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REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
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TURKEY AND GERMANY RELATIONS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THESIS

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AHMET MUHSİN KANKILIÇ

HAZİRAN 2019

DEDICATION

I dedicate this study to my brother Mete Han who has always supported me for academic career and to the everlasting Turkish- German friendship.

Most important of all, I dedicate this study to the founder of Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal ATATURK, who wishes for our world "Peace at home, peace in the world."

ABSTRACT

TURKEY AND GERMANY RELATIONS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS

KANKILIC, Ahmet Muhsin

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Along with the historical relations, this study aims to analyse the effects of the Syrian refugee crisis, the unavoidable relationship between Turkey and Germany and to uncover the critical turning points that Turkish-German bilateral relations have undergone during the crisis era. It also studies some challenges and opportunities, which have appeared for both countries due to the efforts for hindering refugees' entering into the EU uncontrolled. The study first gives a historical perspective of bilateral relations to understand the contemporary matter broadly. It then evaluates the refugee crisis and its transformation from a regional crisis into a European crisis. At this point, the strategic moves from both parties are also taken place in the study. The Turkish-German dialogue has been reinterpreted with the declaration of the "EU-Turkey Statement", widely known as the EU-Turkey "refugee deal." Domestic and foreign obstacles of the bilateral dialogue are unfolded within this study. In the final part, some assessments are put forward regarding the prospect of Turkish-German relations and the expectations from the "refugee deal" by considering the data of the previous chapters of this study. The ultimate aim of the study is to shed light to this specific eight-year period in the long dated Turkish- German relations. Besides the destructiveness of the civil war, this study briefly examines the historical relations to understand fully, how deep and rooted have been the relations of both countries over the course of history as well.

Key Words: Turkey Germany Relations, Syrian Refugees, Conflict in Syria, Refugee Deal.

ÖZET

SURİYELİ MÜLTECİ KRİZİ ÇERÇEVESİNDE TÜRKİYE-ALMANYA İLİŞKİLERİ

KANKILIÇ, Ahmet Muhsin
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Danışmanı: Dr.Öğr.Üyesi Mesut SOHRET
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Bu çalışma tarihsel ilişkilerin analizinden başlayarak Suriyeli mülteci krizinin etkilerini ve Türkiye-Almanya arasındaki vazgeçilmez ilişkiyi analiz etmekle beraber mülteci krizi döneminde iki ülke arasında var olan diyaloğun yaşadığı kritik dönüm noktalarını gözler önüne sermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Diğer yandan, Avrupa Biliği'ne kontrolsüz bir şekilde giren mültecilerin engellenmesi gayretleri ortaya çeşitli zorluklar ve fırsatlar çıkarmıştır. Bu çalışma öncelikli olarak güncel bir tartışma alanı olan göç ve göçmenlik konusunu geniş bir şekilde anlamak için tarihsel bir perspektif vermekte ve ardından mülteci krizini ve onun bölgesel krizden Avrupa krizine dönüşmesini değerlendirmektedir. Bu noktada, hem Türkiye hem de Almanya tarafının yaptığı stratejik hamleler bu çalışmada yer almış ve Türk- Alman ilişkileri genellikle "AB-Türkiye mülteci anlaşması" olarak bilinen "AB-Türkiye mutabakatı" deklarasyonuyla tekrar yorumlanmıştır. İkili diyalogun İçsel ve dışsal engelleri irdelenerek son bölümde Türk-Alman ilişkilerinin geleceğiyle ilgili ve önceki bölümlerdeki bilgiler ışığında “mülteci anlaşmasından” beklentiler ile ilgili bazı değerlendirmeler yapılmıştır. Çalışmanın temel amacı uzun süreli Türk-Alman ilişkilerindeki bu spesifik sekiz yıllık bölüme ışık tutmaktır. Geniş manada ise bu çalışma, sorunu tam anlamıyla anlamak için Türk - Alman ilişkilerinin tarihsel yönünü, ilişkilerin nasıl derin ve köklü geçmişe sahip olduğunu da incelemektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Türkiye- Almanya İlişkileri, Suriyeli Mülteciler, Suriye'deki Çatışma, Mülteci Anlaşması.

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This study is completed in time thanks to my advisor Dr. Mesut SOHRET and his encouragement. Without his guidance, this study cannot be completed.

Thanks to everybody, who directly or indirectly contributed to this endeavour.

DECLARATION

No portion of the work referred to in the study has been submitted in support for another qualification or degree of this or any other institution of learning or university.

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LIST OF ABRIVIATIONS

The following abbreviations have been used in this thesis

AFD	Alternative for Germany Party
AKP	Justice and Development Party
CDU	Christian Democracy Party
CSU	Christian Socialist Union Party
EC	European Commission
EEC	European Economic Community
EU	European Union
FSA	Free Syrian Army
HTS	Organization for the Liberation of the Levant
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAZI	National Socialist Party
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PYD	Syrian Democratic Party
SNC	Syrian National Council
SPD	Social Democratic Part of Germany
USSR	Union Soviet Socialist Republics
YPG	People’s Protection Units

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Turkey and Germany have long-lasting relations since the beginning of 18th century. The relations between Ottoman Empire and Kingdom of Prussia first started in 1790 with a treaty of peace and friendship. The link between Prussia and the Ottomans was thought to be limited to military cooperation, but also the both states collaborated on some important projects, such as the Baghdad Railway. (www.mfa.gov.tr).

The affairs between Berlin and Istanbul reached its climax level throughout the First World War. Ottoman Empire has started to use German military officers since the nineteenth century to modernize the army, which was not sufficient to wage new wars and damaged by a series of defeats. The Prussian-German army was at the time regarded as the best in the world especially by the Young Turks (Jon Türkler) holding important positions in the government. This admiration brought Ottomans to the WWI allying with Germans.

Before the WWII, the newly founded Turkish Republic has pursued friendly relations with foreign countries and dealt with domestic problems. The burden of the defeat in the WWI caused deep economic troubles in Germany, which led to the breaking out the WWII. Although, Turkey and Germany have made some agreements and deals before and during the WWII, they did not ally in this world war. Turkey stubbornly protected its neutral policy, despite many efforts of Nazi Germany.

One of the most important development that affected relations was the "Labour Recruitment Agreement" in 1961. After the WWII, Germans were in need of workforce to stabilize the country's thriving post-war economy while Turkey had some domestic political problems, which increased unemployment rates. So both

countries agreed on a deal. Thanks to this agreement, there are now over 3 million people with Turkish background in Germany.

Turkey’s most important economic associate is Germany. With total investments of over 14 billion US dollars since 1980, Germany is the second largest foreign financier in Turkey after Netherlands. The figure of both German and Turkish businesses in Turkey that have received German equity investment has now risen to almost 7320. Entrepreneurs of Turkish descent employ some 500,000 people in Germany and generate an annual turnover of approximately 50 billion Euros (www.auswaertiges-amt.de).

Just before the "Syrian Refugee Crisis" erupted, Turkey and Germany have decided on an agreement due to Germany’s escalating reliance on Turkey in domestic and foreign relations subsequent to the emergence of the "Sovereign Debt Crisis" in the EU and the "Arab Spring," correspondingly. This short stage of agreement did not last long, Turkish-German relations fall into another dispute, because of Germany’s negative approach towards Turkey's accessing into EU throughout the election season in Germany and Turkey's handling of Gezi protests in 2013. In this period, a decline was seen in the intergovernmental talks between Turkey and Germany.

Multifaceted and long lasting relationship between Ankara and Berlin has changed its path and become more strategic during the alteration of the regional "Syrian Refugee crisis" into a European i.e. Germany's refugee crisis in late of 2015. The both countries played a crucial part in solving this conflict despite reaching full desired results. In 2015 the most intensive time of the refugee crisis, Turkish-German friendship became more important and unavoidable.

In the summer of 2015, the Turkey-Germany relations developed positively and brought about some important changes such as constructing strategic dialogue between both governments. Because of her "open-door policy" for the Syrian migrants, which resulted in decreasing Merkel’s and the CDU’s fame in German public and the mass exodus of refugees to German cities, Merkel then changed her stance towards the Turkey's EU accession although she was known to be the opposing leader in Turkey's accession. This can be regarded as a win-win situation

Merkel had to do this to prevent further refugee arrivals therefore; she rewarded Turkey with the incepting of the visa liberation procedure for Turkish people and as stated in the terms of the deal with the contribution of monetary support for Turkish government in exchange for hosting Syrian migrants. The terms that were added as parts of the so called "refugee deal" between Turkey and Germany that aimed to stop the mass exodus of more irregular migrants to the Europe using Turkey. Merkel created the main structure of the "refuge deal," while Turkey pressed for visa liberation and for the financial aid for the Syrian refugees, which Turkey has already been hosting.

Within the historical process experiencing so many ups and downs, this relation now handles one of its most difficult time, which is refugee crisis. The crisis changed Europe and the stability in the MENA region. It also discusses the critical ups and downs that Turkish-German mutual relations have gone through throughout this specific emergency period.

Not only the Arab countries but also the neighbouring countries even the European countries have deeply affected by the developments beginning with Arab Spring or to some “Arab Winter.” To some other “Arab Winter” is the best rational term to use to explain this period because its destruction is much bigger than its positive effects to the region. Especially, the incidents took place in Syria caused a refugee overflow to Turkey and Europe and because of the fact that diplomatic relations between Ankara and Berlin have strengthened. Anatolia is a gate to Europe, if it falls, Europe will follow so Germany wants it to be secured against Syrian refugees.

This study wants to show to what extent historic Turkish and German relations affected by Refugee crisis. The bilateral dialogue seemed to develop in this process however; the chance of closing to the EU has been missed. The vital external policy aim for Turkey in the relations with the Western powers is to access the EU. This chance could be realized with the refuge deal beginning with visa liberation.

However, due to the domestic problems that Turkey has experienced through the year 2016, Turkey has channelled its policy to the East. EU and Turkey have never been distanced from each other since the beginning of the relations. The

chance turned into mischance. This study tires to analyze how the chances of having closer relations have been missed and how the Syrian civil war damaged the bilateral relations. The refugee deal was regarded at the beginning as a step towards joining the EU but then it turned into leverage to threaten.

The opposition in both countries criticizes the governments because of the humanitarian approach to the issue, for example, in Turkey the opposition blames AK Party government for helping radical organizations in Syria to flourish and for not supporting Assad regime at the beginning of the clashes. In Germany many far rightists think that Merkel government behaves much tolerantly of the refugees and accepting of so many refugees to the country is harming social cohesion of Germany. This study reviews all the literature from the scientific books to the newspapers, magazines, and online data. In the light of the data collected, this study illuminates this specific issue of refugee crisis and visible effects on the relations. What kind of relations Germany and Turkey have during this process and what kind of collaboration they have to settle this problematic issue analyzed in this study.

The main research question of the study is that to what extent historic Turkish German relations are and will be affected with this regional problem. Another important question is how long the foreign policy of Turkey and Germany can resist the internal oppositions in both countries. How long Turkey resists to the burden of nearly four million Syrian refugees, which is on the shoulders of every Turkish citizens. Because of nearly four million refugees and all of the cross border operations against the organization which is seen as a terrorist organization called PYD (Syrian democratic party), Turkey's economy begins to show significant weaknesses in the beginning of 2018 with the big loss of value in Turkish Lira against Dollar and Euro. How long this process can sustain. Although European Union aids the refugees in Turkey, accommodating the most Syrians comparing the other states, Turkish government spends much more money from his budget.

Due to mass exodus of Syrians irregular migration, EU-Turkey have agreed on a deal. Turkey has done its own part so far for example, the number of the irregular migration and deaths caused by irregular migration in the Aegean Sea have decreased significantly. According to the deal, Turkey was promised a sum of 6

billion Euros, which was originally decided to be given to the country in two-stages, to be used by Turkey to fund projects for Syrian refugees. Visa freedom for Turkish citizens was also pledged to be provided under the deal. Finally, the customs union was also promised to be more up to date in accordance with the deal. In exchange for these promises of the EU, Turkey promised cease irregular migration through the Aegean Sea by applying firmer actions against human traffickers and improving the situations of more than 3 million Syrians living in Turkey. Some of these promises were kept, some were not. In the next chapters, these are explained broadly.

Although this study contains all the handpicked literature review on this specific topic, there were some unavoidable factors limiting the scope of this research. Instead of quantitative research methods, qualitative research methods are used to review existing literature on the subject. The literature is mainly from the scientific internet sources because the topic of the study is relatively new and constantly updates itself. The newspapers, articles, and recent political magazines taken from the Internet sources are used frequently about the refugee crisis. To shed light on the historical perspective of the relations published books and thesis are used. Thanks to many published resources, examining historical relations of the mentioned countries was not a big deal.

The only problem regarding the historical background is that after the WWII, the relations between two countries in addition to the sources about it illuminating this period is relatively few. Until Germany reunited again as a one independent country, finding resource between1945-1990 was a problem specifically touching on the relations of both countries the findings of the research about the relations are complex but not hard to understand so one can easily deduct the results from the given information. The sensitive bilateral relations of both countries such as the refugee deal are always documented and presented to the community by the officials; maybe few things stay behind the locked doors. Such data does not take place in this study however; the data given in this study are enough to analyze the historic relations of this period.

The research consists four chapters and each chapter has subtitles to give some scientific data about specific topic in detail. The first chapter briefly explains

the crucial aspects of the study to attract attention of the researchers. In the second chapter, from the long history of bilateral Turkish German relations only the most important parts are picked to give critical background information chronologically before explaining the most important chapter. Without looking back to the historical relations, it would be hard to analyze this recent issue.

With the maps and the statistics given in the third chapter, one can easily understand what the civil war has brought to the region or stole from the people in the region. The chaos that Syria experiences are put in front of the eyes of the readers. Turkey also struggles with regional terrorist organizations some of which are discussed in this chapter. One of the most important thing in this chapter is the refugee deal process which strengthened the relations between both countries however, after the promises, which are already given are not kept, the relations have experienced historic low levels. These are matters dealt in this chapter.

In the chapter four, all the data given before are evaluated together and made some deductions about the future of the relations of both countries. Analyzing and assumptions regarding the bilateral relations are the main concern in this chapter. As Assad regime gaining his power again, the question of "what will happen in Syria" is also discussed deducting no clear explanation from the data in the hands. The future of Syria is still ambiguous.

CHAPTER TWO

TURKISH GERMAN RELATIONS IN HISTORICAL PROCESS

2.1 TURKISH GERMAN RELATIONS DURING OTTOMAN PERIOD

The Turkish – German relations began in the 18th century. While Ottomans were losing its great power and territories, the Kingdom of Prussia had disputes with Austria and Russia to solve these dispute Prussia sought new friendly relations with Ottomans in exchange for Ottoman's ambition in reforming its military to balance the defeats in the wars.

2.1.1. Before the First World War

The Ottoman state sent in The Prussian Kingdom in 1701 Asım Efendi led a group of fifteen people, in order to celebrate King of Prussia, Friedrich I. This was the first relations of both states (Yılmaz, 1993:21).

The Turkish Foreign Ministry describes the beginning of historic relations with the words below:

> "After having signed a treaty of peace and friendship with the Kingdom of Prussia in 1790, the Ottoman Empire intensified its military ties with Germany, especially during the reign of Abdülhamid II. The relationship between Germany and the Ottoman Empire was not restricted to being allies in World War I; the two countries also cooperated on several large scale investment projects, such as the construction of the Baghdad Railway." (http://www.mfa.gov.tr).

Between 1713-1867, the German State was called as Kingdom of Prussia and Turkish state was called as Ottoman Empire between 1299-1923 (Yakut and Bağcı, 2013: 6-7). Prussia was a powerful kingdom. In 18th century, King of Prussia II. Ferdinand has assigned count Rexin as a diplomat to Istanbul. The King of Prussia, II. Friedrich, found Russia and Austria's expansionist policy against Ottoman Empire harmful to his own interest. Therefore, the King of Prussia tried to develop better relations with Ottomans. Grand Vizer Koca Ragip Pasha and Carlo E.

Rexin signed “Peace and Amity Treaty” in 1761. According to this agreement, Ottoman Ambassador Ahmed Rasim was appointed to Prussia in 1763 he was the first Ottoman Ambassador appointed to this country. At the epoch of Selim III, in 1770, "the Amity Treaty" between both countries was resigned (Aghayev, 2014:1). In 19th Century, the Sultan of Ottoman state sought help of Prussia to modernize and restore the Ottoman army then Prussia sent a military mission led by Helmut von Moltke to the service of Ottoman state. Through Moltke, the German public began to be interested in Ottoman society (Yakut and Bağcı, 2013: 7).

2.1.2 Relations during the Sultan Abdulhamid II

Bismarck solidified his powers effectively in the new German Empire from 1871 to 1891, whilst Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) was governing the Ottoman Empire with his sole and unquestionable power, which held him in power nearly for 33 years. On the one hand, the new Germany was a developed, physically powerful, and rational state; on the other hand, the aged Ottoman Empire was turning into a more and more destabilized and domestically devastated state, the best thing it aimed to keep its lands away from a number of domestic and foreign threats (Öncü, 2003: 20).

Abdulhamid II ascended to the throne as soon as the first constitution of Ottomans was announced in 1876. Afterward, Ottomans occupied with overwhelming combat with Russia from 1877 to 1878. This war could be regarded a conflict of interests over Balkan region and straits between the Ottomans and the Russians allying with Romania, Bulgaria Serbia, and Montenegro. This alliance resulted in rising 19th-century Balkan nationalists. Extra aspects helped Russian goals such as taking back territories, experienced throughout the Crimean War. Russia re-established itself in the Black Sea and supported the political groups trying to liberate Balkans from the Ottomans (Crowe: 2013:931).

In the West, Bismarck overpowered France and Austria to realize German unification. He then chose a path to strengthen Germany's economy and solidified administrative power structures, rather than on foreign disagreements. The disagreements mostly caused by "the sick man of Europe" John Russell described Ottomans in 1853, just before the Crimean War, citing from Nicholas I of Russia, as

"a sick man—a very sick man," a "man" who "has fallen into a state of decrepitude", or a "sick man, gravely ill". Because of the fact that, Bismarck could not resist to join the conflicts due to developments beyond his control. Following the great battles between Russia and the Ottomans, a treaty was declared. The Treaty of San Stefano was so advantageous for Russia that the European powers would not let the treaty to be applied. One of the big powers, Great Britain, expressed its concerns along with Austria-Hungary. Britain had always objected to Russia's expansionist policies towards Ottoman lands. Russia could not resist the British, Austro-Hungarian, German pressure, therefore decided to present the conditions of the treaty of San Stefano to a congress, which was named as the Congress of Berlin ("San Stefano, Treaty of," 2004).

The results of the Ottoman-Russian War in 1877-1878 forced Abdulhamid II to seek foreign help; he initially wanted to have this help from Germany. The reason why he chose Germany instead of England and France was that Germany had not had Muslim colonies and had not had any secret goals over national uprisings in the Balkans. While, England, France and Russia had a big Muslim colonies in India, Central Asia and MENA. They were also provoking the minorities of the Ottoman territories to revolt against Ottoman caliphate. Because of these very reasons, Abdulhamid II chose the dictatorial Germany to the England and French. (Ortaylı, 1981: 36) The Ottoman Empire asked from the German banks for foreign credit, which caused Germans to make investments to Ottoman Empire. Sultan Abdulhamid II gave the Baghdad railway project to the German Bank, on the one hand, he has cleared the pathway for the German investors to make investments in Ottoman Empire and on the other hand, he attempted to decrease the chief position of the France in the Ottoman economy. Due to these facts, Bismarck could not avoid himself of Eastern politics (Aghayev, 2014:1).

In 1888, Ottomans gave the permission to work on the Istanbul-Izmit railway project and to expand it to Ankara. In 1896, the big part from Eskisehir to Konya was constructed. The project was to expand the railway to Bagdad and Basra. Britain wanted to get some concessions of this railway; nevertheless, the project belonged to the Germans. One of the most important concessions within this railway agreement was that the geological predilections belonged to the Company. A region

of as long as 20 km on both side of the railway, was given to the full advantage of the Company, together with all the natural resources that were obtainable on this broad band of land, along with the option of opening new oil wells (Atun and Aya, 2014: 9).

Due to the upcoming wars and the defeated by Russia, Ottoman Sultan II. Abdulhamid requested from Prussia a professional staff to reform the Ottoman army. Prussia responded the request positively after stepping aside from "trio" and desired to shape the ottoman army in the framework of new balances. Although, Bismarck gave a positive response to the Abdulhamid II., he chose to wait a little while because Bismarck's new ambition was to secure German unity against France. The relations in this era between Prussia and Ottomans developed mostly in military field. Beginning from 1882, Military officers from Germany started to work in Ottoman army. These officers dealt not only with strengthening the Ottoman army but also opened a new market for German weapon industry. After their best endeavors, Ottoman weapon market which had been under the control of the English and the French companies, passed to the German industry like Mauser Loewe and Krupp. (Özyüksel, 2004:14) Meanwhile, Ottoman military officers were dispatched to Germany as well to send the message that “we stand with Germans” German influence on Ottoman army continued until the very end of the WWI (Yakut and Bağcı, 2013: 9).

The reason why Ottoman Prussia relations had such great importance was that Prussia had not requested any Ottoman territory from II Abdulhamit, contrary to the English and the French, Prussia defended territorial integrity of Ottomans.

Turkish-German relations became more important in the 19th century. The bilateral political and economic relations, which is long dated has been turned into military and technical collaboration at this period and after a while, it expanded to business and culture. The French admiration, which had great importance among the Ottomans in the 18th century, has slowly left its position to German appreciation in 19th century (Aghayev, 2014:1).

2.1.3 Turkish German Relations as Allies during the First World War

Just before the WWI, the Ottomans was in ruin announcing its bankruptcy because of consecutive battles in this era, great lands were lost, the financial situation was terrible, and people were not willing to declare new wars. What the Ottomans needed was a peace time to heal its wounds and to carry out reforms to recover; however, for this, time was not enough, because the world was on the edge of another big war and the Ottoman Empire and its territories were not able to stay out of it. Since the old policy of pursuing balanced relations with foreign countries and concentrating on reforms had not appeared to be probable, the Ottomans had to work with foreign powers, because, after a great deal of wars, it was totally exhausted and its strategic lands and straits made it impossible. Neither sufficient amount of weaponry nor the equipment left in the Ottoman arsenal; and the Ottomans were broke enough to buy new ones. The single alternative for the Ottoman Empire was to ally with a Western power; and in the beginning, it did not important which one would it be. As Talat Pasha, the Interior Minister at that time, wrote in his letters: "Turkey needed to join one of the country groups so that it could organize its domestic administration, strengthen and maintain its commerce and industry, expand its railroads, in short to survive and to preserve its existence" (Talat Paşa, 2016).

The Balkan wars and its results caused significant changes in the foreign policies of great and regional powers. After Abdulhamid II was dethroned; the Party of Union and Progress replaced him. This party followed pro-German policies through his period. The Ottoman Empire was devastated because of the long years of wars, the people was demoralized as a result of this, the party of Union and progress tried to provide integrity of Ottoman Empire therefore they made some reforms and sought alliance with great powers to re-establish the state however there was only one choice remaining this was an alliance with Germany (Yakut and Bağcı, 2013: 29).

Shortly before the beginning of the WWI, the Russia was upset with Ottoman Empire because it gave the command of its armies to a German General Liman von Sanders. One of the most important crises during this period was also the Armenian issue. This issue has been affecting Turkish Foreign policy since the end

of the WWI. Armenians were both non-Muslims and patronized by the Russia which is the greatest enemy of the Ottoman empire this made the problem even worse. From the beginnings of 1870's the emerging problems brought attention of great power and the Ottomans on Armenians. After Erzurum uprisings and Istanbul protests in 1890, the issue gained an international importance. As understood from the sixteenth article of the treaty of San Stefanos, the issue became international matter. The departure of the Russian army, from the territories, which was occupied in the South of Turkey, and which was to be given back to Turkey, increased the disagreements and problems harmful to the preservation of good will between both countries. The Ottomans tried to carry out the agreement, without further delay, the developments, and modifications demanded by locals in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to assure their safety from Kurds and Circassians (Yakut and Bağcı, 2013: 16).

The Ottomans and the Germans decided on a clandestine agreement on 2 August, 1914. The Ottoman Empire was to join the WWI together with the Central Powers. The coalition was approved on 2 August by several senior Ottoman officials... The terms of this treaty are as follows;

> 1. "Both contracting parties pledge to preserve strict neutrality in regard to the present conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia."
>
> 2. "If Russia should intervene with active military measures, and should thus bring about a casus foederis for Germany with relation to Austria-Hungary, this casus foederis would likewise enter into effect for Turkey."
>
> 3. "In case of war, Germany will leave her military mission at the disposal of Turkey. The latter, for her part, assures the said military mission an effective influence on the general conduct of the army, in accordance with the understanding arrived at directly between His Excellency the Minister of War and His Excellency the Chief of the Military Mission."
>
> 4. "Germany obligates herself, if necessary, by force of arms to protect Ottoman territory in case it should be threatened."
>
> 5. "This agreement, which has been concluded for the purpose of protecting both Empires from international complications, which may result from the present conflict, goes into force as soon as it is signed by the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries, and shall remain valid, together with any similar mutual agreements, until December 31, 1918."
>
> 6. "If this treaty is not given notice of cancellation by one of high contracting parties six months before expiration of term mentioned above, it remains in effect for a further period of five years."
>
> 7. "This present document shall be ratified by His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, and by His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans, and the

> ratifications shall be exchanged within a period of one month from the date of its signing."
>
> 8. "The present treaty shall remain secret and can only be made public by one of the high contracting parties only after an agreement by both said parties." (Öncü, 2003: 77-78)

This alliance was accepted without keen thinking. Ottoman Empire was amazed by the power and industry of Germany especially Enver Pasha, who was in authority at that time and loved adventures according to an article by Kızılkaya in Hurriyet daily news (Kızılkaya, 2015). So, the alliance gave big advantage to Germany because Germany would not fight in just few fronts besides new fronts would be opened on the great Ottoman lands, the caliphate power of Ottomans would be used and the Turkish straits would be secured too. Instead of protecting what it had, with full trust to Germans, Ottoman Empire dreamt of regaining the territories lost before the WWI without thinking its military capacity. So, this treaty can be regarded as a fait accompli.

2.2. RELATIONS BEFORE AND AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The two ally countries have shared the same fate both has lost the war. The Ottoman Empire had to sign Armistice of Mudros (Mondros) in 30 October 1918. The 23. Article of the so-called armistice has urged Ottomans to cut all the relation with his allies in the First World War and likewise Germany has been urged to cut the ties with Ottomans in Versailles (Özgiray,1998:5).

2.2.1. Relations before and during the Second World War

In 1924 treaty of friendship between Turkey and Germany has been signed. In 12 January 1927 the mutual residence treaty has been signed. This treaty has regulated the conditions under which the citizens of these countries reside in the related country (Sönmezoğlu, 2011:283-284). This treaty has also aimed at improving commercial relations.

One of the developments, which have improved Turkish German relations, was the travel of Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras to Germany. This visit has taken place on April 1929 to discuss the developments in Balkans, relations with Italy, and Turkey's membership to the League of Nations. The Turkish Foreign

Minister has implied that Turkey has no expansionist ambitions. A short time after this visit, both countries has signed a reconciliation treaty in 1929. Thus, both countries could solve their issues with bilateral talks. The positive developments in the relations of both countries have continued on the economical grounds. At the end of 1920's, an airplane and motor company was built with the association of both countries and an agreement regulating flights from Berlin to Istanbul has been done with Lufthansa. These positive developments left its place to a different approach after Hitler came to power (Yakut, Bağcı, 2013: 77).

The new world order, which was built after the First World War was not realistic and therefore the relations among the European countries between 1920-1930 were fragile. Germany, which was not satisfied with the current situation, was the prominent actor of the revisionist countries. After the war, this country dealt with great social, economic, and political turmoil. Adolf Hitler, who was discharged from the army with corporal rank, has shined in a short time and organized German public within Nazi ideology. The reasons why the Nazi ideology has found a place in German public were the burden of the payments from WWI repatriations, and the world economic depression in 1929. Due to this crisis, many small and mid tier businesses have bankrupted. Many Germans became unemployed. Feeding from social and economical turmoil, Nazis has won a great victory in elections at the end of the 1932. The president Hinderberg has appointed Hitler to the Prime Ministry. After the death of the president Hindenburg, Hitler has united the powers of presidency and prime ministry within himself and became "Fuehrer." He aimed at establishing a totalitarian state ideology. He was determined to unite all the Germans under the roof of one state and create a living space "Lebensraum." in the East (Yakut, Bağcı, 2013: 103). He described "Lebensraum" in his book "Mein Kampf";

> "And so, we National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath the foreign policy tendency of our pre–War period. We take up where we broke off six hundred years ago. We stop the endless German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze toward the land in the East. At long last, we break off the colonial and commercial policy of the pre–War period and shift to the soil policy of the future" (Adamthwaite, 2013: 119).

Hitler has abolished all the limiting articles of treaty of Versailles and followed an expansionist policy. He has withdrawn from disarmament conference and League of Nations and strengthened the land navy and the air force. Using the

Nazis in Austria, he has tried to annex this country. However, it has resulted in failure. He has annexed Saar region without using any weapon in 1 March 1935. German Army occupied Austria in 12 March 1938 and Czechoslovakia in 15 March 1939. The revisionist behaviour of the Germany became the main factor, which has reshaped the international environment (Yakut and Bağcı, 2013: 60).

Germany's ambitions were so endless whereas Turkey's priorities were different. The new Turkish government was to re-establish domestic integrity by promoting nationalism, making agreements with the neighbouring states and with other states in order to boost its credit internationally, to maintain its strength and advance the revolutions indispensable in the alteration to a contemporary state. The new Republic's dictum was “Peace at home, peace in the world." It was stated by the founder, Mustafa Kemal, later named Atatürk and he died on November 10, 1938 (Altınörs,2017:1).

The situation between the two wars was not stable. Except for Turkey, which opposed the treaty of Serves just after the First World War, she got his complete Sovereignty with the treaty of Lausanne. The other states were not happy with the status quo established after the war. The attempts like League of Nations and the other organizations to protect peace have borne no fruit. England, which was one of the leading countries, imposed that the status quo had to be protected but she has not taken any necessary steps. She only focused on the security of her colonies. The above-described situation has been analyzed very well by the founding fathers especially by Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; therefore, foreign policy of the new Turkish Republic has been set up accordingly (Sönmezoğlu, 2011: 227-245) (Armaoğlu, 1988: 229-303). Following the policy of the founding father, all the governments have pursued western policies and the policy of "peace at home, peace in the world." until 2000's. After AK Party governments, Turkey has been pursuing more pro-active polices in its region.

On the other side, after Coming to power in 1933, Hitler has changed radically domestic and foreign policy of Germany. During this process, economical relations have improved but foreign relations it is vice versa. Turkey on the one hand had some hesitations towards the revisionist ideology of Germany; on the other hand

she did not act against Hitler in the League of Nations. In fact, Turkey stands with Germany within the framework of the harshness against loser states of WWI; however, she opposed to alter the status quo with force although, political relations has sustained. Turkish foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras has declared to the German ambassador of Rome that Turkey empathized the new government in Germany. Short time after this contact, Hitler received Turkish parliamentary committee and the head of the foreign relations commission Mahmut Soydan in Berlin. In this talk, Hitler implied that Germany was friendly to Turkey and tried to increase the common grounds with Turkey (Koçak, 1991: 101-102). Nevertheless, political approach of the both countries has not been accomplished because of revisionist policy of Germany and Germany's negative attitude towards Balkan pact and Montreux treaty on the regime of the straits. Since, Germany saw Balkan region as an expansion area, she felt discomfort with the effectiveness of Turkey in the region. Germany was also not satisfied with the Montreux Treaty 1936 because the Nazi administration thought that with this treaty England and Turkey became closer. Germany's intent to make new deal over the straits was rejected too. These factors has cooled the relations, however Turkey refrained from actions which could make Germany an enemy (Koçak, 1991: 106-124). Germany had a visible importance in Turkish economy. In 1936, the general trade portion of import of Turkey reached 45% and the portion of export of Turkey reached 51%. The materials of many factories built in Turkey have been provided from Germany. Many experts in economy and culture have been brought to Turkey. This situation had Turkish government's attention too. Therefore Turkish Government took some necessary precautions against it (Yakut and Bağcı, 2013: 87).

Just before the Second World War Germany tried to become ally with Turkey. The German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop has invited Turkey's general secretary of Foreign Minister Menemencioğlu to become an ally within the revisionist group and suggested neutrality agreement. Menemencioğlu has rejected this suggestion saying that Turkey had already agreements with her neighbours but he added that Turkey would not join any cooperation against Germany. Germany had spent great effort not to see Turkey as an ally with England. Germany stooped all the military vehicles and materials in case of a possible Turkey-England alliance.

However, continued to buy chromites, which provided Turkey with substantial foreign currency. Mentioning the concept of "Poland Syndrome" is important here. Until 22 January 1941, Turkey has always feared that the Russia and Germany would become ally and attack together to Turkey in this situation Turkey be invaded like Poland. After Germany's attack on Soviet Turkey's worries have faded (Yakut, Bağcı, 2013: 110).

Germany could not achieve its aims in the WWI; therefore, in 1933 Nazis (National Socialist Labour Party) came to authority to resurrect Germany, which had a devastated economy. After the World War I in 1923, inflation got out of control such as a loaf of bread, which was 250 Marks in January 1923 had increased up to 200,000 Million Marks in November 1923. (Hyperinflation) German Mark was worthless. Along with these difficulties and hard repatriation payments to England and France, the satiation has brought about good political field for National Socialists to abuse. In 1938, the WWII has begun after the assault by Hitler to the Austria. The Turkish government afterwards agreed on a Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Britain and France in Ankara on 19 October 1939 after the outbreak of the World War II in September 1939, against the Axis powers especially Italy. A definition of this treaty from the Soviet encyclopaedia:

> "A mutual assistance pact concluded in Ankara on October 19; it elaborated the Anglo-Turkish and Franco-Turkish declarations signed on May 12 and June 23, 1939, respectively. The treaty provided for British and French assistance to Turkey in the event of aggression against the latter and provided for Turkish aid in the event of "an act of aggression, committed by a European power and leading to war in the Mediterranean Sea involving France and the United Kingdom." Turkey was also obligated to give assistance to Greece and Rumania in the event that Great Britain and France were drawn into war in compliance with the British and French guarantees given to these states by declarations of Apr. 13, 1939. The treaty was to be in effect for 15 years. Protocol No. 2 attached to the treaty declared that "the obligations undertaken by Turkey as a result of the aforementioned treaty cannot compel Turkey to take action the result or consequence of which would be to draw it into armed conflict with the USSR" (Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of 1939).

The treaty had no practical value because Turkey would not want to join the war against Germany. The year that the treaty signed Soviet Union did not chose his side besides In August 24, 1939 a non-aggression pact between Russia and Germany was signed by Ribbentrop and Molotov. Therefore, Turkey has chosen to be patient and secure herself without being ally with neither side. During World War II, 1939–45, the Turkish government not only refrained from helping the allies in order not to become an open enemy of Germany, but on June 18, 1941, it signed a friendship

treaty with Germany because in 1941 Germany became a neighbour country of Turkey by occupying Greece (Yakut, Bağcı, 2013: 105).

Turkey was insisted on joining the war on many occasions by both sides of the war but Turkey rejected these offers without harming the delicate relations. Turkey used the diplomatic channels very well to stay out of the war. Turkish foreign policy throughout the WWII was condemned due to being neither ethical, nor moral. Several critics blamed Turkey playing the "balance game"(Deringil, 1989:238).

İnönü received a letter from Churchill on January 31, 1941. He suggested that Britain dispatch military equipments to Turkey to end the German advancement. İnönü rejected this suggestion. Eden, the British foreign secretary paid a visit to Turkey on February 26, 1941 and wanted from Turkey to declare war against the Nazis, if Greece was assaulted by the Germany. This proposal was rejected by the Turkish government as well (Altınörs,2017:2).

Germany dispatched a letter to the Turkish president İsmet İnönü on March 1, 1941. Hitler emphasized in the letter that the precautions taken by Germans were in no way a risk against Turkey's territorial integrity. He stated his wish for future collaboration between Turkey and Germany. Hitler also added his wish that there is no reason that can be confronting Turkey and Germany. He added that he gave previously orders to stop any misunderstanding about the existence of German military in Bulgaria. Hitler implied that Turkey should not act necessitating altering in the German manner (Altınörs,2017:2).

Turkey gave reply to Germany via a letter on March 12, 1941. Hitler sent a second letter talking about alliance and he proposed a non-aggression pact between both countries. Consequently, the Foreign Minister of Turkey Şükrü Saraçoğlu and the German Ambassador agreed on Turkish-German friendship and non-aggression pact on June 18, 1941. Inönü spoke at a meeting in Izmir. He said, "We will try to stay out of the war. We have no reason for combat. But military mobilization will not change and we will take every measure to be ready for changing situations" (Altınörs,2017:2).

In this period, the Turkish government pursuit the foreign policy of the founding Father which is "Peace at home, peace in the world." This peace policy

helped Turkey to have balanced relations with both the Allied powers and the Axis powers. The diplomatic relations were cut with Germany towards the very end of the World War II. In 1941, “Nonaggression Treaty” was signed between Turkey-Germany. However, Turkey declared war against Germany after seeing the change of the course on 23 February 1945. Turkey cut diplomatic relations with Germany just before the very end of the WWII. This announcement of war was not practical but political and even a shell had not been used against the German soldiers throughout the WWII (Yakut, Bağcı, 2013: 119).

Turkey announced that it stopped chromites delivery on 20 April 1944. On 5 June 1945, some war ships have passed through the Turkish straits which made allies upset with Turkey. After this incident, Foreign Minister Menemencioglu had to resign from his post (Yakut, Bağcı, 2013: 116).

Turkish foreign policy remained both defensive and neutral. The Turkish government also had continuous suspicions related to Soviet aims intended for the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus and the Turkish straits. Soviet demands after the war, for changing the Montreux Convention 1936 and annexation Kars and Ardahan from Turkey revealed that suspicions of the Turkish government were right for the USSR. Another significant fact is that Turkish Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu has emphasized on 27 August 1942 during the talk with German Ambassador von Papen that as a Turk I really long for Soviet's defeat and this opportunity comes only one in every thousand years; however, as a Prime Minister with regard to Turkey's interests, Turkey has to follow neutral policy. Germany gave up insisting Turkey on becoming ally at the end of 1942. This is of course because of poor economy, technically inadequate military, lack of manpower, negative result of latest wars, assumed Soviet risk through and after the war and common public opinion have been the reasons playing role in the Turkish foreign policy all through the WWII (Yakut, Bağcı, 2013: 112).

Turkey did not want to be on the losing side as in the First World War. She accomplished this by following balance policy. In my opinion, Turkey has made the best choice. If Turkey had chosen Axis powers, she would only delay the defeat of Germany because she had no proper army to fight against the USA and the Soviets.

If Turkey had chosen the Allies from the beginning, the Nazis would have chosen to declare war against Turkey and decided to occupy Turkey before Russia that would have been a disaster for Turkey and the Allies because of the straits and critical position of Turkish land.

> "This success is mostly associated with President İnönü's firm and determined state of mind and very careful attitude of avoiding fatal mistakes. President İnönü and his team should be appreciated for their achievement in avoiding the nation from the destructive effects of WW II which for sure would have delayed economic, political and social progress of the country." (Altınörs,2017:7).

After the foundation of Turkish republic, one of the main mottos of her defined by Atatürk has been to rise the level of contemporary civilizations, which are the West. Therefore, Turkey has always chosen to ally with England and the USA at the WWII and following the war.

The president of that time İsmet İnönü has saved Turkey from the burden of the Second World War by being neutral. He knew that Turkey could not heal even the wounds of the First World War. On the other part, Germany has lost its second great war within a half century.

2.2.2 Relations During the Cold War

The Cold War was an ideological war between the two world superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, beginning after the Second World War. After the war, Germany was left defeated, Turkey was left alone for a while because of her neutrality in the war, and Britain and France were weak and worn out. The Cold War superpowers i.e. the USA and the USSR, was weary too. But soon after, the both superpowers became competitor because of their contradictory ideologies and shared doubt and continually greed for supremacy until 1989, the fall down of the Berlin Wall. Up to this day, these states are great rivals with their opposing interests especially in the MENA reminding us of the Cold War.

After the WWII, Turkey and Germany came together under the NATO umbrella because of Korean War and two-poled Cold War, during which Turkey has chosen to be with the USA and western superpowers rather than Soviets. After diplomatic and consulate offices were given in 1951, Turkish- German war state has been abolished and diplomatic ties re-established (Aksoy ,et al, 1994:53).

At the times when Turkey had low figures economy, defence support was provided from the USA and the Germany. In this way, beginning from 1964 Germany provided Turkey with 1.9 billion Marks financial support. 20% of this sum was military equipments. Apart from this, Germany sent 2.9-million mark worth of materials as a support for a buffer state Turkey (Tulgar, 2006:201).

In 1959, Turkey needed to join in European Economic Community (EEC) because of its economic situation. As traditional trading partners with Turkey, the six members of EEC Germany, Italy, France, Luxemburg, Belgium and Netherlands had no objection to Turkey's membership. In 1963 Turkey signed Ankara agreement building partnership with EEC. With this agreement, after the preparation and transition phase prepared by the EEC member, a way to Turkey's full membership was opened. After completing the preparation phase, Turkey entered the transition phase in 1973. According to the protocol, all the customs would be abolished in 22 years and within this period Turkey would become a full member. However; due to the deep instability in Turkish economy and in Turkish policy and the negative reaction of European countries to the 1980 military coup in Turkey intensified the relations. When Turkey applied for a full membership, EEC rejected this due to Turkey's incapacity to fulfil all the requirements (Tulgar, 2006:228-229).

The nature of International relations demands political changes even in every hour, which can be very different from the policy followed before. Of course there have been many critical changes in the Turkey Germany relations in the history since the end of World War II and the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany The Turksish relationship with Germany since the 1960s can be defined as “intermestic,” which combines both domestic and foreign policy components. As a leading German analyst Heinz Kramer noted in 2007. (Szabo,2018:2)What make Turkish German relations "intermestic", are;

> "Close to 3 million Turkish citizens living in Germany and German citizens of Turkish descent, an annual trade volume of 25 billion Euros, accession process of Turkey to the EU as well as tourism due to the 4 million German tourists visiting Turkey each year, are among the building blocks of our relations with Germany, one of our most important allies. In addition to the intense and institutionalized relations at the bilateral level, Germany is among our most significant partners in European security and political structures, including NATO, OSCE as well as the Council of Europe." (http://www.mfa.gov.tr), (16.04.2019)

The main Issues between Turkey and Germany after the WWII were the Labour Recruitment Agreement,

> "European Economic Community and European Union from end of the cold war to the recent days The first beginnings of commercial, economic and cultural ties between Turkey and Germany were further developed and intensified during the Cold War. Subsequently in 1960's with the signing of the Labour Recruitment Agreement between Turkey and Germany, a great number of Turkish citizensimmigrated to Germany." (http://www.mfa.gov.tr), (16.04.2019)

In the beginnings of 1960, Germany became short of workforce. Therefore, the country had to reinforce her developing economy with foreign workers. Germany's workers deficit was around 500.000 in 1961. At the same year with the Labour Recruitment Agreement, Germany received 6,800 Turkish workers. The Turkish workers have gone to Germany for a short time and to spare money after that to return home country. So, the poor countries of the Europe like Italy, Spain Portugal, Greece Yugoslavia and Turkey sent workers to Germany through the 1960's and 1970's. At this time, the German government met the foreign workers by great festivals and joy. From this workers agreement not only the Germans but also the sending countries benefited because they could deplete the unemployment rates and more foreign currency entered the countries.

In 1981, Greece in 1986 Spain and Portugal joined European Community. Because of this development, the economies and political stability of the mentioned countries got better, therefore the guest workers of these countries returned to their homeland. Nevertheless, Turkey's economic situation did not get better that's why Turkish workers continued to stay in Germany. Because of the bad economic situation and petrol crisis in the world, Germany limited immigration and the period of staying of the immigrants in their homelands to 3 months in 1973. However, this made some increases in the number of the immigrants because they were allowed to bring their families with them beginning from this year. Family reunification increased the number of immigrants (Tulgar, 2006:246-247).

In spite of the limitations to the emigrations, Turkish population was 1.028.000 in 1974 then increased to 1.581.000 in 1982 and in 1990 to 1.600.000. In 1960's, 90% of the foreign workers were single but today families consist of 60% of the population. (Tulgar: 2006:248) In 1983, the promotion of return became a law. In the context of this law, 100.000 Turkish foreign workers with their families the

number increased to 313.000 people returned to Turkey. To promote this law, Germany paid 10.00 German Marks per worker. It is supposed that the total sum of the money paid to the workers was between 5.00-250.000 German Marks when worker's compensation added. Nevertheless, the returnees were not much when compared to the numbers of staying workers and newborn children. (Türkmentekin, Özgüç: 367) After the second world war, above 30 million ethnic Germans, refugees, guest workers together with their families settled in Germany. 30% of them are Turkish immigrants with the highest number (Tulgar: 2006:248). İçduygu stated in his study the economical and historical side of Turkish workers migrating to Germany.

> "For instance, Turkey's first Five-Year Plan in 1963 reported that the export of excess, unskilled labour to Western Europe represents one of the possibilities for alleviating unemployment. It is generally agreed that since the early 1960s, around 10 % of the workforce in Turkey has been unemployed and another 15% underemployed. These figures persist over the whole period of the last 45 years. Thus, reduction in unemployment and underemployment is of paramount importance. Emigration has obviously helped to reduce unemployment pressures in Turkey, but it is not easy to quantify the effects of emigration on unemployment since both are difficult to measure precisely. On the other hand, several studies point out the potential growth-slowing effects of Turkish emigration because of the emigration of skilled worker" (İçduygu, 2012:24).

Today, the world's largest number of Turkish society are living in Germany with nearly three million people of Turkish origin, more than half of which have German citizenship. For years, Turkey's largest trade partner has been Germany and German foreign investor, with almost 7,000 German firms at present functional in Turkey (Paul, and Schmidt, 2017: 44).

2.2.3. Relations Until the Syrian Civil War

The ending of the Cold War changed the world completely. One of the most important changes in the world was the change of the organization of the international political order. The two centres of activity in the previous order had been the U.S and the Soviets, where the two opposing ideological blocs faced each other armed with nuclear arms in Europe. According to Kirişçi,

> "These nuclear weapons and the priorities of the leading two superpowers ensured a considerable degree of stability in the international politics of East-West relations. However, this order has been completely overturned with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communism."

The ex-pro Russian Bloc has fallen into an era of quick political revolution followed by an extraordinary degree of instability. This situation has intensely affected Turkish foreign policy behaviour (Kirişçi, 2009).

During most of the Cold War period Turkey remained silent in international politics. One of the reasons for that Turkey had a close treat like Soviets who had nuclear weapons. Turkey, throughout this period, was a close and unavoidable ally of the Western Bloc. The strategies of the foreign policy of buffer states like Turkey were determined by the strategic exigencies of their leading NATO allies. The only few times during the cold war period that Turkey showed herself in international politics. This was usually in the context of crises in its relations with Greece or Cyprus. However, since the end of the Cold War, Turkey suddenly appears to increase her effectiveness in the international politics (Kirişçi, 2009).

> "Turkey's importance for the West is not only because of its geo-strategic value or its natural resources but also because Turkey is seen as a good instance of democracy for those countries that are rising from the collapse of the Soviet Union after the fall down of Marxism. Turkey's chief value is to be an example to the region around it – a living demonstration of the proposition that a Muslim country can become a prosperous democracy, a full member of the modern world" (Kirişçi, 2009).

After 1990's, Germany stated that she would collaborate with Turkey; however, Germany criticized Turkey for its cross border operations against PKK in Iraq alleging civilian deaths. As a result of this, Germany stopped weapon aid to Turkey worth of 250 million Mark. Again because of this same reason, NATO cut all the military deliveries to Turkey. Germany has defended all her actions referring to the human rights and accepted all applicants, who apply for political asylum from Turkey to Germany. Germany wanted this kind of arguments to be used in international arena against Turkey and to take advantage of domestic political turmoil in Turkey. This was also an advantage against Turkey's full membership to EU. However this kind of attitude closed Turkey to the USA and Turkey provided all the weapons from the USA. Germany lost his power in the region because of the policy followed between 1960's and 1980's. Through the end of this cold war era, the biased expressions of Helmut kohl against Turkey's full membership to the EU, replaced with positive attitude with the new Prime Minister Schröder implying that if Turkey completed all the requirements, she would join the EU (Tekin: 2012: 64).

As of 2005, the new Angela Merkel government came to power and followed a foreign policy against Turkey. Merkel suggested Turkey a privileged partnership instead of full membership. In the first years of her term, the German government implemented some harsh laws against Turkish community in Germany. In the name of integration, assimilation policies were performed. The new visa and language regulations were put into force. Merkel believed that because of Turkey's Muslim identity, Turkey did not belong to the EU, which consisted of Christian countries. She also believed that the ties should not be cut with Turkey therefore suggested a privileged partnership (Tekin: 2012:64-65).

In the last years of 2000's, Turkey's political and economic developments especially becoming a leading country in the region have made Germany change her policy positively about Turkey. These changes brought about not only economic but also political changes in the foreign policy of Germany about Turkey. Westerwelle implied these positive relations with these words.

> "… But we have a big interest in Turkey turning in Europe's direction. I want a Turkey that is on Europe's side. Not just for economic reasons. The country can also provide very constructive help in resolving many conflicts, whether it is Afghanistan, Iran, Yemen or the Middle East" (German FM Westerwelle: We have a great interest in Turkey turning towards Europe": 2019).

The German stance on Turkish EU membership shows an important feature of German-Turkish bilateral friendship. Turkey regards Germany as the most influential country in making EU policies towards Turkey. While all over the years, Berlin has seen Ankara as a significant strategic associate that should be kept under control and not segregated, usually it has not given enough support for Turkey's EU membership endeavors. Different approaches to hold Turkey under control of Europe have been followed, for example the Customs Union (CU), which was created by ex-Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The single change in the policy occurred under the Social Democratic (SPD) and Alliance '90/The Greens Coalition between 1998 and 2005. Because of its influential place inside the European Union, Germany is the most influential policy maker in EU-Turkey relations. Germany may speed or stop the relations any time it wants. Any swing in the bilateral dialogue would not only impact mutual affairs but also EU-Turkey dialogue (Paul and Schmidt, 2017).

Germany's policy after the cold war was outlined in the speech of the defense minister Volker Rühe at the Military academy West point. The defense Minister emphasized the USA role as a key superpower. He also mentioned Germany's key role in Europe at the post cold war era. He said;

> "At the cold war era, the strategic thinking in Germany was underestimated. Now, Germany has to develop new understanding, which promotes export of democracy, supporting of the allies, and protecting basic values in the free world. As the USA acts according to her responsibility, Germany should also be aware of her key role in Europe." (Canbolat,2003:198).

Although Rühe's words and suggestion did not welcome in the USA public, it was important fact showing us the expectation of Germany for a new role in post cold war Europe.

Famous International relations scholar Hans Peter Schwarz told post cold war era in his book “German's return to World Stage.” originally "Deutschlands rückkehr auf die Welt Bühne" (1994). He said in his book; “From the perspective of international law , Germany was freed from the chains of the WWII, at which she was defeated giving many concessions but the psychological chains of the war has still been continuing." He was right in 1994. However, beginning from 1998 the Schroöder und Fischer government had many supports for getting rid of these chains.

Germany's economic power and its population in European Union make Germany a driving and leading power for Europe. The population of an EU country gives her more right in the EU for governing. Therefore, let alone the other reasons, it does not make sense that Germany support full membership of Turkey because of Turkey's population, which is nearly 82 million.

In 1997, the German Prime Minister Kohl expressed that "Turkey cannot join the EU because of cultural and religious differences." In response to this expression, the Turkish prime Minister of that time Mesut YILMAZ said: "The reason why Germany prefers Middle Europe about joining Europe is because of her policy of "Lebensraum" (Tulgar, 2006:265).

If Turkey would join the EU, she would be represented in the EU's decision-making process with her big population with high proportion. The other Turk population in European countries should be added to the Turkey's population. When

the constantly growing population of Turkey is considered, in the long run, Turkey's biggest rival in the decision making process would be Germany.

It is defined by the EU public that the biggest obstacles of Turkey in the way to EU are religion, culture and economy besides Turkey's growing and dynamic population. One of the former Prime Ministers of Germany "Helmut Schmidt" told:" Turkey's population is now 65 million, in 35 years this number would rise to 100 million. At the end of the 21th century, Turkey's population would be as much as the total population of France and Germany. Everyone who want Turkey join the EU, should keep these facts in mind." It is also important to touch another speech of Kohl at a meeting on 8 April 2000; "Whatever EU's future will be, there is no place for Turkey. We cannot allow 20 million Turkish workers to move freely in the EU. We cannot accept that Europe become a neighbour of Iraq, Syria and Iran" (Tulgar,2006:266-267).

This view is still valid. In fact, the other European countries share the same opinion with Germany but they do not give a loud voice to them. Even Germany does not want to oppose Turkey openly. As mentioned above these views belong to the prominent politicians of Germany.

Germany, who seemed like main supporter of Turkey's membership to the EU, gives up this policy completely in the late 1990's. This policy of Germany was expressed openly after the Helsinki summit at the annual meeting of Christian social unity party:

> "Turkey's full membership to the EU is extremely dangerous. We oppose Turkey's membership but Turkey is strategically important for the EU. Therefore, we should develop a new formula in order that Turkey stays with us. We want Turkey not to completely fall apart from the EU and find new partnerships."

Gerhard Schröder and the leader of Green party have fully supported the membership of Turkey to the EU. In 1999 Schröder has contributed great efforts for Turkey to gain candidate status. Both Schröder and Fscher have emphasized that they would do everything Turkey's full membership to the EU (Tulgar,2006:266-267).

At the beginning of the 2000s, Ankara experienced both development and obstacles in its attempts to join the EU. Turkish governing Party, Ak Party, presented some transformations demanded by the EU, for example the eradication of the death

penalty and precautions to strengthen civil government over the military. After that, South Cyprus entered the EU in 2004, winning advantage in its year's long disagreement with Turkey over the Northern Cyprus. Cyprus has used its veto power several times to obstruct some chapters of the EU-Turkish talks.

Especially with Customs Union in 1995, Germany became more interested in Cyprus. The German policies performed together with the EU, has evolved into a sort of policy against Turkey. Turkey accepted Cyprus problem to be disputed by the EU at Helsinki Summit in 1999. Since then, EU countries have been producing policies about the EU.

Cyprus has joined the EU on 1 May 2004 and made a short term of presidency. Germany stressed that the EU negotiations with Turkey should not be started unless Cyprus issue resolved. In 2007, Merkel noticed that before resolving the Cyprus issue, Cyprus's membership to the EU was wrong (Sandıklı, 2010;12).

The former German Prime Minister Schroder paid a visit to the Northern Cyprus stating that Germany should recognize the Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic and make some investments here. Schröder, who is famous for a close friend of Turkey, had some backlashes against his opinions especially by Merkel in Germany. Following these developments, Merkel (First official visit in German history) paid a visit to the Cyprus expressing that she will pursue a policy to reunite the divided Cyprus. According to Merkel, if this issue would not be settled, there would always be an obstacle for Turkey. Even if she was seemed neutral in this matter, she sometime showed her preference Cyprus instead of Turkey for example with these words from 2011."We detected that you (Southern Cyprus) are ready for an honourable agreement but Turkish side does not give appropriate response to it. Besides, Germany supports Turkey's membership but before all Turkey has to resolve Cyprus and the other issues." (Tekin,2012:73).

The Turkish foreign policy institute evaluated the opinions of the German Chancellor Merkel with this paragraph

> "The expressions of the German Chancellor Merkel showed the cooperation among the EU members. Until now, we have seen how the Cyprus issue is used against Turkey within the framework of accession negotiations by both EU commission and the member states in spite of Turkey's complete rightness. Again, Chancellor Merkel supports Cyprus this time refraining from all the realities. Mrs Merkel

> puts aside all the reports supporting Turkey and the efforts exerted by the United Nations Secretary. So, Germany announces that in every condition she will support Cyprus as an EU member. This is a challenge" (Tekin,2012:74).

Another most important issue between Turkey and Germany was the Armenia debate. The official response of Turkey is:

> "Turkey does not deny the suffering of Armenians, including the loss of many innocent lives, during the First World War. However, greater numbers of Turks died or were killed in the years leading to and during the War. Without belittling the tragic consequences for any group, Turkey objects to the one-sided presentation of this tragedy as a genocide by one group against another." (http://www.mfa.gov.tr) (28.04.2019)

Germany is also accused of helping this tragedy by sending weapons to the Ottomans. In 1915, the Armenians held Germans responsible for not preventing the harsh attitude by the Ottoman army. Due to this reason, the Armenians have hated Germans for years (Kandaz, 2006; 115).

After the allegation of helping the Ottomans, Germany wanted to clear herself. The German- Armenian community sent a letter to Germany; the letter was about begging help from Germany to hinder the accusations to Germany. This Armenian hatred caused Germans to take action. Germany reviewed her Armenian policy. In the last years, Germany has been pursuing a policy to inflict all the tragedy on Turkey. In this context, a proposal was presented to German parliament recognizing so called “Armenian Genocide.” exerted a great deal of effort in order to be recognized that the first Genocide in Human History was perpetrated by the Turks. Besides, Germany supported the recognition of Armenian allegations by the French parliament (Tekin, 2012:76).

Germany has been the most active state prompting the advertisement of so-called genocide, by making projects, spending the most money, investing a lot of money. It is surprising to see how great deal of money German foundations, instructions and universities invested in the research and the promotion of so called Genocide. The history books in German school title the events of 1915 as Genocide. So far, the most official or unofficial presentations meeting or conferences have been organized by Germany (Tekin, 2012:77).

Germany overpoweringly accepted a null and void and fraught resolution on 2 June 2016 announcing the killings of Armenians by Ottomans in 1915 a genocide, increasing tension with Ankara at a diplomatically delicate stage. The Turkey

furiously announced the voting as "null and void," and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called Turkish ambassador in Germany back to Ankara for consultations. "The way to close the dark pages of your own history is not by defaming the histories of other countries with irresponsible and baseless decisions," Turkish Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, declared on Twitter (Smale and Eddy, 2016).

One of the most influential development experienced during the term of Merkel was the expressing of president Wulf stating that "Islam belongs to Germany," which meant the adoption of nearly 7 million Muslims to Germany. The Foreign Minister Westerwelle also stressed the importance of the country's role as a bridge to Muslim culture and as a NATO member. He described Germany and Turkey's relationship as "even", adding that care must be taken that "the day doesn't come when Europe is more interested in Turkey than Turkey is in Europe" (Tekin,2012:104).

Before discussing the main topic of this study, expressing some economic figures between both countries are necessary.

> "The bilateral trade volume between Turkey and Germany stood at 36,4 billion USD in 2017, which corresponds to an increase of 3,1 percent compared to the year before (exports 15,1 billion US Dollars; imports 21,3 billion US Dollars). Main items of Turkey's exports to Germany consist of road vehicles, parts and accessories for motor vehicles and parts for use with piston engines; whilst main items of Turkey's imports from Germany are road vehicles, medicaments and parts and accessories for motor vehicles. In the period of 2002-2017, total amount of direct investments from Germany to Turkey is 9,15 billion USD. This figure is,260 billion USD from Turkey to Germany in the same period. There are about 80 thousand Turkish-German businesses operating in Germany. Their annual turnover amounts to approximately 52 billion Euros and they employ almost 500 thousand people in 50 different sectors More than 3,5 million German tourists visited Turkey in 2017" (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/commercial-and-economic-relations-between- turkey-and-the-federal-republic-of-germany.en.mfa). (28.04.2019)

> "Turkey, as a part of the Western world since the Paris Conference held in 1856, brings multiple benefit to Europe and the West World and provides, geographical depth to the continent, while enriching its ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity. As an active member of international organizations such as the Council of Europe, OECD, NATO and OSCE, Turkey's strategic aim is EU membership. Turkey, whose geographical and cultural heritage provides her access to regions beyond her immediate neighbourhood, aims to consolidate her place in Europe's past with EU membership in its future. Despite artificial obstacles, Turkey also remains committed to her full membership negotiation process" (http://www.mfa.gov.tr). (28.04.2019)

Germany's largest export market is Turkey. The close economic relations usually bring both sides on common grounds on many issues. It is not easy to underestimate this bilateral economic dependency. This dependency shapes the

foreign policy of both countries about each other. Looking to the data from Turkish importers assembly, machines, electronic devices, technological devices, motors, and supply parts for the car industry make up a particularly large share of Germany's exports to Turkey. Textiles/leather goods, food, and motor vehicles and electronic goods, are the principal German imports from Turkey. Currently, companies and small businesses owned by Turkish descent in Germany provide work for around 500 thousand people. The annual income of these businesses has accomplished 50 billion Euros. Over three million Germans spend their holidays in Turkey annually. More than 7 thousand German companies work in Turkey. Germany has become to be the first co-worker of Turkey in the areas for example foreign trade, financial and technical cooperation, tourism and defence industry (www.auswaertiges-amt.de). (www.tim.org.tr).

Table: 2.1 Sections in the Export to Germany (TİM, Economy and foreign trade Report,2017)

CODE	Product	2014 Million Dollar	2015 Million Dollar	2016 Million Dollar	15/16 Change Rate %
87	Road motor vehicles, tractors, and their components..	2,142	2,072	2,605	29,5
84	Boilers, machinery nuclear reactors, their components…	2,352	2,084	2,144	2,9
61	Knitted apparel accessories	2,384	1,886	1,891	0,3
85	Electircal machinery, TV, audio video recorders their components…	995	898	878	-2,2
62	Non-knitted apparel and accessories	937	798	797	-0,1
73	Ironware or Stellware	553	498	491	-1,4
20	Vegetables, fruits, nuts…	555	687	490	-28,6
63	Gamments made of knitting materials, suits…	550	472	450	-4,6
40	Rubber and Rubberware	514	421	425	0,9
8	Edible fruits and nuts	478	459	421	-8,3

Table: 2.2 Sections in the Import from Germany (TİM, Economy and foreign trade Report,2017)

CODE	PRODUCT	2014 Million Dollar	2015 Million Dollar	2016 Million Dollar	15/16 Change Rate %
87	Road Motor Vehicles tractors, and teir components…	2,223	5,706	5,210	-8,7

84	Boilers, machinery, mechanical equipment, nuclear reactors	5,428	4,541	4,495	-1,0
85	Electrical machinery , TV audio video recorders-transmitters and their componets	1,709	1,645	1,979	20,4
39	Plastics and plasticware	1,612	1,420	1,400	-1,4
90	Tools and equipments for optics, photography, movie measurement checking medical purposes and their components	861	830	842	1,4
30	Pharmaceuticals	857	794	822	3,5
88	Aircrafts, space, crafts and their components	50	580	638	9,9
72	Iron and steel	719	608	563	-7,4
73	Ironware or steelware	444	385	460	19,5
38	Various chemical materials(bio-diesel, fire extinguishing materials, etc)	455	454	451	-0,7

> "Germany's exports to Turkey have increased from $5.74 billion in 1995 to $21.5 billion in 2016, resulting in a German trade surplus of $7.5 billion, down from its high point in 2013, when exports to Turkey exceeded $25 billion with a $10.3 billion trade surplus" (Szabo,2018:7).

The investment ambiance got worse after the coup attempt in 2016 against Turkish government, when the Turkish government criticized Germany for not giving enough support against FETÖ (Fethullahist Terrorist Organization) and alleged that some Germany companies had links with FETÖ. However, the German government in response in September 2017 put a limit on Hermes credit assurances against savings risks for German companies working in Turkey to 1.8 billion Dollars for 2017 and has ceased EU dialogue on an extended Customs Union with Turkey. In 2016 the volume of cover for trade with Turkey had diminished from about $2.4 billion to $1.2 billion due to the domestic problems in Turkey. As a result of this tensed relations, the great loss in value of Turkish Lira became more perceivable in 2018.

Germany has been the second-largest weapons provider to Turkey; this weapon trade affiliation was resurrected in the beginning of 1980's. Through the 1980s and 1990s, Germany sent over 400 tanks to Turkey mainly known as "Leopard", as ingredient of "NATO defence aid." In 2005, Ankara started taking an extra 354 upgraded tanks. Weapon trade to Turkey in 2017 totalled $70.7 million, up from $31.5 million in 2015. The arms trade has stopped for a short time in the period

when German citizen Deniz Yücel was jailed. He has been released in February 2018 (Szabo,2018:8). Critical economic data is given below to see how political situation effected the relations.

> "Exports from Turkey fell 0.4 percent from a year earlier to USD 15.5 billion in March 2019 as sales of manufactured products, which accounted for 94.9 percent of total shipments, decreased 0.1 percent.Among major trade partners, exports declined mainly to Germany (-6.7 percent). Exports in Turkey averaged 3165.62 USD Million from 1957 until 2019, reaching an all time high of 15679.14 USD Million in October of 2018 and a record low of 7.10 USD Million in August of 1958. Imports to Turkey tumbled 17.8 percent from a year earlier to USD 17.6 billion in March 2019, as purchases of intermediate goods, which accounted for 79 percent of total imports, dropped 13.3 percent.. Imports were down from all major trade partners: Russia (-8.2 percent), Germany (-23.1 percent), Imports in Turkey averaged 4873.35 USD Million from 1957 until 2019, reaching an all time high of 23245.30 USD Million in May of 2013 and a record low of 15 USD Million in August of 1958." ("Turkey Imports | 2019 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast | News", 2019)

CHAPTER THREE
THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR AND ITS EFFECTS ON TURKISH GERMAN RELATIONS

3.1. BACKGROUND OF THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR AND REFUGEE CRISIS

After taking her sovereignty from France in 1946, Syria has experienced much political instability. The history of the Syria was defined by the internal struggle for power and the wars with Israel in 1948, 1967, and 1974. Four coup d'état has been attempted even in the same year in 1949. From the middle of 1950's, Ba'ath party became more influential and in 1963, the party took control in Syria. After 1970, Hafez el Assad came to Power with an intra party coup (Dursun, Arı: 2013:36).

From 1971 to 2000, Hafez al Assad served as a sole power in Syria. During the cold war, he acted with the Soviets and built a secret intelligence, Idare el-Muhaberat al-Ama, the name of which can be easily heard from Syrian migrants in Turkey even today, the regime in domestic policy, by means of which he contained all the opponents in order not to give any chance to riot against him. Mainly, the massacre in Hama, which has still been criticized, occurred in 2 February 1982. When the regime army, with the commands of the country's dictator Hafez al-Assad, surrounded Hama for 27 days in order to suppress a revolt by the Muslim Brotherhood against the government. The mass murder, performed by the Syrian Army, commanded by General Rifaat al-Assad, effectively ended the fight, which has begun in 1976 by Sunni Muslim groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, against the government (Fisk, 2010). The Britannica encyclopaedia defines the foundation of the party as follows:

> "Arab Socialist Baʿth Party was founded to advocate the formation of a single Arab socialist nation. It has branches in many Middle Eastern countries and was the ruling party in Syria from 1963 and in Iraq from 1968 to 2003. The Baʿth Party was founded in 1943 in Damascus, Syria, by Michel Aflaq and Ṣalaḥ al-Dīn al-Bīṭār,

> adopted its constitution in 1947, and in 1953 merged with the Syrian Socialist Party to form the Arab Socialist Baʿth (Renaissance) Party. The Baʿth Party espoused nonalignment and opposition to imperialism and colonialism, took inspiration from what it considered the positive values of Islam, and attempted to ignore or transcend class divisions. Its structure was highly centralized and authoritarian" ("Baʿth Party | Arab political party", n.d.).

Taking her sovereignty from France The Ba'ath party came to power after a successful coup d'état in 1963. Since then, Nusayris (Arab Alawites) which is a branch of Shiites, rule the Syria. Although Nusayris, which is the Ba'ath party, governs the Syria, they consist of only 15% of the total population in Syria. The secular Syrian Regional Party stayed in the main political authority in what had been a despotic state until the first multi-party voting to the People's Council of Syria was held in 2012 (Dursun, Arı: 2013:13).

Map 3.1- Map of minorities in Syria I (Akgün,2012:6)



After Hafez Al Assad death because of lung cancer, for a short time his vice president governed the country to make some changes in the Syrian constitution for Baser Al Assad to be elected. Assad became president with a formality election in 2000. (Akgün, 2012:6)

3.1.1 Arab Spring and the Reasons of Syrian Uprising

"The Arab Spring" was at the beginning a series of pro-democracy and pro freedom, in some countries started with pro-Islamist ideology that expanded to a number of largely Islamic countries, together with the countries in the MENA region. The rebellions in these mainly monarchic regimes generally begun in the spring of 2011, which led to the name. Nevertheless, the political, social, and economic power of these trendy revolts stays noteworthy even today, years after most of them ended. First of all, the so called Arab Spring started in the late 2010. The Tunisian street retailer Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest against the unjust seizing of his vegetable stand by police because of failure to get consent. He actually showed his anger towards the government, which put obstacles in front of him trying to sustain his life. Bouazizi's courageous action acted as a mechanism for the so-called Jasmine Revolution and the Arab spring in Tunisia and the other Arab countries ("Arab Spring", 2019).

Together with autocratic family states governing countries for years and censorship of freedom and basic human rights, economy played the most crucial part in raising dissatisfaction among Syrian opposition. They had revolted before against Assad's father. Bad economy, worsening farming harvest, negligence of constant bread crisis, inflation that affected millions of Syrians, failure of Assad regime to provide enough jobs for skilled youth as population increases, irritated the rural masses who were beforehand stamina of Ba'athist rule.

> "In 2010, Syria's nominal GDP per capita was only $2,834, similar to Sub-Saharan African countries for instance Nigeria and far lower than its neighbours for example Lebanon, with a twelve-monthly growth rate of 3.39%, beneath most other developing countries" ("Syria GDP per Capita [2002 - 2019] [Data & Charts]", 2019).

Syria has also experienced primarily high youth unemployment rates. At the beginning of the conflicts, displeasure against Assad was the highest in Syria's underprivileged areas, mostly amongst conservative Sunnis. These cities are with high unemployment rates, for example Daraa and Homs, and the poorer districts of large cities (Larsen, 2019).

Widespread bribery and nepotism in government job sectors as well as in economic liberalization strategy caused anger among urban middle class too. There was no optimism left among them, and they saw government alter as only option to end their misery (Amanullah, 2017).

The human rights issue in Syria has long been the topic of cruel analysis from the west ("World Report 2010": 2010:555). The civil liberties of free expression, association and assembly were firmly taken under control in Syria even before the unrest. Syrian people were suffering under despotic rule from 1963 until 2011 and every gathering of more than five people were not allowed. A Human Rights Watch report issued just before the beginning of the 2011 uprising stated that he had failed to substantially improve the state of human rights since coming to power (Black, 2010).

What has the Arab Spring brought so far? The immediate consequence is three civil wars that have caused terrible human costs, undermined the regions around them, and proven to be training grounds for large numbers of radicals and the other terrorist groups like PYD/YPG. These conflicts have resulted in the increase of illegal arms, trade of drugs throughout these regions and extend of radical movements that became uncontrolled to surrounding governments.

In retrospect, the Arab Spring made us some good. In the states where the foreign forces intervened, such as Libya and Syria, and to a lesser degree Yemen, horrible regimes were either changed by even more dictator regimes, or existing regimes became even more despotic or gave way to absolute political turmoil. Those countries that could escape from political chaos did so largely by making shallow changes while suppressing even harsher on trendy unrest. In the end, the Arab Spring did not conclude the crisis of governmental legitimacy that affected the Middle East, it only resulted in just enough extra repression to delay the predictable outburst to a later date.

The Europe and the USA and Turkey, even a country of the same region completely misjudged and misunderstood the Arab Spring, which should have been the voice of democracy and freedom. Was this a lack of enough intelligence from the region or unlucky selections by those in governance, or an unawareness of the region's past or just a case of the hubris that takes for granted the superpowers can redesign the rest of the world to comply with their fixed ideas of what it should be like? Both way, the actions to support it only increase disorder and civil war, and had only serve up to weaken the region even more. Education decreases extremist

ideology. Another question is: Was the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) youth educated enough to bring democratic values of the country. Education is prerequisite of democracy. Seeing so many extremist groups in Syria, which are calling for Islamic state, make us think about it.

3.1.2 The Death Toll of ongoing Syrian Civil War

The most well-known of the groups declaring the death toll is the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, said in its latest report on March 2019 more than 570 thousand people were killed since 2011. According to the same organization, the group announced in March that it had recognized more than 350,000 of those killed by name; the rest were cases in which it knew deaths had occurred nevertheless did not know the victims' names. (Specia, 2018) the regime forces and their allies reached 60.2% of the area of the Syrian territory, with an area of 111526 km², while the control of the Syria Democratic Forces reached 28.9% which is about 53389 km2, while the control of the "Islamic State" Organization reached 2.2% of the area which is about 4090 km2; represented by a large enclave in the Syrian Desert west of Euphrates, also the rebel and Islamic factions, Hayyaat Tahrir al-Sham, and the factions of "Euphrates Shield" and "Olive Branch", and the western-backed factions controlled 8.7% of the area of the Syrian territory, which is about 16175 km², Many organizations depend on this count as the best up to date evaluation ("More than 570 thousand people were killed...", 2019).

As the numbers vary, all of the groups have the same opinion on two things: that the Syrian regime is accountable for the mass of the civilian deaths, and that calculating the toll is challenging. Above all, it is just the numbers that we talk about, whether it's 400,000 or 500,000, but it's also about the trauma that is behind each of these lives It has become almost emotionless, the number. It is actually just a cold figure, but behind it are lives

3.1.3 Refugee Crisis

First, it should all the terminology is clarified before discussing the topic: The terminologies used here are taken from the study of the World Bank Group the first term used mostly is "Forced Displacement."

> "Forced displacement refers to the coerced and involuntary movement of a person or persons away from their home or home region due to a well-founded fear of persecution. “Migrants,” as opposed to the “forcibly displaced,” choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but primarily to improve their lives by finding better employment, education, or family reunion opportunities. It is an important distinction, although many population movements (like those to Europe from host countries outside Syria)are “mixed migration” flows, motivated by a combination of these factors."

Taking the Syrian refuge crisis into account, the refugees, and as a host country, Turkey need international support. The forcibly displaced people often live in poor areas in Turkey and in other developing countries, which have many domestic problems. Hosting the unexpected arrival of masses made some countries close their borders some other countries like Turkey experienced social and economical problems. It is hard for host governments, putting further pressure on their ability to deliver basic services and infrastructure without international help.

> "Forced displacement is a humanitarian crisis, close to 10 million people are now in exile for over 5 years—the highest since the end of the Cold War—underscoring the need for a more sustainable and efficient way to support both the displaced and their hosts with a longer term perspective" (www.worldbank.org).

The second term is "Refugee."

> "The 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention defines a refugee as any person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." "The Convention defines a universal right of protection from persecution as well as from refoulement, and a right to access work, education, and health care. The Convention is nonbinding, although it is ratified by 145 countries. With the exception of Turkey (which retains a geographical limitation), the countries hosting the majority of Syrians have declined to join the Convention or the subsequent 1967 Protocol."

According to the statics by UNHCR, Two-thirds of all refugees globally are from only five countries, these are Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar and Somalia. As a chief refugee target, Asylum-seekers in Turkey submit his papers to the Turkish authorities (to the Directorate General for Migration Management) for international shelter. Based on their conditions and origin country, they may be qualified to apply to the UNHCR.

The third term is "Asylum Seeker."

> "An asylum seeker is a person who has applied for asylum under the 1951 Refugee Convention and the person remains an asylum seeker for as long as their application (or appeal against refusal of an application) is pending. For Syrians, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees generally approves all asylum seekers for refugee status. In its broader context, refugee means a person fleeing the

diverse impacts of conflict but not necessarily fearing direct and personal persecution as defined by the 1951 Refugee Convention." (The Toll of the War: The economic and social consequences of the conflict in Syria", 2017)

Refugee is defined by Britannica as follows;

"Refugee, any uprooted, homeless, involuntary migrant who has crossed a frontier and no longer possesses the protection of his former government. Prior to the 19th century, the movement from one country to another did not require passports and visas; the right to asylum was commonly recognized and honoured. Although there have been numerous waves of refugees throughout history, there was no refugee problem until the emergence of fixed and closed state frontiers in the late 19th century. By the 1920s and'30s the tradition of political asylum had deteriorated considerably, partly because of growing insensitivity to human suffering and partly because of unprecedented numbers of refugees." ("Refugee", 2019)

As a principle, everyone can apply for asylum for this national asylum systems are in place to determine who qualifies for international protection. However, because of the mass refugee exodus, usually as a result of conflict, violence or wars, it is usually impossible for the countries to evaluate the applications properly. These groups are often called "prima facie" refugees.

As stated UNHCR, Global Trends report, "65.3 million people, or one person in 113, were displaced from their homes by conflict and persecution in 2015. Every minute 24 people are displaced."

Table 3.1. UNHCR Global Trends Report



"In all, 86 per cent of the refugees under UNHCR's mandate in 2015 were in low- and middle-income countries close to situations of conflict. Worldwide, Turkey was the biggest host country, with 2.5 million refugees. With nearly one

> refugee for every five citizens, Lebanon hosted more refugees compared to its population than any other country. Strikingly, children made up an astonishing 51 per cent of the world's refugees in 2015, according to the data UNHCR was able to gather (complete demographic data was not available to the report authors). Many were separated from their parents or travelling alone." (UNHCR, 2016).

It is important to discuss the question why the Syrian refugees do not choose to go to Gulf States, like Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Firstly, the Gulf States seldom give nationality to foreign people, even rich immigrants who work for years in senior positions. The governors of these countries think that cultural diversity of the newcomers may question their wealth and power so they fear of new citizenships. Therefore, these states try to protect their local population, often little in number, and their right to profit from precious natural resources. ("Why aren't rich Gulf States welcoming Syrian refugees...or are they?", 2019)

As of 2015, the route that the refugees generally follow is shown in the table taken from the study of the World Bank Group:

Map.3.2-The Refugee Route 1("Refugee", 2019)



Map 3.3 Migrant Score card as of July 2015



As shown in the map 3.3 above, the Syrian refugees do not choose to go to rich Gulf States instead they go to European countries. The reason why they refugee to Europe is simple; the rule of law. The Gulf Cooperation Council states has not approved the United Nations Refugee convention, which has controlled international regulation on asylum since WWII. The convention states the status of refugees in the society and the tasks and rights of the authorities. Taking refugee status in European Union provides migrants the right to accommodate in the country indefinitely, guarantees access to social support, housing, education for children, language courses, and help with guidance for the job market. As of 2015, 95% of the refugees are hosted in just five countries, theses are, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan ("Why aren't rich Gulf States welcoming Syrian refugees...or are they?", 2019).

3.2 GERMANY'S APPOROACH TO THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

Germany has had its hesitations about what the civil war would bring to the region therefore has not given a full support to topple Assad Regime in the region. Germany's hesitance and neutral position left Turkey alone n the region in order to topple Assad. Germany at the beginning has pursued the policy of "wait and see" but

then the results of the civil war began to treat its national security that's why Germany sought collaboration with Turley. Germany's stance towards war is explained in the paragraphs below.

3.2.1 How Germany Evaluates the Syrian Civil War

From the beginning of the peaceful protests, Germany warned the Assad regime against atrocious reacting to the protesters; as the protests were also regarded as one of the series of the Arab spring intending only some democratic changes in the country. Germany and Turkey wanted Assad to make some democratic changes in the constitution to still the protesters. The Assad regime in response made some small reforms such as accepting the resignation of the Prime Minister Muhammad Naji al Otari. On 29 March 2011, the entire cabinet resigned due to the protests against the regime. On 3 April 2011, President Assad appointed Adel Safar to succeed Otri. To prevent the protests, Assad proclaimed amnesty twice and abolished state of emergency on 21 April 2011, which was in force since 1963. He also abolished high state security court and issued a new law allowing peaceful protests. Besides, he increased the wages of civil servants and the subsidies of daily needs. Nevertheless, the clashes through the country were extended, the protesters demanded all the prisoner set free, allow new political parties to be established, fair and free elections be made, new democratic constitution be prepared and the effects of Ba'ath party on the new constitution be diminished. Assad in response to these demands increased the violence in the country by sending air force and the military to the cities to destroy the protesting cites. In the first phase of the war, thousands of civilians have been killed. To legitimize his cause, Assad defined these protests as an act, supported by foreign powers to divide the country. Since the beginning Germany and particularly Turkey chose their sides by the protesters and took position against Assad regime. German foreign missilery shapes his policy towards the paragraph below (Erdoğan and Yakut, 2013:209):

> "The initially peaceful popular protests calling for freedom and an end to the Assad dictatorship escalated in the course of 2011 as a result of the regime's use of brutal violence against the people. The conflict developed into a civil war in the course of which ethnic and sectarian antagonisms became ever more prominent. Russia, the pro-Iranian Hezbollah militia and Kurdish fighters joined the civil war. Helped by the events in Iraq, the Islamic State (IS) carved out a sphere of influence in the north-eastern part of Syria and is now being fought by the international anti-IS coalition. In

> the Nusra Front or Jabhat Fath al-Sham, the terrorist organization al-Qaeda also has an offshoot that is involved in the fighting in Syria" (Amt, 2018).

From the beginning, Germany officially and clearly stated its position in the Syrian civil war, which was on the side of the opposition. However as the course of the war changed and the opposition became more affiliated with the radical groups, Germany also changed its stance. This change helped Assad regime to stay and reinforce his forces against the opposition.

3.2.2 Syrian Civil War as a Non-European Crisis

Initially, Syrian civil war was not a big deal for Germany. It was chaos, which would be resolved like the other uprisings during the Arab spring. No one assumed that the protests would turn into a big continental crisis. Neither Syria or Russia nor the USA and the other oppositions are happy with the results leaving behind so many refugees, destroyed cities, historical sites, and death of many civilians.

Germany unlike Turkey and French has always abstained from a military solution in Syria. In place of military intervention, the German governments used European Union sanctions to deteriorate Assad regime. The primary sanctions against Assad regime incepted in summer 2011. Germany, which has a leading country in the EU, forced EU to apply oil embargo against Assad. Before the oil embargo, Syria exported almost two-thirds of its exports to Italy and Germany with almost all of the rest going to France, the Netherlands, Austria, Spain, and Turkey. The scheme of the embargo was to stop a chief resource of foreign currency that helps to finance the defence apparatus and limit funds at Assad's disposal to reward Assad supporters. As all countries do, Syria uses its profits of the oil trade to finance not just its security forces but also the whole civil sector such as police, education, and health system. The idea of the sanctions was to clear out of the Syrian regime however with this method it also harmed the Syrian people too. Nevertheless, it was not enough to overthrow Russia backed Assad (Ochsenreiter, 2013).

Instead of sanctions, military intervention would be a certain short cut to overthrow Assad regime like the Libya example as always suggested by Turkey. Looking back to the first phase of the war, it can be concluded that the West caused the war become widespread without taking necessary steps. Either the West should

have completely decided to overthrow the Assad regime or she stays with Assad regime to support at least the stability of the region and suppress the opposition with Assad and the Russia. Germany rejected French offer for military intervention by these words:

"From our point of view, there is no necessity to speculate about military options in Syria," Mr. Westerwelle told "Der Spiegel" magazine. "We want to help the people of Syria, and we want to prevent a military wildfire spreading across the region." His doubt is also given voice by some politicians in other countries. "I was very surprised by Mr. Hollande's words, the more so as French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius just recently declared there was no intention to start a ground offensive against Syria," says Ruprecht Polenz, chairman of the foreign committee in the German parliament and a party colleague of Chancellor Angela Merkel. Germany's political opposition agrees. "I doubt very much that we would be able to control the consequences of a military strike against Syria," says Hans-Ulrich Klose, foreign affairs spokesperson for the Social Democrats (Steininger, 2012).

As Turhan stated in her study that Syrian civil war was not a matter of concern for Europe until it became a refugee crisis expanding towards European Union.

> "The Syrian refugee crisis originally rose as an emergency situation that took rather place in Europe's wider neighbourhood in 2011 when Syrians sought to find shelter first in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. The crisis has "remained largely a non-European crisis until April 2015. While in 2014 there were approximately 130,000 Syrian applications for international protection in the EU, Syria's neighbours Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq were already hosting all together around 3,9 million Syrian refugees by the start of 2015. However, with the Syrian refugees increasingly seeking to reach the EU soil for a higher quality of life and safety, and following the death of almost 850 refugees due to the collision of a refugee boat close to Italy in Spring 2015, the crisis of the European periphery has turned into a European refugee crisis. In 2015, around 1.2 million refugees applied for asylum in EU member states, doubling the numbers of the previous year. This meant that almost all EU member states "experienced a growth rate of over 100 percent in the inflow of asylum seekers from 2013-15" (Turhan, 2018).

Such crisis in the Middle East have repeatedly occurred in the history, which has not attracted enough attention from Europe except the crisis in the Palestine. Israel has always had support from its European friends. The other important matters in the Middle East such as the dispute between Saudi Arabia and Yemen were not as important as the recent Syrian refugee crisis. This crisis has

awakened the oldest fear of Europe which has been the invasion from the East i.e. Islam. Europe fears this refugee crisis will change its social dynamics, culture, language and religion in the near future. The increasing birth rate in the Muslim community in Berlin contrary to the Germans placed the name "Mohammed" in the first place in 2018 according to the news from Anadolu Agency.

3.2.3 From Regional to Global Refugee Crisis

Until recently, Syrian civil war was a problem of neighbour states like Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan; however, the events in the summer of 2015 made the crisis a European crisis. Some of the refugees could not find the desired future in Turkey and in Lebanon so they began a risky journey to the dream country "Germany." The tragedy that the refugees were having during their travel mostly on foot, caught a considerable attention in the European media, for which Merkel felt herself responsible. Therefore, the chancellor Merkel gave a much-criticized statement that Germany would admit the refugees; this statement aroused a great excitement among the refugees. Nevertheless, it did not take long that the refugees understood that it was a daydream. The roads to Germany were closed with a barbed wires and the trains carrying refugees to Bayern stopped working (İnat, 2016).

It is important to mention here a shameful incident, which took a place in front of the world public and had a broad repercussion in the public. A video was posted on Twitter by German reporter Stephan Richter, showing a woman who was later identified as László "kicking a girl and tripping up the man carrying a child." The video went viral and attracted widespread media attention. This video rose awareness about the refugees (Srivinas, 2015).

The most affected countries by the migration of refugees into the European countries were Greece, Italy, and Bulgaria because of their frontline locations. One of the reasons of this problem, which the front states experienced, and always complained was the Dublin System, which states that the paper works of asylum have to be dealt by the first state that the refugee arrives at. Selcen Öner states in her article, “The Dublin system puts a disproportionate amount of pressure on the member states, which are located at external borders of the EU such as Greece and Italy”. On August 25, Germany suspended the Dublin process for Syrians, which

meant that refugees from that state not any more had to be sent back to the first EU country that they entered (Öner,2016).

These developments were incepted a discussion atmosphere, which was on relocation and a debate on immigration occurred in the spring and early summer of 2015. This was an "April tragedy." An unprecedented misfortune took place off the coast of Libya. A migrant boat sank leading to the deaths of up to 800 migrants, the largest single loss of life in the Mediterranean in decades. Only 28 people survived the sinking on the night-time of 18 April 2015, this was a start for policy solutions that would lessen a part of the load of the unexpected refugee arrivals to frontline states. Greece, Italy and Bulgaria. It was time to examination frequently declared however not often applied the theory of solidarity. In July 2015, the Council agreed to relocate the refugees (Miglierini, 2016).

At first stage, 40.000 refugees from Italy (24.000) and Greece (16.000). The largest refugee crisis in Europe since the end of the WWII, relocating 40.000 people is nothing comparing with the total number. Extra assist was required. In September, the European Council took a resolution to relocate an extra 120.000 people from Italy and Greece. The overall number was later increased to 98.255 as it became obvious that a fewer number of people were appropriate than expected. Because only talented people wanted to be taken in and the rest would be sent back to Turkey or the other Middle Eastern countries (Šabić, 2017:5-6).

During the summer of 2015, after the April Tragedy, Merkel has shown up as the only sponsor of the improvement of solidarity among the EU countries and the realization of the relocation and resettlement process with the plan to achieve a more fair separation of effort in the EU. In spite of the opposition in the country, thanks to the Merkel commitment in June 2015, she called all "EU states to demonstrate their will to accept a fair distribution of refugees throughout Europe" and emphasized Germany’s readiness to “do its bit” (Merkel, 2015).

On August 31, Chancellor Merkel announced, ″We can do this″ as European Union was bump into the largest refugee crisis it has seen in years. The civil wars, political instability and terrorism in the Middle East, and in the Asia, particularly in Syria, changed the perceptions in German government giving shelter to hundreds of

thousands of refugees. As Merkel implied, it was "a national duty." This decision made Germany a model for the other EU members and encouraged to mobilize them for contribution in relocation. Nonetheless, by the end of 2015, the EU was not close achieving cohesion among its members to realize the relocation and, thus, improve the prediction an EU-wide resolution for the relocation crisis (Dockery, 2019) (Turhan,2018:192).

Table 3.2 Number of Refugees in Germany



Merkel’s unilateral open-door policy opposed by the far rightist with nationalistic jargon Because of this policy Merkel has lost her support as she was known to be “the strict defender of German interests” in the EU (Turhan:2018:197). This pessimistic image of German Chancellor Merkel has arisen mainly after the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro zone both within German and European public opinion. ZDF-Poli-barometer, which is a TV channel and survey company, has organized on the November 2015 an opinion poll. This pool showed 52 percent of Germans refused Chancellor's policy for Syrian refugees, while the German public put Merkel at number four on the position of most admired German politicians behind Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Turhan:2018,197).

Along with the decreasing domestic reputation of the German Chancellor Merkel, her party Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) has also showed disapproval against her open door-policy, which nurtured an increase in the popularity of Germany's new Eurosceptic party Alternative for Germany (AfD). The general perception of the public emphasized that German Chancellor Merkel was going to have a possibility to triumph the next federal election only if she abandoned her open-door policy (Turhan,2018:197).

3.2.4 The Results of the Election under the Influence of Refugee Crisis

Four weeks before the upcoming German federal elections on 24 September 2017, Merkel told about the refugee policy of Germany in an interview for a newspaper "Die Welt am Sonntag"

> "It was an extraordinary situation and I made my decision based on what I thought was right from a political and humanitarian standpoint. I'd make all the important decisions of 2015 the same way again, Merkel added. Yet, she also accepted some of the mistakes during the process for some time we didn't have enough control at Germany's border. No one wants a repeat of last year's situation, including me, said Merkel who is possibly to be re-elected for a fourth term in September, under the shadow of much criticism. Her open door policy caused anger among some at the time, leading to an increase in support for the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party." (Alexander, et al, 2017).

Taking the statics into account Mudde states that

> "The radical right party (AfD) gained from the fact that immigration was the number one election issue affecting German public. The populist radical-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party not only entered the Bundestag, the German parliament, but does so almost certainly as the third biggest party, with a stunning 13.3%, an increase of 8.8 percentage points according to the exit poll. Moreover, both the centre-right CDU/CSU and the centre-left SPD scored their worst electoral results in the post-war era, with 32.5% and 20% respectively. This means that AfD had two-thirds of the SPD vote, and 40% of the CDU/CSU vote" (Mudde, 2017).

CDU/CSU lost almost 9 percent when compared with the results of the previous federal elections. The results were not surprising and the results of the elections showed that Merkel government should review her open "door policy.

Table 3.4 Distribution of Seats (www.bundestag.de)



Horst Seehofer interior minister the leader of the sister party of CSU, criticized Cahncellor Merkel attitude towards migration and threatened to finish the coalition. The discussion on July 2018 concluded as Seehofer wanted. The leader of Angela Merkel's coalition partners the CSU said "The dispute with the chancellor over migration, that nearly led to the fall of her government, is now over." He stated, "Migration feud with Angela Merkel is over." Merkel changed her position on migration to end a dispute led by her Interior Minister Horst Seehofer that threatened the survival of her fragile coalition government, which lost great deal of support comparing the last elections. (Tamma, 2019)

The deal is element of the Merkel's political method to end the stream of its voters to the far-right AfD in the October's local elections. AfD, which has been campaigning on migration, has been rising in the polls. The parties of the CDU/CSU-SPD federal-government grand coalition suffered heavy losses on the October regional elections.

> "The CSU and the SPD both lost more than 10 percentage points compared to the 2013 election, finishing at 37.2% (CSU) and 9.7% (SPD) respectively. AfD, which ran in Bavaria for the first time, made double-digit gains and won 10.2% of the total vote. The Greens gained 8.9pp and hence finished as the second strongest party, at 17.5%, replacing the SPD. The Bavarian Free Voters gained 2.6 points and finished third, slightly ahead of AfD at 11.6%." ("Landtagswahl - Ergebnisse in der Tabellenansicht für Bayern":2018)

3.3 TURKEY ATTITUDE AGAINST SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

Turkey was at the beginning the major supporter of the Syrian opposition to defeat Bashar al Assad. However, beginning in late 2016, Turkish policy has shifted bacuse of increasing Russian support to Assad in the region. This change in policy caused a reconsideration of Turkish policy away from the defeat of the regime and towards close cooperation with Russia and competition with the United States. This policy change has explained in the chapters below.

3.3.1 Zero Problem Policy with Neighbours

The Ottoman Empire was a super power that, at the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent reached its peak time, controlled huge areas of region in the modern Middle East, North Africa, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, before its last dissolution after WWI ("Ottoman Empire", 2019). After the foundation of Turkish Republic, the founding father Ataturk's motto was that Turkish republic would have no imperialistic ambitions over the other countries and be a brave defender of peace in the world. This motto can be summarized in his statement; "peace at home, peace in the world." This policy has been implemented during the Second World War. Aligning with big international organizations like NATO can also be a good example showing that Turkey pursued the policy of "peace at home peace in the world." However, Ataturk did not mean that Turkey would always be silent about the incidents or unfairness in the world. He meant using soft diplomacy rather that military solution without provoking the other country and using international organizations effectively as he did in the resolution of Hatay issue, a province of Syria at that time now Turkey's province, without using a bullet against Syria. The foreign policy of the Turkish Republic, starting from AK Party (Justice and Development Party) governments in 2002 to this day, has been described as an attempt to increase Turkish control in the regions of the Ottoman Empire. The new concept is called as Neo-Ottomanism. The AK Party has frequently used the term such as Osmanlı torunu (descendant of the Ottomans) to be more sympathetic to their right wing supporters and also their leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who is regarded as rebuilder of strong Ottoman empire as in the old days, during their election campaigns. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkish foreign minister from 2009 to 2014, a scholar

in international relations and inventor of the new Turkish foreign policy, has however objected the term "neo-Ottomanism" to explain his country's new foreign policy. Davutoğlu defined Turkey's new foreign policy on the principle of "zero problems with neighbours" as opposed to Neo-Ottomanism, which he doubted could be “seen as expansionist.” “Soft power” is regarded as particularly useful ("Davutoğlu: Yeni Osmanlıcılık hedefi yok", 2010).

The new perspective in Turkish foreign policy, which was to rise to the level of contemporary civilizations, that is the West, has bring about discussions about whether Turkey's axis shifts from West to East. The Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said at a Turkish Syrian business council meeting in Damascus that "Turkey doesn't choose its foreign policy path according to outside directives but in line with its own interests." He again refused arguments of an "axis shift" in Turkish foreign policy,

> "Turkey will not give up its policy of fostering friendly ties with neighbouring countries such as Syria just because some see this as part of a shift from the West to the East."

He continued;

> "Not only are we abolishing visas, we will remove other obstacles, too, Everyone is free to say whatever they want. However, I find these arguments (of an axis shift) ill intentioned. The rapprochement between Turkey and Syria is actually the normalization of bilateral relations. What is wrong is not today's rapprochement, but rather yesterday's distance and the visa issue." He added, "Development and prosperity in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and other regional countries means nothing on their own because we live in a common region. Besides, we have nations that are relatives with each other." He also stated that "Turkey's only wish in the region was peace, prosperity, stability and security. We have to establish an atmosphere of prosperity, peace, security, and stability on the regional scale, not in individual countries so we can't neglect the problems of Syria, Iraq or Lebanon" ("PM again rejects claims of axis shift in Turkish foreign policy", 2009).

Turkish republic under the rule of AK Party has placed herself as a protective authority as well as a sponsor of the Palestinian cause. An example of this could be seen in Davos economic forum in 2009, Prime Minister Erdoğan said “Mr. Peres, you are older than me, your voice comes out in a very loud tone. And the loudness of your voice has to do with a guilty conscience. My voice, however, will not come out in the same tone. When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill.” This brave reaction of Erdoğan has carved into the minds of many Turkish citizens Although Mr. Erdoğan has strongly objected Israel’s Gaza attack, Ankara and Israel have long benefited from close diplomatic and economic relations. With its strong

relations with the militant group Hamas, which controls Gaza, foreign minister Davutoğlu has played a growing position reconciling among Israel, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians. .Turkey has been frank about the perceived mistreatment of ethnic Turkmen groups in China, and has put its support for Sunni-political groups in Iraq and the Muslim Brotherhood and its leader in Egypt against military coup. These are some of the good examples showing the ideology of Neo-Ottomanism in AK Party governments (Bennhold, 2009).

Turkey's approach in foreign policy is a natural reflection of the “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” policy laid down by Great Leader Ataturk, founder of the Republic of Turkey. Using this traditional policy, the foreign minister Davutoğlu put emphasis on the issue that Turkey should have zero problems with its neighbours. The foreign minister Davutoğlu is also a professor in international relations. As a minister of AK Party government, he put some principles shaping the Turkish foreign policy. According to Yenigün (Yenigün, 2010:63-86), some principles that Davutoğlu applied during his ministry can be summarized as follows.

1- Turkey, which balances security and democracy in the country, plays an active role in her region.

2- Implements zero problem policy in the region

3- Establishing strong relations with the countries in the Balkans Caucasian and the Middle East.

4- Pursing and implementing a balanced, coherent policy with universal super powers.

5- Adopting a diplomatic strategy by using international organizations effectively

Because of the proactive diplomacy that Davutoğlu pursued, nearly all the countries around the world admired Turkey for its diplomatic endeavours and proposals. For example, in 2008, Turkey was active as a conciliator between Basher al Assad and Israel and in the framework of zero problems with neighbours; Turkey developed its diplomatic ties with its neighbours. The founding father of this foreign policy model, Ahmet Davutoglu, who became Turkish Foreign Minister between

2009-2014, had summarized in his book "Strategic Depth", his idea of Turkey as a central power in the region that should have a more proactive position in regional political principles because of its central geographic location and immemorial history, which dates back to Seljuk's and mighty dynasty Ottomans (Erdoğan and Yakut,2013: 195-196).

The AK Party's Neo-Ottoman ideology, however, only became fully exposed in 2011, when this soft-power and zero problems with neighbours policy turned into alternative policies and an more and more hard-power policy in the context of the Syrian conflict. The civil war in Syria can, therefore, be regarded as the beginning point of what can be called as Neo-Ottomanism. Whether this was a reflection of Neo Otomanism policy or not, Turkey's stance about Syrian civil war can also be regarded as humanistic (Manhoff, 2017). Although Turkey's stance about Syrian civil war was met with a big surprise as, Syria and Turkey had had a best diplomatic relations in the history until the emergence of the war. Turkey was one of the first countries, which showed her position, stood with the opposition in Syria. The policy of zero policy with neighbours was begun to be disputed because of the hostile policy against Assad. “We wanted [al-Assad] to be the Gorbachev of Syria, but he chose to be Milosevic. That is a problem,” Davutoğlu told students at George Washington University to emphasize Turkish policy against undemocratic Syrian Regime (Eroğan, Yakut,2013:210).

The word in 2012 by Erdoğan was also important to understand Turkish policy about Syrian regime. Erdogan saw the developments in Syria as an internal problem of Turkey. So, Turkey would do whatever necessary to bring stability to Syria. Erdoğan stated that

> "Turkish opposition parties that supported the Syrian regime will be embarrassed in the near future to visit Damascus, whilst he and the members of his party will go to Damascus to meet their brothers and sisters there; recite al-Fatiha (the opening chapter of the Quran) by the tomb of Salah Eldin Al Ayoubi; pray in the courtyards of the Umayyad mosque; visit the grave of the Prophet’s companion, Bilal El-ibn Rabah; the tomb of Imam Ibn Al-Arabi, the Sulaymaniyah College and the al-Hijaz station; and thank Allah side by side with our Syrian brothers" ("Erdogan vows to pray in Damascus’ Umayyad Mosque", 2014).

Turkey as a neighbour of Syria has right to say, protect its borders and interests. The unity and democratization of Syria would be fruitful so at the beginning of the clashes, the atmosphere showed that Assad regime would soon

change. That's why Turkish leader Erdoğan told with certainty. Looking back to Erdoğan's political adventure, Erdoğan had always referred to the power of the people in domestic policy so in Syria issue, he believed if he took side with and Sunni Syrians, i.e. the opposition, who consists most of the population, he would be the winner of this conflict.

The Turkish foreign ministry announced officially,

> "Both the countries of the region and all the other parties should be sensitive about the National unity and territorial integrity of Syria. The only wish of Turkey is that this process should be resulted democratically according to the wishes of Syrian people without discriminating because of gender, religion, and ethnicity" (Erdoğan, Yakut,2013,210).

Seeing the atrocities of the Syrian regime against its own people, Turkey, from the very beginning of the Syrian uprisings, began to support Syrian opposition by forming a council named as Syrian National Council (SNC). Supporting this council aimed at toppling Syrian regime and making international intervention possible. Therefore, the council consisted of all segments of Syrian people such as Kurds, Sunnis, and Muslim Brotherhood (Weiss, 2011).

First, Ankara wanted to end this conflict with soft power by attracting attention of international community on behalf of the armed opposition. Helping the establishment of SNC, which was for democratic interests of Syrian people at the beginning then replaced its place to more radical groups such as Muslim Brotherhood in its executive board, was also problematic due the disagreements among the fractions. Besides, these efforts were fruitless because of the support of Russia and China and a power in the region, Iran, which has raced for decades against Turkey about the domination of the Levant (Manhoff, 2017).

Turkey called on international powers to intervene in Syria however under these circumstances, Turkey soon realized that waiting international powers to topple Syrian regime was in vain so she gave weapons directly to the Syrian opposition under the leadership of SNC and Free Syrian Army (FSA) (Manhoff, 2017:7-8).

It is important to mention here Annan's six-point peace plan, which was a showing of good will for peace to end the conflict in Syria. The text is calling Syrian authorities to

> 1- "Commit to work with the Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people, and, to this end, commit to appoint an empowered interlocutor when invited to do so by the Envoy;"
>
> 2- "Commit to stop the fighting and achieve urgently an effective United Nations supervised cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties to protect civilians and stabilize the country. To this end, the Syrian government should immediately cease troop movements towards, and end the use of heavy weapons in, population centers, and begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centers. As these actions are being taken on the ground, the Syrian government should work with the Envoy to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism. Similar commitments would be sought by the Envoy from the opposition and all relevant elements to stop the fighting and work with him to bring about a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties with an effective United Nations supervision mechanism;"
>
> 3- Ensure timely provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting, and to this end, as immediate steps, to accept and implement a daily two hour humanitarian pause and to coordinate exact time and modalities of the daily pause through an efficient mechanism, including at local level;
>
> 4- Intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons, including especially vulnerable categories of persons, and persons involved in peaceful political activities, provide without delay through appropriate channels a list of all places in which such persons are being detained, immediately begin organizing access to such locations and through appropriate channels respond promptly to all written requests for information, access or release regarding such persons;
>
> 5- Ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a non-discriminatory visa policy for them;
>
> 6- Respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed. ("Text of Annan's six-point peace plan for Syria": 2012)

As his previous attempts like in the Cyrprus issue, this positive effort by UN secretary Annan gave no fruit. All of the terms were agreeable in democratic sense by both parties; however, it was great evidence to show us that neither Assad nor the opposition had aimed to reach a better democracy. Assad did not stop his attacks, as the opposition did not protest peacefully.

Within two years, the uprising turned into a civil war and the opposition became more radicalized, Turkey's aim to topple Syrian regime has overshadowed. Fearing that weapons were delivered to the Radical Islamists in the region, the USA and England ceased weapon delivery in order not to strengthen the radicals, which has been aiming to erect Sunni-Islamic state by toppling Assad regime. Along with Free Syrian army, Turkey supports Ahrar al-Sham and Jaish al-Islam, which are the main rebel groups supported by Saudi Arabia as well. Both are fighting for an Islamic state in Syria under Sharia law. At that moment, Turkey was separated from its Western allies by continuing to support the opposition. The U.S and other allies ceased their support to the opposition when the opposition became more radicalized

and changed their idea from democratic values to Islamic Sharia law. In all counties, where their people consist mostly of Muslims, have always been the dangers of radical Islamism ("Islamic State: Who supports the jihadist group?", 2014).

Waiting for the full support from the U.S, Turkey maybe overestimated the support of the president of the U.S Barack Obama. Taking the full support made Turkey think that Assad was to be toppled in just few months. However, because of the possible uncertainty after Assad in the country, the USA revised its policy of toppling Assad. At the start of the uprisings, Obama encouraged Turkey by requesting Assad to step down. President Barack Obama formally announced Assad to resign "for the sake of the Syrian people" and issued new sanctions on his regime in August 2011. Some allies President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and Prime Minister David Cameron of the United Kingdom — called on Assad to resign, too. For Obama the red line in the Syrian civil war was utilizing chemical weapon. Obama said in 2012.

> "We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus."

When Syria regime threw chemical bombs to slay the civilians Aug. 21, 2013, it passed the red line with this attack on rebels in Damascus. Almost 1,500 people, along with children, were killed. Under these circumstances, the NATO allies supported the US's decision to arrange a pair of U.S. Navy destroyers to start 59 Tomahawk missiles, collapsing the Assad's military airbases where planes, which made chemical weapons assault, are thought to have been started from. This was the first substantial action that the USA has made. (Conway, 2017)

From the start of the conflict, the American- Turkish relations were tense, because Turkey wanted that the U.S to enforce no-fly zones in Syria to deactivate the Assad's air dominance. However, this was refused. Moreover, Turkey has always been insisted that the West support the opposition, which is now regarded by many Western allies as a body controlled by radical Islamist organizations, slowly segregated Ankara from its Western allies in Syria. Most importantly, in the summer of 2014, the borne of ISIL (Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant) altered

the course of the conflict, and Western expectations from Syrian public, mainly those of the U.S., began to collide with Turkish interests, which was about the unity of Syria and preventing a Kurdish state in the Region. (Manhoff,2017:9-10)

Destroying ISIL became the first priority for the USA, as Turkey urging the West for toppling Assad regime. The initially weak approach for toppling the Assad regime was abandoned by the West for the sake of destroying ISIL. As the policy of Obama changed, Turkey's support for rebel groups diminished due to the emerging treat of ISIL close to the Turkish borders. At the beginning, ISIL was protected by Turkey in exchange for toppling Assad. Beginning in late 2013 and early 2014, Turkish border cities like Gaziantep, Hatay and Sanlıurfa became the chief logistical, training centres for foreign militants wanting to enter Syria and Iraq to join the Islamic State and other rebels. The militants came even from the European countries to join the global Jihad, which force all Muslims to fight against unbelievers allying with Islamic State. The opinion of a Sunni Islamic state in Syria might at the beginning excited Turkish authority that is AK Party, which has been regarded by the opposition in Turkey as an Islamist party aiming to change course of Turkey to a Islamic state. According to an article by Reuters, as Turkey is a bridge between Europe and Middle East, foreign fighters from around the globe first travelled to Turkey to easily access the region hold by the ISIL that is to Iraq and Syria, consisting the spine and outstanding power of the Islamic State. In 2013 alone, some 30,000 jihadists crossed Turkish border, establishing the so-called jihadist highway, as Turkey became a means for militants seeking to participate the ISIL (Yayla and Clarke, 2018).

On June 11 2014, 49 Turks from the Turkish consulate personnel and their families, together with children were taken as hostage by the ISIL in Mosul, the Foreign Ministry of Turkey announced in a printed announcement. Among them are attachés, support workers and Special Forces soldiers. In the early period of the civil war in which Ankara permitted fundamentalists units to pass its borders without hindrance however this policy has been revised soon after it became obvious that in place of focusing on dethroning Assad, the radicals were building their puppet state in Syria and conflicting with more calm opposition. The members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIL attacked the consulate despite the anonymity of the

diplomats. The radical group has made some achievements including occupation of oil wells in the north and west Iraq. The capture of the Turkish consulate was possibly in revenge for Turkey's sealing the boundary to the radicals. This strategy has been the main source for ISIL to gain new foreign combat force since 2011, and the policy shift as the policy of the USA disappointed them. The biggest security treat for Turkey at that time became the ISL because of their retaliation power with previously built organizations since 2011. Along with these attacks, ISIL has also committed many other terrorist attacks in Turkey (Manhoff,2017:10).

According to Turkey, the prolongation of the Assad regime in Syria has strengthened instability in the region in several areas, which was loaded by radical group ISIL, and eventually extended to Iraq. On August 2015, Ankara took strict measures at its borders and decided to take part in strike operations as element of Operation Inherent Resolve (Yeginsu, 2014).

3.3.2 Among the Triple Threat: Assad, ISIL, PYD

The critical problem for Turkey in the Syrian issue was whether Ankara was more troubled by the Islamic State, the Assad regime or the Kurdish issue. The arguments were that the appearance of a strong Kurdish state in the region means forthcoming menace for Turkey. As erection of a Kurdish state in Syria would trigger the Kurdish population in Turkey to rebel. The terrorist organizations like PYD and PKK has yielded their human resources mostly from the Kurds living in Turkey. PYD's only aim in Syria is to strengthen Kurdish autonomous territory, therefore despite all the insistence from the U.S ,fearing from a Kurdish state in Syria, Turkey hesitated to help PYD against ISIL in Ayn El Arab (Kobani) until the last minute. However Turkey could not resist the treat that Kobani would fall into ISIL hands. Besides, Turkey is also endangered by Assad regime hold on power that continued to end in more migrants coming in Turkey, and by the "Islamic State", that keeps abhorrence and hostility against the West and the Shia minority (Balci, 2014).

Ankara's main goal of toppling the Assad regime in Syria seemed possible in the summer of 2015, as a Turkish, Saudi and Qatari-supported coalition of Islamist rebel groups, which were FSA, HTS was on the edge of accessing the Latakia region after a pair of military victories in Idlib, eastern

Homs and Deraa. Nevertheless, Russia and Iranian forces intervened timely in September 2015, to stop the fall of Assad regime, changed the circumstances completely in support of Assad and the fall of Dictator Assad looked highly unlikely. Through 2016, it became obvious that without direct involvement of the West, Turkey could not reach its aim of toppling Assad. As a regional power, Turkey overestimated its influence in the region as the opposite side was backed by Russia defending its last castle in the region (Manhoff,2016:10).

Because of the ideal of being the leader of Islamic World, Ankara's neutral diplomatic standing suffered a lot, which was known since the foundation of the republic. The idealistic manifesto of Foreign Minister Davutoglu promoting democracy in the region has destroyed all the former diplomatic efforts with Syria and Egypt. Zero problem policy has wasted for Neo-Ottomanism. Turkey's diplomatic relationship with Assad and his allies, Russia and Iran, was already worsened at the very beginning of the clashes. After the interference of Russia and the shooting down of a Russian plane by Turkey in November 2015, the situation changed into a full political disaster between Russia and Turkey. The downing of the jet was the first annihilation of a Russian or Soviet Air Forces warplane by a NATO member state since the attack on the Sui-ho Dam (at the Korean War). After this incident Putin emphasized at a meeting that “Ataturk is turning in his grave," which means that Turkey is drifting away from the West to the radical Islamism. Turkey was contained regarding its operational capabilities in Syria because the Russian and the U.S backed PYD military power made it nearly impossible for Turkey to directly take part on the side of the militants or to clash with ISIL. Turkey also separated itself from its old Western allies owing to its sustaining assistance of more radical groups against Assad, which had also been the policy of the US. U.S changed its policy in favour of YPG in spite of harsh criticism from Turkey. The U.S. cooperation with PYD resulted in ostracizing Turkey in Syria, which is geographically impossible and such a thing would not be desired by Turkey regarding the shaping of new Syria. Because of this, a new low-point in U.S.-Turkey relations was witnessed (Manhoff, 2017:10).

After the elections in Turkey President Erdoğan was not happy with the developments in domestic and in foreign policy. The reason of this unhappiness was

related to the former foreign minister and later Prime Minister Davutoğlu who was regarded as a relentless pursuer of Neo-Ottomanism in his term. Of course, as a sole leader Erdoğan has not ever let his ministers decide on their own.

However, Erdoğan wanted his policies to be applied in the government and declared Davutoğlu to step down, the inauguration of his heir Binali Yildirim, who was more agreeable person about Foreign Policy matters. This can be seen as the changing point in Turkish foreign policy in Syria and casting aside of all the idealistic approaches of foreign minister Davutoglu, who directly opposes any unfairness and chose his side in every dispute in the region. In his first speech in parliament after the inauguration on the 24th of May, 2016, Yildirim announced Turkey's new approach of "we will increase the number of our friends; we will decrease the number of our enemies", directly about Turkey's current lonely position (Genc, 2016).

Trying to normalize the relations, Turkey apologized from Russia in June 2016 for downing the Russian jet. Pursing his own policy in Syria, Turkey’s worst nightmare has come true: on the one hand Turkey's efforts were in vain seeing that Putin assist has given advantage its enemy Assad to stay in power, on the other hand Kurdish terorists have enjoyed from U.S. support as they were depicted of battling with ISIL, boosting their position in territory neighbouring to the Turkish borders. (Tattersal, et al, 2016).

These developments, which can be defined as a nightmare Ankara, were followed by a change of Ankara's policies in Syria. Focusing on regime change brought nothing but calamity and by now desperate endeavour, Turkey concentrated its efforts on destroying the YPG, which aims at a great Kurdish state in Turkey Syria and Iraq, along its border, or at least implement a strategy of containment. (Dalacoura, 2017)The fight against ISIL was strengthened to decrease negative reaction coming from the West and the threat of attacks on border cities by ISIL and PYD along Turkey's southern border, to recover the faith of the international community, and, through this, expand its political leverage against the PYD. The toppling of Assad regime was, and still is, a principal concern for Ankara, although it is now much less of a main concern and has lost its meaning

as Syria is threatened by losing its unity creating many small neighbours in the region (Dalacoura, 2017).

The shift in Turkish foreign policy was a requirement of Realpolitik approach by admitting the incidents on the ground and by concentrating on more dangerous long-term security concerns. Desiring to be the leader of Muslim world, Turkey is now threatened by protecting its own territorial unity The Neo-Ottoman ideology was good in essence however has no practical meaning in a region dealing with chaos for several hundred years. From historical perspective, Ottoman empire had already tried to put together the Muslim world, actually, this was an attempt which gave no fruit and the lesson was learned bitterly by the Turks, ostracized by the Muslim world gaining his independence all alone. Neo-Ottomanism was based on the idealistic approach and Turkey's own wrong perception of its regional influence and power inspired from the Ottoman Sultans controlling the Middle East. Turkey's goal of regime change in Syria was followed almost one-sided policy and ultimately ignored long-term consequences and chaos in neighbouring countries and strengthening of radical Islamist groups (Dalacoura, 2017). With regard to Ankara’s role in the MENA region, the finale from the above analysis is that due to the recent economic crisis and domestic problems and change of Prime Minister Davutoglu, Turkey will be a less involved less interventionist power than in the instant post-2011 period. It will pursue its direct interests in Syria and Iraq more persistently which are the unity of Syria and Iraq without erecting an artificial Kurdish state, as it has done over the past few months, because this agrees with AK Party intentions (Manhooff, 2017).

As a NATO member and as its natural right to protect its border on the 26th of August, 2016, Turkey declared the begin of 'Operation Euphrates Shield' and its direct military intervention in the Syrian conflict in an endeavour to produce a safe corridor from the Turkey to the town of al-Bab. According to president Erdoğan, the operations intend was to combat against ISIL and Kurdish PYD to defend Turkish national security interests. Indeed, the man aim of the operation was to achieve at once: First, to prevent the YPD from constructing a stable and coherent corridor along the Turkish border by blocking the road of the YPG-controlled cantons of Afrin and Kobani, second, to eliminate ISIL from the

Turkish border and demonstrate Ankara's will to destroying the group, and, finally, to form an area of retreat for the Turkish-backed opposition in Syria. (Heller, 2017) Moreover, Ankara thought that some of the over three million Syrian refugees in Turkey would be able to return to their homes in these areas once they were secured. As a result, some of the refugees have returned. Turkish rapprochement with its NATO ally,

On the other hand, the U.S has departed its strategic partner in Syria. In response to that Turkey played the Russian card after seeing that the U.S ignoring the demands of Turkish officials about arming the YPG repeatedly stated on every occasion. As the relations worsen, the U.S. had to stop its support for the YPG. However President Trump's decided on May 9th, 2017 to arm the YPG for the joint operation against the ISIL-held city of Raqqa, which began on June 6th, 2017 despite all the objections of Turkey. Besides, Turkey, as on every occasion, repeated its call for the toppling of Assad and presented complete support for U.S.-led measures in the aftermath of the Khan Sheikhoun chemical attack and subsequent U.S cruise-missile bombardment of a Syrian airbase in the beginning of April, 2017 (Karadeniz and Pamuk, 2017).

Seeing the recent events in the region, Turkey decided to change the policy towards fighting YPG in Syria, toppling Assad became less important, in addition to increased pragmatism in regard to the realities of the region casting Neo Ottomanist was put aside. Until now, as in 2019, although Ankara strengthened the relations with Russia, it stands alone at a crossroad with its own strategy in Syria and unfortunately has restricted alternatives. Ankara's combat against the YPG and the Syrian regime cannot go too far without risking a direct conflict with the two powers, U.S. and Russia and their proxies in the region, which are closely located near Turkish border which threatens Turkish border security. Similarly, as long as the U.S does not give needed support and Russia and Iran back the Assad regime, Turkey will not succeed in achieving regime change in Syria with military means.

Actually, taking historical, sociological realities into account, Turkey should not have desired a regime change in the chaotic Middle East and noticed that a single

small instability in the region would harm its national security. Of course, Ankara will maintain to follow a diplomatic term that will in Syria try to isolate the YPG the biggest national security challenge for Turkey since 1980's and to persuade the U.S. to end its support for the group without its support YPG will lose its power to establish a Kurdish state

In December 2018, Trump has instructed his military commanders to quickly package the American military operation in Syria so that he can bring troops home within a few months, he wrote on twitter. This decision will improve Turkey's moving capacity in Syria. Without protection from the U.S, the PYD have every right to be afraid as a stated by Arin Sheikmos, a Kurdish journalist and commentator, "If the Americans pull out and leave us to the Turks or the [Syrian] regime, our destiny will be like the Kurds of Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991. Neither the regime, nor Iran nor Turkey, will accept our presence here." Seeing these backlashes, Trump dropped his insistence on an immediate withdrawal, after commanders told him they needed time to complete their mission. The officials of Russia are happy with the decision stating "Donald is right," as US-backed Kurdish-led force, warns fight against Islamic State not over (Chulov, et al, 2018).

Until the borne of ISIL Turkey and the U.S have supported all the opposition to topple Assad however, now it is obvious that the Assad regime will not fall because there is no strong military opposition left. It has become clear that Turkey and U.S interests have differentiated. Although Erdoğan blamed Assad severely naming him as butcher of his own people, on a diplomatic level, Turkey has been left with no other choice than engaging in diplomacy with Iran, Russia, and the Assad regime. Since Turkey aims only for peace along with territorial unity of Syria and the burden of refugees became unbearable , it will stay loyal to the peace process outlined during the Astana talks and only care about its border security and national interests in Syria. With the announcement of the secure zones, Turkey will send some of the refugees to their homelands. Turkey has been strengthening its footing in its Afrin and Idlib territory in Northern Syria by relocating Turkmen families into the area and by growing vegetable, re-establishing civil administration and services.

3.4 AGREED AND DISAGREEED ISSUES BETWEEN TURKEY AND GERMANY

The first agreed issue was the "refugee deal," which has had some problems about implementing all of its terms so far. One of the disagreed issues was Turkey's allegations about not getting enough financial support from their rich partners like Germany and not giving military support to topple Assad. Besides explain the term of "refugee," these problems are clarified broadly in the chapters below.

3.4.1 The Legal Status of Refugees

Before discussing the deal between Turkey and the EU, the legal status of the Syrian refugees should be understood. The legal status of the war escaped Syrian nationals in turkey and in Europe is still a complicated issue after all these years. Turkey and the EU members has signed refugee convention of 1951, however Turkey has put limitations on three matters.

The most important one of them is Turkey recognizes refugee status only for the migrants who come from European countries. In 2013, "law on foreigners and international protection" created a new category called "temporary protection", to identify Syrian refugees. The particularity of this status is stated in the law's second article. Temporary protection can be "provided to foreigners in cases when there is a large influx into Turkey and when they cannot return back to the country they were forced to leave." Within the new Law, the regulation on temporary protection also came into force on 22 October 2014.

This regulation provides the legal status to Syrians, as well as other foreigners under temporary protection in Turkey. Under this regulation, in short, the foreigners bearing this status will be provided with the opportunities to public health, education, employment, social assistance, and interpretation services. The convention of 1951 emphasizes;

> "As a result of events occurring before 1 january 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." ("legal status of Syrian nationals in turkey", 2017).

In German constitution, Germany recognizes the right of asylum as a basic right of a person and everyone can apply for asylum who flees from political persecution. The agency that deals with this matter is the Federal Office For Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 'BAMF'). "An asylum seeker is permitted to reside in Germany if he or she is approved of political asylum, refugee status, or subsidiary protection, or if the agency declares a deportation prohibition." The most widely known acts that define the asylum right are the Asylum Act and the Residence Act that provide procedure for the admission and management of refugee claims. Several amendments to these and to other laws have been legalized due to the current Syrian refugee crisis ("Refugee Law and Policy: Germany", 2016).

A method of admitting a refugee is an in-person interview which is conducted and country-specific resources and experts consulted. Every applicant, who is over the fourteen years of age, has to present to procedures founding his or her identity and provide fingerprints in order to be checked in the databases. Refugees resides usually in reception services, in which the refugees are provided with essential items while refugees who are accommodating outside of reception services mainly collect cash allowances to buy vital needs. Before the application is resulted, asylum seekers are not permitted to depart the area of the reception services without consent. If an applicant has no self-sufficient means of survival, a residence permit may as well be limited territorially. A refugee can gain nationality after six years of legal residence, rather than eight, and naturalization of refugees has also been considered presumptively in the public interest for purposes of optional naturalization ("Refugee Law and Policy: Germany", 2016).

3.4.2 The Refugee Deal

According to the definition made on the website of EC Migration and Home affairs;

> "Readmission agreement is an agreement between the European Union (EU) and or an EU Member State with a third country, such as Turkey, on the basis of reciprocity, establishing rapid and effective procedures for the identification and safe and orderly return of persons who do not, or no longer, fulfil the conditions for entry to, presence in, or residence in the territories of the third country or one of the EU Member States, and to facilitate the transit of such persons in a spirit of cooperation."

Turkey and the EU signed the Readmission Agreement on December 13th, 2013. According to the Agreement, Turkey will meet its responsibilities regarding with the readmission of third-country nationals and stateless people until October 2017. However as the migrant crises has worsened, the EU has had to reschedule the date to June 1st of 2016. In order to obtain Turkey's approval, the EU has suggested abolishing the Schengen Visa for the Turks. At the beginning, visa liberalisation was not a discussion matter between the EU and Turkey. Before the full implementation of the visa free travel, the EU decided that Turkey should act in accordance with 72 requirements listed in the roadmap towards a visa-free travel (Bilginoglu, 2016).

After the Syrian civil war became a European problem, Germany took steps to prevent the possible effects of mass exodus starting from Syria to Turkey and then as a last destination to the EU. Turkish foreign ministry declared that the deal was "game changer" and intended only humanitarian purposes According to the Turkish foreign Ministry; Turkey maintained an “open door” policy for Syrians since 2011. Therefore, the deal was thought to be a relief for Turkish economy. Turkey strictly complies with the non-refoulement. Turkey has more than 3.6 million Syrians. 270.000 Syrians accommodated in 26 temporary protection centres in the border cities like Gaziantep, Hatay, and are supplied with basic needs, health and schooling services as well as psychological support. Besides, Syrians who live in the cities outside these border centres are also under Turkey's security system and they gain from free health care and education services, from which even Turkish citizens do not benefit freely ("From Rep. of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs", 2016). Subsequent to the declaration of the 18 March 2016 EU-Turkey deal on finding a way out of irregular migration, flows to Europe; Turkey and the EU have broadly regarded Angela Merkel as the key designer of the deal. On 18the March 2016 Turkey and the EU has signed a readmission deal, after three summits held between Turkey and the EU since October 2015. Not all member states of the EU are signatories of the Agreement. As stated in the joint declaration part of the Agreement, the Agreement does not apply to the territory of the Kingdom of Denmark, nor its nationals. Ireland has also not decided to be a part of the Agreement. The full text of the agreement includes commitments to;

1) "All new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey. This will take place in full accordance with EU and international law, thus excluding any kind of collective expulsion. All migrants will be protected in accordance with the relevant international standards and in respect of the principle of non-refoulement. It will be a temporary and extraordinary measure which is necessary to end the human suffering and restore public order. Migrants arriving in the Greek islands will be duly registered and any application for asylum will be processed individually by the Greek authorities in accordance with the Asylum Procedures Directive, in cooperation with UNHCR. Migrants not applying for asylum or whose application has been found unfounded or inadmissible in accordance with the said directive will be returned to Turkey. Turkey and Greece, assisted by EU institutions and agencies, will take the necessary steps and agree any necessary bilateral arrangements, including the presence of Turkish officials on Greek islands and Greek officials in Turkey as from 20 March 2016, to ensure liaison and thereby facilitate the smooth functioning of these arrangements. The costs of the return operations of irregular migrants will be covered by the EU."

2) "For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria. A mechanism will be established, with the assistance of the Commission, EU agencies and other Member States, as well as the UNHCR, to ensure that this principle will be implemented as from the same day the returns start. Priority will be given to migrants who have not previously entered or tried to enter the EU irregularly. On the EU side, resettlement under this mechanism will take place, in the first instance, by honouring the commitments taken by Member States in the conclusions of Representatives of the Governments of Member States meeting within the Council on 20 July 2015, of which 18.000 places for resettlement remain. Any further need for resettlement will be carried out through a similar voluntary arrangement up to a limit of an additional 54.000 persons. The Members of the European Council welcome the Commission's intention to propose an amendment to the relocation decision of 22 September 2015 to allow for any resettlement commitment undertaken in the framework of this arrangement to be offset f rom non-allocated places under the decision. Should these arrangements not meet the objective of ending the irregular migration and the number of returns come close to the numbers provided for above, this mechanism will be reviewed. Should the number of returns exceed the numbers provided for above, this mechanism will be discontinued."

3) "Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU, and will cooperate with neighbouring states as well as the EU to this effect."

4) "Once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ending or at least have been substantially and sustainably reduced, a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be activated. EU Member States will contribute on a voluntary basis to this scheme."

5) "The fulfillment of the visa liberalization roadmap will be accelerated vis-à-vis all participating Member States with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016, provided that all benchmarks have been met. To this end Turkey will take the necessary steps to fulfil the remaining requirements to allow the Commission to make, following the required assessment of compliance with the benchmarks, an appropriate proposal by the end of April on the basis of which the European Parliament and the Council can make a final decision."

6) "The EU, in close cooperation with Turkey, will further speed up the disbursement of the initially allocated 3 billion euros under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and ensure funding of further projects for persons under temporary protection identified with swift input from Turkey before the end of March. A first list of concrete projects for refugees, notably in the field of health, education, infrastructure, food and other living costs, that can be swiftly financed from the Facility, will be jointly identified within a week. Once these resources are about to be used to the full, and provided the

> above commitments are met, the EU will mobilise additional funding for the Facility of an additional 3 billion euro up to the end of 2018."
>
> 7) "The EU and Turkey welcomed the ongoing work on the upgrading of the Customs Union."
>
> 8) "The EU and Turkey reconfirmed their commitment to re-energise the accession process as set out in their joint statement of 29 November 2015. They welcomed the opening of Chapter 17 on 14 December 2015 and decided, as a next step, to open Chapter 33 during the Netherlands presidency. They welcomed that the Commission will put forward a proposal to this effect in April. Preparatory work for the opening of other Chapters will continue at an accelerated pace without prejudice to Member States' positions in accordance with the existing rules."
>
> 9) "The EU and its Member States will work with Turkey in any joint endeavour to improve humanitarian conditions inside Syria, in particular in certain areas near the Turkish border which would allow for the local population and refugees to live in areas which will be more safe." ("EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016 - Consilium", 2016)

By signing this treaty, Merkel actually made a wise choice. The official statistics show that the deal has worked for EU.

> "While in 2015, 856,723 refugees arrived in Greece, in 2016 arrivals were only 173,450 and in 2017 the numbers were remarkably low, as only 29,718 people reached the islands of the Aegean. At the same time, the death toll at the Eastern Mediterranean route is seemingly low. In addition, 2,177 refugees were sent back to Turkey from Greece under both deal and the bilateral protocol between Greece and Turkey. Finally, as of March 2018, 12,778 Syrian refugees have been resettled from Turkey to several European countries, with Germany and the Netherlands accepting the largest numbers of people" (Karakoulaki, 2018).

In the light of the statistics, Merkel protected EU borders by loading the entire burden on Turkey. However, from the humanistic perspective and to criticize the deal, a refugee who survives the war and the boat ride and arrives to Europe for a fresh start, will end up in Turkey if the asylum application is not granted (Karakoulaki, 2018).

Some terms of the deal were also advantageous for Turkey at first glance such as visa liberation and funding for Syrian refugees. However, the count nation of hosting the refugees made the EU funding insufficient for Turkish economy. Turkish economy feels the refugee burden deeply as Turkey has been carrying the burden of Europe as well. Although Turkey has completed nearly all the necessities regarding visa liberation, Turkey was disappointed about this promise. According to the deal, visa liberation would be implemented as soon as possible. EU puts forward some a few pre conditions that Turkey needs to put in force before the visa liberation. As a general evaluation, the Readmission Agreement (Agreement) diverges from UN

refugee convention and provides an inadequate, pragmatic and temporary solution to the refugee crisis.

In the aftermath of the declaration of the EU-Turkey deal, Ankara showed great deal of efforts in order to fulfil the obligations required by the EU towards a visa free regime with Turkey. The process required that Turkey fulfil 72 pre-conditions, which had to be fulfilled by Ankara. The visa free regime agreement was produced in exchange to the Readmission Admission Agreement between Turkey and the EU. Taking advantage of the refugee crisis Turkey made a clever move by forcing EU to give some concessions of which Turkey has been dreaming for years. Because of the fear that Turkey could ease the path of refugees to the EU, the EU approved the visa-free travel regime for Turkey, this could be regarded as a show of good will and bilateral understanding within the frame of the "Readmission Agreement" between Turkey and the EU. The only visible move in front of Turkey for visa free travel was Turkey's completing of the 72 pre-conditions declared in the Roadmap, with the 18 March 2016 joint statement of Turkey and the EU it was as well powerfully connected to the so-called EU-Turkey refugee deal. Actually, the EU-Turkey deal emphasized that "the completion of the visa liberalization roadmap will be accelerated vis-à-vis all participating Member States with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016, provided that all benchmarks have been met" ("EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016 - Consilium", 2016).

On 4 May 2016, The third Progress Report of the European Commission (EC) has been announced about the improvements in the pre-conditions of the visa liberalization roadmap emphasized that Ankara was willing to perform the remaining 7 pre-conditions out of 65 in which was necessary for visa free travel. The European Commission foresaw that the liberalization would take place until the end of June 2016 (Turhan, 2018:199).

Because of positive attitude of both parties and bilateral dependencies, the relations have gone well during this process has been witnessed both between Turkey and the EU however this positive air has continued until the publication of the Commission's report. (European Commission, 2016) In this process the role of

Merkel was more important due to her peacemaker role between Turkey and the EU. This role has shown itself after the critics of EC third report, which angered Turkey. Chancellor Merkel stated on the day of the EC's report launch that she "was hopeful that Turkey would soon realize the remaining benchmarks to obtain the right for its citizens to travel inside the EU without a visa" On 23 May 2016. However, Turkey unchanging position towards the matter has made Merkel some statements regarding visa free travel for Turkish citizens. During her visit to Turkey for an UN-Summit, the German Chancellor emphasized "it is foreseeable that some things won't be able to be implemented by July 1", namely visa freedom because the conditions are not yet fulfilled." As a reaction to Merkel's statement, Turkey made its stance clear expressing that Turkey was probably not to approve the Readmission Agreement, if progress was not going to be realized regarding the visa liberalization dialogue. So Erdoğan played his refugee card (Turhan:2018:199-200).

The European commission was satisfied with the results. EU has stated that after the announcement of the EU-Turkey deal and close cooperation between Turkey and the EU has shown that "there has been a substantial decrease in the numbers leaving Turkey for Greece: In the weeks before the implementation of the Statement, around 1,740 migrants were crossing the Aegean Sea to the Greek islands every day. By contrast, the average daily arrivals since 1 May are down to 47, a decrease of over 95%" (Agreement, E. T, 2016).

The German Chancellor has shown great endurance in order not to harm the agreed deal. Even she expressed her readiness to accept the terms put forward by Ankara. Due to Merkel's political balancing act in order to preserve the deal, the deal was applied for months (Turhan,2018:200).

The relations however have tensed when the German parliament moved to name the Armenian issue of 1915 as genocide. The EU refugee deal with Turkey led by Angela Merkel was put under further tension as the German parliament votes on a symbolic resolution on the Armenian genocide. The deal between Turkey and the EU has depleted the number of refugees arriving in central Europe recently, easing pressure on Merkel in domestic policy, But Erdoğan has since repeatedly questioned the conditions of the deal, with members of his party threatening to call off the

agreement altogether if Germany accepted Armenian resolution. During the voting, Merkel was not in the parliament to seem perhaps sympathetic to Ankara. The so called genocide was acknowledged by the German parliament then Turkish ambassador was quickly called back to Turkey between June and early October 2016. This resolution worsened the relations, which in the contemporary Turkish-German dialogue could not be observed often. (Turhan, 2018:200-201)

Another event harmed the relations was the leaked German interior ministry document, which was about the Islamization of the Turkey and being a hub for Islamic terrorism. The German officials rejected the report on Turkey, in which Turkey was regarded as a centre of Islamic activity that is the groups transferred to Syria to fight against Assad in the Middle East. The report strained already tense relations between both countries. The report mentions: "As a result of the increasing Islamization of Ankara's domestic and foreign policy since 2011, Turkey has become a central platform for action for Islamist groupings in the Middle East region," According to the report: Turkey supported the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the militant Gaza-based Palestinian group Hamas and the armed opposition groups in Syria. Turkish Foreign Ministry has rejected these claims : "It is obvious that behind these allegations are some political circles in Germany known for their double-standard attitudes in the fight against terror, As a country which sincerely fights against terror of every sort whatever its source, Turkey expects that its other partners and allies act in the same way." In the aftermath of this incident, Turkey in June 2016 refused to let German lawmakers visit soldiers at Incirlik airbase in southern Turkey. ("Germany tries to downplay Turkey 'Islamization' report, 2016)

One of the most important discussions between Turkey and Germany was the 15th July coup attempt, to which according to Turkey, Germany did not responded properly as Turkey wanted. Turkey and Germany has been experiencing a big disagreement about the understanding and the results of post-coup developments in Turkey and about actions taken following the 15 by the Government. At the same time, Turkey feels Germany has not taken the July 15 coup attempt seriously, Although just after the coup German Foreign Minister Steinmeier condemned the coup attempt by saying that "Any attempts to change the democratic order in Turkey by force." Germany behaved different by being a hub for fleeing coup attendees from

Turkey. ("German FM condemns coup attempt in Turkey", 2016) Steamier after a month of coup attempt expressed that "we are talking with each other like emissaries from two different planets. There is essentially no basis for understanding ... no basis for discussions." ("German minister sees `no basis' for talks with Turkey after failed...":2016) Turkey showed some reactions against Germany's attitude by threatening to cancel the deal: "We may cancel the readmission agreement. The EU has been wasting our time on the visa liberalization issue. We are not applying the readmission agreement at the moment, and we are evaluating the refugee deal," The reason for this kind of expression was the relations between the EU and Turkey have soured after Germany and The Netherlands prevented Turkish politicians, including Cavusoğlu, from campaigning for a referendum scheduled for April that could expand Erdoğan's powers as president. Erdoğan told in the aftermath of banning the election campaign in the Netherlands: "Europe is heading towards being drowned in its own fears Turkophobia is mounting. Islamophobia is mounting. They are even scared of migrants who take shelter there." This was according to Erdoğan a sign of "sprit of fascism." In addition, another expression by Erdoğan in a meeting was "My dear brothers, a battle has started between the cross and the half moon. There can be no other explanation." ("Turkey threatens to unilaterally suspend EU refugee deal": 2017) Germany does not like the term fascism, which reminds of her National socialist past. One of the actual reasons behind this strained relation was a German journalist with Turkish origin, Deniz Yucel, who was detained in Turkey in 2017. Columnists say his arrest is an instance of the Ak Party attacking critical writers and the press freedom. Ankara was also angry that PKK affiliates have been permitted to rally in Germany. Erdoğan has blamed the Germany of assisting the terrorists i.e. Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which has attacked a three decades-long war against the Turkey and is a recognized terror organization nearly from every country. Putting aside this kind of allegations, Germany has announced its worry over extensive post-coup purges; whereas Ankara criticized Germany has done nothing against the Gülen terrorist organization, which Turkish government hold accountable for the coup attempt. The head of German secret intelligence service said after a month of the coup attempt he had received no evidence the Gülen movement was behind the coup ("What you need to know about the Turkish-German row", 2017).

3.5 THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF TURKEY AND GERMANY TO THE SYRIAN REFUGEES

Turkey has spent as of April 2018 as a total 31 Billion Euros to the refugees, which made Turkey the most generous country of the world taking his GDP per capita into account comparing the other countries. According to an organization from UK, Turkey has ranked first as the state giving the most humanitarian support in the world with its $8.07 billion worth of humanitarian support ("Akdağ, Suriyelilere 31 milyar euro harcadık", 2018).

> "As of 31 August 2018, Close to 4 million refugees, Turkey maintains to host the world's largest refugee mainly Syrian refugee population. The cities holding this population are the mainly border cities almost 50 percent of all refugees in Turkey are registered in four key provinces: Gaziantep, Hatay, Istanbul and Sanliurfa. Youth refugees' approximately one million refugees in Turkey are aged between 15 and 24, of which 60 percent are male" (UNHCR, 2018b).

While the US follows Turkey with $6.68billion, Germany with $2.99 billion and UK with $2.52 billion, EU facilities are in fourth rank with $2.24 billion. The report's statistics show that Turkey hosts the most refugees in the world with 3.5 million. As said by Global Humanitarian Assistance Reports of 2013, 2014 and 2015, Turkey was the third state to supply the most humanitarian help three times in a row, and the second state in the final 2 years (Kızılayı, 2018).

According to the UNHCR report, as of 19 June 2018;

> "There are now the highest levels of displacement on record in the world. An unprecedented 68.5 million people around the world have been forced to go out his/her home country. Among them are nearly 25.4 million refugees, 12.2 million people are under the age of 18. Despite of the international law, which prohibits leaving people stateless, there are also 10 million stateless people who have been denied a nationality and access to basic rights such as education, healthcare, employment and freedom of movement" (UNHCR, 2018a).

EU has also supported a 21-month long project organized by the UN refugee agency. The European Union finances the project with 25 million Euros under the service for Refugees in Turkey. The EU has given Turkey in the framework of the refugee deal 3 billion Euros. In March 2016, as above mentioned the EU and Turkey agreed on a contract to end migration via the Aegean Sea, and advance the circumstances of over 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. In the deal, the EU had promised 6 billion Euros ($7.44 billion) as an aid for the refugees. The

EC (European Council) decided on sending the second part of the resource for Refugees in Turkey. EC pledged to activate the second 3 billion Euro ($3.72 billion) part by the end of 2018 ("EU agrees to give Turkey second tranche of 3 billion Euro for Syrian refugees ", 2018).

Germany on the other hand has given 476,9 million USD contributions according to UNHCR in 2017 and 360 million USD in all of 2016. After the refugee problem became an European problem, according to UNHCR report;

> "Germany in 2015 and 2016 admitted more than one million persons seeking protection. Germany was one of the first states along with Turkey ratifying the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention. It also has been a member of UNHCR's governing body, the Executive Committee (ExCom), since its establishment in 1958. In addition to being an important host country, Germany has significantly expanded its engagement in refugee protection globally, including by increasing funding to respond to situations of forced displacement. With contributions of almost 477 million USD in 2017, for the first time Germany is UNHCR's second largest donor" (UNHCR, 2018c).

These figures show that Germany provides not only for humanitarian reasons but also for keeping the Syrian refugees where they reside. Germany takes refugees in a slow pace, cautiously. It can be said Germany gives the most assistance comparing with its Western allies, who are mostly has fear against the refugees. On this matter, Turkey and Germany has common approach to the refugee crisis, however it is generally affected by the domestic politics as happened after the elections in Germany. The German open door policy has been almost forsaken because of the recent election results. The same thing is also valid for Turkey. The opposition and the Turkish public are questioning the Syrian refugee issue because of the worsening Turkish economy.

CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION

After years of war, regime leader Assad has taken three-quarters of the Syria back from the rebels, the future of the country is still dark. Idlib is the final rebel stronghold in the northwest close to the Turkish border, has not yet been captured by Assad. That's why Turkey does not want Idlib fall neither in the hands of Assad nor the Kurds in the region if this happens Turkey's border security will be in danger. Approximately three million people reside in the Idlib province holding many regime opposition who escaped or were sent to Idlib. Assad is planning to attack Idlib to put an end to the opposition but it hesitates about Turkey's reaction instead of doing so he consolidates the power in the region where he gained control. Turkey and the Assad regime also know that the U.S is sensitive about the Kurds, who hold northeast of the country attacking them can immediately result with a backlash from the U.S. It is obvious that the war did not go in the way that Turkey, Germany, and most importantly the U.S had wanted. The NATO allies wanted to overthrow pro Russian Assad regime and put someone more pro Western in his place however, the U.S did not give enough assistance to Turkey so none of the efforts gave fruit. The Russia and Iran, after seeing that the Assad regime has weakened and about to fall, came to help and saved Assad from losing all the control in the country. The future of the country is unknown as Turkey is willing to march into northern Syria to eliminate Kurdish terrorists. Syrian army is marching toward the territory, which the US will shortly abandon. Israel is attacking the pro Assad militias deep inside Syria. In addition, Putin could almost immediately go to press the last trace of the Syrian anti-government uprising. Now, with the Americans' departure and the end of the rebellion against dictator Bashar al-Assad, Iran and Russia will be even freer to expand their powers in Syria.

The losers of the war are the Syrian people: all of those who are in opposition to the Assad regime. Eventually, however, the whole country is on the

losing side. No one has won. Turkey has also lost the war. Before the war, economic ties with Syria were very strong but now the regimes foremost enemy is Turkey because of the support for the opposition. The death toll is estimated over 500,000 people also includes tens of thousands of soldiers belonging to Assad's Alawite minority. Five and a half million people have gone to bordering states like Turkey Lebanon and there are 6.5 million internally displaced making for a sum of around half the country's 2010 population. The Syrian middle class from both sides are escaped from the war. The opposition fled from the cruel attacks of the regime while the Assad supporters escaped from forced recruitment and the country's financial crumple. Those who stay go through from the fact that the Syrian money is only a tenth as precious as it was in 2011 while costs have increased and incomes have stayed mostly stagnant (Reuter, 2018).

The UN's special representative for Syria said at the end of 2017 that the total was at least $250 billion. The World Bank has tried to work out the whole losses to the economy over the numerous years it will take to improve. The study has concluded that the subsequent losses to the economy will be bigger than the harms directly caused by the aggression. The study also adds; "the longer the conflict persists, the deeper the grievances and divisions will run in the Syrian society, rendering it very difficult to build efficient institutions and effective economic mechanisms" ("The Toll of the War: The economic and social consequences of the conflict in Syria": 2017).

> "When conflict ends in its sixth year (baseline), GDP recoups about 41 percent of the remaining gap with its pre-conflict level within the next four years. In comparison, it recoups only 28 percent of the gap in four years if the conflict ends in its 10th year (alternative scenario). These results do not capture much of the complications like political economy challenges, such as conflict-driven grievances. Adding these factors would only reinforce the main finding here: the more the conflict persists, the deeper will run the grievances and divisions in Syrian society, rendering it very difficult to reinstate efficient institutions and economic mechanisms. More people may have been killed in Syria due to a breakdown of the health system than due to direct fatalities from the fighting" ("*The Toll of the War: The economic and social consequences of the conflict in Syria"*: 2017).

The future of the relations is complicated but positive. Turkey has domestic problems and the governing AK Party government is holding its hard attitude against the opposition in domestic policy. Germany is feeling responsible to intervene in Turkey's domestic policy because of its own prosecuted citizens and the close relations coming from the past. While, Turkey wants Germany to take actions that are more concrete in the fight against terrorist organizations, for instance the PKK and FETO (Fethullahist Terrorist Organization), Germany wants AK Party to be more democratic in domestic policy. Despite many problems, Turkey has not given up its membership goal to the EU. However, Turkey seeks ways of cooperating with Russia for its own national interests. Although, Turkey's western allies are not satisfied with this developments, this conjectural impetus brought with Syrian refugee crisis should be assessed in bilateral relations as a chance to work out on the temporary problems in the historic Turkish-German relations. Strong relations can be rebuilt with mutual understanding on the equal grounds. The opportunities in the long dated Turkish-German relations should not be missed, and because of the bilateral multi dimensional dependency, both countries should cooperate by taking necessary steps for the common grounds. No doubt, Turkish-German relations will be stronger in the future as it was in the past despite all the fluctuations. The question is whether the leaders of these two countries give concessions, give up the blaming words, and be more diplomatic or not.

The findings of this study show us Turkey and Germany is dependent on each other in every matter that relates Europe. Turkey, whether a European country or not with its nearly five million Turkish citizens in Europe is and will always be a matter of interest for Europe. The developments in recent years may make us think that Turkey is shifting towards Eastern powers like Russia and China but this is not reality even if Turkey wanted. Turkey's historical roots aiming to reach the level of civilized nations for hundred years and economic factors are strictly binding. One most important reality is, Turkey has been disappointed many times by its Western allies. Turkey has done many efforts to successfully finish the EU process however now it is dead end because of bilateral mistakes. EU did not give enough support for Turkey's democratization process and Turkey with its fully supported President Erdoğan left the path of more democratization. The main discussion point of the

study is the refugee deal, which was not fully implemented because of the unkept promises by the EU. This disappointed Turkey. As Turkey has done its part regarding the deal. The EU applies only financial terms of the deal, which is about aiding Syrians in Turkey. The other terms like visa liberations and updating the Customs Union are not foreseeable yet. This satiation is not sustainable for Turkey. If the promises are not kept, Turkey may also cancel the deal in the near future. The U.S on the other hand is supporting the enemies of Turkey in Syria besides for the Cyprus issue there is no reasonable solution yet. Although the Turkish-German relationship has weakened in the recent years, there have always been these kinds of fluctuations in the relations. Considering the historical facts, the relations will be better again but the promises that Germany has given in the deal will not be implemented in the near future such as visa liberation.

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ÖZGEÇMİŞ

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