and beloved as a prey, Alcibiades clearly lacks maturity, not having the characteristics of patience, forgiveness, detachment along with other requirements thus he cannot be a Lover. He is arrogant, his low sense of self is in falsehood seeking for the appreciation of the human rather than The Divine:

Socrates is the only man in the world who has made me feel shame—ah, you didn’t think I had it in me, did you? Yes, he makes me feel ashamed: I know perfectly well that I can’t prove he’s wrong when he tells me what I should

do; yet, the moment I leave his side, I go back to my old ways: I cave in to my desire to please the crowd. My whole life has become one constant effort to escape from him and keep away, but when I see him, I feel deeply ashamed, because I'm doing nothing about my way of life, though I have already agreed with him that I should. Sometimes, believe me, I think I would be happier if he were dead. And yet I know that if he dies I'll be even more miserable. I can't live with him, and I can't live without him! What *can* I do about him? (Plato, *Symposium*, 216b-216c)

Socrates starts his speech by distinguishing himself from other speakers also about the method of talking on Love, claiming that he will not praise him, instead give the Truth:

I think that is why you stir up every word and apply it to Love; your description of him and his gifts is designed to make him look better and more beautiful than anything else—to ignorant listeners, plainly, for of course he wouldn't look that way to those who knew. And your praise did seem beautiful and respectful. But I didn't even know the method for giving praise; and it was in ignorance that I agreed to take part in this. So "the tongue" promised, and "the mind" did not. Goodbye to that! I'm not giving another eulogy using that method, not at all—I wouldn't be able to do it!—but, if you wish, I'd like to tell the truth my way. I want to avoid any comparison with your speeches, so as not to give you a reason to laugh at me. So look, Phaedrus, would a speech like this satisfy your requirement? You will hear the truth about Love, and the words and phrasing will take care of themselves. (ibid, 198e-199c)

Socrates does not give an account in the argumentation form, instead, he reports what the art of love is as he learned from Diotima who is wise in many matters and is in connection with the Divine to tell Athenian's what to sacrifice. *Symposium* also starts with a man who wanted to hear the story, was in a distance from Apollodorus the teller of what happened. Much debated in the literature, I believe that Diotima is not a real person but an invention of Plato, a way of distancing Love to appreciate its divinity.

The direction of the contact to convey the Love is given in the relationship between Socrates and Diotima. Socrates who does not take any fixed point and never

claims to know anything tells us that the only matter he understands is love and he takes Diotima's words to be the Truth. Diotima talks about Love (Erōs) as neither beautiful nor good but this does not necessitate to conclude that he is ugly and bad. Negation of something does not lead to its opposite, thus we are given that logic may lead to a logical fallacy of false dichotomy in divine matters. It exceeds the rational judgment and understanding in terms of "making sense". "Everything spiritual, you see, is in between god and mortal." (202e) In her words, Love is not a God but a great spirit, daemon, in between, and explains their function as being mediator between mortal and immortal:

They are messengers who shuttle back and forth between the two, conveying prayer and sacrifice from men to gods, while to men they bring commands from the gods and gifts in return for sacrifices. Being in the middle of the two, they round out the whole and bind fast the all to all. Through them all divination passes, through them the art of priests in sacrifice and ritual, in enchantment, prophecy, and sorcery. Gods do not mix with men; they mingle and converse with us through spirits instead, whether we are awake or asleep. He who is wise in any of these ways is a man of the spirit, but he who is wise in any other way, in a profession or any manual work, is merely a mechanic. These spirits are many and various, then, and one of them is Love. (Plato, *Symposium*, 202e-203b)

She continues with saying that Socrates based on what he said about love, confuses Love with being loved instead of being a lover and takes a different form, of being in between (ibid, 204c). She carries on by drawing attention that there are different kinds of love, yet we do not call the pursuer of those different kinds 'lover' in the sense of desiring and engaging in an activity or person that brings joy; but only a certain kind of being in love qualifies to be called 'love', 'in love' and 'lover' (ibid, 205d). "In a word, then, love is wanting to possess the good forever." (ibid, 206b)

And this is the object of love, “It is giving birth in beauty,³ whether in body or in soul” (ibid, 206b) while adding that “Beauty, however, is in harmony with the divine.” (ibid, 206d) since love (Erōs) is only of what we do not have. Thus, the object of Love is Reproduction for this is the closest mortals can get to the experience of immortality. Erōs makes it easier for us to outgrow, leaving ourselves and being there for the other out of desire. Yet, when reproduction is taken in its merely physical sense, erotic or sexual love does not qualify as Love, and it is dangerous. Rather it is the lower form of love, that of between man and woman. The reason Love is not given by Diotima as a God might be due to

Lewis's point that 'the real spiritual danger in Eros as a whole lies... elsewhere' - not in its carnal element (p. 90). It lies in making Eros into a god, in giving it unconditional obedience when it speaks most like a god: 'Eros, honoured without reservation and obeyed unconditionally, becomes a demon' (p. 101). [...] So the real danger, as with other loves, is the one that has its source in something endemic to the natural love in question itself; in this case to Eros: 'of all loves, Eros is, at its height, most god-like; therefore most prone to demand our worship.... The real danger... [is] that the lovers will idolise Eros himself (p. 102). [...] He (Eros) is notoriously the most mortal of our loves. The world rings with complaints of his fickleness. What is baffling is the combination of this fickleness with the protestations of permanency. To be in love is both to intend and to promise lifelong fidelity. (Dilman, 1998, p. 153-154)

Erotic love strengthens the motive for being open and make contact with the other. Sexual attraction is not sufficient for sustaining the love, rather what makes Lovers unique according to Dilman, is the exclusive character of love. It is to be shared only between lovers, no third person. In this sense, being in love requires a commitment to the discipline of having an ethical way of life. Love (Erōs) thus allows a life-long maturation, growth, discovery and self-knowledge. It is a taste of

³ The preposition is ambiguous between “within” and “in the presence of.” Diotima may mean that the lover causes the newborn (which may be an idea) to come to be within a beautiful person; or she may mean that he is stimulated to give birth to it in the presence of a beautiful person.

what it means to move beyond the human nature of self-seeking and being a source for the other's wellbeing, happiness. Caring about the other as oneself, we overcome human separateness by being a lover rather than needing to be loved, seeking a union with integrity thus acknowledging the autonomy of others. To expand this state of being a lover from directing it from one particular lover, to every individual, I believe, allows a reproduction in the Soul.

Diotima to expand the understanding of Love that takes Reproduction as its object, talks about the existence of studying:

‘For what we call *studying* exists because knowledge is leaving us, because forgetting is the departure of knowledge, while studying puts back a fresh memory in place of what went away, thereby preserving a piece of knowledge, so that it seems to be the same. And in that way everything mortal is preserved, not, like the divine, by always being the same in every way, but because what is departing and aging leaves behind something new, something such as it had been. By this device, Socrates,’ she said, ‘what is mortal shares in immortality, whether it is a body or anything else, while the immortal has another way. So don’t be surprised if everything naturally values its own offspring, because it is for the sake of immortality that everything shows this zeal, which is Love.’ (Plato, *Symposium*, 208-208b)

Studying in terms of knowledge then, is a form of reproduction in which mortals can experience a kind of immortality. Being a lover of wisdom as in between wisdom and ignorance thus carrying the study of love by becoming a source for others while in the process of various individuals one will continue on one's self-discovery and learning. What Love enables is thus in alignment with Dilman's views. This can be understood in terms of pursuing a lifelong studying, a philosophical life as mentioned in the *Phaedo*. Diotima as the source of knowledge of love talks about the ascending to the Form of Beauty starting with loving individuals to move beyond the physical to an impersonal Love leading to becoming a lover as a source to others.

Plato's view, as articulated by Diotima, is that the answer to the situation parodied is to be found in an ascent to an impersonal love. Such a love is mediated by a love of the Good, it is indiscriminating between particular individuals and so is detached from the needs and desires in us, the satisfaction of which we seek in them. In the *Phaedo* this detachment is represented as achievable by means of the purification of the soul from the self. There is a close affinity between this conception of love and that found in Christianity. The ascent of which Diotima speaks in the *Symposium*, ascent from the particular to the form of the good, the detachment from what we turn to in the particular and the individual for the satisfaction of our needs, does not imply indifference to the particular and the individual. Not at all. For the love of the good towards which we move in such an ascent and detachment is something that finds expression in our concern for individuals. It is only there that it can find expression. This ascent thus is not a flight into the abstract and the general, a flight from the world in which it is the individual that counts, the individual with whom we make contact. [...] In Plato this thought is expressed in the *Republic* in terms of the allegory of the cave in the idea of the return to the cave by the individual who has been freed from it. (Dilman, 1998, p. xix-xx)

CHAPTER 4

KNOWING BEYOND KNOWING

4.1 Ethical training: Affective apprehension as seeing the soul in flesh

In Section 2.2, I briefly introduced what Dilman calls affective apprehension and tried to uncover its relation to the ‘affective maturity’ which is a person’s capacity of relating to others as subjects that also determines the maturity level of one’s capacity to love. Such an apprehension, that is through our emotions, enriches and opens one to the outer. Thus, Dilman takes affection to be central for relating to ourselves in a peculiar way, through relating to others and the world. This can perhaps be best understood by examining further the Wittgensteinian foundations of his conceptions:

Wittgenstein argues that we do not learn the meanings of such words as ‘pain’, ‘anger’, ‘joy’ and ‘sorrow’ *from our own case* and then transfer these meanings to those words in other people’s mouths by analogy. Hearing them use these words in the first person, seeing their behaviour and reactions and noticing their circumstances play an important part in our learning their meanings and so form part of our conception of what it means to be in pain, angry, joyful or depressed. Hence anger or joy is not only what a person *feels* when he is angry or joyful and says so, but also what we see when he is angry or feels joy and does not hide it. What he feels and what we see are thus *one and the same thing*; they form part of the same conception. (Dilman, 1987, p. 33)

If one can relate to others and apprehend their reality affectively, that is through one’s emotions; then one is able to see the others’ behaviours, reactions, noticing their circumstances in depth that is ‘in a meaningful way’. This is how we make sense of the world through making sense of words, via observing their instances as the relationship of the particular circumstances and the experiencer. So, affective apprehension allows one to see beyond the ‘surface level’ of a person, that is mere

reactions, behaviors, body movements, by putting those into the relevant context. It allows making a contact in the following sense:

It is in the particular circumstances of human life that a man's words, gestures, movements, postures and facial expressions constitute this kind of pattern [of a bodily expression such as the pattern of sorrow, joy, smile etc.]. To see the pattern is to see his soul. [...] My main point is that it is the person before me who has the joy and it is to him that I respond, in my turn, when I see him dance for joy. Wittgenstein speaks of my response as 'an attitude towards a soul' (1963, p. 178). By a soul he means a human being in contrast with a thing. The term 'attitude' here is opposed to 'opinion'. Do I believe (Wittgenstein asks) that he is not an automaton? Is this belief which, if justified, would constitute a piece of knowledge? He rejects the idea. [...] But if I believe that he is suffering then 'my attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul'. It is only of that towards which I take this attitude is a logical precondition of such a belief but it is not itself something I can entertain, can question, justify, verify, or deny. It is not based on anything. It is not *because* I recognize a human being or soul in what I encounter that I respond or react in the way I do. (Dilman, 1987, pp. 33-4)

I will explore the difference between knowing a thing and a person in the next section for it is crucial to understand how ethics is although still an epistemic practice moves beyond epistemology. This I hope will clarify the purpose of the "purification of the soul" in connection to Love and Beauty.

4.2 Epistemology to ethics: knowing a thing vs. knowing a person

Although in philosophy we have different views for what "knowledge is", it is often investigated in epistemology and knowing is taken as an epistemic practice. Dilman, however, emphasizes "affection" to point out the ethical aspect of knowing a subject in contrast to epistemic knowing of an object, facts or state of affairs. The difference between knowing a person in contrast to knowing a thing lies in one's capacity to stand in "an attitude towards a soul", to view the other as a subject beyond any reach of a fixed point of view about the other. This is only possible by making a contact

with the other as the other so that one does not reduce a subject to an object as if a person is merely a set of properties.

The knowledge in question, I have argued, is not a form of cognition or apprehension, but of acquaintance or contact with another person. Thus to know someone is not the same thing as knowing this or that about him; and the kind of deception that undoes or defeats my knowing someone is when I am deceived by him, and not necessarily about him. The antithesis of the kind of knowing that is in question here is not ignorance but estrangement, loss of contact, the cessation of intercourse. [...] Even when two people make contact on a purely intellectual plane, the contact itself is never purely intellectual and has an affective dimension. I said that it takes two to make contact and that this is primarily an affective matter. The other person must be *there* to me, his responses through which I come in contact with him must be authentic, come from him – he must be in them. I on my part must meet them, not flinch from them or draw back, nor must I pretend that they are something other than what they are. That is I, in turn, must be honest, clear-sighted, and myself. Just as I must not be simply accidental object of his responses, so equally my responses must be directed to him *as he is* – I must not project my phantasies on him or treat him as a mere instrument. (Dilman, 1987, p. 135)

Dilman is saying that to know a person one must meet the other in person. Only being with the other in humility to keep in mind that one does not and cannot know the other allows one to change the context of relating the other from epistemology to ethics, to see that the other is not some thing to be known but a person to be with, to be engaged in joint activities, to be experienced in the course of life or in Dilman's words "in the traffic of human life" (Dilman, 1987, p. 121). And thus, one keeps the curiosity of viewing the other as the other. Knowing a person as an epistemic practice thus serves as merely marking the limit between the epistemology and the ontology, of one's knowledge of the other and the being of "what/who a person really is". Plato also points out to this limit in the *Symposium*, while talking about the Ocean of Beauty where "horizon" can be read as a symbol, a marker of a limit but

also the beyond.⁴ In contrast with inquiry or observation as in a scientific experiment, Dilman states the following:

Indeed I am most inclined to say that one cannot aim at coming to know another person, as one can aim at finding something out and pursue this aim by conducting an inquiry. It is true that people say: ‘I would like to come to know you – or know you better.’ But if this is genuine, it is an expression of interest in the other person to which, in turn, he may respond positively. It is an overture, not the prelude to an inquiry. If one wants to know a person, that is because one is interested in him, and not in finding out anything about him. (Dilman, 1987, p. 121)

One may only make a request to be responded, yet actually contacting the other takes the permission and presence of the other also. Humility thus allows one to recall the limit and to view the other a subject to make contact in the right way, that is appropriate to human relations. My emphasis above is to point out the appropriateness revealing the ethical nature of this contact. Ethical not only in the sense of recognizing the autonomy, the individuality, the permission of the other but also “being true in being” that is being authentic, true to one’s nature. Dilman’s by emphasizing the “affective” aspect is thus referring to two things:

I said that it takes two for there to be knowledge of another person, that knowing a person is not a one-way thing. Part of what I mean is that the other person has to be *there* for me to respond to him. I mentioned mutual trust, for trust is one way of being there for the other: you know that he will keep his word, you know that he will come forward for you. This is a relationship of reciprocity. (Dilman, 1987, p. 123)


To know another person’s mind, when he is not transparent, is to penetrate behind the moving surface of a living person – a surface of words, gestures, postures, attitudes and behaviour... But this moving surface is not necessarily a barrier of façade... It can be transparent as well as opaque. When it is transparent we can be said to have *direct* knowledge of another person’s mind. Thus the obstacle to knowledge of another person’s mind is not a logical gap which no reasoning can bridge, as the philosophical sceptic imagines, but other person’s unwillingness, reserve, mistrust, or insincerity. (Dilman, 1975, pp. 208-9)

⁴ I particularly thank Çiğdem Yazıcı for bringing “horizon” to my attention as it makes clear the symbol of “Ocean”.

Shifting the context of knowledge from epistemology to ethics reveals how Dilman orders the “maturity” levels of love as an “ethical maturity” beyond psychology. This I see as closely in alignment with and very helpful in reading what Plato means by the condition of the soul:

Thus there are four such conditions in the soul, corresponding to the four subsections of our line: Understanding for the highest, thought for the second, belief for the third, and imaging for the last. Arrange them in a ratio, and consider that each shares in clarity to the degree that the subsection it is set over shares in truth. (Republic VI, 513d-e)

The line in the above quote is illustrated as:



(Plato, 1997, Republic VI, p.1130, footnote 13)

Considering the soul in its bodily context, this makes sense as the maturity levels of Love for relating with the others and the outer world. For instance, the immature levels may be taken as corresponds where the soul is in the state of imagination, projecting its needs and desires to the other and is provoked or

stimulated by the images of beauty in physical that is bodily. As in *Phaedrus*, merely remaining down to earth that is the visible, the world of images disempowers the wings of the horses. In such a state one is merely on the surface level of a person or the empirical world, not in contact with the truth. Whereas ascending to conditions requires a more developed sense of self, bringing the chariot as reasoning which, while operating in the realm of intelligible, “grasps by the power of dialectic” (*Republic VI*, 511c).

I believe, beyond Reason that uses dialectics lies “ineffable” Love (Erōs) as in between. An understanding of a different kind that necessitates an ethical being, an autonomous subject capable of relating the others as an “affective” contact.

It is of behaviour *thus understood* that Wittgenstein says: ‘If one sees the behaviour of a living thing one sees its soul’ (1963, sec. 357) I stress the ‘thus understood’; the behaviour in question is not behaviour as conceived by behaviourist psychologists and philosophers. Equally when, in connection with the religious idea of the existence of the soul after the disintegration of the body, Wittgenstein remarked that ‘the human body is the best picture of the human soul’ (1963, p. 178), the body, as he spoke of it, was not the body as it figures in Descartes’ philosophical thinking. (Dilman, 1987, p. 31)

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In the introduction of the dialogue *Phaedo*, it is pointed out that Plato places motifs to indicate that the ideas in the dialogue are not in alignment with the philosophy of Socrates and do not fit with other dialogues in which Socrates was talking about the virtues of the soul and presenting his own views. As Phaedo says Plato was not there himself, he was ill. Thus, the Socrates of the *Phaedo* seems a fictitious character for Plato to convey the Truth in human and linguistic form, extending its limits via myths and several dialogues to be able to personify a way of living or the ‘ineffable’ love within a body.

Phaedo while saying that they used to visit Socrates in prison says “When it opened we used to go in to Socrates and spend most of the day with him.” (Plato, *Phaedo*, 59d) as if Socrates is not a person but rather a field to go “in to [him]” a realm of philosophical life and ethics that he is the personification of. It is also remarkable that at the end of his life, just before he is to unite with The Divine, he starts to come into contact with the realm of his dreams and starts to write poetry. He explains it as following:

“I tried to find out the meaning of certain dreams and to satisfy my conscience in case it was this kind of art they were frequently bidding me to practice. The dreams were something like this: the same dream often came to me in the past, now in one shape now in another, but saying the same thing: ‘Socrates,’ it said, ‘practice and cultivate the arts.’ In the past I imagined that it was instructing and advising me to do what I was doing, such as those who encourage runners in a race, that the dream was thus bidding me do the very thing I was doing, namely, to practice the art of philosophy, this being the highest kind of art, and I was doing that. But now, after my trial took place, and the festival of the god was preventing my execution, I thought that, in case my dream was bidding me to practice this popular art, I should not

disobey it but compose poetry. I thought it safer not to leave here until I had satisfied my conscience by writing poems in obedience to the dream. So I first wrote in honor of the god of the present festival. After that I realized that a poet, if he is to be a poet, must compose fables, not arguments. Being no teller of fables myself, I took the stories I knew and had at hand, the fables of Aesop, and I versified the first ones I came across. Tell this to Evenus, Cebes, wish him well and bid him farewell, and tell him, if he is wise, to follow me as soon as possible. I am leaving today, it seems, as the Athenians so order it.” (Plato, *Phaedo*, 59d-61b)

Thus, I believe Socrates is a personification of Erōs in between human and The Divine and its contact with The Divine is through logos and a philosophical life to attain the ethical purification of the soul. What can be “said” about such a way of life and how to attain it, who to be in order to realize oneself in the Truth? Yazıcı’s examination of *Apology* regarding this ‘limit’ of the ‘sense’ as both the empirical body, the Reason or logos and the language is as follows:

For to practice *logos* before the ‘law’ brings with it the search for whether the action for which the defendant is held responsible is just or not and brings the requirement to tell the truth which demands having ‘knowledge’. So the language in which the truth is to be told by the practice of *logos* becomes crucial as the locus of the possibility of law and justice. This discussion will lead us to mark the limits of knowledge and of telling the truth in language that Socrates encounters when he speaks before the law. However, it will also show us what the practice of *logos* in language offers to the speaker: That is ‘self-realization’ by telling ‘who he is’ through realizing ‘what his limit in knowledge concerning truth in language is’. In other words, the defence speech turns into a defence and a realization of Socrates’ character. Since the *Apology* is Plato’s interpretation of the trial, we can also say that this discussion shows us how Plato defends and therefore realizes his character: Socrates. (Yazıcı, 2003, p. 9)

This is the limit of reason and linguistic expression; The Truth lies “ineffably” beyond that deemonic limit experience. As Socrates says:

Now here is what we must say about its structure. To describe what the soul actually is would require a very long account, altogether a task for a god in every way; but to say what it is like is humanly possible and takes less time. (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 246)

Diotima talks about seeing the Ocean of Beauty (210c-e), Socrates is defined by Agathon in the *Symposium* such and defines himself as the seer in the following:

“If you wish to reach a good decision on any topic, my boy, there is only one way to begin: You must know what the decision is about, or else you are bound to miss your target altogether. Ordinary people cannot see that they do not know the true nature of a particular subject, so they proceed as if they did; and because they do not work out an agreement at the start of the inquiry, they wind up as you would expect—in conflict with themselves and each other. Now you and I had better not let this happen to us, since we criticize it in others. (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 237b-d)

Recalling The Chariot Allegory in the *Phaedrus*, the horses remember Heavens and divinity when they see the beauty. This kind of seeing is first via the bodily eyes, then the eye of the Intellect and finally through the Soul. The matters of Divine however, exceeds the limits of logic and language. Through comparative close reading of the *Symposium* in connection with *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*, via Dilman’s framework of maturity, I defended that Socrates is Erōs in his characteristics I mentioned such as standing still, not getting affected by physical limits of the body - for instance drinking excessively without getting drunk, carrying his day without sleeping, walking barefoot on winter cold, etc. He is an embodiment of Plato’s argument to picture a life on the divine mission of remaining with the question of “Who/What am I?” with a philosophical attitude and this way of life is ethical. Thus, Socrates via a form of argumentation inquires into matters to the extent or ‘limit’ of ‘sense’ while he does not do so in the *Symposium*. Rather he says it is the only matter he understands, and I defended that this is so because Socrates, the character in written text which came to this very day is Plato’s account of Erōs, via philosophical becoming a creation as literature. In this sense, Socrates as Plato’s fictitious character is in between mortal and immortal.

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