



UNIVERSITY of PORTSMOUTH

A Neoclassical Realist Analysis of the AKP Foreign Policy from 2011 to 2016.

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Statement of Originality

This work is submitted in accordance with the requirements for the MA International Relations and European Studies degree, University of Portsmouth. I declare that the work presented is to the best of my knowledge original, except as acknowledged in the script, and that the material has not been submitted, either in whole or in part, for a degree at this or other educational institution.

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Abstract

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) is a political party that come to power in Turkey in the 2002 general elections. This dissertation seeks to provide a neoclassical realist analysis of AKP foreign policy from 2011 to 2016, focusing on the significance of external constraints in the making of Turkish foreign policy. The incentive for carrying out this research is to analyse if the AKP leaders' vision, personality and leadership can override domestic and external constraints. The research includes an analysis of theories of external constraints and leadership and the vision of the AKP leaders with a comparison to the role of external constraints in contemporary Turkish foreign policy. The breakdown and discord in Turkey's relations with its allies was used as a case study in this dissertation. This dissertation argues that the AKP leaders' vision tilts Turkey away from its allies and external constraints are critically interpreted by the Turkish foreign policy executive (FPE). Because of the importance that the Turkish FPE gives to domestic politics, this dissertation concludes that neoclassical realism may not be the best theory to show the relationship between leaders and domestic audiences and that domestic politics needs to be highlighted even more in Turkish foreign policy analysis.

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Abbreviations

AKP (AK Party): Justice and Development Party

ANAP: Motherland Party

DYP: True Path Party

EU: European Union

FETO: Gulenist Terrorist Organisation

FPA: Foreign Policy Analysis

FPE: Foreign Policy Executive

IMF: International Monetary Fund

ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

MHP: Nationalist Movement Party

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGO: Non-governmental organisation

PKK: Kurdistan Workers' Party

PYD: Democratic Union Party

RP: Welfare Party

US: United States

UN: United Nations

YPG: People's Protection Units

Table of Contents

Statement of originality.....	1
Abstract.....	2
Acknowledgements.....	3
Abbreviations.....	5
Table of contents.....	6
Introduction.....	7
Chapter One: The contribution of neoclassical realism to foreign policy analysis.....	10
Background.....	11
Classical realism and neorealism.....	11
Neoclassical realism.....	21
Chapter Two: The Akp leadership’s vision and direction.....	33
Chapter Three: The role of external constraints in the making of Turkish foreign policy.....	43
Conclusion.....	53
Bibliography.....	57

Introduction

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey in 2002. Until its re-election in 2011, the AKP can be seen to have been a pragmatic government by being responsive to both external constraints and domestic politics (Cavdar, 2006; Dagi, 2008; Gol, 2009). After 2011, the AKP has been described as ‘assertive’, ‘authoritarian’ and ‘Islamist’ by different analysts (Kessler, 2016; Dombey, 2014; Sambur, 2016). Some have even described their rule as a kin to the rebirth of the Ottoman Empire or the beginning of ‘the Great Turkey’ (Teller, 2016; Czajka and Wastnidge, 2015).

According to Kessler (2016, p.173), the AKP can be described as a ‘moderate Islamist party’. Kessler also claims that, even though the secular Turks had been afraid of the rise of AKP in 2002, the AKP government pursued rational policies which sought progress in the EU membership process and success in the Turkish economy. Kessler argues that Erdogan and his party were extremely pro-European Union (EU) and pro-business in their first and second terms in power but that by the third term, Erdogan “saw the vote as a mandate to become an all-powerful sultan, free to act as he wished, regardless of the consequences” (2016, p.173). The government now appears less responsive to law, the old constitution and pragmatism (Sambur, 2016, Dombey, 2014).

Analysts have tried to label the motivation and type of policies pursued by Erdogan. Titles such as ‘neo-Ottoman’ and ‘Islamist’ have been used to explain AKP policy direction. A Turkish analyst, Cagaptay, suggests that neo-Ottomanism is a misnomer for

the AKP's policy decisions and therefore it may be appropriate to describe AKP as an Islamist party (Cagaptay, 2009, p.3). The reason for this is the fact that Turkey under the AKP government has exclusively focused on the 'Muslim' Middle East, ignoring other areas of the old Ottoman realm (Cagaptay, 2009, p.1). The reason why Cagaptay thinks Erdogan and his executives are much more Islamist than neo-Ottomanist is that the Ottoman Empire had 'secular instincts' (Cagaptay, 2009, p.3). However, describing the AKP solely as an Islamist party may be unjust since financial interests also shape its policy decisions (Cagaptay, 2009). Even though analysts such as Kanat (2014) claim that the AKP government is very successful in making Turkey a trading state (Kanat, 2014, p.76) and an international player in international politics (p.66), some other analysts believe that the AKP's foreign policy harms the Turkish economy (Hakura, 2016) and that its assertive moral conservatism may bring Erdogan's political career to an end (Akyol, 2013). The failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016 may back up such assertions. However, the coup attempt may also give Erdogan opportunities to become more assertive and increase Islamists' support for him and even lead to an Islamic revolution (Cagaptay, 2016).

How analysts describe the AKP government and its policy decisions matters less than the fact that there has been a certain break down in Turkey's relations with the United States (US) and the European Union. There is also a certain discord with NATO in Turkish foreign policy. Even though the Turkish government is forced to observe some external constraints, it is clearly being more autonomous in respect of those dynamics (Kanat, 2010, p.205). Turkey's allies, the EU and NATO countries expect the AKP government to implement foreign policies in accordance with theirs, and this has been problematic in recent years.

Turkey's rapprochement with Tehran and Moscow after 2013 has been accompanied with friction with Washington, Tel Aviv and Brussels (Cagaptay, 2009, p.1). For Cagaptay, "this picture represents a departure from the traditional, exclusively pro-Western orientation of Turkish foreign policy" (2009, p.1). It could be said that Erdogan tries to behave more independently while making foreign policies and pays less attention to the external constraints than his predecessors. It can be said that Turkey's relations with the US, NATO and the EU are still structurally important but have been critically interpreted by Erdogan and Davutoglu.

It is this interpretation that this dissertation seeks to investigate. This dissertation will focus on the significance of external constraints in the making of Turkish foreign policy. Why this issue is very important is that whilst there is disagreement about what Turkish foreign policy actually is, there is agreement on the idea that the leadership has a disproportionate role in deciding what Turkish interests are and that this is grown since 2011. This research is going to investigate the role of the vision and leadership of the AKP leaders compared to external constraints. The dissertation will analyse if Erdogan and Davutoglu's vision, personality and leadership override domestic and external constraints. In order to do that, an analysis of theories of external constraints and leadership will be undertaken drawing in the main from neoclassical realism. Then, the vision of the AKP leaders and their practice of neoclassical realism will be considered. The breakdown in Turkey's relationship with its Western allies will be used as a case study for this research. Finally, the end of the dissertation will consider the significance of external constraints in contemporary Turkish foreign policy.

Chapter One: The contribution of neoclassical realism to foreign policy analysis

Neoclassical realism is a helpful theory for foreign policy analysis as it concentrates on international constraints. Of all the theories that exist in international relations, it is realism that has done the most work on external constraints as throughout its history it has been concerned with issues such as anarchy and the balance of power which are related to the external world. Waltz's structural realism also highlights external constraints. Neoclassical realists do not challenge views of external constraints in previous realist schools. It tries to refine the concept by trying to find out what the impacts of leadership and domestic politics have on the importance of external constraints. The main aim of neoclassical realists is to understand the external constraints that confront states and how leaders and the foreign policy executives (FPE) perceive those constraints while making foreign policies. Domestic politics also play a role in neoclassical realism since leaders need domestic support to maintain their powers and mobilise that power abroad. In order to employ neoclassical realism as a means to analyse Turkish foreign policy, its relationship to other forms of realist thought - classical realism and neorealism (structural realism) needs to be established which will enable a clearer understanding of its potential contribution. The approach also needs to be compared and contrasted to other branches of foreign policy analysis (FPA), particularly those which examine domestic variables. The object is to see if other branches of the FPE treat domestic variables as more significant than external constraints.

Background

Realism has traditionally been the dominant paradigm in international relations theory. Because neoclassical realism has its roots in classical realism and neorealism, it is sometimes known as the third generation of realist theories. Classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau and E.H. Carr, are known as the first generation of realist theories. The second generation, the neorealists, such as Waltz and Mearsheimer, placed more emphasis than their predecessors on the structure of the international system and excluded domestic politics and the classical realist stress upon human nature from their analysis (Waltz, 2010, p.65). However, scholars like Zakaria and Rose have argued that the analysis of states' foreign policies should include both systemic and domestic influences (Zakaria, 199, p.6). This view led to the birth of neoclassical realism which tries to explain how the domestic politics of a state intervene between its leader's assessment of international threats and diplomatic, military and foreign economic policies that the leader then pursues (Lobell, Ripsman & Taliaferro, 2009, p.4).

Classical realism and neorealism

Classical realism groups together the first generation of realist thinkers, drawing on the work of thinkers such as Hobbes and Machiavelli. For classical realists, states are like humans in the state of nature where 'life can be nasty, brutish and short'. With no international government, each state is left to protect itself in a sea of anarchy. For Art and Jervis, anarchy should be seen as the fundamental fact of world politics for classical

realists (2015, p.7). For classical realists, anarchy signifies a lack of authority or a dominant power in the world. States are seen to be continually competing for resources and influence with no global authority above them. Classical realism links this drive for resources to the personality of the state which is seen in terms of self interested human nature (Morgenthau, 1973, p.4). Mainstream realists today, such as Robert Axelrod, focus on anarchy as the key contribution of the classical realists and see this situation as the most important problem facing humanity (1984, p.190). According to classical realists, in order to defend themselves and survive, states have to rely on self-help. In such an anarchic system, state power is key because only through power can states defend themselves (Slaughter, 2011, p.129). However, this situation is seen to lead to a continual security dilemma. According to Jervis, a state sees another state's armament as a threat and arms itself too (1998, p.974). It continues mutually and the threat inevitably gets bigger. This is the reason that realists stress the importance of the balance of power and external constraints.

Classical realists see the balance of power as both inevitable and vital because they see it as a way to "contain power and limit its potential abuse" (Toledo, 2005, p.59). As Morgenthau states: "the balancing process can be carried on either by diminishing the weight of the heavier scale or by increasing the weight of the lighter one" (1973, p. 198). According to Morgenthau, the balance of power is either a situation or a policy. As a situation, it can be in equilibrium or disequilibrium (Toledo, 2005, p.59). The balance of power in equilibrium is seen as a condition where the power of a state is balanced by another state or states who has/have the same power (Claude, 1962, p.13). Morgenthau also claims that equilibrium is crucial to protect nations' sovereignty and the international system's pluralistic nature:

The balance of power and policies aiming at the preservation of the international balance of power are not only inevitable but are essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations; and that the instability of the international balance of power is due not to the faultiness of the principle but to the particular conditions under which the principle must operate in as society of sovereign nations (1973, p.187).

The balance of power in disequilibrium can be seen when the distribution of power between states is not balanced (Toledo, 2005, p.59). Hitler's Germany without the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union against it in the late 1930's exemplifies such a situation. In the Middle East, Turkey can be seen as one of the most important powers. Without Turkey, which is aligned to NATO, conventional or unconventional armies could endanger the Middle East's security more than ever. If the balance of power is in disequilibrium, this circumstance is seen by realists to lead to the abuse of power by the strongest state in the world and it may create insecurity in the world. The theory of the balance of power as a policy is to encourage the condition of a balance of power in equilibrium (Toledo, 2009, p.59). The balance of power as a policy can exist in two ways: firstly, a situation where there is only one power 'balancer' in the world; secondly, a situation where there are two power balancers reacting against each other by increasing their military capabilities. However, classical realists' and neorealists' views on the balance of power differ from each other. Neorealists believe in bipolarity as the most stable model while classical realists prefer multipolarity (Waltz, 1999, p.694). Either way, there is no guarantee of peace and war remains a constant threat. The balance of power theory assumes that survival shapes the motivation of states in an anarchic system "where no external guarantee of survival exists (Waltz, 1967, p.1)". For Waltz, the balance of power policies require at least three or more states (1967, p.2). Furthermore, the constraints of balance of power politics indicate that

each state must fend for themselves and try to maintain their own existence. External constraints are seen to drive policy. But, as Waltz explains,

At the same time, the operation of balance of power politics is strangely truncated; for one essential means of adjustment is absent, and the operation of other is severely restricted ... the old balance of power model of classical realism can not be applied without modification to world in which two states far exceed all others in force at their disposal (1967, p.3).

In a world where there are three or more powers, making and breaking alliances becomes possible. Therefore, in this circumstance, states seek to satisfy their partners in order to stay in the alliance. Neglecting the views of allies is possible if there is no need for military operations (Waltz, 1967, p.4). However, in an anarchic world this may not be possible. More recent realist work on the balance of power utilises offence-defence theory which clarifies the security dilemma. Offence-defence theory offers the view that wars can be prevented if defence becomes more advantageous than offence. Jervis's (1978) offence-defence theory identifies two main variables. The first is the offence-defence balance, the second is the differentiation between offensive and defensive postures.

By using these variables, Jervis creates four possible environments to characterise the security dilemma (Jervis, 1978, p.188). The first is where offensive-defensive behaviour is indistinguishable but offense has an advantage. The second environment is where offensive-defensive posture is indistinguishable but defence has an advantage. In this second environment, the security dilemma is still a problem but defensive advantage will give countries a chance to use their defensive capabilities. The third environment is where offensive-defensive posture is distinguishable and offence has an advantage. The

last environment is where offensive and defensive posture is distinguishable and defence has an advantage. For Jervis, this is the safest environment. In this environment, security dilemma may not have a big impact on countries because they can differentiate and analyse others' intentions in addition to investing in their defensive capabilities (Jervis, 1978, p.190).

Van Evera (2013) builds his ideas on Jervis's offence-defence theory and presents his own ideas in addition. He suggests that “though slighted or ignored by many realists, offense-defense theory is the most powerful and useful realist theory on the causes of war” (Van Evera, 2013, p.117). For Van Evera, there are eleven war-causing effects when the conquest is easy. Firstly, states may pursue opportunistic expansion “because attempts at expansion succeed more often and so pay greater rewards (Van Evera, 2013, p.119)”. However, states may also pursue defensive expansion if they feel less secure. If states feel less secure, they may try to gain control of defensible areas and resources to decrease their neighbours' power. Insecurity may lead states to resist one another's expansion more fiercely. This is because states can transform small gains into greater ones and losses are less reversible” (Van Evera, 2013, p.125). Van Evera claims that allies can also support their allies more fiercely in this condition because their allies' loss may also mean their loss. According to Van Evera, first-move advantage creates the risk for a pre-emptive war because the situation may enable more territory to be defended. It may also make surprise attacks easier. For Van Evera, environment of opportunity and vulnerability can be problematic for declining states. For declining states, using force can be more efficient than peaceful approaches (2013, p.120).

A fait accompli may evoke better rewards for countries since they do not retreat without

huge loss; either a state concedes to others or a war results. Even though states negotiate with each other, because of the problem of cheating, states may violate agreements. States may make their defence policy secretive and that situation may increase the perception of mutual military calculations. An arms race is even harder to control and it raises the risk of wars. If their offence is in question, states may build larger forces and self-defence may get more difficult. Increased secrecy may also make countries over-armed and controlling arming is more difficult. Eventually, offence dominance is self-feeding considering all these factors (Van Evera, 2013, p.121). The offence-defence theory is more associated with a defensive realist understanding since defensive realism is about maximising security, making moderate policies and limiting aggressive power. Unlike defensive realism, offensive realism is more about maximising power in the anarchic environment without reference to context because of fears of states cheating.

Brown (1998) states that there is lack of confidence between states in the international system. The basis of this lack of confidence is the possibility of states behaving offensively. Therefore, because “it is always difficult to deter potential aggressors, states have ample reason to prepare for war” (Brown, 1998, p.336). Brown also argues that states in the international system aim to maximise their powers because if a state has a military advantage over other state, it may be more secure (1998, p.337). In such circumstances, states maximise their military powers to take advantage of each other. They may even go to war “if circumstances are right and victory seems likely” (Brown, 1998, p.337). For Brown, defensive realist understanding may lead to relative gain considerations and concerns about cheating which may make cooperation between states more possible (1998, p.338). With the help of cooperation or concerns of relative gains, states may focus more on economic partnership, make moderate policies and try

to limit the aggressive power through cooperation. Turkey's approach towards Libya during the Arab Spring justifies these assumptions. Even though Turkey played an important role as an actor in the Arab Spring, it did not directly intervene in Libya. The Turkish government maintained its pragmatism until Gaddafi's last days, because the Turkish FPE did not want to harm economic cooperation between the Gaddafi government and Turkey.

It should be noted that perception is the key element in the distribution of power and the security dilemma. Van Evera states that, if a state thinks that the offense is strong, they will more likely to act as it were (1998, p.6). For Van Evera, offence-defence theory has two variants: real and perceptual (1998, p.6). Moreover, Van Evera claims that "both the reality and the perception of easy conquest can be shaped by human action; hence offense-defense theory offers prescriptions for the dangers it frames" (1998, p.7). This conception is similar to neoclassical realism and its role for the FPE. To give an example for offence-defence theory, the changing tension between Turkey and Greece can be considered. Because Turkey is stronger than Greece militarily, it resists Greece's and other European countries' requests about the Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, because Greeks think that Turkey's power and development favours offence, they do not behave too aggressively, but instead try to improve their army - especially their airforce - as a result of dogfights over the Aegean sea.

Neoclassical realists do not mention the role of perception in terms of offence-defence theory. However, analysts like Van Evera think that perception matters in concern with offence-defence theory. Van Evera's ideas on perception demonstrates that the FPE's perception about international constraints decide what measure a state will take. If

executives perceiving the situation think that the situation favours offence, they may think that their state is in danger and this circumstance may create a security problem. As Van Evera states, perceived offence dominance may cause many wars as has been seen throughout history (1998, p.47).

Nonetheless, it may be claimed that offence-defence theory cannot simply be applied to terrorism or other issues related to unconventional warfare and asymmetric threats. The contemporary threats that states face are not always measurable and rational in traditional way. For example, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) do not have war planes or many of the weapons that Turkey has. Both terrorist organisations are ground attack forces. However, they try to expose the lack of security in Turkey by sending suicide bombers into metropolises and killing civilians. Those organisations are not subject to a rational deterrence and their militants believe that the act itself is a political outcome. Thus, offence-defence theory can not be applied to every scenario.

One of the other main differences between classical realists and neorealists is that neorealists do not consider human nature or domestic politics as drivers of foreign policy (Shimko, 1992, p.293). Instead, they emphasise the structure of the international system. Neorealists argue that the structure of the international system plays a vital role in determining relationships between states. Waltz (2010, p.57) describes the structure of the international system as 'non-hierarchical' and believes that every state has the same function. Therefore, cultural or ideological differences do not matter because the international structure creates same incentives for all great powers (Mearsheimer, 2013, p.83). For Waltz (2014, p.104), "a system is composed of a structure and interacting

units”. According to Waltz , the concept of structure is based on the fact that units may behave differently and in interacting produce different results. Structure defines arrangement of the parts in a system. But, it is not a collection of its institutions and such. Some parts of these arrangements can be defined with the help of the constitution of a state, but these arrangements may not be identical to the constitution. Waltz (2014) indicates that domestic politics is ordered hierarchically, the units of the system “stand vis-a vis each other in relations of super – and subordination” (Waltz, 2014, p.81). The principles of the system first gives information about how the parts of the system are related to one another and political actors differ according the limits of their authorities.

Waltz (2014) argues that the placement of the units is not fully defined by the system’s principles or differentiation of parts. The placement of the units may also “change by changes in their relative capabilities. In the performance of their functions, agencies may gain capabilities and lose them” (Waltz 2014, p.105). Because of the changes and the relative capabilities, units relations to each other may also change. Eventually, Waltz defines domestic political structure with the help of the principles, specifications of the units and distribution of the capabilities - anarchy entails the coordination between the units and implies their sameness (Waltz, 2014, p.109). Waltz also argues that power is about comparing the capabilities of different units (Waltz, 2014, p.110). The distribution of capabilities is a system-wide concept for Waltz and variation of the structure is introduced by the distinctions between the units considering their capabilities. Any changes in the distribution of capabilities may be the changes of the system as the system can be anarchic or hierachic (Waltz, 2014, p.112).

Considering all of the above, Kenneth Waltz’s structural realist approach towards

foreign policy can also be examined. Telhami (2002) mentions two factors which infer possible state behaviour. These are *opportunities* and *preferences*. For Telhami, neorealism mostly focuses on opportunities. However, in terms of preferences, neorealists only assume that states seek self-protection (Telhami, 2002, p.160). Nonetheless, states may also have some other preferences which helps analysts to differ a state from another. For neorealists, relative material power can be the most important sign of influence in the anarchic world since it is both important for preferences and opportunities (Telhami, 2002, p.160). For Telhami, states expand their interests roughly by increasing their powers (2002, p.160). Distribution of capabilities in the state structure comes into account at that point. Telhami notes that different distribution of capabilities may alter the preferences of the states (2002, p.167). In a neorealist world, desire for security and relative power drives foreign policy in general (Telhami, 2002, p.163). However, it may also be noted that neorealists neglect domestic politics and do not consider it as a driver of foreign policy. This may indicate neorealism's lack of assumptions to consider foreign policies of states as a whole. But, its assumptions may still help analysts to understand the foreign policy of some particular states, especially the smaller ones with a conflict within or near their borders.

Some neorealists like Gilpin (1983, 1984) also make economic arguments about the distribution of power such as trading, national resources and states' wealth. Gilpin mentions that the international political system creates a framework for economic activities (1983, p.295). For Gilpin, the international economy is not a separate or autonomous sphere as liberals argue (1983, p.295). Gilpin also suggests that economic forces have crucial effects on the distribution of power in the world and "they always work in the context of the political struggle among the groups and nations" (1983,

p.295).

Jakobsen's (2013) ideas on why the US is the strongest country in the world is a helpful example to demonstrate the significance of economic forces. Jakobsen implies that the US accounts for 40 percent of world military spending, rising to 65 percent when combined with its allies (Jakobsen also states the advantage that China has). According to Jakobsen, China's conscious translation of economic growth into military capacity makes the Chinese stand against the United States. Consequently, neorealism is not only about security and insecurity in military terms. It is also about economic issues which especially associate with the distribution of power in the world. It may also be said that economic issues have driven Turkish policy towards its application for membership of the European Union, a new relationship with key states in the Middle East under the AKP, and attempts to build trade patterns with Russia across the Black Sea as an alternative to the West European single market.

Neoclassical Realism

Neoclassical realism does not directly refute classical realism or neorealism but does not consider human nature. It provides a wider means of analysis for scholars to examine the foreign policies of states. In essence, neoclassical realism is about how leaders perceive international constraints and how they react to those constraints by considering internal dynamics as a source of information (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2009, p.22). According to the neoclassical realist theory, “leaders face a two level game while devising and implementing their countries' grand strategies” (Lobell et al, 2009, p.7). When leaders devise and implement a grand strategy, they should

respond to the external world and interpret the events in international politics by consulting the FPE. With the help of the FPE, they must also work through domestic factors and gain support from domestic actors.

Of Kenneth Waltz's 'three images' in *Man, the State and War* (1959), the second and third images can be used to understand the steps of neoclassical realism's foreign policy making - the second image is the level of the state, and the third image is the at level of international system p.239). For neoclassical realists, domestic actors or state structures have big impacts on the foreign policies of countries. However, neoclassical realists believe that leaders and the FPE are critical to Waltz' third image as they define national interests and decide the policy in addition to domestic actors and state structure. The FPE may consist of diplomats, intelligence officers and policy makers. Because one of the duties of the FPE is to maintain the balance of power, it is helpful to look at the issue of power in neoclassical realism. After that, the FPE's and leaders' role, domestic politics and international constraints can be examined.

Like other realist theories, neoclassical realism also centres on power in politics. Neoclassical realists believe that anarchy and power determine the security of a country and that security is critical in anarchy. Furthermore, because leaders are also interested in power in their countries, domestic politics may influence the foreign policy of states (Lobell et al, 2009, p.45). Even though neoclassical realism depends on neorealist ideas on anarchy, the relative distribution of power and accepts that states "become functionally alike due to the socialisation effect of anarchy" (Lobell et al, 2009, p.206), leadership and perception are seen as critically important. Jervis (2015, p.13) gives the

utmost importance to decision making analysis and claims that perception of the decision makers matters. According to neoclassical realism, during a military intervention or making foreign policy, leaders consult what they perceive to be national interests. Then, they try to pursue those interests in the light of domestic politics (Jervis, 2015, p.36).

Leaders' perceptions of national interests have a crucial role on foreign policies. Leaders or presidents have distinctive ideas and convictions on national security and foreign policy and these ideas and convictions may eventually turn into real policies and even military intervention (Jervis, 2015, p.145). In Turkey, Erdogan's ideas are very significant for making policies. Because he is the president of the country and implicitly assigns the prime minister and ministers as he wants as a result of his influence in the governing party, his ideas are the most likely to be turned into real policies. Because the former Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, could not negotiate outright with Erdogan on some issues, he had to resign even though he won the general election last year with 49 per cent of the vote. Even though Erdogan may need to listen the military's, the intelligence agency's and the minister of foreign affairs's suggestions, his Islamist and anti-Western background in politics can be seen to have crucial effects on the Turkish government's foreign policy decisions (Stone, 2015).

Domestic politics may also affect the FPE's perception of national interests. Leaders may consider domestic politics while making foreign policy because they need to mobilise and maintain domestic support to stay in power (Lobell et al, 2009, p.168). A good example of this would be Turkey's refusal to help the United States in 2003 when

Americans sought access to Iraq through Turkish territory. Turkey refused the US' demands with both government and opposition supporters joined together to support the government's decision. After 2011, the AKP had such a big majority that they became more confident and paid less attention to public opinion. This situation fits neoclassical realists' arguments that governments are more vulnerable to domestic opinion when they have small majorities. Only on very rare occasions in history, governments will continue to pursue unpopular policies if they think security reasons are strong enough, for example, the US' continued intervention in Vietnam.

Neoclassical realists believe that anarchy does not necessarily dictate how states should behave since states are free to experiment and emulate others' practices (Lobell et al, 2009, p.198). Unlike their shared beliefs on anarchy, neoclassical realists' perceptions about the balance of power differs more from neorealists' claims on it. Instead of conventional balance of power theories, Lobell et al (2009, p.54) argue that the FPE and leaders "do not balance against aggregate or net shifts in power alone", they also define threats based on specific components of other state's power. According to Lobell et al (2009), the FPE and leaders make policies to address components of other state's power. This is part and parcel of offence-defence analysis and the importance of perception. The FPE and leaders also respond to shifts in the distribution of power that may threaten their specific strategic interests. 'Components' may refer to shifts in territory, population, ideology or military power (Lobell et al, 2009, p.55) meaning that different components of power in a country may trigger different threats to societal groups in other countries. Thus, leaders and their executives are always under pressure from societal groups. The FPE may need to conduct coalitions with some societal actors before implementing a theory. Therefore, states, leaders and the FPE are not

autonomous from international politics and domestic factors when they decide which policy to implement. It creates a big responsibility for the FPE in a state because neoclassical realists believe that the FPE are the central decision makers since they sit at where domestic and international politics merge (Lobell et al, 2009, p.56). One of the main duties of the FPE is to maintain their nations' power and interests. The FPE are responsible for deciding grand strategy and to pursue the national interest. But the FPE seek to guard their autonomy and they do not want to share their authority in general.

In order to pursue national interests, leaders and the FPE make foreign policies and may even engage in military intervention abroad. When states involve themselves in military intervention, they want to control and shape the international environment (Rose, 1998, p.152). Turkey's incursion into Northern Iraq in 2008 was a sign that Turkey wanted to have a say in the future of the region. Turkey's intervention in Bosnia in 1993, also demonstrated Turkey's desire to shape the external environment. However, if they decide to use military force, leaders of states should consider the material power of both their own state and other states (Rose, 1998, p.150). The FPE also need to assess other states' intentions but sometimes they may evaluate other states' intentions and relative power. If they do so, it would be difficult for them to understand a country's foreign policy and it may endanger their own country's sovereignty.

Mandelbaum (1988, p.2) mentions that the security policies of strong states are different from those of weak ones and both may differ from the security policies of states which are neither strong nor weak. According to Gilpin (1983, pp. 22-23), economically and militarily stronger states may pursue bigger security and welfare aims. However, grand

strategy is not only about the military. It may also be political and economical. Furthermore, it should be noted that grand strategies may be created by long term planning. Thus, the FPE can affect their country's future for decades. Turkey's application for associate membership in the European Economic Community in 1959 was the beginning of Turkey's attempts to join Europe. This still affects Turkish foreign policy today and the constraints the EU has imposed are important in Ankara's policy making. Additionally, the FPE mostly focus on “which components of power are increasing relative to their own” (Lobell et al, 2009, p.62). However, neoclassical realists claim that regimes may not function as unitary actors. Elites' and politico-military institutions' disagreement about international threats, division in the leadership and state's vulnerability to the events may prevent leaders and the FPE from implementing a policy.

If leaders fail to respond to systemic incentives, they might endanger their states' survival (Rose, 1998, p.147). Turkey's failure to respond to the Kurdish declaration of autonomy in Northern Iraq in 2004, has affected Turkey's war against terrorism. Just as Turkey has opposed the birth of Kurdistan in Northern Iraq, it has opposed Kurdish autonomy in Northern Syria. Furthermore, leaders and the FPE may also need to predict the response of other countries after they implement a policy. According to neoclassical realists, if a leader gains more power in the country, s/he will seek power abroad. Similarly, if s/he loses power, her/his actions may also be in danger. As a decision maker of national interests, a leader should consider the support s/he may gain or lose from different units in society while making a policy. Units may not have direct effect on their members' voting behaviour, but if they have, it may affect the leader's power in policy making (Lobell et al, 2009, p.181). Because of that, leaders and the FPE should

pay attention to systemic pressures and translate them through domestic actors' perceptions and the structure of the state (Lobell et al, 2009, p.152). Social elites in a country may consist of internationalists or nationalists. While leaders and her/his executives plan a grand strategy, they should consider those social elites who seek more power in society. Decision makers may even use foreign policy as a tool in order to increase domestic support or, if they are afraid of losing the domestic support, they may change their countries' foreign policies. So, domestic politics plays a very important role in influencing the FPE.

Domestic politics has its actors and factors. Domestic factors consist of the media, public opinion, the legislature and organised interest groups. Domestic factors may spread with the help of media or organised interest groups such as political parties and NGOs (Snyder, 1991, p.316). Domestic actors consist of business groups, labour unions, political institutions and other interest groups. Political institutions - in the same way as domestic actors - may be the military, religious groups and the aristocracy. Neoclassical realists also pay attention to unit level variables which may include leadership change, economic situation, social standards and international prestige (Lobell et al, 2009, p.62). Neoclassical realists use variables to interpret states' external behaviour and also try to explain behaviour of the parts in the society and their relation to one another. Sometimes, executives of a country may have to negotiate with the domestic actors of a society in order to implement a policy or extract sources to implement policy choices (Lobell et al, 2009, p.197). If they feel in danger, social elites may disrupt policies made by the government because they are concerned about the political balance of power in the society. If power shifts from one group unit to another in a country, it may also have effects on another country's domestic politics. So, a

country's foreign policy is compounded with its domestic policies. As a result, “leaders can act internationally for domestic reasons or domestically for international purposes” (Lobell et al, 2009, p.147).

In order to understand the difference between neoclassical realism and other theories, the treatment of domestic factors by foreign policy analysts with the neoclassical realist position should be compared. The general difference between FPA and the neoclassical realist view is the role of the FPE, who interpret domestic variables in the neoclassical point of view whereas other FPA theorists try to give those variables a more autonomous impact. According to Breuning (2007, p.21), foreign policy analysis has the desire to understand the interactions of countries. It pays attention to decision makers as neoclassical realism does and assumes that foreign policies are determined by the “complex interplay of multiple factors” (Breuning, 2007, p.21). Breuning (2007) states that leaders always face domestic constraints when they make foreign policies. Leaders who make foreign policies should not only consider appropriate responses to situations abroad, but they should also consider how such responses will be received by the domestic audience (Breuning, 2007, p.116). In order to do that, executives may try to convince the legislature through the understanding of domestic constituencies outside the government (Breuning, 2007, p.116). A leader’s decision making may be affected by agencies that make up the government bureaucracy. Government agencies are the main source of information and they function as a constraint on leaders and her/his executives (Breuning, 2007, p.118). For Breuning, there may be different kinds of agencies such as insulated and embedded agencies. Insulated agencies are autonomous or independent entities and they have their own staff to involve in government bureaucracy. Embedded agencies are parts of larger entities and they are under the

influence of the organisations they are linked to. Both embedded and insulated agencies are idea-based organisations and serve specific goals.

Such domestic constituencies may put pressure on leaders and these pressures may be exerted by interest groups, the media and public opinion (Breuning, 2007, p.120).

Domestic audiences may affect the government's decisions on foreign policy to an extent depending on whether a society is democratic or non-democratic (Breuning, 2007, p.121) as in democratic countries with pluralistic systems, leaders tend to pay more attention to domestic audiences. According to Hudson (2013, p.128), as international constraints have an effect on domestic politics, domestic constraints also have an effect on international politics. Lobell et al (2009, p.188) claim that domestic groups may have a larger effect on foreign policy making while the government is vulnerable. Domestic politics and independent variables are more important for leaders during a crisis, a low majority in the parliament or an election. For example, After the general election in Turkey on 7 June 2015, the AKP lost its majority in the parliament and could not build a majority government. Most of the votes that the AKP lost were won by the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The AKP's biggest loss, despite the MHP's progress, was the reaction of the Turkish public against the peace process with PKK terrorists. Then, the AKP realised that it had to change its policies towards the Kurdish problem. Therefore, the elected government ruled by the AKP broke down the peace process with the PKK and launched military operations in the eastern part of Turkey again. As a result, the AKP won the votes that it lost whereas the MHP lost a big amount of votes at the general election held on 1 November 2015.

According to Lobell et al (2009), domestic groups who want to affect policy making

should have a deterrent power such as manipulation of votes, media organisations or physical power such as military's armed power against the government during a military coup. For foreign policy analysts, even though domestic actors do not have enough power to remove a leader or decrease the government's power, they may still affect foreign policy making. For FPA, with the help of bureaucracy, domestic groups may directly affect the policies made by the government. However, neoclassical realists believe that whether domestic groups may affect policies or not is up to the FPE who interpret domestic constraints. For example, Erdogan's insistency on offering citizenship to Syrian refugees still continues in spite of the negative reaction by the Turkish people.

Unlike neorealists who neglected the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy, neoclassical realists try to explain how domestic political factors affect foreign policy and which domestic groups matter most (Lobell et al, 2009, p.42). Even though domestic factors and actors are usually considered seperately, "they share common aspects that make it appropriate to treat them together" (Lobell et al, 2009, p.170). For example, public opinion does not function by itself, it needs to be spread through the media and its representatives in the legislature. It may also be noted that even non-democratic countries take domestic politics into consideration while making policy because, even in non-democratic countries, military, economic elites and public may affect the power of leaders. The main aim of domestic actors is therefore to influence the decisions of the FPE. Domestic actors such as the military, business and religious groups may also affect the leadership's power if they feel in danger.

As a decision maker, the FPE and state leaders should pay attention to both these

incentives and international constraints. Otherwise, they may not only lose power, but also risk the continuance of their previous actions too. Almost every domestic group has an interest in foreign policy and foreign security policy. These groups may have concerns about their power, privilege or any specific issue related to them. According to Lobell et al (2009), interest groups who can change their members' voting preference may have the bigger impact on influencing policies. Some groups such as ethnic diasporas or a group who has a “important voter base in strategic regions” may have greater influence than other groups (Lobell et al, 2009, p.182) – the Kurds in the eastern part of Turkey are a good example. However, in order to affect policy making as it is defined above, a society should first be democratic. In non-democratic states, the leadership's desire to maintain its power may also help domestic groups to influence policies. But those groups need to have ultimate power to select, support or remove leaders (Lobell et al, 2009). If they cannot select, support or remove leaders in democratic ways, domestic groups can even find undemocratic ways to do it - those who have joined the PKK terrorist group in the eastern part of Turkey can serve as an example of this.

Domestic actors' influences on foreign policy and foreign security policy may change depending on time periods. Domestic actors may have more influence over policy making during stable periods since the FPE may ignore domestic political interests if the state's security is at risk (Lobell et al, 2009, p.186). Sometimes structural autonomy exists in states too. The FPE may behave independently while making policy if their government is not vulnerable, not in coalition or not facing big reactions from the public. Lobell et al (2009) claim that leaders may be more responsive to domestic incentives and even choose riskier policies if they feel that power is slipping from their

hands (Lobell et al, 2009, p.173). If the FPE work in a coalition government or their party does not have a big majority in parliament, the FPE may be more eager to listen to domestic actors while making foreign policy.

Conclusion

Neoclassical realism is a helpful theory to analyse Turkish foreign policy between 2011 and 2016. Through neoclassical realist views, the influence of domestic politics, how the FPE perceive national interests with the help of domestic politics, and the effects of international constraints can be analysed. The FPE's perception of national interests in Turkey are shaped by domestic and external constraints in addition to the world view and political background of their leaders. Domestically, the pressure of domestic groups and the government's concerns about re-election are important to our understanding of the perceptions of the FPE in Turkey. Turkey's EU membership process, and its relations with the US and NATO can be considered as examples of some of the external constraints faced by Turkey. Those external constraints will be used as case studies to advance this research. Such case studies will help us understand the impact of domestic incentives on foreign policy making and how the leadership affect the AKP's decisions. The aim of this theory chapter was to provide theoretical examination of external constraints in terms of what they are and how they can be understood. The realist school of thought takes external constraints very seriously but neoclassical realism takes the interpretation of these constraints a step further by re-introducing leadership from the classical realist school. The perception of leaders needs to be highlighted even more in the Turkish case.

Chapter Two: The AKP leadership's vision and direction

The vision of the AKP's leaders, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ahmet Davutoglu, can be seen to have played a crucial role in the making of Turkish foreign policy in the period of 2002 to 2016. Erdogan and Davutoglu sought a more autonomous Turkish foreign policy despite external constraints. This chapter will analyse the ideas, objectives and vision of the AKP leadership. In order to do that, the historical roots of the AKP and its leaders will be examined. The chapter will also focus on the foreign policy chapter in the AKP's Party Programme. Furthermore, the political backgrounds of the AKP leaders, their speeches and written works will be observed.

The AKP is a right-wing political party which was established in 2001. Most of founding members of the party consisted of people who had political backgrounds in old right-wing parties such as the True Path Party (DYP), the Welfare Party (RP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP) (Saydamer, 2003). Even though the DYP and the ANAP had a more Western-inspired and pro-European Union vision of foreign policy, the RP could be described as an Islamist and anti-Western party (Gulalp, 1999, pp.22-23). Davutoglu and Erdogan's understanding of foreign policy began in the RP.

The foreign policy orientation of the RP was designed to create an independent foreign policy which foresaw a leading role for Turkey (Bilgin, 2008, p.409). The RP also aimed to create the World Union of Muslim Countries and place Turkey within it rather

than developing political relations with the European Union, which the RP's executives saw as a 'Christian Club' (Bilgin, 2008, p.409). 'The National Outlook' ideology of the RP sought "nationalism underlying the manifesto blended religiosity with anti-westernization" (Yildiz, 2008, p.201). The RP's Party Programme divided political positions into two and differentiated between the 'National Outlook' and the 'imitators' who copied the West (Bilgin, 2008, p.409). The Party's manifesto also criticised the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU and proposed an Islamic common market instead of those organisations (Bilgin, 2008, p.409).

The AKP's 2002 foreign policy manifesto differed from the RP's foreign policy views in terms of positive relations with Western countries. This is probably because the RP was banned by the constitutional court in Turkey and the AKP could not repeat the mistakes of the Welfare Party. The AKP's Party Programme emphasised the importance of globalisation and the importance of relations with the EU, the United States, Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus is also mentioned in the AKP's programme (Bilgin, 2008, p.412). However, just like the RP's Party Programme manifesto, the AKP's Party Programme also includes an emphasis on the leadership role for Turkey in its region and the world ("Party Programme", n.d.). Even though the AKP's Programme includes the significance of maintaining relations with financial organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank, Erdogan's speeches about such organisations have revealed his true intentions about the AKP's foreign policy orientation. After Turkey had repaid the debt it owed to the IMF, Erdogan announced that "Turkey had left the IMF hospital and began to show better economic performance" (Yasar, 2013).

In contrast with his party's programme, Erdogan has also begun to fiercely criticise the

EU and the US in recent years. In 2016, for example, he said: “We will go our way, you go yours” (“Turkey’s Erdogan takes tough EU line after PM quits”, 2016). Erdogan also blamed the US and questioned its sincerity because of American help for the Kurds in Syria (Botelho, 2016). Even though the AKP’s Party Programme emphasises the importance of Western-led policies and good relations with the Western world, the AKP leaders’ speeches show that Turkish foreign policy sought a different direction. Thus, it can be noted that AKP leaders may make foreign policy decisions regardless of the Party Programme. Therefore, the leaders’ own vision may be more important than a Party Programme or election manifesto. The AKP leaders may also have consultants working with them. However, even though Erdogan might be consulting some academics and diplomats close to him, he may be seen as the final decision maker in Turkish foreign policy. Therefore, the FPE in Turkey can be considered as some academics and diplomats, but Erdogan’s crucial impact on decision making may let him ignore the wider FPE.

A leader’s political background plays an important role in shaping their vision. Because their political careers began in the RP, Erdogan and Davutoglu’s visions differ from the views written in the AKP’s Party Programme. However, as shown in the theory chapter, the FPE may behave independently while making foreign policy if their government is not vulnerable. The AKP leaders felt more confident to put their vision into words and actions after gaining more support from the Turkish people at the 2011 elections. Therefore, they began to implement policies regardless of the Party Programme.

Ahmet Davutoglu - who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs between 2009 and 2014, and Prime Minister between 2014 and 2016 - was not as active in politics as Erdogan

was. However, Tatlican's (2014) interview with Davutoglu's aunt shows that Davutoglu was also interested in politics and had applied to the RP to be a councillor when he was young. Over time, Davutoglu had begun to become more active in Turkish politics and had a good political career. After he became a professor in 1999, Ahmet Davutoglu began to work as a consultant to Abdullah Gul who was Prime Minister in 2002. Therefore, it can be said that Davutoglu had been influencing decision making in Turkish foreign policy between 2002 and 2016. He has been described as the "intellectual architect of Turkish foreign policy" (Aras, 2009, p.127). After he became the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009, Davutoglu had a chance to put his vision into practice. Davutoglu's vision has been claimed to consist of principles such as neo-Ottomanism (Daloglu, 2013) and pan-Islamism (Par, 2015) typically demonstrated in support for the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East.

Ahmet Davutoglu's vision of Turkish foreign policy may be best understood by analysing his 'Strategic Depth' doctrine. Davutoglu's 'Strategic Depth' seeks to position Turkey as an actor in the centre of international politics as it is at the intersection of multiple regions. According to Davutoglu, after the Cold War, Turkey has a greater role in the Middle East (Walker, 2011, p.6). This view may be intertwined with the idea neo-Ottomanism since he thinks that Turkey is particularly endowed because of both its geopolitical position and its historical legacy as an heir to the Ottoman Empire (Walker, 2011, p.7). According to 'Strategic Depth', Turkey is not dependent on the Western world, therefore it should balance its relationships and alliances and also "harken back to the days of the Ottoman Empire but more importantly of a self-confident regional power" (Walker, 2011, p.8). Davutoglu's doctrine requires Turkey to be based on

‘Ottoman glorification’ and ‘zero problems’ with its neighbours. However, because of the conflicts in the Middle East, Davutoglu’s aim of having ‘zero problems’ with neighbours did not work permanently and was instead turned into a more pro-active approach in different regions of the world. In an April 2012 speech, Davutoglu was more specific about his regional ambitions:

On the historic march of our holy nation, the AK Party signals the birth of a global power and the mission for a new world order. This is the centenary of our exit from the Middle East ... whatever we lost between 1911 and 1923, whatever lands we withdrew from, from 2011 to 2023 we shall once again meet our brothers in those lands. This is an obligatory historic mission. (Bekdil, 2015).

Davutoglu states that a country such as Turkey which is both European and Asian and is also close to Africa through the Eastern Mediterranean, “cannot define itself in a defensive manner” (Davutoglu, 2008, p.78). Davutoglu remarks that a pro-active understanding of Turkish foreign policy may make Turkey a more meaningful contributor to the EU and NATO (Kozakou-Marcoullis, 2009, p.4). Even though Davutoglu seemed to support Turkey’s rapprochement with the Western world (Davutoglu, 2009, p.11), Erdogan’s views on the issue overbore Davutoglu’s in the AKP government. As a result of disagreement on several issues between Davutoglu and Erdogan, Davutoglu had to resign (“The Removal of Turkish PM Davutoglu”, 2016). After the AKP faced the threat of losing its power at the 2015 general elections, problems between Erdogan and Davutoglu turned into growing friction (McLean, 2016) and it led to the removal of Davutoglu from the premiership. Even though Davutoglu was believed to be the ‘intellectual architect’ of the AKP foreign policy, Erdogan’s insistency on the ‘one man leadership’ in government led to a break down between two statesmen. That is why the removal of Davutoglu from the premiership is named as a ‘palace coup’ in the media (Letsch, 2016). As stated in the theory chapter, regimes do

not function as unitary actors. The division in the leadership and the government's vulnerability seems to have prevented Davutoglu from implementing policies after the election held on 1 November 2015. Furthermore, it may be claimed that Erdogan did not want to share his authority with Davutoglu as the FPE always seek more power. This situation led to Davutoglu's resignation.

It can be said that Erdogan has been directing AKP foreign policy as much as Davutoglu between 2002 and 2016. It is true that Davutoglu was the 'intellectual architect' of AKP foreign policy, but Erdogan seems to be the 'eternal leader' for most AKP supporters (Akyol, 2015). Therefore, his vision can be much more effective than Davutoglu's in the making of Turkish foreign policy. Even though their visions are similar to one another, it can be noted that Davutoglu is described as less authoritarian and more moderate by many analysts (Malsin, 2016; Mills, 2016; Tol, 2016). It can be said that Erdogan has a more Islamist, anti-Western view of the world compared to Davutoglu. After 2011, Erdogan's Turkey has come to a point that "were Turkey applying for NATO membership today, it would have little chance of success" since NATO members are required to have

stable democratic systems, pursue the peaceful settlement of territorial and ethnic disputes, have good relations with their neighbours, show commitment to the rule of law and human rights, establish democratic and civilian control of their armed forces, and have a market economy ("Running out of friends", 2016).

Erdogan has such a critical approach towards the Western world that the relationship between Turkey and its allies has declined. Turkey's relations with the US, the EU and NATO have been in tension since Erdogan became President of Turkey in 2014. The reasons why Turkey's relationship with its allies have worsened are linked to Erdogan's

vision of Turkey's role in the world. Yesiltas (2014, p.27) suggests that "Turkey's leaders have exaggerated their foreign policy capacity, leading to excessive self-confidence in their ability to solve regional problems". For Yesiltas, Erdogan's 'rigid' political discourse is also a problem (2014, p.27). Erdogan's speeches accusing the EU and the US for being insincere about their alliance with Turkey may actually reflect Erdogan's real vision of Turkish foreign policy.

In one of his speeches, Erdogan claimed that the EU does not accept Turkey as a member because Turks are Muslims ("Erdogan: "Europe, you don't want us because we're Muslim", 2016). These words may be a reference to Erdogan's political background as his old party, the RP, saw the EU as a 'Christian Club'. Erdogan also threatened the EU by saying that he may take Turkey to a referendum to ask the public whether people want to continue negotiations with the EU ("Erdogan: "Europe, you don't want us because we're Muslim", 2016). In one of his speeches after the coup attempt had failed, Erdogan told the EU and US to "mind their own business" (*Agence France-Presse*, 2016). Erdogan also declared that he would put the refugees in buses and ship them to Europe since the EU has not paid for the migration deal as promised (Tastekin, 2016).

The AKP government's approach towards the United States in recent years is also interesting. After the failed coup attempt by a Gulenist religious group in Turkey on 15 July 2016, the Turkish Minister of Labour and Social Security, Suleyman Soylu, a close Erdogan associate, claimed that the US was behind the coup attempt (Kotsev and Dyer, 2016). Erdogan's demands on the US to extradite Fethullah Gulen, by questioning the partnership between Turkey and the US, underpin Soylu's claims (Sanchez and

McKenzie, 2016). Erdogan also questioned the US' alliance with Turkey in the recent past by asking "Hey America! Are you together with us or are you with the PYD?" ("*Ey Amerika! Size kac kere soyledim?* [Hey America, How many times have I had tell you?]", 2016). Erdogan's speeches addressing the EU and the US show the anger and dissatisfaction that Erdogan has against the West while rapprochement with Russia and Iran has added to the friction with Washington.

However, this rhetoric may only be for satisfying a domestic audience whereas the real policies of a leader could be different. Robert Putnam's (1988) two-level game theory explains this situation. According to Putnam, leaders seek power by constructing coalitions with domestic groups at the national level. At the international level, they seek to maximise their abilities to satisfy domestic pressures and minimise the adverse consequences of foreign developments (Putnam, 1988, p.434). Both games should be considered by decision-makers in order to increase and maintain their powers (Putnam, 1988, p.434). However, Putnam suggests that the domestic audience may tolerate differences in rhetoric between the two games (1988, p.434). Thus, leaders may speak in a different way than s/he acts in order to satisfy the domestic audience. For example, even though Erdogan's rhetoric raised the tension between Israel and Turkey in 2010, the volume of trade between those countries actually increased 26% in the same year ("*Turkiye-Israel ticaret hacminde %26 artis*", 2016). According to *Hurriyet*, the military relationship between Israel and Turkey also continued immutably despite the diplomatic crisis between two countries ("Israel: relations with Turkey continues", 2010). These examples show that Erdogan tries to continue diplomatic relations with the countries which he seems to vilify. But, in order to satisfy the diplomatic audience, he also verbally attacks some other countries. However, even if the Turkish FPE do not

play a two-level game, could be argued that Erdogan lays out his vision by attacking Turkey's traditional allies verbally, but external constraints do not let him put his vision fully into practice.

The AKP leaders' vision has had a very significant effects on Turkish foreign policy. Just as it may be difficult to label AKP foreign policy, it is also very difficult to label Erdogan and Davutoglu's vision due to rapid changes in Turkey's foreign policy. Despite the AKP's pro-Western foreign policy between 2002 and 2011, it can be said that its leaders' conceive a vision of "nationalism that includes an essential component of being Muslim" (Stevenson, 2016). The AKP's critical approach towards the US, NATO and the EU causes problems and discord between Turkey and its allies. The failed coup attempt in Turkey on 15 July 2016 may ruin Turkey's alliances with Western countries more than ever. After the coup attempt which killed more than 200 civilians, it can be claimed that Turkey has lack of civilian control over its armed forces. Furthermore, the three month state of emergency declared after the coup attempt concerns international organisations such as the EU, NATO and the UN because more than "60,000 bureaucrats, soldiers, policemen, prosecutors and academic staff have come under the government's spotlight." (Shaheen, 2016). The detention of these staff, their suspension from employment, and their imminent prosecution has caused concern in Western circles. Erdogan's closure of media outputs and his reintroduction of the debate over the death penalty has caused alarm in the EU.

Conclusion

Even though we cannot simply label the AKP foreign policy as pan-Islamist or neo-

Ottomanist, it is certain that the AKP leaders have been trying to change Turkey's foreign policy orientation by putting their vision into practice. It is not easy to label Erdogan and Davutoglu's vision either, but it could be said that AKP leaders have a sense of fundamentalism and moral conservatism in their vision. Therefore, Erdogan and Davutoglu's vision tilt Turkey away from its traditional Western allies whilst simultaneously leading to intimacy between Turkey and countries such as Russia, Iran and China.

The aim of this chapter was to examine the vision of the AKP leadership. This chapter also sought to analyse leaders' vision by investigating their political backgrounds, their speeches and written works. The official programme of the AKP and election manifesto of the RP was also viewed in this chapter. The next chapter will focus on the role of external constraints in contemporary Turkish foreign policy and the utility of neoclassical realist theory.

Chapter Three: The Role of External Constraints in the making of Turkish foreign policy

In structural realism, external constraints play a crucial role in deciding a state's foreign policy. In neoclassical realism, while external constraints can be seen to be the primary driver of foreign policy, it is the perception of those constraints by the FPE which is critical. This chapter will try and examine the role of external constraints in contemporary Turkish foreign policy and compare that with the vision of Erdogan and Davutoglu. In this chapter, the changes in the international structure since the Cold War will be considered and the specific regional constraints that confront Turkey will be examined.

In his article, *The Emerging Structure of International Politics*, Waltz (1993) mentions that the multipolar era consisted of twelve great powers before the Second World War . At the beginning of the Second World War, seven great powers remained and during the Cold War there were only two great powers (Waltz, 1993, p.44). According to Waltz (1993, p.45), after the Second World War, “the behaviours of states, the patterns of their interactions and the outcomes of those interactions had been repeatedly continued despite the changes in the internal composition of states”. Bipolarity conditioned the international system, not just for the superpowers, but smaller powers, such as Turkey, also had to operate in this East-West structure. For Ankara, the Cold War simplified external constraints. Furthermore, strategies and alliances such as NATO enabled Turkey to pursue a defined foreign policy.

Whilst the Western orientation of Turkey was occasionally challenged by events such as the Cyprus dispute for most of the period up to 1990, foreign policy making was conducted against a very clear and simplistic context. But when the Cold War and the threat of the Soviet Union ended, a new structure emerged. One interpretation was that it provided an opportunity for fulfilling the liberal goal of the United Nations (The UN).

When we are successful – and we will be – we have a real chance at this New World Order. An order in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping forces to fulfill the promise and vision of its founders. (George H.W. Bush, 1991).

The reality has been somewhat different as power politics has continued, albeit in a new and more complex international system. For Ankara, the post-Cold War period produced a context in which constraints multiplied. As Davutoglu pointed out, Turkey lies amongst a number of regional systems, not least the Middle East (Walker, 2011, p.7). Aydin (2013) states that Turkey had a much more problematic time with its Middle Eastern neighbours than during the Cold War era and the Turkish FPE have been “much more occupied with the problems emanating from Iran, Iraq, Syria, and the PKK” (Aydin, 2013, p.478). Without the Cold War defining its boundaries, Ankara now faced numerous dilemmas in security relations as it is on the front line for NATO in the Middle East (by bordering Syria) and its bipolar relationship with Russia in the Black Sea. Turkey’s bid for accession to the EU was not successful and its relationship with the US became strained as Americans intervened in the Persian Gulf. Whilst the 1991 intervention with Iraq to liberate Kuwait did not transform Turkish-American relations, the 2003 war did as the Kurdish regional government was born in Northern Iraq following the regime change. Furthermore, American allegiance to that region of Iraq not only challenged its traditional relationship with Ankara but it reopened the Kurdish question for Turkey. Thus, Turkish alignment with the West was challenged by

processes of external change even before the AKP came into power in the country.

At the same time as the power structure changed, there has also been certain changes in the understanding of security. The security dilemma which traditionally faced Turkey was the classic dilemma defined by Jervis (1978), Van Evera (2013) and Brown (1998), namely in the form of other states. Nonetheless, new understandings of security developed as intrastate conflict spilled over borders. For example, ethnic conflict in Bosnia prompted Turkish intervention (alongside the international community) partly because of the potential for the Bosnian problem to engulf the entire Balkan region in conflict. However, there are other emerging dimensions of security and regionalism has become more important. It is also that security has been redefined in the post-Cold War period since it now has a human security dimension, a clear economic focus as well as a military state security. Therefore, the new agenda for Ankara is multilevel, ranging from societal groups to states, regions and global considerations (Carr and Massey, 2006, p.137). For example, Ankara's economic interests are now more important than surviving as a sovereign state in the Cold War. Ankara also has to respond to sub-state security issues in neighbouring states, particularly the Kurdish issue, by considering its economic interests and human rights issues.

Both structural and neoclassical realism partly describe the above, but do not yet fully integrate new security agendas. Neoclassical realism is probably more helpful because the perception of external constraints is more central to the analysis. In the Cold War era, external constraints were easy to perceive. In this new complex, multi-issue and multi-level world, they are very difficult to understand. Domestic politics can also be considered as more important in a world where there are risks rather than threats.

Consequently, it would be difficult enough for any Turkish government to successfully operate in a new era of multiple constraints and multiple understandings of security in the new agenda.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, key parts of the AKP leaders' vision are autonomy, Islamism (Par, 2015; Kessler, 2016; Dombey, 2014; Sambur, 2016) and neo-Ottomanism (Walker, 2011; Daloglu, 2013). However, some scholars single-mindedly described the AKP as a party that is conservative "in respect of Islamic base" (Aydin, 2013, p.478), or a nationalist party "that includes an essential component of being Muslim" (Stevenson, 2016). Ozbudun (2014, p.156) even claimed that the AKP's course of action may be described as electoral authoritarianism of a more markedly Islamic character. In the Turkish case, it could be claimed that the Turkish FPE may seem to pursue their vision while deciding Turkish foreign policy. For example; in a world of complex constraints, the AKP appears to be more concerned with their vision than pragmatism. In order to test this proposition, we will look two case studies, one on the EU membership application, and one on the Syrian Kurds.

In order to be a member of the EU, Turkey has to fulfill the conditions in the Copenhagen Criteria whilst also developing good relations with the member states. Similarly, Turkey has to implement consistent foreign policies with its allies in NATO. As stated in the previous chapter, NATO members also need to

have a stable democracy, pursue the peaceful settlement of territorial and ethnic disputes, have good relations with their neighbours, show commitment to the rule of law and human rights, establish democratic and civilian control of their armed forces, and have a market economy ("Running out of friends", 2016).

However, it should be noted that NATO membership could not prevent political turmoil in Turkey, nor did it prevent intra-regional disputes between Turkey and its neighbours (Carr, 1998, p.165). Turkey's relations with the EU and the US seem to have broken down because the Turkish FPE has interpreted external constraints in accordance with their own vision. Under the AKP, the Turkish FPE sought more autonomy for Turkey, they did not pay enough attention to the constraints that Turkey faced, and neglected the expectations of their allies. What the EU and NATO requires from Turkey is a commitment to the rule of law, human rights and democracy, protection of minorities, civilian control over the armed forces, having an open market, and implementing external policies in accordance with theirs ("Accession Criteria", n.d.). Turkey is claimed to have problems with every single condition which are stated above except for having an open market. In the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)'s scorecard in 2015, it is stated that "Turkey has largely regressed on the rule of law, civil liberties, separation of powers, and freedom of expression" ("European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2015", 2015). In the scorecard, social media bans, obstruction of the investigation of corruption allegations, and prohibitions including expressing critical opinions of authorities in Turkey are mentioned ("European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2015", 2015).

The European Commission declared in its 2014 progress report on Turkey that the press is not free in Turkey ("Turkey Progress Report", 2014). The 2014 progress report on Turkey also reported that the internet in Turkey is not completely free whilst police operations against the media and imprisonment of the journalists are also worrisome ("Turkey Progress Report", 2014). Similarly, after the failed coup attempt by the Gulenist terrorist organisation (FETO), the Turkish government's purge of top officers

in the army and government agencies also have raised an alarm in Europe and NATO:

German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Thursday urged Turkey to show restraint in pursuing coup plotters, voicing concern about a widening crackdown, reverberating beyond the military as the government suspends more than 66,000 civil servants and seizes institutions from media outlets to schools and hospitals. (Peker, 2016).

The US central command commander, General Joseph Votel stated at the Aspen Security Forum meeting that he is concerned about the restraints' impacts on their relationship with Turkey (Peker, 2016). This situation has also affected Turkey's deal with the EU on visa-free travel. Easing visa requirements for Turkish citizens was one of the incentives promised in return of the Turkish help with the refugee crisis (Pitel and Brunsden, 2016). In exchange, the EU requested an amendment in counter-terror law in Turkey. However, the Turkish government is reluctant to make amendments in its counterterror law because it is against Turkey's national interests (Pitel and Brunsden, 2016).

The EU's demands of amending the counterterror law in Turkey also brings Turkey's problems with the Syrian Kurds into question. It seems that Turkey failed to convince its allies to recognise the People's Protection Unit (YPG) as a terrorist organisation. Even though Turkey sees the YPG as an extension of the PKK in Syria, the US State Department and Pentagon warned Turkey to stop shelling the YPG (BBC Monitoring, 2016). The EU also called on Turkey to "stop shelling Syrian territory and refrain from further complicating the efforts of world powers to halt the hostilities" (BBC Monitoring, 2016). Its allies' support towards the YPG may show that Turkey's national interests are in contradiction with its allies' interests in Syria.

It should be remembered that the AKP may have had to stop the peace process with the

Kurds in Turkey because of the huge loss in its votes at the June 2015 general elections (MacAskill, 2015; Dalay, 2015; Laub, 2015). The Turkish public's reaction against the AKP at the June 2015 general elections, which possibly occurred as a result of the Kurdish peace process, might also be considered as the reason of Turkey's aggression against the YPG in Syria. If the AKP leaders had compromised with Turkey's allies and had stopped shelling the YPG in Syria, they might have lost the support of nationalist individuals and groups domestically. This shows that domestic politics can be important than external constraints in the making of Turkish foreign policy.

As stated in the theory chapter, because leaders are interested in power in their countries, domestic politics may influence the foreign policy of states (Lobell et al, 2009, p.45). Leaders decide what they perceive to be national interests. After they decide what their national interests are, they try to pursue those interests in the light of domestic politics (Jervis, p.2015, p.36). Erdogan's criticism against Israel in the past was also interpreted as an action to drum up domestic political support (Kirisci and Ekim, 2015). However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, AKP leaders may also be playing a two-level game in the making of foreign policy, just as they did in the Turkish-Israeli case.

Robert Putnam (1988, p.454) states that international pressures may reverberate in domestic politics, "tipping the domestic balance and thus influencing the international negotiations". Frohn and Staeglin (1980) quote Dieter Hiss' words that countries do not violate their own interests, but their interests may change during international summits (Frohn and Staeglin, 1980, p.286). Putnam states that messages from abroad may change citizens' minds, move the undecided and encourage those in the domestic

majority (1988, p.455). Putnam also suggests that a leader's preferences about an issue may diverge from people in her/his society (1988, p.456). Furthermore, international negotiations may enable leaders to do what they "privately" wish to do but are powerless to do domestically (Putnam, 1988, p.457). In the international context, leaders may also pursue their own conception of national interests rather than their people's perceptions (Putnam, 1988, p.457).

In Putnam's article on two-level game theory, *Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games*, it is noted that, even though leaders may be reluctant to endorse an international deal for the sake of their power in domestic politics, they may be willing to risk a few of their supporters (1988, p.458). Furthermore, if there is an assumption that a leader is an honest broker and is acting on behalf of her/his constituents, the domestic audience may be readier to acquiesce to the international agreement. The AKP leaders' deal with the EU, despite their rhetoric against Europe, may be a good example of Putnam's point of view on bargaining between leaders and domestic audiences. Even though many Turks do not welcome Syrian refugees in their countries (Simsek, 2015), visa-free travel to Europe may be seen as a factor to decrease their negative reactions against Syrians. Similarly, Erdogan's decision on rapprochement with Israel can be seen as a factor which may endanger Erdogan's popularity for nationalist and religious groups. However, Erdogan seems to have decided that improving relations with Israel is useful for Turkey's national interests in the Middle East.

The AKP leaders' relationships with the Kurds in Northern Syria and Northern Iraq are similar to Turkey's deals with the EU and Israel. Even though the AKP leaders regret

the Western support for the Kurds in Syria and have threatened to invade Syria if Kurdish autonomy is established under PYD rule, Gunes and Lowe (2015, p.10) state that Ankara agreed to let Iraqi Kurdish peshmergas cross Turkish territory to reach Kobane in Syria, on 1 November 2014. It should also be noted that the AKP government has maintained dialogues with the PYD despite their opposition to Kurdish autonomy in Syria. Gunes and Lowe (2015, p.9) also report that the PYD's co-president, Saleh Muslim, has visited Turkey several times since July 2013.

The AKP's approach towards external constraints is ultimately linked to domestic politics because the AKP's main focus on Turkey's problems - before November 2015 - seemed to be gaining the support that it lost at the previous election. Even though Turkey has strong economic relations with the Kurds in Northern Iraq (Fidan, 2016), the Turkish government preferred to oppose any kind of Kurdish forces around its borders regardless of those forces' relations with the PKK. In order to gain the votes of nationalists that it lost at the general elections in June 2015, the AKP government may have hardened its policies against the Kurds in Northern Iraq and Syria. The AKP's approach towards the Kurdish forces may not have changed after the elections, because the government is still fragile due to public pressure and the coup attempt. By considering these examples, it can be said that the AKP leaders play a two-level game in foreign policy making, except it is almost as if their international politics are the international politics of their domestic politics.

The AKP leaders' domestic politics seem to have a major role in what they are doing abroad whereas neoclassical realists would argue that the outside world should be determining what leaders do and domestic politics should only play a part under certain

conditions. The case of Turkey suggests that domestic politics may at times be more important than neoclassical realists suggest. Neoclassical realists mention the role of perception of the FPE, and they also suggest that leaders are forced to look at the external bids first and then to see the domestic consequences.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the role of external constraints that Turkey faces as a consequence of its relations with the EU and NATO and compared that with the AKP leaders' vision. What we have seen in Turkey's case is a period in which leaders consider domestic politics or their own vision first. External constraints may be of secondary importance for the AKP leaders. Therefore, Robert Putnam's two-level game theory has provided us more clues about the AKP leaders' foreign policy decisions. However, it should be noted that the AKP leaders' vision cannot be realised in this multi-level and complex order. The Middle East is too volatile, and the relations with the West are too difficult to manage since Turkey's interests under the AKP government are seen as much stronger than Western interests. In contemporary Turkish foreign policy, domestic politics seems to have played a much larger role than the theory of neoclassical realism would predict. The Kurdish question also seems to dominate Ankara's Syrian policy rather than the threat of ISIS which is the focus of both the US and Russia.

Conclusion

This dissertation focused on the significance of external constraints in the making of Turkish foreign policy. This research also investigated the role of the vision of the AKP leadership compared to external constraints as understood in neoclassical realism. It sought to analyse if Erdogan and Davutoglu's vision, personality and leadership have overridden domestic and external constraints.

What this dissertation suggests about the external constraints in foreign policy making is that how the FPE perceive those constraints is critical (Lobell et al, 2009, p.22).

Neoclassical realism can therefore make a major contribution to our understanding of foreign policy making. The majority of external constraints are a matter of perception for any government. Those that are visible are things that can be touched, felt and seen in paper such as legal agreements. But power boundaries and the security dilemma are a matter of perception as outlined in the theory chapter.

What is fundamental to a state's existence is essentially the perception of reading the behaviour of other states and the international structure. There may also be physical reminders of power boundaries, such as when states dispatch their navy, air force or military. But it is still a matter of interpretation, and of risk to that particular executive. Therefore, if external constraints are a matter of perception, the role of the FPE is critical. In the Turkish case, what is very interesting with the AKP is the degree to which they may be testing external constraints. Turkey's deal with the EU during the refugee crisis is a good example of this:

Erdogan sought to turn the tables on the EU by saying Turkey had every right to send the refugees out of the country if it so wished. “We do not have the word ‘idiot’ written on our foreheads. We will be patient but we will do what we have to. Don’t think that the planes and the buses are there for nothing,” Erdogan said (*Agence France-Presse*, 2016).

It can be argued that the AKP’s approach towards external constraints is not about ignoring those constraints, but manipulating them. It could also be claimed that Erdogan’s personality and vision might be considered as a factor which gives him confidence to test external constraints that other leaders may not challenge. Furthermore while the new security agenda of human rights and societal factors provide criteria for the Western states to judge Turkey e.g. its application for EU membership, Ankara still seems to be thinking in old terms such as state security and territorial integrity. As stated in the introduction, Turkey’s relations with the US, NATO and the EU are still important, but they have been critically interpreted by Erdogan and Davutoglu and measured against their vision of interests. Therefore, neoclassical realism is correct to stress the perception of the FPE. But in the Turkish case, it can be argued it does not give enough importance to domestic politics. Because it seems that domestic politics is not only important near elections, it is also important for the FPE’s perceptions. Therefore, when the FPE thinks that domestic politics is important, it becomes important. In the Turkish case, domestic politics has a much higher priority than neoclassical realists argue.

The great virtue of neoclassical realism is that it argues that the FPE’s perception of things really matters (Lobell et al, 2009, p.168). But it is not just their perception of the security dilemma and external constraints that matters, it is also their perception of domestic politics. For the AKP, their objectives and vision inside Turkey seem to drive

their foreign policy. It is not that domestic politics is driving them, but it is the importance they attach to their domestic needs which is driving their foreign policy.

Therefore, even though neoclassical realism is a major contribution to our understanding of foreign policy, the Turkish case shows us that neoclassical realist views of domestic politics needs to be expanded and Robert Putnam's (1988) two-level game theory is one way forward.

Putnam argues that "domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies" (1988, p.434). Putnam also suggests that politicians try to satisfy the domestic audience because they need to maximise their power (Putnam, 1988, p.434). According to Putnam's two-level game theory, leaders who represent their country have "no independent policy preferences, but seek simply to achieve an agreement that will be attractive to his constituents" (1988, p.435). Robert Putnam also suggests that domestic ratification of international agreements is also possible in democratic countries (1988, p.435). Putnam's two-level game theory accounts for the impacts of international constraints on domestic politics and gives the utmost importance to both international and domestic factors in foreign policy making (Wilson, 2010, p.54). Therefore, it could be said that Putnam's thesis is much more useful than neoclassical realism to show the relationship between leaders and domestic audiences. The two approaches would profit from greater integration.

The perception of domestic politics held by the leadership, influences foreign policy in ways that neoclassical realism does not discuss, though the 2015 elections, which neoclassical realists would look at, have clearly affected Turkey's policies against the

Kurds in Northern Syria and Iraq. In light of the Turkish case study, this work suggests that neoclassical realism should place greater emphasis on domestic politics. However, research into other states' foreign policies and case studies would be needed before one could generalise about any possible deficiencies of the general theory.

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