EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND CHANGING MEANS OF RURAL LIVELIHOOD: PATTERNS OF PROLETARIANIZATION AND LABOUR PROCESSES IN SOMA COAL BASIN

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ABSTRACT

EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND CHANGING MEANS OF RURAL LIVELIHOOD: PATTERNS OF PROLETARIANIZATION AND LABOUR PROCESSES IN SOMA COAL BASIN

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This dissertation analyses the wider set of social relations and processes behind the labour processes and transformation of the means of livelihood in Soma coal basin. Rising significance of the coal industry in general and coal extracted in Soma in particular for the Turkish economy from the mid 2000s onwards in order to overcome the problem of huge dependency on imported resources in electricity production and rising incentives to the private sector investments in coal mining accordingly coincided with the dispossession and proletarianization processes of the petty commodity producers in agriculture stemming from the neoliberal transformation of agriculture. In this dissertation, the relationship between extractive investments and the transformation of the rural means of livelihood is analysed with reference to the three interrelated theoretical discussions and their relevance for the case of Soma. First, labour supply in the coal pits of Soma and formation of the local labour market is elaborated with reference to the processes of dispossession and proletarianization of the tobacco producer families and to the

labour migration to Soma. Secondly, as the study is built upon a gendered analysis, transformation of the sexual division of labour in the basin in productive and reproductive work in the form of feminisation of agricultural labour and intensification of reproductive labour of women is examined. Finally, labour processes and labour control regimes in the coal pits and at the local level are analysed.

Keywords: Proletarianization, Extractivism, Coal Mining, Rural Transformation, Soma.

ÖZ

EKSTRAKTİF ENDÜSTRİLER VE KIRSAL YAŞAMIN DEĞİŞEN BİÇİMLERİ: SOMA KÖMÜR MADENİ HAVZASINDA İŞÇİLEŞME MODELLERİ VE EMEK SÜREÇLERİ

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Bu tezde Soma Kömür Havzası'ndaki emek süreçleri ve geçim araçlarının dönüşümünün arkasında yatan daha geniş kapsamlı sosyal ilişki ve süreçler bütünü incelenmektedir. 2000'li yıllardan itibaren elektrik üretiminde ithal kaynaklara bağımlılık sorununu çözmek için genel anlamda kömür endüstrisi ve özel olarak Soma'da çıkarılan kömürün Türkiye ekonomisi için artan önemi ve kömür madenciliğinde özel sektör yatırımlarına yönelik artan teşviklerle tarımın neoliberal dönüşümünden dolayı küçük meta üreticilerinin mülksüzleşme ve işçileşme süreçleriyle aynı döneme denk gelmiştir. Bu çalışmada, ekstraktif yatırımlar ve kırsal geçim araçlarının dönüşümü arasındaki ilişki birbiriyle bağlantılı üç kuramsal tartışma ve bunların Soma örneği ile olan ilişkisi esas alınarak incelenmiştir. İlk olarak, Soma kömür ocaklarındaki işgücü arzı ve yerel işgücü piyasasının oluşumu tütün üreticisi ailelerin mülksüzleşme ve işçileşme süreçleri ve Soma'ya olan işçi göçü ele alınarak irdelenmiştir. İkincisi, çalışma toplumsal cinsiyetlendirilmiş bir analize dayandırıldığı için, Havzadaki cinsiyete dayalı işbölümünün tarımsal

emeğin feminizasyonu ve kadının yeniden üretim emeğinin yoğunlaştırılması şeklinde üretim ve yeniden üretim emeğinin dönüşümü incelenmiştir. Son olarak, kömür madenlerinde ve yerel düzeyde emek süreçleri ve emek kontrolü rejimleri irdelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İşçileşme, Ekstraktivizm, Kömür Madenciliği, Kırsal Dönüşüm, Soma.

To the memory of "My Brilliant Friend" Ceren Tecim

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
ARIP	Agricultural Reform Implementation Project
Bağımsız Maden İş	Independent Miners Union
BAT	British American Tobacco
CHP	Republican People's Party
Dev Maden Sen	Trade Union of Progressive Miners
DİSK	The Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ELİ	Ege Lignite Enterprises
GLİ	General Directorate of the Western Lignite Enterprises (GLİ)
Maden İş	Trade Union of Miners of Turkey
MTA	Mineral Research and Exploration Institute
SHD	Social Rights Association
TAPDK	Tobacco and Alcohol Market Regularity Authority
TBB	Union of Bars of Turkey
Tekel	The State Monopoly of Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverages
TKİ	Turkish Coal Enterprises
TOKİ	Housing Development Administration of Turkey
TTK	Turkish Hard Coal Authority

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> My father and I had a sole ambition: to provide people employment. (Can Gürkan, Chair of the Executive Board of Soma Coal Incorporated Company)

> If there are such bad conditions in mines, why did many workers file a re-employment lawsuit? (Lawyer of one of the defendants of criminal suit of massacre)

> Do you see any urban dweller or rich people around here? We are all peasants and poor. Otherwise why would anybody work in coal mines? (Mother of a deceased miner)

1.1. The Aim and Motivation of the Thesis

On May 13, 2014 the biggest mine disaster and workplace homicide of the Turkish labour and employment history took place in a coalmine called Eynez pit operated by Soma Coal Company Incorporated in Soma district of Manisa, in western Turkey. The massacre resulted in the decease of 301 miners. During the following days of the massacre and in the prosecution process in the Akhisar High Criminal Court, in response to the accusations, Chairman of the Executive Board of Soma Holding Alp Gürkan and his son Can Gürkan (Chairman of the Executive Board of Soma Coal Company Incorporated), frequently mentioned the employment they have generated in the basin and its benefits for the local development. Infact this argument is justifiable to a certain extent given that immediately before the massacre[1] seven thousand workers in the pits operated by Soma Coal Enterprises,

[1] In this study the word massacre is used instead of accident or disaster. The word accident is not preferred because it prevents to see the responsibility of the coal company and the deficiencies stemming from the macro coal policies that has led to the death of 301 miners. On the other hand, disaster is not preferred because it is a term mostly indicating natural incidents. For the case of Soma, the term massacre is preferred in order to underline the fact that it is an outcome of systemic neglects of the Soma Coal Company regarding health and safety for the objective of the extraction of the maximum amount of coal through the labour-intensive production methods and the deficiencies of the macro coal policies permitting the companies to neglect these measures and implement

and fifteen thousand workers in total were employed in the pits operated by the private sector firms. Furthermore, six months after the massacre, 2,831 miners' contracts were terminated by Soma Coal Enterprises. Some of them filed a reemployment lawsuit and almost all of them are willing to be re-employed in one of the underground pits in the basin. This brings up the question of how fifteen thousand miners and their families are willing to work under the terminally insecure conditions unfolded with the death of 301 miners. The most clear answer to this question can be found in the following statement by a mother of a deceased miner:

> Do you see any urban dweller or rich people around here? We are all peasants and poor. Otherwise why would anybody work in coal mines!

This study has been motivated by two concerns. First, the study seeks to make a contribution for the analysis of rural transformation and extractive investments in the countryside in critical theory. In particular, it seeks to analyse the relationship between extractivism and transformation of the rural means of livelihood within the intersection of the (i) Marxist literature on permanency of primitive accumulation and proletarianization of the rural population (ii) labour process theory and local labour control regimes (iii) materialist feminist discussion on women's productive and reproductive work in the countryside and feminisation of agricultural labour in the extractivist regions. Secondly, the study seeks to reveal the wider set of social relations and processes behind the labour supply, labour process, and diversification of the means of livelihood in Soma coal basin-one of the leading basins of lignite reserve in Turkey which experienced the biggest mine disaster and workplace homicide in the history of Turkey that resulted in the decease of 301 miners on May 13, 2014.

Proletarianization of the rural population is a very complex theoretical subject which is discussed by various approaches in the Marxist and non-Marxist literatures. This thesis adopts a relational Marxist and a materialist feminist approach so as to analyse the social relations in a particular time and locality with reference to the wider capitalist and patriarchal relations. Accordingly, such an analysis of social relations

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production pressure. On the other hand, during the field research it was observed that the relatives of the deceased miners insistently refuse the word accident and their slogan has been "this is not an accident but a murder, not a fate but a massacre!"

in the particular time and space should reflect not only what the relations in that time and locality are but how they are constructed on that locality and how they are related to the wider capitalist and patriarchal relations. Rural household is the proper unit of analysis to examine the processes of rural transformation and proletarianization as these processes indicate diversification of means of household income through various forms of use of household labour power potential and sexual division of labour. Extractive investments are particularly significant in this sense as they transform the class relations and sexual division of labour in the countryside. On the other hand, in line with the composition of the rural (local) labour market in the extractivist regions, particular forms of labour control strategies in the workplaces and at the local level are developed by the extractive capital mostly in collaboration with the state and through the use of local political, institutional, and community dynamics.

Soma coal basin offers a fertile ground for the analysis of the relationship between the rural transformation and the extractive investments. In Soma, 2000s is marked by a huge wave of proletarianization that has accompanied the simultaneous neoliberal transformation of agriculture and of coal mining. On the one hand, transformation of agricultural production in general and tobacco production in particular through the simultaneous decrease of product prices and increase of production costs initiated the impoverishment and dispossession process of the local population. As long as income received from agricultural production started to become insufficient for the survival of the small agricultural producer households, they started to search for diversification of their sources of income in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. On the other hand, this process has coincided with transfer of coal production to the private companies and orientation towards labour intensive underground coal mining. Therefore male members of these families have started work in the underground coal mines. However, instead of a full detachment from the land, this process has indicated the diversification of means of income for the rural households in the basin and feminisation of agricultural production. As male members of the families started to work in the underground coal mines within this process, it has become women's responsibility to maintain agricultural

production in at least one of the following forms: petty commodity production, subsistence production, and agricultural wage work.

Increasing significance of the coal of Soma for the Turkish economy stems from the fact that from the early 2000s onwards the most significant item triggering current account deficit has been the energy imports. Therefore, use of domestic coal especially in the coal fired powerplants and private investments in the regions possessing rich coal reserves have been encouraged. Therefore, from 2005 onwards, Turkish Coal Enterprise (TKİ) has started to transfer the coal production in the underground pits of Soma to the private companies through the royalty tender. Royalty tender constitutes a significant incentive for the coal investors as TKİ provides them guarantee of purchase and does not put limit to the amount of coal production. Therefore, coal companies operating in Soma has experienced a significant corporate growth in parallel with the increasing profits with the royalty tender.

During this period, Soma coal basin has become attractive not only for coal investors but also to coal miners and families from other mining towns in Turkey such as Zonguldak and Kütahya and from the towns that have historically been supplying labour power to Zonguldak such as Bartın, Ordu, and Çorum who started to migrate to Soma to work in the underground coal pits. Main reason behind this migration has been relatively more secure conditions of working in Soma when compared to Zonguldak and Kütahya. Accordingly, relatively bigger firms have been investing in Soma contrary to the smaller or even illegal firms operating pits in Zonguldak and Kütahya. Therefore, employment in Soma has been guaranteeing at least regular payment of the wages, social insurance, and relatively higher wage levels.

As it will be elaborated in this thesis, neoliberal transformation of agriculture and coal mining has determined the formation of the local labour market in Soma as well as the labour processes and labour control strategies in the workplace. At the local level these have been shaped according to the composition of the local labour market. First, patterns of agrarian change, dispossession and proletarianization of the local population on the one hand and migration from other mining towns on the other hand have formed the local labour market. Then, different patterns of

proletarianization in the coal mines of Soma have led to different patterns of working class household reproduction, survival strategies and sexual division of labour within the household in productive and reproductive work. In line with the composition of the local labour market and with the rhythms of investment and size and forms of the firms, labour process in the coal pits have been shaped. Furthermore, certain local labour control strategies in collaboration with the state and capital through the use of local political, institutional and community dynamics have been developed.

1.2. Design and Method of the Field Research

In relation to the motivation of this research, the aims pursued during the field research are: (i) to investigate patterns of dispossession, impoverishment and proletarianization processes in Soma coal basin from the 2000s onwards in parallel with the neoliberal transformation of agriculture and of coal mining; (ii) to illustrate the changing relations between the state-capital-labour following these transformations such as labour processes (in women's agriculture work and in the coal mines), labour control mechanisms at the local scale, moments of consent and resistance of the population.

Following these aims, research questions are formulated as follows:

1. What are the peculiarities of Soma coal basin in the process of dispossession and proletarianization of the local population?
2. What is the gender dimension of neoliberal transformation in Soma? How has women's productive and reproductive labour been transformed within this process?
3. What is the significance of Soma for Turkey's coal industry? And how does this significance affect labour processes in the coal pits?
4. What are the determinants labour control strategies in Soma? What are the moments of coercion, consent and resistance?

The most proper method to reveal the answers to these research questions is qualitative research method as the "insider" view of a locality gained through this method provides the researcher to have in-depth contextual information about the

practices, beliefs, emotions of the population within that locality. By this way, the researcher is able to gather information not only regarding the everyday life but also the way the individuals and groups attach to and evaluate their everyday lives through their beliefs and meanings (Roberts, 2014: 7). As qualitative research stresses the socially constructed nature of the reality, the intimate relation between the researcher and the object of analysis and the situational constraints shape the inquiry. The researchers seek answers to questions regarding the way social experience is created and given meaning (Denzin and Lincoln, 2012). Therefore, through the qualitative research, information on the following questions can be gathered (Polucci, 2007: 116 as cited in Roberts 2014):

- What are the ongoing empirical regularities within the context in question?
- What are the most essential structural relations in this context?
- What structural relations account for specific empirical regularities?
- What historical events account for the rise of this or that set of relations?
- How have these regularities and structural relations changed over time?
- What are the primary causal forces of this change?

Moreover, qualitative research methods provide the researcher with flexibility to change or diversify the research content and method and develop new mechanisms to gather information during the fieldwork. As argued by Mason (2002: 24), thinking qualitative means rejection of:

> The idea of a priori strategic and design decisions or that such decisions can and should be made at the beginning of the research process. This is because qualitative research is characteristically exploratory, fluid and flexible, data-driven and context-sensitive. Given that, it would be both inimical and impossible to write an entire advance blueprint. In qualitative research, decisions about design and strategy are ongoing and grounded in the practice, process and context of the research itself.

In line with this feature of the qualitative research methods, following methods have been used in accordance with the requisites of the research process in particular time and space:

Semi-Structured Interviews

Semi-structured interviews sit in between the focused and structured methods while utilising from both. In the semi-structured interviews, certain questions are priorly

specified but the interviewer may direct the flow of the interview in accordance with the answers. Mostly, questions regarding the demographic information are asked in a standardised format, then, the researcher shapes the rest of the questions in advance (May, 2010).

In the semi-structured interviews conducted with the miners and miners' wives, questions on age, hometown, education level were fixed whereas the latter was shaped in accordance with the criterion such as relation to the land and agriculture, type of household, employment status and firm, and political stance.

Focus Group Interviews

The strength of the focus group interviews lies in the fact that they provide the researcher the opportunity to discover the reasons behind the differences of opinions, attitudes, and beliefs among the members of the sample. The researcher, as a moderator, is able to "listen in" the conversation among the sample (Kleiber, 2004: 97). Therefore, the researcher is expected implicitly to encourage the participants to talk to one another instead of asking questions to each participant (May, 2010: 137-8). Therefore, focus groups composed strategically provides the researcher information that she/he cannot gather through individual interviews.

During the field research, five focus group interviews (three interviews in the phase II, and two interviews with women in Phase III) were carried out. In the first one, miners employed in different firms were interviewed in order to see the way they discuss the differences between the production processes in different firms or pits. In the second and the third ones, focus group interviews were carried out in two separate villages of Savaştepe composed of members having different relations to the land, from different generations, and having experience in different forms of employment. For example, in one of the villages, the group was composed of three miners employed in two different companies, one unemployed miner and two retired miners formerly worked in the state-owned pits. Their conversation enabled to see the differences among the participants in their relations to the land and agriculture, the significance they attribute to the employment in the coal mines, and their production and reproduction processes. Finally, in the third phase, two focus group

interviews were carried out with the women working as agricultural worker having different types of land ownership, employment status, and relation to the land.

Participant Observation and the Field Diaries

Participant observation indicates a uniquely interpretive process as opposed to empiricist and positivist research method (Atkinson and Hammersly, 1994: 249) that enables the researcher to actively participate in the social world in which people are experiencing, interpreting and understanding their environments. To become a part of a social scene and participation in it requires more than "hanging around". The researcher needs to be accepted by the social setting to a certain degree (May, 2010: 173).

Participant observation was the most significant method for the fieldwork of this research for several reasons. First, during the first-preparatory-phase of the field research, in order to gather general information about the basin, to become familiar with the local social relations, and to establish the connections to conduct interviews participant observation method provided the best opportunity. Moreover, due to the political pressures in the basin especially over miners, they could be reluctant to do a recorded interview. Therefore, during the more flexible conversations during the home visits or the social events, they were feeling more comfortable and talked more freely. Thereby all possible chances of attendance in various activities were used for participant observation such as:

- Trials of the criminal suit of Soma massacre
- Summer schools of the Social Rights Association
- Women workshops of the Social Rights Association
- Meetings and demonstrations in the anniversaries and month anniversaries of Soma massacre
- Social events such as weddings, fast-breaking meals, and home visits
- Visiting the agricultural producers and workers in the farms, helping them in certain works such as stringing tobacco or irrigating the small yards.

Attending these events made possible to observe the social relations and interactions in the basin, observe and experience the intra-class conflicts, to hear the discussion

on political issues. Most significantly, being among them in the most significant political situation of the contemporary Turkey, namely July 15 Coup attempt, and observing their reactions and the way they interpret made it possible to identify the way they relate themselves to the existing power relations. Moreover, observing their daily life and the way they interpret their daily lives made it possible to identify the underlying tensions and conflicts embedded in the process of rural change and proletarianization. It would not have been impossible to gather most of the information by merely using interview methods.

1.2.1. Structure of the Field Research Design

The fieldwork of this study consists of three main phases at intervals from June 2015 to August 2018. The first phase, consisting of separate visits, involved the preparation process within which the scope and content of the study was determined and the first impressions regarding the social relations in the basin and regarding the prosecution process of the Soma massacre were made. The second phase, from June 2016 to the September 2016 and a three-day visit in March 2017, includes the field research in the Soma district and in the selected villages of Soma, Kınık, and Savaştepe. The third and the last phase of the field research carried out in the summer of 2018 includes the research on women's productive and reproductive work in Soma.

Phase I

The first phase of the fieldwork mainly consists of the preparation stage of the field research. During this period, getting familiar with the field in order to plan the forthcoming phases was aimed. Therefore, in the summer of 2015, as much time as possible was spent in Soma.

Table 1.1. Phases of the Field Research

Phases	Time Period	Aims	Research Methods
Phase I	15-16 June 2015, 15 July 2015 – 25 July 2015	Choosing the scope of the case study Gathering general information about the basin Preparing the interview questions	Document collection Following up the prosecution process of Soma massacre Participant Observation Semi-structured interviews with the local prominents
	13 February 2016 – 26 February 2016	Conducting the pilot interviews Developing the interview questions	
Phase II	1 June 2016 – 1 September 2016	Gathering information on: (i)the transformation of the agricultural production in Soma (ii) the production relations in the coal pits (iii) local class relations (iv)labour control mechanisms (v) Moments of consent and of resistance	Following up the prosecution process of Soma massacre Participant Observation Semi-structured interviews with the local and migrant miner families, trade union represenatives, local politicians Focus group interviews in the village coffeehouses Field diaries
	30 March 2017 – 1 April 2017		
Phase III	2 – 13 July 2018	Gathering information of women's productive and reproductive labour	Participatory observation (in the production process in the farms) Focus group interviews Semi-structured Interviews
	25 – 30 August 2018		

In this context, first, starting from the second block lawsuit of the Soma Massacre in the Akhisar High Criminal Court in June 2015, prosecution process was followed. In the first phase of the field research, during the second block lawsuits in June 2015 and the fifth block in February 2016, through the conversations with the relatives of the deceased miners using the participant observation method general information was gathered regarding demographic profile (especially regarding the hometowns/villages) of the miner families in the basin, the factors pushing the families to employment in the mines, working conditions of the miners, and living conditions of the miner families. In addition, by listening defences of the defendants of the criminal suit who are composed of the owner(s), directors, engineers, shift supervisors of the coal company and the witness statements of the workers of the coal company an opinion regarding the relations of production in the coal mines was formed.

Secondly, during the first phase, semi-structured in depth interviews were done with the local prominent people in order to gather information regarding the historical transformation in the basin. In this context, interviews with one agricultural engineer, one high-school teacher, three lawyers, and one politician were undertaken. Especially in the interviews with the agricultural engineer and the high school teacher who were born and grown up in the public housings of TKİ, detailed information regarding the lives of the miners employed in the state operated mines before the 1980s was gathered. Finally, in this preparation phase, interviews with the representatives of oppositional trade unions, associations, and other political organizations were carried out. In this context, first, two interviews with the local representatives of the local branch of Dev-Maden Sen-trade union affiliated to Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (DİSK)-established immediately after the Soma Massacre were done. Then, certain activities of the local branch of the Social Rights Association (SHD) were followed such as the march they organize at the 13th day of each month (month anniversary of the massacre), their summer school, and workshops with the women. Third, interview with the district president of the Republican People's Party (CHP) was done. In this part of the first phase, in addition to the in depth interviews, activities of these organizations and their effectiveness in the basin were observed.

In addition, in between the Phase I and Phase II, interviews with three lawyers of the families of the deceased miners were carried out in Ankara and in İstanbul.

Phase II

The second phase of the fieldwork involved data gathering on the transformation of agricultural production, production relations in the coal pits, local class relations and everyday life, labour control mechanisms and power relations, and moments of consent and of resistance. During this period, through a three-month continuous stay by renting a flat at the centre of Soma district, a detailed ethnographic research was carried out. Before going in detail, one point needs to be underlined regarding this phase of the field research. The summer of 2016 witnessed a considerably significant political atmosphere in Turkey due especially to coup attempt in July 15, 2016 and the declaration of the state of emergency in the country. In Soma, just like

the most parts of Turkey, even before the coup attempt due to the political and social discomfort and mechanisms of oppression stemming from the crisis management process of the massacre it was quite difficult to conduct interviews based on free expression. After the coup attempt and the declaration of the state of emergency, it became even more difficult.

In the first days of the Phase II, a group of interviews with the Ege Lignite Enterprises (ELİ), local branch of the TKİ, coal companies and the trade union collaborating with the coal companies were attempted. First, I called the trade union and asked for an appointment. They requested the questions and an authorised person told that they accept to answer my questions as long as they are not political ones. Then I emailed the list of questions by eliminating all "political" questions and trying to keep them purely technical. In a couple hours they called me and told that given that Soma is (politically) under the spotlight they are not in charge of deciding to do the interview and told me to request for a permission from the district governorship. Given that trade unions are not institutionally bounded to the district governors, I could not receive such permission.

Later, I scheduled an appointment with the head of ELİ and visited him with the list of the questions and a document from the Middle East Technical University showing the name and code of the Scientific Research Project. He did not even check the questions or documents and stated that I should bring him an official permission from the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources in order to conduct an interview with him and with the coal companies as follows:

> I have no idea what I am telling here would be used for what. Then I cannot account for. The companies are dependent to us. They cannot make an interview without our permission. In the end, we are the license holder. Three companies are operating the mines here: Demir Export, Soma Kömürleri and İmbat. İmbat is the largest one, it has about 6500 workers. Only Gökalp (general manager) can answer your questions but our permission is necessary for this. Therefore, ministry permission is needed to interview with them. (Q1)[2]

Then, my thesis supervisor, as the project coordinator wrote a petition to the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources to request the permission to conduct the

[2] Quotations cited from the statements of the interviewees are numbered (as Q1, Q2…) and their original Turkish versions are available in Appendix B with their corresponding numbers.

interviews with ELİ and with coal companies, and the ministry responded to the request by stating that such permission is not under the Ministry's responsibility. Eventually, I could not conduct interviews with the Maden İş Union, ELİ and coal companies.

In the preparation period of the fieldwork, it was noticed that neoliberal transformation of agriculture and coal mining indicates the re-demarcation of the basin and what is meant by Soma basin is not limited to the Soma district of Manisa. Here, the basin is defined with reference to the labour supply to the coal pits and it includes Kırkağaç and Soma districts of Manisa, Savaştepe district of Balıkesir, and Kınık district of İzmir and their surrounding villages. Therefore, field research with the miner families can be grouped as follows: (i) local families living in the centre of Soma; (ii) migrant families living in the centre of Soma; (iii) local families living in the centre of Kınık or Savaştepe; (iv) local families living in their villages. Migrant families indicate the families migrated to Soma from other mining cities such as Kütahya and Zonguldak and from the cities and towns such as Bartın, Ordu and Çorum historically supplying labour to Zonguldak. They have migrated to Soma following the increasing labour demand in the coal pits located in Soma basin.

During this phase of the field research, primarily, interviews with the families consisting first two groups were carried out. In order to reach the interviewees network of the Soma branch of SHD was used such as the parents of the students attending the summer school or other families they are in contact with. Then, by using snowball sampling method, more interviewees were reached over the previous ones. This period was relatively more difficult than the period of the interviews with the third and fourth groups due to the political and economic pressures over miners within the Soma district. Most of them were not willing to do the interviews or were not feeling free to express themselves while recording. Therefore, around 1/3rd of the interviews were not recorded, notes were taken during the interviews.

Later, interviews with the families living in Kınık, Savaştepe and their surrounding villages were carried out. They were feeling relatively more free compared to the families living in the district centre of Soma given that they were not feeling the political and economic pressure during the outside their workplaces. In order to

reach this second group, in addition to the snowball sampling, village representatives (muhtar) most of whom are also miners were reached and they helped for the schedule of the interviews with the miner families in the corresponding villages. Tape recording constituted a problem in the villages as well. Therefore, mostly, interviews in the villages were not recorded, instead notes were taken during and/or immediately after the interview.

During the Phase II in general, participant observation method was used as efficient as possible, due especially to the difficulties stemming from the political pressures within the basin. By attending the wedding ceremonies, social events such as fast-breaking meals, visit the families at their homes, sometimes stay overnight especially in the villages, information regarding the everyday lives were gathered. The conversations were recorded by keeping diaries.

During the three-month stay in the summer of 2016, it was not possible to conduct focus group interviews with the miners, as a woman researcher. In March, 2017, together with the supervisor of the dissertation, three focus group interviews were conducted. The first one was at the district centre of Soma with three workers from Kütahya. Other two focus group interviews were done in coffeehouses of two villages of Savaştepe. Focus group interviews' main significance lies in the opportunity it provides for the researcher to observe the communication and discussion between the interviewees. In the first one, the interview was done with the migrant workers from Kütahya employed in different companies. It provided the opportunity for the researchers to be able to the see the differences in their working conditions. In the second and third interviews, a more significant objective was achieved that the group was composed of miners from different generations. It enabled the researchers to discover the different meanings attributed to both coal mining and agricultural production among the generations and the changing working conditions in the mines especially between employment in the state-owned mines and private companies.

Phase III

During the visits to the basin in the first and second phases of the field research focusing on the proletarianization processes following the transformation of agriculture and its impact on local class relations, women's peculiar experiences within this process have been observed. These observations are mostly based on the conversations with the women (wives or mothers of the deceased miners) while following up the prosecution process of the Soma Massacre in Akhisar High Criminal Court or conversations in the social events such as weddings, fast-breaking meals as a participant observer. In the previous phases of the field research, main focus was the experiences of miner families in general instead of the women but during the interviews with the mothers or wives of the miners or from the statements of the miners regarding their wives or mothers' significant peculiarities of the women's labour in the relations of production and of social reproduction were observed.

In order to make a holistic analysis of the rural change, proletarianization patterns and transformation of class relations, gender relations and sexual division of labour should not be disregarded. It would be insufficient to define the transformation process with reference to the proletarianization of the male population in the coal mines. As long as the unit of analysis is the family in the analysis of rural transformation and the labour processes in the countryside, the analysis should be built in the gendered basis. As the family or household is shaped by the patriarchal relations, transformation of labour use within a household is not independent from gender relations. This process that has been defined as the diversification of the rural means of livelihood indicates the over-exploitation of women's labour in agricultural production and also within the household, i.e. in the reproduction of labour power. Therefore, during this last phase of the fieldwork women's labour in the relations of production and of social reproduction was observed.

During the previous phases of the field research it was observed that proletarianization process in the basin has not resulted in the total detachment from the land and from the agricultural production. Instead it has indicated the diversification of income sources. It was observed that proletarianization process of

the male population in the surrounding villages also witnessed the increasing exploitation of the women in at least one form of the agricultural production that are agricultural wage work, petty commodity production, or subsistence farming. Besides, certain physical and emotional peculiarities regarding the reproduction of the miners have been detected.

Therefore, transformation of women's labour in agriculture and in the reproduction of the labour power of the whole family have been subsequently included in the research. Thus qualitative field research based on feminist methodology has been carried out in the basin in the summer of 2018. At this phase, field research was done with miners' wives engaging in agriculture by using the methods of semi-structured interviews, focus groups interviews and participant observations. Following the differences observed in the previous phases between the experiences of local and migrant miners stemming especially from their relations to the land interviews with the local and migrant women were made and certain commonalities and differences were specified. In order to reach the interviewees, connections established during the previous phases of the field research were used.

During this last phase of the field research, two visits have been made during the harvest season of the tobacco and tomato and pepper respectively. During the tobacco harvest (in July 2018), two groups of interviews were done. The first group (6 interviews) was composed of one to one interviews with the women at their home. Three of them were migrant women who did not work in agriculture (experiencing the process of housewifisation) other three were daily agricultural wage workers and the interviews were done when they come back from the farm in the afternoon. As three agricultural worker interviewees mentioned the subtle production process in the tobacco harvest, in order to observe the production process participant observation was made by going to the farms with two groups of women and helping them (nine women). During the harvest time of tomato and pepper, production processes in larger capitalist farms based on irrigated farming were observed. In this process as well, two groups of interviews were made. The first was the women employed as daily agricultural wage workers in the large, capitalist farms of a lowland village in Kınık whereas the second was the petty commodity producer

women raising tomato and pepper in their relatively small farms or yards in two villages of Savaştepe (3 women).

1.2.2. Analysis of the Findings of the Field Research

The analysis of the data gathered in the fieldwork is a multi-staged process corresponding to the different phases of the fieldwork. All of the recorded interviews were transcribed and together with the notes and field diaries the data gathered were grouped with respect to the subheadings of the Chapter III, IV, and V that were determined with reference to the theoretical framework discussed in the chapter II.

In order to detect shortcomings of the information gathered in each phase and to fill the gap and develop the data in the next phase(s), the data gathered each phase was analysed before the next visit or phase. For example, the need to interview with the workers from different hometowns in the phase II was decided during the analysis of the interviews and the data gathered in the phase I. Most significantly, the need for a gendered analysis of the proletarianization and class relations in the Soma basin was understood during the analysis of the findings of the phase I and phase II. Although Phase II was expected to be the last phase of the fieldwork, after perceiving the significance of the sexual division of labour and of women's productive and reproductive work during the analysis of the previous phases, Phase III was planned and the women's labour has been observed using a feminist methodology.

Therefore, the structure of the research questions was shaped and re-shaped during the field research and this structure guides the structure of the analysis of the research as examined in the next section and conclusions of the thesis. The following chapters show the findings of the fieldwork by focusing on the rural transformation and proletarianization patterns in the basin and the labour control mechanisms and the moments of consent and resistance to these mechanisms.

1.3. The Structure of the Thesis

Responding to the aims and motivation discussed, this thesis critically examines the patterns of proletarianization and labour processes in Soma coal basin in parallel

with the neoliberal transformation of agriculture and coal mining. Accordingly, the thesis is structured into four parts: theoretical framework, transformation of agriculture in Soma and patterns of dispossession, transformation of coal production in Soma and labour processes in the coal pits, and local class relations with reference to the local labour control strategies developed and the way miner families are articulated to or resist against it.

Chapter II develops the theoretical framework of the thesis. First, it introduces the discussion on primitive accumulation, proletarianization and formation of the "free labourer" with reference to the classical Marxist texts of Karl Marx and Rosa Luxemburg and to the contemporary Marxist debate on the permanency of primitive accumulation and continuous expanded proletarianization under capitalism. Then, the discussion continues with the development of the theoretical debate on the rural roots of proletarianization and proletarianization of the peasantry as a complicated process constantly subject to contradictory tendencies starting from the classical Marxist texts of V. Lenin and K. Kautsky to the contemporary literature developed out of them. The chapter continues with a discussion on class formation in the countryside as a relational process under neoliberalism with reference to different patterns of proletarianization. Then, it discusses the impact of extractive industries on rural transformation and the relationship between the patterns of proletarianization and the labour processes in the extractive industries and local labour control regimes in the extractivist regions with reference to the literature on Extractivism and on Labour Process and (Local) Labour Control. Finally, it is argued that the whole theoretical discussion of rural transformation and extractivism should be centred in a gendered analysis with reference to the materialist feminist literature. In order to form a basis to the argument, first a methodological background of the feminist critique of Marxism and internal relation between capitalism and patriarchy is discussed. Then, centrality of gendered analysis and women's labour for the analysis of primitive accumulation and rural transformation is examined. Then, feminisation of agricultural labour and transformation of women's reproductive work in the extractivist regions under neoliberalism is discussed.

In Chapter III, neoliberal transformation of agricultural production in Soma is discussed with reference to the processes of dispossession, proletarianization, and feminisation of agricultural production. The discussion starts with the historical transformation of agriculture in Turkey in order to show the macro processes behind processes of dispossession and proletarianization in Soma. Then, transformation of agricultural production in Soma is discussed starting with the historical background since the 2000s. In particular, the transformation of the tobacco production is elaborated with reference to the quota applications and the elimination of the relations of producers to Tekel (the state monopoly of tobacco and alcoholic beverages). Finally, in parallel with the neoliberal transformation of agricultural production and proletarianization of the male population in the coal pits, transformation of women's productive labour (agricultural labour as petty commodity producers and daily wage workers) and reproductive labour (subsistence production and reproduction of the labour power within the household) in the basin is discussed.

Chapter IV examines the labour processes and labour control in the underground coal pits of Soma. In order to make such discussion the chapter starts with the discussion on the strategic significance of coal industry for the Turkish economy and the coal extracted in Soma in this context from the 2000s onwards. The discussion continues with the transformation of coal production in the basin with reference to the initiation of royalty tender and corporate development of the coal companies operating in mines following royalty tender. Then formation of the local labour market and the sources of the labour supply to the coal pits is elaborated with reference to the dispossession of the local population and labour migration to Soma from other mining towns. Finally, based on the changing significance of the industry, transformation of coal companies, and changing composition of the local labour market, labour processes and labour control strategies in the coal pits are examined.

Chapter V focuses on the local labour control strategies, beyond the workplace and the extent to which miner families in Soma articulated to or resist against before and after the Soma Massacre. The discussion starts with the Soma Massacre and its prosecution process with reference to the reasons behind and the institutions and

policies who are to blame for the massacre and certain interventions of the state and coal companies to the prosecution process. Then, power relations and labour control mechanisms developed in the basin from the 2000s onwards is discussed with reference to the collaboration between the state, coal companies and collaborator trade union Maden İş ("devil's triangle" as called by the local population) and the role of hometown associations as the aboveground reflection of the informal subcontracting (dayıbaşılık) system. Chapter V continues with the labour discipline and control mechanisms developed by the same actors after the Massacre in order to prevent a possible resistance movement in the basin. Strategies used in the form of clientelism, wage increases, and threat of unemployment are elaborated in this section. Finally, moments of resistance after the massacre are examined with reference to the attempts for alternative unionisations and other organisations and two significant resistance movements in Yırca village of Soma and in İmbat Coal Company.

This thesis ends with Chapter VI written as a conclusion of the thesis. The conclusion aims to reconsider various aspects of the patterns of proletarianization, labour processes, and local class relations in Soma in relation to the relevant literature. In this manner, it is aimed in the conclusion to provide empirical and theoretical insights for the future research.

CHAPTER II

PATTERNS OF PROLETARIANIZATION, LABOUR CONTROL AND CLASS FORMATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

2.1. Introduction

This chapter outlines the theoretical background of the thesis: it seeks to examine the patterns of proletarianization, its rural roots within the processes of primitive accumulation, dispossession of the peasantry, and class formation in the countryside at a high level of abstraction in order to explain how it is possible to analyse the changing means of rural livelihood through rising extractive investments and to what extent local population is controlled by and/or resist to the extractive capital. The debate about the proletarianization of the rural population within the countryside, transformation of their control on the means of production and subsistence, and role of the non-farm employment opportunities in this process is a complex one and this chapter aims to clarify the debate by separating the discussions: first, the review of the debate on the permanency of primitive accumulation and ongoing process of proletarianization of the peasantry with reference to the Marxist literature developed in the context of different historical waves of dispossession and proletarianization; second, role of extractive investments in the transformation of the means of rural livelihood and the dynamics of labour regimes and labour control mechanisms; and finally significance of the gendered analysis for the processes of proletarianization in the countryside through extractive investments in order to place the discussion within the sexual division of labour in the processes of production and of social reproduction.

The overall aim of this thesis is to reveal the wider sets of social relations and processes behind the labour supply, labour processes, and diversification of the means of livelihood in Soma coal basin in parallel with the increasing coal investments since the mid 2000s. Increasing significance of coal extraction in Soma for the Turkish economy from the mid 2000s onwards in parallel with the aim of overcoming the over-use of imported natural gas in electricity production and of encouraging the use of domestic coal coincided with the dispossession of the petty commodity producers in agriculture due to the neoliberal transformation of agriculture, especially of tobacco production. In this study, it is argued that it is significant to relate the characteristics of the agricultural production in the region toward which extractive industries are oriented in order to understand the relationship between the investors (extractive capital) and local population (prospective miners). In other words, for the analysis of the impact of the increasing extractive investments in the countryside it is necessary to define the condition of the petty commodity producers within the process of the neoliberal transformation of agricultural policies. In the Turkish countryside, confrontation of the rural population to the large-scale extractive investments correspond to the mid 2000s-the period of the most dramatic transformation of agricultural policies. This transformation indicated petty agricultural producers' reproduction squeeze due to the continuous increase of input prices and fall of the products they produce (Büke and Eren, 2016: 314-218). Therefore, as long as income generated from the agricultural production was insufficient for the survival of the rural households, they started to develop certain strategies to diversify their means of income and employment generating potential of the extractive investments has constituted an "opportunity" for the local population and lack or insufficiency of other employment opportunities lowered their bargaining power towards the extractive capital. On the other hand, as long as this process has indicated the diversification of the survival strategies of the rural household (Aydın, 2001), new patterns of the use of household labour potential (Özuğurlu, 2011) based on the new forms of sexual division of labour have been at stake.

Therefore, analysis of extractive investments in the rural regions of Turkey in general and in Soma in particular necessitates the following discussions:

i. Formation of a rural labour market and labour supply to the coal mines: rural transformation, dispossession and proletarianization of the agricultural petty commodity producers, labour migration to the extractivist regions and class formation in the countryside
ii. Labour processes and labour control strategies in the rural extractivist regions
iii. Sexual division of labour in the rural households in the productive and reproductive work.

This thesis adopts a relational Marxist methodology and philosophy of internal relations in which understanding any fact requires understanding of the processes and relations in the larger context within which it arose and developed. Philosophy of internal relations makes possible a particular method of analysing the world with reference to the elements of the dialectic, to the "process of abstraction" (Ollman, 2003: 2). Accordingly, by focusing on the relations rather than the things as the bases of what is real dialectics enables to explore the process through which something has taken place and the broader interactive context within which it happened. In other words, as stated by Ollman, dialectics, by replacing the common sense notion of "thing" with notions of "process" (which contains its history and possible futures) and "relation" (which contains as part of what it is its ties with other relations) (ibid 13). Ollman explains the method of abstraction with an example exclusively useful for the content of this study as follows (2003: 14):

> In abstracting capital, for example, as a process, Marx is simply including primitive accumulation and the concentration of capital-in sum its real history-as part of what capital is. Abstracting it as a relation brings its actual ties with labour, commodity, value, capitalists, and workers-or whatever contributes to its appearance or functioning-under the same rubric as its constituting aspects. All the units in which Marx thinks about and studies capitalism are abstracted as both processes and relations. Based on this dialectical conception, Marx's quest-unlike that of his common sense opponents-is never for how a relation gets established (as if it were not already changing) but for the various forms this change assumes and why it may appear to have stopped. Likewise, it is never for how a relation gets established (as if there were no relation there before) but again for the different forms it takes and why aspects of an already existing relation may appear to be independent.

Likewise, the analysis of the capital-labour relation (not only of exploitation but also of control, discipline, and containment) in a particular time and space is internally related to the processes and patterns within which the corresponding workers have been compelled to sell their labour power to that capitalist. For the extractive

investments in the countryside, that process mostly indicates the proletarianization of the peasantry in different forms and patterns in different historical phases and spaces. Therefore, the discussion in this chapter begins from the classical Marxist discussion on the primitive accumulation and proletarianization of the peasantry given that contemporary literature mostly built on the permanency of these processes under neoliberalism.

In addition, it is argued in this study that relational analysis should reject the dualistic analysis of the relations of production and of social reproduction. Therefore, following the argument that capitalist accumulation "draws its lifeblood for its continuous volarisation from waged as well as unwaged labour" (Dalla Costa 1995: 7) gender analysis is put at the centre of relational Marxist methodology in this study. As discussed in the discussion on the feminist critique of Marxism (part 2.4.1.) dialectical materialist method of Marxism constitutes the convenient basis for the feminist analyses defining patriarchy as social and historical structure (Hartman, 1976: 158). What is necessary is revision of them by putting the gender contradictions at the centre of the analysis. This is particularly significant for the analysis of the rural transformation and extractive investments in the countryside given that the process mostly results in the feminisation of agricultural production and intensification of reproductive work.

Therefore, according to the relational Marxist and materialist feminist approaches, analysis of the social relations in a particular time and space cannot be made independently from the wider capitalist and patriarchal social relations. Examination of the social relations in the time and space in question reflect not only what the social relations in a particular locality are but how these relations are constructed in that locality and how they are related to the wider capitalist and patriarchal social relations. Following the methodological roots of the research, extractive investments in the countryside is examined in this study with reference to the intersection of the following literatures (i) Marxist debate on primitive accumulation, proletarianization of the peasantry and their permanency and class formation in the countryside (ii) labour process theory and local labour control regimes in extractivist regions (iii) materialist feminist literature on women's

productive and reproductive work and feminisation of agricultural labour in the extractivist regions.

2.2. Proletarianization as a Permanent Primitive Accumulation

Karl Marx defines primitive accumulation in the Volume I of Capital as the:

> Historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production" (1995) and underlined that this process "transforms, on the one hand, the social means of subsistence and production into capital, on the other, the immediate producers in the wage-labourers (1995).

Primitivity of this process, for Marx, stems from its correspondence to a historical phase within which mode of production necessary for capital accumulation had not yet been realised. Therefore, primitive accumulation mainly indicates dispossession of the peasantry from the means of production which was essential for capitalism for two reasons. First, dispossession of the peasantry is a precondition for capital accumulation that Marx saw the genesis of capitalist class in England partially in the capitalist farmers who benefited from enclosure movements. Second and more significant reason for this study is that primitive accumulation and dispossession of the peasantry indicates the formation of a class of free labourers separated from their means of livelihood. Marx expresses the need of capital as a relation to the free labourer as follows (1995):

> Free labourers, in the double sense that neither they themselves form part and parcel of the means of production, as in the case of slaves, bondsmen nor do the means of production belong to them, as in the case of peasant-proprietors; they are, therefore, free from, unencumbered by, any means of production of their own. With this polarization of the market for commodities, the fundamental conditions of capitalist production are given. The capitalist system pre-supposes the complete separation of the labourers from all property in the means by which they can realize their labour. As soon as capitalist production is once on its own legs, it not only maintains this separation, but reproduces it on a continually extending scale. The process, therefore, that clears the way for the capitalist system, can be none other than the process which takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of production; a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means of subsistence and of production into capital, on the other, the immediate producers into wage-labourers.

Rosa Luxemburg (2003) on the other hand, by relating primitive accumulation to the contradictory characteristic of capitalist accumulation argues that instead of being the feature of a particular historical phase, primitive accumulation is the continuous element of capitalist accumulation. Accordingly, persistence of capitalist accumulation is not possible without existence of the non-capitalist settings outside

of it. Therefore, in her analysis, capitalism in its mature sense is also in need of the pre-capitalist social formations. Indeed, capital needs the labour power and natural resources of all over the world for unlimited accumulation. Since majority of that labour power and natural resources exist in the orbit of pre-capitalist production, capital must go all out to obtain ascendency over these territories and social organisations. While referring to Marx's analysis of primitive accumulation and of transformation of the peasant production she criticizes Marx for regarding this process as merely reflecting the genesis of capitalism and argues that (Luxemburg, 2003: 345-6):

> [C]apitalism in its full maturity also depends, in all respects on non-capitalist strata and social organisations existing side by side with it. (…) The interrelations of accumulating capital and non-capitalist forms of production extend over values as well as over material conditions, for constant capital, variable capital and surplus value alike. The non-capitalist mode of production is the given historical setting for this process. Since the accumulation of capital becomes impossible in all points without non-capitalist surroundings, we cannot gain a true picture of it by assuming the exclusive and absolute domination of the capitalist mode of production. (…) Capital needs the means of production and the labour power of the whole globe for untrammelled accumulation; it cannot manage without the natural resources and the labour power of all territories. Seeing that the overwhelming majority of resources and labour power is still in the orbit of pre-capitalist production – this being the historical milieu of accumulation – must go all out to obtain ascendancy over these territories and social organisations.

Therefore, as long as relates primitive accumulation to the contradictory logic of capital accumulation, Luxemburg's analysis paves the way for regarding primitive accumulation as a continuous element of capitalist accumulation instead of as a feature of a particular historical phase and so has constituted the basis for contemporary debates on primitive accumulation.

Similar to her intervention to Marx's analysis of primitive accumulation as a historical phase and her argument for the permanency of it, Rosa Luxemburg emphasizes the continuous character of proletarianization by mentioning the significance of the sources from which the urban and rural proletariat is recruited that is:

> The continual process by which the rural and urban middle strata become proletarian with the decay of peasant economy and of small artisan enterprises, the very process, that is to say of incessant transition from non-capitalist to capitalist conditions of a labour power (Luxemburg, 2003: 342).

When Marx's statement and Luxemburg's intervention are brought together with the permanency of primitive accumulation thesis, it is possible to argue that capitalist production owes its existence to continuous reproduction of the detachment of direct producers from the ownership of the means of production and this can only be possible through "expanded proletarianization" (Bonefeld, 2014: 66).

Main tendency in the contemporary debate on primitive accumulation is to regard it as a continuous character of capitalism (cf. Bonefeld, 2014; De Angelis, 2001; Glassman, 2006; Harvey, 2003; Perelman, 2000). In the literature on permanency of primitive accumulation, this characteristic of capitalism is explained with reference either to expansive nature of capitalist reproduction (Harvey, 2003) or to the process of subjection of labour to capital (De Angelis, 2001). In both cases, the outcome is expanded proletarianization. Therefore, in these studies, primitive accumulation is regarded both as the historical prerequisite of capitalism and as the compulsory component of capitalist reproduction (Bonefeld, 2014).

It is plausible to argue that David Harvey's argument that in the context of global capitalism accumulation by dispossession has become the dominant form of capitalist accumulation is critical for the proliferation of the debate on primitive accumulation and its permanency. One of the main emphases of Harvey's work is that capitalism, especially to overcome its crises, necessitates accumulation by dispossession but this indicates not only the detachment of direct producers from the means of production and subsistence but also the new means of enclosing the commons such as privatisations (Harvey, 2003: 149):

> The corporatisation and privatisation of hitherto public assets (such as universities) to say nothing of the wave of privatisation (of water and public utilities of all kinds) that has swept the world indicate a new wave of 'enclosing the commons'. As in the past, the power of the state is frequently used to force such processes through even against popular will. (...) The reversion of common property rights won through years of hard class struggle (the right to state pension, to welfare, to national health care) to the private domain has been one of the most egregious of all policies of dispossession pursued in the name of neoliberal orthodoxy.

By this way, he explains the way accumulation by dispossession solves the crisis of overaccumulation with reference to its follow-up quality of primitive accumulation. By releasing a set of assets at very low costs, over-accumulated capital can hold of

these assets and turn them into a profitable use. In the case of primitive accumulation, this necessitated enclosing and expelling a resident population to create a landless proletariat and releasing the land into the privatised mainstream of capital accumulation. Similarly, privatisation opened up vast fields for overaccumulated capital to seize upon (ibid 149).

For the analysis of the relationship between primitive accumulation and proletarianization, the work of Massimo De Angelis (2001) conceptualising the permanency of primitive accumulation with reference to labour-capital contradiction is significant. Accordingly, as long as the working class struggle is the perpetual factor of capitalist relations of production, capital applies the strategies of primitive accumulation to recreate the conditions of capital accumulation. As De Angelis puts it:

> "(t)o the extent class conflict creates bottlenecks to the accumulation process in the direction of reducing the distance between producers and means of production, any strategy used to recuperate or reverse this movement of association is entitled with the categorisation-consistently with Marx's theory and definition-of primitive accumulation" (2001: 15).

Bonefeld (2011), on the other hand, by taking a step further, regards primitive accumulation as the constituent element of capitalist social relations. Starting from Marx's statement in *Grundrisse* (1973: 460) that what *"originally appeared as conditions of its becoming … now appears as results of its own realization, reality, as posited by it"* he argues that the constitutive role of primitive accumulation has annihilated only in appearance and it re-emerged as a result of its own reproduction. Accordingly, the fact that the individuals freed from the ownership of means of production able to survive only by selling their labour power itself proves that primitive accumulation is the constituent element of capitalist relations. Indeed, capitalist form of organization of labour presupposes the detachment of the direct producer from the ownership of means of production and it appears as the social form of that expropriation. This, originally appeared as conditions of formation of the capital, now appears as results of its presence. Therefore, as the result of its own realisation, primitive accumulation is the permanent accumulation (Bonefeld, 2011: 4-5).

As defined by Charles Tilly (1979: 1) proletarianization:

> Is the set of processes which increases the number of people who lack control over the means of production, and who survive by selling their labour power.

These processes include impoverishment, dispossession, commodification of the means of production and subsistence and their concentration in the monopoly of private property (Özuğurlu, 2008: 64) and so find the expression in the concept of primitive accumulation. Özuğurlu (2008: 68-74) defines the historical and sociological content of the proletarianization with reference to three interrelated factors that are the origin, speed-size-timing and the direction of it. Accordingly, the origin of proletarianization indicates the economic, social, and cultural features of the life from which the producers are detached. In other words, it corresponds to the basis of free labour and found mostly in the agrarian structures. In order to analyse the proletarianization processes, emphases of the processes of detachment from land/agriculture, its mechanisms and the opportunities for a counterstrategy, and their impact on class formation are necessary. The speed-size-timing of proletarianization on the other hand indicates the way workers are articulated to labour market and necessitates the analysis of the volume of the transformation of proletarianizing population's relation to the land and agriculture. Direction of proletarianization is related to the migration dimension and includes the reasons, levels and extent (individually or family) of migration.

Therefore, as seen in the discussion so far, primitive accumulation as permanent accumulation and proletarianization is directly related to the transformation of agrarian structure. Transformation of the property and production relations in agriculture is one of the main moments of capitalist transformation. This indicates on the one hand, the process of detachment of petty producers from the ownership or tenancy of land on the other hand the formation of capitalist producers (Marx, 1973: 195-7). However, especially in the late capitalist countries like Turkey, proletarianization processes may not include a complete detachment from the land. Critical question to be answered here is whether proletarianization necessitates a complete dispossession or not and the answer can be found in the classical and contemporary Marxist literature on proletarianization and formation of the free labourer.

2.2.1. Rural Transformation and Proletarianization Debate in Classical Marxist Literature

In his analysis on primitive accumulation, Marx directly interrelates the development of capitalism and conversion of subsistence farmer peasantry into the waged labourers. Accordingly, proletarianization of the peasantry is the logical consequence of advancing process of class differentiation in Europe and the small peasantry is the future proletariat, as put by Engels (Araghi, 1995: 340). Therefore, Marxist thesis on disappearance of the peasantry is based on the capacity of development and expansion of capitalism to eliminate former production relations. Accordingly, through the processes of dispossession resulted from primitive accumulation, peasants become obliged to sell their labour power to the capitalists and this constitutes the basis for capitalist industrialisation (Boratav, 2004: 113). As stated by Marx in the Volume 3 of Capital:

> Just as the capitalist mode of production in general is based on the expropriation of the conditions of labour from labourers, so does it in agriculture presuppose the expropriation of the rural labourer from the land and their subordination to the capitalist (1999).

In the *Peasant Question in France and Germany* (1950) Engels mentions the significance of the peasantry within the population, production, and political power and questions the way to capture political power in European countries where development of capitalism was an ongoing process and capitalism had not yet replaced precapitalist social relations. Instead of the issue of the emergence of agrarian capital or rural capital accumulation, his focus is on the stark division between capitalist farmer and wage labourer and the political implications of their relations. Accordingly, the ultimate resolution of agrarian question was the development of capitalism in agriculture and fully developed capitalist relations of production with rural population doubly free as mentioned by Marx (Akram Lodhi and Kay, 2009: 7; Byres, 2012: 13).

Development of capitalism in agriculture and proletarianization of the peasantry has taken various forms and phases in different countries as well as different regions within the same country due to factors such as differentiation of crop varieties, different forms of capital and labour intensity, different forms of incorporation into

the world economy, different trajectories of rural class struggles etc. The most significant implication of this diversity is manifested in different forms and paths of the differentiation of the peasantry and the proletarianization (Gürel, 2011: 198-9). In this sense, Lenin and Kautsky's contributions to the agrarian question within the classical Marxism are significant. Under the influence of Marx, they both accept that dispossession of the peasantry and proletarianization is the general tendency of capitalist development. However, they develop this thesis by considering both different experiences of capitalist development and peculiar dynamics of development of capitalism in agriculture. They both define the peasantry as a combination of complicated class and groups that needs to be analysed with reference to their relations to other classes and emphasize that this analysis must take into account the relatively more complicated development of capitalism in agriculture when compared to the industry (Aydın, 1986: 133-3; Boratav, 2004: 118-9).

For Kautsky, development of capitalism in agriculture indicates the transformation of the peasant into a hired labourer and increasing abandonment of the population from the countryside (Lenin, 1974: 85). However, Kautsky (1988) revised the Marxist discussion on the elimination of the peasantry by mentioning that it is a contradictory and complicated process constantly subject to contradictory tendencies. For Kautsky, capitalism does not impose a path dependence on agriculture that there is no unique law of agrarian development (Akram Lodhi and Kay, 2009: 10). Accordingly, similar to the fact that concentration and centralisation of production eliminated petty commodity production in agriculture it would result dissolution of the peasantry and formation of a rural society based on two classes: rural proletariat and capitalist farmers. He defines the rural proletariat as the class of commodity producers and agricultural wage workers (Alavi and Shanin, 1988: xv). Therefore, his analysis is based on the processes through which the capital dominate agriculture, transform the property relations in the agriculture and create new forms of exploitation (Özuğurlu, 2011: 68).

Starting from the fact that the number of small agricultural firms increased while it was expected to disappear, Kautsky concludes that development of capitalism in agriculture is far more complicated than in industry. Therefore, instead of within the

duality of disappearance and persistence he analyses the proletarianization processes by considering the persistence of peasant production. For Kautsky, development of capitalism in agriculture paved the way for the changes such as the size of firms or the products to be sold or bought and a complementary relationship between the small and large firms was developed. As it can be detected from his definition of the rural proletariat, in Kautsky's analysis, petty commodity production in agriculture indicates the over-exploitation of peasant labour power (Alavi and Shanin, 1988: xv) that small agricultural firms sell labour instead of commodity and by this way complement the big farms (Aydın, 1986: 138). Therefore, contemporary relevance of Kautsky stems from his explanation of peasant family farms within capitalist mode of production and their continuity under the domination and exploitation of capital without their complete dissolution. By this way, the peasant sector of the capitalist political economy is a source of continuous primitive accumulation (Alavi and Shanin, 1988: xxxii).

His analysis of proletarianization of peasantry therefore does not regard the complete dispossession and separation from the land and he mentions the peasants selling their labour in agriculture or in other sectors despite they own a certain plot of arable land and argues that:

> The rural proletariat … swells the ranks of the proletariat without expropriating the small farmers, without breaking their tie to the land (1988: 190).

Starting from the peasants' increasing need for money as a result of the development of commodity relations in agriculture he argues that this need is met by selling surplus labour rather than surplus product. This pressure to acquire money may result in migration to the cities to work in the industry as well as search for peasant supplementary employment in the countryside (Kautsky, 1988: 168-9). While specifying the forms of peasant supplementary employment, despite arguing that agricultural wage labour is the most typical form of it he mentions the significant role of the rural industry.

Moreover, Kautsky claims that partial detachment of the proletarianizing petty producers from their land can be preferable to the agricultural and industrial bourgeoisie. Population possessing a certain amount of land but working in the

nearest capitalist firms (agricultural or industrial) because of the fact that the income they receive from their land is insufficient for their subsistence, sell their labour power for cheaper amounts because they can meet at least some of their reproduction costs from their land. On the contrary, capitalists are responsible from all reproduction costs of fully proletarianized and migrant workers and this sharpens the class contradiction. Therefore, transformation of rural structures under capitalism leads proletarianization on the one hand in the form of full dispossession and migration to cities, on the other hand of the rural population possessing certain amount of land (Gürel, 2014: 308). Here, the fact that Kautsky's analysis is based on the household instead the individual is significant. In fact, proletarianization in the countryside mostly indicate the variety forms of use of household labour potential such as in agriculture and in other rural industries or waged or non-waged etc.

Similarly, while defining the dispossession and proletarianization of small agricultural producers as a historical path of development of capitalism, Lenin (1974) also mentions the persistence of them within this process and, like Kautsky, mentions the increase of peasants' dependency in cash as the driving factor behind their search for supplementary income (Lenin, 1974: 42):

> It is forgotten that the "freeing" of one section of the producers from the means of production necessarily presumes the passage of the latter into other hands, their conversion into capital; presumes, consequently, that the new owners of these means of production produce as commodities the products formerly consumed by the producer himself, i.e., expand the home market; that in expanding production the new owners of the means of production present a demand to the market for new implements, raw materials, means of transport, etc., and also for articles of consumption (the enrichment of these new owners naturally presumes an increase in their consumption). It is forgotten that it is by no means the well-being of the producer that is important for the market but his possession of money; the decline in the well-being of the patriarchal peasant, who formerly conducted a mainly natural economy, is quite compatible with an increase in the amount of money in his possession, for the more such a peasant is ruined, the more he is compelled to resort to the sale of his labour-power, and the greater is the share of his (albeit scantier) means of subsistence that he must acquire in the market.

For Lenin, capitalism in agriculture results in differentiation of the peasantry that indicates the process of depeasantisation and the creation of the new types of rural inhabitants (1974, 173). While criticising the scholars interpreting the rural transformation as simple property differentiation he argues that property differentiation is merely the starting point of the whole process in which the old

peasantry is ceasing to exist and being ousted by the new types of rural inhabitants that are rural bourgeoisie and rural proletariat. He defines the rural bourgeoisie or rich peasantry as a class who in time turns into capitalist farmers. Rural proletariat, on the other hand, indicates the poor peasants including:

> Completely landless; but most typically (…) the allotment-holding farm labourer, day labourer, unskilled labourer, building worker or other allotment holding worker" whose defining feature is their "inability exist without the sale of the labour power (…) and extremely low standard of living (1974: 177).

Therefore, like Kautsky, Lenin includes poor peasants possessing certain amount of land to his definition of rural proletariat (1974: 177):

> It should be added that our literature frequently contains too stereotyped an understanding of the theoretical proposition that capitalism requires the free, landless worker. This proposition is quite correct as indicating the main trend, but capitalism penetrates into agriculture particularly slowly and in extremely varied forms. The allotment of land to the rural worker is very often to the interests of the rural employers themselves, and that is why the allotment-holding rural worker is a type to be found in all capitalist countries.

The fact that Lenin regards the poor peasants who are not completely dispossessed and continues production in their own land to a certain amount indicates that his understanding of agrarian change is defined with reference to the emergence of exploitation in Marxian sense. The central transformation therefore is the commodification of labour power because either in the form of wage labour or petty commodity production, surplus product is produced by the rural proletariat through prevailing sets of relations of production and that constitutes the basis for rural accumulation (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2009: 12).

Works of Lenin and Kautsky, together with the theses on the permanency of primitive accumulation, constitute proper ground for the analyses of the proletarianization of the peasantry and class relations in the countryside in the contemporary literature focusing on rural transformation under neoliberalism.

2.2.2. Rural Transormation and Patterns of Proletarianization under Neoliberalism

In the context of neoliberalism, global wave of proletarianization and class formation process of the recently proletarianized population have taken a new form. The most significant strategy of neoliberalism has been the grab of the commons for

capital accumulation and simultaneous subjection of the individual small property to the big companies (Benlisoy, 2015). Impact of this strategy on agriculture has been subjection of the producers to the functioning of the market and therefore small agricultural producers have adopted variety of strategies to cope with the uncertainties of market conditions. These strategies may either be migration to the cities by quitting agricultural production or diversification of the sources of income through additional in or outside of the agriculture (Keyder and Yenal, 2013: 54).

There are various approaches defining neoliberalism and neoliberal transformation in quite different ways. In this study, in line with the relational Marxist methodology, neoliberalism is defined as a "material structure of social, economic, and political reproduction underpinned by financialisation" (Fine and Saad-Filho, 2016:2) the most feature of which is "the systematic use of state power to impose (financial) market imperatives in a domestic process that is replicated internationally by 'globalisation'" (Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005: 3). Therefore, in contrast to the interpretations of neoliberalism as the removal or reduction of state intervention, it is argued in this study that instead of removal or reduction the state interventions, state-market and state-class relations have been transformed in the context of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism, accordingly, indicates a shift in the balance of power (in favour of capital) and transformation of the social relations of reproduction more dependent on the market such as increasing cash dependency in the reproduction of labour power or increasing market dependency of the immediate producers.

In the contemporary Marxist literature, transformation the peasantry in the context of neoliberalism, as in the discussion of permanency of primitive accumulation, is analysed with reference to the permanent strategy of capitalism to dispossess small producers and to include non-capitalist settings to capital accumulation. Araghi (2009: 118) argues that analysis of the transformation of agriculture and peasantry has to be built on the relation between the theory and history. While doing so, it is noteworthy to avoid a determinist, evolutionist, and teleological assumptions of both the disappearance thesis of classical Marxism and the permanence thesis of Chayanovians. Araghi argues that transformation of peasantry should be analysed with reference to the transformation of practices of dispossession and specifies three periods that are colonialism, developmentalism, and globalisation. Based on a

similar periodisation, Bernstein (2010: 43) argues that the colonial period based on colonies' being able to "pay their way" and generation of profit for colonial powers given that control of the colonial subjects of agrarian societies and reproduction of labour were significant destruction of pre-colonial modes of peasant subsistence and rent was necessary. Therefore, transformation experienced under colonialism was based on depeasantisation, proletarianization, and urbanisation at colonialist countries and peasantisation, ruralisation, and super-exploitation of the coerced labour in the colonies (Araghi, 2009: 122).

The second period underlined by Araghi (2009) is the period of (national) developmentalism marked by retreat from classical liberal free market economy and transition to Keynesian mixed economy. Fall of the prices of agricultural products and depreciation of land assets in 1920s marked the beginning of depression of the 1930s and transition to protective agricultural policies. On the other hand, especially during the post-World War 2 period characterised by US hegemony, American agrarian policies' protectionist characteristic was limited to national scale whereas it was liberal at the international scale. In this period, US sold surplus products to underdeveloped countries as food aid for underestimated prices and this led to decrease of food production in underdeveloped countries (Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler, 2015: 90-1). In this period, under the US hegemony, industrialisation of agriculture accelerated and international agri-food corporations emerged. A significant technical development in agriculture was experienced through the "chemicalisation" (fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides), mechanisation and the development of high-yielding seeds and animals. This development essentially experienced in the Northern countries was the product of growth of agro-input corporations (Bernstein, 2010: 72).

Transformation process of the small family farms of the South into petty commodity producers was initiated under the developmentalist period and governments of the Southern countries adopted large scale policies for modernisation of agriculture and state led development. Common logic of these modernisation policies and programs was the "greater integration of farmers in markets, in which they specialise in producing particular commodities for sale" (Bernstein, 2010: 75). Dispossession process under national developmentalism of post-World War II is defined as relative

depeasantisation due to the simultaneous experience of peasantisation and depeasantisation (Araghi, 2009: 130). Through the protectionist policies such the price supports, subsidies and financing of agricultural inputs by the states integration of small peasants to the global market conditions slowed down and alleviated.

In 1970s, whereas contradictions of national developmentalism, started to become apparent through the demands coming from the Southern countries for independence and for control over national resources, contradictions of Keynesian full-employment implementations resulted in inflation, stagnation and pressures of global competition and inability of Northern countries to suppress these demands led to systemic crises. Therefore, national developmentalism and Keynesian policies were no more offering proper opportunities for capital accumulation. Neoliberal program, as a solution to the crises was offering a proper accumulation model to overcome strictness of the previous period and promoting a flexible accumulation model to be able to adopt global competition. Accordingly, flexibilization of employment by abandoning Keynesian strict form, withdrawal of the state from the investments for global competitiveness, privatisation of public enterprises and services, and imposition of structural adjustment programs to the Southern and former-Soviet states were necessary. These reforms had variety of impacts on agriculture such as removal of state subsidies to the petty agricultural producers, conglomeration of global agri-firms through mergers and acquisitions, and rising control of decreasing number of agro-food firms (Bernstein, 2010: 82).

These transformations have resulted in subjection of millions of small producers to competition with agribusiness corporations and inability of the small peasantry to survive under this competition brought them into the process of proletarianization. Therefore, the question that whether the global depeasantisation and proletarianization will be accomplished under neoliberalism was brought into the agenda again.

2.2.3. Class Formation in the Countryside Under Neoliberalism

From the 1970s onwards, proletarianization has accelerated in parallel with the neoliberal transformation of the world economy. This is a clear indicator of the

structural adjustment programmes and economic liberalisation both of which resulted in the subsistence crisis (Johnson, 2004: 56). In the context of neoliberalism, just like mentioned by Kautsky and Lenin for historical transformation of German and Russian peasantry, there is no uniform and linear path of proletarianization.

The main transformation has been the direct producers' dependence on the market for their survival and self-reproduction that their access to the means of production and means of labour itself is mediated by the market (Wood, 2009: 38). As stated by E. M. Wood (2009: 42):

> (T)he critical turning point occurred when producers lost non-market access to the land itself. The emphasis here is on non-market access not complete dispossession, because market imperatives were set in motion well before the complete dispossession of direct producers or the complete commodification of the labour power. Indeed, if anything, the complete dispossession of direct producers was a result more than a cause of these market imperatives.

Therefore, rural communities selling their labour in agricultural and or non-agricultural sectors as a result of loss of non-market access on their means of production and subsistence may still maintain agricultural production. Through seasonal work or various use of labour potential of the household, subsistence farming or petty commodity production can be supported by wages.

Replacement of protectionism of the former period with the global market order resulted in petty agricultural commodity producers' obligation to compete with global agro-industrial corporations and inability to adopt this competition paved the way for their dispossession. This created the potential and active reserve army of labour. The difference between the potential and active reserve army of labour is based on the difference between the ownership of he means of production and that of subsistence. Differentiation of the peasantry has created a semi-dispossessed rural population whose ownership of means of production persists at least legally but they lost their non-market means of subsistence. These semi-dispossessed peasants constitute the potential or active reserve army of labour of our times. It is neoliberal agricultural policies that accelerated the dissolution of the peasantry through dispossession and displacement (Araghi, 2000: 150-1; Araghi, 2009).

In the contemporary studies that link this process of commodification of the means of subsistence to dissolution of the peasantry (cf: Bernstein, 1979; Bernstein, 2001; Bryceson, 1999; Johnson, 2004), proletarianization is claimed to indicates diversification of rural means of livelihood within which subsistence farming, petty commodity production and waged work in agriculture or in off-farm employment are simultaneously experienced. For Johnson (2004: 56), depeasantisation indicates the diversification of rural means of subsistence (of income sources) as a result of the subsistence crisis of the rural population. Accordingly, peasant form of production indicating a logic of subsistence and some control over the means of production is not disappearing it is being redefined.

For Bernstein (2004), development of capitalism in agriculture changed the social composition in the countryside and transformed peasantry into petty commodity producers. Meanwhile prices of the products produced for the market has fallen whereas the input prices have risen. This subsistence crisis may be defined with reference to what Bernstein's conceptualisation of "simple reproduction squeeze" (1979: 427) that refers to the impact of commodification of the rural economy or rural households that result in the increase of the cost of production and the decrease of the returns of labour. As a result of this commodification, poor peasants become unable to reproduce themselves and had no option but to sell their labour power. With reference to Lenin's warning of the stereotyped understanding that capitalism requires landless, free worker, Bernstein argues that rural population selling their labour power while having access to small plot for contribution of their subsistence constitute the rural proletariat. To put it simply, loss of the non-market access to the means of production and subsistence and the simple reproduction squeeze resulted in increasing cash dependency and so the necessity for regular income of the rural population to finance both the input for agricultural production and daily consumption. Thereby petty producers having a small plot of land together with the landless rural population swelled the ranks of rural proletariat and constitute the reserve army of labour in the countryside.

Here, the question of whether complete detachment from the land is a necessary moment of proletarianization arises again in the context of neoliberalism. Concepts such as *semi-feudal* (cf: Bhaduri, 1984; Byres, 1996) indicating lack of complete

freedom from the ownership of the means of production (land) as one factor of the dual freedom mentioned by Marx or *deproletarian* or *unfree labour* (cf: Brass, 1999; Brass, 2010) for dispossessed, proletarianized labour have been developed within the contemporary Marxist literature. Semi-feudalism explains dual means of subsistence with reference to the argument that relations of production has not yet been capitalised and when capitalism in its mature sense is developed these dual means of subsistence disappears and all workers become dually free (Çınar, 2014: 121).

Deproletarianisation on the other hand, related to Tom Brass' concepts of unfree or bonded labour, in contrast to semi-feudal approach, is based on the argument that labour-power is unfree not because capitalism is in its primitive stage rather because it is mature (Brass, 2010). Brass defines the bonded labour as unfree relations constituted by bondages such as debt and unfree labour with reference to its differentiation from the so called free labourer dispose of his/her labour power. Brass' starting point in his analysis of free labour is the double freedom of labour power in Marxian sense and defines the unfree labourer with reference to the role of the lack of the second freedom-from the control of a particular employer-in the capitalist accumulation. Accordingly, unfree labourer:

> Unlike a free labourer who is able to enter or withdraw from the labour market at will (1999: 10).

Is subject to extra-economic coercion and therefore lacks the freedom to decide to sell his/her labour power. His main argument is that this unfreedom does not indicate a precapitalist relationship rather a critical aspect of the class struggle between capital and labour in which capital's control over labour increases and the cost of labour reduces. Therefore, for Brass, unfree labour is not only compatible with capitalism but it also is a matter of choice because the deproletarianisation of the rural workforce is significant for class struggle that enables capitalist producers to depoliticise, cheapen and discipline their workforces (Brass, 2010: 25).

However, making such definitions based on the dual means of subsistence is problematic in the sense both of development of capitalism and of class conceptualisation. To begin with, capitalist development does not have a pure form

and path. Capitalist relations in agriculture should be regarded as processes increasing market dependency of peasant households. Flexibility of such definition paves the way not only for analysis of different cases but also for understanding the fact that commodification of labour power indicates more than wage labour (Banaji, 2002: 115). Moreover, as Banaji (2003: 70-1) mentions, as long as Marx defines capitalism's emphasis of freedom as a fiction and free labourer as people "*compelled to sell himself of his own free will*" there is no free contract because economic coercion is pervasive under capitalism. Capital is capable of exploiting labour power through various social arrangements in different historical circumstances and labelling them with reference to the boundary between freedom and unfreedom is mostly quite fluid and ambiguous. Capitalist production can articulate diverse forms of exploitation and ways of organising labour to produce surplus value, historical materialism needs to go beyond a motionless paradigm and analyse complex ways within which capitalism works (Banaji, 1997: 88; Bernstein, 2010: 34; Banaji, 2012: 231).

Furthermore, as stated by Çınar (2014: 98) definitions such as semi-feudal or deproletariat is related to the method of their class analysis. There are two methodological ways to define the class: class as a structural location or as a social relation. The first group can either be within Weberian or structural Marxist tradition (such as Althusser, Poulantzas, Balibar) and define the class on the basis of stratification and as a layer in the hierarchical structure determined by criteria such as income, market chances or occupation. Relational class analysis based in the Marxist tradition (Lenin, Gramsci, Thompson) on the other hand views class as a historical process and relation between the direct producers and appropriators of surplus value (Öngen, 2002: 12; Wood, 1995: 76). Therefore, relational approach to class analysis within Marxist tradition defines class based not merely on their empirical existence but on their interrelations. In addition, as long as these relations indicate the dialectical relations formed in the process of expropriation of the surplus value class formation is defined as a happening based on class struggle (Çelik, 2017: 225; Çelik and Erkuş-Öztürk, 2016: 421). By replacing the notion of thing with that of process and relation dialectics paves the for the analysis of "what is" with

reference to the processes by which "it has become that and the broader interactive context in which it is found" (Ollman, 2003: 13).

E. P. Thompson, one of the most prominent representatives of the relational approach to class analysis claims that as a historical category class is derived from the observation of social process over time. Therefore, the reason why we know about classes is that people have repeatedly behaved in class ways (Thompson, 1978: 147). Accordingly, the way to conceptualise/theorise the class is to explain the class formation processes instead of mapping the class locations. Therefore, as long as conceptualises the class as a process and relationship (Wood, 1995) relational approach within Marxist tradition leads up to a dynamic class analysis.

Given that scholars such as Bhaduri and Brass approach the class as a structural location, they attempt to redefine class positions that do not fit those locations and use adjectives such as semi-feudal or de-proleteriat. However, transformation of the peasantry and proletarianization indicate the transformation of class relations and class formation processes in the countryside. Therefore, proletarianization and transformation of the peasantry are processes neither mutually exlusive nor zero-sum. As stated by Araghi (2009: 138) depeasantisation and proletarianization "is not a completed or self-completing process leading to death of the peasantry. Social classes do not simply end or die; they live and are transformed through social struggles". Instead, proletarianization indicates "an ongoing historical process 'a happening" in E.P. Thomson's words" (Araghi, 1995: 359).

In this study Bernstein's concept "classes of labour" is preferred to explain the miner families in Soma coal basin. For Bernstein, classes of labour:

> Is less encumbered with problematic assumptions and associations in both political economy (e.g. functionalist readings of Marx's reserve army of labour) and political theory and ideology (e.g. constructions of an idealised (Hegelian) collective class subjects.

By referring to Lenin's analysis of de-agrarianisation or de-peasantisation having different paths Bernstein defines his term classes of labour as:

> a component that is neither dispossessed of all means of reproducing itself nor in possession of sufficient means to reproduce itself (ibid: 73) and therefore comprise the

> growing numbers … who now depend-directly and indirectly- on the sale of their labour power for their own daily reproduction (Panitch and Leys, 2001: ix).

Based on Shanin's (1986) argument that as long as rural issues must be understood in terms of capital-labour relation beyond the agriculture Bernstein conceptualizes classes of labour side of this relation as "*labour beyond the farm*" (Bernstein, 2010: 110) and claims that while representing a new phase of centralisation, concentration and mobility of capital globalisation also generates increasing fragmentation of labour (Bernstein, 2004: 204-5). Accordingly, the growing global reserve army of labour as a result particularly of global depeasantisation pursues its reproduction increasingly in insecure and oppressive wage employment across different sites of the social division of labour such as urban and rural, agricultural and non-agricultural, wage employment and self-employment-what Breman (1996) terms "footloose labour".

Moreover, in parallel with neoliberal rural development policies and employment creation in the countryside, new paths of labour migration in the form of urban-rural or rural-rural migration have been at stake. This brings a new dimension for labour processes, class relations and class formation processes in the countryside due to the differences between local and migrant workers. In his analysis of migrant labour Burawoy (1976)[3] puts this difference in the reproduction of labour power and mentions the externalisation of certain costs of labour-force renewal and therefore inability to reproduce themselves. Therefore, their reproduction and renewal processes are more dependent on income generated by the productive work (1976: 1052). Existing literature focuses on rural class relations with reference to the differentiation of peasantry and with reference to the transformation of agriculture. However, under neoliberalism, in parallel with the enclosure of rural commons especially through extractive industries, labour migration is not only from rural to urban centres. Migration to the rural regions possessing non-agricultural employment opportunities therefore, migrant workers and their families has to be taken into account.

[3] Burawoy's analysis is based on emigrated farm workers in California and migrant mine workers in South Africa. In this study, his analysis is used to explain the domestic labour migration.

Especially under neoliberalism, in parallel with enclosure of rural commons for capital accumulation proletarianization of the rural population in rural industries-especially extractive industries-has accelerated. Therefore, for most cases, rural-urban migration is not a necessary component of proletarianization of the rural population in the non-agricultural sectors. Significance of Breman's analysis of footloose labour (1996) lies in the fact that observing that agricultural labour is no longer the principal source of income for majority of the Gujamat he bases his analysis on the growing significance of non-agrarian economy for the employment of the rural proletariat and examines the growing significance of non-agricultural work and income in the countryside. Extractive investments are exclusively significant in this process given that they are based on the exploitation of natural resources they mostly bring the proletarianization of the corresponding rural population without detachment from their land/village and form the rural footloose labour.

Enclosure of the rural commons is a two-dimensional process. On the one hand, the nature itself and the ecological commons are reduced into a commodity subject to market relations whereas on the other hand labour power of the agricultural small producers become increasingly dependent on the market imperative. Therefore, enclosure of the rural commons brings "proletarianization through precarisation" (Benlisoy, 2015) of the rural proletariat either as agricultural petty commodity producers or as wage-labourer in agricultural or non-agricultural employees in the countryside.

Extractive investments in the countryside in particular have had significance in this process. On the one hand, extractive industries have become new field for capital accumulation; on the other hand, given that extractive investments are possible through exploitation of natural resources it brought proletarianization process of the rural population (Eberliköse, 2012: 131). In other words, petty commodity producers within the simple reproduction squeeze have confronted extractive investments in their villages from the early 2000s onwards and gave consent mostly for diversification of their means of income.

Therefore, in the analysis of the proletarianization patterns of the rural population and class formation in the countryside significance of off-farm employment, labour processes in these employment forms, formation of rural labour market and the labour control in the countryside have to be included in the analysis. For this study analysing the rural transformation, proletarianization patterns and labour processes in a coal pit, significance of extractive investments, labour processes in the mining regions and determinants of the labour control over the population living in the coal sites are central to the analysis.

2.3. Extractive Investments, Labour Processes and Labour Control in the Countryside

In the context of neoliberalism, extractivism-exploitation of hard and energy commodities in their raw state-has become a key development strategy especially for developing countries possessing rich resources (Ayelazuno, 2014). Despite the fact that literature on extractivism as a development strategy has been widely focusing on Latin American experience, expansion of extractivism is a global phenomenon from the United States to the resource-rich countries of Africa or to Turkey as there has been a rising trend towards the rise of extraction of minerals (Arsel et al, 2016). Within this general trend, countries are oriented towards a development strategy based on resource extraction within their own peculiar structural conditions such as availability and magnitude of resources, institutional arrangements, level of economic development etc. The driving force behind such orientation towards resource extraction varies across countries depending on structural economic conditions such as export oriented development in Latin America or substitution of the imported energy in Turkey.

On the other hand, development strategies in general, extractivism in particular should not be analysed based solely on structural conditions or independently from the class relations and the class struggle within the country and locality in question. As argued by Veltmeyer and Petras (2014) extractivism as a development strategy can be viewed:

> Upon the prism of class struggle, political conflict, and resource wars.

Besides, extractivism takes different forms under different historical phases in accordance with the transformation of capital accumulation regime and that of class struggle. Therefore, there is a need to place extractivism into a historical perspective of continuity and change within the evolution of global capitalism. Accordingly, under neoliberalism resource extraction indicates the exploitation of:

> Unlimited supply of surplus labour generated by the capitalist development of agriculture and (…) accumulation by dispossession (Veltmeyer, 2013: 81).

Therefore, under neoliberalism, extractive investments result in a new form of rural class struggle whose protagonists being indigenous communities of peasant farmers, partly proletarianized rural workers that have significant differences from the traditional proletariat formed under the primitive accumulation in the dawn of capitalism. As underlined by Veltmeyer and Petras (2014) the traditional proletariat is formed through the separation of direct producers from their means of production and conversion into wage labourers whereas extractive investments under neoliberalism formed a proletariat of landless or near landless rural workers and partly proletarianized peasant households growing numbers of whose family are forced to work off-farm in the countryside (Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014).

As long as extractive investments in the countryside indicate processes of dispossession, proletarianization, and formation of a rural labour market there is a need to analyse the peculiarities of labour control strategies of capital over the local labour market. This is especially significant for the mining industry given that the resources are not mobile and capital cannot simply re-locate the investments and must contend with the local communities around the mine sites (Ellem, 2006: 370). Also, as long as extractive investments are based on the exploitation of the rural communities in the process of dispossession and on the exploitation of the natural resources the scope of the labour control must exceed the workplace and shift towards the community.

Labour process theory and the literature on the local labour control regime underlining the need to connect the analysis of workplace to the broader structures such as macro and local labour control regimes constitute a proper ground for the analysis of the labour control in the regions of extractive investments. Accordingly,

workplace level (particular use of labour force by a particular firm), local dynamics (use of the local labour power by the locally located capital or specific features of local labour market and of industrial relations), and global operation of the capital-labour relation are internally related and therefore need to be regarded as the moments of the same totality and of each other (Gough, 2003: 27-28). Therefore, the analysis of the labour process and labour control regimes in a coal pit for example, cannot be made independently from the analysis of the formation of the local labour market (labour supply) that is rooted in the transformation of agrarian structures and patterns of labour migration and corresponding strategies of capital to discipline that workforce from the workplace to the sphere of reproduction.

Analysis of the labour process is significant given that it is "the key site of labour's disempowerment within capitalism" and through the control of the labour process capital is able to ensure that "more value is produced by the workforce than it is paid in wages" (Gough, 2003: 34). Starting from Harry Braverman's influential but controversial work *Labour and Monopoly Capital* within the Marxist literature, labour process is analysed as a class relation under the logic of capital accumulation. Braverman's (1998) main argument in this sense is that through the division of labour (especially between mental and manual labour) the control of the labour process was expropriated from the workers and this process indicates the progressive degradation of the work, i.e. deskilling of work. Despite being an influential work for locating the labour process and labour control within the capital labour relations, Braverman's work is criticised for reducing the labour control to the expropriation of skill (Burawoy 1996: 297). Michael Burawoy, in his celebrated work *Politics of Production* (1985) goes further to argue that the sphere of production has its own ideological apparatuses and develops the concept of the factory regime. Factory regime embraces two dimensions of the "politics of production". The first is that the organisation of work has political and ideological effects and within the production process, particular social relations are being reproduced. Secondly, for Burawoy, there are distinctive political and ideological apparatuses of production that regulate production relations alongside the work (1985: 7-8). Based on these dimensions of the factory regime, he makes a distinction between the notions of "relations of production" and "relations in production".

Following Marx, Braverman, and Burawoy, Labour Process Theory conceives the labour process as a manifestation of the fundamental moment of inequality in the social relations of production and argues that as long as this unequal exchange between the employer and employee is far from natural, measures have to be taken for the protection of it. In other words, Labour Process Theory suggests that labour process requires multidimensional and evolving repertoire of labour control strategies and analysis of it necessitates attention on wider political economy affecting employer-employee relations (Baglioni, 2017: 113). Under capitalism, the need for labour control arises from the separation of the economic and political controls and the fact that capitalists own the means of production but they do not own the workers (Jonas, 1996: 325). Labour control therefore indicates the interplay between the labour exploitation (production of surplus value) and disciplining (mechanisms of mitigation and containment) (Baglioni, 2017: 112).

On the other hand, several studies have developed the labour process theory by underlining the local embeddedness of the labour process and put the analysis of labour process in a geographical perspective (cf. Gough, 2003; Jonas, 1996; Peck, 1996; Pattenden, 2016). Based on the argument that local labour mechanisms need to be described within the local scale Jonas (1996: 325) defines local labour control regime as an "historically contingent and territorially embedded set of mechanisms which coordinate the time-space reciprocities between production, work, consumption, and labour reproduction within a local labour market". Therefore, there is a need to analyse the labour process, capital accumulation, and local economy given that they are internally related to each other (see Figure 2.1.). As an immediate site of the capital-labour relation, labour process gives particular resources to management and workers and shapes their daily concerns. Geography is central to this analysis given that workplace is embedded in the structures of the larger spatial scales such as local labour markets, systems of reproduction of workers, and local institutions. On the one hand, firms face the pressures coming from local structures whereas on the other hand workers are reproduced in the local communities in which they have ties to a varying strength (Gough, 2003: 9-10). By this way, local labour control can be defined with reference to the interrelationships among workplaces, family and community institutions, local trade union

organisations, employers' associations, and local political parties. Therefore, as long as labour exploitation and labour control are mutually linked and reinforcing, local labour control regimes represent different articulations between labour exploitation and diverse related instances of labour disciplining at the local scale through various mechanisms.

Labour process and labour control are directly dependent on local reproduction of labour power. Reproduction sphere in the localities produces a socially differentiated labour power in which work capacities of the people are constructed by their household incomes and those of their neighbourhoods. On the other hand, reproduction sphere is also strongly "shaped by local production. The condition of local employment and its segmentation affect the local relations (in the neighborhood or at home). Labour process and the reproduction of labour power are internally related that they form a single differentiated structures (Gough, 2003: 37-8) that shape the local control labour regimes. Therefore, investments in localities indicates more than entrepreneurialism but reproduction of local market conditions through various strategies of control and containment such as development of locality based recruitment practices, provisions of employee services outside the workplace, organisations of local consumption opportunities, involvement in local philanthropic, civic, and cultural endeavours, proposing local policies and supporting local candidates for elections etc (Jonas, 1996: 334).



Figure 2.1. Labour Process in the Localities
Source: Gough, 2003: 10

As long as defined as internally related moments of a structural whole, analysis of the labour process in a particular locality requires the analysis of the social relations of reproduction within that locality as a whole. As stated by Rainnie et al (2010: 299):

> (U)nderstanding the labour process requires the understanding that what occurs in the shopfloor is shaped by what goes on outside the factory or office gates, for the perpetual reconstitution o capital-labour relations is fundamentally shaped by the spatial contexts within which this occurs. Specifically, (…) how workers reproduce themselves socially and biologically such that they can keep coming back to their workplaces on a daily basis is fundamentally spatially structured, as is the way in which workers and labour markets are regulated and the way in which accumulation literally 'takes place'.

In the analysis of local labour control regimes, local labour markets and labour supply in the local context should be put at the centre of the analysis as they

constitute the scale at which labour power is reproduced. Accordingly supply of labour and formation of local labour markets are geographically distinct processes based on the different dispossession and/or proletarianization patterns in various localities. Different patterns of proletarianization determine the characteristics of the local labour markets in different spatial contexts and this necessitates different labour control and disciplining mechanisms. As stated by Peck (1996) capital seeks the most suitable local conditions for profitable production on the one hand whereas on the other hand labour geography is not solely dependent on capital. Instead, "the nature of labour markets is shaped by both 'general' processes of labour segmentation and by 'specific' local structures of labour reproduction and institutionalisation. Geographies of labour are formed at this intersection where flows of capital accumulation collide with the structures of the community" (1996: 16). Therefore, labour markets can be defined as social arenas where the domain of capital comes into conflict with that of labour. Local labour market, on the other hand, acts as an intermediary mechanism between the labour process and associated labour demand of the local factories and the actual patterns of industrial restructuring such as the transformation of the regional employment patterns. Therefore, local labour market is the sphere where "abstract imperatives of labour demand are translated into actual employment outcomes" (Peck, 1996: 160).

In accordance with the profile of the local labour market, capitalists develop certain labour control regimes. Local labour control regimes and organisation of work are directly related to the way workers and capitalists are differently embedded in the economic landscape. It is likely, in time, that certain traditions of work and organisation of labour process to be congealed in these localities. on the other hand, capitalists always face a conflict between the need to be fixed in space in order for accumulation to occur and the need to remain sufficiently mobile. The resolution of such geographical tension varies among different sectors given that local embeddedness varies among different sectors (Rainnie et al, 2010: 303).

Mining is a profoundly local industry because of the "materiality and territoriality of extractive commodities" (Bridge, 2008: 389) and the "fixity of ores" (Ellem, 2016:936). The local scale is specifically significant for the mining companies and the labour processes in the mines are exclusively shaped by the local tensions. As

argued by Ellem (2006; 2016) the localities within which mining operations takes place and where its labour processes are organized are complex in socio-spatial terms for several reasons (Ellem, 2016: 936):

> The fixity of ores, the problems of mining in isolated sites and the need to control the labour processes in these places pose significant challenges in understanding employment relations and for seemingly powerful mining corporations seeking to organise production and unions attempting to organise workers. The history of work and employment relations in mining is in large part a history of the way in which these geographical tensions have been resolved, through competing spatial fixes.

On the other hand, analysis of the labour process and labour control in the mining regions necessitates the analysis of the class relations, patterns of dispossession and proletarianization in the countryside and their impact on local labour regime. In other words, there is a need to apply the local labour control regime analysis to the countryside and to examine how labour process in the mines interact with local dynamics of agrarian change. The processes within which labourers are:

> Compelled to enter the market to sell their labour power as they lack sufficient assets for their material reproduction (Pattenden, 2016: 1813).

Should be taken-into-account for the analysis of the labour processes in the coal sites established in the rural areas. Therefore, it is argued in this study that labour control in the mining regions in the countryside include the following interrelated variables:

- Patterns of agrarian change, dispossession, and proletarianization
- Formation of a local labour market (labour supply to the mines either through dispossession of local agrarian population or through migration)
- Patterns of working-class household reproduction, relation to the land, survival strategies
- Sexual division of labour within the working class household in productive and reproductive work
- Capital accumulation at different scales and rhythms of investment, size of production, and forms of the firms
- Local political, institutional, and community dynamics.

Patterns of agrarian change, dispossession, and proletarianization is exclusively significant given that it determines the bargaining power of the workers in the

recruitment and labour process. Indigenous communities in the mining regions in the process of impoverishment and dispossession due to the neoliberal transformation of agriculture mostly are not in a position to resist extractive capital from the beginning due to the employment generation capacity of mining. Moreover, once recruited, given that most are trapped in a relationship where they are dependent on the mine-owners for few available wage-paying jobs in the countryside they tend to be obedient to the extractive capital.

This is directly related to the formation of the local labour market and labour supply to the mines either through dispossession of the indigenous community or through labour migration. Various patterns of labour supply results in different positions of workers in the production process and necessitates different mechanisms of labour control not only in the process of production and reproduction. In parallel with extractive investments in the countryside under neoliberalism, besides the proletarianization of the local communities in the mine sites, new paths of labour migration to the countryside have been at stake. This has brought a new dimension for formation of rural labour markets and resulted in differentiations within them in the labour process and in the patterns of working class household reproduction and survival strategies (third variable). Different patterns of household reproduction and survival strategies in the countryside mostly stems from different forms of relation to the land not only between migrant and local working class families but also within the local population. As mentioned with reference to Burawoy's (1976) analysis of migrant labour the main difference of migrant workers' conditions in the labour process stems from their different patterns of reproduction processes and the externalisation of most of the costs of labour force renewal and inability to reproduce themselves. Their relatively more dependent position on wage income received from mining in their reproduction and renewal processes is directly manifested in the labour process. Besides, diversified profile of local labour market brings the need for the extractive capital and to develop corresponding labour control mechanisms in the production and reproduction processes.

Extractive investments in the countryside result in transformation of sexual division of labour both in productive and reproductive work as discussed in the latter part of this chapter. To begin with, formation of the local labour market based on partly

proletarianized rural workers through extractive investments indicates on the one hand proletarianization of the male members of the rural working class households in the mine pits whereas on the other hand feminisation of agricultural labour and over-exploitation of women's work in agriculture. Given that local communities of mining regions tend to diversify their means of income instead of giving up agricultural production, agricultural production formerly undertaken by the whole family weighs upon the women following the recruitment of the male members in the mine pits. Furthermore, increasing rhythms of male work in the mine pits results in the transformation of their reproduction process that is undertaken by the women.

Significance of the industry for capital accumulation at different scales and rhythms of investment is another variable determining the labour process and local labour control regimes. Strategic role of the extractive commodity in question in the global value chains, in the macro development plans of the country and for the development of the locality have direct impact on the rhythms of production in the mines and the discipline and containment mechanisms of the local labour power in the mining regions. In parallel with the strategic significance of the resource extracted various political, institutional and community dynamics within the locality is executed to which labourers are articulated or resist in various degrees. Capital seeks to guarantee economic and social stability to labour markets by extending its influence over the spheres of labour reproduction. This is achieved through various methods of control in the locality such as paternalism or corporate welfarism in order to command workers a sense of loyalty apart from their material interests in wages. These methods are developed through the interrelationships among work places, family and community institutions, local trade union organisations, employers' associations, and local political parties (Jonas, 1996: 327).

Extractive investments in general or mining in particular indicates the transformation of the social relations in the rural areas as a whole. Therefore, its impact is beyond the exploitation of the labour power of the miners in the pits to ecocide, air pollution, use of agricultural land for mining (therefore dispossession of the indigenous communities), feminisation of agricultural production. Therefore, struggles in the mining regions shifts from the workplace to community and the local forces of resistance are organised and mobilised from within that community.

As underlined by Veltmeyer and Petras (2014), the struggle in the mining regions should be placed within "global commons" perspective composed of the land struggle against the land grabbing, dispossession, and exploitation both of workers and of natural resources. Therefore, class struggle in the mining regions cannot be independent from the struggle of the agricultural producers, struggles against land grabbing, ecological struggle, and women's struggle.

2.4. Significance of Gendered Analysis to Extractivism and Proletarianization in the Countryside

In the previous parts of the chapter, rural transformation, patterns of proletarianization, class formation in the countryside, and rural labour control in the mining regions have been discussed. One of the most significant emphasis, starting from Kautsky and Lenin to the contemporary literature on proletarianization patterns in the countryside, has been the fact that total detachment from the land or property is not a necessary condition for the proletarianization of the peasantry. Infact persistence of agricultural production within the rural working class household is preferable for the employers as long as they get rid of the certain amount of the reproduction costs of the labour power by means of it. One of the most significant questions for this study is who undertake this load that employers get rid of and the answer can be found in the women's work at least one of the following forms: subsistence farming, unpaid family work or agricultural wage work.

For the analysis of rural transformation, and proletarianization rural household is the proper unit of analysis. Significance of rural household lies in the fact that it is the main unit within which both production and reproduction of labour power is organised (Özuğurlu, 2011: 92). Furthermore, given that under capitalist patriarchy, household cannot be defined independent from the gender relations, analyses of rural transformation should be based on a gendered analysis. As a matter of fact, analyses of rural transformation based on a gender-blind conceptualisation of rural household fail to consider both sexual division of labour within the household and the constitutive role of women's labour as it is unpaid. Therefore, there is a need to go beyond the gender-blind definition of the rural household and to deepen the

analysis with reference to women's labour either in paid or unpaid form (Uyar et al, 2017).

In order to make a gendered analysis of rural transformation, proletarianization and class formation in the countryside first, materialist feminist methodology and their critique of Marxism is discussed. Then significance of gender relations in the discussions of primitive accumulation and proletarianization is elaborated on. Finally, impact of extractive investments on sexual division of labour and feminisation of agriculture is discussed with a specific reference to its increasing prominence under neoliberalism.

2.4.1. Feminist Critique of Marxism

Starting point for the feminist critique of Marxism is that Marx and Engels' texts are gender blind as they ignore the patriarchy as a social system with material base (Hartmann, 1976: 139). Accordingly, in the works of Marx and Engels, oppression of women is reduced to their exploitation through bourgeois marriage and therefore emancipation of women seen possible through the elimination of private property and formation of the classless society (Yaman, 2014: 120). As stated by Rubel (2003: 335):

> In their minds (Marx and Engels) the proletarian movement (…) was the common concern for workers of both sexes, and the cause of the working class was that of men and women equally subject to the laws of capital and the constraints of paid wages.

However, for the feminist critique of Marxism, as long as patriarchal relations have not disappeared under capitalism, it is not possible to argue that for the equal exploitation of both sexes in the same manner. Instead, as long as patriarchy shapes capitalism, women's exploitation and oppression is not limited to capitalist exploitation. Therefore, it is necessary to put the relation between capitalism and patriarchy at the centre of the analysis. As stated by Hartman (1976: 139):

> (p)atriarchy, far from being vanquished by capitalism, is still very virile; it shapes the form modern capitalism takes, just as the development of capitalism has transformed patriarchal institutions. The resulting mutual accommodation between patriarchy and capitalism created a vicious circle for women (Hartman, 1976: 139).

Accordingly, given that patriarchal relations have not disappeared under capitalism and capital and private property are not the sole reasons of women's oppression, elimination of private property will not result in the emancipation of women.

One of the main objection of the feminist critique of Marxism is to regard women's "exploitation" or subordination to men-i.e. patriarchy-as a residuum of feudal relations (Federici, 2009: 8). On the contrary, patriarchy and capitalism are internally related that unresolved problems of capitalism depend on that relation between exploitation of women and paradigms of continuous accumulation and growth (Mies, 1986: 1). As stated by Werlhof (2007: 12):

> What are the differences between patriarchy and capitalism, and what do they have in common? Capitalism has old and far-reaching patriarchal roots; capitalism is, in fact, patriarchy's latest expression. In this sense, capitalism and patriarchy belong together. The differences lie in what is specific to capitalism: the extension of wage labour; the invention of unpaid housework (which is directly tied to the former); the generalisation of commodity production (in various ways); the guiding role of capital as abstract wealth; the creation of "world system" that replaces the former "empires" (Wallerstein); and the globalisation of the entire capitalist enterprise to the point of its possible collapse due to reaching of the limits of what the earth can take and what can technologically be transcended. Yet all these specific developments still lie within the general patriarchal trajectory.

Therefore, main emphasis of feminist critique of Marxism is the rejection of putting gender relations in superstructural sphere and considering patriarchal exploitations as subordinate to wage relation. Dalla Costa and James (1972) define the relation between capitalism and patriarchy with reference to the differences between the concepts of oppression and exploitation and underline women's exploitation by capitalist and patriarchal relations:

> Since Marx, it has been clear that capital rules and develops through the wage, that is, that the foundation of capitalist society was the wage labourer and his or her direct exploitation. What has been neither clear nor assumed by the organisations of the working-class movement is that precisely through the wage has the exploitation of non-wage labourer been organised. This exploitation has been even more effective because the lack of a wage hid it. (…) Where women are concerned their labour appears to be a personal service outside of capital. The woman seemed only to be suffering from male chauvinism, being pushed around because capitalism meant general "injustice" and "bad and unreasonable behaviour"; the few (men) who noticed convinced us that this was "oppression" but not exploitation.

On the other hand, for the feminist critique of Marxism, despite the fact that texts of Marx and Engels are gender blind, in order to understand the development of capitalist societies and condition of women in these societies, they underline the

convenience of Marxism as a method (i.e. historical materialism) and the need to redefine Marxist concepts by putting patriarchy as a social and historical structure at the centre of the analysis of capitalism (Hartmann, 1976: 158; Mies et al 2014: 11). By this way, materialist feminist literature goes beyond the accomplishment of existing theories by revealing the androcentric characteristics of them and suggests a gendered reconsideration of the social theory and the concepts. In order to do so, the starting point has to be the critique of approaches ignoring the inequalities between men and women as natural inequalities and so trivialising the decisiveness of them in economic relations. As a matter of fact, the trivialisation gender inequalities itself serves for the ignorance of gendered dimensions of modes of production on purpose or not (Çelik and Balta, 2017: 72).

For the Marxist social theory, given that exploitation of wage labour is the main source of capital accumulation, driving force towards socialism is the propertyless wage labourers. Exploitation of unpaid labour of women is excluded from the "main" relation of production (Mies et al 2014: 13). Therefore, feminist critique of Marxism underlines the fact that there lies Marxism's inability to consider value-producing work other than in the form of commodity production and ignorance of women's unpaid reproductive work in the accumulation of capital (Federici, 2011: 92). As stated by Dalla Costa (1995: 7):

> We live in a planetary economy, and capitalist accumulation still draws its life-blood for its continuous volarisation from waged as well as unwaged labour, the latter consisting of all the labour involved in social reproduction.

Accordingly, by rejecting the relation between wage labour and capital as the main contradiction of capitalism, feminist critique of Marxism mainly argues that main contradiction of capitalism is between all labour – life – and capital (Werlhof, 2007: 3).

2.4.2. Primitive Accumulation, Proletarianization and Women's Labour

Primitive accumulation is significant to be considered for feminist scholars given that just like the natural resources, women's labour is regarded as a zero-cost factor for production process. Accordingly, women and land, as means of production producing human are commodities that cannot be produced by capital. Therefore,

control over land and women constitutes the basis for the system of exploitation (Mies et al, 2014: 14-5).

In parallel with the birth of wage labour in the dawn of capitalism, men were the first to be proletarianized. However, formation of wage labour and transformation of the scale of production have affected women more dramatically. Given that most men became wage labourers, enclosures did not change their production process as much as women who simultaneously were being excluded from their household-related productions such as dairy farming, weaving, and food plantation. By this way, on the one hand, households lost significant amount of their subsistence products whereas on the other hand women lost the income they generate by selling the surplus of their subsistence production in the market (Hartman, 1976). In addition, while men were being transformed into wage workers, almost all necessities of male labour power started to be met by the women's domestic labour. During this period, women, by cultivating food, producing the products for basic need at home, selling the surplus in the market, growing children and providing elder care maintained the family on the one hand, whereas reproduce the labour power on the other (Yaman, 2017: 322-3).

Materialist feminist scholars (cf. Federici, 2004; Mies, 1986, 2014a, 2014b; Werlhof, 2014) argue that in the *Accumulation of Capital*, Rosa Luxemburg unwittingly wrote on women question while arguing for capitalism's need for non-capitalist strata. Accordingly, while using Marx's analysis of process of extended reproduction of capital or capital accumulation for the analysis of colonialism and therefore concluding that in contrast to Marx's analysis of accumulation based on the assumption that capitalism was a closed system where there were only wage labourers and capitalism, she argues that capitalism had always needed non-capitalist strata. Mies (2014a: 212) explains what inspired her and her feminist colleagues in Rosa Luxemburg's work with reference to their search for answers to certain questions that they could not find in the works of Marx, Engels and other Marxists. Accordingly, Rosa Luxemburg's argument on capital accumulation's need for "non-capitalist social strata" opened up the way for the analysis of the condition of women, colonies, and nature under capitalism. This "non-capitalist social strata" indicated a form of subsumption targeting the subsistence resources of

a different mode of production free of charge and capitalism constantly creates them in the form of subsistence (Soliland, 2016: 193). As stated by Mies (2014a: 217):

> I have already pointed out that Rosa Luxemburg did not reflect on the situation of women. But her analysis of capital-accumulation helped us, my friends and me, to gain a better understanding of the status of housework under capitalism. This work, like that of peasants, the colonies or other "non-capitalist millieus" (as Rosa calls them) is available "free of charge" like nature; unprotected by labour-law and contracts and available around the clock, it represents the cheapest and politically most efficient way of reproducing labour-power available to capital. Moreover, and as I discovered in my research on Indian lace makers, outwork is also the cheapest and most efficient form of production-work. We extended Rosa Luxemburg's analysis to women's work, and in particular to housework under capitalism. It is these workers-along with the nature, the colonies, subsistence farmers and the many people working in the so-called informal sector the world over-who form the basis of what is called the economy: articulation of capital and wage labour. In short, socialist feminist scholars mention that labour performed in the domestic sphere or in the form of subsistence work (unpaid and performed mostly by women) is subjected to a form of primitive accumulation in the sense that the household produces the most significant element of capitalist production free of charge, that is labour commodity (Soiland, 2016. 192).

Therefore, what Luxemburg's work opened up for feminist analysis of women's labour has been a perspective to understand why women as unpaid domestic workers, the colonies and natural sources have to be exploited for the ongoing capital accumulation (Federici, 2014: 232; Werlhof, 2014: 33-4; Mies, 2014a: 103). As a matter of fact, there is a need to relate the discussion on women's labour to the mode of production and accumulation as a whole. It is significant to specify what these so called non-capitalist producers and consumers (housewives, peasants producing means of subsistence, and the urban and rural marginal population in general) do to understand their common characteristics: they are forced to produce for their consumption (through animal breeding, subsistence farming or selling certain amount of their agricultural products) given that their income is insufficient to survival of the household. What serves for their survival from their point of view is the reproduction of labour power from the capital's point of view. This arguably non-capitalist relation (non-capitalist for being unwaged labour) that is to say reproduction of life (of labour power that is potentially a commodity for capital) through subsistence work for production of use value is favourable for capital precisely for being outside of wage relation. Thereby, capital expropriates the surplus labour of subsistence producers without paying the price or taking any risk (Werlhof, 2014: 31-2).

One of the most significant studies regarding the relation between women's labour and primitive accumulation is Silvia Federici's prominent book *Caliban and the Witch* in which she differentiates her analysis of primitive accumulation from Marx's at two points. She argues that whereas Marx's analysis of primitive accumulation is based on waged male proletariat and the development of commodity production. She underlines the need to approach primitive accumulation from the perspective of women's social position and production and reproduction of labour power. By this way her definition of primitive accumulation includes a set of historical phenomena absent in Marx's analysis that are (Federici, 2009: 12):

> (i) the development of a new sexual division of labour subjugating women's labour and women's reproductive function to the reproduction of the work-force; (ii) the construction of a new patriarchal order, based upon the exclusion of women from waged work and their subordination to men; (iii) the mechanisation of the proletarian body and its transformation, in the case of women, into a machine for the production of new workers.

Women's labour either within or outside the family is realised within the sphere of primitive accumulation that it is both the logical but contradictory complement of wage labour and the basis of reproduction (Werlhof, 2014: 44). Accordingly, the most significant structural separation under capitalism is between production and reproduction. The term production indicates the production of exchange value. Reproduction, on the other hand, indicates the reproduction of the production circuit or expanded reproduction or accumulation on the one hand and the reproduction of labour power on the other. Analysis of the first form of reproduction was analysed by Marx in the Volume I of Capital whereas the second one has been analysed by feminist scholars for conceptualisation of housework and subsistence production. As long as production of human life and of living labour capacity is the precondition of all modes and forms of production we need to specify the relation and continuity between the reproduction labour power and subsistence production given that they both indicate the production of use value (Mies 2014b: 48-9).

Feminist critique of Marxism is insistent on the argument that exploitation of women has been central for capitalist accumulation given that women are the producers and reproducers of the most essential commodity: labour power (Dalla Costa and James, 1972). Therefore, there is a need to bring women's reproductive work at the centre of the analysis. Mariarosa Dalla Costa (1973: 19) has argued that

labour power – as the commodity transforming the wealth into capital – is a commodity produced by women at home. The commodity produced by women therefore is unique to capitalism unlike all other commodities (Dalla Costa and James, 1972) that women are not marginal at home but instead their labour is fundamental to the reproduction and destruction of capital.

In her celebrated work *No Critique of Capitalism Without a Critique of Patriarchy,* starting from the argument that it is not possible to understand capitalist economy without paying attention to unpaid labour especially in the form of house work, Claudia von Werlhof (2007) argues that it is not always proletarianization but housewifisation of labour that characterizes capitalist development. She furthermore argues that even more than the wage labour system it is the unpaid or non-regular wage labour such as domestic labour, new forms of slavery or precarious labour that define capitalism. These forms of labour are inherently capitalist that in fact "capitalism is not about wage labour but about the cheapest possible forms of commodity production" (2007: 4):

> The objective of capitalism is not the transformation of all labour into wage labour, but the transformation of all labour, all life, and of the planet itself into capital, in other words: into money, commodity, machinery, and the "command over labour" (Marx). The accumulation of capital does not only happen by exploiting wage labour, but by exploiting all labour, as well as nature and life itself. It is not the "socialization" of labour by "free contract" that allows devaluating labour and life and hence accumulating more capital, but it is labour's and life's "naturalization" and its transformation into a "natural resource" for exploitation/extraction (its "natural-resourcization") that do so.

Mies (2014a: 225) uses the metaphor of iceberg to explain capitalism's dependence on unwaged labour of women. Accordingly, neoclassical and Marxist economists only consider the part of iceberg that is above the water (capital and wage labour) to constitute the economy. All unwaged labour of housewives and of subsistence producers is below the surface and all costs capital refuses to pay are relegated to this invisible economy or externalised. Significant part of the wealth rests on the exploitation of this underwater economy. However, all activities performed within this underwater economy have been naturalised and are alleged not to contribute to capital accumulation. Therefore, this underwater economy is disposed by capitalism free of charge. Women's labour as a significant component of this underwater economy is invisible and performed within sexual division of labour and constitutes

a basis for capitalist patriarchy-the modern version of patriarchy. It is invisible as long as it is naturalised. The sexual division of labour within the household is constructed as a non-social natural sphere in the context of the capitalist patriarchy. Relations and practices within this sphere are naturalised and the work of women is regarded as behaviour instead of labour (Acar-Savran, 2008: 10-11).

Therefore, capitalism served for increasing subordination women and of women's invisible labour that while men were being proletarianized (transformed into wage worker), women turned into domestic servants of their husbands (unwaged family labourers). Even when women participated in the wage-labour market where they have been limited both by capitalism and patriarchy. Under wage labour system, men's control over women's labour has been altered but has not been eliminated; it has been maintained and even deepened through sex-ordered job segregation (Hartmann, 1976-152).

As stated earlier, starting from Rosa Luxemburg's analysis underlining the non-capitalist social strata and regions (i.e. peasants and colonies) materialist feminists argue that there is a need to expand this to the women's labour either in waged or non-waged form. Accordingly, dual character of capitalism (waged and non-waged labour relation) indicates continuous need for process of production of use value. Under the dominance of capitalism, free labourers who lost the control over means of production are dependent on wage to meet their (families') basic needs. But wage can merely meet the costs of food, clothing or housing. It mostly cannot meet the necessary labour for conversion of the goods purchased through wage to the use value. Therefore, housework indicates more than reproduction of the labour power (Mies, 2014b: 75).

In this sense, the most significant form of women's labour is subsistence production. Bennholdt-Thomsen (1982: 241) argues that the capitalist mode of production includes two directly related reproduction areas that are extended reproduction (or accumulation) and subsistence production. Accordingly, they are directly related given that the reproduction life and working capacity are the preconditions for extended reproduction. Therefore, there is a need to include subsistence production in the analysis of political economy. In her analysis Bennholdt Thomsen addresses

the difference between extended and subsistence reproduction with reference to the difference between the production of exchange and use values respectively and argues that it is misleading to consider production of use values (i.e. subsistence reproduction) as not belonging to the capitalist mode of production. Accordingly, extended reproduction is based upon subsistence production that the products coming from the latter are introduced in the former. The main difference of production of use value from wage labour is that the amount of labour realised as surplus is neither directly controlled nor fixed by concrete capital in the production process but only afterwards, in the process of circulation.

2.4.3. Women, Extractivism and Feminisation of Agricultural Labour in the Context of Neoliberalism

In the materialist feminist literature it is argued that the common point between the production of housewife and peasant production is the fact that they both produce use value and they both are responsible for the reproduction of the labour power within the household (Bennholdt Thomsen, 1982). As discussed with reference to Kautsky, partial detachment from land and maintenance of certain degree of agricultural production during the process of proletarianization is preferable for capitalists given that they get rid of the reproduction costs of the labour power. It is mostly possible through subsistence production that:

> The basic common feature of all subsistence production within the capitalist mode of production … lies in the fact that capital precisely does not assume responsibility for the labour time required for the labour power and families (Bennholdt Thomsen, 1981 as cited in Soiland 2016: 210).

In addition to the commonalities between housewife and peasant it is women producing the certain amount of food consumed by their families or sold at the local markets for consumption. As stated by Federici (2004: 48):

> (i)t is an undisputed fact … that in rural as well as urban areas women are the subsistence farmers of the planet. That is, women produce the bulk of the food that is consumed by their families (immediate or extended) or is sold at the local markets for consumption.

Women, as the subsistence farmers of the planet have been affected by neoliberalism exclusively given that neoliberalism indicates restructuring of the reproduction of labour power (Federici, 2006). Accordingly, transformation of social policy,

reductions in welfare spendings, and externalisation of a part of reproduction costs away from wage components resulted in the reorganisation of reproduction on more a more market-dependent form (Federici, 2006: 83; Soiland, 2016: 204). Therefore, one of the main consequences of neoliberalism on women's labour is the transfer of costs of reproduction of the labour power from the state to households, and so, to the women. Due to women's primary responsibility for domestic labour under capitalist patriarchy, reductions in the state spending on health, education, transportation, utilities, and food subsidies have all increased the burden of domestic labour, especially by increasing the time women are expected to spend for caring and providing for their families (Deere, 2005: 8).

Rural transformation under neoliberalism (crisis in subsistence agriculture, widespread adoption of rural labour intensive commercial and export crops and the increasing importance of non-farm sources of rural employment and income) generate potentially different changes in the roles of women and men in their households' livelihood strategies and in the rural economy as a whole. The process is highly unequal for men and women (Katz, 2003: 32). Shiva (2014: 231) argues that neoliberal rural policies aim to achieve the replacement of women and other subsistence producers by transnational corporations as the main providers of food. Accordingly, these policies have aimed at marginalising the household and domestic food economies in which women play a significant role. For Shiva (1988) this indicates a "masculinisation" of modern, chemical intensive and mechanised, capital intensive agriculture and the feminisation of traditional subsistence food production which feeds the bulk of the rural poor. As stated by Shiva (1988: 109):

> As more land is diverted to cash crops and is impoverished through the ecological impact of green revolution technologies, women have decreased space but increased burdens in food production. With the market as the measure of all productivity the 'value' of women's work and status falls, while their work in producing food for survival increases. By splitting the agricultural economy into a cash-mediated masculinised sector, and a subsistence, food-producing feminised sector, capitalist patriarchy simultaneously increases the work burden and marginalisation of women. The cash economy draws men away from basic food production, thus increasing women's workload for producing subsistence.

Therefore, there is a need to distinguish between farm labour and management in the discussion of feminisation of agricultural labour (Radel et al 2012). Masculinisation of agriculture indicates the removal of women from the control of

production process in agriculture whereas feminisation indicates the increasing exploitation of women's labour in agriculture either in paid or unpaid form.

In parallel with the neoliberal transformation of agriculture and removal of subsidies and other forms of support to small farmers we have been witnessing differentiation of the rural means of livelihood which generally is associated with male proletarianization. Given that most of this population have been employed in precarious, informal, and low wage jobs income generated by the wages mostly could not be sufficient for the subsistence of the whole family. In this process, in many developing countries proletarianization wave under neoliberalism have mostly been in the form of men's move out of agriculture and women's remaining on the farm or much slower move out. According to the 2017 data of FAO, the share of women in agricultural employment is growing in almost all developing countries (FAO, 2017: 88).

Women are employed in agriculture mostly as temporary, seasonal and precarious ways. On the other hand, this process of diversification of rural income generating strategy and search for off farm employment resulted in women's increasing participation in agriculture not only as wage workers but also own account and subsistence production. Principal factor driving this feminisation of agricultural labour is the need for rural households to diversify their livelihoods. Combination of growing land-shortage, economic crises, unfavourable policies for domestic agriculture under neoliberalism has indicated that rural households can no longer sustain themselves on the basis of agriculture alone. This led to the increase in the number of rural household members pursuing off-farm activities (Deere, 2005: 1).

Extractive industries in the countryside is particularly significant in this sense. These investments encourage male members of the rural households to work in these industries given that extractive labour in general and mining in particular are historically defined as male job. Mercier and Gier (2007: 995) state that "(m)ining's tumultuous history evokes images of rootless, brawny and often militant men, whether labouring in sixteenth-century Peru or twenty-first century South Africa" and underline the fact that women are "ignored or reduced to shadowy figures in the background supporting male miner family members. Where were women in the

mining world?". Some feminist scholars have questioned the role of women in the mining communities. For example, Mc Dowell and Massey (1984) underline how gender division of labour is based on a spatial division of labour between the home and the mine. Still women were regarded as passive agents within the mining communities, as miners' wives. Later, Williams (1981) combined Marxist and feminist approaches to show how women organise consumption within capitalism and play the major part in reproduction of labour while men comprise manual workers to create and maintain the patriarchal order (as cited in Lahiri Dutt, 2011: 198).

Extractivism in the countryside and women's condition in it is under-recognised and under-theorised but is a key issue in terms of thinking through and critiquing extractivism in relation to development and to poor communities in the global South). Extractivism and women, as stated by Jenkins (2014: 330) is related with reference to four intersections areas:

- Women as mine workers
- The gendered impact of mining and specifically the disproportionately negative impacts on women
- Women's changing roles and identities in communities affected by mining
- Gendered inequalities in relation to the benefits of mining.

Women in rural extractive communities, due to their traditional roles, are in charge not only of reproduction of labour power and of housework but also of small scale or subsistence farming (Jenkins, 2014: 332). In addition, unhealthy conditions in the mines constitute a pressure on women's reproduction and emotional labour. Furhermore, as argued by Scheyvens and Lagisa (1998) in parallel with the transition to cash economy (as a result both of increasing extractive investments and of commodification of agricultural production) male dominance over the control of life tends to increase. One final point to be underlined is that displacement due to extractive industries transforms women from agricultural producer to marginalised labour power and to landless migrants. These displaced women confront to the role of construction and protection of the social capital (Schayens and Lagisa, 1998).

2.5. Conclusion

This chapter aimed to examine the interrelation among three literature for the analysis of the extractive investments in the countryside. According to the approach used in this thesis, labour process in the extractive industries in the countryside is internally related to the labour supply and formation of the rural labour market through the transformation of agriculture and proletarianization of the peasantry and this indicates new forms of sexual division of labour in the countryside. Neoliberal transformation of agriculture, has resulted in the impoverishment of the rural households and they have started to search for strategies to diversify their means of income. Extractive investments in the countryside have constituted an opportunity for the rural population in this sense as rural households could be oriented towards off-farm sources income without leaving their villages. In the mining regions, this process mostly indicate proletarianization of the male population in the mines and feminisation of agricultural production. In the next chapter, using the conceptual framework, dispossession and proletarianization processes in Soma basin in parallel with the neoliberal transformation of agriculture and transformation of women's productive and reproductive work accordingly is examined.

CHAPTER III

NEOLIBERAL TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN SOMA BASIN: PROCESSES OF DISPOSSESSION, PROLETARIANIZATION AND FEMINISATION OF AGRICULTURAL LABOUR

3.1. Introduction

History of the class relations in Soma coal basin needs to be analysed with reference to the historical transformation of two sectors. Lignite mining dating back to the first quarter of the 20th century on the one hand and the agricultural production - especially of cash crops such as cotton and tobacco-that had historically been the main source of subsistence in the basin on the other. Simultaneous transformation of these two sectors in the 2000s are the main determinants of the class relations in the basin. This chapter examines the impact of neoliberal transformation of agricultural production in Turkey in the 2000s on local population of Soma basin. The chapter aims to provide a historical context within which local population has been oriented towards a survival strategy through diversifying their means of income, i.e. proletarianization of the male members in the coal mines and feminisation of agricultural production.

The chapter has three sections. The first section provides the wider processes and transformations within which small agricultural producers in Turkey have been left at the mercy of the market in the 2000s. The second section covers the processes of impoverishment, dispossession, and proletarianization of the tobacco producers in the villages of Soma basin and the strategies developed by the households through diversification of their income sources. The last section discusses the women's

productive and reproductive work in the basin with reference to the feminisation of agricultural labour and transformation of reproductive labour within this process.

3.2. Neoliberalism in Agriculture and Transformation of Turkish Countryside

Neoliberal transformation of agriculture in Turkey, as in most parts of the Global South, has been towards the increasing market dependency of the petty agricultural commodity producers in parallel with the neoliberal policies such as decreasing price support schemes, removal of subsidies, or abandoning of co-operative credit arrangements. This resulted in the disappearance of the self-sufficient peasantry and led to the transformation and diversification of the rural means of livelihood.

It is possible to argue that today's agricultural structure in Turkey has its origins in the new international division of labour formed in the postwar period starting from 1944 when Bretton Woods System was accepted. This new international division of labour was formed between the developed and underdeveloped countries according to which former ones were in charge of industrial production and were able to sell industrial commodity to all of the world whereas the latter ones were expected to supply agricultural commodities and raw materials. Within this international division of labour, Turkey was given the role of food and raw material supply to European Countries in the context of the acceptance of Marshall Plan in 1948 (Yıldırmaz, 2009: 69-70; Bor, 2014: 91).

Therefore, Marshall Plan can be regarded as the turning point for rural transformation and of large-scale agrarian change in Turkey. Marshall Plan enabled the state to mechanise agricultural production and encouraged the expansion of cultivated areas. Therefore, integration of the Turkish countryside to the national and international markets was initiated from the 1950s onwards through the increase of the prices of agricultural products, mechanisation of production by increasing use of tractors, and development of infrastructure and transportation (Akad, 2015: 93; Oyan, 2015: 113). On the other hand, despite marking the beginning of internationalisation of Turkish agriculture, Marshall Aid contributed the intensification of state support for agriculture in the forms of government credit, input provisioning, and guarantee of state purchase in main crops (Aydın, 2010:

153). Post World War II Turkish governments both accepted the credits provided by the US to implement the rural development projects in the context of Marshall Plan and implemented agricultural support policies to receive electoral support from the rural population. In the 1950s, by this way, agricultural production rose significantly (Keyder and Yenal, 2015: 105).

Until the 1980s, the Turkish countryside made significant gains from state subsidies and the provision of infrastructure, education, and health services. From the early 1980s onwards, neoliberal policies have had inevitable impact on agriculture. In the Global South, Structural Adjustment Programmes were imposing the reforms such as withdrawal of the state's protectionist role in input subsidies, implementation of minimum price, guarantee of purchase for several crops, and reconstruction of agricultural policies in accordance with the free market logic. Until the 1980s, market dependency in agricultural production was limited to the input and product markets and farmers as commodity producers were able to control the production process. The most significant transformation from the 1980s onwards was that agribusiness capital has started to control producers from production process to the marketing of the food (Bor, 2014: 104-5). As a result, in the neoliberal context, petty commodity producers have been left to the conditions where input prices constantly rise whereas the prices of their products relatively decrease.

In parallel with the worldwide transformation of agricultural production, neoliberalism in agriculture marked the abandonment of national developmentalism based on active state involvement and encouraged deregulation and internationalisation (Aydın, 2010; Keyder and Yenal, 2015). As summarised by Aydın (2015: 1):

> The main aim of the restructuring in Turkish agriculture has been to reduce the number of farmers, replace traditional food crops with alternative cash crops and reduce the burden that supporting the agricultural sector places on the state. The gradual reduction of subsidies, the abolishing of parastatal organizations and elimination of support prices have left the great majority of rural producers in disarray.

Therefore, neoliberal transformation in agriculture resulted in a huge wave of dispossession and proletarianization of the small agricultural producers either in the countryside or through rural-urban migration.

On the other hand, implementation of neoliberalism in agriculture in Turkey has not been a smooth process and especially in the second half of the 1980s and 1990s when the number of parties contesting in the elections was quite high, government interventions to the price formation or re-introduction of certain subsidies and supports despite the displeasures of IMF and World Bank could be in the agenda. The main turning point for restructuring of agricultural policies in Turkey has been the 5 April stabilisation programme under the control of IMF in the aftermath of 1994 crisis. From the 1994 onwards, transformation of Turkish agriculture as envisaged in the 24 January Decisions has been accelerated. In the context of 5 April programme, the number of guaranteed procurement of crops were limited to cereals, sugar beet and tobacco, power of the Union and Agricultural Sales Cooperatives was limited, and input supports were diminished. However, implementation of 5 April programme in agriculture was not smooth due to political expediency, electoral concerns, and change of governments (Aydın, 2010: 158).

Deepening of neoliberalism in Turkish agriculture or "great neoliberal transformation" (İslamoğlu, 2017: 75) in the Turkish countryside corresponds to the aftermath of 2000-1 crises and to the Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments. Determinants of the agricultural policies of this period have been IMF and World Bank agreements, letters of intentions, and the initiation of Agricultural Reform Implementation Project (ARIP) that resulted in a significant reconstruction of the state-countryside relations. Main objectives in this context were (Günaydın, 2009: 178; BSB, 2015: 96-7):

- Withdrawal of the existing support system and initiation of Direct Income Support
- Withdrawal of subsidized agricultural credit system of the Agricultural Bank
- Determination of the prices the support purchases in accordance with the World stock prices
- Restructuring of the Union and Agricultural Sales Cooperatives
- Privatisation of agricultural State Economic Enterprises such as Turkish Sugar Factories Corporation, General Directorate of Tea Enterprises (Çaykur) and the State Monopoly of Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverages (Tekel)

- Promulgation of Tobacco and Sugar Laws.

As a result of these transformations in agricultural policies starting from the 1980s and accelerating from the 2000s onwards, Turkey's total agricultural production fell drastically. The share of agriculture in the GDP fell from 23.8 % in 1978 to 18.9 % in 1988, and to 9.1 % in 2010. On the other hand, the value of total agricultural production rose from 17 billion 2000 to 79 billion in 2009 (Gürel, 2014: 352). Therefore, despite the dramatic fall of the share of agriculture in GDP it would be wrong to claim that this process has indicated the elimination of agrarian relations (or deagrarianisation) in the countryside. Instead, the former agricultural structure dominated by small scale farming has been eliminated and agriculture has been transformed into a more profitable sector in accordance with the interests of national and/or international of agribusiness capital.

Impact of neoliberal agricultural policies has been manifested in the countryside in the form of impoverishment, dispossession and therefore proletarianization of the small scale agricultural producers. In other words, neoliberal transformation of agriculture in collaboration between the state, international organisations, and agribusiness firms indicates a process of "modern enclosures" (Aysu and Kayalıoğlu, 2014: 11). This modern enclosure has been targeting not only the enclosure of the commons but also expropriation of the subsistence production or small-scale agricultural production. In parallel with the neoliberal transformation of agriculture, small scale agricultural producers have found themselves under the conditions within which input prices continuously rise whereas prices of their products fall. Within this "simple reproduction squeeze" (Bernstein, 1979) stemming from this transformation, conditions of household labour use have changed (Özuğurlu, 2011) and rural households started to develop certain survival strategies (Aydın, 2018) in the Turkish countryside.

According to the data of Turkish Statistical Institute, crisis and dissolution of the small peasant households in Turkey corresponds to the 2000s as agricultural employment fell more than 2 million from 2001 to 2006 and during the period between 2000-2012 almost 7 million people left the countryside and migrated to the cities (BSB, 2015: 104). The share of rural population fell from 80 % in 1950 to 50

% in 1980 and 23 % in 2011 (Gürel, 2014: 335). Within this process, the main transformation in the countryside has taken place in the labour dimension given that in parallel with the increasing market dependency of producers, small scale agricultural production decreased and seasonal employment in agricultural or off farm employment has risen (Yıldırım, 2015: 25).

Therefore, this process has indicated deepening of class differences in the countryside and increasing inequalities of income and wealth. The determining factor of the rising inequalities in the countryside is based on the ownership as the differentiation between the propertied and non-propertied households or between the households possessing large and small plots of land has been deepened. For example, it has become necessary for farmers to hold a title of ownership for the lands they cultivated in order to register as farmers and later it has become a precondition for access to the bank credits and eligibility for direct income support. Meanwhile, large landowners have had access to more credits and more leverage vis-a-vis the supplier of inputs whereas those holding less than 100 decares were at a disadvantage.

Özuğurlu, (2011: 10) argues that in order to grasp the structural transformation of the Turkish agriculture, analysis of the proletarianization of small peasantry is essential given that small family farming and petty commodity production have been the prevalent form of agricultural production in the Turkish countryside. Historically, direction of the transformation of the small peasantry has been through differentiation, dissolution, and elimination with an acceleration in the neoliberal context. On the other hand, as underlined in Chapter II, dissolution of the peasantry and class formation in the countryside indicate the diversification of rural means of livelihood especially in the developing countries including Turkey. From the early 2000s onwards, the number of agricultural employment and agricultural producers fell drastically and there has been a limited possibility for the population detached from the land to be absorbed in the urban employment. As a matter of fact, despite the huge wave of proletarianization from the early 2000s onwards, still, rural population constitutes around one quarter of the population in the 2010s. This clearly indicates the development of certain survival strategies by the rural households remained in the countryside. As stated by Keyder and Yenal (2011: 58):

> Structural adjustment and market liberalisation policies have played a fundamental role in intensifying the struggle for viable livelihoods one result of which has been the re-orientation of rural dwellers toward income diversification outside of agriculture. The gradual liberalization of agricultural markets and dwindling state support to agricultural producers have contributed to the decline in agricultural revenues and led rural dwellers to search for complementary resources of income generating activities. This process was, to a large degree, aided by the development of alternative sources of employment in the countryside, thanks to the growth, especially, of the tourism and construction sectors. Thus, migration to large cities by the younger members of rural households has largely been avoided. (…) Younger members of poorer households with limited land availability are more eager to engage in contemporary, seasonal or preferably permanent off-farm employment, but in the vicinity of their villages. In most cases, those with off-farm jobs continue to reside in the village.

Therefore, reliance on supplementary sources of income and off farm employment does not necessarily result in migration to the larger cities. Instead it is quite common to continue to reside in the villages and commute to daily work in close cities or in the rural industries such as mining. Relation of the peasant household to the wage labour is related to the household labour reserve, use of this reserve in the production and reproduction processes of the household, sexual division of labour within the family, and relation between the productive and reproductive labour (Özuğurlu, 2011).

Another form of survival strategy in the countryside is contract farming. In contract farming, farmers transfer the control over the production process to agribusiness firms and maintain the production in their own land by using their own family labour and means of production. In the absence of the former state subsidies, framers may prefer contract farming due to the purchase guarantee and by this way agribusiness firms or supermarkets exploit the agricultural producers as “hidden proletarians” in their own land. On the other hand, by avoiding the direct control of production, they get rid of the cost of social wage-necessary wage for the survival of the whole family (Aydın, 2015: 313). Therefore, it can be argued that contract farming is the implementation of subcontracting in agriculture and transforms the small farmers into subcontract workers employed in their own land. The direct producers lose control over the production and solely possess simple property rights (Bor, 2014: 116-7).

3.3. Transformation of Agricultural Production in Soma

In this section, impoverishment, dispossession and proletarianization processes of the population living in the villages of Soma in the 2000s is discussed. In order to make such discussion, first, historical background of the agricultural relations in the basin needs to be elaborated. Therefore, transformation of agricultural production is divided into two periods that are before the 2000s and from 2000s onwards. Both periods are examined with reference to the findings of the field research.

3.3.1. Historical Background of Agricultural Production in Soma until the 2000s

Until the 2000s, people living in the villages of the Soma basin were engaged in agricultural production, mostly in tobacco production. In this period, especially the local peasants owning a certain plot of land were not preferring to work in the coal pits as the income they receive from the agricultural production was sufficient for the subsistence of whole family. For example, as stated by one of the miners working in a private coal company while his family is still producing tobacco:

> We neither intended to work in the mine nor the thermal plant at that time. We were already earning what they receive as damages in one harvest. It was not meaningful to work in mine (Q2).

As stated by the chairperson of the Trade Union of Tobacco Producers and secretary general of Trade Unions of Farmers (Çiftçi Sen), Ali Bülent Erdem in the interview, during the 1970s population of Soma district was around 29 thousand, 19 thousand of which were living in the villages. Accordingly, around 4,300-4,800 families (meaning around 17-18 thousand people) during that period was producing tobacco and today's miners are mostly among these families:

> We have already been an agricultural country since the establishment of the Republic. Soma is also an agricultural town. But agriculturist character of Soma is not similar to Akhisar or Kınık. For that reason, I mean there are so big plains, large plains and they do irrigated farming. But Soma is one of the places where Bakırçay rises, Bakırçay flows through a narrow valley. For that reason, there is almost no area to do irrigated farming in Soma. That's why Soma is generally known as a tobacco town. Because, tobacco grows over barren lands and does not need water. The main agricultural product is tobacco because of soil characteristic in Soma. Indeed, look at this, let me tell you in figures, the population of Soma was about 29 thousand in 1970's, 19 thousand of which was living in villages. Near 4.300-4.800 households were engaged in tobacco. You need to calculate tobacco in this way, you should multiply this number with four because tobacco is a family agriculture. Nearly 17-18 thousand people were rural people making their living by tobacco at that time. (Q3)

In 1980, when tobacco production was prevalent in Turkey, 222,996 hectares of land in 5,559 villages were used for tobacco production. Main reason behind the widespread orientation of rural population to tobacco production-besides the structural reasons such as availability of land-was the significant degree of state support maintained until the second half of the 1990s (Ertürk Keskin and Yaman, 2013: 335). The most significant form of state support was guarantee of purchase thanks to which producers were able to sell their products. During the interviews, it was frequently underlined that within this period, producers had the chance to sell their products to the merchant paying the highest amount and in cases when they cannot sell the products to any of the tobacco merchants Tekel was providing them guarantee of purchase. As stated by a miner who was a former tobacco producer:

> It was the open market in the past. I was selling my tobacco to any merchant I want. There was also Tekel at that time. I could also sell to Tekel. They were setting a price, then coming to see the tobacco. All merchants… Tobacco merchants could come to see. You could pay 5 liras to my tobacco, another merchant could pay 6 liras or another one could pay something else… I could sell my tobacco to the one who pays more. I knew that I can sell this to Tekel if it goes unsold (Q4).

During this period, tobacco production was done by the whole family. The first reason is the fact that it is quite a labour intensive and time-consuming form of agricultural production and takes around eleven months at intervals. Secondly, given that income generated by tobacco production was sufficient for the whole family, they did not need to diversify their sources of income. Therefore, whole family was engaging in tobacco production and instead of shuttling between the tobacco farms and villages, they stated that they were moving to the farms for four-month period every summer and were staying in the shelter tents.

According to the findings of the field research, one of the main characteristics of this period was lower levels of cash dependency of the families living in the villages-that has prominently changed from the 2000s onwards. All of the interviewees mentioned that they were using certain plots of their land for subsistence production both for their immediate needs while they were living in the farm and for their winter storage. They frequently stated that they were not in need of and therefore did not have to use cash during this period. For example, as stated by a woman who was formerly producing tobacco:

> We were planting tobacco, for example on ten decare field. On one decare of this, we were planting horsebean, chickpea, lentil, melon, water melon, eggplant etc., any fruits and vegetables. They were already… Then we could dry our eggplant, pepper, what's more beans… We could make our tarhana of curd, tomato and flour. So we did not need money (Q5).

Until the 2000s, wage work in agriculture was not widespread for peasants owning at least certain amount of land. An average land-owning family for example, as agricultural production was done by the use of all labour power potential of the family, did not need to employ daily wage workers. For example, as stated by a miner who was formerly a tobacco producer from Kınık:

> For example, we were doing 4-4.5 tons tobacco by ourselves. I mean who has a large land, has possibility could do this. I also know others who were doing 8 tons. But, for example we were not employing any worker. We had our own… I mean my big sisters, siblings… We were already doing it together with my uncles. So, workers were not much needed. Our conditions were well indeed. That's to say, I don't know how much 70 cl Yeni Rakı is now but… When we were staying at the village, tobacco price was equal to the price of "big" rakı. I mean people were really making good money. People were able to buy a zero kilometer tractor with money made from tobacco (Q6).

On the other hand, during the visits to relatively higher-altitude mountain villages not possessing arable land, mostly in Kınık, interviewees stated that they had always been agricultural wage workers given that they do not own land. The significant point is that they also mentioned their relatively better conditions before the 2000s. For example, during a focus groups interview at village headman's home in a mountain village of Kınık it was stated that:

> Agricultural worker… We, the whole village, were living by working in the tobacco farms in the past. Those days, you could not find anyone if you come to our village in the daytime. Everyone was at the plains. Though they still go, they just came for lunch but it is not worth any more. Our people from this locality were always loser and they are still loser. No one has their own land in our village. Look, there is already no land in our village. People cannor even find an area to build a house. (…) But working as a labourer was better in the past. As he said just now, it was equal to price of 70 cl rakı… 3-5 tons were produced before the quota was imposed. We were paid according to this. Then, once the quota was imposed… It does not cover the man, what he can pay for the worker… (Q7)

Therefore, what has been dissolved in agricultural production in Soma from the 2000s onwards, in parallel with the neoliberal transformation of agriculture across the country and of tobacco production in particular, is the relatively secure rural means of livelihood in the villages. In the next section, this dissolution is discussed with reference to the impact of neoliberalism in the agricultural activities in the basin.

3.3.2. Neoliberal Transformation of Agrarian Relations in Soma: Patterns of Dispossession and Proletarianization in the 2000s

From the 2000s onwards, in parallel with neoliberal transformation of Turkish agriculture, two main transformations in tobacco production have triggered the processes of dispossession and proletarianization of the population living in the villages of the basin and therefore they started to search for off farm employment- i.e. to diversify their income sources.

The first transformation was implementation of quota on tobacco purchase by Tekel in 1994. Previously, in the context of law number 196 on Supporting Farmers' Tobacco Markets enacted in 1961 and Tobacco Law number 1177 enacted in 1969, Tekel was purchasing the all tobacco produced by all producers annually. However, in time, problem of overproduction had occurred and sometimes the surplus products may even be annihilated by burning them. Then, quota was initiated to tobacco production. Initiation of quota was significant for the tobacco producers as it has removed the guarantee of purchase (Ertürk Kesin and Yaman, 2013: 422). Similarly, as stated by a tobacco producer from a village of Kınık:

> You have to produce huge amounts of tobacco so that it is worth. A family was producing three to five tons before the quota was imposed. Then a quota was imposed and they said you cannot plant more than 500 kilos. Of course it did not cover. How would it cover? (Q8).

The second and most significant transformation was privatisation of Tekel. Tekel's privatisation was a protracted process and the state support for tobacco production was phased out from 1998 onwards. In the aftermath of 2000-2001 crisis, the coalition government pushed the Tobacco Law number 4733 in July 2001 and it was vetoed by the then President of the Republic on the ground that it would have negative repercussions on the tobacco producers. Then, the government resubmitted the bill to the president and the Law number 4733 was enacted in 2002 as the president cannot veto legislation twice. In the context of this law, the Tobacco and Alcohol Market Regularity Authority (TAPDK) as the absolute monitoring ang regulatory power over the market was established and two main branches of Tekel (alcoholic beverages and cigarettes) were dismantled. Cigarette factories of Tekel were separated from other divisions and its first tender was held in November 2003.

Japan Tobacco International won the auction with an offer of 1.15 billion USD but it was cancelled with the claim that it was under the expectations. Then, in 2004 retender of the cigarette factories was announced but this was also annulled in 2005 for lacking bidders. The final act took place in 2008 and the tobacco factories were sold to British American Tobacco (BAT) and a few months later, BAT declared that only one of those six factories would be kept open (Yalman and Topal, 2017: 453; Ertürk Kesin and Yaman, 2003: 428).

The immediate impact of the Tobacco Law and sale of the tobacco factories on tobacco producers was the elimination of former support purchases. As frequently mentioned by the (former) tobacco producers during the field research, they felt the "absence of state support" and this resulted in the loss of security for tobacco producers. For example, as stated by one of the tobacco farmers who started to work in the mines when he was 46 years old (in 2005) explains the precarity they have been experiencing from the early 2000s onwards as follows:

> You do your job with the fear if the state is not at you back. Peasants are always faintheart, loser anyway. They are always afraid by thinking I am doing this job but if I would earn from this. If the state does not back you up too… We had to start working in the mine (Q9).

Another impact of elimination of Tekel's regulating role in the tobacco production has been the determination of the prices by international tobacco corporations through which prices fell dramatically (Aydın, 2010: 172). All interviewees who either gave up or continue tobacco production mentioned the dramatic decrease of tobacco prices. For example, as stated by an unemployed miner living in a village of Kınık:

> Now you pay 10 liras for a pack of cigarettes, a kilo of tobacco is 13 liras. A kilo of tobacco means your 50 packs of cigarettes. A kilo of tobacco was equal to the price of 70 cl rakı in the past. If this was the case now… If you make 500 kilos of tobacco, 70 cl yeni rakı is 80 liras, it would mean 40 thousand liras. It is not worth any more (Q10).

Therefore, production levels of tobacco sharply dropped from the 2000s onwards, almost 2,500 tons in 2004 to 500 tons in 2014 in the district of Soma in parallel with the sharp decrease across the country-from 290,000 to 62,000 tons (Adaman et al, 2018: 10).

As a consequence, privatisation of coal production and opening up of new underground coal pits, together with the impoverishment of tobacco producers have been the impetus for the local population to start working in the coal mines. This process has indicated simultaneous proletarianization of the male population in the coal mines and feminization of agricultural production in various forms. Main tendency observed in the field research has been the diversification of the income resources instead of complete detachment from agriculture as most of the miner families were simultaneously engaged in coal mining and agricultural production through various forms of use of labour power potential within the household. For example, one of the miners whose family is still producing tobacco explains this process as follows:

> Most of the local people working in the mine now were the families living on tobacco in the past. But, of course the dissolution of agriculture here by the government, political power has slowly… The dissolution has started from the end of 1990's. Quota was imposed on tobacco. For example, you were doing tobacco as much as you want, you did not have a quota. Then, they imposed quota in late 1990's. They said to families that you cannot do tobacco more than 500 kilos. This did not cover people. They started to seek other alternatives for them. Other alternative in our rural area… Karaçam, Çepni, they are all rural villages, I mean they are barren, not wetland. Everything does not grow there. Olive, tobacco… These are the things that may grow on barren land. People have oriented towards the mine as means of living because olive cultivation demands a long term thing. The story of mining started in 2003-2004 in our village. It was very rare, there were few people working in the mine before this. Then, they all became miners after 2003. This was not the case before this (Q11).

One of the most significant transformations of this period is the expansion of the borders of the basin beyond the Soma district. Soma basin, in this study, is defined with reference to the labour supply instead of the location of the pits. Accordingly, the basin contains Kırkağaç and Soma districts of Manisa, Kınık district of İzmir and Savaştepe district of Balıkesir and their surrounding villages from which impoverished tobacco farmers started to work in the underground coal mines from the early 2000s onwards. Households living in the villages of Savaştepe, Kırkağaç, and Soma have similar relations to the land and therefore historical transformation of this relation and product diversity have been similar. Peasants of these villages have historically received their income from tobacco production either as family farmers or agricultural wage workers. Currently, in the context of the transformation of tobacco production discussed so far, income they receive from tobacco production is not sufficient for the survival of their family and they have either given

up agricultural production and started to work in the underground coal pits or (more frequently) diversified their income through mining.

Kınık, on the other hand, contains two forms of rural livelihood. The first one consists of lowland villages possessing relatively more fertile land available for irrigated farming. Land owner families in these villages continue agricultural production, generate a considerable income from contract farming and do not prefer to work in the mines. This population is called "rich farmers" by the residents of other regions of the district. These lowland villages maintain large scale agriculture in the form of contract farming with canning factories or supermarkets and have been formed a capitalist farmer class. Mostly, miners' views are employed as daily wage workers for these farmers. The second part of Kınık consists of mountain villages and has a similar rural livelihood to that of Soma, Kırkağaç and Savaştepe. Peasants of these mountain villages are mainly (former) tobacco producers and started to work in the mines following the transformation of tobacco production.

One of the most frequently observed survival strategies in the Turkish countryside from the 2000s onwards has been orientation towards more favourable products such as fruits and vegetables and abandoning less favourable cash crops such as cotton or sugar beet. However, this has not been an opportunity for the tobacco producers given that it is not physically possible raise another product on the land used for tobacco production. Therefore, the most significant difference between the farmers of lowland villages of Kınık from the former tobacco producers of mountain villages has been their ability to orient towards favourable products and make contracts with the canning factories or supermarkets. This difference is explained by the Chairperson of the Union of Tobacco Farmers, Ali Bülent Erdem, in the interview as follows:

> Well, tobacco has such a characteristic; tobacco is not like other products. It grows on barren lands and it is done almost in the form of a craft. Namely, you have to spend eleven months to produce a tobacco. You have to cultivate seed, seedling, you have to plant, harvest, press tobacco, then bale tobacco. You have to store them and deliver when the companies come to you. You have to assume full responsibility and this is a very hard labor. They earn because the whole family is working. Once they give up, they have no chance to return back. If you give up tobacco, you cannot do anything on these lands. Any other product does not grow on lands where tobacco was made. But, irrigated farming on a plain is not like this. Now, Kınık Plain is a very fertile plain having large lands. The farmers there have hope; I could not earn from tomatoes this year, so I should plant corn and earn from corn next year. They do not prefer mining.

> Those who prefer mining are usually former tobacco farmers. People who do irrigated farming do not usually work in the mine. But, wives of those miners go to these farms work as daily wage workers (Q12).

As underlined in the theoretical discussion in Chapter II on the proletarianization of the peasantry in the early Marxist literature with reference to Kautsky and Lenin that proletarianization of the peasantry does not necessarily indicate a complete detachment from land since they continue agricultural production in various forms through uses of the labour power potential within the household. Both Kautsky(1988) and Lenin (1974) define the proletarianization process of the rural population with reference to the process of dispossession within which rural proletariat (composed of not only of landless agricultural workers but also ones selling their labour power while owning certain plot of land) is forced to search for peasant supplementary employment in the countryside in agricultural wage labour or in the rural industries such as mining and therefore diversify their means of income.

In Soma basin, diversification of the means of income was possible through the sexual division of labour as this process indicates proletarianization of male population in the coal pits and feminisation of agricultural labour. As conceptualised by Bernstein (1979) simple reproduction squeeze has directly been experienced by the peasants in the basin as their market dependence for daily consumption rose and rising prices of agricultural inputs increased their cash dependency, they started to search for supplementary income. While male members of the families started to work as miners, women mostly maintained agricultural activities in various forms such as agricultural wage workers, petty commodity producers, or subsistence producers.

There were considerable number of families maintaining petty commodity production in the basin. Some of the families, especially ones living in the villages of Kınık, were continuing tobacco production despite the decreasing income generated by it. Following the privatisation of Tekel, tobacco producers lost not only guarantee of purchase but also control over the tobacco prices. Families maintaining tobacco production frequently complained about the contract processes with the tobacco merchants. For example, as stated by a miner from Kınık:

> Now we keep doing tobacco at the least. My wife is working, our daily worker relatives are coming, we pay them daily money. I mean my wife is working with them. We continue as contracted farmers but it does not yield any more. The merchants make the contract on dollar. Without even asking the farmers… Even we quarreled last year. Its yield is low, really very low. This year is a bit better, 17 liras but it was 13 liras last year. In the end, tobacco is a demanding plant (Q13).

On the other hand, especially in the villages of Savaştepe, product diversification is frequently observed. Families are either producing more favourable crops such as pepper and tomato or they were engaged in stock raising. Different from large scale farmers of the lowland villages of Kınık, these families are producing pepper and tomato in smaller farms or they are raising limited number of livestock. Small scale tomato or pepper producer families are not making contracts, instead they are selling the product following the harvest season to the dealers. These petty commodity producer families use the income received from the mining to finance the costs of agricultural production. Similar to the tobacco producers, women are engaged in production as unpaid family labourers and the cost of production is met by the wages of the male miners. They frequently stated that as it is no longer economical to produce the inputs such as fodder or fertilizer instead of buying them and the prices of other inputs such as diesel fuel rose significantly, they rely on the income received from mining to finance the cost of production. For example, as stated by a miner living in a village of Savaştepe:

> Well what am I doing… I rely on the wage of mine, for example I bought a bale, with my money. What did I do? I bought this from the money I receive from the mine and spent to my animals. What would happen if the money of the mine did not exist? I had to cultivate them on the farm. Now we breed bullock now, my wife is taking care of this. Actually we receive from here and pay into there. We send the bullocks to slaughtering, we buy for example tractor with the money we earn from this. I mean mine does not prevent farming here. Look (showing), this is corn silage. The machine does a decare of this on 70 liras, they bring the motor on 30 liras. What it costs? 100 liras. Its water is 100 liras too… It costs 200 liras if you don't count in fertilizer, labor. I don't do this, I purchase with money I earn from the mine. It amounts to the same thing (Q14).

On the other hand, for some families, income received from women's daily wage work in agriculture is regarded as side income or women continue subsistence production or petty commodity production as long as income received from mining is insufficient. Especially families living in the villages meet almost all food through subsistence production through planting fruits and vegetables and stock raising.

3.4. Women's Productive and Reproductive Work in the Basin from the 2000s Onwards

For the analysis of rural transformation, rural household is the proper unit of analysis. Significance of the rural household stems from the fact that it is the main unit within which both the production process and reproduction of labour power is organised (Özuğurlu, 2011: 92). The relation of rural household to the wage work in agriculture or in other sectors necessitates the analysis of household's labour reserve, the way this reserve is used for the production and reproduction of the household, and sexual division of labour within the household. Therefore, it is necessary to overcome gender blind definition of the rural household and deepen the analysis of rural household with the analysis of sexual division of labour and women's paid and unpaid work (Uyar et al 2017). In addition, there is a need to overcome the schematic division between the social relations of production and reproduction as for the rural household women's productive and reproductive work are mostly intertwined. In this section women's productive work (petty commodity production and wage work in agriculture) and reproductive work (subsistence production and housework) are elaborated with reference to the feminisation of agricultural production in the 2000s and impact of proletarianization of male members of the family in the coal mines on women's reproductive work.

3.4.1. Women's Agricultural Labour

As observed during the field research, use of women's labour within the rural household is mostly in one or more of the following forms: (unpaid) subsistence production, petty commodity production, agricultural wage work, and reproductive work within the family. These forms do not exclude each other as they are mostly done simultaneously. For example, for mobile agricultural workers, agricultural work and reproductive work of women such as cleaning the tent shelter, preparing the meal etc are intertwined. this indicates a production process in which women's production and reproduction spheres are not differentiated.

Women's involvement in agricultural production in Soma basin is one or more of the following forms: waged agricultural work, petty commodity production, or

subsistence farming. The most widespread form is (daily) wage agricultural work. Most of the women working as petty commodity producers and subsistence farmers are also employed as daily wage workers in the big farms after finishing the work on their own land. Almost all women, apart from the ones residing in the block flats of the towns raise vegetables and fruits or animals for their own consumption on the yards of their village houses and at the same time work as daily wage workers in lowland farms of Kınık and in Akhisar during the harvest seasons of the various products. As stated by one of the interviewees from Kınık, not possessing any farmland:

> Well, we go out by April, then we come back by January. We work nonstop until January, new year. We do tomatoes planting, pepper planting, olive… We also hoe the plants… There is no work we don't do. For example we plant tomatoes, to this, then cotton comes. I hoe cotton, when I finish hoeing cotton, then I start picking tomatoes. When I finish tomatoes, then it comes to pepper. Peppers grow up later, at the end of August. They finish in late September, then we start olives. This time it is time to go Akhisar plain… Olive starts by September, lasts for two or three months (Q15).

Information about the production processes of the harvest of tobacco, tomato, and pepper have been obtained not only through the interviews but also during the production process by using participant observation method. Given that production process varies in different products they will be mentioned separately. However, before discussing in detail one significant point needs to be underlined. As also stated by a female agricultural worker in the previous quotation, almost all female agricultural workers in the basin work in the planting, irrigation, or harvest processes of each product in different times of the year. For example, a woman producing tobacco on her family's land mostly works as a daily wage worker during the harvest period of tomato, pepper, and olive as well.

Although tobacco production in the basin has drastically diminished in parallel with the transformations such as quota and loss of the producers' control over production process, there are still considerable number of families maintaining tobacco production either on their own land or by tenancy. Almost all of current tobacco producer families are miner families. On the one hand, families in the mountain villages who lack off-farm supplementary income cannot finance costs of production such as input, tenancy, and wages of daily workers. Miner families use the fixed income received from mining to finance these costs. On the other hand,

families possessing relatively more fertile land in the lowland villages of Kınık have been oriented towards more profitable products such as fruits and vegetables and quitted tobacco production. Besides, these families have not preferred to work in the mines as they make significant profits from contract farming (see 3.3.2.).

Therefore, it is observed in the field research that most of the female tobacco producers are miners' wives. One significant point to be underlined here is that contracts with the tobacco dealers or the marketing of the products are managed by male members of the family (miners) whereas women are involved only in the production process with their labour power. For example, most of the time, response to the questions regarding terms of contracts or prices of the products were as follows: we don't know this", "men know this part, they form the contract" etc. Thereby, it can be argued that feminisation of agriculture indicates the feminisation of farm labour whereas control and management of agriculture is being masculinised as women are removed from the control of production process. Feminisation of agriculture, instead, indicates increasing exploitation of women's labour in agriculture either in paid or unpaid form (see theoretical discussion in 2.4.3.).

Tobacco production is quite labour intensive and takes an eleven-month period at intervals. During the particular times of the year it has various phases such as seed growing, plant seeding, reaping, stringing, and packaging. One of the women producing tobacco on her family's land explains as follows:

> Firstly, they have seedlings. Then they are planted, hoed with machines. Almost four months, at least, are spent at the plain. After that… Tobacco is very demanding you see! Then you also saw today, we go to harvest and then bring here and string. It takes nearly one month to press. Until November or so. They are pressed in November. This is a job that takes about eleven months (Q16).

During the field research, reaping and stringing processes of tobacco were observed by visiting two groups of women. In the first group, employer was the tenant whereas the other was producing tobacco on her family's land. During the reaping and stringing period, working day is as follows: they wake up at 3 am and arrive in the tobacco farm at 4 am. They immediately start reaping tobacco, give a break for breakfast around 9 am keep reaping tobacco until 12 am. Then, they start stringing tobacco either in the farm (first group) or in the yard of the employer's village house (second group) until 3-3:30 am. For the second group, after the daily workers left,

employer woman cleaned the yard and her husband carried the strung cottons to the sundry. In the tobacco production, daily wage of the workers was 70 liras in the summer of 2018 and they have been working without a social insurance.

It significant to underline that, in both groups, employer women were working under the same conditions as daily wage workers and her income was not much higher than the daily wage workers. It has been observed in almost all phases of the field research that benefit of maintaining tobacco production was to receive the annual income at once. As stated by a woman producing tobacco as a tenant:

> Now a kilo of tobacco is nearly 17 liras, 20 liras. Depending on its quality… What's more, if it got dry badly, it decreases to 10 liras. We already pay 70 liras daily wage. Then how much does it earn… For example, last year I made 15 thousand liras expense, I received 27 thousand liras. The cost is laborer money, land tenure (lease of farm) money… If I also attempted to give insurance, I would have nothing remained. What would remain to me? How can I say… Everything about this job is expensive… If I don't do this and work as casual whole summer, I will earn 6 thousand on my own. At least I should take this trouble, I earn 12 thousand. Besides, I receive this as lump sum. They call me a boss, but I can be a junior boss at most (Q17).

Almost all women interviewed during tobacco production has underlined that tobacco production is a "female work" and even before the massive proletarianization of men in the mines, women had been in charge of most of the work other than portage and contract. Especially reaping and stringing processes are defined as female labour as they have similarities with handicraft such as stitching and it necessitates patience. For example, as stated by one of the interviewees:

> No other worker can do the work that we do. For example, our husbands cannot do what we are doing even though they do not work in the mine without us. They can never do tobacco especially. Tobacco is a feminine work. Because it is difficult, it demands patience. Men are more impatient. Women are more patient. This is surely a sort of work that can be done by women. Look, this is something like handcraft. Women are more skilled in this. (Laughing) Look, how many even you have strung. This is the case not just because they start working in the mine now, this has always been that way. For example, how was it happening? Men were engaging the fire bar. They were not harvesting tobacco by leaning furiously. If there were some who did harvesting, they were not even ten percent. Men were engaging the fire bar and laying out tobacco to dry (Q18).

Both groups of tobacco producers, including the employers, mentioned that tobacco harvest would end in around two weeks and that of tomato would start and they would start to work as daily wage workers in tomato farms.

In the second period of the last phase of the field research, using the network of the interviewees of the tobacco producers of the previous visit, tomato and pepper production in the large-scale capitalist farms were observed. Irrigated farming has started following the neoliberal transformation of tobacco production in the basin through orientation of big land owners in the lowland villages of Kınık from the traditional cash crops to the more favourable products such as fruits and vegetables. Formerly, in the basin, agricultural production was limited to tobacco, sugar seeds and cotton whereas currently tomato and pepper production is widespread in the large capitalist farms of the lowland villages of Kınık and in the petty commodity producers of Savaştepe.

In the lowland villages of Kınık where irrigated farming is currently dominant, capitalist farmers possessing large plots of land make high profits from the contract farming. Land owners in these villages have not preferred to work in the underground mines. They make contracts with canning factories, sauce factories, and supermarkets and daily wage workers are provided for these farms through labour intermediaries called *dayıbaşı*. These labour intermediaries collect daily workers by using their networks based on kinship and hometown and receive a percentage from the daily wages of the workers they provide. Formerly, almost all intermediaries were male, however, following the massive proletarianization of the male population in the mines, women also started collect their team and take them to the farm. One of the interviewees told that she is dayıbaşı, however, she stated that she is in charge only of collecting the team whereas the payment of their daily wages is arranged by her husband who is an unemployed miner:

> I am labour intermediary myself. I am picking up and taking teams to work. I am carrying the team and receive money from their boss… Yet my husband takes the money I don't mess with… (Q19).

The most common form of women's agricultural work in the basin is daily wage work and includes all groups of women. In other words, women living in their villages, in the towns, women continuing subsistence farming or petty commodity production, and migrant women work as daily wage workers in these capitalist farms. Especially for the migrant families, income received from women's agricultural work is seen as a side income necessary due to indebtedness. Almost all

migrant women interviewees mentioned that the reason why they work as daily agricultural workers is to finance their credit debts or to "support" their husband. For example, as stated by a woman from Zonguldak:

> We bought a house, we are paying its loan. My husband's wage is not enough. I go to work in the farm compulsorily. I go no matter which the product is. Because there is corn silk now… Then it would be time to tobacco, tomatoes, olive… (Q20).

Following the collective redundancy of miners in 2014 and increasing male unemployment in the basin, there has been a significant number of unemployed miners starting to work as daily wage workers in these large scale farms. But still the vast majority of agricultural workers are women and children. Moreover, sexual division of labour among the agricultural workers has frequently been mentioned by women interviewees. Accordingly, instead of the processes of planting or reaping, male agricultural workers are in charge of "man handling" part of the work such as portage. For example, as one of the female workers whose husband is unemployed and works together with her in agriculture stated that:

> Men cannot stand. Men pull baskets, pack boxes… Men do not want to lean all the time. under the sun…(Q21).

Production process in the large capitalist farms is quite different from that of tobacco production. In the larger farms, larger numbers of workers are working as teams of various labour intermediaries. During the tomato harvest, female workers wake up at 5 am, prepare their meal (breakfast and lunch) they eat in the farm and arrive in the farm at 7 am and start working. They give two breaks for breakfast and for lunch and they arrive back at home at 7 pm. Significant number of women mentioned their problems stemming from their relations to labour intermediaries or farmers (bosses) and they frequently used statements such as *"there is always maltreatment"* or *"they always yell at us.* Moreover, physical conditions are heavy especially due to the hot weather:

> Tomato harvest is a difficult work… We pick because it is a matter of living, we also got used to. Farming is difficult. Here you are, it is a matter of living. It is hot too… Burning (Q22).

Mostly, female agricultural workers take their children with them to the farm because they cannot leave them at home alone and especially children older than nine or ten years old are set to work. For example:

> I have to go with my kids. 12 year-old child is going to work, just think! For example, you saw how it was hot yesterday, it was about 45 degree. It was also moist. We pick tomatoes all day along for 50 liras under 45 degree temperature. We have a hope if we can send our children to school, if we can cover school expenses… But a 10 year old, 12 year old children go to work I mean. For example, my son is 13 years old, he is carrying baskets. Just think; he is doing porterage. A 13 year-old child! A 13 year-old child is doing porterage from 7 a.m. till 6 p.m (Q23).

On the other hand, in the surrounding villages of Savaştepe petty commodity producer families are engaging in irrigated farming or stock farming and in order to finance the input prices such as fertilizer, fuel, or fodder they use income received from mining. Similar to female tobacco producers, women are engaged in agricultural production whereas the processes such as selling the products, purchasing inputs etc are the responsibility of their husbands. As stated by a miner living in a village of Savaştepe:

> Animal husbandry is already based on my wife in our home. My wife looks after the animals. We do not care much about animals. What are we doing? We bring their feeds. For example hay bale, fodder… We put all them aside, my wife take them and feed animals. What do we do? In some stuff not included in my wife's branch or she may not understand such as disease, drug treatment, sale so-and-so… Even so I visit the animals once every day. Every single day I visit. Excuse me, if I were dying I would even visit them once a day. How are the conditions and efficiency of animals, I take care of them. But the maintenance work formally belongs to my wife. I mean it does not belong to me. Well, when the occasion arises. Of necessity. Sometimes she may be ill or have a thing to do, then I go there. But my wife looks after the animals in general, I do not (Q24).

3.4.2. Women's Reproductive Labour: Subsistence Farming, Housework and Everyday Life

Women's reproductive work in Soma is observed in two forms. The first one is subsistence farming such as growing fruits and vegetables on the yards of their village house or animal breeding for the consumption of the family whereas the second is the reproduction of the family in general and miner in particular having a particularly heavy production process. Before going in detail, one of the most significant observations of this part is that considering women's work in production and social relations of reproduction they almost never stop working and do not have a spare time at all. For example, as stated by a female tobacco producer from Kınık:

> I wake up 3 a.m. We start picking up laborers one by one at 3:30. We arrive the farm by 4 a.m. we start immediately. We have breakfast and tea at 9. Then we continue. We return back to here (home yard) at noon time 1 p.m. We string tobacco here till 15:30. Once we have strung them, we will lay them out to dry outside. Then I will clean here,

> I have to water the garden, vegetables. Bath time, dinner of children… After I put them to bed, I have to make food to me and my husband for tomorrow (food they will eat at the workplace). It would be 23:00-23:30 until I go to bed. Then I will wake up again at 3 a.m… Our life is very fast… It cannot be described but only experienced… Believe me you cannot follow. If you want, try just for one day, you would fail. You would stop and sit by saying that I cannot keep up with you (Q25).

Another woman describes a day she goes for a wage work in tomato farm as follows:

> I work in the field for eight hours but while trying to make my husband's food, my food… I wake up at 5 a.m. and I make them. I go out of the home at 6 a.m. and come back at 7 p.m. This is just the time for coming back to home from work. If we think of the work we do at home, in the garden, we would be unable to settle. It would account for 7 days 24 hours… (Q26)

Significant number of the women are to continue with subsistence farming, especially those residing in their villages. Mostly, on the yard of their houses in the villages they are engaged in subsistence farming for the consumption of their family in order to cut back from expenditures especially due to indebtedness. Most of them grow vegetables, wheat, barley or raise animals for their daily milk, yoghurt or egg consumption. Women who moved to the towns may also continue subsistence production in their villages because of their relatively worse financial conditions due to housing loan or rent. Almost all women were attributing a positive role to the subsistence production and underline its similarity with the "good old days".

The most significant peculiarity regarding the transformation of women's reproductive work is the over-exploitation of their labour as miners' wives stemming from miners' extremely heavy and unhealthy working conditions. During the interviews with the miners, their need for women's reproductive work was clear and mentioned by almost all interviewees. Almost all miners explained the fact that they got married in relatively young ages with their "dangerous and extremely heavy working conditions" so that they are in need of women's reproductive work more than workers employed in other sectors. For example, as stated by a miner:

> Miners prefer to get married at younger ages. Someone needs to deal with our eating and care. We get very tired in the workplace, we would give rise to an accident (Q27).

On the other hand, while stating that miners prefer to get married in younger ages, they frequently argued that it is unbearable for a miner who is "*mentally depressed enough at work"* to take the responsibility of the marriage and children. For example:

> Anyway it is whole day… Miner families told this frequently after this massacre, "go on, go on!"… I have been already perished underground because of this "go on, go on!" You cannot spare much time to our family, because you somewhat wish to keep away from responsibility, from pressure. Because if you intend to go somewhere with your family, you would have to burden responsibility. For example, children want something, wife wants something… I mean this pressure totally exhausts us. You wish your spare time, by yourself, alone… To feel more relaxed… When I go home soon, my wife would tell me we need this at home, this should be bought so-and-so. Same thing I mean… Your standing sergeant saying "you worked less", "you got off work early", "you came early"… I feel this is the same thing with the questions at home. This is shortfall, this is needed, this should be done at home… You feel being pinned down. I mean this is getting harder psychologically. Because, which one you would beat your brain! As I said, resting time is very short, working conditions are oppressive, the place is very noisy. On top of it, when a matter arises at home, the person would totally become… I mean you would feel being pinned down. So I am with friends… Or I spend time in coffee houses. Something like that I mean (Q28).

Therefore, physical and mental impact of miners' working conditions results in women's overload in the reproduction of labour power. For example, as stated by a miner's wife:

> I think being a miner's wife is difficult. Why is it difficult? Especially in summer time… Even so, two months are easy in winter. Sometimes I go out as soon as my husband comes home. My husband comes from night shift at 1 a.m. and I go out to work in tobacco at 3 a.m. towards morning. Sometimes I cannot even make his food in time, just think… This is hard. We have animals, we need to make food at home, take care of our husband… This stuff is not done by a company, I have to do the laundry and everything else (Q29).

Most of the female interviewees mentioned their overload and argued that their husbands are only in charge of his work in the mine but they are working much more than a miner. Almost all of them underlined their worries for not being able to complete their duties at home. For example, as stated by a female agricultural worker who is also a subsistence farmer:

> The only thing men do is to go to the mine. Everything else is on hands of women. You do farming, you do shopping, you prepare food box for your husband. You take all them upon yourself to do something. All tasks of children, plain works, care of your husband fall to you… They are all on your shoulders. Your husband just goes to the mine. Well I only come short of going to the mine. The way things are, we would have to go to the mine tomorrow or later. My husband wakes up at about 5:30 a.m., he arrives the workplace at 7:30. But if you are a woman, works never end. I am always afraid of being unable to finish, catch works (Q30).

On the other hand, almost all women mentioned their husbands' angry, nervous, tense, and exhausted mood at home and its impact on their emotional labour was quite obvious. For example, as stated by a woman whose daughter is with mental disability:

> Besides, the mine makes men very angry. When he comes here. Whoops! He would terrorize. Mining is stressful… The man kind takes their stress out on home. He would come soon… I don't want to hear your voice. For example, if my daughter is a little bit ill… He gets angry if she cries. He says don't cry. He says, look I am stressful, I am depressed. Every evening is like that (Q31).

Childcare, as expected, is undertaken by women as a "natural" follow up of the traditional gender roles. On the other hand, due to women's overload in the process of production and reproduction, they mostly are forced to take their children to farms. Therefore, it is possible to argue that women's productive and reproductive work are mostly intertwined.

Consequently, due to their overexploitation in the productive and reproductive work, women almost have no spare time at all. Most of them stated that they work all the time expect the time they sleep. For example:

> If we count housework also as work, we are working all the time. We only don't work when we are asleep. We cannot even do this properly. For example, I went to bed at 11 p.m. last night and woke up at 3 a.m. We generally sleep for two or three hours a day. We do not go the plain one day a week, Friday. Normally, we should rest at that one day… But children stuff, works of house, shopping, garden at that one day… Sometimes we forget we are women in such a rush. Such an extent that, believe me (Q32).

One final point to be underlined in this sense is that there are significant differences between local and migrant women's processes of production and of reproduction. These differences stem from different relations to the land and different patterns of proletarianization of the families. Migrant families live in the district of Soma in the flats. Therefore, it is not possible for them to engage in subsistence farming and only possible relation to agriculture is daily wage work. Almost all migrant women complained about being unable to produce food at least for the consumption of their family. They frequently mentioned that their cash dependency has risen in Soma, they have to buy food from the farmers' market or supermarkets and pay either rent or mortgage. For example, as stated by a woman from Kütahya whose husband and son are miners:

> If my village is close, I would go there and plant my own garden for example. I would make winter clothes of my children. Or I would go there at time of sacrifice, I would buy a calf and tether it in the garden two or three months before. Then I would sell this at time of sacrifice feast. We always suffer from being far (Q33).

Moreover, migrant women mostly stated that they were engaging in agriculture in their hometowns at least as subsistence producers whereas in Soma they are unemployed, lonely, and locked in the flats. Therefore, most of the migrant women experience the process of housewifisation due to the distance from their land and agriculture.

3.5. Conclusion

This chapter examined the transformation of agricultural production in Soma that resulted in the dispossession and proletarianization of the tobacco producers from a gendered perspective. As long as proletarianization of the local population resulted in diversification of the income sources instead of complete detachment from land and agriculture, it has indicated a new sexual division of labour in the basin. In parallel with the neoliberal transformation of tobacco production, families can no more be able to generate a sufficient income for their survival from tobacco production. This resulted in their search for additional income sources in agricultural and non-agricultural work. This resulted, on the one hand, feminisation of agricultural production in the form of daily wage work, petty commodity production and subsistence farming whereas on the other hand proletarianization of male population in the coal mines. In the next chapter, labour process and labour control mechanisms in the coal pits is examined with reference to the neoliberal transformation of coal production in Turkey and in Soma in the 2000s.

CHAPTER IV

NEOLIBERAL TRANSFORMATION OF COAL PRODUCTION IN SOMA AND LABOUR PROCESS IN THE COAL PITS

4.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the labour processes and labour control strategies in the underground coal pits of Soma by relating them to the increasing significance of coal industry and of the coal extracted in Soma for the Turkish economy in the 2000s. It was argued in Chapter II (see 2.3.) that labour process and labour control strategies necessitates the analysis of the relation of the workplace to the broader structures. Accordingly, workplace level, local labour market, and national and global operation of capital labour relation should be regarded as the moments of the same totality and of each other. Therefore, the analysis of the labour process and labour control regimes in the underground coal pits of Soma necessitates the analysis of the increasing significance of the coal industry for the Turkish economy, formation of local labour market and roots of the labour supply to the coal pits and in accordance with these processes, dynamics the organization of work and control mechanisms in the production process.

The chapter has three sections. The first section examines the significance of the coal industry for the Turkish economy from the 2000s onwards whereas the second section examines the transformation of the industry in Soma in parallel with this. The last section analyses the labour processes and labour control strategies in the underground coal pits of Soma.

4.2. Turkey's "Coal Rush": Coal as a Strategic Sector for the Turkish Economy from the 2000s Onwards

In Turkey, coal production is mostly related to the coal fired powerplants and the use of domestic coal in electricity production to overcome the problem of energy supply security is among the significant 2023 objectives of the consecutive AKP governments. Energy supply security was first brought in the policy agenda during the oil crisis of the early 1970s as the share of imported oil in electricity production rose from less than 10 percent in the first half of 1960s to almost 50 percent in the early 1970s. Dramatic rise of the oil prices from 1973 onwards, under such high level of dependence on imports, resulted in a significant energy crisis in Turkey and became one of the reasons of the crisis of the late 1970s in Turkey. To overcome the energy crisis, orientation towards the domestic coal was encouraged and in the context of a General Basin Planning increasing coal production in resource rich basins such as Soma, Kütahya, Muğla, Afşin Elbistan, Çayırhan, Bursa-Orhaneli, and Sivas Kangal was supported. From the mid 1980s onwards, the share of imported oil in electricity production was diminished to around 20 percent. However, during the 1990s, policies prioritising imported energy were brought into the agenda and resulted in high rates of imported natural gas and hard coal especially for the electricity production (Tamzok, 2016). Particularly, from the early 2000s onwards, economic and social transformations in Turkey have resulted in a huge increase in energy demand and from 2000 to 2012, primary energy supply increased more than 50 percent whereas electricity consumption increased more than 100 percent. In 2012, 75 percent of the total energy demand, 93 percent of oil, and 99 percent of natural gas were imported from Iran and Russia and this dependence on imported energy has been constituting a significant pressure on the balance of payments (Acar et al, 2015).

Turkey's dependence on imported energy and orientation towards the use of domestic coal is directly related to the dramatic increase in electricity demand in the 2000s and privatisations in the electricity sector. The first efforts for the liberalisation of electricity market were initiated in the 1980s and were mainly characterised by attempts to encourage private sector investments through Build-Operate Transfer, Transfer of Operational Rights or Transfer of Autoproducer

Rights. However, within this period, privatisations were quite limited. The first attempt for privatisation of electricity production was in the context of Law no 3096 on Authorisation of Enterprises other than Turkish electricity Enterprise to Produce, Transmit, Distribute, and Trade Electricity enacted in 1984. The purpose of the law was stated as the creation of a framework in which private entities could build and/or operate powerplants without completely leaving the management of the energy field to the market. It was followed by series of other laws each of which sought to encourage the private investments in the industry. In 2001, Electricity Market Law number 4628 was enacted to create a market reform and as stated in the first article, main aim of the law is the establishment of a financially strong, efficient, transparent electricity market subject to a private law and Energy Market Regulatory Authority established with this law. AKP governments, from the beginning, have not only embraced the perspective set by Energy Market Law but also encouraged private entrepreneurs to invest in the energy sector and to do so have passed numerous legislations to complete and strengthen the energy reform (Aksu, et al 2016: 13, Erensü, 2017: 126).

When AKP first came to power in 2002, 68 percent of the total installed capacity was operated by public sector whereas 32 percent was operated by private sector. Twelve years later, in 2014, this percentage was reversed to 21.5 percent public sector and 68.5 percent private. This was directly reflected in electricity production that within this twelve-year period, share of public sector in installed production fell from 62 percent in 2002 to 28.1 percent at the end of 2014 (Pamir, 2015: 397). As stated in the Electric Energy Market Supply Security Strategy Paper (SPO, 2008):

> The main aim of restructuring based on liberalisation in electric energy sector is to create investment environment that will ensure making investments required for supply security and to reflect gains to be obtained by means of productivity growth in the sector that will be caused by competitive environment.

However, contrary to this expectation, privatisations in the electricity market resulted in the increasing use of imported natural gas and imported coal in electricity production and therefore in the increasing problem of supply security.

It can be argued that two features of the macroeconomic performance of the 2000s in Turkey has made coal industry a strategic sector especially from the 2010s

onwards. During the initial years of AKP, by following a series of economic reforms imposed and supported by IMF and World Bank, a considerable rate and speed of growth was achieved. However, as detailly discussed by certain scholars (cf: BSB, 2015; Boratav, 2010; Telli et al, 2006) employment generation capacity of this growth had been insufficient and 2000s is marked by "jobless growth". Unemployment rate jumped from 6.5 percent in 2000 to 10.3 in 2002 in the aftermath of the financial crisis (Tell et al, 2006: 256). Jobless growth has two direct implications on coal industry. The first implication is the increasing demand for energy stemming from the economic growth whereas the second is the increasing significance of investments having a potential for employment generation. Particularly the employment generation potential of the coal investments in the countryside has been significant as 2000s is also marked by massive dispossession, impoverishment, and proletarianization of the small producers in the countryside. Main discourse in this sense has been providing employment opportunity in the countryside as it has also been repeatedly argued by the chairman of Soma holding, Can Gürkan during the prosecution process of the Soma Massacre:

> My father and I had a sole ambition: to provide people employment.

The second and related dynamic of Turkish economy from the 2000-1 financial crises onwards has been the growing current account deficits. While the share of external sources constituted around 1.5 percent of the total GNP between 1987-1997, it was 4.3 percent between 1997-2007. Therefore, Turkey's experience in the 2000s has indicated extensive use of external resources to perform high levels of growth (BSB, 2008: 85) which constitutes a significant structural deficiency (BSB, 2015: 33). As Boratav (2010: 467) puts it, the problem here is not "outsourcing for the finance of current account deficit" but "current account deficit generated by outsourcing". Accordingly, high levels of foreign capital inflows raised current account deficit systematically. The most significant item for this deficit has been the increasing dependency on imported energy, especially in electricity production.

To limit the energy imports the government activated the so called "coal rush"[4] plan and declared 2012 as the "year of coal". In order to diminish the dependency on

[4] https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/06/is-it-too-late-to-stop-turkeys-coal-rush.

imported sources, especially on imported natural gas and certain amount of hard coal, increasing the share of domestic coal in electricity production has been one of the main objectives of the policy programmes such as The Tenth Five Year Development Plan's Action Plan for Energy Program Based on Domestic Resources (2014-2018) or National Energy and Mining Policy declared by the then Minister of Energy and Natural Resources in April 2017. As stated in the goal and scope section of the Action Plan for Energy Program based on Domestic Resources (2014-2018):

> In 2012 and 2013, 62 and 49 percent respectively of trade deficit stemmed from energy imports. In order to meet growing energy needs rapidly, imports of oil, natural gas, and hard coal are steadily increasing. This results in the maintenance of energy dependency and pressures current account balance and energy supply security. (…) It is primarily significant to utilise all domestic resources for energy production for Turkish economy to perform high and steady growth.

Within the objective of increasing the share of domestic resources in primary energy production certain incentives and subsidies to the coal industry are specified in the action plan.

In this context, construction of new coal fired power plants is encouraged through incentives provided for financial expenses or operating costs. Similar attempts have been made to expand the lignite reserves and lignite production given that 13.4 billion tons of 13.9 billion tons total coal reserve is low quality lignite (Acar et al, 2015). Consecutive AKP governments have developed policies to support implementation of lignite projects, Turkish banks have prioritised the finance of projects based on domestic coal, international finance institutions such as World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) have supported orientation towards domestic energy (BNEF, 2014).

According to the data of Acar et al (2015) measurable incentives to coal industry have reached to 730 million US dollars and this amount includes direct transfers to hard coal industry, subsidies for exploration of coal reserves, improvements of coal fired powerplants, and coal aids to poor families. Public spending for coal fired power plants was 28 million US dollar in 2013, 31 million in 2014. The first group of subsidies are for coal exploration, government mobilised exploration activities by government sponsored campaigns undertaken by Mineral Research and Exploration Institute (MTA) and TKİ starting from 2005. Until 2010, around 50

percent increase in the existing reserves was achieved. From 2010 to 2014, on the other hand, government spending on coal exploration rose from 10 to 25 million dollars per year (Oil Change International, 2014).

The second group of subsidies include the producer subsidies in the forms of investment incentives, privatisations, and loan guarantees. In 2012, the government initiated new investment incentives providing subsidies through the enactment of a Decree on State Aids in Investments and coal projects were declared as priority investments receiving high levels of subsidies. These subsidies have been key for new large-scale coal projects. On the other hand, according to the calculations of Acar et al (2014) privatisations and royalty tender themselves are significant incentives as the Turkish government has provided at least 52 million US dollars for rehabilitation programmes as part of the privatisation process of coal fired powerplants and coal mines. In fact, the privatisation process of powerplants and of coal production have resulted in a significant increase in coal production and construction of more coal fired powerplants mainly through royalty tender system (Oil Change International, 2014: 7-8; Acar et al 2015).

Currently, there are two state-owned coal companies, Turkish Coal Enterprises (TKİ) and Turkish Hard Coal Enterprises (TTK). TTK oversees hard coal mines whereas TKI oversees lignite mines. Although technically, Turkish state-owned enterprises own the vast majority of the country's coal mines, about 90 % have been effectively privatised through a royalty tender scheme beginning in 2002 that vastly increased coal production in Turkey. Under this programme, TKİ transfers coal-mine management to private companies, which in turn pay royalties to the TKİ and provide coal to Turkey's state-owned Electricity Generation Company (EÜAŞ) (Makhijani, 2014). In the royalty tender, TKİ either transfers the operation of lignite pits to the firm committing the highest payment for the coal per ton or to the firm committing the cheapest sale price. Despite a slight difference between two forms of royalty tender, what is significant regarding the state-capital-labour relations in the two forms stems from the fact that state, as the sole customer of coal, makes the industry attractive for investors by providing a guarantee of purchase. There is no legal restriction for the firms to produce more than the amount committed in the contracts and TKİ buys the all coal produced (TBB, 2014: 36-7; Ersoy, 2015: 44).

Therefore, to make more profits, coal companies tend to accelerate the production and to produce the maximum possible amount of coal at minimum cost. It can widely be observed that through the guarantee of purchase, coal companies can prefer to minimise the cost of production by disclaiming to invest in new production technologies and prefer to accelerate production by using labour intensive production techniques. As a matter of fact, royalty tender system has been successful in driving new installed coal power capacity.

In Soma, investment preferences of the coal companies, labour processes and labour control mechanisms in the coal pits are directly shaped by the strategic significance of coal industry for Turkish economy and therefore by initiation of royalty tender in Soma from 2005 onwards. On the other hand, this process has led to the increasing attractiveness of Soma basin not only for the coal companies but also for coal miners from other mining towns. Together with the proletarianization of the local population in the coal mines (discussed in Chapter III) migration of the families from other mining towns resulted in formation of a local labour market in the 2000s and this also determined the labour processes and labour control mechanisms. In order to examine the current labour processes and labour control strategies in Soma, there is a need to first discuss historical transformation of the lignite production and labour processes and lives of the miners.

4.3. Historical Background: Coal Mining in Soma before the 2000s

Exploration of the lignite field of Soma dates back to the 19th century, 1863-1864, during the period when Ottoman government had assigned a research group to Soma. Following its exploration, Soma's lignite had been sold by auction to the owners of the cotton factories in order to test the lignite coal and to observe its similarities to and differences from the hard coal of Zonguldak. According to the documents of the Ottoman Archive of the Prime Ministry, the period from this probation period to 1889 is not known. In 1889, tender was called for the coal of Soma and in 1890 it was transferred to two families from İzmir (Hacı Raşit and Mehmet Nuri Efendiler). According to the contract two thousand tons of annual coal production was promised. The contract was expired in 1891, following the death of Raşid Efendi. In 1913, a new field within the borders of Soma had been explored in

the Kısrakdere site of Tarhala (Darkale) village and its privilege was given to Osman Efendi (Yorulmaz, 1998: 291-292). The significance of the lignite of Soma had increased during the war years (1914-1918) and the mine operation was transferred to a German firm to produce the lignite for the requirements of the army. Then, in accordance with the terms of Armistice of Mondros operation was transferred to French firms (Ergün, 1997: 98-9). After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, in 1926 the operation was transferred back to the domestic firms and especially during the years of Great Depression coal demand of İzmir province was met by the lignite of Soma.

In 1939, mine operation in Soma was transferred to Etibank, state bank established in 1935 to focus on the electricity sector. Following the transfer of operation to the state, lignite production rose drastically given that in accordance with the attempt to increase the share of domestic resources lignite was preferred in addition to the hard coal of Zonguldak. Therefore, lignite production rose from less than 100 thousand tons in 1937 to more than 1 million ton in 1948, around a quarter of which had been produced in Soma. Also, share of the state-owned mines, which had been quite rare before the establishment of Etibank, rose up to 69 percent in 1939 and to 81 % in 1945. Previously, dominant form of lignite production in Soma was underground mining whereas in the context of the Marshall Plan surface mining had gained significance and in the mid 1950s, 300 personnel houses, a hospital with 30 beds, a library, cinema, clubhouse, guesthouse with 24 rooms, sports courts, and a primary school was built (Tamzok, 2014).

In 1957, a new state economic enterprise was established for the operation of the coal industry, Turkish Coal Enterprise (TKİ) and operation of the lignite pits of Soma was transferred from Etibank to TKİ. When the operation of the pits in Soma was transferred to TKİ in 1957, coal production (685 thousand tons annually) was done almost completely (91%) through underground mining. Following its transfer to TKİ, the first unit of the coal fired power plant was installed and in the following decade coal production rose around 10 times and reached to 1 million ton in 1966. In parallel with the orientation towards the surface mining under the control of TKİ, despite the significant increase in the coal production, deadly mine disasters were quite limited.

As discussed in part 4.2., oil crisis of the 1970s affected the coal industry in Turkey significantly and the concept of the energy supply security was brought to the agenda from the 1970s onwards due to the increasing use of imported oil for the electricity production. Therefore, the energy shortage resulting from the dramatic increase in the oil prices from 1973 onwards was overcome through the use of domestic coal reserves. In 1978, in accordance with the Law no 2172 on Mines Operated by the State, all coal pits operated by the private firms were transferred to TKİ in order to increase the production of domestic coal and solve the problem of supply security. As stated by the retired miners or relatively older interviewees, from 1979 to early 1990s all pits in Soma were operated by the TKİ.

During this period, TKİ planned a new project and prepared the General Basin Planning in the context of which Soma basin was separated from the Western Lignite Enterprises (Garp Linyit İşletmeleri), and was transformed into a new production region. In this context, Ege Lignite Enterprises (ELİ) was established and three production regions within the Soma basin were specified. Meanwhile, a new powerplant (B Powerplant) designed from 1970s onwards started to be installed in the early 1980s. In the project planning of this new powerplant, annual coal production was proposed around twelve to thirteen million tons to be used in the electricity production, industry, and for household use (Ergün, 1997: 98-99).

Similar to the 1960s and 1970s, surface mining was the dominant form of coal production in the 1980s and 1990s and the number of deadly mine disasters was quite limited. During the period between 1982 and 2004, when the production rose from around 2 million to more than 12 million tons whereas number of miners who lost their lives in mines was 26 (Tamzok, 2014). Similarly, miners who had worked in the state operated mines before the 2000s frequently mentioned the significance of health and safety.

For example, a retired miner, who has worked both in the state-operated mines and in the private firms following his retirement and whose son died in the Soma massacre compares his working conditions in TKİ with his son's (or his when he was working in Soma Coal Enterprises until 2012) with reference to the role attributed to the health and safety. Accordingly, in TKİ, health and safety was more

important than the amount of the coal extracted whereas under the operation of private coal companies the main concern is the extraction of maximum amount of coal no matter how:

> I mean, in our days work safety was coming first in state. In principle. Production was of secondary importance. First work health, work safety. You go to work in the morning, shift supervisors come. They say have a nice working day, your work safety comes first. Just like you have entered in this order without making your arm bleed, work in a way that you will be able to go back to stand over your children in the evening. They said each one does not have a supervisor. If there is gas, call the sergeant, call security, do not enter in dangerous places. Let the production is low, but something bad would not happen to you. This is the difference of public I think. There was no "come on come on!" in time of state. The company is total opposite! Fortification is not so important, labor health, labor safety is not so important. That's all extracting coal! (Q34)

Until the 2000s, most of the miners were not from the rural population in the basin as rural population was engaging in agricultural production and mostly did not prefer to work in the mines. Most of the miners were living in the personnel houses built in the 1950s in the context of Marshall Plan. The personnel houses were located in the neighborhood named Maden[5] located in the Kısrakdere site, relatively high altitude and isolated neighborhood distanced to the district centre. Both the civil servants of the TKİ and the workers were living in that neighborhood. They had clubs, markets, bakery, cinema, healthcare centre, school etc. Therefore, their lives were quite isolated from the local population, as mentioned by one of the interviewees they were living "*like a closed community*". Two of the interviewees who were grown up there stated that they were not visiting the district centre because the district centre was like a "village" whereas their lives were seen as privileged by the local dwellers of Soma. Then, during the late 1970s and 1980s, as the coal production increased, two more personnel houses in the central neighbourhoods of Soma were built (100 evler and 300 evler). These personnel houses also had social facilities of their own. Therefore, before the 2000s, miners had a spatial association and they were living like a community.

4.4. Neoliberal Transformation of Coal Production in Soma in the 2000s

Privatisation of coal industry in Turkey was not realized until the 2000s. Initial attempts for privatisation of coal production in Soma dates back to 1995 when power

[5] Turkish word for the mine.

plant called B fired by coal extracted in Soma was brought to the privatisation agenda. But this attempt was not successful and the powerplant could not be privatised. Meanwhile, reserves of surface mining were draining and new investments for underground mining was needed. On the other hand, investment capacity of TKİ was quite limited given that the budget necessary for new investment capacity could not be allocated, there was no available external credit, and employment of new personnel was not allowed. Therefore, TKİ's cost of production rose dramatically and TKİ started to transfer its certain tasks to the private sector. In 2001, according to the development plan prepared by TKİ, the expected amount of marketable coal production from Soma basin was determined as 10.6 million tons (Tamzok, 2014).

In Soma, transfer of coal production from TKİ to private firms through royalty tender began in 2005. In parallel with the increasing dependency on imported resources in electricity production, coal extraction by private firms in resource rich basins such as Soma was given priority (see. Part 4.2.). On the other hand, high costs of production in the sector limited the number of firms to invest in coal industry. Therefore, instead of privatising the coal pits, TKİ transferred the production in Soma to private companies through the royalty tender. In this context, the amount of the coal extracted by TKİ declined from 8.5 million tons in 2004 to 2.9 million tons in 2012 whereas the extraction of private firms rose from 58,000 tons 11.7 million tons within the same period. Furthermore, this increase in the share of private sector production was through the increase in underground mining. The amount of coal extracted from underground mining rose from 300,000 tons in 2004 to around 11.7 million tons in 2013 (Tamzok, 2014). As underground mining has quite labour-intensive production process, from 2004 onwards the number of miners has increased significantly.



Figure 4.1. Number of Miners in Soma in the 2010s
Source: Soma Municipality Strategic Plan, http://www.sp.gov.tr/tr/stratejik-plan/s/815/Soma+Belediyesi+_Manisa_+2015-2019

On the other hand, it should also be noted that Soma basin-different from Zonguldak for example-did not experience a long-term massive state-owned mining. The only period when all pits were operated by TKİ in Soma is around ten years following the enactment of Law no 2172 on Mines Operated by the State in 1978. Both before the enactment of this law and during the 1990s there were small-scale private firms operating mines and two of these firms were Soma Coal Company and İmbat Mining that, from 2004 onwards, have become leading firms operating large scale pits. Therefore, what has changed from the 2004 onwards is the initiation of royalty tender and expansion of coal production through the private firms. As royalty tender constitutes a significant component of coal subsidies of Turkish governments to the coal investors. Especially due to the purchase guarantee provided by the TKİ regardless of the amount of the coal extracted, coal companies mostly extract higher than the amount stated in the royalty contract.

By this way, initiation of royalty tender in Soma basin resulted in the transformation of coal companies. Before the royalty tender, Soma Coal Enterprises and İmbat Mining were operating pits in the Geventepe region under the name of Balcı Mining and Üstaş Mining respectively. As frequently stated by the relatively older miners,

initiation of royalty tender has resulted in transformation of these firms into conglomerates. For example, as stated by a 45-year-old TKİ employee and trade union official, during the 1990s, Balcı and Üstaş companies were in charge of not only coal extraction but also of its marketing. Therefore, their production was limited to their marketing capacity. However, in the context of guarantee of purchase provided by TKİ through royalty tender, they started to extract the maximum possible amount of the coal and their profits have increased accordingly. As stated by a retied miner:

> In 1996-97, Soma Coals and İmbat, called as Balcı mine and Üstaş at that time, were producing and marketing by their own. Number of workers they employed was low or according to workload they can do. Then, Darkale zone that is owned by ELİ or TKİ now, the Central pit we call as Atabacası currently transferred to Soma Coals, Eynez that was also transferred to Soma Coals… By the way, reserve started to decrease in open pit mining. You have to take topping layer fast because it goes deeper. This brings cost. For this, you have to continue underground mining. Labor cost of underground mining is considered high by the state… So it was transferred to private sector through royalty. Transfer through royalty led the private sector to grow. Namely, small enterprises started to become holdings. During the period we have worked (early 1990s) they had difficulty in purchasing material. The establishment (ELİ) became smaller, but private sector has grown after the royalty. Now, we have about 12 thousand labors working in mines. This is even increasing. Demir Export has started, Polyak is now in preparation stage… The state calls this as build, operate, transfer but it actually says I give you purchase guarantee, produce your coal, build your plant, consume your electricity rather than build, operate and transfer. It says produce for me, whatever you produce. It did not impose a quota (Q35).

From 2005 onwards, guarantee of purchase has been accompanied by several measures for the reduction of the cost of production. For example, Chairperson of the Executive Board of Soma Holding, Alp Gürkan, in an interview before the Soma Massacre explained the improvement of Soma Coal Enterprises and conglomeration with their ability to reduce the cost of coal production from 2005 onwards:

> When TKİ was extracting coal in Soma, the cost of extraction per ton was around 130-140 US dollar. We promised to diminish this cost to 23.80 US dollars. Neither our company nor others would invest in this sector unless we knew we will make huge profits".[6]

This reduction in the cost of production has been accompanied by a significant rise of the coal production. According to the calculations in the report on Soma Mine Disaster prepared by Boğaziçi University Soma Research Group, from 2004 to

[6] http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ttk-10-milyar-lira-alacak-21586913 (date of access: March 3, 2019)

2013, through the royalty tender, coal production increased by 13 times, from around 1 million ton in 2004 to approximately 13 million tons in 2013.[7]

4.4.1. Labour Supply to the Coal Pits in Soma in the 2000s: Formation of a Local Labour Market and the Relations Between Local and Migrant Families

As a result of both increasing coal investments and transition from surface mining to labour intensive underground mining, demand for miners has drastically increased. There have been two means of labour supply for the underground coal pits during the 2000s: dispossession and proletarianization of local population in the surrounding villages of the basin and migration to Soma from other mining towns of Turkey. As discussed in Chapter III, during the 2000s, neoliberal transformation of coal mining was accompanied by neoliberal transformation of agriculture, specifically of tobacco production. Local population who did not prefer to work in the coal mines until the 2000s as the income they generate from tobacco production was sufficient for the survival of their family. From the 2000s onwards, in parallel with the rising input prices and the falling prices of the products local families have found themselves in the "simple reproduction squeeze" (Bernstein, 1979) and male members of these families started to work in the underground coal pits. The second means of labour supply during the 2000s has been migration of the families to Soma due to increasing attraction of the basin for lignite production from other mining towns such as Zonguldak and Kütahya and from the towns that were formerly supplying labour to Zonguldak such as Bartın, Ordu or Çorum.

Migration from Zonguldak, Bartın, Ordu, and Çorum is due to the diminishing investments in Zonguldak and the relatively smaller or even informal coal pits. Zonguldak is a province of more than 600,000 population on the western Black Sea cost in Turkey. Zonguldak coal basin had historically been the single most important mining centre starting from the Ottoman Empire (Şengül and Aytekin, 2012: 154) and attracted migrants especially from the cities such as Bartın, Ordu and Çorum. From the 1980s onwards, Zonguldak has witnessed a gradual process of decline of

[7] https://madencilikhaberleri.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/boc49fazic3a7i-c3bcniversitesi-soma-arac59ftc4b1rma-grubu-raporu.pdf (date of access March 3, 2019)

coal industry. In the late 1980s, the government announced its intentions to close down the coal pits in the basin completely, workers' response to which was a strike in 1990 and a huge march to Ankara in the winter of 1990-1991. The government had to drop plans to close down the entire basin but replace it with a policy of phasing out the coal production through practices such as early retirement, stopping recruitment of new personnel, and suspend the new investments. This phasing out policy was followed by all subsequent governments and currently the pits are either closed down or being privatised (Aytekin and Şengül, 2012: 156). And therefore, Zonguldak is a declining industrial region.

Zonguldak has a long history of state (Turkish Hard Coal Enterprises-TTK) operated mining before the privatisations. Royalty tender in Zonguldak started from the 2000s onwards and before, emigration from Zonguldak was not frequent. Main reason behind migration from Zonguldak to Soma, according to the findings of the fieldwork, is the relatively stable and secure conditions of work in Soma when compared to Zonguldak. All interviewees from Zonguldak underlined the precarious and uncertain conditions in Zonguldak's smaller or even informally operated pits. Insecure conditions in Zonguldak and familiarity of mining as a "father's occupation" have been the main impulse for their migration to Soma. For example, as stated by aminer from Zonguldak:

> There are illegal pits rather than corporate companies in Zonguldak. I mean a day-long… There are such families that sell their garden through royalty. Zonguldak is not a city where great investments are made now. It is worn out now. People are in trouble, people are immigrating to other cities. There are people coming to Manisa and extracting coal in mine pits even though they have coal in their hometown. We can understand the situation from this… Why did these people leave there and come to here to extract coal? There is unavoidably a miner identity recognized from the past. They start out by saying if I can't do this job in Zonguldak, I would either go to Ankara or Edirne Keşan neighborhood or go to Soma like us… Another point, people uneducated try to guarantee something in life: that is early retirement. Since they always think about concern for future, they automatically think that without concerning how they would physically get exhausted: I will complete my insurance period in 13 years, and complete my registry in 20 years. If I start this job when I am 20 years old, I will be retired in my 40. What do they do? They prepare themselves for this in some way. They think they guarantee themselves but diseases and disorders that would arise after 40 years old… (Q36)

Most of the workers mentioned the difference between relatively more secure working conditions in Soma when compared to Zonguldak with two factors. The first one is the existence of the investments of the bigger firms and holdings in Soma

whereas the second was the state support provided for the coal companies of Soma especially in purchase guarantee. The fact that there are no problems of irregular payment of wages or informal employment was explained with reference to the bigger and more institutionalised structure of the coal firms in Soma and the significant state support for coal firms in Soma. For example, a 30-year-old miner, who has had experience both in small firms of Zonguldak and in the biggest firm of Soma explains this as follows:

> The good side of Soma… Firstly money and weekly leave. And there is no trouble. Let me say, only state operating mines implement the laws orderly in Zonguldak. If I say with an estimated figure, TTK closes every year at a loss of one thousand liras. We do not suffer such a trouble here. Because the firms are large, production is high… Wages are not delayed. The worker is contented. Of course, at the same time all works are state guaranteed here. The state directly purchases coal once you mined. For example, we had a director in Zonguldak, nobody liked him but they could not dismiss. Why? He was well-connected. He had strong connections with Erdemir and other enterprises. Companies have difficulty in selling coal there. There are also many illegal pits. You could not receive your money at present in Zonguldak. Here, you are contented, you know your money will be paid on-time (Q37).

It was unexpected to hear from almost all workers from Zonguldak, the claim for relatively more secure conditions of mining in Soma only two years after the biggest mine disaster of the country's history. On the other hand, when questions regarding this confusion were asked, most of the workers stated that in case of a deadly accident in Soma at least their children can have certain rights. For example as stated by one of the miners from Zonguldak:

> In an illegal pit, everything is under your responsibility, the company has no liability in any issue. If you even died, you would be responsible. If you die, nobody would be informed about this anyway. Look, families of death miners have obtained all their rights here (Q38).

One last point to be underlined regarding the miners from Zonguldak is that among the miner families observed during the fieldwork they had minimum relation to the agricultural production. Given that Zonguldak's mining dates back to the Ottoman period, formation of a mining community in Zonguldak is relatively older when compared to Soma. Therefore, different from local miners and even from ones migrated from Kütahya, miners that migrated from Zonguldak have a mining tradition transmitted from earlier generations.

Kütahya, on the other hand, is a city in Inner Aegean Region possessing a significant lignite reserve especially in the Tavşanlı district where the General Directorate of the Western Lignite Enterprises (GLİ) located. Significant part of the miner population in Soma are migrants from Kütahya and its surrounding districts and villages. GLİ produces lignite in Tavşanlı-Tunçbilek basin since the 1940 to be used for the powerplant in Tunçbilek. Significant part of the miners in Soma are the migrant workers from Kütahya given that investments in Kütahya has not been providing a sufficient employment opportunity for the local population. Different from the migrant workers from Zonguldak, they have relatively weaker relations to mining and a relatively more recent relation to the agricultural production. In other words, before migrating to Soma most of these families were engaging in agriculture. For example, as stated by a retired miner migrated from Tavşanlı in 1988 to work in the private coal company in Soma stated that they were also engaged in agricultural production in Kütahya but still they migrated to Soma given that it was harder to find employment in the state-operated mines of Kütahya:

> Our village is Balıköy located in Tavşanlı. We lived on farming when we were at the village, then we see that number of our children increase from one to two, two to three… We came here, to the mine… There is also a mine in Kütahya but private sector does not exist there. Since there is completely state sector… We could not start a job there. Actually we had everything, our bullock, donkey there (Q39).

Migration from Kütahya has a relatively longer history when compared to Zonguldak. Therefore, families who migrated after the initiation of royalty tender used their family networks to be employed in the pits of Soma. Moreover, miners migrated in the 2000s, mostly had similar reasons to work in the mines with the local population. As they could not receive sufficient income from agriculture they tried to find employment opportunities in coal mining and given that the investments in Kütahya were insufficient to provide enough employment opportunity for the local population, they used their networks in Soma. For example, as stated by a miner migrated in 2008:

> Because possibilities are limited in the village, we don't have an occupation… We thought we can be insured here. We could not find it in Tavşanlı. We have many kith and kin, relatives here. We came here thanks to them. We have been working nonstop since that time (Q40).

Different from the miners from Zonguldak, miners from Kütahya-especially ones migrated in the 2000s-does not have a mining experience in their hometown, instead, started to work in the mines in Soma.

Therefore, for the migrant workers, Soma, having a large-scale mine operating firms and huge number of employment opportunities provides a better opportunity when compared to their hometowns. As discussed in Chapter II with reference to Burawoy's (1976) analysis of migrant labour, main difference between the local and migrant workers stem from differences in the reproduction of labour power. Accordingly, reproduction and renewal processes of the migrant labour are more dependent on wage income whereas local labourers are able develop certain strategies to lower the costs of reproduction such as subsistence production or living in their families' houses etc. Such difference between the reproduction of the local and migrant families was clearly observed during the field research and it was mostly stemming from their different relations to land and agriculture. Migrant families are either completely detached from land or it is limited to women's daily wage employment in agriculture. Besides, all of the migrant families live at the centre of Soma and pay rent or mortgage. During the interviews, migrant families frequently mentioned their disadvantageous condition stemming from detachment from their land and villages.

Local miner families, as discussed in Chapter III, are able to maintain their relation to the land at least to meet their consumption needs whereas the migrant families do not have such opportunity. Especially women interviewees mentioned their disadvantage not being able to produce the food at least for their own consumption. For example, one of the woman interviewees from Kütahya whose husband and son are miners explain this as follows:

> For example, I wish my village was closer… I wish we could go to our village more frequently, but we can arrive there almost in three hours. If I were able to arrive my village in half an hour, I would go there in the morning if I didn't in the evening vice versa. For example, I would go there and make my own garden. I would make winter clothes of my children. Or I would go there at time of sacrifice, I would buy a calf and tether it on the yard two or three months before. Then I would sell this at time of sacrifice feast. You can go to Savaştepe and come back in one hour but it takes one day for Kütahya (Q41).

Local workers, on the other hand, frequently mentioned such disadvantageous conditions of the migrant workers as an impediment for formation of a workers' struggle or unionisation. Accordingly, as long as migrant workers are more dependent on income received from mining they are more obedient to the coal companies and to their supervisors during the production process. Especially local workers living in their villages frequently mentioned this. For example, as stated by a miner living in Savaştepe:

> We do not pay house rent here. We eat what we cultivate. Or if I go to Soma and I need fifty liras, there is no one I can ask for. But here we all know each other. If I run out of money in Soma, I have to rely on credit card. We have solidarity here. However, for example a man comes from Kütahya, takes out loan and buys a house. Then this man would become a slave for the mine. He even must do if you order him a work that is forbidden. Because he is in debt. Something could not be in order for him. You know what! These people from Kütahya, Zonguldak… They have become slaved. If you say them you cannot not go out of the mine, you must work for one extra shift, they would work even so. They are puppet. If the sergeant says sit down, they would sit. If the supervisor says sit down, they would sit down. If there are some people who a little bit resist against this pressure underground, we are them. But, you see we are coming to the fore. They can tell us to pack our stuff and go out at the most, but this would not kill us. When we come here, we have a farm, land, animals we can deal with and earn our keep (Q42).

In the next section, labour processes and labour control mechanisms developed in the coal pits of Soma are analysed with reference to the characteristics of the local labour market.

4.5. Labour Process and Labour Control Mechanisms in the Coal Pits

4.5.1. Firms Operating Mines in the Basin

In Soma district, currently, there are two open pits operated by the ELİ and four underground pits operated by three coal companies. During the field research, one underground coal pit was being prepared for production in Kınık district.

Soma Coal Company Incorporated, having its headquarters in İstanbul, was established in 1984 by Alp Gürkan and started coal production in 1986. During the 1980s and 1990s, Soma Coal Company was a small coal firm operating coal mines in Soma whereas after the initiation of royalty tender in 2005, the company has grown up and expanded drastically. It also undertook significant investments in the construction sector such as the construction of the second biggest business quarter

named Spine Tower, in İstanbul[8]. Meanwhile, Soma Coal Company has expanded its investments in Soma coal basin and in 2013 it was operating four sites in the basin (see Table 4.1). From 2014 onwards, the number of the pits operated by Soma Coal Company was two (Atabacası and Işıklar). Geventepe pit was closed down as it ran out of the coal reserve whereas Eynez pit was closed following the mine disaster in May 2014.

Table 4.1. Pits Operated in Soma Until 2014

	2010	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**
ELİ Open Pits (O.P.)	Soma O. P.	Soma O. P.	Soma O. P.	Soma O. P.	Soma O. P.
	Deniş O. P.	Deniş O. P.	Deniş O. P.	Deniş O. P.	Deniş O. P.
Pits operated by the private firms through the royalty tender	İmbat A.Ş.	İmbat A.Ş.	İmbat A.Ş.	İmbat A. Ş.	İmbat A. Ş.
	Eynez Soma Kömürleri A.Ş.	Eynez Soma Kömürleri A.Ş.	Eynez Soma Kömürleri A.Ş.	Eynez Soma Kömürleri A.Ş.	Eynez Soma Kömürleri A.Ş.
	Geventepe Soma Kömürleri A.Ş.	Geventepe Soma Kömürleri A.Ş.	Geventepe Soma Kömürleri A.Ş.	Geventepe Soma Kömürleri A.Ş.	Atabacası Soma Kömürleri A.Ş.
	Uyar Madencilik	Uyar Madencilik	Uyar Madencilik	Uyar Madencilik	Demir Export
			Atabacası Soma Kömür A.Ş.	Atabacası Soma Kömür A.Ş.	Işıklar Soma Kömür A.Ş.
			Demir Export	Demir Export	
				Işıklar Soma Kömürleri A.Ş.	

Source: Soma Municipality Strategic Plan

İmbat Coal Company, having its headquarters in İzmir, currently operates in the largest pit and almost half of the miners are employed by İmbat Coal Company. The company was established in 2002 and operated as a coal marketing firm until 2004. It started coal extraction in Soma in 2004[9].

Demir Export Incorporated is an associated company of Koç Holding, the largest investment holding in Turkey. Demir Export was established in 1957 and it was initially operated in iron mining. Then, the company started extraction of several minerals such as silver, gold, and chalcocite. In Soma, Demir Export took the tender of the coal pit in Eynez region for 18 years (the first three years being the preparation

[8] https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2014/gundem/akpnin-komuru-ile-holding-patronu-oldu-511037/.

[9] http://www.imbatmadencilik.com/kurulus.aspx.

period) in 2011 and started production by the end of 2015[10]. Relatively lower number of workers is employed in Demir Export as it is the only firm using fully mechanised production technique that is less labour intensive.

Polyak Energy and Mining Incorporated on the other hand is currently in the preparation period and it will operate in the pit located in the Elmadere village. Elmadere village is among the formerly tobacco producer villages within the basin that experienced significant proletarianization in the 2000s. In 2014, couple of months before the mine disaster, farms of the residents of Elmadere were expropriated for the construction of the coal pit and powerplant. One significant point to be underlined is that Polyak Company bought the boring machines from a Chinese Company named China National Coal Group. As the installation of machines is undertaken by this company, Chinese workers are employed for this task. Currently, especially due to the significant problem of unemployment experienced especially by local population, employment of Chinese workers causes discomfort of the local population.

4.5.2. Labour Process in the Coal Mines

According to the findings of the field research, working conditions in the coal mines of Soma embodies the notions of recruitment process, workload and organisation of work, working time, wages, production process, and health and safety measures. Different from women's labour in agriculture, it was not possible to observe miners' working conditions as it was not possible to visit the underground pits. Therefore, the labour process and organisation of work discussed in this part is completely detected from the stories of the miners.

4.5.2.1. Recruitment Process and the Informal Subcontractors

Mostly, both migrant and local workers start working in the coal mines by means of informal subcontractors. The informal subcontracting system operates through labour intermediaries called *dayıbaşı* most of whom are experienced miners. Before going in detail there is a need to explain the reason why the term "informal

[10] http://www.demirexport.com/Pages/Home.aspx.

subcontracting" is used to define these labour intermediaries. First, informality here does not indicate unregistered employment. In the coal pits of Soma, all miners have social insurance and there is no problem of unregistered employment. Besides, these informal subcontractors are also hired as registered employees to the coal firms. The term subcontractor is used because of the fact that miners in the basin call the labour intermediaries as their subcontractors (*taşeron* in Turkish). The adjective, informal is used to underline two features of this system. The first is the fact that this system is different from the subcontractor system defined in Turkish Labour Law No. 4857 enacted in 2003 as transfer of certain services within a company to another firm specialized at those services. However, informal subcontracting in Soma is not a legally defined relationship between two firms. Instead it is an informal relationship between the coal firms and the individual subcontractors. Secondly, relations in production between the informal subcontractors and the workers in their team most of the time exceed the formal boundaries and may take informal forms such as physical violence, production pressure etc.

These subcontractors first provide workers for the coal companies using their networks based on kinship and hometown. Informal subcontractors are hired by the companies as registered and waged employees but besides their wages, companies make them additional payments for each worker they provide.

This system was needed for the coal companies in the early 2000s when due to initiation of royalty tender and increasing investments in the underground coal mines, the need for miners drastically rose. It was frequently stated that especially before 2014, informal subcontractors were hanging notices in the coffeehouses, bus stops, or parks around the basin declaring that they were looking for miners for their teams. Also, migrant workers from Kütahya said that there were similar announcements in their hometowns. While the informal subcontracting system was started when it was hard for the firms to find workers it was continued to be implemented as the number of people willing to be employed in the underground mines increased in due course. This indicates a second and more significant function of this system that informal subcontractors are expected to provide the firm that is to guarantee the extraction of maximum amount of coal. In other words, informal subcontractors are the oppression and control mechanisms of the firms in the

underground pits. As stated by most of the workers, informal subcontractors stand over them just like *Azrail* (the angel of death in Islam) to implement the production pressure which is argued to be the main reason of the Soma massacre. As stated by an experienced miner:

> In the underground mines, you have to work as teams. You cannot work individually. There are variety of teams in charge of variety of tasks. Each team is headed by a dayıbaşı who is supposed to control the workers and fasten the production. It this system is not used, I would argue that, production per shift would decrease two tons. There are three shifts per day. This means firms produce additional six tons of coal per day owing to informal subcontracting system.

As previously stated, almost all informal subcontractors are experienced miners. But as there are number of experienced miners in the basin, the question of how an individual can become an informal subcontractor was asked. Mostly, workers stated that there is no particular criterion through the statements such as:

> A man who can collect workers becomes informal subcontractor. There is no other requirement.

As stated by a workers from a village of Soma, the process proceeds as follows:

> Suppose that I am a subcontractor. I go meet the employer and promise to bring certain number of miners. Then I go collect miners… For example, our subcontractor was promising something… For example, if a miner not working under an informal subcontractor receives 1,000 liras, he said that we would receive 1,100 liras in his team. He was making such commitments. If you collect, for example 20 men from the villages or from somewhere else, that's all. You are an informal subcontractor. Then he (informal subcontractor) does not even go to work. Now, we have a subcontractor called Mehmet Ali. He never comes to work. But he has around 150 men in İmbat. He never comes to work, he is in the coffeehouses or somewhere else from morning till night. His income keeps increasing (Q43).

On the other hand, informal subcontractors receive additional payments from the performance of their team. Premium system in the coal pits of Soma is employed through informal subcontracting system. For example, if there are thirty subcontractor teams, the team having the highest performance (i.e. the team extracting the maximum amount of coal) is rewarded with the highest premium payment. Therefore, informal subcontractors receive premium payment from the company beside their wages and the payment for the workers he provided to the company. For example, as stated by an experienced miner who is no longer working:

> Well these men receive regular wages from the firms. There is also a production share they receive from the company. What is this? For example, I am in charge of extraction, suppose I received chimney work subcontracting, how many meters I have

> progressed on the chimney today? 2 meters. Some share is set to me for two meters and I receive allowance from this. I receive a monthly wage of 3-5 thousand per worker and additional 5-10 thousand or sometimes extra 20 thousand from the company. Then how much would my wage be? I receive pots of subcontracting money without working. The only thing I do is to go down to the mine once a day, if I do, storm around and swear a blue streak at people… (Q44)

Therefore, it is clear that informal subcontractors constitute a significant cost item for the firms. When the interviewees were asked why firms prefer such expensive system even there is a significant number of people willing to work in the mines, almost all of them stated that profits made through this system is much more than its costs for the firms. Moreover, almost all interviewees stated that it is not possible to achieve high levels of productivity by using formal employment relations, it is only possible through production pressure implemented by the use of informal relations even through the use of physical violence. Similarly, it was also frequently stated that as there are big firms operating large pits and large numbers of workers are employed in each pit, dividing the workers into the subcontracting units functions as a labour control mechanism. For example, as stated by an unemployed miner from Savaştepe:

> Why do the firms prefer informal subcontracting? Shift supervisor or directors cannot follow up the production process. The pit is large, the number of workers is high… So, what can they do? Informal subcontracting… They find informal subcontractors and they control their team… When necessary he can even beat or swear to the miners. A university graduate engineer or shift supervisor cannot do these.

4.5.2.2. Working Conditions in the Coal Pits

4.5.2.2.1. Workload and Organisation of Work

During the interviews, questions regarding the organisation of work and workplace hierarchy were asked especially in the first two phases of the fieldwork in order to understand the specific features of the labour process. Given that labour process and working conditions may not indicate the same thing for all workers and the hierarchical relations within the technical division of labour may result in division among the workers analysis of the *relations in production* should be added to the analysis of the relations of production. As argued by Burawoy (1979: 15) relations of production are "always combined with a corresponding set of relations into which men and women enter as they confront nature, as they transform raw materials into objects of their imagination" and this relation constitutes the labour process. This

definition of the "labour process as the relations in production" embodies the relations in which the workers enter during the production process both with each other and with the management.

It should be noted that the information regarding the relations in production and the technical division of labour is quite limited for several reasons. First, labour process in the underground coal mines could not be observed. Secondly, interviews with the representatives from the administrative levels of the firm could not be made due to series of restrictions as underlined in Chapter I. Finally, and most significantly, due to the sharp division of labour through technical and informal differentiations, most of the interviewees did not have sufficient information on the operation of the whole production process in the underground pits. Their information is mostly limited to the unit and subcontracting team they are working within.

The first division of labour mentioned during the interviews was among the different technical units that are specified as follows: mechanical unit, coal conveyor unit, safety unit, preparation unit, production unit. The units other than preparation and production are based on specialisations such as electric installation, provision of health and safety or transmission of the coal extracted. Coal extraction is the responsibility of preparation and production units.

Most of the workers used the metaphor of a town or neighborhood while explaining the plan of the underground pit. For example, one of the miners explained the plan as follows:

> Think about Soma as a forty floor mine. Main streets, alleys… For example, if home is a production panel, corridors would be conveyor and the rooms would be production units (Q45).

The coal is extracted in the production units named *ayak* where the subcontracting teams are employed. The work hierarchy in these units is explained as follows: unskilled worker, substitute, foreman, sergeant, and informal subcontractor. Above all units there are shift supervisors and principal engineers. As expressed by a foreman, organization of the production works as follows:

> Now I am a foreman, my immediate supervisor is sergeant. I mean in the work order, there is unskilled worker at the bottom, then substitute comes, there is foreman on top of substitute, then the sergeant comes. Sergeant is followed by shift supervisor, then

> preparation chief engineer. Well, the sergeant always stands over me. For example, I am usta and we would bore a tunnel, what is my task here? My task is to bore 30-35 holes or at most 60 holes with a gun according to mirror width. My task is to bore this hole, when do I need the substitute at my back? Some frames will be placed there. What is needed for the frame? Three pieces of TH iron is necessary for a frame. Here it is, studding, brushing, gamma… The task of them, namely those behind me, is to prepare this stuff in back of me. Suppose, we are working here, there is no material at the pit, they were not sent from the ground… They say you should find somewhere underground. The man, namely the substitute, goes out from there, heads for the Bus Station, he cannot find and comes back. Then he goes to Government Office from there, he cannot also find there and comes back. He covers the distance till the station bridge, he has to bring and the materials from there to here on-time. Beside, all these ways are inclined. It is not a flat area like the ground. There are ups and downs, you need to pass through mud and water (…) Unskilled worker also goes with the substitute to learn the issue. Newly recruited workers are called as unskilled worker. He learns about the materials and the job he is doing by going and return with the substitute. One day he will be a substitute. The shift supervisor both controls us and informs his supervisor. Just like, today this work has been done or not done or there is such danger etc…(Q46)

Sergeants have also their teams from which they are responsible for. In some cases, it was argued that an informal subcontracting team is composed of the teams of the sergeants and sergeants may also provide workers to the informal subcontractors. As mentioned by a retired miner, sergeants may be defined as the subcontractors of the informal subcontractors. On the other hand, they mainly underlined their difference from the informal subcontractors by underlining that sergeants work with their teams in the underground pits different from informal subcontractors. For example, as stated by an unemployed miner from Kınık who was formerly sergeant:

> I was sergeant, I had my own team. But was also working underground. Informal subcontractors never work. Even when they visit the pits, it is impossible to see them working. They yell at their team, even swear. Then they leave the pit (Q47).

Finally, another group of miners in the underground mines are in charge of portage. Especially in the sections of the pits where mechanised conveyor is not installed, extracted coal is carried by portage workers. They do not work in the production units but extract the coal extracted in these units. Mostly, portage workers stated that mechanised conveyors are not installed in the sharp slope sections of the pits and for example a 60-kilogram man may carry around 100 kilograms of coal in these sections.

Within such organization of work hierarchy, there are three eight-hour shifts: day shift (8 am-4 pm), evening shift (4 pm-12 am), and night shift (12 am-8am)[11].

[11]Evening shifts are called serseri (bummer) and evening shifts are called paşa (pasha) by the miners.

Therefore, the production in the pits never stops and miners of each shift reach to their production units through conveyor bents. Most of the interviewees used the metaphor "like slaves" while expressing the way they are transported to underground production units. For example:

> Think about the movies in which slaves are transported all together. It is exactly the same as the way miners go to the underground production units everyday" (Q48).

In order to understand their workload, the interviewees were asked to express their daily life with reference to a particular shift. For example, as stated by a miner with reference to a day shift:

> If you work in day shift, you have to wake up 5:30 a.m., have breakfast, go out of home about 6 fifteen and walk to the bus stop, get on the bus service at half past 6. You arrive the workplace at about 7 a.m. You change your clothes after 7 and start going down to the mine between 7-7:15 a.m. You take the work from your supervisor, namely your sergeant… Suppose, two frames will be attached or three frames will be attached… You would concentrate on this work. You would do whatever you were told, two frames or three frames. You start going out slowly by about quarter to, twenty to 4. Then you would be on ground at about 4-4:30 p.m. Normally, it takes half an hour, we go to the underground by 7:30 a.m. and we can go out by about 4 p.m. This partly depends on depth, length of the pit and the location you work. We go out by 4:30 p.m., in 10 minutes… Sometimes we do not even have chance to wash our hands and face, we can hardly catch up with the service bus. We get off the service bus at about quarter or half past 5. Then we arrive our home, taking a shower, having a dinner, it's 8-8:30 p.m. What can you do after that time. You cannot go anywhere, for example to a coffee house… You cannot say let's go about the park to your wife and children. You need to sleep and take a rest. You have already got tired whole day. Beside, this is a dangerous work… (Q49)

Almost all interviewees mentioned that even though the time necessary to reach the section they work in the pit (around one and a half hour) is not counted as a working time and even though they seem to work for eight hours a day, the total time they spend underground is almost ten hours. On the other hand, they do not have fixed lunch break and they have lunch when they have an opportunity to take a break. They have lunch underground and bring their food from home prepared by their wives. It was frequently mentioned that their lunch break cannot exceed half an hour and it was controlled by the sergeants.

There are various formal and informal control mechanisms, pressures, threats towards the miners within such organisation of work. However, for a rural population in the process of dispossession and for the migrant workers who are not able to survive in their hometowns, mining-despite deadly conditions in the

underground mines-is seen as an "opportunity" to "earn their bread". For example, one of the retired miners living in a mountain village of Soma used the following words while talking about an informal subcontractor who once thrashed his son soundly:

> A miner working in the state operated mine has become informal subcontractor. He made the peasants breadwinning. Thanks to him… Young village people are still working. Young people started to earn their bread thanks to them. May God bless them. Villagers started to earn money and acquired social insurance. (Q50)

Therefore, as it can be understood from this statement, the reason why mining has become an opportunity for the local population is directly related to social rights it provides that are: regular wage income, social insurance, and early retirement.

As discussed in Chapter III, agrarian transformation in the basin resulted in the commodification of the means of subsistence and increasing cash dependency and this resulted in massive proletarianization in the basin. Increasing cash dependency and relatively unstable characteristics of other employment opportunities such as daily wage work in agriculture or in construction has made mining the relatively secure income generating option in the basin. For example, as stated by the mother of a deceased miner:

> How did we become a part of such system of exploitation? Before we used to go to the farm and eat our tarhana soups all together. We didn't have money but we were happy. We didn't used to need money as we do now anyway. Now they condemned us to money! (Q51)

On the other hand, for the migrant families mining in Soma provides more secure employment opportunity when compared to small or illegal firms operating in Zonguldak or Kütahya. In Soma, all miners work registered, have social insurance and receive their wages regularly each month. Furthermore, while the minimum wage in Soma was the same as the level of minimum wage in Turkey before the massacre, after the wage improvements following the massacre the minimum wage level has reach to the double of minimum wage in Turkey. In the summer of 2016 for example, minimum wage of an underground miner was around 2,800 liras-the amount that is impossible for an uneducated employee to receive at any sector.

Even more significant factor making employment in the underground coal mines attractive for the miners (both for local and migrant) is early retirement right for

underground miners. In Turkey, workers employed in the underground pits can get retired when their 4,000 workday insurance premium is paid regardless of their age[12]. Therefore, average age of retirement is around forty and this makes mining relatively more attractive. For example, as stated by a miner from Zonguldak:

> People from Zonguldak come to Soma and extract coal in the coal pits. It is understood that… We have a miner identity coming from the past. But in the pits of Zonguldak, there is even no social insurance. If you search for another job… Look, uneducated people always try to guarantee one thing: early retirement. It is because of the future anxiety. You make calculations: My insurance premium is completed in twenty years. If I started working when I was twenty, I can be retired when I am forty. You think that you guarantee your future. What you miss is the occupational diseases of mining… (Q52)

On the other hand, for the local workers still engaged in agricultural production, just as the wage received from mining, early retirement and the retirement grant they receive is seen as a means to finance agricultural production. For example, as stated by a miner from a village of Savaştepe whose wife is engaged in stock raising:

> The lighter side of mining has been… When you complete 4,000 days, you are retired when you are 39 years old. Then you can maintain your other works. There is the retirement grant, retirement pension… You can finance farming or stock raising by these. For example if I buy an olive grove following my retirement I can raise them with my children Our life is relatively comfortable. In other jobs… Look, my friend is a teacher. He is quite older than me, there are years until his retirement. I will be retired next year (Q53).

Similarly, most of the unemployed miners whose contracts were terminated after the Soma massacre and could not find job in the underground pits mentioned the fact that they lost their right for early retirement. As stated by a worker who found job in İzmir following his dismissal:

> Well I was 39 years old when they dismissed us. There were around 500 days left until my retirement… Now I am working in a factory and I have to work until the age of 55. I lost my opportunity of early retirement. If I could have continued in mining… This makes you feel offended (Q54).

4.5.2.2.2. Labour Control Mechanisms in the Coal Pits: Production Pressure

In this part, the way organization of the work elaborated in the previous part determines the relations in the production process in the form of production process is discussed. The term production pressure is preferred for defining the control mechanisms with reference to the term's use by the miners of Soma following the

[12]http://www.sgk.gov.tr/wps/portal/sgk/tr/emekli/yaslilik_ayligi/emeklilikte_ozel_kosullar/maden

massacre to explain the reason behind it. Accordingly, production pressure indicates the top-down industrial relations aiming to guarantee the extraction of maximum amount of coal through such, oppression, and pressure over the miners, as miners call it *hadi hadicilik.* Production pressure, in this study, is discussed with reference to the informal subcontracting system and relatedly to premium system and division among the teams on informal basis.

Even under conditions when there is a problem of unemployment in the basin, informal subcontracting is preferred by the coal companies given that the most significant function of this system in the extraction of maximum amount of coal (see part 4.5.2.1.). It was clearly observed that informal subcontracting system is the underground oppression and control mechanism of the coal companies. Therefore, production pressure is applied through informal subcontractors and their sub-subcontractors, i.e. sergeants. For example, as stated by a miner from Kınık:

> They need the informal subcontracting because a shift supervisor for example cannot oppress the workers that much. The informal subcontractor assigns the sergeant to control the workers for eight hours. A shift supervisor cannot control for eight hours for example. The sergeant is at the disposal of the informal subcontractor… They control us for eight hours! They even control us during the lunch break. If it takes more than half an hour they start to ask "why are you late" or "it has been forty minutes…" A shift supervisor cannot control you during the whole shift. In our production unit, there were four sergeants. They do not work at all! They always give directions to us. Do this, do that… We were eighty miners in the production unit and there were four sergeants controlling us. Keep extracting! If there is no extraction for a minute? Keep extracting, keep extracting… Unless, the company will bankrupt! (Q55).

During the field research, whether the interviewees were recruited individually or through informal subcontractors was questioned. Accordingly, all workers who started working in the mines after the initiation of royalty tender in 2005 started working with their subcontracting teams whereas some of the workers who started from 2010 onwards (especially after the massacre) stated that they applied to the companies individually. On the other hand, it was observed that as a system informal subcontracting has not been abandoned. For example, during the prosecution process of the massacre, it was insistently argued by the defendants that there were no informal subcontractors in the Eynez pit from 2011 onwards. However, as it was clearly observed in the documents of the criminal process, what has changed has been limited to the name of the position. In a document showing the amount of the coal extracted in January 2010, names of the informal subcontractors of each team

were specified. On the other hand, in a document showing the same data for January 2014, instead of the "subcontractor" the statement smock hole chef (baca şefi) was used for the same people.

Despite the fact that, some of the miners applied individually from 2010s onwards, they stated that once they were hired the company assigned them to a subcontracting team and they argued that despite the prohibition of the informal subcontracting system, especially the workers employed in the production units are still working under informal subcontractors.

The premium system is employed through this informal subcontracting teams and it is frequently stated that this system results in competition among the teams given that the team extracting the highest amount of coal is rewarded with the highest level of premium payment. Eventually, this competition to receive the maximum amount of the premium payment results in the production pressure applied by the informal subcontractors and as frequently underlined the extent of the pressure may entail physical violence. As expressed both in the interviews and during the witness statements in the prosecution process of Soma massacre, physical violence, swear words, insults were commonly used by the informal subcontractors. For example, as stated by an unemployed miner:

> I saw a miner who got a beating from his informal subcontracting just because he took a rest for two minutes. Even the most decent statements they use include swear words (Q56).

Therefore, as expressed by almost all miners, the most significant, in time even mere, function of informal subcontractors is to guarantee extraction of maximum amount of coal and function as an underground domination mechanism of coal companies. As stated by an unemployed miner:

> They are like the sticks for the workers. For further extraction… Further extraction, further extraction… Go on, go on, go on… Informal subcontractor does not have any other function. They are assigned to oppress the workers for the extraction of the intended amount of coal!(Q57).

Furthermore, informal subcontracting system operates as a labour control mechanism in the pits and at the local level. This system is mostly based on the division of workers based on their hometowns and encouraging competition among

different teams through the premium system. First, coal companies contact informal subcontractors to provide the firm workers. Then, they collect workers either from the surrounding villages of the basin or from mining towns such as Kütahya or Zonguldak by using their networks based on kinship and hometown. Once hired, these workers work as teams at the same production units. Workers of each team use the same personnel vehicle from the same village or from the same neighborhood such as the neighborhoods of people from Kütahya, Zonguldak or Ordu etc. In addition, migrant workers have established hometown associations and these associations have coffeehouses, clubs for women and men etc. Therefore, on the one hand, workers are divided into informal subcontractor teams at work whereas on the other hand they are disintegrated in their daily lives throughout the networks based on kinship and hometown.

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter examined the labour processes and labour control mechanisms in the underground coal pits of Soma by putting the significance of coal industry for the Turkish economy from the 2000s onwards at the centre of the discussion. From the early 2000s onwards, the most significant reason behind the current account deficit in Turkey has been the energy imports. Therefore, use of domestic coal especially for the electricity production in the coal fired powerplants has been one of the policy priorities from the 2010s onwards and Soma basin, possessing rich lignite reserve has gain significance within this period. From 2005 onwards, TKİ has started to transfer the coal production in the underground pits of Soma to the private coal companies through the royalty tender. Royalty tender constitutes a significant incentive for the coal companies as long as the TKİ provides them guarantee of purchase without questioning the amount and method of coal extraction. As a matter of fact, from 2005 onwards, coal companies operating in Soma has experienced significant corporate growth through the profits they make thanks to the royalty tender.

On the other hand, within this period, Soma basin has been attractive not only for coal investor companies but also for the miners of the other mining towns such as ZonFdiaguldak and Kütahya and towns that have historically been supplying labour power to Zonguldak such as Bartın, Çorum or Ordu. By means of the informal

subcontractors, miners from these towns have migrated to Soma basin to work in the underground coal pits. Together with the partly dispossessed local population, they have formed the local labour market and certain strategies of labour control have been developed through the use of conflict between migrant and local workers.

Labour process in the underground coal pits is directly related to the significance and urgency of coal production for the Turkish economy and to the composition of local labour market. Organization of work is strictly hierarchical and the production is fastened through the pressure over the miners within this hierarchical structure. On the other hand, workers are divided into subcontracting teams through the informal subcontractors and these people function as the underground control and domination mechanisms of the coal companies to guarantee the extraction of maximum amount of coal. Within these subcontractor teams, the production pressure may reach to informal levels such as using swear words or physical violence towards the miners etc.

Labour process in any locality is directly related to the local class relations and certain mechanisms of control are developed in collaboration between the state and capital. In the following chapter, local labour control strategies in Soma basin are examined with reference to the ways miner families are articulated to or struggle against them.

CHAPTER V

COERCION, CONSENT, RESISTANCE IN SOMA COAL BASIN: LABOUR CONTROL STRATEGIES AND MOMENTS OF RESISTANCE

5.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the labour control strategies beyond the workplace in Soma coal basin and the extent to which miner families are articulated to or struggle against these. In Chapter II, it was argued that the analysis of the labour process is internally related to what goes on outside of the factory or office gates, how workers reproduce themselves, and how local labour markets are regulated (Rainnie et al 2010: 299). It was also argued that strategies of regulating and controlling the local labour market is especially significant for the extractivist capital as they are not able to easily relocate their investments due to the "fixity of ores" (Ellem, 2016). In order to sustain its investment in a particular locality, the extractivist capital needs to develop local labour control regime(s) appropriate for the composition of the local community or it may even have to develop strategies for the re-formation of the local community through encouraging labour migration.

In Soma coal basin, where local labour market has been formed through the different patterns of proletarianization and through labour migration and capital accumulation in agriculture and in coal industry has had different rhythms, certain local political and institutional dynamics have been operated in collaboration with the state and capital for the sustainability of coal investments. This local labour control regime in Soma has taken various forms since the experience of a huge tragedy in the basin 2014 that resulted in the death of 301 miners. This chapter has four sections. In the first section details of the Soma Massacre and its prosecution period is elaborated. Then, labour control mechanisms that have been operated through the

subcontracting system-and hometown associations as this system's aboveground reflection-and in collaboration with the state, coal companies, and the Maden İş trade union are analysed. In the third section, the specific forms that labour control mechanisms have taken since the Soma Massacre such as clientelism or threat of unemployment are elaborated on. Finally, moments of resistance of local community against the local control regime is discussed with reference to attempts for unionisation and struggles of village dwellers of Yırca and of miners whose contracts were terminated by one of the coal companies.

5.2. Soma Massacre and Prosecution Process

On 13 May 2014, the biggest mine disaster and workplace homicide in Turkish history took place at the Eynez Karanlıkdere underground coalmine in Soma and resulted in the decease of 301 miners. The disaster occurred when a fire spread in the galleries following a collapse of wall and exposed self-burning coal that produce increasing heat and smother. When the significance of the situation was realised a rescue operation was organised that was ineffective for several reasons such as lack of proper air circulation, increased number of miners working in each shift beyond the mine's capacity, lack of safe rooms for miners to take refuge during emergencies, and improper guidelines for mine evacuation in case of an emergency (Adaman et al 2018: 521-2).

According to the expert report submitted to the board of the Akhisar High Criminal Court in August 2016, coal policies of AKP governments in general and Soma Coal Company in particular are to be blamed for this mine disaster. The reasons why coal policies and the relevant institutions are blamed are as follows:

- Shortcomings regarding the basin planning such as the relation between the amount of coal extraction and technical structure of the pit; relation between the number of workers per shift and the air content;
- Terms and conditions regarding the royalty tender: guarantee of purchase provided by TKİ regardless of the relation between the amount of coal extraction and technical structure of the pit;

- Shortcomings regarding the inspections of General Directorate of Mining Affairs affiliated to the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Ministry of Labour and Social Security, and Turkish Coal Enterprises;
- Deficiencies in the relevant legislation regarding the health and safety in the coal mines.

On the other hand, Soma Coal Company was blamed for the deficiencies and shortcomings regarding the metalation system, worker training, relief and expulsion system, use and quality of gas masks, and most significantly for the extraction of coal beyond the technical capacity of the pit.

Following the massacre, at the same week, eight people got arrested in the context of the conduct investigated by the Akhisar Chief Public Prosecutor's Office[13]. Meanwhile, despite the attempts of the lawyers of the families of the deceased miners for the investigations of the inspectors from Turkish Coal Enperprises and of Alp Gürkan (Chairman of Soma Holding), the investigation process was not initiated until the expert report was declared in August 2016. Following the declaration of this expert report, criminal proceeding process of additional defendants including the chairman of Soma Holding started.

The judicial process-the trials-of the massacre started in April 2015, in Akhisar High Criminal Court and lasted for more than three years (until July 2018) through the prosecution of 51 defendants (including defendants without arrest). In December 2015 two shift supervisors and one in October 2017 were evicted and the prosecution process ended with 5 arrested defendants. In July 2018, in the last trial, the judgment was delivered and the prosecution process ended in the punishment of 14 defendants and exculpation of the remaining 37 defendants including the chairman of Soma Holding (Alp Gürkan). For the families of deceased miners and for their lawyers these punishments were far from being fair. Accordingly, defendants should be punished with reference to eventual intent but the board of the criminal court punished them for killing people by gross carelessness. As frequently

[13] The prisoners were as follows: Can Gürkan (Chairman of the Executive Board of Soma Coal Company Incorporated), Ramazan Doğru (General director of the company), Akın Çelik (operating manager), İsmail Adalı (technical manager), Ertan Ersoy (technical supervisor), Mehmet Ali Günay Çelik (safety technician), and shift supervisors Yasin Kurnaz and Hilmi Kazık.

mentioned by families and their lawyers, prosecution process should not be made as if this is a “traffic accident” or a “natural disaster”. They kept arguing that what happened in Soma was “not an accident but a massacre” and this cannot be “fate of the miners”. Instead they have been arguing that this massacre was the result of systemic neglects of the coal company, the representatives of the state, and the “collaborator” trade union named Maden İş for the objective of extracting the maximum amount of coal.

As discussed in Chapter IV, coal industry has a strategic significance for the Turkish economy as the most significant reason of high levels of current account deficit is energy imports and the use of domestic coal in electricity production is seen as a solution. Even following the Soma Massacre, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources announced that Turkey is expected to quadruple its coal-fired powerplants by 2020 (Adaman et al, 2018: 525). Soma massacre and its prosecution process in this sense has turned into an insuperable barrier to overcome as long as the result of the prosecution process would have impact beyond the Soma Coal Company and it would affect the coal industry as a whole. Therefore, there had been certain interventions to the prosecution process by the state especially from the January 2017 onwards. In the last day of the trial blogs held in January 2017, attorney general first told that his opinion is ready and will give an opinion following a ten-minute break and after the break attorney general did not give opinion by stating that he needs time to reorganize his opinion. And during the following fourteen-month period he did not give an opinion. Meanwhile, the most significant intervention to the prosecution process was that in the summer of 2017, in the context of a decree enacted by Council and Judges of Prosecutors, the judge of Soma massacre case was changed. This change was reacted against by the families and lawyers given that the former judge knew all details of the case file, saw the pit, and-as stated by most of the lawyers-“knew the exact place where each miner died”. The new judge, on the other hand, is known for his famous decision in a mine disaster in another pit in Southern Turkey (Afşin Elbistan) and imposed fine to the defendants blamed for the decease of 11 workers.

Meanwhile, there were series of interventions to the prosecution process by the coal companies operating pits in the basin. Following the shutdown of the Eynez coal pit

after the massacre, the contracts of 2831 miners employed in this pit were terminated and the problem of unemployment started in the basin. It was frequently stated during the field research that workers who gave evidence against the company could not find job not only in the pits operated by Soma Coal Company but also in the other pits. Therefore, most of them stated that they could not dare to give evidence. For example, as stated by one of the interviewees who survived with an injury: "I am unemployed for two years, I have two kids. I borrowed money even to come to the court. I am sorry but I had to drop the charge."

On the other hand, there are strong evidences regarding the collaboration between the firm and witnesses. In return for the witnesses not to file a complaint, the firm provided them some benefits in the form of cash payments or employment opportunity. Three of the unemployed interviewees mentioned that the company offered money to them. For example, as stated by an unemployed miner:

> The company offered me money too. I didn't accept. They offered 80,000 liras for me not to give evidence against the company. That money would have changed my life but I did not accept. Look, I am unemployed now. And I cannot find job under these circumstances (Q58).

Similarly, during the trials, significant number of inconsistencies were observed between the statements made in the prosecution office immediately after the massacre and the statements in the trials. This can easily be explained with the increasing problem of unemployment and increasing pressure towards the witnesses within the period between the two statements. Furthermore, another inconsistency observed during the trials was that between the statements of the witnesses who filed a complaint and ones who did not regarding the factual questions. For example, whereas a witness gave evidence against the company by telling that informal subcontracting system was employed in Eynez coal pit, another witness who did not file a complaint against the company told there were no informal subcontractors in Eynez pit.

Almost all employees from miners to the engineers stated during the trials and during the interviews that they were aware of the presence of self-burning coal. It was frequently stated that the temperature in the galleries had already increased drastically, warning systems indicated increasing levels of carbon monoxide and

carbon dioxide levels above the expected levels more than a month before the massacre. As it is clearly revealed in the report written by Boğaziçi University Soma Research Group, the temperature doubled from the first week of March 2014 to May 13, 2014-it rose from 22.7 degrees in May 1, 2014 to 45 degrees in May 13 2014 (Ersoy, 2014: 36). Accordingly, expected temperature of the pit during the seasonal normal was 20-21 degrees but it started to increase from the early April onwards and reached to the levels at which the production should have been stopped. Despite such dangerous increase in the temperature, production was maintained and this was confirmed in the statements of the witnesses who worked in that pit. Interviewees who formerly worked in that pit frequently mentioned the increase of the temperature in the pit and of the coal by statements such as "it was impossible to touch the coal. It was that hot! It was burning… The pit was also scorching." As stated by a 48 year-old unemployed miner formerly working in Eynez pit but in another shift:

> I am a miner for years. I was a sergeant. I know the underground pits inside out. I was that coal was burning. I told them, they told me just do your thing. If you do not consider… So to say, it was natural or it was the will of god! Come on! Think about, you are driving a car. You don't fasten seatbelt, you are drunk, and you go overspeed. If you have an accident can you call it will of god? (Q59).

The most obvious examples of the disaster waiting to happen for more than a month were observed during the statements of the families of the deceased miners during the trials. First, there are number of deceased miners whose father formerly worked in the same pit and these fathers underlined their conversations with their sons comparing the changing conditions in the same pit towards increasing production pressure. Secondly, and most significantly, statements of the women (either their mothers or wives) responsible for the reproduction of the labour power of the miners conspicuously revealed the changing physical and psychological conditions of the miners employed in that pit before the massacre. Almost all women mentioned increasing physical problems of their husbands or sons with reference to headache, extreme fatigue, vomiting attacks, dehydration, and intoxication especially during the month before the massacre. For example, as stated by a wife of a deceased miner during the trials in December 2015:

> My husband was working in the S panel.[14] During the last two months he was taking extra underwear they were all wet. Four days before the incident, he got poisoned. He threw up for hours. He always had a problem of headache anyway, he was taking painkiller all the time. He was tired out all the time, he was always sleeping at home during his last days (Q60).

In addition, during the trials it was frequently mentioned by the lawyers of the families that there were large numbers of applications to the Soma State Hospital stemming from carbon monoxide poisoning. On the other hand, during the statements of the workplace doctors it was argued by the complainant lawyers that problems of the workers stemming from carbon monoxide poising were glossed over by these doctors.

Various instances of neglect regarding the health and safety were underlined during the trials. One of the most significant was the absence of sufficient worker training. While it has been argued by the defendants that there was two-week compulsory worker trainee provided by the company, two of the interviewees (wives of deceased miners) stated that their husbands had started working in the pits three days before the massacre and died in the most dangerous gallery. On the other hand, neglects regarding the maintenance and repair of the oxygen masks or regular lung x-rays were frequently mentioned during the trials. Adverse witnesses repeatedly stated that even during the fault status they were expected to maintain extraction. Finally, the most significant neglect mentioned both during the trials and the interviews in the fieldwork was regarding the inspections. Almost all witnesses and interviewees argued that date of the inspection was previously known and necessary preparations were done. Moreover, it was frequently mentioned that inspectors did not visit the underground production units but only visited the main galleries. As stated by an interviewee formerly working in Eynez and lost his two brothers in the massacre:

> They are talking about inspectors during the trials. I worked for nine years, and I have never seen an inspector. I also told it during the trials, there were no inspectors. Or they were visiting but we did not used to see them. I was working in the production unit, they were not visiting the production units. As I heard, they were visiting the main galleries (Q61).

Soma massacre is the result of the objective of extraction of the maximum amount of coal even under dangerous circumstances, production pressure applied mostly by

[14] The location from where fire spread.

informal subcontractors and neglect of the even most basic health and safety measures to reach this objective. The most clear summary of the process that led to the Soma massacre can be found in the following statement of a witness in the trial:

> There was a pressure for overproduction. Sometimes the engineers or supervisors were oppressing the miners by insulting. I remember some instances when I could not even take gas mask or my boots. Miners are hired by unofficial subcontractors. Chief executive of the company employs the workers like slaves. There were even instances when they did not provide our necessary equipment such as mask or helmet due to the default in payment. They always oppress workers to work more. When the inspectors visit, some deficiencies in the mine are fixed, some are hidden. Workers are forced not to tell about deficiencies to the inspectors.

It is possible to argue that Soma Massacre is directly related to the coal policies of the government that have been shaped by the objective of diminishing the dependency on imported energy in electricity production through the increasing use of domestic coal. Especially implementation of the royalty tender and guarantee of purchase provided by the state to the coal companies regardless of the amount of the coal extracted within this context have triggered coal companies to accelerate production through labour intensive techniques. On the other hand, lack or insufficiency of inspections resulted in neglect of the health and safety measures and coal companies may even regard avoiding these measures as a cost saving strategy. As long as the result of the prosecution process of Soma Massacre would have impact on the sector as a whole beyond the Soma Coal Company and the consecutive AKP governments have been reluctant to abandon the "coal rush" plan to alleviate the problem of current account deficit stemming from the energy imports, prosecution of process of Soma was not conducted independently from the political interventions of the government over the judicial procedure.

5.3. Coercion and Consent: Informal Subcontracting System Aboveground and the "Devil's Triangle"

As it can be detected from the statements quoted so far, miners and their families blame the coal company and informal subcontracting system operated by it for putting the profit of the company above the workers' health and safety. They also accuse the state for lack or insufficiency of inspections. On the other hand, besides the state and coal company there were number of workers blaming the trade union for not defending the rights of workers, instead, being collaborator of the coal

companies and the state representatives against the workers. Following the massacre, workers and representatives of oppositional trade unions, political parties, and associations argued that the reason for the massacre is the "devil's triangle" consisting of the state, coal companies, and Maden İş trade union. During the field research, it was observed that informal subcontracting system is an intrinsic part of this so called "devil's triangle" reproduced through hometown associations aboveground.

Informal subcontracting system operates as a control mechanism beyond the coal pits and determines the local class relations as a whole. As mentioned in Chapter IV, work is organised through the subcontracting teams in the underground pits and these teams are formed by using the networks based on kinship and hometowns. Therefore, thanks to the subcontracting system, workers from other mining towns migrate to Soma through the networks of their countrymen or relatives. It was frequently stated by the interviewees from other mining towns that they were able to find job in the mines because their relatives suggested them to their subcontractors. For example, as stated by a miner during a group interview with three workers from Kütahya:

> Now, I made Ali be recruited, then Ali made Samet be recruited. I mean, we are about one fourth of Soma, as people from Kütahya people. If its population is 100 thousand, there are at least 15-20 thousand people from Kütahya. We have our own neighborhoods here. I mean this is attracting. For example, friends from hometown call us and ask whether they should come here, if they can find a job here… There was something called informal subcontractor in the past before these incidents. We should not deny this. We were telling them we have a friend willing to get a job, namely telling these big brothers. They were making benefits, helps. (…) We also have an association. Where we can visit and have a conversation by saying we are from Kütahya… Where we can also look after and recover when one of our men falls into trouble. For example, someone may have an accident or something like that… Under the name of an association… If someone needs, we can immediately collect 3 liras, 5 liras. In that way… (Q63).

It can be argued that hometown associations are the aboveground reflections of the informal subcontracting system. Indeed it was frequently stated that these associations were established by informal subcontractors themselves. For example, as stated by a miner from Kütahya:

> Here, they made an association from the mine. For example you are a subcontractor, I am a subcontractor, he is a subcontractor… Our subcontractors come together and make an association. Here it is the Kütahya association…(Q64).

According to the statements of local prominent people interviewed in the first phase of the field work, number and influence of these hometown associations increased from the early 2000s onwards. Therefore, establishment of these associations is strongly related to the transformation of local class relations in the basin through neoliberal transformation of agriculture and coal mining and therefore to massive proletarianization. According to Chairman of Tütün-Sen, Ali Bülent Erdem spread of these associations stems from the gap as resulting from the loss of the secure conditions of miners guaranteed by the state:

> I figure out how these associations have become such widespread in this way. In the past, relationship with agriculture was established over the state before the neoliberal policies being implemented. The relationship between workers and the mine was over the state. The relationship established by the government with people was over the establishments like TEKEL, ELİ. What is completely dissolved now is these relationships. The state is out of the frame. Necessity for another relationship has risen when it becomes excluded. In my opinion, the need for these countryman assocations directly fills this gap. Because, there is actually a mafia type organization: the existing ELİ, district governorate, shipping agents, cooperatives, local assocations… These local assocations are even effective in ensuring everyone voting in election periods. Which are marketing the votes of all these countrymen, their own members, acting in concert with the district governor in policies to be implemented… I think an instrument applied by the state is included in this organization. The time when local assocations became widespread and turned into a significant power is about late 2002. They were provided buildings. The existing district governorate did this. If you visit, you will see they have considerable possibilities, the state itself encouraged and developed them. Therefore, a triangle of union-capital-state is mentioned but actually it is multi-dimensional (Q65).

As stated by Erdem, therefore, hometown associations and informal networks constructed through them fill the gap resulting from the dissolution of the previous relations of the local population to the state such as tobacco production under the purchase guarantee of TEKEL or employment in state operated mines and living like a community in the personnel houses and the social facilities provided by the Turkish Coal Enterprise. They trust these associations especially in cases of need and the socialisation of the migrant families takes place in the coffeehouses or clubs of these associations, and they live in the neighbourhoods such as Kütahyalı Mahellesi, Ordulu Mahallesi, or Zonguldaklı Mahallesi. For example, as stated by a woman from Ordu who works as a per diem agricultural worker:

> I mean, could people from Zonguldak, from Kütahya, from Ordu be the same? We go to work in the farms together, we are different there too. People from Kütahya have lunch together, those from Zonguldak together and we together. We also have an association. If I go there and say I need this, they would help me. We don't have our

> own house, but if I buy I would prefer to buy a house in neighborhood of people from Ordu (Q66).

On the other hand, these associations constitute a new form of control and containment mechanism over the miner families by the coal companies and the state. They have also been instrumental in preventing formation of a united opposition of the miner families. As a matter of fact, these associations are encouraged and supported by the local representatives of the state and various religious and cultural mechanisms are employed to include miners in these hometown associations.

Moreover, it was frequently argued that religious relations in the form of tarikat and community networks operate through these hometown associations and these networks are functional especially due to the fact that almost all migrant workers are suni Muslims whereas the local miner families are Alevis. Therefore, through these hometown associations, workers' lives are divided on religious, cultural, and spatial basis on the hand, whereas on the other hand they operate as labour containment mechanisms. Therefore, instead of an alternative unionisation, these associations mostly constitute a more straightforward, proper, and trustworthy opportunity for the miner families. For example, as stated by a representative of an oppositional trade union (Independent Miners Union) these hometown associations constitute a significant barrier for them to organise the miners and they are strongly supported by the local representatives of the state as follows:

> If you go to countryman associations today, you would see large spaces of all them. People from Ordu association, whatever association… All these are granted lands by the municipality. Other things are granted by whoever. They are helped for electricity, water bills. Many possibilities are provided for them. Naturally they are unprogressive elements, they feed with social policies implemented in the form of submissiveness. When religious order have got involved… There are intensive religious order stuff. There are the entities they call as sister houses, brother houses etc. at every step. They are also fed by these countryman associations. Settled elements of this place are not actually very effective in social structure, because majority is Alewi. But, because the majority of population has come from outside, they do rent transfer by means of association, you see… For example a man goes to people from Ordu association, give them two televisions or so, pay their rent and electricity bill etc… Night meetings are organized, people are sent to their hometown by taking a bus, sheep are sacrificed so-and-so… Then, the association president is on the top of people, if he says we will vote for AKP my friends then some stuff will be provided in return for this, everyone would agree… The effect of local assocations is really great here. Indeed, they perform all their social activities over these assocations. Traditional activities, ceremonies, solidarities… Subcontractors establish the associations… Then, for example union branch director is the president of People from Zonguldak Association at the same time. Now, look at the management… There are Çepni, people from Ordu, from

> Zonguldak, from Kütahya… That's to say, the capital is much clever! It is much difficult for a left union to penetrate into this! (Q67).

As it is clearly understood from these statements, hometown associations are directly related to the so called "devil's triangle". Each association is represented in the administration of the Maden İş trade union. Therefore, given that associations are established by and operated through the informal subcontractors and informal subcontracting system, it can be argued that this system is directly manifested in the "collaborator" trade union[15].

Miners Trade Union of Turkey (Maden İş) was established in 1958 and became a member of Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Türk-İş)[16] in 1960. Türk İş Confederation and its affiliated trade unions experienced a significant transformation during the AKP period in parallel with the transformation of the logic of unionisation within this period. During the AKP period confederation called Hak-İş have explicitly been supported and a new form of unionisation based on control and discipline of workers instead of their collective organisation to defend social rights have been developed. According to some scholars (cf: Erdinç, 2014; Çelik, 2012) during this period while DİSK (Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions) has kept its pro-labour position whereas Türk İş failed to take a firm stand and significant degree of cleavages among the trade unions affiliated to Türk İş have been observed. Maden İş Trade Union in this sense have taken a firm stand on the side of the mining companies and of the AKP as it is clearly seen in the findings of the field research in Soma. The most obvious example in this sense is that Soma branch of Maden İş refused to give an interview during the field research and asked for a permission from the district governor. As it can be expected, according to the Law on Trade Unions, there is no affiliation between the trade union branches and local governors.

According to the relatively older miners who formerly worked in the public sector mines or private firm operated pits, 2005 (initiation of the royalty tender) indicates

[15] As listed by a miner employed in the Turkish Coal Enterprises who has long been in the administration of the trade union each association is represented in the administration and the trade union works in close relation to these associations.

[16] Türk İş is a confederation established in 1952.

a significant turning point for Maden İş trade union. As frequently stated, it was formerly a "real trade union" protecting the rights of the workers. Accordingly, from 2005 onwards, the number of members fell drastically due to the decrease in the number of workers employed in the state operated mines. During the period between 2005-2008 coal companies were against the organisation of the Maden İş trade union in the pits. For example, as frequently underlined by relatively older miners, Alp Gürkan, chairman of the executive board of Soma Coal Company stated that "as long as I am here, there will be no trade union in this company." On the other hand, from 2008 onwards, coal companies, including Soma Coal Company and Alp Gürkan, started to force workers to become a member of Maden İş. Therefore, according to the stories of relatively more experienced or retired workers, collaboration between the coal companies and Maden İş such as nomination of the candidates for union representatives before the elections, distribution of already signed ballots, and cheating in the union elections started from 2008 onwards. In other words, they explain the changing attitude of Soma Coal Company regarding unionisation with development of this collaboration from 2008 onwards.

Currently, Maden İş is authorised in all pits except the one operated by Demir Export Coal Company and functions in Soma directly as a control and domination mechanism of the coal firms and the domination relation is mostly operated through informal subcontracting. Unionisation in Maden İş is explained with direct reference to the decision of the companies instead of the workers. Workers employed in Soma Coal Company and İmbat Coal Company answered the question how they decided to become a member of the trade union frequently as follows: "they said you have to be a member of Maden İş, so we did" whereas workers from Demir Export answered either as "the company does not accept trade union" or "there is no trade union in Demir Export". In addition, interviewees working in Demir Export stated that the company explains the reason why they are against the trade union by arguing that Demir Export is a strong company that can protect the rights of the workers so workers of Demir Export do not need trade union.

Close relations of the trade union with the employers in contrast to limited relations with the workers is underlined as the main dynamic of the transformation of the trade union in the 2000s. For example, as stated by a miner from Kınık:

> Previously, Türk İş was a well operated trade union. We didn't used to know its close relations to the employers. They were in contact with the workers when necessary. Or they were asking for the opinion of the workers. For example, they were telling that "the company offered 5 percent rise of wages but we request 10 percent and we try to reach an agreement". Now they do not even let us in the trade union office… This has become apparent since 2008-2009. They started not to deal with the workers at all or started to just meet the employers when they visit the company…(Q68)

Answers to the questions regarding the miners' relation to the trade union can be grouped into three as neutral, positive, and negative ones. Neutral answers mostly belonged to the depoliticised workers who do not have sufficient knowledge regarding (and therefore expectation from) unionisation. They mostly used the statements such as "trade union membership has not changed anything" or "the only thing I know is they cut a one-day wage from our salary every month". Similarly, references of the miners having a positive attitude towards the union were not related to the social rights of the working class or to the unionisation. Most of them emphasized the advantage of being a trade union member with reference the material benefits specified in the collective bargaining such as soup, detergent, and most significantly coal aid. For example, as stated by a miner from Zonguldak, working in Soma since 2015:

> I preferred the trade union and I am pleased from it. Let me explain as follows… You receive five tons of coal instead of two tons. They cut a daily wage from our wages but our wages are sufficient not so it is not a problem. I can earn that by working overtime by just one hour. What else can be expected from the trade union? (Q69)

Or, there were several miners, mostly among the migrant ones, who underlined the advantages of being a member of the union and blame the miners for criticising the union. For example, as stated by a miner from Kütahya:

> The trade union is essential for us. It is the only thing we can trust. Some people find its actions wrong… But for us, there is no problem. Actually, this is the same for everyone… But for example… Someone may have gone against the trade union or may have a problem with the employer... Of course, the trade union cannot defend these people. They help people having real troubles. I have never had a problem with the trade union. It is because I do my job well. If someone does not, he will of course have problems with the trade union. The trade union cannot be expected to defend workers who are not good at their jobs! (Q70)

Therefore, even for the miners who did not complain about the trade union and underlined the advantages of union membership, the union was expected to operate for the interest of the coal companies and not to go against the companies even in the cases of workers' complaints.

Finally, workers complaining about the trade union constituted three quarters of the interviewees. They can be divided into two groups: workers still member of the union but discontent with the union and those who resigned from Maden İş membership and organized in the oppositional unions. The former group composed of workers dissatisfied with the union and aware of its collaboration to the coal companies but do not resign from the union due either to the fear of unemployment or for the maintenance of the incentives such as the coal aids. Workers of this groups mostly stated that they do not believe in the unionisation at all. For example, as stated by one of the workers from Soma:

> I will compare this with the current government's relationship with citizens… Today, go out to street, ask someone about AK Party, nobody likes them. But when you look at, everyone has voted for them or they have won in some way at election period. However, people still talk about dissatisfaction. This is also the case here. For example, I don't like Maden İş… On my part. But just… I have even never questioned whether we have a chance for not being a member. The union does not improve our status. Does it worsen it? Just from me… They deduct from my wage, I don't give my blessing. They do not benefit for anyone. I will compare with the government again. Suppose you are an Ak Party representative and come to my house… I say you are so good, you are fabulous… You check my kitchen, my foodstuff and I put you on a pedestal (Q71).

One final point to be underlined regarding Maden İş is that it lends money to the workers just like a bank credit and most of the interviewees were considering this as a duty of the trade union. As stated by a miner from a village of Soma:

> The union gives credit to workers. Supposing that 10 thousand TL is necessary, the union gives this, applies interest and it is paid by installments. But an employer does not give a credit. If it gave, it would have to make me work to receive back the money. The union does not give to every worker too. It also has to make workers work (Q72).

Most workers stating their gratitude to the union were the ones who borrowed money from the union. For example, as stated by a worker from Soma:

> I am pleased with the union. They meet all what we need. For example, I have asked to borrow money recently, they lent me. I have become indebted to the union rather than a bank, then I paid this by installments (Q73).

On the other hand, the reason why some of the workers were complaining about the trade union was that they were refused by the union when they applied for the credit. For example, one of the workers who resigned from Maden İş membership and became a member of DİSK Dev Maden Sen explained the reason why he resigned from Maden İş as follows:

> The union didn't even give credit to me, made me dependent on the bank. Look, this union has 400 thousand monthly revenues. Every month… Am I a member of this union. Yes. Do I work in the mine? Yes. Do they receive union dues from me? Yes. I have run low on cash, I am in debt, I need money. They could give me 5-10 thousand instead of making me dependent on the bank… Then they could deduct from my wage. They don't need to make me dependent on the bank. By the way, does DİSK give a loan, it does not. But DİSK does not have money. It would give if it had money (Q74).

Therefore, as it can be detected from the statements quoted so far, Maden İş trade union operates in collaboration with the coal companies. On the other hand, under conditions where there are weak ties among the workers, absence of a formation of a class culture and consciousness, workers' expectation from the unions are shaped accordingly. They directly link the trade union to coal companies and do not demand anything from the trade union that would contradict the interests of the coal companies. This can be summarised with the words of an unemployed miner from Kınık who became a member of DİSK following the massacre:

> They have formed the union, made people a member of this. They have threatened people. They said members would receive such amount of coal, non-members would not receive… Members would be given such premium, non-members would be given such… Namely, employer itself encouraged for the union. Then, it was backed by the union of course. Turkish Maden İş Union… They have carried from here to party meetings. Then they acquired Eynez. Then acquired Işıklar, Atabacası (Q75).

Finally, it is significant to address the means through which AKP penetrates the basin and its relation with the local actors. It was clearly observed during the field research that before and after the Soma Massacre, the most significant concern of the miners and their families have been employment opportunity in the coal mines- even more significant than health and safety in the mines or impact of coal mining and coal fired power plants on their health. Even for the workers organized in oppositional trade unions or other organizations the most significant problem is unemployment. Meanwhile, through the coal firms, informal subcontractors, and hometown associations it is imposed upon the workers and their families that thanks to successive AKP governments and to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan they have had a job with a regular income. This is explained with reference to the opening up of new pits in the basin during the AKP governments that has indicated employment opportunity for the local population who has been experiencing a process of impoverishment and dispossession on their own land. Given that it is AKP governments that "finally utilised Soma's coal" from 2004 onwards and this process is regarded as their success whereas possible fall of the AKP is imposed as a danger

of diminishing coal investments or even closure of the existing pits. For example, as stated by the secretary general of the Soma Chamber of Industry and Trade during in the interview:

> First of all, coal has become more important in every sense following the change of the government. Needy families receive coal aid every year at the moment. A production increase has occurred about this. Moreover, there were reserves not operated by ELİ, they have given these to private firms. We call this royalty here. They are paid some amount per ton they produce through ELİ and TKİ. Currently, 80-85% of production is made via the private sector, with royalty. Number of firms has increase, they have put new sites out to tender. ELİ has an awkwardness, this government solved this. Probably this would be so fatalist but coal is a blessing of God to Soma. None of the former governments were willing to value coal to such extent until now. Now the production has increased. Surely some troubles are experienced, we cannot deny… Soma was not a place visible from Ankara for example till the accident. You know what they say there's no such thing as bad advertising, our accident was such that. The name of Soma was heard by the whole world. It is always attractive for investment. This attraction was not known until this government. They have a very good logic on this subject. In terms of privatization, in terms of giving to private sector… They also provide employment, they also provide that. They found a good method (Q76).

Such arguments were clearly reflected in the statements of some workers. For example, there is a significant problem of unemployment since suspension of 2831 miners from Soma Coal Company six month after the massacre due to close down of the Eynez pit. It was frequently stated by the local people that coal companies and political actors have been arguing that Republican People's Party (main opposition party) and its Manisa deputy Özgür Özel are responsible for the unemployment in the basin. Accordingly, due to their opposition the government and coal companies are prevented to restart the operation of Eynez pit and this is why problem of unemployment cannot be resolved. This was reflected in the following statement of an unemployed miner:

> Nobody cares about us, everyone left us in the lurch. Özgür Özel promised, he said he would find a job to me, but he didn't. The only thing he did was to make the pit closed. If the pit was open, I would not be unemployed at least now (Q77).

Or during the visit two weeks before the 2017 Constitutional Referendum on Presidency, interviewees stated that they are going to vote yes given that Turkey needs political stability to become an independent and strong country and that the future of coal industry (therefore their employment) is directly influenced by political instabilities. It was again explained with reference to the problem of unemployment and the closed pit through statements such as:

> If stability comes, our pit will reopen, unemployment comes to an end, this would smooth our way (Q78).

From 2002 to 2019, in all elections (general, local, and referendums) AKP has been the leading party in Soma and Savaştepe districts. In Kınık, on the other hand, AKP won general elections both in 2014 and 2019 whereas since the massacre Republican People's Party has become the leading party both in general elections and in 2017 referandum. This difference of Kınık from other districts can be explained with the dominance of Alevi population. Population in Savaştepe on the other hand is relatively more conservative than the local populations of both Kınık and Soma. Success of AKP in Soma district is mostly stemming from dominance of the migrant families and the fact that labour control mechanisms mentioned so far are mostly operating within the Soma district. For example, as stated by most of the interviewees, hometown associations constitute the grassroots[17] for AKP in the basin.

During both the interviews and the statements in the prosecution process it was frequently stated that workers are forced to attend the public meetings of the AKP in the surrounding cities such as Manisa, Balıkesir, and İzmir by the coal companies. In return, workers who attended the meeting are paid extra per diem wage whereas workers refuse to attend are punished by cutting down per diem wage from their monthly salaries. Furthermore, cost of refusing to attend the meetings is more than a wage cut for a worker given that they are blacklisted by the coal companies. For example, as stated by a woman during the trials: "they were making my husband to go to their meeting forcefully. Once I asked why he went. He said, if you don't go they would dismiss you." Most of the workers stated that Soma Coal Enterprises Incorporated has become the "favourite of the AKP" within this period given that: Of course Ak party likes Soma Coal Company most. If İmbat sent one bus, Soma Coals sent 15 buses to the meetings".

It was frequently stated that it is quite common to become member of AKP in order to find a job in one of the coal pits of the basin. For example, as stated by an Alevi worker from a mountain village of Soma:

[17] Oy deposu.

> Probably others don't say but I would clearly say. I became a member of AK Party to get a job. I applied many times, they didn't hire me. People told me to try this. Then I went and became a member. They said there is someone, an engineer there, go and see him, say hello to him for me. Then I was immediately hired. Miners are all members of AK Party in our village. But actually, this locality is completely CHP supporters (Q79).

During the neoliberal transformation process in general and in the AKP period in particular Islamic notions and networks have consistently been used as labour control and inclusion strategy. Most significantly, *tarikat* and community networks have been used actively. On the one hand, social policies in the form of charity have been operated through these communities whereas on the other hand these communities operated as significant pedagogic bodies teaching obedience and gratitude. One of the most significant shortcomings of the field research has been the inability to concretely observe the *tarikat* networks in the basin. There was only one worker who stated that he was formerly a part of a *tarikat* and he mentioned the significance of the *tarikats* and communities as follows:

> Tariqats are effective here. For example to everyone… There was Nur community, Kadiri tariqat in the past. There is all around religious order here. I was also in Kadiri tariqat previously. Now I don't go there. There are many, they have meeting places, slaughtering spaces… Now they are building a dormitory. I mean they are large, effective (Q80).

In conclusion, in parallel with the strategic significance of coal industry various political, institutional and community dynamics within the Soma basin have been in the spheres of reproduction in order to guarantee the sustainability the investments. As argued by Jonas (1996: 327), the methods of local labour control regimes are developed through the interrelationships among workplace, family and community institutions, local trade union organisations, employer associations and local political parties through the use of various methods of control convenient to locality such as paternalism or corporate welfarism. In Soma, this is clearly exemplified in the interrelationship among the AKP government, coal companies, hometown associations and informal subcontractors, and Maden İş trade union. The most convenient method preferred by these actors has been the use of conflicting characteristics and interests of local and migrant workers stemming from different patterns of reproduction of labour power or denominational differences. To a certain extent, this has maintained following the massacre but under the crisis conditions

following the death of 301 miners, they developed additional discipline and control mechanisms.

5.4. Labour Discipline and Control Mechanisms in Soma After the Massacre: Clientelism – Wage Increases – Unemployment

During the following days of the massacre the then Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yıldız and the then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made successive statements in the TV programmes and in the press statements. Taner Yıldız's statements were mostly on the final situation of the pit and of the miners. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, on the other hand, adopted a tone marked by the "combination of defiance and fatalism" (Adaman, et al 2018: 1). For example, he responded the questions regarding the loss of lives of the workers with reference to the mining disasters from the mid 19th century England. Then, he employed the Islamic term "fıtrat" in order to explain that such tragedies are inherent and inevitable nature of the coal mining. Also, he visited the Soma district and was met by the fierce protests of the residents. The Prime Minister was forced to take cover in a supermarket in order to escape from the protestors and meanwhile one of his aides kicked one of the protestors.

As mentioned in the discussion on the prosecution process of Soma Massacre, eight people including the chairman of the executive board of the Soma Coal Enterprises were detained and get arrested three days after the massacre. Also, all pits operated by Soma Coal Company were closed down for six months. During that six-month period, miners working for Soma Coal Company received double wages. Six months after the massacre there were three significant developments that have determined the class relations in the basin. First, in November 2014, six-month after the massacre, 2831 miners employed in the pits operated by Soma Coal Company were fired by showing the financial bottleneck of the company stemming from the massacre as the justification. The second development is that in the context of the Omnibus Law No. 6552 enacted in September 2014, minimum wage for the underground coal miners was determined as double minimum wage and the maximum working hours as maximum 36 hours a week (this indicated the rise from one day off to two-day off). Finally, families of the deceased miners received a

significant amount of compensation. Besides compensations significant amount of financial aid were provided from different regions of the country or from the well-known people such as artists, football players etc; and the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKİ) initiated a housing project of 602 flats (two for each family).

Therefore, increasing financial inequality and the problem of unemployment have been determining the local class relations since the massacre and these two factors have been used as a considerably successful strategy of intra-class conflict by the power bloc in the basin. It has been clearly observed during the fieldwork that different groups of families bear hostility among each other. A striking example was witnessed in the summer of 2016 during the fieldwork. During the commemoration of the families of the deceased miners done in every month anniversary of the massacre, someone yelled at the families by telling:

> You received 500 thousand liras money, why do you still make a fuss?.

Then families attacked him and a clash between them took place. Then, it is found out that the man who yelled at the families was one of the unemployed miners. Another significant situation witnessed was that, during third anniversary meeting of the massacre, one of the women-wife of a deceased miner-got on the stage and made the following statement:

> I see some miners who still work and I want to spit in their face. You receive 3-4 thousand salary thanks to our dead husbands but you don't support our fight. You have never come to court. I don't give up that salary to you, may you get no benefit from it (Q81).

Unemployed workers have been experiencing a significant process of impoverishment since the massacre. Almost all unemployed interviewees stated that they were not expecting a suspension instead they were expecting the opening up of all pits of Soma Coal Company and to continue working there. All unemployed workers complained about the fact that their conditions were invisible. All attention of the state and the public is on the families of the deceased miners despite the fact that they do not have any financial difficulty. Statements such as "did we have to die to be seen?", "I wish I died, my children would not be starved at least", "nobody sees us because we didn't die, what would happen to us" were frequently used. On

the other hand, most of them were expressing an anger towards the families of the deceased miners and their improved financial situation. For example, as stated by an unemployed miner from Zonguldak:

> They saved themselves. All they bought a house, a car. I see them time to time. They all changed, they are now fancy. Surely because they found money (Q82).

Among these 2831 miners, only 53 of them filed a reemployment lawsuit. The reason for such low number of workers filing reemployment lawsuit was mostly explained with reference to their fear of not being able to find a job in the pits anymore. For example as stated by a miner who filed a lawsuit:

> Among these 2831 people, 53 people in total including me filed a restitution case. How bad. The aim is that; they think if you file a restitution case, you would be opposite to the company. The Union, Maden İş realized this. You will become unemployed, the pits will be opened anyway, you cannot be employed again if you file a case… (Q83).

Local and migrant families have been experiencing the process of unemployment in significantly different ways. All local unemployed miners stated that they started to work as per diem agricultural wage workers with their wives and children. For example, as stated by a miner from Kınık:

> Now I am going to farm to work with my wife… 50 liras daily wage, no insurance. My wife has always worked there but she was at least benefiting from my insurance at that time. Now we are both uninsured. We have no social security. Working conditions… Of course there is no work safety. Look an accident has just happened, 15 women workers died in Gölmarmara. If we have an accident or something like that happen… We go and return with tractor. If one of us got sick, what would we do? (Q84).

Migrant workers on the other hand stated that their conditions are even worse than the local workers financially due to both their relatively higher costs of reproduction stemming from lack of subsistence farming and payments such as rent or mortgage. On the other hand, given that their migration to Soma stemmed from their precarious conditions in their hometowns, most of them were not considering going back to their hometowns. For example, as stated by a miner from Zonguldak:

> No I can’t return back to Zonguldak yet. They don’t give money there too! Besides, everywhere is illegal pit. Everything is under your responsibility in an illegal pit. If you even died, you would be responsible. If you die, nobody would be informed about this anyway (Q85).

On the other hand, during this period, especially İmbat Coal Company has enlarged its pit and the number of employees rose from around three thousand to more than

six thousand. Moreover, new pits have been opened up for production. However, still, number of unemployed miners have been kept around three thousand. One of the most significant ways to protect around three thousand workers unemployed has been suspension of blacklisted workers for being a member of DİSK or participating in the demonstrations against coal companies or the government.

Most of the new employees were brought from Kütahya or Zonguldak. They also hired workers from among the 2831 unemployed workers but not all of them. According to the interviewees, this was a strategy of coal companies to discipline workers. The framework mentioned so far regarding the post-massacre period is directly related to the workers' various forms of relations to the land. It is observed that the advantage of maintaining agricultural production is reversed in this period and the firms started to prefer migrant workers. Especially the unemployment problem of the Turkmen Alevi (Çepni) community have been deepened in this period whereas the mass recruitments have mostly been collection of workers from Zonguldak or Kütahya and their surrounding cities. Both local and migrant workers argue for the firms' increasing preference of the migrant workers. Accordingly, the advantageous status of the local workers stemming from their continuing relation to the land and therefore lower costs of reproduction of the family is explained as the reason for their active participation in the oppositional movements after the massacre. Especially workers from Kınık argue that relatively stronger reaction/uprisings from Kınık following the massacre, in time, turned out to be an impediment for them to be employed in the mines. For example, as a 48-year-old miner who was working following his retirement and dismissed in the collective redundancy of November 2014 states:

> They never take Kınık people on the mine. Because they got on TV after the accident. If you apply and your place of birth is Kınık. You would never be hired. We had farming in the past, they deprived us of farm, we were forced to the mine. Now they are trying to take this too. What would happen to people of this locality? We have always been impoverished. We have always been more impoverished! (Q86)

On the other hand, migrant workers and even some workers based in Soma district were explaining stronger uprisings in Kınık when compared to Soma after the massacre with Kınık's stronger relations to the land and availability of more fertile land in Kınık:

> Kınık people are braver. Because they can find a job even in the absence of mine. Everywhere is fertile, they can cultivate the soil. This is a plain in the end (Q87).

This argument is reasonable to a certain extent given that it is more widespread in Kınık to maintain agricultural production or agricultural wage work. However, they were still not able to generate the income level as they used to as miners from agricultural production or agricultural wage work. Local workers, on the other hand argue that the reason they cannot form a united class struggle is the fear of migrant workers:

> We cannot be organized because of their cowardice, people are either tenants or in debt. If the sergeant tell them to enter where they would die, they would even enter there (Q88).

As a matter of fact it was quite common for the families from Kınık to maintain agricultural production on their own land or work in the big farms as per diem workers. Still, they could not generate the same amount of income they receive from mining from agricultural production. In short, intra-class conflict based on hometown is strengthened after the massacre.

Both for the local and migrant families, unemployment of miners directly influenced women's labour in production and reproduction. Historically, employment patterns and power relations stemming from it are being shaped under the assumption in which family's survival is possible through the income received by the "father" or "husband". This inevitably locates women as subsidiary labourers both within the family and in the workplace (Elson, 2002: 13-4). On the other hand, women's participation in wage employment may increase in times of crisis[18] given that women's labour is regarded as the reserve army to be used in the last resort. Under conditions when hopes of men to find a job are shattered or men become unable to provide sufficient income for the family women start working (Yaman, 2009: 6; Akgöz and Balta, 2015: 4).

Unemployment of their husbands mostly resulted in the over-exploitation of women's work in agriculture or in other non-registered employments on the one

[18] What is meant by crisis in the related literature is financial crisis such as 2008. Here, the term crisis is used with reference to a local dynamic in which, 301 miners died, significant degree of unemployment is experienced and women's labour is reconstructed accordingly.

hand, of their reproductive and emotional labour on the other hand. Indeed, wives of unemployed miners from local families frequently stated that their workload in agriculture increased following the suspension of their husbands. They mostly stated that when their husbands were employed in the mines they did not feel obliged to go for wage agricultural work every day or to the harvest of all products but after their husbands' unemployment they had no option to choose and most of the time they have to work for seven days a week and in the harvest of all products in the surrounding towns. Even if their husbands also started to work in the farms as agricultural wage workers after they were fired, it did not result in the unemployment of women due to the sharp sexual division of labour in the agricultural work discuused in Chapter III. As stated by a wife of an unemployed miner from Kınık for example:

> Of course, this is more difficult now. For example, I could say I am tired, I will not go to casual work today. I am 46 years old, you saw yesterday it was almost 50 degree. I would not have worked in such a weather if it was in the past. I go for seven days now compulsorily. Then, for example I would not have gone to olive to Akhisar in the past. Now I have no such chance. I go to any work any time. We have two children (Q89).

On the other hand, women's workload in the form of reproductive and emotional labour has also increased. It was frequently stated by wives of both unemployed miners and miners who survived from the pit that their husbands have been mentally depressed since the massacre and this has resulted in increasing pressure on women. On the other hand, given that it is traditionally women's responsibility to take care and manage the household, financial bottleneck of the family made it drastically harder. Most of them mentioned the difficulty even in feeding the family. For example, a striking conversation between two women (former is a mother of a deceased miner latter is a wife of an unemployed miner):

> - Are you still doing point lace?
>
> - Yes. What can else I do? We have three children, we are tenanted. Can someone eat pasta for three meals including breakfast? We are doing this.
>
> - Never mind. God bless your husband.
>
> -Amen. (Q90)

Miners who are currently employed in one of the coal pits on the other hand are under the threat of unemployment that is mostly applied by the informal subcontractors:

> Concern for unemployment is great. And the company uses this against workers. Mostly subcontractors use this. They say there are many people looking for a job outside, if you don't work it is up to you (Q91).

Wage increase made employment in Soma even more attractive both for local and migrant workers. Wage increase together with the increasing unemployment and therefore poverty has encouraged competition among the workers. In 2014, before the massacre miners' wages were around 1200-1300 Turkish Lira whereas the minimum pay rose to double minimum wage (around 2600 TL in 2016, more than 4000 in 2019). Due to the lack of sectoral diversity in the basin and the massive dispossession, competition for the relatively stable employment and high wages provided by the mining has increased. Simultaneous experience of the unemployment and wage increases have been used an instrument of oppression towards the miners and as stated by them "they cajole people into accepting the lesser of two evils" or "people have to make a choice between dying of starvation and dying in the mine" For example, one of the interviewees mentioned his worry due to the fact that there was a gas leakage in a production unit he was working as follows:

> Methane was found on our section, it is very bad if it is closed. I don't know if they would let us unpaid leave or directly dismiss (Q92).

As clearly seen in this phrase, he was scared of being unemployed more than gas poisoning that may cause his death.

Therefore, despite the insecure working conditions that led to the death of 301 miners, employment in the underground pits of Soma is still attractive for miners. For example, most of the migrant workers who started working in Soma explained the attractiveness of Soma with wage levels. As stated by a worker migrated to Soma from Zonguldak in 2016:

> If you ask if Soma is a place worth living, I say no. But because job opportunity is high… Normally people must have immigrated from Soma after such an accident. But the state has given such incentive payments … If the salaries were like in the past, this would not have been the case. Why? Someone away from home thinks like that.. I can

> already earn 1500 liras in my home town anyway. But the amount is over 3 thousand liras, this job becomes very attractive (Q93).

On the other hand, it is clearly observed that wage increase together with the threat of unemployment resulted in increasing obedience of the workers to the coal companies. Most of the workers explained the reason why they did not become a member of DİSK or resigned from DİSK with reference to risk of unemployment and to the fact that after the wage increase the cost of losing job has risen. For example, a miner who was formerly among the leaders of a strike called *Hema Direnişi* in Zonguldak argued that it was impossible to organise such resistance in Soma currently by stating that:

> Let me tell the important difference… If you tell these people to protest, they would not. Workers only have a head for their wage. This is the case both either in Soma or in Zonguldak. If a worker's wage is not paid for two months, does not get a raise, he/she would protest only in this case. No financial trouble is existing here, wages are good… Resistances like in Zonguldak do not rise here. Besides, class level is apparent, your education level is apparent. We cannot easily find such amount of money with this education level. I am and others are included in this… We could not find this easily, so we do not want to give up once we obtain. What can you do if you don't want to give up? You would be either lickspittle of the employer or you would work without opposing. You would say "all right" to everything… (Q94)

Therefore, simultaneous experience of wage increase and unemployment is used both against miners and unemployed people as a means of domination and results in obedience of both. Unemployed miners are afraid of being blacklisted and not be able to find a job again whereas miners currently working in the mines are afraid of being fired. This constitutes a significant barrier for formation of a united workers' movement. On the other hand, both unemployed and employed miners criticise the families of the deceased miners for their ongoing struggle by arguing that "they received a fair payment. Even more than they deserved actually. What else do they demand?".

It was not expected before the field research to observe willingness of, even competition among, workers to be employed in the underground pits after such a huge tragedy. Therefore, questions regarding the improvements on health and safety were posed. Workers frequently argued that further measures for workers health and safety were taken and firms began to pay much attention to it. In that sense, certain comparisons among the companies were made. For example, Demir Export was appreciated for belonging to the biggest and oldest business group of the country

and workers repeatedly underlined the higher standards of health and safety in Demir Export. However, immediately after Demir Export accomplished the preparation phase and started production, six miners were poisoned due to coal gas and taken to the emergency. Moreover, during the field research, in July 2016, a miner died in Demir Export due to explosion of a mirror.

Similarly, Imbat Madencilik was argued to be considerate of health and safety especially after the massacre. Only, workers in Soma Coal Company mentioned problems regarding the health and safety measures. For example, during a focus group interview with miners from Kütahya, worker employed in Soma Coal Company insistently argued that different from İmbat Coal Company their conditions have not been improved and they still work under risk:

> Yet, there is nothing related with work safety in us. I am already side by side with danger as soon as I come in the door and start going down to underground. Such an extent that. They (other workers employed in İmbat), there is nothing like that for us. For example, sometimes I can't find where I could step on. We cannot find a point to step on because everywhere is full of materials. What would happen if I fall down. I would either break my head or my arm or something else. Are they able to be overcome? They are not. I mean, even if 3001 people, rather than 301, died, the situation would not have been recovered. Does the state come to audit us? No it doesn't. I mean we don't know even if it comes. We don't even see. Any state man doesn't come and ask us if we are okay (Q95).

İmbat Coal Company was exclusively mentioned in this regard and statements such as "*İmbat is number one in safety"* were frequent. On the other hand, when questions such as "what are the measures taken" or "did the firms make new investments on safety" answers indicated that what is meant by increased health and safety measures is the increased pressure on workers not to give way to an accident. Given that it has been imposed upon the miners that the main reason for Soma massacre was workers' defect, incautiousness or carelessness, the solution offered is disciplining workers and punishing them in cases of lack of attention. For example it was frequently stated by workers in İmbat Coal Company that*:*

> Imbat is number one in safety. If you bang a nail on a wrong place, they would immediately cut off your daily wage (Q96).

On the other hand, under the claim of health and safety, workers having chronic illnesses or psychological problems have been experiencing a certain degree of precarity. Most significantly, as it was also underlined in the press that miners

mentally affected by the massacre were either fired or could not find a job in the pits. According to the claims of the workers, coal companies request a document showing their one-year prescriptions. For example, as stated by a worker in the interview in a newspaper[19]:

> I don't work. I also applied to other mines. Honestly, I don't want to work in the mine but I have home loan debts, so I applied to other mines to complete my remaining days left until my retirement and to look after my wife and children somehow. We were not able to be hired because of drugs we use. By reason of drugs we received from psychiatry. One year drug breakdown is included in requested documentation. Most friends may not get a job in such circumstances.

On the other hand, during the interviews, three miners told that their employment were terminated due to their chronic illnesses such as epilepsy, diabetes, and hernia by justifying the risk of bringing accident in the mines. For example, as stated by a miner from Soma who started to work in the mine for pension rights:

> We have always engaged in agriculture, we started working in the mine to get retirement. I worked for 11 years. 10 years 7 months. I fell sick in May 19. On the ground, organization site. When I opened my eyes I was in the sickroom. They brought me to the hospital. Doctor checked me. I went back to the workplace, they did not accept emergency report. I had an EG. It appeared I have epilepsy. Then they dismissed me. I did not want to quit. I was thinking I should at least complete this wage period. It did not happen. They told me this disease may cause accident underground. Actually they could make shift on the ground but they didn't do this. I applied for retirement due to disability. SGK rejected (Q97).

Therefore, by imposing the workers that mine disasters stem from defects of the workers, firms on the one hand are freed from the responsibility of the disasters whereas on the other hand discipline workers to work more efficiently. According to the findings of the field research this was successful to a significant extent that it was frequently argued by the miners that the reason behind the massacre can be lack of attention or even sabotage of the workers. For example, response of a worker from Soma working in Soma Coal Company to the question "what is the reason behind the accident, what do you think" was as follows:

> Workers' fault. Even… The man would have burned the band because he got angry at his subcontractor. But he could not estimate the things would reach to such an extent. He is an uneducated man in the end.

One final point to be underlined regarding the period after the massacre is the reflection of the statements of the representatives of the government on local

[19]https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2015/04/150410_soma_izlenim_rengin_arslan.

population and means through which they have been imposed. Naturalising the "accident" with reference to Islamic notions imposed through the mechanisms were mentioned with reference to the devil's triangle and especially hometown associations. It was frequently stated not only by interviewees but also by people who visited Soma after the massacre that, immediately after the massacre there were people with religious dress in the streets of Soma and visiting the victims of the disasters in their homes. Also, as mentioned before hometown associations are said to include strong religious networks. During the interviews, there were, at least ten workers explaining Soma massacre with religious/Islamic notions. For example, as stated by a miner retired from Soma Coal Company:

> This accident was an act of God. Nobody could understand the reason of it. These people are in prison, far away from their family. Who wants this? Who does this intentionally? (Q99).

Or as stated by a woman from Zonguldak whose husband works in İmbat Coal Company:

> They told us we should return back to Zonguldak after the accident. But nobody knows what would happen in future. There is no guarantee whether I would not have a car accident and die after going out. Death finds a person everywhere if the fatal date comes (Q99).

Consequently, local labour control mechanisms established by the "devil's triangle" prevents workers' integration at the production and reproduction processes and the networks operated through the informal subcontracting system, hometown associations, and religious relations constitute significant impediments for the formation of an organised class movement in the basin. For example, one of the workers whose job contract was terminated for being an active member of DİSK stated that one of his relatives who is an informal subcontractor and in the executive committee of Maden İş trade union told him that:

> Break off your organization (DİSK Dev Maden Sen), break with people there, agree to become a member of our Maden İş, I will make you get a job just tomorrow. But even I can't find you a job as long as you stand by them (Q100).

On the other hand, unemployed miners are under the threat of not being able to be employed in a coal pit whereas others are threatened by losing their jobs and by this way they are set against each other by the use of money and material conditions. As a result, participation in the oppositional demonstrations fell, workers did not prefer

to take a stand in the criminal court. They were afraid of being blacklisted. As a matter of fact, black listed workers due to the opposition towards Soma Coal Company for example cannot find a job in other firms either. Also, shopkeepers of the main street of the Soma district were mobilised against the workers who attended the meetings or other demonstrations in return for incentives such as interest free loan. It is frequently argued that they videotape the demonstrations and deliver to the coal companies and the trade union. Therefore, workers confined within these networks of revelation, targeting, competition, and coercion have not developed a strong alternative power against this local labour control strategies. Still there were certain attempts of organisation and moments or resistance since 2014. In the next section these attempts will be discussed.

5.5. Moments of Resistance: Attempts for Alternative Unionisations and Other Organisations Following the Massacre

Under such conditions of oppression, control, and coercion organised by the power bloc in the basin and the clear consent of the miner families mentioned so far there have been still moments of resistance in Soma from 2014 onwards. In this part, first, institutional actors of resistance such as oppositional trade unions and associations, then, two significant resistance movements will be examined.

Immediately after the massacre, Dev Maden Sen (Progressive Union of Miners) affiliated to DİSK opened a branch in Soma. DİSK which was established in 1967 was closed down in September 12 military coup and reopened in 1992. Dev Maden Sen on the other hand was established in 1959 under the name of MTA İŞ (workers of Mineral Research and Exploration Institute) and it was affiliated to Türk İş Confederation until 1975, then in 1975 it became a member of DİSK and organised not only in MTA but also TKİ, Demirçelik, and Etibank. Before it was closed down in 1980 after the military coup, the trade union had almost 25 thousand members in Turkey. In 1992, it was reopened with other trade unions affiliated to DİSK and in 1999 it was merged with another trade union affiliated to DİSK operating in the mining sector (Yeraltı Maden-İş) under the name of Dev Maden Sen.

According to the representatives of Dev Maden Sen, the trade union attracted a significant attention at the beginning. Almost all representatives and members of it stated: "On *the first days, people lined up to become a member of DİSK*". According to the claims of a representative of Soma branch, number of the members reached almost 1,000 at the beginning, then, in parallel with the labour control strategies operated from 2014 onwards such as the threat of unemployment, collective redundancies of the members of DİSK etc number of the members have continuously fell, to around 400-500 members in the summer of 2015.

Meanwhile, internal fights within the trade union started from 2015 onwards and a group of workers, without resigning the trade union engaged in opposition activities to the trade union. Therefore, there were two competing groups within the trade union to take over the administration in the Regular General Assembly held in April 2016 and both groups conducted campaign against each other for around six months. These groups were composed of the ones supporting existing administration and ones arguing for the need for change. Main point of refence for the opposition group was that, current chairman of the trade union is not a miner and is not willing to leave his seat but miners' union should be directed by the miners themselves by using the slogan: *"we are the ones who produce we will also be the one who govern"* (Q101). The first group won the elections and by arguing that they cheated in the elections the second group filed a lawsuit against the trade union.

Eventually, the second group resigned from Dev Maden Sen and established an independent trade union called Independent Miners Union in June 2018 by using the same slogan. In the opening press release of the trade union, besides the coal companies and Maden İş trade Union, Dev Maden Sen and DİSK have also been clearly criticised as follows[20]:

> In a business line where nearly two hundred thousand people are working, only 35 thousand workers are trade union members. The unions existing in this business line have been seized by the state and employers. They directly function as instruments of attack against working class. Trade unionists receive high wages and they engage in pillaging union dues of workers on subsistence and fake expenditure items. They are integrated with human resources and accounting departments of employers. The trade union affiliated to DİSK is only a signboard union, it functions as a tool for personal prosperity search of directors in DİSK. They reject our membership application on the

[20] http://bagimsizmaden.org/2018/06/12/bagimsiz-maden-iscileri-sendikasi-kuruldu/.

> excuse that we may be opponent to them. Sometimes they caused us dismissed by reporting us to the employers. We have obtained certain concrete achievements in certain basins in direction of Maden İşçileri Meclisleri study we have carried out in our business line after Soma massacre. We made decision for establishment of an independent mine workers union head office of which will be located in Soma where 16 thousand miners work collectively as a result of meetings organized in Soma, Divriği, Çetinkaya, İliç, Kangal, Hekimhan, Zonguldak, Bartın, Murgul, Yatağan, Afşin-Elbistan and Akçakale.

Therefore, currently, there are two opposition trade unions in Soma both having quite limited number of members and trying to organise workers under the conditions when there is intense pressure over workers. During the interviews with the representatives of both trade unions, interviewees insistently underlined the difficulties of organising workers in Soma basin. For example, as stated by a local representative of Dev Maden Sen during an interview in July 2015 (before the split):

> At the beginning, we saw about 1000 members. At that time, significant number of workers was coming. But they prevent this by putting something into practice. We can also criticize us. We probably made wrong discussions. Of course we had some fault, I don't justify us. But in general sense, the state applied a serious pressure. This necessarily inflicted the union. Besides, when you talk about a union, the thing coming to mind is very different here… For example, we do a training practice in every village we visit. About how a trade union should be, so-and-so. We start telling the process so basically… How a worker can be unaware of collective bargaining articles! We even have to tell what collective bargaining is (Q102).

Similarly, Kamil Kartal General Secretary of Independent Miners Union, uses the following metaphor "labour organization in Soma is like acting as a mine field donkey" (Bütün, 2015: 255). What he means is that it is quite difficult to organise workers who suspect the word trade union itself. Accordingly, the idea of trade union for workers in Soma is directly related to the coal companies and it is quite difficult to gain their confidence. Moreover, during the conversations with Kamil Kartal throughout the field research, it became clear that the impact of religion is the main problem for organisers to organise workers in a trade union. As stated by Kamil Kartal:

> Religion is very effective. Families become introverted. Then of course, religious orders get involved. Now if you ask, most of them consider the incident as a destiny (Q103).

On the other hand, in November 2014, Social Rights Association (SHD) opened a branch in Soma. SHD is an association based in İstanbul and has three branches in İskenderun, Adana, and Soma. Under the slogan of "social rights for everyone" SHD is engaged in defending social rights in issues such as workers' rights, women's

rights, right to the city, ecology etc. In Soma, SHD has been pursuing a struggle that is not limited to the working conditions or rights of the miners but also including the condition of small agricultural producers and agricultural workers, and struggle against the ecological genocide in the basin. Since 2014, Social Rights Association has organised variety of activities in Soma such as miners' councils, women's workshops, summer schools for the children of the miners and agricultural workers, struggle against the newly constructed powerplant in Kozluören village[21]. Moreover, SHD has followed up the prosecution process of Soma Massacre both through advocating the families in the criminal court and organising the families to follow up the criminal process.

From 2014 onwards, there have been two significant and successful resistance movements in Soma. The first one was against the construction of a coal fired power plant and grabbing of the olive groves for it in Yırca in November 2014, whereas the second was against the collective redundancy of DİSK members by the İmbat Coal Company.

Yırca is a small village of Soma having around 400 residents. Main means of living in Yırca is agriculture, especially olive cultivation and there are quite limited number of miners (four in the summer of 2016) different from most of the villages of Soma. However, Yırca has been affected by coal mining in a different way that in April 2014, the then Council of Ministers decided for urgent expropriation in Yırca for construction of a power plant by Kolin Incorporated. Once received the notification, families appealed the decision and when this process was continuing. In October 2014, Kolin Incorporated went to Yırca and cut down 511 olive trees. Then, residents of Yırca started stand guarding the olive grove to protect the rest of the trees from the Kolin company until November 7. In November 7, at 6:00 am, an assault was organised by the Company together with private security forces and they cut down 6 thousand olive trees. Later in the very same day, the Council of State adopted a motion for stay of execution. According to the decision of the Council of

[21] In May 2014, againts the construction of a new powerplant in Kozluören village of Soma, families from Kozluören and representatives from SHD pitched their tents to organise a struggle againts the construction of the powerplant. But due to lack of attention to the struggle from the residents of the village, it was a short-lived struggle.

State, it was not legal to construct a powerplant in an olive grove. Therefore, despite the cut down of the olive trees, struggle in Yırca prevented the construction of the power plant.

Leaders of the struggle in Yırca were women and their main fear was conviction of Yırca to coal industry like other villages of Soma but in a different way. They were insistently underlining the threat against the health of their children due to the air pollution stemming from coal fired power plants. As stated by a woman during the resistance: "They died in the mine for once, we are dying slowly."[22] Then, by refusing conviction, of their lives to the coal powerplants and coal mines, women in Yırca decided to form an alternative means of living and initiated a collective life based on soup production. They established an association of Yırca Village and affiliated Yırca Hanımeli İktisadi İşletmesi. Women mainly produce soup made up of olive oil, and food products such as gravy or tarhana and sell them either online or through other means. Women in Yırca claim that their struggle for olive trees has taught them so much that they united to produce collectively:

> We have learned unionizing in the olive resistance. We have interlocked to each other. Look, our olives were cut but we retained our fields. Now we are united in soap house. I realized that working and earning your own money is such good.[23]

Another striking resistance during this process was organised by the miners fired from İmbat Coal Company in December 2015. Starting from December 17, 2015 miners in İmbat Coal Company were informed that their contracts were terminated when their personnel card was not scanned in the gate. As stated by a miner who is among the first ones to know:

> I went to the day shift by 17th of the month. In this morning, I saw that the device did not read my card in the entrance. I asked. They told me to go and as the personnel. The man had 3-4 pages of A4 paper, he was looking at the list… Your labor contract was terminated. I asked the reason. Nonconformity. The employer finds you abstracted, you may cause an accident. I said say the real reason to me, what is the real reason. No answer. I yelled, asked if it is because of the union. They asked me what my union is. I said Dev Maden Sen, they said we don't know such a union. Volkan was with me at the same time. Then Serkan could not enter the day shift in the same way… (Q104).

[22] https://baslangicdergi.org/olmez-agac-yirca-direnisi-ve-direnisin-oznesi-kadinlar/.

[23] https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/yircali-kadinlar-birlik-olmayi-zeytin-direnisinden-ogrendik-206721.html.

The next morning, workers went to the coal company with their lawyers to learn the "real reason" why they got fired. They waited in front of the pit until the evening. And in the evening lawyer of the company explained that 29 workers' contract were terminated. On the very spot, 12 of the workers decided to start a protest in front of the entrance of the coal pits under the slogan "we want our jobs back". Later that night, all twelve workers were detained by the military police.

The next day, following their release, they conducted a meeting to plan the rest of the resistance and their number from the beginning fell to four workers. Others were claimed to be both afraid of after the detain and decided to give up and wait for the severance payment instead. Starting from that day, four workers pitched a tent in front of the coal pit and started the resistance. However, during this process, as mentioned by one the workers, there have been continuous discussion among the workers on the role of Dev Maden Sen in their resistance. Three workers, having more radical political stance, refused the name of DİSK in the resistance and they decide to call it "resistance of the workers of İmbat". In time, one of them who is also a delegate of Dev Maden Sen, stated that he started to feel uncomfortable with terrorization of their struggle due to the radical political engagement of the other three workers and their rejection of DİSK to be a part of the struggle. He left the resistance in the 24th day. Remaining three workers continued the struggle for more than 60 days and they were detained more than 10 times.

During this process, there were series of meetings and negotiations with the general director of the İmbat Coal Company but he refused to reemploy them. For example, as stated by the brother of one of the insurgents that during the meeting the general director told:

> If legal actions have been taken, they would have chance to take back their job but if I reengage them, everyone dismissed would attempt to put up a tent in front of the company. All workers see them every day while they are coming to job. It is impossible after that point (Q105).

But then when he met his brother to tell the words of the general director, his brother decided to make the resistance "even more radical" and at the same day he climbed the high voltage tower in front of the pit and told that "we want our jobs back and if our request is not complied I will jump off". Then, after seven hours, they were told

that their request would be complied and two days later, they were hired by other two companies (one by Soma Coal Company, two by Demir Export).

Imbat resistance was a significant and successful resistance given that the demands of the workers were complied. However, there is a need to underline two significant dynamics of it. To begin with, the resistance was limited to the problem of employment/unemployment but did not have a content regarding the rights of the miners in the basin as a whole such as health and safety. Instead the resistance remained limited to the employment of three workers. Secondly, despite they got their jobs back, they were not hired by the company that terminated their contracts. This indicates a significant collaboration among the coal companies. As mentioned by the general director of İmbat company, it would be a loss of control for the company over the workers if they hire them back in İmbat Coal Company on the one hand but on the other hand, the resistance had to be stopped. The solution was found through the collaboration of the coal companies. Therefore, İmbat resistance also exemplifies intra-class solidarity of the capitalist class. As a matter of fact, during the interviews with the miners from İmbat Coal Company, it was frequently stated that their resistance was shown as a threat towards them by their supervisors. For example, as stated by one of them:

> They have already been dismissed because they did not work, they were absent. Our sergeant was always showing us this tent by saying that you will be there if you don't work hard. (Laughing). After their tent issue, production has increased and absence ended in İmbat. The company did not take them back, said I would not take back a man who did wrong to me (Q106).

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The main motivation behind this thesis was to understand and analyse the relationship between extractive investments and transformation of the rural means of livelihood with reference to the patterns of dispossession and proletarianization, labour processes and labour control strategies, and power relations in Soma coal basin from the 2000s onwards. More specifically, the thesis has sought to address how existing forms of labour processes in the coal mines and in agriculture, sexual division of labour, social relations of reproduction, and local labour control mechanisms in Soma coal basin were shaped through neoliberal transformation of agriculture and coal industry in Turkey and by different patterns of proletarianization in Soma accordingly. As a matter of fact, simultaneous experience of increasing dominance of capitalist relations in agriculture in parallel with neoliberal transformation of agriculture and transfer of coal production to the private companies as a result of increasing significance of coal industry in general and the coal extracted in Soma in particular for the Turkish economy have determined the class relations from the 2000s onwards. During the mid-2000s, on the one hand, local population who have historically received their income from tobacco production were experiencing the simple reproduction squeeze due to the increasing input prices and falling tobacco prices under the impact of neoliberal agricultural policies. Hence they have started to search to diversify their income preferably through wage income. On the other hand, in the context of the Turkish governments' "coal rush" to overcome the problem of energy dependency by encouraging the use of domestic coal in the electricity production, the coal extracted in Soma has gained significance. With increasing incentives to the coal investors, private sector

investments in the underground coal pits have drastically increased from 2005 onwards. Therefore, this process has entailed the formation of a local labour market in Soma through different patterns of proletarianization involving both the local (rural) population and the families migrating from other mining towns.

This thesis has adopted a relational Marxist methodology that analyses any fact within the wider (historical) processes and relations within which it arose and developed. Focusing on relations and processes rather than things enables to explore the processes and mechanisms within which it happened. Analysis of labour processes and labour control strategies (exploitation, control, and discipline of the workers) in a particular time and locality is internally related to the processes within which those workers have been compelled to sell their labour to a particular capitalist. Moreover, it is argued in this thesis that relational Marxist methodology should overcome the dualistic analysis of relations of production and of social reproduction. Hence, the need to put the labour processes within the relations of reproduction and therefore gender analysis at the centre of the analysis. This is particularly significant for the analysis of extractive investments in the countryside. Since the processes within which male population in the countryside are compelled to sell their labour power to extractive capital also indicate the feminisation of agricultural production and transformation of women's reproductive labour. Therefore, the impact of coal investments in Soma has been analysed with reference to these interrelated processes:

- Impact of neoliberal transformation of agriculture in Turkey on Soma and formation of a rural (local) labour market through the processes of dispossession and proletarianization of the small agricultural producers,
- Sexual division of labour in the extractivist regions in the productive and reproductive work within the processes of proletarianization and feminisation of agricultural labour,
- Labour processes and labour control strategies in the extractivist regions.

Based on relational Marxist and materialist feminist methodologies, in Chapter II, theoretical background of the research developing a discussion by combining three literature has been provided. First, formation of a rural labour market and class

formation in the countryside has been discussed with reference to the Marxist analysis of primitive accumulation and contemporary debate on its permanency. As long as primitive accumulation is defined as a process within which immediate producers are transformed into proletarians with the decay of peasant economy and the debate on its permanency is based on Rosa Luxemburg's claim that capital accumulation continuously needs the means of production and the labour power of the non-capitalist social settings, the discussion on proletarianization under neoliberalism should start with the discussion of primitive accumulation and its permanency. Proletarianization, accordingly, indicates the processes of impoverishment, dispossession, commodification of the means of production and subsistence for the rural population. Critical question for the proletarianization literature is whether proletarianization necessitates a complete detachment from the land or not. The answer for this study is found in the works of Lenin and Kautsky.

Significance of Lenin and Kautsky for this study has been underlined with reference to the fact that that contemporary discussion on the diversification of rural means of livelihood is grounded on their analyses of the proletarianization of peasantry. Both Lenin and Kautsky revised the Marxist discussion on the elimination of peasantry by underlining that it is a contradictory and complicated process constantly subject to contradictory tendencies. Their analyses of the proletarianization of peasantry do not define this process as a zero sum game and therefore do not see complete detachment from land as a necessary condition of proletarianization. Accordingly, peasants selling their labour in agriculture and in other sectors while possessing a certain plot of arable land are also defined within the "rural proletariat". Therefore, as argued by Lenin, the defining feature of rural proletariat is their "inability to exist without sale of the labour power" (1974: 177) even if they continue agricultural production on their own land.

Then, the thesis has undertaken a view of the contemporary literature focusing on the proletarianization patterns under neoliberalism which underlines that there is no uniform and linear path of proletarianization that can be associated with either persistence or elimination of the peasantry. Accordingly, proletarianization is claimed to indicate diversification of the rural means of livelihood within which subsistence farming, petty commodity production and wage work in agriculture and off-farm

employment may be simultaneously experienced in the countryside. Accordingly, rural households experiencing the "simple reproduction squeeze" (Bernstein, 1979) and unable to reproduce themselves in parallel with simultaneous increase of the cost of production and decrease of the returns of labour have had no option but to sell their labour power under neoliberalism. In parallel with his definition of transformation of the rural means of livelihood with reference to the transformation not only of production but also of social relations of reproduction, Bernstein conceptualises this rural household as "classes of labour" (2010). Based on Lenin and Kautsky's analysis of proletarianization of the peasantry having different and contradictory patterns he defines classes of labour as a rural working class household neither completely dispossessed of all means of reproducing itself nor possessing sufficient means to reproduce itself. Accordingly, classes of labour depend on the sale of their labour power for their daily reproduction so as to diversify their means of income rather than complete detachment from land.

Moreover, new paths of labour migration have been experienced under neoliberal rural development policies based on employment creation in the countryside especially through extractive investments. This has brought the need to highlight the characteristic features of the rural labour market with reference to the differences between local and migrant workers. In order to elaborate these discussions, Burawoy's (1976) analysis of migrant worker has been used in Chapter II according to which migrant workers' disadvantageous position stems from their inability to reproduce themselves due to the externalisation of costs of reproduction in contrast to the members of the local rural household reproducing themselves on their own land.

As our research has shown, proletarianization has not taken a uniform and unilinear path in Soma coal basin. Instead there have been different patterns of proletarianization and different relations of miner families to the land and agriculture and these differences have determined the local class relations from the 2000s onwards. The first difference in the patterns of proletarianization is between local and migrant families. Increasing demand for miners after the initiation of royalty tender in 2005 was mostly met by the local population who has become unable to reproduce themselves solely by the income generated by agricultural

production. Meanwhile families from other mining towns such as Zonguldak and Kütahya and towns historically supplying labour to Zonguldak such as Bartın, Ordu, and Çorum have migrated to Soma to work in the underground mines. Main difference between the local and migrant families stems from their difference in the processes of reproduction and migrant families' relatively higher dependency on income received from mining. Accordingly, the fact that miner families are not able to continue agricultural production at least for their subsistence was increasing their cash dependency and mostly resulted in indebtedness. This has resulted in relatively weaker and obedient position of migrant families towards the mining companies both in the workplace and in their social relations.

On the other hand, there are significant differences among the local families regarding the patterns of proletarianization and their relation to land and agricultural work. During the field research, four different patterns of proletarianization and relation to the land among the local families were observed. The first group of families were maintaining agricultural production. As the income received from petty commodity production was not sufficient for the survival of the family, male members have started working in the underground mines whereas agricultural production continues through women's labour. Most of these families are using the income received from mining to finance the cost of agricultural production. In the second group of families, miners' wives are working as daily wage labourers in agriculture and their relation to land is limited to wage work. Some of these families do not have arable land and they were agricultural workers even before they started mining. These families underlined that income received from wage work in agriculture has also fallen following the neoliberal transformation of tobacco production therefore male members started to work in mines whereas women are maintaining daily wage work in agriculture. On the other hand, among the families of this second group there are ones still possessing land but have given up production on their own land. They either lease their land or it remains unused. The third group of families include the first two groups in which mining, daily wage work in agriculture, and petty commodity production are maintained simultaneously through the use of labour power potential within the family in various ways. Last group, on the other hand, is composed of unemployed miner families within which

all family members work as daily wage workers in agriculture. Even if some of the families in this group have their own land they cannot cultivate it as they lack regular income to finance the costs of agricultural production.

As discussed with reference to the relevant literature and observed during the field research in Soma, proletarianization in the countryside is a complicated process constantly subject to contradictory tendencies. Thus it is not a unilinear and zero sum process of detachment from the land. What has been experienced in the basin is the proletarianization of the rural population through diversification of the sources of income and the formation of a rural (local) labour power composed of local and migrant workers having different means of reproducing themselves.

It was also argued in Chapter II and Chapter III that rural transformation, proletarianization and impact of extractive investments in the countryside should not be complete without a gendered analysis. Accordingly, the analysis of primitive accumulation and proletarianization should be extended to the development of the new forms of sexual division of labour in wage and unwaged forms and construction of new forms of patriarchal relations under different phases of capitalism. On the one hand, against the identification of neoliberal transformation of agriculture and dispossession of the peasantry with male proletarianization *per se*, feminisation of agricultural labour within the process of diversification of rural means of livelihood is underlined. On the other hand, against the formal separation of the spheres of production and reproduction under capitalism and the analyses defining the sphere of reproduction as “non-capitalist”, transformation of women’s reproductive work (which is capitalist as it reproduces the most significant means of production that is labour power) in the extractivist regions is underlined.

In this thesis, observations on women’s productive and reproductive labour in Soma aimed to contribute to the ongoing discussion within the last few decades on the relation and the schematic differentiation between the production and social relations of reproduction. Most significantly, the transforming impact of extractivist investments on agricultural labour in general and women’s labour in particular should not be disregarded. It is significant to underline that households based agricultural production, just like the household itself, contains patriarchal relations.

Therefore, the analysis of household-based production or household as a unit of analysis should be centred around a gendered analysis.

As a matter of fact, it was observed during the field research that in parallel with the neoliberal transformations in Soma, women's productive and reproductive work have drastically changed. Thus, in this study women's labour in the basin is defined as an invisible labour overexploited within this process. In fact, proletarianization processes in Soma have indicated the feminisation of agricultural labour in at least one of the following forms: (unpaid) subsistence production, petty commodity production, agricultural wage work. In the subsistence and petty commodity production, women work as unpaid family labourers. One significant point to be underlined in regards to the petty commodity producers is that making the contract or marketing the products are still managed by their husbands whereas women are involved in agriculture with their labour power. Therefore, feminisation of agriculture in Soma indicates the increasing exploitation of women's labour in agriculture. Female agricultural wage labourers are working on a daily basis and without social security. On the other hand, as the labour processes of the labour power reserve within the family have been transformed and diversified, their reproduction has also been reconstructed. Women have frequently underlined their increasing workload in housework since their husbands started to work in the mines. Most of the women interviewees stated that they do not have spare time at all and some of them were engaged in petty commodity production, subsistence production, agricultural wage work and reproductive work simultaneously. As frequently stated to define the period from the 2000s onwards: "here, women never stop working".

Labour processes and local labour control strategies in the basin are shaped and developed in accordance with the different patterns of proletarianization and composition of the local labour market. Chapter II, therefore, has included the discussion on the role of extractive investments in the transformation of rural means of livelihood, on labour processes and development of labour control strategies with reference to the labour process and labour control literature.

It has been argued that under neoliberalism, extractive investments in the countryside result in a new form of rural class struggle whose protagonists are

peasants in the process of proletarianization. As long as extractive investments are not mobile and cannot be simply re-located, certain strategies of control in the workplace and within the local community have to be developed in line with the composition of the local labour market. The theoretical discussion on labour control has been made with reference to the studies underlining the local embeddedness of labour process. Accordingly, the analysis of labour process, capital accumulation, and local economy are internally related. As workplaces are embedded in structures of larger scales, local labour control should be defined with reference to the interrelationship among the organisations of the work, community and family institutions, local trade union organisations, and local political parties.

During the field research, it was observed that factors that shape the labour processes in the coal pits and local labour control mechanisms in Soma have been the increasing significance of coal industry for the Turkish economy from the 2000s onwards with implications for the emergence of different patterns of proletarianization and composition of the local labour market. In accordance with these, certain labour control and discipline mechanisms have been developed starting from the recruitment process of miners to the coal mines to organisation of the daily life in the basin. Two features of the Turkish economy from the 2000s onwards have made coal industry a strategic sector especially from the 2010s onwards. 2000s is marked by jobless growth of the Turkish economy that have two direct implications for the coal industry. The first is the increasing demand for energy stemming from the economic growth whereas the second is increasing significance of investments having potential of employment generation. With the process of neoliberal transformation in agriculture in general, tobacco production in particular, the dispossession and proletarianization of the rural population resulted in increasing significance of extractive industries in the Soma basin under the discourse of "employment generation in the countryside". The second and the most significant dynamic of Turkish economy for coal industry has been the growing current account deficits stemming especially from imported energy. Therefore, orientation towards a domestic coal instead of imported natural gas especially in electricity production has become a policy priority from the 2010s onwards in the documents such as Tenth Five Year Development Plan (2014-2018) or National

Energy and Mining Policy (2017). Within this context, certain incentives to the coal industry have been provided by the government and one of the most significant incentives has been the privatisation method of the coal production, namely, royalty tender. Through the royalty tender, TKİ transfers operation of the pits to private companies and as the sole customer of the coal provides a guarantee of purchase regardless of the amount of the coal extracted. This has made the industry attractive and profitable for the investors and as observed in the case of Soma, resulted both in significant corporate growth of coal companies and encouraged big conglomerates to invest in the industry.

It is argued in Chapter IV that, in Soma, labour processes and labour control mechanisms in the coal pits are directly shaped by the strategic significance of coal industry for the Turkish economy and the terms and conditions of the royalty tender. As, under the royalty tender, the only way to make profits for the coal companies has become extraction of maximum amount of coal by using labour intensive methods, the labour process (recruitment process, organisation of work, and labour control strategies in the workplace) is organised in accordance with that objective. First, miners start to work in the coal mines through labour intermediaries called *dayıbaşı* who act as an informal subcontracting mechanism. Informal subcontractors who are also hired by the companies as waged workers provide miners to the coal companies using their networks based on kinship and hometown. Beside their wages they receive additional payments for each worker they provide. On the other hand, as detected from the stories of miners during the fieldwork, the more significant function of informal subcontractors is to guarantee the extraction of maximum possible amount of coal through implementing "production pressure" (as defined by miners) over their team. As stated by almost all interviewees, the production pressure may take various forms such as insults, physical violence, or threat of unemployment.

Informal subcontractors do not follow up the labour process during the whole shift. Instead within each subcontracting team, the work is organised in a strictly hierarchical way. Each subcontracting team is divided in subgroups from which sergeants are responsible. As defined by the miners, sergeants are the sub-subcontractors having relatively smaller teams under the subcontracting teams. Working as subcontracting teams has two significant functions for the coal

companies. The first function is to increase productivity through strict control of the miners through the use of informal networks. As stated by most of the interviewees, it is not otherwise possible for the managers or shift supervisors to control the production process as the coal pits are quite large and in each shift a large number of miners between 1,000 and 2,000 are involved. The second function is limiting the socialisation of the workers by allocating them into subcontracting teams. Thereby, the significant risk for the formation of an organised labour movement would be mitigated. As mentioned by all interviewees, most of the time, it would be neither possible nor plausible for the miners to have relations with the other teams.

It has been elaborated in Chapter V that, informal subcontracting system has impact beyond the coal pits since it operates as a labour control mechanism throughout the basin through its aboveground reflection, namely hometown associations. In line with the theoretical discussion on the local labour control regimes in Chapter II, it was argued that they operate in collaboration with the firms, state, local community institutions and local political and social organisations. It is observed during the field research that hometown associations signify an important labour control mechanism in the basin. Through these associations, while miners' lives are divided on religious, cultural and spatial bases, the miner families have been provided an alternative mechanism of socialisation instead of an oppositional trade union. Therefore, they have also been instrumental in preventing the formation of a united opposition of the miner families. As observed during the field research, hometown associations have direct relations to the so called "devil's triangle" as called by the miners to explain the collaboration between the state, coal companies and Maden İş Trade Union. Hometown associations are represented in the administration of the trade union while associations are established by and operated through the informal subcontracting system. Thus, it can be argued that this system is directly manifested in the collaboration of the devil's triangle.

Chapter V has also provided the changing forms of labour control and discipline mechanisms since the Soma Massacre. Accordingly, the main power relations have been maintained after 2014 but as a fatal disaster was experienced in the basin certain additional mechanisms have been developed through the collaboration of the same actors. On the other hand, it can be argued that political interventions of the state in

Soma have increased following the massacre and it can be explained with reference to the strategic significance of coal industry in general and the coal of Soma in particular for the Turkish economy. It was argued in Chapter II that defining characteristic of the labour control regimes in extractive regions is the inability to re-locate the investments due to the geographical fixity of the resources. Therefore, in order not to sacrifice the significance of Soma's coal after the massacre, the government made certain interventions in order to guarantee the maintenance of the investments in Soma. One of the most significant interventions has been over the prosecution process of the Soma massacre. If the punishments would have been in line with the expert reports that blame the company, TKİ, and coal policies in general, the result of the prosecution process would have changed the future of the industry. In order to prevent this, there have been series of interventions by the government.

On the other hand, after the massacre, simultaneous experience of the clientelism to the families of deceased miners, unemployment and wage increases has triggered competition and disintegration among the miner families. Unemployed families have been experiencing a significant impoverishment and are complaining about being invisible whereas on the other hand families of the deceased miners have received significant amounts of compensation, assistance, or opportunities such as becoming a civil servant or two flats provided by TOKİ. Meanwhile, wages of miners have been doubled and their social rights have been extended. As the working conditions have been improved competition for the employment in mines has escalated. On the other hand, this has prevented the formation of united oppositional movements as miners have been threatened either by not being able to find employment opportunity anymore or by being fired.

Still, there have still been moments of resistance in Soma basin after the massacre such as attempts for alternative unionisations or resistance movements. It was discussed in Chapter V that, these attempts have been limited for several reasons such as the oppression and control mechanisms employed in the basin, internal fights within the movements, notwithstanding the increasing attractiveness of employment in the coal mines of Soma. However, it is argued in this thesis that the main reason behind the failure of the oppositional movements has been limitation of their content to the employment conditions in the coal mines.

This research has aimed at revealing the wider processes within which class relations have been transformed from the 2000s onwards. The research therefore has been built on the holistic analysis of the transformations beyond the current employment conditions in the underground pits of Soma. It has been argued that the transformation has three inter-related dimensions. First, existing social structure in Soma is a direct consequence of the impoverishment and dispossession of small agricultural producers as a result of commodification of their means of livelihood following the neoliberal transformation of agriculture. This has indicated the proletarianization of the rural households through the sexual division of labour. Secondly, in the context of the "coal rush" of Turkey, underground coal pits of Soma have been enlarged and the labour process has been shaped by this coal rush. Therefore, the working conditions in the underground coal pits of Soma that has resulted in the decease of 301 miners indicates more than the technical division of labour within a particular firm but a reflection of the coal and energy policies in Turkey. Thirdly, this process has indicated the over-exploitation of women's invisible labour in agriculture and in reproductive work within the labour. They have been working without social security, the number of deadly accidents especially during the transportation of the agricultural workers has drastically increased from the mid 2000s onwards. On the other hand, one of the most significant outcomes of this process has been and will increasingly be ecocide, air pollution, and increasing threat to the health of the local population.

As the processes of expropriation and exploitation in Soma include all these dimensions the struggle against these should be multi-dimensional. The reason behind the failure of the resistance movements and alternative organisations attempted so far has been limitation of their endeavour to the rights of the miners and/or conditions of employment in the mines. Main claim of this study is that since the impact of neoliberalism in Soma has not been limited to the working conditions in the coal mines but has entailed the expropriation of land, dispossession and impoverishment of the small producers, over-exploitation of women and ecocide, the struggle should involve all these processes and actors. Therefore, struggle for the rights of the miners should not be independent from struggle of the farmers, land struggles, struggle of women, and struggle against the ecocide.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: ORIGINAL TURKISH VERSIONS OF THE STATEMENTS QUOTED FROM THE INTERVIEWS

Q1 : Benim burada söylediklerimin nasıl kullanılacağını bilemem. Ben hesap veremem sonra. Şirketler de bize bağlı. Bizden izin çıkmadan görüşme yapamazlar. Sonuçta ruhsat sahibi biziz. Burada ocak işleten üç şirket var; Demir Export, Soma Kömürleri ve İmbat. En büyükleri İmbat, 6500 civarı çalışanı var. Oradan ancak Gökalp (genel müdür) cevaplayabilir sizin sorularınızı onun için de bizim iznimiz lazım. Dolayısıyla, onlarla görüşebilmek için de bakanlık izni lazım.

Q2 : Biz o zaman ne madene girmeyi düşündük, ne termik santrale. Zaten onların tazminat olarak alacaklarını biz bir üründe alıyorduk. Oraya girmemizin bir anlamı yoktu.

Q3 : Zaten Cumhuriyet'ten itibaren tarım ülkesiyiz biz. Soma da bir tarım kenti. Ama Soma'nın tarımcı kenti olması Akhisar veya Kınık gibi değil. Şunun için değil, oraların çok büyük ovaları var, geniş ovaları var ve sulu tarım yapıyorlar. Soma ise Bakırçay'ın ilk doğduğu yerlerden biri, dar bir vadi içerisinden geçiyor Bakırçay. O yüzden de sulu tarım yapılabilecek alan neredeyse yok Soma'da. Soma genellikle, onun için, bir tütün kenti olarak geçiyor. Çünkü tütün kıraç topraklarda yetişir, suya ihtiyaç duymaz. Soma'da toprağın özelliğinden dolayı esas tarım ürünü tütündür. Yani bakın size ölçü olarak şunu vereyim ben, aşağı yukarı 70'li yıllarda Soma'nın nüfusu 29 bin civarında, bunun 19 bini köyde yaşıyor. 4.300-4.800 civarında

hane tütünle ilgileniyor. Tütünü şöyle hesaplamanız lazım, tütün bir aile tarımı olduğu için bunu dörtle çarpacaksınız. Soma'da aşağı yukarı 17-18 bin kişi, tütünle geçinen kırsal alandaki insan o zaman. Bugün çözülenler, madene girenler bunlar.

Q4 : Önceden açık piyasaydı. Ben istediğim tüccara tütünümü verirdim. Tekel de vardı o zaman. Tekel'e de verebilirdim. Fiyat belirlerdi, tütüne gelir bakarlardı. Bütün tüccarlar… Tütün tüccarları gelir bakarlardı. Sen gelirdin benim tütüne 5 lira verirdin öteki gelirdi 6 lira verirdi, öteki gelir 4 lira verirdi., öteki bilmem ne verirdi… Hangisi fazla veriyorsa ben ona verirdim tütünümü. Satamadım mı, bilirdim ki Tekel'e verebilirim.

Q5 : Biz tütün ekiyorduk, örneğin on dönümlük tarla. Onun bir dönümüne biz bakla, nohut, mercimek, kavun karpuz, patlıcan vesaire sebze meyve falan ekiyorduk. Onları zaten… Yarın patlıcanını kurutuyordun, biberini kurutuyordun, fasulyeni falan… Tarhanamızı yapıyorduk kendimiz. Paraya ihtiyaç yoktu yani.

Q6 : Mesela biz kendimiz 4-4.5 ton tütün yapıyorduk. Yani arazisi çok olan, imkanı olan daha fazla yapabiliyordu. 8 ton yapan da biliyorum yani ben. Ama biz mesela işçi çalıştırmıyorduk. Kendi şeyimiz vardı… İşte ablalarım, kardeşlerim… Amcamlarla da beraber yapıyorduk zaten. Yani çok da işçi şey yapılmazdı. Şartlarımız güzeldi yani. Şöyle söyleyeyim şimdi 70'lik Yeni Rakı'nın fiyatı ne kadar bilmiyorum ama… Bizim köyde durduğumuzda büyük rakının fiyatı neyse tütünün fiyatı da o oydu. Yani gerçekten iyi kazanılıyordu. İnsanlar tütün parasıyla sıfır traktör falan alabiliyordu.

Q7 : Irgatlık… Bütün köy ırgatlıktan geçinirdik eskiden. O zamanlar gündüz vakti gelsen bir kişi bulamazdın bizim köyde. Herkes ovada olurdu. Gerçi şimdi de gidiyorlar, öğle yemeğine geldiler ama artık para etmiyor. Bizim buranın insanı hep ezgindi hala da ezgin. Bizim köyde kimsenin kendi arazisi yoktur. Zaten yer de yok

bizim köyde baksana. Millet ev yaptıracak yer bulamıyor. (…) Ama ırgatlık da eskiden daha iyiydi. Demin dedi ya 70'lik rakı parasıydı diye… Kota gelmeden 3-5 ton üretilirdi. Sana da ona göre para verilirdi. Sonra kota konunca… Adamı kurtarmıyor, ırgata ne verecek…

Q8 : Tütünü bol üreteceksin ki para etsin. Kota gelmeden bir aile üç beş ton üretirdi. Sonra kota kondu, dediler ki 500 kilodan fazla ekmeyeceksin. O da kurtarmadı tabii. Nasıl kurtarsın ki.

Q9 : Arkanda devlet olmayınca korka korka yapıyor insan. Zaten köylü hep korkar, eziktir yani. Bu işi yapıyorum ama kazanacak mıyım diye hep korkar. Arkanda devlet de olmayınca… Mecbur girdik madene.

Q10 : Şimdi sen sigaranın tanesine 10 lira veriyorsun, tütünün kilosu 13 lira. Bir kilo tütün dediğin senin 50 paket sigara. Eskiden tütünün kilosu 70'lik rakıyla aynı fiyattı. Şimdi o kadar olsa… 500 kilo tütün yapsan, 80 lira 70'lik yeni rakının fiyatı, 40 bin lira olurdu. Artık para etmiyor.

Q11 : Burada zaten şu an madende çalışan yerlilerin birçoğu tütünle geçinen ailelerdi. Ama tabii hükümetin, siyasi iktidarın tarımı burada tasfiyesi yavaş yavaş… Ta 1990'lı yılların sonunda başladı tasfiye. Kota girdi tütüne. Örneğin sen istediğin kadar tütün yapabiliyordun, kotan yoktu. Ondan sonra 1990'lı yılların sonunda kota koydular. Dediler ki aileye, sen dediler 500 kilodan fazla tütün yapmican. Milleti kurtarmadı bu. Yavaş yavaş başka alternatifler aradılar kendilerine. Başka alternatif de bizim kırsal bölgede… Karaçam olsun, Çepni köyleri hep, kırsaldır yani sulak değildir. Her şey yetişmez yani. Zeytin, tütün… Kırsalda yetişebilecek şeyler burada. Zeytincilik de uzun vadeli şey istediğinden dolayı geçim kaynağı olarak millet madene yöneldi. Şimdi 2003-2004'te başladı bizim köyün madencilik hikayesi zaten. Öncesinde çok nadirdir, tek tüktür madene girenler. 2003'ten sonra artık madenci oldu komple. Ondan önce yoktu.

Q12 : Şimdi tütünün şöyle bir özelliği var; tütün başka ürünlere benzemiyor. Kıraç topraklarda yetişiyor ve neredeyse bir zanaat halinde yapılıyor. Yani bir tütünü üretmek için aşağı yukarı on bir ayınızı harcamak zorundasınız. Tohumu, fideyi yetiştireceksiniz, dikeceksiniz, kıracaksınız, basacaksınız tütünü, balyalayacaksınız. Onu siz saklayacaksınız ve şirketler geldiğinde teslim edeceksiniz. Sorumluluk hep sizin elinizde ve çok ağır bir işçilik. Bütün bir aile çalıştığı için kazanıyorlar. Bundan bir vazgeçtikleri an bir daha dönme şansları yok. Eğer tütünden vazgeçerseniz o topraklarda hiçbir şey yapamazsınız. Tütün yapılan toprakta başka ütün yetişmez. Ama ovada sulu tarım öyle değildir. Şimdi Kınk Ovası çok büyük toprakları olan, çok verimli bir ova. Oradaki çiftçinin bir umudu vardır; bu sene domatesten kazanamadım seneye mısır ekerim, mısırdan kazanırım. O madeni tercih etmez. Genellikle madeni tercih edenler geçmişin tütüncüleri. Sulu tarım yapan genelde madene inmez. Ama çalışan madencilerin eşleri o sulu tarıma yevmiyeli işçi olarak gider.

Q13 : Şu anda biz tütüne az da olsa devam ediyoruz. Eşim çalışıyor, yevmiyeci akrabalar geliyor, yevmiye veriyoruz. Hanım onlarla beraber çalışıyor yani. Sözleşmeli devam ediyoruz ama getirisi yok artık. Tüccarlar sözleşmeyi dolar üzerinden yapıyorlar. Hiç çiftçiye sormadan… Geçen sene tartıştık hatta. Getirisi az, gerçekten çok az. Bu sene biraz iyi, 17 lira ama geçen sene 13 liraydı. Sonuçta uğraş da isteyen bir bitki tütün.

Q14 : Şimdi ben ne yapıyorum? Madenin maaşına güveniyorum mesela ben dün balya aldım, paramla hazır aldım. Ne yaptım? Madenden aldım hayvana verdim. Maden olmasa ne olacak? Mecbur onları tarlada ekicem. Biz tosun yetiştiriyoruz şimdi, hanım onunla ilgileniyor. Buradan alıyoruz oraya koyuyoruz aslında. Gönderiyoruz tosunları bıçağa, ondan kazandığımız parayla işte traktör alıyoruz. Yani maden buradaki çiftçiliği engellemez. Bak (gösteriyor) bu mısır silajı. Bunun makine dönümünü 70 liraya yapıyor, 30 liraya da motoru getiriyor. Ne

etti? 100 lira. Bunun 100 lira da suyu… Gübresini, işçiliğini saymazsan 200 lira. Ben bunu yapmıyorum, madenden aldığım paramla alıyorum. Yine aynı şeye geliyor.

Q15 : Şimdi biz Nisan'da bir çıkarız Ocak'ta geliriz. Ocak'a kadar, yılbaşına kadar durmadan çalışırız. Domates ekimi yaparız, biber ekimi yaparız, zeytin yaparız… Çapasını da biz yaparız… Bizim yapmadığımız iş yok. Domatesi ekeriz mesela, çapalarız sonra pamuk gelir. Pamuğu çapalarım, pamuğun çapası biter sonra domates toplamaya başlarım. Domates biter, sonra biberler çıkar. Biberler daha geç çıkar, Ağustos sonunda. Onlar da Eylül sonuna biter, sonra da zeytine başlanır. Bu sefer Akhisar ovasına… Zeytin Eylül'de başlar, iki üç ay sürer.

Q16 : Önce bunların fideleri oluyor. Sonra ekiliyor makinelerle, çapalanıyor. Hemen hemen dört ay en azından ovada geçiyor. Ondan sonra… Tütün çok zahmetli ya! Ondan sonra işte gördün bugün, kırmaya gidiyoruz, işte getirip burada diziyoruz. Bir aya yakın da basması sürüyor. Kasıma kadar falan. Kasımda da basılıyor. On bir aylık falan bir iş.

Q17 : Şimdi tütünün kilosu aşağı yukarı 17 lira, 20 lira. Kalitesine bağlı… Sonra kötü falan kuruduysa 10 liraya kadar düşer. E 70 lira da yevmiye veriyoruz zaten. Ne kazandıracak o da… Mesela ben geçen sene 15 bin lira masraf yaptım, 27 milyar lira para aldım. Masraf da işte amele parası icar (tarlanın kirası) parası… Bir de sigorta vermeye kalksam hiçbir şey kalmaz. Ne kalacak bana? Nasıl diyim ki… Her şeyi pahalı bu işin… Ben bunu yapmayıp bütün yaz yevmiyeye gitsem alacağım 6 milyar, tek başıma. En azından bu zahmete katlanayım 12 milyar alıyorum. Hem de toplu almış oluyorum. Bana patron diyorlar da bakma benden ancak patroncuk olur.

Q18 : Bizim şeyin çalıştığını hiçbir işçi çalışamaz. Bizim mesela adamlar biz olmasak madene girmese de bizim yaptığımızı yapamazlar. Hele

tütünü hiç yapamazlar. Tütün kadın işidir. Zor çünkü, sabır istiyor. Erkekler daha sabırsız olur. Kadın daha sabırlıdır. Biraz da kadınların yapabileceği bir iş tabii. El işi gibi bir şey baksana. Kadının eli daha yatkındır. (Gülerek) Bak sen bile kaçıncıyı dizdin. Sadece şimdi madene gittiklerinden öyle değil hep öyleydi. Mesela nasıl olurdu? Erkek ızgaraya falan bakardı. Eğilip de tütün kırmazlardı cayır cayır canım. Kıran varsa da yüzde onu bile değildir. Erkekler ızgaraya bakardı bir de tütünü kurumaya sererdi.

Q19 : Ben kendim dayıbaşıyım. Ekip götürüyorum işe çalışıyorlar. Ekibi götürürüm, patronlarından paralarını alırım… Eşim alır gerçi parayı ben şey yapmam da…

Q20 : Ev aldık, kredi ödüyoruz. Eşimin maaşı yetmiyor. Ben de her gün tarlaya gidiyorum mecburen. Hangi ürün varsa gidiyorum. Şu an darı püskülü olduğu için… Sonra tütün olur, domates olur, zeytin olur…

Q21 : Erkek dayanamaz. Erkek sepet çeker, kasa sarar… Devamlı eğilmek istemez erkek. Güneşin altında…

Q22 : Domates zor bir iş… Ekmek davası da topluyoruz biz, alışmışız da. Tarla zor. Ne yapıcan, ekmek davası. Sıcak da… Yakıyor.

Q23 : Ben çocuklarla gidiyorum mecburen. Düşünün 12 yaşında çocuk işe gidiyor. Dünkü sıcağı gördün mesela, 45 derece vardı. Nem de vardı. 45 derece sıcağın altında, 50 milyona akşama kadar domates topluyoruz. Bir umut çocuğumuzu okutabilir miyiz, okul masraflarını giderebilir miyiz… Ama çalıştığın yerde 10 yaşında çocuk, 12 yaşında çocuk işe gidiyor yani. Mesela benim oğlum 13 yaşında, sepet taşıyor. Düşün yani hamallık yapıyor. 13 yaşında çocuk! 13 yaşında çocuk sabah 7'den akşam 6'ya kadar hamallık yapıyor.

Q24 : Bizim zaten hayvancılık, resmen hanım üzerine. Hanım bakıyor hayvanlara. Bizim hayvanlarla pek ilgimiz yok. Biz ne yapıyoruz? Yiyeceklerini getiriyoruz. Mesela saman balyasını, yemini… Hepsini

öyle koyuyoruz kenara, hanım alıyor hayvanlara veriyor. Biz ne yapıyoruz? Hanımın branşında olmayan ya da anlayamadığı şeylerde, hastalıkta, ilaç tedavisinde, satışında şunda bunda… Ben yine de her gün bir kere uğrarım hayvanların yanına. Uğramadığım hiçbir gün yoktur. Afedersin ölüyor olsam, günde bir sefer uğrarım. Hayvanların durumu nasıl, randımanı nasıl, onlarla ilgilenirim. Ama bakım işi resmen hanıma ait. Bize ait değil yani. Ha oluyor. İster istemez. Rahatsızlığı oluyor ya da başka bir işi oluyor oraya o zaman gidiyoruz. Ama genelinde hanım bakar hayvanlara, biz bakmayız.

Q25 : Şimdi ben 3'te kalkarım. 3:30 gibi tek tek ameleleri alırız. 4'te tarladayız. Hemen başlarız. 9'da çayımızı kahvaltımızı yapıyoruz. Sonra yine tekrar. Saat öğlen 1'de buraya (evin bahçesi) dönüyoruz. 15:30'a kadar burada tütün diziyoruz. Şimdi bunları dizdik ya, dışarı kurumaya sereceğiz. Sonra burayı temizleyeceğim, bahçeyi sebzeleri sulamam lazım. Çocukların banyosu, yemeği… Onları yatırdıktan sonra yarına kendime de eşime de yemeği hazırlamam lazım (iş yerinde yiyecekleri yemek). Zaten saat 23:00-23:30 olur yatana kadar. Sonra sabah tekrar 3'te kalkacağım… Bizim hayat çok hızlı… Anlatılmaz yaşanır… İnan takip edemezsin. Birgün dene, gücün yetmez. Durursun, ben senin hızına yetişemem der otururs un.

Q26 : Tarlada sekiz saat çalışıyorum ama adamın yemeğini, kendi yemeğimi hazırlamak derken… Sabah 5'te kalkıyorum onları hazırlıyorum. 6'da evden çıkıyorum, 7'de evdeyim. İşten eve gelene kadar bu. Evdeki, bahçedeki yaptığın işi de saysan zaten çıkılmaz işin içinden. 7 gün 24 saat eder…

Q27 : Madenci erken evlenmeyi tercih eder. Yemenle içmenle birinin uğraşması lazım. İş yerinde çok yoruluyorsun, kazaya sebebiyet verebilirsin.

Q28 : Zaten bütün gün… Madenci aileleri de bu katliamdan sonra çok söyledi ya hadi hadi… Zaten yer altında hadi hadiyle kendim

mahvolmuşum… Ailene fazla zaman ayırmıyorsun, çünkü bir şekilde kendini sorumluluktan, baskıdan atmak istiyorsun. Çünkü aileyle bir yere gidecek oldun mu sorumluluk sırtında oluyor. Mesela çocuklar bir şey istiyor, hanım bir şey istiyor… O baskı seni tamamıyla yoruyor yani. Boş zamanını da, başıboş, tek başına… Daha rahat hissetmek için kendini… Ben şimdi gittiğimde hanım bana diyecek ki evde şu ihtiyaç, şu alınacak falan. Aynı şey işte… Ayaktaki çavuşun ya da amirin, 'az iş yaptın', 'erken çıktın', 'erken geldin'… Aynı şey gibi geliyor evdeki soru. Evde şu eksildi, şu olması lazım, şu yapılması lazım… Sık boğaza geliyorsun. Psikolojik olarak ağırlaşıyor yani artık. Çünkü hangi birine beyin yoracaksın! Dediğim gibi, istirahat saatin çok az, çalışma şartın baskılı, gürültülü olan bir yer. Bir de evde bir şey oluştuğunda insan tamamıyla şey yapıyor yani… Sıkboğaz oluyor yani. Ben de işte eş dostla… Veya işte kahvelerde zaman geçiriyorum. Öyle şeyler yani.

Q29 : Madencinin eşi olmak bana göre zor. Neden zor? Özellikle yaz geldi mi… Yine kışın iki ay rahat da. Bazen eşim eve geliyor ben çıkıyorum. Eşim gece vardiyasından gece 1'de geliyor ben sabaha karşı 3'te kalkıp tütüne gidiyorum. Bazen yemeğini bile yetiştiremiyorum düşün… Zor oluyor. Evde hayvan var, evindeki yemeğin var, eşinin bakımı var… Şirket yapmıyor ki, kıyafetlerin falan yıkanması hep bende.

Q30 : Erkek bir madene gidiyor. Geri kalan her şey kadınlarda. Çiftçiliği de yapıyorsun, pazarını yapıyorsun, eşine torba hazırlıyorsun. Hep onu kendine vazife olarak görüyorsun. Hep senin üzerine düşüyor çocuğun çoluğun, ova işleri, eşine bakma görevi… Hep senin üzerinde kalıyor. Eşin sadece madene gidiyor. Bir madene gitmediğim eksik valla. Yarın öbür gün onu da biz yaparız bu gidişle. Eşim saat 5:30 gibi kalkıyor, 7:30'da iş yerinde. Ama kadın oldun mu iş bitmiyor. Bende hep iş bitirememe, yetişememe korkusu var.

Q31 : Maden bir de adamlarda çok sinir yapıyor. Şuraya bir gelsin. Anaa... Terör estirir. Maden stresli… Erkek millet de stresi evden şey yapar. Şimdi gelir az sonra… Hiç sesinizi duymak istemiyorum. Mesela bizim kız biraz rahatsız ya… Ağladığı zaman kızar. Ağlama diyor. Stresteyim bak psikolojim bozuk diyor. Akşamları hep böyle.

Q32 : Ev işine de iş dersek, biz hiç durmadan çalışıyoruz. Sadece uyurken çalışmayız biz. Onu da yapamıyoruz ki doğru düzgün. Ben dün saat 11'de yattım mesela 3'te geri kalktım. Genelde iki saat, üç saat uykuyla duruyoruz. Haftada bir gün, Cuma gitmiyoruz ovaya. O bir günde de dinlenir ya insan normalde… O bir gün çocukların işleri, evin temizliği, Pazar, bahçe… Koşturmaktan bazen kadın olduğumuzu bile unutuyoruz. İnan ki o derece.

Q33 : Benim köyüm yakın olsa ben giderim bahçemi yaparım mesela. Çoluğumun çocuğumun kışlık yiyeceğini hazırlarım. Giderim ya da kurban zamanı, iki üç ay öncesi bir dana alırım bağlarım bahçeye. Kurban zamanı onu satarım. Her zaman yakın olmadığının şeyini yaşıyoruz biz.

Q34 : Yani bizim zamanımızda, devlette her şeyden önce iş güvenliğidir. Prensip olarak. Üretim ikinci plandadır yani. Önce işçi sağlığı iş güvenliği der. Sabah işte olursun, vardiya amirleri gelir. Arkadaşlar hayırlı işler, önce sizin iş güvenliğiniz. Kolunuz kanamadan nasıl bu tertibe girdiyseniz akşam da çoluğunuzun çocuğunuzun başına o şekilde dönecek şekilde çalışın. Herkesin başına bir tane amir düşmüyor derdi yani. Gaz mı var? Nezaretçiyi arayın, emniyetçiyi arayın Tehlikeli olan yerlere girmeyin. Üretim az olsun ama size bir şey olmasın. Yani kamunun farklılığı burada. Hadi hadi yoktu devlette. Şirket tam tersine! Tahkimat çok önemli değil, işçi sağlığı I güvenliği çok önemli değil. Kömür çıksın!

Q35 : Şimdi 96-97 yılında Soma Kömürleri ve İmbat, o zamanki adıyla Balcı madeni ve Üstaş, kendi üretip piyasaya kendi pazarlıyordu.

Çalıştırdığı işçi sayısı azdı ya da yapabileceği işe göreydi. Daha sonra ELİ ya da TKİ'nin elinde olan Darkale bölgesi, şu anda Soma Kömürleri'ne devredilen Atabacası dediğimiz Merkez ocak, yine Soma Kömürlerine devredilen Eynez… Bu arada açık ocak işletmeciliğinde rezerv azalmaya başladı. Derine indiği için de örtü tabakasını hızlı almak zorundasın. Bu da maliyet gerektiriyor. Bunun için de yer altı işletmeciliğine devam etmek zorundasın. Yer altı işletmecilğinin de devlete işçi maliyeti fazla geliyor… Özel sektöre rödovanslı olarak verildi. Rödovanslı olarak verilince de özel sektör büyüdü. Yani küçük kurumlar holding haline gelmeye başladı. İlk bizim çalıştığımız dönemde (early 1990s) malzeme almakta zorlanırlardı. Rödovans'tan sonra işletme (ELİ) küçüldü özel sektör büyüsü. Şu an 12 bin civarında madenlerde çalışan işçimiz mevcut. Daha da artıyor. Demir Export başladı, Polyak şimdi hazırlıkta… Devlet yap islet devret diyor ama yap islet devretten ziyade ben sana alım garantisi veriyorum, kömürünü üret, santralini yap, elektriğini harca diyor. Ürat bana diyor, ne üretirsen üret. Kota koymadı.

Q36 : Zonguldak'ta kurumsal şirketlerden ziyade kaçak ocaklar mevcut. Hani günübirlik… Öyle aileler var ki bahçesini rödovanslı satan aileler var. Çok büyük yatırımların olduğu bir şehir değil şu an Zonguldak. Bitik şu anda orası. İnsanlar çok güç durumda, çok göç veriyor. Kendi memleketinde kömür olduğu halde Manisa'da gelip kömür ocaklarında kömür çıkaran insanlar var. Oradan anlayabiliyoruz… Bu insanlar neden orayı bırakıp da kömür çıkarmaya buraya geldiler? E geçmişten gelen ister istemez kabul edilmiş bir madenci kimliği de var. Bunu Zonguldak'ta yapamıyorsan ya Ankara'ya giderim ya Edirne Keşan tarafına giderim ya da Soma'ya gelirim diye yola çıkıyorlar bizim gibi… Bir de eğitim öğretimi olmayan insanlar hayatta bir şeyi garantiye almaya çalışırlar: bu da erken emeklilik. Sürekli gelecek kaygısını düşündüğü için fiziksel olarak ne kadar yıpranacağını düşünmeden otomatikman şunu düşünür: 13 yılda sigortam doluyor, 20 senede sicilimi tamamlıyorum. Ben bu işe 20

yaşımda başlasam 40 yaşımda emekliyim. Ne yapıyor? Bir şekilde kendini buna hazırlıyor. Hayatını garantiye aldığını düşünüyor ama 40'ından sonra gelecek hastalık ve rahatsızlıklar…

Q37 : O da tahmini rakamla söyliyim, bir milyar lira zararla çıkıyor her sene TTK. Burada öyle bir sıkıntı yaşamıyorsunuz. Firmalar büyük olduğu için, üretim fazla olduğu için… Maaşlarda gecikme olmuyor. Adamın kafası rahat, işçinin kafası rahat. Bir de tabii buradaki bütün işler devlet güvencesi altında. Çıkarttığında kömürü direk devlet alıyor. Zonguldak'ta mesela bizim bir müdür vardı, kimse sevmezdi ama işte çıkaramazlardı. Niye? Çevresi geniş. Erdemirle olsun, başka iş yerleriyle bağlantıları kuvvetli. Kömür satma sıkıntısı var orada şirketlerin. Zaten kaçak ocak da çok fazla. Paranı alamıyorsun şu an Zonguldak'ta. Burada kafan rahat, maaşın gününde yatacak biliyorsun.

Q38 : Kaçak ocakta her şey senin sorumluluğunda, şirketin hiçbir konuda hiçbir sorumluluğu yok. Ölsen de sorumlu sensin. Zaten ölsen kimsenin haberi olmaz. Bak burada ölenlerin aileleri bütün haklarını aldılar.

Q39 : Bizim köyümüz Balıköy, Tavşanlı'da. Köydeyken çiftçilikle geçindik, sonra baktık çocuklarımız birken iki oldu, ikiyken üç oldu… Geldik buraya, madene… Kütahya'da da maden var da, özel sektör yoktu. Hep devlet sektörü olduğundan… Biz de oraya giremedik. Orada öküzümüz, eşeğimiz hepsi vardı aslında.

Q40 : Şimdi köyde imkanlar kısıtlı olduğu için, elimizde de bir meslek olmadığı için… Sigortamız olsun dedik. Tavşanlı'da bulamadık. Burada eş dost akraba çok. Onların sayesinde geldik buraya. O zamandan beri aralıksız çalışıyoruz.

Q41 : Mesela benim köyüm yakın olsa… Biz hiç durmadan gitsek üç saatte anca varıyoruz köyümüze. Şurada yarım saat olsa benim köyüm

buraya, akşam gitmesem sabah giderim, sabah gitmesem akşam giderim. Gider oraya bahçemi yaparım mesela. Çoluğumun çocuğumun kışlık yiyeceğini hazırlarım. Giderim ya da kurban zamanı, iki üç ay öncesi bir dana alırım, bağlarım dama. Kurban zamanı onları satarım köyüm yakın olsa. Şurada Savaştepe'ye bir saatte gider gelirsin ama Kütahya'ya bir gün sürer.

Q42 : Şimdi biz ev kirası vermiyoruz. Kendi ektiğimizi yiyoruz. Ya da şimdi Soma'ya gitsem ben, bana bir elli lira para lazım olsa kimden isteyeceğim? Ama burada hepimiz birbirimizi tanıyoruz. Soma'da bir sıkışsan mecbur kredi kartına yükleneceksin. Burada dayanışma var yani. Adam ama mesela geliyor Kütahya'dan, kredi çekiyor ev alıyor. Adam artık madene köle oluyor. Sen mesela yapılması yasak bir işi bile emretsen yapmak zorunda. Çünkü borcu var. Onun için bazı şeyler düzene girmiyor. Onlar var ya, Kütahyalılar Zonguldaklılar… Onlar köleleşti. Onlara madenden çıkmayacaksın, bir vardiya daha çalışacaksın de, yine çalışırlar. Kukla onlar. Çavuş otur dedi, oturur. Amir otur dedi, oturur. Bu baskıya karşı yer altında biraz duran varsa bizleriz yine. Ama biz de öne çıkıyoruz işte. Bize en fazla olsa çantanı al çık derler, o da bizi öldürmez. Biz buraya geldiğimiz zaman yapabileceğimiz bir tarlamız, toprağımız, hayvanımız var.

Q43 : Şimdi diyelim ben kendim taşeronum, gidiyorum işverenle görüşüyorum. Ben elimde şu kadar adam getireceğim size diyorum. Şirket de tamam sen getir ben seni taşeron olarak alıyorum diyor. Adam gidiyor, boştaki adamları… Biraz da vaat veriyordu. Örneğin taşeronu olmayan 1000 lira alıyorsa sen 1100 alıcan diyor. Öyle taahhütte bulunuyor yani. Tamam diyor adam, gidiyor. Köylerden, oradan buradan 20 tane adam topladın mı al sana taşeronluk yani. Adam ondan sonra işe de gitmez. Şimdi var bizim Mehmet Ali diye bir taşeron. Hiç işe gelmiyor. Ama 150'ye yakın adamı var İmbat'ta. Adam işe gelmiyor, kahvede orada burada sabahtan akşama. Parası yürüyor.

Q44 : Bir de şirketten aldıkları üretim payı var. o ne? İlerlemeciyim, mesela baca taşeronluğu aldım, bacada bugün kaç metre ilerledim? 2 metre. Iki metreye bana bir pay biçiliyor bana oradan da ödenek geliyor. Hem işçi başına 3-5 milyar bir aylık alıyorum hem 5-10 milyar ya da bazen belki 20 milyar da şirketten. Benim maaşım ne oluyor? Hiç çalışmadan dünya kadar taşeronluk ücreti alıyorum. Tek yaptığım günde bir kez o da inersem aşağı inip esip gürleyip milletin anasına avradına sövmek…

Q45 : Bütün Soma'yı 40 katlı falan bir maden olarak düşün. Ana caddeler, sokaklar… Ev mesela bir üretim panosuysa odalara giden koridorlar bantlar, odalar ayaklar.

Q46 : Şimdi ben ustayım, benim bir üstüm çavuş oluyor. Şimdi işçi olarak en altta düz işçi var, yedek var, yedeğin üstüne usta var, sonra çavuş geliyor. Çavuştan sonra vardiya miri, ondan sonraki de hazırlık baş mühendisi. Şimdi çavuş devamlı benim başımda zaten. Şimdi ben ustayım mesela tünel sürücez, benim görevim ne burada? Benim görevim, mesela tabancayla 30-35 tane, aynanın genişliğine göre bilemedin 60 tane delik delmek. Benim görevim o deliği delmek, benim arkamdaki yedek bana ne lazım? Buraya kasa konacak. Ne lazım kasaya? Bir kasaya üç tane TH demir lazım. İşte saplamasıdır, fırçasıdır, gamasıdır… Bunların görevi, arkadakilerin yani, benim arkama onları hazırlamak. Atıyorum biz burada çalışıyoruz, ocakta malzeme yok, yer üstünden gönderilmemiş… Diyorlar ki yerin altında bir yerden bul. Adam, yedek yani, buradan benim yanımdan gidiyor, Otogar'a doğru gidiyor bulamıyor geri geliyor. Oradan hükümet konağına gidiyor bulamıyor geri geliyor. Ta istasyon köprüsüne kadar mesafeyi gidiyor oradan buraya malzemeleri çekip yetiştirmek zorunda. Bir de rampa hep bu yollar. Yer üstü gibi düz bir alan değil.İnişi de var yokuşu da var, çamurdan da suyun içinden de geçiyorsunuz. (…) Düz işçi de yedekle gidiyor ki öğrensin diye. Yeni işe girmişe deniyor düz işçi diye. Yedekle beraber gide gele

malzemeyi öğreniyor, yaptığı işi öğreniyor. Ki o da yedek olacak. Vardiya şefi de hem bizi kontrol edip hem üstüne bilgi veriyor. İşte bugün şu iş oldu veya olmadı; ya da şu tehlike var…

Q47 : Ben çavuştum, kendi ekibim vardı. Ama yer altında çalışıyordum da. Taşeron çalışmaz. Yer altına arada girer ama çalışmaz. Bağırır, çağırır, söver hatta… Sonra gider.

Q48 : Hani filmlerde görürüz ya, köleler topluca taşınır. Madencinin yer altına girişi aynen öyledir işte.

Q49 : Gündüz vardiyasına gidiyorsan sabah 5:30 gibi kalkarsın, kahvaltı yaparsın, 6 çeyrek gibi evden çıkıp durağa yürürsün 6 buçukta servise binersin. 7 gibi iş yerinde olursun. 7 ‘den sonra üzerini değiştirip 7-7:15 arası ocağa inmeye başlarsın. İşi alırsın amirinden, çavuşundan yani… İşte bugün iki kasa bağlanacak ya da üç kasa bağlanacak… O işe konsantre olursun. İki kasa üç kasa ne dendiyse onu yaparsın. Saat 4’e çeyrek kala 20 kala çıkmaya başlarsın yavaş yavaş. İşte saat 4-4:30 gibi yer üstünde olursun. Normalde yarım saat sabahleyin gidiyor, 7:30’da giriyoruz yer atına, 4 buçukta anca çıkabiliyoruz. Biraz da ocağın derinliğine, uzunluğuna, çalıştığın yere bağlı. 4:30’da çıkıyoruz, 10 dakikada… Elimizi yüzümüzü yukamaya fırsat bile olmuyor bazen, servislere zor yetişiyoruz. 5 çeyrek, 5 buçuk gibi işte servislerden iniyoruz. Evimize varıyoruz işte, duş almamız yemek yememiz saat 8-8:30’u buluyor. E o saatten sonra ne yapabilirsin ki? Bir yere gidemezsin, bir kahveye gidemezsin… Çocuğunu eşini alıp bir parka gezdireyim falan diyemezsin. Yatıp dinlenmen lazım. E yorulmuşsun da bütün gün. E iş de tehlikeli… Herhangi bir sosyal hayatın yok. Sürekli böyle rutin devam eder yani.

Q50 : Devlette çalışan bir madenci taşeronluk aldı. Köye ekmek sağladı sağolsun. Köyün gençleri hala çalışıyor. Onların sayesinde gençlerin

eli ekmek görüyor. Allah razı olsun. Köylülerin cebi para gördü, sigortaları oldu.

Q51 : Biz nasıl böyle sömürü düzenine girdik ki? Önceden ovaya gider hep beraber tarhanamızı yerdik. Paramız yoktu ama mutluyduk. Paraya şimdiki gibi ihtiyaç da yoktu zaten. Şimdi bizi paraya mahkum ettiler.

Q52 : Kendi memleketinde kömür olduğu halde Manisa'ya gelip kömür ocaklarında kömür çıkarıyor insanlar. Oradan anlayabiliyoruz. Geçmişten gelen ister istemez kabullenilmiş bir madenci kimliği var. Ama Zonguldak madenlerinde sigorta bile yok. Başka iş desen… Bakın eğitim öğretimi olmayan insanlar hayatta bir şeyi garantiye almaya çalışırlar bu da erken emeklilik. Sürekli gelecek kaygısını düşündüğü için. Otomatikman şunu düşünüyorsun: 13 yılda sigortam doluyor, 20 senede sicilimi dolduruyorum. Ben bu işe 20 yaşımda başlasam 40 yaşımda emekliyim. Hayatını garantiye aldığını düşünüyorsun ama 40'ından sonra gelecek hastalıklar ve rahatsızlıklar…

Q53 : Madenin bizim iyilik yönü bu oldu. 39 yaşını doldur, 4 bin yevmiyenin üstüne çıktın mı emeklisin. Ondan sonra istediğin şekilde diğer işlerini yapabilirsin. İkramiye var, emekli maaşı var onunla çiftçiliğini hayvancılığını yap. Atıyorum tarlanla, bahçenle uğraş. Zeytinlik al 5-10 dönüm. Çocuklarını da al hep beraber yetiştir. Yaşamın daha rahat oluyor. Öbür işlerde… Bak öğretmen bu arkadaş. Benden çok büyüktür, emekliliğine çok var daha. Ben seneye emekliyim.

Q54 : Şimdi ben 39 yaşındaydım bizi çıkardıklarında, emekliliğime 500-600 yevmiye bir şey kalmıştı… Şimdi fabrikadayım. 55'ime kadar çalışmam lazım. Emeklilik yandı. Madende kalsam. E zoruna gidiyor insanın…

Q55 : İhtiyaç şöyle duyuyorlar, çünkü bir vardiya amiri sana o kadar baskı yapamaz. Çavuşu başına koyduğu anda taşeron… Seni 8 saat bekler

çavuş. Ama vardiya amiri 8 saat bekleyemez. Çavuş dediğin zaten taşeronun adamı olduğu için… 8 saat berabersin. Yemek yediğin yere bile geliyor. Yarım saati geçirdiğin zaman arkandan geliyor. Niye geç kaldın? Yarım saat oldu, 40 dakika oldu. Böyle bir system vardı. Ama seni bir vardiya amiri takip edemez. Bir ayakta bizim dört tane çavuş vardı. Hepsi boş. Bir şey yaptığı yok sdece akşama kadar dikelir ya da oturur, şunu yap bunu yap! 80 kişiydik bir ayakta, 4 çavuş başımızda duruyordu. Kömür gelsin! Bir dakika kömür gelmedi mi? Kömür gelsin, kömür gelsin… Yok efendim şirket batar!

Q56 : Adam iki dakika dinlendi diye tekme tokat taşeronundan dayak diyen gördüm ben. Taşeron adamın kafasını bandın altına soktu, öldüreyim mi seni şimdi burada diye diye dövdü. Ettikleri en düzgün laf, siz de bayansınız kusura bakmayın ama küfürlüdür.

Q57 : İşçilerin başında bir sopa. Daha çok üretim için. Daha çok üretim, daha çok üretim, daha çok üretim… Hadi hadi hadi… Taşeronun hiçbir fonksiyon özelliği yok. Sadece istenilen üretimi versin diye taşeronları insanların başında tutuyorlar.

Q58 : Bana da para teklif etti şirket. Ben Kabul etmedim. Mahkemede tanıklık yapmayayım diye 80 bin lira teklif etti. O para belki benim hayatımı değiştirecekti ama Kabul etmedim. Bak şimdi işsizim. Bulamam da bu gidişle.

Q59 : Ben kaç yıllık madenciyim. Kaç yıllık çavuştum. Yer altını çok iyi bilirim. Kömürün yandığını gözümle gördüm. Söyledim, sen işine bak dediler. Dinlemezsen böyle olur işte. Sonra neymiş fıtratmış, takdiri ilahiymiş. Olur mu hiç öyle şey! Şöyle düşün hocam, sen araba kullanıyorsun şimdi. Emniyet kemeri takmamışsın, alkol almışsın üstüne bir de hız yapıyorsun ve kaza oluyor. O allahın takdiri mi olur şimdi? Göz göre göre oldu.

Q60 : Eşim S panosunda çalışırdı. Son iki aydır her gün iki çift çamaşır götürürdü. Hepsi ıpıslak gelirdi. Bunlar su ıslağı değil ter derdi. Olaydan dört gün önce eşim zehirlendi. Yeşil yeşil kustu saatlerce. Sürekli baş ağrısı çekerdi zaten ağrı kesicilerle dururdu. Hep halsizdi, evdeyken hep uyuyordu son dönem.

Q61 : İşte müfettiş müfettiş diyorlar mahkemede. Ben 9 sene çalıştım müfettiş görmedim hiç. Yine söylüyorum, mahkemede de dedim, gelmedi. Ha geliyormuş da biz görmüyorduk. Ben ayakta çalışıyordum, ayağa gelmiyordu. Ana galeriye geliyormuş diye duydum.

Q62 : Fazla üretime dönük baskı vardı. Bazen mühendisler, usta başları işçilere hakaret ederek baskı yapıyorlardı. Ben bazı dönemlerde gaz maskesini ve çizmemi dahi alamadığımı bilirim. İşçi alımını gayri resmi taşeronlar yapar. Şirket müdürü Ramazan Doğru şirket yönetimine ödeyeceği para için işçileri köle gibi çalıştırır ödemede çıkan aksaklıklar sebebi ile bizim zorunlu olan maske baret gibi malzemelerimizi vermedikleri olur. İŞçilerin daha fazla çalışması için baskı yaparlar. Müfettiş geldiği zamanlar maddened eksik olan hususlar düzeltilir, müfettişin görmemesi gereken elektrik panosu, plastic telefonlar gizlenir. İşçilere de bu sakladıkları şeyleri müfettişe söylememeleri için baskı yaparlar…

Q63 : Şimdi Ali'yi işe ben aldırdım, Samet'i de Ali aldırdı. Soma'nın ne diyim dörtte biri kadar varız zaten herhalde Kütahyalılar olarak. 100 bin nüfusu varsa en az 15-20 bin Kütahyalı vardır. Bizim burada kendi mahallelerimiz vardır. Yani bu çekici oluyor. Şimdi memlekette olan arkadaşlar bizi arıyor, gelsek mi gelsek işe girebilir miyiz… Şimdi eskiden, bu olaylardan önce dayıbaşları diye bir şeyler vardı. Bunu inkar etmeyelim. Onlara diyorduk ki bizim bir arkadaşımız var işe girecek, yani o ağabeylere söylüyorduk. Onlar da faydaları, yardımları oluyordu. (…) Şimdi bizim derneğimiz de var. Kütahyalıyız diye varıp oturacağımız, muhabbet edeceğimiz… Gene bir insanımız

düştüğü zaman tutup kaldıracağımız mesela. İşte kaza geçirir şu olur bu olur… Dernek adı altında… İhtiyacı olan olsa kendi hemen 3'er 5'er lira toplarız. O şekilde…

Q64 : İşte madenden dernek yaptılar. Mesela sen taşeronsun ben taşeronum o taşeron… Bizim taşeronlar toplaşıp dernek yaptılar. İşte o Kütahya derneğini…

Q65 : Bu derneklerin falan bu kadar yaygınlaşmasını ben şöyle kuruyorum. Geçmişte, uygulanan neoliberal politikalardan önce tarımla ilişki devlet üzerinden kuruluyordu. İşçilerin madenle ilişkisi de devlet üzerindendi. İktidarın halkla kurduğu ilişki TEKEL gibi, ELİ gibi kurumlar üzerindendi. Şimdi çözülen tam olarak bu ilişkiler. Devlet devre dışı. O devre dışı olduğu zaman başka bir ilişkiye ihtiyaç doğdu. Ben bu hemşeri derneklerine olan ihtiyacın bire bir bu boşluğu karşıladığını düşünüyorum. Çünkü Soma'da mafya tipi bir örgütlenme var aslında: mevcut ELİ, kaymakamlık, nakliyeciler kooperatifi, yöre dernekleri… Bu yöre dernekleri bütün oyların kullanılmasında dahi etkilidir bütün seçim dönemlerinde. Bütün o hemşerilerin, kendi üyesi olanların oylarını pazarlayan, uygulanacak politikalarda kaymakamla beraber hareket eden… Bu örgütlenmenin içinde Soma'da devletin baş kurduğu araçlardan biri olduğunu düşünüyorum. Yöre derneklerinin yaygınlaşması, önemli bir güç olması 2002 sonrasına denk gelir. Onlara binalar yapılıp verildi. Mevcut kaymakamlık yaptı bunu. Gidip gördüğünüz zaman imkanları çok fazladır, bizzat devlet teşvik etti ve geliştirdi. Dolayısıyla sendika-sermaye-devlet diye bir üçgenden bahsediliyor ama çok boyutlu aslında.

Q66 : Şimdi Zonguldaklıyla Kütahyalıyla Ordulu bir olur mu? Biz ovaya da beraber gidiyoruzi orada da ayrı oluyor. Kütahyalılar beraber oturur yemeğe, Zonguldaklılar beraber, biz beraber. Derneğimiz de var. Şimdi gitsem benim şuna ihtiyacım var desem onlar yardımcı olur. Evimiz yok ama alsak bizim Ordulların mahallesinde alırım.

Q67 : İşte hemşeri derneklerine gidin bugün, bütün hepsinin koca koca yerlerinni görürsünüz. Ordulular derneği, bilmem ne derneği… Bunlara arazileri hep belediye veriyor. Öbürünü bilmem ne veriyor. Elektriklerine sularına yardımcı olunuyor. Türlü imkan sağlanıyor bunlara. Doğal olarak da gericileştirilmiş unsurlar, biat eder biçimde uygulanan sosyal politikalarla da besleniyor. Tarikatların da devreye girmesiyle… Burada yoğun tarikat şeyleri var. Adım başı bacıevleri, işte kardeş evleri falan dedikleri şeyler var. onu da besliyor bu hemşeri dernekleri. Toplumsal yapıda buranın yerleşik unsurları çok etkili değil aslında, Alevi çünkü çoğunluk. Ama nüfusun çoğu dışarıdan geldiği için, onlara da işte dernek vasıtasıyla rant aktarımıyla… Adam gidiyor Ordulular derneğine mesela oraya iki televizyon veriyor, kirasını elektriğini ödetiyor bilmem ne… Geceler yapılıyor, bayramlarda otobüs tutulup memleketlerine götürülüyor, kurban kesiliyor bilmem ne yapılıyor… Oradaki dernek başkanı da zaten milletin üzerinde arkadaşlar AKP'ye oy vereceğiz, karşılığında şu yapılacak diyince bitti... Burada yore derneklerinin etkisi gerçekten çok büyük. Yani bütün sosyal faaliyetlerini de dernekler üzerinden yapıyorlar. Geleneksel faaliyetlerini, törenlerini, dayanışmalarını…. Taşeronlar kuruyor dernekleri… Sonra mesela sendika şube başkanı Zonguldaklılar Derneği'nin yöneticisi aynı zamanda. Bakın şimdi bir yönetime… Çepni var, Ordulu vari Zonguldaklı var, Kütahyalı var… Yani sermaye o kadar akıllı ki! Bunun içine sol bir sendikanın sızması o kadar zor ki!

Q68 : Aslında Türk İş önceden iyi bir sendikaydı. Öyle bir şeyi de yoktu ama… İşverenle içli dışlı şeylerini falan bilmezdik. Yine bir şey yapılacak oldu mu falan işçiyle konuşuyorlardı ediyorlardı. Işçiye yine bir şeyler soruyorlardı. Mesela işte diyorlardı işveren bize yüzde 5 verdi biz yüzde 10 istiyoruz, anlaşmaya çalışıyoruz. Şu anda bizi sendikadan içeri almıyorlar… Özellikle 2008-2009'dan itibaren

tamamen kendini belli etmeye başladı, zırvalamaya. İşçiyle muhatap olmamalar, sadece gelip işverenle konuşup gitmeler…

Q69 : Ben sendikayı tercih ettim, memnunum da… Şöyle söyleyeyim… İki ton kömür alabilecekken normalde beş ton kömür alıyorsun. Yevmiye kesiyorlar ama maaşlarımız iyi zaten dokunmuyor. Bir saat mesai yapar kazanırım onu yine zaten. Başka ne beklenir ki sendikadan?

Q70 : Şimdi sendika bizim olmazsa olmazımız. Yani o bizim sırtımızı sırtımızı dayayabileceğimiz tek şey. Kimine ne kadar yanlış gelir o uygulamalar… Bizim açımızdan hiçbir sıkıntı yok. Herkes açısından böyle aslında da… Hani ne olur… İnsan işletmeyle ters düşmüştür, bir vukuatı olmuştur işverene karşı… Bunu da kalkıp savunacak hali yok sendikanın. Gerçekten mağdur insansa yardımcı olurlar. Benim hiçbir sorunum olmadı bugüne kadar sendikayla. İşimi düzgün yaptığım için. Yapmayanın olur tabii. Sendikanın da işini düzgün yapmayanı savunacak hali yok.

Q71 : Şu anki hükümetle vatandaşın ilişkisine benzeticem ben bunu… Bugün sokağa çıkın, Ak Parti hakkında birilerine bir şeyler sorun, hiç kimse beğenmiyor. Ama işte bakıyorsunuz oy zamanında, seçim zamanında herkes ona vermis veya bir şekilde kazanmışlar. Ama hala memnuniyetsizlik belirtiyorlar. Bizde de aynen öyle. Ben kendi açımdan sevmiyorum mesela Maden İş'i. Ama sadece… Üye olmamak gibi bir lüksümüz var mı onu bile hiç karıştırmadım öğrenmedim. Sendika durumumuzu iyileştirmiyor. Kötüleştiriyor mu? Benden sadece… Benim yevmiyem kesiliyor, ben hakkımı helal etmiyorum. Kimseye bir faydası yok. Yine hükümete benzeticem. Ak Parti temsilcisisiniz, benim evime geldiniz… Ay diyorum ne iyisiniz şahanesiniz… Siz de mutfağa erzak bırakıyorsunuz ve ben sizi yere göğe sığdıramıyorum.

Q72 : Sendika işçilere kredi veriyor. Diyelim 10 bin TL para gerekti, veriyor, faiz koyuyor, taksitle ödüyor. İşveren vermez ama kredi. Verirse

parayı alabilmek için beni çalıştırmak zorunda. Sendika da her işçiye vermez. Onu da çalıştırması gerekir.

Q73 : Ben memnunum sendikadan. Her istediğimizi yerine getiriyorlar. Mesela geçen borç istedim, verdiler. Bankaya borçlanacağıma sendikaya borçlandım, sonra taksitle ödedim.

Q74 : Bana kredi bile vermedi, beni bankaya muhtaç etti. Bakın bu sendikanın aylık 400 milyar geliri var. Her ay… Ben bu sendikanın üyesi miyim? Üyesiyim. Madende çalışıyor muyum? Çalışıyorum. Sen benden aidat alıyor musun? Alıyorsun. Ben sıkıştım, borcum var, para lazım. Ya sen beni bankaya mecbur edeceğine 5-10 milyar ver… Sonra benim aylığımdan kes. Beni bankaya mecbur etme. Ha şimdi DİSK veriyor mu, veremez. DİSK'in parası yok ama. Olsa verir.

Q75 : Sendikayı getirdiler, millet üye yaptılar. Tehdit ettiler. İşte üye olanlar şu kadar kömür alacak, üye olmayanlar şu kadar alamayacak… İşte üye olanlara şu kadar pirim verilecek üye olmayanlara bu kadar gibi… Yani sendikaya işveren kendisi teşvik etti. Sonra, sendikayı arkasına aldı tabii. Türkiye Maden İş Sendikasını… Mitinglere buradan işçileri taşıdılar. Ondan sonra Eynez'i aldı. Ondan sonra, Işıklar, Atabacası oraları aldı.

Q76 : Hükümetin değişmesiyle bir kere kömürün önemi her anlamda arttı. Muhtaç ailelere kömür yardımı oluyor şu anda her sene. Bununla ilgili bir üretim artışı oldu. Bir de ELİ'nin kendi işletmediği rezervler vardı, onları özel firmalara verdiler. Biz burada rödövans deriz ona. Ürettiği ton kadar ücret ödüyor ELİ ve TKİ kanalıyla. Şu an üretimin yüzde 80-85'I özel sektör kanalıyla, rödovansla. Firmalar da çoğaldı, yeni sahaları ihaleye açtılar. ELİ'nin bir hantallığı vardı, onu çözdü bu hükümet. Şimdi bakın fazla kaderci olacak belki ama kömür Soma'ya Allah'ın bir lütfu. Şimdiye kadar hiçbir hükümet bu kadar değerlendirmek istemedi. Şimdi üretim arttı. Bir takım sıkıntılar muhakkak oluyor, olmuyor değil de… Soma kazaya kadar Ankara'dan

falan görünen bir yer değildi. Reklamın iyisi kötüsü olmaz derler ya, bizim kaza da o şekilde oldu. Soma ismi bütün dünyaya duyuldu. Yatırım için cazibesi her zaman için var. Bu cazibe bu iktidara kadar bilinmiyordu. O konuda mantıkları çok iyi. Özelleştirme yönüyle, özel sektöre vermek yönüyle… Hem istihdam da sağlıyorlar hem şey sağlıyorlar. Güzel bir yöntem buldular.

Q77 : Kimsenin umrunda değiliz, herkes sattı bizi. Özgür Özel de söz verdi, iş bulucam sana dedi, bulmadı. Ocağı kapattırdığıyla kaldı. Ocak açık olsa hiç olmazsa işsiz olmazdım şimdi.

Q78 : (İ)stikrar gelecek ki ocağımız tekrar açılsın, işsizlik bitsin, önümüz açılsın.

Q79 : Başkası söylemiyordur ama ben açıkça söyleyeyim. Ben işe girebilmek için Ak Parti'ye üye oldum. Gittim geldim işe almadılar. Bunu dene dediler. Gittim üye oldum. Onlar da bilmem kim mühendis var, orada git onu göre, selamımı söyle dedi. Hemen alındım işte. Bizim köyde madenciler hep Ak Parti üyesi. Ama aslında bizim bura hep CHP'lidir.

Q80 : Tarikatlar etkili burada. Herkese mesela… Önceden Nur cemaati vardı, Kadiri tarikatı vardı. Dört bir kol hep tarikat burada. Önceden ben de Kadiri tarikatındaydım. Şimdi gitmiyorum da. Var baya yani, toplanma yerleri, kurban kesim yerleri… Yurt da yapıyorlar şimdi. Büyük yani, etkili.

Q81 : Aranızda hala çalışan madencileri görüyorum ve yüzüne tükürmek istiyorum. Siz bizim ölen eşlerimiz sayesinde 3 bin 4 bin lira maaş alıyorsunuz ama bizim mücadelemize destek olmuyorsunuz. Bir kez olsun mahkemeye gelmiyorsunuz. Helal etmiyorum size o maaşları, haram olsun.

Q82 : Onlar kurtardı kendini. Hepsi ev aldı, araba aldı. Çoğu da öyle böyle olmuş. Ben de görüyorum bazen. Hep değişmişler, bir süs, bir bir şey. Parayı bulunca tabii.

Q83 : Bu 2831kişi içinden, toplamda, ben dahil 53 kişi ise iade davası açmışız. Ne kadar kötü. Amaç şu; işte işe iade davası açarsanız şirketin karşısında olursunuz. Sendika, Maden İş başardı bunu. İşsiz güçsüz kalırsınız zaten ocaklar açılacak, dava açarsanız işe giremezsiniz tekrar…

Q84 : Ovaya gidiyorum şimdi, eşimle… 50 lira yevmiye, sigorta yok. Eşim hep gidiyordu da hiç olmazsa o da benim sigortamdan faydalanıyordu o zaman. Şimdi ikimizde de yok sigorta. Sosyal güvencemiz hiç yok. Çalışma şartları da… Tabii iş güvenliği de yok. Bak daha yeni kaza oldu, 15 kadın işçi öldü Gölmarmara'da. Biz de yolda bir kaza maza yapsak… Traktörle gidip geliyoruz. Ya da bir hastalansan napcan?

Q85 : Yok dönemem artık Zonguldak'a. Orada da para vermiyorlar ki! Bir de hep kaçak ocak. Kaçak ocakta her şey senin sorumluluğunda. Ölsen de sorumlu sensin. Zaten ölsen kimsenin de haberi olmaz.

Q86 : Artık Kınıklıları asla madene almıyorlar. Kazadan sonra televizyonlara falan çıktı ya. Başvurdun diyelim, doğum yeri Kınık mı? Almıyorlar. Eskiden tarımımız vardı, onu aldılar elimizde madene mecbur kaldık. Şimdi onu da alıyorlar. Ne olacak buranın insanı? Hep yoksullaştırıldık. Hep daha da yoksullaştırıldık!

Q87 : Kınıklılar daha cesur. Onlarda maden olmasın yine iş bulurlar çünkü. Her yer verimli, topraklarını ekerler. Ova sonuçta.

Q88 : Onların korkaklığı yüzünden örgütlenemiyoruz, adamlar ya kirada ya kredide. Çavuş öleceği yere gir dese girer.

Q89 : Şimdi daha zor tabii. Ben önceden bugün çok yorgunum yevmiyeye gitmeyeceğim diyebiliyordum mesela. Ben 46 yaşındayım, bak gün

gördün hava 50 derece vardı. Önceden olsa dün gitmezdim. Şimdi mecbur yedi gün gidiyorum. Sonra mesela ta Akhisar'a zeytine gitmezdim eskiden. Şimdi öyle bir şansım yok. Ne zaman ne iş varsa gidiyorum. İki çocuğumuz var.

Q90 : - İğne oyası yapıyor musun hala?
- Yapıyorum abla. Yoksa ne yapcan. Üç çocuk var, kiradayız. İnsan kahvaltı dahil üç öğün makarna yer mi? Biz yaşıyoruz bunu.
- Olsun. Allah kocanı başından eksik etmesin.
-Amin.

Q91 : İşsizlik kaygısı çok. Şirket de çalışana karşı kullanır bunu. En çok da taşeron kullanır. Dışarıda bekleyen adam çok diyor, çalışmazsan kendin bilirsin.

Q92 : Bizim ayakta metan çıktı, kapatılırsa çok fena. Artık ücretsiz izne mi çıkarırlar direk atarlar mı bilemiyorum.

Q93 : Soma yaşanacak yer mi değil. Ama iş imkanı yüksek olunca… Öyle bir kazadan sonra normalde Soma'nın göç vermesi lazım. Ama devlet öyle bir teşvik Verdi ki… Eski maaş tutarında olsa böyle olmazdı. Niye? Gurbetteki adam söyliyim şöyle düşünür.. Ben zaten 1500 lira parayı kendi memleketimde de kazanırım bir şekilde der. Ama şimdi 3 bin liranın üzerine çıkınca cezbedici tarafı çok artıyor.

Q94 : Bu insanlara siz eylem yapın deseniz de yapmazlar. İşçinin kafası sadece aldığı ücrete çalışır. Somada olsa Zonguldak da olsa. İki ay maaşı yatmıyorsa, zam alamıyorsa o zaman eylem yapar. Burada maddi sıkıntı yok, ücretler iyi… Burada bizim Zonguldak'taki gibi direnişler çıkamaz. Bir de sınıfın düzeyi belli, eğitim düzeyin belli. Bu eğitim düzeyiyle bu parayı kolay bulamazsın. Ben de dahilim buna başkası da dahil… Kolay bulamıyorsun bunu, yakaladığın zaman da bırakmak istemiyorsun. Bırakmak istemediğinde de ne yapacaksın?

Ya işveren yanlısı olacaksın veya hiç karşı koymadan çalışacaksın. Peki diyeceksin her şeye…

Q95 : Şimdi iş güvenliğiyle alakalı zaten bizde bir şey yok. Ben zaten yer altında, kapıdan girip aşağı inmeye başladığım zaman tehlikeyle yan yanayım yani. O derece. Bunlar, bizde hiç öyle bir şey yok. ben bazen ayağımı nereye basacağımı bulamıyorum mesela. Malzemeden basacak yer bulamıyorum. Bir düşsem ne olacak? Ya kafamı patlatıcam ya bir tarafımı kırıcam. Bunlar aşılabiliyor mu? Aşılamıyor. Yani 301 kişi değil 3001 kişi ölse yine düzelmez. Devlet geliyor mu bizi denetlemeye? Gelmiyor. Gelse de biz bilmiyoruz yani. Biz görmüyoruz ki. Devletin bir adamı gelip de nasılsın memnun musun demiyor yani.

Q96 : İmbat güvenlikte on numaradır. Yanlış bir yere çivi mi çaktın, hemen o günkü yevmiyeni keserler.

Q97 : Bizim tarımdı hep, emekliliğimiz olsun diye girdik madene. 11 yıl çalıştım. 10 yıl 7 ay. Mayıs'ın 19'unda rahatsızlandım. Yer üstünde, tertip alanında. Gözümü bir açtım revirdeyim. Sonra hastaneye getirdiler. Doktora gösterdiler. Tekrar gittim iş yerine, acilin şeyini kabul etmediler. EG çekildi. Epilepsi olduğu belli oldu. Ondan sonra çıkış verdiler. Ben çıkmayı istemiyordum. En azından şu yevmiyeyi doldurayım diyordum. Olmadı. Bu hastalık yer altında kazaya sebebiyet verebilir dediler. E yer üstünde idare edebilirlerdi onu da yapmadılar. Malulen emekliliğe başvurdum, SGK olumsuz döndü ona da.

Q98 : İşçi kusuru. Hatta… Ya adam taşeronuna kızmıştır yakmıştır bandı. Ama bu boyuta geleceğini kestirememiştir. Cahil adam sonuçta.

Q99 : Kazadan sonra bize Zonguldak'a dönün dediler. Ama insanın ne olacağı belli değil ki. Benim şuradan çıkınca araba çarpıp

ölmeyeceğimin de garantisi yok sonuçta. Vade geldiyse her yerde bulur insanı ölüm.

Q100 Bulunduğun örgütle (DİSK Dev Maden Sen) ilişkini kes, oradakilerle selamını kes, bizim Maden İş'e üye olmayı Kabul et, yarın hemen seni işe sokayım. Ama onlarla olduğun sürece sana ben bile iş bulamam.

Q101 : Üreten bizi yöneten de biz olacağız!

Q102 : Başlangıçta 1000 civarında işçiyi gördük. O ara işçi ciddi ciddi geliyordu. Ama bir takım şeyleri devreye sokarak onu engellediler. Biz kendimizi de eleştirebiliriz. Belki yanlış tartışmalar yaptık. Tabii ki bizim de eksikliğimiz vardır, kendimi de aklamıyorum. Ama genel anlamda devlet ciddi bir basınç uyguladı. O da ister istemez sendikayı vurdu. Bir de sendika diyince akla gelen çok farklı burada… Her gittiğimiz köyde mesela eğitim çalışması yapıyoruz. İşte sendika nasıl olmalıdır falan diye. O kadar alttan başlıyoruz ki… Ya bir işçi toplu sözleşme maddelerini bilmez mi! toplu sözleşme ne demek onu anlatıyoruz daha.

Q103 Din çok etkili. Aileler içe kapanıyor. E tabii tarikatlar falan da devreye giriyor. Şimdi sorun birçoğu kader olarak görüyor olanları.

Q104 : 17'sinde gündüz vardiyasına gittim. Sabah girişte baktım cihaz benim kartı okumadı. Sordum. Personele git sor dediler. Orada adamın elinde 3-4 sayfa a 4 var, bakıyor listeye… Senin iş akdin feshedildi. Dedim gerekçe ne? Uyumsuzluk. İşveren seni dalgın buluyor, kazaya sebebiyet verebilirsin. Gerçek sebebi söyleyin bana gerçek sebep ne dedim. Cevap yok.Bağırdım, sendika yüzünden mi dedin. Senin sendikan ne diye sordular. Dedim Dev Maden Sen, biz öyle bir sendika bilmeyiz dediker. Aynı anda Volkan da var yanımda. Sonra Serkan da paşaya giremedi aynı şekilde…

Q105 : Hukuki yollara gidilseydi işlerini geri alma şansları olabilirdi ama şimdi geri alsam her isten çıkan şirketin önüne çadır kurmaya kalkar.

Her gün işe girip çıkarken bütün işçiler görüyor bunları. Buradan sonra mümkün değil.

Q106 : Onlar zaten çalışmadıklarında, devamsızlık yaptıklarından atıldılar. Bizim çavuş o ara hep, bakın iyi çalışmazsanız sizin de yeriniz orası, o çadır diye gösterirdi. (Güler) Onların çadır şeysinden sonra İmbat'ta üretim arttı, devamsızlık kalmadı. Zaten onları da geri almadı şirket, bana yamuk yapan adamı almam dedi.

APPENDIX B: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

EKSTRAKTİF SANAYİLER VE KIRSAL YAŞAMIN BİÇİMLERİ: SOMA KÖMÜR HAVZASINDA İŞÇİLEŞME MODELLERİ VE EMEK SÜREÇLERİ

Bu çalışma iki amaç etrafında şekillenmiştir. Birincisi, kırsal dönüşüm süreçlerinde ekstraktivist yatırımların rolü üzerine eleştirel literatüre bir katkı yapmak. Bu bağlamda, ekstraktivizm ile kırda yaşam araçlarının dönüşümü arasındaki ilişkiyi yazındaki üç farklı tartışmanın kesişiminde ele almıştır: (i) Marksist ilkel birikimin sürekliliği ve kır nüfusunun işçileşmesi (ii) emek süreci ve yerel emek kontrol rejimleri (iii) maddeci feminist literatürün kırda kadının üretim ve yeniden üretim emeği ve tarım emeğinin feminizasyonu. İkinci olarak, çalışma 13 Mayıs 2014'te, 301 işçinin ölümüyle sonuçlanan Türkiye emek ve çalışma yaşamının en büyük maden faciası ve iş cinayetinin yaşandığı Soma Kömür Havzasındaki mevcut işgücü arzı, emek süreçleri ve yaşam araçlarının çeşitlenmesinin ardındaki daha geniş ölçekli toplumsal ve tarihsel süreçleri ortaya koymayı amaçlıyor.

Kır nüfusunun işçileşmesi literatürde farklı yaklaşımlarca ele alınan oldukça karmaşık ve çok katmanlı bir tartışma. Bu tezde, belli bir zaman ve mekandaki toplumsal ilişkileri daha geniş ölçekteki kapitalist ve patriyarkal ilişkiler bağlamında değerlendiren ilişkisel Marksist ve maddeci feminist yaklaşımlar kullanılmaktadır. Buna göre, belli bir zaman ve mekandaki toplumsal ilişkilerin bu ilişkilerin "ne olduğu"ndan öte o mekanda nasıl oluştuğu ve kapitalist ve patriyarkal ilişkilerin geneliyle nasıl ilişkilendiğine bakarak anlaşılabilir.

Böyle bir araştırma için uygun analiz birimi kırsal hane olmalıdır. Nitekim kırsal dönüşüm ve işçileşme, kır hanesinin hane emek gücü potansiyelinin muhtelif

kullanımlarıyla ve cinsiyete dayalı iş bölümüyle geçim kaynaklarını çeşitlendirme süreçlerine işaret etmektedir. Bu bağlamda, kırda emek süreçlerini ve cinsiyete dayalı iş bölümünü dönüştüren ekstraktivist yatırımlar özel olarak önemlidir. Diğer yandan, sermaye, devlet ve yerel kurumsal yapıların işbirliğiyle, yatırımların yapıldığı bölgelerdeki yerel işgücü piyasasının yapısına uygun olarak iş yerinde ve yerel ölçekte çeşitli emek kontrol stratejileri geliştirilmektedir.

Soma Kömür Havzası, kırsal dönüşüm ile ekstraktivist yatırımların ilişkisinin analizi için uygun bir örnek teşkil etmektedir. 13 Mayıs 2014'te, Soma Kömür İşletmeleri A.Ş. tarafından işletilen Eynez Karanlıkdere Ocağı'nda 301 madencinin ölümüyle sonuçlanan ülke tarihinin en büyük maden faciası ve iş cinayeti yaşandı. Katliamı takip eden günlerde ve Akhisar Ağır Ceza Mahkemesi'ndeki yargılama süreci boyunca, kendilerine yapılan suçlamalara karşı Soma Holding patronu Alp Gürkan ve oğlu Soma Kömür İşletmeleri A.Ş. yönetim kurulu başkanı Can Gürkan, ısrarla Havzada sağladıkları istihdam ve bunun yerel kalkınma için faydalarını vurguladılar. Bu iddianın bir gerçekli payı da vardı. Nitekim katliamdan önce havzadaki özel şirketler tarafından işletilen ocaklarda çalışan maden işçisi sayısı on beş bin olup bunların yaklaşık yedi bini Soma Kömürleri'nin ocaklarında istihdam ediliyordu. Dahası, katliamdan altı ay sonra Soma Kömür İşletmeleri'nin çalıştırdığı ocaklarda çalışan 2,831 maden işçisi, katliam sonrası şirketim mali durumu gerekçe gösterilerek, işten çıkarıldı. Bu işçilerin bir kısmı işe iade davası açarken neredeyse tamamı çeşitli biçimlerde tekrar madende çalışmak istediklerini ifade ettiler. Bu durum, madenlerde ölümcül olabilen düzeyde güvencesiz koşullara binlerce işçi ve ailesinin nasıl razı geldiği sorusunu akıllara getiriyor. Sorunun cevabını ise Havza'daki küçük tarım üreticisi ailelerin 2000'li yıllarda yaşadığı mülksüzleşme (dispossession) ve işçileşme sürecinde bulunabilir.

Soma'da 2000'li yıllar büyük bir işçileşme dalgasıyla karakterize olmuştur. Bu işçileşme dalgasının belirleyicisi tarımın ve kömür madenciliğinin eş zamanlı neoliberal dönüşümüdür. Bir yandan, genel olarak tarımsal üretimin özel olarak tütün üretiminin dönüşümü, bu dönüşüm bağlamında ürün fiyatlarının düşmesi, girdi fiyatlarının ise artması yerli nüfusun yoksullaşma ve mülksüzleşme (dispossession) sürecini beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu süreçte tarımsal üretimden elde edilen gelir küçük üretici hanenin geçimi için yetersiz hale geldikçe tarımda ve tarım

dışında gelir kaynaklarını çeşitlendirme yoluna gittiler. Bu süreç aynı zamanda kömür üretiminin özel sektöre devredildiği ve emek yoğun üretim tekniklerinin kullanıldığı yer altı madenciliğinin tercih edildiği bir döneme denk geldiğinden küçük tarım üreticisi ailelerdeki erkekler yer altı kömür madenlerinde çalışmaya başladılar. Ancak bu süreç, topraktan topyekun bir kopuştan ziyade kır hanesinin geçim araçlarını çeşitlendirme ve tarımsal üretimin feminizasyonu eğilimleriyle karakterize oldu. Ailelerin erkek üyeleri madenlerde çalışmaya başlarken tarımsal üretim kadınların sorumluluğu haline gelmiş ve kadınlar tarımsal üretimi küçük meta üretimi, geçimlik üretim ve ücretli tarım işçiliğinin en az birinde sürdürmektedir.

Soma'da üretilen kömürün Türkiye ekonomisi için önemi temel olarak 2000'li yıllardan itibaren sürekli artan cari açıktaki en önemli kalemin elektrik üretiminde kullanılan ithal enerji olmasıdır. İthal enerji sorununu çözmek için kömürlü termik santral projeleri ve bu santrallerde yerli kömürün kullanımının teşvik edilmesi için çeşitli politikalar geliştirilmiştir. 2005 yılı itibariyle, Soma'da yer altı kömür sahalarının işletmesi Türkiye Kömür İşletmeleri (TKİ) tarafından rödovans sözleşmesiyle özel şirketlere devredilmeye başlanmıştır. Rödovans sözleşmesi, alım garantisi ve üretilen kömür miktarına herhangi bir sınır koymaması gibi sebeplerle kömür yatırımcılarına devlet tarafından sağlanan önemli bir teşvik olmuştur. Dolayısıyla, Soma'da kömür sahası işleten kömür şirketleri de rödovans uygulamasıyla elde ettikleri kar sayesinde ciddi bir kurumsal büyüme tecrübe etmiş, görece yaşlı işçilerin ifadesiyle holdingleşmiştir.

2005 yılı itibariyle Soma havzası yalnızca kömür yatırımcıları için değil Zonguldak, Kütahya gibi madenci kentleri ve bu kentlere tarihsel olarak işgücü sağlayan Bartın, Ordu ve Çorum kentlerindeki madenci aileleri için de cazip hale gelmiştir ve bu kentlerden Soma'ya, halen devam eden, ciddi bir göç dalgası başlamıştır. Bu göçün ardındaki temel sebep ise Zonguldak ve Kütahya'ya nazaran Soma'nın maden ocaklarındaki daha güven(ce)li çalışma koşulları. Soma'da, Zonguldak ve Kütahya'daki, küçük ölçekli ve/ya kaçak ocaklardan farklı olarak görece büyük şirketler ve büyük ölçekli şirketlerin yatırımların mevcut olması Soma'daki ocaklarda çalışan madencilere en azından maaşların düzenli ödenmesi, sigorta ve görece yüksek ücretler gibi avantajlar sağlıyor.

Tarımda ve kömür madenciliğindeki eşzamanlı neoliberal dönüşüm, Soma'da yerel işgücü piyasasının oluşumunun belirleyicisi oldu ve işyeri ölçeği ve yerel ölçekteki emek kontrol stratejileri de yerel işgücü piyasasının kompozisyonuna göre şekillendi. Öncelikle, bir yandan tarımsal dönüşüm, mülksüzleşme ve işçileşme süreçleri diğer yandan diğer madenci kentlerinden Soma'ya göçle yerel işgücü piyasası oluşturuldu. Daha sonra, farklı işçileşme kalıpları farklı hane içi yeniden üretim biçimlerini, geçim stratejilerini ve hane içinde üretim ve yeniden üretim emeğinde cinsiyete dayalı iş bölümü örneklerini beraberinde getirdi. Havzadaki emek süreçleri de, yerel işgücü piyasalarının kompozisyonu ve yatırımların ritmine (şirketlerin biçimi ve büyüklüğü gibi) göre biçimlenmiş durumda. Ayrıca, emek kontrol stratejileri çoğunlukla devlet ve sermaye işbirliğiyle ve yerel siyasi, kurumsal ve yerel toplulukların dinamiklerine göre geliştirilmiş durumda.

Araştırmanın motivasyonuyla ilişkili olarak, saha araştırmasında amaçlanan (i) 2000'li yıllar itibariyle tarımın ve kömür madenciliğinin neoliberal dönüşümüne paralel olarak ortaya çıkan farklı mülksüzleşme, yoksullaşma ve işçileşme süreçlerini incelemek; (ii) bu süreçte dönüşen devlet-sermaye-emek ilişkilerini, emek süreçlerini (tarımda kadın emeği ve kömür madenlerinde emek süreçleri), yerel emek kontrol mekanizmaları, yerli nüfusun bunlara eklemlenme ve direnme biçimlerini örneklerle açıklamak olmuştur. Bu amaçlar doğrultusunda, saha araştırmasının soruları şu şekilde formüle edildi.

1. Soma Havzasındaki yoksunlaşma ve işçileşme süreçlerinin özgüllükleri nelerdir?
2. Soma'da neoliberal dönüşümün toplumsal cinsiyet dinamiği nedir? Bu süreçte kadınların üretim ve yeniden üretim emeği nasıl dönüşmüştür?
3. Türkiye kömür endüstrisi için Soma'nın önemi nedir? Bu, kömür sahalarındaki emek süreçlerini nasıl etkilemiştir?
4. Soma'daki emek kontrol rejiminin belirleyicileri nelerdir? Zor, rıza ve direniş uğrakları nelerdir?

Bu araştırma sorularını yanıtlayabilmek için en uygun araştırma yöntemi, araştırmacıya sahadaki nüfusun yaşam pratikleri, inançları ve duygularına dair "içeriden" derinlemesine bilgi edinme imkanı veren nitel araştırma tekniği oldu. Böylece, araştırmacı yalnızca gündelik yaşama dair değil, kişilerin ve grupların olup

bitenle nasıl ilişkilenip nasıl yorumladığına dair de bilgi toplayabilmekte (Roberts, 2014: 7). Nitel araştırma gerçekliğin toplumsal olarak inşa edilmiş doğasını ortaya koyduğu ölçüde araştırmacıyla araştırma nesnesi arasındaki ilişki ve durumsal kısıtlar araştırmayı biçimlendirir. Araştırmacı, toplumsal deneyimin oluşumu ve anlamlandırılması üzerine soruları cevaplamaya çalışır (Denzin and Lincoln, 2012).

Dahası, nitel araştırma yöntemleri araştırmacıya saha araştırması sürecinde araştırmanın içeriği ve yöntemini değiştirme ve/ya çeşitlendirme ve bilgi toplamayabilmek için yeni mekanizmalar geliştirme esnekliğini sağlar. Mason (2002: 24) tarafından iddia edildiği gibi, nitel olarak düşünmek, araştırmanın akışına dair apriori karar ve stratejilerin reddini gerektirir. Nitel araştırmada araştırmanın tasarım ve stratejilerine dair kararlar süregider ve araştırma sürecinde ve akışında yeniden şekillenir. Nitel araştırma yöntemlerinin bu özelliğine uygun olarak, bu araştırmada kullanılan nitel araştırma teknikleri yarı-yapılandırılmış mülakatlar, odak grup görüşmeleri, katılımcı gözlem tekniği ve saha günlükleri olmuştur.

Maden işçileri ve madenci eşleri ile yapılan yarı yapılandırılmış mülakatlarda öncelikle yaş, memleket, eğitim durumuna dair sabit sorular sorulurken geri kalan sorular toprakla ve tarımla ilişki, hane tipi, istihdam biçimi, çalışılan firma veya siyasi görüşleri gibi kriterlere göre şekillendi. Saha araştırması boyunca, beş odak grup görüşmesi yapıldı. Bunlardan ilk grup (üç görüşme), köy kahvelerinde, farklı kuşaklardan maden işçileriyle olup ikinci grup tarım işçisi kadınlarlaydı. Saha araştırmasında kullanılan en önemli yöntem birçok sebepler katılımcı gözlem tekniği oldu. Öncelikle, saha araştırmasının hazırlık bölümünde, havzadaki toplumsal ilişkiler ve gündelik yaşama dair fikir edinebilmek ve araştırmanın geri kalanına dair gerekli bağlantıları kurabilmek için katılımcı gözlem tekniği kullanıldı. Ayrıca, havzadaki özellikle katliam sonrası oluşan politik baskı, insanları ses kaydı alınan bir mülakata gönülsüz olmalarına sebep oluyordu. Dolayısıyla, ev gezmeleri, iftar ya da düğün yemekleri gibi sosyal etkinliklerdeki daha rahat hissettikleri ve rahatça konuşabildikleri sohbetleri tercih ediyorlardı. Bu yüzden, muhtelif etkinliklere katılabilmek için birçok fırsat değerlendirildi. Bunlardan bazıları şu şekilde:

- Soma Davası duruşmaları

- Sosyal Haklar Derneği yaz okullarında gönüllü öğretmenlik
- Sosyal Haklar Derneği kadın atölyeleri
- Katliamın yıldönümü ve ay dönündeki miting ve basın açıklamaları
- Düğün, iftar, altın günü gibi etkinlikler
- Tarım işçisi, küçük meta üreticisi ve geçimlik üretici kadınları tarla veya bahçelerinde ziyaret edip tütün dizme, bahçe sulama gibi işlere yardım.

Bu tür etkinliklere katılmak havzadaki toplumsal ilişkileri, sınıf içi çatışma dinamiklerini, siyasi gelişmelere verilen tepkileri gözlemleme fırsatı sundu. Ayrıca, havzadaki madenci ailelerin gündelik yaşamlarını, gündelik yaşamlarını anlamlandırma biçimlerini gözlemlemek kırsal dönüşüm, işçileşme ve emek süreçlerindeki çatışma ve çelişkileri anlamayı kolaylaştırdı.

Saha araştırması Haziran 2015'ten Ağustos 2018'e kadar aralıklarla üç aşamada yürütüldü. Birinci aşama, hazırlık aşaması, birden fazla ziyaretten oluşuyordu ve bu aşamada araştırmanın kapsam ve içeriğini netleştirme ve havzadaki toplumsal ilişkiler ve Soma katliamının yargılanma sürecine dair ilk izlenimler bu dönemde edinildi. İkinci aşama ise üç ay boyunca (Haziran – Eylül 2016) havzada konaklama ve 2017'nin Mart ayındaki üç günlük ziyaretten oluşuyordu. Bu safhada Soma ilçesinde ve Soma, Kınık ve Savaştepe'nin köylerinde derinlemesine mülakatlar, odak grup görüşmeleri ve katılımcı gözlem tekniği kullanılarak saha araştırması yürütüldü. Üçüncü ve son safhada ise, ilk iki dönemde havzadaki neoliberal dönüşüm süreci ve mevcut emek süreçlerinin toplumsal cinsiyetli karakterinin anlaşılması üzerine havzada kadın emeğine odaklanıldı.

Saha araştırmasında toplanan verilerin analizi de saha araştırmasının farklı safhalarına göre belirlenmiş çok aşamalı bir süreç oldu. Her bir safhada toplanan verilerin analizi, eksiklikleri görüp bir sonraki safhada tamamlayabilmek ve yöntemi geliştirebilmek için, bir sonraki safhadan önce yapıldı. Örneğin, farklı memleketlerden işçilerle mülakatlar yapılması ve soruların yerli-göçmen işçi farkına göre düzenlenmesi gerekliliği birinci safhadaki veriler ışığında anlaşıldı ve ikinci safha buna göre şekillendirildi. En önemlisi, havzadaki işçileşme ve emek süreçleri ve yerel sınıf ilişkilerinin toplumsal cinsiyetli niteliği ilk iki safhada anlaşıldığından baştan planlanmayan üçüncü safha araştırmaya eklendi.

Dolayısıyla, çalışmanın amacı, soruları ve kapsamı saha araştırması boyunca sürekli yeniden şekillendirildi.

Bu tez, giriş ve sonuç bölümleri dahil altı bölümden oluşmaktadır. Giriş bölümünü takip eden *İkinci Bölüm* tezin ilişkisel Marksist ve maddeci feminist metodoloji üzerine kurulu teorik arka planını oluşturmaktadır. Bu bölümde, Marksist ilkel birikim ve işçileşme, emek süreçleri ve emek kontrol stratejileri ve kırda kadın emeği ve tarımın feminizasyonu olmak üzere üç farklı literatürden faydalanılmış aralarındaki içsel ilişki vurgulanmıştır. *Üçüncü Bölüm'*de ise Soma'da kırsal dönüşüm, işçileşme süreçleri ve madenci eşi kadınların üretim (tarımda) ve yeniden üretim emekleri tartışılmıştır. Bu bölümde öncelikle, Soma'daki dönüşümü doğrudan belirleyen daha geniş ölçekli dönüşüm süreci, 2000'li yıllar itibariyle Türkiye kırında küçük ölçekli tarımsal üreticilerin piyasanın kontrolüne girme süreçleri ve tarım politikaları tartışıldı. Buna paralel olarak Soma Havzasına bağlı köylerdeki tütün üretici ailelerin yoksullaşma, mülksüzleşme ve işçileşme süreçleri ve gelir kaynaklarını çeşitlendirmek için geliştirdikleri stratejiler tartışıldı. Son olarak, bu dönemde Soma'da tarım emeğinin feminizasyonu ve yeniden üretim süreçlerinin dönüşmesi bağlamında kadınların üretim ve yeniden üretim emekleri tartışıldı. *Dördüncü Bölüm*de ise, Soma'daki maden ocaklarındaki emek süreçleri emek kontrol stratejileri, 2000'li yıllar itibariyle genel olarak kömür sektörünün özel olarak ise Soma'da çıkarılan kömürün Türkiye ekonomisi için önemiyle ilişkilendirerek tartışıldı. Bunun için öncelikle, 2000'li yıllar itibariyle Türkiye ekonomisi için kömür endüstrinin artan önemi tartışılıp daha sonra sektörün Soma'daki dönüşümü değerlendirildi. Daha sonra ise, sektörün stratejik önemine göre biçimlenen emek süreçleri ve emek kontrol stratejileri analiz edildi. *Beşinci Bölüm*'de ise, Soma'daki emek kontrol mekanizmaları, iş yerinden öte yerel ölçekteki ilişkilere referansla analiz edilmekte ve madenci ailelerin bunlara eklemlenme ve direnme uğrakları tartışılmakta. Bu bölümdeki analiz mümkün olduğunda katliam öncesi ve sonrası ayrımına dayandırılıyor. Bunun için de öncelikle Soma Katliamı ve yargılama süreci değerlendiriliyor. Daha sonra, çoğunlukla dayıbaşılık sistemiyle-ve onun yer üstündeki yansıması olan hemşeri dernekleriyle-uygulanan yerel emek kontrol stratejileri ve buradaki devlet, kömür şirketleri ve Maden İş sendikası arasındaki işbirliği tartışılıyor. Tartışma daha sonra,

bu kontrol mekanizmalarının katliamdan sonra aldığı yeni biçimlerle devam ediyor. Son olarak ise, bu kontrol mekanizma ve stratejilerine göre geliştirilen direniş uğrakları muhalif sendikal ve kurumsal oluşumlar ve Yırca zeytin direnişi ve İmbat Madencilik işçilerinin direnişi olmak üzere iki direniş örneğiyle tartışılıyor. Tezin sonuç bölümünde ise Soma Havzasındaki işçileşme örüntüleri, emek süreçleri ve sınıf ilişkileri ilgili literatürle ilişkisi bağlamında tartışılıyor.

Tezin genelinde amaçlanan, yukarıda belirtildiği gibi, Soma kömür havzasında 2000'li yıllardaki işgücü arzı, emek süreçleri ve işçileşme süreçlerinin ardındaki daha geniş ölçekli toplumsal ve iktisadi süreçleri ortaya koymak. 2000'li yıllar itibariyle Soma'da çıkarılan kömürün Türkiye ekonomisi için, elektrik üretiminde ithal enerjinin aşırı kullanımı ve yerel kömür teşviğiyle, artan önemiyle yerli tarımda küçük meta üreticisi ailelerin tarımda neoliberal dönüşümün etkisiyle mülksüzleşme (dispossession) sürecine girmeleri aynı döneme denk gelmiş bu da havzada emek süreçlerinin ve sınıf ilişkilerinin belirleyicisi olmuştur. Çalışmada temel bir iddia ekstraktivist yatırımların yapıldığı kırsal bölgelerdeki tarımsal üretimin niteliğinin yatırımcı (ekstraktivist sermaye) ile yerli nüfus (geleceğin madenci aileleri) arasındaki ilişki için önemli olduğu. Bir başka anlatımla, kırda ekstraktivist yatırımların analizi için yatırımların yapıldığı dönemde bölgedeki tarımdaki küçük üreticinin durumunun net bir biçimde ortaya konması gerekmektedir. Neoliberal bağlamda bu çoğunlukla, neoliberal tarım politikalarının sonucu olarak basit yeniden üretimin sıkışması (Bernstein, 1979) sürecini tecrübe eden küçük meta üreticileridir. Türkiye kırında da kırsal nüfusun büyük ölçekli ekstraktivist yatırımlarla karşılaşması 2000'li yılların ortalarına, yani tarım politikalarının hızla neoliberalleştiği döneme denk düşmesidir (Büke ve Eren, 2016: 314-318). Dolayısıyla, kırsal hane, tarımdan elde edilen gelir geçim için yeterli olmadığı ölçüde gelir kaynaklarını çeşitlendirmek için stratejiler geliştirmeye başlamış, kırdaki ekstraktivist yatırımlar da bu dönemde önemli bir "fırsat" olmuştur. Ayrıca, bu süreç kırdaki hanelerin beka stratejilerinin (Aydın, 2001) çeşitlendirilmesine işaret ettiği ölçüde, hane emek potansiyelinin yeni kullanım biçimleri (Özuğurlu, 2011) özellikle cinsiyete dayalı işbölümüyle gündeme gelmiştir. Dolayısıyla, kırda ekstraktif yatırımların analizi aşağıdaki tartışmaları gerektirmektedir:

- Yerel (kırsal) işgücü piyasasının oluşumu ve ekstraktif sanayilere emek arzı: kırsal dönüşüm, küçük tarım üreticilerinin yoksunlaşma ve işçileşme süreçleri, ekstraktivist yatırımların olduğu bölgelere emek göçü ve kırda yeni sınıf oluşum süreçleri
- Bu bölgelerde emek süreçleri ve emek kontrol rejimi
- Kırsal hanelerin üretim ve yeniden üretim süreçlerinde cinsiyete dayalı işbölümü.

Klasik Marksist metinlerden yakın dönem takipçilerine uzanan ilkel birikim ve sürekliliği literatürüne atıfla kırda işgücü piyasası oluşumu ve kırda sınıf oluşumu tartışması yapılmıştır. İlkel birikim, köylü ekonomisinin çökmesiyle doğrudan üreticilerin işçiye dönüştüğü bir süreç olarak tanımlandığı ölçüde, ilkel birikimin sürekliliği de Rosa Luxemburg'un (2003) sermaye birikiminin kapitalist olmayan alanlara ve bu alanlardaki emek gücüne duyduğu sürekli ihtiyaca dayanır. Dolayısıyla, neoliberalizm bağlamında da işçileşme tartışması ilkel birikim ve sürekliliği tartışmasına dayanmalıdır. Buna göre, işçileşme; kır nüfusunun yoksullaşma (impoverishment), mülksüzleşme (dispossession), üretim ve geçim araçlarının metalaşması süreçlerine işaret eder. Ancak işçileşme tartışmasına dair cevaplanması elzem bir soru, işçileşmenin topraktan topyekun bir kopuş önkoşulunu gerektirip gerektirmediğidir ve cevabını Lenin ve Kautsky'nin kırda işçileşme tartışmalarında bulmak mümkündür.

Lenin ve Kautsky'nin kır analizlerinin bu çalışma için önemi, analizi köylünün işçileşmesi üzerine dayandıran yakın dönem kır yaşamının çeşitlenmesi tartışmasına atıfla vurgulanmıştır. Lenin ve Kautsky, Marksist köylülüğün tasfiyesi tezini, bu sürecin çelişkili ve karmaşık, her an karşıt eğilimleri içeren niteliğini vurgulayarak gözden geçirir. İkisinin de köylünün işçileşmesi analizi, bu sürecin sıfır toplamlı bir tanımını reddettiği ölçüde topraktan topyekun kopuşu işçileşmenin bir önkoşulu olarak görmez. Buna göre, Lenin tarafından iddia edildiği gibi (1974: 177) belli bir miktar ekilebilir toprağı varken (ve bu toprakta üretimi sürdürürken) emek gücünü tarımda veya tarım dışında satan köylüler de "kır proletaryası" içindedir.

Neoliberalizm bağlamında işçileşme süreçlerine odaklanan yakın dönem ilişkisel Marksist literatür de, benzer bir biçimde, köylülüğün devamlılığı ya da tasfiyesi

ikiliğinde yeknesak ve sıfır toplamlı bir işçileşme süreci olmadığı iddiası üzerine yükselir (krş. Araghi, 1995, 2009; Bernstein, 1979, 2001, 2010; Bryceson, 1999; Johnson 2004). Buna göre, işçileşme süreci kırda yaşam araçlarının çeşitlenmesine işaret eder ve geçimlik üretim, küçük meta üretimi, tarımda ve tarımda dışında ücretli işçilik aynı anda tecrübe edilebilir. Nitekim tarımda neoliberalizm, kır hanesinin artan üretim maliyetine karşın düşen ürün fiyatları karşısındaki "basit yeniden üretimin sıkışması" (Bernstein,1979) ve hanenin kendi yeniden üretimini tarımsal üretimden sağlayamaması biçiminde deneyimlenir ve dolayısıyla bu haneler giderek daha fazla emek gücünü satmaya yönelir. Kırda yaşam araçlarının dönüşümünü yalnızca üretim değil toplumsal yeniden üretim süreçlerinin de dönüşmesiyle açıklayan Bernstein (2010) basit yeniden üretim sıkışması içindeki haneyi "emek sınıfları" (classes of labour) kavramıyla tanımlar. Emek sınıfları kavramı, Lenin ve Kautsky'den başlayarak devam eden köylünün işçileşme sürecinin her an karşıt eğilimlere maruz kalan karmaşık bir süreç olduğu analizinde yola çıkarak, ne kendi yeniden üretim araçlarından tamamen yoksun ne de kendi yeniden üretimi için yeterli araçlara sahip kırsal işçi sınıfı hanesini tarif eder. Bir diğer anlatımla, emek sınıfları, kendi günlük yeniden üretimi için emek gücünü satan ancak bunu topraktan tamamen koparak değil gelir araçlarını çeşitlendirerek yapan işçi hanesidir.

Kırda istihdam yaratma söylemine dayanan neoliberal kırsal kalkınma politikaları kapsamında ve özellikle ekstraktivist yatırımlar aracılığıyla kır ve kent arasında yeni bir emek göçü biçimi başladı. Kırdan kente yönelmesi beklenen emek göçünün bu dönemde kırdan kıra ve hatta kentten kıra da yönelmeye başladığı görülüyor. Bu durum, kırsal işgücü piyasası analizinin yerli ve göçmen işçi arasındaki farklar ve ilişkileri göz önünde bulundurarak geliştirilmesi ihtiyacını doğurdu. Burawoy (1976) göçmen emeği tartışmasında, göçmen işçilerin yerli işçilerden en önemli farkının yeniden üretim sürecinden kaynaklandığını vurgular. Buna göre, göçmen işçinin yeniden üretim maliyetinin dışsallaşmış olması (kendi toprağından yeniden üretimini sağlayan yerli işçiden farklı olarak) emek sürecinde ve sınıf ilişkilerinde dezavantajlı ve güçsüz konuma düşürür.

Dolayısıyla, neoliberalizm bağlamında ekstraktif yatırımlar kırda sınıf mücadelesinin biçim değiştirmesine yol açar ve bu mücadelenin baş aktörleri de

mülksüzleşme ve işçileşme sürecindeki köylü çiftçilerdir. Veltmeyer ve Petras (2014) bu nüfusun, kapitalizmin şafağında oluşmuş geleneksel proletaryadan farklı olduğunun altını çizer. Buna göre, geleneksel proletarya doğrudan üreticilerinin üretim araçlarından ayrılması ve ücretli işçilere dönüşmesiyle oluşmuşken neoliberal ekstraktivist yatırımların yöneldiği bölgelerde oluşan proletarya giderek daha çok kırda tarım dışı istihdamda çalışmaya başlayan kısmi olarak proleterleşmiş kır hanesidir.

Kırdaki ekstraktivist yatırımlar mülksüzleşme, işçileşme ve kırda işgücü piyasasının oluşma süreçlerine işaret ettiği ölçüde bu bölgelerdeki yatırımcıların yerel işgücü piyasası üzerindeki emek kontrol stratejilerin analizi elzemdir. Özellikle, doğal kaynaklar yer değiştirebilir olmadığı ve bu yüzden yatırımcının yatırımı başka bölgeye yönlendirmesi kolay olmadığından bölgedeki yerel topluluğun dinamiklerine göre stratejiler geliştirmesi diğer sektörlere göre daha önemlidir (Ellem, 2006: 370). Ayrıca, ekstraktivist yatırımlar aynı anda hem kırsal toplulukların emek gücünün hem de doğal kaynakların sömürüsüne odaklandığı ölçüde, emek kontrol mekanizmaları iş yeri düzeyinden çok topluluk (community) düzeyine odaklanmalıdır.

Emek süreci teorisi ve yerel emek kontrol rejimleri yazını işyerindeki sömürü ilişkilerinin analizinin daha geniş toplumsal yapılar içinde gömülü olması gerektiğini vurgular. Buna göre, makro ve yerel düzeydeki emek kontrol rejimleri iş yerindeki emek rejimiyle içsel olarak ilişkilidir. Buna göre, iş yeri ölçeği (emek gücünün belirli bir firma tarafından kullanılması), yerel dinamikler (yerel emek gücünün yereldeki yatırımcılar tarafından kullanımı ya da yerel işgücü piyasasının özgüllükleri) ve küresel ölçekte emek-sermaye ilişkilerinin özellikleri içsel olarak ilişkilidir ve dolayısıyla her biri aynı bütünselliğin (totality) ve birbirinin uğrakları olarak değerlendirilmelidir (Gough, 2003: 27-8). Böylece, örneğin, bir kömür ocağındaki emek süreci ve emek deneyim rejiminin analizi, çoğunlukla kırsal dönüşümden kaynaklanan yerel işgücü piyasasının oluşumu (emek arzı) ve emek göçü ile sermayenin yerel işgücünün kompozisyonuna uygun olarak üretim ve yeniden üretim süreçlerinde geliştirdiği kontrol ve disiplin mekanizmalarından bağımsız düşünülemez.

Buna ek olarak, çalışmada temel bir iddia, üretim ve yeniden üretim ilişkileri arasındaki biçimsel ikiliğin aşılması gerektiğidir. Böylece, kapitalist sermaye birikiminin yaşam kaynağını sürekli olarak ücretli ve ücretsiz işgücü sömürüsüyle genişlemesinden aldığı (Dalla Costa, 1995: 7) iddiasından hareketle bu çalışmada toplumsal cinsiyet analizi ilişkisel Marksist yöntemin merkezine oturtulmuştur. Marksizmin maddeci feminist eleştirisinde temel bir iddia, Marksizmin maddeci yönteminin elverişli bir zemin oluşturduğu (Hartman, 1976: 158) ancak Marksizm'in kavramlarının ve metinlerinin toplumsal cinsiyet çelişkileri ve patriyarka merkeze alınarak yeniden gözden geçirilmesi gerektiğidir (Mies et al, 2014). Bu, kırsal dönüşüm ve ekstraktivizm analizi için özel olarak önemlidir nitekim süreç çoğunlukla tarımsal üretimin feminizasyonu, tarımda kadın emeğinin aşırı sömürüsü ve yeniden üretim emeği sömürüsünün şiddetlenmesidir.

Diğer yandan, araştırmada analiz biriminin hane olduğu daha önce vurgulanmıştı. Kır analizi için hanenin en uygun analiz birimi olmasının nedeni emek gücünün üretim ve yeniden üretiminin örgütlendiği birim olmasından geliyor (Özuğurlu, 2011: 92). Kapitalist patriyarka bağlamında, hane toplumsal cinsiyet ilişkilerinden bağımsız tanımlanamayacağı ölçüde, kırsal dönüşüm analizi de toplumsal cinsiyetlendirilmiş olmalıdır. Nitekim, cinsiyet körü kırsal dönüşüm analizleri, hane içindeki cinsiyete dayalı işbölümünü ve ücretsiz olduğu ölçüde kadın emeğinin kurucu rolünü gözardı etmekte. Dolayısıyla, kırsal hanenin cinsiyet körü tanımından kaçınılmalı ve analiz kadının ücretli ve/ya ücretsiz emeğini de içerecek biçimde yapılmalıdır (Uyar vd, 2017).

Literatürde yapılan tartışmadakine benzer bir biçimde, işçileşmenin Soma Kömür Havzasında da yeknesak ve sıfır toplamlı bir süreç olmadığı, farklı işçileşme süreçleri ve madenci ailelerinin toprakla kurdukları farklı ilişkilerin 2000'li yıllar itibariyle yerel sınıf ilişkilerinin temel belirleyenleri olduğu gözlemlendi. İşçileşme süreçlerindeki birinci ve en belirgin fark, yerel ve göçmen aileler arasındaydı. 2005 yılı itibariyle Havzada rödovans uygulamasının başlamasıyla artan maden işçisi ihtiyacının önemli bir kısmı tarımdan elde ettiği gelir geçimine yeterli olmayan yerel nüfustan karşılanmıştır. Aynı dönemde, Zonguldak ve Kütahya gibi madenci kentlerinden ve bu kentlere tarihsel olarak işgücü arzı sağlayan Bartın, Ordu ve Çorum gibi kentlerden Soma'ya ciddi bir göç dalgası başlamıştır. Yerel ve göçmen

işçiler arasındaki en önemli fark, yeniden üretim sürecindeki farktan ve bu süreçte göçmen işçilerin madenden elde edilen gelire daha bağımlı olmasından kaynaklanıyor. Göçmen işçilerin en azından kendi tüketimine yönelik de olsa tarımsal üretim yapamıyor olmaları nakit bağımlılıklarını arttırıyor ve çoğunlukla borçlanmayla sonuçlanıyor. Bu durum, göçmen işçileri kömür şirketleri karşısında hem iş yerinde hem yerel toplumsal ilişkilerde görece güçsüz ve itaatkar bir hale getiriyor.

Diğer taraftan, yerel aileler içinde de işçileşme süreçlerine ve toprak ve tarımla ilişkilere dair önemli farklar gözlemlendi. Saha araştırmasında, toprakla ilişki ve işçileşme modellerine göre dört farklı hane türü gözlemlendi. Birinci grup, küçük meta üretimini sürdüren aileler. Bu ailelerde küçük meta üretiminden elde edilen gelir bütün ailenin geçimi için yetersiz olduğu ölçüde erkekler madenlerde çalışmaya başlarken kadınlar tarımsal üretimi sürdürüyorlar. Bu ailelerde çoğunlukla madenden elde edilen gelir tarımsal üretimi finanse etmek için kullanılıyor. İkinci grup ailede madenci eşleri ücretli tarım işçisi olarak çalışıyor ve ailelerin toprakla ilişkisi bununla sınırlı. Bu ailelerin bir kısmının ekilebilir arazisi yokken bir kısmı olduğu halde iyi gelir elde edemedikleri veya üretim maliyeti yüksek olduğu için arazide üretim yapmıyorlar. Toprakları boş duruyor veya kiraya veriyorlar. Üçüncü grup, ilk iki grubu kapsayan aileler. Bir diğer anlatımla, bu ailelerdeki kadınlar küçük meta üretimi ve tarım işçiliğini eş zamanlı sürdürüyorlar. Son grup ise, işsiz madenci aileler olup ailenin bütün fertleri ücretli tarım işçisi olarak çalışıyorlar. Bu ailelerden bir kısmının da arazisi olduğu halde hiçbiri kendi toprağında üretim yapmıyor. Bunu da artık madenden gelen düzenli gelirin olmayışı ve dolayısıyla üretim maliyetini karşılayamamalarıyla açıklıyorlar.

İlgili yazına atıfla da tartışıldığı gibi Soma'da da gözlemlenen işçileşmenin sıfır toplamlı bir süreç olmadığı, toprakla belli bir miktar ilişki sürerken ücretli işe yönelme şeklinde gerçekleştiği. Havzada tecrübe edilen, kır nüfusunun geçim kaynaklarını çeşitlendirerek işçileşmesi ve bu dönemde yerel işgücü piyasasının farklı yeniden üretim araçlarına sahip yerel ve göçmen ailelerden oluşması.

Havzada kadın emeğine dair gözlemlenen, Soma'daki neoliberal dönüşüm sürecine paralel olarak kadınların üretim ve yeniden üretim emeklerinin belirgin bir biçimde

dönüştüğü ve bu sürecin kadının görünmeyen emeğinin aşırı sömürüsüyle (Çelik ve Balta, 2017) karakterize olduğu. Öncelikle, Soma'daki işçileşme süreçleri yalnızca erkeklerin madende işçileşmesi değil tarımda emeğin artan feminizasyonuyla da karakterize olmuştur. Tarımda kadın emeğinin sömürüsü geçimlik üretim, küçük meta üretimi ve ücretli tarım işçiliğinin en az birinde gözlemleniyor. Geçimlik ve küçük meta üreticisi kadınlar, ücretsiz aile işçileri olarak çalışıyorlar. Bu anlamda önemli bir nokta, küçük meta üreticisi kadınların üretim sürecinde emek güçleriyle yer alması, kontrat veya ürünün pazarlanması gibi süreçlerle erkeklerin ilgilenmesi. Dolayısıyla tarımın feminizasyonu, kadın emeğinin tarımda artan sömürüsü anlamına geliyor. Ücretli tarım işçisi kadınlar ise, yevmiyeli ve sigortasız olarak çalışıyorlar.

Havzada işçileşme süreçleri, kadınların tarımdaki emeğinin yanı sıra yeniden üretim emeklerinde de ciddi bir dönüşümle karakterize olmuş durumda. Görüşme yapılan kadınlar, eşlerinin madende çalışmaya başlamasıyla artan ev içi iş yüklerini sıklıkla vurguladılar. Birçoğu, hiç boş zamanları olmadığını ısrarla vurgularken yarıya yakınının küçük meta üretimi, geçimlik üretim, ücretli tarım işçiliği ve yeniden üretim işini eş zamanlı olarak yürüttükleri gözlemlendi. Dolayısıyla kadınlar 2000'li yıllar sonrasını tanımlamak için sıklıkla "burada kadınlar hiç durmaz" ifadesini kullandı.

Saha araştırmasında, Havzadaki emek süreçlerini ve emek kontrol stratejilerini şekillendiren faktörlerin 2000'li yıllar itibariyle kömür endüstrisinin ülke ekonomisi için stratejik önemi, farklı işçileşme biçimleri ve yerel işgücü piyasasının kompozisyonu olduğu gözlemlendi. Buna göre, işe alım sürecinden kömür madenlerine ve hatta gündelik yaşamın tasarımına kadar muhtelif emek kontrol ve disiplin mekanizmaları geliştirilmiş durumda. 2000 yıllar itibariyle Türkiye ekonomisinin iki özelliği kömür endüstrisini özellikle 2010'lu yıllarda stratejik hale getirdi. Öncelikle, 2000'li yıllar, Türkiye ekonomisinin istihdamsız büyümeyle karakterize olduğu bir dönem. İstihdamsız büyümenin kömür endüstrisine doğrudan iki etkisi olduğunu söylemek mümkün. Birincisi yüksek büyüme performansından kaynaklanan artan enerji ihtiyacıyken ikincisi istihdam yaratma kapasitesi yüksek yatırımların artan önemi oldu. Özellikle kırdaki büyük yoksunlaşma ve işçileşme dalgası kırsal alanda yapılan kömür yatırımlarının "kırda istihdam yaratma"

söylemiyle meşrulaştırılmasına neden oldu. Ülke ekonomisinin ikinci ve en önemli dinamiği ise büyük ölçüde ithal enerji kaleminden kaynaklanan yüksek cari açık. Dolayısıyla, özellikle elektrik üretiminde ithal doğal gazdan yerli kömüre yönelme 2010'lu yıllarda hazırlanan Onuncu Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı (2014-2018) ya da Milli Enerji ve Maden Politikası (2017) gibi planlarda öncelik kazandı. Bu kapsamda hükümetler tarafından kömür sektörüne çeşitli teşvikler sağlandı ve bu teşviklerden en önemlisi kömür üretiminin rödovans sözleşmeleriyle özelleştirilmesi oldu. Rödövans sözleşmeleriyle TKİ kömür üretimini özel şirketlere devrediyor ve kömürün tek müşterisi olarak çıkarılan kömürün miktarı ne kadar olursa olsun satın alma garantisi veriyor. Soma'da da gözlemlendiği gibi alım üretime sınır konmadan verilen alım garantisi yatırımcı için sektörü cazip ve karlı hale getiriyor ve birçok kömür şirketinin bu dönemde ciddi bir kurumsal büyüme tecrübe etmesini ya da büyük şirketlerin sektörde yatırım yapmasını teşvik ediyor.

Soma'da emek süreçleri kömürün makro düzeydeki öneminden, rödovans sözleşmelerinin şartlarından ve sektörde devlet-sermaye ilişkilerinden doğrudan etkileniyor. Rödovans sözleşmelerinde, kömür şirketleri için daha fazla kar etmenin yolu emek yoğun üretim tekniklerini kullanarak mümkün olan maksimum miktarda kömür çıkarmak olduğu ölçüde, emek süreçleri (işe alım, işin organizasyonu, ve işyerindeki emek kontrol stratejileri) bu amaca uygun biçimde tasarlanıyor. Öncelikle, maden işçileri işe dayıbaşı adı verilen ve enformel bir taşeron sistemi olarak işleyen aracılarla alınıyor. Dayıbaşlarının öncelikli görevi kömür şirketlerine, memleket ve akrabalık ilişkilerini kullanarak, maden işçisi sağlamak olup aynı zamanda şirketlerin kayıtlı ve ücretli işçileri de oluyorlar. Maaşlarının yanı sıra sağladıkları her bir işçi üzerinden de ekstra ödeme alıyorlar. Diğer yandan, maden işçilerinin hikayelerine göre, dayıbaşlarının kömür şirketleri için daha önemli bir işlevi maksimum miktarda kömürün çıkarılmasını garantiye almak için işçiler üzerinde "üretim baskısı" (işçiler tarafından ifade edildiği biçimiyle) uygulamaları. Neredeyse bütün görüşmecilerin ifade ettiği üzere, bu üretim baskısı işten çıkarma tehdidi, aşağılama ve hatta fiziksel şiddet biçiminde olabiliyor. Dayıbaşları, üretim süreçlerini vardiya boyunca takip etmiyorlar. Her dayıbaşının ekibinde görevler oldukça sıkı bir hiyerarşik düzene göre organize ediliyor. Her bir ekip kendi içinde,

çavuşlar tarafından yönetilen alt gruplara ayrılıyorlar. Madencilerin anlattığı biçimiyle, çavuşlar "taşeronun taşeronu" işlevi görüyorlar.

Ekipler halinde çalışmanın kömür şirketleri için iki önemli işlevi olduğu gözlemlendi. Birincisi, enformel ağları kullanarak maden işçileri üzerinde sıkı bir kontrol mekanizması oluşturmaları ve böylece verimi arttırmaları. Birçok görüşmecinin vurguladığı üzere, müdürlerin ya da vardiya amirlerinin her bir vardiyada 1.000-2.000 civarı işçinin çalıştığı oldukça geniş sahalarda üretimi kontrol etmelerinin imkansız olduğuydu. İkinci işlevleri, işçileri ekiplere bölerek sosyalleşme olanaklarını sınırlamak ve böylece olası bir işçi muhalefetinin önünü kesmek. Neredeyse her görüşmecinin belirttiği üzere, işçilerin diğer ekiplerdeki işçilerle iletişim kurması ve hatta birbirlerini tanımaları bile imkansız oluyor.

Dayıbaşılık sistemi, yer altı kömür sahalarının ötesinde, Havza genelinde etkili bir emek kontrol mekanizması olarak işlev görüyor. Özellikle bu sistemin yer üstündeki yansıması olan hemşeri derneklerinin rolü Havzadaki sınıf ilişkilerinde oldukça etkili. Araştırmanın teorik bölümünde iddia edildiği üzere, yerel emek kontrol rejimleri şirketler, devlet, yerel topluluklar ve onların kurumları ile yerel politik ve toplumsal örgütler aracılığıyla örgütlenmekte. Saha araştırmasında da gözlemlenen hemşeri derneklerinin yerel topluluklar için önemli bir emek kontrol mekanizması işlevi gördüğüydü. Bu derneklerle bir yandan madenci ailelerinin yaşamları dini, kültürel, mekânsal olarak bölünüyor diğer yandan da işçilerin ciddi bir kısmı için örneğin alternatif/muhalif bir sendikadan daha güvenilir ve sağlam seçenekler teşkil ediyorlar. Böylece, bu dernekler Havzada örgütlenebilecek olası bir güçlü muhalefeti önlemekte önemli rol oynuyorlar.

Saha araştırmasında gözlemlendiği üzere, hemşeri dernekleri devlet, sermaye ve Maden İş sendikasıyla (katliamdan sonra maden işçileri tarafından tanımladığı ismiyle "şeytan üçlüsü") doğrudan ilişkili. Hemşeri dernekleri sendikanın yönetiminde temsil ediliyor ve bu dernekler de dayıbaşları tarafından kurulup yönetildiği ölçüde, dayıbaşılık sisteminin doğrudan yerel iktidar bloğunda tezahür ettiğini iddia etmek mümkün.

Havzadaki emek kontrol stratejileri Soma katliamından sonra aynı aktörlerle sürdürülmekle birlikte böyle bir trajedinin yaşanmasından sonra bazı ek mekanizmaların geliştirildiği gözlemlendi. Diğer yandan, katliamdan sonraki süreçte devlet müdahalesinin arttığını söylemek mümkün. Teorik bölümde iddia edildiği gibi, ekstraktivist yatırımların doğal kaynakların sabitliği nedeniyle yer değiştirmesi oldukça zor hatta imkansız olması bu bölgelerdeki emek kontrol rejimlerinin belirleyicisidir. Dolayısıyla, katliamdan sonra Soma'nın kömüründen vazgeçmek istemeyen hükümetler yerel emek kontrol rejiminin organizasyonunda aktif bir biçimde yer altı. Bunun en belirgin örneklerden biri de katliamın yargılama sürecine yapılan müdahalelerdi. Davanın müşteki avukatlarının ısrarla belirttiği üzere, yalnızca şirketi değil TKİ ve kömür politikalarını da sorumlu tutan bilirkişi raporlarına uygun bir cezalandırma, sektörün kaderini değiştirecekti. Bunu engellemek için yargılama sürecine çeşitli müdahaleler yapıldı. Diğer taraftan, katliamdan sonra Havza içinde ciddi bir ekonomik eşitsizlik tecrübe edildi. Bu fark özellikle, ölen madencilerin yakınlarına yapılan ciddi yardım ve destekler, çalışan madencilerin ücretlerinin katliam öncesinin iki katına çıkması ancak bunlar olurken üç bin civarı işsiz bir nüfus bulunmasıyla oldu. Özellikle işsiz madenci ailelerinin ciddi bir yoksullaşma sürecinde olması ve ölen madencilerin yakınları ciddi miktarda tazminat, yardım ya da memuriyet hakkı ya da TOKİ'den verilen evler gibi ekonomik imkanlar elde ederken kendilerinin görünmez olmalarından sıkça şikayet ediyorlar. Aynı dönemde maden işçilerinin maaşlarının artması ve sosyal haklarının genişletilmesi madende çalışmak için işçiler arasında ciddi bir rekabet ortamını başlattı. Bu durum da çalışan madencilerin işsiz kalmamak için işsiz madencilerin de tekrar işe girme fırsatını kaçırmamak için muhalif sendikal hareketlerden ve diğer mücadele biçimlerinden kaçınmasına yol açtı.

Bunlara rağmen, katliamdan sonrası Soma'da belli direniş ve örgütlenme girişimlerini gözlemlemek de mümkün. Ancak bu girişimler Havzadaki baskı ve denetim mekanizmaları, muhalefet içi tartışmalar veya Havzada istihdamın artan cazibesi gibi sebeplerle hep sınırlı kaldı. Bu çalışmada bu örgütlenme çabalarının başarısız ve yetersiz olmasının önemli bir sebebinin de maden işçilerinin hakları ve çalışma koşullarıyla sınırlı olduğu iddia ediliyor.

Sonuç olarak, bu araştırmada amaçlanan 2000'li yıllar itibariyle Soma Havzasındaki sınıf ilişkilerinin dönüşümünün ardındaki geniş toplumsal süreçleri ortaya koymaktı. Dolayısıyla araştırma, Havzadaki mevcut istihdam koşullarının ötesinde, toplumsal dönüşüm sürecinin bütüncül bir analizi üzerine inşa edildi. Bu anlamda araştırmada esas olarak iddia edilen, Soma'da neoliberal dönüşüm sürecinin üç içsel olarak ilişkili boyutu olduğu. Birincisi, Soma'daki mevcut toplumsal yapı tarımda neoliberal dönüşümün etkisiyle küçük meta üreticilerinin yaşamlarının metalaşmasının, yoksullaşma ve yoksunlaşmalarının doğrudan sonucudur. Bu da Havza köylerindeki hanelerin cinsiyete dayalı işbölümüyle işçileşme süreçlerine işaret eder. İkinci olarak, Türkiye'nin "kömüre hücum" planı çerçevesinde, Soma'da yer altı kömür sahaları genişlemiş ve emek süreçleri de bu hücum planı etrafında şekillenmiştir. Dolayısıyla, Havzadaki kömür ocaklarında, 301 işçinin ölümüyle sonuçlanabilen çalışma koşulları belirli bir firmadaki teknik özelliklerden öte Türkiye kömür ve enerji politikalarının doğrudan sonucudur. Üçüncü olarak, bu süreç kadının görünmeyen emeğinin tarımda ve ev içinde aşırı sömürüsüne işaret ediyor. Kadınlar tarımda sigortasız çalışıyorlar ve bu dönemde özellikle tarım işçisi kadınların ulaşımları sürecinde ölümlü kazalar belirgin bir biçimde arttı. Diğer taraftan, bu sürecin-tezde yer almayan-en önemli sonuçlarından biri ekolojik tahribat olup hava kirliliği ve bunun yerli halkın sağlığına artan bir biçimde tehdit oluşturuyor olması.

Soma Havzasında gasp ve sömürü bu boyutların hepsini içerdiği ölçüde, buna karşı oluşturulacak direniş de çok boyutlu olmalı. Katliamdan itibaren denenen direnişler ve alternatif örgütlenme girişimleri maden işçilerinin hakları, madenlerde çalışma koşulları ve işsiz madencilerin işe iadesi ekseniyle sınırlı kaldı. Bu araştırmanın temel iddiası, Soma'da neoliberalizm madendeki çalışma koşullarıyla sınırlı olmadığı, toprak gaspı ve mülksüzleşme ve küçük üreticilerin yoksullaşması, kadın emeğinin aşırı sömürüsü ve ekolojik tahribatı da içerdiği ölçüde mücadele bu süreçlerin tamamına karşı ve aktörlerin işbirliğiyle örgütlenmeli. Bir başka anlatımla, maden işçilerinin mücadelesi küçük üreticilerin mücadelesinden, toprak mücadelelerinden, kadın mücadelesinden ve ekoloji mücadelesinden ayrı düşünülemez.

APPENDIX C: CURRICULUM VITAE PERSONAL INFORMATION

PERSONAL INFORMATION

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GRANTS, FELLOWS, AWARDS

Sabancı University Gender and Women's Studies Centre of Excellence Şirin Tekeli Research Encouragement Award, with Ecehan Balta (December, 2017).

Turkish Social Sciences Association, 2013-2015 Young Social Scientist Award in the Category of Master's Thesis (December, 2015).

Scientific Research Grant, Middle East Technical University (2016); Political Economy of Coal Mining in Turkey in the 2000s (BAP-07-03-2016-012) (Galip Yalman)

PUBLICATIONS

Journal Article:

Bayırbağ, M.K., Göksel, A. and Çelik, C. "Child Poverty and Youth Unemployment in Turkey", Poverty and Public Policy, 10(3), 390-413 (2018).

Çelik, C. "Kırsal Dönüşüm ve Metalaşan Yaşamlar: Soma Havzasında İşçileşme Süreçleri ve Sınıf İlişkileri", Praksis, 43(1), 785-810 (2017).

Çelik, C. and Erkuş Öztürk, H. "Role of Precariousness and Space on Class Formation Process: The Case of Antalya's Tourism Workers", Capital and Class, 40(3), 419-445 (2016).

Chapter in a Book:

Çelik, C. "Sınıf Deneyimi Olarak Güvencesizlik: Antalya Turizm İşçileri Örneği", in P. Bedirhanoğlu, Ö. Çelik and H. Mıhçı (eds.) Finansallaşmanın Gölgesinde Türkiye'de Devlet, Sermaye Birikimi ve Emek, Ankara: Notabene, 221-248 (2017).

Paper Presentations:

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Çelik, C. "'Job Opportunity in Mines' or 'Conviction to the Mines'?: Transformation of Class Relations in Soma Coal Basin", Turkish Social Sciences

Association 15th National Social Science Congress, Ankara Turkey November 2017 (in Turkish).

Çelik, C. "Neoliberal Transformation of Tukey's Coal Industry", International Initiative for Promoting Political Economy 8th Annual Conference in Political Economy, Berlin, Germany, September 2017.

Çelik, C. "Proletarianisation Process and Changing Local Class Relations" 8th National Congress of Sociology, Ankara, Turkey, December 2016 (in Turkish).

Çelik, C. "Proletarianisation Process and Local Class Struggle: The Case of Soma, Turkey", International Initiative for Promoting Political Economy 7th Annual Conference in Political Economy, Lisbon, Portugal, September 2016.

Çelik, C. "Class Struggle within the Rural-Urban Duality: The Case of Antalya's Tourism Workers: Turkish Social Sciences Association", 14th Congress of Social Science, Ankara, Turkey, December 2015 (in Turkish).

Çelik, C. "Turkish Islamic Synthesis as the Ideological Discourse of Neoliberal Restructuring of the State in Turkey", World Congress of Administrative and Political Sciences 2015, Rome, Italy, November 2015.

Çelik, C. And Erkuş Öztürk, H. "Spatial Disintegration as a Barrier for Class Formation: The Case of Tourism Workers in Antalya Tourism Region" World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies (WOCMES) 2014, Ankara, Turkey, August 2014.

Çelik, C. "Impact of Labour Market Flexibility on Women's Labour: Seasonal Tourism Workers in Antalya", 3rd European Conference on Politics and Gender (ECPG' 13), Barcelona, Spain, March 2013.

Çelik, C. "Conservative Populism, Welfare Governance, and Charitable Foundations: The Case of General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity", Eurasian Forum on Social Sciences, Baku Azerbaijan, October 2012.

Çelik, C. "Poverty Mitigation Programmes and the Notion of Charity as a Neoliberal Form of Social Policy in Turkey", 6th Congress of Economic Approach, Ankara, Turkey, December 2011 (in Turkish).

APPENDIX D: TEZ İZİN FORMU / THESIS PERMISSION FORM

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TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (**İngilizce** / English): EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND CHANGING MEANS OF RURAL LIVELIHOOD: PATTERNS OF PROLETARIANIZATION AND LABOUR PROCESSES IN SOMA COAL BASIN

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: **Yüksek Lisans** / Master ☐ **Doktora** / PhD ■

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