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WITTGENSTEIN and THE LIMITS OF LANGUAGE IN PHILOSOPHY
IN 20TH CENTURY

Ezgi ALKIM

119679001

Assoc. Prof. Ferda KESKİN

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**WITTGENSTEIN VE 20. YÜZYIL FELSEFESİNDE DİLİN
SINIRLARI**

Ezgi ALKIM

119679001

Thesis Advisor: Assoc. Prof. Ferda Keskin

Istanbul Bilgi University

(Signature)

Jury Member: Assoc. Prof. Chryssi Sidiropoulou

Boğaziçi University

(Signature)

Jury Member: Assoc. Prof. Zeynep Talay Turner

Istanbul Bilgi University

(Signature)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iii
ABBREVIATIONS	iv
ABSTRACT	v
ÖZET	vi
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 1: WITTGENSTEIN.....	10
CHAPTER 2: HEIDEGGER	14
CHAPTER 3: DERRIDA'S CRITICISM.....	20
CHAPTER 4: SILENCE.....	22
CHAPTER 5. EARLY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY.....	24
CHAPTER 6: TRACTATUS PERIOD.....	33
CHAPTER 7: FREGE - ON SENSE IN MEANING.....	35
DISCUSSION.....	38
CONCLUSION	44
REFERENCES	52

ABBREVIATIONS

TLP The **Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus** (widely abbreviated and cited as TLP) is a book-length philosophical work by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein which deals with the relationship between language and reality and aims to define the limits language.

ABSTRACT

The following research is based on the thesis on the limits of language in philosophy through Wittgenstein perspective and the diachronic analysis of language in philosophy. Language has been identified as an essential aspect of human communication. However, the use of language has its limits, as Ludwig Wittgenstein has pointed out. He pioneered the controversial linguistic conception that the meaning of words, either relative or not, cannot be specified in isolation from the life practices that they are used. Wittgenstein also came up with the “language-game” that explains the phenomenon of language acquisition and use. Language is conceived in a totally different way, even methodologically: it is no longer a representation or index of anything; rather, it is like an instrument that can emit a different sound depending on its use made of it. Words are compared by Wittgenstein to different tools, and of these, a single use cannot be attributed. The Philosophical Investigations try to show the epistemological errors that we make daily when using language: the meaning of an expression is not necessarily to inform or describe. In short, the Philosophical Investigations represented a fundamental turn in contemporary epistemology. Wittgenstein contributed with his work a new method of understanding the linguistic fact that, although it disdains the question about the essence of language, it is capable, however, of providing more complete explanations, but now from its use. The research will answer three questions that will provide the number of appropriate systems with formal logic, the association of formal logic with the logic of language, as well as provide empirical evidence regarding the limitation of language. All the objectives will be answered using a qualitative research method.

Keywords: Wittgenstein, Language, Silence, Limits of Language, Language Games

ÖZET

Aşağıdaki tez, Wittgenstein perspektifinden felsefede dilin sınırları üzerine bir dizi araştırmaya ve felsefede dilin artzamanlı analizine dayanmaktadır. Dil, insan iletişiminin önemli bir yönü olarak tanımlanmıştır. Ancak, Ludwig Wittgenstein'ın işaret ettiği gibi; dil kullanımının sınırları olduğunu söylemek yanlış olmaz. Wittgenstein, görelî olsun ya da olmasın; sözcüklerin anlamlarının, kullanıldıkları yaşam pratiklerinden ayrı olarak belirlenemeyeceğine dair tartışmalı dilbilimsel anlayışa öncülük etti, dil edinimi ve kullanımı olgusunu açıklayan “dil oyunu” kavramını da literatüre kazandırdı. Wittgenstein’da dil, metodolojik olarak bile tamamen farklı bir şekilde kavranmıştır; artık hiçbir şeyin bir temsili veya göstergesi değildir. Daha ziyade, kullanımına bağlı olarak farklı bir ses çıkarabilen bir enstrüman gibidir. Kelimeler Wittgenstein tarafından farklı araçlarla karşılaştırılır ve bunlara tek bir kullanım atfedilemez. Felsefî Soruşturmalar, dili kullanırken her gün yaptığımız epistemolojik hataları göstermeye çalışır: Bir ifadenin anlamı mutlaka bilgilendirmek veya tasvir etmek değildir. En geniş özetleyle, ‘Felsefî Soruşturmalar’ çağdaş epistemolojide temel bir dönüşü temsil ediyor diyebiliriz. Wittgenstein, çalışmasıyla, dilin özüne ilişkin soruyu küçümsese de, daha eksiksiz açıklamalar sağlama yeteneğine sahip olduğu, ancak şimdi kullanımından vazgeçtiği dilsel gerçeği anlamının yeni bir yöntemine katkıda bulunmuş bir felsefecidir. Aşağıda irdelenecek araştırma; biçimsel mantıkla uygun sistemlerin sayısını, biçimsel mantığın dil mantığıyla ilişkisini sağlayacak ve dilin sınırlılığına ilişkin ampirik kanıtlar sağlayacak üç soruyu yanıtlayacaktır. Tüm hedeflere nitel bir araştırma yöntemi kullanılarak cevap aranacak ve cevap verilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Wittgenstein, Dil, Sessizlik, Dilin Sınırları, Dil Oyunları

INTRODUCTION

Badiou (Badiou, A., 2019) describes language as fundamental to human nature. It conditions human nature, the understanding of the world, as well as conditions the institutions that are in societies where human beings live. Ndianaefoo (Ndianaefoo, I., 2011) describes language as inarticulate or articulate thoughts that can assume the form of a system of gestures or symbols aimed at transmitting a meaning. He adds that language, therefore, does the fundamental function of objectifying and externalizing thought processes. Floyd (Floyd, J., 2007) writes a quote by M. Heidegger, Holzwege, that states that “language can express everything we think clearly.” Ndianaefoo (Ndianaefoo, I., 2011) claims that most analytical philosophers assume that issues of philosophy are issues of language. According to Phillips (Phillips, G.A., 1971), language acquisition occurs because of the correlation of non-verbal and verbal elements. Evidence from socio-linguistics demonstrates that communication of messages both for receiver and sender is improperly conceived when explained and understood strictly by verbally oriented models and methods. One of the proponents of language having limitations in philosophy is Ludwig Wittgenstein. He envisioned the concept of the limit of language in *Tractatus* (Badiou, A., 2019). Hacker (Hacker, P.M.S., 2001) writes that Wittgenstein was a critical philosopher in two more or less Kantian sense. Wittgenstein’s philosophy is important because it is concerned with the 'critique of dialectical illusion,' which is the systematic criticism of the 'logic of illusion.' Wittgenstein aimed to dispel abstract theories that speech exists independently from the speaker’s behavior (Costall, A., 1980). He pioneered the controversial linguistic approach that the meaning of words, either relative or not, cannot be specified in isolation from the life practices that they are used. Avgerinou (Avgerinou, M., 2017) writes that the message of the *Tractatus* cannot be used to implicitly describe ethical concerns of language because the determination and logic of meaning are fundamental grammatical rules. Thus, by logically evaluating language, there are limits in its application, and the result is limits of sensical thought. Language

needs to be assessed from the starting point of its practices instead of abstractions to semantics and syntax. As Wittgenstein put it, “Speaking a language is part of an activity, or a form of life” (Blair, D., 2006). He believes it should be a rule-governed activity (Kuusela, O., 2009). There are criticisms of the limitation of language in philosophy. Priest (Priest, G., 2006) writes that to claim that language has its limits and to say that there are things that cannot be communicated is, in a sense, to communicate about them. Hence, the paradox exists in a precise form in some of the paradoxes of self-reference in modern logic. Wittgenstein makes the study of language to be a challenging process since assessing the meaning of words not only requires verbal definitions but analysis of the entire language game of practices they are connected to and situations.

One of the most important notions in the second Wittgenstein's conception of language is that of language games. The question to be resolved in this section is: why does Wittgenstein use the notion of language games? Initially, it must be borne in mind that this notion implies a departure from the idea of language as computation, the original concept of the first Wittgenstein. The second Wittgenstein, for his part, abandons the idea that language is a carrier of meaning because of its accuracy; that is, of an image of exact language as the basis of language in general, where all kinds of language—including ordinary—bears meaning only to the extent that it starts from presuppositions taken from a metalanguage or another language considered more exact. To carry out this objective, Wittgenstein abandons the notions that had previously served him to defend the idea of language as calculation, for example, those that he points out in the *Tractatus*. In the first place, he points out that words are defined by the existence of ultimate linguistic components, which would be undefined signs that make definition possible. Second, he argues that language is more perfect to the extent that it approaches the ideal of exact language. To refute the first notion, Wittgenstein shows that it is not possible to define the essential properties of words; For example, with respect to the same word game, there are no properties that all games or activities

that are usually called games have in common. Then, there is no basic and unitary definition that makes it possible to apply them to the different definitions of other particular games since the apparent universal properties are not necessarily fulfilled in the different games. Wittgenstein himself (1999) refers to it in the Blue book: «We tend to think that there must be something common, let's say to all games, and that this common property is the justification for applying the general term “game” to the different games; since the games form a family, whose members have a family resemblance. Some of them have the same nose, others the same eyebrows, and others the same gait, and these resemblances overlap. The idea that a general concept is a common feature of its particular cases is connected with other primitive and very simple ideas about the structure of language (p. 45). On the other hand, with regard to the notion of language games, Wittgenstein (1999) points out the relevance that he assigns to these, as can be identified in the first pages of the Blue book and the Brown book: «In the future, I will draw your attention again and again to what I will call language games. They are simpler ways of using signs than the ways in which we use the signs of our highly complicated ordinary language» (p. 44). Words have a meaning that has been assigned by the subjects. For this reason, he points out later in the same work: «I want you to remember that words have the meanings that we have given them; and we give them meanings through explanations» (Wittgenstein, L., 1999, p.56). Now, with respect to the second notion that Wittgenstein rejects, the fact that language is better to the extent that it resembles an exact language. It implies that every word must follow certain basic rules and that the rules have to be stated definitively. The second Wittgenstein rejects such notions by indicating that, in principle, nothing is fixed forever in language; there is, according to him, no object that is the essential possessor of meaning. In fact, the very notion of language games implies certain flexibility with respect to the rules.

In the argumentation so far presented, it has been insisted that the meaning of a word is given by its use. This way of postulating language indicates that its significance

is due to the fact that it speaks of the real. What Wittgenstein proposes is to look at the relationship between words and the situations in which they are immersed. This indicates that the use of expressions that refer to situations of reality is found in a context, which implies that there is not something called language, but a particular language in which both linguistic and non-linguistic activities are developed. For example, language games. Together, speaking of "language games" instead of "the language" emphasizes that with language, a multiplicity of events is named. Taking this proposal as a starting point, from now on, there are no expressions that participate in language, but rather expressions that refer to the reality that is immersed in both linguistic and non-linguistic activities; that is, they are part of a language game. For this reason, ultimately, expressing oneself in terms of «language games» supposes revising the relationship established between theory and practice. In other words, the "language game" shows how language works within the actions in which it is woven. And language understood in this way does not have to be some kind of theoretical reflection, «but it is the reflection that is part of a language game» (Wittgenstein, L., 1999, p.391); although, paradoxically, "the concept, for the same reason, is in the language-game as in its house." Griffin, J. (1965). in his text the philosophy of Wittgenstein, interprets this position thus: "Where philosophers have traditionally looked for unity and equality, Wittgenstein looks for difference and multiplicity" (p. 217). Although there is no precise definition of language games, they can be interpreted as methods for examining the functioning of language: language games provide content and meaning to language. Wittgenstein (1999) insists on the instinctive roots of language. In Zettel (a book written by Wittgenstein), he states that "the language game is an extension of primitive behavior" (p. 545); and "primitive behavior means prelinguistic behavior, and a language-game is based on it, which is the prototype of a way of thinking, and not the result of thinking" (Wittgenstein, L., 1967). Wittgenstein (1999) defines language games for the first time in the following way: «Ways of using signs, simpler than the ways in which we use the signs of our highly complicated ordinary ,,,,language. Language games are the forms of language with which a child

begins to make use of words” (p. 44). This definition is too simple; however, gradually, throughout his work, Wittgenstein expands it. This is how he begins to outline it from the Brown book: «I do not contemplate the language games that I describe as incomplete parts of a language, but as complete languages in themselves. In such a way that certain grammatical functions of a language would not have any correlation with another. The agreement or disagreement with reality would be something different from the various languages; the simplest language is not an incomplete form of the most complicated” (Wittgenstein, L., 1999).

To clarify this, the example of the mason and his student can be taken up again. Imagine a language, a communication system of a bricklayer A with his assistant B. A builds building with construction stones; there are cubes, pillars, slabs, and beams. B has to pass the stones to him, just in the order that A needs them. To this end, they use a language consisting of the words cube, pillar, slab, and beam. A shouts the words, and B brings him the stone that he has learned to carry from that shout. This can be conceived as a primitive communication language. This language game has several characteristics to highlight. In the first place, the words that A says to B are not simply indicative but imperative. Cube is a word that means, in this language game, "I order the cube to be passed to me," in the same way as pillar, slab, and beam. It is possible to affirm that in this example, the linguistic and the non-linguistic aspects of language games can be glimpsed. A does not need to say to B: "I order you to give me the brick"; Simply, after expressing the word, a response follows, which is to hand over the brick. B does not have to say: "Here is the brick that you ordered to bring." With this example of a language game, it is determined that one acts in a certain way and not in another; there are some stipulated rules that make it unique. Keep in mind that Wittgenstein repeatedly stresses that language games are changeable, interpretable, and commanding. How many kinds of sentences, and how many types or games of language are there? Wittgenstein wonders in paragraph 23 of the Philosophical Investigations. It seems clear that if symbols and words are grouped according to their

kind of use and not their grammatical forms, then there are as many kinds of language-games as there are kinds of use of symbols, words, and phrases. But these uses are countless and open in their plurality. Thus, Wittgenstein (1999) asserts there is an indefinite multiplicity of language games, with new games being born and existing ones disappearing: "There are innumerable genres: innumerable different genres of everything we call 'sign,' 'words,' 'prayers.'" And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once and for all, but new types of language, new language games, as we can say, are born, and others grow old and are forgotten» (p. 23). This is an example that illustrates the previous conceptualization: «What holds the ship to the dock is a rope, and the rope consists of fibers; but its strength is not given by any fibre that runs through it from beginning to end, but by the fact that there are a large number of intertwined fibres» (Wittgenstein, L., 1999, p.87). Thus, expressing oneself in terms of "language games" means, first of all, denying the existence of an essence common to all languages. This implies that it is only possible to understand the meaning of a term considering the context or the situation in which it is used. In the Brown book, Wittgenstein (1999) begins to conceive of the idea of the "use of the sign in a particular system of language" (p. 113). As has already been said, with the concept of «language game» Wittgenstein (1999) has wanted to emphasize that language is a human practice that is immersed in the other practices that constitute the complicated form of human life: «I will call 'language game' to the formed whole and the actions with which it is interwoven» (p. 7). Then, an essential condition to fully understand them is to participate in them. Now, since language games are not reducible to one, that is, there is not something that can be called "the ideal or formal language game in which others participate; and given, furthermore, that there are so many and heterogeneous types of «language games» the questions arise: what is essential to «language games»? what makes a series of language games be called as "language games"? This is an objection of which Wittgenstein (1999) himself is aware: "Here we run into the great question that lies behind all these considerations. Well, it could now be objected: "You cut the easy way! You talk about all possible language games, but you have not said anywhere

what is essential to a language game. What is common to all these processes, and what converts them into language or parts of the language? Thus, you are spared precisely the part of the investigation that has given you the greatest headaches in its time, namely, that which has to do with the general form of the proposition and of language” (p. 65). What is surprising is that there is nothing absolute in common with all the phenomena we call language. This does not imply that the word language has an infinity of meanings but rather that it designates a family of phenomena which are related to each other in many different ways (Wittgenstein, L., 1999, p.65). Based on the above, it is necessary to try to solve this dilemma. Wittgenstein's contribution in this regard is linked to one of the outstanding notions of his second philosophy, namely: family resemblances . In short, language games are sets of linguistic and non-linguistic actions governed by rules, which are acquired by habit, which refers to a certain "form of life."

Throughout this writing, in which the main notions that make up the conception of language in the philosophical context of the second Wittgenstein devastated, it has been possible to observe that language is a human practice that is immersed in everything; both in linguistic and non-linguistic practices. It has also been emphasized that the latter do not make sense on their own since they work based on human requirements. Likewise, Wittgenstein has insisted, with the notion of a language game, that language must be seen as a system of practices immersed in contexts, which make up "forms of life." This is precisely what he confirms: «The expression 'language game' must emphasize here that speaking the language is part of an activity or form of life» (Wittgenstein, L., 1999, p.23). Forms of life, understood as the conditions in which communication takes place, can be expressed as types of defined scenarios, given, in which various types of activities take place: language games. In the words of Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, L., 1999, p.517): "What must be accepted, what is given - we could say - are forms of life.” And if one has to ask about the nature of forms of life, it must be recognized that there are multiple forms of life, where the way of acting

is unique in each one. Thus, taking as a premise that forms of life are given, then it must be recognized that they are unquestionable, that is, that they are neither true nor false. Therefore, it must be accepted that it is through the form of life that the language game must ultimately be explained. The sense or nonsense of this depends not on its correlation with reality but on the coupling it maintains with the form of life to which it belongs, from which the language game arises jointly. When Wittgenstein warned that forms of life are the Given, it is clarifying at the same time that these are not predetermined and that their nature is such that they are not based on a pact that human beings elaborate (as a defining criterion that gives logic to language), to subsequently act correctly or incorrect. This is how he affirms it: «You say that the concordance of men decides what is true and what is false? True and false is what men say; and men agree in language. This is not an agreement of opinions, but of the way of life» (Wittgenstein, L., 1999, p. 241). Now, the activities (events, language games) can only be carried out in one place, in precise circumstances, in such a way that the understanding of the meaning of the expressions of the language is only possible if we connect the language game with A lifestyle. In this sense, forms of life must be conceived as situations in which certain linguistic and non-linguistic activities (habits, behaviours) are developed. In this way, a language game makes sense when it is immersed in a particular way of life and not in another. An example that illustrates the above is this: «A tribe has two concepts related to our “pain.” The one will apply in cases of visible injuries and is linked with care, compassion, etc. The other is applied in cases, for example, of stomach pain, and consists of making fun of the one who complains» (Wittgenstein, L., 1999, p.380). Now, admitting a way of life different from the one we usually recognize is, for Wittgenstein, to accept that the same concepts are not used in different contexts. For this reason, the author states: «Imagining a language means imagining a way of life. » (Wittgenstein, L., 1999, p.19); or from another point of view: "Imagining a language means imagining a culture" (Wittgenstein, L., 1999, p. 215). What Wittgenstein wants to emphasize is that the way in which the two concepts are manifested in the tribe comprise communication systems that they use, that they

understand, and that, therefore, can be identified. It would seem, then, that not only imagining a language means imagining a way of life, but that by giving a way of life, a language is also given. From this perspective, the concepts of the pain of the tribe differ from those of another culture, although the same word is used: pain. This is why the use of a word is the part it plays in a language game, in the way of life. The point here is that "other people have concepts that intersect with ours" (Wittgenstein, L., 1999, p. 279). On the other hand, there are other aspects by which the differences between concepts occur: "An absolutely different education could be the foundation of completely different concepts" (p. 87), which explains how this difference implies a different way of life, since "life would follow a different course. What is interesting to us may not be interesting to them. There other concepts would cease to be inconceivable» (p. 388). Based on the above, it is revealed that the meaning of language rests on forms of life. In this regard, Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations, makes a pertinent appreciation that refers to the understanding of the concepts that are acquired in language: «If we want to know any concept, we must obtain a vision of the behavior human, the activities, the natural expressions that surround the words for that concept" (p. 91). This is the language game within the form of life. It is thus concluded that it makes no sense to refer to a conception of the meaning of an expression as a form of use if language games and forms of life are not taken into account. The close relationship between these two notions constitutes the central axis of the conception of language in the context of the second Wittgenstein.

CHAPTER 1: WITTGENSTEIN

As is well known, after Wittgenstein abandoned the philosophy of the *Tractatus*, there was a transition period in which a new approach to language was generated. In this phase, a large part of his ideas was outlined in the Blue Book and in the Brown Book as a preamble to what would later become the *Philosophical Investigations* of concepts that seek to generalize the language. Although Wittgenstein's new proposal is, to a great extent, a rejection of concepts elaborated in the *Tractatus*, this does not mean that the purpose of this thesis will be to draw a parallel between the two periods. In turn, it is not the purpose of this work to examine the problems of the mind/body distinction, nor to conduct a survey on the structure of solipsism, as it is a typical structure of the errors that are made when improper use is made. Understanding what the criterion for assigning meaning to language is—or the rule that is followed in this process—can lead to a dangerous analogy: «Language functions as a calculation of fixed rules»; or, worse yet, it is logic that shows what a correct proposition must look like (Wittgenstein, 1999). This assumption can lead to a problem that Wittgenstein suggests in paragraph 7 of the *Philosophical Investigations*: "Can the meaning of a sentence be made more precise by analyzing it down to its last components?" In the negative, Wittgenstein provides the answer to this question in the *philosophical investigations* and in the works carried out in the transition period between his first and second philosophy. The author maintains that it is not known with certainty what the last components of the sentence are or where the analysis should stop because if the meaning of a proposition depended on the words that compose it, then men would be faced with the impossibility of understanding others, no matter how simple they are. This was the great inconvenience that the *Tractatus* attempted to resolve; Wittgenstein approaches it looking for an exact meaning, which leads him to think that we only fully understand a proposition when there are no more doubts (when there can be no more doubts). Now, in the philosophy of the *Tractatus*, since logic is

what is understood as fixed, all languages make sense when they operate from certain invariable rules (those of logic). In turn, when logic makes it possible to clarify all languages, it also deals with the foundations of all possible understanding. When Wittgenstein studies language, he debates that he can trace its logical composition in order to determine, once and for all, its meaning; in fact, he comes to think that in the background of a proposition, there is a certain logical form, which is what guarantees its possibility of figuration (Newell, 1973). For him, it is this, the logical form, that appears when a proposition is analyzed down to its final components. But precisely, this is what the philosopher now questions, after, in the *Tractatus*, he had considered it as a fundamental presupposition for his conception of language. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein affirms that he has deviated from his purpose, that really, the exactness of the language was not what he was looking for. It is in paragraph 91 of this work that Wittgenstein (1999) most clearly criticizes the ideal of crystalline purity: he tries to show us that «understanding representation as a very complicated manoeuvre of the proposition leads to necessarily presupposing an element that directly relates the facts to propositions» (p. 94); ideal that in the *Tractatus* is expressed between paragraphs 2.1511 and 2.17 when starting from the assumption that simple objects exist (Wittgenstein, L., 1999, p. 2.021-2.0212). The question then arises: why did Wittgenstein fall into this «misunderstood»? Why did you mistake the object of investigation for him? The answer to this question tries to be given in the last line of paragraph 94 of the *Philosophical Investigations*: it is shown that since it is proper for language to allow a man to describe the world, then he believes that this is his only function; for example, that the *raison d'être* of language is to be a figure of the world (this claim can be seen in the *Tractatus*, p. 4.01), and this leads man to search for the background that allows language and reality to be united. For this very reason, in paragraph 97 of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein speaks of that order common to the world and thought, pure or crystalline order, insofar as it is not contaminated by causality or experience, but it is at the same time concrete order, which in its firmness it guarantees meaning. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein

wants to reorient his work: to understand the world-language relationship in a new way and, above all, to see that the proposition is not as strange as he believed it to be. From paragraph 98 of the Investigations, he begins to chart a new course: "Every sentence in our language 'is in order' as it is. That is to say, we do not aspire to an ideal...». He now understands the meaning of a proposition as something flexible that can allow vagueness. Helping himself with the analogy to the game, the author says that although the rules are vague, a person can think that it is a game; if he definitely wants it to be perfect, it is because he still has the glasses of the ideal on (Wittgenstein, 1999, p.103). At this point, Wittgenstein acknowledges that his conception of crystalline purity was not a result of research, but a requirement (p. 107), which prevents him from moving forward in his purpose. In this way, the central point of the approach of the second Wittgenstein is the abandonment of logical language, isomorphism, the acceptance of language games justified by use, and the recovery of philosophy as a therapeutic activity. In fact, philosophy itself is now a linguistic entanglement game to be "untangled." Wittgenstein openly criticizes philosophy, calling it the giver of explanations or the founder of theories, since from now on, the role of philosophy must be to clarify thoughts through the description of the use of language. Thus, from now on, philosophy will assume a double task: firstly, it has a therapeutic function, which consists in sanitizing the language of metaphysical illness. At this stage, it is understood that misunderstandings have been caused, for example, using ethical language with the same value as psychological language. One must always ask oneself about the meaning of words in their ordinary use, and in this way, it will be possible to rid language of "metaphysical misunderstandings." Second, philosophy has a descriptive function, which consists of showing everyday reality. Philosophy must dissolve problems, that is, describe them and leave them as they are: «Philosophy must not, in any way, interfere with the effective use of language; ultimately all it does is describe it. What we do is return the words, from their metaphysical use to everyday use" (Wittgenstein). In this way, the role that philosophy plays is defined as follows: "Philosophy merely exposes everything and does not explain or deduce anything..." In this regard, the

author makes the following statement: «In this area, philosophy does not have many fields of operation, since the causal explanations that are analyzed to give meaning to a concept or a proposition are not its competence, but rather its competence of logic.» (p. 173).



CHAPTER 2: HEIDEGGER

Although the writings collected in *On the Way to Language* (Philipse, H., 1999. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being*.) can be considered the first explicit thematization of the philosopher focused primarily on language, we should not, therefore, conclude that such reflections are exclusive to his latest works. Meditation around language runs through all of Heidegger's production and constitutes one of its fundamental nuclei. In fact, in relation to the *Sprache*, the continuity that his later writings establish with the texts prior to the *Kehre* can be highlighted. The projective function of language appears already prefigured in the development of the notions of "world" and "worldliness" in the analysis of *Being and Time* (Philipse, H., 1999. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being*.). Faced with the theoretical pre-decision of traditional philosophy, which conceived the subject as an intentional consciousness directed at an object, Heidegger established in 1927 a notion of the "world" that made possible the so-called hermeneutic transformation of phenomenology. The "world," constitutive of the opening of *Dasein*, is not understood as an entity or as the set of all entities but as a plexus of meanings articulated by *Dasein*'s own projection of meaning. From here on, "world" is understood as the set of reference relationships that ultimately refer to *Dasein* as a thrown project (Lefresne, 2011).

This referral, which has *Dasein* as its centre, is enabled by the factum of the understanding of being (*Seinverständnis*), which enables a constitutive relationship of existence with its own facticity. The perspective of the function of language as "openness of the world" is possible only through this understanding from which the entire structure of *Being and time* starts we always move in a certain understanding of being. From it arises the question that expressly asks about the meaning of being and the tendency to forge the corresponding concept. We don't know what "is" means. But already, when we ask, "what is 'being'?" we remain in a certain understanding of the "is," without being able to fix in concepts what the "is" means. We do not even have a

notion of the horizon from which we must grasp and fix the meaning. This understanding of being, of the average, and the vague term is a factum (Philipse, H., 1999. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being.*).

For this reason, the function of language within the hermeneutic structure of existence described in 1927 already appears essentially related, on the one hand, to the pre-comprehensive structure of Dasein; and, on the other, to the "worldliness" that configures a network of symbolically mediated relationships in which every relationship "at hand" is always preceded by an ante-predicative and "interpretative-comprehensive" instance (Lefresne, 2011). In this way, the elaboration of language that culminates on the way to language is essentially consistent with the premises established in being and time: language always occupies the ontologically founding function of "world opening." The central difference that we will find between the periods delimited by the Kehre will be that the place of foundation of the language will change (Kovacs, 1989). If in Being and Time, language was based on the interpretive structure of Dasein in its projective character, in the texts belonging to the late work, language reaches a space of impersonal expression from which it bases itself through the notion of Ereignis. In this sense, silence appears throughout the work after Being and Time as a space of rupture in which both the figure of the thinker and that of the poet are absorbed when carrying out the task of founding new openings. This can be seen as early as 1936 in the conference "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry" (Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung).

There, based on the famous phrase "what lasts is founded by poets" (Was bleibt aber, stiften die Dichter), poetic work is characterized in a double way. In the first place, it is presented as the essential feature of human existence, and in this sense, as a "donation": 'To dwell poetically' means, on the other hand, to stand in the presence of the gods and act as a lightning rod for the essential imminence of things. 'Poetics' is, deep down, our true reality, which comes to say: that being founded and grounded is not its merit; it is a gift (Philipse, H., 1999. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being.*). On the

other hand, this donation to which the poet agrees in his experience also has a foundational meaning. The poetic word does not manifest "a passing exaltation," a certain "warmth," or a mere "manifestation of culture." On the contrary, it has the inaugural value of the "foundation and support of history" (Philipse, H., 1999. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being*). It is precisely these two elements that constitute the central position that Heidegger unfolds later in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* and from which we can analyze the relationship established between language and silence. In the Martin Heidegger's philosophical work called "The Essence of Language," an experience with the language is proposed with the purpose that "in the future, our relationship with language becomes worth thinking about" (Lefresne, 2011).

This text brings together three discussions whose axis lies in the search to reach the Essence of Language from language itself. In the search for this experience, the figure of the poet appears again. It is the poet, in this case, Stefan George, who manages to establish a deep contact with the giving of language. It is there where the configurative relationship between "word and thing" that we are interested in deepening in relation to silence is manifested. In George's poem entitled "The Word," Heidegger observes the last of his lines: Thus sadly did I learn renunciation: Nothing is where the word is lacking (Kovacs, 1989). That "nothing is where the word is missing" implies that the author already experiences in his poeticizing not only the aesthetic experience that could be typical of every artist but also manages to capture the very essence of the language in its very operation. This poem works precisely in relation to the very task of poetry (Lefresne, 2011).

It transits and intuitively the inaugural function of the word as a donation insofar as it leads "the language itself to its speech and says something about the relationship between word and thing," which implies a change radical of position regarding language, of "the opinion that I had until now of the relationship between a thing and word." It entails the abandonment of a merely designative thesis, which understood that language named objects independent of the word. Renunciation has a positive value

here as "availability for another relationship," a relationship that understands that "only the word" "maintains and sustains a thing in its being" (Kovacs, 1989).

The Essence of Language, which recreates a world and enables the appearance of the entity (while hiding everything that is presented as not representable), does not, in turn, resonate as a presence with a positive value. That "nothing is where the word is missing" supposes that it is a function of the opening of language to open a world where the thing emerges as an entity and can be named. But "Where does the word take its property from?" The donation collected by the poet appears as a silent movement for which there can be no name. The word that he finds is always silent as a "jewel that is sustained in the nameless" (Chrulew, 2014). The nameless itself is the experience of the essence of language, which appears and approaches as a donation. At the end of this discussion, Heidegger leaves open a question that allows us to understand the importance of the notion of silence in his late work: "Should the very setting-in-way be called the appropriating advent of silence"? (Chrulew, 2014).

"The Path to Language," delivered in April 1936, Heidegger intends to walk the path toward language while remaining attentive to what might arise in this journey. This perspective is proposed by the paradoxical fact in man, even though he is "always, in some way, in possession of language," does not manage to experience the linguistic essence. Even though the language is so close, man cannot gain a perspective from which he can relate to it as an object of knowledge (Lefresne, 2011). For this, we need to distance ourselves from the conception that understands language as "speaking." Although this theory has focused almost exclusively on the result of the language display itself, it has never been concerned with sufficiently developing this display. He fails to think about it from its origin and focuses on "what is shown" by language, avoiding the conditions of such a display. It is precisely this vice that has degenerated into the conception of language as a designation, denying us an experience of language "from language." (Chrulew, 2014).

The Sprache constitutes, therefore, a manifestation, but not as the showing of everyday expression, from which it has always been understood. The "speaking" of man in his demonstrative character is made possible and is indebted to an original demonstration that opens through language. It is a manifestation, not of the man, but of the "said." The oral expression appears as a derivative, that is, as a sonorous expression, as speaking of the man, etc. The saying of the "said," on the contrary, is presented as the Corresponding word in which the inaugural demonstrative manifestation occurs. "Say" (sagen) originally comes from "show" (sagan), "make appear." What is spoken, what manages to express itself through words, is a "reciprocally show something," a "trust together with what is shown," a "show what the light carries from itself." Now, this saying is expressed through silence. Language opens through "what is said (die Sage)," a horizon where: "What is adjudicated speaks as a sentence in the sense of what is assigned, whose speaking does not even require manifesting" (Chrulew, 2014). "What is said" (die Sage) as what is shown (die Zeige) allows man to make the word sound; that "as a speaker," he expresses the word, that he "replies," giving an answer. It is open to "what was said." This opening, in which the man makes his word "resound," is expressed as the "silent saying of the saying." It is the silence, prior to any discursive stratification, that expresses the unfathomable and ignominious background desired and in which language moves in its inaugural character (Chrulew, 2014).

Human speaking in the variety of its natural languages, as well as in its different historical openings, is made possible by what appears to us as differentiable thanks to a world configuration opened by language in its original and, fundamentally, silent expression. What happens always rests on "what is said," which in turn expresses it. Zeige) The happening appears as the giving (Ergebnis) in which "what is said" by language in silence is presented as a donation in which what is present remains and is not subtracted (Lefresne, 2011). In this way, "what was said" reaches the language of man. The path towards language (Unterwegs zur Sprache) is the path of "what is said,"

and the event is its path towards language. Silence expresses the manifestation that the linguistic essence acquires when in its inaugural saying, it establishes the horizon of all human expression possible in a given historical opening. "The saying" is happening, and the happening is "telling" and is expressed silently (Lefresne, 2011).



CHAPTER 3: DERRIDA'S CRITICISM

Derrida starts from the same Nietzschean questioning towards the history of philosophy as the history of successive masking of the values (or concepts) that the West has pondered as supreme. Philosophy has been covering up its characteristic face in each historical moment through different names and always under the auspices of an ideal or "central notion"; He has related, Derrida tells us, the very history of the West as a "successive chain of different determinations of the centre" (1989: 385). In this case, Derrida understands the concept of centre, in turn, placing himself in the same line as Heidegger's problematization of the notion of foundation: metaphysics has always meant by "being" (and for this reason has kept it in oblivion), being of an entity, that which allowed to ensure the existence of the entity under the fundamental condition of its "being there", of its being present, both as its foundation, and at the same time as the condition of possibility of the entity in its totality, that is, by reason of its onto-theo-logic. "Being", in some way, was understood as the point of reference and the origin of all beings, that to which one always had to refer since "it is there"; it is, in the broadest sense of the word, it is that is, "the presence of the present" (in short, for Heidegger, the supreme entity).

Now, this characterization, according to Derrida, is motivated precisely by a permanent attitude of centrality. Metaphysics has shaped the apparent solidity of its structure "through a gesture consisting of giving it a centre, referring it to the point of presence, to a fixed origin..." (Derrida, 1989, p.383).

The being is sent to the centre, and this serves as the point of presence that ensures the understanding of the entities under the mode of representability, guaranteeing in some way the coherence of the structure or the system. To question the structure of the metaphysical text is to question the very authority of presence, Derrida would say (and thus, also, to question "its simple symmetrical opposite", absence or lack), since the history of metaphysics is history itself of the determination of being as

presence, of the unfolding of that presence; "...it is the determination of being in the presence or in existentialism –he clarifies us– what is thus questioned, by the thought of difference". Here, precisely, Derrida makes clear the explicit recognition of the (apparent) proximity between his proposal and the Heideggerian proposal: ...in trying to discredit here the assumptions that have led us to form the sense of being in general as the presence or absence [...], we can already see that the type of question to which we have been led in this way is, say, the Heideggerian type, and [our notion of] difference seems to lead us to the difference ontico-ontological... (Derrida, 1989, p.45).

Meanwhile, this format of presence or absence leads us to one of the essential aspects that will prelude the exhibition on the Derridian difference: the problem of the articulation of philosophical language as an architecture of binary oppositions (a problem that always remained at the forefront of his thinking, but is that as the essential concern of him). Binarism, which fundamentally, since Plato is at the base of all Western thought, decisively marks the philosophical language not in terms of a "peaceful coexistence" between two terms but through a structure that is essentially conflictual and violent. Through the history of binary oppositions, "one of the terms [always] is imposed on the other (axiologically, logically, etc.).

CHAPTER 4: SILENCE

The imperative of silence enunciated in the Prologue and the final paragraph of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* has three meanings —logical, ethical and mystical— whose differences and mutual connections are elucidated here. The place of silence in the language is analyzed, and the extent to which the imperative of silence persists in Wittgenstein's late work is examined. In particular, the position of the *Tractatus* is connected with the works on ethics of the year 1929, in which the philosopher seeks to demonstrate that the languages of morality and religion violate the limits of meaningful language. In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, there are only two very brief passages that expressly refer to silence (Gjerstad, E., 2014). As this is the only work by Wittgenstein that revolves entirely, according to its author, around the absolute importance of keeping silent, it may seem strange that we do not find further explanations of the matter in it. One can surely think that this parsimony is discreet since to speak too much about the value and scope of silence would be misleading and suspicious. How to recommend silence to others if the philosopher himself is not willing to practice it to some extent? In later works, Wittgenstein refers only indirectly to the various parts that silence has in our lives and to the ways in which none of the alternatives of the learned practice of being silent in certain circumstances can replace or surpass it. In Wittgenstein's work, there are three functions of silence: logic, morality and what the philosopher calls mysticism. The real reason why Wittgenstein mentions the duty of silence so rarely, twice in the *Tractatus* and then never directly again, is that this aspect of the work belongs to a philosophical system that its author criticized and partially abandoned at his later works. Already in its origin, the three meanings of silence, despite each being peculiar and largely conceptually independent of the others, are linked to the first philosophical system and referred through it to each other in a way that is difficult to follow. Systematically, silence would have to be one, but Wittgenstein's exposition actually exhibits it in three different dimensions, among which the links are obscure and were not explained by its

author. In the *Tractatus*, it was necessary that the formula that says the need to remain silent be very simple and sparing so that, like the sentences of the ancient sages, it could be understood in various ways. The imperative of silence in the *Tractatus* acts both as a trivial conclusion to the logical exposition of the system and as a recondite truth that expresses the moral and mystical reaches of Wittgenstein's first book.



CHAPTER 5: EARLY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

A historical review of Analytic Philosophy, in order to identify the position or thesis of the language games of Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (1998), it is pertinent to outline at least the most important elements of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (2007). For such a task, it is inexcusable to unify concepts and keep in mind the philosophical antecedents prior to the second Wittgenstein. The most generalized affirmations distinguish three currents within the analytical movement of the 20th century, which are: Logical Atomism, Logical Neopositivism and Analytical Philosophy. To the first belong (in random order of importance or influence on Western philosophical thought) Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, S. Kripke, and the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*; to the second, the so-called Vienna Circle founded by Schlick; and the third, Gottlob Frege and the Wittgenstein of *investigations*. The three positions are characterized and have as a common denominator: first, a tendency towards empiricism, to the extent that only what can be experienced is considered valid; second, a special interest in the study of language, since its analysis is the method and the special task of philosophy; and third, a very marked rejection of metaphysics. Regardless of their positions, most authors of Analytic Philosophy agree on this. There is a more or less accepted argument that Wittgenstein changed his first philosophical position for another, although it is more precise to affirm that the Austrian thinker rather had the genius of containing two philosophies. The analytical position designated with the rubric of Logical Atomism is initially due to that of the first philosophical position, specifically contained in the *Tractatus*, whose most important points are the composition of the world, expressed by the author as follows: "the world is everything that happens"; "the world is the totality of facts, not of things". In turn, they are part of the issued Logical Atomism, isomorphism, the apophantic sense of language, languages with meaning and the relationship between philosophy, language and science. According to the previous approach, philosophy is critical of language; its

object is the clarification logic of thought; it is not for her to throw out philosophical propositions but rather to clarify said propositions. It is not the task of philosophy to give global explanations of the world since the totality of valid propositions constitutes the natural sciences; In this regard, Russell's Logical Atomism expresses the relationship that exists between reality and language because if the latter designates reality, there must be a similarity between the structure of the latter and the structure of the former. This language is by no means ordinary language, since it, according to Russell, is full of inaccuracies; it refers more precisely to logical language. The world, that is, the reality, is made up of facts, language by propositions that are logical representations of the facts.

The primary facts of the reality of the world are simple or independent facts: Bertrand Russell calls them "atomic facts." In parallel, the primary elements of language are simple or atomic propositions. Each simple proposition expresses an atomic fact. The atomic statement, inheritance of Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*, consists of replacing the "p" and the "q" with "Pa", "Qb", "Ra,b", where "a" and "b" are proper names of possible individuals, "P" and "Q" predicates designating simple qualities, "R" a relational predicate designating a simple relationship. The disjunction around the truth and validity conditions takes the form of a disjunction of state descriptions, where a state description is conjunction (link) of atomic sentences and negations of atomic sentences that it contains, for each atomic sentence of the language, either to it or to its negation, but not to both. A true statement is defined as one that encompasses all state descriptions. In this regard, Carnap and Wittgenstein's theory of logical truth, extending the idea of truth conditions for a statement, affirms that a logically true statement exhausts the range of possibilities, understanding by "state description" the "description of a world possible", which is very closely related to Wilhelm Leibniz's conception of "truths of reason", as valid truths in all possible worlds, and in which a possible world is nothing other than a world that conforms to the laws of logic: in particular to the laws or principles of non-contradiction and of the excluded middle which is, at least,

the most traditional statements of logic. Logical language, to express these situations, has the possibility that simple propositions are linked to each other through connectives and form propositional complexes that are called molecular propositions. In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein explains that propositions are picture of reality since the state of things they represent is known if I understand the meaning of the proposition (4.021), and the proposition shows us its meaning since if the proposition is true, it shows how things are and says that things are like that.

The first Wittgenstein (2007) affirms that “reality must be fixed by the proposition itself or not. This is why it must be fully described by her. The proposition is the description of an atomic fact. Just as the description of an object describes it according to its external properties, so the proposition describes reality” (4.023). According to this argument, the proposition constitutes a "world" with the help of a given logical framework; it is, therefore possible, according to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, to see in the proposition, if it is true, the logical aspect of reality itself (ibid). I cite these theses with brushstrokes also to emphasize that they were received with joy by Phillipp Frank and Otto Neurath between the two world wars, trying to formulate philosophical conceptions that would explain, among others, Albert Einstein's theory of relativity published between 1915 and 1964; authors who years later would join the group of Rudolph Carnap and Moritz Schlick who, in line with Bertrand Russell and Whitehead, demand a new logic based on mathematical logic and the affirmation of the empiricist character of the new logical doctrine, having as a model or point of reference to David Hume. Concerning the latter, Reichenbach, in *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy*, explains that Hume arrives at the result that all knowledge is analytical or derived from experience: mathematics and logic are analytical, while all synthetic knowledge is derived from experience. Analytic, according to Reichenbach, equals "self-explanatory" as the example of analytic truth: "no single man is married." “Self-explanatory” equals self-evident. Synthetic a priori knowledge does not exist in such a model (p. 84-87). All these authors mentioned, especially Bertrand Russell, sought a

philosophy with regulated scientific language: a language of the sciences that would avoid pseudo-problems (Lopez, L. and Felipe, A., 2012.) and the unification of the sciences and their method, rejecting any current that tried to divide them, to which is added a categorical opposition to any speculative philosophical conception, understanding speculation as any theory that exceeds reality supported by positive sciences.

It is from such positions that Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (1998) distances himself after a certain number of biographical ups and downs, which are omitted in this writing. In disagreement with the theory that conceived language as a portrait of reality and that sought its perfection and regulation, a thesis of which he was also a forerunner, he will now maintain in the *Investigations* that there is not just one language, but many: languages natural, which philosophy also cannot manipulate in any way in its effective use, since it can only describe them, not regulate them (Wittgenstein, 1998). In the *Tractatus*, the Austrian philosopher stated that the meaning of the terms consists in their references, in the objects represented by them; in the *Investigations*, he explained that meaning and referent are not the same things (48): the referent is the objects of meaning, and rather the meaning of a term depends on its use in a given language. That is why he will also argue that the task of the philosopher should be able to understand the statements because misunderstandings of these have resulted in problems and contradictions inherent in philosophy, and they do nothing but impede the true motive of the philosopher, which is language (Ibid). From this assumption, the author presents his theory in language games, which refers to the different ways of using the terms; those games are the determinants of the meaning of those. The Austrian author says: "Our simple and clear language games are not preliminary studies for future regulation of the language. Rather, they are there as objects of comparison that by way of similarity and dissimilarity must shed light on the relations of our language" (Id. 130). Wittgenstein saw each language as a game that always works according to certain rules, and each proposition acquires meaning when

used according to the rules of the game in which it is formulated. Linguistic games are linguistic uses. For Wittgenstein, a fact of fundamental importance is that we all establish rules and a technique for a game and actually follow those rules; but things do not always go according to the assumption that the rule assures us. We get caught up in our own rules; moreover, these entanglements deserve to be understood; this fact sheds light on the concept of meaning precisely because something happens that had not been foreseen. Instead, possibility is a philosophical problem (Wittgenstein, 1998 p.125). We can use language to describe but also for its most common uses, such as commanding, begging, asking, affirming, and complex among others. In *Philosophical Investigations*, the fundamental question of philosophy, according to the Analytical Philosophy of this second Wittgenstein, is not the one referring to the meaning exclusively, but to the use, since the meaning of a word is determined by the use that that specific word has in the language; I cite an example with which Wittgenstein himself (1999) explains it: Think of the tools in a toolbox: there is a hammer, a pair of pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a ruler, a pot of glue, glue, nails and screws. As diverse as the functions of these objects are the functions of the word (and there are similarities here and there). Certainly, what puzzles us is the uniformity of their appearances when the words are spoken to us, or we find them written or printed. For his employment is not so clearly presented to us. In particular, when we philosophize! (11). The validity of each tool is the product of its use and what it is for, regardless of what it is; In the same way, words are the object of the study in language games, and we must pay attention to their functions, their uses, what they are used for. Thus, Wittgenstein's critique of the referential model, the attempt to establish a logically perfect language, since it is not reduced to descriptive phrases, becomes understandable from the above premise; Rather, language is a way of life. The real world is understood by language games. In this way, the task of philosophy, its object, as Wittgenstein himself explains in the *Philosophical Investigations* with the example of the fly enclosed in the bottle, is to show the way out; the fly does not need to be taken out of the bottle, since it is enough for it to be shown the way out; in the same way, the philosophical problems

that have the form: “I don't know how to orient myself” or “I don't know how to get out of the quagmire” (Wittgenstein, 1998, p.123) refer to misunderstandings in linguistic uses. Philosophy, according to this position, must propose the dissolution of philosophical problems through the activity of understanding linguistic uses and the games that occur in it. The Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* believed in an ideal language composed of all significant propositions: descriptive language; For the Wittgenstein of the *Investigations*, language is expressed and manifested in a plurality of different language games, of which the descriptive language is only one case, a fact, a game. It could be said that first, Wittgenstein defined the invalidity of a proposition insofar as it exceeded the limits of meaningful language. The second Wittgenstein understands that a proposition can break us, or represents a crack in the rules of the game that we set ourselves, to the extent that it tries to be used within a language game to which it does not belong, of which it is not native. For the early Wittgenstein, meaning could be determined by reference, because a word names something or a proposition pictures a fact; if not, it has no meaning, because it is impossible to determine or assign validity to it. The second Wittgenstein, explaining what refers to the thesis of the games that exist in language, recognizes in ordinary language the descriptive function, and at the same time, the domain of meaning is much broader than that of reference; that is to say that the use of ordinary language does not require more than its simple, daily and formal use, which does not undermine the practices common to speakers. The referential criterion of meaning is expanded in the *Investigations* by the pragmatic criterion of meaning. Wittgenstein proposes to unlink to the language of the conditions of truth, to anchor it to conditions of justification (Freddy, Santamaría, Velasco. (2009). The words and the sentences formed with them must no longer state facts or have a close correspondence with objects; rather, these words, statements or arguments are part of a linguistic framework in which the use is constituted as the validity criterion for its significance.

Wittgenstein, inclined to think that the intent of his first work was wrong in trying to obtain from logic the structure of language, thought and reality, affirms in the *Investigations* that logic no longer operates in thought neither in the language nor in reality, since language is rather a set of procedures to make use of words in connection with various activities. This is precisely what he called "language games" (*Sprachspiele*). However, given the purpose of this writing, it is inexcusably necessary to clarify that Philosophy, both for the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* and for the Wittgenstein of the *Investigations*, continues to have the same task, which is to clarify the language. The heart of the matter is the way in which that clarification is made. In the *Investigations*, that task is no longer to extract or determine the logical structure of language but to show the uses we make of it. Although one of the most important undertakings of Analytic Philosophy asserted by the Vienna Circle, specifically by Moritz Schlick, is the one that corresponds to the clarification of meanings without concluding in assertions of distinctively philosophical propositions, it is precisely in the first one in which Wittgenstein can be identified with other authors such as Hilary Putnam, for whom the path of reference is the philosophical route that leads to the clarification of language. Frege and Edmund Husserl speak of reference and designation, respectively. Frege delimits the meaning of two terms, for example, through what he calls "the mode of giving"; the meaning for Frege determines the referent because whoever knows the meaning of any term knows the way in which its referent is given. With regard to this matter, there is a way in contemporary philosophy that consists in rejecting the argument that the meaning of a term define what we mean when we use that term precisely. The rejection of this thesis is found mainly in Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam; both will say that the reference of the words is not in the head. Following Putnam's expression, the "traditional doctrine" that understands the meaning of a term as its concept has implicit the difficulty of conceiving that meaning as a mental entity; in Frege's terms, this conception is of a "psychological" nature and invalid, since the meanings are public property; that is to say that the same meaning is subject to the possibility of being grasped by a large number of people at different

times. The "intentions" or meanings are, therefore, not mental forms but abstract entities. The next inherent drawback of the traditional doctrine of meaning takes the following form: two terms may have the same extension but not the same purpose. In addition, the traditional doctrine proposed the thesis according to which two terms cannot coincide in extension and, at the same time, have the same intention. This thesis, although formulated, always lacked argumentation (Putnam, 1992, p. 152). The foregoing reflects the assumption on which ancient and medieval philosophers thought of the concept of a term as valid and sufficient to always be within the extension of the term. We could then say with Putnam that the "traditional perspective" on meaning is an illusory or false consideration since there are many words that can be used perfectly well, even if they do not have any property common to all those things to which that word is applied. correctly. We can then synthesize the two problems described by Putnam by stating them as follows: the traditional theory of meaning has been wrongly based, first, on the fact that to know the meaning of a term is to be in a certain psychological state, and second, that psychological states (in the "intensional" sense) determine the extension of a term. Putnam says that it is not possible to hold both assumptions at the same time. The reason is, according to the author, that it is possible for two identical psychological states to occur at the same time, but each one has different extensions. Putnam gives concrete examples of his argument, one of which is that of Earth and Twin Earth, where the term "water" expresses on earth the chemical composition formulated as H_2O , while in parallel, on Twin Earth, the very term "water" indicates a different composition, formulated as XYZ. The point is, according to Putnam's explanation, that the water of the Earth and the "water" from Twin Earth are sensorially identical to the naked eye; thus, he will argue that a person's psychological state does not determine the meaning of a term (Putnam, 1992, p. 153-156). Now, if I use the term "water" on Earth to refer to water and my "Doppelgänger" on Twin Earth also uses "water", despite being in the same mental state, then we both refer to different things. According to Putnam, it is incoherent to think of meaning as a state of mind: "Whatever you put it, meanings just aren't in your head!" (p. 156). This cited example,

together with that of the term “aluminium” and the term “gold”, are examples of the mundane division of labour, which also engenders a linguistic division of labour that, with respect to extension and indexicality, Putnam explains with the hypothetical case of the Twin Earth: that it is to the state of the sociolinguistic community (language games) to which the extension of the term is fixed and not to the speaker alone. The division of linguistic labour is due, according to Putnam (1992), to the non-linguistic division of labour (p. 157). And this can be explained by saying that a certain number of speakers can, according to the non-linguistic division of labour, decide or fix whether a sample of water, for example, belongs or not to the extension of the term “water”, an extension that later it is used in the term “water” by the community. Those speakers that I am referring to are, for example, experts in the field, specifically in water, which in turn, the other speakers trust regarding those specifications and conditions that the expert speakers put on the extension of the term “water”. The thesis is concluded by discussing the impossibility of a private language with Wittgenstein; An impossibility that is fully explained in the thesis of language games in the sum of games immersed in its use, each governed by its own rules, which is by no means special, because it is the only criterion by which we understand that we have. Follow the rule correctly, it lies in customary use: for its use and games belong to a community and never to a single individual. Thus, for example, the use of the word “hunger” is linked to a series of similar experiences, such as “appetite”; Based on this, we associate the word “hunger” with what we experience privately. In this sense (that of language games), the philosophical study of language in the social realm is extremely important: when I insert myself into a social world, I am inserting myself into a world of meaning, into the culture. I am not a language without the other; I do not learn a language without the other. All human beings are words; culture is made because we make language; that's why animals don't make culture because they don't have language; there is no thought without language. We are not simple sounding boards that emit a single type of linguistic manifestation; we humans make world with words. Talking is an action; to do philosophy is to practice life.

CHAPTER 6: TRACTATUS PERIOD

One of the assumptions of the *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*. It is the view that language symbolizes or represents the facts that constitute the world (cf. TLP, 2.13), so the book's philosophical endeavour consists in making this process of representation explicit. In this way, Wittgenstein presents what Russell judged to be “the basic doctrine of the *Tractatus*” (Russell, 1959, p. 113): the picture theory of the proposition, which establishes that “The proposition is a figuration of reality” (TLP, 4.01), that is, a model of the reality, such as a model or a sculpture (TLP, 2.12).

The idea that a proposition makes sense because it is a representation of reality would have been inspired by the practice of a court in Paris of representing traffic accidents using models (i.e., miniature cars and dolls). Cars and other miniatures are to be interpreted as a language that describes (or represents) a real state of affairs: real cars and a real accident. This representation is possible, according to Wittgenstein, because language and the world share the same logical system. (TLP, 2.16-2.18) and, evidently, because both structures – the figuration and the fact represented by it – can be decomposed into their constituent parts (TLP, 2.02-2.0212). Thus, since the structure of language is identical to the structure of the world, understanding the elementary parts of language would allow us to understand the correspondingly elementary parts of the world: the facts. Therefore, Wittgenstein defends the need to analyze language down to its simplest parts, the elementary propositions.

Elementary propositions constitute the totality of the propositions of language because every proposition is: either an elementary proposition or the result of (logical) operations on elementary propositions. Thus, the logical analysis of any complex proposition should reveal elementary propositions that are logically independent, unanalyzable, which do not imply or are implied by any other elementary proposition (and whose truth or falsity depends solely on the existence or non-existence of atomic

states of affairs). Thus, Wittgenstein's aim was to show how the most complex sentences are constructed from the simplest sentences.

In this way, the picture theory is the basis for Wittgenstein's claim that metaphysical sentences are meaningless (or nonsense), for although they purport to describe the essential nature of the world, they are neither analytic nor synthetic and therefore would not serve the purpose of broadening our understanding of empirical reality. After all, for a given proposition to make sense, it must be either a synthetic proposition that asserts something about the world, representing a situation that may or may not be a fact (as, for example, the assertions of science and common discourse), or an analytic (non-factual) proposition, such as logical tautologies. Sentences that do not fall into either of these two classes (e.g., metaphysical sentences) are pseudo-propositions, and the fact that they are pseudo-propositions can be revealed by logical analysis.

Philosophical propositions are nonsense “that comes from not understanding the logic of our language” (TLP, 4.003). These are questions of the following kind: “is good more or less identical to beauty?” something that results in nonsense precisely because we have not assigned a meaning to the word “identical” – which, in this sentence, functions as an adjective. (TLP, 5.4733)¹⁰. The task of philosophy, therefore, is to show that such sentences go beyond the limits of what can be said meaningfully. Hence, whenever someone intends to say something metaphysical, says Wittgenstein, we must “show him that he has given no meaning to certain signs of his propositions” (TLP, 6.53).

At the time of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein thought he had essentially solved all the problems of philosophy. However, one of the main merits of his effort was “to show how little it matters to solve these problems” (TLP, Preface) because, in his view, all philosophy is an attempt to answer questions that are not really questions or to solve problems that aren't really problems.

CHAPTER 7: FREGE- ON SENSE IN MEANING

Wittgenstein begins to develop a new philosophy. The declaration of his change lies in considering language from another perspective, different from that of the *Tractatus*. From the Blue book, it becomes clear that the question to be solved is not "what is language?" but "how is a language understood within a way of life?". At this stage, Wittgenstein demonstrates that the use made of language is what allows the meaning of words to be found; This is exactly what he says: "The meaning of a word is its use in the language" (Wittgenstein, 1999, p. 43). In this way, for the second Wittgenstein, the sense of a proposition or the meaning of a word is its function; that is, the meaning is determined by the use made of the words. For this reason, it is worth saying that asking about the meaning of a word or about the sense of a proposition is equivalent to asking about how it is used. Now, at this stage, the so-called philosophical problems are not, in reality, problems but perplexities; hence the mission of philosophy is that of a struggle against the "bewitching" of our understanding by language. It is, then, according to Wittgenstein (1999, p. 255), to consider this confusion or bewitchment of thought as a disease and to apply the appropriate therapy to make it possible for said disease —that is, the philosophical problem— to disappear completely. The relationship between the meaning and the type of philosophical confusion is exposed through an example from the beginning of the Blue book. The aim of this passage is to reveal what authentic philosophical reflection must lie in and, consequently, why "language must matter to philosophy." Wittgenstein (1999) states: «What is the meaning of a word? Let us attack this problem by asking, first, what is an explanation of the meaning of a word; What does a one-word explanation look like? The way this question helps us is analogous to the way the question "how do we measure a length?" helps us to understand the problem of "what is the length?" (p. 27). The method that Wittgenstein proposes at this stage goes against the tendency to find the meaning through the question "what is the meaning of each of the components of an expression?

»; for example, the decomposition of a proposition into words. In this sense, the author assures that words acquire their meaning when they are related to other words, other facts and other circumstances in which they are located; For example, the expression «blue chair» represents a reality that is not simply limited to pointing towards a «blue chair», but rather a series of implications that can result when using such an affirmation. From this perspective, the meaning of an expression is given by the explanations made from it. In distinction to what has been said above, several questions arise, among which the following must be rescued: if we start from the premise. Since the meaning of a word is given by its use, then how do you establish the relationship between the meaning and the use of language? Or, more precisely, how does use reveal the meaning of a language? The answer to these questions is not found explicitly in Wittgenstein's work; its definition will be purely descriptive, thus giving rise to the notion of language games. Now, it is worth asking what Wittgenstein understands by using since there seems to be no single way in which this notion applies to all cases. On some occasions, the use consists of executing or practising something; in others, it is reduced to habits or customs; and at other times, it is what a thing is for. On the basis of various passages in the *Philosophical Investigations*, a classification can be made regarding the way in which words are used.

The use of words as a function. "Think of the tools in a toolbox: there's a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a ruler, a pot of glue, glue nails, and screws. As diverse as the functions of these objects are the functions of words» (p. 11). "We would like to talk about the function of a word in this sentence. As if the proposition were a mechanism in which the word has a certain function. But what does that function consist of? (p. 559). The use of words with a purpose. If the example in paragraph 13 is considered, one can perhaps glimpse to what extent the general conception of the meaning of the word surrounds the language with a halo that makes clear vision impossible. It dispels the fog to study the phenomena of language in primitive genres of its use in which the purpose and functioning of words can be clearly mastered with

the eye” (p. 5). The use of words with a purpose. «We could imagine that the language of paragraph 24 was the total language of A and B, and even the total language of a tribe. Children are educated to perform these actions, to use these actions with them, to use these words with them, and to react in this way to the words of others» (p. 5). Before analyzing the notion of games, an analysis of a key concept is presented that serves to clarify what Wittgenstein calls "knowing" the meaning of an expression: the criterion.



DISCUSSION

Within the second Wittgenstein's conception of language, another relevant notion is that of a rule, and more specifically, what has been called following a rule. One of the objectives that Wittgenstein has when making an analysis of the rules is to amplify another of the elements that make up the various ways in which language works. For Wittgenstein (1999, p. 197-205), the rules not only govern the use of language but are constitutive of our language games in a way analogous to how the rules of chess are constitutive of this game. The author supposes that the sense, the truth and the falsity of the empirical propositions are based on the rule, for example, those that refer to practice. The propositions that describe the rules of our language games, called by Wittgenstein "grammatical propositions," cannot be true or false because they express rules that are the foundation of all truth and falsity. We cannot give reasons for them because they are the foundation of all reason. Thus, it is evident that the rules are neither true nor false. To start with, if you want to specify what is meant by a rule, you immediately have to ask yourself these questions: is it perhaps a model that is used systematically in all cases? Is it possible to understand, as a rule, something like a model that is used for a particular case but that cannot be guaranteed to work for all cases analogous to this one? (Wittgenstein, 1999, p. 82). How can a rule teach what to do in certain places or situations? What makes certain actions and not others compatible with the rule? When following a rule, are the actions that must be executed implicitly? Can these, in some cases, be guided by a "road indicator"? Perhaps all the steps to follow are predetermined by the rules? For Wittgenstein, the answer to these questions can only be found if the question is formulated from a particular way of life since everything depends on the customs, uses and institutions that are established. The forms of life are what give the foundation for the rule. Using the relationship that the rules maintain with the variety of language games, a particularity is added that they possess: to be understood, they do not have to be absolutely fixed and univocal, just as

to play ball, we do not need the rules to be predetermined; idea that Wittgenstein is going to emphasize constantly. Meanwhile, when Wittgenstein appeals to the transformable nature of the rules, he is somehow insinuating that the steps do not have to be strictly rigid to reach an objective. Here he begins to disagree; then, everything can be made to agree or not with the rule. Is a rule something useless?; when following a rule, the limits are known; are there limits? Are all possible exceptions, variability, etc., taken into account to explain a rule? Are there perhaps rules for the rules that indicate what is the correct way to follow it, and so on ad infinitum? Will it be possible to notice that there are safer rules than those that come to light? So it is possible that this rule idea causes some problems. We tend to believe that a rule must be clear and precise or it cannot be such at all; however, in everyday life, rules are used that are not entirely precise or that are not general, for example, that they do not have to be applied to all cases, but, on repeated occasions, only apply in that particular case. Can this be called a rule? On the other hand, the knowledge of the rules can become problematic if it is intended to resolve where the criterion rooted that allows knowing how the rule is used. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, there is a passage to which an answer might be found: "I say, 'There is a chair.' What if I walk up to it, try to go get it, and it suddenly disappears from my sight? "So, then, it was not a chair but a kind of illusion." But in a couple of seconds, we see it again, and we can grab it, etc. "So the chair was there, though, and its disappearance was some sort of illusion." But suppose after a while it disappears again or seems to disappear. What should we say now? Do you have rules for such cases that say whether something can still be called a "chair"? And are we to say that we really attach no meaning to this word because we are not equipped with rules for all its possible applications? (Wittgenstein, 1999, p. 80). This example of the strange chair leads us to affirm that our language is built on some assumptions. One of them is the permanence of things. These assumptions are the product of "repeated experience" since, so to speak, things remain in their being. Thus, it can be pointed out that the rules are based on use, particularly on the various forms of life. At this point, the presupposition of the existence of fixed rules to assign the meaning of language is

in trouble since, apparently, the meaning of a rule is based on the way of life itself and can often be ambiguous and difficult to determine. To ask about the meaning of the rules is to ask about the way of life or about the needs and habits of those who state the rules. The example of the chair reveals a great difficulty: if Wittgenstein has repeatedly noted that its use is found within the grammar of the word, why can't an intermittent chair not be so easily hinted at as having meaning? The difficulty lies in the fact that the rule does not manage to cover all possible situations because, within the customary ways in which the word chair is used, intermittency had never before been considered as a quality that could be granted to it. The problem does not lie in the impossibility of intermittent chairs but rather in the fact that the rules applied to refer to the use of the chair had not warned of such a possibility. However, given that the rules do not cover all possible situations and in they are inexact in a certain sense, then everything can become permissible; anything has meaning as long as it can be expressed in language in such a way that its rules can somehow be found. The problem that remains with the rules now is their eventual arbitrariness: the rules leave a high margin of freedom, and there is a tendency to confuse the grammar of an expression since it is not known to what extent the rules of language games are inconstant. If such a possibility is admitted, the grammar of any word would be totally confused; that is, its situation in a language game would be incomprehensible. It is, therefore, possible to outline the following question: how is a rule fixed within a language game? Wittgenstein's answer is again directed at the use of expressions. Around the question, "in what sense are the rules of language arbitrary?" Wittgenstein (1999) demonstrates, in an example, the reason why such arbitrariness depends on the use made of the rule in the language game and the way of life in which it is immersed: "Why not I call the rules of cooking arbitrary, and why am I tempted to call the rules of grammar arbitrary? Because while 'cooking' is defined with a purpose, 'talking' is not. The use of languages is thus, in a way, autonomous, where cooking and washing cannot be. Whoever is guided, when he cooks, by rules other than the correct ones, cooks badly; but who is guided by rules other than those that are typical of chess, plays a different game; and whoever is guided

by grammatical rules other than this or that, does not say something wrong for that, but speaks of something else» (p. 320). The intention of this section is to emphasize that although there are infinite language games, an expression is always used within a language game that follows certain rules, which determine the meaning of that use. In this way, in the example of «the strange chair», it is evident that words and propositions have the meaning that the use of language gives them, and not the unit of calculation that logic can provide, that is, the univocal rules. For Wittgenstein, such a unit does not exist, and in the event that it did, it would have no reason to be since it does not satisfy the infinite possibilities of ordinary language. Such a unit would not be useful; it would be absurd.

Continuing with the discussion, the purpose of the notion of following a rule is to show that words are not used arbitrarily. The problem is understanding the meaning of a word; therefore, the clarity of the meaning of an expression will be determined by its use in the circumstances; for example, "a way of life". In this sense, accepting the rules as belonging to the language game leads to the conclusion that language is a behavior guided by the rules. Wittgenstein's insistence on the ordered nature of language should not be thought of as claiming that all uses of language are absolutely determined by rules. But for language to exist, it is necessary to follow the rules: "say, in tennis you have no rules about how high you can throw the ball or how hard you can throw it, and yet tennis is a game and it has rules." » (Wittgenstein, 1999, p. 68). Remember that speaking a language is practice, especially one based on the act of following the rules. And the grammar of the phrase "follow a rule" warns that in any case, parameters must be followed to establish both context and general criteria for what is right or wrong in tracking. Note that when Wittgenstein (1999, p. 199) refers to rules, he is not talking about iron devices that should not be violated. It is clear that when a person speaks, he often consciously does not use strict rules that lead to the correctness and perfection of the concepts used and their meanings. That is, language is not considered a predetermined calculation; in contrast, the structure of rules in a

language game cannot be defined; only their use allows them to be distinguished. The word rule is also related to the word agreement, but it is about the congruence of lifestyles, not ideas. Therefore, when someone obeys a rule, he does not choose but blindly obeys. Now, in paragraph 185 of the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein introduces an aspect referring to the reasons why a rule is followed. This aspect is analyzed from the following position, proposing that a student is taught to write arithmetic progressions in response to commands of the form $< + n >$. Being $n = 2$, the student writes correctly up to 1000, but from then on, he continues the series by adding four instead of 2. Then he formulates: «You should have added two; “Look how you started the series!” He replies: “Yes! Is it not correct? I thought I should do it like this.” Or suppose he said, pointing to the series: “But I have continued in the same way!” It would do us no good to say, “But can't you see?”, repeating the old explanations and examples” (Wittgenstein, 1999, p. 85). In this way, it is seen that the student has interpreted his own response as “following the rule”. Given the finite number of answers that the student can give, these can be compatible with a number of possible rules. How can you ensure that the student has understood the indicated rule? It seems that an infinity of courses of action could be compatible, according to some interpretations, with the rule. On this, Wittgenstein (1999) states: “Our paradox was this: a rule could not determine any course of action because every course of action can be made to agree with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made to agree with the rule, then it can also be made to disagree. Whence there would be neither agreement nor disagreement” (p. 201).

On the occasion of this apparent misunderstanding of the rule, an extensive discussion follows regarding what is the connection between the rules of a game and the order or decision to play it. Paragraphs 197 to 200 of the *Philosophical Investigations* contain the answer to this: the connection lies in the teaching of the game and its constant practice. Obeying a rule, giving an order, and playing a game are all customs, uses, and institutions. After paragraph 205, the examination continues to

clarify this matter in various ways. A rule is not followed because there are reasons or justifications for it. Reasons and justifications soon run out, and then someone can say, "This is just what I do." Neither is following a rule guided by intuition or "inner voice". Understanding a rule is not a state of mind because it is clear that it can guide both good and bad. Order and rule include the elements of regularity and uniformity, but again, to think of a ruler as an infinity segment of rails is equivalent to giving a distorted expression of the use of a ruler. What appears in the *Philosophical Investigations*—is to divest ourselves of an erroneous conception so that what it is to "follow a rule" can be properly understood. Only in this framework can the second half of paragraph 201 of this work be understood: "That there is a misunderstanding there is already shown by the fact that in this course of thought we give interpretation after interpretation; as if each one satisfied us at least for a moment until we think of an interpretation that is still behind it. With this, we show that there is a grasp of a rule that is not an interpretation; but it manifests itself, from case to case of application, in what we call "following the rule" and in what we call "contravening it". Wittgenstein draws in paragraph 202 of the *Philosophical Investigations* his conclusion about what it is to follow a rule and summarizes his criticism of the view that the rule is some kind of abstract entity that guides the action of men: "Therefore, 'follow the rule' is a practice. And believing in following the rule is not following the rule. And therefore, one cannot 'privately' follow the rule, because otherwise believing oneself to follow the rule would be the same as following the rule." The examination seems to lead to the conclusion that the rule for the use of an expression and the acts that agree with it are not independent things but two aspects of practice. There is, therefore, an immediate conceptual relationship between understanding an expression and the pattern of its correct use, a relationship that is precisely manifested in use and is presupposed in the interpretation of the rule. The existence of rules is a practice that implies a stable use, a custom, and as has been seen, understanding a rule does not imply interpreting it but rather blindly following it. The rule should not be sought in some kind of strange process.

CONCLUSION

Talking about the limits of language is disturbing. It cannot be imagined as something with a phrase, in fact the idea of an endless language is better accepted. To demonstrate this, the following simple example will be offered: There are infinite stars and if each one is assigned a different name, it would represent the existence of infinite names and those names are words, and those words are language, therefore, language is infinite. But there is a philosophical system that perceives, in a certain sense, language as finite. Ludwig Wittgenstein, an eminent Austrian philosopher of the second half of the 19th century, with a fascinating singular personality and exceptional intelligence, is its creator.

When Wittgenstein (2019) says in the *Tractatus* "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (p.105), he postulates it with limitations and asserts the existence of particular languages. This was reaffirmed later when he says: "[...] the world that is my world is shown in that the limits of language (which only I understand) mean the limits of my world" (Wittgenstein, 2019, p.105) if we were to say so otherwise, we would say that there are only personal, private languages, with words with their own meanings.

This vision will pave the way for a language perspective with boundaries. From what this author has given us we can conclude that language is where the limit of the particular is where another particular is. The limit of my language is where someone else is. That is, when two people speak, they do not speak the same language, each speaks its own language with its own meanings. The existence of languages can trigger a series of severe problems, for example, it can cause difficulty in understanding what the other is trying to say in the dialogue, and if there is no understanding, there will only be interpretation. In this way, correct communication is difficult.

It can also be said that if my limited language also restricts my world, and if "I am my world" (Wittgenstein, 2019, p.105), then my language shortens me with the

others that are also conditioned by theirs. So, the man is limited for another man and there will always be a border that is put between them, which will make their interaction difficult. But it is also convenient to understand that language is not something that is determined, and in this way, neither is its margin. If it is not determined, we have the possibility of making it different, of enriching it. If it is amplified, so does the world and, consequently, our borders move away.

There is an opening of the consideration of the sign in the Philosophical Investigations; the value of its use is not so much in its internal relations as in the use itself and the value that is given to that use. By adopting this position, we could describe it as pragmatic; it separates itself from the referential current that goes back to Plato and Saint Augustine and passes through Frege and Russell in modern times.

In the Investigations, language no longer has as its main mission to represent a figure (Bild) of the world as it was held in the Tractatus. Now Wittgenstein poses numerous language games. The language games are innumerable; a word is no longer valued only if it is significant if it has an objective reference. Its use is impossible to limit in this nominalist game. The word, then, can be put to different uses. The mistake of the Tractatus and of the entire logicist current

lies in believing that we only speak of things when that use is only one among many possible ones. Consequently, the question about the meaning of a word is not correct, but the meaning of its use is correct.

The danger of unfolding this meaning, which affirms that it has no meaning but is used, lies in the fact that the question remains open, and each one can interpret the sign as they wish. In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein tries to demonstrate that the situation of communicative actualization is at least as important as the referential theory. The meaning of a word now lies not only in its reference but also in the use that can be made of it, the behavior that can be executed with it.

The transition period between the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* and the Wittgenstein of the *Investigations* occurs between 1930 and 1934. There is an anecdote that tries to justify this change. According to this, Wittgenstein began to oppose his first theory when exposing to a Cambridge professor, the Italian economist Piero Sraffa, the thesis of the identity of the logical form between the facts and the picture propositions that refer to them that he exposed in the *Tractatus*, Sraffa interrupted him with a disapproving hand gesture and then asked the Austrian philosopher what the logical form of the gesture he had just made was. This event made him rethink his thesis about the logical form.

Considering language, the referential game that Wittgenstein exemplifies with a text by Saint Augustine results in an interesting reduction in the *Philosophical Investigations* because this is just one more use, one more game among all possible ones. On the other hand, little can be communicated by the dominance of nominalist play alone. Knowing the names does not mean knowing their use. According to Hartnack's hermeneutics to Wittgenstein's work:

“When it is known how words should be used to pose questions, describe objects and processes, make orders, requests, investigations, promises and judgments, name and solve moral problems, etc., etc., it can be said that one speaks—that is, one “knows how to speak”—a language». It could be thought that the nominative game is implicit in the rest of the possible uses. This thinking implies that we learn language through referential and ostensive definitions. But, according to Wittgenstein, this is false because only when we know certain rules of the language, such as what kinds of words there are, can we begin to use them.

By dynamiting the theoretical edifice of the philosophical current of language that he considered its representative nature as its founding element, it is worth asking then what Wittgenstein's response to the question of language is, that is, what language games have in common. The Austrian philosopher denies the possibility of finding a

common element and uses the concept of family resemblance (Familienähnlichkeiten) as a possible solution:

«I cannot better characterize these resemblances than with the expression «family resemblances»; This is how the various resemblances that exist between the members of a family overlap and intersect: height, features, eye colour, gait, temperament, etc. etc. —And I will say: “games” make up a family».

For the Austrian thinker, the meaning of a linguistic sign is given by its use; that is, between the meaning and the reference, there is no more union than that established by its use, and therefore, this is a natural and direct. Wittgenstein justifies his reasoning with the example of a person's proper name. In that case, the proper name A refers to the person X; the meaning of the proper name A is not directly the person X, but our semantic idea of the relationship that we have established between A and X. This seems obvious when we observe that person X may be dead and we continue to name him by A; the referent dies, not the signified.

Language is no longer contemplated as it was in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* in a restrictive and unitary way from the overvaluation of the reference. The *Philosophical Investigations* pose an open definition of language in which all possible language games have a place. Among the various language games, one can only speak of a family resemblance. Consequently, to consider language is to consider a multiple phenomenon and activity: the actualization of innumerable linguistic games. It is impossible to make a closed list of language games of the uses of words and of all their meanings because, over time, they change or fall into oblivion. So another difference can be inferred with respect to Wittgenstein's reflection on the *Tractatus*, and it is that it is not possible to point to the essence of language since each proposition composes a specific logical space, a particular use, in short, a language game. Words and propositions cease to have a significant intrinsic power, which passes into the communicative context: “A word or a sentence has the meaning it has because someone

has given it to it, and not because they are endowed with some power independent of us. If we wish to know or understand more adequately its meaning, we must examine under what circumstances it was endowed with it; that is, you have to identify how that word or that sentence is used”.

After all the above, and by way of conclusion, it can be pointed out that for Wittgenstein, language is basically an instrument of communication between human beings; for example, in paragraph 491 of the *Philosophical Investigations*, he suggests that 'without language, we could not understand each other. Without language, you cannot influence other people in such a way; roads and machines etc., cannot be built. Also, "without the use of speech and writing, human beings could not understand each other." On the other hand, the constant criticism of idealism refers to the fact that there should be no reflections on what "language" is as an abstract entity; now, the attention is directed towards the multiple and different language games. Language games interest Wittgenstein not in terms of the mere description of their elements but especially in terms of observing the dynamics of their rules. This is a result of the use of language in the way of life, which opposes his old thesis that «one can only ask about the meaning of a word in the context of a proposition». All the analysis leads to the conclusion that a person cannot refer to the search for essences. Now, with respect to philosophy, its reason for being is justified because there are philosophical problems. One of the main ones consists of curing what Wittgenstein calls disease by making family resemblances with linguistic concepts and making them identify in common essences. Here the confusion is born and, consequently, the traps of language that philosophy must find. For this reason, Wittgenstein makes constant emphasis on taking care not to fall into what he calls the endemic evil of philosophy: the craving for generality. Ultimately, the second Wittgenstein's conception of language emphasizes that any concept in language must be circumscribed to specific language games for which it has a certain meaning.

Language is conceived in a totally different way, even methodologically: it is no longer a representation or index of anything; rather, it is like an instrument that can emit a different sound depending on its use made of it. Words are compared by Wittgenstein to different tools, and of these, a single user cannot be attributed.

Another difference between the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* is that in the latter, a correction of all linguistic propositions is not pursued the sake of discovering their correct logical form. It is not about correcting but about understanding. Underlying this difference is an epistemological change because it is no longer the search for the represented atomic fact that is important; rather, the understanding of its function is important, that is, apprehending the role it plays within the social communicative fact.

Wittgenstein differentiates between words that designate internal or private sensations and words that designate external or public sensations. While external or public words designate elements, sensations, things, etc., objectifiable; internal or private words designate subjective elements; that is, they refer to elements, sensations, things, etc., that are not found in the public space but in the interiority of those who feel them, hence their privacy. The use of internal words in different propositions (affirmations, exclamations, questions, etc.) forms the private language. Faced with this situation, Wittgenstein intends to demonstrate that such a private language does not exist, and according to Hartnack's reading: "And not only that but its possible future existence must be considered impossible for logical reasons." It happens that when we talk about our sensations, we are not updating the nominative linguistic game even though we think so.

The impossibility of a private language lies, according to the analysis of the Austrian thinker, in the lack of a logical method that can ratify in a correct and objective way whether a sensation occurs or not. Faced with this methodological deficiency, there is only the possibility of defending the sensation according to what it seems to us.

There is no criterion of truth that establishes when there is a sensation other than our own opinion. Consequently, the name we use in the belief that it refers to a sensation is not such since it operates without defined rules. We believe that it is a use that executes a linguistic game, but it is not like that; it does not comply with certain rules to fulfil a function in a correct way. By using a name X to refer to a sensation, Wittgenstein demonstrates that such an actualization does not comply with the rules of the nominative game, fundamentally it does not comply with the requirement that, in Hartnack's words, "What is named must be identifiable. Otherwise, the logical conditions of the nominative function are not satisfied.

Now, if, as Wittgenstein's critique shows, when talking about our sensations, we do not name them, then what is the use of that language? The answer is none other than this: the assertion about a feeling is part of the same feeling through learning. This is how Hartnack recapitulates it: «According, then, with Wittgenstein, the expression "I have pain" is not an assertion; it is simply part of a certain behavior, the behavior of pain (pain-behaviour) [...] Since "I have pain" is not a description of pain, but rather something that occupies, as he himself says, the place of a specific element of pain behavior (i.e., the site of the scream), it is clear why it makes no sense to say that I was wrong in thinking it was a pain when in fact it was tingling. It would make no more sense, for example, to maintain that I was wrong to complain and say, "Ouch!" since, in reality, I would have had to scratch myself».

The Philosophical Investigations try to show the epistemological errors that we make daily when using language: the meaning of an expression is not necessary to inform or describe. In short, the Philosophical Investigations represented a fundamental turn in contemporary epistemology. Wittgenstein contributed with his work a new method of understanding the linguistic fact that, although it disdains the question about the essence of language, it is capable, however, of providing more complete explanations, but now from its use.

In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein (1921) mentions that language and reality are isomorphic because the structure of language translates the structure of reality, which is why reality is limited by language. However, it is worth mentioning that the position of the "Tractatus" is essentialist and it is due to the influence of modern linguists such as Jerrold Katz that it is determined that language is constituted by a multiplicity of diverse activities: narrate, describe, translate, guess, sing, play a role, make up a story, etc.; whose structure does not conform to that of the norms of statements, which are a small part of human linguistic activity. They are, without a doubt, the most important part in a theory of science that is made up of statements, but they are not in a theory of language that must explain all kinds of linguistic activity. It is in this theory that Wittgenstein's best-known thesis is found, in which he conceives language as a game whose pieces are words; This conception of language leads us in two directions, the first leads us to assume that language is an activity subject to rules that are always valid for a group, therefore, these rules cannot be substantiated. The second leads us to construct simple languages that respond to a defined pragmatic situation, that is, to language games, which are models in a double sense that emphasize the mechanisms of linguistic behavior, and, while avoiding the substantiation of subjective internal processes as a correlate of linguistic activity. (Peters and White, 1971)

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