



T.C.

ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

**CULTURE CONSTRUCTION THROUGH HALKEVLERİ
OF TÜRKİYE DURING THE SINGLE-PARTY PERIOD: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY**

PhD THESIS

HAZAN GÜLER SARI

THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION

ANKARA, 2023

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ANKARA, 2023

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The thesis, prepared by Hazan GÜLER SARI and titled “Culture Construction Through Halkevleri of Türkiye During the Single-Party Period: A Comparative Study” is accepted as a doctoral thesis at Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science and Public Administration by unanimous vote/majority vote.

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PLAGIARISM PAGE

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work; otherwise, I accept all legal responsibility. 05.06.2023

Signature

Hazan GÜLER SARI

*This thesis is dedicated to my loved ones; Meral, Oğuz, Reyhan, Uğur, Mina,
Nevbahar and my dear M. Fatih*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to express my special thanks and appreciation to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Yılmaz BİNGÖL for his guidance, advice, criticism, encouragement, and insight throughout the entire period of my PhD study. This dissertation would not be possible without his significant contributions.

My heartfelt gratitude also goes to the members of my dissertation committee for their insightful comments and encouragement. In this regard, I am deeply thankful to Prof. Dr. Murat ÖNDER for his time, suggestions, and comments. I am also greatly thankful to Prof. Dr. Cemal FEDAYİ, with whom I work at Kırıkkale University. He guided me not only in this thesis but also throughout my professional career at Kırıkkale University with his vision and knowledge. I am deeply thankful to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mümin KÖKTAŞ for his previous critics. His advice in order to shape this work was priceless. Without his criticisms on the process of writing, I could not develop this dissertation. I am more than thankful to Prof. Dr. H. Bahadır TÜRK for his great contributions to both my academic career and my life. He guided me from the very beginning of my undergraduate. He not only opened many windows but also gave me strength with his supportive, encouraging, and helpful presence. It has always been a privilege for me to have him in my life. He has always made good touches on my life and I believe that he will always be there.

I extend special thanks to the members of my family. First of all, I am deeply thankful to Meral Güler, my dearest mother, for supporting me by heart and always encouraging me to do my best; and Oğuz Güler, my dearest father, whom I couldn't do anything without his grateful support. I am thankful to Reyhan Güler Akyürek, my one and only sister, for her outstanding encouragement during this challenging process. I am also very much thankful to Uğur and Mina. I could not complete this dissertation without their wonderful energy.

I am grateful to my lovey Nevbahar, my precious baby, for being with me all the time.

Last, but not least, I would like to thank my beloved husband, M. Fatih Sarı. I cannot explain what he's brought to my life since I've met him. I sincerely thank him for the convenience, countless support, and broad perspective he provided for me both in the process of writing the thesis and in all areas of my life. His understanding of me at a glance always made my life easier. I thank him for being my everything.

I want to thank God for giving me the strength to complete this thesis. Through him, all things are possible!

ÖZET

Halkevleri Özelinde Türkiye’de Tek Parti Dönemi Kültür İnşası: Karşılaştırmalı Bir İnceleme

Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de tek parti dönemi kültür inşasını yurttaş imalatı kapsamında *Halkevleri* özelinde incelemektedir. Kültür, kültür-siyaset ilişkisi, kültürel alanda politik bir mücadele olarak hegemonya arayışı, kültürün ulus inşa sürecine katkısı gibi teorik bir temelden hareketle *Halkevleri* üzerine bir vaka incelemesi sunulmuştur. *Halkevleri*’nin tek parti dönemi Türkiye’inde hem yetişkin eğitimi hem de kültür aşılama noktasında kritik bir konum elde etmesi, böylesi bir kültürel inşa analizi içeren çalışma için seçilmesinde temel husus olmuştur. Çalışma *Halkevleri*’nin 1932-1951 yılları arasındaki ilk dönemine dair bir incelemeyi içerir ve söz konusu dönemin aktörlerine bugün doğrudan ulaşmanın mümkün olmaması gerekçesi ile tarihsel bir incelemeyi kapsar. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışma niteliksel yönteme dayanarak hem harici bir perspektif üzerinden karşılaştırmalı bir analizle hem de *Halkevleri* özelinde TBMM tutanaklarına uygulanan içerik analizi ile iddiasını ortaya koymaktadır. Çalışmanın karşılaştırmalı değerlendirmesine katkı sunacak, ikinci vaka analizi incelemesi, 1925 yılında İtalya’da kurulan *Dopolavoro* kültür örgütü incelemesidir. *Dopolavoro* kurumunun bu çalışmaya dahil edilmesi, *Halkevleri* ile benzer dönemlerde benzer saiklerle hareket eden bir kurum olmasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra, *Dopolavoro*’nun dünya genelinde kültür üretim merkezleri adına ün ve başarıları da bilinmektedir. Çalışmanın literatüre sunacağı özgün katkıların bununla kalmayıp, TBMM veri tabanında 1932-1951 yılları arasındaki altı dönemde toplam 1703 birleşmeden 201’inde tespit edilen *Halkevleri* hakkında görüşmelerin incelenmesi sonucu elde edilen içerik analizi ile sağlanacağı düşünülmektedir. Bu çalışma, ‘*Halkevleri* özelinde tek parti dönemi kültür inşa süreci nasıl işlemiş, söz konusu çabalar toplumda nasıl karşılık bulmuştur? Bu nasıl ölçülebilir?’ temel sorusundan yola çıkar. Tek parti dönemi devlet eliyle kültür inşasına ve bunun toplumdaki karşılığına odaklanan çalışma, kültürel motiflerin maruz kaldığı hızlı değişimlerin toplumun tüm kesimleri tarafından kabul edilemeyebileceğini ve dolayısıyla yurttaşların rejimin arzuladığı düzeyde dönüştürülemeyebileceğini kanıtlamayı amaçlar. Bunu göstermek için de çalışmada karma bir metoda başvurulmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kültür, iktidar, *Halkevleri*, hegemonya, yurttaş imalatı, içerik analizi, karşılaştırmalı analiz.

ABSTRACT

Culture Construction Through Halkevleri of Türkiye During the Single-Party Period: A Comparative Study

This study deals with the culture construction process within the scope of citizen construction during the single-party period in Turkey, through the analysis of *Halkevleri*. A case study on *Halkevleri* is introduced with a theoretical basis over the issues of culture, the relationship between culture and politics, hegemony as a political struggle in the cultural sphere, and the contributions of culture to the nation-building process. Since *Halkevleri* had a critical position in both adult education and cultural education in the single-party period, it has been chosen for his study which is designed to build a cultural construction analysis. This study takes the analysis of *Halkevleri* in its first period between 1932-1951 into account. Since it is nearly impossible to reach the actors of the aforementioned period directly today, the study covers a historical perspective. In this regard, based on a qualitative method, the study tries to submit its claim through both a comparative analysis from an external example and a content analysis applied to the parliamentary records specific to *Halkevleri*. The second case analysis that will contribute to the comparative perspective is *Dopolavoro* culture organization established in 1925 in Italy. The reason why *Dopolavoro* is included in this study as a comparative unit stems from the fact that it was established with similar motives in similar periods with *Halkevleri*. It is also known that *Dopolavoro* had a widely accepted reputation as a success in cultural organizations around the world. The originality of the contributions throughout the study is not that all. The study also includes the content analysis obtained as a result of the examination of the records on the issue of *Halkevleri*, which were determined in 201 out of 1703 meetings in the six periods between 1932-1951 throughout TBMM database. The study tries to answer the following questions: How did the tools of culture construction through *Halkevleri* work in Turkey? How did the efforts to establish culture through *Halkevleri* find a social response? And how could this be measured? Focusing on culture construction by the state during the single-party period and the social response, this study aims to prove that the rapid changes to which cultural motives are subjected may not be accepted by the whole society and the citizens may not be transformed at the level as desired by the regime. A mixed method has been applied throughout the study, to achieve this result.

Keywords: Culture, power, *Halkevleri*, hegemony, citizen construction, content analysis, comparative analysis.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The single-party period of the early Republican regime is one of the most significant phases of Turkish political life. Acting as a touchstone in the establishment of the Turkish state with numerous reforms, the founders of the new regime constitute the main actors of this period. In the context of modernization experience, how the regime actors perceived the meaning of modernization deeply affected the entire era. During this period, a total and radical transformation was aimed; and the exclusion of the previous Ottoman experience even made this process extremely critical in itself.

It seems significant, at the beginning of this study, to identify what is meant by the single-party period. The single-party period carries, within itself, the necessity to underline the differences among the terms, figures, and especially facts. This effort is believed to make a great contribution to the accuracy of this study. Although in 1923, the establishment of the Republic of Turkey was undertaken by *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası*, the regime was not directly a single-party regime. The establishment of the single-party rule dates back to the second decade of the Republican era. This is the basic difference between the policies of the 1920s and the 1930s. At the beginning of the 1930s, noticing that the new order was not accepted made the founding cadres take more steps that would both bind people to the regime and consolidate the absolute power of the regime (Tunçay, 1981: 294-331; Köker, 2007: 146-147).

The Kemalist revolution corresponds to a radical construction process in which the actors of the early Republican period undertook the founding mission through numerous dynamics (Köker, 2007: 211; Göle, 2011: 26). As claimed by Tunaya, it is possible to describe the single-party period as the ‘tutelage regime’, Republican People's Party of the period as the ‘tutelage party’ and Kemalism, the ideology of the period, as the ‘tutelage ideology’ (1980: 314). With the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, the establishment of the necessary institutional structure for the nation-state was rapidly provided. While the organization on legal and institutional foundations gained significance in the first place, the importance of the reforms on the socio-cultural level came up over time. The Republican Revolution aimed to make not only the state but also the citizens modernized in the political, institutional, and - more critically - the socio-cultural sense. In this regard, the tendency to

create new and modern citizens beyond the necessary legal, political, and bureaucratic steps of the first period drew attention.

Kemalism was a revolution of values directly targeting the morals of the Ottoman “*ancien-régime*”. And the Republic was intolerant towards the values of the previous regime that threatened its very existence (Mardin, 1971: 202, 209-210). In this sense, calling it a radical revolution is not coincidental. The fact that religion was seen as the core structure of Turkey's cultural system and that Islam had a direct relationship with the social and political structure made the Turkish case a radical one. The modernization process of Turkey was radical, which is a fact accepted by many social scientists, historians, writers, and analysts. Assuming this, we must not forget that the modernization phase of Turkey had to be radical.

Turning back to the modernization phase, we need to shortly mention the late Ottoman modernization movement, to understand the radicalism behind it. As we all know, the Turkish modernization course did not suddenly begin in 1923; but, the Republic of Turkey was the result of many ongoing reforms starting from the 18th century of the Ottoman Empire. The process which started with Sultan Selim III became the pioneer of the modernization/Westernization movement of the Ottoman Empire (İnalçık, 1964: 34). During the Ottoman reign, the process before Tanzimat was highly initiated by technical imports from the West. The Ottomans’ accepting the territorial losses as the result of the developments of the West in terms of its military and technical prosperity caused the first movements of innovations in the empire. These first attempts mostly aimed at acquiring only the military methods from the West. In Berkes’ expressions, this process included the Ottoman tendency to turn to the West instead of returning to reviving its traditional institutions (Berkes, 1978: 69). Therefore, we can assert that the motivation of following the West employing technological and economic development, as well as military progress, formed the basis of the Ottoman modernization experiment at the first stage. Later the process evolved to the adoption of the reforms through institutions such as administration, education, and law. The main goal of all these renovation attempts was to strengthen the Ottoman state.

Mostly keeping a distance towards the socio-cultural base of the developed West, Ottoman Empire remained stable in adopting Western science and technique (Mardin, 1983a: 245-250). However, it had to change the direction of the modernization movement after a short while. In other terms, it was at last understood by the Ottoman authorities that

the way to strengthen the state by modern means could not be fulfilled through categorizing the reforms. In such a categorization the technical and military reforms to be brought from the West were regarded acceptable and welcomed; on the other hand, the social and cultural reforms were considered harmful, and required to be avoided.

“It is seen that the 'innovation', in technical terms the modernization, which started with Selim III or *Lale Devri* (the Tulip Era) in the Ottoman Empire, was defeated by narrow institutional arrangements until the Tanzimat. The focus of these arrangements was always the army. The Tanzimat had a difference in this respect: With the Tanzimat, it was implicitly envisaged to convert to a citizen-based territorial state in terms of the content of the modern state concept” remarks Aydın (1993: 32) and addresses the significance of the Tanzimat period, through the early modernization movements. We observe that during the Tanzimat period that started to change the turn of events, the solutions for recovering the state varied and even became radical. Especially within this process, the aim of the modernization movements to empower the state turned into recovering the state (Mardin, 2017: 342). There occurred a duality in the direction of Ottoman modernization. On the one hand, it was aimed to empower the existing Ottoman state; on the other hand, establishing a new political system was sought, which would later constitute the basis of the Kemalist movement (Tunçay, 1983b: 1924). The process initiated by the Tanzimat brought many political, legal, economic, and cultural revolutions. It was already what made this period vital for the course of modernization. The most important one among those reforms was the constitutional regulations. In this context, young people educated in Western-style schools opened during the reign of Abdülhamit after *I. Meşrutiyet* (the First Constitutional Monarchy), formed the core of *Jön Türk* (the Young Turks) movement that prepared the declaration of the Constitutional Monarchy. In this period, various views on the future of the Ottoman Empire were put forward. Among them, *Turkism*, *Westernism*, *Ottomanism*, and *Islamism* were the most powerful ones (Aydın, 1993: 130-147; 162-179; Çolak, 2017: 61-85). These clashing ideas on the modernization process ended up with the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The Young Turks, who came to power after *II. Meşrutiyet* (the Second Constitutional Monarchy), left their mark on both the last period of the Ottoman Empire and the first years of the Republic (Köker, 2007: 129; Hanioglu, 1986: 9).

Starting with the Tanzimat period and continuing to the Republican era, the separation between the East and the West was aimed to be overcome based on a new nation, a new civilization, and a new future. In this clash, the new order was designed by the

Kemalist rulers, who established the state in 1923. Defining Kemalism as follows, “fulfilling the transition from an Islamic empire to a secular nation-state, it is the most conscious expression of changing civilization, which, beyond changing the structure of the state, penetrated the daily life since Tanzimat period”, Göle (2011: 82) appeals to it as a civilization project. In light of all these, we see that what the Kemalist regime, through the establishment of the modern Turkish state, expected was not only an institutional and legal transformation but also a sociocultural one.

Turkey’s modernization experience was an extreme one by necessity, as we have mentioned the reasons above. To expand it, we may also discuss the modernization politics of Turkey from a comparative perspective. Turkey may have been told to be late in its modernization movement. Turkey was late for the transformation that its European counterparts had carried out almost 150 years ago through the experience of the Enlightenment. Europe had undergone a transformation process starting with the Enlightenment period. The basis of the age dates back to the Renaissance movement. It is the period in which the Enlightenment philosophy was born and started to be adopted in the 18th century (Köker, 2007: 63). Therefore, the Turkish aim of this kind of transformation could only be achieved at the beginning of the 20th century.

Turkey was partially late in its modernization process but - as a matter of fact - its experience was quite different from that of its European counterparts. We know that the modernization attempts started in Europe and spread all over the world. However, this process was not the same everywhere it expanded. And Turkey was one of those having a slightly different modernization course. In the Western European countries, modernization took place as a result of highly industrialization movements. Kautsky, who tries to explain the effects of the industrialization process on political change as a leading factor of modernization, deals with the fact that not every development in terms of modernization was caused by industrialization, in his examinations of the undeveloped regions outside of Western Europe (Kautsky, 1972). As we see from his assertions, in contrast to the internal modernization of Western Europe, modernization in non-Western societies was mostly governed as a process motivated by external factors. Dealing with societal development, Chodak also draws up the modernization processes outside the industrialized world. For him, the countries apart from which ended up their modernization course through the motivation of industrialization may become modernized only through “cultural contact”. For such countries, he appoints two forms of modernization. The first of them is acculturative and the

second is the induced one. Acculturative modernization is a result of historical dynamics, which appears on its own, without any oppression outside. However, the induced modernization corresponds to a complex process involving the development of organizations, institutions, and values in the modernizing country as in industrialized countries. In this regard, the second modernization form starts with the final touches of those industrialized countries without perceiving the basic structures which eased their process of modernization (Chodak, 1973: 263-268). We may refer to the second type as the Turkish modernization process in both Kautsky's and Chodak's categorizations.

Not caused by an industrialization movement nor introduced by a social base movement, Turkish modernization was a unique experience with its top-down campaign (Köker, 2007: 15; 175-176; Çolak, 2000: 11). This top-down aspect of the whole process in Turkish case might also be the result of the aforementioned delay. Not just the modernization of the country through administration but also the civilizing process aimed to fulfil numerous revolutions in a very short period. What Turkey experienced was to some extent a paradigm shift, and felt a necessity to integrate its institutional basis with the society. The social basis, therefore, was of great importance, since the modernization purpose could only be achieved through its wide acceptance by the society. In light of all these, the establishment of the republic was the very first of these revolutionary initiatives.

What the founding cadres aimed at through the Kemalist revolution was total independence with a constitutional order. And they secondly sought to break completely from the old system in terms of institutional, legal, administrative, and - more significantly – religious, social, and cultural structure, which was a significant indicator of secularism. Aydın refers to this experience as follows: “The Republican ideology in Turkey shares the constitutionalist, nationalist, and secular principles that are the primary pillars of modernization and emerges as a combination of these principles” (1993: 225). At this point, many argue that in the course of how the revolution took pace, it may not be so easy for the regime to be moderate. The most appropriate explanation for the inadequacies of this radical process could even be the lack of democracy (Heper, 1976: 485; Köker, 2007: 221-222).

Republican administration can be seen by many as compatible, even identical, with democracy. However, the two differ from each other and this does not necessitate any republic to be democratic naturally. The examination of the modernization process of the new Turkish state can be done through various attempts. One of the most important of these

is the new regime's perception of democracy. The 1920s was a time when fascist totalitarian tendencies became visible around the world, and got highly attractive. At this very point, what Kemalism understood by democracy should not be confused with fascism, which was the widespread movement of that period. The most appropriate definition of the new Turkish regime in its process of radicalism in this regard was the lack of democracy, authoritarianism, intellectual despotism, tutelage regime, or bureaucratic conservatism (Özbudun, 1981: 90; Köker, 2007: 228-229; Mardin, 1983b: 80; Tunaya, 1980: 314). All these explanations were enough to see the extremism of the Kemalist revolution without getting closer to the totalitarian tendencies. It can be claimed that the extremism in question was incompatible with the dynamics of this country in terms of the method it followed rather than its purpose. Before passing such assertions, we may have a closer look at the process leading to the main analysis factor of this study.

It was the field of culture, that the founding elites, who attempted to establish a total change through various mechanisms attached critical importance to. While the legal regulations implemented right after the proclamation of the republic constituted the explicit steps that came to the fore in the redesign of the country under the roof of the nation-state, the internalization of this whole process by the society made the founding cadres rethink the context of the reforms. Through the mission of citizen construction, the regime aimed to transform the behaviour, thinking, and understanding styles of individuals and attempted to replace the existing social memory with an alternative lifestyle. The idea of a transformed order that completely abolished the old and replaced it with a new one was given high significance. Aydın explains this process with the following critical words: "Much more energy was spent on the detailed creation of national consciousness and historical myths, such as hat and clothing regulations, the formation of the Civil Code and the reforms of the status of women than on the maturation of the republic's economic foundation" (1993: 226). In this effort, we easily see that the cultural mechanisms applied by the founding power gained importance.

Turkish revolution can easily be called "an intellectual revolution" as asserted by İnan (1968: 291) and Köker (2007: 166). The aim of the revolution to change the value system generally accepted in Turkish society is shared by many. "The Kemalist civilization project, beyond changing the structure of the state, wished for the penetration of the way of life, behaviour, and daily habits" (Göle, 2011: 83). Göle's referring to the invisible objectives of the revolutionary regime once again reveals what has been mentioned above.

Here, we can see that Göle calls civilization a stage in the broad spectrum of culture in the newly established order. As the following goes on, Göle states: “Although the concept of 'civilization' covers a wide area from the level of technology to eating and drinking customs, it is first of all the 'national feeling of the West'... In short, the concept of 'civilization' defines the superiority of the Western world and attributes a universality dimension to its cultural model.” Göle also emphasizes the culture-civilization duality here. In the face of the mentioned culture-civilization distinction, she writes that "In my opinion, the Kemalist movement includes both” (2011: 85-86). The other of the main debates over the modernization process of Turkey reveals here in Göle’s expressions, which is the division of culture and civilization. Considering the issue mostly from the cultural basis, this study covers the civilization-acculturation (Çolak, 2000: 200) separation and analyses a key institution, believed to serve such duality.

In the early Republican period, culture was considered an element for the development of society, a part of social engineering rather than a living organism based on shared values and historical experiences. The desire to shape the values that individuals would acquire in the process of socialization/civilization through the active intervention of the state was mainly the reflection of this period (Berkes, 1984: 25). This process marked the construction of a purely new culture. The cultural policies of the single-party government, aiming to establish reforms with a social memory change, also gained importance in the process. And institutions such as *Türk Dil Kurumu*, *Türk Tarih Kurumu*, and *Halkevleri* were the vital instruments of this culture to indoctrinate people (Tunçay, 1981: 306-313; Çolak, 2017: 159-164; 172-178). Making the whole society accept this new culture was what made many researchers question these instruments. Therefore, this study is designed on the social query of the position of *Halkevleri*, on behalf of the response it gained from the society to reveal whether the regime could succeed in instilling the culture into the society as they determined.

It is possible to figure out what we have mentioned above in various actions of the regime during the single-party era. Since we consider the sociocultural base for this study, we have mostly shifted our focus to the clashes in that area. In this regard, it is thought to be meaningful to examine the cultural construction tools within the framework of citizen construction in the early Republican period. And this study aims to examine the experience of *Halkevleri*, a critical step in the single-party period of sociocultural construction. *Halkevleri* are examined through the issues of cultural construction, citizen construction,

ideological tool, and national consciousness. Under the major concern of this study, the establishment of *Halkevleri* was an extension of what has been just mentioned; it was one of the leading aims of the whole radical process of modernization. Examining the social response - that *Halkevleri* received - through different methods, this study develops a critical perspective. However, here we should admit that this organization, which is open to criticism, was one of the necessary outputs of the aforementioned radical stages. In this regard, we see many examples of adult education institutions especially in Europe similar to Turkish *Halkevleri*. While it can be mentioned in the first place that what *Halkevleri* aimed to do was partially ordinary compared to its European equals (Çolak, 2000: 181), it will not be wrong to claim that *Evler* could not appeal to society in terms of the way and the method it followed in the long term.

Halkevleri, an adult education centre, established by the Republican cadres as the main tool in the construction of culture, became one of the most important social organizations since 1932. The fact that its ideological attitude since its establishment spread throughout the whole process makes *Halkevleri* not only meaningful for such a study which tries to show that culture is used as a power tool but also turns it into a source for many similar studies in various fields with the extremely critical examples it submits. In this context, the main point of this study is to examine the culture construction process and the social response against *Halkevleri*, which were imagined as places that would serve social integrity but rather undertook the mission of instilling intense political propaganda (Şimşek, 2002: 88-90), both from a historical and comparative perspective. Before sharing the details of the methodology of the study, we may shortly discuss the ideological aspect behind *Halkevleri*, which seem as a critical motivation for the regime with its nationalist and populist functions.

Standing for the socio-cultural improvement of society from a wide scope, *Halkevleri* were submitted as places to preserve the ideals of the Republican revolution. Built on, especially the principles of populism and nationalism, *Halkevleri* came out as a significant portrayal of how the ruling regime considered the two principles. As declared by Köker, who focuses on the inevitable relationship between the two principles, “The relationship between the Kemalist understanding of populism and the principle of nationalism draws attention to the cultural aspect of populism” (2007: 149). Perceiving a relation between the two, Göle also expresses the following “Kemalist nationalism is based on Anatolian populism as

opposed to Ottoman cosmopolitan elitism” (2011: 88). These expressions seem a good point to start our discussion relating to the issue of *Halkevleri*.

The boundaries of the citizens to be built in the new period were designed based on the two principles. Nation, which was a religious concept in the political and social thought of the pre-Republican period, was rigidly separated from it with the proclamation of the Republic and gained a purified form from its religious characteristics. The characteristics of the ideal Turkish nation were declared as providing unity in political existence, unity of language, unity of race and origin, historical resemblance, and moral similarity (İnan, 1969: 22). Furthermore, the nationalism of the new regime was considerably related to the development of the nation. Turkish nationalism highly aimed to walk in harmony with all contemporary nations, in parallel with them on the way to development.

In terms of determining the national will, two ways can be followed, as asserted by Köker (2007: 156): “The first one is the adoption of the method of "direct democracy" following the idea of making people ‘possess their destiny’; and the other is the acceptance of representative institutions in which the national will can only be determined through the deputies elected by the nation.” It seems clear that the Republican regime adopted the second way in this regard. Showing the direct relationship of nationalism with populism in the newly established order is also important at the beginning of our study. We see that populism was politicized by the founding cadres. Göle expresses similar views with the following implications: “Kemalist nationalism was against the Ottoman Palace, but it continued the Westernism of the Ottomans” (2011: 88).

The relationship discussed above makes *Halkevleri* significant, as a matter of analysis. Since in the early Republican period, the new Turkish people were considered to be insufficient to be left to their destiny, the coordination of the whole process was conducted by the regime elites. All along the organizing of institutional, legal, social, and cultural aspects, the rulers appointed themselves as the only authority. The social and cultural part of this organization was, on the other hand, of great importance. And one of the main outputs of this socio-cultural field was *Halkevleri* at the beginning of the 1930s. Aiming the construction of citizens for the new, modern system through cultural means, *Halkevleri* constituted the very critical basis of this organizational process (Çolak, 2017: 129-135).

The differences of the 1930s from the first years of the Republican Revolution explain to us the character of single-party rule. In the 1930s, there were critical changes on behalf of the administration, in other words, how the administration was perceived underwent a critical change. Standing as a real threat against *CHF*, the existence of an opposition party, *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* revealed that there would be some disadvantages to the use of national sovereignty in a political regime of multi-party (Tunçay, 1981: 247-275). This experience showed that the revolutions of the regime were not adopted by the people and that the distance between people and the government was not yet eliminated. All these formed the basis for the steps that distinguished this period from the previous one (Köker, 2007: 145-147). And one of the most important steps was *Halkevleri*.

Within the framework of the Turkish modernization process, by assuming the importance of the main subject of this study, *Halkevleri*, we may go through the details of the thesis. As mentioned before, the examination of *Halkevleri* is formed through more than one analysis method in this study. Beyond the historical context, it is aimed to carry out a comparative study of *Halkevleri* through Italian *Dopolavoro*, a cultural organization established under the guidance of the National Fascist Party in 1925 (de Garzia, 1981: 33-34). In the process of establishing *Halkevleri*, it is known that the inspections of similar practices throughout the world by those who were sent abroad for education in the early days of the republic occupied a large place. In this context, *Halkevleri* took the example of cultural organizations in European countries. And within this study, Italian *Dopolavoro*, which was among those foreign examples of adult education (Şimşek, 2002: 25-26; 62-63), is to be discussed. The reason why *Dopolavoro* is included as a comparative unit stems from the fact that it was established with similar motives in similar periods with *Halkevleri*. The study, with an interdisciplinary interpretation route, is believed to serve as an alternative to many studies carried out on Turkish modernization and *Halkevleri* until today since it focuses on demonstrating the social response towards *Halkevleri* through multiple perspectives.

The examination of an Italian cultural organization, during the fascist regime, seems critical at first sight. Especially doing it with Turkish experience in a comparative manner even makes it more challenging. Italian *Dopolavoro* organization was one of the most influential tools of the fascist government from 1925 on. The reputation of the organization was not spread only in the region but around the world (Ben-Ghiat, 2001: 8). Therefore, it is quite likely for the Italian example to be chosen as a unit of comparison for any study. However, its existence as a part of the first totalitarian regime in the modern world could

easily make it risky. For this study, the examination of the fascist Italian *Dopolavoro* only derives from its similarity with *Halkevleri* of Turkey in their objectives. *Dopolavoro* organization and *Halkevleri* were two cultural tools that emerged in nearly similar periods. The time especially after WWI was the period in which the modern nation-states directed cultural education tools to design societies all around the world (de Garzia, 1981: 1). Under the light of a shared purpose, Italy and Turkey could easily come together in comparative means. For further concentration, we may also recall both *Halkevleri* and *Dopolavoro* organizations as performing similar activities during their lifetime. Regardless of the ideological difference between the administrations that both organizations served, Turkish *Halkevleri* experience under a single-party rule and Italian *Dopolavoro* practice under a fascist rule may be conducted for a comparable analysis. This comparative perspective does not mean that the two different nation-states resemble each other in utilizing the administration.

Comparatively examining the cultural construction tools seems also important in terms of providing an original contribution to the literature. In this context, this study, which aims to shed light on a critical period of Turkish political life, from an explanatory category, through the case study specific to *Halkevleri*, also pursues originality with a content analysis it submits. Therefore, another important point of the study comes up: Investigating the social response of *Halkevleri* by subjecting it to a content analysis on the discussions of the Turkish Grand National Assembly records. In this way, contributions to the literature are taken into consideration through the examination of *Halkevleri* - which have been the source of studies not only in the fields of political science, public administration, and history but also in various fields such as sociology, anthropology, law, linguistics, and literature - from a perspective that has never been done before.

Halkevleri were divided into three periods; the first period from 1932 to 1951, the second period from 1963 to 1980, and the third period from 1987 to the present. Mostly, the first period of *Halkevleri* has been the subject of scientific studies. This may stem from both the direct connection of the period in question with the early republican period of Turkey and the decrease in the influence of *Halkevleri* in the following periods. In its first period between 1932-1952, *Halkevleri* have been subject to many scientific studies. From scientific publications to master's and doctoral theses, there has been a wide range of research on the issue. Besides, the field of study is quite wide. To briefly mention the studies on *Halkevleri* issue in the literature, we may start with the theses, attained through the database of the

national thesis centre of *Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu (YÖK)* (the Higher Education Institution). In the research conducted on the database of the national thesis centre, there are 64 theses written on *Halkevleri* between 1990 and 2022. Among them, five theses are Ph.D. theses, one is a thesis on proficiency in the arts and the rest are master theses. The fields of the studies cover a wide range; from anthropology to information and records management, from education and training to journalism, from folklore to public relations, from communication sciences to public administration, from architecture to music, from performing and visual arts to political science, from social services to sociology, from history to Turkish language and literature and history of Turkish revolution. The Ph.D. theses are mainly written in the fields of the history of the Turkish Revolution, political science, sociology, and folklore. Apart from the theses which directly discuss *Halkevleri* through its name or the topic of the theses, there are many of those which include *Halkevleri* through the general writings of the theses. These are reached in the database of the national thesis centre by searching the word *Halkevleri* or *People's Houses* in the abstracts of the theses. Therefore, we have encountered 226 more theses that are not entitled by the word *Halkevleri* but include the issue in their contents.

Apart from the theses we have mentioned above, there are also many researches and published works on *Halkevleri*. Consisting of books, articles, documents, paper presentations, and other items, various research studies have discussed the first period of *Halkevleri*, between 1932-1951. The published works on *Halkevleri* mainly cover the topics of education issues, artistic effectiveness, the contributions of any *Halkevi* to its region, the role of *Halkevleri* in the formation of nation and history, the activities of any *Halkevi* exemplifying a certain province or district, the reconstruction of public culture, its mission of civilization and modernization of Turkish nation, investigations on the publications of *Halkevleri*, *Halkevleri* as a means of social change or transformation, the political and ideological function of it, etc. The field of study may be extended since it is a related topic to history, folkloristics, and political science. The most common field of study seems to be on the activities of *Halkevleri* branches. Since there were lots of *Halkevleri* branches in nearly all provinces of Turkey between 1932-1951, the activities of *Halkevi* in the related province or district have been subject to several studies. The studies covering the activities of any *Halkevi* in a certain region are mostly prepared by the experts of that region.

Through an overall assessment of all the studies on *Halkevleri*, we can assert that the scope of the studies can be grouped as either the benefits of *Halkevleri* on the cultural

improvement and social education of the Turkish nation or its function of indoctrination through a top-down social engineering process. It will not be misleading to claim that the proportion of the first group studies favouring the activities of *Halkevleri* is quite broader than the second one, which mostly deals with *Halkevleri* from a critical perspective. Among the research articles and books, written on *Halkevleri*, its influence, and its activities, most of them carry the belief that *Halkevleri* have had a great role in the modernization of the Turkish nation by social and cultural means. In this regard, opposing views are largely short in number. Furthermore, we see this not only in the published works throughout the general literature review but also in the theses. However, the examination of *Halkevleri* from a perspective, outweighing the socio-cultural development of society, is highly possible. If we need to put our study on the categorization we have made at the beginning of this paragraph, we may place it in the second group. Since this study aims to question the effectiveness of the purposes of *Halkevleri* by conducting a content analysis and a comparative perspective together, it becomes apparent that this study nearly develops a critical approach, unlike the majority of the studies that have been done so far. Seeming highly challenging, to carry out a study in a critical direction though assigning more than one method, is also believed to make contributions to the general literature review.

The importance of this study can be revealed not only through the examination of one of the cultural tools of the unique Turkish modernization by multiple methods but also by investigating the complex nature of the culture itself. Essentially the intersection of these two helps to understand the significance of the study. The complex structure of the notion of culture on its own, along with the meaning ascribed by the Kemalist regime, is at the core of this study. While the issue of culture has already a critical position as one of the few extremely complex concepts throughout social sciences literature (Williams, 2016: 105), its meaning within the scope of citizen construction in the Turkish experience turns this complexity into an analysable aspect. In other words, the cultural understanding of the single-party government constitutes a source for the field of study of this thesis. Moreover, culture-power relations occupy an important place in this study. Based on the social response of *Halkevleri*, it is sought to what extent the state's involvement in the social field through ideological tools is ensured. The fact that *Halkevleri* were an important ideological institution in the new state indicates the struggle for hegemony in this culture-power relationship. The process of constructing a national culture is also revealed, starting from the

influence of culture in the political arena and reverse considering the impacts of the ‘political’ in the culture.

This thesis, while applying a case study through comparison and content analyses, is heavily based on a theoretical background. The conceptual issues, mentioned above, are designed in the study to meet the needs of a cultural investigation. In this regard, political science terminology has constituted a significant theoretical source for the study. To see the culture-politics relationship, critical references have been taken into consideration. In the process of understanding the Kemalist concept of culture, we mostly refer to Raymond Williams' definition and categorization of culture (1958, 1982, 1993a). As a starting point, the accurate perception of culture, which is already a complex concept by its nature, is of great importance since this study is mainly built on a cultural construction analysis. Description of culture by the regime elites as an area that needs to be dominated and re-designed caused the relationship between culture and politics to exist partially tense during the early Republican period (Çolak, 2017: 22-23). Therefore, the examination of culture, by theoretical means, is continued through its unique relation with politics. The participation of culture in the political sphere which is mostly covered by the unity of culture and power (Bourse and Yücel, 2020), turns out to be one of the pillars of the theoretical background of this study. Following it, the perception of culture in politics leads us to search for the cultural struggle which is conceptualized by Gramsci as hegemony (Gramsci, 1971). In the cultural construction analysis, since we aim to look at the dynamics of Tukey in the single-party period, seeking culture as a factor in nation-building gains importance. Gellner, who develops his theory of nationalism according to the relationship between modernization and nationalism, touches on the issue of culture (Gellner, 1994), which makes it more critical for this study. Choosing *Halkevleri* for this study is also based on both the important role that Gellner attributes to the notion of national development in the modern period culture-politics relationship and his conceptualization of high culture.

All this theoretical information serves for the consistency of the study in general. Without knowing the variations of culture, it would not be available to understand culture as a factor in politics, accordingly, we could not comprehend the search for hegemony and the cultural struggle. Moreover, it would not be possible to capture the issue of culture which is an effective instrument in the nation-building process in the modern era. Therefore, applying such conceptual background through political terminology regarding critical names is believed to make significant contributions.

Dealing with the entire construction of the society with an ideological attitude by the state in the early Republican period, this study tries to prove that the rapid political changes to which cultural motives are subjected are not accepted by all parts of the society. Within the scope of this claim, this study tries to explore the social resistance in question by an in-depth examination of *Halkevleri* from a historical perspective along with reviewing the theoretical background, analysing the tone of *Halkevleri* in the parliamentary records and through a direct comparison with an external example. Based on the culture-politics participation, it is aimed as the final point of the study to show the steps taken by the ruling cadres in terms of culture construction through adult education organizations in comparison with a similar example abroad. Following the indication of the aims of this study from a general framework, it now seems useful to point out the general methodological stand of the study.

Regardless of the branch of science, it is extremely important to plan a study in any kind of quantitative or qualitative study. In qualitative studies, for the organization of the study, it is essential to follow certain procedures. The lack of a standard, especially in social sciences, mainly causes difficulties in terms of the methodology. Besides, the constant change in the levels of analysis within the scope of social sciences, the lack of a fixed form, and a rapid change in world politics increase these methodological difficulties. Qualitative studies, on the one hand, create a state of limitation; on the other hand, offer flexibility for those studying in interdisciplinary fields. Under these limitations, studies that especially include cultural indicators, regardless of their discipline, are challenged every day in terms of analysis levels.

Within the scope of this study, every step to be taken methodologically is based on a kind of discovery. On behalf of the methodology, first of all, we can assert that the research method designed to reveal the examinations of this study is the qualitative method of field research in its most general form. The qualitative research method, unlike quantitative methods, is known as a method aiming to develop a new theory or conceptualization rather than testing a hypothesis (Suter, 2011: 343). It reveals the observations and examinations made by researchers in a certain region, within the framework of a certain language and a set of concepts, rather than revealing statistical information measured with numbers. The characteristics can be counted as introducing flexibility, relationship, and interaction principles in the study compared to quantitative research methods, tending to the phenomenon or the meaning of the phenomenon, making an in-depth analysis, focusing

more on the conceptual and theoretical quality, asking why and how questions, focusing on the experiential knowledge, using the interpretive power; all these increase the orientation towards qualitative research methods (Neuman, 2014: 167-169).

The fact that the spectrum of the studies in the qualitative field is extremely wide creates the need to limit the study in terms of method. In this thesis, a comparative case study has been applied following the formation of the theoretical background, based on the sociocultural and historical context. Including historical continuities, this study is analysed comparatively over two different samples (Turkey's *Halkevleri* and Italian *Dopolavoro* organization). In addition to a case analysis from a historical and comparative sense, the Turkish part of the case study also includes a content analysis, applied to the parliamentary records of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. This attitude shows us that the study is built with a mixed research model, thanks to the flexibility offered by qualitative studies in social sciences. In this mixed method, historical approach, case analysis, comparative analysis, and content analysis - to be used for a certain part of the study - are intended.

The historical method is a qualitative research technique used in the investigation of events and phenomena that occurred in the past or in examining a problem in terms of its relationship with the past. By emphasizing that history and social sciences cannot be separated, Wallerstein argues that one cannot talk about (analyse) any particular set of occurrences without using concepts that imply theorems or generalizations about recurrent phenomena. Thus all 'history' is based on 'social science' (Wallerstein, 1979: ix). The historical method advocates a diachronic attitude against a synchronic one and thus seeks traces of historical change. In this way, historical events are examined with a non-normative approach. "The historical method is the process of critically examining, analysing, synthesizing, and reporting the past to find the truth, in other words, to utilize knowledge" (Kaptan, 1998: 59). Considering society as a changing organism rather than as a rigid and closed system is the basis of this approach since the social environment is a dynamic set of socio-political and cultural relations. Throughout this study, since this kind of historical, socio-cultural context may not be sufficient and may remain theoretical, a detailed case analysis has been carried out.

It is aimed to deepen the case study specific to *Halkevleri* with a content analysis based on the parliamentary records of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. It seems meaningful to carry out the study on a more stable basis, referring to the currently accessible

parliamentary records. The main motivation behind this review is to take a social picture of *Halkevleri* through the official sources of the parliament since it is not possible to directly measure the returns from society in today's conditions. Content analysis is a qualitative data analysis, frequently used in the field of social sciences, providing meaningful results with data from many visual and written sources, using a set of procedures to make valid inferences (Önder and Brower, 2013: 120; Önder and others, 2021: 163) It is a “technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages” (Holsti, 1969: 14). It enables the organization and analysis of non-numeric and unstructured data. “Every content analysis requires a context within which the available texts are examined. The analyst must, in effect, construct a world in which the texts make sense and can answer the analyst’s research questions” (Krippendorff, 2013: 30). The content analysis “shortens facts and understandably simplifies information and data by analysing textual data, such as recording of descriptive studies, open-ended surveys, speeches and media highlights, like videos, photos, and sketches” (Islam and others, 2020: 294). An analysis supported by this method offers review alternatives such as coding with data obtained from the data source, creating themes, performing operations on codes and themes, making classifications, creating queries, and reporting. As a part of this study, it is aimed to develop the content analysis, so that all the records of the Parliament between the years 1932-1951 on the issue of *Halkevleri* are analysed as data. It is designed to reveal the views on *Halkevleri* from a systematic framework, by creating various themes from the meetings, questioning concepts such as *culture*, *cultural institution*, *Halkevleri*, *Halkodaları*, with their frequency of use, and subject-specific analyses.

Upon discussing the forms of method applied in this study, we may now list the stages of the research process as follows:

- Defining the area to be examined as a result of a general field research and literature review,
- Determining the research problem,
- Establishing research approaches,
- Designing the theoretical and conceptual framework,
- Determining the case analysis subject to the research,
- Conducting studies for comparative case analysis,
- Identifying and developing the data collection tools,
- Classification and representation of data,

- Applying content analysis on the records of TBMM (Developing themes from the source, making classifications, introducing queries in line with the existing data) and finally reporting,
- Evaluation of the data,
- Making assessments for comparative analysis.

This guide allows us to expand the subheadings of the method part. The flexibility offered by qualitative studies in social sciences puts this study within some limitations. These include limitations in terms of subject, sources, time, and space, along with the theoretical difficulties of the study. The theoretical limitations are due to the complexity of the set of concepts on which the theoretical framework of the study is arranged. The concepts of culture, power, culture-politics relationship, hegemony, and cultural nationalism are partially difficult to define and have a wide range of meaning spectrum. The limitations in terms of the subject are the limitations arising from the need to deal with concepts that are difficult to define within the framework of a certain attitude. The limitations in terms of sources are because both of the institutions, subject to this study, were active at a time in the past; therefore, it is difficult to reach primary sources, as well as reaching those who had experienced these institutions. Since it is not possible to conduct a direct field study on these two today, the case study has brought some limitations. The limitations of the research in terms of time and space are the limitations caused by institutions that ended their lifetimes about a hundred years ago and therefore cannot be subject to a direct investigation.

After considering the limitations, revealing the basic assumptions of the study may also be an important contribution. In the study, on the preparation of the conceptual and theoretical framework within a certain discipline, the analysis specific to Turkey in comparison with Italy displays some assumptions: Culture is examined as a power tool in the nation-building process. Moreover, it is processed in an idealistic form as an important part of this process. In Turkey, hegemony is assumed to be a cultural-based power struggle; however, in the case of Italy, it is discussed not only by the cultural context but also by economic means. Nationalism is considered a phenomenon that is built rather than an existing form in society, therefore both the Turkish nation and Italian nation are considered to have gone through a process of creation. The mass construction of citizens is one of the main goals of this process in both countries.

The study is designed on the assumptions listed above and aims to clarify them with some questions. To understand the essence of the study, the questions to be answered can be listed as follows: What tension does the concept of culture have? What are the consequences of culture as a determinant factor in the political field? What kind of dynamics can explain the relationship between culture and power? What is the role of the intellectuals in the struggle for hegemony? How can the role of culture in nation-building process be explained? How is culture defined in the early republican period of Turkey? What is the impact of nation-building process on culture within the scope of Kemalist reforms? What is the role of *Türk Ocakları* in the process leading to the construction of culture? How does *Halkevleri* as an adult education centre support cultural construction? How do the efforts to establish culture through *Halkevleri* find a social response? What are the evaluations of *Halkevleri* in the records of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey? How do the tools of cultural orientation through adult education work based on the examples abroad? What are the political and social dynamics that are effective in the process leading up to the fascist regime in Italy? What are the contributions of the Italian leisure organization *Dopolavoro* to the construction of culture? In this context, what are the results of the comparative analysis of the institutions of culture construction of the early Republican period in Turkey and the similar organization of the Italian fascist administration?

In designing the study, it is important to draw attention to the sources and this may also enable us to understand the mixed methodology of the study. Although the use of primary sources has been the main target within the scope of institutional studies, forming the basis for the case analysis, this may not always be possible. In the study of *Halkevleri*, both primary sources, regulations of *Halkevleri*, publication organs of *Halkevleri* such as *Ülkü*, the parliamentary records, CHP records, and secondary sources as evaluation and examination studies on *Halkevleri* are applied. Investigations on *Halkevleri* have been partially available since it is located within the borders of Turkey. However, the situation is not the same for the Italian example. In Italian *Dopolavoro*, the language problem encountered, and the impossibility of the direct accession has made it difficult to use primary resources. Therefore, the analysis of *Dopolavoro* is mostly provided through secondary or translated sources. The use of the data also brings the mixed method of the study to the agenda again. The explanation, description, sampling, and comparison are important steps in terms of using the data. In addition to the comparative part of the mixed analysis with its

historical aspect, the parliamentary records on which the content analysis has been carried out are processed for the study as a data source.

In terms of content, this study consists of four main chapters, apart from the introduction, conclusion, and references parts. The first chapter is where the theoretical framework of the study is built. First of all, the subject is introduced in theoretical and conceptual categories. The basis of the study is formed by determining the disciplines on which the study is based. In this direction, the concept of culture is first examined under the title of theoretical background in strengthening the focus of the study. Since the definition of the concept of culture in detail is important for the formation of the backbone of the study, the concept has been examined both from a historical perspective and today's complex framework with various approaches. Later on, the issue of culture is dealt with as a part of politics in which the culture-power relation is examined and cultural policies are handled. The third main title of the first chapter deals with the understanding of hegemony from Antonio Gramsci's perspective in detail. The principles of hegemony construction, such as the manufacture of consent, the education issue, and the intellectuals are all included in this part. As a last topic, this chapter covers the relationship of culture with nationalism. The construction of national culture and the relationship between modernization theory and nationalism is reviewed from Ernest Gellner's perception.

The second main chapter deals with *Halkevleri* experience in the early Republican period, constituting the first stage of the case study analysis. While examining *Halkevleri*, first of all, the subject of the intellectual foundations is handled; and the need for a state/government-directed cultural institution is revealed. The experience of *Türk Ocakları*, which is accepted as the forerunner of *Halkevleri*, is also included in this chapter. The details of *Halkevleri* are continued by the establishment, purposes, and organizational structure. The organization part consists of first *Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı* of CHP and then the process leading to the establishment of *Halkevleri*. In this context, the purposes of *Halkevleri* and the organizational structure are examined. Following, nine sections of *Halkevleri* are discussed. The examination of *Halkodaları*, which are branches of *Halkevleri* extending to the countryside after 1940, is also included in this section. This chapter is important since it is believed to have a close tie with the fourth main chapter of this study, which is built on the content analysis applied to the records of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

The third chapter of the study deals with the cultural construction institution, *Dopolavoro* organization, in fascist Italy. A significant aspect that makes the example of Italy critical for this study seems worth noting here. That is, to study an institution in Italy requires knowledge of Italian modernization history. In this context, first of all, the unification politics of Italy has been discussed in this chapter. Then, the political atmosphere in the 1920s and the post-war crisis in Italy has been examined to understand the process leading to fascism in the country. In this direction, the review of the rise of the Fascist Party in Italy seems as another important stage. Examination of all these historical processes enables us to reach the main part of this chapter that contributes to the comparative analysis of the study in general. In this regard, the historical background and the evolution of *Dopolavoro* organization under the topics of the establishment, purposes, and administrative structure of the *OND* is handled. The activities of *Dopolavoro* organization are categorized under three headings as culture education, physical training, and social assistance. This last section is believed to provide important data for the comparative analysis.

Thanks to the fourth main chapter, the examination of *Halkevleri* where it is very difficult to obtain healthy and correct returns from the society, is carried out at a different level through a content analysis applied to the parliamentary records. It is thought that the results may make critical contributions to the level of analysis. This last chapter analyses the parliamentary records under two groupings, the first includes the evaluation of the parliamentary records of the single-party period, while the second category covers the evaluation of the parliamentary records after the transition to the multi-party system. In light of all these examinations, through a general evaluation in the last conclusion part, the examples of Turkey and Italy are subjected to a comparative analysis within the framework of the set of concepts examined in the first place, and the main arguments of the study are revealed.

2. THE ISSUE OF CULTURE IN THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY: A THEORETICAL BACKGROUND TO THE ANALYSIS OF CULTURE CONSTRUCTION

The conceptual framework is a very important aspect of a study to be supported theoretically. This part of the study puts forward the theoretical background and conceptual framework, leading to the basis of the case analyses in the following chapters.

Culture is one of the most applied concepts in social sciences; that's what makes it ambiguous. It is not easy to define culture. In this regard, considering culture as a part of social construction makes the concept gain a sophisticated meaning. It also causes difficulties to examine cultural studies in the field of political science. However, it is a necessity to do so to avoid incomprehensibility. This chapter, from a general perception, builds a conceptual framework, by especially looking at the concept of culture and removing the complexities about it.

The issue of culture forms one of the most critical parts of this theoretical background. The difficulties of the term arise in the uncertain nature of the concept, especially when it becomes a part of politics. Moreover, the inability of measuring culture promotes this condition. One of the few words having the widest range of meanings in linguistics, culture is no longer just at the centre of sociology and anthropology. It forms the basis of many studies in various fields such as political science, law, economics, international relations, and public administration. For this reason, it seems significant to examine the definitions of culture, its limitations, and different approaches to the concept in detail.

The interdisciplinary character of culture also forces the concept to transform the fields it has developed. The role of culture in politics becomes essential in this regard. This position has turned culture into a determinant in social affairs. The relationship between culture and state, accordingly cultural policies are among those topics emerging from the participation of culture in the political area. Since culture becomes most visible in the field of power when it participates in politics, the emphasis on cultural struggle becomes vital. Therefore, the relationship between culture and politics has also led to the examination of

hegemony. This struggle points out some sociological aspects we may come across in politics.

Discovering national elements concerning culture and politics, at this point, brings variety to the conceptual framework of this study. The role of culture in the nation-building process cannot be denied. Culture has a critical mission to redesign society in its way to nation-building. So, it is believed to be significant to analyse the tools of cultural construction in the framework of citizen construction. Considering culture as a determiner in the nation-building process brings us the necessity to perceive it through modernity. The relationship between culture and modernization is the other topic discussed in the last part of this first chapter.

Within this chapter, the concepts underlying the theoretical background of this study are analysed thoroughly. Allowing us to evaluate the terms mostly used in political science and sociology, this examination covers the reflections on the concepts in social practice. At first glance, culture is analysed in detail, concerning Raymond Williams. Starting with this issue of culture, as mentioned above, is also a requirement for the general progress of the study. The historical background of the concept, at the very beginning step, provides us with observing different definition levels. Since the issue of culture has some boundaries, understanding it in depth is about identifying the definitions and scope. This part also reveals different approaches to cultural understanding.

In the second place, the relationship between culture and politics is analysed. Such a relationship is believed to contribute to the theoretical basis of the study. Within this framework, the interaction of culture with the state, with the power and the cultural policies are discussed. Since the culture-politics relation is at the core of this study, the second title of the first chapter not only sheds light on the conceptual background but has so much importance in analysing the cases in the following chapters.

The coming title is based on the understanding of hegemony. The problem of hegemony has become an important break not only in political economy but also in political culture. Since it is highly related to power in the cultural area, analysing the theme for the Turkish case seems significant. The understanding of hegemony is focused on through Antoni Gramsci's perspective. Since Gramsci's theory is based on the condition that domination is not only bound to coercion but also consent, the problem of active and passive

consent is examined. Furthermore, the role of education and intellectuals in establishing hegemony is underlined. This part reveals the meaning of culture in the hegemonic struggle; in this manner, a deeper focus on the relationship between politics and culture is put forward.

One of the other important topics touching on the issue of culture in political science terminology is the nation-building process. This issue makes it vital especially for the studies specific to Turkish political life. Under the last title of this chapter, the cultural extent of the national building process is reviewed. Since this study starts with the acceptance that nationalism itself has occurred as the result of the modern era, the first thing to be mentioned in this context is its relation with modernity. The effect of culture on the building of a nation is examined. Ernest Gellner is taken as the main source for this title since he concentrates on the relationship between culture and nationalism. Developing his nationalism theory on the issue of culture, Gellner greatly contributes to this study with his conceptualization, of “high culture”. This first chapter, as a whole, is believed to contribute to underlying the case study through the mentioned conceptual framework.

2.1. The Complex Way to Define Culture

Culture is one of the most difficult terms in social sciences. Its historical development is also full of ambiguity. In this regard, it seems necessary to define the term properly. Culture has occupied a wide range of disciplines and it has become an important break for the field of political science. The foremost thing to do is start examining the concept in a historical manner in detail, to put through various definitions by considering the limitations of the concept, and to deal with different approaches to it.

Raymond Williams has been one of the most important figures, working on the issue of culture. Williams has concentrated on the concept in the most comprehensive way among its various definitions. For him, culture is one of the two or three most complex words in English. “This is so partly because of the historical development of the intricate in several European languages, but mainly because of its use for important concepts in several separate intellectual disciplines and in several separate and incompatible systems of thought” (Williams, 2016: 105). Therefore, culture can be called one of the concepts with the widest range of meanings. This also obstructs cultural studies to organize consistently. For this reason, in the process of defining culture, it seems significant first to examine the historical development of the concept. This allows us to see the limits of the concept.

The main problem of cultural sociology may be the difficulty of defining the concept clearly (Williams, 1993a: 8). At the first stage, Williams's views reveal ambiguity. "There may not be a concept as rich as culture in social thought" remarks Ögün (2010: 1), similarly addressing the diversity of definitions of culture. The problem of conceptualization mainly derives from the historical processes of culture and the new contexts it has acquired. The diversity in the definition of culture is essentially the most important indicator of how much it is used and thus how many speculative situations can occur upon it (Ögün, 2019:18).

Cultural studies as an academic discipline emerged in the second half of the 20th century. Kroeber & Kluckhohn (1952) and Williams (1958 and 1976) were among the first who developed systematic studies on culture in the sociological context. Formerly at the centre of anthropology, culture started to feed various scientific fields after the 19th century. Following the development of anthropology, fundamental questions arose about the construction of separate cultures. And alternative solutions led to an effective scale of meaning in various disciplines such as sociology, psychology, political science, economics, and many other related disciplines. Leading to a diversity of meanings, this made cultural studies both complex and speculative. The culture was no longer a meaningful whole but rather a partially reliable reference (Williams, 1993a: 9).

It may be useful, at this point, to explain Williams' path to culture analysis briefly without having a detailed definition of the concept. As asserted by him, some words that re-entered English after their transformation at the end of the 18th century not only affected the language but also formed the basis for the social sciences repertoire. Five keywords of Williams constitute his first stop on the way to cultural studies. And these are; Industry, democracy, class, art, and finally culture (Williams, 1958). Williams underlines these words while he examines the issue of culture in detail. The changes in the conceptual world of culture are mainly hidden in the change of these five main words. For Williams (1958: xi), these five words are of great importance in the modern structure of meanings. The changes in the exercise of these five words, in the modern era, witness a general change in people's assessment of their common life, their social, political, and economic institutions; the purposes of these institutions; about the relations of these institutions and purposes of their activities in education and arts.

It's a complex process to analyse culture since it is engaged in many other social concepts. Culture is not stable, rather it has a highly changeable, transforming, and

interacting mechanism. This confuses the meaning framework of culture for those who study it. Trying to explain the process through Williams's five related concepts is the first attempt at this point. The first among five words of Williams, industry, despite having technical content, has become the source of major social transformations after the Industrial Revolution. The change in the word has without any hesitation produced a new pattern of society. The second is democracy, which was used as the rule of people early in ancient Greek. As we have seen in the concept of industry, the word democracy has undergone an uncertain nature after the social movements of the 18th century, the French and American revolutions. The word class, the third among William's keywords, has a classical meaning, referring to a division or group in schools before the 18th century. It has undergone a critical change and begun to be built in the social sense. After this change, it becomes clear that the new use of the word class hasn't marked any social divisions. It is, to some extent, an attitude developed towards the classes. The fourth word, art, is formerly used for any form of human skill. It is later on called for a situation or a particular group of skills; especially for imaginative or creative arts (Williams, 1958: xiv).

Taking into account the keywords of Williams, at the centre of all social changes is the culture, as the fifth word. Those working on the issue of culture, Williams, Kroeber, and Kluckhohn on a sociological base, all start analysing the concept through its changing nature. What has made culture become a determinant in the political sphere is this nature. Williams summarizes it by emphasizing the development of the word culture. For him, culture is the total of several important and continuing reactions to the changes in our social, economic, and political life. And it may be regarded as the schema behind the social changes to be resolved (1958: xv). Here culture appears as a concept whose meaning spectrum is expanding. Once referring to a natural crop, culture has become a complex term after the 18th century. From that of a natural crop, it first began to mean 'a general state or habit of the mind', later 'a general state of intellectual development', third 'the general body of the arts', and fourth 'a whole way of life, material, intellectual, and spiritual'.

Among these five main concepts Williams has listed, the change that culture has undergone is the most striking of all. It is once again revealed that culture is complex by its nature. It is because culture has so much in common with the other terms and processes, and it is by far the most comprehensive one. With this brief introduction, it is obvious how important to capture the change in the concept of culture. Now, it is useful to look at the historical background of the culture in detail.

2.1.1. The Historical Background of Culture

The difficulties mentioned while defining the issue of culture mainly stem from the historic course of the concept as well as the widespread and speculative usage. The variation that the meaning of culture had experienced throughout its history caused its ambiguity. Before determining the scope of the definitions of the concept, it seems useful to examine the historical course of culture. This may also allow us to understand the wide spectrum of the meaning.

The starting point for the evolution of culture may be brought back to the modernization process, for Süleyman Seyfi Öğün. Since the complexity of culture lies in the process the concept has undergone, examining the historical phase becomes so attractive. Social thought is a result of modernity. Therefore, the reason why culture has become so complicated must be sought in the contradictions of modernity itself. Culture is directly intertwined with modernity. This process is so diverse that there becomes a strict uncertainty about what culture is (Öğün, 2010: 1).

Culture follows a significant historical phase. This has also become the code for some basic philosophical issues in Eagleton's opinion (2005: 11). These codes have been similar to the socio-political level that the culture integrates. The variation in this level makes it more critical to examine the historical process the culture has experienced. Searching for the origins of the concept etymologically might be an important step.

The word culture originally came from the 13th-century *colere*, in general, agricultural terms in Latin, implying crops with a variety of meanings from development to dwelling, from worship to protection as cultivation. Some of these meanings began to diverge. *Colere*, in time, turned into *cultus* and *cultura* meaning agriculture, development, planting, and cultivation of land (Eagleton, 2005: 10; Williams, 2016: 105). It was mainly used for natural growth; mostly the care of crops and animals. And what was surprising in former usages is that culture was mostly associated with a process including man's interference as opposed to a natural one.

As a functioning process, culture originally expanded its meaning from land and animal cultivation to mind cultivation. In the late 17th century, especially in German and English languages, it turned into a holistic way of life for a particular group (Williams, 1993a: 8-9). Here, the German attribution seems critical. To follow the historical process, it

is necessary to look at the developments in German. In the German language, it was for the first time that that culture gained a philosophical meaning. Ethnographic terms for culture no longer existed. Culture from the 17th century on was no longer equated to a process of agricultural cultivation. It started to refer to a social situation, indicating “the gradual development of mankind as an entity” (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952: 10).

In the 18th century, some questions arose about the scope of culture. The discussions on the nature of the elements that made up the cultures opened a new phase. And the developments in France made the concept even more complicated. The 18th century was the time that civilization arose in France. And Through the mid-18th century, culture started to be used as an independent noun. The French came to use the word civilization which the Germans called *Kultur* (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952: 9-10). And the relationship between civilization and culture became quite complex. For Williams, like each of the original meanings and the relations, this process was not accidental, but it was deeply significant (1958: xvii).

Nobert Elias dealt with the identity of civilization and culture shaped by the French and British experiences, in German history and focused on the national aspect of culture (2000: 261-267). The concept of German *Kultur* was the expression of what was unique, thus it considered national differences; on the other hand, the French and English concepts of civilization did not focus on the differences between peoples or countries with a more universal approach. Civilization was considered, to some extent, as an ideal. It was defined by the future, not by the past. It was progressive. The French and English understanding of “civilization” was about human behaviour. The intellectual, for example, was the civilized person, with a high knowledge of urbanity, command of language, well clothing habits, sitting, standing, etc. He was the person evaluated to the degree of compliance with the rules of etiquette, not through the cultural artifacts that he performed. Elias argued that behind the separation between the French concept of “civilization” and the German concept of “culture” laid the relations of social classes with power.

Concerning the historical development of culture, the impact of the Enlightenment was also noticeable. Through the Enlightenment, the reference to intelligence reached its highest level. And culture became a part of this perception. Culture started to be a reference to the formation and education of intelligence. Human immaturity and barbarism could be overcome by accessing culture. Cuche’s explaining the change in the position of culture

seems significant here: “Contrary to what we have seen before, there has been a transition from 'culture' as an action to 'culture' as the state (to the state of the educated intelligence, to the state of the cultured individual)” (Cuche, 2013: 16). Originally indicating rural labour, culture became almost synonymous with civilization, which was a general process of intellectual, spiritual and material progress.

“The usage of ‘culture’ and ‘civilization’ in various languages has been confusing” (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952: 13). Starting with the 19th century, the relationship between culture and civilization gained a new aspect. For Eagleton, this was a rare semantic deviation and illustrated a very important historical one (2005: 18). The similarities between the two caused their relationship to seem synonymous at first. When we consider culture as a certain development process or a stage of progress, it is reasonable to take it into account with civilization, the name of the course of urban life, urban policies, and complex technologies. However, it later turned out that, the two concepts didn’t coincide with each other.

French civilization typically incorporated a political, economic, and technical existence. German culture, however, pointed to religious, artistic, and intellectual life. Civilization was technological, on the contrary culture was religious and artistic (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952: 16). Although civilization had a political reference, it did not regard national differences. On the other hand, culture took them into account. Within this framework, civilization was not unique to nations or communities, rather it was universal. Yet, culture carried certain social conditions, some of which even could make it acquire a national and political aspect. Almost synonymous throughout the 18th century, the two underwent a radical transformation. And all these differences later showed that the two concepts were not similar, rather they were clashing ideas. As Eagleton described it, civilization was abstract, alienated, fragmented, mechanical, and utilitarian; culture, on the other hand, was holistic, organic, sensuous, purposeful in itself, and inclusive of the past. The conflict between the two thus became a part of the ongoing conflict between tradition and modernity (Eagleton, 2005: 21). Such a distinction once more caused a critical change in the scope of culture, through the end of the 19th century.

The unintentional conceptual development of culture came out in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This period played a key role in the adventure of culture. *Kultur* began to separate itself from the notion of civilization (Williams, 2016: 107), as we have observed in the process above. Culture, now, stood out with modern meaning, expressing a unique

lifestyle. It seems useful to refer to Johann Gottlieb Herder, first using culture to signify a meaningful plurality, freeing it from any singular meaning or the unilinear meaning of civilization. He argued that it was necessary to talk about cultures, the specific and variable cultures of different nations and periods, as well as the specific and variable cultures of social and economic groups within a given nation (cited by Williams, 2016: 108). What Herder signified through culture was a deliberate attack on Enlightenment universality. As quoted by Üstel, “Against the abstract narrative of universality, historical progress, and perfection put forward by most Enlightenment philosophers, Herder argued that societies and cultures were the results of certain historical necessities” (2021: 16). Herder claimed that culture was not the grand narrative of universal humanity, but it was the total of a specific set of life-forms, each with its unique laws of evolution (cited by Williams, 1993a: 9; cited by Eagleton, 2005: 21). Therefore, Herder sought to discover the peculiar values of all peoples and cultures (cited by Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952: 22). For him, what was absolute for one nation could not be taken into account by a second nation and could even be alienated for a third one (Herder, 1968: 49).

Separating itself from the synonymous meaning of civilization, culture as a form of a unique lifestyle was accepted in the 20th century. Although the two, civilization and culture continued to be used especially by anthropologists, culture was now almost the opposite of the other. The culture was denominational rather than cosmopolitan (Eagleton, 2005: 22). As we see a similar tone in Said, cultures were intertwined; none of them was single or pure. All were hybrid, heterogeneous, and highly differentiated (Said, 2016: xxix). This attitude also points out a key factor in positioning culture in the political arena, as we’re going to analyse in the following stages.

The attitude of culture against civilization may also reveal the importance of defining culture properly in political mechanisms. In the historical course of culture, the duality of German and French attribution shows how important the influence of culture in the political field is for international politics. While the German intellectuals submitted kultur against the rationalist and materialist Western civilization that they found to lack depth and originality, the French put themselves in charge of enlightening the barbarians and the underdeveloped, considering the superiority of their civilization over the others (Üstel, 2012: 17). In this regard, both culture and civilization may be told as to have a founding implication. And such positioning for both is of great importance in the socio-political context.

Opposing the universality offered by civilization, culture mostly includes social conditions. In these terms, it becomes associated with nation and state, causing the immediate existence of an 'other'. As Matthew Arnold has pointed out, culture is a weakening and improving concept, consisting of the best that every society knows and thinks (Said, 2016: 13). All these show us that culture has been a source of identity. Since "it does nothing but describe the traditional way of life" (Eagleton, 2005: 23), the socio-political context of culture becomes visible.

Besides a historical and philosophical existence, culture serves as a political conflict area. For Schiller, culture is the operation of what would later be called 'hegemony'. It shapes humans in line with the needs of a new form of state (1943: 25). What Schiller states here turns culture into a glorious virtue or an ideological weapon in the modern age. Moreover, it may also make culture a process binding the status quo. It is exactly this distinction that allows us to understand once again the critical place of the problem of defining culture in the political mechanism.

In the course of establishing the route for culture, it, as indicated by Eagleton, reveals "the historical transformation of humanity from rural to urban life, from pig keeping to Picasso, from cultivating the soil to splitting the atom" (Eagleton, 2005: 10). In this respect, we may go through the second path in this difficult task of defining culture, the different approaches put forward to describe the concept. Beyond the historical course, it seems helpful to limit our process of culture definition by underlying different approaches.

2.1.2. Different Approaches of Culture

The historical course, as examined above, is an important indicator of different attitudes toward the definition of culture. The complex nature of culture has led to such variation. In the process of defining culture, as a holistic lifestyle of a particular group in the 17th century, a developed state of mind in the 18th century, and a unique lifestyle with a radical break from civilization after the 19th century, it becomes more meaningful with assigning some classifications to it.

A leading figure in cultural literature, Williams becomes our prominent source. Associating culture with the industrial revolution, the processes of democracy, and art, Williams puts forward different situations in the course of defining the term. He argues that

the differences in the practice of the term and the difficulty in reaching a consensus among them have been the result of various interests in the early periods (1993a: 10). In this respect, the three approaches Williams develops for his definition of culture have been applied as a significant part of cultural studies.

Williams classifies his approaches to culture as follows: He primarily deals with the issue in two main categories (1993a: 10-11). According to this classification, culture may appear as either an idealistic form (1) or a materialist form (2). For the idealist category (1); culture is based on an 'informative spirit'. It includes social and intellectual activities, especially language and art forms. It is essential to enlighten the society. This is mostly based on a sense of uniform culture. It is also related to the romantic conceptualization of culture. The idealistic perception of culture can be divided into two subgroups: The first is the ideal category (1a) and the second is the documentary category (1b). The ideal understanding deals with culture as a process of perfecting human beings in terms of some universal absolute values (1a). The documentary category explains culture as the sum of the creative and intellectual products of human thought (1b). Materialist culture (2), on the other hand, is based on a demonstrative system. The social order is defined, reproduced, and rediscovered. The materialist explanation of culture moves away from the version of culture as an 'informative spirit'. Instead, it includes other primary activities.

The binary categorization of Williams has been an important source of cultural studies until the second half of the 20th century. In today's world, Williams believes that a new approach is revealed while the two positions are still welcomed (Williams, 1993a: 11). Williams puts forward the social category (3) as his third major classification. It is both similar to the other two forms but also differs from them in some ways. It takes into account the entire social order which reminds us of the materialist approach. Through insisting on the concept of 'cultural practice', it differs from the materialist approach. On the other hand, this emphasis also brings the third category closer to the idealist approach. They both share similar aspects. Since the third approach perceives culture as a signification system through which the social order necessarily communicates, reproduces, maintains experiences, and tends to discoveries, it clashes with the idealist approach (Williams, 2011: 61). The social understanding of culture is the way how people live. It puts culture at the focus of social life. For Williams, the third category has become more visible after the 20th century, but it is not still the only source to define the culture.

Arguing that culture is not just fine arts, Kroeber and Kluckhohn focus on defining the issue in their study. Kroeber and Kluckhohn classify the definitions of culture under seven (7) different approaches: These are the descriptive definitions (1), historical definitions (2), prescriptive definitions (3), psychological definitions (4), structuralist definitions (5), genetic definitions (6) and the last group incomplete definitions (7) (cited by Smith, 2001: 2). The first of them perceives culture as a phenomenon of social life and describes the areas that made up the culture from a wide framework. Secondly, the historical definitions regard culture as a legacy passed down from generation to generation. Prescriptive definitions consider culture as a set of rules determining the behaviours of people. The psychological definitions evaluate culture as a helpful tool in people's communication, learning, and fulfilling their emotional needs. Structuralist approaches argue that culture is a product of abstraction, unlike fixed behaviours. The genetic definitions identify culture as a product of interaction between people, with a reference to the genetics of culture. Finally, incomplete definitions of culture have been applied to unsystematic metaphors (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952: 43-72).

For Paquette and Beauregard, the phenomenon of culture, especially in the field of political science, is analysed in three (3) groups: The first one (1) consists of two subcategories covering aesthetics (1a) and anthropology (1b). The aesthetics include an artistic perception of culture. It puts forward the differences and similarities of tastes and values within the social groups. Such differences and similarities even develop political content. The anthropology category considers culture as a lifestyle. It also triggers the cultural construction process on the political level. For the first category of Paquette and Beauregard, both artistic creation and lifestyle carry a fundamental function in the construction of identity and social feelings. The second approach in which culture is perceived as an "umbrella concept" (2) explains different political issues and fields. The third category, framework approach (3), considers culture as both art and heritage (Paquette and Beauregard, 2017: 21).

The relationship between culture and civilization, one of the most important semantic complexities discussed above, at the same time reveals Ziya Gökalp's cultural approach. Gökalp puts forward the idea that culture is national (*hars*) and civilization is universal. On this distinction, he asserts that; "Culture is the harmonious sum of the religious, moral, legal, rational, aesthetical, linguistic, economic, philosophical and scientific life of a single nation; the common sum of the social lives of many nations at the same level of development is, on

the other hand, civilization” (Gökalp, 1997: 25). It is understood that Gökalp brings a national content to the issue of culture.

A similar classification can also be seen in Bozkurt Güvenç. For Güvenç, culture is used in four (4) different implications (2002: 95-97). In light of his classification, the first is culture in the field of science, as a synonym of civilization (1). The second is culture in the human field as the product of an educational process (2). The third one is the culture in the field of aesthetics, corresponding to the fine arts (3). And the fourth is the culture in the technological and biological sphere, existing within the scope of production, agriculture, and cultivation (4).

Within this complex nature of culture, the classifications may vary. Williams' classification of cultural approach provides a basis for many studies in social sciences and it has also been a source for this study. After the examination of the long history of culture along with the different approaches of it, it is revealed that the most significant point in understanding culture lies in the way of what kind of definition one attributes to the culture. The differences we encounter through these numerous approaches show us that there has been no single definition of culture yet. And this gives significant clues about the position of culture. The diversity of existing approaches becomes determinative in the relationship between culture and politics. Now, before analysing culture in the political field, for the last time in this topic of culture, the definitions are to be listed and their limitations are drawn.

2.1.3. Culture: Definitions and Scope

It seems at first sight how difficult a concept to define culture is. Therefore, it becomes more meaningful to include conceptual contradictions and variations of culture. This may even serve as a bridge to finding out the traces of culture in the political sphere. Indicating that it is nearly impossible, without an enormous number of categories and great artificiality, to group definitions of culture with complete consistency (1952: 41), Kroeber and Kluckhohn point out what is being discussed under this title.

Culture, semantically ranging from cultivating the land to integrating communities around the imagination of a nation, remained a privileged field of study of anthropology for a long time. However, after the 1970s, it reached a marginal research area for sociology and

political science (Üstel, 2021: 17). In this regard, it is considered to be an important effort to underline the limitations of culture.

The complexity of culture does not stem from the term itself but from the variations in practice (Williams, 2016: 111). Since it has a wide range of meanings, Williams argues that the complication we face in the analysis of culture is caused by different forms of use. The different conditions found in the historical context are still valid. Among these definitions, that of Williams' seems striking and, as mentioned before, forms the basis of this study.

The historical development of culture we have examined through Williams' classification shows us the three different forms of culture: The first refers to the development of individuals and societies through religion and aesthetics. The second one addresses intellectual and artistic production. And the last one points out a lifestyle, system of beliefs, and traditions (Williams, 1958: 80). Significantly, Williams argues that none of these forms of culture has lost its validity. On the contrary, they are all shared and continued to be exercised. This is what makes the issue of culture complex today.

In his cult work *Culture and Society 1780-1850*, Williams, deals with conservatives and does this essentially to pave the way for his definition of culture. His quotations from Edmund Burke, one of the important figures of conservatism, have been extremely significant. Williams does not consider Burke only as a conservative, but also as a person feeding himself. "It's very easy to call Edmund Burke a 'conservative'... For Raymond Williams, it is folly to think that Burke's ideas are merely an advice of conservatism" (Dellaloğlu, 2020: 345-346). With these words, Dellaloğlu directly underlies what Williams tries to do, in his interest for Burke.

In the definition of culture, Williams mainly refers to the social position of culture and the collaborative effort in it. Including the conservatives in his work on culture because of the similar attitudes they share is also essential in conservative thought (Williams, 1958: 39-42). Burke claims that human problems are complex and can only be resolved through supervision and social effort (cited by Williams, 1958: 7). Therefore, we understand that Burke's ideas form a basis for Williams in his search for the definition of culture. Burke's assumption that a human left alone may be dangerous and therefore all human virtues are a

natural and social product formed in its course occupies an important place in William's seeking.

The foundations of Williams' conceptualization of culture can also be found in Matthew Arnold. Arnold describes culture as the pursuit of perfection (study of perfection). He argues that the perfection provided by human beings in harmony may improve humanity in every aspect. It is a perfection based on essential introversion, harmoniously developing all aspects of society (Arnold, 2020: 58). For him, culture is not only a literary and artistic development but to some extent a striving for the development of humanity. It is not an activity that individuals can do alone or a group of people can do together. Rather, it is a matter concerning the whole society. Therefore, it points out an extremely holistic action, not a singular one.

Arnold considers culture mainly as a solution to the problems of society. He thinks that culture may help people overcome their difficulties. That's why he names his work *Anarchy and Culture*. Against any possible anarchy in society, culture can be the only answer. It is the only way that can ensure order in society. On this issue of culture associated with a matter of security, Arnold claims that culture is not only a way of perfection but also safety passes through culture. Therefore, culture lovers are hostile to anarchy and they stand firm against anarchy (Arnold, 2020: 104-105; 120). Culture is the pursuit of full perfection of the people. It helps individuals to get perfect as holistic beings. We understand that Arnold's culture has a much more universal character rather than a national one. His perception of culture is out of time and space. Williams also applies Arnold's ideas in his search for culture definition. Culture, for Arnold, is an inward process. The human perfection that culture seeks has an internal position. Perfection cannot be provided if the individuals remain isolated (cited by Williams, 1958: 138).

Since Arnold relates culture with human perfection, it would be misleading to think his definition of culture is based on civilization. Culture and civilization are two different phenomena for Arnold. On the one side, there is civilization which refers to a mechanical development process. On the other side, there is culture whose inner and spiritual paths lead to perfection. Arnold considers culture as an alternative to civilization. Against the artificiality of civilization, culture is an organic and self-executing process. Moreover, the duality between culture and civilization may also appear in terms of functionality. In opposition to the utilitarianism of civilization, bringing individuals into functionality, culture

remains the spiritual side of a nation. Culture is a means of perfection without any self-interest, as indicated by Arnold, it is the impartial pursuit of human perfection (2020: 63).

Williams's ideas on culture have been the main source we have applied up to now. Besides the primary position of William's perspective, it may be beneficial to see how this issue is discussed by some other theorists. The study of culture, apart from the anthropological context, is a partially new area. Especially after the second half of the 20th century, the socio-political field started to engage in the examination of culture. However, this did not lead to an agreement on the meaning of culture. Furthermore, it even gave rise to a chaotic nature. In this respect, instead of the absolute definitions of culture, we may give our attention to the studies made to understand the nature of culture. Beyond the attempt to gather culture around a single definition, it seems considerable to examine the studies in the field of culture from a broader perspective.

The Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (C.C.C.S.) at the University of Birmingham, founded by Richard Hoggart, Edward Palmer Thompson, and Raymond Williams in 1964, can be considered the first academic step in the field of cultural studies (Bourse and Yücel, 2020: 8, 18). Hoggart, Thompson, and Williams explain culture with struggles between different lifestyles. Rather than the evolution of a single lifestyle, for the description of the culture, they break the previous conceptualizations. In the related works of Hoggart, Thompson, and Williams, culture is not submitted as simply accumulated knowledge of the world, but as a process in which meanings and definitions are socially constructed and historically transformed. Richard Hoggart's work *The Uses of Literacy: Aspects of Working Class Life*, published in 1957, has been a significant source of cultural history since it deals with social criticism by combining culture with life experiences. Hoggart discusses culture in terms of both historical and social criticism (Hoggart, 1957). *Making of the English Working Class*, by Edward Palmer Thompson, is another critical source for cultural studies. His work reveals a new tradition of thought and politics in the field of culture (Thompson, 1963).

The contributions of Stuart Hall, the director of the previously mentioned centre between 1968-1979, have also been remarkable. Within the body of the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies, Hall took part in many projects, especially within the Media Group. He has had a central position in areas such as culture-media, popular culture-high culture, and hegemony. For him, Cultural Studies aim to politicize culture against its

ideological position of it, reveal the social interest behind cultural creations, and consider the construction and consumption processes of culture as a whole (Hall, 1990). Hall is mainly concerned with the political aspect of culture. He aims to overcome deterministic and reductionist approaches. So, he examines culture in the context of ideology. He also tries to place culture in the context of social power relations. In his analysis of culture, Hall includes the relationship between classes, cultural groups, and subjects in a heterogeneous way. How these relationships are organized is reviewed by Hall. He argues that ideological and cultural fields are constitutive in the social formation not secondary.

Culture is defined as an interpretative field of struggle in Hall's works. He treats the concept as an essential part of power. Hall insists that power is a central element of culture and it plays a vital role in the establishment of power relations. Hall's ideas enable us to understand the hegemonic struggles behind culture relations (Hall, 2005: 414-415). The claim that culture is political also shows how Hall is fed by Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony. As will be analysed in the coming parts, this argument touches on a very fundamental point in the relationship between power and culture. The potential of the field of social and ideological struggle arising from the lack of an impartial basis of culture is placed on a theoretical basis, especially with Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony.

Among the numerous descriptions of culture, Kroeber and Kluckhohn's definition is of great importance as to having a founding position. As stated by the two, culture "consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered products of action, on the other, as conditional elements of future action" (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952: 181).

Culture is often associated with the anthropological context by Edward B. Taylor. For him, "Culture or civilization... is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society" (Taylor, 1871: 1). Güvenç is one of those who considers the definition of Taylor problematic. He emphasizes that Tylor's definition of culture does not reflect the concept completely, it is only important in terms of expressing the main thesis of cultural theory from a holistic perspective (Güvenç, 2011: 54). Sharing the idea of collectivity we see through

Taylor, Güvenç defines culture as follows: Culture is what is produced by local culture, a community of people and geography smaller than the scale of the nation and country (2002: 110). He states that the boundaries of culture and the geographical boundaries of a country cannot be matched. In this regard, a culture may hold many countries (such as Western culture), and a country may contain many different subcultures within its national borders.

By emphasizing that culture is a field of human action, Bauman deals with the concept through human activities and production (Bauman, 1998: 159). For Bauman, humanity cannot be imagined without culture and that culture cannot exist without humans. Eagleton's definition of culture appears to have a similar framework: The emergence of culture is first the comprehension of the separation of certain moral and intellectual activities from the impulses that take a new form of society. And the concept, later on, turns into “the humane supreme court”, replacing social justice with a refreshing alternative (Eagleton, 2005: 42). It is revealed that culture is a determining factor in the way how people feel, think, and live.

There are also some descriptions of culture focusing on society rather than the individual in the relationship between the two. Leading as one of them, T.S. Eliot believes that culture causes different implications for the development of individuals and society. He states that the culture of the individual is directly related to the culture of the community or class he belongs; the culture of the community or class is based on the society of which it is a part. Therefore, the main point to understanding culture is the culture of the society. Culture should be treated primarily concerning the whole society (Eliot, 1987: 11).

Among various names searching for the definition of culture, Pierre Bourdieu states that culture constitutes the basis of communication and interaction between people. In addition, he thinks that culture is also a source of domination. Consisting of beliefs, customs, values, and language; culture mediates practices that bind individuals and groups into institutionalized hierarchies (Swartz, 2018: 11). We understand that Bourdieu focuses on cultural construction experts, whom he sees as intellectuals. They are treated as specialized agents of culture for Bourdieu.

Emile Durkheim's definition of culture can also be included. He considers culture as a part of the process of ensuring legitimacy. As stated by Durkheim, culture is the process of determining the principles and criteria of minimum moral and rational consensus. It

emerges as a struggle to determine the legitimate conceptions in the public sphere (Durkheim, 2005: 35).

Süleyman Seyfi Öğün, while defining culture, divides it into two groups, vertical and horizontal. Culture is used in two different aspects. First of them, “the state of being cultured” is to some extent a difference in tastes and sophistication of tastes. This form is usually adopted by urban. It is a means for the urban citizens to show their differences from the ‘vulgar’ countrymen and peasants. It may be called the vertical practice of culture, mostly associated with civilization. The culture of the common people, in this regard, is partially ignored. This is a form of degenerated culture. There is the second form of culture for him, the horizontal interpretation of culture, mostly associated with the local and traditional aspects. In this form, the subject of the culture changes. Culture occurs in the countryside, in the village; it is at the periphery. It includes all valuable traditions. The common people have become the real subjects of culture. From Öğün’s description of the culture, we see two contradicting theories. And he claims that the elitist form of culture, which is considered the vertical culture, is a widely accepted one (Öğün, 2010: 1-2).

All the definitions discussed above show us that there has been no single definition of culture. The concept is still being practiced in various forms. And this is what makes culture confusing. All these attempts to define culture, at the final point, make us understand that culture is exercised mostly in either a populist or elitist manner. And the part of how culture is perceived affects its relationship with the other fields, especially the political sphere.

The concept of culture has transformed. Both at the contextual and intellectual levels, it has changed a lot. Historical developments have been effective in this process. The fact that culture could easily find itself a place in various fields has also promoted this process. Mostly having a specific position in the first stance, culture has gained a much more abstract meaning over time. All this course prevents us to reach a unique meaning of culture. A wide range of meanings has caused it to gain a controversial position in the political arena as well. And it has made the issue of culture extremely sophisticated. For this reason, explaining the general framework seems sufficient to understand the impact of culture in the political field.

2.2. Culture as a Part of Politics

Existence of culture in the political arena as a binding factor took place after certain turning points in politics. As we have already seen in the historical development of the concept, culture had also undergone some distinctive moments. Affecting the position of each other, culture and politics interacted at a point and became an essential part of each other. Modernization has been effective in this process. Since how culture has gone under a change is discussed above, the transformation of the political mechanism seems noteworthy here. The main goal of this title is initially to interpret this political change, then to deal with the power relations of which culture has become a significant part, and lastly to examine the dominance of the cultural field outside the political power.

Cultural elements have a critical influence on the determination of political behaviour (Bingöl, 2000: 29). In this respect, it is known that the ‘political’ is not only influenced by material and rational factors but also by much more abstract factors, such as culture and identity. “Whatever the content of political culture is, it changes the political perceptions of individuals, guides their behaviours in the same way, and most significantly determines the individuals’ manners in their process of participating in the political life” (Fedayi, 2007: 110). That culture is a political determinant can only be possible with the study of such abstract means.

“Politics, as a space, was monopolized throughout ancient history and was kept refined. Soon in the modern world, it was realized that politics could no longer hold the population as a pure subject. It was a significant sign showing that politics would not remain as politics” (Öğün, 2010: 3). The change expressed by Öğün may be the first thing we may examine. The traces of this political change have been decisive in the participation of culture in the political space.

The main function of the political mechanism in ancient history was the organization of the basic affairs among people. It was largely charged with organizing major agricultural and commercial issues. The sense of community, on the other hand, was very limited. All kinds of social formations were subordinate to the ‘political’ and this provided an extremely broad area to the political mechanism. Such a large scale of power made politics easily melt all other elements. We see that the ‘social’ didn’t have any power against the political. In this context, the cultural issues were barely on the agenda of political power.

Modernization has transformed the political mechanism, as mentioned before. The first blow against the elitist nature of politics was caused by the bourgeois revolution of the 1900s. For the first time in political history, the absolute position of the political mechanism started to be questioned. Demands on politics to go down to the ordinary man seemed necessary. As the only policymakers of the ancient period, the monarchs and aristocrats were overthrown.

The bourgeois revolution also formed a significant basis revealing the relationship between political powers and economic powers. This process caused the emergence of economy-politics. Ögün argues that this made politics acquire an economic character. Political and economic activities from that time on could only exist with a significant degree of mutual respect. On the transformation of political mechanisms, Ögün states that a political calculation could only be successful with economic feedback, not simply with traditional wisdom. The transformation of politics was promoted by the process of recognition, participation, and sharing. This is where the social significance emerged. “These are the processes leading from the subject (*tebaa*) to nation, from servitude (*kulluk*) to citizenship” (Ögün, 2010: 8).

On the relationship between modernity and political change, some questions emerge. Have all these modern processes been sufficient to make the ‘political’ responsible for the ‘social’ or has the ‘social’ found a chance to intervene in the political sphere? The answer to these questions is hidden in the fact that modernization has not been sufficiently fulfilled as it showed a top-down trend. The top-down experience has again brought the dominance of the political mechanism, creating a subject gap. This whole process revealed the importance of cultural and social dynamics. Contrary to the political mechanism extending from the centre to the periphery, the cultural emphasis goes from the periphery to the centre. And this once again reveals the critical position of culture.

Drawing attention to its role in the centre-periphery relationship, political power has faced a new dichotomy: the political culture. In the new order, in which politics becomes cultural and culture becomes politicized, the role of culture becomes one of the major issues. The position of culture in the top-down relationship of centre with the periphery has led the centre to consider culture as a binding factor. The existence of culture as one of the elements of power has made the politics-culture relationship very distinctive from then on. On the other side, the equivalence of culture to civilization has also affected this process.

The leaning of politics on culture, as examined above, took place as a result of an avoidable process. The radical change of the political mechanism in the 19th century indicated a break in the encounter of politics with culture and made it a vital part of power. In the end, Cultural and social phenomena got irreparably involved in politics. The main question is now the new circumstances caused by such participation. It seems useful to examine the relationship between culture and political power after the short history of culture taking part in politics.

2.2.1. Culture and Power

A concept as complex as culture in political science terminology can be power. The participation of culture in the area of power makes this process even more complicated. Referring to the brief history of culture as a factor in politics, it is understood that this cooperation can be largely analysed through power relations. Under this title, it is aimed to study the nature of power, the relationship between power and culture, and the difference between political power and power in the cultural field.

In examining the culture-power relations, the first thing to do may be the investigation of power. The concept of power, most of the time, is equated to political power. Whenever the issue of culture is involved in the process, the situation gets more complicated. To understand the relationship between the two, it is necessary to remove the problem of power out of its political implication. A brief analysis of the concept of power is a key factor to perceive this relationship.

Power is simply defined as the act of superiority established by one over the others. It is often associated with political authority. It is mainly treated together with political concepts such as power, authority, and control. As stated by Duverger (2011: 129), power is the right of a person or actor in a social relationship asking for others to obey his/her/their orders. Power can use legitimized force through various tools such as pressure, force, persuasion, and consent. It is based on an unequal hierarchy. And the role of the state in the institutionalization of power is undeniable. However, defining power only through the state mechanism limits its scope.

Considering power only in the political context limits our perception. In this regard, Foucault's analysis of power gains importance. Foucault deals with power by concentrating

on any form of bilateral relations. As he states frequently, he does not use power in the sense of government or the sense of state (2005: 234; 2012: 48). He argues that it is necessary to analyse power in a more specific way, rather than defining it in terms of the authority-building mechanism of politics. For Foucault, power is a phenomenon that comes out at macro and micro scales. It is not a force developed only between the state and citizens. It can exist within all layers of society, including interpersonal relations and the individual's own body. Removing power from its traditional form, Foucault expands the scope of it to a very large area.

Power is essentially the authority to define the person who says 'you shouldn't', as stated by Foucault (2014: 141). This is the purest form of the domination of one over the other. The phenomenon of power manifests itself in all areas of life and it takes control of the behaviours of individuals. Power is, to some degree, a watchman. Since its sphere of influence is extremely large, it covers the cultural realm, from daily life practices such as eating and drinking pleasures to artistic preferences. So, we understand that power is everywhere. It may appear at the centre of each relation.

When the problem of power is described through the relations of the state only, it enables us to perceive the true nature of power. Power is a much more complex mechanism. It is more than a set of laws or a state apparatus (Foucault, 2012: 98). For him, the circle of power is so wide and unexpected that even an individual can notice it over his body. He may find a place for himself as an abstract power over his own body. This is what Foucault calls bio-power. Depending on this perception, power has a microstructure. It can be considered within the framework of the entire structure of relations, including bilateral relations. As stated by Foucault himself, talking about the functioning of power, he refers to the microscopic powers. This form of power works on individuals, from their daily behaviours to their bodies. All lives of people are bound into the political chain of power and it surrounds people everywhere (Foucault, 2012: 48).

It is now clear that the concept of power is beyond a political situation. It is Foucault who reminds us of the essence of power. Power should not be considered only at the level of governments or states, rather it comes out in every individual. What makes the field of power so wide is the social life itself. The basic point reflected in the relationship of power with culture appears at this point. Although Foucault does never directly use the word culture

in his comprehensive definition of power, the importance he attaches to social relations in the related process points out clues for us to establish such a reference.

"Culture is an instrument of power, as it instils a worldview. It is never just a form of entertainment. On the contrary, it is a symbolic structure imposing authority and political influence. The problem of culture cannot be separated from the problem of power. So, the examination of culture will also lead to a political critique of society" remark Bourse and Yücel (2020: 178). They directly address this inevitable nature of culture concerning power.

Turning back to Bourdieu's definition of culture, he considers culture as a tool of domination. This shows us that the issue of culture cannot be independent of the issue of power. Bourdieu, in this way, reveals the power relations produced through cultural means and institutions (Swartz, 2018: 79). As stated by Bourdieu, all cultural symbols and practices, from artistic tastes to clothing, from eating and drinking habits to religion, science, philosophy and even language itself, have a function. It aims to reinforce social distinctions.

Examining culture as a factor dependent on the political content, Bourdieu claims that power relations are reproduced at the social and cultural levels. He emphasizes the role of culture in social reproduction (Bourdieu, 1973: 71). Engaged together, culture and power have a central position in social life. In this regard, we see that Bourdieu attaches great importance to symbolic forms. For him, power is not a separate field; it lies at the centre of social life. For the exercise of power, legitimacy is required. And Bourdieu bases the source of his legitimacy on social and cultural dynamics, which he believes at least as important as economic and political ones.

Symbolic forms become prominent in Bourdieu's theory. For him, symbolic issues both establish and maintain power structures. Bourdieu reconceptualizes the relations between the material and symbolic dimensions of social life through his conceptualization, the symbolic power (Swartz, 1997: 8). Symbolic power is a theory of social and political exercise of symbolic systems. For Bourdieu, symbolism helps explain social and class struggles. And each symbolic expression is full of meanings such as self-explanation in social space, power relations, and domination. The symbolic power, as stated by Bourdieu himself, is the ability to create individuals who have the potential to identify, to construct, to transform a point of view. Symbolic power legitimizes economic and political power, but cannot be reduced to them (Bourdieu, 1992: 170).

Symbolic power is an invisible power that develops political power. It is a tool of domination practiced especially by modern powers. In the modern world, domination has gained a new form, freeing itself from the traditional method. In its modern context, domination is not exercised by definite power applied to the human body, but through abstract forces applied to human consciousness. It uses violence on the consciousness in much more abstract ways (Bourdieu, 1991: 163-164).

The symbolic power, mentioned above as mostly an abstract form of domination, can also become visible in actual means. The best example of this can be found in the practices of daily life such as the movements reflected in behaviour patterns of the citizens and the use of language. Among them, language stands out as the most important one for Bourdieu. He believes that power does not lie in words or symbols per se but in the belief in the legitimacy of words and the person using them (Bourdieu, 1977: 117).

Bourdieu emphasizes the active role played by the practices treated unquestionably in the establishment and maintenance of power relations (cited by Swartz, 2018: 128). Bourdieu considers culture as the most important of these practices so he places culture as the source of legitimacy. The use of power, independent of its form, is based on legitimacy. This essentially differentiates the position of power from the political level, in Bourdieu's theory. What makes his symbolic power, emerging at such an abstract level, so significant lies in how that disapproving of the power considers it legitimate. The acceptance of this symbolic power as legitimate by those who have been a victim of that power or are not satisfied with that power is an important indicator for us to understand the position of symbolic power in terms of the cultural aspect. Bourdieu's referring to the symbolic power as "the power of world-making" (1987: 13) is not surprising at this stage. The cultural sphere, as Karademir states, "is the relational existence of various types of capital such as language, body, religion, art, politics, education, where factors such as customs, tastes, attitudes, and practices are valid. It is the sum of the areas in which power struggles are resolved" (2014: 234). Regarding Bourdieu's theory, the cultural sphere is a very comprehensive domain of power. Upon his broad theorization of a new form of power, we may go through other contributions to this relation.

It is also useful to look at the relationship between culture and power as a matter of sovereignty. It is believed to be important for the course of this study to consider this relationship within the scope of the sovereignty of the state. The transformation of the state

in the modern age is the cornerstone of the fundamental transformation in the perception of sovereignty. Having the monopoly of using force, the modern state is formed by the combination of ‘power’ in the sense of a will that can be carried out even if it is opposed and ‘authority’ in the sense of the legitimacy of this power (Çakırca, 2020: 195). In this respect, the modern state has established a new formation. This modern form of the state has gone through a transformation directly affecting the domination issue by removing the traditional form of administration. The need to establish legitimacy alongside authority reveals the nature of cultural tools at this stage.

We have already mentioned that culture as a part of politics, especially as a part of power, has been accomplished as a result of modernization. Previously, traditions and religion laid as an intermediary between local actors and power. They were important elements for the cultural basis of political legitimacy. With modernization, the state has become the project of building a new identity and transforming culture (Mardin, 1992: 160). The unrestricted, unquestionable, and absolute sovereignty has started to be limited. Moreover, the cultural part of this sovereignty has day by day turned into a means of imposition. “Cultural power, dominated by modernization, suppresses the difference in the specific characteristics of societies and states as a holistic set of values. It has become a threat to sovereignty (Çakırca, 2020: 202).

We understand that the contemporary practice of sovereignty is limited by the rules of law in the national and international arena. It gains its legitimacy from the people and international legal norms, rather than the supreme power of the state. It cannot be shared with any institution, nor can it be transferred (Biersteker and Weber, 1996: 10). In this respect, culture has become the most applied tool of political power. It has become a factor that helps to guide the society on behalf of the ruling elites.

Following the perception of power as a significant part of the political sphere, we may continue seeking this relationship through cultural policies. The fact that culture is a tool in the political arena is also closely related to cultural policies. The scope of cultural policies has become decisive in the establishment of power. These policies can be manifested in a wide range of areas. So now, it is believed to be useful to examine cultural policies, the visible indicators of examining the place of culture in politics, and its meaning in terms of power.

2.2.2. Cultural Policies

A contemporary discipline, political science has long developed as the study of the state. It mainly focused on the state issue as its main problem. Given this, the cultural policies have remained partially on the periphery. The state's intervention in the cultural field can be regarded as a recent subject. Considering the issue of culture is already a determinant factor in politics through the modern age, it is not surprising that cultural policies are relatively current.

The cultural policies of the state point to a multidimensional and complex nature. The most fundamental feature we need to address at this stage is the issue of the nation-state. The nation-state building process is a key to understanding cultural policy, as asserted by Bell and Oakley (2015: 115). For the two, culture is one of the most important aspects in defining a nation. Regardless of whether contractual or organic, the establishment of the nation is, culture is of great importance in the nation-building process. Therefore, we may understand the beginning of cultural policies through their relation with the establishment of the nation-state.

The issue of culture, constituting a significant part of politics, is as mentioned already a new phenomenon. It is considered the result of the modern era. And the turning of culture into a form of policy is the result of the establishment of nation-states. In the formation of the nation-state, culture has been exercised as a political tool. The common aspects of a given nation, which are the significant indicators of the culture have been applied in the building process of the nation-state. Therefore, the existence of cultural policies can be directly related to the aforementioned process.

Within this framework of the relations of culture and politics, the cultural policy regimes have produced completely different results in countries that completed their national unity at a later time than their European counterparts. Italy represents one of the most basic examples of late nationhood in Europe. In Italy, the relationship between art and politics has long been determined by competition between cities. The political and artistic polycentrism started with the Italian Renaissance and influenced the country's cultural policies for a long time (Dubois, 2015: 460-461). Italy's example also seems important in terms of the means of cultural construction chosen as the subject of this study. The unique process of cultural

construction in Italy from other European countries is due to the delay in the previously mentioned course of the nation-state.

It can be seen how the formation of the nation-state affects cultural policies. This also shows us the levels at which culture has turned into a political tool. The lateness or earliness of the nation-state formation reveals whether the culture of the newly established nation-state has an aesthetic form or imposes a lifestyle. Different nationalization processes have led to the differentiation of the role the states have assigned to culture and the national definition of culture (Bell and Oakley, 2015: 13).

The formation of the state either in an organic way or by force has also been an important aspect affecting the cultural policymaking process. Culture seems to be a critical part of politics where the nation-state is established through top-down. In the Turkish revolution, for example, cultural policies emerged as a desire to indoctrinate a lifestyle with mainly ideological purposes. Art and culture in the Turkish Revolution did not serve as an organic nation-building process but stood as a means of indoctrination. It was the social engineering that the state had adopted.

Nation-state building is not the only factor behind cultural policies. The activity of states to develop cultural policies by establishing an association with culture is based on many other factors. Among these, the meaning attributed to the definition of culture at the state level determines a critical part of the cultural policymaking process (Eagleton, 2009: 12). It has been mentioned that culture exists in various forms today. In this regard, how the state mechanism, as the main decision-making actor, interprets culture and the historical course of culture can be another factor affecting the formation of cultural policies.

The cultural policy draws attention as an area composed of plenty of variables. The role of the state is extremely dominant. On this subject, Ahearne argues that the most common criterion in the context of cultural policies is political power (2003: 127). Either centralized or decentralized, political power directly affects the formation of cultural policy. Cultural policies may be formed in the presence of the central power in a regulatory form and through a directing manner in centralized structures. In decentralized structures, on the other hand, the main authority in developing cultural policies may be delegated to local governments.

Although cultural policies can be examined within certain categories, both the ambiguous structure of the field of culture and the difficulty in the policy-making process make it almost impossible to have a fixed, single categorization. Therefore, the formation of cultural policies has a variable, developing, and reproducible nature with many criteria. It is not possible to consider any ideal type of cultural policies. Cultural policies may become meaningful for each of the societies and state structures, in which there occur common formations. At this point, the meaning attributed to the culture through the evaluation of social dynamics by the political power is of extreme importance.

The first part of the first chapter of the study, examining the course of culture in the historical context, the difficulties in defining the concept, the course of its transformation into a political tool, and the formation of cultural policies concludes here. Following the examination of culture in politics, the understanding of hegemony is aimed to be discussed. As a field of cultural struggle, hegemony has undoubtedly been one of the most important phases of the issue of culture in the political context. For this reason, it is important to analyse this area of struggle at least as much as the conceptualization of culture in the course of the study.

2.3. The Search for Hegemony and Cultural Struggle

Culture, either applied as a tool of transforming the society or reproducing the existing social forms, points out many different questions, in its interaction with politics. And observing the problems of culture from a framework of publicity leads to the politicization of culture, at the same time creating social tensions (Öğün, 2010: 5). The aforementioned difference is discussed within the scope of hegemony in the political sphere. Hegemony has a complex meaning. At this stage, it is aimed to examine the relationship between culture and politics by considering it, especially in the hegemonic struggle.

Under this topic, in the first place, hegemony is examined from Gramscian perspective. Within the concept of hegemony, the principles of constructing hegemony consisting of the manufacture of consent, the impact of education, and organic and traditional intellectuals are determined. It is thought that the analysis of these principles, each of which plays a significant role in the construction of hegemony may contribute to the culture-politics relationship. Thus, it is believed that the theoretical background of

domination in the political sphere through culture may be completed with the understanding of hegemony.

The period following the Enlightenment came out as a new era. This process brought the importance of culture to the agenda critically. It is even stated that the place where the political struggle was based from that was the cultural sphere. Defined by Gramsci as a "form of cultural leadership", hegemony begins with the acceptance that coercion alone is not sufficient for the continuity of power (Gramsci, 2014: 33-34; 75-76). The legitimacy of the power may be possible by gaining the consent of the people.

Dellaloğlu defines the struggle in the cultural sphere in the following words: "The power in the political field is equal to hegemony in the poetic field" (Dellaloğlu, 2020 313). By calling it a poetic field, Dellaloğlu refers to the cultural sphere. He addresses the differences between the forms of power in this way. In his opinion, discussing power through politics is subject to some principles. Political power has some legal and procedural rules, such as ballot box, elections, representation, and majority and minority rights. Winning and losing, that is, the rules of the game are clear. It indicates a quite comfortable process to measure and determine the power. However, it is not easy to talk about power when it is about the cultural sphere. Coming into power employing culture is pretty complex. It is extremely difficult to measure. It is a process in which the rules are not transparent as in the political sphere (Dellaloğlu, 2018: 108). The fact that there are no certain boundaries of power in the cultural sphere causes tensions as we have quoted from Öğün above. In politics, the quality of the power can easily turn into a quantity issue; but in the cultural sphere, the relationship between quality and quantity may not be so clear. For that reason, it is not very likely to refer to accession to power directly in the cultural sphere. Here it seems an important attitude to refer to the concept of hegemony as the struggle in the cultural field (Dellaloğlu, 2020: 313). Rather than describing it as a cultural power, the most appropriate form of reference is portrayed in the concept of hegemony. The construction of cultural authority is closely related to the construction of hegemony.

The political struggle in the cultural sphere is not clear. That it has its characteristics carries some difficulties. It is not easy to become powerful in the cultural sphere without penetrating the details. In the long term, cultural hegemony gains importance as a more specific perception to eliminate uncertainties. "Power in the cultural sphere does not change easily. In the cultural sphere no one can be completely in power. Therefore, it would be more

accurate to discuss hegemony" (Dellaloğlu, 2020: 313-314). All these explain why we should focus on the issue of hegemony in a study that covers the practice of political tools in the name of cultural construction. As stated by Dellaloğlu, the struggle in the cultural sphere is best described by the conceptualization of hegemony, put forward by Antonio Gramsci.

Introducing the concept of cultural hegemony to political literature, Gramsci has made important contributions to contemporary social sciences. Although his views are left-wing¹, his ideas on the struggle for dominance in the cultural sphere have been referred to by all kinds of views. Gramsci's ideas occupy an extremely important place for studies in which culture and power relations are discussed together. Now, it seems meaningful to examine hegemony in a detailed manner from Antonio Gramsci's perspective since he is accepted as the founding father of the concept.

2.3.1. Cultural Hegemony in Gramscian Perspective

With the theory he puts forward, Gramsci has influenced almost the whole social sciences. What he asserted seems quite different from what had been put forward before. He states that history has a revolutionary character and that it may function quite differently from the past. Subsequently, he has developed the concept of hegemony or cultural hegemony. Cultural hegemony deals with the functions of economic classes from which Gramsci develops the functions of social class within the social structures established for and by cultural domination (Bullock, 1999: 387-388). His discovery of how the social and cultural order of his age affected the power relations of his time constitutes an important reference for this study. It may not be possible to examine the concept of hegemony

¹ Hegemony is a theoretical concept that has essentially a Marxist connotation, introduced by Gramsci to describe the economic-political situations in Italy during the fascist regime. Gramsci's main concern in his theory of hegemony was to explain capitalism; dealing with the power relations and ideological structures in capitalist societies. He stated that the socialist revolution cannot take place spontaneously in a capitalist society and emphasized that the revolution can only occur as a result of a conscious struggle. Gramsci's theoretical approach aimed to explain how to provide the conditions necessary for the revolutionary process to take place. It is seen that through his Marxist theory, Gramsci considered the methods that would provide the basis for the fulfilment of the socialist revolution. However, over time, many views and theories regarding the concept of hegemony have been put forward. In other words, the scope of hegemony has expanded as the references to the concept have diversified. It is known that Gramsci's approach aimed at an economic, political, cultural, and ideological analysis of modern capitalist societies. Through his holistic approach, he criticized the externalizations that reduced social life to only a certain area (only economic or only political) (Gramsci, 1989: 139). In this respect, it can be asserted that his theory can be a source for cultural-political studies as well as economic-political studies.

independent of Gramsci's own life. Therefore, it is aimed to look at the notion of cultural sovereignty from the framework Gramsci has designed.

Widely accepted by the second half of the 20th century, Gramsci's ideas have become one of the most applied fields in political science. His revolutionary theory mainly covers social and cultural dominance in the political arena. Addressing the occupation of state politics, Gramsci aims to destroy the unequal perception of power. For him, politics is a complex structure and cannot be considered independent of heterogeneous goals. Therefore, he focuses on the pluralization of modern cultural identities (Gramsci, 1978: 55, 80, 171, 263). His ideas have paved the way for the redesign of political existence through the culture.

Although the concept of hegemony has a socialist reference in its origins, it is frequently used by many who are interested in cultural field politics². Gramsci's ideas are very comprehensive and today are highly appealed (Tok, 2003: 239). Accordingly, Gramsci applies the concept to indicate a system of alliances that he believes the working classes should make to overthrow the bourgeois state (Gramsci, 1978: 443). It is also known that some events that took place in Gramsci's own life, have also been influential in his invention of the concept. Therefore, briefly discussing those experiences seems also important to understand his world of ideas.

Gramsci was born in the southern part of Italy. He made his initial analyses of the political system through the southern-northern difference in Italy. Forming the basis of his philosophy, *The Southern Question* by Gramsci was a turning point in Italian political history (Adamson, 1979: 38). It was shaped by the structural and socio-economic differences between Southern and Northern Italy. It showed that the developed North had a capitalized appearance; the rural South, on the other hand, had a semi-feudal structure. The issue Gramsci brought up as a problem in his article under the same name was the problem of the

² "Gramsci emphasized not only economic but political, cultural, and ideological dimensions of modern capitalism to understand the role of the modern state and the territorial division of social formations. For him, social change is situated in social life under capitalism, and understanding of social relations requires explaining the hegemonic relations in modern societies. A collective political consciousness for social change thus should be located in the structure of everyday life because there is a strong connection between the advanced capitalist state, the social relations of production, and the space" remarks Sargın (1997: 36). This quotation is significant since it addresses a critical point for our aim through Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony. In this study, Gramsci's reference is not based on political economy, but on a cultural-political basis due to the peculiarities of Turkey's modernization experience. Gramsci's conceptualization with a Marxist reference has been used to point out the social and cultural dimensions of power. Since there has been no class struggle in Turkish political life in general and Turkish modernization in particular, Gramsci's cultural dimension in power relations constitutes a source for this study.

exploitation of the South by the North (Gramsci, 1926). Beginning from the end of the 19th century, Italian industry in the North had grown rapidly. It was supported by protectionist policies in Italy and kept foreign capital out, securing dominance in the domestic market. This protectionism supported the industrial foundations of the North. It, on the other hand, had devastating effects on the agriculture of Italy. The southern peasants were no longer able to export their products. All these problems caused the South to remain rural while giving rise to the development of the North. The differences between the two regions were proved geographically, socially, and politically (Albanese, 1980: 66).

Regarding it also a factor behind the late nationalization of Italy, Gramsci tried to shed light on the problem of South-North distinction. Starting from this problem, Gramsci shaped the foundations of hegemony (Gündoğan, 2008: 46). He referred to the concept in the first place to explain the relations characterizing national issues with similar political history and especially social class relations. As stated by Gramsci, the relations between the bourgeoisie and the working classes were hegemonic and shaped by the capitalist society (Gramsci, 2014: 34-35).

Gramsci defines hegemony in his *Prison Notebooks* in a form that related to the proletariat as a ruling class and to the exercise of this rule. It indicates the coercion that the ruling class necessarily exerts on the opposing groups. However, it is also the control of the allies through philosophy and culture (Gramsci, 2014: 33). He argues that the most important condition for changing the existing hegemonic system for the benefit of the working class, which means the establishment of the hegemony of the working class, lies in the belief of other classes that their interests can only be protected by organizing around the working class. Giving their consent to the working class is, in short, the only way to ensure the hegemony of the working class (Jones, 2006: 47).

Gramsci emphasizes making the ideological codes inherent in the dominant class, related to the whole society. He discusses abstract tools for this struggle as culture, rather than absolute pressure. Culture is expressed as a power opportunity provided by consent. Therefore, we understand that Gramsci emphasizes the importance of culture as one of the means of ensuring the domination of the ruling class. He also reminds us that the distance between obedience and rebellion is much less than anticipated. It is possible to gain power in the cultural sphere only by providing obedience. Dellaloğlu's following words show us the critical point between obedience and rebel, by Gramsci's perception of hegemony: "The

fact that some people obey where they think they rebel and that those whom we blame for obeying participate in a rebellion is a secret hidden in the culture" (2020: 314-315).

As a unique philosopher distinguishing culture from ideology (Dellaloğlu, 2020: 314), Gramsci considers hegemony essential for the continuity of power. He opposes culture being treated as a tool by the state mechanism. Mostly totalitarian regimes have applied such ideological treatments of culture for the continuation of the state, rather than using force solely. Since culture is one of the most effective aspects of this process, it is possible to regard culture as an ideological tool of the state (Althusser, 2017: 50-51; Nalbantoğlu, 2018: 33).

"In any society not totalitarian, then, certain cultural forms predominate over others, just as certain ideas are more influential than others, the form of this cultural leadership is what Gramsci has identified as hegemony" (Said, 1978: 7). Cultural manners and social identities play a decisive role in the construction of hegemony. This reveals the importance of culture within the scope of hegemony on behalf of this study. Edward Said is one of those focusing on the issue of culture, concerning the establishment of hegemony. On Gramsci's hegemony, Said thinks that culture appears in civil society. The influence of institutions or other people is built through what Gramsci calls consent (Said, 1999: 16). The dominant class, as the guarantor of hegemony, can achieve its superiority by penetrating the whole public sphere through culture and by creating awareness among the masses through persuasion. It shows how significant to concentrate on the issue of culture for the examination of hegemony as well as power. Similarly, the distinction between civil society and political society made by Gramsci himself also indicates the role of culture in hegemony. Civil society is developed through voluntary relations in schools, families, and trade unions. On the other hand, political society is formed directly by state institutions. Civil society is the basis on which culture becomes functional and contributes to the continuity of power (Said, 1999: 16).

Gramsci's methodology is based on the dialectical relationship between hegemony which is equal to consent–support, and domination which is equal to coercion–force. For him, there is a crucial conceptual distinction, between power based on "domination" and the exercise of "direction" or "hegemony" (Cloud, 2020: 838). "The term 'hegemony' for Gramsci has two faces. On the one hand, it is contrasted with 'domination' (and as such bound up with the opposition State/Civil Society), and on the other hand 'hegemonic' is

sometimes used as an opposite of ‘corporate’ or ‘economic corporate’ to designate a historical phase in which a given group moves beyond a position of corporate existence and defence of its economic position and aspires to a position of leadership in the political and social arena”³ (Gramsci, 1999: 20) and on this issue he continues; “Two of its key passages then read as follows: “. . . a class is dominant in two ways, i.e. ‘leading’ and ‘dominant’. It leads the classes which are its allies and dominates those which are its enemies. Therefore, even before attaining power a class can (and must) ‘lead’; when it is in power it becomes dominant, but continues to ‘lead’ as well . . . there can and must be a ‘political hegemony’ even before the attainment of governmental power, and one should not count solely on the power and material force which such a position gives to exercise political leadership or hegemony” (1999: 211). This distinction essentially forms the backbone of Gramsci's theory. The problem on behalf of Gramsci is not how hegemony displaces domination, it is which side of this relationship becomes foremost applied (Kendie, 2006: 90). This is also the basis of the relationship between culture and power. No political power can survive through mere coercion. Although power in the traditional sense is obtained within certain indicators, hegemony focuses on the process of achieving power and maintaining itself in this process.

It can be easily seen that Gramsci's philosophy is fed by dialectical relationships. He often relies on contradictions in forming and conceptualizing his thoughts. Hegemony and counter-hegemony, consent and coercion, coercion and persuasion, state and church, political society and civil society are among these (Bobbio, 1979: 35). The struggle for hegemony is also fed by such contradictions as can be seen in his writings: “What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural ‘levels’: the one that can be called ‘civil society’, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called ‘private’ and that of ‘political society’ or ‘the State’. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of ‘hegemony’ which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of “direct domination” or command exercised through the State and ‘juridical’ government” (Gramsci, 1999: 145). Culture comes out as a significant part of this process.

³ Gramsci criticizes the strict economic determinism of classical Marxism and tries to explain the determining role of the superstructure within the framework of the concepts of civil society and hegemony. In a chapter of the *Prison Notebooks*, he opposes his mechanical determinism, which undervalues the subjective factor and reduces historical progress to a simple and direct reflection of economic processes (1971: 360). Gramsci, thinking that the relationship between the superstructural elements and the structure is not one-sided, assumes that it is necessary to move away from all forms of economic reductionism for the development of Marxism (Femia, 1987: 133). This point is also important for our study. Calling hegemony a struggle towards the capitalist perception of power, Gramsci does not only consider the economic base, his attribution stands also for cultural hegemony, and especially in this study, the perception of hegemony establishes the basis for a cultural construction analysis.

In that, for Gramsci, “the state is the bourgeoisie's domain of oppression or armed domination of the exploited classes and civil society is the bourgeoisie's domain of cultural orientation or voluntary hegemony” (Gramsci, 1978: 170).

Gramsci focuses on culture throughout his philosophy, but he never reduces it to ideology. He is concerned with the ideological aspect of culture but keeps the basis of cultural phenomena apart. In this context, Gramsci’s ideas, on account of the ideology issue, have been a source for many others. It is not possible without pointing out the ideological aspect when referring to Gramsci's concept of hegemony. However, the relationship between hegemony and ideology has already a complex nature. It is understood from the following statements of Dellaloğlu who explains this relationship in a historical context: “Hegemony is the concept of the period when ideology acculturated” (2020: 316). We see that ideology and hegemony differ from each other. Ideology becomes meaningful in the process of accession to power, but it is the hegemony that ensures remaining in power. The questions Gramsci tries to solve mainly include ideological attitudes in society. In other words, Gramsci tries to explain the secret of life within ideology through hegemony.

The basic tool used by those who want to establish domination is mostly ideological apparatuses. Gramsci remarks, “The realization of a hegemonic apparatus, in so far as it creates a new ideological terrain, determines a reform of consciousness and methods of knowledge: it is a fact of knowledge, a philosophical fact” (1999: 690). In this regard, Gramsci's notion of ideology and the structure-superstructure relationship seems extremely important. In explaining structure and superstructure, Gramsci begins by quoting the sentence in the preface to the *Critique of Political Economy*: “Men acquire consciousness of structural conflicts on the level of ideologies should be considered an affirmation of epistemological and not a simply psychological and moral value.” (Gramsci, 1999: 689). He defines ideology with the following words: “‘Ideology’ was an aspect of ‘sensationalism’, i.e., eighteenth-century French materialism. Its original meaning was that of ‘science of ideas’ and since the analysis was the only method recognized and applied by science it means ‘analysis of ideas’, that is, ‘investigation of the origin of ideas’” (1999: 704). We understand that for Gramsci, the ‘science of ideas’ takes the ‘system of ideas’ over time and is put into use in this widely known form in the 19th century (Stoddart, 2007: 200-202).

Gramsci believes that in the extension of his philosophy, it is necessary to consider ideology as a part of the superstructure (Filippini, 2017: 6-7). And it is necessary to examine it from a historical perspective. He argues that "One must therefore distinguish between historically organic ideologies, those, that is, which are necessary to a given structure, and ideologies that are arbitrary, rationalistic, or 'willed'. To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity that is 'psychological'; they 'organize' human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc. To the extent that they are arbitrary, they only create individual 'movements', polemics, and so on (though even these are not completely useless, since they function like an error which by contrasting with truth, demonstrates it) (Gramsci, 1999: 707). In this distinction, the first category organizes people; it prepares the basis for people to take action if necessary and thereby they have a validity. The second category is busy causing controversies and individual movements (Hall, 1985: 111).

"Gramsci agrees with, or rather pre-empts, the Althusserian view of ideology as an organic part of a social totality" (Filippini, 2017: 5) It is known that Althusser takes part of his inspiration from Gramsci (Bidet, 2014: xxiv). He refers to Gramsci in his theory of the state, in which he deals with the subject of ideology: "Gramsci is the only one who went any distance in the road I am taking. He had the 'remarkable' idea that the State could not be reduced to the (Repressive) State Apparatus, but included, as he put it, a certain number of institutions from 'civil society: the Church, the Schools, the trade unions, etc.'" (Althusser, 2017: 49). Althusser welcomes the power of the law, police, army, prisons, and secret organizations; based on the recognition that the 'state' is an instrument of oppression and violence (Nalbantoğlu, 2018: 38; Gramsci, 2014: 351). In his theory of state, Althusser considers distinguishing between state apparatus and state power. Moreover, he focuses on the formation of state apparatus. Althusser brings a new conceptualization called the ideological apparatus of the state, which should not be confused with the (repressive) state apparatus. Not far from the point Gramsci evaluates the concept of the state, Althusser systematizes Gramsci's thoughts on ideology through the theory of the state. Here is how Gramsci explains the state: "It is usually understood as a political society (or dictatorship; or coercive apparatus to bring the mass of the people into conformity with the specific type of production and the specific economy at a given moment) and not as an equilibrium between political society and civil society (or hegemony of a social group over the entire national society exercised through the so-called private organizations, like the Church, the trade

unions, the schools, etc.); it is precisely in civil society that intellectuals operate especially ." (Gramsci, 199: 109-210).

The state is not a monolithic structure in Althusser's text. To some extent, it is the representation of the bourgeois class and is based on the reproduction of capitalist relations (Althusser, 2005: 12). For him, the critical point is that such reproduction cannot completely rely on force. It is the system of state apparatuses that reproduce the relations, which is categorized in two forms repressive apparatuses and ideological apparatuses. In Althusser's theory, reproduction is not a force-oriented process but a problem of creating and maintaining practices through rituals (Güvenç Salgırlı, 2018: 27).

The state apparatuses are grouped into two categories, as mentioned above: the repressive state apparatuses and the ideological state apparatuses. Among this distinction, the ideological state apparatuses are of vital importance to what is examined so far. They are the instruments of the state, just like the repressive apparatuses. Yet, the two differ from each other (Hall, 1985: 98-103). In his description of the Ideological State Apparatuses, Althusser first chooses to refer to the state's (repressive) apparatuses, accepted by many as fundamental. His purpose in doing so is to show that the state apparatuses essentially set up a mechanism of repression. In this way, he reveals the difference between the ideological state apparatuses easily:

ISAs (Ideological State Apparatus) "must not be confused with the (repressive) State apparatus. Remember that in Marxist theory, the State Apparatus (SA) contains: the Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, etc., which constitute what I shall in future call the Repressive State Apparatus. Repressive suggests that the State Apparatus in question 'functions by violence' – at least ultimately (since repression, e.g. administrative repression, may take non-physical forms).

I shall call Ideological State Apparatuses a certain number of realities which present themselves to the immediate observer in the form of distinct and specialized institutions. I propose an empirical list of these which will obviously have to be examined in detail, tested, corrected and re-organized. With all the reservations implied by this requirement, we can for the moment regard the following institutions

as Ideological State Apparatuses (the order in which I have listed them has no particular significance):

the religious ISA (the system of the different churches),

the educational ISA (the system of the different public and private ‘schools’),

the family ISA,

the legal ISA,

the political ISA (the political system, including the different parties),

the trade-union ISA,

the communications ISA (press, radio, and television, etc.),

the cultural ISA (literature, the arts, sports, etc.) (Althusser, 2017: 50-51).

Althusser gives great importance to these eight ISAs rather than the repressive apparatuses of the state since he believes that the class struggle takes place in all ISAs (2005: 123). The first of these, the religious ISA has a significant place in the struggle for power and legitimacy. It is a frequently used apparatus to guide people, especially in societies where religious institutions continue to exist. The second group, the educational ISA is possibly the most important one for Althusser. School, constituting the basic stage of formal education and adult education, is the most prominent tool in the reproduction of power. The family ISA is the tool in which power is constantly reproduced since it represents the smallest block of society. Althusser attaches at least as much importance to this apparatus as the school ISA. The legal ISA is the instrument of bourgeois legal ideology. Political ISA is the only apparatus that the actors, on the surface, carry out some rhetoric as homeland, nation, and religion; but, they mostly represent the interests of the ruling class ideologically and don't fail to use the means of repression. The communication ISA is the apparatus that almost creates the new public sphere of the state. The state ideology is promoted through the media. The cultural ISA is a many-sided apparatus that increased its influence after the modernization process and continued to spread day by day. It has become a commodity market for the struggle for power. It is not possible to think of ideological apparatuses away from the cultural basis (Nalbantoğlu, 2018: 42-28; Althusser, 2014: 76-78). All the ISAs,

although including the public area, belong mostly to the private area. They spread over a large area. They are also significant in the accession and maintenance of power in Althusser's formation. The repressive state apparatuses, on the other hand, function by violence. This category belongs to the public domain largely. The government, the administration, the police, the courts, the prisons, and the army are among the repressive forces applied by the state.

Althusser breaks the traditional perception of the state through his distinction. He considers the ideological apparatuses of the state as essential as the repressive apparatuses. For him, several aspects are making the ideological apparatuses different and effective from the repression mechanism. Although all of the state's repressive apparatuses seem to differ from each other, they serve a single purpose (Tan, 2020: 133). Even though the repressive state apparatuses act in harmony, the ideological state apparatuses may be observed through different methods in which they may indicate various contents. They are multi-organized compared to the repressive apparatuses (Hall, 1985: 99). The ideological state apparatuses have greater constitutive power over human subjectivity. The (Repressive) State Apparatus, on the other hand "constitutes an organized whole whose different parts are centralized beneath a commanding unity, that of the politics of class struggle applied by the political representatives of the ruling classes in possession of State power, the Ideological State Apparatuses are multiple, distinct, 'relatively autonomous' and capable of providing an objective field to contradictions which express, in forms which may be limited or extreme, the effects of the clashes between the capitalist class struggle and the proletarian class struggle, as well as their subordinate forms" (Althusser, 2005: 116-117). Althusser deals with the physical density through the repressive apparatuses. However, he mostly emphasizes the hidden impact of ideological apparatuses. The role of ideology in the struggle to remain in power seems much more essential for him.

Another factor about the two apparatuses can be seen in the public-private separation. While the repressive state apparatuses appear in the public sphere entirely, the ideological state apparatuses are mostly part of the private area (Althusser, 2014: 79-81). Although they may be transferred to the public sphere, the ideological state apparatuses are mostly located in the private sphere. Such a distinction between public and private also occupies an important place in the accession of power. As claimed by Althusser, "The distinction between the public and the private is a distinction internal to bourgeois law, and valid in the (subordinate) domains in which bourgeois law exercises its 'authority'. The domain of the

State escapes it because the latter is 'above the law': The State, which is the State of the ruling class, is neither public nor private; on the contrary, it is the precondition for any distinction between public and private" (Althusser, 2017: 51).

The main difference between the state's repressive and ideological apparatuses is that the former functions through violence and the latter by ideology. Each of the state apparatuses, whether repressive or ideological, functions both by violence and ideology. Althusser reminds us that there is no apparatus based entirely on violence or, on the contrary, solely on ideology. In his own words (Althusser, 2005: 52): "(Repressive) State Apparatus functions massively and predominantly by repression (including physical repression) while functioning secondarily by ideology... In the same way, but inversely, it is essential to say that for their part the Ideological State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by ideology, but they also function secondarily by repression, even if ultimately, but only ultimately, this is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic" (Althusser, 2014: 78). The point lies behind the question of which apparatus is preceded. Although they are based on physical violence, the repressive apparatuses cannot be independent of ideology. As in the example of the army and the police, these apparatuses include ideology in both their internal and external positions. The situation is the same for the ideological apparatuses too. Although the ideological state apparatuses are mostly based on ideology, they may apply to force. The main difference is that the violence used by ideological apparatuses is not thoroughly physical violence but a moderate, implicit, and symbolic one. Methods such as punishment and expulsion applied in public or private institutions within this apparatus can be given as examples of the pressure exerted by ideological apparatuses. Through such a distinction put forward by Althusser, it is understood that there are unceasingly explicit or implicit relations between the ideological apparatuses and repressive apparatuses.

Although ISAs are state apparatuses and they are less in number and unorganized than the repression apparatuses, they are at least as effective as the repressive ones. Because, for Althusser, they ideologically and implicitly provide the continuity of the bourgeois state. The ideological apparatuses are the basis of the bourgeois state order; they are the structure that allows the state ideology to penetrate society. Althusser believes that the state without concentrating on such issues can never be a powerful one (Batukan, 2018: 72).

The ideological structure plays a significant role in the power struggle. Althusser, who systematizes his theory through the path developed by Gramsci, tries to show this

significance through the ideological state apparatuses in ensuring legitimacy. In this respect, Althusser claims that “no class can hold State power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses” (2017: 53). We understand that what causes the change of power is the ideological apparatuses. For this reason, it is seen that “It is not the state power that must be destroyed but the state apparatus; specifically, it is the ideological apparatus of the state” (Batukan, 2018: 79).

From a broader perspective, it is possible to notice the relationship between hegemony and ideology in Stuart Hall's works. As stated by Hall, hegemony should be ensured by cultural leadership, not by coercion (Hall, 1999a: 119). For him, hegemony is not an endless process. Hegemony can be exercised in specific historical conjunctures. However, even a hegemonic power cannot completely include all the subordinated classes. In addition to the law, police, and army as the authoritative face of the state, hegemony is achieved through superstructure agents made up of the family, the education system, the church, the media, and other cultural institutions. In this way, Hall once again reminds us of the relationship between hegemony and the ideological apparatus of the state (Hall, 1999b: 223). In this context, we come to the point that one of the main functions of ideologies for Gramsci is the achievement of consent in the process leading to hegemony. And ensuring legitimacy through hegemonic power can only be achieved through ideological struggle.

The relationship of all these processes with Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony, and the effects of the phenomena in the social and cultural fields on power mechanisms has occupied political science and sociology after him and the most important development of this has been put forward by Althusser. For this reason, Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony and his association of the issue of culture of with the struggle for power cannot be explained without Althusser's ideas on ideological apparatuses. In this regard, power in the field of culture, where legitimacy can be ensured on much more specific levels, goes beyond the conventional perception of the political mechanism and takes the ‘social’ in the process more than ever before. It is clear that the struggle in the cultural field is preserved ideologically and that all the processes and actors in this relationship have an implicit ideological hold. It is now the time to identify these actors and principles.

2.3.2. The Principles of Hegemony Construction

We have been informed of what hegemony is in general terms up to now. The power to dominate cannot be achieved only by the mechanism of repression. Gramsci states that, in the process of seizing power, more instruments are required. And culture is the most important determinant in this process (Jones, 2006: 27). The function of ideology is also explained by Gramsci. Althusser seems to be fed by Gramscian theory, but he does not consider the question of culture as much as Gramsci. Therefore, Gramsci partially differs in that he does not reduce the notion of culture to pure ideology. Ideology is extremely important for Gramsci, but it should not be equated to hegemony as a whole. Hegemony is a much broader category. To understand this, it is useful to examine the principles that make up Gramsci's hegemony construction.

Gramsci reveals the uniqueness of his theory of hegemony by examining the aspects of it that he believes to be as effective as the phenomena itself. Rather than the visible components of power, he assigns some specific principles to the struggle for power. The construction and maintenance of hegemony are based on some determinants. Within the scope of the political sphere, Gramsci removes the condition of obtaining power from traditional methods and places it on a new, albeit complex ground (Lears, 1985: 570). His ideas, accepted as almost revolutionary for the existing political mechanism, highlight that culture is one of the actors of politics.

The role of culture in the acquisition of power may even complicate Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony, just as we have seen in describing the nature of culture. For this reason, it seems useful to examine the main principle to eliminate any kind of ambiguity. The relationship between hegemony and culture, the relationship between hegemony and ideology, and the values attributed to all these relationalities in the political sphere cannot be meaningful without examining the principles that make up the analysis of hegemony.

With its simplest formula (hegemony = coercion + consent), Gramsci's political leadership is the cultural hegemony established not only by coercion but also through consent (Gramsci, 1978: 55, 80, 171, 263). At this point, the most significant point can be listed as the manufacture of consent, the importance of educational institutions, and the role of intellectuals in the process of achieving consent. Under this title, these three are discussed as the main principles of hegemony analysis. They are considered the key elements to

understand the formula in question. Gramsci's hegemony may become clear when all these principles are detailed with each other. First of all, examining the manufacture of consent, the necessity of this consent issue in the name of hegemony; considering the differences in the manufacture of hegemony between active consent and passive consent is believed to be significant.

2.3.2.1.The Manufacture of Consent

In the light of Gramscian hegemony, power is not the result of a purely political society. It is necessary to establish domination beyond the traditional methods, integrating into social and cultural processes. Since the mechanism of force alone is not sufficient, the manufacture of consent is considered essential by Gramsci. Bates expressed this in the following: “The basic premise of the theory of hegemony is one with which few would disagree: that man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas” (Bates, 1975: 351). We see that coercion and consent become a synthesis in Gramscian theory.

Gramsci refers to the dominance of a certain class through hegemony. This domination also includes the obedience of other classes. The submission is achieved not fully by force but to a significant degree by consent. It is a very significant means of constructing hegemony and provides the continuation of it for Gramsci. In this regard, Gramsci claims that thoughts and institutions emerge only with consent, not through the direct intervention of the sovereign. For him, consent is by far the most effective means of domination, when compared to force. Hegemony is characterized by the reduction of the use of force, depending on the degree of consent.

Calling Gramsci “the consent theorist”, Buci-Glucksmann (2012: 130), asserts that Gramsci does not only distinguish between coercion and consent but also, he relates the two to each other. Coercion and consent may seem to balance each other in a fair relationship. But the only condition of power exercised in a “standard” way is that it should rest on the majority of consent. While consent serves to power, power in turn opens the way to the manufacture of consent. At this point, hegemony is regarded as a strategy aimed at achieving the active consent of the masses in all areas, from civil society to the factory, from school to family.

A fundamental distinction for Gramsci comes to the fore. That is how consent is built. He classifies the manufacture of consent as either actively or passively (Jula, 1986: 178-182). Active or passive, both types of consent can serve the existence of hegemony in different ways. Gramsci states that consent can be either active/direct or passive/indirect. The first is the self-determination of consent, leading up to the accession of power. The second one is about the consent caused by the legitimacy of power through legal rules, norms, and ideological values (Buci-Glucksmann, 2012: 122-128).

Having various characteristics, this basic distinction between the two also shows us some more details about the nature of politics. Active consent is provided directly by the organization of the masses, whereas passive consent is provided indirectly. Therefore, the passive one is often not based on democracy from Gramscian perspective. Active consent gives priority to hegemonic leadership; however, the passive version is based on statist sovereignty. Active consent, under spontaneity, is expansionist and democratic; on the other hand, passive consent is partly repressive and bureaucratic. The active consent excludes any bureaucratic relationship between the rulers and the ruled along with the reduction of democracy to this legal aspect alone. Active consent is popular and democratic, while passive consent presupposes passive revolution (Jones, 2006: 58, 99, 124). From the meaning Gramsci attributes to passive consent, it is obvious to deduce why consent must be active to construct hegemony.

Gramsci conceptualizes a new phenomenon, *the passive revolution*, in the process of explaining his issue of consent. Gramsci associates passive revolution with an obligatory process of manufacture of consent. It is important in elaborating the passive consent. As stated by Gramsci, when the hegemony of the ruling class is weakened by the challenges of the rising powers from civil society, the ruling class tries to maintain its power with different strategies such as "passive revolution" (1978: 210). Passive revolutions are carried out from above, without the participation of the masses, by successive small waves of reforms or interventions.

Showstack Sassoon asserts that Gramsci applies passive revolution for the constant reorganization of state power and the protection of this power over the majority of society by a small number of people. He also applies this phenomenon to show the relationship he establishes with society to prevent the masses from maintaining control over politics and the economy (Showstack Sassoon, 2012: 137). In this regard, passive revolution does not lead

to social transformation; rather it functions as a mechanism strengthening the hegemony of the sovereigns. Gramsci thinks that the proletariat cannot transform society through passive revolution. The proletariat can do so if only it prepares a program developing the system of alliances under its hegemony (Showstack Sassoon, 2012: 152-153). The hegemonic strategy of the proletariat to win the majority of consent can only be a "counter-passive revolution". And this should be based on what Gramsci calls active consent.

In Gramsci's circumstances, it is vital to achieving active or direct consent from all (Buci-Glucksmann, 2012: 119). The rule of the hegemon can only be expansionist. A movement that ensures continuity, moving from the bottom to the top may only provide cohesion in society. Along with the distinction Gramsci has made in explaining the manufacture of consent, he emphasizes the importance of active consent for hegemony. Only in this way, the domination may occur spontaneously and be permanent.

Hegemony is not a given and permanent phenomenon, as stated by Hall. Therefore, it must be actively achieved and consolidated (Hall, 1999b: 223). Active consent, to some extent, covers the legal and legitimate force. In the manufacture of this form of consent, there equate the interests of a single class or power bloc with the interests of the majority (Hall, 1999a: 121). For Gramsci, this has to do with the superstructures. At the state level, particular interests can be represented as general interests in which all have an equal voice.

The necessity for the power mechanism to achieve consent as well as coercion, turns out to be the primary condition of hegemonic domination (Jones, 2006: 49-52; Lears, 1985: 568). At this stage, as one of the most important determinants of the construction of hegemony, the manufacture of active consent takes place with the introduction of some other tools. These can be examined as the education and the contribution of the educated class to the process. The education issue is the other significant reference Gramsci applies in the cultural field. Not only the manufacture of active consent to make this manufacturing process sustainable but also education is given great importance by Gramsci. It is now useful to examine this issue as the other principle of the analysis of hegemony.

2.3.2.2. The Education

In the way to establish hegemony, education is one of the most important instruments for Gramsci. What makes the education issue different is that it has turned from a mechanism

of knowledge construction and transmission into an implicit consent construction tool in power relations (Manojan, 2019: 126). This highly effective aspect of education, both through educational institutions and actors (Gramsci conceptualizes as intellectuals), enables us to examine it in more detail as a principle of the analysis of hegemony. Trying to understand the education issue before passing through intellectuals is also important to perceive the important role Gramsci has given to them.

As Gramsci himself lived in fascist Italia and was able to observe the policies of the period (and even became a victim of the fascist regime), the political climate he was exposed to was extremely influential in shaping his thoughts (Cloud, 2020: 835). Therefore, Gramsci's ideas on the education issue cannot be considered independently of his history. Mussolini adopted a system of education, based on a form of 'instruction' rather than 'education'. It developed a wide-ranging critique of the existing school system. The system was based on educativity and active education as put forward by Giovanni Gentile, Mussolini's minister of education (Gramsci, 1978: 162). It can be understood that in Mussolini's Italy, the main purpose of education was to indoctrinate the masses through the principles of fascist power.

Gramsci's emphasis on education and his subsequent in-depth theses on intellectuals is due to his discovery of how the fascist administration of his time progressed on this phenomenon (Monasta, 1993: 598). For this reason, the idea that 'each level of education is essentially political' surrounds him. Gramsci's aim in his writings on education is to reveal the character of the political mechanism behind the education issue. He focuses on the political face of the issue without ignoring the relationship between the organization of education and culture. His ideas on education are merely shaped by the relations between education and class, vocationalism, the ideology of education, and the comprehensive school (Gramsci, 1978: 162-164). For him, the crisis of the organization of education is one aspect of the largely more comprehensive crisis at the political level. Because of all this, Gramsci assumes that education indirectly occupies a very critical place in the maintenance of power.

The basis of Gramsci's ideas on education is shaped by the education of Mussolini period, as mentioned above. "The Gentile reform school intended professional and religious instruction for workers, to forge ethical-political passivity in them; hence much of the criticism directed at it by Gramsci" remarks Martins (2021: 11). Stating, "It is not entirely true that 'instruction' is something quite different from 'education'", Gramsci identifies the

relationship of education with the political sphere. “For instruction to be wholly distinct from education, the pupil would have to be pure passivity, a “mechanical receiver of abstract notions—which is absurd and is anyway “abstractly” denied by the supporters of pure educativity precisely in their opposition to mere mechanistic instruction... But the child’s consciousness is not something “individual” (still less individuated), it reflects the sector of civil society in which the child participates and the social relations which are formed within his family, his neighbourhood, his village, etc” (Gramsci, 1978: 179). We see that education cannot unilaterally take the individual as passive. Therefore, Gramsci draws attention to the necessity of considering any person as a result of existing social and cultural relations.

Regarding Gramsci's basic motto that he describes how education should be organized, Fontana asserts that every relation of hegemony is also an educational one and all education is essentially political (Fontana, 2013: 69). Based on the idea, it once again becomes obvious that the issue of education is political. Fontana explains this by including Gramsci's thoughts in his writings as follows; "The relationship between teacher and student is an active relationship of mutual interaction. Every teacher is a student and every student is a teacher" (Fontana, 2013: 207). The relationship between the educator and student should not be passive, but rather be active; affectionately respecting the physical, biological, and moral development of the students individually (Martins, 2021: 13). Therefore, every hegemony relationship is necessarily based on an educational basis, shaped by socio-cultural conditions.

The control mechanisms of the reconciliation of power has a wide structure organized by cultural institutions such as school, family, church, newspaper, and association. All these introduce internalized submission to the exploited classes through the ideologies. Emphasizing that education is the most important one among them, Gramsci draws attention to the active role of both educational institutions and intellectuals. At his point, it is once again useful to discuss the issue of education in Althusser. Because, among the eight ideological state apparatuses Althusser believes to be the most effective is the educational ISA (Nalbantoğlu, 2018: 43).

“I believe I have good reasons for thinking that behind the scenes of its political Ideological State Apparatus, which occupies the front of the stage, what the bourgeoisie has installed as its number-one, i.e. as its dominant Ideological State Apparatus, is the educational apparatus, which has replaced in its functions the previously dominant

Ideological State Apparatus, the Church. One might even add: the School-Family couple has replaced the Church-Family couple” remarks Althusser (2005: 123). From what he asserts, we can see that, behind the game played by the political ISA in the foreground, the bourgeoisie brings the school apparatus as the dominant ideological state apparatus and the school takes place the functions of the formerly dominant church/religious ISA (Backer, 2022: 3). The role of the dominant ideological apparatus of the state, the Church has now been taken over by the School apparatus. "One Ideological State Apparatus certainly has the dominant role, although hardly anyone lends an ear to its music: it is so silent! This is the School." (Althusser, 2017: 60-61). Elsewhere he remarks:

“It takes children from every class at infant-school age, and then for years, the years in which the child is most ‘vulnerable’, squeezed between the Family State Apparatus and the Educational State Apparatus, it drums into them, whether it uses new or old methods, a certain amount of ‘know-how’ wrapped in the ruling ideology (French, arithmetic, natural history, the sciences, literature) or simply the ruling ideology in its pure state (ethics, civic instruction, philosophy)” (Althusser, 2017: 61).

Explaining how the bourgeois state has made the school ISA a part of its power and thus made education dominant in capitalist societies, Althusser points out the dominant authority that creates groups of people dependent on itself throughout their whole education life (Backer, 2022: 56-57). The school, for Althusser, is the most appropriate place where this implicit indicator can be made. At the same time, it is also the most suitable one for making the ideology of the ruling classes influenced by the ruled:

“The mechanisms which produce this vital result for the capitalist regime are naturally covered up and concealed by a universally reigning ideology of the School, universally reigning because it is one of the essential forms of the ruling bourgeois ideology: an ideology which represents the School as a neutral environment purged of ideology (because it is ...lay), where teachers respectful of the ‘conscience’ and ‘freedom’ of the children who are entrusted to them (in complete confidence) by their ‘parents’ (who are free, too, i.e. the owners of their children) open up for them the path to the freedom, morality and responsibility of adults by their own example, by knowledge, literature and their ‘liberating’ virtues” (Althusser, 2017: 63).

Schools contribute to the survival of ideological representation. On the surface, each teacher fills students with the basic information their curriculum requires. However, this is not an ideology-free space. Teachers become important actors of the rulers (Backer, 2022: 58). Therefore, the school ISA is an important source to perceive these implicit methods of power apparatuses.

Within the scope of the relationship between politics and education, Gramsci writes that; “The more extensive the ‘area’ covered by education and the more numerous the ‘vertical’ ‘levels’ of schooling, the more complex is the cultural world, the civilization, of a particular state” (1978: 143). He reveals the mutual interaction of culture on education and educational institutions on culture in the context of hegemonic power. He extends to explaining the position of intellectuals, as another principle that he considers as much important as educational institutions. Gramsci doesn’t consider the education issue independent of the role of intellectuals. The position of intellectuals has been so important for Gramsci that he conceptualizes his theory within the distinction between organic and traditional intellectuals. Following the explanation of education in culture and power relations, it is now ready to focus on intellectuals.

2.3.2.3.Organic and Traditional Intellectuals

The education issue and intellectuals are interrelated subjects in the examination of Gramscian hegemony. Intellectuals are as important as the education issue for Gramsci for the construction of hegemony. Within the scope of their initiative, the (organic) intellectuals have a significant role in ensuring social and cultural hegemony. Evaluating in two categories, Gramsci explains the functions of intellectuals in detail.

From the very first passage he deals with intellectuals, Gramsci’s views on this subject are clear. All individuals are potential intellectuals since each person has the capacity (Nieto-Galan, 2011: 457). Gramsci does not consider intellectuals as a separate social category. Every social group may have a distinctive intellectual category of its own. The critical point comes out in distinguishing the form of intellectual. Although every individual has the potential to become an intellectual, not everyone can have this title in terms of their social function. “All men are intellectuals, one could say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals” (Gramsci, 1978: 140). Gramsci’s “starting point is famous that ‘all men are intellectuals’, but he qualifies this by arguing that only a minority of people can

function as intellectuals within any given society. By this, he means that there is no particular characteristic that unifies intellectual activities as opposed to practical ones since manual tasks also have a creative and thinking dimension. Instead, the meaning of being an intellectual is generated by the 'complex [or structure] of social relations' at a historical moment, within which some practices are privileged as being intellectual, while others are relegated to the status of common sense or practical knowledge" (Jones, 2006: 81). The qualification of being an intellectual is applied to certain segments of the given society. And thus, under this title, the distinguishment of these intellectuals is evaluated.

The intellectual is the person who tries to exercise his/her intelligence and analytical thinking systematically. Defining the concept, Mannheim thinks that not every individual who has intelligence directly turns into an intellectual. For him, an intellectual is the sufficiency of one to comprehend the social structure of human thoughts and actions, and his closeness with social history. The most important aspect for an intellectual is to see all actions and thoughts, either ordinary or extraordinary, in their particular forms. This provides the intellectual with multiple perceptions of daily problems. He cannot overcome the problems he encounters from a single point of view. He looks at the problems of his age from several perspectives. The intellectual is mainly motivated by the training he is equipped with (Mannheim, 2017: 36; 138).

It is seen that the intellectual is not the most intelligent person in his society, rather he/she is the person who has a strong cognitive ability. The intellectual, within the scope of hegemony, is the person whose ideas pioneer society. His/her deep analyses and ability to think broadly makes him/her contribute to the hegemonic construction process (Ives, 2004: 75). Therefore, we see that the intellectual to establish and maintain hegemony is not a person who directly enlightens society. It is Gramsci himself who holds the intellectual responsible for social facts and imposes duties on him/her in the struggle for hegemony (Lears, 1985: 578).

Before explaining the distinction between traditional and organic intellectuals, Gramsci addresses the differences between intellectuals as rural and urban. In other words, he examines his traditional/organic distinction between the urban and rural categories. In the first step of his distinction, Gramsci (1978: 148) emphasizes that; "Intellectuals of the urban type have grown up along with industry and are linked to its fortunes. Their job is to articulate the relationship between the entrepreneur and the instrumental mass and to carry

out the immediate execution of the production plan decided by the industrial general staff, controlling the elementary stages of work.” The intellectual of the rural type, with a different living standard from that of an average peasant, on the other side, “are for the most part ‘traditional’, that is they are linked to the social mass of country people and the town (particularly small-town) petite bourgeoisie, not as yet elaborated and set in motion by the capitalist system. This type of intellectual brings into contact the peasant masses with the local and state administration (lawyers, notaries, etc.).”

As stated by Gramsci, the intellectual is divided into two groups by social and cultural means: “Intellectuals in the functional sense fall into two groups. In the first place, there are the ‘traditional’ professional intellectuals, literary and scientific, whose position in the interstices of society has a certain inter-class aura about it but derives ultimately from past and present class relations and conceals an attachment to various historical class formations. The most typical of these categories of intellectuals is that of the ecclesiastics who for a long time (for a whole phase of history, which is partly characterized by this very monopoly) held a monopoly of several important services: religious ideology, that is the philosophy and science of the age, together with schools, education, morality, justice, charity, good works, etc. Secondly, there are the ‘organic’ intellectuals, the thinking and organizing element of a particular fundamental social class. These organic intellectuals are distinguished less by their profession, which may be any job characteristic of their class, than by their function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they organically belong” (Gramsci, 1978: 131).

Within the scope of Gramsci's classification, the traditional intellectuals, are those who have been doing the same thing for generations in society. They may be the leading or professional groups of society. They may be professionals such as teachers, administrators, and priests, who address a certain group. On the other hand, organic intellectuals are a unique group functioning in the struggle for hegemony. They are effective in providing power and control, guiding society with their broad perspectives, and developing relations with certain classes or organizations (Said, 1995: 22).

With his distinction between the traditional and organic intellectuals in the struggle for hegemony, Gramsci highlights the importance of one of the groups as mostly contributing to the maintenance of power socially and culturally. For him, organic intellectuals have a greater position than traditional intellectuals in the construction of

hegemony (Jones, 2006: 81-90). Bringing the organic intellectual to the fore is due to the intellectual's effort to make perfection in society within a certain circle of comprehension, far from all established and traditional perceptions. The development of culture itself is effective in the emergence of the intellectual. The phenomenon of culture along with its relation to power influences this process. An organic intellectual is one who has a close and sincere relationship with the public and he/she is not isolated from the social and cultural needs of his society (Gramsci, 1988: 301).

Apart from traditional/organic intellectual distinction, Gramsci has also another conceptualization: “the democratic philosopher”. The democratic philosopher is a teacher whose knowledge can turn him into an organic intellectual. This may happen under the influence of the environment (Fontana, 2013: 69). In essence, the democratic philosopher is an important sign showing that the organic intellectual does not necessarily have to be naturally born, it may come out later with some social conditions. The democratic philosopher can get rid of the general form of his society, become democratized, go beyond ideology, and can come into contact with culture more, which turns him into an organic intellectual in the process.

From all these distinctions and conceptualizations, it is possible to see how much importance Gramsci gives to the organic intellectual in the context of hegemony. Organic intellectuals are important since they highly contribute to the process of accession to power, which is ensured through the manufacture of active consent. Organic intellectuals are not transferred from generation to generation, but they are naturally created in the social and cultural norms (Jones, 2006: 85). For Gramsci, they are willing to participate in the struggle for hegemony. Through the knowledge of society and politics, organic intellectuals contribute to this struggle. As stated by Hall, “It is the job of the organic intellectual to know more than the traditional intellectuals do: really know, not just pretend to know . . . to know deeply and profoundly” (Hall, 2005: 268).

Considering the intellectual as an actor independent of class, Gramsci's following description seems perfectly reasonable: “The intellectuals are the dominant group's ‘deputies’ exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government” (Gramsci, 2014: 34). Therefore, we understand that the intellectual has a direct impact on the political and economic life. Even though he/she is classless, the organic intellectual is not autonomous. Unlike the traditional intellectuals asserting themselves as autonomous and

independent of the dominant social group, the organic intellectuals are bound to society. This effectiveness associates the organic intellectual with society and culture (Ives, 2004: 76). Gramsci's definition of the organic intellectual as "he must be an organizer of masses of men; he must be an organizer of the 'confidence' of investors in his business, of the customers for his product, etc." (Gramsci, 2014: 135), here, reveals what is mentioned.

Gramsci lists the duties of the intellectuals as performing subordinate functions of social hegemony and political government. These functions comprise firstly "the 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group;" and secondly "the apparatus of state coercive power which 'legally' enforces discipline on those groups who do not 'consent' either actively or passively." (1978: 145).

As is seen from the general tone of this part, Gramsci is so much concerned with the intellectuals. Since he regards the intellectuals as the maker of hegemony, thanks to their knowledge about society and relations with it, he deals with the issue from a broad perspective. From the very first attempts of him on Italian fascist history and politics, he introduces the distinction between the intellectual issue as traditional and organic and puts forward the latter as the real one.

As a final word on this broad hegemony topic, we can say that the problem of hegemony has been discussed together with many other aspects. The position of culture, as a significant output of the contemporary period, has been one outstanding of them. Before analysing hegemony, the issue of culture at the conceptual level is examined. Its turning into a political factor is also analysed historically. Hegemony emerges as one of the most important constructions in the context of the culture-power relationship. Although it emerges as a leftist concept, Gramsci's hegemony has been used as a source of reference by many. It is considered important to make an examination specific to Gramsci since he is the person who introduces the concept of cultural hegemony in political science terminology.

Considering that the power struggle is at the centre of politics and specific rules are followed there, it becomes equally difficult to make a hegemony-based analysis. How the cultural struggle is carried out even makes the analyses in question gain a much more abstract form. The determinants and processes of the struggle for power in the cultural sphere are not

clear. It is an unambiguous effort, unlike the one in the political field. In this respect, the cultural struggle becomes meaningful, especially through Gramsci's hegemony.

The analysis of Gramscian hegemony, independent of its economic context, is based on the relationship between culture and power in this study. As we may see in the coming chapters of the study, the issue of power in early republican Turkey is built on a cultural basis rather than an inter-class one. Interpreted in terms of Turkey, it is observed that the struggle for power has some cultural aspects. In the early republican history of Turkey, the relationship between culture and politics remained together with factors based more on nationalism and nation-building. That's why cultural construction has gained a form of citizen construction during the reforms of the Republican era.

After the conceptual framework necessary for the analysis of culture construction is completed, the issue of culture in the nation-building process, as the last stage to be applied to the theoretical part of this study, is now introduced. The coming title seems critical in terms of some aspects of the study unique to Turkey's modernization history. Apart from the key concepts examined so far, a cultural construction analysis specific to Turkey cannot be considered independently of the citizen construction process. And this is thoroughly related to the nation-building process. Therefore, the last title of the conceptual framework of this study now provides the relationship between nationalism and culture.

2.4. Culture in Nation Building Process

Along with the fact that nationalism is one of the most critical ideologies, it is too comprehensive to be a sub-title of a study. It is not acceptable to enclose nationalism into a single title, as an ideology that has always preserved its vitality and reproduced itself. With the presumption of all these, this title deals with the process of national construction rather than the ideology of nationalism. Mainly, it is aimed to examine culture within the scope of the nation-building process.

The concept of cultural nationalism is thought to be functional in the first stage. It argues that factors such as a common language, cultural traditions, and a common understanding of history are determinative in the formation of national elements rather than race or ethnicity. This approach has a moderate tone within nationalist ideologies (Nielsen, 1999: 119-130). Cultural nationalism, mostly applied within the scope of the independence

struggles, is important in terms of revealing the active role assigned to the issue of culture, which Williams classifies as idealist, especially in the nation-building process.

“Nations are not inherent in things and political adaptations of the natural species doctrine; nor the fate of national states, ethnic or cultural groups. They are cultures that actually exist; cultures that often live in indeterminate groups, mingling, overlapping, intermingling. On the other hand, there are often, but not always, political units of all shapes and sizes. In the past, the two, culture and politics, did not quite coincide. The rulers defined their identities by separating themselves from the lower strata, while the small governed communities differentiated themselves from similar neighbouring units at the same level. However, nationalism is not the awakening and assertion of these mythical, natural and alleged units. Although nationalism, on the contrary, explicitly uses the cultural, historical and other legacies of the pre-nationalist world as raw material, it is actually the crystallization of new units suitable for new conditions” (Gellner, 1983: 49).

The quoted words of Gellner exactly explain why we have added this title to the study. Since we cannot think the culture and power relations without nationalism, it is a brief initiative to consider culture in the nation-building process.

The study, so far, has tried to understand the meaning of culture from a conceptual framework. The position of culture in the political mechanism as a struggle has been examined within the framework of Gramscian hegemony. As we understand so far, in the analysis of culture in politics, it is not possible to ignore the nationalist elements. It is impossible not to consider the issue of culture in the light of national construction, especially for a cultural building study that takes place in the experience of Turkey.

The process that Turkey has gone through in the scope of its modernization process includes unique aspects. In shaping the theoretical background, the effect of the culture-politics relationship on the formation of Turkish national culture, in addition to culture and hegemony, also occupies an important place. Since the elements of nationalism contain cultural elements within themselves, there is an extremely organic relationship between the two. However, it is the dynamics of the modernization experience that makes this situation critical for Turkey. Therefore, this title is believed to be meaningful in the understanding of the culture-building process, especially for the example of early republican Turkey.

This part of the study, a step to be taken to understand the outcomes of early republican politics in Turkey, mainly aims to contribute to the theoretical background of the study in general terms. It can provide an infrastructure for the policies of the early republic, which is discussed in detail in the following chapters. At this point, the meeting pots of nationalism and culture are determined hereafter. Rather than focusing on the ideology itself, the cultural elements affecting nationalism are handled.

Perception of the role of culture in the process of constructing citizens makes it necessary to review a brief history of the ideology of nationalism, under the modernist frame. Therefore, a significant part of this chapter covers the relationship between modernism and nationalism. In this regard, Ernest Gellner who is believed to be pioneering the nationalist ideology in the 20th century constitutes our main source. Focusing on nationalism not as a spontaneous expression of a cultural locality, but as the construction of the nation-state, Gellner's theory seems to be meaningful as one of the references of this part.

2.4.1. Nationalism and Culture: The Construction of National Culture

The issue of nations is regarded as a current matter. And national cultures represent a new paradigm in the study of culture, that is, a radically new approach (Hofstede, 1980). Culture occupies a critical place in the nationalist discourse of the modern age. The formation of national culture is the specific result of this significant position. With its various determinants, culture has been an essential factor in the formation and maintenance of national elements. The most fundamental aspect distinguishing a national community from others is culture. It would be misleading to consider the national construction process without mentioning the phenomenon of culture.

The structure of national culture is complex by its nature, referring to a variety of aspects. Under this title, the construction of national culture is discussed along with these aspects and its impacts on the perception of a given nation. Arguing that rather than race and ethnicity, the factors such as common language and cultural traditions shared by a certain group of people on a historical basis are the determinants of the process of national formation, the national culture identifies a critical turn in both the course of nationalism and the political meaning of culture. In line with this, Robbins (1990) defines national culture as the core system of values and practices that characterize a country. With national culture,

Hofstede points to a collective national feature that helps individuals in their programs of cultural thought (1981: 15).

It might make sense to start with how culture is considered by nationalism. As stated by Öğün, "Nationalists do not perceive culture objectively as a world of activities, they develop a position against nature. Even if culture is accepted in its objective sense, in the final analysis, it is spiritualized and a strict moral formation" (Öğün, 2000: 17). In this respect, it can be argued that nationalism applies the issue of culture through much more symbolic elements. The elements may be symbolic, but the process of creating national culture shows itself in various activities. The construction process is sought precisely in the cultural aspect. It includes these symbolic elements in which certain forms of behaviour are institutionalized.

Dividing cultures into two groups national and organizational cultures, Hofstede defines the concept as "the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others... Culture includes system of values; and values are among the building blocks of culture... In the center is a system of societal norms, consisting of value systems shared by major group of population" (1980: 21-22). For him, culture is mainly a collective phenomenon. It is usually used for tribes or ethnic groups in anthropology, for nations in political science and sociology; and for organizations management. His definition of culture gives significant clues about the nature of national culture for the study of political science. As supposed by Hofstede, people share a common national character representing their cultural programs mentally. The expectations, perceptions, values, beliefs, assumptions, and behaviours of the group are shaped accordingly: "When people write about national cultures in the modern world becoming more similar, the evidence cited is usually taken from the level of practices: people dress the same, buy the same products, and use the same fashionable words (symbols); they see the same television shows and movies (heroes); they engage in the same sports and leisure activities (rituals). These relatively superficial manifestations of culture are sometimes mistaken for all there is; the deeper, underlying level of the values, which moreover determine the meaning for people of their practices, is overlooked. Studies at the values level continue to show impressive differences among nations" (Hofstede, 2010: 347).

As claimed also by Bourdieu, national culture is a system including semiotic codes effective on the practices of the individual. It has a clear advantage over other group cultures.

Nation and national culture have been the centre of the nation-state as the dominant pattern of the political organization. It is a form of group belonging whose simplicity is least questioned (except the family) (Bourdieu, 1996: 19-26). As a response to shared past, values, and habits, culture constitutes the collective experience of a particular group. In this sense, Bourdieu refers to culture as a semiotic pattern. Assuming that the most basic actions are based on group affiliations determined by social factors (Bourdieu, 2015: 162), it is very likely to place culture at the core of nationalist formations. And national culture comes out as a set of symbolic systems that define the nation.

“Every nationalism is born out of the tension or struggle with another culture it identifies as more or less foreign to itself” (Öğün, 2000: 17). The fact that one community is different from another is one of the prerequisites for its existence. Culture can offer alienation as a system of distinction towards others and promote cooperation in itself. The complex nature of culture is encountered in the formation of national cultures as well. While culture serves unity and belonging among a certain group, it causes separation and differentiation from other groups thanks to the same aspect.

Considering culture at the national level, it is observed that political power nationalizes culture through certain mechanisms. This is what makes the phenomenon of culture so critical within the scope of nationalism. The process, of the legalization of the national culture through political power, may involve bureaucratic actions such as simplification of language and standardization of education (Öğün, 2000: 15). These constitute the visible, legal, and formal aspects of political power. On the other side, there are some other activities, not visible but prompted by the government in the nationalization process of culture. This process functions through symbolic means such as the construction of collective memory, and the formation of the national sense of ethics and national myths.

National culture, thus, can be defined as the instrument of a group belonging, constructed by political power. It reveals a set of dispositions. Putting scientific customs such as history, geography, law, or statistics into a certain form; national culture also provides legitimacy to the power mechanism (Hofstede, 2010: 45-46). We can expand this power mechanism with the term, *power distance* described by Hofstede as “the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. Institutions are the basic elements of society, such as the family, the school, and the community; organizations are the places where people

work” (Hofstede, 2010: 61). And it affects “the degree of centralization of the control and decision-making structure and the importance of the status of the negotiators” (2010: 400). This scope is important in understanding the relationship between national culture and power mechanism.

Öğün addresses some duties of the national culture as a part of the nationalist movement in the following words: “Cultural creativity must have developed over its previously national character and every new construction must recreate the facts about the national culture” (2000: 17). Although nationalism falls so deeply into the culture, it does not consider culture as an autonomous field. There are certain points that nationalism distinguishes itself. These require creativity that compels the national culture to be a missionary. Nationalism demands certain values. It fulfils spreading the national spirit of the culture and make it victorious in fierce competition with others.

The most important function of national culture in the maintenance of national spirit appears in the linguistic field. For many of the nationalists, the main aspect of national culture is language. Therefore, in this missionary title, what nationalists attribute as the dominant factor through which the national culture should be integrated is language. Each of the above-mentioned indicators and symbols is essential. However, a common language offers the most natural method of describing a community in historical and social means. It also causes any community to differ from others. Defining nations as a cultural entity, rather than a biological or ethnic form, Herder (2004: 119) indicates that the traditions and desires of any nation are the results of the language of their collective aspirations.

All other symbols, material and spiritual elements of the national culture can only become meaningful with language. Cooperating with language, they all contribute to the organic unity of the community. It is Herder who emphasizes the importance of language in terms of national culture. In addition, Herder's relating culture with civilization reveals his ideas on the organic formation of societies. Herder argues that societies and cultures are the results of certain historical contexts and necessities. And here, the language is one of the most important indicators. It is not only for the formation of a nation but also for the survival of the nation, language is of great importance. Any community with historical unity and a language of its own carries the basic characteristics of being a nation. And the nation may continue to exist if only the common language is preserved. Language makes nations share a common imagination, certain orientations, and intellectual goals. Without language, none

of the national elements matter. Therefore, every single person should preserve their language as its most sacred piece (Herder, 2004: 119).

The aforementioned impact of culture on the formation of nations as well as the maintenance of the national spirit has caused a new expansion in nationalism studies. It also has made the issue of culture get a position at the centre of nationalist formations. As we have seen, culture, placed at the centre of nationalism within certain conditions, has also partially changed the dimension of the debates on nationalism. The specific position of culture following the modern age has contributed to the reconstruction of nationalism itself. In this respect, it seems meaningful to focus on the studies of nationalism through the relationship between culture and nationalism. Explaining this process regarding Ernest Gellner, who has a critical role in the analysis of culture-centred national construction with his conceptualizations, seems significant. It is also believed to be meaningful to see how the comprehensive studies of nationalism and studies on citizen construction historically meet with culture.

2.4.2. The Relationship Between Modernization and Nationalism: Gellner's Theory of Nationalism

The modernist tradition in nationalism studies is mostly based on the idea that nationalism is a modern phenomenon that emerged following the 18th century. It is not due to the modernist theorists' claim that the national identity or national consciousness has come up only after this period; rather, they generally consider nationalism as a product of industrial and democratic processes (Gorski, 2000: 1428-1429). Despite the variations in the modernist understanding of nationalism, studies mostly agree on nationalism is a new phenomenon. Starting from here, the significant point behind the tradition of nationalism lies in the perception of culture in the modern era.

Culture as a determinant factor in nationalist perception has been partly a recent issue. It is turning into a part of nationalism studies and this is not simultaneous. Like the process of culture becoming politicized, the emergence of culture in nationalism studies has come out in the modern age. This part of the study begins with the assumption that the phenomenon of the nation does not have a historical depth. Its existence is based on mobility during the post-industrialization process. In Smith's words; "Nations are modern, as is nationalism, even when their members think they are very old and even when they are in

part created out of pre-modern cultures and memories. They have not been there all the time” (1997: 385). With the emphasis made on the development process of the word nation, Greenfeld (2016: 20-27) points out that nation comes from the Latin word *natio*, meaning something born. Although the nation's conceptual history is a long one, it has acquired its current meaning in the modern age.

Culture, nation-building, and identity have been the forefront fields of theoretical studies on nationalism. The development of theories of nationalism, especially after the second half of the 20th century, has contributed to the formation of an important field. Mainstream theories of nationalism have developed along a route composed of primordialism, modernism, and ethnosymbolism, all of which are extensions of the same school (Özkırmılı, 2010). Modernist theories have created a theoretical area extended by cultural studies and Ernest Ernest Gellner has become one of the leading figures of this area.

Ernest Gellner draws attention as being the person who has examined the historical depth of the phenomenon of the nation and put forward one of the most brilliant theses of modern times in social theory. Gellner's importance in nationalism studies is a great one. For Orkunoğlu, Gellner's views that "nations are an imagined political community" and that "nations are created by the state and nationalism" has had a striking effect on many, especially those nationalists, who regard the nation as an eternal entity (Orkunoğlu, 2018: 24). In O'Leary's expressions, Gellner's significant role is also revealed with the following words: “In numerous essays and four books, Ernest Gellner, as exceptionally brilliant, fluent, prolific and witty philosopher, anthropologist, sociologist and multilingual polymath provided lucid and persuasive accounts of why nationalism is a necessary component of modernity” (O'Leary, 1998: 40). Gellner's theory, as expressed by Özkırmılı “is generally considered the most important attempt to make sense of nationalism. The originality of his analysis is conceded even by his staunchest critics” (Özkırmılı, 2008: 160).

In the modernist philosophy, almost all “constructivist” theories share the argument that a general map of nationalisms and nations can be drawn through one grand theory (Özkırmılı, 2010: 197-198). Gellner's theory has been one of the first and most important examples of these. Gellner has influenced many theorists in various aspects. As in the field of social sciences by the 1960s, the increase in studies on culture has played a very significant role in the spread of modernist theses. In this regard, what Gellner has contributed is the idea that culture has a central position in the perception of differences among groups.

In Smiths' expressions, we see that Gellner wants to prove that nationalism is ultimately the result of modernity, the growth of society, industrialism, and its cultural prerequisites (Smith, 1996: 374). In Mouzelis' expressions, Gellner's focus is revealed once again "Gellner links nationalism, as a predominantly modern social construction, to two core features: industrialization and cultural homogeneity. Both these features create difficulties for Gellner's theory" (Mouzelis, 2007: 132). All these emphases have also made the nationalism issue critical for this study⁴.

Gellner brings a new perspective to the problem of nations and nationalism, which have hitherto been identified through identities. Although he accepts the given identity features, he claims that these are not sufficient to explain nationalism. The emphasis on nationalism lies in the construction of the nation-state (Gellner, 1994: 32). He takes the source of his theory from industrialized societies. Industrialization has not only led to economic growth in Europe but has also brought a form of social reorganization (Gellner, 2018: 76)⁵. The monotonous adventure of social movements which started in the 18th century has become fragmented with the change of social structure, in line with the development of the perception of technology-democracy, economic reasons, cultural and social satisfactions, specialized organizations, and globalization (Bingöl and Tanrıver, 2011: 140). From that on, nationalism has pointed to a construction process at the social and political levels.

Gellner defines the theory of nationalism as a modern political principle. This principle foresees a direct relation between the political and the national unit. "Nationalism

⁴ By his theory of nationalism, Ernest Gellner tries to define industrialization in the capitalist society. Since the existence of nations is only possible through the industrialization process, Gellner explains the theory of nationalism through the stages of industrialization. The main reason why Gellner has been chosen as a source of this study lies behind his explanation of this industrialization process by emphasizing the relation between culture and nationalism. Gellner bases his theory of nationalism on the sociological and cultural effects of industrial capitalism. He establishes a relationship between the inevitability of cultural homogenization in industrial society and nationalism. In the relationship between compulsory homogeneity and nationalism, nationalism does not give rise to compulsory homogeneity. On the contrary, a high cultural establishment brings nationalism (Gellner, 2018: 117). Seeing the compulsory existence of the state in the industrial society, Gellner deals with the evolution of the social order in the nation, taking the division of labour and expertise as a reference. Since the role of culture in the process is of great importance (Gellner, 2018: 80-84), he constitutes a significant source for this study.

⁵ Gellner's economic modernization, which is referred to as industrialization, is directly related to sociocultural modernization. Factors such as the growing division of labour, the exercise of management techniques, and the advancement of technology, which are mostly identified with the increasing economic transformation cannot be considered independently of factors such as secularization, the increase in literacy rate, the urbanization process, and the gradual weakening of traditional authority. A system in which a literate and unified culture is exercised effectively and education is not of a low standard is required. This can only be the state. In Özkırımlı's words; "This is what brings state and culture together: 'The imperative of exo-socialization is the main clue to why state and culture must now be linked, whereas in the past their connection was thin, fortuitous, varied, loose, and often minimal ... That is what nationalism is about' (Özkırımlı, 2018: 102).

is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state – a contingency already formally excluded by the principle in its general formulation – should not separate the power-holders from the rest" (Gellner, 1983: 71). In explaining his theory of nationalism, Gellner at the beginning also reveals the reason why he considers it in a modern framework. Since nationalism itself essentially corresponds to a modern political process, it has arisen as a result of sovereignty. He rejects the major theories of nationalism which claim that nationalism is natural, self-evident, and self-generating (O'Leary, 1997: 198).

In Gellner's theory, it is not possible to consider nationalism and the phenomenon of the nation independent of post-industrial developments. He asserts that nationalism is not the result of a gradual historical process where the idea of nationalism appeared in people's minds and later on, people created it. For him, nationalism is a product of modernity (Hobsbawm, 1983: 1). Gellner builds his thesis on the fact that nationalism is a modern formation and accordingly nations are created by nationalisms. The emergence of nationalism is not a coincidence but is followed by some historical processes. However, this historicity is bound to some conditions. In Gellner's opinion, if we want to learn when the nationalism and the nations, as the product of nationalism are born, we need to focus our attention on the industrial society, in which the state has become inevitable (cited by Ögün, 2000: 70). A similar approach on the idea that nationalism is a modern phenomenon is revealed by Smith in the following statements: "Modernists like myself believe that the world was created around about at the end of the eighteenth century and nothing before that makes the slightest difference on the issues we face" (Smith, 2017: 16). However, we also see that a former student of Gellner, Anthony D. Smith proposes a theoretical framework "bridging the gaps he noted within the modernist account on one hand, and correcting the flaws he considered inherent to primordialism on the other" (Mathieu and Bodet, 2019: 26). In his suggestion, Smith's main focus figures out that "modern nations cannot be understood without taking pre-existing ethnic components into account" (Özkırmı, 2008: 148).

As far as the genealogy of nations in Gellner is concerned, Smith states that Gellner focuses on two things: Firstly, nations are navel-less which means they don't have parents; and secondly even if they ever had, it's irrelevant. Nations in Gellner's perception begin *de novo*, in a brave new industrial world (Smith, 1996: 375). Gellner considers the phenomenon

of the nation as a result of the organization put forward by industrialization⁶. That's why he relates modern political processes with his theory of nationalism. "For Ernest, the genealogy of the nation is located in the requirements of modernity, not the heritage of pre-modern pasts. Ernest is claiming that nations have no parents, no pedigree, except the needs of modern society. Those needs can only be met by a mass, public, literate, specialized and academy-supervised culture, a 'high culture', preferably in a specific language which allows context-free communication" (Smith, 1996: 374). As claimed by Gellner, political organization in the pre-industrial, agricultural period is not provided by the state. There are several potential nations in the world; however, the place for a certain number of independent or autonomous political units in the world is limited. It is such a political organization determinant in the process of transforming into a nation (Gellner, 2016: 59-60). Therefore, in the simplest terms, Gellner's definition of nationalism goes through the state organization, which is also a modern product. There is a requirement for a modern form of administration that would establish the organization in the political sense. And Gellner calls it a state. The political unit in question may not necessarily be a state under all circumstances. However, Gellner best explains it through the modern state organization.

There comes the need for a general definition of state, to understand Gellner's definition of nationalism. Gellner focuses on Max Weber's point of view in his definition of the state. The state is described by Weber in his famous definition: "A state is human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (Weber, 1958: 78). Apart from providing the organization of the cooperation, the state's having monopoly on the use of force, to establish order, leads Gellner to refer to the state at this point. The organization of large industrial societies may not take place directly by itself. A higher authority may apply coercion or force. For the only power

⁶ Since we address Gellner's theory as an explanation of industrialism in general, we need to add how he differs from the theorists of his age both in the means of his nationalist ideas and his perceiving industrialism in the social and cultural context. In Smith's expressions, "The fact that Ernest took up the issues of nationalism in the 1960s and that he kept returning to them, when most social scientists were interested in Marxism, functionalism, phenomenology, indeed everything but nationalism, and the fact that he established a Centre for the Study of Nationalism in Prague devoted to research and latterly teaching in this field, demonstrates how thoroughly he appreciated the power, ubiquity and durability of nationalism", we may see it as a significant interpretation (Smith, 1996: 372). His building of the nationalist theory against the Marxists shows his uniqueness on this nationalism issue, which he directly tries to examine through a historical and economic phase - industrialization. His theory is not a challenge to Marxist views but also to those liberals as we see in O'Leary's words: "Marxists, who thought the future age of statelessness was also to be an age of nationlessness (when we were all expected to be classless and cultureless or perhaps monocultured in a multicultural way), have an affinity with liberal functionalists" (O'Leary, 1997: 210-211). This affinity makes Gellner's views unique and gives a vital meaning for this study as well.

that can use force is the state, the organization around a state, a fully centralized disciplinary institution or a group of institutions may be inevitable. Anderson agrees Gellner's idea on the state, as can be seen in the following expressions: "... the culture needs the state, and; the state probably needs the homogenous cultural branding of its flock. In brief, the mutual relationship of a modern culture and state is something quite new" (Anderson, 1992: 190).

Although Weberian state formation is mostly appropriate to modern society for Gellner, there may be some other units that have the monopoly of using violence but not to a legitimate degree. To elaborate on the state in understanding the modern societies Gellner refers to, we may continue with Weber's definition of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is already part of state organization. In modern society, the state has a highly developed division of social labour. It is even impossible to call a unit a state without the division of labour (Gellner, 2016: 61). The state symbolizes the specialization for the maintenance of order.

"Gellner's theory can be better understood within the context of a longstanding sociological tradition whose origins go back to Durkheim and Weber. The cardinal feature of this tradition is a distinction between 'traditional' and 'modern' societies (Lessnoff, 2007: 189). At this point, we may go through Gellner's explanation of the stages of industrialization, to understand his theory of nationalism. "Following in the footsteps of the founding fathers of sociology, Gellner posits three stages in human history: the hunter-gatherer, the agroliterate and the industrial" (Özkırımlı, 2008: 163-164). In Gellner's opinion, mankind has passed through three fundamental stages in history: These are pre-agrarian, agrarian, and industrial. "Gellner maintained that each of the three key phases is associated with characteristic modes of production, coercion, culture and cognition" (O'leary, 1997: 1999). The first one, hunter-gatherer societies are too small to have a political society that makes up the state. The need for an institution that would require specialization in these communities has never emerged. In the second group, agrarian societies, the organization of society is also far from establishing a state. Communities in these agricultural societies live inwardly. There is no concern for creating a homogeneous culture for such communities. A striking cultural diversity is witnessed in traditional agricultural communities (Öğün, 2000: 70). This has pushed the agricultural communities to have lots of administration units. And the state is not a common option among those forms. Smith emphasizes the position of pre-modern societies as follows: "It is important to stress here that pre-modern ethnies are not nations, whether in Ernest's definition of the nation, or mine" (Smith, 1996: 385-386).

The third stage of mankind has a significant position in Gellner's theory. For Gellner, in the post-agricultural, industrial era, the existence of the state rather than its absence is inevitable (Gellner, 2018: 76). The most basic factor that distinguishes the industrial society from the pre-modern societies is the division of labour and its organization. In agrarian societies, there is a division of labour. Conversely, in industrial societies, the organization of complex and continuous relations is by far the most important part of the administration. Industrial societies are enormously large-scale and they involve a highly complex division of labour (Gellner, 2016: 72). Therefore, cooperation is essential and is aimed at increasing efficiency in the industrial society. As Weber refers to this situation, pre-calculated objective foundations in a rational and legal framework need to be developed for this cooperation (Weber, 1996: 24-26). In the following statements of Mouzelis, it is also possible to find the difference between modern nations and pre-modern ones from a wider perspective: "There are some structural features which distinguish modern from premodern social formations. Among them are the destruction of segmental localism and the mobilization and inclusion of the whole population into the centre. This is achieved via the unprecedented and unmediated state penetration of the periphery. From this perspective nationalism can be conceptualized as a discourse by political elites trying to reduce the autonomy of local potentates and concentrate the means of production, of domination/violence and persuasion/education at the top" (Mouzelis, 2007: 137).

Gellner's nationalism, an important pillar of the cultural construction process in the modern era, takes its homogeneous structure mostly from a common language and a system of homogeneous education (Gellner, 2015: 5-6). It turns out that these two instruments are also fundamental elements for the legitimacy of the national organization of political power. Both language and education have gained their influence in industrial societies. They are important tools for the homogenization of large masses. In contrast to the cultural diversity seen in hunter-gatherer and agricultural societies, the social and cultural unit of people is a vital aspect of the industrial societies in the political struggle. In this regard, Gellner summarizes the general and main characteristics of industrial society as follows: "A modern society provides a very prolonged and fairly thorough training for all its recruits, insisting on certain shared qualifications: literacy, numeracy, basic work habits and social skills, familiarity with basic technical and social skills... The ideal of universal literacy and the right to education is a well-known part of the pantheon of modern values... All this suggests that the kind of education described – universal, standardized, and generic – really plays

some essential part in the effective working of a modern society, and is not merely part of its verbiage or self-advertisement... Universal literacy and a high level of numerical, technical and general sophistication are among its functional prerequisites. Its members are and must be mobile, and ready to shift from one activity to another, and must possess that generic training which enables them to follow the manuals and instructions of a new activity or occupation” (1983: 35; 113).

In his claim that “the problem of nationalism does not arise when there is no state”, Gellner (1983: 5) argues that nationalism can only come out in modern societies. He believes that, if there is no state, there is no problem with whether the borders coincide with the national borders or not. Here, Gellner’s relationship between nationalism and modernization becomes clearer. In other words, he puts a framework for why nationalism doesn’t emerge before modernization. In this context, it seems meaningful to determine the place of the nation in his definition of nationalism. This also allows us to see the relation Gellner has established with culture in this theory of nationalism. The nation is a modern phenomenon, as mentioned before. Any anthropologist can assert that tribes can organize without a state; yet in the modern era, it is not possible to imagine a community without a nation. Being a part of a nation is all about modernity. “Having a nation is not an inherent attribute of humanity, but it has now come to appear as such” (Gellner, 1983: 77). This is essentially the result of nationalism.

Gellner’s theory of nationalism is based on the idea that nationalisms create their nations as a result of modernization. Not every nation is created directly by nationalism, and some nations certainly emerge without affiliation with their state. Mill considers that the assimilation of smaller nations into more civilized larger nations is to some extent a requirement for progress and it is the best or only way of integrating them with the modern world (Mill, 1993: 395). What is decisive for Gellner here is culture (Gellner, 2016: 40). We see Gellner’s nation has two different contexts. The first is that “two man are of the same nation if and only they share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating.” And the second is “two man are of the same nation if and only they recognise each other as belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations maketh man; nations are the artefacts of men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities. A mere category of persons (say, occupants of a given territory, or speaker of a given language, for example) becomes a nation if and when

the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it" (Gellner, 1983: 78).

Gellner's theory of nationalism is bound to industrialization, concerning culture and social structure. "For Ernest, modernity introduces a radical cultural break" (Smith, 1996: 378). "For Gellner culture is the foundation of industrial society, not only something very important in an industrializing one" (Szporluk, 1998: 27). Gellner asserts that "modern man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture" (Gellner, 1983: 36). Gellner's most important contribution to modernist theory is his revealing the necessity of reinterpreting the relationship between culture and national identity. Following him, a large group of modernists have placed culture at the core of their theories and focused on the problem of defining the relationship between national culture and national identity (Özkırımlı, 2008: 161-163). The significant point behind the modernist views that place culture at the centre of nationalism theory is that in the modern era, those who desire to govern society could only be the people with the same thoughts. In accordance, these people want to get support from people with the same culture (Hobsbawn, 1992: 35).

In his emphasis on the issue of culture, Gellner considers it essential to question the function of culture for nations rather than defining it in the formal sense. Regarding the normative position of culture against its anthropological position, Gellner essentially associates culture with the notion of creation in his thesis on nationalism. The will to organize the increasing growth in post-modern societies is a matter of establishing a cultural community that would accept its homogeneity in nationalism (Gellner, 2018: 78). "Nationalism and the phenomenon of the nation in Gellner focus on the developments of a formation in which the demands for a homogeneous culture, a homogeneous community, and a homogeneous political unity are crystallized" (Öğün, 2000: 71). Apart from political and legal unity, organizing around a certain language, a system of education, common values, etc. gives clues about the meaning that Gellner assigns to culture.

Gellner develops his theory of nationalism also by considering its beneficial outputs to modern societies. His understanding of functionality through nationalism can be found in his arguments cited by Elster; "nationalism is a result of modernization, it is beneficial for the states to modernize – because a highly specialized division of labour means a unified high culture and developed educational system, moreover nationalism carries out the modernization mission through the activities of states in modernization process in functional

terms” (Elster, 1979: 28-35). We may easily capture the formulation of functionalist reasoning in Gellner’s ideas.

Gellner examines the nature of culture for nationalism from a very critical perspective. As claimed by Gellner himself, the nationalist movement is an outward manifestation of an inevitably radical adaptation of the relationship between government and culture (Gellner, 2018: 112). As mentioned before, he emphasizes the functionality of culture rather than its anthropological status. So, he brings his thesis to the distinction between high and low culture. This distinction exists within modern nations, tending to cultural homogenization (Taylor, 1997: 32).

Nationalism has emerged as a result of the changing culture-politics relations at the level of industrial societies. Subsequently, nations come out as a result of nationalisms. So far, how culture is effective in separating modern societies both politically and socially from the previous societies is examined. This issue of culture, which forms an important part of Gellner's thesis, needs a more detailed analysis. In this regard, it is useful to examine the concept of high culture. “This concept of a ‘high culture’ became the key to Ernest’s later theory of Nationalism” remarks Smith (1996: 379). This enables us both to analyse the power-culture relationship and the impact of this national building process on culture. In this way, the importance and meaning of culture in the construction of a nation can be truly understood.

In the relation of culture with politics, the position of high culture for nationalism seems significant. Since culture is a shared one and offered to all, it must be the same for every member. This is what establishes high culture, in Gellner’s expressions. A high culture in which literacy is not a privilege but widely available to all and general education is offered to all, will prevent differentiation and ensure homogeneity (Gellner, 2018: 116). “Cultural homogenisation is heavily dependent on the imposition of a standardized high culture, exo-socialization of state-wide education and context-free communication” (Maleševic, 2007: 156; Dikshitt, 2022: 234). And the nation, whose members are loyal to the principle of the nation and its high culture, comes into being largely after the nation-state, whose institutions - including the educational system and the shared labour market - serve to homogenize the population culturally (Eriksen, 2007: 171).

While describing the general features of societies, Gellner points out the perception of cultures from which he leads up to his conceptualization of high culture. “The employability, dignity, security and self-respect of individuals, typically, and for the majority of men now hinges on their education; and the limits of the culture within which they were educated are also the limits of the world within which they can, morally and professionally, breathe... The observe of the fact that a school-transmitted culture, not a folk-transmitted one, alone confers his usability and dignity and self-respect on industrial man, is the fact that nothing else can do it for him to ant comparable extent” (Gellner, 1983: 35-36). Accordingly, in describing the scope of culture in the nationalist discourse, Gellner reveals the high culture: “Culture is no longer merely the adornment, confirmation and legitimation of a social order which was also sustained by harsher and coercive constraints; culture is now the necessarily shared medium, the life-blood or perhaps rather the minimal shared atmosphere, within which alone the members of the society can breathe and survive and produce. For a given society, it must be one in which they can all breathe and speak and produce; so it must be the same culture. Moreover, it must now be a great or high (literate, training-sustained) culture, and it can no longer be a diversified, locality-tied, illiterate little culture or tradition” (1983: 37-38).

Developing his theory on the cultural situations of the societies, Gellner distinguishes the issue of culture as high/normative culture and low/folk culture, as mentioned above (Haugaard and Malešević, 2007: 21). Comparing culture to plants which can be divided into savage/wild and cultivated/garden varieties, he tries to explain his distinction. The savage kinds are produced or they reproduce themselves from generation to generation, without the need for supervision or surveillance. For this kind, “Gellner’s judgement about ‘low’ cultures is somewhat hasty” remarks Malešević (2007: 158). However, the cultivated ones are the developed forms. They include complexity and richness, mainly sustained by high literacy and specialization (Gellner, 1983: 50). Through this comparison we understand that Gellner refers to the nature of cultures, which he separates into two categories. We may find this comparison in Smith’s expressions as well: “A ‘high’ culture, as we have seen, is a literate, sophisticated culture, serviced by specialized educational personnel and taught formally in mass, public, standardized and academy-supervised institutions of learning. It is a highly cultivated or ‘garden’ culture. A ‘low’ culture, by contrast, is wild, spontaneous, undirected, and unsupervised” (Smith, 1996: 379).

The pre-modern social structure, which Gellner gives great importance in explaining the industrial society better, can be the first step to understanding his distinguishment between high and folk cultures. In these communities, culture does not have an essential role in maintaining order. It reinforces the existing traditional structure. The culture of this kind of pre-modern society, folk culture, consists of cultural differences and favours horizontal cultural division. These communities lack literacy or in other words; the literacy in such societies is limited to a certain group of society. Folk culture takes social inequalities for granted. The social statuses are gained from birth and they cannot find a response in the political arena. Such inequalities are inevitable, constant, unchangeable, and natural processes (Lessnoff, 2007: 189; Gellner, 2018: 79- 116).

In the industrial age, on the other hand, all the sociocultural features undergo a critical change. “The rise of high cultures and nations is a consequence of the mobility and anonymity of modern society and of the semantic, nonphysical nature of modern work” (Smith, 1996: 375). The state of variability has transferred to the political field and directly affected the political mechanism. It is mainly the culture, carrying an exceptional position here. In modern society, we see culture as a determining factor and come out through a new phenomenon, high culture. “A high culture pervades the whole of society, defines it, and needs to be sustained by the polity” (Gellner, 1983: 18). This is, to some extent, the culture dominating society in general. Therefore, industrial society is defined through a standardized high culture.

As a key turn, the industrialization process shapes the transition from agricultural society. Accordingly, this symbolizes the evolution of folk cultures into high culture (Dikshitt, 2022: 235). “By Ernest’s criteria, many of the older languages and cultures were ‘high’ cultures. But, even where they were ‘low’ (or ‘lower’), spontaneous, popular cultures, they could become the basis for a subsequent ‘high culture’” (Smith, 1996: 381). As modernity serves a mass literate society, the tendency for ‘high’ culture effectively to colonize ‘folk’ culture becomes possible in this age (Haugaard and Malešević, 2007: 21). The transition mainly covers the procedure in which the local cultures leave the historical partnerships depending on blood or race to a form of culture that is internalized by the whole society within the framework of standardized rules. In Eriksen’s words, high culture is shortly defined as “The elites in a fully fledged nation need to consolidate their unity around a ‘high culture’ symbolically laden with claims to uniqueness, historical memories – real or fictional – and aspirations to aesthetic and moral greatness on behalf of the nation. This high

culture, sometimes an upgraded version of peasant culture, sometimes a nationalized version of a cosmopolitan one, and more often than not a mix of both, is generally recognized, in a functioning nation, as the national culture" (Eriksen, 2007: 170-171). Gellner addresses that the high culture has spread to the whole society in the modern era with specific changes, therefore he believes that the secret of nationalism should be sought at this very point. For Gellner, "A 'high culture' is the only cement for a modern, mobile, industrial society; and this is the only kind of society open to us today" (Smith, 1996: 375).

In the changing history of humanity, the existence of culture as a political factor rather than a given element has affected the whole political mechanism. Gellner considers education as an indispensable aspect of this process. He examines the duty of the state to turn the members of its nation into citizens through general education provided by the high culture. He, in this way, underlines that the aim is to create a universally literate high culture, which in the end creates a homogenous cultured society. This transformation is expressed in Malešević's words also as the popularization of high culture; "Gellner's argument that in the modern age 'we are all clerks' into the claim that all high culture in the end "becomes popular culture" (2007: 161).

General education has an extremely important place in the modern system. It is essential in the organization of society as culturally homogeneous individuals. The person in the industrial era can gain useful knowledge, dignity, and self-respect only with the culture provided by the school instrument. In the expressions of Szporluk, the importance of education employing modernity is revealed as follows: "Modernity calls for an educated person, education is attained in school, schools use different languages... In school one learned to work and one also learned to be a citizen" (Szporluk, 1998: 27). The identity of one can no longer be acquired through the legitimacy of the locality (Gellner, 2016: 74). For the high culture to be extended, education is of great importance. Although the standard educator in the modern period has achieved a professional position, the spread of a standardized education among the whole society is considered essential (Dikshit, 2022: 233). Teachers are important in terms of their professions.

Modern society establishes high culture through universal literacy and general education. Claiming that "At the base of the modern social order stands not the executioner but the professor. Not the guillotine, but the (aptly named) *doctorat d'état* is the main tool and symbol of state power. The monopoly of legitimate education is now more important,

more central than is the monopoly of legitimate violence. When this is understood, then the imperative of nationalism, its roots, not in human nature as such, but in a certain kind of now pervasive social order, can also be understood”, Gellner (1983: 112) indicates another important factor for the relationship between culture and politics and it is the position of intellectuals. Modern man is no longer tied to a kinship group; one’s education is considered his most valuable investment and ultimately gives him an identity.

An important part of this nation-building process, the high culture is directly chosen by the state for its citizens by distinguishing it from folk culture (Gellner, 2016: 64-69). Gellner defines high culture concerning the changes in the industrial age. “In the industrial age, the high culture come to dominate in quite a new sense. The old doctrines associated with them mostly lose their authority, but the literate idioms and styles of communication they carried become far more effectively authoritative and normative, and, above all, they come to be pervasive and universal in society. In other words, virtually everyone becomes literate, and communicates in an elaborate code, in explicit, fairly ‘grammatical’ (regularized) sentences, not context-bound grunts and nods... Every high culture now wants a state, and preferably its own” (Gellner, 1992: 288). He considers high cultures as the only organizational form that would ensure the survival of the political system. It is to some extent a civilized way of living. It includes certain cultural elements such as an established language, transferred to the whole society through education (Gellner, 2018: 115-116).

Nationalism is the result of a new form of social organization, deeply internalized, based on educationally high cultures, each of which is protected by the state (Gellner, 2018: 127). The modern state is the only authority that can dominate the organization of educational institutions since they aim to spread the high culture through universal literacy and education (Gellner, 1992: 290). As in pre-industrial societies, the dominance of religious or private institutions in education should be seized by the state; for the imposition of high culture, education should take place at the state level. The organization of a uniform, equal and continuous education for every citizen in a standard and specialized manner is the responsibility of the state in the industrial society. It is also essential for constructing citizens with a high culture (Smith, 2016: 35).

On the way to end the part on high culture, we may additionally refer to Malešević’s expressions in which he critically touches on an important point about the nature of high cultures. As stated by him, “Gellner’s standardized high culture of the nation-state emerges

actually in two forms – as an authoritative and as a mundane type. While the authoritative layer stands for a normative ideal through which nation-states imagine and present themselves to other nation-states, the mundane layer is how modern culture functions in everyday life” (Malešević, 2007: 159). The authoritative type is an ideal notion of high culture, which is historically transformed. It is to some extent a normative ideal recognized by most members of particular nation-states. On the other hand, the mundane type of high culture is fed by those recognizable and stereotypical images. The popular, lived culture functions in the same normative frame of the nation-state. The binary classification made on the issue of high culture seems critical. Since it addresses the formation of high culture, such a categorization directly affects those who are exposed to it. And it constitutes an important part of whether the form of culture is a natural one or a created one. After explaining these two forms, Malešević adds his critical interpretation of the ideal form of high culture for Gellner, “Despite its obvious and important difference from the folk culture of the agrarian world the mundane layer is not and could never be Gellner’s high culture. Instead, popular culture requires the existence of high culture as it can articulate itself only in relation to it, whether as its exaggeration, its simplification, its caricature or its direct opposition” (2007: 161).

From a general perspective, it can be seen that high/normative culture is used both to instil civic consciousness into the whole society and to make individuals realize their potential in the modern age. It enables society to catch industrialization. The basic criterion of being a citizen is no longer to have a lineage/family tie or a large land but to acquire certain abilities at the social level (Gellner, 1994: 60-61). And culture is the most basic aspect which the state takes under protection and turns its citizens into national subjects. Nations can exist only “when general social conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities” (Gellner, 1983: 55).

To remember Gellner’s definition of nationalism once again seems critical at this point: “Nationalism is the general imposition of a high culture on society, where previously low cultures had taken up the lives of the majority, and in some cases the totality, of the population. It means the general diffusion of a school-mediated, academy supervised idiom, codified for the requirements of a reasonably precise bureaucratic and technological communication. It is the establishment of an anonymous impersonal society, with mutually sustainable atomised individuals, held together above all by a shared culture of this kind, in

place of the previous complex structure of local groups, sustained by folk cultures reproduced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves” (cited by Özkırmı, 2008: 167). We can easily understand that the main condition of nations to be found out by nationalisms lies behind the establishment of high culture. Finally, it becomes clear that this process requires political support. For this, Gellner adds: “Now that the task of the high culture is so much greater and so much more onerous, it cannot dispense with a political infrastructure” (1983: 51).

We understand from Gellner's theory that “nationalism invents nations where they do not exist” (cited by Smith, 2016: 117). Through his studying nationalism in the 20th century from a perspective that focuses on nationalism as a modern phenomenon, Gellner also criticizes the former nationalist ideas. In O’Leary’s following expressions, we can see this: “Gellner presumed that nationalist ideas are bad, or low-brow, but also that they are epiphenomenal. He had no wish to disturb the bad press which nationalists’ writings have received. This bad press holds nationalism responsible for many disasters and catastrophes, wars, forced mass-population transfers, imperialisms, fascisms, and genocides” (O’Leary, 1997: 219). It is easily seen why Gellner considers nations and nationalism as a modern phenomenon and why he perceives nations as created. As a result of the distinction, he has brought to the history of humanity, Gellner emphasizes the position of culture. He discusses nationalism as the transformation of the cultural nature of the relationship between the changing politics and social mechanisms through the industrialization process. What makes Gellner and his modernist thesis essential for this study lies in the fact that he places culture at the centre of the nationalization process.

Through Gellner's emphasis on the active role of culture as a part of politics, it is seen that Gellner has been one of the most critical names that this study can examine the relationship between nationalism and culture. Therefore, expected to make important contributions to this study, Gellner is believed to provide an extremely comprehensive theoretical background. His work on Turkey named *Kemalism* (Gellner, 2016: 113-126) already justifies us in offering his nationalism theory as a theoretical framework for the political and social transformation in the early republican period of Turkey.

3. AN IDEOLOGICAL TOOL IN THE PROCESS OF CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION: THE EXPERIENCE OF *HALKEVLERİ*

The Republic of Turkey points to a modern and extremely radical formation since it completely rejected the traditional form of the previous government and society. The intellectual basis of the republic, reforms, institutional steps, and all other exercises addressed a highly transformed dominance. “The radical change, the revolutionary modernization aimed at breaking ties with the past and erasing social memory, gained momentum during the single-party period of the Republic and continued until the 1950 DP government” (Fedayi, 2010: 156). This kind of extremist manner directly impacted many areas ranging from politics to history, from sociology to law, from anthropology to economics, etc. The early Republican period, therefore, corresponds to a very critical source for researchers from various fields.

In the formation of the new order, apart from the organization of government, society had a paramount importance. Since the new citizens were direct subjects of the radical changes; they were urgently expected to keep up with the modern improvements. This was the major issue after the regime could consolidate itself legally in a period of a ten-years. The creation of a society that would adopt the revolutions was a real obstacle for the founding staff. In other words, in the first ten-years period of the republic, the regime elites became aware that the society could not easily accept the revolutions or they were unwilling to do so. Therefore, in the second decade of the Republican period, immediate steps to incorporate society into the process were started to be taken. Among them, the project *Halkevleri* occupied an outstanding role. Not only for its founding procedure and functioning but also for the feedback received from the society gained so much importance.

Halkevleri were among the most respectable institutions of the new republic in cultural and educational means. It was described as a non-governmental organization. It had a status of a "public benefit association", functioning for the defence and expansion of housing, health, education, environment, women's rights, and disabled rights throughout Turkey, founded on 19th February 1932 and continued until 1951. The purposes of *Halkevleri* were declared as to raise the society – which was believed to be left underdeveloped - to the level of prosperous civilizations, to integrate people with reforms,

and to contribute to the upbringing of generations by adhering them to the new regime. What made it become so critical for the social and cultural development of Turkey was mainly *Halkevleri*'s aim to carry a modern and new culture through a "top-down reflection" (Çolak, 2000: 11).

The significance of *Halkevleri* in the name of this study can be pointed out as the exercise of culture by the state elites. The Republican regime aimed to transform society in every respect through social and cultural organizations. Society was going to be re-designed and modernized in all areas of life, especially by social and cultural means. In this regard, *Halkevleri* drew the highest attention as it was nearly turned into the cultural branch of the ruling party.

Halkevleri, despite being founded as an independent organization for adult education and socialization, had direct ties with *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası (CHF)* (Republican People's Party). The need to establish this kind of organization stemmed from the regime elites' desires to establish an institution that could easily be adhered to by the party/state. The idea of forming a cultural institution for the adoption of revolutions was not discovered by the Republican elites. The official foundation of *Halkevleri* dated back to 1932, but the roots of this intellectual movement could easily be brought back to the 1910s when the modern republican regime was not even established yet. It referred to the experience of *Türk Ocakları*, in the period of Ottoman rule over the Anatolian lands. *Türk Ocakları* were established in 1912, performed in the social and cultural fields, and undertook important tasks for the adoption of the reforms during the Ottoman Second Constitutional period. *Türk Ocakları* refused to join any political parties during its lifetime. Although *Ocaklar* continued its activities after 1923, its independent stance nearly disturbed the new regime shortly after the Republic of Turkey was established. And this proved that *Türk Ocakları* could no longer continue without taking a guided form. Therefore, the new regime rapidly abolished *Türk Ocakları* in 1931 and in as short as one-year established the new culture organization, which was - as a central issue - a party-directed one. From 1932 on, *Halkevleri* started to act as an organic branch of the ruling party. The key point behind the idea of civil society had been nearly violated. And the doubtful nature of the institution, subject to this study became more visible. The reflection of *Halkevleri*, in the context of culture and power relations, has become the focus of this part of the study.

This chapter of the study concentrates on *Halkevleri* from a historical perspective. In the first place, the intellectual foundations are examined and the need for a state/party-guided cultural institution is questioned. The second topic is about *Türk Ocakları*, accepted as the forerunner institution. Since *Halkevleri* inspired many of its existence from *Türk Ocakları*, studying *Ocaklar* seems remarkable. The following title touches on the establishment, organization, and purposes of *Halkevleri*. The study later continues with the nine sections of *Halkevleri*; focusing on their aims, the functioning of each section, and other technical information. Discussing *Halkevleri* cannot be complete without mentioning *Halkodaları*, which were established in 1940 as the regime's expansion towards the villages.

3.1. The Intellectual Foundations: Need for A State/Party-Directed Cultural Institution

The establishment of the Republic of Turkey was the result of many interrelated stages. The early Republican history covered a series of reforms that were carried out rapidly. During this process, the main purpose of the ruling elites was to consolidate the modern state. Therefore, the first decade of Republican history was mostly compromised of the institutional and legal settlement. The social issues remained of secondary importance. However, by the end of the 1920s, the significance of the social and cultural revolutions was signified as essential as the initial institutional and legal formation. And this awareness made ruling cadres widen their perception towards moving the social and cultural fields.

For the founding cadres, the idea of building a Western-oriented order had been the sole incentive from the very early stages of the republican idea. Not only in the process of establishing the new state but also in building the system, the rulers nearly replicated the Western model. In this context, from 1923 to the beginning of the 1930s, the necessary structural organization continued to implement the aforementioned concepts under the roof of modernization. The reforms carried out by the ruling elites aimed to consolidate political power (Şimşek, 2005: 72-74). Similar views were repeated by Aydın with the following expressions: "From 1923 to 1930, the main problem of the Republican cadres was the conclusion of the power struggle, the security of the new borders, the adoption of them and eliminating the negative effects of the Great Depression. From the 1930s onwards, it was time for the Republican ideology to be put into practice and to make even the most remote citizens adopt it as a 'new identity'" (Aydın, 1993: 227).

The 1920s corresponded to the period of institutional, legal, and symbolic construction, as stated by Çolak (2007: 30). Starting with the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, later continuing with the abolition of the caliphate in 1924; the unification of education and training under the Law of Unification of Education in the same year; closure of dervish lodges, zawiyas and tombs in 1925; the adoption of the law on hat revolution in 1925; the adoption of the civil code in 1926; the adoption of the new alphabet in 1928; and many similar developments in the following two years; the reforms of the first period gained importance as the initial stages of the transition to a new civilization.

The establishment of political power in a legal framework later led to the search for dominance in the social and cultural fields as well. “The struggle of the administration to consolidate its power continued until 1929. Most of the reforms carried out in the 1920s aimed, directly or indirectly, at the absolute seizure of political power and the establishment of a form of government capable of using this power indefinitely” (Şimşek, 2002: 5-6). The need to mobilize society in the name of the new order was recognized as a major concern. Attempts of the centre for the adoption of revolutions by the whole society could show itself through cultural institutions after the 1930s (Çeçen, 2018: 79).

The necessity that revolutions should reach society was felt by the 1930s since the issue of culture remained at the level of discourse up to that time. “In the 1930s, the Republican administration defined populism as establishing a people's nation by taking them as the basis of Republic, raising this stratum materially and spiritually and making it fully dominant over the country” (Gülcü, 2020: XIX). Making society adopt the reforms occupied the agenda of ruling elites for many years and the expectation that the revolutions would be accepted by the whole society arose intensely. However, this adoption process was nearly impossible through the legal regulations. “In the Kemalist discourse, every equal/citizen should be 'educated' until they gain self-determination” (Çolak, 2007: 34). This perception manifested itself ideologically in the second decade of the republic. In this regard, the reason for distinguishing the attitude of the ruling elites towards cultural construction in the 1920s and 1930s became clear.

The political developments during the founding years led to the separation of the 1930s from that of the 1920s and pushed the Republican elites to move toward the society. This remote position of the new regime from society was mainly because the administrative structure had been established, but the participation of people in the political administration

wasn't guaranteed yet (Şimşek, 2002: 10). The right to elect and to be elected didn't allow the existence of a real opposition, which strengthened the single-party rule. Therefore, a form of government devoid of legal opposition also led to uncertainties at the social level. Ever since the establishment of the Republic, "the opposition was suppressed twice, once more brutally and secondly, more gently" (Mardin, 2017: 178). The first of these was the Menemen incident and the second was the existence of *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (the Free Republican Party). These two incidents demonstrated the interest of society in politics. They once again evoked the need for the single-party administration to reach society with the policies at the cultural level.

The distinction of the 1930s, from the first period of the republican regime, was explained through the idea of two different aspects of the principle of populism in Köker's perception. For him, "the evolution of the principle of populism in the period from the 1920s to the 1930s was twofold: Populism in the first period covering the war of independence and the first years of the republic was expressed in formulas such as 'the people's own and actual possession of their destiny'. In this context, debates over populism took place on a platform determined by the concepts of direct democracy and representative democracy. However, populism in the second stage of the 1930s was expressed in the formula of 'for the people, despite the people'; the Turkish Grand National Assembly was considered sufficient for the participation of the people in political life; the wishes and aspirations of the people were not allowed to be freely reflected in the parliament, which existed only formally" (Köker, 2007: 137-138). He continued and asked this question on this issue: Is it possible to claim that single-party populism was in contradiction with the principle of republicanism? "It is possible to say that the perception of populism in the single-party period weakened in terms of political content compared to the 1920s, while more emphasis was placed on the cultural and economic dimensions of populism" (Köker, 2007: 149). His answer showed how the single-party regime transformed the principle of populism and turned its focus on the cultural aspect.

A similar criticism appeared in Göle's assessments. As claimed by her, "Turkish nationalism is fed by the discourse of populism rather than the originality of national cultural artifacts: At the core of the nationalist movement lies the aim of 'towards the people', reaching to the people'... However, with the Western-oriented definition of the civilization ideal, the nationalist ideology's search for origins in Anatolia has the potential to contradict each other" (Göle, 2011 88-89). Evaluating Kemalism as a civilization project, Göle, in this

regard, claimed that the civilization project abstracted the ideology of nationalism from its cultural roots.

Starting with the establishment of the republic, the concept of culture mostly had an ideological and political reference. It was nearly equated to civilization. Within the scope of Turkish modernization, Western civilization was taken as a sample. In light of this, a perception of shared culture was mostly ignored; even rejected. At this point, the most important factor that distinguished the 1930s from the first period was the need to eliminate the culture-civilization distinction (İnan, 1969: 48-49).

As of the 1930s, the rising social opposition against the rulers and the threat of the regime losing its legitimacy forced Republican People's Party to rethink the reforms. And formal regulations in the first years left their weight to the establishment of ideological institutions. Established in 1931, *Türk Tarih Kurumu*, established in 1932 *Türk Dil Kurumu* and *Köy Enstitüleri* were among those organizations of cultural construction. In this ideological transfer, the pedagogical attitude of the ruling elite could also be observed. Founded in 1929 *Millet Mektepleri*, 1931 *Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı*, and *Dil Tarih ve Coğrafya Fakültesi* (the Faculty of Language, History, and Geography) established in 1936, were the other institutions where ideological mobilization was exercised within the scope of the indoctrination project (Şimşek, 2002: 1).

The position of the Republican People's Party in the process was also an important issue. Beyond its standing as a founding power, CHP - almost the owner of the state - became the main force behind ideological mobility. Besides the organization of the party, CHP was influential in the organization of those cultural institutions. CHP's desire to control all areas was the main triggering point behind the establishment of *Halkevleri*. The obstacles created by the party against the existence of any oppositional movements restricted the party to reflect all segments of society. And this caused founding cadres' stand-off. All of these were the other reason behind the regime's focus on the social and cultural field.

One of the main topics of the regime officials on the way to a state/party-directed cultural institution was education. Undoubtedly, the issue of education had always been one of the most striking motivations. "It was desired by the newly established state to be a 'People's State' and for the masses to own it, but this was not sufficient to fulfil spontaneously. A mass education and adult education was required" (Çeçen, 2018: 77-81).

Indoctrination of the masses by confronting the principles of the regime, the civilization of the whole society could only be achieved through education. The emphasis on education, when the mission turned into a social civilization process, changed its extent. Therefore, in the early Republican period, this kind of mental change directly affected the state policies and society's response to it.

As claimed by Belge (2012), education is the most appropriate and moderate form of “militarizing” society. The approach of the founding staff towards education was authoritative, similar to Belge's assertion. The form of education in modern Turkish history may directly call to the minds the notion of propaganda since the educational motivation behind the founding father pointed out an easily politically directed one. It may be helpful to refer to Laswell, who believed that it was helpful to define propaganda and education separately: In both popular and technical usage, the word propaganda was associated with education. “We feel the need to give a name to a process by which techniques are produced. If that name is education then we are free to call the process of creating value-loaded behaviours and attitudes propaganda” (cited by Berelson and Janowitz, 1981: 77). Then it is possible to say that the education policies in the early period were a form of propaganda.

In the first years of the republic, eliminating the literacy deficiency was mostly on the agenda. The problem of indoctrination, on the other hand, entered into the agenda by the 1930s and the process turned into a matter of propaganda after then. The following quotation from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; “The main lines of our education policy should be as follows, the basis of the education policy we will follow is to eliminate the existing ignorance” (Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2006: 224) at the very beginning gave us clues about the direction of the educational policies. Fighting with the uncivilized was the very first attempt of the state. In this respect, it was apparent that education would continue by direct control of the authorities; and this would not only be valid for the mass education of the young but also for adult education.

In the hands of the rulers, it turned into a “civilizing” pressure on people through the disciplinary practices of adult education in *Halkevleri* and *Halkodaları*. So, the Kemalist model might be formulated as a civilizing process from above remarked Çolak (2000:12) in his thesis and addressed to social engineering process through the educational policies of founding cadres. Civilizing the masses formed the basis of how the regime considered the

issue of culture. Starting from this, as we have mentioned before, the emergence of culture as a tool of civilization is one of the first steps to understanding *Halkevleri*.

It can be easily seen that culture was a vital part of the social engineering process in the Republican era, for Köymen as well (1936: 324). Adapting society through the ideals of the state was the most important aspect of the notion of culture. The culture was mainly introduced as a new way of life within the framework of modernization. It was a form reflecting the development of society rather than a living organism based on shared values and historical experiences of society. It was based on the exclusion of previous Islamic traditional values with the discourse of a good life and a civilized lifestyle (Çolak, 2007: 31). Since many traditions and local values were excluded under the engineering project, it is clear that culture, in the early republican era, served - to some extent - as a stranger to the society.

The cultural perception of the ruling elites in the republican era differed sharply from that of Ziya Gökalp, one of the important references to Turkish nationalism. Considering culture as a harmonious whole of common values of a nation such as a language, morality, religion, reason, law, economy, technique, and aesthetics, Gökalp attributed a live meaning to it (1995: 35). This definition of culture, strictly differing from the concept of civilization, also accepted culture as a unique situation that could not be reduced to an ideological extent. For Gökalp, culture and politics were separate from each other and therefore he didn't accept the intervention of the political system in the cultural field (Parla, 1993: 132-133-144). This also revealed how far from authentic Turkish nationalism the reforms that handled culture within the scope of the ideological program and turned it into a civilizing tool.

Before examining *Halkevleri*, it seems meaningful to reveal what the political power aimed with these institutions, by considering the foundations from an intellectual point of view. The evaluation of this background information, in which the perception of culture in the single-party period was examined, constitutes a key feature for the following topics. Now, we can look at the vital role of *Türk Ocakları*, accepted as a precursor of our main analysis.

3.2. The Forerunner to *Halkevleri*: *Türk Ocakları*

The intellectual foundations of *Halkevleri* were not discovered by the Republican staff, as mentioned already. In terms of its activities, *Halkevleri* were based on both similar institutions abroad and *Türk Ocakları*, a similar organization established to spread and develop Turkish culture and language and to modernize Turkey during the Ottoman era. *Türk Ocakları* drew attention as a critical forerunner to *Halkevleri* at this stage. Its importance mainly stemmed from the fact that the dissolution of *Türk Ocakları* carried vital clues about the establishment process of *Halkevleri*. Avoiding having a political position throughout their life, *Türk Ocakları* pioneered *Halkevleri* and also differed from that in the same respect.

Established in the last period of the Ottoman Empire *Türk Ocakları* had a major role in the transition from empire to nation-state. Considering *Ocaklar* as a forerunner institution to *Halkevleri* makes it critical to include it in this study. Therefore, it is of great importance to examine the establishment, structure, and activities of the institution along with the process leading to the closure of it.

Ocaklar had the longest life among many associations established during the Second Constitutional Period and had succeeded in reaching large masses. “As a unique institution, *Türk Ocakları* claimed to represent the power of intellectuals who believed that they had something to say in the development process of the country while trying to put a third focus between the old palace-reaya dichotomy of the Ottoman period and the state-citizen relationship brought by the revolution and to protect their autonomy against the political power” (Georgeon, 2006: 40).

Founded on March 12, 1912, *Türk Ocakları* started its activities to provide cultural and scientific development in the light of nationalist ideology. Immediately after its establishment, it was affected by the negative atmosphere created by the Balkan Wars, which broke out in 1913. Just for this reason, *Türk Ocakları* made a large-scale change in the administrative committee; Hamdullah Suphi was appointed the chairman and Yusuf Akçura became the second chairman (Üstel, 2020: 58). *Ocaklar* brought writers and intellectuals such as Mehmed Emin, Ziya Gökalp, Halide Edip, Hamdullah Suphi, Ahmed Ferid and immigrant Turks such as Ahmed Ağaoğlu, Yusuf Akçura, and Hüseyinzade Ali together. Through Hamdullah Suphi's presidency, a significant revival was experienced in the

institution. The background of Suphi contributed to the scientific and intellectual development of *Ocaklar*. In this first period of its activity, *Türk Ocakları* conducted mass education very effectively through conferences, concerts, and broadcasting activities and contributed to the rise of national consciousness in Turkish society. Moreover, as a very revolutionist movement for its time, *Türk Ocakları* gave Turkish women the chance to participate in public cultural events; theatrical performances, etc. *Ocaklar* played an indisputable role in women's liberation (Domaniç, 2007: 120).

In *Nizamname-i Esas ve Dahili* (Main and Internal Regulations) of *Türk Ocakları*, the general purpose of the association was stated as “to work for the perfection of the race and language of Turks, which is an important condition of the Islamic culture, with the progress of the national education, science, social and economic levels” (*Türk Ocakları Nizamname-i Esas ve Dahili*, 1912: 1). Article 4 of the same regulation was about the independence and impartiality of the association: “While trying to reach these aims, *Ocaklar* will remain in a purely national and social situation; will never deal with politics and will never be a servant to political parties.” The principle of staying away from politics was a vital matter for *Türk Ocakları*. This effort to preserve its independence made *Ocaklar* an institution of great importance since its very first establishment. Although *Ocaklar* did never allow it, the desire of *İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası* (the Party of Union and Progress) to consider it a cultural part of the party headquarters was known.

In its regulation, it was decided to hold a congress on behalf of *Türk Ocakları* every year. The administrative committee elected in 1913 could not hold a congress until 1918 since the members had to leave Istanbul to support the national struggle. During the armistice period, *Türk Ocakları* organized many demonstrations in İzmir against the Greek occupation and in İstanbul to protest the Allies. After Izmir and Bursa branches of *Türk Ocakları* were closed by the Greek armies and the Istanbul branch was closed by the British troops, *Türk Ocakları* ended its activities (Georgeon, 2006: 41).

Türk Ocakları Congress, which could only be held later in June 1918, introduced important decisions and findings to be examined here. In addition to the objectives presented at the congress, the activities carried out by *Ocaklar* until that time were mentioned in the report by the administrative committee. They included the relations with educational institutions, and the transformation of education programs to bring Turkish art and culture to the fore. They also mentioned free trips, concerts, and exhibitions made by male and

female members for indoctrination. Social welfare exercises such as aid to students and health services were included in the activities of *Türk Ocakları*. *Türk Ocakları* introduced the library system, and this way once again demonstrated the meaning given to education (Üstel, 2020: 80-90). In addition, *Türk Yurdu* journal, the major publication organ of *Türk Ocakları*, involved another field of activity. *Türk Ocakları* had around 1800 members in 1917, increased the number of members to 2500 with 35 branches, as stated in the 1918 congress showing significant success in a short time.

Another development was the "Villagers' Association", established in 1919 by *Ocaklar* to go "towards the people" in the countryside. At the end of the war, a few young doctors from the Military Medical School and *Türk Ocakları* combatants established the Villagers' Association. They mainly aimed to bring civilization to the village, to awaken the villagers by working with them, to provide medical aid and training (Georgeon, 2006: 56). This movement came up with the understanding of instilling modern civilization in Anatolia within *Türk Ocakları* (Toprak, 1984: 69). It was tried to ensure that populism was removed from the theoretical field and put into practice. As we analyse in the following titles, the Villagers' Association was similar to *Halkodaları* organized by *Halkevleri* to spread in the countryside and especially in the villages.

The position of *Türk Ocakları* after the proclamation of the Republic was of great importance in terms of the process leading to *Halkevleri*. The British ambassador in Turkey, Sir G. Clerk's following expressions about *Türk Ocakları* were to prove the importance of the institution in this new era: "The role of *Ocaklar* in the past and present and possibly in the future, in the reorganization of Turkey on a national basis, is worth considering" (cited by Georgeon, 2006: 39). Since they actively contributed to the national struggle, *Türk Ocakları* took a break and started to reorganize after 1923. The restructuring of *Türk Ocakları* was carried out extremely quickly; by the end of 1923, *Ocaklar* continued their activities with 43 branches. They took a step towards becoming one of the most important cultural, scientific, and social forces of the country. What made this period critical was that they were reshaped under the state ideology, in a different way compared to the time they were first established. "The rapid organization of *Türk Ocakları* in the days following the proclamation of the Republic brought the necessity of determining a specific activity program, as well as a critical rethinking of the past and the position of *Türk Ocakları* during the First World War and the Armistice period" (Üstel, 2020: 127). From this point of view,

in this new period of *Türk Ocakları*, it was seen that they pursued the goals in the reorganization phase, but ideologically went to rethinking.

Türk Ocakları tried to gain the support of the new regime in this new period. Worth noting that *Ocaklar* largely agreed with the basic principles of the revolution. “*Türk Ocakları* claimed to be an intermediary body between the government and the masses, an intermediate station that conveyed the decisions taken in Ankara to the masses and carried back the echo of deep Anatolia” (Georgeon, 2006: 64-65). The effort of *Türk Ocakları* to unite with the new state ideology as well as to spread Turkism in this new period seemed remarkable. In this regard, it was apparent that throughout *Türk Ocakları*, the understanding of nationalism was a form of cultural nationalism. Nationalism took over a cultural meaning in its new era. Here, the tendency of the founding cadres to consider *Türk Ocakları* as an institution that they could easily guide started to dominate the exercise of *Ocaklar*. The changing of the regulation of *Türk Ocakları*, which had been in force since 1912; the need for renewal arose in the face of the new and developing conditions. It was decided to hold a general congress to fulfil these goals and to ensure coordination among the branches of the increasing number of *Türk Ocakları*. Thus, the foundations of the 1924 Congress, which would be the first congress in the Republican era, were laid. In return, the new government strongly supported *Türk Ocakları*. There was no doubt that the administrators expected *Türk Ocakları* to spread the revolutions and the state ideology to the masses. *Ocaklar* played an extremely important role in conveying the reforms, the source of which was the government, to society. In the early years of the Republic, in a decree he signed, Mustafa Kemal described *Türk Ocakları* as an association serving the public interest "that works to publish and complete the principles of populism and nationality in the farthest corners of the country" (Georgeon, 2006: 50).

To examine the activities of *Türk Ocakları* in the new period, it would be useful to look at *Türk Ocakları* Office Program, issued in 1926. It enabled local branches to carry out their activities in a coordinated way. This program was a small brochure published by the Central Committee for the use of the administrative councils of these branches; in the form of instruction. In the regulation, it was stated that each branch should hold conferences, if possible, once a week, on Fridays. These conferences aimed at educating the public on a wide variety of topics, such as economics, travel, history, geography, local studies, fine arts, etc. The branches should also open a library free to the public, including works related to Turkishness in particular. Every branch should also have a reading room with newspapers

and magazines, and organize exhibitions of works of art and local crafts. Moreover, it was recommended in the regulation that each branch should send at least one student to Europe to continue his/her studies (Türk Ocakları Mesai Programı, 1926: 28).

In the same program, recommendations were also given on the cultural emphasis, reminding the aims of *Ocaklar*. In this context, it was stated that each branch should contribute to protecting Turkish culture from extinction by compiling traditions, examining dialect forms, recording tales, proverbs, folk songs, folk music, and recording local dances. Starting from this, the program also focused on the civil function of *Türk Ocakları*. It was expressed that the “Turkish nation was the ‘representative’ of the West in the East” (Türk Ocakları Mesai Programı, 1926: 18). A reference to the civilizing mission of *Ocaklar* was made by emphasizing that it was the most advanced Islamic nation in adopting Western methods and techniques. Therefore, another duty of *Türk Ocakları* was revealed as to popularize Western models among Turkish people.

In the program of *Türk Ocakları* of 1926, peasant activity was also given place as a divine principle of *Türk Ocakları*. For the authors of the program, this activity was mainly medical. In light of its aim, the regulations for the continuation of the activities in the rural parts of the country were listed throughout the program. Since bringing culture and civilization at the local level was first associated with the healthiness of the people in the region, the activities mostly proceeded at the medical level (Georgeon, 2006: 55-57). As it is seen from a general evaluation of its activities, *Türk Ocakları* continued their efforts to keep their operations in a standardized manner in the Republic of Turkey as it had done before. *Ocaklar* in this period also attempted to stay away from politics, in a highly professional way.

In the second period following the Proclamation of the Republic, *Türk Ocakları* organized seven congresses. In the first of these, the 1924 Congress, changes were made in *Türk Ocakları* Law, accepted by the sixty branch delegates and it entered into force till the closure of *Ocaklar*. In the aforementioned law, the article "Working with civil and sanitary evolution" was added to the aims of *Türk Ocakları* (Birinci Türk Ocakları Umumi Kongresi Zabıtları, 1924: 33). The congress decided to meet on April 23 in Ankara every year and review the general activities.

1927 Congress of *Türk Ocakları* had a critical place among these congresses, bringing the process which led to the closure of *Türk Ocakları* then. The year 1927 also drew attention as a period in which the attitude of the government towards *Türk Ocakları* started to change. CHP Grand Congress in the same year was a turning point for the future of *Türk Ocakları*. In the congress of CHP, certain changes were made in the domestic policy with the new party regulation. In this congress, the autonomous structure of *Türk Ocakları* was questioned for the first time. The idea of joining *Türk Ocakları* to the Republican People's Party was brought to the agenda. "Since the rulers of *Türk Ocakları* were always concerned with their independence, it is hard to believe that there was no pressure to compel them to accept this unity with the Party" (Gerogeon, 2006: 51). In this context, *Türk Ocakları* were listed as "an organization under the control of CHP" in article 40 of CHP regulation. The decision of the congress continued as follows: "The candidates who will enter the delegations of political, administrative, social, economic, cultural and related organizations are announced after they are approved by the party inspectors" (Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Büyük Kongresi, 1927: 15-17). Moreover, the expression "*Türk Ocakları* were together with Republican People's Party in state politics" was used for the first time in the law of *Türk Ocakları* regulated in the annual congress of *Ocaklar* (Tunçay, 1981: 176). The initiatives of integrating *Ocaklar* with CHP started after 1927. Although the congress held in 1930 showed a rising opposition, the main progress regarding the closure of *Türk Ocakları* took place a year later in 1931.

In the process leading to the closure of *Türk Ocakları*, its close ties with the Free Republican Party were another problematic issue. "During the visit of the Speaker of the Parliament Kazım Özalp to Balıkesir *Türk Ocakları*, on some members asking what their attitude would be if they transferred to the Free Republican Party, his reply declaring that *Türk Ocakları* administration committee was the cultural branch of CHP and therefore those who were transferred to the Free Republican Party should also withdraw from the membership of *Türk Ocakları*, was proof that the government was looking for assurances in this regard" (Üstel, 2020: 342). The relationship between the members of the Free Republican Party and the members of *Türk Ocakları* was highly disturbing the political power. This also revealed the aim of the single-party administration's desire to control all areas.

There was a rising opposition to the single-party regime, which increased its authority on *Türk Ocakları* by 1927. This opposition was also fed by the above-mentioned

relationship of *Ocaklar* with the Free Republican Party. Upon this, the government decided to eliminate *Türk Ocakları*. The Extraordinary General Assembly held in 1931 constituted a turning point in *Türk Ocakları*'s history. Although it was the target of the ruling cadres since 1930 in an official way, *Türk Ocakları* drew a very successful profile. The statistics reported by Georgeon were as follows (2006: 39), " Reorganizing after the War of Independence, *Türk Ocakları*, experienced a great breakthrough and became a powerful organization spread all over the country with 250 branches and 30.000 members, with an imposing centre in Ankara in the early 1930s."

The reason for the meeting was clearly stated in the congress invitation, sent to the branches and delegates, dated April 10, 1931. The rapidness in organizing the Congress also showed itself in the transfer of the properties of *Türk Ocakları* to CHP shortly after the Congress (Üstel, 2020: 384). In this regard, it was decided to move CHP Centre to *Türk Ocakları* headquarters on April 13. Monetary transactions and transfers of movable goods were carried out quickly in the following days. Among the real estate owned by *Türk Ocakları*, there were not only buildings but also movie theatres, shops, sports fields, cafes, and orchards, which would be moved to the use of *Halkevleri* later. The value of the real estate transferred to the Republican People's Party after 1931 was more than 1,300,000 liras (Georgeon, 2006: 67).

From a long-term perspective, the abolition of *Türk Ocakları* could be defined as a result of the policy of political power towards them. After releasing the reins at a time when the political power felt the need to hold on to them, it took control in 1927-28 and suppressed them in 1931. In that recent period, the desire of the Republican People's Party to establish an authority throughout the country that it would not share with anyone became apparent (Georgeon, 2006: 70). By 1931, the control that CHP wanted to establish overall organizations left no alternative to *Türk Ocakları* either to close or to continue only by compromising their principles on becoming a part of politics. The only option for *Türk Ocakları* was to go to abolition. As a result of all these developments, *Ocaklar* were closed in the extraordinary congress held in 1931. It was seen that the state would intervene in the intellectual and social fields since the government decided to move to statism in all areas, which would enable its full control through the principles of populism and nationalism. At this stage, the organization of *Türk Ocakları* remained like an expression of liberalism. A similar view was stated by Tunçay as follows: "The liberalism-statism dilemma emerged

indirectly with the Free Republican Party during the closure of *Türk Ocakları* resulted in CHP's gradually choosing statism after this development” (1983a: 2021).

During the process of the abolition of *Ocaklar*, the news about *Halkevleri* that would be going to be established instead of *Türk Ocakları* started to take place in the local press. The first news on *Halkevleri* began to be released one year before *Halkevleri* officially opened and about three months before *Türk Ocakları* closed. The spreading news indicated that organizational mobility had taken place to meet an important need, as to control the youth and masses in general. Since this control could not be achieved through *Türk Ocakları*, which remained insistent on preserving the autonomous structure and liberal mentality, opening *Halkevleri* was nearly turned into a necessity. It was also a critical sign showing that *Türk Ocakları* were not capable of satisfying the single-party administration. In other words, *Türk Ocakları* were not capable of meeting the ideological expectations of the single party. Therefore, the closure of *Ocaklar* was inevitable. In addition, the financial benefit that the seizure of *Türk Ocakları* would provide to the Party should not be underestimated. The news that appeared in the press before *Ocaklar* were closed revealed that a new institution was already designed as an alternative to it (Tunçay, 1981: 306-309).

“The necessity of resolving the problem of *Türk Ocakları* as soon as possible led to a decision to be taken before CHP congress, held every two years under the Law on 23 April. The news of removing the name of *Türk Ocakları* and renaming it as the Cultural Branch of the People's Party, transferring all the movable and real estate properties of *Ocaklar* to the Party, that the members naturally becoming party members, that CHP headquarters being moved to *Türk Ocakları* headquarters soon showed that the future of *Türk Ocakları* was decided in a very detailed way, even before the Congress was convened and before the opinions of the members were taken independently.” This long quotation from Üstel (2020: 368-69) indicated clearly what we addressed above as the implicit reasons for this abolition process.

From a general perspective, the aim of controlling all areas under single-party administration shook the position of *Türk Ocakları*, a functioning organization since the second constitutional era. The effectiveness of *Türk Ocakları*, especially in Anatolia, caused the threat of a second power alongside the provincial organization of CHP. “Behind this idea, the desire to control this autonomous organization which was in the position of competing with the local branches of Republican People's Party in the provinces, towns, and

villages seemed to be hidden” (Georgeon, 2006: 51). Beyond that, *Ocaklar* began to be considered a threat through its cultural activities and success in establishing horizontal relations with the public. Therefore, *Türk Ocakları* tuned into a 'problem that needed to be resolved' for the administrative staff. *Ocaklar* could not find a place for itself in this new era. Achieving significant successes since the day it was founded, *Türk Ocakları* had to agree on the abolition because it could not continue with that existing political atmosphere.

At the beginning of its second period, *Türk Ocakları* were compromised of 71 branches. In 1931, when *Ocaklar* were closed, the number of branches increased to 267 and the number of members to 32,000. During the same period, the budget of *Türk Ocakları* increased from 6,900 liras to 1,500,000 liras. All these figures showed that *Ocaklar* had a striking output (Georgeon, 2006: 42). These also showed us that *Halkevleri*, opened right after the abolition of *Türk Ocakları*, benefited greatly from the experience of *Ocaklar*.

As we finish *Türk Ocakları* part, the following words of Üstel - who submitted her thesis on *Türk Ocakları* issue - seem very meaningful: “Starting from 1928, the criticisms of the pro-government press that *Türk Ocakları* lost its function, it could not integrate with the public and it had an elitist approach, is the result of CHP’s desire to bind these organizations to itself” (2020: 403). This shows that *Türk Ocakları*, trying to protect its autonomy from the very beginning, became helpless towards the duality of state-government in the early republican period. Üstel continued her words as follows: “Indeed, practices such as *Halkevleri*, Turkish History Thesis, and the Sun Language Theory are expressions of Republican People's Party's effort to gather all forces in a single centre, to eliminate possible oppositions and to direct the cultural life in line with the Party's ideology” (2020: 403-4). The reference to the issue of culture in Üstel’s emphasis is remarkable at this point, as the main focus of this study is an analysis of the intervention in the cultural field.

In light of the information provided by the general literature, it is understood that *Türk Ocakları* made great contributions to the social development in the country as a non-political mechanism. The insistence of *Türk Ocakları* to stay away from politics revealed the process from *Türk Ocakları* to *Halkevleri* in the dimension of both organic and non-organic relations between the two bodies. As a last word, it is possible to say that inheriting the legacy of *Türk Ocakları*, *Halkevleri* existed as one of the tools of the founding power; the cultural branch of CHP.

3.3. *Halkevleri*: Establishment, Purposes, and Organization

With the Republican Revolution, the source of social change became the state itself. All the reforms and progressive procedures were started to be conducted by the state authorities. During this new era, as we have analysed just above, the position of *Türk Ocakları* had either to change or to become compatible with the new regime. *Ocaklar* kept up with the new process except for one principle; to keep away from politics and to reject engaging in party politics. It was precisely this principle that clashed *Türk Ocakları* with the new state and paved the way for a new beginning for *Halkevleri*.

Established on February 19, 1932, after rapid the abolition of *Türk Ocakları* in 1931, *Halkevleri* were built on the legacy of *Türk Ocakları*. At this point, it is important initially to understand *Türk Ocakları* to have a better comprehension of the organization of *Halkevleri*. It is also possible to compare the two organizations with each other. *Halkevleri* were not a unique formation neither in terms of intellectual base nor in terms of its activities. As already mentioned, *Halkevleri* benefited from the experience of *Türk Ocakları* that flourished in Anatolian lands and those external experiences both in Europe and in the Soviet Union.

Under the topic we examine *Türk Ocakları*, the views of a British ambassador in Turkey quoted by Georgeon was included. The words of Sir G. Clerk expressing the undeniable contribution of *Türk Ocakları* in the formation of the modern state were conveyed. Regarding the rest of Clerk's expressions, Georgeon made such a remark: "Sir G. Clerk would probably have been surprised to see what a minor role that the historians today assign to *Türk Ocakları* in Turkey's reorganization." And he continued his comments: "The same historians insisted on *Halkevleri* established in 1932 instead of *Türk Ocakları*" (2006: 39). Even this interpretation alone shows that *Türk Ocakları* were the leading institution of *Halkevleri*; however, it lagged behind *Halkevleri* in Turkish literature review. As Çolak stated; "the monopolization of exercise of culture gave *Evler* a unique position" (2000: 199). Working as the cultural branches of the Republican People's Party, *Halkevleri* were recorded as the only component in the formation of modern Turkey. The role of its predecessors was almost ignored; the position of *Türk Ocakları* was always problematized.

Following the establishment of the Republic, the regime entered a process of restructuring the institutional, legal, economic, and social life. The six arrows in this context

constituted the main pillars of the regime. The foundations of a new, modern state were laid through the principles of republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and revolutionism. In this regard, *Halkevleri* served for both the principle of nationalism and populism. As analysed above, after the proclamation of the republic, the attitude towards *Türk Ocakları* changed and its active role in the spread of nationalism was pacified with long efforts. Pointing out the abolition of *Türk Ocakları*, this process corresponded to the course of transforming the nationalist tendencies in the country. From that on, nationalism became a state affair. And *Halkevleri* were seen as a critical tool to create a new identity in Anatolia (Georgeon, 2006: 20).

Along with the establishment of the nation-state, the efforts to reveal the absolute sovereignty of the state in the field of nationalism emerged. In addition to the institutions such as *Türk Dil Kurumu* and *Türk Tarih Kurumu*, as well as theses such as the Sun Language Theory and the Turkish History Thesis, *Halkevleri* became the most prominent instruments of this effort. Aydın's following statements proved the significant role of *Halkevleri* for the aforementioned institutions: "*Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi, Türk Tarih Kurumu ve Türk Dil Kurumu* which we see as the source institutions that constructed the new cultural identity of the Republic, conveyed their messages to the target audience through educational institutions and *Halkevleri*" (Aydın, 1993: 233). *Halkevleri* became a cultural institution, in which the dominance that the Republican People's Party could not establish with *Türk Ocakları* could finally be applied. Although the Republican People's Party claimed that *Halkevleri* were an independent institution, it was apparent through its activities, establishment process, and its organization that it functioned as the cultural branch of the party. The inclusion of the phrase "*Halkevleri* are the cultural source of the Turkish Union" at the entrance of central *Halkevleri* branch in Ankara was a pretty simple indicator of why *Halkevleri* had a central position in the cultural construction process, which is also the main concern of this study.

3.3.1. Towards A Party-Directed Organization: *Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı*

Following the abolition of *Türk Ocakları*, the desire of the Republican People's Party to control all areas finally gained an official appearance. CHP initiated a large-scale citizen education project to be carried out under its supervision. The project mainly involved political education. Before *Halkevleri*, *Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı* was founded by CHP in 1931

to fulfil the political education and propaganda part of the project through various initiatives. It mainly aimed to make propaganda by using the art and the techniques of oratory. This organization became the most important propaganda tool of that period because other propaganda tools such as radio, television, and press media were either absent or existed at a minimum level (Şimşek, 2002: 45). In the third major congress of CHP held in 1931, the basis for the establishment of both *Halkevleri* and *Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı* was prepared. Aydın defined this process as follows: “In its 1931 Congress, the Republican Party decided to establish a new Cultural Revolution Institution with the mission of transforming the masses of the people into a more ‘enlightened’ stage” (2003: 95).

Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı was established as a result of several political necessities. It was one of the establishments in the new era, initiated to provide the reforms to be adopted by the public and to ensure that the foundation philosophy was spread to large masses. It undertook an important task in the construction of the nation-state (Uzun, 2010: 108). The ruling elites sought ways to reach the public and build a bridge between the state and the people. *Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı* aimed verbal propaganda, when the mass media instruments were not widespread yet. In this period, verbal propaganda tools were prioritized above all (Çakan, 2004: 237).

The guideline published by CHP during the establishment of *Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı* provided the basic pillar from the rules to the principles of the organization. The purpose of the organization was defined in the guideline as follows: "*Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı* of Republican People's Party will be formed to explain the principles of Republican People's Party, the great ideals and aims in line with the daily political situation, through words, one of the most effective indoctrination tools" (Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı Talimatı, 1931: 5).

In the second part of the guideline, the principles on which the orators/*hatips* would concentrate were emphasized. These principles were gathered under three headings and listed: The first principle included the foundations of the republican regime and the virtues of the revolution; the second one focused on Turkish civilization, Turkish history, Turkish heroism, and Turkish culture; and lastly, on the third principle, the meaning of important days and national holidays was explained (Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı Talimatı, 1931: 6).

The following part of the guideline was about the characteristics of the orators to be selected. It included the qualifications sought in those candidates who would be orators. Among the criteria were that the related candidates should be respected in the region they lived in, can influence and persuade the environment they addressed, be loyal to the Republic, and the party, and be enthusiastic and faithful to their work (Halk Fırkası Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı Talimatı, 1931: 7). In the next part, the differences at the level of the regions to which the orators could address were emphasized. The orators were grouped under two categories: The first covered the orators who would address the intellectuals and the urban people in the cities and the second was the orators who would address the people in the villages and small towns.

There were also issues about how the orators should fulfil their duties in the guideline. In this context, the orators would follow all the important dates such as national holidays, fairs, circumcision ceremonies, day trips, and picnics. In such areas, the orators would be able to call to the public. In addition, it was emphasized how to make an oratory. Speeches would be prepared in advance; and they would be made in a natural atmosphere (Halk Fırkası Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı Talimatı, 1931: 9-10). The guideline included suggestions about the attitude of the orators in their calling to the villagers. It was important for the orators to develop close ties with the villagers. “It is clear that CHP, who believed in the power of propaganda and expected success from this process, divided the orators into two categories and made arrangements for the orators' attire and words. In this regard, the orators should adopt the principle of ‘being one of the people’, as a propaganda method” (Uzun, 2010: 100).

The dominant role of CHP in the process of *Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı* was also significant and worth noting. In the guideline, it was stated that the Party was the only responsible authority to prepare and distribute an outline of propaganda that would explain the important points to be emphasized by the orators. The party would publish brochures of its program and summaries of special conferences and send them to the orators for use in their oratory. CHP did not allow the orators to speak on their own; they should follow some rules regulated by the Party. It was stated in the guideline; “Party orators should not add a word or an idea to their words; they should add the following words as they begin; ‘I am a speaker of the Party or I am speaking on behalf of Republican People's Party’ (Halk Fırkası Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı Talimatı, 1931: 11). Şimşek (2002: 53) explained this situation in the following statements: “The most interesting point here is that: On the one hand, the Party

is starting an all-out political education and propaganda campaign, on the other hand, it doesn't wish the public to be aware of it.”

The last part of the guideline was about the organization of *Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı*. “Making itself primarily responsible for *Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı*, CHP undertook the mission of establishing and operating this mechanism. It also prepared an organizational chart that would enable *Halk Hatipleri* to be appointed from the largest settlement to the smallest one” (Uzun, 2010: 103). Any person, who was the member of the Republican People's Party and who had the feeling of happiness in his state and his nation was considered the permanent orator of the party. The 6th and last part of the guideline stated that “If any sectarian, in any situation, witnesses a conversation that does not comply with the principles of the party, he is obliged to explain the truth and correct the mistakes... In any case, every sectarian must bravely fight for ideas and take initiative in situations that will destroy the ideals of the party, no matter what the current conditions are. There is no need for smoothness of expression to speak in such a need. These are both a national debt and a duty of honour to our members. Even if there are not those who stay against in travels, gatherings, speeches, and conversations; every Party sectarian should start the word on their own and convey the purposes, reveal a principle, a rule, an action of our Party. Expressing the truths in a way that will make everyone believe with pleasure.” It can be easily understood that every CHP member could be an orator. And most importantly the members were responsible for defending the ideals of the party.

The orator's organization schematic was explained in five articles in the guideline: Initially, it was the party who would choose the orators from suitable persons and train and organize them in a professional group. Secondly, the party in each province would appoint orators among persons with related qualifications. Party would appoint between 5-15 orators in large cities such as İstanbul and İzmir. Thirdly, each township organization would employ 2-5 orators, depending on the importance of the location. Fourthly, Party organizations in the sub-districts would have 1-3 orators. And finally, Party members in districts, villages, and neighbourhoods were also asked to appoint 1-2 orators (*Halk Fırkası Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı Talimatı*, 1931: 13-14). It was stated that all orator candidates would be trained at regular intervals through courses and conferences given at the Party headquarters. The elected or to-be-elected orators were kept under control and inspected by the provincial and district organization of CHP. This guideline shows us as Uzun explains it, “CHP *Halk*

Hatipleri Teşkilatı took its job seriously and followed everything it stated in the Guideline in detail” (Uzun, 2010: 103).

In the course we are aiming to analyse *Halkevleri*, *Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı* gives us important clues. First of all, it tells us about Republican People's Party. The party's desire to gather all powers in a single hand became obvious through the developments after 1931. Discovering its remote position from society, CHP felt necessary to touch the social base of the country to establish its dominance in the sociocultural context. The experience of the Free Republic Party, along with the *Menemen incident* were significant indicators of the increasing opposition in the country. In addition, after Atatürk's three-month country visit, he found it necessary to take steps both to oppress the opposition and to raise the cultural and intellectual awareness of the people. Within the scope of the mentioned goals, the ideological aspect of the single party also came to the fore.

Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı was an important precedent for *Halkevleri*, even though *Halkevleri* developed on a much wider scale. For those founding cadres who had similar expectations from the two institutions, the relationship between *Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı* and *Halkevleri* became clearer when the ideological structure imposed by the party manifested itself. The aim of the two organizations to shape society through indoctrination was the manifestation of this ideological attitude. With the experience of *Halkevleri*, this situation became much more systematic and the indoctrination process became quite visible.

3.3.2. The Establishment of *Halkevleri*

The ideological mobilization of people especially in the 1930s was nearly equal to the institutional and legal settlement of the 1920s. The founding fathers of the regime had very much longed for an institution like *Halkevleri*, ever since the Republic was established. However, the existence of *Türk Ocakları* and the urgent priority given by the Republican elites for the legal organization of the country could make the fulfilment of this desire only at the beginning of the new decade.

In a general definition, “*Halkevleri* were the adult education and cultural centre founded by Atatürk and his Republican People's Party in 1932. They were government-directed centres located throughout the country in cities, towns, and even small villages” (Jansen, 1961: 355). The process of opening *Halkevleri* began officially after CHP Congress

of 1931. Through the dissolution of *Türk Ocakları*, the 3rd Grand Congress of CHP was held between 10-18 May 1931. The proposal to open *Halkevleri* was brought to the agenda at this Congress. The elimination of *Türk Ocakları* had already pointed to this process. Moreover, increasing news on the opening of *Halkevleri* and the examination of similar adult education organizations abroad could be accepted as the first steps. "Such news, published before *Ocaklar* were closed, revealed that a new institution was designed in all details, as an alternative to *Türk Ocakları* and it would bring the people together as a whole" (Gülcü, 2020: 13).

Following the decision on the establishment of *Halkevleri* at CHP Grand Congress, preparations officially began. 1931 CHP Party charter had already charged its provincial organizations with the task of opening and running *Halkevleri*. Establishing *Evler* was appointed to Reşit Galip, who was the Minister of Education in September 1932. Reşit Galip held a meeting in Ankara *Türk Ocağı* building. As a result of this meeting, a commission was founded on the subject and the commission was charged with arranging the main bylaws of *Halkevleri* (Arıkan, 1999: 268). Finally, on February 19, 1932, *Halkevleri* were opened all over Turkey with 14 branches in Adana, Afyon, Ankara, Aydın, Bursa, Çanakkale, Denizli, Diyarbakır, Eskişehir, İstanbul, İzmir, Konya Samsun, and Van. The number of *Halkevleri* throughout the country increased rapidly with the 20 branches started to function on June 24, 1932, which were Antalya, Bilecik, Edirne, Gaziantep, Giresun, Silifke, Kastamonu, Kayseri, Kırklareli, Kocaeli, Kütahya, Ordu, Rize, Sinop, Şebinkarahisar, Tekirdağ, Trabzon, Van, Yozgat and Zonguldak (Toksoy, 2007: 42). Each of these provinces where *Halkevleri* were opened, a Party or state official was present at the opening ceremony (Zeyrek, 2006: 22).

The opening of *Halkevleri* was celebrated with great enthusiasm in those 14 provinces. The grand opening ceremony held in Ankara centre on February 19, 1932, started with the Turkish National Anthem and followed by the Republic oath, the Live Plate, the Speech of CHP Secretary General Recep Peker, the poem 'Opening' by Behçet Kemal Çağlar, the speeches of the Minister of National Education Dr. Reşit Galip and lastly the exhibition of the play 'Shepherd' written by Behçet Kemal Çağlar. This ceremony of Ankara *Halkevi* opening was broadcasted to the whole country via Ankara Radio and reported in *Akşam* newspaper (Halkevleri Her Tarafta Büyük Merasimle Açıldı, 19 February 1932). The same newspaper article had the following statements about the opening of *Halkevleri*: "To make the history of Turk enlightened, its language pure and smooth, its literature concise

and awakened, its music deep and lively, its body strong and durable, to spread the light of wisdom that the Turkish people yearn for, to everyone with the greatest ease and to give the social assistance they need to every individual, *Halkevleri* will be great headquarters of those who want to work and struggle to bring the light of civilization.” In essence, *Halkevleri* were introduced to the country with a very unique position.

Right after the opening, a regulation on the functioning, duties, practices, and organization of *Halkevleri*, was arranged. Then CHP *Halkevleri* Regulation was published and it was in force from its foundation in 1932 to its closure in 1951 with partial changes. The following statements were included at the beginning of the regulation, giving us clues about the general nature of *Halkevleri* from the very beginning:

“We are bound and determined to raise the homeland, which was rescued under the guidance of our party, on deep and solid political, social, and economic foundations... From the years of National Struggle until today, the country has been freed from the enemy invasion and the chains that hinder its political, intellectual, social, and economic development; it has reached national advancement, which we call the principles of revolution; and reached prosperity and civilization... Our party strives to raise the Turkish nation to the highest level of civilization. This cannot cause us to forget the real situation we are in today. We are already observing the weight given to the national march of life by the factors of political and social decline and regression in the last two or three centuries and the path taken by other nations during this period. This scene tells us how we should work. The state does what is possible with all its efforts. We have to equip the whole country with a spirit of struggle and a forward-looking enthusiasm. In the new program of our party, the articles and provisions aiming to gather all the functioning elements that can work outside the state organization to increase the national culture are of great importance.” (CHF *Halkevleri* Talimatnamesi, 1932: 1-2)

The regulation of *Halkevleri*, as it is seen, began by making critical references to the recent history of the Turkish nation. It referred to radical forgetting. Exactly this reference pointed out the need for development in the field of culture. To make this cultural development more meaningful, examples of similar institutions in developed Western countries were listed as follows:

“Even in countries where state treasuries are richer, financial opportunities are larger and the rate of literacy is one hundred or ninety-five percent compared to our country, more and more importance is given to the culture organizations every day. The degree of this importance can be measured by a few examples: The formation of national cultural associations in Hungary begins in 1867. In Czechoslovakia (in Mazarik institution of public education) there are nearly four hundred cultural houses. Fascists have a national cultural organization called Dopolavoro, covering all of Italy. This organization has 1586 cultural associations and about 1000 amateur representation groups, consisting of young people representing plays on national issues. The number of public libraries they opened in 1930 alone is 8000. During the last year, the fascist Dopolavoro organization organized about 27 thousand national holiday manifestations in various cities, towns, sub-districts, and villages in Italy. The same institution organized more than 1500 practical knowledge courses in Italy today. The Germans have several cultural organizations that would fill pages to count. In England, 2 million 700 thousand permanent listeners continue to the listening clubs for the lessons given by the public education society on the radio...” (CHF Halkevleri Talimatnamesi, 1932: 4-5)

Through the external examples, the need for a state-directed institution as *Halkevleri* was reinforced; it was emphasized how necessary these formations, embodied even in the developed Western countries, were for Turkey. The case of Italy, here, drew attention as an important example among them. It is known that the Republic of Turkey consulted its Italian counterparts many times to make observations. The officials of the state visited Italy due to the success of *Dopolavoros*.

The regulation continued with the explanation of the principles on which CHP was based: “The foundations of our party are republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and revolutionism” (CHF Halkevleri Talimatnamesi, 1932: 5). Since *Halkevleri* were to some extent a branch of CHP, its emphasis on CHP’s foundations seemed critical. Described as “the six arrows”, these principles constituted a critical part of the revolutions. All of the six arrows pointed out important signs. With the principle of republicanism, the modern republican regime was accepted in place of the old empire. The second principle, nationalism, put forward that the complete dissolution the Ottoman nationalism was necessary for the establishment of a new, Turkish nationalism. Through the third principle, populism, a classless society established immediately after the republic proclamation was

asserted, in which the people could personally take part in administration. The fourth, the principle of statism defended state centrism, that the people could take the state into action when they were not self-sufficient. The fifth one, secularism was about the freedom of religion and conscience of the Republic, emphasizing its difference from the Ottoman Empire. Lastly, the principle of revolutionism pointed out that the new Turkish body was only possible with revolutions and emphasized that the support of revolutions would be made all the time.

Following the official opening, *Halkevleri* started arranging social and cultural activities immediately. *Evler* had an ideological structure since its establishment. It became clear at the very beginning that *Halkevleri* would function as a cultural branch of the Republican People's Party. The role of CHP in this process was inevitable. The Party's goal of building the country in a liberated manner under its guidance through basic foundations such as *Halkevleri* might be enough to explain this dominant role (CHF *Halkevleri* Talimatnamesi, 1932: 3). At this point, a detailed examination of the purposes and objectives put forward by *Halkevleri* may reveal the similarity of the ideals of the Party with *Evler* and give us more clues about CHP's role.

3.3.3. The Purposes of *Halkevleri*

Even before *Halkevleri* were officially established, it was more or less known when they were going to be established, for what purposes they would be functioning, and what the scope of their activities were going to be. After 1927, it became apparent that Republican People's Party called for an institution affiliated with itself, where the party could easily impose its ideas in an ideological manner. Remembered as an experience that could not reach the aims of CHP to control it, *Türk Ocakları* started the process for *Halkevleri*. After the opening of *Halkevleri*, the expression of the aims in question by the official authorities was quite comprehensive.

The purpose of the establishment of *Halkevleri* was explained with the following statements in its regulation;

“Our program identifies and points out the training of citizens with strong qualifications, raising the national character to the levels inspired by Turkish history, raising the fine arts, strengthening the national culture and scientific developments

and activities. All of these principles aim to raise generations that will win those long years lost by Turkishness on the way to civilization with brave motivations and to regain the position of honour compatible with the natural virtues and abilities of Turk in the field of civilization. The purpose of *Halkevleri* is to serve as a gathering and unifying place for the idealistic citizens” (CHF Halkevleri Talimatnamesi, 1932: 5).

Since *Halkevleri* would ultimately be a means of instilling culture, it was easily observed that the new regime was in a direct effort to discredit the life codes of the recent past in nearly every detail. *Evler* aimed to replace the institutions and more significantly the lifestyle inherited from the Ottoman Empire with a new and modern one. It was aimed to end the contradiction between the new and old, at the same time fully strengthening the new order. This can be easily seen in the regulation of *Halkevleri*: “As we are not far from the Menemen incident and similar events, it is very clear that it is necessary to leave the negative currents to history” (CHF Halkevleri Talimatnamesi, 1932: 4).

We see in the above quotations that the recent history of the Turk is an obstacle for him; therefore, the traces of the past must be gotten rid of immediately. This also paved the way for the process of creating a new citizen quite different from the old one. It was understood that *Halkevleri* aimed to be places that would create, civilize and educate the new Turkish citizen. “The expectation was that *Evler* would be the places where new cultural principals and images manufactured and advanced by *Türk Tarih Kurumu* and *Türk Dil Kurumu* and other cultural institutions of CHP, would be disseminated and those from all strata of society would be indoctrinated” (Çolak, 2000: 200). By this way, the modern civilized new Turkish man, who comprehended the reforms and adopted the regime's principles would be constructed.

In his speech at the opening of *Halkevleri*, Recep Peker, the Party Secretary General, explained the reason why *Evler* were established. He stated that *Halkevleri* were founded to perform public education as well as mass education. Peker emphasized that it was aimed to raise national unity with careful cultural work (Toksoy, 2007: 32). He associated the importance of nationalization with cultural development. For him, national unity constituted the primary purpose of *Halkevleri*: “To become a nation, it is necessary to establish a public education besides the mainstream education and to make the people work together. We believe that *Halkevleri* will advance our nation to the future like a friendly granite mass with its superior volume and ore, by becoming a community rather than being one by one”

(Halkevlerinin Doęuşu 19 Şubat 1932 Açılışın İlk Haftası, 1971: 6-9). The same desire was expressed in Nasuhi's column as "to provide harmony and unity between the differences in spirit and consciousness among society" (1933: 1). This kind of a uniformization wish had an extremely vital meaning for the cultural organ of the regime and formed the backbone of the civilizing mission.

The aim of unity also pointed to the elimination of the cultural distinction between rural and urban citizens. This was also an important duty of the regime from the very beginning of the new state. The disconnection between urban and rural areas and the low literacy rate hindered the effective use of existing communication tools and it became one of the major starting points for *Evler*. For the regime elites, controlling the aforementioned urban-rural distinction was only possible by turning the latter into the former. This purpose was later on reinforced through *Halkodaları*, which were established to spread to the villages in 1940.

In the aforementioned purposes of *Halkevleri*, major duties were assigned to the intellectuals. They became prominent actors in fulfilling the ideals of the regime. In essence, the regime aimed to apply such a civilizing mission to the rest of the society through not only the party itself but also the intellectuals. In a writing about the activities of *Halkevleri*, Çağlar underlined that the intellectuals were all civilized missionaries who would meet and join the people in *Evler* (1939: 85). "The responsibility of the activities in *Evler* was carried out by school teachers, considered the most important instruments of the reform, capable of fulfilling *Halkevleri*'s broad educational-emancipation goals" (Karpat, 1963: 59). In addition, the necessity of intellectuals to provide affinity with the regime also occupied the administrative cadres as a vital issue. Obedience to the dominant ideological structure gained great importance since the exception of this was thoroughly experienced and the results were seen through the previous *Türk Ocakları*. As it was known, the lack of ideological unity among the intellectuals in the country alarmed the administrators. Therefore "even among the elite groups the possibility of the emergence of different life forms, even 'being modernized' in a different way, was not welcomed" (Çolak, 2000: 203).

The goal of changing the way of belief and system of thinking in society was the key factor of the whole process. As declared by the officials of CHP, the ultimate aim would be the social union of people and their becoming closer to a "new way of life". Exactly for this reason, *Halkevleri* tried to keep the scope of its activities quite wide. Possible to define the

process as social engineering, Çolak (2000: 202) expressed that as follows: “In its broadest sense, these may be seen as attempts to discover and describe the nature of the people that in the hands of the civilizing elite came to be an object of social engineering. This act of ‘knowing’ would make them project a ‘well-refined’ way of life from above.”

From a general perspective, *Halkevleri* had several purposes as to educate the people in line with the positivist world view; to create a new political culture that would support the new regime; to ensure the unity of people, who would understand each other and exchange ideas; to keep the youth away from harmful habits; to raise healthy generations; to bring people to a modern mentality; to eliminate the differences between the village and the city; to carry out adult education both in the villages and cities; to remove ignorance and to instil nationalist, secular and populist ideas. It was aimed to make people act with knowledge in every field such as culture, politics, art, and professional life. All the people would know how to read and write and would have the information necessary for all areas of life. It became clear that those knowing the modern world would contribute to the process of their country's arrival in the modern world. In this way, a series of activities were initiated to integrate the people and the state. The purposes of *Halkevleri* were redefined many times over the years. Although there were differences in the expressions, it can be observed that the purposes of *Halkevleri* did never change totally over the years. To see this related process in detail, it is now useful to look at the organizational structure of *Halkevleri*.

3.3.4. The Organizational Structure of *Halkevleri*

The organizational structure of *Halkevleri* is another important factor that we need to apply, to understand this institution. The opening and functioning of a *Halkevi* branch in any province, along with its organizational structure were bound by some procedures and principles by CHP executives. These were announced early at the opening stage. Here, it seems meaningful to examine this administrative and organizational structure. Understanding the administration scheme of *Halkevleri* essentially helps us to discover the close ties it established with CHP. There was a close tie between the Party and *Evler* in the field of administration, undertaking important duties in the formation of the structure of a cultural revolution and it occupied a large place in the agenda of the Republican regime.

Halkevleri were settled and organized under CHP's Secretary General. The administrative officers and the government personnel of CHP were instructed to support

Evler. The authority to open a *Halkevi* and determine the general policy was assigned to CHP central committee. The control of the activities was also left to the responsibility of the provincial organizations of the party (Karpas, 1963: 59). At this stage, it was seen that *Halkevleri* were under the chain of the party administratively and people who were not directly related to the party could not take place in the administrative staff.

The principles regarding the administrative organization of *Halkevleri* were determined in *Halkevleri* Regulation of 1932. “To be a member of *Halkevleri* administrative committee, it is necessary to be a member of CHP (There is no legal objection for civil servants to join these administrative committees and branch committees.)” (CHF *Halkevleri* Talimatnamesi, 1932: 5). In the regulation, it was stated that *Halkevleri* Administrative Board consisted of a representative determined by the branch committees. The members had the right to be re-elected in the elections held every two years. The head of each *Halkevi* was appointed by the party’s provincial chairman. *Evler* had to send their reports of activities to the General Secretariat of CHP every quarter. And deputies were assigned to inspect *Halkevleri*.

Ankara *Halkevi* had a privileged position among all other *Halkevleri* branches. Only the central organization of Ankara *Halkevi* was under the direct authority of the Secretary-General of CHP. Since Ankara *Halkevi* had such a position for the party, its administrative structure differed from all others. The budget of Ankara *Halkevi* was approved by the General Administration Committee of CHP (CHF *Halkevleri* Talimatnamesi, 1932: 5). As expressed by Şimşek, giving Ankara *Halkevi* an exceptional place could have two important meanings: First, the Party might have located Ankara as a perfect example to all *Halkevleri* branches in the country. Secondly, the Party might have wished to introduce Ankara *Halkevi* to foreign diplomats and leaders as an exemplary national institution (Şimşek, 2002: 73).

As stated by the regulation, the decision to open *Halkevleri* was a part of the duty of the General Administrative Committee of CHP. And the establishment, organization, and inspection of each *Halkevi* belonged to the Provincial Administrative Committees of CHP. In addition, each branch kept a record of the number of current members. Branch committees with up to 50 members constituted a branch committee of 3, and; those with more than 50 constituted a branch committee of 5 people. *Halkevleri* Administrative Committee consisted of one representative member to be elected by the branches’ administrative committees. Unlike the board of directors, general membership to *Halkevleri* and participating in their

activities did not require any relation with the party. It was expressed in Article 1 of the regulation as follows: “*Halkevleri* are places of gathering for those who feel a high level of excitement in their hearts and minds that makes the love of the country holy and advanced. In this respect, the doors of *Halkevi* are open to all citizens who are registered to the party or not” (CHF *Halkevleri Talimatnamesi*, 1932: 6).

The organizational structure of *Halkevleri* showed that *Halkevleri* were not an institution free from politics. Although the prime minister of the time, İsmet İnönü declared “*Halkevleri* are not a political institution. They are social and cultural institutions”, it was apparent that they were cultural institutions exercising through ideological means (Zeyrek, 2006: 18). The influence of the ruling party in the cultural indoctrination process was evident even in the smallest detail in the way *Evler* were organized. It was also possible to see this in other headings related to the organizational structure.

If the opening of any *Halkevi* was delayed, the activities of national and local organizations corresponding to the working branches of *Halkevi* were going to be conducted by the Party Administrative Committee. The buildings of *Halkevleri* were arranged and furnished by the administrative committees of the Republican People's Party. In addition to the symbols such as the Turkish flag and Atatürk statues in the buildings of *Halkevleri*, party slogans and flags with Six Arrows were hung, indicating the ties of *Halkevleri* with the party (Özdemir and Aktaş, 2011: 253). The 11th article of the related section of the regulation had the following remarks: “*Halkevleri* halls are open for the meetings of all national societies that do not oppose the principles of our party and are not members of other political parties.” Reported as a non-political organization in every case, *Halkevleri* kept itself away from only other political views. And this showed that the relationship between CHP and *Halkevleri* did not meet with any other political views.

CHP made great efforts even before *Halkevleri* were established to ensure the relationship between the party and *Evler*. The party desired this relation to remain at the same level in every branch. The Party Executive Board was divided into four main groups, A, B, C, and D; a total of 13 bureaus. The related office of *Halkevleri* was office B. This was a significant indicator that the party made the issue of *Halkevleri* one of its main aspects (Tunçay, 1981: 319). For this reason, the Party concentrated heavily on the organization of *Evler*. Studies were carried out both at the level of the General Secretariat of the Party and at the level of provincial organizations to carry the policies determined by the centre to *Evler*,

to implement the related activities in the regions where the branches were located, and to provide general coordination. Moreover, CHP established *Halkevleri* Advisory Board in 1940 to coordinate all its activities. Apart from the establishment of the administrative structure, there were also some other organizational regulations.

To establish a *Halkevi* in a settlement, certain conditions had to be provided. The opening of *Halkevi* in a settlement was possible after the following steps were taken in sequence. As cited from the Regulation of *Halkevleri* (CHF Halkevleri Talimatnamesi, 1932: 6); The process began when the board of directors of the Party organization determined whether the minimum conditions required to open a *Halkevi* in that region were met. The party then declared its proposal to open a *Halkevi* to the board of directors of the Republican Party in the related province. After this stage, the application request that reached the General Secretariat as the highest authority was finalized with the decision of the General Board of Directors. In this context, it might be proper to add the following comments of Gülcü (2020: 21): “The uncontrolled increase of *Halkevleri* was not allowed and the opening of *Evler* was not permitted anywhere unless there was a firm belief that they would work and strict guarantees were obtained from those who were committed to the joint involvement in the area *Halkevi* would be opened.”

A standard *Halkevi* was expected to have nine sections: “*Halkevleri* are established to consist of different sections so that every citizen can find a field of activity that he/she can choose” (CHF Halkevleri Talimatnamesi, 1932: 6). And these sections were: (1) Language and Literature Section (*Dil ve Edebiyat Şubesi*), (2) Fine Arts Section (*Güzel Sanatlar Şubesi*), (3) Drama Section (*Temsil Şubesi*), (4) Sports Section (*Spor Şubesi*), (5) Social Assistance Section (*Sosyal Yardım Şubesi*), (6) People's Classrooms and Courses Section (*Halk Dershanesi ve Kurslar Şubesi*), (7) Library and Publications Section (*Kütüphane ve Yayın Şubesi*), (8) Village Development Section (*Köycülük Şubesi*) and (9) History and Museum Section (*Tarih ve Müze Şubesi*) (Karpat, 1963: 60). To establish a *Halkevi* in a settlement, a sufficient number of members, to run at least three sections out of these nine had to be fulfilled. In addition to these, in order for a *Halkevi*, it was essential to have a hall with a capacity of at least 200 people, a library, and a building suitable for gymnastics.

Each *Halkevi* branch organized its programs in line with the instructions sent from the party centre. In this way, it was tried to ensure a unified order through the activities carried out in the branches. After the programs of each branch were prepared as quickly as

possible, these programs were examined and approved by the board of directors of *Halkevleri*. And a copy of each was sent to the General Secretariat of CHP. Although the activities of branches were detailed in the instructions, the appropriateness of them was inspected by the party. *Halkevleri* administrative committee had the following duties: the organization and administration of public manifestations of the national holidays, implementation of *Halkevi* performance programs, maintaining harmony between various branches, arbitration between branches in cases of any conflict and disagreement, examination and approval of special instructions to be prepared by the branches for the regulation of their activities, maintenance of the accounts of *Halkevi*, arrangement, and application of their budget (CHF *Halkevleri Talimatnamesi*, 1932: 8-9).

The buildings of *Halkevleri* were another significant indicator of the mechanism and organizational scheme. *Halkevleri* buildings, their location, and all other features were supplied by CHP, as conducted in *Halkevleri* Regulation. The Party procured the projects of *Halkevleri* buildings through competition, order, or through the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement (Gürallar Yeşilkaya, 2003: 136). It must be noted here that *Halkevleri* did not always have new and autonomous buildings. The buildings remaining from *Türk Ocakları* were used as new *Halkevleri*. Moreover, methods such as utilizing and renting other buildings were also applied when new buildings could not be provided or the buildings were insufficient. The regulation declared that following the reach of a *Halkevi* in a province to a certain size, it could have a building of its own.

The ideological structure of *Halkevleri* was maintained through the architecture of the buildings. The buildings of *Halkevleri* were "an example of the republican regime given to the country in every field" in the eyes of architects (Arkitekt, 1940: 163). The idea of dominating the centre prevailed in the buildings of *Halkevleri* as it was practiced in other elements of the regime. *Halkevleri* branches were mostly located in the squares of the cities. Çeçen's comments about the central location of *Evler* seemed worth noting: "Another point that draws attention to the location of *Halkevleri* in the city is their relationship with religious buildings. *Halkevleri* are an organization that aims to bring the people gathered as 'communities' in mosques together as a 'nation', that is, to gain a new habit of gathering and to ensure 'unity and solidarity'" (1990: 380). According to this idea, the buildings of *Halkevleri* aimed to serve as an alternative to religious places. *Halkevleri* buildings, in addition to their being a symbol of the nation-state with the construction and positioning, also revealed the notion of secularism of the regime. Çeçen pointed out this position of

Halkevleri as the substitute for the local mosques through the following statements: “During the Ottoman Empire, mosques functioned as the centre of society. Mustafa Kemal founded a new centre substituting for the mosques. *Halkevleri*, in the new state of the Republic, emerged as the centre of society on the way to democracy. The masses that were meeting in mosques eventually would gather as a nation instead of *ümmet*. As secularism became the basic principle of the republic, the new centres were required to bring the masses together outside the mosques” (Çeçen, 1990: 380).

Through considering the organizational structure of *Halkevleri* from a general perspective, it becomes clear that the ideological attitude of the Republican Party was reflected in all *Halkevleri* branches. This is an important indicator that clarifies why we need to define *Halkevleri* as a party/state-directed institution. In this way, the Party found the opportunity to establish dominance in the social sphere as well as in the institutional structuring of the new state. Şimşek's following words on *Evler* are like an afterword for this topic: “It is understood that democracy is not on the agenda in terms of *Halkevleri* and the management and organization structure mentioned is rather reminiscent of a principality system” (2002: 89-90).

3.4. The Sections of *Halkevleri*

Examining the sections of *Halkevleri* is of great importance as it covers the examination of the activities carried out mainly in the means of cultural construction. Within the framework of its principles, *Halkevleri* had nine sections. Through each of these sections, it was aimed to control the daily activities, hobbies, and interests of the citizens, and to subject society to a total cultural change. In light of this, people were made subjects of a new culture, a high culture.

The principles of each section were determined by CHP *Halkevleri* Regulation. “Taking the Party program into account in all the activities of *Halkevleri* sections is essential in the spread of them” remarks the regulation addressing the dominance of the Republican Party in any form of cultural activity ranging from literature to theatre and music, from sports to education and entertainment (CHF *Halkevleri* Talimatnamesi, 1932: 9). In the division of these sections “there were various kinds of activities from political and cultural education through lectures, propaganda films and ceremonies to the education on practical information about farming techniques, etc. Among them, lectures, concerts, performances, and

exhibitions came to the fore to penetrate the hearts of the people a love of Western-style music, taste, fine arts, and modernist principles” (Çolak, 2000: 203). Therefore, now it seems necessary to see the regime’s influence over *Halkevleri* by examining each section one by one.

3.4.1. Language and Literature Section

The perception of language in *Halkevleri* can be directly related to the steps taken by the new state beforehand. The first thing that came to mind was probably the language reform carried out by *Türk Dil Kurumu*. The most important institution directing *Halkevleri* regarding the language and literature section was *Türk Dil Kurumu*. The Language and Literature sections of *Halkevleri* were embodied as natural members of this institution since *Türk Dil Kurumu* became the sole authority in the Republican era for language teaching. They played an important role in the spread and adoption of pure Turkish in society.

The duties of the Language and Literature section on behalf of language studies were explained in Article 27 of the Regulation; “The language, literature, and history department (named as the Language and Literature section after 1940) organizes interviews and conferences on topics that will help to increase the general knowledge of the people. In these conversations, the roots of the principles of the Republic and the Revolution are explained; increasing the love of the country and the sense of civic duty are put forward” (CHF *Halkevleri Talimatnamesi*, 1932: 10).

The Language and Literature section aimed at restoring the Turkish language to its original identity and organizing linguistic studies in the same direction. And two basic methods were followed to fulfil this aim: One of them was to make investigations and editions and the second was derivation (C.H.P. *Halkevleri Çalışma Talimatnamesi*, 1940; 12-13). There were many other efforts to control the future position of the Turkish language. The identification and improvement of the words of the main Turkish language that were not used in the written language and literature of that day were applied as one of the methods addressing this purpose. What was striking here was the emphasis on the ancestors of the language in pre-Islamic times, keeping the Ottoman language separate within the scope of the activities of re-remembering and reintegrating the pure Turkish language into society. It was related to the language policy of the regime, which revealed the aim of the destruction

of language as an important component of culture in breaking the ties between generations (Bingöl, 2009: 45).

The duties of the section covered activities in the field of literature. The main goal was to increase the number of studies praising Turkish history and revolution. In addition, it was intended to protect and encourage those who showed a special talent in the fields of science and literature among the young. Therefore, one of the most important duties of the section was to construct new members who “know how to speak”. It was aimed to break off the new individual from the old one by spiritual and linguistic means. “Dignity is restored to the speech since the opening of *Halkevleri* in our cities and towns because they were under the influence of the crippled Ottoman Empire who had adopted an opinion as ‘speech is silver, but silence is golden’ for centuries” (CHP Halkevi ve Halkodaları 1932-1942, 1942: 4). For these purposes, the section held meetings between the authors and arranged literary competitions. Behçet K. Çağlar expressed this aim with the following words: "It is to destroy the silent, introverted mentality that finds its expression in the motto of the Ottoman upbringing, 'if words are silver, silence is gold' (cited in *Konuşmalar*, 1946: 109).

This section was able to publish the journals as well. One of the main duties of the section was to publish the official journals of *Evler*. In this regard, the journal *Ülkü*, as the official publication organ of Ankara *Halkevi*, gained a central position in all *Halkevleri* branches. From the first year of the establishment of *Halkevleri* until 1939, official journal publications were made mostly on subjects such as social sciences, literature, applied sciences, history, and geography. The topics in the process from 1939 to 1942 were listed as general works, history, geography, and literature (CHP Halkevi ve Halkodaları 1943, 1944).

This section fulfilled an important task in the process of educating the public: It was based on raising the level of the people through conferences on numerous topics. However, the issues committed to the continuation of the conferences were not fully carried out. Although it was stated in the regulation of *Halkevleri* that the doors of *Halkevleri* were open to every intellectual who wanted to make speeches in their field of expertise and that those intellectuals could give conferences on a wide range of topics, it was later on seen that this did not work in practice. Since *Halkevleri* acted as an extension of CHP, they did not allow different opinions to emerge. Conferences became an important indicator of this. The 11th article of the regulation declared that: “*Halkevleri* halls are open for the meetings of all national societies that do not oppose the principles of our party and are not members of other

political parties.” In practice, it did not always happen in this way. In the inspections carried out by CHP, it was confessed by a party official that, "I regret to say that our conferences are not attracting the attention of the public as we would like... I attribute the reason for this to the fact that the conference topics are not related to the daily lives and works of the people. Boring expressions and lengthening of conferences for hours also have a great effect on this issue” (DABCA, 1933: 1005-878-1, 16). Another criticism was brought by Olgun. For him, *Halkevleri* were inadequate in terms of organizing national and general public meetings, which were very important in terms of 'warming the people to the regime and the revolutions and strengthening the national unity'. The main criticism of *Halkevleri* on this issue was that they thought they were doing their duty only by organizing their programs for such meetings (Olgun, 2019: 155).

3.4.2. Fine Arts Section

Halkevleri, from the very beginning, aimed to raise the cultural level of people and to construct new, modern, high-cultured citizens. In this respect, the continuation of cultural activities was a cornerstone for the fulfilment of the main objectives. For this reason, the meaning of the fine arts section was quite considerable not only for *Halkevleri* administration but also for the ruling party. This section, among all other sections of *Halkevleri*, was the one, most interfered with by the centre.

The duties of this section were shortly explained in the regulation as follows: “Fine arts section gathers together artistic or amateur elements in fields such as music, painting, sculpture, architecture, ornamental arts and so on. It deals with the development of young talents through encouragement. The section arranges the musical part of the public performance programs; organizes public music evenings for the citizens” (CHF *Halkevleri* Talimatnamesi, 1932: 10-11). Following these purposes, limited technical facilities such as radio and gramophone were profited and courses were organized to spread the art among the society. Throughout this section, *Halkevleri* succeeded in taking advantage of many opportunities that were limited at that time, to direct society's tastes in the fields of art and music.

The most important aspect of the fine arts section was to ensure that cultural activities were offered to society in an educational manner. The section “tries to increase the followers of fine arts and to increase the level of aesthetic perception and understanding in the

neighbourhood with the courses to be opened where possible” (CHF Halkevleri Talimatnamesi, 1932). Behçet Kemal’s views were on the same line; “In countries of revolution like ours, art, whatever it may be, should know to be at the service of the revolution as a pleasure of the heart, a debt of conscience, a remedy for life. For revolutionary movements to be fully adopted by the whole society and to be fully absorbed in the spirit of the people, art must shine in their hands and pass through the retort of art. Art will put new feelings in the hearts of the people and new perceptions in the eyes of the people” (1935: 336).

Throughout the civilization mission, the reference of art was determined as that of accompanying its Western counterparts in a modern framework. In article 33 of *Halkevleri* Regulation, named ‘the direction to participate in music’, this orientation was expressed as follows; “Modern international music and national folk songs will be taken as a basis and international music techniques and instruments will be used in the public performances at *Halkevleri*. In other words, we aim to keep modern and international music as a basis and to apply it.” This did not mean that the national elements were going to be lost completely in music. In the same chapter of the regulation, it was declared that the fine arts section should determine the harmony of the national dances with the notes and words of the national songs among people, especially in the villages. Although the issue of maintaining national elements came to the fore, it was known that the main purpose was still to instil art into society with a developmental process. To eliminate the duality in the reflection of arts into the practice, the aim of uniting the national elements with the international technique was mentioned within *Halkevleri* Regulation, which was revised in 1938: “Modern international music and our folk songs will be taken as the basis and international music techniques and tools will be used. We aim to keep the modern and classical music and its style as a basis and to ensure this” (CHP Halkevleri Öğreneği, 1938).

The aim of incorporating Western music into the tastes of the public (1935 *Halkevleri*, 1935: 40) was mentioned as a necessity many times. In Article 21 of *Halkevleri* Working Regulation, it was stated that people would listen to Western music. According to the article; “The main purpose in the music activities of *Halkevleri* is to gather and preserve our folk songs, which live as a treasure in the depths of the national spirit, through processing it with the Western technique for future composers, to accustom and warm the ears and tastes to polyphonic music, for this making use of many opportunities to listen to the works of Western music abundantly (*Halkevleri* Çalışma Talimatnamesi, 1940). “Although the task

of making a revolution in music was given to *Halkevleri*, it was determined *Evler* could not protect themselves from the eastern music” (Olgun, 2019: 118-119). As an important point, Eastern music was continued, but “it was forbidden to open lessons in Eastern type of music, to train students relatedly” as stated by the inspections carried out by CHP (DABCA, 1933: 1005-878-1, 18). According to this inspection report, the music lessons would only be open for international music.

The following incident in 1938, as a critical example of the aforementioned national-international harmony in arts, seemed interesting: During Mustafa Kemal’s visit to Ankara *Halkevi*, an *ashik* from Gaziantep was interrupted by Mustafa Kemal while performing his music. The reason why Kemal Pasha stopped the singer with his words was explained in this direction: “Friends! We see examples of this tiny instrument on the monuments of our ancestors, the Hittites. It is a piece of fireside music, not the music of this society. We need music to give us a source of joy, not drowsy. Our artists will take these sounds into their hands, national symphonies, and operas. They'll do it. You shouldn't have to deal with such fossilized forms” (cited by Güven, 1974: 59). Even only these statements proved that the national and international harmony in art aimed by *Halkevleri* remained unfulfilled.

In the way of transforming society, the arts had a highly functional place for the regime. Essentially, the control of cultural forms in achieving the desired high culture and making society a part of this culture was fulfilled through this section of fine arts. It was aimed to achieve such goals not by preserving the existing culture, but by changing it almost completely and replacing it with a new form - a Western model. This revealed how large a gap existed between the development process envisioned by the ruling elites and the values of the society.

3.4.3. Drama Section

The drama section came to the fore as a mass tool that gained great importance in line with the general purposes of *Halkevleri*. This section, in carrying out its major goals, mainly focused on the activities of cinema and theatre to reach more people. The section aimed to transform society by benefiting from the unique inspirational power of the theatre, to meet the needs for theatre in cities and towns, to raise successful actors, and to make propaganda. It was ideologically similar to the other sections of *Halkevleri* but differed in the scope of its activities and its accessibility. The theatre was considered an extremely

important implement by the single-party government to transform society with the content of the plays. For this reason, both the performances and the contents of the plays were kept under control by the regime. The purpose of the theatre plays was to awaken life and movement in *Evler*, to train the young people to speak freely, to help their intellectual and artistic education, to raise good orators, and to make useful suggestions for the country (C.H.P. Halkevleri Çalışma Talimatnamesi, 1940).

The gathering of men and women in the representations was a significant aspect of this section. “The drama sections of *Halkevleri* constitute a representation group consisting of male and female members being enthusiastic and talented for the art of representation” (CHF Halkevleri Talimatnamesi, 1932: 11). The 'male and female' participation in plays collectively was an important sign for the establishment of regime principles. Within this frame, it was indicated that women's roles would no longer be given to men and that great efforts would be made for the union of male and female actors. This was meaningful for the position of women in the new Turkish state. It also conveyed critical messages in that it was promoting a secular alternative to the old-fashioned way.

In the document published in 1935 on how *Halkevleri* worked up to that time, in three years-period, it was possible to see the participation of male and female actors together was directly challenged against the former Ottoman artistic style. It was stated through the following words: “Many families considered such a representation as a sacred duty to keep this revolutionary institution alive and therefore, they put their daughters on stage after *Halkevleri* started this representation business, which caused many new talents to emerge. It caused another old and crippled idea to be defeated... This mentality is now suppressed, it can no longer exist” (1935 *Halkevleri*, 1935: 52). It was revealed that the efforts of the republican regime through this representation section were not only to establish the ‘new’, but also to cut all kinds of physical and mental relations with the ‘old’ one.

The power of theatre was great in reaching the masses and appealing to them. As in all other sections of *Halkevleri*, the tendency to spread culture and art under the direction of the party was apparent in this section as well. The major distinction for this section was the possibility to reach great masses in a single activity. As asserted by Şimşek, “In the conditions of the 1930s and 1940s, the Drama section could reach the widest audiences in the country” (Şimşek, 2002: 82). According to some, the drama section was the most

effective one compared to the other sections of *Halkevleri* in spreading the basic principles and ideology of the party.

The content of the plays to be performed in *Halkevleri* branches was also an extremely important topic. “The plays that will be chosen by the general administrative committee are represented at the public halls of *Halkevi*. The plays to be represented separately must also be seen and approved by the centre” (CHF *Halkevleri Talimatnamesi*, 1932: 11). One of the main purposes for the drama section, as indicated in *Halkevleri Regulation* was the determination of party-directed plays.

As a critical review of the functioning of theatres in *Halkevleri*, Reşat Nuri Güntekin stated that “the repertoire in the representations remained weak in the drama sections. However, better results could have been achieved if the leading authors had been employed within certain rules. The plays were requested to be patriotic and social since they served as significant propaganda and therefore the subjects were severely restricted. First of all, it is necessary to see the theatre as a theatre. The theatre creates itself with elements such as joy, sadness, and excitement so that it can arise in the public. Although the chief duty of the theatre is to give good and useful thoughts to the people, this feature should lag behind the others. A poor theatre can never be a good propaganda tool. A play that contains high thoughts but is not well organized can inspire respect for those thoughts in the audience, but never taste and excitement. If ever this happens, the actor loses his will and the public does not go to the theatre anymore” (cited by Karadağ, 1988: 167).

Among the activities carried out in the drama sections of *Halkevleri* were not only theatrical performances but also movie screenings. In other words, this section benefitted from cinema tools to spread the regime’s ideology to large masses. There were two types of cinema machines, fixed and portable. It was aimed to spread the cinema even to places where there was no *Halkevi*. The cinemas consisted of films that passed the filter of CHP General Secretariat in terms of subject and content. The films were procured to spread the idea of revolution and increase the level of culture. Films approved by the party were sent to *Halkevi* branches (Çağlar, 1935: 62).

The plays exhibited in *Evler* were free of charge. Through this method, it was aimed both to provide economic benefit to society and to reach more people. Nearly all the activities in *Halkevleri* were afforded by CHP. However, later on with the increase in the

number, it was accepted that *Evler* would provide paid services in some areas. It was possible to understand the ideological aims in every detail of *Halkevleri*. It was also probable to see that political efforts laid behind *Halkevleri*'s push for these cultural activities.

3.4.4. Sports Section

The sports section of *Halkevleri* became a part of a cultural movement, mainly as a result of new inventions in the Turkish Revolution. This also caused the section partially differed from others. Occupying a large place in the adult leisure organization pioneered by Italy in the 1920s, sports activities attracted the attention of Turkish ruling elites and sports became a tool for the adult organization for the first time in Turkish history, with this section.

Sports drew attention as it turned out to be the most detailed section in *Halkevleri* Regulation. "Sports and all body movements are essential elements of youth education and national education. The section should encourage love and interest in sports and body movements among Turkish youth and Turkish people. It must make them a mass movement, a national activity" declared Article 39 of the Regulation (CHF *Halkevleri* Talimatnamesi, 1932: 12). Considered an important part of youth and national education, sports and physical education aimed at ensuring national unity. The basic goal of the section was to treat sports as the motivation behind culture and physics, to reveal the national sports issue, to traditionalize sports, and to engage in mass movements. It was also aimed to eliminate the existing discrimination in society through sports activities.

This section intended to introduce various sports types to Turkish people. These included gymnastic movements that would increase physical strength and development; sports activities such as rowing, athletics, swimming football, boxing, wrestling, cycling, horse riding, hunting, fishing, and shooting with guns, which required strength; and activities such as javelin, mountain and winter sports, wild animal hunting, sailing and fishing in the open seas, which could be considered partly dangerous (CHF *Halkevleri* Talimatnamesi, 1932: 12). The activities of this section included mass-activating gymnastics as well. As in other sections of *Halkevleri*, this section had the duty of organizing sports festivals, giving sports conferences, and providing training on unknown sports branches. One of its important activities was the excursions and camps (C.H.P. *Halkevleri* Çalışma Talimatnamesi, 1940).

Applying to sports activities to ensure national unity mainly stemmed from the belief that "the development of the body, soul, and mind are joint with each other" in *Halkevleri* regulation (1935 *Halkevleri*, 1935: 66). This unity was also related to the history of the Turkish nation. Accordingly, the necessity of sports was pointed out in this way: "We were able to learn from Western knowledge as well as from our history that Turkish society raised strong men until the beginning of the 19th century. However, the bodies of the generations after the 19th century were the heirlooms of the reign in Anatolia. For this reason, sports were a necessity for food and air, from villages that were neglected and left unhealthy, to those cities full of people. Before we did sports as a skill, we had to apply it as a dream, as a social necessity" 1935 *Halkevleri*, 1935: 66).

Throughout this section, sports activities in *Halkevleri* were more than an activity of pleasure; they were appointed as an intermediary in raising generations. The aim of raising energetic generations and thus ensuring national unity was answered in *Halkevleri* as follows: "Sport is not fantasy, nor was it an individual business; it has always taken into account that the aim is to raise hundreds of thousands of disease-free, active and healthy individuals rather than elite singles and champions" (1935 *Halkevleri*, 1935: 69).

In light of all these purposes, necessary physical conditions were provided to benefit from sports and gymnastic activities in many branches of *Halkevleri*. The necessity of the existence of gymnasiums as well as the library, reading halls, and representation halls for cultural activities made this section important for each *Halkevi* (Çağlar, 1935: 65). Moreover, additional attention was given to gymnasiums in the buildings of *Halkevleri* that would be built from the beginning. The provision of physical conditions included not only the construction of gymnasiums but also supplying sports equipment to the branches. In addition to many sports activities carried out in these sections, mass body movements, which should be given the most importance, could not be started due to the lack of teachers in many *Halkevleri* and the absence of gymnasiums in all *Halkevleri* (Olgun, 2019: 121).

3.4.5. Social Assistance Section

The only way to spread the regime's principles and ideology was not to guide people through activities in a certain field. It also required fulfilling some other social needs. Being aware of this necessity, *Halkevleri* did not only take an active role in the cultural construction but also focused on other forms of social activities to reach people in need and meet their

basic needs. In this way, *Halkevleri* claimed that it would stand by society not only in joy but also in grief. It was aimed to “make the practice of populism not just through literature, but also to take into account the body's health and bodily needs while ensuring the mental well-being and development of the people” (Çağlar, 1935: 82). This kind of social assistance mobility of *Evler* was a method seen in many adult education institutions as a functional way to reach society.

One of the main duties of this section was to identify people in need in the areas where *Halkevleri* were located and to extend a hand of compassion to the orphaned women, children, old, widows, and sick people. In this framework, it was aimed to arouse a sense of love, compassion, and cooperation among the public and to bring these feelings to the highest level, to help people in need in health and many other areas, to inform the public about health, to help the unemployed find a job, to seek solutions against begging (CHF Halkevleri Talimatnamesi, 1932: 14). They were seen as a source of development and spread of social compassion. “The section looks for income sources to carry out all these duties. For this purpose, it organizes appropriate performances or excursions at appropriate times and opportunities” (CHF Halkevleri Talimatnamesi, 1932: 14) As stated in the Regulation, *Halkevleri* organized concerts and performances with the support of other sections to facilitate the delivery of aid within the scope of social assistance section. At this point, the drama section and the fine arts sections were those that *Evler* for social assistance activities most frequently applied to.

The section refused to be called a charity, but it cooperated with many social aid organizations such as public and private hospitals, hospices, dispensaries, child maternity and nursing homes, and establishments that would take care of the children of orphan workers (such as kindergartens), student dormitories, workers' treatment hostels established by companies and institutions written in the sanitary law. Particular attention was also paid to the clothes, meals, residence, and care of the orphaned school children. In addition, assisting the needy in prisons was one of the activities of this section.

Within the framework of the aim of modernizing society, social assistance emerged as a section that undertook major philanthropic tasks. To integrate the people not only culturally but also socially, CHP gave great importance to this section. The considerable factor here was that the contribution of the social assistance section was indisputable in the integration process of the state/party with the public.

3.4.6. People's Classrooms and Courses Section

Raising society to a high cultural level was, first of all, related to the dissemination of all kinds of literacy activities and their total provision. *Halkevleri* largely focused on the issue of educating and training the citizens. People's Classrooms and Courses section was established to ensure that non-formal education was carried out at the level of adults, apart from the general education provided to children and young people. Aiming to contribute to general education with their classrooms and courses sections, *Halkevleri* formed the basis of the Public Education Centres to be established by the Ministry of National Education in the following years. In essence, this section had a significant place in the general logic behind *Halkevleri*. While the information about the revolutions and the continuation of the revolutions were transferred to children and young people through formal education, the adults could only be educated through *Halkevleri*. The adults as the critical respondents of the process were given high importance and they were transferred principles of revolutions. For this purpose, people's classrooms and courses section was appointed. The main point of this section was to instil literacy throughout society and to ensure that no illiterate person was left.

The first principle stated in the regulation regarding this section was as follows; "A Public Classroom and Courses Section will be opened in each *Halkevi* to ensure and protect the advancement and expansion of all kinds of teaching, writing, and training that will raise the level of the people." The most important purpose of this section, in this regard, was to raise the level of the people by teaching literacy. In this context, as reported in the regulation, "This section follows closely and with firm interest the attempts of local administrations, municipalities, and private entrepreneurs to encourage individuals, to teach foreign language, science, art, and practical life information. It gives particular importance to opening technical and specialized schools and courses" (CHF *Halkevleri* Talimatnamesi, 1932: 15-16).

The position of intellectuals in the functioning of these courses and private teaching institutions was also an important point to be emphasized. In the regulation, the statements regarding the teachers of the courses and private teaching institutions to be opened in *Evler* were explained with the following lines; "The teachers of the classrooms and courses in *Halkevleri* are honorary. Our precious friends will not withhold this honourable duty of making the citizens stronger and more successful in their struggle of life by teaching them."

It was understood that those who would teach in these courses and private teaching institutions were going to be volunteers. There were also statements that they would undertake an extremely important task. In the definition of this important task, the struggle with the recent Turkish history was revealed: “They (the teachers) put aside the old script, the old style, the old expression, the old science and showed their renunciation and consciousness to give a new clarity and a new peace to their writings, style, and expressions in a lecture” (1935 Halkevleri, 1935: 95).

The aim of raising the level of the people who were left ignorant during the Ottoman sultanate highlighted the importance of the new, modern techniques and specialization in the courses section (CHP Halkevleri Öğreneği, 1938). Besides courses such as Turkish language, literacy, foreign language, science, craft, history, and civics, some social studies that would provide general education in *Halkevleri*, vocational courses such as typing, accounting, sewing, embroidery, ironing, floristry, beekeeping, electricity were opened. Among the courses, the most popular one was the foreign language course. For the regime, the foreign language courses had a vital meaning since they aimed to destroy the disabled perception of the past: “Instead of the Persian and Arabic languages which could only be used as a tool for religious abuse, it was necessary to teach Turkish children other foreign languages - the term ‘foreign’ sounds strange here, more precisely, languages that are cultural friends, civilization relatives of us - which are the keys to civilization and the idea of westernism” (1935 Halkevleri, 1935: 96). The making the whole society forget the Ottoman past here, critically, included introducing them with the new model, which was the West.

People's classrooms and courses section had a significant position in terms of Turkish courses compared to other sections. Because teaching the mother language throughout society was of great importance. Lack of literacy was one of the main obstacles to raising the level of society. However, in the literacy campaign, people's classrooms and courses section could not go as far as expected. According to the statistics, shared by CHP, participation in courses opened by *Halkevleri* decreased gradually after 1940, which was the most productive period of *Evler* in terms of courses. Most of the courses opened in the later periods were opened in the provincial *Halkevleri* and the courses opened in the villages were almost non-existent (CHP CHP Halkevleri ve Halkodaları 1943, 1944: 11-12). In the report published by CHP on the 10-year activities of *Halkevleri*, it was stated that *Halkevleri* did not do their part in this regard (CHP Halkevleri ve Halkodaları 1932-1942, 1942: 10). For

Olgun, the most important reason why this section did not show the expected success was that it did not receive the necessary support from all the institutions in the region (Olgun, 2019: 79).

3.4.7. Library and Publications Section

For a *Halkevi* branch to be opened in any province, there were required at least three sections until the necessary physical conditions were met. The fact that each branch had to have a library or a reading hall, as one of the required properties, revealed the importance of this section. This section was not only significant because of the library opportunities but also because it hosted the publishing activities of *Halkevleri*. The activities of this section, within the scope of the general objectives of *Evler*, were extremely vital to raise the level of society. Since literacy received great attention within the scope of *Halkevleri*, it made this section especially meaningful for the regime.

“Libraries are major agents in the development of public knowledge; for this reason, having a library and a reading room in each *Halkevi* is considered one of the first conditions of *Halkevi*. As long as its building is available, there should be a library and a reading room. There is also a book cabinet or shelf in places where the building is not available or the existing one is not sufficient. *Halkevleri* can also open their libraries and reading rooms in places separate from their buildings. Even if there is a public library in the city or town where *Halkevi* is located, each *Halkevi* establishes the basis of its library or protects another library or reading room” (CHF *Halkevleri Talimatnamesi*, 1932: 17). As stated in the Regulation, though building up libraries, *Halkevleri* aimed to turn the section into a basic need and more significantly to make every member of the society feel this necessity deeply. Instilling a love of reading throughout society constituted the essence of this section. It was expected that the works should be in very clear language and include national feelings. Proposing a development line from "neighbourhood coffeehouses to *Halkevi*'s libraries" (1935 *Halkevleri*, 1935: 99), the library and publications section tried to fulfil one of the main goals of *Evler*. Besides, this section of *Halkevleri*, through the form of mobile libraries, offered reading activities to citizens in many different places such as neighbourhoods, villages, and prisons or in any places that lack *Halkevleri*.

Making people acquire a habit of reading formed the basis of this section: “The section will take every possible and appropriate measure to increase the works that will

promote the national culture and to awaken the pleasure of reading in every group as much as possible. Efforts will be made to increase the number of readers of books and newspapers recommended by the general administrative committee; it will try to regulate this desire of those who cannot buy books and newspapers on their own” (CHF Halkevleri Talimatnamesi, 1932: 18).

While it was aimed to turn reading into a habit through libraries and publishing sections, the content of the books was also identified and filtered by the Republican Party General Secretary. At this point, before the books were brought into the library of *Halkevleri*, a very strict control was passed. Books containing literary, agricultural, and sanitary advice, works that would give new ideas and perceptions to the public on various issues from city planning to spiritual systems, and publications describing local measures to be taken according to local needs, were deemed appropriate to be read in *Halkevleri* (1935 Halkevleri, 1935: 99-100). Exactly this control revealed the works that were forbidden to be read and not allowed to enter the library in Article 90 of CHP *Halkevleri* Working Regulation as follows: (CHP Halkevleri Çalışma Talimatnamesi, 1940): “Works that are religious in nature, do not comply with the ideology of the Turkish revolution, describe foreign regimes and ideologies, insult the superstitions, backward and reactionary mentality that is generally outside of national and realist views, suggest pessimism, depict cases such as murder and suicide, stimulate lust and passion and encourage youth to adopt unhealthy habits, cannot be placed in *Halkevleri* libraries.”

The library and publications section also aimed to encourage publishing activities. This section was the publishing centre of the party and *Evler*. All publications, except the official journals of *Halkevleri*, were provided by the library and publication section. The Library and Publications section didn’t have the authority to issue journals since it was the duty of the Language and Literature section. Although the main attention was given to libraries within this section, publishing occupied an important place. Each branch would submit the work to the Administrative Committee of *Halkevleri* with the decision of the committee and the manuscripts of this work to the library and publication committee. CHP General Secretariat played an active role in the publishing phase as well. Great importance was given to having publications in the journals to be published in *Evler* that were going to introduce the idea of revolutionism, describe the heroism of the national struggle and give the love of populism.

3.4.8. Village Development Section

Villages were of great importance as one of the most important areas where the dominant ideology desired to spread. Considering that at the time of the revolution, most of the citizens lived in villages rather than cities, it might be apparent why this section was given so much emphasis. The new regime spread more easily in cities than in the countryside; it found the opportunity to express itself easily in the cities but had difficulty in the villages. Therefore, it became more essential than ever to reach the citizens in the villages. Although the villages constituted the majority of the country in terms of population (over 80 percent of the people in the country lived in the villages or small towns), the fact that they were far from the centre made the regime give special attention to this area. The regime elites understood that the reconstruction of the country could only start with organizing the countryside in the first place. And this revealed the efforts of *Halkevleri* to reach the society starting especially from the smallest district.

“One of the ideas underlying the establishment of *Halkevi* is the 'village'. For this purpose, village development sections are established in almost every *Halkevi*, even in places with at least three sections” (1940: 203) declared Ünal, addressing the importance of this section on behalf of *Halkevleri*'s main purposes. The intellectual origins of this section could be traced back to the Villagers' Association, established within *Türk Ocakları* in 1919, as many similarities could be seen in the stages of *Halkevleri*. It was known that this association aimed to ensure the development of the villagers, to educate the villagers, and to enable the villagers to integrate with the intellectuals. *Halkevleri*'s village development section aimed to reach the villages for similar purposes. It was extremely important for the regime to reach the villages to guarantee the future of the country and to ensure the total recognition of the revolutions.

“The main duty of the village development section is to strengthen the feelings of mutual love and solidarity between the villagers and the townspeople, for the sanitary, civil, moral development and evolution of the villages” (CHF *Halkevleri* Talimatnamesi, 1932: 19). The basic principle stated in *Halkevleri* Regulation regarding this section was the integration of the people in the village with those in the city and it was emphasized that this was necessary, especially for the development of the villages. In light of these objectives, *Halkevleri* intended to reach the villages by making use of the activities of other sections. Theatre tours were organized in the villages in cooperation with the drama section; in this

way, the villagers were able to experience activities such as *Karagöz*, puppetry, and national dances in their places (CHP Halkevi ve Halkodaları 1932-1942, 1942: 14-15).

It was not easy to reach the countryside from the centre. This section had great difficulties in reaching the villages and the people living there due to the disadvantageous conditions in rural Turkey at that time. Although the villages were given great importance, the expected success could not be achieved which could be understood from the steps to be taken soon. At this point, the Village development section of each *Halkevi* accepted all the teachers working in the villages as its natural members, as stated in Article 111 of Working Regulation (CHF Halkevleri Çalışma Talimatnamesi, 1940). Besides, for *Halkevleri* to achieve success in a short time, the General Secretariat of CHP wrote letters to the provinces. In the articles, the necessity of ensuring the interest and relevance of the teachers and students was expressed; and the government was requested to help the teachers to take part in these places. It was specially requested that teachers should come to *Evler*. Based on these articles, the government decided on 19 July 1932 in line with the request of the CHP General Secretariat (DABCA, 1932: 30-55-15).

In the first inspections on *Halkevleri*, the village development section was criticized by CHP officials for not performing its duties properly. In most of *Halkevleri* that were inspected, it was determined that the members of these sections were busy with rural activities in the cities instead of going to the villages (DABCA, 1933: 1005-878-1, 130). In addition, it was also stated in the inspections that national holidays were celebrated only in cities and towns until that day and that the villagers, who constituted the majority of the nation, were not even aware of the celebration of these holidays (DABCA, 1933: 1005-878-1, 9).

The fact that all revolutions took place in the centre did not make the countryside unimportant; on the contrary, the adoption of these reforms by the whole society was what the regime wished for. The key to the total recognition of the regime laid in the villages, which demographically constituted the majority of the population. And, this section, also pioneering *Halkodaları* established in 1940, was essentially a testament to the importance the regime attached to the issue of focusing on the village.

3.4.9. History and Museum Section

The activities for the history studies in *Evler* were carried out under the Language, History, and Literature Section in the first place. They were later merged with the Museums section and named the History and Museum section. This section, with the influence of *Türk Tarih Kurumu* established in 1931, aimed to settle a new form of historiography or a new historical consciousness. The section served as an honorary branch of *Türk Tarih Kurumu*. Since history, in general terms, had a dominant role in establishing the identity of a society, determining what to forget and what to remember was of great importance. In such an ideological climate, where the idea of creating a new identity, a new culture, and a new society was dominant, the significance of setting history from the very beginning could not be denied. In this regard, this section fulfilled duties such as assisting local museums, opening museums, making albums by taking photographs of ancient artifacts and protecting and repairing old and valuable artifacts.

Exercised as the Museum and Exhibition section in the first place, this section was divided into two groups the Museum group and the Exhibitions group. In this context, through the museum group, the section informed the related official authorities about the preservation of historical artifacts and monuments in the related *Halkevi* area. It assisted private associations in the preservation of these works. If there were official museums in the place where a *Halkevi* was located, the section tried to enrich them, to make up for their deficiencies, or to establish them if there were not. The exhibition group, on the other hand, was charged with keeping the safety of fine arts and national products (CHF Halkevleri Talimatnamesi, 1932: 20-21).

With the presence of *Türk Tarih Kurumu*, the history and museum section intended to bring the historical studies to sufficient levels within the scope of *Halkevleri* and this caused a change both in the name of the section and its activities. It had various duties such as conducting historical research, protecting historical monuments and conducting local folklore studies, conveying historical values to the public through publications, conferences, and panels, working for the compilation and collection of local historical remains, initiating the opening of new museums in addition to existing museums and issuing catalogues of historical ruins (CHP Halkevleri Öğreneği, 1938).

As well as writing and producing historiography, maintaining and transferring it to society was another motivation of the regime. For this reason, the activities of the history and museum section were carefully followed by the General Secretariat of the Republican People's Party. Moreover, Party Secretary General Şükrü Kaya insisted on making *Halkevleri* more active in historical studies. In this way, they aimed to revolutionize the national cultural life.

Evaluating the sections of *Halkevleri* from a general perspective, the common feature showed up that regardless of their activities, ideological indoctrination and asocial engineering prevailed in nearly all sections. It was also seen that ideological tools were exercised for the construction of the new culture. The activities of each branch were controlled by CHP. It was already known that the party's General Secretariat was concentrated on this audit. This situation showed that *Halkevleri* acted under the oppression of the state-government duality in the construction of culture and was almost a branch of the ruling party. In this context, it was revealed in the reports that the activities of *Halkevleri* were not successful enough to satisfy the regime elites.

All the activities of the sections were followed by CHP and all activities served to maintain the ideology of CHP. In this way, the intervention of the political sphere into the private sphere was attempted to be legitimated. All these pointed out the existence of an administration that struggled to consolidate its power culturally through *Halkevleri*. Through *Evler*, the government tried to solve the problems that it could not solve at the ideological level. In 1938, some shortcomings related to the outcomes of *Halkevleri* sections were identified by CHP General Secretariat. And it was stated that raising the cultural level of the people was still a great need and this was becoming more and more important day by day. From that on, the activities deemed necessary for a *Halkevi* to be considered active were presented in a circle published by the Party Secretary General and Minister of Interior, B. Şükrü Kaya. The precautions that were taken place repeatedly in the mentioned report were listed as: “*Halkevi* branches in every province should have a reading room that will be open at certain hours; some books and journals worth reading should be available. Every fifteen days, conferences should be held on a subject that would attract the attention of the citizens and gather the crowd spontaneously in *Halkevi*; these conferences must also include a written copy. Family meetings should be held once a month, where literary pieces such as Atatürk's great speech, and the national and local airs should be read, speeches should be made in return; conferences on various topics should be given among the participating youth;

and during this period, young people should both refresh and improve their knowledge and get used to oratory. Even if there is only one doctor in the area, poor patients once or twice a week should be examined. Preferably, pedestrian excursions should be organized to nearby villages once a month and these excursions should ensure real urban-peasant unification; it should be preferred that a doctor be present on the trips to take care of the patients in the village. Every *Halkevi* must have a gymnasium and the garden of *Halkevi* should be built with sand, a vineyard, rings, and some gymnastic equipment. Every *Halkevi* should try to identify natural beauties, historical artifacts, achievements, and folklore of the Republican era with photographs” (cited by Gülcü, 2020: 38-39). All these issues mentioned in the article dated 1938 proved that *Evler* could not yet achieve the expected level of performance in the six years. It was demanded that more activities should be carried out in *Evler* to raise the cultural level of the society as a whole and to eliminate the closely related urban-rural distinction.

The reports sent by CHP General Secretary and Minister of Interior B. Şükrü Kaya to *Halkevleri* also included some significant points. The issues that were insistently emphasized in the circular of 1938 regarding the activities of *Halkevleri* could be an example of this. In another report sent by the party's General Secretariat to solve the problems in *Halkevleri* village development section, the following drew attention: It was stated that *Halkevleri* could not be sufficient in reaching the villages; therefore, some suggestions were made to increase the number of village tours and some ways were recommended for those involved in the tours. In the report published in 1937, a letter was presented that suggested the need to hold more activities in the villages since the number of organized conferences was few; that the villagers with low cultural levels should be dealt with closely and that village tours should be made more frequently to make them feel that they were given attention; that the main concern of the section should be to bring advice and books to those ignorant people and to bring doctor and healing to those sick people (cited by Gülcü, 2020: 52). The content of this report also revealed that the village development section was not active enough and it tried to give the message that *Halkevleri* should be much more active in the field.

Within the scope of the goals of the activities carried out in the sections of *Halkevleri*, there also seemed some common points that attracted the attention which seemed to be worth mentioning. The adoption of the reforms by the whole society not only on the surface but also intellectually and spiritually and the spontaneous involvement of society in this whole

process was the main issue for *Halkevleri*. These essentially constituted significant parts of a desired cultural revolution. It was clearly stated that the main purpose of *Halkevleri* was to carry out the principles of the republic and revolution not only apparently, but in a way that "dominates all spirits and ideas" (CHP Halkevleri Öğreneği, 1938: 4). Moreover, it was also stated that an inner direction was intended with the activities of *Evler*: "It is known that even to conquer the simple mind of the people, it is necessary to start by conquering their hearts" (1935 Halkevleri, 1935: 14). "We would incorporate our revolutions into the souls of the people. After all, we were not content with the people staying with a kind of trust, a belief similar to passive consent, saying if Atatürk is in it, if it is the job of the Republic, of course, it is good; it was necessary to throw a spark into his heart from the fire of every revolution and to create the fever of the revolution in every Turk" (1935 Halkevleri, 1935: 3).

Defined as "the places where Turkish people are planted" (Nasuhi, 1933: 194), *Halkevleri* aimed at the cultural rise of the people not only by completing the subject of revolution in the minds but also by bringing them into a single mass. The regulations of *Halkevleri* also drew attention to the creation of homogeneity in the same direction: "Deep feelings of friendship prevail under the umbrella of *Halkevleri*. For this reason, the idea of an act contrary to the idea of treating everyone the same cannot find a place in *Halkevleri*" (CHP Halkevleri Öğreneği, 1938).

The aim of spreading the activities to as many people as possible in all sections of *Halkevleri* was essential to attract the people who were not only physically far from the centre but also mentally distant. *Evler* offered activities for those who were unlikely to have access to *Halkevleri*. It was the peasants that the regime wished to reach and spread its ideology the most. The idea that the villagers needed the services of *Halkevleri* more than anyone else was valid even before *Halkevleri* became official. The peasants were the most essential group that was expected to raise the level of culture and thus adopt the regime. It was this background that gave rise to the idea of *Halkodaları* in 1940.

3.5. Regime Extending to the Villages: *Halkodaları*

The establishment of *Halkodaları* was mainly due to the need to fill the deficiency that the Republican People's Party could not reach the villages sufficiently through *Halkevleri*. Although the village development section of *Halkevleri* was seen as an important

step by CHP in reaching the villages, over time it was understood that those sections were not sufficient to end the backwardness in the villages. The necessity of taking a step towards the villages, beyond the village development sections of *Halkevleri*, was one of the main factors that caused CHP to pave the way for *Halkodaları*. “It was thought that these places, which could not be reached through *Halkevleri* organization, would be touched. This new institution would be suitable for their needs, wishes, and conditions; therefore, *Halkodaları* were born” (CHP Halkevi ve Halkodaları 1932-1942, 1942: 17).

“The masses, especially the peasants, whose life became more and more distant from that of the centre through reforms, had to adapt to a new culture established by the centre... This came to mean the expansion of cultural control of the modernizing centre over the countryside” stated Çolak (2000: 211) in his thesis, explaining the starting point for *Halkodaları*, as a separate institution from *Halkevleri*. *Halkodaları* were not independent organizations in the countryside, but calling them so was another way of showing that they would be a considerable organization concentrated on the villages. Although *Halkodaları* were not the first and only initiative for the villages, they gained importance as they would be the only representative of *Halkevleri* in the villages.

The decision to expand through villages was taken by CHP in its 1939 program, approved at the 5th grand convention of the party. The program had two main outputs. The first of these was *Köy Enstitüleri*, established mostly for basic education in the villages, which was opened on April 17, 1940. The institutes aimed to train the village youth as primary school teachers for village schools who would give general education to the children and also provide cultural and practical knowledge to the villagers such as agriculture and manners (*Köy Enstitüleri Kanunu*, 1940). What made *Köy Enstitüleri* critical and turned them into the ideological apparatus of the regime was apparent: The teachers to be trained would not be ordinary ones; they would be raising the national culture of the villagers, educating them following the requirements and conditions of the age in terms of social life; taking the necessary measures for the dissemination and strengthening of the positive values of the village culture; organizing and directing ceremonies by taking local songs and dances into account at times of national festivals, school openings, and local festivals; enabling the villagers to use the radio, etc. They, in other words, would be the agents of the regime in the villages. In addition to the position of teachers in the institutes, the participation of villagers in this kind of teaching activity was intended to be obligatory, as prescribed by law (*Köy Okullarını ve Enstitülerini Teşkilatlandırma Kanunu*, 1942). The villagers would help

teachers and work together while fulfilling their duties; if they did not do so, the villagers would even be punished. Although *Köy Enstitüleri* remained as a much more technical stage, they relied on an ideological basis.

The second step of the village movement was the opening of *Halkodaları* in 1940 beyond the village development sections of *Halkevleri*. *Halkodaları* were put into exercise for rural areas where it was partially difficult to open a *Halkevi*. It was mainly established to spread social and cultural values, as a distinguishing feature from *Köy Enstitüleri*. As one moved from big cities to smaller towns or the countryside, it was seen that the conditions sought by the regulation of *Halkevleri* narrowed. And the means of establishing a *Halkevi* were reduced to the extent that they could not operate this institution. *Halkodaları* were established to meet such needs.

Halkodaları were administratively subordinate to Republican People's Party, just like *Halkevleri*. This commitment was also expressed in the 1939 Party program before *Halkodaları* were established. It was stated in the program that, "Aiming to provide non-formal education to the public, *Halkodaları* need support from the state". (CHP Programı 29 Mayıs 1939, 1939: 22). The number of *Halkodaları* increased exponentially in a short time; there were 141 *Halkodaları* branches in 1940, this number reached 455 in 1946 and by 1951 there were a total of 4322 *Halkodaları*, 830 of which were in towns (Çavdar, 1983: 882).

Halkodaları were implemented as a small version of *Halkevleri* in the rural region of the country. It could be easily seen that *Halkodaları* did not differ from *Halkevleri* in terms of principles. A directive was submitted by CHP in 1939. The activities to be carried out in *Halkodaları* as well as in *Halkevleri* were clearly stated in the Regulation prepared by CHP (CHP *Halkodaları Talimatnamesi* 1939 & CHP *Halkodaları Talimatnamesi* 1945). Accordingly, it was deemed appropriate to open a *Halkodası* in any place where sufficient numbers could not be reached to open a *Halkevi*. In Article 3 of *Halkodaları* Regulation, a minimum of 50 members, a hall, a reading room, and one staff to provide service with a budget were the necessary conditions to open a *Halkodası*. The board of directors consisted of 3 to 7 party officials or civil servants. For the other members, no ties with the party were sought.

In *Halkodaları*, which resembled *Halkevleri* in terms of organization, the same structures were not included in substance. Since *Halkodaları* were a kind of smaller

organizations than *Halkevleri*, *Odalar* were not divided into sections as in *Evler*. On the other hand, the range of activities carried out in *Halkodaları* was quite limited. In this context, the duties of *Halkodaları* were listed in the regulation as follows (CHP *Halkodaları Talimatnamesi* 1939, Article 13): To operate a clean meeting room, to prepare a reading room or a reading corner, to arrange the books that the party would send, to organize entertainment days and special days in which people could listen, read poems, listen radio and record player, encourage the performance of folk dances, open local exhibitions, ensure games such as wrestling, hunting, and horse riding to be played, ensure national holidays and other important days and help the poor and needy.

As in the administrative and institutional structure of *Halkevleri*, a similar system was activated in *Halkodaları*; the activities would be continued within the scope of the needs of each region. Many activities undertaken by the sections of *Halkevleri* were provided by *Halkodaları*. In this framework, activities such as coordinating conferences, arranging meetings and speeches, organizing celebration ceremonies on national holidays, performing local plays such as puppetry and *Karagöz*, and singing folk songs were among what was expected from *Halkodaları* (CHP 1945 Yılında *Halkevleri ve Halkodaları*, 1946: 18).

The continuation of the activities of *Halkevleri* with similar motivations in *Halkodaları* brought to mind the fate of the village development section of *Evler*. The existence of *Halkodaları* could easily invalidate the village development section in *Halkevleri* because they served nearly the same purposes. CHP solved this problem as follows: *Halkevleri* would be responsible for *Halkodaları* as the supreme institution; the village development sections and *Halkevleri* would be in direct contact with the people in the cities and *Halkodaları* would keep in touch with the countryside and people living there. The mission of *Halkevleri* to guide and assist *Halkodaları* would thus eliminate any kind of dualities (Şimşek, 2002: 141).

The rapid increase in the number of *Halkodaları* until 1951, when *Halkevleri* and *Halkodaları* were closed, was an important sign to understand the new regime's interest in peasants. But unfortunately, as Karpat expressed "*Halkodaları* were not as effective as *Halkevleri* due to the lack of peasant interest, local entrepreneurs and trained professionals maintaining the activities in *Halkodaları*" (1963: 63). In a similar way, Tütengil was of such an opinion; "The aim could not be achieved with the village development sections in *Halkevleri* and *Halkodaları*. Besides the small size of the Anatolian villages, the fact that

Halkevleri acted with a bureaucratic mentality has a great role in this” (1969: 93). Since reaching villages necessitated an interactive process, the high number of *Halkodaları* was not sufficient enough to maintain success at a similar pace to *Halkevleri*. The reason behind it was the imagination of a new society turning into a mission of "civilizing" the peasants. Since *Halkodaları* were considered the core of *Halkevleri*, many places that were originally set up as *Halkodaları* later turned into *Halkevleri*.

The Villagers’ Association of *Türk Ocakları* organization essentially constituted both the village development section of *Halkevleri* and the foundation of *Halkodaları*. The idea of enlightening the villagers with a motivation of “moving towards people” of the Villagers’ Association slightly changed dimensions in the hands of the new regime after the Republic and started serving the purpose of “transforming the villagers”. “This was because of how the regime recognized the peasants. They were considered to be culturally backward. And their position was depicted as a deficit in the path of Westernization” (Çolak, 2000: 212). Enabling the villagers’ acculturation in their areas –and expecting a top-down hierarchy– was the only obstacle for the regime to reach people.

It is possible to write about *Halkodaları* at length, but they manifested to some extent a miniature of *Halkevleri* in terms of content; so, it seems more useful for this study to examine the general perception of adult education and civilization processes rather than the activities of *Halkodaları*. Then it is also important at this point to see what kind of dynamics this indoctrination process – starting first through *Evler* and extending to the countryside through *Halkodaları* - hosted.

3.6. An Overall Assessment

Exercising as a state/party-directed cultural tool, *Halkevleri* were closed in 1951 after the transition to multi-party life. *Halkevleri* tended to lose the momentum that it gained in the first ten years of its opening, in its later periods. However, what was interesting here was that, in the statistical information shared by CHP, there was neither a noticeable decrease in the number of *Evler* nor the interest in *them*. Moreover, in the sources shared by the party, it was claimed that the success of *Halkevleri* continued increasingly. The belief that the knowledge of quantity obstructed the general quality of *Halkevleri* also prevented healthy evaluations of *Halkevleri* during its time.

In the process of the abolition of *Halkevleri*, the gradual decrease of enthusiasm in *Evler* when compared to the early days occurred as an important aspect. However, the transition to the multi-party system and the changing dynamics in the international arena in this process would not be deniable. Since 1946, when *Demokrat Parti* (Democrat Party), was just an opposing party, even the idea of those opposing CHP taking part in power kept many people away from going to *Halkevleri* or leaving the membership of *Evler*. In addition to the impact of this situation on society, the problems related to the budgets of *Halkevleri* also played an important role in the decline of *Evler*. “It was no longer easy for CHP to transfer money from the state and local governments' budgets to *Halkevleri*” (Şimşek, 2002: 206). The budget transferred to *Halkevleri* from the state treasury and that of local governments was the main subject of discussion between the two political parties, especially after 1946.

The close relationship between CHP and *Halkevleri* attracted the attention of the other parties in the parliament and this was one of the main factors affecting the position of *Halkevleri* in the new period. The legal personality of *Halkevleri* as the cultural branch of CHP was one of the reasons that led to harsh discussions in the parliament. What brought the opposition parties and Republican People's Party against each other on the issue of *Halkevleri* could be explained by the fact that CHP insisted on not changing the position of *Halkevleri*. However, Democrat Party (DP), which constituted the basic figure of the multi-party life since 1946 and represented a significant majority in the Assembly, questioned the organic ties of *Halkevleri* with CHP. DP requested *Halkevleri* to provide services not only for CHP and its members but to all citizens across the country. The members of DP argued that the money transferred to *Halkevleri* was deducted from the taxes collected from all Turkish citizens regardless of whether they were members of CHP or not; therefore, their parties should be able to benefit from these organizations at least as much as CHP. On the other hand, CHP's claim that it had no ties with *Halkevleri*, presenting it as an independent organization that carried out cultural and artistic activities, led to contradictions between DP and CHP towards *Halkevleri*.

The idea of separating *Halkevleri* from CHP and turning them into an independent organization was put forward and started to be discussed to solve the problems arising from the controversial position of *Evler*. This idea, first discussed at the 7th Great Congress of CHP on November 17, 1947, led to long discussions. Although CHP decided to turn *Halkevleri* into a public "facility" in the same congress, there were severe discussions

between the two parties in the parliament and no consensus could be reached (Toksoy, 2007: 110). After the very contentious parliamentary debates between CHP and DP, the process of closing *Halkevleri* was officially begun. *Halkevleri*, which came into existence as “the cultural institution of the revolution”, in Çolak’s words (2017: 128), was closed by the law 5830, accepted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 8 August 1951 and entered into force after being published in the Official Gazette on 11 August 1951 (Özacun, 2001: 10). The draft law on the closure of *Halkevleri* “prohibited the donation of the assets of public institutions, legal entities and associations to political parties and their transfer free of charge. It also made it obligatory to return the goods transferred from defunct public institutions and associations such as *Türk Ocakları*” (Şimşek, 2002: 212-213).

In lieu of the conclusion of this chapter, Şimşek’s evaluations seemed significant: “The changes experienced by *Halkevleri*, the failure of CHP in 1946 and especially in the 1950 elections, the revival of traditional and religious patterns of behaviour during the multi-party period; all these indicate that success of *Halkevleri* remained far below the expectations. The strategy of the regime intending to create a historically amnesiac or weak-minded people did not display the expected results” (2005: 88).

Öztürkmen (1994: 174) asked the question of whether *Halkevleri* were closed or they completed their natural lifetime, in his article on *Halkevleri*. This caused many researchers to examine the issue and offered us the opportunity to make an assessment of the institution and the dynamics of the period from a historical perspective. Starting its activities in 1932, *Halkevleri* had a total of 479 branches around Turkey, including 478 branches in the country and 1 branch abroad, in London. The number of *Halkodaları* reached 4322 (Çavdar, 1983: 882). Having a total of 17968 members in 1932, *Halkevleri* increased the number of its members in a short time; by 1935, the number of members of *Halkevleri* reached 54998 members and 136535 members by 1938. The number of memberships, which showed a great increase in the first years, did not have the same momentum later on. The statistical information about the membership of *Halkevleri* and the citizens participating in the activities carried out by *Evler* was accessed through CHP. However, this arose some questions. The feedback about *Halkevleri* made us understand that *Evler* could not achieve as much success as it was pointed out by the regime.

Başgöz and Wilson, in this regard, were suspicious of the statistical information shared by CHP executives and *Halkevleri* administrators. “In the official statistics of CHP

submitted by the directors of *Halkevi*, a large number of workers and peasants were shown as members of *Halkevleri*. However, the accuracy of these statistics is doubtful. In keeping these statistics in *Halkevleri*, there was no systematic and professional management. In addition, in preparing their annual reports, directors often falsified the actual figures to show that the number of members was growing rapidly” (Başgöz and Wilson, 1968: 157).

In the expression of the numbers, the image of *Halkevleri* was not damaged, but a shadow over the democratic character of *Halkevleri* was cast. From the dominance over *Halkevleri* of the single-party government, which supported the idea that democracy could only be established by themselves through the Republican regime, it could be understood that no democratic process was maintained through *Evler*. This could be easily discovered in the course covering the transition from *Türk Ocakları* to *Halkevleri*. Beyond providing a party-directed adult education program; CHP determined the circumstances of joining *Halkevleri* through some basic conditions. They consisted of not being against the People's Republican Party, not being a member of another party, and not making reactionary propaganda.

One of the most important supporters of *Halkevleri*, İsmayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu's following determinations about *Halkevleri* seemed critical: "There are two big realities in Turkey. These two realities are: A youth who is thirsty for culture and *Halkevleri* which are an institution existing to give culture from body to soul. They are both of a happy breed, but there is a third reality that makes people sad: very few of these young people are inside these *Evler* and most of them are outside *Evler*" (1939: 2). With these words, Baltacıoğlu summarized one of the main pillars of *Halkevleri*. And it was that *Halkevleri* turned into an institution away from the people, despite its emphasis on populism.

The idea that *Evler* acted as an ideological part of the regime, rather than a genuinely populist initiative was accepted by many historians and writers as one of the most fundamental issues that prevented *Halkevleri*'s success. Tunaya's definition of *Halkevleri* as "the places established by Republican People's Party to take the place of *Türk Ocakları* and to carry out the cultural policy" (Tunaya, 1995: 578), and Yetkin's definition as "an institution that worked to spread the principles of CHF among the society and to explain and adopt the policy being followed" (Yetkin, 1983: 87-90) were among the important examples that could be given. Similarly, the following statements of Tekeli and Gencay proved that *Halkevleri* were far from populism as claimed: "*Halkevleri* were established as having a

function that carried the aims of the regime to the people, rather than being an institution that started from the base and aimed to convey the aspirations of the public to the administration. *Halkevleri* put forward a one-sided trend, or in other words, worked in the light of the principle of 'for the people despite the people'. Down-top interaction did never come into question" (Tekeli and Gencay, 1978: 83). Ergil, with a similar perspective, stated the following: "*Halkevleri*, which are not autonomous in terms of neither their administrative staff nor the majority of their members or the content and preparation of their programs, have not been centres where different segments of people can develop their programs. On the other hand, these organizations can be identified as to be 'pacifying' tools of the authoritarian state and that they directed the political energy of the public to cultural and educational channels" (Ergil, 1978: 34-37). For Öncü, *Halkevleri* were far from reaching great audiences. *Evler* did not attract much attention outside the big cities. As she stated, instructions were sent from CHP Centres to civil servants and teachers to register in *Halkevleri* branches in provincial centres such as Ordu and Mardin. And even the majority of the members of *Halkevleri* were state personnel (Öncü, 1976: 49).

It has been mentioned that *Halkevleri* were not as populist as they claimed; on the contrary, they constituted important forms of disconnection between the people and the rulers. The following objection of Belge could constitute an answer to this: "In official ideology, 'populism' was one of the six arrows. The word 'populism (*halkçılık*)' is the Turkish equivalent of 'populism (*popülizm*)'. Its being one of the six arrows is appropriate to the use of populism (*popülizm*) forms in the world. 'We are Populists (*halkçı*) already. We don't need socialism.' By this calculation, 'the peasant is the master of the nation.' The Single-Party is already a 'People's' party. And upon this, *Halkevleri* were established... This mainly stems from the paradoxical appearance of populism (*popülizm*), which we can say is an obligatory one. The coin, whose face 'populism' (*halkçılık*) is shown to the public, is written 'elitism' (*elitizm*) on the face which is held by the power" (Belge, 2017).

Although the reputation of '*Halkevleri* belong to people' was promoted as the basic idea behind *Evler*, it remained a place where top-down hierarchy was felt much more deeply. The duties assigned to *Halkevleri*, in its establishment phase, were addressing the disconnection between the public and the intellectuals, therefore *Halkevleri* were introduced to bring an end to such disconnections. However, the policies implemented did not close the gap between the intellectuals and the people, on the contrary, they widened it. Some shared experiences also supported this perception. Köker explained this idea as follows: "*Halkevleri*

led to the increase of the separation between the public and intellectuals, rather than eliminating it" (Köker, 2007: 176). Even for Baltacıoğlu, some of those *Evler* existed on the surface, but they considered a certain group as their subject, not the youth, who were going to be their main target group (Baltacıoğlu, 1937: 2). For Çavdar, *Halkevleri*, established to raise the cultural level of the people, caused the feeling of 'grasping to ignorance' among the public as a result of the intolerant and top-down approach of those teaching elites (Çavdar, 1983: 883). Similar views were expressed by Karaömerlioğlu: "*Halkevleri*, which were opened in the name of populism, tried to continue their activities around anti-liberal and single thought with top-down methods (Karaömerlioğlu, 2002: 283). For Çelik, "the studies carried out in the villages did not focus on the problems of the villages and villagers, they just remained giving plenty of advice to the villagers" (Çelik, 2007: 58).

Based on the example cited by Berkes, it could also be questioned whether *Halkevleri* were the houses of the public in real terms or not. The main issue that raised such a question was how a person whose "clothing was obvious that he was from the public" was thrown out of Ankara *Halkevi* while he was being shown around there by the President of *Halkevi* (Berkes, 2017: 72). The following statements in the *Resimli Şark* magazine (1933: 87), which was a social monthly journal in Istanbul, revealed a critical example of the treatment against the commoners according to their costumes in *Halkevleri*. In an article in the journal, those who came to *Halkevleri* were presented not as the owners of *Evler*, but rather as "tens of thousands who would receive help from *Halkevleri*". This led us to think about the populist position of *Halkevleri*, as it revealed the line between those who received help from *Evler* and the owners of *Evler*.

The situation paved the way for *Halkevleri* to be called an upper-class institution, failing to reach the public. Başgöz's following statements explained this: "*Halkevleri* turned into centres where bureaucrats and people, who had already received a certain education, attended. From the beginning, all state officials were instructed to support *Halkevleri*; the Ministry of National Education put pressure on teachers to take an active role in these organizations." Circulars issued by the government in the institutionalization phase of *Halkevleri* and designated *Evler* as non-political places also facilitated the state's hand at this point. Başgöz continued his words; "The government issued a special circular and declared *Halkevleri* as an organization that is out of politics. Thus, it was made possible for civil servants, who were forbidden by law to participate in political organizations, to take part in *Halkevleri*. And they also did it to some extent." It was understood from these expressions

that the interest of the existing civil servants in this institution decreased over time. Başgöz completed his claims that *Halkevleri* were an institution of the upper classes with the following words: “The majority of the uneducated people refused to accept *Halkevleri* as their activity places and did not go to these institutions” (Başgöz, 1968: 157).

The following example also revealed that participation in the activities of *Halkevleri* did not always happen at the public level. It was striking in detail: There was no demand for the music course, which was planned to be opened free of charge by the fine arts section of Giresun *Halkevi*. However, some families in Giresun wanted to hire the music teacher of *Halkevi* for their children. And the condemnation in the journal of Giresun *Halkevi* (*Aksu*) mentioned that: “It is a logic flaw that a citizen who avoids sending his/her child to *Halkevi* to find the right to benefit from her teacher” (“Evimizin Çalışmaları”, 1940: 23). Hiring the teacher of *Halkevleri*, at the same time refusing to send their child to the course offered by Giresun *Halkevi* by making private offers, some families became a critical sign in showing how some of those *Halkevleri* were far from the major aim, as to interact with the public. Moreover, the fact that this situation was revealed by the confessions of some of *Halkevleri* officials made it even more critical.

The idea that *Halkevleri* were a part of the social engineering process of the regime was also accepted by many. Aydın, who wrote his dissertation on the revolutionary ideology in the 1930s of Turkey, the *Ülkü* version of Kemalism, asserted in his thesis that “Actually, the People's Houses became a mechanism for overt social engineering (*cemiyet mühendisliği*) and secular indoctrination than a means to impart skills that were increasingly necessary for an urbanizing and industrializing Turkey” (2003: 271). We see that the issue that Aydın addressed was not that *Halkevleri* achieved the success promised, but that it was turned into a social and cultural project. “The propaganda activities of *Halkevleri*, the innovations made to simplify the language, and the attempts to change the understanding of people on arts were not successful enough as they were reflected the public in a top-down manner” (Tuğluoğlu, 2005: 116).

Turning the activities of *Halkevleri* into propaganda created another obstacle for *Evler* in achieving the expected level of success. The fact that life practices offered by such propaganda tools were disconnected from the beliefs and lifestyles of a significant part of society, in the long run, was the most effective factor. The modern, Western lifestyle, the value system based on Western positivism, appreciation system that was far from the core

culture of Turkish society were all introduced by the new regime. And this revealed the elites' distant position from society despite their aims to reach the ordinary people. In this context, it was also admitted by some who gained importance on behalf of the mentioned institutions that *Halkevleri* could not achieve the expected success. As stated by Baltacıoğlu, "We know of such *Evler* that almost none of their branches work, all activities consisted of a tour of the village a few times a year and performing one or two theatre performances (Baltacıoğlu, 1937: 2).

According to many, *Halkevleri* were an institution that achieved significant firsts in the history of Turkish modernization and achieved great success. In essence, *Halkevleri* provided researchers with critical content to be one of the cornerstones of Turkish modernization history. This was even a fact far from the issue of whether *Halkevleri* could become successful or not. Again, to some, the success of *Halkevleri* was not as much as it was reflected by either the state authorities or the administrators of *Evler*, rather it had a lot of disappointment. Based on the criterion that *Halkevleri* could affect society intellectually and were able to transform society, it is understood at what point the answer of this study stands. However, for those who base their information only on CHP sources, the longing for *Halkevleri* with successful stories for years easily emerges. All the approving and conversely critical opinions about *Halkevleri* continue today and it is understood that they have taken a firm stand against the fact that *Halkevleri* were a cultural institution that could not be kept independent from the ideological goals of the single-party government. As long as this part of the studies on *Halkevleri* is not skipped, it seems essential that they be reconsidered.

4. CULTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE ITALIAN NATIONAL FASCIST PARTY: *DOPOLAVORO*

The post-World War I period pointed out a very critical era for adult education around the world. It is known that many institutions in various countries were established to reshape society with some political motivations during this period. As we have seen above through the example of *Halkevleri*, the number of similar institutions was quite high both in Europe and in other parts of the world. Behind this was mostly the effect of the single-party governments established in the new political system formed by modernization. Within the scope of this chapter, Italian *Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro*, constituting an important example worldwide is focused on.

Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro, *OND* (The National After-Work Program) was a vast organization established in Italy to divert and instruct the working classes during their leisure time. The frequently abbreviated name for the institution *Dopolavoro* called for *after-work* in Italian, combining the two words, *dopo* meaning ‘after’ and the *lavoro* meaning ‘work’. Among its various purposes, the institution mainly aimed to incorporate the masses into the emerging regime (Whittam, 1995: 73). Through providing leisure activities, *Dopolavoro* sought to impact the lives of workers. How the fascist government attempted to re-design Italian social life formed the stages of this program.

In the first phase, the adult education organizations in Italy were private enterprises. They mostly took part along with the workers’ syndicates. However, October 1922 was a critical date for the expansion of *Dopolavoro* organization which the Fascist Party took over the control of the Italian government. In one year, various after-work organizations participated in the Nationalist Confederation of Fascist Syndicates. With this initiative, they also gained an official position, which meant they were tied to the fascist regime.

The *organization* became a national institution under the control of the Fascist Party on 1 May 1925 with the creation of *Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro* by a royal decree (Gregor, 1979: 237). By that time, thousands of clubs, sports, and cultural organizations were settled to federate under the jurisdiction of the *OND*. The establishment of the after-work program as a national agency was an important sign, exposing the state’s implicit policy on the conduct of social and cultural initiatives in ideological terms. Throughout turning the

organization into a para-governmental foundation, a wide range of social activities came out to be the state's project, which meant at the same time the organization's break away from syndicalist protection. Since the organization of *OND* originally was designed as a technical project rather than a political intervention, its transformation from a technical issue to a political one was nearly a nationalist and cultural engineering process.

Framing recreational activities turned into a political issue under the fascist influence in Italy mainly after the adoption of the 8-hour working day in 1919 as a consequence of the international labour convention held in Washington (Harrison, 1935: 267). In this regard, it was aimed to ensure homogeneity in a different context through the work equation of the people. Giving an ideological cast to the social experiences of the workers outside of their workplace was the main initiative to unite people. The establishment of the After-Work Leisure program in Italy made apparent the possibility of building a consenting nation by social means and at the same time through non-class methods. Since class divisions in the country were commonly accepted, all social relations were incompatible with the needs of production. It was especially following World War I that the idea of combining political aspirations with economic demands came out (de Garzia, 1981: 10).

Behind the fascist motivation, there was the goal of "making masses adhere to the regime"; therefore, the activities of the *OND* involved nearly everything about the daily lives of the working classes (de Garzia, 1981: 33). To show up the regime's interest in the social arena, Mussolini authorized the Minister of National Economy for the legislation of the national agency in 1925. In 1927 thereafter, the *OND*'s main duty of unifying and running the workers' clubs that were taken over from the Socialists made it a party auxiliary. In 1931 the *OND* was already the largest adult organization with 1.75 million members; this number reached about 3.8 million members by 1939 (Morgan, 2004: 135). 80 percent of the whole state and private-sector salaried employees and 40 percent of the industrial workers were enrolled in the *OND* by that time, which was an important indication of the success of the adult organization in the Italian example.

The idea of controlling the everyday life of citizens through a nationalist program, however, was not unique to Italy and it was not entirely new. The effort to create a national identity and the idea of nationalization of the masses was a constant goal of the ruling elites in the late 19th century. *Dopolavoro*, which could be considered one of the most successful

institutions among its various kinds, was not the only practice. This became a kind of cultural event that occupied the agenda of rulers, especially during the 1920s and the 1930s.

Before concentrating on Italian mass organization, it's better to discover the historical conditions in Italy during its modernization period. Seizing the unification politics and post-war political atmosphere of the country seems remarkable. The 1920s were important due to the accession of fascist power in Italy by Mussolini government. Italian fascism also gave clues in terms of being the first of the dictatorial regimes that rose in the same period. Italian political arena was a model, taken advantage of, not only in the pre-war period but also after WWII for the authoritarian regimes and extreme nationalist movements.

This last chapter of the study focuses mainly on the functioning of the adult education organization, *Dopolavoro* in Italy. In this context we may add that, the analysis of *Dopolavoro* organization contributes to the comparative aspect of this study, which is mainly constructed on the issue of *Halkevleri*. Not directly combining the two, but focusing on the fact that they, in similar periods, served for similar purposes, *Halkevleri* and *Dopolavoro* organizations are handled together in this study. Fındıklı expressed the relationship between the two with the following words: “Although *Halkevleri* had the same name, they differed from the socialist-oriented *La Maison du Peuple* in Europe, *La Casa del Popolo* in Italy, *Volkshaus* in Switzerland or *Folkets Hus* in Norway. In terms of the ideological goals and its activities, *Halkevleri* stood close to the '*Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro*' (*OND*), which mostly aimed to transform leisure activities into political mobilization. This situation could be seen in the regulation of *Halkevleri* published in 1932.” (Fındıklı, 2012: 101). The regulation in question discussed the activities of the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes of that period on public education and praised the struggle for progress and development of the 'civilized races and distinguished nations' all over the world (CHF *Halkevleri* Talimatnamesi, 1932: 1). The following words in *Halkevleri* regulation, which directly referred to *Dopolavoro*, were, to some extent, proof of why the *OND* was chosen within the scope of this study: “The fascists have a national cultural organization called *Dopolavoro*, which covers all of Italy and this organization's 1586 cultural association and about 1000 amateur representation groups, consisting of young people representing plays on national issues. The number of public libraries they opened in 1930 alone is 8000. During the last year, the fascist *Dopolavoro* organization organized about 27 thousand national holiday manifestations in various cities, towns, sub-districts, and villages in Italy. The same organization manages more than 1500 operational information defects in Italy today” (CHF

Halkevleri Talimatnamesi, 1932: 2). In this context, it seemed useful to look at Italian culture construction organization as a source providing a comparison for *Halkevleri*.

To have a better understanding of the structure and activities of *Dopolavoro* organization, which were mostly accepted as a success, first of all, the unification process of Italy and later on the political atmosphere of the 1920s are discussed throughout this chapter. The reasons that lead to the changing political dynamics in Italy before WWI is believed to be worth analysing in the historical context. After examining the historical circumstances, it is also supposed to contribute to this study by underlining the rise of the fascist regime in Italy. The whole background information at least takes us to analyse the organization in detail. Such an in-depth analysis may contribute to the comparative analysis of this external example. The evolution of *Dopolavoro* organization, through the administrative structure of the organization, its development, and the outcomes of the process are presented. The relations of the organization with the fascist party are observed in the context of an indoctrination process. The activities carried out by the *OND* are also another topic of this chapter. They are examined under three categories as defined in the regulation of National Leisure Hours Institution; culture education, physical training, and social assistance. This last chapter ends with a general assessment of the Italian experience by making the context of its inclusion in this study as a comparison object with the experience of *Halkevleri* of Turkey. In this way, the background information is put forward to understand how the Italian example differs from the Turkish example and in which contexts they become similar.

4.1. A Brief History of Italian Modernization

For Italy's case in her political struggle through a nation-state, 1861 marked a critical stage since it referred to the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy. 1870 was also another important date when the territorial and political unification of the country was completed by the assignment of Rome as the capital city. The period starting from the unification till the outbreak of WWI seemed worthwhile discussing to understand the post-war politics in Italy. The motives that led the fascist movement to gain success throughout the country might not only be explained by the 21st-century developments but the experiences in the process of Italian reformation and resurrection.

“Among Italians an identity far from complete, of language and literature, combined with a geographical position which separates them by a distinct line from other countries

and, perhaps more than everything else, the possession of a common name, which makes them all glory in the past achievements in arts, arms, politics, religious primacy, science and literature, of any who share the same designation, give rise to an amount of national feeling in the population which, though still imperfect, has been sufficient to produce the great events now passing before us, notwithstanding a great mixture of races and although they have never, in either ancient or modern history, been under the same government, except while that government extended or was extending itself over the greater part of the known world” stated Mill, (1863) and addressed the process of unification later leading the nationalization of the country. Therefore, to understand the politics of Italy, first of all, we need to have background information about the beginning of this process.

“Fascism was essentially the ‘revelation’ of recent Italian history” mentioned Carter (2011: 227), dating back to the Risorgimento - the establishment of modern Italy - and pointing out the importance of the reformation history in understanding the fascist spread in Italy. Fascism and the outcomes that this ideological movement caused in the country cannot be perceived independent from the unification history and the developments afterward. It seems now meaningful to begin with the early history of Italian unification/*risorgimento* and go through the political atmosphere of the 1920s, regarding the post-war crisis in Italy.

4.1.1. Unification Politics of Italy

Italian unification had a different course than many other examples due to its unique process. Examining it from a general perspective, it becomes apparent how Italy differed in her political unification process from its European counterparts. On the Italian peninsula, there was ethnic homogeneity; linguistic and cultural unity, but there was no unified political power. Before moving on to the main factor, which was politics, another important parameter to be mentioned in the first stage was the religious ties in the peninsula.

It was possible to talk about a religious authority on the Italian peninsula since the 5th century when Italy hosted the authority of the Pope. This sense of unity gave people the feeling that they lived in certain ties with one another. Moreover, the concept of the community covered not only Italy but also the Western parts of the Christian world. And yet it was felt most strongly in Italy. Belge (2012: 323-324) took the issue from a different perspective and reminded us of the possibility that the factor delaying Italy's pursuit of

political unity might have been this aforementioned spiritual unity in the peninsula. The spiritual coexistence might have avoided the necessity for a political one.

The Catholic institution was particular to Italy and it was not an external circumstance. Therefore, the influence of the Papacy in the political process in the country was a great one. The difference here was valid for Italy since in other countries of Europe the Catholic institution was not involved in the state administration. Italy had almost become the centre of the entire Catholic world. For this reason, any movement or any person aiming for the unity of Italy would risk getting the pope's opposition. The tension between nation and religion was nearly at the highest level. This tension was more difficult than in many Catholic Christian countries in the world (Belge, 2012: 343-345).

It was usual that the clash of nation and religion was more difficult in Italy than anywhere else. The specific position and private history of the Vatican was the main reason for this perception. The effect of the papal institution on Italian unification could be evaluated as an obstacle rather than a contribution. As the revolutionary waves swept across Italy, the church was also damaged. In 1864, *Syllabus* counting 80 major sins was published (Collier, 2003: 87). The main purpose of the publication was to explain to people that it was impossible to be both catholic and liberal; therefore, there showed a position against any independence movement.

Italy's political, economic, and cultural polycentricity had a double impact on the unification issue. On the one hand, it led to a history that would create national pride in intellectual, cultural, religious, and artistic terms. On the other hand, it created political uneasiness and a sense of delay. The lack of political unity in the new, modern conditions was considered a problem (Belge, 2012: 327-328). And such a seeking led to the movements towards a modern political establishment. The lateness in Italy increased the attempts to achieve Italian unity, albeit by different groups.

What distinguished Italy from its counterparts in Western Europe was that the peninsula's not having a unified rule did not cause negativity as experienced in the other European countries. Starting from the French Revolution of 1789 to the 1848 revolts was a period of permanent revolutions in France and in the rest of Europe. When the idea of colonialism began to occupy the agenda of the continent, the revolutionary soul in Europe went under change, along with complicating the state organization (Gündoğan, 2008: 51).

Throughout the European scene, the cases of Italy and Germany were exceptional since they were late in their process of union. Moreover, Italy was also industrially backward. “Industrial growth in Italy had come later and been far less intense than in England” (de Garzia, 1981: 8). According to Hearder, many bright political ideas appeared in the 19th century, from which Italy originated, but the concept of national sovereignty was not among them. And he added, “The ideas of 1789 were not native to Italy” (2001: 153). The French Revolution had an impact on nearly every developing country. However, the reflection of the revolution in Italy was different than others. There was a mass of structures in Italy that were not prone to adopt any form of democracy. So, it may be well to see the process of unification from now on then.

The unification of Italy was a process of almost half a century, starting with the post-Napoleonic era in 1815, and ended up in 1870 with the outcome of the Franco-Prussian war. Though, it was not a result of a single-handed effort. The unification process didn’t have a central planning or a unique directing route; rather it was settled by separate individuals, groups, and political parties that were often uncoordinated and had even conflicting demands and decisions (Sabetti, 1982: 65). The Italian unity was not activated by a single authority from above, but ensured by different groups in their internal dynamics. It was both a base movement and an elite one. The result was the combination of different efforts from North to South. At least a single rule through the involvement of the society was achieved. Setting the framework of the unification process shortly may help us understand the events leading to the *Risorgimento* better. This may also allow us to analyse the path to the rise of fascism in the country following the main research subject of this study.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the main question about Italian lands was how to fulfil the union of those people living in the peninsula, which was divided into different states politically. Ever since the dissolution of the Roman Empire in the 6th century to the 19th century, the peninsula could neither be ruled by a single authority nor was it a unified political whole. The use of the term Italia, although it was never a united administrative district, spread over the entire peninsula in the period of republican and imperial Rome. At the time of the French Revolution, Italy was made up of several states which were independent of each other, having their governments, customs, cultures, and languages. The peninsula, home to various distinct states, was comprised of The Kingdom of Sardinia (including Piedmont), Lombardy and Venetia regions, the Republic of Venice, the Central

Duchies and the papal states in the north; and the Kingdom of Naples, the Kingdom of Sicilia in the south through the end of the 18th century (Grab, 2017: 152).

Following the Napoleonic experience, the Italian peninsula entered into a new era. In 1815, the Napoleonic wars came to an end. The victorious states of the war, Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia came together to draw up a settlement in line with their aims in the continent. Aiming to ensure peace in Europe, the victors set off to prevent France from causing instability in the region again. The importance of the Italian lands gained visibility there. At the Congress of Vienna, where independent Italian lands were restored by the diplomats assigning themselves with disposing of the fortune of the European continent, the dissolution of the Italian territory was confirmed. The Italian map was shaped in the Congress. The treaty was a reflection of the diversion of the lands. Consequently, Austria was appointed as the guarantor of Italian lands. That's why during the period between 1815 and 1848 the efforts for a political change in Italy were not to have a unified state but rather to get rid of the Austrian interest in the land. Clark asserted this period under Austrian control through the following words; "the real political issue in Italy was not the constitutional liberty, nor independence nor unification, but the land" (1998: 131).

1848 revolts were another significant development in Italian unification history. Spreading even in Paris and Vienna, the revolts did not end Austria's control of the Italian land until 1849. On the contrary, the revolts became so popular that they triggered the way to Italian unification. The revolts had multiple meanings and purposes, among which removing illiberal, oppressive regimes could be counted as the most striking one. They mainly aimed at constitutional governmental administrations throughout the country, along with offering some prospects for national unification. However, the revolts could not succeed in what was targeted totally. The foreign armies were still active in the country (Smith, 2002: 55). Under these circumstances, it was nearly impossible to make a constitutional reform immediately after.

The failure of the 1848 revolts did not prevent the revolutionist groups from seeking liberal Italy. The common unrest against the oppressive governments continued. Moreover, the collapse of those revolts showed even more clearly that Italian unification could neither be ensured by a Papal authority nor a federal union (Smith, 2002: 80). Therefore, the question of Italian liberation changed its direction. While at the beginning of the century, the main triggering point was how to unite the country under a single authority; right after the

1848 revolts it turned out to be what kind of a unitary system the country would have. Upon this problem, several ways were proposed for the best solution; which included the disintegration of the two parts of Italy: the developing north and the steady south.

Established in 1861, Italy's unified state was a result of an unbalanced political alliance among different groups in the peninsula. The state unification of Italy which Gramsci called a "passive revolution" referred to a complex chain of relations between the class segments of society which were on the one hand the northern landlords and the commercial interests; on the other hand, the semi-feudal latifundists⁷ of the south (Elazar, 1996: 236). Gramsci defined this process as a passive one because he found that the revolutionary movement of Italy was lack of mass participation in society. For him, the Italian revolution through aiming at a bourgeois state was missing the participation of the bourgeoisie. Moreover, it also lacked revolutionary leadership. The old society yet resisted and continued to secure itself.

The critical difference between Italian *risorgimento* and the French Revolution came up at this point. One of Gramsci's main arguments on the revolution in Italy was to compare the nature of *risorgimento* with 1789, the French experience. It was regarded as the revolution taken a reference by nearly all examples of modern reforms. "The new Italian state was a long way from the compact modern French nation, created by the French bourgeoisie in the 1790s" (Carter, 2011: 227). Italy, in her process, did not only lack mass participation but also a Jacobin party that would lead the bourgeoisie and the peasantry. During the French experience, the Jacobins forced the revolution for a historical development and they were able to head the rest of the society in the same direction. As stated by Carter, for Gramsci liberal Italy was from the beginning a 'failed' state. It was effectively born 'bad'. "Gramsci described the Risorgimento as a less-than-successful 'passive' bourgeois revolution, whereby a weak Italian bourgeois class was unable to impose itself on the 'old feudal classes', or establish 'hegemony' – influence – over the popular classes" (Carter, 2011: 226).

The new Italian state could be neither fully bourgeois nor capitalist. This idea could easily be understood from Gramsci's account. "[The Italian educated class] said that they were aiming at the creation of a modern state in Italy and they produced a bastard. They

⁷ Land in the southern part of Italy was owned by absentee landlords and rented by peasantry farmers under a system of *latifundia*.

aimed at stimulating the formation of an extensive and energetic ruling class and they did not succeed; at integrating the people into the framework of the new state and they did not” (Gramsci, 1971: 90). Such a failed bourgeois revolution in Italy directly affected the class relations in society. For Riall, Italian bureaucracy wasn’t also sufficient enough to constitute a modern basis for the new state, since it could not defeat the existing feudal order (1998: 9-10).

The anti-liberal thesis about the Italian unification mentioned above might not be generally accepted by all historians. Unlike Gramsci, who evaluated the *risorgimento* as a failure, there were considerations on the process of the liberal state as a success. One of those, Benedetto Croce, against the negative portrayal of the liberal state, stood up for Italian liberation. He argued that despite the obstacles and the challenges Italy had to experience in the process, the Italian state was able to succeed in having a liberal form. In comparison with the tiny pre-unification states of the peninsula, Croce believed that the new national integrity - without any doubt - was able to make a move (Croce, 1929: 214).

One of the major reasons behind this arguable process of unification laid ‘the Southern question’. The phrase was first employed by Gramsci in 1926, but the situation had a former background, which seemed worth remarking on for the comprehension of the Italian Revolution history. The great difference between the southern and the northern parts of Italy had a geographical and cultural background until the 1860s. There was a difference in the patterns of land cultivation between these two regions. The southern part of Italy was mostly underdeveloped. Within this context, the South’s being separate made the unification course even more complicated. In the south, the situation remained stable against the modernization process. As claimed by Riall, the South even represented a challenge to the identity of liberal Italy. Because, those policies did not work in the southern half of the peninsula (Riall, 1998: 3-4).

The southern part of the Italian peninsula suffered from various factors that prevented the development of the region. The region, especially the Sicilian part of the south had an image of a violent society. They were not as willing as the Northerners on the issue to change the political system. Most of the Italian liberals considered there a region that always broke out riots; therefore, it was considered nearly impossible to constitute a governmental order in the south. Such a constitutional framework would not work there for the liberals and the reforms would face failure. A regular administration to provide law and order in the region

was a major problem in the course of reforms. A Northerner general, Giuseppe Govone even described the situation as; “really something out of the Middle Ages. The Sicilians had not yet developed beyond a stage of primitive ‘barbarity’ and were thus not yet able to the benefits of civilizations” (Smith, 1988: 371-373). The resistance that the Southern part showed against the efforts of the bureaucrats and soldiers was a reflection of more anxiety for the northern part about the territorial integrity of united Italy.

In 1861, when the unification was accomplished, the scope of the south-north gap changed its shape. Until the beginning of the 1860s, the division between the North and South, through geography and culture, was effective in the political formation; but immediately after the union was achieved, these distinctions affected the politics throughout the country with some economic motives. There occurred severe economic disparity, leaving the south of the country underdeveloped. Apart from problems such as climate, soil, and geography; the southern landscape was, at that time, lacking economic growth which indicated a central role in the modernization of Italy. Following the unification, the different rates of economic growth between the industrializing north and the agrarian south had become the main symbol of ‘the southern question’ (Riall, 1998: 8). With the Risorgimento in 1870, the unity of Italy was fully established; but the socio-economic differences in society became more evident. The industrialized north became richer and more advanced; while the rural and agricultural south got poorer and remained feudal (Belge, 2012: 345-346).

Apart from the regional dissimilarities and problems in Italy during the unification process, the different tendencies of the architects of unification were another important point in understanding the unification politics of Italy. The three men to whom the Italian unity was provided were Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Cavour. The first of the most influential and important intellectual fathers of Italian nationalism was Giuseppe Mazzini. Mazzini (1805-1872) became a member of the Carbonari organization, where democratic and republican views became clear in the political struggle. He headed the national movement in the 1830s (Belge, 2012: 334-336). Not all those who wanted Italian unity at that time were republicans like Mazzini. The idea of a republic was too radical for Italy in the 1830s. Therefore, Mazzini's coup and uprising attempts were always suppressed. Italy's conditions for such a revolution were still very inadequate; required to get mature. Failing in Italy but undeterred, he attempted to organize more widely across Europe. Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882), who was more effective and who had a more victorious history than Mazzini, was the second

important name of this period (Limiti, 2008: 492). His military activity was undeniable in the country's unification process. Garibaldi was leftist, compared to nationalist Mazzini. On the other hand, the real architect of 1870 was Count Camillo Benso Cavour (1810-1861) with his pragmatist and practical personality. With the journal he founded, *Il Risorgimento* (called resurrection), he thought that Italy, which had been under foreign rule for a long time, would find its national spirit and take its fate into its own hands. His newspaper mainly dealt with the subject of the Constitution.

"If it is asked which of the three people mentioned, the chance of 1870 would decrease without it, I think the answer is Cavour" declared Belge (2012: 339). Among these three revolutionary names and their solutions for the unification, there were significant differences and, in that context, Belge considered Cavour's policies as the most valuable and indispensable for the union. Garibaldi was a supporter of unity, of course, but he was not addicted to the idea of democracy. The unification could easily have been established without democracy. Mazzini was a very determined republican. Regardless of the peninsula's conditions, he believed that the only way was establishing the republic. Apart from all these, Cavour was aware that the unification of the peninsula could only be possible with a kingdom administration. He was in favour of democratic education for the king as well. He was a severe supporter of democracy. In Cavour's Italy, large and small states in the peninsula envisioned a better way of life than they had and that was not a military power but a kind of economic development (Smith, 1986: 2).

An overview of the three most influential men in this whole process revealed that Mazzini was from the middle class, Garibaldi was from the lower class and Cavour was from a noble class, so they did not have much in common. The unification of Italy was not truly a result of a widespread effort or joint class organization, rather it involved different groups. It might not be easy to call the unification a political, moral, and spiritual unity of all Italians. As Carter expressed it, "The history of liberal Italy was one of achievement and gradual democratization" (2011: 227). With the unification of the peninsula under The Kingdom of Italy in 1861, a constitutional monarchy covering the main juridical and institutional characteristics of the state was established. This gradual process of Italy in her way to becoming a state included the legal, political, and military institutions guaranteeing the exercise of sovereignty over one's territory; but whether the unity in this newly established structure had national motivations or not, raised doubts. To call Italy fully a nation-state was not possible, for so many. Bringing numerous different states under a single authority was

complete by this date, but the process still could not come out as the integration of the whole society. “The creation of the Italian state was neither inevitable nor had it been planned” (Collier, 2003: 4).

The famous observation “We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians” by Massimo d’Azeglio, on becoming a nation-state, was an important sign for the researchers to seize the substance of the nationalization issue in Italy’s modernization case (Wood and Farrell, 2004: 132). The saying was truly addressing the conditions that came up in the real Italy in the 1870s (Carter, 1996: 545), which consisted of two different forms of ambitions over the future of the peninsula. For many historians and researchers, because the unification procedure was not a widely accepted movement, the ways to imply statehood had to gain various tasks. Carter explained these duties of two-faced Italy as follows: “Certainly the methods implied by the Italian liberal state after 1861 to ‘make Italians’ – not simply in the sense of making the population aware of its nationality but also of developing a bond between the nation state and civil society – were to prove wholly inadequate” (1996: 545). In the famous saying quoted, there was not a nation-building process through patriotic initiatives but it included a pragmatic challenge. ‘Making of Italians’ would in this way turn into a politically operative project.

This intricate course of state formation ended up in September 1870, with entering of the troops of King Victor Emmanuel II of Italy in Rome. The assignation of Rome as the capital city of the new Italy at the time was an official indicator of this initiative (Mazzoni, 2010: 14). In 1861 when the fulfilment of a modern unified state was accomplished in Italy, it was not over. The political and social outcome that brought different states of the peninsula under the Kingdom of Italy needed some nationalistic motivations to be a real nation-state. Therefore, the politics of the risorgimento process had significant signs and included some messages for the coming stages of Italian political history.

The risorgimento truly represented the composition of the new Italian political system and the character of the class relations in the country. The propertied class in the newly established state gained some basic aspects which at the same time disabled the workers and the peasants from voting. This kind of severe distinction of suffrage by literacy or property qualifications was a significant determiner of the major mechanism that shaped the political hegemony after the unification (Elazar, 1996: 236). It did not only prevent those underdeveloped parts of the society from involving in politics but also directly guaranteed

the privileged classes, especially those men of property, to access political power. This kind of system could easily show how the leadership exercised its power in a privileged way in the new Italy. And surprisingly this exercise did not only determine itself in the first years of unification but also - even more crucially - after WWI, in the period of shifting coalitions and the outbreak of fascism in the country.

The steps taken after modernization were directly related to the establishment history of the states. At this point, the process in Italy leading first to a liberal state and then a fascist one cannot be analysed without understanding the unification policies. As could be seen from the short history of Italian unification, the difficulty of bringing together the different groups that existed throughout the country transformed Italian unity into a movement that included a wide variety of groups. To discuss the situation in Italy in more detail, it would be useful to look at the post-WWI period and deal with the processes that gave birth to fascism.

4.1.2. The Political Atmosphere in the 1920s and The Post-War Crisis of Italy

The period by the end of World War I was a new beginning for the politics of Italy. It was not just an Italian issue either, but touched the whole world. Many countries that participated or did not participate in the war, were affected by the outcomes of the world war. "The question of "government by consent" became for the first time an overriding concern of political and economic elites in Europe as they sought to re-establish the bases of their rule after the enormous disruptions of World War I" (de Garzia, 1981: 1). The uniqueness of Italy here revealed through her pioneer role in the existence of fascist ideology. What made Italian politics differ from other countries and became worth analysing was the events that led to the fascist rise in the country. Therefore, to understand the beginning of the fascist movement in Italy, it is important to see the political atmosphere of the 1920s foremost.

"The 'normal' exercise of hegemony on the classical terrain of parliamentary regimes is characterized by a combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally without force over prevailing too much over consent... In the period following the World War, the hegemonic apparatus cracked apart and the exercise of hegemony became permanently difficult and aleatory" (Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 80)

declared Gramsci and touched on the critical point behind the developments of the aftermath of WWI. Starting to understand this title with Gramsci's famous quotation is somehow related to the study's main argument, the exercise of hegemony.

Pollard asserted that "Italian fascism did not suddenly appear from nowhere" (2005: 133) and addressed the background experiences that led to the rise of fascism in the country. Observing the political climate in post-World War I Italy may be equal to understanding the rise of fascism. What distinguished Italian political history from the other nation-states was that it hosted the birth of fascism. Italy was of great importance in the evolution of fascism from a political movement to a political regime, as it introduced the first example in the world. To read the politics of Mussolini period, it is believed to be useful to evaluate the process leading to the rise of fascism in Italy.

At the end of World War I, Italy occupied an extremely critical position due to the developments the country had experienced up to that time. The post-war disappointment was added to the already existing discontent in the country. Although Italy was among the winning states of the war, there was an atmosphere of dissatisfaction and unrest, almost similar to that of the defeated countries (Carocci, 1965: 6). Moreover, this situation was triggered not only by political but also by many other factors as economic, social, cultural and historical. Therefore, the rise of fascism in Italy was experienced as a result of various causes coming together after WWI.

Sided with the Triple Alliance in the process leading to WWI, at the first stage, Italy sided with England and France through the beginning of the war. As a result of the negotiations, it was concluded that it would be more appropriate for Italy's interests to be on the same side as the Entente Powers. London Treaty was signed with England in 1915, and; the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne was signed with France in 1917. According to the provisions of the aforementioned treaties, it was expected that Italy would receive a share from the German colonies and Ottoman lands after the war (Armaoğlu, 2010: 217). However, immediately after the war, situations that would disappoint Italy economically surrounded Italy one after the other. The President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson's failure to recognize the Treaty of London caused Italy not to meet its expectations from German colonies. In addition; after the Bolshevik Revolution that took place in Russia in 1917, the Treaty of Saint Jean de Maurienne was also in abeyance.

Coming out of WWI as a "defeated victorious" state, Italy (Bourderon, 1989: 8) could not achieve what she expected from the war in economic terms and this made her current situation even more difficult. "It must be told that Italy did not come out of the war in a satisfied manner. This, perhaps more than anything else, was the result of Italian confusion" (Belge, 2012: 358). By 1919, an atmosphere of unrest, as in the war-torn countries, swept all over Italy. Under the pressures of unemployment, Italy fell into both a material and a moral vacuum. In addition to the economic difficulties caused by the post-war developments, a politically complex atmosphere spread throughout the country.

The economic problems that emerged after the war, the critical changes in the supply-demand balance, the increase in unemployment, and much more dragged Italian people into a sense of obscurity not only financially but also spiritually. At this point, without denying the effects of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, it was seen that socialist ideas began to increase in the country. Through these tendencies, a new liberation effort prevailed throughout the country. Socialist movements, struggling not only for economic demands but also for political ones, were active in Italy between the post-war period and 1922, the time when fascism came to power. During this period, socialist parties gained significant support from the Italian people, especially from the working class. (Sander, 1998: 22-24).

Looking at the political climate in Italy between 1919 and 1922, it was easily seen that the intended level of stability could not be achieved after the war. In the country there held two elections, and there were four government changes in this short period. The governments of Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, Francesco Saverio Nitti, Giovanni Giolitti, Ivanoe Bonomi, and Luigi Facta were established respectively; all these revealed that there was unsteadiness in the domestic political structure at least as much as in the economic field of Italy (Savelli, Hayward, Falcionelli, 1940: 433). The ineffectiveness of the established governments in the face of the ongoing economic and political environment led to new seeking. The petty bourgeoisie, which held the current governments responsible for the atmosphere of chaos, started to turn to the extreme right as an alternative to the socialist and communist rulers (Yalçın, 1998: 23). The strikes, occupations, and lootings in this period showed that the socialist governments were insufficient for the internal problems of the country. All of this created an atmosphere of weakness against the instability of socialism and communism; this was where fascism fed from.

Italy had a despotic administration, as declared by Gramsci. It was, on the surface, a democratic state with its so-called democratic institutions. Not only in the process of Italian unification but Gramsci evaluated the politics of Italy also during the liberal period. Since Gramsci was not satisfied with the democratization of the country, he interpreted this period as insufficient. Even under a liberal government, the voting system remained limited until the end of WWI. The aftermath of the world war was the emergence of a new ruling class (Forgacs, 2018: 50). Gramsci and many others regarded this process as the formation of a radical administration. Since there could not yet be a state of class in Italy, a new form of dictatorship was about to occur. What characterized the situation in Italy of 1919 for Gramsci was a weak state with fierce conflicts on the labour front. He described the process as follows; “both the industrial bourgeoisie and the labour movement emerged stronger from the war” (cited by Forgacs, 2018: 88-89).

The issue of culture, one of which was the main indicator of a developmental process for Gramsci in his theories on power relations, was also discussed in his considerations of Italy's case. The illiteracy rate in Italy in the post-war period was among the highest in Europe; and this rate increased rapidly from big cities to rural areas, from north to south. Providing educational opportunities to the working-class and peasant children failed in Italy in the early years of the 20th century. For the education issue, people from upper levels received disproportionate aid, and the system as a whole promoted discrimination against the children of the working class (Forgacs, 2018: 68-73). This was important to see that education through the issue of culture did not remain only a technical matter but also a political one in Italy.

The discontent in Italy was multidirectional as is seen above. In the general socio-economic instability of the country, industrialization started unilaterally in the north. And industrialization aftermath of the war remained where it started, concentrating in the northern part of the country. This meant an increase in the number of skilled industrial workers in the north. It also affected politics. It may be useful to look at the structure of post-war industrial north and agricultural south distinction in detail, here. In Northern Italy, there was a serious increase in the population of the industrial proletariat and in the number of those who dared to take revolutionary action. It was even possible to understand this just by looking at the one million people who voted for the Workers' Party in 1914. But, in the Southern part of the country, the industrial relations and proletariat could never gain visibility. Rather, a population that was extremely foreign to such socio-economic problems

emerged. In this social structure, working-class radicalism was doomed to remain isolated from the South. Unlike the structure in the North, there was no sympathy for the wave of communism in the South (Pescosolido, 2019: 455).

The southern question that Gramsci named it so, showed its main outcomes aftermath of the world war. This problem even paved the way for the fascist rise in the country. “Some aspects of the southern question”, an article by Antonio Gramsci written in 1926 was about the south-north problem (*la questione meridionale*) addressing the political aspects of regional differences in Italy which mainly took its source from the southern part’s underdevelopment or the south’s being left underdeveloped. The problem, named with an instinct expression to the Italian south, stemmed mainly from economic, political, military, social, and cultural changes that became visible and caused complexities in the south of Italy when compared with the northern part of the country. The differences between the two regions of the country became questionable at the beginning of the 20th century as that period included a reformation process.

For some, the differentiation of the south from the north by political and social means had a central aspect, preventing the development of the southern region; yet for some, the economic conditions made the region have such a problematic nature at the same time blocking Italian reform. In whatever levels the problem was defined, the Southern Question had a significant role in both the unification process of Italy and in the post-war period. Gramsci’s point of view at this point took a more critical meaning since he focused on the problem more than anyone else. His dealing with the question later on continued with one of his great theories, hegemony, and culture-power relations (Albanese, 1980: 63-72).

The roots of the Southern question, in essence, went a long way back. From Gramsci’s perspective, the peasant problem was a historically determined question in Italy. This was not a “peasant and agrarian question in general” (Gramsci, 1926). And the southern question, later on, emerged as one of the results of two typical and particular forms of this peasant question. One of those problems was the Vatican question that rose through the result of the specific Italian tradition and the specific development of Italian history. Within this approach, gaining consent from the majority of the peasants was equal for the Italian proletariat to understand the class demands.

The situation at the basis of the southern problem, as the second and most important cause of the problem, was what was spreading in the north of Italy, at the same time keeping southern Italy from getting developed. This was especially the diseased point of view of the Northerners towards the Southerners. Gramsci's suggestion for the Turin communists - who were among the representatives of the northern bourgeoisie - at the first stage, was to learn how to change the political position and general ideologies of the proletariat (Gramsci, 1926). It was very well known that the propagandists of the bourgeoisie were spreading a biased attitude towards the South among the northern masses: According to them, The South was the ball and chain which prevented the social development of Italy from progressing; the Southerners were biologically inferior beings, semi-barbarians or total barbarians by their natural destiny. If the South was backward, it was truly the fault of nature, not the capitalist system (Forgacs, 2018: 211-212).

In this framework, the Socialist Party was an instrument of the aforementioned bourgeois ideology within the Northern proletariat and it employed the "Southernist" literature through the positive school (Gramsci, 1994: 333-334). Through articles, tales, novels, short stories, impressions, and memoirs, science was employed to crush the exploited Southern groups. What made this surprising for the Italian experience was the treatment of such an attitude by socialist groups. The language directed to oppress the exploited took on a socialist character. In that case, Gramsci truly blamed the socialist party in Italy for failing to provide that solidarity, even though he was a socialist.

For a better understanding of the Southern question, Gramsci reminded us of two critical events that happened in the North of Italy: One of these took place in Turin and the other in Reggio Emilia. Both the events had considerable importance as to be the centre for 'Southernists' discourse (Gramsci, 1994: 326-327). Through the events Gramsci aimed to show the inadequacy of the Socialist Party at that time. Gramsci's main solution came up thereby: to free the working class from existing under the leadership of the bourgeoisie. He believed that the proletariat had to be politically active and must free itself of all corporatism to be capable of ruling as a class.

As Gramsci recorded, in the summer of 1920, factories were forcibly occupied. This movement was heroically written in the history of the Italian working class. Metal industry workers were among the first to venture into this business. They occupied the factories in response to the lockout. Thus, some branches of industrial production were in the hands of

the workers. The seriousness of the events increased tremendously. After these factory occupations, the *Fiat* board of directors proposed to workers that they would run the company as a cooperative. So, the first event to remember was *Fiat* crisis in Turin. The communist-led branch of the socialist party later told the workers that “A great firm like *Fiat* could be taken over as a cooperative by the workers, only if the latter resolved to enter the system of bourgeois political forces which governed Italy the day” (Gramsci, 1926). The proposal of the *Fiat* board formed a part of Giovanni Giolitti’s political plan for the future of Italy. Giolitti himself was, in a way, a representative of bourgeois rule, and the socialist party nearly turned into an instrument of politics of him. The workers surprisingly rejected the proposals made by the board directors. And then, through a series of actions by the workers, it was seen that a high level of political maturity and competence was reached. As it turned out, this process went in favour of the proletariat. All privileges within the factory and the exploitation of less skilled groups by the more skilled were abolished. This was the foundation upon which the Communist Party developed in Turin and the Party wanted to extend this stance outside of Turin.

The second event that Gramsci reminded was the incident in Reggio Emilia. Reggio Emilia was always compromised by the *Southernists*. The Reformist leader of Reggio Emilia confederation, Prampolini expressed that “Italy is made up of Northerners and filthy Southerners” (Gramsci, 1926). The expression was critical to see the roots of the discrimination against the South. In Reggio Emilia, a similar cooperative business proposal was made as happened in Turin, but it was also rejected by the workers. What happened later in 1921 and became surprising in the course was the defeat of the workers. In April, workers at Fiat factory were temporarily laid off; and the workers' councils were abolished.

This process, Gramsci cited to explain the problem, also marked the beginning of syndicalism in Italy. We attributed the issue of the syndicate so much importance at this point since the main topic of this chapter, *Dopolavoro* organization directly consisted of it. On the formation of syndicates, it might be told that the masses reacted to the policies of the reformist leaders during the period. The reaction of the working class against the bloc of the bourgeoisie, in favour of the bloc of the peasants, gave birth to syndicalism. Gramsci considered the birth of syndicalism as a “weak attempt on the part of the Southern peasants, represented by their most advanced intellectuals, to lead the proletariat” (Gramsci, 1926).

The Southern part of Italy was defined as a great social disintegration by Gramsci himself. The Southern society, according to Gramsci, was set apart and this relation could not only be applied to the peasant groups but also to the intellectuals of the region. The social structure of society was compromised mainly by the agricultural bloc. The peasants, who made up the majority of the southern population, lacked an internal unity among themselves. What made the Southern society so much interesting and worth concentrating on to have a better understanding of the Italian national life for Gramsci was in real the critical situation of the Southern intellectuals (Gündoğan, 2008: 49). Since agriculture played a dominant role in the region, the intellectuals of the Southern part were old-typed. The traditional intellectuals mostly depended on the peasantry and craftsmen.

“The Southern peasant is tied to the big landowner through the mediation of the intellectual. This type of organization is most widespread, throughout the mainland South... Its single aim is to preserve the status quo. Within it, there exists no intellectual light, no program, no drive towards improvements or progress” remarked Gramsci in 1926, in his article. In this way, it became clear why he associated this social segregation with not only the Southern peasants but also with the intellectuals of Southern Italy. Yet such a problem also had ties with the rising of Italian fascist radicalism.

A wide range of causes, which were mostly political, economic, and social events, made the ground problematic for Italy's case a short period after it completed its unification process. Especially the developments in aftermath of the WWI and the differences between the North and South parts of Italy were the most visible reasons in explaining the complicated nature of Italy before fascism broke out. The uniqueness of Italy in her process of unification and the other events in the country during the 1920s was nearly enough to see Italy's differentiating politics.

The modernization process that Italy experienced separately from its European counterparts was among those important factors that influenced the rise of fascism in the country. Italy, along with Germany, had a critical position in Europe as to be the last two countries in achieving their national unity. Italy had a lot in common with the history of Germany on the way to becoming a nation-state. On the peninsula, as in the large area where the German people lived, there was ethnic homogeneity. It could not be thought that there was no linguistic and cultural unity for both regions; however, its not being guaranteed

within the framework of political unity made the situations quite difficult for both Italy and Germany (Belge, 2012: 323-324).

Considering the two main examples in which fascist regimes have succeeded in the world, it is understood that this state of being late when compared to their counterparts in Europe became an undeniable factor in the rise of fascist ideology in both Italy and Germany. It might be a sociological issue that impacted the rise but it had significant outputs not valid only for the Italian peninsula but also for the German political life. However, the difference between Italy and Germany within the scope of the developments on the subject of fascism made Italian politics meaningful so far. It is significant that the fascist structure in Italy, when compared with the German experience, had a lot to do with this study, in terms of the acceptability of the regime by society. On this issue Belge declared that; “When we generalize by looking at the framework of the events in the two countries, we see that the process in Italy cannot even come close to Germany in its horror... In the context of their fascist regime, Italy's criminal burden has never been as heavy as Germany's... It has been told that Italian fascism was looser, less deadly, that it was generally more moderate and softer; and that it was more tolerant of dissident thought.” (2012: 363-364, 366). All these are believed to be important facts for the understanding of the Italian fascist regime’s spread across society with various social engineering mechanisms. What made Italian fascism differ from other major examples like Germany laid in its gaining success and acceptance through various instruments such as the cultural organizations. Therefore, through a detailed examination of one of the most influential social instruments of the Italian fascist regime, *Dopolavoros*, getting to know the rise of the fascist movement seems important to contribute to the main purpose of the next title.

4.2. Fascism and The Rise of the Fascist Party in Italy

Making a relation between the invention of fascism as an ideology and a fascist party’s march to power was a fact unique to Italy, for the first time in history. It seemed remarkable to consider fascism in the context of Italy both in terms of its meaning - importance to the subject of this study - and its effects on modern political thought. The fascist movement’s impact on the general atmosphere of the 20th century was undeniable. Unlike all other modern ideologies, the emergence of fascism could be regarded as to be late. Understanding the origins of fascism meant understanding the politics of the 20th

century, especially starting with Italian politics. Since the outbreak of the fascist ideology was directly related to the Italian modernization process, we first need to treat fascism in this regard.

“In circumstances in which industrialization had proceeded to the level of the most advanced systems, something like fascism might emerge where a society sought to escape the real or fancied restrictions imposed by history - lost wars, unequal treaties, foreign impostures, and loss of national territories - burdens that followed as a consequence of an eccentric past and unequal competition with more powerful neighbours” (2003: 69) declared Gregor and addressed the significance of the circumstances in Italian history which made up fascism. Applying his words as the starting point seems meaningful.

Friedrich Engels, in his preface to the new edition of Karl Marx's book, *The Class Struggles in France*, expressed that wider suffrage would inevitably lead to a leftward flow of votes. “If the increase in the socialist vote continues in this way, we (the socialists) will eventually have attracted most of the middle strata of society, the petty bourgeois and farmers” remarked Engels (cited by Tucker, 1978: 571). He forecasted that increasing legality was in favour of the socialists, while it was a motivating factor for the conservatives. There was nothing the conservatives could do to stop the socialist rise, except to pierce this legality with their own hands. Even if Engels had only made this prediction in 1895, it was not possible to say that it would gain a mass dimension at that time. Engels was not the only one who thought about the ongoing social relations in that new era. Just before the beginning of the 20th century, Alexis de Tocqueville (2000: 662) considered that the oppressive political mechanism would break out somewhere, at some point, against the shouts of victory that the socialists believed and put forward. Moreover, Sorel's determination in 1908 was also about the possibility of returning to extreme conservatism, especially after the socialist rise. He thought that a revolution that succeeded in the decadence period might lead to a return to the past or even choose social conservatism as its ideal (Sorel, 1999: 79-80).

Fascism itself was the result of some surprising outcomes; the events that were very unexpected and highly unlikely for its time. Since the invention of the ideology had direct ties with Italian political history, we might have a better look at the roots of the word in the Italian language, which is in direct relation with the developments of Italian politics. The origin of the word, fascism came from the Italian *fascio*, meaning a bundle or a bunch. Going further back, the word seemed to evoke the Latin *fascēs*, which was the name of an axe

carried in a sheath of poles and in front of rulers to represent the authority and unity of the state during parades in Rome. Until 1914, this Roman imperial symbol, *fascēs* was generally owned by the left groups. Following 1914, a class of left-wing nationalists, including Benito Mussolini, used the word in the name of their mobilization movement while trying to bring Italy into World War I on the Allies' side. The group named themselves later on as *Fascio Rivoluzionario d'Azione Interventista* (Revolutionary Interventionist Action League). It was first a local socialist organization. At the end of the war, Mussolini used the term *fascismo* to describe the disposition of a group of nationalist veterans around him and pro-war syndicalists like himself (Paxton, 2020: 15-16).

It came out that fascism etymologically referred to a reactionist political activity. The term fascism was officially born on March 23, 1919, in Milan. A group of young people - including the war veterans, syndicalists who supported the war - under Mussolini leadership had gathered in Milan "to wage a war on socialism" (Delzell, 1970: 7-11). The movement, which continued under the name of the struggle association, became the basis of the Fascist Program within two months. Defining themselves as nationalist socialists, the group announced a call on 6 June 1919. Through this call, the fascist movement revealed the new state ideal, aiming for the leadership-citizenship-unity pattern that Italy deserved.

Italy was extremely important in the context of the rise of fascist ideology. The ideology got its name from there and took its first steps there. It originated from the Italian peninsula both as a term and a political movement. The country was the first example in which a fascist party seized power. And then, both the political movement and the ideology spread to the other parts of Europe. Fascism did only spread in the European continent, but the politics pointed out by the ideology subsequently showed up all over the world. As fascism became a regime in Italy, it caught the attention of the world. However, it took on different meanings in local contexts. Italian fascism was not replicated outside of Italy in the form it existed there. It acquired a transnational character, in each country where it occurred. Transnational fascists adapted the ideology to their different national and political traditions. Many eager dictatorships like Mussolini's began to appear in other parts of the world; like *nazism* in Germany, *nacionalismo* in Argentina, *integralismo* in Brazil (Finchelstein, 2021: 16). At the forefront of all these was Germany, known as the bloodiest experience of fascism.

Before concentrating on the perception of fascist ideology we need to understand the gradual rise of the fascist regime. In the study of the evolution of the fascist regime, Griffin

(2014:103) reminded us to consider the pro-war and violent lobby at the beginning of 1914, just before the world war broke out. Because the experiences of the pre-war period had some critical impacts on the fascist movement rising. That's to say the starting point of fascist groups was not the end of WWI, but rather 1919.

In the pre-war period, there already formed a group with the ideals of 'New Italy'. In their call for revolution in Italy, this group referred to a new Italy of power and heroism, instead of the decaying and collapsing old Italy. This new generation almost devoted themselves to completing the Italian *risorgimento*, which they believed to be left unfinished. As seen through the articles of Mussolini, political writing occupied an important part of the organizational structure of the fascist movement. Just ten years before the war, expressions of pre-war Italian counter-political culture began to emerge in these writings. Giovanni Papini, who could be considered the first and one of the most important of these, wrote about the collapse of liberalism and the disunity of socialism in Italy under the "Nationalist program" yet in 1904 (Adamson, 1993: 7535-755). In this way, he contributed to the spread of anti-socialist, anti-liberal, and ultra-nationalist ideas and even made it prestigious in Italy in the pre-war period.

In 1910, the first Nationalist Congress was held in Florence. In the congress, *Associazione Nazionale Italiana*, ANI (Italian National Association) was founded by Papini and his close colleague Luigi Federzoni. ANI's ultra-nationalism was right-wing. And it proposed a transformation in the conservative tradition. Assuming that the war was the leading factor in the establishment of the new Italy, this group continued their campaigns in the aforementioned direction. The core belief of the group was that the war would bury all the forms and ideologies of the past; "whoever remained passive would be left behind, because the past was growing and Italy was entering a new age" (Roberts, 1979: 112). This group was openly promoting the idea that Italians had to take part in the world war.

Fascism, at the very beginning stage, was quite far from violence. Its supporters were promoting the European war indeed, but they did not dominate acts of violence. The goal of seizing power was not fully established too. The group was based on different and small ultra-nationalist views, which at first seemed unlikely to turn into a major movement. It was a phenomenon of political writing maintained on the outskirts of mainstream political culture. The development of high-circulation newspaper columns and mass meetings with high attendance were important breakthroughs in the spread of the fascist movement.

It is necessary to mention Gabriele D'Annunzio while focusing on fascism. D'Annunzio gained importance for the pre-war period of Italian nationalism. He was neither in any political culture nor a member of any political group. He had originally assumed the role of resisting the threat of mediocrity posed by modern mass society. Over time, he sought to use his lyrical and dramatic wit to create patriotic enthusiasm in the masses and to be instrumental in the rebirth of Italy as a powerful, imperialist, and modern nation. He became close with ANI in the early days of the group but never became an official member. As declared by Griffin, "It was D'Annunzio, not Mussolini, who showed the possibility of creating a full-fledged fascist movement out of Italy's post-war crisis" (2014: 116).

The most critical person who should be referred to as arousing ultra-nationalist feelings in the pre-war period of Italy was undoubtedly Benito Amilcare Andrea, better known as Benito Mussolini. Mussolini, whose main profession was teaching, was in a similar position to D'Annunzio in 1914. He, like many of the first ultranationalist leaders, was a newspaper writer at that time. In the newspaper *Avanti*, Mussolini made edits; he was working on his extraordinary journalistic skills and magics (Neville, 2004: 29). It was well-known that Mussolini's interest in politics started within the scope of the socialist party. However, by the time World War I broke out, he had almost completely taken himself away from the socialist Marxists.

The first fascists, who considered the war as a means of renewal and liberation of Italy, were spreading to a surprising majority in Italy day by day. Especially upon the end of the war, the increase continued with the effect of external factors along with the domestic factors of Italy. With the final peace agreement to be made after the Allied Powers won the war, the expectation that Italy would gain important territory was raised. At the same time, the unrest about liberal rule began to emerge. After the war, the failure of the liberal government created a new political constituency.

The attempts to suppress the liberal government after the war were first made by D'Annunzio and his followers. But it came to an end with the government's brutal resistance to D'Annunzio and his supporters. It also marked the failure of the fascist movements led by D'Annunzio. It was precisely this failure that led to a new rise on the side of Mussolini's fascism. Mussolini established *fasci di combattimento* in March 1919 (Örs, 2010: 499). Soon after D'Annunzio's movement was suppressed, pro-Mussolini groups were encouraged to form their cadre of action (*squadrisimo*). Towards the end of 1920, these cadres took on the

mission of maintaining anti-communist security in the rural areas of Italy. It was a small group, not very active until that time. But later on, it turned into a national and rural-based movement. In December 1919 there were 31 Fasci with 870 members and within two years, this number increased to a quarter of a million (Griffin, 2014: 118).

The *squadristo* transformed fascism from an ineffective group into a powerful movement. It also helped to strengthen Mussolini, thanks to his opposition to liberal rule due to the continuing collapse in the country. And Mussolini founded the *Partito Nazionale Fascista (PNF)* in 1921. In 1922 he organized the March on Rome. As a result of all those incidents, King Victor Emmanuel III abolished martial law and appointed Mussolini as the prime minister on 31 October 1922 to resolve the social crisis in the country (Örs, 2010: 499).

Mussolini gained wide acceptance in a short time after his prime ministry. He had the image of a young prime minister, who was a necessary political figure to end the atmosphere of violence across the country. However, his movement was also extremely influential in the rise of the chaotic and pro-violent attitude throughout Italy. Immediately after his appointment, he disbanded units and recruited members into newly formed militias, MVSN (Decree Establishing the Fascist Militia), which reinforced Mussolini's image (Paxton, 2020: 81). Some determined fascist people did not fully accept this. Their violence ended up in the assassination of socialist Giacomo Matteotti, a member of parliament in 1924. Matteotti was one of the only lawmakers to oppose the Acerbo Act, which facilitated the opening of a majority path to the fascists with the raised votes in the parliament.

From the time Mussolini became prime minister, he maintained an essentially heterogeneous fascism, rather than a radical one. In three years, his fascism went from being a small group to a mass movement. However, in January 1925, the transition to fascist dictatorship officially began (Bosworth, 2022: 107). The acts of his supporters, as well as the anti-fascist movements, were effective in the radicalization of Mussolini's fascist attitudes. The extremist actions that spread to the parliament led to a separation between the fascist groups. And Mussolini came out of this separation of legality and extremism by seizing opportunities for himself. The fascist regime quickly changed to policy making. The regime was accepted by the society in a short time. But, in the long run, this whole process would prove that the fascist ideals that supported the idea of a new Italy were just a dream for Italy.

Mussolini's unlimited rise began when he declared the basis of the Italian state as fascism. The most effective part of his government was the top-down construction of the society. Throughout the fascist regime, policies and changes were designed to influence every aspect of social life. Fascism was to some extent a "cultural filter" in which the regime's policies, social programs, and institutional changes were taken and put forward through a filter (Griffin, 2014: 126). The most influential vehicle for this purpose could be considered the organization of *Dopolavoro*. The leisure time organization *Dopolavoro*, to be examined in detail in the next title, was a social life organization arranged to discipline Italians, especially the working class. Gaining a higher visibility by social and cultural means and becoming much more effective compared to the political and economic transformations, this organization of *Dopolavoro* provided modern leisure activities in many areas of daily life to millions of ordinary Italians. It was of great importance in understanding the politics of the period as an important indicator of the fascist rise. "Taken in its totality, 'culture' took in all the areas where the regime could expect to 'fascistise' the Italians and affect their conduct and behaviour, from the educational system to the PNF's ever-proliferating sectoral organizations, to the corporations" (Morgan, 2004: 138).

Since fascism - as an ideology - emerged in Italy and spread from there, the true understanding of the roots of the fascist ideology seems significant. And this process, as can be seen above, was directly related to the power politics of Italy through the end of WWI. Now, the basis of fascism as a political ideology can be expanded. The analysis of the ideology is also significant to understand the conditions of the culture construction mechanism that emerged under the totalitarian fascist power.

The fascist theory has never been an articulated belief system. It has always been a fluctuating set of ideas. At the heart of fascism was a worldwide ideological rejection of the liberal order. Fascism described itself as a reaction to all the progressive revolutions of the 19th century. It was the representation of a counter-revolutionary attack against the revolutions that developed the understanding of equality, tolerance, and freedom in the political, economic, and social context. Fascism was not only an armed victory against the movement of the working class, but it was also a highly ideological and political victory, as is seen in the case of Italy.

Fascism was essentially a modern ideology. When compared to other fundamental ideologies, it was one of the current ideologies. It was a 20th-century invention. However,

it included a type of modernism with a reactionary motivation (Ben-Ghiat, 2001). With its struggle against liberties, fascism considered itself the child of the time, even the "primitive" state of the future. The creation of other isms belonged to the period when politics was the business of gentlemen; this was done through learned parliamentary debates between educated men who appealed to each other's reasoning and feelings (Paxton, 2020: 38). Classical isms were based on coherent philosophical systems outlined in the works of systematic philosophers. Fascism, on the contrary, was a new invention, recreated for the era of mass politics as declared by Paxton, who addressed the modern formation of fascism against modernity (2020: 40).

Fascism was the ideology of inconsistencies. From the very beginning of its formation, it implied full of contradictions. As expressed by Gregor, " Since fascism's tasks ran counter to the course of history, fascism was not only reactionary, it was irrational. The forces it was compelled to conjure up to discharge its reactionary responsibilities could only be barbaric and inhumane" (2003: 58). The ideology did not have a systematic philosophy, neither had it wide intellectual support. Rather than a detailed program or a teaching system, fascism aimed to appeal to the emotions of people with rituals and ceremonies held meticulously and densely filled rhetoric. It emphasized popular sentiments such as superior race rather than an elaborate philosophical framework. Contrary to classical ideologies, fascist ideology had methods on its own, with a very unique activism.

Due to his definition of fascism in *Enciclopedia Italiana*, Giovanni Gentile was recognized as the chief ideologue of the fascist ideology. Gentile developed his interpretation of the fascist revolution - based on a highly individualistic philosophy known as actualism - by synthesizing Hegelian philosophy of history (Griffin, 2014: 122). It would also be effective to take Mussolini's fascist ideas into account, due to his actual contributions to the fascist regime. Mussolini himself defined the fascist movement as a "revolution of reaction", to tensions between ideology and modernity. Fascism was, to some extent, a response to the concerns carried out for a long time about modernity. Especially the inter-war years were a period in which such anxieties were experienced at the highest level and so, it promoted the rise of the fascist movement.

A critical argument by Ben-Ghiat revealed some clues about the spread of fascism among Italian society, even the intellectuals: "Fascism appealed to many Italian intellectuals as a new model of modernity that would resolve both the contemporary European crisis and

long-standing problems of the national past. For those who believed that both capitalism and communism led to social and economic balance, fascism offered the fantasy of a mass society that allowed economic development without giving harm to social boundaries and national traditions” (2001: 2-3). Fascism, from these words, was considered a saviour of time, in the example of Italy.

When fascism became a ruling regime under the leadership of Mussolini, it also became the name of an anti-Enlightenment, anti-democratic tradition. As claimed by Finchelstein (2021: 42), fascism aimed to overthrow democracy and replace it with a modern dictatorship from top-down. Against the Italian anti-fascists who first used the concept of totalitarianism as a modern form of tyranny in the 1920s, Mussolini interpreted the term positively. Considering totalitarianism as a modern form of absolutism, Mussolini almost defined a new formulation for the concept. In this context, he introduced a different form of totalitarianism through fascism. For Mussolini, the fascist state was not only a “night watchman” involved in the safety of its citizens but also a guarantor of material well-being and relatively peaceful living conditions of the citizens. “The state, as designed and implemented by fascism, is a spiritual and ethical entity established to ensure the political, legal, and economic organization of the nation, an organization that is the manifestation of the spirit both in its origin and in its development process” (Mussolini, 2016: 119-121). And then, Mussolini emphasized an extremely important point; the state in question would guarantee security in the country. Beyond that, it would touch the citizens through non-visible means: It would protect and transmit the spirit of people which was shaped throughout the ages in their language, traditions, and beliefs. This state would correspond not only to the present, but also to the past and, more significantly, to the future. This meant penetrating the immanent consciousness of the whole nation.

The fascist definition of culture was also important, as defined by Morgan through the following expressions “If Fascism’s goal was the creation of morally and spiritually regenerated national community collectively assembled and unified around the *Duce*, then the goal was expressed in and through ‘culture’” (2004: 137). Mussolini defined culture in a broad and ‘totalitarian’ manner. As claimed by him, the main duty of culture was to transform all areas of life; since he was concentrating on Italy, the mission of culture was the transformation of Italians. The official statement of Fascism which was co-authored by Mussolini and Gentile in 1932 in *Doctrine of Fascism*, described the totalitarian state as the ethical state that would penetrate the values of fascism into people. It offered an all-covering

belief system for the lives of the whole of Italian society. The culture was located as the mediator between the state and the society in delivering the state's service.

Mussolini believed that fascism was a unique "ism" in the forest of "isms" (Finchelstein, 2021: 68). Fascism in Mussolini's perception meant a legendary and sacred revolution as well as the rebirth of the trinity of country, leader, and people. Fascism could be understood as a specific code, a language of political interpretation and action. And Mussolini defined the unchangeable dimension of fascism as "*fondo commune*" equalled "common ground". The following statement by Mussolini also pointed to the monism of fascism based on differences. He told that: "Each of us has a different nature, we each have different sensitivities and each of us has his psychology, but there is a common ground that equalizes the whole" (cited by Finchelstein, 2021: 69).

As an important characteristic, fascism had a special perception of the state and its monopoly of violence. In addition to all the aspects of fascism, another significant part of the ideology was that it attached absolute value to violence. With the philosophy of political action, a positive reference was made to violence. This positiveness was reinforced by Soviet communism in 1917 as well. However, there was an important difference in the philosophy of the fascist ideology there. Fascism had already identified itself as the opposite of communism. Within this framework, while fascism was fed by the widespread rejection of communism, it took advantage of some elements of the social revolution and incorporated them into its structure (Dutt, 1978: 59). It was the Soviet experience that matured the conditions for fascism. In any case, fascism's devastation from the matter of violence was the belief in the age of total warfare of the 20th century. After WWI, this violent attitude combined with extreme right nationalism, imperialism, and non-Marxist, anti-parliamentary, and left revolutionary syndicalism tendencies, and; became what fascism is known today.

The close relationship of fascism with the Marxist theory is also worth considering here. This relationship was even interpreted as the ideology of "twin brothers" by Gregor (Gregor, 2003). The post-World War I period showed that Marxist theory gained widespread attention. It was because of the theory's pointing out a world without any wars, any discrimination of the oppressed and the weak; in which the material and spiritual abundance produced by advanced industrial capitalism were shared. Marxism, with the promise of the world that people longed for, aroused curiosity and great expectations towards the suffering of WWI and its aftermath. The socialist movement that Mussolini also emerged from led to

the emergence of an ideology that was the exact opposite of the post-war conditions in Italy. The first to accept fascism were those who came from within the socialist party, such as Mussolini (Dutt, 1978: 66, 102). Mussolini himself was one of the ideologists of the Italian Socialist Party and was appreciated by many Marxist thinkers before he went extreme right (Acemoglu and others, 2020: 6).

At this point, it can be asserted that the success of fascism was due to the actions of socialists in alienating people in Italy during the 1920s. The success was not caused directly by the contributions of fascist ideologues of modern capitalism. Socialists played an important role in the rise of fascism. Therefore, the policies of socialism had more of an impact on Mussolini's support from many sections, rather than the contribution of capitalism. The socialists in Italy did not only alienate people but also, they damaged the prestige of the army. By 1921, there was serious disappointment among the Italian public about the socialist rulers at that time (Dutt, 1978: 69).

In Italy, there was, on one side, the so-called “progressive left” hindering development and on the other side so-called “reactionary right” trying to take steps for the country's progress. So, there was a state of almost intertwined ideologies and policies. The separation of one from the other and one's gaining a decision-maker position on behalf of Italy corresponded to the rise of fascism. What emerged was a commentary that perceived fascism as a form of single-party developmental dictatorship among many forms of government, remarked Gregor (2003: 68). He addressed the complexity between fascism and socialism and then he took us back to the Soviet experience, which had some similarities with the Italian situation of the increase of fascism. What the Soviet Union, under the auspices of Stalin, had described as proletarian democracy, eventually turned into a dictatorship of bureaucratic strata. In a system devoted to the rapid development and modernization of a backward national economy, the fact that technocrats became politically neutral people and bureaucrats who took care of the system became the exploiters of the system was the summary of the situation in the Soviets.

One of the most important determinations of socialists about fascism was the claim that fascism was an extension of capitalism. For Guerin, “fascism was a terrible product of decadent capitalism”. For Dutt, fascism was “the most perfect expression of the modern capitalist tendency”. As mentioned already, the climate of despair and weariness created by the economic depressions seemed to be an important factor in the formation of fascism;

however, it became a widely accepted view that imperialist finance capitalist was already involved in this formation (cited by Thalheimer and others, 2018). This perception was considered the basis of the social conditions that prepared the development of fascism as the crisis that emerged at the economic level. However, this economic depression was not an ordinary one. It was not only the social democrat party's failure in becoming a real revolutionary party but also the fact that fascism was an activity the bourgeoisie resorted to against the increasing demands of the working class that made the rise of fascism (Bank, 2016: 52).

To sum up the fascist ideology, it can be mentioned that the political conditions in the Italian peninsula made fascism the enemy of Italian socialism and communism after the war. It was an expected situation for Italy. What caused the separation between the existing socialist groups in Italy did not happen following either right or left tendencies; basically, the attitude displayed during the participation in WWI was decisive. The process took the peninsula step by step toward this result. While an aggressive section advocated Italy's entry into the war on the side of the Allies, some socialists showed neutrality towards entering the war.

Especially after the fascists' march to Rome in 1922, the tension between the two tendencies took on an official appearance. The clash of the two movements led to the Marxists defining fascism as "right-wing", "reactionary" and "anti-revolutionary". From that time on and especially after the fascist party's rise to power, the distinction between fascist and Marxist ideology turned into obvious hostility. Despite the similarities they shared in the political arena, fascist ideology, through tuning into a fascist regime, took it a step further between the period of 1922 and 1943.

In moving forward, besides the totalitarian tendencies of the regime, the process of designing the society by social instruments gained the utmost importance. Here, in the context of the scope of the study, *Dopolavoro*, one of the most critical institutions of Italian fascism, as an adult construction centre by national means constituted the main analysis level. Starting with the historical background of the organization and its evolution of it, the next titles continue with the activities of *Dopolavoro* and feedback from Italian society.

4.3. *Dopolavoro*: The Culture Organization of Italy

The place that culture occupied in fascism, as is seen above, was immense. Culture was one of the most significant keys in the way to understanding the fascist project. Although fascism was an outward-looking ideology; the aspect that made it accepted by so many people constituted the proof of how close it was to this issue of culture. During Mussolini's power in Italy, the notion of culture manifested itself openly. And key institution for such occupation was *Dopolavoro* organization (*OND*). This organization pioneered many cultural initiatives that were established around the world at that time. In this context, examining the Italian *Dopolavoro* organization both as a unique institution in itself and in the context of its effects on the fascist administration is believed to make important contributions to the comparative manner aimed throughout this study.

As Gregor expressed (1979: 263) “many of the Fascist programs were continuations of those already begun under the parliamentary system that the regime displaced, and many had their functional analogues in more generous legislation enacted by parliamentary governments on the Continent and in North America. Some, however, like the *Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro* were unique, more comprehensive, and popular than any generated in the non-Fascist systems”, the impact of the *OND* on the fascist establishment was nearly unchallenged. The contributions of *Dopolavoro* organization to the fascist regime as a whole are the main focus of this topic.

“If Fascism's goal was the creation of a morally and spiritually regenerated national community collectively assembled and unified around the Duce, then the goal was expressed in and through ‘culture’” (Morgan, 2004: 136). As we may easily seize from what Morgan stated, through the fascist regime Mussolini tried not only to make Italians over but also to reshape them in a combination of indoctrination and legislation. Within this framework, *Dopolavoro* organization had a significant role. The *OND* maintained the most fundamental position of becoming a carrier of culture in fascist Italy. Defining fascist policies as a process of “social engineering” (Ben-Ghiat, 2001: 3), indirectly referred to the fascist purpose of making a new man or perfecting a man. Since the *OND* was among the most important determiners of such a project, it is better to examine the organization in detail hereupon.

4.3.1. The Establishment of the *OND*

After WWI, it became apparent worldwide that for political support and social cooperation at the administration level, having tangible power was not enough, but it was necessary to build consent. In other words, the use of force to impose certain situations on citizens and to manipulate them was not sufficient and effective enough for a ruling. As described by de Garzia, “The new age, that of an expansive, consumer-oriented, organized capitalism, called for rule by consent” (1981: 1). In the *Prison Notebooks*, Gramsci used it to designate the establishment of a holistic form of class domination that existed not only through the economic supremacy and political power of the ruling classes but also through the active participation of subaltern groups in their social processes and cultural experiences (Williams, 1977: 108). Along with the economic determinants, policies built on the social level gained importance. However, this required to be placed in a new frame of reference, which was mostly ignored till then. ‘Cultural revolution’ conveyed exactly what fascism tried to achieve through the social and cultural organizations it established (Morgan, 2004: 137). Within this context, the *OND* was established “to give a distinctively ideological cast to social experiences outside the workplace to unite national citizens – demanded the creation of a nation-wide political culture that might persuade people that their shared goals transcended pretty economic haggling, regional and ethnic disputes, or age-old social animosities” (Lyttelton, 1982: 603).

The Italian organization of *Dopolavoro* was the leading instrument of the fascist government in shaping social life in Italy, as briefly mentioned earlier. It was a national after-work program, aimed to re-design the social and leisure activities of the Italian nation, especially outside the workplace, and to incorporate the masses into the emerging regime. It included leisure programs, welfare programs, and some other facilities for the workers. It was officially established on May 1, 1925 (Harrison, 1935: 266). It had traces of the socialist unions before the fascist part acceded to power. There was no real gap between the state and civil society in pre-fascist Italy. It could be argued that civil society in pre-war Italy was "overly politicized" by failure to develop a particular type of intermediary rather than suffering from a shortage of institutions. With the failure of liberal power in Italy which aimed to develop a modern form of social solidarity in the country, there witnessed above all deep social and ideological divisions. This period also triggered the emergence of syndicalism promoting private interest institutions, but the divisions prevented any kind of agreement on a single project. The socialists, the Catholics, and the industrialists had

different approaches to the issue of forming worker associations and clubs. A rapid growth in the social clubs' movement was supplied by the reformist socialists of the time. "The socialists naturally resisted any additional state regulation, on the entirely legitimate ground that any measure justifying further government restrictions on associational activity was bound to be used by the prefects to harass socialist workingmen's clubs" (de Garzia, 1981: 7-8). They played an important role during the red years of 1919-1920; creating a socialist counterculture in their associations.

After the rise of the fascist regime, the ongoing position of syndicates was to be changed. During the first years of fascist power, the fascist labour organizing issue was entirely efficient. But the socialist, ex-revolutionary syndicates found themselves in a complex position. The fascist regime started to get conservative and imposed a state-based rule over the associations. The socialist tendency for 'rule by the corporations themselves' could no longer be valid. The *OND* intended to fill the place that became vacant with the dissolution of the socialist syndicates. "Calls for the workers themselves to take up a 'struggle of expertises' were blocked by the PNF; attempts to satisfy worker demands were precluded by Mussolini's injunction against strikes in March 1923" (de Garzia, 1981: 25). Therefore 1923 stroke a critical date: During this period nationalist, technocratic and commercial views on how to create the citizen-construction model were quickly assimilated. The programs of the working corporations turned mostly into worker education, technical instruction, social welfare, and recreation (Gregor, 1979: 237). All these addressed the education of workers through a national interest. And as a last point in the way to the establishment of the *OND* officially was Mussolini government's support for the eight-hour day principle, which was accepted by the worker's congress in the USA. In March 1923, Mussolini issued a new decree covering the field of industry, maintaining all the collective agreements and regulations of that time (Feis, 1924: 399). Through this emphasis, Mussolini was able to attract many ideologically differentiated syndicate organizers.

"It was scarcely accidental that the syndicates were increasingly bypassed in favour of the *OND*, the regime's main point of contact with an industrial working class which Mussolini continued to recognize as hostile to or distant from Fascism" (Morgan, 2004: 146). The leisure organization was founded shortly after Mussolini approved the fascist unions' demands to set up the *OND*. Since the program was not a structure specific to the fascist party and becoming more powerful than the previous experiences was of importance.

The first head of this organization under the fascist party was Mario Giani, the former director of Italian Westinghouse, an American manufacturing company. Giani was first invited to contribute to the newspaper of the fascist movement and later to join the directory of the fascist confederation on the organization of worker leisure. Since Giani offered ready answers to the urgent needs of the syndicalists, he was considered the most appropriate person for such a mission. "By December 1923, the fascist syndicalists had drawn up comprehensive guidelines for the establishment of what were now generally known as '*dopolavoro* circles'" (de Garzia, 1981: 27).

In 1927, two years after the establishment of the organization, Mussolini appointed the Fascist Party's Secretary, Augusto Turati as the person in charge of the *OND*. The *OND*, with this change of position, was now the party's official branch (Gregor, 1979: 237). Mussolini's intention of turning the organization into a fundamental part of the fascist party - *Partito Nazionale Fascista* - was revealed, since in the organization of the *OND* there was a legacy left by the socialist syndicates. The Socialist Party's influence on the organization was at a very high level with its chambers of labour and leagues. The fascists' taking over those positions was the short beginning of the organization's history. From 1927 on, the *OND* became an "auxiliary of the fascist party". Apart from the presidency undertaken by the party secretary, the provincial counterparts became *federali* and the local administration of the *OND* branches was also taken over by the fascist party cadres (Morgan, 2004: 135).

The definition of culture had a totalitarian response according to fascists, as examined already. Culture was the basic instrument to penetrate the lives of people. In this regard, the *OND* was recognized as the leading mass organization through controlling the everyday lives and set of values of the workers in Italy. "The *OND*'s profile was culturally lowbrow, folksy, and geared to providing popular entertainment, leisure, and recreation rather than explicit propaganda and indoctrination" (Morgan, 2004: 146). For Mussolini, the important thing was that people were able to meet in places where the fascist regime could control them. Therefore, the key point became apparent: the tendency to guide masses towards physical and mental development; in a general definition it was to create mass organizing. And therefore, *Dopolavoro* organization occurred as "a social service agency and at the local level the promoter of official cultural directives" of the fascist regime (de Garzia, 1981: 16-17).

As in the emergence of many cultural organizations, *Dopolavoro* was established to shape the values of the regime to which it was affiliated and to shape the society it addressed. At this point, the organization of *Dopolavoro*, independent of the fascist oppression, was also important. So, it seems more likely to understand how this institution, whose objectives, organization, and activities will be now examined in detail, became a source for our aim to compare with the Turkish example throughout this study.

4.3.2. The Purposes of the *OND*

Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro was one of the modern social institutions established by the fascist regime in Italy. Initially, it was exercised to solve the problems of workers' leisure times and penetrate them into the regime's purposes on the physical, intellectual, and moral betterment level (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 7-9). Protecting the workers, contributing to their improvement by enriching their leisure hours, and building their physical and mental energy up along with ensuring the interests of the nation-building process were the ultimate goals of the organization. In this sense, *Dopolavoro* had an autonomous place in terms of constituting one of the most active examples in the world. The success achieved by *Dopolavoro* in the process of fulfilling its aims led it to be taken as an example by many countries. Not only in practice but also through spirit, the organization implied one of the most effective methods of social education.

Its effectiveness was by far the most successful adult education organization established around the world in its time, as accepted by many. As asserted by some historians, Mussolini's Italy was not only successful but also a first in the world. "In the fascist dictatorships, the problem of leisure was addressed by the direct government intervention; and the solution generally took the form of a special national institution" (de Garzia, 1981: 239). As indicated in the official publishing of the institution that "The Italy of Benito Mussolini was the first country that, with a realistic vision, united the activity of protection in the moral field to that of protection of all the workers' interests in the economic field and has provided the means suitable for elevating the mentality, the customs and ways of living, secure in the knowledge that thereby all the most legitimate aspirations of the workers would be satisfied... The results of the first ten years of *Dopolavoro* have been such as to command the attention of the whole civilized world and many nations, such as England, Germany, Austria, etc., following the example and criterion set by Italy, have, themselves,

established institutions which demonstrate clearly the origin of the idea which was first put into practice in Italy” (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 8-9).

At the beginning of examining the purposes of the *OND*, the issue of “social engineering” winked at us, as many scholars and historians referred to this pattern while concentrating on *Dopolavoro*. Social engineering gained importance as a common judgment for not only the *OND* but for the whole cultural construction mechanisms. It is, to some extent, the most abstract form of guiding people in a certain direction and it is possible by using the socio-cultural tools ideologically.

“From the moment that leisure was legally installed, the regime began a campaign of social engineering to ensure that worker's time-off would be as efficient and beneficial to the state (and corporations) as their work time” (Kariouk, 1998: 272). It was not only Kariouk who defined the process as social engineering but also Ben-Ghiat called the fascist policies a part of social engineering. He told us about the concept of *bonifica*, the reclamation, which was a central issue to many discourses of fascist modernity. As claimed by Ben-Ghiat's theory, Mussolini's totalitarianism was not a kind of crushing pluralism; but rather promoted cultural development along with social and technological progress. This notion of reclamation, besides, included a concrete manifestation of the fascist desire to purify the human, the lands, and the culture by the construction of institutions in that direction (Cannistraro, 1972: 120). *Bonifica agricola* (the agricultural reclamation), *bonifica umana* (the human reclamation), and *bonifica della cultura* (cultural reclamation) were, for Ben-Ghiat, the most significant attempts by the fascist movement to create the new fascist man (2001: 4). Therefore, culture was conceived as a complementary tool by the state, to create a shared set of values to adhere the people to the state. As declared by Ben-Ghiat, “the *OND* was created as a vehicle for the indoctrination of peasants and working classes who would learn the national virtues of order and discipline” (2001: 8).

Whittam expressed that “this impressive piece of social engineering was suggested by an engineer, Mario Giani” (1995: 73). Giani was so much more preoccupied with the notion of social engineering than the bureaucratic development of the organization. Edmondo Rossoni, an important fascist politician, supported this idea and spread it within the fascist movement. Giani's ideas were promoted to use for common activities. As his plans became national and state-directed, the main purpose of the organization became clear. It was to shape Italian society in a particular fascist direction. However, Giani's purposes

for the development of the *OND* were not fully appreciated by fascist party members (de Garzia, 1981: 36). The exercise of social engineering in the Italian post-war community continued nearly until 1927 to modernize the society.

Through the activities, the *OND* aimed to unite the masses under a single objective. The cultural, artistic, and sports organizations at that point were the actual ways to organize, coordinate and develop. In this context, the operations of *Dopolavoro* could be classified under three main categories: Culture Education, Physical Training, and Social Assistance (Harrison, 1935: 270). A similar classification, which we see through the nine sections of *Halkevleri*, was compiled into three main categories in the Italian example; and the activities of these groups were kept comprehensive.

Cultural education, the first of the sections, aimed to improve the workers in terms of cultural aspects and technical developments (Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro, 1938: 21). Through the evening courses following the rush hour of the workers, holiday courses mostly on weekends, the workers were aimed to be educated. To accompany this education issue, libraries were founded. More than lectures and general courses, agreeable talks, informative conferences, and competitions with prizes were held in *Dopolavoros*. On a cultural basis, general instructions were given to raise the workers' moral and mental conditions. Establishing orchestras, philharmonic societies, and choirs in a national and educational repertoire; as well as organizing instrumental concerts, competitions, and meetings were among such activities. As another important point, such outputs were reviving the Italian customs and recreating them in line with the traditional tone. Radio and cinema were other instruments of this category. A significant means of propaganda, both radio and cinema were promoting the cultural and technical development of Italian society. "The *OND* clearly also played a part in persuading the regime of the utility of modern means of mass communication: the cinema and, especially, radio. These were increasingly incorporated into a more refined propaganda apparatus as the 1930s went on" (Morgan, 2004: 136). The scope of the culture education section of *Dopolavoro* organization was covering a set of many subcategories in itself.

The second category of the *OND* activities, the physical training was by far the most reputed among the objectives of *Dopolavoro*. Covering many forms of sports from excursions to swimming and fencing, the *OND* had a remarkable organization of sports and in this way reached millions of Italian workers. Making masses involved in physical exercise

became a critical point in the unification of the nation under the fascist regime during the 1920s. With the idea that “a healthy mind resided in a healthy body”, the *OND* aimed to maintain healthy citizens (Todd, 2011: 40). Providing physical and mental capability through sports was to improve and strengthen workers’ conditions against any possibilities: to make all the workers ready against any act of violence and to active citizens by all means. The reputation of *Dopolavoro* organization within the scope of the physical training section was extremely effective in its acceptance as a success worldwide.

The activities of social assistance as the third category had a slightly different, more spiritual aspect among *Dopolavoro*’s section of activities. Helping the suffering and preventing people from accidents were the basic aims of the social assistance section. Moreover, it provided special nursing houses, encouraging economic and at the same time popular gathering places. It also paved the way for assisting the domestic economy of the country. This section mainly built the spiritual necessity up among the masses to co-ordinate themselves and develop the group consciousness directly related to fascism (Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro, 1938: 85).

The activities carried out by the *OND* organization had also ties with the Depression years. The facilities offered by the *OND* branches aimed to eliminate the distress and discontent among the workers. The services that would promote low pay for the working classes helped the organization to reach large masses in a short time. “Workers and their families could join to enjoy what it offered, without having to make any uncomfortable political choices about their general view of Fascism” (Morgan, 2004: 146). The purpose of the involvement of those workers, at first sight, was not for the fascist regime to gain support but rather to serve facilities that the workers could have.

As can be seen, regardless of the existence of the fascist power in Italy, the objectives of the *OND* in line with its activities coincided with the objectives of *Halkevleri*. Even though the impact of the activities throughout the two countries was different, the similarity of the tools used made it essential to carry out this study in such a comparative direction. The administrative structure, which is examined in the next title, is believed to contribute one more step in understanding this association.

4.3.3. The Administrative Structure of the *OND*

Looking at the organizational construction of the *OND*, the first thing to say may be its direct ties with the Partito Nazionale Fascista. The *OND*, through the general officers of the fascist party, was able to carry out specific duties of the fascist party. From an organizational process, all of the institutions of the fascist government were engaged accordingly. The *OND* had a comprehensive structure since its organization was valid from the smallest unit to the largest premises bound to the fascist party. Thanks to this large-scale organization, *Dopolavoro* branches were able to touch as many people as possible and keep them together as a whole national body. The activities of *Dopolavoro* providing cultural, educational, and recreational assistance to the masses were among the most important organizing forces of the fascist regime.

The general direction of *Dopolavoro* was headed by the General Secretary of the Party, since 1927, two years after the establishment of the organization. It was also subject to the guidance of the President, the *Duce*. The Direction General was divided into six categories which were organization, administration, sports, art and culture, excursions, and lastly assistance (de Garzia, 1981: 37-38). These social services covered the instruction of popular culture, vocational training; artistic education of theatre, music, cinema, radio, and folklore; physical education of sports; assistance in housing, consumer affairs, health and hygiene, social insurance, and company recreational facilities. The services were completed by a sanitary inspectorate, various technical and legal offices along with fifteen regional inspectors. There were about 98thousands of directors in collaboration with 3680 technical directors.

In the process of the organization of *Dopolavoro* turning into a national movement from social welfare agency, the impact of local boards was undeniable. Under the direct supervision of Federal Secretaries were provincial *Dopolavoros*. The provincial boards of these *Dopolavoros* were commissioned with the supervision of the local after-work organizations. Since the structure of the *OND* spread from the small settlement to the largest throughout the country, in every chief provincial town, there was a 'Provincial Directorate of the *Dopolavoro*'. They comprised the sections as the representatives of the employers and the employees. The direction and coordination of the activities of various sections of *Dopolavoro* were conducted by the political secretaries in the communes. The Rural and

Communal *Dopolavoro* constituted a president and members of five to seven people (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 13-14).

The membership in *Dopolavoro* sections was another topic concerning the organizational structure of the institution. For any worker to be a member of *Dopolavoro* branches, there did not require any extra fees or bureaucratic processes. Since the regime always needed to reach more and more citizens, they had never made it difficult to come to *Dopolavoro* and become a member. Membership included many advantages on behalf of the workers. It did not only give rights to the workers but also provided some privileges in the form of assistance. The organization offered various benefits such as discounts on railway tickets and reductions on entrance fees to cultural public performances; theatres, cinemas, etc. (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 15).

The classification under the *OND* was determined following the subjects of the organization. Although the organization was mostly designed to reshape the lives of workers in their leisure time, it served the peasants too. *Dopolavoro* branches for the peasants and those for the workers therefore differed. The branches for the workers and employees were also classified separately within themselves. Employees and manual workers were divided into particular sections. *Dopolavoro* for the State Employees were autonomous branches but bound to the general direction of *Dopolavoro*. The railmen's *Dopolavoro* (1), employees in the post, telegraph, and telephone (2), employees in the tobacco industry (3), and *Dopolavoro* for the colonies (4) were the four groups under *Dopolavoro* for the State Employees. These *Dopolavoros* were mostly comprised of state services. Having their local institutions, the branches were able to conduct cultural and educational activities in their buildings. "For example, *Dopolavoro* of the Railwaymen in Rome, a magnificent modern building, contains a theatre with seating capacity for 1500 spectators, 100 bedrooms for guests, a restaurant and a café for the exclusive use of railwaymen passing through Rom" (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 16). However, the activities of these branches were not unique. Vocational schools, courses in general culture, libraries, cinema, radio possibilities, music, sports manifestations, and some excursions were shared opportunities with the members of the ordinary *Dopolavoro* branches.

The rural *Dopolavoro* branches were, by a majority, composed of peasants and citizens living in the smaller settlements. Among the main incentive of these branches laid the importance of agriculture and the civilization of the rural parts. The role given to rural

areas in the development of agricultural production, and the organization, and functioning of *Dopolavoro* branches gained attention. Agricultural development and organization were especially an essential and implicit part of the fascist social policies. The *OND* associated itself with a large scale of propaganda for the support of the rural economy. Not only by economic means but also in terms of producing a healthy and progressive race, the rural *Dopolavoros* were in direct relation with the purposes of fascism. For the nation to acquire organic and healthy customs and get powerful both physically and mentally, these branches were of great importance. The branches, while contributing to the continuation of the Italian race, they served the development of the rural citizens and rural regions. Improving the cultural education and the technical acquirements of the peasants were other initiatives of the branches. Through these rural branches, the *OND* aimed to encourage the farmers in their attachment to the land. For such reasons, the cultivation of fertile land, the breeding of animals, and the supply of agricultural production in industries were promoted (Kariouk, 1998: 273). The importance of the rural areas for the fascist regime was also a result of the north-south difference in Italian society. The organs of the fascist party in the southern part of Italy, which consisted mainly of rural regions, were quite ineffective in activity range and membership. Because in many parts of the South, the fascist regime was nearly unknown before the party was established. “But basically, Fascist organizations in the 1930s were paying the price for Fascism’s renewal of the ‘transformistic’ deal... In some rural communities, for whom the state had always been no more than the policeman and the taxman, organizations like the *OND* at least presented a more benign face to state authority” (Morgan, 2004: 148).

At the bottom of the hierarchical level, there were the local *Dopolavoros*. They had carried out the same organizational structure with the central directorate. These local *Dopolavoros* were supervised by the secretary of the local fascio, administered by a president who was appointed by the party, and were counselled by a board composed of the town secretary, the municipal medical inspector, the elementary school teacher, the fiduciary of the women's fasci, representatives from the local fascist unions and employers' association. The meeting centres of the local *Dopolavoros* were -as expressed by Benito Mussolini- expected to offer their members new opportunities for culture, recreation, and physical education, in line with the tastes of the local groups (de Garzia, 1981: 40).

As we can understand from the organizational structure of *Dopolavoro*, the institution, which aimed to fulfil the objectives of the party, was under the roof of the PNF,

from its establishment in the smallest region to its organization in big cities. After all, it seems useful to look at *Dopolavoro*'s activities now.

4.4. The Activities of *Dopolavoro* Organization

In light of the purposes of the *OND*, we see that the organization served numerous activities in various fields since culture construction was a comprehensive way including so much content. "The mixed character and the variety of functions it was called on to play made *dopolavoro* organization from the outset a hybrid institution" (de Garzia, 1981: 16). A detailed analysis of the activities of *Dopolavoro* can make its effectiveness be easily observed.

A typical *Dopolavoro* section in the provinces had to have a library, a radio, a recreation and sports centre, and a clubhouse. In this way, it was able to organize sports facilities, festivals, cinemas, theatres, and activities for the members to socialize. As mentioned above, the activities of *Dopolavoro* organization were classified under three main categories. All of the sections aimed at integrating the masses in Italy through the fascist line. Under all these categories, there were numerous activities carried out through a process of social engineering. These activities, while ideologically driven, did not always explicitly appeal to a fascist orientation. All these also showed why and how *Dopolavoro* organization succeeded, despite existing under totalitarian control. The best way to underline this is to have a detailed analysis of the activities, now.

4.4.1. Culture Education

Among various facilities of *Dopolavoro*, the most remarkable service in line with the fascist party's standards, the cultural and artistic education may be the first to discuss. Assigning a new role for the artists and intellectuals in the fascist state was the very first aspect of the totalitarian fascist regime in examining the cultural policies. "In respect of art the *Dopolavoro* carries on a vast and complex artistic and cultural work by various means such as the philodramatic societies, the Cars of Thespis, the Cinema, music, bands, choirs, and the radio" (Missiroli, 1937: 76). The arts as a whole went into a highly concentrated transmission period during Mussolini's Italy. "It was no longer to be a matter of 'art for art's sake', of elitist ivory tower intellectualism, but of artists serving the state and of art becoming

one of the ways which connected the wider society to the state” (Morgan, 2004: 138). Making art for society’s sake was the main goal at this point.

The artists in *Dopolavoro* organization were given so much importance that they were regarded as the guarantor of the fascist regime. They were critical actors in fulfilling the myth of fascism and forming the new fascist man. The remote position of the artists from the rest of society made them considered the educator of the nation. But despite all, the fascist regime gave high attention to breaking the settled perception of arts for art’s sake or the sake of elites and changed it with a new understanding as the arts’ getting popular and accessible. “The Fascist regime deliberately sought to break down the barriers between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture and bring a broader public to ‘art’, partly by encouraging more and more people to ‘consume’ art through the promotion of the forms of the new mass culture, radio, and especially cinema” (Morgan, 2004: 139). Such a popularization of culture showed itself in mostly the artistic activities of *Dopolavoro* organization.

As a means of civil and mental education, the theatrical activities of the *OND* were very important. The theatre was not only a critical social factor in the workers’ lives but also it was a critical form of their educational process. Striking as a powerful influence on the collective spirit of the masses, the educational side of theatre occupied an extremely large area for the fascist regime. For the *OND*’s aim of carrying out the fascist program, the theatre was among the most effective methods. In light of this purpose, there laid the following; “To complete its activity in favour of the theatre, the *OND* has obtained for its members special reductions for public spectacles so that, on presentation of the membership card, a reduction of 50% is given on the price of tickets” (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 38).

The exercise of the theatrical performances had significant meanings for the administrators of *Dopolavoro*. The Provincial Federations organized, assisted, and supervised the theatrical activities. The representation of a performance to be spontaneous rather than a kind of schooling in a didactic method was the most necessary point. For this purpose, the Federations made significant contributions to the development of the plays. They consisted of the most highly esteemed directors of the philodramatic societies and a president, who was an expert, appointed by the related *Dopolavoro* (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 23). The duties of the experts were to encourage and supervise the performances, organize the members in the society and provide the groups with technical and artistic theatrical matters. Arranging breathing exercises, correct pronunciation

(orthoepy), diction, gesture and facial expressions, bearing, dancing, make-up, costume planning, and design were among the extensive curriculum of the artistic schools of *Dopolavoro*.

The cultural organization had a multi-directional character. By encouraging the participation of the masses in theatrical performances, the *OND* aimed to increase the effectiveness of the artistic branches and educate the masses. Moreover, apart from the artistic value of the activities, the *OND* ensured the rules of good behaviour and correct pronunciation of the Italian language. In the process of creating a national spirit, the cultural activities of the *OND* had various conducts. *Dopolavoro* branches organized competitions for this aim. Not only for the social value of the activities but also for the artistic functioning in the course of nation-building, competitions were arranged on a large scale.

In the functioning of the activities, there occurred some difficulties for the ones who organized and for those who supervised them in the fascist party. Establishing a large and permanent theatre program was not sufficient for the cultural activities to reach great audiences. Considering to a large extent, a single theatre could only ensure a city, not the whole nation. Therefore, a travelling theatre was planned. In this way, the access of large numbers of ordinary people to cultural activities would be ensured. The “Cars of Thespis”, which was set up in 1929 was the first moving travelling theatre, performed many times for hundreds of people in fascist Italy (Gregor, 1979: 262). With all the modern equipment, carrying the professional theatre to those workers who could not individually reach would facilitate the *OND*'s target of spreading to large audiences. And in 1930, three more moving theatre cars were constructed.

There were also some practical issues that occurred as a problem that disjoined the public from cultural activities. The cost of entrance fees was among these problems. Providing theatre programs with more popular prices would be the perfect solution so that the masses could easily attend the performances. The following was quoted regarding this problematic nature of the cultural activities of the *OND*: “... The prosperity of the theatre was not dependent on the interest of the few, but on that of the many, that the principal function of the theatre was not among the intellectual classes but among the people and that the problem to be solved was and is, the construction of large popular theatres” (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 28).

The musical activities were also significant. The organization of music was included in *Dopolavoro*'s educational framework as well. "Music, owing to its appeal to the human spirit and the profound emotions it arouses, is an indispensable factor in any educational initiative" (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 40). The *OND* arranged and coordinated musical performances in the theatre halls. The most important thing in the *OND*'s musical events was that they revived the old, ancient songs of Italian popular culture. The rustic type which was inherited from fathers to sons in Italy was reflected in nearly all musical activities. The continuation of traditional forms in music was an extremely important aspect of the development of the leisure organization in Italy in parallel with fascist tendencies. Not only the forms but also the rustic instruments played by special orchestras were revived through these activities. In this way, musical mobility became the original and elegant expression of the spirit of the Italian people.

The daily concerts of classic music were the other type of activity, organized in *Dopolavoro* branches. As an extension of cultural propaganda, the musical activity was given in the form of a lesson. This kind of musical education included the history of Italian music; illustrated the lives and works of great Italian composers. Musical auditions and competitions were part of this process. All provincial *Dopolavoros* organized annual competitions for music bands, choirs, and other compositions to encourage the development of music. The competitions also gained the opportunity for the young talents to show their abilities. "All this shows clearly the impulse given by the *OND* to the creative faculty and artistic ability to its members with a view to subsequent utilization in its educational program" (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 46).

Choirs, as a collective reflection of musical activity, were also an important part of the cultural propaganda in the *OND*. An easy way of reaching people in the same group, the choirs were direct methods of performing together in the collective consciousness. Awakening the sense of discipline, order, responsibility, and self-respect, the Choral School was a direct instrument of the fascist culture propaganda. The members' learning to keep together, singing together at the right time, having orders from the director on time, along with keeping each of their position was an important sign showing how they served the regime ideals. The social and moral aspect of this kind of choral singing was the cultural tutorial of the fascist administration on enriching the national spirit (Facci, 2010: 113).

Having success in gathering people through cultural acts later broadened the spectrum of cultural activities. The *OND* started to organize open air performances. Being able to attract a great number of people in the open areas, these performances indeed represented the theatrical activities for the workers. Musical programs were included in the curriculum. The musical car of Thespis was also a very unique enterprise. It was an original type of travelling theatre peculiar to the *OND*. Constructed in 1930, several special performances were given in the following years by the musical car of Thespis (Missiroli, 1937: 77). Another activity by the *OND* was the Saturday theatres which were held only on Saturday evenings in the form of matinee performances, especially for the workers and employees. The prices of the tickets were regulated, taking into account the purchasing level of the workers, not exceeding two lire.

As another form of entertainment, the *OND* organized cinematography. "Cinema-going certainly increased, partly because it was facilitated by the regime's own organizations like the *OND*" (Morgan, 2004: 136). To make cinematography accepted fully by its members, *Dopolavoro* first of all maintained reductions in people's access to the cinemas. The reduced prices in cinemas were one of the greatest facilities that the *OND* offered to its members. Furthermore, the *OND*'s installing projectors into the centres of *Dopolavoro* buildings provided the members' accession to these facilities easily. Most of the cinemas included entertaining films but there were also historical films giving fascist messages. Along with the historical films, educational films were shown. The fascist propaganda was officially promoted by the weekly documentaries. Organizing and encouraging cinemas, the *OND* in a very short time, succeeded in enriching its program capacity. In a varied program, it was able to open numerous cinema halls and present numerous movies. Moreover, *Dopolavoro* organized travelling cinemas that made the reach of cinema to more people, resembling the travelling theatre. The *OND* opened 748 cinema halls with 20 travelling cinemas (Gregor, 1979: 262).

All these activities played a significant part in uniting the groups in various provinces. Besides the musical activities and cinematography, radio transmission was also included in the *OND*'s program. To increase its influence on the masses, the *OND* broadened its range and applied more than the forms of entertainment. In other words, the *OND* regarded recreational activities not only for entertainment but also as a way of mental and moral refinement of modern Italy. As a current propaganda tool, the *OND* successfully took advantage of mass media organizations. The radio transfer was the one that the *OND* actively

applied. In the process to convey the fascist message and its presence to the rural populations, radio was very effective. Since the rural parts of the country were isolated by illiteracy and were traditionally indifferent to the policies of the government, reaching them through a modern instrument of mass communication seemed radical. However, it was only through radio transfer that made it available to deliver messages from a single source to many different places at the same time. "Radio sets had been supplied to almost all the sections, chiefly those in small rural centres, so that, at present, there were thousands of sections of *Dopolavoro* provided with their own radio sets" (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 50). To improve the efficiency of radio clubs, the *OND* provided facilities such as the exemption of radio sections from the compulsory tax, discounts on prices of the purchase of radios, and reduction in the annual subscription fees. The statistics were significant to show the efficiency of this service among people. "During the fascist era, the number of radio subscribers increased from an estimated 27.000 in 1926 to over one million at the end of 1939. By 1937, 8.795 of the sections, under half of the total, reportedly owned their own radio sets. The number of persons with access to them, estimated at 840.824" (de Garzia, 1981: 155-156).

As a part of its educational character, the *OND* organized another very important activity that included special instructions for those non-educated or semi-educated. Meaning the collaboration of educational interest with national duties, and the instruction of adults who were unable to read or write, was a part of the fascist cultural indoctrination. For this reason, courses were arranged in many districts. The attention was given especially to the history and geography courses. Providing the members with the knowledge of the national territory, the political background, and the requirements of the nation, these courses were regarded as principal outcomes of the *OND*'s cultural apparatus. Apart from these two most important courses, there were also given Italian language and literature, chemistry courses. The fascist legislation on how the regime was running was also included in the courses.

"The action of the *OND* was not limited to instruction, but was supplemented by scholastic assistance for those most in need, scholastic material being supplied such as books, exercise books, maps, slates, etc." (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 53). The special instructions to improve the non-educated members through general culture were also supported by the increasing number of libraries, which contained instructive literature (Gregor, 1979: 262). All *Dopolavoro* branches had to have at least one library. Perceiving the importance of social education to the masses, the *OND* never limited the number or

category of books included in libraries. Providing its members with the facility of obtaining books without any extra fees, every *Dopolavoro* branch aimed to extend the scope of the libraries. To make libraries effective in the areas mentioned above, the *OND* organized the supply of libraries attentively. In the running of these libraries, some special discounts were made for the publishers as well. All the process was following the national consciousness that the fascist regime intended to build. There were also travelling libraries which mostly helped the problem of spreading the books. Like the Car of Thespis and the travelling cinemas, many *Dopolavoro* branches arranged travelling libraries that travelled provinces and distributed books. “Considerable publicity was given to the *OND*’s mass distribution of books. In 1928, 118000 books or 1270 for each province were sent out” (de Garzia, 1981: 197).

In all the activities listed above, a striking point was revealed. All these activities were carried out without breaking with the traditional Italian spirit. The regional and local values were all aimed to be protected under the *OND*. In photographic libraries, cinemas, exhibitions, songs and dances, choirs, singing competitions, festivals, and many more activities, the Italian popular culture, customs, and popular motives were retained (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 57-68). The regional nature, the national sentiment, the traditional tone, and the religious cult of people in these activities were aimed to be revived. Returning to one's essence was a significant purpose of these activities. The Duce also referred to the traditionality that the *OND* displayed through various forms of its activities as follows: “We have revived and cherished all those traditional manifestations which make the spirit happy and healthy” (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 64). The revival of traditions was not only for the fascist regime to make Italian history be remembered but it was promoted also for the union of the masses’ minds and bodies. It was regarded mostly as the manifestation of the racial spirit of people. Ensuring the members’ return to their characteristic efficiency through recreation was the ultimate objective of creating a healthy and blessed nation.

When we look at the cultural education activities of the Italian *Dopolavoro* within the scope of its comparable nature with *Halkevleri*, we see that the activities of *Dopolavoro* in the artistic field were carried out in a very similar way to *Halkevleri*. The main difference was *Halkevleri*’s exercising similar activities with *Dopolavoro*, through different sections, under different and multiple names. In this context, it can be asserted that the language and literature section, the fine arts section, the drama section, the people's classrooms and courses

section, the library and publications section, and the history and museum section of *Halkevleri*, which were all separate sections, were similar within the scope of this culture education section of *Dopolavoro*. In this regard, the criteria for opening a *Halkevi* was to have at least three of those nine sections, together with having a library, a hall suitable for performances, a study room, and a gymnasium. One thing worth noting here is that the issue of reviving the heritage of the past in artistic activities did not occur in *Halkevleri*. Because *Evler* had a perception of the history that needed to be forgotten totally. *Halkevleri* aimed to change radically and even abolish the values and institutions of Turkish traditional culture. It is seen that the tendency to maintain these national values in line with the regime differed in terms of meaning. “*Evler* were considered centres that would carry the country to the future by destroying traditional means and all kinds of institutions that had historical value and were seen as a lifeless parasite” (Necip Ali, 1933: 104). Another source of such an interaction was the physical training section of *Dopolavoro* organization, which gained a worldwide reputation. Therefore, it now seems significant to look at the physical training section of *Dopolavoro* in detail.

4.4.2. Physical Training

From politics to science, from mass media to works of fiction, the *OND* felt responsible to be active in various fields of activity. As well as the cultural field mentioned above, the other section that gained excessive importance for the Italian *Dopolavoros* was physical education and training. The *OND* considered physical training as a means of one’s developing his/her personality and will. The objective of education was continued within this section. Through sports, the *OND* aimed not to turn the masses into athletes but largely to encourage the workers to practice, so that they would provide improving their physical and mental health and strengthen themselves. It was aimed to instil in members a taste for sporting events. Through several games and sportive practices, the *OND* allowed its members to become aware of their potential, personal intelligence, abilities, and of the warrior spirit within themselves.

When we look at sports activities from a broader perspective, the relationship of sports with labour issues drew attention. The *OND*’s activities in this field were effective in penetrating the masses to be active which would also make them pass on to their performance in their workplaces. There was an increasing number of members, attending sports activities

in stadiums, and sports fields. The members' willing collaboration also increased noticeably. In a very short time, Italy had a leading role in this field of physical education. "Within a few years the OND had awakened in the working population of Italy an interest in and enthusiasm for every kind of sport which was without precedent" (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 69-70). Additionally, the success of Italy in the adult organization through sports activities was honoured around the world.

The organization of physical education activities was carried out by the Sports Service of the Central Sports Commission which was dependent on the Direction General of the *OND*. The main duty of this commission was to organize, initiate and regulate sports activities in both regional and provincial *Dopolavoros*. The Technical Sports Directorates was the other unit that operated the activities in regions and provinces (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 71). The whole of the sports activities in various *Dopolavoro* branches, communes, urban districts, industrial establishments, and rural centres were under the supervision of this unit. They also organized championships throughout the rural and provincial *Dopolavoros*.

Looking at the activities, we may easily catch the traditional tone as there could be easily seen in the artistic field. The scope of the games was extremely wide; the ancient styles of Italian society, and their typical games were enthusiastically maintained. *Dopolavoro* organizations contributed to the development of these ancient games. One of the most popular of these was bowling which had a long history in Italy. A kind of bowling played on grass ground; the bowls were not only attractive for the competitive nature but also for not requiring any exhaustive output of one's physical energy. Nearly all *Dopolavoro* branches opened bowling greens, attracting thousands of members from the smallest units to the larger ones. Another game was tug of war, a very primitive form of collective sport but at the same time one of the most popular games among the masses (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 72-72). Based on the fact that Italy was a peninsular country, activities on about sea were common. Rowing and swimming activities, therefore, became important parts of these physical activities. Gymnastics were also among the physical education, which mainly intended to develop the workers' bodies and to heal harmful habits. Later on, the access of women to athletic activities made the *OND* effectiveness spread easily among the larger people.

Excursions, as the other important remarkable form of recreation, might be another mention of physical activities. The trips to neighbouring places, artistic spots, and industrial centres, visits to certain regions and locally famous places, and tours to some natural beauties were all included in the excursions. The activities included walking tours, skiing, and cycling trails, fixed and moveable camps, marches and shootings in the mountains, cruises, scientific explorations of caves, popular tours, mass gatherings in natural areas, such as mountains, plains, lakes, rivers, etc. (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 79). Nearly all forms of activities promoted the mass movement with all possible forms of transports.

The initial aim of the recreational organizations was to educate the masses by social and cultural means, to give them knowledge of different localities and a wider vision of men, nature, and things. In this direction, the organization of excursions became very popular in Italy. They reached a significant stage of efficiency and were able to attract an enormous number of members. The members were also filled with numerous facilities through some agreements by the *OND* and various state organizations; the railway and steamship companies along with public and private bodies. Looking at the facilities, the following may help us understand how this field could easily become popular among the members: Reductions of 50% on return tickets on all state railways from Saturday to Monday for groups of at least five people; with the same discount rates, without any time limit, on state railways for parties of at least fifty people; reductions from 30% to 50% on return tickets on secondary railways, tramways and public-private automobile services; free entries for parties to all museums, excavations, galleries under the direction of the Direction General of Antiquities and Fine Arts; special reductions in the price of board and lodging in hotels and pensions throughout Italy for trippers; free insurance against accidents during leisure hours, before and after excursions; reductions varying from 20 to 30 and 40% on the price of sports clothes and equipment (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 80-81). All those facilities that were worker-friendly became critical indicators of how the fascist regime could succeed in penetrating the workers and make the *OND* a functioning cultural branch of the fascist regime.

In a short period, the *OND* made a name for itself within the scope of these sports activities, as accepted by many scholars. “By 1933 some 7.294 of the 19.029 *dopolavoro* sections were sporting societies, whereas the number of sports events was tallied at 191.773. The ‘working masses’, as the *OND* leadership was solemnly to affirm in its 1935 yearbook, ‘prefer sports to all other activities’” (de Garzia, 1981: 175). “Particular attention has been

given to sport. Sports manifestations have increased from 1.563 to 203.284 and the sections engaged in organizing sport from 467 to 8.025” (Missroli, 1937: 77). Encouraging sports among the members and developing the spirit of sports, the *OND*, after eleven years of sports activities, arrived at a standard of individual capacity. For the workers who were over 21 years, the *OND* tried to promote their assignment to sports activities. In this way, the masses were going to adhere to the fascist regime. The *OND* aimed to design the nation in line with its fascist roots to make individuals turn into enthusiasts in various branches of sports and build within them a passion for overcoming time and distance through sports activities.

Sports activities appeared to be a key aspect in Italy to adhere citizens to the regime. At this point, the activities of this section were important not only for people staying fit but also for their readiness against all possible acts of violence. Although the success of the activities in binding the Italian society to the regime was an important example for Turkey, it was known that the sports activities in the Turkish experience could not show the expected effect on the society. It is possible to observe a similar situation experienced in the field of social assistance, which is the coming topic.

4.4.3. Social Assistance

Social and health assistance was the last field of activity of the *OND*. Social protection and care were divided into two groups in *Dopolavoro* organizations; the first had a general character and the second one was for more special outcomes. The main purpose of the *OND* through the social assistance department was to protect and secure as many workers as possible by physical and intellectual means. It aimed to develop forms of assistance, aid, advice, and comfort and to fill the workers with an atmosphere of well-being, serenity, and harmony. The Office of Social Assistance, which was instituted in every provincial and communal *Dopolavoro*, was the main operation service of the *OND*. At the head of the office was a provincial technical director for social assistance in provincial *Dopolavros* and an expert attendant in the communal *Dopolavoros*. The offices were open in the evenings as well.

Among the facilities of this section, the leisure hour insurance seemed striking. The *OND* instituted a special policy that would cover the possible risks of the members’ getting injured. It provided the members with a *Dopolavoro* membership card. Holding a *Dopolavoro* membership card meant for any member to have the right the payments of

10.000 lire in case of death, 15.000 lire in case of permanent disability, and 5 lire per day - for a maximum of one year- for temporary disability (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 86). Moreover, the *OND* agreed with some of the state agencies. It was with National Insurance Institution for an insurance policy for the accidents that the workers could have outside their working hours. It was to some extent insurance covering all the risks that might happen during their leisure hours. Such insurance policies showed that the *OND* was the social guarantor of the fascist regime.

The privileges facilitated by the *OND* could be counted as a form of social assistance since the *OND* had provided its members with lots of facilities and discounts. The discounts on railway tickets, as mentioned before, were the most known facility by the *OND* for the members, but this was not the only one. For the members of the *OND*, normal prices of single railway tickets were 50% discounted on feast days and the same discount rate was applied for the parties of at least five people on any day of the week. In addition, in the purchases of some special products, considerable reductions were guaranteed. The *OND*'s agreement with the firms from industrial manufacturing for its members to obtain clothes and all types of house furnishings at the cost of prices was another form of assistance.

Facilities on health services had also important outcomes. As a result of the *OND*'s agreement with the Fascist Federation of Private Nursing Homes and the National Fascist Association of State Employees (state-employed doctors), the members were able to receive some basic discounts in health services too. Another agreement on the local level made with doctors, medical officers, surgeons, chemists, and nursing homes provided the members with discounts from 20% to 70% of the normal tariffs (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 89-90).

The technical directorate of the health services of the *OND* was the main organizer of the health assistance. In every provincial *Dopolavoro*, the health organization was carried out not only by doctors but also by veterinary surgeons, chemists, and sanitary engineers. The services were grouped under four sections; medicine concerning sports, hygiene propaganda, first aid, and general health assistance. The first one included the examination for permission to be given for any member to take part in competitions and championships. The second one was more generally ensuring hygiene for individuals at home, work, and anywhere outside. The hygiene propaganda aimed to prevent people from infectious diseases. Practical lectures and instructions were given in some districts. The third section,

first aid included specific courses with the collaboration of *UNPA* (National Anti-Air Protection Union). Instructions of the first aid courses were categorized under two groups; one for the cultured people which mainly consisted of the directors of party organizations, and managers of the factories, and agricultural estates; and the second was for the workers. The general health assistance section lastly contained the institutions of consulting rooms for special diseases in marine and mountain colonies, in summer camps, and during excursions and competitions. This section also included discounts on fees of nursing facilities, hospital visits as well as ambulances and pharmacies (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 92).

The social assistance section of the *OND* was pursued by numerous opportunities and discounts in various fields. Shopkeepers, manufacturers in many branches of trade and industry, a great number of business houses, etc. gave discounts to the members of the *OND* and this allowed as many members to benefit as possible. The social assistance issue nearly turned out to happen across the country and showed the impact of the fascist movement spread all over the country. This proved that the *OND* was possible to go far beyond making use of the leisure time of the workers. “It may be told that only a regime such as the Fascist Government - which considered work as the basis of the new corporate civilization – could undertake such an ambitious task for assistance and social protection” (National Leisure Hours Institution, 1936: 93).

It was seen that Italian *Dopolavoro* offered very comprehensive activities in the field of social assistance. From Welk (1968: 105) wrote, “It must be recognized that under Fascism social welfare has been in the forefront of public attention and that institutions of considerable benefit to the mass of the Italian people have been perfected”, it can be concluded that one of the main factors in the *OND*’s success was its activities in this field. The social assistance section, which provided many opportunities for social welfare as well as indoctrination, played an extremely effective role in establishing the hegemony of the fascist power in Italy (Gregor, 1979: 262).

4.5. An Overall Assessment

This chapter is mainly designed to understand how *Dopolavoro* organization re-established fascist domination from a social and cultural context in Italy. If we make a general evaluation in terms of *Dopolavoro*, it can be told that the organization existed as a

moderate implement of the totalitarian regime in Italy and even provided many advantages to the people it addressed in the light of national interests. By applying social, cultural, and national tools, *Dopolavoro* served the fascist power and helped the political power in reshaping the Italian society, from an ideological framework.

The statistics on the membership were important indicators of the effectiveness of the organization. “The figures were impressive without being ‘totalitarian’” (Morgan, 2004: 146): In 1931 the *OND* had already been the largest adult organization with 1.75 million members and after that membership increased rapidly; in 1936, 3 million people out of a wage-earning population of 11 million became members of the *OND*; this number reached about 3.8 million members by 1939. 80 percent of the whole state and private-sector salaried employees and 40 percent of the industrial workers were enrolled in the *OND* by that time (Gregor, 1979: 238). “Facts speak louder than words. What is the membership of the *Dopolavoro*? How many are its institutions? How many and what are its manifestations? In ten years, membership has risen from 280.534 to 2.108.227” remarked Missiroli (1937: 76), addressing the effectiveness of *Dopolavoro*. As was seen from the numbers, the organization had a broad-scale structure. De Garzia (1981: 16) mentioned this mixed and at the same coherent character of the *OND* as follows; “The initiatives behind these groups were both popular and elitist; perhaps one-half of the total in their first formation predated the fascist seizure of power, including not only the surviving working class clubs - ex-reform socialist, ex-democratic and most rarely ex-communist - but also the small-town bourgeois *circolo* and hundreds of peasant hang-outs; another sixth were run directly by industrial and commercial firms on behalf of their employees or by the government ministries for their personnel; about a third, located primarily in rural areas, were established on entirely new bases by the fascist regime itself.”

In regard to the all information shared about the Italian cultural institution, it can be asserted that the *OND* continued to spread not as solely an expression of a totalitarian tendency, but as a part of society in a much more spontaneous way. Introducing forms of popular mass leisure and recreation activities, the *OND* can be told to be the mild side of the fascist regime. “Precisely because it exploited social roles and needs outside of the workplace, *Dopolavoro* organization shows especially well, the means of ideological and social persuasion developed by fascism to build a responsive public among industrial workers, peasants, and salaried employees - that is, among people whose previous

associational traditions and economic treatment under one dictatorship made them strongly resistant to any explicitly political appeal” (de Garzia, 1981: 16).

Although the statistics showed *Dopolavoro* as a great success, they could not constitute a single source for us to call the institution so. Among the activities of fascist power, the success of the *Dopolavoro* organization was shared by many. For Missiroli (1937: 74-75, 77), “The Fascist State has envisaged this mass of primary and elementary needs of the workers. Among these facilities, some are truly masterpieces of practical generosity. For example, the *Dopolavoro* is one of the finest, most original, and most fruitful creations of Fascism... Before the advent of Fascism, the popular classes knew very little of Italy. Now through organized excursions, the *Dopolavoro* has made it possible for all Italians to get to know the innumerable beauties of their country. Touring by bicycle, walking tours, fixed and mobile camps, voluntary re-forestation, excursions, visits in parties to modern works and historical places, and cruises have greatly contributed towards raising the cultural level of the people.” Additionally, as declared by Gregor (1979: 238); “The *Dopolavoro* was to become one of the most effective instruments of the regime.” The public impact of the *OND* was also likely to ease some of the social distress and discontent that arose during the Depression years as we understand from Morgans’s following statements: “It retained the character and function of its PNF relaunching during the revaluation crisis, providing some compensation in the form of facilities and services for the low pay and living standards which prevented many workers from becoming serious consumers” (2004: 135) and as well as Gregor’s words: “By the time of the Great Depression the basic framework for the control of public information, intellectual life, and formal and informal education, had been constructed” (1979: 238). Moreover, Finer’s expressions on *Dopolavoro* as “splendid work, grandly conceived and enthusiastically executed, with great benefits to those who took part” (Finer, 1935, 438) supported these views. The judgements by Claudio Schwarzenberg were also revealing the traces of such views “In the years between 1934 and 1939 there was a progressive centralization of insurance and provident undertakings in several parastate institutions, accompanied by a notable extension of coverage. The working classes received undeniable concrete benefits: paid vacations, indemnities in the event of job loss, protection of employment on the occasion of illness, family support, the expansion of mutual assistance agencies, and the various forms of assistance provided by the *Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro* (group trips at minimal cost, theatrical performances, recreational centres), and so on” (cited by Gregor, 1979: 262-263).

The organization of the masses in their leisure time through a national plan had direct ties with factors of the fascist regime in Italy. Since the establishment of such an institution was historically bound with the rise of fascist ideology, Italy became a critical example to analyse the mass organization that surrounded world politics in many countries between the 1920s and 1930s. Italy's case for mass organization/education/recreation, despite being under totalitarian rule, was able to reach the society. It was precisely the mildest power tool that the fascist regime had ever experienced among its policies. The *OND* gained great popularity among the workers. However, the organization could not prevent the weakening towards the end of the 1930s.

With the outbreak of the Second World War, it was understood by many scholars and scientists that the problem of mass organization would no longer be conducted by state intervention. In other words, institutions like the *OND* that aimed to act as a mediator between society and the state to establish national unity through sociocultural means could not be able to function transparently. It was not known whether such a perception change resulted from the spread of democratic tendencies around the world or not; yet, the *OND* experienced its most popular times till 1939, the beginning of WWII. Later on, the institution started to continue its lifetime in a complex way. The end of Mussolini power in 1943 did not directly end *Dopolavoro* organization. Moreover, the continuation of the *OND* after Mussolini's fall was, to some, an important sign showing that its popularity and success were not truly dependent on Mussolini. However, later in a short period, in 1945 the organization was altered to ENAL (Ente Nazionale Assistenza Lavatori / National Organization of Worker Assistance).

When we come to the evaluation of *Dopolavoro* organization in the context of its comparable nature with the Turkish case, *Halkevleri*, we may add some more assessments. The concept of public education in the early republican period in Turkey, the establishment of *Halkevleri*, and the examination of such practices of cultural initiatives in the world, especially in countries such as Italy, Germany, and Russia, formed some of the important political and cultural topics of discussion. In the process of implementing the political programs of the Republican People's Party, the international conjuncture of the period, as well as the economic, social, and cultural conditions of Turkey, was effective. While the social problems created by the economic crisis of 1929 gave a new impetus to the rising nationalist movements in Europe, the reflections of this change were also felt in Turkey. While the authoritarian and nationalist discourse in the country found the opportunity to

express itself in a stronger language, it entered a new ideological phase. At this stage, it was known that Italy was among those international sources taken as an example in this process by Turkish authorities.

Considering that the relationship of *Halkevleri* with the cultural-political atmosphere of *Dopolavoro* in Italy seemed to have received little attention, which was expressed by Fındıklı with the following: “It is seen that some intellectuals and bureaucrats who look at Italy from Turkey tend to idealize the activities of fascism on public education, leisure activities, and youth organization. Despite the prevailing political atmosphere in Italy, a fascist and homogeneous country imagination has been developed instead of seeing the social dynamics that constantly produce pluralism in every field. Rather than trying to understand Italy, this seems to be the result of projecting the homogeneity fantasy about Turkey onto another... Some Turkish bureaucrats contacted the Italian authorities to inspect *Dopolavoro*'s band and theatre groups; they wanted to get to know *Dopolavoro* closely in the aestheticization of politics and artistic effectiveness and to learn about the performances in theatre and music” (Fındıklı, 2012: 108-109, 110). Fındıklı continued his remarks about the mentioned Italian-Turkish relations with the following statements: “In the Early Republican Period, the construction of body politics and the aesthetic performance developed in this process were emphasized as much as the organizational structures in Italy and *Halkevleri* became one of the important institutions where these body politics and performance culture was localized within the framework of regional conditions and the search for a new synthesis was continued... *Halkevleri* and *Halkodaları* hosted a large number of cultural and political performances, from quality choreographies to simpler ceremonies. These were not built purely architecturally but through spatial practices and political negotiations. These institutions should be analysed and problematized in comparison with the practices of 'public education', 'leisure time activities', and 'political organization and mobilization' produced by other authoritarian regimes in Europe, by placing them in the context of world history. Italy, which the Kemalists follow with interest, is one of the most suitable countries where such a study can be done” (Fındıklı, 2012: 110).

In light of all these, why this study, which includes a case study specific to *Halkevleri*, is handled through a comparison with the Italian organization *Dopolavoro* is slightly revealed. Within this context, it seems important to evaluate regarding *Dopolavoro* organization while analysing *Halkevleri*, although a one-to-one comparison may not be possible despite the differences between the two countries in their historical processes and

social factors. In this case, it may be the conclusion part that will make the study meaningful in which the comparison is made and the outputs are reached.



5. *HALKEVLERİ* IN PARLIAMENTARY RECORDS OF THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF TURKEY: A CONTENT ANALYSIS

This new chapter, which applies content analysis on the parliamentary records about the issue of *Halkevleri* allows our analyses of *Halkevleri* to have a wider basis. Throughout the study, the diversity of the inquiries on *Halkevleri* issue is revealed. The reflections of *Halkevleri* have been handled from a historical framework up to now. This chapter includes an in-depth examination of the parliamentary records between 1932-1951 and expects to contribute to understanding the role of *Halkevleri* in the cultural construction process.

The general framework of the study shows that *Halkevleri*, as the cultural institution of the Republican regime, has a significant place in Turkish political life. This part of the study presents a content analysis of *Halkevleri* from the database of the Turkish Grand National Assembly between 1932-1951, aiming to make a unique analysis of *Halkevleri*. Since it is difficult to reach living witnesses of that period, the study applies to the parliamentary documents.

Opened in 1932, *Halkevleri* have frequently been on the agenda of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. The studies subject to the content analysis are made by scanning the phrase "*Halkevleri*" in the parliamentary records. The phrase in question is determined in 201 meetings out of a total of 1703 in six periods between 1932-1951. In this regard, the phrase "*Halkevleri*" is sometimes used with only a single expression and sometimes it involves long discussions in parliament.

To analyse the discussions, it is necessary to categorize the parliamentary records within themselves. Throughout the scope of this study, it seems meaningful to examine the records in two separate categories and to make the evaluations in this light. The reflections of *Halkevleri* in the parliamentary records are, first of all, the issues on the parliamentary agenda during the single-party period and secondly, the issues that cause heated debates in the parliament during the transition to multi-party life and in turn the change of government. The main reason for separating the study into these two periods is that the negotiations about *Halkevleri* change radically after 1946. Throughout the examination of the two periods, it

can be asserted that the second-period records constitute the main source of this part of the study since it includes intense debates about the position of *Halkevleri*.

Since *Halkevleri* are established in 1932, all the parliamentary records between the 4th term 2nd legislative year, and the 9th term 2nd legislative year of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey are examined chronologically for this part of the study. The records of the 8th and the 9th period include the transition to the multi-party period and the DP rule. The discussions on *Halkevleri* during these periods are much more intense than the other periods, and it is observed that the negotiations take place on a more controversial basis. Therefore, the basic classification of the study is designed as follows: The first group handles the records covering the single-party process starting from the 4th term of the Turkish Grand National Assembly to the 4th legislative year of the 7th term. And the second group consists of the records starting from the 8th term and continuing with the 2nd legislative year of the 9th term. With the closure of *Halkevleri*, they are radically removed from the parliamentary agenda. The records of the second group are extremely critical at this point since they deal with the end of the single-party period in the parliament along with the transition to the multi-party system and then the change of the government. Throughout our categorization, *Halkevleri* are reflected on the surface in the records in the first group. However, it is seen that the references to *Halkevleri* in the second group increase incomparably. To observe it in more detail, now we may start our analysis.

5.1. First Group: The Evaluation of the Parliamentary Records of the Single-Party Period

An in-depth analysis of the first group records, at first glance, shows that this period mostly covers the negotiations on legal arrangements, institutionalization, and some exemptions regarding *Halkevleri*. *Halkevleri* come to the fore of the deputies through its mission, vision, purposes, and objectives. Discussions on *Halkevleri* take place in a moderate tone. The institutional settlements of *Evler*, activities carried out by *Evler*, the allocation of various equipment to *Evler*, some tax exemptions of *Evler*, and the aids from the budget are the main themes of this first group records. An important point that draws attention in this group is that the phrase "*Halkevleri*" is mostly used together with the phrase "cultural institution". In this context, *Halkevleri* are defined as an extremely beneficial organization

in the development of the revolution in the cultural field mainly aiming to raise conscious and refined citizens.

We have mentioned that *Halkevleri* consider the improvement of citizens by socio-cultural means as a vital one and this incentive is directly reflected in the discussions of the first group records. In this context, through the records, it is emphasized that *Halkevleri* are a means of raising, educating, developing, and instilling culture in adults. The cooperation of the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Education with *Halkevleri* indicates how they are fed by this purpose. In the first-period records, the emphasis on the goals and activities of *Halkevleri* is included with lots of praise. Considering that there is only one authority in the parliament and that this authority was already the power that established *Halkevleri*, the praise of CHP deputies and the intense speeches they make about the contributions of *Evler* seem remarkable. In the parliamentary discussions, there are some keywords about *Halkevleri* which are frequently repeated. These can be exemplified as the contribution of *Evler* to the “cultural development”, *Halkevleri*’s providing “adult education” and “moral and physical education” for the youth, their having a “key role in the implementation of the reforms”, their pumping the “conscious citizen construction” process, and their helping the citizens to “expand their world-views”.

Strengthening the content analysis through one-to-one examples from the parliamentary records is our next step. In this context, discourses on the aims of *Halkevleri* come to the fore from the very first record. Minister of Internal Affairs, Şükrü Kaya B. expresses *Halkevleri*’s duty of raising citizens as follows: "The citizen we are looking for is the citizen who is aware of the interests of his/her country and the destiny of his/her nation, just like the greatest responsible person at the head of that country, and who is interested in the country by saying what he/she knows everywhere at any time... To get a vote, it is necessary to be interested in the affairs of the country. It is the duty of the Republic of Turkey. Our party, leading the destiny of the Republic today, is also doing this. *Halkevleri* are opened just for this" (22.06.1932). In another report, *Halkevleri* are defined as follows: “a cultural institution ‘commencing education and welfare’” (25.06.1932). *Halkevleri* are an adult education centre/organization in line with the purposes of CHP, which is to educate citizens not only through a pedagogical context but in every aspect of their lives. In a report where the scope of the responsibilities of *Halkevleri* are discussed in detail with reference to its relations with the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Culture; such aspects of raising adults are expressed by Samsun deputy Meliha Ulaş as follows: “Today, our children and

young people are growing up with a lot of information. However, much of the information about the characteristics that support him/her and that he will encounter in every situation of life remains incomplete. From the dinner table to the theatre and movie theatres, we see the negative traces of this everywhere. Friends, regretfully I assert and you always witness that, since we do not teach this knowledge of social behaviour to our children, they do not know how to count the elders, walk on the streets, stand on the bus, or tram, sit in public places such as *Halkevleri*, concert theatres, cinemas, and shows, how to speak and laugh. It is time for this important information to be given to the young and conscious generation of our Great Republic" (26.05.1937). Within the scope of all the purposes, *Halkevleri* have a key role in maintaining the republican regime and keeping the regime principles alive. Berç Türker expresses this with the following words; "*Halkevleri* are working hard to make it as useful as possible for the country and with great intelligence, *Evler* instil the holiness and the principles of the Republic regime established by Atatürk, to Turkish youth, who always had the feeling of progress" (24.05.1938). In terms of the duties of *Halkevleri*, they perform not only for cultural adult education but also for the protection of the family and family ties. The following words of Minister of Internal Affairs Faik Öztrak prove this: "We are always fighting and will always struggle with structures that destroy the happiness and durability of the family and destroy the morals of the citizens, no matter what the circumstances are. The organization of our party and our *Halkevleri* consider this as one of their chief duties" (24.05.1939).

The responsibility of *Halkevleri* to instil a high culture among the citizens and to raise their cultural level is extremely important for the citizen form that the regime desired to create. At this point, the aim to introduce a Western taste for the cultural development of this country through *Halkevleri* come to the fore among the first group records. The bill of law presented by Denizli deputy Kucuka is the clearest indicator of this: "There is no need to mention the necessity of music in the cultural development of this country. *Halkevleri* undertake the duty of promoting the masterpieces created by Western culture over the country, penetrating the Western culture and taste, and the citizens who want to grasp that Western culture cannot fulfil this duty in the face of the heavy provisions of the tariff law. I submit the following proposal law since I believe that our great Assembly which considers the spread of Western culture in the country as one of its cherished goals, should make the same provisions about this issue " (08.12.1937). The main reasons for Kucuka's law draft in

question show that the founding cadres aimed to build the struggle for cultural development, including *Halkevleri*, on a Western taste and perception.

In the light of fulfilling the above-mentioned objectives and duties, the provision of various facilities to *Halkevleri* is another point reflected in the negotiations in the parliament. *Halkevleri* are exempted from some taxes and stamps within the scope of the first-term parliamentary records. This exemption is one of the most important signs showing that *Halkevleri* have a privileged position among the ruling elites. The fact that the single-party government is the only authority in the administration of *Halkevleri* provides *Evler* with gaining so many advantages. The following statements in the bill of law dated 25.06.1932 prove our claim: "*Halkevleri*, assigned to the moral and physical training and education of people and the youth, are exempt from the building tax." These advantages are not limited to tax exemptions indeed; it is observed that many advantages are provided to *Evler* in terms of the allocation of equipment to *Halkevleri* as well. "Law proposal of Konya MP Kazım Hüsnü and Giresun MP Hakkı Tarık on radio and cinema machines to be imported on behalf of *Halkevleri*" (11.03.1933) and "Laws regarding the exemption from customs duties of radio and cinema equipment to be imported for *Halkevleri* were negotiated and accepted" (20.04.1933, 22.04.1933) can be given examples to this issue. At the same time, the following statements of the speaker of the parliament can be another example to understand the importance of bringing such equipment to *Halkevleri*: "The use of these machines will be very valuable for the circle of certain ideas in our public life and for the enlightenment of the people. Since all *Halkevleri* are cultural institutions, it is obvious that it is necessary and beneficial to make use of these vehicles to ensure the circulation of ideas among the people" (20.04.1933).

Within the scope of the advantages offered by *Halkevleri*, the influence of the Republican People's Party is another factor that is jointly determined in the records of this first group. It can even be asserted that the most important topic that distinguishes the first group records from the second group is the attitude towards CHP of the negotiations on *Halkevleri*, which seems evident in the records. The contributions of the People's Party to the entire political life of this nation constitute the main point of the records at this stage. Prime Minister İsmet İnönü's words are the most evident example: "We consider it our duty to make possible facilitations and incentives to *Halkevleri*, which are trying to raise the whole nation with a broad heart" (05.07.1934). In addition, the following can be acknowledged regarding the close ties of CHP with *Halkevleri*: The first group records refer

to a period in which all of the law proposals about *Halkevleri* are passed easily, due to the absence of another political party in the parliament. This is already an important sign to see the influence of CHP on *Evler*. A similar attitude is seen in the first phase of multi-party life, that is, during the CHP rule. Despite all the reactions of the opposition parties in the multi-party system, the influence of CHP in the legislature is felt sharply, as it is the strongest wing in the parliament of that time. Ruşeni Barkın's following expressions can be a good example to see this close relationship: "Our Party is joint with our government. If a *Halkevi* is to be built in any town and if it needs help, the government is not a stranger to the party. It may assist that *Halkevi*, as much as it can" (08.02.1937). The definition of *Halkevleri* in the report dated 25.12.1939 is reflected as another indicator of this close tie: "*Halkevleri*, which carries out the most beneficial business in the cultural field of the country, a functioning branch fulfilling the morale work of Republican People's Party." The following statements by F. A. Barutçu are also critical examples in terms of revealing this close relationship most explicitly: "*Halkevleri* do not have a separate personality. *Halkevleri* are a part of the Republican People's Party. If donations are made to the People's Party, the donations made to *Halkevleri* are also exempt from tax within this context... The donations may not only be made to *Halkevleri* but also to the Party. Our Party is a party that has undertaken public services to the extent of the country. Since our Party is in a position to undertake services in the field of culture and social aid through cultural branches as *Halkevleri*, we preferred to use the general term to ensure tax exemption for donations to the Party" (05.01.1944). Another factor that makes these words critical was the explicit admission that *Halkevleri* do not have an independent personality. This acceptance also reveals the demand for donations to *Halkevleri* to be made to the Party. And the bill that grants the donations made to CHP on behalf of *Halkevleri*, is an indication that *Halkevleri* exists under the control of the Republican People's Party.

It is already mentioned that *Halkevleri* and their activities are highly praised by CHP deputies during this period. In this regard, the fact that there is no authority in the parliament other than the People's Party as the founding element of *Halkevleri* is enough to understand that these praises are met frequently during the first period records. İsmet İnönü's words of praise: "The benevolent services of *Halkevleri* as a home of knowledge and civilization are encouraged and rewarded with a general favour from the nation. The desire of the nation is to extend the activities of *Halkevleri* " (05.07.1935), the Minister of National Education Hasan Ali Yücel's following statements; "There are many documents related to our

education and cultural history in the publications of *Türk Tarih Kurumu* and *Türk Dil Kurumu*. I find the publications of military schools, Republican People's Party and *Halkevleri* very useful in this regard" (17.06 .1942) may be just a few of them.

In the parliamentary records, sports activities are considered one of the priority fields of activity that *Halkevleri* contribute to and encourage. Physical activities are considered significant in the development of many young. Article 14 in the parliamentary report dated 29.06.1938 states: "Halkevleri can have their members and those who wish to have physical training exercises such as gymnastics, fencing, wrestling, walking, parlor games and national dances in indoor or outdoor halls according to the programs to be organized jointly with the General Directorate of Physical Education... Since *Halkevleri* organization is one of the institutions that have served to spread physical education for a long time, an exceptional provision is made to enable this organization to engage in some types of sports." And article 11 of the same parliamentary record states; "Municipal administrations and *Halkevleri* help the clubs that manage the youth of the city or town - to the extent their budget allows - to provide and supply sports fields and necessary equipment." While *Halkevleri* as an institution to promote physical activities is an important topic, in the parliamentary meeting dated 05.05.1944, the following expressions of Burdur deputy Engineeri are in the form of a confession that reveals the unexpected performance from *Halkevleri*: "We all know that we have a General Directorate of Physical Education, a Directorate of Physical Education for Schools and a branch of Physical Education at *Halkevleri*. There seems no contact between these three organizations. Many sports equipment sent to the Burdur *Halkevi* is decaying in the warehouse and has been standing like this for years. If coordination could be established as I have mentioned, maybe the General Directorate of Physical Education would have had the opportunity to benefit from this equipment." This confession, on the one hand, puts forward the aim of strengthening the scope of physical activities within *Halkevleri*, on the other hand, points out the difficulties encountered in the functioning of *Halkevleri*.

Another remarkable point in the parliamentary records is that *Halkevleri*, as the organization that brings society together, is confronted with mosques and some other religious sections. Although this topic is not frequently mentioned in the records, equating religious values with a social existence, like *Halkevleri* seems important in understanding the ideological attitude behind *Halkevleri*. Here, there is a desire to replace religious places with *Halkevleri*. In article 19 of the report dated 27.01.1937, the decision "The needy villagers in the districts where the forests are located are given timber from the stacked places

of the forests or from the places indicated by the forest officers, to the extent necessary, for the costs of cutting and transportation for their needs such as houses and barns and for the construction and repair of the bridges on the mosques, schools and roads of the villages within this zone" is taken. Upon this decision, the deputy of Manisa, Tahir Hitit, suggests that "trees should be given to *Halkevleri*, since trees were given to mosques" in the aforementioned article. He submits to the parliament to amend the article of the law in this direction. On the phrase "for the construction of mosques, schools and village roads in villages", CHP deputy's request "since it is given to mosques, it should be given to *Halkevleri*", reveals that the needs of *Halkevleri* are determined based on that of mosques, but not any institution. Moreover, his suggestion makes the religious institutions insignificant by subjecting Islamic houses of worship and *Halkevleri*, which are two completely different places, to the same evaluation.

Halkevleri play a key role in raising the awareness of illiterate people. In a discussion about the death penalty in the parliament, the words of General Kazım Karabekir are a significant example of his struggle against ignorance in the countryside; the duties of *Halkevleri* are revealed in his expressions as follows: "The issue is not just to advise the younger generation who grew up in schools. The real murder is not committed by them but by our ignorant people in the villages." Karabekir puts forward *Halkevleri* as a solution for the situation in question: "Capital punishments should not be passed by just being approved here, through a small line in the newspapers. These should be drawn up to the villages with clear means to take an example from, and; our press should always take them into account. Moreover, epistles should be written and films should be translated, describing the miserable and disastrous lives of the victims and their families left behind, in colloquial language. They should be listened to, read, and shown to the public. In this regard, I think that *Halkevleri* can be of great help" (12.06.1939). As it is seen, the presentation of *Halkevleri* as a multidirectional program by CHP is a common feature of the first-period records. On a parliamentary discussion about children sent to a child welfare institution, once again General Kazım Karabekir expresses his views: "The matter is quite simple. Assistance can be quite easy, let me offer it briefly. The children of Erzincan were exposed to such a disaster 20 years ago. They should not be left to the Child Protection Agency alone. In the army, as we did earlier, all regiments should immediately take children wherever they find them and send them to headquarters. Today, there is a very nice inspection office in Erzurum. There is also a beautiful *Halkevi* next to it. These children should be sent those *Evler* immediately.

They should never be left; the children should be sent there immediately. Let's gather them together and provide their education and training here" (17.01.1940). The rehabilitative feature of *Halkevleri* seems evident here.

As of 1940, *Halkodaları* are established to spread the activities of *Halkevleri* to a much wider area, especially in the countryside, and to fight against illiteracy. With the establishment of *Halkodaları*, they are included in all the opportunities and privileges of *Halkevleri*; in all legal regulations, this situation gained official appearance on 24.11.1941. In the 1st article of the report, it is decided that "After the word "*Halkevleri*" in paragraph A of the fourth article of the law dated 18.5.1935 and numbered 2721, the word '*Halkodaları*' was added." Additionally, the similar expressions on *Halkodaları* "After this date, *Halkodaları* had to be subject to the same provision in terms of communication documents and transportation fees, since they perform the high service that *Halkevleri* have had in the scientific, social and cultural field to a smaller scale, this law project has been prepared to ensure this" also reveal the official position of *Halkodaları*.

Throughout the first group records, there come out mostly biased evaluations of *Halkevleri*, followed by the praises of CHP deputies. Although it is very rare, there are also records in which some deputies self-criticize the issues about *Halkevleri*. The following words of Kütahya deputy Dr. Ali Süha Delibaşı at the meeting dated 09.12.1940 seem like a confession about the activities of *Evler*: "I am a friend of yours who has been working at Ankara *Halkevi* since its foundation. Like me, my friends who work there also know that; when a concert or a performance is given at any time, some of the people who should benefit from theatre and performance could not attend these performances in the face of the attack of even small children who should not come to the night entertainments since these concerts and performances were free. They have seen this suffering along with me... We all wish to include a wider public to benefit from such activities and concerts without any financial burden. This is already one of the biggest slogans of our Republican government. However, the fact the concerts are free makes the situation far from achieving our aim. Indeed, any of us who work at a *Halkevi* know that since these concerts and performances are exclusively free, there are people who come just because they are free, even though they are not interested in these concerts or music. These people prevent those who want to listen." From these expressions, it is seen that the participation of the public in the artistic activities organized by *Halkevleri* disturbed some. Claims of the deputies that some people attend the activities of *Halkevleri* only because they are free of charge shows how far *Halkevleri* are,

in essence, from the goal of reaching the public. This indicates that the principles of *Halkevleri* to reach society and to ensure the integration of intellectuals with society may not reflect truths. Therefore, this example can be recorded as a very unique confession. As another source of confession, a report from 1945 contains the expressions of Hatay deputy who received requests from the public to reduce the wages. Durukan mentions: “While walking around our district, people requested our Ministry of National Education in our contacts with *Halkevleri*: It was to provide the opportunity for classical works to be delivered to *Halkevleri* and to be easily procured by everyone by reducing their prices. In this case, knowledge of science and art will spread to the country in less time and on a larger scale. I would like to draw the attention of the Minister on this matter” (23.05.1945). Regardless of whether the tickets are free or not, *Halkevleri* seem far from being an institution that has fully reached the public. The words of Durukan, who convey demands from the public, indicate the incompetence of *Evler* both in terms of serving cultural activities and embracing all segments of the public.

Within the scope of the first group, we have mentioned that it is frequently noticed in the parliamentary records that *Halkevleri* are presented as an extremely beneficial institution for the revolution. In this regard, many aspects are supporting this idea in the records. However, another point draws attention as follows: In the parliamentary report dated 23.06.1943, the benefits of such artistic movements offered to societies by similar organizations in foreign countries, the educative impact, and the general importance of art for the cultural development of the citizens are dealt with. To educate the public in a cultural sense, examples from abroad are emphasized without even any direct reference to Turkish *Halkevleri*. First of all, the Bulgarian example is put forward: “State theatres and operas were established in almost every country with a gradual development and within the possibilities of that country. The theatre activities, which started in the middle of the nineteenth century with private enterprises in Bulgaria, which is our closest neighbour, and the opera activities that developed at the end of the same century, started to be supported by the State as of 1904. Theatre and opera were turned into state institutions under the Ministry of Education.” The discussions are continued with other examples from abroad: “It is seen that the Bomen opera, which was started in Romania in 1870, was carried out with private enterprises until 1919, but no further success could be shown. When it was considered a cultural institution in the form of a school by the Government in 1919 and was taken under protection, it showed great development. State theatres and operas in Yugoslavia went

through more or less similar phases” (23.06.1943). The German experience, which is one of the other examples in Europe, is mentioned in the reports with the following statements: “In Germany, at the end of the 19th century, the role of the theatre in public education was comprehended and the ‘public theatre associations’, which were established in Berlin and other cities since 1892, based on the principle of ‘art for society’s sake’, prepared the opportunities for low-income families to attend the theatre at low prices... Considering that theatre and opera are very effective means of inculcating the highest national and humane ideas in the cultural life and the artistic education of a nation, it is important to consider that the artistic formation we have today can be cultivated in the easiest and most efficient way, without repeating the experiences made in the countries mentioned above; and the necessity to ensure its development immediately arises... Considering the educational role played by theatre and opera performances and concerts in the art education and raising their national and human feelings, it is imperative to accept that these institutions are schools of civilization” (23.06.1943). Bringing these indirect examples to the parliamentary agenda aims at proving the importance of *Halkevleri* and their social and cultural necessity.

The discussions on *Halkevleri* in the first period, that is, the single-party period parliamentary meetings, have been examined so far. Throughout the records topics related to *Halkevleri* in similar contexts are compiled and the general tone of this period has been discussed. However, with the transition to a multi-party system, we notice a radical change in the negotiations on *Halkevleri*. After 1946, the topics discussed about *Halkevleri* vary, since the second group records within the scope of the classification include the transition to multi-party life and the change of government. The fact that *Halkevleri* are no longer dealt with by the single authority that founded it, makes the records of this second group meaningful for the study.

5.2. Second Group: The Evaluation of the Parliamentary Records After the Transition to the Multi-Party System

The parliamentary records of the single-party period mostly consist of discussions on the legal regulations and institutionalization of *Halkevleri*, praises for the activities of *Evler*, and the contributions of *Evler* to the revolution. However, it is seen that a critical change happened after the transition to the multi-party system in 1946. The existence of other parties in the parliament as an alternative to the single-party rule is the most important factor in this.

Democrat Party causes a new basis where *Halkevleri* are questioned for the first time in the history of the parliament; voices are raised against the unconditional support and exemptions to *Evler*. Moreover, it is seen that not only DP deputies but also other opposition parties and independent deputies in the parliament participate in these heated negotiations.

After the transition to a multi-party system in Turkey, the position of *Halkevleri* become a controversial issue in the parliament. We have already mentioned that the records of this second period constitute the basic source for this study. In this framework, the second group records have been analysed under this title in the context of both the discussion topics and the differences from the first period. The most controversial issue of this period, without question, is the funds allocated from the state budget under the name of ‘aid to *Halkevleri*’. These discussions, initiated by the opposition groups after 1946, extend with the change of government in 1950 and continue until the closure of *Halkevleri* in 1951. The repeated topics in the meetings of the parliament provide important clues about the changing position of *Halkevleri*. It is now helpful to take a closer look at the records of these second group covering the period between the 8th term 1st legislative year and the 9th term 2nd legislature of TBMM resources.

It is already mentioned that budgetary issues are at the centre of discussions about *Halkevleri* in the parliament. This situation starts with the proposal to allocate 1.950.000 Turkish liras from the state budget to *Halkevleri*. The fact that aid allocated to *Halkevleri*, including the amounts from the special administrations and municipalities, reach approximately 4 to 5 million in total. And this prompted the opposition parties to bring the issue to the parliament’s agenda. The speaker of the parliament of that time expresses these fees in the following words: “Two million liras were given as the aid to *Halkevleri*. This amount was allocated last year and at the end of the year, half a million lira was added. The millions given to *Halkevleri* every year from private administrations and municipalities are not included in this calculation. There were years when *Halkevleri* received five million liras from the National Treasury alone. *Halkevleri* are not an association, they have no legal personality. The money is paid to the cashier of the People's Party. Who can ask and inspect where this money, given from the treasury and state institutions, was spent?” (26.12.1947). While the amount given from the state budget is found to be excessive by the opposition parties, it is also stated that special administrations and municipalities also allocate aid for *Halkevleri* which means an excessive amount is given to *Halkevleri*. In the face of the fact that *Halkevleri* do not have a personal identity and the aid is transferred to the People's Party,

it is expressed in the discussions that the investigation of these funds was necessary. The following question of Özçoban, deputy of Afyonkarakisar, touches on similar points: “Enormous money was given to *Halkevleri* and the People's Party from the village, municipality, special administration and public equalization so that they could take care of the poor and orphans. I'm asking the state and the government; What happened to this money, which children were invested in which institutions? Can they show a child that was brought up by these institutions?” (28.05.1948). On yet another meeting, Hasan Dinçer's oral question covers the same matter: “In 1948, apart from the allocation of 1.950.000 liras in the State Budget for *Halkevleri*, how much money was allocated from the budgets of special administrations, municipalities, and villages and how much was spent on where?” (24.11.1948).

“If we look at the actual and legal situation of *Halkevleri* today, it is not possible to allocate these funds from the public budget. Because *Halkevleri* do not have a legal personality. And again, *Halkevleri*, with their actual practice today, were born into a political party, it is an institution that lives under that political party's wings, is kept under its control, and serves that party. No aid can be provided to an institution that arises from a political party, lives under its roof, and is subject to its control. Assisting such institutions is no different than allocating funds directly from the public budget to political parties” (28.12.1947) mentions Hasan Dinçer, Afyonkarahisar deputy of DP. Apart from the amount of money allocated from the budget to *Halkevleri*, giving such amounts to *Evler* that exists within the body of a political party has often been on the agenda in the parliament.

The following statements of Ahmet Tahtakılıç, a member of Democrat Party, seem significant on the same issue of the funds transferred to *Halkevleri*, but put forward a different point of view: “This aid was given to *Halkevleri*; as if Turkey was a country where two sick people did not sleep in a single bed, as if the agricultural struggle had progressed one step further from the most primitive point... This system of additional allowances damages the necessity to keep the State's expenses at one point in Turkey. If the Assembly does not stop it, the economic situation of the country tomorrow will be darker than it is today” (17.12.1947). Tahtakılıç draws attention to the excess of aid given to *Halkevleri* in the face of the current situation of the country. We see a similar attitude in the records dated 24.11.1948 from DP Deputy Hasan Dinçer: “This country, during the war years, that is, in the most troubled years, when there were no beds to hospitalize the patients, made such sacrifices for *Halkevleri* and saved a huge amount of money such as four million liras. This

is enormous.” The statements of Tahtakılıç at another meeting resemble the same issue as follows: "We tried to build enormous buildings when we couldn't handle the simplest needs, we tried to do a large water work in a country where we couldn't carry drinking water, we tried to build monuments in a country where we couldn't construct the roadwork. These are the results of the inability of the public control. If the services are begun in reverse, if we start some artificial welfare movements while the needs are still, just like in state affairs, the result will be today's picture." And he explains the situation with an example specific to Mersin: "The service provided by the grand *Halkevi* opened in İçel to raise the cultural level of the citizens, is a matter of debate even today. Besides, Mersin has so many problems that giving the turn to a *Halkevi* problem shows how poor we are..." (24.02.1949). We see worries arising from the opposition on this allocation matter, through revealing the difficult conditions of the country.

The high amount of aid given to *Halkevleri* is also brought to the parliament's agenda through the examples of some other debts that the government has to pay, by DP deputy Hasan Polatkan: "Although the government owes the bank 4 million liras, the government has not paid this debt to the bank for years. This Government, which was able to allocate two million liras to the People's Party under the name of *Halkevleri* in the 1948 budget, could only allocate 1.146.711 liras in return for its four million lira debt to Ziraat Bank" (30.12.1947). It is argued that, despite the difficult economic conditions of the country, providing large amounts of aid to *Halkevleri* seems problematic. Similarly, while there were much more important structures for the state to transfer money to, the expenditures made on *Halkevleri* were criticized in the following statements of DP Istanbul deputy Fuad Hulusi Demirelli: "The strengthening of our justice mechanism, no matter how broad the State's duties are, always comes before the duty of aiding *Halkevleri*. And yet, the current government transfers millions from the State Budget every year and allocates them to these *Evler*, which they have served for the influence of their parties. This year, *Halkevleri* are given one million two hundred and fifty thousand liras from our budget. However, out of 109 districts without court, only 15 districts were allocated for the organization" (14.02.1950). What is stated in common in all these discussions is that, while there are tens of hundreds of needs to be done in the country, there are many places that need to be paid, and it is not approved to transfer so much money to *Halkevleri*.

Staying against the funds transferred to *Evler*, Democrat Party justifies this situation by putting forward the constitution. Yunus Muammer Alakant, deputy of Manisa examples

it as follows: “Dear friends, Democrat Party, strongly opposes the allocation of nearly two million liras from the state budget which should be allocated to public services. It is clearly stated in our Constitution that the taxes collected from taxpayers are kept to be spent on public services. And it is wrong to mention that the money allocated to these *Halkevleri* can be allocated to public services. Because to be able to claim this, the whole nation must benefit from these institutions with equal rights, regardless of class, group and other differences; the situation today is not like that at all” (24.02.1949).

Allocating funds to *Halkevleri* from the state budget is subject to certain conditions as claimed by the opposition. Dinçer expresses this as follows: “If *Halkevleri* changes its current form, gets rid of political considerations, opens its doors to every citizen with or without a party membership, and if it becomes a public institution, then allocations can be made from the general budget. As long as the People's Party serves it with its current situation, a penny cannot be given from the general budget” (28.12.1947). At this point, another topic that occupies the agenda of *Halkevleri* during the budget discussions within the scope of the second group records reveals: the need for *Evler* to change its current position which is to be independent totally, open to all citizens by turning their status into a real public organization. If *Halkevleri* are not given an independent identity, as put forward by DP deputies “this money will be spent directly on the goals of the People's Party.” Another suggestion for the situation is proposed in the parliament as follows: “It is possible by keeping *Halkevleri* away from the currents of partisanship, away from the influence of any parties and making it a genuine and national cultural institution of the country. It is also possible to turn *Halkevleri* into an institution affiliated to the Ministry of National Education” (24.11.1948).

We have mentioned that the efforts of DP deputies for *Halkevleri* to gain an independent status are not for themselves – as they claimed- but for the benefit of the nation as a whole. At this point, DP deputies often think that if DP were to establish such an organization, the party and that institution would not benefit from similar budgets. Dinçer’s expressions may be a good example of this: “I would like to ask you, if Democrat Party founds an institution just like *Halkevleri* and if organizations similar to *Halkevleri* emerge from the bodies of the political parties that may be established tomorrow, will we help them from the public budget as well? Undoubtedly not” (28.12.1947). The words of Abidin Potuoğlu, deputy of Eskişehir, in the meeting dated 17.02.1950, are also of the same nature: “If we establish such an institution, we will not take the allocation from the nation, we will

pay it ourselves.” A similar speech is done by DP deputies for *Türk Ocakları*, which were re-established in 1949. Upon this, Özçoban’s asks: “Yes, *Türk Ocakları* were opened. Let's compare it with *Halkevleri*. I do not know; I'm not a member. But today it has a spiritual and legal personality. Why don't we give money to this institution that has the same goal? The aim of *Türk Ocakları* is the same, they are also cultural institutions. Why don't you give it to *Türk Ocakları* too? (17.02.1950).

A surprising situation regarding the proposal of DP for *Halkevleri* to be transformed into an independent institution or to exist under the Ministry of National Education or the Ministry of Culture occurs. According to this, the deputies of CHP state that they are of similar opinions to DP members. It is, from the beginning of the period, known that although CHP differs from DP on the position of *Halkevleri*, the existence of other political figures during this second period prevents CHP from taking a sharp stance in these discussions. We see such tension from the expressions of the Prime Minister of the period: “The idea of turning *Halkevleri* into a legal facility was not imposed on us by others. CHP itself thought on this and decided. I think that CHP has worked in a way that *Evler* can be beneficial not only to itself but also to the whole country, for the whole people, to all kinds of groups and members of any political organization, whether they are party members or not... I could not definitively determine why there has been a division of opinion between us. The duty of all of us is to ensure that this cultural institution expands and functions more beneficially, spreading its activities to the benefit of the whole nation. I think our friends from Democrat Party do not think against us either” (24.11.1948). However, it is clear in several records that the opinions of the Prime Minister regarding *Halkevleri* are not similar to those of DP members. While the deputies of DP demand *Halkevleri* be given an independent identity, CHP seems to be trying to keep the current position of *Evler*. For example, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu's views on *Evler* are critical in terms of revealing the difference in question and even showing his opposition to the existence of *Halkevleri* under neither the Ministry of National Education nor the Ministry of Culture: “*Halkevleri* are not a school, it cannot and should not be a school. Is there a need for such an organization as *Evler* when there is a ministry of culture? Even if this ministry provides primary, secondary, and higher education, we still need these *Evler*. Because the vital duty of *Evler* is not teaching, but keeping the life of the nation alive. Its first and sacred duty is to appeal to the hearts and consciences. *Halkevleri* teach the alphabet, teach geography and give sociology conferences, but its main task is to keep the whole communal life alive” (17.02.1950).

On the above-mentioned criticisms, we see so many law proposals submitted by DP deputies on the subject in almost every meeting in which the issue of *Halkevleri* are discussed. On 28.12.1947, Hasan Dinçer's proposal: "to the Supreme Presidency, I submit and propose the reduction of the allocation of 1 950 000 liras allocated to *Halkevleri*, based on the reasons I have verbally explained" is just one of them. Also, on 17.02.1950, we see two more bills of law, one belonging to Afyon deputy Kemal Özçoban "to the Supreme Presidency, I propose not to give the money allocated as the aid to *Halkevleri*, as I have verbally stated" and the other belonging to Hasan Dinçer once again: "to the Supreme Presidency, I propose the removal of the 1 250 000 lira *Halkevleri* allocation in the 625th section."

We have seen that *Halkevleri* are heavily praised in the parliamentary records of the first period. The activities of *Evler*, their benefits to society, and their contributions to the continuation of the revolution are often brought to the parliamentary agenda by CHP deputies with admiring expressions. We see *Halkevleri* being praised in this second-period records as well, but not with the same frequency as in the first group of records; this time the praises are mostly aimed at dispelling the opposition's rhetoric towards *Halkevleri*. Muhsin Adil Binal's expressions can be given as an example here: "There are 463 *Halkevleri* and 4170 *Halkodaları* in our country. These *Evler*, especially in the most remote places, attract our citizens. They give them the pleasure and value of their cultural level" (28.12.1947). In Sahir Kurutluoğlu's expressions, we see this air of praise: "*Halkevleri* are an organization that will raise the level of knowledge and culture of this nation and open to all citizens, regardless of whatever their ages are" (25.02.1949). At this point, it is noteworthy that *Halkevleri* are equated to the public universities in Hulusi Oral's statements: "*Halkevleri*, like *Halkodaları*, are institutions that have served the country for a long time with their sections of villages, sports, fine arts, broadcasting and many other; they will finally be called as public universities" (17.02.1950).

In the face of intense criticism of the opposition towards the allocation given to *Halkevleri*, CHP's protection stands out. CHP justifies *Halkevleri*'s allocating money from the state budget supporting it as the surplus money spent on the activities, construction, repair, and maintenance of *Halkevleri*. Prime Minister Hasan Saka's expressions indicate what we have asserted: "The money transferred to *Halkevleri* from the budgets of the local administrations is spent to aid *Evler* in their performing various services. The aid from the state budget meets some needs in terms of national culture and general knowledge, as well

as the construction and repair of *Halkevleri* and *Halkodaları*” (24.11.1948). CHP claims that, despite the criticism of DP, they do not use the funds of *Halkevleri* for themselves. Kurutluoğlu expresses this with the following words: “We take this money not for ourselves, but for the benefit of the nation, for the knowledge of the nation, for culture, for the survival of these institutions. We do not import this money into the budget of the People's Party. This money is completely in a separate fund. We take them for their construction, repair, and management.” Speaking on behalf of the budget commission at the meeting dated 28.12.1949, Muammer Eriş also rejects the claims of DP with very clear words: "This money is given to *Halkevleri*. It was never transferred to Republican People's Party. This money is given to the administration of *Halkevleri*.” CHP deputies claim that the funds allocated to the People's Party on behalf of *Halkevleri* are used entirely for the expenses of *Halkevleri*. Prime Minister Rüşti Aksal's words prove this: "After I became the Minister of Finance, I have examined all the expenditures of *Halkevleri* to the Finance. For the year 1949, I found out 1.950 thousand liras. In the 1950 Budget, the amount of aid was reduced to 1.250.000 TL in order not to prevent the cultural activities of *Halkevleri*. This money is spent on cultural activities. If you remove it from *Halkevleri*, it will be necessary to close *Halkevleri*" and Cevat Dursunoğlu's expressions also prove it: "Up to date, no expenditure has been made for the political purposes of CHP from the allocations given to *Halkevleri*. We only serve *Halkevleri*. Thank God we don't need his money in terms of politics" (28.12.1949). Eşref Dizdar from CHP goes one step further and criticizes DP's calling CHP to account for the money in question with the following words: “The Turkish nation is giving that money here. You cannot interfere with it” (28.12.1949).

CHP deputies believe that the aid provided to *Halkevleri* from the state budget is not sufficient. We can see this thoroughly in Hulusi Oral's statements: “If those, who spoke against this allocation, had taken part in this party organization and witnessed the services performed by *Halkevleri* and *Halkodaları*, I think they would accept that this allocation is low” (17.02.1950). The fact that the aid is even insufficient can be seen in the following words of Muhsin Adil Binal. He explains the situation with long justifications: “There is no doubt that the basis of these institutions is culture. A nation without culture cannot improve. Today, some institutions of public education, apart from their educational systems, are kept alive by many states around the world. Among these, there are public education institutions and schools, as well as various organizations such as clubs; and the money spent by the external states for these public education institutions from their general budgets is quite

large. You will appreciate that the development of a nation that has improved itself from a very backward situation cannot be achieved only by educating children of certain ages in schools. Apart from these, there is a necessity for the education of a group of citizens other than the school, which constitutes the majority of the country. We are faced with the necessity of such a need to enlighten the nation. In this country, there was no such movement in any town or village before *Halkevleri*. Before *Halkevleri* were formed, there was no place like the libraries where people who could read and write or less could come and live. Even our large provinces were deprived of them. Thank God, we have several thousand volumes of books that we can show to every intellectual and literate person under the roofs of our *Halkevleri*. So, your high committee appreciates how necessary institutions our *Halkevleri* are for our culture and social life. And the funds transferred to them are completely deserved. Here is the Ankara *Halkevi* standing in front of our eyes. Great things are being done there and it is done with little money” (17.02.1950). These statements, in which it is claimed that no organization fulfilled the cultural mission before *Halkevleri*, easily ignore the previous experiences and place *Evler* in a unique position. It also promotes the idea that the given aid is not that much for such an institution. Although the state support for *Halkevleri* is criticized by DP members, CHP believes that this aid is a necessity. We see this in İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu’s following words: “The state wherever notices an activity of moral, economic or cultural nature, it is obliged to help there, regardless of which party it belongs to. We are witnessing *Halkevleri*, which deals with culture, morality, nationality, six arrows, and the development of the country as a whole. Not only is the state free to help *Evler*, but it has to” (28.12.1949). Moreover, CHP claims that the party transfers a lot of money to *Halkevleri* from its budget as well. This not only denies DP’s claims but also seems as a discourse we frequently encounter in the records of the second period. For this, Kurutluoğlu’s expressions seem important: “I would like to note that *Halkevleri* are not run only with the aids made from the State budgets. The People’s Party has also added a lot of things to *Evler* from its budget. The party has allocated its material and spiritual existence, science, money, personnel, and everything to this institution and spent it on *Halkevleri*” (25.02.1949). In addition, in Tahsin Tüzün’s expressions, we see similar claims: “You cannot say that the People’s Party is consuming these funds. They say that this money is directly transferred to the People’s Party, this is evident from the speeches of our opponents. Or let’s take it out of the budget, not accept it. There’s no way this can be taken out of the budget. The People’s Party spends this money on *Evler* and even adds more to it” (17.02.1950).

One of the main arguments shaping the opposition's discourse on *Halkevleri* in the parliament is that *Evler* are to some extent a pillar of the Republican People's Party; *Halkevleri* do not appeal to the whole society. The following words of Dinçer are among the examples of this; "The Turkish Nation knows very well how *Halkevleri* work and how *Halkevleri* are a stage for party politics games" (24.11.1948). The fact that *Halkevleri* are the scene of political games is one of the definitions we frequently encounter in the records of this period. These remarks seem critical as they show that *Halkevleri* are an instrument for the political propaganda of the People's Party. "With its current position, *Halkevleri* are at the service of the People's Party. With today's practice, *Halkevleri* have become an institution where People's Party members talk about politics. Can I go to any *Halkevi* and give a policy speech like a deputy from the People's Party? Undoubtedly not" (24.02.1949). The example that DP deputy Alakant gives from Manisa *Halkevi* is similar: "A very simple example; when I went to Turgutlu this time, we were holding a meeting at Democrat Party building. Lots of people came, the rooms were full, and the corridors overflowed from the stairs to the street. At the time, the weather was so cold. *Halkevi* was, on the other hand, large and calm. One of those people coming to our meeting got up and said, 'Friends, when the People's Party deputy comes, he goes to *Halkevi*, listens to everyone there; let's go to *Halkevi* together this time, if necessary, the gendarmerie may come, the police may come and get us out'. I said 'No, friends, let's gather in the cold, snow, and rain if necessary, but never go on a road that will require the intervention of the police and gendarmerie'" (25.02.1949). Another example is revealed in İzmir deputy of DP, Halil Özyörük's expressions: "I am asking those who say that *Halkevleri* are the houses of the people. In a telegraph I received from the Governor of Elazığ today, people from the People's Party stated that they put a large lock on the door of *Halkevi* and closed it. Is this the people's home? I do not see the need to repeat that words. *Halkevleri* exist under the seat of the People's Party, as a part of it and are managed in this way. *Halkevleri* are a means of transferring money from the State Treasury for the People's Party" (07.08.1951). It is seen that the statement of CHP deputies that every political view is treated equally in *Halkevleri* is somehow doubtful.

One of the accusations of DP deputies about the organic ties between *Halkevleri* and the People's Party depends on that *Halkevleri* buildings and CHP buildings are located together in many provinces and districts. According to Alakant's expressions; "Today there are People's Party Executive Boards within *Halkevleri* institutions in many places and there is neither an office nor a building outside this board of *Halkevleri*. The clerks are hired from

this allocation; the stationery spent is entirely spent for the People's Party” (24.02.1949). Kemal Özçoban’s statements give clues about this relationship: “We all know that *Halkevleri* are the roof where Republican People's Party at least holds its congress and carries out its political activities” (28.12.1949). Kemal Zeytinlioğlu’s following expressions also explain this matter: “Every day we see in the newspapers that CHP Provincial and district congresses are held in *Halkevleri* buildings. These also show that *Halkevleri* have been turned into a policy nest” (28.12.1949). In Hasan Dinçer’s expressions, as well, it is possible to see this: “Let me give you an example: Visit and see Afyon Karahisar *Halkevi*. Afyon Karahisar *Halkevi* and the People's Party are in a single building. The fee of CHP clerk is paid from the allocation allocated to *Halkevleri*. The cost of other expenses is paid from this allocation” (17.02.1950). In the same meeting, Özçoban touches on this issue with explicit examples: “*Halkevleri* have become the property of the People's Party today. I can give you some examples in this regard. The people construct the buildings, but these are transferred to the People's Party. For example, in Düver, Afyon, and in Fatih, İstanbul, five and ten liras were forcibly collected from the people, and buildings were constructed for thousands of liras. Later, this building of *Halkevi* or *Halkodası* was transferred to the People's Party and this was attached to the deed.” Another example can be found in the following statements of Fahri Ağaoğlu, who describes the construction of Mersin *Halkevi*: “I would like to introduce you to an example of how Mersin *Halkevi* was built. *Halkevi* built in Mersin cost 3 million liras. The construction continued for three years. Mersin *Halkevi* construction was completed after all three million liras were collected from the people of Mersin, with a 10% increase in the cross-stitch prices imported to Mersin and the cross-stitch prices purchased by the farmers (07.08.1951).

The "six arrows" hanging in *Halkevleri* buildings are also on the agenda of the parliament quite frequently, as a new topic of discussion. DP deputies frequently shape their discourse against CHP through this symbol. Dinçer’s description of *Halkevleri* may be the first example: “Everyone agrees that it is not right and besides it is unreasonable to provide eternal aid from the nation's funds to these *Evler*, which have six arrows on their doors and the People's Party in their deed” (24.02.1949). In the example given by Kemal Özçoban on the activities of *Halkevleri*, a similar symbol is applied: “A friend of mine told me exactly this: A theatre play was represented; in one scene of the play, a flag with six arrows was displayed. Is this the means of culture? Even on the theatre stages, the propaganda of the Republican People's Party is being made. I am one of those who wish to develop a culture

in this country. Therefore, if we want to move forward in the field of culture, we should give up such propaganda places aiming at politics” (17.02.1950). On the other hand, the idea that these six arrows are not the symbol of CHP but the entire revolution rose in common from the People's Party deputies: For this issue, in the meeting dated 25.02.1949, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu remarks: “Have we done anything wrong if we hung the Six Arrow flag on the door of *Halkevleri*? There are no Six Arrows, friends; There are Nationalism, Statism, Populism, Secularism, and Revolutionism. It is not a flag; these are the inheritance of the Turkish Nation”; Cevad Dursunoğlu also states: “These six arrows, which are the symbol of CHP, are also the symbol of the Turkish revolution. The Turkish Revolution grew up under these principles and there is no doubt that *Halkevleri*, together with all the Turkish intellectuals of this revolutionary institution, wholeheartedly served the development of the principles such as nationalism, statism, and secularism”, and Muhittin Baha Pars expresses: “Friends, these six arrows are not only the symbol of the People's Party; it is also a symbol of the constitution.” As can be seen, the symbol of six arrows is introduced by DP members to reveal the relationship of *Halkevleri* with CHP, however, it is asserted by CHP as the value of the entire revolution.

By taking the Regulation of *Halkevleri* as a reference, DP deputies try to show that *Halkevleri* are a part of CHP. As stated by Dinçer regarding the regulation, “This institution is not a national institution, it is the People's Party’s institution. This is how the first article of *Halkevleri* Regulation describes it. ‘*Halkevleri* are an institution of Republican People's Party’, it says... If we take a look at the Regulation of *Halkevleri*, we will see that *Evler* are completely subordinate to the People's Party and are governed entirely by the directive of the People's Party. They are governed by the same regulation; their budget is drawn up by the Executive Committee of the People's Party. In short, *Halkevleri* function as a part of the People's Party.” Again, in the same meeting, Dinçer continues directly with the articles of the Regulation and expresses the following: “‘*Halkevleri* are open to all classes of citizens’, they said. However, let's take a look at the 16th article of *Halkevleri* Regulation: ‘To be elected as a committee member, it is necessary to be a member of Republican People's Party’. It is told to be open to every class citizen, but in its Regulation; to be a member of the committee to *Halkevleri*, it is necessary to be a member of CHP. In the 6th article of the Regulation, it is stated that the general administration of *Halkevleri* belongs to the general administrative committee of the People's Party. Wherever you look; take a look at their financial and administrative affairs, and you will hear and see the smell of party politics,

influence, and dominance. The claim that this is a cultural institution, then, remains out of sight. *Halkevleri* are an organ of the People's Party, it is a mechanism that does what the party desires" (24.11.1948).

In the first-period records, the close ties of *Halkevleri* with CHP are undeniably reflected. While in the records of the first period, CHP deputies do not hesitate to say that *Halkevleri* are under the party's management and control, we see that this is partially denied in the records of this second period. Prime Minister Hasan Saka's words prove it: "*Halkevi* institution, is a national cultural centre that has taken part in the development of national culture and works for the benefit of all citizens with a mentality that is far from party and political views. This blessed place is not under the command and service of CHP, but a cultural institution in the service of the country and the nation; the party has only the honour of establishing and working it" (24.11.1948). In another meeting Kurutluoğlu from CHP remarks similar things: "*Halkevleri* are not just a home for People's Party members. Since the day of its establishment, its door is open to all citizens. It has a functioning method that will enable our intellectuals and scientists to come together with the public, talk and unite in these *Evler*, outside the working area of the government. The doors of *Halkevleri* are open even to those who don't belong to this party" (25.02.1949). In the same meeting, we see a similar tone through the statements of İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu: "The loyalty of *Halkevleri* to CHP has been portrayed so strongly that it makes us imagine such scenery that there is a police force standing at the door of all *Halkevleri*! So, in my imagination he asks as I enter; 'Are you from CHP?' I say 'yes', and he says 'pass'. If you're from Democrat Party, he says 'You can't enter!' I say 'I will give a conference'; he wants to learn the topic of the conference; he says 'It may be against CHP, so you cannot give a conference!' These do not reflect the truth. In the years before I became a member of CHP and those years when I was a member of CHP, I have never seen such a record, even when I was the head of the Istanbul Province of the Free Republican Party. I did not see their relevance to politics, I did not see any party difference. If these are lies, I am a completely dishonest man." Ziya Ortaç, deputy of Ordu from CHP, has also similar statements about this situation: "Last night, our friend Hasan Dinçer said that while talking about this issue, it is not possible to enter through the six arrows at the door of *Halkevleri*. I used to think that the art of exaggeration could exist only in literature, but I see that literature surpasses politics! It's like six arrows on the door of *Halkevleri* turn into six warriors, they put their arrows on their bows and rest on the chest of those who came in: 'Let's see your policy document, which party do you belong to,

friend?’ I will say that this is not a reality, not even a dream: Eminönü *Halkevi* is one of our largest and most crowded *Halkevi*. The speakers of the conferences given *here* - I don't think it's right to mention their names because they are not here, but if Mr. Dinçer wishes, I can give their names- they are mostly independent scientists, artists, and politicians who are members of the opposition groups, some of them are not from the People's Party. Second example: Mr. Adnan Menderes came to Ordu, my constituency, with the most respected Democrat Party President Celal Bayar. They would make the propaganda of Democrat Party and talk to the citizens there. The platform that Mr. Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes sought to criticize the People's Party and to spread the propaganda of their parties was *Halkevi*. Stones were thrown against us from that *Halkevi*" (25.02.1949). The following words of İsmail Hakkı Balticioğlu are also significant in this manner: “Are we so stupid that we will openly say, ‘do not vote for democrats?’ Never!” (17.02.1950).

Halkevleri’s affiliation with CHP has always disturbed the opposition and it prevents *Evler* to belong to the whole society, as claimed by DP deputies. One of the most important topics of this period is turning *Halkevleri* into an independent national institution, free from any political influence. There have been many statements on this issue both by the opposition and the People's Party, and; it has been one of the most discussed issues of the second period. Hasan Dinçer’s question to be answered by the prime minister starts these negotiations: “What is the reason for the delay in the absolute guarantee that *Halkevleri*, which were established in the single-party system and are completely under the command and service of CHP with their current status, will be turned into a national cultural institution, will be opened to the benefit of all citizens?” (24.11.1948). Similar questions have been the main arguments of the opposition towards the government after the transition to the multi-party system. In the report dated 25.02.1949, Afyonkarahisar DP deputy Bozca deals with this situation: “There is an absolute necessity to put *Halkevleri* to the benefit of the nation. The safest solution for this is to return them to the nation who is the true owner of them.” Moreover, the insistence of DP on this issue and their demand for a change in the status of *Halkevleri* is not in favour of itself, but for the whole society, as we see in Yunus Muammer Alakant’s following expressions: “I think that the Congress of the People's Party has already given the authority in this matter. Honourable deputies should not hesitate to take their responsibilities in their Congress and make a decision on this, which is beneficial for the people, for the sake of the law, for the country, the nation and the youth” (25.02.1949).

Continuing with the discussion on *Halkevleri*'s turning into a facility, Prime Minister Hasan Saka states that such an arrangement could only be implemented as a result of a decision taken within the party: "Turning *Halkevleri* into a facility is an issue that is related to the internal order of Republican People's Party. As I am a member of the Republican People's Party Court, I am aware that this is being worked on and that some legal difficulties are being tried to be resolved. Since this issue is one of the matters to be decided by the authorities of CHP, I submit that I could not find the opportunity to answer our friend's question on this matter. I can only say that the decision to turn *Halkevleri* and *Halkodaları* into public facilities is sincerely sought to be implemented and fulfilled" (24.11.1948). A similar promise is expressed by CHP deputy Sahir Kurutluoğlu in the report dated 25.02.1949: "The People's Party mentioned how it is possible to manage the functioning of the activities of *Halkevleri* in the multi-party system and decided to establish a facility, supposing that the best solution is to turn them into a facility. In this way, the party would provide *Evler* with the opportunity to exist as an independent institution... In this respect, it is desired to be done..." Promises regarding the independence of *Halkevleri* are frequently mentioned in the records. Even the ministers continue these promises beyond the deputies. Rüştü Aksal, the Minister of Finance of the period, expresses that "*Halkevleri* will, in any case, be given a new shape. There are some legal reasons for this. The party convention had decided to make them a facility. However, it has been stated by the lawyers that it is not possible to establish this facility. *Halkevleri* will be allocated in a way that will meet the needs better than their current form" (28.12.1949). As we can see in Muhsin Adil Binal's statements, these promises continue in 1950, four years after the negotiations on this matter start: "Our congress will find the best form in this regard. After this form is found, the situation will be regulated from the legal side. Our friends from CHP are working on this without any financial benefit, by adding their night to day" (17.02.1950). In essence, the declaration of CHP's working on turning *Halkevleri* into a facility pushes DP deputies to keep this issue on the agenda, since the preparations to do so could never be completed. Even though CHP claims to be working on the issue, the following words of İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu seem doubtful: "Just like everyone else, I want *Halkevleri* to be independent. What would be the loss of the People's Party if autonomy is given to *Halkevleri*? What would be the gain of those from Nation and Democrat Parties or independent citizens? I can't understand this" (17.02.1950).

It is understood from the records that the requests made by the Opposition to change the legal status of *Halkevleri*, depend on the decision of CHP only. This is a significant sign that *Evler* are an extension of the People's Party. CHP deputies frequently state that they are working on changing the status of *Halkevleri* after the transition to a multi-party system. CHP has made many promises in this regard. Thereupon, DP deputies react against the promises' never being fulfilled and the People's Party's still receiving high amounts from the state budget on behalf of *Halkevleri*. The following statements of Dinçer are an example of this: "I understand from today's negotiations that the People's Party resigned from its promises a year or two years ago. In the previous budget negotiations, CHP agreed with us that *Halkevleri* should be an institution open to all citizens and open to the benefit of all citizens. From this platform, they asked for additional time to bring *Halkevleri* into this legal status. They claimed that as soon as possible they would find a legal formula within six-months-time and turn them into a public cultural institution. The assignment was given then. I proposed for the next year. While Prime Minister Hasan Saka was responding to my proposal, they stated that they were focusing on the issue, but it was not an easy task that they were in contact with authorized legal professionals and they would find a formula. Three years have passed, and they still haven't made what they promised. This business cannot continue for three years. It is not a process that requires a long period as three years" (28.12.1949). Hasan Polatkan also draws attention to these unfulfilled promises in his following words: "In 1946, we were told that the allocation of two million liras allocated to *Halkevleri* should be accepted, that these institutions should not be allowed to collapse, in that case, a decision would be taken on *Halkevleri*'s position in the first grand congress of the People's Party and that *Halkevleri* would be separated from the People's Party. In 1947 it was reported that the decision promised last year was about to be taken. In 1948, it was claimed that this decision was taken and *Halkevleri* would turn into an independent institution. In 1949, it was stated that this decision taken at the last People's Party Congress did not comply with the rules of law and that a new decision would be taken in the next grand congress. The four-year situation clearly shows that this matter is still not settled and has been put into a stalling phase. Promised in 1946, promised in 1947; We made a decision in 1948, that in 1949 this decision had some difficulties and it would be decided in the People's Party Congress to be reconvened" (17.02.1950). A similar reproach comes from Kayseri deputy Kamil Gündeş: "If ever *Halkevleri* are a cultural institution, it was necessary to give them an independent identity for three years. The government just doesn't like it. What is the reason? We established this institution, we will keep it alive and therefore we do

not give such an independent identity for now, friends came to such conclusion” (17.02.1950). In the face of these promises lasting for four years, Gündeş in the same meeting even suggests that the expenses of *Halkevleri* should from that time on be covered by the Party, in case the position of *Halkevleri* continues in the same way during a new election process is started: “Let me say right away that the People's Party is alive, not *Halkevleri*. This institution works for the survival of the People's Party. And these allocations do not help culture. If they continue to remain the same, the People's Party has a lot of income, it should give these 1.250.000 lire from its budget. At least then we may go to the next elections on equal terms.”

While *Halkevleri* are being discussed under the topics put forward by the opposition, we see that DP is not totally against *Halkevleri* or the money spent on them from the budget. The first example for this may be given through Dinçer’s expressions: “If the current situation of *Halkevleri* were as how CHP deputies had mentioned, I would regard 4 million liras allocated from the budgets every year as really insufficient and say that it should be sacrificed, but if we look at the practice; *Halkevleri* do not perform this duty” (24.11.1948). A similar attitude is also valid in the idea that *Halkevleri* exist as an institution of this country whose mission is to spread culture. *Evler* may truly be considered a cultural institution as long as they are owned by the entire public. Kamil Gündeş’s following statements; “As Democrat Party, we have never had the idea that we should not help or allocate cultural institutions. If the funds we will give, the allocation we will allocate, is under your intention, it is our debt, first of all, as a Turkish citizen, to go further and put an allocation that will meet all its needs, not such an allocation as one million, 1.5 million or one million 250 thousand liras” and Özçoban’s words, all, prove this idea: “Yes, we wish as much as you do, let *Halkevleri* be cultural vehicles in this country. But *Halkevleri* do not have any useful activities as in the time of Atatürk and their establishment. Its activities are nothing but a show or two in favour of the People's Party” (17.02.1950).

There are mostly praiseworthy statements about the activities of *Halkevleri* in the first period records as we have seen; CHP deputies mostly state that *Evler* achieve success within the scope of their activities. We have seen some confessional statements regarding the activities of *Evler* during the first period. However, when we come to the second-period records, we see that the activities of *Halkevleri* are the focus of the deputies of DP –mostly in a critical way. DP deputy of Kahramanmaraş, Emin Sosyal’s expressions can be given as an example for this situation: “I would like to deal with the issue of *Halkevleri* in terms of

educating the nation. In many provinces, township centres, and sub-districts, *Halkevleri* and *Halkodaları* have become places where educated intellectuals gather, read poems, repeat some subjects from the history of literature, etc. The people in the neighbourhood where these *Evler* and *Halkodaları* are located in almost every village of the country are not only civil servants and intellectuals. Since there are blacksmiths, coal smiths, carpenters, traders, craftsmen, and citizens of all backgrounds, *Halkevleri* and *Halkodaları* should include all these people and seek ways to raise them. However, *Halkevleri* and *Halkodaları* are not in this direction. They have become a place where the people whom we call the intellectuals of that neighbourhood gather, read poetry, have literature nights, and have some fun. They are far from having a function as raising public outside the school. This is an inappropriate method” (24.02.1949). As we understand here, *Halkevleri* cease to be places appealing to the whole nation, they turn into places enjoyed only by the intellectuals. And, as asserted by Soysal, if this so-called educating function is not provided, the funds transferred to *Halkevleri* are useless.

As we have seen in the records of the first period, the success of cultural organizations abroad which resemble *Halkevleri* in terms of social development, education of adults, and raising the cultural level, comes to the fore in the records of this second period, in a different extent. While the emphasis on the importance of the contributions of developed countries for such institutions in the first period is to justify CHP's investment in *Halkevleri*, we see that the examples mentioned in this second period are handled in a different framework by the opposition deputies. As an important detail, the person who start the discussions on this issue is the former Minister of National Education Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, who started his political life in CHP, then resigned from there, continued as an independent deputy, and at the end joined DP. At this point, the direct relationship of the history of *Halkevleri* in Turkey - after the examination of adult education organizations abroad - is pointed out and the regimes in which these adult education institutions are experienced are brought to the parliament agenda by Tanrıöver: “*Halkevleri* were born under the influence of youth organizations established in various countries. Since the parties in these regimes were subject to the will of a single man, every kind of influence was exercised by the people in a way that would suit the youth of any country to this absolute domination” (25.02.1949). This emphasis of Tanrıöver mainly intends to draw attention to the common feature of the regimes in the places where such organizations are established: ‘the rule of a single man’. There is a reference to *Halkevleri* here. These explanations bring the idea that

Halkevleri are also dependent on a single authority. Moreover, Tanrıöver puts forward his suggestion about the legal position of *Evler*, which is being discussed in the parliament since 1946: “If raising Turkish youth well is a matter of concern, I say to my dear friends; we cannot depend it on the luck of parties whose future is uncertain. There is no doubt that the People's Party will lose power one day, like all parties in the world. What will happen then? Will this institution that a very poor nation set up by spending millions be left unowned? I'm curious and worried, I wonder who will get it. In this confused time of the world, at a time when fires are burning everywhere, millions and hundreds of millions collapse, don't you ask yourself where will this institution go?... CHP transferred all the buildings of *Halkevleri* from *Türk Ocakları*. And there CHP hung its flag with six arrows. It started to manage them directly as the youth organization of CHP.” From these statements, it becomes clear that Tanrıöver also focuses on the close ties of *Halkevleri* with CHP. However, he indicates that this relationship should be left. Behind his suggestion is the belief that an institution such as *Halkevleri* could only survive in this way.

A further remarkable topic in the discussions of *Halkevleri* is the case of *Türk Ocakları*. Since *Türk Ocakları* existed with a similar motivation to *Halkevleri* and were not affiliated with any political sect, they constitute one of the important subjects of this period. The main reason for giving such an example is to draw attention to the fact that although *Halkevleri* are not politically independent, they receive large amounts of money from the state budget. It is again Tanrıöver, as the former member and executive of *Türk Ocakları*, who brings this issue to the fore of the parliament: "Once upon a time, these lands experienced a practice; an education institution that was not affiliated with any sect, the institution of raising youth. It was first established in Istanbul, in extremely modest, poor conditions. A tin lamp, 12 chairs, a dissection book, a few well-recycled newspapers, a library... Since this institution was not tied to an obscure organization like a political party, but to permanent values such as the nation and the state, *Türk Ocakları* did not fall; developed continuously for 20 years. Do you know what was the aid given to *Türk Ocakları*? Only 25 thousand liras from the state budget per year. This went on for 20 years. And finally, one day, under the influence of the foreign organizations and examples I have mentioned, the desire to establish a youth organization affiliated to CHP appeared here” (25.02.1949). *Türk Ocakları* experience seems very critical. It is known that *Halkevleri* were founded with the remains of *Türk Ocakları*, but *Evler* are problematic in serving the whole society: “There is an organization with a long history, it is the Turkish Nation; *Halkevleri* were built with

the money of this nation. Return them to the Turkish Nation.” Tanrıöver’s words of reference to *Türk Ocakları* reveal the idea that such a cultural institution that does not work for the whole society should be given back to the society and be made available to all citizens.

While *Türk Ocakları* have a significant role in proving the necessity of devoting *Halkevleri* to the whole nation, it is not sufficient to consider *Türk Ocakları* only. Tanrıöver’s focus includes some more general terms, as he explains with the following: “Friends; You will listen to a memory of mine of 1925; The General Secretary brought a proposal to the 1927 Congress of CHP. The party wished to nominate the executive committees of all associations. I took the word; I said: No, the result will be opposite to what you desire. You will not bring societies and youth institutions closer to you, on the contrary, you will make them go away from yourself by doing so. An establishment under orders... It moves away and does not bring closer. The system that raises slaves...” (25.02.1949). This is why he emphasizes that *Halkevleri* should not be allowed to continue under the authority of political power: “Do not allow *Halkevleri* to continue as an institution that takes orders from above. Let Turkish youth be free to run their societies. This system reveals weaknesses. The values that will govern the country tomorrow will become clear there. Those who make efforts with their efforts enjoy their establishments and, in this way, those establishments will show great progress” Moreover, he repeats his proposal that *Halkevleri* should not be affiliated with a political party or any other institution of the state; rather it should exist as a completely free organization: “*Halkevleri* cannot be transferred from party to party. This offer is inappropriate, it is wasteful. It should be left to the intellectuals of the country as a national cultural institution and kept from being a formal institution. Government influence crushes them, suffocates them.”

The second-period records are also separated within themselves. As stated at the beginning, the second group covers a period starting from the transition to multi-party life in 1946 and continuing with the 1950 elections, in which the government changed for the first time in the history of the Republic. In this regard, we see two different processes; the first is between 1946-1950 and the second is the period after 1950. In the first period of the second group records, that is, during the first four years of multi-party life, when the power is still held by CHP, we see that in matters such as DP members' right to speak, their making a proposal or passing their proposals through the parliament remain ineffective. The example in which the speaker of the parliament who is a member of the People’s Party, does not allow DP deputy Yunus Muammer Alakant to speak; the report dated 25.02.1949 describes this

biased attitude of the speaker of the parliament with the following justification: “Following the procedure if there are people who want to speak against adequacy, only one of them is given the right to speak. It seems that you do not find the negotiation sufficient, a few more people want to talk about it, there is also a qualifying proposal, whatever the general committee says will be done. (Enough, enough! sounds)”. It is seen that the chairman submits this to the vote of the parliament with the words "I submit the proposal to your vote. Those who accept... Those who do not accept... The proposal for qualification is mostly accepted", and takes advantage of being on power. And Suphi Batur from DP tries to protest this situation with the following statements: "Mr. Head, they are winning when it comes to voting. There's no need to even put it on the relay". In another example, a similar attitude shows itself: On the proposal of Afyonkarahisar deputy Kemal Özçoban as “I propose that 210.000 liras in Section 511 be removed from the Budget as I have presented verbally”, the chairman directly rejects it: “Those who consider the proposal... For those who do not... the motion is rejected. Chapter 511 accepted” (28.12.1949). As it is seen, in the first four-year period after the transition to a multi-party system, the demands and proposals of DP deputies regarding both *Halkevleri* and many other issues are left unfinished, since the majority already consists of deputies from CHP.

Following the elections on 14 May 1950, the change of government partially affected the attitude towards *Halkevleri* that we have seen in the first phase of the second period. In the new process of this second period, it is seen that contrary to the discussions on *Halkevleri* in the last four years, some specific acts have been on the agenda of the parliament. In this process, we see that rigid actions are taken against *Halkevleri*, and legal measures, mostly prevented in the last four years, are taken. As the first example that can be given in this context, the draft laws submitted by DP deputies in 1950 and 1951 to cut the aid to *Halkevleri* and to abolish the privileges offered to *Evler* can be given: In 20.12.1950, “Erzurum Deputy Emrullah Nutku's law proposal on the withdrawal of the money transferred from the Treasury, private accounting and municipalities on behalf of *Halkevleri* to the account of Republican People's Party” and in 17.01.1951 “Fehmi Açıksöz's proposal regarding the abolition of the exemption granted to *Halkevleri* in paragraph 62 of Article 32 of the Stamp Law”, in 26.03.1951 “The draft Law on the repeal of Law No. 2154 on tax exemption for radio and cinema machines to be imported for *Halkevleri*.” For the justification of the draft laws on the abolishment of the privileges, it is put forward that *Halkevleri* in the new era act as a branch of a political party, it doesn't reflect the interests of the society, and therefore

Evler cannot fulfil its purposes. All these are expressed through the following statements: “Although *Halkevleri* were not formed by the Law of Associations and were not accepted by the Government as an association based on public interests and it had no personality in the previous conditions; *its* operating as a part of a political party and being considered a cultural institution of this party did not comply with the main purpose of its facilities. Therefore, the removal of tax exemptions for *Evler* is necessary in terms of the general rule of taxation and the principle of justice” (28.05.1951). This justification also shows that the withdrawal of *Halkevleri* from the mentioned privileges aims at ensuring justice around the country.

In this new process, after the 1950 elections, we see that the steps that are left incomplete in the previous periods and the series of actions that lead to the closing of *Evler* are put into practice step by step. In this period, efforts to reach a consensus through some legislative proposals as in the early years of parliament are no longer attempted. In the records of the meeting dated 06.08.1951, which is the first meeting that *Halkevleri* are dealt with after the 1950 elections, the Law proposal regarding the return of immovable properties belonging to dissolute associations, of those left to political parties and of buildings built by these parties for general interest to the owners and the Treasury is discussed. As stated by Burdur MP Fethi Çelikbaş; “The proposals show that there is an enormous conflict of principle between the two sides. The opposition party considers this issue, which means a retraction to the legal remedy of its institutions, which are still the remnants of the single-party era, as a separate *Halkevleri* issue. On the other hand, the government has adopted the retraction of the institution, which includes *Halkevi*, and which the single-party era cannot afford to wait any longer and its recourse to the law. After the establishment of the multi-party National Assembly, it was possible to reach a solution. This issue could have been settled most appropriately for the national interest in the conditions of that day. And this could be done by the government of that time. But it could not conclude and *Evler* continued to be supported by the special administrations, municipalities, and the State budget” (06.08.1951).

During the rule of DP, CHP blames DP for not reaching an agreement over *Halkevleri*. It is possible to see this clearly in the following statements of İsmet İnönü: “Honestly we have made an effort to inform the opposition party, their demands and opinions. The opposition party at that time continued their complaints and did not state their wishes. In this way, our attempt to find a solution with the agreement of the parties failed.

In the 1947 congress of the People's Party, we declared the administration of *Evler* through establishing a facility. The main reason why we could not accrue this was, again, the inability to reach an agreement with the opposition party” (06.08.1951). It is understood from İnönü's statements that Democrat Party, which was in opposition at that time, was far from reaching an agreement with CHP and did not express any opinion. However, in almost all of the records examined after the transition to the multi-party system, it can be easily seen that DP deputies express their opinion on the position of *Halkevleri*. On this matter, İnönü continues: “This proposal clearly shows that the negotiations between the Government and us are not likely to reach a positive result. The basis of our projects was to make *Halkevleri* continue their duties. We understand from this proposal that the main purpose was the abolition of *Halkevleri*. In our project, we kept the idea of the facility as the main precaution.”

İnönü evaluates the steps taken by Democrat Party government on *Halkevleri* as follows: “The abolition of *Halkevleri* is an unjustified destruction. Instead of turning *Evler* into a facility above the parties, leaving the Council of Ministers to the right of usufruct is not only an unfair disposition but also paves the way for using these buildings exclusively with the political desire of the ruling party” (06.08.1951). It is apparent that as of this new period, *Halkevleri* have entered the process of abolition. However, it may be doubtful as it can be understood from the examination of all these records that this procedure happens suddenly after Democrat Party's access to power. Democrat Party, in particular, put forward the idea of turning *Halkevleri* into a non-partisan facility and made various efforts for this purpose in the period from 1946 to 1950. It was CHP who put off and refused to turn *Evler* into an independent institution.

İnönü goes further and argues that what has been passed over *Halkevleri* is unconstitutional with the following words (06.08.1951): "All these actions are to some extent a violation of the Constitution. These actions are an attempt of the ruling party to deprive the opponent political party of constitutional guarantees." However, during the rule of the People's Party, transferring money from the state budget on behalf of *Halkevleri* was, in fact, unconstitutional. Behzat Bilgin, on behalf of the Budget Commission, expresses this with the figures truly from 1935 to 1950 and shows the real problem which causes conflicts with the constitution: “From 1935 to 1950, an annual allocation was made for *Halkevleri* issue in the budget. These allocation amounts were a total of 23.624.000 liras. Now, friends; How did the People's Party get this allocation? Did they get it legally?” The fact that *Halkevleri* is not an independent association has made those funds received from the state

budget through the People's Party unconstitutional. The People's Party not giving *Halkevleri* the status of an association or an independent establishment exercising following the provisions of the Law, explains this situation. Therefore, it may be inconvenient for *Halkevleri* to receive money from the budget unless *they* become an institution unless *they* have an administrative committee, and unless *they* have a legal status.

This period includes not only the implementation of the demands of DP in the previous four years on behalf of *Halkevleri* but also CHP's becoming much clearer on the issues that distract Democrat Party members. Thus, in this new process, CHP chooses to take rapid decisions on the issues that they postponed when they were on power. The following statements of CHP Trabzon deputy Faik Ahmed Barutçu prove it: "*Halkevleri* will be protected as a memory from Atatürk and will be turned into a facility and their purposes and working hours will be determined following the requirements of the new era. All the real estate built as *Halkevleri*, *Halkodaları* and buildings transferred from legal entities to be used as *Halkevleri* will be transferred to this facility. In this way, all these controversial issues will be settled as a whole" (06.08.1951). These expressions show us how CHP is eager to make changes in the position of *Halkevleri*. The main problem here appears that the People's Party is quite late in taking these steps since it did not pay any attention to Democrat Party members and their demands during their rule.

Upon CHP's claim that DP wishes directly to close *Halkevleri* through the aforementioned proposals, statements arise from Democrat Party ranks. Osman Şevki Çiçekdağ in the meeting dated 07.08.1951 states the following this; "The Leader of the opposition, İnönü confuses our proposal so much, he gives such inappropriate meanings that it is impossible not to feel sad. With this proposal, he accuses us of abolishing *Halkevleri*. This is unfair. He accuses us of that we are taking *Halkevleri* on ourselves. I'm screaming. Our offer has been submitted to you and the entire nation for your examination and appreciation. If they show a single word implying a meaning such as abolition, I consider it my duty to express seriously that I will personally take my signature back on this proposal immediately. No, dear friends, the institutions called *Halkevleri* and referred to the cultural and artistic organizations are still affiliated with their parties. They can run it as they wish. With our draft, we only offer the return of the goods, which were taken from the nation free of charge and which were illegally and unjustly attributed to the People's Party under the name of the aid to *Halkevleri*, to the nation, the genuine owners."

Democrat Party, first of all, didn't plan to close *Halkevleri*. We see that at the beginning, DP members just aimed to return what was taken from the people on behalf of an institution that lived under CHP. In the expression of Sıtkı Yırcalı, DP deputy of Balıkesir, we can see this: "They say that we are seizing *Halkevleri*. No, friends, we are not. Neither in the substance nor in the spirit of our proposal, there is no aim to seize *Halkevleri* or to run it in the hands of our government tomorrow. We only aim to return the real estates, which was made by the money taken in violation of the legislation of that day, and the acquisitions made by violating the legislation to the nation, to their true owners. If they want to run *Halkevleri* as the cultural organ of the People's Party by establishing and installing separate buildings with their own private and financial resources, they are completely free to do so. This is outside our law" (06.08.1951). As a justification for his words, Yırcalı continues; "According to the investigation carried out in the records and accounts of the People's Party through financial inspectors, no money has been spent on *Halkevleri* by the People's Party so far. On the contrary, millions of liras are misappropriated by the People's Party from the money given from the State budget, private accounting, and municipalities under the name of *Halkevleri*." All these show that what *Halkevleri* acquire till that time is not legal. Arranging those properties legally is among the main purpose of DP.

Ferit Alpiskender expresses the background of the steps to be taken on *Halkevleri* on the basis that *Evler* have never belonged to the whole nation with the following words: "Friends, *Halkodaları*, which are built by the peasants with their hard work, effort and money, today do not include a significant number of citizens in the face of the provisions of the single party regime. Villagers are whining and complaining about it. *Halkevleri*, built with the money of the nation, are closed to the majority of the nation, in cities." For the legal justification of the mentioned decision of the 06.08.1951 records, Bahadır Dülger also states the following: "This matter of *Halkevleri*, which we have been dealing with for a long time, has become an issue in our minds. We have grasped all the details of this issue, at what points it is against the law, and for what reasons it should be passed on to the nation, fully and with all its subtleties. However, the decision we are making here today is a historical one that will result in a change in the reign of the single-party and single-person reign. In his entire political life, let me say from the beginning to the end, the leader of the opposing party, who has made it a profession to violate the Constitution in his entire political life, confronts us as the defender of the Constitution." As can be seen, the aim of regulating such an unconstitutional situation within the constitutional framework ultimately becomes clear.

In yet another meeting, Osman Şevki Çiçekdağ expresses that *Halkevleri* are far from carrying out their main goals with the following words: “Dear friends, İnönü once again told ‘*Halkevleri* are the cultural institution of the country, it is to some extent an art centre. The People's Party is working on this. You will destroy *Halkevleri* by taking them away from us’, he says. I do not believe in this. As a friend of yours who travels many parts of the country like you, I submit to you that *Halkevleri* have never fulfilled the duty assigned to them. The children of the country do not go to the libraries of *Halkevleri*. Since there are political currents, there are political activities there, peoples choose not to go. Turkish children and intellectuals have always escaped from his sanctuary.” We can see easily that *Halkevleri* have been used as a place of political propaganda for the People’s Party. In another meeting, repeatedly, Osman Şevki Çiçekdağ touches on this issue, “We understand from the ledgers that most of the aid given to *Halkevleri* was spent on the propaganda of the People's Party, like the money that was taken from them by force in recent years and that was misappropriated” (07.08.1951). Manisa deputy Muhlis Tümay expresses similar thoughts with the following words; “We know that during the single-party era, *Halkevleri*, built on the captured legacy of the destroyed *Türk Ocakları*, emerged as a propaganda tool of the People's Party from various sides; and they maintained it until 1950.”

Along with all the discussions in the new era, it is articulated in the parliamentary records of May 1950, the Republican People’s Party exercises the right to rent the properties of *Halkevleri* and to own their properties by themselves. Apart from making political propaganda in *Evler* as claimed by DP, under the aim of producing culture, the accomplishment of such matters necessitates the DP government to take a step, towards reclaiming the treasury on the properties of *Evler*, step by step, in August 1951. The following words of Abdurrahmen Fahri Ağaoğlu about the situation in question seem explanatory: “Since they knew that this law would come into force one day after May 14, 1950, they rented out those real estates on a large and long-term basis to their people. They registered it. Konya *Halkevi* building is not a rentable building. *Halkevleri* hall cannot be rented out either. But two or three years ago, they rented it to their party clerks for 4-5 years, for small amounts, and registered it in the directorate of land registry” (08.08.1951).

During the negotiations in the parliament, the details on the revenues of *Halkevleri* are shared by the Ministry of Finance. It is an important point that it provides an explicit justification for the steps of Democrat Party to be taken after 1950 on behalf of *Halkevleri*. The numbers are, as asserted by the Minister of Finance, Hasan Polatkan, as follows; “The

income of the People's Party from 1932 to 1950, together with the revenues of *Halkevleri*, which do not have a legal personality and are a branch of the People's Party, was 65.854.665 liras. For *Halkevleri*, 48.630.780 liras were given, 27 million-odd from the State Budget, 14 million-odd from special administrations, 6 million-odd from municipalities, 519 thousand-odd from village budgets, and 264 thousand-odd liras from State Economic Enterprises. It is understood as a result of the inspection that 10.858.127 liras were spent on the services of *Halkevleri*, 11.355.837 liras were spent on the construction of *Halkevleri* and 5 million 773.229 liras were misappropriated by the People's Party” (07.08.1951).

It is seen that the issue of *Halkevleri* causes uncertainty in the meeting held on 8 August 1951, when the ongoing discussions about *Halkevleri* in the parliament come to an end after the 1950 general elections. Some DP deputies determine a specific period, three months-time, for CHP to evacuate the buildings and return them to the state. In the General Assembly of the Parliament, requests are received from some of the deputies that it is not necessary to wait for the mentioned period, following the statement "Political parties that partially or wholly occupy the real estate subject to restitution by this law, are obliged to evacuate and give them back within three months from the date of entry into force of this law" (08.08.1951). In this meeting, Akif Sarioğlu's following words, "Turkish Nation is with us in the case of *Halkevleri*. I would like you to accept the release period which is three months, as one month" and those of Süreyya Endik, "Friends, the issue of *Halkevleri* is a gangrenous one in Turkey, why should I do it three months-time? Let's put it a month later. Is there a stronger reason than this? Friends, let's turn our ears and eyes to the Turkish Nation, the desire of the Turkish nation is to be evacuated within a day, not even a month. So, I ask for the acceptance of one-month time" are among these demands. Feridun Fikri Düşünsel summarizes the nature of what is intended with the law in question as follows: "Now let's examine what is intended to be done with this law: First, the return of real estate belonging to *Halkevleri* to the State and secondly return of those properties, taken from here and there contrary to the laws of the time, from the People's Party” (08.08.1951).

With an overall assessment, it can be seen that the discussions on the legal status of *Halkevleri*, which are initiated by DP deputies in the negotiations of the budget commission after the transition to the multi-party system, acquire a wide-ranging extent with the change of government in 1951. This process later leads to the abolition of *Evler*. This process, which is not intended for the abolition of *Halkevleri* in the first place, is in the direction of establishing the legal position of *Halkevleri* to serve every citizen following its main

purpose. The fact that the People's Party does not choose to make any changes in the position of *Evler* through its congresses, leads to the questioning of *Halkevleri*, which are already considered problematic in their functioning. The paragraphs above, which briefly discuss the meetings of the parliament after Democrat Party's access to power, reveal the process of the abolition. Upon all these debates, with the law numbered 5830, accepted on 8 August 1951 and entered into force on 11 August 1951 after being published in the Official Gazette, all *Halkevleri* across Turkey were closed and their properties were transferred to the national treasury.

In lieu of a conclusion, we can assert that this part of the study, making a special examination of *Halkevleri* in the parliamentary records starting with the first day of its establishment until 1951 when it was abolished, are gathered in two main categories: The first phase covers the single-party era until the transition to the multi-party system and the second period after the multi-party system, the two groups are examined under separate headings. After examining the institutional functioning of *Halkevleri* in the historical context in the second grand chapter of this study, a content analysis based on the discussions about *Evler* in the parliament reveals the meaning and importance of *Halkevleri* in the single-party period of Turkey.

The main point behind this last grand chapter is to see how *Halkevleri* become a source of discussion both during and after the single-party rule and how they affect the process leading to the abolition of *Halkevleri*. In this context, the parliamentary records are concretized through a qualitative analysis and, as stated before, the second group records provide the main source for this study. Based on all these, the idea that *Halkevleri*, which are introduced as a cultural institution by the founding regime and to which high sums are devoted from the very first day of its establishment, turn into a political propaganda tool of CHP. Especially after the transition to the multi-party system, the perspective towards *Halkevleri* and their activities partially change in the parliament discussions; it diversifies. In this framework, during the period between 1946-1950, Democrat Party makes numerous attempts to change the legal position of *Halkevleri* in a way that would serve the whole society and thus gain the status of a real cultural association. Despite Democrat Party, which takes steps in this direction many times by proposing laws, the Republican People's Party, to which *Halkevleri* are affiliated, does not make any attempt to change. CHP claims that they would discuss this in their grand congress but does nothing in this direction. During this multi-party era, it is understood from the examples given by the regional deputies in their

declarations that *Halkevleri* have become non-operative. And in the new era after 1950, for the first time, a process for the return of the properties owned by *Halkevleri* to their real owners begins, it is to some extent a legal improvement. With this critical step, the process of the abolition of *Halkevleri*, which has already serious problems in its functioning, comes out; and the course results in the abolition of *Evler* in August 1951. The law is justified by the reasons such as the fact that *Evler* do not appeal to all parts of the society. Moreover, despite *its* failure in reaching the nation as equals, *Evler* continue to receive high amounts from the state budget and the people's budget; it serves as the political mechanism.

This examination, made by subjecting the speeches of the deputies directly to the parliament along with the law proposals and the decisions, is considered very critical in terms of explaining how *Halkevleri* serve the cultural construction process of the founding regime. For this study, which has been trying to understand the importance of the concept of culture in the political mechanism from the very beginning, it is thought to be meaningful to show the efforts of power mechanism to establish dominance in an abstract area through a directly guided institution, the practice of *Halkevleri* and its reflections in the parliament. Within the scope of this significance, it can be asserted that *Halkevleri*, established as a cultural institution, have turned into a tool of power that is far from reflecting the society. Aiming to recreate the society in line with the principles of the regime in an ideological manner, *Halkevleri* can be regarded as unsuccessful enough to transform society. It is believed to be critical for this study to reveal this claim with the historical context presented in the second grand chapter and through content analysis applied to the parliamentary records within the scope of this last chapter.

6. CONCLUSION: THE OUTCOMES OF THE COMPARATIVE STUDY

Early Republican history constituted one of the most critical turning points in Turkish political life. The Republic of Turkey, experiencing its modernization through various motives unique to itself, took steps that would affect Turkish political life from many aspects for long years. The modernization course of Turkey was quite different from that of the nation-states of the West and the colonial states. In its phase, the Republican regime introduced a new way of life with various changes which corresponded to a very radical construction process. At this point, the actors of the early Republic period undertook the mission of founding through numerous dynamics.

The motivation behind the Republican Revolution did not only include political and institutional means, but also social; there aimed for a total modernization movement. In addition to all institutional and technical reforms, there was a serious effort for social and cultural transformation. The new citizen form desired to be constructed pointed to a much more abstract process beyond the bureaucratic changes. In this context, aiming to transform the behaviours and perspectives of individuals, the new regime attempted to replace the existing social memory with an alternative one. The motivation to re-design social practices, ways of thinking and behaviour, and tastes of society was carried out by the regime through cultural means. However, it is still discussed whether this process could affect the value judgments of society and whether the changes could create a national consciousness in line with the expectations or not. Shaping the social memory, which was essentially a problem of a century ago, still occupies an important place in today's world of debate in political science, public administration, sociology, history, anthropology, law, literature, linguistics, etc.

It is considered meaningful for this study to examine the means of cultural construction within the framework of citizen construction. Undoubtedly, during the modernization process, the importance given to education by the founding elites was extremely wide-ranging. At this point, it is not a coincidence that this study focuses on *Halkevleri*, which, after the theoretical structure is established, enables us to analyse culture construction through an education mechanism. *Halkevleri*, an adult education centre, were one of the most important social and cultural organizations of the Republican regime. First

established in 14 provinces in 1932 and in a very short time expanded all over Turkey, *Halkevleri* became a source for the cultural construction which forms the basis of this study. The response received from the society constitutes the main subject of this study since it seems critical to deal with *Halkevleri*, which were conceived by the regime elites as places that would rise the cultural level of people and enable the intellectuals to come together with the ordinary people and thus serve the social integrity, but turned into a political tool and assumed the mission of instilling intense propaganda. The case study in question is carried out through a comparative analysis of the Italian similar organization *Dopolavoro* and by the examination of the parliamentary records between 1932-1951.

In this study, the example of *Dopolavoro* (The National After-Work Program), a cultural organization in Italy is discussed. In the establishment phase of *Halkevleri*, the studies on similar practices in the world by those who were sent abroad for education in the early days of the foundation of the new state occupied a large place. It is known that in the establishment process of *Halkevleri*, cultural organizations existing in European and Balkan countries were taken as an example. In this context, the examination of the Italian example, which constitutes the second analysis unit of the study, has a significant place. *Dopolavoro* institution became the main tool for building cultural hegemony in Italian society after the fascist regime came to power; it mostly appeared as a cultural institution that aimed to organize leisure time among workers in an ideological way. Examining Italian *Dopolavoro* within the scope of the study seems to be an important effort for the case analysis in Turkey as well. Both *Halkevleri* and *Dopolavoro* lived in similar periods and served similar purposes. Since *Dopolavoro* organization in Italy was considered a success in adhering masses to the regime and made itself attractive to Italian society, it has been chosen as a comparative unit for this study. Comparatively examining the cultural construction tools is considered important in terms of providing an original contribution to the literature.

The examination of *Halkevleri*, in this study, is not only provided by the comparative analysis of an external example but also by a content analysis applied to the parliamentary records of the Grand Turkish National Assembly. It is thought to be meaningful to show the regime's effort to establish dominance in the cultural area, which is an abstract one, through the reflections of *Halkevleri* in the Assembly. Such an examination, made by subjecting the direct speeches of the deputies in the parliament, their proposals of law, and the decisions taken in the parliament, is considered very critical in terms of explaining how *Halkevleri* served for the cultural building process of the single-party era. Since it would be nearly

impossible to contact real people who had experienced the practice of *Evler* and impose a field research, appealing to legal sources is considered significant for this study.

The study, with an interdisciplinary interpretation route, is believed to be an alternative to many studies carried out on Turkish modernization and *Halkevleri* until this date. Focusing on cultural construction by the state in the single-party period, the study aims to prove that the rapid changes to which cultural motives are subjected may not be accepted by all parts of society. It focuses on revealing the social resistance in society through the effect of *Halkevleri* in the parliamentary debates and the comparison with an external example. In this context, it is assumed that a cultural construction analysis that takes into account a content analysis and an external perspective has become the key element in reaching impartial findings.

Based on the culture-politics participation, the final point of the study can be stated as the examination of the steps taken by the regime in terms of culture to manage the national consciousness and especially their reflection in society. Within this framework, the study consists of a total of six chapters, which are the introduction, four main chapters, and the conclusion parts. The introduction part is a route in which the general purpose of the study through the importance of the topic is laid and the path to be followed by the study is submitted. In addition, this part contains information about the methodology of the study. This study aims to shed light on a critical period of Turkish political life through a case study from an explanatory category. It has a qualitative basis and is concluded through a mixed method. The case study includes a comparative analysis with Italian *Dopolavoro*, a similar organization of *Halkevleri*, and a content analysis covering a specific examination of *Halkevleri* as a result of the scanning of all the meetings of the Turkish Grand National Assembly between 1932-1951. This mixed method chain aims at both establishing originality and ensuring the reliability of the results for a qualitative examination.

Regarding the basic questions of the study, the main four chapters have been designed in the body part to reach the information that would lead to the final examination. In this context, in the first chapter of the study, primary political science, sociology, and history texts are consulted through the literature review; concepts such as culture, hegemony, intellectual, nation-building, cultural nationalism, and high culture have been discussed to form the basis for the conceptual framework of the study. First of all, an in-depth theoretical formation on the issue of culture has been established. The concept of culture is defined and

the tensions of the concept have been put forward. The different approaches to the concept have been handled within the scope of its definition. After having understood the complex nature of culture, the relationship between culture and politics, which is believed to make important contributions to this study, has been examined. In this context, the relationship between culture and power has been discussed; the impact of cultural policies on this relation has been reviewed. Later, the subject of hegemony, which is another critical topic of the first chapter, has been focused on. Hegemony and the place of culture in this pursuit have been studied in depth. In this framework, the understanding of hegemony accompanied by cultural struggle has been analysed from Antonio Gramsci's theoretical framework. The principles of hegemony construction from Gramscian perspective have been examined and his conceptualizations in hegemonic pursuit have been sought. Within this scope, the active and passive consent, the place and importance of education in the construction of hegemony, and the organic and traditional intellectual formulation have been discussed under separate headings. The last field of study of the first chapter is the effect of culture on nation-building processes. It is thought that this impact has indisputable importance in terms of affecting the course of the study. Therefore, the relationship between nationalism and culture has partially been addressed. In this context, the formation of national culture has been examined. Ernest Gellner's understanding of nationalism, which examines the relation in question in depth, has been the theory that forms the basis of this part. Gellner's concept of high culture has been discussed in terms of its contribution to the overall study. This topic also provides an understanding of the relationship between modernization and nationalism. After the theoretical framework has been formed, the study passes through the first analysis unit of the study, *Halkevleri*.

The second main title of the study consists of the examination of *Halkevleri* in a historical context. In this chapter, where *Halkevleri*, one of the critical addresses of the cultural construction of the early Republican period is discussed, the institutional organization and the feedback received from the society indirectly through the activities of Evler have been evaluated. Within this framework, the intellectual foundations of *Halkevleri*, which form the basis of the need for a state/party-directed cultural institution have been underlined. The experience of *Türk Ocakları*, which were regarded as a forerunner institution of *Halkevleri* has been examined. After providing this background information, the establishment, purposes, and organization of *Halkevleri* have been discussed in detail. The administrative and organizational structure of *Evler* has been reviewed. Sections and

the activities within *Halkevleri* constitute another topic. *Halkevleri* consist of nine sections. In this sense, separate studies have been conducted on the following sections of *Evler*: Language and Literature section, Fine Arts section, Drama section, Sports section, Social Assistance section, People's Classrooms and Courses section, Library and Publications section, Village Development section, and History and Museum section. *Halkodaları*, established in 1940 as the provincial extension of *Halkevleri*, have also been discussed within the scope of the studies. They are important to see regime extension to the villages in a wide range. Dealing with *Halkevleri* in a theoretical and historical context, this chapter also includes an overall assessment of *Halkevleri*, in which *Evler* have been put in a general evaluation from the historical context.

The third chapter, which is believed to make important contributions to the comparative analysis of the study, deals with the organization of *Dopolavoro*, a similar cultural institution in Italy. The chapter, from a theocratical and historical context, covers *Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro*, *OND* (The National After-Work Program), a vast organization established in Italy in 1925 to divert and instruct the working classes during their leisure time. Before underlining the *OND* in detail, the process leading to the fascist power in Italy has been examined under this chapter, going back to the modernization process in the 19th century. The unification politics of Italy, the *risorgimento* (the resurrection of Italy) has been examined. Since the new Italian political system seems critical to understand Italy's position after WWI, the political atmosphere in the 1920s and the post-war crisis constitute one of the other titles of this chapter. From here upon, the rise of fascism in Italy has been discussed. Fascism and the fascist party's accession to power is the last significant step before examining *Dopolavoro* organization. To understand fascist power, fascist ideology is briefly mentioned, as Italy has become the place where fascist ideology first emerged. This whole process leads us to figure out the historical background and the evolution of *Dopolavoro* organization. After exploring the establishment, purposes, and administrative structure of the *OND*, the study deals with the activities of *Dopolavoro*, which are grouped under three categories as culture education, physical training, and social assistance. Italy's case for mass education, despite being under a totalitarian rule, was able to touch the society, as shared many. It was precisely the most moderate instrument that the fascist regime had ever experienced among its policies. The examination of the Italian case, in this regard, also enables us to make a comparison with the Turkish example. At the end

of the chapter, the reason why we consider the Italian example comparatively to a case study conducted specifically for *Halkevleri* in Turkey is revealed.

The examination of *Halkevleri* is not limited to a historical context but also includes a content analysis, applied to the parliamentary records. The fourth and last main chapter of the study covers a content analysis, applied to the parliamentary records, especially on the issue of *Halkevleri*. This chapter of the study dealing with the first term of *Halkevleri* (1932-1951), presents a content analysis from the database of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, due to the difficulty of reaching living witnesses of *Halkevleri*, but aims to make a unique analysis of *Halkevleri*. Through a deep examination of the records of TBMM between 1932-1951, the analysis tries to find out the outcomes from parliamentary records. This part of the study has also been divided into two sub-titles: The first of the analysis consists of the evaluation of the parliamentary records during the single-party period and the second part includes the parliamentary evaluation after the transition to the multi-party system and the change of government. Therefore, this last chapter of the study shows that *Halkevleri* have been examined beyond a historical perspective, explicitly, regarding the parliamentary records.

On the way to the conclusion of the study, we may repeat some critical points figured throughout the thesis. Functioning as an important instrument of the Republican regime since its establishment, *Halkevleri* had the mission of instilling culture. As seen in many of its counterparts abroad, the problem that makes it critical for this study has been the path followed by *Halkevleri* rather than its purpose. It is the method followed by *Halkevleri* which were guided by CHP that made it the subject of such a critical study. In this respect, *Halkevleri* stood out as an institution affiliated with CHP that tried to spread the values and principles of the regime to the society ideologically, rather than remaining as an independent one. At this point, it would be useful to mention some points about the political figure that *Halkevleri* were affiliated with.

This study, which defines both *Halkevleri* and the political power that *Halkevleri* were attached to, as being away from the society due to the methods followed, essentially includes a modernization critique of the early Republican era. While the radical nature of the regime is a kind of source for the formation of this study, the necessity of being radical under the conditions of the period is revealed. The top-down tendency can be easily seen when we examine the political figure from which *Halkevleri* emerged, in the context of

Turkish modernization. The most appropriate definition of the new regime in its process of radicalism in this regard is defined by the terms; lack of democracy, authoritarianism, intellectual despotism, tutelage regime, or bureaucratic conservatism. However, we should not confuse this authoritarianism tendency with fascist motivations, which constitute the basis for the second examination unit of this study.

It was not only the new Turkish state that applied to such social engineering projects to construct citizens *de novo*. Many regimes around the world that were mostly authoritarian intended to reshape society with various cultural initiatives. In this regard, the part that makes the study suitable just for this discourse is the examination of Italian *Dopolavoro*, a similar organization established in a similar period. As it is known, the fascist party came to power in Italy in 1922, the transition to the fascist regime was adopted completely in 1925. And the *OND*, which is our second analysis unit, was a part of the fascist regime in Italy. The 1920s and 1930s were already years when fascism became attractive around the world. At this very point, it seems important to note the fact that *Dopolavoro* organization has been chosen for this study does not act on the view that a pro-fascist attitude emerged in Turkey. Despite the rising authoritarianism in the newly established country, Turkey was not interested in fascist tendencies. In Turkey, top-down politics carried out through institutions such as the aforementioned *Halkevleri* were different from the violent fascist regime in Italy. In light of these, the comparison of Turkish and Italian examples stems only from the similar themes of the cultural organizations of both countries in similar periods.

The broad conceptual examination carried out in the first main part of the thesis makes important contributions to the theoretical support of this study. In this context, it is extremely significant to consider the study within the scope of the theoretical framework in question. As the historical process of culture shows in this study, we may start by remarking that most of the definitions of culture, which is one of the most difficult concepts to define in social sciences, are still in use today. In this context, dealing with the cultural construction of the early single-party period in Turkey within the scope of hegemonic struggle, this study shows that the regime applied the idealistic form of culture as we see in Raymond Williams' classification. The idealist structure was adopted by the ruling elites in the creation of modern citizens and in the construction of a completely new culture in the same direction. As stated by Williams, culture in the idealist form is based on an 'informative spirit' that includes all social activities, especially language and art forms; the intellectual forms of culture. Therefore, the aim of enlightening society is apparent in this context of culture.

Moreover, through *Halkevleri* experience, we can easily see that culture was equalled to civilization by the regime. Considering the two as the same was what made the cultural perception of the founding regime problematic, as discussed in this study. For such an understanding, we may recall Herder's perception of culture. Herder argues that societies and cultures are the results of certain historical contexts and necessities. This reveals the difference between culture and civilization. Defining culture as a living organism, Herder distinguishes it from civilization. We see a similar attitude also in Gökalp's perception of culture (*hars*). For Gökalp, who has been a very critical name for Turkish nationalism, constituting one of the semantic complexities, the relationship between culture and civilization is of great importance. He puts forward the idea that culture is national (*hars*) and civilization is universal. And, these two which are completely different issues, were kept equal within the scope of *Halkevleri* experience. In other words, through *Halkevleri* practice, it was easily seen that culture was exercised as a civilizing mission. In this regard, treating culture thoroughly as civilization prevented understanding the social and cultural dynamics in the newly established state. As is seen, among various definitions of it, how the regime perceived culture was directly effective in the implementation of culture in politics.

It can be seen that a perception of culture, which was equated with civilization, pioneered an ideological attitude in the policies of the single-party period. For this reason, it is important to mention Hall's ideas. Examining culture in the context of ideology, Hall places culture in the frame of power relations and treats the concept as an essential part of power. His ideas constitute the basis for the single-party regime's making use of culture in an ideological manner. By putting culture at the centre of politics, especially after the 1930s, the rulers of the single-party period made culture an important component of politics. The regime, which aimed to consolidate its position through significant cultural tools, also reminds us of Bourdieu, who thinks that all symbols and practices have a political function. Bourdieu emphasizes the active role played by the practices treated unquestionably in the establishment and maintenance of power relations and he considers culture as the most important of these practices. These indications allow us to perceive how culture was exercised as the source of legitimacy by the Republican regime.

How culture was defined and how it existed as an ideological instrument in the political mechanism reveal the traces of the political struggle in the cultural field during the single-party period. And this brings us to Gramsci's understanding of cultural hegemony, which constitutes a very important structure for this study. Gramsci argues that power can

be maintained not only by force but also by the manufacture of consent. The concept of hegemony, which Gramsci puts forward to explain capitalism and seek power relations in capitalist societies, has been adapted to the example of *Halkevleri* in Turkey in a cultural and political spectrum throughout this study. In this regard, the point that brings Gramsci's understanding of cultural hegemony to a central position in this study has been the effort of the single-party rule to establish power in the cultural field, which was aimed to be carried out through *Halkevleri*. While the course of the reforms, which started after the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, was mostly provided at the legal and institutional level in the first ten years, it was revealed that the process was not acknowledged by society at the desired level by the 1930s. It was this awakening that led to the need for political power to be accepted by society, for the first time in its history. And precisely, a process was initiated by the single-party administrators in which the factors that Gramsci introduces while explaining his concept of cultural hegemony were put into practice. Making the reforms accepted by the public which meant gaining the active consent of all parts of the society was the main objective of the regime. Through *Halkevleri*, CHP officials, who followed the process in detail, attached great importance to the active inclusion of society in the process. In addition, the importance given to education by the regime revealed the emphasis of Gramsci in the theoretical context. *Halkevleri* as an adult education and culture organization in its presence formed exactly the equivalent of this emphasis. A social and cultural mechanism, *Halkevleri* served as the mildest instrument of political power, in the way to gain consent. In addition, the importance given to the issue of education by the regime brought the position of teachers and intellectuals to the agenda. In the understanding of Gramsci's intellectual emphasis, the duties given to intellectuals by the regime through *Halkevleri* became crucial. In explaining his concept of cultural hegemony, Gramsci divides the intellectuals into two groups as organic and traditional intellectuals. He points out that this distinction is extremely critical in establishing and maintaining hegemony. Gramsci argues that the identities that can read the dynamics of society may contribute to the construction of hegemony as an organic intellectual; on the other hand, he states that traditional intellectuals cannot be a part of the manufacture of consent due to their remote position from society by being reproduced in the historical context. The distinction in question also found a response in *Halkevleri*. While CHP aimed to raise the cultural level of the people in *Halkevleri*, the fact that it insisted the intellectuals come together with the ordinary people reminded us of Gramsci's aforementioned distinction. It is seen that the distinction emphasized by Gramsci was not implemented by the regime and therefore the desired success could not be achieved. The

educational actors introduced by *Halkevleri* were the traditional intellectuals, far from the organic intellectual that Gramsci emphasizes. And this made it difficult for society and the intellectuals to come together through *Halkevleri*.

The process of perfecting citizens in terms of some absolute values corresponded to the ideal understanding of culture by the regime elites, as we have mentioned above. In this direction, Gellner's concept of high culture, as another dimension of the process of citizen construction, has been one of the only tools that the founding regime applied. In his theory on nations and nationalism, Gellner tries to understand the nature of industrial societies within the framework of modernization. The developmental process of societies which later on turn them into nations, constitutes Gellner's examination. However, Gellner who deals with the understanding of nationalism with some economic motives, has been included in this study through cultural and political motivations. In other words, what makes Gellner's theory critical for this study is his focus on the issue of culture while explaining his nationalism theory. For Gellner, high culture is the necessarily shared medium provided by universal literacy and education; it is the experience of local cultures' leaving their importance and placing of historical partnerships depending on blood or race to a culture internalized by the whole society within the framework of standardized rules. The decisive role of the state is also considered a key point of this process. High culture, which the state chooses for its citizens and distinguishes it from the folk culture, is an important part of the nation-building process. Gellner charges the state for turning the members of its nation into citizens through high culture. He, in this way, underlines that the aim is to create a homogenous cultured society. Besides, it would be appropriate to remember that Gellner's high culture has an authoritarian side as considered throughout Malešević's distinction as authoritative and mundane. The authoritative layer, in that distinction, stands for a normative ideal. In this regard, *Halkevleri*, in terms of the content and purposes, perfectly corresponded to Gellner's conceptualization of high culture. When we look at the social transformation of the early republican period through *Evler*, it can easily be seen that the processes in question were introduced to the citizens through a top-down manner to make each person a part of this high culture, which was the same for each, prompting universality. Through various activities, the nine sections of *Halkevleri* aimed to serve this high culture. *Halkevleri*, with the civilized way of living concept it aimed at in numerous activities, became the most important reflection of high culture that Gellner points out in the early republican period. Both as an educational and an important cultural institution, *Evler* served issues such as

uniform and continuous education, the cortical involvement of intellectuals, and universal literacy all of which are emphasized by Gellner.

Halkevleri, here, were regarded as a very important example of the culture-building process in Turkey, as it was nearly the only institution in which all this theoretical framework is embodied in a shared way. In that case, the outputs of the study can make this theoretical structure even more meaningful. It is, in this way, believed to make significant contributions to the literature.

In light of all the details shared throughout the study, a theoretically supported evaluation of the cultural construction process of the single-party period, including both comparative and content analyses, is introduced in this conclusion chapter. According to all the discussions in the study, there have been reached some outcomes. *Halkevleri* and *Dopolavoro* organizations, which are the cultural institutions established by the state to transform society, are discussed in terms of their similarities and differences. These two organizations, which are, in building the society, exercised according to the ideological attitude of the regimes, can be evaluated in terms of their aims, tools, and methods as follows.

The similarities between the two can be listed below:

- The *OND* and *Halkevleri* were organizations that existed as mild cultural elements of the political powers. Both aimed to construct new citizens in line with their ideologies, to guide society, to control daily life practices of society, and to instil a culture in the way their regimes desired.
- Turkey and Italy were two different countries in terms of their modernization process. What made them similar to be discussed in this study was the tendencies of the political power that attempted to create new citizens loyal to the regime with similar cultural tools. Moreover, their initiatives belonged to similar periods. Their views and attitudes towards the issue of citizen construction were similar in terms of the steps they took; they both aimed to create a regenerated national community.
- When the foundation phase of *Halkevleri* is examined, it is seen that the institution was not unique in terms of idea and organization. *Halkevleri* were established under the influence of both *Türk Ocakları* which were established before them with similar aims and those external adult education institutions

which were experienced by the students sent abroad. *Dopolavoro* organization was also not original intellectually and institutionally. The *OND* was structurally similar to the labour unions that existed beforehand. For the similar Turkish and Italian examples, the conditions that turned both institutions into ideological institutions resemble each other. Continuing the aims of the political power in which they were born and transforming the society within the framework of the principles of power pushed both institutions to become similarly guided.

- Both cultural institutions, which were the result of social engineering through an indoctrination process, existed under the roof of the political parties of the regime that established them and they were the single parties of their period. Italian *Dopolavoro* was founded as an extension of the Partito Nazionale Fascista and *Halkevleri* were established as the cultural branch of the Republican People's Party in Turkey. However, the regimes that these two political parties exercised were different from each other.
- What makes the *OND* critical is that it provided a wide-ranging contribution to the understanding of "making masses adhere to the regime", which was the main goal of the fascist regime. At this point, the desire of *Dopolavoro* organizations to touch almost every aspect of daily life came first. This situation was also valid in the Turkish case; there were just some differences in priority between the two. In the Italian example, sports activities were the mainstay of *Dopolavoro* organization. The idea of raising physically strong adults was one of the most important areas of the fascist regime. Although there were sports activities in Turkey, they were not of primary importance.
- Italian *Dopolavoro* activities were divided into three main categories which were culture education, physical training, and social assistance. Although *Halkevleri* in Turkey were similar in scope, they had nine sections in total. These sections of *Halkevleri* were similar to those *Dopolavoros* in terms of the context of their activities.

And the differences between Italian and Turkish cultural organizations are as follows:

- It is known that the issue of culture and citizen construction is closely related to modernization, as Gellner has discussed. As we have seen in both Turkish and

Italian examples, these cultural institutions were ideological instruments of the two modern states that had just completed their formation. The examples of Turkey and Italy on the way to becoming a nation-state were not even compatible. Although Italy had a modernization experience different from its European counterparts, it was hardly possible to compare it with Turkish modernization. Unlike the other examples in Europe, the industrialization process was not passed during Italy's modernization. There was also no top-down modernization process like in Turkey. The difference in the transition to the nation-state had an impact on the cultural institutions established by the two countries after their modernization procedures. These differences also affected the acceptability of the cultural institutions by the society in both countries.

- We have mentioned that *Halkevleri* were not the first attempt in Turkey in terms of institutionalization and that there was a similar structure before, named *Türk Ocakları*. We have also expressed that this was similar for Italy too. However, there emerged a critical difference between the two. In the case of Turkey, *Türk Ocakları* were closed by the founding regime so that *Halkevleri* could be established on it. The regime chose to abolish the previous institution to create an institution that the government could ideologically guide in line with its principles. However, in the case of Italy, it was observed that the labour unions, which were considered to be the predecessors of *Dopolavoro* organization, went to dissolution through their decisions. After fascism came to power in 1922, fascist workers' organizations started to emerge and other labour unions chose to change their positions voluntarily. The measures taken by Mussolini were effective in this decision. By 1923, Mussolini's government set a nationalist, technocratic, and commercial line. Accordingly, the focus was mostly on worker training, outreach, and recreation. The adoption of the "8-hours working" principle, which emerged for the first time in a workers' congress in the USA, by the government and Mussolini's issuance of a protective decree covering all collective agreements and regulations in favour of the workers enabled the regime to be attracted by many workers' union organizations. The attitude of Mussolini on behalf of the workers in the process leading to the establishment of the *OND* promoted a smooth transition to the new process.
- Another critical difference can be viewed in terms of the relationship of both organizations with the political parties to which they were affiliated. *Dopolavoro*

organization was officially established in 1925, exactly three years after the fascist regime came to power. Although it was founded as an extension of the fascist party, engineer Mario Giani, who was the director of an American company, was appointed as the head of the *OND*. The appointment of Giani as the responsible for *OND*, which was such a significant institution for the regime, was the most important indicator of the importance given in terms of technical as well as ideological dimensions. However, after two years the *OND* was established, the general secretary of the fascist party was appointed as responsible for the *OND*. In the Turkish case, on the other hand, the existence of People's Party staff showed itself in the whole establishment and management process of *Halkevleri*. The fact that the administrators of *Halkevleri* were directly the managers of the Republican People's Party and that all decision-making processes at the administration and organization levels were determined by the Party from the first day revealed the difference of Italian example in the ideological approach.

- We have already mentioned that the Italian *Dopolavoro* and *Halkevleri* were generally similar in terms of their activities. Contrary to this, a striking point in the activities carried out within the scope of *Dopolavoro* in Italy differed dramatically from the Turkish example. In the activities carried out by the *OND*, there was a motivation as reviving Italian traditions and reintegrating them into society. As an important aspect, in many cultural activities such as music, cinema, and theatre; the activities intended to revive the Italian history. The illustration of the lives and works of the great Italian composers lived in the past, and the history of Italian music, all showed the effort to revive Italian history in particular. From the following expressions of Mussolini; "We have revived and cherished all those traditional manifests which make the spirit happy and healthy", it could be easily understood that Italy did not choose to forget its traditions, but rather aimed to educate and organize citizens in a way to revive those traditions. However, the situation was almost the opposite in Turkey. Everything that would revive the recent history of Turkey was radically avoided. It could only be the history of Turk in the pre-Islamic periods that could be remembered. Through *Halkevleri*, the new Turkish state desired to forget the past and replace it with a completely new, modern set of traditions. Eliminating the old, Turkey adopted a modern, Western understanding.

- Following the subject mentioned just above, in the Italian example, the local *Dopolavoros* - which were quite like *Halkodaları* in Turkey - were expected to offer their members new opportunities for culture, recreation, and physical education, according to the tastes of the local groups. This showed that Mussolini did not aim to transform the countryside through the local *Dopolavoros*; but the tastes of the local fragments were kept original. It is known that this was unfortunately not the case in Turkey. The mission of civilizing the peasants prevailed in Turkey, first through *Halkevleri* and after 1940, especially through *Halkodaları*. And the fact that the villagers were considered too backward to be left alone showed how much the Turkish case differed from the Italian example in this topic. In Turkey, through *Halkevleri*, the regime desired to transform the villagers rigidly.
- In Italy, the aim of the regime on the popularization of culture within the scope of cultural activities drew attention. This came up with very different outputs even though it was aimed in a similar way in Turkey. In Italy, the fascist regime deliberately sought to break down the barriers between the high and low culture and bring broader public to art, by encouraging more and more people to consume art through the promotion of the forms of the new mass culture, radio, and especially cinema. In Italy's example, art was no more for art's sake but it was used to bind wider society to the state. Therefore, art became popular and accessible, rather than being elitist. In Turkey, on the contrary, the regime aimed to give rise to the distinguishment of high and low culture in particular and to transform the whole society into a new, high culture. The aim of reducing the art to reach more people was adopted in Turkey just like in Italy, but this could not be achieved. The example of Turkey, in which art remained quite elite, also showed that the activities of *Halkevleri* remained ineffective in carrying out their main goals.
- Last but not least, the difference between *Halkevleri* and *Dopolavoro* manifested itself in the advantageous situations that *Dopolavoro* organization offered to the workers. The *Dopolavoro* example did not only give rights to the workers but also provided many advantages and privileges such as discounts on railway tickets, reductions on entrance fees to theatres, museums, galleries, and some other public performances, discounts in hotels and hostels, free insurance against the accidents during the leisure time, etc. The social assistance section had a

significant role in the successful commemoration of *Dopolavoro* in Italy. The privileges made the institution attractive to the workers. In addition to these, medical offers were also extremely effective in binding workers to the regime. All these showed that the *OND* was able to go far beyond making use of the leisure time of the workers. In the Turkish example, it was not possible to come across a wide variety of attractive elements. Although there was a social assistant section in *Halkevleri*, the opportunities as in the Italian experience could not be provided widescale.

Based on the culture construction within the scope of hegemonic struggle, this study deals with two institutions, Italian *Dopolavoro* and *Halkevleri* of Turkey, in a comparative context. It is understood from all these comparisons that, although there are similarities in terms of the establishment, functioning, relations with the single party, activities, and purposes, some fundamental differences make this study meaningful. The internal dynamics of the two cultural institutions discussed in this framework are also important in revealing this separation. Italy, as a country that gave birth to fascism, hosted a critical period for its political history through the fascist government. Turkey, on the other hand, appeared to be a country that underwent its modernization process undoubtedly more democratically than Italy. The main reason why these two examples, which are partially similar but fundamentally different, are considered together is that the Italian *OND* experience resonates as a successful example in the name of adult education and cultural organization throughout the world.

In this study, which is built on the culture-politics of two countries, the content of the political powers gains importance. Although the fascist government in Italy differs from the democratic single-party government in Turkey, they have many aspects in common in terms of their culture-construction processes. This is why it is essential to emphasize the concepts of culture and power in the context of the study. In this respect, it seems possible to say that the single-party government in Turkey was lack of democracy. The fact that *Halkevleri* were the cultural reformation mechanism of the political power was examined through the example of the Italian *Dopolavoro*, in which this similarity was achieved. The comparative analysis of *Halkevleri* also contributes to discovering whether *Halkevleri* were successful as desired by the founding regime. Since it is accepted by many that *Dopolavoro* was able to exploit the social roles and needs outside the workplace, the means of ideological and social persuasion was provided by fascist organization and was able to build a responsive public

accordingly. Within the context of the differences discussed above, it can be asserted, as a last say, that Turkey was not much successful in creating such a responsive public.

This study, which examines the culture construction in Turkey through *Halkevleri* by applying a mixed method, is also believed to be a source for possible forthcoming studies. Since culture is already an extremely broad subject and constitutes an extensive resource not only for politics but also for many other areas, it may introduce possible topics. As in this study, which takes the issue of culture from the shared theme of fields such as political science, history, and sociology; culture can be applied to studies in public administration, international relations, law, psychology, education, and many other fields. At this point, this study, in particular, can also lead to future studies such as cultural reconstruction and cultural power in terms of theoretical and factual analysis.

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- TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, (TBMM) Dönem VII, IV. Yasama Yılı, Toplantı 57, c. 23 (31 Mayıs 1946): s. 237-284
- TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, (TBMM) Dönem VII, IV. Yasama Yılı, Toplantı 58, c. 24 (3 Haziran 1946): s. 1-36
- TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, (TBMM) Dönem VII, IV. Yasama Yılı, Toplantı 59, c. 24 (3 Haziran 1946): s. 37-70
- TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, (TBMM) Dönem VIII, I. Yasama Yılı, Toplantı 8, c. 1 (26 Ağustos 1946): s. 90-171

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TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, (TBMM) Dönem VIII, II. Yasama Yılı, Toplantı 47, c. 4 (20 Şubat 1947): s. 293-350

TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, (TBMM) Dönem VIII, II. Yasama Yılı, Toplantı 48, c. 4 (21 Şubat 1947): s. 351-425

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- TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, (TBMM) Dönem VIII, III. Yasama Yılı, Toplantı 18, c. 8 (17 Aralık 1947): s. 41-64
- TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, (TBMM) Dönem VIII, III. Yasama Yılı, Toplantı 23, c. 8 (26 Aralık 1947): s. 275-370
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