

BAŞKENT UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY
MASTER IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY WITH THESIS

PAST PERFECT OR FUTURE PROGRESSIVE: HOW IDEOLOGY INFLUENCES

OUR VIEW OF TIME

BY

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MASTER'S THESIS

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ANKARA - 2025

BAŞKENT ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZ ÇALIŞMASI ORJİNALLİK RAPORU

Tarih: 14.05.2025

Öğrencinin Adı, Soyadı: Alper Erdem

Öğrencinin Numarası: 22210263

Anabilim Dalı: Psikoloji Anabilim Dalı

Programı: Sosyal Psikoloji Tezli Yüksek Lisans Programı

Danışmanın Unvanı/Adı, Soyadı: Doç. Dr. Zuhal Yeniçeri Kökdemir

Tez Başlığı: Past Perfect or Future Progressive: How Ideology Influences Our View of Time

Yukarıda başlığı belirtilen Yüksek Lisans tez çalışmamın; Giriş, Ana Bölümler ve Sonuç Bölümünden oluşan, toplam 90 sayfalık kısmına ilişkin, 14.05.2025 tarihinde tez danışmanım tarafından Turnitin adlı intihal tespit programından aşağıda belirtilen filtrelemeler uygulanarak alınmış olan orijinallik raporuna göre, tezimin benzerlik oranı %7'dir.

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Öğrenci İmzası:

Tarih: 14.05.2025

Öğrenci Danışmanı, Unvan, Ad, Soyad

Doç. Dr. Zuhal Yeniçeri Kökdemir

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my thesis advisor, Assoc. Prof. Zuhâl Yeniçeri Kökdemir, for opening new paths for me, for the opportunities she created, and most importantly, for her unwavering trust throughout this process. Her guidance and support have been invaluable for both the academic quality and personal meaning of this work.

I am also sincerely thankful to the esteemed jury members, Assoc Prof. Burcu Tekeş Tolungüç, Assoc. Prof. Leman Korkmaz, and Asst. Prof. Reşit Kışlıoğlu, who generously devoted their time, offered valuable insights, and contributed to the development of this thesis during the proposal and/or defense stages.

I would like to thank the Başkent University family for assisting me in collecting data and providing me with motivation.

I extend my heartfelt thanks to my family, who have stood by my side in every way since the beginning of my master's journey, who raised me, educated me, and supported me unconditionally through every step.

I would like to thank the TÜBİTAK Directorate of Science Fellowships and Grant Programmes for awarding me the 2210-A scholarship throughout my master's education.

And finally, to my wife, without whom none of this would have been possible. Her patience, love, strength, and wisdom have been my greatest source of power. She is not only my partner in life, but also my most trusted advisor. This journey would not have meant the same without her.

ÖZET

ERDEM, Alper. Bitmiş Bir Geçmiş mi, Sürmekte Olan Bir Gelecek mi: İdeoloji Zamana Bakışımızı Nasıl Şekillendiriyor. Başkent Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Sosyal Psikoloji Tezli Yüksek Lisans Programı, 2025.

Bu tez, bireylerin siyasi inançlarının zaman içinde toplumsal değişim algılarını nasıl şekillendirdiğini incelemektedir. Yaygın olarak kullanılan liberal-muhafazakâr ikileminin ötesine geçilerek, muhafazakârlık, liberalizm, milliyetçilik ve sosyalizmi kapsayan, Türkiye bağlamına uyarlanmış çok boyutlu bir model benimsenmiştir. Katılımcıların altı temel toplumsal temaya (otoriteye saygı, aile bağları, gelenekselcilik, ekonomik eşitlik, geleneksel değerler ve toplumun genel yapısı) ilişkin değerlendirmeleri dört farklı zaman diliminde (1970-1995, 1995-2020, şimdi ve gelecek) değerlendirilmiştir. Bu yaklaşım, siyasi ideoloji ile zamansal algı arasındaki ilişkinin daha detaylı bir şekilde incelenmesine olanak sağlamıştır. Çalışmanın örneklemi, yaşları 18 ila 33 arasında değişen 337 katılımcıdan oluşmuştur. Ölçümler arasında siyasi ideoloji, siyasi katılım, gelecek zaman yönelimi ve zaman içinde toplumsal değişim algıları yer almıştır. Bulgular, siyasi ideolojinin bazı alanlarda toplumsal değişim algılarını etkilediğini, ancak tüm temalarda tutarlı olmadığını ortaya koymuştur. Çoğu alanda önemli bir ideolojik farklılık gözlenmemiştir. Ancak, milliyetçi ve muhafazakâr katılımcılar otorite ve aile yapılarında gelecekte meydana gelebilecek değişiklikleri daha olumsuz görme eğilimindedir.

Tekrarlanan ölçüm analizleri, ideolojik yönelimden bağımsız olarak, geçmişten geleceğe genel bir toplumsal gerileme algısı olduğunu göstermiştir. Siyasi katılım ve gelecek zaman yönelimi, seçili alanlarda gelecek değerlendirmeleri ile ilişkili bulunmuş, ancak genel etkileri mütevazı kalmıştır. Bu çalışma, siyasi ideolojiyi basit bir sol-sağ sürekliliğinden ziyade çok boyutlu ve bağlama duyarlı bir yapı olarak kavramsallaştırarak literatüre katkıda bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca, siyasi inançların geçmiş ve gelecek algılarıyla nasıl kesiştiğini araştıran gelecekteki araştırmalar için bir temel sağlamaktadır. Genel olarak bulgular, ideolojinin zaman algılarını bir dereceye kadar şekillendirdiğini, ancak bu etkinin genellikle temaya özgü ve kültürel olarak bağlamsal olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu sonuçlar, politik düşünceyi ve zamansal algıyı anlamaya yönelik daha esnek ve yerel modellere duyulan ihtiyacı vurgulamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *politik ideoloji, zaman algısı, politik katılım, toplum algısı, geleceğe yönelik zaman yönelimi*

ABSTRACT

ERDEM, Alper. Past Perfect or Future Progressive: How Ideology Influences Our View of Time. Başkent University, Institute of Social Sciences, Master's in Social Psychology with Thesis, 2025.

This thesis examines how individuals' political ideology shape their perceptions of social change over time. Moving beyond the commonly used liberal-conservative dichotomy, a multidimensional model that encompasses conservatism, liberalism, nationalism and socialism is adopted, adapted to the Turkish context. Participants' assessments of six main social themes (respect for authority, family ties, traditionalism, economic equality, traditional values and the general structure of society) were evaluated in four different time periods (1970-1995, 1995-2020, present and future). This approach allowed for a more detailed examination of the relationship between political ideology and temporal perception. The sample consisted of 337 participants aged between 18 and 33. Measures included political ideology, political engagement, future time orientation and perceptions of social change over time. Findings revealed that political ideology influenced perceptions of social change in some areas, but not consistently across all themes. No significant ideological differences were observed in most areas. However, nationalist and conservative respondents tended to view future changes in authority and family ties more negatively. Repeated measures analyses showed a general perception of social regression from the past to the future, regardless of ideological orientation. Political participation and future time orientation were associated with future evaluations in selected domains, but their overall effects were modest. This study contributes to the literature by conceptualizing political ideology as a multidimensional and context-sensitive construct rather than a simple left-right continuum. It also provides a foundation for future research exploring how political beliefs intersect with perceptions of the past and future. Overall, the findings suggest that ideology shapes perceptions of time to some extent, but that this influence is often theme-specific and culturally contextualized. These results emphasize the need for more flexible and local models for understanding political thought and temporal perception.

Keywords: *political ideology, time perception, political engagement, societal perception, future time orientation*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES.....	ix
LIST OF FIGURES.....	x
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. What is “Ideology”?	2
1.2. Left Wing vs. Right Wing	4
1.3. Multidimensional Models	6
1.3.1. Leonard W. Ferguson’s (1944) model	7
1.3.2. Eysenck’s (1957) model.....	7
1.3.3. Rokeach’s (1973) freedom-equality model.....	9
1.3.4. Braungart & Braungart’s (1986) model: moderate-extreme and left-right distinction in youth politics	10
1.3.5. Greenberg and Jonas’ model (2003)	11
1.3.6. Mitchell’s model (2007).....	12
1.3.7. Political compass by Colacrai and colleagues (2024)	13
1.3.8. Alternative political axes and alternative categorization models.....	14
1.3.9. Model comparison between countries in the same geography	15
1.3.10. A model for turkish citizen context (Küçüker, 2007).....	18
1.3.11. Models for measuring political ideologies	18
1.4. Dimensions for Turkish Context.....	20
1.4.1. Conservatism.....	20
1.4.2. Liberalism	21
1.4.3. Socialism or social justice bias.....	22
1.4.4. Nationalism or ulusalism	23
1.5. Dimensions for This Study.....	25
1.6. Ideology and The View of Time.....	27

1.7.	Future Time Orientation	29
1.8.	Future Time Orientation and Its Relation with Political Ideology	31
1.9.	This Study.....	32
1.9.1.	Purpose and significance.....	32
1.9.2.	Contribution of the study to the literature.....	33
1.9.3.	Conceptual justification of key variables	35
1.9.4.	Hypothesis:	37
2.	METHOD.....	39
2.1.	Participants	39
2.2.	Instruments	40
2.3.	Procedure	41
2.4.	Analysis.....	42
3.	RESULTS.....	45
3.1.	Descriptive Statistics	45
3.2.	Preliminary Analyses	46
3.2.1.	Political engagement and demographic variables	46
3.2.1.1.	Political engagement and political ideology	46
3.2.1.2.	Political engagement and gender	46
3.2.1.3.	Political engagement and education.....	46
3.2.2.	Future time orientation scale: reliability and descriptive statistics	47
3.2.3.	The Relationship between future time orientation and political engagement	48
3.2.3.1.	Correlation analysis.....	48
3.2.3.2.	Regression analysis	49
3.2.4.	Future time orientation and political ideology.....	49
3.2.4.1.	Anticipation subdimension	50
3.2.4.2.	Involvement subdimension	50

3.3. Temporal Perceptions by Political Ideology: Thematic Exploration Across Time Periods.....	51
3.3.1. Respect for authority (1970–1995)	51
3.3.2. Respect for authority (1995–2020)	51
3.3.3. Respect for authority (Now)	52
3.3.4. Respect for authority (2030–2055)	52
3.3.5. Family ties (1970–1995).....	52
3.3.6. Family ties (1995–2020).....	53
3.3.7. Family ties (Now)	53
3.3.8. Family ties (Future).....	53
3.3.9. Traditionalism (1970–1995)	54
3.3.10. Traditionalism (1995–2020)	54
3.3.11. Traditionalism (Now)	54
3.3.12. Traditionalism (Future)	54
3.3.13. Economic equality (1970–1995)	55
3.3.14. Economic equality (1995–2020)	55
3.3.15. Economic equality (Now)	55
3.3.16. Economic equality (Future)	56
3.3.17. Traditional values (1970–1995)	56
3.3.18. Traditional values (1995–2020)	57
3.3.19. Traditional values (Now)	57
3.3.20. Traditional values (Future)	57
3.3.21. Society in general (1970–1995)	58
3.3.22. Society in general (1995–2020)	58
3.3.23. Society in general (Now).....	58
3.3.24. Society in general (Future).....	59
3.4. Thematic Change in Perception of Time: Repeated Measures Analyses	59

3.5.	Overall Perception of Time: Comparison of Composite Temporal Scores..	61
3.6.	Differences in Future Evaluations Based on Future Time Orientation (FTO)	62
3.7.	Effect of Political Ideology and Future Time Orientation (Median Split) on Future Period Evaluations	64
3.8.	Interaction Between Political Engagement and Perceptions of Social Change Over Time	67
3.9.	Ideological Closeness Across Political Groups.....	68
3.10.	Relationships Between Political Ideology and Perceptions of Social Themes	69
3.11.	Descriptive Overview of Politically Unclassified Participants	71
4.	DISCUSSION	72
4.1.	Sample Characteristics and Contextual Considerations	72
4.2.	Political Engagement and Demographic Factors	73
4.3.	The Relationship Between Future Time Orientation and Political Engagement	74
4.4.	Future Time Orientation (FTO) and Political Ideology	75
4.5.	Perception of Time and Political Ideology Investigating the Social Themes	76
4.6.	Perception of Social Change Across Time.....	78
4.7.	The Relationship Between Future Orientation and Time Perception	81
4.8.	The Interaction of Political Ideology and Future Time Orientation with Future Social Assessments	82
4.9.	Interaction Between Political Engagement Level and Perception of Time..	83
4.10.	Ideological Closeness and Politically Unclassified Participants: Reflections on the Validity of the Model.....	84
5.	CONCLUSION.....	86
5.1.	Limitation and Suggestions for Future Studies	88
	REFERENCES	91
	APPENDICES	

APPENDIX 1: Informed Consent Form

APPENDIX 2: Political Questions Form

APPENDIX 3: Measurement Of Respect for Authority

APPENDIX 4: Measurement Of Closeness to Family

APPENDIX 5: Measurement Of Traditionalism

APPENDIX 6: Measurement Of Economic Equality

APPENDIX 7: Measurement Of Adherence to Traditional Values

APPENDIX 8: Measurement Of Society in General

APPENDIX 9: Future Time Orientation Scale Turkish Adaptation Form

APPENDIX 10: Demographic Information Form

APPENDIX 11: Future Time Orientation Scale Permission to Use

APPENDIX 12: Correlational Matrix

APPENDIX 13: Pearson Correlations Among Thematic Perceptions in the Distant Past (1970–1995)

APPENDIX 14: Pearson Correlations Among Thematic Perceptions in the Recent Past (1995–2020)

APPENDIX 15: Pearson Correlations Among Thematic Perceptions in the Present (2020–2030)

APPENDIX 16: Pearson Correlations Among Thematic Perceptions in the Future (2030–2055)

APPENDIX 17: Future Time Orientation Scale Item Correlations

APPENDIX 18: Ethical Approval

LIST OF TABLES

	Pages
Table 3.1. Demographic Characteristics of Participants	45
Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables.....	45
Table 3.3. Political Engagement: Grouped Descriptives.....	47
Table 3.4. Correlation and Regression Results between FTO Subscales and Political Engagement	49
Table 3.5. Means and Standard Deviations of FTO Subdimensions by Political Ideology	50
Table 3.6. Respect for Authority by Political Ideology Across Time Periods	52
Table 3.7. Perceptions Of Family Ties by Ideology and Time Periods.....	53
Table 3.8. Perceptions of Traditionalism by Political Ideology Across Time Periods	55
Table 3.9. Perceived Economic Equality by Political Ideology Across Four Time Periods	56
Table 3.10. Perceived Traditional Values Across Historical Periods by Political Ideology	58
Table 3.11. Perceived Society in General by Political Ideology Across Time Periods	59
Table 3.12. Mean Ratings of Perceived Societal Values Across Time Periods	61
Table 3.13. Composite Temporal Perception Scores by Time Period.....	62
Table 3.14. Paired-Samples t-Test Results Between Time Periods	62
Table 3.15. Regression Results: Future Evaluations by FTO Subdimensions	63
Table 3.16. Two-Way ANOVA Results for Future Perceptions: Political Ideology × Future Time Orientation (Anticipation and Involvement Dimensions).....	66
Table 3.17. Summary of Main and Interaction Effects of Time and Political Engagement on Thematic Perceptions of Social Change	68
Table 3.18. Mean Closeness-to-Ideology Scores by Political Orientation.....	68
Table 3.19. Partial Correlations Between Political Ideological Groups and Perceptions of Social Themes Across Time	70
Table 3.20. Self-Reported Political Identities Outside the Four Main Ideological Categories	71

LIST OF FIGURES

	Pages
Figure 1.1. Eysenck's (1957) Model	8
Figure 1.2. Rokeach's (1973) Model.....	9
Figure 1.3. Braungart and Braungart's (1986) Model.....	11
Figure 1.4. Mitchell's Model (2007): Four Main Traditions.....	12
Figure 1.5. Mitchell's Model (2007): Eight Political Perspectives	13
Figure 1.6. Colocrai and Colleagues' (2024) Model	14
Figure 1.7. Political Dimension of Egypt.....	16
Figure 1.8. Political Dimension of Morocco	16
Figure 1.9. Political Dimension of Jordan.....	17
Figure 1.10. Political Dimension of Algeria.....	17

1. INTRODUCTION

Contemporary Turkish politics is characterized by a marked polarization, where ideological divisions significantly influence both political behaviors and everyday social interactions (Olcaysoy & Sarıbay, 2012). Political engagement in Türkiye remains notably high, with voter turnout consistently exceeding 80%, reflecting not only an engaged electorate but also noticeable ideological commitments within the society (YSK, 2023). This combination of heightened ideological polarization and substantial civic participation underscores the role of political ideologies as critical lenses through which individuals perceive societal developments and mobilize collectively (Jost, 2017). Although traditional political frameworks often utilize the left-right or liberal-conservative distinctions, recent literature argues that these binary classifications may not fully capture the complexity and multidimensionality of political beliefs (Carmines & D'Amico, 2015; Küçüker, 2007).

Addressing this complexity, this study adopts a multidimensional model previously validated within the Turkish context, encompassing conservatism, liberalism, ulusalism, and social justice bias (Küçüker, 2007). These ideological dimensions, influenced by specific historical, social, and economic contexts unique to Türkiye, provide a more distinctive framework for analyzing political thought. For instance, conservatism in Türkiye intertwines closely with religious and traditional values, contrasting significantly with Western conceptualizations (Özbey, 2023). Similarly, nationalism has evolved distinctively within Turkish political history, encompassing elements ranging from secular and populist nationalism to more conservative and authoritarian interpretations (Bora, 2017; Elder, 2023). Meanwhile, socialist ideology, historically shaped by various leftist movements and unions (Yaşlı, 2023) has recently seen a resurgence, reflecting broader concerns over economic inequality and social justice.

Political ideologies not only guide individuals' interpretations of present conditions but also influence their perceptions of past events and future possibilities (Caprara & Vecchione, 2009; Jost et al., 2009). Psychological research suggests that temporal perceptions which means how people recall the past and anticipate the future are fundamentally shaped by motivational frameworks and ideological orientations (Carstensen, 2006; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2015). For example, individuals identifying with conservative or nationalist ideologies may idealize historical periods and view future societal changes with skepticism (Rigoli, 2024),

while those aligned with liberal or socialist values might express greater optimism about progressive social transformations (Caprara & Vecchione, 2009).

Given these theoretical insights, the current study aims to explore how young people in Türkiye relate their ideological orientations to their perceptions of social change across different time periods. By focusing on six key societal themes which are respect for authority, family ties, traditionalism, economic equality, traditional values, and general societal structure, the thesis investigates the extent to which ideological alignments affect evaluations of the past, present, and anticipated future.

Additionally, this study examines whether political engagement and future time orientation (FTO) also influence these temporal perceptions, providing further understanding of how ideological beliefs and individual differences in future orientation shape perceptions of social change. Exploring these relationships can offer deeper insight into how political ideologies connect with temporal judgments in Turkish society, highlighting the importance of adopting a multidimensional and context-sensitive approach when studying ideological influences on perceptions of past, present, and future. Moving beyond conventional dichotomous frameworks, this study provides a more refined examination of ideological impacts on temporal perception, contributing to the literature by highlighting the necessity for multidimensional and context-sensitive analyses of political thought (Küçüker, 2007; Jost et al., 2009). These considerations naturally lead to a deeper inquiry into the definition and conceptualization of ideology itself, which remains essential for comprehensively examining its various impacts on societal perceptions and behaviors.

1.1. What is “Ideology”?

The term "ideology" comes from a philosophical school with empiricist and sensationalist views and leaned toward materialism (Lefebvre, 1968). The pioneer of the term “ideology” which means “the science of ideas” was Antoine Destutt de Tracy, who was also a leading figure in this school (Lefebvre, 1968). Marx and Engels (1846/1970) took up this idea in two different ways in their book, “The German Ideology”. In this sense, ideology is an abstract or symbolic system. It explains or legitimizes social, economic, or political realities. Also, ideology has a bad connotation. It's seen as a set of distorted ideas that deviate from reality. It's associated with "false consciousness". Both ideas that Marx and Engels put forward are still widely held. Following this, Karl Mannheim wrote "Ideology and Utopia", in which he defined ideology as "the sociology of knowledge," as we now use the term (Mannheim, 1929/2013). Although Converse (1964/2006) claims that different uses have

"muddled" the term ideology, it got much attention in the twentieth century (Knight, 2006). Thus, the concept is considered in different ways and focuses on different characteristics, ideology can be defined as "the set of ideas that constitute the moral, political, philosophical and cultural system of thought of a political view or class formation" (Jost, 2006, p. 653).

These sets of ideas shape the shared but not universal beliefs, values, and opinions of a particular group, class, voting group, or society (Freeden, 2001; Knight, 2006). Herein lies the importance of defining a group or community. It emphasizes that rather than being an individual aspect of ideology, it is a shared aspect, i.e. a shared specification of how a particular group or community sees the world and how it should be structured (Denzau & North 1994). It is therefore important to underline that when we speak of an ideology, we are referring to the view of a group, leaving personal views aside. They also contribute to the interpretation of the world by developing assumptions about human nature, historical events, and social realities (Jost, 2006).

Research shows that ideology plays a central role in structuring voters' political decision-making processes (Carmines & D'Amico, 2015). Accordingly, ideology is defined as a structure that connects individuals' political ideas within a certain logical framework. This ideological framework is dynamic rather than static and is influenced by a range of factors such as personality traits (Nilsson et al., 2020), moral intuitions (Graham et al., 2009), and overarching worldviews (Tomkins, 1963). Despite these changes, limited research has explored the reasons behind why certain ideologies evolve while others remain unchanged (Leader Maynard, 2019). Shaped by numerous factors, political ideology can also influence how individuals respond to various stimuli. Research shows that those on the right and left of the political spectrum have subtle differences in their responses to external stimuli (Hibbing et al., 2014). Individuals' general worldviews and philosophical attitudes (Evans et al., 1996; Federico & Sidanius, 2002), how they think about political issues (Jacoby, 1991; Jost, 2006), and how they evaluate political candidates (Federico & Schneider, 2007) play an influential role in decision-making in many different contexts.

Many researchers suggest that ideology is represented in the mind as a schema of interconnected views, beliefs, and values that individuals learn and store in their memory (Erikson & Tedin, 2019; Fiske et al., 1990; Hamill et al., 1985; Jost, 2006; Kinder, 1998; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). The functioning of this mental schema has often been explained in psychological terms. Even in the works of non-psychologists, psychological mechanisms are used to explain the foundations of ideology (Converse, 1964/2006). In the studies of psychologists, ideology is considered together with psychological variables such as values,

attitudes, and motivation, and it is seen that psychological mechanisms play an active role in interpreting the results of the phenomenon represented in the mind (Jost, 2006).

Although it is explained by psychological mechanisms, according to Baradat and Phillips (2016, pp. 10-11), ideology is primarily a political concept and although it is used in different contexts, its primary meaning is related to politics. The general definition of political ideology, which is a sub-branch of ideology but often perceived as the same as an ideology because ideology is usually studied in the context of politics, is as Jost (2006) puts it, “political ideology is a set of moral and political attitudes with interrelated cognitive, affective and motivational elements”.

These political ideologies not only explain the current situation but also offer a vision for the future. In this context, at the center of ideology is a design of how society should be shaped, and this design envisions a future order. Moreover, political ideologies are action-oriented, meaning that they are not just about ideas and values; they provide their followers with a roadmap of what to do to achieve these future goals (Baradat & Phillips, 2016). Accordingly, ideologies encourage people not only to think but also to act towards specific political and social changes (Jost, 2006).

Traditionally, political ideology, individuals' preferences for change and stability, and their preferences for the appropriate level of government intervention in the economy (Carmines & D'Amico, 2015) have been measured along a single left-right or liberal-conservative dimension. While some research suggests that this left-right dimension includes two separate dimensions, preferences for change and stability and preferences for economic intervention in society, these two dimensions are highly correlated among political elites and citizens who follow politics closely, thus in practice reducing them to a single dimension (Poole & Rosenthal 2011).

1.2. Left Wing vs. Right Wing

One of the most well-known ways to classify political ideologies is by looking at the left-right distinction. This idea dates to the French Revolution (1789–1799) when members of parliament were physically seated based on their political stance, radical groups sat on the left, while aristocrats took their place on the right (Heywood, 2017; Knapp & Wright, 2006). Today, communism and socialism are generally seen as left-wing ideologies, while conservatism and reactionary views are on the right (Heywood, 2017). Liberalism, on the other hand, does not fit neatly into either category; although it is labeled as left/liberal in

American studies (Jost et al., 2003), it can lean left or right depending on the context. Some political perspectives don't conform to this traditional left-right spectrum and are categorized as "syncretic politics" (Eatwell, 2003; Griffin, 1995). In its early years, this ideological divide was shaped by attitudes toward the old order or the Ancien Régime. Generally, the right supported aristocracy, monarchy, and religious authority, while the left championed republican governance, secularism, and individual rights (Knapp & Wright, 2006).

Over the last century, social scientists have tried to develop various models to analyze political differences most accurately. Ideology has been defined by researchers as basically two different extremes (left/liberal and right/conservative). In modern democratic societies, the distinction between left-wing and right-wing ideologies seems to have remained significant. This ideological divide seems to be a reliable indicator of political preferences and consistent social attitudes. According to Caprara and Vecchione (2018), these attitudes provide a connection between an individual's personality and their political affiliations. The binary distinctions of left/liberal versus right/conservative are regarded as valuable, both for their alignment with the principle of parsimony in scientific research and for the empirical support they receive from various studies (Benoit & Laver, 2006; Carney et al., 2008; Jost, 2006; Knight, 1999).

This dual distinction can also vary from country to country. While the distinction in the United States is usually framed as liberal and conservative (Jost, 2006), in Türkiye it is defined in terms of leftist and rightist (Cesur et al., 2018). These distinctions are based on two fundamental oppositions. While the left-liberal side advocates social change and a social order based on equality, the right-conservative side constructs its vision of social order in opposition to social change and social equality (Jost et al., 2003). Even in politically volatile countries like Türkiye, research has shown that categorizing political ideologies along liberal-conservative (Olcaýsoy & Sarıbay, 2012) or left-right lines (Cesur et al., 2014) can still be useful, despite the limitations of these classifications.

While the left-right distinction is widely used and supported by various studies, it has also been argued that this binary framework doesn't always capture the full complexity of ideology and may fall short in explaining certain variables (Conover & Feldman, 1981/2004; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Kerlinger, 1984/2022; Kinder, 1998; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985; Zumbunnen & Gangl, 2008). Research argues that discussions of ideology are conceptually and measurably inadequate and therefore misunderstand the ideological makeup of the public and the effects of ideological thinking. The ideological makeup of the American public is much more complex than the simple liberal-conservative binary used by political

elites (Carmines et al. 2012). It is seen that this situation is no different in Türkiye. Accordingly, there is an example of a study arguing that political ideology has not 2 but 4 different dimensions in Türkiye (Küçüker, 2007). Accordingly, the first dimension reflects cultural conservatism, while the second dimension represents liberal attitudes emphasizing free market economy and individual freedoms. The third dimension displays a nationalist orientation, sometimes including racist and authoritarian elements. Finally, the fourth dimension, although seemingly heterogeneous in structure, displays an egalitarian and social justice-oriented stance.

It is also argued that the public may not make the liberal(left)-conservative(right) distinction in the same way as it does on a party basis when evaluating itself (Layman & Casey, 2002), that it derives different meanings from concepts such as liberalism-conservatism, and that being conservative or liberal in different contexts can also make a difference (Duckitt, 2001; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Schwartz, 1992; Treier & Hillygus, 2009). Therefore, although the left-right distinction remains valid in many studies (Benoit & Laver, 2006; Carney et al., 2008; Jost, 2006; Knight, 1999), this is not the case in every study in the field (Conover & Feldman, 1981/2004; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Kerlinger, 1984/2022; Kinder, 1998; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985; Zumbunnen & Gangl, 2008). Therefore, it is not surprising that the expected results are not obtained, that the results are contrary to what the literature suggests, or that the results do not reach a statistically significant level (Rigoli, 2024). Instead of this dichotomic distinction, measuring ideology on a multi-dimensional level would be more meaningful in terms of the results or would provide a more detailed result as it would present ideological differences with more group comparisons.

1.3. Multidimensional Models

Going beyond the binary model in the literature and measuring ideology with multidimensional models is discussed in many studies (Conover & Feldman, 1981/2004; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Kerlinger, 1984/2022; Kinder, 1998; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985; Zumbunnen & Gangl, 2008) Research which are based on this alternative approach suggests that public attitudes can be based on political values and principles rather than ideology, and that ideology should be considered multidimensional rather than unidimensional (Carmines & D'Amico, 2015). Thus, this alternative approach is expected to allow us to better understand the actual level of ideological thinking, explain in more detail how it interacts with individual beliefs, and generate new questions that can be answered (Carmines &

D'Amico, 2015). In the decades since the first model was proposed, many different multidimensional models for measuring ideology have been proposed.

1.3.1. Leonard W. Ferguson's (1944) model

Leonard W. Ferguson (1944) was the pioneer in measuring ideology in multiple dimensions. In this first model, he attempted to develop a model of ideology based on 10 factors including evolution, censorship, patriotism, law, theism, capital punishment, birth control, war, punishment of criminals, and communism. In his later factor analysis, he categorized political ideologies under 3 main headings: Nationalism, religionism, and humanism. However, Ferguson's approach was based on developing a model based on data rather than creating and testing a predetermined theoretical framework. Therefore, care should be taken in its interpretation. A study conducted in later years showed that the factors were not consistent (Kirkpatrick, 1949).

1.3.2. Eysenck's (1957) model


Following Ferguson's work, Hans Eysenck (1957) conducted research on political attitudes in the United Kingdom. He argued that Nazi fascism and communism were similar despite being at opposite ends of the left-right axis. In his 1957 study, *Sense and Nonsense in Psychology*, he conducted a questionnaire including different political statements, measured the opinions of the participants and subjected the results to factor analysis (Eysenck, 1957). As a result of the analysis, he identified two main factors: "Radicalism" (R-factor) and 'Emotional Sensitivity' (T-factor). While the R-factor corresponded to the traditional left-right divide, the T-factor was more complex; individuals with high T-scores supported pacifism, racial equality and religious education, while those with low scores favored militarism, capital punishment and traditional marriage norms (The model is presented in Figure 1). According to Voinea and colleagues (2013), radicalism in Eysenck's model was associated with progressive social and economic policies, while conservatism was associated with authoritarian and status quo views. Similarly, emotional sensitivity was based on peaceful and conscientious values, while rigid mindset was defined by authoritarian methods of punishment.

When Eysenck's work was tested in different countries, it was found to be very similar to the religiousness and humanism factors identified by Ferguson in the US. Factor analyses in Germany, Sweden, France and Japan also confirmed the existence of R and T axes (Dator,

1969; Eysenck, 1953). However, the weight of political attitudes varied from country to country. In countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, political orientations have traditionally been understood primarily through the left-right spectrum. However, in France, the T-factor has played a more significant role in shaping political tendencies. In the Middle East, only the T-factor made a clear distinction; the radical-conservative axis did not show a significant difference (Eysenck, 1957).

Figure 1.1

Eysenck's (1957) Model



One of the most important criticisms of Eysenck's political model is that its methodology contains uncertainties. Factor analysis generates abstract dimensions based on the relationships between data, but it is not always certain whether these dimensions have a material counterpart in the real world. Since the second factors are mathematically determined to be orthogonal to the first factor, they can only be a statistical by-product, making it difficult to validate Eysenck's hard/soft mindset model (Lykken, 1971; Ray & Bozek, 1981; Wiggins, 1973). In addition, the association of hard and soft mindset concepts with extraversion and psychoticism produced inconsistent findings, which increased criticism that the psychological foundations of the model were not sound (Ray & Bozek, 1981). Rokeach and Hanley, on the other hand, questioned Eysenck's identification of Nazis and communists as having a harsher mindset than mainstream political groups because it contained technical errors and suggested that the method could lead to political bias

(Rokeach & Hanley, 1956). In conclusion, although Eysenck's approach provided an important framework for explaining political ideologies, his methodology and results were found controversial by many researchers.

1.3.3. Rokeach's (1973) freedom-equality model

Rokeach (1973) argues that the one-dimensional evaluation of political ideology not only provides analytical convenience but also is functional in the theoretical framework, which would be insufficient in comparative analyses. About two decades after his criticism of Eysenck's model, Rokeach developed his model (Rokeach & Hanley, 1956). He emphasized that political ideologies can change according to time and space, that there is no universal definition of liberalism and conservatism and that these concepts can be confused with each other due to ambiguity. He also argues that authoritarianism should be evaluated independently of the left-right axis. For this reason, Rokeach proposed a two-dimensional model that evaluates political ideology through two fundamental values such as freedom and equality.

According to this model as presented in Figure 2:

High freedom + high equality = Socialism,


High freedom + low equality = Capitalism,

Low freedom + low equality = Fascism,

High equality + low freedom = Communism (Rokeach, 1973).

Figure 1.2.

Rokeach's (1973) Model



Rokeach's (1973) model has faced criticism due to the possibility that content analysis may be influenced by the researcher's political perspective. Some researchers have questioned its objectivity, suggesting that focusing on the frequency of certain text concepts might overlook the authors' intentions and the broader context (Mahoney et al., 1984). This methodology is also criticized for defining concepts like equality and freedom only through the phrases of specific political individuals. Therefore, the complexity and diverse nature of political ideologies are thought to be outside the scope of this method (Rous & Lee, 1978).

1.3.4. Braungart & Braungart's (1986) model: moderate-extreme and left-right distinction in youth politics

Braungart and Braungart (1986), like Rokeach (1973), used multidimensional modeling in their study investigating the grouping of youth political orientations. In Braungart and Braungart's (1986) model, just like in Rokeach's model, there were 4 different groups, but these 4 groups were arranged on a linear line. He developed a typology model by considering youth politics on two basic axes (see Figure 3). In this model, political orientations were evaluated as left and right, and the intensity of political attitudes as moderate and extreme. In this framework, four basic political categories emerge:

Moderate Left: Young people who adhere to democratic and parliamentary traditions and prefer compromise and reforms over radical solutions.

Moderate Right: Young people who tend to preserve the existing order and maintain stability, and are open to ideological flexibility and compromise.


Extreme Left: Young people with a desire to radically change political and social structures, advocating revolutionary or radical solutions.

Extreme Right: Refers to youth who idealize the past, prioritize authoritarian and traditional structures, and are often influenced by rigid conservative or nationalist rhetoric.

Braungart and Braungart's (1986) study suggests that youth political engagement follows a curve along the left-right spectrum. While moderate groups remain closer to the center, extremists on both ends may resort to similar radical methods. In general, far-left and far-right groups embrace anti-systemic and radical positions, whereas moderates tend to be more open to democratic processes.

Figure 1.3.

Braungart and Braungart's (1986) Model



Although the Braungart model explains youth political participation in terms of moderation and extremism, this approach has been subject to various criticisms. Jost and colleagues (2003) argue that the right-wing tends to be closed-minded and this may lead to less analytical voting behavior (Yılmaz & Sarıbay, 2017), while findings that the far right and left share common psychological characteristics (van Prooijen et al., 2015) show the inadequacy of the model. Moreover, research suggests that extremists can be ideologically stable and have heterogeneous values (Hanel et al., 2019; Zwicker et al., 2020), suggesting that the model ignores this diversity.

1.3.5. Greenberg and Jonas' model (2003)

Jeff Greenberg and Eva Jonas developed a model that explains political attitudes using two dimensions: the left-right spectrum and ideological rigidity (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). Ideological rigidity, which is closely linked to dogmatism and authoritarianism, includes traits such as loyalty to strong leaders, group bias, ethnocentrism, nationalism, hostility toward opponents, and reliance on security forces to uphold authority. According to Greenberg and Jonas, ideological rigidity is particularly driven by the need to reduce uncertainty and fear and appears to be a common trait in individuals adhering to far-right and far-left ideologies.

The Greenberg and Jonas (2003) model has been criticized. One major critique of the model is that reducing political ideologies to a simple left-right divide may oversimplify their complexity (Feldman & Johnston, 2014). Malka and colleagues (2019) also questioned its framework, arguing that cultural and economic conservatism don't always go hand in

hand. In addition, the association of ideological rigidity only with the right wing has been criticized. van Prooijen and colleagues (2015) show that both the far right and the far left may exhibit similar psychological characteristics and that rigidity can be seen in all ideological extremes. Jost and colleagues (2007) argue that the tendency to avoid uncertainty is more closely linked to conservatism than to ideological extremism. This challenges the model's assumption that psychological motivations operate in a single direction. While the Greenberg and Jonas Model (2003) provides useful insights into political attitudes, it may not fully capture the complexity of ideology, the various dimensions of ideological rigidity, or the diversity of psychological motivations. To address these limitations, future research should take a more nuanced and comprehensive approach.

1.3.6. Mitchell's model (2007)

Brian Patrick Mitchell (2007) categorized Western political history according to the concepts of *kratos* (the use of force) and *archē* (authority or social hierarchy) based on four main traditions (see Figure 4). He identified four main traditions: republican constitutionalism, libertarian individualism, democratic progressivism and plutocratic nationalism. He identified eight distinct political perspectives (see Figure 5) within this framework, positioning individuals along these axes based on their political tendencies. However, some scholars, such as McGuire (2022) and Brysk (2017), have argued that the model falls short in representing the complexities of modern politics.

Figure 1.4.

Mitchell's Model (2007): Four Main Traditions





Figure 1.5.

Mitchell's Model (2007): Eight Political Perspectives



1.3.7. Political compass by Colacrai and colleagues (2024)

Colacrai and colleagues (2024) developed this model to discover the complexity of political ideology in online platforms. They analyzed the /r/PoliticalCompass and /r/PoliticalCompassMemes subreddits on Reddit, a social media platform. By analyzing more than 8 million comments, the authors intended to understand better how political beliefs are shaped and stated. Accordingly, they proposed two axes of ideology: the economic axis (left-right) and the social axis (libertarian-authoritarian). Looking at online interactions within this framework, the researchers assessed how different ideological groups interact with each other and the extent of polarization in these discussions. The model is presented in Figure 6.


The findings show that people are more likely to interact with people who share their views on social matters (homophily), while discussions between individuals with conflicting views on economic matters are more common (heterophily). The study also found that the exchanges between people with conflicting ideologies often become more hostile and aggressive language increases. These results highlight the role of social media in shaping political polarization and show that ideological positioning affects the way people engage in online discussions.

Beyond these patterns, the study challenges the traditional left-right political spectrum and argues that political ideology cannot be fully understood without considering both economic and social dimensions. The findings provide important insights into how digital

platforms contribute to political socialization and reinforce or reshape ideological identities over time.

Figure 1.6.

Colocrai and Colleagues' (2024) Model



However, Gaudette and colleagues (2021) note that studies of online political debates may ignore key influences such as the echo chamber effect and the role of platform algorithms in shaping public discourse. Without accounting for these factors, they suggest that research on digital political debates may fail to capture the full complexity of how political conversations unfold in everyday life.

1.3.8. Alternative political axes and alternative categorization models

Some researchers have argued that the political spectrum should consist of more dimensions. Accordingly, studies in Germany have identified at least four different political dimensions, six in the US and ten in the UK (Alós-Ferrer & Granić, 2015; Lewenberg et al., 2016). In addition, various additional axes have been proposed to assess political ideologies. For example, the communitarian-individualist axis contrasts community-centered policies with approaches that prioritize individual freedoms (Blattberg, 2001). While the urban-rural divide is an important political variable in regions such as Europe and Canada, it has historically played a more prominent role in the US. Foreign policy diverges between interventionist and isolationist approaches, while the globalization-economic independence axis contrasts free trade with economic protectionism. The form of participation includes models of governance ranging from democracy to aristocracy and tyranny, while the conception of freedom distinguishes between positive freedom (active guarantee of rights)

and negative freedom (prevention of external interference) (Blattberg, 2001; Sulakshin, 2010).

1.3.9. Model comparison between countries in the same geography

The nature of political ideology varies according to different social and political contexts. Research in the Arabic world shows that ideological differences are characterized differently in each country. In Algeria (see Figure 10), for instance, politics are mainly shaped around economic issues, while in Jordan, cultural and religious issues are at the center of attention (Abduljaber, 2018). In Egypt (see Figure 7), although the Islamist-secularist divide is thought to have been effective in the post-Arab Spring period, it has been observed that the economic crisis and the debate on the form of governance have become increasingly determinant. This situation reveals that ideological conflicts in the region cannot be evaluated on a single axis; on the contrary, each country has developed different ideological lines in line with its own historical and political dynamics.

This variation shows that political ideology is not homogeneous at the regional level. In Morocco (see Figure 8), politics are shaped by economic development and democratization, while in Jordan (see Figure 9) identity politics is a more dominant element. Similarly, while the role of political Islam is debated in Egypt and Tunisia, the ideological divisions in the Gulf countries are more in the context of state modernization policies and economic reforms. These differences reveal that political ideology in the Arab world cannot be analyzed through a single template and varies according to the specific political and social context of each country (Abduljaber, 2018).

Accordingly, studies to be conducted in Türkiye should also take cultural differences into consideration and focus on a dimension to be proposed in Türkiye as opposed to the dimensions used in other countries. Since the political climates of countries are unique, as seen in the Arab world, it seems valuable to use a model proposed in Türkiye in political ideology studies in Türkiye.

Figure 1.7.
Political Dimension of Egypt




Figure 1.8.
Political Dimension of Morocco




Figure 1.9.
Political Dimension of Jordan





Figure 1.10.
Political Dimension of Algeria



1.3.10. A model for turkish citizen context (Küçüker, 2007)

Aslıhan Küçüker (2007) argues that measuring political ideology in Türkiye only on the right-left axis is insufficient and proposes a four-dimensional model. Küçüker's model evaluates individuals' political views on four main axes:

Conservatism: This dimension is associated with commitment to traditional values, the influence of religious beliefs on politics, and sensitivity to social norms. While culturally conservative individuals generally defend religious and national values, they may have more restrictive attitudes toward individual freedoms.

Liberalism: The second dimension in Küçüker's model includes liberal attitudes that favor a free market economy and individual freedoms. Individuals with high scores on this axis are in favor of limiting government interference and encourage economic freedom.

Nationalism or Ulusalism: This dimension encompasses attitudes towards national identity and strong protection of the state. Nationalist tendencies can range from patriotism to authoritarian and racist elements. Küçüker's research reveals that this dimension can sometimes overlap with dictatorial tendencies.

Socialism or Social Justice Bias: This dimension includes views that support the provision of social justice, equality in income distribution, and state intervention in economic life. Individuals with high scores in this dimension prioritize social welfare policies and the expansion of education and health services.

Küçüker's model shows that it is insufficient to evaluate political orientations in Türkiye only based on the right-left octave. It is emphasized that individuals can attribute different meanings when defining their political identities regardless of party affiliation and that ideology has a multidimensional structure. Accordingly, the model allows for a more detailed and accurate analysis of different ideological groups by addressing political attitudes in a broader framework.

1.3.11. Models for measuring political ideologies

The measurement of political ideologies has historically been considered within the framework of two-dimensional approaches, and ideological tendencies have generally been evaluated on the left-right or liberal-conservative axis (Jost et al., 2003). However, research has revealed that ideology is not limited to these two axes and that individuals' political attitudes have a more complex structure (Conover & Feldman, 1981/2004; Feldman & Johnston, 2014). For this reason, it has been suggested that two-dimensional approaches may

be insufficient in certain contexts and may not fully reflect ideological diversity (Kerlinger, 1984/2022; Kinder, 1998; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985). Many multidimensional models have been developed over the years to overcome these limitations. For example, Ferguson (1944) presented a model consisting of three main axes: nationalism, religiosity, and humanism. Eysenck (1957), on the other hand, proposed a model based on radicalism and emotional sensitivity factors, arguing that ideologies can be explained not only by the left-right distinction but also by the intellectual flexibility of individuals. Rokeach (1973) proposed a model that evaluates political ideologies on the axes of freedom and equality, while Greenberg and Jonas (2003) developed an approach that includes the ideological rigidity axis. In recent studies, models that evaluate political ideologies with economic and social dimensions have come to the fore (Colacrai et al., 2024). These multidimensional approaches have shown that ideologies are not universal, that they can vary according to cultural and social contexts, and that this should be taken into account when measuring them. For example, the liberal-conservative distinction stands out in the United States, while the socialist-nationalist distinction is more pronounced in Europe (Benoit & Laver, 2006). In the Middle East, on the other hand, ideologies are often based on distinctions based on religion, state structure, and ethnic identity (Abduljaber, 2018). Therefore, it is suggested that each country should develop an appropriate ideological model, considering its unique social dynamics and political culture (Lewenberg et al., 2016).

In the case of Türkiye, various studies have emphasized that the traditional right-left distinction is insufficient (Cesur et al., 2018; Olcaysoy & Sarıbay, 2012). In this respect, Küçüker (2007) proposed a model specific to the Turkish context and analyzed ideology in four main dimensions: conservatism, liberalism, nationalism/ulusalism, and social justice bias/socialism. Küçüker's model made it possible to analyze ideological diversity more comprehensively by showing that political orientations in Türkiye cannot be explained by only two axes.

In this study, based on Küçüker's four-dimensional model, we will examine how political ideology is related to the perception of time. Going beyond the traditional two-dimensional distinctions and evaluating ideologies in a broader framework will provide more meaningful results in a politically dynamic and diverse country like Türkiye.

1.4. Dimensions for Turkish Context

1.4.1. Conservatism

Conservatism is defined as an ideology that advocates the preservation of the social and political structure (Wilson et al., 1973). Historically, conservatism was shaped as a reaction to the radical transformations of the French Revolution, and the cornerstones of classical conservative thought were laid with Edmund Burke's (1790/1986) "Reflections on the Revolution in France" (Heywood, 2017). This ideology favors the continuity of traditions and the existing order while adopting a cautious approach against rapid and radical changes (Schwartz, 1992). In different contexts, conservatism can have different meanings in religious, cultural and economic dimensions (Duckitt et al., 2010).

One of the basic principles of conservatism is that society is an organic structure and traditional norms that evolve over time should be preserved. In this context, conservatives advocate gradual and controlled changes rather than sudden revolutions (Alexander, 2015). While conservatism does not completely reject individual freedoms, it tends to put the general welfare of society ahead of individual rights (Caprara et al., 2006).

Conservatism is often confused with status quoism, but essentially it aims to guide change in a controlled manner rather than a complete defense of the past (Küçüker, 2007). Cultural and political conservatism is directly related to individuals' worldviews, authoritarian tendencies and reactions to uncertainty (Jost et al., 2003). Studies on conservatism have suggested that it is related to individuals' authoritarian personality structures (Adorno, 1950). Wilson and colleagues (1973) found that conservatism is related to individuals' anxiety levels and attitudes towards uncertainty. Duckitt (2001) stated that right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation shape conservative tendencies. Studies on conservatism in the academic literature reveal that individuals' conservative tendencies are related to different psychological and social factors. For example, Caprara and colleagues (2006) examined the links between personality traits and political preferences and showed that conservative individuals generally have higher values of security and traditionalism. According to the Five Factor Model of Personality, conservative individuals generally score higher on personality traits such as "extraversion" and "emotional stability" (Caprara et al., 2006).

Unlike its Western counterparts, conservatism in Türkiye has a structure intertwined with religious and national elements (Özbey, 2023). The values of conservative individuals

in Türkiye are generally shaped by religiosity, loyalty to traditions and respect for state authority (Demir, 2023). The scope of conservatism does not have a homogeneous structure in Türkiye. It varies among different social and economic classes. The model developed by Küçüker (2007) provides an important framework for understanding the different components of conservatism. Political conservatism in Türkiye takes on new forms, changing with historical events and economic transformations (Bora, 2017).

1.4.2. Liberalism

Liberalism is defined as a political ideology based on individual freedom, the rule of law, and a free market economy (Heywood, 2017). Historically, liberalism emerged in the Age of Enlightenment and developed as a system of thought advocating individual rights, free enterprise, and limited state intervention (Rokeach, 1973). John Locke's social contract theory and Adam Smith's views on the free-market economy formed the cornerstones of liberalism (Smith, 1776/2024). In the modern sense, liberalism emphasizes the right of individuals to self-determination and limits the main function of the state to protect individual rights (Mill, 1859).

Throughout history, liberalism has evolved in different directions and taken three main forms: classical, social, and neoliberal. While classical liberalism emphasized individual rights and the minimal role of the state, social liberalism drew attention to the state's obligation to ensure social justice (Baradat & Phillips, 2016). Neoliberalism, on the other hand, was shaped by the dynamics of the free market and globalization in the late 20th century and redefined the regulatory role of the state in the economy (Harvey, 2007). From a political psychology perspective, liberal individuals tend to be open-minded, open to experience, and more prone to change (Jost et al., 2009).

According to the Five Factor Personality Model, liberals generally exhibit high levels of openness to experience and low authoritarian tendencies (Caprara et al., 2006). In addition, while liberalism is generally associated with left-wing ideology, it can also be supported by the right-wing from time to time due to its emphasis on individual freedom (Lipset, 1963/2003).

Liberalism in Türkiye has a different dynamic from its development in the West. It was dealt with within the framework of Westernization movements, especially with the Ottoman modernization process, and steps were taken to expand constitutional rights with the Tanzimat Edict and the Constitutional Monarchy regime in the 19th century (Demir, 2023). In the Republican period, different approaches to liberal economic policies and

individual freedoms emerged but were periodically balanced with statist policies (Özbey, 2023). One of the most important areas of debate in liberal thought in Türkiye has been the problem of how to balance individual rights and freedoms with state authority (Küçüker, 2007).

In brief, liberalism is an ideology based on the balance between individual freedoms and the role of the state. This ideology, which has been interpreted and applied in different ways in the historical process, is currently being reconsidered within the framework of debates such as globalization, social justice, and economic inequality. In Türkiye, liberalism has undergone a unique process of evolution, especially in the political and economic context, and has shown periodic variations. Future studies will provide a better understanding of the dynamics of this ideology by focusing on how liberalism has been shaped in the Turkish context and its responses within society.

1.4.3. Socialism or social justice bias

Socialism is defined as a political ideology based on equality, social welfare, and collective ownership (Heywood, 2017). This ideology takes a critical approach to individual ownership and the free market system, arguing that the means of production should be under public ownership (Freedman, 1996). The origins of socialism were shaped by the rise of egalitarian politics after the French Revolution and gained a scientific framework with Karl Marx's theory of historical materialism (Marx, 1872). According to Marx, capitalism is inherently exploitative and historically needs to be overcome through a socialist transformation.

The historical development of socialism can be divided into different stages. Utopian socialism proposed alternative models of society to capitalism, while Marxist socialism developed a theory of transformation based on class struggle (Kolakowski, 2005). In the 20th century, social democracy developed a perspective that advocated social justice and welfare state practices instead of the complete overthrow of capitalism (Crosland, 1956/2013). The concepts of social democracy and social justice gained importance in the mid-20th century, especially with the expansion of the welfare state, and emphasized the role of the state in regulating the market and reducing inequalities (Miller, 1979).

The concept of social justice emerged in the 19th century with the perspective of expanding individual rights and fair distribution of social resources (Rawls, 1971). Socialist thought suggests that social justice can be achieved not only through individual efforts but also through the transformation of social structures (Heller & Fehér, 1991). In particular, the

socialist critique claims that capitalism creates natural inequalities and that the free functioning of the market leads to unjust outcomes in income distribution (Dunn, 1984).

From a political psychology perspective, socialist tendencies are often associated with social solidarity, equality, and collectivism (Jost et al., 2009). According to the Five-Factor Model of Personality, individuals with socialist tendencies were found to have higher levels of “openness to experience” and “social responsibility” (Caprara et al., 2006). Socialist thought emphasizes not only the economic welfare of individuals but also their social commitment and solidarity (MacIntyre, 1984).

Socialism in Türkiye has followed a different path from the development process in the West and has been shaped through various leftist movements and trade union organizations, especially since the late Ottoman period (Demir, 2023). Although socialist movements faced various bans and repressions during the Republican period, leftist ideologies became more visible in the political sphere from the 1960s onwards (Özbey, 2023). One of the most important debates on socialism in Türkiye has been the question of how a balance should be struck between statism and individual freedoms (Küçük, 2007).

Although Küçük (2007) used the term social justice bias instead of socialism in his study because it did not create a differentiation, TIP, a socialist party, had a vote share of about 2% in the 2023 elections and was able to get a seat for itself in the parliament. Therefore, taking into account that socialism in Türkiye also has the right to a say in parliament, and that it also has an alliance of its own (Labor and Freedom Alliance) (YSK, 2023), it was considered to use socialism in this study.

Socialism and social justice tendencies are ideologies based on the balance between individual rights and social equality. This ideology, which has been interpreted and applied in different ways in the historical process, is currently being re-examined within the framework of issues such as globalization, social justice, and economic inequality. Socialism in Türkiye has undergone a unique process of evolution, especially in the political and economic context, and has shown periodic variations. Future studies will provide a better understanding of the dynamics of this ideology by focusing on how socialism was shaped in the Turkish context and its responses within society.

1.4.4. Nationalism or ulusalizm

Nationalism is defined as an ideology that defends the political unity, cultural integrity, and independence of a nation (Heywood, 2017).

Modern nationalism was shaped by the French Revolution and formed the basis of the concept of the nation-state (Gellner, 1983). The historical development of nationalism has led to its emergence in different forms. Ethnic nationalism argues that the nation comes from a common ancestry and cultural heritage, while civic nationalism considers national identity in the context of legal and political citizenship (Anderson, 1983).

The psychological and sociological dimensions of nationalism are closely related to group identity, attitudes towards external groups, and collective sense of belonging (Huddy & Khatib, 2007).

Social Identity theory argues that individuals develop belonging through group identity and that nationalism creates a strong bond between individuals (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The theory of social Identity argues that individuals develop belonging through group identity and nationalism creates a strong bond between individuals (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, nationalism can be chauvinistic, exclusionary, and authoritarian from time to time and is especially associated with anti-foreigner attitudes (Ariely, 2012).

Nationalism in Türkiye emerged with the Ottoman modernization process and has undergone different evolutions over time (Demir, 2023). Nationalism, which was advocated by the Young Turks and the Union and Progress Society in the last periods of the Ottoman Empire, was aimed at ensuring national unity. With the establishment of the Republic, Atatürk's nationalism was conceptualized and the construction of a secular nation-state was aimed (Bora, 2017). However, nationalism has not exhibited a homogeneous structure in Türkiye; it has been shaped as a multi-layered ideology that includes secular, conservative, and ethnically based interpretations (Elder, 2023). Nationalism is being reshaped in Türkiye today, especially in the context of anti-immigrant and cultural identity debates (Elder, 2023). Secular-populist nationalism positions immigrants and foreigners as a threat to national identity and creates a strong political influence (Özbey, 2023). In this context, political movements such as the Victory Party combine nationalism with a populist discourse to mobilize anti-foreigner feelings in society (Elder, 2023). Although Küçüker (2007) preferred to use *ulusalism* instead of nationalism because it did not create enough segregation in his study, this factor is seen in a spectrum ranging from patriotism to authoritarian and racist elements, and the nationalist parties in Türkiye in the 2023 republican elections; the İYİ Party, the Nationalist Movement Party and the Victory Party (Çınar & Arıkan, 2002; Yardım-Geyikçi & Yavuzylmaz, 2024; Yilmaz et al., 2020) getting a place for itself in each alliance (People's Alliance, Nation Alliance, and ATA alliance), even having a special alliance of nationalism (ATA Alliance) and the fact that this separate alliance can get 5% of

the vote in elections, while the other two parties can get a seat in parliament from two separate alliances with a total of 20% of the vote (YSK, 2023), may indicate that nationalism has now gained a separate place for itself rather than ulusalism. For this reason, nationalism was chosen instead of ulusalism to be used in this study. As a result, nationalism is an ideology that emerges in different forms with both historical and current dynamics. How nationalism will be shaped in the face of globalization and multiculturalism in the future remains an important research topic. In the context of Türkiye, nationalism is being reinterpreted and transformed within the framework of national identity, state policies, and social dynamics.

Today, nationalism in Türkiye is being reshaped especially in the context of anti-immigrant and cultural identity debates (Yaşlı, 2023). Secular-populist nationalism positions immigrants and foreigners as a threat to national identity and exerts a strong political influence (Özbey, 2023).

In conclusion, nationalism is an ideology that emerges in different forms with both historical and contemporary dynamics. How nationalism will be shaped in the future in the face of globalization and multiculturalism remains an important research topic. In the Turkish context, nationalism is being reinterpreted and transformed within the framework of national identity, state policies and social dynamics.

1.5. Dimensions for This Study

The determination of axes in political ideology studies differs depending on the changes in historical and social conditions. Traditionally, ideologies have been evaluated on a bipolar axis such as liberalism and conservatism (Rokeach, 1973). However, this model is insufficient to fully explain ideological distinctions. Although the four-dimensional model proposed by Küçüker (2007) identifies the axes of conservatism, liberalism, pro-social justice/socialism and ulusalism/nationalism, in today's Türkiye, where political polarization has deepened, the axes of nationalism and socialism need to be made more explicit in these studies.

Nationalism emerged with the modernization process and was shaped as an ideology that emphasized issues such as national identity, sovereignty and the integrity of the state (Gellner, 1983). Küçüker's (2007) original framework did not treat nationalism as an independent axis. Although nationalist tendencies can be seen in a spectrum ranging from patriotism to authoritarian and racist elements in the section where this factor is measured, these factors are defined as nationalism. The reconfiguration of ideological axes to include

nationalism as a distinct dimension is supported by cognitive research indicating that nationalist attitudes are associated with specific cognitive patterns that differentiate them from both conservatism and liberalism (Zmigrod et al., 2018). This finding reinforces the need to treat nationalism as an independent ideological construct rather than a mere subcomponent of broader ideological categories.

Also, recent political trends show that nationalism has gained significant power in both electoral politics and ideological discourse in Türkiye (Özbey, 2023; Yaşlı, 2023). In particular, social identity theory argues that nationalism is a fundamental psychological mechanism that affects intergroup relations and political attitudes (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As nationalism increasingly shapes party preferences and ideological commitments in Türkiye, this study does not consider nationalism as a subset of conservatism but as a separate ideological dimension. Nationalism has been used as an axis in many different studies over the years (Abduljaber; 2018; Ferguson, 1944; Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Mitchell, 2007).

In Türkiye, nationalism has become an important element of political identity, developing in the context of both Kemalist state ideology and conservative-nationalist movements (Bora, 2017; Demir, 2023). The rise in the vote rates of nationalist parties in Türkiye in recent years shows that nationalism has become an increasingly decisive factor in politics (Yaşlı, 2023). Therefore, the use of the axis of nationalism instead of nationalism in political analyses will better explain the ideology's real counterpart on the ground.

Similarly, socialism maintains its importance on a global scale, especially as an ideology that offers solutions to economic inequalities (Freedman, 1996). Socialism in Türkiye has historically developed through various leftist movements and trade union organizations since the early Republican period, but has had a limited sphere of influence due to repression (Özbey, 2023). However, the rise of socialist movements in Türkiye has become more evident in recent elections and leftist politics has entered a new structuring process (Yaşlı, 2023).

Küçük (2007) used the axis of social justice bias in his study, but avoided using the term socialism directly. This is because the idea of social justice can be embraced by different ideologies and socialism does not show a homogeneous structure in Türkiye (Küçük, 2023). Although, Küçük (2007) used 'social justice bias' as an ideological axis, this study argues that 'socialism' should be treated as an independent ideological dimension. Psychological research supports this distinction: values play a crucial role in shaping political ideologies (Rokeach, 1973), and studies such as Roccas and colleagues (2010)

indicate that personal values strongly correlate with national identity and social responsibility. The resurgence of socialist movements in Türkiye further strengthens the necessity of reconsidering socialism as a separate ideological framework rather than subsuming it under a broader concept of social justice. In the past models, socialism has been included as a dimension in more than one study (Eysenk, 1957; Rokeach, 1973). Given the current political environment, the fact that socialism has become a strong ideological pole again legitimizes the direct use of the term socialism in axis analyses.

As in Küçüker's (2007) study and as in previous models (Benoit & Laver, 2006; Caprara & Vecchione, 2018; Carney et al., 2008; Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2003; Knight, 1999; Poole & Rosenthal, 2011), conservatism and liberalism are also taken as dimensions in this study. Building upon Küçüker's (2007) model, this study proposes a revised framework incorporating nationalism and socialism as distinct ideological axes. Psychological research supports the necessity of this expansion, as political ideologies are deeply intertwined with personal values and identity formation (Rokeach, 1973; Roccas et al., 2010). Nationalism, as an identity-driven ideology, and socialism, as a value-oriented ideology, both play critical roles in shaping political attitudes. As highlighted by Kağıtçıbaşı (1998), individuals perceive ideological concepts as psychological objects, further reinforcing the need for a multidimensional ideological approach. Therefore, in order to better analyze political polarization in Türkiye, the four-dimensional ideological model needs to be reconfigured along the axes of conservatism, liberalism, nationalism and socialism. This change both better explains the current political representation of ideologies and ensures that academic studies are more in line with the reality on the ground.

1.6. Ideology and The View of Time

Political discourse often emphasizes historical narratives (Denton, 1980), yet there is scant research exploring whether this focus resonates similarly among the general populace or if their historical perceptions vary according to ideological leanings (Rigoli, 2024). A study by Rigoli (2024) revealed that individuals with right-leaning ideologies tend to view the past more positively, whereas perceptions of the present and future do not differ significantly. It should be noted that the majority of the sample of this study (5/6) is from Western countries. It is stated that engagement with political realities in Western societies may vary, which could occasionally lead to differing or conflicting perspectives. (Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Galston, 2001). Converse (1964/2006) argued that the American public generally lacks ideological coherence. According to Converse (1964/2006), with the

exception of political elites and highly politically engaged citizens, the broader public demonstrates what Kinder (1998) describes as "ideological innocence."

In Türkiye, by contrast, political polarization is quite high (Olcaysoy and Sarıbay, 2012). Additionally, political engagement as voter turnout is notably high, with 80-90% of the population participating in elections (YSK, 2023). Evidence suggests that ideology significantly influences the historical perceptions of the general population (Caprara & Vecchione, 2009; Jost, 2017; Jost et al., 2009; Schwartz et al., 2010), but the evidence is rather weak or controversial (Rigoli, 2024). Further research in Türkiye may not only reinforce this finding but also reveal differences that previous studies have not captured.

It has been observed in the literature that political ideology sometimes resorts to an emphasis on time. For example, in a study analyzing the slogans of the 2019 local elections in the Turkish sample, it can be seen how the parties' emphasis on time is shaped (Batu et al., 2021). According to this study, among the opposition parties, CHP, which positions itself on the left/liberal side (Yılmaz et al., 2020), emphasizes time, change and a more hopeful future (Batu et al., 2021), for example, "The End of March is Spring". As an opposition party, it may not be surprising that this emphasis on change and hope is reflected in its slogans. However, the slogans of another opposition party, İYİ Party, which maintains its right/conservative line with its nationalist stance (Yılmaz et al., 2020), do not emphasize hope and time. On the other hand, the slogans used by the ruling party AKP also refer to the past, for example "From Yesterday to Today" (Batu et al., 2021).

However, as previously noted, in countries with more complex climates like Türkiye (Olcaysoy and Sarıbay, 2012), the situation does not always unfold as expected. For instance, change slogans such as "Yeter Söz Milletin!" (may be translated as "Enough! The Nation Speaks!") which hold significant importance in Turkish elections, have been utilized by right-wing parties (Aktaş, 2004), and this slogan signaling hope and change became the winning factor in the election (Asya, 2024). The same party in 1957 stood out with election posters that referred to the country's backwardness and the negative aspects of the past (Duman & İpekşen, 2013). Additionally, the ruling AKP emphasized hope in its 2015 campaigns (Vodinalı & Çötök, 2015). At the same time, as a right-wing/conservative party, AKP has frequently highlighted the difficulties of the past in its campaigns, such as the "queues for oil" (Birdal, 2019). The 2002 election, which brought the right-wing conservative party AKP to power (Uslu & Yolcu, 2002), also presented a complex situation. While AKP referenced historical figures in its posters with slogans like "We are the Yunus, Mevlana, and Pir Sultan

Abdal of Türkiye," another right-wing conservative party, ANAP (Uslu & Yolcu, 2002), emphasized change and hope in its posters.

While ideology-driven time perception plays a role in political messaging, its actual influence on voter behavior remains uncertain. Some studies indicate that political knowledge levels may moderate the impact of these narratives (Carney et al., 2008). Voters with higher political literacy may be more resistant to campaign messages that selectively emphasize historical or future themes, whereas those with lower political knowledge may be more susceptible to these influences. This raises questions about whether the ideological effects on time perception are conditional on broader cognitive and informational factors.

On the other hand, it is challenging to determine whether the posters and slogans used by political parties resonate with the public or if references to the past, present, or future influence voting behavior independently of the party affiliation. In the Turkish context, sometimes right-wing/conservative parties make references to the future, while left-wing/liberal parties refer to the past. These references in slogans and posters appear both in winning and losing campaigns. Although studies explore the relationship between political ideology (right-wing or left-wing) and perceptions of the past, they are insufficient to explain current and future trends. It remains unclear whether a high level of political knowledge influences whether one's right-wing or left-wing orientation affects their behavior. The expected effects seen in the literature may be absent because political opinion, typically analyzed in a dichotomous dimension, is now examined in four dimensions. Moreover, it remains unanswered whether such effects will be observed in more polarized contexts.

Given Türkiye's high levels of political engagement and polarization, future research could explore whether these factors intensify ideological biases in time perception. If polarization continues to rise, it may strengthen historical nostalgia among conservative voters and future optimism among liberals. Conversely, if ideological divisions soften, there may be a convergence in how different political groups perceive time. Investigating these dynamics could offer deeper insights into the role of time in shaping political attitudes and electoral behavior.

1.7. Future Time Orientation

Future time orientation (FTO) is a concept that refers to the extent to which individuals or societies prioritize and plan for future events, goals and outcomes. This orientation, which has deep connections with cognitive, emotional and behavioral processes, shapes

individuals' decision-making mechanisms and strategies to achieve long-term goals (Zimbardo & Boyd, 2015).

From a cognitive perspective, FTO is considered in two main dimensions: cognitive elaboration and temporal distance. Cognitive elaboration refers to how clearly and in detail individuals can envision future scenarios, while temporal distance is related to how far into the future an individual can carry his/her thoughts (Zimbardo & Boyd, 2015). These cognitive processes help individuals to mentally simulate possible outcomes and improve their strategic planning (Johnson et al., 2014).

From an emotional perspective, FTO is directly related to emotions such as hope, optimism and anxiety. While a positive emotional stance enables individuals to show resilience in achieving their long-term goals, excessive anxiety about the future can negatively affect decision-making processes (Seginer, 2008). This orientation is also related to motivational processes; it enables individuals to associate present actions with rewards in the distant future and is supported by features such as self-regulation and delayed gratification capacity (Phan et al., 2020). Research shows that individuals with a strong FTO, internalize their long-term goals as part of their self-concept and therefore exhibit greater persistence and adaptability (Seginer & Lens, 2014).

Behaviorally, FTO is manifested in proactive habits such as academic achievement, financial planning, and health awareness (Peng & Zhang, 2022). This orientation allows individuals to aim for long-term gains by avoiding short-term gratification. Moreover, it is directly related to executive functioning and enhances individuals' capacity to achieve long-term goals by enabling impulse control (Phan et al., 2020). Research reveals that individuals with a strong FTO exhibit higher resilience and have lower levels of anxiety and depression (Chen et al., 2021; Jo et al., 2020; Knowles & Olatunji, 2021; Servidio et al., 2022).

The development of future time orientation is influenced by several variables such as personal experiences, social support, and cultural factors (House, 2004; Strathman et al., 1994). Individuals who develop a future-oriented mindset during adolescence are more prone to behaviors such as goal setting and planning, and these processes increase the sense of action in individuals by reducing feelings of hopelessness (Mac Giollabhui et al., 2018; Seginer, 2009). In addition, it should be kept in mind that FTO is not a fixed trait and can change depending on factors such as the individual's developmental process and education (Steinberg et al., 2009). Cultural norms also shape FTO by determining whether individuals' future goals are oriented towards individual success or collective prosperity (Lee et al., 2017).

In today's world, in the context of issues such as climate change, technological transformations and global uncertainties, the psychological characteristics of FTO are becoming increasingly important. In particular, its capacity to integrate cognitive foresight with emotional investment helps individuals develop more adaptive responses to uncertainty (Zhu et al., 2020). As a consequence, FTO not only explains individual differences, but also functions as a critical psychological mechanism for mental health, academic achievement, and societal advancement.

1.8. Future Time Orientation and Its Relation with Political Ideology

Research shows that political ideology has a decisive influence on FTO and that individuals' political views shape the way they think about the future (Jost et al., 2017; Lindholm et al., 2024). From a cognitive perspective, FTO is closely related to long-term planning and risk assessment processes. Conservative individuals exhibit a selective FTO in line with the importance they attach to tradition, order and stability, and are more oriented towards preserving existing systems and using resources to ensure future security (Jost et al., 2017; Rapeli et al., 2021). On the other hand, liberals, due to their openness to change and the importance they attach to innovation, develop a more expansive FTO; they tend to support social reforms by envisioning long-term transformations. Their support for issues with long-term effects, such as climate policies or universal health care, reflects this tendency (Christensen & Rapeli, 2021; Zmigrod et al., 2018). Research shows that liberals have a stronger tendency to think in a future-oriented way, whereas conservatives are more focused on preserving the status quo (Većkalov et al., 2021).

These differences also have neuroscientific foundations. Differences between conservative and liberal individuals' brain structures, especially variations related to the amygdala, may lead to different perceptions of the future (Hibbing et al., 2014; Kanai et al., 2011). Research shows that conservative individuals tend to perceive the world as a more dangerous place, while liberals find uncertainties less threatening (Dodd et al., 2012; Duckitt, 2001; Perry et al., 2013). However, conservatives' higher need for cognitive closure differentiates their coping mechanisms with uncertainty and stands out as a factor that limits their future orientation (Chirumbolo, 2004). Therefore, they may tend to avoid uncertainty by using cognitive shortcuts towards the future.

The affective dimension of FTO is also related to ideological orientations. While conservative individuals may show resistance to change due to future anxiety that cultural and social order may be disrupted, liberal individuals are more open to transformation by

acting with a sense of hope and optimism for the future (Carney et al., 2008). These emotional responses directly influence individuals' attitudes in areas such as economic planning, social policies and environmental issues (Schaupp & Virkkunen, 2017).

Motivationally, FTO drives individuals' tendency to set goals and make long-term investments. Conservatives place more emphasis on delayed gratification to ensure family and national continuity, while liberals prioritize investments in collective welfare and focus more on areas such as education, health and social equality (Peng & Zhang, 2022). This difference leads conservatives to favor gradual policy changes, while liberals tend to favor more radical transformations of social structures (Graham et al., 2011).

The cultural context of FTO is also an important factor determining ideological differences. In individualistic societies, FTO is associated with personal responsibility, while in collectivist cultures it is linked to social welfare (Lee et al., 2017). In addition, in societies with increased political polarization, FTO is a strong predictor of individuals' political stances on issues such as immigration, economic reforms, and environmental sustainability (Schaupp & Virkkunen, 2017).

All these findings suggest that FTO is an important psychological mechanism for understanding not only individuals' perception of time, but also how political ideologies are shaped, debated and implemented. Conservative and liberal individuals' time perspectives directly affect how they perceive the world, how they evaluate risks and how they act when making long-term decisions. Therefore, the relationship between future time orientation and political ideology provides a critical framework for understanding how individuals embrace social change and future-oriented policies.

1.9. This Study

1.9.1. Purpose and significance

This study investigates how political ideology affects individuals' perceptions of the past, present, and future. Starting from the assumption that political ideologies shape and are shaped by historical narratives, personal memories, and collective memory, this research aims to delve deeper into the ideological spectrum to understand these effects in different temporal contexts. While previous studies such as Rigoli (2024) suggest that ideology can significantly influence how individuals view historical and current events, the evidence is scant, especially in politically unstable environments such as Türkiye.

This study will investigate whether the positive perception of the past documented among right-wing individuals in the Western context holds in the Turkish context, where political engagement and polarization are markedly high. We will also examine whether these ideological biases extend to perceptions of present and future expectations, thus providing a comprehensive overview of ideological influence on the evaluation of the time. It will also investigate whether the ideological dimension, which will be examined in 4 different dimensions, shapes how we perceive the past, present, and future. Unlike the previous literature, this perception will be measured by analyzing the past time in two different dimensions and the future time by asking direct, non-leading questions and by moving away from the dichotomic measurement of political ideology and examining it in 4 dimensions.

The importance of this study lies in its potential to contribute to a broader understanding of how political biases shape historical consciousness and future expectations. By illuminating the distinctions of ideological influence, this research can provide valuable insights for policymakers, educators, and civic leaders on how ideological orientations can elaborate collective understandings of the past and expectations about future societal developments. The findings of this study can also enrich theoretical frameworks in political psychology and ideology, thereby improving predictive models of political behavior and attitude formation in different cultural and political settings.

1.9.2. Contribution of the study to the literature

This study makes a unique contribution to the literature by examining the relationship between political ideology and the perception of time, especially in the context of a polarized country, Türkiye. Unlike previous research that focuses primarily on Western contexts, this study investigates how ideologies shape perceptions of past, present, and future in a politically dynamic society. By incorporating a four-dimensional model of political ideology and analyzing its impact on temporal perspectives, the research provides a new framework for understanding the psychological mechanisms underlying political beliefs and behaviors. In contrast to another study (Rigoli, 2024) that investigated how future perceptions are influenced by political ideology, this study measured future time perception by asking the participants directly about their thoughts without any prompting. Moreover, by investigating the role of future time orientation as a moderating factor, this study will contribute to a better understanding of how individuals' future orientations interact with their ideological beliefs to shape their perspectives on social progress. Furthermore, the study will use political

engagement questions to measure the political engagement of the participants in the Turkish sample and will check whether the higher political engagement of the participants in the Turkish sample also affects their perceptions of time and whether these perceptions of time change as political consciousness increases.

The decision to divide the past into different periods (1970-1995 and 1995-2020) and the future period into 2030-2055 is based on the literature that defines a generation to cover a period of 20 to 30 years (Tremblay & Vézina; 2000; Wang et al., 2023). Previous studies have used broader or vague periods, such as 1950-2000 (Rigoli, 2024), with some participants having direct, lived experiences in the period specified as 1950-2000, while others had second-hand knowledge based on what they had heard or read. By adopting a more structured segmentation of 25-year periods each, this study accommodates the generational framework and allows us to capture both personal experiences and historical knowledge across generations. This division also reflects important political and social changes in Türkiye. While the period 1970-1995 was characterized by political instability, military interventions, and coalition governments, the period 1995-2020 witnessed significant changes resulting in the rise of a more consolidated conservative government.

The present is defined as a more uncertain time between 2020 and 2030 to reflect the dynamic nature of time perception outlined in Zimbardo and Boyd's (2015) Time Perspective Theory. According to this theory, the perception of time is dynamic rather than static, meaning that we do not see the present as a precise moment, but rather against the more fluid background of history. Measuring “today” therefore requires measuring not only the current year but also a period that varies according to the individual. However, since the measurement of this present will vary from person to person, it allows for a more systematic measurement to be made by separating the intervals of years that can be included in the present from the past and the future, rather than drawing a clear range of years for each person.

The reason for ending the measurement of the past in 2020 and starting the interval for evaluating the present from that day is that, as stated in the literature, historical events significantly affect temporal perceptions (Halbwachs, 2020; Zerubavel, 2003), and the perception of time was shaped by marking a turning point in routines and social change that started with the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 (Droit-Volet et al., 2020). The reason for ending the present in 2030, in other words, starting the future in 2030, is that according to the literature, the near future (e.g., 5-10 years) is perceived as more predictable and real by individuals (Carstensen, 2006; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2015). Therefore, the year 2030 is not

seen as a distant future for the participants, but as a “near reality” that has not yet happened. It also provides a symmetrical time frame between the past and the future, allowing a more equal time frame to be used for measurement. Accordingly, limiting the present to the years between 2020 and 2030 is consistent with the literature. This framing allows for a closer examination of how ideology shapes temporal perceptions by positioning the present as a bridge between the past and the future. However, rather than restricting the present to the years 2020-2030, it is also possible to respond according to where one positions the present in the dynamic perception of time. Accordingly, even if the person limits his/her interpretation of the past in 2020 and starts the future in 2030 in the questions, he/she has the freedom to evaluate the present according to his/her perception of time in measuring the present, if necessary, by considering the years 2020-2030, and if necessary, by evaluating the present in the years he/she draws the present according to his/her perception between these years.

In addition, the use of the mentioned year divisions, in the data collected in 2025 in this study is also in line with the current demographic and research literature on youth definitions. Although there are different definitions for the youth age group in the literature, official documents in Türkiye define youth within the 12-25 age range (I. Gençlik Şurası, 1988; T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, n.d.). However, in the current research literature and the European Commission’s 2007-2012 Youth Programs, youth is considered as the 15-30 age group (The Gallup Organization, 2007; T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 2007). For this reason, the determination of the youth age group within the scope of the research and the annual data analysis are consistent with the definitions adopted at both the international and national levels.

By structuring the analysis around these periods, the study aims to better understand how generational differences as well as lived and learned history shape perceptions of both the past and the future. This approach provides a more refined framework for analyzing participants' temporal perceptions and allows us to capture the generational and political transitions that define how different cohorts perceive historical events and prospects.

1.9.3. Conceptual justification of key variables

The present study investigates the psychological and ideological underpinnings of temporal social perceptions by incorporating a series of variables with distinct conceptual origins. These variables were selected not only based on their empirical relevance but also

for their potential to reflect underlying cognitive and motivational mechanisms related to time orientation and sociopolitical positioning.

Closeness to ideology, as used in this study, was operationalized through a subjective measure asking participants how close they feel to a particular ideological label. Unlike identification—which refers to the internalization of a political stance as part of one’s self-concept—closeness is understood as a sense of emotional proximity or attitudinal alignment. This distinction is well established in the literature. For instance, Huddy and colleagues (2015) distinguish emotional closeness from full ideological identification, which involves deeper cognitive and identity-based internalization. Similarly, Tajfel and Turner’s (1979) social identity theory underlines that identification implies a more integrated social self, while perceived closeness may remain at a surface level of attitudinal resonance.

The political engagement construct was formed by combining two components: political awareness and conceptual understanding. This operationalization reflects the degree to which individuals cognitively engage with political matters—how well they comprehend key political concepts and perceive themselves as capable of making sense of socio-political developments. This definition aligns with broader conceptualizations of political engagement in the literature, which emphasize political efficacy, awareness, and cognitive involvement (Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Verba et al., 1995; Zukin et al., 2006). Rather than measuring mere interest or participation, the variable used in this study aims to capture a reflective and analytical engagement with political content.

The thematic domains through which social change across time was assessed—respect for authority, family ties, traditionalism, economic equality, traditional values, and general societal structure—are conceptually derived from the dimensions developed in Rigoli’s (2024) framework. Rigoli identified core belief structures through which individuals evaluate societal trends, offering a structure to assess how ideological predispositions intersect with temporal frames. These six themes were adapted and applied across four time periods in this study to examine how ideological orientation influences temporal social representations.

In shaping the directional hypotheses of the study, theoretical expectations were derived from both previous empirical findings and the psychological logic of ideological narratives. For instance, right-wing ideological positions have been associated with more nostalgic and positive views of the past, whereas left-wing ideologies often emphasize future-oriented societal improvement (Rigoli, 2024). Likewise, individuals with higher levels of future time orientation are theoretically expected to construct more positive future

projections, given their greater cognitive-emotional investment in long-term planning and anticipation (Keough et al.,1999).

Finally, while the study is predominantly hypothesis-driven, some sections involved exploratory analyses—particularly where existing literature did not provide sufficient theoretical ground to justify directional expectations. In such cases, the goal was not to confirm preconceived relationships but rather to probe possible associations that could inform future hypothesis-building.

1.9.4. Hypothesis:

H1: Participants' perceptions of the 1970-1995 period will differ based on their political ideology. Participants with conservative political ideologies will evaluate the 1970–1995 period more positively than those with liberal, nationalist and socialist ideologies.

H2: Participants' perceptions of the 1995-2020 period will vary according to their political ideology. Participants with conservative political ideologies will evaluate the 1995–2020 period more positively than participants with liberal, nationalist and socialist ideologies.

H3: Participants' perceptions of the present time will differ depending on their political ideology. H3: Participants with liberal or socialist political ideologies will evaluate the present period (2020–2030) more negatively than participants with conservative and nationalist political ideologies.

H4: Participants' perceptions of the future (2030-2055) will vary according to their political ideology. Participants with conservative or nationalist political ideologies will evaluate the future period (2030–2055) more negatively than participants with liberal or socialist ideologies.

H5: Participants' perceptions of the future will differ based on their level of future time orientation. Those with a high future time orientation will evaluate the future more positively.

H6: The interaction between future time orientation and political ideology will influence participants' perceptions of the future, leading to significant differences in future-oriented evaluations. Future time orientation will have a stronger positive effect on future perceptions among participants with liberal or socialist ideologies compared to those with conservative or nationalist ideologies.

H7: Participants' level of political engagement will influence their perceptions of time, regardless of their political ideology. Those with higher political engagement will exhibit

distinct differences in how they perceive the past, present, and future compared to those with lower levels of political engagement.



2. METHOD

2.1. Participants

The participants of this study were individuals who were born in Türkiye after 1992. In determining this historical boundary, the findings of the literature that the average age range in which autobiographical memory begins to form is 3-4 years old were considered (Usher & Neisser, 1993). Thus, it was assumed that the participants could remember the social events of 1995 as the earliest date. In addition, the fact that the definition of youth in European Union member and candidate countries generally corresponds to the age range of 15-30 (T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 2007; The Gallup Organization, 2007) was effective in determining the target age group of the study.

To increase the diversity and representativeness of the sample, a stratified sampling method based on basic demographic variables (gender, education level, political orientation) was applied. The required sample size was calculated for the Two-Way ANOVA (including interaction) model using G*Power software by entering the values of effect size $f = .25$, alpha level $\alpha = .05$, and statistical power $1-\beta = .80$. As a result of this calculation, it was determined that a minimum of 237 participants should be reached. To prevent possible data losses, the target sample size was increased by approximately 25% and it was planned to reach at least 296 participants.

Data was collected through an online survey and a total of 556 participants completed the survey. However, a multi-step and comprehensive data-cleaning process was applied before analysis. First, participants who did not consent to the informed consent form and incompletely completed the questionnaire were excluded from the study. Then, individuals who did not show variance in all scale items, i.e. who consistently marked the same response category, were identified, and these response patterns were considered as indicators of insufficient effort responding (Huang et al., 2012).

In addition, within the framework of the Response Consistency Screening (RCS) method, participants with extremely short or unusually long completion times were also excluded from the data set. The literature suggests that excessively fast or slow completion times may indicate responses that do not produce meaningful content in online surveys (Leiner, 2019).

Finally, Mahalanobis distance was calculated to detect multivariate outliers, and participants who were significant at $p < .001$ were considered outliers and excluded from the

study (Huang et al., 2012). In addition, individuals who checked the “other” option in the political ideology variable were not included in the analyses because they could not be included in the defined categories.

As a result of all these exclusion criteria, the statistical analyses of the study were conducted on the cleaned sample of $N = 337$.

2.2. Instruments

Demographic Information Form: Participants completed a form that gathers standard demographic information such as age, gender, education level, and perceived income.

Political Questions: The first 2 questions were designed to measure the extent to which the respondents were aware of the local and general elections, using a 5-point Likert scale with 1 meaning “I am not aware at all” and 5 meaning “I am fully aware”. Questions 3 and 4 were designed to measure the extent to which the participants are interested in politics, using a 5-point Likert scale with 1 meaning “I cannot answer at all” and 5 meaning “I answer completely”. These two questions were formed to measure political engagement. In this study, political engagement was operationalized as a combination of political awareness and conceptual understanding. This operationalization is based on the idea that, rather than merely reflecting interest or behavioral participation, this variable aimed to capture individuals’ cognitive involvement with political issues, that is, how well they understand key political concepts and perceive themselves as capable of interpreting socio-political dynamics (Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Verba et al., 1995; Zukin et al., 2006). This approach aligns with contemporary definitions of engagement that emphasize internal political efficacy and knowledge rather than simple attentiveness or activism.

In the next 2 questions, respondents were asked which of the four dimensions of political ideology (conservative, nationalist, socialist or liberal) they felt closest to. Those who did not check one of them wrote the ideology they felt closer to in the other option. Below this four-choice question was a 5-point Likert scale where respondents were asked to rate how much they identified with the chosen view.

Questionnaire about how we perceive the past, present and future: In this questionnaire, respondents assessed their perceptions of different time periods: 1970-1995, 1995-2020, present and future (2030-2055). Respondents rated each time period on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “very good” to “very bad” on various dimensions such as respect for authority, strength of family ties, economic equality and adherence to traditional values.

Future Time Orientation Scale: The Future Time Orientation Scale (FTOS), developed by Gjesme (1979), is a 14-item measure designed to assess individuals' levels of concern, interest, and involvement regarding the future. The scale uses a 4-point rating system, and in Gjesme's original study, it demonstrated a reliability coefficient of .62. In the Turkish version (Öner, 2000) of the scale, reliability was initially found to be .26, but after the removal of three items, it improved to .61. In the present study, the scale's dimensions of involvement and anticipation were emphasized, with items being revised for better applicability as in Güler's (2004) study. Permission to use the scale is presented in Appendix 11.

2.3. Procedure

Ethical approval for this thesis was obtained from Başkent University Institute of Social Sciences (Ankara, Türkiye. Approval Number: E-62310886-605-436443). Data were collected between February 27, 2025 and March 27, 2025 (See Appendix 18). The study was prepared through Qualtrics application and distributed to the participants. Bonus points were given to students from Başkent University, which constituted some of the participants. Other participants were reached through the link shared on social media and no bonus points were given.

Data collection for this study is conducted through an online survey that will be distributed to participants from various regions of Türkiye.

The participants completed the informed consent form first (presented in Appendix 1). After the informed consent form, the participants were given the political questions form (presented in Appendix 2). The first 4 of these questions are 5-point Likert questions that measure whether the participants have heard of elections and whether they are familiar with the concepts of ideology. Participants were then asked to indicate their political ideology by choosing one of four ideological categories: conservative, nationalist, socialist or liberal. Participants who saw themselves in a fifth ideology were asked to fill in the ideology they considered themselves close to by marking "Other". Participants responded to a single-item question, 'To what extent do you think this political ideology reflects your views?' designed to assess the extent to which they believe their chosen political ideology reflects their views. This question was a 5-point Likert-type question, with participants rating their responses on a scale from 1 ('Not at all') to 5 ('Completely reflects').

Participants then completed a questionnaire measuring how they rated various dimensions such as respect for authority, strength of family ties, economic equality and

adherence to traditional values according to different periods (1970-1995, 1995-2020, present and future 2030-2055). The order of the different dimensions was randomized and varied from respondent to respondent. The years were asked in a standardized order: 1970-1995, 1995-2020, present and 2030-2055. For each period, they rated each dimension on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 'very good' to 'very bad' (see Appendix 3-8).

Participants also completed the Future Time Orientation Scale (FTOS), a 14-item scale designed to assess their level of future-related anxiety and commitment. The scale uses a 4-point rating system and its reliability was ensured using a revised version adapted to the Turkish context (presented in Appendix 9).

Finally, participants will fill out a demographic information form that includes details such as age, gender, education, income and religiosity levels (presented in Appendix 10).

2.4. Analysis

In this study, various statistical analyses examined how participants' perceptions of time are affected by political ideology, future time orientation, and political engagement. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to analyze how participants' perceptions of four different periods (1970-1995, 1995-2020, now, and 2030-2055) vary according to their political ideology (conservative, liberal, socialist, nationalist) (Hypotheses 1-2-3-4). One-way ANOVA analyses were conducted separately for each sub-dimension. Post-hoc tests were conducted to determine the differences.

Independent sample t-tests were conducted to evaluate the effect of future time orientation (high and low) on participants' evaluations of the future (2030-2055) (Hypothesis 5). Future-oriented evaluations in each sub-dimension were analyzed separately.

Furthermore, a two-way ANOVA was conducted to investigate the interaction between political ideology and future time orientation about future time evaluations (2030-2055) (Hypothesis 6).

Furthermore, independent t-tests were conducted to investigate the role of political engagement (high and low) in shaping time perceptions in different periods (Hypothesis 7).

Finally, a two-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to examine the interaction between political ideology and political engagement about evaluations in different periods (1970-1995, 1995-2020, present, and 2030-2055). Although this analysis was not among the hypotheses, it was conducted for exploratory purposes. Exploratory correlation and regression analyses were also conducted to examine the relationship between political engagement and political ideology.

Also, descriptive statistics were used to summarize participants' demographic characteristics. For continuous variables (e.g., age, income, religiosity), means and standard deviations were calculated, while categorical variables (e.g., gender, education) were reported using frequency distributions and percentages. To explore whether these demographics have relationships with political ideology, future time orientation, and political engagement variables, additional correlation and regression analyses were conducted.

In addition to hypothesis-driven tests, a series of exploratory analyses were conducted to provide contextual insights into how key variables are distributed and interrelated across socio-demographic and ideological groups. These analyses were not based on prior theoretical assumptions but aimed to detect potentially meaningful associations and group differences that could inform the interpretation of later hypothesis tests.

First, one-way ANOVAs and independent samples t-tests were employed to explore whether political engagement differed by gender, educational level, and political ideology. These analyses revealed group-level patterns that, while not all statistically significant, offered a clearer picture of engagement tendencies across social strata.

To investigate how future-oriented thinking may relate to political behavior, multiple linear regression analysis was performed using the Anticipation and Involvement subdimensions of the Future Time Orientation (FTO) scale as predictors of political engagement. While the model was marginally significant, it suggested that cognitive-emotional involvement with the future plays a more central role in political engagement than planning-related behaviors.

Subsequently, independent samples t-tests were conducted using a median split approach to determine whether participants' evaluations of future societal conditions (2030–2055) differed based on their FTO levels. These analyses revealed that only a limited number of associations approached statistical significance, with modest effects observed particularly in the domain of traditionalism.

In addition, a series of 2×4 factorial ANOVAs were conducted to examine whether interactions between political ideology and FTO (Anticipation and Involvement) influenced perceptions of the future across six thematic domains (e.g., respect for authority, family ties, economic equality). Although most interactions were not statistically significant, a trend-level interaction emerged for economic equality, suggesting potential moderation effects worth exploring in future research. Although continuous-variable methods generally provide higher statistical power, the median split approach was maintained for consistency with the

initial power analysis and to facilitate 2×4 factorial designs aligned with the study's theoretical framework.

Finally, to account for potential confounding variables such as age, gender, education, SES, religiosity, and political engagement, partial correlation analyses were conducted. These analyses examined the relationships between political ideology and perceptions of social change across multiple time periods and thematic domains while statistically controlling for these covariates.

Taken together, these exploratory analyses enriched the dataset by offering new directions for interpretation, identifying subtle trends, and clarifying the broader contextual landscape in which the main hypotheses were situated.



3. RESULTS

3.1. Descriptive Statistics

As demonstrated in Table 1, the ages of the participants ranged between 18 and 33, with a mean age of $M = 22.56$, $SD = 3.44$. As Table 2 presents the distribution according to education level is as follows: 67.7% high school graduates ($N = 228$), 4.7% associate degree ($N = 16$), 23.4% bachelor's degree ($N = 79$), and 4.2% master's degree ($N = 14$). In terms of political-ideological identity, 24.6% of the participants were identified as liberal, 42.4% as nationalist, 5.9% as conservative, and 27% as socialist. Gender distribution was 81% female ($N = 273$) and 19% male ($N = 64$). The 3 individuals who marked themselves as other and identified as non-binary were eliminated during data cleaning in the response variance. The correlation matrix between Closeness to ideology, political engagement and future time orientation and time perceptions is presented in Appendix 12. All statistical analyses were carried out using data from 337 participants unless otherwise specified.

Table 3.1

Demographic Characteristics of Participants

Variables	Frequency	%
Gender		
Female	273	81.01
Male	64	18.99
Education		
High-School Graduate	228	67.66
Associate Degree Graduate	16	4.75
Bachelor's Degree Graduate	79	23.44
Master's Degree Graduate	14	4.15
Political Ideology		
Liberal	83	24.63
Nationalist	143	42.43
Conservative	20	5.93
Socialist	91	27.00

Table 3.2

Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables

Variable	Min	Max	M	SD	Skewness	Kurtosis
Age	18	33	22.56	3.44	1.18	0.83
Political Engagement	4	20	13.45	3.09	0.01	0.01
Closeness to Ideology	1	5	3.86	0.77	-0.99	2.05
Religiosity	1	10	4.14	2.30	0.17	-0.93

3.2. Preliminary Analyses

Although no specific hypothesis was formulated regarding the relationship between political engagement and demographic variables, a series of exploratory analyses were conducted to better understand how political engagement varies by ideological identity, gender, and education level. These analyses were intended to provide contextual insight into the distribution of engagement across key socio-demographic groups, which may inform the interpretation of subsequent hypothesis testing.

3.2.1. Political engagement and demographic variables

3.2.1.1. Political engagement and political ideology

One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine whether there was a significant difference in the political engagement levels of the participants according to their political ideologies. Levene's test showed that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met, $F(3, 333) = 1.83, p = .141$. ANOVA results revealed that there was no statistically significant difference in levels of political engagement between ideological groups, $F(3, 333) = 1.92, p = .126, \eta^2 = .017, 95\% CI [.000, .047]$. According to the mean scores, socialist participants ($M = 14.11, SD = 2.90$) seem to have a higher level of political engagement compared to other groups; however, this difference is not statistically significant (see Table 3).

3.2.1.2. Political engagement and gender

Independent samples t-test was applied to examine the difference in levels of political engagement by gender. Levene's test confirmed the homogeneity of variance, $F(1, 335) = 2.40, p = .122$. The results of the analysis showed that male participants had significantly higher levels of political engagement ($M = 15.56, SD = 3.36$) compared to female participants ($M = 12.96, SD = 2.80$), $t(335) = -6.44, p < .001$ Cohen's $d = 0.89$. The mean difference is -2.61 (95% CI : -3.40 to -1.81) (see Table 3).

3.2.1.3. Political engagement and education

One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was applied to assess the relationship between educational attainment and political engagement. Levene's test showed that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met, $F(3, 333) = 0.92, p = .432$. As a result of

the analysis, a significant difference was found in the levels of political engagement between educational level groups, $F(3, 333) = 10.05, p < .001 \eta^2 = .083$. Tukey HSD post-hoc tests revealed that high school graduates ($M = 12.98$) showed significantly lower political engagement than bachelor's ($M = 14.68, p < .001$) and master's ($M = 15.64, p = .007$) graduates. In addition, associate degree graduates also had significantly lower levels of political engagement compared to both bachelor's ($p < .05$) and master's ($p < .05$) groups (see Table 3).

Table 3.3

Political Engagement: Grouped Descriptives

Variables		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Gender	Female	12.96	2.8
	Male	15.56	3.36
Education	High-School Graduate	12.98	2.61
	Associate Degree Graduate	13.56	2.81
	Bachelor's Degree Graduate	14.68	2.96
	Master's Degree Graduate	15.64	3.07
Political Ideology	Liberal	13.48	2.91
	Nationalist	13.53	2.78
	Conservative	13.7	3.19
	Socialist	14.11	2.9

3.2.2. Future time orientation scale: reliability and descriptive statistics

The Anticipation subdimension assesses individuals' tendency to plan ahead and behavioral patterns such as procrastination. This dimension includes three reverse-coded items. The reliability analysis revealed high internal consistency, with Cronbach's $\alpha = .81$. For a brief subscale, this level of internal reliability is considered strong. Corrected item-total correlations ranged between .61 and .70, indicating that all items were strongly and consistently associated with the overall construct. Inter-item correlations ranged between .54 and .67 which also supports item homogeneity. These findings suggest that the Anticipation subdimension provides a psychometrically reliable and theoretically coherent structure.

FTO scale used in this study consisted of 14 items initially. However, based on reliability and factor analysis procedures, only two subdimensions—Anticipation and Involvement—were retained for further analysis. Five items were excluded due to low item-

total correlations, poor internal consistency, and lack of structural coherence in exploratory factor analysis. These items did not align with the theoretical underpinnings of either subdimension and thus were omitted from all subsequent evaluations.

The remaining items formed two reliable subscales. Anticipation subdimension assesses individuals' tendencies to plan ahead and avoid procrastination. Cronbach's α was found to be .81, indicating high internal consistency. Corrected item-total correlations ranged from .61 to .70, and inter-item correlations were also strong. The second one, involvement subdimension reflects cognitive and emotional engagement with the future. After excluding one item that negatively affected the scale's reliability, the subdimension achieved an acceptable internal consistency level ($\alpha = .74$). Corrected item-total correlations ranged from .36 to .56. All analyses were conducted considering reverse-coded items. For detailed item-level statistics and factor loadings, see Appendix 17.

3.2.3. The Relationship between future time orientation and political engagement

3.2.3.1. Correlation analysis

According to the correlation analysis, a significant and positive relationship was found between the Involvement sub-dimension of FTO and political engagement ($r = .12, p = .031$). This finding suggests that individuals who are more mentally and emotionally attached to the future are more politically engaged. On the other hand, no significant relationship was found between the Anticipation subscale and political engagement ($r = -.06, p = .286$). In other words, the tendency to plan for the future or habit of leaving things to the last minute does not seem to be significantly related to political behavior.

In order to explore the relationships between key variables in the study, a series of Pearson correlation analyses were conducted. These analyses included correlations among future time orientation sub-dimensions (Anticipation and Involvement), political engagement, closeness to political ideology, and participants' evaluations of different time periods (Past1: 1970–1995, Past2: 1995–2020, Now: 2020–2030, and Future: 2030–2055). Additionally, for each time period, sub-dimension-level correlations were examined across six thematic domains: respect for authority, family ties, traditionalism, economic equality, traditional values, and perceptions of society as a whole. The resulting matrices are presented in Appendix 13 to 16. These correlation tables offer a comprehensive view of how future

orientation, ideological engagement, and time perception are interrelated across both general and thematic levels (see Table 4).

3.2.3.2. Regression analysis

Multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to test the joint effect of the two sub-dimensions of FTO on political engagement. Multiple linear regression analysis was conducted to test the joint effect of the two sub-dimensions of FTO on political engagement. While the model did not reach conventional levels of significance, it showed a trend in that direction: $F(2, 334) = 2.80, p = .062, R^2 = .016$. This shows that approximately 1.6% of the variance in the political engagement variable is explained by the FTO sub-dimensions. While the model approached significance, the variance explained remained limited. When the regression coefficients are analyzed, only Involvement sub-dimension stands out as a significant predictor ($\beta = .115, t = 2.11, p = .036$). Accordingly, as the extent to which individuals invest emotionally and mentally in the future increases, their level of political engagement also increases. On the other hand, the regression coefficient of the Anticipation sub-dimension is not significant ($\beta = -.053, t = -0.97, p = .334$), indicating that planning habits or time management style are not directly related to political behavior (see Table 4).

Table 3.4

Correlation and Regression Results between FTO Subscales and Political Engagement

	<i>r</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE B</i>	β	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
FTO – Anticipation	–.06	–0.044	0.045	–.053	–0.97	.334
FTO – Involvement	.12*	0.076	0.036	.115	2.11	.036*

Note. Results that are significant at $p < .05$ are marked with an asterisk. The model demonstrated a marginal level of statistical significance: $F(2, 334) = 2.80, p = .062, R^2 = .016$. Correlations (*r*) are presented alongside regression results for each FTO subdimension.

3.2.4. Future time orientation and political ideology

Although these analyses do not test a specific hypothesis, they were conducted in an exploratory manner to preliminarily examine whether Future Time Orientation subdimensions (Anticipation and Involvement) vary by political ideology. Identifying potential group differences at this stage was intended to provide a foundational context before conducting the interaction-based analysis described in Hypothesis 6.

3.2.4.1. Anticipation subdimension

A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine whether Anticipation scores significantly differed across political ideology groups. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met, $F(3, 333) = 0.16, p = .921$. According to the ANOVA results, there was no statistically significant difference in Anticipation scores among the ideological groups, $F(3, 333) = 0.55, p = .648, \eta^2 = .005$. Descriptive statistics indicated that nationalist participants had the highest mean score ($M = 9.64$), while socialist participants had the lowest ($M = 9.04$); however, this difference was not statistically significant (see Table 5).

3.2.4.2. Involvement subdimension

Similarly, a one-way ANOVA was conducted for the Involvement subdimension, and the homogeneity of variances was again confirmed, $F(3, 333) = 0.58, p = .629$. The results indicated no significant difference in Involvement scores across the ideological groups, $F(3, 333) = 0.87, p = .456, \eta^2 = .011$. Although socialist participants had the highest mean score ($M = 21.34$), and liberal participants the lowest ($M = 20.13$), these differences were not statistically significant (see Table 5).

Table 3.5

Means and Standard Deviations of FTO Subdimensions by Political Ideology

FTO sub-dimensions	Political Ideology	N	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Anticipation	Liberal	83	9.22	3.84
	Nationalist	143	9.64	3.67
	Conservative	20	9.50	3.64
	Socialist	91	9.04	3.64
Involvement	Liberal	83	20.13	3.82
	Nationalist	143	21.16	3.90
	Conservative	20	20.90	4.38
	Socialist	91	21.34	3.76

Note. The ANOVA results indicated that there were no statistically significant differences among ideological groups for either FTO subdimension ($p > .05$). No post-hoc comparisons were conducted since the overall model was not statistically significant.

3.3. Temporal Perceptions by Political Ideology: Thematic Exploration Across Time Periods

Although Hypotheses 1–4 were initially designed to examine ideological differences in the perception of specific historical time periods (e.g., 1970–1995, 1995–2020), the analysis was further expanded by exploring these perceptions across six thematic domains: Respect for Authority, Family Ties, Traditional Values, Economic Equality, Traditionalism, and Society in General. Rather than testing isolated hypotheses for each theme and time period, the following sections provide a thematic comparison of ideological evaluations across four historical periods. This exploratory strategy was conducted to have more nuanced understanding of how ideological perspectives shape perceptions of societal change across time.

3.3.1. Respect for authority (1970–1995)

A one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine whether participants' perceptions of societal respect for authority during the 1970–1995 period differed by political ideology. Levene's test indicated a violation of homogeneity of variances, $F(3, 333) = 3.05, p = .029$. Therefore, the Games-Howell post-hoc test was used. The ANOVA results showed no statistically significant differences among ideological groups, Welch's $F(3, 77.29) = 1.32, p = .273, \eta^2 = .013$. Descriptive statistics indicated that participants from all ideological backgrounds perceived respect for authority during this period at a moderate level (see Table 6).

3.3.2. Respect for authority (1995–2020)

Participants' perceptions of societal respect for authority between 1995 and 2020 were compared across political ideology groups. Levene's test showed that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met, $F(3, 333) = 0.32, p = .815$, so Tukey HSD post-hoc comparisons were used. The ANOVA results showed no significant difference, $F(3, 333) = 0.45, p = .718, \eta^2 = .004$. Tukey post-hoc comparisons confirmed that none of the group differences were statistically significant ($p > .05$). Respect for authority was perceived as low to moderate across all groups (see Table 6).

3.3.3. Respect for authority (Now)

A one-way ANOVA was conducted to evaluate current (2020–2030) perceptions of respect for authority across ideological groups. Levene’s test showed that the assumption of equal variances was met, $F(3, 333) = 0.32, p = .808$. Tukey HSD post-hoc comparisons were used. The results showed no statistically significant differences between ideological groups, $F(3, 333) = 0.90, p = .441, \eta^2 = .008$. Descriptive results indicated similarly low to moderate perceptions across all groups (see Table 6).

3.3.4. Respect for authority (2030–2055)

A one-way ANOVA was conducted to explore ideological group differences in expectations of societal respect for authority in the future (2030–2055). Levene’s test revealed a violation of homogeneity, $F(3, 333) = 3.06, p = .028$; thus, Games-Howell post-hoc tests were used. The ANOVA indicated a statistically significant difference among the groups, Welch’s $F(3, 78.13) = 4.71, p = .004, \eta^2 = .041$. Post-hoc results showed that liberals had significantly higher expectations of future respect for authority than nationalists ($p = .031$) and socialists ($p < .05$). The conservative group did not differ significantly from any other group (see Table 6).

Table 3.6

Respect for Authority by Political Ideology Across Time Periods

Ideology	1970–1995		1995–2020		Now		Future	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Liberal	3.42	0.87	2.98	1.00	2.59	1.04	2.61	1.15
Nationalist	3.43	0.94	2.86	0.88	2.41	0.92	2.15	0.91
Conservative	3.30	1.30	3.00	1.03	2.45	1.00	2.45	1.05
Socialist	3.57	0.94	2.85	0.91	2.36	0.96	2.14	0.94

3.3.5. Family ties (1970–1995)

A one-way ANOVA was conducted to assess whether participants’ perceptions of the strength of family ties during the 1970–1995 period differed by political ideology. Levene’s test confirmed the assumption of homogeneity of variances, $F(3, 333) = 0.31, p = .819$. Therefore, Tukey HSD post-hoc tests were used for group comparisons. The ANOVA results showed no significant differences among the ideological groups, $F(3, 333) = 0.32, p = .811$,

$\eta^2 = .003$. Post-hoc tests confirmed this result ($p > .80$). Mean scores indicate that participants across all ideological groups perceived family ties in this past period as strong (see Table 7).

3.3.6. Family ties (1995–2020)

Perceptions of the strength of family ties in the 1995–2020 period were also compared across political ideology groups. Levene’s test showed that the homogeneity assumption was met, $F(3, 333) = 0.15, p = .929$. Therefore, Tukey HSD was used for post-hoc comparisons. The ANOVA revealed no statistically significant differences, $F(3, 333) = 0.58, p = .630, \eta^2 = .005$. Post-hoc comparisons also showed no significant pairwise differences. Participants from all groups tended to rate family ties during this period as moderate (see Table 7).

3.3.7. Family ties (Now)

Perceptions of current (2020–2030) family ties were compared across ideological identities. Levene’s test indicated homogeneity of variances, $F(3, 333) = 0.66, p = .576$, and Tukey HSD was used for post-hoc testing. The ANOVA results indicated no significant difference among the groups, $F(3, 333) = 0.64, p = .588, \eta^2 = .006$. All groups reported similar levels of perceived family ties in the current period (see Table 7).

3.3.8. Family ties (Future)

Participants’ expectations regarding the strength of family ties in the 2030–2055 period was analyzed by political ideology. Levene’s test showed that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met, $F(3, 333) = 2.31, p = .076$. Thus, Tukey HSD was used for post-hoc analyses. The ANOVA results indicated a statistically significant difference, $F(3, 333) = 2.91, p = .035, \eta^2 = .026$. However, none of the post-hoc comparisons between group pairs reached statistical significance ($p > .05$). Descriptive statistics showed that conservative participants reported the lowest expectations ($M = 1.85$), while liberal participants had the highest ($M = 2.39$) (see Table 7).

Table 3.7

Perceptions Of Family Ties by Ideology and Time Periods

Ideology	1970–1995		1995–2020		Now		Future	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Liberal	4.01	0.89	3.51	0.76	2.77	0.80	2.39	1.01
Nationalist	4.11	0.83	3.52	0.77	2.65	0.84	2.06	0.90
Conservative	4.05	0.89	3.80	0.83	2.60	0.60	1.85	0.75
Socialist	4.02	0.87	3.38	0.76	2.62	0.81	2.19	0.94

3.3.9. Traditionalism (1970–1995)

A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare participants' perceptions of adherence to traditionalism during the 1970–1995 period across ideological groups. Levene's test indicated a violation of the homogeneity of variances assumption, $F(3, 333) = 4.05, p = .008$, so Games-Howell post-hoc tests were used. The ANOVA results revealed no statistically significant difference among the groups, $F(3, 333) = 1.55, p = .202, \eta^2 = .014$. Pairwise comparisons also confirmed no significant differences ($p > .05$). Descriptive statistics suggest that all ideological groups perceived strong adherence to traditionalism during this period (see Table 8).

3.3.10. Traditionalism (1995–2020)

Participants' perceptions of society's adherence to traditionalism in the 1995–2020 period were compared by political ideology. Levene's test confirmed homogeneity of variances, $F(3, 333) = 1.38, p = .249$, and Tukey HSD post-hoc testing was used. The ANOVA indicated no significant difference between the groups, $F(3, 333) = 1.64, p = .179, \eta^2 = .015$. Post-hoc results also showed no significant pairwise differences. Perceptions of traditionalism during this period appear to be relatively homogeneous across ideological lines (see Table 8).

3.3.11. Traditionalism (Now)

To evaluate current perceptions of adherence to traditionalism, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. Levene's test confirmed homogeneity of variances, $F(3, 333) = 1.82, p = .143$. The ANOVA result was not statistically significant, $F(3, 333) = 1.39, p = .245, \eta^2 = .012$. Mean scores were highly similar across all groups, with conservative participants reporting slightly lower scores (see Table 8).

3.3.12. Traditionalism (Future)

Participants' expectations regarding the future (2030–2055) of society's adherence to traditionalism were compared across ideological groups. Levene's test showed that the assumption of homogeneity was met, $F(3, 333) = 0.64, p = .587$. Tukey HSD was used for post-hoc comparisons. The ANOVA yielded no significant difference among groups, $F(3, 333) = 0.28, p = .837, \eta^2 = .003$. The mean scores were quite similar across all ideologies (see Table 8).

Table 3.8*Perceptions of Traditionalism by Political Ideology Across Time Periods*

Ideology	1970–1995		1995–2020		Now		Future	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Liberal	3.83	0.99	2.94	0.82	2.46	0.75	2.06	0.90
Nationalist	3.99	0.88	3.18	0.85	2.48	0.82	1.96	0.89
Conservative	3.85	0.99	2.95	1.05	2.10	0.72	2.05	1.05
Socialist	4.10	0.65	3.19	0.86	2.49	0.87	2.03	0.85

3.3.13. Economic equality (1970–1995)

A one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine whether perceptions of economic equality during the 1970–1995 period differed based on political ideology. Levene’s test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met, $F(3, 333) = 0.12, p = .946$. Therefore, Tukey HSD was used for post-hoc analysis. The results showed that the differences between ideological groups were not statistically significant, $F(3, 333) = 1.45, p = .228, \eta^2 = .013$. Pairwise comparisons confirmed no significant differences between group pairs ($p = .22$). These findings suggest that participants from all ideological backgrounds shared similar perceptions of economic equality for this past period (see Table 9).

3.3.14. Economic equality (1995–2020)

Perceptions of economic equality during the 1995–2020 period were analyzed using one-way ANOVA. Levene’s test confirmed homogeneity of variances, $F(3, 333) = 0.44, p = .723$, and Tukey HSD was used for post-hoc testing. The ANOVA results were not statistically significant, $F(3, 333) = 1.36, p = .256, \eta^2 = .012$, indicating no significant differences among ideological groups. The mean scores suggest that participants across groups associated this period with low levels of economic equality (see Table 9).

3.3.15. Economic equality (Now)

To examine current perceptions of economic equality, a one-way ANOVA was performed. Levene’s test approached significance but was not violated, $F(3, 333) = 2.50, p = .060$. Tukey HSD was used for post-hoc comparisons. The ANOVA revealed a statistically significant difference between ideological groups, $F(3, 333) = 2.69, p = .046, \eta^2 = .024$. However, post-hoc pairwise comparisons did not yield significant differences ($p > .05$), suggesting that while a group-level difference exists, no specific pairs were statistically

distinct. Descriptive statistics indicate that conservative participants perceived relatively higher economic equality ($M = 1.85$), while socialist participants reported the lowest levels ($M = 1.44$) (see Table 9).

3.3.16. Economic equality (Future)

Participants' expectations for future economic equality (2030–2055) were analyzed with a one-way ANOVA. Levene's test confirmed homogeneity of variances, $F(3, 333) = 1.36$, $p = .254$, and Tukey HSD was applied for post-hoc testing. The results were not statistically significant, $F(3, 333) = 1.71$, $p = .165$, $\eta^2 = .015$. Mean scores suggest that participants across ideological groups generally hold low expectations for future economic equality (see Table 9).

Table 3.9

Perceived Economic Equality by Political Ideology Across Four Time Periods

Ideology	1970–1995		1995–2020		Now		Future	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Liberal	2.92	1.04	2.40	1.01	1.54	0.80	1.84	0.97
Nationalist	3.01	1.03	2.45	0.97	1.64	0.69	1.71	0.94
Conservative	2.80	0.95	2.80	0.89	1.85	0.88	1.95	1.05
Socialist	3.19	0.95	2.33	0.94	1.44	0.56	1.57	0.80

3.3.17. Traditional values (1970–1995)

A one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine whether participants' perceptions of adherence to traditional values during the 1970–1995 period differed significantly across ideological groups. Levene's test indicated a violation of the homogeneity of variances assumption, $F(3, 333) = 4.05$, $p = .008$; therefore, Welch's ANOVA was also reported. The analysis revealed no statistically significant difference among the ideological groups, $F(3, 333) = 1.55$, $p = .202$, Welch's $F(3, 78.89) = 1.65$, $p = .185$. The effect size was small, $\eta^2 = .014$. Descriptive statistics showed that perceptions of traditional values during this period were relatively high across all groups, with socialists ($M = 4.10$, $SD = 0.65$) reporting slightly higher scores than liberals ($M = 3.83$, $SD = 0.99$), nationalists ($M = 3.99$, $SD = 0.88$), and conservatives ($M = 3.85$, $SD = 0.99$) (see Table 10).

3.3.18. Traditional values (1995–2020)

A one-way ANOVA was conducted to assess whether perceptions of adherence to traditional values during the 1995–2020 period differed based on political ideology. Levene's test confirmed the assumption of homogeneity of variances, $F(3, 333) = 1.38, p = .249$. The ANOVA results indicated no statistically significant difference between ideological groups, $F(3, 333) = 1.90, p = .129, \eta^2 = .017$. Descriptive statistics showed that nationalists ($M = 3.18, SD = 0.85$) and socialists ($M = 3.19, SD = 0.86$) reported slightly higher perceptions of traditional values compared to conservatives ($M = 2.95, SD = 1.05$) and liberals ($M = 2.94, SD = 0.82$), although these differences were not statistically significant (see Table 10).

3.3.19. Traditional values (Now)

A one-way ANOVA was conducted to assess whether perceptions of traditional values in the current period (2020–2030) differed across ideological groups. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was not violated, $F(3, 333) = 1.82, p = .143$. Welch's ANOVA was also reported. The analysis revealed no statistically significant differences among ideological groups, $F(3, 333) = 1.39, p = .245$; Welch's $F(3, 82.91) = 1.71, p = .171$. The effect size was small, $\eta^2 = .012$. Descriptive statistics showed similar perceptions across groups: liberals ($M = 2.46, SD = 0.75$), nationalists ($M = 2.48, SD = 0.82$), socialists ($M = 2.50, SD = 0.87$), and conservatives ($M = 2.10, SD = 0.72$). These findings suggest that conservatives tend to perceive current traditional values as stronger than other groups (see Table 10).

3.3.20. Traditional values (Future)

A one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine whether participants' expectations regarding society's future adherence to traditional values (2030–2055) differed by political ideology. Levene's test showed that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met, $F(3, 333) = 0.64, p = .587$. The ANOVA revealed no significant differences among ideological groups, $F(3, 333) = 0.28, p = .837, \eta^2 = .003$. The mean scores were highly similar across groups: liberals ($M = 2.06, SD = 0.90$), nationalists ($M = 1.96, SD = 0.89$), conservatives ($M = 2.05, SD = 1.05$), and socialists ($M = 2.03, SD = 0.85$), indicating a shared expectation of low adherence to traditional values in the future (see Table 10).

Table 3.10*Perceived Traditional Values Across Historical Periods by Political Ideology*

Ideology	1970–1995		1995–2020		Now		Future	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Liberal	3.83	0.99	2.94	0.82	2.46	0.75	2.06	0.90
Nationalist	3.99	0.88	3.18	0.85	2.48	0.82	1.96	0.89
Conservative	3.85	0.99	2.95	1.05	2.10	0.72	2.05	1.05
Socialist	4.10	0.65	3.19	0.86	2.50	0.87	2.03	0.85

3.3.21. Society in general (1970–1995)

A one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine whether participants' perceptions of general societal conditions during the 1970–1995 period differed across ideological groups. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of homogeneity of variances was met, $F(3, 333) = 0.71$, $p = .550$. The ANOVA revealed no statistically significant difference among ideological groups, $F(3, 333) = 0.56$, $p = .643$; Welch's $F(3, 80.01) = 0.56$, $p = .640$. The effect size was negligible, $\eta^2 = .005$. Descriptive statistics showed similar perceptions across all groups: nationalists ($M = 3.43$, $SD = 0.90$), liberals ($M = 3.37$, $SD = 0.95$), socialists ($M = 3.30$, $SD = 0.84$), and conservatives ($M = 3.25$, $SD = 0.97$) (see Table 11).

3.3.22. Society in general (1995–2020)

To examine whether participants' perceptions of society in general during the 1995–2020 period differed by political ideology, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. Levene's test indicated that the assumption of equal variances was met, $F(3, 333) = 1.07$, $p = .361$. The ANOVA revealed no statistically significant differences among ideological groups, $F(3, 333) = 2.45$, $p = .063$; Welch's $F(3, 84.33) = 2.32$, $p = .081$. The effect size was small, $\eta^2 = .022$. Descriptive statistics showed that nationalist participants ($M = 3.11$, $SD = 0.85$) reported slightly more positive evaluations of this period compared to conservatives ($M = 3.05$, $SD = 0.69$), socialists ($M = 2.95$, $SD = 0.83$), and liberals ($M = 2.80$, $SD = 0.88$), although these differences were not statistically significant (see Table 11).

3.3.23. Society in general (Now)

To examine whether perceptions of society in general for the current period (2020–2030) differ by political ideology, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. Levene's test indicated a violation of the homogeneity of variances assumption, $F(3, 333) = 2.64$, $p = .049$.

Therefore, Welch's ANOVA was used as a corrective measure. The Welch-adjusted analysis revealed a statistically significant difference between ideological groups, $F(3, 79.45) = 4.46$, $p = .006$. The effect size was small to moderate, $\eta^2 = .042$. Descriptive statistics showed that conservatives ($M = 2.50$, $SD = 0.95$) reported the highest perceptions of society in general, followed by nationalists ($M = 2.25$, $SD = 0.82$), socialists ($M = 1.98$, $SD = 0.79$), and liberals ($M = 1.94$, $SD = 0.79$). These findings suggest that conservatives perceive current society in general more positively compared to other groups (see Table 11).

3.3.24. Society in general (Future)

To assess ideological differences in expectations about the general state of society in the future (2030–2055), a one-way ANOVA was conducted. Levene's test confirmed the assumption of equal variances, $F(3, 333) = 0.72$, $p = .539$. The analysis showed no statistically significant differences among ideological groups, $F(3, 333) = 1.74$, $p = .160$; Welch's $F(3, 78.92) = 1.42$, $p = .244$. The effect size was small, $\eta^2 = .015$. Descriptive statistics indicated generally low expectations across all groups: conservatives ($M = 2.50$, $SD = 1.15$), liberals ($M = 2.18$, $SD = 0.99$), nationalists ($M = 2.11$, $SD = 0.95$), and socialists ($M = 1.98$, $SD = 1.00$) (see Table 11).

Table 3.11

Perceived Society in General by Political Ideology Across Time Periods

Ideology	1970–1995		1995–2020		Now		Future	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Liberal	3.37	0.95	2.80	0.88	1.94	0.79	2.18	0.99
Nationalist	3.43	0.90	3.11	0.85	2.25	0.82	2.11	0.95
Conservative	3.25	0.97	3.05	0.69	2.50	0.95	2.50	1.15
Socialist	3.30	0.84	2.95	0.83	1.98	0.79	1.98	1.00

3.4. Thematic Change in Perception of Time: Repeated Measures Analyses

The following repeated measures ANOVA analyses directly addressed Hypotheses 1–4 by examining how participants' perceptions of different societal themes changed across four historical periods, and whether these changes varied by political ideology. Repeated measures ANOVA analyses conducted on six themes regarding participants' social perceptions of four different time periods to test hypothesis 1, 2, 3, and 4 (1970–1995, 1995–2020, 2020–2030 and 2030–2055) aimed to test the effect of time and time $\times$ ideology

interactions. Mauchly's sphericity test showed assumption violations in all themes, so Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied in the analyses.

As presented in the Table 12, the main effect of time was significant for the respect for authority theme, $F(2.37, 788.9) = 69.60, p < .001, \eta^2 = .173$. Mean scores show that the perception of respect for authority decreased over time ($M_{1970} = 3.43, M_{1995} = 2.92, M_{Now} = 2.45, M_{Future} = 2.34$). This decline is statistically significant in a linear direction, $F(1, 333) = 124.02, p < .001, \eta^2 = .271$. The time $\times$ ideology interaction showed a marginal tendency toward significance, $F(7.12, 788.9) = 1.59, p = .089, \eta^2 = .016$; the decline was particularly more pronounced for liberal participants.

The theme of family ties similarly shows a significant decline over time, $F(2.37, 788.9) = 74.47, p < .001, \eta^2 = .183$. According to the mean scores, the perception of family ties declined faster after 1995 ($M_{1970} = 4.05, M_{1995} = 3.52, M_{Now} = 2.66, M_{Future} = 2.15$). The time effect was significant both linearly ($F(1, 333) = 145.11, p < .001, \eta^2 = .303$) and quadratically ($F(1, 333) = 23.13, p < .001, \eta^2 = .065$). The time $\times$ ideology interaction was not significant, $F(7.05, 782.0) = 1.22, p = .289, \eta^2 = .011$.

The main effect of time was also significant in the traditionalism theme, $F(2.44, 813.2) = 44.60, p < .001, \eta^2 = .118$. Mean scores gradually decrease from 1970 to 2055 ($M_{1970} = 3.15, M_{1995} = 2.77, M_{Now} = 2.40, M_{Future} = 2.03$) and this decrease is significant in linear direction, $F(1, 333) = 96.10, p < .001, \eta^2 = .224$. The time $\times$ ideology interaction is not statistically significant, $F(7.33, 813.2) = 1.51, p = .157, \eta^2 = .013$.

The perception of economic equality decreased steadily over time, and this change was statistically significant, $F(2.39, 796.0) = 30.65, p < .001, \eta^2 = .084$. Mean scores were $M_{1970} = 3.04, M_{1995} = 2.50, M_{Now} = 1.62$ and $M_{Future} = 1.71$, and this decrease is significant in both linear ($F(1, 333) = 78.82, p < .001, \eta^2 = .191$) and quadratic ($F(1, 333) = 16.89, p < .001, \eta^2 = .048$) directions. The time $\times$ ideology interaction is not significant, $F(7.17, 796.0) = 1.13, p = .340, \eta^2 = .010$.

A similar decline was observed in the perception of commitment to traditional values. The main effect of time is significant, $F(2.43, 811.2) = 30.18, p < .001, \eta^2 = .083$. Mean values decrease over time ($M_{1970} = 3.95, M_{1995} = 3.07, M_{Now} = 2.43, M_{Future} = 2.03$) and this decrease is linearly significant, $F(1, 333) = 72.76, p < .001, \eta^2 = .179$. The time $\times$ ideology interaction was not significant, $F(7.30, 811.2) = 1.23, p = .281, \eta^2 = .011$.

Finally, perceptions of the general structure of society also decreased significantly over time, $F(2.42, 806.1) = 54.20, p < .001, \eta^2 = .140$. Mean scores show a more positive orientation towards the past and a more negative orientation towards the future ($M_{1970} = 3.34,$

$M_{1995} = 2.98$, $M_{Now} = 2.17$, $M_{Future} = 2.07$). This change reflects a significant linear decrease, $F(1, 333) = 107.80$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .245$. The time $\times$ ideology interaction was not significant, $F(7.27, 806.1) = 1.31$, $p = .244$, $\eta^2 = .012$.

Table 3.12

Mean Ratings of Perceived Societal Values Across Time Periods

Ideology	1970–1995		1995–2020		Now		Future	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Respect for Authority	3.43	0.94	2.92	0.93	2.45	0.97	2.34	0.98
Family Ties	4.05	0.88	3.52	0.77	2.66	0.81	2.15	0.87
Traditionalism	3.15	0.87	2.77	0.84	2.40	0.80	2.03	0.85
Economic Equality	3.04	1.02	2.50	0.96	1.62	0.85	1.71	0.91
Traditional Values	3.95	0.87	3.07	0.88	2.43	0.89	2.03	0.91
Society In General	3.34	0.91	2.98	0.89	2.17	0.83	2.07	0.88

3.5. Overall Perception of Time: Comparison of Composite Temporal Scores

In addition to testing specific thematic domains, an overall composite score was calculated by averaging participants' ratings across all six themes for each time period. This analysis aimed to capture the general trend in social perceptions over time, regardless of ideological or thematic nuances.

Mauchly's test indicated a violation of the sphericity assumption, and thus Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were applied, $W = .510$, $p < .001$. The main effect of time on the composite societal perception scores was found to be highly significant and substantial, $F(2.07, 688.6) = 378.23$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .532$. Mean comparisons showed a clear downward trend in time perception scores as presented in the Table 13.

1970–1995 ($M = 21.80$) > 1995–2020 ($M = 18.02$) > 2020–2030 ($M = 13.71$) > 2030–2055 ($M = 12.26$) (see Table 14), with all pairwise differences being statistically significant ($p < .001$, Bonferroni-adjusted). The interaction between time and political ideology was at the conventional threshold of significance, Wilks' Lambda = .950, $F(9, 805.7) = 1.89$, $p = .050$, $\eta^2 = .017$. Although the interaction between time and political ideology only approached statistical significance ($p = .05$), it may hint at a subtle divergence in how

different political groups interpret societal changes over time. While this effect remains minimal, the overall pattern indicates that participants tend to perceive social life more negatively as they move from past to future evaluations, possibly reflecting a shared emotional trajectory across ideological lines.

Table 3.13

Composite Temporal Perception Scores by Time Period

Time Period	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
1970–1995 (Past1)	21.80	3.69
1995–2020 (Past2)	18.02	3.36
2020–2030 (Now)	13.71	3.06
2030–2055 (Future)	12.26	3.78

Table 3.14

*Paired-Samples *t*-Test Results Between Time Periods*

Comparison	Mean Difference (Δ)	<i>t</i> (<i>df</i>)
Past1 vs. Past2	3.77***	18.42
Past1 vs. Now	8.08***	31.30
Past1 vs. Future	9.53***	30.51
Past2 vs. Now	4.31***	22.85
Past2 vs. Future	5.76***	22.37
Now vs. Future	1.45***	8.17

Note. $p < .001$ ***. All comparisons are statistically significant. Bonferroni correction was applied. Δ = mean difference; $t(336)$ = paired-samples *t*-test statistic.

3.6. Differences in Future Evaluations Based on Future Time Orientation (FTO)

To test Hypothesis 5, which posited that individuals' evaluations of future societal conditions (2030–2055) would be shaped by their level of Future Time Orientation, a series of multiple linear regression analyses were conducted using continuous scores from the Anticipation and Involvement subdimensions of the FTO scale. Results were presented in Table 15.

Separate regression models were computed for each of the six future-oriented outcome variables: perceived respect for authority, family ties, traditionalism, economic equality, traditional values, and the general societal structure. An additional regression was performed using a composite future evaluation score, which averaged participants' ratings across all six domains.

The results revealed that FTO-Anticipation significantly predicted three future evaluations. Participants with higher anticipation scores perceived stronger adherence to traditionalism ($\beta = .169, p = .002$), greater value placed on traditional societal norms ($\beta = .143, p = .009$), and more optimistic views in the overall future composite score ($\beta = .127, p = .020$). These associations suggest that individuals who tend to plan ahead and avoid procrastination are more likely to evaluate the future in a more positive light across specific cultural domains.

On the other hand, FTO-Involvement, reflecting emotional and cognitive investment in the future did not emerge as a significant predictor in any of the models (all $p > .05$). This finding implies that mere psychological engagement with future time may not directly influence participants' expectations of sociocultural conditions in the coming decades.

The overall variance explained by these models remained modest, with R^2 values ranging from .003 to .030 across outcomes. However, significant models were observed for traditionalism, traditional values, and overall future perceptions, supporting a partial confirmation of Hypothesis 5.

Table 3.15

Regression Results: Future Evaluations by FTO Subdimensions

Dependent Variable	β (Anticipation)	p (Anticipation)	β (Involvement)	p (Involvement)	R^2	p (Model)
Respect for Authority	0.049	0.371	0.03	0.588	0.003	0.586
Family Ties	0.079	0.147	-0.109	0.046*	0.019	0.044*
Traditionalism	0.169	0.002*	-0.03	0.582	0.03	0.006*
Economic Equality	0.074	0.173	-0.038	0.485	0.007	0.3
Traditional Values	0.143	0.009*	-0.048	0.373	0.023	0.02*
Society in General	0.007	0.904	-0.078	0.153	0.006	0.355
Future Total	0.127	0.02*	-0.067	0.215	0.021	0.028*

Note. $p < .05$ is indicated with *. Median split was used to create low and high FTO groups for both dimensions.

3.7. Effect of Political Ideology and Future Time Orientation (Median Split) on Future Period Evaluations

To test Hypothesis 6, which posits that future time orientation and political ideology interact in shaping future societal evaluations, six separate 2×4 ANOVAs were conducted across key thematic domains. The dependent variable in each analysis was participants' evaluations of the future (2030–2055). Although most interaction effects did not reach statistical significance, a trend-level effect was observed in the domain of economic equality ($p = .094$), suggesting a nuanced relationship between future engagement and ideological orientation in perceptions of economic justice.

Participants' perceptions of six different sociocultural themes concerning the future period (2030–2055) were examined through a series of two-way factorial ANOVAs. In these analyses, political ideology (liberal, nationalist, conservative, socialist) and future time orientation – anticipation (low vs. high; categorized using median split) were included as independent variables. The analyses aimed to investigate both the main effects and the interaction effects of these factors on participants' future-oriented evaluations across each thematic domain (See Table 16).

Regarding the theme of respect for authority, the main effect of political ideology was statistically significant, $F(3, 329) = 2.90, p = .035, \eta^2 = .026$. However, the main effect of future time orientation – anticipation was not significant, $F(1, 329) = 0.30, p = .584$. The interaction between future time orientation and ideology also failed to reach significance, $F(3, 329) = 0.13, p = .944$. Although post-hoc comparisons initially showed that liberals reported significantly higher respect for authority in the future compared to nationalists and conservatives, these differences did not remain significant after correction for multiple comparisons. This distinction between uncorrected and corrected results is important to note.

For perceived family ties in the future, neither the main effect of political ideology ($F(3, 329) = 0.88, p = .451, \eta^2 = .008$) nor the main effect of future time orientation ($F(1, 329) = 0.63, p = .427, \eta^2 = .002$) was statistically significant. Additionally, the interaction between the two variables was not significant ($F(3, 329) = 0.66, p = .576, \eta^2 = .006$).

In the domain of traditionalism, no statistically significant effects emerged in the factorial ANOVA. However, due to violation of normality assumptions in this dimension, a Kruskal-Wallis test was additionally conducted and revealed a trend-level effect of future time orientation – anticipation, $\chi^2(1) = 3.19, p = .074$. Participants with higher anticipation tended to report slightly stronger future-oriented perceptions of traditionalism, although the

effect was not statistically robust. Although this result did not reach significance, it may still reflect a tendency worth further exploration.

Similarly, for perceived economic equality in the future, neither the main effect of political ideology ($F(3, 329) = 0.73, p = .532, \eta^2 = .007$) nor the main effect of future time orientation – anticipation ($F(1, 329) = 0.18, p = .670, \eta^2 = .001$) was statistically significant. The interaction between these two variables was also not significant ($F(3, 329) = 0.49, p = .691, \eta^2 = .004$).

Perceived attachment to traditional values showed no significant main effects either for political ideology ($F(3, 329) = 0.66, p = .579, \eta^2 = .006$) or future time orientation ($F(1, 329) = 0.59, p = .444, \eta^2 = .002$). The interaction effect was again non-significant ($F(3, 329) = 1.02, p = .384, \eta^2 = .009$).

Lastly, participants' evaluations of the general structure of society in the future were not significantly influenced by political ideology ($F(3, 329) = 0.59, p = .621, \eta^2 = .005$), nor by future time orientation ($F(1, 329) = 1.70, p = .193, \eta^2 = .005$). Their interaction also failed to reach statistical significance ($F(3, 329) = 0.77, p = .512, \eta^2 = .007$).

To explore whether individuals' future time orientation (FTO) involvement levels interact with their political ideology in shaping their future-oriented societal evaluations, six separate 2×4 ANOVAs were conducted for the dimensions of perceived authority respect, family ties, traditionalism, economic equality, traditional values, and overall societal structure. In all models, the dependent variables reflected participants' evaluations of the 2030–2055 period.

For perceived respect for authority, the interaction between FTO involvement and political ideology was not statistically significant, $F(3, 329) = 0.51, p = .676, \eta^2 = .005$. Neither the main effect of political ideology, $F(3, 329) = 1.09, p = .353, \eta^2 = .010$, nor the main effect of FTO involvement, $F(1, 329) = 0.03, p = .873, \eta^2 < .001$, reached significance.

Similarly, for perceived strength of family ties, none of the effects were significant. The main effects of ideology, $F(3, 329) = 0.65, p = .584, \eta^2 = .006$, and FTO involvement, $F(1, 329) = 0.38, p = .537, \eta^2 = .001$, were non-significant. The interaction effect also failed to reach significance, $F(3, 329) = 0.90, p = .442, \eta^2 = .008$.

In terms of perceived traditionalism, neither political ideology nor FTO involvement showed significant main effects ($p > .40$), and the interaction effect was also not significant, $F(3, 329) = 0.91, p = .435, \eta^2 = .008$.

For the perception of economic equality in the future, the analysis revealed a marginally significant interaction between political ideology and FTO involvement, $F(3,$

329) = 2.15, $p = .094$, $\eta^2 = .019$. Although not statistically significant, the effect size suggests a small but potentially meaningful trend. Participants with low involvement and liberal ideology reported notably higher expectations of economic fairness ($M = 2.33$) compared to their high-involvement counterparts ($M = 1.82$). No significant main effects were observed for either political ideology, $F(3, 329) = 0.35$, $p = .786$, $\eta^2 = .003$, or FTO involvement, $F(1, 329) = 0.97$, $p = .326$, $\eta^2 = .003$.

For traditional values, all effects were nonsignificant. Neither political ideology, $F(3, 329) = 1.66$, $p = .175$, $\eta^2 = .015$, nor FTO involvement, $F(1, 329) = 0.65$, $p = .422$, $\eta^2 = .002$, nor their interaction, $F(3, 329) = 0.40$, $p = .751$, $\eta^2 = .004$, showed significant associations with participants' expectations for 2030–2055.

Finally, for perceived structure of society, results indicated no significant main or interaction effects. The main effect of political ideology was $F(3, 329) = 1.49$, $p = .218$, $\eta^2 = .013$, and the FTO involvement main effect was $F(1, 329) = 0.05$, $p = .829$, $\eta^2 < .001$. The interaction between ideology and FTO involvement was also not significant, $F(3, 329) = 0.39$, $p = .760$, $\eta^2 = .004$.

Table 3.16

Two-Way ANOVA Results for Future Perceptions: Political Ideology $\times$ Future Time Orientation (Anticipation and Involvement Dimensions)

	Anticipation			Ideology			Interaction		
	F	p	η^2	F	p	η^2	F	p	η^2
Respect for Authority	0.43	.511	.001	2.02	.111	.018	0.50	.681	.005
Family Ties	0.51	.478	.002	1.40	.243	.013	0.40	.751	.004
Traditionalism	0.51	.477	.002	1.33	.264	.012	1.29	.278	.012
Economic Equality	0.01	.943	.000	0.95	.416	.009	0.26	.857	.002
Traditional Values	1.64	.201	.005	0.63	.597	.006	0.60	.612	.005
General Structure	1.53	.217	.005	0.78	.507	.007	0.78	.507	.007

3.8. Interaction Between Political Engagement and Perceptions of Social Change Over Time

To test Hypothesis 7, repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for each thematic domain to examine whether political engagement (low vs. high) moderated perceptions of social change across time. It was hypothesized that individuals with higher political engagement would perceive temporal changes more distinctly compared to those with lower engagement.

A significant main effect of time was observed across all six themes; respect for authority, family ties, traditionalism, economic equality, traditional values, and overall societal evaluation ($p < .001$). These findings indicated a consistent downward trend in participants' evaluations of society over time, with earlier periods rated more positively than the present or future.

The main effect of political engagement was significant in three domains. Participants with lower levels of engagement provided significantly higher overall ratings than their high-engagement counterparts for traditionalism, $F(1, 335) = 8.99, p = .003, \eta^2 = .026$; family ties, $F(1, 335) = 5.39, p = .021, \eta^2 = .016$; and overall societal scores, $F(1, 335) = 7.86, p = .005, \eta^2 = .023$. These differences, however, do not reflect changes in the pattern of time perception across groups, but rather a general tendency among lower-engagement participants to rate all periods more positively.

The critical time $\times$ engagement interaction effect was not statistically significant in five of the six domains: respect for authority, $F(3, 1005) = 0.72, p = .543, \eta^2 = .002$; family ties, $F(3, 1005) = 1.48, p = .219, \eta^2 = .004$; traditionalism, $F(3, 1005) = 0.35, p = .790, \eta^2 = .001$; traditional values, $F(3, 1005) = 0.36, p = .781, \eta^2 = .001$; and overall score, $F(3, 1005) = 0.66, p = .577, \eta^2 = .002$. However, the interaction reached statistical significance in the domain of economic equality, $F(3, 1005) = 2.79, p = .039, \eta^2 = .008$. This result suggests that highly engaged individuals perceived a sharper decline in economic equality over time compared to those with low political engagement (See Table 17).

Table 3.17

Summary of Main and Interaction Effects of Time and Political Engagement on Thematic Perceptions of Social Change

	Time Effect (<i>p</i>)	Engagement Effect (<i>p</i>)	Interaction (<i>p</i>)	η^2	Interpretation
Respect for Authority	< .001*	.972	.543	.002	Not supported
Family Ties	< .001*	.021*	.219	.004	Not supported
Traditionalism	< .001*	.003*	.790	.001	Not supported
Economic Equality	< .001*	.238	.039*	.008	Partially supported
Traditional Values	< .001*	.143	.781	.001	Not supported
Overall Score	< .001*	.005*	.577	.002	Not supported

Note. $p < .05$ is indicated with *.

3.9. Ideological Closeness Across Political Groups

Although no formal hypothesis was specified regarding ideological identification, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to explore whether participants' sense of closeness to their political ideology differed across the four political orientation groups. (Liberal, Socialist, Conservative, Nationalist). The analysis revealed a significant effect of political ideology on ideological closeness, $F(3, 332) = 8.73$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .073$. Although the effect size was modest, the results indicate a significant ideological identification gap. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that Liberal participants reported significantly higher closeness scores ($M = 5.53$, $SD = 1.44$) than Conservative ($M = 4.54$, $SD = 1.71$, $p < .001$), Nationalist ($M = 4.65$, $SD = 1.52$, $p = .002$), and Socialist participants ($M = 4.86$, $SD = 1.55$, $p = .014$). No other pairwise comparisons reached significance ($p > .05$). These findings suggest that individuals with a liberal orientation tend to identify more strongly with their political ideology compared to other groups (see Table 18).

Table 3.18

Mean Closeness-to-Ideology Scores by Political Orientation

Political Orientation	N	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Liberal	83	5.53	1.44
Socialist	91	4.86	1.55
Conservative	20	4.54	1.71
Nationalist	143	4.65	1.52

3.10. Relationships Between Political Ideology and Perceptions of Social Themes

To explore the nuanced ways in which political ideology may shape perceptions of societal change over time, a series of partial correlation analyses were conducted separately for four distinct ideological groups: liberals, conservatives, nationalists, and socialists. These analyses examined the relationship between ideological affiliation and perceived changes in social domains (e.g., respect for authority, family ties, traditionalism, economic equality, traditional values, and societal structure) across four historical and future-oriented time periods (1970–1995, 1995–2020, 2020–2030, 2030–2055). Crucially, all correlations were computed while statistically controlling for potential confounding variables including gender, age, education level, socioeconomic status (SES), religiosity, and political engagement. The results were presented in Table 19.

Overall, most partial correlations were small in magnitude, and only a few reached statistical significances. However, these significant results offer some insight into how specific ideological groups perceive social transformation differently across time.

For liberals, a modest but statistically significant positive correlation was found between liberal identification and future-oriented perceptions of respect for authority ($r = .19, p = .001$), as well as family ties ($r = .11, p = .002$). These findings suggest that individuals with a liberal orientation tend to hold more optimistic expectations for future respect for authority and slightly more optimistic expectations about family ties in the future. A similar trend, albeit weaker, was observed in their evaluation of future societal structures ($r = -.11, p = .041$).

In contrast, conservative identification did not show any statistically significant correlations with perceptions of social themes across any time period ($p > .05$), indicating a more stable or undifferentiated pattern of evaluation across time among this group.

For nationalists, a weak but statistically significant negative correlation was found with future-oriented perceptions of respect for authority ($r = -.11, p = .047$), mirroring the pattern observed among liberals but with lower effect size. However, no other significant relationships emerged for nationalists across the remaining domains and time periods.

Among socialists, no significant correlations were observed after controlling for covariates, except for a small positive correlation with traditionalism in the 1970–1995 period ($r = .12, p = .037$). This result may indicate a retrospective appreciation for early forms of social solidarity or community bonds among this group.

Taken together, these findings underscore the importance of disaggregating political ideology into its specific forms when investigating its relationship with social perceptions. Although the effect sizes remain small, the results suggest that ideological positioning—particularly liberal and nationalist orientations—may influence how individuals imagine the future of society in terms of authority and familial structures.

Table 3.19

Partial Correlations Between Political Ideological Groups and Perceptions of Social Themes Across Time

	Ideology			
	Liberal	Conservative	Nationalist	Socialist
Respect for Authority Past 1	-0,037	0,469	0,809	0,195
Respect for Authority Past 2	0,047	0,643	0,603	0,619
Respect for Authority Now	0,091	0,999	0,629	0,291
Respect for Authority Future	0,187***	0,409	0,047**	0,130
Family Ties Past 1	-0,030	0,728	0,369	0,771
Family Ties Past 2	0,013	0,132	0,683	0,141
Family Ties Now	0,068	0,662	0,558	0,758
Family Ties Future	0,113**	0,323	0,169	0,951
Traditionalism Past 1	-0,044	0,679	0,321	0,037
Traditionalism Past 2	-0,057	0,166	0,202	0,094**
Traditionalism Now	-0,025	0,926	0,528	0,239
Traditionalism Future	0,008	0,640	0,374	0,550
Economic Equality Past 1	-0,056	0,258	0,952	0,101
Economic Equality Past 2	-0,003	0,147	0,991	0,474
Economic Equality Now	-0,016	0,197	0,387	0,173
Economic Equality Future	0,089	0,380	0,623	0,141
Traditional Values Past 1	-0,091	0,366	0,819	0,068
Traditional Values Past 2	-0,093	0,251	0,374	0,208
Traditional Values Now	-0,026	0,127	0,537	0,561
Traditional Values Future	0,002	0,304	0,526	0,905
Society All Past 1	0,014	0,407	0,454	0,526
Society All Past 2	-0,112**	0,659	0,074	0,823
Society All Now	-0,077	0,334	0,196	0,551
Society All Future	0,031	0,097	0,829	0,241

Note. $p < .05^*$, $p < .01^{**}$, $p < .001^{***}$. Correlations are adjusted for gender, age, education, SES, religiosity, and political engagement.

3.11. Descriptive Overview of Politically Unclassified Participants

A total of 28 participants provided self-descriptions that could not be classified into one of the four predefined ideological categories (liberal, conservative, socialist, nationalist). These responses were either expressions of political non-alignment (e.g., “I do not feel affiliated with any ideology”) or included unique ideological identifications that did not fit the main coding frame (e.g., “capitalist”, “sol liberalizm”, “Atatürkçü”). Additionally, a small group preferred not to disclose their political orientation or left the item blank. Although these participants were excluded from hypothesis-driven analyses involving political ideology, their responses were preserved and summarized for transparency.

The most common subgroup consisted of individuals explicitly stating detachment from any ideology ($N = 4$), followed by self-identified democrats and social democrats ($N = 5$), Atatürkists ($N = 4$), anarchists ($N = 3$), and republicans ($N = 2$). Five participants used unique or hybrid labels such as “sol liberalizm”, “capitalist”, or “secular nationalist”. These entries are detailed in Table 20.

Table 3.20

Self-Reported Political Identities Outside the Four Main Ideological Categories

Reported Identity	Frequency
"I do not feel affiliated with any ideology"	4
"Prefer not to say" / Empty / Ambiguous	5
Democrat / Democratic / Social Democrat	5
Atatürkçü / Atatürkçülük / Kemalist	4
Anarchist / Anarşizm	3
Cumhuriyetçi / Cumhuriyetçilik	2
Other (Sol Liberalizm, Kapitalist, Seküler Milliyetçi, Muhalif, Apolitik)	5

Note. A total of 28 participants indicated a political identity that did not match the four main ideological categories included in the analysis (liberal, conservative, nationalist, socialist). These responses were diverse, including declarations of non-affiliation, avoidance of labels, or self-defined hybrid categories. While they were excluded from group-based inferential analyses, their presence was recorded for transparency and interpretive clarity.

4. DISCUSSION

This study aimed to examine how individuals' time perceptions of the past, present, and future are related to the political ideologies they hold. Conducted in the context of Türkiye, where political polarization is high and ideological diversity is observed, this study aimed to evaluate the impact of ideology on time perception more comprehensively by taking a multidimensional approach. At the same time, the intersection points between ideological orientations and psychological variables were examined by including “future time orientation”, which refers to individuals' tendencies towards the future, and political engagement levels. While the findings overlap with some studies in the literature, they also question some established assumptions. In this section, the study's findings will be discussed in the light of existing theoretical approaches and Türkiye's socio-political context, and the contribution and possible implications of the results obtained will be evaluated.

4.1. Sample Characteristics and Contextual Considerations

The characteristics of the sample structure provide an important context for interpreting the research findings. This study's sample is predominantly female (81%), which may limit the generalizability of the findings. Considering that gender may be related to ideological orientations and perceptions of time, certain tendencies may have been observed as more dominant in a sample with a predominance of women.

In terms of educational attainment, the majority of the sample is high school graduates (67.7%). Since most of the sample was collected from university students, the last education level they graduated from was actually high school. This may have an impact on the level of political participation in general and the mastery of ideological concepts.

In terms of ideological identity, the highest percentage of respondents identified as nationalist (42.4%), followed by socialist (27%), liberal (24.6%) and conservative (5.9%). Considering that nationalism appeals to a wide range of voters in Türkiye, this distribution is meaningful in terms of reflecting the ideological tendencies of the sample. However, the relatively low proportion of conservative individuals indicates that caution should be exercised in interpreting the relationship between this group and time perception and other psychological variables. The relatively low rate of conservative participants in the sample points to a situation that is frequently encountered in the literature. Conservative individuals may have various reservations, especially when participating in survey-based academic studies. These include a lack of trust in the research or the researcher (Yılmaz, 2017),

ideological distance from academia (Santoro & Sydnor, 2024), and assumptions that the researcher may be biased (Cologna et al., 2025). This is particularly evident in highly politically polarized societies, where the decision to participate is often filtered through an individual's ideological filter (Pew Research Center, 1998).

When the descriptive data on continuous variables are analyzed, it is seen that the political involvement level of the participants is at a medium-high level and their ideological affinity scores are relatively high. This suggests that the sample consists of politically engaged individuals and therefore ideological influences on time perception may be observed more prominently.

4.2. Political Engagement and Demographic Factors

There was no significant difference between the political engagement levels of the participants according to their political ideology. Although it is noteworthy that socialist participants show a higher level of political engagement on average, this difference is not statistically significant. This indicates that ideological orientation alone may not be a determinant of an individual's active engagement in political processes. Although some studies in the literature suggest that especially left-leaning individuals are more prone to collective action and political activism (Jost et al., 2003), this effect may not be statistically visible in all contexts. In countries with high political engagement, such as Türkiye, although this rate is high in socialism, which is a left-oriented ideology, there is no statistically significant result due to the high political engagement in all ideologies across the country, and Türkiye was found to be politically engaged as expected. In the Turkish context, ideological orientation should be evaluated together with mediating variables such as the individual's level of trust in the system, perception of political opportunity structure and expectation of political representation.

The study found that male participants showed significantly higher political engagement than female participants. This finding reflects the impact of gender roles in the political sphere. Especially in societies with strong patriarchal structures, there are various structural and cultural barriers to women's active engagement in political decision-making mechanisms (Yüksel, 2021). The fact that women are pushed into spectator or supportive roles rather than being political actors may be reflected in lower scores on political engagement scales. In addition, the dominance of male dominance in the public sphere can be considered as a factor preventing women from increasing their visibility and voice in political issues. In this context, the result shows that not only individual motivations but also

structural inequalities shape political engagement. Nevertheless, when interpreting this finding, it should be kept in mind that the difference in the number of participants in the study should also be taken into account.

It is observed that political engagement increases significantly as the level of education increases. High school graduates have lower levels of political engagement compared to bachelor's and master's degree graduates. This finding is in line with many studies in the literature. The level of education is considered a factor that increases not only an individual's access to political information but also his/her critical thinking skills, awareness of social responsibility, and courage to speak out on public issues (Verba, et al. 1995). Especially among the young population, new forms of political engagement, such as social media campaigns, digital petitions and online calls to action, are more often adopted by highly educated individuals (Cender & Kuş, 2024). The results obtained in this framework once again emphasize the importance of education-oriented policies to increase political engagement.

4.3. The Relationship Between Future Time Orientation and Political Engagement

The findings of this study revealed that the Involvement dimension of time orientation towards the future, which represents emotional and cognitive commitment, is significantly related to individuals' level of political engagement. It is observed that individuals who mentally invest in the future are more involved in political processes. This is in line with the theoretical approaches in the literature that argue that time perspective is closely related to motivation to take action (Boniwell & Zimbardo, 2015; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2015). In particular, individuals setting long-term goals, mentally preparing for possible future scenarios, and positioning themselves as active subject in these scenarios may support the tendency to take social responsibility and thus political engagement.

On the other hand, the Anticipation dimension of the FTO, that is, individuals' behavioral time management tendencies such as planning or habit of leaving things to the last minute, was not significantly related to political engagement. This finding suggests that political engagement may be related not only to the individual's planning habits but also to the meaning and emotional states that the individual attributes to that plan. Although planning behaviors are theoretically considered part of future orientation, they may not translate into political action unless they are accompanied by a sense of agency and emotional involvement. In other words, individuals may plan extensively in their personal lives but remain detached from political matters if they do not perceive political engagement

as meaningful or relevant to their goals. This result highlights the importance of differentiating between the behavioral and affective components of future time orientation when examining political behavior. This is because, although individuals may plan in their daily lives, they may not see themselves as effective actors in the political arena or they may not be emotionally engaged enough in this area. Therefore, planning behavior may be a sufficient but not a necessary condition for political behavior. This distinction suggests that time orientation has not only a behavioral but also a meaning-making aspect (Boniwell & Zimbardo, 2015; Zimbardo & Boyd, 2015;).

In support of this relationship, regression analyses showed that only Involvement was the sub-dimension that significantly predicted political engagement. This finding suggests that emotional and intellectual engagement about the future may make individuals more politically active. However, the total variance explained by the model is quite low. This reminds us that political engagement is not shaped by time orientation alone but in combination with many other factors such as personality traits, characteristics of the political environment, opportunity structure, and social identity (Verba et al., 1995). Nevertheless, individuals' intellectual orientation towards the future and their level of emotional investment stand out as important psychological determinants of political engagement.

4.4. Future Time Orientation (FTO) and Political Ideology

The study examined whether individuals' future time orientation differs significantly based on their political ideology. The findings, however, indicate that there is no such difference. Both the Anticipation subdimension (reflecting tendencies such as planning and last-minute behavior) and the Involvement subdimension (reflecting emotional and mental engagement with the future) showed no statistically significant variation across ideological groups.

This result supports the idea that time orientation is shaped more by personal traits or individual life history than by political ideology. Indeed, the literature emphasizes that time perspective is a relatively stable tendency influenced by a person's identity development, values, and lived experiences (Zimbardo & Boyd, 2015). From this perspective, the fact that people from different ideological backgrounds relate to time in similar ways is not unexpected.

Still, some minor trends emerge from the descriptive statistics. For instance, the slightly higher mean score of socialist participants on the Involvement subdimension may suggest a greater degree of cognitive engagement with the future. Likewise, the slightly

higher Anticipation scores among nationalist participants could indicate a stronger orientation toward planning or time management. However, since these differences are not statistically significant, they should be regarded as minor sample-specific variations rather than meaningful group distinctions.

More broadly, these findings suggest that while ideological orientations help shape people's views about the world and society, they may not exert a direct influence on more subjective and internal psychological tendencies such as time perception. In particular, concepts like future time orientation may appear to be more closely linked with personal factors such as life satisfaction, goal-setting tendencies, intrinsic motivation, or self-concept (Seginer, 2009). Political ideologies, by contrast, are more likely to guide individuals' outward attitudes and behaviors.

Overall, the findings underscore that time orientation may function more as an individual psychological construct rather than an ideological one, particularly in young adult populations with fluid political identities.

4.5. Perception of Time and Political Ideology Investigating the Social Themes

This study examined how individuals' perceptions of social change over time are shaped by their political ideological positions. The results point to a layered reality. While strong and consistent differences between ideological groups were rare, certain themes and time periods revealed more noticeable variations.

Across all six social themes, participants showed a remarkable level of agreement in their retrospective evaluations. Regardless of ideological orientation, the period between 1970 and 1995 was consistently remembered as a time when social bonds were stronger, respect for authority was higher, and traditional values were more central. This convergence suggests that perceptions of the past are influenced more by shared cultural memory than by political identity. In social psychology, it is widely acknowledged that individuals tend to reconstruct their group's past in a positive light as part of identity formation (Liu & Hilton, 2005; Bar-Tal, 2000). In Türkiye, studies by Kağıtçıbaşı (1996) and İmamoğlu (1998) have similarly shown that collectivist values and strong communal ties are central elements of cultural memory. However, because collective memory was not directly measured, this interpretation should be viewed as an avenue for future research rather than a definitive account.

However, when it comes to evaluations of the present (2020–2030) and future (2030–2055), the picture becomes more complex. Although group-level ANOVA results showed

few statistically significant differences, partial correlation analyses revealed more distinct ideological patterns, especially among liberal, conservative, and nationalist participants.

For example, with respect for authority, liberals reported higher expectations of future respect for authority than nationalists and socialists, albeit the overall trend for all groups was downward. This finding is consistent with research suggesting that liberal orientations are often associated with skepticism toward hierarchical structures, whereas conservatives value authority as a source of social stability (Jost et al., 2003; Graham et al., 2009). Recent studies on youth and social values in Türkiye indicate fluctuating trust levels toward institutions such as the judiciary, police, and government authorities, reflecting broader societal shifts in expectations of authority and governance (KONDA, 2024).

Regarding perceptions of society's general structure, conservative participants evaluated both the current and future periods more positively than other groups. This finding aligns with system justification theory, which suggests that right-leaning individuals are more likely to perceive existing social arrangements as legitimate and desirable (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). Findings by Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2007) demonstrate that conservative worldviews in Türkiye place a strong emphasis on social harmony, political stability, and the preservation of traditional societal structures.

In the domain of traditional values, although no strong group-level differences emerged, conservative participants tended to score slightly higher, particularly when evaluating the future. This subtle trend supports the idea that traditional values continue to hold symbolic importance for conservative identities, even in a context of rapid social change (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). In Türkiye, the ongoing public discourse about "family values" and "cultural erosion" illustrates how traditionalism remains a salient topic across the political spectrum but is more strongly emphasized in right-wing narratives.

Interestingly, family ties and economic equality appeared much less ideologically polarized. Participants across all ideological groups reported similar perceptions about the weakening of family ties and persistent economic inequalities. These findings suggest that some social issues may be seen as part of a broader societal narrative rather than through an ideological lens. For instance, in Türkiye, the impact of urbanization, neoliberal reforms, and globalization have widely been discussed as contributing to changes in family structures and widening social disparities (Buğra & Keyder, 2006; Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014).

The fact that certain themes—such as authority and society in general—revealed stronger ideological patterns while others did not, can be explained by the varying symbolic and emotional importance attached to different social domains. As previous research

indicates, political ideology tends to shape perceptions more strongly in areas that are closely tied to values like hierarchy, tradition, and order (Zmigrod et al., 2018; Graham et al., 2009). By contrast, themes such as family ties or economic conditions, although politically relevant, may also be heavily influenced by shared cultural experiences and broader structural forces.

Taken together, these results suggest that political ideology does not act as a constant filter shaping all aspects of temporal perception. Instead, its influence is selective and emerges more clearly when individuals evaluate social themes that resonate closely with their core values and political identities. In many other domains, collective memory, cultural narratives, and personal experiences appear to play a more significant role. Future research could explore how emotional investment in specific social themes and perceptions of threat or stability further modulate the relationship between ideology and temporal perception, particularly in dynamic socio-political contexts like Türkiye.

4.6. Perception of Social Change Across Time

To evaluate hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4, we investigated how individuals' political ideologies relate to their perceptions of societal change across time. In line with the study's multidimensional approach to political ideology, findings revealed a complex but coherent narrative: participants, regardless of ideological stance, tended to idealize the past, view the present with concern, and approach the future with heightened pessimism. These patterns align with theoretical frameworks suggesting that temporal perception is deeply rooted in both personal time orientation (Zimbardo & Boyd, 2015) and collective memory systems (Halbwachs, 1992), rather than being shaped solely by current ideological leanings.

Across all examined themes, a consistent and statistically significant downward trend was observed in participants' evaluations from the past to the future. Respect for authority, family ties, traditional values, economic equality, social bonds, and the perceived overall structure of society were all rated more positively for the past and increasingly negatively for the present and future. Particularly, inflection points around the post-1995 period became apparent, suggesting that larger socio-political shifts in Türkiye, such as neoliberal reforms and accelerated urbanization (Buğra & Keyder, 2006), may have influenced collective evaluations of societal change. However, from a psychological perspective, this perception likely reflects broader patterns of "rosy retrospection" (Mitchell et al., 1997), where individuals' memories of the past are selectively reconstructed in a more favorable light.

When the role of political ideology was considered, it became evident that ideological positioning exerted only selective and theme-specific influences. In general, ideological differences did not dominate perceptions across time; rather, only in certain domains such as respect for authority, traditional values, and societal structure did ideological alignment show small but meaningful effects. Specifically, liberal participants exhibited more positive expectations for future respect for authority compared to nationalist and socialist participants. This aligns with psychological theories suggesting that individuals with liberal orientations are more critical of hierarchical structures and display greater openness to democratic reforms (Jost et al., 2003).

Meanwhile, conservatives rated the overall societal structure most positively in the present and future, but they did not lead on traditional-values scores; in fact, their ‘Now’ rating was the lowest of all groups. This finding is consistent with the system justification theory (Jost & Hunyady, 2005), which posits that conservative individuals are more likely to perceive existing social arrangements as legitimate and desirable. Such tendencies may buffer conservative participants against perceiving rapid societal changes as overwhelmingly negative, though the general trend of decline was observed across all groups.

Interestingly, for themes like family ties and economic equality, political ideology exerted minimal influence. The shared perception of weakening family ties and declining economic fairness suggests that some aspects of societal change are perceived as collective experiences, transcending ideological boundaries. This may be partly explained by emotional convergence models (Jost, 2017), which argue that under conditions of rapid societal transformation, individuals across ideological lines may experience similar emotional reactions such as loss, uncertainty, or nostalgia. Recent data from youth surveys in Türkiye also indicate a widespread sense of economic pessimism, distrust toward social institutions, and uncertainty about the future among younger generations, reflecting the broader emotional patterns observed in the present study (KONDA & GoFor, 2024). This shared decline in optimism is further supported by public data in Türkiye, which indicate a gradual decrease in perceived social trust and future expectations over the last two decades (TÜİK, 2022; World Values Survey, 2022).

The overall decline in temporal perception scores, as evidenced by the composite index, further underlines this shared pessimism. Each successive time period was evaluated significantly more negatively than the previous one, and this pattern held even after controlling for ideological orientation. Although the interaction between time and ideology

approached significance, it remained minimal, suggesting that while ideology may add subtle coloration to perceptions, the main narrative is one of collective emotional experience rather than polarized worldviews.

Psychologically, these findings align with theories of motivated cognition and affective forecasting. Research shows that people often overestimate future difficulties and losses compared to past experiences (Gilbert et al., 1998), contributing to a general anticipation of decline. Furthermore, the emotional salience of perceived threats to social cohesion, traditional structures, and economic fairness may enhance negative future expectations, as emotional memory tends to prioritize experiences of loss and uncertainty (Baumeister et al., 2001).

Thematically, the steepest declines were observed in respect for authority, family ties, and adherence to traditional values. Similarly, findings from the World Values Survey (2022) highlight a global and national trend of declining trust in institutions and increasing concerns about societal fragmentation. This suggests that societal transformations touching on moral order, relational stability, and authority structures are perceived as particularly disruptive. In the Turkish context, where family and authority have historically constituted central pillars of social life (Kağıtcıbaşı, 1996; İmamoğlu, 1998), perceived erosion in these areas may trigger stronger emotional responses.

While participants' perceptions of economic equality also declined, this domain seemed slightly less ideologically charged compared to authority and tradition-related themes. Recent reports by TUIK (2023) also reveal widening income disparities and persistent inequalities in Türkiye, aligning with participants' pessimistic outlook on future economic equality. The general pessimism about future economic conditions aligns with broader global trends of economic disenchantment (Piketty, 2014) and reflects findings from national surveys indicating growing concerns about wealth distribution and opportunity gaps in Türkiye (TÜİK, 2023).

Overall, the results suggest that although political ideology provides cognitive schemas that selectively shape perceptions of authority, tradition, and societal structure, broader emotional and cultural dynamics, such as collective memory, uncertainty about modernization, and shared societal anxieties, play a more dominant role in shaping perceptions of time.

In conclusion, participants did not merely express ideological positions about social change; they narrated a collective emotional story where the past is idealized, the present is problematic, and the future is fraught with uncertainty. Psychological mechanisms such as

nostalgia, motivated cognition, affective forecasting biases, and shared cultural narratives appear to be key drivers of these perceptions. This study highlights the need for future research to further examine how individual cognitive-emotional tendencies and broader cultural narratives interact in shaping perceptions of social change over time. Rather than seeing ideology as a simple left-right filter, understanding it as a context-sensitive and theme-specific framework, embedded within shared emotional landscapes, offers a richer and more accurate perspective.

4.7. The Relationship Between Future Orientation and Time Perception

To test hypothesis 5, we examined how individuals' future evaluations are shaped by their levels of Future Time Orientation, focusing on two subdimensions: Anticipation and Involvement. The results pointed to an important distinction: it was not simply thinking or feeling about the future that made a difference but rather being organized and action oriented.

Regression analyses showed that individuals who scored higher on Anticipation were more likely to hold relatively hopeful views about the future. This tendency was especially visible when it came to expectations around traditionalism and traditional values. These results suggest that having a clear plan and structure for the future can act as a psychological anchor, helping people resist broader societal pessimism. This finding echoes earlier research suggesting that goal-setting and future planning are linked to stronger feelings of personal control and resilience (Boniwell & Zimbardo, 2015).

On the other hand, emotional and cognitive engagement with the future seized by the Involvement dimension did not significantly predict more positive future evaluations. Being emotionally connected to the future, without a sense of structured agency, seems insufficient to shield individuals from a more negative outlook. This distinction aligns with psychological models emphasizing that future-oriented optimism is closely tied to perceived agency and control (Nurmi, 1991; Oyserman & James, 2011).

While the amount of variance explained by these models was modest, the pattern is still meaningful. It highlights that when people feel they are actively shaping their future they are more likely to envision a better tomorrow. Merely caring about the future, without concrete behavioral steps, may not provide the same buffer against pessimism.

Regarding the scale itself, the FTO measure performed well in this sample. The Anticipation and Involvement subdimensions demonstrated solid internal consistency and theoretical clarity. Some items that weakened the theoretical structure were removed during the scale refinement process, improving the overall measurement quality. Especially for

Anticipation, the items clustered strongly around future planning behaviors, supporting its conceptual coherence (Field, 2024; Gliem & Gliem, 2003).

Taken together, these findings highlight that how people think about the future is not just about emotions or general attitudes which are closely tied to what they do about it. Planning, organizing, and preparing seem to give individuals a firmer psychological footing to imagine a hopeful future. Emotional engagement is valuable, but it appears to need the support of structured action to translate into optimistic expectations. Building and supporting future-oriented behaviors may thus be a key pathway to help individuals navigate uncertainty and maintain a positive vision for the future.

4.8. The Interaction of Political Ideology and Future Time Orientation with Future Social Assessments

For hypothesis 6, we looked at how people's political ideology and views on the future affect their thoughts about society. The results show that these factors have some influence, but it is quite limited.

Across six social themes, neither political ideology nor future time orientation was a strong predictor. Most main effects and interactions were not statistically significant. This suggests that people's views about the future are not just reflections of their political identities or how future-minded they are. One exception is in the area of economic equality. Here, we saw a trend where emotional-cognitive involvement and political ideology interacted. Participants with lower future involvement who identified as liberal tended to have slightly more positive views on future economic fairness. This finding wasn't fully statistically significant but hints at a complex relationship between political and psychological factors under certain conditions. These results suggest that when thinking about the distant future, common emotional climates and shared uncertainties may matter more than political ideologies or planning habits. This aligns with psychological research showing that, under high uncertainty, people often share emotional responses even if their political views differ (Jost, 2017; Baumeister et al., 2001).

The limited role of future time orientation stands out. While planning and emotional investment in the future are important for personal goals, they might not change people's broader societal expectations. This is especially true when larger cultural narratives about uncertainty or decline are prominent. Time orientation might serve as a buffer in personal life. It may not help us understand social change. The findings suggest that when thinking

about the future of society, participants' emotional responses may be influenced more by shared anxieties and hopes than by their political views or planning styles. Future studies could explore whether more specific psychological traits, like intolerance of uncertainty or belief in progress, better explain how people imagine the social future. While political ideologies and future time orientation add subtle shades to visions of the future, the broader emotional climate shaped by shared cultural narratives seems to dominate the general picture.

4.9. Interaction Between Political Engagement Level and Perception of Time

The seventh hypothesis of the study proposed that individuals' perceptions of social change over time may vary depending on their level of political participation. Repeated measures analyses were conducted to compare the temporal perceptions of high and low political engagement groups across six key social themes. The significant main effect of time across all themes reflects a well-established pattern in the literature: individuals tend to view the past with greater positivity compared to the present and future. This temporal asymmetry echoes Keough and colleagues (1999) work on time perspective and is consistent with Davis's (1979) sociological account of nostalgia, which suggests that societies often idealize the past in response to contemporary uncertainties.

However, the main effect of political engagement level was only significant in a few specific domains. Notably, participants with lower political participation rated all time periods more favorably when evaluating family ties, social ties, and the general structure of society. This suggests that individuals less engaged in political discourse may maintain a more optimistic or less critical stance toward societal development. Previous studies have shown that individuals with low levels of political engagement are less likely to encounter competing viewpoints and tend to experience less institutional distrust. As a result, they often maintain a more static and undifferentiated view of society (Dalton, 2008; Hooghe & Marien, 2013). This may explain why political disengagement is associated with a flattened perception of societal change.

Crucially, the interaction effect between time and political engagement, the central focus of this hypothesis was found to be statistically significant only for the theme of economic equality. Politically engaged individuals perceived economic inequalities as worsening more sharply over time compared to their less engaged counterparts. This finding aligns with prior research suggesting that increased political awareness heightens sensitivity to systemic inequalities and social injustice. Jost and colleagues (2003) emphasized how

ideological orientation informs such perceptions, while van Zomeren and colleagues (2008) highlighted the role of collective identity and perceived injustice in driving critical awareness of structural issues. Political engagement often enhances individuals' sensitivity to macro-level societal patterns, particularly those related to distributive justice and inequality.

In other domains, this interaction was not observed, suggesting that although political participation may influence how intensely social changes are evaluated, it does not necessarily alter the form or direction of time perception. This is an important distinction: while politically active individuals may exhibit a more critical stance, particularly regarding inequality the overall pattern of “past positive, future negative” remains consistent across engagement levels. These findings imply that political participation can deepen the emotional and evaluative intensity of time perception, but it does not substantially shift its structural pattern.

The findings suggest that political engagement does not alter the general direction of time perception but rather adds complexity to how social realities are interpreted across time. McLeod and colleagues (1999) found that politically engaged individuals process information in more cognitively elaborated ways, and Jost (2017) further argues that ideological involvement enriches how people emotionally and cognitively construct social meaning, especially when the issues are personally or thematically salient.

4.10. Ideological Closeness and Politically Unclassified Participants: Reflections on the Validity of the Model

Lastly, we looked at how participants felt close to their political beliefs. We also described participants who did not fit traditional ideologies. These findings shed light on the four-dimensional political ideology model used in this study.

There was a notable difference in ideological closeness among groups. Liberal participants felt stronger emotional ties to their political views than conservatives, nationalists, and socialists. The effect size was modest, but it suggests that a liberal identity may be more integrated into self-concept. Research shows that liberalism's focus on autonomy and individual expression helps create a stronger political identity (Federico & Malka, 2023; Jost et al., 2009).

In contrast, conservative and nationalist participants reported lower levels of ideological closeness. This may reflect their ideologies, which often stress loyalty to existing

systems and collective belonging over personal values. Socialist participants showed moderate closeness, similar to conservatives and nationalists.

Most participants fit into one of the four ideological categories, while a small group did not. Among those unclassified, a significant portion rejected ideological labels or described themselves as apolitical. Others used hybrid labels like “social democrat,” “Atatürkist,” or “secular nationalist.”

This distribution aligns with recent research showing that political identities are becoming more complex, especially among younger and urban populations (Bennett et al., 2011; Dalton, 2013). Still, the low number of unclassified individuals suggests that the multidimensional model used here is strong and inclusive for capturing political identities in contemporary Türkiye.

These results show that ideological identity serves as a mental framework and emotional anchor. Political psychology says that strong ideological ties create consistent attitudes and more political involvement (Huddy et al., 2015). The close ideological ties among participants, especially liberals, show that political identities are key to many people's self-concept. Recognizing politically unclassified participants highlights the changing nature of political self-definition. Rather than seeing them as outliers, their presence emphasizes the need for flexible models that embrace both traditional and emerging political identities (Hawkins et al., 2018; Mounk, 2018).

In summary, while not all participants fit neatly into the defined ideological categories, the model used here captured meaningful psychological differences in political self-definition. The findings support using a multidimensional framework to understand ideological identity in today's social contexts.

5. CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed to examine how individuals' future time perceptions and orientations relate to their political ideological identities and to understand how perceptions of social values over time are shaped by ideology, political engagement, and individual tendencies. Within the scope of the study, important variables affecting the individual's social position such as future time orientation (FTO), political ideology, political engagement, and ideological closeness were evaluated together. Additionally, time perceptions of social values were comprehensively analyzed within a framework extending from the past to the future.

In the first part of the study, we focused on whether individuals' future-oriented time tendencies (Anticipation reflecting behavioral planning, and Involvement reflecting emotional and cognitive commitment) differ according to their political ideological identities. However, the analyses indicated that there was no statistically significant difference between ideological groups on these subdimensions. This result supports the view that time orientation is not directly shaped by political ideology but is rather influenced by individual characteristics or life experiences. In the literature, time perspective is described as a relatively stable and individually centered tendency, associated with the self-concept, value system, and developmental processes of the individual (Zimbardo & Boyd, 2015). Therefore, it is not surprising that individuals from different ideological backgrounds may show similar time orientations.

On the other hand, the relationship between political engagement and FTO is particularly striking. While the Involvement subdimension significantly predicted political engagement, the Anticipation dimension did not show a significant effect. This finding suggests that planning behaviors alone may not be sufficient for political participation, and that emotional and cognitive investment in the future plays a more central role. Political engagement appears to require not only behavioral regularity but also the attribution of meaning to the future and a sense of social responsibility. In this context, it seems reasonable to expect that individuals who are emotionally invested in the future also tend to be more politically active.

Regression results also showed that the Anticipation aspect of the FTO was a modest but consistent source of hope. Higher Expectancy scores predicted more positive expectations for future traditionalism, traditional values and the overall 'future composite'

index. In short, respondents who are in the habit of organizing and planning their future are better able to resist the general climate of pessimism.

The second main focus of the thesis was to explore how perceptions of social values over time differ according to ideological positions. Both general trends over time and ideological differences were analyzed. The findings revealed that perceptions of the past were consistently more positive, whereas expectations for the future were more pessimistic. This trend emerged as a linear decline across almost every theme. Especially in areas such as respect for authority, family ties, economic equality, the 1970–1995 period was evaluated more positively, while expectations for the 2030–2055 period remained considerably lower. The decline appeared largely independent of political ideology, suggesting that perceptions of social disintegration, insecurity, and individualization have become widespread in Türkiye over time.

Political engagement itself colored temporal perception only at the margins, but a notable interaction emerged: highly engaged respondents saw a much steeper historical decline in economic equality than their less engaged peers. Thus, political engagement seems to sharpen sensitivity to distributive injustice over time, even while leaving intact the trajectory that the past is good and the future is bad.

However, small but notable differences were observed depending on ideological orientation. For instance, liberals expressed significantly higher expectations regarding future respect for authority. Additionally, although it is not significant, socialists reported lower expectations for future economic equality. These findings indicate that political ideology continues to shape attitudes toward certain social themes. Nevertheless, most of these differences remained statistically limited, and the overall picture revealed a general perception of social pessimism that transcends ideological divides.

Partial correlation analyses also found that, controlling for demographic characteristics and religiosity, stronger liberal identity was associated with slightly more optimistic expectations of future respect for authority and family ties. This suggests that liberalism, which is often framed as anti-hierarchical in Turkey, may also harbor a rule of law-centered appreciation for authority and relational harmony.

A final descriptive finding concerns ideological closeness. Liberals reported a significantly stronger emotional attachment to their ideology than conservatives, nationalists, or socialists. This heightened identification may help explain why liberal respondents showed the most distinct thematic expectations: identity-central ideologies tend to amplify both attentiveness and affective investment in societal issues.

When all findings are considered together, this thesis highlights that the perception of time is a psychological construct that is largely independent of ideology and shaped by individual differences. Perceptions of social values are influenced not only by political stances but also by the way individuals relate to time and the future. This Türkiye-specific study contributes valuable insights to both the psychology of time and the field of political psychology.

Overall, this study suggests that the perception of time, while not entirely independent of individual ideologies, may be shaped more by general psychological dispositions and shared cultural narratives. While ideological differences seem to be influential in assessments of past, present and future social values, the general tendency of participants was to develop a growing sense of negativity towards the passage of time. These findings suggest that time perception may be related not only to individual political identities but also to broader societal emotions and shared perceptions. Thus, the results of this study provide a perspective that time perception, while encompassing individual differences, may be a more collective and culturally shared psychological construct.

5.1. Limitation and Suggestions for Future Studies

Although this study provides important insights into the relationship between political ideology, future time orientation, and the perception of social change, several limitations must be acknowledged, and future research directions can be proposed accordingly.

First, the data were collected through an online, voluntary survey method. Although this method provides broad access to participants, it limits the representativeness of the sample. In particular, the low participation rate of conservative or politically disengaged individuals led to an imbalance between ideological groups. This situation may have restricted the diversity of political perspectives captured in the study. Future research should aim to create more balanced and heterogeneous samples to allow for healthier comparisons across different ideological groups.

Second, all data were gathered through self-report measures. Self-reports are vulnerable to biases such as social desirability, self-censorship, and underreporting of true beliefs, especially in politically polarized environments like Türkiye. Participants may have refrained from expressing their genuine political views openly. Future studies could minimize these biases by incorporating indirect measurement techniques or experimental paradigms that better protect participants' anonymity and reduce self-presentation concerns.

Third, the structure of time perception measurement was based on predefined historical periods (e.g., 1970–1995, 1995–2020). However, the extent to which these periods align with participants' own lived experiences varies according to their birth years. Especially for younger participants born after 1990, perceptions of earlier decades are likely shaped by second-hand narratives such as family stories or media portrayals rather than direct personal experience. Future research could address this by explicitly measuring historical memory, generational narratives, and mediated representations when analyzing temporal perceptions.

Fourth, although the study focused on the Anticipation and Involvement subdimensions of Future Time Orientation (FTO), these do not fully encompass broader aspects of temporal psychology such as hedonism, fatalism, or differentiated attachments to the past, present, and future. Future research could incorporate multidimensional time perspective scales to capture individuals' complex relationships with different temporal zones more comprehensively. Additionally, the FTO scale could be adapted or newly developed to more directly measure future social perceptions, rather than focusing only on general behavioral and emotional future tendencies.

Fifth, while this study focused on single-item measurements for each societal theme, this approach may limit the internal consistency and content validity of the constructs. It is recommended that future studies develop or employ more detailed, multi-item scales specifically tailored to assess perceptions of social domains such as respect for authority, family ties, traditionalism, and economic equality across time.

Moreover, the current design asked participants to rate themes based on general impressions. A more subtle assessment could be achieved by separating two dimensions: (1) how participants perceive the level of a given phenomenon (e.g., low or high respect for authority) and (2) how positively or negatively they evaluate this perceived level. Such dual assessments would allow researchers to disentangle whether participants' pessimism stems from their perception of change itself or from their evaluation of that change.

In addition, the study relied on participants selecting a single political ideology to report their closeness. However, ideological affiliations are often multidimensional. Future studies could improve this by allowing participants to rate their closeness to multiple ideological categories through Likert-type scales. This approach would provide a richer, gradient view of political identity and allow for the investigation of hybrid or overlapping political self-concepts.

Participants who could not be categorized under the main ideological groups were also encountered in this study. Although their data were descriptively presented, future research

could focus more systematically on such hybrid or uncategorized identities. Pre-studies could be conducted to identify contemporary political self-definitions more accurately, particularly in rapidly changing political climates.

Furthermore, a longitudinal research design could offer valuable insights into how perceptions of social change evolve over time. For example, repeating the study after major political or societal shifts, such as a change in government or significant policy reforms, could help to test the stability or variability of societal time perceptions.

Finally, as the study utilized a cross-sectional, correlational design, causal inferences could not be made. Longitudinal, experimental, or quasi-experimental designs are recommended for future research to explore the causal dynamics between political ideology, future time orientation, and perceptions of social change.

Despite these limitations, the study offers a valuable contribution by highlighting the psychological foundations of time perception in the political context. Future research should continue building interdisciplinary bridges between political psychology, time psychology, and cultural studies to gain deeper insights into how individuals make sense of temporal and social transformations.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1: Informed Consent Form

Değerli katılımcı,

Bu çalışma, Başkent Üniversitesi Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Psikoloji Bölümü öğretim üyesi Doç. Dr. Zuhale Yeniçeri Kökdemir danışmanlığında, Sosyal Psikoloji Yüksek Lisans programı öğrencisi Alper Erdem tarafından yürütülen bir tez çalışmasıdır. Bu çalışmada, politik ideoloji ile zaman algısı arasındaki ilişkinin araştırılması amaçlanmaktadır.

Bu çalışmaya katılım tamamen gönüllülük esasına dayanmaktadır. Katılımcılardan elde edilecek tüm kimlik bilgileri gizli tutulacak ve hiçbir aşamada kimlik bilgileri açıklanmayacaktır. Araştırma bulguları yalnızca bilimsel amaçlarla kullanılacaktır.

Çalışmaya katılım kapsamında, katılımcıların demografik bilgi formu ve çeşitli değerlendirme araçlarını eksiksiz doldurmaları beklenmektedir. Bu süreç yaklaşık olarak 10 dakika sürecektir. Araştırma sonuçlarının güvenilir olabilmesi için, sorulara içten ve eksiksiz yanıt verilmesi büyük önem taşımaktadır. Soruların size tam olarak uymadığı durumlarda, size en yakın gelen yanıtı işaretlemeniz yeterlidir.

Bu çalışmaya katılım herhangi bir risk içermez. Katılımcılar diledikleri zaman çalışmaya katılmayı reddedebilir veya herhangi bir aşamada çalışmadan ayrılabilirler.

Araştırmaya katıldığınız için şimdiden teşekkür ederiz. Bu çalışma hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak için Alper Erdem: adresine ulaşabilirsiniz.

Bu araştırmaya tamamen gönüllü olarak katıldığımı, istediğim zaman yarıda bırakabileceğimi biliyorum. Verdiğim bilgilerin bilimsel amaçlı yayınlarda kullanılmasını kabul ediyorum.

☐ Onaylıyorum

☐ Onaylamıyorum

Katılım Tarihi:

İmza:

APPENDIX 2: Political Questions Form

1. Yerel seçimlerle ilgili güncel gelişmelerden ne ölçüde haberdar olursunuz?

1. Hiç haberdar olmam
2. Çok az haberdar olurum
3. Orta düzeyde haberdar olurum
4. Oldukça haberdar olurum
5. Tamamen haberdar olurum

2. Genel seçimlerle ilgili güncel gelişmelerden ne ölçüde haberdar olursunuz?

1. Hiç haberdar olmam
2. Çok az haberdar olurum
3. Orta düzeyde haberdar olurum
4. Oldukça haberdar olurum
5. Tamamen haberdar olurum

3. Milliyetçilik, sosyalizm, liberalizm ve muhafazakârlık gibi kavramların tanımını size sorulacak olursa bu tanımları ne ölçüde cevaplayabilirsiniz?

1. Hiç cevaplayamam
2. Çok iyi cevaplayamam
3. Orta düzeyde cevaplarım
4. Oldukça iyi cevaplarım
5. Tam anlamıyla cevaplarım

4. Size güncel politika hakkında birkaç soru sorulacak olursa, bu sorulara ne ölçüde cevaplayabilirsiniz?

1. Hiç cevaplayamam
2. Çok iyi cevaplayamam
3. Orta düzeyde cevaplarım
4. Oldukça iyi cevaplarım
5. Tam anlamıyla cevaplarım

5. Hangi politik ideolojinin sizi daha iyi tanımladığını düşünüyorsunuz?

Liberal ()

Milliyetçi ()

Muhafazakâr ()

Sosyalist ()

Diğer ()

6. Seçtiğiniz bu politik ideolojinin sizin görüşlerinizi ne düzeyde yansıttığını düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Hiç yansıtmıyor

2. Biraz yansıtmıyor

3. Ne yansıtmıyor ne yansıtmıyor

4. Biraz yansıtmıyor

5. Tamamen yansıtmıyor

APPENDIX 3: Measurement Of Respect for Authority

Aşağıda farklı yıl aralıklarında otoriteye duyulan saygıyla ilgili ölçüm yer almaktadır. Lütfen size en uygun gelen seçeneği işaretleyiniz.

1. Okuduklarınıza ve çevrenizden duyduklarınıza dayanarak, 1970-1995 yılları arasındaki dönemi düşündüğünüzde, toplumda otoriteye olan saygının genel durumu hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

2. Kendi anılarınıza dayanarak, 1995-2020 yılları arasındaki dönemi düşündüğünüzde, toplumda otoriteye olan saygının genel durumu hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

3. Günümüzdeki toplumu düşündüğünüzde, otoriteye olan saygıyı nasıl yorumluyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

4. Toplumu otoriteye olan saygı açısından değerlendirdiğinizde, 2030-2055 yılları arasındaki dönemin genel durumunun ne yönde olacağını düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

APPENDIX 4: Measurement Of Closeness to Family

Aşağıda farklı yıl aralıklarında aile üyelerinin birbirine olan bağlılığı ile ilgili ölçüm yer almaktadır. Lütfen size en uygun gelen seçeneği işaretleyiniz.

1. Okuduklarınıza ve çevrenizden duyduklarınıza dayanarak, 1970-1995 yılları arasındaki dönemi düşündüğünüzde, toplumda aile üyelerinin birbirine olan bağlılığını nasıl yorumluyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

2. Kendi anılarınıza dayanarak, 1995-2020 yılları arasındaki dönemi düşündüğünüzde, toplumda aile üyelerinin birbirine olan bağlılığını nasıl yorumluyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

3. Günümüzdeki toplumu düşündüğünüzde, aile üyelerinin birbirine olan bağlılığını nasıl yorumluyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

4. Toplumu aile üyelerinin birbirine olan bağlılığı açısından değerlendirdiğinizde, 2030-2055 yılları arasındaki dönemin genel durumunun ne yönde olacağını düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

APPENDIX 5: Measurement Of Traditionalism

Aşağıda farklı yıl aralıklarında toplumun geleneklere olan bağlılığı ile ilgili ölçüm yer almaktadır. Lütfen size en uygun gelen seçeneği işaretleyiniz.

1. Okuduklarınıza ve çevrenizden duyduklarınıza dayanarak, 1970-1995 yılları arasındaki dönemi düşündüğünüzde, toplumun geleneklere olan bağlılığını nasıl yorumluyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

2. Kendi anılarınıza dayanarak, 1995-2020 yılları arasındaki dönemi düşündüğünüzde, toplumun geleneklere olan bağlılığını nasıl yorumluyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

3. Günümüzdeki toplumu düşündüğünüzde, toplumun geleneklere olan bağlılığını nasıl yorumluyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

4. Toplumu geleneklere bağlılık açısından değerlendirdiğinizde, 2030-2055 yılları arasındaki dönemin genel durumunun ne yönde olacağını düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

APPENDIX 6: Measurement Of Economic Equality

Aşağıda farklı yıl aralıklarında ekonomik eşitlik düzeyini ile ilgili ölçüm yer almaktadır. Lütfen size en uygun gelen seçeneği işaretleyiniz.

1. Okuduklarınıza ve çevrenizden duyduklarınıza dayanarak, 1970-1995 yılları arasındaki dönemi düşündüğünüzde, toplumdaki ekonomik eşitlik düzeyi hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

2. Kendi anılarınıza dayanarak, 1995-2020 yılları arasındaki dönemi düşündüğünüzde, toplumdaki ekonomik eşitlik düzeyi hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

3. Günümüzdeki toplumu düşündüğünüzde, ekonomik eşitlik düzeyi açısından toplumun genel durumu hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

4. Toplumu ekonomik eşitlik düzeyi açısından değerlendirdiğinizde, 2030-2055 yılları arasındaki dönemin genel durumunun ne yönde olacağını düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

APPENDIX 7: Measurement Of Adherence to Traditional Values

Aşağıda farklı yıl aralıklarında geleneksel değerlere bağlılık ile ilgili ölçüm yer almaktadır. Lütfen size en uygun gelen seçeneği işaretleyiniz.

1. Okuduklarınıza ve çevrenizden duyduklarınıza dayanarak, 1970-1995 yılları arasındaki dönemi düşündüğünüzde, toplumdaki geleneksel değerlere bağlılığın genel durumu hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

2. Kendi anılarınıza dayanarak, 1995-2020 yılları arasındaki dönemi düşündüğünüzde, toplumdaki geleneksel değerlere bağlılığın genel durumu hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

3. Günümüzdeki toplumu düşündüğünüzde, geleneksel değerlere bağlılık açısından toplumun genel durumu hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

4. Toplumu geleneksel değerlere bağlılık açısından değerlendirdiğinizde, 2030-2055 yılları arasındaki dönemin genel durumunun ne yönde olacağını düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

APPENDIX 8: Measurement Of Society in General

Aşağıda farklı yıl aralıklarında toplumun çeşitli açılardan değerlendirildiğindeki genel durumu ile ilgili ölçüm yer almaktadır. Lütfen size en uygun gelen seçeneği işaretleyiniz.

1. Okuduklarınıza ve çevrenizden duyduklarınıza dayanarak, 1970-1995 yılları arasındaki dönemin toplumunu çeşitli açılardan değerlendirdiğinizde genel durumu hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

2. Kendi anılarınıza dayanarak, 1995-2020 yılları arasındaki dönemin toplumunu çeşitli açılardan değerlendirdiğinize, genel durumu hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

3. Çeşitli açılardan değerlendirdiğinizde günümüzdeki toplumun genel durumu hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

4. Toplumu çeşitli açılardan değerlendirdiğinizde, 2030-2055 yılları arasındaki dönemin genel durumunun ne yönde olacağını düşünüyorsunuz?

1. Çok kötü
2. Kötü
3. Ne iyi ne kötü
4. İyi
5. Çok iyi

APPENDIX 9: Future Time Orientation Scale Turkish Adaptation Form

Aşağıdaki ölçek gelecek zamana dair tutumlarınızı ölçmek için tasarlanmıştır. Lütfen sizi en iyi yansıtan seçeneği işaretleyiniz.

1. Bazı şeyleri genellikle hep son dakikada yapmaya çalışırım.

1. Hiç katılmıyorum 2. Katılmıyorum 3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 4. Katılıyorum 5. Tamamen katılıyorum

2. Gelecekte ne yapacağım hakkında çok fazla düşünürüm.

1. Hiç katılmıyorum 2. Katılmıyorum 3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 4. Katılıyorum 5. Tamamen katılıyorum

3. “Son teslim tarihi” olmayan şeyleri yapmakta zorlanırım.

1. Hiç katılmıyorum 2. Katılmıyorum 3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 4. Katılıyorum 5. Tamamen katılıyorum

4. Bir şeyleri halledebilmem için üzerimde zaman baskısı hissetmem gerekir.

1. Hiç katılmıyorum 2. Katılmıyorum 3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 4. Katılıyorum 5. Tamamen katılıyorum

5. Yarım yıl benim için oldukça uzun bir zamandır.

1. Hiç katılmıyorum 2. Katılmıyorum 3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 4. Katılıyorum 5. Tamamen katılıyorum

6. Gelecek hakkında çok az düşünürüm.

1. Hiç katılmıyorum 2. Katılmıyorum 3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 4. Katılıyorum 5. Tamamen katılıyorum

7. Genelde şu an için neler hissettiğimle ilgilenirim.

1. Hiç katılmıyorum 2. Katılmıyorum 3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 4. Katılıyorum 5. Tamamen katılıyorum

8. Zamanın biraz ilerisindeki şeylerle çok fazla ilgilenmem.

1. Hiç katılmıyorum 2. Katılmıyorum 3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 4. Katılıyorum 5. Tamamen katılıyorum

9. Gelecek ile ilgili endişelenmek aslında yersiz, çünkü ne olacaksa olur.

1. Hiç katılmıyorum 2. Katılmıyorum 3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 4. Katılıyorum 5. Tamamen katılıyorum

10. Gelecek hakkında çok fazla kafa yorarım ve geleceğin çok çabuk yaklaştığını hissedirim.

1. Hiç katılmıyorum 2. Katılmıyorum 3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 4. Katılıyorum 5. Tamamen katılıyorum

11. Genellikle, gün hiç bitmeyecekmiş gibi gelir.

1. Hiç katılmıyorum 2. Katılmıyorum 3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 4. Katılıyorum 5. Tamamen katılıyorum

12. Birçok kez kendimi zamanı öldürecek yollar ararken bulurum.

1. Hiç katılmıyorum 2. Katılmıyorum 3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 4. Katılıyorum 5. Tamamen katılıyorum

13. Gelecek bazen bana çok belirsiz gelir.

1. Hiç katılmıyorum 2. Katılmıyorum 3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 4. Katılıyorum 5. Tamamen katılıyorum

14. Genellikle zamanın çok çabuk geçtiğini hissedirim.

1. Hiç katılmıyorum 2. Katılmıyorum 3. Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 4. Katılıyorum 5. Tamamen katılıyorum

APPENDIX 10: Demographic Information Form

1.Cinsiyetiniz

Kadın ()

Erkek ()

Diğer (belirtiniz)

2.Doğum Yılıınız: __

3.Eğitim Durumunuz:

İlkokul mezunu ()

Ortaokul mezunu ()

Lise mezunu ()

Önlisans mezunu ()

Lisans mezunu ()

Yüksek Lisans

Doktora mezunu ()

4.Kendinizi hangi sosyoekonomik durumda görüyorsunuz?

Çok Düşük ()

Düşük ()

Orta ()

Yüksek ()

Çok Yüksek ()

5.Hanenizde kişi başına düşen toplam gelir Türk Lirası cinsinden ne kadardır?: _____

6.Kendinizi ne ölçüde dindar tanımlarsınız?

1. Hiç dindar değilim

3.

4.

5. Orta

6.

7.

8.

9.

10. Tam anlamıyla dindarım

APPENDIX 11: Future Time Orientation Scale Permission to Use

Future Time Orientation Scale Türkçe Uyarlamasını Kullanma İzni Gelen Kutusu x



Alper Erdem
Alici:

29 Kas Cum 14:46 (3 gün önce)



Sayın Prof. Dr. Bengi Öner Özkan,

Ben Alper Erdem, Başkent Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü'nde yüksek lisans öğrencisiyim. Tezim kapsamında bireylerin zaman algısının politik farkındalık ve ideolojik tutumlarla ilişkisini incelemeyi amaçlıyorum. Bu kapsamda, Future Time Orientation Scale'in sizin tarafınızdan Türkçe'ye uyarlanmış versiyonunu temel almayı planlıyorum.

Çalışmamda, Ayça Güler Edwards'ın (2004) yüksek lisans tezinde yaptığı gibi, ölçekten üç maddeyi çıkararak kullanmayı düşünüyorum. Bu konudaki görüşünüz, yönlendirmeleriniz ve kullanım izni vermeniz benim için çok önemli. İlgili geri dönüşünüz için şimdiden teşekkür eder, iyi çalışmalar dilerim.

Saygılarımla,
Alper Erdem



bengi
Alici: ben
xxx

29 Kas Cum 17:08 (3 gün önce)



Merhabalar,

Çok memnun olurum, öçeği dilediğiniz gibi, çalışmalarınızda kullanabilirsiniz. Kolaylıklar ve başarılar dilerim,

Bengi



APPENDIX 12: Correlational Matrix

Pearson's Correlations

Variable		FTO_Anticipation	FTO_Involvement	Political Engagement	Closeness	Past1_Total	Past2_Total	Now_Total	Future_Total
1. FTO_Anticipation	<i>r</i>	—							
	<i>p</i>	—							
2. FTO_Involvement	<i>r</i>	-0.050	—						
	<i>p</i>	0.362	—						
3. Political Engagement	<i>r</i>	-0.058	0.117*	—					
	<i>p</i>	0.286	0.031	—					
4. Closeness	<i>r</i>	0.020	-0.022	0.305***	—				
	<i>p</i>	0.719	0.683	< .001	—				
5. Past1_Total	<i>r</i>	-0.058	0.075	-0.040	0.137*	—			
	<i>p</i>	0.288	0.172	0.465	0.012	—			
6. Past2_Total	<i>r</i>	0.044	0.052	-0.100	0.048	0.434***	—		
	<i>p</i>	0.421	0.338	0.068	0.376	< .001	—		
7. Now_Total	<i>r</i>	0.056	-0.062	-0.217***	-0.127*	0.023	0.421***	—	
	<i>p</i>	0.308	0.253	< .001	0.019	0.668	< .001	—	
8. Future_Total	<i>r</i>	0.129*	-0.053	-0.022	-0.004	-0.179***	0.126*	0.563***	—
	<i>p</i>	0.018	0.329	0.686	0.942	< .001	0.020	< .001	—

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

APPENDIX 13: Pearson Correlations Among Thematic Perceptions in the Distant Past (1970–1995)

Pearson's Correlations

Variable		Respect for Authority 1	Family Ties 1	Traditionalism 1	Economic Equality 1	Traditional Values 1	Society in General 1	Past1_Total
1. Respect for Authority 1	<i>r</i>	—						
	<i>p</i>	—						
2. Family Ties 1	<i>r</i>	0.278***	—					
	<i>p</i>	< .001	—					
3. Traditionalism 1	<i>r</i>	0.314***	0.376***	—				
	<i>p</i>	< .001	< .001	—				
4. Economic Equality 1	<i>r</i>	0.275***	0.260***	0.240***	—			
	<i>p</i>	< .001	< .001	< .001	—			
5. Traditional Values 1	<i>r</i>	0.407***	0.478***	0.603***	0.216***	—		
	<i>p</i>	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	—		
6. Society in General 1	<i>r</i>	0.332***	0.416***	0.303***	0.428***	0.334***	—	
	<i>p</i>	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	—	
7. Past1_Total	<i>r</i>	0.648***	0.678***	0.690***	0.617***	0.735***	0.693***	—
	<i>p</i>	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	—

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

APPENDIX 14: Pearson Correlations Among Thematic Perceptions in the Recent Past (1995–2020)

Pearson's Correlations

Variable		Respect for Authority 2		Family Ties 2		Traditionalism 2		Economic Equality 2		Traditional Values 2		Society in General 2		Past2_Total
1. Respect for Authority 2	<i>r</i>	—												
	<i>p</i>	—												
2. Family Ties 2	<i>r</i>	0.146	**	—										
	<i>p</i>	0.007		—										
3. Traditionalism 2	<i>r</i>	0.292	***	0.302	***	—								
	<i>p</i>	< .001		< .001		—								
4. Economic Equality 2	<i>r</i>	0.171	**	0.142	**	0.205	***	—						
	<i>p</i>	0.002		0.009		< .001		—						
5. Traditional Values 2	<i>r</i>	0.292	***	0.354	***	0.623	***	0.282	***	—				
	<i>p</i>	< .001		< .001		< .001		< .001		—				
6. Society in General 2	<i>r</i>	0.247	***	0.295	***	0.326	***	0.423	***	0.380	***	—		
	<i>p</i>	< .001		< .001		< .001		< .001		< .001		—		
7. Past2_Total	<i>r</i>	0.568	***	0.552	***	0.702	***	0.600	***	0.752	***	0.691	***	—
	<i>p</i>	< .001		< .001		< .001		< .001		< .001		< .001		—

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

APPENDIX 15: Pearson Correlations Among Thematic Perceptions in the Present (2020–2030)

Pearson's Correlations

Variable		Respect for Authority 3	Family Ties 3	Traditionalism 3	Economic Equality 3	Traditional Values 3	Society in General 3	Now_Total
1. Respect for Authority 3	<i>r</i>	—						
	<i>p</i>	—						
2. Family Ties 3	<i>r</i>	0.144**	—					
	<i>p</i>	0.008	—					
3. Traditionalism 3	<i>r</i>	0.258***	0.361***	—				
	<i>p</i>	< .001	< .001	—				
4. Economic Equality 3	<i>r</i>	0.090	0.227***	0.255***	—			
	<i>p</i>	0.097	< .001	< .001	—			
5. Traditional Values 3	<i>r</i>	0.274***	0.365***	0.625***	0.230***	—		
	<i>p</i>	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	—		
6. Society in General 3	<i>r</i>	0.135*	0.198***	0.229***	0.374***	0.210***	—	
	<i>p</i>	0.013	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	—	
7. Now_Total	<i>r</i>	0.552***	0.609***	0.729***	0.548***	0.724***	0.567***	—
	<i>p</i>	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	—

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

APPENDIX 16: Pearson Correlations Among Thematic Perceptions In The Future (2030–2055)

Pearson's Correlations

Variable		Respect for Authority 4	Family Ties 4	Traditionalism 4	Economic Equality 4	Traditional Values 4	Society in General 4	Future Total
1. Respect for Authority 4	<i>r</i>	—						
	<i>p</i>	—						
2. Family Ties 4	<i>r</i>	0.244***	—					
	<i>p</i>	< .001	—					
3. Traditionalism 4	<i>r</i>	0.366***	0.420***	—				
	<i>p</i>	< .001	< .001	—				
4. Economic Equality 4	<i>r</i>	0.367***	0.115*	0.216***	—			
	<i>p</i>	< .001	0.035	< .001	—			
5. Traditional Values 4	<i>r</i>	0.334***	0.409***	0.676***	0.196***	—		
	<i>p</i>	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	—		
6. Society in General 4	<i>r</i>	0.327***	0.285***	0.352***	0.423***	0.318***	—	
	<i>p</i>	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	—	
7. Future Total	<i>r</i>	0.669***	0.613***	0.748***	0.579***	0.720***	0.682***	—
	<i>p</i>	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	< .001	—

Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

APPENDIX 17: Future Time Orientation Scale Item Correlations

Item-Level Statistics and Exclusion of Future Time Orientation Scale (N = 337)

Item	Subscale	Corrected Item–Total Correlation	Inter-Item Correlation Range	Scale Mean if Item Deleted	Scale Variance if Item Deleted	Cronbach's α if Item Deleted	Exclusion Rationale
1	Anticipation	.61	.54 – .56	–	–	–	–
3	Anticipation	.69	.54 – .67	–	–	–	–
4	Anticipation	.70	.56 – .67	–	–	–	–
2	Involvement	.56	–	18.89	15.72	.68	–
6	Involvement	.50	–	18.26	16.53	.70	–
7	Involvement	.37	–	19.91	16.85	.73	–
8	Involvement	.53	–	18.53	15.62	.69	–
9	Involvement	.46	–	18.78	15.20	.71	–
10	Involvement	.48	–	19.60	14.96	.71	–
5	Excluded	< .20	Low	–	–	.49 (total)	Low consistency
11	Excluded	< .20	Low	–	–	.49 (total)	Low consistency
12	Excluded	< .20	Low	–	–	.49 (total)	Low consistency
13	Excluded	< .20	Low	–	–	.49 (total)	Low consistency
14	Excluded	< .20	Low	–	–	.49 (total)	Low consistency

APPENDIX 18: Ethical Approval

Evrak Tarih ve Sayısı: 26.02.2025-436443



T.C.

BAŞKENT ÜNİVERSİTESİ REKTÖRLÜĞÜ

Akademik Değerlendirme Koordinatörlüğü

26.02.2025

Sayı : E-62310886-605-436443

Konu : Alper Erdem'in Etik Onay Başvurusu

SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNE

İlgi : 17.01.2025 tarih ve 410192 sayılı yazınız.

Enstitünüz Psikoloji Ana Bilim Dalı Sosyal Psikoloji (Tezli) Yüksek Lisans Programı öğrencisi Alper Erdem'in, Doç. Dr. Zuhal Yeniçeri Kökdemir danışmanlığında yürüteceği, "Past Perfect or Future Progressive: How Ideology Influences Our View Of Time" başlıklı tez çalışması değerlendirilmiş ve bilgilerinize ekte sunulmuştur.

Prof. Dr. Sadegül AKBABA ALTUN
Kurul Başkanı

Ek: Değerlendirme Formu

Bu belge, güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.

Belge Doğrulama Kodu :BSE5JFSZFS

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Konu : Tez Çalışması

10 Şubat 2025

İlgili Makama

Üniversitemiz Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Psikoloji Ana Bilim Dalı Sosyal Psikoloji (Tezli) Yüksek Lisans Programı öğrencisi Alper Erdem'in, Doç. Dr. Zuhale Yeniçeri Kökdemir danışmanlığında yürüteceği, "Past Perfect or Future Progressive: How Ideology Influences Our View Of Time" başlıklı tez önerisi değerlendirilmiş ve yapılmasında bir sakınca olmadığı tespit edilmiştir.

Bilgilerinize saygılarımızla sunarız.

Başkent Üniversitesi Sosyal ve Beşeri Bilimler ve Sanat Alan Araştırma Kurulu

Ad, Soyad	Değerlendirme	İmza
Prof. Dr. Gözen Güner Aktaş	Olumlu/ ~~Olumsuz~~	
Prof. Dr. Sadegül Akbaba Altun	Olumlu/ ~~Olumsuz~~	
Prof. Dr. Fatih Çetin	Olumlu/ ~~Olumsuz~~	
Prof. Dr. Hasan Tahsin Fendoğlu	Olumlu/ ~~Olumsuz~~	
Prof. Dr. Filiz Kalelioğlu	Olumlu/ ~~Olumsuz~~	
Prof. Dr. Hidayet Hale Künüçen	Olumlu/ ~~Olumsuz~~	
Prof. Dr. Özcan Yağcı	Olumlu/ ~~Olumsuz~~	