

T.C.
ISTANBUL KÜLTÜR UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

**THE NEW WORLD ORDER: FALL OF
UNILATERALISM AND THE RISE OF PLURALISM**

MA Thesis by

Raghda Alyeh
1900006236

Department: International Relations

Program: International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. İbrahim Mensur Akgün

JULY 2023

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Dedication:

This Thesis dedicated to the souls of the martyrs of the 2023 Türkiye earthquake.

Raghda Alyeh

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ÖZET:

1945'teki II, Dünya Savaşı'ndan ve 1991'de Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasından sonra, Birleşik Devletler askeri ve ekonomik açıdan güçlü bir ulus-devlet olarak kaldı. Amerikan yumuşak gücü ayrıca demokrasi, evrensel insan hakları ve dünya düzeni ilkelerinin kurulmasına yardımcı oldu. Bununla birlikte, uluslararası normların altında işlediği ABD ve Avrupa tarafından desteklenen liberal uluslararası düzen veya Batılı değerler tehdit altındadır. Egemenlik, toprak bütünlüğü, uluslararası insancıl hukuk, demokratik değerler ve ekonomik liberalizm gibi normlar tehdit altında. Çin, Hindistan ve Rusya gibi yükselen güçler, küresel siyasette ABD hegemonyasına meydan okuyor. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin İran'ın nükleer programını geliştirmesini engelleyememesi, Rusya'nın Ukrayna'yı işgal etmesi, Çin ile Tayvan arasındaki gerilimler, Amerikan kuvvetlerinin Afganistan'daki başarısızlığı, Amerika'nın Suriye'deki savaşı bitirememesi vb. Amerikan hegemonyasının ne kadar güçlü olduğunu gösteriyor düşüş içerisinde. Bu araştırma, tek taraflılığın düşüşünün ve çoğulculuğun yükselişinin ardındaki ekonomik, politik ve sosyal faktörleri araştırıyor.

Bu araştırma dört bölümden oluşacaktır. Doğal olarak, ilk bölüm konuya bir giriş, araştırma sorusu, hipotezler, veri toplama ve analiz metodolojisi, çalışmanın önemi veya önemi ve argümanların üzerine inşa edileceği teorik çerçeveyi içerecektir. İkinci bölümde, bir araştırma boşluğu oluşturmak için Amerikan hegemonyasının gerilemesine ilişkin bir literater taraması sunulacaktır. Üçüncü ve en önemli kısım çalışmanın analizi olacaktır. 3. Bölümde hipotezlerimizi test edeceğiz. Ardından dördüncü bölüm, sonuç ve öneriler.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Hegemonyası, Uluslararası ilişkiler, çok taraflılık, yumuşak güç.

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ABSTRACT:

After World War II in 1945 and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States remains militarily and economically a powerful nation-state; American soft power has also helped to establish democratic principles, universal human rights, and world order. However, the liberal international order or western values promoted by the USA and Europe under which international norms operate are threatened. Norms like sovereignty and territorial integrity, international humanitarian law, democratic values, and economic liberalism are under risk. Rising powers like China, India, and Russia challenge US hegemony in world politics. The inability of the US to stop Iran from developing its nuclear program, Russian invasion of Ukraine, China-Taiwan tensions, the failure of American troops in Afghanistan, the American failure to end the war in Syria, etc. demonstrate how US hegemonic power is in decline. This research will investigate economic, political, and social factors behind the fall of unilateralism and the rise of pluralism.

This research will have four chapters. Naturally, chapter one will include an introduction to the topic, a research question, hypotheses, the methodology to gather and analyze data, the significance or importance of the study, and the theoretical framework within which the arguments will be based. Chapter two will present a literature review about the decline of the USA hegemony to formulate a research gap. Chapter three, the most important chapter, will constitute the analysis of the work. We will test our hypotheses in chapter three. And then chapter 4 will be the concluding chapter and recommendations.

Keywords: Hegemony, International Relations, Pluralism, Soft power.

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List of Abbreviations

BRI	Belt and road initiative
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
BOP	Balance of payments
COVID-19	Corona Virus Disease of 2019.
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CCTV	closed-circuit television
CMC	Computer-mediated communication
EU	European Union
GPD	Gross Domestic Product
IR	International relations
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PRC	People's Republic of China
PPP	Purchasing power parity
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PLA	Product listing ad
RECP	Resource Efficient and Cleaner Production
SEZ	Special Economic Zones
SAP	System Analysis Program Development
SVB	Silicon Valley bank
UN	United Nations
WTO	World Trade Organization
IFIS	Independent fiscal institutions

1. Chapter I

1.1. Introduction

The world system relied on three main structures in its stages of development from the middle of the seventeenth century until now: pluralism, bipolarity, and unipolarity. Multipolarity is characterized by the presence of several countries or major poles that have equal resources, capabilities, and capabilities in terms of strength and ability to exert influence and influence in international relations in various political, economic, technological, and other fields, in a way that enables each of these polar powers to attract lesser or weaker countries. (McEachern, 2015).

Bipolarity is characterized by the concentration of power and influence relations in the vicinity of two giant polar powers, the presence of a high degree of conflict and competition between these two powers, and the long distances between each of them and its allied countries, and other countries of the world with regard to the elements and capabilities of power. In bipolarity, there is usually an ideological struggle between the two main poles, each using their own ideology.

The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War marked a milestone in the development of the international system and international relations. It marked the end of the collapse of the Eastern camp and communist ideology, and the end of its influence on the world marked the beginning of a "new world order". (Casey, 2012)

Since 1991, the world has witnessed the birth of a new world, such as the collapse of international relations governed by bipolarity, as the end of the Cold War was declared with the official dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of that year, and the birth of the "new" world. A global scene governed by the unilateral visions and practices of the international system in its American phase. American technology also led to a unilateral policy of the United States in strategic planning and political decision-making without sufficient consultation from the rest of its European allies, and this was accompanied by the emergence of new interests of the United States in new directions, including its orientation. to unilateral military action, although this is often done under the cover of international legitimacy. (Jeapes, 2015)

This was done by relying on a set of ideas, strategies, and theories that emerged after the Cold War, which are considered the correct intellectual reference for American unipolarity, as these theories, ideas, and strategies have a major as well as a strategic role in the hegemony and superiority of the United States at the head of the political system. After the Cold War, especially since the United States has many intellectual centers in which these thinkers work, in addition to that they worked during a period of their lives in many decision-making centers in the United States, and these centers, including the thinkers they belong to, often They are associated with decision-making centers, as they are often commissioned by the US government to prepare strategic reports that show the way to the decision-maker. All of this works to perpetuate the United States and its survival and uniqueness at the top of the international pyramid. (Wills, 2006)

In addition to the penetration of the neo-conservative group in power. Since the arrival of former US President Reagan to power and then their complete control of power with former US President George Bush Jr. assuming power, their ideas focused on the survival of the United States alone and dominance in the international system, as well as preventing any hostile international force from ascending to the top of the international system and then Competition with the United States. (Hastedt, 2009)

This group had a role in the wars waged by the United States during the two terms of President Bush Jr.'s term, especially the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. All of these things, in turn, constituted an intellectual reference adopted by the decision-maker in his foreign policy at the level of the international system, and thus the survival of unipolarity in its American form dominating the international system. This intellectual reference would not have reached this level of influence had it not been for the existence of a set of elements of material power upon which the United States of America relied in imposing its polarization on the international system.

The United States of America emerged victorious from World War II, through the most powerful economy in the world, both in terms of gross national product, which was the highest or in terms of average per capita income, which is also the highest in the world, as well as its dominance in the trinity of the international economy (the Monetary Fund The World Bank and the World Trade Organization), which are the main pillars of the US economy at the level of the international system, as well as multinational companies that are considered octopuses in the

space of the global economy, as well as the global position of the dollar as the United States worked to link the global economy to the US dollar through the Bretton Woods system, in addition to dominating many of the world's energy sources, which helps perpetuate its polarization over the international system. (Vermengo, 2021).

In addition to its military power, which is not matched by military power in the world, the United States invested heavily in its military capabilities following World War II and throughout the Cold War, creating a large and powerful military arsenal.

It is the highest country in the world in terms of military tunnels and an advanced nuclear arsenal. very big. An external military arm is the main arm in its domination of the international system, which is NATO, on which it relies in its military missions. In addition to a high technological ability, whether technical or informational, through which it was able to control the global media through its high informational capacity, addition to tangible technology, whether civil or military, which reached the point of dealing with nanotechnology. which is the smallest detail in high technology. All this is supported by a political decision at the level of the international system, whether in terms of passing and implementing its decisions or in terms of obstructing the decisions of other powers, through the possession of its permanent seat in the Security Council, which is considered one of the basic elements for its continued domination of the international political system. (Walker, 2018)

All these elements do not preclude the existence of challenges that impede the continuity of its polarization, whether on the internal or external level or even at the level of its interventions in the world, which in turn undermines its ability to remain dominant at the international level. The American system suffers from internal challenges represented by challenges on the economic level as well as challenges on the social level, in addition to external challenges facing the United States of America at the level of the international system through the emergence and rise of major powers that compete with the United States. (Muggah, 2018)

And its competition is at the top of the international system, which makes the international system at its peak more comprehensive. This, in turn, causes the international system to undergo transformations that may lead to a change in its structure, which prompts us to present and put forward the possibilities that the international system is expected to transform into in the future.

It is important to mention important signs of the development of the new international order. China is aware of its common interest with the West, and therefore it supports the global capitalist system and its stability, out of concern for its economic interests, because the collapse of such a system could destroy the Chinese economy as well. Russia is keen on its relations with its allies in the world, and this explains its position on the crisis of the Syrian civil war, in which Russia was able to bring about a change in the positions and policies of the United States and the West in general. (Kelter, 2023)

Many factors and studies are pointing out the possibility that the US power in world politics is being weakened. However, the circumstances under which the US hegemony will be challenged and weakened are yet to be studied. The inability of the US to stop Iran from developing its nuclear program, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China-Taiwan tensions, the failure of American troops in Afghanistan, the American failure to end the war in Syria, etc. demonstrate how US hegemonic power is in decline. This research will investigate economic, political, and social factors behind the fall of unilateralism with the US as the hegemon and the rise of pluralism with rising powers such as China, Brazil, India Russia, etc.

There is no doubt that there are shifts in the structure of the international political system, as there was no international power in the new world order except the United States, and with the beginning of the twenty-first century, new international powers appeared looking for a major role in the new world order commensurate with the growth of its military and economic power, and this explains The United States is the dominant global power, but it is not alone. There is a return to new poles in the international system.

1.1.1. The Hegemonic Role

Hegemony has had a big impact on history. It refers to one organization or group's dominance or leadership over others. Two historical examples that show how various powers can affect the world are the British Empire in the 19th century and the United States after World War II. Hegemony is fueled by a variety of interconnected sources of power. Economic strength is important because dominating economies frequently have power over international trade, capital flows, and financial institutions. Hegemonic states can influence the attitudes and interests of other countries thanks to their economic might. (Rosamond, 2020)

Hegemony also requires strong political power and military prowess. A hegemonic state has the power to influence world affairs thanks to its capacity to use force and forge coalitions. They can influence the choices and actions of other players in the international arena by creating agendas, negotiating treaties, and applying diplomatic pressure. The hegemonic role is further strengthened through soft power and cultural influence. Influencing attitudes, values, and cultural norms is a potent weapon for retaining power. Hegemonic states can use cultural exports, media sway, and the spread of ideas to affect the attitudes and behaviors of other countries.

Hegemonic duties do not, however, come without difficulties and opposition. Emerging powers, regional alliances, and counter-hegemonic movements can all be very problematic. The emergence of alternative viewpoints and these changes in power dynamics frequently pose a threat to the status quo and cast doubt on the hegemonic power's legitimacy. Hegemonic functions have extensive ramifications. A dominant power may bring about economic gains and stability, but it may also result in power disparities and cultural uniformity. Hegemonic power may have an impact on or possibly take control of global governance and international organizations, creating concerns about equity, inclusion, and other countries' ability to exercise their sovereignty. (Ikenberry & Gohn, 2019)

1.1.2. Research questions

The research questions revolve around two key questions.

1. Can China represent a threat to the US hegemony in world politics? In other words, due to several factors, it seems that the world is moving towards a multipolar world where the power to dominate international politics does not rest only on the nation, but rather on a group of rising powerful nations such as China or a group of nations such as BRICS Member States.
2. What are the economic, political, and social factors that are challenging the US hegemony in international politics?

Indeed, when assessing power and influence in IR, Power is the standing that a state has in the world, and in this context, it means to the structure of forces that the state has created, including economic, political, and military power. It also refers to ideologies, the international system, and its organizational nature, as well as changes in international politics. Knowledge capabilities, technical inventions, the composition of civil society, and the size and scope of

international cooperation are also factors. The state's capacity to convey social, cultural, and political forces through its foreign policy, as well as the homogeneity of society and its ability to represent local social interests.

The power of the state is the possibility or ability that the state can use to reach its national goals in international conflict, so power is the general energy of the state to control and control the actions of others. economic power is at the forefront of all analysis. Economic power is the foundation on which any other aspect of power is determined. Hence, an objective we intend to study is the economy of the US about other rising power and how effectively it can be used to advance the US political agenda in international politics. Along with the economy, social and political factors also play important roles.

1.1.3. Significant of the Research

This research provides insight into the changes that took place in the new world to become from a unipolar to a multipolar world, and it also shows how the American hegemony declined in terms of political, economic, and geographical terms. and rise other powers in world order Such as the Chinese side and the Russian side becoming a multipolar world, which brought about changes in several global and regional aspects. In this study, I will try to anticipate the new global shape in light of the rise of new global powers.

1.1.4. Purpose of the Research

The primary purpose of this research is to assess the challenges facing US unilateralism supremacy. In it, it should investigate economic, political, and social factors challenging US hegemony in international politics. This research aims to identify current dynamics and power transitions in International Relations to inspire academic and policy reflections on the topic. International politics is undergoing significant changes. Will make a difference on the international scene in the event of the emergence of new global powers and also anticipate what innovations and changes are likely to change and challenge the current order. Moreover, I hope that the findings of this study will help academics and policymakers better prepare for potential shifts in power and influence in international politics.

1.1.5. Scope of Research

The focus point of the research revolves around the US and its influences on world politics and world governance and its retreats as a global power since the aftermath of the Cold War. In it, the study will be mostly restricted to the social, economic, and political interactions the US has with other nations as a superpower, on the other hand, and its relation with the rising powers such as China and Russia, on the other hand. The research will mostly be limited to the changing dynamics in International Relations. The internal dynamics and domestic politics that could also participate in shaping US foreign will not be considered. Only interactions the US has with other nations will be studied.

1.1.6. Limitation of research

As for the limitation of the research, the work will be essentially desk work. Only secondary data and credible internet sources will be used. Accessibility to primary data will be challenging due to financial and time constraints. Therefore, access to some relevant data that require fieldwork may be difficult.

1.1.7. Hypotheses

The research relies on the fact that Unilateralism as such led by the US hegemony is in decline in world politics due to many failures of the US foreign policy globally as well as due to the rising political rivalries from other powers. China is the biggest challenge of the US hegemony in international politics.

1.1.8. Research Method

This is desk-based research analytical in nature. The researcher consulted and carefully examined secondary data sources including journal papers, databases, newspaper articles, blogs, monographs, and other online resources. Before being taken into consideration and qualitatively assessed for the study, these materials were subjected to content validity. Mainstream theories in International Relations were used to understand the new world order.

1.2. Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

1.2.1. Conceptual Framework: Defining key concepts.

International relations (IR) encompass three interconnected but sometimes difficult concepts: multilateralism, bilateralism, and unilateralism. Bilateralism is centered on two states, unilateralism on one, and multilateralism on three or more, according to certain researchers (Keohane, 1990).

The issue of global power transformation - in terms of power polarity - had been a seriously contentious issue amongst scholars of IR, especially since the end of the Cold War when the discourse began to speculate the nature of the forthcoming type of polarity after the world system had moved from bipolar to the unipolar system since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Certainly, unlike multilateralism, unilateralism is seen – as shown below- as an expression of a unipolar system, a foreign policy behavior of a hegemonic state of unilateral action. For multilateralism Given that "Multipolarity today can be represented not just by rivaling states as it was in the past, but by the emergence of ideas of global governance through international organizations (such as the United Nations) which compete with, and often constrain, the power of states," the distribution of power makes institutions' roles in the international system more important. (McGlinchey, Mathur and Acharya, 2022). In addition, multilateralism stresses the importance of values amongst groups of states sharing similar principles (Ruggie, 1992).

Indeed, defining intricate concepts in international relations such as unilateralism, bilateralism, or multilateralism/pluralism is not straight forward. Different interpretations of various scholars have expressed mixed interpretations. For example, Ruth Wedgwood perceives unilateralism as those incidents where the powerful state disregards multilateral norms and assumes a self-centered foreign policy (Wedgwood, 2002). Williams Wallace, however, defines it in terms of power stages that decide how unilateral a state would behave. In due process, unilateralism is the favored strategy for the major powers and is more likely to be conducted by the hegemonic state (Wallace, 2002). However, despite different interpretations associated with the concept of unilateralism as such, they all principally agree that such concept is referred to a

sort of selfish uncooperative foreign policy behavior of a single dominant state to achieve its own interests without taking into considerations attitudes or opinions of other players whether states or non-state actors and institutions. For example, the war on Iraq in 2003 was launched and inspired by the United States without clear legitimate basis to support such action. It was driven by own claims that turned to be false especially as far as those accusations related to Iraqi's possession of weapons of mass destruction.

On the other hand, the concepts of Pluralism/ Multipolar system are very much corresponding to similar interpretations as far as international relations is concerned. Bipolarity, nonetheless, is seen an extraordinarily strong upcoming global system scenario to recall that during the Cold War period with China as a potential competitive global player in the short-medium range. Multipolar is also a very foreseeable scenario with the growing regional economic blocks (BRICS Member States) but maybe in the long run with less degree to take place sooner than bipolarism.

1.2.2. Theoretical Framework

Most of America's closest friends have voiced concerns about the emergence of American unilateralism after the conclusion of the Cold War. This is the propensity for Washington to make choices without giving much thought to the interests or viewpoints of its own allies or the rest of the world. There is no denying that unilateralism has a distinguished tradition in American history. Isolationism has the benefit of allowing solo action. (Maynes, 1999)

The decline of unipolarity in the international system has resulted in a topic of debate in the fields of international relations and political science. When analyzing the realist and liberal schools of the current situation, we find the following:

Liberalism has ruled much of the world since World War II. Under the leadership of the United States and its allies, a sprawling international system was built around security cooperation and economic openness. (Haggard, 2013). At first glance, this context seems ideal, but the facts indicate that this system carries deep problems. Post-World War II Liberalism was not a global project, but part of a geopolitical anti-communist project. Built and developed this project within the Western world. In the early stages during the end of the forties and the

beginning of the fifties, most of the agreements regarding monetary policies and freedom of trade were between Britain and the United States only and then expanded later. When the Berlin Wall fell, this project spread outside the Western world, and the Liberalism project became globalized. (Lamberton, 2019)

Therefore, Britain and the United States, respectively, were considered the center of the first two waves of globalization, but most researchers agree that the third wave will be multipolar, and the new pole here is China.

Liberalism, despite its refusal to recognize war, sees every point in the world as a potential place for war, motivated by the preservation of human rights, and then the irony is that wars increase under liberalism more than realism and from the reality of the foregoing. There are several other examples of the failure of American liberalism, including the American policy towards the Ukrainian crisis, which was motivated by liberal logic, and resulted in the current political crisis between Russia and the West. Also, since 1989, the United States has fought seven different wars in many regions of the world in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Vietnam, and others. (Lieber, 2019)

The failure of the United States to understand the limits of liberalism, and the lack of realization of the nature of its relationship with nationalism and realism, is since Washington, in the end, could not spread its democratic model in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, but rather left them in a state of chaos that eventually led to the emergence of a group such as the terrorist organization “ISIS”. For not realizing the national character that makes up those countries, not to mention their political failure in front of Russian realism in the Ukrainian crisis, from which Europe is still suffering from its effects now, and therefore, the writer confirms that, contrary to the prevailing wisdom in the West, liberal foreign policy does not constitute a formula for cooperation and peace, but rather a means of conflict and instability. (Fisher, 2021)

The realists' vision is based on the concept of "power" that determines the form of relations between states, and there is no such thing as morality or virtue in this system. The global system is a “chaotic” system that is not governed by a supreme authority that can be referred to, and the primary goal or goal of any state is “perpetuity of survival.” Since the system is chaotic, every state is subject to demise and domination by a stronger state. For the state to

maintain its survival and not disappear, it must possess the tools of force that deter any potential enemy and continue the continuous work to maximize power and weaken any potential opponent. (Cawkwell, 2006)

This vision is based on the idea that man is evil and selfish by nature, and no one is safe from anyone except the power that deters others. This idea is summed up by the royal philosopher Thomas Hobbes - who is one of the founders of this school. Because war is not only on the battlefield, or the act of fighting, but rather breaks out over time when the will to compete in war becomes fully known. The idea is summed up in insecurity and that human beings are in a state of constant readiness for war and international relations remain suspicious and fearful of the domination of the strong over the weak, and that the agreements concluded between states are nothing but falsehoods and gossip, as Hobbes sees it. Realists worry about the "power transition" caused by the rise of China and the United States relative decline as they concentrate on changes in the balance of power. the theory says that the fall of a dominant superpower and the rise of a rising competitor often leads to war, and from here some experts are concerned about the possibility of war. Washington and Beijing are in the so-called "Thucydides Trap", the Greek historian who was the first to point out the risks involved when a rising power competes with another dominant power, as Germany challenged Britain in World War I a century ago. (Pan & Kavalski, 2022)

2. Chapter 2 Literature Review

2.1. New World Order

The term "new world order" designates a new historical epoch that exhibits a major shift in both the balance of power in international relations and global political philosophy. Even though this term has been given many different interpretations, as far as new collaborative attempts are made to identify, comprehend, or deal with global challenges that are more complicated than those that can be handled by individual nation-states, it is most usually tied to the ideological idea of world government by great nations. The phrase "new world order" or similar phrasing was commonly used in Woodrow Wilson's vision for world peace, which called for the League of Nations to be established to prevent war and aggression. Harry S. Truman and Franklin Roosevelt never spoke in public about world peace and collaboration. Due to the League of Nations' collapse, Truman frequently used the phrase "new global order". (Luke, 1994)

In actuality, Roosevelt often used the terms "new world order" or "new order in the world" to refer to the Axis powers' aspirations for global hegemony. In speeches by Truman, the terms "new world order" are less frequently used than the phrases "better world order," "peaceful world order," "moral world order," and "world order founded on law." Despite Roosevelt and Truman's reluctance to use the term, critics have referred to the order established by the World War II winners, including the United Nations and the Bretton Woods system, as the "new world order" in the past tense. (Theoharis, 1972).

The most frequent usage of "new world order" in recent years happened during the Cold War's end. Presidents George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev created the phrase to describe the post-Cold War period and the potential for great power collaboration. (Bender, 1991)

Despite the vast and idealistic nature of Gorbachev's first plan, the internal problems with the Soviet system severely limited his ability to advocate for it. In contrast, Bush's perspective was neither more nor less constrained: "A thousand battles have raged throughout the history of humanity in the same way that countless generations have looked for this elusive road to peace. Currently, a world that is considerably different from the one we are used to is battling to exist.

Given the country's new unipolar position, Bush's claim that "there is no replacement for American leadership" was tenable. The 1991 Gulf War reflects a new world that is already beginning to appear, a world where the possibility of a new global order is very real. As a result, the Gulf War was the first major test of this new world. (Cole, 2002)

In the 20th century, the idea of a new global order gained popularity three times. Woodrow Wilson tried to create a new international order after International War I, but he failed because neither the world nor the U.S. Senate was ready for his brand of idealism. Benjamin D. During World War II, Roosevelt envisioned a new global order that would guarantee more stability and peace through the creation of the United Nations (UN), but he viewed it as a body that would be based on great power collaboration. To combat Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the George W. Bush administration turned to this vague notion again later in the century, during the Persian Gulf crisis (1990–1991). (Wills, 2008)

2.2. The New, New World Order

The emergence of new power centers “The new, new world order” demanding a voice in the international system has been evident in the redistribution and diffusion of power. The speculation surrounding the preferred tactic of incumbent powers in response to the demands of emerging competitors has grown significantly. While some academics think it will be containment, others say it will be accommodation. (McEachern, 2015)

An emerging power, a state or group of nations that have a significant and expanding influence in international affairs is sometimes referred to as a "rising power." Such a power aspires to have a bigger impact on world events, on a regional or global scale and has the resources and levels of development necessary to make such ambitions possible. The term "emerging power" has a limited number of conceptualizations. As a result, there are no established criteria by which to identify emerging powers. A basic trait of a rising power is that it also has a developing economy because political and military emergence depends on and precedes economic development (Emerging power jog jails to cloak the growing strength of China navy, 2019).

Although a nation may have the potential to become an emerging power, it is largely a developing economy with the hope or potential to grow its level of influence internationally. This is due, among other constraints, to the seven pillars of state power: geography, population, economy, resources, military, diplomacy, and national identity. Only great powers or superpowers have historically been successful across all seven facets of state authority. (Higuera & Simon, 2008)

The BRICS (The name BRICS stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, five of the world's largest rising economies.) is frequently mentioned as emerging powers, yet they are in different phases of development and have different potentials. For instance, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, which was once a superpower, is now reemerging in several areas of state power. Brazil is rising as a potential great power, while China and India are emerging as potential superpowers (Thakur, 2014).

The BRICS countries, with a combined size of 39,746,220 km² (15,346,100 sq mi) and a projected population of roughly 3.21 billion, make up around 26.7% of the planet's surface area and 41.5% of its population. In terms of population, area, and GDP, the top ten nations include Brazil, Russia, India, and China, which are also occasionally referred to as existing or future superpowers. With a total nominal GDP of US\$26.6 trillion, or around 26.2% of the global GDP, and a total PPP GDP of US\$51.99 trillion, or 32.1% of the world's PPP, respectively, are also available, and estimated combined foreign reserves of US\$4.46 trillion, all five states are G20 members (as of 2018). (Patra & Panda, 2021).

The BRICS were not a formal intergovernmental organization when they were first established; rather, their objective was to identify investment opportunities. Their governments meet formally each year at summits to coordinate multilateral policy, and since 2009, they have become a more coherent geopolitical bloc. (Stuenkel, 2021)

On July 24, 2022, China held the most recent BRICS summit. The primary tenets of bilateral ties between the BRICS countries are non-interference, equality, and mutual gain).

This notion of a stable, US-dominated international order was facing growing opposition by the late 1990s. On September 11, 2001, there were terrorist attacks., that made the negative effects of globalization more apparent. The experience of trying to conduct a "war" on

international terrorism and of using strong coercive force to govern less developed nations (as in Iraq or Afghanistan) made obvious the limitations of military power for attaining political goals.

The conflict between Washington's rhetoric about democracy and human rights and its routine willingness to violate those rights in the name of national security (as with Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and the practice of so-called rendition of terrorist suspects) undermines U.S. claims to moral superiority. (Canterbury, 2021)

And for many others, the Bush administration's unilateralism undermined the authority and acceptability of US leadership. The increasing diplomatic activism of significant rising nations was one of the most obvious indicators that something was going on. One notable example is the aggressive coalitional tactics of Brazil and India at the WTO, especially in light of the G20 coalition of developing nations that was established in Cancun in 2003 (also known as the Trade G20).

It was resolved to put the Doha Development Agenda negotiations on hold until the requests of developing countries were addressed at the fifth Ministerial Conference of the WTO in Cancun in September 2003. The conversation came to a halt. Cancun exemplified the developing world's dissatisfaction with globalization and showed a stronger willingness to protect its interests against those of the developed world.

This misery worldwide was first voiced by the growing powers of the developing world—Brazil, China, India, and South Africa—and many other developing countries quickly followed. Another one of these is the creation of IBSA, a project of cooperation between the three democratic nations of South Africa, Brazil, and India. The Brasilia Declaration, which was adopted in June 2003, effectively established the organization. Later, similar programs that promoted cooperation across several industries were launched. The BASICs (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) provide a third example. This group ignored Europe and compelled the United States to participate in climate change negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009 under completely different institutional conditions while ignoring Europe. (Piepenbrink, 2013)

These incidents might not have drawn such attention on their own. Nevertheless, they revealed a deeper fundamental shift in the dynamics of global capitalism and the global economy

for many people. This phenomenon is captured by the notion of the BRICS. (Narbone & Divsallar 2021)

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, they owned about 50% of the entire foreign exchange reserves in the world. Any remaining reliance on foreign aid had been reduced or abolished, and in the situations of China, India, and Brazil, these countries had even turned into significant donors. These new contributors contributed over US\$11 billion in international aid in 2009. Furthermore, they had deepened their ties, with Sino-Indian commerce approaching US\$60 billion annually and China surpassing the US as Brazil's main economic partner. When compared to global merchandise exports in 2010, South-South commerce accounted for 17.5% of the total, up from a negligible percentage in the early 1990s (Nistor, 2015).

Around 2003, the language of the BRICS and other new and rising nations began to gain traction. The expansion of power and the development of new powers were prominent themes in both political rhetoric and popular commentary. These discussions focused on where the international order will be in the future rather than where it is right now.

The BRICS were significant due to both their recent and quick development as well as the anticipated changes that would alter the global economy and the balance of economic power. These changes and attitudes were influenced by the financial crisis that struck the advanced capitalist core in 2007. The financial crisis's onset in the core Western nations was historically tremendously significant for many powerful figures. In addition to severely harming these economies, it also called into question the technological and moral leadership at the core of the world capitalism system. (Kuwayama, 2010)

The crisis also supported the idea that international economic institutions needed to change to consider the shift in economic power. Brazil and India have long requested seats on the UN Security Council as well as changes to global economic organizations. Although UN reform had made little headway, the WTO saw significant change as Brazil and India joined the US, EU, and other major trading partners in the inner negotiation circle (the so-called "new Quad"), The enlargement of the G7 grouping of industrialized nations into the Group of 20 (G20), which would now include the main emerging countries, was seen by many as another significant symbolic move. (Cooper, 2016)

2.3. The New World Order of China

In March 2021, in Beijing, in front of over 3,000 members of the National People's Congress, China's president declared victory over COVID-19. He attributed it to "self-confidence in our approach, theories, system, and society." He said, "Unlike us when we were young, today's young people can stand tall and feel proud when they go abroad" (Amighini, 2021). China was reclaiming its global leadership and significance, and its success in managing the new coronavirus gave Xi confidence that he was on the right course. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s brief official history was released the next month, lending credence to his hypothesis. President Xi Jinping of China is credited with bringing his country "closer to the center of the global stage than it has ever been" and "closer to rebirth than it has ever been."

China already has a key position in the global order. It boasts the biggest population and military in the world, is the greatest trading power and the most significant source of international finance, and has become a key innovation center. By 2030, the majority of experts predict that China's real GDP will surpass that of the United States, making it the biggest economy in the world. Furthermore, as the pandemic's development has shown, China's reaction to international problems has repercussions for the rest of the world. (Yang, 2016)

They contend that Beijing's posture is largely defensive, seeking simply to accomplish a narrow range of sovereignty claims and to defend its political system from criticism. That viewpoint ignores the scope of Xi's objective. His idea of China's centrality goes beyond merely making sure that the nation's relative importance or influence within the current international order is accurately expressed. It refers to a radically transformed world order.

The unified and resurgent China, in Xi's perspective, would be equal to or greater than the United States. As the most powerful nation in Asia, China now controls disputed territories in the East and South China Seas, expanding its maritime domain. To take back its rightful position as an Atlantic power, the US withdrew across the Pacific. In addition, a Chinese system of communication, bargaining, and collaboration is currently being suggested, which is leading to the disintegration of the robust network of US alliances that has been the primary pillar of the

international system for close to seventy years. Infrastructure including ports, trains, and military installations, as well as fiber-optic connections, e-payment systems, and satellites, all contribute to China's global impact. Much as their American, European, and Japanese counterparts did in the previous century, Chinese corporations are vying for the top spot in building the world's infrastructure in the twenty-first century. China's economic might is skillfully used by Xi to both encourage and force compliance with his plans. (Xu, G, Dong, Xu, & Bhattarai, 2022)

The emergence of a China-centric government with its laws and values is reflected and strengthened by this change in the geostrategic environment. The liberal democracies that emerged in the aftermath of the war were largely responsible for reshaping the post–World War II international order. These democracies have always been committed in theory to equality for all people, the legal order, free market capitalism, and minimal government intervention in their citizens' political and social life, even though they did not always achieve these goals perfectly.

Technology was frequently used in the creation of multilateral organizations and international law to promote these ideals and norms. On the other hand, xi wants to replace such ideas with state dominance. For example, modern technology contributed to combating the Coronavirus in China, where it was able to contain the disease even though it is the source of the epicenter of the epidemic, through the use of high technology 5G, drones, and robots. Institutions, rules, and technologies in this new world order expand governmental control, curtail personal freedoms, and stifle free markets. It is a society in which the government controls the flow of capital and information both domestically and internationally. In this reality, there is no independent check or counterbalance to the authority of the state. (Wang, 2006)

Leaders and academics in China are adamant that the rest of the world agrees with Xi's vision, exclaiming, "The East is rising, and the West is declining!" However, many nations appear to be losing interest once the full political and economic ramifications of adopting the Chinese model become apparent, in Xi's audacious goals. Xi exuded the confidence of a leader who is certain that the world is his to claim at the People's Congress. His certainty, though, can prove to be a liability because it might keep him from understanding the opposition Beijing is igniting through its operations in other nations. Xi's success is dependent on his ability to react

and deal with the fallout. Failure to do so may result in more miscalculations that reshape the global world system, but not in Xi's manner envisions. (Zhang, 2020)

2.3.1. Taiwan Issue

China's annexation of Taiwan in any form, by force, is a settled matter, and there is no separation in the name of China "Taiwan is the main red line for China." (Person, 2022)

Since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, with the victory of the Communists and the retreat of the nationalists to Taiwan, China has avoided entering a direct and overt military confrontation with Taiwan, and the strait separating the two sides has been a site of recurring crises and permanent tensions. But China has always - until recently - put limits on these tensions. Convinced that the most appropriate approach to resolving the Taiwan issue and restoring the country's unity is "peaceful reunification" and strengthening its economic, cultural, and social relations with the island. (Ceng & Chen, 1990)

In addition to the sweeping national feeling that neither the ruling Communist Party nor any Chinese president can challenge or reverse direction; There are geopolitical and geoeconomic dimensions that link Taiwan with the continuation of the process of China's rise as a superpower in the international system. As the island enjoys enormous natural resources and a distinct industrial structure, especially in the technological field, as well as its strategic location in East Asia overlooking the Pacific Ocean and the North and South China Seas; It makes it very crucial to the consolidation of China's military and economic influence in Asia. (Shang, 2001)

And for the same powerful strategic advantages that are decisive for the struggle for international leadership, it is not easy for the United States to abandon Taiwan and make it easy prey for China, even if it is in its weakest condition. Instead of using a military solution, Beijing isolated Taipei internationally and offered economic incentives to Taiwan's allies to agree to abandon it. Additionally, it applied the "One China" policy and undermined Taipei's influence in international institutions by using its rising economic strength. Although Chinese officials have always maintained that they have the right to use force, this option has seemed off the table over the past decades. With the arrival of President Xi Jinping to the reins of power in China, he did not rebel against this policy, but he appeared unwilling to proceed with it indefinitely. And with time, he seemed determined to resolve this issue during his reign. In 2017, for example,

President Xi declared that "complete national reunification is an inescapable condition for realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation," thus linking Taiwan's future to his core political platform. (Maizland, 2023)

The controversial visit of "Nancy Pelosi" to Taiwan raised a very disturbing state of tension between the two powers. Beijing received Biden's steps of escalation, especially Pelosi's visit as an American green light for Taiwan to adhere to secession, and to deviate from the one-China policy that Washington has clung to since the 1970s. China's response came with escalatory military and economic steps against Taiwan. (Team, 2022)

China's violent escalation suggested to many that China's annexations were turning into a contract with each other. Some reinforce his perceptions of the Ukrainian War, which was written a successful Chinese military move toward Taiwan that could change the military balance of power in Asia. If China succeeds in seizing the island through a rapid and intense war, it will be able to absorb Taiwan's strategic resources, such as military equipment, personnel, semiconductor industry, and every resource that would enhance Beijing's military power. The most important thing is that China will be able to establish important military equipment on the island, specifically air and coastal defense systems, as well as underwater monitoring devices, which will impede future US military operations in the Philippine Sea. It is an area of vital importance in any possible future conflict between Washington and Beijing.

All these theoretical assumptions may be reinforced if the scenario of Chinese military intervention takes place, and Beijing may be able to reap unprecedented geopolitical advantages.

On the Western level, this obsession seems to have become present and strong. In his testimony before the US Senate Armed Forces Committee in 2021, Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of the US Command in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, warned that Beijing might try to seize Taiwan in the next six years. These fears have been strengthened since the beginning of the Ukrainian war, and there are US fears that China will take advantage of the international situation, and the world's involvement with Ukraine, to move militarily towards Taiwan. General Mark Milley, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, considered in August 2021 that China's dramatic military rise amounted to a "strategic earthquake" and that it was one of the biggest changes in geostrategic dominance in recorded history. (Yeung, 2022)

Reasons why China is not likely to resort to the military option against Taiwan:

Adhering to the "strategic patience" approach: Contrary to the popular image of China as eager for war, Beijing has shown strategic patience in pursuing its objectives in other conflict zones. The conflict in the South China Sea is a clear example in this regard. Instead of resorting to the military option, Beijing built and militarized seven sand islands without sparking a war with Washington or its regional rivals. China has also tended to exploit its economic and diplomatic influence in Africa, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. To gain international support on controversial issues, which is called a "gray zone tactic". (Pawlak, 2022)

Benefiting from the Ukrainian war: The lesson that China is likely to draw from the current Ukrainian war is that any current military move similar to what Russia has taken under the leadership of President Putin will not pass without Western military and economic punishment, which, no matter how China can confront it, will be costly. At a delicate stage in the global economy. The most critical point is that no matter how confident the Chinese military is in their ability to launch a military adventure in Taiwan, the war is unpredictable, and conducting an amphibious military operation is more complicated than the ground military intervention carried out by Putin's forces in Ukraine. In light of the foregoing, and if the military option is excluded, at least theoretically for the time being, China will have several other options to deal seriously and intensively with the Taiwan crisis, as follows: (Detsch & Gramer, 2023)

Continue to exert economic pressure: Taiwan's economy depends mainly on trade with China, as it is the island's largest trading partner, bypassing the United States. In 2021, China (along with Hong Kong) accounted for 42% of Taiwan's exports, while the share of the United States was only 15%. Immediately after Pelosi's visit, China moved to impose economic sanctions on Taiwan; It included a ban on entering the country for more than one hundred Taiwanese food products. Taiwan can no longer import sand from China, which the construction industry relies on. this research finds that over the past years, Beijing pressured many countries of the developed world not to sign free trade agreements with Taiwan, and two countries deviated from this Chinese desire, namely New Zealand and Singapore. The Comprehensive and Advanced Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) are two global trade blocs that Beijing has wanted Taiwan to be excluded from. (Youell, 2023)

Preparing the geographical area and practicing “psychological warfare”: China’s current exclusion of the military option does not mean stopping any military practice, as it seems clear that it wants to wage a “psychological war” on Taiwan, besiege it with military equipment, and bring military exercises and maneuvers to the stage of “sowing terror.” in the hearts of Taiwan," and showing Washington's inability to protect its ally. These moves also prepare the geographical space for China in case it decides to intervene militarily in the future. In the framework of preparing the geographical area in the region, Beijing has been keen to provide military assistance to all four Pacific Island countries. Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, and Vanuatu. Beijing has also tended to normalize its military presence in the region through increased non-military activities by the People's Liberation Army, such as disaster response and humanitarian aid. For instance, in the early months of 2022, a volcano explosion and tsunami ravaged Tonga, and the People's Liberation Army Navy and Air Force both participated in delivering aid there. China also sent riot gear and provided police training in the Solomon Islands after the unrest of 2021. This gives Beijing stronger and more entrenched political and military influence in the Pacific. (Amber, 2023)

It seems from time to time that China is ready to engage in an imminent military adventure in Taiwan, as indicated by the statements of its official officials. However, Beijing's political experience, and its political and military strategy for managing its crises, suggest that China is still trying to avoid the "military option", in parallel with preparing for it in the future, and preparing the international stage, so that if China decides to intervene militarily in Taiwan, its fate will not be like Russia's now, but rather Beijing would have the upper hand in this scene, without the United States being able to harm or block it. (Person, 2022)

China's annexation of Taiwan is something that will certainly happen overall. In the short term, the balance of power with Washington in particular stands as a heavy obstacle to the annexation scenario. However, what can be asserted is that the US-Chinese conflict over Taiwan has entered a dangerous escalatory turn that reflects within it the equation of balance of power, and also carries with it a definite Chinese annexation of Taiwan in the future through a definite armed conflict that China will engage in when it is completely certain of victory.

2.3.2. Asia-Pacific Case

China is putting a lot of effort into building the foundation that will allow it to surpass the United States as the dominant player in the Asia-Pacific region. The Asia-Pacific area is portrayed by Chinese leaders as being perfectly integrated thanks to Chinese-driven trade, technology, and common cultural and civilizational links. They refer to the region as a "big family" and assert that "China cannot advance independently from the area." and that "the region cannot prosper without China." Particularly fruitful for Xi has been the effort to position China as the region's leading economic force. (Kavalski, 2012)

China is practically all of Asia's primary economic partner, and ASEAN will overtake China as its biggest trading partner in 2021. President Xi successfully ended the negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) by the end of 2020. The RCEP was led by China and comprised eleven nations in Southeast Asia in addition to China, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. Under Xi, China's involvement in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, a free-trade agreement backed by Japan, has also expanded. As a result, China would control the two most important regional trade agreements in the region with the greatest economic growth. Leaving the United States out of the picture. The US has long played the leading security player in the area; China has had less success in trying to assume that position. In 2014, Beijing proposed a new security framework for Asia that would be administered by Asian nations.

China's defense minister has extensively visited the Asia-Pacific area he has pleaded with countries to "Adhere to the notion that regional concerns should be resolved through consultation among regional countries." Chinese authorities have also put a lot of effort into portraying US alliances as antiquated Cold War remnants that are hostile to China. (Haggard, 2013)

A new trilateral security agreement was established between Australia, the UK, and the USA because of China's actions. As a response to China's efforts, several European countries, notably France, Germany, and the Netherlands, as well as NATO, have boosted their security participation in the Asia-Pacific area. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who previously pledged to end his country's relationship with the US and referred to China as a "wonderful buddy," is now increasing defense cooperation with Washington even as he prepares to leave office. (Katzenstein & Okawara, 2001).

2.3.3. Belt and Road Initiative

China's goal of dominance on the international scene is appropriately clear by the Belt and Road Initiative. In addition to giving Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa physical access to China through three land-based and three maritime corridors, the initiative, which was launched in 2013, also brings back memories of the Silk Road and China's imperial era centrality. The BRI was initially supposed to be a means of advancing hard infrastructure along the six corridors under Chinese leadership. The so-called digital, health, and polar Silk Roads, to which all nations are welcomed, are modern BRI offshoots. China is a one-stop shop for funding infrastructure, in contrast to earlier international organizations like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Additionally, it frequently ignores time-consuming financial risk assessments, transparent and open bidding processes, and examinations of the repercussions for the environment and society. It provides the money, labor, and materials for its projects. It is the expansion of China's growth model internationally. (Yang, 2016)

China is now at the center of the international system owing to the Belt and Road Initiative, which has a global reach in terms of its physical, financial, cultural, technological, and political influence. Developing new bridges, fiber-optic cables, 5G networks, trains, and ports that might eventually host Chinese military outposts, it is redrawing even the smallest elements of the international map. One estimate has the BRI's current geographic scope at more than sixty nations and Chinese investment of more than \$200 billion. The BRI is transforming certain countries, including Pakistan, with energy initiatives, brand-new roads, and a huge upgrade to its digital and Gwadar port facilities. Others have had far more limited but advantageous exposure. Chinese investment, for instance, has helped Greece's port of Piraeus rank among the top fifty ports in the world and among the best in Europe. Brazilian government representatives and academics are excited about the BRI's potential to enhance innovation and environmental initiatives as well as infrastructure projects in their nation. (Zhang, 2020)

The BRI is another way that Xi wants to use the BRI to spread China's political and cultural objectives. Beijing currently offers a variety of political training programs after Xi

highlighted China's growth model as one that is worthy of imitation in a significant address in October 2017.

Tanzania, having patterned its cybersecurity law after Chinese law and cooperating with Beijing to manage the flow of information on the Internet and social media, is a BRI pilot nation for the growth of Chinese political capabilities. Chinese technology and training have greatly aided the governments of other nations, like Uganda, in their efforts to track and monitor members of the political opposition. The CCP has also provided training on its structure to political parties in Sudan, South Africa, and Ethiopia. relations with the general public, and other topics, likewise the Chinese propaganda apparatus. (XU, 2019)

To communicate Chinese political and cultural principles, China's Digital Silk Road, which includes, among other things, underwater cables, e-payment platforms, security tools, and 5G networks is particularly crucial. For instance, Beijing provided tens of thousands of hours of Chinese television to over 10,000 people in Kenya in addition to satellite television. Airways in Kenya and other African nations are currently overrun with documentaries that support a CCP political narrative, martial arts movies, plays about life in China, and plays that contain subtitles in regional languages.

However, The BRI is becoming rougher and rougher. Although it can deliver the advantages of China's infrastructure-focused growth model, it also delivers all of the negative side effects, including high debt levels, corruption, pollution, environmental degradation, and poor labor standards. Public protests have been widespread in the host nations. Citizens of Kazakhstan have regularly demonstrated against Chinese mining activities and businesses that harm the environment and recruit Chinese labor rather than locals. Similar protests have also occurred in Papua New Guinea, Cambodia, and Zambia. (Rogelja & Tsimonis, 2023)

Other countries have mentioned corruption problems in their BRI projects, including Cameroon, Indonesia, Kenya, and Pakistan. Azerbaijan and Mongolia are two countries that no longer think the advantages of their BRI projects would ever outweigh the costs. Projects have been delayed or abandoned by several nations; of the fifty-two coal-fired power plants that were supposed to be built under the BRI between 2014 and 2020, 25 have been put on hold, and eight have been scrapped. (China's September 2021 pledge to refrain from building new coal-fired

power plants outside of China raises the possibility that many of the projects that have been put off may be abandoned.)

Beijing is reevaluating its BRI commitments. Since 2016, investment levels have been steadily declining, and some of the anticipated political benefits have not yet materialized. For instance, an analysis of the top 10 BRI beneficiaries shows no correlation between investment levels and support for China from other nations on important problems like Hong Kong, the South China Sea, and Chinese activities in Xinjiang. Like China's territorial expansionism, the BRI has provoked opposition. It has pushed Japan and other nations to start innovative competitions to finance and maintain infrastructure with better standards and more incentives for local labor. Other initiatives to broaden Chinese cultural influence are also struggling. (Mações, 2018)

For instance, through the construction of Confucius Institutes in international colleges and classrooms, xi has advocated for the acceptance of the Chinese language and Chinese cultural offerings. For many educational institutions, the ability of Beijing to support them financially was essential for them to be able to offer Chinese language education. They swiftly spread as a result. The initiative's undercurrent of greater force, meanwhile, hurt its initial success. In 2011, Li Changchun, who was at the time a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, said, "The Confucius Institute is an appealing brand for expanding Chinese culture abroad."It has significantly aided in the development of our soft power. China, because of spreading its culture, has increased its influence and acceptance by others. (Chen & Qian, 2016)

The 1,000 Confucius Institutes China aimed to establish by 2020 are just slightly more than half complete. Additionally, their soft power is not extraordinarily strong one. According to a poll, 71% of people in Africa, where China has established 61 Confucius Institutes, believe that English is the language that future generations need to learn the most, followed by French (14%), Chinese (2%), and English (14%). Only one in every six Kazakhs, according to a survey conducted by the Eurasian Development Bank, believe China to be a "friendly country" despite the former prime minister's daughter being a staunch supporter of China and Chinese-language education in Kazakhstan.

Initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative Although the Confucius Institutes portray a desirable image of Chinese prominence that has been somewhat undermined by undesirable

Chinese governance methods, much of Beijing's attempt to push Chinese centrality is blatantly coercive. For many people, China's pandemic diplomacy revealed the coercive character of Chinese attempts to change the globe, for instance. The production of personal protection equipment (PPE) was militarized by China's "Wolf Warrior" diplomats by threatening to cut off supply to nations who were hostile to China. To deflect attention from Chinese culpability, they also launched an attempt to disseminate false information about the virus's origins. Beijing slapped restrictions and tariffs on some of the nation's most popular products in response to Australia's call for an investigation into the virus's origins. (Larsen, 2021)

It has been well-documented how China exerts pressure on other countries. If they did not officially recognize Chinese sovereignty claims over Hong Kong, the South China Sea, and Taiwan, Beijing warned the global aviation, retail, cinema, and hotel sectors with severe financial repercussions.

Chinese oppression is the most prevalent and successful in influencing the conduct of specific actors. Many international corporations changed their business operations in response to Chinese criticism. Others, on the other hand, appear to submit to Chinese demands while secretly attempting to uphold their principles. For instance, several airlines no longer list Taiwan on their websites but continue to differentiate it from the mainland and provide ticket prices in Taiwanese currency rather than yuan. Importantly, China has largely failed in attempting to change the policies of nations like the Philippines and South Korea through economic pressure, among others, on issues such as rivalry in the South China Sea and the installation of the THAAD missile system, which was produced in the US. Beijing also failed in its attempt to use the imprisonment of two Canadian citizens as political pressure in the case of Meng Wanzhou, the chief financial officer of the Chinese telecoms company Huawei, to evade Canada's judicial system. Before her case was concluded, Meng was finally put under house arrest for close to three years.

China's influence on the world stage is mostly due to its robust economy, which serves as both a catalyst for commerce and growth on a global scale as well as a gateway for other nations to enter its sizable market. But worries about how China's economy will interact with the rest of the world are growing as a result of Xi's initiatives.

Numerous initiatives, including Made in China 2025, that bolster governmental control and seek to shield the Chinese economy from outside competition have come to characterize his leadership. In 2020, Xi proposed the "dual circulation" economic model, which envisioned a mostly self-sufficient China capable of producing, consuming, and inventing within its economy. Through exports, essential supply networks, and small imports of money and expertise, it would continue to be connected to the global economy. Xi has significantly strengthened the CCP's control over Chinese enterprises' ability to make decisions within China. (Choudhury, 2023)

Beijing's international relations now face a new set of difficulties as a result of these deviations from more extensive economic reform and opening. Many nations have lost trust Chinese enterprises now have less access to their markets, and the government is tightening export regulations on vital technologies for Chinese businesses. Beijing's demand for PPE at the beginning of the outbreak aroused concerns about dependency on Chinese supply chains, which prompted other countries to encourage their enterprises to relocate to friendlier countries or return home. Although Xi's policies are lowering rather than boosting the regularity and predictability that economic actors strive for when determining where to invest their time and money, the Chinese economy continues to be attractive as a market and a leader in international commerce and investment, creating new difficulties for Xi's goal of making China the world's economic center.

Xi also wants more control over the current international structure of international organizations. He has regularly and openly encouraged China to take the lead in changing the international governance system by harmonizing it with Chinese values and standards. According to him, the existing rules-based framework does not effectively represent China's or the perspectives of developing nations, according to other Chinese leaders. Instead, it was established and preserved to support a select group of liberal democracies. Xi wants these institutions to uphold Chinese principles and practices, such as putting development rights ahead of Individual political and civic rights as well as the creation of technological standards that provide information flow management by the government.

China's strategy and tactics complement one another. Even when they go against the objectives of the global organizations they support; Chinese officials are taught to uphold Chinese national interests. For instance, in 2020, the International Civil Aviation Organization's

Twitter account blocked users who favored Taiwan joining the organization. Another incident occurred in 2017, when Dolkun Isa, an internationally recognized Uyghur activist, was not allowed to speak at the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues without being forcibly restrained. Chinese representative Wu Hongbo, who is also the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs' Undersecretary-General, later claimed blame for Isa's exclusion on Chinese media, stating, "We must zealously protect the motherland's interests." In a similar vein, the *Le Monde*, a French daily, said in 2019 that Beijing had threatened to stop Uruguayan and Brazilian agricultural exports if those nations did not back China's candidate for the Food and Agriculture Organization's director general. Xi is also dedicated to a long-term strategy to change broader international standards in ways that increase state control over personal freedoms and rights in areas like Internet governance, human rights, and technological standards. (Han & Liu, 2023)

China has flooded meetings with Chinese participants, sought leadership posts in the relevant institutions and supporting committees for Chinese officials or other sympathetic actors and invested a lot of money to influence the topics and conclusions of policy debates in each of these areas. Over time, the strategy has proven effective. The UN is now developing and considering Chinese proposals, for instance, that support state control over the information flow to every network-connected device. Additionally, Xi has made it clear that he is determined to lead the development of standards in fields where they are not yet completely developed, such as space, the Arctic, and the marine spheres. Xi has already made audacious moves in the Arctic to increase China's participation in determining the destiny of the region. Despite being nine hundred miles from the Arctic Circle, China has generated hundreds of scholars who have researched the region. In addition, China has funded several research stations in the region and fostered cooperative study and exploration with Arctic nations. China is by far the most active of the Arctic Council's observer countries, supporting scientific conferences, submitting papers for evaluation, and volunteering to sit on committees. Xi has attempted to assert China's rights in the Arctic decision-making process by referring to China as a "near Arctic power" and recasting the Arctic as a global commons problem requiring dialogue among a diverse range of governments. (Babones, 2017)

However, Aggression has a price, like other facets of Chinese foreign policy. China has made strides toward being more involved in the creation of Arctic standards, but it has also fallen

behind as Arctic nations have grown less open to Chinese investment owing to security concerns. Nations have joined forces, for instance, to stop UN organizations and programs from adopting the BRI into their mission statements or schedules automatically. They are banding together to promote candidates for leadership positions in UN agencies and other international organizations who are committed to openness, transparency, and the rule of law. In the first month of the COVID-19, the World Health Organization was reluctant to approach China about its lack of transparency epidemic is one example of how China looks to be overly influencing or undermining best practices. (Laihui, 2022)

Grandiose ambition drives China's aim to alter the global system. The liberal international system that arose after World War II, the democratic alliance system, and the global leadership of the United States are all firmly established. Chinese authorities nonetheless insist that the two centuries before that, when China did not lead the world economy, were an aberration in history.

They claim that America's influence is waning. Former vice minister of international affairs He Yafei claimed that "the conclusion of the American Century or Pax Americana", is near." Beijing is widely thought to be on track for victory by both Chinese authorities and foreign observers. Shen Dingli, a renowned professor at Fudan University, claims that China is seizing taking the "moral high ground" in the world community and serving as "the leading nation in the new era." China's rejuvenation, according to Xi, is a "historic inevitability." There is reason to be optimistic, according to Xi. In each of the areas he identified as essential for change, China has unmistakably advanced, while internal turmoil and a lack of global leadership have hurt the United States' reputation and influence. (Wang, 2006)

The international community still recalls Beijing's aggressive military actions, even though Xi's optimistic evaluation of China's pandemic response may be highly welcomed at home. coercive PPE policies, bullying diplomacy, persecution in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, and continuous belligerence in trying to track down the virus's sources. Public opinion polls show that despite Xi's wish for China to be perceived as "dependable, lovable, and respectable" by the foreign community, his actions have resulted in record-low levels of confidence in him and little desire for the Chinese leadership. Several initiatives aimed at securing Chinese centralities, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, Confucius Institutes, and global governance leadership, are either

sputtering or ceasing as the full economic and political repercussions of adopting Chinese leadership become clear to the rest of the world.

The rest of the world may likewise be excused for wondering what Xi wants besides centrality. He has made it plain that he wants China to have a significant influence on the creation of the rules that will govern the international system.

However, Under Donald Trump's administration, the United States lost its position as the world's preeminent power, and Xi showed a reluctance or incapacity to fill that void by leading the international community or acting as the world's police officer. China could just want to take advantage of the privileges that come with being the most powerful nation in the world, without taking on all the associated obligations. The goal of Chinese dominance on the international stage is undesirable to a generous portion of the rest of the globe, and given the present atmosphere of growing international resistance, an absolute success for Xi seems doubtful.

The repercussions for the global community might be just as painful if Xi finds that his plan is failing as it could be if he succeeds. By suppressing China's top-tier technology industry, destroying the remaining vestiges of democracy in Hong Kong, and highlighting China's military strength with a hypersonic missile launch, xi has recently astounded world leaders. Furthermore, there is a considerable likelihood that even more unstable actions, including employing force to unite with Taiwan, might occur. While Xi has already shown a readiness to take dangerous military action in the East and South China Seas, as well as near India's border, he has yet to propose a calm future for union with the island nation. (Laihui, 2019)

Xi has responded to major diplomatic headwinds by upping the stakes. Except for issues like climate change that do not threaten his main political and strategic objectives, he is reluctant to restrain his ambition. An ideal, albeit still improbable, the end result would be for Xi to engage in a number of ongoing and implicit internal tradeoffs, such as claiming regional economic leadership while reversing military aggression in the region, taking pride in stopping the spread of COVID-19 while admitting the limitations of Chinese vaccine innovation, and so on. Another example would be beginning the process of releasing "reeducated" Uyghur Muslims from labor camps while proclaiming victory in the elimination of terrorist acts in Xinjiang. By doing this, xi would be able to continue to portray himself as having succeeded in advancing Chinese hegemony while also attending to the most pressing concerns of the international

community. The interaction of several elements, notably the viability of the Chinese military and economy, will determine if Xi can accomplish his dream, as well as the ability of the world to continue resisting Chinese pressure as well as the ability of other countries and the world's democracies to formulate and pursue their compelling vision of the future, on the one hand, and the backing of other top leaders and the Chinese people, on the other. The capacity of Xi to comprehend and manage the significant disconnect between what he wants to offer the world and what the world needs from him will likely be the most important factor in his success. (Rogelja & Tsimonis, 2023)

2.4. Important Books and Publications on the “New” New World Order"Stepping away from the abyss: a gradual approach towards a new security system in the Persian Gulf (2021)

The most comprehensive recently published book on the balance of power and power transition in International Politics and Security is "Stepping Away from the Abyss: a gradual approach towards a new security system in the Persian Gulf (2021)". The inability of the US to play a leadership role in mediating and resolving security issues in the Persian Gulf allowed other actors to control, influence, and advance their agendas in the region, worsening the fragile security situation in the region and the world in general (European University Institute., 2021).

The Russo-Ukrainian War, which had started in 2014, was substantially escalated on February 24, 2022, when Russia attacked Ukraine. Since World War II, Europe has seen the worst refugee crisis as a result of the invasion. It is likely to have caused tens of thousands of deaths. Eight million people were reportedly internally displaced by late May, and 7.8 million Ukrainians were reportedly out of the nation by November 8, 2022.

Russian emigration reached its highest level since the October Revolution of 1917 within five weeks of the invasion. Another effect of the invasion is a lack of food. During the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, Russia annexed Crimea, and paramilitaries supported by Russia took

control of a portion of the Donbas region in southeast Ukraine, which includes the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. An internal conflict arose as a result. Russian forces launched a significant military buildup along their border with Ukraine in March 2021, and by the end of the year, they had 190,000 soldiers and their weaponry in place. Up to the day of the invasion, despite the buildup, several Russian government spokespeople denied making any preparations to invade or attack Ukraine. Russia acknowledged the two Donbass quasi-states that had declared their independence on February 21, 2022. the People's Republic of Luhansk and the People's Republic of Donetsk. After receiving permission from the Russian Federation Council to use force, the Russian military entered both areas the next day.

The invasion has faced broad, vehement resistance. The UN General Assembly approved a resolution denouncing the invasion and demanding a complete withdrawal of Russian troops. Russian military activities were halted by the International Court of Justice, and Russia was ejected from the Council of Europe. Several governments imposed economic sanctions on Russia and its ally Belarus, which had an impact on the economy of both countries.

By August 2022, more than \$80 billion in military and humanitarian assistance had been sent to Ukraine by forty different countries. Around the world, there were protests; in Russia, they were greeted with further media restrictions, such as a prohibition on the phrase's "war" and "invasion," as well as mass arrests. In reaction. More than a thousand firms have departed Russia and Belarus in response to the invasion. The International Criminal Court has been looking into the war crimes committed during the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 since 2013.

By default, the worsening security situation in the Persian Gulf demonstrates that the role of the US as a power in international politics is questionable. Another event the book failed to predict is the ongoing Ukrainian crisis. The Ukrainian crisis gives us more reason to think that there are profound power shifts in International Politics and security. As a leading country in international politics, the US failed to improvise the crisis. Despite much economic and political support given to Ukraine, it also failed to provide a solution to the crisis. The United States has given Ukraine assistance of more than \$7.3 billion since 2014, including funds for both security- and non-security-related projects. Three US guarantees for \$3 billion sovereign loans were also included. The majority of the humanitarian help going to Ukraine

comes from the United States. Since Russia's original invasion of Ukraine eight years ago, the United States has already sent almost \$653 million in humanitarian aid to the region's most impoverished communities, including roughly \$302 million this year. (Pawlak, 2022). But the war does not seem to end anytime soon.

2.4.1. Globalization and the changing liberal international order: A Review of the Literature

According to Amadi (2020), Globalization which facilitated the rise of the US as a superpower worldwide is also the leading cause of the decline of US hegemony in world politics. The US-China trade war, the rise of trade protectionism and the fall of multilateralism, and the withdrawal of the US from many International agreements such as the Iran nuclear program are all signs that US hegemony is declining.

Since China's economic reforms began in the late 1970s, goods commerce between the US and China has significantly increased. After China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, trade dramatically surged, with the US and China emerging as the two largest trading partners. The US has continuously imported more items from China than it has exported, pushing the two countries' bilateral trade deficit in goods to \$375.6 billion in 2017. The US government has periodically questioned a number of aspects of US-China business ties, including the significant bilateral trade imbalances and China's relatively fixed currency rates. China was reportedly selling these items at below-market costs, therefore the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama slapped quotas and taxes on Chinese textiles to protect American textile companies in the US.

But the article failed to mention that other factors that are not merely political can also significantly impact hegemony. When COVID-19 occurred, the US was the most affected country in the world, with the highest death toll. The event demonstrated US internal inefficiencies and weaknesses.

The US economy has been significantly harmed by the COVID-19 outbreak, which has had a detrimental impact on employment, shipping, financial markets, tourism, and other sectors. Consumer and company measure that restrict the virus' exposure and spread, as well as government initiatives to do the same (including at the Federal and State levels), can be blamed

for the outcomes. The real GDP fell by 3.5% in 2020, the first decline since the Financial Crisis of 2008. Millions of jobs were lost, which resulted in a record-breaking number of claims for unemployment insurance over several weeks. Numerous companies, most notably restaurants, closed their doors as consumer and retail activity declined. To stop the spread of COVID-19 in the workplace, several companies and workplaces switched to remote work.

One of the legislations passed by Congress in 2021 to provide stimulus and alleviate the effects of job losses and company closures is the American Rescue Plan Act. In order to maintain the stability of the financial markets and stimulate the economy, the Federal Reserve lowered its target for the federal funds rate to almost zero and implemented a number of liquidity tools. Inflation started to rise to levels last seen in the 1980s in late 2021.

The employment situation before lockdowns was mirrored according to the February 2020 employment report, 1.28 million Americans were classified as "permanent job losers." 3.41 million people fell under this category in August, and 3.75 million fell under it in September. Although the number of "temporary layoffs" decreased, it appeared that several positions that had previously been designated "temporary" had become permanent ones. (Asfaw, 2022). The international community is very skeptical about the capability of a hegemon that is not even capable of facing and promptly revolving around its internal matter to be a global superpower.

2.4.2. Power Transition and US-China Conflicts (2006)

Tammen (2006), in his article "Power Transition and US-China Conflicts," demonstrated the decline of the US hegemony is the result of a foreign policy failure. The protection of the United States and its citizens, the maintenance of access to essential resources and markets, the preservation of a balance of power in the world, and the protection of human rights and democracy can be seen as the four main goals of the U.S. government's foreign policy. (Tammen, 2006). There are numerous difficulties to the large and complex operation of US foreign policy. First, there is no global authority dictating how the world's countries ought to interact with one another. The significant differences in national perspectives regarding the function of government in the lives of citizens present a second obstacle. Thirdly, different nations' perspectives on the ideal form of government. Fourthly, many contemporary foreign policy issues cross national boundaries.

Last but not least, the various conditions of the world's nations influence what is achievable in terms of foreign policy and diplomatic relations. In the 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the US foreign policy strategy has been to fight terrorism and national security. According to Tammen (2006), US's sole concern was national security and the fight against terrorism. China and other Asian countries were trying to build up their global economic influence. It explained why US hegemony declined over the following years.

But the article failed to mention that the US has been a strong advocate of structural adjustment programs, a derivative of capitalism in the same period. In the majority of South American nations, structural adjustment programs (SAPs) were imposed during the 1980s and 1990s in large part because to U.S. involvement. To force recipient nations to liberalize their trade and investment policies and implement macroeconomic policy changes, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Northern governments developed SAPs as loan conditions. Through its trade and aid programs, Washington sought to alter the economic strategy of the Southern nations. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as regional multilateral organizations like the Inter-American Development Bank, all have structural adjustment programs that were developed and are in large part funded by the United States (IDB). The United States continuously began to attach the adoption of a package of economic changes and adherence to the World Bank and IMF's recommendations to assistance agreements in the 1980s.

Additionally, American trade negotiators started to advocate for changes to other nations' economic policies to promote greater trade and investment with the United States. SAPs typically comprise several fundamental elements designed to lower inflation, encourage exports, adhere to debt payment schedules, and reduce budget deficits. They typically involve drastic cuts to government employment and spending, as well as increased interest rates, currency devaluations, lower real salaries, the sale of state-owned businesses, lowered tariffs, and a loosening of rules governing foreign investment (Collier & Gunning, 1999).

So, the US prioritized fighting terrorism and national security and a capitalist economic model all around the world. The fundamental factors of the decline of hegemony are somewhere else. There are numerous issues with current American foreign policy. Nearly all developing nations are subjected to widespread structural adjustment programs, while the North only

sparingly upholds its neoliberal ideals. Although SAPs may have nominal GDP growth, this growth is based on the exploitation of cheap labor and the extraction of resources in an unsustainable manner. Tax benefits and production incentives frequently go to the wealthy and foreign investors, while the indigenous economy and the jobs that support the poor and middle classes suffer sharp declines. Few would argue the need for reforms in the face of issues like ongoing budget deficits, inefficient and unproductive government operations, and rising inflation. However, rather than being based on unbiased assessments of the unique economic issues and possibilities of a nation, SAPs are primarily motivated by neoliberal ideological concepts. A variety of economic, social, political, and environmental issues arise as a result of the typical structural adjustment package promoted by the International Financial Institutions and the U.S. government failing to accommodate each country's unique needs.

2.4.3. Integrating Theories of international regimes

Hasenclever et al. (2000) article on International Relations theories eloquently described and provided examples of how International Relations theories see power and hegemony in international politics. According to Hasenclever et al. (2000), Realists measure a country's influence in International Relations in terms of territorial size and military power. The US possesses all those elements. The US is the third-largest country in the world by area, behind Russia and Canada. 3,717,792 square miles or 9,629,091 square kilometers overall. This includes the District of Columbia and the fifty states. In this area, there are 9,158,960 square kilometers (3,536,274 square miles) of land and 470,131 square kilometers (181,517 square miles) of water. The United States is roughly half the size of Russia and somewhat larger than either Brazil or China. It has a long border (3,326 kilometers or 2,066 miles) with both Canada (8,893 kilometers or 5,526 miles) and Mexico.

The nation's perimeter measures 12,248 kilometers (7,610 miles) in length. While the Pacific Ocean borders the West Coast of the nation, the Atlantic and Caribbean Seas surround the Eastern United States. The Arctic Ocean borders some areas of Alaska. The overall length of the country's coastline is 19,924 kilometers (12,380 miles). The capital of the country, nearly halfway between Maine and Florida on the East Coast, is where you will find Washington, D.C. While the capital city has a population of 519,000, the biggest cities in the country are New York (7,428,162), Los Angeles (3,633,591), and Chicago (2,799,050). (Immerwahr, 2016).

Additionally, the US territory has not changed, and its military spending has increased rather than decreased over time. The majority of the Department of Defense's discretionary budget, or more generally, the amount of the budget devoted to any expenses related to the armed services, is made up of the military budget. The military budget pays for new product development and purchase as well as operational support, infrastructure maintenance, uniformed and civilian staff wages, training, and health care.

The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Space Force are five components of the American armed services that are funded by the budget. China, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, and Brazil together do not spend more on defense than the United States does. The U.S. military budget in 2018 accounted for over 36% of worldwide arms sales, in contrast to the U.S. GDP, which comprises only 24% of global GDP. The 2018 budget is around 2.5 times greater than China's military budget of \$250 billion.

Two-thirds to three-quarters of all military spending across the world is funded by the United States and its close allies (of whom it is also primarily accountable). Additionally, the US maintains most military facilities abroad. There are now around eight hundred American bases abroad, but none of them are independent structures with a permanent basis in the US. The military receives close to 16% of all government spending and around 50% of discretionary spending. Generally speaking, One-third of the annual federal budget is allocated to discretionary spending, which includes both defense and non-defense spending. Out of its 3.97 trillion expenditures, the United States spent \$637 billion on the military in 2015.

When only the basic Department of Defense budget expenditure is considered, the United States spent 3.29% of its GDP on the military in 2016, which was more than France's 2.26% and lower than Saudi Arabia's 9.85%. It peaked in 1944 at 37.8% of GDP, which is historically low for the US (and fell to its lowest level between 1999 and 2001 at 3.0%).

The proportion reached a high of 9.4% in 1968, even during the height of the Vietnam War. United States military spending in 2018 was 3.2% of GDP, compared to 8.8% in Saudi Arabia, 4.3% in Israel, 4.0% in Pakistan, 3.9% in Russia, 2.6% in South Korea, 1.9% in China, 1.8% in the UK, and 1.2% in Germany. (DeGrasse, 2016).

Despite reaching a peak in 2009, the US Military's budget is still significantly higher than that of any other military power.

But then, why is the US power and influence in International Relations is not as influential as it used to? Something must have gone wrong somewhere. Liberals, on the other hand, agreed that military power and territory are essential to gain influence in International Relations, but other factors must not be neglected. Those factors are economic and mutually beneficial cooperation. Again, the US possesses the most significant diplomatic network in the world and cooperates with more countries than any other country. United States diplomatic missions include 166 of the 193 United Nations members, Vatican City, an observer state, non-member Kosovo, Taiwan, and the second-highest number of diplomatic missions of any country in the world, behind Mainland China. In other countries' embassies, it keeps "interest sections" in Afghanistan, Iran, and Syria, which are member states. So, the liberal criteria of hegemonic power do not inform about why US hegemonic power is declining.

2.4.4. Rising Powers and International Institutions

The most comprehensive book ever written on rising powers in international politics is "Rising Powers and International Institutions (Chin, 2015)". According to the chapter on "Rising powers and the future of international order," established powers such as France, the UK, and the US decided to accommodate demands of some rising power while opposing others. Nevertheless, according to the same chapter, rising powers with similar economic systems, regime types, and social and human rights systems have a better chance of being accepted by established power than those with significant differences. Based on the analysis drawn by the book, China, which has significant domestic socio-economic and political differences from the US, would challenge the US hegemony in world politics. It has been a prevailing trend in recent years. However, the book did not elaborate on the strategies of rising powers such as China to advance this agenda and challenge US hegemony in international politics.

The significant turning point in the world trade system is China's emergence as a major player. Due to its "Import Substitution" strategy, China started its trade reform program near the end of the 1970s, when it was ranked 32nd among all countries in terms of international trade. China surpassed the United States to become the greatest exporter in the world thirty years later.

To address global economic integration and the migration of industries, China has devised a strategy and policy that places a high priority on "active absorption of foreign direct investments and support of foreign trade development". With this method, amazing achievements were achieved, but it has since encountered a growing number of issues. Resources, energy, and other issues are severely impacted by China's economy's rapid rise and the surrounding.

The fast growth of China's trade volume has impacted China's ties with other countries and caused an increasing number of trade issues worldwide. In light of these new conditions, recent national advancements, and relations with the rest of the world, China is creating a sustainable trade strategy. China used the import substitution development strategy, which successfully used a range of economic resources to support the nation's efforts to industrialize through the system of planned economies. China had developed a somewhat full industrial system by the 1970s, but the system, which had been created using the import substitution method, was not extremely competitive on a global scale.

China thus encountered the "two-gap" model, which was defined by Hollis Chenery, the former head economist of the World Bank from 1972 to 1982, not long after adopting the trade liberalization program.³ China began to implement an export-oriented strategy in its labor-intensive sectors after studying the success of certain East Asian nations in this area. The main Chinese policies were to boost the international competitiveness of domestic exports and to draw in foreign investors who are interested in the export market. (Zhou, 2008)

The establishment of further economic zones and special function zones. When China originally welcomed international investors, neither its hardware, which mostly consisted of physical facilities, nor its software, which also included rules, regulations, governmental administration, and services, could meet their demands. China was therefore forced to draw on other nations' successful export processing zone-building expertise. Since 1980, China has created SEZs in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen to promote an environment for investment that will attract international money. Building various infrastructure facilities, implementing tax laws that benefit foreign investors, such as exempting their imported equipment from tariffs and lowering or exempting their corporate income taxes, as well as recognizing foreign investment projects and providing incentives to those export-oriented

projects (proposing performance requirements on foreign investment projects primarily related to domestic contents, Balan) were some of the specific regulatory measures.

China established Economic and Technological Development Zones in fourteen coastal cities in 1984 and put in place laws that were comparable to those of special economic zones, building on its first success in developing them used for SEZs. Then China established many other special function zones with nearly comparable regulations, including Bonded Zones, Export Processing Zones, and New and High Technology Industry Development Zones. China made the investment environment favorable to outside investors by doing this. China has successfully leveraged its advantage over Western investors in technology, management, and global marketing networks with its competitive advantage of inexpensive land and labor.

Special function zones are becoming more crucial nodes for the expansion of China's global commerce. These special function zones' total import value reported in 2009 was 37.1% of China's total import value, while its total export value in 2009 was 33.1% of the country's total export value. (Zhou, 2022).

The literature on Unilateralism or US hegemony in world politics and the rising powers presented some academic weaknesses this research will investigate. Despite its capacity to withstand economic shocks, the American economy acquired various weaknesses in the first decade of the twenty-first century that pointed to potential risks. The nation has a significant trade deficit; imports far outnumber the value of American goods and services exported to other nations. Since the 1970s, household earnings for a generous portion of the population have essentially stagnated, while levels of debt have risen to all-time highs.

Furthermore, a growing income gap between the nation's general populace and the small cohort at the top of the economic pyramid has been noted by many analysts. Operating businesses, heating homes, and moving people and commodities have all become more expensive due to rising energy costs. The nation's aging population increased the cost of public health care and pension plans (including Social Security). In addition, the funding for social programs was constrained by the growing federal budget deficit. Most of the US's vulnerabilities include slow economic development, rising unemployment, crumbling infrastructure, a massive national debt, and bitter political conflict over how to deal with these problems. World power has

been stretched to the limit of its ability to act, both domestically and internationally, due to the precarious social condition, the unfavorable economic climate, as well as internal political tensions between the White House and Congress.

Hegemonic power is not only about having socio-economic and political influence in world politics. Other factors, such as the capacity to protect a nation during events like the COVID pandemic, are also essential to being a hegemon. The US failed to protect its citizens from COVID promptly. The United States has the highest number of confirmed cases and mortality. Then, how would the international community rely on the US global power? Another important literature gap is that many analysts agreed that the US fulfills all requirements to be a global power or a hegemon. Still, they failed to explain why the US power is declining even though the country possesses all prerequisites to be a hegemon. It is another literature gap this research is going to investigate.

3. Chapter 3 Analysis

3.1. Rising powers are challenging the US economic hegemony in international politics.

3.1.1. US Economy Outlook

To understand how the US power is declining we need to analyze US economic history starting from the 20th century. Since the 1920s, in terms of GDP, the United States has historically had the largest national economy. The quantity of debt that the public owns has grown during the twenty-first century. Out of 207 countries, the United States debt level as a percentage of GDP was the 43rd highest in 2017, rising from 31% in 2000 to 52% in 2009 and 77% in 2017. (Shkliarevsky, 2023)

After Donald Trump was elected president in 2017, the American economy had significant difficulties starting in March 2020 because of the new coronavirus and the need to "shut down " significant parts of the economy. (Hall & Kudlyak, 2022)

By May 8, the unemployment rate in the US had risen to a record 14.7 percent. The American economy was at its lowest point since the 1930s in May 2020 (Mahmoudi, 2022).

The American economy expanded by 5.7% in 2021, which was the best performance for the nation's economy, while the Consumer Price Index inflation rate increased by 9.1% in June 2022. After China, the USA rose to become the second-largest trading nation in the world. Worries regarding the soundness of the banking system were expressed throughout the financial industry. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the US economy increased by 2.1% in 2022. (Dunbar, 2022)

The main contributor to this growth was consumer expenditure, which accounted for 1.9% of the overall annual increase. Despite two consecutive quarters of negative growth in the first half of the year, the economy showed signs of improvement in the latter half, and this momentum continued into early 2023. The labor market remained robust throughout 2022 and into 2023. In 2022, an average of 399,000 new jobs were generated monthly, and a total of 4.8 million new jobs were created for the year. (Horsley, 2023)

With almost one million new jobs created in the first quarter of 2023, or an average of 345,000 new positions each month, the labor market remained robust. In 2022, inflation spiked to 8%, the highest yearly level in four decades. However, it started to decline after reaching a peak of 9.1% in June 2022 and decreased to 5% in March 2023 from 6.5% in December 2022. Despite being down from its top of 6.6% in September 2022, the upturn in March shows that there are still strong pricing pressures. The Federal Reserve was under pressure in 2022 because of how quickly prices were rising to rapidly hike rates and stop inflation. The Federal Reserve increased interest rates seven times in 2022, intending to slow the economy and reduce inflation, it is moving at its most brisk pace since the 1980s. (Kiderlin, 2023)

Early in 2023, interest rates were increased twice again, by a quarter point each time, on February 1 and March 22. The federal funds rate increased at the quickest rate on record, from about zero in March 2022 to around 5% in March 2023. The assets that lost value when interest rates went from near zero to near zero were a contributing factor in Silicon Valley Bank's (SVB) failure in March 2023. By the end of 2022, approximately 60% of SVB's assets were fixed-rate securities. As interest rates rose (Sweet, 2023)

The Federal Reserve kept its attention on bringing inflation to its target level during its meeting on March 22, 2023, notwithstanding the recent instability in the financial sector. Even though the economy created more than a million jobs in the first quarter of 2023 and inflation was still high, the Fed decided to keep an eye on it and decided to raise interest rates by 0.25%.

The likelihood of a domino effect brought on by bank failures and rising market stress has made the future actions of the central bank and the trajectory of the US economy more unpredictable. The chance of a recession in the next 12 to 18 months seems to have grown as a result of the recent instability in the banking industry and financial markets, even if recent growth and job numbers indicate that the economy is robust, and inflation is down. (Horsley,2020).

Moreover, there is now a greater chance that policy choices may result in a slower growth rate. Financial anxiety has increased due to worries about the soundness of the banking system and the impasse over lifting the debt ceiling. The two economic problems have merged, creating more economic uncertainty that the US Congress may increase by addressing both problems at once. (Jahangir, 2022)

3.1.2. International Politics and Dollar

Based on extensive research we carried out for this thesis we found out that the primary objective of U.S. policy regarding the dollar is political, and it consists of two parts: the first is to use the dollar as a symbol of the power of the United States, and the second is to use the dollar as an instrument of power by developing a financial network that enables the US to exert influence over the decisions made by other governments.

The main objective of dollar policy and economics is politics. One is that the American economy needs to dominate the world in the sense that no other currency can compete with the dollar as an international reserve, and the other is that the United States of America needs to be the dominant political power for its decisions to take precedence over those of its allies. (Kiderlin, 2023)

The US dollar has been the currency adopted in most global trade movements since World War II, which gives the US economy an advantage. (Guttman, 2021). The adoption of the dollar as an official currency in the U.S. on the recommendation of President Thomas Jefferson dates to the late second half of the eighteenth century. Its value was adjusted in gold more than once until it settled at a fixed price under the Bretton Woods Agreement.

If we go back a bit, the US President, Richard Nixon, was tired of the consequences of pegging the dollar to gold, so he decided to unpeg the dollar from gold in 1971. Under the Bretton Woods Agreement, the United States returned to the "gold standard" after World War II.

The "gold standard" was effective for a while, but it was soon abandoned when the economies of Germany and Japan developed more quickly, and the US government budget was impacted by the astronomical costs of the Vietnam War. A study by the American research firm "The Motley Fool" claims that when US dollars deluged international markets, several nations started to demand gold in return for their dollar holdings. Although the "gold standard" had ended, the market kept rising for a year and a half, and inflation was only moderately high during that time. (Ryczek, 2020). The benefits of the Nixon shock, however, turned out to be inadequate to counteract the ensuing economic unrest.

By 1973, it was obvious that Nixon's decision to temporarily suspend the gold standard would be permanent since most other nations had decided to value their currencies independently of the gold standard. (Derks & Smith, 2005)

Inflationary swings that occurred when the world's nations switched to floating their currencies were not suppressed by the price restrictions intended to do so. Leading economists are still debating the effects of the "Nixon shock" today, and more than 50 years after that decision, it can be said that its effects on the global economy and US monetary policy were greater than those of any other event throughout the latter part of the 20th century. (McKinnon, 2013)

3.1.3. The Decline in Importance of the Dollar as a world currency

One of the most important pieces of information this thesis can inform us of is that countries around the world started to develop alternative ways to carry out international financial transactions without the dollars. The USA, the UK, and the European Commission all came

together on February 26, 2022, to publish a joint declaration that might very well transform the economic landscape of the entire world (Umair, 2023). In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, these countries promised in the letter to freeze the Central Bank of Russia's foreign currency reserves. These reserves, which were worth about \$630 billion, had been building up since 2014 when Russia intervened in Ukraine for the last time. (Rappeport, 2022). When they were frozen, their number was at its highest level since records began. This move could be as big a change in the world's financial system as when the U.S. dollar stopped being tied to gold in 1971 (Norrlof, 2014).

Vladimir Putin, the President of Russia, delivered a speech on the 16th of March 2022, in which he presented his economic future's plans. A portion of that speech was shared on various social media platforms almost immediately after it was given. Putin stated that the illegal freezing of some of the Bank of Russia's currency reserves indicates the end of the dependability of assets considered to be of first-class status. The US and EU have failed to live up to their commitments to Russia. It is now common knowledge that money reserves can be taken without much effort (Vernengo, 2021).

Since 2014, when Crimea was annexed, Russia has been seeking to confront the "dollar dominance", as Moscow realizes the paramount importance of reducing its excessive dependence on the dollar in economic and trade transactions with the world, in terms of protecting its monetary sovereignty and mitigating the risks of US and European sanctions on its economy., especially those that limit their access to the global financial system. (Corera, 2020)

Moscow's orientations in this regard crystallized again after the outbreak of the Ukrainian war in February 2022, as the West sought to tighten the economic noose on it by imposing a wide series of sanctions aimed primarily at tightening its international isolation (Bertrand & Liebermann, 2023). The Russian government has thus taken more significant measures to restrict the use of the dollar in its foreign trade. in return for increasing the use of the Russian ruble and other currencies. Among these steps is the announcement by the Russian "Gazprom" group, on September 6, 2022, that China will start paying for Russian gas shipments in rubles and yuan instead of dollars. (Person & Xu, 2022)

Russian efforts seeking to reduce the exposure of its economy to the US dollar were based on several main aspects (Morris, 2022), the most important of which are:

- Reducing the dollar's share of the Russian monetary reserve and replacing it with the yuan and the euro.
- Reducing the share of the dollar in Russian trade with friendly countries.
- Reducing Moscow's dependence on the infrastructure of the international payment system.

The United States used the dollar as a weapon in response to the Russian military operations in Ukrainian territory; by imposing a package of economic sanctions aimed at undermining Moscow's ability to access foreign currencies, especially the dollar, which prompted Putin to search for solutions and tools to confront Western sanctions and reduce their impact on the Russian economy. In this regard, the internationalization of the ruble was seen as one of the tools available to the Russian leadership to circumvent these sanctions and mitigate their negative repercussions. (Rosen, 2023)

It seems that the escalating US sanctions against some countries, and the use of the dollar as a weapon in this regard, may motivate many countries to follow in the footsteps of Russia concerning reducing exposure to the dollar, and in a way that supports the emergence of a global financial system based on various basic currencies.

Despite the initial recovery that the US economy enjoyed from the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, during 2021; What made it the most recovering economy among most of the world's economies, the year 2022 came loaded with many challenges that put the US economy in great trouble. The Russian-Ukrainian war and its economic repercussions, and the geopolitical tensions that accompanied it, represented the most prominent factor in the emergence of these challenges (Barari, 2022), which are continuing with the advent of the new year 2023.

The US economy is currently grappling with uncertainty in light of hyperinflation, rising interest rates, a slowing housing market, increased government spending on infrastructure, slowing economic growth, reaching the debt ceiling set by Congress, and growing fears of the

inability to Payment, all of which raise questions about the resilience of the US economy in light of the current conditions. (Person & Mutikani, 2023).

By placing a freeze on Russia's foreign reserves, the USA, the UK, and the EU sent a signal to the rest of the world that the access that other countries have to their reserve holdings denominated in dollars, pounds, and euros is dependent on the foreign policy decisions that those countries make. (Troianovski, 2022).

This new phenomenon will garner the attention of the entire world, with particular focus being placed on China. As a result of China's long-standing practice of running massive trade surpluses with Western countries, the country's accumulation of foreign reserves has reached staggering proportions. However, the Chinese government must now evaluate these reserves through the prism of their international relations. If, for instance, China decided to grab control of the island of Taiwan (Doshi, 2023). It appears inevitable that the reserves would be frozen at this moment in time. Even if China only made a more modest incursion, would they still be stuck in place? Nobody knows. But you can bet that people in China are talking about it.

In the future, it will be necessary for all nations to evaluate their foreign currency reserves in the context of their foreign policy. Americans have taken a critique that was directed against their monetary system by a neo-Marxist economist and transformed it into a vehicle of global hegemony. To this day, Americans have leveraged the hegemonic status of the dollar to live beyond their means. Even though the United States has been running massive trade deficits with the rest of the globe for many decades, the status of the dollar as the reserve currency helps to keep its value relatively stable. If the U.S. dollar did not hold the status of reserve currency, the already affordable goods that consumers in the United States buy, particularly those made in China, would be a great deal more expensive. (Bina, 2023).

The trend to abandon the dollar is not new in the countries of the world, as it was preceded by similar measures between several countries during the past years, but what is new in the Chinese-Brazilian decision is that it comes between two economically large countries, which means that it is an additional step towards bringing about a change in the mechanisms of economic dealing. (Wang, 2017).

China and Russia have been leading efforts for some time to end the dominance of the US dollar in world commerce. To establish a multipolar world order in which the US does not hold the center of leadership or domination, the two nations want to diminish the US hegemony over the globe in terms of politics, economics, and technology. (Coker, 2017).

This decision will boost Brazil's economy, especially since Beijing is Brazil's largest trading partner.

In the years after Brazil and Argentina proclaimed their intentions to start a shared currency between them that is akin to the euro, several other nations across the world have also taken similar actions. Additionally, Russia and Iran are collaborating to develop a gold-backed cryptocurrency for use in international commerce. The free trade agreement was also inked between the UAE and India last year to boost non-oil commerce and utilize the rupee as a floating exchange rate.

The US economy faces challenges and unfavorable signs that cannot be ignored as they lead to its decline:

- Slowing down GDP growth: The US Department of Commerce announced that GDP was growing at an annual rate of 2.9% in the fourth quarter of 2022, down from 3.2% in the third quarter; This reflects a slowdown, or even a regression, in the level of growth. (Sweet, 2023)
- The decline in consumer spending: Considering that consumer spending is the main driver of the US economy, and therefore its impact on economic developments has direct repercussions on the US economy. Consumer spending growth declined in the last quarter of last year compared to 2021; For example, consumer spending grew between January 2022 and January 2022 by about \$223.817 billion, compared to growth in 2021 - which is the year of recovery - by about \$748.698 billion. (Gura, 2022). Perhaps what contributed to the drop-in consumer spending growth is that the Federal Reserve raised interest rates from near zero to more than 4%, the highest rate in 15 years; This policy encouraged

consumers to save more and spend less, in the hope that this would relieve upward pressure on prices.

- Real estate market contraction: real estate has been hit hard by the rapid rise in interest rates; As it is considered the most sensitive sector to the high costs of lending; real estate construction activity contracted at an annual rate of 26.7% in the fourth quarter of 2022, thus becoming its worst year since the mortgage crisis 15 years ago, a situation that was driven by a decline in the construction of new homes, and this also represents a stark contrast to what happened in earlier during the COVID-19 pandemic; When real estate was booming. (Gura, 2022)
- Unemployment soaring: Runaway inflation and skyrocketing operating costs have forced some companies to resort to a collective decision to reduce employment, as technology companies have cut more than 330,000 jobs over the past 12 months, according to statistics from Menasa. True Up research, including nearly 90,000 job cuts since the start of the new year 2023.
- US debt crisis: The US government announced that it had reached the debt ceiling that Congress established in January 2023, which compelled the US Treasury Department to begin implementing exceptional measures aimed at allowing the country to pay its payments. It is an extremely significant indicator. With the debt limit at around \$31 trillion, if the United States defaults on its debt, financial markets, and various investments will be the first to be affected. (Simmons-Duffin, 2023)
- High-interest rates : The Federal Reserve increased its benchmark interest rate seven times in the past year, from zero to a range of 4.25% to 4.5%. Policymakers at the Federal Reserve have predicted that they would keep raising the benchmark interest rate until it surpasses 5%, the highest level in 15 years. Due to higher borrowing prices, fewer Americans can afford

mortgages or loans for their cars ,along with inflated rates ;
This leads to depriving the economy of its main driver
represented in healthy consumer spending. (Shkliarevsky, 2023)

This led to a decline in the prices of the dollar and its dominance, which led to an increase in the prices of the dollar and its dominance, and it appeared, albeit in a slightly obvious way, recently.

3.1.4. US Geopolitical are in decline.

The concept of American decline refers to the belief that the US is losing power on a variety of fronts, including geopolitical, military, financial, economic, demographical, social, moral, spiritual, and cultural, regarding difficulties relating to healthcare, as well as about the environment (Flint, 2021).

The fact that China is competing with the US for global hegemony. is a key subject in the debate concerning the collapse of the United States? As an illustration, The US is no longer the unmatched, unrivaled superpower it once was in every single region of the planet. According to the 2021 Asia Power Index, the United States continues to rule Asia in terms of military strength, cultural impact, resilience, future resources, diplomatic influence, and defense networks. However, when it comes to economic competence and trade connections, the United States trails behind China. (Connaughton,2022)

The United States' fall has been attributed to several things, including declining military superiority, rising deficit expenditures, growing geopolitical influence, and Moral, social, and behavioral norms that have been altered.

Some academics believe that the idea of decline is also known as declines. There is a study in 2021 showed that 79% of American respondents claimed that the United States is "coming apart".

Sometimes those who think that The United States of America is declining have "consistently been wrong" in the past. Political analyst Matthew Kroenig claims that the US government has "followed the same fundamental, three-step geopolitical plan since 1945." First

off, the existing, rules-based international order was established by the United States. Second, the US collaborated with its partners to protect the system against nations or organizations that might try to undermine it. This was accomplished in three ways: third, it invited all nations that followed the rules, even previous foes, into the club. (Falk, 2013).

The illusion of increased power might be created by an increase in military action and hostility, but according to historian Emmanuel Todd, it can be used as a cover for a decrease in power. There is a need for further explanation. He points out that this happened in the Soviet Union and the Roman Empire at the same time in the 1970s, and that the US may be going through a similar phase right now. (Brown, 2013)

In 2005, the United States maintained a total of thirty-eight big and medium-sized facilities across the world, the majority of which were air and naval bases. This number is comparable to the thirty-six naval bases and army garrisons that the United Kingdom had at the height of its imperial power in 1898 (Hulme & Gartzke, 2021). Now the USA plans to withdraw its military forces from many countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan that is appears the decline of power and the shrinking of the geopolitical area. (Go, 2020)

The US hesitation, and what was described as the American complicity in silence or more than it with the Russian intervention in Syria in 2015, marked the beginning of the decline of American hegemony in the region, as many of Washington's allies saw that it allowed the Russian presence in an area that was almost forbidden to him, which sounded alarm bells for some.

The regimes and states that saw Russia strengthening its presence in the eastern Mediterranean, and supporting regimes with all its strength, made these countries count on Russia to stay in power more than Washington's support, and with the retreat that occurred to Washington, whether with the withdrawal of its forces from Iraq, or with a chaotic withdrawal From Afghanistan, the conviction of many of these countries increased in the decline of American hegemony in the region and the world in general, which strengthened their new tendency to rely on Russia and China, which sees America abandoning its allies, and adheres to its principles in supporting the forces of change and democracy in the Arab world (McCoy, 2018)

3.1.5. American culture decline

Human rights in the USA are suffering a historic setback. The USA, which claims itself on being a "defender of human rights," is rife with endemic diseases like money politics, racial prejudice, gun and police violence, and wealth polarization. Serious defeat in human rights and justice laws severely weakened the basic freedoms and rights of the American people. Discrimination based on race is on the rise, and ethnic minorities frequently face it. Racial bias-related hate crimes have sharply grown in the US. (Horton, 2022)

Humanitarian disasters have been brought about by the US use of excessive force in the name of "fighting terrorism," the United States has conducted military operations in eighty-five nations since the turn of the twenty-first century. These operations have directly resulted in the deaths of at least 929,000 civilians and the relocation of thirty-eight million people. The United States has imposed more unilateral sanctions than any other nation in the world and is still imposing sanctions on more than twenty nations, which has made it impossible for those targeted to supply necessities like food and medication for their citizens. (World report, 2022)

The issue of immigration has been used as a weapon in partisan disputes, and numerous immigration charades have been created, subjecting immigrants to extreme bigotry and inhumane treatment. The United States is a nation with a reputation for being extremely violent, where residents are constantly in danger from both violent criminals and violent law enforcement. Prisons are overcrowded and serve as both sites of traditional slavery and sites of widespread forced labor and sexual exploitation. (Parker, 2019)

Modern slavery now takes place in prisons. In a report jointly released on June 2022, by the American Civil Liberties Union and the University of Chicago Law School, it is stated that the US has over 1.2 million inmates in state and federal prisons, of whom 800,000 are subject to forced labor and account for 65 percent of all convicts. More than 76 percent of those polled said they were compelled into continuing to work and that, if they did not, they would face punishments like solitary confinement, pushed-back release dates, and denial of family visitation rights. (Jackson, 2022)

Under liberal hegemony, the U.S. frequently incites wars, which fuels more conflicts and destabilizes the global order. These violent conflicts frequently fail, occasionally in a catastrophic way, mostly at the expense of the state that the liberal Goliath is meant to be defending. By frequently using force, inciting "proxy wars," arbitrarily imposing unilateral sanctions, gravely violating the rights of migrants, and refusing to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility, the United States pursues power politics in the international community, destroying world peace and development and impeding the advancement of human rights. The United States, which was founded on colonialism and inequality, has sunk more in its internal affairs, racism, and social unrest, the high number of deaths and the high rates of harassment in recent years and others have led significantly to the decline of American culture (Turchin, 2023)

3.2. China, the Number 1 Cause and Challenge to US Hegemony in International Political

3.2.1. Outlook of the Economy of China

In terms of nominal GDP product, China. When measured in terms of purchasing power parity (GDP PPP), China's economy, which had been the second largest in the world since 2010, overtook the US economy to take the top slot in 2014. In addition, China has the largest economy in the world and the one that is expanding the fastest. Since 1978, when China started experimenting with market-based economic reforms, the country has had annual GDP growth of more than 6%. China is also the second-largest consumer of goods and the top exporter of commodities in the world. China's contribution to the growth of the global GDP ranged from 25% to 39% between 2010 and 2019. It has been accountable for between 25 and 50 percent of all financial losses since the financial crisis of 2008–2009, 30 percent of the whole global economic expansion. As a result, it serves as the primary engine of global growth. As of the year 2021, China is responsible for 18% of the nominal GDP of the world economy (Xu, 2022).

Throughout the majority of the last two thousand years, one of the greatest economies in history was that of China. But it has also had times of both growth and fall over this time. China's economy has changed significantly since the start of economic reforms in 1978, becoming one of the most important players in global commerce and becoming quite varied.

Manufacturing, retail, mining, steel, textiles, vehicles, energy production, renewable energy, finance, electronics, telecommunications, real estate, and e-commerce are a few of the important industries with the strongest competitive strength. (Zhang, 2020)

Three of the top ten stock exchanges in the world as of October 2020 are located in China, including Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Shenzhen. The aggregate market value of these three stock exchanges is more than \$15.9 trillion. Shanghai, Hong Kong, Beijing, and Shenzhen are four of the cities in China that are included among the top ten most competitive financial centers in the world by the 2020 Global Financial Center Index.

This is more than any other country. According to research by Oxford Economics, four Chinese cities—Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen—are expected to be in the top ten in terms of nominal GDP by the year 2035. China has been the world's top manufacturer since 2010, unseating the United States of America, which had previously held the title for the previous one hundred years. (Accius, 2022)

China is currently the leader in the field of electric vehicles, as in 2018, the nation manufactured and acquired more than BEVs and PHEVs make up half of all plug-in electric vehicle sales globally. Furthermore, China is the largest manufacturer of electric vehicle batteries and has several crucial raw materials for making batteries. China possessed more than 40% of the world's solar power capacity at the end of 2018. (Fleisher & Zhang, 2021)

Some Chinese and foreign sources have asserted that the official numbers released by the Chinese government exaggerate the country's rate of economic growth. However, the official projections for China's economic development, according to a number of Western scholars and institutions, greatly underestimate the country's actual pace of growth. The Economist Intelligence Unit, among others, feel that China's nominal and real GDP numbers are generally reliable, although there is evidence that China's GDP data is "smoothed". The economic liberalization of China resulted in the development of a sizable Illegal Market in the country, which is known as the informal sector. (Yang, 2016)

As of the year 2020, China has overtaken the United States as the nation with the biggest concentration of persons who have accumulated a personal net worth of at least \$110,000. According to the Hurun Global Rich List 2020, five of the top ten cities in the world with the

highest concentration of billionaires are found in China. Some of these cities are Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou. This is more than any other country. As of January 2021, China was home to eighty-five female billionaires, accounting for two-thirds of the total number of female billionaires across the globe. Additionally, China created twenty-four new female billionaires in the year 2020. (Accius, 2022)

In the wake of Beijing's abandonment of the "zero COVID" policy, many economic institutions have revised their forecasts of China's economic growth (Amighini, 2021). In the same regard, Fitch Ratings considers, in its analysis of the Chinese economy, that many economic indicators are still high in the country, as the services PMI jumped to 54.4 in January 2023 from 41.6 in December 2022. It considers fitch believes that the Rapid exit from the "Covid pandemic" shock means that economic activity in the first half of this year will be stronger than the expectations of economists that were set for economic growth at the end of last year. (Bi, 2023)

3.2.2. What is China's global plan?

The US-China competition has been centered on disagreements about regional and, more recently, global order since the conclusion of the Cold War. It focuses on non-military strategies that potential rivals to the United States, like China, can adopt. Coercive power (to force compliance) (Cooker, 2017), consensual inducements (to encourage it), and legitimacy are the three main "means of control" that are used to direct the conduct of other states and establish a hegemon's place in regional and global order (to legitimately command it). (Woodward, 2017)

Two primary strategies-often pursued in that order are required for rising states to successfully depose the hegemon peacefully. The first strategy is to restrict the hegemon's ability to exert power, especially over the growing state. If a growing state is still at the hegemon's mercy, it cannot overthrow the hegemon. (Lorenzini, 2019).

If a rising state is unable to compel the respect of other nations by coercive threats, mutually beneficial inducements, or genuine legitimacy, it cannot become a hegemon. The

second is to create tools for controlling other people. Without initially neutralizing the hegemony, efforts to establish order are likely to be unsuccessful and easily resisted. (Andrade, 2016).

Developing power cannot securely employ the third strategy, global expansion, which seeks to blunt and build at the global level to displace the hegemon from world leadership until it has successfully carried out a good deal of building and blunting in its home region. These regional and then global strategies combined present a difficult route to success for the nationalist Chinese Communist Party officials who want to put China back in its rightful place and undo the historical anomaly of the West's dominance, global dominance. (Kavalski, 2012)

The most crucial factor influencing the Chinese grand strategy—its sense of US power and threat—has seen dramatic discontinuities, which has caused China to switch from one plan to the next (Rudd, 2022). China's first displacement strategy (1989–2008) attempted to quietly erode After the catastrophic triplet of Tiananmen Square, the Gulf War, and the Cold War, American influence over China, particularly in Asia, and the demise of the Soviet Union prompted Beijing to dramatically increase its sense of US danger. The second displacement policy of China, which ran from 2008 to 2016, was designed to lay the groundwork for regional hegemony in Asia. (Edelstein, 2020)

It was introduced as a result of the Global Financial Crisis, which gave Beijing the confidence to act more assertively and perceive US strength as having declined. China is now starting a third displacement plan that expands its blunting and building operations globally to unseat the United States as the leading power in the globe. In response, the book's final chapters create an asymmetric US grand strategy that takes a leaf from China's playbook and aims to thwart China's regional and international goals without exchanging money, ships, or loans loan for a loan. Based on knowledge of China's policy, this strategy (F. & Parisot, 2018)

It is expected of great powers will have grand strategies. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is commonly regarded as an emerging great power, and the majority of analysts agree that Beijing does have a grand plan. However, one should not automatically assume that the Chinese government has a comprehensive strategy. (Levesque, 2018)

3.2.3. Why Is Grand Strategy Important?

The necessity for a firm grasp of China's goals and strategies has never been greater than before (Wang,2006). China today represents a challenge unlike any the US has ever encountered. Now US opponents or coalition of rivals have surpassed more than 60% of the US GDP in a century. China discreetly achieved this milestone as early as 2014. When the relative pricing of commodities is considered, Already, China's GDP exceeds that of the US by more than 20%. (Levity, 2018).

Therefore, China is the biggest rival the US has ever had. How the US manages China's ascent to superpower status will determine the next century. Grand strategy is distinguished not only by the size of the strategic objectives but also by the coordination of several "means" to achieve them. (Kashmeri & Lateef, 2019)

When states have grand strategies, however, they can influence world history. Nazi Germany employed a comprehensive plan that included economic pressure on its neighbors, military buildups to scare its competitors, and political alliances to encircle its enemies. (Swaine & Tellis, 2000), despite having a GDP that is less than one-third that of its great power rivals, this allowed it to outperform them for an awfully long period.

Washington sought a grand strategy during the Cold War that included the use of military force to deter Soviet aggression, economic assistance to limit communist dominance, and political institutions to unite liberal governments and limit Soviet influence in the absence of a US-Soviet war. (Kashmeri & Lateef, 2019). The integration of China's statecraft tools in the service of broad regional and international goals has enormous consequences, but it has also been the subject of considerable debate but little thorough analysis. China is already a major player, so if it devises a coherent plan to link its \$14 trillion economy with its blue-water navy and growing political influence globally—and the United States either misses it or misinterprets it—the twenty-first century may unfold in ways that are harmful to the country and the liberal values it has long defended. (Goldstein, 2008).

The USA is only now realizing this, leading to the most fundamental reconsideration of China policy in more than a decade. Despite this reevaluation, there is still much disagreement

on China's goals and direction. Beijing is said to be focused on regional matters, while others assert that Beijing has global ambitions. Some claim it has a well-coordinated 100-year plan. (Yang, 2016). Others assert that it is opportunistic and error prone. Beijing is viewed by some as an overtly revisionist state, while others regard it as a significant player in the present system of government. Some claim Beijing wants the US to leave Asia, while others claim it is happy with a limited US presence there. (DOSHI, 2023)

It became the supreme command in defining its strategic goals and then determined to reach the main goal of reaching the main goal, and it is planned to become the joint leadership between the other countries. (Chau & Kane, 2014)

Regarding the plan of the Republic of China and its interests, Beijing has set several goals, about economic growth, global leadership and development of economic structures, and control over disputed territories. Some of the goals fuel rivalry, conflict, and tension with Americans and their allies. (Shambaugh, 2020)

And to be specific targets for specific targets, these represent weather conditions. China aims to manage its relationship with the US to advance and resolve problems brought on by that rivalry without impeding China's capacity to pursue its economic objectives. (Wang, 2006)

Since 1949, China has developed four major plans in succession: the revolution strategy (1949–1977), the recovery strategy (1978–89), the strategy of comprehensive national power building (1990–2003), and the strategy of national renewal (2004-present). Although there are differences between these four strategies, he notes that there are some permanent strategic goals that have persisted over decades. (Tse, 2012)

Among the most important of these constants: restoring and preserving regional integrity and preventing the domination of another power over the Asia-Pacific region. Since 1978, two Additional strategic goals have been added, such as creating international conditions that support economic growth and giving China a say in the evolving global order. These four main approaches all aimed to strengthen China. However (Agbodji, 2015), Different goals and approaches, and resources have been prioritized by different People's Republic of China presidents.

According to China's idea of comprehensive national strength, which contrasts its strength with that of its main rivals, its current perspective on its relationship with the US is based on competition across a variety of issues. This concept of national strength includes a variety of additional factors, including cultural security, economic development, military might, and internal stability. China's worries about its relative inferiority in critical areas can be clarified by using a framework similar to the one employed in this study. As a result, US officials could have a better knowledge of possibilities when they materialize. (Andersen & Jiang, 2014)

3.2.4. The Unresolved Issue

Analysts and decision-makers have different views about China's aims and approach. Others think the rise of China can be controlled and may even benefit worldwide, while others are skeptical of it and regard it as a potential danger to the present global system.

Skeptics frequently have a negative opinion of China's actions, interpreting them as manifestations of a drive for supremacy and disrespect for international standards and regulations. As evidence of a more aggressive and authoritarian approach to world affairs, they cite China's growing military aggression, its territorial claims in the South China Sea, they also express worry about China's rising economic influence and the possibility that it may use it to exert pressure on other nations. (Myers, 2021)

On the other hand, believers typically view China's rise as a normal and legitimate development that has the potential to bring about good improvements to the international system. They contend that China's rising economic might aid in the emancipation of millions of people from poverty and that China's growing influence in international politics can promote more cohesion and stability. Additionally, they stress how crucial it is to communicate with China and find methods to cooperate on matters of shared interest, such as global health and climate change. (Grosse, 2021)

With a quickly expanding economy, a modernized military, and a more forceful strategic plan on the international scene, China has recently emerged as a major world power. For decision-makers, leaders, and scholars attempting to manage the complex dynamics of international relations in the twenty-first century, understanding China's grand strategy is crucial.

In this research, we contend that, to fully comprehend China's strategic priorities and how they may change over time, a scientific and sociological analysis of China's grand strategy is needed.

Scientific strategy:

To investigate the Greater China Strategy scientifically, data must be gathered and analyzed using quantitative techniques. Economic metrics including GDP growth, trade balances, and investment trends can provide light on China's strategic objectives to attain economic hegemony as well as its top economic priorities. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for instance, can learn more about China's economic goals and strategies for achieving them by examining investment trends. To assess China's military policy and its capacity to project influence beyond its limits, it is also possible to examine military prowess and technological developments. For instance, China's creation of innovative stealth technologies and hypersonic weaponry has alarmed both its rivals and neighbors. We may learn about China's strategic objectives and how it intends to deploy its military by examining its military capabilities. (Doshi, 2021)

Social Analysis:

The cultural, political, and historical influences on China's worldview and approach to foreign relations are examined as part of a social approach to researching China's grand strategy. For instance, Confucianism has had a significant impact on Chinese culture for thousands of years, shaping its view of government and international relations. Similarly, to this, it would be possible to look at the legacy of the Chinese Communist Party and its emphasis on nationalism and the lust for power. China's strategic aims have also been influenced historically by events like colonialism and its "century of humiliation" at the hands of foreign powers. For instance, China's territorial conflicts in the South China Sea can be interpreted as an effort to restore land that it believes is legitimately theirs. We can better comprehend China's motivations and values by looking at these cultural and historical aspects. (Scobell, 2020)

this research can understand China's grand strategy more thoroughly by integrating scientific and social methods. Although military and economic elements are significant, also this research can better comprehend China's fundamental motivations and ideals by looking at cultural and historical aspects of the country.

This study, which builds on the work of several others, also aims to stand apart in notable ways. Grand strategy is defined and studied using a novel social-scientific approach, and other noteworthy aspects of the book include a vast collection of previously unexplored or infrequently cited Chinese texts, a systematic analysis of important conundrums in Chinese military, political, and economic behavior, and a close look at the factors affecting strategic adjustment. Overall, it is intended that the research contributes to the developing China debate by providing a novel way for systematically and rigorously revealing China's grand plan.

Due to its relative position to Washington, China has made several steps to replace the United States on a regional and global level.

US policymakers are cognizant of the fact that the topics addressed in the Crowe memorandum bear a remarkable resemblance to the issues we face today. Henry Kissinger cites it in his book *On China*. The previous US ambassador to China, Max Baucus, regularly referred to the document as a roundabout way of questioning Chinese strategy. (Tse, 2012)

There are a variety of issues that will determine how efficiently a grand strategy developed by China can be implemented in the years and decades to come. Along with the form and characteristics of their political system, as well as the extent to which this system successfully regulates Chinese society, the coherence, competency, and worldviews of PRC leaders are among the most crucial elements. This chapter discusses the composition of the PRC's senior leadership, how this group views the world, their main goals, and significant developments in Chinese politics and society as of the end of 2017. (Shen, 2020).

Midway into Xi Jinping's expected ten-year reign as China's most powerful person, these meetings ended. Most people agree that Xi is the most important paramount leader of China in recent memory.

There is a widespread belief that Xi would work behind the scenes to get an extension of his time in office beyond the period that runs from 2022 to 2023. Actually, in March of 2018, delegates at the National People's Congress voted to lift the constitutional provision that the President of the People's Republic of China may only serve a maximum of two five-year terms in office. (Darimont, 2023). Without a doubt, Xi Jinping is the most ambitious Chinese leader to

take office since Deng Xiaoping, and the profound organizational shifts that he has brought about will have an effect on China for a respectable number of years to come .

Skeptics assert that China's objectives are constrained and that it is still primarily concerned with internal stability and development, rather than with regional or global hegemony over the United States. White House officials with experience have expressed skepticism over "Xi's desire to drive the United States out of Asia and destroy the United States' regional alliances." Other well-known experts have made the following points more forcefully.

These doubters' opponents are the believers. This group has not yet put up a plan of action to persuade the skeptics that China has a grand strategy to topple the United States both regionally and worldwide. Senior intelligence officials within the government, such as former Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, have made public statements that "the Chinese are essentially attempting to usurp America's position as the world's superpower,"but they have not (or perhaps they are unable to) provide more detail or suggest that this goal was accompanied by a specific strategy outside of government. Only a few recent works have attempted to present the case in detail. (Pauken, 2020).

Although he asserts rather exaggeratedly that China has had a covert grand plan for global conquest since 1949 and, in major areas, mainly depends on personal influence and tales, Pentagon official Michael Pillsbury's marathon blockbuster *One Hundred Years* is the most well-known. Coming to comparable conclusions and doing a lot of things correctly, but they are more intuitive than technically empirical, and a social scientific methodology and a wider data basis can make them more compelling. Consequently, they spend less emphasis on the crucial post-Cold War era to the present, which is the focus of competition between the United States and China. (Woodward, 2017)

3.2.5. Governance and System

Although the term "party-state" is frequently used to describe China's political system, The Communist party, which was created in 1921, the military forces, which were formally constituted in 1927, and the state administrative apparatus, which was fully established in 1949, are the three primary bureaucratic structures. (Shen, 2020). As a result, it is more correct to refer

to the dictatorship as a party-military-state in a tripartite manner. which includes Xi Jinping and his cohorts, they were born in the 1950s and reached adulthood between 1966 and 1976.

According to the Chinese Constitution, a People's Democratic Dictatorship is in charge of the communist country known as the People's Republic of China. The alliance between the working class and the peasants is the basis for the working class, and the council system of people's representatives is the appropriate organizational form for that. The system of inter-party cooperation and political consultation headed by the Chinese Communist party is the proper party structure for this. (Heilmann, 2017). The core elements and fundamental framework of the Chinese political system, which is a centralized expression of socialist democratic politics, are the system of people's congresses, the system of party cooperation and political consultation under the direction of the Communist Party of China, the system of regional national autonomy, the systems of political dialogue and vast grassroots autonomy. (Dreyer, 2014)

The system of inter-party cooperation, being the basic political system of the state, determined the status of the CPC and the parties. The various political aspects of the political life of the state, its roles, and the relations between them. (Ming, 2017)

The CCP has formed close friendly party relations with various democratic parties. The basic theory, basic line, basic method, and basic experiences of the CPC has various parties Democracy approved all, building socialism with Chinese characteristics has become a common goal of all Chinese political parties. In a political environment characterized by smoothness, stability, solidarity, and harmony, the CPC carries out broad political cooperation with the CPC's various democratic parties, considering the political and material interests of its allies and solidarity with them on the path of progress together.

China began the process of revolutionizing Chinese society, and Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong (1949-1974) chose to side with the Soviet Union and ally with it and began ambitious industrial growth and military building initiatives with Soviet assistance. In subsequent periods, in the second phase after the Mao era, (Heilmann, 2017). which practically ended with the end of the seventies of the twentieth century, especially since the nineties of the last century, China was able to achieve economic successes represented in attracting foreign investment, increasing exports, building infrastructure, manufacturing light products and durable

goods at low prices for markets. world, and significantly increased per capita income relative to its huge population, setting new records of growth at the global economic level (Mansing, 2006).

3.2.6. Chinese Culture Influence

There have been discussions on how China's cultural influence may change the dynamics of global culture, particularly how it may displace some aspects of American culture, as it has grown in recent years. China's lengthy history, deeply rooted customs, and rich cultural inheritance have allowed it to express its cultural impact on a global scale. China has increased soft power initiatives, trying to spread its language, arts, philosophy, and traditions outside of its borders in light of its fast-expanding economy and expanding worldwide footprint. (Zhao, 2018)

The media sector is one significant example of Chinese cultural influence. Chinese films, TV shows, and other entertainment goods have received praise and recognition internationally. The calligraphy, painting, and martial arts that are part of the traditional Chinese arts have gained popularity and acclaim worldwide. The globalization of Confucius Institutes, which support the Chinese language and culture, has benefitted Chinese cultural communication. Discussions concerning the potential effects of China's growing cultural influence on the supremacy of US culture have arisen. it's crucial to recognize that the dominance of American cultural exports in some markets and contexts may be challenged by the rising popularity of Chinese exports. (Lihua, 2013)

3.3. U.S.- China Relations

The United States follows the policy of America first, and China is no less than it in raising this slogan China first; It also has a cultural heritage that makes it aspire to this leadership role. We are facing two powers in the global arena, the dominant American power and the rising Chinese power, which seeks hegemony, so the struggle is over who will be the first; It will create a lot of crises that will, in turn, affect global politics The Treaty of (Wanghia) between the United States and China in (1844) represented the first beginnings of American-Chinese relations (Wanghia). Especially after China lost to Japan in 1895, then the United States set itself up as a

representative of Western countries to ensure that China's markets remain open to Western countries. (Fitzsimmons, 2021)

Until the end of the year (1949) China remained an ally of the United States, but China's conversion to communism after the national liberation revolution led by Mao Zedong made the United States become an opponent of China, and then it was seen as a competing country. However, this did not prevent the United States from rapprochement with it as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union, which provided China with enormous economic and technical assistance that formed the backbone of Chinese economic and military development. In 1972, former US President Richard Nixon visited China. Shortly after the visit, the two sides issued the (Joint Sino-American Statement) or what is known as the Shanghai Declaration as a guide and guide for relations between the two countries, and a sign of opening the gate of Sino-American contacts wide, which resulted in agreement on the common interest of both countries in confronting the Soviet threat. (Lieberthal, 2009)

The American leaders, from the period of US President Bill Clinton to the period of US President Obama, relied on the principle of containing China, participating with hedging, and trying to create a political and economic environment through which it seeks to reshape its international behavior. and persuade China to contribute to global public goods and global institutions by acting as a responsible stakeholder. Those American policies proved that strengthening the policy of balancing power through participation did not guarantee Chinese friendship with the United States. With the advent of US President Donald Trump, US policies towards China were completely different, as the US president pursued a policy of strong blows to the Chinese economy and a protectionist policy for the US economy, which was represented in the Unilateral imposition of tariffs on Chinese exports to the United States from the rate of (10%) to the rate of (25%), with a value of \$200 billion. dollars and the US administration under Donald Trump demanded that China treat and export its products To China with preferential treatment and accused China of manipulating the Chinese currency. I also led many Diplomatic efforts with Western countries allied with the United States to prevent the adoption of Chinese technologies from the company Huawei, in addition to putting in place measures to prevent the purchase of American and European technology by third parties Chinese, and measures to stop

Chinese investments in the United States, in addition to pressure on allies to adopt a vision similar to the American hardline vision of China. (Borekci, 2022)

Adequate measures for democratic reform, and therefore a hardline approach must be taken against it, especially in light of the increasing American complaints about the Chinese military force, and the Chinese "Resolute and Path" initiative, and targeting Beijing to lead the most advanced modern technology by 2025. While the US national security strategy under US President Joe Biden considered China the only competitor to the United States, and influential in reshaping the global system. According to the National Security Strategy, China poses a long-term threat to the United States of America and its national security and interests, while Russia poses an immediate threat to the international order. The strategy confirms that China is the only country that threatens the US hegemony and role in the long term and poses the biggest and most real challenge to the United States of America. It intends to reshape the international order, and increasingly wields the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to achieve this goal. That is why the US Department of Defense refers to China as the "speed challenge". Therefore, the United States of America must develop the capabilities of the armed forces, competitiveness, innovation, and democracy. (Kelly, 2023)

Seeing the future in what and how the United States has expressed China's strategy and the Lavender and Road Initiative," it was seen by the United States as intended to advance China's global interests and vision while serving China's domestic economic needs. And strengthen the position of its companies in the global market at the expense of non-Chinese companies and expand the use of Chinese industrial standards in key technology sectors. China's geopolitical strategy aims to expand its sphere of influence, strengthen new rules for international cooperation, and form a new world order, and this initiative hides behind its more intense geopolitical competition. (Feng, 2023)

American strategists view China's use of the Belt and Road Initiative as a means to launch a geo-economic attack, to expand its security and political influence in the Asia-Pacific region, and thus as a threat to the regional system led by the United States, while some political analysts say that the Belt and Road Initiative is China's response to the policy of " The axis of the United States of America towards Asia, a policy that emerged during the presidency of Barack

Obama because the United States aims to contain China using political, economic and even military means. For this reason, the Chinese leadership seeks a polar, multipolar system.

The United States believes that China will try to transform the projects of the “One Belt and One Road” initiative into political influence and military empowerment, and China is increasingly using its economic influence to extract political concessions from other countries, or exact revenge on them.

As stated by the US Department of Defense in its annual report (2019), which assesses the current and future paths of China's military and technological development, security and military strategies, and organizational and operational concepts of the People's Liberation Army. The One Belt, One Road initiative is linked to the PLA's ambitious expansion of overseas deployments, including in locations such as the Pacific Islands and the Caribbean. The United States considers that the initiative leads to the establishment of a network of allies for China in the Middle East and the African continent that threatens American interests in those regions. The World Bank report on the Belt and Road Initiative showed that China was able to grant many financial loans to developing countries that exceed the American financial loans to those countries. Countries. The United States also considered that the initiative seeks to undermine American security and prosperity, as it constitutes a threat to maritime security led by the United States in the Pacific region. (Zhong & Myers, 2021)

China-American relations were between cooperation and competition, but China during the Trump era faced several problems, including the growing trade deficit with the United States with it, which led to an escalation of the trade dispute, in addition to the North Korean nuclear program, and the escalation of tension over the issue of Taiwan and human rights, in addition to To the territorial disputes between China and the allies of the United States of America in the South China Sea. Although Trump's pivotal strategy was based on trying to address the US trade deficit with China, the biggest danger that constituted a source of strategic concern for the US administration in the short and medium term is the rise of China as a threatening economic and military power. In the medium term to topple the United States of America from its position as a power. Therefore, the United States has adopted a policy aimed at preventing China from becoming a strategic competitor to it. The United States under Trump imposed sanctions on Chinese officials over human rights issues in China and the spread of the coronavirus, to end a

protracted tariff war. The current US President, Joe Biden, also promised to "take a tough stand against China." Thus, US-Chinese relations are expected to witness increasing tension. Various economic, political, geostrategic, and human rights issues, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, are extremely sensitive issues between the two sides, and therefore each party will try to direct the relationship in a way that achieves the maximum possible interests in light of the elements. The strength it has and its ability to mobilize and employ it, considering its weaknesses. It suffers from it and the other party can seek to deal with it and employ it to serve its goals and interests, and this will also be reflected in the future of the international system, as it will move in the medium term to multipolarity, in which China plays a pivotal role, relying on its economic superiority, in addition to competition. (Tao, 2022)

On artificial intelligence next to the United States In the economic field: Beijing is growing at a rapid pace that is difficult for the United States to keep up with, which threatens Washington's international standing. China benefits from the free international market system, but it does not open its markets to other countries and imposes restrictions on foreign trade to its large economy and its estimated market of four hundred million people. This dimension represents one of the most important reasons for the intensity of competition between them, as China's total gross volume increased from about \$420 billion in 1980 to about \$14.6 trillion in 2020, and per capita, gross national product increased from about \$430 to \$10,400 during the period itself. China's share of the global economy increased from about 10% in 2005 to 16% in 2015, and it appears to reach about 19% The US share of the global economy is expected to decline from about 19% in 2005 to about 15% in 2025 The size of the Chinese economy will exceed that of the United States. And it follows that China has become 2020 the first trading partner for most of the major economies in the world, and Washington coalitions occupy this position in 2000. (Yu, 2020)

3.3.1. The U.S.- China facing a new cold war between unipolarity and a multipolar world.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine may have contributed to the current global crisis, but it is the ongoing rivalry between the United States and China that is driving the features of the new

world. The entry of the Chinese airship into US airspace, which Washington claims are part of a larger program to spy on military installations around the world, is a stark reminder that two powers are still engaged in a struggle for global dominance. (Brands & Gaddis, 2023)

Compared to the Soviet Union, China is a much more formidable enemy. The Soviet economy's GDP peaked at 60% of the US economy. On the other hand, the Chinese economy is expected to overtake the US economy within the next ten years if current trends continue. The development of the technology sector matched that of the United States in China, but the Soviet Union was unable to keep up with Western technological developments. China will likely overtake the United States in economic output by the second half of the century, by virtue of a population more than four times larger than the United States. (Sanger, 2021)

The competition between the United States and China is unique in several respects. This competition in multiple theaters significantly affects the new world order and its stability. It is similar to the Cold War in terms of hostility between two great powers and raises concerns about the re-emergence of competing blocs and axes, whether in Europe or between countries. Developing, but some believe that the bipolar system in light of the Sino-American competition will be less stable than in the Cold War period. (Bluhm, 2023)

As this competition is characterized by an unstable transitional dynamic that shows indications of a real danger of the outbreak of a major war that threatens the entire international community. Based on this competition, it may start from Ukraine or any potential point of tension, although it is unlikely that the use of military force by the two powers constitutes an imminent threat. It is unlikely that the Chinese would risk a war with the United States and vice versa, as any confrontation, however limited, could have dire consequences for regional stability and the global economy.

Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Tibet are the most important theaters of confrontation that Washington exploits against Beijing, and they are a major source of instability in the new bipolar system, and Taiwan represents the greatest danger to the war of the great powers in an era of competition between the two powers, with uncertain escalation dynamics in terms of geographical spread and the use of weapons. (Ferguson, 2019)

In addition, the Gulf region, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. China's recent entry into the mediation line between Iran and Saudi Arabia translates into transforming the supposed plans to start implementing the Belt and Road Initiative, which poses a direct threat to US interests, starting from this region and reaching Europe and Central Asia. (Youell, 2023)

The Iranian-Saudi rapprochement is understood by Washington as not diversifying Riyadh's partners, but rather liberating itself from American hegemony, and also a disappointment to Washington for its inability to manage the conflict in the region and a success calculated for China in rehabilitating Iran, which was rejected by the West, as it constitutes an effective step to remove it from its isolation, and strengthen its position China as a stabilizing force in the region. (Olimat, 2023)

South China Sea This region is one of the most obvious areas of contention, and the South China Sea is considered a passage for a third of global maritime trade with large reserves of oil and natural gas, as China and the United States compete for influence and power in the region that both views from a geostrategic point of view, and China went to The artificial expansion of the disputed islands in the region limits the construction of military institutions, which is a direct manifestation of the growing threat posed by China to US hegemony in this region, which causes great concern to Washington. (Luzyanin, 2023)

Narrowing the gap in the levels of economic and military power between the two countries, as well as the competing international institutions established by China to balance American influence, as China has rapidly grown its economic, military, and diplomatic capabilities at the domestic and international levels and is moving towards parity of power with the United States, this expansion is accompanied by the challenge facing the regime and current American leadership, which sparked a confrontation the United States had not seen since with the Soviet Union. (Yang, 2021)

When looking at the levels of power and the behavior of the rival states, it becomes clear that parity is not far off. Military expansion and modernization stimulate deterrence, which ultimately creates a highly contested environment. As China's economic power continues to expand, we can expect a continuation of the current hostilities and competition.

US-Chinese relations can be described as constantly changing, and the future of the international system has become linked to the competition between China and the United States, and therefore the competition is likely to calm down in periods imposed by the interests of the two countries, and in other periods the pace of competition will increase and may result in a polar or multipolar industrial system. It is widely known that witnessing new forces and alliances.

3.4. BRICS Member States, an Opportunity for a Multipolar World, and a Threat to USA Hegemony

The BRICS group is a bloc that includes Russia, China, Brazil, South Africa, and India. It was founded in 2006 in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg after a summit held there, and its name changed from “BRIC” to BRICS in 2011 after South Africa joined it. This international group aims to strengthen economic relations between its members using local currencies, thus reducing dependence on the US dollar.

The summit's main topics of discussion included how the four nations could cooperate more effectively in the future as well as ways to improve the world economy and financial institutions. There was considerable discussion about how poor nations, including 3/4 of the BRIC members, could participate more actively in world politics (Wang, 2017). Following the conference in Yekaterinburg, The BRIC countries saw the need for a new, "diverse, stable, and predictable" global reserve currency. Russia has previously questioned the seeming "dominance" of the US dollar, although without outright condemning it, the comment did lower the dollar's value in comparison to other significant currencies. (Prins, 2019).

Argentina and Iran are just two of the many nations that have indicated interest in joining the BRIC grouping (also known as BRICS) since South Africa did so in 2010. During talks the current BRICS chair, and prominent Chinese officials, throughout the summer of 2022, both expressed their determination to join BRICS. Beijing endorsed Argentina's participation during a meeting between Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Argentine Foreign Minister Santiago Cafiero outside of the G20 Summit in Indonesia. Later, at their encounter outside the 77th UN General Assembly, Cafiero and Yi, China once more reaffirmed their

support for Argentina's probable application. It is also acknowledged that Brazil, Russia, and India support Argentina's application. Iran also applied to join the Chinese government's economic association of emerging markets in June 2022.

In recent months, relations between Iran, China, and Russia have improved as all three regimes look for new partners to counter growing Western criticism. While they have not yet made official requests, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt have also shown an interest in joining the BRICS. There is not a formal application procedure per se to join BRICS, but any prospective country needs to have the support of all current BRICS members to be accepted. These are Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. (Cooper, 2016)

The BRICS accelerated the development of a multipolar system of international relations and the expansion of international economic cooperation. A new economic system based on equitable access for all nations to financial and sales markets, a blend of state planning and a market economy, has emerged as a result of the growth of the BRICS. The relevance of the BRICS paradigm lies in a qualitative shift in the economic development model of the Global South rather than in increasing the capabilities or goals of the BRICS countries.

The liberal world order has been put in danger, and stability in Europe has been disturbed, but these are not the only consequences that the United States should be concerned about. The current strengthening of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) organization is a result of the crisis in Ukraine. (Wang & Liu, 2017), which if properly addressed might pose a threat to the current Western-led international order in addition to the apparent challenges to ideas of sovereignty. The United States must accept the growing power of BRICS and provide a compelling alternative if it hopes to safeguard opposing the rising influence of authoritarian countries like China and Russia in the future (Wouters, 2012).

The BRICS countries already comprise a powerful, economically effective alliance that wants to expand, therefore the United States should be concerned about their expanding collaboration. 40% of the world's population, 30% of its geographical area, 18% of its commerce, and 25% of its nominal GDP are now represented by the five BRICS countries. Additionally, these countries provide a considerable contribution to the world's food supply: India is the largest exporter of rice, Brazil is the largest exporter of soybeans, and Russia is the

largest exporter of wheat. Similarly, to this, China, India, and Russia all significantly influence the global energy market. (Stuenkel, 2021). Russia is the second-largest natural gas exporter behind China, while India and China are important players in the switch to clean energy.

Russia and China have also shown a powerful desire to expand the coalition. While China recently invited Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Kazakhstan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Thailand to join the club, Iran has submitted a membership request. The possibility of these countries joining BRICS should worry the West because they are all major participants in the world economy. (Babić, 2023)

Additionally, the BRICS countries have recently come closer together as a result of the conflict in Ukraine and the sanctions put in place as a result. The incentive for non-western nations to buy Russian oil has increased as the price of oil has soared to as much as \$120 per barrel globally as a result of a shortage on the market; Russian oil is currently trading at \$30 to \$35 per barrel. Thus, nations like China and India have significantly expanded their purchases of Russian crude oil. For instance, India increased its purchase of Russian oil from twelve million barrels in the full year of 2021 to nearly sixty million barrels in the first half of 2022. (Chernova & Liakos, 2022).

Furthermore, South Africa recently disclosed that it is thinking about buying Russian oil. The president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, asserts that trade between his nation and the other BRICS nations has risen. Putin claims that trade with China, India, Brazil, and South Africa increased by 38% in the first quarter of 2022. (Blackmon, 2023). War has improved relations between the nations economically, and in some ways, it even seems to be settling conflicts. For instance, tensions between the two countries on their border with the Himalayas have decreased as a result of China and India's earlier this year tightening of relations with Russia. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the BRICS countries' relations have grown closer, and as a result, so has their influence over emerging countries.

BRICS crosses an international grouping that differs greatly from the rest of the forms of alliances and organizations that the international system has witnessed before, as it is not linked to a geographical or regional scope. Or linguistic, and the talk began with the possibility of the BRICS countries collectively exercising a global geostrategic influence, and in this context, it is

possible to achieve the serious and ambitious endeavors undertaken by the BRICS countries; To formulate a new international pattern in light of the radical changes taking place in the world; It aims to take on a more active role in international affairs to challenge American hegemony and promote the idea of national sovereignty and independence. (*BRICS*, 2014).

By attaining sustainable economic growth, the BRICS nations are assuming new leadership roles in the developing world. A number of factors, the most important of which is the nature of the countries that make up the bloc, contributed to the creation of diversity and pluralism in the field of energy. These factors include the nature of the countries that make up the bloc, which alone have great economic and military capabilities, and the richness of these countries in resources and energies. In an effort to reestablish the distribution of power in the globe, sources, and industrialization, and from it to integration in various locations despite the geographic distance, were considered. To break Western hegemony over the international system and draw features of a multipolar international system in which the countries of the group can sit comfortably. (Wang,2017)

4. Chapter 4 Conclusion

This research discussed that unipolarity, led by American hegemony, is in decline after it dominated the world since the end of World War II. Today, we are witnessing a decline in

hegemony because of its recent policies with the world. Also, the emergence of a rising power on the international scene opened the field of competition for the leadership of the new world. China is the largest competitor to America at present, whether economically or politically, as for Russia, which recovered after the fall of the Soviet Union, it is usually strong on international arms to prove that it is ready to compete for the seat of the new world. Russia, which recovered after the fall of the Soviet Union, return strongly to the international area to prove that it is ready to compete for the seat of the new world.

From the mid-20th century to the early 21st century, the US has been the dominant power in the world, both politically and economically. But like all superpowers in the past, the US hegemony and dominance will not reign over the world forever.

This research studies the point of view of the basic International Relations theories that are pointing out the possibility that the US power in world politics is being weakened. Those are the mainstream theories (liberalism and Realism).

The literature review proved that China and other powers are on the rise and could be the beginning of a new “new world Order” as described by the title of this work. The term "new world order" describes a new historical era that shows a significant shift in global political ideology and the power dynamic in global interactions. The phrase in the years leading up to the end of the First Global War, references to a "new world order" or similar expressions were regularly made. Then, the term referred to a world where the US is the dominant power or superpower. But we demonstrated in this research that the US no longer holds the same power it used to have after WWII, thus, the emergence of new power centers is what this thesis calls the new “new world order.”

An emerging power, often known as a rising power, is a state or a group of states that has a sizable and growing influence in international affairs. Such a power seeks to play a more significant role in international affairs, on a regional or global scale and has the resources and levels of development necessary to make such ambitions possible. There are no established criteria by which to identify emerging powers, however, a basic trait of a rising power is that it also has a developing economy because political and military emergence depends on and

precedes economic development. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) are five of the greatest developing economies in the world.) are frequently mentioned as emerging powers, yet they are in different phases of development and have different potentials. The BRICS organization is challenging US hegemony in several ways. Based on the data we gathered, we discovered that the collective economic and political power of BRICS has grown rapidly in recent years, challenging the dominance of the US-led Western world order.

The group has established several, Financial entities like the Contingency Reserve Arrangement and the New Development Bank which have provided alternative sources of funding and financial support to member countries. Additionally, BRICS has been advocating for more equitable international trade practices and has sought to increase their representation in international organizations, challenging the US-led global governance system. Overall, BRICS is becoming an increasingly influential player on the global stage, and its collective efforts are likely to continue to challenge US hegemony in the years to come.

Events such as the Russo-Ukrainian War, the terrorist acts on September 11, 2001, the limitations of the military and political power of the US to end the War in Iraq and Afghanistan, the discrepancy between Washington's rhetoric on democracy and human rights and its systematic readiness to violate such rights for national security (as with Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and the practice of so-called rendition of terrorism detainees) revealed that in recent years the US position as a global power is at stake.

Based on the data the research found presented through this research, China already has a key place in the global order. It has the biggest population and military in the world, is the largest trading partner in the world, and is a major source of international loans, particularly to developing nations. It has also become a center for technological innovation on a global scale. Our findings suggested. that by 2030, China's real GDP would surpass that of the US, becoming the greatest economy in the world. China also challenges the US in many geopolitical issues. We have provided the case of Taiwan as well as the Asia-Pacific case.

Another global program that China initiated to consolidate its power is a program known as Belt and Road. By linking China to Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa via three land-based and three marine corridors, the plan not only makes Chinese primacy more tangible but also brings back memories of the Silk Road and Chinese dominance during the imperial era. The

BRI was initially supposed to be a means of advancing hard infrastructure along the six corridors under Chinese leadership.

Research indicates that four important works (Books and articles) provided even more analysis regarding the changing nature of the world order. The first item on our agenda is *Stepping Away from the Abyss: a gradual approach towards a new security system in the Persian Gulf* (2021). The book revealed that the inability of the US to play a leadership role in mediating and resolving security issues in the Persian Gulf gave rise to other actors such as China to control, influence, and advance their agendas in the region, worsening the fragile security situation in the region and the world in general.

The study shows the second piece of literature is an article from Amadi (2020) "An overview of the literature on Globalization and the shifting liberal international order." The author presented a concise analysis of how globalization can be both the maker and breaker of superpowers in world politics. As an example, Globalization which facilitated the rise of the US as a superpower worldwide is also the leading cause of the decline of US hegemony in world politics. The US-China trade war, the rise of trade protectionism and the fall of multilateralism, and the withdrawal of the US from many International agreements such as the Iran nuclear program are all signs that US hegemony is declining.

Tammen (2006) provided us with a different perspective by looking at foreign policy failure which can also make or break super power in international politics. Tammen (2006), in his article " Power shifts and disputes between the US and China," demonstrated the decline of the US hegemony is the result of a failure of foreign policy. The protection of the United States and its citizens, the maintenance of access to necessary resources and markets, the preservation of a balance of power in the world, and the protection of human rights and democracy are the four main objectives to which we can attribute much of what the U.S. government does in the area of foreign policy. There are numerous difficulties to the large and complex operation of US foreign policy. First, he said, there is no global authority dictating how the world's countries ought to interact with one another.

Secondly, different nations' perspectives on the ideal form of government. Thirdly, many contemporary foreign policy issues cross national boundaries. Last but not least, the various conditions of the world's nations influence what is possible in terms of diplomatic relations and foreign policy.

In the most important part of this research, which is the analysis part, we have presented several pieces of evidence to show that the new “new world order” is a reality. We begin our analysis by looking at the US and its economy since the US is the major power in world politics. We discovered that since the 1920s, in terms of GDP, the world's top national economy has historically been that of the United States. but even so, its influence is diluting.

Another key factor about the US economy worth mentioning is that throughout the 21st century, the amount of debt that is owned by the public has increased, this is a measurement of the public debt. Out of 207 countries, the United States had the 43rd-highest debt-to-GDP ratio. nations in 2017, having increased from 31% in 2000 to 52% in 2009 and reaching 77% in 2017. This is not looking good for the US economy because the level of debt to GDP ratio determines how well an economy is doing. Furthermore, since 1976, the US has experienced a deficit in its goods trade with foreign countries, and since 1982, it has had a deficit in its current account with the rest of the world. All these factors combined make the US economy less and less competitive.

Another factor in the US economy is the dollar. Based on extensive research we carried out for this thesis we found out that the primary objective of U.S. policy regarding the dollar is political, and it consists of two parts: the first is to use the dollar as a symbol of the power of the United States, and the second is to use the dollar as an instrument of power by developing a financial network that enables the United States to exert influence over the decisions made by other governments.

After the dollar, the next factor that shows the decline of the US hegemony in international politics is the “American Culture.” During the past 30 years, Violent crime has increased sixfold, illegitimate births have increased fivefold, divorce rates have increased fivefold, the number of children living in single-parent families has increased fourfold, and the risk of adolescent suicide has increased thrice. Another criticism is the fragmentation and polarization of American society, with the rise of social media and cable news networks leading to people self-selecting into like-minded echo chambers. This has led to a breakdown of shared cultural values and a sense of national identity. All these factors combined may have weakened the US power and influence in international politics and gave rise to other powers particularly China, the number one challenge of the US hegemony in international politics.

We have discovered that the Chinese economy has undergone rapid growth and transformation over the past few decades, making it one of the world's largest and most important economies. The country has implemented a range of economic reforms, including opening to foreign investment, and embracing market-oriented policies. This has led to significant growth in industries such as manufacturing, technology, and services. China's global plan, a significant infrastructure project known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) intends to establish a network of land and water routes connecting China with Europe, Asia, and Africa.

The initiative was originally made public in 2013 and has since become one of the largest and most ambitious economic projects in history. Overall, we concluded that China's global plan is a complex and multi-faceted initiative that has the potential to shape the future of global development and economic growth and will undoubtedly challenge Americans. As the initiative continues to evolve, it will be important for policymakers to carefully consider its potential benefits and drawbacks, and to work towards ensuring that it promotes sustainable development and global cooperation. China's grand strategy is important because it represents the country's long-term vision and goals for its domestic and foreign policies. The strategy is designed to promote China's economic, political, and military interests, and to secure its position as a major global power.

It also shows China's ambitions to challenge the influence of world politics and alter the current international order. Policymakers and analysts must comprehend China's grand plan to foresee and react to China's actions, and intentions. It is also important for promoting international cooperation and managing potential conflicts between China and other countries. Overall, China's grand strategy will continue to have a big influence on how future world politics and economy are shaped.

This research revealed the US-Chinese relations, which are considered one of the most important relations at present. This study revealed that US and Chinese foreign policy changes and develops according to the development of regional and international events and situations, after the outbreak of the Corona pandemic and the recent crises that the world went through, especially the Russian-Ukrainian war, as it became clear there a lot of big differences in terms of public opinions, commercial and economic relations, and strategic trust. US-Chinese relations have worsened greatly in the recent period, especially at the level of the information industry

with advanced technology, and economic and commercial competition has emerged at its highest level. The goal of American foreign policy remains to maintain its position at the top of the international system, despite the decline of its hegemony. As for the goal of Chinese foreign policy, it seeks to emerge as a major power on the international level and to change the structure of the system to become multipolar.

To recall, the primary purpose of this research is to investigate economic, political, and social factors challenging US hegemony in international politics by identifying current dynamics and power transitions in International Relations to inspire academic and policy reflections on the topic. To synthesize our research question which is: Can China represent a threat to the US hegemony in world politics? We have used qualitative research methodology to gather secondary data sources including journal papers, databases, newspaper articles, blogs, monographs, and other online resources. Before being taken into consideration these materials were subjected to content validity.

The answer to our research question “Can China represent a threat to the US hegemony in world politics?” is affirmative for ten good reasons.

1. Large and Growing Economy: China currently boasts the second-largest economy in the world after seeing significant growth over the previous several decades, with a GDP of over \$15 trillion.
2. Industrial and Technological Advancements: China has made significant progress in developing its industrial and technological capabilities, particularly in fields including 5G technology and artificial intelligence.
3. Global Trade: China is a major global trader and plays a vital role in international supply chains. Its BRI has expanded its economic reach globally.
4. Military Power: China has the largest standing army and is investing heavily in developing its military capabilities, including in areas such as cyber and space technology.
5. Population Size: China has a population of more than 1.4 billion people. has a vast labor force and consumer market?

6. Cultural Influence: Chinese culture, including its language, cuisine, and traditions, is gaining increasing popularity around the world.
7. Chinese emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in the world. but it is also investing heavily in renewable energy and has made commitments to reach carbon neutrality by 2060.
8. 8-Diplomatic Influence: China has established diplomatic relationships with countries around the world and is using its influence to shape global governance and institutions.
9. International Aid: China has become a major player in international development aid, particularly in Africa, and is using its economic power to advance its political interests.
10. Strong Leadership: China's political system, with its emphasis on centralization and long-term planning, has enabled it to make bold moves in areas such as economic reform and international diplomacy.

So, our hypothesis “the US hegemony in world politics, is in decline due to many leadership failures of the US as well as rising competition from other powers” is proved after analyzing our findings.

Some of the limitations of this study are the work was essentially desk work, and only secondary data and credible internet sources have been used. Accessibility to primary data was challenging due to financial and time constraints. Therefore, we did not have access to some relevant data that required fieldwork. Furthermore, the research was mostly limited to the changing dynamics in International Relations. The internal dynamics and domestic politics that could also participate in shaping US foreign have not been considered. Only interactions the US has with other nations were considered.

Recommendations:

American politicians and media personalities need to change their attitude from lecturing to listening to successfully traverse the intricacies of a multicultural and multipolar century. This means aggressively finding out the opinions and issues of other countries, promoting understanding among them, and engaging in successful diplomacy. Multilateral institutions should be welcomed with a focus on cooperation and consensus-based solutions to increase American strength. Economic recovery may be sped up by shifting funding away from expensive military operations and towards domestic projects like infrastructure and education. Harnessing the potential of a diverse workforce requires welcoming immigrants and developing solid commercial ties. Understanding China's many facets and acknowledging its expanding international importance is essential for managing ties with it. Last but not least, BRICS countries and regional organizations should cooperate more effectively by increasing operational activities. When properly implemented, these suggestions can help make American policymaking and international participation more complex and fruitful.

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