

THE ROLE OF FOREIGN AIDS IN STATE BUILDING
THE CASE OF SOMALIA

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY

BY
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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION

AUGUST 2018

DECLARATION

I declare here that all information in this thesis is my own original work. I have clearly referenced in accordance to Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University guidelines as well as with the academic rules and ethical conduct.



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ABSTRACT
THE ROLE OF FOREIGN AIDS IN STATE BUILDING
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July 2018, 123 pages

The international community have been engaging more actively in failed states such as Haiti and Afghanistan, therefore, Somalia as a failed state, since the collapse of the Siyad Barre dictatorship in 1991 provides a number of interesting insights into the influences of external actors on state-building. Enormous external efforts have been made by the international community to establish a formal central state in Somalia while they have seemed increasingly involved in providing various forms of support and developments assistances to the state-building process through bilateral, multilateral, and non-government organizations. However, in the process of state reconstruction, the international donor's assistances play a very important role in enabling the government to deliver the public services effectively. This is not a new political strategy, since the formation of the first republic in 1960 from the union of the British protectorate Somaliland and Italian protectorate Somaliland, Somalia has been always dependent on foreign aids to balance its operations and development budgetary. Therefore, the study is aimed to investigate the role of foreign aids in the Somali state-building efforts and attempted to answer the main study question of what is the role of foreign aids in the Somali state-building? And to examine this, multiple regressions have been employed as the study concludes that there is a significant relationship between foreign aid and state-building efforts in Somalia. The study also found out that the ongoing process of the state-reconstructing is dependent heavily on foreign aids granted by the international donors.

Key words: foreign aids, international community, state-building, Somalia.

ÖZET

DEVLET İNŞASINDA YABANCI YARDIMLARIN ROLÜ

Somali ÖRNEĞİ

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Ağustos 2018, 123 sayfa

Uluslararası toplum, Haiti ve Afganistan gibi başarısız devletlere daha aktif bir şekilde müdahil olmaktadır; bu durum itibarıyla başarısız bir devlet olarak Somali, 1991'de Siyad Barre diktatörlüğünün çöküşüyle, devlet yapılanmasında dış aktörlerin etkilerine dair farklı yaklaşımlar sunmaktadır. Uluslararası toplum tarafından Somali'de resmi bir merkezi devlet kurulması için büyük çapta dış destek verilmiştir ve uluslararası toplum iki taraflı, çok taraflı ilişkiler ve sivil toplum kuruluşları yoluyla çok çeşitli destek ve kalkınma yardımları sağlayarak devlet inşası sürecinde giderek daha fazla yer almıştır. Söz konusu uluslararası yardımlar, devletin yeniden yapılandırılması sürecinde ve kamu hizmetlerinin etkin bir şekilde hükümet tarafından sağlanmasında oldukça önemli bir role sahiptir. Bu durum yeni bir politik strateji olmamakla beraber; İngiliz sömürgesi olan Somali bölgesi ve İtalyan sömürgesi olan Somali bölgesinin birleşmesi ile 1960'ta cumhuriyetin ilk kez kurulmasından bu yana Somali, devlet faaliyetlerini ve kalkınma bütçesini dengelemek için her zaman yabancı yardımlara bağlı kalmıştır. Bu kapsamda, bu çalışma, yabancı yardımların Somali'nin devlet inşasında oynadıkları rolü incelemekte ve "Somali'nin devlet inşasında yabancı yardımların rolü nedir?" temel sorusunu cevaplandırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmada, derlenen nicel ve nitel veriler çoklu regresyon yöntemiyle incelenmiştir. Araştırmada, Somali'de devlet inşa çabaları ile dış yardımlar arasında önemli bir ilişki olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Halihazırda devam eden devletin yeniden yapılandırılması sürecinin, uluslararası bağışlar yoluyla sağlanan yabancı yardımlara önemli ölçüde bağımlı olduğu görülmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: yabancı yardımlar, uluslararası toplum, devlet inşası, Somali

DEDICATION

TO My Parents
And
To the People of Somalia



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research thesis is my academic contribution in order to achieve a master's degree in Political Science and Public Administration, at Yildirim Beyazit University. This has been realized with the support and encouragement of many people. Firstly, I would to express my special thanks of gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Murat Önder for his valuable guidance, recommendations, suggestions and comments that he gave me during the course of this work. Secondly, a huge appreciation also goes to all my family and friends who helped me in shaping this thesis. I am grateful for the support and encouragement they offered me during my studies at the University.

Finally, I would like to thank the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities for offering me this scholarship in order to achieve my life goal. And awards like yours make it possible for students like me to earn our degrees and take the responsibility to make our countries and the world a better place.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member States
PSG	Peace and State Building
SDRF	Somali Reconstruction and Development Fund
ODA	Official Development Assistant
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
WBMPF	World Bank Multi-Partner Fund
UN MPTF	UN-administrated Multi-Partner Trust Fund
NPD	National Development Plan
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nation Operation in Somalia
U.S.S.R	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
EUNAVOR ATALANTA	European Union Naval Force Operation Atlanta for Somalia
EUTM	European Union training Mission in Somalia

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

“To rebuild our nation we must focus on three pillars; rebuilding the security institution, massive economic reforms, and comprehensive and inclusive political alteration that would strengthen the connection between the government and the public”

(H.E, Kheyre, Somali Prime Minister)

Foreign aid has been identified as a broad category of grants usually from developed countries to developing and less developed countries. For economic development, health improvement, response to humanitarian challenges, and some cases in state building purpose. For instance, the Somalia case which the state-building process is heavily dependent on aid from the international donors. Furthermore, it may be useful in security and military assistances and counterterrorism activities, and also in programs to fight corruption and promote public transparency. These are not the only reasons for which aid is given; economic and political interests as well as national or shared values can also be reasons why donors are willing to aid recipient states. However, for the last two decades, the world has witnessed nations going through reconstruction for a range of socio-economic and political reasons. While the international community have seemed increasingly involved in providing various forms of support and development assistance to these nations through bilateral, multilateral, and non-government organizations.

State-building, on the other hand, has been identified as the creation, re-creation, and reinforcing and strengthening of a public structure in a given territory capable of delivering public goods (Fukuyama, 2004). The creation of sovereign capacities of which the essential one is the successful and generally undisputed claim to a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” has its significance to state-building efforts (Glassman, Ronald; Muvar and Vataro 1984). Although, the ultimate aim of state-building is not the use of physical force, but rather the creation of a state as a concentration and expression of collective power without the need to exercise compulsion (Seymour, 2004). For instance, the reconstruction attempts in Western Germany and Japan after World War II,

as well as the state building process in Cambodia or Poland's post-communist reconstruction have been recorded as the ideal examples of the successful state-building processes. The similarity of those nation's reconstruction was their underlying and stabilizing sense of national identity whose significance or substance has never been disputed. Poland has identified as a good fresh example of state building. Regardless of the irritating nature of the transition, touching upon many aspects of a political culture which is profoundly impacted by four decades of communist rule, it is indeed the sense of national unity and harmony which allowed governments and politicians of different ideologies and persuasions to have reached an agreement and go through this process (Glenny, 1990).

State-building concept has become a global phenomenon, and many countries including Timor-Leste, the Solomon Islands, Bosnia, the Congo, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Iraq, Afghanistan and South Sudan have undertaken state-building process. According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a fragile state is one that needs external support in order to accomplish its goal of undergoing reconstruction. In fact, this state-building is a crucial and continuous process in post-conflict countries.

The literature on state-building is mainly categorized accordingly to the alternative assumptions about the state. Several authors (Zartman, 1995; Battera, 2003) consider the notion of the nation-state to be the bedrock of the international system and therefore, the concept of the state should be maintained at all costs. Others argue that the protection of state is worthless and the international community should let them collapse so that a new states which reflects more accurately the pre-existing local 'nations' can emerge (Brock, 2001; Ottaway, 2002). Remarkably, there is very little debate in the literature over what type of state should international community attempt to establish in fragile areas (Samuels, 2004). The normative assumption is that a state is liberal market democracy spread over a geographic territory and according to this understanding, state-building can be identified as the transfer of western values, norms and institutions, which exposes it to accusations of neo-imperialism. Proponents of the state-building idea argue that this sort of neo-

colonialism is distinct from the previous incarnations of colonialism. It is more altruistic, multilateral and involves the non-government sector (Paris, 2002).

For years, it was convinced that the perfect solution for the complex global problems can be solved only if wealthy nations mustered enough will and funding to champion the resolution of such problems. But despite a desire to help and willingness to give, the donor community keeps stumbling in efforts to address both short-term crises such as natural disasters and longer-term challenges such as global poverty, political instability, economic boosting and state-building process. In this matter, the foreign aid have yet to succeed in solving the problems in most of its recipients. Moreover, this is a global problem and much worse in some areas such as Africa, Latin America, and Asia which continue to receive a huge amount of foreign aid. Particularly, some countries such as Haiti and Afghanistan have been utilizing most of their granted assistance for state building purposes, but unfortunately have not shown yet any significant results. Similar to Africa, many countries are receiving a large amount of aid to contribute to reconstructing their economic and political situations, although there have not been any results that can prove the effectiveness of the aid.

Considering the Somalia case since 1991, since Siyad Barre military regime collapsed, the country has been in the state-building process with the support and collaboration of the international community. Nevertheless, the first attempts led by the United Nations and US (1992 -1995) ended up with failure. While the efforts re-emerged at full tilt after coming out of a terrorist organization, it compelled U.S, European Union, and their allies to look at the Somalia case more closely, fearing that it might become a safe haven for international terrorists. The U.S also links the current powerful group al-Shabaab to al-Qaeda (Woodward, 2007).

In this process of state reconstructing, the international donors' assistance plays a very important role in enabling the government to function and deliver the political and economic expectations of the Somali people. This is not a new political strategy, as since the formation of the republic in 1960 from the union of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, Somalia has been always dependent on foreign aid to balance its operations

and development budgets. After the collapse of the central government and due to the bad circumstances resulted from the civil war the country's dependence on aid has increased. And more international donations has been directed on finding peace and political stability in Somalia.

At the beginning of this process, two transitional federal governments had been established in 2004 in Nairobi and followed by 2009 in Djibouti. In 2012, an election which marked the end of the transitional period was organized. The international community with the leadership of U.N. endorsed the results of the election and pledged a full and ideal backup for the newly elected administration. And as a response, the new deal compact has been crafted by the FGS with collaboration and cooperation of its member states and international donors, with the aim to serve as the comprehensive plan of the country.

The reasons motivated the new deal compact to be adopted was to enable the unification of the international donations for Somalia in order to be more effective and valuable so that Somalia can be aided to achieve some economic and political changes. On the other hand, since the compact was agreed, Somalia's official development has increased rapidly. For example in 2017 as the Aid flows report states 27% of the country's GDP came from ODA while the domestic revenue was 2.2%. This demonstrates how critically aid is important for Somalia's state-building process. Therefore, this research study would attempt to answer, how effective and significant foreign aid has been in Somalia's state building process. The study will also attempt to demonstrate the role of the foreign aid on the ongoing efforts led by the FGS to regain Somalia's state legitimacy and dignity.

This research study applies both qualitative and quantitative research approaches. Qualitative research aims to gather an in-depth understanding of state re-building in Somalia and the role of foreign aid alongside the reasons behind that. The discipline investigates why Somali state rebuilding is in need for Foreign Aid. At the same time, it examines profoundly how foreign aid has been useful in Somalia's state-building efforts. The researcher will also examine the phenomenon through observations in numerical representations and through statistical analysis. In order to find out the role of foreign aid

for the ongoing Somali state-building efforts, different simple regression models have been employed since influencing factor of foreign aid is a single independent variable to test the research questions. These questions include a several causative relationships between the independent variable and dependent variable. However, in this thesis, a secondary data collected from the World Bank and Aid Flows Reports conducted by the federal ministry of finance particularly the aid coordination unit will be used to prove the role of the foreign aid in the Somali state-building process. These reports will also be useful in efforts to scrutinize the impacts of foreign aid on rule of law, political stability, and control of corruption, government effectiveness. The date covers from 2006 till 2016.

The study has employed a simple regression which is a statistical technique used to assess the magnitude and direction of the relationship between a criterion variable and a predictor variable. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis will be used to estimate the models. OLS regression was selected for two reasons: It is a widely accepted statistical procedure for exploring and predicting the relationships among different variables, and the results of regression are easy to interpret (Onder, 2006).

Generally, the study will be organized chronologically with four chapters, consisting of decentralized sections. Chapter one of this research is an introduction to the general objective of our research. It gives the reader a general idea of why this topic was chosen, the motivations behind the choice of the subject, which country will be examined, the hypothesis and assumptions. Chapter two covers the concept the study intends to use as variable concepts namely foreign aid and state-building. It begins by defining and looking at the origin of the state as well as the definition of the state. It also explores in detail the concept of foreign aid by defining what it is, looking at its evolution and applicability. The types of foreign aid as well as state-building definition and the relationship between them are also examined. Furthermore, the motive of the donors to grant that huge amounts of aid to beneficiaries has also been explored.

Chapter three entails the history of state formation in Somalia by exploring the wider debates on the state and society in pre-colonial and post-colonial eras. Despite the extensive similarities that Africa share with the regards to the conjuncture between the

state and society, Somalia rarely appears comparative thematic scholarship on Africa. In other words, a scholarship providing a comparison of Somalia to other African experiences is almost non-existent in Somalia. Therefore, this chapter will hardly attempt to compare the post-colonial state formation in Africa with Somalia state formation experience. However, since 1991, a number of conferences has been held on behalf of Somalia and gathered the international donors to pledge donations in Somalia's state building process. Since then, attempts to strengthen the Federal system have been growing rapidly, with the utilization of massive amounts of aid which made the federal government and federal member states heavily dependent on aid. For instance, Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Somalia totalled \$ 1.4 billion in 2016. Therefore, the fourth chapter focuses on how these international community efforts and financial supports are contributing to the ongoing attempts of state building in Somalia and how effective that support is, by using multiple regressions to prove the efficiency of aid and most importantly its correlations with the state-building process.

The study is trying to answer the main research question: What is the role of foreign aid in State Rebuilding process in Somalia? Nevertheless, Somalia is now on its path to emerge from collapse, fragility and prolonged instability with the cooperation and support of the international community. As a result of several barriers including the fight against terrorist groups and its very limited domestic revenue, the public institutions have been putting enormous efforts to strength and improve the capacity. Therefore, the study is also attempting to examine the capacity and functioning ability of four crucial indicators which is very critical for Somalia's state building process, namely:

- Rule of law
- Political stability
- Control of corruption
- Institutional effectiveness

The effectiveness of foreign aid on the state-building process in Somalia will also be examined. Furthermore, it explores the donor's long term strategy and goals in Somalia and identifies the activities and the purposes of their foreign aid for various aspect of the

country's state-building process. The primary lines of inquiry are whether the international donor's support shows any difference in the efforts of restoring state and the political order in Somalia. Moreover, how much aid has been directed on behalf of this process and the impact it have had through the visibility of the state-building projects. Nevertheless, this thesis would be added value to the ongoing debates about the foreign aid effectiveness, and also provide a clear inquiry on how the direction of foreign aid is critical in the state-building processes particularly, the Somalia case.

The study acknowledges the dependence of the Somali government on aid to balance its development projects and budgetary. But also shows to some critics on some issues like effective institutional building, poverty reduction, and economic and social development which are crucial to the state-building of Somalia, but have not improved as expected compared with amounts of aid and efforts that have directed towards them. Of course, there is no doubt, the aid's significant role for the Somali government to operationalize and covers the salaries of the government employees and public service delivery. But it should be more beneficial, and have something to do with Somali federal government and its state member's implementation approach which failed to overcome the fundamental challenges that would allow Somalia to benefit from aid in a productive way. One of the biggest challenges of the study was finding a sequence data from the World Bank, while some of the years are not available. This limited the researcher's ability to examine more independent variables in order to prove the connection between the foreign aid and state-building.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: STATE BUILDING AND FOREIGN AID

The debate of Foreign Aid and its contribution to economic growth, poverty reduction and institutional development of the recipient countries has been in place for the last three decades. Scholars have various opinions with regard to this issue. Proponents of foreign aid like Jeffery Sachs (2005; Easterly (2006); believes that Foreign aid is the only way forward to save poor countries and eliminating poverty in this world. Furthermore, it is obligated to the rich countries to help the poor donor recipients. Ali and Isse (2005) underestimates the contribution of aid on economic growth as their empirical results shows that the relationship between economic growth and aid is sequential and indicates that a more aid can actually lead a lower economic development.

Furthermore, Goumanee, Mourissey, and Girma (2005) contend that the existing organizations and most importantly, the bilateral Official Aid have achieved very little in contributing to the development of the beneficiary countries and particularly, in terms of poverty reduction. In contrast, others disagree completely and see foreign aid as a danger to the recipients. For instance, Moyo (2009) criticizes heavily on the foreign aid contribution to socio-economic and political developments. Whereby the first stage of her argument is Foreign aid is easy money without accountability which increases corruption and creates altered form of economic and proposed for recipients to rely upon private financial markets and taxation which make them more accountable to lender. Nevertheless, Friedman (1995); Easterly (2007); Easterly (2003) and Collier (2007) emphasis the significance of aid effectiveness in stimulating development and the donor countries are continuing to commit a substantial financial assistance to promote the needs of the beneficiary countries. Therefore, this chapter examines the existing literature on Foreign Aid for State Building by attempting to cover the distinctiveness of foreign aid regarding the typology of foreign aid, foreign aid for state building, and most importantly, the relationship between foreign aid and donor's national interests.

2.1 The State Origin

The human beings lived for the first years in bands and villages with autonomous administrations. Not until perhaps 5000 B.C that the villages had begun to aggregate into larger political units. Once this process of the harmonization began, it continued at a gradually faster speed and led, around 4000 B.C., to the creation of the first state. For Carneiro (1970; 733), state is an autonomous political unit, with power over its territory where a centralized government operates with the authority to collect taxes, draft men for work or war and decree and enforce law. However, the current theories of the rise of the state have failed to provide a comprehensive explanation on the origin of the state. For the most part, the complex theories about the state origin are relatively modern. Carneiro (1970) argues that the classical leaders like Aristotle seemed unfamiliar with other forms of political organizations and tended to think the state as “natural” which the nature forms and therefore not requiring any explanation. However, during the age of enlightenment, many scholars agreed that people throughout the world lived not in states, but in an independent villages or tribes that made the state seem less natural, and thus requires of further explanation. In addition, the majority of the modern theories about the origins of the state that have been proposed, a few of them consider the origin of the state as neither peculiar thing nor incidental as well as not the product of genius or the result of chance, but the outcome of a regular and determinate cultural process.

For Carneiro (1970) mainly the state origin theories have two general types: voluntaristic and coercive. The voluntaristic theories displays the concept that certain people gave up their individual sovereignties spontaneously, rationally and voluntarily and united with other communities in order to establish a larger political unit deserving to be called a state. The most widely accepted theory of voluntaristic type of theories is what Carneiro terms as ‘automatic theory’ which is suggesting that the chief driving agent of state formation was agricultural purposes. On the other hand, the coercive theory indicates that the state has risen by force and not as a result of freewill. It is the mechanism by which political evolution and inter-polity violence has transformed autonomous villages to a state. Most of the materials supporting this theory come from anthropological research on the

preindustrial states that are very different from the industrialized societies (Cohen 1984; 329).

The idea of war had an important role for the emergence of state is however not new. Prominent philosophers had indicated that hundred years ago while the Greek philosopher Heraclitus wrote that 'war is the father of all things' (Carneiro, 1970). Traditional Philosophers such as Ibnu Khaldun (1377), Machiavelli (1532), Spencer (1876), Gumplowicz (1899), as well as more recent scholars like Carneiro (1970), Otterbein (1970), Narroll and Divale (1976) and Otterbein (1976) have acknowledged war as a significant driver of state emergence. Where they generally noticed the same thing, polities had some kind of trouble between them which eventually led conflict. And the conflict leads to violence and out of this violence state emerged. Thus, war makes the state. However, the first meticulous study of role of warfare in the formation of the state was made less a hundred years ago by the English philosopher Herbert Spencer in his principles of sociology in 1876. However, coercive theory suggests two directions in regard to the significance of war in state emergence. The first direction underlines war as necessary but not sufficient while the second underlines war as both necessary and sufficient in state formation. For instance, Carniero (1970) emphasizes that the war is necessary for the rise of the state but not sufficient.

Regardless of deficiencies in particular coercive theories, however, it demonstrates that in one way or another war had a decisive role in the rise of the state. Historical and archaeological evidences proved the impact of war on the formation of some ancient and modern states such as Greek, Egypt, Northern Europe India, Central Africa, Polynesia, Middle America, Peru and Colombia among others (Carneiro 1970; 734). According to scholars arguing that war is necessary but not sufficient, there are two questions that are paramount in our attempt to understand warfare and statehood: (1) why and under what conditions does warfare give rise to state? (2) What effects does warfare have on state formation once the state emerges from a non-state background? To answer these questions Carneiro (1970; 734) underlines war as a mechanism of state formation, and furthermore, specified the conditions which it gave rise to the state while he emphasizes the importance of other factors that are common to other parts of the world in which state arose

indigenously and argued that the environmental circumscription, political evolution, resource concentration and social circumscription are other factors that should be considered in explaining for the rise of the state.

2.2 State Definition

The state has been identified as the most universal and powerful of all social institutions as well as a natural institution. Aristotle said that man is a social animal and by nature, he is a political being. For him, to live in a state and to be a man means one and the same. Human beings unlike some other animals do not strain to survive alone and do not stop penetrating the future welfare of their lives. History has proven this, seeking protection from life risks has always led human beings to the same increasingly complex social interactions that, allowed the human beings to give up their individual rights for the sake of the society. So this compelled to human societies to establish chains of command, organize information flows, and most importantly enforce the rules and regulations for the purpose of public welfare (Ronald, 1984)

The state has become necessary as it comes into existence out of the basic needs of life and has continued to remain for the sake of good life. The main job that state does, it translates for the desires, aspirations, and aims of human beings into action. Though the state has become an indispensable institution, most of the scholars have disagreed on its definition and that is the reason Berki (1986: 12) argues that the modern states are really hard to understand particularly, how they operate. For the modern state term Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) was used for the first time in his writings particularly, the “prince”. The understanding of state has been used to imply a bewildering range of things; a territorial unit, a collection of institutions, an instrument of coercion, a philosophical idea and oppression, and so on. This confusion is related, partially, from the fact that the state has been understood in a four different quite ways; from an idealistic perspective, functionalist perspective, organizational perspective and an international perspective (Heywood 1997: 57).

The idealistic Perspective of understanding to the state is most clearly has its origins and connections with the writings of Hegel. For him ‘State is the march of God on Earth’

which gives us the understanding to consider the state as the divine manifestation on the earth. And identified three moments of social existence; the family, civil society, and state. The family has a particular altruism that operates to encourage people to put aside their own differences and interests for the wellbeing of their children or elderly relatives. While Hegel describes the civil society as a sphere of universal egoism in which individuals place their interests before those of others. On the other hand, regards the state as an ethical community underpinned by mutual sympathy – universal altruism (Hegel 1820: 159). In this context, Heywood (1997: 57) argues that idealism did not succeed to distinguish clearly between the institutions that are part of the state and those that are not which are outside of the state.

Functionalist approaches to the state focus on the roles or purposes of state institutions and according to them, the state has a set of institutions that maintain and provide social stability while its ultimate goal is the protection of social order and stability where its citizens can flourish and reach prosperity. A similar argument has been presented by the neo-Marxists who have been inclined to see the state as a mechanism through which class conflict is ameliorated to ensure the long term survival of the capitalist system (Heywood 1997: 57). The Marxists approach to state argues and categorizes the society in a number of classes and some of them have to dominate, rule and exploit the other classes. For example slaves are exploited by owners and workers are exploited by the capitalists. They perceived the political power as an occupation of economic power and that the government always cheers up with the interests of the affluent classes. For to them the type of state and government does not make a difference. While the real power always relies on the elite and the state mandate is to facilitate the manipulation and exploitation done by them (Kasper, 2000).

The functionalist perspective argues that state exists because it provides services to protect the interests of the larger society. Power belongs to society and it is them who can power and decreased. Even though the power may never get out of the clutches of the elite, those in power should do something to address the needs of the masses (Kasper, 2000). Meanwhile, the perspective emphasizes the effectiveness and function of the state and most importantly the responsibility of the state toward the society. Heywood (1997: 57)

sheds light on the weakness of this perspective while he argues that functionalist approach seems to connect any institution that preserves order such as family, mass media, trade unions and the church with the state itself. For that reasons, Heywood favors the Organizational perspective of state understanding in his book “Politics”.

The organizational perspective describes the state as the apparatus of government in its broadest sense and gives a set of organizations that are recognizably ‘public’ which have the responsibility for the collective organizations of social existence and operates with taxes collected from the public. As Heywood argues (1997:57) the great thing about this definition is that it has succeeded to differentiate noticeably between the state and civil society. It has achieved to indicate the responsibility of the state by describing it as an institution that comprises the different entities of the government; the military, the police, bureaucracy, the court, social security system etc. Furthermore, the organizational approach enables us to discuss about the development and setbacks of the state, in the sense of intensifying or contradicting the responsibilities of the state, and expanding or shrinking its institutional machinery.

The other approach through which the state is being understood is the internationalist perspective which views the state primarily as an actor on the world stage, and as the basic unit of the international politics. This clarifies the dualistic structure of the state which the previous definitions did not mention: the fact that the state has two faces, one looking outwards and other inwards. Whereas the previous definitions of state has focused on the inward looking face which gives an explanation the state and its relations with the individuals and groups that live within its borders, and most importantly, its ability to preserve the local order, the international view deals with the state’s outward looking face, its relation with other states, and therefore, its ability to provide protection against the external attack. For Heywood (1997; 58) this perspective about the state brings it very close to the notion of a country. And the main difference between how the state is understood by political philosophers and sociologists, and how it is understood by international relations scholars is that the former treats civil society as separation from the state

2.3 State Features

The key components of the state features has identified as (1) Sovereignty of the state which often seen that the modern understanding of the concept have been driven the French Philosopher “Jean Bodin” (1529–96). However, the most uncompromising stance about the state is the one that Hobbes illustrated in his book “Leviathan” (Pierson 1996: 11) a study which portrays the state as “leviathan; a gigantic monster, usually represented as a sea creature”. On the other words, Heydwood (1997: 57) and Hinsley (1986: 1, 26) identify sovereignty as a concept where a final and absolute authority exists in the political community. These views expressed by such authorities in the statehood discourse accentuate the crucial nature of sovereignty in the operations of states.

The second feature is territory; states are geographic or geopolitical entities. States inhabit an increasingly visibly defined space over which they characteristically claim sole legatine authority. The importance attached to this feature is manifested in the recognition given it by a range of classical scholars like Hobbes, Engels and Weber. This component has also been expressed in contemporary studies such as Mann and Giddens (Pierson 1996: 9) which asserts that territory surrounds all those who live within the state’s borders, whether they are citizens or non-citizens. On the international stage, the state is therefore viewed (at least, in theory) as an independent entity (Heywood 1997: 58).

The third feature is state legitimacy. For Kant (1724–1804) the state is an aggregate of men under rightful law (Dyson, 1980: 107). Furthermore, Heywood (1997: 58) and Pierson (1996: 14) argue that the state decisions are usually ‘not necessarily’ accepted as binding on the members of the society because it is claimed they are made in the public interest, or for common good; the state supposedly stands to reflect the permanent interest of society.

The fourth and fifth features are the publicity of the state institutions and the domination of the state. The public bodies of the state are responsible for making and enforcing collective decision and that process is called public bureaucracy by Weber. Through this process the private bodies, such as families, private businesses and trade unions fulfil their individual interests. The last feature is the issue of authority and legitimacy on which

Pierson (1996; 17) argues that there is no state which can survive for long exclusively through its power to coerce even where power has distributed unequally and in cases like that the possibilities of coercion are at their greatest. Furthermore, Heywood (1997; 58) opines that state authority is backed up by coercion; the state must have the capacity to ensure that its law are abided. Heywood's argument is related to the Max Weber's definition of this subject which suggested that state was defined by its monopoly over the means of legitimate violence.

2.4 Understanding the State Building

The state-building process has described as the establishment and strengthening of the necessary institutions in order to support long-term economic, social and political development. In the countries which fundamental institutions are weak or absent and that hinders the development. In the sense of this process, state-building aims to reinforce those institutions in the post-conflict areas. For instance Bosnia and Herzegovina or Liberia which has been engaging a post-conflict reconstruction since the dictatorial ruler was removed in 2003. Furthermore, it also aims to end a conflict and accomplish peace and reconciliation. Cases like Afghanistan and Somalia have been identified as an example on this subject. As Fukuyama (2004) argues state building intends the establishment, re-establishment, and strengthening of public structure in a given territory capable of delivering public goods. In this framework, state-building process is determined to establish, re-establish or empower the necessary foundations such, legislative, judiciary, executive agencies , policy and military forces, securing gaps like fighting with the terrorist groups as well capacity gap; proving the basic or needs such as education, health and etc.

However, state-building process has become the target of several scholars, global meetings and research initiatives. Consequently, that produced a large amount of written regarding this subject either explicitly or implicitly. Nevertheless, State-building seems an interdisciplinary topic, drawing interest and discussion form social science, international relation, political studies, anthropology, economics, international development and security studies, among others. Frequently, scholars and researchers

from these diverse fields are coming together and working collaboratively to analyse extremely on the complex state-building conflict (Scott 2007: 3).

As Herbst (2004), Goldsmith (2001) points out there has been a much confusion regarding the difference between nation building and state-building. Many scholars are used the terms interchangeably, others with a completely different meanings. In general, most scholars use state building to refer the interventionist strategies of restoring and rebuilding the institutional framework and most importantly the apparatus and structure of the state, for instance, the bureaucracy (Scot, 2007: 3). In this explanation, some scholars have viewed state-building as a process which external hands and actors are engaging. In contrast, nation-building according (Goodhand, 2010: 82) and (Scot 2007: 3) is the process which a formation of a national identity that associates to the specific territory of the state takes place. However, the confusion of these two terms and using them interchangeably has become common lately in the international community. Most commonly, in non-academic circles, NGOs, donors, think tanks etc. this confusion has reached its highest level during the Bush administration as a result of the media's habit to use the nation-building term for its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq (Clausen 2016: 47). However, the concept of nation-building has often linked with the activities that could more accurately affiliate in state-building (Scot 2007: 3), thus the current foreign policy and popular culture are presenting the two terms as opposing forces.

Ottaway (1999) argues that state-building is related in establishing a homogenous nation-state while the nation-building concept emphasizes the significance of cultural identity which may in due course lead to call for self-determination. Furthermore, the literature itself has neglected the creation of cultural identity aspects of nation-building and chose instead to focus on the more technical issues of building state capacity. As a matter of fact, this actually has led more scholars to write about the nation-building, but in fact, their emphasis was perhaps on state-building (Scot 2007: 4). This gives a clear explanation of why this lack of distinction between the two concepts exist.

External intervention has underlined as an inevitable matter in this process of the state-building and history is showed some explanations for why these external actors are

engaging wherever these efforts of state-building undertaken. Yet, the nation-building and state-building are often used interchangeably in the current debates, the noble thing out of this debates is that the two concepts have not always perceived as synonymous (Scot 2007: 4). In 1950's and 1960's the notion of state building was heavily discussed and carried a strong conceptual link to modernization theories of development (Dinnen 2006). During the cold war, the US and the USSR both used the term nation building as a tactic to limit the reach of their enemies.

In 1970's the notion of nation-building had been linked profoundly with the US become involved in the Vietnam War. During the 1980's state and nation building were has completely disappeared at the international political landscape, with focus turning to diminishing the political role of state and promoting the free market (Fakuyama, 2004). However, by 1990's, once more the limited progress of the many southern states has re-emerged the concept of state-building into the international politics alongside good governance. The good governance agenda has become the main focus on the capacities and structures of the state in developing countries. Literally, after the 9/11 period, development and security has been linked again, as they were during the cold war. The concept that under-developed poor fragile states are threatening the security of wealthy nations has appeared at the international politics. This ensures the concept of state-building to remain for some time to come as a preoccupation of the international community (Scot 2007; 4)

2.5 State Building and Development

As (Ottaway, 2002) argues, the international relations and political science fields have been the driving force largely the literature on state-building, however, the contribution from development scholars on this topic is limited . Nevertheless, the notion of state-building has not been seen widely in the field of the development community, the dominance of the good governance priorities within development field and most importantly, the growing focus of development strategy and policy on the primacy of the politics and state, indicates that many features of mainstream development activity are significant to state-building efforts and that creates correlation between the State-building

and Development (Scot, 2007:6). For instance, tax reforms, infrastructure reviving, strengthening the capacity of government institutions to deliver services, civil service reform, democratization, conflict settlement, enabling the political parties to function and public financing training and management. Therefore, this illustrates state-building to seem as a sub-set of development. Mallaby (2002) referring to his argument on the aggressive current foreign policies alongside the existing modernization theories, firmly, viewed state-building as a discipline of development policy.

Evans (1989), on the other hand, created a heuristic evaluation or tool to examine and analyse the developmental impact of the state, while he created a continuum consisting of three different states. At the far left of the continuum is the predatory state that is exemplified by the case of Zaire. In this case the political elite provide a minimum of collective goods. On the other end of the continuum, Evans placed the developmental states exemplified countries like Taiwan and South Korea and additionally he uses to coin them the term embedded autonomy. In which he means as (Tolstoy 2009: 19) argues, a highly bureaucratic structure with interceptive capacity built upon historical experience as well as a relatively organized private actors who is able to provide an important intelligence and valuable contribution of decentralizing the decision making and implementation.

Evans (1989: 575), States that the most crucial aspects in order to reach a developmental impact are state-society network and well-functioning bureaucracy. In the middle of continuum it has placed with the intermediately state exemplified by Brazil which sometimes has promoted a transformative political and economic changes but has an inclination towards clientelistic behaviour and the level of the bureaucratic capacity is lower than the socio-economic and political state. Indeed, this argument is crucial as it emphasizes the significant role of the interaction between the state –society and bureaucratic institutions networks, for the general development of any country. The last predatory state in the Continuum is failed state which is a political notion developed by Gross (1996) but the commonality of Evans and Gross in this concept, both authors build their arguments on the hypothesis that economic growth is the initial and primary important function of a state. Ghani and Lockhart (2008) propose a similar argument

though qualitative research which states that strengthening bonds between the state, civil society and market is the single important factor influencing state building.

2.6 State Failure and State Building

As (Helman & Ratner, 1992) argue, that the concept of state failure had been introduced in the academic field discourse in 1922. Although, scholars varied on precise definition, it generally being described the failure of public organisations to bring a positive political changes to its citizens on extent which most likely to challenge and undermine the existence and legitimacy of the state itself (Rotberg, 2003). Commonly, the state failure associates or occurs regarding to a wide range of political aspects of which the most significant and influential issues are the provision of legal system to adjudicate disputes, security, initiating of some form of welfare policies, establishment of economic and communication infrastructure and also setting up the opportunities that citizens can have an effective political process for participation. Almost certainly, the ability to which states have the capacity of providing the necessary political goods hugely influences their relative strength, weakness or failure (Bogdandy and all, 2005).

The public choice school, on the other hand, has emerged and attempted to explore the implications for the behaviour of the governments and non-governmental organizations that all related agents chasing after their individual interests. However, few writers attempted to exploit this literature to be able to construct the “theory of government failure” which matches the market theory. Among them Wolf (1979:107) who attempted to further the literature of government failure and due to that reason published an article in the journal of law and economics entitled “A Theory of nonmarket failure” and fallowed by several academic endeavours to scrutinize the argument. However, the recent reviews of the public choice have actually ignored the Wolf’s contribution on the subject neither the work of Hayek arguably the greatest economist to address the issue of government failure (Grand, 1991; 424).

As wolf’s (1979) has identified four reasons of why government institutions with self-interested agendas usually fails to provide the public service and associated three of them associates with efficiency; internalities and organizational goals disjunction between the

cost and revenues, distributional inequality and derived externalities, although, the distributional inequality did not mention on theoretical level. However, it seems that the concept of the government failure has been linked with the market circumstances, whereby if the market fails most of the economists consider the case as a government failure. It is worth mentioning, that government failure studies, does not indicate or suggest that governments are always fail, still less that markets always succeed. The enquiry whether a particular type of government involvement allows more inequity and inefficiency than, if the government interference in the market did not happen is literally an empirical question and one that is by no means always supported by the evidence. Nevertheless, governments sometimes achieve tangible successes a fact that should be remembered in order to explore the opportunities of the market's bright lights (Grand, 1991; 442).

Regarding the state failure, a number of measurements have been identified which points out the government's failure among them; the government's lack of capability to secure its borders and entirety, disagreement and tensions between the communities, high level of criminal violence, corruption that hindered the government institutions and a decaying public infrastructure (Yoo, 2010). However, in Europe a number of countries liberated from communist ideology and political system matched these measurements. The Eastern Europe countries showed these symptoms after they became independent from the communist political ideology. Consequently, the public service delivery has decreased as well as an open criminal violence had raised. In addition, the new Caucasian nations whom had been struggling to establish their own states had encountered the same difficulties (Rotberg, 2003).

Africa and Asia have also produced another type of failed states, after the colonial legacy fell down. Many states emerged since the end of Second World War while some of these states did not have enough ability and capacity to govern themselves. But the political rivalry and economic interests of the superpowers during the cold war, kept those nations in life among them Somalia and Ethiopia which became the subject of competition for influence between the Soviet Union and western countries. However, the Soviet Union's fell down have impacted negatively in many countries that were dependent on their

development and military aid. This marked the emergence of third set of failed states, like Afghanistan and Haiti, which have had difficulties and challenges in establishing a fully effective governing bodies within their territories because of endemic civil war and tribal rivalries (Yoo, 2010).

The global institutions that evaluate the failed states have attempted to draw indexes to measure the nations with the worst functioning governments. For instance, the World Bank has established a “country policy and institutional assessment” indexes to rank states for purposes of distributing aid. The World Bank policy framework categorizes the “fragile states” as nations with low income, political instability, poor governance, frequent violence and weak institutions or suffers the consequences of past severe conflict (IDA, 2007).

In 2007, the World Bank announced 34 nations as fragile states based on a review of economic management particularly, macro policy and fiscal policy as well structural policies such as trade and business regulations. Social inclusion in the bases of gender equality, environmental and labour policies were also included. As well, the public sector management and institutions for instance property rights, budget and revenue, public administration and corruption and etc (Yoo, 2010). Unfortunately, Somalia was placed into the last in the list, Kosovo was underrated Somalia. Using the similar factors Fund for Peace with cooperation of Foreign Policy magazine is produced the best known ranking arguably which declared the two worst functioning state. Yet, again Somalia was ranked as the worst functioning state.

Institutions have varied regarding the way of ranking failed states. Rotberg (2003) identifies the Somalia case as a state collapse but for the cases of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan as failed states. While he considers roughly 35 other states as “weak,” arguing that they could become failed states. The Brookings Institution’s 2008 “Index of fragile states in the developing world” contains the most of the same states as the World Bank and Fund for Peace and used to rank with the same measures of security, economic, social and political welfare factors. Still selects to describe the “failed states” only three

states; Somalia, Afghanistan and Democratic Republic of Congo, followed by larger group of critically weak states (Rice & Patrick, 2008).

Grading the performance of the states as well as the failed states encounters from the same problems as other forms of ranking. There are disputes surrounding the dysfunctional nature of nation's governmental institutions or the severity of internal armed conflicts. The rankings distinguish cases depending on the cause of a state's decline; Iraq, for instance was not included the failed states list until the United States "2003" invasion. This sheds light, the disagreement among the observers over whether a nation with a strong, even tyrannical, central government can be considered failed when a small clique presides over widespread poverty and economic collapse for example North Korea (Yoo, 2010).

With this regard W. Pfaff (1997) suggests to deal carefully with failed states doctrine, because of its tendentious susceptibility for being misused for imperial or hegemonic interventions. In addition they raised their concerns about the outcome of the failed state concept if we misuse it. On the hand, state building concerns the re-establishment and fixing of the collapsed institutions as well strengthening the weakening ones and making them able to deliver public goods (Mylonas 2013). Essentially, the state-building doctrine is the formation of sovereign capacities of which the primary one is the accomplishment of generally undisputed claim to a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force (Weber, 1984: 91). Perhaps, the aim of state-building is not the use of physical force, but rather establishing the necessary political institutions without the need to exercise coercion (Seymour, 2004).

Various nations have identified as successful examples of state-building process among them; reconstruction efforts in Western Germany and Japan following World War II, as well the process in Cambodia or post-communist Poland. Moreover, the common feature of them is their underlying and stabilizing sense of national identity which has not been disputed. Glenny (1996) marks Poland as a recent good example of a nation rebuilding its state. Regardless of the painful nature of the transition touching upon many issues of political culture deeply impacted by four decades of communist rule, it is exactly the sense

of national unity which has carried governments of different political persuasions through this process.

2.7 Types of Foreign Aid

Since the Marshall plan era the foreign aid debate has been dominated by the international area, and much research has devoted to analyze the characteristics and dynamics of the Aid from the donors view, as well as the recipient point of view (Soares, 2011: 65). Among those characteristics are the objective and purpose of giving aid, the impact that aid leaves behind, aid for activities, the effectiveness of aid on socio-economic and political cycle, as well as the coordination of the aid (Riddle, 2007; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Dewald, 1996). Furthermore, since then much research on various topics related to foreign aid has flourished, such as on strategic, political goals behind the aid during the cold war (Meernik, Krueger & Poe, 1998; Schraeder, Hook, & Taylor, 1998), economic development (Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Easterly, 2003; Robinson & Dixon, 2010; Bearce & Tirone, 2010) peace-building, nation/state building (OECD, 2009: Fukuyama, 2007; Dobins, 2003; Chesterman, 2002), and humanitarian relief (Myers, 2009; Margesson, 2007; Richards, 2010).

Regarding the flow of foreign aid a number of factors has been mentioned Lumsdaine (1993; 5) suggests that among those factors are; colonial history, the democratic status of the recipient and income level. Moreover, Alesina and Dollar (2000; 33) argue that stream of aid is dedicated by the political and economic strategies of the donors and that they differ from one to another. Though the common behavior of these donors is finding those countries which are politically unstable, weak in their public management, and continue to have close ties with their former colonizers and get more aid compared to others that are economically impoverished. For instance, France's aid to its former colonies in Africa is tied to political alliances; additionally the Japanese aid to Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s was described to be motivated by its intention to pursue political and economic interests in response to internal and external pressure, particularly from the United States (Katada, 1997). Moreover, Riddle (2007;92) argues in addition to the above mentioned factors, there are two other factors that donors have considered significant aspects before

giving aid; the human rights records of the recipient countries and for the purpose of the public good. Additionally, the majority of the donors is persuaded to employ mixed motivations from the above aspects and most importantly differs from one donor to the next and most importantly, these motivating aspects changes overtime.

In the 21st century the dynamics of foreign aid flow have changed compared to the 20th century in at least four significant questions have been presented and all have different directions “ who provides the aid, why it is provided, how it is organized and delivered and how large it is (Lancaster, 2007; 39). Regarding the question of who provides the aid, the author is referring to the primary actors of the foreign aid such the bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, international development agencies and international NGOs. The why aid is given is referred to the interest of the donors either such as diplomatic, strategic interests as well as for humanitarian assistance and the last two question was presented to deal with the management of the aid by the aid agencies. Furthermore, the quantity or volumes of aid flow from donors to the recipient countries.

The self-interested motivations has always been a keen for foreign aid allocation and past experience has revealed that mostly countries provide foreign within self-interests. Different view such as Realism, Marxism and liberal internationalism have arose in different decades to examine particular donors give aid to specific recipients at specific periods. For instance the 21st century, Humanitarian relief, economic development, strategic diplomacy, and commerce were the key purposes of giving aid largely but in the post-cold war period, aid flows seemed to be mainly for development and that does not reduce the influence of the other factors in the distribution of aid such as strategic diplomacy, commerce (Lancaster, 2007; 44-46). One such example can be found in china’s emerging economic cooperation with countries in Africa, Latin America and the Southeast Asia as it continues to wage a diplomatic battle with Taiwan arguably over the recognition of a one China policy in the recipient countries in exchange for aid (Lum and Fisher, 2009). Although, china has shifted its diplomatic rival with Taiwan to economic interests (Lowy Institute, 2010).

Based on the structure and allocation aid is classified into two types, program and project and over the last three decades the majority of donors have been involved the both program and project aid. Riddle (2007; 18, 196, 207) states that program aid is normally provided for sectoral programs, budgetary support, technical assistance, and capacity building. On the other hand, the project aid, despite its myriad of focuses, has been concentrated on the sectors of health, education, rural development, agriculture, transportation, telecommunication, human rights and peace building among others. And with the launch of the Millennium Development mission by the United Nations in 2002, project aid-related to social and human development has become more salient then before. The MDG was initiated by the United Nations in 2000 was aimed at addressing the critical development-related issues such as poverty, education, women's empowerment, maternal health and environmental and sustainability.

The EOCED associated donors focus on soft development or social infrastructure development such as technical assistance for institutional building. The Australia's Foreign Aid activities in the 1990s could be exemplified focused on the four interrelated strategic areas of economics and finance, which include public management, law and justice and non-governmental organizations (Lyon, 1999). In contrast, the East Asian major donors such as China, Japan and Korea have allocated most of their official aid to physical infrastructure and which allows their domestic construction companies permeate emerging markets. For instance the Japan aid to China in the past two decades has been channeled mainly for building physical infrastructure such as telecommunication networks, railways, and port facilities (Muldavin, 2000).

Regardless of the focus areas, the utmost consideration should be given on how both programs answer the needs of the recipient countries. In this regard, aid effectiveness is a fundamental framework for assessing the casual relations among donors, policy makers and recipient in the implementation of both program and project aid. Aid effectiveness is generally described as the efficiency of development aid in attaining development targets; it supports recognition of the recipient needs and their participation in the entire process of the development. It has shown a concern the aid architecture and the way that the international aid system works and brought together donors, governments, civil society

organizations to jointly tackle the matter (Soares, 2011; 32). That unification started in 2000, and in 2005 when countries around the world came together and endorsed what today is known as Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (OECD, 2005). The agenda was furthered strengthened at Accra in 2008; the declaration identified five principles for the donor community to comply with in advocating aid effectiveness; alignment with the country programs, national/recipient ownership, harmonization, managing results and mutual accountability (Soares, 2011: 33).

the focal point of general understanding about aid effectiveness has focused on what makes aid more effective and efficient in accomplishing development targets, donor performance, and criteria for the selection of recipient countries (World Bank, 1998: Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Collier & Dollar, 2002). Substantial literature has been assigned to examine the complexity of aid effectiveness use in development. Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) argue that due to the variety factors that motivates aid and coupled with limited instruments of analysis with regard to the complexity between aid flow and the results or outcomes on the ground placed the aid effectiveness unclear. Furthermore, the significance of unpacking the “black box” of the “causality chain” on aid effectiveness to give an explanation why aid is effective and the mentioned causality chain relates to donors, policy makers and the policy outcomes whether or not aid will be effective depends on the interaction between these components.

Reinikka (2008: 179) articulates the accountability relationship in aid effectiveness between donors, policy makers and recipient countries. The analyze is based on the experience that donors often have a tendency to bypass national governments, which will eventually produce an isolated projects due to a lack of communication that generates little non-externalities on the recipient sides. Furthermore, has proposed that the relationship accountability should be implemented on the situation that donors should focus on strengthen the critical relationships between the recipients, providers and policymakers. In this process of strengthening the relationship the author suggests that donors should assist national institutions through harmonization and realignment of their activities from financial assistance which most of the foreign aid is described to knowledge and skill transfer that are in line with the national programs and most importantly donors should

evaluate in the process constructively and systematically. Moreover, the author concluded his proposal that donors should reintegrate their assistance into the development strategy, budget and service delivery for the country they are willing to assist and that will most likely increase the extent of aid effectiveness (Soares, 2011; 34).

2.8 Foreign Aid and State-Building

For the last two decades, the global politics has witnessed a growing international engagement given by a certain definitions include peace-building activities in post-conflict countries and that was aimed at thwarting security threats and in some cases claiming to prevent countries from failing or institutionally collapsing. All those unstable countries have been under this process largely, among them; Liberia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Haiti, the Solomon Islands, Timor-lest and recently added, Iraq, Afghanistan, South Sudan and Somalia (Soares, 2011; 34).

As a result of the international institutions close involvement in those countries through peace-keeping, peace-building, reconstruction, democracy and governance and economic development, their engagement has prompted many scholars and practitioners to engage in the discourse of “nation building”. Newman (2006; 17) argues the nation building concept was emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War, after the success story of United States’ post-war reconstruction engagement in Germany and Japan. The concept was blurred and became subject to controversy in the post-cold war era and it was due to the fact that aid was meant to shore up many undemocratic and authoritarian regimes in the most part of the developing world and as well as for anti-communist purposes. At the same time, the other concept of state-building was invented and gained currency. (OECD, 2008) marks both nation-building and state-building are used interchangeably but at the same time, they led to confusion.

(OECD, 2008; 13, 14) elucidates the clear difference between the nation building and state building by explaining nation building as deliberate strategies usually generated by domestic elites to forge a common national cultural in historical or political sense, whereas state-building concerns in the broader context of state formation or as a result of a purposeful action to promote or develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the

state in order to reach at the end an effective political process which brings together the mutual demands of state and societal groups.

The OECD definition of state building contrasts with other concepts in scholarships for instance, Fukuyama (2004; 17) defines state building as the process of creating new government institutions. Fritz and Menocal (2007; 14) and OECD (2008) define state building as the process of establishing a key institutions for function state. Nevertheless, the distinction of both definitions is Fukuyama does not require the existence of state in order to apply in this process of state building to any country and that include all the post conflict countries or stateless without separating them, for instance Somalia and etc. in contrast, functioning state is required for the second definition that tells state building process only contributes the capacity development of the institutions as they narrowly concentrate on institutional building and this denies the ongoing activities in the stateless countries of “creating state” to be called state building process.

The Development Assistance Cooperation was formed formally in 2005 by OECD (DAC)’s mandate has been to monitor aid flow to unstable states. Likewise, the fragile state concept is a new notion that emerged after 9/11 at international community’s political landscape designed by World Bank and OECD’s aid frameworks. The fragile states concept was risen up out of the blend of two regions of research and activities consolidating with the struggle against poverty reduction and social disparities alongside international security (Chataiger and Ouarzazi; 2007: 1). Since then, many countries around the world have been considered as a fragile states including, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Somalia.

Considerable literature has devoted to examine foreign aid to fragile state taking up various responsibilities and activities among them; (Goodhand, 2010: Kahler, 2008: Goldsmith, 2001: Dobbins, 2003: and Patrick, 2001). Goodhand’s (2010: 578) literature has examined the donor policies and practices in Afghanistan in the aftermath of 2001 born agreement. Meanwhile, argued that the donors have failed to engage sensitively and strategically with all relevant stakeholders specifically the domestic actors, both governmental and societal groups, in their intervention and engagement, thus contributing

to the “unraveling of fragile war to peace transition” in the country. Perhaps this has been a common senior for those fragile states that state building process or international intervention is taking place.

Goldsmith (2001: 124) work has focused on aid to Africa’s statehood and suggested that donor’s and lawmakers drew contradictory conclusions over the aid’s effects on the statehood of the continent and that the given aid has played a very modest role or was just a” minor net plus” for African states capacity to govern well. Moreover, Barakat (2009) argues that in the case of Afghanistan donors have failed to accomplish their commitments and it impeded the country’s effectiveness on state-building process. Donors have an inclination and a tendency to emphasize the strategic interests rather than the development impact of the country’s reconstruction project. As a matter of fact (Soares, 2011; 37 points out that the most of the international community intervention or engagement on the state-building process in contemporary post conflict countries has resulted in mixed records, if not entire failure).

2.9 National Interest and Foreign aid

The close link between the foreign aid goals and programs to the donor’s foreign policies has become a central point of many studies in international relations. And particularly, when aid is given to low-income, fragile and conflict countries. For instance, Australia and America’s overseas development assistance or Aid have been affiliated with their foreign policy and one very recent example is the US aid to Egypt, Libya , Somalia and several countries embroiled in the Middle East (Eddlem, 2011). Traditionally the concept national Interest has been understood at encapsulate two broad areas “strategic/security interests, and economic interests. However, in today’s interconnected world a third category of national interest was emerged as a “good international citizen” has considered the new category of the concept (Moyd, 2016).

A large body of academicians has investigated the interconnections between the donor’s and aid and their foreign policy. Hook (1995) argues that it becomes a virtual axiomatic the tendency of the donor’s to pursue national interests through their overseas development assistance. Additionally, every country has different position on their

international hierarchy and regarding to “physical and human resources, cultural traditions and ongoing ties to other states” and the behavior of the state leader which plays a vital role in the determination of the national interests.

However, foreign aid has also seen as a soft power instrument to achieve national interests Jayawicraka (2010) suggests that foreign aid has been employed as a soft power instrument for countries to pursue their national interests and America has been the standard case and it's growing for emerging donors such India, Brazil and China. Nye (2004) defined soft power the ability to achieve what you want through attraction rather than coercion and payments. And this can be done through culture, political ideas and policies. Exemplifying the US aid to Japan in addition Marshall Plan to Europe after the WWII was approached through soft power.

In the last two decades, new donors have emerged with different aid policies compared with the traditional donors who always linked their national interests with their overseas development assistance and china was among them. Despite the western scholars which view that China's foreign aid to developing and less developed countries is driven by its quest for natural resource but several scholar challenge this argument among them; Rebol (2010: 39) argues the China's aid to African is relatively unrelated to its pursuit of natural resource, but it fills the ears that western donors has been neglected such as infrastructure, industrialization and manufacturing.

Brautigam (2009: 34) further describes the China's aid to Africa as a comprehensive assistance that involves not a physical economic infrastructure development but in everything such banking, agriculture, the health sector, among others. An empirical study on China's aid policies in Africa by Samy (2010) argues that China is the only available option for Africa especially with reference to building a constructive partnership and this demonstrates the effectiveness of China's assistance to Africa. Overall, all above arguments on foreign aid provides insightful understanding about how foreign aid system works within the donor's and recipient countries environment. Most of them, have agreed that donors tend to have specific self-interested policies in both the short term and long term goals when providing aid, and even sometimes reduce the possibility of aid

effectiveness in that area. Additionally, the lack of coordination and better knowledge about the recipient countries has also been a significant factor which hinders the aid effectiveness on the recipient countries.

To sum up, state building process has been identified a continuous efforts and it is supposedly the primary responsibility of the national actors that include government, citizens of the country and civil society. Nevertheless, the third hand or the external actor which is involving in this process, has not the role of implementing the primary responsibilities but to facilitate technically and financially for those primary tasks. It is mostly agreed that foreign aid has been exploited as a soft power instruments in foreign policy. Certain elements play a significant role in determining the country's foreign aid policy among them; geopolitical, geostrategic and economic opportunity. Although some adjustments and modifications in the aid system in 21st century, since the Marshal Plan, yet foreign aid continues to be used for the purpose of maintaining and achieving national interests. However, the foreign aid contribution to socio-economic and political life of the recipients has devoted a large amount of research, various opinions have made with regard to this aspect, while majority of the scholars agreed that aid lacked to contribute effectively on those aspects.

CHAPTER THREE

THE HISTORY OF STATE IN SOMALIA

In the African settings, the recent study of state is tremendously important, not only in light of the substantial number of nation-states that were created in Africa at the end of the colonial fall in 1960s including Somalia, but also compared with the state that had been formed in the rest of the world towards the end nineteenth century and the start of the twentieth century. Africa succeeded to offer more examples regarding the contemporary states that had formed out of colonial legacy and the recent indigenous nations that formed their own states (Southall, 1974).

The debate on Africa state formation generally is extensive and the literature presents a number of different assumptions. The first assumption suggests that the organized political power did not exist in Africa before colonialism and the colonial powers brought the modern state method into the continent and perhaps this marked the beginning of the organized political power in the region. In other words, the colonial powers were carrying the rule of law and legitimacy. In contrast, other scholars propose an extensive argument which suggests that the roots of state in Africa have origins that date back to the pre-colonial period. Jean François Bayard (1989) proposes a historical view of the State in Africa built upon the bases of pre-colonial State traditions and on the colonial experience. In this view, contemporary African States have received influences both from colonialism and from pre-colonial kingdoms and empires, and are based both upon the Rule of Law and upon ancestral political traditions. This seems the most balanced assumption; it has acknowledged both the pre-colonial and colonial contributions of State Development in Africa.

Supposedly, It is not simple to describe the concept of the “African state” from among the many and diverse concepts of the state. Generally, the rooting definition on the concept of the state was perceived in political science studies, an explanation of the “Africanness” of the African state is also sought. Young and Turner (1985) suggest six factors of the concept of the state as territoriality, sovereignty, and nation, institution of rule, a legal system, and an idea. Young (1988) offers seven factors by dividing institutions of rule into

judicially equivalent units of rule within the international community and institutions of rule. Zartman (1995) points out that the basic characteristics of a state are a population, territory, a governmental apparatus, and authority. These theories of the state are the conventional and existing theories concerning state factors.

The theory of the African state, the focus has been laid on the relationship between the state and society (civil society). Azarya (1988) points out in “ Reordering state Society relations” that though the state is an organization within society, it is distinguished from the myriad of other organizations in seeking predominance over them and in aiming to institute binding rules regarding activities of other organizations. Perhaps, this has become Azarya’s definition of the African state. Bratton (1989) adopts Azarya’s definition, and Villilon (1995) follows the definition of the state proposed by Azarya and adopted by Bratton. However, the history of African states formation has different experiences and roots. Most states began as kingdoms, in which the king was considered divine and endowed with temporal and spiritual powers. And all those kingdoms are not only significant for political unity but also had historical importance. Indeed, literature has shown that the roots of Somali modern state date back to ancient kingdoms that the Somali clans had used to administer themselves. As history has recorded the pre-state kingdoms have acquired the power and legitimacy through inheritance and whenever one fell another raised until the colonial powers invaded and divided Somaliland. Nevertheless, assessing these pre-state kingdoms we come to understand some of the fundamental characteristics of the modern existed where others were missing. In that way, it appears that Somalia’s state formation have accomplished through two combined efforts, the existed fundamental traits that Somali kingdoms had combined with the new ones they gained from the colonial experience.

3.1 The Pre-Colonial Administrative Structure

The social structure of Somalis the past and present have been a clan-based identity, though, it’s been weakening lately. The society has always divided into Southern agro-pastoral and Northern nomadic and that clan division settlement influenced the political unity of the society while they were not a unitary group but settled as a different of wide

clan alliances that spread across the country and power and authority is decentralized among and inside tribe families, clan, sub-clans, and Diya-paying sets, which had become essential in the northern pastoralists' political unity (Lewis, 1961: 325)

Until the nineteenth century the history of the eastern Horn of Africa was dominated by protected Somali expansions from the North, and the rise and decline of Muslim emporia along the coast. To a certain extent each of both two themes has its own particular history, but at no time over the centuries was one entirely independent of the other. The Somalis gradual enlargement on their country was not achieved by movement in the hinterland only, nor were events ran on the coast without their effect in the interior (A. I. Asiwaju ,1985) but by the mid-nineteenth century, a chance of state approaching equilibrium had been attained between the outward pressures of movement in the interior and the inward trend from the coast: if anything, perhaps, the balance was tipped in favor of the hinterlands which had come to exert a dominant political influence over the coastal settlements. For the history of the coast documentary evidence from various sources is available, at least in some periods, but for events in the hinterland or the nomadic community the historians rely on much more heavily upon the testimony of oral tradition. The Hamitic Somali community which is from the shores of the Gulf of Aden made gradual expansion over the last ten centuries to plains of northern Kenya and indeed is one of most sustained expansion though, it was not a migration into an entirely empty land it was only extended by war and bloodshed (Lewis, 2002: 18).

Regarding the administrative structure, during the period of statelessness, the society employed both customary and Sharia law as a method of solving the conflicts, to deal with the legal aspects deriving from rivalry over resources such water or field, family issues, criminal activities and compensation as well as (Diya) payments. The distinction between sharia and customary law places at the point that according to the sharia laws the perpetrator is individually held responsible, where the customary law is allowing a collective responsibility based on lineages regarding the committed crime. (Rýdlová, 2007: 19). On the other hand, the customary law has been utilized as a tool for reconciliation and settling disputes and it has profoundly connection with the clan system as the descent “tol” or contract “xeer” supplement each other and provides security and

safety grantees for the members of communities (Lewis 1961; Schlee, 1995). Both laws have different sources the “tol” law’s solidarity drives from agnatic statues in lineage system ”where (xeer) is a form of an egalitarian contract that “enable agnates,(and sometimes non-agnates)” to unite in corporate political groups sometimes irrespective of their genealogical proximity” (Lewis, 1961b: 94). Furthermore, “xeer” plays as the role of the legal foundations with regards to the traditional politics. Customarily, its informal agreement by which the society structured to solve and settle its legal and political issues. It has traditionally designed individual-to-individual relationships among the nomads. (Lewis, 1961:3) described it as a kind of social contract, which did not prompt the production of a state. But later played a significant role after the colonials left and Somalis intended to form their own state.

Clan ideology, customary rules and sharia laws are structured to regulate the men’s behaviour not only towards his clan relatives and kinsmen but towards members of other clans (Samatar, 1991: 10). The customary rules known in Somali language as “xeer” functions with established certain lineage groups or councils called the “guurtis”, which met occasionally in order to solve the existing conflicts. Participating or attending in “guurti” meeting is normal and arrangements of the participants is adapted regarding the type of conflict to the lineage level of the groups involved as well as clan. (Lewis, 1961: 240-265). Furthermore, the type of conflict whether it is interfamily, political or economic determines the arrangement of the council members. In pastoral context, the council of elders is elected based on democratic principles and participation while their main task is to provide a legal or political constitution that can be employed as a legal and political unit and political unit (Rýdlová, 2007: 21) certainly, these lineage group councils- Guurtis- had the similar authority and power of the modern state, they had given the authority of declaring war and making peace. They also had the responsibility of proposing punishments towards its members. Most importantly, they are responsible for establishing principles which stand as a political-social unit and allows them to act collectively. They had the ability to decide the proportion in which they will obtain or supply as compensation for external incidents and amounts they must pay if there are

international disputes. However, the “Guurti” councils have considered as the essential institutions of government during the pre-state era of Somalis (Lewis, 1961: 198-199).

The pre-colonial Somali society administrative systems and in today’s modern terminologies known a “political structure” is described as an egalitarian ‘pastoral democracy’ although excluding women and non-nomads from this system (Samatar ,1994) Until colonialism came they did not have a formal, centralized government and instituted authority. They organized as clan and each clan; elders are regarded with respect and often decide policies. Somalis moved across their country with their livestock in search of pasture and water and that had a significant influence with the decision makers. Moreover, individualism, independence and pride are a strong part of the Somali culture and have had a significant role for the elder’s decisions. At the same time family affiliation is considered to be very important. For example, nomadic society has a concept of shared responsibility for violence or accidents, which is visible in the payment of blood-wealth (Teutsch, 1999: 23).

3.2 The Colonial Partition

In the middle of the nineteenth century, Somalia was rapidly drawn into the theatre of colonial competition between Britain, France and Italy. And also some African countries were involved first Egypt and later Abyssinia known at the present time Ethiopia for expanding and consolidating its realm. In 1897 year, the partition of Somali-land was virtually completed theoretically, though the subsequent adjustments occurred later (Lewis, 2002:40).On other hand, Colonialism had a massive impact on Somali society. The economy, social and political organization was altered, owing to the impact of new ideologies and the changing cultural values which the Somali people face, have realized their difference from the colonizers and indeed that compelled them to unite against a common enemy (Teutsch 1999:36).

Religious identity also played a vital role in this unity; Somalis had seen themselves as Muslims, distinct from the Christian colonizers. According Samatar (1993) the reactions were diverse, as some people identified more strongly with Islam, while others experienced a loosening of this identification. As the social order was shattered however

space was created for new identity schemes including nationalism. The nationalist ideology was thereby driven not only by the educated elite, civil servants or traditional elders, but actually found a common welcoming and cheer among all Somalis. With the experience of colonialism, the changing economy, administrative and political developments a nation-building process was rapidly initiated.

Commercial, security distress and strategic aims was behind the division of Somali 'land into five parts. Red sea was the major concern, although, it was nominally under Turkish rule but was actually governed by local potentates. The British interest with Somali coast was provoked by concerns for the security of trade and communication with India (Teutsch 1999:38). In the meanwhile, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 led to a great change in the geopolitical evaluation of the region as the Red Sea became a major avenue of trade with India and the Far East, so that its shores acquired considerable strategic importance.

The British colony started efforts to consolidate their position in the region, setting up an occupation of the Somali coast which was officially notified in the General Act of the Berlin Conference, 1884-85. However, in December 1884 the French claimed their possession of Tajura, and Italy extended its holding around the Assab near the lower end of the Red Sea. France also needed a base and coaling station along the route to Madagascar and Indochina, and was combined with an interest in developing trade. Therewith France's interest differed from Britain's whose policy was guided by the strategic necessity of securing imperial communication, and in commercial terms only concerned about supplies to Aden. In 1885, the French colony and protectorate was formally established in the boundaries of today's Djibouti (Teutsch, 1999:38).

By 1899 Italy had launched its influence over the Somali coast from Bender Ziadeh, on the Gulf of Aden in the north, to Kismayo on the Indian Ocean in the south. Undeniably, the geopolitics of Somalia specifically the "red sea" was the biggest factor behind the appalling partition and division of the colonial powers. In fact that was proven again when the piracy appeared in that areas while they became an immense threat for the commercial ships travelling to the Indian Ocean, since then, the United Nation approved a mission of

protecting Somali Sea by global marines. And arguably, that is what situated the country into many terrible circumstances for instance, the current local political disagreement which many powers regionally and globally is involving on behalf of their national significances (Lewis, 2002:40).

Unfortunately, the colonial powers had included the division of the 'Somali nation' as a substitute of reaching their interest by regional powers. It was divided into five parts. The area around Djibouti was under French rule, and the population was ethnically mixed with Somalis and Afars. The British Somaliland Protectorate had Hargeisa as its main colony base; the neighboring Italian Somaliland had Mogadishu as its capital. The Ogaden region where Somalis constitute a large part of the inhabitants has been under Ethiopian rule, while other Somalis came under British flag in Northern Kenya. Thus, having constituted no political unit before colonialism, the Somali people found themselves part of different centralized political systems (Samatar 1989) crucially, however, that was a significant instant for the Somalis society for organizing themselves and creating their unification as a coherent society.


3.3 The Emergence of Nationalism

“The African nationalism is a subjective sentiment of kinship and similarity that people with African roots share. It is emotions that associates with cultural norms, racial heritage, traditional institutions, and common historical experience. Which is the colonial oppression, an enduring historical moment that all Africans have become familiar and forced them to maintain their own cultural, political and social values” (Nsamba, 2003: 151)

However, the African nationalism, like other nationalism elsewhere in the world, is not new: it's as old as ancient time. In fact, in Africa, contrary to a common view in Western scholarship of Africa, African nationalism predates colonialism, the modern nationalism of African which endorsed the nation building and organized the African society under one administration dates with the anti-colonial time at least, countries like Somalia, the consciousness of finding a coherent society which structured themselves under one power or had one central administration, that awareness and consciousness were not there until

the colonial powers came and started colonizing the splintered society of Somalis. In other words, in Somalia, that consciousness was born as a colonial response. Though, in the annals one finds coherent organized African communities with a very strong sense of identity, prepared to defend their territorial and cultural integrity against those who would want to destroy or undermine them. For instance, Somalis during the pre-colonial days, despite the fact that had not under single administration but they were prepared to defend their land and property.

Map 1 Demarcation of Somaliland Boundaries, 1888-1925



(Source Beachey 1990: x)

The idea of establishing a Somali state begun as anti-colonial opposition. In response to the colonial exploitation and oppression. First, the British colonial oppression in Northern Somalia, where liberation struggle rose as an idea, led by Mohamed Abdulle Hassan known as “Sayyed” in which his anti-colonial movement has predominantly objected at spreading “Salihiya” a religious faith among Somalis. Which eventually turned into anti-colonial movement after he convinced most of his followers that the colonial rulers is changing and damaging their Islamic culture and belief by spreading the Christianity. In this case, religion has become a source of unity against the colonial tyranny. However, the continued strive of his movement culminated an agreement peace between the colonial powers and Dervish in 1905. While the agreement was allowed Sayyed and his movement to administrate a fixed residence between and Ras Gabbe and Ras Garad a territory in North-eastern Somalia which was under the colonization of both British and Italians (Touval 1963: 54). Although the Italian flag remained, administratively the dervish movement had a full political authority over these territories and that presented Hassan and his movements as procurator of the Italian government. Furthermore, the agreement has also stated the inclusion of the traditional authorities and to consent regarding the formation of new policies.

Weber (1919) pointed out certain elements of state although he did not specially mention the word elements we do understand from these elements from his definition of the state among them; Territory, Idea of a state and control of means of violence. However, in this sense, Sayyed Mohamed’s administration could be identified as a state while, his constituting components of the polity were: council of elders, the official army, and the community at large (Samatar 1982: 119). And his formation of armed forces was based on non-clan principle. The unifying ideology of his followers, the identity beyond clan affiliation had both a religious and a political component, the religious one being a consent component. The political component of identity beyond clan affiliation lay in his autocratic rule, where power was concentrated in one person. Lewis (1961: 227) notes, “Amongst his followers, who came from many different clans, lineages and Diya-paying group, he strove to replace clan and contractual allegiance by loyalty to himself”. Since

Dervish endeavors at state formation was driven by force, the power rested with upon their leader and not with elders.

Weber (1919) pointed out certain elements of state although he did not specially mention the word elements we do understand from these elements from his definition of the state among them; territory, the existence of the notion of a state and manipulation of violence. However, in this sense, Sayyed Mohamed administration could identified as a state while, the dervish administration structure had constituting elements in terms of polity were; the dervish army, the elders and governed community at large (Samatar 1982: 119). Moreover, the dervish army forces were not based on neither clan principles nor division. The unifying ideology of the army forces and followers was not predominantly clan identity. He succeeded to form his own ideology which had a political and religious component. The religion was utilized as a consent component and the political identity was based on beyond clan relationship as it was designed to lay in his autocratic rule where the power and decision were concentrated on him. Lewis (1961: 227) argues that “Amongst his followers, who came from many different clans, lineages and Diya-paying group, he strove to replace clan and contractual allegiance by loyalty to himself”. Nevertheless, the Dervish attempts and struggle to liberate and unify Somaliland was driven and motivated by force and power and decisive decision rested with upon their supreme leader without given an active role of decision making with elders.

The freedom movement of the Dervish led by Sayyed Mohamed made big achievements against the colonial powers in order their message of liberating and unifying Somaliland to be heard. Nevertheless, Sayyed’s attempts at state formation did not succeed to evolve from imaginary to reality or in other words, ideas to practice. Because of the political and social challenges that encountered to his liberation and state formation efforts. Firstly, the clan affiliation which has been associated with the Somali culture for a long time, had its influence of dervish not succeed for accomplishing their ultimate goal. The dervish leader has come from a nomadic background in which the clan affiliation is very strong and active rather than cities, even though, he tried to appeal for religious unity within his followers and movement, yet he continued to employ clan politics; for example combining descent, marriage and agreement with descent as an instrument to extend and secure his

power base. Therefore, his political decisions and policies remained to be attached with clan and thus fragmented. His revolt was directed not only towards the British colony, but towards the Somali communities who collaborated with the colonial powers mainly “Akils, and trading community in Northern Somali towns” (Brons 2001: 140).

Secondly, another major challenge that dervish movement encountered to transform their movement into state was due to incongruity of Sufi orders followed by Mohammed Hassan and Sheikh Uways Mahamud al-Baraawi, a political leader from the South (Kassim 1995). And thirdly, the different colonial experience among the agro-pastoralists and nomads had its impact on dervish failure to unify the Somali communities and anti-colonial resistances under one administration. Most importantly, Sayyed’s struggle was derived from a nomadic background and always used it as source for the difficult times and during the decision making, while other community’s resistance against the colonial rule was in nature different to that of dervish and nomads and revolved around villages (Mukhtar 1996).

Nevertheless, the Dervish struggle and resistance of freedom against the colonial power had made enormously political and social revolutions. Essentially, it settled the foundation of the unprecedented freedom signals and consciousness while Somali have accepted as a true the ability of gaining their independence which eventually, took the colonial powers out of the country and succeeded to establish an independent Somali state. In contrast, the different colonial experiences had left behind unhelpful negative impacts. They reinforced the clan division as they exploited it as a tool to rule. As well as, the traditional ways of management and governance were destroyed and the colonial administrations imposed an arbitrary boundaries motivated by their economic interests with a total disregard of traditional clan ties (Rýdlová, 2007:31). The colonial impositions had damaged and somehow tried to get rid of the traditional political systems, nevertheless, that helped Somalis to find a way of establishing Somali nationalism which have succeeded to abolish the social fragmentation to smaller extent but unfortunately created new dimensions of social fragmentation. On the other hand, the colonial experience was an outstanding opportunity for Somalis to unite themselves at some point and understand the significant of establishing a central authority that governs them.

3.4 Decolonization, Nationalist Project and Way to Independence

Somalis recognized in early time apparently, years shortly, after the colonial powers invaded them, the necessity of ending the colonial oppression and immediately started to refuse to comply the colonial domination which was characterized by exploitation, supremacy and lengthening the clan division by using indirect rule. At the first attempt, Somalis decolonization was by force and indeed, they fought for their sovereignty. The anti-colonial struggle led by Sayyid Mohamed Abdulle which ended up on defeat by British and Italian colony, while history recorded his legacy as the first African anti-colony that colonial powers attacked by air force. Nevertheless, the dervish attempts to liberate their Somaliland by force did not succeed for internal and external challenges, in the meantime, alongside with tactical advantage and familiarity of fighting of the colonial powers also played a vital role. Most appreciably, that promoted the Somali Decolonization and nationalism project into a new manner, a peacefully approach of seeking out the independence, a nationalist ideology was constructed by the political elites and intellectuals of the Somalis, emphasizing the unity of the Somalis that colonial powers were divided into five parts. Ahmed (1995:136-140) describes how intellectuals perpetuated a distinctive picture of Somalia and 'produced' the nationalist ideology, sharing a 'fetishized consciousness' with their Western counterparts. Four important groups have contributed to the creation of this national ideology: The historians (Somalis and non-Somalis) reconstructing the past from a specific assumption; the colonial anthropologists "sifting through the raw and the cooked in developing countries" while logocentric privileging 'modernity' over 'tradition'; Somali politicians who desired to encourage their nationalist ambition; and Somali poets focusing on the poetry of one section of society and performing it as universal.

It must be highlighted, there were three opportunities in which Somalis could aspire to be free again and foster the nationalist project of unifying the several Somali territories, and to provide conditions under which this aim could largely have been realized (Lewis, 2002:116). First, four of the five Somali regions dominated by different colonial powers (Ethiopia, Britain, and Italy) were loosely united under Britain. As a result of this unification, Somalis could move between different regions of their territory without any

hindrance from artificial boundaries. The new contacts among Somalis inspired their nationalist spirit, and the leaders of various Somali communities had occasion to meet and think about their future as one nation rather than as a fragmented political or cultural entity. The sharp and painful memory of fascist rule, Britain's use of freedom as a propaganda weapon against the Italians, and the United Nations' debates on the disposal of former Italian territories instigated an energetic nationalist current (Samatar 2016:39). Most significantly, like "most African anti-colonial leaders, whether Nkrumah, Nyerere, or Kenyatta, had established political parties that led their countries to independence. Which became instrumental for the founding leaders' tenacious attachment to political power, thereby losing much of whatever democratic qualities they had". Somalis intellectuals and anti-colonial movement also established a liberation party to achieve independence, the Somali Youth Club (SYC) and by end 1947 it had changed its name to the Somali Youth League (SYL) opened at Mogadishu on 13 May 1943 with thirteen founders (Lewis 2002; 121). instantly the league had made their priorities to unite all Somalis generally under one central administration, and the youth especially with the consequent repudiation of all harmful old prejudices (for example, tribal and clan distinctions); educating the youth in modern civilization by means of schools and by cultural propaganda circles; to taken interest in and assist in eliminating by constitutional and legal means any existing or future situations which might be prejudicial to the interests of Somali people; and finally , to develop the Somali language and to assist in putting into use among Somalis the "Osmaniya Somali script." (Lewis, 2002:123).

These were the main aims which were suitable for the occasion and circumstances that league underneath and indeed the Italian colony did not find fault and threat. SYL was the founders of Somalis modern nationalism and the largest and best-organized movement but, the league was not the only organization to emerge in this initial period. Apart from a number of ephemeral smaller groups, mainly with limited local and particularistic interests, the second most import was originally formed under the name of the Patriotic Benefit Union, or "Jumiya", emerged the Italian colonized Somaliland. Despite, the policy and strategic difference, the two leagues had common agenda and goal, liberating Somaliland from the colony and uniting them was their common object.

In late 1940s the global powers of that did not agree on the future status of Somalia, Britain to discreet SYL, like France and America, had now definitely come round to supporting trusteeship under Italy, while Russia, although previously also advocating this, had now decided in favor of four power control (Lewis, 2002:128). And with this failure to reach an agreement with involved also the other ex-Italian colonies, the whole turgid issue was passed for settlement to General Assembly of the United Nations. After having discussed the disposal, the United Nations Assembly decision on 21, November 1949 proposed to entrust Somalia for ten years to Italian administration under U.N. tutelage was received calmly and without incident (Ben-Ghiat & Fuller, 2005). This event had increased the anti-colonial public demonstrations all over the country and in fact, the Somali modern nationalism mainly expressed through the S.Y.L was immediately gathered a fresh access of support and so firmly entrenched. Moreover, the United Nations Assembly decision was upheld the Somali modern history into a new point which brought the broken Somali society closer and furthermore, pointed out the colony as their only enemy.

3.5 The Trusteeship Period 1950-1960

On April 1, 1950, Somalis nationalist leader's nightmare became a reality, Britain following the United Nations Assembly decision handed over the territory to Italy (Samatar, 1989) and The first sign of the return of the prewar order was the recruitment of the senior Italian staff for the trusteeship administration from the old school, as a British diplomat observed (Samatar, 2016; 57) Italy's new position in her former colony of Somalia was carefully and closely defined in the United Nations Trusteeship agreement under which she assumed responsibility for the territory. The Italian Trust Administration was required to foster the development of free political institutions and to promote the development of the inhabitants of the territory towards independence. And to achieve this, the trusteeship agreement articulated, Somalis were to be given in the political and administrative responsibilities of their country under the benevolent tutorship of the Trust Administration (Lewis, 2002:139). Unfortunately, The Italian Officials who have come to Somalia, with the exception of the Chief Administrator and possibly a few others, are entirely Fascist minded and all were all an old colonial servants with very few exceptions who served under and for the Fascist regime (Abdi Samatar, 2016; 57)

The Italian rule imposed policies that meant to destroy swiftly the Somali nationalism project, which they were seen their biggest threat. As Rýdlová (2007) Samtar, (2016), Lewis, (2002) points out, the Italian Trusteeship Administration made a coordinated effort in all the major settlements to suppress the nationalist resistance and in order to achieve that, most senior Somali employees of British administration was dismissed as it considered them loyal followers of the nationalist party, and it strove to dismantle the SYL, which apparently seemed the most significant opponent of nationalist organization against the colonialism.

On other hand, the Italian Trust Administration made some impact on the areas of social development and economic too, for instance, 1952 with UNESCO collaboration, new state schools providing free education were replaced the mission schools upon which the Italians had relied in the past. More importantly, a school of politics and administration was opened at Mogadishu as a training center for Somali official and political leaders (Lewis, and 2002:141). In the context of economic, the Italian took the local products of the Somalis into the global market and perhaps that lifted the economy conditions of the locals.

Incessantly, SYL maintained its nerve in the face of the unrelenting Italian aggression. Its petitions continued to flood the advisory council in Mogadishu and the trusteeship council in New York. The Philippine and Egyptian members of the advisory council supported the nationalist movement and submitted critical reports to the trusteeship council. This was in contrast to the Colombian delegate, who was sympathetic to the Italians. Ironically, one of the major voices at the trusteeship council during its annual meetings was the Soviet delegation, which caustically criticized the behaviour and performance of the administration (Laitin and Samatar, 1987)

Indeed, the SYL struggle and again the administration had made a strategy change, in 1953; the administration took a new strategy and decided to collaborate with their rival nationalist party, and the administration approached Salahdiin Faddel, the Egyptian representative in the advisory council, and complained that the resistance of the SYL prevented it from accomplishing its mandate. It asked if he would mediate between the

party and the administration. Faddel, who had excellent relations with SYL leaders, relayed the message to the party (Samatar, 2016;57), the nationalist party SYL accepted to cooperate with the Italian administration as long as they were committed to fulfilling the mandate of the trusteeship council and although, SYL was cooperating with the administration, they also continued to advance its nationalist agenda. And that opened a new chapter of the Somali modern political history.

3.5.0 SYL Victory and the Formation of the First Somali Government

The outcome of the collaboration and indulgent between the Trusteeship Administration and SYL was very crucial for the development of the Somali modern state, the first territorial election for a legislative assembly took place in 1956. Several Somali parties competed for sixty seats. The electoral results shattered whatever illusions the Italians had about rural Somalis voting for the pro-Italian parties. Anzillotti, the Italian administrator, conceded defeat and tried to put the best interpretation on the failure of its allies (Samatar, 2016; 59)

The tenure of the elected deputies was three years. In spite of the new freedoms and responsibilities, the legislative assembly's authority was circumscribed because its decisions had to be sanctioned by the Italian administrator for the first year. Further, assembly members could not introduce legislation without the administrator's Approval. And indeed, The SYL felt vindicated and, despite latent suspicions about Italian intentions, the final push toward independence commenced. The party convened a national congress in which all regional secretaries participated. The aim of the meeting was to set the policies that would guide the new Somali government. Once general policy matters were dealt with the convention turned its attention to the emotional issue of how to deal with the pro-Italian parties and individuals who staffed the administration (Kaplan 1969).

Several members were keenly aware of the administration's discrimination against SYL members when employing and the public's deep resentment against pro-Italian parties and their supporters. And SYL leadership and member saw that an opportunity to prepare the country for independence. The victors moved forward, and the first step for the legislative

assembly was to elect officers. It chose Aden Abdulle Osman, the SYL leader, as Speaker of the assembly. He immediately relinquished his party leadership, and Abdirazak H. Hussen was chosen to replace him. Anzillotti nominated Abdullahi Issa as prime minister and asked him to form Somalia's first internal self-government (Samatar, 2016; 60).

Table 1 Election results for the legislative assembly, 1956

Party	Votes for	Seats
SYL	333,820	43
HDMS	159,961	13
SDU	80,866	3
Ex-Benadiria	21,630	0
Merahaan Union	11,358	1
Others	726	0

Note: SYL, Somali Youth League; HDMS, Hizbia Digil Mirifle Somali; SDU, Somali Democratic Union.

Source; Africa's first democrats

The new government was accountable to the legislative assembly. Policy issues were first discussed in the cabinet and then submitted to the assembly as a motion. If the legislature passed the motion, then it went to the administrator for authorization. Each Somali minister worked with an Italian advisor, whose presumed responsibility was to guide and train the minister. These advisory positions were abolished at the end of the year (Samatar, 2016; 60). Despite the several difficulties they had in their first year from the trusteeship administration and British transfer of Somaliland to Ethiopia in 1954 but the government and assembly performed very well.

One of the biggest successes of the government was the 'Somalization' of the civil service which was moving at an acceptable rate, and the performance of the Somalis recruited to

it was satisfactory. Despite the valuable success that SYL reached with the limited collaboration of the trusteeship administration, there were three major crises confronted the party and its leadership between 1957 and 1960, and key individuals of the party played a critical role in defusing them as a mediator within the SYL and between it and the opposition parties and as a moderate voice of the party, thinker, and nationalist leader. All three problems were provoked by senior members of the party straying from the SYL's fundamental principles. These were political conflict among cabinet members, a contest between the opposition and the SYL over electoral deadline, and a tussle between the prime minister and his critics (Samatar, 2016; 63).

Leadership crisis was the biggest disaster that SYL faced since the establishment of the party, conflict between the leadership of the party regarding the direction of the country and other technical issues had occurred and corrupted their leadership, even influenced the general assembly of the party, although the end of the conference a few members proposed to postpone the forthcoming assembly election, since the territory lacked the necessary population census for a legitimate election but at the end, the majority opposed the proposal, for the reason that they believed that other former colonies, such as India and Nigeria had free and fair election in the absence of national census (Ibrahim, 2010) and indeed that political disagreement was opened to a new door for the Somali political culture, a new gate of democracy and social equality .

The assembly election held in 1959 could be a good example for the democratic transformation which the leadership conflict caused, although wasn't enough, the election was approached a competition among the major political parties and between members within each party heated up. Another challenge was impending from the ministerial unaccountability, the activities the ruling party 'SYL' and particularly, the unilateral action of the Minister of the interior brought another heavy challenge to the party, disturbances about the election took place in the north eastern town Gardo the president of one of the competing parties was arrested and SYL, a strong hold was involved that incident. Moreover, some other political irregularities occurred for instance, the two parts offices were closed though later after the election was reopened. The assembly election

results were announced on March 11, 1959, and the SYL was victorious, claiming eighty-three of the ninety assembly seats ((Smith 1996).

After that triumph of SYL, the crisis continued even became worst, corruption and misuse of authority emerged which preoccupied the attention of the some party and assembly leaders. The growing corruption in the ranks of the parliament, government and public service was another challenge that SYL party and their government was faced during their way to independence, Malfeasance and preferential treatment given to Italians and their supporters was fundamental to the Italian colonial administration. In contrast, the party's vital objectives were to eliminate these prejudices and to protect the rights of all citizens regardless of their identity (Samatar, 2016; 75).

3.6 The Unification of Two Somaliland and Way to Independent State

Despite the difficulties and challenges that faced SYL government and their nationalist project, the aspiration of independence and independent Somali state continued. Somalis domination in the peninsula for millennia has developed cultural, linguistic, religious and economic norms. In spite of this common heritage, Somalis did not establish a united political unity. Perhaps, the absence of such political institution in part facilitated the division of the splintered nation into five. The nationalism founts of Somalis became aware of that advantage wanted to capitalize on the common values and significantly tame while their two constitutional pillars uniting and liberating all Somalis within the peninsula and building a collective political identity based on common citizenship were revolutionary ideas at the time whose wisdom is not yet to be realized (Samatar, 2016;78) and in other hand, the consciousness of capitalizing that common value was existed in the British protectorate Somaliland and biggest nationalist party over there was among the strongest supporters of the inspiration and the Somalis national league left no doubt about their commitment and loyalty to the Somali unification.

As Lewis (2002; 162) and Samatar (2016, 79) states, in July, 1959, the informal discussion on the idea of great Somali which was uniting the Somali society was instituted, in the meanwhile, In December of the same year, the U.N general assembly adopted a resolution determining that Somalia's Trusteeship should terminate on July, 1960. And April, 1960,

after the legislative council of the ruling government passed a resolution calling for immediate independence and union with Somalia, and the motion requested to value the U.N. Resolution without delay. As (Lewis 2002;163) argues five days after the motion came out, the British Prime Minister announced in the House of Commons that his government was endorsed to Somali request and there would be a constitutional conference to discuss independence early in May. In other hand, the formal discussion took place in the same year, and the British protectorate delegations had discussions with the existed government leaders in Mogadishu in the middle of April. By this time, the preparation of the constitutions that Somalia will adapt after independence had been completed, while, on the other hand the protectorate delegates after extensive discussions came with the conclusion that the republic that they would become part of it, should be a unitary state while the president is the head of state and had come to power by elections and be governed by a Prime Minister and Council of Ministers responsible to a single legislative assembly.

In short, there was to be one flag, one president, one parliament, and one government and in the meantime the agreement made exception for the judiciary and economic systems of two united territories to continue function separately until the two uniting parts could be fully integrated (Lewis 2002; 163) despite their desire, the French Somaliland colony was not included the union neither the other Somaliland parts which was under colonial administration , the French administration rigged the referendum in 1957, and this galvanized the liberation movement in the territory. Key leaders of the independence movement, fled harsh French prosecution and went to Mogadishu, where they were guests of the SYL government (Samatar, 2016; 79).

In spite of the policy difference of the parties representing the nationalist projects, in June, 26 and July 1, 1960, marked the realization of two of the SYL's and other nationalist parts visionary principles of a free and united Somalia, as the former British and Italian Somaliland amalgamated to form a unitary and democratic republic.

Within a period of fifteen years, Somalia experienced a gigantic political transformation. Some of these changes were from the postwar shift in world affairs and others were

induced by the determined struggle and initiative of the Somali people led by the SYL. Somali resistance to European colonial rule had been somewhat dormant since the defeat of Somalia's modern national leader, Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hassan, in 1921. However, the defeat of Italian fascism by Britain in northeast Africa in 1940 provided an opportunity for Somalis to wake up again and think of their destiny as free people and establish their own administration. However, the contribution the colonial powers had an impact for the establishment of the Somali, referring that, to the state factors mentioned at the introduction part, the pre-colonial Somali society had two state characteristics arguably, the population, and territory while unity and modern system of governing were missing, perhaps the colonial powers provided the opportunity to realize those missing pieces and discovering them to complete the first Somali Republic.

3.7 The Establishment of the First Republic

Somalia succeeded to form its first independent republic in 1960 and was considered as a democratic state fulfilled the majority of the democracy values and principles, particularly, from the election side. Its legal system combined Sharia and customary law with modern state law. In many respects, local political arrangements continued to operate, creating diffuse domination over social control. The majority of people remained detached from the modern state framework (Doornbos and Markakis 1994). In the meanwhile, the First Republic President was elected by Adan Abdullah Osman democratically, while he became the first African President elected in a democratic manner, and literally it became a prove for SYL success of their struggle, to build an inclusive country in which all citizens had equal rights. After his victory President Osman appointed in July 12, 1960 as his Prime Minister for Abdirashid Ali Shermarke who was crucial member of the SYL nationalist party to run for the government business while Prime Sharmarke formed his cabinet ministers immediately. And his government sought out to deliver the basic obligations of government at the same time as the government continued to focus greatly the nation building pillars. Despite the immense endeavor that government shown, three items dominated the first year of the republic. These were the plebiscite on the draft constitution, the election of a permanent president, and the appointment of the government after the Provisional period was over (Samatar 2016; 99)

Table 2 the First Somali Cabinet

Name	Ministerial Position
Abdirashid Ali Sharmarkee	Prime Minister
Mohamed Ibrahim Egal	Defense Minister
Abdullahi Issa Mohamoud	Foreign Affairs
Abdulkadir Mohamed Aden	Finance Minister
Abdirazak H. Huseen	Interior Minister
Ahmed Haji Dualeh	Agriculture Minister
Ali Garaad Jama	Education Minister
Mohamud Ahmed Mohamed	Justice Minister
Ali Mohamed Hirabe	Information Minister
Shiekh Ali Jimale Barre	Health and Labor
Abdinur Mohamed Hussen	Public works and Communication
Osman Mohamed Ibrahim	General Affairs
Abdi Hassan Booni	Deputy Prime Minister

Note: the first cabinet ministers that Somalia had.

Although most these items were resolved peacefully, yet again, the First Republic encountered three indispensable challenges the inheritance of two contrasting colonial systems of government, which required reform and integration a general incapacity induced by an impoverished population of which more than 90 percent were illiterate; and a lumpen elite, most of whose members did not understand how modern democratic institutions worked or the centrality of building a public sphere that was autonomous from

sectarian political projects. In this case, the most importance and immediate challenge of the Republic in its first phase was the transformation of the Somali aspiration for freedom and unity into functioning democratic unity. A most decisive instrument for meeting such a daunting transformation was the quality of political leadership in parliament and senior members of the government (Samatar, 2016; 86)

During the First Republic, the government made two significant political decisions which impacted the prospect of the first republic arguably, during its first years a political dissatisfaction between the two united parts regarding the political distribution was emerged, the northern part politician was unhappy, how the southern politicians dominated the political offices of the first republic and indeed one year after independence on 11, December, 1961, that motivated for young commanders from northern union part to attempted a coup while they had support from key Northern political leaders and their frustration reflected the displeasure of the people of the region with the union (Samatar and Samatar, 1987). Another political choice that Prime Sharmarke's government which impacted the fate of the Somali democracy as some analyst argued was the shifting towards Soviet Union 1963 after the Prime Minister Sharmarke met with American President at that time John. F. Kennedy. The Soviet union started to help Somali Republic for institutional development by providing technical support, expertise sharing in the different areas particularly, the military, and financial aid which later resulted a war against Ethiopia in 1964, those decisions can be highlighted the toughest political decisions that the First Republic placed them.

The democratization process of the political institutions were continued, and despite the difficulties and complexity that faced to the civic politics of Somalia, and among these were the misuse public resources by some politicians and government employees, the abuse of political power by some people in position of authority, and incompetency at higher levels of public service that impeded the country's progress (Samatar 2016; 128) and yet again to maintain the democracy and transforming it as a political culture, the municipal and parliamentary election was held in 1963 and 1964 and President Osman won again and appointed his Prime Minister in this time by Abdirizak Haji Hussien. The second republic period of 1964 to 1967, best exemplifies the work of two democratic

statesmen and the tussle between two competing political forces for national supremacy: the democratic nationalists versus sectarian entrepreneurs. During this period, the president and the prime minister, who led the civic element, were keen to institutionalize Somalia's nascent democracy and deepen merit-based public service, while the second camp was more predisposed to self-enrichment and saw membership in parliament and the cabinet as an end in itself. The latter group gradually coalesced around the former Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke but still had an informal and shifting membership driven by self-interest rather than an oppositional national program (Samatar 2016; 128).

3.8 The Military Coup and Socialism and State Collapse

In 1967 the Third Republic was elected, as the democratization of Somali institutions vision continued, due to the mistakes that the different Somali Republics made, a group of Military Commanders led by General Mohamed Said Barre overthrew the democratic institutions of the civil government in 21, October, 1969. Few days after the assassination of Third Republic President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke on 15, October, at the same year by one of his police guard while the Prime Minister Egal was absent on overseas visit. the commanders were succeeded to took over the country with a bloodless coup and immediately as the nature of the coup d'état members of the government and other political leaders and personalities were arrested and detained, the national assembly disbanded, constitution was dissolved, the supreme court abolished, and political parties declared as an illegal. A Supreme Revolutionary Council composed 25 of military and police officers under the presidency of General Mohamed Said Barre was named as the new political force in the country (Teutsch, 1999; 45)

Different reasons motivated the military to intervene the country politics, the local political situation that country was under it, the corruption, political dissatisfaction, tribal nepotism, economic shrink which also resulted highly rate of unemployment, and poorness and so on. Nevertheless, as the military commanders claimed these are the authentic factors that motivated these particular police and military officers to take over the civil democratic institutions. The new regime declared that it would rid the country's

social ills, by eliminating corruption, and tribal nepotism, delivering for economic and social betterment for all, and re-establishment of the honorable society. Moreover, the political change that continent had witnessed at the post-colonial era had also impacted on the military coup, many African countries drifted toward single party order or succumbed to dictatorships” Africa saw twenty coups before 1969” (Samatar 2016;98). Perhaps this could have been a genuine impact while indeed; the Soviet Union which had the ambition of adopting socialism to Somalia was in the country. The former Somali President Hassan Shiek Mohamoud stated that the Russian commanders that were working in the country at that time, representing the Soviet Union had facilitated the coup by motivating the Somali commanders (Abdi, 1977).

Consequently, over the last government’s failure to accomplish the citizen’s expectations, many Somalis initially perceived the coup as a political change. The military government successfully began its ambitious socio-economic and political task from the outset. Extensive public administration reform took place, and public projects to boost the economy of the country were introduced and as a result many people were recruited (Lewis 1993:32) the military regime did whatever tactics they could to sustain in the power and create legitimacy. In their first anniversary of the coup, the supreme leader of revolution General Siyad declared that Somalia would apply as a political ideology with the Scientific Socialism. This marked the beginning of a significant drift from a pro-western position to a close relationship with the Soviet Union which also signaled the army’s growing dependence on Russia and the idealist orientation of young intellectuals (Laitin & Samatar 1987:79)

However, in the first years, the military regime became very successful in both socially and economically, writing the national language and educating it on 1972 was one of the biggest success that the regime left behind, the infrastructure of the country was built successfully, the regime enabled the transportation of the countryside to side and that helped the economic development of country moreover the regime started to industrialize the country though was diminutive. Nevertheless, 1977, a significant political decision that influenced the fate of the military regime and more important the Somali state completely happened the Somali Ethiopia war which determined the military regime to

shift again its political ideology from the Soviet Union towards West. Somalia was defeated in that war, since then the Siyad barre regime faced different challenges, different rebels and oppositions emerged, the regime social and economic development decreased, until finally the military state was defeated in 1991 by rebels aided and supported by the regional, continental and global elements and situated the country in a stateless situation. Therefore, it was the beginning of the new era where Somalia has been struggling to recover from the wounds of the stateless period and beyond.

The Somali state creation has come from the two combined reasons, the pre-colonial efforts and preparation and characteristics that Somalis were missing which the anti-colonial period and experience Somalis inherited it from the colonial and realized there significant. Moreover, the nationalism movement both the hard and soft movements had also a vital role in the Somali state formation, hard movement practice of Siyad Mohamed following by the rise of the SYL as a democratic liberation party created sufficient spaces for the emergence of the Somali state which finally accomplished with the unification of the two Somali territories which was the target.

Furthermore, Somalis inherited from SYL democratic institutions, the unique democratic features, almost unlike any others in the African continent. SYL democratic process started in a consensus-based party and developed into an open democratic institution without arm wing and more important without an overbearing leader who was considered indispensable for liberation. Additionally, SYL demonstrated their devotion to independence and establishment Somali owned state as any others in African countries, however, what vary them from the other liberation movements in the continent, they believed that the democratic process was the absence of liberation and consequently practiced it. And fortunately, that political ideology and philosophy gave the country a short period of a chance to deepen its democracy after independence.

The traditional political culture had played a significant role in the state collapse. The clan-based political system eventually resulted in a political dissatisfaction between the clans. It is seems that clans did not agree the power sharing in the political offices. At the first Republics, the Northern inhabited clans felt instantaneously that the political office

had dominated by the Southern clans and that resulted in an immediate political clash. Failed coup attempt demonstrated how fragile the clan politics is and can create rivalry between the clans. Indeed the unstable Somali political alliance and ideology is also another important factor that contributed the state collapse significantly. Since the establishment of the Somali independent state, the different Somali state leadership had shown a hugely impacted political shifting, from western alliance to Soviet and later on deepened that relationship and again shifted towards western, that inconstancy of alliance eventually fated the Somali state to end badly



CHAPTER FOUR

THE ROLE OF FORIENG AID IN STATE BUILDING IN SOMALIA

After years of political instability that Somalia witnessed, ever since the military regime took over from power. Consequently, a civil war broke out in 1991 which claimed the lives of thousands, displaced a large number of population and finally led the country into political and economic chaos. Furthermore, different actors were engaged in the conflict, the warlords who claimed the representation of their clans, a group of religious people called Al-Itixaad¹, who fought for the establishment of an Islamic state and the regional powers who were more concerned about the security threats that could come from the political mess up, where the alarming circumstances. This warning and the alarming conditions in Somalia demanded an international response. However, intervention from the international community had become inevitable and the UN and USA responded between April 1992 and March 1995. Since then, an international effort and commitments to rebuilding the Somali state which is able to control over its territory has been taken place. In 2006, a self-organized religious group asserted the name of the Islamic Courts Union “ICU” took over the control of the south and central Somalia and where the ultimate goal as they claimed was the establishment of an Islamic state. Ultimately, this again caught the global powers' attention while in response, immediately they backed the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian troops to tackle what they viewed as a regional and global security threat. After the defeat of ICU and with the emergence of new radical groups such as Al-Shabaab and Xisbul-Islaam, the support from the donor world towards Somalia to reclaim its state has seemed more possible. A number of conferences had been held on behalf of Somalia and gathered the international donors to pledge donations in Somalia's state-building process. Since then, attempts to strengthen the Federal government have been maturing apace, with the use of massive amounts of aid and the federal government and federal member states have been heavily dependent on aid. For example, official development assistance (ODA) to Somalia totalled \$ 1.4 billion

¹ Al-Itixaad: an Islamic militant organization operated in Somalia 1991-1996 and aimed to establish an Islamic state in Somalia. They were defeated by the local clan militias with collaboration of the neighbouring countries

in 2016. Thus, the discourses of this chapter would focus on how international community efforts and financial support are contributing to the ongoing efforts of state building in Somalia

4.1 The Civil War: Causes and Consequences

In 1991 after the military regime had been ousted, the state went to a catastrophic civil war, the opposition rebels that ousted the military regime devolved into fighting after the downfall of the regime (Hall, 2015, 8). This prompted the country into political, economic and social chaos (Farah, 2007). Indeed, the civil war has various and complex causes including economic, political, ethnic and psychological views. As well as, different internal and outside actors have taken part with different characters in the course of the battle. Elmi and Barise (2006) argued that the root cause of the Somali conflict were a rivalry for power and resource as well as a repressive state and colonial legacy and regarded as contributing factors in the conflict, the politicized clan identity, the availability of weapons, the large number of youth unemployment.

The part of clan militias in the battle had been a very controversial, defining this clan militias and their legitimacy from the clans has become a critical component to understand the clan's relationship and role in the conflict. Elmi & Barise (2006) pointed out that the civil war occurred between the clan militias and it was based over resource competition. Furthermore, and this sort of conflict existed before the colonial period, where Somali clans had often clashed over resources such as water, livestock, in particular, the camel and grazing and historically, traditional leaders settled these conflicts by using the widely accepted traditional system "XEER²". All the same, this illustrates the connotations that after the colonialism ended, and the urbanization of the Somalis had started rapidly, dramatically, it varied the types of resources that were needed, and the means used to get them as comfortably. The domination of the state had become the new means of obtaining

² Xeer or Customary law in English: which deals with all kinds of cases from murder to marriage and unlike the modern constitutions, the XEER law dates as far back as the 7th century was never written. It was passed down from generations in the form of literature.

the nation's resources. Access to government resources, recruitment of civil servants and control of the foreign aid has replaced with the previous methods of obtaining resources.

In contrast, Farah (2007; 9) pointed out that the civil war in Somalia were not among the clans and no clan ever fought against other. There were some people and groups representing internal political actor's interest as well clan families who wanted to take over the power and one of aiming that was to claim to be fighting on behalf of a clan family representation. He underlined representation as the core issue while he raised the question of who represents whom? And the degree of accuracy of someone's claiming to represent this or that clan does he apply to represent these interests? However, the power hungry of the politico military leaders in order to control the nation's resources was underlined as a key factor behind the civil war.

Kaptein (2012; 8) argues that the civil war marked the first time that political-military leaders used large-scale clan-based violence as a political instrument outside the institution of the state. It also became the first time that politico-military leaders incited and organized the civilians to contribute and become perpetrators of such violence. However, during that period, several peace-making initiatives were attempted to end the war, but the mistrust among the politico-military leaders that were claiming the representation of their clans had impeded to reach any final conclusions. Until this moment, this political conflict regarding who will be ruling who? Exists among the clan chiefs and represents and it needs to be solved with an inclusive political reconciliation. Nevertheless, those unsettled disputes that existed among the clans before the independence is crucial to understand why the civil war happened. It was kind of conflicts that are characterized by episodic violence and bouts which keep recurring and seem to be resistant to, but not to mean impossible, to resolve through peacemaking or negotiation settlements (Crocker, Hampson & Aall 2009: 493).

Realist theories, On the other hand, have considered the protected conflicts to be high stake and best won through control, domination and counter control. Intractable conflicts (also referred as protected social conflicts)" (enduring rivalries conflicts) or moral conflicts) are distinguished from other kinds of conflicts in three ways; first, they are

persistent, secondly destructive and third they are resistant to peaceful means of solving the problem (Coleman, 2006: 532). Some scholars such as Azar's (1978) define protracted conflicts as "as a mixture of socio - ethnic and interstate elements that defy traditional settlement methods and generate escalating perceptions and behaviours" (d'Estree, 2009: 150). One can associate with the case of Somali civil war and prolonged political conflict then to results of other studies which indicate that most efforts towards crisis are only meant to maintain the conflict at its minimum; some of them are only 'frozen' temporarily and remain unsolved. This explains the episodic nature of intractable conflicts.

More emphasis is placed on violent and overt conflicts while non -violent and latent conflicts are ignored (Ramsbotham et al., 2011: 100). This indicates a simplistic view that ending a conflict at one stage or the absence of violence for some time may mean peace. Nevertheless, this underlines a crucial episode of history in the pre-colonial Somali clans of conflict nature; they were not living side by side in peace or under a single united administration, but rather there were frequent conflicts over control of resources, land and trade routes as discussed above. The coming of the colonial powers brought a sense of solidarity and consciousness of unity and therefore opted to come to an end the rivalry between them. Indeed, their main priority had become defeating this common enemy. Although, this does not necessarily mean that the pre-colonial rivalry among the clans was solved or they were at peace. One of the assumptions we understand from this case is that the very fact that the main objective of unity among the different clans in Somalia was to defeat the European colonialists, with no any elaborate post-independence agenda as to how they would cement their unity and create an inclusive state means that the unforeseen conflict was already inevitable

Crocker (2009) points out that failure to provide long lasting solution to the underlying problem has sometimes led to the false assumption of peace simply by looking at the fact that violent confrontation has declined or suspended. Some scholars refer to this kind of situation as a conflict in abeyance (Mayer, 2000; Wolf, 2006). The potential for such conflicts to recur cannot be ignored (Crocker 2009: 492). Away from the pre-colonial rivalry, similar instances of suspended or frozen conflict continue to be witnessed in the case of Somalia and are often at times mistaken to mean the end of the war. This explains

why the conflict over the resources among the clan had appeared on the level during the formation of state and after the regime collapse. Because of the unsettled disputes that mostly the Somali political elite ignored to elaborate rationally and realistically on the post-colonial period and most importantly at the formation of the Somali state has affected the fate of the state. Looking at the past and present of the Somali conflicts, the competition for the resource has become for the most determinant and persistent factor that has ignited or sustained violence and the political crisis. As a result, the rebel leaders who overthrew the military could not success to agree on an inclusive government that could replace the military. Perhaps their struggle for power made the civil war worst, where drought eventually had changed into disastrous famine. And this compelled the United Nations to respond by carrying out operation restore hope.

4.2 The UN Interventions (RESTORE HOPE OPERATION)

Democratization, economic reconstruction or liberalization and pacification are among the often familiar terms of the liberal peace-building process in the war torn societies after the cold war. The idea of liberal peace-finding and more precisely the narrative of how this was practiced at the peace-building processes are ideologically traceable to a more general revival of Neo-Liberalism (Hansen, 2012; 2). With the end of the cold war, the neoliberal approach of the 1980s became dominant, and the idea of free market was promoted as the catalyst of peace. Furthermore, it enabled the expansion of liberal peace practices, which made easier to intervene in other countries for the sake of peace-making and the liberal peace-making and state building paradigms has become the foundation of many peace- building strategies (Paris, 2004; 13-21). The other side of neo-liberalism was the privatization of the public services that emerged at the end of the cold war and resulted to privatization of the security and military sector and affected the humanitarian and peace-building activities that took place during that time (Barnett,2006;4)

The liberal peace-making paradigm was manifested in virtually every post-cold war intervention conducted in the name of the international community while the ideological aim was to reconstruct the collapsed state in the image of the liberal state. This proposed

the monopolization of the means of violence, which paradoxically allowed military operations to become part of the peace-building agenda (Jaye and Atuobi, 2008; 615)

In this case (Hansen, 2012; 3) argues that the liberal paradigm of peace-making had been implemented in Somalia and has influenced the scope and structure of the security sector. Furthermore, the military intervention in Somalia with the private security agents included serves an example of how the private security paradigm under the liberal peace actors differs from private security hired by a local government in Africa. The direct military and security support to local rulers demand a different set of skills than operating under the command of the international organization like the UN. In the meanwhile, the support operation for local ruler demands heavily to bring about tangible results and lack of that might mean the termination of the operation. Both features were missing the military interventions in Somalia. Of course, this could be impaired by the outcome of the operation.

United Tasked Force (UNITAF) led by the US government and authorized by the UN, introduced the private military companies in Somalia. The long and trusted relationship between the US and the Private Security Companies played an important role in the launch of these PSCs. Some of these companies engaged in these operations were quite old and had experience supporting the U.S. Army during the cold war, if not during the Second World War. They were involved at the softer end of the military operation and were not engaged in direct military operation as their mandate was to provide training and logistics (Baird, 1992; 1). Although UNOSOM11 withdrawal in 1995 meant the end of the engagement of the private security companies within the global governance and state-building in Somalia some of the PSCs were left behind and continued to operate (Hansen, 2008; 57). In the course of this operation, the private security sector that participated in the peacekeeping operation was dominated by foreign firms such as the Hart Group, Saracen, Topcat and Northbridge all operated outside the mandate. Their long-term relationship with their respective state sponsor in the west and most importantly U.S brought them in Somalia.

The United Nations, On the other hand, authorized a peacekeeping mission (restore hope operation) in response to the deteriorating conditions existing in the country at the time, and the main aim and priority were to deliver the humanitarian assistance to the needed people in three years between April 1992 and March 1995. The operation had three phases; UNOSOM-1 which took place (April – December 1992) led by UN which eventually failed and called for help from the US, who formed the phase two of this operation UNITAF (December 1992- April 1993), A multinational force led by the USA. The US forces withdraw and left the mission to the third phase; UNOSOM-2 (May 1993 – March 1995) in this phase, the United Nations had the full command and expanded the Humanitarian mission to include nation building (Crocker, 1995; 3). Moreover, all these different operations and efforts were mandated to monitor and protect the fragile ceasefire that brokered by the UN in March 1992 between the fighting groups (Poole, 2005; 6).

The first UN operation (UNOSOM1) failed, after severe resistance from the militias in Mogadishu and compelled the UN to seek help from the US. President George H.W. Bush was reluctant at first but later agreed to establish a multinational force to protect the humanitarian mission in 1992 due to the alarming conditions of the civilians (Wennesland 2013; 24). Responding from the Security Council resolution 794 (1992) 30,000 American troops and 17,000 troops from 20 other countries were unified and participated in the operation with the aim of restoring the order, delivering the humanitarian assistance and establishing a political stability. The UNITAF (United Task Force) operation failed and the U.S withdrew its forces from Somalia. That said, something had been accomplished in the course of the operation (Crocker, 1995). The restore hope operation succeeded in delivering the humanitarian emergency to the needed people and partially in encouraging negotiation between the warlords in order to end the war and achieve political stability (Wennesland 2013; 24

The UN leadership liked the idea that UNITAF forces should play a more active role and disarm the faction leaders and restore the political stability (Hirsch; Oakley and Crocker, 1995). However, a clash between UNITAF and armed militias in Mogadishu started when UNITAF carried out an operation aimed to capture the biggest warlord of Mogadishu (Paterson, 2009; 452). After series clashes between the US-led forces and the biggest

warlord in Mogadishu, General Mohamed Farah Aideed (a former General of the collapsed military regime) when this incident happened it changed the nature of the operation. In October 1993, nineteen American Rangers were killed and dragged around in the streets of Mogadishu by General Aideed militias and supporters had shifted the America's policy and engagement in Somalia's crisis. While, President Clinton who was elected in the office recently ordered the withdrawal of all American forces by April 1994. Moreover, he announced that the USA would no longer play a role in any regional conflicts unless these three conditions were present; solid public backing of intervention, multilateral participation under UN authorization and limited goals were clearly articulated and finally security threat to the USA. Furthermore, President Clinton also declared that the USA would, generally, not take any responsibility for nation-building (Magstadt, 2004).

The decision of Clinton to withdraw from Somalia in a time that the country's security and political stability had actually seemed substandard is posing questions, of the US claiming to protect global values such as democracy, human rights and others. Most importantly invaded a number of countries because of those value such Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam. This sheds on lights the reality that the national interests of the global powers are always ahead of the global values; so withdrawal of US from Somalia would not be a surprise after their soldieries were killed (Hansen, 2012). Although, the decision of departure from Somalia raised questions while the main one was why choose to depart at the time that conflict and political crisis had speeded and reached at it is highest level . Magstadt (2004) argues that Somalia was a chance for the USA to try a new foreign political principle that combined liberalism and pragmatism together.

After the departure of US forces by mid-February 1993 UNITTAF (the peace-making operation) was renamed again to UNISOM2 which mandated by Security Council Resolution 814 and the mission continued under 'Lieutenant General Bir' from Turkey and no longer the USA remained the command (Buer, 2001; 35).The UN did not learn any lessons from the previously failed missions; UNOSOM1 and UNITAF had objected the same paradigm which caused immediate challenges of command and control issues.

The UNOSOM2 operation attempted to disarm the faction leaders among them Aideed, Cismaan, and Qeybdiid, who were controlling the fighting militias in the city and that made a military mess. The new approach also created political disagreement between UN and US while US did not agree the same paradigm and approaches that UN wanted to repeat (Hirsch and others, 1995). Nevertheless, this eventually led the UNOSOM11 termination by 2 February 1995.

Consequently, these successive failed attempts at rebuilding the Somali state and restoring order and law led to notable changes. Three different self-governing units emerged; Somaliland unilaterally declared its independence in 1991 while Puntland established itself as an autonomous region in 1998, and the Southern regions, including the capital Mogadishu, stayed unstable politically with many local actors fighting for the power (Lewis, 2002: 333). In this sense, Somalia showcases the inherent difficulties of external powers state creation in Africa (Clapham, 2011:73).

4.3 Shifting the Paradigm and Reconciliation Efforts

Since the military regime collapsed in 1991, violence and predation become a regular way of daily life in Somalia. Consequently, various international interventions took place, none of which had succeeded. From UNOSOM1 to UNITAF which later transformed to UNOSOM2 ended up without attaining any valuable accomplishments from the political messes. The failed attempts of the UN-led operations with the cooperation of the U.S which had no long-term strategy at the time left the country to its fate and compelled the UN to change its state-building implementation approach and to attempt a different mechanism of state building with the hope this time will bring a political stability.

UN leadership applied a top-down approach of state-building while the all decisive decisions had been made by UN officials at the UN office. However, it did not succeed and therefore needed a reconsideration and revision. The UN policy makers understood the significance of the local people and conflict actors to be included in the process if, it is to achieve political stability. A political reconciliation has become necessary and attempts to begin negotiations efforts between the warlords that had been controlling in

Mogadishu became inevitable. Several attempts to enforce peace between them took place between 1993 and 1997, more or less supported by the international community from the first Addis Ababa agreement to Cairo agreement (Battera, 2004; 4).

This was perceived that international community is applying a blocking building approach to reconstruct the state in Somalia. the idea was first to break the territory down into smaller pieces that can be administrated by local authorities, these were then later to re-unified under a decentralized, federal or even con-federal structure. This assumption reached its highest level in the late 1990s after the formation of the new local authority 'Puntland' in which many people interpreted to be moving in the same direction as Somaliland. Nevertheless, after a series of attempts to reaching a reconciliation and dispute settlement among the conflicting parties in particular the warlords, the international community, through of the UN changed its approach and abandoned the so-called building blocks approach that had maintained local reconciliation between 1997 and 2000 with regard to Somaliland in 1993 and 1996-1997 which unilaterally declared their independence in 1991—and begun to recognize new community based national initiatives such us that of Arta in 2000 after IGAD approved a peace plan proposed by the government of Djibouti (Boas,2010;4).

The Congress produced a Transitional National Government (TNG) based on the presumptions of the national reconciliation congress, nonetheless, the TNG did not achieve any political milestones (Battera, 2004; 4), yet again, the international community called for a national conference, to be held in Eldoret 2002. Civil society representatives and warlords were brought together and after four months of unsuccessful attempts to reconcile the disputes between the actors particularly the warlords, the conference was moved to Nairobi. However, the Congress succeeded to introduce a new model of governance to Somali political sphere; a Transitional Federal Government led by President Abdullahi Yusuf and included several warlords. The TFG was the outcome of the 14 international community attempts to fashion a central authority in Somalia. Furthermore, the given main priorities of the TFG were to establish inclusive political

organs that can lead the government inside the country, with the hope that it would help to find political stability and reconciliations (Boas, 2010; 4).

On the other hand, due to its prolonged civil war and chaotic political and security circumstances, Somalia has been perceived to be, particularly by the western countries and regional powers a safe haven for various armed Islamic organization (Hoch and Rudincová, 2015, 3). The notion that the UN interventions, in particular, the UNITAF operation led by the US was intended to dismantle the growing armed militias such as Al-Itixaad who were at that time presiding over parts of the southern and northeastern Somalia (Hansen, 2012:5). As a matter of fact, Islam has always been a key factor in the Somali society and politics. Although the modern Islamic movements emerged after the military took over the power in 1969, they were not very influential. Their involvement with the political landscape has begun after the fall of the military regime. However, even then, they were not a powerful actor in the Somali politics until the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) mastered the situation in 2006 and took over the majority of the country (Rudincová, 2015, 3).

This indeed was perceived as a global threat and most important a regional danger and in response, the western countries and regional actors had become to intervene, Ethiopian troops who had the global powers support entered Somalia to help the powerless TFG. With that help, the TFG eventually succeeded to defeat the ICU and took over the capital city. Later, the UN responding to a request from the TFG approved a peacekeeping mission to Somalia. African Union mission in Somalia 'AMISOM' was launched in 2007 (Barnes and Hassan, 2007). At the same time, Peace negotiations efforts between the Islamic militias and TFG had been attempted and led enormous political changes; the emergence of Al-Shabaab a new terrorist actor extracted from ICU, withdrawal of the Ethiopian army, the election of the president Sheikh Sharif who was the leader of the moderate Islamists as the next president of TFG. Al-Shabaab has made a close relationship with the international terrorists such Al-Qaida and claimed the agenda of forming Islamic state in Somalia. Due to the weakness of TFG, AL-Shabaab had succeeded to control over large parts of central and southern Somalia. And eventually after series clashes against TFG

with help of AMISOM they lost a vast majority of their controlled areas. But, the emergence of these Islamic organizations repeatedly sheds light on one thing, the necessity of a central source of authority that exercises a legitimate monopoly of force in the country. This has become inevitable since the fell down of the military regime. While UN representing the international community efforts launched a vigorously state-building process to avoid the possibility that Somalia can become a safe haven for the terrorist organizations.

4.4 The Heavy Dependence on Aid

Since the establishment of the Somali Republic in 1960, from the unification of two Somaliland controlled by British and Italy “the British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland” the Somali different Somali administrations have been always dependent on foreign aid. For instance, the Somali Republic financed 31% of it is budget, for the first three years after independence, with aid granted by its former colonizer Britain and Italy (Metz, 1992). Moreover, after the civil government overthrew, the socialist military regime that governed the country between 1969 and 1991 continued to depend on aid and received financial, technical support from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics “U.S.S.R” until the disagreement resulted from 1977-1978 war between Somali Ethiopia disrupted the relationship. The military regime also succeeded to replace the financial loss caused by their exit from U.S.S.R. with aid received from US, Saudi Arabia and countries in Western Europe (Warsame, 2011:1)

Consequently, the 1977-1978 war internally displaced a huge number of people who sought refuge in Somalia and that allowed the regime to receive enormous humanitarian support from the international donors to resettle the displaced people in refugee camps in Somalia. As well, financial and military assistance was granted for the regime in order to repel armed and largely clan movement against his legitimacy. By 1991, just before it collapsed, the military regime was getting a financial support of 100 million from US (Maren, 1997). However, after the collapse of the regime, the clan-based rebels took control and civil conflict erupted which dried up the Bilateral aid, but humanitarian support still continued and that led both UN and the US to intervene Somalia in 1992

presumably to facilitate the delivery of the humanitarian assistance to needed Somalis (Suarez,2006). The absence of the government institutions which provides the people's necessity has increased the aid dependence of the country. For instance, from 1991 up to 2011 the international donors granted for Somalia more than \$ 9.2 billion as a humanitarian and developmental purpose, an average of \$ 439 million annually. Over the same time, the international community contributed more than \$3.2 billion for caring for the Somali refugee in other countries and that is more than \$152 million annually.

The humanitarian assistance has provided the essential needs to millions of Somalis effected by the general collapse of Somali state institutions and followed by severe draughts and famines. As well as the Somali refugees that fled from the conflict. An assessment collected by (Norris and Bruton, 2011: 17) shows that from 1994 to 2009, the international community spent aiding for the Somali refugee in other countries \$ 2.2 billion more than \$106 annually and \$ 185 per refugee. In addition, in 2011 the international community allocated another \$1 billion for assisting them.

The evolution of the radical ideology and most importantly, the Islamic militias had compelled the international community and particularly, the European Union and the US play a more critical role in the state-building efforts in Somalia. Their fear of Somalia to become a haven for international terrorist became the key factor in pushing the international community to be concerned with the Somali issue.

Therefore, establishing a central authority to deal with the political messes had become an important priority and this propelled the international community to set up the first Transitional Federal Government in 2004. Most importantly, supported the new TFG in terms of financial needs to function and at least to look like a government as well as a militarily assistance to be able to challenge with the radical groups has also become unavoidable. This increased the country's dependence on aid and aid become indispensable in order to operate the Somali governments (Warsame, 2011:2)

Table 3 Humanitarian and Development Trends 1991-2011

Year	Humanitarian and development Fund	Private Donors	Total
1991	\$185,800,000	\$37,200,000	\$223,000,000
1992	\$652,900,000	\$130,600,000	\$783,400,000
1993	\$889,800,000	\$178,000,000	\$1,067,900,000
1994	\$535,000,000	\$107,000,000	\$642,000,000
1995	\$187,700,000	\$37,500,000	\$225,300,000
1996	\$88,100,000	\$17,600,000	\$105,700,000
1997	\$80,400,000	\$16,200,000	\$97,000,000
1998	\$80,400,000	\$16,100,000	\$96,400,000
1999	\$114,700,000	\$23,000,000	\$137,600,000
2000	\$101,000,000	\$20,200,000	\$121,200,000
2001	\$147,700,000	\$29,600,000	\$177,300,000
2002	\$146,800,000	\$29,400,000	\$176,200,000
2003	\$173,700,000	\$34,700,000	\$208,400,000
2004	\$198,700,000	\$39,700,000	\$238,400,000
2005	\$237,000,000	\$47,400,000	\$284,300,000
2006	\$391,000,000	\$78,200,000	\$469,100,000
2007	\$384,100,000	\$76,800,000	\$461,000,000

2008	\$762,200,000	\$132,3000,000	\$914,600,000
2009	\$661,700,000	\$132,3000,000	\$793,400,000
2010	-----	-----	\$750,000,000
2011	-----	-----	\$1,250,000,000
Total	-----	-----	\$9,222,200,000

Source: Norris and Bruton, 2011.

Fulfilling those gaps, the World Bank established a reconstruction and development program budgeted 2.2 billion in January 2008 after a joint needs assessment with the United Nations Development Program ‘UNDP’ (Norris and Bruton, 2011: 18). The international community is also financing the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The operation was launched in January 2007 by the African Union Peace and Security Council with an initial six months mandate. The primary priority of AMISOM was to support the existed structures under the transitional federal government, train Somali security forces, and supporting the national security plan in order to reach political stability and reconciliation and protecting the humanitarian assistance. The mission was fashioned to structure every six months and is going (Williams and Hashi, 2016: 13).

The number of AMISOM troops had been increased and reached 22 thousand soldiers yet, are still unable to realize its mandates. From a security perspective, the mission has accomplished some important gains on the ground but not succeeded to control over entire Southern Somalia, and Al-shabaab, though weakened, still maintains considerable sources.

Financially, from July 2008 to June 2012 the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly appropriated some \$798 million for AMISOM operation, according to the U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Nonetheless, the USA and EU are the leading donors to AMISOM. Between 2007 and 2010 USA provided over

\$185 million in training, equipment, and logistics to AMISOM. While, the EU donated \$297 million between 2007 and 2011. Indeed, these numbers have increased over the past years. However, in the recent year's new donors have joined to contribute the state building efforts and granted both humanitarian and development projects. Emerging powers such as Turkey have seen on the ground playing a critical role in the state-building processes. Turkey's unprecedented involvement with Somalia begun in 2011 and since then, has contributed around \$1 billion with this process. In addition, Turkey has recently opened their biggest overseas embassy in Somalia. Meanwhile, they have opened a military base to train the Somali national army. This informs us the unprecedented relationship and alliance that Turkey and Somalia is willing to establish. Furthermore, Somalia holds the second largest recipient of Turkish development assistance.

Table 4 Total Security Council and General Assembly Spending on July 2008 to June 2012

Year	Expenditure
July 2008- June 2009	\$75, 642, 000 ⁷⁶
July 2009- June 2010	\$213, 580, 000 ⁷⁷
July 2010- June 2011	\$205, 221, 000 ⁷⁸
July 2011- June 2012	\$303, 912, 000 ⁷⁹
Total AMISOM Financing 2008-2012	\$798,355,000

Source: United Financing Reports 2012.

In many ways, the AMISOM operation in Somalia represents an effort by international community and western powers to manage security at the first place, and accomplish political stability in the region. It is no wonder this strategy did not work enough and it seems a repetitious and never-ending process. Although, the United Nations and Federal Government have agreed recently a smooth transition which allows the Somali national

army to take over the control and the responsibility. This seems a risky decision without defeating Al-Shabaab and fundamentally altering them the environment that allows them to flourish the radical ideology. A well skilled and trained Somali national army could be the replacement which currently, the international community with the cooperation of the federal government and federal states are attempting to establish. As matter of fact, unless this would be realized the departure of the AMISOM which offers a little protection to the civilian population would be looked back as a severe security risk.

On the other hand, a huge amount of money has been spent on delivering humanitarian and development projects to Somalia since 1991. In fact, that did not lead to enduring and sustainable improvement in Somalia and it is capacity. Indeed, lives were saved and protected, but the lack of more effective political approach to reaching a durable peace agreement, shoring up the existing weak institutions, or addressing security concerns demonstrated that Somalia's cycle of political crisis and conflict remained unbroken and is indeed needed to be dealt by coming up with a complex strategy. Perhaps FGS realized without a paradigm shift, the international donors could well continue spending billions of dollars to treat symptoms of Somalia's long crisis without making any strategic gains or taking any real steps toward resolving the conflict. This led to the FGS with the assistance of international community reassess and re-examine their state-building strategy.

4.5 The New Deal Compact

For the last two decades, there has been a growing concern within the international community policy landscape towards a greater focus on effected conflicts and fragile states. As a response, the new deal for engagement in fragile states was agreed at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in 2011 in Busan (Devinit, 2016: 1). The New Deal acknowledges the need to increase the proportion of aid towards situations of fragility and most importantly, to take a different approach to assist in fragile states and Underlies the peace and security as a prerequisite for sustainable development. This has been accomplished after the United Nations Secretary-General 'UNSG' called it officially at the World Humanitarian Summit 'WHS' as well UN High-Level Panel on Humanitarian

Financing in 2015. Over the same year, for the fourth year, Somalia was identified as the most failed state in the world (Warsame, 2011:2) and the country had been characterized by poverty, insecurity and human rights disregard

In 2012, a provisional constitution was agreed which set out a framework for the new federal government to be elected in Mogadishu. Following this political development, based on the Busan New Deal principles, the FGS with the collaboration of the Federal states including Somaliland, the international community, and civil society initiated a new deal compact in December 2012. The compact was the result of an inclusive process to define the priorities of Somalia in between 2014-2016 Furthermore, was endorsed by the international community in 2013 in Brussels. (BTI, 2016: 32).


In one way, the compact had proffered the complex, multifaceted and differ according to various political, social and regional contexts of challenges that Somalia is encountering and at least somehow demonstrated the strategy to overcoming all these challenges and effectively lead Somalia on a path of recovery, durable peace and development. The compact emphasized the establishment of strong, reliable, accountable and functioning state institutions. In this respect, the formation and support of local and regional administration as well federal units according to the provisional constitution was seen as key milestones for a vibrant and stable Somalia. On the other hand, the compact provided a new political, security and development paradigm in shaping the future relationship between Somalia, and it is people and the international community in the spirit of new partnership. However, foreign aid plays a critical role in the process of the Somali state building and it is various projects. Therefore, it has become important that Somali government and it is development partners to work harder and collectively to improve the effectiveness of development assistance in Somalia and make sure these assistances contribute to peace-building and state-building results. Indeed, this required a paradigm shift in the way aid is provided and perhaps a different model from the previous. In that case, the new deal compact was designed to fulfill this gap and make able to the international community to evaluate the progress and achievements (Devinit, 2016: 6).

Ultimately, the success of the new deal compact was supposed to be measured by its impact on the state-building process and how it would be able to bring fragmented Somalia together. In order to achieve this FGS (Federal Government of Somalia), federal states and international stakeholders drew a clear overarching strategic framework for coordinating political, development and security efforts. Where the FGS had the responsibility of accomplishing these objectives.

Consequently, the NEW DEAL increased ODA (Official Development Aid) which the international community has donated to Somalia. For instance, Somalia's development partners reported in 2015 an amount of \$675 million and 2016 \$666 million which was donated for development in Somalia. Accompanied by nearly \$593 in humanitarian aid, therefore, only in 2015, ODA for Somalia was estimated \$1.3 billion. This excluded military aid and peace contributions. Under the New Deal compact, the development aid has grown compared with the previous years. For instance, in between 2005-2012 nearly 65% (\$3.3 billion) of reported donations went towards humanitarian activities. While in between 2013-2015 more aid was disbursed for development (\$1.81 billion) compared with 2005-2012 combined (\$1.78 billion) (Aid Flows, 2016, 4).

As the above chart shows ODA has made rapid trends over the past 11 years. Both Humanitarian and development projects have increased and consequently, slight political stability, economic growth, security stability has been achieved. As well as transparency and accountability have made a good progress. FGS and its ODA donors agreed the establishment of funding windows in order for donors to channel their development aid. For instance, Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility have been found (SDRF) to go through the development donations given to the FGS and its federal member states apart from Somaliland.

Figure 1 ODA Trends in Somalia, 2007-2016



Source: Aid Flows 2018

Generally, over the course of 2014-2016 which the new deal compact had been implemented, donors reported \$ 458 million in contribution to the SDRF, While EU (European Union) was by far the largest contributor with \$ 214 million in reported contributions over the new deal period. Furthermore In 2015 donors channelled 31 % of their development aid (\$ 209 million) and was a significant increase compared with the 2014 only 13% (\$80 million) went through this funding window (Aid Flows, 2016, 9).

The ultimate objective of the international community has been the creation of Somalia that is able to coexist with peace and establishes it is way to development, and that compelled them to agree on the segmentation of the responsibility and objectives and successfully accomplished to carve up by five PSG (peace and state-building goals) and one cross-cutting issues including; capacity building, gender and stabilization and conflict sensitivity. While the cross-cutting issues included in every PSG. Perhaps, these PSG's were optimized all priorities for the Somali state-building process and therefore, the upcoming parts of this thesis will be designated to discuss the peace and state building goals intensely, by analysing them and assessing their influences and effects for the Somali state-building efforts.

Table 5 Reported Donors contribution to SRDF Funding Windows, 2014-2016 in Million

Partner	Reported SRDF Contributions			Total SRDF Contributions	Total Reported Development Aid,2014-2016	% Chan nelled throu gh SDRF
	2014	2015	2016			
EU	41.6	100.4	71.9	213.9	575.18	37%
UK	18.5	51.8	26.3	96.6	334.06	29%
Sweden	8.4	16.5	18.0	42.9	126.92	34%
Switzerland	4.5	6.4	13.0	23.9	32.38	74%
UN PBF	-	11.0	12.0	23.0	23	100%
Norway	-	10.5	11.4	21.9	98.92	22%
Denmark	-	6.3	10.5	16.8	51.36	33%
Italy	-	6.5	2.2	8.8	61.80	14%
WB SPF	8.0	-	-	8.0	14.80	54%
Finland	-	-	2.3	2.3	26.11	9%
Total	81.0	209.4	167.6	458.0		
This table only includes development partners who reported contributions to the SDRF funding windows.						

Source: Aid Flows Report 2016.

There are two funds which is currently operational under SDRF: The UN-administrated Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UN MPTF) and World Bank Multi-Partner Fund (WBMPF). The UN MPTF currently has a total of US\$ 125 million in signed legal agreements, of which US\$ 72.7 million have been paid in by donors. Current UN MPTF donors include Denmark, the European Union, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,

and the UN Peace-building Fund (PBF). While The WB MPF currently has a total US\$ 183.5 million in signed legal agreements, of which US\$ 89.8 million have been paid in by donors. Current MPF donors include Denmark, Finland, the EU, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, the UK, and the WB State and Peace-building (SPF). During the New Deal period ODA has consistently hovered around more than 1billion expected to remain constant in the upcoming years.

Table 6 ODA by Type during the New Deal Compact, USD\$M

Type	2014	2015	2016	Total
Development	607	675	666	1948
Humanitarian	672	593	88	1353
Total ODA	1,279	1,268	754	
Support to peacekeeping	439	624	141	1,204

Source: Aid flows 2016

Note: these totals capture disbursements from development partners to recipients (e.g. government, implementing partners, multilateral agencies, funds) for a specified purpose. They do not represent expenditures, which are financial outlays for goods, services or salaries.

4.5.1 Inclusive Politics Peace and State Building Goal

The strategic objective of PSG is building stable and peaceful Somalia that can coexist regardless of their clan affiliation or religious ideology through inclusive politics. This compelled the stakeholders of the Somali state-building to realize that this political vision cannot be achieved without the inclusion of the local people. Therefore, promoting a national and local levels of peace and reconciliation efforts has become inevitable. In addition, a complex political strategy that enables the revision and adaption of the federal constitution. This was intended to accomplish before the 2016 parliamentary and presidential elections and due to the political, technical and economic challenges it did not happen to be achieved. However, constitution has been always and will a critical political

milestones which it will be difficult to sort settle. The current federal government is attempting to reach one step forward about the constitutional challenges, but challenges like the natural resource distribution as well as federalization are defying them. Fixing these problems will play an important role for the stabilization and recompilation of Somalia. Inclusive politics as PSG had three main priorities (1) facilitating and promoting an inclusive political reconciliation between the Somali communities as well as empowering and strengthening the relations between federal government and its federal member states. In order to restore and establish trust between the political entities so that can accelerate the state-building efforts (Manuel and others, 2017).

The FGS, FMS and international political actors engaging in this process have identified this as a significant political priority in order to stabilize Somalia and a critical pre-condition for enabling an effective political organs that can transform the people's expectations into actions. Moreover, the FGS have had this political priority of facilitating and enabling a political environment which peace and reconciliation can be accomplished. As well as the creation of regional administrations in all stable areas in accordance to the provisional constitution. According to the way that inclusive politics was fashioned, the issues of fiscal federalism, mandate and administrative structure of various agencies of the security, natural resource distribution and most significantly, the mandate, function and scope of certain administrative agencies "Political Decentralization" have agreed to address at national dialogue between FGS and FMS. At the same time, the inclusive politics PSG has emphasized the realization of an inclusive process for reconciliation and being able to recover the conflicts between the communities at the local level and most importantly, to regain trust between communities through community dialogue and mediation. Throughout this process, the Somali state-building stakeholders have perceived local capacities and institutions mobilization as inevitable and that women, youth, and disadvantaged groups would get participation and representation.

(2) Completing the revision and adopting a federal constitution by December in 2015 was another priority that inclusive politics had to carry out. The federal parliament had set a timing and roadmap to flow in order to finalize and ratify the constitution. This has caused a number of political disagreements between FGS and its FMS for the last five years and

indeed it will be challenging to realize easily. But, as a matter of fact, to overcome the repeated political crisis between the FGS political organs, as well as the FGS and its member regional states, Somalia should accomplish a well-designed and defined constitution that differentiates the political powers. (3) Prepare for and hold an election by 2016 was another mandate that inclusive politics supposed to deal with. The creation of an electoral policy that all Somalis have trust on it, was supposed to aim under this peace and state-building goal. This includes the creation of a functioning an independent election commission and ratification of related legislation. Emphasizing the political parties and voter registration was also supposed to achieve during the new deal period under the inclusive politics PSG. As well to ensure a broad-based participation, outreach and civic education were about to achieve through a comprehensive public communication strategy and the women's Quito participation. This PSG had the role of leading Somalis with political transformation, where the people are able to vote and elect their president. This has seemed as an impractical political agenda building upon the political situation that country under, a political fragmentation, still a powerful terrorist group who is controlling major towns and lack of trust between the communities. Indeed, it looked impossible to achieve one man one vote at the time (Manuel and others, 2017).

Table 7 Total Spent on Inclusive Politics 2014-2016, USD\$M


Year	ODA amount
2014	25.6
2015	40.3
2016	32.2
Total	98.2

Source: Aid Flows 2015.

The Inclusive Politics was breakdown into four main section; Federalism and resource sharing, constitutional review and implementation, democratization and electoral process

and political dialogue and social reconciliation. The aim was to accomplish all these objectives within three year.

Figure 2 Reported Aid Flows Against PSG1: Inclusive Politics



Source: Aid Flows 2016

4.5.2 Security Peace and State Building Goal

As the country has been struggling to defeat Al-Shabaab, security becomes a critical objective for realizing a successful state-building process while, the strategic objective of this peace and the state-building goal was to establish unified, capable, and accountable and rights-based Somali federal security institutions that are able to provide basic security and safety for its citizens. Perhaps the stakeholders of the Somali state-building process realized that the formation of strong institutions that control within its borders and maintains peace with its neighbours can only be achieved if the security institutions are committed to implement these four priorities which has placed under this PSG while the aim was to be delivered within three years.

The first Priority, emphasizes the capacity building as well as accountability of state security institutions which enables them to defeat Al-Shabaab and recapture territory back, stabilizes and provides basic safety and security. Secondly, integrate security forces into federal institutions and ensuring them that they move as a more unified structure and organizing them as cohesive entities. Thirdly, in order to accelerate the fight against

terrorism, the adoption and implementation of the national programme for the treatment and handling the disengaged combatants through a comprehensive process which fighters in Somalia can disengage in line with international law and human rights have also underlined as a priority under this objective. Fourth, since piracy has become a source of money for many young Somalis, the necessity to develop an effective maritime security strategy within the framework of the maritime resource and security strategy had also become inevitable (Manuel and others 2017).


Table 8 Total Spent on Security 2014-2016, USD\$M

Year	ODA amount
2014	43.2
2015	63.3
2016	62.4
Total	169.0

Source: Aid Flows 2016

The security of peace and state building goal was broke down into three main objectives and each object had supported separately.

Figure3 Reported Aid Flows Against PSG2: Security




Source: Aid Flows 2016

4.5.3 Justice Peace and State Building Goal

After the catastrophic civil war that Somalia went through the establishment of independent justice institutions that have the capacity to address the justice needs of the people has identified as a necessary objective for the Somali peace and state-building process. This PSG was intended to deliver those necessities. Three priorities were given to this PSG. 1. The key priority was the organization of the judiciary system, are aligned with the constitution and the international standards. 2. The justice institutions were supposed to star to address the key grievances and injustice in Somalis. 3. To ensure that more Somalis have access to fair and affordable legal justice. However, the vision was to establish a sustainable and resourced legal policy with the leadership of the Ministry of Justice. This indeed has been a fundamental requirement for the peace and state-building efforts in Somalia. The consequences of the civil war haveaffected by every Somali and to heal those wounds, the establishment of the sustainable and genuine justice system are inevitable and that could help the restoration of the brotherhood and tolerance among the Somalis which the civil war demolished (Danida, 2015).

Figure 4 Total Spent on Justice 2014-2016, USD\$M



Source Aid Flows 2016:

As it is demonstrated on the above chart the total amount of ODA that had been utilized for improving security during the new deal compact was \$39.1 million. Furthermore, this PSG was not broken down into sections nevertheless financed as one category. However, the most of these priorities were not achieved but at the least, the foundations have been formed and in order to realize fully the justice institutions must arm themselves with

comprehensive strategic objectives and considerable justice reforms along with well-trained experts that can deliver social justice and also establish tolerance and acceptance amongst Somalis. The international community has been supporting financially and most importantly technically to all these efforts of re-establishing a functioning legal and justice systems in Somalia.

4.5.4 Economic Foundation Peace and State-Building Goal

In post-conflict areas, economic growth has a significant effect on the state building processes of the nations that are recovering from conflicts and chaos. In fact, the FGS with the collaboration of its development partners realized the significance of this subject for the ongoing efforts and included the compact as a fundamental goal. The strategic objective of this goal was to regenerate and expand the Somali economy with a focus on livelihood enhancement, employment generation, and broad-based inclusive growth. This peace and state-building goal aims to allow government institutions to generate revenues in order to deliver the public services as well as building the capacity and legitimacy of the public institutions. However, the improvement of the local economy with a vibrant private sector can probably increase opportunities for peace and contribute to the diminution of conflict.

Boosting the state-building efforts the FGS with the support of its development partners was assigned to achieve certain objectives and through broad-based and inclusive engagement of the population including the Diaspora, in productive activities, and the generation of employment. Nevertheless, the international community had a critical role in implementing and transforming for these objectives into actions by providing financial and technical support. In the course of the NEW DEAL compact, the FGS government had certain priorities under this PSG (1) Enhancing the productivity of the necessary sectors that are fundamental for the Somali economy as well as reconstructing the significant infrastructure projects. (2) Expanding opportunities for youth employment which was significant for security purposes too, through job creation and capacity enlargement like skills development. (3) Sustaining the achieved development and establishing the capabilities of natural resource management by developing legal and

regulatory frameworks which can enable to build the capacity of key natural resource management institutions. This intended to achieve within three year and nevertheless, due to the reasonable and legitimate circumstances and challenges the FGS did not succeed to deliver those priorities as it was scheduled but succeeded to establish the foundations (FRS, 2013).


Table 9 Total Spent on Economic Foundations 2014-2016, USD\$M

Year	ODA amount
2014	130.9
2015	136.8
2016	173.1
Total	440.7

Source: Aid Flows 2016

At the same time, to ensure that this peace and the state-building goal is probably managed it has broken down into four main sections amongst them; community-driven development, NRM, resilience and productive sectors, infrastructure and private sector development and employment. Perhaps each of them has funded independently.

Figure 5 Reported ODA against PSG4 sectors 2014-2016, USD\$M



Source: Aid Flows 2016

Note: this figure explains the disbursement on PSG 4 sectors. NRM, Resilience and Productive sectors along with Infrastructure has utilized the largest disbursements.

4.5.5 Revenue and Service Peace and State Building Goal

The objectives and aims of this peace and state-building goal were designed to have a close association with the ongoing public financial management (PRF) reform and action plan. The goal is about to increase the service delivery with the aim that government services will reach out to the most vulnerable communities. As well as, sustaining the public expenditure which can achieve by promoting good governance. That allows the revenue generation institutions to be accountable and contributes to the ongoing efforts of FGS to strengthen the capacity of the institutions associating with public finance management.

The revenue and services PSG had three essential priorities to accomplish within the new deal period. (1) Providing an equitable, affordable and accessible social services, by creating a suitable environment that participates the decentralization of service delivery and prioritizes key investments that increase and extend access to services. (2) As well as this peace and state-building goal had the responsibility to strengthen transparent and promote accountability towards revenue generation. (3) Strengthen PFM to enable the different levels of government to better manage financial resources in a transparent and accountable manner, in support of national priorities. In fact, delivering on these priorities would indeed make a huge difference towards the government revenue and trust among Somali citizens. However, International donors have had played the role of facilitation in order to reach those priorities by assisting the Federal government and federal member states financially and technically (FRS, 2013).

The ultimate goals that this PSG intended to accomplish were to clarify service delivery frameworks and prioritize key investments to expand and increase access to key social services and also to increase government revenue and developing the capacity of FGS to collect taxes by operating with an effective tax administration system which shows accountability and transparent towards society


Table 10 Total ODA Spent on Revenue and Services 2014-2016, USD\$M

Year	ODA amount
2014	339.5
2015	282.5
2016	253.5
Total	875.6

Source: Aid Flows 2016

However, the international community has been assisting FGS to robust PFM system and processes alongside to build the capacity of the staff which is essential to building more effective institutions that are able to provide the basic public services to the people of Somalia.

Figure 6 Reported ODA against PSG5 sectors 2014-2016, USD\$M



Source: Aid Flows 2016

4.5.6 Cross Cutting Issues Peace and State Building Goal

Historically, the Somali women have played a critical role in community mobilization and peace establishment in the pre-state period as well as the colonial era while they showed their strength and resistance against the colonial rule. After the state collapsed Somali women have also shown their political and social leadership by attempting to fulfil the

government role. The role of Somali women on socio-economic and political aspects has been restrained by certain religious interpretations, clan based social system which is patriarchal and followed by prolonged civil war and humanitarian crisis which they made victims. Therefore, this PSG principles and priorities outlined has endeavored to contribute to enhancing the role of women plays in Somali society as a peacebuilding advocator as well as economic actors and social cohesion. The new deal compact ensured the women's political participation quota as well as youth and other marginalized groups and attempted to address factors spreading and preserving gender inequality through strategic and comprehensive priorities under all PSG. Including, emphasis on political and decision-making forum, protection from gender and sexual based violence, equal accessibility to justice institutions, economic empowerment and accessing equally the basic services such as education and health.

The institutional capacity building has had a key enabler for the implementation of the compact and the ongoing national development plan which replaced the NEW DEAL compact. While the ultimate objective was to build a core public sector that is able to accomplish the compact's peace and state-building goals. Nevertheless, the establishment of effective institutions that have the capacity to deliver the expectations of the Somali people are is still needed. Although the new deal compact enabled the foundation of this significant core yet, FGS and its development partners should enhance their commitments towards this objective. However, rebuilding citizen-state relations that had been lost in the last decades can only be accomplished by building the trust and confidence between the public institutions by promoting a broad-based and inclusive consultative processes with the inclusion of an empowered and independent civil society and Somali citizens. Strengthen the capacity of the public institutions and empowering the public personnel as making the public institution accountable to the citizen can only accomplish the lost state-citizen trust.


“The establishment of the sustainable and development in Somalia is required human rights sensitive approach across all of the PSG priorities in the compact, including the promotion of access to justice, human rights sensitive legislation and

security sector reform as well as addressing past injustices and violations. Particular focus must be given to the protection of the rights of the most vulnerable groups, such as IDPs, women, children and elderly. It will require targeted promotion and protection of human rights through the establishment of a human rights commission and strengthening of existing mechanisms, in line with the Post-Transition Human Rights Roadmap for Somalia for 2013-2015” (Somali Compact, 2013:3).

The cross-cutting ultimate objectives were to deal with these specific priorities that are related to peace and state-building goals. Moreover, enables to reach them such as capacity building, gender equality, human rights, stabilization, and others. However, after the compact period ended, the FGS and FMS proposed a national development plan that underlines the key priorities for the Somali peace and state-building efforts. The NEW DEAL compact has not succeeded to accomplish all of its priorities and agendas but succeeded to accomplish something regarding in establishing the foundations of these priorities. However, since then, as like as not, a political and socio-economic growth has been noticed inside the country (FRS, 2013).

The political problems in Somalia has been spilled over effects regionally and internationally not least in the areas of piracy, terrorism, refuges and repeatedly humanitarian crisis. A Critical challenge for the federal government of Somalia to collaborate with its international partners to address both threats emanating from Somalia and ensure that international partners are supportive and constructive for peace, stability and development in Somalia. Moreover, should emphasize the ongoing peace and state-building processes through broad-based and inclusive consultative including the Federal Member states, civil society (H.S, 2013).

Figure 7 Reported ODA against Cross-Cutting sectors 2014-2016, USD\$M



Source Aid Flows report 2016.

The “other cross-cutting activities” category contains four reported activities that have relevance for more than two PSGs. These include the Accountability Programme and the Somalia Aid Enablers Programme, both reported by DfID. The other two are the UN Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralization and a UNOPS project for enhancing peace, security, development and governance. While the activities classified as “other” could not be classified against the PSGs, such as the financing for the UNHAS and EU flights, staff secondments and general support to Somali CSOs without a reported thematic focus

4.6 Analysing the Dimensions of the National Development Plan (NDP)

After setting the foundation and basis of a number of key peace and state-building milestones in Somalia, including the completion of the federalization map by creating a new federal member states such as Galmudug, Southwest, Hirshabeele and Jubbaland, landmark parliamentary and determined the presidential elections mechanism under the New Deal compact between 2014-2016 served as the country’s comprehensive and political roadmap. The FGS with the cooperation of the FDSand under the leadership of the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) projected the National

Development Plan to replace the New Deal Compact and serve as the country's comprehensive development plan. The NDP serves in a period of three years, from 2017 to 2019, while the strategic objective is to envision the country's development plan consistent to recover from the long years of the state collapse, the persistent conflict and shattered economy (NYP, 2017, 13). However, Somalia's development donors endorsed the NDP as the basis of collaboration and partnership considering the unique socio-economic and political situations of Somalia.

It is the first National Development Plan crafted by the central government of Somalia since 1986 while the plan provides an analysis of Somalia's current development status or in other words the impact that New Deal made as well as the challenges and opportunities. As a matter of fact, the plan is supposed to deliver Socio-economic transformation in order to achieve the stated objectives such as poverty reduction, economic revival and societal transformation within three years as well in a socially just and gender equitable manner. However, the priorities and objectives are similar with the expired New Deal compact and it is the continuation of the efforts and goals that new deal introduced. Nevertheless, a 'Mutual Accountability Framework' has developed that governs the working relationship between the FGS and its development partners throughout the lifetime of the National Development Plan (USFS, 2017; 13).

The Federal Government takes a leadership responsibility in terms of the overall development agenda. Government leadership, coordination, ownership, and implementation increase exponentially under the NDP. The process of drafting the plan has been inclusive, federal agencies, federal member states, the private sector, civil society have all contributed the finalization of the plan except (Somaliland) and will indeed play a critical role for the implementation and success of the agenda.


During the three-year cycle of the National Development Plan, key milestones have supposedly to continue developing in the areas of security, governance, rule of law, energy including renewable energy, infrastructure, clean water, accountability, gender equality, and promoting resilience. Furthermore, the NDP is putting a great deal emphasis on reviving the country's traditional economic sectors such as livestock, agriculture, and

finishing by utilizing the strength and the potentiality of the private sector (NYP, 2017, 16). However, the international community or the country's donors is taking their role of facilitating and the financing the NYP action plan. Since the adoption of the NDP to replace New Deal which is expired in 2016, the country's Aid has reached a record high for instance, in 2017, reported official development aid (ODA) for Somalia totaled US\$1.75 billion. This marks a 41% increase compared with the reported ODA in the last three years which averaged US\$1.24 billion per year. The humanitarian assistance provided within that year as a response to the drought has also increased a 66% percentage compared with the past three years (US\$ 608 million annually), while the USA, Alongside with the United Kingdom and UE commission provided two thirds (US\$ 702.2 million, 69%) of all humanitarian aid to Somalia in 2017. nevertheless,

The development assistance granted to Somalia in 2017 totaled US\$ 742 million, a 9% increase compared with the previous year (Aid Flows, 2018; 2). Despite the fact that New Deal compact has been replaced, yet the aid delivering mechanism has remained, although, the share of aid delivered on treasury significantly increased in the last year. More than US\$ 100 million in external grants (approx. 14% of development aid) was delivered through the treasury of the federal government of Somalia in 2017. The majority of that granted aid (91% US\$ 94 million) were delivered through three channels; projects financed by donors through the World Bank Multi-Partner Fund (WMPF), the general budget support provided by Saudi Arabia, and sector budget support provided by Turkey (Aid Flows, 2018; 2). In fact, the NDP is designed and crafted very well, and it acknowledges all priorities that Somali people need to overcome the political crisis and conflicts and heading to their path to rebuild effective institutions that can deliver their expectations. Nevertheless, to implement this kind of comprehensive national development plan strong governance is inevitable, in particular, public institutions that have the capacity to transform the plan into action. Does FGS have the institutional capacity and the human capital to accomplish all the NDP goals and objectives within three-years will remain a critical matter? Compared with the New Deal principles the NDP pillars are relatively similar with six pillars among them; inclusive politics, security and

rule of law, effective institutions, economic growth, infrastructure, social and human development and resilience.

Figure 8 Reported ODA against National Development Plan 2016-2018, USD\$M



Source: Aid Flows Report 2018; 17

4.7 Aid Effectiveness in Somali State-Building

Africa as a continent has been largely dependent on aid since 1960s and received more 60 billion as foreign aid. Despite the continuing and increasing amount of aid, nonetheless, its contribution to socio-economic and political dimensions of the continent has been debated. Scholars like Moya (2009) contends that the aid Africa continent receives has failed to accomplish any valuable contribution to the socio-economic and political cycles of the continent even so, harms the existed socio-economic progresses. Despite the widespread western belief that the rich should help the poor and that form of help should be aid is not functioning, Moya (2009) argues that aid makes the poor people more poorer, and therefore, proposes for the donor countries to rethink their paradigm of uplifting the continent's economy and emphasises that aid must be stopped in order Africa to reach a valuable economic growth that can alleviate it is people's poverty. Furthermore, aid has been, and continues to be, an absolute political and economic calamity for most parts of

the developing world and to overcome this challenge, the developing countries should come up with another strategies and commitments to boost their economy. In short, aid is the disease that pretends to be the cure.

In contrast, Sachs (2014) believes in foreign aid as one tool of economic development when it is properly designed and delivered and underscores its contribution for the economic growth of the recipients. Furthermore, affirms the significant and efficacy of foreign aid for the beneficiary communities and cutting it would immensely affect the lives of the 6 million people in the continent that are dependent on aid in order to survive from preventable diseases such as Malaria, Undernourishment, Lack of safe water and etc. Easterly (2014) highlights the mistakes that donor countries have made, of giving too much aid to dictators or otherwise wasted bad ideas badly implemented but points out that is just one part of the story. Millions of lives have been saved by aid and are still dependent on it for surviving. In terms of growth, despite the misconceptions, a large bulk of research has been dedicated to evaluate the effectiveness of foreign aid while it has found that the most significant ingredient in energizing growth, overall it has had a modest positive impact. Moreover, Easterly (2003) criticized the current approach of delivering aid towards recipients, the top-down paradigm of research have failed to produce any valuable changes, and proposes to shift the resource to bottom-top researchers and to increase accountability from aid agencies to make sure that aid reaches the poor.

One of the reasons that some scholars have been so critical on aid's contribution to the growth of the beneficiary countries is that looking at the political and economic situations of the List Developed Countries where massive amounts of aid goes, have not seen of any substantial shifts, low rate of democracy, lack of transparent, authoritarian leaders are still there and high corruption rate. This arise the debate of whether aid encourages these political and economic setbacks. Findings from Peter Boone stating (1996) shows that despite the tremendous amount of aid transferred to Africa, the continent has still remained one the poorest in the world if it is not the poorest, relative to other continents. However, this debate over whether or not foreign aid can lead to the recipient world on growth and development would remain unsolved mystery.

For instance, Somalia has been dependent on aid since it is dependence in 1960 to balance it is development and budgetary projects. After the military regime collapsed the dependence on aid has doubled, a large total of aid has been utilized for the purpose of reconstructing a legitimate state, which is able to have power over its territory. This has been the mission of the international community over the last decades and indeed, some of their efforts are explained in the previous sections.

4.7.1 Research Design

To examine the role of foreign aid for the ongoing Somali state-building efforts, different simple regression models has been employed since influencing factor of foreign aid is a single independent variable to test the research questions. These questions include one causative relationship between the independent variable and dependent variable. However, in this thesis, a secondary data collected from the World Bank and Aid Flows Reports conducted by the federal ministry of finance particularly the aid coordination unit will be used to proof the role of the foreign aid in the Somali state-building process. In order to answer the research question what is the role of foreign aid in state building process in Somalia? The date covers from 2006 till 2016.

Simple regression is a statistical technique used to assess the magnitude and direction of the relationship between a criterion variable and a predictor variable. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis will be used to estimate the models. OLS regression was selected for two reasons. 1. It is a widely accepted statistical procedure for exploring and predicting the relationships among different variables. 2. The results of regression are easy to interpret (Onder, 2006).

To examine the foreign aid effectiveness four hypothesis has been studied.

Hypothesis one: Foreign Aid is more likely to strengthen the rule of law.

Hypothesis two: Foreign aid is more likely to contribute the political stability in the post-conflict areas.

Hypothesis three: Foreign Aid has a positive contribution to corruption control.

Hypothesis Four: Foreign Aid is more likely to impact on government effectiveness.

The OLS regression models used variables as given in the following;

$$Y_{1...n} = a + bX + e$$


Where;

X = Official Development Assistance,

$Y_{1...n}$ = Rule of Law, Political Stability, Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness.

e = Error term.

Figure 9 Official Development Aid and Rule of Law




Source: World Bank Database

Pearson R^2 : .24, Adjusted R Square = .13, F= 2.4, F significant= 0.15, a; -2.5, b; .012 □□, 0.079, $P < 0.15$, N: 10

Rule of law is a system that holds the government institutions and private sectors accountable to the law and protects the rights of citizens from arbitrary government and abusive of power. Hence, since the collapse of the central government, rule of law has been one the most important principles that is highly needed to bring back to the governance system of Somalia. The FGS and U.N. organizations representing for the international community have been made solid reforms to improving the rule of law in Somalia and contributed for the last three years along with security and inclusive politics an amount of 389 million. Therefore, as the result of the regression analysis shown, there is a positive correlation between the ODA and Rule of law, whenever ODA increases there is also slight improvement in rule of law. But that does not mean Foreign Aid impacts

directly to the Rule of law in Somali and in increase in ODA does not necessarily mean rule of law in Somalia will improve.

Figure 10 Official Development Aid and Political Stability




Source: World Bank Database

Pearson R^2 : .68, Adjusted R Square = .64, F= 17.40 F significant= 0.005, a: -3.79, b: .00098 $\square \square$ 0.22, P< 0.003, N: 10

The widespread phenomenon of political and policy instability that Somalia had been encountered since 1977, has its negative effects on the economic performance, which eventually led to the total collapse of the state in 1991. Since then, the international community has been putting enormous efforts and strains on finding a political stability in Somalia. To achieve that, they facilitated a number of national dialogues and eventually succeeded to fashion a central government with the hope it would be able to control over its territory. This has been a key political milestone for the international community for the last three decades. For instance, during the new deal compact the political stability factor under the inclusive politics peace and state-building goal was spent an amount of 51.8 million as well security as a PSG 169 million. Therefore, the data analysis supports the effectiveness of these efforts, and underlines that there are a significant correlation between the two variables and whenever ODA increases the political stability also gets better. The major political shifts along with some other factors such as the repulsing of

Al-Shabaab by the Somali national army and AMISOM that occurred in the last decade have played a critical role in accomplishing the fragile political stability.

Figure 11 Official Development Aid and Control of Corruption




Source: World Bank Database

Pearson R^2 : .32, Adjusted R Square = .24, F= 3.89 F significant= 0.083, a: -1.83, b: .00015 $\square \square$ 0.07, $P > 0.083$, N: 10

Although corruption is both one of the leading causes and consequences of endemic political instability in Somalia, it has been ranked bottom of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index since 1991. It occurs at all levels in both the public and private sectors, and is a visible and an expected form of behavior. This has affected virtually every aspect of the Somali society. Despite the major political shifts that occurred in early 2017 which saw the peaceful transition of power to a newly elected government, there are as yet a few signs of comprehensive anticorruption reforms. However, the study made the conclusion that; there is a positive correlation between the two variables, and the increase in ODA has brought a slight control in corruption. In fact, this has something to do with the new mechanisms that are in place which the FGS and its donors agreed to deliver for the granted ODA during the new deal compact and later than. On the other hand, the analysis showed there is somehow significant relationship between the two variables therefore; the increase in ODA will results in controlling the corruption.

Figure 12 Official Development Aid and Government Effectiveness



Source: World Bank Database

Pearson R^2 : .003, Adjusted R Square = -0.12, F= 0.03 F significant= 0.86, a: -2.22, b: -1.91 $\square \square 0.10$, $P > 0.86$, N: 10

An effective government is one that is capable of delivering service that its citizens need to improve their social welfare. However, the establishment of an effective government has been an essential objective to realize, ever since the State-building process in Somalia has launched. The FGS and its development partners have been putting enormous efforts and dedication to realize this political milestone. For instance, since the National Development Plan launched to replace the new deal compact, an amount 399 million has spent to strengthen the FGS institutions. However, the data analysis results showed there is no direct relationship between the two variables and when ODA amount increases that do not mean it will have any impact in government effectiveness. Therefore, the possibility that ODA could impact is too little and of course, this supports to the thesis argument that in order to FGS and FMS become more effective political organs, a tremendous reforms must be done towards corruption and other challenges hindering Somalia to have more effective institutions.

CONCLUSION

It is a general perception that Somalia is a chaotic place where no order exists. Somalis are still relying on traditional structures, which make up informal constraints enabling Somalis to do their daily activities. The traditional structures can only provide informal constraints, but formal constraints are inevitable if economic development is to be accomplished. Therefore, in the long term the institutional framework of the traditional structures should be supplemented or replaced by formal constraints. And perhaps these formal institutions should be formed based on known practices familiar to the Somali society, in order to gain a general understanding and acceptance of the Somali people and to make way for institutional syncretism. However, since 1991 after the military regime ousted the Somali political elite with the assistance and the collaboration of the international community concerned about the political crisis as humanitarian inherited from the conflict and the political instability, and has been willing in the long run to establish a formal constraints that are capable to deal with the country's political and economic calamities. Being intrigued and motivated by curiosity about why the Somali political elites and their international partners have not succeeded to establish a central authority, to find an answer for this questions issue, the study sets out as its main research question as “what is the role of foreign aids in state-building in Somalia?”

The thesis aims to deductively investigate this research question. While its objective was to explore the phenomenon of state-building, and to examine the relationship between Somali state-building and foreign aids or international actor's support for the purpose of regaining its own state. However, enormous international efforts has been taken place since 1991, in order to find a political stability and establishing central authority which is effective and able to control over its territory and therefore Somalia has been the site for internationally sponsored political engineering. Between 1991 and 2012 the international actors endorsed 15 attempts at forming a central authority and several meetings outside Somalia, five of which were major conferences, produced temporarily outcomes, though they all failed to produce a sustainable solution at the end. The failure of all these attempts were referred to interference from external actors particularly, the neighboring countries as well as the unwillingness of domestic actors to reconstruct the state. After a series of

initiatives without progress, ultimately, the Somali national reconciliation in Kenya, as known the Mbagathi peace process between 2002 and 2004 produced the transitional federal government and due to the consequences and challenges which was not able to settle in Mogadishu.

After two transitional federal governments which did not bring much on the political and economic progress of the country as well as the reconciliation and peace building , an election was held in September 2012 and the federal parliament was elected a new president as it marked for the first time a presidential election held inside the country since 1967. This had given the impression of political and security progress and Somalia's development and state-building partners acknowledged the little improvements but also demanded the realization of more political accomplishments. And to achieve that, the newly elected FGS with the cooperation of the FMS and its international donors proposed the new deal compact which served a period of time as the country's comprehensive development plan. The compact had been addressed all the priorities for the Somali state-building process and received the endorsement of the country's international donors in September 2013 in Brussels. Furthermore, it had a clear goals and milestones which scheduled to be accomplished within three years.

There seemed little doubt about the comprehensiveness of the new deal compact. It did clearly seek to fully engage with all the peace and state building goals discussed at chapter four of the thesis. With hindsight, the only major oversight from the original compact was the role of the federal member states. However, the compact structures adapted to their growing role and have provided some basis for dialogue between Federal Government, the emerging Federal Member States at the time and development partners. There are many concerns about the effectiveness of the compact and the progress on the multiple milestones. The ambitious and comprehensive nature of the compact was always going to be challenge for implementation. This proved during the course of the compact, political instability which brought at the office three prime ministers and five cabinet ministers, several high-profile corruption scandals which undermined trust with development partners and political misunderstanding between FGS and FMS was noticed. On the other hand, the compact has also accomplished some progress on the political settlement and

security and as the data analysis proves that the international donor's enormous investment on the political stability and security brought in Somalia some sort of political settlements during that period. As well as, there has been a steady modest economic recovery (IMF, 2016) but the country yet to witness a rapid period of growth that has happened in other post-conflict countries. However, the compact has provided a valued transparent framework; it has also become the public focus for concerns about the lack of tangible progresses in ordinary lives. The Federal Government of Somali pointed out that the new deal compact has made some improvement on trust and transparency. But there was a consensus among development partners that the direct impact of the compact on trust between the government and the public had been very limited. Not only this, but also other factors such government effectiveness, rule of law which the new deal investment had a positive correlation, and whenever the international donor's assistance increased those indicators have improved but with limited scale. One of the potential facilities that Somalia inherited from the new deal compact, which is necessary to keep it, is the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) which has been discussed at the chapter four. A highly effective mechanism but only just begun to work at scale. It has taken too long to fully operationalize the new financing mechanism agreed to be delivered for the international donor's financial assistance towards the state-building process in Somalia. despite, the slight improvements for the control of corruption during the compact period, yet over the course of the new deal compact 2014-2016 limited amounts of donations from the development partners has been delivered through the SDRF treasury due to the fears and lack of trust that Somalia's international friends had towards the possibility of corruption to happen at the government institutions.

As a matter fact, the study has concluded that Somalia's state-building process is heavily dependent on aids and seems it cannot operate at the moment without the international donors support. For instance, in 2017 the 27% of the country's GDP has come from ODA while the domestic revenue was estimated 2.2%. Furthermore over the period of three years, from 2015 to 2018, the European Union aided €3.7 billion to Somalia in development and humanitarian purposes as well as peacekeeping operations. The EU members are a crucial supporter of Somalia over the areas of security with three significant

security and policy missions such as European Union Naval Force Operation Atlanta for Somalia (EUNAVOR ATALANTA) initiated as counter piracy as well as, European Union training Mission in Somalia (EUTM) and European Maritime (EUCAP) Security which is mandated to support Somalia in developing maritime security. These operations and mission was initiated to contribute the state-building efforts as well as the stabilization of Somalia. The African Union Mission (AMISOM) to Somalia has been operating for ten years while EU has consistently supported financially and technically and since the operation was launched the EU spent on AMISOM operation in Somalia with €1.73 billion. However, at the last Somali partnership forum in Brussels the European Union announced that they will be increasing their security assistance to Somalia. More aid to Somali institutions associates with security issues. Further, the EU members pledged as a humanitarian assistance with more than \$100 million to prevent any new humanitarian challenges that might happen in Somalia. .

In this case, foreign aids play a very critical role for the ongoing efforts of reconstructing and reengineering of the Somali state. As the regression analysis on the four indicators such as rule of law, political stability, control of corruption and government effectiveness proves, there is a positive correlation between the foreign aids and state-building process. Therefore, the federal government of Somalia needs to emphasis the implementation of the mutual accountability framework, which is higher level broader document jointly, agreed by the FGS and its international donors. As well as, security needs to be beyond the discussion and FGS with the cooperation of its member states should overcome the existing security challenges. Moreover, the government should introduce a comprehensive policy that endorses the growth of the domestic revenue. That enables for the government to give up its dependence on foreign aids. However, Somalia seems to be heading its path to recovery from the prolonged civil war and political stability therefore, international donors must put all their efforts to strengthen the existing fragile institutions to eventually able to overtake the all responsibility and control over its territory, and most importantly to deliver the expectations of its citizens.

The FGS and its FMS and International Community representatives meet in every six months to analyze and assess the political, economy and security achievements that have

accomplished, as well as the challenges and opportunities. On July 16th, the stakeholders of the Somali state-building gathered in Brussels in two days meeting called “the Somali Partnership Forum” organized by EU alongside the Federal Government of Somalia and Sweden. While the agenda of the forum was to discuss and evaluate for the past six months FGS achievements over the areas of inclusive politics, economic foundations, security etc. over 60 delegations from the international donors participated and agreed on joint agreements for key areas of the Somalia’s state-building. However, the international community representatives acknowledged the FGS progress and accomplishments in stabilizing the country since the last partnership forum held in London last year and pledged to continue the assistance and support of FGS. For instance, high Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini announced that EU will provide additional €200 million to support overall stabilization of Somalia. Furthermore, signed the EU’s contribution of €114.2 million for the African Union Mission to Somalia until the end of this year.

The president of FGS Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed also stated that the FGS is fully committed to implement the political roadmap of 2020 regarding the Transition plan for security, economic reform and reach out to the whole of Somalia for reconciliation and dialogue. On the other hand, the foreign minister of Sweden has highlighted the significance of this forum and what has been achieved through this forum. Meanwhile, **it has been** announced that Sweden is doubling its development support to Somalia to approximately \$350 million over the next five years. However, the Somali partnership forum produced a new commitments from the international community while in total \$1.2 billion has pledged to Somalia’s state-building process and this time will be channeled through the government budget. Over the course of the meeting, security and stabilization of the country has pointed out as the key factor of Somalia’s progress and development. And in order to achieve that, strengthening the existing political institutions as well as continuing efforts to curbing corruption and promoting transparency and accountability at all levels should be accomplished. It is the responsibility of the FGS to craft a complex and comprehensive plan which is able to deal with and overcome all those impediments,

perhaps without prevailing over them, it would be indeed, difficult for Somalia to benefit from these international donations and supports.

It is worth mentioning that this process of state-building requires a social mobilization of new social actors alongside a strong political leadership to bring about. However, neither of them is available in this process of Somalia's state-building. Of course, it is one of the reasons that this process has been lacking to achieve any valuable results since it is beginning, and the international community cannot provide either of these aspects but can somehow facilitate the process of getting these significant pre-conditions. However, state-building has to rest on a foundation of nation-building, that is, the establishment of national identity that serve as locus of loyalty and overcomes attachments to family, tribe or ethnic group. Generally, nation-building process sometimes bubbles up from the grassroots, but it can also be the product of powerful political institutions that forms and protects. This is another important prerequisite that Somalia's state-building building efforts is lacking a strong national identity that is able to replace that current identity affiliations and it's the responsibility of the Somali political elites and leadership to form and systemize it carefully.

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