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WORKING CLASS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR IN TURKEY:
BLUE COLLAR WORKERS

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

WORKING CLASS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR IN TURKEY: BLUE COLLAR WORKERS

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In this study, voting behavior of the blue collar workers in Turkey was examined. The effects of demographic, social variables and political approaches on workers' choices of political parties were scrutinized. Within the scope of the study, traditional and contemporary theoretical approaches to the concept of working class were dealt with and the relationship of the concept of class to voting behavior was questioned. Moreover, depending on secondary resources a historical analysis of the development of working class from Ottoman period to modern-day was involved.

Keywords: Working Class, History of Labor in Turkey, Voting Behavior

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE’DE İŞÇİ SINIFI VE OY VERME DAVRANIŞI: MAVİ YAKA İŞÇİLER

Ganioğlu, Zafer

Doktora, Sosyoloji

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Bu çalışmada, Türkiye’de mavi yakalı işçilerin oy verme davranışlarını incelenmiştir. Demografik, sosyal değişkenlerin ve siyasal yaklaşımların işçilerin tercih ettikleri siyasi partilere olan etkileri üzerinde durulmuştur. Çalışma kapsamında işçi sınıfı kavramına dair geleneksel ve güncel kuramsal yaklaşımlar da ele alınmış, sınıf kavramının oy verme davranışı ile ilişkisi sorgulanmıştır. Ayrıca Osmanlı’dan günümüze işçi sınıfının gelişimine dair ikincil kaynaklar üzerinden geliştirilen bir tarihsel analize de yer verilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İşçi Sınıfı, Türkiye’de Emek Tarihi, Oy Verme Davranışı

To My Wife and Big Family

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
ANAP	Motherland Party
BDP	Peace and Democracy Party
CHP	Republican People's Party
CSI	International Trade Union Confederation
ÇSGB	Ministry of Labor and Social Security
DİSK	Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions
DP	Democratic Party
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
GNP	Gross National Product
ISCO	International Standard Classification of Occupations
LCBSL	Law of Collective Bargain, Strike and Lockout
LLU	Law of Labor Unions
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party
NUTS	Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics for Turkey
SGK	Social Security Institution
SOEs	State Owned Enterprises
TİP	Workers Party of Turkey
TİSK	Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations
TL	Turkish Lira
TRT	Turkish Radio and Television Corporation
TT Inc.	Turkish Telecommunications Inc.
TÜİK	The Turkish Statistical Institute
TÜRK-İŞ	The Confederation of Labor Unions of Turkey

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this thesis is to examine the factors affecting the voting behavior of the blue collar workers in Turkey. Within the scope of the study, the effects of demographic, social variables and political approaches on workers' choices of political parties are scrutinized. Moreover, traditional and contemporary theoretical approaches to the concept of working class are dealt with and the relationship of the concept of class to voting behavior is questioned. Additionally, depending on secondary resources a historical analysis of the development of working class from Ottoman period to modern-day is involved. In the following sections of this chapter remarks and introductory information on each chapter of the thesis is presented. In doing so the theoretical and methodological perspectives of the study expected to be put forward, as well as its historical approach. Also, an account of the literature on history of working class in Turkey, and the record of the research conducted in the scope of the thesis is tried to be given.

1.1. On Theory of Class

Utilization of the concept of class as an explanatory notion of the social existence of humankind dates back to Ancient Greece. It is known that Greek thinkers used to appeal to the concept in order to designate significant strata of the society with respect to the different income levels.¹ Nevertheless, in the meaning we are familiar with and with the central role attained to it in understanding social formation, it started to be used with the advent of political economy as a field of scientific inquiry.² Since economy became the main subject of political sphere and it is started to be planned and constructed with a holistic approach at a national

¹ Tonak, 2013, p. 1

² Clegg, Boreham & Dow, 1986, p. 1

level, the concept of class came into prominence and has been in use widely.³ As the expertise in social sciences developed, the concept gained broader meaning through underlining of social, cultural and political aspects of it. Hence, class has a variety of meanings. As Crompton sums up, the use of class may describe legal or traditional rankings, social prestige or material inequalities, as well as revolutionary or conservative social forces or actors.⁴ Yet, our concern here signifies the latter usage of the word; (working) class as a social force or actor.

Although it was Auguste Comte who coined the word sociology, the real founding father of the discipline is Henri de Saint-Simon. Along with the formation of the discipline of sociology, his thought influenced two primary philosophies of modern age, namely Marxism and positivism. These two philosophies also gave way to two primary schools of sociological thinking in the field of social differentiation.⁵ Comte's positivism and Durkheim's modern theories of industrial society led to the structural functionalist tradition that construes society as a system the fragments of which function in harmony and work in a way to create unity. On the other hand, Saint Simon's socialist thinking inspired Karl Marx and his followers who argue that conflict among the social groups is the real grounding dynamic of the existing social order and change of it. The former tradition regards social inequality valuable in that all particular functions have social importance regardless of their social status. They legitimize the hierarchical differentiation with the idea of equality of opportunity. The latter school, on the other hand, associates social inequalities with continuing tensions, instability and tendencies to crisis. Although there is no consensus among conflict thinkers with respect to the persistence of conflict or forthcoming downfall of the social stratification system of industrial societies, one common feature of all is the

³ Ibid, p. 5

⁴ Crompton, 1993, pp. 9-10

⁵ Giddens, 1973, p. 23

importance they give to the social classes as primary actors of change in societies.⁶

Although the examination of class in the theory chapter of the study is predicated on the historical development of the concept, Marxist understanding of class is given the central role. However, the analysis is not only limited with the ideas of Marx and Engels, but the contributions of certain scholars who had developed the concept within the same tradition are also sought to be involved. In the final part of the chapter two major approaches to class usually conceived as alternatives to each other is tried to be utilized within the same domain. There is Althusserian ideological structural approach on the one side, while on the other side Thompsonian culturally oriented collective agency exists. In view of this study, an opportunity for a synthesis of these two primary Marxist understandings of class is evident in Lukacs' distinction between objective and subjective consciousness. In respect to that view, on the theoretical ground that these three scholars advanced the class conception of Marx, a framework for comprehending the development of Turkish working class is tried to be achieved.

1.2. On Turkish Labor History

Working class history is usually conceived as the area of study dealing with the transformation of the conditions and actions of all workers. Nevertheless, this understanding of working class history is problematic. It does not differentiate between workers in general and workers as a class. It is necessary to understand the difference between history of laboring people, history of workers and history of working class, which are usually used synonymously. As it shall be scrutinized in chapter 2, workers are a specific form of laborers. They earn their lives in need of their waged employment. And, working class as a concept does not simply define these wage laborers, but it also defines specific conditions in which the wage labor dominates the economic and social existence. Talking about working

⁶ Crompton, 1993, pp. 5-8

class necessarily indicates development of certain relations of production and existence of distinct forms of distributing surplus.

Characteristically, only with the advent of modern societies it is possible to talk about the dominance of wage labor. And, what brings about this domination is the dawn of capitalism. Historically capitalism is boosted with the industrial revolution. Yet, working class is not a concept limited to the manual industrial workers, as sometimes it is tended to be considered so. What is today called blue collar workers are only one section of working class. White collar workers and workers of other economic sectors are also members of working class in so far as they are waged and part of capitalist mode of production. In short, working class is a modern concept and when I mention history of working class, I mean the conditions and actions of laboring people in a specific form of production, namely capitalism. However, the relations of labor and work prior to the emergence of capitalism are naturally important in the history of working class. They inform us about the conditions in which working class has developed.

In the third chapter, starting from the modernization era of Turkish society and the development of capitalism I will focus on the transformation of the conditions of working class in Turkey. Nevertheless, as it is necessary to understand the conditions throughout which development of working class occurred, reference to the earlier forms of labor and work in the Ottoman period will also tried to be given.

1.2.1. Studies on the History of Labor in Turkey

Almost every comprehensive study focusing on the early Turkish working class history, especially the ones focusing on the Ottoman period, starts with the notion that the area of scrutiny has been a belated one. Ahmet Makal underlines two reasons for this postponement.⁷ First, the late industrialization of Ottoman and Turkish economy had delayed the development of capitalist relations of

⁷ Makal, 2007, pp. 15-17

production in Turkey. So, workers as a class did not have a crucial place in the formation of economic, social and cultural relations in the early Turkish society. This in turn, resulted in the late occurrence of the studies concerning the employee-employer relations and their history. Secondly, until the 1960s, legal and illegal sanctions, for the sake of fight against communism threat, made the subject matter a taboo for researchers of the area, as well. Series of problems that Oya Sencer faced, starting with the denial of her Ph.D. thesis and ending with her resignation, illustrate the scale of the coercion that people working on the subject may experience.⁸ Even until the midst of 1990s such pressures have been an issue. Experience of Alparslan Işıklı with his associate professorship thesis, *Unionism and Policy* serves to be a good example.⁹ Hence, these two factors caused first, lack of interest to the subject, and then suppression of the existing interest for a long time. It was not until the 1980s that comprehensive studies on history of labor and working class have increased in numbers. Nevertheless, including aforementioned study of Oya Sencer, it is possible to list a good deal of pioneering works dated before 1970s.

Both Ahmet Makal and Kemal Yıldırım in their histories of labor in Turkey give detailed accounts of the early works in the field.¹⁰ If their going over is followed, the two earliest works on the subject are Hüseyin Avni Şanda's research on the revolts of Ottoman workers against foreign capital in 1908 and Ahmet Ali Özekten's history of Ereğli coalfields.¹¹ Following these, Lütfü Erişçi's book, titled *The History of Working Class in Turkey*, came in the early fifties as the first study that has a holistic approach regarding the area of study. Again in the fifties, the first book on the history of trade unionism in Turkey is written by Kemal

⁸ Sencer, O. (1969). p. 5-7; Sencer's Ph.D. thesis, *Dawn and Structure of Working Class in Turkey*, had denied twice by the professors board of İstanbul University where she served as a research assistant. The event led to the occupying of the university by the students. Sencer resigned at December 26th, 1968.

⁹ Işıklı, 1995, p. 19; Işıklı's thesis has been categorically denied by two jury members, even without being read.

¹⁰ Makal, 2007; Yıldırım, 2013

¹¹ Şanda, 1932; Özekten, 1944

Sülker. In the same decade, two additional founding studies regarding the legal dimension of the labor history by Saymen, and concerning the individual labor relations and structure of labor force by Zaim also released.¹² Although sixties witnessed a lively discussion with respect to the class structure of Ottoman Empire, which will be touched upon later in this chapter, studies specifically focused on the history of labor are limited in that period. Together with Sencer's, Kurthan Fişek's book on the development of capitalism and working class, dated 1969, can be counted as an example of those few works.

Korniienko's book, *The Labor Movement in Turkey*, first published in Russian in 1965 and then in English in 1967, stands as an early representative of a seventies trend. In the seventies, a series of USSR originated studies that have a predominant socialist ideological perspective are seen. While Şişmanov being distinguished among them; it is possible to count Rozaliyev and Şnurov's names in this school, as well.¹³ Şehmus Güzel's early studies on worker movements and Canan Koç and Yıldırım Koç's anonymous work, *History of Turkish Working Class and Worker Movements* published in the name of Union of Turkish Economists are also informative and notable studies of the period. Furthermore, it should be underlined that in seventies, the research done in other disciplines, especially in architecture and economics, also provided valuable resources regarding labor history. Thank to these studies it is possible to reach remarkable information about labor relations in different eras and geographies of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴

In regard to studies on labor history, eighties starts with a dynamic debate among Mesut Gülmez, Zafer Toprak and Şehmus Güzel on *Tatıl-i Eşgâl Kanunu* (Law of Cease Work / Strike).¹⁵ Following the example it is possible to say that the focus

¹² Saymen, 1954; Zaim, 1956

¹³ For a detailed account of their research please see Makal, 2007

¹⁴ For instance, in architecture, Barkan. Ö. L. (1972) *Süleymaniye Camii ve İmarat İnşaatı*; Erder, L (1975). *Factory Districts in Bursa During the 1860s*; and in economics, Ökçün, G. (1971). *Osmanlı Sanayii: 1913, 1915 Yılları Sanayi İstatistiki*; Sayar, N. S. (1977). *Türkiye İmparatorluk Dönemi Mali Olayları*

¹⁵ For more detail please refer to Yıldırım, 2013, p. 17

of the studies during this decade was on workers movements and the legal dimensions of labor relations. Gülmez's book, *Labor Relations in Turkey (before 1936)* was of vital importance, both theoretically and methodologically. It is not going too far to argue that this study has set standards for subsequent ones and can be regarded as a big step in the development of the area of study.¹⁶ Along with the aforementioned figures, Turan Yazgan and Gündüz Ökçün's articles should also be mentioned among the notable works of the time.¹⁷

With 1980s, a trend of broadening interest in different aspects and eras of Ottoman Empire has shown its first sparks. This trend has continued through 1990s and 2000s and offered a significant amount of detailed information for the studies on the transformation of labor relations and the advent of working class at the late period of the empire.¹⁸ The level of detail presented made a more comprehensive historiography of individual labor relations possible. Studies on workplaces, wage rates, working conditions, households and life styles of workers, etc. have become more frequent. The last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of 21st century can be called the heyday of the subject matter in Turkey. Only after the studies that came forward in that period, it is possible to talk about labor history, workers history or history of working class as legitimate, separate areas of study in Turkey.

In the traditional capitalist western countries, in 1990s, when social history as a discipline rose and significantly developed, unfortunately the interest in the history of working class and labor had almost diminished. In spite of a clearly defined subject matter and new, exciting approaches, social historians of labor remained low in numbers. The primary reason of this could be seen as that in

¹⁶ Makal, 2007, p.20-21

¹⁷ Yazgan, 1982; Ökçün, 1982

¹⁸ Until then, E.Z. Karal's and Bernard Lewis's studies on Ottoman Empire were distinguished as the primary sources. Although Halil İnalcık made invaluable studies throughout the 60s and 70s, it was not until late 70s that those studies turned into a collected body of work. Starting with Halil İnalcık and Osman Okyar's *Türkiye'nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi (1071-1920)*, after 80s, many studies by scholars like Feroz Ahmad, Eric Jan Zürcher, and İlber Ortaylı have opened door to different dimensions of Ottoman History.

these “developed” countries process of a post-industrialization was believed to be at stake and labor movement or working class were not seen crucial in social dynamics, anymore.¹⁹ For Turkey, on the other hand, when this new tradition in history became effective the interest in history of labor has not been lost, yet. In nineties and two thousands, wage labor and studies in social history of working class have increased in numbers, hand in hand. A lot of new research put forward different dimensions of working class, from daily life practices to ethnic and religious differences; from work place conditions to social benefits. Research on collective labor relations has also been extended, considerably.

The giant work edited by İnalçık together with Quataert lays down the economic and social history of Ottoman Empire in a detail level that has never been done before.²⁰ From the beginning of 14th century, the study presents a scrutiny of different aspects of the empire in a chronological manner, where each era is went through by a different scholar. In the same work, Şevket Pamuk also offers an analysis of monetary structure throughout the Ottoman reign. Quataert’s unique studies on agriculture, manufacturing and mining in Ottoman Empire are valuable resources, especially for the 19th century of the empire.²¹ Together with the economic and social history of Ottoman Empire, studies concentrating on the republican era also emerged. Makal’s trilogy of history of labor relations in Turkey that comprises the Ottoman age (until 1920), single-party period (1920-1946) and multi-party period (1946-1963), is also central in the literature developed in the decades at issue. Yıldırım Koç and Şehmus Güzel’s historiographies of working class have also continued in these years. Along with comprehensive studies concentrating on long terms and wide-ranged topics, many studies that have narrower, yet better focused interest were also arisen. These studies presenting micro aspects of labor in certain times and geographies of

¹⁹ van der Linden, M. (1999). The End of Eurocentrism and the Future of Labour History: Or, Why We Should and How We Could Reconceptualise the Working Class. *Actas dos V Cursos Internacionais des Cascais*, 159–192

²⁰ İnalçık and Quataert, 1994

²¹ Quataert, 2008; Quataert, 1993, Quataert, 2005

Turkey, provide more specific and intense information that makes possible the generalized knowledge in the field to be tested with particular cases. Such studies that are usually encountered in the form of article are also collected in special issues of journals or edited books.²² Thesis studies, some of which are printed as books, that increase in number day by day should be mentioned, as well.²³

If the academic quality of this literature is taken into consideration, one can conclude that together with not a few of the early research in the field, even some of the new studies have methodological and theoretical problems. In some, even use of inaccurate data is evident. This is why some scholars are quite suspicious about the existing body of knowledge in the area and heavily criticizing the works in the field. For instance, Yiğit Akın, in his evaluation of the early republican labor history, following Yüksel Akkaya, refers to the current literature as “miserable”. Şehmuz Güzel also calls the social history in Turkey as underdeveloped and history of social movements as orphaned. Both criticisms are to a certain extent rightful in that they underline the limitations of the field. Nevertheless the severity of expressions could hardly be accepted as just. If Akın’s harsh criticism is left aside, which is responded by Makal in detail²⁴, and Güzel’s arguments²⁵ are focused it is seen that his denigration of the area is exaggerated. First of all, Güzel’s claim that ‘the studies in the area are done by people from irrelevant disciplines or incompetent and uninformed historians’ is unfair initially to himself as he is among many names who had contributed the history of labor in Turkey. Regardless of through which discipline the scholars take up their research, their studies grounded the newly emerging specialists of the area. Secondly, unlike what Güzel argues, in subjects of social history, like women, ethnic groups, youth, daily life, family, etc., there is an increasing interest

²² For instance, *International Review of Social History*, 2009 No:54, Supplement, pp. 115–142; *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, 2010, No: 12, Labor Movement in Turkey; Makal and Toksöz, 2012, *Geçmişten Günümüze Kadın Emeği*.

²³ Kırpık, 2004; Durak, 2013

²⁴ Makal, 2007

²⁵ Güzel, 2007, pp. 9-15

in Turkey. These topics that can be included in the history of individual labor relations are more and more touched upon by both young and experienced scholars.²⁶ Lastly, it is not possible to agree with Güzel's point that reliance on the secondary sources made the field that of chain errors. It is obvious that there are over generalizations or data errors in the early studies of history of labor in Turkey. But this is a common feature in many fields of history in their development stage. What matters is the capacity of emerging literature to correct the existing errors and over generalizations and avoid further ones.²⁷ Güzel, himself, gives good examples of such endeavor in correction of facts. With access to new resources or careful reexamination of existing ones, many misjudgments are revised. Along with Güzel's own examples, abandoning the argument that there was a clearly defined division of labor among different ethnic and religious groups in Ottoman Empire can be a good one.²⁸ In sum, the early studies in the field are invaluable in their contribution to the formation of the area as a discipline.

Today, it is possible to say that, a comprehensive literature on Turkish labor relations and a peculiar historiography of Turkish working class have developed. This historiography provides sufficient data and resources for social researchers studying in the area. Such researchers may utilize the existing histories of labor or follow evaluation articles regarding the field to have a good command of the current literature, as done in this thesis, or they may turn to a reference studies like the one done by Canan Koç and Yıldırım Koç in 2008, namely *Bibliography of Labor Relations in Turkey*. Along with secondary sources, access to primary ones is also getting easier based on the experience built by prior studies in the field. As a matter of fact, Yıldırım Koç also wrote a book bringing references of existing sources and data together.²⁹

²⁶ Articles in Makal and Toksöz, 2012 is a good example

²⁷ For a good example of an effort in analyzing and correcting the existing errors in the field, please see Koç, 2010, *Yanlış-Doğru Cetveli: İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi Yazımında İnatçı Hatalar*

²⁸ Quataert, 2001, p. 96-97

²⁹ Koç and Koç, 2008

1.2.2. Periodization

Different dimensions of the working class could have been undertaken in this study chronologically. To illustrate, issues like history of labor unionism, legal aspects of work relations, collective worker movements, and daily lives of workers could be presented alone following a historical timeline of change. Nevertheless, this method is not preferred for not to discount the interaction between the different aspects of working class and for creating an opportunity to construe the internal integrity of the events of certain periods in labor history. Instead, following the logic of periodization that is generally accepted in the literature of working class history, each era is preferred to be taken into consideration, solely. On the one hand, the structural relations that make certain periods significant and coherent are tried to be revealed, on the other hand as the transition periods refer to important structural changes, a comparative analysis of old and new conditions are attempted to be underlined.

In this respect, in this study, the periodization defended by Ahmet Makal and commonly acknowledged by many other scholars is believed to be reasonable and to be followed.³⁰ However, existence of a slight difference requires an explanation or legitimization. In respect for working class although Makal does not feels need for further periodization within the Ottoman history, in this study, Ottoman period is taken into consideration in two parts. Usually histories of working class are initiated rightfully with the late 18th or 19th centuries of the Ottoman Empire, when modern forms of workers were witnessed for the first time. In this study, on the contrary, a different path is followed. In order to put forward the historical background that makes the developments in the 19th century Ottoman Empire unique, a scrutiny of the economic structure of Ottoman classic era is aimed to be given in detail. Compared to western countries, how the unique experience of Ottoman society through the existence and degeneration of this structure resulted in a different path of entering capitalist form of economy is tried to be understood.

³⁰ Makal, 1999, pp. 30-35

Following this path, giving meaning to the working class heritage of Ottoman times passed on to today is expected to be achieved. In this respect, history of working class in Turkey is taken up in five periods; namely (1) Ottoman Classic Era, (2) Reforms and Westernization, (3) Independence and Single-Party Period, (4) Multi-Party System Era, and (5) New Constitution (1961): Liberties and Rights. First two periods were presented in Chapter 3, while last three were examined in Chapter 4. The division of history of working class in two chapters as Ottoman and Republican eras does not reflect an approach that reads these two eras by means of a theory of rupture. It is rather a decision taken on the basis of the desire to provide practical clarity and convenience for the readers since the total volume of two eras is sizable. The rise of neo-liberalism following Coup d'état of 1980 and the global crisis witnessed at the end of 1990s resulting in the wave of flexibility, weakening legal protection and sub-contracting is to be assessed together with the working class panorama that is tried to be given in the Chapter 5.

1.3. On the Condition of Working Class

As I will touch upon in Chapter 2, in order to talk about the conditions of working class, two criteria should be fulfilled. First, economic development should reach to a level that would allow workers for being a class in itself. Second, the relations that workers develop on the basis of their objective conditions should produce practices and experiences that permit us to call them a class. The Chapter 5 of this study examines the general condition of working class in Turkey with the light of the information provided by formal statistics. The first section of Chapter 6, which focuses on the findings of the research conducted within the scope of the thesis, tries to contribute this designation in areas where formal data do not exist or present lengthier information. On the other hand, as it is among the primary aims of the study, the daily life practices, forms of socialization, workplace conditions of blue collar workers shall also be examined in that chapter. In this regard, the fragmentation among the blue-collar workers shall be underlined. What is expected to be achieved in this study is at first to draw an overall profile of blue collar workers in peculiar and working class in general in Turkey, in a similar

fashion with what Shostak did in late 1960s for United States.³¹ Secondly, whether this profile is reflected in certain behavior patterns is tried to be understood.

In Turkey, although there are studies that present the subjective existence of workers focusing on local case studies, a thorough analysis of working class grounded on statistical research at national level and with a this large sample has not been done before. Although such a study would be more comprehensive if it had involved direct experiences of workers from different economic domains and work environments. Yet, time being in the first place, limitation of resources did not allow reaching such a high level of inclusiveness. Nevertheless, future commentary research similar to the *Some Habits and Customs of the Working Classes*, which was written at the early stages of the development of working class in England, should be done to supplement the quantitative data with sufficient qualitative data.³² In the same breath, existing data should be backed with the first hand experiences of workers through in-depth interviews and general conditions of working class should be

1.4. On Method of Research

Research on the behaviors of working class usually focus on collective actions of workers like strikes, work stoppage, slowdown strikes, workplace occupying, political marches, etc... that directly involve visible political activity. The conditions and the ways these behaviors occur usually are related to the existence or level of class consciousness. However, collective action is not the sole political area where workers could present common or similar behavior patterns. It is obvious that in a developed parliamentary democracy, workers have choice of voting for a political party that best suits their interests or priorities. Moreover, in choice of vote they may act in accordance with other workers. As workers have massive effect on the results of the elections, their collective choice of a single

³¹ Shostak, 1969

³² Wright, 1867

party can be decisive in many contexts. In this sense, studies on voting behavior of working class not only provide us information on social and political traits of a large section of society, but also help us reach conclusions on possible political developments in recent future.

Generally those studies that examine the voting behavior of citizens focus on through which motives or ends different sections and segments of society act in certain ways. To serve this purpose, a wide range of research is being conducted in Turkey. Along with relatively limited studies with academic interests, most of the research was done by opinion research companies. Political parties usually have a considerable part of these valuable and comprehensive studies conducted in order to determine their strategies and develop certain policies. It is hard to deny the richness of these studies especially regarding the data they provide on opinions of voters in specific issues. Yet, almost all of these studies provide descriptive analyses that only deal with target groups and their voting patterns. Explanatory analyses are not preferred as the meaningful statistical data collected from the voters almost always are in categorical type, like education level, race, religious preference, gender, occupation, etc... Hence, the relations between variables are examined and presented through limited descriptive statistics. If the very limited research is put aside, almost none of the surveys that has been done results in any significance analysis between defined variables. In this study possibility of building an explanatory model with categorical independent variables is sought. In case that such endeavour fails, each independent variable is examined in terms of their effect of voting behavior and significance of their relationship.

By use of the data acquired it is aimed to reach specific answers to three inquiries regarding the possibility of making research on working class by use of quantitative data. These inquiries are as follows:

- Is it possible to reveal the conditions of workers as a class in Turkey, on the basis of the case of blue collar workers, through a detailed examination

of their objective conditions of existence, their practices in work as well as in their daily lives?

- Is it possible to grasp blue collar workers in Turkey on the basis of the question that whether all these conditions form certain relations or patterns and ideas through which blue collar workers in Turkey makes themselves?
- Is it possible to comprehend to what extent these relations effect certain decisions of the working class?

To answer these three questions, in the scope of the study a three staged examination of the research data will be presented in Chapter 6. In the first stage commonalities and fragmentations among workers will be presented. Secondly, certain social behaviors and political attitudes and the common or different traits of workers will be tried to be drawn. And lastly, effect of those traits on voting choice of blue collar workers will be scrutinized.

1.4.1. Research Summary

The research has been conducted in September, 2013 in Turkey in 20 provinces. The respondents represent blue collar workers 18 years old or above, living in urban areas of Turkey.

Total number of respondents is 1.967, 1700 of which are men and 267 of which are women. Face to face survey method was used.

The results of the survey were controlled both in the field and by use of computer techniques. The reliability of the data was observed.

According to the coding manual prepared, data entry templates were created through statistical program; SPHINX and by utilizing electronic logic checks and data mining techniques entered data were controlled in terms of errors.

The provinces included in the survey were İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Kocaeli, Konya, Diyarbakır, Tekirdağ, Kayseri, Malatya, Adana, Antalya, Bursa, Manisa, Denizli, Trabzon, Gaziantep, Mersin, Erzurum, Van, Samsun.

Stratified sampling method was used. Strata were determined on the basis of gender, age, education, distribution in geographical regions and provinces. As formal statistics in Turkey do not present abovementioned variable for manual laborers except for gender subpopulations were formed on the basis of comparison of data on wage laborers in general and data regarding manual laborers acquired from previous comprehensive research done by a private research company.

To reach workers randomly and also to prevent any bias due to gatekeepers, surveys were conducted at houses instead of workplaces. The regions, provinces, cities and districts where workers are mostly concentrated were determined respectively by use of previous data. In those districts houses were chosen randomly and scanned for respondents who could represent the population.

The respondents were chosen and the interviews were done on the basis of the predetermined quotas.

The computer analysis on sample following the field work showed that the sample in general is capable of representing the blue collar workers in Turkey and standard deviation is at minimum level.

The sample on the whole represents workers in Turkish urban areas within the confidence interval of ± 2.3 percent.

CHAPTER 2

A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE WORKING CLASS

2.1. Adam Smith and David Ricardo

French physiocracy as a comprehensive economic theory could be regarded as an early form of classical political economy which aimed at developing policies in order to increase the national wealth in a feudal system. They were dealing with the “natural” dynamics of agricultural surplus production and its appropriation by a non-producing class with the choice of allocating it either for manufacture or unproductive consumption. So they were talking about three classes: landlords, peasants and artisans. Adam Smith takes this main problematic – economic growth – within the framework of capitalism, and tries to understand the developments within industrial societies. The studies he made in this respect, and the later contributions of David Ricardo, gave birth to the political economy as a scientific discipline. Although Smith’s arguments developed in this field are found contradictory and severely criticized, almost everyone, including his critics, admit that his contribution to the development of the economic discourse, especially on the capitalist economy, with a new set of ideas he developed could hardly be denied.³³ Especially his methodological approach and analyses on class and labor theory of value grounded the emergence of some of the primary concepts of Marxism.

Adam Smith distinguishes three different classes; namely landlords, workers, and merchants and manufacturers. Each class has a separate function in the mechanism of the economy and in this respect they receive their share in the joint social product. Smith’s approach here is innovative in that instead of simply examining the relationship of different parties in the particular production

³³ Clegg et al., 1986, p. 6

processes, he scrutinizes production with a holistic approach at the level of economic totality. Hence, he could conceive different individuals serving the same functions in forming a concrete class. In other words, his conception of class is grounded in a specific understanding of socio-economic structure. There exists a division of labor in this socio-economic structure. Therefore, members of each class have different structural interests. These divergent positions that the members of classes are subject to, affect their character-structure. In other words, according to Smith, one's lived experience, especially of working life, is the principal determinant of character-structure.³⁴

Although there are different motives and interests of the classes and these also determine the character of the members of these classes, society may exist in harmony and solidity thanks to one principle. Smith believes that class interests are aligned with the general interests of society. Here, according to Smith, members of the classes – landlords and wage laborers – act rationally in a way to deliberately delimit their own interest at a level where it starts to work to the disadvantage of general interest. This is because they know that as the economy goes into a trend of decline, their interest is also obstructed. On the other hand, the class of merchants and manufacturers also know that their interest has no similar connection with the general interest and act in a way to maximize their profit on every condition.³⁵ Smith developed his conception of “general interest” as early in his well-known study, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, published almost two decades before *Wealth of Nations*. The awareness of general interest allows anyone to grasp the conditions in which a peculiar case could be assessed from the position of an “impartial spectator”, the ultimate reference point for moral and just action. As one's sentiments may lead him/her to make decisions on the basis of self-interest, one must have a moral imperative to make objective decisions, to which the impartial spectator serves in Smith's theory.³⁶ Unlike his general image

³⁴ Rækstad, 2011, pp. 11-12

³⁵ Smith, 1937, pp. 247-250

³⁶ Smith, 1976, pp. 37-38

in the academic circles of which he is known for his philosophical approach serves to the interests of the bourgeoisie, Smith underlines the need for government measures to prevent the division of labor from proceeding to its limits and restrict self-interest in a way to prevent it to going beyond general interest.³⁷

Among the three classes that Smith defines, the class of wage laborers constitutes the vast majority of society. What defines them as a class is their dependence on their wages, which is advanced to them by landlords or merchants / manufacturers, or sometimes a combination of both. Since they are reliant on the wealth of the other two classes for their share of the national income, worker's interest is in parallel with the general interest. Smith's discussion on the relationship between self-interest and general interest presents that his notion of class involves members who have consciousness of their self-interest and general interest of society in a way to make rational decisions on the basis of their awareness. Smith believes that their understanding of the greater part of the men necessarily formed by their ordinary employment, which shows us that he believes that the consciousness of the totality of the economic structure is conceived by the classes through their individual economic practices. Moreover, unlike the general impression that *Wealth of Nations* is a book on class harmony, the contradiction between the interest of the class of merchants and manufacturers and the other two classes show us that he is akin to the idea of conflict in an economic and social setting.³⁸

In spite of their dependence on wages, the notion of working class in Smith has a broader scope. He also includes self-employed and semi-employed workers in this class as their economic activities and life practices are similar. So, sections of society that Marx would later on call 'petty bourgeoisie' took the attention of Smith, yet he construed them as a part of the working class on the basis of their

³⁷ Chompsky, 1995, p. 19

³⁸ For further details on class conflict in Smith's writings, please see Ingrid H. Rima (1998). Class Conflict and Adam Smith's "Stages of Social History". *Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, 20, 103-113

economic pursuit. Here, Smith categorizes wage laborers in respect to their structural position in the division of labor in the economy.³⁹

David Ricardo's analysis of capitalism and science of the political economy also contributed to the understanding of class formation and class behavior. Although Ricardo was sharing similar motives with Smith in his desire for the extension of the bourgeoisie rights, he was also aware of the fact that unhindered economic growth did not necessitate the equal or rightful share of benefits. He introduced the concept of unearned income to political economic literature and criticized the class of landowners in that while workers and bourgeoisie input to the production process; labor and capital, respectively, landowners do not. As laborers receive wages and the bourgeoisie take profit from the final produce, landowners get an unearned share of the surplus. As rents increase, it does so to the loss of the two classes who are not renters. Ownership of the land creates this unjust situation and there is always an antagonistic relationship between the industrial capitalists and the landowners.⁴⁰ Ricardo's contribution to the political economy by underlining this antagonistic relationship is important in that Marx, later on, made use of Ricardo's approach in his analysis of class relations in a capitalist society. Unlike in Ricardo's agricultural economic systems, as in the capitalist economy, the landowner class either disappeared or was merged into the capitalist class, the abovementioned antagonistic relationship is inherited by the bourgeoisie and proletariat.

2.2. Marx and Engels

With Marx's contribution, the class conception of the political economy before anything else gained historical depth. For Marx, classes existed before the rise of the commercial economy, and they are actually a determinate sequence of historical changes.⁴¹ Yet at the same time they are responsible for those changes,

³⁹ Rækstad, 2011, pp. 47-48

⁴⁰ Clegg et al., 1986, pp. 9-12

⁴¹ Giddens, 1973, p. 26

hence the statement that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles”.⁴² If the brief introduction describing the context and the content of the script is set aside, *Manifesto of the Communist Party* starts with this very sentence designating classes as the actor in the history of existing society. In its broadest sense, Marxist conceptions of class can be conceived as a central point for Marx and Engel's critiques of German philosophy, French sociological thinking and British political economy. The core of these critiques is the peculiar understanding of history in Marxist thinking that is embodied in the one brief sentence of the *Manifesto*, given above. This precise statement is the product of both Marx's critical assessment of the aforementioned traditions and the influence of them on Marx. It is obvious that the theory of class in general has a central role in Marx's theories of man, history and society. Particularly, the theory of evolution of the working class is crucial in understanding the entire Marxist discourse.⁴³ Nevertheless, Marx had not written on class to the extent that the importance of the concept deserves. His *magnum opus*, *Capital* is a break off at the point where he starts to discuss the concept of class. To put it in a different way, it is not wrong to argue that concept of class is more or less lost in the shuffle of Marx and Engels' writings.⁴⁴ In absence of a clear definition of class by Marx, Anthony Giddens points out three sets of factors which complicate discussion of the Marxian conception of class:

The first of these refers simply to the question of terminology – the variability in Marx's use of the word ‘class’ itself. The second concerns the fact that there are two conceptual constructions which may be discerned in Marx's writings as regards the notion of class: an abstract or ‘pure’ model of class domination, which applies to all types of class systems; and more concrete descriptions of the specific characteristics of classes in particular societies. The third concerns Marx's analysis of

⁴² Marx and Engels, 2004, p.14

⁴³ Goldthorpe et al, 1969, p. 2

⁴⁴ Lukacs, 1968, p. 46

classes in capitalism, the case which overwhelmingly occupied his interests: just as there are in Marx's 'pure' models of class, so there are 'pure' and concrete models of the structure of capitalism and the process of capitalist development.⁴⁵

All these three issues are chiefly results of a certain break in Marx's analysis of capitalism following the revolutions of 1848. According to Clegg et al. Marx's examination of the dynamic inclinations of the typical capitalist economy before 1848 produced a simple abstract model of class. His response to the failure of 1848 led to a more complex, yet descriptive scrutiny of class structure. He developed his argument that the defeats of the insurrectionary movements of 1848 were due to the immaturity of the existing class relationships, in his famous articles published in 1850 and 1852 respectively as "The Class Struggles in France" and "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte". He underlined the fact that social relationships did not come to the point of sharp class antagonism and in his endeavor to do so he described the class structure in a more detailed manner. Later in *Capital*, he started to transform the ideas presented in the aforementioned two articles into a more abstract model.⁴⁶

Within the limits of this study I will mostly focus on the first level of class conception in Marx, which is the simple abstract model in *Manifesto* and the antecedent texts like *Draft of a Communist Confession of Faith*. It should be noted that these texts were written prior to the events of 1848. In their Preface to the 1872 German Edition of *Manifesto*, Marx and Engels stated this fact. However they also argued that the general principles laid down in the text were, on the whole, as correct at the given moment as ever.⁴⁷ In regards to class, *Manifesto* presents us a less detailed framework which Marx and Engels elaborated on in their following studies. Hence at certain points, I will also try to broaden class

⁴⁵ Giddens, 1973, p. 27

⁴⁶ Clegg et al., 1986, pp. 28-35

⁴⁷ Marx and Engels, 2004, p.4

understanding given in the *Manifesto* with aspects and ideas introduced in “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”. *Capital* will be consulted only in a limited way due to two reasons. First, as mentioned before, the book is incomplete, especially the part on class. But more important than that, I believe the abstraction level presented in *Capital* could hardly contribute to us understanding the Turkish working class, given the course of the capitalist development in Turkey.

2.2.1. Historical Materialism and Classes

In *The Poverty of Philosophy*, Marx criticizes the economist in that while explaining how production takes place in the relations they present, they do not explain how those relations themselves are produced.⁴⁸ One of the primary aims of Marx is to reveal the historical movement that gave birth to the economic relations of production. He developed a methodological approach in this sense, which is called ‘historical materialism’. In *German Ideology*, he states the first premises of the materialistic method as follows:

The way in which men produce their means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the production of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce it. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Marx, 2009, p. 46

⁴⁹ Marx, 2000, p. 6

In its basic form, Marx argues that changes in the material conditions determine the social and economic organization and transformation of life.

According to Marx and Engels, all societies in history were arranged into various orders in a complicated way. In other words, all societies had inequalities that are presented in the form of gradation of social rank. In the complex order of social groups the primary axis of reference is the constant opposition of two groups to one another; of the oppressor and the oppressed. The relationship over oppression and exploitation is the decisive factor for the class positions.⁵⁰ Marx clearly emphasizes that class is not to be identified with source of income in the division of labor, which would yield an almost endless plurality of classes.⁵¹ It is rather the control of the means of production that determines the formation of classes. Hence class is as much a political concept as an economic one.

Class Struggle as the Source of Social and Historical Change

The conflict of interest results in an ongoing fight between the classes, hidden or revealed. As a result of this struggle the social existence is restructured or the demise of the competing classes is witnessed. In neither case does the class struggle end. New classes, new conditions of exploitation and new forms of struggle take place of the old ones. New classes are born from the revolution of mode of production.


To summarize the historical materialist view of society, Berberoglu schematizes it on the basis of the relationship between mode of production and superstructure. Socio-economic base of the foundation of society is the mode of production. It is a combination of relations, forces and mode of production. Class struggle occurs primarily within the relations of production where the owning and laboring classes fight to resolve their conflict of interest stemming from the exploitation/oppression relation. What make production possible are the

⁵⁰ Marx and Engels, 2004, p.14

⁵¹ Marx, 1999, p. 425

productive forces and the means of production. Productive forces, or forces of production, are the entirety of labor, labor processes and technology, technique and knowhow of production. The development stage of the productive forces determines the appropriate relations of production, as a result of which the ruling class controls the means of production. The owning classes not only control the means of production, but also dominate the superstructure. State, legal system, ideology, religion, education and means of communication are regulated by the dominant class.⁵²

Diagram 1: The Historical Materialist View of Society and Social Structure



Source: Berberoglu, 2009, p. 18 (modified)⁵³

⁵² Marx, 1999/b, p. 4

⁵³ Berberoglu does not distinguish between the forces of production and means of production, which is the common tendency in analysis of historical materialist model (even in the glossary of marxist.org, forces of production includes means of production). However Marx's use of these two

These apparatus convey the class struggle to a different level where superstructure represses the laboring class in favor of the ruling class and the laboring class resists this repression. The totality of all these relations forms the social formation. Although superstructure is determined by economic sphere, at the same time it influences the forces of production. Change occurs when the forces of production and the existing relations of production contradicts.⁵⁴

New forces of production enforce a change in the organization of production and exchange. In other words, the development of new productive forces transforms the existing relations of production. The new dominant class rising in the economic sphere takes control of the political arena. The new dominant class continuously revolutionizes the former means and relations of production as its existence depends on it.⁵⁵

2.2.2. Capitalist Mode of Production and Bourgeois Society

A series of revolutions in the modes of production and a long course of development produced the modern bourgeoisie.⁵⁶ The means of production and exchange that made possible the rise of the bourgeoisie were generated in feudal society. Feudal relations of property at some point fell into contradistinction with the productive forces and necessitated change.⁵⁷ The class structure of feudal society broke down, yet the class antagonism survived in a different form.⁵⁸ The first feature that makes bourgeois society distinct is the simplicity of the class

concepts necessitates such a differentiation. Forces of production or productive forces are related to labor and production process in action. However, means of production involves materials needed in the production (involves capital, land and raw materials in bourgeois society) process, which are more static aspects of production. In spite of the strict control of bourgeois class over means of productions, it is not possible to say that capitalists have total control over forces of production. If this would be the case there would be less space for class struggle, and the historical materialist model of Marx would be a more stagnant one. Hence, the model Berberoglu presents is modified here to set forth this nuance and dynamic character of productive forces.

⁵⁴ Berberoglu, 2009, p. 18

⁵⁵ Marx and Engels, 2004, pp. 15-17

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 15

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 17

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 14

antagonism. Bourgeois revolution burns down whatever there is before it and defies the settled values and traditions of the old regime. In such conditions men have to face their real conditions of life. Whatever conceals their real conditions with other men is stripped-down. New conditions of conflict rise clearly. Society is almost divided into two opposed groups; bourgeoisie and proletariat.⁵⁹

In a very short time bourgeoisie creates larger productive forces than it has ever done before. Capitalism concentrates property in the hands of few. It also centralizes the means of production. Centralization is also reflected in the political sphere and creates a process of nationalization. Production is organized and held at the national level. However, as in the industrialized world, nationalization is the natural result of capitalist development in the countries where bourgeoisie societies reach for new markets, and national freedom is lost. Bourgeois culture invades local and peculiar cultures and makes them resemble its own. It transforms foreign cultures in reference to its own reflection. Thus, a process of nationalization and globalization goes hand in hand, respectively in production and exchange.⁶⁰

2.2.3. Inevitable End of Bourgeois Society

As the means of production and exchange on which bourgeoisie grounded itself were created by the feudal society, a similar process is experienced in capitalist society. Modern bourgeois society does not have the capacity to control the massive means of production and exchange it built. The modern productive forces revolt against the property and production relations that make the conditions of existence and the rule of the bourgeoisie. A contradiction between the forces of production and the relations of production arises, which would lead to revolutionary restructuring of the existing order. What is interesting at this moment is that the abovementioned contradiction between capitalist forces and

⁵⁹ Ibid, pp. 15-16; Although following 1848, Marx argued that in the case of France and other European countries that witnessed revolutionary movements class conflict did not reach to a level as advanced as he assumes, he still holds that at a certain moment in history this revelation regarding the simplicity of class conflict and interest would arrive.

⁶⁰ Ibid, pp. 16-17

the relations of production is inherent in the conditions that made the capitalist mode of production possible. The forces of production that once contributed to the development of the conditions of the bourgeois property, inevitably turned against them. To put it in a better way, Marx believes that even at the birth of a bourgeois society there is a potential for a contradiction that will lead to a crisis in time. In other words, a capitalist mode of production is doomed to annihilation. Commercial crises, growing at every turn and the defect of over-production will ultimately bring about the end of capitalism.

Although Marx and Engels state that the forces of production grew too strong and had the potential to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie, they also underlined the fact that the conditions of existence of bourgeois property fettered the proletariat. What still keeps the solidity of bourgeois society is the restrained condition of the forces of production. Once this is overcome, uncontrollable rising forces of production will bring disorder to capitalist society and put the existence of the bourgeoisie in jeopardy. Marx identifies three methods that bourgeoisie practice for getting over the crises. On the one hand, there is the option of reducing production by destroying the productive forces. On the other hand, there is the possibility of increasing consumption to a level that would match production. The latter could be achieved by either finding new markets, or by deepening the level of exploitation of the existing ones.⁶¹ As long as the bourgeoisie employs one of these three methods they can manage to postpone the crises to a later period. The former method could hardly be utilized by the bourgeoisie, since the development of the forces of production is at the same time the condition for the development of the capitalist class.⁶² So, in a broader perspective, the destruction of it means self-mutilation for the bourgeoisie. For the latter method, although the expansion of market is a possibility, for Marx, eventually the commercial crisis will reach to such a level that bourgeois society and the relations of property it is based upon could not contain.

⁶¹ Ibid, pp. 17-18

⁶² Ibid, p. 18

2.2.4. Proletariat

Another unique characteristic that Marx and Engels attributes to capitalist mode of production is that unlike the previous forms of class society in bourgeois society the contradiction of the forces of production and the relations of production will not result in the rise of new classes. On the contrary, they argue that the demise of the capitalist system will be in the hands of the proletariat, which is one of the primary classes of the existing social formation. In its fight against the forces of the old regime, the bourgeoisie created its own particular end. In Marx and Engels' own words, it is the modern working class who will turn the weapons, with which the bourgeoisie demolished feudalism, against the bourgeoisie. The natural ally of the bourgeoisie is now the enemy of it. Since the development of the bourgeoisie depends on the proletariat, yet at the same time its development makes the proletariat stronger, eventually the reign of the bourgeoisie will end.⁶³ But who is this proletariat?

Wage Labor

Marx and Engels define the working class as a class of laborers, who depend on the wage they receive in return for their labor which increases capital. Proletariat is a propertyless class. They do not own any means of production. They have to sell their labor and in this sense they are no different than commodities. Their life is bound to their earning through their work. That is why the worth of their labor practically corresponds to their needs for survival. By this means, they are subject to the rule of capital and they are different than the bourgeoisie. Their family relations, their close encounters with other men, their character, all differentiates them from the bourgeois class. All the modern capitalist countries in the world are organized in a way to enhance the bourgeois rule over the proletariat. Law, morality, religion all defends bourgeois interests, the interests of the few. On the contrary, for Marx, what distinguishes the proletariat from other classes is that its movement aims to serve the masses. Unlike the rising classes of previous regimes

⁶³ Ibid, p. 18

who are elitist in character, proletarian movements protect the rights of the majority.⁶⁴

Working Conditions

Dependence upon wages for living and a need for a job are not the only changes in the conditions of production in bourgeois society. The spatial organization of the work has been transformed as well. Unlike the pre-capitalist manufacturing laborers, whose workplace was small workshops, the proletariat or the modern industrial working class work in large factories. Factories bring workers together in large numbers and keep the production process under control and surveillance. The subjection of the proletariat to the bourgeoisie becomes visible in the person of overlooker. Marx defines the condition of workers in the factories as modern slaves. The hierarchical structure of the factories reveals the despotic rule of the bourgeoisie and that spatial organization creates hatred and bitterness in the proletariat. Their common experience of this brutality makes workers self-conscious and their interrelation results in a common self-awareness.

Equalizing the Effect of Technology

The proletariat works in factories in a way that they are enslaved by machines. Their role in the production process should be in accordance with the operation of the machine. They are like the extensions of machines. As machinery develops and increases in numbers, the need for the peculiar skills of the workers vanishes. Their individual character as craftsman is not needed anymore. What is required of workers is a simple process of labor that is monotonous and standardized. Along with the requirement for skill, machinery also leads to the diminishing of the need for strength. Women become possible alternatives to men as laborers in almost all branches of industry. Also, age ceases to be a noteworthy criterion. Technology causes an equalizing effect within the proletariat. Machinery results in the decrease of the skill based competition among workers.

⁶⁴ Ibid, pp. 19-20

2.2.5. Stages of Proletariat: Towards a Classless Society

In Marx and Engels' conception of modern society, overthrowing of the bourgeois rule is the fate of the proletariat. However, they argue that before reaching a level of independent movement that finally will bring down the capitalist relations of production, the proletariat will go through different stages of development.

Individual Fight

The first resistance against the bourgeoisie starts at the level of workplace as individual direct opposition against the owner of the workplace in person. Then, the resistance spreads first to the level of factory, second to the branch of one trade and third to one locality. The target in this basic level is not the bourgeois condition of production but the instruments of production, usually in the form of machine breaking. These revolts are usually reactionary ones that aim at the reinstating of the lost statuses of the old regime. At this level workers are still a scattered and incoherent mass. Their actions in accordance are not due to their association but because of the organization of the bourgeoisie as a united class. Bourgeoisie diverts the real target of the proletariat and directs them to remnants of the old regime; landlords, the non-industrial bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie. What brings together workers in this stage is nothing but the false enemy. Yet a potential for the unification of workers is provided by the fact that together with an increase in the numbers of workers, industrial development concentrates and empowers them in masses. The different life conditions, experiences and interests are leveled by the working conditions described above. As the guaranteed subsistence of feudal economy is destroyed and wages are determined by minimum living standards, uncertainty and insecurity becomes the common experience of workers, which brings them together.

Emergence of Class Struggle

At the next stage, the individual striving of the workmen turns into a class struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie. Workers are organized under associations. They perform collective actions in order to improve their conditions of work; primarily for increasing the level of wages. These organizations become

permanent and usually act as benevolent associations to recover the loss of workers during the fight for rights. Workers start to triumph in certain occasions and gain temporary or permanent rights that improve their conditions of living. However, Marx underlines that the real achievement of their battles is their expanding union.⁶⁵

Union of Workers

Unification of workers is a lot easier than the process that bourgeoisie went through for being a unified class, thanks to the widespread means of communication. Cooperation between different localities could be achieved easily and fast by use of mass communication. Worker organizations could be centralized by this means and class struggle could be raised to the national level in two shakes of a lamb's tail. Although in its very essence class conflict has an international character; Marx and Engels state however, that in form it should be fought at the national level. The union of workers as a class which will turn into a party in time could always be interrupted by the competition among the laborers. However, each failure makes workers reorganize in a stronger way like a phoenix that is reborn from its ashes. And, in time the proletariat will overcome its fragmentations and utilize the schisms among the bourgeoisie and gain its rights on a legal basis.⁶⁶

Education and Consciousness

As it is mentioned before, the bourgeoisie's utilization of the proletariat in its fight against the old classes and the capitalist powers of other nations as an ally provided the proletariat with experience in class struggle. Politization of the workers and their education in this field are the aftereffects of the bourgeoisie's striving to destroy the old regimes' forces of production. Marx argues that in the enlightenment of the workers, those elements of the ruling class who will fall to the status of proletariat will make undeniable contributions. In a similar fashion

⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 19

⁶⁶ Ibid, p. 19

with some members of aristocracy who participated in the class struggle siding with the bourgeoisie, Marx and Engels expects a part of the bourgeoisie to join the ranks of the proletariat. This will be another source for the progress of workers in developing methods for fighting the bourgeoisie.

Revolution

The last stage of the development of the proletariat is the transformation of this hidden or revealed class struggle into an open revolution. At a certain point in history proletariat will overthrow bourgeoisie by force and take the rule. Arrival of this moment is inevitable for Marx and Engels, and they ground their argument on the fact that no class could contain the oppressed class without the promise of rising to a better condition. In the industrial bourgeois society the conditions of the oppressed class continuously grow worse. The proletariat is more impoverished day by day and in Marx and Engels' words, poverty develops more rapidly than population and wealth. Hence, as there is no reasonable ground that will allow the prolongation of the bourgeois rule – the proletariat eventually will take over the power.⁶⁷

All the classes who get the upper hand envisage a social existence that will secure its conditions of exploitation. According to that social construction, the new ruling class repositions the relations of production and restructures society accordingly. Destruction of the old regime even includes the old class position of the new ruling class. By this way, class struggle continues in another form. However, since the proletariat will be the first oppressed class that will reach to the position of being the ruling class, instead of institutionalizing new conditions of exploitation, it will abolish the existing relations of production and convey the social formation to a classless existence. Marx and Engels believe that the rise of the proletariat will be the end of the social existence based on inequalities.

⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 20

2.2.6. Peripheral Classes of Bourgeois Society

In the Marxist understanding of class, characteristic class struggle occurs between two primary classes; namely, oppressed (laborer) and oppressor (owner). However, in any mode of production there exists a residual class from the old regimes. Also, peculiar classes may occur in the transitional periods between modes of production. In spite of the original view of Marx and Engels to construe the existence of these secondary classes as temporary, following the experience of 1848, Marx developed the idea that they may have active involvement in the class struggle in certain periods and affect the course of development. Despite their peripheral role in the class struggle, especially through certain alliances with the ruling or oppressed class, these classes may take significant parts in the scene of history.⁶⁸ Regardless of this new space Marx opens for the peripheral classes in his method of historical materialism, the faith he designates for these classes did not change. For Marx, the dominant class has to revolutionize the former means and relations of production continuously. Its existence depends on this, and the bourgeoisie has a peculiar capacity in doing so. Therefore, classes apart from bourgeoisie and proletariat will diminish as industrial capitalism advances.

Among these peripheral classes of bourgeois society, Marx and Engels counts the medieval burgesses, the small peasants, the lumpen proletariat and the petit bourgeoisie or the industrial middle class. The first three of the abovementioned classes are the remains of a feudal mode of production. The last one, on the other hand, emerged at the transition to the capitalist mode of production. Although the first two classes mostly disappeared in the modern industrial societies, Marx and Engels states that they may co-exist with the rising bourgeoisie in the industrially and commercially less developed countries. The third class listed above is also called the dangerous class by Marx and Engels. They are the lowest segment of the old society. They are loiterers, who may take any side in the class struggle. They are dangerous in that they could be bought for taking part in the intriguing

⁶⁸ Marx, 2010, p. 33

plots of the bourgeoisie. The last but not least is the petit bourgeoisie. Unlike the other three classes the petit bourgeoisie is a supplementary class to bourgeoisie.⁶⁹

Petit Bourgeoisie

Industrial middle class is used in *Manifesto* as a concept to describe the group of manufacturers who took the place of guild masters. They make production in single workshops. Marx and Engels consider them to be replaced by modern bourgeoisie, which differentiate from petit bourgeoisie basically in terms of the use of modern technology and the size of the capital held.⁷⁰ As the middle class is an intermediate form, it can only survive in preservation of the relations of production of the old regime. Bourgeoisie strives for and will destroy the mode of production (and the social conditions grounding them) that gave birth to the petit bourgeoisie. The tool for achieving this end is nothing but brutal competition created by the industrial capitalist production. Marx and Engels list the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen, the handicraftsmen or the artisan and peasants as the lower strata of the middle class. They are confined to turning into proletariat since their limited capital does not allow them to make production at a level to compete with the big capitalists. Yet, a more fundamental reason for their demise is that their skills and specializations are worthless within the new method of production. Thus, Marx and Engels argue that as modern industry advances, the petit bourgeoisie will disappear as an independent class and they will turn into overlookers, bailiffs and shopkeepers, respectively in manufacture, agriculture and commerce.⁷¹ Although all these classes are potential allies for the proletariat in its struggle against the bourgeoisie, their fight has a totally different motive. Their resistance to bourgeoisie is never a revolutionary movement, but a reactionary one. Their primary aim is to conserve the old regime, rather than constituting a new one. The only condition for them to join the

⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 29

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 15

⁷¹ Ibid. p. 29

campaign of revolution depends on a prospective vision that defends their interests as future members of the proletariat.

2.2.7. Fallacy of Marx

Any theoretical perspective developed on the concept of class is to a certain extent contradictory in that it is about an ongoing process. Let alone the predictability of the development of this process, merely the political effect of the analysis to the process suffices for talk about a contradiction. By force of this contradiction, analysis on class needs continuous revision over time. The necessity of revision especially for Marxist class analysis is beyond argument. The denigration of revisionism in Marxist circles and designating it as watering down or abandoning of Marxism is senseless in that indeed above all, the premises of the class analysis made by Marx and Engels did not come true. Regardless of this fact, solely by the possibility of creation of new political factions, alternative descriptions of Marxist utopia, the way to reach it, evaluation of the acquisitions of bourgeois revolution, etc. are all considered unfavorable in Marxist or socialist movement. Nevertheless, it is obvious that prior to utopian Marxism, there is a need for recapturing the Marxist scientific conception of class in view of the recent developments in capitalist society. At the very foundation, an experience of revolution occurred in conditions that Marx did not foresee, and in the conditions that Marx and Engels believed that would bring revolution, capitalism or bourgeois society had survived. In other words, scientific Marxism failed in its premises. As Marx and Engels accuse socialist and communist systems that are developed in an underdeveloped stage of capitalism, in failing to grasp the capacity of proletariat having historical initiative⁷², it is plausible to think that Marxist conception of class displays a similar failure. Marx and Engels' system of thought in this respect had failed to comprehend certain aspects of class that would develop in the future stages of capitalism.

⁷² Marx and Engels, 2004, p. 32

There are many premises and expectations of Marx regarding capitalism and classes of bourgeois society that did not hit the mark. First of all, capitalism managed to develop mechanisms to cope with the commercial crises which Marx believed would bring an end to the bourgeoisie. The primary strategy of capitalism to do so has been the ingrowth of market. Unlike Smith and Ricardo, Marx does not conceive the reproduction of means of subsistence solely consisting of production of physical existence. It also involves a definite form of activity; i.e. it also comprises the reproduction of relations of production. Overproduction is reaching of supply to a level that exceeds beyond what physical existence necessitates. For Marx, excessive supply will eventually destroy the bourgeois relations of production. Nevertheless, the capitalist system overcame this problem by changing the nature of the need. In our modern capitalist society need is no longer the primary drive for consumption. On the contrary, consumption practices define what is to be needed. The need went beyond what is necessitated for the physical existence of men. Consumption is not anymore an effect of production that is limited by the need. As the need is defined by the consumer products, production is derived by endless consumption. Although the excessive production turned the world into an immense garbage dump of commodities, the demand for consumption products has never ended.⁷³

Second, workers have not been condemned to absolute poverty. Wages have not been anchored to the level of subsistence. In spite of the continuity of relative poverty and deprivation, noteworthy developments have occurred in working and life conditions of workers. The capitalist system advanced in a way that position's workers as consumers as well as part of the productive force. When this new orientation was combined with the decline of prices due to excessive production, workers reached to a financial power level that meant they could have alternative consumption patterns. In the classic Marxist sense, modes of consumption are primarily determined by the relations of production.⁷⁴ However, within the

⁷³ Baudrillard, 1997, pp. 15-18

⁷⁴ Giddens, 1973, p. 28

abovementioned new conditions, today the upper strata of the working class came close to the consumption patterns of the lower strata of the bourgeoisie in certain areas. An important gap occurred between the upper and lower strata of the working class that may lead to different lifestyles and cultures within the proletariat. On the contrary, to Marx and Engels' expectation not only has there not been breakaways from the bourgeoisie in favor of the proletariat, but also the bourgeoisie managed to control the proletariat by keeping alive the hope of reaching the dream of an ideal life created in the image of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie gave the proletariat something else other than their chains; hope of becoming bourgeoisie. This ideological mechanism developed by the bourgeoisie was improved by the fact that the intermediate classes did not disappear, unlike what Marx and Engels had anticipated.

Third, as mentioned before, despite their detailing of the class structure of bourgeois society later on, Marx and Engels believed that class conflict in modern society to be simple. Division of society into two camps is an obvious fact. It is hard to accept this statement for the modern developed capitalist societies of our time. As the classes of the old regime made the class conflict and struggle a complex issue in the revolutions of 1848, today not much has changed. Although in the developed countries it is possible to say that a large section of the old middle class have lost its significance, an important part of it, namely the petit bourgeoisie had not vanished. Advancement of capitalism occurred in the direction that it is no longer possible to talk about capitalist society merely as an industrial society. The services sector started to hold a larger share across the economies of most of the developed world. Along with the increasing worth of boutique, personalized and skill involved production, especially when creative, intellectual labor is at stake, increasing capacity of the small scale companies or even individuals to compete with large companies had a great role in the survival of the intermediate classes. Such developments created new conditions of existence for these classes. The rapid development in the services sector not only resulted in the preservation of the petit bourgeoisie, but also created a new middle class of laborers whose conditions of work differ from industrial manual laborers.

Tremendous increases in white collar jobs created a large middle class in developed countries. In spite of the proletarian class character of the new middle class, its existence contributed to the diversion of capitalist development from the projections of Marx and Engels. Above all, with the advent of new middle class, proletariat was offered a rising opportunity to the oppressed class, which Marx and Engels underlined before as one of the reasons why bourgeois society would fail. Along with the presented bourgeois dream, the proletariat is also promised a betterment of life and a more preferable lifestyle within its class position.

Fourth, Marx and Engels' thesis of parallel development of bourgeoisie and proletariat also worked in the direction opposite to which they expected. The proletariat strengthened the bourgeoisie in its every effort of gaining power. It is true that development of the bourgeoisie inevitably contributes to the development of the proletariat. However, this relation is also valid for the opposite direction too. A strong proletariat means increasing accumulation of capital, since as Marx and Engels argues wage laborers could find work only so long as their labor increases capital.

Fifth, another misestimation of Marx and Engels' analysis of capitalist advancement was the class consciousness developing effect of the workplace. Marx and Engels believed that the brutal conditions of control in the factories would make the exploitation of bourgeoisie and enslavement of the proletariat to the ruling class visible to workers. Moreover, as the capitalist system brings together masses of workers in factories, they argued that the bourgeoisie creates the conditions which will help the proletariat unite and become more powerful, by its own hands. Nevertheless, although industrial workplaces became areas that gave way to organization of workers and their movements, the resulting effect was milder than Marx and Engels predicted. Furthermore, as the industry as a sector lost its significance in the overall capitalist employment distribution, the workplace that they envisaged transformed radically in a way to preclude the abovementioned results that the organization of production in factories would bring.

Sixth, the competition among workers did not cease. Although the unskilling process that Marx and Engels believed the mechanization of production would bring occurred for a long time, especially following the development of information technologies the trend became reversed. Detailed analysis of Braverman on the effect of mechanization in particular and technology in general on the skill structure of the working class proved wrong the general idea that technology is likely to increase skill requirements, for the 1970s. What he argued was although development in technology requires new skills and an extended education or training period for workers, what really matters in the Marxist sense is the decrease or increase in the variation of skills required. In other words, the requirement for new skills does not necessitate the requirement of different skills for the production period. It only means that a shift or change in the required skill has happened. In time, education fulfills the new skill requirements of the industries and workers as masses attain what is needed from them. Hence, deskilling compared to the pre-industrial societies that Marx and Engels underlines is evident. Indeed, the need for talent disappeared, but rather a need for formation has risen. The key concept to understand the deskilling process is variation. The fact that acquiring of the required skills by workers takes a longer time, in the totality of economy it does not make sense in this respect. What matters is the level of distinction and diversity of the average skills essential for workers to have in order to continue production by use of latest technology.⁷⁵

Mechanization or technological development in the area of industrial production proved Marxist expectations for a long time. In spite of the rise in the variation of skills needed at the managerial level or higher levels of society, for the working class the situation has been the opposite. Workers had not expected to be knowledgeable of the black boxes of the production process. They do not need to learn how the machines they work with operate. They were only expected to have the skills that would provide the continuation of production. These skills may

⁷⁵ Braverman, 1974, pp. 424-429

correspond to a large repertoire. However, they are almost always generalizable and could be acquired by the whole proletariat. They could even be regarded as uniform. Therefore, basic training or primary education can provide the general skills needed for industries. Nevertheless, it should be noted that these valuable analyses of Braverman date back to before the social, economic and cultural transformation of modern society resulting from the developments in the forces of production that is commonly called the information revolution.

The overall picture Braverman depicts has changed significantly following the above mentioned transformation. Computerized or digitized mechanization shows different characteristics to industrial mechanization. Though like industrial mechanization, developments in computer applications establishes new common knowledge or skill sets, and the variation in skills requirements of particular occupations is immense. Moreover, the speed of development of new applications enhances competition among workers. Intelligence and creativity took on the role of talent in the preindustrial skill variation. It is obvious that these developments mostly happen in the non-manual sectors of the economic system. However, it should be noted that the aforementioned economic area is increasing both in terms of its share of overall production of economic value and also in terms of the share of workers employed.

Last but not least, the formation of a capitalist class has changed in a way to undermine certain principles of Marxist analysis of class. As Dahrendorf presented this change in the context of joint-stock companies, new forms of capitalist production has developed where the ownership of means of production and control over them have separated. These new forms are crucial in that they are decisive in the way the capitalist system is administered. But maybe more important than that, these new forms are critical with respect to the working class in that they make it harder to designate the real target of the class struggle, which results in a fluid system of power relations.⁷⁶ Dahrendorf's contribution to Marxist

⁷⁶ Dahrendorf, 1969, pp. 93-98

literature at this moment is crucial in that he integrates the Weberian understanding of power into the Marxist conception of class.

Today, subcontracting mechanisms applied as a result of the neo-liberal policies, enhance the phenomenon Dahrendorf underlines. They institute intermediary structures and levels between the laborers and the capitalists. This process should not be taken into consideration simply as large firms' the externalization of the problem of control of the workers to small companies. It should be examined thoroughly as it results in the reaching of competition among laborers to an uncontrollable level. To illustrate this, the production processes of the international software companies can be a good case. Thanks to the developing information technologies these companies hired software engineers and designers who are located in the local hubs, for wages way under their regular employees. These companies can even make production by getting the lowest costs via virtual labor markets through auction by underbidding on project or piece basis. Today, the developing means of communication that Marx believed would contribute to the organization of the proletariat provide ground for the deepening of exploitation.

2.3. Marxist Conception of Class after Marx

In development of Marxist theory, Antonio Gramsci has a pioneering and significant role through his productive critique of scientific Marxism. The primary concerns in his analyses were the reasons for the failure of proletarian revolution and the alternative methods for workers to rise to power within the conditions of capitalist development that is departed from the Marxist expectations. In the circumstances where the objective conditions of the working class does not necessitate or bring the long expected revolution, Gramsci was mostly concentrated on the foundations of bourgeois rule. The primary focus for understanding these foundations was the utilization of the state as an apparatus, and through the state the employment of cultural institutions for maintaining power of the ruling class. He developed the concept of hegemony in this context and dealt with the class subjectivity. Although in understanding the political

struggle of the working class and the capitalist class, Gramsci's contributions are invaluable, as in the perspective of this study they are peripheral. Hence I will not go further in detail of his theoretical influences to the conception of class. I would rather focus on the contributions of three other giant figures, namely Georg Lukacs, Louis Althusser and Edward P. Thompson.

The reason why these three figures are chosen among many other who made productive critical readings of Marx is that together they would provide us with a framework through which the existing conditions of the working class in Turkey could be examined and grasped. Usually the opposition between Althusser and Thompson is construed on the basis of structure and agent dichotomy. However, here the dispute or disagreement of these two particular scholars is taken into consideration with respect to the importance they give to the part of the Marxist distinction between objective and subjective conditions of the working class. Although Marx did not use the exact terms, their stress on the different stages of the formation of class as 'class in itself' and 'class for itself' makes their analyses valuable in the view of this study. On the other hand, before consideration of the ideas of these scholars, Lukacs contribution to Marxist literature with respect to the abovementioned distinction will try to be given.

2.3.1. Lukacs

In *The Historical Novel*, Lukacs states his aim, like Marx, as translating the whole mysticism of the spirit into the materialist historical reality.⁷⁷ In accordance with this aim the first critical premise of Marx is the denial of the conception of 'man' in abstract form other than sorts of 'men' who exist in different times and places. According to Marx, as forms of life man leaves changes, and the nature of man changes, as well. So, what should one seek in history is the way in which man makes his living; the tools they use, and the organization of their labor in striving to satisfy their own needs.⁷⁸ "First Premises of Materialist Method" in *The*

⁷⁷ Lukacs, 1976, p. 119

⁷⁸ Acton, 1973

German Ideology, starts with a claim to begin with 'real' premises; real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity.⁷⁹ In other words one should look at the way in which men produce their means of subsistence. Marx, clearly makes a difference between the existing means in nature that are reproduced by men and production with respect to the development of new productive forces, since the latter causes in return the division of labor.⁸⁰ The division of labor that results from the improvement of tools and methods of production leads to class division. As mentioned before, class is a vaguely defined concept by Marx, and it is possible to witness two particular, but not contradicting, meanings attributed to the term; (1) wide clusters of people which can be assorted together by an objective criterion with respect to their relationship to the means of production, and (2) groupings of exploiters and the exploited that emerged in all human societies beyond primitive communal as a result of the division of labor. The word objective in the first definition and the word exploitation in the second are quite critical, as the former defines the factual existence of class, while the latter introduces a subjective criterion in it. Lukacs bases his understanding of class and class consciousness on this duality.⁸¹

As a result of the division of labor, different classes emerge in history. Among these classes, those that realize their own existence as a class and whose members pursue the interest of the class in general, participate in the making of history, while others are simply victims of that banish in time. Lukacs conceives this self-realization process for a class as a transition from class in itself to class for itself. The class that takes the exploiter position with respect to the dominant mode of production becomes the dominant class and in time it is subjected to a further separation on the basis of material and mental work, which results in a sub-class. The ideas from the view point of the dominant class are imposed on the whole of

⁷⁹ Marx, 2000, p.6

⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 6

⁸¹ Hobsbawm, 1971, pp. 5-6

society through this sub-class of thinkers. In a historical epoch – a period during which a given mode of production prevails – the ideas produced by this sub-class determine the consciousness of the existing order.⁸² For Marx, all the ideas related to the consciousness from a certain class viewpoint within a historical epoch forms ideology. In that respect, ideologies are misleading and illusory systems of ideas that determine our consciousness.

Marx and Engels claim that men become conscious of the conflict in material conditions of production, i.e. economic relations, in ideological forms. Yet for them, those ideas do not have an external existence of their own, but simply result from the material conditions of men. In other words, our ideas and consciousness of our material conditions of production are determined by the economic sphere. This is basically the two-tier structure that was sought to be schematized before on the basis of economy determines the superstructure. Marx puts this relationship into words, in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859) as;

The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure, and to which corresponds definite forms of consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political, and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. (...) The changes in the economic foundation lead, sooner or later, to the transformation of the whole, immense, superstructure. In studying such transformations, it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic, or

⁸² Acton, 1973

philosophic - in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.⁸³

So for Marx a period of transformation cannot be explained by the consciousness of it, but must be assessed by the conflict existing between social forces of production and the relations of production. This assessment is possible only through the positive science of men and society; a science based on the observation of men as they really are in their day to day concerns. To sum up, ideas with respect to those relations from the limited viewpoint of the dominant class corresponds to consciousness that is false. As this consciousness is determined by the existing relations of production, the real motives driving the thinker (the material conditions of existence, in the historical epoch at stake) are actually unknown to him. Marx compares this to the inversion of objects on the retina and argues that the appearance of the circumstances of men in all ideology upside-down as in a *camera obscura* is similarly resulted from the historical life-process.⁸⁴

Lukacs, while agreeing with this dichotomy, tries to explain it in a different way with a more Hegelian terminology and since he is not satisfied merely with the statement of false consciousness, he attempts to understand the meaning of it at the level of class consciousness and its practical (functional) significance in the revolutionary process. Prior to that, he looks into Marx's critical evaluation of how bourgeois thinking conceives history. The first premise of Marxist criticisms of history is the realization that the real driving forces of history are independent of man's consciousness of them. It is obvious that people have motives, intentions and wills, yet what is important is the drive behind them. With this respect, Marx criticizes both the idealist conception of history and eternal laws of nature governing society. He denies history unfolding itself through an evolving content that reaches a peak point as an end. He undermines the eternally valid principles

⁸³ Marx, 1996/b, p. 4

⁸⁴ Marx, 2000, p. 9

that are external to mankind either in the form of ideas or social institutions. Instead, he recognizes those ideas and institutions as social constructs of men which constitute the real history by bringing men together in societies.⁸⁵ This is where the conflict between the exploiter and the exploited comes to scene, a conflict that is not to continue forever as fate, but to be resolved in a synthesis. However, this resolving is not the end of the history as it is in the Hegelian dialectic, but a moment when men cease to be controlled or ruled by their own social action that takes the form of action of objects. The objectivity at stake is the self-objectification of human society at a particular stage in its development and is to reach a dissolving moment in that course of development. This is how Lukacs perceives the history in the sense of Marxist dialectics. Nonetheless, this resolution does not occur in essence by itself, instead class consciousness plays a crucial role.

According to Lukacs, having displayed bourgeois history as a dogma, Marx proposes a critical philosophy; a theory of theory...⁸⁶ Bourgeois thinking (ab)uses history as an apologia for the existing conditions or a way of legitimizing them. Such a perception concludes either with the idea of a history at an end or with the denial of historical development. So for bourgeois thought, there was once history but not anymore, or history can never be understood with rational categories and every age is reduced to a subjective equivalence. In Lukacs' own words, Marx resolves this dilemma by exposing it as an illusion.⁸⁷ Considering the aforementioned understanding of real in Marxist thinking in respect to ideology, the relationship between real and illusion and how illusion is created are to be examined. For that purpose, Lukacs claims that Marx takes over from Hegel the "category of totality, the all-pervasive supremacy of the whole over the parts".⁸⁸ However, Marx transforms the concept into the foundations of a whole new

⁸⁵ Lukacs, 1968, p.47.

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 48

⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 49

⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 50-52

science. The basis of this science lies at the idea that the production relations in every society form a whole.⁸⁹ Ideology as the representation of the class consciousness of bourgeoisie determines the “form of the objectivity”, thus the structure of knowledge itself.⁹⁰ However, as it is mentioned before that consciousness is false, because it is only limited to the class view point of exploiter. It lacks the capacity to grasp the whole. For Lukacs, class consciousness is not merely the awareness of a particular class at a particular stage of history. It is rather an objective awareness of itself that is its location within the class structure and the essential role of the class structure within the social totality as a whole.⁹¹ When Lukacs talks about totality he is not referring to something external to society. He means nothing other than the overall relation between the constitutive parts of the social that are visible in class struggle. Hence, totality does not refer to ‘absolute’ as it is in Hegel.

Class consciousness is then for a class to realize its role as a part of the concrete social totality. Nevertheless, this is only one dimension of class consciousness for Lukacs, because in its dialectical course, society as a concrete totality changes through history. Then, the relation between the tasks of the immediate present and the totality of the historical process turns out to be another dimension of class consciousness.⁹² Therefore, class consciousness must be assessed to be true or false at two different levels, namely at subjective and objective levels. Any class that establishes its relation to society as a whole can achieve a class consciousness subjectively justified in the social and historical condition at issue. Yet, this consciousness can be false with respect to the essence of the evolution of society and objectively can be false. It is also possible for a class to actualize the objective aims of a society while failing to reach its self-appointed goals.⁹³ From this point of view, the dominant class in a historical era can have an active role in history

⁸⁹ Marx, 2009, p. 49

⁹⁰ Lukacs, 1967, pp. 59-60

⁹¹ Lukacs, 1965, p. 50

⁹² Lukacs, 1967, p. 5

⁹³ Ibid. p. 226

but cannot go beyond the role history assigns it. It is impossible for it to remain objective, as it lacks the possibility to grasp the totality. There is only one exception for that; proletariat.

Lukacs argues that only proletariat has the objective possibility of perceiving the essence of the evolution of the concrete social totality that requires a class to give up its power freely and view the social relations from a central point (as opposed to a limited viewpoint of class).⁹⁴ Thus, proletariat has the capacity to realize its ascribed consciousness as a class. To abolish the existing relations of production in the capitalist society, proletariat should rise to the challenge and fulfill its historical role. In this sense, Lukacs proclaims proletariat to be the subject-object of history.

In conclusion, "bourgeois science is abstract and ideological by being based on false consciousness, for only true class consciousness is possible by becoming conscious of the historical role of the class which is impossible for bourgeoisie."⁹⁵ Lukacs also puts forward this impossibility in a general sense as follows:

"It is only when the core of being has showed itself as social becoming, that the being itself can appear as a product, so far unconscious, of human activity, and this activity, in turn, as the decisive element of the transformation of being."⁹⁶

Then, when the core of being shows itself as social becoming, objective determination of men comes to an end, and a subjective possibility arises. This idea of Lukacs underlines ideology to be a theory of subject and subject's role in the historical process of development.

⁹⁴ Lukacs, 1967, p. 79

⁹⁵ Lukacs, 1965, p. 73

⁹⁶ Lukacs, 1967, p. 5

2.3.2. Althusser

This is the point where Althusser takes over the discussion on class consciousness and examines it in relation to his specific conception of ideology and subject. While Marx claims that genuine theory is mastery over events and with proletariat and the concrete science of totality men will reclaim the rein of history, Althusser develops an alternative perspective to this idea.

René Descartes, in his *Discourse on Method*, claims that good sense; the power of judging well and of telling the true from the false, is equal in all men. His basis for this argument is the self-evaluation of all people in this respect that everyone thinks they have such a good supply of it that do not want more, even if they are extremely hard to please about other things. He believes that it is not possible for everyone to be mistaken about something. This is part of the very basis upon which Descartes grounds his philosophical thinking through which he argues that thanks to the infallibility of reason, everything that can be doubted can be rendered certain and knowable by use of a systematic method. He judges that the historical existence of mankind is also involved in this sphere of knowledge. For Descartes, to distinguish between right and wrong is only a matter of rightly conducting the reason. In opposition to the conclusions of the Cartesian philosophy, Marx claims that until a certain moment in history, everyone (who has the possibility of being active and effective in history) can be mistaken about history, about men, about their relation to their conditions of living, etc... Their consciousness of them is false. Because of this illusion they perceive the results of their own activity as external and eternal universal laws. A scientific approach that makes the totality visible will make men comprehend that those laws are nothing but consequences of their actions and will also be eliminated by their action. The elimination at issue will be realized by the proletariat and men will be released from the chains they produced and be free. One aspect of the Marxist theory is an undeniable fact that with the advent of the proletariat as an actor of power struggle in the scene of history, and for the first time in history, a perspective other than the thinking of the dominant class has been voiced and become effective. This critical and alternative reading of history is valuable at least in this respect and

deserves the theoretical presence it has in many fields of study in social sciences including studies of inequality, regardless of having many defects that even orthodox Marxists admit. This is so, as despite the defects of the theory, due to its dialectical nature and revolutionary character, it is always open to philosophical development.⁹⁷ Based on this feature, Althusser adds a new dimension to the Marxist conception of ideology.

Althusser and Ideology as Interpellation

It is seen that Lukacs brought an alternative analogy to the base-superstructure dichotomy in Marxist thinking. This alternative paved the way to broadening the limited view of society based on economical determinism, in the tradition, at least for the historical period following the emergence of proletariat or to put it in a different way, after the capitalist era. Another Marxist thinker who had great influence on the development of class analysis was Althusser, who also examined the same dichotomy and enhanced it in a way to open more space for the elements of superstructure in the historical context.

Althusser initiates his specific reading of Marx with the notion that no social formation can survive without the reproduction of its conditions of production, which include productive forces and the existing relations of productions. To reproduce the relations of production simply means to reproduce the material conditions of production which is related to the need for the reproduction of the means of production. Although, at first glance, this may seem possible to be analyzed at the economic unity of firm, it is actually more complex in that it involves a necessary dependency to other agents and the reproduction of their means of production, as well. Even though it had been possible to conceive it at the level of firm, productive forces are not limited to the means of production, but also involves the labor power, the reproduction of which definitely occurs outside the firm. This is why if one talks about reproduction of productive forces, it is

⁹⁷ Althusser, 2005, pp. 224-226

obvious that what is dealt with is entirely a new domain.⁹⁸ Then, one should identify this domain and concentrate on it in order to understand how social formation continues to exist.

When he talks about reproduction of labor, Althusser distinguishes between the long term reproduction of labor and short term reproduction. The short term reproduction of labor is simply acquired through the satisfaction of the needs of the workers⁹⁹ by consumption outside the factory. Although how the needs of the workers are defined historically and the ways they are satisfied are important issues, Althusser leaves them aside to focus on long term reproduction of labor. It involves not only the reproduction of the labor force with certain skills that the labor market requires, but also reproduction of the labor force in a way to provide its subjection to the existing relations of production; i.e. it involves the obedience of the working class to the ruling class. Primarily, Althusser deals with the apparatuses of this subjection and the theory of it. To locate the sphere of this subjection, Althusser, with a critical addition to the classical Marxist theory of state, contributes the distinction between the state apparatus and the state power with a further distinction in the state apparatus as repressive and ideological. For Althusser, state apparatus functions through repression in the interest of the ruling class and it is a unique apparatus. At opposition to that, ideological state apparatuses are structures fairly disperse that exist in plurality and are possible to be thought of as a unified body through their essential functioning principle; namely ideology.¹⁰⁰

The separation between repressive state apparatus and ideological state apparatuses by Althusser, has significance in two respects. First, it necessitates a new conception of power beyond coercion in Marxist theory. And, second, it underlines the need for a theory of ideology at the structural level. The former

⁹⁸ Althusser, 1971, p. 127

⁹⁹ The new meaning of need in the advanced capitalist society should be kept in mind.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, pp. 142-148

point raises further thinking on the distinction between public and private on the basis of the description of 'public' by Antonio Gramsci as where the bourgeoisie law enacts or exercises its authority.¹⁰¹ If ideological state apparatuses involve institutions like family, which are generally thought to belong to the domain of private, reevaluating the relationship between public and private on the basis of a new conception of power is indispensable. Moreover, if one talks about institutions of religion, education, politics and partially law as ideological state apparatuses, then a search for a theory of ideology must try to grasp how ideology operates at the institutional level.¹⁰² Althusser reinstates the understanding of ideology in Marxist thinking in this framework.

Taking over the definition of ideology from Marx as the system of the ideas and the representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group, Althusser elaborates why ideology is a negative concept. In Marxist thinking, the negative value attributed to ideology is based on the Feuerbachian understanding of the concept. According to Feuerbach, men make themselves an alienated representation of their conditions of existence, which are the 'real' conditions of mankind. Due to the alienation of men from their real conditions, the consciousness of them results in a false representation. The reasons behind this false representation are the real conditions of mankind. In Feuerbach's view, which also Marx agrees with, the real conditions in which men exist are alienating. For Marx, since the material conditions of men are the real conditions of men and a conflict between the conditions of mankind and their representation distorts and obscures the reality ideology is taken in a negative sense. In short, for Marx, men make themselves an alienated representation of their conditions of existence because of the alienating character of the conditions of existence and ideology is the misrepresentation of the real (material conditions of mankind).¹⁰³ Althusser denies the Feuerbachian conception of ideology and claims in contrast

¹⁰¹ Gramsci, 1971, p. 513

¹⁰² Althusser, 1971, 184

¹⁰³ Ibid, p. 164

that what leads men to misrepresent their own conditions of existence is the way the relationship of men to their conditions of existence is established, which he calls 'imaginary'. In ideology, what is represented is not the real world in an imaginary way, but the way men relate to the world surrounding them, or in Althusser's words, the imaginary nature of this relation. More important than all, this imaginary way of relating to the conditions of existence is actually the real conditions of mankind. By this intervention Althusser simply balances the relationship between the infrastructure and superstructure in Marxist theory, if not turns it upside down.

Althusser by drawing on Freud's theory of unconscious makes an analogy between ideology and dream. He claims that Marx regards ideology in the sense that dream was conceived before Freud; an imaginary assemblage (bricolage), a pure emptiness and vainness, constituted by the 'day's residues' from the only full and positive reality, that of 'the concrete history of concrete material individuals materially producing their existence'.¹⁰⁴ Ideology is, then, for Marx nothing but a pure dream. It has no history, at least no history of its own as it is just an inverted reflection of the real history. Althusser, adopting this very same phrase by Marx uses it in a positive sense. He first detaches ideology and specific ideologies. While ideologies have their own history, despite being determined outside of them by material relations, ideology in general has no history. Like the eternal unconscious in the Freudian sense, ideology as such is immutable throughout the course of history in terms of its functioning and structure and its reality is omni-historical. This is what legitimizes for Althusser a theory of ideology in general and comes up with peculiar theses on the structure and functioning of ideology.¹⁰⁵

The first premise he presents that leads him to his central thesis is mentioned before as 'ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence'. His second thesis claims ideology to have a material

¹⁰⁴ Althusser, 1971, p. 161

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, p. 161

existence. By this statement, Althusser hypothetically rejects the ideal (idéale or idéelle) or spiritual existence of ideas or representations which seem to make up ideology. Yet, the statement also denies the disregarding of those ideas as illusions but construes them as springing out of materially existing relations or practices in the materially existing institutions that in turn produce materially existing consequences. Moreover, as Althusser claims the imaginary relation of mankind to their conditions of production is itself endowed with a material existence.

Althusser further explains the material existence of ideology through the notion of the ideology of ideology. Ideology of ideology simply functions in a way to make one conceive oneself out of ideology. Anyone who believes in an ideology thinks, thanks to ideology of ideology, that he or she is a conscious subject who freely chooses the ideas that are present in his or her consciousness and acts accordingly. Althusser, stresses the importance of practice here;

[...] this ideology talks of actions: I shall talk of actions inserted into practices. And I shall point out that these practices are governed by the rituals in which these practices are inscribed, within the material existence of an ideological apparatus, his ideas are his material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject.¹⁰⁶

Through this analysis he summarizes that while the concept of ideas in the definition of ideology in a Marxist sense disappears, along with the surviving notions of subject, consciousness, belief and actions, others like practices, rituals and ideological apparatus come along. From this summary, Althusser acquires the central term of ideology as subject and to reach his primary theses he lays down two major arguments; first, he claims that there is no practice except 'by and in an

¹⁰⁶ Althusser, 1969, p. 168

ideology', and second there is no ideology except 'by the subject and for the subject'. Althusser means by these that the constitutive category of all ideology, regardless of the alternative names under which it functions like soul or god, is subject. Nevertheless, for Althusser, this is a mutual constitution as ideology has the function to constitute concrete individuals as subjects. As he quotes from St Paul, it is in the 'Logos', meaning in ideology, that we 'live, move and have our being'. Even before the moment we are born by having been given a name, we are constituted by ideology as concrete subjects. By the functioning of the category of the subject, all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as subjects. The interpellation takes place in almost every moment of our daily routines of gestures and rituals. It happens in everyday life, and in everyday language in its materiality. But considering that we are interpellated by ideology even before we are born, or to put it in a different way in account of the fact that we are subjects prior to our material existence in this world, it is possible to say that individuals are always-already subjects. In this sense, it is not possible to be outside the ideology, although ideology always denies the ideological character of ideology. It acts as if it is outside the ideology. That is why Althusser claims that ideology has no outside, yet at the same time it is nothing but outside from the view point of science and reality.

In conclusion, it is possible to say that the theory of ideology that Althusser develops on the basis of Marxist premises and by use of Freudian (and Lacanian) concepts is a theory of the subjection and constitution of subjects. That which Althusser chiefly focuses on is the structure and function of the ideology and its enabling characteristic as well as its repressive side. The domain that ideology operates in is not only the intellectual sphere, political arena, institutional structures but also the daily life where certain utterances of language between subjects occur. This is the framework that ideology in general functions and ideologies are produced, reproduced and denied as truth.

2.3.3. E. P. Thompson

In opposition to the Althusserian idea of calling, E. P. Thompson's¹⁰⁷ approach to the conception of class and the development of the working class historically can be summarized with his famous phrase; 'the working class made itself as much as it was made'.¹⁰⁸ Thompson's examination of the working class focuses on a specific period of English history, when he believes that masses of individual workers turned into a class with common interests and values, and a common culture. For Thompson, in the period between 1790 and 1832, workers in England started to see themselves as one class in conflict with the property-owning classes. In the said period, he argues that the workers achieved 'collective self-consciousness and 'perhaps the most distinguished popular culture England has known'. Although his particular stress was on cultural experience, he starts his analysis with a structural change that while in the late 18th century workers of England were 'slaves' of landlords, until the mid-19th century a great transformation had been witnessed that made workers 'slaves' of a bourgeois democracy instead. He defines this transformation as a revolutionary process.¹⁰⁹

Although Thompson defines the process experienced in the approximate 40 year period he examines as the development of the working class in opposition to the middle and upper classes of English society. He believes that classes cannot exist as separate entities so they find enemy classes and struggle against them. They experience the existing relations of production through exploitation. They realize conflicting interests and struggle in respect to these issues. Their discovery of the existing relations of production comes through class consciousness. Class and class consciousness are posterior to objective conditions in the real historical processes. They follow experience.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Although the common usage of the name is with initials to distinguish E.P. Thompson from his father, in this study, this point onward his initials will not be used as the text includes no reference to Edward John Thompson.

¹⁰⁸ Thompson, p. 194 reference to printed version

¹⁰⁹ Currie and Hartwell, 1965, pp. 633-638

¹¹⁰ Thompson, 1995, p. 136

Although Thompson is being accused of culturalism from time to time, this does not mean that he denies the existence of structures in his analysis. He admits the economic class structures but focuses on describing the cultural experience of them. He is interested in the workers' way of life, their dispositions and cultures. It is certain that workers find themselves in determined structure. However, within the given structures in the social existence they create their own unique experiences. By means of these experiences they become conscious of their lives and develop political orientations and actions. Thompson's conception of class is a holistic one that involves various dimensions. Yet his examination of these dimensions is not through structural levels. Instead, he is interested in the way people live within the boundaries of those structures and how they realize them. He seeks the patterns of collective action through the experience of structures. In Thompson's approach to class, both experience and agency is considered culturally mediated.¹¹¹ Hence, Thompson construes class not as a category or structure. But instead he conceives it as a relation or process.¹¹²

It has already been mentioned that for Thompson, experience is determined by the relations of production. The experience becomes concrete through traditions, value systems, thoughts and institutional forms. Class consciousness is embracing the experience in these cultural forms. Hence experience is visible, yet class consciousness is not. That is why experience is crucial in Thompson. It is the practical means through which we grasp class consciousness. By this practical means of events and phenomena we realize that class formation can be conceived only within the historical context. Indeed Thompson believes that for an artificial moment of silence in history, in a paused instant there would be nothing but a collection of distinct individuals. It is not possible to talk about a class in such a scenario. On the other hand, Thompson argues that as these people are observed in the continuity of their social existence, certain patterns and regularities in their

¹¹¹ Spohn, 1990, pp. 80-81

¹¹² Yılmaz, 2013, p. 353

relations, thoughts and institutions are revealed. He states that class is defined by the people as they live their own self-history. He opposes solely an economic conception of class and the claim that it is the way Marx defines it.¹¹³ In his assessment of the agenda of Thompson's work, Richard Webster refers to George Orwell's famous saying in *The Road to Wigan Pier* that "The job of the thinking person is not to reject socialism but to make up his mind to humanize it".¹¹⁴ It is not possible to evaluate the righteousness of this remark for socialism within the limitations of this study but it could be easily said that Webster's ascription is definitely true for Marxism. Thompson's contribution to Marxist theory of class is in humanizing it.

Although there used to be a tense discussion between Althusser and Thompson in regard to the nature of class, in the scope of this study it is possible that the two conceptions of class presented by these two scholars may be aggregated. The distinction that Lukacs draws between the objective class consciousness and subjective class consciousness creates the ground for having a perspective that could embrace both thinkers' understandings of class. The class consciousness that refers to the positions of a class within the relations of production of a given mode of production suits with the Thompsian understanding of class consciousness. Workers who realize their interests within their objective conditions and in this regard comprehend their connections with those other people with similar interests could acquire objective class consciousness. At the second level Lukacs talks about a subjective consciousness of a certain class that realizes the totality of history and its role in that. In history, for Althusser it is the structure that he calls ideology as such, that prevents classes to envisage the totality at stake and postpone continuously the realization of subjective class consciousness. Such a conception could hardly come close to Thompson's analysis; nevertheless this is an argument that works at a totally different level to that of Thompson's examination. Hence, neither it is relevant to his writings nor

¹¹³ E.P. Thompson, 2004, pp. 40-42

¹¹⁴ Webster, 1982

to the interest of this thesis. On the other hand, the ideological state apparatuses and ideologies in particular that are concrete structure where Thompson starts his culturally oriented examination of the capitalist industrial order are quite relevant to the subject at stake. If the question of revolution and the conditions of subjective class consciousness are put aside, there is no obstacle left between Althusserian and Thompsonian analysis of class, except for the primacy of structure or agent. The latter dichotomy could also be resolved in Lukacs conception of subject and class as becoming in long terms. Such a conception involves both stability of structure and the flow of collective agency at the same level, therefore opens space for the alternative class conceptions.

To sum up, Thompson's approach deals with the formation of class consciousness at the objective level and he examines the conditions of it in respect to cultural aspects. On the other hand, Althusserian structural analysis of class deals with the institutional mechanisms and ideologies that shape the subjects and classes within the context of any given mode of production. In respect to the question of whether consciousness of class emerges from certain daily life practices and experiences Thompson is preoccupied with the conditions that form it, while Althusser concentrates on structures that prevent it. The structural analysis of Althusser provides a good starting point for a further Thompsonian examination of class over conditions and relations. It is plausible to say that what defines a worker as a worker, for Althusser, is being born into a social existence where something "called" worker, and the practices of which, have been clearly defined. Workers act in accordance with the expectations from a worker defined by ideological rules. For Thompson, on the other hand, people, by living in the objective conditions that being a worker brings and conducts certain practices and common behaviors within those conditions, create what being a worker is. In doing so, they overcome the necessities defined by the structurality into which they were born. However, Althusser believes that there exist unavoidable practices governed by ideological state apparatuses that workers are willingly or unwillingly involved in. Those would operate in a way to prevent a worker from reaching a consciousness level that Thompson defines. Yet, Althusser's conception of ideologies in

particular has never been a rigid or structural one. They may be realized; they may be overcome, replaced or reformed. The only condition that Althusser puts forward is that all that happens would occur within the boundaries of ideology as such.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORY OF THE WORKING CLASS IN TURKEY: OTTOMAN ERA

3.1. Ottoman Economic Structure in the Classic Age

Understanding the legacy passed on to Turkey by the laborers and specifically the workers of the Ottoman era, is possible through having a better grasp of the economic and social organization of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, the experience of the Ottoman laborers in the economic and social structure of the empire would tell us about the formation of the working class in Turkey, vis-à-vis the heritage left to the early republican period. Also having a closer look at the formation of the working class in Turkey substantially requires examining the development or underdevelopment of capitalism in late Ottoman history. Transformation of the Ottoman economic model is crucial in that respect. However, it is not possible to explain the economic structure of a state like the Ottoman Empire that reigned for a long period of time and over a large and diverse geographical area with a single conception or model. Certainly, setting aside a few exceptions, structures and inclinations that endure time and space and reflect the general character of the empire are apparent. But finding them is a challenge in itself.

For better understanding, the history of the empire and its advancement, avoiding over generalizations, is paramount. For example, considering the first three and a half centuries of the empire, categorized as the rise and growth periods, one of the important sources of income for the Ottoman treasury was revenue obtained through conquest. In the stated period, the Ottoman state expanded from a little ghazi emirate to an empire ruling lands of nearly twenty million square kilometers, over three continents and was sovereign over various vassal states. Nonetheless, it is not plausible to categorize the Ottoman Empire merely as a capture or pillage empire, and the expansion halted in the late 17th century. Firstly,

this categorization fails to embrace the whole history of the state, but also the existence of a solid developing economic model, that began to be employed even in the rise and growth eras of the empire, would refute such a claim. One should think twice about reaching hasty and essentialist conclusions about the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman state was based on a complex structure, which arrived over time and through long-term efforts, and it cannot be easily reduced to simple explanations.

An expedient, yet comprehensive and cautious definition regarding the empire is brought forward by Şerif Mardin. Following Bent Hansen, he calls the Ottoman state, a “fiscal state”. What Mardin means by fiscal state is a state whose primary economic policy is to maximize the taxation of the rural economy.¹¹⁵ Halil İnalcık, following van Klaveren, also uses the concept of fiscalism for defining the Ottoman economic mind.¹¹⁶ Fiscalism or fiscal state closely defines the Ottoman economic principle for the classic era of the empire. The functional existence of the Ottoman economic model was completed with extensive laws, registry systems and institutional structures, in this classic era which might be dated as the 15th-16th centuries. The history of that period should be examined through the existence and functionality of this model, whereas, the late Ottoman history should be construed via the decline and transformation of this structure. In this period, the Ottoman economy was mostly based on agrarian production. Along with the agrarian production, provincial administration, maintenance of the main forces of the army and rural security were achieved through a land management system called *timar*.

3.1.1. Ottoman Rural Life and Land Administration (*Timar*) System

In the Ottoman Empire, in the literal sense, private property did not exist. With certain exceptions, the whole country principally belonged to the Ottoman sultans

¹¹⁵ Mardin, 1980, p. 206. For Hansen’s referred work please see Hansen, B. (1973). *An Economic Model for Ottoman Egypt: the Economics of Collective Tax Responsibility*. Berkeley, California: Institute of International Studies.

¹¹⁶ İnalcık, 1994, p. 44

and to the state. Inspired by the Islamic ruling tradition and Roman/Byzantium land administration systems, in most of the arable Ottoman lands, the property, possession and usage rights belonged to the state. These lands were called *miri* lands. The usage rights of the lands acquired through conquest, or the unoccupied lands reclaimed, were given to their existing owners or Ottoman subjects, respectively, through a rental contract. Dependent peasants were in return held responsible for cultivating the land, collecting the crops and giving a fixed rated tax named *öşür* (*aşar* in its plural form, meaning one tenth). The land that *reaya* (peasant families) plough was organized as farms and a bunch of farms formed a *timar*. These lands provided total revenue of more than twenty thousand *akçes* (the Ottoman currency at the time). *Timar* holders were soldiers who showed effectiveness in war or administrative duty, and were called *sipahi*.

The possession right of the land was given to the *reaya* with a contract called a *tapu*.¹¹⁷ Although in modern Turkish the term *tapu* is used for a title deed or land registry that bonds full ownership rights, the traditional concept used to refer to a contract regarding only the usage rights of the land. It was more like a lease that had no end date and continued as long as the peasant family satisfied the obligation of cultivating the land, giving certain services to the state and *sipahi*, and paying tithes and dues each year. Since a certain fee in cash is paid to *timar* owners to acquire the *tapu*, it is plausible to think of what is sold as a ‘business enterprise’ that has a right to use the mentioned *çiftlik* (farm) in the contract. Although the *tapu* did not include any inheritance rights, in the case of a family land under *tapu* becoming vacant, firstly the relatives of the family and then the inhabitants of the village had preeminent rights to bid for the *tapu*.

Sipahis did not get any salary from the central treasury. Instead, they received the tax income of the *timar* they held. As long as they were not expelled from military duty, they could hand down the right to the land they held to their son(s). In return for the tax income they received, *sipahis* were expected to attend military

¹¹⁷ İnalçık and Quataert, 1994, pp. 103-120

campaigns whenever they were called upon. Depending on the size of their *timar*, they might also be asked to provide extra soldiers and supplies. Since they formed the main body of the Ottoman army, there is a tendency to believe that *sipahis* were of Turkic Muslim origin. On the contrary, they did not even constitute the majority of the sum total.¹¹⁸ Soldiers from the *kul* origin constituted the majority of non-Muslim *timar* holders. Along with their military responsibilities, *sipahis* were also expected to maximize the cultivated land within the boundaries of their *timar*, although there was no sanction for the lack of effort. They held police authority in their regions, as well. However they did not have execution rights without judgment by the *kadis* (local magistrates assigned by central authority).

Timar lands would never be comprised of a whole village. A village would consist of two or three *timars* that were held by different owners. In this way, the security responsibility was divided, moreover, any local centralization of power was avoided. The rule was also valid for larger lands. These lands, the income of which was larger due to the physical size and therefore bigger in terms of earnings, were called *ziamet* and *hass*. *Zaims*; *ziamet* owners, and *begs of sancaks* or *beglerbegis* of provinces could hold land that was in spread out areas, so that they were responsible for different regions and could not have control over just one. This organization also works like an insurance system, so that in the case of a drastic reduction of crops in one region due to *casus major* like drought, flood or fire, the income of other regions would balance both the needs of the land holders and the dependent peasants. Unlike the feudal systems, an Ottoman provincial administration had measures and mechanisms to prevent local authorities from gaining enough power to control the whole region. Along with the distribution of power among different government officers in the regions, a constant presence of central authority through *kapıkulu* soldiers was also an effective precautionary measure. The castles situated in the *sancaks* or province centers were inhabited by *janissary* (soldiers of Porte) garrisons. The control of the citadels was given to *janissaries* called *kale dizdarı* (castle wardens). Moreover, the inspection

¹¹⁸ Ortaylı, 2007, pp. 51-53

authority of the castles was given to *kadis* instead of *beblergegis* or *begs*.¹¹⁹ The existence of janissaries in the region represented the direct authority of the sultan, and was able to threaten the local powers with the sword in cases of rebellion. Furthermore, unlike the *zaims* and *sipahis* who had lifelong rights, *begs* and *beglerbegis* could only hold the *hass* lands as long as their assignment in the region continued. When they were transferred to somewhere else they lost their rights to those lands.¹²⁰

With the *timar* system, the revenue produced by the *miri* lands was exploited by the military/administrative class: a large army was maintained without any expenditure from *enderun* (the central treasury), valor in campaign was rewarded, local security was provided, central authority was protected and the basic needs of dependent peasants were met. *Timar* system as a tax collection method also served for the decentralization of revenue. The Ottoman state, by making indirect payments through allocating the rights for land revenues to officers, avoided the burden and risks of carrying large sums of money to the imperial capital. This also helped invigorate local economies. Furthermore, through the system, basic construction duties were planned and carried out at a local level. For example, at the village level, road building or repairing of drinking fountains was the responsibility of *sipahis*. Peasants of a certain type, called *derbentçi*, were charged with the duty of construction, in return for being exempted from tax payment to the *timar* holders. At larger levels, there were units of *su yolcular* and *köprücüler* with the same logic responsible for construction and maintenance of aqueducts or water canals and bridges, respectively. Passing the basic construction duties to local authorities, the Ottoman state also negated the obligation of building larger projects, for instance mosques and *kervansarays*. The reason behind this denial of responsibility was the seeking out of tax revenues from private investment.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ For a detailed account of castle organization in the Ottoman Empire, please see Eftal Şükrü Batmaz, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Kale Teşkilatına Genel Bir Bakış", OTAM (Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Dergisi), Sayı: 7, 1996

¹²⁰ Ortaylı, 2007, pp. 49-56

¹²¹ İnalcık, 1999

Along with private investment, most of the abovementioned construction business was carried out by *vakıfs* (strong charity organizations).

3.1.2. Ottoman Central Administrative Structure: *Kul (Gulam)* System

The main institution of the central administration of the Ottoman state was the *kul* (*gulam*) system. In its early forms, the *kul* system consisted of a structure where slaves were trained as palace servants, statesmen and even elite soldiers. Originally, being a traditional practice of Middle Eastern Islamic states, the *kul* system was adopted by the Ottomans with the addition of the *devşirme* method. In cases of a shortage of necessary slaves, the Ottomans looked to the children of its Christian subjects to cover the required workforce needed in the *kul* systems. Reaching its advanced form in the reign of Mehmet II, allocation of *kuls* widened in the administrative structure to the extent that even grand vizier and viziers started to become of *kul* origin.

Kuls with the highest abilities were chosen for administrative positions. In order to serve in the administrative structure they were well-trained in the education institutions of the palace; *enderun* and *içoğlan*. In principle, ascension in rank was by meritocratic basis. Achievements in the given positions were the key to promotion. *Kuls* were not only utilized in the central state institutions. In accordance with the practice of “going out” (*çıkma*), promotion to positions and within tasks was regularly performed. However, these promotions were applied both vertically and horizontally. In the “going out”, some of the palace officers were sent to *bilun* and assigned for provincial duties (*eyalet*) and given titles in the *eyalet* centers or *sancaks* according to their rank. As mentioned before *beglerbegis* and *begs* were of *kul* origin. *Kuls* of relatively lower ranks were given *zeamets* and *timars*. In the constitution of a central authority, having *kul* soldiers in the capital was a balancing factor. Moreover, through assigning *kuls* to administrative and military positions in the provinces, the existence of central authority was also conveyed to the regions.

Those *kuls* who were not chosen for administrative duties were utilized in the military forces, directly bound to the sultan. *Kul* soldiers, called janissaries, were renowned for being the elite section of the Ottoman army. Selected according to their skills, they were allocated to different sections (*ocak*) and assigned to serve a variety of duties. It is possible to say that there was a high level of specialization in the army. In the line they were consigned to, they used to pursue their training as *acemioğlans* and advance in rank. In the expansion period, the Ottoman Empire highly benefited from a janissary army consisting of well-trained, specialized and experienced soldiers, extremely loyal to the sultans. As the salaries of *kuls* were paid directly by the central treasury, generating a lump sum of money to contain the administrative/military was always an issue for the Ottoman economy, especially considering the fact that for a long time they increased regularly in numbers. The decline in the *timar* system hastened this growth. In the time of Süleyman I, the number of *kapıkulu*, *kuls* in the property of sultan, increased significantly. In 1527, the number of *kapıkulu* in the provinces (*bilun*) was approximately 25 thousand, and their salaries constituted more than 10 percent of the budget. At the end of that century, the total number *kapıkulu* exceeded 80 thousand.¹²²

3.1.3. Ottoman City; Manufacturing (*Lonca* System) and Trade

Ottoman cities were production centers serving to small, close and local markets. There were bigger cities by exception, and they were the centers of regional or international trade¹²³, but they were not many in number. The lack of sufficient means of transportation was the primary reason behind this. Hence, most of the large cities were either port cities, urban centers with relatively advanced and safe road links, or cities with access to big rivers that allowed shipping. A lack of improved circulation of materials led to a scarcity of raw materials in most of the urban production centers. This in turn resulted in the need for an almost perfect supply and demand balance in order to develop a stable business environment. To

¹²² İnalcık, 2009, pp. 210-211, 215

¹²³ İnalcık, 2009, pp. 265-267

provide the conditions and an atmosphere for production, the Ottoman state strictly controlled both the production processes and the selling of goods. Mechanisms of controlling greed, excessive competition and profit were developed.

In the classic age Ottoman cities, there used to be a manufacturing network through which the raw materials coming from agricultural production, hunting, forestry and mining were processed. For certain larger centers, goods of international trade were also used for production. From the provision of raw materials to the acquisition of production tools; from assurance of the minimal quality of the produce to the determination of price margins, the whole production and sale process was organized in the well-planned and controlled structure of a guild (*lonca*) system. The very first function of the system was the obtaining of regular inputs at the lowest possible price. In order to do this, the guild head used to buy the inputs as a bulk sum, and then allocate them transparently and fairly amongst the members. Secondly, while conducting the production within a standard that ensured the utmost conceivable product quality, the system also sought a consistency of outcome among all members of the guild. This way, the differentiation of any of the members through extra sales or a higher-level income was prohibited. The sale of the final product was carried out by the guilds' common shops. So, it can be concluded that there was hardly any room for competition, both in the acquisition or the selling of goods. Control at both ends of the production not only prevented rivalry, but also stabilized price levels. Through the guilds, the state was in affect setting a ceiling for the number of products that could be sold by one member. Moreover, with this direct form of intervention in the market, the state also strictly punished profiteering and speculation of prices. Stocking and black marketing activities of merchants would not have been allowed.

In the *lonca* system, there was a strong relationship between the guilds and the state.¹²⁴ Although guilds were independent in their internal affairs, like electing the head of the guild, they only operated with the approval and title of privilege given to them directly by the sultan.¹²⁵ Also, the affairs of the guilds were supported by state authorities, such as in the case of breaking the strict rules regulating the market. The Ottoman state was concerned with the needs of the city dwellers, and was trying to establish conditions that would satisfy those needs in the best way. In this respect, the limits of production were designated carefully. For example, while in smaller cities like Beypazarı only ten bakeries were allowed, in İstanbul there was more than a hundred and fifty. When further demand occurred, the state allowed new shops or workshops.

As an economic model, where the production was aimed at a small market within the immediate area, inter-regional trade was conducted and organized in a limited number of urban centers. The existence of cities or hinterlands that made production for outside markets and specialized in certain products, made the long distance trade possible. Nevertheless, what initiated the flow of goods to remote areas was the securing of overseas transportation by the merchant states of Venice and Genoa through a strong naval force and capitulations. The demand of overseas markets was realized at both ends of the Mediterranean Sea and the Ottoman Empire not only provided goods for Europe in its core regions, but also mediated the passage of merchandise from east to west and vice versa.¹²⁶ The Ottoman expansion in the Balkans led to the abolition of customs in a very large area. This created a lively and suitable atmosphere for inter-regional trade.¹²⁷ As international trade levels rose, the cities at the intersection points of trade routes started growing. By the 16th century, Konstantiniye was among the most

¹²⁴ Even in the formation period of the early Ottoman Ghazi emirate, artisans and craftspeople were closely involved. For more details on the role of religious artisan organizations in the early Ottoman society, please see İnalçık, 2009, pp. 34-42

¹²⁵ İnalçık 2009 41; pp. 297-298

¹²⁶ Ibid, 298

¹²⁷ İnalçık quotes from C. Jirecek; ibid, p. 301

important cities of world trade. Its population exceeded half a million and overtook London as the largest city in Europe. There were also important trade centers like Bursa, Edirne, Kefe, Haleb, Thessalonica, Kahire, Şam, Trablusşam, Beirut, Basra, Cidde, and Bagdad.¹²⁸ Regional and inter-regional trade was also boosted with the growth of these cities, as a result of the huge increase in demand for supplying the needs of the rising populations of these centers.

Unlike local markets, the Ottoman state had a relatively loose grip on cross-regional transportation and the selling of goods. For production, consumption and transactions of goods on a gigantic scale, the guild system and its strict rules had no use. Although the state had an inclination to enforce the classical model of market regulation, especially for items that weren't necessity commodities, there was a relatively free market. Nevertheless, in spite of the relative freedom from the state, the international trade at that time should not be portrayed as an area of unrestricted and unburdened economic conduct. It was mostly shaped and limited by the conflict between the religiously and culturally competitive worlds of the Ottoman Empire and Europe. The agreements and the privileges of trade freedom (capitulations) in the seas and lands of the Ottoman Empire and its European counterparts was a determining factor on the conditions of business. Almost constant warfare, corsair activities, and the destructive forces of nature made international trade a risky investment.¹²⁹ Therefore, while being a comparatively liberal business, due to its difficulties, possible adversities and risks, international trade required large scale investments. As it utilized the price differences among the distant regions, only with considerable investment was international trade profitable.

Hence, a powerful class of merchant capitalists emerged in the empire. Although the Ottoman state considered this class to be of a lower status compared to the agrarian and manufacturing productive sections of society, the central echelons of

¹²⁸ Ibid, p. 298; İnalcık also adds İzmir to this list with the note that its importance grew only after 17th century.

¹²⁹ Ibid, p.188

power had always held good relations with the merchants. With the capital they held, merchants had an indispensable role in the functioning of the Ottoman economic model, which is addressed in the following section. Merchants were also providers of luxury goods for the society's elite, serving as emissaries and bringing valuable information from distant realms.¹³⁰

3.1.4. Tax-Farmers and Pious Foundations as Capital Holders

The monetary necessities of the Ottoman treasury regularly required tax-farmers who could pay the tax from a certain economic activity in advance to the state or to the military/administrative class. In return, these tax-farmers were given the right to acquire the state's share of the possible revenue of any surplus. By ceding the claim for a portion of its tax rights, the state could ensure a certain level of income for the treasury and actuate the profit generating activities with little effort. In this way, local authorities could concentrate their efforts on other administrative responsibilities and military duties. Large amount of *miri* lands in rural areas that were not registered in the *tapu* system for various reasons were rented out in this manner to other villagers, city dwellers like artisans, merchants or even to soldiers through a method of bidding.¹³¹ If the expected revenue of the land or the economic activity open to *mukata'a* was considerable, then only the merchants holding large amounts of capital could pay such big amounts and thereby save the Ottoman central or local authorities from the difficulty of tax collection. In this sense merchants were serving as mediators between the state and the *reaya*.

Ottoman mines and customs were also enterprises of such kind. Essential goods demanded by the *reaya* like salt, metals such as gold, silver, lead, iron and copper, those necessary for the state's monetary and military needs, and industry inputs like alum for dye production were all important mining assets.¹³² The revenues exploited from mines were so vast that existing rich mining areas accounted for

¹³⁰ Ibid, p. 263

¹³¹ Ibid, pp. 249-250

¹³² Ibid, p. 243

the conquest of certain regions, like in the case of the Balkans. While the mining practices of the conquered areas remained technologically unchanged by the Ottoman authorities, the administrative organization was taken under the *mukata'a* system. Mines of precious metals were of special importance to the state and although the right to operate them was by rental agreement, the selling of the final product to the state mint was compulsory. When it came to salt, as it was a need product, the state used to own the salt beds and the mines directly. Nevertheless, private investment was encouraged to extend the salt sources by giving out the property rights of newly initiated mines to the finders, on condition of paying the necessary taxes. *Mukata'a* owners, who can be envisaged as contractors, would invest the capital required for exploitation, find the labor and also manage the business. The state, in many cases, helped the contractors in acquiring the essential labor force and provided conditions for security.¹³³ In customs offices, although the state did not operate as an active facilitator for the contractors, as it was in the case of mining, the same model and practices were exercised. The capital invested in these businesses was enormous. For example the income the state generated from the tax-farming of copper mines in Kastamonu amounted to almost half of the whole income of the Anatolia province. Similarly, during the last quarter of the 15th century, a consortium of Turkish, Jewish and Greek tax-farmers paid almost half a million Venetian gold for the investment. This amount corresponds to approximately 15 percent of the total Ottoman budget, excluding *timar* revenues.¹³⁴

Along with private investment, another form of capital holder was the pious organizations called *Vakfs*. As explained earlier, apart from cases that required direct involvement of the state for public benefit, the construction activities facilitating commercial activity were left to private investment. Usually activities of this kind were carried out by pious organizations. *Vakfs* were established for clearly defined functions of charity work, with the approval of the central

¹³³ İnalçık and Quataert, 1996, pp. 58-60

¹³⁴ The percentage was calculated based on the budget of 1496 (Alvise Sagudino) given in İnalçık and Quataert, 1996, p. 78, Table I: 18

authority and they were not allowed to serve any other means than this binding purpose. Nevertheless, to fund that charity responsibility, these institutions were either given tax income of certain lands or operated certain service businesses that brought in a continuous income, like running caravanserais and bathhouses. In return, market facilities like bazaars, shops, bedestans and religious and educational buildings of mosques, seminaries and schools were built by *vakfs*. In other words, these pious organizations were investors in specific business areas while being providers of explicit services.

3.1.5. Forms of Labor and Early Workers

The Ottoman state did not count its population until the very late periods of the empire. But instead, they steadily registered the people who had tax obligations.¹³⁵ In spite of the limitations of the information that tax rolls provided, along with the statistics regarding the economically liable population, there is additional data in judiciary registers to get a general picture of the Ottoman economic model and its reproductive social relations. To get a better grasp regarding the Ottoman labor force, one needs to thoroughly understand the economic model consisting of tax generating production, services and investments. Also, how the state uses the generated income is an important area for scrutiny. From now on, I will focus on the conditions of workers in this structure.

To elucidate where Ottoman workers can be found in the examined economic structure, one should first focus on the defining characteristics of workers and see which forms of labor better fit those features in Ottoman society. The primary condition for calling a laborer a worker is the exchange of labor for a form of determined payment. The second condition is liberation of the labor. There are forms of paid labor that are mandatory either by law or by temporary imposition by the state. A laborer can only be called as worker on the condition they have a relatively free choice of work. Talking about free choice also necessitates the multitude of job opportunities to a certain extent within the labor market. Lastly, a

¹³⁵ Quataert, 2000 p. 111

lack of the means for production and a dependence on selling labor power for subsistence is essential.¹³⁶

In the Ottoman economic system, the primary productive classes, i.e. the peasants in the rural areas and the artisans and craftsmen in urban regions, were under rigid state control. The conditions of the laboring population working under the *timar* and *lonca* systems, as examined above, were a lot different than for modern workers in respect to relations of production. The conditions were generated as an inevitable consequence of the economic and social structure that the Ottoman state tried to establish by means of an ideal model. On the other hand, it should be noted that there were exceptions to this ideal model, that alternative forms in terms of relations of production were witnessed in almost every region through the course of time. For example, in the *çift-hassa* system there were farms where the families owning *tapu* hired other families or sometimes even single men for working in agricultural production and for daily activities of farm life. Considering the fact that the income level of *timar* lands varied, in farms with higher earnings these families or laborers could be thought of as receiving their allowance as salaries. Also, *timar*, *zeamet* and *hass* owners, or their contractors under *mukata'a*, were known to hire waged workers for production and for certain services on the lands given to them for their personal use, namely *hassa çiftlik*s.¹³⁷ Unlike agriculture, where the production unit was mostly a nuclear family utilizing the labor power of a pair of oxen, in the urban manufacturing system of guilds, experienced workmen (foremen) and apprentices were paid laborers and should be considered as workers. They were mostly working in the small scale workbenches and shops. While learning the craft or trade from the master, they were also working in the production process in exchange for a salary. Their recruitment and the level of payment they received were determined by the market conditions of supply and demand.¹³⁸

¹³⁶ Koç, 2010, p. 19

¹³⁷ İnalçık and Quataert, 1996 pp. 117-118

¹³⁸ Kırpık, 2004, p. 40

As was explained in previous sections, the Ottoman economy comprised of other productive activities than just these two state controlled economic realms. These activities were enterprises of private investors, who rented in a way to control certain lines of business from the state. Where there was capital accumulation, one could expect to see professional labor relations requiring the presence of workers. In the Ottoman classic era, the activities of merchants, tax farmers and pious organizations are places where, almost in the modern sense, workers could be commonly encountered. Public constructions, workshops of trade goods, mine sites were primary domains where productive waged-labor of different skill levels was concentrated.

The constructions rarely taken on by the state were usually large-scale architectural projects. Along with a large network of public constructions and repair works organized by the chief architect, provincial architects were managing the building and repairing of fortresses, mosques, bridges and other public buildings.¹³⁹ These architects were in charge of employing the craftsmen and workforce needed for the above-mentioned projects. As stated earlier, the rest of the construction business was carried out by the *vakfs*. Mostly these institutions were subcontracting the construction and repair activities they were responsible for to agents called *emin*. Rather than maintaining direct involvement, they assumed a role of supervising the progress of the work. *Emins* were coordinating the operation of the whole business. The services at stake were elicited in a professional manner, by hiring salaried craftsmen and workers.

In the Ottoman manufacturing system, merchants held an exceptional position. They organized the production of goods for the demand of remote markets. The production was mostly workbench based and continued both in professional shops and in the houses of the workers, either in cities or in villages. Raw materials were provided by merchants and the workers received payment in advance per

¹³⁹ İnalcık and Quataert, 1996, p. 79

production piece. Similar investment projects were also held for the extra needs of the state, especially for an expanding military force like garments, etc...¹⁴⁰ The method of production applied was called *selem*. Whilst it does not fit perfectly to the modern employer-employee relationship,¹⁴¹ it involved an early form of the Ottoman industrial worker and paved the way for an advanced capitalist production method in the following centuries, so it has to be worth a mention.

For the construction projects including repairing activities, and the trade based manufacturing production, it is not possible to assume that workers were the primary source of labor. For most of the time, the opposite was the case, yet certain examples leads us to think that waged work was among the prevailing forms of labor in the Ottoman economy. In construction, for example, using labor of *kul* soldiers, slave labor or forced work was also very commonplace. However, it should be noted that in the construction of the Süleymaniye Mosque complex, the majority of the workforce consisted of wage laborers. Compared to a total of 2.7 million workdays, 1.5 million was carried out by workers, which constitutes 55 percent. Of these 1.5 million workdays, more than 80 percent was carried out by skilled laborers. Other sources of labor were cadets of *kul* soldiers (1.1 million workdays) and slaves (140 thousand). Another example of large worker employment was the construction of Musul Castle, where 3,035 wage laborers were hired.¹⁴² Yet, due to a lack of sufficient workers, on various occasions, including construction works like repairing roads and aqueducts, the building of public structures like *medreses*, or the production of war equipment like cannons, central authority would invoke mandatory work. Laborers of various skill levels including low level architects (*benna*), carpenters (*neccar*), porters (*arka hamalı*), stonecutters (*taşçı*), masons (*duvarcı*), sawyers (*bıçkıcı*) and caulkers (*kalafatçı*)

¹⁴⁰ İnalçık, 2009, p. 279

¹⁴¹ Ibid, p. 307

¹⁴² Koç, 2010, p. 46

were called up for public work.¹⁴³ Even *tımar* holding *sipahis* were occasionally used as forced laborer especially in castle building or repair works.¹⁴⁴

Although these laborers were forced to work in the aforementioned jobs, it should be pointed out that in most cases they were relatively well paid. And the obligation to work was limited to the period of construction. So, in the conditions of a labor market where job opportunities were limited, to what extent these works could be construed as enforced is a matter of question. Here, it should be noted that the state's primary principle was the acquisition of a willing workforce wherever possible. Nonetheless, in more urgent cases, the lack of a sufficient labor force in terms of its size and quality, or the inaccessibility of existing labor due to remoteness, the state reluctantly exercised a system of obligatory work. An extreme example of this kind was the mining business. Mines were also sites of production where free wage labor was utilized. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that in principle the Ottoman state preferred freedom of the labor force, compulsory working was often practiced in this sector. As mentioned before, mines were strategically important sites for the state both in terms of their monetary and military significance. The Ottoman state would not allow any mining site to be deserted. Although the primary expectation was employment of free workers at the mines, due to the harshness of the working conditions, the remoteness of the workplaces and the opportunity of possibly losing a better job, most probably in agricultural production, at certain sites free labor was hard to attract.¹⁴⁵ On those occasions, the state forced the *reaya* of close by villages to work in the mines as *küreci* (miners). There was a noteworthy division of labor in these enterprises among miners, coalers, lumberjacks and carpenters. Along with the administrative workers like the minister of a mine, clerk and paymaster, artisans and unskilled laborers were utilized as manual workers. Regardless of high salaries, the right to a share in the final product, tax immunities and

¹⁴³ Kırpık, 2004, 34-35

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 36

¹⁴⁵ Kırpık, 2004, pp. 32-35

reductions, provision of certain needs in kind by the state or inhabitants of environs, miners had a tendency to escape from their duties, in spite of severe punishments.¹⁴⁶

If the areas where workers in the Ottoman economy are present, one can also talk about the existence of wage laborers outside the productive activity, in occupations where certain services are provided. Trade itself was an economic activity of this kind. Ottoman customs were run under the *mukata'a* system and officers working in these institutions were waged workers. Moreover stevedores at the docks, crewmen of ships, carriers and security personnel in caravans were also generally working as wage laborers. Of course slave labor was common in these jobs, too, and there were other forms of work, like *commenda* partnership (*mudaraba*), as well. Officers like scribes or veteran security personnel made partnership contracts with the investor for a share of the successful business profit in return for their labor.¹⁴⁷ At the revenue institutions of the *vakfs*, like public baths and caravanserais, there were also salaried and skilled service personnel. Moreover, along with the businesses of these pious organizations' charity services they provided, were also places where well-educated workers were hired. For example, there were 3,700 salaried persons in mosques in the Anatolia province, whereas 170 professors at the seminaries had salaries paid for by *vakf* endorsements.¹⁴⁸

The workers in production activities done in *miri* land, guild structure, private investments, state or *vakf* constructions and services have been touched upon. Alongside these one could also talk about the existence of paid labor in the central administrative structure of the Ottoman state, which is examined under the title of the *kul* system. It is obvious that it is not possible to talk about the liberation of labor in the case of Ottoman *kuls* as they were either slaves or the outcome of the

¹⁴⁶ Varlık, 1981, pp. 192-197

¹⁴⁷ İnalçık and Quataert, 1996, pp. 47-48

¹⁴⁸ İnalçık and Quataert, 1996, p.83

devşirme system, where they were forcefully taken subjects. Nevertheless, in the late periods of the classic age, in the 17th century, it is known that the recruitment strategy of the *kuls* changed. Everyone, regardless of origin, could enter the system and was free to go out of it in certain conditions. So, it can be concluded that at a certain point they received the status of free labor. Putting aside units of *kapukulu* who were in direct military engagement both in the *enderun* and *bilun*, there used to be a large section of *kuls* who were directly involved in professional occupations. They were regularly paid and had bargaining power over their salaries. So it is plausible to argue that they were prototypical workers.¹⁴⁹ Alongside the administrative structure, reflections of the *kul* system in Ottoman social life gave way to the existence of paid labor. It is a well-known fact that high ranking administrators of the Ottoman state had imitated the palace organization in their private lives. Possession of *kuls* for the services needed in daily life was accepted as an indicator of status. In fulfilling those services together with slave labor, paid labor was also utilized as in the late classic age, a shortage of *kuls* occurred. So in conclusion, a peculiar form of *kul* system in *konak* organization made room for the hiring of workers.¹⁵⁰

Although the first two characteristics of workers; paid and liberated labor, are problematic in the context of the Ottoman classic age, for the last aspect, namely losing the means of production is a less challenging issue. It can be easily said that conditions of the Ottoman economic system regarding agrarian and industrial production would not allow anyone having means of production and work at the same time in some other place. Neither farmers of the *tımar* system, nor members of manufacturing guilds in cities could have extra jobs, since their occupation required their full time effort for economic gain. Apart from this practical necessity, there were also binding laws for members of these systems to continue the conditions of production they are engaged in under certain contracts. Moreover, these people having control of the means of production through rental

¹⁴⁹ Koç, 2010, pp. 46-47

¹⁵⁰ İnalçık, 2009, p. 214

agreements or certificates that allow access to tools and workshops were not the actual owners. In principle, the state owned the productive means and even acquiring the usage rights of them. There was mediating institutions of guilds or authorities of the military/administrative class. Outside these forms of production, ownership of means of production meant holding a significant amount of capital, which would not require one to seek out waged work at the same time. It is plausible to argue that these capital owners were solely dealing with the managerial and organizational duties of their business, saving the fact that during upward and downward mobility, there may be temporary conditions where workers could hold means of production in a limited way.

To summarize, at the classical age of the empire, workers were an integral part of Ottoman economic life. Although the ideal form of agrarian production would not allow for the hiring of wage labor, exceptional forms, which could hardly be avoided, created room for workers. The hiring of families or single workers in *çiftliks* and *hassa çiftliks* was a common situation. Also, in the manufacturing of trade goods conducted in rural areas, an early form of workers that later on gave way to Ottoman modern industrial work was widespread. The urban manufacturing of goods in guilds was also conducted on the regular hiring of apprentices and journeymen, who were of crucial importance for the sustainability of production. Investment in tax farming business, by use of capital earned usually in trade, also created job opportunities for workers. These enterprises in the fields of construction, agriculture, manufacture and mining were the areas where ‘workers’ could be found almost in the modern sense of the word. Unproductive service business in trade, customs or in transportation, or at the charity or profit organizations of *vakfs*, was also significant in their capacity for wage labor. It should be noted that workers were not the only form of labor in these investments, and shared the role of workforce with slaves, enforced labor, soldiers, and hybrid forms like *selem* and *mudaraba*. İnalcık claims that especially in *mukata’a* businesses, where capital and paid labor met, there was the potential to progenerate an advanced form of capitalism. Nevertheless, it remained at a limited level. Although the Ottoman state co-operated with the capitalist class for the sake

of the continuity of certain sectors, as may be seen in the example of mandatory work practices, it never attempted to establish conditions for a momentous economic development. Especially when it comes to competing with foreign capital, following its traditional economic principals, the state acted on the ground to protect the consumers. The state's position stood in the way of the productive classes and also prevented a development from bottom to top. The economic understanding of the Ottoman state will be dealt with in the following section.

3.2. Reforms and Modernization

Whether the Ottoman Empire was a feudal state in the European sense, or it was an empire of the Asiatic mode of production, has been a hot topic of discussion among Turkish intellectuals for a long time. The reason why this dispute has been lively, sustained especially in Marxist circles, was the endeavor for determining the framework in which Turkey would pass to a capitalist mode of production. Today, a sociological argument regarding this question is irrelevant, as the capitalist mode of production is already dominant in Turkey. In other words advancement towards capitalism for Turkey is no longer a valid inquiry regarding a future potential, but rather a subject of historical analysis. As attempted to be shown in the previous section, the Ottoman economic and social structure is unlike European feudalism. With the same conviction it can be argued that the Asiatic mode of production raised on the other side of the discussion could hardly explain the Ottoman classic age.¹⁵¹ Based on the rich historical and geographical heritage of the empire, the Ottoman economic model is an eclectic, yet unique structure. Its authenticity led the Ottoman modernization experience to follow a different historical course than Western Europe. The Empire's subordinate position in its close interaction with European powers also enhanced this original path. What İnalcık calls the Ottoman economic mind was instrumental in this European domination.

¹⁵¹ For further detail on the discussion of Feudal mode of production vs. Asiatic mode of production (AMoP), and denial of AMoP please see Avcılar, 2002

Economic principles of the Ottoman state can be basically explained by six rules: (1) acquire as much wealth as possible; (2) secure and expand that wealth with a strong army; (3) redistribute the wealth for basic needs of the subjects; (4) promote economic activities that provide an economy of plenty; (5) set regulations to avoid shortages of need goods; and (6) control the quality and price of those goods. Ottoman institutions explained in the previous section function in a way to make these rules work.

An institutional structure stemming out of these principles would create a functional and stable economic system unless change becomes necessary due to outside intervention. In so far as the huge military and bureaucratic body of institutions serves their primary aims, i.e. secure the social order and justice, protect the safety of the country and its subjects, gain through conquest (new land, subjects and revenues), and control the international trade income, etc..., the Ottoman economic and social order functions successfully. Ottomans, as a political empire, used its military power to balance economic and scientific advancement of European powers for a long time. In the classic era, the expansionist policies and seeking an economy of plenty on the Ottoman side created a mutualistic relationship with early European overseas powers. Ottoman trade relations with the naval city states of Italy, namely Venice and Genoa, was at least harmless, if not profitable for Ottoman economic life. It was serving the economic aim of providing ample goods in the market and keeping the important Ottoman centers as hubs of international trade. Nonetheless, the entrance of western European powers to the international arena with a relatively advanced capitalist state of mind; i.e. mercantilism, and the cessation of Ottoman expansion, disturbed this balance in favor of Europe.

Mercantilism is simply defined as the accumulation of wealth through a favorable balance of trade by means of a continuous growth in home industries and exports. The political absolutism of the Ottoman Empire shared the idea that 'accumulation of wealth enhances power' with its European counterparts. Nonetheless, for Ottoman understanding, fiscal activities are the primary means of

accumulating wealth. Economy is not a conduct that is to be pursued by the state for its own sake. On the contrary, in the European mercantilist approach it is believed that a country can accumulate wealth by producing and exporting more goods than it imports. This requires a doctrine organizing and administering economy at the scale of nation, which the Ottomans never had.¹⁵² In accordance with mercantilist principle, while European powers were pursuing political actions protecting their national economic interests, they were hardly challenged by Ottoman authorities. The results of this process paved the way for the collapse of the empire.

For the Ottoman state of mind, supplying the Ottoman capital and other large cities was one of the most important issues of the economic domain. In achieving this goal, instead of protecting home industries against foreign products, the Ottoman state welcomed the import of goods. It did not have an understanding to pioneer the economic development and restructure the economic conditions in a way to organize production for outside markets. It only sought ways of augmenting tax collection and protecting public financial strength. Nevertheless, as the conquests ended, this classic model failed to work. For the Ottoman Empire, the end of conquest meant the loss of new *miri* lands, new mining sites, and new trade markets, in short, the loss of new tax generation opportunities. As the technological advances were changing the circumstances of military engagement, the Ottoman army of *sipahis* depending on the *timar* system became *démodé*. An army, capable of using firearms, well-trained in a central structure and ready for campaign at all times turned out to be a necessary requirement. European countries accepted this technological progress and adapted to this new condition very quickly, whilst for the first time in its history, the Ottomans were experiencing a new condition; that its international opponents were superior in power.

¹⁵² Mardin, 1980, pp. 37-39

For adjusting to these new conditions and by forming a central army that could match its opponents, the Ottoman state enlarged its *kul* system. Being already an important economic sector, the military industry also expanded. As the land administrative system failed to function, taxing former *timar* areas became an issue. Since the Ottoman state had little experience of direct taxation and an institutional structure was absent in this sense, the practice of tax farming inflated. It is known that taxmen created a huge burden on the agrarian producers and *reaya* was crushed under the high tolls. The restrictions of the state through the guild system prevented the determination of prices of both labor and products within market conditions. Peasants losing rental rights to means of production could not pass through a process that would turn them into workers. State regulations confining private investment in manufacture and a lack of liberation of the skilled labor force, due to the expectation of becoming a master within the guild system, provided against the development of a capitalist mode of production. The principle of protecting traditional production methods also precluded discovery or adaptation of technological advances.¹⁵³ The Ottoman producers had to compete with Europeans in these harsh conditions.

While being functional in its given conditions, the Ottoman economic model created a network of relationships that is very much close to change and transformation. In this respect it would usually be defined as stagnant.¹⁵⁴ Decline of the empire against European technological and economic development and its striving for reform occurred under conditions of momentous outside pressure. The last two centuries of the state passed with creating an army in contemporary standards and with the efforts of establishing military, political and economic institutions necessary for this purpose. In other words, with regard to the Ottoman state in this era, reorganization of military bureaucracy became the focal point of other developments. Ottoman subjects, on the other hand, while sometimes becoming the players in great transformations in political and economic rules

¹⁵³ Koç, 2010, pp. 51-53

¹⁵⁴ For an example please see, McNeil, W. (1964) *Europe's Steppe Frontier 1500-1800*, London: The University of Chicago Press

newly emerging in a multitude of dimensions, in other times reacted in a way to protect their existing rights and conditions.

3.2.1. Agriculture

In the period of reforms, although the traditional structure of exploiting agricultural production and the administrative and military model based on it had changed, agriculture continued to be the utmost important economic activity in the empire. Although I will look in further detail at foreigners, or their agents, taking over the Ottoman trade and mining, and the failure of Ottoman hand crafted goods in competing with foreign serial production later on, it should be noted that agriculture was the only Ottoman economic sector that relatively survived in power, during the 18th and 19th centuries. Ottomans aimed to use this sector for creating a momentum for the rest of the economy and through agrarian income intended to finance the reforms done in almost every domain of political, social and cultural life. Dependence on agriculture was also enhanced by the Baltalimanı Trade Treaty (1838), which made the Ottoman Empire an integral part of the international trade market. By creating free trade conditions the treaty was limiting, if not abolishing, state control and restrictions over the economy and assigning a position for the empire as provider of foodstuff and raw materials and the buyer of finished goods. Being left with no other choice, the Ottomans depended on agricultural development through a series of reforms, for the modernization of the state.¹⁵⁵

According to Quataert, Ottoman agriculture in Anatolia during the 19th century composed a picture of a population on average of 10 million people, approximately 80 percent of which labored in agriculture; generating 35-39 percent of the total tax income of the empire; and constituting 70 percent of the total increases in export.¹⁵⁶ Following the collapse of the Ottoman *timar* system, *mukata'a* or tax farming as a tax collection method was adopted, yet, direct

¹⁵⁵ Quataert, 2008, pp. 31-32

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, pp. 33-42

collection as an alternative method still became dominant from time to time. The *timar* system was abolished with the Imperial Edict of Gülhane in 1839, and land ownership was ordered by the 1858 Land Law. In the 18th century, with the weakening of central authority, the Ottoman Empire witnessed the rise of regional powers (*ayans*). Before the 18th century, private property though being evident, especially in cities, was of exceptional character.¹⁵⁷ Particularly in the rural areas, the overwhelming majority of the land was in *miri* status. However, during the 18th century, *ayans* in their regions created a practical existence of private property in rural areas, either by seizure of deserted land following peasant revolts, or by appropriating the usage rights of lands from peasants on account of their debts. Nevertheless, it should be noted that small scale land ownership was still the pre-dominant form. Even at the beginning of the 20th century, it comprised 75 percent of all arable land.¹⁵⁸

Quataert shows us that during the 32 year reign of Abdülhamid, Ottoman agriculture in Anatolia went through a relatively important transformation with state reforms. For the first time in its history, the Ottoman state directly engaged in economic activity in a way to restructure the existing conditions and improve both the methods of production and marketing options. A new agricultural bureaucracy had been developed. After 1876, with the establishment of “trade and agriculture associations”, a network that provided a flow of information about conditions in the regions was created. In 1880, these associations were practically turned into “chambers of agriculture” and finally in 1882 they were united with “chambers of trade”. These organizations were active in establishing connections abroad, forming trade relationships and negotiating with the state in defending the rights of local merchants and producers against European powers.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ For a detailed analysis of private property in the empire, please see Çiftçi, M. (2011). Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Döneminde Özel Mülkiyet ve Yapısal Özellikleri. *Turkish Studies*, 6/3, 623-644

¹⁵⁸ Quataert, 2008, p. 55

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, pp. 79-84

For the education of producers in the theory and practice of modern farming, agriculture schools were founded. The first attempt of an agricultural school that opened in the mid-19th century failed, in 1892 at Halkalı, İstanbul, a new Agriculture and Veterinary School was instituted. The school had a comprehensive curriculum and a professional group of teachers. Although the aim was to open numerous ones similar to the pioneering project, yet lesser in capacity, eventually only two other projects could be implemented in Thessalonica and Bursa.¹⁶⁰ Also, for the dissemination of the agricultural education, example fields were built and for the application of agricultural reform and inspectors or agricultural engineers established modern farms in association with local farmers in the chosen pilot provinces. These undertakings contributed to the formation of a local agricultural bureaucracy, as well.¹⁶¹ To finance all these reforms, in 1888 the Ziraat Bank was founded. With funds made available through the bank, all the aforementioned institutions were built up and agriculture credits were given to producers who took an active part in the application of modern techniques.¹⁶²

The introduction of mechanization was also among the agriculture policies of the Ottoman state. The aim was basically to increase production, as well as to make otherwise infertile or non-arable lands available for cultivation. The Ottoman state also promoted the production and importation of certain crops, directly and indirectly. Before better means of transportation were introduced in the last decade of the 19th century, wheat produced in central Anatolia could only reach as far as the local markets and while a plentitude was experienced in the regions, in populated centers like İstanbul, there was shortages and even importing ensued. The railway projects that connected Ankara and Konya to first of all Eskişehir, and then to İzmir and İstanbul boosted both the production and export of wheat. The state also implemented incentive programs for wheat, as well as for silk and

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, pp. 97-101

¹⁶¹ Ibid, pp. 108-119

¹⁶² Ibid, p. 120

grapes. All these undertakings of the state returned a combined 79 percent increase in agricultural export, along with a 45 percent increase in production. Nevertheless, the income created through this improvement could never be used for the proposed purpose of financing industrial development; instead the money raised was squandered away on the payment of state debts.

3.2.2. Manufacture

It is known that the Ottoman guild system declined since the 16th century when it had dominated the sphere of manufacture in the empire. Onur Yıldırım defines three important events that undermined the guild system until the early 19th century.¹⁶³ First, Celali rebellions resulted in a wave of migration from rural areas to cities. In turn, guilds were forced to develop methods of exclusion and inclusion to deal with the unavoidable population pressure on the manufacture sector. Second, in the 18th century, the Ottoman state altered its approach towards pious organizations due to an economic crisis. For creating new revenue items, though being against Islamic law, *vakıf* properties were seized and their tax-exempt revenues were expropriated. As for the usage rights of the guild buildings where the production and sale of products were carried out, they used to belong to foundations, but the state's new policy had a pernicious effect on the guilds. Thirdly, in the 18th century, what Yıldırım calls an institutional invention, *gedik* occurred. According to this practice, masters gained the right to use the means of production in the workshops and exercise their art outside the guild. Instead of being delimited under the rigid rules of guilds, numerous masters preferred to operate independently. Yet, exposed to the harsh market conditions without the support of the traditional guild structure, a lot of craftsmen lost their *gedik* certificates to merchants as payment for their debts. This led them to exit the guild structure, while others with no artisan skills entered in. In turn, the hierarchical structure and spatial organization of the guild system became hindered.

¹⁶³ Onur Yıldırım, 2008, Ottoman Guilds in the Early Modern Era

Gedik certificate was not only a privilege given for production, but it could also be used in the trade of goods. So it gave way to a monopolization of products, where the state's control through the guild system was intact. One of the main problems caused by this monopolization was basically the rise of prices. This consequence could not be accepted by the Ottoman state, which had always enforced availability of products for the subjects in affordable conditions.¹⁶⁴ Competition from abroad varying in level in different regions of the empire and a weakening of the central authority resulted in the occurrence of important differences in the way the guild system was practiced throughout the empire.¹⁶⁵ Also their lack of capacity in competing with the European products in the end led the sultan to make attempts for abating the state's support to guilds. Nonetheless, in many regions, primarily in the capital, close relations of the guilds with military bureaucracy helped them to resist elimination for a long time. When Selim III was in power the monopolization rights were terminated. Abolishing of janissaries by Mahmut II, in 1826, removed the buffer between central authority and the guilds. The 1838 Baltalimanı Trade Treaty and the Imperial Edict of Gülhane sealed the collapse of the guild system.¹⁶⁶

On the other hand, it is not plausible to argue that Ottoman manufacture weakened entirely in the 19th century on the basis of the collapse of the guild system, because in this period, manufacture outside of the guild system and the first examples of modern factories were developing. Meanwhile, some of the guilds, especially the ones in the large cities, adapted to the changing conditions and competed furiously with other players in the market. While the inflexible guilds were disappearing, in the alternative production areas production structures with a relatively high capacity for competition were coming in to existence. Since these

¹⁶⁴ Bayram, 2012, Ahilik ve Lonca Teşkilatı

¹⁶⁵ Çelik, B. (2004). Osmanlı Lonca Sistemi İçinde Yamaklık Olgusu. *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Tarih Bölümü Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 23 (36)

¹⁶⁶ Quataert, 1993, p. 22

structures could hardly be taxed, they were usually unregistered and hence they were unseen.¹⁶⁷

In the 19th century, in the development of Ottoman manufacturing, international markets became a determining factor. Nonetheless, it should still be noted that the authentic structure of the Ottoman economy interacted with the outside influences in the resulting events. When the overall production and the import of goods in manufacture are considered for that era, in spite of the lack of certain data, one can conclude that an increase in both values occurred. Yet, it is not possible to talk about an industrial leap, at all. The share of Ottoman goods dropped from 3 percent to less than 1 percent when compared to the previous century. The already unbalanced trade relationship between the empire and European powers became even worse as the industrial revolution made possible a remarkable increase in manufacturing volume and transportation capacity. While 80 percent of the ships coming to İstanbul in the 1860s were sailing ships, in the beginning of the new century the percentage of steam vessels reached up to 95 percent. Interestingly, the change in share occurred without any decrease in sailing ships, on the contrary they increased in numbers. If just the sea transportation was taken into consideration, it can be said that the trade volume of İstanbul became 15 times bigger in size in only forty years. Bearing in mind that this trade was a disadvantage for the Ottoman manufacturer, it can be easy to realize how grave the situation for local producers had become.¹⁶⁸

Having already lost the foreign markets, Ottoman production was aimed at internal markets; however they were also shrinking as a result of tremendous territorial losses. High international competition made the creation of alternative markets impossible. As a result, Ottoman manufacture developed in the industries that European powers were no longer actively involved in, or in industries where there was no competition at all. Orientation of western European countries like

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, pp. 24-28

¹⁶⁸ Quataert, 2000, pp. 99, 119-120

England towards capital goods made the textile sector easier to enter and compete for Ottoman producers. In this way production for internal market edged ahead. Although the population of the empire fell to its lowest level of approximately 25 million at the beginning of 20th century, still the internal demand managed to sustain the existing textile industry. On the other hand, as export goods of carpet weaving, lacework or silk production rose as newly emerging sectors due to lack of European competition.¹⁶⁹

It is pointed out that after 1826, the state's position in the manufacturing sector reduced to just a peripheral role as its control of the market conditions decreased. Since the Treaty of 1938 did not allow protective intervention, the state could only manipulate the markets through changing customs tariffs and the granting of exemptions. Along with its regulatory role, the Ottoman state used to be directly involved in certain economic activities. Its traditional part in the growing military industry that arose in the 16th and 17th centuries continued into the 18th and 19th centuries. In this period, additional state investment was made in the textile factories of İzmit, Hereke and Zeytinburnu. Quataert reports that the share of these industries in overall Ottoman manufacturing terms was marginal.¹⁷⁰ Yet, they should still be taken into consideration due to the high investment made into them and their pioneering role in the introduction of new methods of production. The investment in these factories cost one sixth of the state's total income. They were also the first factories in the modern sense where the knowhow on production techniques through the use of machinery was transferred.¹⁷¹

In Ottoman industrialization, along with large scale state factories, private investments in areas usually requiring low capital and workforce also had an important role. Following the Imperial Edict of Gulhane, they started to spread out in both Anatolia and Rumeli and after 1860 with state backing they significantly

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, pp. 13-17

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, pp. 17-18

¹⁷¹ Buluş, 2012, p. 50

increased in number. The Ottoman state supported private businesses with rights of monopolies, privileges and benefices, customs exemptions for factory construction materials and machinery, temporary tax immunities, grant of state land, and free utilization of raw materials in the unoccupied state lands.¹⁷² Most of these factories were owned by either non-Muslim subjects of the empire or by foreigners. They were making production commonly for supplying the demands of internal markets. Among the numerous private investments, were cotton factories in Turgutlu, Kırkağaç, Biga, Tekirdağ and Balıkesir, sesame in İzmir, and silence cloth in Van, flavor in Malkara, Midilli and Çanakkale, paper in Beirut, and fabric in Trabzon. These private investments reached more than a thousand during the period between 1840 and 1881.¹⁷³

The overall conditions of economic structure described above to a particular degree incapacitated Ottoman industrial development. Backwardness in steam engine technologies, a lack of master craftsmen who could establish production facilities, tools and repair them, and also a lack of technical knowledge, skilled labor force and secure raw material resources were general limitations of the era.¹⁷⁴ To overcome these, along with policies for lowering establishment and raw material costs stated above, the Ottoman state brought in experts from European countries and sent Ottoman citizens abroad for education. Moreover, to compensate for the loss of the educational function of the diminishing guild system, international fairs were held and vocational schools that specialized in training workers for factory production were opened.¹⁷⁵ Even as a result of all these ventures it is hardly possible to say that the Ottoman Empire became an industrial society, nevertheless these institutions and factories established in the 19th century, most of which survived in to the early republican era, had

¹⁷² Şener, 2007, pp. 68-72

¹⁷³ Ibid, pp. 82-84

¹⁷⁴ Buluş, 2012, pp. 50-51

¹⁷⁵ Kurt, 2013

considerably established the Turkish industry and contributed to the development of the spirit of entrepreneurship in Turkey.¹⁷⁶

Together with factories, the Ottoman and foreign capitalists also continued the alternative forms of production that had developed since the 16th century. The modest productions made at small ateliers and at homes under the system of *mukata'a* turned into large organizations of production in the 19th century. Especially in the textile sector where labor intense production was necessary, private investment formed vast bench based networks. Cotton yarn, fabric, lacework and carpet were the leading products manufactured in this form. Carpets were exported to the USA and Europe. Although in the 18th century there was still considerable export of other textile products, these existing markets ceased with the advent of the 19th century domination of foreign competition and protective measures of European powers. Hence, production in these goods was aimed purely at local regions. Geographically and over time, the density of these production organizations varied. However, it could easily be said that Ottoman citizens involved in these businesses were fairly numerous. In Halep for example, 6,000 people were working in 400 workshops for cotton yarn. Considering the fact that total production was more than 40 times of what is done in Halep, the number of people working in this sector alone could be estimated at more than 200 thousand.¹⁷⁷

When fabric production is taken into account, at the beginning of the 20th century there were approximately 50 thousand workbenches in houses and atelier.¹⁷⁸ Moreover, in the carpet industry it is estimated that 60 thousand people were working.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ Şener, pp. 83-84

¹⁷⁷ Quataert, 1993, pp. 72-74

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 149

¹⁷⁹ Donald Quataert, 1986, p. 473

3.2.3. Ottoman Workforce Before 20th Century

Having examined the structural transformations in the Ottoman economic life, in this section the focus will be specifically on the workers and how they were affected by those changes. Before going into detail of the working conditions and social composition of workers, general trends regarding laborers and where one could encounter workers notably will be tried to figure out. After examining the role of workers in agriculture, construction, industry/manufacture, mines and trade the working conditions involving wages, working hours, workplaces and other incentives will be examined. Following that, the ethno-religious, gender and age differences of workers throughout the empire will be tried to see through. Lastly, labor organizations and labor movements will be looked at.

Workers in Agriculture

It is already stated that the dominant sector of the Ottoman economy has always been agriculture and it was the main source of income for many Ottoman subjects. Looking at records regarding the Ottoman Agriculture Association, Kadir Yıldırım notes that the proportion at stake was two thirds.¹⁸⁰ As it is known, in agriculture the land ownership form was traditionally and primarily family farms. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that wage labor was limited in this dominant form of production. Nevertheless, a significant increase in the number of workers in agriculture was witnessed in the second half of the 19th century, especially in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean regions.¹⁸¹

In the local dividend books of the Ottoman archives (*temettuat defterleri*), there are different terms used to refer to Ottoman subjects working in agriculture. *Erbab-ı ziraat* (cultivators), *çiftçi* (farmer) and *rençber* (farm workers) were concepts used for land owners or share croppers. *Irgat* (agrarian worker), on the other hand, referred to unskilled workers in agriculture. In spite of these exceptions, *ırgats* did not possess enough land for them to live off. Although the

¹⁸⁰ Yıldırım, 2013, p. 24

¹⁸¹ Koç, 2010, p. 49

type of work done was not specified, another term used was *hizmetkâr* or *hizmetçi* (servants). There were also occasions where *amele* (worker), a term actually referring to non-agricultural wage labor, was used for agrarian practices. Workers of different agricultural fields of garden ware, orchard keeping and husbandry, had specific names, accordingly, like *çoban*, *sığirtmaç* or *desteban* (herdsman), and *çukadar* (leg man).¹⁸² There were also regional distinctions in terms. A good example is the term *tutma* (hiring/hired), used for temporary or regular employees who usually work for the land owners in return for the produce of a divided land, in the Adana region.¹⁸³

Despite the variations in labor relations within and among regions, the number of agricultural workers was at a level that could not be easily underestimated. Noting that they had a semi-proletarian character, Yıldırım Koç states that the number of cotton workers just in the Adana region alone was reaching the 100 thousand mark in the 19th century.¹⁸⁴ Nevertheless, Çukurova can be regarded as an exception, compared to the rest of the empire, where wage labor was still not dominant. Small scale land ownership and the dispersed character of settlements in agricultural regions caused a scarcity of wage labor. This was one of the major problems that prevented the development of capitalist farming. To overcome the labor need, capital holders depended on forms of share cropping and seasonal workers. In western Anatolia, seasonal workers were attracted from the Aegean islands and from Eastern Anatolia. Although it was illegal in the second half of the century, slave labor also continued to be utilized in agriculture to overcome labor shortages.¹⁸⁵ Even the migration waves following territorial losses did not create an increase in the supply of wage labor, because the state had given agricultural lands to the immigrants free of charge.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸² Özgün, 2012, pp. 319-320

¹⁸³ Koç, 2010, p. 49

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 49

¹⁸⁵ Özgün, 2012, pp. 327-329

¹⁸⁶ Kırpık, 2004, p. 24

Workers in Construction Projects

The tradition of utilizing wage labor when possible in construction projects became even stronger throughout the 19th century, when marks of industrialization were first observed in the Ottoman Empire. What stood out among those projects, were the building of railroad tracks in different regions of Anatolia, mostly by foreign capital (90 percent). The first railroads were built as English business ventures; French and German investments followed. If the Kahire-İskenderiye Line in Egypt is put aside, the first railroad route of the empire was the İzmir-Aydın Line finished in 1866. The Rumeli Line, Central Anatolian (Cereal) Line and Hicaz Line were among the important projects of railroad construction in the same period.¹⁸⁷ Since these projects were conducted on the basis of various privileges taken from government, working conditions were determined by the European capital owners. This made the employee-employer relationships reflect more of a European character. Hence, most of the labor force used in these projects was waged-labor. However, Yıldırım Koç, states that these workers could hardly be categorized as unpropertied. They were mostly working in railroad projects for extra income.¹⁸⁸ In respect to the development of wage labor in the Ottoman Empire, railroad projects were also important in a supplementary way. The settlements where railroad routes had passed through developed into newly emerging trade and agriculture centers, which created many job opportunities suitable for workers. For example, Eskişehir was a small village, like the satellite settlement of Kütahya, until the construction of the Anatolian railroad. Following the railroad's operation it flourished as an economic center which embraced a significant workers population.¹⁸⁹ Railroad also helped existing trade centers to increase their export capacity as well as connecting newly emerging industrial areas of the trade network. In carpet weaving, Uşak as a traditional center and

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, pp. 50-51

¹⁸⁸ Koç, 2010, p. 49

¹⁸⁹ Efe, 2002, pp. 14-19

Konya as a province with a newly established industry, were both good examples of areas benefitting from railroad construction.¹⁹⁰

Workers in Factory Production

As it could be expected, another domain where workers are encounter is Ottoman factories. The state's military industry contained a series of manufacturing plants located mostly in İstanbul and İzmir, including a sewing factory for military uniforms and boots, textile factories of İstanbul and İzmir, a fez factory in İzmir, artillery foundry, and a gun factory and gunpowder mills in İstanbul.¹⁹¹ It should be noted that these industry establishments were not the first efforts of the Ottoman state to introduce modern factory production. In the reign of Selim III, there were failed attempts at building factories, among which were the Beykoz paper and fabric factory.¹⁹² The imperial fez factory was the second largest of these plants, after the imperial arsenal. To give a better idea about the size of these institutions it could be taken as a reference that approximately 500 people were employed in this state institution.¹⁹³ Although these factories could not be taken as generalizable cases for the Ottoman factories, they had an important role in Ottoman industrialization in that they set the first examples of modern conditions of work in the empire. Some of the rights regarding working conditions like working hours, wages, retirement options, worker housing etc. were first seen in these institutions.¹⁹⁴

Where the private factories are considered, the conditions of workers were not as good as the state employees. Private factories, unlike state enterprises, had developed in the harsh conditions of competitive Ottoman and international

¹⁹⁰ Quataert, 1993

¹⁹¹ Shaw and Shaw, 1977, p.44

¹⁹² Seyitdanlioğlu, 2009, p.58

¹⁹³ Kabadayı, 2009, p. 69

¹⁹⁴ For detailed information on other state factories, like Hereke fabric and carpet factory and province factories affiliated with Tophane manufacturing plant please see Seyitdanlioğlu, 2009, pp. 63-65

markets. The conditions of workers in these business initiatives were consequently tougher. However working in the private factories was still a preferred choice as long as the payment was higher than what could be gained in agricultural production. The textile industry was one of the oldest and most fundamental of Ottoman manufacturing sectors. The first wave of private investment in factories also occurred in this sector.¹⁹⁵ The Ottoman textile industry had never had a problem of raw material scarcity. Neither in cotton nor in natural dye production had Ottoman provisions ever fallen short. Use of synthetic dyes varied according to regions and time periods, yet either by import of dyestuffs/dyed laces or production of these items in Ottoman factories, the industry was always supplied with the necessary inputs.¹⁹⁶ Nevertheless the conditions of competition in the field were based on price rivalry. The traditional cotton yarn production, which will be briefly touched upon later on, was challenged by the European factory products for a long time. To decrease the input costs in textiles, Ottoman producers also built modern cotton mills. At the edge of the First World War, 25 percent of the total cotton yarn used in the empire was built in Ottoman factories. The state's incentives, especially the custom tax exemptions for raw materials, had an important role to play in the significant increase in market share. İzmir, Adana, Thessalonica, İstanbul, Harput, Sivas, Ankara, Elazığ, Gelibolu and Manisa were among the cities where these factories were built. Around 1814, the number of spinning wheels in the Ottoman regions of Thessalonica/Macedonia, Adana/Tarsus and İzmir reached 140 thousand. At the end of the 19th century in İstanbul, there were around 10 thousand spinning wheels as well. The total number of workers employed in these factories is not known exactly.¹⁹⁷ Nonetheless, using the data Quataert provides by use of the number of spinning wheels and reference to the Adana Mavrumati factory (worker/spinning wheel=0.11) and Macedonia factories (worker/spinning wheel=0.034), where the number of workers hired is known a rough estimate

¹⁹⁵ Seyitdanlioğlu, 2009, p. 65

¹⁹⁶ Quataert, 1993, pp. 51, 54

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, pp. 74-87

could make that a total of 5,100-16,500 people were working in these factories. Of course not being certain at all, these numbers were also subject to change according to the alternating production conditions over time and even to seasonal variations. In regard to the labor supply, one can easily say that there were significant differences among the regions. The overall scarcity of workers in all the regions of the empire resulted in the determination of a labor supply by the existence of alternative economic activities and sectors in regions. For example, in Thessalonica the developing tobacco industry and in Voden silk production was creating competition for the textile industry in attracting their workers.¹⁹⁸

When the fabric production of cotton, wool or silk in the textile industry is examined it becomes harder to distinguish the production of yarn and final products in factories. Most of the factories had production in both branches. There were plants that produced yarn for workshop and for home based manufacture, as well as for factories. The data regarding the regions is usually on the number of items sold, sales values and the numbers of workbenches or sewing machines, but there is limited information about the number of workers. It is known that textile factories were limited, compared to workshops. They were concentrated in areas like the Balkan provinces, İstanbul, İzmir and Adana that have access to important harbors. At the end of the first decade of the 20th century, in Edirne there were a few very small scale workshops that had production with machines, and two relatively small factories employed around 50 people in each. In another Balkan city, Nis, there was a factory where around 150 people were working. There were also two more factories of similar scale in Thessalonica and one big and a few small factories in Bitola. At the beginning of the 20th century more and more small workshops started using machines for production. In İstanbul, following the state investments at the end of the 19th century, private factories came to the forefront. Among them a well-known one was the Karamürsel fabric factory, built in 1890. Primarily making production for the army, 500 wage laborers were working in this factory. In another textile factory in Eyüp, another 600 workers

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 89

were occupied. In İzmir, the fabric production was performed alongside carpet production, where the residuary wool and cotton in carpet factories were used for fabric production. Oriental Carpet Manufacturers Ltd. and another company were making production in this manner. In these establishments 700 people were salaried. Along with the two factories in Harput, there were also a series of yarn factories utilizing machines in production, some of which also had fabric production sections.¹⁹⁹

Silk weaving and carpeting were manufacturing sectors where production at home and workshops was dominant. However, as both sectors produce import goods it is possible to talk about factory production to a certain extent. In Bursa, traditionally where sericulture has developed, in 1838, although varying in size, there were almost 50 silk weaving factories. The number of workers employed in these enterprises was around 4,500. Less than 20 years later, there were 37 factories where mechanized production was in place within the province.²⁰⁰ The filature factories, on the other hand, were larger in terms of size of employment. At the beginning of the 20th century, there were 40 thousand people working in these factories, half of which was living in Bursa. Lebanon was the second largest region in terms of workers in this sector with 14 thousand people. Other important centers were Edirne and Thessalonica.²⁰¹ In carpeting it is possible to say that machine weaving was not developed in the Ottoman Empire. However, with the production of yarn and dye, which was among the primary inputs, in factories, the carpeting sector created a supplementary industry where jobs were available for wage laborers. It should not be thought that these two areas of industry were dominated by factory production. In the carpeting sector, trends were driving the trade dynamics and most of the time production forms were changing, both periodically and regionally. In this respect, factory production had risen in some regions temporarily. The big trade companies, primarily Oriental Carpet

¹⁹⁹ Quataert, 1993, pp.159-163

²⁰⁰ Seyitdanlioğlu, 2009, p.65

²⁰¹ Quataert, 1993, p. 234

Manufacturers Ltd., could only organize inter-regional relations that would allow a form of production where inputs produced in factories in different areas could transport to weaving zones.

Apart from the traditional manufacture areas, among the important production plants Paşabahçe bottle factory founded in 1885 could be counted.²⁰² In the Aegean region, olive oil and soap production were two industries that had risen and in these areas factories started to be built. In 1865, also in Trablusgarb, one olive oil factory was established. Moreover, a company named MC Andrews and Forbes between the years of 1854 and 1875 in Aydın, Söke, Kuşaklı and Nazilli opened four factories for the processing of licorice.²⁰³ Although a good deal of the Ottoman factories, state and private, survived until the republic era, among all these factories, only the Hereke textile and carpet factory is around today.

Workers in Atelier and Home-Based Manufacture

Although in the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century there was considerably important developments in factory production, the real volume of manufacture in the empire was dependent on the traditional forms of atelier and home-based production where workbenches of different kinds were used and labor intensity was high. This form of production was pursued for either commercial or subsistence economy. The leading sector, as it may be expected, was textile. Depending on the raw materials of cotton, wool, silk and flax, both spinning and weaving was performed in vast amounts. Lacework was also among the common economic activities in this form. The introduction of imported goods led to the decrease of the subsistence economy, whereas it resulted in an increase in the production for market. To better understand how huge this sector was, Quataert's statement on the size of the labor force in this area can help us. He

²⁰² Kırpık, 2004, p. 86

²⁰³ Seyitdanlıoğlu, 2009, p. 66

notes that by the first decade of the 20th century, one-half of the total labor force in the manufacturing sector was working in this form of textile industry.²⁰⁴

Quataert refers to the observers of the era regarding the number of workbenches in use within the empire in the 19th century and he makes the statement that there was one workbench at almost every house. Although he finds this statement exaggerated the numbers, he states that there were 50 thousand workbenches in the regions of Sivas, İzmir, Harput-Erzurum and Syria alone. Most of the Ottoman women who were working at workbenches were involved in production for household consumption. Others were working for merchants who organized the production of cotton yarn for market. Foreign merchants and trading consuls were also active in the sector and mostly provided workbenches for the workers for production. Usually home based production was dominant. The size of ateliers was typically small and they were found intertwined with home based production. However, dye-houses were bigger in size. In Tokat, a region famous in this business, at the beginning of the 20th century there were 150 dye and print houses where 1,800 people worked.²⁰⁵ Although the exact numbers for the whole empire regarding cotton spinners and weavers is unknown, there is better data regarding the silk yarn producers. Although this sector is relatively small when compared to the cotton industry, in 1900, the workers in Bursa alone exceeded 150 thousand. The number of workers in Lebanon was of a similar scale. When weavers in Halep and Diyarbakır and spinners in Thessalonica and Edirne are added, the total number of workers in the silk industry was above 400 thousand people.²⁰⁶ This gives us an idea about the size of the textile industry in general.

The employment capacity of carpeting was also small with respect to the rest of the textile industry. However, this sector has significance for two reasons. First, in the new economic conditions of the Ottoman Empire of the 19th and 20th

²⁰⁴ Quataert, 2010, pp. 477-478

²⁰⁵ Quataert, 1993 pp. 149-154

²⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 195

centuries, it presents us with the emergence story of a unique sector that conjoins traditional economic production with new production and sale organizations. Second, the carpet industry diverges from the most of the textile industry with the existence of a high capacity for export and in this respect it creates relatively better conditions of work. At the beginning of the 20th century, Ottoman carpeting was a multi-centered economic sector that was dispersed across hundreds of provinces throughout the empire. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the previous century, it was limited only to Uşak and its environs.²⁰⁷ Moreover, even up until the last quarter of the century, a large scale of the Ottoman carpet exports were of Uşak origin. In 1873, 77 percent of the total value of carpets exported from İzmir harbor consisted of Uşak rugs. Within the same period, when 1880-1884 data was examined to evaluate the share of İzmir in terms of total export, one can see that 92 percent of the total carpet exports were from this region. In other words, seven tenths of the total export of carpets produced in the Ottoman Empire was produced in Uşak. This dominant role of Uşak decreased gradually until the end of the century and other carpet centers gained a share in the sector. By 1906, Uşak was still accountable for half of the total İzmir exports, yet less than 5 years later, the region fell to a level of not even a quarter of total production.²⁰⁸

Along with Uşak and its hinterland (Gördes and Kula), the important centers of Anatolian carpeting were the Sivas, Ankara and Konya provinces. In 1906, in Uşak, including Gördes, Kula and Demirci, around 11 thousand workers were weaving carpets. In Konya the number was close to 5 thousand. In Ankara province, although the exact number of workers is unknown, a comparison through production values can lead us to an estimate of 4,000 people. When a similar deduction is made for Sivas, a more healthy result can be seen due to the presence of data on workbench numbers. At the same time in the Sivas rural area, there were around 10 thousand workbenches in 350 villages. A considerable part of these were used in production facilities called factories, but were in fact

²⁰⁷ Quataert, 1993, pp. 266-272

²⁰⁸ Ibid, pp. 242-243

ateliers. A basic calculation can lead us to the result that around 30 thousand workers were occupied in houses and workshops. At first glance, this number can be regarded as somewhat exaggerated with respect to the huge differences in total production value compared to Uşak. However, the high advancement level of production techniques, relatively high prices of carpets and a high average knot capacity of weavers in Uşak can explain the difference. In light of all these data, in the first decade of the 20th century, it can be accepted that the number of workers in carpet weaving manufacture in Anatolia were a lot more than 50 thousand people. In parallel with this, Quataert states that just the workers of the East Carpet Production Co. alone were around 50 thousand in number.²⁰⁹

Workers in Services

As the structure of the services sector in the classic age of the Ottoman economy is examined, it is seen that in an era when the empire was almost swamped by European products, the 19th century witnessed a service sector in the possession of foreign investors. Together with traditional market relations, and sometimes interweaved with them, in this period new styles of marketing chains and shops organized by foreign companies had emerged. In cosmopolitan centers, whose population was interested in western-style consumption such as İstanbul, İzmir, Beirut, Cairo and Thessalonica, department stores had opened. Classic Ottoman sale shops were organized in a way to reflect the guild system; hence they were concentrated on selling only one product or products of one art. Bazaars were only spatial organizations replicating these same individual shops. Department stores were different in character in this sense. Like bazaars, they were places offering a variety of goods to consumers, too, yet under one roof, owned by one person or a group of business people. Traditional retail stores were part of a system where the supply of products was kept at an optimum level for reaching a price balance that would satisfy both the producer/seller and the consumer. However, department stores were aiming to maximize profit through mass sales of goods at the cheapest possible price. In return, they were economic organizations where many workers

²⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 280

were employed and managed from one center. Such institutions were extraordinary to the Ottoman service sector, and they saw conditions of work that were hardly experienced before and made new social relations possible. Also they were important in that department stores had several hundred employees which were workers in the modern sense.²¹⁰

In the 19th century, in the services sector, alongside the occurrence of this new form, another important development had happened. The earnings of Ottoman state officers became wage based and they were brought to a status so that they could be regarded as workers.²¹¹ This section of the labor force was used to gaining their income through taxation of allocated land or businesses in the classic age. As they transformed into wage laborers, the accustomed incidences of bribery, baksheesh and presents also finished. The registries of the ministry of internal affairs show that in the reign of Abdulhamid II, the Ottoman state had 92 thousand officers.²¹² Considering this number, after the second half of the 19th century, state officers should be considered as a large part of the Ottoman workers force.

3.2.4. Conditions of Work

In the last 150 years of the empire when the sparks of industrialization were first observed, the fundamental norm regarding the workforce was scarcity of labor. Only in certain times and especially in localities like the larger cities was a manpower surplus seen and solely in terms of unskilled laborers. In other words, unemployment was a periodical and regional issue, but only for unqualified workers. Accordingly, the apprentices and foremen who lost their jobs following the decay of the guild system could easily find positions in the newly established factories and ateliers.²¹³ Due to the scarcity of labor power, competition among

²¹⁰ Köse, 2009, p. 91-94

²¹¹ Koç, 2010, pp. 49-50

²¹² Kılıç, 2012, p. 132

²¹³ Kırpık, 2012/a, p. 40

sectors and business branches to attract workers had always been seen. This in turn directly affected the working conditions, joining different sections of society to the workforce and generally the capacity of the country for agricultural and industrial advancement.

Wages

In the classic age, the control of the Ottoman state over agriculture and manufacture in terms of determining the production and market conditions of goods is examined. The prices of most products and services and the income gained through them were determined by state regulation. Although there was relative freedom for determination of the amount of payment for wage labor, still it was very much affected by the controlled market conditions. However, in the last century of the empire, the state's control over markets diminished. In turn, the wages of workers were also affected and free market conditions became dominant in the designation of pay. The state did not determine a minimum wage level. There were different forms of salary including payment on an hourly, daily, and monthly basis, as well as payment per piece, and in some rare cases, even payment in kind. Mostly, night shifts were calculated at a different rate. The primary determinant of the wages was the kind of work and skill level of the worker, both in state and private businesses. In some cases, private companies were observed applying different amounts according to seniority.²¹⁴

In a comparison among the traditional sectors, mining seems to top all the others, nevertheless it should be noted that still it was not a popular sector among free workers due to the very hard work required. The newly emerging areas in the service sector were also better paid²¹⁵, and manufacturing followed them. As the level of industrial development increased, the wages were also going up for the reason that higher skills were required. Yarn production and sorts of weaving fabric were bringing more gain compared to carpet weaving. With a few

²¹⁴ Kırpık, 2004, pp 109-111

²¹⁵ Workers of the department store were not only paid better compared to other Ottoman economic sectors but also compared to their European counterparts. Köse, 2009, p. 102

exceptions, usually the spinning of silk, cotton and wool were better paid in this order. There were significant variations in wages for the same tasks and jobs in different regions. Investors were mostly inclined to distribute the production activities to diverse areas in order to decrease the labor cost of businesses that were traditionally concentrated in unique areas (the story of carpeting spreading from Uşak to the rest of Anatolia would be a good example). The existence of more than one industrial sector in one region was increasing the wages of laborers (the tobacco industry's effect on textile industry in Thessalonica illustrates this). Similarly, competition between firms was causing the same effect and usually cartels were formed to avoid this result.²¹⁶

The dominant sector of the economy was agriculture: a sector which paid the least to wage laborers. However, in the second half of the 19th century, the increase in exports of agricultural products positively affected the wages of temporary and regular workers. The wages of Ottoman workers increased by 70 percent between the periods of 1839-49 and 1870-79. The wage rates were usually in parallel with trade activities in the agricultural regions that make production for market, like western Anatolia. When one looks at the internal regions, away from the harbors, the wages go down. As the wages of non-agricultural workers were higher, the scarcity of labor in agriculture became a determining factor. Since the unskilled laborers in cities could get a better gain than agricultural workers, often seasonal workers from other regions were utilized. Failure to attract seasonal workers, or a decrease in supply due to other reasons, was increasing the wages of agricultural workers. When the wage increases of workers in the second half of the 19th century are examined relative to increases in the price of goods, it is seen that the increase in wages rose above the increase in prices by a factor of 3 to 2.²¹⁷

Women and children were paid less in almost all the traditional sectors. Consequently, in the sectors where they could be employed in large numbers,

²¹⁶ Ibid, pp. 111-117. For a comparison of wages in other manufacture branches, please also see Kırpık, pp. 118-119

²¹⁷ Özgün, 2012, pp. 327-329

naturally the supply of labor force was higher, like the textile industry, and the overall wages were low too. They were also paid less in newly emerging business branches in the service sector, like department stores. In comparable positions with men, women and children were usually paid 25 to 50 percent less.²¹⁸ Especially in the long war eras, inflation of prices was affecting the workers' purchasing power drastically and demands for higher wages was soaring. The wage rise was usually determined by regional dynamics. In the same sectors, in certain regions no change might occur for a long time, while in others sharp declines or upsurges could be observed. Realization of payments was a critical issue. In the financial crisis eras, the state could hardly pay the wages of workers and even officers on time. In the private sector, similar problems were observed too. Workers were reacting in different ways, in certain cases going on strike or even leaving their jobs.²¹⁹

Working Hours

In manufacture, where home-based production had a great share due to the flexible working conditions, it was hard to determine the actual working hours of laborers. Therefore, in these organizations investors preferred payment per item or unit, instead of time based regular wages. On the contrary, in factory and ateliers, production standardization was higher. In these areas where controlled production was conducted, efficiency was higher and thanks to that, working hours were relatively lower. For example, in carpeting, the East Carpet Production Co. could apply an 8 hour working day and reach better daily knot rates than carpet masters working at home.²²⁰

Daily working hours were subject to seasonal change and there were a series of reasons behind that.²²¹ First of all, most of the Ottoman industry was based on

²¹⁸ Köse, 2009, p.102

²¹⁹ Kırpık, 2004, pp. 119-120

²²⁰ Quataert, 1993, p. 281

²²¹ Ibid, p. 227

agricultural inputs. Hence, in the harvest and picking periods, production increased and as the labor supply was limited, inevitably the working hours were increased. Secondly, except for very rare occasions, production was only performed in daylight. As the daylight hours are more in summer time, the working hours became longer too. Under Ottoman Islamic civil law of *Mecelle-i Ahkâm-ı Adliye*, working hours were regulated in a parallel way. *Mecelle* did not involve any limitations to working hours. Moreover, it was managing the work time to the length of day and local customs.²²² In the reign of Abdulhamid II, although the state did not enforce limits on working hours for the private sector, in state investments certain limits were followed, despite the seasonal and business differences.²²³

Workspace

The general form of production in Ottoman industry was controlled and organized by merchants. Although production for subsistence was done at home, market production was performed in homes, ateliers and factories. Factories were limited in number and mostly similar to ateliers with inadequate machinery facilities. Although there were factories and ateliers where workers were present in large numbers, they were mostly by exception. On average, factories and ateliers that could be called large had 200-300 workers. State manufacturing plants in İstanbul had workers in even larger numbers.

Rights of Workers

When the Ottoman work life in respect to social rights is scrutinized, it is seen that in terms of holidays, retirement, health and housing, what was offered to workers was very limited. In the classic era, the weekend was determined according to religious rules of the workers. While Muslims took Friday off, Jewish and Christian subjects were permitted days off on Saturday and Sunday, respectively. Eids of Ramadan and Sacrifice were the annual holiday times for all subjects. Christians were also allowed to have holiday at Easter. In the 19th century, in state

²²² Gülmez, 1983, pp.365-366

²²³ Kırpık, 2004, p. 126

institutions and businesses, holidays were standardized according to Muslim traditions. While in the private sector, the rule was typically applied, variations were not exceptional. Both in state and private investments, occasions of workers barely exercising their holiday rights were not uncommon. Infrequently, in some state institutions, workers were given 15 days annual holiday, after their first year in a job. In some others, workers leaving their jobs to visit their home were given a guarantee of a job if they returned. Leave on medical report was also possible in most of the jobs.²²⁴

Retirement systems for workers started to be established in the last quarter of the 19th century, initially in state institutions; it was seen rarely in private businesses.²²⁵ In the case of a worker's death, the widowed and orphaned were given a pension at certain rates, if the deceased had worked at least 10 years.²²⁶ Regarding health insurance, Ottoman regulations were very primitive. Although in some state institutions doctors were present and workers could be examined free of charge, but only on rare occasions and with simple ill health were they treated with state funding. Moreover, retired people were not allowed to utilize this opportunity.²²⁷ Housing was provided in sectors like mining, where business areas were distant to the residential areas or homes of workers. Due to a scarcity of the labor force, housing was used as an incentive in private investments for attracting workers. For example, in the yarn production industry in Adana, to attract Armenian workers from southeast Anatolia, barracks were built.²²⁸ Also, again in Adana, mostly agriculture and agricultural industries workers were given daily food rations together with their wages.²²⁹ Similar methods were exercised in Macedonia and Bursa, too.²³⁰ Apart from factory production workers, they were

²²⁴ Kırpık, 2004, pp. 132-133

²²⁵ Ibid, p. 135

²²⁶ Ibid, p. 137

²²⁷ Ibid, pp. 150-151

²²⁸ Quataert, 1993, p. 88

²²⁹ Quataert, 1993, p. 80

²³⁰ Ibid. p. 81; Erder, 1975, p. 89

usually employed in areas close to their houses or even in their homes, so they were not in need of housing facilities.

3.2.5 Composition of Work Force

Ottoman work life had a cosmopolitan character. The empire had subjects from different religions and a variety of ethnic origins. Together with these foreigners, was an intrinsic part of the workforce in the Ottoman economy. Moreover, women were involved in economic activities a lot more than expected by general opinion. Age variation among workers was at a high level too. In the work environment of the Ottoman economy, a heterogeneous setting for workers was quite possible. Now, the dimensions of this diversified structure will be looked into.

Ethno-Religious Differences

In the classic age of the empire, the multicultural structure of Ottoman society was mostly seen as a factor of richness and did not cause any harmful effect in economic relations. However, in the 19th and 20th centuries, this positive picture had changed partially. Incidences of disputes were known that sometimes reached to the level of violence among workers from both different religions and ethnic groups. On rare occasions, there are records that show that even in the same ethno-religious groups; people from different cultural backgrounds were having problems.²³¹ Before considering the sources of these problems, it is better to have a profound look at the ethno-religious composition of laborers in the empire.

The recent historical studies on the Ottoman economic and social life proved that contrary to common belief, in Ottoman society there was no clearly defined ethno-religious division of labor. In spite of some notable trends, there were neither legal constrictions nor absolute cultural rules in this sense. The primary determinant in this respect was economic and social conditions. Except for regional occupations that were carried out by certain ethnic or religious groups due to the economic and social conditions of the area at stake, in every sphere of

²³¹ Yıldırım, 2013, pp. 75-76

work life, non-Muslims and Muslims and workers from different ethnic origins were employed side by side. For example, textile was an empire-wide industry and despite the regional dominations of certain branches of industry by different ethno-religious groups, no activity in the industry was exclusive to any one group. Ottoman citizens from various backgrounds were involved in different aspects of the business.²³² This statement was true for other industries and for agriculture, which was the main economic activity of the empire.

What changed in the 19th century was the domination of economic areas where mostly workers were employed by foreign investors or by non-Muslim Ottoman citizens. Nonetheless, from this fact it should not be concluded that Muslim citizens of the empire were distant to trade and capital based wealth accumulation. Muslim subjects of the Ottoman state had usually preferred agriculture in that for a long time, it was the most stable and gainful sector, yet less arduous and a lower risk economic activity in the empire. On the other hand, in the classic age of the empire, workers who were hired in trade under the *commenda* system were mostly from Greek and Jewish origins. And it was them who later on turned into the capitalists owning businesses in different areas of trade, manufacture and tax farming.²³³ Europeans gaining power against the Ottoman state and their increasing effect and control over Ottoman economic life also enhanced this situation. In other words, the existing condition was not as a result of a cultural choice, but rather an economic and social fact. This fact in turn created a hierarchy in the composition of the Ottoman labor force that had never been seen before the second half of the 19th century. In the economic areas where foreigners ruled, especially in trade and manufacture, the managing positions were held by foreigner workers. Non-Muslim citizens of the empire were predominantly doing the higher-grade jobs. And, Muslims were usually the unskilled laborers. Although the statistical trustworthiness of the 1915 industry inventory was not high, it is still possible to refer to it in regards to skilled labor force. It proves the

²³² Quataert, 1993, p. 144

²³³ Ibid, p. 209

above mentioned statement that 60 percent of the total skilled industry workers in the empire were Greek, while 15 percent were Armenian and 10 percent were Jews.²³⁴

In the Ottoman classic era, an important area where non-Muslim subjects were left out was the military and bureaucratic positions. During the reign of Mahmud II, they started to be involved in these areas practically and increasingly hired as state officers. However, the legal regulations that would allow non-Muslim citizens to become officers came a little bit later with the Imperial Edict of 1855. With the Improvement Edict the legal ceiling of promotion for non-Muslims was also abolished. In the reign of Abdulaziz, first non-Muslim citizen become a general and in the reign of Abdulhamid II, the Ottoman state had its first non-Muslim cabinet minister.²³⁵ However, these positive developments were temporary as following the independence movements of the non-Muslim population of the empire, hostility against Armenians and Bulgarians emerged both within Muslim groups and at the state level. Both Armenian and Bulgarian workers were excluded from official posts and from holding positions in state business. In these negative acts against non-Muslim groups, the state's primary motive was the sentiment of distrust. The Greek population of the empire was seen as trusted in that period and was often not affected by these practices. On certain occasions, regulations were also made against Muslim subjects of the empire too. For example, following the abolishment of the Janissary guild, Turkish and Kurdish porters who were closely affiliated to them were seen as not dependable, and as they were moved on, the positions they left were given to Armenians who were then the trusted citizens.²³⁶

²³⁴ Akkaya, 2002, p. 131

²³⁵ Kılıç, 2012/a, pp. 131-132; also for detail on Armenian officers in ministry of foreign affairs, please see Kılıç, 2012/b

²³⁶ Yıldırım, 2013, pp. 75-83

Foreign Workers

Technological backwardness of the Ottoman Empire resulted in a reliance on foreign experts in the transfer of knowhow from Europe. Also, a lack of skilled labor, especially in industry, led to the hiring of foreigners in the newly emerging sectors and in traditional sectors where machinery was introduced. Since the foreign capital played a large role in the Ottoman economy, the fact that European companies preferred workers from abroad was also increasing the number of foreign workers. Railroad construction, harbors and mining were the primary economic areas where foreign employment was significant. Foreigners were usually hired in to managerial positions or as skilled laborers in these sectors.²³⁷ In the construction of the central Anatolian railroad, the whole of the technical supervision personnel was German. Moreover, the number of foreigners working on the railroad line was also high, and they were predominantly Italian, Montenegrin and Dalmatian.²³⁸ Ereğli Co. which was given the privilege of operating the Ereğli harbor and mine had 807 foreign workers among approximately 1,600 personnel.²³⁹

Usually, foreign workers were better paid compared to Ottoman citizens. They were also given better incentives by their employers and as a result, enjoyed a better standard of living. Moreover, they were usually preferred instead of Ottoman workers and this caused unemployment and wage decreases. Furthermore, in case of war with the nation of certain worker groups, hostilities might occur both at a political and social level. Hence, there was a constant source of high tension between the Ottoman and foreign soldiers. To avoid undesired events of violence and disorder starting up, from the last decades of the 19th century the Ottoman state took on a position against the employment of foreigners. Although it was not banned, in certain cases the state advised against

²³⁷ Kırpık, 2004, p. 51

²³⁸ Efe, 2005, pp. 107-108

²³⁹ Kırpık, 2004, pp. 54-55

it. Moreover, in some of the state's businesses, the obligation to hire Ottoman citizens was adopted as a rule.²⁴⁰

Gender in Work Life

The traditional role of women in the Ottoman Empire was not limited to the house as is usually assumed. There was no restriction regarding the working of women in the Islamic civic code. Even in the 17th century in Trabzon, women were involved in the economic affairs in the public sphere.²⁴¹ Following the 19th century, western influence in the empire strengthened women's role in work life. Women started to be seen more and more in the different economic sectors. The primary sector in which women were hired most was the textile industry. Women were spinning, dyeing and weaving in almost every region of the empire. In this manufacturing area, tasks were not strictly divided among the men and women. Labor market conditions were effective in deciding who would do what. No area of responsibility was solely performed by men or by women, except for particular cases like lacework, which was solely done by women. Women were dominant in home and atelier based production by far. This also resulted in the fact that the women's role in the labor force was underestimated. They were not generally noticeable as they predominantly worked from home. Also, as the tax registries were done on the basis of men, women who worked side by side with the men and sometimes instead of them, in cases like war, were largely unnoticed.²⁴²

When the textile business was inclined towards the marketplace, instead of family consumption, and when production in cities, especially in the factories, was at stake, the share of men in the workforce increased. Nevertheless, in certain sectors, like silk yarn production, women were leading in numbers. For example in 1860, in the Bursa filature factory district, 90 percent of the 8,000 workers were

²⁴⁰ Şener, 2007, pp 68-72

²⁴¹ Kırpık, 2004, p. 100

²⁴² Quataert, 1993, pp.143-148

young girls and women.²⁴³ In 1907, there were more than 20 thousand women among the workers of the 165 yarn factories.²⁴⁴ They were also outnumbering men in the cotton yarn factories in Thessalonica and Macedonia, and in carpet weaving in almost every region of Anatolia. In the service sector, professions like transporter, sales clerk and officers were predominantly jobs filled by men. In agriculture, most laborers of the worker status were also men. However, traditional laborers who owned or rented land involved women too, as the production unit was family based. In almost every sector and region, women were lower paid compared to men.²⁴⁵ As they were mostly serving as a reserve labor army, in case of war when the number of men in the labor force was drastically decreased, the number of women workers increased considerably.

Age

As mentioned earlier, the determining character of the Ottoman labor market was the scarcity of the labor force. To overcome this problem, the utilization of women and child labor was applied across many sectors. Especially in areas where women were high in numbers, like the home and atelier production, children and especially young girls were present too. In carpet weaving, girls at the age of 6-7 were taken on as apprentices, mostly by their family members. Following a training period of 2-3 years they started to work on their own.²⁴⁶ There was no legal regulation in the empire regarding working age. In times it was demanded, but the *Şura-yı Devlet* (Ottoman council of state) denied responding on the basis of the principle of *serbesti-i say i amel*, which means freedom of working.²⁴⁷ In cases of a labor shortage, there were even unusual occasions where the state used child labor. For example, to supply the yarn demand of the navy, the Ottoman state required orphaned children to do wage paying work in factories on the basis of rotation.

²⁴³ Erder, 1975, p. 97

²⁴⁴ Güzel, 1984, p.8

²⁴⁵ Özgün, 2012, p.328

²⁴⁶ Quataert, 1993, pp. 88-89

²⁴⁷ Kırpık, 2004, p. 106

3.2.6. Labor Organizations and Movements

Labor organizations in the modern sense of a labor union did not emerge in the Ottoman work life until the beginning of the 20th century. Relatively late industrialization, low worker numbers, ethno-religious diversity of the Ottoman labor force, a fairly high rate of women and child labor and the state's negative approach towards labor organizations could be considered among the general reasons for the delay.²⁴⁸ Organizations of workers before 1908 were mostly trade, cooperative and charity associations. Proclaiming the second term of constitutional monarchy in 1908 was a turning point in respect for both labor organizations and movements. The atmosphere of liberty instituted in the political domain was influential in the sudden change.²⁴⁹ When the actual first labor union in Ottoman history was founded is a matter of dispute. The famous *Amelperver Cemiyeti* (Association of Labor Friends), once accepted as the first labor union, is now known to be a charity organization helping unemployed and poor people.²⁵⁰ Another association recognized in this respect was *Amele-i Osmani Cemiyeti* (the Association of Ottoman Workers) and its political tendency preponderated to its union character.²⁵¹ If the secret organization thought to be found among shoe workers for increasing wages in 1879 put aside, *Tütün Amelesi Saadet Cemiyeti* (the Association for Prosperity of Tobacco Workers) founded in Kavala, Thessalonica, could be accepted as the earliest known labor union of our history.²⁵² The associations in the form of labor unions before 1908 were all established secretly and illegally, and those who applied for permission from the state were rejected.²⁵³

The advent of labor organizations occurred in 1908, together with a series of worker movements. As there was no legal regulation regarding worker's

²⁴⁸ Akkaya, 2002, p. 134

²⁴⁹ Yıldırım, 2013, pp. 99-100

²⁵⁰ Serçe, 1995, p. 41

²⁵¹ Yıldırım, 2013, p. 108

²⁵² Ibid, pp. 110-111

²⁵³ Ibid, p. 114

organizations, these associations were established without following an institutional process. In 1909, the Law of Associations was passed and the beginning of the 1910s witnessed intensity in the formation of worker communities.²⁵⁴ Lines of business in which the organizations of workers concentrated were railroad construction, the tobacco and cigarette industry, the maritime sector, docks and warehouse operations, textile, and the press and printing houses. Although some of the workers' organizations in Thessalonica had a socialist political inclination, the rest of them all around the empire were mostly established on the basis of economic motives. The initial organizations were short-lived associations. Primarily, they were organized on the basis of a workplace or a field of occupation. In spite of the existence of rare socialist groups trying to bring together all the unions, not much was achieved in this sense. While in some of the foundations women were not allowed, the general trend was not to follow this practice. In terms of ethno-religious diversity, a similar situation could be observed; there were both ethno-religiously segregated and mixed organizations.²⁵⁵ Most of the union members were skilled laborers and the part the blue collar workers played was small. The main reason behind this was the leading role of foreigners in both workers' organizations and movements. Foreign workers not only brought technology and knowhow from their home countries, but also their experiences on class struggle.²⁵⁶

In years between 1913 and 1918, the unions lost many members due to the continuous wars. In the same period not only the number of workers decreased as a result of conscription, but also the tension in the political environment delayed the conflict in employer-employee relations. Hence the labor organization and movements were temporarily suspended during these 6 years. Following the end of the war, most of the Ottoman labor unions were left behind in lost territories. As a result, Ottoman workers' organizations became limited to the ones in

²⁵⁴ Ibid, pp. 135-136

²⁵⁵ Ibid, pp. 137-138

²⁵⁶ Kırpık, 2004, p. 71

İstanbul, which were commonly just revived versions of the pre-1913 associations.²⁵⁷

Ottoman labor movements for the betterment of wages and working conditions have examples even dating back to the 16th century.²⁵⁸ However, these unique cases are very hard to use to generalize the formation of a labor movement tradition and show limited continuity. In other words they were exceptional cases. The frequency of labor movements in the empire hit an all-time high in the short period following the proclamation of the constitutional monarchy. While 92 strikes were recorded in the 38 years between 1870 and 1908, in just five months after the beginning of the Second Constitutional Era, there were 143 walkouts.²⁵⁹ The major demands of the strikes between 1909 and 1912 were wage rises, regular and on time payment and the decreasing of work hours. Apart from the strikes, labor movements were resistant against new technologies and machine breaking, and they held boycotts and actions regarding wage demands. In concern about the losing of their jobs, in some cases the Ottoman workers were opposing the implementation of new technologies and the establishment of factories or production lines with machinery.²⁶⁰ Sometimes these actions reached the level of machine breaking. The movements of prevention could be traced back to the last quarter of the 19th century, whereas the first recorded machine breaking event occurred in 1908 in Uşak.²⁶¹ These actions in turn did not result in the favor of the workers, in that it only postponed the introduction of new techniques and delayed the industrial development. Boycotts were held mostly against the merchants of European countries with whom the Ottoman Empire had engaged in war or had strong conflicts with. In such cases Ottoman workers either denied giving services

²⁵⁷ Yıldırım, 2013, p. 139

²⁵⁸ For early examples, please see Akkaya, 2002, pp. 137-139. Also for a detailed example from 17th century, please see Berber, 2010, p. 5.

²⁵⁹ Ibid, pp. 114-115

²⁶⁰ Ibid, pp. 191-193

²⁶¹ Quataert, 1986, p.473

to the citizens of foreign powers or demanded extra payment.²⁶² Lastly, the actions regarding wages that did not reach the level of strikes were mostly in the form of damaging the business investment at stake, marches and collective complaint and the submitting of petitions.²⁶³ It is possible to say that the Ottoman labor movement actions, both in strikes or other forms, were spontaneous, unorganized and disordered.²⁶⁴

3.2.7. State-Worker Relations

In the Ottoman classic age, the state was involved in the labor relations to protect both the workers and the employers. In cases of dispute the primary reference in state decisions was to the common good of Ottoman subjects as consumers and perpetuity of production of goods. Usually the state's intervention in the labor market was in the form of the determination of minimum and maximum wages in the guild system and the imposing of compulsory duties for the sake of production. From the 19th century onwards, as wage labor increased and the conflict between the interests of capital holders and workers became evident, under the guidance of the foreign skilled laborers, the Ottoman workers developed new forms of action to enforce their demands. In response, the state took a stance against these movements on the principle that these actions were putting public order in danger.²⁶⁵ European councilors were also warning the Ottoman state regarding the hazards of worker strikes that had severely damaged the European economy. The state's negative attitude towards collective worker actions changed temporarily with the revolution of 1908 and the control of the government by Young Turks. The Society of Union and Progress had seen workers as natural allies and workers were active in reaching the common cause of freedom.²⁶⁶ Following their rise to power, their immediate response to workers' organizations

²⁶² Yildirim, 2013, p. 199

²⁶³ Yildirim, 2013, p.205

²⁶⁴ Ibid, pp. 191-193

²⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 111

²⁶⁶ Sefer, 2013, pp. 1-4

was positive and they created an atmosphere of freedom for them.²⁶⁷ However, the wave of strikes in the following five months changed this opinion. The economic burden and social disorder created by the number of strikes brought the Union of Progress in to force.²⁶⁸ This process resulted in intolerance against labor organizations, as well as labor movements.²⁶⁹

In terms of legal regulations, there was no single comprehensive Ottoman Law of Work regarding labor relations. Generally, codes and rules in this area were enacted on the condition of particular needs. When the texts regulating this area are examined, it is seen that they are mostly bylaws of specific factories, mines or other state businesses before 1908. Following the series of worker movements in this year, the government passed the temporary law of *Tatil-i Eşgal* (Stopping Work) as a measure, and later in 1909 an extended version of this temporary law was enacted. The law reflects the changing attitude of government regarding workers' actions and in spite of defining a legal framework for labor organizations and movements; it was restrictive in its character. It has already been mentioned that a law prohibited labor organizations and movements in public services owned either by the state, or by the private sector sanctioned by state authority. Moreover, strikes were allowed on the condition of failure of a mandatory consensus process between worker and employer representatives, mediated by state officers. Also, strikes were not allowed to contain activities that would prevent the continuity of production. In other words, employers could replace workers on strike with new laborers, for which they would have sufficient time to do, thanks to the obligatory negotiation period.

The 1909 *Cemiyetler Kanunu* (Law of Associations) was different from *Tatil-i Eşgal* in spirit. The governing authority of Young Turks were positive to the

²⁶⁷ Please see the quote from Amele Sendikaları, *İttihad ve Terakki*, No:11, 17 Ağustos 1324, 30 Ağustos 1908, p. 4 in Yıldırım, 2013, p. 115

²⁶⁸ For a further analysis of the economic and social problems that workers movements in second constitutional era caused, please see Aslan, 2009

²⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 116

freedom for association as their Society of Union and Progress used to be banned and had to operate abroad or illegally and secretly within the Ottoman border. They also saw liberal conditions that this law would institute as an opportunity to bring together that element of the empire that was breaking down and create a more peaceful environment. Although the law was not planned in the first place to regulate the organization of labor in Ottoman society, as there were no other law regarding the labor associations, almost all the labor unions operating legally were founded according to this law. Another law that was effecting Ottoman labor relations was the 1909 *İçtimâat Kanunu* (Law of Assembly). In the period following the proclaiming of the Second Constitutional era, a series of changes were applied to the constitution which involved Act 120; the right of assembly and meeting.²⁷⁰ To further clarify the act and define the legal conditions of assembly, the Law of Assembly was enacted on June 9th 1909.²⁷¹ By law, the right of assembly without permission from the state was recognized on condition of notice in advance.

²⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 309

²⁷¹ Ibid. p. 343-344

CHAPTER 4

HISTORY OF THE WORKING CLASS IN TURKEY: REPUBLICAN ERA

4.1. Single-Party Period

Ottoman heritage of the working class of Turkey is usually underestimated. Either the working class in the Ottoman era is depicted as underdeveloped or on the rare occasions where some credit is given, it is often stated that the Ottoman experience could not be transferred to the republican era. Usually the level of industrialization, and in relation to that, the number of workers in Ottoman society is regarded as limited. For example, Akkaya indicates that in the beginning of the 20th century the number of Ottoman workers was around 400 thousand. Yet in the last years of the empire the size of the Ottoman wage labor force dropped to less than 1 percent of the total population. Moreover, the workers that were left behind in lost territories then migrated or were deported, and these were generally the skilled part of the Ottoman labor force.²⁷² Even before this loss, characteristics of the existing labor force were believed to be problematic. Alternative forms of labor, like farmer-workers, temporary or seasonal workers, and soldier-workers, prevented the continuity of the working class and belated the formation of a common identity. These groups are seen among the obstacles in the path to class consciousness. Also the legal constraints prevented the working class in building their own specific form of organization, but stuck with associations that also involved artisans and other forms of laborers.²⁷³ Unlike Akkaya, while Üstün was positive about the working class potential of Ottoman society, he was more concerned about the failure to transfer this potential to the republican era.²⁷⁴ Sharing Akkaya's argument that the skilled part of the Ottoman labor force is

²⁷² Akkaya, 2002, pp. 136-137

²⁷³ Ibid, p. 144

²⁷⁴ Üstün, 2002, p.229

eliminated as a result of the long period of wars, he also adds that the ethno-religious diversity of the Ottoman labor force had a bad influence on the possible alliance among workers and formation of the working class. According to him, the nationalist tendency that developed at the end of the empire and beginning of the republic excluded the most proletarianized sections of workers.²⁷⁵

The approaches of both scholars are backed by important and pointed findings on the objective conditions of the Ottoman working class. Here, I do not have an intention to question the virtue of these arguments. On the contrary, some of them had already been accepted in previous sections of this study. What is to be underlined as problematic is rather the approach in evaluating the data presented solely in respect to its relevance to the subjective conditions of the working class. If the subjective conditions of the working class are put aside and the objective conditions are regarded without reference to the formation of a class consciousness, their relative importance could be better understood. The political transformation from empire to republic will be further examined later on, however for now it should be noted that, in respect to the current subject, the historical context in which the conditions of the Ottoman working class is being evaluated is the beginning of a process of state controlled modernization. In this sense, assessments on the conditions of the working class would be on this basis rather than the working class' historical capacity for revolution. Hence, it is also plausible to argue that the gravity of the conditions defined is somewhat exaggerated.

The size of the wage labor force that the republic took over from the empire is very small when compared to the rest of the population. However, the estimated numbers only involve wage labor in the modern sense. The existence of intermediate forms that are regarded as obstacles in the formation of class consciousness can be seen as a positive force too. The existence of the labor force, though not completely liberated but they had experienced labor market conditions,

²⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 230

worked under the obligations of an employee-employer relationship. This bore witness to new relations of production in a society slowly evolving towards a capitalist form. The fact that they were dependent on a wage for living, even for a limited time, is not something to be straightforwardly overlooked. Once the numbers stated previously regarding this section of society are considered, the actual picture turns out to be a bit better.

When the objective conditions of the working class are evaluated on the basis of Ottoman industrial underdevelopment, one should consider that the Turkish Republic took over almost all of the state industrial institutions formed during the Ottoman era. Moreover, a significant amount of private factories survived up until the early republican era.²⁷⁶ Obviously, as Kabadayı states, the state factories formed in the mid-19th century could hardly be regarded as success stories. However, they initiated labor relations important in the emergence of factory labor in our history.²⁷⁷ The value of this step can be better understood when it is considered that industrialization is not an easy and rapid process. Turkey inherited an economic structure that has institutions in the development level and factories, though limited in number, which harbors knowhow for industrial production and experience of modern labor relations. In other words, the basic conditions of existence of the working class were not formed from scratch in the republican era. Existence of an institutional structure that regulates class relations, daily life practices including in the workplace that stem from emerging capitalist relations, an economic and a social structure that would allow the development of a working class should not be discarded solely due to the fact that they are limited.

On the other hand, it is also not completely true that the existing experience of the Ottoman working class was not inherited by Turkish society. It is true that an essential part of the Ottoman workforce is detached due to the aforementioned reasons. However, Ottoman society was not a totally isolated and separated

²⁷⁶ Şener, 2007, p. 56

²⁷⁷ Kabadayı, 2009, p. 69

structure. The experiences that emerged in the lost important centers of working class did not totally vanish. It is reasonable to assume that the knowledge produced in the Ottoman public sphere and the collective memory of Ottoman society conveyed the experience of these social groups to the republican era. Besides, other key centers left in the borders of the new republic also kept the Ottoman heritage alive. The significant industrial centers of the empire like İstanbul (including İzmit), Bursa, İzmir, Adana and regional bases of manufacture, continued to be important in the economic development of republican Turkey. Newly emerging industrial centers were also those cities that were subjected to the Ottoman industrial investments such as the central Anatolian railroad. Today the leading areas of wage labor in Turkey, both proportionally and quantitatively, are these same provinces.²⁷⁸

Lastly, although the legal ground about labor relations in the Ottoman Empire was regarded as underdeveloped, it is interesting that the late Ottoman regulations were then inherited by the republic. It should be noted that the Ottoman constitution was customarily in effect during the early years of the Independence War, until 1924. Moreover, the laws on strikes, associations and assembly rights that were enacted by the Ottoman parliament were also used as such in the early republican era.²⁷⁹ Accepting their certain delimiting effects on labor organization and movements, it should be noted that they provided at least a legal framework for them.

To conclude, not only the negative sides of the Ottoman economic structure, but also some of its positive features were influential in the early republican era. Moreover, the labor tradition and experience that was shaped in that background was also inherited by republican Turkish society at a level not to be underestimated. In this sense, instead of regarding the Ottoman economic and social history as a subject of an isolated inquiry, or attaining an ahistorical

²⁷⁸ Please see Chapter 5

²⁷⁹ Yıldırım, 2013, p. 297

character to the Turkish working class, in this study, it is given a special role in respect to its instrumental potential for understanding the development of the work conditions in Turkey. Therefore, it is given particular attention and focus as a part of this historical scrutiny. As will be claimed in this chapter, the two main principles that define the labor relations in the single-party period are products of certain traditions inherited from the Ottoman classic age and the Ottoman industrialization movement. But before going further in to detail, it is better to examine the profile of the early republican economic conditions.

4.1.1. Economic Panorama

When the demographic structure of Turkey in the few years following the war of Independence and the proclamation of the republic is examined, a pretty devastating picture is realized. As the region that provided the most soldiers to the Ottoman army, Anatolia suffered heavily from the long period of wars. Due to the conditions of war and deportation practices, a sizeable loss of life occurred and the casualty total in the end reached approximately 3.5 million people. A significant proportion of deaths resulted from famine due to the collapse of the agriculture sector and the outbreak of epidemic illnesses. During the war period which lasted approximately 10 years and the following period of peace building, the population of Anatolia decreased by about 20 percent due to death and 10 percent because of migration.²⁸⁰

In the transition from Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic, the loss of labor power is even greater in proportion when compared to the general population loss. Among the total casualties, a significant amount was due to serving in the military and this caused a correspondingly bigger loss from the working age population. A significant statistic in this regard is the age distribution of the early republican population; in 1927, 23 percent of the population was at the age of six or below.²⁸¹ Also, death of so many men, who constituted the larger part of the active

²⁸⁰ Zürcher, 1993, pp. 238-239

²⁸¹ Akkaya, 2002, p. 145

workforce, had a damaging impact. Again, the striking data with respect to this situation is that in 12 provinces alone, most of which are in western Anatolia, the proportion of widowed women to the total population was higher than 30 percent.²⁸² Territory losses and migrations resulted in a reduction of skilled laborers, especially in manufacture and industrial production. As it is known, Ottoman citizens did not experience an extensive process that would make them propertyless. Through acquiring the possessions of the deceased, the migrated people experienced a further increase in the rate of those owning property in the early republican era.²⁸³ The demographic structure at the time also overshadowed the endurance of the chronic scarcity of Ottoman labor in the early republican economy.

Together with the undesirable conditions of labor, the state of capital was not pleasant either. It is already seen that the share of foreign capital in the last century of the Ottoman Empire had increased considerably. Also, a large share of the domestic capital was in the hands of non-Muslim citizens. At the end of the war era, foreign capital was withdrawn from the country. The main elements of internal capital either remained in the lost territories or were deported after the war. Anatolia lost its big Christian communities and together with them, an important group of entrepreneurs and managers. Moreover, efforts of creating a national capitalist class by Young Turks could hardly reach success.²⁸⁴

The main sector of the economy inherited from the empire was agriculture and it was based on small scale land ownership. The demographic breakdown following the war period affected this sector in a bad way, nevertheless, it recovered rapidly. Existing manufacture and industries were also known to be dependent on agricultural products and backwards in terms of technology. Relative underdevelopment of these industries resulted in infrastructure that stayed at a

²⁸² Zürcher, 1993, p. 239

²⁸³ Koç, 2010, p. 111

²⁸⁴ Mardin, 1980, p. 217

minimal level due to damage caused by war. In this, the fact that most of the prevailing industrial complexes located within İstanbul province, where the destructive effect of the war was least felt, was also influential. A noteworthy demolition happened in western Anatolia. The railroad line that used to connect the agricultural industry and local manufacture networks to market was damaged. Both in war time and in the period of retreat, the Greek army destroyed bridges and some residential areas. The blaze that occurred during the liberating of İzmir harmed the city extensively.²⁸⁵

In 1924 the share of agriculture in terms of Gross National Product (GNP) was 39.8 percent, while it was 13.2 percent for industry. Regarding the employers, the shares were much more in favor of agriculture; with 89.6 percent, but only 4.6 percent in industry and 5.5 percent in services. The 1921 an industrial inventory count was conducted in the regions that the Ankara government controlled, which excluded relatively important centers in terms of industry, like İstanbul, Bursa, İzmir and Adana. The results show us that not much had changed since the previous counts of 1913-1915. The most striking change was the number of workers per company. In 1913-1915, the average was 53, but this number fell to just 2 in 1921. Although the sudden decrease can be explained by the collapse of gigantic companies like Oriental Carpet Manufacturers Ltd. and the fact that the artisans and workers who previously used to be regarded as part of big companies were now counted as independent organizations. Also, it should be taken into account that important cities where some of the larger companies and factories were located were excluded from the count of 1921. Nevertheless, a conclusion could still be that by 1921, Anatolian industry was primarily composed of small scale ateliers and shops.²⁸⁶

When the fiscal status at the time is examined, it is seen that the tax income of the country due to war conditions was certainly low, that the GNP level and the

²⁸⁵ Zürcher, 1993, p. 240

²⁸⁶ Makal, 1999, pp. 193-195

international trade volume were considerably reduced and the republic was obliged to pay for the debts of the Ottoman state. When the GNP per capita of Turkey in 1923 and the average of the European powers is compared, it is seen that the income of Turkish citizens was almost one tenth of their European counterparts. It took Turkey some 15 years to bring this rate up just to one third²⁸⁷, and GNP in general only reached its pre-war level by 1930. International debts of the Ottoman Empire were also left for Turkey to pay. Although an important share of Ottoman loans from Germany were canceled and almost one third of the rest of the debt was charged to other nations founded from former Ottoman territories, the share left to Turkey still amounted to a large number (approximately 65 percent of the national income), that were paid back in installments up until 1954.²⁸⁸ Furthermore, in spite of the end of the war, the Turkish state had to cope with a series of revolutionary movements in the eastern regions of the country. In the years 1924 and 1925, more than 500 banditry incidents occurred. Dealing with all these incidents, which decreased year by year but only be ended in 1933, cost the Turkish state dearly.²⁸⁹

4.1.2. Political Change

One way to explain the process of founding the republic is by defining it as a bourgeois revolution. In general this definition makes possible two different approaches to the institution of the Turkish republic. First, one may claim that it resembles the classic bourgeois revolutions of American, English and French societies in terms of its anti-feudal, secular and nationalistic character. The second approach on the other hand, may concentrate on its belated and hence peculiar characteristics and stress its similarities with the German tradition of transformation to capitalism. Its lack of rising over popular support (the central role of state) and non-existence of leadership of a bourgeois class are also to be underlined. It is considered beyond doubt in Marxist chambers, that one of the

²⁸⁷ Eğılmez, 2011

²⁸⁸ Özdemir, 2009, pp. 129-135

²⁸⁹ Koç, 2010, pp. 209-210

primary representatives of the second approach is Sungur Savran. In his work, *Class Struggles in Turkey*, he criticizes the rooted dichotomy of rupture or continuity regarding the foundation of the Turkish republic, which he embodies in the thinking of Leftist Kemalists and the Liberal Left in Turkey.²⁹⁰ It is obvious that his argument regarding the need for reading Turkish history as a history of class struggle is necessary in the Marxist sense. His effort to do so, though involving certain problematic and contestable sides, is a valuable endeavor.²⁹¹ Here, a modified version of his theoretical approach to the late Ottoman and republican eras will be followed in order to understand the political climate and present its influence on labor relations.

As Savran claims, the founding of the Republic of Turkey and the following series of reforms can be regarded as a part of a specific kind of bourgeois revolution. Mısırlı, using a different and more accurate terminology than Savran, designates this specific kind as a Prussian type of transition to capitalism. He does not use the phrase bourgeois revolution in that neither the foundation of the republic, nor the proclamation of the constitutional monarchy could be rightfully called revolutions. Instead, he uses the term modernization, which better fits the historical context and experience of Turkey.²⁹²

The analyses of the Turkish independence movement as a bourgeois revolution is not a novel approach. A statement regarding the condition of the working class in Turkey from an outsider; Ho Chi Minh; a member of Comintern, who would later become first the prime minister and then president of the Democratic Republic of

²⁹⁰ Savran, 1992

²⁹¹ For example, it is true that as a part of the institution of capitalist order by state, republican elite pursued a project of creating a national capitalist class, just like Young Turks tried to do so a couple of decades before. However, the claim that war of independence depends on Turkish and Kurdish classes of capital holders who were founders of countrywide resistance organizations (*Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri*) (Savran, 1992, p.70) is an overrated assessment and more importantly it conflicts with the main argument of his historical materialist analysis. Other examples could be presented as well, yet since critique of Savran's ideas is not the main concern of this study I will put aside such an attempt for a later review.

²⁹² Mısırlı, 2002, p. 220

Vietnam, shows us how early that tradition was developed. His note on the Turkish working class and the foundation of the republic was published in 1924, in *l'Humanité*, with the title “The Workers’ Movement in Turkey”.²⁹³ Minh describes the Turkish Independence War as a struggle of the people of Turkey against imperialism and the regime of the sultanate. In this regard, the primary gain of the war, which was a bourgeois revolution, was a united and strong republic. Nevertheless, he determines that the actual winner of this revolution, as with all bourgeois revolutions, to be the rich classes.

The Turkish proletariat, as a contributor to independence, was expected to give another fight; that of a class struggle. Among the obstacles that weakened the Turkish working class was the lack of organizations in the form of western type labor unions. The existing associations were limited to specific sectors or regions. In spite of this constraint, a series of labor movements were held in İstanbul by 10 thousand workers including railroad builders, dock workers, and the workers of beer factories, etc. Also an attempt at uniting the different workers’ organization was made in İstanbul. A federation that would represent 45 thousand workers and 34 associations from İstanbul, Zonguldak and Balıkesir was agreed to be formed, but the State did not recognize the federation. Depicting these conditions, Minh accuses the Turkish state of being in league with the foreign capitalists. Minh’s brief note is important for us in that it presents us with an early example of designating the war of independence as a bourgeois revolution, and how the working class and state are positioned in that regard.

In pre-capitalist social formations, economic surplus is exploited through a non-‘economic’ asset, the use of power. This presents a plane where economy and politics exist together. This structure is transformed through the advent of a working class and the formation of a labor market, in advancing towards capitalism. According to Mısırlı, societies that pass to feudalism from an Asiatic mode of production form a feudal structure that makes the abovementioned

²⁹³ For a recent reprint: Minh, H. C. (2011). *The Selected Works of Ho Chi Minh*, New York: Prism Key Press

transformation almost impossible. This specific feudalism is centralist and in that structural property ownership was dominated by the state. The union of economy and politics occurred in a stronger way due to strict state controls.²⁹⁴ Here, the essential disagreement I have with Mısırlı, regarding the fact that the Ottoman Empire was not built upon a social formation that passed from an Asiatic mode of production to feudalism is not essential. Because, in spite of not fitting in with Mısırlı's conceptualization, the Ottoman classic economic structure that is tried to be shown in the first section of this chapter presents the characteristics that are crucial for the argument I would like to develop. In other words, the Ottoman state, with a strong central structure was controlling (as an outside mediator by enforcing a frame of consensus) the relations through which economic surplus in agricultural production was exploited by use of non-economic power. In turn, this control was preventing the expected dissolution of the union of political and economic domains with a bourgeois revolution.

The propellant power of history in the Prussian model of transition to capitalism is different from the classic bourgeois revolution. As it is examined in its historical example of French revolution, in the classic model, the primary determinant is the struggle between new social classes and with the old aristocracy. Though, in the Prussian model, there is a consensus between the old hegemonic classes and the classes that would become hegemonic in the new regime. This condition results in the state as a historical subject, becoming the main player in the change. Struggle between the classes occurred in the constitution of the state. The development of a capitalist formation under the influence of foreign powers also enhances the relationship between the new classes and the state. In this regard, what distinguished the new capitalist class from the working class was its close connection with foreign capitalist centers, as well as local state (its comprador character). In the economic sphere, by means of this connection, the contributive role of outside powers occurs. This role, sometimes contradicts with the state's determination of the internal dynamics, while other times it turns out to be an

²⁹⁴ Ibid, pp. 223-224

element facilitating the transition to capitalism. In this formation, the primary conflict is between the modernist reformers and the traditional restoration supporters in the state apparatus, and from that conflict, an intellectual group arises. This group both grounds the ideology of the transition to capitalism and also directly governs it as soldier and civil bureaucrats.²⁹⁵

In this transitional model, historical development happens through three important steps. Firstly, during the transition, the modern social classes would develop and undertake their subject position. Second, a capitalist class would organize as the hegemonic class. Third, the intellectual group that led the transition in the state would abandon their active role and distantiate from the state to institute its relative autonomy.²⁹⁶ Whether the structural conditions stated above and the steps of change that are listed are applicable to the Turkish case is central to making sense of the historical development Turkey experienced. Here, it is argued that this model was primarily followed in the Turkish case. To put it another way, Turkish modernization was structurally a Prussian type of transition to capitalism. Nevertheless, it is different from the other examples that fit this model by means of its authentic conditions. In the following sections, both the transformation experienced in the frame of this model and the peculiar conditions of Turkey will try to be construed in respect to their influence on the formation of a Turkish working class and the advancement of labor relations in Turkey.

4.1.3. *Halkçılık* (Populism) as the Principle Determining Labor Relations

In Turkish political literature, there is a tendency to attribute the origins of early republican principles of populism to the constitutional era thinking. In terms of a systematic ideological position, it is true that populism had developed in a variety of forms in this period and that republican populism was a derivation from those forms. Nevertheless, I believe that the roots of populism go beyond the last century of the Ottoman Empire, to an earlier stage, that of the Ottoman classic

²⁹⁵ Ibid, pp. 224-225

²⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 225

age. İnalçık argues that the Ottoman state was a welfare state.²⁹⁷ According to him, Islamic economic ideals of the redistribution of wealth and the provision of minimum means for everyone were reflected in the Ottoman economic structure. The role of the sultan as the central authority for allocating and redistributing resources, the principle of an economy of plenty, charity organizations including *vakfs*, traditions like *sadaka*, *bakshish*, and the reciprocal exchange patterns of gift giving could all be regarded in this respect.²⁹⁸ But, maybe more important than all, the Ottoman economic morality of social “justice/equity” could be considered concordantly. According to Mardin, acceptance of the existing hierarchy in society should bring about fair rewards, in other words, guaranteeing the minimum means for livelihood appropriate to the social status held. To Mardin, the denial of an uncontrolled liberalism by Young Turks resulted from this morality. It grounded both the spirit of solidarity developed in the second constitutional era and the principle of populism that dominated the early republican era. Furthermore, it later took on the form of Ecevit populism in the 1960s and 1970s with the aim to institute a modern welfare structure. Even today, traces of this morality can be observed in Turkish society as an excessive expectation from the state, especially in rural life.

Ideological Origins of Turkish Republican Populism

It is true that the ideological formulation of this morality was systematically done by leading figures like Ziya Gökalp at the last period of the empire. Gökalp’s version is not the only form of populism that developed in the constitutional monarchy era. It is possible to talk about two other significant forms; namely, the populism of the Towards the People Committee and of Yusuf Akçura.²⁹⁹ Haspolat claims that populism as an ideology emerged in the late Ottoman period as the intellectual group of Young Turks needed a ground for gaining the support of people in their effort to overthrow sultan Abdülhamid II. Former Tanzimat

²⁹⁷ İnalçık and Quataert, 1994, p.45

²⁹⁸ Ibid, p.46

²⁹⁹ Haspolat, 2011, p. 558

statesmen did not have such a social vision; rather they were aiming at an enlightenment process for individuals and the emancipatory movement for saving the state by use of the techniques of the west. The intellectual climate of the constitutional monarchy era, on the other hand, was dominated by the failure of the movement itself and its ideologies of Ottomanism and Islamism.³⁰⁰ In this context, the Narodnik movement from a similar pre-capitalist geography, namely Russia, influenced Ottoman intellectuals thorough three channels; (a) Balkan intellectuals, (b) Turks migrated from Russia, and (c) the socialist Hınçak movement of Armenians. Ottoman intellectuals acquired the principle approach of Russian populism, yet applied it in a dissimilar way that reflects the peculiarities of Ottoman society. Institutionally, the first sparks of the movement were seen in *Türk Ocağı* (Turkish Hearts) and *Milli Talim ve Terbiye Cemiyeti* (National Teaching and Training Association). *Köylü* (Villager), *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland) and *Halka Doğru* (Towards the People) were journals where the idea was generated.³⁰¹ Although Narodnik movement's influence is significant in the spawning of populism in Ottoman thinking, the inspiration from Jean Jacques Rousseau and Durkheim's view of solidarist society could not be denied.³⁰²

Gökalp populism based on the abovementioned roots was built upon the idea that movement towards people is a necessary result of nationalism. In this regard, for Gökalp, the first principle of Turkism was going to the people. Populism is the meeting and interaction of the elite and educated classes with the people. The cultural ground that people would provide and the civilization that intellectuals would establish were going to be the fundamentals of the nation state. *Tanzimat* and constitutionalism ceased all political privileges. According to Gökalp, by this means, a democratic equity was instituted and political classes were abolished. Yet, economic classes still existed. Just like political populism did, social populism would end the economic differences and equalize all people. Gökalp

³⁰⁰ Ibid, pp.559-560

³⁰¹ Ibid, p. 563

³⁰² Makal, 1999, p. 56

here takes a Durkheimian solidarism standpoint and envisages a network of solidarity based on professional associations as the method for equality and harmony. The idea was based on a nationwide model of Turkish-Islamic guild brotherhood, which used to be organized at the city level.³⁰³

Populism understanding of the Towards People Committee was based on a more limited conception of people. They designated a notion of people as the Turkish-Islam bourgeoisie of the middle class. As an extension of the Union and Progress Party's national economy movement, their thought and organization was centered in İzmir, which was the pilot region of the nationalist economy project. Unlike *Türk Ocakları*, who inclined towards villagers as people, the populism that the Committee assumed was targeting the Anatolian rich middle class and among them propagating nationalism that originally was a bourgeois ideology.

Lastly, Akçura's version of populism was based on the idea that Turkish national thought emerged depending on certain socioeconomic transformation. For him, Turkism was a movement that recognized the right of being a nation for other national groups and claims its own in this respect. Unlike Ottomanism and Islamism, Akçura believed that it had real material conditions.³⁰⁴ Turkism arose parallel with the Turkish bourgeoisie that strived to form its own national market and gain political autonomy. Akçura states that though Turkism saves the seat of honor for villagers, as advanced and modern states rise over the shoulders of the bourgeoisie capitalists and bankers, Turkism mandates the development of the Turkish bourgeoisie.³⁰⁵ Sharing the aims of Gökalpian populism, Akçura denies the necessity for abolishing the economic classes. Moreover, he rejects the central role of guild like the organization of professional groups. Rather, he stands by a pluralistic democratic view, refuting the domination of any individual or social group/class in social formation. To conclude, Akçura populism is the formation of

³⁰³ Toprak, 1977

³⁰⁴ Haspolat, 2011, p.573

³⁰⁵ Toprak, 1977

a real democratic regime depending on people, by means of eliminating the reactionary classes by small peasants and a national bourgeoisie.³⁰⁶

Republican Populism

Even from the early periods of the Independence War the principle of populism was adopted by leading figures of the future republic both in action and discourse. The foundations of the principle were initially seen in the code of practice of The Association for Defense of National Rights. The first concrete appearance of populism as a motto was witnessed following the promulgation of the parliament. In the second meeting of the Grand National Assembly on April 24th 1920, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk proposed his views to parliament; his views and suggestions to be followed for the future, and submitted them for approval of the members. Following the approval of his views by parliament, on the basis of this project Atatürk prepared a program regarding the institution and nature of the government. The program became the foundation for the constitution and was submitted to parliament on September 13th 1920. Later on, these two documents were brought together under the Program of Populisms as a manifesto and grounded the principles that would define the new state that was about to be established. Following the decision to be put up for election in the parliament, the Association for Defense of National Rights Group prepared a declaration for their campaign known as the Nine Principles, which substantially reflected Populism.³⁰⁷ The first bylaw of the People's Party, which was founded on the declaration of the Nine Principles, defines the concept of people as follows:

In view of the party, the concept of people is not limited to any class. All individuals having no claim for any privilege and generally accepting absolute equality before the law are among the people. Populists are those individuals who do not allow privileges for family, class, community, or

³⁰⁶ Haspolat, 2011, p. 575

³⁰⁷ Bila, 2008

individual, and in legislation recognize the absolute freedom and independence.³⁰⁸

The legal aspect presented in this passage regarding the equality before law and defining people on this basis is derived from the Gökalpian version of populism. Although this statement shows no difference among the different groups that constitute the people, especially regarding the economy, unavoidable republican policies and discourse leaned towards the dignification of villagers. This is understandable as agriculture was the pioneering sector that gave dynamism to the economy through policies of promoting market based production. The coming of peasants into the forefront is convenient with Akçura's understanding of populism.³⁰⁹ Together with the equality notion both at the individual and class level, another strong emphasis of republican populism was the notion of solidarity, which is best illustrated in Atatürk's following speech about the People's Party:

In my opinion, our nation does not have various classes that follow different interests and as a result of this struggle among them. Existing classes are in need of each other. Therefore; the People's Party deals with defending the rights and providing the development conditions for all classes.³¹⁰

The bylaw and program accepted in the general assembly of the Republican People's Party was the first legal party document where all of the Six Arrows were involved.³¹¹ The document, in defining the principle of populism, makes two important attributions. The first was the idea of sovereignty of the people/nation. The second, which is more important in respect to our study, was the necessity of

³⁰⁸ Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri, Cilt 16, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 100

³⁰⁹ Ibid, pp. 577-578

³¹⁰ Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, c. II., p. 82.

³¹¹ Ahmad, 1985, p. 237

using the sovereignty pursuant to the responsibility of the state to its people. Alongside these two references, another important change was brought forward in the document; for the first time in the definition of people, the term high bourgeoisie was included.³¹² Makal's remark on this change is befitting. The economic policies followed until the beginning of the 1930s, partially helped by the formation of a capitalist class and a working class who makes production under the control of the bourgeoisie who held the means for production.³¹³ From that point onwards, populism, which used to be a solidarist principle, started to be utilized as an apparatus to suppress the gradually felt class conflict. Until the structural settlement of the capitalist system, single-party government strived to postpone the conditions that would allow this conflict to drive the social dynamics. Nevertheless, it should not be ignored that class struggle lived in the political/economic arena at the state level.

The early republican period was marked with the ideals of impartiality and harmony, around the ideology of populism. In every aspect, exploitation of the people was to be protested and the oppressive and vulgar sides of capitalism were to be refuted. Individuals and social classes must be protected against any ill-treatment on this basis. In this sense, republican or Kemalist populism, as some may prefer to use, distinguishes from the form of populism adopted by the Union and Progress Party. The latter's populism was based on a social emphasis only on the basis of calling for a progressive and strong social class that would back the party's struggle against its internal and external foes. Atatürk's conception of populism on the other hand, synthesized the traditional *Tanzimat* understanding of westernization and variations of populism of the constitutional era. The latter helped republican populism to avoid limiting its conception of people in a way to favor one or other class, but focus on the solidarity and functional cooperation among them. Furthermore, the former traditions gave an individualistic tone or

³¹²CHF *Nizamnamesi*, 1931, pp. 31-32

³¹³ Makal, 1999, pp. 113-115

dimension to the republican populist movement, highlighting the dignity of each person on its own.³¹⁴

Nationalism and Peculiarity of Turkish Modernization

Another important difference of republican populism from its version in the constitutional era was the formation of its relation to nationalism. In the constitutional era, populism was usually conceived as a necessary result of, or an asset for nationalism. However, in the republican era it is the primary principle that founded the political organization in the first place. It should be noted that in the one-part era, the predominant and most broad-based ideological principle was nationalism. It was nearly incontestable.³¹⁵ However, the ideology of populism had a constraining effect on it. Unlike, Union and Progress populism that served to nationalism, the republican approach had a function of smoothing the ruffled feathers of the nationalist movement. Republican populism, in this characteristic also caused Turkish modernization to differentiate from other cases of Prussian bourgeois revolutions. Although in each case, similar structural formations enforced similar results, however the peculiar conditions of Turkey, among which the abovementioned aspect of populism had an important part, resisted this enforcement. The best example in this regard could be seen in the authoritarian tendencies that almost all examples of Prussian model countries show. As a country where the transition to capitalism was governed by the state in a social formation that merges political and economic spheres, a comparable pattern was also seen in Turkey. Nevertheless, thanks to the strong will for creating solidarity among the social classes the realization of this inclination stayed at a minimum level, when compared to, for example, Germany, Italy and Japan. It is possible to say that the morality of equity/justice that ruled the political/economic mind of the Ottoman classic age was revived in republican populism. Its transformation into a doctrine was influenced by French thinking. Grounded on that revival, a view of nationalism that construes a nation as a level of solidarity emerged in Turkey.

³¹⁴ Mardin, 1983, pp. 249-250

³¹⁵ For the idea that nationalism was the utmost appropriated principle among Six Arrows, please see, Makal, 1999, pp. 48-19

In short, populism not only provided a strong ideological basis for the economic policies of the new republic, it also served as a measure for the other principles to avoid extremes. In spite of its restraining effect on other ideological principles, after the multiple party era this reference point was lost and could not be replaced at the same level in terms of economy.³¹⁶ Within this context, Makal rightfully designates populism as the concept that would help us make sense of the connection between political sphere and labor relations in a single-party period.³¹⁷

4.1.4. Economic Transformation

Given the structural integration of political and economic spheres and consequently the state's significant role in change, the specific interpretation of populism as an ideology was dominant in the economic transformation of Turkey in the early republican era. However, application of the ideals spawned from populism differentiated with respect to the changing conditions of the country and international context. This resulted in different tendencies in the economic sphere that necessitates a further periodization of the single-party period. The method that applied in reaching the transition to capitalism was noteworthy in this periodization. The period when the state followed a less interventionist and more incentive based policies is usually called the liberal era, which lasted until the 1930s, whereas the period when the state dominantly led the economy was called the statist era. The last period in which international conditions shaped by World War II indispensably dictated extraordinary policies in the country is reasonably defined as the war period. Having agreed with the beginnings and ends of the periods, the naming of the first period is a matter of dispute in literature. Kuruç finds it inconvenient to call the first period liberal, and he seems to be right in avoiding the term in that there was a strong predisposition to deny foreign capital in that period. It is hard to call an economic atmosphere liberal with this

³¹⁶ Ahmad, 1985, p. 263

³¹⁷ Makal, 1999, pp 45-46

condition.³¹⁸ This view is also supported by the fact that the following statist era did not emerge as a result of a fundamental reaction to liberalism. Hence, while being loyal to Makal's periodization, the first era was known as the national private economy.

Before going further into detail in each era, as the common trends in all of them are looked for one important point takes attention; the regular expansion of the bureaucratic structure. A process of transition to capitalism governed by the state could only be possible with a strong and able bureaucracy.³¹⁹ Turkey a considerably significant group of bureaucrats left over from the Ottoman Empire. However, most of them were at senior administrator level and there was a strong need for midlevel specialists, as well as technical staff that were required for industrialization. The Turkish state not only carried out policies of education and training to raise a skilled labor class, but also provided advantageous conditions of work to attract and keep them in the needed areas and sectors of the economy.³²⁰ In both the private economy and statist eras, implementations like the 1926 State Officers' Law and public economic enterprises offered relatively better conditions for workers.³²¹ However, the single-party period was also characterized with strong pressure over the working class too. According to Koç, the reason behind this restraining policy was the conflict arising from the creation of a workers aristocracy by the state's provision of relatively affluent living standards for workers. Considering the traditional role of skilled laborers as the leading group of social movements and organization since the late Ottoman era, this group posed a danger for the political system. Given the political atmosphere that was created by the close relationships with Soviet Russia, the single-party period approached this group of workers with suspicion and always sought to have a firm grip on them; the communist party was especially suppressed through the use of

³¹⁸ Makal, 1999, pp. 199-200

³¹⁹ Koç, 2010, p. 111

³²⁰ Ibid, p. 111

³²¹ Ibid, p. 112

prohibitions and legal sanctions.³²² This tension was only relieved after the cessation of activities by the party, following a decision reached on a large alliance against rising fascism in the 7th meeting of the Communist International and the joining of leftist figures to the ranks of the Republican People's Party.³²³

National Private Economy Era

Following victory on the battlefield, the new state aimed to institute a strong and dynamic economic structure. There was almost a common accord regarding the economic system required to reach this end. For the desired future of Turkey, leading figures of the era had arrived at a consensus on western style capitalism and the industrial society that it would enable. However, the method to accomplish this end was still to be decided. For that purpose the Economic Congress of Turkey³²⁴ was held in İzmir between February 17th 1923 and March 4th.³²⁵ Although the congress had a secondary purpose of building a nationwide corporatist structure, no further steps were taken towards this intention. Attendants were determined on the basis of the representation of different occupational clusters, namely; farmers, merchants, industrialists and workers. The representative authority of the participants was questionable, as the representatives of the workers group did not even consist of workers and farmers were only represented by large land owners. Also, there was another adverse effect, that the bureaucratic domination over the decisions of the congress prevented a process of bottom to top decision making.³²⁶

The inclination of the Union and Progress party to a policy of putting Anatolian and Muslim-Turk elements of society at the center is mentioned before. Their aim was to reverse the dominance of foreigners and non-Muslim citizens of the empire enhanced by the liberal policies implemented during the first years of the second

³²² Koç, 2010, p. 112

³²³ Ibid, pp. 115-116

³²⁴ A.k.a. İzmir Economic Congress

³²⁵ Makal, 1999, p. 201

³²⁶ Ibid, 206-208

constitutional era. This policy resulted in the development of an “anti-liberal” aspect in Turkish nationalism. This aspect of Turkish nationalism was also reflected at the Economic Congress of Turkey.³²⁷ One of the major themes of the congress was that with the Independence War, Turkey instituted its political independence; but economic independence also had a need to be established. Although operationally, the state’s direct involvement in the economy was not assumed, and the employment of protective measures for national producers was accepted.

When the workers’ position in the congress is examined, ideologically they appear to embrace the principle of populism and deny the existence of class struggle as it does in the western world.³²⁸ They presented a list of demands like the other groups represented there, and among them, seven requests were prominent. They could be categorized under these titles: (1) recognition of workers’ status as a reputable social group (through usage of the word *işçi* instead of *amele* which had insulting connotations); (2) requests regarding the working hours and working age; (3) women’s maternal rights; (4) designation of a minimum wage periodically by local authorities; (5) demands regarding holidays and leave; (6) appeals on social security; and lastly, (7) the recognition of labor unions.³²⁹

The congress resulted primarily in accordance with requests of the farmers and merchants. An alliance between the dominant economic groups of Turkish society and bureaucracy is reflected. As it was in the representation, also in terms of influence on the results, workers were the least effective group. Although the congress decided on the encouragement of capital in general, there was a notable reluctance against foreign capital. Together with determining the economic areas available only to domestic capital, the congress also took a stance against western imperialism. In this respect, the Muslim-Turkish merchants were aimed to be the

³²⁷ Varlı and Koraltürk, 2010

³²⁸ Makal, 1999, pp. 206-208

³²⁹ Ibid, pp. 209-210

primary intermediary for foreign capital. Also, it was advised to the government that foreign firms should be excluded from the same economic privileges bestowed upon Turkish citizens and firms. Moreover, the stock market and exchange centers were also to be controlled by Turks as well. Decisions regarding workers were also taken in parallel with this nationalist outlook. The best example was the 26th article of the workers group's request that: "All the businesses set up in the country are to be allocated to Turkish laborers and workers".³³⁰

Five years after the Economic Congress of Turkey, in 1927, an industrial inventory count was undertaken. According to its findings, in Turkey there were 65 thousand corporations that employed 257 thousand workers. The size of the firms was still small in that 36 percent of the owners of these firms were self-employed. Also 8 percent was dependent on family labor and, another 36 percent employed only 1 or 2 people. The number of firms that employed more than 100 workers was only 155 throughout the whole of Turkey.³³¹ The utilization of machinery power was limited to 4.33 percent.³³² Within this context, as also happened in 1913, a temporary law for the stimulation of industry was enacted in 1927. Among the incentives were free land allotment, tax exemptions, discount in transportation fees, regulations binding the state to buy domestic products, and discount for goods in state monopolies. The law remained in effect until 1942, however the investments made through that period did not show an effective return.³³³

Although the firms utilizing the law were more efficient when compared to other Turkish firms, by comparison to foreign companies they were still less productive. Growth of industry took place at the pace of 8.5 percent on average between 1924 and 1929. Nevertheless, this development was mostly due to a realization of the

³³⁰ Varlı and Koraltürk, 2010, pp. 139-140

³³¹ Koç, 2010, p. 118

³³² Makal, 1999, p. 217

³³³ For a detailed analysis of the positive yet insufficient consequences of the law please see Altıparmak, 1998

existing potential. Furthermore, the industrial growth was below the average economic growth of 10.9 percent. The incentives did not bring any gain except for creating opportunities for private investors to make easy money. Underdevelopment of infrastructure was the main reason that prevented the development of industry. Also restrictions for the determination of customs tax in the Lausanne Treaty inhibited the Turkish government from taking protective measures in favor of national producers. These two factors also reduced the possible positive effects of the stimulation policies in industry.³³⁴

Among the other important economic developments of the era was the abolishment in 1925 of the Ashar tax. Through ashar, half of the previous year's tax revenue and 28.6 percent of the budget was generated. As a result of losing an income source as big as this, the budget deficit tripled in the following year. Also by the end of the 1920s and in the beginning of the 1930s, the demand for agricultural products from the international markets decreased significantly due to the great depression. Between 1928 and 1933, export figures halved. Moreover, price cuts in the exported products were higher than for imported goods.³³⁵ In the period between 1923 and 1929, Turkish imports were 26.8 higher than exports.³³⁶

National State Economy Era

Statism of the early republican era, unlike its development in the world, did not emerge as a direct reaction to liberalism. A series of reasons like the effects of the great depression, the failure of the stimulation of industry policies, absolute poverty conditions under which a considerable part of the population was living, a decrease in foreign capital, and a lack of capacity to tolerate this gap, caused these statist policies to become a necessity. A desire for industrial development to occur more rapidly also enhanced this inclination.³³⁷ The ideological principle of populism that dominated the economic policies was also a great foundation for the

³³⁴ Ibid, pp. 218-223

³³⁵ Ibid, pp. 223-224

³³⁶ Çokgezen et al., 2004, p. 4

³³⁷ Albayrak, 1996, pp. 102-105

statist economy. Traditional expectations of the people from the state in regard to minimum conditions of living, since the Ottoman classic age, made the Turkish government ideologically rationalize the statist policies. The following passage is taken from a speech that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk made during his visit to a local branch of the Republican People's Party on January 27th 1931.

The program that our party follows is in one way entirely democratic and populist. Yet, from an economic point of view it is also statist. In this respect, it is natural for the republican government, which is based on our party, to deal with citizens' lives, futures and their well-being in every aspect. Our people are by nature statist, in that they take the requiring of any kind of need from state for granted. In this respect, there is an absolute correspondence between the nature of our nation and the program of our party.³³⁸

Statism policies depended upon the idea of mutual responsibility, of state and people, to each other. This argument is also supported by social policy implementations carried out in state factories and businesses. Although Makal evaluates them as an apparatus for fighting against the scarcity of skilled labor, and Koç believes that these rights were given to workers to invalidate the political threat that may emerge from workers' movements, it can also be argued that they are at the same time important indicators of the reflection of a populist approach to the economy in regard to providing people with better means for living.

The principle of statism, similar to populism, had transformed in meaning over time. Although in the early years of the republic the concept was limited to the state's necessary intervention in economic areas where private sector was insufficient, and to provide for the needs of the people, that meaning is expended and became less flexible starting from the beginning of 1930s. The Republican People's Party (CHP) program, adopted in the 4th Congress, was primarily

³³⁸ Translated from Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, Cilt: II, p. 262.

focused on statism and a planned economy. The Party Program of 1935 expands on the meaning of statism in a way to include the struggle against interest groups that make profit through the utilization of state resources, supervision over private property and the avoidance of all kinds of monopolies. Ironically, this uncompromising view of statism was moderated in the harsh conditions of the Second World War, by the Program of 1942. Although the state's presence was still felt in every domain of social life during the war years, the Program of 1942 had a more liberal tendency. It delimited the state's control over private enterprise, but only on conditions where national interest necessitated it.³³⁹

The era focused on is the period when the state was directly involved in the economy, through establishing business enterprises, regulating the economy through planning and control over markets via the enactment of laws.³⁴⁰ As the other two methods were briefly touched upon, it is better to first focus on state owned enterprises (SOEs). When the economic outcomes of the establishment of SOEs are examined, it is seen that in the industry sector, the growth rate had increased. The share of industry and state investments in the gross national income had also risen. Moreover, sectorial distribution of employment also changed in favor of industry. In terms of gross national income, the share of imports had decreased and the foreign trade deficit observed in the 1920s was turned into a surplus by the 1930s. These establishments helped the development of the private sector in that they not only trained a large group of skilled laborers, but it also led to the emergence of an entrepreneurial class of former state officers. The transformation of the labor force composition was among the important effects of the SOEs. While the share of industry in the labor force was 4.6 percent in 1924, it rose to over 8 percent in the 1940s. The overall trend was the crossing of workers from agriculture to the industry sector.³⁴¹ Nevertheless, it should not be concluded from this fact that a process of losing property in rural areas had

³³⁹ Bila, 2008

³⁴⁰ Makal, 1999, p. 236

³⁴¹ Makal, 2007, pp. 118-120

occurred in this period. On the contrary, as recorded in the consecutive censuses in 1927, 1935, 1940 and 1950, up until the 1950s the agricultural population remained at the level of 75 percent.³⁴² Another important change occurred in the status of the laborers. The number of wage laborers increased from 265,341, to first 289,147 and then up to 373,961 in 1937, and increased again in 1947 and 1950, respectively. Also, the number of state officers doubled from 1931 to 1946. The number of total workers employed in the industry complexes that belonged to the state also increased from approximately 70 thousand in 1938 to 150 thousand in 1948. The number of workers employed in Sümerbank, which was around 5,000 in 1933, hextupled by 1950.

The Law of Work enacted in 1936 was to be exercised in companies that employed more than a certain number of workers. In order to determine those firms, in the following year an inventory was undertaken and it was noted that 281 thousand workers were hired by companies that employed more than 5 people. In 1947, the number of workers was 301 thousand in 3,200 companies that employed more than 10 people. It is hard to say that all of these workers were propertyless. Moreover, regardless of the increasing number of workers, there was still a significant shortage of industry workers. The turnover of workers in companies was at a devastating rate in the 1940s. For example, in August of 1943 in the Malatya fabric factory, one fourth of the workers were absent. In 1940, in Sümerbank 7,826 workers out of 10 thousand left their jobs and 8,679 were hired in replacement. In other words, almost four fifths of all workers were renewed in one year. In 1944, this rate drastically increased up to 93 percent.³⁴³

Another important effect of SOEs and the statist industry policies was seen in the social rights bestowed upon workers who were employed in these industrial complexes. They had opportunities like utilizing housing facilities, free lunches, health services, discounted shops, educational and cultural events, as well as

³⁴² Koç, 2010, p. 117

³⁴³ Ibid, p. 119

sports centers and sports fields. Social security options, and in some institutions the right to a leave of absence with pay, was also among the important social policies implemented. To illustrate the importance given to social rights in these institutions, a good example would be Sümerbank again, where expenses made for social opportunities amounted more than 20 percent of the total budget of the company.³⁴⁴

War Era

Until the 1940s, especially in the state economy period, the Turkish economy in general advanced considerably. It is also possible to say that in the latter period, a significant growth in industry was achieved; and 1939 was the top year in terms of economic development in the overall era. In 1939, gross national income had reached its highest level in all economic sectors, but from that year onward, the troubles of the war period started to be felt and the economy recessed in all sectors, even to below the level at the beginning of the 1930s.³⁴⁵ Although Turkey did not enter World War II, the economic conditions of the country were directly affected by the international conditions shaped by the war. Scarcity of goods, high inflation and government regulations during this period gave way to black marketeers and other profiteers to accumulate capital, which resulted in the active involvement of private enterprises in the post-war era. These developments occurred in spite of two extraordinary tax practices; namely, the wealth tax and the soil products tax.³⁴⁶

4.1.5. Working Class in Single-Party Period

Although in previous sections, depending on a variety of data, I have presented certain statistics regarding the size of the working class in the early republican era, it should be noted that the numbers given could hardly be accepted as healthy or reliable. It is true that they are sufficient for grasping the general trends, by giving

³⁴⁴ Makal, 1999, pp. 280-281

³⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 288

³⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 289

us an opportunity for comparing and contrasting different years, yet they still provide us with limited information on the general picture of workers. For example, the aforementioned statistics collected for the determination of workplaces and workers that were subject to the 1936 Law of Work excludes non-manual labor, workers hired in companies which had less than 10 employees, and those who worked in the agricultural, maritime and aviation sectors. Also, family businesses were excluded from these records, so a large section of laborers were not visible within certain statistics. To get a rough idea about the size of the working class in that period, Makal refers to the estimations of Kuvılcımlı for the year 1935. According to Kuvılcımlı, the total number of workers might vary somewhere between 798 thousand and 960 thousand. Based on the minimum numbers he had given, the distribution of workers among sectors is as follows; 30 percent would have been industry workers, 19 percent agricultural industry workers, 25 percent agricultural workers and 19 percent unproductive workers.³⁴⁷ The share of the workers in terms of the total population was around 5 percent. When the regional distribution of workers is examined, it is seen that the traditional industrial centers were still dominant, in spite of the state's policy for dispersing industrial investments throughout the country. İstanbul and İzmir, as the pioneering industrial centers, still had 29 percent of all workers and 34 percent of the industrial workers. Concentration of workers in limited centers prevented workers' movements from becoming widespread throughout the country.³⁴⁸

Composition of Working Class

As the composition of the working class in the early republican era is examined, it is already noted that the ethnic variety of the workers reduced significantly following the war and migration periods and the relative importance of foreign workers had diminished. The tendency towards creating a national economy made the Turkish-Muslim population by far the most dominant element of the working class. As the scarcity of labor power continued both in agriculture and industry,

³⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 305

³⁴⁸ Akkaya, 2002, p. 147

the role of women and children as workers also continued. Early republican policies on encouraging women to go out to work in the public sector and a decrease in male workers due to war conditions also increased the participation of women in the labor force. In 1943 women constituted 20.76 percent of the total wage laborers, while child labor amounted to 18.86 percent. It should be mentioned here that age distribution of the children made the numbers even more dramatic, as the share of younger children was greater than older ones. This distribution had changed in favor of the older children towards the 1940s. Women and child workers also received lower wages compared to the men; however the rates were not as bad as during the Ottoman period.³⁴⁹ Lastly, if the share of workers employed by the state is looked at, it is seen that the number of state workers had increased both in number and in proportion with respect to the overall population and labor force, between 1938 and 1946.³⁵⁰

Workers' organizations and Movements

The most important characteristic of the early republican workers was their temporary existence in the workplace. The lack of labor in agriculture was also limiting the supply for industrial labor, too. Rather than a regular flow of laborers from rural to urban regions, mostly the villagers were going to the cities to find jobs only in the case of rural poverty. Even in those situations, people of rural origin usually only took jobs temporarily, and only for the purpose of gaining additional income. As seen by the numbers, there was a high rate of turnover in almost every industrial workplace and the lack of permanency in jobs limited the development of a worker identity for most of these laborers.³⁵¹

The legal regulations made at the end of the 1920s organized workers under artisan associations. Until 1946, workers came together under the roofs of solidarity funds, organizations, cooperatives and artisan associations. Although

³⁴⁹ Makal, 1999, pp. 310-311

³⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 314

³⁵¹ Akkaya, 2002, p. 145

from time to time, attempts made at further development into labor unions were witnessed, the state's repressive policies did not allow those efforts to get off the ground.³⁵² The primary law that regulated the labor relations was the 1936 Law of Work. Although further detail regarding the law will be presented in the following section, it should be noted in respect of the workers' organizations, that it did not allow space for labor unions as it only recognized workers' representatives in collective labor relations. The Law of Associations was going to take it a further step and prohibit the unions entirely. Until 1946, only solidarity funds served as centers of organization and they were mostly associations close to the CHP and usually kept under strict monitoring of the government. CHP's position in respect to labor organizations would not change until the 1946 elections.³⁵³

Labor movements in the single-party period were concentrated in the 1920s. With the beginning of the 1930s, the abovementioned policies of the state and the negative aspects in the objective conditions of workers limited the number of workers' movements and strikes as well as workers' organizations. In the years between 1923 and 1929, 63 strikes were observed, while between 1930 and 1936 the number of strikes reduced to half that of the previous period. Half of these strikes occurred in İstanbul, where the most lively and well-organized group of workers existed. Tram workers and harbor workers were the most active ones. According to the overall distribution of strikes among business lines the food industry, transportation and textile industry were the top three sectors.³⁵⁴

Work Conditions and Wages

In the early republican era there were significant developments in terms of working hours and working times. First, with the Law of Weekend, a one day weekly holiday was secured.³⁵⁵ Later on, with the regulations that the Law of

³⁵² Ibid, p. 147

³⁵³ Ibid, p. 154

³⁵⁴ Ibid, pp. 167-168

³⁵⁵ İleri, 2008, p. 86

Work brought, a weekly maximum work time was limited to 48 hours. The law also forbade making children between the ages of 12 and 16 years work for more than 8 hours a day. To prevent child labor, a minimum age of work was set at 12 years. Also, male workers under the age of 18 years were prohibited from being employed in the mines, as well as women.

The major determinant of the wages in the era seems to be the supply and demand conditions of the labor market. As neither side of the labor relations became institutionalized in this era, the legal regulations did not show positive results. Hence, the state's control over wages remained limited, apart from the SOEs. Until the war period, it was possible to talk about a general trend of increase in wages. However, during the war period, a radical decrease occurred to the extent that in 1944, wage averages were reduced to half that of the 1938 levels. The decline in wages was even higher when compared to the decrease in GNP.³⁵⁶ It is possible to argue that the burden of the economic crisis experienced due to the war period was felt at its highest level by the workers together with the agricultural producers.

Social Security Rights

As it has been seen, the social rights and especially the social security opportunities of the Ottoman laborers were quite limited and as they were dependent on this heritage, the conditions of the early Turkish workers were very much the same. However, as early as the Independence War era, certain developments had occurred in this area starting with the mining sector. Those first implementations through worker unions had involved with the common features of social security systems such as mandatory participation, responsibility of employers and employees in fund raising, and the aid given to injured or sick workers and their families. These unions were the pioneering forms of social security in Turkey.³⁵⁷ The first examples of the right to legal remedies for work

³⁵⁶ Makal, 1999, pp. 447-448

³⁵⁷ Ibid, pp. 419-421

related disputes and the possibility of compensation and more importantly the necessity for employers to take due precautions to prevent work accidents, were brought up with the 1926 Law of Obligations. In the 1930 Public Health law, it was made obligatory for employers who hire more than a certain number of workers to cover the health expenses of their workers in case of illness, accident and for giving birth. The 1936 Law of Work, brought limited social security rights like half-payment for workers who worked for a period of time at the same place in cases of maternity or sick leave. Nevertheless, the law proposed a gradual actualization of different social security programs, which could be put into action after 1946. In terms of other social rights, as noted before, SOEs were pioneering institutions where modern facilities and opportunities were provided for workers in different areas.

Legal Framework

Although the legal developments in labor relations with respect to their effects on the conditions of workers have been touched upon, to briefly scrutinize this area in a holistic approach, it is seen that the state's regulation of work life with its laws were usually protectionist for individual labor relations and prohibiting for the collective labor relations.³⁵⁸ The 1925 Law of Maintenance of Order indirectly but negatively affected labor relations. In the four years when the law was in effect, workers' organizations were closed on the grounds of that law. Although between 1924 and 1934, five different drafts were prepared for a law regarding labor relations; it was not until 1936 that a comprehensive regulation in this area was passed into law. Among them, the 1932 law draft was considerably progressive due to the need for preventing the significant support of workers to the opposition party; Serbest Fırka. The proposal even involved rights for collective bargain and strike. Unfortunately, the party was closed and following the disappearance of the opposition, the proposal and the originators of the project were removed from political life.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 387

³⁵⁹ Akkaya, 2002, p. 152

The 1936 Law of Work was the first legal act that aimed to regulate the entire area of labor relations. It was also the first law in this area that was put into force nationwide. The law stayed in place until 1967. It was also the first law regarding labor relations that was enforced by serious sanctions.³⁶⁰ The law was necessitated by the harsh conditions under which workers were living, especially those from the private sector. Also, the government believed that in the conditions of labor scarcity, the protection of workers and the provision of better conditions for them would serve in the interest of economic development. Moreover, an increase in the number of workers and large scale companies made workers more visible and important for the economy. The state's increasingly direct involvement in the economy was also an important reason that made the law a requirement in that the state had to define standards for labor relations for its own industrial enterprises. The state's desire to control the labor relations as well as other political and economic domains was also reflected in the enactment of the law. External factors like joining the International Labor Organization and the influence of European laws, especially those of authoritarian regimes by example, were also leading in the process that led to the law being passed.³⁶¹

It is possible to say that the conditions that brought about the necessity of the law and the process by which it was prepared, determined the final content of it. In terms of individual work conditions, it was liberal and protective in character and compatible with its international equivalents. Along with general clauses, there were also specific articles regarding the protection of women and children. Within the framework of the law, regulations were introduced regarding minimum wages, regularity of payment, obligation of cash payment, seniority indemnity, conditions of maternity leave, weekly working limits, daily working limits for certain sectors, minimum working age, the state's responsibility in labor exchange, and social

³⁶⁰ Makal, 1999, pp. 353-354

³⁶¹ Ibid, pp. 358-383

security programs.³⁶² In terms of collective labor relations the law was restrictive and even repressive as it prohibited strikes and lockout. There was no regulation regarding labor unions, so it was in a way confirming the de facto restrictions in the area. Instead, the law was giving worker representatives the roles of unions like mediating within labor disputes. Nonetheless, it should be noted that these representatives had no job guarantees that would allow them to defend the rights of workers to the full extent.³⁶³

Another important law that considerably affected labor relations was the 1938 Law of Associations. Through this law, establishing associations on class basis and involving class names were forbidden. The law also restricted the foundation of profession based associations that worked for state or local government. Only after 1958 was this restriction removed and the chambers of doctors, architectures and engineers were founded.³⁶⁴

4.2. A Step towards Democracy: Multi-Party Period

Following the Second World War, the general positive trend in terms of democratization rising in the world was reflected within Turkey, too. The economic recession caused by the war period led to a restructuration of the economic relations. Social groups that were overwhelmed by the harsh conditions of war started to complain about their burdens and voice their demands. Although the state of economic crisis did not end immediately after the war, industrial production and in relation to that, the number of wage laborers had increased.³⁶⁵ The unfair market conditions of the war years allowed for the considerable accumulation of wealth in the hands of some merchants and private capital had a reasonable role in the relative development of the economy. A shift from the state's direct involvement in economic activities to the provision of infrastructure

³⁶² Ibid, pp. 395-399

³⁶³ Ibid, pp.400-403

³⁶⁴ Ibid, pp. 410-411

³⁶⁵ Şahin, 2010, p. 25

commenced, such as the building of roads and investment in energy.³⁶⁶ Due to this shift in CHP's economic program, it is possible to talk about a significant continuity with the last period of CHP and Democratic Party (DP) rule in this area.

In terms of overall economic performance of the country, the 5 years following the end of the war could be thought of as a restoration period. The national income at constant prices decreased some 23 percent between 1938 and 1945. Nevertheless, by 1950, national income reached a level 21 percent higher than the 1938 level. In the period between 1946 and 1953 were years where rapid growth was observed, and agriculture was the main generator of this development. The increase in income per capita was lower than the increase in national income due to the prompt increase in the population level.³⁶⁷

4.2.1. Political Transition Years

Politically, the period between 1946 and 1950 can be defined as transition years. The first elections with multiple parties had been held and as a consequence of the results, the CHP remained in power. However, CHP's conditions of ruling in the single-party period had altered since the rise of alternatives in political life. The state ceased to be the only addressee of the social and economic requests or opposition in general. Like the case with the Liberal Republican Party, orientation towards DP made CHP apply reforms in areas that they were reluctant to act in before. The key change in this transition era was CHP's assumption of a reactive political position. In spite of having won the elections, rising opposition channeled by DP made CHP change certain policies in reference to DP's political arguments. For example, as DP was in favor of a more liberal economy, from 1946 to 1947 CHP's strict statist economic approach was replaced with a looser political stance that left more room for private investment.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁶ Makal, 2002, p. 83

³⁶⁷ Ibid, pp. 87-88

³⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 84

Labor relations are among those areas where CHP changed its attitude and approach. The understanding of social formation in Turkey by denial of the existence of classes in the western form was renounced, after having been adopted for a long period during single-party rule. Instead, a reluctant acceptance of class conflict took place. Though accepting their existence, CHP's position with respect to the classes remained distant in its discourse, and the ideological stance of the party in favor of harmony among the classes was insisted upon. Nevertheless, populism, as the key principle of the party, was pushed to the background and nationalism rose as the primary principle that would constitute the social cohesion. In the late 1940s, CHP's approach towards workers was shaped on the basis of this change.³⁶⁹

Together with the change that allowed the founding of other associations apart from CHP, the 1946 amendment to the Law of Associations also made the establishment of class based foundations possible. As the legal obstacles that restricted workers to form labor unions were eliminated, a period of rapid syndication was experienced. Already by the beginning of 1947, the number of labor unions had reached almost 100.³⁷⁰ Together with democratization, the increase in the labor movements in this period was due to the relative revival of industry after the war period, and an increase in the number of workers.³⁷¹ Most of the labor unions formed between 1940 and 1950 retained the character of a charity organization, as in the previous period. However, some local unions founded with the influence of the political initiatives of the Socialist Laborer Peasant Party of Turkey and Socialist Party of Turkey, were taken by the government as an inclination towards independence of the working class. Hence, together with them, the political activities of the two parties were banned. Furthermore, in 1947

³⁶⁹ Akkaya, 2002, p. 155

³⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 155

³⁷¹ Güzel, 2007, p 111

the Law of Labor Unions,³⁷² the first law regulating the founding and operation of labor unions in Turkish history. Through the law, the state was given strict financial control over the unions. Moreover, labor unions had to maintain an apolitical stance and a nationalistic character. They were also expected to be exclusive to the members of the professional category for which they were founded.³⁷³ Authority given by law to the government over labor unions and the existing legal restrictions on worker movements pacified the labor unions until the 1960s.

The political environment described above resulted in a conflicting relationship between CHP and the labor unions. Results of the 1946 elections showed that even at that time, CHP was distant to large social groups. According to Karpat, workers predominantly voted for DP in these elections.³⁷⁴ To gain the support of the working class CHP leveled down its authoritarian attitude towards workers and work life. The abovementioned legal regulations allowing for the foundation of labor unions and certain improvements in individual labor relations were steps taken in this regard. Yet, especially in the dawn of the Cold War period the party's overall will to control the labor movements and organizations continued. Hence, on the one hand CHP was prohibiting political entanglement of workers' organizations; whilst on the other hand the party was establishing labor unions under its control, even by the use of public funds. These unions were rather more like apparatuses of social control than modern workers' organizations in the western sense.³⁷⁵

In this climate, according to Güzel a threefold structure of labor unions emerged.³⁷⁶ The first group constituted those unions close to the ruling party or even those that were founded directly by the government. CHP used the Ministry

³⁷² Law on Employer and Labor Unions and Union Federations (5018)

³⁷³ Güzel, 2007, pp. 112-113

³⁷⁴ Karpat, 1967, p. 144

³⁷⁵ Makal, 2007, pp. 260-261

³⁷⁶ Güzel, 2004, pp. 112-113

of Labor, founded in 1945, and the Labor Bureaus for the purpose of organizing its satellite labor unions. These were intermediary institutions between employers and employees and were directly controlled by the party. The second group involved labor unions close to the party, or parties that had a high probability of ascending to power. Although these labor unions were not as formal as the government controlled ones, they were always ready to replace the first group and were usually tolerated by official authorities. The last group of the labor unions could be called independents. These labor unions were not under the control of either the government or the mainstream political parties. Unlike the previous two groups, these labor unions were organized in the private sector, mostly in its sections where the harshest conditions of capitalist exploitation were felt. Though small in number, they were resilient structures and radical in terms of their struggle. In certain cases they were known to have relations with mostly socialist political parties. This structure, the formation of which was pioneered by CHP, was taken over and preserved by the DP. Hence it is possible to say that there was continuity between late CHP and DP governments in this respect too.

4.2.2. Democratic Party Period

There is a specific reason why this very short period is examined in two sections. A quick glance at the period as a whole in terms of labor relations does not reveal a necessity for further division. However, as the year 1950 had a crucial role to play in regard to Turkish modernizations, the need to observe this era by taking this date as a milestone is felt. The founding figures and cadres of the republic, in other words those who administered the state controlled transition to capitalism had to give up their pioneering role and their direct relationship with state was distanced. On the other hand, the 1950s were also key years in that they witnessed important developments in the formation of the working class in terms of class experiences. Although in regard to workers' movements and organizations it is possible to portray this era as stagnant, class formation is not only constituted by these institutional aspects. As seen in Chapter 2, workers' daily practices and the dynamics of their daily life experiences are crucial in the activation of workers as subjects of history. This period is not to be simply overlooked by virtue of this

approach.³⁷⁷ In spite of continuity in different areas between the DP period and the period that is called transition years, they are distinguished on this basis.

Economic Developments

The years following the Second World War were of economic growth. However, 1954 was a turning point, in that after that year, the growth rate decreased significantly. Economic policies of free international trade and foreign-dependent development plans failed and resulted in recession, and economic performance in the following years fell. Foreign trade surplus procured by the employment of statist economic projects had lost in these years and high rates of deficits were seen. Hyperinflation affected the purchasing power of the different sections of society. Uprising and discontentment led the DP government to put a National Security Law into effect that was employed previously in the severe war years. Although the economy was still determined chiefly by state policies in this era, political domain also started to be extensively affected by economic developments. As the early years of the 1950s were economically successful, social groups were content and the political attitude of the government was moderate. However, the authoritarian tendency of DP government appeared when the economic conditions worsened and social restlessness arose.³⁷⁸

The mid-1950s witnessed a shift in the DP's economic policies both from its program and from its earlier practices. The rising foreign trade deficit resulted in state control over international trade. The need created for consumer goods following limitations of imports resulted in the production of import substitutes by the state. Although DP was against the state's role in the economy through SOEs, ironically new SOEs were founded and existing one's reorganized and some of them were then scaled up in the DP era.³⁷⁹ This resulted in an increase in both the share of the investments in public expenditures and the ratio of public investment

³⁷⁷ Koçak, 2008, pp. 73-76

³⁷⁸ Makal, 2002, p. 90

³⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 94

to gross national income. But, it should be noted that the private sector's share in total investment increased more than the state's share in the same period.³⁸⁰ When the share of sectors in terms of GNP was viewed, there was a significant decrease in agriculture observed, along with a slight increase in services, and a remarkable rise in industry. To conclude, the years under DP rule could be characterized by slow growth, which in spite of the increase in state investments, was led by the private sector and mostly occurred through developments in industry.

Workers in DP Period

Data on different quantitative aspects of the working class in the early republican era is already presented. To give a better idea about the overall trend in the number of workers in the multi-party era it could be useful to present a comparison of selective years. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Labor, the number of workers who were subject to the Law of Work was 180 thousand in 1937. This number increased gradually to around 290 thousand in 1947, 374 thousand in 1950 and 755 thousand in 1960.³⁸¹ So in the years under DP rule, the number of workers subjected to the law doubled. A similar increase can be observed in a comparison between the 1950 and 1964 industrial inventories. Those who worked in manufacture increased in from 335,576 to 679,462 (103 percent).³⁸² An interesting point of this data shows that as the rate of the number of workers subject to the Law of Work to the overall population increased between 1955 and 1960, and the rate of those workers to the total wage laborers decreased. Depending on these numbers one can conclude that the development in small scale private businesses in this period was higher than for other corporations.

The trends in employment mostly followed overall economic changes. When the share of sectors in employment is examined, it is seen that along with a

³⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 93

³⁸¹ Akkaya, 2002, p. 146

³⁸² Makal, 2002, p. 149

considerable decrease in agriculture, an increase in the industry and services sectors was experienced between 1950 and 1960. Nevertheless, unlike the GNP shares, employment increases in the services sector was higher than for industry. By 1960, 11.5 percent of the total employment was in industry and 13.7 percent in services.³⁸³ In this period while landless peasants decreased in percentage, there was a tendency towards small scale land ownership in agriculture. Although both trends at first sight seem to be against wage labor, due to the increase in the use of machinery in production, wage labor increased both in agriculture and in the other two sectors. An increase in machinery on the one hand lowered the need for sharecropping/land rental, but on the other hand it created a need for skilled labor to operate and maintain the agricultural machinery. The former sharecroppers started to migrate to cities in search of permanent job opportunities. Hence, both the skilled wage labor in rural areas and unskilled laborers in urban areas increased. Though it started in the 1950s, as the limit of arable lands was going to be reached by the 1960s, the effects of this trend would reach its top level after 1960.³⁸⁴

In spite of the aforementioned turning to statist policies, in the DP period, the public share of non-agricultural employment, and of industry workers in general and workers employed in the large corporations, decreased. In the large companies, the state's share in total wages decreased by more than 10 percent in 1962 when compared to 1950, when it was almost at the level of 60 percent.³⁸⁵ But then the number of state officers increased incredibly between 1950 and 1960, almost doubling from 219,999 up to 401,179. As this number increased compared to the total population, the labor force and non-agricultural employment regularity of the referential change became apparent. After 1960, the rate of increase in the numbers of state officers even became higher.³⁸⁶ A similar trend was observed in

³⁸³ Ibid, p. 92

³⁸⁴ Ibid, pp. 96-108

³⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 95

³⁸⁶ Ibid, p 158-160

the workers of SOEs. While the number of them was 73,101 in 1950, that increased up to 154,642 by the end of 1959.³⁸⁷

The DP period witnessed substantial improvements with regard to the skill level of the labor force. As mentioned before, the chronic problem of scarcity of labor in Turkey started to decrease in this era. This resulted in a downward movement in the labor turnover rates, especially in SOEs. The reason why turnover rates were lower than in the private sector was the social benefits provided along with the relatively high wages in public businesses. In traditional and well-rooted industrial areas like İstanbul, the turnover rates were even lower, so that together with public-private differences, there were variations among the regions, too. Regularity of jobs that were started up in these regions helped the otherwise unskilled laborers to gain certain skills through practice and thereby they learned to perform their tasks better. Since the educational training of the labor force was limited to occupational training, the experience gained in the workplace was crucial for skills acquisition, which in turn increased efficiency. During the same time period, workers stayed in the same job so they could also develop habits, life styles and experiences peculiar to the working class.³⁸⁸

Women Workers

Labor force participation for both men and women decreased between 1955 and 1965. However, the decrease in the women's labor force participation rate was higher than for men. So the women's share of the labor force also decreased from 43.11 percent to 37.89 percent. Although the number seems to be high, most of these women were unpaid laborers who worked mostly on their family land in agriculture. As a matter of fact this can be seen through the sectorial distribution of women and their work status. Around 95 percent of women were working in agriculture and the ratio stayed almost unchanged through the DP period. Status distribution of women shows that 90 percent of them were unpaid family laborers.

³⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 164

³⁸⁸ Ibid, pp. 115-117

When labor force participation in places with a population higher than 10 thousand is taken into consideration, it is seen that there was a sharp decrease from 18.07 percent in 1955 down to 9.16 percent in 1960.³⁸⁹

In the 1955-1965 period, the number of women wage laborers was seen to increase from approximately 200 thousand to 300 thousand. Also among the women laborers, the rate of wage laborers rose in the given period from 3.83 percent to 5.92 percent.³⁹⁰ Another data regarding the whole period under scrutiny (1947-1963), shows that when workers employed in corporations subject to the Law of Work were examined, although both child and female workers increased by 18 and 96 percent respectively, male workers increased by a much higher rate of 273 percent, so the work share of children and women decreased. The share of women working in these companies decreased from 17.58 percent in 1947 to 10.24 percent in 1963. The decrease in both child and female labor in this period could be explained by the increasing male labor supply, as a result of the ending of the war era, and the abovementioned developments that occurred in agriculture.³⁹¹ Lastly, the number and share of female state officers increased from 13.5 percent in 1946 up to 16.2 percent in 1963.³⁹²

Workers' Organizations

The 1960s and 1970s are considered the heyday of Turkish workers' organizations and working class movements. This caused a comparative lack of interest in the 1950s' developments regarding formation of the working class.³⁹³ It is a known fact that in terms of workers' movements these years were relatively passive times. However, this is not the case with the workers' organizations. Before the 1950s', syndicalism was of a state directed nature; nevertheless, this does not mean that those years were not important in the development of the

³⁸⁹ Ibid, pp. 180-186

³⁹⁰ Ibid. p. 186

³⁹¹ Ibid, pp. 193-195

³⁹² Ibid, p. 200

³⁹³ Koçak, 2008, pp. 69-72

Turkish working class. Güzel claims that the 1950s were effective in the recognition of a reconciliatory labor unionism and conservative political attitudes. This understanding was founded on the process of syndicalism developed within the control of the state for a long time. As DP took over the approach of CHP to labor unions, having been in power for a longer time, they formed structural bonds with syndicators and created a rightist tendency among them. The influence of US unionists in the establishment of the first labor union federation of Turkey had also contributed to the formation of the character of Turkish unions.³⁹⁴ Having agreed to a certain extent with this negative evaluation of the era, it should also be noted that the labor union movement in the 1950s had noteworthy positive effects for the working class in Turkey. The early republican period policies and overall political and economic conditions of the era resulted in a break of two decades in labor union works. Union activities started to be regarded as risky and communistic. Oppressive state practices against the socialist leftist parties and labor unions related with them in 1946 also played a role in the formation of this drawback. The state's direct involvement, otherwise regarded as negative, could be seen as a positive asset under these circumstances that within the Cold War conditions, without the state's direct involvement it would have been very difficult to organize trade unions. The state's will to control the process eased the acquisition of legal rights, eliminated administrative obstacles and created a reasonable funding for the first initiatives. Important big steps were taken thanks to the facilitating of the state.³⁹⁵

The number of labor unions in 1947 was 49 and they had 33 thousand members. They constituted 12 percent of workers subject to the Law of Work who were allowed to participate in labor union activity. In only three years, at the edge of the DP period, the number of unions reached 88 and the number of members was 78 thousand. One fifth of the workers were labor union members. DP was as active as CHP in state labor unionism. In the 10 years of DP rule, the number of

³⁹⁴ Güzel, 2007, 113

³⁹⁵ Koç, 1999, pp. 32-33

workers subject to the Law of Work doubled, while the number of labor unions quintupled and their members tripled. Almost two fifths of the workers were union members and the increase in union members was higher than the increase in the overall number of workers.³⁹⁶ In September 1960, the number of labor unions was 432, while their membership reached 282 thousand.³⁹⁷

In this period, for the first time in our history a comprehensive and legitimate federation of labor unions was established. Trade unions, mostly founded in state enterprises, evolved from workplace unions to local councils and federations. Two potent higher level organizations under the control of CHP and DP; namely the İstanbul Labor Unions Federation and the Liberal Labor Unions Federation, merged under the name of the former on September 10th 1950. This organization could be regarded as the inception of the countrywide federation founded later on.³⁹⁸ The Confederation of Labor Unions of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – TÜRK-İŞ) was established in 1952. As the first nationwide organization of the working class in Turkey, it gained international recognition as well.³⁹⁹

Workers Movements

The transition years witnessed some incidents of worker movements. Between 1946 and 1950, 11 actions were observed. In 1946 there were 5 events in the cities of İzmir, İstanbul and Gaziantep. On May 13th 1950, Ereğli mine workers stopped work and left the mines to vote in the 1950 elections. This event was recorded as the first political strike in Turkish labor history.⁴⁰⁰ In the DP period, in terms of strikes, work stoppages and resistance to work, 35 workers' movements had occurred. Dock workers were the most active professional group in those actions. Harsh working conditions and low pay were the main reasons for the strikes and

³⁹⁶ Akkaya, 2002, p. 163

³⁹⁷ Koç, 2010/b, p. 2

³⁹⁸ Sülker, 1969, p. 66

³⁹⁹ Koç, 1999, p. 34

⁴⁰⁰ Akkaya, 2002, p. 170

the state's response happened to be severe, even in some cases it was in the form of suppressing the movements by force from the police. Mostly it was the organized actions through the labor unions that the state responded harshly to. An important feature of this period is that İstanbul lost its significance in the events and worker actions started to disperse to the Anatolian regions. Also a parallel development with the sectors where workers' movements occurred and labor union organizations grew is noteworthy. In the late years of the 1950s, a decrease in workers' movements occurred due to the DP government's authoritarian practices against workers.⁴⁰¹

It has already been mentioned that the late 1940s and 1950s could be characterized as years where the workers started to evolve into players of social formation in Turkey. However, these years, as seen above, were also times of severe state authoritarianism against any political opposition. As newly emerging players of economic, social and political life, in the given conditions the working class in Turkey, through their newspapers, touched upon issues that directly related to them. In order to influence the policy-making processes, they used these channels for expressing and disseminating their views. However, they had developed a peculiar language of their own to avoid the state's negative response to their demands. Instead of simply submitting to authority, they made use of an alternative language through which they did not evoke socialist or communist threats against the state, but still could give voice to their expectations and requests as a social group. Equality, justice and human rights were the main themes by the use of which they tendered their rightful requests on the improvement of their overall social status, as well as betterment of their working conditions. A new political terminology had emerged in the post-war period when transition to the multi-party system took place. Workers' political discourse matched with this terminology by use of concepts like citizenship rights, equality, freedom, justice, oppression, despotism, and tyranny in order to avoid alienating the DP government and provoking them to tighten their grip on workers'

⁴⁰¹ Ibid, p. 171

organizations.⁴⁰² The change in the language of workers to articulate their demands in the new political discourse is an example of their development of alternative strategies for reaching their concrete ends. This is important in that it is a good indicator of workers becoming active agents in Turkish social structure rather than being just a passive and ineffective group.

Institutionalization of Labor Relations

At the last years of the one-party period, important steps were taken on the state's side to form an institutional structure that would regulate and facilitate labor relations. The Ministry of Labor was founded on June 27th 1945. Following that, the Institution for Providing Jobs and Employees was founded on March 15th 1946, monopolizing job placement services on a public and private institutional basis which dated back to late 19th century.⁴⁰³ Accession to the multi-party system was made through changing of the Law of Associations and abolishing the prohibition regarding the foundation of political parties other than CHP. The same act also allowed the establishment of associations on the basis of, and with the names of classes. The gap occurred in the legal ground regarding the regulations for the foundation of these institutions with the Trade Unions Law that was enacted in 1947. As expressed above, even under the control of the state, a significant development occurred in this field. In spite of being restrictive in many respects, the law was quite important in our labor history, in that through this law, legitimate institutionalization of one of the trivets of labor relations had occurred for the first time. Although the law also moderately improved the collective bargain under the title of general contract, the last of the three fundamentals of labor relations (i.e. the right of strike and lockout), was still not permissible until 1963.⁴⁰⁴ Although DP failed to actualize the promise of the right of strike and lockout in its party program, it should be noted that in the field of individual labor relations, certain improvements occurred during the DP rule. Among them could

⁴⁰² Akin, 2009, pp. 167-172

⁴⁰³ Şahin and Yıldırım, 2012

⁴⁰⁴ Makal, 1999, p. 481

be counted the paid week's holiday, extra bonus within state institutions, annual paid vacation and the right to obtain credit from social insurance institutions for workers cooperatives in building public houses.⁴⁰⁵

4.2.3. CHP in Opposition

In the 1950 elections, which were the first elections held in relatively liberal conditions after the transition to multi-party system, DP got support from large sections of society and rose to power after receiving the majority vote. CHP, who resorted to suppressing the conflict among social compartments, especially classes, and their requests from the state, was abandoned by important groups of its former followers and voters. The capitalist class and large scale land owners that were referred to in the CHP Program of 1931, chose DP in the process of the separation of the party. This was the case for the influential figures over the organizations of workers. In that, CHP's reluctance to take position in favor of workers was also effective. Peasants that were greatly respected by the party became impoverished in the economic conditions of the war period and reactively gave support to the new party. In other words, the dominant classes of the former regime that started to lose their central role and the classes whose claim in the formation of the new order was responded to so repressively, did not back CHP in the elections. CHP's ideal of ultimate social cohesion in a classless society failed and the way to class politics was paved. Although CHP accepted the existence of classes in society, it did not clearly take sides with any class, but sought a political balance during the DP period. While fighting against the authoritarian practices of the government, they pursued the means to gain popular support and establish strong ties with different sections of society.

In this endeavor, in the 11th congress of the party, CHP made a declaration called the "Initial Objectives" which later on formed part of the Constitution of 1961. The declaration involved important democratic claims like the implementation of equal treatment, a free press, social justice and security, fair representation,

⁴⁰⁵ Koçak, 2008, p. 79

university autonomy, and the establishment of institutions like second chambers, a constitutional court and a supreme council of judges. Although no direct act in favor of workers was involved in the declaration, the principle of a social state provided a framework for the betterment of conditions of the working class. On the other hand, the outline of the Law of Labor Unions (274), enacted in 1963, was formed by the proposed law presented in a book prepared by CHP called Project of Employers and Employees Professional Organizations, Freedom of Association for Labor Unions. The significant change in CHP's position with respect to workers was also evident in the 1957 party program and the party's discourse in the budget discussions of 1958. One of the major demands of CHP was the institution of the right to strike for workers. Their main argument was that neither the collective bargain nor the right of association of labor unions could be complete in their role in the determination of labor relations without the ammunition of strike.⁴⁰⁶

4.3. New Constitution and a New Social Formation

The characteristic features of the period between 1960 and 1980 was determined by the new constitution put into action following the coup d'état of May 27 and the new political climate that reshaped Turkish society. However, the determination at stake is not to be construed solely as a top to bottom process. On the contrary, the liberal setting and new rights that the constitution brought removed the long-lasting repression over certain social groups and made it possible for these groups to take a more active role in both economic and political life. The discussion on whether May 27 was a progressive or regressive movement is not the concern of this study; but what is rather important for us, is in what way this event affected the process of the Prussian model bourgeois revolution, or as the way it is preferred to call it in this study; the Turkish modernization. When the primary outcomes of the coup d'état are interpreted in this context and the new constitution it formed is considered, May 27 had the effect of delimiting the absolute power of government. This was achieved through

⁴⁰⁶ Koç, 2010/b, p. 22

the principle of separation of powers, by ensuring the independence of the judiciary system and the establishment of a strong system of checks and balances. A comprehensive structure of independent institutions was established and these institutions included autonomous universities who were allowed to orient social development. The relatively democratic environment mentioned above strengthened the ground for transition to a class society.

4.3.1. Workers' Response to May 27

As examined in detail, the period before the coup d'état was a period when capitalism developed worldwide to the extent that the era is usually called the golden age of capitalism. During this period, global economic progress was reflected in Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey used the advantages of its indispensable position resulting from its geopolitical importance to gain international economic assistance. Petty commodity producers and workers had their fair share of this economic development. Work and life conditions of the wage laborers were improved considerably. Along with the progress in the economic conditions, certain developments were achieved in technology, infrastructure, and social policy practices, especially in the field of health. This resulted in workers, especially those with a labor contract, supporting the DP government, in spite of its general policies that served to strengthen foreign powers and the capitalist class.⁴⁰⁷ Despite their former support to the DP government, workers not only did not react against the May 27 coup, but acted in favor of the new ruling authority, namely the National Unity Committee.

TÜRK-İŞ (the largest workers confederation) acted in favor of the intervention as if blindfolded, as they did not have a clue at the time about the democratic and liberal environment that was to be established following the coup. The board of directors of the confederation forced the president who was known to be close to Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to resign. The secretary general of the confederation who backed Menderes openly was also sent on compulsory

⁴⁰⁷ Koç, 2010/c, p. 212

leave.⁴⁰⁸ The new constitution prepared after May 27 made a great improvements in favor of the workers' movement, which did not actively take part in the struggle for democracy during DP rule. However, the period immediately following the coup also had some negative effects on certain worker groups. The workers employed in state institutions that were hired by and were close to DP were suspended temporarily from their jobs. It even took some of them two years to get their positions back.⁴⁰⁹ Regardless of these incidents, it should be noted that the overall effect of the coup d'état was positive on the working class.

4.3.2. Economic Developments

The three years following the coup d'état presented a rapid economic growth in comparison to the DP period.⁴¹⁰ From the early 1960s until the end of the 1970s, this incremental trend continued. Although an economic crisis emerged in the beginning of the 1970s, its effects were delayed until around 1980 through a series of attempts at a solution. The economic basis of the growth was import substitution industrialization. Grounded on this policy, domestic markets for local industrial products expanded considerably. Moreover, the bipolar world system helped Turkey to improve its economy through its indispensable position at the international level.⁴¹¹ The foundation of the European Economic Community in 1963 also had a positive effect on the Turkish economy, since the foreign investment level increased via the member countries. The Federal Republic of Germany started a race with the USA in terms of both their investments and their market share in Turkey. The economic understanding that reigned during this period was planning. The five-year progress plans applied after 1963 initiated a restructuring period in industry. Industrial development led by the state occurred during this period, however unlike the 1930s, this time it was with the active

⁴⁰⁸ Koç, 2010, p. 173

⁴⁰⁹ Koç, 2000, p.48-51

⁴¹⁰ Makal, 2002, p. 88

⁴¹¹ Koç, 1999, pp. 40-41

involvement of the private sector. Petroleum, automobile, iron-steel, chemicals and rubber were the primary industries developed during this period.⁴¹²

The economic strategy of producing import substitute durable goods was put into practice in the form of assembling the imported inputs and intermediate goods. This was determined by three major factors; (1) the structural tendency of production aimed at the domestic market, (2) dominance of foreign companies in the montage industry, and (3) strict control and prohibition of the importation of end products. This structure of the economy resulted in an indispensable dependency on foreign economies, low efficiency and competition, and limited rates of export. Also as a consequence of this structure, the level of monopolization was high. The mark-up rate as an indicator of this situation was as high as 28 percent in the private sector during the 1960s. It was even higher in state institutions, which was around twice the private sector's rate. Although this environment created high product prices and helped the accumulation of capital, the prices started to decrease at the beginning of the 1970s. To compensate for the loss of high profit, the industrial economy depended on increasing labor power efficiency. As the crisis deepened at the end of the 1970s, the burden on workers also increased and they were put into a position of having to defend their rights.⁴¹³

4.3.3. Conditions of the Working Class

In the period of 1961-1980, the number of workers increased considerably. In 1965 the number of wage laborers was 3 million. That increased to 4.2 million in 1970, then 5.4 million in 1975 and 6.2 million in 1980. The proportion of wage laborers to those who work in income-producing jobs also increased from 22.4 percent in 1965 up to 33.4 percent in 1980.⁴¹⁴ In the first decade of the period, the industry sectors' share of the working population increased from 7.5 to 9.2 percent. The proportion of wage laborers to the total working population also

⁴¹² Güzel, 2007, p. 114

⁴¹³ Akkaya, 2002, pp. 66-67

⁴¹⁴ Koç, 2010, p. 183

increased in the same period. While in 1960, the number of workers was 2,177,263, that figure rose to 3,879,029 in 1970.⁴¹⁵ Although the proportion of industrial workers to the total population did not reach to a level comparable to industrialized western countries, the increase in the size of the industrial workforce both exceeded the overall and urban population growth. In 1980 the number of industrial workers reached two and a half times that of 1960. On the other hand, a population growth occurred of around 60 percent, while in the urban population, a twofold increase was witnessed.⁴¹⁶

More women also participated in the labor force as workers. 15 percent of the labor force was made up of women in 1980, compared to a figure of 10 percent in 1965. Traditional sectors where women were greatly involved, such as the textile and food industries, played a role in this increase, however the services sector very much led the field. As the number of workers in general and the share of the industry sector increased, a high rate of migration from rural areas to the cities was also seen. The prominent areas that took high levels of immigration were the traditional centers of manufacture like İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir and Adana. The rapid urbanization resulted in a process of central integration and expansion of the public sphere. As radio and television became widespread, the connection between national and local agendas grew stronger.⁴¹⁷ It should be noted that in spite of the high migration rates, petite bourgeoisie, especially petite commodity producers in agriculture, did not become impoverished or propertyless in the period since they were supported by state subsidies.⁴¹⁸

In 1963, the Law of Collective Bargaining, Strike and Lockout was enacted. As the collective agreements became widespread, the real wages of workers increased considerably.⁴¹⁹ Until 1977, when workers' wages reached its top level, a

⁴¹⁵ Akkaya, 2002, p. 114

⁴¹⁶ Ibid, p. 65

⁴¹⁷ Güzel, 2007, p. 114

⁴¹⁸ Koç, 2010, pp. 184-185

⁴¹⁹ Ibid, p.238

continuous increase in net pay is observed, with the exception of 1972 when a small decrease occurred. Wages of public sector workers showed a similar pattern where the top year was 1978 and a temporary fall back was experienced in 1973. Conversely, there was a drastic drop in civil servants' wages between 1963 and 1980. If the significant increase that happened in 1970 is put aside, the decline in net pay was continuous. As the net pay of state officers was 1000 in 1963, in 1963 year's prices, the top level for wages was reached in 1970 with 1253 TL. However, in 1980 the wages level dropped to a level that was even under 450 TL. So compared to 1963, wages decreased to less than half of the original level by 1980. The decrease was around two thirds when the 1970's level was taken as a reference.⁴²⁰ The rapid increase in workers' wages could be explained by the overall characteristic of the import substitute economic model's approach to wages in terms of consumption power rather than production cost. The rise in the net pay of workers until the late 1970s could be construed by means of the understanding that conceives wages as a factor of demand and favors increase in wages for economic growth.⁴²¹

A comparison between workers' and civil servants' wages reveals that the traditional high payment of state officers changed in the mid-1970s. The gap was closed and turned in favor of workers in 1974 for public sector workers and in 1976 for private sector workers. When the state and private sectors are compared in terms of wages in the 1960s, it is seen that while in the early 1960s, workers in public and private businesses used to receive similar pay, but as time passed, the gap between them increased considerably in favor of the public sector. In the wake of rapid increases in the wages of public sector workers in the 1970s, in 1979 private sector wages equaled only two thirds of the public sector. Although in the 1960s, workers in state institutions received relatively higher salaries in reference to those in private sector, as when the share of wages in value added is considered, private sector salaries outperformed the public sector. The rate was 33

⁴²⁰ Ibid, p. 239

⁴²¹ Akkaya, 2002, p. 72

percent in the private sector, while it was around 25 percent in public businesses. What workers took from the final surplus was determined by the active involvement of the workers' organizations. The difference was due to the structural disparity of the labor unionization process between the private and public sectors. Relatively high salaries in public institutions, on the other hand, could be possible as the profit rates of goods produced in those institutions were higher. In the 1970s, on the other hand, the picture had changed in favor of the public sector. While the public sector mark-up rate decreased to that of the private sector, the share of wages in value added reached 50 percent. Along with the active role of TÜRK-İŞ in the defense of workers' rights in public institutions where its members were concentrated, the private sector's high vulnerability to economic crisis and employer's lack of capacity to meet the demands of workers also had a role in the failure to achieve better pay in the private sector.⁴²²

Despite the overall positive effect of collective bargaining and the structural difference resulting from public and private labor unions, the effect of workers' movements on wages, notably strikes, is a debated issue. As Savran and Ercan underlines the positive effect of workers actions, Akkaya on the other hand, notes that depending on the data regarding the high rates of profit and exploitation, and the low shares of wages, it is not possible to agree with them for the large part of the period, including the first half of the 1970s. He states that only for the second half of the 1970s, after the aforementioned progress made especially in the public sector, that Savran and Ercan's argument could be regarded as valid. Especially in the private sector, capital holders were even known to utilize the long strike periods for their benefit, as they got rid of the wage burden while they were still selling their products from sizeable stocks.⁴²³ This argument could also be confirmed by examining the rise of wages in manufacture too. In the years between 1962 and 1976, when workers' movements and labor unionization reached its strongest levels, the average annual real pay increase of workers was

⁴²² Ibid, p. 67

⁴²³ Ibid, p. 69

4.2 percent, according to Social Security Institution data and 4.4 percent according to industrial inventory records. Nevertheless in the same period, the average annual increase of real income was around 4.5 percent. In other words, it should be noted that workers' income increases were lower than the national average and it is plausible to argue that the capitalist class retained its strength in the given period.⁴²⁴

In terms of other benefits, in the same period, certain opportunities to improve the conditions of workers were provided. For example, in housing large numbers of workers were given credits from the Social Security Institution. The number of workers that utilized this assistance was 45,008 for the decade between 1962 and 1972. In 1973 there were 21,128 workers who benefited from this subsidy, in 1974 the number rose to 8,430 and in 1975 it was up to 16,325.⁴²⁵ The 1960s and the early 1970s were also good years for job opportunities. The labor force scarcity experienced throughout Europe created a demand for Turkish unskilled laborers. Between 1961 and 1973 approximately 1 million people from Turkey went to Europe legally for work, which at that point seemed to be under the condition of temporary employment. However, a large share of these workers stayed in the countries they went to as permanent immigrants. In spite of some poor working conditions for these workers, they managed to save money and succeeded in sending money back to Turkey. To get a better grasp of the amount of inflow of foreign currency, one could look at the proportion of it to the amount received from total exports of the country. It was 46 percent in 1970 and that increased gradually to 70, 84 and 90 percent in 1971, 1972 and 1973, respectively. This incoming cash resulted in the postponement of workers in Turkey becoming propertyless. Moreover, it contributed vastly to the creation of a market demand needed for the import substitute industrial production. Lastly, the rate of

⁴²⁴ Ibid, p. 75

⁴²⁵ Koç, 2010, p. 240

unemployment decreased considerably and migration from rural areas to urban centers also decelerated.⁴²⁶

4.3.4. Socialist Ideas and Workers' organizations

In the 1960s, thanks to the democratic environment created by the new constitution, for the first time in Turkish history socialist and communist movements became widespread, both in legal and illegal forms. Labor unions played a crucial role in introducing socialist thinking to the masses and legitimized the formerly feared leftist ideas. In the diffusion of socialist ideas the Workers Party of Turkey (TİP) played a central role. Although it was formed by a group of labor union activists from TÜRK-İŞ origin, one year after its foundation, the party took on a socialist ideological stand. The party became the first socialist party that gained parliamentary representation by gaining noteworthy support in the 1965 general elections. Nevertheless, the meeting of the socialist and labor movements through TİP did not create the expected class conflict based political struggle. Instead, as the state raised ultranationalist and religious fundamentalist movements against the socialist and communist groups, an artificial conflict of right-left and Sunni-Alevi was instigated. In the cold war era, the intervention of foreign intelligence services amplified the violence that resorted in that period. Hence, class identity became of secondary importance.⁴²⁷

On the other hand, socialist thought contributed to the development of the self-awareness of workers. Through the newly acquired intellectual insight, the Turkish working class started to form an internal integrity within the country and develop relations with the workers' organizations from the rest of the world. They gradually became responsive to their relative conditions. This did not result in the formation of class consciousness in the Marxist sense, however it still produced an alternative understanding of labor unionization to the state centered tradition of the 1950s that were shaped by nationalist ideology. Through this new trend, the

⁴²⁶ Ibid, p. 241

⁴²⁷ Ibid, p. 179

state's strict control over workers' organizations was broken to a certain extent during this period.⁴²⁸

As mentioned before TÜRK-İŞ had embraced the new political order and submitted to the ruling authority after the coup d'état. In this way, the confederation managed to maintain their close ties with the government and the state oriented labor union understanding.⁴²⁹ They usually practiced actions and strikes during the election periods where they used their power based on the voting effect of its members. Somehow they achieved certain rights by use of this method; nevertheless this resulted in a lack of self-confidence among laborers in regular times. This underestimating of their capacity to affect decision-making through their power came from their economic role in relations of production.⁴³⁰

In 1967, three labor unions were forced to leave TÜRK-İŞ; namely Maden-İş, Lastik-İş, and Basın-İş. They joined together with Gıda-İş and Türk Maden-İş to form the Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (DİSK). The founding unions of DİSK had around 40 thousand members. Soon, as the confederation actively struggled for improving the rights of workers, this number increased dramatically. In spite of the socialist tendency of the confederation in its early years of the 1970s, the organization adopted a more social democratic ideology and established close ties with CHP.⁴³¹ DİSK was organized in relatively small workplaces when compared to TÜRK-İŞ, yet member unions and laborers were as active as TÜRK-İŞ members in their action. Between 1970 and 1980 the number of workers that joined strikes in TÜRK-İŞ was 178 thousand, while it was 118 thousand among DİSK members. Almost half of the strikes made by member unions of DİSK occurred in 1980.⁴³²

⁴²⁸ Güzel, 2007, p. 115

⁴²⁹ Akkaya, 2002, p. 71

⁴³⁰ Ibid, p. 67

⁴³¹ Ibid, pp. 71-72

⁴³² Ibid, p. 69

4.3.5. Workers' Organizations and Movements

In accordance with the obligation stated in the constitution of 1961, with law numbers 274 and 275, the labor unions and their right of strike were regulated in 1963. These regulations contributed considerably to the development of labor unions and workers' movements in Turkey. However, the traditional structural characteristics of labor unions remained unchanged, regardless of the efforts of TÜRK-İŞ and DİSK to establish a sector based organization. The forming of numerous small and weak labor unions survived during this period, too. Also in terms of member rates, it is not possible to talk about a significant improvement; on the contrary, in the 1970s, a considerable decline occurred. Among the workers who had social insurance as members of labor unions were around 62.8 percent in 1963. This rate stayed almost at the same level until 1970, yet by 1980, it had decreased to 47.6 percent.⁴³³

The total number of labor unions followed a fluctuating course in the period, yet an overall increase was observed from 565 in 1963 to 733 in 1980. The peak was reached in 1978 with 912 trade unions. The number of labor union members on the other hand gradually and then tremendously increased. While in 1963 there were 295,710 trade union members, the number exceeded 3.3 million workers by 1975. In 1980, 5,721,074 workers were labor union members.⁴³⁴ These numbers however are not to be regarded as reflecting the real conditions of workers, in that since trade unions were not obliged to prove their member size, usually the number of members was exaggerated when submitted to the Ministry of Work.⁴³⁵ Workers under collective agreement do not provide healthy information as well, since they were very much changing too, as annual drops happened due to conflict in bargaining. Nevertheless just to give an overall idea about the general trend, a comparison between 1966 and 1979 could be useful. It is seen that in these years,

⁴³³ Ibid, p. 70

⁴³⁴ Koç, 2010, p. 200, p.262

⁴³⁵ Ibid, p. 189

workers under collective agreement increased from 335 thousand up to 746 thousand.⁴³⁶

Since 1963, when the legal grounds for workers' movements were regulated, trade unions had undertaken numerous actions to improve the rights and working conditions of laborers. Along with rights-based movements like strikes, the labor unions also organized political actions of different sorts, too. For example, in accordance with its founding purpose, TÜRK-İŞ held a meeting against communism in Ankara which was massively attended in 1962.⁴³⁷ Between 1963 and 1980, strikes and the elapsed time in action followed an oscillating pattern. However, the overall inclination was towards an increase in both indicators. In 1963, only 1,514 workers spent 197 thousand days on strike. On the other hand, in 1980, almost 85 thousand workers spent more than 1 million, 300 thousand days on strike.⁴³⁸

4.3.6. Social Change and Rise of a Social Democratic Party

Turkish society, in the context of the early republic, was defined as lacking class conflict by Atatürk and had gone through a noteworthy change at the end of the 1950s and classes emerged as significant determinants of social relations. In spite of this change, CHP denied to be one of the constant camps of the class conflict. In the period when the DP government gradually became authoritarian, CHP inclined to detach its bonds with the state. Being loyal to the principle of populism, with the Left of Center movement, CHP oriented towards being a political party that acknowledges social democracy as its ideology and defends class consensus. Although this orientation that spawned from a dissenter position had been interrupted with the coup d'état of 1960, almost all the democratic and liberal demands listed in the declaration of Initial Objectives were put into practice with the Constitution of 1961.

⁴³⁶ Ibid, p. 200, p.262

⁴³⁷ Ibid, p. 228

⁴³⁸ Ibid, p. 237, p.270

The era starting with 1960 and continued until 1980, could be regarded as a period in which the labor relations were institutionalized and workers' organizations and movements increased extensively. The objective and subjective existence of the working class that evolved until the 1960s unfolded during this period. They had a say and role in the political life which used to be controlled by the state and increasingly by the bourgeois class. The former structure in which politics and the economy intertwined under the complete control of the state was fairly much dismantled. In accordance with the rising role of classes, economic relations started to become more influential in political and social relations. State formation ceased to be the only arena for class struggle. Thanks to the extensive opportunities of participation guaranteed by the new constitution, the working class started to strive to be involved in politics in increasing numbers. In this context, CHP, in accordance with its new social democratic identity, worked in the direction of opening a political sphere for the masses for the first time in Turkish history.⁴³⁹

In the 1973 and 1977 elections, CHP received massive support from various different social groups. Among the most prominent of those groups were the urban poor and the working class who dwelt on the outskirts of large cities. Industrial workers, especially those who worked in manufacture, in mines, in sectors where private enterprise was dominant and were members of trade unions, supported CHP in significantly high numbers. These workers had mostly migrated from rural areas to the cities. They attained skills either through training or apprenticeship and they worked in areas where trade unions were organized. Especially in the industrial areas, CHP's party organization also involved workers' leaders, technical staff and labor union administrators, especially after the establishment of close relations with DİSK.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁹ Ayata, 1995, p. 85

⁴⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 87

4.3.7. New Rights

The constitution of 1961 provided rights regarding the collective labor relations that were earlier repressed by the state. Right to work, strike, organization, and collective bargaining were all then assured under the constitution. The corresponding laws were enacted in 1963 and provided a suitable environment for the development of workers' organizations. In accordance with Temporary Act No. 7 of the constitution, the Law of Labor Unions (LLU) and the Law of Collective Bargain, Strike and Lockout (LCBSL) took effect on July 24th, 1963. Although LLU expands the liberties in the organization of workers, LCBSL regulated workers' movements with certain limitations. Nevertheless, it should be noted that although both strike and collective bargain, which are important fundamental rights in the area of labor relations, were prohibited before this law, it could still be regarded as a progressive move.⁴⁴¹

Both in the issuing of the constitution and during the discussions of the abovementioned laws in parliament, the general atmosphere was that the acquisition of workers' rights resulted from a top to bottom process. In his speech at the parliament regarding the laws, Bülent Ecevit, the Minister of Work, stated that the rights about to be given to Turkish workers had been implemented in western countries as a consequence of the onerous struggles of their laborers. He claimed that in Turkey, unlike Europe, the practice would follow legal regulations.⁴⁴² Although it is reasonable to say that Turkish workers' struggle for constitutional rights could hardly match that of western laborers, it is not to be underestimated entirely. The demonstrations held in cities like İstanbul, Ankara and Ereğli for the legislation that would recognize these rights could be a good indicator of how Turkish workers adopted the values and rights reflected in the new constitution.⁴⁴³

⁴⁴¹Güzel, 2007, p. 115

⁴⁴² Işıklı, 1983, p. 1831

⁴⁴³Güzel, 2007, p. 115

CHAPTER 5

PANORAMA OF THE WORKING CLASS IN TURKEY

5.1. Economic and Political Conditions Following Coup D'état

In the last years of the 1970s, the Turkish economy experienced a structural transformation. The previous model of import substitution was abandoned and export based production was instituted. However, the economic relations in effect, positioning of the economic players, existing experiences and habits did not allow this new inclination to be put into practice easily. The Demirel Government tried to put the Turkish economy on to a neo-liberal track with the (in)famous 24th January Decisions. According to the economic stability program prepared by Turgut Özal, who was then the undersecretary of the prime ministry, monetary policies were slackened, and the state's share in the economy was reduced; the effects of which were felt in SOEs immediately, support buying in agriculture was delimited, and foreign trade was gradually liberalized.

By supporting exports with loans and tax reductions, attempts were made at outward-oriented industrial growth. The Turkish Lira was devalued with a high rate in reference to the US Dollar. The foreign trade deficit of the country was aimed at being covered by the increase in exports.⁴⁴⁴ Industrial sectors with priority were determined as those that depended on domestic raw materials and cheap labor. Primary sectors that were decided to be concentrated upon were textiles, the manufacture of readymade cloth, glass, ceramics, packaging, leather goods, durable consumer goods, and the automotive and metal subsidiary industries. On the other side, not only was the investment in heavy industries like iron, steel and petrochemicals avoided, but also the existing industries were scaled down.⁴⁴⁵

⁴⁴⁴ Sandalcılar and Yalman, 2012, p. 52

⁴⁴⁵ Akkaya, 2002, pp. 69-70

The level of trade liberalization in Turkey increased gradually after 1980. The degree was mathematically defined as the proportion of the sum of exports and imports to the gross national product. Although all these factors increased over the last 30 years, since the sum of imports and exports increased more than the GNP, a level of liberalization of trade could be assumed. The effect of liberalization to the labor market on the other hand is determined by the balance between imports and exports. While exports have a positive effect on employment, as might be expected, imports have a negative effect. In Turkey, the liberalization of trade had a twofold negative effect on the labor market, since a significant part of our exports has been achieved by means of imported inputs. Indeed, the statistical data proves this argument in that especially during the 2000s, in spite of the high rates of economic growth, even in some years an increase in unemployment rates was witnessed, let alone a drop.⁴⁴⁶

As its long term effects proved, the Turkish working class was right in its suspicious approach to this new era of the Turkish economy. Workers took the lead among the different sections of society that stood against the governments new initiatives. The immediate burdens of the new economic orientation were felt by workers and low income sections of society and their hesitant approach turned into a strong resistance in a very short time. In 1980, the number of striking workers was four times larger than that of 1979. A great deal of these workers (more than three out of four) was members of trade unions that were confederates of DİSK.⁴⁴⁷ This data alone shows that workers' reaction to the implementation of new policies was severe. The 24th January Decisions could only be put into practice by the 12th September regime.

It is not possible to explain a complex sociological phenomenon like coup d'état with a single factor. Özçelik lists among those factors that led to 12th September;

⁴⁴⁶ Sandalcılar and Yalman, 2012, p. 62

⁴⁴⁷ Koç, 2010, p. 270

the depression of capital regime based on import substitution, the series of economic crises, the deepening of political tension in the country, the neoliberal restructuring process of global capitalism and Turkey's integration. Along with these, she also underlines the importance of the increase of class conflicts that resulted in the politization and activism of the working class. She explains the military intervention by utilizing Poulantzas' concept of "exceptional form of state" and argues that the abovementioned factors, which were entangled in a way that could hardly be resolved with internal dynamics, were overarched by a military power that portrayed itself as an impartial supreme authority.⁴⁴⁸ Unlike 1960, consequences of the 1980 coup d'état was dramatic for the working class. Although depending on their previous experiences of 1960 and 1971, labor unions were ready to act in a way to avoid meddling, the conditions that brought about the military intervention did not allow a basis for a consensus between the new authority and the workers. It was known that labor unions were not as docile as they were in 1960 and in the long run workers could hardly accept the economic and social conditions that the new regime would bring. Hence, the military authority conceived workers as being among the factors that prevented the restructuring of the economic system in Turkey and thereby, a serious threat. That is why the rising of the working class as a strong center of political opposition was crushed by the military regime. Direct interference of the coup d'état and policies implemented by the military regime or the following neoliberal governments created a heavyhearted picture for the working class and the leftist sections of society.

What 12th September brought to Turkey was a new economic orientation at the expense of democracy, acquired rights and the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. With reference to the Cumhuriyet newspaper, Koç summarizes the catastrophe created by 12th September in numbers as follows:

⁴⁴⁸ Özçelik, 2011, pp. 73-83

In this era, 650 thousand people were taken into custody and were subjected to various forms of torture; 1 million and 683 thousand people were blacklisted; 230 thousand people were put on trial; 7 thousand people were facing the death penalty; 517 people were sentenced to the death penalty; 18 people from the left, 8 from the right, 23 judicial criminals and 1 Asala militant were executed; 98,404 people were accused of being members of illegal organizations. 338 thousand people were denied a passport; 14 thousand people were denationalized; 30 thousand people had to go abroad as political refugees; 300 people died in suspicious circumstances. 171 people were proven to have lost their lives in torture; 299 people died in jails, of those, 144 people died in suspicious circumstances and 14 people died from hunger strikes; 16 people were killed “during escape”, 95 people died in firefights; and 43 people were stated as having “committed suicide”.⁴⁴⁹

This horrible atmosphere dramatically changed the course of development of the working class in Turkey. Activities of labor unions were halted by the military intervention. The constitution of 1982 brought serious limitation to the founding of labor unions and their activities. In 1983 laws numbers 274 and 275 that were regulating the rights of workers regarding organization and action were repealed. In accordance with the restrictive spirit of the new constitution, law numbers 2821 and 2822 were declared.⁴⁵⁰ Although in the period of coup d'état it is not possible to talk about an enforced process of deunionization among trade union members, the policies implemented and legal regulations of the military regime led workers to shift to more docile labor organizations. The state's relative autonomy that was instituted by the voting and production power of the working class was suspended by military power. Unlike Demirel who departed from the 24th January Decisions in July and August 1980 to avoid a possible loss of workers' votes in the 1981 elections, the military regime implemented all the clauses of the decisions.

⁴⁴⁹ Koç, 2010

⁴⁵⁰ Çelik, 2004

Moreover, they took a clear stance in favor of the capitalist class in Turkey. During the preparation period for the new constitution, almost all the demands proposed by the Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (TİSK) were accepted.⁴⁵¹ In the 1982 constitution, mandatory work, which was prohibited in 1961, was reinstated. Holding an administrative position in labor unions was stipulated to the condition of actively working as a wage laborer for at least ten years. Membership of multiple labor unions was banned. Any form of connection between the labor unions and political parties was prohibited. Monetary control over labor unions was also strengthened. Before 1980, it was possible to have a collective contract both at the level of workplace and at the level of branch of activity. This right was also taken from the workers. Strike for claiming rights was banned. The right of lockout for employers was recognized in the constitution. Labor unions were held responsible for the harm done to the workplace without their disposal. Right to restart strike after postponements was also lost. Strike breakers were protected by the constitution. Strikes for political purposes, solidarity strikes, general strike, occupying of a workplace, slowdown strikes, efficiency reduction and all other kinds of resistance were banned. Being a member of parliament and holding an administrative position at the same time was precluded. Taking the right of representative in the collective bargain was made difficult for the labor unions. Workers were deprived of taking their wages and other social payments for the period of a strike.⁴⁵²

Neo-liberal policies of the 1980s, the global role designated for Turkey as a cheap labor country, which was embraced by Motherland Party (ANAP) governments, led to a rapid and absolute impoverishment. The ANAP period resulted in more loss of rights for workers. Supervision of and strict control over labor unions was increased. Contracted and statuses with no job security became widespread in SOEs. These personnel were deprived of the rights of organization, strike and collective bargain. The age of retirement was increased gradually. Conditions for

⁴⁵¹ Koç, 2010, pp. 287-289

⁴⁵² Ibid. pp. 297-300

gaining the right for collective bargain were complicated further. Mandatory labor for convicts was put into practice.⁴⁵³ As a result of all these adverse events and regulations, the years 1986-1991 witnessed the rise of class identity and class struggle that reached a level more substantial than ever before.⁴⁵⁴ It is plausible to argue that after 1980, a new period for workers had started, in which they had to commit their efforts for regaining their lost rights. In the following sections the objective conditions that the working class in Turkey had reached during these years of struggle will be focused on. The official data where possible and in the cases where they are unreliable or absent, supplementary data will be used.

5.2. Working Class with Numbers

The Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) has presented detailed data on the labor force since 1988. Prior to this date, as mentioned in the previous chapter, data on workers is either limited or unreliable. Moreover, the relatively comprehensive data presented by TÜİK involves the category of wage laborers; however it does not differentiate the property owners and self-employed people who work as wage laborers in order to gain additional income on the side. Hence, to designate the working class through official statistics has been a problematic issue in Turkey. Today, this problem more or less seems to be solved. Still, some of the workers in Turkey earn income from property ownership. There is also a small group who is self-employed but from time to time work as wage laborers. Nevertheless, both categories are at a level no longer regarded as noteworthy. The overall tendency of the former group of workers, since 1980, has been to become propertyless. The ratio of the latter group in wage laborers is decreasing as well. In other words, the importance of those who are not actually workers among the wage laborers is weakening. In this respect, there is no bias in regarding the group categorized as wage laborers in the official data as working class.⁴⁵⁵ Having stated that wage laborers could be equated to the working class, in this section the different

⁴⁵³ Ibid, pp. 317-318

⁴⁵⁴ Koç, 2010, pp. 305-306

⁴⁵⁵ Koç, 1998, pp. 55-56

characteristics of this group and certain trends in its transformation will be focused on.

5.2.1. Size of the Working Class

According to the 2012 data provided by TÜİK, the number of people working in income earning jobs is approximately 24.8 million in Turkey, and 15.6 million of these are waged or salaried laborers. Employers constitute around 1.2 million, while 4.7 million are self-employed. The rest are unpaid family laborers (around 3.3 million).




Figure 1: Status in Employment According to ICSE Classification (%)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

When compared to 1988, a two-fold increase in the number of workers in Turkey occurred, as the number of workers in 1988 was approximately 7.2 million. Then, the share of workers among those who work in income earning jobs was 40.4 percent, whereas today it has reached 61.7 percent.⁴⁵⁶ These numbers do not reflect the real size of the wage laborer population as TÜİK data does not include undeclared laborers, such as children, housewives, students, retired and the handicapped. A lot of people are also employed in the form of subcontracting (*taşeron*). In other words, the number of wage laborers is actually higher than the official records show.

⁴⁵⁶ DİE, 1988, Ekim




Figure 2: Change in Employment Status (.000)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2011

Since 2008, TÜİK has been recording data on casual workers as wage laborers. The above graphic presents data for the years between 1988 and 2008, when it was possible to obtain information about the size of the seasonal and temporary workforce in the numbers of total workers. In the said period it is clearly seen that apart from some exceptions, waged and salaried laborers increased regularly both in number and proportion. Casual workers and employers stayed almost at the same level in number, yet decreased in terms of their share in the total number of people working in income generating jobs. Self-employed people and unpaid family laborers, on the other hand, decreased in terms of both size and ratio. If the

casual workers and wage laborers are merged together to examine the data TÜİK offers for pre and post 2008, as presented in the graphic below, it is seen that the group that could be call working class is inclined to increase in size.




Figure 3: Paid Employment (Wage Laborers) (.000)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2011

5.2.2. Regional Distribution

TÜİK does not provide the regional dispersion of the working class and the proportion of workers to the people working in income earning jobs at the provincial level. To gain a general idea, it would be useful to utilize data that is procured at the second level of statistical regional classification called NUTS. As may be seen in the following table, the traditional industrial cities of Turkey, since the Ottoman period, like İstanbul, İzmir, Bursa, Kocaeli, and Adana are among those cities where workers exist densely. Along with these important centers, Ankara, that became the capital city following the proclaiming of the republic,

takes part as a newly developed center of industry. In İstanbul, there are 3.5 million workers, which is almost one quarter of the entire workforce of Turkey. İstanbul is, at the same time, the province where the highest proportion of workers to people in income earning jobs is observed. In terms of the number of workers, Ankara and İzmir follow İstanbul, whereas in terms of the rate of workers Bursa, Eskişehir, and Bilecik regions come before İzmir. In 2011, the regions where workers are mostly concentrated are TR10 (İstanbul), TR51 (Ankara), TR31 (İzmir), TR41 (Bursa, Eskişehir, Bilecik), TR42 (Kocaeli, Sakarya, Düzce, Bolu, Yalova), TR62 (Adana, Mersin), TR32 (Aydın, Denizli, Muğla), TR61 (Antalya, Isparta, Burdur), and TR33 (Manisa, Afyon, Kütahya, Uşak). The workers in these regions constitutes of 65.7 percent of total workers in Turkey.

**Table 1: People Working in Income Generating Jobs
According to Job Status and NUTS 2 Regions (.000)**

	Wage laborers Or Casual Workers	Percentage of Workers	Employer or Self- Employed	Unpaid Family Laborer	Total
Total	14,876	61.70	5,931	3,303	24,110
İstanbul	3,446	81.83	731	34	4,211
Ankara	1,234	79.87	259	52	1,545
İzmir	999	70.80	300	112	1,411
Bursa, Eskişehir, Bilecik	945	76.46	216	75	1,236
Kocaeli, Sakarya, Düzce, Bolu, Yalova	773	63.88	292	145	1,210
Adana, Mersin	760	61.29	304	176	1,240
Aydın, Denizli, Muğla	578	53.08	308	203	1,089
Antalya, Isparta, Burdur	546	52.86	289	198	1,033
Manisa, Afyon, Kütahya, Uşak	503	47.19	294	269	1,066
Hatay, Kahramanmaraş, Osmaniye	491	55.23	269	129	889
Samsun, Tokat, Çorum, Amasya	433	43.47	279	284	996
Tekirdağ, Edirne, Kırklareli	409	64.72	151	72	632
Gaziantep, Adıyaman, Kilis	394	67.93	144	42	580
Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır	388	63.82	164	56	608
Trabzon, Ordu, Giresun, Rize, Artvin, Gümüşhane	380	36.64	420	237	1,037

	Wage laborers Or Casual Workers	Percentage of Workers	Employer or Self-Employed	Unpaid Family Laborer	Total
Konya, Karaman	379	51.08	224	139	742
Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat	362	48.72	201	180	743
Balıkesir, Çanakkale	284	49.39	171	120	575
Malatya, Elazığ, Bingöl, Tunceli	269	51.83	139	111	519
Mardin, Batman, Şırnak, Siirt	256	70.14	86	23	365
Kırıkkale, Aksaray, Niğde, Nevşehir	251	52.95	134	89	474
Van, Muş, Bitlis, Hakkari	231	46.48	127	139	497
Zonguldak, Karabük, Bartın	183	43.88	131	103	417
Erzurum, Erzincan, Bayburt	142	43.56	93	91	326
Kastamonu, Çankırı, Sinop	123	37.85	92	110	325
Ağrı, Kars, Iğdır, Ardahan	118	34.30	112	114	344

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2011

5.2.3. Categories of Economic Activities

TÜİK follows two different methods to categorize the characteristics of the jobs in which workers are employed. The first is the statistical classification of economic activities. TÜİK uses a version of NACE Rev. 2 since its implementation by the European Union, in 2006. Unlike the original version, TÜİK omits the two categories regarding household employment and extraterritorial organizations' jobs. The institution also merges the construction and substructure activities into one category. So instead of the original 21 sections, TÜİK uses a standard that has 18 sections.⁴⁵⁷ By use of the same categorization method, TÜİK also presents 3 other sections: the classical agriculture, industry and services division. Among the 15.6 million workers, 9.5 million are working in the services sector, whereas 5.5 million people work in industry. Those who are employed in agriculture are only 600 thousand people. As seen from the chart below, proportionate employment in

⁴⁵⁷ For detailed information on NACE Rev. 2, please see NACE Rev. 2 – Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community, Eurostat Methodologies and Working papers, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-RA-07-015/EN/KS-RA-07-015-EN.PDF

the economic sectors does not reflect the overall importance or role of these sectors in the economy. According to the World Factbook, in 2012 the service sector constituted around 64 percent of the Turkish economy, while industry amounted to 27 percent and agriculture 9 percent.⁴⁵⁸ Similarly, there is a disparity between the overall employment pattern in the sectors and the distribution of workers. The primary reason behind this is that the traditional production form of small scale commodity production still survives. As a matter of fact, there are still almost 2.5 million self-employed and over 2.8 million unpaid family laborers in agriculture.




Figure 4: Distribution of Wage Laborers in Sectors (.000; %)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

As seen below, a more detailed examination of the economic activities shows us that most of the wage laborers in Turkey are still hired in the manufacturing sector. More than 3.8 million workers are employed in this sector which corresponds to one quarter of the entire wage labor force. Wholesale and retail trade holds the second position. Public administration and defense, and construction and public works follow as the third and fourth economic activities

⁴⁵⁸ CIA World Factbook, Turkey, Economy, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html#Econ> Last date accessed: 24.10.2013

where workers are concentrated. Workers employed in these four categories amount more than 55 percent of all the wage laborers.




Figure 5: Workers in Economic Activities (NACE Rev. 2 / .000; %)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

5.2.4. Classification of Occupations

The second method TÜİK employs is classification of occupational groups. The International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) is utilized in this field. Although ISCO-88 was adopted by the 14th ICLS in 1987 and approved by the ILO Governing Body in 1988, TÜİK continued using ISCO68 standard until

2003. Since then, they have been presenting data in ISCO88 format.⁴⁵⁹ That is why, in order to examine the change of occupational groups over time one needs to form two tables for the periods of 1988-2002 and 2003-2011.




Figure 6: Workers in Occupations (ISCO88 / .000;%)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

Unskilled laborers, workers in services and artisans are the three occupation categories that have the largest number of workers. Workers in these three categories form half of the total number of wage laborers. Skilled agricultural workers are the smallest groups of wage laborers due to the aforementioned economic structure of the sector.

⁴⁵⁹ For more detail on International Standard Classification of Occupations, please see <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco88/>. Last date accessed: 24.10.2013

A quick look at the change of occupation types of workers shows a clear tendency to shift away from agriculture to other occupation categories. It is the only occupation category that decreased in numbers between 1988 and 2003. As the number of paid employees in all the other occupation categories increased, apart from services, the increase was regular. In services, on the other hand, despite the overall increase, a downward movement is observed after 2000, which might result from the negative effects of the 1999 economic crisis on the job market.




Figure 7: Distribution of Workers in Occupations by Years (ISCO68 / .000)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2011

The overall tendency towards the increase in the share of workers in the labor power is reflected across all types of occupations. Between 2004 and 2012, workers in all categories increased. The highest increase was seen in the unskilled workers in elementary occupations. Service workers, shop and market sales workers are the second category of occupation where the number of workers increased the most. This increase is parallel with the enlarging retail sector in Turkey. Craft and related trades workers also showed a significant increase.




Figure 8: Distribution of Workers in Occupations by Years (ISCO88 / .000)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

Although the number of workers in all occupation types scaled up in the 8 years between 2004 and 2012, as the growth was not proportional, the composition of the work force in terms of the type of jobs has also changed. As the change in the distribution of workers among occupation categories is looked at, a sharp increase in the share of workers in elementary occupations stands out. As for the rest of the occupation types, for the eight years period at stake, except for the limited enlargement of service workers and skilled agricultural workers, they all shrank. The most significant loss of share occurred in plant and machine operators and assemblers.




Figure 9: Distribution of Workers in Occupations by Years (ISCO88 / %)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

Blue Collar vs. White Collar

According to ISCA88, the type of occupation could be defined alternatively in terms of the four categories of employees. The first group is high skilled white collar workers (ISCO codes 1, 2 and 3), including legislators, senior officials and managers, professionals, technicians and associate professionals. The second group is low skilled white collar workers (ISCO codes 4 and 5) including clerks, service workers, and shop and market sales workers. The third group is high skilled blue collar workers (ISCO codes 6 and 7) including skilled agricultural and fishery workers, craft and related trades workers. The last group is low skilled blue collar workers (ISCO codes 8 and 9) including plant and machine operators and assemblers and elementary occupations.⁴⁶⁰ Hence, the white collar workers in Turkey are the sum of the first five groups above, the number of which is around 8.1 million people. Whereas, the number of blue collar workers in Turkey is closer to 7.5 million. In other words, 52 percent of the all paid employees are white collar workers, while 48 percent of them are manual laborers.




Figure 10: Blue and White Collar Distribution (ISCO88 / .000; %)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

The general trend of change, as it may be seen in the following graphic, is that the share of blue collar workers has been increasing in the last 8 years. The primary

⁴⁶⁰ <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/surveys/ewcs/2005/classification.htm>

Last date accessed: 24.10.2013

driver of the shift is the increase in workers in elementary occupations. In 2004, white collar workers were around 55 percent and in 8 years their share has decreased around 3 percent.




Figure 11: Blue vs. White Collar Distribution by Years (ISCO88 / %)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

Skill Level of Workers

The two graphics above also gives us information about the skill level of the workers. 42 percent of the total wage laborers could be regarded as skilled workers while 58 percent are unskilled. Skilled laborer numbers are in decline; as in 2004 they represented more than 45 percent of the total workers. A decrease, in terms of percentage, is seen both in white collar and blue collar skilled workers. On the contrary, the share of both white collar and blue collar unskilled laborers is increasing. It should also be noted that despite the decrease in their shares, in the said period, both white collar and blue collar skilled workers has significantly increased in number. Nevertheless, it is not wrong to argue that the labor force in Turkey has gone through a period of deskilling. It is plausible to argue that the

policies of labor market flexibility and regulations weakening legal protection and paving the way for sub-contracting are influential in this process.

5.2.5. Public Workers and SOEs

In 2013 there are over 3.1 million public personnel in Turkey, around 2 million of which are civil servants. As may be seen in the table below, there are approximately 125 thousand high-ranking officials who are academicians and judiciary personnel. The number of permanent workers is over 290 thousand. As opposed to them, the number of contracted personnel and temporary workers/personnel has almost reached 240 thousand.

Table 2: Public Personnel According to Employment Types

Employment Type	Ministries and Related Institutions	SOEs	Local Government	Armed Forces	Central Bank	Total
Civil Servants	2,050,249	5,910	104,365	28,239		2,188,763
Judges and Prosecutors	13,889					13,889
Academic Members	113,078					113,078
Contracted Personnel	86,950	76,627	22,237			185,823
Permanent Workers	81,670	61,033	130,187	20,800		293,690
Temporary Workers	9,182	13,618	9,014			31,814
Temporary Personnel	21,408					21,408
Personnel out of Category		1,961				1,961
Military Personnel				205,978		205,978
Personnel Subjected to Special Provisions					56,247	56,247
Total	2,376,435	159,149	265,803	255,017	56,247	3,112,651

Source: Prime Ministry, State Personnel Presidency, 2013

As the change in number of public personnel is examined for the period between 2003 and 2013, a fluctuating course is observed. Until 2006 a drop occurred in the number of public personnel, yet after that date a sharp increase is seen. Although the graphic shows a decrease for the two years following 2009, it is actually because personnel of state banks have been excluded from the data since that year. Also, the rapid increase in 2012 is due to the inclusion of administrative personnel of the Armed Forces and Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT).




Figure 12: Number of Public Personnel by Years*

Source: Prime Ministry, State Personnel Presidency, 2013

* The numbers do not include personnel of the Armed Forces, Parliament, Presidency, Intelligence Service, the Central Bank or Local Government.

In order to have a better grasp of the change in the number of state's employees, it is perhaps better to use data provided by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, which has more internal consistency. As may be seen in the graphic below, the number of civil servants has increased regularly between 2003 and 2011. Although there was not a big upsurge in the total number of public personnel, still it has increased around 5 percent. More importantly, the composition of public workers has changed. While the number of permanent state workers is decreasing sharply, they are being replaced by contracted personnel,

which show us that state is also adopting neoliberal policies and preferring to employ laborers under flexible and insecure work conditions.




Figure 13: Number of Public Personnel by Type and Years

Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 2011

In spite of the increase in the number of civil servants, the state is actually downsizing in terms of its economic enterprises. It is a known fact that Turkey had witnessed a noteworthy process of privatization starting from the late 1980s. Though it is an ongoing process, practically it could be regarded to be about to end, since not many SOEs remain to be sold. The number of employees in SOEs is a good indicator of this situation. In 1985 there were approximately 650 thousand employees in SOEs. Almost 60 percent of them were trade union members. In that year, there were no non-union or contracted workers among the state employees. There were around 80 thousand temporary workers, the number of which remained stable for around 15 years and then dropped to an ignorable

level. Workers with trade union membership decreased incredibly until the beginning of the 2000s, whereas this decrease was compensated by the employment of contracted workers. In 1995 these two groups of workers were level and with a similar pattern they continued to reduce in number. In 2013, the number of employees in SOEs is less than 120 thousand. In other words, the state's neoliberal wave's impact has been felt significantly in state owned enterprises, both in the form of downsizing and vulnerable employment.




Figure 14: Number of Employees in SOEs

Source: Undersecretariat of Turkish Treasury, Directorate General of SOEs, 2013

5.2.6. Demographic Features of Working Class

In this section I will focus on the basic demographic features of the waged paid employees in official statistics, which I find convenient to designate as working class. Although statistics that are presented here are mostly descriptive, they are expected to give us information about the family structure of the workers, their skill levels and conditions of inequality.

Age Distribution

The age group of 25-34 constitutes more than 36 percent of all paid employees and workers between the ages of 30 and 34 comprise the largest age group. Although this is also true for male workers, female workers have the youngest profile as their largest age group is 25-29. The fact that there are around 923 thousand workers at the level of high school education is significant.




Figure 15: Age & Gender Distribution of Paid Employees (.000)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

Education

Almost one third of the workers in Turkey are primary school graduates or below. On the other hand, more than a quarter of workers are university or vocational high education graduates. Along with those who had tertiary education, if vocational high school graduates are added in together, paid employees with education towards a profession add up to 38 percent. It is seen that 42 percent of paid employees in Turkey are skilled workers. On the basis of these two statistics, it can be concluded that 4 percent of the wage laborers gained their skills through experience or via on-the-job training. Also when the proportion of high school graduates are considered together with the 50 percent of the relatively uneducated group, it can be estimated that at least 8 percent of high school graduates are hired as unskilled laborers. This rate may be higher depending on the size of the undereducated group who gained their skills during their work career.




Figure 16: Education Level of Paid Employees (.000)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

Marital Status and Children

More than two thirds of the paid employees in Turkey are married. As 30 percent of them are single, the remaining, which is around 3 percent, are divorced or widowed. When compared to the same age group (15+) for the general population, the rate of singles is 3 percent higher in workers. As it may be expected, the widowed are less among workers since there are not many people working beyond the active working age, the top level of which is the age of 65.⁴⁶¹




Figure 17: Marital Status of Paid Employees (.000)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

When the marital status of workers is examined over the years, it is seen that periodical changes are creating a dependent inverse relationship between being married and single. Although at first sight this may be an expected trend by the very nature of marriage, what is shown here is that not only that temporary situations are not reflected, such as the breaking up a marriage, but rather the avoidance of marriage. On the contrary, long term inclination shows us an inverse relationship between divorce and marriage. In other words, for the 12 year period

⁴⁶¹ For detail on marital status of population please see TÜİK, ADNKS Statistics.

taken into account in the following graphic, the share of divorced workers has increased around 1.5 percent.




Figure 18: Marital Status of Paid Employees by Years (%)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

There is no comprehensive data regarding the family structure of workers, their household living conditions or the number of children they have. Nevertheless, by use of a survey compiled by TİSK with workers in their member associations, one could get some idea about the numbers of children for paid employees. The survey was applied to approximately 160 thousand workers in 2011. It should be noted that there is a categorical error in the data. The categories given are not jointly exhaustive. They do not present any information regarding divorced or widowed people who have children. However, as there is not any other alternative data to present, the information provided by existing data could be used. According to the results of the survey it is seen that the proportion of single

workers was 21.6 percent, while single workers constituted of 29.7 percent of the paid employee population in Turkey. Hence, the data should be regarded as biased in favor of marriage and of course the number of children. As the result of the survey is taken into account, almost 70 percent of the workers in Turkey have children. Those who have more than 2 children amount to approximately 45 percent of the total wage laborers.




Figure 19: Marital Status and Number of Children (TİSK Survey / %)

Source: TİSK, Labor Statistics and Labor Costs, 2011

Gender Distribution

In Turkey, a large percentage of the people working in income generating jobs are male. Only 29.4 percent of them are women.

Table 3: Employment Status of Women (.000)

	Wage laborers Or Casual Workers	Employer	Self-Employed	Unpaid Family Laborer	Total
Women	3,967	93	788	2,460	7,309
Men	11,652	1,145	3,907	808	17,512
Total	15,619	1,238	4,695	3,268	24,821

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

This rate falls to 7.5 percent for employers. However, unlike the general tendency, most of the unpaid family laborers are women. Women amount more than three quarters of the latter group. Almost three quarters of the waged or salaried laborers in Turkey are male. Labor force participation by women is also very low, and in, 2012, it was around 29.5 percent.




Figure 20: Gender Distribution of Paid Employees (.000; %)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012⁴⁶²

5.2.7. Women as Wage laborers

As the employment status of women is examined by years, it is seen that it reflects the overall trend of an increase in wage laborers' share.




Figure 21: Employment Status of Women by Years (.000)

TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

⁴⁶² TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

As the share of the waged or salaried women in total is increasing, unpaid family laborers are decreasing at the same time. On the other hand, the proportion of neither self-employed nor employers has changed significantly.

In Turkey, approximately more than one out of four women is working in agriculture or stockbreeding, and more than one out of five is working in this sector as unpaid family labor. The largest occupation groups of women are professionals, clerks and service workers. It is also notable that almost one fifth of the women working as wage laborers are hired for elementary occupations as unskilled workers.

Table 4: Employment Status of Women (.000)

	Wage laborers Or Casual Workers	Percentage of Workers	Employer or Self-Employed	Unpaid Family Laborer	Total
Legislators, senior officials and managers	134	43	41	1	220
Professionals	735	22	19	3	780
Technicians and associate professionals	509	3	16	7	535
Clerks	738	1	2	34	775
Service workers and shop and market sales workers	678	13	43	133	867
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	20	8	403	1,670	2,101
Craft and related trades workers	177	2	127	16	321
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	240	1	3	7	251
Elementary occupations	735	0	135	589	1,459
Total	3,967	93	788	2,460	7,309

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

Unlike workers in private sector, women in public sector have a relatively better share. The overall proportion of women to men is more than one and a half times,

whereas two fifths of civil servants in Turkey are women. Members of academy are the employment type where women are hired in the largest proportion.

Table 5: Women in Public According to Employment Types

	Number of Women	%
Civil Servants	813,502	39.03
Judges and Prosecutors	3,392	24.42
Academic Members	46,493	41.12
Contracted Personnel	53,885	32.94
Temporary Personnel	3,119	14.57
Permanent Workers	9,819	6.01
Permanent Workers out of Category	376	19.17
Temporary Workers	2,629	11.53
Total	933,215	36.11

Source: Prime Ministry, State Personnel Presidency, 2013

5.2.8. Labor Unions and Membership

It is mentioned before that as the 1963 LLU does not necessitate labor unions to prove their statement of member numbers, official data regarding the labor union density did not necessarily reflect the real situation until the 1980s. After 1980, the picture was not much better, either. This time it was the state, rather than the trade unions that skewed the numbers. Today, still, the number of labor union members and the number of workers subject to the labor union law (6356) and the labor union density are disputed issues in Turkey. The reason behind the varying results for the data is differentiation in conceptualization, method of data collection and difference among the data presented by different groups. There is consensus neither in the definition of trade union membership, nor in the designation of the reference of total workers. There is also disagreement in whether data should be collected by government agencies or accepted from the statements of each institution. Hence, domestic institutions like the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (ÇSGB), TÜRK-İŞ and TİSK have different calculation methods, and in turn have conflicting results regarding the data at stake. International organizations like the World Bank, OECD and ILO on the other

hand, rely on the data provided by different national institutions over time for their own calculation methods, which makes comparison hard even by addressing the data presented by a single institution.⁴⁶³

ÇSGB uses a methodology in which they give priority to the legal necessities rather than academic objectivity. This is why ÇSGB's data is open to political intervention and usually regarded as untrustworthy. What they used to do was take the ratio of trade union members and workers who have social security in order to reach the trade union density. However, the number of workers in the registries of the Ministry and the Social Security Institution do not match. That is why mostly the number of workers who are subject to collective agreement and the number of workers announced by TÜİK (then, DİE) were used in calculations as an alternative method.⁴⁶⁴ ÇSGB has been publishing labor union statistics on the basis of branches of activity since 1984. According to the ÇSGB method, in 1985 there were 3,075,343 workers in Turkey, 1,828,471 of which were labor union members. By use of these numbers, the labor union density appears to be around 64.9 percent, which is a very high rate.

Table 6: Labor Union Statistics According to ÇSGB Data⁴⁶⁵

	Workers	Labor Union Members	Labor Union Density (%)
2003	4,781,958	2,751,670	57.54
2004	4,916,421	2,854,059	58.05
2005	5,022,584	2,945,929	58.65
2006	5,154,948	3,001,027	58.21
2007	5,292,796	3,091,042	58.40
2008	5,414,423	3,179,510	58.72
2009	5,398,296	3,232,679	59.88

Source: ÇSGB Statistics, 2013

⁴⁶³ Çelik, 2004

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁵ July numbers are taken.

Similarly, for the years 1990 and 1995, the proportion was calculated as 56.1 percent and 68.3 percent, respectively. The table below (Table 6) presents the official data of ÇSGB, which shows that high rates of labor union density are observed when ÇSGB statistics are considered even in the 2000s.

Table 7: Labor Union Statistics According to Collective Agreement Data

	Paid Employees	2 Years Average	Labor Union Density (%)
1988	7,170,000	1,591,360	22.2
1989	7,077,000	1,505,520	21.3
1990	7,419,000	1,385,919	18.7
1991	7,305,000	1,443,297	19.8
1992	7,595,000	1,556,928	20.5
1993	7,891,000	1,529,825	19.4
1994	8,323,000	1,407,682	16.9
1995	8,471,000	1,144,989	13.5
1996	8,953,000	1,137,788	12.7
1997	9,657,000	1,319,563	13.7
1998	9,697,000	1,209,155	12.5
1999	9,544,000	1,054,422	11
2000	10,345,000	1,042,473	10.1
2001	10,057,000	1,010,563	10
2002	10,625,000	1,007,305	9.5
2003	10,707,000	957,418	8.9
2004	11,344,000	919,364	8.1
2005	12,360,000	933,537	7.6
2006	12,999,000	902,247	7
2007	13,573,000	831,335	6.1
2008	12,937,000	750,018	5.8
2009	12,770,000	748,399	5.9
2010	13,762,000	805,525	5.9

Source: Calculated by use of TÜİK Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics

As mentioned above, to reach a more accurate result, the number of workers subjected to collective agreement is used as an alternative method. However, in Turkey, collective agreements can be done for two or three year terms, as well as on an annual basis. In years when disputes occur, sometimes contracts are carried

over to the following year. This is why annual numbers could not be taken as such.

In order to determine the actual number of workers subjected to contract, usually a mathematical correction is applied. First, the sum of two consecutive years is taken. Then, the arithmetic mean of the sum with the successive one is taken and the result is accepted as the total number of workers subject to contract for that year.⁴⁶⁶ The following table (Table 7) shows us the labor union density calculated by use of this method, for the years between 1988 and 2010.

As the labor union density is examined by years, it is seen that since 1988, the proportion of union members to the total number of workers has decreased dramatically. As in 1988, more than one out of five workers were members of trade unions, but in 2010 this rate has dropped to one out of seventeen.




Figure 22: Labor Union Density by Years (%)

Source: Calculated by use of TÜİK Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid

Since 2013, on the basis of the change in constitution, ÇSGB started using a different method for the calculation of labor union density. According to the official data of ÇSGB, which is found to be more realistic than their previous numbers, as of July 2013 there are 1,032,166 workers who are labor union members in Turkey. These workers are divided among the confederations as follows: 725,912 in TÜRK-İŞ, 176,640 in HAK-İŞ and 103,128 in DİSK. ÇSGB determines the number of workers to be 11,628,806 by using data from the Social Security Institution (SGK). Taking this number as a reference, labor union density for 2013 turns out to be 8.8 percent. In 2012, as it has been noted before, there are around 15.6 million paid employees in Turkey. According to TÜİK data in April 2013, the number of wage laborers has risen to 16.3 million. It should be noted that this number includes civil servants as well, while SGK numbers do not. So either SGK numbers should be accepted as true, or the number of labor union members in the public sector should also be included in the calculation.

As public personnel are considered in terms of labor union membership, the numbers are relatively positive when they are compared to those of wage laborers.

Table 8: Labor Union Statistics in Public Sector

	Civil Servants	Members of Unions	Labor Union Density (%)
2003	1,272,267	788,846	62.00
2004	1,564,777	787,882	50.35
2005	1,584,490	747,617	47.18
2006	1,568,234	779,399	49.70
2007	1,617,410	855,463	52.89
2008	1,691,299	931,435	55.07
2009	1,784,414	1,017,072	57.00
2010	1,767,735	1,023,362	57.89
2011	1,874,543	1,195,102	63.75
2012	2,017,978	1,375,661	68.17
2013	2,134,638	1,468,021	68.77

Source: ÇSGB Statistics

In 2013, the number of civil servants who were in the scope of labor union law was 2,123,638, while union membership was 1,468,021. The labor union density for the public sector was 68.8 percent.

If labor union density is analyzed by years, a drop until 2005 and a regular increase following that can be observed. The government's interest in public sector labor unions and its encouragement of employed civil servants to be labor union members is an important factor in this increase. The significant increase in the number of members of a confederation known to be close to the government is a good indicator of this. Even in the years when the overall number of union members was decreasing, the members of this confederation have increased, to the extent that in a 10 year period, its membership has risen more than sevenfold.




Figure 23: Labor Union Density of Civil Servants by Years (%)

Source: ÇSGB, Department of Strategy Development, 2013

To conclude, according to the recent data of ÇSGB, as of July 2013 there are 2.5 million paid employees who are labor union members, including workers and civil servants. As this number is compared to the total number of wage laborers in Turkey, which is 16.3 million as of April 2013, the labor union density is found to be 15.3 percent.




Figure 24: Labor Union Members in Turkey (%)

Source: ÇSGB Statistics and TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2013

5.2.9. Labor Movements

Between 1984 and 2012, 2,290 strikes occurred in Turkey. In the public sector, although the number of strikes was relatively low when compared to the private sector, the number of workplaces was significantly higher as the public institutions have branches in many localities; and so when a strike occurs, it creates a widespread effect, geographically speaking. As the public institutions were large in scale, the number of workers involved in strikes is also proportionately high. The high density of labor union membership in the public sector also has a role in this difference. Unlike the number of workplaces and the numbers of workers involved, in terms of the number of workdays lost, the private sector surpasses the public sector. The public sector strikes are usually short termed and dependent on three factors. First, the public sector strikes are more effective with respect to their capacity for capturing the public's attention and thereby creating discontent through the withdrawal of public services.

Table 9: Labor Movement Statistics (1984-2012 Total)

	Number of Strikes	Number of Workplaces	Number of Workers Involved	Number of Workdays Lost
Public	265	5,913	441,375	10,692,169
Private	2,025	3,520	381,129	13,636,869
Total	2,290	9,433	822,504	24,329,038

Source: ÇSGB Statistics

Depending on the high rates of union membership, their effect takes place within a short period of time as well. Lastly, the state's capacity to respond to the demands of workers and civil servants is a lot higher than in the private sector. In public affairs, the 'public good' is at stake and the principle of profit having a secondary importance also has a role in the state's eagerness to end strikes.

In terms of the number of strikes in the private sector, between 1987 and 1991 was the liveliest period when 1,429 strikes occurred in total. The year with the highest number of strikes was 1990 with 438. Within this period, even in the year that witnessed the least number of strikes, which was 1988, 147 events happened. Apart from this period, strike data as dense as these years have not been seen. The years 1992 and 1995 witnessed the highest numbers of strikes with just 50 each. The number of workplaces that hosted the strikes generally presents a similar graphic with the number of strikes. However, an exceptional jump is observed in 2007. This is due to a strike that was set up in the 768 workplaces of Turkish Telecommunications Inc. (TT Inc.), which made that year hit the top spot in this category. For the number of the workers that attended the strikes, a partial deviation from the number of strikes and workplaces hosting them is observed.

In the period when the strikes were concentrated, the number of workers attending the strikes shows a paralleled increase. However, in 1987, when a relatively high number of strikes were seen, the number of workers that attended those strikes was low when compared to 1990 and 1991. Again, in 2007, workers who attended TT Inc. strike constituted almost all of the workers in action in that year (25,400 out of 25,652). Except for 2007, the loss of workdays follows a similar pattern with the number of strikes. In 2007 due to the TT Inc. strike a total of 1,152,000 workdays were lost as an exceptional case.




Figure 25: Strikes in Private Sector by Years

Source: ÇSGB Statistics, 2013

In terms of strikes in the public sector, all the indicators of the number of strikes, the number of workplaces, the number of workers attended and the total workdays lost, show a parallel pattern. The most active period in the public sector is between the years 1988 and 1995. The Big Miner March of 1991, the Resistance for Rights Movement of 1992 and 1995 movements organized by the Committee for Confederation Formation of Public Labor Unions in order to protest against the government's political reassignments and demands for constitutional rights for strike and collective bargaining were among the significant events of this period. The years of 1995 and 1992 were significant in all the aforementioned indicators with more than 236 thousand workers attended 118 strikes that occurred in 4,604 workplaces. The total workdays lost in these two years were over 5 million.




Figure 26: Strikes in Public Sector by Years

Source: ÇSGB Statistics, 2013

It should be noted that the strike statistics presented by ÇSGB do not include the most important worker's movement during the 2000s, namely the resistance of TEKEL workers, in 2009 and 2010. TEKEL was the state's tobacco and alcoholic beverages company that used to produce and sell products in these fields, as well as being the regulating authority of these business lines. The company has been taken into the scope of privatization since 2000 and its production facilities were sold piece by piece. At the end of 2009 the remaining factories of the company were decided to be sold for good and the company was set to be wound up. As the sales agreement did not have a binding clause for securing employees jobs, the British American Tobacco Co. decided to lay off most of the workers (8,247 out of 10,081).

The government offered these workers a status called 4/C which meant a loss of seniority and job security rights, together with a serious reduction in wages and yearly working time (10 months at most). Workers, on the other hand demanded being assigned to other state institutions with their existing job status. As a result, a series of protests and marches occurred. As the government did not respond to workers' demands positively, some of the workers started hunger strikes that eventually led to a work stoppage and a general strike at the level of labor union confederations. TÜRK-İŞ, DİSK, Türkiye Kamu-Sen and KESK were among the confederations that joined in the strikes. Also, international labor organizations like International Trade Union Confederation (CSI) and European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) declared their support for TEKEL workers.

5.2.10. Social Security

The effect of neoliberal policies in Turkey was also strongly felt in the social security conditions of workers. In 2000, 15.21 percent of the workers in Turkey were not registered to any social security institution. In 2012 this ratio reached 22 percent. In crisis periods, the proportion of uninsured workers increases even higher. As may be seen in the following graphic, in 2009, when the last significant economic crisis in Turkey was experienced, the percentage of uninsured workers reached 26.23 percent.




Figure 27: Workers Not Registered to Any Social Security Institution (%)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

5.2.11. Size of Workplace

When the distribution of paid employees according to workplace size is examined, it is seen that in 2012, more than half of the workers were employed in workplaces that have more than 25 employees. The largest group is constituted by the workers employed in the 50+ companies. Workplaces with a single paid employee are the smallest group.





Figure 28: Distribution of Workers According to Workplace Size (%)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

The distribution of workers according to the size of workplace over the years shows that workers in all workplace sizes are increasing. However, compared to the year of 2000, in 2012 the composition of workplaces has changed. In 2000, 50+ workplaces had the largest number of workers as they do now. However, workplaces where 10-24 paid laborers were hired had the second largest group of workers back then. In 2012, this workplace size is fourth, after the workplace group sizes of 25-49 and 5-9, in terms of the workers they employ. It is plausible to argue that neo-liberal economic conditions enforce mid-sized workplaces to either enlarge or shrink.



**Figure 29: Distribution of Workers According to Workplace Size
by Years (.000)**

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

5.2.12. Working Hours

The legal weekly maximum working time in Turkey is 45 hours for those who are employed in worker status, and 40 hours for those who are employed as civil servants. According to the employment legislation in effect, workers should get at least an extra 50 percent for overtime pay, in cases where they are required to work more than 45 hours. In Turkey a large share of the workers, which is close to half of the total, are working more than the legal work time. Three quarters of the workers are working more than 40 hours a week and almost one fifth of all workers are actively working for 60-71 hours. Although there is no direct access to the data regarding the sectorial differentiation of the working hours of workers, one could make an overall estimate about the issue by use of data of those who are working in income generating jobs. Especially in wholesale and retail trade, in hotels, restaurants, and in the construction sector whose active working time exceeds 45 hours, overtime payment is rare.





Figure 30: Distribution of Workers According to Working Hours (.000; %)

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

As the data is examined longitudinally, it is observed that the share of employees working 40 and 41-49 hours are decreasing. Interestingly, the shares of the groups who work fewer hours are increasing. Especially, the group who work actively between 17 and 35 hours showed a significant rise in share during the 2009-2012 period. Although in the said period there was also an increase in the share of part-time workers (3.74% in 2009 and 4.23% in 2010)⁴⁶⁷, this increase alone does not explain the abovementioned composition change. It is reasonable to think that relative freedom of skilled white collar workers in planning their own work time, whose number and ratio in labor force is increasing, have played a role in this transformation.

⁴⁶⁷ TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012



**Figure 31: Distribution of Workers According to Working Hours
by Years (.000; %)**

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

5.2.13. Seniority

Although there is not any statistics regarding the seniority of the population of wage laborers in Turkey, the results of the TİSK survey of 2011 could be utilized to get an idea about the issue. However, it should be noted that the representation capacity of the sample is problematic in that more than 70 percent of the workers that took part in the survey were trade union members, as opposed to the overall trade union density rate in Turkey of 5.4 percent (2011). According to the results of the survey, almost half of the 184.5 thousand workers who completed the survey have less than 5 years of seniority. When those who have less than one year of seniority are excluded, the average years of seniority is 9.1. With a very high ratio of the surveyed being members of trade unions, it is plausible to argue that the actual situation is a lot worse than the abovementioned numbers. Considering the fact that 585 thousand people in the public sector and 419 thousand people in the private sector are working with subcontracts and are not

utilizing seniority rights of any sort, it can be concluded that the picture is a lot different than the data indicates.⁴⁶⁸ Nevertheless, it can be at least said that the labor force in Turkey does not show the traditional high turnover rates that were witnessed between the 1930s and 1960s.




Figure 32: Seniority of Paid Employees (TİSK Survey / %)

Source: TİSK, Labor Statistics and Labor Costs, 2011

5.2.14. Wages

Except for a rise in civil servants' wages in 1982, until 1989, all the wages decreased. While in 1988, the wages of civil servants and workers in private sector were leveled, the wages of workers in the public sector reached the bottom level even below half of the 1981 level. The beginning of the 1990s witnessed a huge rise in wages thanks to the revival of workers' movements. By 1993, the wages of workers in the private sector had almost doubled when compared to the level at 1981. On the other hand, civil servant's wages and public workers' wages increased by 61 percent and 50 percent, respectively. In 1990, the wages of workers in the private sector surpassed the wages of civil servants.

⁴⁶⁸ ÇSGB, <http://www.cs gb.gov.tr/cs gbPortal/cs gb.portal?page=haber&id=basin491>




Figure 33: Net Real Wage Index (1981=100)

Source: DPT, Program of 1995

When the period between 1994 and 2010 is examined it is seen that the wages of civil servants has increased significantly. Unlike civil servants, the wages of private sector workers stayed at the same level, while wages of workers in the public sector decreased approximately 15 percent. The top level of wages for both groups of workers was reached in the year 2000, while civil servants' wages reached its peak point in 2009.




Figure 34: Net Real Wage Index (1994=100)

Source: DPT, Collected from Programs of 2000, 2005 and 2012

On the other hand, despite following a similar pattern of increase and decrease, labor costs do not proportionally match the rises in wages. The increase in wages between 1985 and 1993 are higher in ratio than that of labor costs. A similar relationship is valid for the period between 1994 and 2010 as wages stayed at the same level, but labor costs decreased around 8 percent.




Figure 35: Labor Cost Index of Private Sector (1985=100)

Source: TİSK, Labor Statistics and Labor Costs, 2011

CHAPTER 6

MANUAL WORKERS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

6.1. Research Question

What are the common and different traits of blue collar workers in Turkey and how do those traits affect the voting behavior of blue collar workers?

A survey analysis was performed in order to examine the existence of the abovementioned relationship. Through demographic questions and questions regarding family structure, workplace relations, working conditions, socialization patterns and political opinions and the different characteristics of blue collar workers in Turkey have attempted to be portrayed. Respondents were also asked for which party they would vote if an election was held on the day of interview. Although the respondent's actual vote in previous elections was also asked, the results of that question were not included within the analysis. The reason of the preference of using a hypothetical vote instead of their recent actual vote, was the bias that 'time passed from the last election' would cause, as the most recent elections were held back in June 2011.

Blue Collar

In this study, a blue collar worker is taken as a skilled or unskilled, manual wage laborer mostly hired in production and maintenance activities.

6.2. Sample

As explained in the research summary, stratified sampling was used in the determination of the respondents. Nevertheless, as certain traits of blue collar workers of the population are unknown,⁴⁶⁹ formal data regarding those who work

⁴⁶⁹ TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012 only presents data with respect to the combination of two variables plus gender and region. As the blue collar workers could be isolated from the population by the combinations of classification of occupations in ISCO 88 standard and

in an income generating job are taken as a reference. Moreover, data from a comprehensive study that was conducted in March 2013 in 50 provinces with respondents who were at or above the age of 18 was also used. The reference data was conducted with a large sample size of 10,860 which was designated by use of simple random sampling. According to the results of the survey, those who were in the status of workers constituted of 1,020 people. Below, the profile of the blue collar workers in our data and profiles presented in the abovementioned study and TÜİK data (Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012) are compared in terms of the variables that were used for performing the stratified sampling.

6.2.1. Gender

The table below shows the gender distribution of TÜİK, the reference sample and the sample data for blue collar workers. Gender is the only category that TÜİK data gives direct information for blue collar workers. As may be seen in the table below, women are slightly underrepresented in the sample.

Table 10: Gender Distribution of Sample

Sex	TÜİK %	Reference Sample %	Sample %
Female	15.7	16.6	13.6
Male	84.3	83.4	86.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

6.2.2. Age

Below, the distribution of age groups is given. The TÜİK data presented belongs to those who work in income generating blue collar jobs instead of blue collar workers. The primary difference between the two categories is that the former group includes a significant number of unpaid family laborers who work in the agriculture sector and are mostly that bit older. As those people are not involved

status at job. So for blue collar workers there can only two extra discriminative used variables at once. Among them also regions are according to Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics for Turkey, which does not fit with the common 7 regions model. Hence only gender difference of blue collar workers regarding the population can be estimated from formal statistics of TÜİK.

in the population group of our research, the difference between TÜİK distribution and the sample distributions becomes meaningful. If the two sample distributions are compared, it is seen that while the youngest group is overrepresented, the oldest group is slightly underrepresented. The middle aged group on the other hand is relatively better represented. It should be underlined that the average age of the sample is one year less than the reference sample.

Table 11: Age Distribution of Sample

Age Groups	TÜİK %	Reference Sample %	Sample %
30 years or below	29.3	31.5	34.1
31-45 years	47.4	49.2	47.5
46 years or above	23.4	19.3	18.4
Average age	35.7	36.8	35.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

6.2.3. Education

At first sight, a high difference between the distribution of education levels among the sample and the reference groups is noticeable. The TÜİK data presented once again belongs to those who work in income generating blue collar jobs rather than blue collar workers. A bias in that sense due to unskilled unpaid family laborers in agriculture is expected. This explains the difference between the reference sample and TÜİK data at the intermediate education levels. The Secondary school or equivalent category is similar in all data sets as most of the people categorized in this group are mostly graduates of 8 years compulsory education. So the difference chiefly occurs between the primary education graduates and high school graduates. The reference group distribution in these three levels of education seems more realistic than the TÜİK data. In respect to the illiterate group, although there is similarity between the TÜİK and reference sample data, the percentage of this group should be less than the presented numbers as our population excludes rural areas in which almost all the illiterate population resides. In light of this information, when the sample is evaluated with respect to

the distribution of education levels, it is seen that high school graduates are somewhat overrepresented when compared to primary school graduates who are underrepresented. The rest of the education levels are more or less represented in a more balanced fashion.

Table 12: Education Distribution of Sample

Education Level Attained	TÜİK %	Reference Sample %	Sample %
Illiterate	3.3	4.0	0.9
Literate / Primary School	52.4	33.7	19.8
Secondary School or Equivalent	24.4	25.2	27.8
High School	7.9	33.0	37.5
College or University	12.0	4.0	13.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

6.2.4. Marital Status

In the previous chapter, the marital status of wage laborers has been observed in general. Here this data will be used along with data regarding the marital status of those who work in income generating blue collar jobs. Also once again, the reference sample groups will be used for comparison. As it can be seen in the table below, the distribution of marital status in the sample is almost exactly the same with TÜİK data for wage laborers in general.

Table 13: Marital Status Distribution of Sample

Marital Status	TÜİK Wage Laborers %	TÜİK Income Generating Jobs %	Reference Sample %	Sample %
Single	29.8	24.0	22.0	29.9
Married	66.8	72.9	74.2	65.2
Divorced	3.3	3.1	3.7	4.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

A slight difference is observed in the divorce rate, which could be explained by the fact that the previous data involves white collar workers who are known to be more inclined to divorce. Hence it is plausible to say that marital status distribution of the sample is highly representative.

6.2.5. Regions

The TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics provides regional data on the basis of Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics for Turkey (NUTS). The first level involves certain groups of provinces with respect to the population and development levels. This classification cannot be converted to seven commonly known geographical regional classifications in that NUTS Level One has provinces that are classified in different regions of geographical classification. Therefore, NUTS regions from the TÜİK and sample data are collated into seven regions in order to have a level of comparison with the reference sample. But it should be noted that the conversion creates a significant increase in the Marmara region, but to the disadvantage of the Aegean, Central Anatolian and Black Sea regions due to these changes. Hence when these shifts are considered, the distribution of blue collar workers in TÜİK data and the reference sample is quite similar.

Table 14: Regional Distribution of Sample

Regions	TÜİK %	Reference Sample %	Sample %
Marmara	39.8	33.3	30.7
Aegean	14.4	15.6	15.8
Central Anatolia	12.8	15.6	15.6
Mediterranean	12.5	14.4	14.7
South East Anatolia	8.7	7.3	8.2
Black Sea	7.1	6.9	7.8
Eastern Anatolia	5.2	6.9	7.3

Source: TÜİK, Household Surveys, Labor Force Statistics, 2012

As the regional distribution in both the TÜİK and sample data are at the same level, a direct comparison is possible. As the table below clearly shows, Marmara

region (which involves certain parts of Aegean, Central Anatolia and Black Sea) is highly underrepresented, whereas Aegean, Central Anatolia, Mediterranean and Eastern Anatolian regions are overrepresented.

6.2.6. Monthly Household Expenditure

It is preferred to acquire data regarding the monthly expenditure of the household instead of asking the salary or wage of the workers. As TÜİK data does not present any information regarding either household expenditure or income levels, the only reference for the designation of expenditure strata's is the distribution of the reference sample according to income levels. As the table below shows, the low income/expenditure group, whose monthly income/expenditure is 1,500 TL or less, is overrepresented in a significant way (more than 16 percent). Both the middle income/expenditure and the high income/expenditure groups are underrepresented. As seen in the table below, the average income/expenditure of the sample group is also slightly lower than the reference groups. Although the reference group consists of workers in general and certain difference between income levels is expected due to inclusion of white collar workers in the reference group, the size of the representation difference could not be explained solely by this fact. Therefore, this would cause a level of bias in all the other variables that are affected by income.

Table 15: Income Distribution of Sample

Income Levels	Reference Sample %	Sample %
1500 TL and below	55.0	71.6
1500-3000 TL	39.2	26.5
3000 TL and above	5.8	1.9
Average Income (TL)	1,488.7	1,417.1

In general, if the income level distribution is put aside, the distribution of subpopulations represents the population well.

6.2.7. Unit of Analysis

As it is mentioned before in the research question and introduction section, the unit of analysis in the research is blue collar workers who are of voting age.

6.2.8. Choosing the Right Statistical Test and Limitations

Our inquiry regarding the voting behavior of blue collar workers aims to reach an explanatory conclusion. To put it in a different way, in this study it is intended to reach certain factors, traits, features, and beliefs of workers that could predict the political party they vote for. Depending on those factors, the significance of the class position is expected to be designated in the political decisions of manual laborers. One needs to utilize regression analysis, logistic regression analysis or discriminant analysis to reach such a conclusion. However, each of these tests could be applied in certain cases, depending on the type of variables and whether they fulfill the required assumptions.

Regression analysis, in general, requires a single dependent variable of continuous character. Since in the case of this study, the dependent variable is the preference of political party, it does not fit for the regression analysis as it is a categorical variable. Although certain types of regression models like logistic regression can deal with such data, the most common form of it, which is bivariate logic, works for dichotomous categorical variables. One could test the decision on choosing one party or not by use of such an analysis; however it does not provide us a prediction model that would estimate the way a manual worker with certain traits votes for.

Multinomial logistic regression can test the relationship between more than one categorical or continuous independent variable and a categorical dependent variable. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the results of the test with high numbers of independent variables, as in this case, is hardly possible. Moreover, the presented outcome of the test is always presents information with respect to a reference variable. To put it in a different way, by use of multinomial logistic regression, one can find to what extent a group of manual laborers prefers a single

party over others with respect to other groups in the same categorical variable. Hence the best statistical analysis for the research question presented here seems to be discriminant analysis.

The capacity of the discriminant analysis to cope with categorical independent variables is vague. Although in many statistical reference books the analysis is categorized to fit best for continuous independent variables and categorical dependent variables, The University of California Los Angeles, Institute for Digital Research and Education categorizes the test to be suitable for one or more interval IVs and/or one or more categorical IVs. In other words, in spite of the fact that the discriminant analysis best fits to continuous independent variables, categorical dependent variables could also be used. This is crucial in that a lot of opinion-based information acquired from the surveys is categorical independent variables and being able to put them in the final equation is a particular strength of the test used.

In a similar analysis regarding preferences of candidates in San Francisco elections, Latterman uses discriminant analysis.⁴⁷⁰ He regards discriminant analysis preferable in that it uses predictive value as well as explanatory value, and provides the possibility of examining election choices for more than two candidates.

The capability of discriminant analysis to create discriminant functions that are able to produce accurate groupings is increased when the assumptions of normality, linearity, and homogeneity of variance are fulfilled.

Discriminant analysis shows better performance in cases where the relationships are linear. Linearity means that the amount of change or rate of change between scores on two variables are constant for the entire range of scores for the variables. If non-linear relationships are used in the statistical analysis, assuming

⁴⁷⁰ Latterman, 2004, pp. 1-5

that they are linear, the assessment could underestimate the strength of the relationship. It may even fail to detect the existence of a relationship.

The assumption of multivariate normality requires data values to be from a normal distribution. Normality tests can verify this assumption. However, it should be noted that normal assumptions are usually not indispensable. The significance tests that are done can still be reliable by use of data that is not normally distributed.

Lastly, in the case of high multicollinearity among two or more variables, the discriminant function coefficients will not reliably predict group membership. In other words, the statistical analysis fails to designate which independent variable really affects the decision on group discrimination and creates an equation that functions with bias. The pooled within-groups correlation matrix can be used to detect multicollinearity. If correlation coefficients larger than 0.8 are examined, some variable should be excluded.

It is almost impossible to create an equation that satisfies the assumptions of discriminant analysis in the field of political decisions. Voting behavior usually does not have linear independent variables. Normal distributions are very rare as well.

So the relationship between the predictors found and the dependent variable may be stronger than concluded. Moreover, certain independent variables could have been omitted from the final equation although there may be relations between some variables.

Although there are shortcomings regarding the nature and the distribution of the variables, using discriminant analysis should be insisted upon in that voting behavior is, in almost all cases, an action that is determined by many factors. In order to conceive the effect of multiple variables together, one needs to apply a statistical test that allows more than one independent variable, which is the case

for discriminant analysis. On the basis of this idea within the scope of this study a discriminant analysis was attempted, though a successful result could not be achieved.

First of all, as the sample size was large enough, it was split into two parts and one of them was used as a hold-out sample in order to test the results of the analysis with a set of data that was not involved in the creation of the final equation. In determination of the variables to be involved only continuous variables were used initially. Unfortunately, the information provided by those variables did not suffice for the creation of a model of prediction. Additionally, categorical data were also involved and discriminant analysis was done repetitively to reach an equation that could predict voting behavior to a certain extent. Nevertheless, as the categorical data that actually affected the voting behavior on the singular basis are of a character that is not compatible with the assumptions of the test, they did not contribute to the formation of an equation. That is why, the formation of a predictive model for voting behavior failed with the data at hand and the present bag of tricks.

As any sort of statistical analysis with multiple variables could not be applied to the current data, analyses with single independent variables had to be preferred. So it was decided to test the relationship between each and every variable with the dependent variable on a singular basis by use of relevant statistical tests. As the most efficient statistical analysis for categorical independent and dependent variables is cross tabulation and chi square test, they are attempted to be utilized.

6.3. Life Conditions of Blue Collar Workers

In this section, it is intended to present the objective conditions of the blue collar workers in general, in a similar way to the profile of wage laborers presented in the previous chapter. Demographic statistics, family structure of blue collar workers, including expectations for their children, and income and consumption details will be examined. Female blue collar workers will also be scrutinized and

their distinct characteristics compared to male blue collar workers will try to be shown.

6.3.1. Demographic Features

A comparison between TÜİK data and the data acquired through the sample in certain demographic categories has already been presented including gender, age, education, marital status, etc. To summarize what has been gone through, only 15.7 percent of the blue collar workers in Turkey are women. Almost two thirds of blue collar workers are married. In the overall population who are over 15 years of age, high school graduates constitute 21.4 percent⁴⁷¹ and 37.5 percent of the blue collar workers in our data are high school graduates. It is mentioned that this group is overrepresented compared to other education levels, yet even when considering this fact, the percentage is still significantly high. This is because this level of education includes vocational high schools. Similarly, a high percentage of university graduates are observed due to technical (two year) tertiary schools, which comprises 4.3 percent within the group categorized as university graduates.

Hometown

As the regional distribution of the blue collar workers are determined according to subpopulations defined by use of distribution presented in a previous survey, there is no use presenting the results here. To put it in a different way, they are deliberately chosen. On the other hand, the hometown of blue collar workers gives us an idea about their regional origins. Interestingly, almost all the blue collar workers (except for 13 cases out of 1,938) state another city/province than the one they live in as their hometown. This shows the effect of high migration rates across Turkey in the last six decades. The population of Turkey has been, so to say, ‘shuffled’ within this period. This has had a tremendous effect on working class living patterns. Such a high rate of mobility means that workers do not have a settled life in the cities as they have lived there for no longer than three, or even two generations.

⁴⁷¹ TÜİK, Household Surveys, Education Statistics, 2013

However, the length of time living in the province where they currently live also shows an interesting situation. On average, the blue collar workers have been working in their current city/province for more than 20 years, with 70 percent of the blue collarites living in the same place more than 20 years. Although regarding their hometown, almost all blue collar workers refer to another city/province within their lifetime, they have generally been in the same place for a long time. To put it in a different way, blue collar families are in a trend to continue a more settled life than their families in the past used to.

Table 16: Hometowns of Blue Collar Workers

Province	%
Diyarbakır	5.4
Samsun	5.1
Konya	4.8
Erzurum	4.7
Gaziantep	4.2
Manisa	4.0
Trabzon	4.0
Ankara	3.8
Adana	3.3
Bursa	3.2

The above table presents the cities/provinces that top the list of hometowns of blue collar workers. Diyarbakır is the province that has the highest frequency among the hometowns of blue collar workers. However, as may not be expected, the origin provinces of blue collar workers are not mostly from the South Eastern and Eastern Anatolia Regions. Workers from provinces like Ankara, Bursa, Adana, etc. are working in other regions. In other words, there is no single pattern of migration, such as from eastern regions to the center and west, which occurred within the last two generations among blue collar worker families.

Ethnicity

When the ethnic differences of blue collar workers are examined, it is seen that those who define themselves as Turkish and Kurdish constitute almost 90 percent

of the sample group. The biggest five groups are Turks, Kurds, Zazas, Arabs and the Laz people. Circassians, Arnauts, Bosniaks, Pomaks, Georgians, Armenians and other ethnic groups are at marginal rates among blue collar workers.

Table 17: Ethnic Identity of Blue Collar Workers

Ethnicity	Valid %	Cumulative %
Turkish	72.6	72.6
Kurdish	16.6	89.2
Zaza	2.2	91.3
Arab	2.3	93.6
Laz	2.1	95.7
Circassian	0.6	96.3
Arnauts	0.4	96.7
Bosniak	0.5	97.2
Pomak	0.2	97.4
Georgian	0.5	97.8
Armenian	0.2	98.0
Other	2.0	100.0
Total	100.0	100.0

6.3.2. Blue Collar Families

In the survey, information about the education and work status of the spouses of blue collar workers is also collected. According to the data, educational attainment of the spouses of blue collar workers is lower than their self-attainment.

Table 18: Education Level of Blue Collar Spouses

Education Level Attained	Blue Collar Workers %	Spouses %
Illiterate	0.9	10.5
Literate / Primary School	19.8	29.5
Secondary School	27.8	30.3
High School	37.5	23.4
Vocational College	4.3	2.4
University	9.3	3.9
Total	100.0	100.0

The primary reason behind this is that most of the workers are male, and females are undereducated in Turkey. When the table is gone through, a high rate of illiteracy among the spouse group is immediately obvious. More than 70 percent of the spouse group are either secondary school graduates or had a lower level of education.

Being undereducated, the spouses of blue collar workers are also largely out-of-work. In more than 71 percent of the blue collar families, only one of the married couple is working. Among those spouses who work, 62.5 percent of blue collar husbands are workers as well. However, blue collar wives are largely housewives with 76.8 percent.

Table 19: Working Condition of Blue Collar Spouses

Work Status	%	Valid %	Cumulative %
Merchant-Businessmen	2.0	0.1	0.16
Other	4.0	0.2	0.32
Farmer	5.0	0.3	0.40
Self-Employed	10.0	0.5	0.81
Retired	13.0	0.7	1.05
Shopkeeper	37.0	1.9	2.99
Unemployed	41.0	2.1	3.31
Civil Servant	46.0	2.3	3.72
Private Sector Employee	58.0	2.9	4.68
Worker	181.0	9.2	14.62
Housewife	841.0	42.8	67.93
Total	1238.0	62.9	100.00

Family Size verses. Household Size

In terms of the number of children the married blue collar workers have, and the household size, on average it is seen that there is a high correspondence. The mean of the number of children is 2.04 while the mean of the household size of married blue collar workers is 4.18. When the distribution of the children and household size are examined, it is seen that 85 percent of the blue collar families have three children or less. 84 percent of the households of the married blue collar

workers consist of five people. A large share of blue collar workers are living in their households as nuclear families and have three or less children.

Expectations for Children

Expectations for children are good indicators of family values and the ideals of people. In this sense three questions regarding this category were asked to the respondents; namely the worth given to education, the priority for a good life and the determination for upward mobility. 85 percent of the blue collar workers who have children definitely expect their children to graduate from university. The second largest group, with almost 10 percent, expects their children to finish vocational school and have a valuable occupation. Only 3.8 percent of the blue collar workers express traditional values and either deny the educational rights for girls or denounce the worth of education.

The choices given to blue collar parents for their expectations for their children involved having a good profession/occupation, home, education, or financial situation. Also options such as being powerful and being a good Muslim were included. The last two options were about being a worker that stresses two aspects, respectively on technical capacity and on honesty and being hardworking. Having a good profession was chosen by the majority of the blue collar workers with 61 percent. Almost 15 percent preferred a good education over a profession. It is plausible to argue that this group does not see education simply as a means to reach certain objectives, but as an end in itself. Being well-off and having a good home followed the abovementioned options.

Father's Work: Family Origin

One third of the blue collar workers are coming from a worker family. In other words, one third of blue collar workers are from two generation worker families. The second largest group among the blue collar workers in this criterion is those whose fathers were, or are, farmers. They constitute one fourth of the total. Shopkeepers and Civil Servants are among the other occupations that are more frequently observed.

Table 20: Occupations of the Fathers of Blue Collar Workers

Occupation	%	Cumulative %
Worker	33.8	33.8
Farmer	25.3	59.1
Shopkeeper	17.8	76.9
Civil Servant	11.7	88.6
Self-Employed	3.9	92.5
Private Sector Worker	3.4	95.9
Unemployed	2.1	98.0
Merchant - Businessman	1.3	99.3
Other	0.7	100.0

6.3.3. Blue Collar Households***Size***

The household size of the married blue collar workers is shown in the previous section. As the blue collar household size in general is examined, the mean is 4.09. Approximately 85 percent of the blue collar workers' household size is smaller than five. As the data does not vary much from that of the married blue collar workers, it could be assumed that family patterns of single blue collar workers (who most probably live with their parents) is not much different than married ones.

Expenditure

Although the monthly expenditure of blue collar households was touched upon in the section on the sample, the table below shows a more detailed and better distributed grouping of the expenditure category. As cumulative percentages indicate, more than half of the blue collar families have monthly expenditure less than 1,500 TL. Almost one third of the families live on a monthly budget of 1,000 to 1,500 TL.

According to the research by TÜRK-İŞ, the absolute hunger line was 1,022 TL and poverty line was 3,322 TL, in August 2013.⁴⁷² Hence it can be concluded that almost one fifth of the blue collar families live under the level of hunger, while more than 95 percent of the blue collar families live under the poverty line. It has been seen that the mean household size in Turkey is four. However, the size of around 35 percent of blue collar households is larger than four. For those families it could be regarded that the conditions of living is a lot harder than the defined parameters.

Table 21: Monthly Expenditure of Blue Collar Households

Turkish Lira	Valid %	Cumulative %
499 and below	1.8	1.8
500-999	21.4	23.2
1,000-1,499	31.0	54.2
1,500-1,999	22.9	77.1
2,000-2,499	14.3	91.4
2,500-2,999	4.1	95.5
3,000 and above	4.5	100.0

Income

65 percent of the blue collar workers get their payment as monthly salaries, while 15 percent of them get daily pay, and nine percent receive it as weekly wages. Half of the blue collar households in Turkey depend on one person in terms of income. In 36 percent of the blue collar households, two people work in income generating jobs or have pensions, while for another 10 percent this number is three. In short, in 87 percent of the blue collar households, those who contribute to the household budget are two or less, while for 97 percent it is three or less. This data is consistent with the fact that a large share of the blue collar households is constituted by nuclear families with two or three children. Within the 50 percent of the blue collar households where only one person contributes to the income, 80 percent has no other income source. This section corresponds to the 40 percent of

⁴⁷² TÜRK-İŞ, 2013, Ağustos 2013 Açlık ve Yoksulluk Sınırı, <http://www.turkis.org.tr/?wapp=52521E5F-FCA5-4BDD-940D-A284DA6F151D>

all blue collar workers. Among the 60 percent of blue collar households who have other sources of income, we know that 36 percent of the total group (60 percent of those who have other sources of income) has a second wage income. When the remaining group of 40 percent who have secondary sources of income other than wages is examined, it is seen that the largest group is land or orchard owners. They constitute 8.6 percent of this group of workers and 5.2 percent of the total blue collarites. Another 2.8 percent states ownership of land as a third source of income. As it is argued in the previous chapter, the section of wage laborers who has ownership of means of production is minimal and continues to decrease. Here it can be seen that for blue collarites it is at most around eight percent, since these lands and orchards may belong to other members of the household too. Other sources of income are rent with 7.7 percent, financial aids with 4.6 percent, trade with 4.4 percent and lastly street trading with 2.2 percent.

Table 22: Wages and Monthly Expenditure of Household

	%	Cumulative %
01-10	2.7	2.7
11-20	3.3	6.0
21-30	6.8	12.8
31-40	7.2	20.0
41-50	16.7	36.7
51-60	12.0	48.7
61-70	13.2	61.9
71-80	13.8	75.7
81-90	6.6	82.3
91-100	16.7	100.0

When the income of blue collar workers is compared to the household needs in general, it is seen that a significant share of the blue collar households depend on income sources other than the wage of blue collar workers for providing the needs of the members of the household. As the table below indicates, more than one third of the blue collar workers state that their earning suffices 50 percent of the household needs or less. There is a section of workers that constitute the six

percent of the blue collarites whose salary corresponds to 20 percent of the household expenditures or less. Those blue collar workers whose salaries meet the household needs are only around 16 percent.

The overall change in the living standards of the workers in the last 10 years shows that conditions of blue collar workers are getting better. In spite of the fact that approximately 22 percent of the blue collarites' living standard has been gone down in the last ten years, 43.4 percent of them state that their living conditions have been improved. The rest of the blue collar workers, which are around 35 percent, indicate that there has not been any significant change in their lives. The positive opinion of blue collar workers regarding the change in their lives is also evident with respect to the general conditions of workers. When blue collar workers were asked to evaluate the last ten years in terms of the employment and conditions of employees, 46 percent of them believe that progress was made in those areas. Only one fifth of blue collarites think that things have become worse in the last ten years for workers.

Indebtedness

In spite of the low income levels that blue collar workers have, 50 percent of them do not have any debts. Most of the other 50 percent are indebted to banks. 23 percent of the total blue collar workers have credit card debts and another 17.7 percent have active bank loans. The rest, which is approximately three percent, borrowed money from relatives or friends. Only 1.8 percent of the blue collarites are indebted to more than one lender. When the blue collar workers were asked whether they can pay their debts or have trouble doing so, only around nine percent indicated that they are having difficulties in paying their credit. 22 percent of the blue collarites can pay their debts on time, yet they have to cut down from their basic needs to do so. Those who borrowed money from their relatives and friends state that their creditors are sympathetic and do not rush them for payment. To sum up, a significant part of the blue collar workers utilize the option of taking credits for their needs from institutional sources. Besides, a noteworthy section of them are having difficulty making their payments without lowering their living

standards or could not make payments on time and face additional bank interest and charges.

Financial Aids

Respondents were asked whether they receive any kind of regular aid, temporarily or even once or twice. More than four fifths of the respondents state that they do not receive any aid. Only 17.4 percent of the blue collar workers get financial support as payment or payment in kind from different sources on a regular or irregularly basis. Although all the respondents in the survey are employed, and in this respect the low rate of beneficiaries is understandable, considering the fact that financial supports are given on the basis of income level in Turkey, the number of recipients may be regarded to be lower than expected. Usually families or individuals who get support from institutional means deny their condition in order to get more aid or not to lose existing aid. There is a tendency to suspect that conductors of the surveys may be inspectors of institutions who check whether those receive aids satisfy the requirements.

House and Car Ownership

Half of the blue collar workers are living in their own house. Considering the income level of these workers this rate is significantly high. Without any doubt, this shows how important having a house is for a blue collar family. 40 percent of the blue collar workers are living in a rented house. Around five percent live in the houses of their relatives and do not pay rent. The number of blue collar workers who have cars is not as high as the numbers of blue collar workers who own a house. Only 35 percent of the blue collar workers own a car.

Dependents

Students constitute 77 percent of the total children in blue collar households. In other words, more than three quarters of the children in blue collar households are of school age. Most of the blue collar households have either three children or less that are going to school. In only 2.2 percent of the total blue collar households the number of children in education is more than four. Considering the family and

household size of blue collarites and the employment status of blue collar wives and husbands, it can be concluded that the large majority of the dependents in a blue collar household is comprised of children in education. Along with children and unemployed members of the household, in nine percent of the blue collar households, there is either an elderly person or a disabled person who needs daily care as well.

6.3.4. Blue Collar Expectations

As blue collar workers express that their living conditions have improved in the last 10 years, they are also optimistic about their future. When they are asked how their life will be in the next five years, around 57 percent of them are positive and believe that things will be better than they are currently. Only 14 percent of the blue collarites are pessimistic about future. The rest of the blue collar workers, which is around 30 percent do not expect any significant change in their life standards in the near future. On the other hand, in terms of their personal expectations of future plans it is seen that most of the blue collar workers are not ambitious for improving their class position. 68 percent of the blue collarites' expectation for future is being retired as a wage laborer. Conversely, around one fourth of the blue collar workers are planning to find a new job or to start a new business.

6.4. Blue Collar Jobs

Before going into detail on the working conditions of blue collarites, the occupational distribution of their jobs, their means to get a job, their priorities to choose a job, etc. will be focused upon. The frequency of changing a job through examining the total working years and the number of jobs of blue collar workers will also be examined.

Occupational Distribution

The two wide ranging categories of blue collarite occupation in Turkey are construction workers and factory workers. Cleaning workers, shopkeeper assistants and textile workers follow the first two occupations.

Table 23: Occupational or Sectorial Distribution of Blue Collar Workers

Occupation/Sectors	%	Cumulative %
Construction	10.55	10.55
Factory Worker	10.18	20.73
Cleaning	7.40	28.14
Shopkeeper Assistant	6.56	34.70
Textile	6.19	40.89
Electric and Electronics Technician	5.41	46.30
Industry	5.04	51.34
Food Salesperson	4.51	55.85
Municipality Worker	3.94	59.79
Waiter	3.94	63.73
Office Worker	3.88	67.61
Driver	3.62	71.23
Automotive Industry	3.36	74.59
Restaurant	3.15	77.74
Furniture	2.99	80.73
Stationery Salesperson	2.05	82.78
Sales Clerk	1.78	84.57
Bakery Worker	1.73	86.30
Security Personnel	1.57	87.87
Fitter	1.31	89.19
Machine Operator	1.26	90.45
Hairdresser	1.21	91.65
Porter	0.89	92.55
Mover	0.89	93.44
Gardening	0.84	94.28
Health Services	0.84	95.12
Hardware person	0.79	95.91
Decoration	0.73	96.64
Agriculture	0.68	97.32
Landscaping	0.63	97.95
Printing	0.63	98.58
Gas Station	0.37	98.95
Seasonal Worker	0.37	99.32
Accommodation	0.26	99.58
Shipyard	0.26	99.84
Piece Work at Home	0.10	99.95
Dry Cleaning	0.05	100.00

Technical stuff (electronics-electricity) and industry workers are around five percent and together with the abovementioned groups constituting more than 50 percent of all blue collar workers in Turkey.

Depending on the data presented in the table below, with a rough calculation, it can be concluded that around 30 percent of the blue collarites work in the services sector. Whereas, around 70 percent of the blue collar workers are employed in sectors that can be categorized under the industry sector.

Job Preference Criteria

Wage level is the criteria for job preference for almost 40 percent of the blue collar workers. One fourth of the blue collarites put conditions of work above all the other criteria. Another one fifth determines the suitability of a job on the basis of social security. Around eight percent of the blue collar workers surveyed state that they have no say in choosing a job. In other words, their life conditions, their skill level or the labor market conditions allow such a choice.

Means to Find Job

More than half of the blue collar workers said that they found their current job by themselves. Those who had found their jobs through other means mostly did so by use of traditional sources. Mediation of relatives is widespread with 21 percent. Friends follow them with 16.5 percent. Only five percent of the blue collar workers found their jobs through institutional means like a labor exchange, or from newspaper ads and Internet career sites.

Frequency of Job Change (Total Work Time / Number of Jobs Changed)

The mean of the frequency of job change for blue collar workers is approximately six. The median value on the other hand is four. The most repeated value is two. Almost 70 percent of the blue collar workers had changed jobs up to six times at most. 46 percent of them had changed less than three jobs. As it is seen, Turkish labor history used to have a phenomenon of job turnover. It is possible to say that although the rates are low according to the early years of the development of

industry in Turkey, it is still possible to talk about a job turnover problem. One of the major reasons for frequent job change is the predominance of the sectors that are suitable for temporary employment in Turkish economy. The leading sector in this sense is construction, which employs a large share of blue collar workers.

On the other hand the depicted picture will get worse in time. It should be considered that the Turkish population, and in turn the Turkish labor force, is quite young, which results in low average total working time. As these young workers advance in their career and the population in general grows older, the frequency of job change will increase. Also the tendency towards an increase in unskilled blue collar labor will reinforce the abovementioned pattern, in that it is known that unskilled laborers have a tendency for job mobility more than skilled ones, unless there is a sudden change of technology that would lead to a skills mismatch.

6.5. Work Conditions

In this section, work conditions of blue collarites will be examined in detail. From seniority to status of work, from working hours and wage type to conditions of workplace in terms of health and security will be scrutinized. Also to what extend blue collarites are utilizing social security rights and work satisfaction will be analyzed.

6.5.1. Work Status and Social Security

46 percent of the blue collarites have the status of continuous worker with cadre. 33 percent, on the other hand, have no cadre yet have the continuous workers status, too. Temporary workers constitute nine percent of the blue collar workers, while 12 percent of the total blue collarites are working under subcontracting agreements. When the social security condition of blue collar workers is looked at, it is observed that 11 percent of them do not have social security at all. Almost 80 percent of the blue collar workers are subjected to Social Security Institution (SGK). While the share of private insurance companies is only around 1.7 percent, approximately six percent of blue collar workers are related to the social

security system for artisans, shopkeepers and the independently self-employed. This indicates that these workers either had their own businesses at a certain period throughout their work career, or they are not insured by their employers and in order to get social security benefits they pay their own insurance premiums by themselves.

It is seen that the share of blue collar workers who do not have social security is almost half that of workers in general. However, when they were asked for how long they have been workers without having social security throughout their career; the severity of the condition of blue collar workers in this respect becomes more visible. While 32 percent of blue collarites had to work without having social security for a duration between one and five years throughout their career, 25 percent of them had uninsured employment for more than five years. The average duration for uninsured employment in general is 3.8 years for blue collar workers. Less than half of the blue collar workers did not have to work without having social security.

In the survey blue collar workers were asked whether they feel their job status is safe or not. Only half of the blue collar workers believe that their job is safe. 15 percent of them feel insecure about their jobs at all times, while for the rest, the feeling is just from time to time. For those who felt in threat of losing their job, the primary reason for that is the general condition of the economy and the labor market. 25 percent of the total blue collar workers live with the fear of being discharged because the labor market is not stable. While another six percent who foresee that their workplace may become bankrupt in the near future is added to that, it turns out that one third of the blue collar workers are uncertain about the future of their jobs because of the weak economic structure. Another 14 percent feel insecure due to the attitude of the employer. So for a noteworthy section of blue collar workers, it is possible to talk about the existence of a tense relationship with the employer. Lastly, 6.2 percent of the blue collar workers state that they do not feel secure about their jobs because their employer tends to discharge workers so not to pay seniority indemnity.

6.5.2. Seniority

It is seen that in spite of the young labor force, the average job mobility is relatively high for blue collar workers. This affects the seniority of the blue collarites, too. 40 percent of the blue collar workers in Turkey are in work for less than 10 years. It is reasonable for this section of the blue collar workers to have low levels of seniority. However, low seniority data of the blue collarites could hardly be explained by the effect of a young population in that almost 78 percent of the blue collar workers have been working in their current job either for ten years or less. Those who have 15 years or more seniority comprise only 12 percent of the total blue collar workforce. This number is more meaningful when it is compared to the fact that 30 percent of the blue collar workers have more than 20 years of total working time. As the average total working time of blue collar workers is 13.5 years, the average duration in the last job is around seven years.

6.5.3. Skill Level

When the skill level of blue collar workers is examined on the basis of their statement, it is seen that 45 percent of them are unskilled. There is a section of 22 percent who are working in jobs that require skills at the intermediate level. The skilled blue collar workers are almost at the same size with the combination of technical personnel and those workers who control and administer the production process. Both groups are around one fifth of the total blue collar workers. If workers with mid-level skills are evenly distributed to skilled and unskilled groups, it can be concluded that half of the blue collarites are skilled laborers.

Table 24: Skill Level of Blue Collar Workers

Skill Level	%	Cumulative %
Apprentice	4.2	4.2
Unskilled Worker	40.1	44.2
Mid-level Worker	12.4	56.6
Skilled Worker	22.3	78.9
Foreman/Technician	21.1	100.0

Occupational Education/Training

It is seen that a considerable ratio of the blue collar workers are doing jobs that require certain skills. When the acquisition of the skills is examined, it is seen that the role of workplace training is very crucial in the process. 50 percent of all blue collar workers had training in their workplace. The proportion of workers who acquired skills through the education system is around one fifth of the total blue collarites. It is also seen that the training given by the labor exchange institution is very limited in that only around nine percent of the blue collar workers attended such a program. Lastly 18.4 percent of the blue collar workers did not have any sort of occupational education or skill at all. Considering the fact that half of the blue collarites are working as unskilled laborers, certain types of occupational education or training are not sufficient enough for workers to get jobs that require skills. As the skill condition of blue collar workers that had education at university, vocational schools and apprenticeship school is examined, it is seen that the proportion of blue collarites in unskilled labor is reduced to 25 percent instead of 50. This indicates that the part of the education system concentrating on professional education provides skills that the labor market requires, while other sorts of training, either institutional or given in the workplace, fail to do so at the same level.

Table 25: Occupational Education/Training of Blue Collar Workers

Occupational Education/Training	%	Cumulative %
University	4.4	4.4
Vocational School of Higher Education	3.3	7.7
Vocational School	6.3	13.9
Apprenticeship School	8.1	22.0
Employment Agency Training	8.7	30.8
Workplace Training	50.3	81.1
Other	0.5	81.6
No Occupational Education/Training	18.4	100.0

6.5.4. Working Hours

Law no 4857, act 63, does not define a daily working limit; however, 7.5 hours is indicated as a normal working day, with a basic calculation of 6 workdays a week and 45 hours total work time a week. According to the law, the 45 hours can be distributed unevenly across all days of the week, with a daily maximum of 11 hours. The average daily work time for blue collar workers is 9.7 hours, with a mean and mode of 10. So it is possible to say that on average, blue collarites in Turkey work for 10 hours a day, on a six day working week. That is 15 hours more than the normal weekly working limit. Considering the fact that overtime payment is an exception in Turkey, it can be concluded that blue collar workers usually have to work more than the limits that the legal authorities define. 55 percent of blue collar workers work 10 hours a day or more, while 25 percent of them work even more than the daily ceiling of 11 hours. It is indicated in the previous chapter that in Turkey, 27 percent of workers in general are working 60 or more hours a week. When the condition of blue collar workers is compared to workers in general, it is seen that the share of blue collar workers that are working in the conditions defined is almost double that of workers in general. So, it is plausible to say that exploitation of labor, with respect to working hours, is a lot higher in blue collar jobs than in white collar jobs. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the statistics regarding the workers in general depends on observation, while data on blue collar workers is based on statement. Thus, the depicted conditions of blue collar workers may be biased to a certain extent.

6.5.5. Workplace Environment

41 percent of the blue collarites are working in places that employ nine or less workers. For workers in general, the figure is 34 percent as indicated in the previous chapter. Hence, blue collarites are working in smaller workplaces in terms of the number of employees when compared to white collar workers. This pattern is also visible for large companies that while 38 percent of blue collar workers are hired at workplaces with 25 or more employees, this proportion is 53 percent for workers in general. It can be concluded in this respect that blue collarites are working in less institutionalized environments than white collar

workers. On the one hand, for white collar workers, direct surveillance and control by the employer is felt more, but on the other hand, for blue collar workers, more informal relationships are possible between the employer and employee.

When the workplace environment of blue collar workers is examined in terms of health and safety, it is seen that almost half of the workplaces involve a factor that threatens the safety of work. 20 percent of blue collar workplaces are unsafe due to the conditions of the tools and machines used in production processes. In 11 percent of the blue collar workplaces, since necessary precautions are not taken, work related accidents occur frequently and threaten the safety of workers. Nine percent of blue collar workers do not feel safe at their workplace due to the categorical definition of their job. In other words, they are working in dangerous jobs. Lastly, seven percent of the blue collar jobs are in toxic environments where the air breathed is not completely healthy.

In such conditions, 37 percent of blue collar workers state that they have varying health problems resulting from their workplace environment. The most common problems are complaints connected to stress. Muscle and bone injuries follow as second. Thirdly, respiratory problems are evident in a significant share of blue collar workers. In more than one third of all blue collar workers, one of these three problems is seen. Also in five percent of blue collar workers, allergies resulting from the workplace environment are observed.

6.5.6. Discrimination at Work

Only 5.5 percent of the blue collar workers indicate that they believe there is discrimination against certain groups at their workplace. Women are subjected to discrimination most frequently. Kurdish and Alevi workers follow them. Although blue collar workers report relatively low levels of discrimination, when specifically women were asked if they have any peculiar problem due to being women at their workplace, a higher rate of discrimination is observed. Those women who state that they have been subjected to discrimination comprise eight

percent of the total of blue collar workers. They also comprise 59 percent of blue collar women. The most common problem that women face is not getting the salary they deserve. 10 percent of women also indicate that they are given tasks within their skill level or capacity. While six percent of women argue that they experienced sexual harassment, another six percent argues that they are denied deserved promotions.

When blue collar workers are asked what they would do if they faced maltreatment from their employer, 16 percent of them say they would not respond at all in fear of losing their job. Another 11 percent say that they would not respond and look for a new job. On the other hand, 54 percent of the blue collar workers indicate that they would confront their boss and defend their right individually. Only 7.4 percent of the blue collar workers state that they would seek collective action and either act together with their colleagues, or apply to a labor union. Five percent of the blue collarites indicate that they would harm the employer in a passive way by slowing down production, not doing the job properly or using more input than required. Only 0.5 percent notes that they would harm the employer directly by damaging the goods.

6.5.7. Work Satisfaction and Problems of Workers

As the life and workplace conditions of blue collar workers are examined, they were also asked whether or not they are satisfied with their job. In spite of low income, long working hours, being in debt and unhealthy conditions in the workplace, 75 percent of the blue collar workers are satisfied with their jobs. 18 percent, which is included in the 75 percent, think that their job is outstanding. As the eight percent who are indecisive are omitted, it turns out that only 17.3 percent of blue collar workers are unhappy with their jobs. The overall insecurity that blue collar workers feel about their job status and the general difficulty in finding a new job may be a factor in the contentedness of blue collar workers.

The primary problem of workers in Turkey is low wages according to the opinion of blue collarites, as stated as the most important problem by more than 75

percent. Working conditions and inequality of wages follows. These are also the most commonly noted problems as second choice. While 66 percent of blue collar workers indicate more than one problem that workers face, 41 percent states more than two.

Table 26: Problems of Blue Collar Workers

Problems	1 st Problem		2 nd Problem		3 rd Problem	
	%	C. %	%	C. %	%	C. %
Low Wages	76.3	76.3	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1
Inequality of Wages	7.2	83.5	29.9	30.1	0.1	0.1
Working Conditions	10.3	93.8	25.4	55.5	22.7	22.8
Relations with Employer	1.2	95.0	3.7	59.2	6.5	29.3
Labor Union Problems	1.0	96.0	1.0	60.2	1.7	30.9
Insecurity of Job	4.0	100.0	5.3	65.5	10.2	41.1

Although half of the blue collar workers do not believe that their job is safe, job insecurity is not indicated as a significant problem. In conclusion, what really matters for blue collar workers seems to be the level of wages and it's just distribution among the different sections of workers.

6.6. Patterns of Socialization

In this section patterns of socialization of blue collar workers will be dealt with. What kind of friends they avoid having, how they get information about developments regarding the country's agenda, which newspapers or TV channels they follow, spare time activities, etc. will be examined.

6.6.1. Friends and Spare time Activities

When the general tendency to make friends is examined, it is seen that almost half of the blue collar workers do not want to pal up with someone who see themselves as superior. It is possible to say that arrogance is a factor of discrimination for blue collar workers. The second highest group with respect to this issue among the blue collarites is those who do not want to be friends with non-believers with approximately 23 percent. Another group with seven percent denies friendship

with those people who have different lifestyles. If these three inclinations are brought together, it can be concluded that blue collar workers prefer to be friends with people who feel similar to themselves. They do not want their self-assurance to be violated. While non-believers are not favored, conversely five percent of the respondents do not prefer people who are considered extremely religious.

Almost 80 percent of blue collar workers spend their out of work time mostly at home. Neighbor, friend, or relative visits is the second among the activities that takes most of the spare time of blue collar workers with 7.7 percent. This is also the second choice for spare time activity of almost one thirds of the blue collarites. The only significant activity that blue collar workers prefer as their first choice, other than the abovementioned two, is going to a coffeehouse. It is preferred by six percent of the workers as a first choice and eight percent of workers as a second choice. Depending on this data, it can be concluded that primary activities done by workers out of work passes in private places. Public place activities are limited with the traditional going to a coffeehouse. Indeed only 1.7 percent, 4.3 percent and 4.4 percent of the blue collar workers spend their spare time in the city market as first, second and third choices, respectively.

In spite of the limited socialization practices in the places other than workplace and home, 38 percent of the blue collar workers do not include their workplace friends among their close friends. 45 percent of them define only a couple of workplace friends as their close friends. In the light of this information it could be concluded that blue collar workers prefer to have friends primarily from their home environment and to a certain extent from their workplaces.

6.6.2. Source of Information

More than 60 percent of blue collar workers follow the ongoing events or news in general via television. On the other hand, 15.5 percent of them prefer the Internet, while 13 percent favors newspaper as a means of following the agenda of the country. Almost 70 percent of the blue collar workers prefer those TV channels that are commonly considered 'mainstream' as their first choice. A higher rate is

presented in the second choice of TV channels. Except for one TV channel, which has an 8.8 percent of first choice, ideologically inclined TV channels is only preferred as second or third choices, yet with limited rates. Although it has a relatively low percentage (7.9) a news channel is at the fourth order among the first choice of blue collarites. One third of those who prefer the indicated news channel as their first choice also prefer a different news channel as their second choice. So, despite being small, a focused group of blue collar workers uses TV primarily for reaching public information.

Similar patterns regarding mainstream media choice are also observed for newspapers. On the contrary to TV watching, a very high rate (one third) of blue collar workers never read newspapers. Yet, among those who do read newspapers, 60 percent prefers more than one newspaper. This group comprises more than 40 percent of total blue collar workers. Only 4.1 percent of the blue collar workers prefer local newspapers as their first choice and 6.6 percent only follows sports newspapers.

When the access to Internet in general is examined, it is seen that 35.5 of the blue collar workers do not use it at all. Among those who use the Internet, 70 percent primarily chooses to use it at home. 20 percent, on the other hand give preference to mobile Internet as their first choice. If we include second choices, then mobile Internet usage is doubled among the blue collar workers. In other words, 26.8 percent of all blue collar workers have access to the Internet through their mobile devices.

6.6.3. Religious Practices

A significant share of blue collar workers consists of practicing believers. Those who perform at least the Friday prayer are more than 75 percent. Almost one quarter of the blue collar workers perform five time daily prayers. Occasional performers are almost 30 percent. Only 15 percent of the blue collarites do not perform prayers at all. Apart from religious prayers, only 3.7 percent of the blue collarites attend religious talks and 22.4 percent occasionally shows attendance to

such activities. As almost 60 percent did not attend religious talks at all, the rest of them have been to them a couple of times.

6.7. Labor Union Membership

9.4 percent of blue collar workers are currently labor union members, and another 6.1 percent used to be trade union members. And also in the workplaces of a 1.8 percent of blue collar workers, a labor union organization was started but failed. As a result, more than four fifths of blue collar workers neither had in past, nor have today, any relationship with labor unions. Moreover, 70 percent of the blue collarites do not believe that problems that occur in the workplace could be solved even partially through labor unions. 62 percent of the blue collar worker had never attended any sort of collective worker action. Those who attended more than one type of collective action are only around seven percent. Among those who attended any collective actions, the most common activities were lawful strike and slowdown strike. Work stoppage and petitioning follow them. Another significant action type is attending protest marches.

6.8. Attitudes and Values

When the attitudes and values of blue collar workers are examined, it is seen that a large share of them are still bound to traditional values. 80 percent of blue collar workers believe that employees should protect their employers as a father figure and this is important in their evaluation of a job. Also a similar patriarchal value is evident in blue collar worker's approach to women's position in society. 67.1 percent of the blue collar workers believe that women should ask permission from their husbands in order to work. Interestingly, half of the women workers also believe in this idea. The traditional idea that the state should be responsible for the subsistence of the poor is valid for approximately 93 percent of blue collar workers. Almost two thirds of blue collar workers still assume that if one who does his or her job properly and works hard, in the end he or she will get the appropriate pay. In other words, a large section of blue collar workers believe that the system works fairly in general. However, more than half of the blue collarites

accept that the government always sides with the rich, at the same time. So there is a controversy between these two opinions.

Regarding the political attitude of blue collar workers, except for one third of them, they state that they never voted for a party with any sense of peace of mind. In other words, most of them do not think that they are properly represented in the current political party system. Yet, it is seen that more than half of them do not also believe in political action in the form of street protests. To put it in a different way, although not believing in the party system, they also think that expressing their demands or publicly protesting against the wrongs of the system do not have a use either. Though not the majority, a notable section of blue collar workers argue that there is a need for an authoritarian leader to correct things in the country. Those who believe so constitute around 25 percent of the blue collar workers.

6.9. Political Orientation

6.9.1. Voting Criteria

If the 10 percent of blue collar workers who habitually vote for the same party over the years are put aside, blue collarites are divided into three groups of almost the same size with respect to their primary reason for selecting the party to vote for. Those who put the party leader and the policies of a party at the first place in their voting decision are equal in size and each group constitutes 31.1 percent of blue collar workers. Also, an important section of blue collar workers vote on the basis of their political views or ideology.

43 percent of blue collar workers take into consideration only one aspect of political parties in their voting choice. For those blue collar workers who look for a second aspect as a reference for voting, the policies of the political parties matter most. 60 percent of blue collar workers take into consideration the policies of a political party for making their decision on voting.

Table 27: Reason for Voting Preference

Reason	First Cri. %	Second Cri. %
Party Leader	31.1	4.7
Always Voting for Same Party	10.1	4.2
Political View, Ideology	27.1	18.6
Policies	31.1	29.1
Other	0.6	0.5
Total	100	57

Although, as it is seen, an important share of blue collar workers looks to the leader of the political party, it is not paid attention to as a second reference point in a similar fashion. To put it in a different way, those who take notice of other aspects of the political parties are mostly not interested in the leaders' image or performances. Although, 46 percent of blue collar workers consider the political views or ideology of a political party, more than 35 percent takes into account the leader, and almost 15 percent tends to vote for the same party, still half of the blue collar workers state that they could vote for another party in local elections in the case that the candidate is better.

6.9.2. Labor Relations Policies and Contentedness

Although for 60 percent of the blue collar workers, policies of political parties are important criteria for determining which party to vote for, not that many blue collarites are aware of the parties' policies regarding labor relations. It is observed that only 51.2 percent of blue collar workers have information about the policies regarding the said field of the party they vote for. And when they were asked if they are content with those policies, approximately 72 percent of blue collar workers are happy with the policies of the party they are voting for. Only around 37 percent of blue collar workers are fully informed about the policies of the party they vote for and satisfied with those policies. 17.1 percent of blue collarites have no idea about the policies of the party they vote for regarding labor relations.

6.9.3. Political Spectrum and Ideology

In the survey, blue collar workers were asked where the parties they usually vote for stand in the political spectrum. On a five point scale based on left vs. right dichotomy, it is observed that approximately 58 percent of the blue collarites prefer parties to the right of center. On the other hand, around 35 percent of them usually vote for parties to the left of center.

Table 28: Political Spectrum and Blue Collar Workers

Political Spectrum	Valid %	Cumulative %
Right	47.5	47.5
Center Right	10.4	57.9
Center	7	64.8
Center Left	12.1	77
Left	23	100

In terms of more specific ideological preferences, 24 percent of blue collar workers define themselves primarily as nationalist. Those who identify themselves as conservative and religious are respectively the second and third largest groups among blue collar workers.

Table 29: Ideology and Blue Collar Workers

Ideology	Primary	Secondary
Secular	14.2	11.5
Nationalist	23.9	15.4
Conservative	18.5	15.9
Social Democrat	12.6	9.9
Ataturkist	13.5	10.5
Religious	17.0	16.4
Other	0.3	1.6
Total	100.0	81.3

Secularists, Atatürkists and social democrats follow these groups. 81.3 percent of blue collar workers use more than one ideological position to identify themselves. When the percentages of the secondary choices are added to the primary choices, it is seen that the order of preference does not change.

An overall examination of the ideological positions and political spectrum shows that blue collar workers are divided into two camps. While nationalist, conservative and religious (in total, 59.4 percent) are on the one side of ideological preferences, seculars, Atatürkists and social democrats (in total, 40.3 percent) are on the other. This differentiation seems to correspond to the right vs. left division both in terms of the categorization of ideologies on this basis and in terms of quantity. It is possible to categorize the first three ideological positions as right, while the latter three as left. Also, rightists (57.9 percent) on the one side, and the majority of center and left (in total, 42.1 percent) on the other, seem to perfectly fit to the abovementioned ideological grouping in size.

Table 30: Ideology and Blue Collar Workers of Left/Center

Ideology	Primary	Secondary	Total
Ataturkist	27.2	14.7	41.9
Social Democrat	21.8	15.6	37.4
Secular	16.7	19.9	36.6
Nationalist	12.7	12.7	25.4
Conservative	9.3	9.2	18.5
Religious	9.6	8.3	17.9

Nevertheless, a more detailed examination within the groups show that there is not a perfect correspondence between voting behavior on the basis of political spectrum and ideological self-definitions, in that the latter clearly crosscuts the former.

The table above shows the ideological differentiation of blue collar workers who generally vote for political parties at the center or left. Unlike might be expected

secular, Atatürkist and social democrats do not form the overwhelming majority of the selected group. Those who define themselves primarily as Atatürkists, social democrat and secularists are larger than the other groups. Nevertheless, there is still a noteworthy section of blue collar workers who identify themselves with ideologies that could be categorized as rightist. Especially when primary and secondary choices are evaluated together, those who define themselves as nationalists constitute one fourth of blue collar workers who vote for parties at left or center. As may be seen below, though being weaker, a similar mismatch could be observed with the blue collar workers who vote for political parties on the right.

Table 31: Ideology and Blue Collar Workers of Right

Ideology	Primary	Secondary	Total
Nationalist	31.4	17.4	48.8
Conservative	23.9	21	44.9
Religious	22.7	22	44.7
Secular	10.6	6.6	17.2
Atatürkist	4.5	7.6	12.1
Social Democrat	5.1	6	11.1

6.9.4. Nationalist and Religious Feelings and Voting

Those who define themselves ideologically as nationalist either as primary or secondary choice constitutes 39.3 percent of blue collar workers. However, when they are asked whether their nationalist feelings have any role in their voting choice, 56.8 percent of the blue collarites say it is important. In other words, 17.5 percent of blue collar workers, in spite of not defining themselves positively as nationalist, give importance to nationalist feelings and any negative action or attitude towards those feelings have an effect in their voting behavior. A similar pattern is visible for religion. Those who define themselves ideologically as religious are around 33 percent. Yet, those who say that their religious feelings affect the party they vote for is more than 51 percent.

6.10. Self-Definition

Religious belief, ethnicity and regional or local identity are respectively the most important criteria that blue collar workers define themselves through. Interestingly, only 3.4 percent of blue collar workers define themselves with respect to their class position.

Table 32: Reference of Self-Definition of Blue Collar Workers

Reference of Self-Definition	%	Cumulative %
Region/Locality	29.3	29.3
Religious Sect	3.7	33.0
Religious Belief	37.2	70.2
Ethnic Identity	24.2	94.4
Class Position	3.4	97.8
Other	2.2	100.0

6.11. Factors Effecting Voting Behavior

As most of the data acquired by the survey analysis are categorical variables, it is not possible to involve them in the multiple variable tests. Or in case they were involved, as in the discriminant analysis, the possibility of not showing existing relations becomes high. Hence in this section, the connection between each variable and voting choice will be focused on in order to find out whether or not they are independent of each other or if there is a known relation between them. To reach the abovementioned conclusion, as both of the dependent and independent variables are categorical, cross tabulation and chi square tests will be used.

6.11.1. Singular Relations (Chi Square Analysis)

Here, a list of independent variables that has relations to voting behavior is presented. Also some of the important factors that affect choice of political parties are given in a more detailed fashion by examining the relationship over the crosstabs. Since there are numerous independent variables in the data acquired, all of the results for each and every independent variable are not given in a detailed fashion. Instead, solely their significance level will be noted in a table collecting

different variables together. Nevertheless, to illustrate how each analysis was done, the relationship between education and voting behavior will be examined in detail as an example under the demographic features section. Also crosstabs regarding different important independent variables will be presented as well.

Table 33: Factors Affecting Voting Behavior

Variable	Type	Significance Level
Gender	Demographic	0.001
Age	Demographic	0.002
Ethnicity	Demographic	0.000
Marital Status	Demographic/Social	0.050
Education	Demographic/Social	0.040
Education of Spouse	Demographic/Social	0.000
Father's Occupation	Social Background	0.000
Duration of Residence in Current Province	Social Background	0.000
Capacity to Pay Debts	Economic	0.015
House Ownership	Economic	0.001
Car Ownership	Economic	0.000
Change in Life Standard	Economic	0.000
Future Expectation	Economic	0.000
Future Plans	Economic	0.000
Expectations on Children's Economic Achievement	Economic	0.007
Friend Choice	Socialization	0.000
Channels of Information	Socialization	0.000
Internet Usage	Socialization	0.001
Spare Time Activity	Socialization	0.007
Religious Practices	Socialization	0.000
Means to Find a Job	Social/Work	0.000
Job Status	Work Condition	0.000
Social Security	Work Condition	0.010
Workplace Safety	Work Condition	0.000
Job Evaluation	Work Condition	0.000
Work Time	Work Condition	0.013
Time of Uninsured Work	Work Condition	0.000
Workplace Size	Work Condition	0.000
Response to Maltreatment	Class Action	0.050
Labor Union Membership	Class Action	0.033
Belief in Economic Justice	Political Values	0.000

Table 33: Factors Affecting Voting Behavior (continued)

Variable	Type	Significance Level
Belief in Relative Autonomy of Government	Political Values	0.000
Belief in Political Action	Political Values	0.000
Belief in Authoritarianism	Political Values	0.000
Belief in Women's Subordination	Political Values	0.000
Importance Given to Nationalist Feelings	Political Values	0.000
Importance Given to Religious Feelings	Political Values	0.000
Political Spectrum	Ideology	0.000
Ideological Position	Ideology	0.000
Reference of Self Definition	Ideology / Class	0.000
Skill Level	Work	NS
Workplace Friends	Work/Socialization	NS
Belief in Labor Union's Function	Class Action	NS
Problems of Workers	Work Condition	NS
Fear of Losing Job	Work Condition	NS
Financial Aid	Life Cond. / Income	NS
Working Hours	Work Cond.	NS
Monthly Household Expenditure	Life Cond. / Income	NS

As it is mentioned, the table above shows all the factors that affect voting behavior together with their significance score in Pearson chi square test. At the bottom of the table some important variables that do not have a significant relationship to voting behavior are also given.

In the following sections, those variables that display meaningful patterns along with significant relationships are examined in order to contribute to the interpretation of the voting behavior of blue color workers.

Demographic Features

It is seen that most of the demographic features of blue collar workers including gender, age group, marital status, ethnicity, education and spouse's education, affect their voting behavior.

The table below shows the cross tabulation between education and voting behavior for blue collar workers. It should be noted that missing data and party choices with very low percentages are excluded from the table although they were involved in the calculation. As can be seen in the table, there are clear patterns that show how blue collar workers of different education level tend to vote.

Table 34: Education and Voting Behavior

Education Level Attained		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Illiterate	Count	8.0	1.0	3.0	5.0
	Expected	7.5	3.0	2.7	1.7
Literate / Primary School	Count	170.0	45.0	40.0	37.0
	Expected	150.7	60.6	54.5	34.0
Secondary School	Count	226.0	80.0	89.0	49.0
	Expected	223.9	90.1	81.0	50.6
High School	Count	295.0	124.0	108.0	65.0
	Expected	294.4	118.4	106.5	66.5
Vocational College	Count	30.0	20.0	17.0	4.0
	Expected	35.3	14.2	12.8	8.0
University	Count	55.0	45.0	28.0	18.0
	Expected	73.2	29.4	26.5	16.5

When the education level is low, Justice and Development Party (AKP) are more likely to be voted for when compared to higher education levels. The situation is vice versa for CHP. CHP is especially strong among university graduates. Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) on the other hand, presents a similar pattern with CHP, while Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) shows a fluctuating performance. BDP votes are higher than expected in low education levels, yet university graduates are an exception in that they perform above expectations in the said group. Although certain patterns of voting for blue collar workers of different education levels could be clearly identified, the relationship presented should be tested in order to prove that the existence of the patterns are not accidental. So a chi square test was made in order to prove the significance of the relationship.

Table 35: Chi Square Results of Education and Voting Behavior

Chi-Square Tests	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	66.483 ^a	48	0.040
Likelihood Ratio	70.897	48	0.017
Linear-by-Linear Association	0.093	1	0.761
N of Valid Cases	1788		

As the Pearson Chi Square result shown above is 0.04 (below 0.05) it can be concluded that there is a significant association between education and voting choice. Change in education level is paralleled with change in voting behavior. Nevertheless as the strength in terms of symmetry is examined, it is seen that association in this respect is little or none, as the Cramer's V value is less than 0.1.

Table 36: Symmetric Measures for Education and Voting Behavior

Symmetric Measures		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	0.193	0.040
N of Valid Cases		1788	

The pattern presented in the education level of blue collar workers is evident more significantly in the spouse's education level, since most of the blue collar workers' spouses are female. An increase in the education level of women indicates a breaking off from the traditional values and that in turn it affects the voting behavior. The table below clearly shows a negative relationship between AKP votes and the education level that blue collar spouses attained. CHP votes on the other hand increases together with education level of spouses.

Table 37: Education Level of Spouse and Voting Behavior

Education Level Attained		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Illiterate	Count	71.0	10.0	11.0	35.0
	Expected	66.2	23.0	20.1	13.4
Literate/Primary School	Count	174.0	59.0	53.0	36.0
	Expected	174.7	60.8	53.2	35.4
Secondary School	Count	193.0	61.0	65.0	24.0
	Expected	183.3	63.8	55.8	37.1
High School	Count	134.0	61.0	39.0	22.0
	Expected	138.5	48.2	42.2	28.0
Vocational College	Count	8.0	7.0	6.0	2.0
	Expected	13.3	4.6	4.1	2.7
University	Count	18.0	10.0	8.0	2.0
	Expected	21.9	7.6	6.7	4.4

The opinion polls usually indicate that AKP is a women's party. However, it is also a known fact that most of the women supporting AKP are housewives. Though being supported more by women, too, CHP gets the votes of educated and/or working women. The said common view is presented with the data in that in spite of the fact that AKP gets more votes from women than might be expected, the margin is not as much as it is in the general population.

Table 38: Gender and Voting Behavior

Gender		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Female	Count	104	59	28	12
	Expected	101.4	40.8	36.7	22.9
Male	Count	684	258	257	166
	Expected	686.6	276.2	248.3	155.1

In other words, blue collar women do not support AKP as much as other subgroups of women. Conversely, blue collar women's level of support to CHP is attention taking. The general idea in mind that MHP is a male party is proven for blue collar workers too. A similar pattern is seen for BDP, too, although this is not the case for their overall voter profile. This could be explained by the large share

of seasonal laborers among the blue collar supporters of BDP, most of who are male workers.

In terms of age, CHP, MHP and BDP are clearly younger generation parties, whereas AKP is a party of middle-age or the older generation. An exception to this pattern is the votes that CHP gets over the expected value for the age group 45 and above. This is because of the traditional and repeating votes of CHP.

Table 39: Age Groups and Voting Behavior

Age Group		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
30 or less	Count	214	119	106	75
	Expected	265.8	106.9	96.1	60
31-45	Count	420	136	131	77
	Expected	376.4	151.4	136.1	85
45 or above	Count	154	62	48	26
	Expected	145.9	58.7	52.8	33

AKP is known to be a political party that adopts conservative and traditional values, while CHP is associated with more liberal and modern values regarding lifestyle. In this respect, it is understandable that those blue collar workers who live in conjugal union tend to vote more for AKP.

Table 40: Marital Status and Voting Behavior

Marital Status		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Married	Count	557	194	167	120
	Expected	517.4	209.4	186.8	117.9
Single	Count	196	109	101	54
	Expected	232.8	94.2	84	53
Divorced / Widowed	Count	28	13	14	4
	Expected	30.8	12.5	11.1	7

However, as it may be seen, despite sharing similar values with AKP, MHP instead show a similar pattern with CHP. MHP's relatively high support from

young voters is determinant in that. Also a similar situation is observed for BDP, while their voters have a similar moral stance with AKP, they are not only performing above expectations for married blue collar workers, but also for single ones.

What determines the significant relationship between ethnicity and political party choice are the Kurdish voters. Kurdish ethnicity is a strong determinant for BDP votes, whereas CHP and MHP fail to get the votes of Kurdish blue collar workers. Although AKP is known to be contesting BDP for Kurdish votes, even they fail to match the expected counts in this group. To put it in a different way AKP underperforms among blue collarites when compared to its general performance for Kurdish voters. In spite of the fact that there are other visible trends in the original crosstab specific to certain ethnicities, since the observed values are not as high as they should be to make statistically meaningful interpretations, the data as such is not found reliable to make any further analysis. That is why these ethnicities are categorized under the category of ‘other’. Those ethnic groups categorized under ‘other’ are Zaza, Arab, Laz, Circassian, Arnaut, Bosniak, Pomak, Georgian and Armenian. As the table below shows, AKP and CHP perform more than expected in these groups, while MHP and BDP have weak support from the totality of ethnic groups, excluding Turks and Kurds.

Table 41: Ethnicity and Voting Behavior

Ethnicity		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Turkish	Count	574	266	256	10
	Expected	561.8	225.7	204.1	128.4
Kurdish	Count	106	11	7	157
	Expected	133.6	53.7	48.6	30.5
Other	Count	99	36	20	11
	Expected	83.5	33.6	30.3	19.1

Household size also affects the way blue collar workers vote. The blue collar workers living in the households that are larger than classic nuclear family, i.e. in

those households constituted by more than four people, vote for AKP more than expected. The linear positive relation between household size and AKP votes is valid until the household size reaches 10. Blue collar workers living in households with four or less people CHP performs above the expected level. MHP also has a similar pattern to CHP with the exception that in the two person households especially comprised by couples without children or single parents with one child MHP underachieves. In the households of six or more people BDP support increases.

The number of children in education presents similar trends too. AKP performs better when blue collar workers have more children who are at the age of education. Yet, the upper limit is three children, over which AKP fails to go beyond expected value. CHP and MHP perform better than average in blue collar families where there are two children. For both parties, more children in education over two means fewer votes. However, CHP and MHP underperforms in blue collar workers in whose households there are respectively one and no children in education. As may be expected BDP is the only party that constantly increases its vote percentage as the number of children in education goes up.

When the social origin of blue collar workers is examined, it is seen that workers whose father was a civil servant tend to vote for CHP and MHP more than would be expected. This pattern is consistent with the two parties' images relating them with the state. CHP votes are also high in two generation worker families. However, it is interesting that in the said group, AKP's performance is above the expected count. There may be two primary reasons for that. First, for the middle-aged blue collar workers, it could be thought that their fathers became workers and were politicized in the 1970s. The political trend in the 1970s had two important aspects. One of them was the rise of CHP in newly emerging industrial localities. The second was the ongoing control over labor unions by rightist governments. Assuming that there is a significant relationship between the father and their offsprings' political choices, the tendency towards AKP as the current inheritor of central rightist tradition in Turkey could be better understood.

Inclination towards CHP in two generation blue collar workers could be explained with the same logic. Second, support to AKP could also be explained when younger blue collar workers are considered, in that their fathers are actively working today and some of them already vote for AKP on the basis of their government's performance and policies.

Another significant trend is that in the families where the economic activity was agriculture, yet children gave up that tradition; blue collarites tend to vote for MHP. This could be explained by the fact that in the regions where agriculture is declining and a process of increase in waged labor happens, like Central and Eastern Anatolia and the Black Sea region, MHP has a traditional vote pool. Lastly, and contrary to expectations, AKP underperforms in this group. Considering its strong rural vote AKP's low performance in this group takes attention.

Table 42: Father's Occupation and Voting Behavior

Father's Occupation		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
State Officer	Count	53.0	48.0	37.0	12.0
	Expected	74.0	30.3	27.5	17.0
Private Sector Employee	Count	21.0	8.0	7.0	0.0
	Expected	19.7	8.1	7.3	4.5
Worker	Count	202.0	79.0	80.0	44.0
	Expected	84.0	76.4	47.3	84.0
Shopkeeper / Artisan	Count	46.0	45.0	18.0	46.0
	Expected	45.7	41.5	25.7	45.7
Merchant / Businessman	Count	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.0
	Expected	3.6	3.3	2.0	3.6
Self Employed	Count	9.0	9.0	2.0	9.0
	Expected	9.7	8.8	5.4	9.7
Farmer	Count	53.0	47.0	59.0	53.0
	Expected	64.1	58.3	36.1	64.1

There is a significant relationship between the duration of residence and voting behavior. However, it is not possible to talk about an overall trend for the three

big parties. The only consistent pattern is visible in BDP that the more settled a blue collar worker is the fewer tendencies they show to voting for BDP. Yet, this relationship is actually vice versa in that BDP voters in Southern Eastern Anatolia went through a big wave of forced migration until the beginning of the 2000s. This is reflected in the data in the opposite direction.

Table 43: Duration of Residence and Voting Behavior

Duration of Residence		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
10 and below	Count	146	65	43	62
	Expected	164.2	65.3	58.8	37.8
11-20	Count	180	63	60	55
	Expected	180.1	71.6	64.5	41.5
21-30	Count	199	78	77	36
	Expected	194.6	77.3	69.7	44.8
31-40	Count	146	50	63	13
	Expected	135.2	53.7	48.4	31.1
41 and above	Count	89	46	29	9
	Expected	85.9	34.1	30.7	19.8

Economic Conditions

When the economic conditions of blue collar workers is analyzed in terms of the effect of different economic variables to voting behavior, it is observed that capacity to pay debts, ownership of a house and car, evaluation of the change in life standard in the recent past, and future expectations regarding economic conditions have significant relations with the party blue collar workers vote for. There is no statistically meaningful relationship between monthly expenditure level, number of sources of income and social aid. However, the crosstab between social aid and voting behavior will be presented in that the reason why the relationship is not significant is that the number of blue collar workers getting support is really low. Yet, there exists a meaningful pattern between the two variables that is worth dwelling upon.

Blue collar workers who never had serious debts tend to vote for parties other than BDP. On the other hand, those who have debts, but could pay them, mostly support AKP. Indebted blue collar workers who could only pay their debts by lowering their life standards inclined to vote for parties other than AKP. CHP voters usually have institutional debts. That is why CHP performs under the expected count within the group of blue collar workers who fail to pay their debts, but have tolerant creditors. Those blue collar workers who continuously pay interest for their debts support BDP and MHP more than expected.

Table 44: Indebtness and Voting Behavior

Indebtness		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Yes	Count	346	120	111	70
	Expected	331.7	123.4	119.2	77.5
Only by reducing the life standard	Count	170	69	66	50
	Expected	175.4	65.3	63.1	41
Partially	Count	53	28	32	32
	Expected	75.5	28.1	27.1	17.6
No, but debtees are tolerant	Count	20	5	7	5
	Expected	18.7	6.9	6.7	4.4
Never had serious debt	Count	114	38	39	9
	Expected	104.4	38.8	37.5	24.4

When house and car ownership of blue collar workers and voting behavior is scrutinized, it is seen that AKP, as the governing party for the last 12 years before the survey is done, performed above expectations among the better off blue collar workers. Similarly, MHP also gets more votes than expected from car and house owner blue collar workers.

Table 45: House Ownership and Voting Behavior

House Ownership		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Own house	Count	429	167	147	74
	Expected	402.8	163	146.5	91.8
Rent	Count	300	119	92	93
	Expected	310.1	125.5	112.8	70.7
Relative or friend's house; not paying rent	Count	34	15	23	7
	Expected	39.5	16	14.4	9

While blue collar workers who have a house give CHP more support than expected, this is not the case for car owners. BDP performs under the expected counts both for car and house owners. So it can be concluded that in terms of property ownership, blue collar workers constituting the BDP voter base are those who have the worst conditions of life standard. Though small in number, those blue collar workers who live in their relative's or friend's houses without paying rent tend to vote more for MHP.

Table 46: Car Ownership and Voting Behavior

Car Ownership		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Car Owner	Count	309	100	121	41
	Expected	279.8	111.5	101.5	63.6
Not Owning a Car	Count	474	212	163	137
	Expected	503.2	200.5	182.5	114

The overall change in the life standard of the blue collar workers also affects the way they vote. It should be noted that in the survey, the real change in economic conditions of the blue workers is not determined. Instead, blue collar workers were asked how their life had changed over the last ten years. So, the independent variable here is opinion based, rather than data driven. For AKP voters there is a linear negative relationship between change in the life standard and voting behavior, whereas for CHP and MHP voters, the relationship is linear positive.

Table 47: Change in Life Standard and Voting Behavior

Change in Life Standard		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Very Good	Count	112	22	21	9
	Expected	78.8	31.1	28.3	17.7
Good	Count	329	80	76	63
	Expected	270.1	106.7	97	60.6
Not Changed	Count	247	112	96	63
	Expected	267.4	105.6	96.1	60
Bad	Count	89	83	76	35
	Expected	144.8	57.2	52	32.5
Very Bad	Count	8	13	13	6
	Expected	23.9	9.4	8.6	5.4

In other words, those who believe that their life standard has become better in the last ten years tend to vote for AKP, while those whose life became worse (bad) are more likely to prefer CHP and MHP. BDP voters also have a similar pattern to CHP and MHP voters, yet unlike the said parties, BDP performs above expected count for the group of blue collar workers who state that their life is better compared to ten years before.

When the future expectations of blue collar workers and its effect on voting behavior are viewed, the tendency of those who want to start a new business and are voting for opposition parties should be underlined. Those who seem to be content with retirement vote for AKP above the expected values. Although its share is minimal, blue collar workers who plan to go abroad prefer CHP over other parties.

As mentioned before, the data acquired with the survey does not present a significant relationship between the type of social support taken and the voting behavior. The reason for this can be explained by the fact that only a very small share of blue collar workers indicates that they get any kind of social assistance and as more than seven types of social aids are listed, crosstab values are too low for interpretation. However, as the data is regrouped on the basis of the source of

social assistance by category of public, religious and social network, a meaningful pattern could be observed.

Among those blue collar workers who get financial aid in general, AKP and CHP perform above expectations while MHP and BDP fail to do so. In the category of institutional social aids AKP and BDP perform above the expected counts in blue collar workers who get assistance from central public sources and local public sources respectively. CHP and MHP are less likely supported by blue collarites that get aid from public institutions. MHP gets fewer votes than expected in all types of social assistance, while CHP only performs above expectations among blue collar workers who get support through their social relations. It is reasonable to argue that CHP gets higher votes among this group of voters who have strong social solidarity networks, since it is a social democratic party. It can also be argued that CHP and MHP voters are deprived of the social assistance programs funded by the government.

Socialization

How blue collar workers make friends, or to put it in a more correct way, what kind of people they avoid as friends gives clues about voting behavior of blue collarites, too. The trends in the table below shows that blue collar workers with certain traits tend to vote for certain parties. Blue collar workers who do not want to be friends with self-important people vote for AKP and CHP more than expected. Interestingly, CHP and BDP gets support from blue collar workers who avoid people with different lifestyles. This is remarkable especially considering CHP's political sensitiveness regarding lifestyles intervention by the government. Those who believe that their lifestyle is under attack by others most respond in a way to avoid people who have different lifestyles. In other words, they defend their lifestyles reactively.

Table 48: Friend Choices and Voting Behavior

Friend Choices		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Self-Important people	Count	355	149	146	86
	Expected	371.5	149.6	133.6	83.5
People with different life styles	Count	72	35	24	21
	Expected	74.7	30.1	26.9	16.8
People from different ethnicities	Count	12	4	13	3
	Expected	15	6.1	5.4	3.4
People speaking of complicated issues	Count	52	16	14	8
	Expected	47.3	19.1	17	10.6
Non-believers	Count	224	36	57	32
	Expected	172.9	69.6	62.2	38.9
Extremely religious	Count	11	57	9	11
	Expected	42.5	17.1	15.3	9.5

MHP's strong nationalist position with respect to ethnic diversity is a known fact. The data presented in the table also proves that this policy appeals to those blue collar workers who have similar attitudes. Blue collarites who avoid people from other ethnic groups tend to vote for MHP more than other parties. However, voters of BDP, which also make ethnic politics, do not show a similar attitude. As most of these voters are Kurdish in origin, they themselves experience cultural discrimination based on ethnicity. Yet, instead of developing a reactive response, they are more open to relations with people from other ethnic groups, in the context of blue collar workers. Blue collar workers who do not want friends that talk about issues they do not understand or sophisticated matters vote for AKP more than expected compared to all the other parties. In other words, blue collar workers who are AKP voters are more inclined to make friends with people with similar or lower intellectual level.

When voting behavior of blue collar workers on the basis of their ways of accessing information is examined, it is seen that those who are singled out as using more modern means, tend to vote for CHP than other political parties. CHP gets support from those who follow national events and agenda through the Internet at a noteworthy level, while they fail to get the votes of those blue collar

workers who prefer more traditional means, like printed newspaper, television or friends at the expected level. Before going further in to detail of how blue collar workers using these traditional methods tend to vote, it should be noted that those who are not interested in following national events are inclined to vote for MHP and BDP.

Table 49: Means to Follow National Events and Voting Behavior

Means to Follow National Events		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Newspaper	Count	96	39	35	27
	Expected	104.6	41.6	37.6	23.8
Television	Count	524	180	158	110
	Expected	481.1	191.4	172.9	109
Internet	Count	94	67	51	20
	Expected	118.3	47.1	42.5	26.9
Friends	Count	26	8	11	8
	Expected	27.4	10.9	9.8	6.2
Not Following	Count	37	16	22	12
	Expected	45	17.9	16.2	10.2

As can be seen in the table above, only BDP performs over the expected count among those who still prefer printed newspapers as the primary means in reaching information. Blue collarites preferring television also tend to prefer BDP, as well as AKP. Among workers who learn about goings-on from friends, MHP and BDP get more votes than expected. So those who rely more on personal relations for being informed tend to vote for the two political parties that have a vigorous ethnic understanding of community.

For the blue collar workers who do not use the Internet at all, voting for AKP and BDP is more likely than other for parties. Among those who use the Internet, those who use it mostly at home tend to vote more for parties other than BDP. Between blue collarites whose first preference of access to the Internet is mobile devices, BDP support is more than expected. This can be associated with the fact that seasonal workers, who mostly vote for BDP, do not have a settled life that

would allow them to use the Internet at home. Also, those preferring workplace or Internet cafes most of the time tend to vote for parties other than CHP. CHP and MHP also get more support from blue collar workers who prefer mobile Internet as a second choice. In other words, blue collarites that use the Internet primarily at home and secondarily via mobile devices tend to vote more for these two.

When the different spare time activities that blue collar workers prefer and their effect on voting behavior is examined, it is seen that those who do more outgoing activities tend to vote for CHP. Those who prefer to stay home in their spare time usually tend to vote for parties other than CHP. A similar pattern is seen for AKP among blue collar workers who spend their free time with neighbors, friends and relatives.

Traditional coffee house and tea garden voters mostly support MHP more than other parties. Though limited in numbers, those going to city centers, shopping malls and gyms clearly vote for CHP and MHP more than the other two parties.

Table 50: Spare Time Activities and Voting Behavior

Spare Time		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Home	Count	656	236	200	138
	Expected	614.9	247.9	222.4	138
Neighbor, Friend, Relatives	Count	42	26	22	23
	Expected	57.7	23.3	20.9	13
Coffee House	Count	35	18	32	10
	Expected	49.8	20.1	18	11.2
City Center	Count	9	12	4	1
	Expected	13.2	5.3	4.8	3
Shopping Mall	Count	6	4	5	0
	Expected	7.9	3.2	2.9	1.8
Gym	Count	8	8	5	0
	Expected	9.7	3.9	3.5	2.2
City Park / Tea Garden	Count	5	2	5	1
	Expected	6.2	2.5	2.2	1.4

To summarize, blue collar workers who prefer activities that develop parallel with city culture tend to vote for CHP and MHP. Among them, those who prefer more traditional urban spaces for socialization are inclined towards MHP.

There is also a significant relationship between the frequency of religious prayer and voting behavior. Religious practice shows strong relationship with AKP and CHP votes, yet in opposite directions. When the frequency of prayers increases, the AKP votes also go up.

Table 51: Frequency of Prayer and Voting Behavior

Religious Practice		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
5 times daily prayer	Count	275	11	39	49
	Expected	183	72	66	41
Occasionally	Count	258	57	80	52
	Expected	225	89	82	51
Friday prayer	Count	189	62	101	36
	Expected	197	78	72	45
At Religious Festivals	Count	22	49	30	3
	Expected	54	21	20	12
Never	Count	40	131	31	38
	Expected	122	48	44	28

The opposite is true for CHP. MHP voters on the other hand present a moderate religious position in that MHP votes are below the expected counts when frequency of religious practice goes to both extreme ends. A similar relationship between AKP and CHP voters is present between MHP and BDP voters in that unlike MHP, BDP shows better performance in both extremes.

The contribution of social relations to finding a job and its effect on how blue collar workers vote show interesting results. Although AKP, BDP and MHP are slightly under the expected count with respect to blue collar workers who found their jobs without any help, CHP performs beyond expectation in this group. In return, those who found their jobs by means of their relatives and friends are less

likely to vote for CHP. Blue collar workers who relied on their relatives for finding their current job tend to vote for AKP and BDP, while those who utilized connections of their friends support MHP more than other parties. AKP is the only party that those who took support from their townsmen for getting their job less likely to vote for.

Table 52: Means to Find a Job and Voting Behavior

Means to Find a Job		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Unaided	Count	397	171	140	87
	Expected	398.9	159.7	143.2	89.8
Relatives	Count	181	61	55	42
	Expected	165	66	59.2	37.2
Friends	Count	118	43	58	29
	Expected	128.2	51.3	46.1	28.9
Townsmen	Count	19	11	11	9
	Expected	25.2	10.1	9.1	5.7

Work Conditions

In this section, work conditions, social security condition, labor union membership and labor movement experience and opinion will be studied in terms of their individual effect on voting behavior.

Work status is among those factors that affect the voting behavior of blue collar workers. Among the regular workers with cadre AKP and MHP perform above the expected values. The support given to these parties by the said group of workers is understandable in that AKP has been in power for more than 10 years and MHP was the coalition partner at the government before AKP. CHP's low performance among workers with cadre could be explained by the same logic as it has been a very long time since the last time they came to power. Conversely, CHP and BDP get more support from regular workers without cadre. Among the seasonal workers, a significant pattern is evident, as well. BDP and MHP have dominance in this group and together almost reach the vote level of AKP. It is

known that MHP has support among the seasonal workers of the Black Sea region who work in the labor intensive agricultural jobs, like hazelnut picking. BDP has also a similar traditional support among the seasonal agricultural workers of the Mediterranean region, especially around Çukurova area. Along with agricultural workers, seasonal workers in the construction sector are also known to vote for BDP as most of them are from Southeastern Anatolia. Both parties also perform well among the seasonal workers in the tourism sector. Lastly, workers under subcontract support AKP more than predicted. It could be assumed that the reason for this support may be AKP's power in the allocation of party followers as workers in the subcontractor firms who do business with the government. On the other hand, it should be noted that this group of workers vote for BDP above the expected counts, too.

Table 53: Work Status and Voting Behavior

Work Status		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Regular with Cadre	Count	390	132	139	40
	Expected	358.3	142.4	129	79.5
Casual, Seasonal	Count	56	23	35	22
	Expected	66.4	26.4	23.9	14.7
Regular without Cadre	Count	232	119	83	81
	Expected	258.2	102.6	92.9	57.3
Under Subcontract	Count	97	34	22	29
	Expected	92.1	36.6	33.2	20.4

As the working time increases, the chance of blue collar workers voting for AKP also increases. In other words, there is a linear positive relationship between working time and AKP votes. Those blue collar workers who recently started their work career tend to vote for opposition parties instead of AKP. This pattern is simply a reflection of the success of opposition parties to attract young voters support. Unlike AKP, there is a linear negative relationship between working time and MHP votes. BDP also loses support of blue collar workers as the working time increase with the exception that if a blue collar worker has a career over 20 years; support to BDP goes above the expected level. Support given to CHP from

workers grouped in terms of working time shows variation. Nevertheless, it can still be singled out that CHP votes increase when working time is at the margins, such as below 5 years and above 20 years.

Table 54: Working Time and Voting Behavior

Years		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
1-5	Count	178	104	84	56
	Expected	216.8	87.8	78.3	49.3
6-10	Count	153	50	61	40
	Expected	153.5	62.1	55.4	34.9
11-15	Count	136	53	41	15
	Expected	121.4	49.1	43.8	27.6
16-20	Count	136	32	40	24
	Expected	114.3	46.3	41.3	26
21 and above	Count	175	76	55	42
	Expected	172	69.6	62.1	39.1

Workplace employee size is a factor that affects the anonymity of relations and level of employers' control over employees. As the employee size increases due to need for institutionalization, arbitrary practices and irregularities at the workplace is also reduced. Working conditions of blue collar workers become more liberal. As also mentioned in Chapter 2, in the Marxist sense, workers unite and organize more easily when they are large in numbers in their workplaces. With some exceptions, it can be said that as the number of employees in a workplace increases, blue collar workers tend to vote highly for CHP and MHP in general. CHP seems to be relatively underperforming among the workers whose workplace has 25-49 employees. AKP is strong in almost all sizes of workplaces except for those that have 10 to 24 employees. Lastly, if the workplace is small, BDP performs above the expected counts. In short, in workplaces where the control of employers is high, AKP and BDP succeed more. In larger workplaces blue collar workers tend to vote more for CHP and MHP.

Table 55: Employee Size of Workplace and Voting Behavior

Size of Workplace		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
1	Count	28	6	9	8
	Expected	29.2	11.7	10.6	6.3
2	Count	44	9	8	14
	Expected	37.2	14.8	13.5	8.1
3	Count	40	11	13	3
	Expected	36.7	14.7	13.3	8
4	Count	43	17	26	6
	Expected	46	18.4	16.7	10
5-9	Count	142	55	46	44
	Expected	142.4	56.8	51.6	30.9
10-24	Count	119	80	56	32
	Expected	146.4	58.4	53.1	31.8
25-49	Count	88	26	28	14
	Expected	77	30.7	27.9	16.7
50 and above	Count	205	79	71	33
	Expected	194.2	77.5	70.4	42.2

The social security status of blue collar workers presents two primary patterns in terms of its relationship to voting behavior. First, blue collar workers who do not have social security of any kind tend to vote for MHP and BDP over the expected values. AKP and CHP on the other hand underperform in this group. Second, among blue collar workers who have social security, those who are related to BAĞKUR tend to vote for AKP.

Table 56: Social Security Condition and Voting Behavior

Social Security		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
SSK-SGK	Count	624	267	225	127
	Expected	624.2	249.2	226	140
BAĞKUR	Count	56	3	14	9
	Expected	43.2	17.3	15.6	9.7
None	Count	80	32	35	31
	Expected	89.5	35.7	32.4	20.1

In other words, those blue collar workers who have a background of artisanry or other kinds of self-employment are inclined to prefer AKP over other political parties. MHP and BDP under perform in the group of blue collar workers with either type of social security, while CHP gets support from SGK related workers above the expected count.

Among the blue collar workers who are labor union members, the general trend is to vote for parties other than AKP. Those who work at workplaces where labor union organization is attempted, yet failed, CHP is supported more than the expected value. Usually in such places failure is due to the pressure from either government or employers and in return workers develop reactionary attitudes and behaviors. AKP is the only party that performs over the expected count in the group of blue collar workers who had never been a labor union member.

Table 57: Labor Union Membership and Voting Behavior

Labor Union Membership		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Still a Member	Count	60	36	35	20
	Expected	74.8	29.8	26.6	16.9
Used to be a Member	Count	48	25	15	6
	Expected	48.2	19.2	17.2	10.9
Labor Union Organization Failed	Count	13	10	5	2
	Expected	14.2	5.6	5	3.2
Never been a Member	Count	657	239	222	148
	Expected	640.8	255.3	228.2	145

When blue collarites were asked what they would do in case of maltreatment by their employer, those who indicated that they would confront their boss tend to vote more for parties other than MHP. More docile workers, who state that they would do nothing, tend to vote for AKP, as well as MHP. So, AKP voters are divided in terms of their supposed behavior in case of cruelty at the workplace. Again those who would take any form of collective action support parties other than MHP, yet AKP voters usually prefer individual means for collective actions, like acting together with friends, while CHP and BDP voters rather seek

institutional support of labor unions. MHP voters mostly express that in case they would react they would do a form of passive resistance rather than a direct confrontation. BDP also gets higher than its expected votes in the group of workers who would take actions of passive resistance.

The uninsured working time of blue collar workers presents a similar pattern to labor union membership in terms of voting behavior. As the work time without insurance increases, a tendency to vote for AKP occurs. Conversely, CHP votes goes above expected values when the uninsured work time decrease. In other words, when social security covers the working conditions CHP gets more support. BDP predominantly gets the votes of blue collar workers who have worked without insurance for at least six years.

Table 58: Uninsured Working Time and Voting Behavior

Uninsured Working Time		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
1 year	Count	47	16	24	10
	Expected	53.2	17.9	17	13.4
2 years	Count	64	32	27	7
	Expected	67.1	22.6	21.4	16.9
3-5 years	Count	137	42	43	30
	Expected	133.7	45	42.7	33.6
6 years and above	Count	209	64	52	68
	Expected	203.1	68.4	64.9	51.1

On the contrary, MHP is strong among the groups of workers who worked less than six years with the absence of insurance. In short, while workers with safer working conditions in terms of social security prefer CHP and MHP over BDP and AKP, short and long period uninsurance respectively serves AKP and BDP.

When collective action experience of blue collar workers is examined, it is seen that AKP and MHP perform slightly better than the expected counts where CHP and BDP somewhat underperform. Yet, looking in further detail, it turns out that the support AKP gets depends on those workers who mostly took the action of

submitting a petition. CHP and MHP are more popular than expected among blue collar workers who had attended legal strikes before. As they stated they would do so, the past experiences of blue collar workers who are voters of MHP also indicate their inclination towards passive resistance, like slowdown strike. Those who attended stop work actions tend to vote for MHP and BDP more than the other two parties. In short, AKP gets support from those blue collar workers who prefer to take safer actions, while CHP, BDP and MHP voters prefer more vigorous actions. This is also convenient with the fact that AKP has been in power for a long time and those who vote for AKP put their partisan loyalties over their class based demands in that they avoid an increased level of conflict in their workplace with the employers.

This tendency is also proven with the idea that collective street action is useless. Those who agree with the said statement significantly vote for AKP over the expected counts. While CHP and BDP perform over expectations among blue collar workers who deny the statement, MHP only gets slightly more than its expected value. So the abovementioned trend of voting that tendency of docile workers for AKP, passive resistant workers for MHP and more spirited workers for CHP and BDP is also proved at the level of value. With the exception of MHP, the data regarding those who are more likely to submit to authority produces similar results for voting behavior. Blue collar workers who believe that the country needs an authoritarian leader tend to vote at a noteworthy level for AKP and over expectations for MHP. The leader cult tradition of MHP political movement of *ülküculük* explains this tendency of submission to authority of the blue collar voters who vote for the party. CHP voters are those who react most significantly to this statement, while BDP underperforms very slightly among the denying group.

When it comes to attitude regarding women's status in work life, AKP and CHP have two opposite positions as those who believe that women should take permission of their husbands in order to work tend to vote for AKP, while those who reject the idea vote for CHP way over expectation. BDP and MHP are

respectively positioned with AKP and CHP, yet with a milder stress. It is known that certain segments of BDP voters have a tendency for patriarchal values, yet it is interesting that MHP gets more support than it is expected among those who are in favor of women's autonomy and rights. This could be explained by the process that MHP has been continuously becoming more of an urban party within the last two decades.

Values, Political View and Ideology

When the reference of blue collar workers for making their voting decision is taken into consideration, it is seen that AKP and opposition parties are separated in two respects. First, AKP is a party of leader. Those who give importance to the leader of a political party significantly vote for AKP over the expected values. A similar situation is evident for policies of a political party. As the importance given to policies increases, tendency to vote for AKP also rises. Hence, second, AKP is a party of policies. Blue collar workers who give importance to ideology prefer the opposition parties over AKP. Moreover, those who vote in a customary way support CHP and MHP above their average votes. Apart from being a settled and rooted political party, getting more customary votes also mean that an identity relationship between the party and the votes is established.

Table 59: Reference for Voting and Voting Behavior

Reference		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Leader	Count	366	67	63	30
	Expected	250.3	101.5	90.3	57
Customary	Count	42	79	43	17
	Expected	82.3	33.3	29.7	18.7
Ideology	Count	105	118	121	94
	Expected	218.1	88.4	78.6	49.6
Policies	Count	267	53	54	36
	Expected	227.3	92.2	82	51.7

Thus, CHP and MHP are distinctive in terms of their ideological standpoint, but moreover their images are strong enough to be adopted as part of the voter's identity. BDP is solely a party of ideology.

The table below indicates the relationship between political spectrum and voting. It is noted at the beginning of this section (6.11.1) that there is a significant relationship between political spectrum and voting behavior. However, it is not actually plausible to say that political spectrum determines the voting behavior depending on this data. Because, the technique used in asking about the political spectrum does not depend on values associated with right and left. But, instead it is asked which parties blue collar workers usually vote for with respect to right vs. left distinction. So, the table below rather is a way to define how voters see the parties they vote for with respect to the political spectrum.

Table 60: Political Spectrum and Tendency of Voting

Political Spectrum		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Right	Count	472	11	185	9
	Expected	327.6	140.3	118.3	77.1
Center Right	Count	118	4	20	3
	Expected	71.9	30.8	26	16.9
Center	Count	55	3	10	11
	Expected	43.9	18.8	15.9	10.3
Center Left	Count	13	116	17	19
	Expected	82.1	35.2	29.7	19.3
Left	Count	26	159	15	119
	Expected	158.5	67.9	57.2	37.3

Blue collar voters define AKP prominently as a party of right, center right and center. MHP is a solely a party of right. CHP is a party of both left and center left. Conversely, BDP is more than a party of left than it is a party of center left.

When the classification of the political parties that blue collar voters make with respect to the political spectrum and their self-definitions regarding the ideological positions are examined together, an interesting perspective rises.

Table 61: Self Definition and Voting Behavior

First Choice		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Secular	Count	83	75	26	14
	Expected	108.7	44	39.6	23.9
Nationalist	Count	136	31	185	11
	Expected	181.4	73.4	66.2	39.9
Conservative	Count	253	2	16	19
	Expected	141.9	57.5	51.8	31.2
Social Democrat	Count	59	37	11	96
	Expected	99.3	40.2	36.2	21.8
Ataturkist	Count	23	163	19	1
	Expected	104.7	42.4	38.2	23
Religious	Count	219	5	25	27
	Expected	135.3	54.8	49.3	29.7

Second Choice		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
Secular	Count	47	87	30	14
	Expected	89.3	39.2	33.7	18
Nationalist	Count	123	49	54	14
	Expected	121.4	53.3	45.8	24.5
Conservative	Count	178	7	48	27
	Expected	125.3	55	47.3	25.3
Social Democrat	Count	61	50	18	29
	Expected	78.3	34.3	29.6	15.8
Ataturkist	Count	33	77	52	2
	Expected	83.5	36.7	31.6	16.9
Religious	Count	186	8	38	34
	Expected	129.3	56.7	48.8	26.1

First of all, it should be noted that being secular is not a dichotomous discriminant as it is usually assumed among the blue collar workers. It is clear that CHP performs over the expected count for the group of blue collar workers who define themselves both as first and second choice as secular. Yet, AKP and MHP's

performance among the said group is not marginal, though being significantly below expected values. However, being religious, which is usually seen as the opposite of being secular, is a pronged determinant, for CHP. CHP performs only at a marginal level among blue collar workers who define themselves as religious in either choice.

Nationalism as an ideology at first sight seems to be discriminating MHP and other parties in that those who define themselves as nationalist in their first choice vote for MHP significantly over the expected count. However, when it is considered together with blue collar workers who define themselves secondarily as nationalist this distinction vanishes to a certain extent. AKP and CHP perform better among this latter group than the former one, to a level that for this group AKP even goes above the expected vote level.

Conservatism as an ideology presents a similar fashion with nationalism in that the blue collar workers who primarily define themselves as conservative distinctively vote for AKP. Nevertheless, as a secondary option in self-definition of blue collar workers it turns out to be a crosscutting category. MHP and BDP, as well as AKP, perform above the expected count in the latter group. CHP fails to get any support from the said group and only gets votes of a marginal part of these blue collar workers.

Interestingly, as the major social democratic party of Turkey, CHP fails to get the expected vote from the group of blue collar workers who define themselves first as social democrat. BDP's performance among this group of workers is beyond the expected vote. They reach a level of vote in the said group above the four fold of their average vote. CHP only reach above expectation for the group of blue collar workers who define themselves secondarily as social democrat. Another significant result is AKP's performance among the blue collar workers who define themselves as social democrat as the second choice. In spite of being under the expected value AKP still gets a considerable vote from this section of blue collar workers.

The data indicates that in the Turkish context, the true opposite of religious as an ideology is Atatürkist, rather than secular. While CHP performs over expected values in both groups who define themselves as primarily and secondarily as Atatürkist, AKP could get limited support in the mentioned section of blue collar workers. MHP fails to reach the expected count for the blue collar workers defining themselves chiefly as Atatürkist, while they go above the expected value for those who choose Atatürkist as a second ideological position. MHP voters could be defined in this sense on two axes. On the one hand there is a nationalist/conservative voter base of MHP, while on the other hand there is also a nationalist/Atatürkist voter base among blue collar workers. BDP is extremely distant to Atatürkists.

When blue collar workers were asked to rate how much their nationalist feelings affect their voting preference between ‘1’ and ‘5’ (‘5’ being most influential), it is seen that those who state it, is influential at the top level vote at a significantly high level for MHP. Those who say that nationalist feelings are moderately important for their choice of political party tend to vote for opposition parties. Those blue collar workers, who indicate that it does not matter for them, vote for AKP above expectations. Those who state that their nationalist feelings have the least effect on their voting behavior support BDP above expectations.

Table 62: Influence of Nationalist Feelings and Voting Behavior

Influence of Nationalist Feelings		AKP	CHP	MHP	BDP
1	Count	80	27	13	27
	Expected	82.8	33.3	30	18.7
2	Count	99	35	8	21
	Expected	83.7	33.6	30.3	18.9
3	Count	199	62	21	29
	Expected	163.9	65.8	59.4	37.1
4	Count	345	154	134	82
	Expected	347.7	139.6	125.9	78.6
5	Count	64	38	109	19
	Expected	108.8	43.7	39.4	24.6

In religious feelings there is a sharper differentiation. Among those who express that their religious feelings have influence on the way they vote prefer AKP and MHP over CHP and BDP. Also symmetrical form of the relationship is valid, too. Those who do not regard their religious feeling in making their voting decision or even those who take a neutral stance about it tend to vote for CHP and BDP.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

In this study, following a brief introduction, in order of presentation, the theoretical perspective adopted in the thesis regarding the concept class, the historical account of development of capitalism and working class in Turkey, the overall conditions of wage laborers in Turkey, the general trends of change they go through, the specific conditions and features of blue collar workers in their daily lives, in their workplaces, the political attitudes of them and finally the factors effecting their voting behavior are attempted to be given. To sum up what is went through in an integrated fashion, as a conclusion, in this chapter the general findings regarding the conditions of wage laborers and peculiarly blue collar workers will be put forward. Then, a theoretical assessment of the abovementioned findings will be presented and in this respect the broader research question of this thesis that is the effectiveness of the Marxist conception of class in understanding the development of economic, social and political existence of blue collar workers in contemporary Turkish society will be scrutinized.

7.1. General Trends Regarding the Conditions of Working Class

Turkish economy has been going through a neoliberal wave since the beginning of 1980s. Although the economic growth rate has been following a fluctuating course, the average growth rate in the last 12 years is close to the average of the republican average between 1955 and 2001. In the said period economy not only has been advancing in terms of size, but also the mode of production has been transforming. Turkey used to be known as a country of agricultural production. The number of own account workers, unpaid family workers, and employees had been larger than wage laborers for a long time. Industrial production used to be predominantly in the form of small scale manufacture. This picture of the past has been changing rapidly. Today more than 60 percent of those who work at an

income generating job are wage laborers. Between 1988 and 2008 the number of wage laborers had been twofolded. As of 2012 there are 15,6 million wage laborers in Turkey. The number and share of wage laborers continue to increase. The share of agriculture sector has almost diminished in economy. It is only around 4 percent. Services is the largest sector with a 61 percent share. Workers in this sector are also increasing with a significant rate. In short, the old middle class in Turkey still survives, however it is in rapid decline, especially in agriculture. It also seems that also petit bourgeoisie will stay standing for a considerable period of time, yet unlike its past condition, Turkey is a country of wage laborers now.

The data of 2012 indicates that there are 7.5 million blue collar and 8.1 million white collar workers. Although the white collar workers are higher in number, the share of blue collar workers has increased around 3 percent for the 8 years period, before 2012. 42 percent of wage laborers in Turkey are skilled workers, nevertheless though increasing in number the share of skilled laborers within the labor force composition is falling. In other words, while both blue and white collar skilled laborers have been increasing in number, Turkish labor force is going through a deskilling process, at the same time. Hence, neo-liberal policies show their effect.

Number of public personnel is also increasing in Turkey. The main motor of this change is the increase in the number of civil servants and contracted personnel. The number and share of permanent public workers is rapidly decreasing, too. Most dramatic change is seen in the number of workers employed in SEOs. Due to the privatization policies only around 25 years, the number of workers of SEOs who were labor union members has decreased more than 300 thousand. Their place used to be filled with contracted personnel until the beginning of 1990s. Since then, the number of contracted personnel is decreasing at a similar rate with permanent workers, too.

Turkey has a relatively young labor force, but it should be noted that it is also going old with a high pace. 50 percent of wage laborers have an education level

below high school level. Moreover, the quality of education given or the accordance between labor market demand and education given is questionable. At least 8 percent of wage laborers who are high school graduates are doing jobs that require unskilled labor. Two thirds of blue collar workers are married, yet the share of married workers is decreasing slowly. Most of the worker families have 2-3 children. Only one fourth of wage laborers are women. Female wage laborers are increasing while predominant female unpaid family laborers, especially in agriculture, are decreasing.

Size of workplace in terms of number of employee is increasing. As of 2012, two thirds of workplaces employ 10 or more workers in Turkey. Moreover, the general trend is also in favor of large workplaces. However, it should not be thought that these businesses are all of industrial character and the workplaces at stake are factories in the classical sense we know them. A significant part of the new large workplaces employ white collar workers, like engineers, designers, doctors, nurses, teachers, waiters, shopkeeper assistants and other services sector wage laborers.

Labor union density in Turkey is decreasing. Yet, when the public workers and civil servants are included, a considerable rate of labor union members still exists. It is around 15 percent and when compared to European Union countries it is under many countrys' rates. However, Germany, a country known to be with its strong tradition of working class has a very close rate of labor union density to Turkey, which is around 18 percent. So, the numbers are not as dramatic as they are assumed. The primary problem of labor unionization in Turkey seems to be excessive control of unions by state/government. Labor union density in public employees is increasing. For workers in public sector a significant decline is evident. The reason why labor union density increases in public sector can be explained by government's "yellow" labor union policy and governments increasing setting up of its own cadres in public offices. Dramatic increase in the number of members and overall share of a certain confederation known to be close to government is a good indicator. Moreover, labor unions are working way

below their potential, even in disadvantage of workers in some cases due to control of government. The mentioned confederation's attitude to back government's offer rather than worker's demands in collective bargain process can be a good example, again. The labor movements are also in decline since the peak years between 1986 and 1994. Apart from specific events like TEKEL resistance or TT Inc. strike the overall course of collective labor movements is at a stationary level.

Wages had shown a significant increase between 1988 and 1993 thank to the rising collective worker movements of the mentioned period. However, since 2010, the net real wages of workers in private sector have remained same while that of public sector decreased around 15 percent. An increase has been witnessed for the said period only in the net real wages of civil servants. As the labor cost index is examined for the given period it is seen that there is a sharp decrease at stake. So, even workers could not take their fair share from the economic growth or they lost their certain social rights within this period. Considering the neo-liberal economic course of Turkey and the flexible conditions of labor market, the latter interpretation seems to be more accurate.

Working hours of wage laborers also indicate dramatic conditions. 35 percent of the wage laborers work over the legal limit of working hours per week. Most of these workers are known to be not receiving overtime pay. However, the trend is towards the decrease of working hours in general. On the other hand the share of those who do not go to work or those who work under the legal limit is increasing. Hence, it is possible to talk about emergence of a group of workers who have flexible working hours. This is parallel with the rise of skilled white collar workers in number.

Between 2000 and 2012 the proportion of uninsured workers to total workers increased around 7 percent. As of 2012, 15.21 percent of the workers in Turkey are not registered to any social security institution. At the times of economic crisis the given ratios increase to higher levels. This is exemplified in 2009 economic

crisis with 26.2 percent. It should be noted that the given statistics are state's official data. Along with the mentioned section of uninsured workers, there is also a large section of workers without any social insurance opportunity as they are employed in the large informal sector in Turkey.

There is no data regarding the seniority of wage laborers at national level. By use of certain surveys it can be concluded that even in a large sample of workers 70 percent of which is labor union members have 5 years of seniority or less. In 2012, 585 thousand people in the public sector and 419 thousand people in the private sector are working with subcontracts and are not utilizing seniority rights of any sort. Also as it is mentioned in the context of social security, it is possible to talk about the existence of a noteworthy informal sector in Turkey. Hence, it can be concluded that a large share of workers in Turkey could not utilize seniority indemnity, at a level similar to retirement pension. Furthermore, while this thesis was written, government was working on a policy package that would limit the possibility of getting severance pay.

7.2. Typical Blue Collar Worker

By use of the data acquired through the survey, in this section it will be attempted to designate the features of the typical blue collar worker in Turkey. In electing the characteristics of average blue collar worker, those traits that are shared by at least 60-70 percent of the blue collar workers are taken into consideration. By this means an ideal type of blue collar worker will be drawn. It should be noted that although each feature given has a high probability of being found in a random blue collar worker, it is not possible to argue that majority of blue collar workers share these characteristics. One must keep in mind that ideal types are useful, yet they are not to be found in social existence as such. The reason why this exercise will be conducted is to figure out the commonalities of blue collar workers in terms of their living conditions, work environment, social existence, values and attitudes. At the section 4 of this chapter, how those commonalities would affect the existence of blue collar workers in Turkey as a class will be dealt with.

First of all, the typical blue collar worker is male. Blue collar worker either had intermediate-level education or in case he had higher education it is of technical or vocational character. His wife does not work and is usually undereducated when compared to him. Blue collar families live in a household mostly constituted by their nuclear family with two or three children. Their children are mostly at the age of education. Blue collar families mostly do not live where their grand parents used to live. However, they are not new to the city or province where they currently live in, too. Monthly expenditure of their household is less than 2000 TL. Blue collar worker's salary is hardly enough for household needs. In case they need extra funds, blue collar households prefer bank credits. Typical blue collar worker is not pessimistic about his and his families' future, in economic terms. His first option for his future career is retirement. In other words, he does not have ambitions for upward mobility.

Blue collar worker's job can be characteristically categorized under industry sector. The way he found his job is on his own or through his personal connections. In other words, blue collar workers archetypally did not utilize institutional means in finding their current job. Though not preferring a life time job, he does not change his job too frequently, either. Although typical blue collar worker most probably has social security, at a certain time of his career he definitely had to work without insurance. Most probably either during his education or at his workplace he had a sort of occupational training. He works around 10 hours a day. Typical blue collar worker usually thinks that there is no discrimination against any group in his workplace. So he works at an egalitarian environment. If one asks the typical blue collar worker if he is satisfied with his job, most probably the answer he will give would be yes. Yet, this does not mean that blue collar worker is satisfied with his salary. Low or unjust pay is the primary concern of blue collar worker. He does not pursue his demands regarding his job via labor unions or by use of collective action. He does not believe that labor unions could contribute solving his problems, either.

Blue collar worker wants to be friends with people similar to him. He spends his time out of work at home or at friends', neighbours' or relatives' houses. Though limited, in case he goes out in his sparetime most probably one will see the blue collar worker at a coffe house. He watches TV and follows the agenda through it. Main stream channels are his favorites. Regarding religious practices he at least does the Friday pray.

His ideal boss is a father figure. He does not want his wife to work without his permission. The father role expected from the boss is also expected from the state, in that typical blue collar worker believes that state is responsible for the subsistence of poor. Considering these aspects it is possible to say that average blue collar worker is inclined to patriarchal values. He generally believes that hardwork would pay off and economic system in this sense works fairly. He thinks that there is not a political party that represents him entirely. Policies of a political party are important for the typical blue collar worker. He defines himself according to his demographic features rather than his class position.

7.3. Fragmentation among Blue Collar Workers

Along with the common features of blue collar workers, there are certain traits that fragment blue collar workers into different groups. In the last ten years, the distribution of income in Turkey has become increasingly unfair. That is to say, the poor are poorer, while the rich are richer. Nevertheless, the reflection of economic growth in general to the lower income groups has contributed certain developments in regard to absolute poverty. Net real wages have increased significantly since 1981. Though in the last 15 years this trend of increase has halted, a considerable increase is achieved in the net real wages of civil servants. However, in terms of relative poverty, it is possible to say that the economic conditions of working class have regressed. Indeed, it is already mentioned that the share that workers get from the economic growth has decreased. The effects of the said regression are felt more by those increasing unskilled laborers who have lesser income. It is possible to talk about an impoverishment process for a part of working class in Turkey. Nonetheless, this process is not experienced as Marx

assumed it to be in the form of absolute poverty. The relative impoverishment at stake is felt at different levels even among the blue collar workers who were focused on in this study. To put it in a different way, blue collar workers are not affected by the change in their conditions of existence equally. Hence, variations occur among the conditions of blue collarites in terms of life standard. In this sense, blue collar workers differentiate among them in terms of their ownership of house and car, existence of alternative income resources in their household, adequacy of salary for household expenses, indebtedness, and expectation for improvement in the life conditions.

It is not possible to talk about a principal common point among blue collar workers in their criteria for preferring a job, in their status of work, in the duration of uninsured work. In terms of their skill level, seniority at their current position, threat of losing their job and the means by which they gained their occupational attributes blue collar workers vary significantly. In terms of the number of employee and relative health and safety conditions workplaces of blue collar workers have different conditions. Though having certain shared features the way blue collar workers socialize presents alternative patterns regarding their number of close friends from their workplace, their means to get information or connect to the world and the frequency of different religious practices they do.

In terms of attitudes and values, blue collar do not agree on the idea that government always favors rich. Their voting criteria, the importance they give to their religious and nationalist feelings in voting, have significant differences. They also define themselves mostly according to their demographic features but in relation to different ones.

7.4. Class and Voting: Blue Collar Workers in Turkey

From a broader perspective it can be concluded that blue collar workers are fragmented in terms of their life standards and work conditions. This fragmentation is reflected in the way they vote or to put it in a different way, in their choice of political party. The common daily life practices of blue collar

workers could hardly create shared experiences. Those features that are similar among the blue collar workers have no influence on establishment of a continuous interaction between workers. For example, they have the common feature that the way they socialize is usually indoors, at their houses, in other words in an isolated environment. In absence of interaction through common practices and life standards, the differences based on the fragmentation of work conditions and demographic distinctions affect the world view and political attitudes of the blue collar workers. These in turn determines the political choices of them as ideology is a significant determinant of voting behavior. As there is no traditional class based political party in Turkey and the fact that ideological classification do not correspond to the axis of left and right enhances the abovementioned condition. What determines the ideological differentiation turns out to be the dichotomy of traditional vs. modern life style, rather than the material division of right vs. left, although there are ideologies that crosscut even the former dichotomy, like nationalism.

7.5. A Theoretical Note on Class, Parliamentary System and Voting

Boratav in his book, *Social Classes and Distribution in Turkey in 1980s*, designates two theoretical perspectives to social class analysis.⁴⁷³ The first one of these perspectives, also the one he associates with tradition of American sociology, defines class in terms of differentiation. He argues that differences of class, in this tradition, are stated in the form of the problem of inequalities. He puts forward the usage of the term middle class in plural as middle classes with a vague meaning as an example of this understanding. He denigrates the abovementioned terminology by declaring the way it is used as slack and arguing that the approach of differentiation fails to depend on a consistent and a meaningful conception of class.

In this study, in Chapter 2, sociological perspectives on social differentiation are briefly touched upon. First of all it should be noted that unlike what Boratav

⁴⁷³ Boratav, 2005, pp. 9-11

claims, social differentiation school is not a product of American sociology tradition, but it is as old as the discipline of sociology. Secondly, the main problematic part of Boratav's analysis is that he conceives social differentiation and social inequality as concepts employed for understanding the existence of social classes. In other words, he takes the very existence of social classes for granted. On the contrary, inequality is a fact of social existence in almost all societies. Class as a concept is coined and has been used in many different theoretical perspectives to explain the existence of social differentiation. That is why the emergence of the concept depends on the scrutiny of social division of labor. Marxist conception of class, which was adopted in this study is nothing but one of these traditions. The fact that it may be among the the strongest does not make labeling others as ideological legitimate.

As to the plural usage of middle class, even Marx himself, uses the term in plural form, as early as in *Communist Manifesto*. Let alone talking about strata, lower/upper sections, fractions, he also defines an industrial middle class along with the previously existing middle class. Today what we call new middle class is clearly distinct from traditional middle class in its class character on the basis of exploitation. While Marx was using the term middle class in plurality within the same camp of subclasses in terms of oppressor and oppressed dichotomy, accusing those who use the term in a way that crosscuts this dichotomy of doing bourgeois sociology could hardly be regarded as fair. In Chapter 2, it is already mentioned that following the experience of 1848, Marx oriented towards a more pluralistic conception of class, though he did not totally abandoned the idea of the dominance of a dualistic class conflict in the formation of social relations. In other words, he opened space for the existence of other classes than oppressor and oppressed and to their possible roles in the course of history in his theoretical understanding.

It is obvious that endlessly seeking for differentiation and discarding the explanatory strength of the Marxist conception of class based on exploitation are crucial mistakes. Yet, being oppressed with a dualistic model of class and trying

to fit social existence into a given model that would avoid certain facts and peculiarities are similar errors. In this study, a balanced approach with respect to these two extremes is attempted to be achieved. The reason why blue collar workers are chosen as the focus of the study and white collar workers are excluded in understanding the formation of working class in Turkey was firstly to avoid the tendency to focus the differences among the proletariat accepted as given in the advanced capitalist world. The excessively large chapter on history of working class in Turkey attempted nothing but to grasp the peculiarities of the development of capitalism in Turkish society. Through those peculiarities the specific conditions of existence of workers in Turkey was expected to be understood. As seen in the panorama of working class, in Chapter 5 the current course of development of working class in Turkey is a lot different than classic Western way.

In the late 19th century and at the beginning of 20th century, while socialist were discussing the validity of Marx's prescience on the faith of capitalism, they were also discussing the possibilities for alternative methods of transition to socialist society. Prominent ideologues like Eduard Bernstein were revealing the failure of premises of Marxist expectations on the development course of capitalism even in the beginning of past century, in a similar way it is attempted in this study. The passage taken from Bernstein's famous work, *Evolutionary Socialism*, briefly summarizes the scientific Marxist ground that is targeted by the abovementioned approach.

A scientific basis for Socialism or Communism cannot be supported on the fact only that the wage worker does not receive the full value of the product of his work. "Marx", says Engels in his preface to the *Poverty of Philosophy*, "has never based his communistic demands on this, but on the necessary collapse of the capitalist mode of production which is being daily more nearly brought to pass before our eyes."⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁷⁴ Bernstein, 1911, p. 42

In result of the endeavor for criticizing Marx's faulty premises an understanding that puts politics before economic determinism and believe that social inequalities and misdeeds could be overcome in time had emerged. In accordance with this understanding in different European countries the passive stance with respect to the malignity of early capitalism that awaits the rise of the conflict within capitalism started to be abandoned by certain political groups, one by one. As a more active strategy necessitates condemnation of parliamentary system is also given up. A political struggle for suffrage rights of workers developed. At the same time, a "revisioned" form of Marxism arose. Instead of awaiting the day when socialism will come as a result of the necessity of class conflict, social democratic understanding underlined the possibility of socialist ideals through class solidarity. This also meant the emergence of working class parties in various European countries seeking for power to achieve certain rights and better living conditions for proletariat.⁴⁷⁵

As it is tried to be given in this very brief background, in the European context, the connection between class and certain political parties was seeded at the roots of development of parliamentary democracy. Existence of class based parties and exhibiting of certain voting behaviors by the members of a class was an inherent characteristic of Western social and political life. However, in the same Western societies starting with the post-war era the significance of class as a determinant in politics has gradually weakened. The profile of worker who traditionally votes for labor, social democrat or socialist parties was also shakened or even diminished.⁴⁷⁶ Resentment in the working conditions of workers and their contracts was the first sparkle for the establishment of labor unions and socialist parties. The reason for the decline of class based politics is usually sought in the change of the said conditions of workers.⁴⁷⁷

⁴⁷⁵ Berman, 2012, pp. 32-45

⁴⁷⁶ Evans, 1999, pp. 1-9

⁴⁷⁷ Knutsen, 2008, p. xi

Knutsen lists seven theories on the decline of class voting in Europe. First of all, due to the increasing availability of possibility of mobility, workers in the transition period tend to vote in accordance with the interests of their future class position. Second, cross cutting divisions like ethnicity, religion, and consumption patterns take precedence over class cleavage. Third, as the level of education of workers increase, their intellectual capacity and political comprehension also rise. In turn, the inclination for individual action occurs. Fourth, thank to the capitalist economic development the process of *embourgeoisement* is experienced. Those workers who reach similar life standards with bourgeoisie assume its values as well. Fifth, as the service sector enlarges, a new class of workers that have tendency to form conservative attitudes also rises. The said group of workers has a certain degree of authority and better conditions of work tend to vote in favor of status quo. Sixth, new political agendas or views that are shaped in a post-materialist understanding emerge. Especially new middle class adopt these agendas like feminist movement or green policies. Last but not least, unlike what Marx anticipated industrial workers do not constitute the majority of modern capitalist societies. In condition that new middle class vote weakly for left, left-wing parties rely on a limited pool of voters. Hence as an electoral trade-off they extend their programs to appeal other segments of society. This in turn, results in cross class voting patterns.⁴⁷⁸

All these factors not only show that within the European context class lost its role in politics, but also its explanatory capacity as a concept in understanding those societies. However, the experience of Turkish society presents a different case. As it is seen in the data, in Turkey blue collar workers and white collar workers are developing and increasing in number at the same time. In other words, our labor force is not transforming from a predominantly blue collar structure to a white collar one. Interestingly, unlike the European countries in Turkey white collar workers have a tendency to vote for the main social democratic party instead of inclining towards conservatives. On the other hand, it is blue collar workers who

⁴⁷⁸ Ibid, pp. 1-9

do not prefer predominantly leftist parties. However, the peculiarities in the Turkish case do not make the outcome of European experience worthless. The explanation of decline of classes mostly through the rise of new middle class underlines a condition that explains the absence of class as a defining category, namely fragmentation.

In the scope of this study, to better understand whether it is possible to talk about the existence of working class in Turkey, white collar workers are left out in the analysis, as the very existence of new middle class undermines the possibility of class as a determining factor. As Turkey is still a developing country, the conditions of advanced capitalism that distorts the conditions of the existence of working class in the classic sense are not as strong as it is in Western countries. Moreover, blue collar workers in Turkey are increasing in number. So they are still in the process of development. Keeping in mind that theoretical perspective of class that Marx and Engels put forward has a strong explanatory capacity in the early forms of capitalist society and for the early formation of working class, within the limited possibilities of this study, whether a similar class formation process is being experienced in Turkey is attempted to be observed. In other words, it is sought that whether blue collars in Turkey are developing voting behaviors similar to the European experience. In this context, class as a context that is mostly abandoned in the political arena in Europe, is questioned to be still meaningful in the peculiar conditions of Turkish economic, social and political existence

In Europe, class voting studies focus on left-wing vs. right-wing parties.⁴⁷⁹ Because it is possible to talk about a class based historical experience in Europe that makes the determination of the political spectrum by left vs. right dichotomy, meaningful. As it is seen in the previous chapter, in Turkey, the ideologies that could not fit with leftist positioning within the political spectrum are intertwined. This is because, the primary axis of political positioning in Turkey has been

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid. p. xiii

shaped around the traditionalist vs. modernist dichotomy rather than a political stance based on materialist class positions. As it is attempted to be explained in Turkish history it is hard to talk about politics determined by the conditions of class struggle but it was the conditions of class struggle that was determined by politics. The underlining of the importance of Prussian model of bourgeois revolution was to achieve the historical background of that case. To sum up, there is not a political party system that could be used as a reference point for determining whether a worker votes in accordance with adopting class values and through class consciousness or otherwise. To put it in a different way, in the European sense, Turkish politics do not have class parties. In such a context, what is left for a social scientist to observe in the conditions of workers to designate the existence of class behavior is nothing but looking at similarities and differences. The existence of discriminant and common behavior patterns and their underlining factors is the place to seek the existence of the class.

In result of such a survey and observation it is seen that Turkish historical experience and material conditions of workers in Turkey do not spawn a similar pattern of development as Marx had explained in the early European industrialization. In other words, worker's objective conditions do not lead them to conscious or unconscious common experiences, attitudes and behaviors. Those limited commonalities do not operate in favor of class behavior, but rather enhance the traditional or other ideological values. Even in the case that the new middle class is excluded from the analysis in the conditions of Turkish case it is not possible to define blue collar workers' voting behaviors as motivated by their class position. Their existence as a class is even questionable. It is rather possible to talk about fragmented groups of blue collar workers who present different traits and characteristics. Certain arguments that is put forward in the case of Europe on the basis of differentiation between blue collar and white collar workers or classic proletariat and new middle class are even evident withing the blue collar workers in Turkey. Indeed, in the given condition of excluding white collar workers in order to avoid the effect of fragmantation and in the relative underdevelopment of

capitalism in Turkey, Marxist conception of class did not prove to have a possible extensive use.

Although it is aimed to focus on a Marxist conception of class throughout the thesis and commonalities of blue collar workers is expected to be revealed on the basis of exploitation, the objective conditions of blue collar workers imposed the the category of differentiation. It is seen that blue collar workers' common practices do not produce common experiences and common approaches in the Thompsonian sense. What is determinant seems to be rather the fragmantations in their demographic existence, work conditions, life styles and parallel with these differences in their political and ideological orientations.

7.6. Concluding Remarks

Although it is argued that Marxist conception of class failst to explain the conditions of blue collar workers in Turkey, this does not mean that the Marxist theory is out of date. As it does in many other contexts, within the certain conditions and for certain time periods in the Turkish case as well Marxist theory has a capacity to explain social, economic and political developments. Just to give a brief example, what Marx calls petit bourgeoisie socialism in explaining the French case is a perfect theoretical tool for understanding the “middle of left” movement that rose in and dominated the political arena in 1960s' and 1970s' Turkey. Theory is a tool to explain social reality. A good theory is the one that not only explains peculiar conditions but has the capacity to predict the universal. In this regard all the theories have a tendency to obtain a level of abstraction that would allow them to have a wideranged inclusive character. Yet, it should also kept in mind that each and every theory exists through the peculiar condition that it is developed for explaining. It embarks the features or conditions of that peculiar case inherently.

Good theories take the form of grand theories not only because their claim to explain everything but their capacity for internal consistency and applicability to many contexts. Existence of such theories brings a common bias that leads social

researchers to seek for the features of a theoretical narration in the peculiar condition being examined. The interest in grand theories like Marxist theory declined in the post-war western world on the basis of a large critique of failures in explaining certain conditions due to the aforementioned bias. In the scope of this study, it is believed that the fault at stake is as much of the researcher as of the explanatory capacity of the theory. Once again, theory is a tool. It is the researcher who should use the right one at the right place. Social scientists are responsible for putting theories in practice and test their capabilities in explaining the social existence. What is attempted to be achieved in this study and the results presented should be evaluated in this respect. In other words, the results of this study do not make Marxist theory insignificant, but they designate certain conditions that Marxist theory could hardly explain the economic, social and political existence.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu alıřmada, Trkiye’de mavi yakalı iřilerin oy verme davranıřları incelenmiřtir. Demografik ve sosyal deėiřkenlerin ve siyasal yaklařımların iřilerin tercih ettikleri siyasal partilere olan etkileri zerinde durulmuřtur. alıřma kapsamında iři sınıfı kavramına dair geleneksel ve gncel kuramsal yaklařımlar da ele alınmıř, sınıf kavramının oy verme davranıřı ile iliřkisi sorgulanmıřtır. Ayrıca Osmanlı’dan gnmze iři sınıfının geliřimine dair ikincil kaynaklar zerinden geliřtirilen bir tarihsel analize de yer verilmiřtir.

Tarihsel Miras

Trkiye’nin Osmanlı’dan gelen iři sınıfı mirası genellikle nemsenmemektedir. Ya Osmanlı dnemindeki iři sınıfı azgeliřmiř olarak tasvir edilmekte, ya da, hakkının teslim edildiėi ender durumlarda, Osmanlı deneyiminin Cumhuriyet dnemine tařınamayacaėı belirtilmektedir. Genel olarak, Osmanlı toplumundaki sanayileřme seviyesi ve bununla baėlantılı olarak iři sayısı kısıtlı olarak grlmektedir. Yirminci Yzyılın bařında Osmanlı’daki iři sayısı 400 bin civarındadır. Ancak, İmparatorluėun son yıllarında Osmanlı’daki cretli iř gc toplam nfusun yzde birinin altına dřmřtr. Kaybedilen blgelerde kalan iřiler, g edenler ya da tehcir edilenler dřřte nemli yer tutmaktadır ki bunlar genel olarak Osmanlı iř gcnn beceri sahibi kısmını oluřturmaktaydı. Bu kayıplar ncesinde dahi, mevcut iř gcnn karakteristik zelliklerinin sorunlu olduėu dřnlmektedir. ifti-iřiler, geici ya da mevsimlik iřiler ve asker-iřiler gibi alternatif emek formları iři sınıfının srekliliėini engellemiř ve bir ortak kimlik oluřumunu geciktirmiřtir. Bu gruplar sınıf bilincine giden yol nndeki engeller arasında grlmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra, hukuki sınırlamalar

işçi sınıfının kendi özel örgütlenmesini inşa etmesini engellemiş, zanaatkâr ve diğer işçi türlerini de içine alan oluşumlara saplanıp kalmalarına yol açmıştır.

Bir diğer yaklaşım Osmanlı toplumunun işçi sınıfı potansiyeline karşı olumlu bir tutum takınmakla birlikte, daha çok bu potansiyelin Cumhuriyet dönemine taşınamaması ile ilgilenmektedir. Osmanlı iş gücünün vasıflı kısmının uzun savaş dönemleri neticesinde ortadan kalktığı öne sürülmektedir. Ayrıca, Osmanlı iş gücünün etnik-dini çeşitliliğinin işçiler arasında olabilecek ittifaklar ve işçi sınıfının oluşumu üzerinde olumsuz bir etkiye sahip olduğu iddia edilmektedir. İmparatorluğun son zamanlarında ve Cumhuriyetin başlangıcında gelişen milliyetçi eğilim işçilerin en çok proleterleşen kısımlarını dışlamıştır.

Bu argümanların her ikisi de somut verilere dayanmaktadır. Ancak, yaklaşımları bağlamında sınırlıdır. İşçi sınıfının öznel koşulları bir kenara konulduğu ve nesnel koşullar bir sınıf bilinci oluşumuna atıfta bulunulmaksızın ele alındığı takdirde, Osmanlı'dan gelen mirasın göreceli önemi daha da iyi anlaşılabilir. Osmanlı işçi sınıfının koşullarının değerlendirildiği tarihi bağlam, devlet kontrollü modernleşme sürecinin başlangıcıdır. Bu anlamda, işçi sınıfının koşullarına ilişkin değerlendirmeler işçi sınıfının tarihsel devrim gerçekleştirme kapasitesinden çok bu temelde yapılmalıdır. Buna göre, tanımlanan koşulların ağırlığının bir dereceye kadar abartılmış olduğunu öne sürmek makul olacaktır.

Cumhuriyetin İmparatorluktan devraldığı ücretli iş gücü nüfusun tamamıyla karşılaştırıldığında çok küçüktür. Ancak, tahmini sayılar sadece modern anlamda ücretli emeği kapsamaktadır. Sınıf bilinci oluşumunun önünde engel olarak görülen ara formların varlığı da önemli bir etmen olarak görülebilir. Tamamıyla özgürleşmiş olmasa da, iş gücü, emek piyasası koşullarını deneyimlemiş ve işveren-çalışan ilişkisi yükümlülükleri altında çalışmıştır. Bu şekilde, bir kapitalist forma doğru yavaş bir şekilde evrilen bir toplum içerisinde yeni üretim ilişkilerinin doğuşuna tanıklık edilmiştir.

Sınırlı bir süre için bile olsa yaşamlarını sürdürmek için bir ücrete bağımlı olmaları göz ardı edilecek bir olgu değildir. Toplumun bu kesimine ilişkin olarak çalışma kapsamında ortaya konan sayılar göz önüne alındığında, tablonun biraz daha iyi olduğu görülecektir.

İşçi sınıfının nesnel koşulları Osmanlı endüstriyel azgelişmişliği temelinde değerlendirilirken, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Osmanlı döneminde kurulan tüm devlet sanayi kuruluşlarının hemen hepsini devraldığı göz önünde bulundurulmalıdır. Ayrıca, önemli sayıda özel fabrika da erken Cumhuriyet dönemine dek varlığını sürdürmüştür. Bu kuruluşlar, tarihimizde fabrika emeğinin ortaya çıkmasında büyük önem taşıyan emek ilişkilerine ön ayak olmuştur. Türkiye, gelişme sürecinde kuruluşlara sahip olan ve sayıca kısıtlı da olsa endüstriyel üretim bilgisi ve modern emek ilişkisi deneyimi taşıyan fabrikalar içeren bir ekonomik yapı miras almıştır. Bir başka deyişle, işçi sınıfının temel var oluş koşulları Cumhuriyet döneminde sıfırdan oluşmamıştır. Sınıf ilişkilerinin, düzenleyen bir kurumsal yapının varlığı, oluşmakta olan kapitalist ilişkilerden kaynaklanan işyerindeki pratikleri de içeren günlük yaşam deneyimleri, işçi sınıfının gelişimine olanak tanıyacak ekonomik ve toplumsal yapı da sırf kısıtlı olduklarından dolayı göz ardı edilmemelidir.

Öte yandan, Osmanlı işçi sınıfının mevcut deneyiminin Türk toplumu tarafından miras alınmadığı da tam anlamıyla doğru değildir. Osmanlı iş gücünün önemli bir bölümünün sözü edilen nedenlerden dolayı ayrıldığı doğru olmakla birlikte, bu durum mevcut deneyimin tamamen kaybedildiği anlamına gelmemektedir. Osmanlı toplumu tamamen izole ve ayrılmış bir yapıya sahip değildir. Kaybedilen işçi sınıfı merkezlerinde oluşan deneyimler tamamen yitirilmemiştir. Osmanlı kamusal alanında ve Osmanlı toplumunun kolektif belleğinde üretilen bilginin, bu toplumsal grupların deneyimini Cumhuriyet dönemine taşıdığını kabul etmek akla uygun olacaktır. Bunun yanı sıra, yeni Cumhuriyetin sınırları içerisinde kalan diğer kilit merkezler de Osmanlı mirasını canlı tutmuştur. İstanbul (İzmit dahil olmak üzere), Bursa, İzmir, Adana ve bölgesel imalat merkezleri gibi İmparatorluğun başlıca sanayi merkezleri Cumhuriyet Türkiye'si'nin ekonomik

kalkınmasında önemli yer tutmaya devam etmiştir. Yeni yeni ortaya çıkan sanayi merkezleri de Anadolu Demiryolu gibi Osmanlı sanayi yatırımlarının çevresinde gelişen şehirlerdir. Günümüzde de, Türkiye’deki ücretli emeğin önde gelen alanları hem orantısal hem de nicel olarak bu aynı illerdir.

Son olarak, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’ndaki emek ilişkilerine ilişkin hukuki temeller gelişmemiş olarak görülse de, geç Osmanlı düzenlemelerinin Cumhuriyet tarafından miras alınması dikkat çekicidir. Osmanlı Anayasası’nın Kurtuluş Savaşı’nın ilk yılları sırasında, 1924 yılına dek mutat olarak yürürlükte olduğu da dikkate alınmalıdır. Ayrıca, Osmanlı Parlamentosu tarafından çıkarılan grevlere, derneklere ve toplanma haklarına ilişkin kanunlar da erken Cumhuriyet döneminde olduğu gibi kullanılmıştır. Emek örgütlenme ve hareketlerini kısıtlayıcı etkileri kabul edilmekle birlikte, en azından bunlara bir yasal çerçeve sağladıkları da anlaşılmalıdır.

Nihayetinde, erken Cumhuriyet döneminde Osmanlı ekonomik yapısının sadece olumsuz yanları değil, bazı olumlu yanları da etkili olmuştur. Ayrıca, emek geleneği ve bu arka planda şekillenen deneyim de Cumhuriyet Türkiye’si toplumu tarafından azımsanmayacak bir derecede miras alınmıştır. Bu anlamda, Osmanlı ekonomik ve toplumsal tarihine ayrı bir incelemenin konusu olarak yaklaşmak, ya da Türk işçi sınıfına tarihdışı bir karakter atfetmek yerine, Türkiye’deki iş koşullarının gelişimini anlamaya yönelik araçsal potansiyelini gerçekleştirmeye yönelik bir rol biçilmelidir. Hakikaten de, tek parti dönemindeki emek ilişkilerini tanımlayan iki ilke olan halkçılık ve devletçilik Osmanlı’nın klasik döneminden ve Osmanlı sanayileşme hareketinden miras alınan bazı geleneklerin ürünüdür.

Türkiye’de Kapitalist Gelişim

Cumhuriyetin kurulma sürecini açıklamanın bir yolu, bunu bir burjuva devrimi olarak tanımlamaktır. Bu tanım genel olarak Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin kuruluşuna iki ayrı yaklaşımı mümkün kılmaktadır. İlk olarak, anti-feodal, seküler ve milliyetçi karakteri temelinde Amerikan, İngiliz ve Fransız toplumlarındaki klasik burjuva devrimlerine benzediği iddia edilebilir. İkinci yaklaşım ise, gecikmiş ve

buna bağılı olarak ayrıksı karakteristiklerine odaklanarak kapitalizme geçişte Alman geleneği ile benzerliklerine vurgu yapacaktır. Halk desteği üzerinde yükselmemesinin (devletin merkezi rolü) ve bir burjuva sınıfı liderliğinin bulunmamasının da altı çizilebilir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulması ve bunu izleyen bir dizi reform özel türde bir burjuva devriminin parçaları olarak ele alınabilir. Bu özel tür devrim ise Prusya tipi kapitalizme geçiş olarak adlandırılabilir. Devrim yerine modernleşme terimi Türkiye'nin tarihsel bağlamına ve deneyimine daha uygun düşmektedir.

Pre-kapitalist toplumsal oluşumlarda ekonomik fazla “ekonomik olmayan” değer, güç kullanımı üzerinden sömürülmektedir. Bu, ekonomi ve politikanın yan yana durduğu bir düzlem sunmaktadır. Bu yapı bir işçi sınıfının gelişimi ve bir emek piyasasının oluşumu ile kapitalizme doğru ilerlemek üzere dönüşmektedir. Osmanlı ekonomik yapısının kendine has özellikleri ve batı modeli feodalizmden farklılıkları dolayısıyla, sözü edilen dönüşüm neredeyse olanaksızdı. Güçlü bir merkezi yapıya sahip olan Osmanlı Devleti, (konsensüs çerçevesi dayatan bir dış arabulucu olarak) tarımsal üretimden gelen ekonomik fazlanın ekonomik olmayan güç kullanımıyla sömürülmesini kontrol etmekteydi. Bu kontrol de, politik ve ekonomik alanların beklendiği gibi bir burjuva devrimi ile çözülmesinin önüne geçmekteydi.

Batı burjuva deneyiminin aksine, Türk toplumunda eski egemen sınıflar ile yeni rejimde egemen olacak sınıflar arasında bir konsensüs bulunmaktaydı. Bu durum, devletin tarihsel bir özne, değişimin esas aktörü olarak öne çıkmasına yol açmıştır. Sınıflar arası çatışma devletin bünyesinde gerçekleşmiştir. Dış güçlerin etkisi altında bir kapitalist oluşumun ortaya çıkması da yeni sınıflar ile devletin arasındaki ilişkiyi geliştirmiştir. Yeni kapitalist sınıfı işçi sınıfından ayıran yabancı kapitalist merkezlerle olduğu kadar, yerel devlet (onun işbirlikçi karakteri) ile olan ilişkisidir. Bu oluşumda, ana çatışma modernist reformcular ile devletteki geleneksel restorasyon destekçileri arasında gerçekleşmiş, ve bu çatışmadan bir entelektüel grup ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu grup hem kapitalizme geçiş

ideolojisi temellendirmiş hem de bunu askeri ve sivil bürokratlar vasıtasıyla doğrudan yönetmiştir.

Bu geçiş modeli izlendiğinde, Türkiye'nin tarihsel gelişimi üç önemli adımda incelenebilmektedir. İlk olarak, geçiş sırasında, modern toplumsal sınıflar gelişmiş ve kendi özne konumlarını üstlenmişlerdir. İkinci olarak, kapitalist sınıf egemen sınıf olarak organize olmuştur. Son olarak, geçişte devlette öncülük eden entelektüel grup aktif rolünü bırakmış ve göreceli otonomisini kurmak üzere kendisini devletten uzaklaştırmıştır. Türkiye'de kapitalizmin gelişimi bu adımlarla şekillenmiştir. Devletin Türk toplumsal ve ekonomik hayatındaki önemli rolü, bürokrasi elitinin erken Cumhuriyet döneminde ortaya çıkışı ve tek parti dönemindeki iktidarı, 30'lar ve 40'larda ulusal burjuva sınıfının oluşumu, çok partili sisteme geçiş ve 60'larda bürokratik elitin iktidardan çekilmesi ve 70'lerde işçi sınıfının yükselişinin tümü Türkiye'deki modernleşme sürecindeki ilerlemelerdir.

İşçi Sınıfının Nesnel Koşulları

1970'lerin son yıllarında, Türk ekonomisi bir yapısal dönüşüme uğradı. Önceki ithal ikame modeli terk edildi ve ihracat temelli üretime geçildi. Ancak, geçerli ekonomik ilişkiler, ekonomik aktörlerin konumlanmaları, mevcut deneyimler ve alışkanlıklar bu yeni eğilime kolayca işlerlik kazandırılmasına izin vermemiştir. Demirel Hükümeti 24 Ocak Kararları ile Türk ekonomisini neo-liberal bir yola sokmayı denemiştir. Zamanın Başbakanlık Müsteşarı Turgut Özal tarafından hazırlanan ekonomik istikrar programı uyarınca para politikaları gevşetilmiş ve devletin ekonomideki payı azaltılmıştır. Bunun etkileri KİT'lerde hemen hissedilmiş, tarımdaki destek alımları sınırlanmış ve dış ticaret kademeli olarak serbestleştirilmiştir.

İhracatın krediler ve vergi indirimleri yoluyla desteklenmesiyle dışa dönük endüstriyel büyüme denemeleri yapılmıştır. Türk Lirasının değeri A.B.D. Doları karşısında büyük oranda düşürülmüştür. Ülkenin dış ticaret açığının ihracattaki artış ile kapatılması hedeflenmiştir. Yerel hammaddelere ve ucuz emeğe dayanan

öncelikli endüstriyel sektörler belirlenmiştir. Üzerine eğilmeye karar verilen başlıca sektörler tekstil, hazır kumaş imalatı, cam, seramik, ambalaj, deri mamulleri, dayanıklı tüketim malları ile otomotiv ve metal yan sanayiidir. Öte yandan, demir, çelik ve petrokimya gibi ağır sanayi yatırımlarından kaçınılmakla kalınmamış, mevcut sanayilerde de küçülmeye gidilmiştir.

Uzun vadeli sonuçlarının da gösterdiği gibi, Türkiye işçi sınıfı Türk ekonomisindeki bu yeni döneme şüpheli yaklaşmakta haklı çıkmıştır. İşçiler, hükümetin yeni girişimlerine karşı durmada toplumun farklı kesimleri arasında başı çekmiştir. Yeni ekonomik yönelimin getirdiği yükler işçiler ve toplumun düşük gelirli kesimleri tarafından hissedilmiş, tereddütlü yaklaşımları kısa zamanda güçlü bir direnişe dönüşmüştür. 1980 yılında, greve giden işçilerin sayısı 1979 yılındakilerin dört katıdır. Bu işçilerin büyük bölümü (dörtte üçünden fazlası) DİSK'e bağlı sendikalara üyeydi. Sadece bu veri bile işçilerin uygulamaya konan yeni siyasalara karşı tepkisinin ciddiyetini göstermeye yeterlidir. 24 Ocak Kararları ancak 12 Eylül Rejimi ile uygulamaya konulabilecektir.

1980 Darbesinin sonuçları işçi sınıfı için dramatik olmuştur. Askeri Yönetim işçi sınıfını Türkiye'de ekonomik sistemin yeniden yapılanmasını önleyen etmenlerden biri ve dolayısıyla da ciddi bir tehdit olarak görmüştür. Bu yüzden de, işçi sınıfının politik muhalefet odağı olarak yükselişi askeri rejim ile bastırılmıştır. Darbenin doğrudan müdahalesi ve askeri rejim ya da bunu izleyen neo-liberal hükümetlerce uygulanan siyasalar işçi sınıfı ve toplumun sol kesimleri için karamsar bir tablo ortaya koymuştur.

Türkiye'de işçi sınıfının gelişimi darbe ile birlikte çarpıcı bir biçimde değişmiştir. Sendikal faaliyetler askeri müdahale ile durdurulmuştur. 1982 Anayasası sendikalarının kuruluşuna ve faaliyetlerine ciddi kısıtlamalar getirmiştir. 1980 öncesinde kazanılan hakların birçoğu geri alınmıştır. 1980'lerin neo-liberal politikaları, Türkiye'ye biçilen ve Anavatan Partisi (ANAP) tarafından benimsenen ucuz emek ülkesi rolü hızlı ve kesin yoksullaşmaya yol açmıştır.

ANAP dönemi işçiler için daha da fazla hak kaybı getirmiştir. Sendikalar üzerindeki sıkı denetim ve kontrol artırılmıştır. KİT'lerde sözleşmeli ve iş güvencesi olmaksızın çalıştırma yaygınlaşmıştır. Bu personel örgütlenme, grev ve toplu görüşme haklarından mahrum bırakılmıştır. Emeklilik yaşı kademeli olarak yükseltilmiştir. Toplu görüşme hakkı kazanma koşulları daha da güçleştirilmiştir. Hükümlüler için zorunlu çalışma yürürlüğe konmuştur. Tüm bu olumsuz olaylar ve düzenlemelerin sonucunda, 1986-1991 yılları sınıf kimliğinin ve sınıf çatışmasının daha önceki yıllardan çok daha önemli bir seviyeye yükselmesine tanıklık etmiştir. 1980 sonrasında işçiler için alıkonulan haklarını yeniden kazanmak için uğraşacakları yeni bir dönemin başladığını öne sürmek anlamlı olacaktır.

Türkiye'de işçi sınıfının bu zorlu yıllar sırasında ulaştığı nesnel koşulları ve Türkiye işçilerinin maruz kaldığı genel gelişim trendlerini resmi verileri kullanarak bir raddeye kadar kavramak mümkündür.

Bu çalışmada, kısa bir girişi takiben sırasıyla bu tezde sınıf kavramına ilişkin olarak benimsenen kuramsal perspektif, Türkiye'de kapitalizmin ve işçi sınıfının gelişiminin tarihsel izahatı, Türkiye'deki ücretli emeğin genel koşulları, geçirdikleri genel değişim trendleri, mavi yakalı işçilerin günlük yaşamlarında, işyerlerindeki özel koşulları ve özellikleri, politik tutumları ve son olarak oy verme davranışlarını etkileyen etmeler sunulmaya çalışılmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, geçilen süreci toplu bir şekilde vermek üzere, bu bölümde genelde ücretli emekçilerin, özellikle de mavi yakalı işçilerin koşullarına ilişkin bulgular üç kısımda sunulacaktır. Bunu takiben, yukarıda söz edilen bulguların kuramsal değerlendirmesi ortaya konacaktır. Son olarak da, bu tezin daha geniş anlamda araştırma sorusu olan çağdaş Türkiye toplumundaki mavi yakalı işçilerin ekonomik, toplumsal ve politik varlığının gelişiminin anlaşılmasında Marksist sınıf kavramının etkililiği tartışılacaktır.

İşçi Sınıfı Koşullarına İlişkin Genel Trendler

Türkiye ekonomisi 1980'lerin başından beri bir neo-liberal dalgadan geçmektedir. Ekonomik büyüme hızı değişken bir yol izlemekteyse de, son 12 yıldaki ortalama büyüme oranı 1955 – 2001 arası Cumhuriyet ortalamasına yakındır. Sözü edilen dönemde, ekonomi sadece büyüklük açısından gelişmemiş, aynı zamanda üretim tarzı da dönüşmüştür. Türkiye bir tarımsal üretim ülkesi olarak bilinmekteydi. Kendi hesabına çalışan işçilerin, ücretsiz aile içi emekçilerin ve çalışanların sayısı uzun bir süre boyunca ücretli emekçilerden daha fazla olmuştur. Endüstriyel üretim büyük oranda küçük ölçekli imalat formunda gerçekleşmiştir. Geçmişe ait bu tablo hızla değişmektedir. Günümüzde, gelir getiren işlerde çalışanların yüzde 60'tan fazlası ücretli işçilerdir. 1988 – 2008 arasında ücretli emekçi sayısı ikiye katlanmıştır. 2012 yılı itibariyle, Türkiye'de 15,6 milyon ücretli işçi bulunmaktadır. Ücretli emekçilerin sayısı ve payı artmaya devam etmektedir. Tarım sektörünün ekonomideki payı hemen heme kaybolmuştur. Toplam ekonominin yüzde 4'ünü oluşturmaktadır. Hizmet sektörü yüzde 61'lik payıyla en büyük sektördür. Bu sektördeki işçilerin sayısı da önemli bir hızla artmaktadır. Özetle, Türkiye'deki eski orta sınıf varlığını sürdürmekle birlikte, özellikle tarım alanında hızla azalmaktadır. Ayrıca, küçük burjuvazi de bir süre daha ayakta kalacak gibi görülse de, Türkiye eskinin aksine bir ücretli emek ülkesi haline gelmiştir.

2012 yılı verileri 7,5 milyon mavi yakalı ve 8,1 milyon beyaz yakalı işçi bulunduğunu göstermektedir. Beyaz yakalı işçilerin sayısı daha fazla olsa da, mavi yakalı işçilerin oranı 2012 öncesi 8 yıllık dönemde yüzde 3 oranında artmıştır. Türkiye'deki ücretli emekçilerin yüzde 42'si kalifiye işçidir; sayıları artmakla beraber, kalifiye işçilerin iş gücü kompozisyonu içerisindeki payı düşmektedir. Bir başka deyişle, hem mavi yakalı hem de beyaz yakalı kalifiye işçiler sayıca artmaktayken, Türkiye iş gücü aynı zamanda bir becerisizleştirme sürecinden geçmektedir. Bu bağlamda, neo-liberal politikalar etkisini göstermektedir.

Türkiye’de kamu çalışanı sayısı da artmaktadır. Bu değişimin ardındaki ana etken kamu çalışanı ve sözleşmeli personel sayısındaki artıştır. Daimi kamu işçilerinin sayısı da hızla düşmektedir. En çarpıcı değişim KİT’lerde görevli işçilerin sayısında görülmektedir. Sadece yaklaşık 25 senedir süren özelleştirme politikaları sonucunda, sendika üyesi KİT işçisi sayısı 300 binin üzerinde gerilemiştir. Yerleri 1990’ların başına dek sözleşmeli personel ile doldurulmuştur. O zamandan bu yana sözleşmeli personel sayısı daimi işçiler ile benzer hızda azalmaktadır.

Türkiye görece genç iş gücüne sahip olmakla birlikte, bunun hızla yaşlandığına dikkat edilmelidir. Ücretli işçilerin yüzde 50’si lise seviyesinin altında eğitime sahiptir. Ayrıca, eğitimin kalitesi ve emek piyasası talepleri ile verilen eğitim arasındaki uygunluk üzerinde de soru işaretleri mevcuttur. Ücretli emekçilerin lise mezunu olan en az yüzde 8’i beceri gerektirmeyen işlerde çalışmaktadır. Mavi yakalı işçilerin üçte ikisi evli olmakla birlikte, evli işçilerin oranı yavaş yavaş düşmektedir. Emekçi ailelerinin çoğu 2-3 çocuk sahibidir. Ücretli emekçilerin sadece dörtte biri kadındır. Kadın ücretli emekçiler artmaktayken, özellikle tarım alanındaki büyük ölçüde kadın ücretsiz aile içi emek gerilemektedir.

Çalışan sayısı anlamında işyeri büyüklüğü artmaktadır. 2012 itibariyle, Türkiye’deki işyerlerinin üçte ikisi 10 ya da daha fazla işçi istihdam etmektedir. Ayrıca, genel trend de büyük işyerlerinin lehinedir. Ancak bu işlerin endüstriyel karakterde oldukları ya da söz konusu işyerlerinin klasik anlamda fabrikalar olduğu düşünülmemelidir. Yeni büyük işyerlerinin çoğu mühendisler, tasarımcılar, doktorlar, hemşireler, öğretmenler, garsonlar, tezgahhtarlar ve hizmet sektöründeki diğer ücretli emekçiler gibi beyaz yakalı işçileri istihdam etmektedir.

Türkiye’deki sendika yoğunluğu düşmektedir. Yine de, kamu işçileri ve kamu çalışanları da dâhil edildiğinde ciddi oranda sendika üyesi mevcuttur. Bu sayı yüzde 15 civarındadır ve Avrupa Birliği ülkeleriyle karşılaştırıldığında pek çok ülkeninkinin altındadır. Ancak, güçlü bir işçi sınıfı geleneğine sahip bir ülke olarak bilinen Almanya yüzde 18 gibi Türkiye’ninkine çok yakın bir sendika

yoğunluğuna sahiptir. Buna göre, sayılar beklendiği kadar olumsuz değildir. Türkiye’de sendikalaşmanın ana sorunu sendikaların devlet/hükümet tarafından aşırı kontrolü olarak görülmektedir. Kamu çalışanlarında sendika yoğunluğu artmaktadır. Kamu sektöründeki işçiler için belirgin bir gerileme görülmektedir. Kamu sektöründe sendika yoğunluğunun artışı hükümetin “sarı sendika” politikası ve kamu kuruluşlarına kendi kadrolarını giderek daha fazla yerleştiriyor oluşu ile açıklanabilmektedir. Üye sayısındaki çarpıcı artış ve hükümete yakınlığı bilinen bir konfederasyonun toplam payı bu konuda açıklayıcı bir gösterge sunmaktadır. Bunun ötesinde, sendikalar potansiyellerinin çok altında, hükümetin kontrolü yüzünden bazı durumlarda işçilerin zararına olacak şekilde çalışmaktadır. Sözü edilen konfederasyonun toplu görüşme sürecinde işçilerin talepleri yerine hükümetin teklifini destekler bir tutum takınması yine iyi bir örnek oluşturacaktır. Emek hareketleri de 1986 ve 1994 yılları arasında en üst noktaya ulaştıktan sonra gerilemektedir. TEKEL direnişi ya da Türk Telekom grevi gibi özel olaylar haricinde, kolektif emek hareketlerinin genel gidişatı durağandır.

1988 ve 1993 arasında, sözü edilen dönemde yükselen kolektif işçi hareketleri sayesinde ücretlerde ciddi bir artış görülmüştür. Ancak 2010 yılından bu yana özel sektördeki işçilerin net reel ücretleri aynı kalırken, kamu sektöründekilerinki yüzde 15 gerilemiştir. Sözü edilen dönemde sadece kamu çalışanlarının net reel ücretlerinde bir artış görülmüştür. Verili dönem için emek maliyet endeksi incelendiğinde, keskin bir düşüş olduğu görülmektedir. Buna göre, işçiler bu dönemde ekonomik büyümeden hak ettikleri payı alamamışlar ya da bazı toplumsal haklarını kaybetmişlerdir. Türkiye’nin neo-liberal ekonomik gidişatı ve emek piyasasının esnek koşulları göz önüne alındığında, ikinci yorum daha doğru olarak öne çıkmaktadır.

Ücretli emekçilerin çalışma saatleri de zorlu koşulları işaret etmektedir. Ücretli emekçilerin yüzde 35’i yasal haftalık çalışma saatinin üstünde çalışmaktadır. Bu işçilerin çoğunun fazla mesai ücreti almadığı bilinmektedir. Ancak genel trend çalışma saatlerinin düşmesi yönündedir. Öte yandan, işe gitmeyen ya da yasal sınır altında çalışanların payı artmaktadır. Yani, esnek çalışma saatlerine sahip bir

işçi grubunun ortaya çıktığından bahsetmek mümkündür. Bu kalifiye beyaz yakalı işçi sayısındaki artış ile paraleldir.

200 ve 2012 yılları arasında sigortasız işçilerin toplam işçilere oranı yüzde 7 civarında artmıştır. 2012 itibarıyla, Türkiye'deki işçilerin yüzde 15,21'i herhangi bir sosyal güvenlik kuruluşuna kayıtlı değildir. Ekonomik kriz sırasında bu oranlar daha da yüksek seviyelere çıkmaktadır. Bu 2009 ekonomik krizi sırasında gerçekleşen yüzde 26,2'lik oran ile örneklenebilmektedir. Verilen istatistiklerin devletin resmi verileri olduğuna dikkat edilmelidir. Sözü edilen sigortasız çalıştırılan işçi kesiminin yanı sıra, Türkiye'nin büyük kayıtdışı sektöründe istihdam edilen hiçbir sosyal güvence olanağı bulunmayan geniş bir işçi kesimi bulunmaktadır.

Ücretli emekçilerin kıdem durumuna ilişkin ulusal seviyede veri bulunmamaktadır. Bazı araştırmaların kullanılması yoluyla, yüzde 70'i sendika üyesi olan geniş bir işçi örnekleminde dahi ortalama 5 yıl ya da daha az kıdeme sahip olduğu sonucuna ulaşılabilmektedir. 2012 yılında, kamu sektöründe 585 bin kişi, özel sektörde de 419 bin kişi taşeronluk sözleşmesi altında çalışmakta ve herhangi bir kıdem hakkı kullanamamaktadır. Yine sosyal güvenlik bağlamında söz edildiği gibi, Türkiye'de dikkate değer bir kayıtdışı sektörün varlığından söz edilebilmektedir. Böylece, Türkiye'deki işçilerin büyük bir bölümünün emekli maaşından faydalanamama seviyesine yakın bir seviyede kıdem tazminatından faydalanamadığı sonucuna varılabilmektedir. Ayrıca, bu tez yazıldığı sırada hükümet kıdem tazminatı alınmasını kısıtlayacak yeni bir politika paketi üzerinde çalışmaktadır.

Araştırmanın Sonuçları: Tipik Mavi Yakalı İşçi

Araştırma sonucunda elde edilen verilere dayanarak, Türkiye'deki tipik mavi yakalı işçinin özellikleri belirlenmeye çalışılmıştır. Ortalama mavi yakalı işçinin karakteristiklerinin seçilmesinde, bu özelliklerin mavi yakalı işçilerin en az yüzde 60 ila 70'inde paylaşılmakta olması temel alınmıştır. Böylece bir mavi yakalı işçi

ideal tipi oluşturulmuştur. Verili her bir özelliğin bir mavi yakalı işçide bulunma olasılığının yüksek olmasının yanı sıra, mavi yakalı işçilerin büyük çoğunluğunun bu özelliklere sahip olduğunu iddia etmenin olanaklı olmadığı göz önünde tutulmalıdır. İdeal tipler faydalı bir araç olmakla beraber, toplumsal varlıkta oldukları gibi karşılık bulmamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın gerçekleştirilmesinin nedeni mavi yakalı işçilerin yaşam koşulları, çalışma ortamları, toplumsal varlıkları, değerleri ve tutumları açısından ortak noktalarının belirlenmesidir. Bu bağlamda, bu ortak noktaların Türkiye'deki mavi yakalı işçilerin bir sınıf olarak varlığına nasıl etki ettiği tartışılmaktadır.

Öncelikle, tipik mavi yakalı işçi erkektir. Mavi yakalı işçi ya orta öğretim seviyesinde eğitim sahiptir, ya da, yüksek eğitim görmüşse bu teknik ya da mesleki karakterdedir. Eşi çalışmamaktadır ve genelde kendisine göre düşük eğitim seviyesine sahiptir. Mavi yakalı aileler genellikle iki ya da üç çocuklu çekirdek aileden oluşan haneler halinde yaşamaktadır. Çocukları çoğunlukla eğitim çağındadır. Mavi yakalı aileler genellikle büyük ebeveynlerinin yaşadığı yerde yaşamamaktadır. Ancak, yaşadıkları şehirde ya da ilde yeni değildirler. Aylık hane masrafları 2000 TL'nin altındadır. Mavi yakalı işçinin maaşı hane ihtiyaçlarına ancak yetmektedir. Fazladan gelire ihtiyaç duyduklarınad, mavi yakalı haneleri banka kredilerini tercih etmektedir. Tipik mavi yakalı işçi kendi ve ailesinin ekonomik anlamda geleceğine ilişkin karamsar değildir. Kariyer geleceği konusundaki ilk seçeneği emekliliktir. Bir başka deyişle, dikey hareketliliğe ilişkin bir hırs taşımamaktadır.

Mavi yakalı işçinin işi tipik olarak sanayi sektörü altında kategorize edilebilmektedir. İşini kendi kendine ya da kişisel bağlantıları sayesinde bulmuştur. Bir başka deyişle, mavi yakalı işçiler tipik olarak mevcut işlerini bulmak için kurumsal yolları kullanmamışlardır. Bir yaşam boyu işi tercih etmemekle beraber, sık sık iş değiştirmemektedir. Tipik mavi yakalı işçi büyük olasılıkla sosyal güvenliğe sahip olsa da, kariyerinde bir noktada kesinlikle sigortasız çalışmak durumunda kalmıştır. Eğitimi sırasında ya da işyerinde büyük ihtimalle bir nevi mesleki eğitim almıştır. Günde 10 saat civarında çalışmaktadır.

Tipik mavi yakalı işçi genellikle işyerinde herhangi bir gruba karşı ayrımcılık yapıldığını düşünmemektedir. Buna göre eşitlikçi bir ortamda çalışmaktadır. İşinden tatmin olup olmadığı sorulduğunda tipik mavi yakalı işçinin cevabı büyük olasılıkla evet olacaktır. Yine de bu mavi yakalı işçinin maaşından memnun olduğu anlamına gelmemektedir. Düşük ya da adaletsiz ödeme mavi yakalı işçinin önde gelen sıkıntısıdır. İşine ilişkin taleplerini sendikalar ya da kolektif faaliyet yoluyla takip etmemektedir. Sendikaların, sorunlarını çözmeye yardımcı olabileceğine de inanmamaktadır.

Mavi yakalı işçiler kendilerine benzer kişilerle arkadaşlık etmek istemektedir. Arkadaşları genellikle aynı işyerinden değildir. İş dışındaki vaktini evde ya da arkadaşlarının komşularının veya akrabalarının evlerinde geçirmektedir. Sık sık olmasa da, boş zamanında dışarı çıktığında mavi yakalı işçi bir kahvehanede görülecektir. Televizyon izler ve gündemi ondan takip eder. Favorisi ana akım kanallardır. Dini pratikler açısından en azından Cuma namazına gider.

İdeal patronu bir baba figürüdür. Eşinin, izni olmadan çalışmasını istemez. Patronun beklenen baba rolü devletten de beklenir; tipik mavi yakalı işçi fakirlerin geçiminin sağlanmasının devletin sorumluluğunda olduğunu düşünmektedir. Bu açılar göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, ortalama mavi yakalı işçinin ataerki değerlere yatkın olduğu söylenebilir. Genellikle çalışkanlığın sonuç vereceğini ve ekonomik sistemin bu anlamda adil olduğunu düşünür. Kendisini tamamen temsil eden bir siyasal parti bulunmadığını düşünmektedir. Bir siyasi partinin politikaları tipik mavi yakalı işçi için önemlidir. Kendisini sınıfsal konumundan çok demografik özelliklerine göre tanımlamaktadır.

Mavi Yakalı İşçiler Arasında Ayrışma

Aktarılan ortak niteliklerinin yanı sıra mavi yakalı işçilerin pek çok nitelik ve koşul bağlamında alt gruplara ayrıldığı gözlemlenmiştir. Son on yılda Türkiye’de gelir dağılımı adaletsizliği yönünde önemli bir süreç yaşanmıştır. Yoksullar daha yoksul, zenginlerse daha zenginleşmiştir. Ancak genel ekonomik gelişmenin alt gelir gruplarına yansımaları sonucunda Türkiye’de çalışanların uzun vadede bir

mutlak yoksullaşma süreci geçirdiğini söylemek mümkün değildir. Örneğin, 1981-1995 dönemi ele alındığında tüm çalışanların net reel ücretlerinde artış yaşandığı bilinmektedir. Öte yandan son 15 yılda ücretlerin durağanlaştığı hatta kamu ve özel sektör işçilerinin maaşlarında kısmi düşüşler görülmüştür. Buna rağmen ekonomik gelişmenin sağladığı tüketim imkânları da düşünüldüğünde işçilerin bir mutlak yoksulluk sorunu olduğundan bahsetmek zordur. Ancak, göreceli yoksunluk çerçevesinde işçilerin durumu düşünüldüğünde ekonomik koşullarının gerilediğini iddia etmek yanlış olmaz. İşçilerin ekonomik gelişmeden hak ettikleri düzeyde pay almadığı hali hazırda belirtilmişti. Söz konusu ekonomik gerilemenin etkisi özellikle daha düşük gelir düzeyine sahip olan vasıfsız işçilerde daha da derin hissedilmektedir. Yani Türkiye’de işçilerin belirli bir bölümünün bir yoksullaşma deneyimi yaşadığı ortadadır. Söz konusu göreceli yoksullaşma çalışma bağlamında ele alınan mavi yakalı işçiler içinde dahi farklı düzeylerde yaşanmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle mavi yakalı işçiler varlık koşullarında yaşanan değişimden eşit düzeyde etkilenmemektedir. Bu farklılık yaşam standartlarındaki ayrışmaları pekiştirmektedir. Söz konusu çerçevede mavi yakalı işçiler araba, ev sahipliğinde, hane içinde alternatif gelir kaynaklarına sahip olmada, ücretin hane giderlerini karşılama düzeyinde, borçluluk durumunda ve yaşam koşullarının iyileşmesine dönük beklentilerde kendi içinde önemli farklılıklar göstermektedir.

İş tercih nedenleri, çalışma statüleri, iş hayatı boyunca sigortasız çalışma süresi gibi kriterlerde de ortak bir nokta bulunduğundan söz etmek mümkün değildir. Vasıf düzeyi, kıdem, iş güvencesi ve iş niteliklerinin kazanılma şeklinde de önemli ayrışmalar gözlemlenmektedir. Mavi yakalı işçilerin çalışma ortamları da benzeşmekten çok farklılıklar arz etmektedir. Çalışan sayısına göre şirket büyüklükleri, göreceli sağlık ve güvenlik koşulları belirleyici etmenler olarak işçileri alt gruplara bölmektedir. Ortak nitelikler arz etmekle birlikte sosyalleşme şekilleri de farklılıklar barındırmaktadır. Örneğin iş yeri arkadaşlarının yakın arkadaş olma düzeyi, ülke gündemini takip etme ya da bilgiye erişim araçları ve dini pratikleri yaşama düzeyi değişkenlik göstermektedir. Tutum ve değerler açısından benzerlikler olmakla birlikte daha ziyade ataerkil değerler etrafından

birleşilmektedir. Oy verme kriteri, hükümetin zengileri desteklediği kanaati ya da milliyetçi, dini duyguların oy verme davranışındaki rolü gibi konularda ise mavi yakalı işçiler birbirlerine alternatif pozisyonları benimsemektedir. Mavi yakalı işçiler kendilerini demografik nitelikleri bağlamında tanımlasa da etnisite, yöre, din gibi farklı kriterler etrafında gruplandıkları da görülmektedir.

Sınıf ve Oy Verme Davranışı: Türkiye’de Mavi Yakalı İşçiler

Geniş bir bakış açısı ile sonuç olarak söylenebilir ki mavi yakalı işçiler yaşam standartları ve çalışma koşulları çerçevesinde ayrışmaktadır. Bu ayrışma oy verme şekillerine de yansımaktadır. Bir başka deyişle, mavi yakalı işçilerin siyasal parti tercihleri farklı varlık koşullarından ve deneyimlerinden etkilenmektedir. Ortak günlük pratikler ortak deneyimler üretecek kadar güçlü değildir. Ortak nitelikler işçiler arasında sürekli etkileşim kanalları tesis edememektedir. Etkileşim ve deneyim benzeşmesinin yokluğunda çalışma koşulları ve demografik ayrışmaların dünya görüşü ve siyasal tutumu belirlemede rolü artmaktadır. Bunlar da ideolojinin etkisinin yüksek olduğu koşullar çerçevesinde siyasal tercihleri etkilemektedir.

Türkiye koşullarında ise geleneksel bir sınıf siyaseti ve materyal koşullar çerçevesinde konumlanmış bir sağ sol ayrımı bulunmadığı için ana ideolojik aks daha ziyade gelenekçi modernist ayrımı üzerinden şekillenmiştir. Her ne kadar bu ayrımı kesen milliyetçilik gibi ideolojiler bulunsu da asıl belirleyenin bu aks olduğu söylenebilir.

Bulguların Kuramsal Analizi

Çalışmanın ana varsayımlarından birisi Avrupa’da artık demode olarak adledilen Marksist sınıf analizinin, Türkiye’deki kapitalist gelişmişlik düzeyi göz önünde bulundurulduğunda ve ana fragmantasyon tezine dayanak olan yeni orta sınıf, yani beyaz yakalılar analizin dışında tutulduğunda işçi sınıfının genel durumunu ve gelişimini açıklayıcı olacağı yönünde olmuştur. Ancak araştırmanın bulguları göstermiştir ki Türkiye’de mavi yakalı işçiler, Avrupa’daki gelişmiş kapitalizm koşullarının yaşanmadığı bir bağlamda dahi Avrupa deneyimini güçlü bir şekilde

açıklayan Marksist sınıf kavramı çerçevesinde anlaşılamamaktadır. Marks'ın, Thompson ve Althusser tarafından geliştirilen ve Lukacs'ın oluşturduğu kuramsal zeminde bir araya getirilen sınıf anlayışı ne yazık ki Türkiye'nin özgün koşullarında ve çalışmanın belirlediği verili sınırlılıklar içinde dahi mevcut hali açıklama imkanı sağlamamaktadır. Bir başka deyişle Türkiye'de gelişen ve büyüten bir kesim olarak mavi yakalı işçiler Marks'ın ön gördüğü ve koşullarını Thompson'ın tanımladığı tarzda bir sınıflaşma süreci yaşamamaktadır. Buradan hareketle Marksist kuramın bütününe geçersiz olduğu yönünde bir sonuç çıkarılmamalıdır. Pek çok bağlamda olduğu gibi Türkiye örneğinde de toplumsal, ekonomik ve sosyal gelişmeleri belirli oranda Marksist anlayış dahilinde açıklamak mümkündür. Ancak çalışma kapsamında belirlenen alanda bir sonuç alınamamıştır. Bu anlamda farklı kuramların açıklayıcı kapasitesi sınamak kadar Marksist kuramın yetkinliğinden faydalanabilmek için farklı koşullar dahilinde kuramı yeniden ele almak ve geliştirmek ilerisi için önemli bir çalışma alanı olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır.

B. CURRICULUM VITAE

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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	METU Sociology	2006
BS	METU Sociology	2003
High School	Atatürk Anadolu High School, Ankara	1998

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2011-	TBMM	MP Consultant
Present		

RESEARCH PROJECTS AND SEMINARS

June 2003 – July 2003, Joint Seminar Program on Globalization, METU and Berlin Free University

presentation: Global Cities: İstanbul and Berlin

Fall 2002 – Summer 2003 City Culture of Ankara, METU (Code: 2001.01.02.04),
Research Asistant

Spring 2002, Sociology Department, Student Assistant, Supervisor: Prof.Dr. Ayşe Saktanber

February 2002 – June 2002 Iodized Salt Usage Project, Ministry of Health of Turkey and UNICEF,

Regional Supervisor, Eastern Black Sea and Eastern Anatolia Regions

December 2001 – May 2002 Beneficiary Assessment of World Bank (2001) Turkey: Social Risk

Mitigation Project, Regional Supervisor, Eastern Anatolia Region

September 1999, Restructuring After Earthquake, Social Solidarity Networks, Interviewer

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English

COMPUTER SKILLS AND COMPETENCES

Windows Operating Systems and Office Applications

Ubuntu and Pardus (Linux based Operating Systems)

Adobe Creative Suite; Photoshop, Illustrator, Acrobat, Flash, Fireworks,

DreamWeaver

SwishMax,

SPSS 19.0 (advanced level, METU, Statistical Methods and Computer Applications in Social Sciences)

UCINET 6 (intermediate level, University of Groningen, Course: Social Network Analysis)

HOBBIES AND INTERESTS

Science Fiction and Fantasy Literature, Turkish Folklore, Cinematography, Scuba Diving, Computer Technologies

C. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

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Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	☒
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	☐
Enformatik Enstitüsü	☐
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Adı : Zafer
Bölümü : Sosyoloji

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