T.C.

ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

CAUSES OF CIVIL WARS IN AFRICA: CASE STUDY THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND SOUTH SUDAN

THESIS

Langeh Marcel FUSEH

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İSTANBUL AYDIN ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ

YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZ ONAY FORMU

Enstitümüz Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler İngilizce Tezli Yüksek Lisans Programı Y1412.110047 numaralı öğrencisi MARCEL FUSEH LANGEH 'in "The Causes of Civil War in Africa: Case Study Comparing South Sudan and The Central Africa Republic" adlı tez çalışması Enstitümüz Yönetim Kurulunun 22.05.2019 tarih ve 2019/11 sayılı kararıyla oluşturulan jüri tarafından oybirliği/oyçokluğu ile Tezli Yüksek Lisans tezi 11.06.2019 tarihinde kabul edilmiştir.

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I hereby declare that all information in this thesis document has been complied and presented to the jury and the academic community by my own self following all academic rules of ethics and conduct. I also formally declare that, as required by the institute, I have fully cited and referenced al the materials I used and do not claim the rights over any of them in this thesis.

Marcel Fuseh LANGEH

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to the following;
To my lovely parents, my beautiful mother Mrs. Victorine Yeneseh and to my wonderful father Mr Langeh Peter, who have been so supportive and instrumental in my studies and in my entire life.
To all my siblings the entire Langeh's family who have stood by me in my studies and my entire life and also to my friends Nchekenji sixtus, Bendi Ngonda and Maishu Lawrence for the massive support and encouragement they have been giving to me.
Lastly, I will like to thank Agberndifor Evaristus for his advice and support at all times. In addition, my special regards go to my academic supervisor Dr Ozum Sezin Uzun who has been very patient and helpful and always present to provide me with all the necessary things to complete this work
I wish that this thesis will be useful in further studies or in field related to the topic.

FOREWORD

This thesis is written in completion of Master's program on political science and International Relations at Istanbul Aydin University. The research is focused on the "The Causes of Civil War in Africa Comparing Central African Republic and South Sudan". It tries to bring out the motive or the cause of the civil war in Africa. Looking at Africa, one may say is on the move and almost all the countries in Africa are facing either an influx or outflow of people from their countries and this possess a security threat to African countries and to the continent as a whole. This thesis then tries to provide answers why the continuous arm conflict in some African countries, why is so difficult for tribes to live together in Africa. It also tries to bring out the answer why the arm conflict continues in Central Africa Republic, despite the fact reconciliation talk and the disbarment commission by the United Nation. Also, this thesis try to know why South Soudan, being one of the youngest country in the world has been in a serious civil war despite few years of existence. And finally, the comparison between The Central African Republic and South Soudan some similarities and differences causes of civil war.

My profound gratitude goes to my supervisor Assis. Prof. Dr Ozum Sezın Uzun whose ideas, criticism guardian devotion and encouragements gave the shape and form of this study. Despite her busy schedule she was able to allocate time to write, correct and guide me on what to do and made sure that I was on the right tract. I will rather say she was more of a mother to me than just a supervisor.

My sincere gratitude goes to my beloved parent, my father Mr Langeh Peter Ntokuh and and my mom madam Langeh Victorine Yeneseh for their relentless encouragements, moral and financial support throughout my entire life.

Above all, greatest thanks go to God Almighty for the protection and guardians throughout the entire course and His tremendous deed in my educational life

May, 2019 **Marcel Fuseh LANGEH**

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ABBREVIATIONS

AU : African Unions
CA R : Central Africa Republic
CPA : Comprehensive Pact Agreement
GDP : Gross Domestic Product
D RC : Democratic Republic of Congo
ECL AC : Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
EU : European Union
FSI : Fragile State Index
ICC : International Criminal Court
MESAN : Mouvement pour l'évolution sociale de l'Afrique noire
MRC : Cameroon Renaissance Movement
SSLM : South Sudan Liberation movement
SWAPO : South West Africa People's Organization
TGNU : Transitional Government of National Unity
UN : United Nations
UNMISS : United Nations Mission in South Soudan
UNDP : United Nations Development Programme
USA : United States of America

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AFRİKA'DAKİ SİVİL SAVAŞ NEDENLERİ: VAKA ÇALIŞMASI ORTA AFRİKA CUMHURİYETİ VE GÜNEY SUDAN

ÖZET

Bu tez, Sahra Altı Afrika'daki iç savaşların genel nedenlerine odaklanmakta ve Orta Afrika Cumhuriyeti ile Güney Sudan'ı karşılaştırmaktadır. Bu tez, sözü geçen ülkeleri, bu ülkelerde birbirini takip eden iç savaşlara yol açan silahlı çatışmalara sebep olan faktörlerin aynı olup olmadığını karşılaştırmak için seçmiştir. Tez, Collier ve Hoeffler'in iç savaşlar üzerindeki çalışmalarını kullanarak Orta Afrika Cumhuriyeti'nin tüm zengin mineral kaynakları uluslaşma için kullanılabilecekken hala silahlı çatışmaya karşı neden eğilimli olduğu sorusuna cevap vermeye çalışmaktadır. Tez ayrıca dünyadaki en genç ülke olan Güney Sudan için de aynı soruyu cevaplamaya çalışmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, Afrika'daki en büyük petrol reservlerinden birine sahip olması sebebiyle bu çalışma, ülkede anlamlı bir uluslaşma yerine iç savaşın neden üstün geldiği üzerinde durmaktadır.

Bu tez, çalışmanın bireşimsel akışını göstermeye çalışan birbirine bağlı altı bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölüm tezin bulgu ve plan çalışmasından oluşan genel bakışından oluşmaktadır. Ikinci bölüm Yönetim, Güçlü Devlet, Zayıf Devlet ve Başarısız Devlet gibi bazı anahtar terimleri tanıtmakta ve bu terimlerin iç savaşla nasıl ilişkili olduğunu göstermektedir. Üçüncü bölüm Afrika'daki iç savaşların genel sebeplerini vermekte ve yetkili organizasyon ve araştırmacılardan alınan tablo ve diğer verileri kapsamaktadır. Ardından gelen dördüncü bölüm Orta Afrika Cumhuriyeti'ndeki iç savaşların sebeplerini derinlemesine açıklamakta, ayrıca harici ve dahili sebepleri incelemektedir. Keza beşinci bölüm Güney Sudan'da hala devam etmekte olan iç savaşın sebeplerinin eskiden ve günümüzde ne olduğunu harici ve dahili sebeplere dayanarak detaylı bir şekilde incelemektedir. Son olarak, altıncı bölümde tez, Orta Afrika Cumhuriyeti ile Güney Sudan'ın yönetimlerine ve güvenlik donanımı sıkıntılarına bakarak karşılaştırılmasıyla sonuçlanmaktadır. Kapanış, iki ülkeden kriz yönetimi ve uyuşmazlık çözümü ile ilgili olan bir çalışma tarafından önerilen teklifleri izlemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Sivil savaşlar*

CAUSES OF CIVIL WARS IN AFRICA: CASE STUDY THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND SOUTH SUDAN

ABSTRACT

This thesis is focused on the general causes of civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa and it compares The Central Africa Republic and South Sudan. This thesis picked up these countries to compare if the factors that cause the armed conflict that led to their respective civil are the same. Using Collier and Hoeffler's studies on civil wars, the thesis tries to answer the question why The Central African Republic with all it is rich mineral resources is still prone to armed conflict whereas the resources would have been used for nation building. The thesis also tries to answer the same question with South Soudan which is the youngest country in the World. More so, owning to the fact that it has one of the biggest oil reserves in Africa, the study wonders why civil war prevails in the country instead of meaningful nation building.

The thesis consists of six chapters which linked to each other try to show a synthetic flow of the study's argument. The first chapter gives the general overview of the thesis, that is, the material and the plan work of the thesis. The second chapter defines some key terms like Governance, Strong State, Weak State and Failed States and shows how they are related to civil war. The third chapter gives the general causes of civil wars in Africa and it uses tables and other data gotten from accredited organizations and researchers. Then the fourth chapter deeply elucidates the causes of civil war in the Central African Republic and looks at the internal and the external causes. Chapter five also looks deeply into what was and is still the causes of the ongoing civil war in South Sudan looking at the internal and external causes. Lastly, in the sixth chapter the thesis tries to come out with the comparison between the two countries, The Central African Republic and South Soudan, looking at their governance and their security apparatus challenges. The closely follows recommendations proposed by the study related to crises management and conflict resolution from the two countries.

Keywords: *Civil war, Central Africa Republic and South Sudan*

1. INTRODUCTION

The provision of political goods is fundamentally imperative for the welfare and success of every state that desires to remain stable, grow economically, politically strong and socially bonded. States that have achieved these over the years, make up the strong and mighty nations of the World today that can not help but enjoy the international regards appended on them. And those that have not been able to achieve these are obviously in the category of the so-called third World countries. The main issue is that those countries that struggle to deliver meaningful political goods, make up the vast scholarship of literature on civil wars. Consequently, civil wars have become monotonous among underdeveloped nations that it suffices to extend a serious look at the fundamental causes at a time when the world has become a global village.

The main research question that this study worked with was "What are the causes of civil wars in South Sudan and the Central African Republic? To answer this question the thesis was divided into six chapters, each addressing a particular area of interests whose literature will bring substantial material to solidify the research.

Chapter two is the literature reserved only for state theory. In this chapter the study conceptualized strong states, weak states and failed states in relation to civil war. This chapter sought to understand how state capability and power could start, manage or prevent a war. Chapter three discusses the fundamental causes of civil wars and under this chapter internal, external, religious and ethnic factors were reviewed as prerequisites of civil wars. From a holistic perspective, tables and other factual data were critically examined and measured to prove that the elements, choosing among many, really can cause civil war. Chapter four is exclusively reserved to the detailed analysis of both internal factors such as ethnic and religious differences, and external factors, such as the roles of Chad and Sudan, causing civil wars in the Central African Republic. Chapter five is also exclusively reserved for South Sudan and the detailed analysis of the internal factors, such as ethnic issues between the two major tribes that is the Dinka and Neur tribes, and external factors,

such as the roles played by Uganda and North Sudan in escalating the tensions that cause civil war in the country were examined. Lastly, chapter six, as a conclusion chapter, is the prime of the study as it compared the governance policies of both countries whereby it hoped to make a final statement if bad governance tied to ethnic differences was to be blamed for the problems the countries face. The chapter concluded that in conformity to what Collier and Hoeffler (2004) whose study were pivotal to this research said, indeed, bad governance leads to grievances which opens doors to opportunities to insurrect. In addition, the opportunities lead to greed which culminates to armed insurrection and since most times the armed insurrections are poorly managed they lead to civil war.

As for the methodology, the study limited itself to qualitative research. So much content analysis was done in order to bring out the best from all the literatures reviewed. Other sources were checked which helped to shed more light on the subject and by that the study was able to make a resounding assertion that bad governance is responsible for most of the troubles African states face. Added to these, a series of tables were used to present statistical data which supplemented on the vast literature reviewed on civil wars.

In the course of the study, the researcher faced some challenges related to isolating the meaningful arguments that differentiate the cases between both countries. Firstly, both countries have ethnic incentives which cause the civil war. The first temptation was to assume that since they both have ethnic issues as their fundamental baseline, then they might be the same. But no, that was not the case in the long run! This is because a close look into the literature revealed that their ethnic problems were very diverse and different from the other. Secondly, it was also a little staggering to review the roles played by their elite groups because the scholarship of materials consulted show that The Central African Republic is a failed state in reconstruction. Therefore, from an in-exhaustive stance, it might be thought that the elites of the Central African Republic are vain and devoid of political, economic and social direction which mostly accounts for the present tribulations of the state. So, there was also this quick tendency to make the same hasty conclusion about South Sudan without taking a proper look into the roles played by the elite groups before, during and after the war. However, with some more patience, it was openly seen that though

the roles of the political elites differ in the two countries, their elites have different abilities and the challenges they face are considerably different from the other.

With regards to what this thesis offers to the literature about civil wars in Africa, this thesis would like to add that it joins itself to the vast literature of civil wars out there to prove first, that one of the fundamental causes of civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa is its highly heterogeneous nature. Secondly, the inhumane practice of bad governance which at times has religious motives culminates in parallel thoughts that make one group or tribe to think it to be more important than the other. When this happens as seen in the two countries, resentments and grievances, set in. Alas, if these are not properly handled by the state which is supposed to be the organ in the possession of the tools and skills required for handing crises, then chaos sets in. More so, the study shows that for as long as African nation states do not address these tribal and ethnic issues squarely, there are bound to be more wars and social divisions among the countries and which will lead them to nowhere but failure and regression. Secondly, this study takes the attempt to go past conspiracy theories that allowed the narration that external powers including France, China, Chad and Uganda are responsible for the internal divisions in the two respective countries. Having elaborated on its content reviews, this study can now authoritatively say that contrary to popular views, there are internal causes to be blamed as well for the current states of the two countries. Furthermore, the study goes ahead to cement the reports of other researchers and news outlets that indeed, there are external powers who are taking advantage of the internal troubles in these countries in order to increase their gains and expand their interests.

Finally, this study hopes that its findings and contributions will not only provide new avenues for further and more detailed research but will open doors for greater policy discourses. As a matter of fact, this study hopes that decision makers in the two countries and beyond will consult these findings and take them into consideration as they ply the boisterous highways of nation building.

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter will study the conceptual definitions of governance, strong states and their relations to civil wars, weak states and their relations to civil wars and finally, failed states and how they relate to civil wars. This conceptual review is aimed at establishing a strong rational that anticipates aligning with the hypothesis and theory about the role of government in tandem with the outbreak of civil wars. Central to this study is the state in it is level of analysis and it is considered the principal player in managing state affairs which might require dealing with armed and insurgent groups.

2.1 Governance

Sheng (2016) notes that the literature on governance has developed dichotomies over time which have had in them added words such as ‘good governance’ which is believed to be a positive form of governance and ‘bad governance’ which is assertively the root of all evil and political malpractice. He continues that the use of these two phrases is increasingly being made available by political and other related economic literatures which place emphasis on the roles international financial institutions have to play in the implementation of good forms of governance. More so, some Bretton Woods institutions such as the IMF-International Monetary Fund insist that loans demanded must be tailored towards the designing and implementation of reforms that will bring about good governance.

Finding a solemn base, which might propose a more convincing definition of governance, could be tricky and difficult an adventure to embark on. The reason is that it might come to mean different things depending on the discipline it is approached from (Ysa, et. al., 2014). Thus, defining governance is a problematic and Keefer (Gisselquist, 2012 cited Keefer, 2009: 439) notes, ‘there is no agreed definition of governance that would provide a convenient device for organizing the literature’. Similarly, Ysa et. al. (2014) warns that it is imperative to recognize that there are many actors and players whose roles cannot be minimized in the

governance project. Therefore, defining governance might mean including them to broaden the concept just in case it might be accepted as inclusive and unbiased. Weiss (Gisselquist, 2012 cited Weiss, 2000) in support to the definitional problem, tried his hands on a couple of premises that might lead to a more assertive and accepted definition drawing influence from many organizations.

Before diving deep into the varying controversies or agreements in defining the term it is worth reviewing the epistemology of the word that is, it is root origin as well as the different meanings earlier and later ascribed to it.

Ysa et.al. (2014) believe that the word governance comes from the Greek word Kybernan which means to steer or pilot a sheep. However, they continue that the concept was enlarged by the Roman Empire, used it in its Latin form gubernare which means to direct, rule or to guide. With this foundation, its seen that governance is the act of directing policies or decisions made by a superstructure of either elected or appointed principalities, who sit at the frontier of state power. And these officials cannot work on their own otherwise chaos lies at the door. In order to somewhat decentralize their power, they must invite other non-state actors a little lower in their level of analysis to the political fest and that means having the civil society, business people, religious leaders and only to name a few. With this foundation, Ysa et.al. (2014) define governance as "nowadays, governance can be broadly understood as the interaction between governments, business stakeholders and non-profit organizations by which and policy decisions implementation are undertaken".

Nonetheless, and mindful of how antique the term governance in relation to human civilization is with some understanding that it predates modern nation states, Sheng (2016) defines supportively that "it is the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented)". It is important to note that though there is a slight margin between the usage of government and state, not forgetting that sometimes they might be used interchangeably in the implementation of policies and decisions, the government in this sense is figurative in its own regard and application of governance while the state takes on a more holistic and territorial stance and meaning.

A series of financial agencies have also tried to present what they suppose is a better definition of governance and one of such is the UNDP (Gisselguist, 2012a cited the

UNDP, 1997: 2-3) which defines governance as 'the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels', which 'comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences". This definition partly agrees with that of Ysa et. Al (2014) above but brings in a new element, 'institutions'. Furthermore, the IMF, it is 'the process by which public institutions conduct public affairs and manage public resources' (Gisselguist, 2012b cited the UNDP 2007: 128). For the OECD, it is 'the use of political authority and exercise of control in a society in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic development,' which 'encompasses the role of public authorities in establishing the environment in which economic operators function and in determining the distribution of benefits as well as the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled' (Gisselguist, 2012c cited the OECD 1995: 14). By adding the ruler and the ruled in this definition, the IMF deliberately sides with Rousseau's social contract and his advocacy for social justice. At this point the definitional problem has deepened and broadened and if this study should continue further, it will find other definitions from the World Bank to mean 'the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs' (Gisselguist, 2012d cited World Bank 1989: 61).

To avoid drowning in the definitional controversy, this study isolate the following words which summarize the definitions listed above, government, human activity and role in decision making, economic factors and portable economic environment and strong institutions. So, this study might fall for the temptation to dare to define governance as "the role of the government in synergy with its citizens to make and implement decisions whose resulting effects produces economic factors that depend on portable economic environments and patronized by strong institutions that guarantees their effectiveness, efficiency and durability".

It might sometimes be nice to state rather categorically that the true essence of good or bad governance is a premonition made feasible of either strong states, weak states or failed states and how these relate with simple protests that in some cases might turn to violent insurrections which also might lead to civil wars depending on the maturity of its institutions. The discussions below will closely examine the concepts of strong, weak and fragile states and will try to find possible links to civil wars.

2.2 Strong States and Civil War

The categorization of what it means to be a strong state or weak state is also a hard argument among scholars who follow different parameters at different geographical locations and different times. Their results and the results they see on the ground affect their judgments which sometimes overlaps with preexisting thoughts they might have had about why some states are considered either strong or weak. For example, Muslu, (2012) argues that state strength can be measured by its democratic institutions and its ability to democratize. Furthermore, he uses the Middle East as a strong comparison whereby he focuses on its political, economic, cultural and historical factors. With these, he makes a strong assertion that the regions political history and political culture is unfriendly to democratization and democracy. Another reason he forwards is that weak or rather toothless civil society organizations that can only bark but not take concrete action aggregate for the weakness of their states. Thus, from this perspective; he makes a claim that in order for Middle Eastern countries to be strong states, they must revert their political history to become responsive or rather receptive to democracy and should create for themselves the most appropriate tools for democratization. Persson (2010) agrees with him on the political and economic terms but dives deeper with explanations about the fiscal strength of the state and its ability to maintain a strong legal system. With his analysis it brings us straightaway to the definition he proposes which is discussed below. Still from the economic point of view Acemoğlu (2005) looks at it from the level of development of a state as the parameter to use to determine if a state is a strong or weak state.

This section will examine in the light of these definition tussles the proposed meaning of what a strong state is and what it means to be strong. With its definitional foundation, it will proceed to discuss the elements that make up a strong state and more so, if these elements sometimes have a correlation with domestic irregularities that might otherwise lead to civil war.

The Center For International Private Enterprise (2009 cited Barcena, 2009) defines a strong state as “public-private partnerships” and “institutional coordination” to improve innovation and competitiveness in economy” and it adds the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 2008/2009

report that a strong state might also mean “the “visible hand” of government to play a stronger role in the economy”. This definition from a clear look advocates for strong institutions that can carry out the work under the auspices of the government to ensure a thriving economy. Thus, this definition looks at the subject from the economic point of view.

Persson (2010) defines a strong state as one having these two fundamental assets: Firstly, the state has a sound extractive capacity that is it has up-to-date infrastructure with which to raise taxes from broad bases; like income or value added. Secondly, it is a state with an elaborate productive capacity that is it possesses infrastructures with which to enforce contracts or protect property rights. The summary of this definition is that a strong state must have a strong economy and a viable legal system. So highlighted above, Persson (2010) agrees with Muslu (2012) and Center for International Private Enterprise (2009) which stress on the economic importance but also adds on the legal aspect which cannot be otherwise minimized in this globally changing world.

Acemoğlu (2005) defines a strong state “as one which has the power to determine and impose taxes and regulate the economy and which can also withstand the political and social challenges from non-state actors”. The definitions listed all make a case for economic power to state strength. However, this short study will examine critically if the economic aspects of states are the only prerogatives needed to make them strong states or if there are other parameters not mentioned which in their respective likes, can alongside engender state strength.

Rotberg (2011 pp. 1-26) explains that many states fail because they are trapped and “convulsed” by internal conflicts which sometimes could graduate to civil wars. Talking about civil wars much shall be said about it in the proceeding chapters. However, there is a need to say something about it. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) define civil wars as “an internal conflict with at least 1.000 combat-related deaths per year. However, despite the many challenges that nation-states are dealing with some have not been able to climb up that position of violent war though Collier and Hoeffler (2004) frighten this study with the facts that “all of the 15 major armed conflicts listed by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for 2001 were Internal (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004 cited SIPRI, 2002). If we consider the economic definitions proposed above by different financial institutions about what a

strong state is then a state like Saudi Arabia with a strong economy qualifies to fall under the strong state category for reasons to be seen below. Moreover, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) add that from econometric findings Saudi Arabia and South Africa are strong and rich counties such that any thought of inciting a civil war will possibly be ousted. A rational reason for this might be as a result of their GDPs which should surpass 6.000 USD and with living standards that are far elevated. In addition, with their high GDPs and advanced production facilities, their governments are able of financing themselves against any possible insurrection. Thus, the surge of a civil war in Saudi Arabia and South Africa is not impossible but a difficult reality at this time.

Another cause for internal divisions which serves as a vanguard to nations that desire to become strong states is the loss of legitimacy of the government, its institutions and the entire state itself in the eyes of firstly, its citizens and then the international community (Rotberg, 2011). Nothing is as bad for any government as when it losses the trust and confidence of its citizens. It creates such a gap in the social and political interactions such that opportunists can take advantage of it in order to reign chaos, or bring in old and unattended grievances whose perceptions and interpretations could be seriously problematic to maintaining the left overs of an already weakened state. This indicator stands strong in the face of all nation-states that would do anything to quench any popular uprising or anything that threatens the security of their nation. More so, most states would not like to fall prey to any internal conflict that could wipe out their existence from their regional block.

In the old, the collapse of a nation or state had little or no effect on others as it was purely survival of the fittest (Rotberg, 2011 pp. 1-26). However, the story has turned around in this modern epoch where thanks to globalization (Sheffield, et. al., 2013); many states have become closely interdependent (Baldwin, 1980) and densely connected in ways unfathomable. Therefore, the instability of any state especially those that recently gained their independence is a worry for an entire region and it goes as far as threatening the entire regional security of that region.

So then, with this foundation laid what are the indicators that qualify states as strong, weak and failed and in extreme cases collapsed?

The prime role of states is to look after their citizens and ensure the prosperity of their interests. Secondly, states enforce measures necessary for the implementation of

equal and equitable rights of their citizens to avoid polarization and radical differentiation. Rotberg (2011 pp. 1-26) adds that states design policies that must meet and satisfy the needs of their people while pursuing other national goals which sometimes do not directly concern the individual citizens goals. Thus, the liberal practices of states vis-à-vis the different ways with they relate with their citizens and the policies they pursue separates them from others with respect to the degrees of success or failures they have. On this account, states are classified as strong, weak and failed states (Larson, 2004).

Rotberg (2001 pp. 1-26) adds that strong states deliver quality political goods to their nations which help to maintain the social, political, ethnic and cultural bond. Talking about political goods they define it to mean "expectations, conceivably obligations, and uniformity of the local political culture". Furthermore, they add that strong states turn to respect without bias the rule of law, the social contract (Rousseau, 1762) taking Rousseau's words to account which he said "The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right and obedience into duty". Under the auspices of this statement, strong states clearly define the boundaries between the ruler and the ruled (Rotberg, 2011 pp. 1-26) and make sure that in no instance should the feeling of slave-master relationship be felt by the citizens as this might incite grievances and generate feelings of violence.

Another important element that qualifies states to be regarded as strong is their ability to provide the most vital element of human rest and calm which security. Therefore, the most important political good according to Rotberg (2011 pp. 1-26) is security. Though it falls second in Maslows (1943) hierarchy of needs human security stands out as the most important element that can strengthen or weaken a state. The common sense on this point is common in the sense that a nation-state weakened by disease, epidemics, poverty, rebellion and civil unrest cannot prosper and achieve it is goals. However, such a nation is on its way to bend the knee to become a weak state and if the weakness deepens, it automatically becomes a failed state and if the extremes occur, it becomes a collapsed state. On this note, human security is imperative and prime and states that invest a whole lot to develop the human capital and security of their citizens benefit a lot from the long term entrepreneurial dividends that are made. These dividends conglomerate to cause a dramatic economic development and growth to the entire nation. Furthermore, strong

states must endeavor to protect their territorial integrity and ensure the security of their borders. The failure to secure ones borders opens it up to foreign detractors and domestic threats that might impede the state interests of the state. The state must develop it is security system and units to be able and up to date to deal with any impromptu threat that arises either domestically or from without (Foucault, 1978).

Tikuisis and Carment (2017) support the argument and add that "state capacity is often judged by a multitude of attributes from a state's military and economic strength to its human development capability. What they mean is that states must struggle hard regardless of the odds to build credible institutions that can provide empirical services to citizens who consult them to resolve their worries and problems. Adding institutions to this argument means states must build legitimate organs that promote liberal democratic practices that respect and protect the civic rights of citizens. Rotberg (2011 pp. 1-26) explains that these civic rights include "freedoms, the right to compete for office; respect and support for national regional political institutions like legislature and courts; tolerance of dissent and difference and lastly, the capacitation, promotion and independence of the civil society". Added to the political goods Rotberg (2001 pp. 1-26) adds to his argument, are medical and health care, education with school infrastructure equipped with the most current educational technology materials, modern roads, railways, and communication infrastructures. Last but not the least; strong states go an extra length to have a stable currency which is backed by independent and viable banking and other financial institutions. This study is of the opinion that when citizens trust their financial institutions and have confidence in their currency, they will relate with their banks better by trusting them with their money. However, if they prefer to save their money with foreign banks then there is a strong problem with their banking system and that is questionable.

A look at the most advanced countries in the 21st century reveals that strong states do almost all of the above and stand very little or no risk of a civil war except otherwise from an external agent. However, weak states are simply a reverse of the above mentioned and the deficiencies of the above mentioned could possibly incite a civil war if civic uprisings are not properly attended to.

2.3 Weak States

Weak and failed states pose a threat to the international community and have the power to damage the internal security of many nation-states (Kaplan, 2019). Hence, the weakness or failure of one state has a devastating effect to it is neighbours and to the world because it will definitely export refugees who will seek refuge in safe havens. The parameters used to measure the weakness of states might differ from scholar to scholar but the underling factors persist and cannot be denied. In simpler terms, weak states are simply a lower version of strong states discussed above because though they can provide some political goods, they lack in a great deal of expectations. Sometimes they might be badly weakened by internal riots, protests and conflicts that might shift their investment attentions to diverting resources that were meant for development to solving sociopolitical problems that might crop up to civil war if not properly attended to. From this end the Goodluck Jonathan Administration of Nigerian was careful to make certain concessions to avoid a bloody civil war that was on the rise from its oil rich Niger Delta Region (Umoru, 2016).

For Grdesic and Koska (2009) the parameters to be used to determine if a nation is weak are if its "unable to establish a firm tax base, combat corruption, provide non selection enforcement of the rule of law and enforcing contracts through a competent and independent judiciary". They also look at it socially to be "the lack of societal organizations such as student unions, women's organizations, environmental movements to have full memberships, find finance and support from the population". Massa (2008) thinks that it's best to qualify weak states as states that lack good governance, good infrastructure and have serious problems with legitimacy (Massa, 2008 cited Jackson, 2002:38). He adds that in some cases, weak states define legitimacy as the political group to which one belongs. Thus, though the state might grant the authorization for a party or political organization to exist, if it does not have the support of the people and a viable membership, it might be regarded as illegitimate. More so, the use of force is never excluded from the table in order for parties not to only get members but also to enjoy this kind of legitimacy. The use of force to silence protesters has worried South American nations who fear that the abuse of human right in Nicaragua by its president might drown it into another Venezuela crisis (Turak, 2018). The abuse of human rights and the marginalization of

the civil rights of citizens is also very pertinent with weak states who might fear democracy and democratization. This is because they might see these institutions if truly given a chance to work as demeaning to their power and interests. Therefore, most weak states are plagued by endless coups such as in the Central African Republic; riots (Scacco, 2016), and violent protests and revolts (Norris, 2006). These always shake the institutions and the foundations on which the country stands and with the wrong policy options of the leaders, the nation is either set to become a failed or collapsed state.

Weak states are also at the mercy of ethnic tensions which most times leaves them beheaded by the frailties of a centralized power (Fagouet, 2014). Though most weak states preach decentralization be it effective or ineffective, the centralization of power has always been its biggest drag net. For instance, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso under former president Blaise Compaore, Congo Brazzaville under Denise Sassou Ngessou, and Equatorial Guinea under Obiang Nguema Mbassogo. The case of Equatorial Guinea is very particular because it has suffered more than two coup attempts (Biyoa, 2008) but survived it though still harbouring a president who has been in power since 1979. This centralization of power which is very characteristic with most weak states is one of the reasons why people within them cry foul and seek different ways of getting heard. Unfortunately, some of them have been violent clashes with the government such as in Nigeria, Congo and Sudan. If only these governments could practice effective decentralization or federalism, it could really solve the problem of governance and reduce the risks of violent conflicts and civil wars.

Another feature with weak states is power is backed by a select few who practice patronage (Massa, 2008) that is power is shared only with those who are considered an impassable threat to the regime. As such they must share or succumb to a blood bath. Bayart (1993) called this “the politics of the belly” where political power is shared among a select few not based on merit and legitimacy but based on social and interpersonal feelings and perceptions”. This brings this study to highlight that most weak states suffer from legitimacy because of this, their citizens wake up every morning from their troublesome sleeps to see clowns and incompetent lunatics in power whereas there are competent and very educated youths on the streets with graduate degrees.

Consequently, institutional performance in weak states might not always be poor especially when it comes to protection the tyrants in power (Massa, 2008). The military in most countries ruled by dictators such as Idris Derby of Chad, Paul Biya of Cameroon, and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe perform well in protecting their boss against the liberal democrats who constantly push for change. Nonetheless, not everyone identifies with this shadow success of institutions that are tailored at protecting selfish tyrants who trample on their subjects for their personal gains. As a matter of fact, Fukuyama (Massa, 2008 cited Fukuyama, 2004:130 and Byman& Evera, 1998:37) says that weak states lack the strength to implement good and durable policies due to a possible internal decay in the political structure. Lastly, most weak states suffer from a weak territorial security and struggle to secure their borders as effectively as they should (Reveron, 2010). This inability exposes the country to potential predators who may be eying its natural resources take advantage of its security potholes and impound heavy losses on the entire nation. This also helps to weaken the country from within leaving it to the mercy of wicked forces both within and without.

2.4 Failed States

Nothing is more pathetic to weak states like falling down the drain to the category of failed states. Failed states arise when the troubles that affect weak states drastically overwhelm them with the passing times and this also follows their political choices and ideas in times of crisis. Rotberg (2011) defines a failed state as a polity that is no longer able or willing to perform the fundamental job of a nation-state in the modern world". Most nations find themselves in this shameful position of failed states as a result of long years of violence and civil wars or rebel uprisings against the state. Thus, failed states are tense, deeply conflicted with all kinds of grievances raised here and there by the citizens who sometimes express their worries and bitterness in ways that are not only dangerous to them but also to anyone who does not align with them. Occasionally, the official authorities in a failed state face two or more insurgencies fighting side by side either against themselves or against the state (Rotberg, 2011). However, most times, the insurgencies in a state are against the state or other privileged groups within the state as it was the case in the Central African Republic when the Seleka Muslim minority rebels rose against the Christian

majority shortly after they came to power in 2013. Ungaro (2012) studying the political predicaments of Afghanistan reveals that most times it is not the power or the fighting intensity of the warring factions that qualify a state as a failed state. Rather, it is how long the fighting lasted and a good example for this is Afghanistan, Syria and Sudan before the independence of South Sudan in 2011. These countries have dropped to this category for this reason and many others to be seen below as they have more than ten years of civil unrest in their territories. Most often in a failed state, violence is directed against the state or the regime in power (Rotberg, 2011 pp. 1-26) especially if the regime is a gerontocracy (a nation ruled by old men) and an octogenarian (a ruler between 80 and 89 years old) (Buwembo, 2017). In failed states that face one of these the grievances raised might be for power sharing, a demand for more autonomy, transparency of political institutions and the government or in some extreme cases as in East Timor, secession.

Another characteristic of failed states is the rise of social polarization between ethnic groups, interests groups that stirs up anger. One important thing to note about failed state is that they are very particular with ethnic, religious, linguistic and other identical strife that pour more fuel into their already burning fire (Reynal-Querol, 2002). Sometimes, if the country is blessed with natural resources such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and mineral resources are discovered which some groups might find threatening to their interests, that might push them to raise arms and if not properly managed by their already weakened states, chaos is the breaking news. Ross (2002) supports this assertion and in his own words reveals that "one of the most surprising and important findings is that natural resources play a key role in triggering, prolonging, and financing civil conflicts". He adds that the most prominent resources that usually trigger these conflicts are "gold, diamonds, timber, oil, hard-rock minerals and other germ stones". So, for resource rich countries, the political smartness of the government and the policies they pursue greatly affect the outbreak or the quenching of civil wars.

Though failed states are a complete reverse of weak states and torn by war for all the reasons that could be found, it is imperative to supplement in this literature that while strong states can control their borders with a strong military and police force that are backed by an implacable secret service that sweeps indiscriminately across the entire national territory, failed states are totally deficient of this political good. They cannot

protect their boarders and as such they have thousands of kilometers of land along their borders that are at the mercy of mercenaries and insurgents who use them as garrisons and safe heavens from where they plan their attacks and other corresponding assaults. Rotberg (2011 pp. 1-26) notes that failed states are mostly characterized by a limitation of power which on most cases is limited to the political capital or other satellite cities that are sympathetic to the ruling elite. He adds that plausibly, a state's failure can be measured by how much of its geographical expense it genuinely controls by its government (Rotberg, 2011 pp. 1-26). A failed state like Somalia could best describe this sentence because most of its capital Mogadishu as well as a majority of the country is in the hands of warlords who act as authorities. The central Somali government controls just a piece of its own capital city and a little of other cities outside its capital (Blair, 2008). The power vacuum that resulted from the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1900 and the civil war that broke up in 1991 paved way for present day Somalia. Thus, who really expresses power in a states or districts reveals how much a country is a failed state (Rotberg, 2011 pp. 1-26). This study therefore thinks that in a failed state there could be more than one person or group exerting power in different regions of the country thus diffusing the power of the weakened central power to a toothless bull dog.

Another feature of failed states is the inability to adequately provide the political good of security which is strongly characteristic of strong states. Failed states lack the capacity to provide security to their citizens as they always have to deal with disgruntled groups who usurp radicality to pass the message on (United States Institute for Peace, 2018). Sometimes, this radical behavior of the groups is highly detrimental and fear-setting to both the state and the ordinary man on the street who might be caught up in the cross fire. An example is the tragic death of the coach driver who was transporting the Togolese national team who was killed with six Togolese players injured by armed secessionist groups in Angola in 2010 as they took part in the Confederation of African Cup of Nations. Unfortunately, failed states cannot help their citizens (United States Institute for Peace, 2018) who depend on them for security and protection from both domestic and foreign threats to national security.

Worst case scenario is when failed states cannot provide security to their citizens and cannot negotiate the growing pressure from the international community to call for dialogue and find a solution to the pressing issues that besets them; they might turn to prey on their own citizens. Gal-Or (1993) says that unable to contain the failures of their government the state might get itself involved in organized crime and collective violence against its own citizens by further polarizing the remaining moderate parts of the country. Sometimes it may accuse a particular group or ethnicity for being sympathetic to insurgents and may decide to favour another thus, further creating tensions between groups. Another assertion this study makes to this phenomenon is that the state might do this as a proxy to show the international community that the problem most times does not come from its end but it's as a result of radical groups. This study would like to add that failed states that have lost their friends in the international community and are running short of international support might result to this criminal activity which will instead dig their graves deeper. From the look of things states that practice this are already failed states and choosing this policy means driving the state a collapsed state which is even worse.

While insecurity increases in failed states, it is not surprising to note that failed states are very characteristic of high criminality and violence. The power vacuum that was once filled by social cohesion, the state police and military has been emptied by war and social unrest leaving everyone to them. Mirkin and Chamie (2019) believe that sometimes there might be a spontaneous increase of criminality that may overwhelm both the state under attack and the far-left groups themselves and the result of this of course will be confusion. In such cases pimping, prostitution, drug and human trafficking such as Libya, arms trafficking gain the premise to rise beyond understanding taking over cities, and the streets. As a matter of fact, lawlessness becomes legitimate and a social culture creating more favorable conditions for the rise of criminal groups than ever. This study is of the opinion that as anarchy reigns in the international community which is deficient of a leader with the unanimous authority to exert law, failed states overladen by war find themselves driven back to 17^{th} and 18^{th} century Europe where Feudal lords controlled some parts of the territory and even challenged the authority and legitimacy of kings and emperors. With war lords parading the streets of failed states, ethnocentrism, tribalism and nepotism are all activated because it is believed that these warlords might like to firstly, take care

of their tribes men before any other. Following the demise of the police force and the vast expense of lawlessness that thrives, anarchy looms and consequently, overtakes the entire country.

One sad thing about failed states is that they cannot perfume well and cannot provide the political goods expected of them as as strong states do (Rotberg, 2011 pp. 1-26). As it was discussed above, most failed states got to their current points because weak states were overladen by internal wars and fractionalizations. Unable to quench the flames that caught up with them, they lost their power to exert full control over the nation and consequently, lost the full support and trust of their citizens. Now the nation is as the African adage says "Everyone for himself, God for us all". The collapse of state institutions ensures that warlords positioned in different sectors of the economy now exert the rights and duties of the nation's institutions leaving the central executive power just a limited force to pass its vague and pointless decrees which are limited to well defined boundaries of the failed state control. Ezrow and Franz (2013) persist on the fact that the institutional decay that hovers over failed states impedes them from any meaningful discussions of democracy which only appear as a farce that flies away in the face of logic. In fact, there exists no separation of power as the executive considering the circumstances is constrained to join the judiciary under it and any comments about the legislative are just stories that end up on documents as stamps.

With bad institutions that are themselves failed institutions, good governance is nonetheless not an impossibility but a very expensive luxury which has to face the challenges of a morally decapitated military, which in some cases might even be used as a systematic machine of oppression on the locals. More so, the saddened failure of the institutions and the different organs of the government that is the legislature, executive and the judiciary that can sanction development projects that will determine growth lower the country to another nightmare of infrastructural despondency. This study is of the opinion that following this infrastructural regression, corruption looms in and beheads the last of the nation's dreams to rise above its persecutions. Furthermore, this study believes that one of the most offsetting reasons could be the indiscriminate surge of corruption which bleeds the nation to a state of emptiness and ensuring that the little monies left that could at least provide just one political good that could save the status quo is misappropriated

and embezzled by government officials who prefer to keep it in safe heavens rather than use it of safe their dying nation. Alas, the capital needed to redeem the nation from its impoverished status and reboot the shadow economy falls short and leaves the nation lacking behind again. Consequently, the poor road, educational and health infrastructures dilapidate the more making living conditions and state services very inaccessible and so uncomfortable for everyone. Of course, the ordinary citizens suffer and this creates more room for grievances which of course, might be translated to polarization whose result might be violence and once gain bloody conflict. So the nation sees itself oscillating in a circumference of endless violence and bloodshed. At this stage, most of the citizens especially those who can afford it migrate to distant lands in search of greener pastures, local service provision becomes increasingly difficult and to the dissatisfaction of everyone, negates the cropping up of economic hunters who take advantage of the gap and impose frivolous prices on goods and services that bring no small pain to the ordinary man who has paid the highest price of the violence.

Lastly, the loss of legitimacy of the government and the ruling elite which could even lead to the citizens questioning the legitimacy of the state itself, leaves the country to an economic woe where its factors of production almost all go extinct or better still if its lucky in recession. Kharas (2009) noted that the Global Economic crisis that rocked the world in 2008 affected many countries so badly and as such he cited the World Bank which predicted that thanks of the crisis over 50 million people would be in hunger. It must be reiterated that the crisis didn't have the same effect on all countries as rich countries thanks to their reserves were able to meet up. Failed states on the other hand, found themselves on the other side of the boisterous river. With their low per capita, GDP, restrained factors of production and bad economy, not forgetting enormous foreign debts, many of such countries saw themselves either blocked with goods that could not be exported such as Sudan in 2008 or imported such as Bangladesh (Kharas, 2009). Whatever the case, many failed states under such circumstances; find themselves blocked with high levels of corruption and renting which promulgate the machinery of favoritism, bribery and economic inequality. Sadly, the nation might find itself succumbing to the pressure of privatization and dependency on foreign aid which all come with unfathomable strings attached. Another important thing to recognize is that under such tensed economic climates,

the gap between the rich and the poor increases drastically and this of course sets the state for new grievances whose boiling points come with apparent results.

3. FACTORS CAUSING CIVIL WARS IN AFRICA

This chapter will discuss in empirical depths drawing from the scholarship of materials available the factors causing civil wars. Of these, internal, ethnic and religious as well as external factors shall be discussed. Some tables shall be used to show in clearer sense the effects of either of these in civil war escalation or reduction. This study shall also show that while some areas might be considered unusual in escalating civil wars, they in effect are highly detrimental if overlooked.

3.1 Internal Factors

It is important to know that 79 large civil wars have occurred between 1960 and 1999 (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) not forgetting those that came after the 21st century notably in South Sudan, The Central African Republic and presently Cameroon. Civil wars are becoming more rampant and unceremonious, not that they have ever been ceremonious though some liberals might attribute the French Revolution to a ceremonious one that ended the power and rule of the monarchy. However, over the past half-century civil war has replaced international war as the most prevalent form of large-scale violence (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009). More so, it is imperative to add that though there might have been studies on civil wars in the past, the parameters required to radically address their pertinence were established by Collier and Hoeffler (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009 cited Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004). Thanks to these authorities in civil war studies, there is a vast knowledge about civil war starts, duration and ends. Therefore, this study shall make good use of their parameters in explaining its arguments in this chapter not forgetting its arguments earlier presented in chapter two about state strength, governance, weak states and failed states. In this chapter, this study shall look with en empirical mirror what actually causes civil wars to start and in a lime light over turn a country to become a weak, failed or collapsed state. To be used also is the economic theory of civil wars which will be added as a substantial argument capable of causing some internal dissentions that can bring a state to its knees.

However, it would be nice to show the number of civil wars that have occurred in Africa in the past century and for that this study presents two tables below for clarity sake.

Table 3.1: Number of countries in Africa that have had civil wars in the past fifty years

Country	Number of civil wars	Years	Civil war
Sudan	2	1956-1972	Yes
		1983-	Yes
Algeria	1	1962-1962	Yes
Rwanda	2	1963-1964	No
		1994-1997	Yes
Congo-Kinshasa	2	1964-1965	Yes
		1977-1979	Yes
Burundi	3	1965-1973	Yes
		1988	No
		1993-1994	Yes
Uganda	2	1972-1979	No
		1980-1986	Yes
Angola	1	1975-2001	Yes
Ethiopia	1	1976-1979	Yes
Somalia	1	1988-1991	Yes
Central African Republic	2	2004-2007	Yes
		2013-	No
South Sudan	1	2013-	Yes
Nigeria	1	1980-1984	Yes
Sierra Leone	2	1991-1996	Yes
		1997-1999	Yes
Zaire/Demo. Rep. of Congo	3	1960-1965	Yes
		1991-1996	Yes
		1997-1999	Yes
Cameroon	2	1959-1961	Yes
		2016-	Yes

Source: Angela D. Nichols, (2008), The Origins of Genocide in Civil War, Collier and Hoeffler, (2004), Greed and Grievance in Civil War; Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009), Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war.

Table 3.1 reveals that most African countries have suffered civil wars from 1956 to 1999. The studies of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) were done between these periods and they considered five year periods of peace and war. Therefore, their study falls short of civil wars that started after 1999 like those mentioned above that is South Sudan, The Central African Republic (henceforth, C.A.R) and Cameroon that only

has one civil war recorded. To complete the table this study therefore, added to the date following current occurrences. More shall be explained below.

From table 3.1 Sudan has had two civil wars but the second started after a weak truce which was signed in 1973 between the northern Sudanese government and the South Sudan Liberation Army. From table 1 it is seen that the second war starts from1983 and indicates ongoing because at the time of Nichols research which was probably taken in five year episodes of either peace or conflicts, Sudan was still having the war which finally stopped in 2005 following negotiations for a referendum in favour of South Sudan.

Under internal factors, the first thing this study would like to discuss is opportunity, grievance and greed as proxies to start a civil war.

3.1.1 Opportunity

With the information on table 3.1 presented its now important to demonstrate how opportunity, grievances and greed are excellent factors that can cause a strong internal dissention and war in a given country. Firstly, it is worth noting that some scholars such as Collier and Hoeffler (2004) think that insurgents are equal to rebels who are motivated by greed. However, rebellions have what they quantify as “typical grievances” and “typical opportunities” some of which include looting. In simpler terms long unattended grievances can lead to a civil war just like the presentation of an opportunity to extract a certain benefit can cause some people to suddenly become warmongers and start a war. Moreover, Hirshleifer (Collier and Hoefler, 2004, cited Hirshleifer, 1995;2001) thinks that some possible internal causes of civil wars under this regard could be attributed to preferences, opportunities and perceptions. This study is of the opinion that perceptions refer to what people see about something or the analysis they make of something at a given time depending on a given circumstance. Nevertheless, perceptions are sometimes the baseline foundations for grievances and they set the stage for the civil war engine. Furthermore, perceptions depending on the source and mode of transmissions of information might be wrongly interpreted and misguided such that a war is started (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

Table 3.2: Opportunity Model

	1	2	3	4	5
GDP per capita	-	-	-0.873	-1.237	-1.243
Male secondary schooling	-0.025	-0.024	-	-	-
Previous war	0.464	-	-	-	-
Mountainous terrain	0.013	0.014	0.008	-	-
Geographic dispersion	-2.211	-2.129	-0.865	-	-
Social fractionalization	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0002	-	-

Source: Collier and Hoeffler, (2004). The figures represent studies done from over 540 cases

In an attempt to present a clear picture of how opportunities could start a civil war Collier and Hoeffler (2004) think that firstly as defined in chapter 2 a civil war is an internal conflict with at least 1000 battle deaths per year. Furthermore, the government must also suffer at least 5% loss of its soldiers (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). They continue that if rebels perceive a possible source of income either from within or without the country, it could be a good incentive to start a war. Similarly, hostile governments and the diaspora could be taken as these sources of finances and a good example they give is the extraction of natural resources. They add that natural resource extortion such as the diamonds of West Africa, timber in Cambodia and cocaine in Colombia (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, cited Klare, 2001) make a good incentive for a civil war start. In addition, they add that bad governance as it's the case with most African countries is a primordial gain for rebels who might capitalize on it to start a war.

From table 3.2 income flow and GDP are directly proportional to male secondary school education because the number of uneducated males in a country will determine the possible recruits that rebels will have to advance their course and logic. Secondly, low income and income inequalities in a country are breeding grounds of young men to join radical groups with sometimes vague and misplaced agendas. It is also important to note that the agenda of rebel groups could either be

political or religious and opportunities for looting serve as a test to these groups if they will remain resolute on their course or will in hesitantly forget their reason for fighting to take hold of the Lootable resources (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner, 2009). Table 2 again reveals that male secondary school education has a two sided effect on the military potential of rebel groups. In support of this fact, Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner (2009) add that an important component of civil wars is the finances and military power of rebel groups. They continue that without money and a military no rebellion can stand and for those who have been standing for the past decade and still going strong, it therefore means their sources of both finances and recruits flow endlessly. As such, education might affect the risk of conflict through changing attitude (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). What this means is that uneducated youths with no jobs might see no other choice but join a rebel organization where they might be taken care of. A good example is the recruitment of terrorist soliders by Boko Haram in the north of Nigeria and north of Cameroon who take advantage of the high and unthinkable levels of poverty in those regions. BBC (2016) reported that some young men blinded by the illusion that Boko Haram has money promised to join. This illusion comes from propaganda made by Boko Haram which makes many to think that they have resourceful sponsors who pump money into the organization and whoever gets in will find milk and honey. Similarly, “hundreds, perhaps thousands, of young people in northern Cameroon, who lack access to school and employment, are increasingly fighting alongside Boko Haram, local authorities say. As a matter of fact, Colonel Joseph Nouma of the Maroua Defense Regiment, added that the government of Cameroon is aware that Boko Haram is recruiting youths” to fight for them (AllAfrica, 2015). The recruitment does not end with uneducated and unemployed youths because educated youths and skilled workers, whose political and economic rights have been trampled upon, might still join a rebel organization in order to fight for their rights. Thus, education comes in as a two edged sword which could work for or against joining a rebel group.

Furthermore, table 3.1 shows a strong correlation between mountainous terrain and civil war. As Collier and Hoeffler (2004) noted geography is a strong motive and hideout for rebel forces that prepare themselves to engage government and loyalist forces of the country. As a matter of fact, a limited knowledge of their geography by the military coupled with the possession of cheap equipment (Collier and Hoeffler,

2004) may favour rebellions. Secondly, the organizational structure and response ability of the military to the hinterlands which might not be very accessible to cars could weaken the state's response to anti-government activities which could instead strengthen the military ranks of the rebel forces. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) add that the geographic dispersions of citizens within a country is another setback that can help hide rebel forces. They continue that Herbest (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, cited Herbest, 2000) suggests that "Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) is prone to rebellion because its population, lives around the edges of the country". This study thinks that one of the best solutions to this is to reduce the rural density and dispersion of citizens, create a harmony of migration and settlement that gives the government a sharp response to insurgent activities at any given time. Table 1 also shows that previous war has a strong sign and warns of a possible repetition of civil war. Meaning states that have had civil wars as table 3.1 shows will probably have another one unless a strong reconciliation and normalization institution is set up to address the preceding causes of the war. Lastly, table 3.2 shows that social fractionalizations as well as ethnic problems (to be elaborated below) are solid agents that can cause civil wars.

3.1.2 Grievances

Collier and Hoeffler (2004) discuss grievances in four different ways. Firstly they look at ethnic or religious hatred, political repression, political exclusion and economic inequality. Ethnic and religious hatred shall be discussed in depths below and economic inequality shall also be discussed in depths when discussing the economic theory of civil war. For now only political repression and political exclusion shall be discussed.

It is very important to note that political explanations of civil wars trace their roots to historical grievances which were left unattended or partially treated (Coller, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009). These unattended and unresolved grievances became volcanoes that boiled over years and increased in energy and coupled with other environmental and ethnic factors erupted to violent exchanges and then civil war when the right time came. This study applies common sense that the repression of political rights is a gross violation of the law and constitution of a country because all liberal democracies give their citizens the rights to stand and be elected for office, the right

to choose the candidate of their choice and the right to freely relate with state institutions and the government without the fear of coercion or reprimands. Article eight of the South African Constitution on civil and political rights states that "everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law" (South African Commission for Human Rights, 2016/2017). Therefore, exhibiting this right must be free from ethnicity, religion, and race, level of income or social status. However, trouble sets in when this right is repressed by either the government or any leading authority or reduced in one region of the country and increased in another for any of the reasons mentioned above that is ethnicity, religion and economic power. Furthermore, if the political culture of the country is that kind where membership to groups, political parties and other interests groups is as a result of ethnicity or allegiance to a particular individual, then the chances for violence are high. This is because minority groups might never have a say in the day to day running of the affairs of the country and citizens with weak and smaller income might never be counted as valuable for economic decisions. From table 3.2 social fractionalization is possible and visible in such a case and before long, there is a full scale war between ethnic groups, most importantly, which might also spread to political parties within a short period of time. Thus, the repression of political rights is very consequential for national unity and very bad tool for governance. Unfortunately, it has been one of the most preferred tools of some governments who prefer to victimize a part of their country for political, religious, economic and ethnic reasons. Sometimes, the political rights of citizens are not directly repressed as such. Instead, they are simply excluded from the political spheres of influence and are reduced to take whatever others decide whether it fits them or not. In an address to the constitutional council of Cameroon after the October 2018 presidential elections, Maurice Kamto, presidential candidate and chairman of MRM (Cameroon Renaissance Movement) asked a painful and pertinent question to the members of the constitutional council when he sensed a possible election rig and his projected victory denied him. His question was "What exam should I write to become a Bulu (the ruling ethnic minority group) so that I can be regarded as a true Cameroonian? The Biya administration of Cameroon has for over 36 years propagated the rhetoric that only the Beti/Bulu's are good for power and have the ability to rule the country. In the same vein, Sam Nujoma the former president of Namibia and former chairman of The South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) had used the same

populist rhetoric when he said “his party, SWAPO, will remain in power for the next 1000 years” (Melber, 2015). Similarly, Mugabe who had denied the late Morgan Tsvangirai his true victory to the presidency twice had earlier said “only God who appointed me will remove me, not the MDC, not the British" (The Telegraph, 2008). Therefore, political exclusion and political dominance of a majority or a minority in power and the wickedness they show towards a selective minority or an individual is a great resource to ignite the bloody flames of civil war.

Lastly, political inequalities and economic inequalities go hand in gloves. As such political inequalities and rebellions work together to creative tensions and war (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Most civil wars in Africa come from this spectrum of recurring events which are succeeded by different administrations such as those of the Central African Republic which systematically marginalized the Muslim minority to breaking point (Jolley and Wolcott, 2017).

3.1.3 The economic theory of civil war

Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics

	Sample	**No civil war**	**Civil war**
	1167 cases	1089	78
Primary commodity exports/GDP	0.168	0.169	0.149
GDP per capita (const. US$)	4061	4219	1645
GDP per capita growth	1.62	1.74	-0.23
Diaspora (relative to the population of the country or origin)	0.017	0.018	0.004
Ethnic fractionalization	39.57	38.64	52.63
Religious fractionalization	36.09	35.98	37.70

Source: Collier and Hoeffler, (2004), Greed and grievance in civil war”. 78 in the table indicate war starts.

From table 3.3 it is seen that countries that are stable have a 0.169% of primary commodity export/GDP which drops to 0.149% when the war starts. Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009) add that a higher risk of rebellion will reduce income. In fact, they continue that low per capita income would directly increase the risk of rebellion: and the chances for the state to control only a small part of its country is higher as rebels capture and take full control of different regions of the country. Following low GDP and the lack of income to mobilize a viable army that can counter the rebels the government finds itself struggling to contain the rebellion. This study adds that low GDP is directly proportional to a rise in rebellion. For as long as the economic growth of a country continues to suffer and dwindle, there are high chances that meaningful political goods will not be delivered to citizens. Consequently, rebel forces will increase and most importantly, will fix their eyes on Lootable resources that can be used to finance their operations.

Secondly table 3.3 shows that GDP per capita growth is a significant matter that causes rebellions to flourish or diminish. According to Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009) economic growth will badly affect the recruitments of rebel soldiers because the political goods delivered by the state from the dividends of the economic growth will keep them busy and so preoccupied with the boom they enjoy. Thus, no one will dare to trade those goodies for any war no matter the reason. However, low per capita growth would increase the chances to recruit soldiers, create multiple sources of rebel financing which might lead to a sarcastic weakening of the state. In addition, table 3.3 reveals that GDP in relation to primary commodity export reduces from 0.169% to 0.149% during war times. The foremost reason might be that both government and rebel forces during this time might be fighting hard to maintain control over the most available natural resources they can find. In cases of South Sudan the foremost natural resource could be oil, in Niger republic it could be Uranium exports, in Sierra Leone it could be diamonds, in the Democratic Republic of Congo it could be diamonds, coltan and timber and in the Central African Republic it could also be diamonds. So, whoever lays hands on these resources controls the land as they would be in the possession of the latest military gadgets that will inflict considerable losses and pain on their enemies. This fight therefore, explains why primary commodity exports reduce and another reason is as a result of the lack of availability of the labor force most of whom might have either been killed

either by rebel forces or by government forces. Those who survive would certainly be on the run and there would be no one to work in the state owned corporations thus, leveraging heavy blows the primary commodity exports.

The next item on table 3.3 is diaspora finance. Collier (2000) warns that Diasporas are dangerous because they can inflame and sponsor civil wars to levels beyond imagination. He writes that during civil wars if a large portion of a country's diaspora is resident in the US, then the chance for the civil war to restart even after it might have stopped is high. This is because one of the fundamental sources for rebellions after natural resources is the diaspora. Angoustures and Pascal (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004 cited Angoustures and Pascal, 1996) reviewed a good example which was the finance of the Tamil Tigers in North America by their Sri Lanka diaspora in the USA. It has also been known that during war times the diaspora population decreases as seen in table 3.3 where the percentage of the diaspora drops from 0.017% to 0.004% when civil war broke out. Nichols (2018) explains that the population of the diaspora reduces during war times maybe because most emigrants travel to the US or maybe those outside the country return to fight either as pro-government or pro-rebel. This study is still not sure why it happens this way but Collier and Hoeffler (2004) add that the emigrant population in the US is mostly used to calculate the ferocity a country's diaspora during war times.

3.2 Religious Factors

This study is not sure if there exists any literature of religious wars related to the indigenous African religions. However, this study is sure that following the coming of Christianity and Islam which are so far the two major religions in Africa while not forgetting Animists, some interpersonal responses to religious beliefs have sprouted raging tensions and to some extents bloodshed. As one of the independent variables and possible causative factors of civil wars, this study shall like to review a few instances where religion might be a detrimental and destructive factor rather than constructive one for state development and unity.

From table 3.3 above we see that religious fractionalization changes from peace times to war times and worst during civil war periods. The data shows that during peace times religious fractionalization stands at 35.98% and during war times it goes up to 37.70% meaning the society increases the more in polarization.

On this regards, Kasfelt (2005) divided some African countries that have suffered the devastating agony of religious fragmentation and which resulted to civil war into four parts; “the southern Sudan; Rwanda/Burundi/Congo; Zimbabwe/South Africa; and Sierra Leone/Liberia/Guinea”. These countries though having ethnic diversity which is also a fundamental agent of division as it shall be seen below, found themselves deepen into bloodshed as a result of some differences that might have occurred between Christians, Muslims and other indigenous ethnic beliefs such as Animists as mentioned above. Kasfelt (2005) is of the thought that civil wars might have broken out in the aforementioned countries as a result of the role of religious institutions which in their respects might have either mounted tension or further polarized their societies. Secondly, religious practitioners may have solemnly legitimized their quest for civil war through religion. In this case religion becomes a proxy to satisfy a gratification directed towards bloodshed. Thirdly, there might have or might not have been the role of religion in debating and making sense of war and conflict. And lastly, extremists, taking advantage of the social disintegration of their countries might have captured their societies such that religion was used as a cultural resource in warfare and revenge.

However, the argument that oscillates about the roots of civil wars related to religion might be properly expounded by Heynes (2007) who outlines three fundamental cause of religious warfare. According to him, group competition for space, material resources and favour from the selective minority or government might sprout to warfare. This is very possible for countries where the dominant religion has many sub-sects in it like Islam where there are Sunni, Shia Muslims, etc. In Christianity though there are many beliefs and fractions such as the Pentecostals, Catholics, Apostolic, etc. which most times contract each other and claim to have the absolute revelation of the bible, there have never been any reasonable violence. No arguments between these groups have ever led to any radical exchanges. However, this study sees that this has always not been the case when two opposing religions such as Christianity and Islam clash together. The results of any clashes have always been blood with one claiming to perform a purge or a Jihad on the other. For instance, in Nigeria, Muslim Fulani herdsmen have unceremoniously been in the business of slaughtering hundreds of Christian farmers because of the shortage of grazing land. Ochab (2018) mentioned hundreds that the Fulani herdsmen have killed in Nigeria

which prompted the reaction of President Trump of the United States who made an outcry in favour of Christians who are savagely killed by Fulani herdsmen. Haynes (2007) adds that the second factor is associated to developmental failures. It was discussed in chapter two that when a government fails to deliver political goods such as good governance, democracy, infrastructure, the respect of civil rights and a viable economic growth and per capita, there is bound to be room for warmongers who will take the society hostage. Murshed (2002) notes that though the incentive to a civil war which according to him follows rational choice might be the lack of development and infrastructure, he worries that civil wars make poverty and growth difficult to achieve. This is because already existing infrastructures will possibly be destroyed in the conflict and the nation will find itself struggling gain to rebuild its ruins some of which might take ages. However, this study thinks that the grievances that surround underdevelopment are enormous and mustn't be underestimated because they have the capacity to bring a terrible social and ethnic segregation in the country, causing daring polarization whose extremities off course, could be war. Murshed (2002) is also careful to note that the entrance of ethnicity into the religious tensions equation summons greater unrest because ethnicity as a concept and an act is a strong uniting factor whose mode of operation could transcend national boundaries, thus, causing greater troubles internationally. This is especially true for kin countries such as those in the Central trigger point of Africa such as Cameroon, Gabon, The Central African Republic and Congo. These countries all share the Fang tribe and the Pygmies. Therefore, ethnic tension in one country will possibly affect the attitudes of their brethren in the neighboring country whose response might lead to a policy crisis and national security alert. Lastly, Haynes (2007) continues that political instability is another force capable of promoting religious war. In a society where religious diversity frequently causes problems due to competition from the different groups present, the failure of a party or leader might escalate hostilities between the different groups such that the only way to identify true sectarian strength and legitimate the claims to the realms of power might be through war. Furthermore, the political exclusion of a particular religious group deemed incompetent, insignificant or rationally absent by the ruling party or religious group is a breeding ground for vengeance. This is particularly true for the Central African Republic; however, much shall not be said now about this particular case. As Murshed (2002) and Ochad (2018) noted the line that separate religious and ethnic groups is very

thin, thus, making an easy intersection between both when laying claims on social and other national amenities. Thus, transcending the different hemispheres is relatively easy and reversible because whatever threatens a particular religious sect or group might be seen to also threaten its ethnicity and vice versa.

Considering some of the efforts that have been made to solve the ethnic and religious differences between group in a country Haynes (2007) proposes that the solution finding mission should begin firstly, with effective democratization whereby everyone in the country regardless of their religious beliefs and ethnic backgrounds and irrespective of the fact that their tribes might not be the majority or minority should feel the sense of belonging with equal access to the political goods discussed in chapter two. Secondly, he adds that executive and legislative policies of good governance should be holistic and regionally equitable. That is the dividends gotten from the exploitation, management and sharing of natural resource should be equally allocated and regionalization should be applied in practical terms and not only limited to the paper. If these are done, coupled with the strength of institutions that increasingly work hard to deliver the expected goods in record time, the nation will grow in strength to become a strong state that might not suffer any civil war as seen in chapter two.

3.3 Ethnic Factors

For rebellions to succeed, they must be free from any ethnic marginalization from within their ranks otherwise they are doomed to failure. Easterly and Levine, Alesina et al., and Collier (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, cited Easterly and Levine, 1997, Alesina et al., 1999, and Collier, 2001) warn that "ethnic and religious diversity as seen in table 3 above within organizations tends to reduce their ability to function". One of the reasons could be that should a rebel group be ethnic centric the rebel group may end up losing the most of its recruits who might feel discriminated upon. Furthermore, other ethnic groups who might have bought their arguments and logic in times past may retaliate by withdrawing both their materials and human support as a result of their perception of being discriminated. When this happens the success, the rebel group might have had to impound, heavy losses on its enemy will reduce and its quest for a civil war will reduce. If it gets so bad, the rebels lose the war and many may end up killed by loyalist soldiers or locked up with a few lucky ones

escaping to other countries where they may stay forever. Table 3.3 shows that ethnic fractionalization stands at 38.64% during peace times but climbs to 58.63% during war times. This study is also of the opinion that if the rebel army is too strong the government might infiltrate them and try to spur ethnic differences in order to weaken them. The success of the rebel army then faced with this infiltration will depend on how serious and fixed they are on their resolve.

To second to this fact it must be known that Africa is highly heterogeneous and sometimes the civil unrests come either from its religious diversity as seen above or its ethnic diversity. Thus, countries that have suffered a history of civil war or a series of civil wars in the past might suffer it again (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2009). Therefore, both the government and rebel forces have a great role ot play to either prevent or escalate a civil war. More so, civil wars are very costly and prosecuting a civil war comes with serious economic, military, political, environmental and social costs. Thus, for governments which end up to be the losers on the most part because GDP per capita which might have taken long to build ends up lost to moments of insurgency must come up with contingent policies and concessions that will stop civil wars from taking place. Walter (2014) witnessed that the government of Canada provided many political goods and concessions to the Quebecois when the rose up and fought for independence. She also cites Nicaragua, Ecuador who gave some level of autonomy to regions that complained of marginalization. Countries that refuse to bargain with rebels and choose to prosecute a war must then be ready for the worse because as discussed above and as shown in table 3.2, rebels might hide behind the benefits of any opportunity they find to derail the course of the state. Walter (2014) continues that ethnic troubles are fundamentally detrimental when they result to grievances. As a matter of fact, she thinks that “ethnic groups are more likely to have more grievances against the state than other non-ethnic groups and cries”. IN that regard, she thinks that if the grievances of ethnic groups are not properly looked at, though they may go silent for a while, these ethnic groups will have no trouble mobilizing themselves for a greater fight. The reason for this mobilization is simple; ethnicity as this study understands is a strong unifying factor and once ethnic groups have been unified the level of harm and destruction then can do is phenomenal. Walter also thinks that the simple fact that ethnic groups share the same space, time, resources and always rub shoulders

with each other makes it very easy for them to find sympathizers and support should they decide to make an insurrection. The danger here is that once one ethnic group stands up to cry foul, it may lead to an equal reaction with another and if this stimulus sweeps across the country, within a short period of time, the ruling government may be toppled or it may lead to arson, violence and gun exchanges.

Walter (2014) believes that one of the fundamental reasons why tribes and ethnic groups express grievances comes from the political practice of the elites. Most African countries have more than ten ethnic groups and most of them are in the government though the proportion of the elites may differ with respect of their degree of dominance. Nevertheless, when political elites start favouring their own tribes men at the detriment of other ethnic groups, it acts as a deliberate toe-stepping on other ethnic groups that may retaliate and ask for a rotation of power so that they too can have their time and share of the national cake. Furthermore, negotiating with ethic groups is extremely difficult and sometimes impossible. And this is the case before, during and after civil wars have started (Walter, 2014). A basic argument this study reasons with is that ethnic diversity should be a strong unifying factor that can promote national unity, development and economic growth. Unfortunately, it hasn't always been the case over the ages because wars and other forms of social and ethnic tensions have left many nations fractured or collapsed many economies. On that regard "ethnically diverse developing countries feature prominently on the list of countries that have suffered from civil war and insurgency in recent decades," according to Sriskandarajah (Venkatasawmy, 2015; cited Sriskandarajah, 2005:63). As a matter of fact, Horowitz (Venkatasawmy, 2015; cited Horowitz, 2000) summarily "considers tensions arising from ethnic diversity to have been the principal trigger of genocide in Rwanda, violent riots in the Democratic Republic of Congo, civilian mass killings in Burundi, army killings in Uganda and repeated hostilities in Chad - that have occurred during the last two decades of the 20th century".

As stunning as it has been one still wonder why these hostilities prevail and why at times they are used as policy tools by the ruling clergy to hurt, maim and deoxidize their societies knowing what the results in the short run would be.

While discussing the religious incentive of civil war above, this study mentioned that the line separating ethnic and religious tensions is very slim. To support this fact

Venkatasawmy (2015) quotes that the implementation of the Sharia in northern Nigeria caused a terrible rift between ethnicities this led to mass killings and war between Muslims and the Christians in Kaduna in the 2000s. More so, Langer, Mustapha & Stewart (Venkatasawmy, 2015; cited Langer, Mustapha & Stewart, 2009) "further explain that since the late 1950s, different ethnic groups have been in competition over representation in Nigerian government and state institutions. Often this led to feelings of discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and race among the groups that were inadequately represented, which in turn provoked tensions and conflicts, culminating in Nigeria's civil war (1967-1970)". The ethnic group in particular here are the Biafrans and today the movement has rejuvenated with the same calls for secession that led to the bloody killings of over one million Biafrans in the late 1960s.

This study believes that the same ethnic tensions apply in Cameroon, The Central African Republic, and Ethiopia where particular ethnic groups are sidelined by bad governance and made a scum in the entire nation. Similarly, this study asserts that the Ethiopian civil war which led to the independence of Eritrea might be a well pleasing fact to this regard. Furthermore, the self-proclaimed independence of Somaliland and Putland in Somalia upon the fall of Siad Barre in the early 1900s also shows how much ethnic differences coupled with bad governance can destroy the national identity of a nation. Lastly, politicizing ethnicity as a market gain for political power is sarcastically detrimental for the welfare of the nation because though it may work for a time, the short run effects are obvious.

3.4 External Factors

Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009) believe that one of the sources of funding of rebel organizations is from hostile governments who might not like the domestic policies of other countries. Furthermore, they cited the funding that was given by Zimbabwe to the Renamo rebels in Mozambique. For many years civil wars have been incited by foreign nations who have interests in other countries or who for political reasons choose to persecute a country in order to show their dominance and power in their region of influence or to prove their global ambition. Syria is a good case in this regard because French parliamentarians themselves

testified of France's involvement in escalating the conflict in Syria for geopolitical and selfish reasons (Allen, 2013).

Sambanis et al. (2017) outline a series of parameters which they identify as suitable for inciting civil unrest in a country. They believe that promises from a foreign government to rebels who engage the central government might brainwash them to continue tirelessly in their plight. Secondly, they believe that this can result to polarization (that is division in thought and ideas) between the members of the society who might either sway on the side of the government or on the side of the rebels. Thirdly, they say that foreign military interventions prolong civil war or incite them in cases where quarrels between sects in the society haven't reached firing point. And talking about intervention, they specify very clearly that in cases where conflict has begun, pro-government intervention might reduce civil war because the government receives enough foreign aid and military tactical advice and personnel to quell up rebels. More so, pro-rebel foreign intervention may instead escalate the conflict beyond understanding. Just maybe it might be good to mention the support Uganda gave to the South Sudanese military liberation army under the leadership of the late John Garang in their 50 years' war against North Sudan (Nicolaisen, 2015). This example shows that following hostilities directed against the dominant Muslim north Uganda gave the South Sudanese rebels a save heaven and favourable treatment during war times which helped them to rehabilitate their army, strategies and to continue fighting. However, despite the central role Uganda has played to solve South Sudan's war, The Archbishop of Gulu Diocese in Northern Uganda, Bishop John Baptist Odama, accuses Uganda for being a principal proponent in escalating the war (Sudan Tribune, 2018). Following Sambanis et al. (2017) illustration of how foreign interventions can either escalate or deescalate civil war, this study believes that a third option might still be necessary. The third option is the neutral option which asserts that whether pro-government or pro-rebel intervention might still not have an effect once the civil war machinery has been prosecuted by any of the actors.

Furthermore, Sambanis et al. (2017) think that during the cold war, polarization between countries that struggled among ethnic lines might have caused civil war. They think that ethnic groups might have wrestled among themselves on the choice of world power their country must make to ensure their collective survival. They

assert again that either of the world powers might have incited this ethnic polarization which could result to civil war so that a country ends up aligning with them. However, the fall of the Soviet Union gave room instead for greater ethnic and religious conflicts such as those of Somalia which saw the fall of the Siad Barre regime immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union. This study would like to highlight that Somalia at the time benefited from the military support and aid of the Soviet Union so following other internal troubles, when the Soviet Union fell; Somalia's abusive regime followed immediately leading the bloodbath. Secondly, the declaration of independence of some Baltic and Slovac countries opened up more bloodshed such as those of the Former Yugoslavia whose fall also culminated to the killings of over 7000 Bosniak Muslims by Bosnian Serbian Army (Hayden, 2008).

Sambanis et al. (2017) adds that polarization depends on the external and the international environment (Sambanis et al., 2017, cited Reyno-Querol, 2005). This study thinks that in The Democratic Republic of Congo French, British and Belgian forces pretending to be intervening thought the United Nations peace keeping force, might be the actual cause of the unending war in this country and also the actual protagonists behind the death of Dag Hammarskjöld (Borger, 2017), the UN Secretary General who was killed in the Central African Republic in 1961. The latter is said to have been sadden by the imperialist wickedness of the aforementioned powers and decided to apply international law which was aimed to put an end to the conflict. Unfortunately, his good actions cut across the selfish intents of some and so he was allegedly killed (Gladstone, 2018). Since then no other UN diplomat has tried to solve the issues in that country and all that has followed has been political sermons that have led to nothing concrete. The same actions and causes continue to lead to the same effect.

Finally, this study is proud to show that the causes of Civil Wars are not only limited to ethnic and religious divides as a wealth of literature portrays. It has shown that there are a group of internal, domestic and external factors that can either directly or indirectly cause the spring of civil wars. It is not left for policy makers and governments to find a solution to this matter and make sure that they put an end to a possible hike in bloodshed in their countries as well as their neighbours. More so, the African Union is called upon to wake up from it is long slumber and vain sermons of nothing concrete to efficient and more continent policies of crisis management. If the

African Unions 2063 Millennium Goals are for real and must be met, then the time to act is now or never.

4. CAUSES OF CIVIL WAR IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

This chapter will look at the causes of civil war in the Central African Republic. In order to present a strong argument it will look at the internal and external causes of the war. With regards to the external causes, it will look at the roles of Sudan and Chad as well as South Africa had to play in the escalation of the war.

4.1 Internal Causes

The internal causes of the civil war in The Central African Republic will be summarized here following an elaborate discussion of the motives that incite civil unrests in the country from the statistical analysis done in chapter three. In chapter three it was shown that mountainous terrain, GDP primary commodity export and GDP growth per capita, male secondary school education, Lootable (such as gold, diamond, and other precious jewels) and natural resources are important compliments that can stir civil wars. In this chapter much of the above mentioned shall be kept as background reference, however, policy issues enacted by different administrations in the Central African Republic shall be critically looked at with emphasis on if they actually were the pace setters to today's turmoil.

The Central African Republic (henceforth, C.A.R.) is noted for three particular things, "coups", armed groups and military mutiny and political instability. The country has had more than six successful coups and a few attempted ones in the last fifty years. To better expound on the subject this study would like to make a critical review of the different administrations that have ruled this country from its independence in 1960 till present day. From that analysis this study would then summarize what the problems are.

4.1.1 The root of the military coup

- David Dacko (1960-1964)

David Dacko was the first president of C.A.R. and he ruled the country for four years before his unexpected demise. Dagne (2007) accounts that David Dacko's rule was

plagued with many inconsistencies and political wrongs that favored the act of the country's first coup. He instituted a one party system and continued with the political party that he had inherited from his predecessor, Barthelemy Boganda who was the country's first prime minister. Dagne (2007) adds that Boganda while acting as Prime Minister, had the founded The Movement for the Social Evolution of Black Africa (French: Mouvement pour l'évolution sociale de l'Afrique noire-MESAN). When David Dacko became president in 1960 he naturally nationalized the party and made the country a one party system. Bissakonou (2015) adds that David Dacko though educated managed the country very poorly. Though he tried many reforms to boost the economy he was unsuccessful to boost the country's economy. Consequently, the GDP growth was very slow and the economy was unable to handle the challenges of the country as a result, it gave way to grievances and opened the doors for the coup. Secondly, he adds that David Dacko practiced nepotism and clientellism such that his buddies and friends were privileged to occupy favourable positions in government and despite the dying economy; they earned unbelievable salaries and enjoyed other benefits. In a multiethnic and heterogeneous country like the C.A.R. such political behaviours come with many consequences and apparently, David Dacko was cultivating the farmland of his own destruction. The United Nations (2004) reports that David Dacko practically drained the country's baby economy and made a waste of its resources for his private benefit regardless of the many millions of citizens who depended on his shaky policies. In fact, he failed drastically to practice liberal and social democracy as well as deliver the political goods that were necessary to stir social cohesion, national unity nationalism and patriotism. This was the genesis of a problem the country will have to suffer for many decades. Dagne (2007) continues that following his bad governance, his own cousin Jean Bedel-Bokassa who was General of the Army then and helped by France, took over power from him in a coup in 1965. This was the first coup but definitely not the last.

Nonetheless, not all that David Dacko did was wrong. Though having signed the famous "Accord de cooperation-Accord of cooperation" with France which was France's way of keeping its former colonies tied to it, and despite David Dacko having enjoyed good relations and protection from France, fell out with them. Ubaku et. al. (2015) reports that until then the Accord of cooperation had given French

companies and firms an exclusive right and power over the economic, military and civil affairs of the country. However, he continues that David Dacko came up with policies that reduced that monopoly and turned the tables to their favour. He increased the monopoly of the mines to the advantage of the C.A.S. In addition, he encouraged Central African citizens to dig up diamonds for their personal selves and this created an awareness of shared national wealth. The government overshadowed by French firms was not going to usurp full control over the economy but in an attempt to empower the people and reduce unemployment, they were asked to dig up diamonds, become entrepreneurial and support the economic growth of the country. What this meant as this study understands it is that as from that moment that decree was passed, French firms were reduced to only a designated portion of land to mine on and the people had exclusive rights over their properties and lands. Secondly, the French firms had to deal with the constant competition of the locals on a daily bases and seeing that they were protected by the state, they were bound to become even more powerful with the passing times. As if that was not enough, David Dacko passed a presidential decree which instituted the policy of "Centralafricanization" (Ubaku et al., 2015). What this term means is that the government of the C.A.R. engaged itself in the recruitment of citizens to fill up the government and the civil service. By this policy many locals found jobs with the government but at the same time, this was highly detrimental to the many French citizens who had been exported by their government to work with the government of David Dacko, some of whom served at the same time, like spies who kept a good eye on the president in case he tried to go against France and its interests. Apparently, David Dacko's economic policies were already going against the interests of France and things were not going to be the same. The recruitments of citizens in the public sectors significantly caused the dismissal of French expatriates in the country's civil service (Ubaku, et al., 2015). However, this also came with a price as most of the locals who were recruited as Ubaku, et al. (2015) noticed were incompetent to handle the duties that had assigned them. Consequently, corruption increased and the misappropriation of state funds loomed.

Lastly, David Dacko once again as opposed to the Accord of Cooperation, which put France in the first place and prevented its former colonies from diversifying their economies, officially recognized the People's Republic of China. His foreign policies

were rather radical and totally antagonistic to the polarity of the international system at the time of the Cold War. Thus, aligning with China meant taking sides with the Soviet Union or sympathizing with communism. The result was the coup that claimed his office and fortunately for him, his life was spared by the mutineers.

4.1.2 The Bokassa administration era

The arrival of Bokassa's reign to power was even catastrophic than David Dacko's. He didn't fill in any of the port holes that his predecessor had bored. Regardless of his military experience, he was worse. Cusak et. al., (2007 that his government suffered severely from poor management and pursued many failed reforms, which instead made his government sarcastic. Furthermore, following his military past and training with the French Army, he was in the best position to instate a transition government and return power back to civilian control and return to his barracks. However, he did not. Ubaku et al. (2015) noticed that as soon as he had taken power in 1965, he raised himself to a full General and declared himself president for life. He had a centralized government which increasingly gave him greater executive powers and he ruled the country with a rod (Dagne, 2007). Dagne (2007) adds that he tried a series of reforms which like his predecessor all failed due to poor management. Secondly, he was very autocratic and was used to making unpredictable policies, many of which brought no good to the livelihoods of his people. As if that was not enough he bankrupt the country for his own personal good and went ahead to spend over $20 million to crown himself emperor thus, becoming Emperor Bokassa I, according to the likes of his icon, Napoleon of France (Ubaku, et. al. 2015). He also received significant support from France and from President Valery Giscard D'Estaing who provided him with almost everything he needed for his coronation (Ubaku et al., 2015 cited Meredith, 2005). Having curtailed the country in a wing of tribalism and serious mismanagement of human and materials resources, he went ahead to offer sumptuous gifts such as a diamond worth a quarter of a million dollars to president Valery Giscard D'Estaing of France and dared to appoint him Minister of Finance (Ubaku, et al., 2015). By appointing Valéry Giscard d'Estaing president of France as his minister of finance, he was enforcing the tentacles of the France-Afrique, which at the time was even stronger since it is pioneer 'dogs' were in power with Bokassa and his predecessors as one. More so, it showed that he honored the French more than he honored his country men who were

already divided on ethnic lines since power had remained in only one tribe since the first president, David Dacko. During that time, tension was building in the country and ethnic fractionalization was taking place because he was very tribalistic and ethnocentric. His bad governance and ruthless rule led to the assassination of over 100 children who protested against the monopoly of his wives' sox business. One of Bokassa's wives owned a textile company that made sox and she enjoyed monopoly thanks to the influence of her husband. At some point, she increased the cost of the sox and this led to a violent outrage of youths who didn't see why she had to do that considering the high unemployment and lack of job opportunities in the country. This led to the country's first wide spread protest that directly challenged this selfish policy. The penalty for this protest was the indiscriminate murder of the unfortunate ones.

The autocratic rule of David Dacko had set forth a stage for bad governance, which without the thoughts and perceptions of the different administrations, was building a negative momentum of social polarity, ethnic strife and division from within the military. To assert power, Bokassa dissolved the constitution and the legislature. He also lost faith in all political institutions and made himself the one and only political institution available in the country. Ubaku et al, (2015) mention that he made sure that telephone lines were not working, and all government offices were required to keep their radios aloud at all times in order to receive direct instructions from him. He made sure that no minister was in office for over a year and carried out unceremonious ministerial amendments to avoid the grouping of his enemies, who might topple him from power or kill him. More so, he made sure that there was no opposition in the country so that his eternal reign could be actualized (Dagne, 2007). As backward minded, as he was, he forgot that tensions were building outside the political capital, Bangui, and that mayhem was coming his way. Dagne, (2007), adds that having had enough of his bad governance and following the bad international reputation he had earned himself after the massacre of the school children who protested against the textile company of his wife which imposed high costs on school uniforms, France once again reactivated the coup machinery. In 1980 in the French backed coup he was replaced by David Dacko in an operation that was called "Operation Barracuda". By this time, the country was already seriously polarized, and coups had become a political culture. However, no civil war had been in the

country, but tensions had seriously mounted in the Muslim northern minority that shares boundaries with Chad and Sudan. This northern section had been isolated by the central governments and had been treated as some foreign land. Little did the blind administrations know that only time would tell and the magma and volcanic eruption that would erupt from this wrong policy would burn the whole country down?

David Dacko did not last in power an in 1981 he too was ousted in a bloodless coup by Andre-Dieudonne Kolingba. On his part, instead of fixing the country and making it livable to the natives, he messed it up like his predecessors and gave more power to the French army who claimed the spoils. Bissakou (2015) adds that Kolingba ruled the country like a private estate, he showed great distrust to the national army, which for clarities sake, was mixed with Chadians who had been brought in as mercenaries and who were never disarmed (Dagne, 2015). Ubaku et. al. (2015) adds that like his predecessors he depended more on foreign peacekeeping forces and militias and even went as far as making a French colonel the head of his presidential security. To reciprocate this gesture, his administration despite the gross human right violations was backed by France and enjoyed a lot of monetary support from the IMF and the World Bank despite his bad political practice. Similarly, his government was plagued by allegations of corruption and mismanagement of funds, which on under normal circumstances, were diverted to private pockets belonging to him and his peers. It could be said that most of these funds were hidden in foreign banks, which at the same time were loaned back to the country. So, the country just like many other Sub-Saharan African countries remained in perpetual debt and those, who felt it more were and remain the ordinary peasants, down the ladder and most times, below the poverty line. Furthermore, the systemic marginalization of the Muslim north continued without remorse and though Ange-Felix Patasse from the northern tribes though not a Muslim, eventually became president after the much contested 1993 presidential elections, so much calm didn't return to the country.

As from the mid-1990s, the country and especially the military were in chaos and didn't pay much allegiance to the central government. The country by this time had already reached the category of a failed state, which was over shadowed by very weak institutions and lacked the human personnel to actualize their goals and objectives. Furthermore, Kolingba preferred to depend on private militias to protect

him instead of developing military infrastructure and skills. In chapter three, it is discussed that poor maintenance of the military and the possession of either outdated military equipment's paves way for rebellions to skyrocket. Once the insurgent machinery is on, it is then hard to stop it. But in the case of the Central African Republic, the rebellion started seriously in the early 1990s with a terrible mutiny of the military. The rebellion of the military threatened the government and tenure in office of Ange-Felix Pattasse who was only three years in power (Ubaku, et al., 2015). In addition to the anger was the recurrent food shortages and worse of all high prices that were constantly were appended to food supplies. Not only did the army leave their barracks in defiance to the central government, but the people followed also. So the government of Patasse that had won the 1993 elections was not only dealing with very angry soldiers, but was also dealing with a threatening civil affair, which in the short run gave power to the soldiers, who at the time were seen as the solution. Cusak et.al. (2007) adds that soldiers complained of unpaid salaries, however, the underlying figment of their anger rested on ethnic issues. The reason Ubaku et al (2015) give to this is that the ousted president Kolingba had loyalist soldiers from his tribe, who didn't take his defeat well. More so, there were soldiers from the ethnic groups of David Dacko and incumbent Patasse, who had different views of who should be in power and how power should be shared. The misrepresentation of the government by members of the government poured kerosene in the angry flames of fire which were in the hands of the angry soldiers.

Following the millennium goals of the African Union, which seeks to have an independent Africa that does not suffer any more from the threats of armed groups, three countries initiated reconciliation. Burkina Faso, Chad and Sudan called for agreements between the central government and the mutineers. The agreement was reached and things started rolling again but some of the mutineers continued to engage government forces. This was a gradual escalation of decades of anger and government sponsored sluggishness in addressing national unity and regional integration. Furthermore, Patasse like his predecessors believed more in private militias and distrusted the government army, which was another fuel that made the military rebellion thrive (Dagne, 2007). His private militia of course was constituted of mercenaries from Chad and Sudan as well as some citizens of the country. This

polarity in the army favoured the coup of Bozize, who took over power on the 15th of March 2003.

4.1.3 The François Bozize administration

The coming of Bozize to power was marred by bloodshed and a monotonous coup that had lived its own history since 1965. Just like his predecessor Jean-Bedel Bokassa, he was a military general, who took advantage of the vacuum that had been created in the country following many military rebellions, social fractionalization and ethnic polarity. These were the perfect interests and ingredients he needed to make up his army, which will oust Ange Felix Patasse from power when was on an official trip to France but later landed in Cameroon immediately after Bozize took power and the possibility of his return to home was denied. The later died in Cameroon in 2011 from a long illness (The Washington Post, 2011). Having taken a completely divided country full of tension and misplaced political institutions which themselves were sunken in corruption, incompetence, bribery, and tribalism, Bozize did not do much to reconcile the country. His administration and tenure in office was also marred by a radical abuse of the constitution. In fact, he suspended the 1995 constitution and demolished the legislature so that he was the only and official authority in the country (UN Security Council, 2003).

Dagne (2007) adds that he relied a lot on foreign militaries by which he hoped to stay in power for as long as possible. Furthermore, he never restructured the military. As a matter of fact, Ubaku et al. (2015) add that following the radicalization of the army during the Patasse administration, instead of de-radicalizing them and sealing the borders with Chad and Sudan, he decided to integrate some of them into the military, though they were originally not citizens. Furthermore, they add that a portion of the mutineers, who had challenged Patasse and whose case was not looked at by the former administration, continued to engage loyalist forces under Bozize. In addition, his failed policies of reconciliation and his inability to maintain national unity strengthened polarization the more and gave his greatest opposition, Michelle Djotodia, the chance and space to begin recruitments of mercenaries in Sudan. Despite peace agreements that had been signed between incumbent president Bozize and his rival Djotodia in Kenya in 2012 (Aljazeera, 2015) and the Libreville accords (Dabany, 2013) nothing changed, as polarization continued. Since the coup of March

2003 and despite the various attempts to resolve the social and ethnic conflicts as well as the military rebellion which aimed to bring peace, armed groups have continued to control or exert influence over the national territory (Dabany, 2016).

It is very important to note that before the war finally broke out in late 2013 the C.A.R. was in good terms with France, Chad and other regional partners. However, when Bozize fell out with France and Chad, he turned to China, India and South Africa for new partnerships (Hauchard, 2018). His choice to bring in the Chinese and the South Africans to the mine fields especially the diamond fields was a catastrophic one because it gave rise to the ultimate goal of the rebellion that had mounted in the northern region which borders with Chad and under the leadership of Michel Djotodia. South Africa in response to this new opportunity sent over four hundred solider to protect Bozize who might have sensed that his days in power were numbered. The soldiers were also mandated to protect the mining interests as well as miners in the C.A.R. 13 of those soldiers were killed when the war broke out between the Seleka rebellion and the loyalist forces to Bozize (BBC, 2013).

It is important to note that foreign powers contributed a lot in financing the war for their personal or better still national gains as it shall be seen in the paragraphs that follow below. When Bozize lost power to Michel Djotodia in March 2013 only two months after the Libreville agreements that were signed under the auspices of the UN Security Council, the C.A.R. had fallen again to this political disdain but this time, it was not going to recover from it so easily like it had with the others.

4.1.4 The Michel Djotodia administration

Michel Djotodia was a diplomat working for the C.A.R before his famous rebellion in 2013. While appointed to Sudan as vice consul of the Central African Embassy, he was actively involved in recruiting mercenaries who would add up to his military coalition (BBC, 2013). The goal was to oust Bozize from power and take over as the strong man of Bangui. It would not be wrong to argue that one of the reasons why the many administrations of the C.A.R. failed considerately was as a result of a wrong policy of centralizing their power only in the nation’s capital. Hence, their influence was almost not felt in other provinces and most times the legitimacy and political power of the president was limited only in Bangui. That means out of Bangui, he was almost not the president and that was the breakthrough rebel groups

needed to build their garrisons especially in the over 1500 km border with Chad and over 2000 km border with Sudan. In chapter three, it is revealed that mountainous terrain is very essential for rebel growth and success and if the military of the country lacks the working knowledge of these demographics and forested regions, and then it will be very hard to quench any rebellion or anti-government activity. Seeing that the government of Bozize lacked so much control of the entire country and following his continuation of the systemic marginalization of the Muslim north, there was every reason for the military coalition to enjoy the support of the locals in the north, and the support of Chadian rebels who actively helped.

Before the offensive moves of Djotodia that ousted Bozize, the agreement with his rebellion was to establish a transition that would quickly bring the country back to democracy and growth (BBC, 2013). However, when the rebellion succeeded, Djotodia had other plans and did not stick to the agreements he had made with his rebel partners and that was going to be one of the reasons for internal wrangling within the Seleka and its associated partners BBC (2013) reported. As a matter of fact, one of the most forward rebel militias that had fought alongside Djotodia, Nelson N'Djadder, told Associated Press news agency that he did not recognize Mr Djotodia as the new leader of CAR. “We had agreed that we would push to Bangui in order to arrest Bozize and that we would then announce an 18-month transition, a transition that would be as fast as possible and not one that would last three years," Mr N'Djadder told AP from Paris (BBC, 2013).

4.2 External Factors

“The C.A.R has barely functioning state institutions, an economy in shambles, an impoverished population and a security apparatus in complete disarray (Kah, 2014 cited N’diaye, 2007:1; Central African Republic Country Level Information; Country Profile Central African Republic). According to him these have helped to make the country ungovernable, and liable to internal problems and all sorts of instabilities.

There are many countries that have been accused to have fueled the war in the C.A.R. and be responsible for diverting intelligence to the different warring groups so that they continue to war and kill innocent people, while their companies take charge of the diamond, uranium and timber exploitations.

Kah (2014) writes that though there are many countries that have been accused of supporting the war in the C.A.R., Sudan is considered the foremost proponent that is actively involved in destabilizing the country. The reason for this is still unknown and it is worth noting that even Chad continues to suffer from this apathetic foreign policy of Sudan (Bissakonou, 2015). Furthermore, South Africa as BBC (2013) reported contributed in though indirectly and through agreements that the Zuma and Bozize administrations had signed to bring the country to its present state. Chad is said to have also been an active sponsor by providing the mercenaries needed by the different coup plotters (Dagne, 2007). Therefore, the C.A.R. is surrounded by very unfriendly neighbours that claim to be friendly but spend much time in devising methods that will tear the country down. As opposed to the Millennium Goals of the African Union, which plans to build and integrated Africa that is free from internal rebellion and division, these aforementioned African countries have been working against the Pan-African dream of unity and integration. They have been helping to tear down this impoverished country though unthinkably rich in mineral resources. As the conflicts escalate, it has opened doors to other world powers that see an opportunity in the diamond fields, timber, uranium and gold. Hauchard (2018) reveals that China and Russia have made significant advances to penetrate the war-torn country despite the calls of the UN for a ceasefire. These powers certainly finance the rebel groups the largest and the most valiant being the Anti-Balaka, which controls most of the country. BBC (2013) had earlier accused France, China and Lebanon to have financed these rebel groups with over $4 million in exchange for the abovementioned resources.

As a result, this chapter has shown that the political practice or marginalization, political exclusion and dominance on a part of the country, dictatorial rule, the abuse of the law and the constitution as well as clientelism by the different administrations that took the country as their private estates, opened doors to ethnic polarization, tension and the current war. De-radicalizing the Anti-Balaka and the Seleka rebels remains a strong challenge to the government of Mr Ange Fausting Tuadera who was democratically elected in 2016.

5. THE CAUSES OF CIVIL WAR IN SOUTH SUDAN

This chapter will discuss the internal and external factors that caused the civil war in South Sudan. It should be noted that just like in chapter three, this chapter will like to make a comparative argument about what might have instigated the war in South Sudan which happens to be the world's youngest nation; having gained its independence only in 2011, yet torn by civil war. For internal factors this study will strongly consider the ethnic incentives that might have polarized the ruling government and thus, pushing it to the rungs of war.

5.1 Internal Factors

5.1.1 Ethnic differences and polarization

The Republic of South Sudan is a multi-ethnic sovereign entity, consisting of 10 states and comprising a culturally diverse population (Shulika and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016). Shulika and Okeke-Uzodike (2016) define ethnicity as a social phenomenon that describes "the condition of belonging to an ethnic group, the sense of ethnic identity felt by members of an ethnic community". They add that the term has prevailed in literature especially when discussing Africa because most African countries are multi ethnic and one of the reasons why there are so many wars in Africa is as result of ethnic disparities. They continue that the historical origin of inter-ethnic disputes between the South Sudanese arises from "grazing land, cattle raiding and access to natural resources-predominantly in the Jonglei State of Greater Upper Nile Province". Sociologists and anthropologists esteem that such rich ethnic diversity should bring much gain and good to the nation (Zevallos, 2017). However, that is not the case, as it is instead an element of repulsion and polarization. The first major problem that South Sudan faces and that policy makers and mediators have to deal with on serious terms is the ethnic issues that enshroud the conflict. Hutton (2018) explains that the problem of South Sudan could be summarized in two phases. Firstly, its ethnic issues and secondly, matters related to governance and state development unpreparedness in the sense that the military/state personnel were not

very ready to build the country when they finally had it as they had long fought for. The thing to note is that while in some countries governance is the result of a wealthy social structure held together in unity and oneness, in South Sudan, it is the reverse. In fact, Hutton (2018) adds that present scenery whereby the debilitating ethnic issues beget governance practices might just be the next demons to deal with. Hutton (2018) makes it clear that following the sediments of ethnicity, patrimony and clientelism within the military is helping to segregate the country. Since the current military hierarchies were once rebel leaders while a united country with Sudan, it appears policies of disarmament were not properly planned and executed. More so, it might be hypothesized that the mentalities and psychology of the hierarchy was not overhauled and the soldiers debriefed of their warring past. Unfortunately, they brought all that back into the new country and the result is apparent. BBC (2019) reports that despite the successful election and re-election of Salvar Kiir as the president of South Sudan and leader of the South Sudan Liberation movement in 2005 and 2010, there has not been a successful transition from military to civilian life among the members of his government; most of whom were former rebel warlords prior to independence. Furthermore, the tendency to use violence as a means to an end-the political end; which includes the provision of political goods seen in chapter two, erodes the governance practices of the government (Hutton, 2018). To say that South Sudan has been dispensing political goods is a sham and must not be belabored because BBC (2019) adds that press freedom, and human rights are badly coerced by the ruling party and the government. As a matter of fact, it adds that the state-owned media has no rival in the country and no direct reporting can be done without any fear of violent repression. So what this means to the ordinary eye is a military government with military attitudes and modes of operation in civilian clothing. The so-called political goods of good governance which should be provided by the government for the welfare of the citizens according to Hutton (2018) end up with the ruling minority and the elites in charge make sure that their ethnic bargains weigh into consideration.

As discussed in chapter three Collier and Hoeffler (2009) make it clear that ethnicity and violence go hand in gloves. That is most times the power mongers or warmongers, would resort to seeking for support either from their ethnic groups or from sympathetic ethnic groups that can help them out with their greed. When this

happens, the society is segregated and chaos looms in. This is exactly what happened and continues to happen in South Sudan. Hutton (2018) accounts that to assert their apathy lusts for resources, the ruling military elite had to find a way of gathering popular support and to achieve this; they effectively initiated violence, thanks to the help they received from their ethnic groups. This created polarization among the different ethnic groups as the clash of identities stepped in. Collier and Hoeffler (2009) add that in order for a military agenda to succeed, the insurgents must try to overcome tribalism and nepotism as these are factors that can stir resentment and hatred. They add that when a rebel group practices the reverse of this and shows other tribes that they are not needed or disallowed to enjoy the expected fruits of their revolution, then they create for themselves enemies who will probably side with the central government or other forces who recognize them. In a multiethnic society like that of South Sudan, such a move could be sarcastically catastrophic as ethnic isolation could force other groups to form a coalition and once its formed, disbanding it might be almost impossible. Sadly, that is what is happening now.

Hutton (2018) reveals again that through clientelism of the ruling military oligarchy the military government in civilian clothing suffers greatly from issues of legitimization. The government is not seen as legitimate by some members of the ruling class as well as some citizens and that creates tension between the political institutions and the citizens who think it ought to be overhauled. Specia (2018a) is of the opinion that before the declaration of independence the country under its rebel rule at the time had both licit and illicit sources of incomes which were used to finance the rebellion. It is expected that after the war and having gained their independence, the leaders would cut these illicit sources of income in order to ascertain their credibility both before the international community and their subjects. However, this was not the case. Specia (2018) adds that some of the top-ranking military personnel who became generals thanks to their ethnic powers and influence might have retained these illicit sources of finance in order to maintain their status quo while at the same time pursuing national interests. Somehow, this study thinks that the clash between the illegal activities, ethnic problems and the complicated state of affairs of the nation are the complimentary results of the difficulty in mediation and reconciliation.

It is important to make a brief discussion of the origin and power that ethnic leaders have in the face of this war and see how impactful they are to either create conditions for reconciliation or to escalate the war. When the British colonized South Sudan, they delegated power to the local traditional rulers and top-ranking tribe's men who operated in some kind of quasi-federalism (Hutton, 2018). These traditional rulers had the right to do whatever was needed to maintain peace, order and serenity in their communities. When South Sudan became independent, the powers of these traditional rulers were reduced but had to succumb to a greater power which is the state of Sudan. However, long before the pre-British colonial independence of South Sudan in 1964 ethnic issues have always been strong calls for tension between ethnicities (Shulika and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016). Thus, the connection between the military elites up the government ladder and their local traditional heads is phenomenal because for their communities they are the elites who represent the hopes of their communities. This means at all times they are bound to receive help and support from their people, regardless. This behaviour is important because as Shulika and Okeke-Uzodike (2016) mentioned it's powerful to hamper mediation and bring lasting peace to the country. Common sense tells this study that no two tribes especially the ruling tribes could ever be happy with the items of negotiation and mediation as each ethnic group will be forwarding its own interests which will mostly be incompatible to the others. At the end of the day chaos is most certain. And with power and natural resources on the table it's going to take more than men to bring the power mongers to terms.

At the local levels elites caught up in the degredating unpatriotic acts of their elites up in the government continue to pursue the struggle to negotiate for ethnic rights handed down to them as a privilege by their military elites. Though one may rejoice that this ethnic diversity may be a positive incentive to uniting the country, and a sphere of influence whereby the South Sudanese can celebrate unity in diversity, it is nonetheless, not the case. The consequential sequence of events that follow this show rather despicably that the struggle to maintain the status quo over ethnic rights creates an elastic tension that generates the greed of which ethnicity will get or possess what rights or privileges depending on the number of influential elites it has in power and how much and how long they can keep for themselves.

To maintain their stance on power and make sure that their tribes are not vanished in thin air, Williams (2017) writes that most of the leaders in power entrenched by their lust for absolute power, prefer to mobilize radical support across ethnic lines rather than considering the social pattern of the state. As a matter of fact, this policy of ethnocentrisms deliberately isolates the power of the society and gives much credence to ethnic potentials that continue to sublimate the welfare of the state. Knowing that such a multiethnic state cannot succeed for as long as it concerns to maintain its ethnic lines and boundaries in public service, the leaders remorselessly, clinch onto it and as such, drive the country straight to its demise. At the end of the day, the social class that was preached by Rousseau is abated leaving ethnic identities to claim the spoil just to become the main policy tool.

In chapter two this study discussed that strong states are able to provide political goods that quench any desire to start an insurgency. Even if such a desire should come, the quality of life citizens enjoy will repel any thought of war. Furthermore, in chapter three, this study citing Collier and Hoeffler (2004) added that ethnic disparities mostly prevail where states fail to provide political goods that cover the entire national territory whereby tribes cry foul. Therefore, when states fail to provide good political goods, grievances step in and when the grievances are mismanaged, they lead to polarization as it is currently the case with South Sudan. Furthermore, when the polarization is not also equitably manhandled, it gives room for the violent expression of anger and temper which most times lead to civil war.

This study started by saying it will look at the factors that caused polarization and hence war in South Sudan judging from both ethnic and foreign actions. In that regards, it will like to add that the current ethnic disparities of thought that prevail among the warring tribes who still cannot find a common ground of understanding amid many negotiations (Maasho and Dumo, 2018), likens them to Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya, The Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan (Shulika and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016) where civil wars started because of competition and mostly selfish opinions of elites who held their ethnic identities high above the state's identity. Peace insight (2019) adds that when ethnic identities are allowed to gain control of the political sphere, they do not only polarize the hierarchy of the government, but they also spread their venom to the political, economic, sociopolitical, sociocultural inequalities that encompass the nation; thus, making them more visible than ever.

The visibility of these sparked by the government's immaturity or illegitimacy as in the case of South Sudan, aggravates matters.

While finders will continuously be pointed to ethnic issues to be the cause of the war, this study from a rear point tries to understand the phenomenal pressure the elites in question might be under from their kins men. These elites in a bid to maintain the status quo might be going through a lot and may just be doing what they do which is very consequential to the state just because they are responding to the pressure from their tribe's men and maybe because they fear of losing their support. Of course, without the support of their tribe's they are nothing and can achieve little.

According to Shulika and Okeke-Uzodike (2016) the ethnic conflicts that are destroying South Sudan predate the modern nation state. They explain that the country even before gaining its independence from Britain in the late 1950s was prone to recurrent bloody exchanges between different ethnicities. In fact, they cement their argument that following that most South Sudanese especially from the rural areas are nomads, disputes usually originated from "grazing land, cattle raiding and access to natural resources-predominantly in the Jonglei State of Greater Upper Nile Province" (Shulika and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016).

Ottaway and El-Sadany (2012) agree that from times past the two most important tribes that is the Dinka and Nuer though to some extent the Murie that is like the third most influential tribe; have never been at peace with each other. Considering their size and the scope of political and economic power they control, the rebel movement that is the Liberation Movement of South Sudan was under their control. Yet, they never fully agreed on the best possible route to take for the success of their revolution. Shulika and Okeke-Uzodike (2016) support this fact that these two tribes from the unset pursued divergent political paths in the great fifty years war against Sudan, presently, North Sudan. They emphasize that the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups have been ceaselessly involved in inter communal conflicts between themselves in this war Dinka vs Nuer, Nuer vs Murie. According to their reports these conflicts have lasted for decades and until now remain unsolved. Furthermore, the ethnic problems between these two powerful ethnic groups started from the conception of the South Sudan Liberation Movement some more than fifty years ago (Shulika and Okeke-Uzodike (2016). Shulika and Okeke-Uzodike (2016) continue that prior to the negotiations that followed in 2005 whose agreements led to the

declaration of independence of the country (Ottaway and El-Sadany, 2012), leadership problems had been erupting in the organization and the struggle for independence. Shulika and Okeke-Uzodike (2016) support this fact that "initially, the Dinka's wanted a united Sudan where every Sudanese will be treated right and equal. They dreamed of a Sudan that is not under the guise of a select few criminals who taking the nation hostage, divert the benefits of the country's resources to them and their children while the majority suffer. Though their thoughts and goals were good, however, they were radically antagonistic to those of the Nuer who on the other hand, stood for outright independence from the North. In addition, these divergent patterns in thoughts and the motives attached behind them led the two groups to multiple bloody exchanges. As a matter of fact, they mention a terrible fight between the two groups in 1995 which brought no small unrest among the soldiers for independence (Shulika and Okeke-Uzodike, 2016). Since violence broke out in 2013 there have risen over nine major rebel groups that constantly engage the government forces on a daily bases (Moscheti, 2019).

That said, this study would like to show the people and the tribes who are responsible for the political problems that the country faces at this time. Moscheti (2019) writes that trouble set in when incumbent president Salvar Kirr who under normal circumstances should be stepped down from power, accused his vice president, Riek Machar, now opposition leader, for plotting to overthrow him through a coup. This allegation was violently taken by the former vice president, who immediately took to the other side of the barrel and engaged the ruling government. As seen above disparities in thoughts leaves the misunderstanding to go beyond the political, economic, social and socioeconomic lines whose results are violence and war. Since then, the accusations have been the risen why the bloody ethnic violence has persisted since then, unfortunately, causing other ethnic groups to step in. Moscheti (2019) adds that other ethnic groups fighting alongside the opposition of Riek Machar do not necessarily support him or sympathize with his political ambitions but engage the government in order to protect their ethnic identities from being crushed. He adds that since the war broke out, the ethnic group of Riek Machar has suffered much genocide and many violent exchanges which have left hundreds dead. Of course, fingers can only be pointed to the president, Salvar Kiir, and his ruling tribe, the Dinka's.

In 2015 a peace deal was attempted where Riek Machar flew in from Uganda join the other warring factions in a power sharing deal. Unfortunately, only five days after the deal was signed, war broke out and many thousands were killed. Furthermore, in 2017 the ruling government met with the nine opposition groups alongside Riek Machar under the auspices of the African Union, to discuss a peace deal which also failed drastically. Since then, the country has moved from one peace deal to another without success (Moscheti, 2019). In an attempt to trim the ferocity of Salva Kiir's fierce opponent, Riek Machar has been held under house arrest in South Africa. This policy is lambasted by many who see it as a failure to stop the war but instead, it will inflame it and give forces loyal to Riek Machar the chance to fight harder. Moscheti (2019) boldly blames the war to have been caused by Salvar Kiir (Dinka) and Riek Machar (Nuer). Unfortunately, their tussle for power has led to the deaths of more than 338.000 people and the displacements of more than a million (Specia, 2018). The London School of Hygiene (Ethicsdaily, 2018, cited London School of Hygiene, 2018) claims that the death toll has reach nearly 400.000 and the sanitary issues involved with those who have survived the war is degredating and pathetic.

5.2 External Factors

The argument if the causes of civil war in South Sudan should be leveled on internal or external factors remains a strong dilemma among academicians. Firstly, it is very important to reiterate that *"*Conflict is undesirable. In its violent form, it claims the lives of many people, destroys property, and diverts human as well as financial resources away from development." (Juba Monitor, 2017a cited Alexander Attilio, 2002). This saying is very typical of South Sudan since 2013 until now. This study argues that the country is trapped in a mare of confusion very parallel to its founding goals and saddled by a sharp piney darkness that washes across the shores of its pre-independence goals and objectives. Prior to independence it was solemnly preached by the insurgents that the New South Sudan would be a country where everyone will be treated right and will have an equal opportunity to develop and achieve his goals and objectives.

More so, every time South Sudan is mentioned both locally and internationally, it generates mixed sentiments related to political and economic stability and drives expectations low. (Juba Monitor, 2017b). According to Juba Monitor (2017) there

exist two groups of thought who try to present a very convincing argument about the causes of the civil war in South Sudan. Both schools of thought have academic and other material proofs to weigh in their arguments. However, whatever the case might be, one thing is sure, both need a lot of courage to face the fact that South Sudan is currently a failed state which according to chapter two of this study, would become a collapsed state. The two schools of thought presented by the Juba Monitor (2017) are the externalists and internalists. According to the externalists the causes of the war in South Sudan come from outside the country. They carry the argument that external forces loyal to wickedness and savagery and jealous over the resources of the newly independent country, do all and sundry to lay their hands on the country's resources. To achieve this they advance diabolic plans that are aimed to kill and mime the people of South Sudan (Juba Monitor, 2017). Juba Monitor (2017) adds that in the externalists' argument, they accuse the US and the UN for trying to rip South Sudan off its national sovereignty by imposing through the Security Council to place the country under international trusteeship (Juba Monitor, 2017c cited Lyman & Knopf, 2016). Secondly, they see in the UN a series of incongruences in their operations especially as peace keeping operations are concerned. According to the externalists, The UN mission to South Sudan (UNMISS) has been involved over the years in the illegal transportation of weapons whose destinations are not sure and whose agenda unseemly obscure. They add that instead of air dropping provisions to their personnel the UN transported weapons hidden in crates and tagged food supplies and rations for their soldiers which is usually not the case and against the UN's principles and mode of operation (Juba Monitor, 2017b). Thirdly, they think that the UN's action to take Riek Machar and wife, as well as hundreds of his soldiers to safety in the Democratic Republic of Congo was a violation of any chance to stir peace in the country. As such they directly accuse the DRC for being an accomplice to providing shelter and security to the most ferocious armed opposition leader of South Sudan (Juba Monitor, 2017d cited VOA, 2015). If this argument stands well then it means they might as well accuse South Africa and Uganda for having provided safety to Riek Machar in the past and for having helped his soldiers with medical and other humanitarian supplies. To find an answer to this dilemma Fabricius (2019) asks "is Pretoria advancing the faltering cause of peace in South Sudan by keeping veteran opposition leader Riek Machar under "house arrest" in South Africa? Though this question sounds precarious, there are many who also think that the move to hold

Riek Machar under house arrest is just some more gallons of petrol being poured into the flames of peril. Reuters (2018) is one of such and they thought as much to this effect by citing Salva Kiir's address to the nation later that year where he revealed that veteran rebel leader, Riek Machar had to be freed. It seems the incumbent president is aware of the fact that keeping his violent opponent under house arrest is a wrong policy taken that will only inflame the flame.

Not wanting to belabor that point the externalists add that Sudan the closest neighbor from many stand points that is historically, culturally and otherwise, has been the bacteria behind the scenes that causes the most violence. They believe that Sudan supplied weapons to Sudan's People's Liberation Movement-in-opposition (SPLM-IO) in 2012 prior to the war and in 2014 when the war had already broken out (Juba Monitor, 2017 cited Conflict Armament Research, 2015). With this fact, it means that the central power in South Sudan has not so much distanced itself from its former colonial master but continues to entreat obscene relations that regenerate old military routes that cause pain and bloodshed. Another valuable argument that might be presented by this study is that considering the paragraphs above, it can be argued that Sudan continues to supply weapons because they still see in the Dinka tribe a figment of friendship. It was established above that the Nuers wanted nothing but outright independence of South Sudan while the Dinka's represented by incumbent president Salva Kirr wanted unification but the a good life for all Sudanese. Therefore, this study dares to think that the tribe in power doesn't still see a line that separates the two countries but continues to manage their relations as if they were still one country. These may be reason why Sudan has the guts to take some unfriendly military policies against the Neur opposition tribe. Furthermore, Juba Monitor (2017) adds that the UN Secretary General's report provided a significant revelation that Sudan air bombed Deim Jala in Raga country and killed 7 people. This proves that Sudan has been actively involved in escalating the conflicts.

Uganda has also been actively accused of playing a double role in escalating the war in the country. DW (2018) writes that though Uganda has been working hard as one of the foremost peacemakers in the conflict, it has also been hypocritically supplying weapons coming from the European Union, The US and China to both sides. DW (2018) adds that this might be done without the knowledge of the countries mentioned. It adds that "weapons and ammunition purchased by Uganda from EU

member states Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia were diverted to the South Sudanese military and armed allies in Sudan. The so-called retransfers took place after the EU imposed an arms embargo on South Sudan, the report says" (DW, 2018). From this revelation it is supported that Uganda has been a "Wolf in sheep clothing" claiming to mediate peace but actively doing business at the detriment of innocent lives by supplying both sides with weapons and other military hardware. In support of this fact and though denied by the South Sudan government disclaiming it as fake (DW, 2018), "the Archbishop of Gulu Diocese in Northern Uganda, John Baptist Odama has accused the Ugandan government of escalating the conflict in war-torn South Sudan (Sudan Tribune, 2018). Such an accusation from a top religious leader cleans every dust of doubt and cements the premise that Uganda is fully involved in fracturing the new and vulnerable country beyond breaking point.

6. COMPARING THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC AND SOUTH SUDAN AND FINAL CONCLUSIONS

This chapter shall implore the content analysis technique because in its search for the best possible incentive to use as a measure of the strengths and weaknesses of its case study countries, it found the Fragile State Index (FSI) of the Fund for Peace (Glawion, de Vries and Mehler, 2018). Upon a careful examination of it is analysis regardless of the criticisms of Grimm et al., (Glawion, de Vries and Mehler, 2018, cited Grimm et al., 2014; Kaplan, 2014), Basedau and Kollner (Glawion, de Vries and Mehler, 2018; cited Basadau and Kollner, 2007) and Lemay-Hebert and Mathieu (Glawion, de Vries and Mehler, 2018 cited Lemay-Hebert and Mathieu, 2014) this study decided to concentrate its attention to their analysis. Under FSI this study shall approach this subject from three important areas by which to cement the final comparative argument of what might have caused the civil wars in South Sudan and the Central African Republics (C.A.R.). These important areas for study include administrative capacity; political will under which fractionalization of political elites shall be critically examined and territorial structuring which shall comprise of the security apparatus of both states. According to the FSI, South Sudan and the C.A.R. are ranked as the world's most fragile states (Glawion, de Vries and Mehler, 2018; cited Messner et al., 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017). In order to avoid controversy, this study identifies that the FSI uses political, social, economic and security factors that indicate the possibility for using it in comparative study. Secondly, this study shall be wise to spare itself the trouble of engaging in the advanced scholarly debate that questions the measurements, indications and aggregations of the FSI by expert scholars some of whom have been mentioned above. It also behooves this study to mention strongly that the term 'fragile' used earlier carries a negative denominator. Moreover, being termed a fragile state comes with severe international consequences (Glawion, de Vries and Mehler, 2018 cited Kaplan, 1994; Piazza 2008; and Rice, 2005). Common sense would explain this to be as a result of the fear and repulsion it would ignite in international investors whose direct investment is capable of boosting the country's economy, create direct and indirect employment and also help the

country amend its infrastructure. Furthermore, it may also distant international financial institutions and creditors who may not be able to help distrusting the fragile government. Thus, this can make the state most liable to be distanced from foreign loans and credits when the need persists. Nevertheless, despite the sharp criticisms that the FSI might have with regards to the conventional understanding of the term 'fragile state' and what it takes to address one as such, this study finds its measurements and findings of pertinent importance among many others, the reason it enjoys this broad-based content analysis. The broad based intent of comparison lies on governance, however, this study decided as mentioned above, to attack the subject from an angle a little more untraditional as other scholars might do. The comparative arguments about the veracity of the principles of governance, democracy and organs for democratization are discussed below.

6.1 Administrative Capacity and Governance

Firstly, it is important to note that despite the C.A.R.'s political and social uneasiness, the country must be credited to have had more than one regime in power since its independence in 1964. In chapter four, this study discussed the political crises whose eruptions brought the country to where it is today and by citing the political eruptions, all the presidents and regimes that have ruled the country were mentioned. This reveals that the country has the potential to discharge the exercise of democracy if the right decisions are taken. However, it suffers from some very important sociopolitical details whose absence levitates the widening of the power vacuum that continues to distance the country from its norms as mutineers and power mongers continuously endorse their quest for more territory and control.

In addition, South Sudan as discussed in chapter five is badly affected by its own past and this study shall bring in more impetus to this claim. In chapter five this study discussed that South Sudan failed to disarm and disband its former militia when it is actively engaged the North in quest for its independence. The disbanded and armed militia, who are presently under the control of warlords who also double as high-ranking states men, pose a direct threat to the state and its citizens. Thus, understanding governance from the South Sudanese point of view would mean looking deeply into the glass of military imposed political culture by which government policies and its associated agencies function.

Talking about administrative prowess the difference between South Sudan and the C.A.R. is clearly seen that in the C.A.R. successive governments and regimes for the last two decades or more have clearly lost total administrative control over the national territory. Meanwhile, South Sudan that still enjoys some level of state control despite its many wars and failed truces, simply needs the politicians to trust each other and forget their ethnicities to that their cease fire agreements and negotiations can take to effect and last forever.

In chapter two, this study discussed broadly that weak states perpetually fail to deliver and supply political goods such as human rights, legitimate governments, job creation and modern infrastructure, social security, democracy and viable organs of democratization, the right to run for office, freedom of speech without the fear of coercion. When these are supplied to citizens it is powerful to maintain and grow their patriotism and love for fatherland. As a matter of fact, the lack of patriotism and suffering of the masses which is as a result of the wickedness of the political elites, results to the distrust of the government. When the government is distrusted, it leads to the questioning of its legitimacy, which might also mean rising up against the government in any way possible. The failure of the government to secure its territory and protect its citizens has left many Central Africans vulnerable to the government's weakness and to other forms of internal and external dangers. For example, human rights abuses continue to scale higher on a daily bases not directly from the government but from armed groups that war each other. According to World Report 2019 of Human Right Watch (2018) armed groups notably the Seleka and anti-Bakala, control over 70% of the country's territory while the president Ange Faustine Tuadera controls Bangui the political capital and surrounding areas to the west. This is a remarkable administrative failure on the part of the state where it is arguably apparent that the government has lost total control of its entire national territory. Unable to maintain administrative control, the governments projects for development and security for sure, can't sail through as they will meet the strong arm of resistance from the militant groups mentioned above. Under these guises, economic investment, foreign direct investment, infrastructural and agricultural growth remain a farce. If they can be implemented then that will only be in the regions (30%) controlled by the government.

Secondly, the failure of the executive arm of government does not leave the judiciary different as it shares its fair share of the failures as well. Still, the World Report 2019 of Human Right Watch (2018) adds that the crippled judiciary of the country has left criminals walk and parade the streets and corridors of power almost free. A sure addition would be that most of the judges and members of the judiciary might have either fled the country, gotten killed or fled to Bangui for protection, thus, leaving their legal districts in the hands of the new landlords. Consequently, the failed judiciary leaves with much impunity crimes committed against civilians and against the state to walk free. As a matter of fact, justice in the C.A.R. remains a distant reality and may be a bad dream for many.

Following the failed judiciary the International Criminal Court- ICC rolled in to help the ailing government provide some exemplary judiciary support and help try warlords who have since plunged the country into turmoil. Unfortunately, their actions have led to a wider mistrust of their strategies and have resulted to a strain on the peace and disarmament process that was initiated by the government under the auspices of the UN in 2017. News24 (2018) reports that groups loyal to the ani-balaka, withdrew from the disarmament process and peace dialogues when two very influential members of the group namely Patrice-Edouard Ngaissona and Alfred Yetekom, accessed of crimes committed between August 2017 and December 2018, were arrested and shipped off to the Hague for trail. According to the anti-balaka this is a targeted assault against them while the Seleka rebels are left untouched. They add that they had picked up arms five years ago simply in response to the growing atrocities of the Seleka rebels under deposed Michelle Djotodia, heavily discussed in chapter four, coordinated a bloody attack against Christians (News24, 2018). Therefore, to restore peace and bring them back to the negotiation table, top ranking members and former leaders of the Seleka must also be apprehended and whisked off in the same manner to The Hague.

As to what concerns South Sudan the talk is more complex and seriously perturbing. This is because the country has been going back and forth with multiple and sarcastic failures to enact a complementary peace process. De Vries and Justin (2016) account that one of the important changes needed in South Sudan comes from the successful implementation of the discourses of a Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) that could deliver the political goods that the nation and its citizens deserve.

Added to this, the nation of South Sudan must work hard on its way to enforce viable capacity building as well as a credible state building mechanism that will be broad-based and inclusive, independent of bias and ethnic affiliation. As discussed in chapter five the tussle for power and the adulteration of illicit sources of money that still go on among the top ranking military/political figures of the nation promulgates rents as another sure source of both resource and trouble. Why the terms rents seeing that it still presents South Sudan as a war stricken zone without a formal leadership? To answer this question this study understands 'resource' to be the source of most of the warring desires that push the different camps and ethnic groups to war. Most of these groups are led by political elites who work for the state and enjoy the benefits accrued to then by the state but are nonetheless, not subject to the state. Rather, they use state materials and benefits to pursue their own desires and needs. Furthermore, 'trouble' because the possession of income gotten from rents from state organs but under the control of these warlords, grants them the chance to independently finance factions of the military that are allegiant to them. By these incongruities the kleptocracy in power is sure to always maintain its status quo for as long as either the executive, legislative and judiciary are powerless and themselves divided within ethnic lines.

According to De Vries and Justin (2016) the administrative policies of South Sudan whose failures resulted to the failure of good governance can be accused to firstly, the unwillingness of the elites to timely address matters of pertinent importance. They add that the elites were 'unable to overcome internal and external challenges of the state'. These show the political unpreparedness and immaturity of the elite who had moved from warlords and experienced soldiers to all of a sudden political engineers. Secondly, they add that it can also be accused to the 'failure to deal with the growing frustrations of the South Sudanese people' (De Vries and Justin, 2016) that weren't seeing the manifestations of the promises that the military now turned political government was making. As a result of this immaturity and incompetence "Elia Lomoro, the Cabinet Affairs minister and a close ally of the president, said the government and its institutions lacked accountability, transparency and rule of law. Echoing similar remarks, Information minister Michael Makuei Lueth pointed the finger at "some officials" who, he said, were disregarding the principles of transparency and accountability" (The East African, 2017). Such a revelation from

top ranking government officials goes a long way to show how weak and vulnerable the state is and how much need to be done to grow the state up to political, social, economic and military maturity. From the look of things and taking the history for the country to account, the ruling elite have a detailed military past whose experience might be unmatched. However, military experience does not necessarily make one a good politician and an intelligent state's man. If this is true then it might be the fundamental failure of South Sudan on many things and the reason why the country is in a state of chaos.

'Transparency and accountability are critical for the efficient functioning of a modern economy and for fostering social well-being' (Carstens, 2005). This is because the government must render an account of every dollar gotten or spent. For countries like South Sudan that are rich of natural resources, the lack of accountability and transparency of the government might be revealing that the elites and the government might be looting the resources of their good and not for the relative welfare of the nation. Consequently, corruption looms in and the nation is plunged into all sorts of illegal activities which are manned under the guises of the public sector. Thus, understanding the extent to which corruption and embezzlement might have eaten through the layers of the state might be nice to begin with political corruption then administrative corruption. However, it may be necessary to look far because according to Zeitvogel and Biajo (2014) Transparency International had ranked South Sudan as the most corrupt country in the world. This report confirms with that of The East African (2017) that had reported South Sudan's ranking by Transparency International as the most corrupt country in the world. Similarly, Eye Radio (2019) which is a popular radio station in South Sudan reported that "International has named South Sudan among countries that are highly corrupt in its 2016 index. According to the organization, South Sudan ranks second to Somalia as country where corruption is highly rampant". They are supported by John (2019) who reports that according to Transparency International's 2018 report **"**Burundi and South Sudan have taken a step backward in fighting against the corruption comparing to other member states of the East African Community". He adds that the organization accuses this failure to the lack of democracy which is apparent in South Sudan.

Following the assertion made above, the resource curse as it is called might be the reason why the top elites of south Sudan are radically sacrificing the entire nation for their own good as monies collected from rents, predominantly oil, are diverted to private accounts rather than instill developmental project that will bring the country together and close the gap between social and ethnic groups. With corruption showing how rotten the public sector of the country is, its most certain to state rather authoritatively that bad governance has been a finite and flamboyant cankerworm since the country gained its pre-autonomous power and identity in 2005 following the Comprehensive Pact Agreement- CPA, heavily discussed in chapter five. Nevertheless, it may also be nice to state that the country's lack of governance could be as a result of a 'chronic crises' (De Vries and Justin, 2016) under which the country has succumbed. More so, the highly divided South Sudan showed its claws after the 2010 elections which revealed how deeply divided the country was as political elites hustled each other for power and a place in the government. This was surely the beginning of the end. According to De Waal, (De Vries and Justin, 2016 cited De Waal, 2014) the failures of governance dates back to many decades, which engraved a systemic political culture within the ranks of the South Sudan's People Liberation Movement some many decades ago. This can be summarized on how they dealt with pressing issues. He adds that this political culture was one that was characterized by violence which was used as a means for bargaining.

As a matter of fact, De Vries and Justin (2016) add that with regards to public resentments and criticisms, the government never took criticisms seriously except if they were violently radical and directly threatened the regime. And when the government responded to such criticisms, it was never through civilized and modern methods of dialogue and national consolidation. Rather, it was through the use of violence. Thus, the South Sudanese government at all times reminded its citizens that it was the only protagonist who had the exclusive right to the use of violence. However, little did it know that this policy of violence was separating the country and polarizing different minorities who according to Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009) would seek and opportunity to incite an insurrection against the state and the regime.

Lastly, Salva Kirr's style of reconciliation by which he quickly and easily pardons rebels who once went against the state by giving them lucrative positions in government badly angers his collaborators most of whom have been with him for ages (Sudan Tribune, 2010). De Vries and Justin (2016) noted that his predecessor, John Garang would never have taken such a step. On the contrary he would have distanced himself the more with defected rebels. Nevertheless, Salvar Kirr's approach has proven successful because it promises unity and social tolerance between the ethnic groups and political compassion between the elites. Nevertheless, the centralized system of the state doesn't hold right because though the president does all to forgive, and grant pardon the center is still threatened from the peripheries which make up different rebel groups which do not only want to have a say in the internal affairs of the state but want to take it hostage for their own good. As a result of this, there is a mad argument among the elites about whether to form a federal system of government or to practice a more decentralized system where the president will have less work and his deputies in other states will take care of their own internal affairs.

6.2 Territorial Security

In this section the study shall discuss the security detail of both countries and shall look at the strengths and weaknesses of their security apparatus in maintaining the status quo. Before reviewing the qualitative assessment of state security apparatus, it is important to note what Messner et. al., 2016, p. 13) thinks will accentuate a good comparative assessment. He lists the following; that the degree of conflict or 'pressures and measures related to internal conflict', small arms proliferation and under this a good question to ask would be who supplies arms to the Seleka and Anti-Balaka rebels of the C.A.R. as well as the rebels of South Sudan? More so, riots and protests, fatalities from conflicts, management of crises, military coups (as seen in chapter four, C.A.R. has a political culture of coups and by comparism it has had by far more coups than South Sudan), rebel activity. A brief discussion here is indispensable. The sources or routes of the rebellions in South Sudan and C.A.R. are largely different. For example, chapter four revealed that Chad and Sudan have over the years played large roles in supplying mercenaries who at the commands of mutineers have brought no small pain and destruction to the state of C.A.R. At the

same time in South Sudan as chapter five showed the rebel activities mostly come from within and are forwarded by soldiers who contrary to their oath of service that requires them to defend and protect the state, instead reign insecurity and terror. Added to Messner's et. al., (2016, pp. 13) list are legitimacy of government where it suffices to say that C.A.R. has a democratic government which lacks full state control. However, and on the contrast South Sudanese government has an enormous state control but continues to wrestle with internal rebellions from military factions that ceaselessly question the powers and legitimacy of the government. In addition to the list are militancy, bombings and political prisoners.

With this information it's now worthwhile to consider the table below for better understanding.

Table 6.1: Qualitative Assessment of State Security Apparatus

	C. A. R.	**South Sudan**
Size (estimate)	Military : 2000 Police, etc. : 3000	Military : 240.000 Police, etc. : 90.000
Evolution	Recruitment along criteria of loyalty and ethnicity	Opposing militias assembled into one security apparatus
Spatial variation/ state control of national territory	Mostly confined to the capital	Spread throughout the territory; frequent splits
Impact on fragility	Unable to secure citizens, the state and the territory.	High: state forces themselves destabilize the state.

Source: Glawion, T., De Vries, L., Mehler, A., 2018

Before analyzing the table above it is important to know that both countries find themselves at sensitive regions that are plagued with border crisis and surrounded by what this study calls "naked wire" neighbours. The term naked wire is used to reveal the political volatility by which these neighbours operate. For example, chapter four revealed that Chad and Sudan have been largely successful in destabilizing the C.A.R. either directly and indirectly under the patronage of the C.A.R. regimes in

power. Sometimes, it can be said to be indirectly, by giving a blind eye to the building of a rebel army along their borders with C.A.R. Similarly, South Sudan though relatively stable as compared to C.A.R. in terms of state strength and the security apparatus shown in the table above, is politically surrounded by Uganda which itself has active rebel groups that terrorize the region. It is also important to note that South Sudan is not the only country suffering from rebel activities that originate from Uganda. As a matter of fact, the C.A.R. has had its fair share of the sufferings and attacks from the Ugandan rebel group called the Lord's Resistance Army founded by Joseph Kony some 30 years ago (Burke, 2017). This rebel group has brought no small pain to South Sudan, The Democratic Republic of Congo and the C.A.R. in the last decades. Nevertheless, Sudan in parallel lines has also been accused as seen in chapter five of actively participating alongside the ruling class in Uganda to incite more conflict in South Sudan for reasons unclear at this material time.

Therefore, unless these regional actors are kept at large and the South Sudanese and Central Africans allowed to deal with their domestic troubles, it is hard to tell if meaningful and lasting peace negotiations will be gotten in either of the two countries.

Now back to the table above, it benefits to explain that the security apparatus of the C.A.R is much different from that of South Sudan because in the C.A.R. the dissolved military and other state forces leave the country vulnerable to self-destruction as religious and ethnic violence rages on. More so, the decapacitation of the military has left the country open to foreign forces that might want to invade the country's resources and go unchecked. As mentioned in chapter four, Chad and Sudan have benefitted largely from this paralyzed military and have actively helped rebels build garrisons in the north of the country. Nevertheless, following from the table above the when compared to those of South Sudan, the soldiers are patriotic and somewhat neutral when state orchestrated violence is concerned. The only problem that the government militia has had is that former presidents such as Bokassa, Ange-Felix Pattasse as discussed in chapter four recruited private militias because they distrusted the flaccid national forces and feared they could suffer a coup from the remnant.

Nevertheless, South Sudan as the table shows has bigger problems. This is because the soldiers are experienced militias who in years past, fought tirelessly against the Sudan government when South Sudan sought for its independence. Upon having signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement of South Sudan in 2005, most of these militias were absorbed into the state army. Knopf (2018) writes that without considering the risk of deradicalising the militias there "were extensively reintegrated into the new nation's armed forces. As it is expected their experience in the armed forces and following their years of active warfare, they should be the custodians of the nation. Instead the reverse is true as they are now the most daring threat to the state because following the many ethnic line and identity issues, they easily switch side. A rational explanation for this attitude by the study suggest that the back and forth movements of the state armed forces sometimes turned rebels, is as a result of a perceived threat the ethnicities might feel. Their responses to these threats make it very impossible to ratify any peace negotiations and agreement signed.

Coming back to the C.A.R. it is clear as explained in chapter four that the criminally legitimate marginalization of the Muslim north by the dominant Christian core as well as the despondent neglect of other parts of the country polarized both the core and the peripheries. This polarization as discussed in chapter three produced grievances and the state's immaturity to handle the grievances gave way to opportunities which were exploited by armed ethnic groups and the result is apparent. The quest for the Seleka rebels to exact revenge on the Christian majority produced an equal but opposite response which is not different form Newton's Third Law of motion. The lay says "to every action there is an equal and opposite reaction" (Khan Academy, 2019). The initiating action here was the ruthless attacks of the Seleka and the opposite for the equal reaction was the brutal response of the Christian Anti-Balaka who appears to have an upper hand over the Seleka. This study believes that the Muslim minority under the deceptive malice of the Seleka, didn't imagine that the reaction of the Christians would be that brutal and would turn out to work for their disfavor. Hypothetically, had they known, they would have pursued justice by trying the protagonists who incite administrative violence and human rights abuse against the state. Secondly, they would have struggled to engage

meaningful national reconciliation and unity in diversity. Had they done this, the country would still been fragile but somewhat united.

Once again the story is much different with South Sudan which has a national army which is present on the field and very ready to defend homeland. Unfortunately, the homeland security is under the orders of warlords who were one time high ranking rebels before South Sudan gained its independence in 2011. These warlords though working for the state, maintained control over their loyal forces who are also elements of the national army. What this means is that they can easily challenge the central government at any time, thus, making governance a scarce resource and national security, a phenomenal challenge. A good example to support this fact is mentioned by Schomeues and De Vries (2014) who account of David Yau Yau's rebellion in the east of the country in 2012, 2013 and the Arrow Boys in the West of the country. These rebellions were all under the command and leadership of top military officials who are also warlords who have denied relinquishing their private rebel militias to the state's control. Thus, with these soldiers under their command, they can resist the governance and security decisions of the state without direct impunity.

From this analogy, it seems to this study that South Sudan lives under a civilized form of the Medieval Feudal system where powerful Dukes, Knights, Lords, Barons and Princes constantly engaged the crown. The most apparent difference between the feudal lords of South Sudan and their medieval counterparts is that they use the state's resources to direct and control their army while the medieval feudal lords hired and trained their own military from their personal pockets. And the most current similarity between both of them is that they both own lands, and territories which are under them and their military. They also have loyal soldiers who are ready to work and die for their cause regardless of the odds. With these, they have a leeway to pursue after their private interests against those of the state while at the same time benefiting from the state's protection.

These antagonisms always put the war lords and the state at the cross roads and the result is always very apparent, war. Therefore, it is seen by this study that the central governments principles of governance, democracy and democratization will never be instilled for as long as the national army is divided and under the control of these feudal warlords. This, thus, makes one of the central security challenges of South

Sudan. So, it should be summarized that in South Sudan the polarization of the country as well as its gradual collapse is instigated by top military/statesmen who out of greed and insubordination follow parallel interests that puts the state and its citizens in danger while in C.A.R. the president and his regime, actively marginalize the army such that mutiny is the only solution. And in times past where mutiny failed, the only lasting solution which is its endemic political culture was a coup.

6.3 Fractionalized Elites

Table 6.2: Qualitative Assessment of fractionalized elites

	C.A.R	**South Sudan**
Size	Small and diverse	Large and fractionalized
Evolution	Rotating elites through regime change; (semi democracy). Marginalized civilian elites	Militarized through armed struggle; strongly marginalized civilian elites
Spatial variation	Concentrated in capital	Spread, some regional elites contest central authority
Impact on fragility base	Medium: Exclusionary and detached from support	High: Violence as means to increase relative power.

Source: Glawion, T., De Vries, L., Mehler, A., 2018

The sections above have discussed the comparison of governance and administrative capacity, security apparatus and now will discuss the fractionalization of elites as a last attempt to show that though both countries have the same outcomes, their causes are very different and detached from the other. Lastly, the fractionalization of its elites is a reason why democratic policies and good governance are a farce and a sham that scale away in the face of logical national building.

In chapter five it was discussed that South Sudan after so many years of war accidentally if it should be said that way, instilled a political culture whereby ethnic groups which have more influence claim the spoils. In addition, this political culture mentioned is such that powerful ethnic groups such as the Neuer and Dinka's aligned

with violence as a means to an end categorically define the political, economic and social attitudes of the country's leaders. Prior to the 2010 elections it was a sure fact that ethnic rivalries were keen in South Sudan but it wasn't known how deep the hostilities between the elites could go until the country had its elections in 2010. The Carter's Center's Final Report of 2010 reveals that after the 2010 elections, it was clearly seen that the competition between the elites was ferocious. The two dominant groups mentioned above that have always competed with each other for everything were the two most foremost protagonists in the tussle (Johnson (2009). It can be further argued that though other smaller ethnic groups were actively engaged in the fight, the battles between the elites in the peripheries that is speaking of other regions in the country over the local elections which also entailed grazing lands accounted greatly for the fall of the country to a total civil war (Justin and De Vries, 2017, cited Pinaud, 2014).

This is much different in the C.A.R. where the battle between the political elites is on a small scale and rests solely as seen in chapter four within the confines of Bangui. When compared to South Sudan which is stronger and relatively more stable than the C.A.R. ethnic, religious, and economic makers are potentially weak and if the political process fails then the surest mode of political dominance which is a coup, takes to effect. This sentence greatly supports the table above because it shows that since the country erroneously centers all of its political prowess on Bangui, it is hard for its elites to gain widespread support from other regions and in cases where there is a legislative deadlock due to insufficient votes, coups might be the last resort. Whereas South Sudan is much different where elite support is huge but because of the political culture of violence, the use of violence is seen as the only means of legitimate force without which no meaningful gains shall be accrued.

7. CONCLUSION

This study has been careful to examine the different types of states which it identified to be strong, weak and collapsed states. Secondly, it went further to find out what elements make up each of the states mentioned and it was careful to highlight the fundamental differences that surround each. In its third chapter it studied the causes of civil wars using the literature review of chapter two to show the potential dangers that states under any of the categories listed above face should they choose the wrong policies. Under this discussion the expert works of Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Collier and Hoeffler and Rohner (2009) were centripetal to understanding the intricacies involved in the governance and political process that could incite or quench civil wars. Taking particular examples into account, the study struggled to prove why Saudi Arabia for example, could not suffer a civil war because following one of its tables in chapter three, where it discussed GDP, the country has passed the 6000 USD GDP mark and its current economy can't afford to allow an insurrection whose lasting effects will be badly felt for ages to come. Moreover, the study still working on this table showed that countries below the 6000 USD GDP would likely suffer civil wars because of an unequal distribution of political goods. The grievances of it citizens who angered as a result of tribalism, unemployment or any other factors that might be responsible for their grievances, might result in the of picking up of arms. And when this happens it brings us to the two countries in case study, C.A.R and South Sudan.

That said the presiding chapters discussed the two countries independently and in chapter four the C.A.R. was seen to be plagued by a political culture of coups initiated in 1964 and since then, unable to leave the country's leadership. Democracy was discussed to be a luxury for this country where most of its presidents mostly military generals, have replaced each other by a brutal and bloody coup. A closer assessment suggested that the country needs to be revamped and its governance policies overhauled from rationally isolating one part of the country due to their religious differences. As such, for meaningful unity and national reconciliation to

take place, the core must be decentralized effectively so that power is equally delegated to other parts of the country and its borders secured to avoid another armed garrison.

In chapter five it was discussed that South Sudan suffers from a chronic ethnic problem that predates the modern republic of South Sudan. Furthermore, despite the unanimous quest for its independence, there were serious internal differences about the choice of their revolution and thos differences were spanned by the two major ethnic groups that is the Dinka and Neuer's. Over the years, their wrangling on each other have always brought others to the cup of pain and murder and thinking that history will teach them their lessons, they have remained resolute to their cause. Therefore, the final solution that this study identified is that for lasting peace and state building to continue, ethnic identities that plagiarize the true sense and identity of the South Sudanese must be eradicated from every political discourse. As such, everyone must see themselves as South Sudanese and not as belonging to the Dinka'a or Neuer's., etc. If this is achieved then the country is on a good footing to reconciliation and restoration. And without which, it will simply plunge to a collapsed state.

Lastly, this study greatly agrees with Collier and Hoeffler (2004) that indeed, greed, opportunity and bad governance are powerful incentives that outright peace and can incite violence and armed insurrection which in their kinds can lead to civil war.

This study concludes that upon a careful literature review and considering the studies done by experts in civil war studies, there is a strong correlation between ethnic and tribal discrepancies which lead to bad governance as it's mostly the case with many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. This study has sought to add more information to already existing knowledge and literature that ethnic differences are great agents of polarization. Furthermore, this study has been able to try to find out to what extent these ethnic differences can not only fractionate a society and decimate a state, but also what impact they have on the regional security block. In addition, this study would like to add that the security crises in the two countries of study are a clear disposition of the depression that is faced by their neighbours who have to stretch their resources to accept externally displaced persons. Furthermore, this study was able to find out that bad governance leads to grievances which opens doors for the opportunity to revolt. When the grievances are not properly handled as Collier and

Hoeffler (2004) showed, then insurgents and mutineers find strong grounds to build garrisons from where they engage loyalist forces. As such, the opportunity to rebel paves way for the influx of arms which encrusts the rebel insurgents to get a promotion to armed groups. Next, the armed operations of these groups leads to violence and if the government maintains a military policy as a response to the sociopolitical crises, then the groups are radicalized the more and the result is the outbreak of civil war. Once this is achieved, this study believes that insecurity has reached its peak and the corresponding results as seen in South Sudan and The Central African Republics are obvious. In a paraphrase, this study makes a final conclusive statement that ethic differences and tribal lines if not expertly handled by mature government policies, lead to civil wars.

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