

IN SEARCH OF JUSTICE
IN THE CASE OF THE *REPUBLIC*
AND *AHLÂK-I ALÂÎ*

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In justice lies the manifestation of another Realm

To the most Beloved

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1. The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.

2. The program of advanced study of which this thesis is part has consisted of:

- i) Research Methods course during the undergraduate study
- ii) Examination of several thesis guides of particular universities both in Turkey and abroad as well as a professional book on this subject.

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ABSTRACT

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IN SEARCH OF JUSTICE

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This dissertation analyzes the notion of justice in the *Republic* of Plato and *Ahlâk-ı Alâî* of Kınalızâde. It basically shows that the notion of justice is quite genuine and precious to play a key role to provide peace, harmony, and success. It investigates the basis and treatments of the notion of justice over the course of time and different places.

As famous for being the first founding the theory of justice, along with its treatments to reach happiness in the world and the unique prizes hereafter, the *Republic* of Plato is one of the indispensable classics. Written almost 2,500 years ago, it has an issue, which is vividly alive in our time.

Ahlâk-ı Alâî, as a heritage of human treasure, constructed upon not only Islamic traditions and sacred laws but also a great deal of intellectual richness including the thoughts, advices, and poetries of significant philosophers and scholars, provides the accumulation of Ottoman Empire's 16th century.

The notion of justice in these works is technically very different. The *Republic* presents a pretty nice inquiry functioning as thought provoking and questioning the essentiality and role of justice, whereas *Ahlâk-ı Alâî* truly deals with its significance and concrete requirements in every possible affair of life. Although it is hard; this thesis tries to show the differences and the similarities of the regard and the treatments of the notion in both works.

Key words: Justice, Virtue, Individual, Family, State, Hereafter

KISA ÖZET

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Ekim 2013

DEVLET'DE VE AHLÂK-I ALÂÎ'DE ADALET ARAYIŞI

Bu tez adalet kavramını Eflatu'nun Devlet'inde ve Kınalızâde'nin *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*'isinde analiz etmektedir. Temel olarak, adalet kavramının huzur, beraberlik ve başarı sağlamada hakiki ve değerli bir rol oynadığını gösteriyor. Adalet kavramının temellerini ve uygulamalarını zaman içinde ve değişik mekânlarda araştırıyor.

Uygulamaları ile bu dünyada mutluluğa, ahirette ise eşsiz mükâfatlara ulaştıracak olan adalet teorisini ilk kurmakla meşhur, Eflatun'un *Devlet*'i vazgeçilmeyen klasiklerdendir. Yaklaşık 2500 yıl önce yazılmış olup, zamanımızda hala canlı yaşayan bir konuya sahiptir.

İnsanlık hazinesinin mirası gibi olan *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, sadece İslam geleneği ve ilâhi kelâmdan değil, aynı zamanda, önemli hükemâ' ve de âlimlerin efkâr, nasîhat ve beyitlerini içeren entelektüel bir zenginlik üzerine inşa edilmiş olup, Osmanlı imparatorluğunun 16cı yüzyılının birikimini sunan bir eserdir.

Bu iki esredeki adalet kavramı teknik olarak farklıdır. *Devlet*, düşünce üreten ve adaletin elzemliğini ve rolünü araştıran hoş bir sorgulama sunarken, *Ahlâk-ı Alâî* gerçek anlamda adaletin ehemmiyetiyle ve hayatın mümkün her safhasında gerekleriyle ilgilenir. Her ne kadar zor da olsa, bu tez, bu iki eserdeki kavram algısının ve uygulamalarının farklarını ve benzerliklerini göstermeye çalışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Adalet, Fazilet, Birey, Aile, Devlet, Âhiret

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DİA	Diyanet Vakfı İslam Ansiklopedisi
EI ³	Encyclopedia of Islam, third edition
Ed., Eds.	Editor(s)
Trans.	Translated by

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INTRODUCTION

*Whether you tear yourself into thousands of pieces,
or your scream, with a terrible sorrow, even reaches the sky,
nothing can be useful if you fail to take the opportunity
to be close to the most Beloved.¹*

Noblest, Aristotle says, *is that which is the most just.*² But is there justice? Or are we just looking for something which is non-existent, yet an unprecedented dream of humankind and the only thing worthy of a lifetime of searching, counting all things found along its path as nothing but tools valuable only for reaching this highest aspiration of humankind? Does justice pay? For if justice is not real, the biggest injustice will be done to one's self, surrounded by all of these gorgeous beauties in their terribly attractive felicity, by lacking eternity in which justice is involved!

The language that surrounds the reader and takes him into its own atmosphere, just as passing years and lands sweep one away into their peculiar feelings and understandings, is the first condition worthy of mention. Through the medium of language, one is able, or not, to comprehend what the author has attempted to articulate. The difficulty of language translation, by which the author's meanings have been brought through time and across great distance, is a responsibility of the first order. Yet, however difficult it is to understand and feel the classics completely, as they would have been felt by their contemporaries, it is nevertheless inspiring and strengthening to reach the fullness of a comprehensive world view that will prove to be absolutely worth catching. As a result, speculations regarding the *Republic* have continuously been discussed, just as with the seemingly endless

¹ Kinalizâde depicts a regretful, surely unjust man's cry in his book and references a verse: "Alas for me having been remiss in what is due to God, and for having been indeed one of those who scoffed (at the truth)!" The Qur'an 39: 56. See, Kinalizâde Alî Çelebi. *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, ed, Mustafa Koç, (İstanbul: Klasik, 2007), 152.

controversies surrounding other Socratic works.³ So, while it is difficult, interpretively speaking, to thoroughly appreciate the value of the *Republic*, it is not, however, completely impossible.

Famous for being the first theory of social design which has at its core a strong and powerful emphasis on justice, along with the treatments it gives to the attainment of happiness in the world, and the prizes hereafter, the *Republic* is one of the indispensable classics of world literature. Written almost 2,500 years ago, it revolves around an issue which is vividly alive in our time. The essential human need for justice has not been traced as much by any other work of Western thought. However, as a reader, one can neither say that the *Republic* presents fully an examination of justice, and thereby justify it, nor can one fully reject it on the grounds of lacking such a perfectly pure integrity. What is undeniable is that in many places perfect, deep, self-proving, and quite original expressions are obvious. The knowledge and wisdom presented therein undoubtedly deserves to be

² Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*, ed and trans, Roger Crisp, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 15.

³ Guthrie discusses the problems related to Socratic works in several places in his book as such, "It is a bold-some will say over-bold-procedure to try to separated Socrates from Plato." See W. K. C. Guthrie, *Socrates*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 5. He continues, "Any account must begin with the admission that there is, and always will be, a 'Socratic problem.' This is inevitable, since he wrote nothing, and all that we know about him and his thoughts comes from the writings of men of the most varied character... Two things are frequently said of him which, if they both were true, would preclude us from making any significant remarks about him at all. It is claimed on the one hand that his teaching is indissolubly linked with his whole personality, and on the other that we can know nothing about historical person Socrates because the accounts of him which we have not only are somewhat distorted, as might be thought inevitable, by being filtered through the minds of his pupils or opponents, but were actually never intended by their authors to be anything but fiction..." See *Ibid.*, 6. Later, he adds, "The existence of the Socratic problem makes it necessary to start with an examination of our sources of information. These are for practical purposes four: Aristophanes, Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle..... With these different characters and gifts they naturally saw different things in Socrates and have left us different impressions of him. Albert Schweitzer wrote that in the matter of historical information we are much better off with Jesus than with Socrates, because Jesus was portrayed by simple uneducated people, but Socrates 'by literary men, who exercised their creative ability upon his portrait'"³ *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, Eng. Tr., 1954, p.6. Quoted from *Ibid.*, 7. In the next pages, he states, "Aristotle, whose interest is purely philosophical, tells us in a few crisp sentences where in his opinion the thought of Socrates ends and that of Plato begins. He if anyone ought to know, and his contribution to the problem is invaluable." See *Ibid.*, 35-6.

greatly appreciated for its having birth to Western philosophy.⁴ Who can deny this? On the other hand, defects, unclarity, and dead-ends centered upon enacting pure justice, along with dramatically and oddly allotting justice to only the best people via strict education, certainly wreck the beauty of the *Republic*.

Having the idea of justice at its core, *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, prepared between 1563–6,⁵ however, has been protected through the centuries from such ambiguity, as has been suffered by the *Republic*, by its manuscript. It is molded from several languages and grounded upon countless books written before. Kinalızâde, while preparing his work, is obviously quite cautious and careful to take the proper affairs, related to the issues, into consideration since every cell represents the importance, value, and strength of the whole body. Adorned with numerous examples, anecdotes, and lines of poetry, the rich composition of *Ahlâk-ı Alâî* is a mixture of philosophical, historical, literary, and political knowledge of his time. In fact, Kinalızâde basically weaves throughout the entire work his religious feelings and experiences, namely the deep love and unending reverence for God. As the heritage of Ottoman understanding and feeling, *Ahlâk-ı Alâî* presents the background principles for the outstanding successes of the sixteenth century. Kinalızâde divides the book into three branches: the science of ethics, the science of the regulation of households, and the science of the government of the city.

It is safe to say that *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, as it concerns the state ethics, is a kind of *nasihatname*,⁶ mainly a book on ethics and government, such as *el-*

⁴ Reeve says, "Western philosophy is not, to be sure, simply a series of footnotes to this amazing text, but many of its best stories begin here." See Plato. *The Republic*, ed and trans, (C. D. C. Reeve, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2004), ix.

⁵ A. S. Oktay, *Kinalızâde Alî Efendi ve Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2005), 68.

⁶ *Nasihatname*, also known as *siyasatnâme*, is a book basically written for the rulers. In Ottoman intellectual tradition, the writer sometimes can be known sometimes not. They hardly follow the same method, yet they often include similar contents since they are written for the leadership. They, on the one hand, have actual and real influential role as functioning to lead the ruler, on the other hand, represent its period in which it was written. It is further stated in The Encyclopedia of Islam, "literally "advice for Rulers", a phrase under which may conveniently be considered the genre of pre-modern Islamic

Letâifu'l-'alâiyye fi'l-fedâili's-seniyye,⁷ *Kutadgu Bilig*,⁸ *Tuhfetü'l-Ümerâ ve Minhatü'l-Vüzerâ*,⁹ *Selim-Nâme*,¹⁰ or *Kitâbu Mesâlihil-Müslimîn ve Menâfi'il Müminîn*.¹¹ Reading some of these books will serve as a guide to understanding how the scope of politics presented in *Ahlâk-ı Alâî* fits with nasihatnames'. Further, *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, like others nasihatnames, is presented to one of the important state officials. It is said that the word "*Alâî*" is used to refer to Kınalızâde and, at the same time, vizier Semiz Ali Paşa to who the

literature which consists of advice to rulers and their executives on politics and statecraft (siyâsa [q.v.] or tadbîr al-mulûk); the ruler's comportment towards God and towards the subjects or ra'iyya [q.v.] whom God has entrusted to his charge..." For more, see C.E. Bosworth. "Nasihat al-Muluk", *EP*. Also see Veli Atmaca. "Hadîsleri Bakımından Siyâsetnâmeler (I)", *Fırat Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 5 (2000), 357–370; also Ahmet Uğur. "Selim-Nâmeler", *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* XXII (1974), 365–379. Further, see Hüseyin G. Yurdaydın. Celâl-zâde Salih'in Süleyman-Nâmesi", *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* XIV (1966), 1–12.

⁷ Written by Ahmed b. Sa'd b. Mehdî b. Abdi's-samed el-Usmânî for Sultan I. 'Alâuddîn Keykubâd in 13rd century. For detail İhsan Fazlıoğlu. "Sultan I. 'Alâuddîn Keykubâd'a Sunulan Siyasetnâme: el-Letâifu'l-'alâiyye fi'l-fedâili's-seniyye", *Dîvân* 3, (1997), 225–239.

⁸ Known as the first long narrative poem in Turkish literature as well as the oldest monument of Turkish Islamic literature, *Kutadgu Bilig* means "knowledge that brings happiness." It is written by Yûsuf Has Hâcib in 1069–70. For more, see A. J. E. Bodrogligeti. "Kutadghu Bilig", *EP*, Mustafa Kaçalin. "Kutadgu Bilig", *DİA*.

⁹ See Abdüsselâm El-Amasî. *Tuhfetü'l-Ümerâ ve Minhatü'l-Vüzerâ Siyaset Ahlâkı*, ed. A. Mevhibe Çoşar, (İstanbul: Büyüyenay Yayınları, 2012).

¹⁰ *Salim-Nâme*, rather valuable prominent book, is written Jalalzade Mustafa Celebi, as the most authoritative and influential historian during the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent. Having a wide range of dominions of the professions as a distinguished Ottoman significant intellectual, he held the chief non-military administrative office of the state, head of the imperial chancery. A chronicle work as an elaborated history of Selim I, *Salim-Nâme* covers the events starting from his governorship in Tırabzon until his death. The information given in *Salim-Nâme* was founded on the first hand source that is Piri Paşa. This book is wider than other kinds of *Salim-Nâme*. For more information, see Celal-zade Mustafa. *Selim-Nâme*, Ahmet Uğur and Mustafa Çuhadar, eds., (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1990). Also, see Ahmet Uğur. "Celal-zade Mustafa ve Selim-Nâmesi", *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* XXVI (1978), 407–425.

¹¹ *Kitâbu Mesâlihil-Müslimîn ve Menâfi'il Müminîn* is written in the early of 17th century of Ottoman Empire. The period, as one of the most difficult times of the history of the state, encountered quite hard problems and corruptions related to the very foundation of the state and society. As means of keeping the society in a well condition and protecting it from any destruction, some books were written. One of them is *Kitâbu Mesâlihil-Müslimîn ve Menâfi'il Müminîn* written in a very distinct basis and manner. The book presents quite significant information concerning the society and state of Ottoman in that period and suggests peculiar solutions for the present and future of the empire. See Yaşar Yücel. *Osmanlı Devlet Düzenine Ait Metinler*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi, 1980).

book was presented.¹² There are certainly differences between it and the others, yet there are also shared issues and views. *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, written in a very systematic and disciplined way, definitely deserves to be an instruction book for university students, particularly those who study the theory of politics and likewise for the candidates who want to be leaders, inasmuch as it is based upon the heritage which has functioned for centuries within actual nation states.

This present article is an attempt to trace the foundations of the *Republic* and *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*. This fortunately will be helpful to appreciate the unchangeable value of the notion, and have a perspective, that human beings have not changed in the course of time, and no matter how distant their places, they can understand each other, feel the same, and share things to build and produce just living conditions. Indeed, the aim, as embodied in this thesis, is to prove the essentiality and benefits of these two works, belonging as they do to different times and places, for humankind's understanding and the promise of their common future. Undoubtedly, variation that enriches the sciences and the arts, and the common feelings and understandings in any work, strengthens the truth.

This thesis will start by presenting the two works classified in accordance to the affairs related to the notion of justice, along with quotations, criticisms, and supporting documentation, written sometimes in the main passage, some times in the footnotes. It will continue firstly with giving a comparison of both works, then address the main mistake of Plato, and conclude with the core message of *Ahlâk-ı Alâî* which is the inspiration for this thesis: what is justice, the significance of its role, and how it is to be maintained.

¹² KINALIZÂDE, 7.

The Influence of the Early Greek Culture and Intellectual Life in the *Republic*

No one should be allowed to read a single fragment of Early Greek philosophy, let alone the great texts of Plato and Aristotle without having internalized the stories and rhythms of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.¹³

Greek philosophy, as the outcome of the long and complicated process of thought, *was not confined to a single school or region, but broke out sporadically*.¹⁴ It was mainly literacy gained through contact with other cultures¹⁵ that led Greece to perform a unique mixture of tradition and rational themes which established the very essence of Greek philosophy. Roughly around 750 B.C., ideas were coming into being through the convergence of three factors: the epic tradition, literacy, and development of the city. In addition, individuals such as Hesiod and the pre-Socratics played crucial parts of their own. Major developments in the intellectual community, religion, and ritual reconstructed the intellectual sphere when gave birth to philosophy.

The Homeric poems, *Iliad*¹⁶ and *Odyssey*, foundations of the very earliest Greek culture and intellectual life, were composed of both religion and mythical elements. Having a quite conservative perspective of life, they were carried through an oral tradition. As the embodiment of the tradition,

¹³ Jeffrey Dirk Wilson, "From Concrete to Concept: How Greek Philosophers Conceptualized Homeric Depiction", (PhD Dissertation. The Catholic University of America, 2009), 506. The book, as tracing the ground of philosophy, including *the Republic*, through various thoughts, has two burdens: "the first was to observe and discuss the reception of Homer by the Early and Classical Greek philosophers, showing that what Homer depicted was conceptualized by the philosophers. The second burden was to argue that there is a Homeric metaphysics which is depicted, that it is a materialist metaphysics which historically preceded the rational metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle."

¹⁴ G. S. Kirk, "The Development of Ideas, 750 to 500 B.C." in John Boardman, and N. G. L. Hammond, and D.M. Lewis, and M. Ostwald, and William R. Kenan, (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History²-IV Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean C. 525 To 479 B.C.*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 389.

¹⁵ For detailed information see Robin Osborne, "The polis and its culture" in C.C.W. Taylor, (ed). *Routledge History of Philosophy-I from the Beginning to Plato*, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 8–36.

¹⁶ Homer. *The Iliad*, trans, George Chapman Wordsworth, (Britain: Classics, 2003); also see Homeros. *İlyada*, trans. Azra Erhat and A. Kadir, (İstanbul: Can Yayınları, 1958).

the masterpieces took their present form around 560 to 527 B.C. Since then, all Athenian learned the poems of Homer¹⁷ as an essential part of their education.¹⁸

"The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* provide a more graphic and more detailed account of life around the end of the Bronze Age than exists for any other period in Greece until the late fifth century B.C."¹⁹ Entire events and the characters mentioned in the Homeric epics played the role of models guiding their own descendants as models. With little rational thought, yet not devoid of organization or empty of reason to assess the material circumstances, or the ideological conceptions, those characters, being accepted by their contemporary audience, set the tone for their own mentality and emotional condition.

The genuine religious feeling seen in Homer's characters neither revealed nor totally disguised the actual worldview of ordinary men. It is in fact stated, "Much of the theological and intellectual background of the poems is considerably earlier than the eighth century B.C., as of course is much of the social content."²⁰ *Odyssey*, on the other hand, presents Grecian dealings in terms of a more straightforward logical analysis, beyond the superficial religious affairs.

The eighth century was particularly important for the history of Greek thought. They faced something radically different and potentially revolutionary to their society that caused them to undergo various changes.²¹

¹⁷ Glenn W. Most. "Homer (fl. c.700 BC)", *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 3637.

¹⁸ Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), 28.

¹⁹ I. E. S. Edwards, and C. J. Gadd, and N. G. L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger, (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History³-II Part 2 History of the Middle East and the Aegean Region C. 1380–1000 B.C.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.), 820.

²⁰ G. S. Kirk, "The Development of Ideas, 750 to 500 B.C." in John Boardman, and N. G. L. Hammond, and D.M. Lewis, and M. Ostwald, and William R. Kenan, (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History²-IV Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean C. 525 To 479 B.C.*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 394.

²¹ For detailed information see Robert Fowler, (Ed). *The Cambridge Companion to Homer*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 210.

Chiefly, it was the employment of an alphabet,²² which brought rapid cultural development and profoundly reconstructed intellectual communities. Although this reduced the epic tradition drastically, nevertheless *Iliad* and *Odyssey* continued to maintain their influence.

Theogony and *Works and Days*, two monumental poems, in which analytical questioning was performed by Hesiod,²³ arose during this transition period. *These are not epic adventure stories but didactic poems aiming directly to teach.*²⁴ According to some scholars, as a turning point, they were distinctly different from the moral and practical ground of Homeric poems. The practical, religious, and mythical affairs started to be replaced with more secular concerns as the initial step an establishing of a secular worldview, and Hesiod *was reaching an area that philosophy was later to occupy.*²⁵

However, some professed the exact opposite of this view. For whom, "There is not an absolute disjunction between Homeric poetry, ... and philosophy, ... what is depicted in Homer is conceptualized in Early and Classical Greek philosophy in a process of transformation from concrete to abstract thinking."²⁶

In a conclusion, it is hard not to think that, "whether ancient Greek philosophy be understood as a continuation or repudiation of Homer, the Homeric texts constituted much of the ancient Greek cultural scaffolding presupposed in almost every philosophical account."²⁷

²² The earliest surviving alphabetic inscriptions are of around 725 B.C. and are in verse. See Kirk, *Ibid.*, 396.

²³ Glenn W. Most. "Homer (fl. c.700 BC)", *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 3534.

²⁴ Osborne, *Ibid*, 14.

²⁵ Kirk, *Ibid*, 398.

²⁶ Wilson, *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁷ *Ibid*, 1.

The Intellectual Composition of *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*²⁸

Ahlâk-ı Alâî, the outcome of an intellectual effort gained only through intensive and disciplined reading and the accumulated experiences of a long life with a witnessing and warning honest heart, can hardly be appreciated. Not exaggerating, yet whatever is told would be lacking from one side or the other. More and more precious, the distinguishing thing about the work is Kinalızâde's own contribution, which makes *Ahlâk-ı Alâî* fabulous. It is extremely difficult, on the one hand, to deepen certain and indubitable knowledge through the compassion of a sensitive heart, and on the other hand, to present in a text what is understood by scholars such as Socrates and Kinalızâde to be the testimony of the heritage of human beings.

Perfectly kneading knowledge with the most Gracious' love, without feeling any hesitation whether he would be condemned or not, due to his serious position in the Ottoman state of the 16th century, Kinalızâde presents a great deal of concrete knowledge, inspiring poems, and wise advice. A rich variety of scholarly names and books, both ancient and contemporary to his time, along with their peculiar contributions to clearly carry the message, help and strengthen the comprehension, and adorn the book with a rich and deep extension which is observable throughout the book. The main fields of its sources are philosophy, religion, history, and literature.

On account of the fact that justice belongs basically to the issue of ethics, the main ethics books, which Kinalızâde applies, will be addressed. Three main ethics books were used. *Akhlāk-ı Nāsirī* is written by Nasīr al-Din Tūsī, *Akhlāk-ı Djalālī* is written by Dawani, and *Tahdhib al-Akhlāk* is written by Miskawayh. Further, the common and similar points among the works of Kinalızâde, Tūsī, Al-Dawani, and Miskawayh will be given in the footnotes.

²⁸ While preparing the ground of *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, for some points, I was indebted to Ayşe Sıdika Oktay by applying her work. For this, it is my responsibility to thank to her for her perfect

Akhlāk-ı Nāsirī

Akhlāk-ı Nāsirī, by which Kınalızâde was the most influenced and applied, was written in Persian by Nasîr al-Din Tûsî in 1245, and translated into English by G. M. Wickens, in 1964.²⁹ Nasîr al-Din Tûsî was an important and influential Shîî scholar in the fields of mathematics, geometry, astronomy, philosophy and theology, and was named in later times al-mu'allim al-thālith "the third teacher."³⁰

As an intellectual work of philosophical ethics, it is divided into three sections: ethics, domestic economics, and politics. The first section on ethics, based upon Ibn Miskawayh's *Tahdhib al-Akhlaq*, was, yet, expanded by Tûsî both in its principles and its treatment of character and virtues. He added a chapter on the cure of the vices that are sicknesses of the soul, being deviations from the state of equilibrium, and included the remedy for them. The sources of the second section on domestic economics are the Arabic translation of Bryson's *Oikonomikos*³¹ and a text by Ibn Sīnā, his *K. al-Siyāsa*. The last section, which is about politics, is followed al-Fārābī's *al-Siyāsa al-madaniyya* and *Fūsul al-Madanī* and Miskawayh's *al-Hikma al-Khālida*. The last part presents the issue of love as the cement of the societies.³²

Akhlāk-i Djalali

Akhlāk-i Djalali, which, as the second source of ethics, Kınalızâde applies, is written in Persian by al-Dawani, born in 1427 at Dawan. He prepared countless commentaries on well-known works of philosophy and

work. See A. S. Oktay, *Kınalızâde Alî Efendi ve Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2005).

²⁹ See Nasîr al-Din Tûsî. *The Nasirean Ethics*, ed and trans, G. M. Wickens, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964).

³⁰ FJ. Ragep. "Al-Tusi, Nasir Al-Din", *EF*.

³¹ The *Oikonomikos*, written by the neo-Pythagorean philosopher Bryson (2nd century A.D.), is regarded as directly or indirectly base of all Arabic treatments of economics. For detail, see W. Heffening. "Tadbir", *EF*.

³² Ragep, *Ibid*.

mystical literature and a number of dogmatic, mystic, and philosophical treatises in Arabic. His best known work is *Akhlāk-i Djalali*.³³

Closely formed from *Akhlāk-ı Nāsirī*, *Akhlāk-i Djalali* is divided into three parts: ethics, economics and politics. Al-Dawani does not take the first theoretical part of *Akhlāk-ı Nāsirī*. The first part is a translation and reworking of an Arabic treatise by Miskawayh, *Tahdhib al-Akhlāk*.³⁴

Tahdhib al-Akhlāk

*Tahdhib al-Akhlāk*³⁵, which is another source Kinalizâde sometimes follows, is written by Miskawayh. Living between 932–1030, he was a philosopher and historian and wrote in Arabic. As a tenth and eleventh century intellect, Ibn Miskawayh was highly influenced by the Greek philosophy. He used philosophy to solve some Islamic problems, yet he hardly applied the religion to model philosophy. "The global vision held by Miskawayh is that of the *Nicomachean Ethics* linked with the Psychology of Plato, the ideas of Galen on the relationship between psychology and physiology, and of Bryson on domestic economy and the education of children."³⁶

As both philosopher and historian, Miskawayh applied two disciplines to produce the most complex ethico-political reflection. Mainly dealing with ethics, Miskawayh *pleaded with conviction for the organizing of philosophical education around and beginning with ethics*.³⁷ *Tahdhib al-Akhlāk* is known as the most didactic, the fullest and most open to the Greek, Iranian, Arab, and Muslim traditions.³⁸

³³ A Turkish thesis was written about Celâleddin Devvâni, his life and works, and his ethics and politics thought. While explaining the ground of *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, I will follow this thesis for the Devvâni's Ethics. See Harun Anay. "Celâleddin Devvâni Hayatı, Eserleri, Ahlâk ve Siyaset Düşüncesi", (PhD Dissertation, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1994),

³⁴ Ann K. S. Lambton. "Al-Dawani", *EF*.

³⁵ Miskawayh. *The Refinement of Character*, ed and trans, Constantine K. Zurayk, (Beirut: Centennial Publications, 1968).

³⁶ M. Arkoun. "Miskawayh", *EF*.

³⁷ Ibid.

CHAPTER 1

THE NOTION OF JUSTICE

1. 1. A Critical Examination of Justice in the *Republic*

1. 1. 1. An Elenchus³⁹ of the Conventional and Sophistical Notion of Justice

Popular and sophistical notion of justice is initially argued through three main characters: Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus. The argument is started with Cephalus, a representative of conventional morality grounded on poetic authority, later continued with Polemarchus, impetuosity of youth, on the ground of proverbial morality and finally with Thrasymachus, the figure of the Sophists. The discussion searches after the concept of justice in ancient Greek understanding and feeling.

Conventional Notion of Justice: Justice as Law Abiding⁴⁰

... whoever lives out a just and holy life:
Sweet hope accompanies,
Fostering his heart, a nurse of his old age,
Hope which most of all pilots
The ever-turning opinion of mortals⁴¹

The investigation of justice starts with Cephalus,⁴² a pagan man who is fairly old and close to death. His age is a strikingly important feature

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ "Elenchus, a cross-examination or refutation. Typically in Plato's early dialogues, Socrates has a conversation with someone who claims to have some sort of knowledge, and Socrates refutes this claim by showing the interlocutor that what he thinks he knows is inconsistent with his other opinions. This refutation is called an elenchus. It is not entirely negative, for awareness of his own ignorance is supposed to spur the interlocutor to further inquiry, and the concepts and assumptions employed in the refutations serve as the basis for positive Platonic treatments of the same topic. In contrast, sophistic elenchi are merely eristic: they aim simply at the refutation of an opponent by any means. Thus, Aristotle calls fallacies that only appear to be refutations 'sophistical elenchi.'" See Robert Audi. (ed). *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, (New York: Cambridge University Press), 1999, 257.

⁴⁰ Justice Based on Poetic Authority

⁴¹ Allan Bloom, *The Republic of Plato² Translated with Notes and an Interpretive Essay*, (USA: A Division of Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), 7.

⁴² Cephalus who is a representative figure of conventional morality, by no means, avoids having philosophical conversation; he rather takes big pleasure. Depicted in a pretty similar

providing ancestral custom due to wisdom gained throughout long experiences. In other words, age signals authority and is *one of the strongest ties which can bind civil society together*.⁴³

The revolutionary road for justice is sparked off a question to Cephalus, whether it is a difficult time of life (328e).⁴⁴ Socrates wants to know *whether the journey to death is rough or smooth*.⁴⁵ Hence, justice is firstly and interestingly related to death. The old man responds via the popular pains of old men. For him, old men have a lot of things to complain, not because of extreme age, yet because of depriving of temperate character. Age is not a matter, yet *a person's character influences the quality of his life more than anything else*.⁴⁶ Cephalus utters that "If one is well-ordered and calm, even old age is only moderately painful. Otherwise, life is hard for the young as well as the old (329d). Thus, temperance that is the first of the four cardinal virtues⁴⁷ toughly grounded justice is firstly mentioned.⁴⁸

Cephalus is next asked what the greatest good that he enjoyed through possession of much money (330d). Due to fearing of death and thinking of the myths told about Hades,⁴⁹ he confesses that he is thinking

to old Socrates, he is not in the circle of Socrates, yet a friend of him. He is a lover of speeches and thereby quite fond of talking with Socrates; however, he is not able often to visit to Socrates due to inabilities of his oldness. Cephalus is someone who is wealthy and spent his youth dealing with plenty of physical pleasures.

⁴³ Ibid, 312.

⁴⁴ For the *Republic*, I used, Plato. *The Republic*, ed and trans, C. D. C. Reeve, (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2004).

⁴⁵ Stanley Rosen, *Plato's Republic A Study*, (London: Yale University Press, 2005), 25.

⁴⁶ C. D. C. Reeve, C. D. C. *Philosopher-Kings the Argument of Plato's Republic*, (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 2006), 6.

⁴⁷ Rosen, Ibid, 27.

⁴⁸ Socrates however raises a general objection rooted from common beliefs is that, according to many, not temperance but money makes one bear the burdens of old age. Although Cephalus agrees with the point at some extent, he adds that money is a necessary means and useful only to people who have temperate character.

⁴⁹ Where people committed injustices in this life are punished. See Şefik Can, "*Hades*" *Klasik Yunan Mitolojisi*, (İstanbul: İnkilab ve Aka Kitabevi, 1963), 156–160; also see Derman Bayladı, "*Hades*" *Mitoloji Tanrıların Öyküsü*, (İstanbul: Say Yayınları, 1997), 49–53.

quite different from his entire life.⁵⁰ Conventional belief, according to which “justice can mean only law-abidingness, and that rewards and punishments in this life and the next are necessary to insure obedience which does not seem to them desirable in itself,”⁵¹ obviously influences his answer.

In addition, temperance is also quite necessary to prolong pleasure, lessen pain, and thus have pleasure. Besides, justice is grace for people who are still alive as having a chance to release from the punishment after death, or to mitigate the fear. As a result, temperance and justice are valued as useful in order to prolong pleasure. Another point here is that justice is grounded on the existence of gods. In other words, “if there are no gods, there is no reason to be just or to worry; if there are, we must simply obey their laws, for that is what they wish.”⁵²

Mentioning a quotation from Pindar,⁵³ concerning the beauty of elders’ lives who had led holy and just lives, Cephalus brings justice and the sweetness of life together. Meanwhile an objection to him is arisen. That is, his life is pleasant due to not temperance, yet money. For this, he claims that the possession of money to be most important for only the people who are decent and orderly (331a). Money is thus essential for decency and order particularly for temperate people who can correct injustices, pay debts, and offer sacrifice for the gods through using it. To note, only the obvious is that decency and orderliness is related to temperance. “Temperance is addressed primarily to oneself, whereas justice, so to speak, is an extension of temperance to others.”⁵⁴

Finally, Socrates discusses Cephalus’ definition of justice⁵⁵ as asking, if it is always correct that justice is telling the truth and paying one’s own debt,

⁵⁰ Obviously, He is worried about injustices that he committed to his fellow citizens during his younger ages and correcting them before he dies.

⁵¹ Bloom, *Ibid*, 315.

⁵² *Ibid*.

⁵³ A famous ancient poet in the tradition of praise poetry, see detail Fowler, *Ibid*, 227.

⁵⁴ Rosen, *Ibid*, 31.

⁵⁵ For Cephalus, justice is telling the truth and paying one’s own debt (331c).

or if this behavior sometimes is unjust (331b). As an objection, Socrates brings an example: If someone borrows a weapon from a person and later the person becomes mad, would it be just to return the weapon to its owner? Would it be just to tell the whole truth the mad man (331c)? Having a certain ambiguity of character, this example points out the exclusiveness of cases and context in which justice is applied. It is true that paying one's own debt and telling the truth is justice, yet it can be reverse in some situations as returning a weapon to a madman.

Justice Based on Reasoned Experience

After Cephalus, his son, Polemarchus, defends the laws. He also applies the poetic authority,⁵⁶ yet he mostly attempts to reason his own experiences with respect to the ancestral laws. Polemarchus offers his father's definition of justice and adds that justice is to give to each man what is owed (331e). For the example, he mentions Simonides.⁵⁷ To give what is owed or to give the suitable property to each person means to do good to our fiends and bad to our enemies. That justice is to benefit friends and harm enemies.

At this stage, Socrates turns to the knowledge of the crafts. Therefore, justice must be a kind of knowledge. For this, he asks what is owed in order for a craft to be called medicine, and he adds to which things it is owed. In subsequent discussion, it is reached that a doctor has knowledge of medicine to prescribe the exact medicine to his patients and thus cure them. Hence, for a craft to be called medicine, it owes drugs, food, and drinks (332c). Now

⁵⁶ In Greece, where there was no sacred book like the Bible, the poets were regarded as inspired authorities on religion and morals. See Macdonald Cornford. *The Republic of Plato*, (USA: Oxford University Press, 1945), 8.

⁵⁷ "The poet whose verse probably best represents a classical synthesis of this rich cultural legacy is the aforementioned Simonides, a professional bard who not only served some of the wealthiest and most powerful aristocratic families in Greece, but who also became in effect the "poetlaureate" of the Polis on the basis of the many commissions he received to commemorate the Greek war-dead in after math of the Persian Wars." For detail, see Joseph Michael Bryant. "Moral Codes And Social Structure In Ancient Greece: A study on the social origins of Greek Ethics...", (PhD Dissertation. University of Toronto, 1978), 269.

that justice is kind of art⁵⁸ not seen as quickly as other arts are realized. A just man has knowledge of his art, and he is also successful at his craft (332d).

The second step of the argument commences with the earlier definition of justice that is doing good to friends and harming to enemies (332d). It was also concluded that the art of medicine is best able to give what is owed to the body. A physician is defined as someone who is most able to use the knowledge of his art to do good to sick friends and bad to enemies. Thus, the sequence of justice is based on two steps; in the first step, there is technical obligation of the art, namely to have knowledge of it. In the second step, the obligation of justice follows as doing good to friends and bad to enemies.

Meanwhile, a question arisen is that, what is the difference of the art of justice from other arts (332d)? According to Polemarchus, justice is most distinct with the affairs of war and alliance. The conditions, Socrates reminds, in which doctors, pilots, and just men are "useful."⁵⁹ That is to say, if there is no sick person, then the physician is useless; if the pilot is not on a sea voyage, then he is too useless. What is underlined here is that the arts are directly connected to their enactment. Besides, for Polemarchus, justice is useful particularly for making contracts in peace times (333a).

Next, playing draughts with who is more useful, the just man or the skilled man, Socrates asks. Moreover, Socrates, by no difficulty, proves that a talented soldier, not a just man, is a better company in the times of war, and a skilled builder, again not a just man, is better one sought in peace time to lay bricks and stones. The result of the argument is that justice is useful

⁵⁸ Regarding justice as an art, Stauffer critics as such: "This search for the "art" of justice is, in turn, only the first part of a three-part critique of the definition of justice as helping friends and harming enemies..." Then he presents three questions answered in the passage these are: "(1) In what respect is justice useful for helping friends and harming enemies? (2) Who are friends? and (3) Does it really belong to the just man to harm anyone whatsoever?" See Devin Andrew Stauffer. "Plato's Introduction to the Question of Justice", (PhD Dissertation, Boston College, 1998), 47.

⁵⁹ "Useful" is defined as a consequence of technical knowledge, see Rosen, Ibid, 34.

neither during war times nor peace times. The problem that is there is no room for the art of justice. Justice is issued as the exercise of an art, and arts are tools to benefit or harm. Besides, arts have subject matter but justice does not. As a consequence, justice is not an art and cannot benefit or harm.⁶⁰

In order to depict in which specific dimension justice is useful, Socrates asks, when a just person is a more useful partner than anyone else (333c). The answer is that *the just man is specially useful in business, where his honesty can be relied on.*⁶¹ But, having knowledge of a good such as horses is useful to choose a proper one and establish the price. Thus, having knowledge about goods by no means requires one to be just. Consequently, it is proved that *technical knowledge is not the same as justice,*⁶² yet justice is useful for the enforcement of the contract.

After some further discussion, Polemarchus comes to agree with Socrates that justice is useful only for guarding things that are not "in use." Then, Socrates questions that justice cannot be something excellent, if it is only useful for useless things (333e). The reasoning used in this argument is quite defective, so what Socrates is doing is beyond a doubt to confuse Polemarchus. Furthermore, the argument draws another important point that is, things which are not "in use" are adequately protected by guardians in order to be used in proper times. Thus, guardianship is underlined in order to ground further arguments as the essential element of justice.

Subsequently, Socrates reemphasizes the knowledge of justice that lets its owner to do good to friends and bad to enemies; so justice, in this context, is laid as *the decision to use it for good rather than for bad reasons.*⁶³ Hence, a good guardian who is perfectly protecting people is also someone who is expertly able to steal enemy's plans; therefore, a just man is

⁶⁰ Bloom, *Ibid*, 320.

⁶¹ Julia Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 24.

⁶² Rosen, *Ibid*, 34.

at the same time good at stealing enemy's plans. This is not problematic when considering affairs of war; however, a problem immediately arises, if this argument is employed to the thesis that is a just man who perfectly guards money. That is to say, a just man is someone who is good at preserving money and who is at the same time excellent at stealing it (333e-334a). Thus, "instead of being the model of reliability, the just man becomes the archetype of untrustworthiness. He is a thief and a liar, the contrary of the debt-paying and truth-telling just man."⁶⁴ The falsity here is that justice, by no means, avoids doing wrong. But, justice primarily involves in a knowledge that is beneficial for men. In other words, it is certain that justice requires the decision not to steal money. Apparently, Socrates confuses him in order to lead him for further discussion and make him thoroughly see the ground of his defective view.

Meanwhile, a crucial question arises that is if it is just to harm one's enemy. The identity of people, whether they are friends or enemies, next leads the conversation. Finally, Socrates carries on the argument about the results of harming dogs and horses that make them worse. In a sense of training animals, harming beyond a doubt brings not excellence. Consequently, harming a man will not perfect him, yet rather worsen him. That is to say, to harm an unjust man will make him more unjust. However, justice is something that involves in human perfection. Therefore, Polemarchus comes to agree that a just man never harms anyone (335d).⁶⁵

⁶³ Ibid, 34.

⁶⁴ Bloom, Ibid.

⁶⁵ A very interesting and helpful critics to think, made by Stauffer as such: "If the definition of justice as helping friends and harming enemies, as Polemarchus originally intended it, is the consummate political understanding of justice, which sees the world as divided into various groups, or cities, all potentially in conflict with one's own group or city (see 332e5), Socrates has led Polemarchus to a new definition of justice which is apolitical to an extreme. Considering the almost certainly inevitable division of the world into multiple political bodies... Socrates has pushed Polemarchus to an understanding of justice which no city, and no individual who must be a member of a city, could reasonably act upon. ... the definition of justice as helping friends and harming enemies, ... allows, or even requires, the harming of just men... But why, then does Socrates push for a view of justice which would be impossible, ... to act upon? Surely he is not naïve about the

In these arguments, Polemarchus is someone who represents the common sense to define the popular notion of justice. Throughout discussion, Socrates obviously tries to confuse Polemarchus and thus points him to rethink his view.⁶⁶ He attempts to show the inadequacy of his thesis; *Polemarchus cannot defend that account against the elenchus.*⁶⁷ In other words, Socrates fairly portrays that “someone like Polemarchus is implicitly thinking of justice as being like a skill with a given end but with the defect that in this case there is no important given end that justice helps us to attain.”⁶⁸

Justice as Advantageous for the Stronger

Thrasymachus⁶⁹ violently enters the discussion⁷⁰ with his impressive statements:

What nonsense you two have been talking all this time, Socrates! Why do you act like naïve people, giving way to one another? (336b) ... Justice is nothing other than what is advantageous for the stronger (338c2–3).

That “justice is nothing other than what is advantageous for the stronger” is the definition of justice announced by Thrasymachus is in fact the definition made by the society. In a position as being the representative

obstacles involved. ... but by leading Polemarchus down this unreasonable path, Socrates does bring to light one of the ways in which political life inevitably sacrifices some of the demands of justice.” See Stauffer, *Ibid*, 63-5.

⁶⁶ According to J. Annas, Polemarchus has the idea of justice that is a skill, on the basis of the analogies with other skills. For detailed information see *Ibid*, 24.

⁶⁷ Reeve, *Ibid*, 9.

⁶⁸ Annas, *Ibid*, 27-8.

⁶⁹ As a famous sophist, Thrasymachus, having a broad sense of knowledge, is a professional intellectual and particularly an expert teacher of public speaking. Having a bad temper as acting in insulting manner and rigorously demanding money, he bursts into the argument through scolding Socrates before the audience. Thrasymachus is quite angry at what has hitherto been discussed that is nonsense inasmuch as obeying certain laws just because not to be subjected to the divine punishments and social pressure and doing good to others rather than seeking better is a sort of weakness. For more information see, Nils Christian Rauhut, “In search of Thrasymachus: The role of Thrasymachus in the Ethical Argument of Plato's ‘Republic’”, (PhD Dissertation. University of Washington, 1997).

⁷⁰ “As a result of Thrasymachus’ attack on justice,” Stauffer continues, “the discussion in Book One will take an important turn. ... at a certain point the guiding question will shift from the question of what justice is to the question of whether justice is good... But this turn should raise a number of questions.” See Stauffer, *Ibid*, 85.

of the city, Thrasymachus construes his thesis by means of expressing the way through which the laws are made. The laws, Thrasymachus explains, are made in accordance with the advantages of the rulers who hold power and govern different cities. Rulers, being able to constitute their sovereign, are definitely stronger. Obeying these laws, in which the sovereign of rulers is embodied, is justice according to the city. That is to say, Thrasymachus presents the view of the society and also explains why he has become very angry. "The city insists that its laws are just and punishes those who break them. Anger seems a proper reaction to lawbreakers who are thought to harm others for their selfish ends."⁷¹ However, Thrasymachus delineates laws that, instead of feeding the common goods, are grounded on the selfish interests of the rulers. Thus, they to some extent harm the rest of the city. Although Thrasymachus initially seems to present what the city says, "his real position is the immoralist one..."⁷²

In the course of the argument, stating "the just is the same everywhere what is advantageous for the stronger," (339a4) Thrasymachus formulates that the advantages of stronger are equal to the advantages of rulers. By this way, the behaviors of a tyrant are equaled to the other rulers'. However, Thrasymachus, soon after, delineates that tyranny is the most complete injustice (344a4). Later, he comes to agree that "justice is really the good of another" (343c3–4). Now that the cases claimed by Thrasymachus become controversial on account of the fact that he has firstly claimed that it is just for the rulers to decree through their legislation in accordance with their own advantages, yet later he accepts that another's advantage is justice. His argument is a really shifting route, so it is very possible to think, "Thrasymachus is not giving a definition of justice, but

⁷¹ Bloom, *Ibid*, 327.

⁷² Annas, *Ibid*, 35.

rather is debunking it by pointing out the standard effects of justice as usually understood."⁷³

Thrasymachus is assuming the popular understanding of justice, grounded on the well-known poem of Hesiod, *Works and Days*.⁷⁴ According to it, an unjust action is a sort of action that breaks the laws and social norms,⁷⁵ whereas just action involves following the laws. Further,

According to Hesiod, justice is the key to a good and successful life: for law (*nomos*) was allocated to humans by Zeus, and he rewards those who uphold it and punishes the unjust.⁷⁶

Hence, Thrasymachus wanders around popular view of justice depended on the moral tradition of the society, based on the rewards for abiding rules and punishment for violating them. Having divine ground, justice is strictly related to abide the laws with respect to existence of rewards.

Before going on the depth of the argument, some points should be analyzed. First of all, it is obvious that Thrasymachus has never had philosophical discussion before. Secondly, his understanding of advantage is based on worldly goods such as money and power. Thirdly, rulers seek their own advantages while making laws since people naturally demand to have more goods. For its consequence, justice is seen as advantageous to the rulers.

Moreover, Thrasymachus claims that justice is an issue of hypocrisy since people avoid doing injustice due to fear of pain (344c3–4). All show that what Thrasymachus, who strongly believes in monopolizing political

⁷³ Gerasimos Santas, (ed). *The Blackwell Guide to Plato's Republic*, (USA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 45.

⁷⁴ *Works and Days* that is one of the central works of the Greek moral tradition. One of Hesiod's concerns in the *Works and Days* is to denounce unjust behavior: he condemns a range of misdeeds including bribe-taking, dishonesty, cheating one's neighbor, perjury, and fraud. Santas, Ibid.

⁷⁵ The traditional association of justice with *nomos*, what counts as "just" in a community depends on what the rulers decree. Ibid.

⁷⁶ Santas, Ibid, 46.

power and wealth in a city, suggests as an ideal is a tyrant. However, results of justice, such as psychological influence on individuals and the family, are just disregarded since they are not material. That is to say, the worldview of Thrasymachus is formed with the power and wealth. Now, the steps of the argument will be analyzed in detail.

The Strict Definition of a Ruler

In the very beginning of the argument, Socrates asks whether the rulers are liable to error just as other people (339c). His question implicitly traces whether rulers err about the means to their private advantages. The answer of Thrasymachus is that they are, beyond a doubt, able to make mistakes. That means, rulers sometimes do what is against their own interests. Hence, what Thrasymachus utters here is exactly contradicting what he has explained before. Beside, "Thrasymachus was interested in the ruler only as long as he unreflectingly assumed that the ruler would be, in fact, the man who was the stronger, the one with the greatest command of resources and power."⁷⁷ At this stage, Clitophon enters the discussion with claiming, "The only source and sanction of law is the sovereign and the laws established by the rulers are based on their apparent advantage."⁷⁸ For him, what Thrasymachus claims is just *the actual practice of cities*.⁷⁹

As giving voice what really goes in the cities, Thrasymachus attempts to establish his thesis on account that fallible laws are defective and cannot be authoritative in cities. Due to causing self-contradiction, he soon adjusts his speaking as asserting that an expert at any craft requires not erring. As an example, he mentions doctors, as an expert, due to having strict knowledge of his craft, will make no errors in the case of curing (340e). Therefore, a ruler is an expert, so he will never fail in making errors. He precisely states, "A ruler, to the extent that he is a ruler, never makes errors and unerringly decrees what is best for him." (340e).

⁷⁷ Annas, Ibid, 41.

⁷⁸ Bloom, Ibid, 329.

Thrasymachus now puts forward a new concept that is “a real ruler.” Here, he draws the concept into a precise and strict meaning. This ideal concept is firstly issued by Thrasymachus. Besides, Thrasymachus and Socrates agree that ruling is a sort of art, and people who truly have knowledge of their art and expertly govern a city are real rulers. These people, on the other hand, are not supposed to have general knowledge about life.

Further, in what conditions a ruler would be just or unjust is inquired. The solution will at the same time answer the question of Socrates is that “do you think it is a trivial matter you are trying to determine, and not rather a way of life—the one that would make living life that way most profitable for each of us?” (344e) In other words, it is, in fact, carrying one of the most essential demands of men as a rational being to know the most worthwhile way to live on.

Serving the Good of the Subject Matter (341c–342e)

Every art, with the agreement of Socrates and Thrasymachus, has a unique subject matter and aims its own advantageous (341d). In word to say, “every craft has a distinctive end, which consists in serving the good of its subject matter; thus the craft-practitioner “in the strict sense” serves the good of the subject matter, not his own.”⁸⁰ In fact, *he forgets himself completely*.⁸¹ As a consequence, a doctor, as an expert in his field, is motivated to cure his patients, not because of money, or praise, yet rather for the goodness of the patient since the aim of medicine is the health of patients.

In addition, the various crafts rule over and are stronger than that with which they deal (342c). To be stronger means to serve the good of the weaker. Thus, a ruler, who is stronger than his subjects and mostly deals with his subjects’, aims the advantages of his subjects. However, Socrates

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Santas, Ibid, 49.

points out that since according to the account of Thrasymachus, a real ruler seeks his own advantageous, he is not a real craft, namely a ruler. Thrasymachus ridicules Socrates through accusing him being naive and asks about shepherds and cowherds (343b). The example of shepherd is sarcastically brought in order to provide that there are some sorts of craft that aims, not subject matter on which it is treated, namely sheep, but the benefits of their masters. Nevertheless, Socrates insists what he has claimed that even in the art of shepherding the aim is the welfare of sheep, not shepherd (345c1–345d5). As a result, the argument is stayed as two polar opposites, yet at the same time each one is plausibly supported.

Furthermore, the payment of the masters of the crafts is next discussed (345e–3457d). The payment named as wage-earning is distinct from the ends of the crafts but the result of them. Therefore, it can be said that wage-earning is a sort of craft that is practiced by not weaker people, yet masters of the crafts in common. "Thus Socrates, whose explicit intention was to show that the practitioners of arts cannot be concerned with their own advantage, has, by the introduction of the wage earner's art, tacitly admitted the necessity and legitimacy of that concern."⁸²

Being Better of Anyone (349b–350c)

The issue of the argument continues with whether a craftsman wants to be better than someone who is like him. Socrates claims that an expert will not seek to be better than his fellow experts yet rather want to be the same as them who perform the same craft. Socrates brings examples from medicine and music. Two expert physicians will come together on the proper treatment, and two expert musicians will play on the right tuning just as *mathematicians are all seeking the same result to the same problem.*⁸³ Experts will not attempt to outdo the other because of their skill. An expert,

⁸¹ Bloom, *Ibid*, 331.

⁸² *Ibid*, 334.

⁸³ *Ibid*, 325.

explains Socrates, attempts to only outdo the non-experts. Furthermore, he has positive attributes as being good.

Nonetheless, a non-expert, having no knowledge of a craft as an expert, wants to be better than everyone else. An unjust person is also someone who seeks to be better than both experts and non-experts. Therefore, the unjust person is someone who does not perform a craft and is a non-expert. Being exactly different from an expert, he seems ignorant and greedy. Beyond a doubt, justice is regarded as *virtue and wisdom and injustice is vice and ignorance*.⁸⁴

The ruler, introduced by Thrasymachus is someone who is a tyrant and never makes mistakes. In addition, he seeks his own advantages; that is to say, he is not a real craft; namely, he is a non-expert and practices injustice in respect with justice depicted on a craft ground.

Justice Essential as a Band (351b–352b)

Socrates puts forward that injustice induces conflicts between any groups of people inasmuch as a group of people can be successful at their all aims if and only if they act towards each other in a just way and come together to act as a whole, composed of different parts. That is to say, *in groups justice unifies, empowers, and enables successful action, while injustice does the opposite*.⁸⁵

Moreover, Socrates claims that justice works similar in one person's soul as unifying and empowering the actions of one person. The analogy is dependent on the thesis that regards the soul of human being as a whole consisting of component parts to work together.

Justice as Virtue (352d–354a)

The next argument starts with questioning function of anything in order thus to lay the ground of the virtue of a thing that enables it to function efficiently. For example, the virtue of eyes is to see, ears to hear.

⁸⁴ Santas, Ibid, 53.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 54.

From there, the function of the human soul is delineated as taking care of things, ruling, deliberating, and so on (353d3–10). At the next step, they come to agree that justice is the virtue of human soul (353e). Hence, justice, as a proper virtue, enables a human soul to perform its functions effectively. By this way, a just soul lives well and becomes happy, whereas the unjust one is wretched⁸⁶ (354a). Therefore, “justice is not only a better sign of intelligence than injustice, it is a better bet if you want to live well and be happy.”⁸⁷

Mainly three arguments are aimed to refute Thrasymachus’ thesis. The first one has been illustrated that even though Thrasymachus appears to hold the conventional understanding, he is, in fact, rather fond of applause. He fundamentally wants to be better off and get more than others. The city, having the conventions, holds a position seeking common good in a harmony along with having no competition. Thus the result of the argument reaches a point that the “just man is more like the wise man in this than is the unjust man. Hence justice is virtue and injustice vice.”⁸⁸

The second argument has been brought by Socrates in order to show that justice is necessary for a group to have success at performing their aims. That justice is a means to an end. Here, the understanding of justice is claimed to have no difference with the understanding of a band of robbers or thieves, or any other group with a common unjust purpose inasmuch as they proceed to their own advantages through binding other people to proceed according to their self-interests.

The third argument puts forward justice in favor of virtue that enables a thing to do its work effectively and efficiently. For instance, sickness, regarded as defectiveness of performance, is not preferred by a live thing;

⁸⁶ As a supporting view, Jensen, in his dissertation, along with critics and other articles, explains and defends that the main thesis of the Republic shows that justice is worth having due to its contribution to felicity. For detail, see Randall Mark Jensen. “Happiness and Justice in Plato’s ‘Republic’”, (PhD Dissertation. University of California, 1997).

⁸⁷ Annas, Ibid, 53.

⁸⁸ Bloom, Ibid, 335.

justice, on the other hand, as virtue to allow a thing to work efficiently, is wished.

Finally, the conventional understanding justice is thus proved to be as a shambles to need lots of amending. In the course of the arguments, the concept of justice that is a virtue not only for a living thing but also for a non-living has not been defined, yet it has been become clear that it is a problem.

1. 1. 2. An Inquiry for a Genuine Conception: Why to Be Just?

The discussion with Thrasymachus ends with Socrates' questioning remarks for the notion: What justice is, what sort of virtue it is, and how it contributes one's life that is to say, whether it brings happiness to one's life or not (354b-c). In a sense, by means of claiming that he does not know the answers of these questions, he presents the need for a query of justice. The first dealing is the definition of the notion in so far as the kind of virtue and its importance to one's life can be reached.

Why to Be Just?

What further argument, then, should we choose justice over the greatest injustice? For if we possess such injustice with a false façade ... both while we are living and when we are dead ... So ... Socrates, what device could get someone with any power—whether of mind, wealth, body, or family—to be willing to honor justice, and not laugh aloud when he hears it praised? (366b3–366c3)

At the very start of the second book, Socrates emphasizes that the first book is only a prelude of the notion. That why to be just is the next significant question confronts Socrates. His interlocutors, Glaucon and Adeimantus,⁸⁹ brothers of Plato, have quite different characters from

⁸⁹ Depicted in noble characters as deserving to be statesmen and the students of Socrates, they are, in the argument, representing the common sense which in reality recognizes unjust life over just life. Two brothers attempt to represent different, yet complementary wings of the same view. While Glaucon establishes his thesis on the nature by means of what he has observed, the other determines his challenge on opinions that are what he has heard. Glaucon and Adeimantus, drawn to politics as two of the best youths of Athenian, challenge the conception of justice, seemed as just completed in the first book, in order thus to see justice truly vindicated.

Thrasymachus as easily passing the requirements of sensual world. Needless to say, they ask Socrates to refute the city's understanding of the notion.

"Glaucón and Adeimantus have often heard the arguments of rhetoricians and sophists, all of which, according to Glaucon, propound the thesis of Thrasymachus ... the application to politics of pre-Socratic philosophy."⁹⁰ In fact, they question the outcome of pre-Socratic philosophy, according to which there is no justice in nature. Justice, as a result, is convention. As a matter of dealing of most people, politics is drawn from this philosophy. Its teaching is based on not the laws or justice, yet rather rhetoric. In other words, pre-Socratic philosophy is well fitted to the city and its laws. Thus, searching after justice, philosophical challenge of Socrates, is an occupation of truth, essentially needing to be fed from natural dependents, against the will of the city founded on ancestral laws and teachers of rhetoric.

Most people, Glaucon and Adeimantus claim, overall avoid doing injustice on account of the very fact that they are afraid of being caught and punished. That is why justice is desired. The main motivation that imposes the common sense according to their expression is rather extrinsic. In word to say, people prefer to seem just, instead to be really just. The ground of the question that is posed before Socrates is that why to really choose a just life and thus to prize it for its own sake is strictly linked to the nature and essence of justice.

Justice on Account of What Has Been Seen Related to Nature

The argument starts with Glaucon's seeking of genuine ground of the conception of justice. It is what makes justice better than injustice (357a4-b3). He asks Socrates to tell him, whether he thinks that there is a sort of good they welcome, not because they desire its consequences, but because they welcome it for its own sake (357b). Glaucon pretends to praise injustice through elaborating what has been regarded by the city that binds its

citizens into a circle founded on the absolute principles of things: ancestral laws supported by divine will and myths.

The Suitable Place of Justice

In order to find out what kind of good justice is, three kinds of good intuitively valued are presented and illustrated by Glaucon.⁹¹ These are the first that is valued only for its own sake, the second good that is valued for its own sake and its consequences, and the third good that is valued only for its consequences (357b–d). These goods are delineated according to their structures, being intrinsic or instrumental goods. Things such as happiness are intrinsic goods valued only for their own sake. Some other things such as health and knowledge are intrinsic and instrumental goods valued for both their sake and consequences, and the things that are instrumental goods are valued for only their consequences such as money.

Although the first sort of good seems as the best good, Glaucon construes that the first type of good such as “harmless pleasures” can not be the highest good in so far as they are valued only for their sake, and there is nothing beyond their enjoyment (357b7–9). However, the second sort of goods is valued not only for their sake that is passing after its enjoyment but also for their consequences that come afterward so as to constitute the ultimate good for human being. Health, for example, is a good initially desired for its own sake; it is praiseworthy in its own account. It is generally regarded as the means contributing to have a nice life. As to say, health is praised for two reasons; the first one is that it is good in itself, and the other is its contribution to the best life to lead.

Glaucon obviously wants Socrates to establish that justice is best fitted to the second type of good. However, happiness wished, beyond justice, is another good that is partly constitutive; thus, justice is good for its own sake and also for another good. As to say, justice is *as intrinsically good on the*

⁹⁰ Bloom, *Ibid*, 338.

*grounds that it is instrumentally good.*⁹² In so far, Socrates is asked to prove that justice should be an ultimate good having nothing beyond itself, yet at the same time carrying something else.

The Origin of Justice: Contractual Agreement

Glaucou further the justice account of the mass (358c6–358d3, 367a9–367b2) in order thus to push Socrates to genuinely prove that justice is preferable to injustice. Socrates shares the view of Glaucon about the mass' regard of justice as the third kind of good. In so far as, most of the people understand justice as a necessary and certain way in order to have a peaceful life, expresses Glaucon, they follow the demands of justice. This is also compatible with the nature of justice, adds Glaucon. "According to Glaucon, the character of justice can be discovered in its origin; the nature of a thing, in his view, is to be understood by that from which it comes, by its beginning and not its end."⁹³ In order to lay ground for his claim, Glaucon describes a historical society which does not have any systematic structure. No laws, no judicial system, no government, no police, anything makes life in an organized way. By means of this example, Glaucon attempts to trace back the origin and nature of justice. In this kind of society, injustice that disturbs most of the people grounds the society; hence, the people make laws in order not to suffer and to be protected from lawless applications. By this way, they produce justice through establishing the prescripts of justice. This is the natural origin of justice which Glaucon suggests (359a2–5).

Glaucou puts forward some crucial points related to the very nature and origin of justice on behalf of the mass. He claims that justice is an outcome of people's agreements. Its origin is based on the essential need of men to be protected from lawless states, and its nature is thus formed by its contractual origin. Therefore, people exercise justice, not for the sake of

⁹¹ For a useful interpretation of this classification, see Robert Heinaman. "Plato's Division of Goods in the *Republic*", *Phronesis*, XLVII 2002, 309–335.

⁹² Santas, *Ibid*, 68.

⁹³ Bloom, *Ibid*, 341.

justice, yet instead for the harmful effects of lawless states. Thus, they do justice unwillingly, just because of unavoidable circumstances; otherwise, they would not deal with justice. This account, beyond a doubt, describes justice as the third type of good.

Here some critics confront the readers. In the first place, Glaucon has to lay certain proofs for the historical basement since he claims that the nature of justice is grounded upon its origin, the agreement of men. What he implies here is that its nature is extrinsic. In the second place, Glaucon constantly uses, "what most people say." This can not be sufficient for their confirmation. Finally, the contractual origin, strictly directed to historical and contextual circle, can not pertain to ultimate good that overarches times and places.

No One is willingly Just: Justice only with Impunity (360c5-6)

The tale of Gyges, the well known mythical tale,⁹⁴ is put forward by Glaucon as reflecting the motivation of most people to be just. The story mainly talks about a ring which has extraordinary power that allows someone whoever uses it not to be detected (359d 360b2). The idea in essence centered suggests that most people are just due to the fear of punishment. Glaucon's claim is that *this, some would say, is strong evidence that no one is just willingly, but only when compelled* (360c5–6).

Two points here are quite striking. In the first place, the tale is delineated as "strong evidence." In the second place, "no one is just willingly" is another rather big questionable claim. Further, the motivation to do wrong and the fear not to do injustice are separated. That is to say, people are not aware of what motivates them to act moral, or prudential.⁹⁵ It is intended to distinguish *real-world motivational concomitants from one*

⁹⁴ By recounting the story of a mythical ring is said to belong to the ancestor of the Lydian, Gyges.

⁹⁵ Why a woman cheats her husband or not: Because in fact we need to fear being caught on almost every occasion of wrongdoing, our motives for avoiding wrongdoing may never be completely transparent to us. For detail see, Santas, *Ibid.*, 73–4.

another.⁹⁶ Thus, it can become visible that the motivation behind being just, according to tale, is related to impunity; if it were possible not to be caught and punished after doing injustice, people would definitely choose to do injustice (359c2–6, 360b2–360c5). With this claim, Glaucon establishes justice *as an unpleasant but unavoidable burden*.⁹⁷

Justice on Account of What Has Been Heard as Opinions

Soon Glaucon finishes his challenge; Adeimantus continues what has started by his brother as the defense of the city's understanding. His point of view is formed out of the rewards of justice, namely reputation gained by unjust men. He applies the poems that depict just men unhappy, yet unjust men happy with the gods' favor, inasmuch as according to the *horizon constructed by the poets and the horizon bounded by the presence of the gods*,⁹⁸ justice does not bring happiness. However, Adeimantus wants to hear something different from Socrates. That is why he extremely challenges Socrates through the very understanding of the city.

The Life of Injustice over the Life of Justice

Vice in abundance is easy to get,
The road is smooth and begins beside you,
But the gods have put sweat between us and virtue (364d)⁹⁹

By means of Gyges tale, people are offered a life that does not bring any bad conclusion as a reprisal. People have two choices as life type: They can either lead a life embodied in injustice applications along with being happy and having good reputation and rewards deserved by the just, or they can lead a real just life yet having injustice reputations and lots of punishments.

In the first type of life, people, having a good reputation, attempt to succeed and mostly become successful in a very secure atmosphere. However, they neither deal with nor follow the demands of justice in so far

⁹⁶ Ibid, 74.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Bloom, Ibid, 342.

⁹⁹ *Works and Days* 287–9, with minor alterations.

as they escape from punishments. Indeed, they do lots of bad actions, yet, since they seem just that is to say, their bad actions are not known and are held in high esteem as modal figures in a society. On the other hand, other people who sincerely serve justice are regarded as dishonest and bad tempered people. Actually, they highly intend to do right and good things but receive lots of unfair punishments.

After expressing the life types, Adeimantus claims that most people would choose the first type of life. In other words, most people in reality would not want to be just, yet seem. So, justice is the third kind of good. These two premises require and thus complete each other. Adeimantus, through life type choice, suggests two claims. The first one is that people would lead an unjust life instead of a just life. By means of this, he describes the real motivation of people to choose a life style and their expected behaviors in reprisal context.¹⁰⁰ The second claim is that it is right to choose an unjust life that is offered. Nevertheless, it is very possible to utter that choosing an unjust life over a just life is wrongdoing.

Socrates confuses his bewildering and utters, "I am at a loss as to what to do. I do not see how I can be of help. Indeed, I believe I am incapable of it" (368b3–5) at the end of the challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus about the very nature and desirability of justice. He is not sure whether he can defend that just life is better than unjust life. That why someone would choose just life for the sake of it, not for any thing else, is a huge dealing embodied in very nature and essence of justice. On account of the pressure of the people gathered around the discussion, Socrates decides to defend justice, by means of not thoroughly answering the questions, but establishing a city as the manifestation of the answers.

¹⁰⁰ In so doing, he makes a bald assertion to which he is not entitled, a claim offered both as a description of people's true motives and as a prediction of their likely conduct in counterfactual circumstances. In neither case does his assertion alone show him to be justified. Santas, *Ibid*, 77-78.

1. 2. The Usage of the Notion in *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*

1. 2. 1. Terminological Basis of the Concept: *Vasat* and *İ'tidāl*

Mid-point (*Vasat*)

Mid-point (*vasat*)¹⁰¹ is explained in two senses. One, just as the center of a circle, is that stands between two things, such as four stands between two and six. Named as true mid-point is the equilibrium state (*ī'tidāl*).¹⁰² However, Kinalizâde states, this is generally not preferred by philosophers so that, instead of it, he introduces the relative mid-point, widely used in the ethics. In word to say, this implies that virtues are changing in accordance with time, places, and also persons.¹⁰³

The State of Equilibrium (*ī'tidāl*)

The State of Equilibrium (*ī'tidāl*), another significant word related to the concept of justice in the thought of Kinalizâde, is a summit that should be reached and after that carefully protected. It is profoundly used to delineate a delicate measure needed by all living things including the harmony and balance between both alive and solid elements constructing bodies and souls. He explains it as such:

... like center and circle; just as on the surface of a circle, on point (which is its center) is the farthest of (all) points from the circumference; while of (all) other points round about, the number of which cannot be reckoned or computed, whether on the circumference or within it, each one is nearer to the circumference than (is) the center; so virtue likewise has a delimitation, which is

¹⁰¹ It is obvious that Kinalizâde's regard of mid-point (*vasat*) is firstly taken from the verse of Qur'an that is, "And thus have We willed you to be a community of the middle way so that [with your lives] you might bear witness to the truth before all mankind ..." The Qur'an 2: 143. Secondly, Miskawayh gives "the pictures of virtues and vices that ... his Tahdhib al-Akhlaq brings together in a systematic form the four cardinal virtues (wisdom, temperance, courage and justice) defined as the just means (*wasat*) between two extremes representing the vices (*radhā'il*). He also invents a technical lexicon of ethics in which the definitions of the virtues and vices known in the Arab tradition come to be joined with those, more philosophically elaborated, of the Nicomachean ethics." See M. Arkoun. "Miskawayh", *EF*². Thirdly, it is seen in Aristotle's work. For this, see Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI 29, 1106a25–30.

¹⁰² At this issue, Kinalizâde thinks the same as Tūsī, Devvâni, and Miskawayh. For this, see KINALIZÂDE, 117; Nasir al-Din Tūsī. *The Nasirean Ethics*, ed and trans, G. M. Wickens, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964), 86; also Anay, *Ibid*, 318.

¹⁰³ KINALIZÂDE, 118; Anay, *Ibid*, 282.

at the farthest extreme from vices, and deviation from that limit necessarily cause proximation to a vice.¹⁰⁴

The word the state of equilibrium (*i'tidāl*), having the same root with the concept of justice (*'adālat*), is used more than the mid-point is. However, Kinalizâde much widely utters that the state of equilibrium (*i'tidāl*) is mid-point. He also states that justice (*'adālat*) is mid-point that is the state of equilibrium (*i'tidāl*).¹⁰⁵ Hence, it becomes clear that justice (*'adālat*) is something mid-point that is the equilibrium state (*i'tidāl*).

Further, Kinalizâde applies the term of the equilibrium state (*i'tidāl*) in the scope of curing of soul illnesses. The psychological illnesses, he believes, are in fact the deviation from the equilibrium state (*i'tidāl*), and treatment of them becomes possible if the sick person reaches the equilibrium state (*i'tidāl*).

Moreover, Kinalizâde uses the word for expressing characteristic needs and the illnesses of bodies. He believes that men are composed of four elements and the harmony and balance between these elements are essential for construction of characters and health of bodies. Here, the equilibrium state (*i'tidāl*) is applied in order to underline the necessary portion of elements for healthy characters and bodies.¹⁰⁶

The term is also applied in the scope of religion. The equilibrium state (*i'tidāl*) is the one, opposite of numbers of vices. The right way that is appreciated in the religion, according to him, is the equilibrium (*i'tidāl*) way, expected from the believers to live on.¹⁰⁷ In addition, the equilibrium way (*i'tidāl*) is the way which all philosophers and saints agree on, let people know, and warn them to be cautious to experience it in order to save the outstanding future live, the eternity of happiness.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 115; Tūsī, 85.

¹⁰⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 135.

¹⁰⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 77.

¹⁰⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 116–7.

¹⁰⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 117.

1. 2. 2. Main Definitions and Applications of the Concept

Ahlâk-ı Alâî although issues the concept of justice (*ʿadālat*) in many separated parts, the chapter of five and six of the first book, particularly focus on it in.¹⁰⁹ Grounding the term on the mid-point (*vasat*) and equilibrium state (*i'tidāl*), Kinalizâde, in the first of the book, mentions it in the case of virtues and vices. In the fifth chapter of the first book, defining justice (*ʿadālat*) as the highest virtues, Kinalizâde continues as such:¹¹⁰

The word 'justice' denotes the idea equivalence (*musāwāt*)¹¹¹; but to conceive of equivalence without regard to unicity (*wahdat*)¹¹² is impossible. Now, inasmuch as unicity is particularized and distinguished as the remotest rank and the highest degree of superiority and perfection-the permeation of its operations from the First Principle (which is truly One) throughout all numbers being like the diffusion of the lights of existence from the First Cause (which is absolutely Existent) throughout all existent things-so, the nearer one is to unicity the nobler one's existence. This being so, no relationship is nobler than that of equivalence ... among virtues, none is more perfect than the virtue of justice, as is obvious in the discipline of Ethics ... for the true mid-point is justice, all else being peripheral to it and taking its reference therefrom. ...

In the thought of Kinalizâde, denoting the idea of equivalence, justice inevitably requires unicity (*wahdat*). In word to say, he attempts to construe the main base of justice (*ʿadālat*) that is unicity embodied in "equality of right."¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ Although Devvâni examines justice in different places in his book, he also separates a particular place for it in the first chapter. See Anay, *Ibid*, 285.

¹¹⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 135; Tūsî, 95; Miskawayv. *The Refinement of Character*, ed and trans, Constantine K. Zurayk, (Beirut: Centennial Publications, 1968), 101.

¹¹¹ "The etymology of the word [equality] indicates to you its meaning. For counterbalance [id] in actions are all derived from the meaning of equality [musāwāh.] Equality is the noblest of the proportions treated in the art of music and other arts." See Miskawayv, *Ibid*, 101.

¹¹² Tūsî states, "Now just as unicity necessarily implies superiority (indeed, is the cause of permanence and consistence in existent things), so multiplicity necessarily implies inferiority (indeed, is the cause of corruption and abortion in existent things)." *Ibid.*, 95.

¹¹³ Regarding equality as "equality of rights," (Bediuzzaman Said Nursi. *The Flashes*, ed and trans, Şükran Vahide, İstanbul: Sözler Neşriyat, 1997, 226.) Nursi asserts that, "justice without equality is not justice." See Bediuzzaman Said Nursi. *Letters*, ed and trans, Şükran Vahide, İstanbul: Sözler Neşriyat, 1997, 552.

In the next lines, Kinalizâde brings out another definition of justice which philosophers claim. According to this definition, there are three scopes of justice (*‘adālat*).¹¹⁴ In the first one, it is just to give property and goods to two persons equally. The second scope is to be just in the affairs of trade. Finally, to be just is required in the scope of training such as punishments.¹¹⁵

In the following page, Kinalizâde lays justice (*‘adālat*) on three matters: the divine laws, trustworthy judge, and means.¹¹⁶ Later, Kinalizâde mainly relates justice to two realms.¹¹⁷ In the first place, it is issued in the sense of human nature: namely, men’s individuality, attributes and capabilities, and organs. In the second place, justice is laid down on the relationships with other people such as the members of family, servants, and statesmen. In the thought of Kinalizâde, a man can be just, if only he follows the requirement of justice (*‘adālat*) in his individuality, attributes, and capabilities. Neither bodily nor spiritual human elements should be lead astray, yet they must be rather used in the way of God. Further, if someone has a family, servants, and workers, he has to behave towards them according to the divine laws. That is to say, a just man, Kinalizâde implies, is someone who firstly individually practices justice, and then leads his associations taken apart of its practice. Besides, he should ever treat them with mercy. Finally, he presents Aristotle’s understanding of justice and gets in the depth of it.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 135; Tūsī, 96; Miskawayh, 101.

¹¹⁵ These three kinds of justice are related to people relations in a society. See, Fārābī. *Fusūlū’l-Medenī*, ed and trans, Hanefi Özcan, (İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1987), 53–54.

¹¹⁶ They will be explained in detail.

¹¹⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 138. This classification is not seen in Tūsī, yet in the work of Devvâni. There is only one difference that Devvâni presented three scopes. In word to say, he puts justice in the relation of family’s members in the second scope and the relation with state members in the third scope. See Anay, Ibid, 286.

¹¹⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 141; Tūsī, 100; Anay, Ibid, 288. This will be later discussed.

CHAPTER 2

JUSTICE: THE GOOD FOR ITSELF

2. 1. The Account of Soul in the *Republic*

The *Republic* divides the soul into three parts in order to thus bring explanation for the human motivations that are constituted of rational and non-rational kinds and the embodied human soul. Through forming the area of motivations, it delineates the process of deciding to act in the most suitable way among the demands of three parts of the soul. The soul, in the thought of Plato, is the subject to thinking, wishing, tasting, and so on. The embodied soul is composed of different elements, each one having particular performances, responsibilities, and demands.

2. 1. 1. The Tripartite Soul

Do we do each of them with the same thing or, since there are three, do we do one with one and another with another: that is to say, do we learn with one, feel anger with another, and with yet a third have an appetite for the pleasures of food, sex, and those closely akin to them? Or do we do each of them with the whole of our soul, once we feel the impulse? That is what is difficult to determine in a way that is up to the standards of our argument. . . (436a–b)

The analysis of soul is in fact commenced in the second book and covered the larger part in the fourth book. The main reason to get in depth in the soul is the task of Socrates to bring explanation of what justice is and how it benefits people who possess it, since the advantages of injustice are claimed as more beneficial, immediate, and tangible. In order to answer this challenge, Socrates attempts to trace what it is justice for a city believing that a large picture, having all virtues just as human being, will work much more effective to discover the answer.¹¹⁹ The starting point already includes

¹¹⁹ "Man and city are alike" (*Republic*, 577d), on Plato's remark, Korab-Karpowicz states that humans without souls are hollow, and cities without virtue are rotten. In his article, he claims that the *Republic* provides us with a rich source of inspiration for inquiry into the political and moral issues of our times. See Włodzimierz J. Korab-Karpowicz. "On the

the acceptance that, "an adequate account of justice in a city must be applicable to the individual person so as to reveal what it is for an individual to be just."¹²⁰ By means of application of the account of justice to a city, Socrates aims firstly to reveal the tendencies of the soul that each part fits to a class of a city and secondly to examine the structure of each part to have its own characteristics features. "To complete this argument Plato examines various types of unjust cities and analogous souls. The benefits of justice, then, are shown by comparing the harmonious, well-ordered, just city, and just soul to the various discordant, unjust cities, and corresponding souls."¹²¹

Believing in, "the best, righteous political order leads to the harmonious unity of a society and allows all the city's parts pursue happiness but not at the expense of others,"¹²² Socrates firstly outlines a best city that is, certainly, a just city which has three classes, composed of the rulers, the military, and the businesspeople. In a just city, these classes work efficiently via thoroughly concentrating on only their own occupations that, "each individual is supposed to perform only the one task in the community to which he is by nature suited."¹²³ The outline of the city that is the very resemblance of the three parts of the human soul is used as a guide to light to the virtues of the soul (cf. 441c4–7). Both in a city and in human being, justice is the principle of the harmony to combine different parts to function effectively.

Socrates gets started to his account by a question is that when we learn new things, when we are angry, when we are hungry, or when we want to drink or eat something, asks Socrates, "Do we do each of them with the same thing or, since there are three, do we do one with one and another

Power of Virtue: Universalism of Plato's Political Philosophy", *Dialogue and Universalism*, 7–8 (2003), 135–149.

¹²⁰ Santas, *Ibid*, 148–9.

¹²¹ George Klosko. *The Development of Plato's Political Theory*², (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 70.

¹²² As Plato's achievement, Korab-Karpowicz presents the characteristics of a good political society described in the *Republic*. See *Ibid*, 148.

¹²³ Klosko., *Ibid*, 71.

with another ..." (436a8) In short he is asking whether there is one or more desiring subjects in human nature. That is to say, there would not be two opposite things in the same respect to the same thing.

Socrates attempts to find an answer to this question by means of examining the case of motion whether the same thing reveals two opposite of the relevant kind in the same respect (436c11–436d1). That is to say, if it is possible for a thing to be in motion and, at the same time, to be at rest on account of the very fact that being in motion and being at rest are opposite to each other in the same respect. In other words, whether the same thing can display two different states, being motion, or at rest, at the same time, is firstly sought.

Some later, Socrates brings an example of an archer, whose arms push the bow away.¹²⁴ Here, he emphasizes that the arms of the archer, while pushing the bow away, are not drawing towards himself. Through this example, he establishes that *the same thing cannot at the same time be the proper subject of opposites*.¹²⁵

Socrates regarded desire and aversion as two opposite tendencies of the soul in the same respect since desire requires the soul's motion towards it, and aversion entails exactly the opposite tendency of the soul (439b1, 439b3, 439b4, and 439d 1). In other words, something could not be the subject of two different directions of a motion.

Nevertheless, there are sometimes some situations in which, for instance, men want to drink water, yet at the same time do not drink (439c5). Hence, Socrates, at this point, arrives that there are at least two things in the soul. Those are exactly different from each other. One works according to the principles of reason, and the other follows the demands of the appetite (439d). As an example, someone is thought that he wants to drink, yet he does not since the doctor prescribed him not to drink. He has to

¹²⁴ See the archer that 439b8–11.

¹²⁵ Santas, *Ibid*, 150.

refrain from drinking any liquid. Two distinct elements of the soul; one is the subject to drink, whereas the other is the subject of aversion to drink. The element desiring to drink is named as the appetitive element, and the element pertaining to drink is named as the reasonably calculating element that motivates the one to refrain to drink functions on the basis of reasoning (439c9–439d1). By means of differentiating the element operating on the reason and the element working on the appetite, Socrates brings in the reason and the appetite as different two parts.

Furthermore, Socrates establishes the soul on three parts, that is to say, there must be another part different from the reason and appetite. In order to find out the third part, Socrates early asked whether people become angry as the result of the motivation of the soul (436a8–436b3), and little later whether there is a third part of the soul to motivate men to be angry (439e3–4). It is obvious that Socrates furthers another part through questioning in so far as he has already mentioned some traits of spiritedness related to angriness (375a11–375b2; 375c7; 411b7–411c2). The state of being angry is crucially distinguished from being spirited which particularly entails a character trait requiring one's consciousness of his successes (550b5). This point delineates that spirited character lets one have a sense of what kinds of behaviors are respected and held in high esteem, and what kinds of behaviors are disliked and bring aversion. This sense, without a doubt, is gained through social interactions.

Irrational anger, not distinct, yet if it is to pertain to the appetite, asked by Glaucon (439e5). This is where Socrates starts to illustrate the difference between the appetite and the spirit. For this, he brings the anecdote of Leontius which shows the different functioning of the appetite and anger. While the appetite of Leontius, according to the anecdote, enforces him to look at the corpse, the anger of his feeling pushes him to turn away. However, Leontius, at the end, yields to his appetite and looks at the corpse along with feeling disgust (439e7–440a3). Socrates uses this

example in order to explain that anger sometimes becomes against the appetite so as to say that the appetite and the anger are separated as two distinct parts and pertain to two different subjects.

Leontius also shows a feeling of disgust towards himself soon after gazing at the corpse inasmuch as he is aware that he has made something really bad. The remorse feeling is the sign of being spirited, yet here another thing is pointed out. That is to say, being spirited determines a disposition which desires to do what the appetite forces and also feels remorse from which it dislikes him. Therefore, the spirited part involves in angriness as well as disgust.

The appetite and the spirited part are so far distinguished. At the next step, Socrates attempts to distinguish the appetite from the reason. The appetite of Leontius' soul drags him to look at the corpse while another part makes him avoid gazing at it. Something that acts exactly opposite the force of the appetite and spreads remorse feeling as the impulse of the appetite yielding him is spirit. As described part of the soul, the spirit is liable for all spirited traits such as anger. Hence, the spirit and the appetite function simultaneously yet in opposite directions related to the same thing.

How the spirit differs from the reason is the next issue discussed. After talking about the arguments related to children and non-humans that display spirit not reason (441a-b), Socrates mentions a part from Odyssey in order to show the motivational ground in the respect of reason and spirit (441b-c). In the story, Odysseus is quite angry because his maidservants' shameless actions. Soon after he realizes these behaviors, he wants to punish them harshly. Yet he controls himself not to kill them. This refraining step is explained by Socrates as such: The man scolds his irrational anger, and his reason calculates the better and worse. As a result, his reason stops the impulse of his irrational anger, namely the impulse of his spirit. The irrational anger is his spirit that at the end yields to his reason. It is obvious that Socrates thinks that reason has influence on spirit as rebuking it. In

addition, reason and spirit, as different parts, counteract. By means of this argument, "spirit is shown to be distinct from reason by the fact that reason and spirit can at the same time do or suffer opposites in the same respect and in relation to the same thing, as when someone's spirit bears a desire to do something or other and their reason at the same time bears an aversion to doing just that."¹²⁶

Furthermore, each part of the soul is formed in accordance with its peculiar desire: The reasoning part is characterized by love of wisdom, the spirit part is characterized by love of victory, and the appetite part is characterized by love of gain. The three kinds of men, Socrates explains, are determined with the rule of the part. Philosophers are those that love to learn and have wisdom, and other people who are the lover of honor and gain. They constitute the classes of an ideal state. People who are dominated by reason are ruler; people who are motivated by spirit are the auxiliaries; and people who are ruled by appetite are the producers.

Features of Reason

Reason is notably depicted as being able to generate and to bear the desires and aversions of its own. As it has been written, the desires and aversions of reason can conflict with desires and aversions of other parts of the soul. In word to say, reason is capable of forming belief about anything that is the best and most appropriate thing in related context to do.¹²⁷ Of course, what the best is to do is gained before; and besides, what the ultimate reality is to understand is aimed to teach through educational program in the book. The point that should be realized here is that the desire of reason is not only restricted to people who go through the education program.¹²⁸ In other words, Socrates, as it is seen in the example of Odysseus, delineates that the demands of reason to decide what is better in

¹²⁶ Ibid, 152.

¹²⁷ Remember the examples, which are seen in the case of the thirsty man who is forbidden to drink any liquid and also in the case of Odysseus' impulse not to kill his maidservants.

¹²⁸ A thirsty man

order to release the anger of the spirited element is not dependent on advanced theoretical training designed in educational program. Rational part, even if it is not well improved, and it thus does not form a sophisticated soul, is regarded by Socrates as capable to generate and sustain its won desires. Nevertheless, it certainly has defects such as in adequate beliefs and reasoning.

Reason has two aspects: practical and theoretical aspects. The practical aspect of reason is issued in the account of virtues as functioning to intelligently point someone in the fourth book. Through the practical aspect, reason has ability to rule over other parts of the soul and thus makes his possessor be wise and foresee what is advantageous for each part and whole soul (441e4–5; 442c6–8).

Furthermore, the account of reason has its own good to effectively rule over other parts. "Socrates thinks reason has an object of pursuit all of its own, which in no way depends on the concerns and desires of the non-rational parts."¹²⁹ Hence it becomes obvious that the rule of reason points someone to avoid following the irrational demands of other parts and receiving them and to cover intelligently demands of other parts.

The desire of reason is to know and comprehend the truth and its manifestation that is, beyond a doubt, advantageous for someone, achieved through the proper actions taken by reason. To know the truth is, clearly, to know the Form of the Good, which is acquired just for its own sake. The desire of reason is named as the theoretical aspect of reason that is closely linked to the practical aspect. Thus, the knowledge of advantageous pointed is gained by knowing the form of the Good (534b8–534c5). By this way, it is implied that the knowledge of wisdom and justice is only possessed by people who go through the education procedure.

Furthermore, Socrates utters, "The three also have three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each. The same holds of appetites and kinds of

rule.” (580d7–8). Thus, he points out that a characteristic sort of psychic rule exclusively pertains to each part of the soul. Souls and people can, thus depicted, be controlled by reason, appetite, and spirit. Someone, who is being ruled by appetite, as having oligarchic character, is corresponded to oligarchic city. That kind of person, explains Socrates, basically takes his appetite into consideration and his reason and spirit have role behind his appetite (580e–81–83). His main concern is to make, even a little money to his great wealth. Nothing but having more and more money in order thus to acquire better wealth is everything for this sort of person. In short, the appetitive element rules over other parts of the soul, remaining as secondary inert elements. It functions according to its own demands as being the primary liable for all psychic activities.

An oligarchic, moreover, Socrates expresses, regards money making opportunities as a good. Besides, if a profitable way as an opportunity to make more and more wealth realized by reason, at this time, reason does not matter whether it conflicts with appetite or not, rules over other parts in order to reach its desire. The oligarchic spirit also values wealth, and it will rule over other parts in a context in which its demand is dominant over other parts to follow money-making.

Socrates examines that the characteristic feature of an oligarchic person who follows the dominant demand of the part of the soul that essentially requires an object of desire, regarded by reason as dominant good. Therefore, oligarchic character is, beyond a doubt, implying some critical points. One of them is that, because of the fact that the primary concern is money-making; reason is stopped to rationally calculate the advantages. Another point is that the rule of appetite and spirit has a big difference from the rule of reason. Reason regards the object of desire as good and follows it under the rule of appetite or spirit; however, other parts of the soul, under the rule of reason, are not required to be attached the

¹²⁹ Santas, *Ibid*, 155.

object of desire, yet rather to pursue its own object of desire. By this, Socrates claims that it is appropriate for the soul to be ruled by reason since it is the rationally calculating element, and it is wise and exercising foresight on behalf of the whole soul (441e4–5). In other situations, it that means, there will be psychic disorders. "Finally the 'tyrannical' man has a soul enslaved to one master desire, lust, which produces a chronic state of unsatisfied need, no part of the soul achieving its proper end."¹³⁰

Appetite

Appetite is the part of the soul which is liable for the desires such as pleasures and is keen to follow these. The desires of appetite are, on one hand, the very bodily needs of a person such as dehydration in which the person needs to drink some proper liquid required by the physiological nature of the body. On the other hand, as it is given an example, pleasures are the desires of appetite. Socrates later adds other desires of appetite that are beyond bodily needs and desires. These are making profit, dealing with politics and doing philosophy (561c6–561d5). In the fourth book, Socrates points that appetite is naturally and intensely interested in money (442a4–442b3). Later, in the ninth book, he outlines bodily needs as the desires of appetite and pleasures which are only fulfilled with money, Socrates names appetite as money-loving element (580d11–581a7).

Spirit

Spirit is not only the motivation of anger but also the source of spirited characteristic that lead someone to have respected traits. As it is early explained through the anecdote of Leontius, spirit counteracts the demand of appetite since this behaviors was disrespected. In the ninth book, Socrates utters that *its whole aim is always mastery, victory, and high repute* (581a9–581b3). The central concern of spirit is to gain others' admiration and respects as being distinguished. However, spirit by no means always seeks for dominance over others, yet it, sometimes rather adequately advanced,

¹³⁰ Annas, Ibid, 134–5.

respects and admires of others in a sense of making himself subordinate to others.

The oligarchic spirit, on the other hand, only admires wealth and wealthy people (553d4–5). Socrates also talks about timocratic character that is described as treating his slaves in a harsh manner (549a1–4). The timocratic one, says Socrates, “surrenders the rule within him to the middle element—the victory-loving and spirited one—and becomes a proud and honor-loving man” (550b5–7). This sentence clearly shows that Socrates, by no means, differentiates the timocratic love of ruling and being ruled.

2. 1. 2. Justice as Unifying Virtue

To be wise, courageous, and temperate, as virtues, is discussed as the very attributions of a just city. A city is wise because it is such structured to have wise rulers who are well educated, wisely experienced to foresee the future, and thus take the best steps for the city. It is brave in the virtue of the courage of the Auxiliaries inasmuch as it has a well prepared and strong army. Temperance, being different from other virtues, pertains to whole classes as a relation between them (428b-432a). “It is the agreement and unanimity of all three classes as to who shall be in charge (432a) and is likened to harmony and concord (430e, 431e432a).”¹³¹

Justice, the fourth virtue appeared in the best city, works as the principle of specialization to unify each part of the city to perform their own particular functions just as the rulers rule the city, the army performs military occupation, and the businesspeople perform their economic tasks. In word to say, it is the main virtue to provide rooms for other virtues to be seen and to maintain their existences (433a–d). “The justice of the city is defined as each class performing its own task and not meddling with the tasks of others.”¹³²

The virtues that are counted for the just city are analogous for the virtues of the soul. Socrates puts forward that the soul has three elements

¹³¹ Ibid, 115.

¹³² Klosko, 71.

just like a city. Each one has their own exclusive role in an order to contribute the good of the soul. First of all, the soul is wise when it uses its calculative element that is reasoning element to decide what is beneficial for itself. Second, he is courageous when his spirited part yields to reason even in very angry times. Third, he is temperate when there is harmony between other elements of the soul in the sense of the ruler.

Finally, justice, as the principle of unifying virtues only through which each virtue performs their own function, is discussed. "It is not concerned with someone's doing his own job on the outside. On the contrary, it is concerned with what is inside (443c8–10)." Plato makes an analogy between justice and health in order to show the significant difference of justice over injustice (444c–e). Justice is the state of a healthy soul, and its embodied nature is understood through this analogy. Bodily elements, in a healthy body, perform their own duties in order to benefit the whole body, just as the psychic elements of the soul do perform their own responsibilities to contribute the whole soul. The profound role of justice is to unify elements thus to constitute a whole one and make other virtues continue to exist (443e). Therefore, Annas expresses, "A person is just, then, if each part is acting virtuously and as it should... Justice in the individual is the appropriate and harmonious flourishing of all aspects of him or her (443d)." Moreover, adds she, Plato thinks that inner harmony can be succeeded only when reason rules over other elements of the soul. "Justice, as thus presented, is worth having for itself, as the ordered state of health is preferable to the disordered state of disease."¹³³

2. 2. The Science of Ethics in *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*

Ahlâk-ı Alâî, consisting of three branches of practical philosophy (*hikmat-i 'amali*), is started with the definition of philosophy (*hikmat*), "... knowing things as they are and fulfilling functions as one should, within the

¹³³ Annas, Ibid, 321.

measure of ability.”¹³⁴ Kinalizâde, then, puts forward two types of philosophy in accordance with two types of external existences.

The first type of philosophy, Kinalizâde issues, is theoretical philosophy (*hikmat-i nazarî*) which deals with objects on which humans have no influence, and the second type of philosophy is practical philosophy (*hikmat-i 'amali*) which deals with the things connected with human's will.

The former is a science, he says, not solely theoretical to enrich people intellectually, yet, instead, lead them perfect to their manners.¹³⁵ Through the knowledge of the theoretical philosophy, humans have certain and clear ideas of external existences and thus to build a thorough theoretical perspective which induce them to acquire right faiths and sciences and avoids them to go astray. Hence, people reach perfection in the world and happiness hereafter.¹³⁶ Kinalizâde analyses the theoretical philosophy under three branches: metaphysics (*'ilm-i ilâhî*),¹³⁷ mathematics (*'ilm-i riyâdî*), and physic (*'ilm-i tabîî*).

After having knowledge of theoretical philosophy, Kinalizâde comes to practical philosophy:¹³⁸

Practical philosophy is the acknowledgement of benefits in voluntary movements and disciplined acts on the part of the human species, in a way that conduces to the ordering of the states of man's life here and hereafter, necessitating arrival at that perfection towards which he is directed.

Kinalizâde divides the practical philosophy into three branches:¹³⁹ the science of ethics (*'ilm-i akhlâq*),¹⁴⁰ the science of the regulation of households (*'ilm-i*

¹³⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 47; Tūsī, 26. This definition what his predecessors also made.

¹³⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 48.

¹³⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 49.

¹³⁷ Tūsī names *'ilm-i mā ba'd al-tabî'a*. See Tūsī, 27.

¹³⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 53–4; Tūsī, 28.

¹³⁹ This technique goes to Aristotle. For this, see Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1141b31–2, 1142a9–10.

¹⁴⁰ Instead, Tūsī uses *tahdhīb-i akhlâq*, 40; Devvâni also uses the same. See Anay, Ibid, 333.

tadbîr-i manzil),¹⁴¹ and the science of the government of city (*ilm-i tadbîr-i medîne*).¹⁴²

Explaining benefits of knowing practical philosophy,¹⁴³ Kinalizâde comes to the science of ethics. He makes an analogy between medicine and ethics.¹⁴⁴ Medicine deals with the health of bodies, while ethics (*tıbb-ı rûhânî*) deals with the health of souls. The aims of ethics, Kinalizâde puts forward, firstly to teach people morality, secondly to change nasty dispositions to perfect ones, finally to maintain the good morality.¹⁴⁵

Whether it is possible to change disposition is strictly in accord with the demands of the issues of ethics, insofar as Kinalizâde queries through applying the views of philosophers. He presents three sorts of thought. Some said that dispositions are natural, and removal from them is impossible.¹⁴⁶ Others claimed that certain dispositions are natural, whereas others are formed from external reasons. Another group of philosophers said that disposition was neither natural nor unnatural. In word to say, human being is capable to acquire dispositions which they want, no matter how it is hard or easy.

As the most of the philosophers' agreement, Kinalizâde finds that the last is the right. He utters, implying the wrongness of the first and second schools of thought, as though it would be otherwise,

... the abandonment of all sorts of discipline and government, the abortion of religious laws and observances, and the neglect by human race of instruction and education.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴¹ Tūsî uses *menâzil* (plural of *manzil*), instead, 40. Devvâni uses the word of *manzil*. See Anay, Ibid, 333.

¹⁴² KINALIZÂDE, 51. Although Kinalizâde's explanation related to philosophy and its division is similar to Tūsî's and Devvâni's, there are still some differences. Tūsî uses the word of *mudun* (plural of *medîne*). Tūsî, 26–8. Devvâni also, like Tūsî, uses the word of *mudun* (plural of *medîne*). See Anay, Ibid, 333.

¹⁴³ KINALIZÂDE, 53–5.

¹⁴⁴ This is also seen in the work of Devvâni. See Anay, Ibid, 297.

¹⁴⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 55; Anay, Ibid, 297. Anay explains, Devvâni that people reach the reason of their existences through ethics. See Anay, Ibid, 268.

¹⁴⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 56.

¹⁴⁷ Kinalizâde adopts Tūsî's view. KINALIZÂDE, 56; Tūsî, 75.

The next issue connected with ethics, Kinalizâde brings out, is whether man is good or bad by nature.¹⁴⁸ He says that a group of philosophers claim that all men were created good by nature, but attaining their desires, ignoring the good actions, and leaving appreciated manners lead them reach in a state in which they reflect neither fairness nor foulness, yet only hold an evil nature.¹⁴⁹ Other philosophers claim, continues Kinalizâde, the exact opposite view of this. That is, human beings were created evil by nature. However, it is possible for some of them to overcome evil nature through instruction and discipline.¹⁵⁰

Finally, Kinalizâde presents the view of Galen according to which some men are by nature good, some evil by nature, and some in an intermediary position between two. The first and second groups are composed of very few people, yet the third group mass of the people.¹⁵¹ Disagreeing with first two groups, Kinalizâde keeps the view that all positions are receptive to change.¹⁵² Further, he does accept that, although, there is a difficulty of changing of some dispositions, due to having deep rooted, yet it is still possible to change with a proper instruction and discipline.¹⁵³

2. 2. 1. Concerning the Soul

"Natural bodies, as bodies, are equal one with another in rank, none having nobility or virtue above the other..."¹⁵⁴ Man, on the other hand, is the most perfect and noblest of the existent beings in this world.¹⁵⁵ All existents are composed of two groups: simple and compound. Simple existents are

¹⁴⁸ Tūsī, 74–6. This issue is also seen in Devvânî's work. See Anay, Ibid, 343. It is also discussed by Ibn Miskawayh, 29.

¹⁴⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 56; Tūsī, 75.

¹⁵⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 57–8.

¹⁵¹ KINALIZÂDE, 57; Tūsī, 75–6; Miskawayh, 30.

¹⁵² KINALIZÂDE, 57. Kinalizâde is probably influenced from Tūsī. He exactly says, "The argument of modern philosophers, that no disposition is natural, runs as follow: every disposition is receptive of change, but whatever is receptive of change is not natural, therefore no disposition is natural." See Tūsī, 76.

¹⁵³ KINALIZÂDE, 58.

¹⁵⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 77; Tūsī, 43.

¹⁵⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 77; Similarly, Tūsī, 43; Miskawayh, 33.

composed of four elements, fire, weather, earth, and water; while compound existents are subdivided into complete and non-complete compounds. Ice, cloud, and raw, unable to protect their existence for a long time, are non-complete compound; whereas minerals, vegetables, and animals, opposite of the former compound, are complete compounds.¹⁵⁶

Gradation and divergence, between natural existences, are based on mingling and involvement between elements which lead the mark of degree gained in accordance with the measure of the compound's proximity to moderation that is ideal unity. Each existent manifests its mixture, according to which it possesses rank nobility and ascending degrees. A point is, eventually, reached where the compound gains the faculty of receiving the Vegetative Soul.

At the utmost of the vegetative degrees, the first of the degrees of animal begins. The measure of their capacity for intentional actions and for sensation determines their superiority over plants. The variation among animal species is dependent on degree of manifestation of irascible faculty

Having ideal unity of compound between elements, human beings come after animal species. Ranks of perfection or deficiency among human species are strictly connected with the control of the rational faculty over the faculty of appetitive and irascible. All men, thus having all these faculties complete, are able, with convenient life conditions, to reach perfection and enjoy a greater virtue and nobility.¹⁵⁷

The first of such degrees is composed of persons who are skilled and able to do subtle instruments. Engaging with sciences and the branches of knowledge and acquiring of virtues are the properties of next group of

¹⁵⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 77–78.

¹⁵⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 80. Both Tūsī and Miskawayh make this kind of classification. See Tūsī, 46; Miskawayh, 37. Anay states that the position of human being in all other creatures is issued by Devvâni almost the same as Tūsī, yet there is a difference: Devvâni claims that celestial bodies are also under the service of human beings. See Anay, Ibid, 254. Besides, Anay adds, Devvâni believes that everything in the world has a purpose. The purpose of human existence is to be the caliph of God. Ibid, 255.

people. Then, a class of people who, by revelation and inspiration (*bi-wahy u ilhām*), receive knowledge of truths and laws, constitute the highest degree. Kinalizâde continues to this degree as such: ¹⁵⁸

This is the highest ... When this stage is reached, there is an inception of contiguity with the nobler world and of junction with the ranks of the sanctified angels and the abstract intelligences and souls. ... Then intermediaries are set aside, gradation and opposition cease, *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem* (*mabda' u ma'ād*) become one, and nothing remains but the Reality of Realities, the ultimate of Quests, which is Absolute Truth: 'And thy Lord's face abides, splendid and revered.'¹⁵⁹

2. 2. 2. The Rational Soul and its Properties

The human soul, as the subject matter the science of ethics, presents praiseworthy or ugly actions, rooted from its will, insofar as Kinalizâde underlines its significance as such:

It must be known what the human soul is, and wherein lies the acme of its perfection; what are its faculties, by which (if it uses them properly) it attains what it seeks, namely perfection and felicity; what, again, it is that prevents it from reaching that perfection.¹⁶⁰

So far as, he states three points (*makâms*). In the first point, he elaborates the rational soul; in the second point, he points out the eternity of the soul;¹⁶¹ finally, he enumerates the faculties of the human soul and presents their distinction from other faculties.¹⁶²

First of all, Kinalizâde brings a widely accepted definition that is, "the human soul is a simple substance, whose function is to perceive intelligibles by its own essence, and to regulate and control this sensible body."¹⁶³ Certain points, which are connected with the definition, are pointed out.

¹⁵⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 42; Tūsī, 44–6.

¹⁵⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 81; Tūsī, 46, "... but forever will abide thy Sustainer's Self, full of majesty and glory." The Qur'an, 55: 27.

¹⁶⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 62; Tūsī, 35; Anay, Ibid, 259.

¹⁶¹ Tūsī, 40–1.

¹⁶² KINALIZÂDE, 63–76; Tūsī, 41–3.

¹⁶³ KINALIZÂDE, 63; Tūsī, 36. The real source of Kinalizâde is Tūsī. This can be clearly seen comparing both books. The source of Tūsī, as much as I was able to search, is Miskawayh. Miskawayh, 5–8.

These are confirmation of the soul's existence; confirmation its substantiality; confirmation of its simplicity; a demonstration that it is not a body or corporeal; a demonstration that it perceives by essence and controls by organs; that it is not sensed by any of the senses. Kinalizâde elaborates each of them.¹⁶⁴ For the second point, Kinalizâde states that the rational soul is eternal and will continue to live even after death of the body. Thirdly, Kinalizâde states that there are three types of the soul: the vegetative soul, the animal soul, and the human soul. The human being, being different from all other creatures, has all three souls. Then, he gets in depth the faculties of each soul.¹⁶⁵

The Human soul¹⁶⁶ is specialized and distinguished among all existents with having two faculties: the faculty of rationality (*qūwat-i nutq*) and the practical faculty (*qūwat-i 'amalī*).¹⁶⁷ The former is composed of two branches: the speculative intelligence (*'aql-i nazarī*) and the practical intelligence (*'aql-i 'amalī*).¹⁶⁸ The speculative intelligence is skilled with acquiring knowledge of the realities of existents and perceiving of the sorts of intelligibles (*ma'kūlât*). The practical intelligence, on the other hand, is endowed with differentiating good and evil actions and comprehending of which leading felicity or astray. The second faculty needs the first one.¹⁶⁹

Kinalizâde divides the practical faculty into two braches: the concupiscible faculty (*qūwat-i shahwī*) and the irascible faculty (*qūwat-i ghadabī*).¹⁷⁰ The direction of the concupiscible faculty is benefits and

¹⁶⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 63–66; Tūsī, 36–41; Miskawayh, 5–10.

¹⁶⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 68–74; Tūsī, 41–43.

¹⁶⁶ Anay states that Devvâni follows the classical Islam Philosophy's understanding of the human soul. See Anay, Ibid, 261.

¹⁶⁷ This is also seen in the work of Devvâni. See Anay, Ibid, 260.

¹⁶⁸ Anay, Ibid, 261.

¹⁶⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 75–6; Tūsī, 42.

¹⁷⁰ This is also seen in the work of Devvâni. See Anay, Ibid, 260.

pleasures. The other is the faculty in association with repelling injuries and theaters and yearning authority and exaltation.¹⁷¹

Further, Kinalizâde adds that, sometimes, these three faculties—the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible—are named as the soul. The first one is named the angelic soul (*nafs-i malakî*), the second the savage soul (*nafs-i saba'î*), and the last one the bestial soul (*nafs-i bahîmî*).¹⁷²

2. 2. 3. Nature of the Disposition

Ethics, a branch of the practical philosophy, Kinalizâde defines, is a science, examining characteristic features and attitudes of men.¹⁷³ "Disposition (*khulq*), is a habit of the soul, necessarily effecting the easy procession of an action therefrom, without need of any reflection or deliberation."¹⁷⁴

Two characteristics of the soul, Kinalizâde brings out, while defining disposition thus to stress its features, are state (*hâl*) and habit (*malaka*). *Hâl* is defined as the state of the soul which easily passes such as laughing, smiling, and so on; habit (*malaka*), on the other hand, is defined as a habit that is not temporal and changeable, yet, instead, is easily causing occurrences and always bringing outcomes such as being courageous and generous. Therefore, in order for an attitude to be regarded as disposition, Kinalizâde emphasizes, it must be permanent and stable and easily come out.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷¹ Tūsî's classification is different from Kinalizâde, see KINALIZÂDE, 35, Tūsî, 42. Misawayh says, "the perfection which is particular to man is twofold, for he possesses two faculties, one of which is the cognitive and the other the practical." Miskawayh, 36.

¹⁷² KINALIZÂDE, 93; Tūsî, 42–3; Miskawayh, 4. Tūsî and Miskawayh think the same as Kinalizâde.

¹⁷³ KINALIZÂDE, 50; Tūsî, 28.

¹⁷⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 99; for the same definition, see Tūsî, 74; Anay, Ibid, 280; Miskawayh, 29.

¹⁷⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 99. Although Kinalizâde regards habit (*malaka*) as one of the characteristics of the soul, Aristotle thinks that dispositions are outcome of practicing habitation. Disposition is relied upon habitation in Kinalizâde's teaching like Aristotle's. For this, see Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*, II 23, 1103a13–1103b3.

Dispositions, Kinalizâde states, cause either virtues, vices, or none of them.¹⁷⁶ If they cause what is approved, that is virtue (*fadīlat*) such as courage, temper, and generosity; and if they cause what is disliked, that is vice (*radhā'īl*) such as cowardice, dishonesty, and miserliness. Kinalizâde points out that the virtues (*fadīlat*) should be known in order to be virtuous, and the vices (*radhā'īl*) should also be known to avoid having defective outcomes.¹⁷⁷

The sources of virtues and vices, Kinalizâde explains through the faculties of the soul, presented into two classifications. In the first division,¹⁷⁸ two main faculties of the soul are issued: the faculty of perception (*qūwat-i mudrīk*) and the faculty of movement (*qūwat-i muharrik*). Kinalizâde puts each of them into two parts. The faculty of perception (*qūwat-i mudrīk*) is divided into a speculative faculty (*qūwat-i nazarī*) and a practical faculty (*qūwat-i 'amalī*); and the faculty of movement (*qūwat-i muharrik*) is divided into the faculty of attraction (*qūwat-i muharrik-i shahwī*) and the faculty of repulsion (*qūwat-i muharrik-i saba'ī*).¹⁷⁹

So as to four sources are laid for either virtues or vices; four main virtues come from these four faculties in each one's equilibrium state (*i'tidāl*). Wisdom (*hikmat*) is generated from the speculative faculty (*qūwat-i nazarī*), justice (*'adālat*) is generated from the practical faculty (*qūwat-i 'amalī*), continence (*'iffat*) is generated from the covetous faculty, and courage (*shacāat*) is generated from the irascible faculty.¹⁸⁰

In any case, the state of equilibrium (*i'tidāl*) is deviated either in the direction of excess (*ifrāt*) or shortcoming (*tafrīt*), then, due to transgressing from the mid-point, at which the virtues are standing, the outcomes from

¹⁷⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 100; Kinalizâde follows his predecessors about the issues of virtues and vices see, Misawayhy, 15–26. Anay states that Devvâni regards virtues or vices as the habit (*malaka*) of the rational soul (*nafs-i nutq*). See Anay, Ibid, 281.

¹⁷⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 100.

¹⁷⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 100; Tūsī, 79–80. Tūsī has the same classification.

¹⁷⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 100; Tūsī, 8. It is almost the same in Devvâni's work. See Anay, Ibid, 283.

¹⁸⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 101; Anay, 285.

these faculties, at two extremities, are vices. The speculative faculty (*qūwat-i nazari*), arising in the direction of excess, corresponds ingenuity (*safah*) sometimes called cleverness, or in the direction of shortcoming, foolishness (*balah*). Likewise, greed (*sharah*) or sluggishness of appetite (*khumūd-i shahwat*) emerges out of the covetous faculty (*qūwat-i muharrik-i shahwī*) from its two extremes points. Foolhardiness (*tahauwur*) or cowardice (*jubn*) is denoted at two extremities of the irascible faculty (*qūwat-i ghadabī*). The practical faculty (*qūwat-i 'amali*), having different nature of other faculties, causes the vice of injustice (*zulm*) at two opposite points.¹⁸¹

In the second classification,¹⁸² Kinalizâde delineates the number of main virtues three on account of the fact that, in this context, he regards the human soul as having three faculties.¹⁸³ These faculties are the angelic soul (*nafs-i malakī*), the savage soul (*nafs-i saba'ī*), and the bestial soul (*nafs-i bahīmī*).

Virtues and vices are grounded on these faculties in accordance with equilibrium state (*i'tidāl*). The first one, the angelic soul (*nafs-i malakī*), is the source of understanding and it causes wisdom (*hikmat*), if it does not arise in the direction of excess or shortcoming. The second one, the savage soul (*nafs-i saba'ī*), includes characteristic features such as taking revenge, desiring of being strong and rich, and doing injustice, yet courage is denoted from this faculty. The last one, the bestial soul (*nafs-i bahīmī*) is the source to attract men to follow appetitive affairs. On the other hand, the consequence of this faculty, at the mid-point, is the virtue of continence (*'iffat*).

Wisdom (*hikmat*), courage (*shacāat*), and continence (*'iffat*) are construed as three main virtues, in this classification. Kinalizâde, here, does not give justice (*'adālat*) as a sole virtue, as he has done in the first

¹⁸¹ KINALIZÂDE, 101–2; Tūsī, 87.

¹⁸² The second kind of classification is also seen in Tūsī. See KINALIZÂDE, 102; Tūsī, 79. A similar classification is also seen in Devvânî's work. See Anay, Ibid, 284.

¹⁸³ KINALIZÂDE, 102.

classification, yet instead, he states that these three virtues come together harmoniously to bring out justice in a homogenous state¹⁸⁴, known as perfection. Injustice (*zulm*) arises in the lack of any virtue of three.¹⁸⁵

In this classification, vices (*radhā'il*) arise from the faculties of the soul; in a case, the state of equilibrium (*i'tidāl*) is deviated in either excess or shortcoming direction. Ingenuity (*safah*) and foolishness (*balah*) are two extremities of the angelic soul (*nafs-i malakī*); foolhardiness (*tahauwur*) and cowardice (*jubn*), as two extremities, are arisen from the savage soul (*nafs-i saba'ī*); greed (*sharah*) and sluggishness of appetite (*khumūd-i shahwat*) are transgressing of the mid-point of the bestial soul (*nafs-i bahīmī*).

In the next pages of *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, Kinalizâde notes many other virtues subsumed under the main virtues.¹⁸⁶ Particularly, the virtue of justice (*'adâlat*) includes twelve sorts of virtues such as loyalty, sincerity, fidelity, solidarity, honesty, perseverance, caring, and humbleness.¹⁸⁷

2. 2. 4. Virtues and Vices

Acquisition of Virtues¹⁸⁸

Kinalizâde, as written before, believes that it is possible to change characteristic features. For this, he, in detail, construes the method of acquiring virtues in the seventh chapter of his first book of *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*.

Ahlâk-ı Alâî states two sources and reasons lead men to have abilities: the nature (*tabî'at*) and the art (*sinâ'at*). The role of the nature is expressed through sperm (*nutfe*), that is, it gains its ability through some alterations. The level of animal is mentioned as an example of the base of motion. For the art, he brings the parts of trees that are used to make useful goods through it. The nature comes before the art and has far much superiority

¹⁸⁴ Anay, Ibid, 285, 297.

¹⁸⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 102–3.

¹⁸⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 103.

¹⁸⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 111–13.

¹⁸⁸ Kinalizâde issues how to acquire virtues in the seventh of the first book of *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, 149; Tūsī, 108. Kinalizâde closely follows Tūsī in this subject. It is also the same in the work of Devvâni. See Anay, Ibid, 294–7.

than art does so as to it is created by God. No role and influence do men have on nature, yet, in the art, people have a big influence and are able to determinate the results. The nature, beyond a doubt, has priority and superiority on the art, so the art should follow the nature as a student.¹⁸⁹

This expression is made in order to lay down the base of acquisition of virtues that is the work of art. In word to say, Kinalizâde thinks that having nice personality does not come with birth, yet it rather depends on will and intentional efforts.¹⁹⁰ The art must resemble the nature in order to reach perfection. Therefore, what has priority in nature should be prior to improve characteristic features.¹⁹¹ For this, he proposes the method grounded on observation the sequence of improvement of faculties of soul. Hence, it can be possible to acquire virtues.

The first faculty that emerges is the faculty of nourishment.¹⁹² When a baby is born, he, without any instruction, tends to be fed by his mother. Kinalizâde defines this as an inspiration and reinforces it to the verse of Qur'an.¹⁹³ After some times, baby gets stronger and starts to use his voice, and he, through usage of it, wants food. After this level, he gets to defend himself from any threat through gaining the irascible faculty (*qūwat-i ghadabī*).¹⁹⁴ Any time, he feels inabilities, he wants help from elders.

After that, the faculty of distinction (*qūwat-i tamyīz*) becomes apparent. The first manifestation of this faculty is shame.¹⁹⁵ When the irascible faculty (*qūwat-i ghadabī*) reaches the level of maintaining his life by himself, he starts to protect people around himself. From it, presidency, superiority, and sovereignty arise as the levels of the faculty. By

¹⁸⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 149.

¹⁹⁰ The issue is the same at the work of Devvâni. See Anay, Ibid, 295.

¹⁹¹ KINALIZÂDE, 150; Anay, Ibid, 295.

¹⁹² Miskawayh and Tūsī agree with Kinalizâde. Tūsī, 109–110; Anay, Ibid, 295; Misawayh, 50.

¹⁹³ "Our Sustainer is He who gives unto every thing [that exists] its nature and form, and thereupon guides it [towards its fulfilment]." The Qur'an 20: 50.

¹⁹⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 151. Kinalizâde takes this subject different from Tūsī who secondly issues the irascible faculty. See Tūsī, 110; Anay, Ibid, 296.

comprehending and memorizing particulars and individuals, the faculty of reason, along with talking, improves. Gaining this ability leads men think in universals and the nature of men and animals. Thus, he becomes quite able to realize similarities and differences between them. That is to say, he is now able to do abstract thinking that prepares him to be a professor.¹⁹⁶

Although people come to the world without their wills, Kinalizâde explains, their continuations depend on their art and correct steps so far as men can only have virtues through them and thus be able to gain the eternal felicity. For men should follow his nature.¹⁹⁷ The sequences, he used for his nature; he should use in order to save the faculties of soul generating vices and manage them towards acquiring virtues. In this level, he firstly takes the faculty of appetite under control and brings it the state of equilibrium (*i'tidāl*). Then, the faculty of irascibility (*qūwat-i ghadabī*) and finally the speculative faculty (*qūwat-i nazarī*) are improved to the mid-point. Anyone who wants to acquire virtues should be patient and carefully take steps. He should neither quit his belief nor ignore steps. Further, Kinalizâde thinks that people should start to acquire virtues as soon as possible since they acquire vices unconsciously if they are not in a discipline to acquire virtues. Thus, it becomes harder and harder to have virtues by means of taking off vices.¹⁹⁸

Without trying and making an effort, Kinalizâde thinks, men can not have virtues. The prophets are only the people who are born with virtues.¹⁹⁹ However, on account of the very fact that men are born with different abilities and capacities; to acquire virtues, thus, is changing from an individual to another. For some, this can require little effort, yet for others, plenty of effort is needed. Such writing depends on both wish and effort. Practical faculties cannot acquire ability without working on them.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁵ Anay, Ibid, 296.

¹⁹⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 151; Tūsī, 110.

¹⁹⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 151.

¹⁹⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 152; Tūsī, 111–112.

¹⁹⁹ Also it is seen in the work of Devvâni. See Anay, Ibid, 296.

²⁰⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 152–3; Tūsī, 111.

Moreover, Kinalizâde professes his thesis via providing similarities between medicine and ethics.²⁰¹ The medicine follows the nature as using pharmacies and taking prudent steps, so ethics should apply nature in order to prepare correct means and to reach justice, bringing eternal happiness.²⁰² If someone wants to have healthy soul, he should be cautious concerning the faculties of soul. In the first place, he should acquire continence as the equilibrium state of the faculty of appetite, and then he should gain courage arisen out of the irascible faculty. Later, he gets wisdom. If he has these virtues and their abilities, then he should thank to God and be careful concerning to protect and maintain them. If he does not have one of them, he should try to gain it according to the sequence of steps.

Having continence and courage leads one acquire the virtues of wisdom. For this, he firstly studies logic in order thus to have means to gain knowledge and later gets depth in math (*‘ilm-i riyâdî*) to have certain knowledge. Thus, he reaches more than assuming and supposing as knowing the truth of things. Next step, he studies the natural sciences and then theology. At this step, he has perfected the virtues and acquired justice. People who reach this level become absolute scholars and talented philosopher (*bi’l fiil insân*).²⁰³

Vices²⁰⁴

Kinalizâde defines vices through the concept of virtues. Two expressions for two types of vices, he mentions;²⁰⁵ the first type²⁰⁶ which includes vices that are directly opposite of virtues and the second type is composed of those that are generated out of the state of equilibrium

²⁰¹ The same is in Devvânî’s work. See Anay, Ibid, 272.

²⁰² KINALIZÂDE, 153; Tūsî, 111.

²⁰³ KINALIZÂDE, 154; Tūsî, 110; Anay, Ibid, 296.

²⁰⁴ Kinalizâde almost fully follows Tūsî.

²⁰⁵ Two definitions of vices are seen these philosophers: Tūsî, 85–7; Miskawayh, 16 for the first kind of vices and 22–25 for the second kind of vices.

²⁰⁶ This understanding is seen, Tūsî, 85; Anay, Ibid, 308; Miskawayh, 16. Also, see Stoa Ethics, Alfred Weber, *Felsefe Tarihi*, ed and trans, H. Vehbi Eralp, (İstanbul: Sosyal Yayınları, 1993).

(*i'tidā*).²⁰⁷ Accordingly, the first type of vices consists of four vices: wisdom, justice, courage, and continence. These are the main virtues, and the direct opposites of them are ignorance, injustice, cowardice, and avidity.

Although, Kinalizâde starts to talk about vices as opposites of virtues, he, later, expresses that every virtue is standing in a limit; in a case its limit is transgressed, it turns into a vice. He explains it through analogy of a circle as such:

Every virtue is a middle point, with the vices corresponding to it in the position of peripheries, like center and circle; just as on the surface of a circle, on point (which is its center) is the farthest of (all) points from the circumference; while of (all) other points round about, the number of which cannot be reckoned or computed, whether on the circumference or within it, each one is nearer to the circumference than (is) the center; so virtue likewise has a delimitation, which is at the farthest extreme from vices, and deviation from that limit necessarily cause proximation to a vice.²⁰⁸

In addition, he brings another example to explain the position of a virtue and vices around it. Two points, Kinalizâde notes, can have only one straight line, yet countless non-straight lines can be drawn between them. Thus, he strengthens his thesis that there can be only one mid-point point. From this, he draws that there can only one true way of life, yet countless deviated ways.²⁰⁹

Therefore, four main virtues have eight main vices.²¹⁰ These are ingenuity and foolishness, foolhardiness and cowardice, greed and sluggishness of appetite, and finally, injustice and suffering of wrong. Wisdom is the mid-point;²¹¹ ingenuity emerges at the excessive direction of wisdom. It is a kind of vice that involves in using intelligence in unsuitable places for wrongful applications such as lying and tricking. The vice emerges

²⁰⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 115; Tūsī, 85–7; Anay, Ibid, 309.

²⁰⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 115; Tūsī, 85.

²⁰⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 115.

²¹⁰ Miskawayh, 16 for the first kind of vices, and 22–25 for the second kind of vices. There are four, on the one hand, and eight, on the other hand. In order to remove contradiction, Kinalizâde combines two theses. He quotes from Tūsī who thinks that there should not be opposite of a virtue. KINALIZÂDE, 115; Tūsī, 122–3. Kinalizâde, taking from Miskawayh, adds a lot more explanation as Tūsī does.

out of the speculative faculty. The exact opposite of ingenuity is foolishness. No knowledge can be taken. Any application related to usage of mind has useless outcomes such as being unable to separate things from each other. Good and bad are at the same position. Because of this, truths and the delicate connections behind sciences can not be understood.²¹²

Courage is the mid-point;²¹³ foolhardiness is arising in the direction of excess and cowardice at opposite. The former involves in undertaking such things that are not approved by thoughtful people. Cowardice is to have fear and worries with no reason.²¹⁴

Continence is the mid-point;²¹⁵ greed is the consequence of the excess direction of the faculty, and sluggishness of appetite is the result of the shortcoming direction. Being extremely devoted to pleasures that are easily passing and not recognizing the limits of reason are the results of this vice. To remove the proper desires permitted by reason and religion and thus to damage himself and his generation are seen as outcomes of sluggishness of appetite.²¹⁶

Finally, justice is the mid-point;²¹⁷ injustice arises transgressing the exact point in the excess direction, and suffering of wrong is seen at the opposite direction. To damage others, their properties and rights are involved in this vice. Suffering of wrong entails to do nothing against what has been done to him and accept his situation as ordinary affairs. Kinalizâde adds that some people think that two opposite sides of justice are injustice. His idea is that injustice is, just like justice, which subsumed all nice characteristic features under it, gathering all nasty features within itself.

²¹¹ KINALIZÂDE, 102; Tūsī, 87; Miskawayh, 23.

²¹² KINALIZÂDE, 118–9.

²¹³ KINALIZÂDE, 102; Tūsī, 87; Miskawayh, 24.

²¹⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 119.

²¹⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 103; Tūsī, 87; Miskawayh, 33.

²¹⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 119–20.

²¹⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 135; Tūsī, 87; Miskawayh, 24.

Further, Kinalizâde mentions that injustice is not only done to others, but also the self. In any case, accepting every kind of injustice for one's self, quitting the religion's obligations, and taking these as his business are also regarded as injustice.²¹⁸

Vices resembling virtues

Kinalizâde points out that there are vices, which resemble virtues. Every virtue has a principle to produce true action. In the next pages, he elaborates each of the vices resembling virtues one by one.²¹⁹

Concerning the vices resembling the virtue of justice, Kinalizâde firstly mentions the essential requirement of the virtue of justice. That is to keep the faculties of soul at the state of equilibrium (*i'tidāl*) or to do whatever is approved by the limits of religion and reason whether when you are alone or with others. If one's treatments do not match with his inner side, Kinalizâde notes, he will manifest unapproved behaves in any situations. Finally, Kinalizâde states that there are countless vices that resemble virtues, yet they can be understood by means of comparing with others mentioned in the book.²²⁰

On preserving the health of the soul²²¹

People who have virtues and perfect morality should preserve their perfections. Kinalizâde separates the eighth chapter of the first book for this issue. To reach the absolute level is not the place, in which everything is finished, yet instead people should keep trying to protect their situations, and they thus can always be happy. Kinalizâde explains the method by means of making an analogy between bodies and souls. The health of a soul should be carefully cared as much as the health of body is taken into

²¹⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 120.

²¹⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 125–33; Tūsī, 88, 95; Anay, Ibid, 300; Miskawayh, 95–100. Kinalizâde follows the tradition coming from Miskawayh.

²²⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 133.

²²¹ KINALIZÂDE, 155–68; Tūsī, 113–22; Anay, Ibid, 297. Kinalizâde's predecessors similarly issue the subject. Kinalizâde, as it will be shown, follows Devvânî's method.

consideration.²²² He professes his thesis on eight points. These are going to be explained step by step:

1. The first and most important suggest of Kinalizâde is that people should be always careful about their companions. People should choose fellowship of persons who are better themselves because of the very fact that people imitate their friends and after some time become like them. In addition, in order to reinforce his argument, Kinalizâde mentions the philosophers' famous remark on human nature that is resembled "thief nature" inasmuch as it slyly acquires friends' features.²²³

In order to protect virtues, it is not enough to prohibit companion with vicious people and their dressing style. Listening to things that include vicious words and cause wrong thoughts should be forbidden since it deeply damages people's hearts. That is because, he emphasizes that songs, their lyrics, and poems related to alcohol and slavery are forbidden. Kinalizâde notes that it is easy to fall down a stone, yet it is hard to carry it to up. That is to say, people should be careful about their souls in order not to go down since it is quite easy.

Moreover, Kinalizâde believes that people who prefer to be far from others are a lot better to be friends with. Even though he thinks that there are countless benefits in solitude and plenty of wrongness among people, yet people still need each other. In other words, Kinalizâde does accept time to time to live with others along with recommending life in solitude.²²⁴

2. The second important suggestion is to practice the virtues in order thus to get used them just as the bodies get better and better through exercises. When bodies leave exercises, they lose their strong performances; likewise, if souls do not deal with approved affairs, they lose their beauties. People should always keep doing useful things and not ignore the faculties of soul, otherwise, it is very possible for them to be lazy and thus step back. On

²²² KINALIZÂDE, 155.

²²³ KINALIZÂDE, 155; Tūsī, 113; Anay, Ibid, 298.

the contrary, people who constantly deal with genuine issues should not be arrogant about their affairs so as to this definitely prevents their happiness.²²⁵

3. The third advice is to be persistent on this way and to try to cope with every kind of difficulties. Kinalizâde brings as an example how people insistently try and work just to reach to temperate pleasures. Besides, he gets in depth that people who want to be virtuous must leave worldly pleasures, otherwise they cannot be successful. With wishing and experiencing temperate pleasures, people never can reach the level of absolute scholar and felicity.²²⁶

4. Another suggest of Kinalizâde is to follow the former people who succeeded on this way. Their lives will be a guider.²²⁷

5. Not to follow the ways that drag people outside of the equilibrium state of the faculty of appetite and irascible is one another suggestion. If people do this kind of things wrongly, they should punish themselves in order thus not to do them again.²²⁸

6. The other suggestion is related to laziness and small sins. When people tend to be lazy, they should be directed to the correct way via nice actions and prayers. Wrongful actions should be avoided having; even if they are small, on account of the very fact that insisting in small sins drag people towards big sins.²²⁹

7. Kinalizâde's next suggestion is that people should be aware of their defectiveness. Men love themselves so much and are blind to see their own mistakes. Because of this, intelligent people seek their missing and faults. In order to reach perfection, he suggests, people can observe other people

²²⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 157.

²²⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 158–9; Tūsī, 114; Anay, Ibid, 298.

²²⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 159–162; Tūsī, 115; Similar in Devvâni's work. See Anay, Ibid, 298.

²²⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 162; Tūsī, 115–6. Similar in Devvâni's work. See Anay, Ibid, 298.

²²⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 162–4; Tūsī, 119. Similar in Devvâni's work. See Anay, Ibid, 298.

²²⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 164. Similar in Devvâni's work. See Anay, Ibid, 298.

around himself and regard them as mirrors for them to do what they like to see on others and to avoid what they dislike.²³⁰

8. The last offer, Kinalizâde brings, is to avoid arrogance and tricks. He thinks that saying prideful words to people's faces about their works and actions is a trick. On account of the fact that these sayings damage people who want to acquire virtues, they should not hear this kind of words or not let others utter them. Kinalizâde adds that these words are even correct and addressed people who deserve them, they will definitely cause them to go astray.²³¹

On treating the sickness the soul²³²

The last chapter of the first book, Kinalizâde issues the illnesses of human soul. Mentioning division of medicine to preserve health and cure illnesses, as such, he explains psychical medicine (*tibb-i nufûs*) divided into two parts: to preserve virtues and remove vices.²³³

Vices, Kinalizâde regards them as diseases,²³⁴ are generated in human soul due to deviation from the state of equilibrium of faculties. Such problems bring ethical illnesses to prevent people to be virtuous.²³⁵

Kinalizâde emphasizes that the kinds of illnesses, the reasons, and symptoms of them should be known; only after then, it could be possible to cure illness that he mainly divides into two groups: simple and compound. With combining and mixing of simple illnesses, he says, many illnesses come out. In addition, he notes that most of the illnesses are reasoned from simple illnesses.²³⁶ Giving detail of each illness, along with the method of recovering and the remedies for them, Kinalizâde pays attention to the issue more than his predecessors.

²³⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 164–7; Tûsî, 120. Similar in Devvânî's work. See Anay, Ibid, 298.

²³¹ KINALIZÂDE, 167–8.

²³² KINALIZÂDE, 169–329; Tûsî, 122; Anay, Ibid, 309–325. Kinalizâde separates the ninth chapter of the first book for illnesses, see 169–322.

²³³ KINALIZÂDE, 169; Tûsî 111; Anay, Ibid, 297.

²³⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 175; the same is seen in Devvânî's work. See Anay, Ibid, 321.

²³⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 170; Anay, Ibid, 321.

²³⁶ Kinalizâde follows Tûsî. See, KINALIZÂDE, 172; Tûsî, 169.

CHAPTER 3

JUSTICE: THE GOOD FOR ITS CONSEQUENCES

3. 1. Justice with Respect to Economic

3. 1. 1. The Basis of the Family Sketched in the Ideal State

Justice is worthy and precious for its consequences. In the fifth book, Socrates, highly expecting to be ridiculed, brings in totally revolutionary ideas concerning the very nature of men and tradition and the rule of philosophers. Here, *he feels free to talk of idealized conditions where human nature is likewise idealized.*²³⁷ What he proposes “provokes both laughter and rage in its contempt for convention and nature, in its wounding of all the dearest sensibilities of masculine pride and shame, the family, and statesmanship and the city.”²³⁸

3. 1. 1. 1. Economic Justice: “Community of the Property”

The community of property²³⁹ and family is, as a regulation, one of the most significant bases of the ideal state, in which Plato strongly grounds his theory. That is, the ruler class is the most important layer of the just state to maintain the existence of the whole state; (545d) just as the skeleton of the state, they secure the state through the system of community of family and property. “Socrates’ point of view the only form of just regime, requires not only the abolition of private property but also the sharing of women and children and the rule of philosophers.”²⁴⁰

The rulers are educated by means of strict training programs. After depicting the principles of the education Plato states, “... besides this

²³⁷ Annas, Ibid, 171.

²³⁸ Bloom, Ibid, 380.

²³⁹ Aristotle, in the fifth chapter of the second book of *The Politics*, discusses in detail the community of property. A question of regulation of the property and possible manners, he firstly brings to think. Along with mentioning some difficulties, he confesses the difficulty of having property in common in respect with property in private. For detail, see Aristotle. *The Politics*, ed and trans, T. A. Sinclair and Trevor J. Saunders, (London: Penguin Books, 1962), 112–9.

²⁴⁰ Bloom, Ibid, 380.

education, they must be provided with living quarters and other property of the sort that will neither prevent them from being the best guardians nor encourage them to do evil to the other citizens." (416c–d)

The families and properties of the guardians are described in a way not to intervene with their other considerations related to the state. The lives of the guardians are depicted as being soldiers totally lack of privacy in a camp loaded with the burden of the common mass (416d–17b) as Adeimatus²⁴¹ describes, "they seem simply to be paid auxiliaries established in the city as a garrison, and nothing else"²⁴² (419e–20a). Private properties, particularly gold and silver, are forbidden to the guardians to have. Further, they, by no means, have a right to have privacy as having private house or just rooms to alone spend sometime there. Guardians will maintain their lives and protect the mass on the taxes given by the lower class which has the real property. "The fact that the rulers rely on the lower classes for their food and wages forges bonds between them and those they are to guard. Thus, community of property is instituted for guardians alone as the best system consistent with human nature."²⁴³

This system is mainly constructed on the principles of economic justice. *Plato of course sees property as intrinsically neither good nor desirable.*²⁴⁴ His system is grounded on, not equal distribution, yet rather

²⁴¹ The interlocutors participate into argument at the fourth book.

²⁴² Here, Aristotle criticizes Socrates on the deprivation of guardians' happiness. He asks, "If the guardians are not happy, who else are?" See, Aristotle, the *Politics*, 119.

²⁴³ Klosko, *Ibid*, 148.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 147; Socrates states, "Wealth and poverty. For the former makes for luxury, idleness, and revolution; and the latter for illiberality, bad work, and revolution as well." (422a); As supporting view, Lötter claims that, "Plato's views on the significance of poverty and wealth in the *Republic* call people to rethink the position and role of wealth. Through his analysis, he establishes several points. First, justice, in the sense of the morality of individuals and societies, is far more important than the acquisition of wealth. Second, moderate wealth is important for its function to enable humans to live a moral life. Third, poverty and excessive wealth have negative consequences for both individuals and societies. Finally, desiring and possessing excessive wealth disrupts and destroys moral integrity and internal harmony in individuals and societies." For detail, see H.P.P. [Hennie]. Lötter. "The Significance of Poverty and Wealth in Plato's *Republic*", *S. Afr. Philos.*, 22 (2003), 189–206.

communal property.²⁴⁵ To have no property is to guarantee and protect the stability; otherwise, it is very probable for the guardians to have more and more and turn into lower classes in the case they have little property. Plato, in the eighth book, first brings the transformation to the corrupted city, as the result of guardians' seizing and distributing of the lands of the state (547b–c).

The further reason for Plato to construct such an economic regulation is to protect the ideal city to have civil strife, constantly seen in ancient Greek cities, mainly between two cities' the warring classes of the poor and the rich (422e–23a; 551d). Another significant reason, desired by Plato, is to build a system in which guardian people²⁴⁶ use the words of "mine" and "thine" for the same things since they have the same property; hence, this will lead there to be only one cohesive city, not more, thus to prevent any strife between different cities (464c–d, 462a–e). However, this will also lead the ideal state to have different classes, both economical and structural. Further, one the fundamental issue which Aristotle argues, is that Socrates says nothing for the plan of government, particularly with respect to individuals. Numbers questions, he utters for the entire population.²⁴⁷

3. 1. 1. 2. "Community of the Family"

The Regard of Women and Family in Ancient Greek

In order to see the radical suggestion related to the very structure of the family of Socrates, it is necessary to recognize the regard of the ancient Greek women. Ancient Greeks had many different cities, each one having exclusive customs and institutions including the place of women. Although

²⁴⁵ Again, highlighting the unspeakable advantages of a man's to own something, Aristotle asserts, "there is very great pleasure in helping and doing favours to friends and strangers and associates; and this happens when people have property of their own. None of these advantages is secured by those who seek excessive unification of the state. And what is more, they are openly throwing away the practice of two virtues—self-restraints with regard to women and liberty with regard to property." See, Aristotle, the *Politics*, 115.

²⁴⁶ Aristotle asserts that the word, "all" which is used for guardians, is ambiguous. For detail, see Aristotle, the *Politics*, 107.

²⁴⁷ Ibid, 117–8.

there were various cities, along with having various traditions, the treatments towards the women were, in general, similar. In fact, the place of women, changing from city to another, was always regarded inferior to men as lacking reasoning or having defective reasoning.²⁴⁸ Women, living in Athens, were accepted as legal citizens, yet they had no right to plead in court.²⁴⁹ Spartan women were better than the women of other cities. They could have and amass private property.

Generally, Greek women, in ancient times, were powerless and not legal people. They spent most of their times dealing with the affairs of the home. "Respectable women were kept in a separate part of the house, and never went out (even shopping was done by men) except on festivals. They saw no men other than their nearest male relatives, and husbands; they had virtually no interaction with the social, political, and romantic life of men."²⁵⁰ They married according to the customs of traditional marriage principles based on arrangements before being teenagers. They, by no way, had chance to have romantic love before their marriages. Their most important role was to give birth.

The family had little importance in Ancient Greek society. It was not highly appreciated for a man to be a family man, yet instead it was highly valuable for a man to belong to the public. Men and women were totally people of different worlds, having virtually no interests and goods in common with his wife to share.

The very miserable and passive role of women and family shows how revolutionary the *Republic* is. These are reasons for Plato to bring in and argue the family in such a way. Positioning women equal to men is the revolutionary aspect of the theory, and it destroys the custom of the family,

²⁴⁸ Ibid, 56.

²⁴⁹ Annas states that, "The Athens that Plato grew up in was a democracy of a universal and direct kind. All adult male citizens could and were expected to play a part in decision-making and the business of governing. (Slaves and women were totally excluded from any such activity.)" See Annas, Ibid, 6.

²⁵⁰ Annas, Ibid, 181.

the very nature of the society. As it is before argued, the capacity delineates a person to have a kind of work in accordance with his or her nature. Hence, men and women have different capacity that is, certainly, very well known by Plato. Besides, Plato claims that the best men are always superior to the best women. That is to say, there is no work in which women are better than men (455c–d). Nevertheless, he does accept that there are women who are superior and deserve to be guardians. There is no doubt that he accepts different nature of women, yet he regards it as the difference between long hair and bald individuals that which not prevent them to be guardians (454c–e). The only significant difference, thus depicted by Plato, is that women are weaker than men, so they must have been responsible for suitable functions with their natures (451e, 455d–e, 457a). Because of this, “Plato is recognized as one of the first thinkers in the Western tradition to look beyond women’s biological natures to their overall potential to contribute to society.”²⁵¹

Moreover, it should here be outlined that having private property and a family in a traditional way is continued in the lower classes due to the very fact that they, by no means, have capacity to carry on the required measures. Only the women who will be guardians are placed equal to men and have the same education with them (456c–d).

“Community of the Family”

Revolutionary ideas essentially come through proposing the change the regard of the women and the way of the family. Socrates suggested that women should be educated like men and thus become equal with them. Women and men, who are born with high characteristic, will be together educated by means of gymnasium along with wearing nothing.²⁵² “In that

²⁵¹ Klosko, *Ibid*, 150

²⁵² Joseph Bryant states that people who belonged to slavery were naked at the end of Bronze Age in Greek. For more information see, Bryant, *Ibid*, 12. In a detailed account in the Cambridge Ancient History, depending upon earlier vases around 500 B.C., brings interesting manners of early Greek, which depicts Greek seniors to wear turban. It is written that, “The manners and furniture of the comus and symposium are rendered quite

play the women of Athens try to institute what is just but politically impossible, and thereby they create ridiculous situations; Socrates surpasses them by radicalizing their proposals.”²⁵³ In addition, the law will motivate people to follow the requirements of the education. By this sort of education, the shame, without a doubt, will firstly be subverted.²⁵⁴

“Community of the family” is suggested for unity and benefit of the state.²⁵⁵ The method that is used among animals in order to take the best pedigree will be applied to people thus to reproduce the best people. “This line of argument leads to dismantling the traditional family structure for the guardians and erection of Plato’s distinctive institutions.”²⁵⁶ The relationship between guardian men and women are strictly monitored (459c–61e). Public marriage festivals will be prepared for temporary marriages which only serve to produce children. In these arrangements, there are no private homes and no private children. The rulers will follow the necessities of the population of the city and the number of marriages. It is also determined that all guardians

explicitly, as they had been on some earlier vases, but there are new elements here which require attention. A number of the revelers are now shown wearing turban headdresses. Some are naked, but some wear voluminous chitons and himatia and many even carry parasols, later even wear ear-rings: transvestites, we might think. But the turban was a male Lydian headdress (*mitra*); the chiton a common male dress in East Greece (many East Greek *kouroi* are dressed, unlike their homeland cousins) and worn by Athenian Dionysuses and seniors.” For detail, see John Boardman, and N. G. L. Hammond, and D.M. Lewis, and M. Ostwald, and William R. Kenan, (eds). *The Cambridge Ancient History²-IV Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean C. 525 To 479 B.C.*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 429-430.

²⁵³ Bloom, *Ibid*, 381.

²⁵⁴ “Plato’s views unacceptable, even repellent” says Annas, in her book. Annas, *Ibid*, 2-3. What is drawn in the *Republic* as one of the requirements of doing the pure (absolute) justice is the absolute equality involving in destruction of the very nature of men. Thus, the revolutionary and at the same time repellent idea *can only be applied*. For detail, see Bediuzzaman Said Nursi. *The Flashes*, ed and trans, Şükran Vahide, İstanbul: Sözlük Neşriyat, 1997, 225–226.

²⁵⁵ One of the other objections, Aristotle arises to Socrates is that such a community would cause to increase evil consequences such as assaults, homicides, quarrels and slanders. Due to the very fact that the relations are unknown, committing evil acts against fathers, mothers, and near relations are equally unholy, so they are much more likely to occur. See Aristotle, the *Politics*, 110.

²⁵⁶ Klosko, *Ibid*, 151.

will be pointed to believe that their marriages are based on lottery.²⁵⁷ In fact, the rulers will decide the most suitable marriages as bringing together the best women with the best men. In order to make the lies believable, *Socrates invokes the gods. Marriages, he says, are sacred that is what is beneficial to the city.*²⁵⁸ Finally, men become deprived of every private thing which is exclusively lovely and nice to their own world and thus become brothers.

The offspring will, by no way, know their parents; the parents also will not recognize their children.²⁵⁹ The children will be grown up in public nurseries. "A father, if he is anything, is the one who engenders the child. A father who did not do so would be a completely artificial entity, at best a substitute for the natural father."²⁶⁰ After men and women lose their reproduction capability at certain ages, they will be free. *Thus, the guardians are to be bred like pedigree beasts.*²⁶¹ Children who are born defective are considered to be hidden and given to a suitable place (460c).

Furthermore, the system will deal with the necessities of the guardians. By enforcement of law, the guardians will be close relatives, namely as kin; and by means of tie blood, they will have emotional ties and treat each other as brothers. These principles, in return, will construct a big

²⁵⁷ What is issued is known as "the noble lie." Carmola stresses, "it is a response to a particular type of injustice articulated in the first two books of the dialogue, and expressed throughout in familial or generational terms. Socrates uses the noble lie to artfully highlight and indulge the fantasies of justice implicit in these early articulations of injustice, even as he subtly criticizes and undermines them." For detail, see Kateri Carmola. "Noble Lying: Justice and Intergenerational Tension in Plato's 'Republic'", *Political Theory*, 31 (2003), 39–62.

²⁵⁸ Bloom, *Ibid*, 384.

²⁵⁹ What Socrates states here is seriously criticized by Aristotle who says, "Nor is there any way of preventing brothers and children and fathers and mothers from sometimes recognizing one another; for children are born like their parents, and they will necessarily be finding indications of their relationship to one another. Besides, Aristotle claims that, 'every individual is chiefly inclined and careful for 'his own', rather than 'the common.' In word to say, everybody generally neglects others'. In a case, one has a thousand sons who are not certainly his own neglects all alike." See, Aristotle, the *Politics*, 108–9.

²⁶⁰ Bloom, *Ibid*, 385.

²⁶¹ Klosko, *Ibid*, 151.

family of the ruling classes, with a large number of guardians around, as a single person who will feel any part of him in any situation closely (462c–d).

*The values of 'the city' are the values of the Guardians.*²⁶² The ruling classes have neither private interests, apart from the state, nor selves. Their interests are only benefits of the state and their selves are devoted to the public self. It is very possible for the people of other cities to have private houses and families which bring private happiness and pains, yet the guardians of the best city, by no means, have privacy of any kind. They have a common aim to think, common good to try, and common pain to feel (464b–d). "Socrates argues that the city will be one, and the demon of private, selfish interest will be exorcised."²⁶³ In order to avoid decaying of the state, Plato attempts to found a city family grounded on guardians who are tightly bound through blood and affectional bonds.²⁶⁴

Plato does know that it is ineradicable side of men to have private property and family inasmuch as he does propose a very strict education, not for everyone, yet for people born with the best features of men as having super natures to bear these measures. "Only a man who did not care too much about the family would be prepared to tolerate Socrates' teaching."²⁶⁵ Further, the lottery system requires highly qualified rulers. Beyond a doubt, Plato believes that, by means of these principles and regulations, not only the guardians but the whole state will have great happiness. Due to being free from private property and family, they will not have to deal with the problems of ordinary people such as lawsuits, debt, and so on (464c–65c).

The very aim of Socrates through the community of property and family is to unify the city and thus manage it to be perfectly governed. By

²⁶² Annas, Ibid, 172.

²⁶³ Bloom, Ibid, 386.

²⁶⁴ Although Socrates professes that the city is built on affection feelings between guardians, Aristotle asserts that if they have wives and children in common, they will be bound to one another by weaker ties, so, inevitably opposite of what Socrates claims, affection will be watery. See Aristotle, the *Politics*, 111.

²⁶⁵ Bloom, Ibid, 387.

this way, the city will be the completed one,²⁶⁶ as a whole body, the ideal state.²⁶⁷ Via the strict education, a guardian will learn to pass over his privacy and material interests and become a philosopher, someone who is exactly different from others as feeling no fear of being ridiculed as such being naked while others are dressed.

III. 1. 2. The Science of Household Regulation in *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*

III. 1. 2. 1. The Family Regard and its Requirements

'Ilm-u Tadâbîr al-Manzil,²⁶⁸ the second book of *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, issues the science of household regulation. The Arabic word, *manzil*, although, means "house", a structure made out of stone and wood, yet Kinalizâde uses it in the meaning of persons of a family and the regulation of the house.²⁶⁹ Beside *tadâbîr al-manzil* exactly corresponds to economics.²⁷⁰ In word to say, it means to manage and control conditions for the present and the future of the family.

Including whole aspects of the family life, expresses Kinalizâde, the science of household regulation deals with ethical education and training of members of the house and determines the certain principles which, rather, construct order and harmony in family life and arrange relationships between members.

²⁶⁶ Numbers of reasons, as given above, Aristotle brings to criticize Plato's the unity of a state harshly in his book, *The Politics*. First of all, Socrates states that the city, the greater one, is the good one. (423) Underlying impracticability of the scheme drawn by Socrates, Aristotle claims that the nature of a state is to be plurality. Hence, the unity of the state would bring its destruction. The state, he points out, consists of a plurality of men, but of different kinds of men; you cannot make a state out of men who are alike. In the next line, he asserts that, in a city, there will be people who rule and the others who are ruled, so there are at least two classes by nature. See Aristotle, the *Politics*, 104.

²⁶⁷ As different perspective, stating, "in spite of the idealism with which he is usually associated," Korab-Karpowicz asserts, "Plato is not politically naïve. He does not idealize, but is deeply pessimistic about human beings. Most people, living in cities corrupted as they are, are for him fundamentally irrational, driven by their appetites, egoistic passions, and informed by false beliefs." See Korab-Karpowicz, *Ibid*, 142.

²⁶⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 325.

²⁶⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 328.

Providing the need of man to live in a family surrounding and to be happy in this world and hereafter, the principles, on which the science of household is based, cannot be known and comprehend by everyone.²⁷¹ With utmost details, these are reinforced by proofs, construed one by one, and gathered under the science.²⁷²

Human being, Kinalizâde states, is civilized who, inevitably, needs to be with others insofar as he can not, by himself, afford his necessities and thus sustain his life.²⁷³ Such essentials as food, tools, clothes, and shelter, beyond a doubt, strictly require others' collaboration.²⁷⁴ The first reason to have a family life, along with other needs, Kinalizâde regards, is men's basic wish to preserve of the species.²⁷⁵

3. 1. 2. 2. The Equilibrium State within the Family²⁷⁶

The Members of a Family

Kinalizâde counts father, mother, children, servants, and food as members of a family of a family.²⁷⁷ In another place, he presents them as father, mother, children, servants, and relatives.²⁷⁸ In detail, he expresses

²⁷⁰ Tūsī regards the word "house" like Kinalizâde. See, Tūsī, 153-4; also Aristoteles for it, see Aristotle. *Politika*, ed and trans, Mete Tunçay, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1975), 10; Tūsī, 203.

²⁷¹ KINALIZÂDE, 325. This is quite important, since Kinalizâde firstly underlines the rules in a family. In word to say, the existence of rules, he lies down and thus implicitly emphasizes their essential place; so this opens application of justice in the institution of the family. Rules are there and needing to be applied in order for people to reach happiness and to constitute the ground of justice. In word to say, the existence of laws proves the essentially of the ground on which to live as a family.

²⁷² KINALIZÂDE, 325.

²⁷³ It goes to Aristotle, who says, "... a human being is by nature a social being." Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*, I 11, 1097b.

²⁷⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 327; Tūsī, 153.

²⁷⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 328; Tūsī, 154.

²⁷⁶ For a useful and detailed explanation of Family Ethics in *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, see Hüseyin Öztürk. *Kinalizâde Alî Çelebi'de Aile Ahlâkı*, (Ankara: Aile Araştırma Kurumu Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1990).

²⁷⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 328; Tūsī, 154.

²⁷⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 325.

each one's responsibilities. Some situations, in which, time to time, parents cannot cover, adds Kinalizâde, certainly demand servants.²⁷⁹

Father

Father, about whom Kinalizâde firstly talks, is a member of a family. In order to have a particular combination, he points out, every mass needs to be gathered under one leader who, in a specific and appropriate discipline, organizes and manages them. As such, a head of the family, due to their sensitive nature, is not a mother, yet rather a father.²⁸⁰

In this context, Kinalizâde makes three analogies in order to construe the detail of significant parts and their inevitable roles related to the issue. The first analogy between shepherd and father, he makes for lightening the first responsibility of the father. Just like a shepherd, the father pays a close attention members of his family in such a way to follow their situations, feed them, position them in proper and secure place, and thus to protect them from every kind of dangers.²⁸¹

Secondly, Kinalizâde asserts that the father, just like a physician, is mainly responsible to manage the affairs of the household. On account of the fact that a physician cares about health of organs and their well-functioning; in any case, there is a malfunction, or disequilibria in any body liquids, which destroys harmony within the body, he does firstly determine the illness and bring solutions to cure it. He thus provides well-condition of the body. The father, the governor of the household, deals with problems between members or of other affairs. He has to preserve his household from nasty manners and their influence within household.

Further, a final analogy makes Kinalizâde on members of the household. A body has organs, each one of which is specialized with particular function to maintain the health of the body and is related to each

²⁷⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 387; Tūsī, 154.

²⁸⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 328; Tūsī, 154.

²⁸¹ KINALIZÂDE, 331.

other. Every member of the family, just like organs, has special functions and is correlated with other members.

To arrange a house, including its conditions such as its construction, structural type, and location, is the father's duty. Kinalizâde also states, it is an obligatory settled upon the father to govern and regulate the property and provisions. Wealth, rooted on money that is one of the preservers of justice in Aristotle's regard,²⁸² is indispensable issue of human beings inasmuch as the need of transactions lasts whole human life span.

As an essential tool, property is handled through three states: its earning, its custody, and expenditure.²⁸³ Its earning is connected with either inheritance or professions that are classified as trade, craft, agriculture, and rulership. Wealth is preserved through its increasing acquisition, its guard, and its prudent consuming.²⁸⁴ Consuming of wealth is viewed through three aspects: to give in the name of God, to give by generosity, and to spend for necessities. The last aspect is strongly connected with moderation that is, uniquely favored one's own goodness. Here, Kinalizâde applies Tusi's view:²⁸⁵

In the third category only one condition must be observed: that of moderation (iqtisād). ... Indeed, if one fulfils the conditions of taking middle course in all respects, one will not escape the aspersions of the slanderer or the disparagement of the detractor. The reason for this is that equity and justice are missing in most natures, while desire and envy and ill-will are firmly rooted. ... These are the universal laws required in the matter of handling property: their particular applications will not escape the intelligent man, God Almighty so willing!

Mother

Mother, another member of the family, Kinalizâde issues with marriage regard. Marriage is basically rooted on two reasons. Due to the

²⁸² Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*, V 90, 1133a15–20.

²⁸³ Tusi and Kinalizâde issue the same. Tūsī, 157.

²⁸⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 331–49; Tūsī, 154. For Bryson, see, W. Heffening. "Tadbir", *EF*².

²⁸⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 347–8; Tūsī, 161.

prophet's remark,²⁸⁶ one's marriage is firstly essential for proliferation.²⁸⁷ As the second reason, Kinalizâde asserts, is one's protection from sins.²⁸⁸ Marriage, he emphasizes, should not be based on appetite.²⁸⁹

A number of features of an ideal lady to marry are brought by Kinalizâde as for worthy wife.²⁹⁰ The ideal lady is the regulator of household, the man's association in housekeeping, partner in property, and representative during his absence. To be assistant and adviser for hard works and consultant to her husband in bad times, are features of a best wife.²⁹¹ Further intelligence, piety, continence, modesty, honesty, loyalty, obedience, and decency are other characteristics of the best candidate.

A free and bachelor woman is preferable to marry. With explaining some peculiar traditions of the prophet and occurrences of his time, Kinalizâde underlines that beauty, money, or any other purposes should not be taken into consideration for marriage.²⁹² Moreover, he presents the best wives' features. According to him, two kinds of provisions are required in marriage ceremony: One is universal, and the other is conditional. Religion, reason, and equality, he explains, are universal provisions reinforced quotation from the prophet.

Stating that people who marry for benefits, Kinalizâde notes, due to holy justice, are objected to God's punishment and do not reach what they have intended. On the other hand, people marry for religious purpose, continence, and hereafter, they, with the help of God, become rich and have higher position.²⁹³

²⁸⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 349.

²⁸⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 349; Tūsī, 161.

²⁸⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 349.

²⁸⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 350.

²⁹⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 349–363; Tūsī, 161–2.

²⁹¹ Tūsī regards an ideal lady as, "A proper lady should be helper and associate to his husband in the affair of home." See Tūsī, 161.

²⁹² KINALIZÂDE, 350–351; Tūsī, 352.

²⁹³ KINALIZÂDE, 360–361.

In order to warn, Kinalizâde depicts some nasty characters of women that upset happiness of a family.²⁹⁴ In addition, goodness of marriage is strictly connected with people who can respect and pay attention their couple's rights; otherwise, marriage should not take place.²⁹⁵

Polygamy

Kinalizâde, firstly depending on the Qur'anic verse,²⁹⁶ underlines a number of harms of polygamy. Indeed, he even finds harmful to have concubines. Inviting of doing injustice, just as the verse warns, polygamy is forbidden in his view.²⁹⁷ It is, although, possible for some men to provide justice between women, Kinalizâde states that, yet, such people are hardly seen in his time. He also adds that philosophers approve of polygamy only for the rulers.²⁹⁸

In addition, he adds that dealing with women will definitely keep one's mind constantly busy and take plenty of his time, which, in turn, will prevent his perfection and to sincerely turn to God. Causing serious damages, hardly cured,²⁹⁹ Kinalizâde asserts that polygamy does corrupt the order of a family inasmuch as it is the responsibility of the husband not to marry with another woman.³⁰⁰ As for it, he says, "the man in the household is like the heart in the body, and just as one heart cannot be the source of life in two bodies, so man cannot easily organize two households."³⁰¹ In a case, harmony and

²⁹⁴ These are hannāna, mannāna, annāna, kaiyat al-qafā, and khadrā' al-diman. See KINALIZÂDE, 358- 359; Tūsī, 221.

²⁹⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 361. Tell the truth the first time, I have encountered to this kind of provision. It is fully right forgotten. I deeply thank to Kinalizâde; may Allah give him the paradises.

²⁹⁶ "And if you have reason to fear that you might not act equitably towards orphans, then marry from among [other] women such as are lawful to you-[even] two, or three, or four: but if you have reason to fear that you might not be able to treat them with equal fairness, the [only] one-or [from among] those whom you rightfully possess. This will make it more likely that you will not deviate from the right course." The Qur'an, 4: 3.

²⁹⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 217.

²⁹⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 354.

²⁹⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 218.

³⁰⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 354; Tūsī, 163.

³⁰¹ KINALIZÂDE, 354; Tūsī, 163.

order are not constituted in a family, Kinalizâde advises to divorce or to be patient.³⁰²

Couples' responsibilities

Kinalizâde, then, gets depth in the responsibilities of each one. For a worthy husband, three conditions should be maintained: to inspire awe, to show favor, and to occupy her mind.³⁰³ The husband, he explains, should be dominant in his family; thus, the woman would respect him. To respect his wife and her rights in order thus to gain her love which, in turn, leads her respect to her husband is the second condition. Thirdly, the husband should provide his wife an art to deal with in her free times.³⁰⁴

The procedure leading happy family life, on the side of a woman, should be along three five lines:³⁰⁵ the practicing of continence, a displaying of efficiency, standing in awe of him, keeping harmony in marriage and avoiding of disputes, and finally, a minimum of scolding, with a courteous manner in their society.

Training of children³⁰⁶

As the third member of the family, children are trained in accordance with period in which the child is. Three periods, Kinalizâde asserts, are the period before birth, the period while birth, and the period after birth.³⁰⁷ The first period is strictly connected with mother. For the second period, "the first advice Kinalizade gives to parents is that a baby is a divine gift; therefore, they should embrace it without indicating any gender preference."³⁰⁸ Hence, two deputies, he concerns, are for parents: to thank to God, without differentiating whether the child is a girl or a boy, and to give her or him a beautiful name.

³⁰² KINALIZÂDE, 358.

³⁰³ KINALIZÂDE, 353; Tûsî, 162–163.

³⁰⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 353–354.

³⁰⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 356–357; Tûsî, 164.

³⁰⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 363; Tûsî, 166–173; also see Enver Uysal. "Kinalizâde's views on the moral education of children", *Journal of Moral Education*, 36 (2007), 333–341.

³⁰⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 363; Tûsî, 166–173.

³⁰⁸ Uysal, Ibid, 336.

Starting with boys, Kinalizâde elaborates the period after birth. First of all, a nurse must be chosen. After that, not showing the affection, yet teaching the discipline and training of character essentially take place. Then, the acquisition of virtues that gradually becomes apparent should be observed in the child. Next, the child should get used to practice the duties of the faith. Besides, manners of dressing, eating, and sleeping habits are given. Coping with hard conditions, learning sciences, and acquiring a craft, which is in accordance with the child nature, are next concerns of parents.

Furthermore, Kinalizâde then proceeds with the training of girls. The manners of speech, movement and rest, and eating and drinking, and observing the rights of parents are construed in this context. As for the manners of eating and drinking, he underlines the principle of moderation. Relying on the tradition of the prophet, he strongly supports the education of girls, including both reading and writing. Some female figures as examples of scholar women, he also mentions.³⁰⁹ Kinalizâde also advises that girls, at the period of puberty, should be married with boys who are equal to them. Religion, morality, generosity, and honor should be cared from an ideal candidate; higher status, money, family, and handsomeness should not be paid attention.³¹⁰

Servants

Kinalizâde finally points out the issue of servants as hands and feet of the body, constituting the whole household.³¹¹ He advises owners of house to be just and give works to servants in accordance with their capabilities.

Rights of Parents

As the first obligation, Kinalizâde regards to express God gratitude and worship Him due to His unprecedented graces in accordance with one's capacity. Next, nothing can be compared with what received from parents. As for this, a number of reasons Kinalizâde mentions in order to highlight

³⁰⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 372; Tūsī is opposite to Kinalizâde, see Tūsī, 173.

³¹⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 373.

rights of parents, which, for him, it is not possible to properly thank in word and deed. Through presenting examples from the traditions of the prophet, he positions them on indispensable ground.³¹² With applying the verse,³¹³ he implicitly asserts that after Creator's obligations have been observed, the rights of parents, with offering gratitude for the graces received from them, should be observed.³¹⁴

3. 2. Justice with Respect to Politics

3. 2. 1. Justice as the Assurance of Ideal State in the *Republic*

3. 2. 1. 1. The Ideal State: The Philosopher-Kings

The ideal state, basically founded on "philosophy, which was introduced as a means to actualize the city's good and is being used as a means to discover the good, turns out to be the end, the human good."³¹⁵ It is formed with a highly significant and distinct contribution of a strict education program, mainly aimed to bring up virtuous subjects and to play crucial role as central institution to provide proper environment for other institutions to well function. In other words, whole system of the ideal state is dependent on education; if it is properly succeeded, then everything will be well. Since then, it must be sufficiently protected by guardians (424b).

Apart from the central institution, other notable political institutions are the system of classes and two forms of community—of property and of the family—before discussed. The state is organized according to the system of classes that takes its roots from the very nature of men. "There are three primary types of people, philosophic, victory-loving, and profit-loving" (581c).

³¹¹ KINALIZÂDE, 387.

³¹² KINALIZÂDE, 382–383.

³¹³ "Worship God [alone], and do not ascribe divinity, in any way, to aught beside Him. And do good unto your parents, and near of kin, and unto orphans, and the needy, and the neighbor who is a stranger, and the friend by your side, and the wayfarer, and those whom you rightfully possess. Verily, God does not love any of those who, full of self-conceit, act in a boastful manner." The Qur'an 4: 36.

³¹⁴ This is the demand of Aristotelian justice. Kinalizâde follows Tūsī, see KINALIZÂDE, 382–38; Tūsī, 178–181.

³¹⁵ Bloom, *Ibid*, 402.

According to their natures,³¹⁶ people should perform their own works that pertain to their classes.³¹⁷ This is the subsequent outcome of functioning justice in a state inasmuch as justice is maintained on the principle of specialization. It should be also noted that the prominent contribution of justice, as a principle, is to make possible other virtues to arise, then thrive, and preserve them since ever (433b–d). In word to say, “justice assures that the state will be wise through the wisdom of the philosophers, brave through the courage of the auxiliaries, and free from faction.”³¹⁸

The guardians of the ideal state must be properly educated; on the one hand, to be courageous enough to fight and protect the state efficiently, and on the other hand, gentle and high-spirited to their citizens (375b–d). Their attitudes towards the citizens will be ensured through education and provisions carefully taken (421a, 416a).

The ruler is chosen according to the agreement between three classes. The kings of the ideal state are the people, having the absolute knowledge, “who are true philosophers who think little of present honors, regarding them as illiberal and worthless, who prize what is right and the honors that come from it above everything, and who consider justice as the most important and most essential thing, serving it and fostering it as they set their city in order”³¹⁹ (540d–41a). The ruler is the one, depicted as a

³¹⁶ As a supportive view, Kim states, “Plato seeks the best possible way to create a state where the mutual cooperation among people with diverse aptitudes is possible, and in which everyone can best flourish by realizing his potential to its fullest through working on the *epitedeuma* that best fits his natural aptitude, incidentally contributing to the state as well. Inasmuch as Plato cares for the happiness of individuals, and inasmuch as he sees the importance of one’s *epitedeuma* to one’s life, Plato plans to construct a society in which everyone, whatever *epitedeuma* he may have, can be respected and appreciated.” For detail, see Hyun-Sook Kim. “The Concept of Epitedeuma Shown in Plato’s Theory of Justice in the ‘Republic’ and its Implicatio...”, (PhD Dissertation. Columbia University, 2001).

³¹⁷ However, it is very possible, says Socrates, for a carpenter to do the work of a shoemaker, or a shoemaker to do that of a carpenter. There will not be harm for the system. See for detail, the *Republic*, 434a.

³¹⁸ Klosko, *Ibid*, 143.

³¹⁹ Interestingly as being opposite what is given here, in the next pages, Socrates states, “Consider, then. Of the three types of men, which has most experience of the pleasures we mentioned? Do you think the profit-lover learns what the truth itself is like, or has

craftsman, who associates with the divine and practices of stamping what he sees into the people's characters (540c–e).

No institution is intended to control the rulers or prevent them to abuse their unlimited powers in so far as, after completing the abstract education and administrative work, they are selected among numbers of groups of guardians through the most rigid and intensive program of testing, including being examined toils, fears, and pleasure at their early years, intellectual capacities and capabilities in next years and other necessary additional tests, there will be hardly problems (412c–e). People who pass these exams must be led to look toward the Good, what itself provides light for everything (540a). The final point, at which the ruler candidate reaches, is to have divine nature (500c9) where his soul is naturally akin to the forms.

The best ruling can be succeeded with the rulers who regard ruling, as not the source of prosperous privileges, yet rather as burden (540b).³²⁰ Plato emphasizes that these kinds of people must be forced to rule by means of two ways. One is that they would not want to be governed by inferior people (347a–d); the other is that they surely know that they are better and more completely educated than others, so to rule the state is their duty (519d–20d). The ruler, in the ideal state, is, actually, loaded with an inescapable duty (520e). *Thus, in their hands, the city is free from internal strife.*³²¹

The ideal state, Plato says, will come into existence through the quickest and simplest way. "When one or more true philosophers come to

more experience of the pleasure of knowing, than the philosopher does of making a profit?" (582a8) Some later, he says, "So, the philosopher is far superior to the profit-lover in his experience of both kinds of pleasures." (582b7) Annas asserts, "Almost universally, critics have complained that pleasure is irrelevant to the argument, and that anyway Plato is wrong about what pleasure is." For more information, see Annas, *Ibid*, 306.

³²⁰ Ben Emond professes that happiness is a communal concept in the *Republic*. For the communal concept, he states that one must act for the sake of one's community in order to be happy. As basing, he discusses that justice is a notion involving others' happiness. According to him, Plato's concept of happiness, in the *Republic*, is consisted of interplaying of both altruistic and egoistic concept of justice. For detail, see Ben Emond. "The Philosopher's Happiness in Plato's 'Republic'", (PhD Dissertation. University of Ottawa, 2006).

³²¹ Klosko, *Ibid*, 145.

power in a city... everyone in the city who is over ten years old they will send into the country. They will take over the children, and far removed from current habits, which their parents possess; they will bring them up in their own ways and laws, which are the ones we described before" (540e–41a-b). Thus, the next generation will be properly raised to thoroughly establish the ideal state.

3. 2. 1. 2. The Ground of the Structure

The Key Institution: Education

The treatment of the state, as another approach to issue the applications of justice, is grounded on moral reform to reach philosophical run. Institutional structure, which is one of the bases of the state, plays rather significant role in the construction of the state. The principle of specialization and the community of property and of the family are the other bases, hitherto construed. Education, having highly order and special program, is one of the essential elements in the structure of the state largely to train the characters and form the intellectual life and thus to found and maintain the whole state.

The period of childhood must be carefully observed in order to prepare the most appropriate training program only through which a lawful spirit can be brought up. Such a training program can not be succeeded through written laws, according to Plato (425b–c). Emphasizing the significance of musical and physical training,³²² he gives little importance to laws. Inasmuch as he strongly believes that a well-organized and ordered state will not leave a place for any defectiveness to arise, and the virtuous and perfectly educated citizens will practice whatever they are obliged in every kind of states (427a).

³²² From literary references and pictorial representations on vase-paintings, we learn that instruction in these early schools centered around two types of training: "gymnastike for the body and mousike for the mind and soul. For more information see, Bryant, Ibid, 268.

The second, third, and tenth Books include serious places for details of the nature and kinds of education. The *ideal state* can be succeeded, only if the education system efficiently works. Aiming at shaping the subjects' souls through providing perfect harmony and thus producing *people who are attracted to good and feel repulsion for evil, finding it ugly and vulgar*,³²³ the system is composed of education in the arts and physical training. Both of training is not disregarded as complementary parts of a method.

Education in the arts is firstly taken place. "Plato's educational system aims to impose on children a single set of values in such a way that they will not be seriously skeptical about them either at the time or later in life."³²⁴ The whole education is mainly developed on three assumptions related to the very nature of man in Plato's view. In the first place, the young soul is quite malleable to receive whatever impresses on it (377b). Plato takes this into account. Beside, the differences of the intellectual capacities and the desire tendencies come with birth, and they cannot be changed. Along with these considerations, the souls of young people can be formed in a way that determines his or her future life whether he is going to be happy or sad. In word to say, people's happiness is rather dependent on education and physical training which they receive while growing up and thus setting their characters.

Another assumption is that the young character is formed through a special way which includes little direct teaching. In fact, the central feature of education, constructed in the *Republic*, is to direct the young minds properly to the light, on account of the very fact that what is gained through education is not something as putting sight to blind eyes, says Socrates.³²⁵ Instead, people come to the world with the ability to turn their gazes from darkness to light. Further, Plato points out the influence of the environment on character. The mind, Plato regards, as being active to have constant

³²³ Annas, Ibid, 83.

³²⁴ Annas, Ibid, 89.

relations with its environment, is influenced from its surrounding, particularly from artistic works.

The last assumption is that the character is took root in the early education³²⁶ which determines the whole future steps of the education. During this period, the teacher primarily deals with forming the desires, instead of reason since the development of reasoning capacity is founded on the developments of other elements, non-rational elements to have order. That is to say, the early education is formed to success in developing an ordering of these elements before properly using reason.

The early education is programmed to train the future guardians. In the course of this procedure, aesthetic and moral attitudes are not sharply cut, yet Plato highly applies artistic works in order fully and properly to train children. It is composed of two parts music and gymnastic. Music is defined by some scholars as "education in arts," covering all arts mentioned in the *Republic*. Gymnastic is expressed as "physical training" that has both physical and psychic influence (410b–c). The aim of the early education is constructed to facilitate the soul to be virtuous.³²⁷ Primarily, it intends the soul's appetite to be under control through combining two parts, the spirited part and reason; thus, they reach a level to have harmony. This combination is succeeded, only when the spirited part submits the will of reason (411e–12a). Hence, through this education, a soul, having order and harmony, works in rational ground, which, in turn, let the soul have correct opinions inasmuch as the soul becomes able to easily differentiate things whether they are good or bad. Thus, with the highest standards, he would praise the fine things and dislike the bad things. That is to say, he would have a high taste to obtain the fine things which cause him to develop truly good character and to do just actions (401e–2a). Such a genuine character is a necessary condition for knowledge.

³²⁵ For detail, the *Republic*, the Book VII (518b–d).

³²⁶ Described in the second and third book.

Imitation, since it has influence for a long time in the regard of Plato, is also applied as an instrument in the education of guardians. People imitate bad or good behaviors of others, which, at the same time, shows that they will have them as ingrained with themselves and habitually continue to do in the future. Because of this, Plato emphasizes that people should imitate courageous, self-disciplined, just, and generous people (395c–d esp. 604e–6d). Imitation is particularly significant in very young ages.

Imitative works are grounded on narrative. They have tragedy, comedy, drama, and poetic recitations. Poetic recitation, according to Plato, has rather big effect; therefore, poetic works should be decided by the state.³²⁸ Music is also used to educate guardians. Its role is mostly a medium to carry artistic representations in general. The music must be composed of fine speech, fine music, gracefulness, and fine rhythm (398b–99e; 400a–c 400d–e). All the artistic works that are stories and other media are intended to make the soul get used to the virtues characters and enable to use reason. The young guardian goes on with what he has taken in early education through passing various circumstances and thus develops the ideal character by means of applying ideal moral prescription.

The physical training is not deeply discussed in the *Republic*. This program is aimed at training soldiers who will work in numbers of different situations. It should be founded on simplicity and moderation that will help guardians to keep their appetites in check. Although the physical training is directed to bodily instruction, it is indeed organized also to shape the soul. Physical training, opposite to early education, is intended to strengthen the

³²⁷ The *Republic*, Book IV.

³²⁸ Since very old times, poets were considered the foremost educators of the people, and it was their which each child was required to memorize and sing. From Homer they learned of the agonal ideal and philotimia, from Hesoid the primacy of social justice; Tyrtaios and Kallinos imparted the virtues of the communal warrior, while Solon and other sages codified the Polis ideal and the principles of the good citizenship. Morally uplifting works by other poets and lawgivers also figured prominently in the early curriculum, and from this inheritance the child was prepared for the adult world of the citizen. For more information, see Bryant, *Ibid*, 269.

sprit. Having highly spirited nature let the guardians rather have their responsibilities properly. Physical training lasts two or three years after the guardians receive the early education before the age of twenty. The formal education of the majority of the guardians ends around at the age of twenty.

The guardians who will be rulers are chosen from these young guardians who have passed both early education and physical training. These study mathematics ten years and later dialectics five years. After having political and administrative work fifteen years in the city, they complete their education to reach at the level of perceiving the Form of the Good around fifty years old. The virtue of the auxiliaries is gained through the combination of education in the arts and physical training only which they become enable to avoid contradictions and obtain correct opinions.

The Philosophical Foundation

The ideal state is shaped from philosophical knowledge, which, as the superiority of the philosophers, is the theory of Forms that are the absolute references.³²⁹ Having immutable and certain essence, the Forms are absolute, timeless, and completely different from the sensible objects.³³⁰ In addition, they are “real” more than anything else in the sensible world. Being placed in intelligible realm, they can be only perceived by the mind. The

³²⁹ For the theory of Forms, “Socrates said that you cannot discuss moral questions like how to act justly, or aesthetic questions like whether a thing is beautiful, unless you have previously decided what you mean by the concepts ‘justice’ and ‘beauty’. Until these are fixed, so that we have a standard in our minds to which the individual actions or objects may be referred, we shall not know what we are talking about, and discussion may be frustrated because the parties are attaching different meaning to the same words. If this is right, said Plato, then we must believe that such a thing as justice or beauty really exists, for otherwise what is the use of trying to define it? It is no good looking for a universal standard if it is only imaginary. He taught therefore the existence of a Form or ‘Idea’ (in Greek *eidos* or *idea*) of these and other concepts, which was not a *mere* concept existing in our minds but had an eternal and unchanging nature independent of what human beings might think it was. This is the famous *chorismos*, or affirmation of the *separate* existence of the Ideas-separate, that is, both from the particular instances of them in the world and from our thought of them; and belief in such independently existing Forms constitutes what is known as ‘Plato’s Theory of Ideas’. That is arose out of the Socratic demand for definitions, and went beyond it in this way, is confirmed by Aristotle.” See Guthrie, *Ibid*, 32-3.

³³⁰ For more information, see Klosko, *Ibid*, 87–104.

Forms, prominently having absolute character, provide certain and secure ground for knowledge; so, by this way, it is very possible to establish secure basis for morality that is founded on the moral Forms. They are absolute, certain, and objective standards of value.³³¹

Objects of the sensible world are depicted as having imperfect and changeable attributes. For instance, a pencil is big in comparison to an eraser, yet it is small in comparison to a computer.³³² In word to say, a pencil is big in comparison to some things and not to others. Therefore, sensible objects carry attributes with their opposites because they *exist imperfectly* (523b–24b).³³³ On the other hand, the Forms are qualified with the highest attributes.

Ethical affairs are also established on similar perspective. An action can be just and unjust at the same time; as an example, returning the borrowed knife to its owner is just under certain circumstances, not every time.³³⁴ Hence, moral actions are related to conditions, just as sensible objects are qualified according to the related objects. Since an action is just under some circumstances and not under some other circumstances, moral actions in the sensible world are always imperfect. Having virtuous character is possible only through attaining the absolute knowledge that is *turning from human actions to the Forms they exemplify*.³³⁵

The Philosophical Characteristics

Plato establishes political stability on philosophical rule in so far as only philosophers have the finer and higher knowledge that keep the rulers to avoid misusing the power and the wealth of the state for their worldly

³³¹ Plato was deeply disturbed by extreme forms of moral skepticisms, and so wished to establish moral standards on a secure basis. He was able to do this by postulating the moral Forms, which are absolute, objective standards of value. Since the Forms also supply the objects required for certain knowledge, they also serve to counter general skepticism of the kind represented by Protagoras' 'Man is the measure of all things', about which Plato was also concerned.

³³² See for more examples, 478e–79c, and 523a–25a.

³³³ Klosko, 92.

³³⁴ This is explained in the first book of the *Republic*.

advantages. In the ideal state, Plato expresses, a ruler has not only absolute knowledge but also special talents. Rulers have the knowledge of the Good only through which everything, including whole knowledge, becomes useful and beneficial (505a-b, 517c). Although it is essentially important, it is known only by a small number of people (590c-d). For a city to be wise, it is enough to be ruled by a wise ruler who possesses the knowledge of the Good.

The knowledge of the Good, as the first and indispensable requirement of a ruler, prominently, provides him morality. Rulers are awake, says Plato, because they are able to see the Form of the Good. In addition, truly rich characters, fed from outstanding values and grounded on a good and rational life, (520c-21b) are raised on the absolute knowledge. Knowledge and morality are brought together through the knowledge of the Good. In word to say, "for Plato in the Republic, intellectual superiority is moral superiority, and ... the philosophers cannot succeed at their appointed tasks without the latter."³³⁶

Philosopher-ruler, in the second place, is somehow extended as a craftsman of temperance, justice, and the whole of popular virtues, who uses a model in his art; however, the ruler applies the Forms that *are those of moral qualities, Justice, Beauty, Moderation (501b), the Good itself (540a)*, as his models.³³⁷ Plato utters, "... as they work, they would look often in each direction: on the one hand, toward what is in its nature just, beautiful, temperate, and all the rest; and, on the other, toward what they are trying to put into human beings, mixing and blending pursuits to produce a human likeness, based on the one that Homer too called divine and godly when it appeared among human beings." (501b) "Plato depicts them as doing their job with an eye to the heavens, governing the state according to the dictates

³³⁵ Klosko, Ibid, 95.

³³⁶ Ibid, 175.

³³⁷ Ibid, 181.

of their exalted knowledge."³³⁸ Without the knowledge of the Good, the state would be blind (484c–d).

In the third place, rulers must be philosophers. In any case, philosophers do not wish to rule, they must be persuaded for so long as they go through a rigorous program of education only by means of which successors are raised and become able to carry the burden of sovereignty. Having a strict education in arts, organized in a rich variety of subjects, and attending fifteen years to the administrative service in the city, grounded upon utmost seriousness, let them have perfect knowledge and talents to perceive the Form of the Good.³³⁹

Moreover, they must have the knowledge of human psychology and different kinds of arts, including poetry, music, and visual images and their influence on human beings in order thus appropriately to provide harmony in souls. To prepare proper tests for future rulers and tools for the lower classes to obey the rulers throughout the state are done by the rulers. Significantly, they must be able to differentiate the best people for the best offspring, organize the lottery, and keep the population under control.

Beyond a doubt, a variety of talents are required for a ruler. The military applications, such as wars, must be intelligently known and managed. The rulers, in international arena, must have effective relationship with other states. The affairs related to the state, such as protecting the wealth, are also recounted as the responsibilities of the rulers in the *Republic*. Numbers of requirements can be listed, yet the important thing is that a ruler is required to a wide range of knowledge and various skills and talents.

³³⁸ Ibid, 177.

³³⁹ "As we noted in Chapter 6, knowledge of the Form of the Good should probably be construed as knowledge of the intelligence behind all things, of the rational pattern according to which the world as a whole is directed." See Ibid, 173.

Wisdom Superior to the Laws

The Republic introduces that the ruler is someone who is mostly using his intelligent actively, yet, at the same time, passively implementing the Forms. He is someone who knows the art of ruling just as a physician knows the art of medicine. The true constitution has rather distinct feature, according to Plato, so far as it is presided over by a genuine statesman. Other constitutions are dependent on laws that are too rigid and general to properly respond to a diversity of cases. A doctor would prescribe some chemicals for his patient under certain conditions; as such, laws are applicable to some average events, yet there are rather special circumstances. It is the skill of the true ruler to precisely manage to different cases by means of adapting his scientific understanding that is formed from the codes of laws.

Further, Plato says, "... there must always be some people in the city who have a rational account of the constitution, the same one that guided you, the lawgiver, when you made the laws." (497c8-d2) Because of this rational account of the constitution, it can never be said that a true rulers is, only and passively, implementing the Forms, yet he is rather intelligently using his understanding and reasonably responding to various situations. The strict education assures Plato about the ruler to successfully structure the society; so as to, it is regarded unnecessary to discuss the details of the rules, regulations, and institutions by Socrates and his interlocutors (425d–e; 423e; also 427a).

3. 2. 1. 3. The Fall of Just City

Justice, as the second sort of good, is also worth having for its consequences. How it benefits its owners? In the eighth book of the *Republic*, Socrates elaborates the superiority of justice via the fall of the just city, in a progressive manner, arising worse and worse unjust state. As the guardians start to give priority, not to the common good, yet to their selfish interests, the breakdown and dissolution of the unity starts. In fact, whatever

follows behind the just city is unjust. Many sorts of unjust city (544c) are there, Socrates utters, yet the four main kinds he puts forward: timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. Likewise, unjust states of the human soul, as the collapse of happiness and personality of one's, outcome just as the domination of other parts rather than reason that is best to deal with whole soul.

The just city, having unified and harmonized ground, started to lose its worth in a gradual degeneration and breakdown. Firstly, how philosophers will fall Socrates explains, "... even though they are wise, the people you have educated to be leaders in your city will, by using rational calculation combined with sense-perception, nonetheless fail to ascertain the periods of good fertility and of infertility for your species. Instead, these will escape them, and so they will sometimes beget children when they should not." (546b) This, as a destruction of the trust and affection feeling between guardians, will certainly bring the breakdown of the guardian's disciplined unity that will lead degeneration in whole city. The rulers, primarily governed by the spirited part of their souls, will definitely follow, instead of the city's good, their own goods, namely "honor," and abuse the power of the state. As a consequence, the principle of specialization among the guardians will upset, which will shake the whole state.

Next, Socrates construes oligarchy, is ruled by few, particularly by the rich in accordance with, not the good of the city, yet rather with their own interests. Giving a captain of a ship as an example, he explains the importance of a qualified office for the work he does, just as how the unsuited and untalented captain leads a very bad voyage. The very fact that Socrates underlines is the fall of the principle of specialization among guardians (551c). The oligarchic one, he explains as, "... he makes the rational and spirited elements sit on the ground beneath it, ... He won't allow the first to calculate or consider anything except how a little money can be made into more; or the second to admire or honor anything except wealth

and wealthy people, or to love being honored for anything besides the possession of wealth and whatever contributes to it.”(553c). The upset harmony and structure of the city is no matter for the oligarch.

Democracy, the next degeneration, Socrates explains, does not constrain things upon citizens. The alteration from oligarchy to democracy is very easy for him just as a weak body to become sick with a subtle external influence or internal without external reason divided into factions (555b557a). Thus, the fall of the just city reached the final point: Namely diversity means the upset of unity. Having not a real unity, the city has neither a common good, nor common rule (557e558a). “Plato presents democracy as defined by tolerant pluralism ... Democracy has to be, for Plato, a permissive free-for-all with no, or weak, sense of overall unity, because it is a further stage of breakdown of the ideal state's unity.”³⁴⁰

The most unjust city is the tyrannical state which is the outcome of a person's excessive desire. As the misery state of the one's soul, many paradoxes would emerge in a tyranny person and wreck his individuality. As the worst state observed in fact is the collapse of the happiness.

Finally, what Socrates in fact underlines is that the good is proposed for its establishment of any unjust state, and its insatiable desire and neglect of other things cause its collapse. Just as, “oligarchy was established due to wealth ... and its insatiable desire for wealth and its neglect of other things for the sake of moneymaking was what destroyed it” (562b) and also, “freedom is the reason to build democracy, yet the excessive and inappropriate freedom put them the harshest and the most bitter slavery.” (569c)

3. 2. 2. The Science of City Government in *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*

Kinalizâde gives tips about management of cities at the end of the second book, in which the science of household regulation is issued.³⁴¹ Firstly, he explains that humans' need of communal life leads to the building of a state, depicted as a big family. Later, he examines the theoretical background of politics and then the practical issues of a state.³⁴²

3. 2. 2. 1. The Inevitable Need: To Live in a Community

The most important reason for human beings are to live together, Kinalizâde presents, is the aid of others. The human being is a social creature and needs to live in a community. Along with acquiring virtues from virtuous people, they have to help each other since he is unable to afford his needs by himself.

Kinalizâde, as following the traditional understanding, divides the creatures into two categories: the perfect and imperfect creatures. Celestial bodies pertain to the first group. Human being is examined under the second group composed of terrestrial compounds. The things, he believes, such elements as minerals, vegetables, fruits, and animals serve human beings on three ways. These are through matters, tools, and assistance.³⁴³ Human beings, on the contrary, provide service these only secondarily.³⁴⁴

Kinalizâde thinks that men help each other through the ways of tools and assistance.³⁴⁵ Although, he implies, whole creatures serve in various ways to human beings to survive, people still need each other.³⁴⁶ In addition, different economic levels of people, he thinks, are the part of the divine plan insofar as they need each other's assist and thus maintain their lives just as

³⁴⁰ Annas, Ibid, 300.

³⁴¹ Following different way from his predecessors who Tūsî separates a particular place for the ethics of state.

³⁴² KINALIZÂDE, 405.

³⁴³ KINALIZÂDE, 406.

³⁴⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 405.

³⁴⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 409. Tūsî and Devvâni think different. They believe that people help each other through the way of assistance. See Tūsî, 188; for Devvâni, see Anay, Ibid, 335.

³⁴⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 411.

each organ of a body needing each one in order to sustain their lives. If otherwise, due to several occupations to provide needs, the times of a man would be divided into several parts. Hence, because of the variation of needs, different responsibilities are settled upon men to protect the society's structure.³⁴⁷

Naturally Social Creature

Kinalizâde, in different places, draws human being as a naturally social creature.³⁴⁸ The word of human (*insān*), which, he explains, is rooted from "uns" that is familiarity.³⁴⁹ Just as a sign, the name of men implies his very structure which is embodied in a shared life.³⁵⁰

... a sense of fellowship which is rooted in the nature of men: indeed, man is called 'man' for this reason, as has been established in the discipline of polite letters(for the person who said 'you are called man because you are forgetful', fancying that 'man' was derived from 'forgetfulness', was in error in his supposition). Now, since natural fellowship (uns-i tabi) is one of the properties of men, and inasmuch as the perfection of any thing lies in the manifestation of its property, so the perfection of this species too lies in the manifestation of this property to its own kind. This property, moreover, is the principle of love calling forth civilized life and the (social) synthesis.

Another reason, Kinalizâde utters for sociality, is religious rituals. In different times, communal pray is appreciated a lot as far as plenty of people come together and share the dealings of life. Attending devotional acts, as an opportunity to feel fellowship, is such a reason for people to know and love each other, which, in turn, causes brotherhood to arise among them.³⁵¹ Thereby a unity, reminding the real Unity, is formed.³⁵²

³⁴⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 412; Anay, Ibid, 335.

³⁴⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 136, 327, 433; Anay, Ibid, 334.

³⁴⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 433. These ideas came from Miskawayh. See Tūsī, 199; Anay, Ibid, 334; Miskawayh, 126.

³⁵⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 433; Tūsī, 199.

³⁵¹ KINALIZÂDE, 433; Tūsī, 199; Anay, Ibid, 335.

³⁵² KINALIZÂDE, 334.

Moreover, Kinalizâde points out the importance of living in solitude in sometimes in order to reach the perfection.³⁵³ His focus is that human being needs time to time to live alone, not always since he has to work in order to afford his needs. Otherwise, due to relying on others, he will undoubtedly cause injustice.³⁵⁴

3. 2. 2. 2. The Government of the Realm

Relying on the nature of human, unavoidable needing both the aid of the other species and the cooperation of its own species, Kinalizâde asserts the significance of communal life. Here, he emphasizes civilized life (*tamaddun*) which is derived from the word of city (*madīna*). For the word of city, Kinalizâde uses not in the meaning of a part of earth, on which people live, yet instead in the meaning of a particular association among inhabitants. With civilized life, a combination of different nations and structured groups, unlike a smaller homogenous group, a mixture composed of opposite groups is meant.³⁵⁵

The State

Communal life, however, provides not absolute peace³⁵⁶ on account of the very fact that the needs and desires of men, due to variation of persons' manners and intentions, can sometimes cause arguments and fights. Problems as such events and others among inhabitants can only be controlled and managed by a governmental group, which is named the

³⁵³ KINALIZÂDE, 417–418. Although Kinalizâde thinks the same with his predecessors about praying together that makes people a lot closer, he thinks different from them about living solitude, sometimes. Tūsī, 194–5; Miskawayh, 126–127.

³⁵⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 416. Being different from his predecessors, Kinalizâde has a soft view about people who prefer to have life in solitude. However, Tūsī opposes living solitude due to relying on others for their needs. See Tūsī, 194–5. Further, Devvâni believes that people who prefer life in solitude and wait their needs from others are real cruel. Anay, Ibid, 335–336.

³⁵⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 479.

³⁵⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 412.

biggest politics (*siyāsat-i 'uzmā*).³⁵⁷ He adds that men can not live in a community without being governed by a political group.³⁵⁸

The politics, Kinalizâde thinks, can be practiced through three main means: These are divine laws (*nāmūs-i šār*), the president (*hākīm-i mānī*), and money (*dīnār-ī nāfi*).³⁵⁹ The laws arrange the whole physical and emotional relationships; the president employs the laws and maintains economical and social life; and money coordinates the economical relationships.

The formation of the state, Kinalizâde reinforces on the need of cooperation and agreements. The first construction of a state is based on the solidarity between people just as beneficial and essential relationship between organs of a body. Everyone has some degree of power. If many people come together, the strength undoubtedly becomes bigger and bigger that is more than the strength of an individual. Because of this, many smaller societies overcome bigger societies. In word to say, any society which has strong bounds within itself is stronger than is a society which has chaos within itself. Agreement of cooperation and mutual assistance among elements of a state, Kinalizâde utters, is quite important and always should be protected since it provides sovereign and superiority.³⁶⁰

Furthermore, a country is composed of diverge elements.³⁶¹ The order and peace are only possible through a synthesis and unity of diverse of opinions and various fancies. This is the liability of the president who has to know how to manage the city in any situations. With experiences, it is well known, says Kinalizâde, that strong bounds and solidarity among elements are outstanding factor not only to construct the state but also to maintain the success of it. Otherwise, any state will be weaken and corrupted in the

³⁵⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 413; Anay, Ibid, 345.

³⁵⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 414.

³⁵⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 413; Anay, Ibid, 338.

³⁶⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 479; Tūsī, 228–9.

³⁶¹ Aristotle claims that the nature of a state is to be plurality. See Aristotle, the *Politics*, 104.

course of time; as an example, the state of Spain is mentioned.³⁶² The author reinforces the protection and future of the state on two affairs. One is the constant agreement among the public and statesmen, and the other is the constant dissension among enemies.³⁶³

Divisions of Cities and their Citizens

The types of cities, formed from faith and acts of its inhabitants, either good or evil, are divided into two: the virtuous (*madīna-i fādila*) and un-virtuous city (*madīna-i ghair-i fādila*). This is the view of Al-Farabi, Kinalizâde accepts and mentions,³⁶⁴ according to which there are too two kinds of cities.³⁶⁵ There is only one type of virtuous city, whose citizens, having only one road to goods, come together to do beneficial things. However, there are three types of un-virtuous city: the ignorant city (*madīna-i jāhila*), the impious city (*madīna-i fāsiqa*), and the errant city (*madīna-i dālla*).³⁶⁶ The people of the ignorant city are unable to use the faculty of reason. Secondly, they are able to use the faculty of reason, yet other faculties overcome rational thought, so this faculty serves other faculties. Having defective reasoning, people of the third group are gathered because of false faiths and corrupted laws.

³⁶² KINALIZÂDE, 479–480.

³⁶³ KINALIZÂDE, 481; Tūsī, 229.

³⁶⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 452. Kinalizâde appreciates Suleyman the Magnificent, who, with a gorgeous effort, constructed and preserved the virtuous city. It is also stated, "Suleyman was regarded as the third greatest Ottoman Sultan... Though Suleyman's military achievements were in no way less than those of his ancestors, in fact he earned more brilliant victories, but his fame as a soldier was shadowed by his image as a "law-abiding" and "just" sultan." For detail, see Mehmet Şakir Yılmaz. "'Koca Nişancı" of Kanuni: Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi, Bureaucracy and "Kanun" in the Reign of Suleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566)", (PhD Dissertation, Bilkent University, 2006), 211.

³⁶⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 451; Tūsī, 211–212, 218–226; Anay, Ibid, 348. The view of Fārābī is, almost the same, accepted by Tūsī and Kinalizâde. See, Fārābī. *El-Medinetü'l Fāzıla*, ed and trans, Nafiz Danışman, (İstanbul: Maarif Basımevi, 1956), 80, Al-Fārābī. *Es-Siyāset ul-Medineyye veya Mebādi' al-Mevcūdāt*, ed and trans, Mehmet Aydın and Albdülkadir Şener and Rami Ayos, (İstanbul: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları: 1980), 52.

³⁶⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 451; Anay, Ibid, 348–50; Fārābī. *El-Medinetü'l Fāzıla*, 90, Al-Fārābī. *Es-Siyāset ul-Medineyye veya Mebādi' al-Mevcūdāt*, 52.

The virtuous city, Kinalizâde explains,³⁶⁷ is composed of people who are faithful. They try for acquisition of goods and avoid from evil dealings and injustice. Even though there are differences in persons and the divergence of states, the end of acts and opinions of people rectify their agreement in participation of perfection, formed from intellectual guidance and fixed by the laws of justice and the conditions of management.

Kinalizâde classifies the people of the virtuous city in accordance with the power of understanding, the capacity of thinking, and strength of faith.³⁶⁸ These are the philosophers (*ekābir-i hukamā*), the people of faith (*ahl-i imān*), the people of assent (*ahl-i taslīm*), and the negligible ones (*mustad'afān*). The most virtuous and noblest ones, whose intellectual faculties adjudged with true knowledge, are philosophers. These people are aware of the true nature of things.³⁶⁹ The people of faith, lower in rank, have not knowledge in true sense, admit that their knowledge is not as perfect as that of philosophers. The third group below them in rank is composed of those who reject the knowledge in the sense of two groups, yet know the reflection of the forms of things. The negligible ones, regarded as excused due to their limit, are those who are unable to over the physical world.³⁷⁰

Underlining account of the verse of the Qur'an,³⁷¹ Kinalizâde thinks that it is very possible for each group to reach true knowledge.³⁷² He states that:³⁷³

³⁶⁷ Kinalizâde, being opposite of Tūsī, does not give information about vicious states about which Tūsī explains. He does give information about virtues states. See KINALIZÂDE, 452; Tūsī, 218–226.

³⁶⁸ The influence of Fārābī is seen. Tūsī does the same. KINALIZÂDE, 454; Tūsī, 212–213; Anay, Ibid, 350–351.

³⁶⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 453.

³⁷⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 452–456.

³⁷¹ "Call thou [all mankind] unto thy Sustainer's path with wisdom and goodly exhortation, and argue with them in the most kindly manner..." The Qur'an, 16: 125.

³⁷² KINALIZÂDE, 455–6. Just like Tūsī, Kinalizâde thinks that all people in these classes are believers and reach the truth according to their capabilities. Due to men's different capabilities, the prophet orders people to talk with them in level which they understand. See Tūsī, 213–214.

³⁷³ KINALIZÂDE, 455–456; Tusi, 214.

"... the professor of the law (*sāhib-i nāmūs*), who is designated to perfect the whole community, is able to bring each person to perfection (in the measure of ability) in accordance with declaration 'Speak to men in the measure of their intelligences!'..."

Furthermore, Kinalizâde analyses people according to occupations:³⁷⁴ the most virtuous ones (*afādi*), the masters of tongues (*al-alsina*), the measurers (*muqaddirān*), the warriors (*mujāhidiān*), and men of substance (*mālīyān*).³⁷⁵ The first group of persons, called the most virtuous ones, is distinguished from their faculty of intelligence and proper opinions on events. Having knowledge of realities of things, they are occupied with governing of the city.

The second group of people who is crafted to invite common people to perfection is occupied with rhetoric and poetry. The measurers who preserve the laws of justice through following accurate measurement in taking and giving and controlling the practice of trade have a craft based on accounting and geometry.³⁷⁶ The fourth group of people comprises the guardians of the city, protecting the inhabitants and the order both from inside rebels and rebellions and outside enemies. Men of substance are liable to manage the supplies and foodstuffs. In addition, Kinalizâde utters that people of this group should be occupied with an art in accordance with their capacities and capabilities.

In a virtuous city, people who are out of these main groups and have no benefits to the state and society are named growths (*nawābit*).³⁷⁷ If some of them have capabilities and capacities to be educated, they should be

³⁷⁴ Due to influence of Fārābī, like Tūsī and Devvānī, Kinalizâde does classify people according to their occupations. See KINALIZÂDE, 457; Tūsī, 215–216; Anay, Ibid, 352; Fārābī. *Fusūlū'l-Medeni*, ed and trans, Hanefi Özcan, (İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1987), 49–50.

³⁷⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 456–458; Fārābī, Ibid, 49–50.

³⁷⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 457. Tūsī adds astrology and medicine.

³⁷⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 457. Tūsī and Devvānī accept these people as the primary people of the state. See Tūsī, 226; Anay, Ibid, 354.

instructed. Kinalizâde also gives subdivisions and explanation each of them.³⁷⁸

The subjects of a realm, constituting the ground and the order of the realm, are important consideration of the governor to observe and preserve the application of the laws of justice. Individuals of the city are classified into four groups, each of which is corresponding to one of four elements. These are the men of pen, the men of sword, the men of negotiation, and the men of husbandry.³⁷⁹

In depth of these groups, it shows no fundamental difference with the former classification of people, made according to their occupations. The second is based on a principle that is, the first class of people is composed of educated people, the second class is guardians, the third group is traders, and the last group is farmers. Kinalizâde approves not only religious scholars but also doctors, engineers, and other scholars to the first class.

Furthermore, the line should not be thought as indicating the importance; instead, just as four elements, each of these groups has no superiority to each other, yet rather essential and significant contribution to their societies. Indeed, he also emphasizes that if an occupation in a society becomes superior to others, this will then cause corruption. Kinalizâde also underlines that people should have and deal with only one occupation.³⁸⁰

Based on people's good natures and ethics, Kinalizâde makes another classification, according to which people are divided into three groups.³⁸¹

³⁷⁸ Like Fārābī, Kinalizâde makes five subdivisions, see KINALIZÂDE, 458; Al-Fārābī. *Es-Siyāset ul-Medineyye veya Mebādi' al-Mevcūdāt*, 69; Tūsī, 226; Anay, Ibid, 354–5.

³⁷⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 485; Tūsī, 230; Anay, Ibid, 341.

³⁸⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 485–466; Anay states, "Devvâni thinks that it is better for one to have only one occupation to deal with." See Anay, Ibid, 341. This is in fact what is approved by Socrates either. See 383rd footnote.

³⁸¹ KINALIZÂDE, 449–450. Kinalizâde makes another classification just like Tūsī in accordance with philosophers. See Tūsī, 210–211.

Finally, the ethical capabilities and capacities are taken into consideration to make a classification.³⁸²

The Politics

Kinalizâde uses the word politics in the meaning of management, divided into two types: virtuous politics and non-virtuous politics. The former is also named complete politics, with the city filled goods, as a master to lead people reach perfection and attainment of felicity through holding the laws of justice. The second is also named deficient government, leading a city generally occupied with evils, treating its subject in a manner to enslave them, holds tyranny.³⁸³

3. 2. 2. 3. The Means to Maintain the Order

Emphasizing importance of living communal in order thus to improve abilities and to reach perfection and felicity, Kinalizâde, however, mentions some problems coming with community life and professes two means to solve them:³⁸⁴ justice³⁸⁵ and love.³⁸⁶ The first mean is rather a general and applicable way to set and maintain the order for whole people, and the second mean, proposing a narrow way, is only for distinguished people insofar as it is impossible for all people to love each other.³⁸⁷

Kinalizâde places love above justice since it is equity (insāf), based on 'equal share' between two colleges, so it requires parting, involvement of multiplicity, no matter they are equal; on the other hand, love unites people.³⁸⁸

³⁸² KINALIZÂDE, 486–489; Tūsī, 230–231. In fact, this is exactly what is named "the principle of specialization" in the *Republic*, yet one difference between them should be presented that is, Socrates emphasizes that everyone should have an occupation which is suitable with his nature.

³⁸³ KINALIZÂDE, 461; Tūsī, 227; Anay, 356.

³⁸⁴ In this issue, Kinalizâde was influenced by Tūsī. See Tūsī, 195.

³⁸⁵ Until Fārābī's *Fusūlū'l-Medeni*, the order is based on application of the laws required by justice and employment of decrees of presidency. Fārābī, *Fusūlū'l-Medeni*, 52–54.

³⁸⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 419.

³⁸⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 419. Tūsī says that justice arises from the loss of love. See, Tūsī, 196.

³⁸⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 419; Tūsī, 196; Anay, Ibid, 361.

3. 2. 2. 3. 1. Justice

The politics, needed to maintain the order and prevent fights in a society, is named the biggest politics (*siyāsat-i 'uzmā*), through which everyone knows his rights and becomes respectful to others'. It is based on three means: the Divine Law (*nāmūs-i šārī*), the ruler (*hākīm-i mānī*), and money (*dīnār-ī nāfi*).³⁸⁹

Also, in the first book of *Ahlāk-ī Alāī*,³⁹⁰ Kinalizâde states these three means to preserve justice. He also adds that Greek philosophers name them "politics," as underlying the ground, upon which they are operated. Hence, it is very to say that the means, settling justice, also constitute the biggest politics. As a consequence, justice coincides with the biggest politics, and thus when justice is provided, the biggest politics is succeeded. In order to provide the order and justice in a society, the ruler should obey the divine laws, and money should be under the control of the ruler. If the president follows these, he is just; if not, vice verse.³⁹¹

Further, Kinalizâde, in the sixth chapter of the first book, issues the justice regard of Aristotle who divides justice into three categories.³⁹²

First comes that which Man must perform in respect of what is due to Almighty God... The second category concerns that which man must perform in respects of rights of his fellow-men, the honouring of princes, the discharge of trusts, and fair-dealing in transactions. Thirdly, there is that which he must perform to discharge the claims of predecessors...

In the following pages, he deepens the understanding in the details. In the first part, justice is regarded as an essential duty to worship to Lord since everything that serves men to live is created and related to God. In the second section, justice is issued in the sense of relationships between men. The requirement of justice is understood such as being cautious about

³⁸⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 413; Anay, Ibid, 338.

³⁹⁰ Kinalizâde defines justice as the most important measure of having morality to set balance and harmony in the middle of two extremes. KINALIZÂDE, 135–147.

³⁹¹ KINALIZÂDE, 137.

³⁹² KINALIZÂDE, 141; Tūsī, 100; Anay, Ibid, 288; Miskavayh, 106.

others' rights, careful the laws, and respectful to the governors, statesmen, saints, and scholars. In the final section, justice is related to the affairs concerning the jurisprudence of death people. To pay the debts of dead relatives, to execute the will of dead people, and to repair founds' buildings are some kinds of examples of the requirements of this type of justice. Thus, Kinalizâde relates justice with other world.

In accordance with practical treatments, Kinalizâde gives another definition of justice which, he utters, is philosophers' claim. Justice is relied upon three states. Namely, these are the affairs of property, contractual agreements, and jurisprudence.³⁹³ Kinalizâde regards justice as the means to provide the order in the whole world embracing every scope of life. To explain, he draws a circle, upon which he locates the main elements related to justice, through an intricate correlation with each other. It is named the circle of justice.³⁹⁴

Now, the three means to coordinate the relationships between people and provide the order and harmony in a society will be discussed.

The Divine Law³⁹⁵

As pointed early, the Divine Law is one of the most significant means to maintain the order, govern the community, and provide justice. Money and the presidency are obliged to it, including all kinds of the enactments, both having religious and secular bases, in the case of governing of a state. Kinalizâde believes that justice can be only succeeded by the laws of God; otherwise, the state would collapse.³⁹⁶ Reinforcing his view with a verse,³⁹⁷ he shows the difficulty of fixing the mid-point through reason.

³⁹³ Philosophers mentioned are Miskawayh, Tūsī, and Dewani. KINALIZÂDE, 135; Miskawayh, 102; Tūsī, 96; Anay, Ibid, 368. These three kinds of justice, related to people relations in a society, see Fārābī. *Fusūlū'l-Medeni*, 52–54.

³⁹⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 539.

³⁹⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 413. Kinalizâde gives information concerning divine laws parallel with Tūsī and Devvâni, yet what he states about men's making laws, along with exempling Cengiz Han, is not seen in Tūsī's work. See Tūsī, 191; Anay, Ibid, 361.

³⁹⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 137.

The community is managed by the government settled upon the Divine Law. In addition, a person who is divinely supported is needed to rule; so people would follow him due to fearing of punishment in a case of disobedience; thus the perfection may be accomplished. As an opposite case, Kinalizâde mentions Cengiz Han³⁹⁸ who made laws to manage his community through force. His laws, in the course of time with declination of the state, were ridiculed and lost their meanings; on the other hand, the Divine Law has been ever acknowledged. Hence, the law made by God has a real ground to last as human generation lasts and provides real peace and felicity.

Early philosophers called the ruler "the professor of the Law (*sāhib-i nāmūs*)" and his enactments "the Law (*nāmūs*)";³⁹⁹ the later used "the Religious Lawgiver (*nabī and shārī*)" and his enactments "the Religious Law (*shārī'at*).⁴⁰⁰" The persons, Plato calls as the possessors of mighty and Aristotle regards as the ones for whom God has greater concern.⁴⁰⁰

The ruler, supported by divine inspiration, is determiner judgments. Ancients named the ruler, the absolute king (*malik 'alā al-itlāq*) and his judgments, the craft of kingship (*sinā'at-i mulk*), later referred him as the imam (*halīfe*) and his craft as the imamate (*hilāfet*). While Plato refers him as regulator of the world (*mudabbir-i 'ālam*), Aristotle calls him the civic man (*insān-i madanī*).

³⁹⁷ "Indeed, [even aforetime] did We send forth Our apostles with all evidence of [this] truth; and through them We bestowed revelation from on high, and [thus gave you] a balance [wherewith to weigh right and wrong], so that men might behave with equity; and We bestowed [upon you] from on high [the ability to make use of] iron, in which there is awesome power as well as [a source of] benefits for might mark out those who would stand up for him beyond His Apostle, even though He [Himself] is beyond the reach of human perception." The Qur'an, 57: 25

³⁹⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 413–4.

³⁹⁹ Tūsī refers it as divine law (*nāmūs-i ilahī*). See Tūsī, 191. Devvâni uses the same. See Anay, Ibid, 362.

⁴⁰⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 414.

The Ruler

Kinalizâde, through an analogy, resembles the ruler a physician who preserves the health of a body, just as, the ruler preserves the health of the community. In word to say, the healthy community is at equilibrium state (*i'tidāl*) that is managed by the ruler.⁴⁰¹ The essential one, who rules the community, lays down the divine law, manages money, and sets justice is the ruler.⁴⁰²

Numbers of names, Kinalizâde uses for the ruler, just as showing the scope of his authority. In addition, felicity and morality of the public is also strictly related to the president inasmuch as he is responsible to construct a state governed in accordance of justice.⁴⁰³ Before and during the lifetime of Kinalizâde, the presidency is acquired through the military power and continued to the next via either military power or inheritance. Not criticizing this, he asserts, upon the verse of Qur'an,⁴⁰⁴ that the ruler is chosen by divine power and help.⁴⁰⁵ Beside, he brings no discussion for the source and legitimacy of presidency,⁴⁰⁶ yet rather supports it with religion.

The regulator of the states (*mudabbir-i mudun*) is the right imam (*imām-ı hak*) and the absolute caliph (*halife-i mutlak*), so he regards the ruler as the leader of the state and religion.⁴⁰⁷ Further, Kinalizâde quotes the prophet's remark, "the scholars are like the prophets of Israel's sons, and

⁴⁰¹ KINALIZÂDE, 479. The same analogy is seen in the work of Devvâni. For this, see Anay, Ibid, 337.

⁴⁰² KINALIZÂDE, 136–137.

⁴⁰³ KINALIZÂDE, 136–137.

⁴⁰⁴ "[And We said:] 'O David! Behold, We have made thee a [prophet and, thus, Our] vicegerent on earth..." The Qur'an, 38: 26

⁴⁰⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 414. Anay explains that Devvâni also brings no critics for acquisition of the presidency; however, for the source and legitimacy of presidency, it can be said that he relies the legitimacy of presidency upon God due to attributions given to the ruler. See Anay, Ibid, 373–5.

⁴⁰⁶ "The legitimacy of a ruler who is called the shadow of God by the sanction of the scholars of religion, however, could not easily be questioned." Tezcan claims. For more information, see Baki Tezcan. "The Definition of Sultanic Legitimacy in the Sixteenth Century Ottoman Empire the Ahlâk-ı Alâî of Kinalizâde Alî Çelebi (1510–1572)", (MA Thesis, Princeton University, 1996), 134.

⁴⁰⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 461.

that the scholars are the heirs of the prophets."⁴⁰⁸ People who deserve this epithet are the deputy and the shadow of God.⁴⁰⁹ These are the possessors of the state.⁴¹⁰

Underlining the influence of the ruler on the community by asserting 'Men have the faith of their kings,'⁴¹¹ Kinalizâde expresses seven essential qualities of the ruler.⁴¹² Loftiness of aspiration, firmness of opinion, determination or execution of decision, forbearance in adversity and endurance of distressing incidents, abundance of wealth, agreement with the military, and noble descent. In all of the seven features, the last one is not, yet other six are essentially required.

The laws of justice, basing and flourishing⁴¹³ the order of the just realm,⁴¹⁴ are assured by the just ruler who maintains several conditions for it.⁴¹⁵ In the first place, all classes of the city,⁴¹⁶ just as corresponding to the four elements in the universe, should be equally treated.⁴¹⁷ In a case, the state of equilibrium (*i'tidāl*) is deviated in the four elements, there will be corruption from the harmony; likewise, a chaos will undoubtedly occur in the society. In the second place, the ruler should behave the people in accordance with their merits and capabilities. Communicating with the best ones and directing the nasty characters to nice and esteemed personalities are his responsibilities.⁴¹⁸ In the third place, the equal division of the

⁴⁰⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 415. Buhari, *Sahih*, İlim, 10. Quoted from Ayşe Sıdıka Oktay, *Ibid*, 493.

⁴⁰⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 415; Anay, *Ibid*, 375.

⁴¹⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 463, 415.

⁴¹¹ Tūsī, 227.

⁴¹² KINALIZÂDE, 463–476. Although Kinalizâde follows Tūsī, he gets in depth more than the former thinkers. Tūsī, 227–228; Anay, *Ibid*, 377.

⁴¹³ KINALIZÂDE, 483.

⁴¹⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 479.

⁴¹⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 485–494.

⁴¹⁶ These are the men of pen, the men of sword, the men of negotiation, and he men of husbandry. KINALIZÂDE, 485; Tūsī, 230; Anay, *Ibid*, 341.

⁴¹⁷ Tūsī, 230–332.

⁴¹⁸ Men, according to their dispositions, are divided into five classes. The first two classes are composed of people who are naturally good and whose goodness is either or not communicable. The third class of people is neither good nor evil by nature. The fourth class includes people who are evil. These people should be preached and treated in a way to leave the evil and incline to good; if otherwise, they should be kept under control. The

common goods between the ranks, in accordance with their merit and aptitude, is another condition of justice constituted by the just ruler. In any case, an individual allotted more or less than what he deserves indicates tyranny. Deficiency is the case of tyranny towards the person himself, whereas increase means tyranny towards the society. In addition, the ruler is also obliged to preserve those goods not to be taken by them.⁴¹⁹ The last condition is that the just ruler should know the needs and problems of the society in a way separating some times to directly listen to their complaints and through others searching about the evidences of problems and observing events.⁴²⁰

International Affairs

The ruler should take into close concern the affairs of enemies, concerning of their plans, opinions, situations, and so on. Being aware of their dealings is essential for him to determine his next action in order to maintain his realm.⁴²¹ Further, humiliating enemies due to their physical weakness and giving way of pride for his strength are not something appreciated and brought success; besides, trusting in something, not God, Kinalizâde notes, causes many states to fail.⁴²²

In the case of war, the ruler should refrain from getting in war until the conditions compels him.⁴²³ The goal of fighting cannot be to widen territories, yet rather to highlight the name of God and remove the danger of enemy. Kinalizâde disapproves participation of the ruler to war; instead he gives him a role to motivate and monitor the soldiers in accordance with

final class constitutes persons who are evil by nature. Among them, some people could be saved along with discipline and good manners; but if they are not reformed, their evil should be measured. General and comprehensive evil is obliged to be removed. See Tusi, 230–232; anay, Ibid, 343. Kinalizâde uses more explanation. He was the jurist in Dimeşk, while writing the book, so he knows the laws of Islam thoroughly. Besides he does accept death penalty. This is different from other intellectuals. See KINALIZÂDE, 492, 504.

⁴¹⁹ Tūsī, 232–233.

⁴²⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 494–5

⁴²¹ KINALIZÂDE, 496.

⁴²² KINALIZÂDE, 498–499.

⁴²³ KINALIZÂDE, 498.

strategy. In absence of the ruler, a chief commander, who is brave, wise, talented, and patient, should be appointed for his place.⁴²⁴ Such matters of warring as applying tricks, forgiving a ruler, informing enemies about breaking agreement, and making agreement, are construed by Kinalizâde. In addition, the manners of soldiers and treatments which should be taken towards them are detailed.⁴²⁵

Domestic Affairs

The others (*re'āyā*), including high officials, constitutes people who are governed. Having delicate nature, relations between the ruler and the others are not reciprocated, yet, for Kinalizâde, it is rather based on manners of the public.⁴²⁶

Kinalizâde calls the politics of a state either virtuous or non-virtuous according to the ruler's manners towards the public. His just and friendly behaviors are signs of the virtuous state. Such a ruler regards old people as his parents, the youth as his brothers, and children as his own children. Whatever he wishes for himself and his relatives he does wish for them either. His affection is just like affection of a father.⁴²⁷

The public's love to the ruler should be more than a child's love towards his father, insofar as the just ruler constitutes peace for fathers to benefit and instruct their sons. However, a ruler's love towards his public should be less since the nature of a ruler has no much tolerance. Because of this, it said that a ruler does not have fidelity.⁴²⁸ Further, serving and talking with the ruler, Kinalizâde inserts, require principles (*adab*).⁴²⁹

Rebels (*tāgī* and *mārik*) are signed people who cause deviation in society and do not obey the just ruler.⁴³⁰ They should be either, if it is

⁴²⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 500.

⁴²⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 498–508.

⁴²⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 491.

⁴²⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 461–463. A similar view in Devvâni's work. See Anay, Ibid, 382.

⁴²⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 441.

⁴²⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 508. He gives information concerning serving the kings under a new title just like Tūsī. See Tūsī, 237; Anay, Ibid, 381.

⁴³⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 137; Tūsī, 98; Anay, Ibid, 383; Miskawayh, 104.

possible, preached to good;⁴³¹ if not, prevented or exiled. If this fails, for the sake of the society, he approves of death penalty.⁴³²

Another issue, Kinalizâde discusses, is the situation of the cruel leader. The ruler, who is cruel towards his public and unable to practice the divine laws, is the cruel leader. As an example, he mentions leaders who led a life of desires, had bad manners, and fulfilled the state with evil.⁴³³ Kinalizâde offers to advise these rulers reminding two sanctions; losing sovereign⁴³⁴ and being subjected punishment hereafter, not only for his sins but also for all whom he, as a figure, drag behind himself.⁴³⁵ A cruel leader will definitely loose sovereign in the thought of Kinalizâde due to the hadith of the prophet, "the sovereign and religion are twins."⁴³⁶

Money

Money, Kinalizâde mentions as one of the means to construct the biggest politics, is called silent justice.⁴³⁷ Emerging as a middle value to arrange the trade, it thus not only prevents chaos and brings the harmony and order, but also makes easy to trade and constitutes a strong tie between people. This can be succeeded, only if the ruler controls money.

3. 2. 2. 3. 1. Love⁴³⁸

Love, one of two means to set the harmony and order in a society, is presented as another way which addresses only a small group of people

⁴³¹ Kinalizâde reinforces the issue on a verse: "Call thou [all mankind] unto thy Sustainer's path with wisdom and goodly exhortation, and argue with them in the most kindly manner..." The Qur'an, 16: 125. See KINALIZÂDE, 455.

⁴³² KINALIZÂDE, 492; Tūsī, 231; Anay, Ibid, 363–4.

⁴³³ KINALIZÂDE, 462. The situation of cruel leader who does not follow the requirements of justice people who do not obey just leader are examined pages between 385–90 in Devvâni's book. Anay states that what should be done to this kind of rulers is not clearly answered by Devvâni. See Anay, Ibid, 388. Anay explains, Devvâni thinks that the cruel leader should be advised with a soft tongue. To force the cruel king to be a just leader is not something approved, yet instead it is regarded as a crime. See Anay, Ibid, 388–9. Tūsī names the ruler who does not follow the Divine Law is Monstrous Tyrant. See, Tūsī, 98.

⁴³⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 463.

⁴³⁵ KINALIZÂDE, 480–481.

⁴³⁶ KINALIZÂDE, 463; Acluni, *Keşfel-Hafa*, II, 215. Quoted from Harun Anay, Ibid, 357.

⁴³⁷ KINALIZÂDE, 137; Tūsī, 97–98; Miskawayh, 103.

⁴³⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 419; Tūsī, 195; Anay, Ibid, 366; Miskawayh, 121.

since it is impossible for all to love each other. Kinalizâde compares two means as such:⁴³⁹

It is obvious that the need for justice in preserving the order of species, arises from the loss of love; for if love were to accrue between individuals, there would be no necessity for equity and impartiality. Etymologically, the word 'equity' derives from 'equal share', i.e. the dispenser of equity divides the disputed object equally with his colleague; but division into halves is one of the consequences of multiplicity, whereas love is one causes of union. In these regards, the virtue of love over justice is obvious.

Love, Kinalizâde utters early philosophers' regard,⁴⁴⁰ is the cause of the ordering for all creatures, the consistency and continuation of which are based on love. In addition, being not unaware of the unity, all are unable to avoid loving; because of this, from a very subtle element to galaxies, everything moves due to love that is quest for perfection and nobility. Hence, perfection and defection are determined in accordance with its grade of quest towards union to approach the One, God.

Kinalizâde continues the issue of love with the view of later philosophers who regard love only worldly. The relationship between things, they believe, is not love yet inclination and flight, and affection and aversion constitute animals' connections. For them, two kinds of love exist between people: natural and voluntary.⁴⁴¹ Mother's love towards her children is natural love; teacher's love toward his students is voluntary love of which is divided into four kinds.

Three reasons, Kinalizâde bases for love:⁴⁴² pleasure, profit, and good. It is either possible for them to compound. The end of pleasure requires love soon contracting and soon dissolving. Profit causes the love that is slowly contracted yet soon dissolved for the gaining of profit. The end of good is the cause of the love to constitute the true unity, by the virtue of essential

⁴³⁹ KINALIZÂDE, 419.

⁴⁴⁰ Empedocles, see Samuel Enoch Stumpf, and James Fieser, *Philosophy: History and Problems*, (New York.: McGraw-Hill, 2003).

⁴⁴¹ The same view is seen in the work of Devvâni. See Anay, Ibid, 329.

affinities, soon contracted yet slowly dissolved. Love, compounded of profit and good or all three reasons, is the second type love slowly contracted and slowly dissolved.⁴⁴³

After comparing love (*mahabbet*) with fidelity and with love (*ısk*), due to men's delicate nature, Kinalizâde says that the love of God is the best, the most virtuous, and the most perfect for eternal happiness. In detail, he construes the issue in the next pages of the book.⁴⁴⁴

3. 3. The Complementary Part: The Ultimate Consequence

3. 3. 1. "Could Anything really Great Come to Pass?"

"For its consequences," Annas says, "justice is also worth having, because it brings happiness in a way not attainable through other kinds of life."⁴⁴⁵ In the last book of *The Republic*, Socrates asks, "In a short period of time, could anything really great come to pass?" (608c) By this, the greatest prizes of virtue, is that necessarily exist as complementary parts of a completed teaching, are questioned. Hence, the conclusion is constituted from three issues: the immortality of the soul, (608c-12a) justice over injustice in this world, (612a-14a) and the rewards of justice in the afterlife (61a-21d). The last issue is referred to as the myth of Er, and as such:⁴⁴⁶

... the fate of the soul before birth and after death in the poetical imagery of myth, but Plato believed that the indestructible soul must reap the consequences of its deeds, good or bad. ... the divine origin of the soul; its fall to be incarnated in a cycle of births as a penalty for former sins; the guardian genius; the judgment after death; the torments of the unjust and the happiness of the just in the millennial intervals between incarnations; the hope of final deliverance for the purified; and certain topographic features... then two ways to right and left...

⁴⁴² KINALIZÂDE, 421. It goes to Aristotle. See Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics*, VIII 145, 1155b18.

⁴⁴³ KINALIZÂDE, 422; Anay, Ibid, 329.

⁴⁴⁴ KINALIZÂDE, 423–450.

⁴⁴⁵ Annas, Ibid, 321.

⁴⁴⁶ Cornford, Ibid, 348-9.

3. 3. 2. The End of Human Perfection: Felicity⁴⁴⁷

People who want authority and felicity, Kinalizâde thinks, should be well educated and acquire a certain knowledge, the gaining of which gradually constitutes a state of equilibrium (*i'tidāl*) between the human faculties. And justice, in which man is named the absolute scholar and authorized philosopher (*bi'l fiil insan*), is the end of human perfection in the attainment of the real authority and eternal felicity.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁷ Tūsī and Miskawayh issue the subject of felicity under a separated title. See Tūsī 80–100, Miskawayh, 72–92. However, Kinalizâde, like Devvâni, examines felicity in scattered places in his work. See Anay, *Ibid*, 325. Kinalizâde defines felicity as being close to God and ranking the high degree near God. See KINALIZÂDE, 49. Men can save these by means of two main ways. One is to have real belief and knowledge, and the other is to live in accordance with perfect morality. The first one is acquired with virtues that are built on the theoretical philosophy. The second one is gained and improved by means of the practical philosophy. With these two important means, men experience what they know and believe thus to reach the perfection and felicity. See KINALIZÂDE, 54.

⁴⁴⁸ KINALIZÂDE, 91-92; also see, Celal Türer. "Kinalizâde'de Mutluluk", *Felsefe Dünyası*, 30 (1999), 80–90.

CONCLUSION

The *Republic*, although Aristotle prudentially criticizes it as, “all the Socratic dialogues are marked by a certain exaggeration and brilliance, by originality, and by an urge to investigate; but they can hardly be expected to be always right,”⁴⁴⁹ is undeniably one of the best known works and truly the mine of Western thought. *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, as a heritage of human treasure, constructed upon not only Islamic traditions and sacred laws but also a great deal of intellectual richness, including the thoughts, advice, and poetry of significant philosophers and scholars, provides the accumulation of 16th century conventional Ottoman’s knowledge along with instructions for application, and while being rather practicable, in its very nature it fully embodies wisdom for the sake of God.

As a consequence, it is difficult, to be sure, to stop thinking and dissolving the message of both works, yet it is an obligation to confess that the justice in these works is technically very different. In a few words, justice, in the *Republic*, is afforded a pretty nice inquiry the function of which is thought provoking in its questioning the essentiality and role of justice as proves how this notion is genuine. Whereas, *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, beyond the questioning of justice, truly deals with its significance and the concrete requirements resulting from it in every affair of life, as well as in the guidance and the testimony of the long history of humankind. This article, in its conclusion, firstly attempts to give a slight comparison of the two works, and will later show the main mistake of Plato, and finish by completing its thesis with *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*’s core understanding of justice.

A Brief Comparison

First of all, it will be useful to underline some points; in order to understand uncovered the difference between the two books before giving a

⁴⁴⁹ Aristotle, the *Politics*, 122.

comparison. The *Republic* is searching, wondering, and trying to be certain, while *Ahlâk-ı Alâî* is delineating, formulating, exemplifying, and asserting the certain success of life in all its aspects. The *Republic* sometimes presents gaps that feel as if it is including lots of speculations, yet *Ahlâk-ı Alâî* gives what is used and tried, and as a result it feels trustworthy. Undoubtedly, both works are quite genuine and precious to read and study in detail.

“What is justice” is the question that the *Republic* starts with. This question is the unavoidable unique of everyone! Through a very nice and familiar discussion, the problem of justice is argued between three representative figures that have authority in their own realms. Different characters, representing possible definitions and general objections for independent of time or place, are laid out. Socrates plays the role of teacher for different levels of people with a very understandable and engaging style discussion.

It is strong evidence for the belief and significance of the hereafter, that justice is related firstly to death, through the character of an old man. Another point emphasized is that the old man is regretful and not in a situation to disregard Hades. Hence, just as the starting contains the core of the future, the end is the summary of the past. Or, to put this another way, what the first concern of the precious work is to be careful for all your deeds and comments since thereby your future will be shaped.

As for the second step, a definition of justice is necessary to answer the question “why to be just” and is essential for taking serious and being cautious for the hereafter. The interlocutors, conscious of the value of justice, expect that justice must be intrinsic good, for its own sake and its consequences, like health. For this, the origin and nature of justice is traced, and contractual agreement drawn from historical society, as the key term, is examined. Another objection, via the tale of Gyges, is made that people are just only with impunity. Further, the poems mentioned assert that unjust men lead happy lives along with having good reputations and rewards

deserved by the just, whereas just people have unhappy lives, unjust reputations, and suffer many undeserved punishments. The dialogue develops; firstly, to show a superficial regard of the notion of justice, since all people know that to do right definitely brings inner peace. To be clear, justice firstly relates to the soul. Nevertheless, while this is not something allotted to the ancient Greek society, it is still the reality for everybody. Secondly and indeed basically, what is depicted up to this point proves the uncertainty of the notion of justice, raising the doubts that are for all times and places.

On the other hand, technically, there is no such discussion in *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, yet there was a very serious construction of justice (*`adâlat*), practiced in Ottoman Empire. Being exactly different from the *Republic*, *Ahlâk-ı Alâî* has a clear and certain message. It does not discuss justice through a dialectic method in order to confirm its importance with the testimony of an audience, since it is quite certain due to the sacred sources of Islam, tested and reinforced in the course of time.

Further, justice is unique for the beneficial future both in this world and the next in the thought of Kinalizâde, inasmuch as it is the main and intricate issue of life. Kinalizâde, without feeling any doubt about its essentiality and role, presents a concrete notion which is highly esteemed and appreciated in his society. Although he gives definition to the notion and scatters its benefits throughout the book, he pays a lot of attention to sketch its requirements. The terms, mid-point (*vasat*) and the state of equilibrium (*i'tidâl*), are like letters upon which justice (*`adâlat*) is, in a caution any manner, built into the whole sphere of life in *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*.

One of the greatest focuses of Kinalizâde is that justice cannot be succeeded without equality; what he refers to as the "equality of right." Equality denotes unicity which is the remotest rank and the highest degree of superiority and perfection-the permeation of its operations of justice. The treatments of justice, along with its applications, are, in detail, issued.

Justice, before happiness and perfection, as the assurance of the order and harmony in one's soul, family, and state, are one by one examined. In a word, justice commences in one's individuality and then surrounds everything, with which one is related.

The essential and most important question is whether justice is worth having for itself; to explain this is imperative of Socrates. In it lies the uniqueness of justice. It is something that essentially and significantly brings happiness to humans since all things valuable for today and the future, come after a healthy soul which is centered upon peace. So, does justice pay? Is justice really the most precious contribution to one's life?

In order to explain this, Socrates considers question of justice by comparing the human soul to a large city. Each class of the city represents a part of the human soul. In this way, he examines the features and the functions of three parts of the human soul. As each class of the city must do its own business to provide order and harmony and thus produce the best, or the just city; peace, in one's soul, is only possible if each part of that soul functions properly. This is the principle of specialization, one of the bases of justice. Further, an analogy between justice and health is drawn to make the obvious point that a state of health is preferable to a state of sickness, so analogously justice, like health, is good for itself.

The soul examination in the *Republic* cannot be disregarded, yet it needs additional considerations. As the prelude for examining the feature of the soul, it is acceptable. However, it does not prove enough help to thorough understand the nature of the soul and to construct the condition for human perfection. It mainly helps the reader to feel how precious and common the value of justice is. The elegant analogy between soul and city is genuinely original and helpful for recognizing that role of justice in a society is to build harmony and a promising future for all, yet the *Republic* does not have as its central aim of the soul. It is enough to say, the soul is not the main focus of the *Republic*, but rather only a part of it.

Ahlâk-ı Alâî primarily starts with a definition of philosophy (*hikmat*). Dividing the categories of philosophy as theoretical (*hikmat-i nazari*) philosophy and practical philosophy (*hikmat-i 'amali*), he classifies the science of ethics as a subset of practical philosophy. Then, he continues to emphasize its importance and construes the details correlated with its very foundations.

The human soul is not immediately and only explained in detail; however, firstly for determining its status, natural bodies, each one's peculiar properties and their correlations, are elaborated. Physical bodies are illustrated as having gradations and divergences in accordance with the manifestations of these mixtures. Later, the soul and the subtle details of its types, is analyzed. Finally, Kinalizâde presents the human soul as the most specialized and distinguished among all existents. Its faculties, causing virtues or vices, are one by one explained. How to acquire virtues and preserve them, along with treating the sick souls, are one by one issued. One of the differences that should be underlined, is that Kinalizâde classifies justice into two groups.

A vast account grounded on the human heritage of knowledge confronts its readers in *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, yet for the sake of this thesis, it has been kept as short as possible. It is a serious account concerning for the training and the happiness of man, which in turn served to build a huge empire.

In order to prove that justice is worthy and precious, for its consequences, Socrates presents totally revolutionary ideas that are the community of the property and community of the family. The ancient regard of women and the family was quite miserable. What the *Republic* suggests destroys the custom of the family and thus the very nature of the society. In fact, just like an ignorant person, Socrates disregards human nature and plays with things that are crucially important for today and the future. Many questions occupy the mind while reading: Why Socrates does this? Is he

honest by proposing this theory? Is he really naïve not to foresee the critics made by Aristotle, and are these really his suggestions?

To be sure, each question brings many others since it is almost impossible to regard Socrates as a clown who makes fun of significant things. His teachings are that the undeniable dignity of man is ever to share things with others, own nothing in private, and think of others before himself and more. In addition, to pay attention to women and position them with men in a place where women are regarded as inferior, and their names bring no advantages are unimaginable for a clown. This character of a baboon also does not fit with someone who adds his life to history as being serious to be sacrificed for the sake of his teachings.

Further, the family as it is depicted in the *Republic* is not an actual family, yet rather it is like a big tent under which the best people dwell in. That is, what is done for the construction of justice is in fact unjust. To spell this out, to classify people in such an unrealistic way does not fit with justice. Moreover, it is unjust to disregard other women as a lower class.

Obviously, as known by those who care for such investigation, what are idealized in the *Republic* are at length discussed. While writing this thesis, some points are presented in the main passage, some in the footnotes. In Particular, Aristotle's harsh criticisms are here carefully followed, and in a sense approved, but not all of them.

The issue of the family obviously, just as other issues, shows the huge difference between the *Republic* and *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*. The latter lays down the concrete bases of an actual family not only for the best people but for all people. What Kinalizâde tells about a family's order and provisions are in fact composed of a couple of rules. To put this in another way, family life has concrete and serious rules functioning as to construct the family and perpetuate its continuation. The rules of the family are indeed the assurance of justice, so they are highly esteemed and carefully observed as the applications of justice in *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*.

Kinalizâde analyzes the issues in an elaborative manner with the help of authoritative knowledge and concrete applications. Containing every aspect of family life, Kinalizâde brings the science of household regulation to deal with ethical education and the training of its members, and determines certain principles which, rather, construct order and harmony into family life and arrange the relationships between family members.⁴⁵⁰

Some points made by Kinalizâde are definitely worthy of emphasizing. First of all, he holds that the prizes and punishments in this world are the outcome of an individual's deed and comments in daily affairs. In the scope of marriage, he warns couples of their intend to marry. If it is based upon its worldly benefits, the couple will not get what they had hoped for as the approval of holy justice. Second, Kinalizâde thinks that people should not marry unless they observe each other's rights. Third, a skill should be provided to the women by their husbands. Fourth, being quite different from his contemporary intellectuals and some parts of his society, Kinalizâde, distinguishes himself by strongly supporting the education of girls and mentions some intellectual women as notable figures. In addition, the rights of servants and the rights of parents, which he carefully underlines, undeniably pertain to consciences, which essentially require justice.

The ideal state is an institutional structure, grounded upon seven bases: the principle of specialization, the community of property and of the family, the education program, the philosophical foundation, the philosophical characteristics, and the superiority of wisdom. The first three ones are hitherto construed. The purpose of Socrates, regarding all above, is to build a purely unified city that is perfectly governed. However, there are significant gaps in his theory.

In the first place, Plato professes an education all program for both men and women in order to construct the ideal state. As the key institution, it instructs the best people. By means of the strict education, a guardian will

⁴⁵⁰ KINALIZÂDE, 325.

be a real philosopher, who is exactly different from others and devoted to the primarily benefits of the state. The *Republic* also explains that people come to the world with the ability to turn their gazes from darkness to light. The point is that “all” people are able to do this, so why are not “all” taken into the education program and thus towards the Good? To classify people, as lower or higher, is not something suitable with justice, and it produces not a unity, but instead political groups!

In the second place, the educational program, in a gradual manner and in its divisions, leads people to have intellectual superiority that amounts to moral superiority. Hence, to be virtuous, or to say, to be just is only allotted to the people who are educated. This is terribly unjust, since everyone inevitably needs morality to have peace.

In the third place, the ruler is regarded as having a divine nature that does not abuse unlimited power.⁴⁵¹ Beyond a doubt, things become corrupting over the course of time. The ruler is a human being who already has a tendency to err and while he may have a perfect character and morality in the beginning, yet he still needs the support and corrections of others.

Finally, organizing a lottery based upon a “noble lie” is something that never, ever can be allowed a place in justice! Further, what Socrates suggests about the superiority of wisdom over the Laws is something truly delicate to comprehend. That suggests applying the Laws properly for each case. This is also what is observed during the period of Sultan Suleyman. The rulers who are highly talented and well supported by the imperial scholars are able to grasp the circumstances of cases and apply the Laws. For this, it

⁴⁵¹ Although this is what is formulated in Ottoman Empire, particularly stated for Suleyman the Magnificent, it is hard to justify. “The Ottoman sultan, as “God’s shadow on earth” has a unique position among human beings; he is distinguished with being supported by God (mueyyed min ‘indi Allah) and recipient of “divine inspiration.” See Celālzāde Mustafa Çelebi, *Tabakātu’l-Memalik ve Derecatu’l-Mesalik*, Manuscript, Süleymaniye Library, Fatih, 4422, p. 143a, 178a-b. Quoted from Mehmet Şakir Yılmaz. ““Koca Nişancı” of Kanuni: Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi, Bureaucracy and “Kanun” in the Reign of Suleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566)”, (PhD Dissertation, Bilkent University, 2006), 199–200.

is noted, "sultan himself was above the law."⁴⁵² Nevertheless, this by no means implies that they disobey the Divine Laws: If so, they would be regarded as a cruel leader, as was explained above.⁴⁵³

Furthermore, Socrates puts forward the other beneficial consequences of justice, via the progressive collapse of the just city. It is in fact one of the unapproachable comments of the *Republic*. It warns, due to giving priority to their selfish interests rather than the common good, guardians gradually lead the just city into unjust states.⁴⁵⁴ Likewise, each one of the states corresponds to an unjust state of one's soul. Thereby, selfishness is the first step towards dissolution. Hence it is rather harmful.

Ahlâk-ı Alâî, as a kind of *nasihatname*, seriously and prudently deals with the possible affairs of a state and elaborates the issues through precious knowledge and experiences. As the efficient and influential advices for actual states, the ethic of the state begins from man's inevitable need to live with others. So it is safe to say that the construction of a state commences with an individual, who in turn constitutes the community. Or, to put this another way, even an individual is important, and he cannot be eliminated.

Also, Kinalızâde, through mentioning the roots of the word "human" (*insân*), underlines that a human being is naturally a social creature. Here, what he is emphasizing is the Unity, which is not intended to result from

⁴⁵² Halil İnalçık. "State, Sovereignty and Law During the reign of Süleyman" in *Süleyman the Second and His Time*, eds. Halil İnalçık, İstanbul, ISIS Press, 1993, 78-81.

⁴⁵³ It is also stated, "... a strong Islamic influence in making sultan laws conforming to şer'i principles, is visible in later codes..." Ibid, 78.

⁴⁵⁴ In Islamic teaching, "equity" that is exactly opposite of "selfishness" highly esteemed, and the Qur'an appreciates in many places. Hassan Afchar states, "Islamic Ethics demands not only Equity which consists in not encroaching on the right another person but also the goodness which consists in leaving to another a little more; to be indulgent. The threshold of goodness is at the boundary of Equity, re-entering at the point of preferring others to one's detriment. It is not demanded but strongly wished." Then, he references several verses from the Qur'an. Some of these are 2: 109, 263; 3: 134; 4: 149; 24:22; 42: 20. See Ralph A. Newman, (ed). *Equity in the World's Legal Systems A comparative Study*, (Belgium: Établissements Émile Bruylnat, 1973), 117. For this issue, the verse of the Qur'an, "... (14) or the feeding, upon a day of [one's own] hunger, (15) of an orphan near of kin, (16) or of a needy [stranger] lying in the dust-" (90: 14-16) is quite striking and plausible to rethink the common message.

destruction of human nature, as is done by the *Republic*. Kinalizâde strongly believes in the superiority and infinite benefits of Unity.

Every community basically needs to be governed for its continuation inasmuch as the common needs could lead to chaos. This is the reason for a political group to arise. In addition, Kinalizâde also makes classifications of the people in accordance with a variety of measures. Being exactly different from what is made by Plato, he constitutes groups by deriving them from actual states. By this, he does not give any authority to someone to decide who the best is and who deserves to be educated.

Politics is management for Kinalizâde, and there are only two kinds: The one leads people to peace and perfection, and the other causes chaos and makes people slaves of the government. He suggests two means to maintain the order. One is, well known, justice, and the other is love. Positioning love above justice as the unifying principle of people, he points out its peculiarity to be understood only a few distinguished people.

Justice is also the actuality of the biggest politics. It relies upon three means: the Divine Law, the ruler, and money. The first one, Kinalizâde elaborates through historical occurrences, is the most important means to maintain the order, control the community, and provide justice.⁴⁵⁵ Other means are bound to it. The ruler is someone who is firstly responsible to God and then to the subject who are entrusted to him by God. In the possibility of international affairs, Kinalizâde highlights and warns that the rulers should always trust only God in; otherwise, they will for ever lose. Further, the goal of expansion can only be for the sake of God. Kinalizâde continues to discuss all possible domestic affairs in depth. Depicting the state as a big family, Kinalizâde gives the role of a father to the ruler who regards his subject as

⁴⁵⁵ For the position of the ruler in Islamic teaching, it is stated, "The man at the helm of affairs is no despotic monarch, nor is he an absolute ruler but a servant of the community, an ordinary citizen, neither enjoying special prerogatives of the type that 'King can do no wrong', nor above the law." See Muhammad Muslehuddin. *Economics and Islam*, (Pakistan: Islamic Publications, 1974), 26-27.

his relatives and wishes for them the things which he wishes for himself and his relatives. His feeling towards his subjects is affection like the affection of a father.⁴⁵⁶

Finally, definitely one of the outstanding comments that make people speechless, Socrates mentions in the last book of the *Republic* that the greatest prize of the unique virtue, as a complementary part of a completed teaching, comes in the hereafter. Hence, the book starts and finishes with a belief in the next world. One other truly interesting and appreciated teaching, needing no explanation, is that badness destroys its owner (609a). This is also related to his early teaching, which asked if injustice will cause one to lose his power (351e).

Human perfection and eternal felicity can only be accomplished in a place wherein lies order and peace, so politics is needed to maintain the order, prevent fights in the society, and thus cause the state to improve. This is named the biggest politics grounded upon justice in *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*.

The Main Mistake of Plato

For justice, Socrates says, "But there may perhaps be a model of it in the heavens for anyone who wishes to look at it and to found himself on the basis of what he sees." (592b) Isn't this statement strange and even terrifying? Yet, only the ignorant can belittle what the *Republic* is saying, no matter, whether it is correct or false! Hard to comprehend the deep links, but it has to be said that, beyond a doubt, Socrates is not someone normal, since his distinguished message, neither easily seen nor truly appreciated, has a rather prophetic tradition.⁴⁵⁷ Hence, there is only one option, which is

⁴⁵⁶ Although the methods of both books are different, this is also what is intended by Plato.

⁴⁵⁷ Socrates was born around 470 B. C. and his trial and execution was taken place in 399. In his book, Guthrie brings some information about his personality. He states, "... Chaerephon went to Delphi and had the effrontery (ἐτόλμησε) to ask the oracle if anyone was wiser than Socrates, and the Pythia replied that no one was." See Guthrie., *Ibid.*, 86. In another page, he states, "One may like or dislike him, but at least it is difficult to disagree with the general verdict of his time as he himself summed it up: 'This reputation which I have-it may be true or it may be false, but at any rate the view is held that

that the integrity of his message was terribly corrupted. So far as this is a digression from the main issue, it is better to leave it here. For now, what is the main message that transcends and strengthens a common human heritage, over the centuries and across the lands?

Justice can be only witnessed "in heaven." Isn't this proposition to be regarded as a worthy of ridicule after inquiring and testifying that these things have a huge correlation with the deepest nature of humankind along with all of mankind? Surely, he knew what he is talking about, and the certainty of that saying involves this numberless audience.

Therefore, it is plausible enough to look once more at the critical elements related to justice. From the very subtle things in the world to another life, "is there really justice?" First of all, it is better to remember the reason Plato was led to write the *Republic*.⁴⁵⁸ The sorrow of Socrates, on the one hand, and the cruelty observed in a society wherein lies no certainty, essentially requiring divinity (It was indeed the Ancient Greek world, yet the small miniature of all the times.), and on the other hand, leaves him no solution. Consequently, along with the unchangeable truths, Plato highly outrages the many by uttering "the one that exists in words, since I do not think it exists anywhere on earth." (592a10) Hence, the fall of the ideal state in the world means the fall of justice: The ideal state was for the ideal impossibility (!)

How could it be possible for such an essential and significant notion, through which, indeed, today and tomorrow and all things of the world are

Socrates is different from the general run of mankind." Plato, Apol. 34e and Symp. 221c. Quoted from Ibid, 94. Finally, mentioning his message, Guthrie presents Socrates' difference as such, "In the most general terms, his message was that to investigate the origin and ultimate matter of the universe, the composition and motions of the heavenly bodies, the shape of the earth or the causes of natural growth and decay was of far less importance than to understand what it meant to be a human being and for what purpose one was in the world. This estimate of Socrates as a turning-point can be traced to Aristotle, ..." See Ibid., 97.

⁴⁵⁸ According to Bloom, "The Republic is the true Apology of Socrates, for only in the Republic does he give an adequate treatment of the theme which was forced on him by

made possible, not to be? Besides, why deal with such an absurdity, if it is not? Surely, the dealing is not absurd, but rather genuine and delicate; the hardness of it lies in locating all the parts to their logical places and cohering with the acceptable testimony of men. Plato was right in his scope of thought: Men cannot do the pure (absolute) justice.⁴⁵⁹ That is the purpose of the ideal state. Yet he was mistaken to put justice so far or to allot it to one's psyche. Inasmuch as if justice were not one of the bases of life, he would not even try to inquire.

As undeniable proofs, what is witnessed in the universe is "the justice and wisdom that hasten to relieve the pettiest need of the smallest of creation"⁴⁶⁰ and within human nature is the indispensable and unstoppable requirement and desire for justice. In a word, there is certainly justice, and it is undoubtedly possible for people, not to do. Yet, rather all need to follow the requirement of the pure justice, only through which happiness, the very need of the human being, is possible.⁴⁶¹

The Core of *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*

"One of the attributions of God," justice, wherein lies the manifestation of His realm, Kinalizâde explains, "is the reason for the messengers to be sent, and by it the heavens and the earth are

Athens' accusation against him." See Bloom, *Ibid*, 307. Socrates was accused of doing injustice and put in death by Athens. This led Plato to write the *Republic*.

⁴⁵⁹ Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, one of the biggest Muslim thinkers of the modern times, presents two kinds of justice: the pure justice ('adâlat-i mahzâ) and the relative justice ('adâlat-i izâfiye). The pure justice, grounding upon the verse, *if anyone slays a human being-unless it be [in punishment] for murder or for spreading corruption on earth-it shall be as though he had slain all mankind*, (5: 32) he continues as, "... the rights of an innocent man cannot be cancelled for the sake of all the people. A single individual may not be sacrificed for the good of all. In the view of Almighty God's compassion, right is right, there is no difference between great and small. The small may not be annulled for the great." If the conditions are not suitable to apply the pure justice, then the relative justice, for which *a particular is sacrificed for the good of the universal; the rights of an individual are not considered in the face of the community*, can be applied. In any case, Nursi adds, to apply the relative justice instead of the pure justice without any constraining condition is wrong. Bediuzzaman Said Nursi. *Letters*, 74-75.

⁴⁶⁰ Bediuzzaman, *The Words*, ed and trans, Şükran Vahide, (İstanbul: Sözler Neşriyat, 1997), 78.

maintained.”⁴⁶² That is to say, the core understanding of *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, as Kinalizâde remarks,⁴⁶³ is justice. It is gathered around a circle, which is named the circle of justice.⁴⁶⁴

⁴⁶¹ Bediuzzaman, *The Damascus Sermon*, ed and trans, Şükran Vahide, (İstanbul: Sözler Neşriyat, 1997), 70.

⁴⁶² KINALIZÂDE, 537; also the prophetic tradition asserts that, *it is by equity that the heavens and the earth are maintained*. For more information, see Newman, Ibid, 112.

⁴⁶³ KINALIZÂDE, 538.

□KINALIZÂDE, 539. See Tarık Tunaya. “On The Cover Cycle of Justice”, *Political Research: Organization And Design*, 1 (1958), 1. Also, Fazlıoğlu mentions this circle as “being famous” in his article. For detail, see Fazlıoğlu, ibid, 228. Further, a very similar is seen in the Book on Politics that is ascribed to Aristotle; the most striking difference is that law is mentioned as “divine law” in *Ahlâk-ı Alâî*, whereas rules are mentioned as “a policy directed by the ruler” in the circle attributed to Aristotle. See Ibn Khaldûn, *An Introduction to History The Muqaddimah*, trans, Franz Rosentha, (New York: Bollingen Foundation, 1967), 41.

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