

THE MAKING OF
EUROPEAN COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP):
THE CAPABILITY GAP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON NATO

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

MEHMET MÜKERREM ARI

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

SEPTEMBER 2013

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof.Dr.Meliha ALTUNIŞIK
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof.Dr.Hüseyin Bağcı
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Assoc.Prof.Dr.Sevilay Kahraman
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof.Dr.Mustafa Türkeş	(METU, IR)	_____
Assoc.Prof.Dr.Sevilay Kahraman	(METU, IR)	_____
Assoc.Prof.Dr.Zuhal Yeşilyurt Gündüz	(TED, IR)	_____
Assoc.Prof.Dr.Haldun Yalçinkaya	(TOBB, IR)	_____
Assist.Prof.Dr.Özgehan Şenyuva	(METU, IR)	_____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Mehmet Mükerrerem ARI

Signature :

ABSTRACT

THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP): THE CAPABILITY GAP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON NATO

Ari, Mehmet Mükerrerem

Ph.D., Department of Social Sciences

Supervisor : Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sevilay Kahraman

September 2013, 191 pages

During the Cold War period, NATO has been the primary organization that links the US and Europe on defence and security matters. European and Transatlantic forces have been very content with stable and extraordinarily predictable security environment. Nevertheless, after the demise of common perceived threat and with the emerging unpredictable threats and upheavals the security environment has become unpredictable. Moreover, the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo have provided dramatic confirmation of European weaknesses with regards to adequate military capabilities in the new security environment. The conflicts in Europe's own backyard sharply manifested that without making an effort to improve its military capabilities, Europe's influence and responsibility for ensuring its own security and stability would remain to be very restricted. These concerns led respectively to the emergence of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and recently after the Lisbon Treaty the CSDP, parallel to transformation of NATO's military capabilities.

Although Europe's military capabilities gap, the EU has embarked upon CSDP project. Therefore it is really interesting to see "How is the evolving process of the CSDP affecting itself and NATO in terms of transatlantic air forces' capability gap?" The thesis argues that the EU has indulged in a path where turning back or turnover is really difficult and inconvenient. The current CSDP structures seems to be locking-in the EU member states in the process of security and defence integration by continuous collaboration and cooperation. Given the established structures and completed/ongoing missions of CSDP, the CSDP project will continue to evolve although its current shortfalls and its capability gap.

Nevertheless, the capability gap will affect to a great extent the operational capability (scope&range) of the EU member states. Moreover, the capability gap will affect the operational capability and harmony of the NATO as well. But the latter effect would not be as much as the first one as long as the US remains and stays in the organization of NATO, since it takes much of the burden.

Key Words: NATO, CSDP, Transatlantic Capability Gap, EU Security

ÖZ

AVRUPA ORTAK GÜVENLİK VE SAVUNMA POLİTİKASI: YETENEK AÇIĞI VE NATO'YA ETKİLERİ

Arı, Mehmet Mükerrerem

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi : Doç. Dr. Sevilay Kahraman

Eylül 2013, 191 sayfa

Soğuk Savaş döneminde NATO; Avrupa ve Amerika arasında güvenlik ve savunma alanında bağlantıyı sağlayan yegane organizasyon oldu. Avrupa ve transatlantik kuvvetler stabil ve tahmin edilebilen tehdit ortamından memnun olmaktaydılar. Ancak, algılanan ortak tehdidin kaybolması, yeni tahmin edilemeyen tehditlerin ortaya çıkması ve karışıklıklar güvenlik ortamını belirsiz hale getirdi. Ayrıca Bosna ve Kosova'daki krizler Avrupa'nın askeri yetenekler bakımından zayıflığını ortaya çıkardı. Avrupa'nın arka bahçesindeki bu krizler, eğer Avrupa askeri kabiliyetlerini geliştiremez ise kendi savunmasını sağlamada çok sınırlı kalacağını gösterdi. Söz konusu kaygılar sırasıyla Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği (AGSK), Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası (AGSP) ve Lizbon Antlaşmasından sonra ortaya çıkan OGSP oluşumuna öncülük etti.

Askeri yetenekler açığına rağmen, AB OGSP projesine girişti. Bu sebeple, "OGSP sürecinin kendi oluşumuna ve NATO ya transatlantik

yetenekler açığı bakımından nasıl etki edeceği” büyük önem arz etmektedir. Bu bağlamda, tez AB’nin geri dönüşü zor ve külfetli bir yola girdiğini iddia etmektedir. Mevcut OGSP yapıları AB üyelerini sürekli bir dayanışma ve işbirliği yönünde bağlamaktadır. OGSP’nin oluşturduğu kurumlar ve icra ettiği misyonlar dikkate alındığında, OGSP projesi mevcut eksiklikler ve yetenek açığına rağmen gelişmeye devam edecektir.

Bununla birlikte, yetenek açığı AB’nin icra edeceği operasyonların kapsamını büyük ölçüde etkileyecektir. Ayrıca, NATO’nun operasyonel kabiliyetine ve harmonisine de etki edecektir. Fakat, yeteneklerin çoğunluğunu barındıran Amerika Birleşik Devletleri NATO’da kaldığı sürece transatlantik yetenek açığının NATO’ya etkisi daha az olacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: NATO, OGSP, Transatlantic Yetenek Açığı, AB Güvenliği

To My Parents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to several individuals, who have contributed in various ways to the completion of this dissertation. First of all, I would like to thank to the members of my Ph.D. examining committee members: Prof. Dr. Mustafa Trke, Assoc Prof. Dr. Haldun Yalınkaya, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zuhall Yeilyurt, and Assist.Prof. Dr.zgehan enyuva for their valuable comments, criticism, and encouraging support during my research.

I would like to particularly thank to my supervisor Assoc.Prof.Sevilay Kahraman for her contribution to this dissertation through his constructive criticism, precious feedback and encouragement during the process.

I am indebted to Prof. Dr. Mustafa Trke, who helped me with his guidance and encouraged me to concentrate my efforts on the Air Force Perspective. I am also indebted to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Haldun Yalınkaya for his guidance that helped me to overcome the obstacles I have faced during the completion of this thesis. I am indebted to Prof.Dr.David Yost as well for his guidance, comments and providing me additional sources for the thesis.

My endless thanks go to my parents, İlknur, Nilgn and İrem Arı, for their continuous love, support and patience during my studies and my job-related burdens. This dissertation is dedicated to them.

Special thanks are again owed to my advisor Assoc.Prof.Sevilay Kahraman. This dissertation would never have come to fruition without constructive comments and support of Assoc.Prof.Sevilay Kahraman.

Last but not the least, I would like to particularly thank to Eyyüp Çelik for his proofreading and valuable comments on the dissertation. Concluding my remarks, I would like to thank to everybody, who have in any way contributed to the completion of this dissertation. I may not have found the chance to claim their names here, but their contribution, support, love and patience reside in my mind and heart.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
DEDICATION.....	viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	xi
LIST OF TABLES.....	xiii
LIST OF FIGURES	xiv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xv
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 The Research Problem, the Purpose, and the Research Question.....	7
1.1.1 The Research Problem of the Thesis	7
1.1.2 The Purpose and the Research Questions of the Thesis.....	10
1.2 Organization of the Thesis	12
2. THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS FOR CSDP	15
2.1 Historical Perspective.....	15
2.2 CSDP Structures.....	25
2.3 Historical Institutionalism: Road to the CSDP	43
2.4 Shrewd Cooperation Procedures	59
3. EU SECURITY CONDUCT	64
3.1 EU Security Strategy.....	64
3.2 After the Lisbon Treaty.....	72
3.3 CSDP Operations.....	79

4. CSDP IN A TRANSATLANTIC CONTEXT	92
4.1 CSDP – NATO Relations	92
4.2 CSDP and Its Clout	108
4.3 EU Security Logic and Remedies for United Cooperation with NATO	112
5. CAPABILITY BUILDING PROCESS AND TRANSATLANTIC AIR FORCES CAPABILITY GAP	116
5.1 EU Capability Building Process	116
5.2 EU Military Capability Progress and Transatlantic Air Forces Capability Gap	131
5.3 EU Defence Expenditure & Military Aspiration Gap	158
6. CONCLUSIONS	172
REFERENCES	180
APPENDICES	
A. TURKISH SUMMARY	188
B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU	190
C. CURRICULUM VITAE	191

LIST OF TABLES

TABLES

Table 3.1: Theory versus Praxis	82
Table 5.1: Selected EU-27 military capabilities 1999-2012.....	133
Table 5.2: World Air Power Order wrt.to Total Fighting A/C.....	139
Table 5.3: World Air Power Order wrt.to 3rd, 4th, 5th Gen AC.....	140
Table 5.4: EU&NATO Air Power Order wrt. Total Combat AC.....	141
Table 5.5: EU&NATO Air Power Order wrt.Sum of 3rd, 4th, 5th Gen. AC	142
Table 5.6: Multinational Initiatives for Air Transport	148
Table 5.7: Transatlantic Air Transport Assets.....	154

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Structures in the Field of FSP/CSDP.....	28
Figure 2.2: The Structure of PCC.....	32
Figure 2.3: The Institutional Architecture of CFSP/CSD.....	36
Figure 5.1: Capability Development Process.....	126
Figure 5.2: Defence Expenditure as a percentage of GDP and as a percentage total Government Expenditure.....	159
Figure 5.3: EU Member States Defence Expenditure	162
Figure 5.4: European Union Member States' Military Aspiration.....	164
Figure 5.5: European Union – US Comparison of Aspiration.....	167

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ATARES	Air Transport, Air-to-Air Refueling and other Exchanges of Services
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Command System
BG	Battle Group
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CDP	Capability Development Plan
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
C-IED	Counter Improvised Explosive Device
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CONOPS	Concept of The Operations
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DCI	Defence Capabilities Initiative
EAG	European Air Group
EATC	European Air Transport Command
ECAP	European Capabilities Action Plan
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEAS	European External Action Service
EEAW	European Expeditionary Air Wing
EP	European Parliament
EPAF	European Participating Air Forces
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force

ESDC	European Security and Defence College
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUBAM	EU Border Assistance Mission
EUISS	EU Institute for Security Studies
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EUSC	EU Satellite Centre
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
JFC	Joint Force Command
MCCE	Movement Coordination Centre Europe
NAD	North Atlantic Council
NAEW&CF	NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORDEFCO	Nordic Defence Cooperation
OPLAN	Operation plan
PCC	Prague Capabilities Commitment
PSC	Political and Security Committee
QDR	Quadrennial Defence Review
SAC	Strategic Airlift Capability
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SALIS	Strategic Airlift Interim Solution
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarter, Allied Power Europe
TEU	Treaty on EU
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the EU
TTTE	Tri-National Tornado Training Establishment
UAS	Unmanned Air Systems
UAV	Unmanned Air Vehicles
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union (EU) is an essential element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). CSDP is the latest label given with the Lisbon Treaty which entered into force on 1 December 2009. In historical perspective, the CSDP, had started as European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and later became European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and after Lisbon Treaty labeled as CSDP.¹

In general outlook, it is plausible to say that the CSDP project predates NATO and it has a lineage to the Brussels Treaty of 1948, whereby the five states of the Western European Union (WEU) (France, Belgium, Luxembourg, United Kingdom and the Netherlands) created an alliance of collective self-defence against the perceived threat posed by an expansionist Soviet Union. Alliance formed by these five nations can also be considered as a direct forerunner to the Washington Treaty of 1949, which

¹ http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm

formed NATO.²

In 1954, the Brussels treaty was modified and the organization's mandate de-conflicted with that of NATO by the addition of Article IV. This article had not only given instructions to the WEU organization to work in close cooperation with NATO, but also had given instructions in "recognizing the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters."³ Consequently, in the face of the perceived Soviet threat, the requirement for an independent European voice was temporarily set aside, in favor of a strong NATO. However, the core idea never went away.

Since its inception in 1949, NATO has been the primary organization that links the US and Europe on defence and security matters. For the duration of the Cold War, NATO's European members perceived that a close and intimate relationship regarding security and defence issues with the US was important for their territorial security. At this period there was a single perceived threat perception, namely, possible attack by the Soviet Union. But after the Cold War, NATO has faced unanticipated new threats and responded with new responsibilities and roles, beyond its traditional

² Alfred Cahen, *The Western European Union and NATO*, (London: Brassey's, 1989), p.2

³ Ibid, p.71 and <http://www.weu.int/Treaty.htm>

Cold War role. In the face of new threats, NATO has changed from a regional collective defence alliance to a collective security organization becoming increasingly active beyond Europe and with global scope. On the other hand, the security perception in Europe has changed with the NATO's changing role.⁴

Between 1949 and 1989 European and Transatlantic forces have been very content with stable and extraordinarily predictable security environment and perceived common threats. Nevertheless, after the demise of common perceived threat and with the emerging unpredictable threats and upheavals the security environment has become unpredictable.

In that context, the WEU assumed the responsibility of the Petersberg tasks in 1992, in order to tackle with the probable crisis in the Europe. The Petersberg tasks incorporated missions from very low to high intensity scale missions: "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks for combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking."⁵

On the other hand, the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo have provided

⁴ F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Leb, et al., Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture, (The Atlantic Council Policy Paper, March 2006), pp.1-2

⁵ Petersberg Declaration, Western European Union Council of Ministers, (Bonn, 19 June 1992), p.6 (<http://www.w eu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf>)

dramatic confirmation of European weaknesses with regards to adequate military capabilities in the new security environment. The conflicts in Europe's own backyard sharply manifested that without making an effort to improve its military capabilities, Europe's influence and responsibility for ensuring its own security and stability would remain to be very restricted. These concerns led respectively to the emergence of the ESDI, the ESDP and recently after the Lisbon Treaty the CSDP, parallel to transformation of NATO's military capabilities.

The idea of the creation of the ESDI was approved at the NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin in 1996. The objective was to allow European countries to engage militarily where NATO not wanted to. At the same time, with this initiative it was intended to share the financial burden of the US and improve the EU countries' military capabilities. It was envisaged also that the ESDI would be established within the NATO structures. Nevertheless, at the Franco-British Summit at St.Malo between the French President Jacques Chirac and the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the declaration of St.Malo was agreed. St.Malo Declaration was a pivotal point in the process of European Security and Defence initiative.⁶ According to St.Malo Declaration, "The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. ... To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond

⁶ <http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/eufp/content/saint-malo-esdp-csdp>

to international crises. ...Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology.”⁷ To a great extent, the St.Malo declaration can be seen as an obvious turnaround from the ESDI to the ESDP with autonomous action statement at its core.

The European Security and Defence initiatives began to have an impact on NATO and transatlantic link, particularly after the St.Malo agreement. It has aroused some misgivings on the transatlantic side. In that respect, the Ex-US Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright, had expressed the US’ misgivings with the so called Three Ds: decoupling, duplication and discrimination. The Three Ds aimed to prevent detaching of the transatlantic link and to avoid wasting resources, duplication of efforts and discrimination of non EU-NATO members.⁸ Today relationship between NATO and EU is still not very healthy despite efforts such as Berlin Plus arrangements.

To sum it up, the CSDP is a project envisaged to give the EU an independent voice with regards to security issues, including independent decision taking mechanism and partially independent resources to conduct

⁷ Joint Declaration Issued At The British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 Dec 1998, EU Institute for Security Studies, February 2000, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/French-British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf>

⁸ Madeline K. Albright, Ex-US Secretary of State, “The Right Balance Will Secure NATO’s Future”, Financial Times, 7 December 1998.

operations relating to security and defence matters. CSDP, which was started initially as ESDI, is the latest endeavor to respond the quest of, “how can the states of Europe provide for their security and pursue their interests in the world?”⁹ This evolving hot issue has been on the table for EU countries since the end of the Second World War. On the surface it may seem a simple question, but the answer is very complicated and controversial. This endeavor has led to misgivings between transatlantic partnership and has caused a hard to achieve balance between consensus building in NATO alliance and efforts of EU requirement for a greater, and in some cases, independent voice on security issues. This tug of war has been influenced by the changes in perceived threats, as well as the ever-continuing integration of EU states in political and defence matters.

Last but not least, it is essential to note that, NATO, to a great extent depends on US military assets. On the other hand, NATO to some extent lacks post-crisis civilian management tools, which the EU would provide. Moreover, military power cannot solve complicated and interwoven political and cultural, regional problems on its own, as experienced in the Middle East, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Since CSDP has military and civilian dimensions, NATO will see the EU/CSDP as a complementary soft power to its military dimension on its quest for greater security in the whole spectrum of future conflicts.

⁹ Jeffrey Becker, “Asserting EU Cohesion: Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Relaunch of Europe”, *European Security*, (Vol. 7 No. 4, Winter 1998), p.12

1.1. The Research Problem, the Purpose, and the Research Questions

1.1.1. The Research Problem of the Thesis

Those who have been interested in NATO and EU over the long period will indisputably agree that the capability gap has been a never ending story. In other words, the capability gap is not new. The capability gap between the US and the EU in terms of security and defence matters is a solid issue since the foundation of the NATO. As David Yost succinctly stated “the defence capabilities gap that divides the US from its European allies is real and it matters.”¹⁰ In particular, the so called capability gap and “large transatlantic disparities” regarding in performing large scale operations have been quite apparent during NATO’s Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo interventions during the 1990’s.¹¹ That is to say; the European dependency on the US, in terms of military capabilities, in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s bloody conflict had been repeated in Kosovo war, which took place during the period of St.Malo and Cologne summits. The lack of adequate military capabilities and the striking capability gap highly affected the European allies which in turn led to the discussions and

¹⁰ David S.Yost, The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union, *Survival*, vol.42, no. 4, Winter 2000-01, p.97

¹¹ Ibid.

commitments for narrowing the gap and improving the capabilities and burden sharing on both sides.¹²

In this context during the same period at St.Malo and Cologne Summits, the EU launched the initiative that the European Union “must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”. It is sensible to have credible military means in order to have a voice in international arena but developing the capacity for autonomous action is an arduous task. Besides, developing a proper working mechanism with NATO is crucial as the capability development for the European allies.¹³

In that direction, after some four years of St.Malo and Cologne Summits, the EU have established some ways of working mechanism with NATO, known as Berlin Plus arrangements and have started conducting peace support operations since 2003.¹⁴

Since that date, the 17 completed CSDP missions with the ongoing 17 CSDP missions clearly show the EU's deliberation among the EU

¹² Daniel Keohane, 10 Years after St.Malo, European Union Institute for Security Studies, October 2008, p.1 (http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/10_yrs_after_St_Malo.pdf)

¹³ Ibid, p.1

¹⁴ Ibid, p.2

member states, to a great extent.¹⁵ The CSDP has become the indispensable framework for the formulation and implementation of Common Foreign and Security Policy. Therefore it is really challenging to formulate solutions to the challenges related notably to growing expectations with a limited capability. The biggest challenge ahead for the EU becomes then how to continue to conduct CSDP missions with its scarce resources. Moreover, another challenge would be how to integrate the member states in the area of security and defence with capability gap without undermining the role of NATO. Thus, it is really important how has the EU through CSDP been employing its new military and civilian crisis management capabilities? And it is really vital to investigate how the EU has been improving its capabilities in the direction of the CSDP project?

On the other hand, one of the difficulties of analyzing the capabilities of the EU member states is that some data cannot be collected from the primary or central sources since the data particularly about the capabilities of the member states are either secret or not publicly available. However there is a certain amount of openly accessed official papers and academic literature available on the CSDP and the capability gap such as Military Technology and Military Balance. So it makes possible to collect required data with a certain degree level of accuracy.

¹⁵ <http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-chart>

1.1.2. The Purpose and the Research Questions of the Thesis

The overall purpose of the thesis is to explore mainly **the development of the CSDP, the expanding structures of the CSDP, the military capability building process and the military capability progress of the EU. The dissertation seeks to examine the defence expenditures of the EU and the US in order to get a grasp of the trend on the capability building process and military ambitions.** The thesis does not analyze any case studies per se, but rather seeks to identify the general tendency of the CSDP missions' characteristics. The thesis aims to analyze particularly **the transatlantic air forces capability gap and then to evaluate the relations between CSDP and NATO** and the impact of the evolving CSDP on the NATO. Hence, the thesis addresses mainly the question: **"How is the evolving process of the CSDP affecting itself and NATO in terms of transatlantic air forces' capability gap?"** Therefore the main objective of the thesis is to present the transatlantic air forces capability gap and military ambitions of NATO and EU.

One of major challenges in CSDP process is that the EU does not have its own armed forces and it does not have any standing forces reserved only for the EU crisis management operations. Each Member State exercises full sovereignty over their armed forces; they only allocate some part of it to the CSDP operations.

The EU cannot achieve anything without the adequate resources to do the job. Moreover the diplomatic solution will not be effective without backing up the political decisions with the adequate capabilities and without being able to mobilize them as soon as possible. The best appropriate enabler asset would be airpower with its unique characteristics such as conducting operations over long distance areas with speed, flexibility and versatility.

In this context, **Air Power** is very critical in terms of **power projection** and meeting the requirements for collective defence. Primarily, a potent Air Power would provide deterrence. Besides, with sufficient air power assets, operations such as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace keeping or peace support operations would be conducted in a timely fashion where and when needed. Therefore **the core of the dissertation** will focus on the **transatlantic air forces capabilities and respective gaps**.

1.2. Organization of the Thesis

The dissertation is divided mainly into two Parts. The First Part contains chapters covering introduction and theoretical framework. The theoretical framework chapter reviews the literature on the CSDP, its historical development, its structures and institutions, and then suggests that a historical institutionalist outlook would best match with the development of the CSDP, since historical and institutional developments play an essential role during the process.¹⁶ In the CSDP context, historical institutionalism implies that once an institution or a policy structure has been created, it will be not easy to overturn or discard its development.¹⁷ That is to say, “political institutions are often sticky”¹⁸ and the institutions and policy structure enter a path or locks itself in “equilibrium for extended periods despite considerable political change”.¹⁹

The third chapter looks at the Security Management of the EU by

¹⁶ Paul Pierson, “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutional Analysis”, *Comparative Political Studies*, 29, 1996, p.158

¹⁷ Maria Green Cowles and Stephanie Curtis, “Developments in European Integration Theory: The EU as Other” in Maria Green Cowles and Desmond Dinan, eds., *Developments in the European Union*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), p.300

¹⁸ Paul Pierson, p.143

¹⁹ Mark A. Pollack, “Theorizing EU Policy-Making” in Helen Wallace, William Wallace, and Mark A. Pollack, eds., *Policy-Making in the European Union*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.20

examining the EU Security Strategy and the Lisbon Treaty adjustments. After reviewing these on conceptual basis, it goes into the CSDP operations and analyzes the classifications of the operations as well as the characteristic trends of those missions.

The fourth chapter deals with EU-NATO relations. NATO is a long established and an old experienced central actor in international security. The relations between the CSDP and the very old experienced NATO are very crucial. Therefore, the fourth chapter examines the relations with the NATO in three time periods. The years between 1999 – 2003, the early days of the EU trying to get a working mechanism and methods with the NATO is defined and analyzed as the first period. The second period covers the years after the US' invasion of Iraq, 2003-2007, the experimental and turbulent period marked by ups and downs in terms of relations with the US and within the EU. The third period is defined as the current period after the year 2007, a more compromised and constructive relationship compared the previous period.²⁰

The fifth chapter explores the EU capability building process and transatlantic air forces gap. At the same time the chapter looks at expenditure and budgetary issues. Since one of the biggest challenges the CSDP project currently faces is the financial crisis, the budget issues should

²⁰ Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane et al. Eds., *European Security and Defense Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, (Paris, The EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009), p. 127.

be taken into consideration seriously. Therefore the chapter five gives detailed analysis about the defence expenditures of the EU member states and later combines them with military ambitions very subtly. In general, this **chapter** constructs the **core** of the dissertation by highlighting the gap between the EU and the US in terms of defence expenditures and military ambitions.

The comparative commitment of the US and the EU is highly remarkable in terms of defence spending ratios and military aspiration. At the end of chapter five it goes without saying that the EU has to spend its money very wisely otherwise the capability gap will get even wider. Even the EU spends its budget very wisely it seems to be that the US military capability will be maintaining its dominant position for a while.

Chapter five comes into conclusion that in general it becomes clear that the capability gap between the US and the EU is getting even wider and the heavy side of the imbalance goes in the direction of west part of the transatlantic link, namely to the US. Moreover, the capability gap will affect to a great extent the operational capability of the EU member states. On the other hand the capability gap will affect the operational capability and harmony of the NATO as well. But the latter effect would not be as much as the first one as long as the US remains and stays in the organization of NATO, since it takes much of the burden.

CHAPTER 2

THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS FOR COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (CSDP)

2.1. Historical Perspective

Since its inception in 1949, NATO has been the primary organization that links the US and Europe on defence and security matters. During the Cold War period NATO's European members perceived that a close tie with the US was important for their territorial security. At this period there was a single threat perception – a possible attack by the Soviet Union. But after the Cold War, NATO has faced unanticipated new threats and responded with new responsibilities and roles, beyond its traditional Cold War role. In the face of new threats, NATO has changed from a regional organization to a military alliance with global scope.²¹ On the other hand, the security perception in Europe has changed with the NATO's changing role.

Although the European Union has a wide spectrum of tools in

²¹ F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Labl, et al., Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture, (The Atlantic Council Policy Paper, March 2006), pp.1-2

economic and political area, which has been very instrumental in enabling EU as an prominent actor in international area, it is disproportionally short of military and civilian assets that would enable EU to carry out successful and effective crisis management operations which in turn would provide CFSP with success and EU with a better stature in crisis management in international arena. CSDP aims to accomplish this goal. Having said that, the WEU's activities, from its creation in 1954 until the end of the Cold War, amounted to little more than confidence-building measures and were overshadowed by NATO's primacy.²²

Among the institutions created in Europe since the Second World War, NATO (dedicated to collective defence and security) and the EU (dedicated to economic and political cooperation) were the two that had the greatest potential in the wake of the fall of the Iron Curtain, not only to maintain security and stability in Europe but also to contribute to the process of European unification.²³

From the European side, after the demise of the Cold War and changing threat perceptions, CSDP, which was started initially as ESDI, is the latest endeavor to respond the quest of, "how can the states of Europe

²² Jochen Rehl and Hans- Bernhard Weissert, eds., *Handbook on CSDP*, (Vienna: Armed Forces Printing Shop, 2010), p.13

²³ Charles-Philippe David, Jacques Levesque, *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia and European Security*, (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), p.197

provide for their security and pursue their interests in the world?”²⁴ This evolving hot issue has been on the table for EU countries since the end of the Second World War. On the surface it may seem a simple question, but the answer is very complicated and controversial. This endeavor has led to misgivings between the alliance requirements for consensus and the EU requirement for a greater, and in some cases, independent voice on security issues. This tug of war has been influenced by the changes in perceived threats, as well as the political and defence integration of the EU states.

Historically, CSDP, which started as ESDI and later became ESDP and after Lisbon Treaty labeled as CSDP, can be regarded as older than NATO in the sense that its roots can be easily traced back to Brussels Treaty in 1948 where France, Belgium, Luxembourg, United Kingdom and the Netherlands which formed Western Union established a union in the face of the most dangerous post WWII perceived threat with aspersion towards expansion, namely Soviet Union. In a sense this treaty can be regarded as the enabling predecessor of the Washington Treaty that established NATO in 1949.²⁵ Despite the fact that NATO took on the responsibility for collective defence, Brussels Treaty left untouched. Since there appeared to be duplication in the collective defence arena Brussels Treaty was changed in 1954 to accommodate this concern. Therefore

²⁴ Jeffrey Becker, “Asserting EU Cohesion: Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Relaunch of Europe”, *European Security*, (Vol. 7 No. 4, Winter 1998), p.12

²⁵ Alfred Cahen, *The Western European Union and NATO*, (London: Brassey’s, 1989), p.2

mandate for collective defence in Brussels Treaty was lifted. This change recognized “the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters” and therefore provided the grounds necessary for better cooperation with NATO. Thus the “quest for an independent voice” in Europe was put aside, but was never crossed out, in the face of the perceived threat from the Soviet Union.²⁶

After the failure of the European Defence Community (1954), security and especially defence policy was not considered as an integral and crucial part of the European Community. European Political Cooperation (EPC) among the foreign ministries was developed informally since 1970, and then incorporated in the Single European Act (1986), in which the term “security” was also introduced, but only as related to its economic implications. The general assumption was that territorial defence functions, in particular, were to be carried out by the Atlantic Alliance and/or national forces.²⁷

France was discontent with the dominating role of the US in NATO and with the lack of Europe to have an independent voice in security matters and reacted to this situation by withdrawing from NATO. France

²⁶ Ibid, p.71

²⁷ Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, The European Union and The Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered*, (Maryland : Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2003), pp.41-42

prominently lead quest for an independent European voice in security issues accompanied lightly by others. Efforts in this arena came to fruition when the Western European Union (WEU) was reactivated in 1984 in order to “increase the co-operation of member states in the field of security policy”.²⁸ This was followed by the statement of Platform on European Security Interests, in which the WEU states agreed that they were “convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defence”²⁹ in 1987.

The 90’s experienced an unexpected turn of events which drastically changed the balance sought out between maintaining NATO solidarity and Europe’s quest for an independent voice in security matters. This was mainly the result of two game changing factors. Firstly and primarily the immediate perceived threat which has overridden all other factors in the field of security disappeared with the fall of Soviet Union. Secondly the integration of Europe reached to a point where integration in security and policy issues was the natural next step. The disintegration of Yugoslavia acted as a catalyst in the midst of these changes. Yugoslavia example was eye-opening in the sense that it lucidly showed that Europe was crucially dependent on US on security matters and was unable to handle a military

²⁸ Cahen, p.83

²⁹ Cahen, p.91

crisis in such a close proximity.³⁰

Nevertheless change of balances and eradication of previous perceived threats in 90's resulted in an increase in political will of EU to seek out an independent voice in security issues. As a result EU Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 where the EU states "resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy."³¹

In order to improve the capabilities of the NATO members and sharing the burden altogether, the NATO summit in January 1994 in Brussels approved the idea of creating Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) headquarters as part of NATO's integrated command structure. Later, the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin, in June 1996, agreed in principle the concept of CJTF as a mechanism within NATO to address potential out of area conflicts or situations which only selected countries feel need addressing. Such a CJTF would permit more flexible and mobile deployment of forces, including for new missions. The main purpose was to give NATO's command structure additional flexibility to achieve its numerous aims, including facilitating the dual use of NATO

³⁰ Tom Lansford, "The Triumph of Transatlanticism: NATO and the Evolution of European Security After the Cold War", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, (Vol. 22 No. 1, Mar 1999) and Alistair Shepherd, "Top-Down or Bottom-Up: Is Security and Defense Policy in the EU a Question of Political Will or Military Capacity?", *European Security* (Vol. 9 No. 2, Summer 2000)

³¹ <http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/treaties-other.htm>.

forces and command structures for alliance and/or operations run by the Western European Union. The purpose was to encourage European nations to undertake missions with forces that are “separable but not separate from NATO” with regards to an emerging ESDI.³²

In the midst of the 1998-99 Kosovo crisis France and Britain released a common Declaration – at St.Malo (France), in early December 1998 – that for the first time called on the EU to develop “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises”. Such commitment would not put into question either NATO or other national defence arrangements in that the Union would take military action “where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged” and “without unnecessary duplication”. The St.Malo agreement was the founding act of the ESDP because of its emphasis on Europe’s capacity for autonomous action with its own appropriate structures. The St.Malo Declaration revived the debate about the degree of European autonomy inside or outside that alliance. The U-turn was remarkable.³³

The common defence policy has been reiterated and augmented in EU declarations throughout the 90s, with the EU Helsinki Summit of 1999

³² Clay Clemens, *NATO and the Quest for Post-Cold War Security*, (New York: Macmillan 1997), pp.40-42, 52

³³ Sloan., pp.171-172

actually forming the structures to implement the common security policy. Dr. Javier Solana, acting in his role as High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy at that time, articulated the issue from the European Union perspective, as the “need to complement the political and economic instruments at our disposal by developing an effective Command and Foreign Security Policy, including capabilities, both civilian and military, to enable us to intervene in international crisis. We have now to begin to take seriously our responsibilities as a global actor for regional security.”³⁴

The subject matter of the renewed CSDP has centered on the establishment of an autonomous EU military capability, with European countries supplying forces to both NATO and the EU force. However, it is really very confusing in terms of the effective use of the capabilities between EU and NATO.

As Solana stated, “the union has stressed that ESDP is not about collective defence. NATO will remain the foundation of the collective defence of its members.”³⁵ That is to say, the EU views this project in no way as a replacement competing with NATO. It is meant to give the EU a security voice outside NATO. Politically, this is important as it means that for the memberships of the EU and NATO are by no means identical. There are

³⁴ Javier Solana, “Common European Foreign and Security Policy Targets for the Future”, NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace 1/2000: p.107

³⁵ Ibid.

6 EU members who are not part of NATO (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Malta, Greek Part of Cyprus) and 5 members of NATO not part of the EU (Canada, US, Iceland, Norway, Turkey). It follows from the EU perspective that, depending solely on NATO for reaction capability means, 6 members of the EU has no voice in the debate, while 5 non-members of the EU do have a voice, in fact a veto.

ESDI which evolved into CSDP has resulted in the formation of a new military organization which will assert political will of EU. The strategic structure of this body is also formed and carries an uncanny resemblance to those of NATO. Standing Political and Security Committee provides strategic direction and political control while military committee provides advice on military matters. European Council also accommodates permanent military staff within its structure. Fifty to Sixty thousand troops are committed to this organization deployable within sixty days and sustainable for a year to be used in international operations.³⁶

Regarding the working mechanism with the NATO, NATO-EU link was established in the 2003 with Berlin Plus arrangements. The Berlin Plus arrangements incorporates four main points: “assured access to NATO planning, NATO European command options for EU-led operations, presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and

³⁶ Sloan, p.175

common asset, and the adaptation of NATO defence planning.”³⁷

Additionally, in 2004 the European Defence Agency was established to help EU Member States develop defence capabilities for crisis management operations under CSDP. Nowadays, the EU already engaged several missions – in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo and in other areas – performing a variety of tasks, from law enforcement and ceasefire monitoring to security and humanitarian crisis management since 2003.³⁸

In an operational sense, EU has divided the spectrum of conflict into two areas, those at the lower end of the scale such as humanitarian relief and conflict prevention and those at the upper end of scale such as collective defence. EU considered the first area achievable within European means and labeled them as Petersberg Tasks.³⁹ For the latter NATO remained as the body with principal responsibility. In consequence EU was able to form some degree of autonomy in producing independent policies and implementing them all the while retaining security provided by NATO at much larger scale.

³⁷ EU Focus, European Security and Defense Policy: Working for a Safer World, (Washington DC, January 2006), p.7

³⁸ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defense/eu-operations?lang=en>

³⁹ Sloan, p.167

2.2. CSDP Structures

Whether and to what extent the Union will be able to use its military capacities to defend and promote its civilian objectives depends highly on its respective instruments and institutions. For this reason, it is worth to get a grasp of the structures and institutions of the CSDP since its inception. Moreover, getting to know the institutions of the CSDP will shed light in explaining theoretical framework of CSDP.

There are mainly three different perspectives highly affecting the institutional character of the evolving CSDP structures. France has been constantly pushing for augmenting the military dimension of the CSDP in order to back up the policies with credible autonomous military means to decide and act in international arena. On the other, while supporting the France's approach about building credible autonomous capabilities, the UK seeks to balance that with maintaining a strong link with the transatlantic side. Furthermore, some Nordic countries and Germany have been favoring to promote the civilian dimension and capabilities of the CSDP. Thus, the institutional character has been getting shaped under the influences of these diverging and converging perspectives. And more importantly the operational experiences affect the institutional character as well.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Thomas Overhage, Less is More: Pooling and Sharing of European Military Capabilities in the

The CSDP is a vital part of the EU Common Foreign Security and Defence Policy. The distinctive and operational nature of the CSDP has given rise to sub-set of institutions. To understand the structural body of the EU, one should keep in mind that there is a never ending balancing between national consensus and institutional perspectives in CSDP domain. Naturally, it takes time to converge the different perspectives and generate effective solutions. Thus, the institutional character of CSDP highly incorporates the evolving give and take and finding a happy medium approach.

The establishment of the military and political structures goes back to Helsinki Summit in 1999.⁴¹ On the basis of Helsinki Summit, EU member states decided that “new political and military bodies and structures shall be established to enable the Union to provide the necessary political guidance and the strategic direction to crisis management and peace support operations”, in general. The member states reached a consensus unanimously to set up a Political and Security Committee (PSC) in Nice in December 2000. The Political and Security Committee was defined as a “linchpin of European Security and Defence Policy,” since it shall be

Past and Present, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 2012

⁴¹ Council Decision (2001/78/CFSP) of 22 January 2001 setting up the Political and Security Committee (Official Journal of the European Communities L 27, 30.01.2001), p.1

responsible to deal with all aspects of common foreign and security policy.⁴²

In Nice, the European Council took also decision to make permanent the three military bodies during the year 2001. The Political and Security Committee (PSC), The EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) all started to work during the Swedish presidency in spring 2001. The EUMS was the last one to be made permanent in 11 June 2001. The Council decision of setting up the EUMS was later amended in 2005 for structural changes.⁴³

It is of vital importance to know how the institutional architecture of the CSDP works. The institutional architecture of CSDP has been subject to major improvements and amendments since 2000. This new structure deserves extraordinary attention to get full understanding. It is really very complicated and the institutional design permits to overlapping responsibilities which makes it perplexing.

⁴² Official Journal of the European Communities L 27, 30.01.2001, p.2

⁴³ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defense/csdp-structures-and-instruments?lang=en>, (Council Decision 2005/395/CFSP of 10 May 2005)

The CSDP structures fall under the authority of the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council.




Figure 2.1⁴⁴ Structures in the Field of CFSP/CSDP

The basic structure of the CFSP/CSDP organization is presented in the figure above. The picture illustrates the relations between the different bodies that exercise CFSP and CSDP. A rough distinction has been made to divide areas of responsibility for the CFSP along with CSDP and the military crisis management.

The major figure in CFSP is the High Representative of the Union for

⁴⁴ Based on Jochen Rehl and Hans- Bernhard Weisserth, eds., Handbook on CSDP, p.39 and W.Wessels, Das politische System der Europäischen Union. Die institutionelle Architektur des EU- Systems, (Wiesbaden: GmbH, 2008), p.412

Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service (EEAS), whereas the major player in CSDP is the Political and Security Committee. As one can infer from its name, the PSC is the center of gravity for CSDP issues. In general, it keeps an eye of the international situations and assists to define policies to the respective situations. If a crisis erupts, the PSC provides a coherent response to the crisis.⁴⁵

The standing Political and Security Committee in Brussels consists of national representatives of senior or ambassadorial level. The PSC meets normally once a week. The PSC deals with all aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including CSDP. During the crisis period, the PSC is responsible of examining, assessing the possible policy option and offering the proposal to the Council that is in EU's best interest. In the possible case of a Peace Support Operation, the PSC exercises, under the authority of the European Council, the political control and strategic direction of the operation. The PSC also forwards guidelines to the Military Committee and receives military advice from it. The Political and Security Committee is a kind of central organ to the body of CSDP and it has a close relationship with the High Representative for CFSP.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ CSDP Handbook, p.39.

⁴⁶ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defense/csdp-structures-and-instruments?lang=en>, and Council Decision (2001/78/CFSP) of 22 January 2001 and Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane et al. Eds., *European Security and Defense Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, (Paris, The EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009), p.29, 30

Besides the PSC, the other main branches of CSDP are the EU Military Committee (EUMC), the EU Military Staff (EUMS), Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC).⁴⁷

The principal top military organ within the Council is the EUMC. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of member states, but represented steadily by their military representatives. The chairman is selected within the Committee and appointed by the Council for three year term and has the rank of a four star flag officer. The EUMC gives advice and opinions to the PSC on military issues. The EUMS provide military capability to the EU and it is the only permanent military body of the Union.⁴⁸

The EUMS play a key role in situational awareness and in military operations. The EUMS assist the High Representative of the Union for Security and Foreign Affairs with military expertise and provide strategic planning and early warning. The EUMS currently work under the European External Action Service. Before the Lisbon Treaty the EUMS were under the Council General Secretariat. The EUMS get the direction from the

⁴⁷ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defense/csdp-structures-and-instruments?lang=en>

⁴⁸ Asle Toje, *The European Union as a Small Power: After the Post-Cold War*, (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.15

EUMC.⁴⁹

The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), a new directorate created in November 2009, calls particular attention to the relationship between civilian and military planning. The CMPD united the former directorates related with defence issues and civilian aspects of crisis management and the civil-mil cell of the EU Military Staff. The directorate also unified civilian and military planning at the strategic level and has been directed by a Deputy Director-General. In short, it brought about more institutional framework for early integrated planning.⁵⁰

The other branch of the CSDP is the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability which is responsible of civilian crisis management aspect of the CSDP matters. It is under the authority of High Representative. It conducts all civilian peace support operations and exercises command and control for civilian CSDP missions.⁵¹ The CPCC was formed in 2007 to better implement the civilian crisis management operations. The main purpose of establishing the CPCC has been to enhance the ability to plan, conduct and support the rapidly increasing scope and range of the CSDP civilian

⁴⁹ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defense/csdp-structures-and-instruments/eu-military-staff?lang=en>, 9Feb2011

⁵⁰ Jochen Rehrl and Hans- Bernhard Weisserth, eds., Handbook on CSDP, p.46.

⁵¹ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defense/csdp-structures-and-instruments/cpcc?lang=en>

missions.⁵²




Figure 2.2⁵³ The Structure of CPCC

The structure of the CPCC is illustrated figuratively by the above figure. The CPCC is conducting the current 13 civilian CSDP mission and the director of the CPCC is the civilian operations commander reporting

⁵² Factsheet, CPCC/04, April 2011, p.3

⁵³ Factsheet, CPCC/04, April 2011, p.3

directly to the High Representative.⁵⁴

There are also supporting agencies in the field of CSDP such as the EU Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS), the EU Satellite Centre (EUSC), the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), and the European Defence Agency (EDA). The EU Institute for Security Studies is the successor of the Western European Institute for Security Studies, which was founded in 1990. In 2002 its name was changed and the EU ISS has been declared open. It is an independent agency with intellectual sovereignty. Its central task is to help bring a common security culture among the EU member states into existence.⁵⁵

The EU Satellite Centre (EUSC) was established in 1992 under the WEU and later in 2002 it has been integrated into the EU. Its' essential task is to provide intelligence and analysis obtained from satellite imagery and get interaction with Community space-related services.⁵⁶

The European Security and Defence College has been set up in 2005. The objective of establishing such a college was to promote a common culture and increase interoperability among member states by

⁵⁴ Ibid., p.1-3

⁵⁵ Jochen Rehl and Hans- Bernhard Weisserth, eds., Handbook on CSDP, pp. 51-54.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.52

providing training and education for civil servants, diplomats, police officers, and military personnel from the EU member states and EU institutions involved in CSDP.⁵⁷

The most prominent one of the supporting agencies in the field of CSDP is EDA, which was established in 2004. All the European Member States except Denmark are part of the EDA. The principal objective of the EDA is “to support the Member States and the Council in their effort to improve European defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the European Security and Defence Policy as it stands now and develops in the future”.⁵⁸

The main tasks of the EDA falls under four categories. These categories embrace the duties such as “development of defence capabilities, promotion of defence capabilities, creation of competitive European Defence Equipment Market and strengthening the European Defence, Technological and Industrial Base.”⁵⁹ In general, the EDA is in charge of promoting the member states’ defence capabilities by addressing the shortfalls and by enhancing the cooperation, coherence and consistency among them.


⁵⁷ ESDP Newsletter, European Security and Defense Policy 1999-2009, Special Issue, October 2009, pp.22-23

⁵⁸ Jochen Rehl and Hans- Bernhard Weissert, eds., Handbook on CSDP, p.51

⁵⁹ Ibid.

It is really remarkable to notice that during research one can hardly come across to a detailed diagram giving clear explanation about the CSDP structures. Most probably, the main reason for that is the complexity of the CSDP institutional architecture and its nature as a living architecture. Besides, there are overlapping task among the branches which makes its structure analysis much more complicated. The figure presented about the structure of the CSDP/CFSP a few pages earlier is a simplified one. Now the figure below shows the complexity of the structure of the CFSP/CSDP.

The Institutional Architecture of CFSP/CSDP



Based on Asle Toje, 2010: p.17

Figure - 2.3

In fact the institutional diagrams do not provide a clear guide about the real mode of actions of the CFSF/CSDP. The current structures are not well integrated. The disunity comes from its intergovernmental versus national nature and competing ideas for the EU Security and Defence Policy.⁶⁰

Institutional complexities and overlaps, of course, bring about operational, political, and institutional headaches. But, remarkably the member states do not necessarily want to alleviate the apparent problems/headaches, because they have mutual interest in creating and maintaining as it is, to some extent. By doing so, they can choose what is appropriate for them.

Considering the overlaps of the competences within the institutional structure; as stated in the Article 38 in TEU, the work definition of the Political and Security Committee (PSC) requires that “it shall act not only at the request of the Council but also of the High Representative and that it shall work under the responsibility of both institutions”. According to Article 222 in the TFEU; “the PSC shall also help the Council in the implementation of the Solidarity Clause and if necessary, cooperate with the new Standing Committee for Justice and Home Affairs”. The tasks attributed to PSC overlap partially with the tasks of the High Representative. By the same

⁶⁰ Asle Toje, p.16

token, the division of competences between the PSC and Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) is not clearly defined⁶¹, which might lead to overlapping tensions between these two institutions preparing sessions of the Council. There is too much room for interpretation on the competences of the institutions which might cause friction and bureaucratic tensions and delays among the institutions.

There are also clashing, overlapping responsibilities and work descriptions for the President of the European Council and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. When comparing the tasks of the President and the High Representative (Articles 15 and 18 TEU)⁶², one gets the feeling that the High Representative seems

⁶¹ TEU, Article 16 (7): “A Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States shall be responsible for preparing the work of the Council”.

⁶² TEU, Article 15 (6): “The President of the European Council: (a) shall chair it and drive forward its work;

(b) shall ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council; (c) shall endeavour to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council; (d) shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the European Council, ...”

TEU, Article 18: “... 2. The High Representative shall conduct the Union’s common foreign and security policy. He shall contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy, which he shall carry out as mandated by the Council. The same shall apply to the common security and defense policy.

3. The High Representative shall preside over the Foreign Affairs Council. EN C 83/26 Official Journal of the European Union 30.3.2010.

4. The High Representative shall be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission. He shall ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action. He shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action. In exercising these responsibilities within the Commission, and only for these responsibilities,...

TEU, Article 27 (2): “The High Representative shall represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy. He shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf and shall express the Union’s position in international organisations and at international conferences.”

to be a more important person than the President on the paper. Since the President should be a coordinating person according to his/her work description. Nonetheless, in the daily practice it is not that way. He represents the Union as a whole in the international system for a two and a half year period and chairs the European Union Council. Besides, he is the prime mouthpiece in all subject matters in international arena.

On the other hand, the High Representative conducts Common Security and Foreign Policy and ensures the consistency of the Union's external action. He/she acts "under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks."⁶³ As mentioned above, the conflicting competences of the President and the High Representative are obvious. Since it is known by the writers/masters of the treaties as well, it has been reflected in the Article 15 (6): "The President of the European Council shall, at his level and in that capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy."⁶⁴ In general, the remedy of the overlapping competences and unspecific division

⁶³ TEU, Article 43.

⁶⁴ TEU, Article 15

of powers left to the daily practice of the relevant officials or institutions.

Within this structure the other main concern is the center or centers where the operations will be conducted. For this challenging problem, the member states have found a happy medium to overcome this strategic problem.

The EU has two options for peace support operations. It can conduct an autonomous one or it can recourse to NATO assets, where NATO as a whole is not engaged (case by case).

The option for conducting an operation through recouring to NATO assets is defined under Berlin plus arrangement. Via an EU Cell in SHAPE (Supreme Headquarter, Allied Power Europe) the EU and NATO have an intense consultation, after dialogue and consultations, if the EU is permitted to use NATO assets and capabilities, where NATO as a whole is not engaged for a peace support operation, the EU can use operation headquarters at SHAPE. Then the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (D-SACEUR) will be the commander of the operation. The operation EUFOR ALTHEA launched in 2004 conducted through recouring to NATO command assets.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Document on EU-NATO Consultation, Planning and Operations (European Council, December 2003) at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defense/csdp-structures-and->

For the autonomous EU operations, an existing national Headquarter will be made available for the operations. So far, five national Headquarters have been declared as to be multinationalised for such operations. France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom are the countries which will provide their national Headquarters in times of EU operations. The locations of the Headquarters are situated respectively in Paris, Potsdam, Larissa, Rome and Northwood. These five member states pledge to provide necessary technical infrastructure to run the military operation with the member states' staff for the autonomous EU peace support operations.⁶⁶ The Operation ARTEMIS in the D.R.Congo launched in 2003 was conducted through the French Operation Headquarter and the Operation EUFOR DR Congo launched in 2006 made use of the German Operation Headquarter.⁶⁷

After gaining some experience the EU has provided another option for the autonomous operations. In January 2007, an operation center with a core staff in Brussels very close to the main buildings of the EU institutions has been activated. It is not a standing operation Headquarter. But it will be

instruments/eu-nato-co-operation?lang=en, pp.1-2

⁶⁶ The EU Operations Centre at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defense/csdp-structures-and-instruments/eu-operations-centre?lang=en>, p.1

⁶⁷ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defense/eu-operations?lang=en>

fully manned and equipped upon short notice by the Council.⁶⁸

Considering the overall process of the CSDP's structure, the EU has started building its structures and capabilities following the Helsinki Summit in December 1999. This shows that once the consensus was reached or once the vision/goal was set up then the EU member started to move on that agreed direction better or worse. And, indeed they have managed to steer crisis management and peace support operation either by ad hoc arrangement or by a distinctive approach.

In short, since the first operation in 2003 the EU has managed to conduct peace support operation through one way or another. On the other hand, it is debatable the degree of success of the operations. The missing ingredient and the main perceived problem about the CSDP is the lack of coherence and efficiency with its growing range of tasks and undertakings around the world. However, the process of the CSDP has brought about some institutions eventually and institutional engineering and reforms have brought about some tools to progress reciprocally.

⁶⁸ The EU Operations Centre, p.2

2.3. Historical Institutionalism: Road to the CSDP

It is hard to say that one theory explains all the happenings in the area of CSDP. Integration theories about EU have valuable insights, but they do not satisfactorily explain the cooperation and integration process in high politics, namely the CSDP. The CSDP is a political and strategic project with a number of tools which participant members concede to move their resources on this distinct European project. It is a very arduous task to coordinate and integrate all political and material interest into one CSDP of member states.

It is really surprising that despite all the disparities and differences of the European national security policies, the perplexity of the present multi-level institutional framework and capability gaps, many significant developments have been achieved in the CSDP project. As Howorth put it “new European institutions and agencies have recently popped up like mushrooms to fill the gap.”⁶⁹ It can be inferred that there are concrete realities of coordination among European member states in the new European Security Architecture. It is very discernible that the cooperation leads concrete institutional and material realities in the course of CSDP. To

⁶⁹ Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defense Policy in the European Union*, (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007), p.30

a certain extent, as Jolyon Howorth pointed out, CSDP “demonstrates a great deal of coordination.”⁷⁰ (coordination and integration) That is to say, there is a pull and push between intergovernmental and supranational forces at play and there are shrewd cooperation procedures at play as well.

The mutual links between the inclination of states to cooperate to achieve joint goals, gains and institutional development is dynamic, in continuous change and helical in nature. That is to say; cooperation inspire and encourage member states to build institutions, institutions themselves foster cooperative outcomes. Thus, “cause and effect” runs in both direction, and institutionalization and cooperation affect each other in a reciprocal way.⁷¹

In the quest to explain CSDP in a theoretical context, the dissonance and tensions between monocausal theories leads one to go on the path of historical institutionalism. European security cooperation arrangement is a really intricate case for international relations theories. In the security and defence arena a state’s power plays an important role. Since the nation state constructs its security and defence policy and defence structures in line with its power. The problem about the EU is the different description of

⁷⁰ Ibid., p.32

⁷¹Michael E.Smith, *Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation*, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.17-18

its power. The EU is denoted commonly as civilian power⁷², soft power⁷³, normative power⁷⁴ or smart power.⁷⁵ We can infer from these various indications that the basic underlying point about the EU is its sui generis/unique entity and identity. The EU's identity can be based on its way of acting or of intervening in the international environment.

There is a plethora of academic and political debates about the EU's identity, most of which comes to conclusion that the EU is some kind of global actor.⁷⁶ But the real challenge we face is the quality of its actorness and the degree of its power in the international system. What kind of actor is the EU? There are various views about its role. In general there are two major concepts: actorness and presence. The first one regards the EU as a full grown state-like actor in the global arena, whereas the second one can regard it as an important player around the globe.⁷⁷

⁷² Andre Gerrits ed., *Normative Power Europe in a Changing World: A Discussion*, (Netherlands Institute of IR, Clingendael, 2009), p. 42

⁷³ Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York, Public Affairs, 2004), p.75

⁷⁴ R.G. Whitman, "Norms, Power and Europe: A new Agenda for Study of the EU and IR" in Richard G. Whitman (ed.), *Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp.1-3

⁷⁵ Olli Rehn, *Europe's smart power in its region and the world*, Speech at the European Studies Centre, St Antony's College University of Oxford, 1 May 2008.

⁷⁶ Michael Smith, "The EU as an international actor", in Jeremy Richardson (ed.), *European Union, Power and Policy Making*, 3rd edition, Abingdon, (2006), p. 290.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

Despite the fact that the CSDP is an integral part of the EU Common Foreign Security and Defence Policy and the institutional frameworks of CFSP and CSDP widely overlap, the operational nature has led to the establishment of a distinctive sub-set of institutions. And the CSDP structures and institutions have undergone nearly a continuous change, expansion and reform since its inception as examined in Chapter 2.2.

It is really difficult to get a clear vision of how far the CSDP will proceed. At the same time, it is very tempting to form a prospective picture about the ongoing CSDP process. Moreover, the CSDP process is facing renewed turbulence and uncertainty. The uncertainties weaken both NATO and the EU itself. This makes it much more important to anticipate the direction of the process. Without making prudent anticipation EU and all the other actors will be caught unprepared for the changing environment and challenges of security management.

The aspiration and goals of the common foreign and security policy of the EU do not form a lot of resemblance to same kind of institutions and processes anywhere in the world. The best way to get a grasp of the process and the only concrete method of assessment is to compare the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy with itself over time. For instance, a quick comparison of this kind provides some clues for our interpretation. In the year 1979, the Soviet forces had invaded Afghanistan. At that time, no rapid common reaction came from the European

Community. They did not even call for an extraordinary meeting of their foreign ministers. The nine member states issued a condemnation only after three weeks of the invasion.⁷⁸

On the other hand, the 27 members of the EU issued a common statement under the French Presidency of the EU in a very few days after the Soviet forces entered into Georgia in August 2008. Surprisingly, the EU decision making process worked much more quickly with 27 members than during the Afghanistan Invasion in 1979 with 9 members. The French Presidency of the EU brokered a peace agreement among the opposing parties. Moreover, Russia approved the six-point plan proposed by the French Presidency. Thus, the parties reached a preliminary ceasefire agreement.⁷⁹

Both events provide useful insight about the facts of the Common Foreign Policy. In retrospect, we might say the EU has made major strides in foreign and security policy. In security and defence arena, the CSDP goes on the area of high politics and the EU learns a lot from trial and error experience. European security culture plays a significant role on the process of the CSDP.

⁷⁸ “Russia Endorses Six-Point Plan”, www.civil.ge, 12.08.2008

⁷⁹ Ibid.

The new CSDP constructed and elevated over the last few decades, which was started informally by European Political Cooperation, is by no means an insignificant success story. It has come a long way, which cannot be underestimated. In terms of historical and international perspective, the formation of CSDP is also an unprecedented emergence. The states accountable for the outbreak of the two world wars and the states that gave battles against each other have now succeeded not only in establishing a security community, but also in forming a system for collective security and defence management.

Despite the fact that the sovereignty issue is at the very essence of the common foreign and security policy, the member states of the EU have a joint agreement on the Treaty on European Union: "The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be ... including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence, ... The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments."⁸⁰ That is to say, there seems to be no formal limitation or restrictive provision to follow a common policy on any issue that may lead a joint action as long as the Member States are in agreement. Indeed, there are very few matters in the field of foreign and

⁸⁰ Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article 11 and Article 17.

security policy nowadays that the points at issue are handled one way or another within the EU framework in practical terms after so many years of experience.

From an intergovernmentalist perspective one can perceive the process about high politics and CSDP as “rationalized intergovernmentalism”⁸¹, as Wessel pointed out. Even after the Lisbon Treaty, the governments still hold the driving force and give limited power to the Council. The member states still go on the unanimity procedures and believe in the central role of the European Council on the CSDP issues. Nevertheless, “the institutions matter”⁸² and “institutions affect outcomes.”⁸³

Historical institutionalism is a theory “which purports to explain elements of particular slices of the EU polity”.⁸⁴ Moreover, the institutionalist character and influence with the EU’s flexible and tailor made solutions to complex problems makes usually an open gate to deadlocks. Thus, historical institutionalist perspective fits better to explain the episode of the CSDP. Nevertheless, that is not to say historical institutionalism explains all

⁸¹ Wolfgang Wessels, “Nice results: The Millennium IGC in the EU’s evolution”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, (2001, Vol. 39, No. 2), p. 204.

⁸² D. Mark Aspinwall, & Gerald Schneider, “Same menu, separate tables: The institutionalist turn in political science and the study of European integration”, *European Journal of Political Research*, 38, 2000, p.3

⁸³ Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan 2000), p.113

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p.126

aspect of the CSDP.

In historical institutionalist approach, the norms, rules and institutions affects and shape political behavior in its historical orientation. In general, “history is not a chain of independent events.”⁸⁵ And historical institutionalism emphasizes that in the course of time along with the process of CSDP, the influence of the member states is to some extent constrained by the institutions of the CSDP. Even though historical institutionalism does not neglect the principal role of the states within the EU, it asserts that historical and institutional developments play an essential role during the process.⁸⁶ In the CSDP context, historical institutionalism implies that once an institution or a policy structure has been created, it will be not easy to overturn or discard its development.⁸⁷ In other words, “political institutions are often sticky”⁸⁸ and the institutions and policy structure has entered a path or locked itself in “equilibrium for extended periods despite considerable political change”.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Sven Steinmo, What is Historical Institutionalism? in Donatella D. Porta and Michael Keating eds., *Forthcoming in Approaches in the Social Sciences*, (Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp.150, 166

⁸⁶ Paul Pierson, “The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutional Analysis”, *Comparative Political Studies*, 29, 1996, p.158

⁸⁷, Maria Green Cowles and Stephanie Curtis, “ Developments in European Integration Theory: The EU as Other” in Maria Green Cowles and Desmond Dinan, eds., *Developments in the European Union*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), p.300

⁸⁸ Paul Pierson, p.143

⁸⁹ Mark A. Pollack, “Theorizing EU Policy-Making” in Helen Wallace, William Wallace, and Mark

If we consider the birth of the CSDP in 1999 and its first mission in 2003, it has not been a very long time. We would not imagine that the EU would execute more than twenty peace support operation on three continents⁹⁰. It is quite an accomplishment in terms of promoting European values around world. Moreover it is also a success story to some degree that the EU has made the CSDP project accepted by the US to a certain extent with some doubts.

The EU uses a combination of military and civilian resources, either separately or jointly whichever is practical and appropriate for the solution. Moreover the EU involve in peace support operation in partnership with others or autonomously for the common good. In short, the EU acts in a way with a logic of its institutional and capability oriented preferences. Nevertheless, we cannot consider the EU like a state. Thus, it is very natural that the EU cannot make decisions as quickly as a state. It takes time to get approval of the 27 member states. But looking from an optimistic point of view, it is beneficial at some point. Not making fast decisions would mean not making fast mistakes either.

A. Pollack, eds., Policy-Making in the European Union, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.20

⁹⁰ www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defense/eu-operations

Compared to the ambition of a nation state, the EU's ambition cannot be greater than the sum of its member states. Member states' decisions as a union are not whimsical or capricious. At the same time, they get usually much more and achieve much more by taking action altogether than doing on their own as historical institutionalism suggests.

Social relations and expert staff attitudes are important in CSDP process. The two way traffic that the PSC exercises continuously with other committees is promoting the development of the CSDP process. For instance, The Nicoladis Group which was set up in 2003 and named after its first director has the task of regulating the expanding workload of the PSC. Since 2003 the PSC has brought about a particular, exclusive, and distinctive working manner. The staff within the PSC has gotten to know each other very well in the course of time. They all tried to find a happy medium between the national positions and common consensus. They have showed greater flexibility as they belong to a particular circle severed from their national identity to some degree. Specifically, the divisive nature of Iraq crisis in 2003 was never taken to the debating table officially within the PSC.⁹¹

This is a very striking example of how the institutionalism provides social norms within the organization. The PSC functions as a “transmission

⁹¹ Ibid., pp.30-31

belt” between national capitals and Brussels, and exercises its full influence to keep the CSDP alive. So the deeds of the PSC have been very significant in compromising different views and in reaching consensus on the launch of around thirty CSDP operations.⁹²

In 2005, following the Hampton Court Informal Heads of Government meeting, the High Representative has made a proposal to the Council for the establishment of a robust situation and risk assessment capacity. The proposal has aimed to bring about better analysis means to other CSDP organs. Out of this necessity, the new Single Intelligence Analysis was finally set up. As we can see staff in the institutions plays a significant role in developing and expanding the institutional capacities and structures.⁹³

The EU has acquired a lot of experience by trial and error during the peace support operations and still learning. In the beginning years the cooperation procedures between several branches of the EU has not been functioning very well in terms of CSDP issues and missions. It was very visible during the EUPOL mission in RD Congo in 2005. The Commission thought it is the responsibility of the Commission to provide the rule of law sector for the needed region. In this context, two CSDP Security Sector

⁹² Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane et al. Eds., *European Security and Defense Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, (Paris, The EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009), p. 31

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 42

Reform missions were deployed simultaneously. From the Commission perspective, the CSDP mission including police missions whose mandate extended to the interface between police and criminal justice has intruded its domain of policy.⁹⁴ So the lack of coordination, the opacity of respective competences and the division of labor problem have become very obvious.

Later these deficiencies have led to some progress in more critical regions such as Afghanistan and Kosovo. The staff from the Commission and CSDP has appeared to be more eager to discuss and delimit the respective competences of the each mechanism. They set up ad hoc committees and tried at least to find a provisional solution until a routine and regular comprehensive approach has been set up.⁹⁵ Moreover, the EU has learned a lot in the last decade and the appointment of a double hatted post for High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is a promising sign of better coordination between other mechanisms of the EU and for CSDP development process.

Also, the informative briefings help to persuade the EU official to be in favor of CSDP process. During the years 2006 and 2007, expert officials gave briefing to the EP members on CFSP/CSDP matter on around 670 occasions in total, which amounts to a considerable number. It really shows

⁹⁴ Ibid., pp.49-50

⁹⁵ Ibid., p.52

an intensified interaction between EU mechanisms in the way of CSDP project. Moreover, the Council Secretariat arranged field trip for the members of the EP to arise more awareness and knowledge about the CSDP mission, thus the inter-institutional dialogue and understanding is increasing in the course of time.⁹⁶

In this context, the Lisbon Treaty can be viewed as the output of past time institutional experience and practice, strategic projection and compromise among various national perspectives, and laborious thinking and reflections on CFSP and CSDP. In general, the Lisbon Treaty brought no particular novelty, but it brought better consensual way to move ahead as explained thoroughly in the next “shrewd cooperation procedures” chapter. It provides shrewd solution in easing the constraint during an agreement process. Thus it enables the member states to work together and go along with each other within the framework of CSDP. Moreover it avoids to a great extent the veto problem from the unwilling countries to a particular decision.

Over the years, the EU has developed a wide range of tools to handle disputed issues. Almost daily, the EU member states agree on common policy statements, showing their willingness on cooperation and collaboration. Although there is no formal obligation for the EU members to

⁹⁶ Ibid., pp.51-53

agree on common goals, the Member states are usually inclined to agree, because the political atmosphere is strongly in favor of reaching a consensus in order to have a united posture and a strong image to the world.

All in all, the analysis and examination of the CSDP institutional framework and of its progress and development during the last decade present a historical institutionalist approach. Regarding the overall structures of the CSDP, we should accept that, to a certain degree it is quite an achievement.

However, EU crisis management structures and capabilities still need to be augmented and improved. The CSDP has come a long way with regard to other mechanisms, but still has a long way to go. The shortfalls of adequate capabilities do constrain the ability of the Union very tightly and limit the EU to undertake more demanding peace support operations.

To some extent, the lack of sound coordination and coherence among the EU organs hinders the CSDP process and slow down the development of the CSDP project. On the other hand, institutional architecture and engineering may facilitate and help the process, but without solid political will it will be subject to erosion as well. Thus, institutional reform only will not be a solution for CSDP. It would help but it will not be sufficient.

The interactions, ability and experience of the institutions and staff along with the lessons drawn from experience from the ongoing and competed CSDP operations is putting into shape institutional composition in a complex way that no one can clearly see the way ahead. It seems like the institutional character prefers to develop initially at least a culture of coordination then engage on the detailed structures and procedures. The purpose of doing this way is to avoid the burden of rigid set of procedures and not to be constrained by a certain set of rules at the beginning.⁹⁷ They later tailor the procedures according their cultural and institutional customs. That is to say, the institutional character of CSDP highly incorporates the evolving give and take and finding a happy medium approach.

As seen in the CSDP structures chapter, the EU has entered a path where turnover is really difficult as historical institutionalism suggests. The current CSDP structures seems to be locking-in the EU member states in the process of security and defence integration by continuous collaboration and cooperation. The CSDP has established considerable structures and conducted numerous peace support operations. As historical institutionalism envisages the policies and institutions of the CSDP tend to go on “unless there is a strong force exerted for change.”⁹⁸ On the other hand, the major

⁹⁷ Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane et al. Eds., p. 54

⁹⁸ Peters, B. Guy, Jon Pierre, and Desmond S. King, “The Politics of Path Dependency: Political

disadvantage of the historical institutionalism is its weakness to explain policy change during the process and also its inefficiency to embody or combine the EU's relations with other organizations such as the NATO.

All things considered, the institutional engineering and reform should be in parallel with the political and operational level priorities of the EU. The institutional design will help to the progress of the CSDP to some extent. But it might not be sufficient without a strong political support and consensus of the member states.

Conflict in Historical Institutionalism”, The Journal of Politics, 67 (4), 2005, p.1282

2.4. Shrewd Cooperation Procedures

The perceived main concern about the CSDP process is the lack of coherence and efficiency among the member states. This discrepancy has been even aggravated with its growing scope of tasks around the world. Nevertheless the CSDP institutions and procedures have been subject to a process of constant expansion and renovation over the last decade.

Although, the final decisions in the field of CSDP are still being taken with the unanimity rule, the influence of the member states is to some extent constrained by the process of CSDP within the CFSP as historical institutionalist perspective would suggest.⁹⁹

Regarding historical institutionalism, the CSDP has moved down to a particular track and followed by additional moves on that same path. That is to say, the structure and institutions of the CSDP has locked itself in “equilibrium for extended periods despite considerable political change”¹⁰⁰ and some deadlock situations to an extent. Thus, the EU member states find one way or another in overcoming deadlocks in several matters. In due course; the member states have learned subtle decision making procedures such as **permanent structured cooperation, enhanced cooperation,**

⁹⁹ Paul Pierson, p.158

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, p.143

constructive abstention and emergency brake procedures in order to reach a consensus among so many (now 28 member states) EU member states.¹⁰¹

If a member state does not agree with the offered proposal or agreement, it has the opportunity to abstain from the vote for the offered decision to be taken or the offered accord.¹⁰² The constructive abstention allows the member state not to get obliged to application of the relevant decision which has to be accepted and respected by the other member states. Furthermore the member state is also exempted from financial burdens or contribution of the relevant decision. As stated in the Article; if the number of abstaining member states rises to at least one third of the member states which holds at least one third of the population of the Union, the entire decision will be rejected. With this constructive abstention, a member state, which does not agree with the decision to be taken, may at

¹⁰¹ TEU, Articles 31

¹⁰² Constructive Abstention, TEU, Article 31 (1).

1. Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded.

When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least one third of the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of the Union, the decision shall not be adopted.

For instance, the Greek Part of Cyprus has abstained formally in participating in the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo-EULEX.

least abstain from the vote instead of giving a veto. Thus, a deadlock and long discussions over a disputed decision may be respected.

In order to protect the national interests in a Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) for a decision, a member state may recourse to emergency brake rule (TEU, Article 31 (2))¹⁰³ as a last option, if the decision to be taken impinges on “vital and stated reason of the national policy”. In such cases, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will act as a mediator in order to get a compromise. If she fails, then the Council has the option to bring the case to the European Council by a qualified majority voting. For CSDP matters, it is significant to note that the QMV “shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications”.¹⁰⁴ The reason QMV does not apply for decisions having military and defence implications is that they are very sensitive and touchy issues to reach a general consensus. Therefore it is usually good to have at least “the lowest common denominator” to avoid stalemate and the possible outcome of no agreement.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ ...

If a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The High Representative will, in close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If he does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity.

¹⁰⁴ TEU, Article 31 (4).

¹⁰⁵ Catherine Gegout, *European Foreign and Security Policy: States, Power, Institutions, and American Hegemony*, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), p. 64.

The Lisbon Treaty extends the range of the flexibility option known as enhanced cooperation in the CSDP matters that has military or defence implications. Besides, the minimum number of the participant member states was changed from eight to nine in the Lisbon Treaty (TEU, Article 20 (2)). In order to proceed with the enhanced cooperation, authorization is needed by a unanimous decision of the Council.

Another flexible cooperation for CSDP, introduced with the Lisbon Treaty, is the permanent structured cooperation (TEU, Article 42(6), 46 and the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation). With permanent structured cooperation, the member states, “whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area”, would declare their intention to form such cooperation to the Council and the High Representative. In no more than three months, the Council has to give the decision with qualified majority voting on the proposed permanent structured cooperation. The objective of the permanent structured cooperation is to help member states to deal with the impediment for deployability and sustainability, particularly by focusing on the capability shortfalls identified by the Capability Development Mechanism and by addressing the shortfalls to the participating member states.¹⁰⁶

As an additional opportunity for cooperation among member states,

¹⁰⁶ Handbook on CSDP, pp.30-31.

the Council may entrust a group of member states with the execution of a task in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests.(TEU, Article 42 (5) and Article 44)

Considering the flexibility provisions for cooperation among member states in the area of CFSP/CSDP, the notable advantages are twofold. At first, such forms of cooperation among some member states are already present without the clearly expressed use of the related flexibility cooperation provision. These flexibility provisions might provide further incentives for the member states to establish cooperation within the framework of CSFP/CSDP instead of outside the treaty. Moreover, these flexibility provisions shall provide transparency for both participating and non-participating states and would further stipulate cooperation among member states.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ Christopher Hill, 'The Directorate and the Problem of a Coherent EU Foreign Policy', CFSP Forum, Vol.4, Issue 6, 2006, pp.1-6.

CHAPTER 3

EU SECURITY CONDUCT

3.1. EU Security Strategy

The Security Strategy can be seen as the codification of the EU's actual foreign policy views and EU security management logic. Such a policy paper was essential to build on consensus at least on diverging issues. The Ex-High Representative Javier Solana did tremendous effort in bringing about a concise Security Strategy paper.¹⁰⁸

After arduous work, the security strategy, approved in December 2003, labeled as "A Secure Europe in a Better World", identifies the main global challenges and threats as the rise of transnational and international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional or internal conflicts, the prospect of failed or failing states and international organized crime. Additionally it includes the possibility of a combination of

¹⁰⁸ Sven Biscop, "The European Security Strategy in Context" in Sven Biscop and J.J.Andersson eds., *The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a global Europe*, (New York, Routledge, 2008) , pp.5-6

several – “if not in a worst case scenario all” – of these threats.¹⁰⁹

As European strategy documents make clear, Europe still faces serious security threats. The ESS sees the traditional concept of territorial self-defence, based on the threat of invasion, as insufficient, and with the new threats the first line of defence will often be abroad. The risk of proliferation of WMD grows over time, and the threat of terrorism tends to become more dangerous if left unattended. State failure and organized crime – often connected on the ground – tend to spread across borders. The nature of threat in the past was purely militarily and the opponent was clear. But contemporary threats are neither purely militarily in nature nor can they be overcome by purely militaristic means. Instead they have to be dealt with a combination of civil and military resources.

Thus, the afore mentioned recent security challenges coupled with the European Union’s political development makes further integration in the defence and security domain a reasonable next step. The strategy document utilizes a broader approach when tackling the threat geography issue and decouples geographic proximity of threat from its seriousness. So it accepts that the threats geographically far away from Europe can be considered as serious as the geographically closer ones. It notes that the “The quality of international society depends on the quality of the

¹⁰⁹ European Security Strategy, pp.3-5

governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform ... are the best means of strengthening the international order.”¹¹⁰

As underlined in the European Union’s European Security Strategy, Europe must think and act globally. That is to say, Europe’s role in global security is far more prominent in the new geostrategic environment and it is essential for Europe to be able to deploy forces and defend European interests at home and abroad. But this requires a political consensus on the mission types European military forces will conduct in the future security environment.

Regarding foreign policy, we can infer three guiding principles for external action in Security Strategy paper, which are prevention, comprehensive approach and multilateralism. These are just the general steering and directing rules. That is to say, the Strategy paper tells about how to do, but it does not tell about what to do. So, sub-Strategy papers should be derived from the main document in order to get clear framework for external actions, such as the level of ambitions of the action, the scale of the efforts, priority regions, prioritized types of operations and etc.¹¹¹ The

¹¹⁰ European Security Strategy, p.10.

¹¹¹ Jochen Rehl and Hans-Berhard Weissert (ed.), Handbook on CSDP, (Vienna: Armed Forces Printing Shop, 2010 April), p.18-19

ESS has not been interpreted or developed into sub-strategies yet. One of the missing ingredients is a well written military strategy or White Book on Defence to avoid confusion and misunderstandings.¹¹²

A militarily more capable Europe is beneficial not only to its own but also to its transatlantic ally. The threats brought about by the new security environment requires both sides of the Atlantic to cooperate closely in security and defence issues as neither one can tackle the problem by itself successfully. In this context, the ESS makes a strong emphasis on transatlantic relationship. And to some extent, it is remarkable that the ESS came out after the 2002 US National Strategy with similar threat perceptions. On the other hand, there have been divergent opinions between the US and the EU and within the EU about the crisis over Iraq. Even though, there is a similarity in threats perception, the means to tackle with these threats may be different.

In terms of theoretical level, we can say that a commitment to NATO-EU cooperation already exists, as reflected in major documents and policy statements from both institutions. The European Union's Security Strategy calls NATO "an important expression of the transatlantic relationship" and notes the EU and NATO's "common determination to tackle the challenges

¹¹² Ibid.

of the new century.”¹¹³ The Ex-NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has underlined that “the roles of the European Union and NATO have become more and more intertwined,” and that the “two organizations have come to rely on each other, both to build security on this continent and to project security beyond it.”¹¹⁴

In general, the Security Strategy paper may not be perfect on addressing issues precisely. However, in order to avoid strong criticism it touches on security issues without reference to particular instances or details. All in all, the Security Strategy paper has given a boost to the strategic framework of European foreign policy.

The Security Strategy paper has become a well-known reference and source point. Five years after the Security Strategy paper has been approved, the mentor of the Security Strategy paper, Javier Solana has given a Report on the Implementation called as “Providing Security in a Changing World” to the ESS to the European Council in December 2008.

As stressed in the Report, the security environment is changing in a dizzy way. Additional to security threats such as Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), terrorism, organized crime, failing/failed states

¹¹³ European Security Strategy, pp.9, 12.

¹¹⁴ NATO and the European Union: Partners in Security, (Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, May 6, 2004)

mentioned in the Security Strategy Paper, the other subjects has become considerable threats as well. The climate change, energy supply, cyber-security and piracy have become crucial issues to be taken into consideration.¹¹⁵ The EU and the world face complex security threats which should be tackled in close cooperation. The internal and external security has been interwoven. Therefore a comprehensive approach in partnership with other organizations included in the Report on the Implementation of the ESS in order to alleviate and tackle today's challenges.

Public support, the most significant point in today's world has been covered in the Report at the end as well. Without getting public support regional or international, it is almost impossible to achieve the objectives in the long run. It is really promising that the EU is well aware of the significance of the public support as stated in the Report on the Implementation of the ESS known as "Providing Security in a Changing World" paper.¹¹⁶

Now, the primary challenge EU facing in security and defence policy making is to develop a common strategic thought which is vital in order to form a common strategic outlook into the future. The cold war witnessed a

¹¹⁵ Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Providing Security in a Changing World, Dec 2008, pp. 5-8

¹¹⁶ Report on the Implementation of the ESS, p.12

rather definite and open structure when it came to use of force. In a sense it can be argued that, it was either total force or no force at all. But new security environment witnesses small scale conflicts and limited wars which is a very foreign concept to the bipolar cold war thinking. The events have been happening at a stunning pace and the distribution of power has been moving around more fluidly. In order to tackle the problems of this new security environment it is absolutely paramount to have an efficient military which can conduct missions required in the full spectrum of the conflict. As NATO Ex-Secretary-General Lord Robertson put it “The days of planning for massive armored clashes in the Fulda Gap are behind us. Today, we need forces that can move fast, adjust quickly to changing requirements, hit hard, and then stay in the theater for as long as it takes to get the job done: this means that today military forces must be mobile, flexible, effective at engagement, and sustainable in theater.”¹¹⁷

The stumbling block now is how to move beyond the rhetoric and make the public pronouncements an operational reality. In spite of the fact that, some European countries are making meaningful efforts to increase their defence expenditures, some European countries’ projected defence spending is relatively flat or decreasing.¹¹⁸ If the member states do not take

¹¹⁷ Lord Robertson, *Post-Cold War Defense Reform*, (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s Inc., 2002), p.56

¹¹⁸ Michele A. Floumoy and Julianne Smith, “European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategy and Capabilities”, *Center for Strategic and International Studies* (Washington: October 2005), p.21

adequate action in the prospective outlook it seems to be as mentioned in the quotation of Michele Floumoy and Julianne Smith, regarding defence expenditures, “In the future, the gap between the rhetoric of the strategy documents, summit declarations and the reality of Europe’s available military capabilities threatens to grow even wider.”¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

3.2. After the Lisbon Treaty

First of all, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 Dec 2009, the acronym ESDP has been relabeled as CSDP.¹²⁰

In general, the Lisbon Treaty can be viewed as the outcome of the experience and reflection of the past decades' practices and consensus among different national interests and perspectives. Reaching a consensus among so many different members with various levels of capabilities is really an arduous work. At least for that reason it is quite an achievement.

Regarding CSDP matters, the Lisbon Treaty have brought about only marginal changes to the most significant issue on foreign and security policy decision making process. The main governing principle is still to agree unanimously¹²¹ on most decision making process, in particular national sovereignty related issues. That is to say, the unanimity continues to be the standard for decision making in CFSP/CSDP field with minor exceptions¹²²

¹²⁰ The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon: Visions of leading policy-makers, academics and journalists, (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2011), p.226

¹²¹ TEU, Article 24 (1) and Article 31 (1)

¹²² Qualified Majority Voting, TEU, Article 31 (2).

Article 31 (2):

By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by qualified majority:
— when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision of the European Council relating to the Union's strategic interests and objectives, as referred to in Article 22(1),

and the European Council is the place of defining the general rules for the CFSP and of course for CSDP. In short, it still maintains its intergovernmental nature.¹²³

Nonetheless, there are two important innovations that further improve the effectiveness of the common foreign and security policy process. The first one is the double hatted post for High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. He/she is at the same time Vice-President of the Commission. His/her role will make the EU more visible on the world stage as a single voice. Moreover, serving as a permanent President of the Council on Foreign Affairs, as well as a vice president of the Commission, will help the EU work much more in harmony in terms of internal institutional relations and will facilitate the external action. The newly created European External Action Service (EEAS) will assist the High Representative with staff from the relevant departments of the European Commission and General Secretariat of the Council and from the Diplomatic

-
- when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal which the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has presented following a specific request from the European Council, made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative, EN 30.3.2010 Official Journal of the European Union C 83/33
 - when adopting any decision implementing a decision defining a Union action or position,
 - when appointing a special representative in accordance with Article 33.

If a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The High Representative will, in close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a solution acceptable to it. If he does not succeed, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity.

¹²³ Asle Toje, *The European Union as a Small Power: After the Post-Cold War*, (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.22

Services of EU Member States.¹²⁴ Surprisingly, the EEAS will consist of 5000-7000 staffers and almost 3000 of them will be diplomats from the all around the states.¹²⁵ To a great extent, we can say that the EEAS will function as a kind of ministry for the High Representative. Beside all the responsibilities of the High Representative, he/she will act as the Head of the European Defence Agency as well¹²⁶.

The second fundamental point that the Lisbon Treaty allows is the enhanced cooperation between groups of states in security and defence policy areas. It really opens up the possibility of increased cooperation if some countries want to opt out or if any country is not ready for any emerged new demands. That is to say, the Lisbon Treaty further extended the enhanced cooperation provision to be applicable in the security and defence field as well. There is no more necessity for the unanimous agreement. The enhanced cooperation provision enables a minimum number of states to deepen relations within the institutional framework and execute a CSDP operation without the requirement of participation of reluctant members. In doing so, the delays and blockings of the unwilling and/or unable members assumed to be minimized for CSDP peace support

¹²⁴ Handbook on CSDP, p. 26

¹²⁵ Asle Toje, *The European Union as a Small Power: After the Post-Cold War*, (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.21

¹²⁶ CSDP Newsletter, Summer 2010, p.28

operations.¹²⁷

Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty broadened the scope of the missions. It ratified the expansion of so called Petersberg Tasks; “joint disarmament operation, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.”¹²⁸

Regarding the mutual defence obligation, the mutual assistance clause¹²⁹ has been supplemented with a solidarity clause.¹³⁰

“1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the

¹²⁷ http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0018_en.htm, 25 July 2011 and CSDP Newsletter, Summer 2010, p.9

¹²⁸ TEU, Article 43(1)

¹²⁹ TEU, Article 42(7) “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States.” (ex Art 17)

¹³⁰ CSDP Newsletter, Summer 2010, pp.9-10.

Member States, to:

- “prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;
 - protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;
 - assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;
- (b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

2. Should a Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. To that end, the Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council.”¹³¹

In the face of the above mentioned instances, the Member States assumed to act jointly in a manner of solidarity. The mutual assistance and solidarity clauses are much the same as the collective security Article 5 of NATO Treaty¹³² which also ensures for mutual cooperation in the case of an

¹³¹ TFEU, Article 222 (1) and (2)

¹³² Article 5: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area...

armed attack on one of the member states. But the major difference between them is that the Article 5 of NATO Treaty specifically uses the wording of "... as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force" whereas Lisbon Treaty Articles (TEU, Article 42 and TFEU, Article 222) does not particularly uses the phrase of "including the use of armed force." Nevertheless, it does not exclude the use of armed force.

Indeed the mutual assistance and solidarity clause has a political significance. Since as stated in Article 42(7) the mutual assistance commitment would not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states. That is to say, NATO remains as the primary collective defence organization for the member states of NATO. Therefore, the mutual assistance commitment in the new treaty can be regarded as a political message in international arena.

As for money issues, the procedures of financing continue to a great degree in the same way. The only minor change is the creation of the start-up fund. The Lisbon Treaty introduced a new statement concerning the "rapid access to appropriations in the Union budget for urgent financing of initiatives" which refers particularly to the civil and/or military operations and missions (Art. 41 (3) TEU). It will help to facilitate the preparatory activities for the missions referred to in Article 42(1)¹³³ and Article 43(1) TEU.

¹³³ "...peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security ..."

Normally, the expenses having military or defence implications are not covered from the Union budget. Now it will be covered from the start-up fund which is made up of member states' contribution.¹³⁴

On the whole, the new treaty does not constrain the member states in terms of CSDP issues. It may not solve all the inherent problems but to some extent it rather incorporates flexible procedures¹³⁵ to include the bilateral ongoing cooperation between member states into the framework of the EU. All these developments manifest the determination of the EU on the way of becoming a single voice and a global player in international arena. So in the next chapter we will see operational procedures, planning and peace support operations conducted by the EU in the way of becoming a global actor.

¹³⁴ CSDP Handbook , p.29 and CSDP Newsletter, Summer 2010, p.10

¹³⁵ Such as permanent structured cooperation, enhanced cooperation, constructive abstention, and emergency brake procedures.

3.3. CSDP Operations

At the time the Maastricht Treaty was signed, the EU had no autonomous operational capabilities. Since it has the political will to become a global player, it has given the operational role to the Western European Union (WEU) and the so-called “Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, task of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking” were given at the responsibility of the military units of WEU Member States. Over the course of time, the mission scope has been widened according to the EU’s need and peace support operations involvement and later incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty.¹³⁶ With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the CSDP mission spectrum has been broadened as follows:

“... peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. ...”¹³⁷ and “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating

¹³⁶ Asle Toje, 2010, pp.96-98

¹³⁷ TEU, Article 42 (1)

terrorism in their territories.”¹³⁸

Lessons learned from the Kosovo war proved that, without a sufficient military capability the EU would have only a marginal influence, if the US have a divergent idea for the conflict to be solved. In the aftermath of the Kosovo war, the EU member states made up their mind to add another instrument to their foreign policy tool box with the Helsinki Headline Goal. Thus, the peace support operations have started since January 2003 in the name of the EU.

In terms of crisis management process, the EU has the necessary means for crisis management phases and planning, to a great extent. The planning phases and products are almost similar with the NATO planning processes. The phases are very rational and very clearly set up. Following the initial indication of an upcoming crisis management, the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) is being prepared in order to define the overall framework and approach of the EU to the management of a certain crisis. The Crisis Management Concept is drawn to ensure the coherence between different EU organs and define the division of labor. The CMC defines the aim and endstate of the particular crisis management operation. After painstaking examination of the situation, the PSC makes up its mind about

¹³⁸ TEU, Article 43 (1)

accepting the final version of the CMC. If the PSC ratifies the CMC, it gives it in to the Council and then the painstaking Crisis Response Planning Process at the Political and Strategic Level kicks off.¹³⁹

After the approval of the Crisis Management Concept, the PSC asks for military or civilian strategic option to be developed. The military committee prepares and issues a military strategic option directive. The military strategic option directive is later prioritized by the EU Military Staff (EUMS). Following thorough analysis of the concept and priorities of the directives, the concept of the operations (CONOPS), the operation plan (OPLAN) and the force generation process start. On the civilian side, the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability are responsible for the processes after the approval of the Crisis Management Concept.¹⁴⁰

In general, the main driving force during this process is the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Once PSC's attention is drawn up to a particular developing crisis, the regular meetings with the relevant working groups kick off. The process ends up either with a peace support operation or the relevant working groups keep monitoring the situation and keep the PSC update.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane et al. Eds., *European Security and Defense Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, (Paris, The EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009), p 56-57 and CSDP Handbook, p.60

¹⁴⁰ Ibid

¹⁴¹ CSDP Handbook, pp. 59-61.

As usual, the theory and the practice do not match always. How ideal the theory and the practice coincide with each other and how crisis management phases and planning process match with the praxis, the table given below tells us and gives a general idea for selected missions.

Operations Planning Documents	Operation CONCORDIA in FYROM (March 2003)	Operation ARTEMIS in DRC (July 2003)	Operation ALTHEA in BiH (Dec 2004)	ACEH Monitoring Mission (Sept 2006)	Operation ATALANTA EU NAVFOR Somalia (Dec 2012)
Crisis Management Concept	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Military Strategic Options Directive	---	---	YES	---	---
Political/Military/Civilian Strategic Options	---	---	YES	---	---
Initial Military Directive	YES	---	YES	---	YES
Concept of Operations	---	---	YES	YES	YES
Operation Plan	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Duration of the Process	≈ 3 months	≈ 3 weeks	≈ 10months	≈ 4 months	≈ 6 months

Table 3.1¹⁴² Theory versus Praxis

¹⁴² CSDP Handbook, p.61 and http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm

As we can infer from the table 3.1, some steps might be jumped over but without an operation plan it is almost impossible the start and execute a peace support operation. After the Operation Plan for the peace support operation on the horizon is approved, the main problem becomes to find the operation center where the command and control is exercised. As explained in the previous chapters the EU has two options in total, in terms of the type of operations: autonomous or recouring to NATO assets. In terms of military operation, the command and control would be exercised either in EU Operational Headquarter at SHAPE if the EU recourse to NATO assets or in Multinational Headquarters (France, Italy, Germany, Greece, and United Kingdom) if the EU execute an autonomous peace support operation. The civilian autonomous operations would be conducted via EU Operation Center in Brussels.¹⁴³

After realizing its structures and procedures about CSDP to a certain stage, the EU have taken the first step in 2003 with EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (200 police officers) as the first civilian mission and with Operation CONCORDIA in FYROM Macedonia as the first military operation Concordia (300 troops) with recourse to NATO assets to protect EU and OSCE monitors and taken over from the NATO operation Allied Harmony. Later the EU launched the Operation Artemis in the DRC, which

¹⁴³ CSDP Handbook, p.62

was the first autonomous military mission without recourse to NATO.¹⁴⁴

Since January 2003, the EU has executed more than twenty civilian and military operations on three continents. Currently, it carries out seventeen peace support operations. It is really very notable achievement if we compare EU operations with the 68 years old UN conducting currently seventeen peace support operations.¹⁴⁵ Besides the geographical diversity of the EU operations, the EU have been broadening the scope of the missions over time as well, ranging from small civilian operations for state-building to police mission and border-assistance missions, traditional peacekeeping operations, and even peace-enforcement operations. Besides, in some CSDP operations, non-EU members have been taking part in by providing additional personnel and equipment which manifests interest and attention from other countries in the EU's growing role in international security management. They even send their troop with EU hats on their heads in order to contribute the peace support operations.¹⁴⁶

In terms of military aspect, out of 17 total peace support operations, the EU has conducted 6 various military operations since 2003 in five different places. Four military operations of them have been conducted in

¹⁴⁴ www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defense/eu-operations

¹⁴⁵ www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defense/eu-operations and <http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko>

¹⁴⁶ ESDP Newsletter, European Security and Defense Policy 1999-2009, Special Issue, October 2009, p.9

some of the almost inaccessible and unpleasant African territory. Two operations have been carried out in Balkans, the Europe's own backyard. The operation in BiH is still in process and significant to the stability and development of Europe's geography.¹⁴⁷

As of May 2013 the EU has been conducting 17 active peace support missions (5 in the Western Balkans, Caucasus and Eastern Europe; 5 in the Middle East; 1 in Central Asia; 4 in Africa). The classifications of the missions are 2 military operations, 2 military training missions and 13 civilian-missions. Of the civilian missions most of them are Security Sector Reform (SSR) missions such as police reform, defence reform, justice reform, border assistance, and monitoring mission.¹⁴⁸

In general, the various EU peace support operations are mostly civilian missions which reflect the nature and capabilities of the EU. The CSDP project has come a long way but it has still long way to go. It is developing gradually and it has been only a decade since the first CSDP mission started. Moreover, it should be admitted that the CSDP missions have some implementation problems as other coalition operations experienced. The quality of personnel and equipment is really a significant

¹⁴⁷ Chart and Table of CSDP and EU missions as of May 2013, <http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-chart>

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

issue.¹⁴⁹

In general, the member states do not support peace support operations sufficiently. They do not always do their best in facilitating or expediting the implementation. Every so often, the participating members send inappropriate personnel lacking sufficient experience and qualifications. This happens usually in prolonged operations and after sending the first qualified batch. Besides, the internal and external coordination challenges such as intelligence sharing and reporting procedures between EU-NATO elements and EU organs become a cumbersome process particularly when there is no agreed upon procedures before launching a mission with recouring to NATO assets.¹⁵⁰

However the EU has some problems in conducting peace support operations, we would not imagine these rapid deployments and developments even a couple years ago although limited in size and scope.¹⁵¹ The deployment of civilian and military personnel in risky fields forced the Member States to have at least a common denominator. Through peace support operations the EU Member States become more prone to compromise over debated issues once the peace support operation is on

¹⁴⁹ Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane et al. Eds., pp. 403-412.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., pp.405-412

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 408

the active list. Thus, EU operations have brought about a broader political unanimity and mutual understanding among the EU countries on certain issues. Thus the EU countries are doing by learning and they are learning by doing as well.

Parallel to the developments mentioned above, there has been an increasing expectation for EU engagement in conflict areas from external actors such as the UN or third states. As the expectations have been growing for CSDP operations, the EU has become increasingly aware of the capability-expectation gap and their own shortcomings.¹⁵²

There are question to be answered for the scope of the EU operations as well. There are no certain principles where on the earth the peace support operations might be deployed. That is to say, there is no commonly agreed statement or official EU documents answering whether the CSDP operation shall be aimed at the EU's neighborhood or very far from its frontiers? As stated in the European Security Strategy and later in the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, "Globalization has brought new opportunities... But globalization has also made threats more complex and interconnected."¹⁵³ In an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are

¹⁵² Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane et al. Eds., p. 117-125

¹⁵³ Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, p.1

near at hand... The first line of defence will be often abroad. The new threats are dynamic...¹⁵⁴ There is no specific and clear-cut identification about the aim of the prospective EU operations.

The EU put their standards so low that they usually find one way or another to overcome the deadlocks. It seems like the priorities for the scope of peace support operations are intentionally not clearly identified. In this way, there is no line to limit and the EU may take action whenever and wherever a crisis arises as long as the EU member states reach a consensus about it and have the will and also the capacity to react to the given situation. To some extent, it seems to be a lack of a broader strategic thinking for CSDP operations. And to a great extent, it is the logical consequence of rapid, imperfect and perfunctory development of peace support operations. Otherwise, it is really difficult to explain why the EU member states have participated in anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia? At the same time they did not even contemplate to support the UN's operation in Lebanon in 2006.

Moreover, the Libyan Crisis intervention had been initially started as Franco-British Alliance relying on the European support. But, we have seen the support only during the United Nations Resolution 1973. In terms of crisis management action, the two leading countries stance were not

¹⁵⁴ ESS, p.6

enough to push the EU for a military response with respect to the enforcement of the UN arms embargo within the framework CSDP. Subsequently the Libyan Crisis turned out to be a NATO operation. Regarding the EU's potent countries, the militarily most powerful EU countries are the United Kingdom and France. Both EU countries are still capable of national nuclear strikes and autonomous expeditionary operations, Nevertheless, collective actions with conventional forces reveal the limits of EU overall warfare power in conflict such as in Libya.¹⁵⁵

During the Libyan crisis, in terms of air strike sorties, the EU countries executed 75% of the strike sorties. But the sorties were limited due to precision guided munitions. Additionally, the US provided mainly Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and Air to Air Refueling capabilities reaching up to 75 %.¹⁵⁶ It can be said that the EU countries relies on the US capabilities in a high density conflict. "If such a short and locally limited operation was not possible without the US, one can think about the futility of action by a single EU nation unless the intervention is indeed limited".¹⁵⁷

Currently, the EU is conducting Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM)

¹⁵⁵ Gareth Chappell, Impact of the Libyan Crisis on the UK-France Defense Programme, Bulletin PISM, no. 36 (253) of 7 April 2011, pp. 472,473.

¹⁵⁶ Benoit Gomis, Rapporteur, Conference Summary European Defense and Security 2012, (Chatham House, London, 13-14 Jan 2012), p. 2-3

¹⁵⁷ Gareth Chappell, pp. 472,473.

in Libya which was approved in May 2013. The objective of the EUBAM is support the Libyan authorities to develop capacity in order to secure the country's borders.¹⁵⁸ It is important to note that the stabilization and reconstruction missions continue even after the conflict intervention. And the Libyan crisis provides to a certain extent a good example of the complementarity of the EU mission to the NATO missions.

Overall, it can be said that today's crisis and conflicts that surround the international community are less susceptible to traditional military intervention. Thus, contemporary peace support operations go beyond the separation of clashing groups. That is to say, military resources are not the only option. They are used in support of vital civilian missions as well. The comprehensive approach, namely the joint civilian-military approach makes the EU also easy-going and flexible. And from the overall missions conducted within the framework of CSDP, the majority of the CSDP missions are civilian. Moreover, the CSDP personnel statistics gives some indication about the EU capability either for high density or low density conflict as well.

As of June 2013 the total personnel number taking part in the CSDP missions amounts to 4.045.¹⁵⁹ Compared to just one NATO mission in

¹⁵⁸ Factsheet on EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya, May 2013, <http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defense/eu-operations/eubam-libya/factsheets?lang=en>

¹⁵⁹ CSDP mission personnel statistics from June 2013, <http://isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/page-attachments/mission%20personnel-June2013.pdf>

Afghanistan, the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) extremely outnumbers the total number of the personnel of the CSDP missions. The personnel seconded to the ISAF mission is around 110.000 as of December 2012.¹⁶⁰ The ratios obviously show the nature of the EU mission.

Overall, the scope and the range of the CSDP missions are mostly civilian. Additionally, the personnel number attendant in the CSDP missions are not too much compared to the personnel number participating high density conflicts. In general it can be said that the CSDP would be not competitive to NATO. It would rather be complementary to NATO with its mostly civilian force for the time being and it will continue to be an evolving process for sometime as long as the EU member states maintain their political will in the same direction of the CSDP developments. In this context the next chapter will look at the relations between CSDP and NATO and the impact of the CSDP on NATO.

Note: The Personnel Breakdown of the CSDP missions is available on the website, which gives detailed view about the personnel numbers of each CSDP mission.

¹⁶⁰ SIPRI Map of Multilateral Peace Operation Deployments September 2012, for further information look at the webpage <http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRIKOMAP0912.pdf>

CHAPTER 4

CSDP IN A TRANSATLANTIC CONTEXT

4.1. CSDP - NATO Relations

In general, it is sensible to say that the process of CSDP has been recognized by its relationship with NATO. It goes without saying that, the reason of the former statement is the strategic importance of the transatlantic relations, namely the relationship with the US. Since the CSDP's inception, the relations between two organizations have been non-linear.

The NATO is a long established and an old experienced central actor in international security. Therefore, the relations between the CSDP institutions and the very old experienced NATO are very crucial. To some extent, the CSDP has developed its own identity in the course of time. Nevertheless, the CSDP has struggled to get recognized its identity and its credibility with regard to NATO which is a strong transatlantic military alliance.

The CSDP has the potential to execute a wide range of operations

according its strategic security paper and the TFEU. Regarding peace support operations, the relations with NATO has not been on a uniform line. Occasionally, the relations can be identified separate from NATO as in the Iraq war and it can be defined as a close working relationship as in the case of Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. That is to say, the relationship between the US and the EU has a non uniform attitude in terms of the CSDP.

Considering the beginning of the CSDP, the relations between the EU and the NATO can be categorized in three periods. The initial period, the years between 1999 – 2003, the early days of the EU trying to get a working mechanism and methods with the NATO. The years after the US' invasion of Iraq, 2003-2007, the experimental and turbulent period, was marked by ups and downs in terms of relations with the US and within the EU. The third period can be defined as the current period after the year 2007, a more compromised and constructive relationship compared the previous period.¹⁶¹

During the period 1999-2003 the two organizations NATO and CSDP have given their efforts to find a way to work together. As well known, the CSDP was decided to be set up just after the end of the Kosovo campaign in June 1999. The EU members of NATO have clearly witnessed their weaknesses during the Kosovo turmoil. So the CSDP project has started as

¹⁶¹ Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane et al. Eds., *European Security and Defense Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, (Paris, The EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009), p. 127.

a burden sharing policy and one of the main objectives was to have credible means to execute an autonomous peace support operations.¹⁶² On the other hand, the main problem during the early years was to set up a close working mechanism that allows the EU to access to NATO military assets which the EU lacks. Additionally, the two organizations were trying to find a way to provide suitability of the NATO and EU capability plans.

Moreover, the main concern in the early years of the CSDP process was the US attitude toward the CSDP. The US had some apprehension about the CSDP process. Therefore the Ex-US Secretary of State Madeline Albright expressed the US' skeptical points with "3 Ds" statement. Since the emerging organization might cause three important incidents: de-coupling/delinking of the US from Europe, discrimination against non EU NATO members, and wasting of resources by duplication of NATO assets such as military planning headquarters and military assets.¹⁶³

Both the Clinton and Bush administrations were skeptical about the CSDP process how it would affect the EU's military capabilities. The Kosovo war explicitly showed the capability gap between the two forces across the transatlantic link. Furthermore, the US increased its defence spending following years. But there has not been any increase in the European side.

¹⁶² Ibid., pp.127-128

¹⁶³ Madeline K. Albright, The right balance will secure NATO's future, (Financial Times, 7 Dec 1998)

Besides, the Helsinki Headline Goals accepted in December 1999 was inferior to the goals that NATO had accepted as Defence Capabilities Initiative in April 1999. As stated in the European Security Strategy “The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the EU and the US can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and to increase its coherence.” At the same time, the US had some doubts how the European partners would live up to stated goals.¹⁶⁴

In the early years between 1999-2003 both organizations were trying to establish a working mechanism. Indeed, finding a working mechanism between the EU and NATO goes back to 1996. In 1996, the Western European Union (WEU) had also tried to get access to NATO military assets for WEU operations. The use of NATO assets for WEU led operations was officially confirmed by NATO member states’ foreign ministers in Berlin in 1996. These negotiations have pioneered and lead up to the so called Berlin Plus arrangement signed in December 2002.¹⁶⁵

In the course of time, the strategic relationship in crisis management is defined on the so called Berlin Plus arrangements. The current

¹⁶⁴ Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane et al. Eds., p. 129.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p.128

mechanism between NATO and EU was formalized in the Berlin Plus arrangement, signed in March 2003. With these arrangements the NATO planning means and capability assets has been made available to European partners under some circumstances.¹⁶⁶ Under this agreement, the military cooperation mechanism through which the EU can have “assured access” to the collective assets and capabilities of Alliance, has been established.

The Berlin Plus agreement is a brief given name for an extensive set of agreements made between the EU and NATO and includes mainly the arrangements stated below:¹⁶⁷

- “A NATO-EU security agreement governing the exchange of classified information;
- Assured EU access to NATO’s planning capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations;
- Availability of NATO capabilities and common assets, such as
- Procedures for release, monitoring, return, and recall of NATO assets and capabilities;
- Terms of reference for NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, who serves as the operation commander of an EU-led operation under Berlin Plus;

¹⁶⁶ CSDP Handbook, p.80

¹⁶⁷ F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Leb, et al., p.13 and <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-111%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf>

- NATO-EU consultation arrangements; and
- Incorporation within NATO's established defence planning system of the military needs and capabilities possibly required for EU-led military operations.”¹⁶⁸

After a very short time it was signed, the Berlin Plus arrangements had been used for some EU led operations such as Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. So the first EU led operation using NATO assets has been implemented according the Berlin Plus arrangements. For this operation an EU command cell was set up in Joint Force Command (JFC), Naples. The Operational Commander was DSACEUR as defined in Berlin Plus arrangements.¹⁶⁹

The NATO assets had been used for the second time in Operation EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With this EU-led operation, the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina was completed by NATO-led forces.¹⁷⁰

It is fair to say that, it has been only a very short time that the Berlin Plus arrangements found a practical ground in Operation Concordia in the

¹⁶⁸ F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Leb, et al., p.13

¹⁶⁹ The EU-NATO Berlin Plus Agreements, Assembly Fact Sheet No.14, (European Security and Defense Assembly/Assembly of WEU, Paris, Nov 2009), p.1-2

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and in Operation EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina after it signed between Secretary General and High Representative. Nevertheless, there are a number of grey areas to be answered. For that reason, only very few missions of the EU-led crisis management operations have been conducted under the Berlin Plus arrangements.¹⁷¹

All in all, the Berlin Plus arrangements cannot be seen as “indicators of a healthy NATO-EU relationship.” Under this agreement EU does not gain access to troops and equipment belonging to NATO members, only to certain NATO assets, such as the planning, force generation, and headquarters capabilities at SHAPE. As stated previously the only NATO assets are the 17 AWACS aircraft. Moreover, the agreement does not provide also a mechanism for combining military and civilian capabilities in a particular operation. Consequently, Berlin Plus arrangements apply only after the result of the decision making process is an EU-led operation. In other words, Berlin Plus does not essentially facilitate the process when NATO or EU should take the lead and it does not provide a mechanism to launch combined operations in times of crisis as seen in Darfur crisis. “In Darfur Crisis, NATO and EU agreed to disagree, and two separate airlifts were established, with the expectation that they would be coordinated by

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

the African Union.”¹⁷²

The Darfur Crisis proved that NATO and EU must establish develop compatible capabilities and establish mechanisms that will allow a rapid coordinated response in times of crisis. If they are willing to work together effectively, they should recognize their relative crucial roles in transatlantic security. Thus, a willingness to make compromises on both sides of the Atlantic is necessary for the healthy future.

After the initial welcoming period of the EU-NATO relations, the positive atmosphere of Berlin Plus arrangement had been damaged seriously by the fissure of EU Member States over the US invasion of Iraq. The initial period had been turned into a turbulent period just three days after the EU-NATO framework for cooperation, the Berlin Plus arrangement, was signed.¹⁷³

The US invasion of Iraq started a crack in the relationship between the US and EU member states. As a result, the US-EU relations hit a highly visible low point in the weeks following the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The attitude of the four EU governments – Belgium, France, Germany and Luxemburg - in favor of establishing its own operations

¹⁷² F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Labl, et al., pp.14, 15

¹⁷³ Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane et al. Eds., p.130

planning staff in Tervuren was the initial signs of estrangement.¹⁷⁴

Additionally, sending an autonomous peacekeeping force to Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo in June 2003 was not welcomed from the Bush administration. The US administration had been astonished by the decision of the EU governments sending troops to Democratic Republic of Congo without talking about their plans at NATO first. Moreover, the US administration had also disappointed with the wording of the mutual assistance clause in the draft constitutional treaty which was released to public in July 2003.¹⁷⁵ In another instance, upon the African Union's request the two organizations sent peacekeeping personnel with separate airlift commands in 2005. Despite separate airlift commands the personnel had tried to coordinate their endeavors.¹⁷⁶

During the turbulent years, the Europeans felt that the US had been using the NATO assets in favor of the US policy tools and American strategic interest although European member states had sent a considerable number of troops in support of NATO missions. Besides, the enlargement of the EU during this turbulent years further complicated the relations and the decision making process.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 130-131

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p.130

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p.132

The Iraq war was the most important test with the CSDP in terms of transatlantic relations. The French' will to play as a counterweight to the US is a collective memory in the international arena. However, Germany, which has been among the pro-US countries in continent Europe, aligning with the France against the attitude of the US in the Iraq war was a disappointment for the US. That is why the countries for and anti Iraq war were defined as "old Europe" and "new Europe" in Ex-Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld's terms.¹⁷⁸

The changes in governments in a number of countries in Europe had transformed the political scene both in Europe and in the US. One way or another, the relations between the US and EU have started to recover to some degree at least on an official level four years after the onset of the US invasion of Iraq. The new leaders in Britain, France and Germany (Gordon Brown, Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel) have led to a reduction of tension between the US and Europe. The new governments have been welcomed from the transatlantic side. Thus, the new political figures helped to pave the way for constructive relations between the EU and NATO.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁸ Charles Grant, "Germany's Foreign Policy: What can be learned from the Schröder Years?", Centre for European Reform, (Sep 2, 2005), http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/essay_germ_for_pol_2sep05-2154.pdf.

¹⁷⁹ Keith Porter, Foreign Policy Implications of the Iraq War: Huge Impact on American Relations, <http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/nessiss3/tp/iraqwarrelations.htm>

President Sarkozy believed highly that the strenuous relationship with the US and the NATO was not in favor of the European Defence. Although the de Gaulle's tradition continued to be the ruling foreign policy tool, President Sarkozy believed in the opposite direction. He saw the cooperation and collaboration with the NATO is security insurance for France. Additionally he believed that by joining NATO France would have a seat during decision making process.¹⁸⁰ Moreover, he viewed that the entry to NATO's military command would provide the American approval of an independent EU defence policy. To assure this, he dispatched 700 more French troops to the NATO mission in Afghanistan in 2008.¹⁸¹

The new leaders' stance in Europe had been received with pleasure from the transatlantic side and brought a change in the US views of EU defence. The remarks of Victoria Nuland, the US ambassador to NATO, “- with 15 missions now on three continents, the EU has proven its ability to deliver a whole which is greater than the sum of its parts ... Europe needs, the US needs, NATO needs, the democratic world needs a stronger, more capable European defence capacity... an ESDP with only soft power is not enough... because President Sarkozy is right: NATO cannot be everywhere... Europe needs a place where it can act independently” were highly notable in terms of change of the US new outlook at the European

¹⁸⁰ <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/world/europe/03/17/france.nato/index.html>, March, 17, 2009

¹⁸¹ Elaine Sciolino and Alison Smale, ‘Sarkozy, a Frenchman in a hurry, maps his path’, The New York Times, 24 September 2007

Security and Defence Policy.¹⁸² Moreover, a positive US attitude has been visible toward CSDP. To prove its new attitude toward CSDP, the US has contributed more than 80 police and judges to the CSDP operation EULEX in Kosovo.¹⁸³

With the hindsight of the launched roughly thirty EU operations since 2003, we can say that it contributed both to the EU's role in the international scene and to the NATO. Considering NATO assets, the NATO lacks to some extent, the post crisis intervention assets. At this stage the EU has the necessary complementary tool which NATO Alliance requires in order to provide and maintain stability in the area intervened.¹⁸⁴

For example in Afghanistan, the EU Police Forces work together in harmony in providing the key area of police training. Besides that, for the civilian missions, the European Commission brings meaningful funding in supply. In other cases, such as in Bosnia, in Macedonia and in Kosovo; the EU and NATO have worked in cooperation smoothly. Thus, the EU's complementary role and political support cannot be neglected.

¹⁸² Ambassador Victoria Nuland, Speech to Press Club and American Chamber of Commerce, Paris, 22 February, 2008. <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/February/20080222183349caifas0.5647394.html>.

¹⁸³ Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane et al. Eds., pp. 135-6.

¹⁸⁴ www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defense/eu-operations and <http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko>

Moreover, we have seen in some occasion that the NATO Alliance was not able to deploy forces in politically troublesome areas such as Georgia in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian conflict, or the Middle East, or the Ukrainian-Moldovan Border. In the occasion of Russian-Georgian conflict, the EU took action instead of NATO. And it was a good example for the EU in taking decision and action in a very short time in August 2008. The EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia was very conducive in setting up a ceasefire and providing a transparent environment in the country of Georgia which is a significant partner of NATO and which is a probable member.¹⁸⁵

Despite the current constructive atmosphere between the EU and the NATO, the Berlin Plus arrangements do not provide favorable opportunity of combining civilian and military instruments between EU and NATO. Moreover, when the two organizations decides to execute simultaneously in the same region a crisis management operation, the making and sharing of intelligence available to all party members becomes a major problem as has been the case in Kosovo, Afghanistan and off the coast of Somalia. Indeed, the main problem was the lack of official set-up communication. Furthermore, the complication comes from political posture of the two organizations' member states.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ The EU-NATO Berlin Plus Agreements, Assembly Fact Sheet No.14, (European Security and Defense Assembly/Assembly of WEU, Paris, Nov 2009), p.2

On the other hand, the Berlin Plus arrangements document is not open to the knowledge of the public and the so called Berlin Plus arrangements document has so far not been ratified by any national parliaments. Moreover, as David Yost pointed out, "... the Berlin Plus package functions to restrict cooperation, not to facilitate and promote it."¹⁸⁷

In order to ensure a healthy relation between EU and NATO, it is vital to pass beyond the Berlin Plus arrangements and it is essential to cover all prospective cooperation possibilities. Otherwise it is doomed to die. Furthermore, we should admit that the demise of Soviet threat had changed the relation between the US and EU profoundly. The efforts to go back in terms of relationship for the two sides seem almost to be a vain hope. In this context, it is essential to recognize the changed circumstances and to talk about the future shape of the relationship.

The development of the CSDP is surely a significant event in a transatlantic environment, but it is even more so for European States. To a great extent, the figures about defence expenditures mentioned in chapter 5.3 show us the gap clearly between the US and the EU military capabilities. To reiterate it, in 2010, the US spent €520 Billion on defence whereas the EU spent €194 Billion. In other words, the US has spent 2.7 times more

¹⁸⁷ David Yost, NATO and International Organizations, Forum Paper, 3, (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2007) p.94

than the EU countries altogether.¹⁸⁸ Considering the ongoing financial crisis in Europe, the transatlantic link still maintains its significance. On the other hand, the US cannot cope with all security threats alone in the new world. So, the former strong Euro – Atlantic ties might have a force multiplier effect when it comes to dealing with the whole range of security challenges.

In NATO and EU relations the bigger part of the difficulties lies at the political level. Partial difficulty lies at the military level as well. In terms of the scope and range of the peace support operations, the NATO covers the one end with the conventional use of force whereas the EU cover the other end with soft power/force such as stabilization and reconstruction of the intervened country. Nevertheless there is only one pool for resources. Therefore both the NATO and EU nations should use the resources wisely. There is no need to duplicate the capabilities and there is no chance to do it in a time of austerity as well.¹⁸⁹

In times of scarce resources it becomes a necessity that NATO and EU, to be in harmony. To work in harmony may require tremendous effort to combine all various nations' national interests and objectives but "it would

¹⁸⁸ European – United States Defense Expenditure in 2010, Building Capabilities for a Secure Europe, (Brussels, EDA, 12/01/ 2012), p 2.

¹⁸⁹David Yost, An interview with General James L. Jones, USMC, Retired, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) 2003-2006, Research Paper, No 34, (NATO Defense College, Rome, Jan 2008), p.2

be unwise to make NATO-EU cooperation harder than it has to be”.¹⁹⁰ And it would be essential and necessary as Ret. Supreme Allied Commander Europe General James Jones maintained that “NATO and EU military headquarters ought to be co-located in the future. ... The real danger to both organizations’ effectiveness would be for NATO and the EU to function as stand-alone organizations without real cooperation between them. Such an outcome would be diminishing the capabilities and effectiveness of both organizations at a time when the capabilities of both are increasingly needed.”¹⁹¹

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p.2

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

4.2. CSDP and Its Clout

The prospects for security cooperation in the continent of Europe are of critical importance. The European security cooperation arrangements will further shape the cooperative composition around Europe. Most importantly, NATO will have a reduced role in the European security system. Additionally, non EU-NATO members will be left out of the European Security management and will be destined look for other resorts. Thus, it is necessary to identify the underlying trends and dynamics of contemporary European security in order to get well prepared for the threats and for the security management challenges ahead.¹⁹²

The arrangements introduced in Brussels in January 1994 and concluded in Berlin in June 1996 served as the basis for cooperation between the WEU and NATO. They centered on the certification of WEU operations, including planning and command, the definition by NATO of the types of separable capabilities that could be allocated following a NAC decision, the agreement of a possible D-SACEUR role in WEU operations and finally the inclusion of all European NATO members. This debate has seen renewed interest since Saint-Malo and the creation of the CSDP within

¹⁹² Adrian Hyde-Price, *European Security in the Twenty –first Century: The challenge of multipolarity*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp.3,4

the EU.¹⁹³

Concerns and misgiving were not clearly under way about aspects of CSDP, which was in the early days ESDI that had been much discussed in the two years since the Berlin and Brussels agreements. But debate has become visible on the surface after the turning point of St. Malo. The US was surprised to see Britain and France in agreement on a matter of military security and activities affecting NATO.¹⁹⁴ Ex-Secretary Albright emphasized these concerns with three D's (Duplication, decoupling, and discrimination) at the December 1998 ministerial meetings in Brussels, just days after the Saint Malo meeting. US reaction to European initiative as declared by Madeleine Albright was clear and simple "no decoupling, no duplication, and no discrimination". No decoupling meant that the concept of "separable but not separate" was tempered with by the Saint-Malo agreement. No duplication meant that Europe should not invest in defence capabilities already present in the NATO. No discrimination meant that the position of the NATO members that are not in the EU should be thought out thoroughly.

Considering the effects of evolving CSDP and the backdrop of so called three D's challenges, it may be useful to consider some of the prospects that an evolving European security system could take in the next

¹⁹³ R.E.Hunter, *The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor?*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), pp. 21-23, 29-31

¹⁹⁴ Hunter, p.33

decade or two. It is prudential to consider the possible effects of these challenges.¹⁹⁵

Although CSDP might attract more funds to defence spending that might not necessarily mean it is good news for NATO or US. It is very much possible for the newly acquired capabilities to be unnecessary duplicates of NATO. Another possibility is that EU might be prone to close or limit its arms market to outsiders most importantly US. The hidden danger that awaits both sides is that unilateralist approach from US combined with the EU yearning for an independent voice in defence matters can trigger Europe to close its doors to all outsiders in the defence procurement process. Historical tendencies of US to not share new technologies with EU and walk alone in the path of revolution in military affairs might worsen the situation.

¹⁹⁶

There are some possible dangers in the way of CSDP concerning its relationship with NATO and US. The first one is the risk of CSDP being perceived as a competitor to NATO and the fear of US and other non-EU member NATO states that NATO is becoming more and more superfluous. Another possible risk is US to overemphasize CSDP and believe that EU has grown into enough maturity in defence matters that it should lift a great

¹⁹⁵ Sloan, pp. 207-208

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p.206

deal of the burden from US' shoulders.¹⁹⁷

It is no secret that many Europeans are in favor of maintaining NATO because they want US to continue taking most of the financial burden. Although they are aware that this approach may prevent them achieving more autonomy in defence matters, not many EU states refuse a subsidy. A good analogue to this situation can be a person that uses crutches for a long time after an injury. Crutches provide support during the healing process but unless they are not abandoned after a certain point full recovery might not occur.¹⁹⁸

At this time European states should either accept that they have permanent damages and follow through that road or come into terms with the fact that healing process is over and it is time to get rid of clutches and start to walk in a natural manner.¹⁹⁹ Hence, the next chapter offers the remedies for united cooperation between the EU and NATO, which is necessary particularly in times of austerity.

¹⁹⁷ Hunter, p.146

¹⁹⁸ E. Wayne Merry, 'NATO died with the Soviet Union. Get Over It', National Interest (Winter 2003/04).

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

4.3. EU Security Logic and Remedies for United Cooperation with NATO

It must be intelligible that cooperation between NATO and EU not just an option it is also a necessity in terms of many possible contingencies. Berlin Plus provided an EU-led military operation to gain an assured access to NATO assets on case by case basis. But it is too narrowly defined to accommodate significant combined operation, particularly those requiring swift deployment or military operations to include stabilization and reconstruction. More should be done than paying lip service to NATO-EU cooperation. It may be obvious that EU lacks the deployable military power necessary to deal with a medium sized conflict or war. Yet NATO needs EU's post-conflict military and civilian capabilities as well as EU's political support.

CSDP is at a critical juncture in terms of transatlantic link. Without collective effort and political will of both sides, the US and the EU, NATO and the EU will continue to develop separately. It is needless to say, without uniting the efforts; more confusion and rivalry will be produced. Besides these, it will cause various areas to overlap.

Moreover, as a result of the new European Security Architecture, a radical change in terms of cooperation and integration process in one organization will have unforeseen impacts on another organization. To put it

another way, the developments in the CSDP will sure have implications on NATO.

Prudently thinking, in order to face new emerging global threats, NATO and EU must build a comprehensive array of complementary and valuable assets to provide capabilities, namely a wide range of military and civilian capabilities, to overcome difficulties comprising from crisis management to reconstruction. Constructing a new transatlantic security architecture will be beneficial to both sides and will provide Europe to play its proper role in security, since without European straightforward support, NATO will be degenerated. That is to say, the US and EU must recognize the other's respective complementary role and "must make a new political commitment based on the recognition that both institutions have very crucial and important roles to play in transatlantic security."²⁰⁰

As both organizations develop new capabilities such as the NATO Response Force and the EU Battle Groups, they must work together to de-conflict force commitments to those multinational forces. They also need to de-conflict all existing and future coordination cells and harmonize NATO and EU standards and metrics for force planning.

The dynamics of the new security environment necessitate a shift

²⁰⁰ F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Labl, et al., Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture, (Washington, Policy Paper, 2006), p.x

from land warfare in Europe to rapid power projection across regions and continents. Greater coordination – and even integration – is especially crucial in a security environment that requires agile, deployable and interoperable forces. The Cold War method of force planning, whereby NATO member states planned and procured capabilities without significant coordination with other European states, is no longer acceptable. Compatible visions, transparent and more collaborative defence planning, and more cooperative efforts to enhance the collective capabilities of the European allies are required to ensure that European militaries can meet the demands of 21st century missions.

To sum up; without US consent EU will not be able to play its proper role in security. On the other hand without European support NATO will be paralyzed. I think remedies are quite clear so far. But the difficulty lies in the practice, beyond paying lip service. We can outline the remedies especially as followed:

NATO and EU must form a structure/system that provides a rapid coordinated response in outbreak of crisis. This system is needed particularly in four important areas:²⁰¹

- Joint planning
- Force generation

²⁰¹ F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Lebel, et al

- Military command and control structure
- Proper political management

Both parties must form compatible capabilities. These military and civilian capabilities must be integrated and must be in a harmony with the other party in terms of interoperability. They should enhance alternative settings for dialogue and consultations as well.²⁰² If the items mentioned above are assured by both parties, the US and EU relationship on security issues will be deepened. Thus, EU will be seen as a proper security actor.

Above all, economics will be at least as large a factor as strategy in defining Europe's political choices on defence and security. Thus, the industrial base will be a factor for each policy option in European security architecture and in turn will be influenced by it. Therefore the next chapter will analyze the capability building process and progress of the EU and later conduct a comparison in terms of transatlantic air forces capabilities and military aspiration.

²⁰² Ibid., p.15-20

CHAPTER 5

CAPABILITY BUILDING PROCESS AND TRANSATLANTIC AIR FORCES CAPABILITY GAP

5.1. EU Capability Building Process

Since the end of World War II, European countries highly depended on the NATO and US military forces. During the 1990's, experiences in the Balkans confirmed doubts about the European dependency on American commitment to European security. Over quite a short period of time, the EU has started to build up its own military capabilities.

After almost a half a century following the WW II, the EU countries have showed departure from dependency on NATO and a tendency toward a build up its own military tools. For EU-NATO relations, this shift was very important in two aspects. First, the failure of the EU to develop an efficient military capability would be considered as an indirect threat to NATO and the US since NATO's European members would appear to be as inadequate partners. At the same time, the EU's desire to build-up its own military capabilities would be regarded as a direct threat to US interest and NATO. It is very arduous task to find a solution to this dilemma. Moreover, it

is a very important ongoing process, which will have serious impact on NATO.

After the Cold War, it has been discerned that Europe would have to play a larger role in security matters than it had generally been accustomed to. Conflicts in the Balkans proved that outright. At the same time, it made also clear that Europe lacked the capabilities needed to address post-Cold War security challenges thoroughly.

In order to build up required military capabilities, Europeans initially responded to the challenge by creating the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) within NATO, which was launched in 1993 and endorsed in 1994. CJTF, a multinational, multi-service arrangement, allowed for more flexible deployment of NATO assets through ad hoc arrangements.²⁰³

Despite this effort to improve flexibility, however, the subsequent Kosovo intervention made it clear that the European allies were not investing adequately in the capabilities needed to perform the humanitarian relief, peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions that framed NATO planning at the time. Almost a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, European countries still lacked many of the capabilities necessary to conduct effective military operations outside NATO's borders. To repeat just

²⁰³ NATO Handbook 2001, (Brussels: NATO Press), pp. 253-254

one of cited statistic, during the Kosovo war on European soil, the US flew 70-80 percent of all strike sorties and dropped 80 percent of precision munitions.²⁰⁴

In 1999, a new initiative addressing the shortfalls that became apparent during the Kosovo intervention was launched at NATO Summit in Washington. The Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) identified 58 key capability shortfalls that merited investment and multinational cooperation. The DCI covered in particular to improve Alliance capabilities in the five areas: **mobility and deployability; sustainability; effective engagement; survivability and interoperable communications.**²⁰⁵

Indeed, DCI's long list of areas for improvement simply proved too ambitious and did little more than paralyze action. In fact, most European defence budgets actually declined in the first few years following DCI's launch.²⁰⁶ But, it soon became apparent that, as constructed, DCI would not succeed in producing substantial changes in European military capabilities.

The 1999 DCI was succeeded by the 2002 Prague Capabilities

²⁰⁴ Philip Gordon, "Their Own Army? Making European Defense Work", *Foreign Affairs* (Vol. 79, no. 4, July/August 2000).

²⁰⁵ NATO Handbook 2001, (Brussels: NATO Press), pp. 50-52

²⁰⁶ Michele A. Floumoy and Julianne Smith, "European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategy and Capabilities", Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington: October 2005), p.21

Commitment. At its 2002 Summit in Prague, NATO launched a streamlined and more focused follow-on to DCI. The Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) outlined four critical areas for improvement, including: “defending against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attacks; ensuring command, communications, and information superiority; improving interoperability of deployed forces and key aspects of combat effectiveness; and ensuring rapid deployment and sustainment of combat forces.” The Prague declaration also recognized the need to think creatively about NATO assets, especially in light of shrinking European defence budgets. It stressed that efforts and initiatives to strengthen capabilities “could include multinational efforts, role specialization and reprioritization.”²⁰⁷ The hope was that, short of increasing their defence budgets, European countries would at least aim to spend their defence resources more wisely by eliminating waste and duplication and identifying other cost savings.

Similar to NATO initiatives, the EU has undertaken also a number of efforts to bridge the European capability gaps. In order to build CFSP, all EU members have believed that the policy have to include some capacity to back it with credible force. It is very natural that the EU should have a credible instrument of international policy if the EU wants to assert and sustain its political credibility and determination as becoming a global actor.

²⁰⁷ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Prague Summit Declaration 2002”, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>.

In this context, the crisis in the Balkans showed obvious military shortfalls of the European countries to back up their policies. Even in the European backyard the EU countries were not able to intervene into the situation without US forces. The 1999 Kosovo war was a pivotal turning point for the European nations to rethink their military capacity to act.²⁰⁸ For that reason, the EU launched Helsinki Headline Goal in December 1999 on development of civilian and military assets (60.000 troops known as European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) supported by aerial, naval and civilian capabilities) required for crisis management along with Petersberg Tasks. The aim was to be able to deploy troops within 60 days for at least one year. The Headline Goal was built upon an earlier bilateral Franco-British Joint Declaration accepted at St. Malo in December 1998, which was considered as the birth certificate of the CSDP.²⁰⁹

With the Helsinki Headline Goal, the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) designed to conduct “Petersberg Tasks” (defined in the Amsterdam Treaty as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking), was slated to become operational by the end of 2003. The Helsinki Headline Goals served as much as a political signal about the need in 1999 of strengthening the European military arm after the almost traumatic experiences in the

²⁰⁸ Asle Toje, *The European Union as a Small Power: After the Post-Cold War*, (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p.56.

²⁰⁹ CSDP Handbook, pp.68-69

Western Balkans.²¹⁰

After the Helsinki Headline Goal process, when EU members compared the requirements of the Petersberg Tasks with their existing national commitments to the EU, they found several shortfalls. In an effort to address these shortfalls, the European Union launched the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) at the Laeken Summit in December 2001. But there has been little progress in finding solutions.²¹¹ The ECAP aimed to concentrate European undertakings on getting particular critical assets such as deployable forces within a certain timeframe. The ECAP has brought about two significant concepts; **the framework nation** and **interim arrangements** to fill their capability gaps.²¹² But, even the ECAP did not help too much for enhancing the capabilities of the EU nations in solid. Nonetheless, these arrangements have helped to pave the way to create Battlegroups and conduct operations by bilateral arrangements.

With the European Security Strategy of December 2003, the EU member states revised their goals and set a new Headline Goal 2010 in June 2004 to be able to participate in the various spectrums of crisis management operations more rapidly and decisively. These new goals and

²¹⁰ F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Leb, et al., p.5

²¹¹ Ibid., p.10

²¹² Giovanni, p.72-77,

ambitions for military capabilities have included a number of interesting, new thoughts, in particular the introduction of rapidly deployable Battle Groups of roughly 1500 troops, capable of deploying within 10 days after an EU decision to launch an operation. Although the ECAP has been slow to trigger major changes in European military capabilities, it did spur the creation of the EU Battlegroups. As part of the Headline Goal 2010, the formation of battle groups consisting each of 1500 troops deployable within two weeks and supported with extensive air and naval assets has been launched. On balance, the Headline Goal 2010 was the reflection of the transformation of the forces from territorial defence concept towards external deployments²¹³

A Battle Group (BG) is defined as the “minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations. The BG is based on a combined arm, battalion-sized force and reinforced with Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements”.²¹⁴ The objective of the BGs is to provide the expeditionary force capability to the EU members. But it is necessary to have sufficient airlift capability to deploy the BGs where and when needed. Moreover the conduct of the BGs may vary from low to high

²¹³ CSDP Handbook, pp.70-71

²¹⁴ F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Lebel, et al., pp.5, 9

intensity missions which is not defined and depends upon the countries.²¹⁵

In all options, the key issue will be highly interoperability and military effectiveness.

The EU has also focused on strengthening its civilian capabilities for conflict prevention, stabilization and reconstruction, and humanitarian missions. In 2004 Civilian Capabilities were committed simultaneously with military capabilities at the EU Civilian Capabilities Commitments Conference. The Civilian Headline Goal was developed with the objective of providing interoperability, deployability and sustainability of civilian resources. The Civilian Headline Goal aims to create a systematic approach for the further development of civilian capabilities as well. The EU's assets for stabilization and reconstruction are valuable even in hostile environment.²¹⁶ It has been proved in the earlier operations. Thus, the EU's military capability may remain limited, but it's complementarity to NATO makes the cooperation between two organization both valuable and necessary.

Regarding capability development, the year 2004 was kind of pivotal. In 2004, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was created to further remedy capability shortfalls and steer the implementation of CSDP. The

²¹⁵ Richard Gowan, "The Battlegroups: A Concept in Search of a Strategy?" in Sven Biscop (ed.), *E Pluribus Unum? Military Integration in the European Union*, (Academia Press, June 2005), p.14

²¹⁶ F.G.Burwell, D.C.Gompert, L.S.Labl, et al., p.11

EDA is intended to improve the coordination and press EU member states, when necessary, to make capability improvements. The EDA faces a number of tough challenges when we consider its' ambitious set of missions such as: modernizing and strengthening Europe's fragmented defence industry; eliminating duplication in arms research, development and procurement.²¹⁷ Mainly, the basic idea behind the creation of the EDA was to help to the capability development process. Indeed, the capability development is the duty of the EU Military Committee. The military staff has to plan to develop the military capabilities in respective stages laid out in the Headline Goal. Generally, in line with the defined Headline goals; the Requirements Catalogue, the Force Catalogue and the Progress Catalogue has been prepared and then formulated in the Capability Development Plan.²¹⁸

Since the launch of the Headline Goals, the EU Council issued a Progress Catalogue 2007. The Catalogue recognized qualitative and quantitative shortfalls that need to be addressed. Following the Progress Catalogue, the Capability Development Plan was issued in July 2008. This Capability Development Plan has given rise to a new "Declaration on strengthening capabilities" in December 2008²¹⁹. The Declaration

²¹⁷ EU Focus, European Security and Defense Policy: Working for a Safer World, (Washington DC, January 2006), p.6

²¹⁸ CSDP Handbook, p.72

²¹⁹ Giovanni Grevi, p.75

envisioning two major civilian crisis management operations and two military rapid response operations at the same time was very demanding and ambitious about what the EU member states should be able to do down the road:

“In order to rise to current security challenges and respond to new threats, in the years ahead Europe should actually be capable, in the framework of the level of ambition established, inter alia of deploying 60,000 troops within 60 days for a major operation, within the range of operations envisaged in the Headline Goal 2010 and in the Civilian Headline Goal 2010, of planning and conducting simultaneously a series of operations and missions, of varying scope: **two major stabilization and reconstruction operations**, with a suitable civilian component, supported by **up to 10,000 troops for at least two years; two rapid-response operations of limited duration using inter alia EU battle groups**; an emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals (in less than ten days)...; a maritime or air surveillance/interdiction mission; a civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 90 days; around a dozen ESDP civilian missions (inter alia police, rule-of-law, civilian administration, civil protection, security sector reform, and observation missions) of varying formats, including in rapid-response situations, together with a major mission

(possibly up to 3,000 experts) which could last several years.”²²⁰

In order to better understand the Capability Development Process, the above explanations are summarized in simple following form:



Figure 5.1²²¹ Capability Development Process

In short, following the headline goals set up by Council and Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Requirements Catalogue, the Force Catalogue and the Progress Catalogue are being prepared by respective committee and military staff. During the process the Council and the PSC takes the monitoring position. Subsequently, the EDA and the EUMC issue the Capability Development Plan.²²²

²²⁰ Declaration on strengthening capabilities, Council of the EU, (Brussels, 11 Dec 2008)

²²¹ CSDP Handbook, p.74

²²² Ibid., p.74

During the Capability Development Processes, the uniformity and balance between the EU's capability development plan with that of NATO is arranged via a joint EU-NATO Capability Group. This arrangement provides transparency and trust between the two organizations which is vital for long lasting relations between them.²²³

Considering the Capability Development Process and achieving the aims of the Capability Development Plan, the EDA plays a significant role in harmonizing national defence planning and co-operation between Member States. The Capability Development Plan (CDP) prepared by EDA provides a view of future capability requirements by taking into consideration of the future security challenges and technological developments and trends. It helps Member states to pool and share their frugal resources and plan the resources effectively. The first CDP was prepared in 2008, updated in 2010 and lastly approved in March 2011.²²⁴

According to the latest approved CDP, a set of ten actions have been prioritized that will be focal points for the Agency's activities in the years to come. The CDP top ten Priorities which the EU member states urgently

²²³ CSDP Handbook, p.73

²²⁴ Capability Development Plan, EU Factsheet, <http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/eda-factsheets/capability-development-plan-fact-sheet>

need are²²⁵:

Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED);

Medical Support;

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance;

Increased Availability of Helicopters; Cyber Defence;

Multinational Logistic Support;

CSDP Information Exchange;

Strategic and Tactical Airlift Management;

Fuel and Energy;

Mobility Assurance

In filling the capability shortfalls the EDA plays an important role. The EDA provides a strategic framework and sets capability priorities in order to have necessary means for backing up its policy implications and in order to bridge the necessary capability gap. The EDA is working on filling the capability gaps addressed in CDP. Particularly, the EDA is making efforts to develop defence capabilities and promote European armaments cooperation. The EDA also works to strengthen the Defence Technology and Industrial Base in Europe, in order to give a rise to a more internationally competitive European Defence Market under the CSDP.²²⁶

Regarding the EDA's deeds, one of the projects the EDA helped to

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ www.eda.europa.eu

organize is Helicopter Training Programme (HTP) in 2010 to provide helicopter crews training of flying hot and high who haven't learned such skills.²²⁷ Another EDA project is the Franco-German cooperation of Future Transport Helicopter. The EDA is working on also in developing the Sense and Avoid technology to prevent collision of Unmanned Air Vehicles/Systems (UAV/UAS) in the air. Five member states and EDA already signed a contract on that project at the Paris Airshow in 2009. The EDA is also looking for additional partners on the Multinational Space-based Imaging System to fill the intelligence/information gap. Six countries (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Greece, and Spain) so far have taken part in this project.²²⁸

The EDA has also been making some proposals in terms of pooling and sharing resources such as using some of the 160 A400M transport aircraft that five EU countries plan to procure. This kind of projects would provide cost effectiveness as well. Similarly, many countries have C-130 Hercules transport airplanes (10 EU countries 136 aircraft), F-16 fighter aircraft and Eurofighter aircraft (430 F-16 among 5 EU member states and 570 Tornados among Germany, Italy and the UK).²²⁹ They have some cooperative efforts but still not enough for large scale crisis management

²²⁷ ESDP Newsletter, p.27

²²⁸ Ibid, p.28

²²⁹ Giovanni Grevi, p. 79.

operations. On the other hand, they find one way or another to overcome their capability needs by pooling resources as the EU whole or part of EU members for peace support operations other than large scale conflicts.²³⁰

Without entering too much into details and having mentioned about few projects of the EDA, the EDA's role is indispensable in establishing situational awareness and in synchronization of the efforts to improve capabilities and strengthen European armaments cooperation, if the member states would like to combine their efforts. Perhaps even more challenging, it will have to persuade the more equal members like the UK, France and Germany to commit to a European system they do not control completely or to an extent they desire. On balance, to a large extent the EDA is the main driving force providing situational awareness within the EU and in the capability building/procurement process and combining efforts effectively and efficiently.

Before looking at the transatlantic air forces capability gap, knowing the capability building process provides a general outlook and sheds light whether the capability gap will widen or bridge to some extent. In this context, the following chapter examines how this capability building process has been successful in terms of building up mainly air force capabilities and assets.

²³⁰ Strength in numbers? Comparing EU military capabilities in 2009 with 1999, the EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2009, www.iss.europe.eu

5.2. EU Military Capability Progress and Transatlantic Air Forces Capability Gap

This chapter analyzes initially a ten year span military development of the EU countries in general. Later it looks at the partnership programs and initiatives of the EU countries mainly in the realm of fighter and transportation air asset capabilities. In the end it gives quantitative and qualitative comparison of the transatlantic air forces.

As known, the Kosovo war in 1999 provided a striking feedback about the capability gap between the US and European military forces and the shortcomings of the EU military capabilities. As stated in the previous chapter, during the Kosovo war the US flew 70-80 percent of all air strike sorties and dropped 80 percent of precision munitions.²³¹

In the wake of this alarming information, the EU member states launched the so called Helsinki Headline Goal 1999. After more than a decade, now, it is really tempting to ponder how much progress the EU member states made since the Helsinki Summit in terms of military capabilities. The comparison will give us a general perspective how they committed themselves to their goals since the Helsinki Summit 1999.

²³¹ Philip Gordon, "Their Own Army? Making European Defense Work", *Foreign Affairs* (Vol. 79, no. 4, July/August 2000).

The table below compiled provides us a comparison between 1999 and 2009 on selected EU-27 military capabilities. The table below²³² covers the information from the 1999-2000 and 2009 editions of The Military Balance. It goes without saying that the ten year span will say a lot about the trend in terms of military reforms in the EU.

²³² “Strength in numbers? Comparing EU military capabilities in 2009 with 1999”, the EU Institute for Security Studies, London, December 2009, www.iss.europe.eu

Selected EU-27 military capabilities 1999-2012²³³

	1999:EU-15	1999:EU-27	2012:EU-27	change 1999-2012
Total Expenditure	€156.2 Bn	€162.9 Bn	€194.7 Bn	+25%
Expenditure / GDP	2.1%	2.1%	1.6%	-19%
Budget / GDP	1.7%	1.8%	1.4%	-22%
Total Active Military*	1,789,868	2,508,908	1,695,488	
Army	1,125,718	1,516,378	924,340	-39%
Navy	281,450	327, 400	223,224	-31%
Air Force	381,605	538,925	346,252	-36%
Conscripts	669,770	1,131,020	201,672	-82%
<i>Equipment</i>				
<u>Land</u>				
Main Battle Tanks	10,827	17,814	7,682	-45%
Armoured Fighting Vehicles	6,851	10,622	7,592	-25%
Armoured Personnel Carriers	19,751	26,311	22,647	-13%
<u>Aviation</u>				
Fixed Wing Aircraft	5,600	7,453	5,401	-28%
Fighter Jets	2,684	3,835	2,340	-38%
Transport (incl.tankers)	439	612	696	+14%
Helicopters**	3,515	4,732	3,573 (2009)	-24%
Attack	1,000	1,312	826 (2009)	-37%
Combat Support	969	1,305	849 (2009)	-35%
Utility	445	584	1,076 (2009)	+84%

Table 5.2 Selected EU-27 military capabilities 1999-2012

* Total Active Military Personnel number include all servicemen and women.

** The Helicopters' figures in the 2012: EU-27 column do belong to the year 2009. So the change reflects only the ten year span only for the helicopter numbers.

²³³ Strength in numbers? Comparing EU military capabilities in 2009 with 1999, the EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2009, www.iss.europe.eu and Military Balance 2011, (London WIT 3JH, UK: Routledge, 2011) and Military Technology 2012, Vol. XXXVI, (Bonn, Mönch Publishing Group, Issue 1/2012) and nationmaster.com

The numbers on the table 5.2 reveals that there is a commitment in the direction of military reform in favor of CSDP. However, it seems to be a slow pace reform process due to the falling defence budgets and economic crisis all around the world.

In terms of budget issues, the defence expenditure as a fraction of GDP has decreased, although there is an increase in the total amount of defence expenditure from the year 1999 to 2012. Moreover, it is really remarkable to know that, two countries, the UK and France afford roughly 43 percent of EU defence spending. Adding two more countries, Germany and Italy, make it almost 70 percent. With the Dutch and Spanish defence budgets, the sum accounts for roughly 80 percent of EU defence spending. Addition to these six countries, Poland, Sweden, Belgium and Greece make up the defence spending 90 percent. Very remarkably, only ten out of 27 countries have 90 percent of the total defence spending. Thus, the defence spending program of the bigger and richer countries has bigger effect than the countries (17 countries) providing only small percentage of the EU defence budget.²³⁴

Also the number of military personnel has fallen since 1999. Some countries abolished the compulsory enrollment for military service, namely

²³⁴ Strength in numbers? December 2009, www.iss.europe.eu and eda.europa.eu. and Military Balance 2011, and Military Technology 2012

conscription/draft system. They preferred professional soldiers for the new security environment and peace support operations. It looks like they adapted the personnel management in line with the new security demands.²³⁵

On the table 5.2 we see a decreasing trend in the number of heavy equipments. Instead of heavy, large equipments for mass attack/defence structure, countries preferred to obtain expeditionary forces and innovative, light, precision guided modern arms structure, because the concept of the Defence Industry has changed considerably after the demise of cold war period. During the cold war time, there was a common enemy and the security and defence policies based on large Defence Industrial Base. In other words, nations preferred to have large defence complexes. But the end of cold war caused the demise of common enemy and undermined the importance of large scale defence complexes.²³⁶

Table of **“Selected EU-27 military capabilities 1999-2012”** shows us that the number of main battle tanks, armored fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers have decreased. Similarly, the numbers of fighter jets, attack and combat support helicopters have all fallen. But the figures of

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Richard Hooke, “The Defense Industry in the 21st Century”, Pricewaterhouse Coopers Aerospace and Defense Leader, 2005

transportation aircraft and utility helicopters have increased in a remarkable manner. The increased assets in the last decade are mostly the means required for peace support operations and those fit better for the crisis management.

On the table “**Selected EU-27 military capabilities 1999-2012**” the quantities of some assets may seem sufficient but the main point to consider is the quality, availability, deployability and the condition of being operational. Since 1999, the EU member states have increased their transportation aircraft in a remarkable manner. Even so, they suffer from the dearth of strategic transportation planes for now, which can carry heavy loads and larger troops to long distance. However, they are making collaborative efforts to obtain that capability by programs such as SALIS (Strategic Airlift Interim Solution) which will be explained later in this chapter. Moreover they are expecting the first deliveries of A400M Future Large Aircraft²³⁷ within the year of 2013.²³⁸

Although the EU countries are making remarkable efforts, from the table 5.2 it can be deduced that the EU countries have invested some but

²³⁷ A400M is a multi-role transport aircraft with the capability of large cargo hold and longer distance. It is supposed to fill the logistic transport gap of the EU countries. The A400M project is a consortium of mainly six countries; France, Turkey, UK, Germany, Spain, and Belgium. For further information see www.a400m.com

²³⁸ http://www.asdnews.com/news/34049/New_Head_of_A400M_Programme_appointed_as_industrial_go-ahead_reached.htm, Monday, March 28, 2011

not enough to get sufficient military tools to back up their policies for the ten year span. Indeed, military reform is not an easy transformation at all. It takes time to reach a common consensus at the national and above national level. On balance, we could thus infer from the table “**Selected EU-27 military capabilities 1999-2012**” that during the ten year span the EU countries made some progress, either slow or fast.

An important fact is that the capability gap is a never ending story. One will be always better than the other. But the main issue will be to keep the gap as close as possible. In terms of air force capabilities, the fighting assets and transportation assets are particularly very critical. The sufficiency of these assets would tell to a certain extent, the capability level of the nations’ crisis management and peace support operation clout.

In terms of NATO capabilities, the only NATO owned capability is the NATO Airborne Early Warning capability. It is the sole NATO-owned component. The NAEW component has been established for the purpose of enhancing the Alliance’s command and control and defence capability in the 1970s.²³⁹

Currently, NAEW component has 17 Boeing E-3A Airborne Warning and Command System (AWACS) aircraft and three trainer Cargo Aircraft

²³⁹ <http://www.e3a.nato.int/>

with integrated international personnel from 15 NATO members. Since the AWACS aircraft are NATO owned, the operational command is under the NATO umbrella.²⁴⁰ The AWACS aircraft can be used for common good of all NATO members. Today, it is very difficult to form such a component in a fiscally constrained NATO environment.

Except the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force (NAEW&CF), it is essential to note that NATO or EU does not buy capabilities itself. Capabilities are provided from nations. In this context, before getting into the transatlantic air force capability comparison it is important to look at first the countries fighting assets, namely fighter aircraft, in order to see whether transatlantic air forces are suitable or not suitable for a high intensity intervention. Such statistics would provide us a general idea about the countries' military stand and it will shed light about the real transatlantic air forces gap.

²⁴⁰ Regional Fighter Partnership: Options for Cooperation and Cost Sharing, Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Germany, March 2012, p.37




Table 5.2²⁴¹ World Air Power Order wrt.to Total Fighting A/C.

It is very clear from the total fighting A/C numbers; the US is the leading country in the world air power order. Nonetheless, the total fighting aircraft numbers do not provide enough data for a countries fighting power in terms of fighting aircraft. Still we have to think about quality versus

²⁴¹ The Military Technology 2012. (The total fighting A/C numbers show the countries' total military A/C including all services.)

quantity problem.




Table 5.3²⁴² World Air Power Order wrt.to 3rd, 4th, 5th Gen AC*

If we leave out the outdated aircraft, we have to compare the 3rd, 4th and 5th generation aircraft. In terms of qualitative numbers, the US is way

²⁴² The Military Technology 2012. (The A/C numbers include the countries' all services A/C.)

*3rd, 4th, and 5th Generation A/C: F-35, YF-22, Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, F-16, Panavia Tornado, Dassault Mirage-2000, Saab JAS 39 Gripen, F-15, F/A-18, MiG-29, Su-27, F-4, MiG-21, Dassault Mirage F-1.

ahead of the other countries. In order to see the differences even closer, we have focused only European and NATO countries fighting aircraft numbers.




Table 5.4²⁴³ (EU&NATO Air Power Order wrt. Total Combat AC)

²⁴³ World Air Forces 2013, Flight Global Insight. (SM2 5AS, UK: Quadrant House, The Quadrant, Sutton, Surrey, 2013) and Military Balance 2011, (London W1T 3JH, UK: Routledge, 2011), and Military Technology 2012, Vol. XXXVI, (Bonn, Mönch Publishing Group, Issue 1/2012)

10 Countries No Combat A/C. (Albania, Estonia, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, S.Cyprus, Slovenia)

Without doubt, the US outnumbers the other NATO and EU countries in terms of total combat Aircraft Number. The total aircraft of the US is almost equal of the rest of other NATO and EU countries altogether. If we go one step further and compare the fighting power in terms of qualitative statistics, we encounter with a dramatic fact.




Table 5.5²⁴⁴ (EU&NATO Air Power Order wrt. Sum of next Gen. AC)

²⁴⁴ World Air Forces 2013, Flight Global Insight, and Military Balance 2011, and Military Technology 2012, Vol. XXXVI.

11 Countries no 3rd, 4th or 5th gen. A/C. (Albania, Estonia, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, S.Cyprus, Slovenia)

As the Table 5.5 shows, regarding the 3rd, 4th, and 5th generation aircraft the US has more than the rest of the NATO and EU Countries' aircraft. As much as a quantitative question to be answered, there is a profound qualitative problem in Europe security and defence capabilities as well.

It goes without saying that the EU and NATO forces highly depend on the US air force's asset for a high intensity war. That is not to say the EU can not undertake a peace support operation individually. But the success will depend on the duration and the intensity of the conflict with respect to available assets. In this context, the EU nations have initiated some cooperative programs to overcome their shortfalls.

In order to cut down the cost and share the burden they established some regional fighter partnership programs. In terms of Fighter Partnership Programs, the EU countries have only a few initiatives.

The well known partnership program among the some EU countries is the European Participating Air Forces program, which was formed during the 1970s. The EPAF countries (Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Netherlands) declared that their fighter aircraft choice would be F-16. Upon EPAF nations' choice the US created the F-16 Multinational Fighter Program (MNFP). The EPAF countries committed to buy a total of 348 F-16 aircraft. With this commitment the EPAF nations declared to have and

maintain F-16 Aircraft in service until 2020.²⁴⁵

Regarding reducing the cost for training, the EPAF countries built the Fighter Weapon Instructor Training program. This training program helped also to train their very experienced pilots to become qualified weapon instructors. This formation eventually led to the creation of European Expeditionary Air Wing (EEAW).

The EEAW have aircraft from each nation offered minimum number of six. According to MOU signed between them they share the maintenance, logistic and crew costs. The EPAF detachment during conflict in Afghanistan worked well between the EPAF personnel. They executed missions without bringing too much equipment to the theater area by using EPAF nations equipment.²⁴⁶

A similar program initiated in 1979 was the Tri-National Tornado Training Establishment (TTTE). The program was formed among United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, which have the same type of aircraft, Tornado. The training base located in UK and seconded with the personnel of roughly 300 crews during its peak time. The TTTE unit is in charge of the

²⁴⁵ Regional Fighter Partnership: Options for Cooperation and Cost Sharing, Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Germany, March 2012, p.33-34

²⁴⁶ Regional Fighter Partnership, p.35-36 and European Air Chiefs Conference (EURAC), 7 Sep 2010, Stockholm, Sweden (personally attended with TURAF Commander)

initial training of all Tornado aircrew and also providing additional training courses for experienced personnel. The cost is shared between three countries respective to their share. But for some reason, the Eurofighter partner nations (Germany, Italy, Spain and UK) have not adopted a similar program to the TTTE. Instead they all have chosen national training programs.²⁴⁷

Other than regional fighter partnership programs, another instance for cooperative efforts within European countries is NORDEFCO (Nordic Defence Cooperation). It is a defence and security cooperation among Nordic countries (Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland and Sweden) aiming at combined and cost-effective contributions to international peace and security. It established in November 2009 as a result of combining previous joint effort within Nordic countries.²⁴⁸

There is no mutual defence obligation for the NORDEFCO countries. But the main purpose of the organization is to enhance the development and production of more efficient military capabilities in the time of shrinking budgets. In doing so, they desire to get increased and credible operational effect through borderless collaboration. They have a wide range of cooperation areas such as reduced bureaucracy in cross-border activities,

²⁴⁷Ibid, p.40.

²⁴⁸ European Air Chiefs Conference, 7 Sep 2010, Stockholm, Sweden

security agreements, exchange officers, combined air transport, helicopter operations, common use of exercise ranges, common courses. The organization explores to enhance each nation's capabilities by creating synergies to common solutions for international peace and stability. In particular, the organization considers itself as complement to UN, EU and NATO.²⁴⁹

Besides pooling and sharing some capabilities, some European countries have joint training programs, in order to cut the costs and develop the interoperability culture. For instance, France and Germany train some of their Tiger helicopter pilots in the same unit together.

Besides to some partnership programs and efforts, the European Security and Defence College has been established in 2005, in order to raise situational awareness about common security. Since 2005 it has given numerous courses to high level civilian and military personnel from the EU member states. It is playing a significant role in promoting the cooperation culture and interoperability among European countries.²⁵⁰

After examining fighter partnership programs and fighter aircraft statistics, it is necessary to analyze air transport capability and programs.

²⁴⁹ European Air Chiefs Conference, 7 Sep 2010, Stockholm, Sweden (For more information visit www.nordefco.org)

²⁵⁰ <http://esdc.mil-edu.be/>

For the operations executed beyond the European continent, Air transport capability has become a critical component for the peace support operations.

Particularly, following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks the threat perceptions of NATO and EU have changed and the logistical support for deployed forces has become increasingly important for distant peace support operations. So the understanding of the Air Transport was dramatically altered and European countries have been trying to find a happy medium for Air Transport requirement. In order to supply transportation capability in the absence of US in a peace support operation, some countries have set up various multinational initiatives for Air Transport necessity.

Multinational Initiatives for Air Transport

	NATO	MCCE	ATARES	EATF	EAG	EATC	A400M	SALIS	SAC
ALBANIA									
AUSTRIA									
BELGIUM									
BULGARIA									
CANADA									
CROATIA									
CZECH REP.									
DENMARK									
ESTONIA									
FINLAND									
FRANCE									
GERMANY									
GREECE									
HUNGARY									
ICELAND									
ITALY									
LATVIA									
LITHUANIA									
LUXEMBOURG									
NETHERLANDS									
NORWAY									
POLAND									
PORTUGAL									
ROMANIA									
SLOVAKIA									
SLOVENIA									
SPAIN									
SWEDEN									
TURKEY									
UK									
US									

Table 5.6²⁵¹ Multinational Initiatives for Air Transport

²⁵¹ NATO Air Transport Capability – An Assessment, Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Germany, August 2011, p.19

The Table 5.7 shows the members of the multinational initiatives set up by NATO and European countries. These initiatives are just interim solutions for the necessity of Air Transport in the absence of the US. These initiatives have been set up to share the burden of the Air Transport and build a strategic or tactical air transport capability down the road.²⁵² To get a grasp of the multinational initiatives for Air Transport, the main idea behind the initiatives and its utility has been explained in the following paragraphs.

The European Air Group (EAG) consists of 7 big European countries. It has been formed to ensure the interoperability among 7 EU countries in a most cost effective way. The EAG mainly provides forum for cost effective interoperability solutions. The prominent achievements of the EAG are the Multinational Training Project and Standardization of Aircrew Regulations.²⁵³

The ATARES (Air Transport, Air-to-Air Refueling and other Exchanges of Services) is a settlement among the Participants to make a multi-national framework available in order to make way for mutual support through the exchange of services, in the realm of air force activity, through mutually acceptable arrangements.

²⁵² NATO Air Transport Capability – An Assessment, Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Germany, August 2011, p.19

²⁵³ Ibid., p.18

The Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE) is a mechanism designed to work as an honest broker in matching participating countries' needs and request to available resources. But MCCE activities are highly dependent on exchange and flow of the information provided by countries. The key functioning of the MCCE is to provide environment for ATARES' arrangements. The MCCE cooperates mainly on various levels but generally in the exchange of flight hours rather than payments between different countries.²⁵⁴

The European Air Transport Fleet (EATF) was formed in 2009 by the intent of letters by 14 European Ministers of Defence to provide forum in order to enhance military airlift capability of the European countries. The EATF concept was initiated by EDA and the EATF's long term vision is to set up an appropriate network to link various European air transport assets and capabilities.²⁵⁵

The European Air Transport Command (EATC) is a command to manage the participating four (Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands) European countries' scarce air transport capability as effectively as possible in a cost effective way. The countries may have national caveats in the

²⁵⁴ Ibid., p.19, 20 and <https://www.mcce-mil.com/Pages/Atares.aspx>

²⁵⁵ NATO Air Transport Capability – An Assessment, Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Germany, August 2011, p.20

programs. The command centrally controls the command function of almost 170 platforms. The platforms are under operational control (OPCON) of the EATC. The major benefit of the EATC is to facilitate and consolidate efforts for training, fleet management, logistics and regulations between participating countries.²⁵⁶

The Airbus A400M program was initiated to replace aging C-130 and C-160 fleets. The members of the A400M program have committed to buy 174 aircraft in total.²⁵⁷ The A400M project will not suffice to meet European air transport requirement, but it will provide at least relief in some points for peace support operations on national basis.

Another temporary solution for the Strategic Airlift Capability is the SALIS (Strategic Airlift Interim Solution) program. This project was formed initially to bridge the Strategic Airlift Capability among NATO and EU countries. But later it has become the de facto solution for Strategic Airlift requirements for some countries. The SALIS program includes 12 NATO nations (Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom) and two partner nations (Finland and Sweden). The SALIS countries contracted with the charter of the Russian and Ukrainian Antonov AN 124-100 aircraft,

²⁵⁶ Ibid., p.21 and <http://eatc-mil.com/>

²⁵⁷ Ibid., p.23 and <http://www.airbus.com/aircraftfamilies/military-aircraft/a400m/>

which is capable of transporting outsize cargo. The program ensures a guaranteed access to a fleet up to six aircraft. With this program the Alliance use the ability of transporting heavy equipment across the globe by air. The SALIS and the SAC programs can be considered as complementary to each other.²⁵⁸

The Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC) is a consortium of twelve nations, 10 NATO countries and two Peace for Partnership countries. After the letter of intent was signed in 2006, the twelve countries formed the Heavy Airlift Wing (HAW). According to the agreement they acquire three Boeing C-17 Globemaster III aircraft based in Papa Airbase, Hungary. Two C-17 aircraft will be procured under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and the US will provide the third one as a US contribution. The participating countries share the cost with their respective total annual flight hours. The operational commander of the HAW is a US general supported with the contributing nations' officer. The operational authority of the SAC and HAW belongs to the participating nations not to NATO or any other international organizations.²⁵⁹

The Heavy Airlift Wing is a very good example of using critical assets

²⁵⁸ NATO Air Transport Capability, p.23 and http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50106.htm

²⁵⁹ Ibid., p.23 and <http://www.heavyairliftwing.org/> and http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50105.htm

in cooperation for common good. The Heavy Airlift Wing is a multinational airlift unit operates C-17 Globemaster IIIs. It was officially activated on July 27, 2009 as part the NATO Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC). The wing possesses three C-17 Globemaster IIIs.²⁶⁰

The wing provides strategic airlift worldwide for humanitarian, disaster relief, and peacekeeping missions in support of the European Union, United Nations, and NATO. The Heavy Airlift Wing Globemasters fly everywhere wherever the 12 participant countries²⁶¹ need support for strategic airlift capability.²⁶²

The Heavy Airlift Wing is not solely European but it is a good example in terms of how Europeans finds solutions for their strategic airlift need for a temporary time with their American partner whether they like it or not. Until Europeans get A-400 M transport aircraft they take the advantage of using NATO&EU assets. Indeed, it is very remarkable for NATO-EU collaboration and provisional solution for the EU's challenges. The SAC/HAW and the SALIS programs can be considered as complementary programs.

²⁶⁰ European Air Chiefs Conference, 7 Sep 2010, Stockholm, Sweden (personally attended with TURAF Commander)

²⁶¹ Participant countries are: the US, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovenia, Sweden.

²⁶² European Air Chiefs Conference, 7 Sep 2010, Stockholm, Sweden (personally attended with TURAF Commander)

Considering all programs and initiatives, only two of them stand out and deemed to be crucial, SAC and SALIS programs. But they are still not a permanent remedy for European transport capability shortfall. These initiatives are just interim and temporary solutions for European Airlift problem.

The reality of NATO's European member countries' Air Transport capabilities versus the US' Air Transport capability indicates a clear gap in the transatlantic airlift capability. EU or NATO itself does not own any tactical or strategic Air Transport assets but they are reliant upon contributing nations.

	<i>Heavy Transport AC</i>	<i>Medium Transport AC</i>	<i>Military Passenger AC</i>	<i>Tanker & Transport AC</i>	<i>Heavy Transport Helicopters</i>	<i>Medium Transport Helicopters</i>	<i>Multirole Helicopters</i>
USA	285	516	78	538	632	2090	467
NATO (EU)	16	323	123	72	205	633	1117
NATO	305	863	210	617	843	2737	1662

Table 5.7²⁶³ Transatlantic Air Transport Assets

As the Table 5.7 shows NATO or EU is highly dependent upon US airlift capability due to some extent in the delay of A400M delivery. The US

²⁶³ NATO Airlift, Military Balance 2011, Chapter 2

is still main provider of Air Transport with the inventory of such as 103 C-5 and 201 C-17 Aircraft and etc.²⁶⁴ In short, NATO or EU depends highly on the Air Transport resources of the US military to fulfill its current level of ambition.

Moreover, even after so many partnership programs and initiatives in the European continent, roughly 89% of the Strategic Air Transport Aircraft in service belongs to the US. Even after A400M program the percentage will reduce to 70, which is still high and shows the dependency on the US Strategic Air Transport Capability²⁶⁵.

Above all, it goes without saying that NATO and the EU highly depends on the US military assets for a high density peace support operation. But it does not mean to underestimate EU military assets. It has not been too long since the CSDP established. It has come to a certain point but it has still long way to go.

On the other hand, security challenges have become more diffuse, transnational and complex. Although NATO is busier than it has ever been, its value is less obvious to many in the past. Even though the EU's military capability may remain limited, the EU is currently conducting seventeen

²⁶⁴ Military Technology 2012, p.58

²⁶⁵ NATO Air Transport Capability, p.38

active peace support missions in three continents. Two of them are military training mission and thirteen missions are civilian missions and most of them are Security Sector Reform (SSR) missions.²⁶⁶

The breakdown of the EU operations will be analyzed later but in general, the various EU peace support operations are mostly civilian missions which reflect the civilian nature and capabilities of the EU. Although its limited military capability, current peace support operations conducted by the EU and its' complementarity to NATO makes the cooperation between two organization both valuable and necessary. Moreover it is known that the current peace support operations have become more or less a coalition of willing operations. It can be considered that the CSDP would be a complementary to the NATO as stated in the new Strategic Concept and as the reconstruction and stabilization mission becomes necessary after conflict intervention missions.

On balance, there is an increasing demand around the globe for EU engagement in peace support operations. Nevertheless there is a mismatch in demand-supply balance. In order to provide useful and flexible instruments for increasing peace support operations the EU have to come up with the more combined effort to bridge the capability gap.

²⁶⁶ Chart and Table of CSDP and EU missions as of May 2013, <http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-chart>

The current gap between requirements and capabilities poses serious obstacles to EU's ability to execute out of area missions and to protect and advance its interests in the security environment. The EU crisis management operations will have their geographical focus constrained by shortfalls in enabling factors such as strategic mobility, specifically strategic capabilities as transport and logistics, command and control as well as reconnaissance. The EU's global approach on Deployability and Interoperability will be a key element of CSDP development. It seems that the EU member states are forging cooperation and interoperability culture for the future challenges in one way or another. They are forging it either by regional cooperation mentioned above between them or by institutional cooperation in the framework of CSDP.

Overall, to some extent the CSDP project is promising. The EU has seen that the CSDP is a security tool indispensable to the conduct of foreign policy and there is a clear need to have military capability to go on the stage to intervene militarily and with civilian power particularly after the demise of Cold War. However there are stumbling blocks that need to be jumped over. The first stumbling block is the political will and lack of a coherent foreign policy. They have hard times in finding common positions and conducting the respected decision coherently. The other one is producing a joint capability. Thus, the desired global role of the EU depends to a large extent on the EU's ability to generate sufficient resources to overcome shortfalls in enabling factors of the CSDP.

5.3. EU Defence Expenditure & Military Aspiration Gap

As the common foreign and security policy keeps expanding, the available resources for the CSDP operations get increasingly problematic. The shortage of resources and capabilities is partly related to the levels of defence spending across Europe. For that reason it is necessary to look at the budget issues affecting CSDP. The budget trend would give some indication about the resource and capability generation down the road.

Before rendering some numerical statistics, it is better to know the current defence expenditure of the EU. As of 2010, the EU's GDP is €12.046 Billion, the overall government expenditure is €6.047 Billion, and the EU's defence expenditure is € 194 Billion.²⁶⁷

According to European Defence Agency (EDA) defence data statistics the EU average for defence spending as a proportion of GDP has fallen from 1.78 percent to 1.61 percent between the years 2006 and 2010. As of total Government Expenditure the EU defence expenditure has also fallen from 3.8 percent to 3.2 percent between the years 2006 and 2010.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁷ 2010 Defense Data, EDA, 2011,
http://www.eda.europa.eu/Libraries/Documents/Defense_Data_2010.sflb.

²⁶⁸ Additional Defense Data Statistics, (Brussels, 16 Dec 2011), EDA,
http://www.eda.europa.eu/Libraries/Documents/Additional_Defense_Data_2010.sflb.ashx, retrieved on 17 May 2012

If we look at the past 5 year span it is very obvious from the below figure to see the downward fall of the defence expenditure part of the whole pie.




Figure 5.2²⁶⁹ Defence Expenditure as a percentage of GDP and as a percentage total Government Expenditure

If we breakdown the Defence Expenditure, the personnel spending

²⁶⁹ Additional Defense Data Statistics, (Brussels, 16 Dec 2011), European Defense Agency

amounted to 51 percent, the Operations and Maintenance cost amounted to 23 percent, and the rest amounted to Investment(Equipment Procurement Including R&D/R&T) and other Expenditure.²⁷⁰ That is to say, roughly **one fifth of the total defence expenditure** goes to the effort of **improvement of the military capabilities**. That reflects the need for more pooling and sharing of the resources available and for more collaborative investment and procurement. In other words, the financial constraints push the EU countries in the direction of intensified unity around the financial issues and defence spending.

In that context, we see that the EDA plays a significant role in collaborative efforts. The 2010 EDA Defence Data shows that out of €34 Billion spent in Defence Equipment Program, the European Collaborative Defence Equipment Procurement amounted to €7,54. In terms of percentages the statistics renders that there is a slight increase during the last 5 year span.²⁷¹ But the same picture for collaborative research and technology differs from year to year. It follows a non- uniform trend.²⁷²

In general, the collaborative efforts are not sufficient. Just to give a

²⁷⁰ 2010 Defense Data, EDA, 2011

²⁷¹ Defense Data 2010, EDA. (The percentages on collaborative procurement program between the years 2006 and 2010 are respectively: 20,9, 18,9, 21,2, 22,0, 22,0).

²⁷² Defense Data 2010, EDA. (The European collaborative R&T Expenditure percentages between the years 2006 and 2010 are respectively: 9,6, 13,1, 16,6, 12,8, 11,8)

general idea about the waste of European effort, the combat aircraft program is a very good example. Although there is competition with the US, the European countries have three different types of aircraft production. Sweden produce Gripen, France produce Rafale and Germany-UK-Italy-Spain consortium produce Eurofighter. The estimated production units of the aircraft are 204 for Gripen, 294 for Rafale and 620 for Eurofighter. Compared to EU aircraft figures the US made combat aircraft Joint Strike Fighter is predicted to be built rough 3000 in numbers. Comparison in terms of Research and Development expenditure reveals the waste of efforts obviously. The R&D costs for European aircraft respectively are €19.48 for Eurofighter, €1.84 billion for Gripen and €8.61 billion for Rafale and in total €29.93 billion, whereas the R&D cost for Joint Strike Fighter is predicted to be around €31 billion for 3000 units. That is to say, **the unit based R&D costs** of the European countries (**€29.93 billion for 1100 combat aircraft**) are way too high than the R&D cost of the JSF (**€31 billion for 3000 combat aircraft**).²⁷³

From the figures given above, it is clear that the EU member states do not collaborate efficiently and effectively although their common shared capability goals. The missing ingredient is the **political will** and **coherence** of the member states.

²⁷³ Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane et al. Eds., p.82 and European Commission, UNISYS, Final report of the study: “Evaluation of the Common Initiative in the context of the Intra-EU Transfers of Defense Goods”, Brussels, February 2005.

In order to see the national contribution to the defence spending in Europe, the respective national defence expenditure chart will help highly to understand the EU member states ranking and place within the EU.




Figure 5.3²⁷⁴ EU Member States Defence Expenditure

From the EU member states defence expenditure figure it is really

²⁷⁴ Defense Data: EDA participating Member States in 2010, EDA, Brussels, 07/03/2012, http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/National_Defense_Data_2010_4.pdf

important to notice that the big four countries (UK, France, Germany and Italy) defence spending almost take up to 70 percent of EU total defence spending.

In terms of money issues it seems that the big four countries have bigger say in the EU. By saying that, it is not intended to ignore the political support of the countries with lesser defence expenditure. Even though the countries are spending less, their political support within the EU is important for shaping general public opinion.

The information only about the countries' respective defence expenditures of the European countries will be limited about the contribution of the nations. If we put the defence spending together with respective percentage of the GDP it will say more about the countries commitment. Additionally, if we combine defence spending with respective GDP and with the ratio of the troops deployed as the percentage of the nations' troops overall, it will say a lot about the nation's military aspiration.

The size of the globe on the figure 5.4 refers to the countries' respective defence expenditure. The position of the globe indicates the level of the military aspiration of the respective country. For instance Germany seems to be less militarily ambitious than Netherland seems to be. Compared to other countries Germany has a considerable defence spending. But its' scale in defence spending as of GDP is not as much as

Greece or Bulgaria. Regarding the troops deployed as percentage of nation's troops overall, Germany keeps its position in a lower scale compared to its defence spending as well.




Figure 5.4 European Union Member States' Military Aspiration²⁷⁵

²⁷⁵ 103 Thomas Overhage, Less is More: Pooling and Sharing of European Military Capabilities in the Past and Present, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 2012, p.48 and Defense Data: EDA participating Member States in 2010, EDA, Brussels, 07/03/2012, http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/National_Defense_Data_2010_4.pdf

Regarding the defence expenditures and military aspirations the big four (UK, France, Germany and Italy) stand out particularly noticeable. And in terms of military capabilities of the EU members with respect to their defence spending and military ambition level resembles to the left hand. As Overhage put it very nicely and concisely “As the thumb, the United Kingdom is connected but a little bit separated from the rest and tries to keep a tight hold on European defence. France is ... best expressed by the index finger, pointing and demanding what has to be done. Like the thumb and especially together with it, these fingers are capable of limited autonomous action. Germany as the middle finger has the most volume. This finger’s overall strength is comparable to the former two, but a middle finger is usually not used for individual or separate action. Italy, as the ring finger with its comparable smaller capabilities, expresses the sense of togetherness. The ring finger and the little finger, expressing all the other EU nations, are not capable of powerful individual actions. However, if they are hurt, they can negatively influence the whole hand. Really powerful actions are only possible when all fingers work together.”²⁷⁶

If we continue with this analogy, the US takes the role of the absent right hand. And the world is frequently practiced to use its right hand. Therefore the European left hand has not been adapted to be used in the

²⁷⁶ Overhage, pp.46-47

first place for the time being in high density conflicts.²⁷⁷

In order to see whether the US is really the right hand compared to the EU, it is noteworthy to look the defence spending comparison of the EU and the US. The military capabilities are to a great extent related to the defence spending levels.

During the year 2010 the US government has spent €520 billion (or \$689 billion), while the EU countries spent on aggregate €194 billion. If we get into details of the defence expenditures, we come across with the fact that the US defence expenditure equals to 4.8% of GDP and 11.2% of overall government expenditure and the EU defence expenditure represents 1.6% of GDP and 3.2% of overall government expenditure. In 2011, the defence expenditure of the EU slightly increased from €194 to €210, while the US defence expenditure increased to the amount of €548.²⁷⁸ The ratios clearly show the financial commitment gap between the EU and the US, which directly affects the military capability gap.

In terms of military ambition level it is necessary to analyze the defence expenditure with the respective percentage of the GDP and with

²⁷⁷ Ibid., p.47

²⁷⁸ <http://euobserver.com/defense/115906>, 17 April 2012 and Europe and United States Defense Expenditure in 2010, Brussels, 12/01/2012, EDA

the ratio of the troops deployed as the percentage of the nations' troops overall. Keeping this in mind, to illustrate the military aspirations of the EU versus the US the figure below provide a clear message about the gap between the US and the EU.




Figure 5.5 European Union – US Comparison of Aspiration²⁷⁹

²⁷⁹ 215 Thomas Overhage, Less is More: Pooling and Sharing of European Military Capabilities in the Past and Present, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 2012, p.48 and “Europe and United States Defense Expenditure in 2010”, Brussels, 12/01/2012, EDA http://eda.europa.eu/publications/12-01-12/EU-U.S._Defense_Data_2010

The comparative commitment of the US and the EU is highly remarkable in terms of defence spending ratios and military aspiration. It goes without saying that the EU has to spend its money very wisely otherwise the capability gap will get even wider. Even if the EU spends its budget very wisely it seems to be that the US military capability will be maintaining its dominant position for a while.

Regarding the EU budget, the apportionment of the budget for the CSDP is only barely adequate. The EU budget in general consists of five headings such as “sustainable growth”, “natural resources”, “citizenship, freedom, security and justice”, “the EU as a global player”, and “administration”. By looking over the EU budget allocation for the CFSP, we will come across with the fact that it is only 6.4% of the EU budget area entitled “the EU as a global actor” in 2013 budget plan. **With respect to the total budget, the CFSP** budget accounts for about **0.25%** of total EU expenditure. Nevertheless there is an increase of 9.2 percent from the year 2010 for CFSP matters which is somehow encouraging.²⁸⁰

Nonetheless, it is really very hard to conceive how this little budget will cover all the supposed EU Common Security and Defence Operations, namely crisis management, humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace support

²⁸⁰ EU budget 2013: Investing in growth and jobs, European Commission (Luxemburg, Publication Office of the EU, 2013)
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2013/budget_folder/KV3012856ENC_web.pdf

operations, police missions, rule of law missions, border assistance mission and so on. If we think of all these various type of mission, the CFSP budget amounts to just a portion of the actual expenditure. For instance, the outlay of the EU mission in Kosovo alone will be almost equivalent to the whole annual CFSP budget.²⁸¹

There seems to be a deadlock for the execution of the EU CSDP missions in terms of budgetary problems. Despite that, the member states have found a way to overcome this handicap to a certain extent. They have come up with different complementary remedies for each civilian and military operation respectively. The civilian crisis management operations are funded from the CFSP budget under the common costs. But the personnel seconded from the participating member states for the mission are paid individually by each member states. If there is no fund remaining toward the end of the fiscal year, the member states desiring to plan additional CSDP mission shall contribute extra or they shall ask Commission to provide extra fund. Thus, the Commission will evaluate the occasion with respect to EU's foreign policy priorities.²⁸²

As for military operations, the expenditure is managed through the

²⁸¹ EU Operations, www.consilium.europa.eu/eulex-kosovo and www.eulex-kosova.eu

²⁸² Initial Concept of Mission Support for ESDP Civilian Crisis Management Missions, Council of the EU, Brussels, 5 Sep 2006

Athena mechanism which was set up on 1st of March 2004 by the Council of the EU. The main advantage of the Athena mechanism is to facilitate the funding to cover the preparatory phase of missions. The common costs are provided by all Member States (except Denmark) in a manner conforming to their respective GNI figures. The staff costs are paid by each member states.²⁸³ That is to say, whenever the funding question arises, each government shall persuade its treasury to get the necessary capital. The expense of the operation is financed by the contributing member states on the percent of “costs lie where they fall”.²⁸⁴

Considering the financing of CSDP civil and military operations, the policies and procedures are not necessarily the ones that are most suitable, but rather the ones that the member states find the happy medium or the least common denominator to overcome their conflict areas and continue riding the same train.

In sum, due to shrinking budgets of the EU member states it has become a necessity to spend the budget very wisely and to use pooling and sharing policy as much as possible. Because of the financial constraints, most of the EU member states can only execute military operations with the coalition forces. Therefore interoperability will be the key element during the

²⁸³ ATHENA EU operating manual, 3/5/2010, www.consilium.europa.eu (under the CSDP structures and instruments/ Financing of CSDP military operations/Dealing with ATHENA/Operating manuel)

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

sharing and pooling policy and it will be crucial for the coalition of willing operations and peace support operations down the road. Moreover, the need to generate adequate assets for peace support operations is not new. The capability generation shortfall has been there from the very start. Therefore it is necessary to back up the EU's security policy objectives or it will not be more than empty remarks.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The CSDP project it is not new indeed in terms of defence project initiative. It is noteworthy to recall the first European Treaty after the Second World War, which was the Franco-British Defence Treaty of Dunkirk in 1947. It later enlarged with the Treaty of Brussels in 1948 and included Benelux countries. It is followed by the fervent discussion about the European Defence Community plan in the early 1950s. Nevertheless the so called the European Defence Community project went never into effect during the Cold War years. The EU security and defence policy as a project remained untouched during the Cold War period. Once the Cold War was over, the EU has started to rethink the latent aspiration to become a security actor. Indeed, it is very remarkable that European member states now seem to be very interested in constructing a security and defence policy after so many years without any military activity during the Cold War years.

Since its inception, the 17 completed CSDP missions with the ongoing 17 CSDP missions clearly show the EU's deliberation among the EU member states. The CSDP has started as a burden sharing but later it has become the indispensable framework for the formulation and

implementation of CFSP. Therefore it is really challenging to formulate solutions to the challenges related notably to growing expectations with a limited capability. The biggest challenge ahead for the EU becomes then how to continue to conduct CSDP missions with its scarce resources. Moreover, another challenge would be how to integrate the member states in the area of security and defence with capability gap without undermining the role of NATO. Thus, it is really important how has the EU through CSDP been employing its new military and civilian crisis management capabilities? And it is really vital to see “How is the evolving process of the CSDP affecting itself and NATO in terms of transatlantic air forces’ capability gap?”

With regard to the overall EU integration process up until now, it can be assumed that it has not been very long since the CSDP started. That is to say, the CSDP is still in its developing stage. Besides, the CSDP has a living architecture. It is developing over the course of time by internal and external factors. Although EU member states have achieved some progress in acquiring military capabilities, EU states recognize and strive to accommodate for a military power that complements the soft power of EU. It can be said that this trend is getting momentum and would pave the way for development in the future.

NATO was the primary security and defence organization during the Cold War period. At that period the US was highly accustomed to its role as the dominant alliance leader, and at the same time inadequate European

efforts only enhanced US predominance. Therefore, when the European allies pledged to develop military aspects of security in the process of European integration, the US had mixed emotions and some misgivings because of the new bargain. And upon this development the US emphasized its concerns with three D's (duplication, decoupling, and discrimination) just days after the St.Malo meeting at December 1998 ministerial meetings in Brussels. Indeed the US would gain benefit from a European ally that could take responsibility of serious financial and military burdens and play a more substantial role dealing with international security problems.

Nevertheless, it seems that the US still prefers the NATO dominant status in the European security and defence scene. As long as this position continues US will not object to and even support better European integration and cooperation which would mean EU picking up more share of the international security burden. However there is the danger that some unilateralist US behavior will undermine both the NATO-dominant approach and the integrating approach. The unilateralist approach from US combined with the EU yearning for an independent voice in defence matters can trigger Europe to close its doors to all outsiders in the defence procurement process. Historical tendencies of US to not share new technologies with EU and walk alone in the path of revolution in military affairs might worsen the situation.

The comparative commitment of the US and the EU as illustrated in the previous chapter is highly remarkable in terms of defence spending ratios and military aspiration. It goes without saying that the EU has to spend its money very wisely in terms of cooperative procurement and research and development otherwise the capability gap will get even wider. Even if the EU spends its budget very wisely it seems to be that the US military capability will be maintaining its dominant position for a while.

The defence expenditure figures are not the only indicator in terms of developing military capabilities. The R&D investment also indicates that the EU member states do not collaborate efficiently and effectively although their common shared capability goals. EDA plays a significant role in collaborative efforts within the EU countries, but roughly one fifth of the total defence expenditure goes to the effort of improvement of the military capabilities as mentioned in the previous chapter.

On balance, the collaborative efforts are not sufficient currently. Although there is competition with the US, the European countries have three different types of aircraft production; Gripen, Rafale and Eurofighter.²⁸⁵ The R&D costs for European aircraft respectively are €19.48 for Eurofighter, €1.84 billion for Gripen and €8.61 billion for Rafale and in total €29.93 billion

²⁸⁵ Sweden produce Gripen, France produce Rafale, and Germany-UK-Italy-Spain consortium produce Eurofighter.

for roughly 1100 units, whereas the Research&Development (R&D) cost for Joint Strike Fighter is predicted to be around €31 billion for 3000 units.²⁸⁶ Even the R&D figures clearly reflect the need for more cooperative and collaborative investment and procurement efforts. Therefore, the EU needs to find a way of establishing a strong industrial base able to develop adequate future competitive capabilities.

The current capability gap will affect to a great extent the operational capability (scope&range) of the EU member states. On the other hand the capability gap will affect the operational capability and harmony of the NATO as well. But the latter effect would not be as much as the first one as long as the US remains and stays in the organization of NATO, since it takes much of the burden. On the other hand, civilian crisis management assets and the experience of EU member states from civilian crisis management would be complementary to NATO regarding comprehensive approach. Nevertheless, the current transatlantic air forces gap will hurt the burden sharing and it will discredit the European military capability if it takes too long to assume the roles asserted in the Security Strategy Paper and in the CSDP policy as a global actor.

Above all, throughout the formation of CSDP civil and military operations, member states' desire and the policies, procedures, and CSDP

²⁸⁶ Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane et al. Eds., p.82

structures have provided the most suitable answers to find the means to overcome conflict areas and continue cooperation and collaboration that provided the key answer. As historical institutionalism suggests, with institutional norms at hand, states find out how to overcome stumbling blocks since they have entered in a path where the turnover is really difficult. So they become very keen to resolve their problems with flexible and shrewd cooperation options such as permanent structured cooperation, enhanced cooperation, constructive abstention, and emergency brake procedures in order to reach a consensus among so many (now 28 member states) EU member states.

In general, the CSDP works one way or another despite all of its shortcomings. The EU's civilian and military crisis intervention capabilities are still in a developing stage. Starting with the Cologne and Helsinki meetings in 1999, EU established structures and organized its procedures, defined and revised a security strategy, launched roughly 30 mission and developed dialogue and partnership particularly with UN, NATO and the African Union under CSDP. Furthermore, it brought about a European Defence Agency and initiated a process to address the shortcomings of the member states in order to harmonize defence efforts and provide necessary assets for crisis management. Taking into account all these achievements, the EU has come a long way, which cannot be ignored.

To sum it up, the CSDP so far created significant institutions,

structures and military bodies in the way of security and defence. Moreover, the CSDP has placed itself as a critical component of the EU's external projection and international profile. The CSDP has brought visible and solid added value by almost thirty military and civilian peace support operations deployed and executed in the last ten years. The CSDP operations have provided a cooperation culture between EU Member States in the security and defence domain, which is highly sensitive. However, EU crisis management structures and capabilities still need to be augmented and improved. The CSDP has come a long way, but still has a long way to go. The shortfalls of adequate capabilities do constrain the ability of the Union to some extent and limit the EU to undertake more demanding peace support operations.

All in all, from institutionalist perspective the EU has indulged in a path where turning back or turnover is really difficulty and inconvenient. The current CSDP structures seems to be locking-in the EU member states in the process of security and defence integration by continuous collaboration and cooperation. The CSDP has established considerable structures and conducted numerous peace support operations. As historical institutionalism envisages, the policies and institutions of the CSDP tend to go on unless there is an unexpected and powerful force of change emerges. From current perspective, CSDP project will evolve in the near term despite its shortfalls and capability gap. But the capability gap will undermine both EU's ability and credibility and will continue to parlay the US default dominant position

until EU finds a way of establishing and maintaining a strong industrial base able to develop future adequate competitive capabilities.

REFERENCES

- Albright, Madeline K., "The right balance will secure NATO's future", (Financial Times, 7 Dec 1998)
- Aspinwall, D. Mark, & Schneider, Gerald, "Same menu, separate tables: The institutionalist turn in political science and the study of European integration", *European Journal of Political Research*, 38, 2000
- B. Guy, Peters, Pierre, Jon, and King, Desmond S., "The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conflict in Historical Institutionalism", *The Journal of Politics*, 67 (4), 2005
- Becker, Jeffrey, "Asserting EU Cohesion: Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Relaunch of Europe", *European Security*, (Vol. 7 No. 4, Winter 1998)
- Biscop, Sven, "The European Security Strategy in Context" in Sven Biscop and J.J.Andersson eds., *The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a global Europe*, (New York, Routledge, 2008)
- Buch, H., Huber R., and Kasetner, R., *Jensits der ESVP: Anmerkungen zu einer transatlantischen Stragie in Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Die Europaische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik*, (Baden: Baden, 2002)
- Burwell, F.G., Gompert, D.C. L.S., Lebl, et al., *Transatlantic Transformation: Building a NATO-EU Security Architecture*, (The Atlantic Council Policy Paper, March 2006)
- Cahen, Alfred, *The Western European Union and NATO*, (London: Brassey's, 1989)
- Capability Development Plan, EU Factsheet, <http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/eda-factsheets/capability-development-plan-fact-sheet>
- Chappell, Gareth, *Impact of the Libyan Crisis on the UK-France Defence Programme*, Bulletin PISM, no. 36 (253) of 7 April 2011
- Charles-Philippe, David and Levesque, Jacque, *The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia and European Security*, (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999)
- Chomsky, Naom, *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003)
- Clemens, Clay, *NATO and the Quest for Post-Cold War Security*, (New York: Macmillan 1997)

CSDP Newsletter, Summer 2010, Issue 10

Declaration on strengthening capabilities, Council of the EU, (Brussels, 11 Dec 2008)

Defence Data: EDA participating Member States in 2010, EDA, Brussels, 07/03/2012,

Document on EU-NATO Consultation, Planning and Operations (European Council, December 2003) at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments/eu-nato-co-operation?lang=en>

ESDP Newsletter, European Security and Defence Policy 1999-2009, Special Issue, October 2009

EU budget 2013: Investing in growth and jobs, European Commission (Luxemburg, Publication Office of the EU, 2013)

EU Focus, European Security and Defence Policy: Working for a Safer World, (Washington DC, January 2006)

European – United States Defence Expenditure in 2010, Building Capabilities for a Secure Europe, (Brussels, EDA, 12/01/ 2012)

European Air Chiefs Conference, 7 Sep 2010, Stockholm, Sweden

European Commission, UNISYS, Final report of the study: “Evaluation of the Common Initiative in the context of the Intra-EU Transfers of Defence Goods”, Brussels, February 2005.

European Security Strategy, 2003

Factsheet on EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Libya, May 2013, <http://consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eubam-libya/factsheets?lang=en>

Factsheet, CPCC/04, April 2011

Floumoy, Michele A., and Smith, Julianne, “European Defence Integration: Bridging the Gap between Strategy and Capabilities”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington: October 2005)

Gegout, Catherine, European Foreign and Security Policy: States, Power, Institutions, and American Hegemony, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010)

Gerrits ed., Andre, Normative Power Europe in a Changing World: A Discussion, (Netherlands Institute of IR, Clingendael, 2009)

Gomis, Benoit, Rapporteur, Conference Summary European Defence and Security 2012, (Chatham House, London, 13-14 Jan 2012)

Gordon, Philip, "Their Own Army? Making European Defence Work", Foreign Affairs (Vol. 79, no. 4, July/August 2000).

Gowan, Richard, "The Battlegroups: A Concept in Search of a Strategy?" in Sven Biscop (ed.), E Pluribus Unum? Military Integration in the European Union, (Academia Press, June 2005)

Grant, Charles, "Germany's Foreign Policy: What can be learned from the Schröder Years?", Centre for European Reform, (Sep 2, 2005)

Green, Cowles Maria, and Curtis, Stephanie, " Developments in European Integration Theory: The EU as Other" in Maria Green Cowles and Desmond Dinan, eds., Developments in the European Union, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004)

Grevi, Giovanni, Damien, Helly and Daniel, Keohane et al. Eds., European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009), (Paris, The EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009)

Haglund, David G., 'ESDP and Transatlantic Relations' in Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Die Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik, (Baden: Baden, 2002), p.272

Hill, Christopher, The Directoire and the Problem of a Coherent EU Foreign Policy", CFSP Forum, Vol.4, Issue 6, 2006

Hooke, Richard, "The Defence Industry in the 21st Century", Pricewaterhouse Coopers Aerospace and Defence Leader, 2005

Howorth, Jolyon, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007)

Hunter, R.E., The European Security and Defence Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor?, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002)

Initial Concept of Mission Support for ESDP Civilian Crisis Management Missions, Council of the EU, Brussels, 5 Sep 2006

Joint Declaration Issued At The British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 Dec 1998, EU Institute for Security Studies, February 2000

Keohane, Daniel, 10 Years after St.Malo, European Union Institute for Security Studies, October 2008

Lansford, Tom, "The Triumph of Transatlanticism: NATO and the Evolution of European Security After the Cold War", The Journal of Strategic Studies, (Vol. 22 No. 1, Mar 1999) and Alistair Shepherd, "Top-Down or Bottom-Up: Is Security and Defence Policy in the EU a Question of Political Will or Military Capacity?", European Security (Vol. 9 No. 2, Summer 2000)

Madeline K., Albright, Ex-US Secretary of State, "The Right Balance Will Secure NATO's Future", Financial Times, 7 December 1998.

Merry, E. Wayne, 'NATO died with the Soviet Union. Get Over It', National Interest (Winter 2003/04)

Military Balance 2011, (London: Routledge, 2011)

Military Balance 2012, (London: Routledge, 2012)

Military Technology 2012, Vol. XXXVI, (Bonn, Mönch Publishing Group, Issue 1/2012)

NATO Air Transport Capability – An Assessment, Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Germany, August 2011

NATO and the European Union: Partners in Security, (Speech by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, May 6, 2004)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Prague Summit Declaration 2002", <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>.

Nye, Joseph S., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, (New York, Public Affairs, 2004)

Opening address by High Representative Catherine Ashton at the symposium on the Common Security and Defence Policy, Washington DC, 8 May 2013

Overhage, Thomas, Less is More: Pooling and Sharing of European Military Capabilities in the Past and Present, (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 2012)

Petersberg Declaration, Western European Union Council of Ministers, (Bonn, 19 June 1992), p.6 (<http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf>)

Pierson, Paul, "The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutional Analysis", *Comparative Political Studies*, 29, 1996

Pollack, Mark A., "Theorizing EU Policy-Making" in Helen, Wallace, William Wallace, and Mark A. Pollack, eds., *Policy-Making in the European Union*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)

Porter, Keith, *Foreign Policy Implications of the Iraq War: Huge Impact on American Relations*,
<http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/nessiss3/tp/iraqwarrelations.htm>

Price, Adrian Hyde, *European Security in the Twenty-first Century: The challenge of multipolarity*, (New York: Routledge, 2007)

Regional Fighter Partnership: Options for Cooperation and Cost Sharing, Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Germany, March 2012

Rehn, Olli, *Europe's smart power in its region and the world*, Speech at the European Studies Centre, St Antony's College University of Oxford, 1 May 2008.

Rehrl, Jochen, and Weisserth, Hans- Bernhard, eds., *Handbook on CSDP*, (Vienna: Armed Forces Printing Shop, 2010)

Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Providing Security in a Changing World, Dec 2008

Robertson, Lord, *Post-Cold War Defence Reform*, (Washington D.C.: Brassey's Inc., 2002)

Rosamond, Ben, *Theories of European Integration*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan 2000)

Russia Endorses Six-Point Plan, www.civil.ge, 12.08.2008

Sciolino, Elaine, and Smale, Alison, 'Sarkozy, a Frenchman in a hurry, maps his path', *The New York Times*, 24 September 2007

SIPRI Map of Multilateral Peace Operation Deployments September 2012

SIPRI Yearbook 2011

Sloan, Stanley R., *NATO, The European Union and The Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered*, (Maryland : Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2003)

Smith, Michael E., "The EU as an international actor", in Jeremy Richardson (ed.), *European Union, Power and Policy Making*, 3rd edition, Abingdon, (2006)

Smith, Michael E., *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation*, (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2004)

Solana, Javier, "Common European Foreign and Security Policy Targets for the Future", NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace 1/2000

Steinmo, Sven, What is Historical Institutionalism? in Donatella D. Porta and Michael Keating eds., *Forthcoming in Approaches in the Social Sciences*, (Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press, 2008)

Strength in numbers? Comparing EU military capabilities in 2009 with 1999, the EU Institute for Security Studies, December 2009

The EU Operations Centre at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments/eu-operations-centre?lang=en>

The EU-NATO Berlin Plus Agreements, Assembly Fact Sheet No.14, (European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of WEU, Paris, Nov 2009)

The European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon: Visions of leading policy-makers, academics and journalists, (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2011)

Toje, Asle, *The European Union as a Small Power: After the Post-Cold War*, (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)

U.S. Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) 2010

Victoria, Nuland, Ambassador, Speech to Press Club and American Chamber of Commerce, Paris, 22 February, 2008. <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/February/20080222183349caifas0.5647394.html>.

Wessels, Wolfgang, "Nice results: The Millennium IGC in the EU's evolution", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, (2001, Vol. 39, No. 2)

Wessels, Wolfgang, *Das politische System der Europäischen Union. Die institutionelle Architektur des EU-Systems*, (Wiesbaden: GmbH, 2008)

Whitman, R.G. "Norms, Power and Europe: A new Agenda for Study of the EU and IR" in Richard G. Whitman (ed.), *Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives*, (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011)

World Air Forces 2013, Flight Global Insight. (SM2 5AS, UK: Quadrant House, The Quadrant, Sutton, Surrey, 2013)

Yost, David S., An interview with General James L. Jones, USMC, Retired, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) 2003-2006, Research Paper, No 34, (NATO Defence College, Rome, Jan 2008)

Yost, David S., NATO and International Organizations, Forum Paper, 3, (Rome: NATO Defence College, 2007)

Yost, David S., The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union, Survival, vol.42, no. 4, Winter 2000-01

Internet:

<http://eatc-mil.com/>

http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2013/budget_folder/KV3012856ENC

http://eda.europa.eu/publications/12-01-12/EU-U.S._Defence_Data_2010

<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/world/europe/03/17/france.nato/index.html>,
March, 17, 2009

<http://esdc.mil-edu.be/>

<http://euobserver.com/defence/115906>, 17 April 2012

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0018_en.htm

http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm

<http://isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/page-attachments/mission%20personnel-June2013.pdf>

<http://soc.kuleuven.be/iieb/eufp/content/saint-malo-esdp-csdp>

<http://www.airbus.com/aircraftfamilies/military-aircraft/a400m/>

http://www.asdnews.com/news/34049/New_Head_of_A400M_Programme_appointed_as_industrial_go-ahead_reached.htm, Monday, March 28, 2011

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/csdp-structures-and-instruments?lang=en>, (Council Decision 2005/395/CFSP of 10 May 2005)

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu>

<http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-chart>

<http://www.e3a.nato.int/>

<http://www.eda.europa.eu>

<http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/treaties-other.htm>.

<http://www.heavyairliftwing.org/>

<http://www.nato.int>

<http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko>

<http://www.weu.int/Treaty.htm>

<https://www.mcce-mil.com/Pages/Atares.aspx>

APPENDIX A:

TURKISH SUMMARY

AVRUPA ORTAK GÜVENLİK VE SAVUNMA POLİTİKASI (OGSP): YETENEK AÇIĞI VE NATO'YA ETKİLERİ

Soğuk Savaş döneminde Avrupa ve Amerika arasında güvenlik ve savunma alanında bağlantıyı sağlayan yegane organizasyon NATO olarak devam etti. Söz konusu soğuk savaş dönemi boyunca; Avrupa ve transatlantik kuvvetler stabil durum, tahmin edilebilen ve ortak olarak algılanan tehdit ortamından memnun olmaktaydılar. Ancak, algılanan ortak tehdidin kaybolması, yeni tahmin edilemeyen tehditlerin ortaya çıkması ve karışıklıklar güvenlik ortamını belirsiz hale getirdi. Ayrıca Bosna ve Kosova'daki krizler Avrupa'nın askeri yetenekler bakımından zayıflığını ortaya çıkardı. Avrupa'nın arka bahçesindeki bu krizler, eğer Avrupa askeri kabiliyetlerini geliştiremez ise kendi savunmasını sağlamada çok sınırlı kalacağını gösterdi. Söz konusu kaygılar sırasıyla Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Kimliği (AGSK), Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası (AGSP) ve Lizbon Antlaşmasından sonra ortaya çıkan OGSP oluşumuna öncülük etti.

AB; OGSP kapsamında 2003 yılından beri birçok barışı destekleme hareketleri icra etmektedir. Ancak, AB'nin hızlı değişim içindeki Dünya'da savunma emellerini ve gerekliliklerini yerine tamamiyle getirebilmesi konusunu tam olarak tahmin etmek zor olacaktır. Bununla birlikte, tez

alıřması yetenek aıklarına raėmen AB'nin geri dnüşü zor ve klfetli bir yola girdiėini iddia etmektedir. Mevcut OGSP yapıları AB üyelerini sürekli bir dayanışma ve işbirliėi yönünde bağlamaktadır. OGSP'nin oluşturduėu kurumlar ve icra ettiėi misyonlar dikkate alındığında, OGSP projesi mevcut eksiklikler ve yetenek aığına raėmen gelişmeye devam edecektir.

Tez, OGSP nin řimdiye kadar kayda deėer biçimde kurumlarını, teşkilatlarını, askeri yapılarını oluşturduėunu ve birçok barış destekleme hareketi icra ettiėini iddia etmektedir. Tarihi kurumsalcılık aısından AB, geriři dnüşü çok zor ve klfetli bir yola girmiřtir. Mevcut OGSP yapıları AB üyelerini sürekli bir dayanışma ve işbirliėi yönünde bağlamamaktadır. OGSP'nin oluşturduėu kurumlar ve icra ettiėi misyonlar dikkate alındığında, OGSP projesi mevcut eksiklikler ve yetenek aığına raėmen gelişmeye devam edecektir.

Bununla birlikte, yetenek aığı AB'nin icra edeceėi operasyonların kapsamını büyük ölçüde etkileyecektir. Ayrıca, NATO'nun operasyonel kabiliyetine ve harmonisine de etki edecektir. Fakat, yeteneklerin çoėunluėunu barındıran Amerika Birleşik Devletleri NATO'da kaldığı sürece transatlantik yetenek aığının NATO'ya etkisi daha az olacaktır.

APPENDIX B:

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü ☒

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

YAZARIN

Soyadı : ARI
Adı : Mehmet Mükerrerem
Bölümü : Uluslar arası İlişkiler

TEZİN ADI : The Making Of European Common Security and
Defence Policy (CSDP): The Capability Gap and Its
Implications on NATO

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ☐ Doktora ☒

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. ☒

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:

APPENDIX C:

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Arı, Mehmet Mükerrerem
Nationality: Turkish (TC)
Date and Place of Birth: 14 May 1972, Şanlıurfa
Marital Status: Married
Email: mehmetari94@gmail.com

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	Air University, Air Command and Staff College	2008
MS	Hava Harp Akademisi	2003
MS	Air University, Air Force Institute of Technology	2000
BS	Hava Harp Okulu	1994
High School	İstanbul Lisesi	1990

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
1994-Present	Hava Kuvvetleri	Pilot-Subay

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Fluent German, Intermediate Spanish