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PERCEPTIONS OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES IN EGYPT AFTER THE ARAB SPRING

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Önder CANVEREN

Supervisor

Assoc. Prof. Dr. İ. Dinçer GÜNEŞ

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إلىشهداءحادثةبورسعيد

To the Martyrs of the Port Said Incident.

ABSTRACT

Police Academy

Institute of Security Sciences

Department of International Security

Perceptions of Foreign and Security Policies in Egypt After the Arab Spring

Önder CANVEREN

Master's Thesis

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. İ. Dinçer GÜNEŞ

2013, 126 (Excluding appendices)

The aim of this study is to measure the public perception of foreign and security policy in Egypt after the Arab Spring. To achieve this aim, a participatory survey method was adopted with a sample of university students in Egypt. The approach was to discover the main trends in public perception regarding the Arab Spring, Egyptian domestic, foreign, and security policies, Turkey, the United States of America, the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Iran, the Middle East, and global affairs with the help of analytical tools such as variance tests and explanatory factor analysis in SPSS.

The study arrived at the following findings: (1) The Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as a leader and Turkey as a country, are the winners of the revolution. Most respondents perceived Erdoğan's leadership and the Turkish political system as models. (2) The respondents perceived the uprising as the result of the nation's internal dynamic, as the revolt by people who are seeking freedom, dignity, and a better life. (3) Anti-Americanism, deeply influenced by the Arab-Israeli conflict, was prominently noticeable. (4) The identity-perception of Egypt combined Anwar al-Sadat's 'Egypt First' and Gamal Abdel Nasser's Arab nationalism, and this also shaped the public discourse on foreign policy. (5) On the Israeli-Palestinian issue, the respondents were pessimistic regarding a final resolution based on Arab Initiative and did not trust the Israelis. In addition, they favoured a renewal of the Egypt-Israel agreement. (6) They perceived Iranian nuclear enrichment as an attempt towards nuclear armament and felt that Egypt should own WMDs. (7) They perceived Israel and the West as major threats to the country and the region, and advocated Arab alliance as a security strategy. (8) They perceived religious institutions and the SCAF as the most reliable institutions, and security and economy as the main internal issues.

Key Words: Egyptian Foreign and Security Policies, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, Public Opinion After the Arab Spring in Egypt, Domestic and Foreign Policies in Mubarak's Egypt, the Arab Spring

ÖZET

Polis Akademisi

Güvenlik Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Uluslararası Güvenlik Anabilim Dalı

Arap Baharı Sonrası Mısır'da Dış Politika ve Güvenlik Politikası Algısı

Hazırlayan: Önder CANVEREN

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Arap Baharından sonra katılımcı araştırma yöntemiyle Mısır'da yapılmış olan anket çalışmasının sonuçlarını içeren bu tez, Arap Baharı sonrası Mısır'da dış politika ve güvenlik algısını ölçmüştür. Mısır'da üniversite öğrencileri örnekleminde yapılan ankette Arap Baharı, Mısır iç politikası, dış politika ve güvenlik, Türkiye, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, İsrail-Arap Çatışması, İran, Küresel Perspektif ve Orta Doğu konularında kamuoyu algısındaki eğilimler SPSS programında fark testleri ve faktör analizleriyle ortaya çıkarılmıştır.

Çalışmada ortaya çıkan temel sonuçlar şunlardır: (1) Lider olarak Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan ve ülke olarak Türkiye, devrimin kazananıdır. Erdoğan liderliği ve Türkiye siyasal sistemi model olarak algılanmaktadır. (2) Devrim iç dinamiklerde özgürlük, onur ve daha iyi bir yaşam arayan insanların hareketi olarak okunmaktadır. (3) Yaygın gözlemlenen Amerikan karşıtlığı, temelde İsrail-Filistin meselesiyle alakalıdır. (4) Mısır kimliği Enver El Sedat'ın 'Önce Mısır' vizyonu ve Cemal Abdül Nasır'ın Arap Milliyetçiliği denkleminde şekillenmektedir ve bu, kamuoyunun dış politika algılamalarında da gözlemlenmektedir. (5) İsrail-Filistin meselesinde, Arap İnisiyatifi tezlerine dayalı çözümün gerçekleşmesi noktasında karamsar olan kamuoyu, İsrail tarafına güvenmemektedir. Ayrıca, Mısır-İsrail anlaşmasının yenilenmesi istenmektedir. (6)İran'ın nükleer çalışmasının silahlanmayı amaçladığını düşünen kamuoyu, Mısır'ın da nükleer silah sahibi olması gerektiğine inanmaktadır. (7) İsrail ve Batı, ülke ve bölge için temel tehditler olarak görülürken, Arap ülkeleriyle ittifak, temel güvenlik stratejisi olarak savunulmaktadır. (8) Dini kurumlar ve Mısır ordusu en güvenilir kurumlarken güvenlik ve ekonomi iç politikanın temel meseleleri olarak algılanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mısır Güvenlik ve Dış Politikası, Dış Politika ve Kamuoyu Algısı, Arap Baharından Sonra Mısır'da Kamuoyu Algısı, Mübarek Dönemi Mısır'da İç ve Dış Politika, Arap Baharı.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

WMDs : Weapons of Mass Destructions

NGOs : Non-governmental Organisations

SCAF :Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

USA : The United States of America

EU : European Union

UN : The United Nations

IDF : Israeli Defence Forces

LE : Egyptian Pound

PKK : Kurdistan Workers' Party

IR :International Relations

PLO :Palestine Liberation Organisation

NATO :North Atlantic Treaty Organization

IAEA :International Atomic Energy Agency

UK :United Kingdom

NDP :National Democratic Party

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INTRODUCTION

After the Tunisian 'Jasmine Revolution', which began in December 2010, scholars, journalists, analysts, and politicians anticipated a domino effect against other authoritarian regimes in the region. "Who would be the next?" was the main question. In an article published on 16 January 2011, Jon Leyne, the BBC reporter in Cairo was sceptical of the claim that Egypt would take the Tunisian road.

Such scepticism was based on the following considerations: 'Egypt had high rates of illiteracy, moreover, Mubarak's regime was strong, and Egyptians did not see the necessity of taking to the streets'. Nevertheless, the analysis, by the above-mentioned BBC reporter and some others proved to be mistaken. The slogan 'Yes, We Can!' led to an uprising all over Egypt, and Egyptians were able to remove Hosni Mubarak from the presidency and bring down his authoritarian regime. 'Tahrir' meaning 'freedom' in Arabic, turned out to be the symbol of this historical transformation in Egypt.

Tahrir Square, which was once *Ismailia Square*, gave birth to the third revolution in the contemporary history of Egypt. In 1919, people flocked to the square after the Egyptians, under the leadership of Saad Zaghlul, gained their independence from British occupation and colonial rule. This square witnessed popular celebration of freedom following the overthrow of King Farouk's regime by the Free Officers Movement in 1952. Thereafter, the Nasser government renamed it as 'Tahrir'.

In the same decade, the Zionist Movement declared 'The State of Israel' in Palestinian territory. Egypt, with its remarkable history, culture, Islamic and Arab traditions, and its leading role in the region, entered a period of conflicts and wars. Neither President Gamal Abdel Nasser nor President Anwar al-Sadat was able to resolve Cairo's domestic and international issues. Both Nasser's Pan-Arabism and Sadat's peace with Israel, reflecting his 'Egypt First' vision, remained as legacies for Mubarak in 1981 when he swore on the holy Qur'an on becoming the President.

Hosni Mubarak's main concern was the survival of his regime. Therefore, he did not attach significance to acquiring domestic legitimacy or submitting to the legitimate demands of Egyptian citizens for improving the political system. Mubarak's government was unable to cope with the rapid and dynamic changes in

the social, political, and economic realities of Egypt. He felt that public opinion does not and should not have a place in the formation of domestic and foreign policy. This narrow vision and authoritarianism, however, failed to prevent the birth of alternative social and political movements that finally propelled Egypt towards a successful uprising.

The uprising and its messages both to the domestic and international politics are significant to exploit. Attending to those message that can be conceptualize, as public opinion is vital in the discipline of International Relations (IR). Indeed, the role of public opinion is much more significant than admitted in the simplistic renditions of liberal and democratic peace theory approaches. Egypt, governed by one-man regimes since 1952, provides an excellent instance of public opinion developing into one of the main indicators for analysing foreign and security policy. Based on this assumption, this study explores Egyptian perceptions of foreign and security policies after the Arab Spring. It is significant to note here that this participatory and survey-based study of public opinion regarding Egyptian foreign and security policy is the first such academic study in Turkey.

To measure the Egyptian perceptions of foreign and security policy, a survey questionnaire consisting of 72 questions after a review of the relevant literature was concluded. For analysing the results of the survey, SPSS Statistics programme was used. The Turkish Ministry of Education and the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara ratified my application to spend two semesters in Egypt in 2011–12 at Cairo University for doing my research and learning Arabic. The first semester was spent acquiring proficiency in Arabic, integrating myself into the social environment, and observing the social and political sphere. In February 2012, the survey questions were finalized. By February 2013, 424 surveys were completed.

The aim of the survey was to acquire a general idea of the public opinion in Egypt regarding the country's foreign and security policies. Furthermore, the survey was conducted soon after the revolution and the timing proved to be opportune for assessing the attitudes and perceptions of the Egyptians in the post-revolution scenario. The foreign and security policy of post-revolution Egypt is a new and controversial subject and most studies today tend to have a predictive nature. It is too early for the new Egyptian regime to have developed a stable and coherent foreign

and security policy. This study will provide policy-makers with an opportunity to gauge the influence of public opinion on foreign policy. Moreover, the results of the survey will provide scientifically rich inputs for scholars interested in Egyptian and the Middle Eastern politics.

The study used the simple random sampling for the survey and restricted the sample to Egyptian university students. A minimized sample set, drawn only from Cairo University students, was later expanded to include students from all universities in Egypt excluding foreign students. First, face-to-face interviews based on a written questionnaire; then, through the internet, by uploading the questionnaire to the *Google Drive* and informing the prospective respondents mostly through the social media were the means to procure the responses.

The questionnaire consisted of 10 sections: D-Demography (7 questions), S-Arab Spring (4 questions), E-Egypt (11 questions), T-Turkey (10 questions), U-The United States of America (6 questions), C-Israeli-Arab Conflict (8 questions), IR-Iran (4 questions), G-Global Perspective (5 questions), ME-The Middle East (4 questions), and M-Media (3 questions).

The thesis contains four chapters, excluding the section on 'Evaluation and Conclusion'. These are: (1) *Research Method,* (2) *Egyptian Foreign and Security Policy in the Middle East*: *Israel-Palestine, Turkey, and Iran,* (3) *Domestic and Foreign Policy in Mubarak's Egypt and the Arab Spring*, (4) *Analysis of the Data*.

The first chapter discusses the theoretical framework for analysing the interaction between public opinion and foreign policy. Further, it briefly explains the methodology of the survey, including its quantitative and analytical aspects. The chapter also emphasizes other issues-including problems, challenges, and opportunities-related to the preparation and the conducting of the survey.

Second and third chapters were organised according to the substance of the questions and it is based on a complete literature review for each category of the survey to locate the relevant arguments and hypotheses.

The second chapter begins with Egyptian foreign and security policies towards Israel and Palestine in the light of the *Social Constructivist* approach to *national identity*. It covers the Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar al-Sadat periods with respect to the prevailing identity awareness, the process of identity construction and

its role in Egyptian foreign and security policies towards Israel and Palestine. It is argued that the difference in Egyptian foreign and security policies towards Israel and Palestine pursued by Nasser and Sadat reflected the difference in the construction of Egyptian identity by the two rulers. The Pan-Arabism of Nasser characterized Israel as an outsider in the Arab world and as an enemy, and the Palestinians as belonging to the Arab 'us', whose historical rights on Palestine must be asserted through military action. On the other hand, the emphasis on a distinct Egyptian national identity, manifest in the *Egypt First* vision of Sadat, resulted in viewing Israel as a legitimate neighbour state, and the Palestinians as a neighbour society whose rights of statehood was not the primary goal of Egypt.

Following to Israel, the chapter explores Egypt-Turkey relations, from the time of the rise of the modern Turkish state to the present, in terms of modernism, ideological trends, international alliances, and position in world politics. It argues that during the Cold War, Ankara and Cairo's international stances shaped their relationship with each other. During this period, the relationship between Turkey, an actor in Western bloc and Egypt, and an actor in third world, was hostile. Post-cold war era opportunities were missed that the initiatives of Özal, Erbakan, and Ecevit during the 1990s aimed at a multidimensional foreign policy to broaden and deepen relations with Cairo. These, however, failed, because of Mubarak's unwillingness towards closer relations with Ankara.

The same chapter discusses Egypt-Iran relations based on national level analysis of foreign and security policies and the hypothesis that the character of the domestic political regimes that emerged after the successful revolutions in Tehran and Cairo determined inter-state interactions. The chapter divides the relations between the two nations into four phases: (1) the monarchical period (2) after the Arab revolution in 1952 (3) after the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 and finally, (4) after the Tahrir Revolution in 2011. Here, it is claimed that revolutionary upheavals in these countries influenced the nature of the relations between them.

Chapter Three covers the period from the Mubarak era to the Arab Spring in Egypt. The first two parts attend to the domestic situation in Egypt under Mubarak's rule. The first part discusses the type of regime, elections, economy, political parties, distribution of political power, the Emergency Law, and civil-military relations, in

order to indicate the causes of the rise of the opposition movement and the road to revolution. The second part, discusses the main social movements and agents that brought about the uprising: *the Muslim Brotherhood*, the *Kefaya,* and the *April 6 Youth Movement*. The third part focuses on Egyptian foreign and security policy during the Mubarak era, referring to the key issues (the geo-strategic position of the country, economy, and political legitimacy) and the actors (Israel, the USA, and Egypt) in the Middle East. This part elaborates on two main areas: (1) foreign and security policy as instruments of regime survival and political legitimacy; (2) Egyptian foreign and security policy during the Mubarak era as a struggle to strike a balance between three things, Mubarak's commitments to Israel and to the USA, Egypt's national interests, and Mubarak's abiding concern with restoring his relations with the Arab world.

The last part of the chapter evaluates the 2011 uprising and Arab Spring in Egypt from actor-based and issue-based perspectives, without advancing any theoretical claims or hypotheses. The assumption is that it is too early to predict the direction that the changes unfolding in the region will ultimately take. In order to arrive at a causal explanation of the uprising, this part examines Egypt's foreign policy, political legitimacy, media, military, and economic performance. The revolution is reviewed through the eyes of the following factors: women, opposition groups, foreign powers (The USA, Russia, China, Iran, and the EU), Christian minority (the Copts) and Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).

Chapter Four presents the results of the survey's analysis through fifteen tables. The results of the survey are narrated in a descriptive manner, indicating the valid numbers and percentages. It also includes Factor Analysis and Variance Tests with their results.

In the concluding part, the evaluation of the data precedes the conclusion. The results of the survey are compared with the themes and arguments in the literature covered of the second and third chapters. Here, the themes and arguments are re-referred in order to gauge the influence of public opinion on the particular issues and actors.

CHAPTER ONE
PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY

One of the fundamental issues in Turkey's academic life is the teaching of methodology at universities and institutions. Turkey, as a major economy, is a member of the G-20, does not have a correspondingly significant position in terms of scientific contributions and writings (www.bilkent.edu.tr, 2010). There are several reasons for this and the problems in the teaching of methodology constitute major reason that is supposed to be addressed.

Academicians in Turkey attach great importance to literature review. One cannot insist on the superiority of one particular research method in the social sciences. However, in the domain of IR, one should give due importance to the quantitative research methods. Most would agree that incorporating quantitative methods and studies is likely to improve the quality of scholarship and the scientific character of IR studies.

We, in Turkey, should also take into consideration that the nature of social phenomena in international relations in the 21st century is complicated and multi-dimensional, and it encourages us to follow a multi-disciplinary approach. Globalization, technological developments, transformation of knowledge, growth of the social media and the erosion of borders has created a more complicated situation in foreign policy. Consequently, foreign policy analysis today should draw on the contribution of other social domains as sociology, culture, economy, domestic politics and history.

1.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the complicated world of the 21st century, public opinion can be one of the significant variables determining foreign policy. The Free Dictionary by Farlex (www.thefreedictionary.com, 2013) defines public opinion as 'a belief or sentiment shared by most people; the voice of the people'. Foyle (1999: 21) describes the concept in academic terms as 'those opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed'.

The two main schools of IR have different positions on the issue of public opinion and its influence upon foreign policy. *Realists* do not attach any importance to the role of public opinion in foreign policy. According to the school, decisions in foreign policy are the outcome of rational calculations and cost-benefit analysis (Elman, 2008: 18). States as the actors in the anarchical world system seek survival and neither leadership nor public opinion matter in the calculation process (Grieco, 1997: 170; Drezner, 2008: 53). In other words, the structure of the world and the interest perception and calculations of the actors shape foreign policies.

Lippmann (1955: 83) regards the public as a dangerous and irrational force. According to him, public opinion is significant only in elections and not after it. For him, the public cannot administer the government. Foyle (1999: 6)'s famous statement is another instance of the Realist view of public opinion: "We should lead the public opinion, not follow".

The *Liberal* school of IR holds an opposite view. According to the school, public opinion can influence foreign policy in two ways (Risse-Kappan, 1991: 481): (1) *Bottom-up Approach*- the general public opinion has an impact on foreign policy decisions, and the leaders follow the attitudes of the public while making foreign policy. (2) *Top-down Approach*- the public opinion involvement in foreign policy is based on the influence of leaders and political elites on the public. Through different instruments such as mass media, speeches, construction of identity and limited sharing of foreign policy secrets, the decision makers manipulate public opinion and bring it into line with their own position.

Democratic Peace Theory developed on the assumption that public opinion influences foreign policy in a peaceful way (Doyle, 1983: 222). However, this assumption of the peaceful influence of public opinion is only applicable to democratic regimes. Thus, the advocates of the theory did not see it as applicable to Egypt, which had been a one-party and one-man regime. There might be two counter-arguments to this approach. The first is that Egypt is now in transition towards democracy and the participation of political parties in the previous election was a significant step in that direction. Although we cannot be sure of the extent of the influence of public opinion on policies, the structure of domestic institutions,

politicians and decision-making processes in the future, we can reasonably argue that there will be a greater degree of public influence as compared to Mubarak's era.

Secondly, the liberal arguments regarding public opinion-foreign policy interactions are somewhat misleading and do not adequately explain the case of Egypt. Public opinion was significant in Cairo even in the past. Notwithstanding the government's suppression of opposition groups, Egyptians were able to find ways to voice their opinion on foreign policy. Governmental oppression failed to prevent the birth of alternative movements in the country. The Muslim Brotherhood, the Kefaya, and the 6 April Movement expressed their opinion on the foreign and security policies of the regime. Moreover, some famous members of the religious and political elite in the country sought to challenge the security and foreign policy preferences of the regime through mobilizing the public with alternative information and arguments. Mohammed ElBaradei and the theologian Yusuf al-Qaradawi are those well-known examples. Further, there were, in Egypt, certain radical groups who had strong opinions on the 'wrongdoings' of the regime in foreign policy. Factions of al-Qaeda in Egypt challenged the legitimacy of the regime on the grounds of its foreign policy, defined the regime as the 'near enemy' (Henzel, 2005: 71), and pursued and advocated the radical path of regime change. A prime example of this is the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat by al-Jihad, in response to his peace with Israel.

A remarkable instance of public opinion shaping foreign policy during the transition period is as follows. Israeli soldiers killed some Egyptians in Sinai in August 2011. In response, there was a mass protest of Egyptian citizens at the Israeli embassy in Cairo. Those protests compelled the SCAF, which was ruling the country until the presidential elections, to minimize their diplomatic relations with Israel and close down the Israeli embassy in Cairo.

We should note here that the Arab Spring in Egypt and the Tahrir Revolution, discussed in Chapter Three, has the following interesting feature: The regime that this revolution overthrew tried to earn legitimacy through its actions in the realm of foreign policy. Nevertheless, it was the regime's foreign and security policy, within the framework of its overall politics, which was primarily instrumental in bringing about mass disaffection with the regime.

1.2. HOW TO MEASURE PUBLIC OPINION

Earlier, one frequently measured public opinion in spheres such as elections, consumer behaviour, demographic characteristics, and so on. However, since the 1990s, measuring public opinion has become a new tool of IR analysis. Today, tink-tanks, political parties, and institutions periodically undertake studies to measure public opinion in the sphere of foreign policy. The European Union's Eurostat[1] is one of the best functional examples of an organization that produces statistics on public opinion on major issues, including public perception of foreign and security policy.

In Turkey, the number of institutions and studies that focus on public opinion on IR has increased dramatically. The establishment of tink-tanks, the interest of political parties, and the internationalization of academic life in Turkey has improved the quality and increased the number of public opinion surveys.

There are different ways of measuring public opinion. Interviews, surveys, and media studies are the most common methods. The interview is an important method, especially in areas where the sources of information are limited (Cherry, 2000: 49). The information from interviews can sometimes stimulate new hypotheses and theories or open up new areas of study.

The second method, the survey, is a set of questions on a subject prepared to analyse an available sample according to the survey design. Through the survey, we can delineate a general framework of political, religious, and cultural perceptions of the selected universe. However, survey techniques encourage for a systematic, ticklish research design with the collaboration of correct usage of the analysis types (Güneş, 2010).

1.3. SURVEY AS A QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH METHOD

The birth of the survey goes to the early years of 1920s, when mainly sociologists used it to describe the main trends and characteristics of a given society. Today, the social sciences apply it in an increasing number of fields as a tool of research. Isaac and Michael (1997: 136) define the survey as follows:

[1]For details, visit, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/

> *To answer questions that have been raised, to solve problems that have been posed or observed, to assess needs and set goals, to determine whether or not specific objectives have been met, to establish baselines against which future comparisons can be made, to analyse trends across time, and generally, to describe what exists, in what amount, and in what context.*

The survey can be used for the purposes of description, explanation, or exploration. It offers the opportunity of generalization from the sample to the related total population. The fact that we must infer the universal from the particular, leads to the first fundamental requirement in conducting successful surveys the researchers should be certain of the representativeness of their samples. The second requirement is to possess basic historical and contextual information of the issue / area / actors that one is planning to study on.

One can classify surveys into two types in terms of time. The first one is the cross-sectional survey, where scholars collect their data at one point of time. The other is longitudinal survey, where the scholar chooses to collect her data at different points in time over a particular period. In this particular study, a cross-sectional design is used to answer the research questions.

Glasgow (2005: 2) lists the steps of a survey as follows: Survey Design, Designing the Survey Instrument, Survey Execution and Data Analysis/Reporting, etc. (as one can see in Figure 1.1)

Figure 1.1: Steps of the Survey



Source: Guyette, (1983: 49).

At the design stage, the scholar should decide on the sampling and then identify the desired response rate, level of accuracy for the survey, and, finally, the sample size. Figure 1.2 depicts the sampling methods, showing that there are two types of sampling: Probability Sampling and Non-Probability Sampling. Probability sampling refers to a mode of sample selection that is based on chance. Here, each member of the population has an equal probability of being selected. In non-probability sampling, the researcher's decision plays an important role in sample selection. These two main sampling methods have their sub-versions: Random, Systematic, Stratified, and Cluster under Probability Sampling; and Quota, Purposive, and Convenience under Non-probability Sampling.

Figure 1.2: Sampling Methods



Source: Mitchell and Jolley, (1988: 284).

Instrument development in survey design refers to the content of the questions. According to Engel and Schutt (2010: 24), the questions should be brief, easily comprehensible and ethical, and the questionnaire should be feasible, i.e. the respondent should be able to complete her response within the given time. The researcher should be careful about avoiding biased phrasing while writing the questions.

The authors mentioned above indicate three methods of conducting surveys: (1) Interviews in which the researcher follows a verbal method, where the respondent answers orally, and the researcher writes down the responses. (2) Written questionnaires, to which the respondents respond through appropriate words or symbols in the designated space. (3) Mixed type, in which the researcher combines the above methods.

Data analysis and reporting are the final steps in which the researcher puts together the results, analyses them, addresses inadequacies and produces reportable or applicable outcomes.

1.4. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE SURVEY CONDUCTED IN EGYPT

The aim of this study is to arrive at a general framework of perceptions of foreign and security policies in Egypt after the Arab Spring. Further, the duration of the survey was significant that in the re-emerged Egypt after the revolution, attitudes and perceptions of Egyptians are significantly valid and reasonable to exploit. The foreign and security policy of post-revolution Egypt is a new and controversial subject and most studies today tend to have a predictive nature. This study will provide policy-makers with an opportunity to gauge the influence of public opinion on foreign policy. Moreover, the results of the survey will provide scientifically rich inputs for scholars interested in Egyptian and the Middle East politics.

Egypt occupies a significant place in the world politics. First, Egypt is a major power in the Islamic, Arab worlds and in the African continent. Egyptians have an influential voice in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Egyptian public opinion is likely to count not only in the Egyptian domestic scene but also in the politics of the West Asia and Africa. The revolts that followed the Tahrir is a prime example of this. Egyptian revolt had a domino effect in the region and other Arab countries such as Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, and Libya followed their Egyptian brothers and sisters.

To measure the Egyptian perception of foreign and security policy after the revolution, a survey questionnaire consisting of 72 questions was prepared and the results were analysed with the help of the SPSS Statistics programme. For studying the historical context, the researcher's application to the *Egyptian Research Scholarship* (www.meb.gov.tr, 2011) in 2010 was ratified by The Turkish Ministry of Education and the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara. After spending the first semester in 2011-2012 to acquire proficiency in Arabic, integrate myself into the social environment, and observe the social and political scenario, by February 2012, the survey questions were finalised and the survey was started.

The study exploited the simple random sampling for the survey and restricted the sample to Egyptian university students. A minimized sample set drawn only from Cairo University students was later expanded the sample set to include students from all universities in Egypt excluding foreign students. First, face-to-face interviews based on a written questionnaire; second, through the internet, by uploading the

questionnaire to the *Google Drive* and informing the prospective respondents mostly through the social media were the means to procure the responses.

The literature review and previously similar survey studies contributed significantly to the formulation of the issues and questions. The main sources that helped to shape our survey questions are the studies by Telhami (2011) and TESEV (2011).

The survey questionnaire consists of 10 sections[2]: D-Demography (7 questions), S-Arab Spring (4 questions), E-Egypt (11 questions), T-Turkey (10 questions), U-The United States of America (6 questions), C-Israeli-Arab Conflict (8 questions), IR-Iran (4 questions), G-Global Perspective (5 questions), ME-The Middle East (4 questions), M-Media (3 questions).

Nominal, ordinal and scale type of questions were used in the survey. 'Strongly disagree', 'disagree', 'neither agree nor disagree', 'agree' and 'strongly agree' were the answers given to the ordinal type questions. Only on the section for Turkey followed the scale type, with rates ranging from 0 (very negative) to 10 (very positive). Initially, the questions were in Classical Arabic (فصحى العصر). After the pilot survey, however, it was noticed that Egyptians had difficulties in understanding Classical Arabic. Therefore, the content was rendered into Egyptian Arabic (مصرى).

Both the written questionnaire and its internet version contain an introductory page at the beginning. This provided the basic information about the survey purpose, the survey contents, request for voluntary participation and contact information.

In the beginning, 30 surveys were conducted as pilot cases to locate problems with the survey and the responses of the students. The first problem that surfaced was the language of the questionnaire. This was solved, as mentioned before, by changing the dialect to Egyptian. The students were more comfortable with the new text. The second problem was the response to the following question: 'Which of the following countries you think will have a better economy 20 years later?'. We found a considerable number of respondents writing 'Egypt' in the empty space adjacent to the query, instead of marking the appropriate response. Then, we modified the question as follows: 'Which of the following countries, *excluding Egypt*, do you think will have a better economy 20 years later?'

[2] The full text of the questionnaire is available in the appendix.

Another problem that surfaced was collaborative response. After receiving the questionnaire, some students started discussing the questions with each other and came up with similar answers. In such cases, we requested the students not to discuss the questions among themselves and to give their own answers, uninfluenced by the opinions of other respondents.

The fourth observation in pilot implementation was the additional information that we were supposed to answer. Mostly, two questions rose as additional information related to the content of the questions. (1) Is Iran Shia or Sunni, (2) Is Turkish society/and myself secular or Muslim? It was an interesting observation that they planned to give an answer according to those additional information.

A few students did not complete the survey. Some of them had to leave because of their classes, others got tired of answering 72 questions. Some students dropped out from the fear of providing answers that revealed their political attitudes. Those were instances of the fear, which characterized the Mubarak era, continuing to linger.

Another significant observation in connection with the survey was the presence of Turkey's soft power in Egypt. On introducing myself, I frequently faced questions about famous Turkish TV series and about the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and was welcomed by smiling faces. Generally, Egyptian society and bureaucracy are very friendly towards Turkish students in the campus and the country.

According to the Cairo University regulations, being a student at that University was supposed to render me eligible for conducting the particular survey. In addition, the scholarship, sponsored based on inter-governmental agreement between Egypt and Turkey, ensured my freedom to conduct the study. However, the process of transition following the revolution and the consequent administrative indecisiveness created a climate of uncertainty and difficulties in the way of conducting the study.

In order to be certain, an appointment was got from the office of Public Relations (العلاقات العامة) under the president of Cairo University to get the information on the process of getting permission. The officers informed me that

being a student at the university and possessing the student identity card rendered me eligible for conducting the survey.

After copying the survey, we started the survey among students inside the campus and at the Giza Students Hostel near the campus. On the third day, while conducting the survey near the Department of Literature, the security staff of the university took me to their office. They questioned me about who I was, what I was doing with a questionnaire full of political questions, for whom I was doing this, whether I am Muslim, whether I am Sunni, etc. They repeatedly asked me whether I had paid the students in return for participating in the survey. They also asked the participating students whether I had paid them. The answers did not convince them. Therefore, they requested a professor from the department of English Language and Literature to ask the same questions in English.

They stopped me from carrying on the survey and asked me to get a written permission,—from where they could not specify. I did not know which authority to approach in this regard. I wrote a letter to the presidency of the university. The letter was forwarded to the Dean of the Faculty of Literature (where we had our Arabic classes). The Dean's office asked me to go to the Turkish Embassy in Cairo and procure a letter certifying that I was from Turkey and this survey was for my thesis.

Interestingly, the letter of my advisor was unable to procure the letter from the embassy, although the embassy was responsible for incoming students during their stay in Egypt. The secretariat informed over phone that the ambassador had checked the survey and decided not to give the required certificate. The justification they offered for their refusal was more tragic: 'The embassy does not want to create an impression in Egypt that Turkish students in this country are involved in illegal activity'.

The next day, the security staff at the university again invited me to a meeting. They apologized and stated that they merely wanted to be sure. They said that they were suspicious because of the political questions in the survey and gave back the filled-up survey sheets. It is not difficult to understand their uncertainty, since only a month earlier, the Egyptian Security had arrested 19 Americans, including students, researchers and NGO staff, on the charge of illegal foreign funding, as part of an on-going crackdown on nongovernmental organizations

(Fahmy, 2012). This must be the reason why they repeatedly asked whether I was paying the Egyptian students for their participation.

The cause of the disappointment was the attitude of the Turkish Embassy in Cairo. If they had given the required certificate, the survey could have finished in the campus much earlier. Going to the Dean's office to pursue the request for the permission was not possible since the letter of certification from the embassy was not taken. It was an interesting experience that led to wonder about my status and identity in Egypt. The Turkish ambassador in Egypt, who is supposed to help Turkish students in that country, created hindrances in the way of this research. To feel yourself in the Turkey of the 1990s and realize the continuing power and role of the bureaucratic practices in a Turkey undergoing democratization and actively seeking EU membership were inevitable.

In May 2012, as per the agreement, the scholarship ended. Thereafter, the questionnaire was uploaded to the Google Drive to post the survey online in university, faculty, and department web pages through the social media. Secondly, we employed snowball sampling. Thanks to the immense effort of my Egyptian friends, the study succeeded in getting the planned quota of survey respondents. By February 2013, 424 surveys was completed.

CHAPTER TWO
EGYPTIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ISRAEL-PALESTINE, TURKEY AND IRAN

This chapter begins with Egyptian foreign and security policies towards Israel and Palestine in the light of the *Social Constructivist* approach to *national identity*. Following to Israel, the chapter explores Egypt-Turkey relations, from the time of the rise of the modern Turkish state to the present, in terms of modernism, ideological trends, international alliances, and position in world politics. The same chapter discusses Egypt-Iran relations based on national level analysis of foreign and security policies.

2.1. EGYPT'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES TOWARDS ISRAEL AND PALESTINE

Shortly after the survey commenced, it was found that Egyptian students had difficulty in answering questions related to their identity. The questions were: (1) 'Which of the following is your most important identity?' (2) 'Which of the following is your second most important identity?' The various options that followed were 'Egyptian', 'religious', 'Arab' and 'citizen of the world'. The questions and the answers given by the students are significant in understanding their perception of foreign and security policies of Egypt.

This part of the chapter discusses Egyptian foreign and security policy with respect to Israel and Palestine. The discussion is from a *Constructivist Approach* with regard to *National Identity*, bearing in mind the following questions: Does national identity have any significance in analysing the foreign and security policy of a given country? How can we link the perception of national identity by Egyptians with Egypt's foreign and security policies?

2.1.1. National Identity and Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework

The Theory of Social Constructivism was born in the late 1980s and contributed academically to IR by introducing a new kind of foreign and security policy analysis. Alexander Wendt, a well-known exponent of the theory, demonstrated the relationship between national identity and foreign policy. For Wendt (1999: 130), materialism and positivism were not sufficient for understanding and evaluating the politics of IR. Scholars should also focus on normative aspects such as national identity, norms/values of a given country, perceptions, etc., and on the role of these normative instruments in decision-making and in the calculations and strategies of policy makers.

National identity is a core instrument of the theory in evaluating foreign and security policy. Vertzberger (1990: 268) defines the concept of national identity as "*Broad and general beliefs and attitudes about one's own nation, about other nations, and about the relationships that actually obtain or that they should obtain between the self and other actors in the international arena".*

This approach is sometimes confused with the Culturists' understanding of identity. For the Culturalist, identity is given and static, irrespective of time, actor, or place. The most famous exponent of this theory is Huntington. However, unlike the conception of identity in Culturalism, social constructivism holds that identity is constructed in a manner that implies that it is dynamic, changeable and context-dependent (Ignatief, 1998: 20). A second characteristic of national identity is closely related to the latter's dynamic nature. This is the process of identity construction, which we call the 'politics of identity'. From this follows the notion that the domestic politics of a given country is significant in foreign policy analysis and should be studied in detail.

The process of building Egyptian national identity was state sponsored and implemented from above (Joseph, 2000: 9). Further, this national identity was the reflection of the beliefs and vision of the leaders and was a state project. As in other similar instances elsewhere in the world, the leaders sought to propagate a set of ideas and beliefs among the whole community through a process that is called the 'construction of identity'. They exploited certain instruments such as education, media and new elitism to mobilize the nation under the umbrella of the new identity.

The third characteristic of national identity (which is directly related to foreign policy) is that the construction of national identity mostly goes parallel with the construction of the 'other' as a threat or an enemy. Leaders prefer an easy strategy for domestic mobilization under the new institutionalized identity by defining an 'outsider' as a threat to the newly defined entity. The positions of other identities are vital for the construction of the new identity. Policy-makers usually link the national identity to the issue of security, that is, the nation must struggle to protect 'us' against 'them'. Foreign and security policy of a country emerges as the core element of this protection against the 'external' threats. In his study, Wallace (1991: 65) has called this as `grand strategy' in foreign policy '*that foreign policy is about national identity itself: about the core elements of sovereignty it seeks to defend, the values it stands for and seeks to promote abroad'*.

This chapter discusses Egypt-Israel and Egypt-Palestine relationships from the time of the declaration of the State of Israel (1948) to Mubarak's era. Here it is argued that Egyptian foreign and security policy towards Israel and Palestine reflected the constructed national identities by Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar al-Sadat. The pan-Arabism of Nasser characterized Israel as an outsider and an enemy within the Arab world and the Palestinians as 'us', whose historical rights on Palestine must be asserted through struggle. On the other hand, the *Egypt First* vision of Sadat perceived Israel as a legitimate neighbour, and perceived the Palestinians as a neighbour society whose rights of statehood was not the primary goal of Egypt. Thus, in Sadat's vision, peace was the appropriate goal that would ensure security and that should guide foreign policy.

2.1.2. The Birth of the State of Israel

In the 19th century, the Jews lived in different parts of the world. In this period, anti-Semitism grew especially in the European continent, and pressures on Jewish communities continued to increase. The Jewish question troubled both Jews and the political leaders in the European continent. In response to the oppression, the Jews usually pursued the paths of Emancipation, Assimilation, Mosaic Religion and migration (to the USA and or to other safe regions such as the Ottoman Empire) (Kimmerling, 2002: 343). Theodor Herzl, an Austrian journalist, was initially a

proponent of emancipation as a solution. However, his unpleasant experiences changed his view (Kornberg, 1993: 125) and in 1895, Herzl wrote *The Jewish State* in which he argued for a homeland for the Jews in Palestine. As the founder of Zionist Movement, he convened and presided over the First Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897 and declared Zionism as a movement aiming to establish a home for the Jewish people in Palestine. Thereafter, Herzl pursued the path of trying to gain international support. He met British and Ottoman authorities to convince them of the need for a Jewish state in Palestine. However, London only offered the option of a Jewish state in Uganda and Sultan Abdul Hamid II refused the Zionist offer, to pay Ottoman debts in return for the permission for a Jewish state in Palestine (Umar, 2002: 423).

Although Zionism did not spread among Jews in the early years, the Jewish migration (Aliyah) to Palestine began. The Holocaust became the turning point in Jewish history. Jews in the world concluded that the alternatives of emancipation, mosaic religion, or immigration could not end anti-Semitism, and there was no alternative to Zionism for Jewish survival (Blumberg, 1998: 59–69). In 1917, Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, declared the future establishment of 'a national home for the Jews in Palestine as legitimate and necessary. This was the first international achievement of Zionism. Ottomans were defeated in World War I, and Britain received the mandate of administering Palestine. In 1947, came the famous UN Partition Plan, which prescribed a state for the Jews and another for the Palestinians and a special international regime for the city of Jerusalem.

In May 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared the State of Israel to the world, with reference to the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the UN Partition Plan of 1947. Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan declared war against Israel under the leadership of Egypt. British forces intervened in the war with Israel. Israel was able to defend itself against the Arab coalition and expanded its frontiers beyond that indicated in the UN Partition Plan in 1947.

2.1.3. Gamal Abdel Nasser and Pan-Arabism

In 1949, after his participation in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Nasser returned to Cairo and became actively involved in the activities of *The Free Officers Movement*. Later,

he became the chairperson of the organization. The Free Officers were not satisfied with the governance of the country under the influence of Britain. The election of 1950 did not bring the changes that could satisfy the movement. Nasser secretly planned declaring the independence of the Egyptian army from King Farouk. In January 1952, Egyptians came out in protest against Britain and the regime's 'worthless' policies. During this disorder, Nasser successfully led a *coup d'état*. He was good at managing the transition that culminated in the 1954 elections, and became the second Egyptian president after the establishment of the Republic. In 1955, Nasser published an academic article in the journal *Foreign Affairs*, where he described the previous regime as corrupted and as a system of foreign rule, misuse of governmental power, and the Egyptian Revolution as a national struggle.

Although Egypt gained formal independence from Britain in 1922, it continued to be largely under British control. The symbol of this continuity of colonialism was British control over the Suez Canal. Nasser's anti-Western stance, beliefs and perceptions were defined in the context of this colonial legacy (Smith, 2002: 108). An anti-Western post-colonialism accomplished the military coup d'état and provided a new direction for Egypt among the world's nations. From the alternatives, Arab, African, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean, Nasser chose Arab and produced a top-down, state-planned national identity—Pan-Arabism. He did not find the other options sufficiently attractive. He was in contact with the Muslim Brotherhood during his youth, but found that he could not agree with it. African identity was rather weak and not popular at that time. The Mediterranean, or indeed, any other identity connected to the West, was not an option because of this post-colonial stance of the rebels.

Gamal Abdel Nasser emphasized Arabism as the ideology of the state and the state focused on this new identity in its public declarations. Smith (1991: 115) describes the character of this new identity as follows: "In Nasser's Egypt 'the nation was viewed as sinless and seamless and the state (and leader) was seen as its political expression".

Pan-Arab mission came to dominate Egyptian politics (Jankowski, 1997: 199). For Nasser, Egypt was meaningful only if it strove for the freedom and unity of the Arab nation (Karawan, 2002: 159). The new legal system denied the alternative

identities, such as Islamic, Marxist-Leninist, and identities related to Europe made them illegal and tried to suppress them. A new bureaucratic elitism with strong ties to Arab nationalism was institutionalized.

In 1956, President Nasser asked for a new Egyptian constitution. The new constitution, which incorporated the philosophy of the regime, reaffirmed the six-point programme of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC): the destruction of colonialism, abolition of feudalism, ending of capitalist monopoly and control, creation of a strong army, establishment social justice and the creation of a democratic society (Peretz, 1959: 31). The new constitution prohibited multi-party system and only one party, *The National Union*, ruled the regime until the Sadat era. The slogan of the regime was '*By the people to work for realization of the aims of the revolution'*. The new constitution legitimized Pan-Arabism as a movement against imperialism. Gamal Abdel Nasser by himself underlined those characteristics of the new identity as follows: *'The constitution which we proclaim today marks the end of a long battle against foreign despotism and it marks the end of one struggle and the beginning of another…*' (Quoted from Peretz, 1959: 31).

The state-centric identity building process was time consuming. However, it later speeded up, especially after the Suez crisis in 1956. Nasser institutionalized new instruments to spread and consolidate the newly constructed national identity. Those were the state-controlled writing of history, new bureaucratic elites, a controlled media and a new judicial system directed especially against non-Nasserist movements. Nasser was famous for his enthusiastic radio speech, and the radio, called the 'Voice of the Arabs' became a medium to spread his Pan-Arabism throughout Egypt and the entire Arab world. The display of his portrait in public offices, patriotic songs sung by famous singers of the time, Umm Kulthum and Abdel Halim, extolling Nasser and Arab nationalism, were his other strategies. He banned alternative movements and had them declared unlawful. The Muslim Brotherhood was the main victim of the regime (Khaled, 2012) and the famous scholar Sayyid Qutb received death penalty during his rule.

The Egyptian foreign and security policies towards Israel and Palestine were founded on Nasser's pan-Arabism. According to Nasser, Israel, declared in 1948 on Palestinian territory, was an illegitimate occupier. Nasser, therefore, denied any

Israeli claim on Palestinian soil. Secondly, according to him, Palestine was a region belonging to the entire Arab nation, to which Egypt belonged. Therefore, the occupation of Palestine amounted to a direct threat to Egypt, and to the entire Arab nation in terms of the philosophy of pan-Arabism. Under the leadership of Egypt, all Arab states (which should unite as soon as possible) had to fight against Zionist occupation and for freeing of all Arab lands. His speech, on 26 July 1956 is a prime example of this notion. He said 'The people will stand united as one man to resist imperialist acts of treachery. We shall do whatever we like…' (Goldschmidt, 2008: 162).

Thirdly, Nasserism perceived the declaration of Israel as a new intervention of the imperialist West in Arab lands and sometimes viewed Zionism as a movement created in Europe by imperialists with the object of denying freedom, dignity and development to the sinless Arab nation (Meytal, 1997: 12). The Balfour Declaration and the UN Partition Plan of 1947 were adduced as evidence for this theory. In other words, the declaration of Israel served the same purpose as used to have during the age of imperialism. During the Nasser era, the conflict with the Israeli state was viewed as that between the Arabs and Israel and that is why it was described as Arab-Israeli conflict. Cairo refused to recognize the newborn state of Israel and fought against it in 1948, 1956 and 1967, when Nasser was alive.

In 1956, after the arming of Egypt by the Eastern bloc (via Czechoslovakia), Nasser's plans for Egyptian economic development and his pan-Arab ideal led him to nationalize the Suez Canal. Britain and France had been controlling the Suez Canal since the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. Although the concerned parties met in London, Britain and France were resolved not to relinquish their imperial advantage. In their view, the Suez was geo-strategically important for transporting Arab oil to Europe.

The arming of Egypt created fear in Tel Aviv, and in October 1956, Israel attacked Egypt to gain the advantage of first strike. Britain and France collaborated with Israel. War began between Egypt on the one hand and Israel, Britain and France on the other. Soviet Russia sided with Egypt and threatened Paris and London. With the involvement of the USA, the war became a major global event. The golden age of Pan-Arabism commenced with Nasser's success in nationalizing the Suez Canal.

This achievement established Nasser's fame in Egypt, the Arab world and the Third World countries. The world appreciated Nasser's achievement in leading the struggle against colonialism and nationalizing the canal, which signified the end of British control in Egypt. During his attendance to the Non-aligned Movement conference at Bandung, he was welcomed as a hero by other leaders (Köchler, 1982: 31). In 1956, he told a reporter, 'Arab nationalism has become the ideology of a whole region' (Vatikiotis, 1978: 228). Thus, Nasser was successful in bringing renown to himself and popularizing his ideology. 'All of us are Nasser' became the slogan of Egyptians and Arabs.

As elaborated earlier, pan-Arabism encouraged the unity of Arabs under one banner for the struggle against external enemies. Uniting Syria and Egypt under the banner of the United Arab Republic was its first step in this direction. Beginning in 1957, Syria experienced sharp political conflicts between the Communists and Arab nationalists. After his nationalization of the Suez Canal, Nasser became famous and popular in Syria, especially among the nationalists. However, Communists were getting stronger every day and the fear of a communist revolution in Damascus haunted the rulers of Syria. President Shukri al-Quwatli came up with the suggestion of a union with Egypt. In February 1958, he and Nasser declared the creation of 'The United Arab Republic'. In the same year, the constitution for this new political entity was adopted. This federal unification of two Arab countries provided tremendous hope for the Palestinians, who felt that a united Arab state offered the only means of fighting the Zionist threat. In Lebanon, civil war erupted in May 1958 between pro-West groups and pro-Nasser groups, which only ended after the UN intervention. King Hussein of Jordan interpreted the unification as a direct threat to his one-man regime and his ties with the UK. He turned for succour to Iraq, which was also ruled by the Hashemite dynasty. Unfortunately for Hussein, on July 14, the Ba'ath Party came to power following the coup d'état against King Faisal II. However, the new government was averse to unification.

Weak organization, Egyptian predominance in the union, unequal distribution of political power, centralization of power, disturbance within the Syrian army and communist activities ended the union in September 1961. In addition to his attempt to unify Egypt and Syria, Nasser supported the Tunisian struggle for independence

against France, the Algerian guerrilla warfare, and the failed revolutionary movement in Yemen.

After the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the collapse of the union with Syria, Nasser looked forward to a programme of economic development. He followed an economic model based on state ownership of enterprises, which was later called 'Arab socialism'. He joined his main project of pan-Arabism with socialism. His anti-colonial stance made him hostile to the liberal economic model. Moreover, he was able to observe the Syrian model of Arab socialism during the union with Syria. Further, in the third world, there was a general wave of pursuing the socialist model of economic growth. In addition, linking socialism to pan-Arabism provided Cairo with the opportunity of getting economic aid from Moscow in order to meet its capital needs.

Nasser's other contribution to the Middle East was the foundation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). In 1964, under Egypt's leadership, the PLO was accepted as the legitimate representative of Palestinian Arabs. Ahmad Shukeiri became the first leader of the organization. Pan-Arabism was the ideology of this new player in the Middle East (Khalidi, 1997: 183). Palestinians were looking forward to a pan-Arabic solution to their problem. They felt that if the Arabs could completely unite against Israel, only then would they be able to end Zionist occupation of Palestinian lands and bring freedom to the Palestinians. Nasser was not only an Egyptian leader; he was also the hero of Palestinian Arabs. According to the PLO, only he could be the saviour of Palestine.

The mid-1960s were full of action in the Middle East. The new government in Syria changed their tactics against Israel. Border disputes and the issue of using the water of the Jordan River created tension between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states of Jordan and Syria. In November 1966, three Israeli soldiers lost their lives in a mine explosion at the Israel-Jordan border and, in retaliation, Israel bombed al-Suma, a border village in Jordan. Egypt and Syria instituted a joint defence programme against Israel and Jordan joined the programme. Tel Aviv considered this defence coalition a preparation for war against Israel. The Russian, British and American intelligence services, with their misinformation and wrong predictions,

created another dimension of the war of 1967. Israel once again followed an aggressive strategy of pre-emptive strikes and bombed Egypt.

Nasser had not prepared for a war and the Egyptian army was not ready. The president was busy with economic modernization and development. There was no preparation against Israeli aggression. The joint defence programme was only a strategy of deterrence. Israel seized the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria and East Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan. Unprepared Egypt lost twenty thousand soldiers. Their radars failed to detect Israeli air attack and within the first hour of the war, the entire Egyptian air force was destroyed.

Figure 2.1: Lands Occupied by Israel in 1967

Source: BBC, (2013a).

Egypt suffered humiliating defeat in the Six-Day War. The loss of Sinai, which was important for tourism and movement via Suez, shocked Egypt. A feeling of insecurity spread over the country. 'Nasser, the hero', who had defied Israel, Britain and France in 1956, lost his prestige and the erosion of Nasserist ideology began. Nasser described the situation as the most grave in the history of modern Egypt. The society was divided and large groups went on strike. They directly chew up pan-Arabism and Nasser's regime with the core characteristics. The number of Nasser admirers declined. From the standpoint of Egyptian interest, it appeared that pan-Arabism and Nasserism had created insecurity in Egypt and caused the loss of Egyptian territory.

The strategy of refusing to accept the reality and power of the Israeli state and conducting war to wrest Arab lands from Israel did not succeed. Nasser himself changed his way of thinking. He said in a speech, 'Today there is no possibility of closing our eyes and speaking about beliefs or dreams' (quoted from Meytal, 1997: 28). According to Meytal (1997: 16), after the war, Nasser began looking for a practical political solution to the post-war situation through the involvement of international bodies. In the same year, Cairo sought the help of the United Nations. Cairo's efforts resulted in the famous resolution number 242, calling Israel to give up occupied territories. Not surprisingly, Israel refused, and subsequently used the occupied lands as a bargaining counter for peace and recognition by the Arab states (Reef, 2009). In 1970, Nasser fell sick and passed away after a heart attack.

The consequences of the war were more dramatic for the Palestinians. Some seven thousand Palestinian troops participated in the war near Egypt, but the result was the expansion of Israeli occupation. The credibility of Nasser and Pan-Arabism was destroyed. This forced the Palestinians to question the core assumption of pan-Arabic support for their cause. They had to face the reality that the freedom of Palestine would not come from outside. In other words, they began to realize that subjugation to Israel was their problem and they could not expect pan-Arabism to solve it. Nasser himself admonished the PLO to treat the UN Resolution 242 as an option. This forced the PLO to change its strategy towards Israel. Simultaneously, they began looking for a new ideology to replace Nasserism. The intra-group dynamics within the PLO and Israelis' alliance with the Western powers encouraged the PLO to transform themselves into a secular-socialist movement in the 1970s.

In 1968, the PLO adopted guerrilla warfare as their new strategy against Israeli occupation. The members of the guerrilla squads were called *Fedayeen*. They were based on Jordan, and this created a new tension between Jordan and Israel. In September 1970, King Hussein ordered a military operation against Palestinian refugee camps and around twenty thousand Palestinians lost their lives (Gowers and Walker, 1992: 91). The exile of the PLO continued until its recognition by Israel and the USA in 1994. After the expulsion from Jordan, the PLO had to move to the south of Lebanon to relocate. This time, Palestinian refugees and the Palestinian question became the domestic issue of Beirut. Civil war erupted in 1976, which created a new

crisis that continues to the present. The PLO realized that they could not base themselves in the territories of their 'Sister Arabs'. They learned from their bloody experiences in Jordan and Lebanon that theirs was not an Israeli-Arab conflict, but was an Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that the support from non-Palestinian Arabs would be limited and not enough to earn their freedom.

2.1.4. Anwar al-Sadat and 'Egypt First'

Anwar al-Sadat, the third president of the Egyptian republic, served until his assassination in October 1981. He had a journalist background and wrote two books: *In Search of Identity* and *Revolt on the Nile*. The title of the first book summarizes the politics of Egypt during his presidency. His search for identity did not continue for long and the slogans written on the boards of today's Cairo, 'Egypt First and Forever' (مص أولا وأخيرا) is his legacy.

During the Nasser era, he was the vice-president of the republic and was elected the president after Nasser died in September 1970. Like Nasser, he came from a revolutionary background and was actively involved in *The Free Officers Movement*. His name took place in the history of the country with his involvements in assassination attempts against kingdom and his ruling class. He also spent years in prison. He went to Yemen on a pan-Arabic mission. During the Nasser era, he was a Nasserist and a 'yes-man' politician and this was the basic reason of his ascent in Egyptian politics.

His experiences during the Nasser era changed his perception towards the world and Egypt. However, he kept his analysis to himself (Reich, 1990: 459) and waited for the proper time and opportunity. As stated previously, Sadat's search for a new identity was almost over long before he assumed power. What he did after assuming power was to build the foundations of this new national identity in Egypt. In discussing Sadat's national identity-building process, one can identify three phases: (1) domestic reform, (2) declaration of the new national identity and (3) its consolidation.

The process of domestic reforms started in 1970. Until 1973, Sadat focused on domestic politics, and his actions testified to his new vision of identity. He came to an understanding with the largest social movement in Egypt, the Muslim

Brotherhood, and renounced Arab socialism/Nasserism and communism (Goldschmidt, 2000: 174). He declared amnesty for the members of Muslim Brotherhood in prison and allowed them to carry on their organizational activities in mosques and universities. He changed the name of the country from *The United Arab Republic* to the *Arab Republic of Egypt*. In July 1972, he asked the Soviet staff (around twenty thousand), who assisted the country on military and technical matters, to leave the country.

During the first years, Nasserism was still influential among Egyptians. Public opinion, particularly student opinion, was often vociferous against the president for not doing something against Israel and about the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. Sadat formed alliances with Syria and Libya. He was aware that a historical achievement would raise his prestige. This would ensure his popularity and power, which would help him to undertake his country's transformation.

In their study, Podeh and Winckler (2004: 6) describe the mid-1970s in Egypt as a phase of 'de-Nasserisation', and the authors list the reasons why Sadat's new identity-building strategy had to be gradual. First, there was a large bureaucracy appointed by Nasser, and Sadat needed time to replace them. Second, he had to deal with Nasserists and communists by allying himself with the Muslim Brotherhood. He was looking forward to a grand success in acquiring legitimacy. Finally, he was concerned about Egypt's relations with other Arab nations and wanted to be sure about their reactions.

In September 1971, the People's Assembly adopted the fourth Egyptian constitution. The Constitutional Proclamation defined the inhabitants of the country as the 'people of Egypt' and 'peace through freedom' was listed as the second main feature of the philosophy of the new regime (www.wipo.int, 2007). Thus, the new regime under Sadat declared Egyptian identity and peace as the basic concerns of the new era.

During the holy month of Ramadan, Egypt and Syria jointly conducted a surprise attack on Israel. Israel was in shock and within a few days, Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal. Israel succeeded in defending itself and in capturing Egyptian cities. Both the Eastern and Western blocs of the Cold War got involved and conducted diplomatic negotiations for ending this fourth Israeli-Arab war.

Egypt gained in the diplomatic sphere, and Israel had to relinquish parts of the Sinai Peninsula. Thus, Sadat succeeded in restoring Egypt's honour and the morale of the Egyptians, which had suffered greatly in the humiliation of 1967. Recapturing Sinai provided him with the historical achievement he was looking for, and the glory he earned gave him the power and popularity to make the radical reforms that he had planned long ago. The war had brought him the legitimacy he required to implement his ideas and policies (Daly and Petry, 1998: 359).

In 1974, Sadat introduced a bundle of domestic reforms known as *Infitah (*انفتاح; *The Opening)*. 'The Opening' was the political and economic liberalization of Egypt. Sadat aimed at changing the main economic characteristics of the previous regime: state controlled economy and centralization of power. In economy and finance, he introduced reforms to import technology and attract foreign direct investments. He also encouraged foreign capitals and financial sector. Nasser's practice of the nationalization came to a halt and a new process of privatization began. Cairo reduced taxes and tariffs for foreign imports. However, he did not attain his aims of transforming the character of the economy. At present, there is still a great deal of dominance by the state, especially the military, in Egyptian economy.

In the political sphere, Egypt entered a phase of controlled and limited liberalization. Sadat stopped oppressing the opposition groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, to a certain extent and created a multi-party system. However, he followed the strategy of pre-emptive action against opposition groups (Ryan, 2001: 35). He wanted to ensure that the opposition did not jeopardize his position as the supreme arbiter in Egyptian politics. The new constitution of 1971 ensured this through a high degree of concentration of power in the hands of the president. He used judicial and bureaucratic power to control the opposition and, if necessary, to punish them. He also established an image of himself as a Muslim leader. In 1980, a constitutional amendment declared that 'Principles of Islamic law (Shari'a) are the principal source of legislation' (www.sis.gov.eg, 1971). He attached 'Mohammad' to his name, prayed regularly, tried to control the al-Azhar School for getting favourable fatwas and sought referendums to strengthen his position and the legitimacy of the regime.

In 1977, he disbanded the Arab Socialist Union that was established by Nasser and that had ruled the country for 25 years. The party was divided into three factions: the Rightists, the Leftists and the Centrists. The centrist faction, with Sadat's support, became the National Democratic Party, which ruled the country until the Arab Spring.

Karawan, in his study, considers the speeches and writings of Sadat as a significant indicator of his new vision for Egypt. Sadat replaced 'the interest of the entire Arab nation', advocated by Nasser, with 'Egypt First' as the central vision and overarching guide to action. On 9 November 1977, Sadat addressed the People's Assembly, where he made the following historical pronouncement (www.sadat.umd.edu, 2013): *'We are ready to go to Geneva and sit for peace talks…I am even ready to go to the Knesset and discuss with them…We should work to build a new future'*. Just after 10 days, he flew to Tel Aviv to address the Knesset- The Israeli Parliament. He started his speech after reading chapters from the Holy Quran that stressed on the concepts of love, justice, and peace in Islam. He reminded his audience of the era of Caliph Omar and Salahaddin Ayyubi, when Jews, Christians, and Muslims lived together in peace.

Sadat, in addressing the Knesset, spoke not as an Arab but as an Egyptian. Speaking from an Egyptian position, he distinguished the concerns of Egypt from those of Palestine and defined the Palestinian issue as that which concerned Palestinians. In accordance with his vision, he described the Palestinian Arabs as 'Palestinians' and Egyptian Arabs as 'Egyptians' in his speech. When he spoke of 'Arabs' in general, he meant independent Arab countries other than Egypt and Palestine.

He criticized Egyptian foreign policy during the Nasser era because it had rejected Israel and refused to negotiate with them. Those statements were Sadat's way of dealing with the 'mistakes of the past'. This was the moment of forsaking pan-Arabism and welcoming peace. While he was asking for the establishment of a Palestinian state, he was taking a regional position that if so, it would be a win-win position for all actors in the Middle East. He also added that Egypt's claim on its territories that were still under Israeli occupation was not negotiable and presented the redline of Egypt. He gave primacy to Egyptian interests with regard to Egyptian

territories. Sadat declared to the entire world that self-determination of Palestinians and the establishment of an independent Palestine or the Israeli occupation of other Arab lands were of secondary importance to him (Pace, 1981). This historical speech in Knesset was the declaration of Egypt's new national identity, which propelled the history of the Middle East, Israel and the Arab world in a new direction. President Sadat described his feelings as follows (quoted from Pace, 1981): *'This is certainly one of the happiest moments of my life. In all the steps I took, I was merely expressing the will of a nation. I am proud of my people and of belonging to them'.*

The US president Jimmy Carter played a historical role in the negotiations between Egypt and Israel. At Camp David, the negotiators came together for 13 days. On 26 March 1979, Anwar al-Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin signed the peace accord. Egypt recognized Israel as a state while Tel Aviv withdrew from the occupied territories. Later in that year, both leaders received the Nobel Peace Prize.

Stein (1999: 5) describes Anwar al-Sadat as a pragmatic leader, a strategist and tactician, with a long-term vision for Egypt. According to the author, Sadat viewed both the peace he had negotiated and the mediation of the USA as instruments for shifting Egypt's foreign policy orientation away from Moscow and towards Washington. For, only the USA could convince Israel of negotiating peace, and Egypt could gain the advantages of development, security and military modernization only through strategic partnership with the USA, which would be possible only after Egypt, had normalized its relations with Israel.

Sadat hoped for the continuity of peace negotiations between the Arab states and Israel after 1979. His plan was to make Egypt the mediator between Israel and the Arab states for a final and just peace. However, the Arab reaction was utterly hostile. In November 1978, the Arab leaders declared sundering diplomatic relations with Egypt and shifted the headquarters of the Arab League from Cairo to Tunis. Cairo was suspended from the Arab League, and he remained suspended until 1989. The states especially outraged by Sadat's decision for peace were Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen.

Without Egypt's military power, Israel had little to fear from the Arabs; because in the absence of Egyptian military strength, no Arab coalition could hope to

hold its ground against Israel. Thus, the Palestinian issue, the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, would remain an unresolved and destabilizing problem in the region. Hence, the Arabs were dismayed and felt betrayed by the Egyptian decision (www. lcweb2.loc.gov, 1990).

Sadat had anticipated the Arab reaction and envisaged a new Egypt in coalition with the Western world (mainly the USA). However, he was also aware of the negative image of Egypt in the West, as a legacy of its Nasserist past. He used the international media to deal with this challenge. He spent endless hours with the Western media and developed contacts with the Jewish lobby in the USA (Quand, 1988: 106).

The situation of the PLO and the Palestinians was more tragic. After the Black September in Jordan, they had to move to Lebanon to relocate. However, the outbreak for the civil war in Lebanon triggered rethinking in the PLO. They had to stop dreaming of Palestinian freedom via external help. In 1971, the Palestinian National Council adopted a charter that aimed for a democratic, secular and socialist state in Palestinian territory. When the Fatah assumed control of the PLO, they claimed it to be the vanguard for anti-Israeli struggle (Rubin, 1994: 124). The death of Nasserism and unpleasant experiences in Jordan and Lebanon forced them to find their own path to liberation.

PLO played no role in the 1973 war. Particularly, Syria discouraged their participation. Consequently, the Palestinians gained nothing after the war. This was another message to the PLO to refrain from viewing their struggle as an integral part of a general Arab resistance.

The PLO started perceiving the neighbouring Arab regimes as a threat to its own aims. The organization, which motive itself to free Palestine, noticed the notion that they could not gain their independences and the plans behind Jordan and Cairo is to expend their territories including Palestine.

After Sadat's peace with Israel, the Palestinians perceived Egypt as a threat (Saliba, 1975). Yasser Arafat, an alumnus of Cairo University, strongly criticized Sadat and actively involved himself in the anti-Sadat bloc to isolate Cairo (Dhanani, 1982). A new Syria, under the dictatorial rule of Hafez al-Assad and Iraq under Ba'ath rule became the new partners of the PLO. In addition, the Gulf States

financially supported the organization for the sake of domestic legitimacy, and the USSR, China and some Eastern European countries provided arms for the organization.

Sadat acted as intermediary between the USA and the PLO, requesting the latter to accept the UN Resolution 242. However, the attempt failed. Cairo, which was planning for a second peace accord between Israel and the PLO, was disappointed that both parties were extremely averse towards coming to terms.

Sadat failed to realize his aims either in the domestic sphere or in domain of foreign relations. Except Jordan, no other Arab state was inclined to negotiate peace with Israel, nor was an independent Palestinian state established. In the domestic sphere, there was no real improvement in the economy after 'the opening' and Cairo was isolated in the Arab and Muslim world because of its peace accord with Israel. Sadat's popularity in the country declined and opposition to his regime increased. He tackled domestic opposition in an authoritarian manner through censorship and imprisonments. In May 1979, Egypt conducted a rigged referendum for procuring approval for the peace treaty. Around 1500 people from the Muslim Brotherhood, journalists and the Christian community (Copts) were arrested. In the same year, he introduced the Law of Shame, which gave wide powers to the police forces and judiciary to throttle criticism of the regime.

On 6 October 1981, while Sadat was observing the military parade celebrating the 6 October victory, members of Al Jihad movement assassinated him. The soldier who was sitting on his right was Hosni Mubarak, who became the next president of the republic. The key question is whether this assassination was a reaction to his peace with Israel. It seems that the peace with Israel was one of the motivations behind Al Jihad's action. However, one should note that the period preceding the assassination was the one in which the Islamic groups were under severe pressure from the regime. This, therefore, was another important motivation. It is significant that Sadat's assassination did not see grieving and lamenting crowds on the streets of Egypt, in contrast to the situation after Nasser died (lcweb2.loc.gov, 1990). The Egyptians carried on with their celebration of the Feast of Sacrifice. His peace with Israel remained as the legacy of Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt and contemporary Middle East.

2.2. EGYPT-TURKEY RELATIONS

In this part, Egypt's relations with another significant actor, Turkey discusses with respect to a short historical background, the Cold War Era, Post-Cold War Era and lastly to the last decade. Modernism, balance of power/position in world politics, leadership are the main concepts that used to divine those periods.

2.2.1. Early Years

The Ottoman Empire allied with Germany during World War I and the Suez Canal was only the zone of Ottoman attack. Through this attack, Germany aimed to occupy British-controlled Egypt to secure a position in the Near East, which was geographically important for the British as it contained the routes to the Far East. However, the Ottoman action failed. The Ottoman Turks lost the battle, they had to entrench itself in the Arab territories of Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, which France and Great Britain invaded. This ended the Ottoman rule in the Arab world.

The German coalition was defeated at the end of the war. Britain, France, Italy and Greece started occupying Ottoman lands after the Mudros Armistice Agreement in 1919.

Figure 2.2: Foreign Control in the Middle East After the World War I.



Source: www.coursea.matrix.msu.edu, (2013).

In 1919, the Young Turks started the recovery and reconstitution process to begin the war of independence against Armenians and Georgians in the East, and against the Greeks in the West. The history of contemporary Egypt-Turkey relations commenced during that time. In 1921, Hilal-ı Ahmer (Red Crescent) of Egypt sent

37,250 Liras to Ankara in order to support the Turkish struggle for liberty. Ankara was victorious and, in July 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, replacing the Sevres Treaty with the Ottomans. Articles 16 and 17 of the Treaty ended Turkish rights and functions in Egypt (www.mfa.gov.tr, 2013a). Although in reality, Egypt was not a part of the Ottomans since the French occupation of 1798, the Caliph retained a small number legal claims, and this treaty ended the Turkish involvement in Egypt. In October 1923, Ankara declared the Republic of Turkey as a new state.

In 1922, Egypt emerged as an independent state after the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the monarch was appointed by London. Egypt was a semi-colony of Britain and the rulers had limited powers in domestic and in foreign policy. They were under the control of the British staff located in Cairo. In 1926, Egypt-Turkey diplomatic relations commenced through an exchange of diplomatic missions.

Egypt-Turkey relations during this period were at a symbolic level. Although the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was viewed as a hero and model for independence in eastern societies (Şimşir, 1999), this adulation was short-lived and only lasted until Atatürk abolished the caliphate and re-organized the regime on secular lines (Hattamer, 2001: 23).

In 1932, there was a diplomatic crisis between Cairo and Ankara. Hamza Bey, the Egyptian ambassador in Ankara, wore his fez to the reception on 29 October (The Republican Day in Turkey). Ankara, which had just abolished the fez, was annoyed at the ambassador's clothing. Atatürk (Tavukçu, 2009) accosted the ambassador and asked him to take off his fez. The ambassador immediately left the reception. The western media reported the incident and the Egyptian public came to know of it. There was public reaction in Cairo and Turkey had to make considerable efforts to normalize relations with Egypt because of this crisis.

During the single-party era, Turkey's foreign policy in general and towards the Middle East in particular was that of mostly staying aloof from the conflicts and new developments. In short, in this period, the general framework of Turkey's foreign policy towards other countries in that region was a passive one. (Oral, 2005: 337–339). The first reason for this was the on-going process of domestic reform. Turkey gave priority to the process of domestic modernization and did not concern itself much with outside events. The second reason was the dominance, in this

period, of more powerful states in the region. After the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire, the entire region was under the mandate of the League of Nations. France and Britain were in control of the Middle East. Turkey, as a less powerful state, was not in a position to involve itself in regional politics in defiance of London and Paris. Thirdly, Turkey's foreign policy was concerned only with the issues that remained as a legacy of the Lausanne Treaty. The treaty had left the fate of Mosul and Hatay to be decided through discussion between the concerned parties. Turkey was later able to enlarge its boundaries by gaining Hatay, but had to leave Mosul with British controlled Iraq.

Another aspect of the Turkish position was a perception of 'Arab treachery'. During World War I, Sharif Hussein and some Arab groups had cooperated with the British. This was seen as betrayal. Somehow, the new Turkish identity, which was a top-down state project, contained a large dose anti-Arab feeling (Ortaylı, 2009). However, recent studies have concluded that this kind of interpretation was erroneous as Sheriff Hussein represented a small minority among the Arab community and viewing his actions as representative of the position of all Arabs during the war was a misrepresentation of history (Kalın, 2007).

2.2.2. Cold War Era: Two Actors in Opposite Blocs

After the death of Atatürk, the period of transition to a multi-party system at the beginning of the Cold War, has the same time interval equal. In 1945, Soviet Russia demanded privileges on Turkish straits and asserted territorial claims in Eastern Anatolia. The Russian threat was the main agenda in Turkey's foreign and security policy during the Cold War (Stephen and Lesser, 2003: 162). The main thrust of Turkey's foreign policy during the Cold War was to ensure Turkish territorial integrity against the Soviet threat. The strategy that Ankara followed as rational, pragmatic and conducive to its national interests was to ally with the Western world, the NATO.

During the same period, the Middle East experienced the dynamics that shaped today's politics in that region. The birth of Israel, the Israeli-Arab wars, civil wars, and regime changes are prime examples. In this period, Turkey had a vision that was blatantly West-oriented and alienated the Middle East. Turkish foreign

policy in the 1950s and 1960s can be called as the golden age of Turkey's Westernized perception (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003: 120). Turkey was the first Muslim country that recognized the State of Israel (in 1949). Turkey also supported France during the Algerian Genocide. It also aligned itself with the West in the Lebanese Civil War.

Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru described the Turkish position and role in the 1955 Bandung Conference that Turkey represented the views of the United Kingdom and the United States. Moreover, Turkey put pressure on many countries to undermine the conference. In this, Turkey was more successful than the UK and the US had been (Akdoğan, 2008: 244).

Turkey supported Arab position in UNSCOP negotiations. Nevertheless, Turkey was the first Muslim country that recognized Israel as a state (soon after its birth, on 28 March 1949). This recognition has been mostly analysed in terms of Turkey's identity concerns that led Turkey to follow a Western-oriented foreign policy (Walker, 2006: 64). Egypt, after the revolution in 1952, classified countries according to their foreign policy preferences. No wonder, Turkey was 'other' instead of 'us' in Egyptian eyes.

In January 1952, Egyptians began protesting against its monarchical regime, which was doing nothing to end British influence and control in Egypt. The secret organization, the Free Officers, successfully overthrew the monarchy. Arab Nationalism in Egypt began with the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Egyptian foreign and security policies were mainly motivated by a desire to struggle against western imperialism for unifying the entire Arab community. President Nasser became the hero of the Arab world, which saw as its primary goal the defeat of Israel and the freedom of Palestine. In addition to this, the new Egyptian state became a leading member of the non-alignment movement.

The respective positions of Ankara and Cairo during the Cold War determined their relations. The relatively developed Turkish nation and the developing Egyptian nation viewed the each other as 'the other', and their relations were hostile during the Cold War.

The hostility between two countries surfaced during the Baghdad Pact Initiative. During 1950s, under British influence, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan

became the northern tier against Soviet expansion in the Middle East. The Egyptian President Nasser sharply criticized the pact. He declared this pact an imperialist plan to divide the Arab world and impose a new type of colonial yoke on Iraq. Turkey, one of the leading partners in the pact, was described as a participant in this game (Oren, 1992: 67). The second reason for Nasser's hostility was Turkey's relations with the State of Israel. Turkey's growing intimacy with Israel and Turkey's pro-western position in the growing crisis in the Middle East discomforted Nasser. When the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes sought a meeting with Nasser, the latter refused.

During the 1970s, the Turkish policy-makers reviewed their position with respect to the Middle East and shifted from a Western-oriented foreign policy to a more balanced one. The main motivation was the Cyprus dispute and Turkey's difficulties in finding foreign support for their military intervention in the island. Turkey, notwithstanding its pro-Western position against Arabs for a long time, hoped that the Muslim identity of the Turks in the island would ensure Arab and Muslim support for Turkey. However, this expectation proved wrong. Thereafter, Turkey re-considered its position with respect to the Middle East. In 1973, Turkey supported Egypt during Yom Kippur War, and the relations between the two sides became much warmer (Yalansız, 2012: 400). In 1975, Turkey supported the Arab initiative in the United Nations for a resolution that declared Zionism as a kind of racism. Turkey started diplomatic relations with the PLO and the PLO office at Ankara was opened in 1979. All those policies were a sign of normalizing its relations with the Muslim world in general, and the Arab world in particular.

Especially in the 1980s, Turkey shifted from pro-Israel position to a moderate one in favour of the Arabs. Turkey did not welcome Israel's occupying Jerusalem and declaring it as capital in 1980 (Blshku, 2006: 186). Immediately thereafter, Turkey reduced its diplomatic relations with Israel to a minimum, and this continued until the early 1990s.

In 1979, Anwar al-Sadat signed the peace treaty with Israel. Turkey welcomed this because it signified that Egypt had re-oriented its foreign policy on the lines of Turkey-solving the problem between two states through negotiations.

The government in Cairo also became friendlier towards with Cairo's shift of interest from Moscow to Washington.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, both Turkey and Egypt were isolated in the world politics because of their domestic developments. In the 1970s, Turkey experienced clashes and armed conflicts between right wing and left wing groups. Political stability was lost and almost every year the governmental coalitions collapsed, accompanied by political crisis. In September 1980, the National Security Council, led by the chief of the general staff, Kenan Evren, overthrew the civilian government and banned all political parties and unions. In November 1982, the country had a referendum to vote for the new constitution and the presidency of Evren for 7 years. In the 1983 elections (where only three parties participated), Turgut Özal's Motherland Party won. In 1987, Özal conducted another referendum for returning political rights to banned political parties and leaders. Turkey returned to the multi-party system. In the meantime, in Egypt in 1981, President Sadat had been assassinated and Hosni Mubarak had become the new president of the republic.

2.2.3. Post-Cold War Era: Opportunities and Challenges

When Mubarak became the new president of the republic, Egypt was isolated in the Arab world because of its peace with Israel. The primary goal of Mubarak was to normalize its relations with other Arab states. He proved successful. Boutros-Ghali (1982: 769) argued in his article that Egyptian foreign policy in the post-Sadat era has been directed towards two main challenges: how to contain Israeli ambitions and how to solve the Palestinian problems. Egypt preferred a strategy of disengagement from conflicts. Mubarak followed a pragmatic policy in the initial decades of his rule. Another problem that Mubarak faced was that of domestic opposition and some radical movements related to his foreign and security policies.

In the 1990s, Turkey's domestic politics and foreign policy underwent significant improvements and changes. There were two main reasons for those changes. The first was the end of the Cold war and newly established states in Euro-Asia, which meant new opportunities for Ankara. The second one was Özal's foreign policy initiatives (Çufalı, 2003). Turkey lost the opportunities because of Özal's death in 1993. Ahmet Davutoğlu (2003), in his book, *Strategic Debt*, argued that

despite the great opportunities for Turkey following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the country was not able to integrate in the political dynamics of this new world for two reasons: inability to anticipate the post-Cold War situation, and, secondly, lack of proper vision, institutions and politics.

In 1989, Özal became the President of the Republic after acting as the prime minister of Turkey for six years. Under his leadership, Turkish foreign policy deviated from the Kemalist tradition, destroying many taboos and refashioning itself (Ataman, 2002: 125). Özal aimed at a multidimensional foreign policy and he tried to improve its relations with Turkic republics, neighbouring countries, the Islamic world in general and Eastern Europe. It is significant to note here that Turkey still had a negative image in Egypt during that time because of its 'wrongdoings' in the history with references to either its Ottoman legacy or policies towards Palestine or political system. He viewed Turkey as a bridge between the East and West and started becoming more active in Middle Eastern politics (Sayari, 1992: 10). Although he had a new vision for Turkey in the world politics, his sudden death in 1993 initiated a new era in Turkish military dominance.

Turkey-Middle East relations again entered time of troubles after his death. Turkey's relations with Egypt as an Arab and Middle Eastern Islamic country took a turn for the worse in this new era. Turkish foreign policy, under the rule of the National Security Council (dominated by Turkish Armed Forces), targeted Islamism and Kurdish revolt/terrorist activities (H.P. Bilgin, 2008: 594). According to Ankara, the threat against the survival of the country came from two internal sources-the Islamists and the PKK. During this period, the PKK terrorist organization and its connection to Middle Eastern countries, especially Iran, Iraq and Syria, has led to strained relations. In 1995, Turkey was on the verge of war with Syria. Internal threats and Turkey's foreign policy preferences influenced its policies towards the Middle East, characterized by a theme of hard power. Mubarak took the initiative for a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Turkey and Syria and the Baath regime in Syria had to remove the terrorist base in Syria.

Secondly, the Turkish army improved its relations with Israel. Many military treaties were signed, and this period was the golden age of Turkey-Israel relations. Turkey struck up a strategic partnership with Israel. The shared threat perceptions—

Arabs and Iran—provided the leeway for economic, military and technological relations (Aras, 2000: 154). This closeness between Israel and Turkey disturbed Cairo, which was trying to develop a balanced relationship with Israel.

In 1996, the Welfare Party of Erbakan won the parliamentary elections and formed the government in coalition with the True Path Party. Erbakan became the prime minister. However, the government ruled for only one year. Erbakan had to quit after the memorandum issued by the military in 1997. With respect to international relations, the main slogan of his regime was 'Just Order'. This pragmatic leader, with his anti-Western, anti-Israeli, pro-Islamist vision, tried to give a new direction to Turkey in which Ankara would improve its relations with the Islamic world (H.D. Bilgin, 2008: 409). Erkaban created D-8, a Turkish-led initiative including Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Pakistan, meant to be a counter alliance to the EU. He also visited Cairo, but the relations between two countries did not improve much.

Bülent Ecevit, with his reactionary, defensive, pro-third word stance also envisaged better relations with the Middle East. The leader accused the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) of committing state-terrorism, using excessive force, failing to differentiate between combatants and civilians and resisting calls to lift the economic and political embargo on Hamas. However, his attempts also failed.

2.2.4. The Relations Since 2003

In his book *Strategic Depth*, Ahmet Davutoğlu (2009), who was Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's chief foreign policy advisor and then minister of foreign affairs, brought a new approach to Turkish foreign policy. Davutoğlu argued that Turkey is located at the centre of several 'geo-cultural basins'—the West (including the United States), the Middle East, the Balkans and Central Asia—and that Turkey should pursue an active policy to take advantage of the opportunities that existed in all of them. Davutoğlu raised the slogan of 'Zero Problem with Neighbours', and argued that Turkey's historic depth enhanced its geographic depth. According to Davutoğlu, a country acquires strategic depth from having been 'at the epicentre of [historical] events', as Turkey had been during the Ottoman Empire. He suggested a 'balanced approach towards all global and regional actors' and 'strong economic linkages with

the states in near region' for Turkey to 'rediscover its historic and geographic identity'—which its long-established foreign policy had neglected.

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes its relations with the Arab world as follows (www.mfa.gov.tr, 2013b):

> *Especially during the recent period, very positive steps have been achieved towards developing our relations, both on bilateral and multilateral platforms, with the Arab world that Turkey enjoys deeply rooted historical, cultural, social and religious ties. Establishment of lasting peace and stability in the geography that we share with the Arab world is one of the main priorities in Turkey's foreign policy.*

Equality, justice, economic cooperation and diplomacy were the instruments that the minister mentioned in his declaration to the Arab world in his article in Al-Dustour in 2009.[3]

Turkey also aimed at developing its relations with Cairo. However, due to Mubarak's unwillingness towards closer the relations with Ankara, Turkish-Egyptians relations did not change much as compared to its relations with Iran or Syria.

As compared to the golden age of Turkey-Israel relations, after the Mavi Marmara Flotilla crisis in May 2010 involving Turkey and Israel, their relationship declined to very low levels. Political leaders in Turkey criticized Israel. Today, Turkey supports the Arab initiative that is based on two-state solution for Palestine and Israel.

On the issue of legitimacy of the regimes in Egypt, Turkey has taken a rather non-interventionist position. Indeed, Turkey has ignored the dictatorial character of regimes in Egypt, Syria, Iran and Libya until the uprisings. Leaving aside ideological and regime debates, Turkey has followed a rather pragmatic foreign policy.

Turkey's foreign policy activism caused some discomfort to Mubarak's Egypt, which felt that Turkey was trying to steal Cairo's role in the region. Mubarak felt threatened by Turkey's rising involvement in intra-region politics, such as in Lebanon and the Hamas- PLO negotiations, and the growth of Erdoğan's popularity, especially after the Davos 'One Minute'. The Arab public realized that a non-Arab leader was more active and more sensitive over the Palestine issue than their leaders.

[3] For the article, visit, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/Makaleler/Sayın%20Bakanın%20Makalesi%20(Ürdün).pdf,

Secondly, Ankara and Cairo had different perspectives on Hamas and Hezbollah. Cairo did not recognize them and Mubarak followed Israel's embargo policy toward Gaza. On the other hand, Ankara had diplomatic talks with Hamas and Hezbollah. Lastly, Turkey's strategy of balancing between Shiites and Sunnis in the region was also another cause of discomfort for Mubarak's Egypt. In short, Cairo, with its aspirations of being the dominant power in the Middle East and the Arab world, was not happy to confront another claimant to that post.

When the Arab Spring migrated from Tunisia to Egypt in January 2011, Turkey took a pro-revolutionary position and asked the existing regimes to listen the just, humanistic, and rational demands of the people in Tahrir. Prime Minister Erdoğan called upon Hosni Mubarak to meet the demands of the people and to listen to the sound of freedom. He also added that Turkey would be with Egypt and Tunis during their transitions (yenisafak.com.tr, 2011). In one of his conferences, Minister Davutoğlu described the position of Ankara as ethically and historically the right place (www.abhaber.com, 2012).

Following to the revolution in Egypt, people and particularly scholars in Turkey, discussed whether Turkey, combining as it did, Islam and democracy, should or could be a role model for the Arab states, especially for Egypt (Kaya, 2012: 27). Although France was again the origin of this artificial fixing of scholarly agenda, a large number of scholars concerned themselves with this new wave of exporting the Turkish model to Egypt. In the second Turkish-Arab Platform at the Cairo University,[4] sponsored by the Turkish government, most participants from Turkey discussed this Turkish model in favourable terms. The Egyptian scholars, however, stated their discomfort of this debate in a perfectly polite manner.

First, Turkey cannot serve as a model since democracy has not consolidated itself in Turkey and, at present, we cannot truly talk of the coexistence of Islam and democracy in Turkey. There are still challenges to a 'democratic' Turkey from the standpoint of the rule of law, civil-military relations, human rights, and political pluralism. Kurds, Alevi, non-Muslims, women and conservatives still have legitimate demands for reforming the system. This is the reason why we classify Turkey as a country undergoing democratization (www.freedomhouse.org, 2008).

[4] For details, visit, http://www.atcoss.org/en/content/atcoss-II-concept/131,

Secondly, this hype about a Turkish model is a Turkish incarnation of Orientalism/Euro-centrism with regard to Egypt. It is a negative message to Egyptians that they are incapable of constructing their own model and; therefore, should import the Turkish one. Here, the critical question by Barry Buzan (2002: 117), 'Are we sure that they seek the regime as we consider', demonstrates the futility of this kind of discussion. In addition, scholars in favour may review their understanding of the democratization issue—that although there are similarities between the Turkish and Egyptian cases, the contexts are quite different and the issue of democratization is more complex than they realize.

Turkey's new alliance partner in the region will be this new Egypt that has emerged after the revolution (Arango, 2012). Both politicians and analysts agree on this issue. Both countries have the plans for visa liberalization. Turkey has offered 2 billion dollar aid to Egypt during its transition. Turkey's trade relations with Egypt, as one sees in the following table, are increasing and both countries look forward to a 5 billion dollar figure in the future. Cairo and Ankara have a similar position with regard to the Syrian crisis and both governments have advised Bashar Assad to quit the presidency.

Table 2.1: Turkey's Trade with Egypt

Year	Export	Import	Trade Volume	Balance of Trade
2005	687.299	267.246	954.545	420.053
2006	709.353	392.501	1.101.854	316.852
2007	902.658	679.345	1.582.004	223.313
2008	1.426.060	942.507	2.368.567	483.553
2009	2.618.360	641.379	3.259.739	1.976.981
2010	2.261.286	926.280	3.187.566	1.335.006

Source: www.mfa.gov.tr, (2013c).

Political dialogue between Egypt and Turkey are in their golden period. Abdullah Gül was the first world leader to visit Egypt after the revolution (in March 2011). Erdogan made visits to Cairo in September 2011 and in November 2012 to deepen and broaden the relationship between the two nations. In February 2013, Gül

made his second visit to Egypt for the conference of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Morsi's visit to Ankara was a special one. He visited Turkey in order to participate in the Congress of the Justice and Development Party and gave a remarkable speech to the audience, in which he underlined a new future for Egypt-Turkey relations.

2.3. EGYPT-IRAN RELATIONS: REVOLUTIONS, DOMESTIC REGIMES AND FOREIGN POLICY

Contemporary Egypt-Iran relationship is complicated, chaotic, multi-dimensional, and greatly influenced by the post-revolutionary characteristics of their regimes. One can divide the relations between the two nations into four phases: (1) the monarchical period, (2) after the Arab Revolution in 1952, (3) after the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979, (4) and finally, after the Tahrir Revolution of 2011. Here, it is submitted that the revolutionary upheavals in these countries influenced the nature of relations between them. The new regimes of both countries preferred a game based not only on international considerations but also on domestic concerns of legitimacy and survival. Neack (2008: 49) describes this as a 'nested game', in which national leaders attempt to play the two games of domestic and international politics to their advantage. Firstly, choices of foreign policy applications of these two states were conducted by their post-revolutionary actions; newly institutionalized foreign policy directions. Secondly, decision-making processes were highly influenced by the re-construction of their new positions in the world politics after the related revolutions.

2.3.1. Revolution, Political Regimes, and Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework

Hagan (1994), who discusses the interaction between domestic regimes and foreign policy preferences, emphasizes on political regime changes in a particular country and its influence on the country's foreign policy stance. Hagan focuses on a regime change brought out by a political group dominated by a single individual. This group, dominated by a single individual, formulates a new foreign policy. First, they re-define their foreign policy orientation as distinctly different from the one that the previous 'bad' regime pursued. Second, this new regime, especially in the initial

period of its rule, proves sensitive to the norms, values and the newly constructed identity in formulating its foreign policy. Finally, and as argued by Neack, the new regime regards its foreign policy as an instrument of its present internal transformation.

Revolutions in both Egypt and Iran were of the above kind, that is, the groups that led these revolutions were dominated by a single leader—The Free Officers in Egypt and the Mullahs in Iran. The predominant figures were Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt and Imam Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran. Notwithstanding the similarity in post-revolutionary characters and foreign policy directions of the two countries, the time and context of the revolutions placed the two regimes in mutually opposed blocs.

The relationship between Egypt and Iran has been hostile. The only exception being the period of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Iran and King Farouk in Egypt.

Egypt and Iran shared similar legacies in the twentieth century—western imperialism and post-coloniality. As soon as they established their own states, the dynamics of the world politics resulted in their emerging as major players in the Middle East. This was the golden age of Egypt-Iran relations. The political regimes of the two countries were content with their good relationship with each other. The reason behind this golden age of good relations was the similarity of their connections and contexts. Both Iran and Egypt were dependent on Britain according to the treaties they had signed—Anglo-Persian and Anglo-Egyptian. The content of these treaties were almost similar in terms of foreign and security policies. The leaders of these countries were not independent in the sphere of foreign and security policy. Moreover, Britain had control over their critical resources and strategically important territories.[5]

Grenville (2005: 422) describe that after the First World War, London's interests in the Middle East dictated the appointment of the leaders of the new established states in the region and the regimes all functioned under British supervision until the uprisings. Lack of control over foreign policy and dependence on Britain was not a problem for the rulers and these west-backed dictators followed the 'advice' of the British diplomats. Egypt's dealings with Iran began in 1939 with an exchange of ambassadors. It is important to note here that Princess Fawzia Fuad

[5] Britain controlled the Suez Canal in Egypt until 1956 and the Iranian oil and gas resources until 1979.

of Egypt married Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and marriage diplomacy was conducted as another instrument for deepening the relationship.

2.3.2. The 1952 Arab Revolution and Egypt-Iran Relations

After the coup d'état that brought Gamal Abdel Nasser to power altered the nature of the relations between the two countries. Controlled by a single individual, anti-Western, highly influenced by post-colonial stance and a revolutionary discourse (Field, 1995: 56) were the main characteristics of the new regime in Cairo. Gamal Abdel Nasser's personality and his dream of the unification of Arabs (pan-Arabism) presented a new direction to Egyptian foreign policy. Cairo was actively involved in the third world politics. Egypt became one of the leading powers in the Non-Aligned Movement and Nasser was regarded as a hero of Egypt, Arab nations and many third world countries particularly after the nationalization of the Suez Canal (Kamrava, 2005: 94). In the realm of foreign policy, Nasser held that Egypt mattered only if it struggled for Arab unity, thwarted imperialism, and fought against colonialism and occupation of Arab land (Barakat, 1993: 166).

The stance and priorities of the new regime in Egypt reflected Nasser's personality, beliefs and ideals. According to Sela (2004: 182), he viewed world politics as an arena where 'good people' suffered from pressure and domination of 'bad people'. His solution to this unjust world order was to unite these 'good people' under a single banner, with a strong army and well established economy, to struggle against Western imperialism and occupations. These beliefs constituted pan-Arabism. The second aspect of his personality is that the occupation of Palestine by Zionists, and the British and French influence on the Arab world became his foremost concerns. These beliefs and concerns of Nasser determined the top-down and state sponsored ideology/movement of Pan-Arabism as the fulcrum of the new regime's orientation and foreign policy.

A definite example of these foreign policy choices is the declaration of Baghdad Pact and Egypt's reaction to it. In 1955, the Baghdad Pact was initiated by Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and Britain as a southern front against the spread of communism. Nasser strongly opposed the Baghdad Pact. In his speeches, he staunchly objected to this new security community. He was annoyed, in particular,

with Iraq's participation in this community. For Nasser, the primary threat to the Arab world in the 1950s was not communism, but imperialism and colonialism and their interference in Arab politics (Jankowski, 2002: 95). More precisely, the threat was France, the United Kingdom and Zionism. If a coalition was needed, it should have been by Arabs and for Arabs, and against the threat originating in the West. Furthermore, Nasser considered the Baghdad Pact as London's project to isolate Egypt in regional politics, to divide the Arab world and to use the pact as an instrument to intervene directly in the domestic politics of Iraq, and thereby, of the Arab world.

During that time, Iran was still under the Shah regime, which collaborated entirely with the West, specifically with Britain. Tehran, with British assistance, was following a status-quo oriented foreign policy. Nasser's new vision and its clash with the Shah regime chilled the relations between the countries and a cold war between Tehran and Cairo began. Iran's willing and active involvement in the Baghdad Pact was enough to provoke Nasser. He blamed Iran for functioning as Britain's instrument for their imperial plans in the region.

The Six-Day War in 1967 proved pan-Arabism to be an unachievable and unrealistic dream for the Egyptians and the Arab world in general and for Nasser himself. Nasser's prestige suffered serious damage. His successor, Anwar al-Sadat, came to the power in 1970. His era was a peaceful and non-revolutionary transition from pan-Arabism to an 'Egypt-First regime' (Karawan, 1994: 252). He followed a domestic and foreign policy designed towards creating a new identity for Egypt. Death of pan-Arabism and the social, political and economic opening up of Egypt normalized the relations between Iran and Egypt for a brief period. This was a period of honeymoon between Cairo and Tehran. For ten years, Anwar al-Sadat transformed the domestic regime through a planned programme and gradually changed the direction of Egyptian foreign policy.

The political regimes of the two countries now resembled each other—favouring westernization and liberalization and aligning with the western bloc—and the two leaders established personal communication. However, this did not continue for long since during the late 1970s Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was gradually losing

his hold. Pre-revolutionary atmosphere had already begun to prevail in Tehran's ghettos and mosques.

2.3.3. The 1979 Islamic Revolution and Egypt-Iran Relations

The Islamic Revolution in Iran was highly influential in the Middle East. In 1979, Iranians, after their indoctrination by Mullahs, brought down the Shah regime and established Islamic Republic as their new regime. Like the other post-revolutionary regimes, the new Iran, with its post-colonial and Shia inspired expansionism, re-defined its position in the region and in the world (Mahmood, 2006: 109). The new regime developed a new foreign policy structure totally opposed to that of Shah's Iran. The Islamic Republic of Iran emerged as decidedly anti-Western. Severing ties with the USA, the UK and Israel were the first foreign policy steps of the Iranian Spiritual Leader, Imam Ruhollah Khomeini.

In the same year, Anwar al-Sadat had begun direct talks with Israel through the mediation of the USA, and Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel. This treaty marked the point when Egypt swerved sharply from anti-western/pan-Arabism to a pro-western/Egyptianism.

President Sadat's personal ties with Iran's earlier regime and his invitation, after the revolution, to the Shah to visit Egypt for medical treatment were viewed as an expression of pro-Shah sentiment by the new Iranian regime. Secondly, Khomeini described the decision of Sadat to make peace with Israel as 'un-Islamic' and encouraged Egyptians to overthrow their government (Encyclopedia Iranica, 2012: 260). This provocative message from Tehran was a direct threat to Sadat's regime in Egypt, too. The two states broke off their diplomatic relations in June 1979.

The hostility between two countries received symbolic expression. After Sadat's assassination, a street in Tehran was named after the assassin, *Khaled al Islambouli*, and this name was in place up to 2004. On the other hand, in 1980 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was buried with the old national flag of Iran in the burial chamber in the historical *Al Rifai Mosque* of Cairo. These gestures of hostility symbolized the clash between the two major players in the region.

Religious sectarianism is another dimension of the Middle Eastern politics. It is evidently another reason behind the unfriendly relationship between Cairo and

Tehran. Both the Shia rhetoric of the Iranian regime and its mission of spreading Shia ideas in the Muslim world disturbed Cairo. The historical legacy of the Sunni school in Egypt, domestic pressures (especially from religious institutions) and the negative attitudes of Egyptians towards Shiites formed the grounds for Sunni-dominated Egypt viewing Iran as a threat. Egypt's religious/theological dominance in the Middle East, and indeed in the entire Muslim world, encouraged it to be the Sunni leading power that was supposed to be in theological conflict with Iran.

Intra-regional politics of the Middle East was another dimension that caused hostility between Egypt and Iran. Egypt's historical, regional and financial interactions with the Gulf countries negatively affected Egypt-Iran relations. Perceiving Iran as a threat is more significant in the Gulf States such as Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and Yemen, where there are significant Shia minorities. As soon as the Mullahs succeeded in their revolution, they indulged in expansionist rhetoric. Iran shaped its foreign policy from an ideological perspective and drew up a plan for an Islamic front (Arjomand, 2009: 134). The Iranian project of exporting Iran's Islamic revolution to the Gulf region from a sense of historical and religious responsibility made the Gulf States fearful (Ze'evi, 2007). Small Gulf states announced the formation of a *Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf* as deterrent to Iranian influence. Between Sunni-Arabs of the Gulf and Shia-Iran, Egypt chose the Gulf side.

The main challenge to Egypt during Mubarak's early years was the isolation of Egypt in Arab world as the legacy of Sadat's peace with Israel (Ad-din and Dessouki, 1993: 168). In addition, Egypt had structural troubles in the economy, such as unemployment, poverty, lack of capital for new investments, etc. Mubarak attached significance to the oil-rich Gulf States, while they were faced with the direct threat of Iran. He followed a strategic foreign policy that led to the normalization of Egypt-Gulf relationships to ensure the likelihood of capital flowing into Egypt from those oil-rich countries. Thus, Sadat's successor turned the crisis in the Persian Gulf to his own advantage.

President Mubarak supported Saddam Hussein, who described his war as the struggle of the Arabs against Persians. Egypt supported Iraq militarily, financially and diplomatically against Persian dominance for 8 years. Egypt provided Iraq with

an estimated $5 billion in weapons, including tanks, munitions and a version of the Soviet Scud B missiles (Karsh, 2002: 43).

In the 1990s, Hosni Mubarak viewed Iran as a direct threat to Egypt, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and to the Middle East in general, not only from the ideological aspect, but, more significantly, in terms of material resources and capabilities. He perceived Iran's financial, diplomatic and military assistance to Hamas and Hezbollah as a direct threat. The 'spreading of cancer' was President Mubarak's analogy for the attempts of the Iranians in this direction (www.washingtontimes.com, 2010). More specifically, Egypt blamed Iran, which was clearly striving to become a major power in the Middle East, for radicalizing Hamas and provoking conflicts in the region. Hosni Mubarak worried about the resulting shift in the regional power towards Iran (Habeeb, 2012: 7). He also added that Iran was an obstacle to a possible peace between Israel and Palestine.

Since the early years of 2000s, Iran's project of nuclear enrichment has raised a new issue of conflict between the two republics. The nuclear experiments of Iran further disturbed Egypt as a Shiite Iran that challenged the Egyptian regime and struck coalitions with Hamas and Hezbollah might attain its aim of being a regional power. Following the order of the new spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, to promote Iran's security and defence capabilities, Iran re-emerged as a major player in regional and international politics.

The Mubarak government's language of diplomacy combined legalist and real-politic approaches. On one hand, Cairo underlined the right of Iran to have nuclear studies for peaceful purposes only if they fully cooperated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On 16 August 2008, Suleiman Awwad, the Egyptian presidential spokesperson, defended Iran's right to a peaceful nuclear programme (www.foxnews.com, 2008). On the other hand, Cairo had real-politic concerns in mind when it declared that Egypt would oppose Iran if Tehran acquired nuclear weapons. On 28 May 2010, Egypt's ambassador to the United Nations, Abed Abdel Aziz (gsn.nti.org, 2010) stated:

> *We in Egypt are against even the presence of nuclear weapons in our region. Nevertheless, if others will acquire nuclear weapons -- and if others are going to use these nuclear weapons to acquire status in the region of the Middle East -- let me tell you, we are not going to accept to be second-class citizens in the region of the Middle East.*

However, Egypt did not take an aggressive stance and did not consider military action against Iran as either rational or practical. Secondly, they came up with a nuclear free Middle East initiative, in which Israel's undeclared WMDs were supposed to be placed in the agenda. Mubarak took a position similar to Turkey's and criticized Israeli calls of military intervention against Iran. On 3 December 2008, Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ahmad Abu Gheit stated (Grossman, 2010): *'Egypt supports international efforts to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, but rejected military action against Iran as an effective means of halting its nuclear program'*.

2.3.4. The Arab Spring and Egypt-Iran Relations

In February 2011, Egypt took yet another turn. In the introduction to this part, it is argued the dependence of inter-state relations on the political regimes of the two countries. From that approach, it would be reasonable to analyse Egypt-Iran relations after the Tahrir Revolution. The relations with Iran after the revolution generated anxiety. At present, almost all stakeholders and scholars are curious about the direction that the relations will take. For, the relationship between the two players is important not only for its own sake, but also because it would be a noteworthy indicator of the main thrust of Egyptian foreign policy and Egypt's position on the world affairs.

In the first days, when Egyptians joined the revolt at Tahrir Square, Ayatollah Khamenei greeted the Egyptians and described the revolution as an Islamic awakening. According to him, the uprising was inspired by the desire to end the non-Islamic regime that had strong ties with imperialist America and racist Zionists. It is evident that Iran aims to use this revolution in Egypt to its own advantage and improve relations with Cairo.

Ideological and religious motives have not inspired Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's foreign policy. He has followed a more pragmatic and rational approach. The revolution in Egypt provided him with a great opportunity to strike a new alliance and minimize the effects of isolation that the sanctions implemented by the UN and the EU had created. In an interview, President Ahmadinejad stated (www.egypt

independent.com, 2012a), *'We respect Egypt and its people and are looking forward to improved relations'*. Ali Akbar Salihi, the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs also reiterated Tehran's intention of coming closer to Cairo (www.egypt independent.com, 2013).

In August 2012, Egypt's new president Mohammad Morsi, after his visits to Saudi Arabia and China, visited Tehran to join the sixteenth summit of the *Non-aligned Movement*. This was deeply significant as an Egyptian president last visited Iran 30 years ago. The international community was curious about the visit and the new president's messages at the Summit. This was crucial, for at that moment the Syrian citizens were in revolt against the Assad regime. In his speech, the president bluntly criticized the Syrian regime and Iran's support of Assad. He drew similarities between the Syrian revolt and the Palestinian struggle, described Basher Assad as a tyrant and admonished Iran not to be a party to the cruelty. Secondly, his Sunni rhetoric coloured his speech. He started his speech by reading out parts from the holy Qur'an and reminded his audience that the four Caliphs of Islam after Prophet Mohammad included Caliph Ummar and Uthman.[6] This visit to Tehran caused a crisis between Iran and Bahrain since the Iranian state-run television changed the word 'Syria' to 'Bahrain' while translating Morsi's speech. This scandal of translation has been viewed as providing an interesting picture of Iranian diplomacy.

Egypt is still undergoing conflicts; the revolution has not come to an end, and the final nature of the Egyptian regime is still not clear. Therefore, it is too early to make an analysis of Egyptian foreign policy from a general regime-based approach. However, one can make some predictions based on the messages given by current leaders. The first is that Egypt-Iran relations will shift from outright hostility to another stage although it is difficult to specify the nature of that stage. An Egyptian government spokesperson said that the Mubarak regime *'used to see Iran as an enemy, we do not'* (www.almasryalyoum.com, 2011). Secondly, this shift from clear hostility to a still undefined relationship will be an area of study for scholars. Their mutually opposed positions regarding the Syrian crisis, their differing perception of Israel, the question of including Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and the USA to the

[6] Shia Islam perceives Caliph Umar (Umar ibn Al-Khattāb) and Caliph Uthman (Uthmān ibn 'Affān) as illegitimate religious figures.

balance, and, of course, public opinion—all these will matter as the new Egypt develops its approach towards Iran and the rest of the world.

The new regime in Cairo does not deny Iran as an undeniable reality in the Middle East. Egyptian foreign minister Mohamed Kamel Amr described Iran as a regional force that cannot be ignored (www.egyptindependent.com, 2013). However, Egypt is aware that Tehran is more interested in normalizing relations and will gain more from a possible Egypt-Iran normalization process. Consequently, Cairo appears to be taking advantage of this in pressing its demands. The new government in Egypt has declared certain pre-conditions for the normalization of relations with Iran. For instance, President Morsi warned Iran's foreign minister that better relations between the two Middle East heavyweights is being hindered by Tehran's support for the present Syrian regime (www.haaretz.com, 2013). One can predict that Egypt is interested in normalizing relations with Iran only if Iran meets certain pre-conditions.

On February 2013, Ahmadinejad visited Cairo for a meeting of the *Organization of Islamic Cooperation*. The last Iranian President who visited Egypt did so 30 years ago. During his visit, a protestor hurled shoes at Ahmadinejad and shouted: 'You killed our brothers' (www.cnn.com, 2013). The public opinion in Egypt gave a signal to the new policy-makers in Cairo that Egyptians also have a voice in the future of Egypt-Iran relations.

CHAPTER THREE
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES IN MUBARAK'S EGYPT AND THE ARAB SPRING

This chapter covers the period from the Mubarak era to the Arab Spring in Egypt. The first two parts attend to the domestic situation in Egypt under Mubarak's rule. The first part discusses the type of regime, elections, economy, political parties, distribution of political power, the Emergency Law, and civil-military relations, in order to indicate the causes of the rise of the opposition movement and the road to revolution. The second part, discusses the main social movements and agents that brought about the uprising: *the Muslim Brotherhood*, the *Kefaya,* and the *April 6 Youth Movement*. The third part focuses on Egyptian foreign and security policy during the Mubarak era, referring to the key issues (the geo-strategic position of the country, economy, and political legitimacy) and the actors (Israel, the USA, and Egypt) in the Middle East.

3.1. DOMESTIC POLITICS DURING THE MUBARAK ERA

In 1987, Hosni Mubarak, the third president of the Arab Republic of Egypt, while addressing the public for his second term of presidency, defined democracy as a firm fact which no one could doubt. He also added that it was a requisite for the growth of the economy and the welfare of the people and visualized a democratic regime for everyone in Egypt (quoted from Makram-Ebeid, 1989: 1).

During Sadat's term, Mubarak was the Air Marshall and he became the new president after Sadat's assassination. In domestic politics, Mubarak inherited the legacy of the *Opening (Infitah),* and people expected that he would undertake economic reform and democratisation (Luciani, 1994: 149). However, this expectation proved misleading and Egypt slid into worse conditions during his leadership. Egypt became a single-person dominated totalitarian regime. Mubarak reversed Egypt's political course—renewing controls on opposition parties, elections, Islamic activity, civil society organizations and the press (Brownlee, 2002: 3). Abaza (2006: 12) describes the main characteristics of Mubarak's rule as follows:

A main characteristic of Mubarak's rule has been a reluctance to carry out any political reforms. The regime consistently claimed that the stability Mubarak provided would be undermined if the door for political reform were opened. Internal pressure for reform has never ceased throughout the Mubarak era...

The assassination of the previous president resulted in the implementation of the Emergency Law by Mubarak, which remained in force until the end of his regime. Constitutional rights were suspended; the military and the police were given extraordinary powers. Civil society and non-governmental movements were restricted and controlled, and censorship remained in force until February 2011.

The Emergency Law, first enacted as Law no. 162 of 1958, provided the President with great power. Its first three articles violated human rights. Articles 48 and 148 of constitution provided constitutional legitimacy to the law. In addition, chapter 6 of the constitution, *Combating Terrorism*, included 16 articles contributing to the same purpose.

The regime and its illegitimate practices became the concern of some international institutions dedicated to democracy and human rights. For instance, in 2002, *the UN Human Rights Committee* advised Egypt to end the 'permanent state of emergency'. Similarly, the *UN Committee against Torture* stated that 'the state of emergency' in Egypt hindered 'the full consolidation of the rule of law in Egypt' (www.hrw.org, 2008).

Egypt had a one-man regime in which the President had full control of the executive, legislative and judicial wings. According to the constitution, the President of Egypt was the head of the state, the supreme commander of the Armed Forces, and the head of the executive authority-the Egyptian Cabinet (www.wipo.int, 2007). In addition, the law of emergency, laws regarding elections and the bureaucratic practices in the country also strengthened the president's power.

The chief factor that caused the regime to be classified as authoritarian was the elections, which occurred periodically during his era. According to the Egyptian Constitution of 1971, the People's Assembly upon the proposal from at least one-third of its members should nominate the presidential candidates and the duration of one presidential term was 6 years. During Mubarak era, Egypt went to the polls in 1981, 1987, 1993, 1999 and lastly in 2005. Mubarak gained more than 90% of the votes and was re-elected as the president of the republic of Egypt in all the elections.

The proposal of his name for candidacy was merely a parliamentary routine, as his party, the National Democratic Party, always occupied the majority of parliamentary seats.

In 2005, the amendment of Article 76 of the Constitution relaxed the conditions of presidential candidature. For the first time, another candidate, Ayman Nour, a political activist in El-Gad (الغد-Tomorrow) Party, declared his candidacy, but got only 7.3% of the votes in an undemocratic and improperly conducted election. The reason for describing the election as undemocratic and improperly conducted is that NGOs and members of international bodies were not allowed to observe the polling. The Presidential Election Commission also did not permit the presence of representatives of the Egyptian political parties in the polling stations. Not surprisingly, turnout was noticeably low, with estimates ranging from the official figure of 23% to 15% according to the independent observers (Sharp, 2005). The 2005 polls were nothing more than a formality. In the same year, the police arrested Ayman Nour on the charge of receiving unlawful aid for his election campaign (www.jpost.com, 2005).

Not only presidential elections but the parliamentary elections also had the same characteristics. Egyptian parliaments enjoy 5-year terms. Egypt had parliamentary elections in 1984, 1987, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and lastly in 2010. As in the presidential elections, Mubarak's NDP always gained the majority in the parliamentary polls, and; therefore, in reality, Mubarak controlled the legislative power in Egypt, too.

Mubarak revived Nasser's practices and did not allow the regime's transformation into a real multi-party system. In formal and legal terms, the system was a multi-party one, yet in practice, with elections controlled by the state, it was never so. In his study, Koehler (2008: 975) argues that the formal electoral institutions were considered to function as mechanisms for inclusion of clientele, devices for control and co-optation, and arenas for limited intra-elite competition.

Similarly, Blaydes (2006: 1) describes that the elections was not motivated by any democratic desires. Rather, the regime considered these as tools and tactics to manage political elites. Mubarak was able to control the political elites in Egypt:

those who submitted readily to his regime were rewarded with higher positions, and those who opposed Mubarak were deprived of their positions through the elections.

Al-Wafd (الوفد) Party, established in 1978 during Sadat's presidency, became the main opposition party (www.aucegypt.edu, 2011). In their nationalist-liberal programme, the party sharply criticized the regime for not being democratic. The party's foremost concern was to abolish the Emergency Law as a means to democratization. The party participated in the elections, but always remained in the opposition. In 1984, the party formed a coalition with the Muslim Brotherhood and occupied 50 seats, which was the highest for an opposition party in the history of Egypt. What the results of the election revealed to Mubarak was that the challenge to regime survival would possibly come from the right wing (Zartman, 1988: 76). As a result, he began directing undemocratic measures against the right wing in the country. In 1990, immediately before the elections, the Constitutional Court of Egypt introduced a new election law with a majority run-off system, and in the elections that followed; the Al-Wafd party did not get more than 7% of the seats. Based on the decisions taken by the High Court, the Muslim Brotherhood was banned from electoral participation and was accused of having a religious agenda.

Tagammu (التجمع) or The National Progressive Party was a Nasserist party that was established in 1977. The party set itself the task of defending the 1952 Revolution and its principles. Like the Al-Wafd, they did not get more than 5% of the parliamentary.

Government-military partnership was another significant aspect of Mubarak era (Picard, 1990: 196). The Egyptian army was the most dynamic, influential and leading domestic player, as compared to the other players such as the media, business, NGOs, or political parties. The army was the guarantor of not only domestic stability but also of peace with Israel. Using the army against terrorism, especially in the 1990s, avoiding any secret mobilization within the army for a new coup d'état and the survival of his authoritarian regime through partnership with the army were Mubarak's main aims.

In return for guaranteeing his regime's survival, Mubarak gave special rewards to the Egyptian army. First of all, the army received political power. As in the past, all the leaders of the republic had army background. Secondly, Mubarak

institutionalized certain arrangements that ensured the army's role in domestic politics, e.g. the Emergency Law, which endowed the army with a parallel judicial system, whose courts were called the Supreme State Security Courts.

Thirdly, the members of the army gained material benefits if they contributed to the regime's survival. The share of military expenditure in the total governmental expenditure was quite high. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, it was well above 10%. Furthermore, the army was actively involved in the economy (Ayubi, 1991: 255–260). Although it is statistically difficult to measure its role in economy, the Egyptian military controlled anything from 15 to 40 per cent of the economy (Tadros, 2012).

Regarding the role of the army in economy, Abul-Magd (2011) describes the developments during the Mubarak era as follows:

> *Between 2004 and 2011, military-owned companies remained untouched. In fact, high-ranking army officers received their share of benefits from corruption-ridden privatization deals in the form of appointments to prestigious positions in recently privatized public sector enterprises.*

Table 3.1: Military Expenditure (Percentage of Central Government Expenditure) in Egypt.



Source: www.tradingeconomics.com, (2012).

Finally, on the individual level, the military officers were highly interested in the survival of the Mubarak regime, since to have a job in the armed forces was the best way of moving up to the social ladder. Their salaries were satisfactory and they gained a higher social status both legally and socially. In addition, Egypt was also famous for the high-level bureaucrats, members of the parliament, and cabinet members with military background. In other words, to be a soldier was an easy way to the political arena.

One of the main challenges to survival of the Mubarak regime was its skewed economic performance. Mubarak inherited the legacies of both Nasser, who

developed a state-run economy, and Sadat, who took the *Infitah* initiative to liberalize the economy. However, the Egyptian economy was highly corrupted and controlled by only a small group of individuals, including Hosni Mubarak's son Gamal Mubarak. Thus, although in recent years there was a high level of economic growth, the living conditions of the average Egyptian remained poor and harsh.

Between 1991 and 2007, Mubarak initiated a number of economic reforms to satisfy the requirements of international organisations, but none of the reforms succeeded in achieving their aims. The state reformed the system of price control, reduced subsidies, and reduced inflation and taxes to attract the foreign investment to Egypt. Between 2004 and 2006, the government privatized various state-run factories and financial bodies.

In the world economic scenario, Egypt ranks as a lower middle-income country. According to the statistics of the Wold Bank, [7] there was a sustainable GDP growth rate during 2000s. Between 2003 and 2008, it increased from 3.1% to 7.2%. However, the regime was not able to moderate the rate of inflation, which, since 2004, was around 10% every year.

Another structural problem was the high rates of unemployment. Although the labour force is large and the median age of the population is 24.8 (www.cia.gov, 2013), the regime failed to create a pattern of development that minimized unemployment. Cairo provided a case in point. Here, a large number of citizens were without regular work.

Oil, manufacturing, Suez, tourism and agriculture were the main pillars of the Egyptian economy. 15.5% of the Egyptian economy was based on manufacturing and a significant number of people were employed in this sector. However, the low salaries, excessive exploitation of the workers and the lack of social and labour rights dissatisfied the workers. Although the Law of Emergency prohibited protests, labour unions attempted to go on strike in the quest for better conditions and salaries. The Suez Canal and ship transportations were a source of income for the state, but here again, the state was not able to use its wealth for the social policies, or improve its redistribution. Only a small group was reaping the advantages of economic activity. Oil, which Nasser had nationalized, was under the control of the state and here the

[7] For details, visit, http://data.worldbank.org/country/egypt-arab-republic,

picture resembled that of the Suez Canal. Tourism was another significant market for Egypt, its ancient history and its role in the Islamic world attracted foreign tourists. According to Tohamy and Swinscoe (2010: 5), tourism is becoming the most important source of foreign currency, with a share of over 28 percent of Egypt's four major sources of foreign revenue.

According to the information from the Egyptian Ministry of Industry and Foreign Trade (www.tpegypt.gov.eg, 2013), the Arab countries are the main trade partners of the country. The USA, the EU members and non-Arab Muslim countries are other partners. Egypt mostly exports oil products, agricultural products, metals and textiles. It imports electronic good, engineering products, agricultural goods, and chemicals.

The main challenge of the Egyptian economy was the re-distribution of the nation's wealth. The regime failed to expand the middle class and decrease the gap between the poor and the rich. Statistical studies by international organizations provide a negative picture of the Egyptian economy. According to the World Bank (2013), more than 16 million people in Egypt were living below the national poverty line, that is, approximately 22% of the whole population. Egypt ranked 115 in the Transparency International's (2008) corruption ranking. In 2003, the country's position in the world investment index was 126. The state run statistical agency (quoted from english.ahram.org.eg, 2013) reported that the poorest 20 per cent have spent an average of LE14, 000 ($2,290) per household annually while the expenditures of the richest 20 per cent have reached an average of LE 31500 ($5,154). With 0.62 score, Egypt was ranked 101 in the Human Development Index (2010).

3.2. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THE UPRISING

All the pressure from and all the measures by the authoritarian regime failed to prevent the birth and the spread of opposition movements in Egypt. The ban on political alternatives channelized the oppositional energy in the form of social movements. The Muslim Brotherhood, Kefaya, and April 6 Youth Movement led to the uprising of 2011 and resulting regime change in Egypt.

The Muslim Brotherhood (الإخوان المسلمون) was an Islamic Movement that was born in the 1920s through the efforts of the famous Islamic scholar, Hassan al-Banna. From the city of Ismailiyyah, he spread the movement to the whole country. It quickly became the most organized people's movement in Egypt and the Middle East.

In 1939, the movement declared itself as a religious organization based on the Qur'an and Sunnah.[8] The Brotherhood's goal during Hasan al-Banna's leadership was to fight against British colonialism in Egypt, resist the establishment of Israel in the Palestinian territory, to eliminate all the Western influence and to create an Islamic state (Barsky, 2011: 1). 'Islam is the solution' was the slogan that the movement has also used in parliamentary and presidential elections after the revolution. In their official website, the movement defines its principles as follows(www.ikhwanweb.com, 2010): (1) the introduction of the Islamic Sharia as the basis for managing the affairs of the state and the society; (2) working to achieve unification among the Islamic countries and states, mainly among the Arabs and (3) the liberation from foreign imperialism.

In 1949, al-Banna was assassinated in the hands of government agents. During the 1950s, the movement supported Nasser's vision of overthrowing the British-backed regime in the country. However, the coalition was short-lived. Nasser's new secular and socialist regime declared the movement illegal.

After 1954, the top leaders and members of the movement were imprisoned and tortured. The second leader of the movement, Sayyid Qutb, spent almost his entire life in Egyptian prisons and was sentenced to death in 1966 on the grounds of planning Nasser's assassination and challenging the regime and the spirit of the revolution. In his writings, *Social Justice in Islam, The Battle between Islam and Capitalism, World Peace and Islam, In the Shahade of the Qur'an, Islam and the Problems of the Civilisation, Jihad, This Religion of Islam*, he explained the movement's understanding of contemporary issues. He examined democracy from the standpoint of Islam and described it as Islamic. In his writings, jihad is a way of defending Islam and the Muslim society against the Western life-style and capitalism. He made a self-critical analysis of his contemporary Muslim world and

[8] Islamic jurisprudence defines Sunnah as the practices and teachings of Prophet Mohammad.

used the analogy of 'Jahiliyyah',[9] which, in the history of Islam, denotes the pre-Islamic period of the Arab world.

During the Sadat era, the regime emancipated the Islamic groups as a strategy to counter the pro-Nasserists and the socialists. This period provided The Brotherhood with an opportunity to re-emerge, although it still did not receive any legal status. Universities, mosques and migrants from rural areas to the larger cities were the movement's preferred sites and target groups.

Since the 1980s, the movement has incorporated certain social and political instruments in Egypt. It is no longer a purely religious movement. For example, it has established a radio station called *Radio Qur'an*; it has started publishing its own journals, books and other publications. It proved adept at gaining a following among the business community, which has lent its economic resources to the movement. Free hospitals, almsgiving, student organizations, and newspapers were other instruments that the movement has wisely utilized. The movement has become one of the leading players in the Middle East after it expanded into Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Lebanon.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the movement tried to attain governmental power with their beliefs and programmes through participating in elections. However, all the attempts of the movement failed, as the government was successful in controlling and restricting the movement through bureaucratic or legislative measures. In 1984, the Brotherhood struck up an alliance with the Al-Wafd party, but attained only 58 seats in the parliament. In 1990, the movement boycotted the elections, and called for reform of electoral law and procedures.

For many years, the movement was sometimes linked to radical movements in the Muslim world. Many was claimed that it was the main source of radicalism, especially after the 9/11, because of references to al-Banna and Qutb by Al-Qaeda's top leaders Ayman Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden. Nevertheless, most western politicians and scholars were found seeking appointments from the top leaders of the movement in Cairo just after the revolution. A comparative study on perceptions of the Western media, political elites, and scholars towards the Muslim Brotherhood

[9] Jahiliyyah means the state of ignorance of Divine guidance, which refers to the Pre-Islamic Era.

that compares the pre-revolution and post-revolution periods might arrive at interesting results.

During the early years, the regime considered the militant Islamic groups such as Jamaal Islamiyya, Al-Qaida or Al-Jihad as the main groups that had to be dealt with. Until the mid-1990s, Mubarak preferred a strategy of vigilant tolerance towards the movement on the hope that the movement would help reduce the militancy of such groups (Yasar, 2006: 184).

In the 1990s, Cairo changed its decision about the movement and formulated new strategies to minimize the role of the movement in the political, social, and economic life (Al-Awadi, 2004: 49). Arrests and new laws such as laws regulating association and education were the new instruments of the regime. In public and international forums, both Mubarak and Amr Moussa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, directly criticized the movement with reference to radicalization among Muslims in Egypt and in the world. A controlled media and academia also issued statements and arguments to make the movement look dishonest in the eyes of the citizens.

The regime made significant use of religious institutions to counter the movement in the theological domain. Davidson (2005: 314) described it as the battle for Islamic legitimacy, where the government and the Islamic movements each tried to convince the public of its Islamic impeccability. In the Egyptian case, Mubarak followed two complementary tactics: first, he had al-Azhar University and the Imams of the mosques to issue statements supporting the state's position. Second, he established alternative instruments of religious propaganda such as radio stations and television programmes dedicated to religious issues. At this point, it is important to note that in his public speeches, the president himself usually referred to the Qur'an and Sunnah.

In 1996, the government developed an economic programme for the Upper Egypt, where the Islamic movements in general and the Muslim Brotherhood in particular had strong bases. Inter-state cooperation, especially after 9/11, was another aspect of the Egyptian response to the movement.

Although the regime used all available means to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood's growing influence not only in Egypt, but also in the Arab

and the Muslim worlds, the movement continued to spread and strike deeper roots. After failing to gain any seats in the 2010 election, the movement accused the government of engaging in fraud, vote-buying, illegal campaigning at polling stations and preventing opposition supporters from voting, especially those supporting the Brotherhood (www.aljazeera.com, 2011). The last election led the Egyptians to give up hopes of removing the regime through peaceful and electoral means.

The Kefaya (كفاية) movement was the second most important social and political movement in modern Egypt. Tığlı (2011: 22) argues that the birth of the movement was a necessity and was a reaction of Egyptians to the situation. The movement originated with the proclamation of September 2004, which demanded freedom, justice and equality in Egypt. This proclamation by the judicial unions suddenly turned into a movement and quickly spread among Egyptians. Most of the educated youths in the 25–30 age with international awareness, voiced the slogan 'Kefaya', which means 'enough' in Arabic.

The movement turned into a political movement. Its short-term aim was to convince Mubarak not to be a candidate for the presidential election in 2005. As distinct from other movements in Egypt, this movement did not lean towards violent strategies, but followed modern and non-violent means of pressurizing the regime. For example, they actively used the media. They had contacts with Al-Jazeera, and used the social media, mobile phones and cameras. They went for internet campaigns, and organized protests in Egypt.

Its followers were not homogeneous and included liberals, nationalists, seculars, Christians, Muslims, feminists, socialists, labour unions, journalists, and so on. Secondly, unlike other movements, they did not have a clear hierarchy or leadership. Their interactions were more spontaneous. Neither did they have any ideological stance. Their main aim was to change the nature of the regime.

They tried transforming the political system through the available instruments. For instance, one of the well-known members of the movement, Ayman Nour, declared his candidacy for the presidential election after the constitutional amendment in 2005. However, their plan to achieve transformation through winning the presidential elections did not succeed due to the undemocratic nature of the

elections. Hosni Mubarak was re-elected. Repressive measures directed towards the members and their activities continued. However, the regime was not successful in either controlling the movement or the road to the revolution. Kefaya Movement was the first to go to Tahrir Square.

The textile sector was not only one of the foundations of the Egyptian economy, but was also a site where a social movement in the pre-revolution period was born (Ben Gharbia, 2008). In March 2008, labours in Al-Mahalla, the city where there is a considerable number of textile companies, came out in protest, demanding an increase in wages and social rights. Similar to the Kefaya movement, the protests spread all over the country.

The activists called on the participants to wear black and stay at home on the day of the strike. This was 6 April, the day that the April 6 Youth Movement was born (حركة شباب 6 أبريل). The social media became the forum through which they made their voices and debates heard, and through which they mobilized against the regime. Ahmet Maher, one of the well-known members of the movement, was arrested and imprisoned, along with his close friends. In different cities, the police and the armed forces attacked and assaulted the protestors.

On 6 April 2008, many Egyptian nationals protested against the increasing costs of living by not going to work and not buying petrol products, meat, fruit, and vegetables.

In their official page (www.6april.org, 2011), the movement declared as their goal 'building supportive public opinion toward peaceful and democratic transition, building youth fronts to contribute to this transition, demanding the end of the emergency law, call for transparent elections, independent judicial system and amending the constitution'.

The movement was also one of the main actors that went to Tahrir, where they asked the citizens to participate in this uprising, which they called 'The Battle of the Camel'.

3.3. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF EGYPTIAN FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES DURING MUBARAK ERA

Domestic and regional dynamics determined the foreign policy of Mubarak's Egypt. This part of the chapter evaluates Egyptian foreign and security policy during Mubarak era with reference to the country's geo-strategic position, economy and political legitimacy, and to its foreign policy constraints and concerns.

Egypt is a corridor between Asia, Africa and Europe. It is located at the centre of the Near East and the Eastern Mediterranean, and has borders with South Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. The Suez is of immense geo-strategic significance because of its key role in the transportation from the Gulf and Africa to Europe and the USA. More specifically, the Canal was a critical maritime route for the export of Gulf oil and gas to the industrialized countries.

The second dynamic that influenced Egyptian foreign and security policy was its domestic economy and its challenges to the survival of the regime. As discussed in the previous part of the chapter, Egypt was over-populated, sources were limited and the regime failed to pursue a development path that improved the conditions of the underprivileged. Foreign aid was vital for the regime to provide the minimum needs of the society such as water, electricity, health care, and food (Tripp and Owen, 2001: 12). Mubarak considered the foreign policy as a tool for managing the economy.

Another dynamic lies in the main character of Egyptian social identity and the vulnerability of the regime, supposed to enjoy political legitimacy. The Arab-Islamic culture of the population was a main indicator that Mubarak should have taken into consideration in designing his foreign and security policy. Yet, in all fundamental issues, the regime preferred a policy that was in conflict with the preferences of the populace, given their cultural character. Maintaining peace with Israel and policies towards Palestine that was in harmony with the USA's interests constitutes a prime example.

For survival, the regime sought international legitimacy, rather than a domestic one. Foreign policy preferences were shaped so as to earn international approval for the regime. International approval dominated and shaped the policy preferences of the regime, in particular after the 1990s, when the first and the second

waves of democratization in the world, which led to the displacement of the regimes in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Mubarak's aim was to ensure that the main global players did not have an agenda of democratization for Egypt. Therefore, Mubarak welcomed all demands of the USA in international relations. In return, Mubarak asked the leaders of the West to be silent on the wrongdoings of his regime. In sum, foreign and security policy was conducted as a means to eliminate the possibility of any pressure for democratization on Egypt, either by states or by international organizations.

Mubarak did not have any option other than looking for international legitimacy since he adopted none of the means that could have strengthened his legitimacy within his country. Max Weber (1960: 126) describes legitimacy as the acceptance of a government as legitimate by its citizens. He identifies three types of legitimate authority in his study: the traditional, the charismatic and the legal rational. In the first and the second types, obligations and loyalties are offered to a person, to the traditional chieftain or to a heroic leader. Mubarak did not achieve any historical success during his rule comparable to Nasser's achievement in 1956 or Sadat's heroic venture in 1973. Therefore, only Weber's last option, in which obligations are given to the legally established impersonal network of institutions for domestic legitimacy, was available to him. This necessitated democratization of the regime. This, however, Mubarak refused to allow. Therefore, he was forced to adopt a dual stance in his own country—he intimidated his people and sought their support at the same time.

According to Telhami (1993: 441) two issues stand out with regard to the issue of legitimacy of Arab regimes with reference to their foreign policy preferences. One is a general anti-colonial sentiment, and the other is the specific question of Palestine. Although the main source of domestic legitimacy of Arab regimes was mostly based on their position in the Israeli-Arab conflict, this was not applicable to the Egyptian case because of its peace treaty with Israel.

Egyptian foreign and security policy during Mubarak era was a struggle to balance between his commitments to Israel and to the USA on one hand, and Egypt's national interests and his ceaseless efforts to maintain good relations with the Arab world on the other.

Egypt was isolated in the Arab World after signing the peace treaty with Israel. Mubarak's prime aim during his first decade was to find ways to restore Egypt's relations with the Arab world. The Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and 1988 provided him with the opportunity of achieving this aim (Makar, 2007: 22). Egypt supported Iraq with military aid and civilian workers. Egypt created an image that it had moved into that Arab mainstream in the region through assisting Iraq against Shiite and non-Arab Iran (Aftandilian, 1993: 27).

Mubarak followed Sadat's 'Egypt First' strategy and ensured the maintenance of the peace accord. Egypt's main strategies towards Israel were to (1) respect the peace, (2) consolidate the peace through the normalization of relations between the two countries, (3) promoting peace between Israel and other Arab countries by acting as a mediator.

Overall, Mubarak was successful in maintaining peace with Israel. The regime in general term fulfilled its obligations as per the peace accord de-militarization of the Sinai Peninsula, supplying Israel with oil and gas, and cooperation with Israel on security issues. The Gaza Strip blockade by Israel and Mubarak's full support to Tel Aviv by closing down the Egypt-Gaza borders was a case in point. However, Egypt's close partnership with Tel Aviv created a problem of legitimacy for the regime. It had to explain its policy preferences to the citizens, who were sensitive on the question of Palestinian rights. This is the reason why the peace between Israel and Egypt is still called the 'Cold Peace' (Kershner, 2011; Sharp 2012: 7). The dilemma for the regime was to reach a common ground with the other Arab nations (who refused to recognize Israel) and to normalize relations with them, and, at the same time, to respect its commitments to Israel.

Consolidation of the peace accord has failed. Neither public opinion, nor the states of Arab core accepted the peace. It was not possible for Tel Aviv to deepen and broaden its relations with Egypt since Israel had difficulties finding partners within Egypt. Egyptian intellectuals, the media, bureaucrats, and business were unwilling to have relations with Israel. The peace was not consolidated as Mubarak had hoped it would, and this could be the reason why, even today, people are still sceptical about the future of peace in the Middle East.

Israeli foreign and security policy in the region threatened Egypt and Israel was perceived as a threat despite the peace treaty with Cairo (Aly, 1995). In the 1990s and 2000s, right wing parties came to the power in Israel. Tel Aviv followed a military-oriented and aggressive foreign and security policy in the region. Although Sadat had envisaged Middle East as a region of peace and dignity, Israel attacked Lebanon and Palestine in 1982, 2006 and 2008. Mubarak preferred strategies that seemed to be against those Israeli acts aggression to meet the demands of the public and other Arab states during his early years. For instance, when Israel occupied Lebanon in 1982, Mubarak called back his ambassador to Israel. Egypt declared the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon as a pre-condition for restoring relations with Israel. Nevertheless, during the late years of his presidency, Mubarak turned into a yes-man for Israel, especially in the 2000s. Despite the reaction of the Egyptian public, Mubarak's full commitment to Tel Aviv continued, and he perceived Hamas and Hezbollah as threats to Egypt.

Israel's undeclared WMDs and the threat perception in Egypt, especially among the military, constituted the second challenge to inter-state relations (Aly, 1995: 22). In all forums, Egypt argued for a Middle East free from WMDs and lobbied the USA and the European powers for the dismantling of Israeli WMDs. The regime's position on Iran's nuclear enrichment was also dominated by the concern over Israel's WMDs, and Cairo suggested that the Iranian issue be discussed as a package, which included the issue of Israeli WMDs.

Mubarak did not attain his aim of being a mediator in the region. He considered the Cairo's mediation between Israel and other Arab countries as one of the central concerns of the regime. However, Mubarak was not able to finalize any peace effort between Israel and Arab states.

None of the initiatives succeeded although Egypt has the potential of being a mediator because of its strategic, human and cultural potentials. According to Makar (2007: 30), Egypt's loss of credibility and new rising powers in the region were the main causes of these failures. Mubarak was not able to restore Egypt's credibility and importance before the Arab world because of the peace with Israel and Egypt's client-patron relations with the USA (Cleveland, 2008: 438). In addition, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey since the 2000s have started acting as regional powers and

created alternatives for small and medium states in the region. The other country that followed Egypt and signed a peace treaty with Israel was Jordan. Here, Norway acted as the mediator, and Egypt failed to have any role in the peace process. It was Saudi Arabia that was able to bring all Arab countries into a common position on the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which we know as *The Prince Abdullah Initiative* or *Arab Initiative*.[10]

The USA was the main actor that had close interactions with Egypt. When Hosni Mubarak became the third president of the republic in 1981, Sadat's famous sentence, *'99% of political cards in the hand of the USA'*[11] constituted the most significant legacy left to Mubarak. Egypt became the main Arab ally of the USA in the region.

From the viewpoint of the USA, Egypt was significant because of its geo-strategic location, influence on the Arab/Sunni world and for the security of Israel, which Washington views as equivalent to the security of the USA (Aloysius and Ehteshami, 2002: 340). The USA was confident that an Arab-Israeli war without Egypt was not possible. Therefore, having a strategic alliance with Cairo was the key to securing Israeli and American interests in the region. The security of energy transportation via the Suez Canal was Washington's second motivation. The USA considered the role of Egypt in the Arab and Sunni Muslim world as extremely significant, because Egyptian cultural and religious dominance in the region could be manipulated in favour of the USA. However, this prediction proved to be wrong when Egypt failed to prevent the spread of radicalism in the Muslim world. Israel did not face war with a new Arab coalition. However, it did not succeed in ensuring its territorial integrity, security, and recognition by other Arab states (except Jordan).

Egypt and the USA collaborated in conducting joint military exercises and in devising counter terrorism strategies and operations, and shared the threat perception of an Iran growing more powerful. In exchange of allying with the USA, Egypt received 2.1 billion dollars per year as aid for its military modernization and economic development.

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[10] For details, visit the page on the Arab League Summit, 2002, in Beirut, at http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm,

[11] For the related interview conducted by the Assiyassa Newspaper of Kuwait, visit, http://www.sadat.umd.edu/archives/remarks/AAFT%20Assiyassa%20Interview1.8.76.pdf.PDF

On one hand, the regime considered the USA its main partner in international relations. On the other hand, it was aware of the potential threat that might originate from the USA especially during the 2000s, when successive US governments declared the democratisation initiative for the Middle Eastern countries, the *Big Middle East Project*, which also included Egypt.[12] Democratization trends in the post-Cold War Era, the pressure from Democrats inside the USA and the rising influence of international organizations put more pressure on Mubarak. However, Mubarak used closed-door diplomacy and was likely to seek US assurance for not including democratization and regime legitimacy into their foreign relations agenda. Fakhro and Hokayen (2011) in their article argue that the US government has been accused of propping up unpopular governments, and labelling anachronistic and obsolescent regimes as 'moderate', in order to secure foreign policy objectives in the region.

In the international arena, Mubarak tried to convince the international society that democratization in Egypt would lead to the rising of Islamists into power and consequently, Egypt would be the second Iran in the region. Radicalization in the Muslim world and post-9/11 developments strengthened his position He followed authoritarian strategies against the legitimate demands of the different groups and did not allow the internationalization of Egypt's democratization issue through being a 'yes man' for the USA. In short, he was aware that the democratization is a wave that originated in the West, but followed the strategy, conceptualised by the famous Neo-realist scholar Walt (1985: 4), of allying with the state that poses the major threat.

3.4. EGYPT AND THE ARAB SPRING

This part evaluates the Arab Spring with reference to Egypt from actor-based and issue-based perspectives, without making any theoretical or hypothetical assertions. Foreign policy, political legitimacy, the media, and economic performance are treated as causal explanations, and, additionally, the Egyptian revolution is re-visited through the eyes of women, opposition groups, foreign powers (The USA, Russia, China, Iran and the EU), Coptic and the Egyptian armed forces.

[12] For more details, visit, http://mepi.state.gov/,

Any analysis of the Arab Spring is subject to the important caveat that it is too early to tell where the changes unfolding in the region will ultimately lead (Mansfield and Snyder, 2012: 1; Barham, 2012: 423; Snider and Faris, 2011: 49).

Figure 3.1: Timeline of Egypt Since January 2011

2011
January - 21 killed in bomb at church in Alexandria where Christians had gathered to mark the New Year.
Anti-government demonstrations, apparently encouraged by Tunisian street protests, which prompted sudden departure of President Ben Ali.
President Mubarak reshuffles his cabinet but fails to placate demonstrators, whose calls for his resignation grow louder. Days later, he promises to step down in September.
February - President Mubarak steps down and hands power to the army council.
March - Egyptians approve package of constitutional reforms aimed at paving the way for new elections.
April - Former President Mubarak and his sons, Ala and Gamal, are arrested on suspicion of corruption.
April-August - Protests continue in Cairo's Tahrir Square over the slow pace of political change. Islamist groups come to the fore. Army finally disperses protestors in August.
August - Former President Mubarak goes on trial in Cairo, charged with ordering the killing of demonstrators earlier in the year.
October - Clashes between Coptic Christians and security forces kill 24 people. Egypt and Israel swap 25 Egyptians in Israeli custody for a US-Israeli citizen accused of spying.
November - Violence in Cairo's Tahrir square as security forces clash with protesters accusing the military of trying to keep their grip on power. Prime Minister Essam Sharaf resigns in response to the unrest. Start of parliamentary elections.
December - National unity government headed by new Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri takes office.
2012
January - Islamist parties emerge as victors of drawn-out parliamentary elections.
March - Pope Shenouda III, the veteran head of the Coptic Church, dies.
April - Crisis in relations with Saudi Arabia over the Saudi detention of an Egyptian lawyer briefly threatens the substantial aid that the Saudis provide Egypt.

May - Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi tops the first round of voting in first free presidential elections, narrowly ahead of Mubarak-era prime minister Ahmed Shafiq. Official media puts turnout at a low 43%. Military leaders announce the end of the state of emergency, which has been in place since Anwar al-Sadat's assassination in 1981, as its last renewal expires.
June - Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi narrowly wins presidential election. Court sentences ex-President Mubarak to life in prison for complicity in the killing of protesters during the 2011 uprising.
July - President Morsi submits to a Supreme Court ruling that the parliamentary elections were invalid, after initially ordering parliament to meet in defiance of a military decree dissolving it in June.
August - New prime minister Hisham Qandil appoints a cabinet dominated by figures from the outgoing government, technocrats, and Islamists, excluding secular and liberal forces. Islamist fighters attack an army outpost in Sinai, killing 16 soldiers, and mount a brief incursion into Israel, highlighting the tenuousness of government control over the largely lawless area. President Morsi dismisses Defence Minister Tantawi and Chief of Staff Sami Annan and strips military of say in legislation and drafting the new constitution.
September - Egypt kills 32 militants and destroys 31 smuggling tunnels to Gaza in an offensive against militants who attacked troops in Sinai in August.
November - Bishop Tawadros is chosen as the new pope of Egypt's Coptic Christians. President Morsi issues a decree stripping the judiciary of the right to challenge his decisions, but rescinds it in the face of popular protests.
December - Islamist-dominated constituent assembly approves draft constitution that boosts the role of Islam and restricts freedom of speech and assembly. Public approve it in a referendum, prompting extensive protest by secular opposition leaders, Christians and women's groups. Government paralysis weakens the currency and delays a $4.8bn (£3bn) IMF loan.
2013
January - More than 50 people are killed during days of violent street protests. The army chief warns that political strife is pushing the state to the brink of collapse.
March - A court halts President Morsi's plans to bring parliamentary elections forward to April, citing failure to refer the electoral law to the Constitutional Court. The main opposition National Salvation Front had announced a poll-boycott earlier.
April-The entrance of the executive and judicial controls over the military budget and military-based companies are announced.
June - President Morsi appoints Islamist allies as regional leaders in 13 of Egypt's 27 governorships. Most controversially he appoints a member of a former Islamist armed group linked to a massacre of tourists in Luxor in 1997. This prompts protests and the Luxor governor

subsequently resigns.

Source: BBC, (2013b).

Davis (2011) describes the Arab Spring was propelled by a broad cross-section of ordinary citizens, especially youth. It has been essentially leaderless, with the slogan of dignity, respect, better life and reforms. It was a result of complex social processes at work, leading to the revolts without any ideological motivation.

Dupont and Passy (2011), who analysed the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, discuss the uprisings with reference to the *Theories of Social Movements*, including the Political Opportunity Theory, Resources Mobilization Approach and Framing Theory, and conclude that the developments in the Arab world were the consequences of dynamics mentioned in the theories. Moaddel (2012) in his empirical analysis concluded that both political opportunity theory and resource mobilization approach are the strongest explanatory models for explaining the motivations and attitudes of Egyptians in Tahrir Square. On the role of the social media and the resource mobilization approach, Eltantawy and Wiest (2011: 1218) argue that social media introduced a novel resource that provided swiftness in receiving and disseminating information. It helped to build and strengthen ties among activists and increased interaction among protesters and between them and the rest of the world. With regard to the new social media, Khonder (2011: 675) states that although the new media is only one of the factors among others, such as the various social and political factors in the region, it nevertheless played a critical role, especially in the light of the absence of a free media and a civil society.

Nuruzzaman (2013), who discusses the revolutions from a human security angle, concluded that human security concerns have considerably driven the outbreak and the course of the development of the Arab Spring.

Economic performance of a government is significant for its legitimacy and survival (O'Donnell, 1994: 65) since economic conditions of a state can lead to regime change from authoritarian to liberal or other political forms (Baroi, 2012). According to Khamis and Vaughn (2011: 8), the economic performance of the previous regime in Egypt was one of the leading factors that brought about the uprising. Egyptians were tired of the extent of corruption, dictatorship and economic

distress, added to which was Mubarak's failure to implement proper relief and rehabilitation policies. Dissatisfaction had been increasing during the last decade due to poor living conditions, because of unemployment, inflation and lack of proper medical facilities (Faris, 2009).

Lack of Cairo's political legitimacy was a significant factor that led to the uprising. Heiss (2012), in his article, came to the conclusion that Mubarak and his regime were unable to cope with the rapid and dynamic changes in the social, political and economic realities that confronted Egypt since the 2000s. He maintained that the lack of political legitimacy was the driving force behind the uprising. Similarly, Zubaida (2012: 566) in her study stated that the political history of the regime explains the uprising to some extent.

Johnstad (2012) in his empirical study on regime legitimacy and nonviolent protest statistically demonstrated that the uprising and its success in Egypt could have been predicted, since the political legitimacy of Mubarak's regime was at its minimum. In his analysis, he measured the legitimacy of a given country by examining the political mythology, performance, international support and the level of threat. The overall legitimacy score of Egypt was 0, similar to that of Tunisia, Yemen, Libya and Syria.

On 18 January 2011 the person who posted in the social media and called upon the Egyptians to demonstrate was a woman, one of the members of the 6 April Youth Movement, named Asmaa Mahfouz. Around 10,000 women marched into the square against Mubarak's regime. They were arrested, tortured and victimized both during the revolution and after, until the presidential elections. For instance, the women in Tahrir and reports of their being subjected to virginity tests by the government became stories in the international media. According to the report by the European Parliament (www.europarl.europa.eu, 2012: 80)

> *Women, alongside men, participated in the protest movements that shook the Arab world in 2011, demanding freedom, equality, justice, and democracy. Women, as well as men, paid and continue to pay a high price for their struggles. Today women must be able to play their full part in building the futures of their countries. Women's participation in public and political life, on an equal basis with men, is an essential condition for democracy and social justice, values at the heart of the Arab Spring.*

Egyptian Christians, during the pre and post-revolution periods, were anxious and divided (Rowe, 2013: 1). The church and the Copts in higher positions rejected

at the beginning any arguments for the overthrow of the regime. On the other hand, ordinary Copts, especially the youth, joined the protests in Tahrir from the beginning.

Violence and bomb attacks on Coptic churches in populated cities created a sense of fear among the Christian community in the post-Mubarak era. They feared that their fundamental rights might be threatened. For instance, as the above timetable shows, in January and October 2011 Christian community members were killed either by bombing or by police and civilian attacks. Moreover, the possibility of an Islamic regime under the Muslim Brotherhood after the elections raised profound questions about whether Egypt was being transformed into an Islamic regime and how the Copts would survive in this new era.

One of the players and the most difficult to analyse was Egypt's strongest and most populated movement-The Muslim Brotherhood. The movement did not play the role of a leader during the uprising that ended with success. Despite the fact that the movement held a neutral position towards the protests at the beginning, many of its young members disobeyed the recommendation of their leaders not to participate in the uprising and went to Tahrir. Eric (2011), in his article, focuses on its organizational structure and the nature of membership as the causes behind the fractured response of the movement.

The movement, which had been one of the main victims of the regime for years and whose leaders were martyred, was either unable to predict the social uprising, or was not politically prepared for this historical change in Egypt although the Tunisian case was a significant sign for them.

The movement started preparing its agenda, forming a political party and getting ready for the elections after the revolution. 'Islam is the Solution' was their slogan during the pre-election period. Finally, the movement succeeded in attaining power when their candidate, Mohammad Morsi, was elected as the new president of Egypt. Thus, a social and religious movement with an Islamic perception of political and economic arrangements got the opportunity to implement all its programmes.

The secular movements in the country were disappointed with the outcome—a revolution had occurred without Muslim Brotherhood participation, yet the Muslim Brotherhood had captured the presidency. Once again, the secular activists flocked to Tahrir. There were two reasons, as can be seen in the timetable. First, as a reaction to

the SCAF, as they felt that the military was trying to keep their grip on power. Secondly, the youth and other members of the movement were protesting against the president and his interesting practices, such as the re-establishment of Emergency Law, declaration of privacy of the presidential office and keeping the president's decisions out of jurisdiction of the courts, and unlimited use of force by the police. There is also scepticism and criticism about Egypt transforming into an Islamist regime after the elections. Benhabib (2011: 3), in his analysis, describes these criticisms as motivated by cultural prejudice.

Bal (2013) describes the Egyptian case as the dilemma of pluralism and majoritarianism, similar to other transition cases and praises the regime for its democratic stance, and care the internal dynamics in order not forward to a potential violence.

The position of the US administration was vital. The USA and its preferences were one of the significant determinants of the uprising. Only two years before the revolution, President Barack Obama, in his historical speech at Cairo University,[13] made the US position clear in his announcement of a new chapter between the USA and the Muslim world. The president both legitimized the just demands for justice, rule of law, human rights, and freedom of the Arab public, and encouraged the Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, to undertake reforms (www.whitehouse.gov, 2009).

During the uprising, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, called for a peaceful transition to a real democracy in Egypt (Curry, 2011). At the same time, President Barack Obama warned of 'difficult days ahead' for Egypt. He also said that the transition following President Hosni Mubarak's earlier announcement that he would not run for re-election in September must begin immediately (edition.cnn.com, 2011).

In his report, the famous American scholar, Friedman (2011) describes two scenarios: (1) a genuine and liberal democratic rising that might replace regimes. (2) American opposition to these risings might result in the emergence of anti-American regimes in these countries. The expectation of the Washington administration was to

[13]For details, see Whitehouse, (2009), *President Obama Speaks to the Muslim World from Cairo, Egypt*, June, 5, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/video/President-Obama-Speaks-to-the-Muslim-World-from-Cairo-Egypt,

go on with the close partnership between the USA and the new Egypt, with specific reference to the peace accord with Israel and more reforms for democratizations.

Russia, China, and Iran understood the Arab Spring differently. Russia was not expecting the developments in the Arab world, nor was it happy with it. Blank and Saivetz (2012), in their article, argue that Russian scepticism of the Arab Spring was the result of its interests in the region, such as trade, arms export, and its fear that Arab spring might influence the Central Asian regimes. In addition, the role of NATO in Libya was a Western initiative that annoyed Moscow.

Iran followed a double-faced policy. Iran viewed the 'Arab Spring' as a new regional opportunity for Tehran to have new alliance partners in the Arab world, whose previous regimes had hostile relations with Tehran. In Egypt and Bahrain, Iran declared the demands as legitimate, the regime as tyrannical, and transition as necessary. The supreme leader defined the uprisings as an Islamic awakening (www.khamanei.ır, 2012). However, in the Syrian case, Iran used a very different language. It defined the rebels as terrorists and the uprising as a game of Western powers and Zionists to destroy the country.

China's response was another interesting story. China preferred to slip under the radar (Parello-Plesner, 2011: 2), in part out of a lack of understanding what was going on, but also in order to prevent sparking internal debates about the nature of the Chinese regime.

The European Union had failed to achieve a peaceful democratic transition in the Arab world with its previous initiatives. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership proposed in 1995, the European Neighbourhood Policy developed in 2004, and the Union for the Mediterranean created in 2008, were all aimed towards a democratic transition through the assistance of previous regimes. However, the democratic transition that happened in those countries was more bottoms-up and the EU was not a main player during the uprising. In 2011, following to revolution, the union had to come up with a new approach called 'The Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean', which declared the EU's intentions and instruments to contribute to the post-revolutionary democratization process in Egypt, Tunis and Libya.

According to Schumacher (2011, 113) the awakening of Arab civil society has provided the EU with a unique opportunity to rethink the artificial compartmentalization of its policies and finally develop a single regional framework. Echagüe, Michou, and Mikail (2011) who discuss the actions of the EU and its member states during and after the revolution concluded that while France and Britain took the leadership of the coalition for intervention, particularly in the Libyan case, Germany remained wary of such action.

The position of the Egyptian armed forces before, during and after the revolution is one of the main issues that should be studied in broader and multi-disciplinary approaches. The armed forces played a key role during the critical days when people went to Tahrir. Their position between Mubarak and Tahrir was vital and determined the future of the country.

First, they disobeyed the order of the president, which encouraged more people to protest for a longer period. Secondly, this was a clear sign to Mubarak that he would not be able to continue anymore because of the lack of the military support. The army was also successful in reconciling the pro-revolutionary and anti-revolutionary groups during the uprising. While the army was able to shoot civilians as the Syrian army is doing today, it wisely prevented a civil war between the civilians and the previous regime.

The opposition-army alliance was a short lived one. One year after the uprising, Egyptians again flocked to Tahrir. This time they went to say 'enough' to SCAF and its policies during the transition. Until the presidential elections, the SCAF ruled the country and a large number of developments and crises occurred in Egypt.

Said (2012) argues that the role of the army in transition and its political preferences were the result of the army's economic empire, social base, their image of being the foundation of the modern Egyptian state, and their role as guarantors of the republic's legitimacy, and the army's special ties with the United States. He lists the causes of the crises between the army and the people as follows: excessive repression, due to using the same old methods of the state apparatus, the generals' hatred for the revolution, the splits among SCAF members and the crisis of legitimacy for military rule.

CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

This chapter presents the results of the survey's analysis through fifteen tables. The results of the survey are narrated in a descriptive manner, indicating the valid numbers and percentages. It also includes Factor Analysis and Variance Tests with their results.

4.1. THE ARAB SPRING

Four questions have risen to the sampling in order to come up with their perceptions of the Arab Spring. The causes, the role of the army and predictions for post-spring period were the main motives of the questions.

Table 4.1: Perceptions of the Arab Spring in Egypt

QUESTIONS	ANSWERS	VALID NUMBERS	PERCENTAGES
Do you believe that the military authorities in Egypt are working to? (Valid Numbers: 418)	Slow down or reverse the gains of the revolution	165	39,5
	Neither advance nor slow down the gains of the revolution	128	30,6
	Advance the gains of the revolution	125	29,9
When you consider about the Arab spring, are you more optimistic or more pessimistic than before about the future of the Arab world? (Valid Numbers: 423)	More optimistic	251	59,3
	More pessimistic	86	20,3
	Feeling no change	86	20,3
Thinking about the Arab awakening, (Valid Numbers: 415)	Ordinary people seeking freedom, dignity and a better life.	266	64,1
	Foreign powers trying to stir trouble in the region.	83	20
	Opposition parties or sects seeking to control governments.	66	15,9

The survey included four questions in order to come up with a descriptive generalization of public perception on the Arab Spring. The first question assessed

their general understanding of the Arab Spring and it indicates that a high proportion of the respondents (64.1%) considered the spring as the awakening of ordinary people seeking freedom, dignity and a better life. Second, the majority of respondents (59. 3 %) were more optimistic about the future of the Arab world. The attitudes of the respondents towards the role of the military in post-revolutionary months are diverse, and the public are divided between those who believe the army would play a role in advancing the gains of the revolution and those who believe the SCAF might slow down the gains of the revolution.

Table 4.2: Perceptions of Countries that Played the Most Constructive Role During the Arab Spring



Valid Numbers: 314.

The last question related to the Arab Spring was chosen to explore the role of selected countries during the uprising. According to the survey, among Britian, China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia and the USA countries Turkey, with 46%, is listed as the country that played the most constructive role during the Arab Spring. The gap between Turkey and the second country, the USA, is around 33%. Very few respondents only saw European countries as constructive and none of the Muslim countries except Turkey was featured in the responses.

4.2. EGYPT

Egypt-related domestic and foreign issues have been measured through ten questions in the survey. Challenges to domestic and foreign policies of Egypt, political systems, threat perceptions, political behaviours were the main topics that aimed to be exploited.

Table 4.3: Perceptions of Foreign and Security Policies in Egypt (%)



The questions that designed to daring act of Egyptians on main concerns of the foreign and security policy disclosed up following domino effects: (1) Security (46.1%) and economy (36.7%) are thought to be the most essential concerns of Egyptian domestic policy. (2) Western powers (38.8%) are perceived as the most vital concern of Egyptian foreign and security policy. The Nile Question (19.3%), as a specific dispute of Africa, is underlined as the second most important issue. (3) Arabism (alliance with the Arab world) is the recommended strategy (46.1%) when the country faces an international challenge. Diplomacy (19.3%) and economy/finance (15.4) are strategies that found support among the public after Arabism and mainly as secondary strategies that are supposed to be followed as counter balance. Although the majority of the people who answered this questionnaire disagree (37.2%) with the risk of Egypt's being divided, there is still a significant number (31%) with the fear of a divided Egypt.

Table 4.4: Perceptions of Foreign Leaders and Regimes (%)



Turkey's Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came up ahead of the Arab Spring. 74.6% of the sampling encouraged the next president of Egypt to be inspired by and act like Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. None of the leaders crossed the 10% line and none of the European leaders acquired a noticeable place. On the other hand, when it came to the political system that Egypt should follow, the results were a little different. 45.7% perceives Turkey as a model for the Egyptian political system. USA (15.6%), France (11.6%), and Germany's (7.8%) political systems that follow that of Turkey. Neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia's model was considered appropriate.

Table 4.5: Political Behaviour in Egypt (%)



Egyptians are significantly more heterogeneous when it comes to political behaviour. Sadat's vision of 'Egypt First and Forever' is what Egyptians believe the new government should base its decisions on in order for these decisions to be the best for Egypt (74.6%). However, Egyptians are divided on the following dimensions of political behaviour: the historical figures that they admire most; the institution they trust the most; and the political parties they would most likely vote for. Anwar al-Sadat, Mohammad Ali, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Hasan al-Banna are the figures that they admire the most, while inter-personal gaps are minor. Religious institutions and the SCAF are equally (23.8%) the most confidential institutions. Political parties or parliaments were the least trustworthy institutions in Egypt. Similar to the election results, Islamic parties are the parties with the highest electoral support: 42.6%. The Liberal and Nationalist Parties were the second and third choices, respectively.

Table 4.6: Voting for Presidential Election in Egypt (%)



Valid Numbers: 411.

University students in Egypt have demonstrated an altered trend as compared to the trends from previous presidential elections. The survey was concluded before the election, and some candidates had been eliminated while others were still in the running for the presidency. This was the only question that did not catch the attention of today's Egypt, and this can be attributed to the court decisions on candidacy during the SCAF rule. Mohammad Al-Baradhi was the most popular among university students-24.6%. However, there were still no candidates dominating the polls and the difference in support for each candidate is not that high.

4.3. TURKEY

This part presents the results of factor analysis of Turkey's perceptions in Egypt. The results of the factor analysis are narrated in Table 4.7. with their factor loading, total variance and reliability verifications.

Table 4.7: Factor Analysis of Turkey's Perceptions in Egypt

FACTOR NAME	QUESTIONS	FACTOR LOADING	TOTAL VARIANCE (%)	RELIABILITY
INTER-STATE RELATIONS	How do you present today's Egypt-Turkey relations?	0,518	25,953	0,681
	How do you describe for future of Egypt-Turkey relations?	0,575		
TURKISH MODEL	Turkey has recently become more influential in Middle East politics.	0,729	32,548	0,656
	Turkey should play a more significant role in the region.	0,669		
	Turkey is a successful example of the coherence between Islam and democracy.	0,630		
	Turkey can be a model country for the Middle East.	0,664		
TOTAL:	58,501			
		Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy		0,621
		Bartlett's Test of Sphericity		378, 074
		df		15
		Sig.		0,000

Initially, the factorability of the seven questions was examined in SPSS program. All questions were under the heading entitled Turkey. KMO and Bartlett's Test Sphericity were used to measure the availability of the questions for factor analyses. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.616, above the recommended value of 0.6. In anti-image matrices, only the question related to Turkey's candidacy to the European Union failed to be above 0.5 (0.35). The factor analysis was repeated after the question was withdrawn from the analysis. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy increased to 0.636 in the second factor measurement. All six questions were available according to the anti-image Correlations.

Rotated component matrix categorized the questions into three, which might be a new factor: T7+T8+T6, T1+T2, T5+T3. Total Variance Explained pictured those three new factors' rotation sums of squared loadings % 24, 1- 22, 1- 21, 4 in total 67.6. In the second step, the reliability of the factors was measured in the program.

In the reliability analysis, the third factor that combined T5 and T6 questions, Cronbach's alpha was 0.541, that is, less than 0.6. As a result of this, the factor analysis went to the beginning again and two options, T5 and T6, came through. In the second option, the question T3 was at risk of not being a part of any factor and, as a result, it was decided to continue with question T5.

In the third analysis of the factoring of the questions, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was 0.621 and all questions were available according to their anti-image correlations. The factors decreased from three to two (T1+T2, T5+T6+T7+T8) for the reliability test, with the rotation sums of squared loadings of 58.501%. The reliability of the first factor was 0, 681 and the second was 0.656, which mean valid factors. Nunnally (1978) and Sipahi and others (2011) state that the reliability and sampling adequacy between 0.6 and 0.7 are still significant if the study measures the public perceptions on a given social phenomena.

The first factor was called inter-state relations and the second was Turkish Model. Both factors were computed according to the regression method in the SPSS and were used in a Chi-Square Test.

Table 4.8: Perceptions of Turkey as a Model (%)



The questions measuring the perception of Egyptians of the 'Turkish model' were conditional; that is, those who argued that Turkey would not be a good model for the Middle East in the previous question ticked the 'why not' option, and those who argued that Turkey would be a good model ticked the 'why' option. However, we should add here that Turkey is considered as a good model according to the factor

analysis. Its democratic regime (39.1%) and economy (30.3%) are outstanding motives that make Turkey a good model in the eyes of Egyptians. Secularism (32.9%) and not being 'Muslim enough' (28.1%) are the factors against Turkey being considered a good model.

4.4. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Another sub-chapter of the survey includes the questions related to the USA, Egyptians general perceptions of the country and Obama Administration, American foreign policy in the Middle East. The aim was to come up with a general description of Egyptian attitudes towards the USA and issues that motivates anti and pro-position with references to foreign and security policies.

Table 4.9: Attitudes Towards the USA and Obama Administration (%)



Anti-Americanism is high among Egyptians. Only 8.4% have a favourable attitude toward the USA; 30.9%, which is a significant percentage, was neutral. For anti-Americanism, which is prevalent in is 60.8% of the public, the decrease is limited when it comes to attitudes towards the Obama administration—56%. A large proportion, 32.8 % was neutral toward the Obama administration. Egyptians believe

that protecting Israel, preserving global dominance, weakening Muslims, and controlling oil are the main factors that drive American policy in the Middle East.

Table 4.10: Attitudes Towards US Foreign and Security Policies in the Middle East (%)



Israel is the primary independent variable in their attitudes towards US foreign and security policies in the Middle East. According to 51% of the respondents, if the USA stops aid to Israel, their views on the USA may improve. Similarly, 62.5% states that Obama's policy, aiming at a final Israeli-Palestinian peace, was the most disappointing when they look at the past years. We should also note here that they are pleased with Obama's economic assistance to the region and policies related to Iraq.

4.5. ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Arab-Israeli Conflicts and its effects towards the Egyptian foreign and security policies was a significant sub-chapter in the survey with eight questions. Two issues were raised in order to come up with a general framework of Egyptian perceptions on the conflict: The Solution and its means and future of the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty.

Table 4.11: Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli Conflicts

QUESTIONS	ANSWERS	VALID NUMBERS	PERCENTAGES
Which of the following statement is closer to your view? (Valid Numbers: 394)	Prepared for peace if Israel is willing to return all 1967 territories including East Jerusalem, but Israel will never give up these territories easily.	168	42,6
	Even if Israel returns all 1967 territ Arabs should continue to fight.	151	38,3
	Prepared for peace if Israel is willing to return all 1967 territories including East Jerusalem, and Arab governments should put more effort into this.	75	19
Which of the following statement is closest to your view about the prospects of lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians? (Valid Numbers: 400)	Inevitable, but it will take more time.	283	70,8
	Don't believe it will ever happen.	102	25,5
	Will happen in the next five years.	15	3,8
What do you believe is the likely outcome, if the prospects of a two states solution in the Palestinian Israeli conflict collapse? (Valid Numbers: 376)	State of intense conflict for years to come.	218	58
	Status quo will continue.	102	27,1
	One state solution in which Israelis and Palestinians are equal.	45	12
	Palestinians will eventually surrender to Israeli power.	11	2,9
A solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that leads to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital, will happen only (Valid Numbers: 390)	Through another Arab Israeli war.	215	55,1
	It will never happen.	68	17,4
	By being imposed by the United States.	44	11,3
	Through serious negotiations.	40	10,3
	By being imposed by the UN.	23	5,9
When you look at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which of the following issues is the most central to you, assuming that they may all be important? (Valid Numbers: 373)	Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem.	172	46,1
	Right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes.	132	35,4
	Establishment of a fully independent contiguous Palestinian state in West Bank and Gaza.	69	18,5
With regard to Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, would you like	Modify the terms.	243	61,5
	Cancel the treaty.	96	24,3

to see Egypt? (Valid Numbers: 395)	Maintain the treaty.	56	14,2
If Israel agrees to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, based on the 1967 border, with East Jerusalem as the capital, what would your position be on the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty? (Valid Numbers: 386)	Modify the terms.	234	60,6
	Cancel the treaty.	83	21,5
	Maintain the treaty.	69	17,6
Which of the following statement is closer to your (Valid Numbers: 378)	I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel returns all the territories occupied, but they won't give up territory peacefully.	148	39,2
	Even if the Israelis return all of the territories occupied in 1967 peacefully, the Arabs should continue to fight Israel.	129	34,1
	I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel returns all the territories occupied, and Arab governments should make more efforts.	100	26,5

Egyptians are pessimistic with regard to the resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict. The main factor for this pessimism is their mistrust of Israel. 42.6 % believe that Israel will never give up occupied territories, including East Jerusalem. Lasting peace between Israel and Palestine is perceived as inevitable but will take more time is what 70.8 % of the people believe; 58 % argue that if a two-state solution collapses, this situation of intense conflict will continue for years. Egyptians do not believe in a final peace through negotiations, if the UN or the USA imposes this. A new Israeli-Arab War is believed to be the final hurdle to the proclamation of a Palestinian State. Egyptians are sensitive of Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem (46.1%) and refugee issues (35.4%) as pre-conditions for peace. The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Accord is being called to be modified by 61.5% of the population. This demand of modification is not motivated with Palestinian Question. In a scenario where Israel agrees to a Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders, Egyptians still believe that the peace between Cairo and Tel-Aviv should be modified.

4.6. IRAN

Iran was quested with references to its nuclear studies and the core question, whether Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons or only for peaceful reasons. Secondly, similar to the debates in the literature, Egyptian perception of the Middle East and Egypt's quest for nuclear if Iran owns the weapons, were questioned.

Table 4.12: Attitudes Towards Iran's Nuclear Enrichments (%)



The public's perception of Iranian nuclear enrichment is quite similar to the government's position; 78.7% believe that Iran is merely conducting research to develop nuclear weapons. The public has a similar position to that of Egyptian policy makers that Iran is using its nuclear program for peaceful purposes. On the possible outcomes of a nuclear Iran, Egyptians have diverse opinions. On the one hand, 40.3% believe that the Middle East with a nuclear Iran is negative, while 34.4 % believe it to be a positive outcome for the region. However, a high percentage of the sampling, 73.6%, also wants Egypt to own nuclear weapons to balance Iran.

4.7. GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Out of Turkey, the USA, Arab-Israeli Conflict and Iran, perceptions of world politics in a broader term with references to preferred superpower, countries and

international organisations that are admired at most were the questions to check the general trend among Egyptians.

Table 4.13: Selected Issues in Global World and Public Perceptions

QUESTIONS	ANSWERS	VALID NUMBERS	PERCENTAGES
In a world where there is only one superpower, which of the following countries would you prefer to be that superpower? (Valid Numbers: 310)	China	88	28,4
	Pakistan	56	18,1
	Germany	47	15,2
	India	37	11,9
	Great Britain	36	11,6
Which world leader (outside your own country) do you admire most? (Valid Numbers: 370)	Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Turkey	258	69,7
	King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia	17	4,6
	Barack Obama of the United States of America	15	4,1
If you had to live in one of the following countries, which one would you prefer? (Valid Numbers: 373)	Germany	91	24,4
	Great Britain	88	23,6
	France	84	22,5
	The USA	55	14,7
If you had to live in an Arab country outside Egypt, which country would you prefer? (Valid Numbers: 392)	The United Arab Emirates	165	42,1
	Saudi Arabia	89	22,7
	Lebanon	63	16,1
	Qatar	32	8,2
Which of the following international organization do you admire more? (Valid Numbers: 343)	European Union	155	45,2
	Organization of the Islamic Cooperation	71	20,7
	United Nations	70	20,4

Five questions measured the perception of global affairs. The first was on what country they preferred to be a superpower; no country gained the highest votes: China (28.4%), Pakistan (18.1%), Germany (15.2%), India (11.9%), Great Britain (11.6%). As seen in previous tables, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, with 69.7% of the votes, is the leader that Egyptians admire most. In the questions following that, only European states and the USA ranked as their preferred countries to live in. In the Arab world, the United Arab Emirates is the most favourable country that the Egyptians would prefer to live. Saudi Arabia and Lebanon follow them on the list. Finally, the European Union is the most admired

organisation in comparison to the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation and the United Nations.

4.8. THE MIDDLE EAST

This part presents the results of the issue and threat perceptions of Egyptians in the Middle East, indicating the valid number and the percentages.

Table 4.14: Selected Issues in the Middle East and Public Perceptions

QUESTIONS	ANSWERS	VALID NUMBERS	PERCENTAGES
What is the basic problem of Middle East? (Valid Numbers: 397)	Influence of the West	141	35,5
	Arab-Israeli Conflict	135	34
	Economy	78	19,6
Which of the following country outside Egypt do you think will have a better economy 20 years later? (Valid Numbers: 373)	Turkey	211	56,6
	The United Arab Emirates	74	19,8
	Qatar	28	7,5
	Iran	25	6,7
Please choose the country that you think posing the biggest threat to your country (Valid Numbers: 374)	Israel	242	64,7
	The United States of America	109	29,1
	Iran	23	6,1
A world without Osama Ben Laden is (Valid Numbers: 402)	No Change	296	73,6
	More dangerous	57	14,2
	Safer	49	12,2

The Israeli-Arab conflict and the influence of the West in the Middle East are perceived as the basic problems of the region. Turkey is considered to have a better economy 20 years later. The Oil-rich Gulf country, the United Arab Emirates, is the second. The last question is asked to measure their perception of Osama bin Laden after his dead. A world without Osama bin Laden would have been no different for the security of the world.

4.9. CHI-SQUARE TESTS

We compared the results of the survey by variance tests based on Chi-Square model to analyse whether there are statistical differences among different demographical and political characteristics, or not. Voting as political behaviours, national identity

perceptions, gender, foreign policy preferences, the historical figures who are most admired, and faith on domestic institutions were the dependent variables. The results of the tests have been discussed in the last chapter for evaluation and conclusion, with references to relevant literature and hypotheses.

Table 4.15: Chi-Square Tests and the Hypothesis

CROSSTABULATIONS	HYPOTHESIS	SIGMA (PI)	RESULTS
Threat Perception and Political Behaviors	**H_0:** There are not statistically differences among supporters of different political parties in Egypt towards the biggest threat that is perceived. **H_1:** There are statistically differences among supporters of different political parties in Egypt towards the biggest threat that is perceived.	0,16	H_1 Rejected **Result:** There are not statistically differences among the supporters of different political parties in Egypt towards the biggest threat that is perceived
Future of Israeli-Egypt Peace and Perceptions towards Egyptian Foreign and Security Policy Decision Best for: Egypt, Muslims, Arabs and the World	**H_0:** There are not statistically differences among perceptions of Egyptian foreign and security policy best for: Egypt, Muslims, Arabs and the world towards the perceptions of the future of Israeli-Egypt Peace. **H_1:** There are statistically differences among perception of Egyptian foreign and security policy best for: Egypt, Muslims, Arabs and the world towards the perceptions of the future of Israeli-Egypt peace.	0,000	H_0: Rejected **Result:** Individuals who underline Egypt and Arabs in which Egypt's decisions should base mostly on best for, more in favor of the modification of the treaty, while Muslims mostly ask for the cancel of it, while the individuals with the world answer ask for the maintenance.
Trust on Domestic Institutions and Figures in Egyptian History that are Admired Most	**H_0:** There are not statistically differences among individuals admire most on historical figures in Egyptian history towards their perceptions of the domestic institutions that they admire at most. **H_1:** There are not statistically differences among individuals with different figures in Egyptian history that admired most on their perception of the domestic institutions that they admire at most.	0,000	H_0: Rejected **Result:** Individuals who admire at most Anwar al-Sadat trust more SCAF and religious institution; individuals with Hasan al-Banna go more to religious institutions; the ones with Nasser go to SCAF and NGOs; lastly Mohammad Ali go to SCAF and universities.
Identity Perception and General Attitudes towards the USA	**H_0:** There are not statistically differences among individuals with different identity perceptions on their general attitudes towards the USA. **H_1:** There are statistically differences among individuals with different identity perceptions on their general attitudes	0,006	H_0: Rejected **Result:** Individuals who define religion as their most important identity mostly have unfavorable attitudes towards the USA; Egyptians are either

	towards the USA.		somehow unfavorable or neutral; Arab and citizen of the world have a more neutral position.
Attitudes on Iranian Nuclear Studies and Possible Outcomes for the Region	**H_0:** There are not statistically differences among individuals who support Iranian right to its nuclear program and the ones who support international pressure towards the outcomes of the nuclear Iran in the region. **H_1:** There are statistically differences among individuals who support Iranian right to its nuclear program and the ones who support international pressure towards the outcomes of the nuclear Iran in the region.	0,000	H_0: Rejected **Result:** Individuals who support Iran's right to nuclear program consider a Middle East with a nuclear Iran more positive, while individuals who support pressure to stop Iran consider it as more negative.
Attitude Towards President Obama and Perceptions of Driving Factors of the US Policies in the Region	**H_0:** There are not statistically differences among individuals with different attitudes towards president Obama on their perceptions of the driving factors of the US policies in the region. **H_1:** There are statistically differences among individuals with different attitudes towards president Obama on their perceptions of the driving factors of the US policies in the region.	0,000	H_0: Rejected **Result:** Individuals with very negative attitudes towards president Obama consider protecting Israel and weakening the Muslim world as the driving factors of the US policies; while individuals with negative and neutral attitudes consider protecting Israel and preserving the dominance as the main factor of the US policies in the region.
Identity Perceptions and Attitudes towards Egyptian Foreign and Security Policy Decision Best for: Egypt, Muslims, Arabs and the World	**H_0:** There are not statistically differences among individuals with different identity perceptions on Egyptian foreign and security policy decision best for: Egypt, Muslim, Arabs and the world. **H_1:** There are statistically differences among individuals with different identity perceptions on Egyptian foreign and security policy decision best for: Egypt, Muslim, Arabs and the world.	0,000	H_0: Rejected **Result:** Individuals who consider Muslim as their most important identity encourage Egypt to follow a foreign and security policy, which is best for Egypt.
Gender and Countries Preferred to Live	**H_0:** There are not statistically differences among males and females on the countries that they prefer to live. **H_1:** There are statistically differences among males and females on the	0,256	H_0: Accepted **Result:** There are not statistically differences among males and females on the countries that they

	countries that they prefer to live.		prefer to live.
Egypt-Turkey Relations and Identity Perceptions	**H_0:** There are not statistically differences among individuals with different identity perceptions on their general attitudes towards Egypt-Turkey relations **H_1:** There are statistically differences among individuals with different identity perceptions on their general attitudes towards Egypt-Turkey relations	0,804	H_1 Rejected **Result:** There are not statistically differences among individuals with different identity perceptions on their general attitudes towards Egypt-Turkey relations
Turkish Model and Political Behaviors	**H_0:** There are not statistically differences among individuals with different political parties to vote towards the perception of Turkey as a model. **H_1:** There are statistically differences among individuals with different political parties to vote towards the perception of Turkey as a model.	0,10	H_1 Rejected **Result:** There are not statistically differences among individuals with different political parties to vote towards the perception of Turkey as a model.

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

Public opinion has become extremely important in Egypt after the Arab Spring. First, the role of public opinion is much more significant than admitted in the simplistic clarifications of liberal and democratic peace theory approaches. Egypt, governed by one-man regimes since 1952, provides an excellent instance of public opinion developing into one of the main indicators for analysing foreign and security policy. Based on this assumption, this study explores Egyptian perceptions of foreign and security policy after the Arab Spring.

The first and perhaps the most reliable empirical verification of this study is *Turkey is the winner of the uprising*. The results of this survey agreed with the outcomes of the studies by Telhami (2011) and TESEV (2011). Within the list of countries that included the USA, France, China, Germany, Russia, and the UK, Turkey is perceived as the country that played the most constructive role during the Arab Spring. The level of admiration of its prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (74.6%) is much more than acceptance of Turkey as a model (45.7%) and as the country that played the most constructive role during the uprising (46%), both of which responses could be seen as indicative of Turkey's soft power in Egypt. Erdoğan with his leadership contributes to the positive image of Turkey in Egypt, as Kalın (2009) argues in his article. Although Turkey's Prime Minister Erdoğan is admired highly, Turkey has not been as successful as their leader. In other words, appreciation of Erdoğan's leadership played a major role in shaping the positive attitudes towards Turkey. The academic literature is rich in studies focusing on Turkey's rising soft power in foreign policy that have similar arguments (Fotiou and Triantaphyllou 2010; Shafak 2006; Oğuzlu 2007).

The analysis suggests the failure of arguments that Turkey cannot be a model for the Middle East. Despite the fact that one of the main arguments in this thesis that Turkey cannot be a model, the respondents viewed Turkey as a model. This is a significant finding of the analysis. Neither identity perceptions nor gender resulted in statistically significant differences among Egyptian respondents regarding their perception of Turkey as a model. The results of the study suggest a re-examination of the considerations by Kaddahor (2010), Altunısık (2005), and Mohapatra (2008), which led them to argue that Turkey cannot be a model at the societal level.

The study corroborated the main findings in the analyses by Davis (2011), O'Dennell (1994), Faris (2009) and Johnstad (2012) on the uprising in Egypt for seeking causal explanations at the level of socio-political motives. Egyptians are more optimistic about the future of their country and read the revolution as their struggle for freedom, dignity and a better life. The study also shows that Egyptian perception does not concur with the opinion (M. Kibaroğlu, 2011) that the West and the USA in particular, are now using a different method than they employed with regard to Iraq to solve the problems unleashed by 9/11. Moreover, the analysis of the survey results shows that the respondents do not concur with the hypothesis that ascribes primacy to the role of foreign actors and dynamics in bringing about the revolution.

The most trusted domestic institutions are the SCAF and the religious institutions. Individuals who admire Anwar al-Sadat most have more faith on the SCAF and religious institutions. Individuals who are more inclined towards Hasan al-Banna lean more towards religious institutions. The ones more inclined towards Nasser lean towards the SCAF and the NGOs. Finally, those admiring Mohammad Ali lean towards the SCAF and universities.

Respondents considered security and the economy as the most important concerns of Egyptian domestic policies. This agrees with the findings of Khamis and Vaughn (2011) and Heiss (2012), which stresses on the economic performance of the previous regime as a motivating factor in the uprising.

Respondents indicated the Western powers and the Nile Water Dispute as the main foreign and security policy concerns of Egyptians. There is a continuing anti-Westernism similar to the literature, but the analysis exploited that the Water dispute in the country is perceived much more than the analysis consider as A. Kibaroğlu (2007) argues.

The results of the survey indicate that Egyptians do not aim to transform their countries to either Iran or Saudi Arabia. It seems that the arguments of the previous regime that democratization will lead to Iranization of Egypt are no more than misleading propaganda. Benhabib's (2011) argument that such criticisms are motivated by cultural prejudice appears to be reasonable.

The survey also indicated that Egyptians preferred neither Islamism nor militarism as strategic instruments. Thus, the arguments of Neo-Conservatives and Israeli commentators (2003), which interpret Egyptian public opinion as a reflection of their religious identity and as inclined towards violence, especially after 9/11, are misleading. One finds that Egyptians prefer peace, and choose diplomacy and economic strength as the means of coping with international challenges.

Even conservative Islamist frames of identity among Egyptians are coloured by nationalism an Egyptian identity to a high degree. Özdalga's (2009) description of nationalism and Islamism as sister ideologies would appear to be correct in the Egyptian case. Even individuals who consider 'Muslim' to be their most important identity, wanted Egypt to follow a foreign and security policy that was best for Egypt, rather than for the Muslim world. Nationalism seems to be the main challenge to political Islam in Egypt. Egypt of the present combines the legacies of Nasser's Pan-Arabism and Sadat's 'Egypt First' identity. Therefore, in the realm of foreign policy and strategy, Egyptians prefer such Arab alliances that are best for Egypt. Egyptian national identity is a combination of Arabism and Egyptianism, as Boutros (1982) argues.

The survey and analysis demonstrates the presence of a high degree of Anti-Americanism among Egyptians. Compared to the earlier studies, e.g. by Brown (2008), Telhami (2011), Zogby (2002), and Furia and Lucas (2008), there appear to be a limited positive impact of the policies of the Obama Administration. However, Egyptians do not appear to think that Obama's personality and vision differ significantly from that of Bush and his administration. Thus, Brown (2009) appears to be correct in asking the Obama administration to focus more on public diplomacy. As the relevant literature suggests, Israeli-Arab conflict and a particular country's stance towards that conflict has particular importance in determining how Egyptians would view that country. Negative attitudes expressed by Egyptians towards the USA are reactions to the Obama administration's position with regard to the Israeli-Arab conflict. The survey's findings would appear to contradict Giuliani's [14] argument that the aversion to the USA has nothing to with Israel and Palestine, and would appear to agree with the arguments by Fullerton (2005). The findings also

[14] For the relevant quotation, visit, http://www.slideshare.net/anarcholibertarian/why-do-they-hate-us,

appear to agree with the view that, ‘‘No other issue resonates with the public in the Arab World, and many other parts of the Muslim world, more deeply than Palestine’ (Telhami 2002, 96). Secondly, our study contradicts the hypothesis that the anti-western position follows from their Islamic identity, a hypothesis that would appear to follow from Huntington’s (1993) hypothesis of the clash of civilisations. In contradiction to this Culturalist explanation of Egyptian attitude to the USA, the study found that Egyptians believed that protecting Israel and preserving global dominance were the main factors driving American foreign policies in the Middle East.

Individuals who described religion as their most important identity revealed deeply unfavourable attitudes towards the USA. Individuals who attached more importance to the Egyptian identity were either somewhat unfavourable or neutral. Individuals who leaned towards ‘Arab’ or ‘citizen of the world’ in describing themselves, revealed a more neutral position.

Individuals with *strongly* negative attitudes towards President Obama considered protecting Israel and weakening the Muslim world as the driving factors behind the US policies. Individuals with negative or neutral attitudes considered protecting Israel and preserving the dominance as the main motivations for the US policies in the region.

Another significant result that almost agrees with the arguments in the earlier literature pertains to the perception of the peace accord between Cairo and Tel Aviv. Similar to what Kershner (2011) indicates, the respondents appeared to think that the peace with Israel as ‘cold peace’. The famous peace study expert and activist Galtung’s analysis (1996) is applicable to the Egyptian case. Galtung describes the peace that is just the absence of the war between two countries as ‘negative peace’; a state that continues unless it broadens deepens towards a ‘positive peace’.

Regarding the peace with Israel, our study found Egyptians asking for modification of the peace treaty. This agrees with the studies by Feldmen and Aly (2011), Eltahawy (2009), and Sharnoff (2011). This implies that Egyptians are prepared to co-exist with Israel in the region. The study found that those who stressed on their identity as ‘Egyptian’, ‘Arab’, and ‘citizens of the world’ were more in favour of the modification of the treaty’. On the other hand, individuals who

attached more importance to their Islamic identity mostly ask for annulment of the treaty. However, the study found that the 'Egyptian' identity was dominant national identity among the respondents.

The respondents were inclined towards a more active Arab initiative for resolving the Palestinian problem, in line with King Abdullah's initiative based on pre-1967 borders. They were however not hopeful of a peaceful resolution. They considered a war between Arabs and Israel inevitable for a final resolution of the Palestinian Question. The Arab control of Jerusalem and the rights of the refugees to return to Palestine were listed as the pre-conditions for a final and just peace. It is interesting and not necessarily self-contradictory that, on the one hand, Egyptians do not favour any military-based strategies for their country in coping with international challenges, but, on the other hand, they believe in a military resolution of the Palestinian issue.

Iran does not enjoy credibility or popularity among Egyptians. This resembled the findings by Pollock (2010) and USAK (2013). There appeared to be near parity between Egyptian public opinion and Egyptian foreign and security policy regarding Iran and its nuclear enrichment. The respondents appeared to believe that Iran was conducting nuclear research for developing nuclear weapons, while adding that Iran had the right to nuclear research for peaceful purposes. Both the legalist and real-politic approaches were apparent in public opinion, which closely resembles the statements of politicians, both present and past. Egyptians agree with the previous regime's assertion that if Tehran came to possess WMDs, Egypt would follow suit. The exception is the possible outcomes of a nuclear Iran in the Middle East and Egyptians are hardly diverging at all in their attitudes towards a Middle East if a nuclear Iran. Our study did not corroborate the 'homogeneity result' of the study conducted by Wilson Centre (2012) that suggested that a nuclear Iran would bring security.

Individuals who supported Iran's right to nuclear programme consider a Middle East with a nuclear-empowered Iran as more preferable, while individuals, who supported pressures to stop Iran's nuclear enrichment programme, consider a nuclear-empowered Iran as undesirable for the region.

The results demonstrate a preference for China. China continues to grow popular, as indicated in the previous studies by Park (2010) and the BBC (2010) and China is visualized as the global super power. Pakistan, which ranks as the second country that the respondents desired as the superpower, reflects the respondents' dream of a Muslim country leading the world. Among the Western countries, Germany, Great Britain, and France were the countries in which the respondents preferred to live. Within the Western nations, Germany continues to be the most popular country in Egypt. This was also observed in the survey study conducted by the BBC (2010). The respondents also preferred to live in the United Arab Emirates, a rising Arab state. New studies that measures Arab perception of other Arab states might provide a more general view of this preference for the United Arab Emirates that this study noticed in Egypt. The EU is the international organisation that is admired at most, and the Arab League was seen to suffer from the problem of legitimacy among Egyptians. The study showed that the EU's agenda of assisting Egypt for transformation and democratization enjoys credibility among Egyptians and the EU might use its positive image to work for 'good governance' in Egypt. There were no statistical differences among male and female responses regarding the countries where the respondents declared they preferred to live.

The threat perception of the public and the previous regime is seen to conflict. This study shows that the respondents consider Israel and the USA as the countries that pose the greatest threat to Egypt. The public do not seem to see Iran as an enemy. This, again, differs from the assertions of the previous regime. When it comes to threat perception, preference for political parties, liberal, Islamist, Arabism, or sex do not lead to statistically significant differences in response.

Tahrir Square re-wrote the history of Egypt in 2011, with the displacement of the old regime. Nasser's, Sadat's, and Mubarak's Egypt transformed itself into a new entity, an entity that is difficult to predict and analyse in detail because of its complexity and rapidly changing dynamics. Any analysis of the Arab Spring is subject to the important caveat that it is too early to predict where the changes unfolding in the region will ultimately lead. Egypt that has emerged through the Arab Spring demands further and detailed studies on all aspects of its policy, including its

foreign and security policy. In other words, 'new Egypt' will constitute the new trend in the Middle East studies.

This study, which aimed to explore the Egyptian foreign and security policy, is a prime example of the difficulties of undertaking scholarly studies in Egypt. For, officials and members of the public inherit the fear that characterized the Mubarak era and feel that discussing politics is entering a zone that is prohibited for citizens. Secondly, the Turkish Embassy in Cairo is another interesting case study of how bureaucratic perceptions and practices may hinder a study that is only motivated by scientific interests. Cairo is one of the main cities where Turkish students prefer to study, particularly those interested in Islamic and Arabic studies. A proper and thorough survey to gauge the views of Turkish residents in Egypt regarding their embassy might encourage reform and improvement of the foreign policy bureaucrats of Turkey, provided, of course, that Ankara attach significance to the findings of scholars.

As in the case of other studies, one can question generalizing the survey findings. One might ask whether the sample truly represents the overall population in Egypt. One might point out similar results from previous studies as an answer to this criticism. Secondly, the university students in Egypt were the main driving force of the uprising and the new developments after the displacement of the regime would appear to corroborate this argument. The Cairo University is not only a model in Egypt, but also in other Arab and Muslim world. For, famous Arab figures in the contemporary Middle East are alumni of the university. Thirdly, university students continue to play a significant role, as evident from their demands for more changes and reforms in the post-Mubarak era. This is the reason why the perceptions of students are significant in Egypt.

Egyptian perception of foreign and security policy is much more complicated and multi-dimensional. This contradicts the simplistic explanations of the Culturalist model, as manifest in the 'Clash of Civilisations' theme. Egypt continues to suffer from the crisis of identity. Egyptianism, Arabism, and Islamism are occasionally in clash and are occasionally in coalition. A more penetrating study, involving variance tests in order to compare the perceptions of samples having different identity orientations, might enrich foreign and security policy analysis.

Legitimacy in the Arab world is in transition and the outbreak of the uprisings is a significant indicator that the stances of the totalitarian governments regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are not indicative of public perception in Arab world. Groups went on strike not only in Egypt, whose previous regime had ties with Israel, but also in Tunisia, Syria, Bahrain and in Libya that some analysts attempted to legitimize their regime with their loyalty to the Palestinian Question. Moreover, the economic explanation of legitimacy also seems to be faulty. The argument that those oil rich regimes are able to survive with their undemocratic regimes by means of a well-structured redistribution of wealth among citizens is not enough to explain the overall dynamics, as is evident from the instances of Libya and Bahrain. Thus, new approaches to this issue of political legitimacy in the Arab world are necessary.

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APPENDIX 1: SURVEY QUESTIONS

Dear Participant:

My name is Onder CANVEREN and I am a graduate student at Institute of Security Sciences in Ankara/Turkey. For my master's thesis, I am examining **"The Perception of Security and Foreign Policy in Egypt".** Since you are one of the students at **Cairo University**. I am inviting you to participate in this research study by completing the attached survey.

The following questionnaire will require approximately **20 minutes** completing. There is no compensation for responding nor is there any known risk. In order to ensure that all information will remain confidential, please *do not* include your name. Copies of the project will be provided to my instructor at **Institute of Security Sciences, Department of International Security**. If you choose to participate in this project, please answer all questions as honestly as possible. Participation is strictly voluntary and you may refuse to participate at any time.

Thank you for taking the time to assist me in my educational endeavors. The data collected will provide useful information regarding the future of Egypt and Turkish-Egyptian relations in coming years. If you require additional information or have questions, please contact me at the e-mail addresses listed below.

Sincerely,

Onder CANVEREN
onder.canveren@gmail.com
Associate Professor İ.Dinçer GÜNEŞ
idgunes@yahoo.com

DEMOGRAPHY

D. 1. What is your age?

D. 2. What is your sex?

1. Male
2. Female

D. 3. Marital status

1. Single
2. Married

3. Divorced
4. Widowed
5. Separated

D. 4. Which social-economic class do you belong to?

1. Lower Class
2. Middle Class
3. Higher Class

D. 5. What type of region did you come from?

1. Urban
2. Rural

D.6. Which of the following is your most important identity?

1. Egyptian
2. Religious
3. Arab
4. Citizen of the world

D.7. Which of the following is your second most important identity?

1. Egyptian
2. Religious
3. Arab
4. Citizen of the world

ARAB SPRING:

S. 1. Do you believe that the military authorities in Egypt are working to?

1. Advance the gains of the revolution
2. Neither advance nor slow down the gains of the revolution
3. Slow down or reverse the gains of the revolution

S. 2. Looking at to the international reaction to the events in the Arab world in the past few months; which of the country, do you believe, has played the most constructive role?

1. Britain
2. China
3. France

4. Germany
5. Japan
6. Russia
7. Turkey
8. The United States of America

S.3. When you consider about the Arab spring, are you more optimistic or more pessimistic than before about the future of the Arab world?

1. More pessimistic
2. Feeling no change
3. More optimistic

S.4. Thinking about the Arab awakening,

1. Ordinary people seeking freedom, dignity and a better life
2. Opposition parties or sects seeking to control governments
3. Foreign powers trying to stir trouble in the region

EGYPT

E.1. What is the most important concern of Egyptian domestic policy?

1. Economy
2. Security
3. Elections
4. The revolution

E.2. What is the most important concern of Egyptian foreign and security policy?

1. Nuclear Armaments
2. Terrorism
3. Western Powers
4. World Financial Crisis
5. Global Environmental Issues
6. Distribution of the water of the Nile
7. Illegal Drug Traffic

E.3. What kind of strategy should Egypt follow when faced with an international challenge?

1. Diplomacy
2. Military
3. Economy/Finance
4. Alliance with Arab world
5. Armament
6. Alliance with more powerful states

E. 4. Do you think that Egypt has the risk of being divided?

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

E.5. As you look through the presidential elections in Egypt, which of the following leaders would you like the next president to look like?

1. Ahmedinejad of Iran
2. Chavez of Venezuela
3. Erdogan of Turkey
4. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia
5. Mandela of the South Africa
6. Nasrallah of Lebanon
7. Obama of the United States of America
8. Putin of Russia
9. Sarkozy of France

E.6. If Egypt's political system should look like one of the following countries, which one would you prefer it to be?

1. Britain
2. China
3. France
4. Germany
5. Iran
6. Morocco
7. Saudi Arabia

8. Turkey
9. The United States of America

E.7. If the presidential elections were held today, for whom would you vote for the presidency?

1. Amro Moussa
2. Mohammad Al-Baradhi (if becomes candidate again)
3. Ahmad Chafic
4. Mohammad Salim Al-Awwa
5. Hayrat Al-Shater
6. Hazem Salah Bu Ismail
7. Abdel Munam Abul Futouh
8. Ayman Nour
9. Hicham Al-Bastaoissi
10. Mohammad Ali Bilal

E.8. What type of the party would you likely vote for?

1. An Islamic Party
2. A Liberal Party
3. A Pan-Arab Party
4. A Nationalist Party
5. A Leftist Party

E.9. Which of the following figures in Egyptian history do you admire at most?

1. Anwar al-Sadat
2. Hasan al-Banna
3. Husni Mubarak
4. Gamal Abd al-Nasser
5. Muhammad Ali
6. Saad Zaghlool
7. King Farouq

E.10. To whom do you trust most during the transformation in Egypt?

1. Reverend/Institutions for Religion
2. SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces)
3. Police Forces

4. Media
5. Political Parties
6. Parliament
7. Bureaucracy
8. NGOs (Non-governmental Organizations)
9. Universities

E.11. When new government in Egypt makes decision; do you think it should base its decision mostly on what is best for?

1. Egypt
2. Muslims
3. Arabs
4. The world

TURKEY

Turkey-Egypt relations

	Very										**Very**
T.1. How do you present today?	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
T.2. How do you describe for	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

T.3. How do you describe Turkish foreign policy toward Arab Spring?

1. Very negative
2. Negative
3. Neither positive nor negative
4. Positive
5. Very positive

T.4. What do you think about Turkey's accession to the European Union?

1. Strongly don't support
2. Don't support
3. Neither don't support nor support
4. Support
5. Strongly support

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disgaree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
T.5. Turkey has recently become more influential in Middle East politics					
T.6. Turkey should play a more significant role in the region					
T.7.Turkey is a successful example of the coherence between Islam and democracy					
T.8. Turkey can be a model country for the Middle East					

(If your answer for the last question is strongly agree or agree please go to the question T.6.a; if strongly disagree or disagree please go to the question T.6.b)

T.8.a Why can Turkey be a model?

1. Its Muslim background
2. Its economy
3. Its democratic regime
4. It stands up for Palestinians and Muslims

T.8.b Why can't Turkey be a model?

1. Its secular political system
2. It is not Muslim enough
3. Its relation with the west
4. No need for a model

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

U.1. Generally speaking, what is your attitude towards the United States of America?

1. Very unfavorable
2. Unfavorable
3. Neutral
4. Favorable
5. Very favorable

U.2. How would you describe your views about the President Barack Obama of the United States of America?

1. Very negative
2. Negative
3. Neutral
4. Positive
5. Very positive

U.3. Which step by the United States of America would improve your views of the United States of America at most?

1. Israel-Palestine peace agreement
2. Withdrawal from Iraq
3. Stopping aid to Israel
4. Withdrawal from Arabian Peninsula
5. Pushing more to spread democracy
6. More economic aid to the region
7. Stopping aid to Arab governments

U.4. When you look back at the past years of the Obama Administration, which one of the following policies are you most disappointed with?

1. Palestine/Israel
2. Iraq
3. Attitudes toward Islam
4. Afghanistan
5. Human rights
6. Spreading democracy

7. Economic assistance

U.5. When you look back at the past years of the Obama Administration, which one of the following policies are you most pleased with?

1. Palestine/Israel
2. Iraq
3. Attitudes toward Islam
4. Afghanistan
5. Human rights
6. Spreading democracy
7. Economic assistance

U.6. Which of the following factor do you believe are the most important in driving American policy in the Middle East?

1. Controlling oil
2. Protecting Israel
3. Weakening the Muslim World
4. Preserving regional and global dominance
5. Promoting peace and stability
6. Preventing spread of nuclear weapons
7. Fighting terrorism
8. Spreading human rights
9. Promoting democracy

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT:

C.1. Which of the following statement is closer to your view?

1. Prepared for peace if Israel is willing to return all 1967 territories including East Jerusalem, and Arab governments should put more effort into this.
2. Prepared for peace if Israel is willing to return all 1967 territories including East Jerusalem, but Israel will never give up these territories easily.
3. Even if Israel returns all 1967 territories, Arabs should continue to fight.

C.2. Which of the following statement is closest to your view about the prospects of lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians?

1. Will happen in the next five years
2. Inevitable, but it will take more time
3. Don't believe it will ever happen

C.3. What do you believe is the likely outcome, if the prospects of a two states solution in the Palestinian Israeli conflict collapse?

1. Status quo will continue
2. One state solution in which Israelis and Palestinians are equal
3. State of intense conflict for years to come
4. Palestinians will eventually surrender to Israeli power

C.4. A solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that leads to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital, will happen only:

1. Through serious negotiations
2. By being imposed by the UN
3. By being imposed by the United States
4. Through another Arab Israeli war
5. It will never happen

C.5. When you look at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which of the following issues is the most central to you, assuming that they may all be important?

1. Establishment of a fully independent contiguous Palestinian state in West Bank and Gaza
2. Arab sovereignty over East Jerusalem
3. Right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes

C.6. With regard to Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, would you like to see Egypt?

1. Maintain the treaty
2. Modify the terms
3. Cancel the treaty

C.7. If Israel agrees to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, based on the 1967 border, with East Jerusalem as the capital, what would your position be on the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty?

1. Maintain the treaty
2. Modify the terms
3. Cancel the treaty

C.8. Which of the following statement is closer to your view?

1. I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel returns all the territories occupied, and Arab governments should make more efforts.
2. I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with Israel if Israel returns all the territories occupied, but they won't give up territory peacefully.
3. Even if the Israelis return all of the territories occupied in 1967 peacefully, the Arabs should continue to fight Israel.

IRAN

IR.1. Do you believe that Iran is merely conducting research for peaceful purposes, or trying to develop nuclear weapons?

1. Peaceful purposes
2. Nuclear weapons

IR.2. There is international pressure on Iran to curtail its nuclear program. What is your opinion?

1. Iran has the right to its nuclear program
2. Iran should be pressured to stop its nuclear program

IR.3. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, which of the following is the likely outcome for the Middle East region?

1. More negative
2. Would not matter
3. More positive

IR.4. If Iran owns nuclear weapons after her uranium enrichments; do you think that Egypt should own them, too?

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neither agree nor disagree

4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

G.1. In a world where there is only one superpower, which of the following countries would you prefer to be that superpower?

1. Great Britain
2. China
3. France
4. Germany
5. Pakistan
6. Russia
7. United States of America
8. India

G.2. Which world leader (outside your own country) do you admire most?

1. Hugo Chavez of Venezuela
2. Mahmoud Ahmadinajad of Iran
3. Hassan Nasrallah of Lebanon
4. Fidel Castro of Cuba
5. Nicolas Sarkozy of France
6. Sheikh M. bin Zayed of the United Arab Emirates
7. Sheikh M. bin Rashed of the United Arab Emirates
8. Recep T. Erdogan of Turkey
9. Putin of Russia
10. Hu Jintao of China
11. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia
12. Barack Obama of the United States of America

G.3. If you had to live in one of the following countries, which one would you prefer?

1. Great Britain
2. China
3. France

4. Germany
5. Pakistan
6. Russia
7. United States of America

G.4. If you had to live in an Arab country outside Egypt, which country would you prefer?

1. Amman
2. Jordan
3. Kuwait
4. Lebanon
5. Saudi Arabia
6. The United Arab Emirates
7. Qatar

G.5. Which of the following international organization do you admire more?

1. European Union
2. United Nations
3. NATO
4. Arab League
5. Organization of the Islamic Cooperation
6. African Union

MİDDLE EAST

ME.1. What is the basic problem of Middle East?

1. Economy
2. Influence of West
3. Arab-Israeli Conflict
4. Popular Movements/Arab Spring
5. Nuclear Armament
6. Terrorism

ME.2. Which of the following country outside Egypt do you think will have a better economy 20 years later?

1. Iran

2. Saudi Arabia
3. The United Arab Emirates
4. Qatar
5. Kuwait
6. Turkey
7. Amman
8. Jordan

ME.3. Please choose the country that you think posing the biggest threat to your country.

1. Israel
2. The United States of America
3. Iran

ME.4. A world without Osama Ben Laden is,

1. More dangerous
2. No change
3. Safer

MEDIA

M.1. How long have you had access to internet?

1. Less than 1 year
2. 1-3 years
3. 3-5 years
4. More than 5 years

M.2. What is your primary source for international news?

1. TV
2. Internet
3. Newspapers/Magazines
4. Radio

M.3. When you watch international news, which of the following network's news broadcasts do you watch most often?

1. Al Jazeera
2. Al Arabiya

3. MBC
4. LBC

ÖZGEÇMİŞ

Kişisel Bilgiler

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Doğum Yeri	**: Polatlı**
Mesleği	**: Araştırma Görevlisi**

Eğitim Durumu

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	Almanya Konstanz Üniversitesi, Politika ve İşletme Fakültesi (Değişim Programı)
	A.B.D. Nazareth Koleji (Yaz Okulu)
Yüksek Lisans Öğrenimi	**: Polis Akademisi Güvenlik Bilimleri Estitüsü, Uluslararası Güvenlik A.B.D.**
	Mısır, Kahire Üniversitesi (1 Yıllık Eğitim ve Araştırma Bursu)
Bildiği Yabancı Diller	**: İngilizce, Arapça**
Yabancı Dil Puan ve Türü	**: ÜDS 86,25**

İş Deneyimi

Stajlar	**: Hollanda Mezunları Derneği (NAATR)**

İletişim

E-Posta	**: onder.canveren@gmail.com**
Tel.	**: (232) 301 87 52**
Tarih	**: 23 Temmuz 2013**