

T.C.
ISTANBUL COMMERCE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND AFRICAN
STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE PROGRAMME

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: A COMPARISON OF KENYA AND UGANDA

Master Thesis Dissertation

Giola CAMI
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ISTANBUL, 2018

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Advisor: Doç. Dr. Hasan Basri YALÇIN

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Abstract

Since 1820 democratization has occurred in waves followed by reverse ones. Political changes transforming an authoritarian regime into a democratic one is conditional on the ground of factors inciting the process. Democratization is a modern concept in political studies and literature about it has been developed after WW2 focusing in the pattern of its evolution, causes and actors responsible. External influence has been considered inferior by internally focused explanatory theoreticians considering them (external factors) as complementary factors rather than primary. It was only in the late '90s when external influence has been identified as a driver for democratic transition in relation to the globalism epoch. This study aims to bring an analysis on the role of external influence as the flagship of democratization during post-Cold War period.

As external influence two are the most acknowledged actors: European Union (and its organizations) and United States of America. Both of them have applied the political conditionality as the mean to carry on democratization in developing countries. This study takes into analysis the impact of international donors' (USA, EU and World Bank) "Carrot and Stick" policy while importing democracy globally, which has been referred as "Promoted democracy" in Sub-Saharan Africa. Western countries led by USA have been granting since post-Second World War donations to developing countries, with an emphasis on Africa; this financial aid has turned to be the rudder of democratization process in the continent either by accelerating or by preventing democratic reformation of the governments.

Comparing democratic transition in Kenya and Uganda this study aims to evaluate the rate of success of promoted democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa – In what conditions and circumstances is external influence to be successful?

Key Words: *Democratization, waves, external influence, Africa, political conditionality*

Özet

1820'den beri, demokratikleşme, dalgalar gibi peş peşinden oluştu. Otoriter bir rejimi demokratik olana dönüştüren siyasi değişimler, bazı faktörlerden etkilenir. Demokratikleşme politik çalışmalarda modern bir kavramdır. Bu konudaki edebiyat, 2. Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra geliştirilmiştir ve evrimi ve nedenleri üzerinde duruluyor. Dış etkiler, içten odaklanan açıklayıcı kuramcılar tarafından, birincilden ziyade tamamlayıcı faktörler olarak (dış faktörler) düşünüldüğünde daha düşük kabul edilmiştir. Dış etkinin demokratik bir geçiş için, küreselleşme çağına göre, bir uyarıcı olarak tanımlandığı, ancak 90'ların sonlarındaydı. Bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde demokratikleşmenin amiral gemisi olarak dış etkinin rolü üzerine bir analiz getirmeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Dış etki olarak iki en tanınan aktördür: Avrupa Birliği (ve kuruluşları) ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri. Her ikisi de siyasi koşulluluğu uyguladı, ortalama olarak demokratikleşme geliştirmekte olan ülkelere devam etmek. Bu çalışma uluslararası bağışçıların etkisini analiz ediyor (ABD, AB ve Dünya Bankası) "Havuç ve Sopa" politikası demokrasiyi küresel olarak alırken, Sahra-altı Afrika'da "Teşvik edilmiş demokrasi" olarak bahse edilmiştir. ABD'ye öncülük eden Batılı ülkeler, Afrika'ya vurgu yaparak, geliştirmekte olan ülkelere İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası bağışlarından beri yardımda bulundular; Bu finansal yardım, kıtadaki demokratikleşme sürecinin hızlandırılmasıyla hızlandı ya da hükümetlerin demokratik reformlarını engelleyerek.

Kenya ve Uganda'da demokratik geçişi karşılaştırmak, bu çalışma, Sahra altı Afrika'da tanımlanan demokrasinin başarı oranını değerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır - Hangi şartlarda ve koşullarda dış etki başarılı olur?

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Demokratikleşme, dalga, dış etki, Afrika, siyasi şartlılık*

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DEDICATION

— To my dearest aunt Lida whom I can never thank enough for how amazingly she has impacted my life. I look up to you and see the woman I want to become. The grace in you impacts hearts - Thank you for being incredibly unique!

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List of Abbreviations

AU	African Union
FDC	Forum for Democratic Change
FDI	Foreign Direct Investments
FI	Foreign Investments
FORD	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
HDI	Human Development Index
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KANU	Kenya Africa National Union
KHRC	Kenyan Human Rights Commission
KNDA	Kenya National Democratic Alliance
LSK	Law Society of Kenya
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NO	New Order
NRM	National Resistance Movement
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PR	Political Rights
PUJ	People Union of Justice
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USD	United States Dollar
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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1. INTRODUCTION

Twentieth century offers a rich legacy on democratic transitions as the modern states started to take form. Alongside the democratization phenomenon described as the Three Waves of Democratization followed with counter waves (Huntington, 1991), the theoretical approach about the process was to be built. Concept of democracy is not new in the process but now in an explanatory and analytical pattern -concept of democratic transition – theoretical frame, conditions required for it to take place and measurement is given light.

Theoretical approaches in the field of democratization, beside differences, forms what is called “Paradigm of Transition“, where transition is understood as the changing from one inferior status to a superior one. *Democratic transition* seems to be considered as a new concept, but in fact it is not such – we can detect the changes in antique Greek cities which explored different types of governments from Aristocracy, Monarchy, Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy.

Ancient Greek cities were first to apply democratic governance, where the people would shape their own political will through actively and directly participating in governance, though women and citizens, who unless both of his parents were Athens, were not allowed to address their will – so we are dealing with Poliarchy rather than a Democracy, which it's more utopic (Dahl, 1971). In the Middle Ages democratic principles of being equal were transmitted through Christianity and it would be Magna Carta in 1215 which would certainly be the cornerstone of a democratic governance, the Act which limited the power of King and shifted this power to Catholic Church of England and therefore the Parliament was created, an institution that today is still the key institution in Commonwealth for a democratic governance. The Declaration of Independence by Jefferson in 1776 deeply rooted in Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Locke's ideas marks a new era of democracy in the west; 1789 French Revolution would be that milestone that founded the ground of civil and political rights in democratic governance. The above events served as the rock background of regimes' political shift from authoritarian to democracies: between 1820 to 1991 Three Waves of Democratization took place, followed by counter waves around the globe with an emphasis on the Third Wave of Democratization from 1974 – The fall of

Portugal Dictatorship to the Democratization in a spillover effect of Eastern European countries in 1991 (Huntington, 1991). This would light up the need to analyze the concept of Transition, and further Transition to Democracy. And it's exactly the era of the modern states where the philosophy of the transition takes its turn, to be treated as an institution, not just a tool in the studies of democratic governances.

This study aims to identify the causes of democratic transition taking place in modern states with a focus in post-WW2 waves of democratization. While the concept of democratic transition was being consolidated, literature was getting richer with arguments on its patterns, conditions, causes and predictions. Many authors have been writing and giving perspectives on the causes of democratization, in an attempt to find a correlation between the degree of democratization and degree of certain variables, be that economic, social, cultural, distribution of resources etc. Each theory has met counterarguments and critics, therefore there is no widely accepted dominant factor of democratization— There is no unlimited explanation for democratization process, only perspectives and cases that support such arguments.

Firstly study investigates '90s interstate arguments that were considered to be the defining framework of democratization led by Lipset, Lerner, Gary, Diamond, Dahl, Huntington, Barro, Grugel, Moore, Stephens and Przeworski. These arguments rely on economic development, literacy level and human rights being a prerequisite for democratic transition. Finding these arguments as unable to serve as the explanatory ground for my research question, this study instead aims to recognize external influence as the primary cause of democratic transition which explains better the differences in Sub-Saharan countries' democracies. This research does not deny the positive correlation between economic development and democracy; both cases of Kenya and Uganda prove the correlation positively – A more economically developed Kenya is more democratic than economically poorer Uganda. The same proportion goes for human rights in both countries: in both Political Rights and Civil Liberties scores by Freedom House, Kenya has performed better than Uganda: Kenya is considered as a "Middle Human Development" group member, while as Uganda is a "Low Human Development" group

member. Yes, there is a positive correlation – more economically developed countries have a predisposition to be democratic - but these modernization indicators do not trigger democratization itself, they do not act as establishers. In the literature of democratic transition one of crucial aspects to be treated has been the difference between factors which act as establishers and those that act as sustainers - the process of democratization enfolds both of them, but they are not the same; Lipset (1959) used the term “requisite” not “prerequisite”. Yet, for both Kenya and Uganda economic development only shows a positive relation with their respective democracies, but they act neither as establishers nor as sustainers. External influence via negative conditionality was the primary cause of their democratic developments thus establishing the first democratic practices; in the same line the accountability pressure from international donors on domestic institutions on the account of democratic practices has been using aid suspense/cutting leverage to drive domestic democratization acting thus acting also as sustainer.

During post-independence period third wave of democratization took over Africa and besides sharing the same political, social and economic legacy countries have met different levels of democracy and this is the question that this study aims to explore.

Arguments in this study treat external influence as the primary cause of democratization and analyze the conditions, circumstances and the motifs of international actors in their quest for democracy. This analytical approach offers answers to what degree externally imposed conditionality through foreign financial aid - as the instrument of external influence’s leverage – has actually shaped domestic reforms on political and economic liberalization.

Looking deeper into the international actors who lead the democratization process, the role of donors in Sub-Saharan Africa is examined either as an accelerator or preventer of democratic changes in the region. Putting an emphasis on financial aid as the “Stick and Carrot” tool, third chapter offers an explanatory analysis on the capacity of donations to act as rudder in democratization.

This study seeks to analyze the success rate of external influence in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a focus on Kenya and Uganda while identifying what are the conditions and

circumstances of a positive turn of events and how much do the motives of international aid assistance matter in the process.

This thesis contains five (5) sections and the structure of thesis will be presented as following. In the first section, this paper describes the aim of the research, objective of the research and data method used to collect data and shape arguments.

In chapter two, the thesis will offer an analysis of the Literature Review discussing interstate theories of democratization : Modernization Theory- Economic development and Democracy; Structuralism Theory – Social Classes and Democracy; Transitional Theory – Agency centered approach; The State, Civil Society and Globalization and External f/actors as influencers of democratization .

In chapter three, thesis offers an analysis on the capacity of external influence as the primary cause of democratization identifying elements of structural approach and actor bases approach. As the literature on the specific role of mogul actor USA in the Sub-Saharan region has been poorly treated, this study will look forward to examine how the international financial aid has been used as the “Carrot and Stick” policy and channeled democratic events in the region, frame working the logic of these actions under the light of motivations of external actors and their foreign policy.

Fourth chapter offers a comparative case study of Kenya and Uganda by arguing the impact of international donors in their domestic politics and how it has shaped their perspective of democratization. This chapter also analyses countries’ respective democracy level by identifying their performance in economy, politics and social platforms to finally draw a comparison between them.

Fifth chapter concludes on the findings of this study: Why external influence better explains democratization process and why Kenya and Uganda regardless of their similar political and economic legacy have different levels of democracy.

1.1. Aim of the Research

- To identify the causes of democratic transition ,actors responsible for the pursuit of the process and their relativity based on geography, history and political culture;
- To analyze the explanatory capacity of external influence as a primary cause of democratization during post-Cold War period;
- To analyze the motivations that drive external actor's quest for democracy;
- To investigate and share information to what extent external influence has been successful in Kenya and Uganda;

1.2. Objective of the Research

- To analyze the theory of external influence as a cause to democratic transition by evaluating international donor's role in SSA
- To explain why Kenya has made better progress in democracy than Uganda
- To explain how negative conditionality policy via foreign aid leverage has impacted democratic development in Kenya and Uganda

1.3. Methodology

This study's analyses is constructed on the comparison of the cases of Kenya & Uganda – the level of their respective democracies and what has impacted the difference of democratic achievements between the two, by evaluation the role of international influence as responsible for their democratization process.

Kenya and Uganda represent similar cases approach, therefore comparison is built upon analyzing and comparing the impact of foreign aid leverage in two countries that share a common & similar political legacy.

1.4. Data method

The data applied in this thesis is secondary data - the data used is qualitative descriptive and analytical. The empirical finding relies on books, magazines, newspapers, political journals, research projects by scholars and universities, NGO publications, public records, publications from domestic governments and publications from regional and international organizations that are specifically written on the causes of democratic transition.

To give an answer to the research question by using deductive method prior arguments on the role of external influence as the primary cause of democratization are applied; yet this study is not limited in only explanatory pattern but broadens the analysis on the role of external influence in Sub-Saharan Africa and investigates the motives of international actors in their quest for the import of democracy globally.

As underlined above this study will focus on external influence as the primary driver of democratization especially since post -WW2 and explains how it has impacted the democracy in Kenya and Uganda.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Many authors have been writing and giving perspectives on the causes of democratization, in an attempt to find a correlation between the degree of democratization and degree of certain variables, be that economic, social, cultural, distribution of resources etc. Each theory has met counterarguments and critics, therefore there is no widely accepted dominant factor of democratization because different countries have reacted differently to analyzed causes – There is no unlimited explanation for democratization process, only perspectives and cases that support such arguments. Yet, there is a need to understand why democracy has been successful in certain countries, but not in others; why the level of democracy is positively / negatively related with certain variables. What are the causes of democratization and do they apply at all countries or some of them and why? Why does some countries become democratic and some not?

Theories of democratization project explanations based on social change. Be that economic development, culture, class conflict, global order – when taken together these approaches have established an institution in social sciences.

2.1 Modernization Theory - Economic development and Democracy

Authors, who take economic development as an argument to explain trends of democratization, analyze this correlation in two dimensions:

- Economic development as a trigger to democratization process
- Economic performance as a factor which supports the legitimacy of an already established democracy.

Modernization Theory, founded on Lipset's Theory, claims that modern democracies have come into existence in economically developed countries, therefore for a non-democratic country to become democratized through modernization – its capitalism the structure that is responsible for the distribution of the produced wealth and creates middle class (Lipset 1959: 78).

Lipset established the democratization explanatory theory based on economic data, positively correlating economic development and legitimacy of institutions with the degree of democracy (Lipset, 1960: 46). According to author 'the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy' (Lipset, 1959: 75; 1960: 48–50), Lipset relates the degree of economic development with the degree of democracy. According to author, from the Greek Antique the level of democracy has been labelled with societies in which the difference between the rich and the poor is light, with a wide middle class which has access to wealth; and that societies characterized by an rich elite and poor massive population are subject to oligarchy and tyranny (Lipset, 1959:75). Author relates economic development with four ingredients: Wealth, industrialization, urbanization and education, which when tested with empirical data Lipset argues that average wealth, degree of industrialization and urbanization, and the level of education are much higher for the more democratic countries rather than those countries that score poor in democracy evaluation indicators.

Wealthier countries have a predisposition to be "more democratic" which allows the average citizen to have access to resources, unlike "less democratic" regimes where access to resources is limited, not merit based and questionable.

Industrialization as a variable is treated by the author as the average percentage of men working in the agriculture economy, which is lower for democratic countries and higher for less ones. A society which has growing trends of people residing or moving to urban areas is tended to be more democratic, which is correlated with the above ingredient in Lipset's theory. While as education, basing his argument in Bryce's theory that education if it does not make men good citizens , makes it a least easier to become so (Lipset, 1959:79) , author empirically establishes his argument that the more literate a society is , the more it will be tolerant to minority groups, opposition and tend to establish democratic regimes. Also Lipset bases his theory on Tocqueville's (1835) argument that lawful institutions have a crucial importance in controlling and checking centralized government power.

Daniel Lerner in his work "The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East" (1958) draws a correlation between democratic regimes and economic development,

taking in basis the variables of Lipset and argues that a society firstly swimming in the waters of urbanization, is followed by a rising wave of literacy, rising media participation and finally therefore is produced democracy, standing solid on the above factors.

Gary Mark and Diamond do further reinforce the argument of Lipset, after analysing 30 years after Lipset's first argument on the issue, only to enrich and support the solid and strong correlation between economic development and democracy, as the authors agree that the evidence shows, with striking clarity and consistency, a strong causal relationship between economic development and democracy' (Marks and Diamond, 1992: 6). Yet, Diamond puts an emphasis more on Human Development Index as a better indicator rather than GDP, who argues that the argument of Lipset has still validity and has proven its self in the tests of the time, but notices the increase of the importance of human rights as a more adequate variable to explain democracy stating that 'The more well-to-do the people of a country, on average, the more likely they will favor, achieve, and maintain a democratic system for their country'. The author projects a positive trended relation between democracy and political and social characterized by a high level of Human Rights. Authors base their argument on the ground of holding Lipset's argument of a positive relationship between economic development and democracy as not linear as it has been subject of weakening and reversal in middle class (Gary & Diamond, 1992:3), while as human development continues to be an adequate and proper predictor on the like hood of democracy.

Robert A. Dahl in the same line with Lipset's argument associates polyarchy with economic ingredients as high level of income, wealth per capita, continuous growth of income and wealth, increase in urbanization, a decreasing trend in the agricultural populations, growing literacy level (Dahl, 1989: 251).

Under this conclusion also joins Edward N. Muller building a positive correlation between economic development of a state and the democratic political system of a country (Muller, 1997: 133).

For Samuel Huntington regimes –democratic and non-democratic ones – are legitimized by prospering economically (Huntington, 1991:34-36), when concluding that almost all

wealthy countries are democratic and almost all democratic countries are wealthy (Huntington 1991: 34). Yet, according to Huntington, if a regime will fail economically it might undermine the regime, but on the same line economic success of an authoritarian regime will legitimize it.

Robert Barro in “Determinants of Democracy” (1999) supports and confirms Lipset/Aristotle hypothesis which concludes that the higher the standard of living the more democracy is promoted. Democracy, according to Barro, is closely measured with electoral rights, civil liberties, standard of living by capita GDP, the gap between male and female schooling and middle class (Barro, 1999: 182).

One of the most grounded critics that would challenge Lipset’s theory came from Rustow in his historical approach to the account of democratization process. Critical on the Lipset’s argument about the undisputable positive correlation between economic development and democracy, he argues that democracies have inhered in societies with low level of economic development – an argument author based on the cases of United States of America in 1820 ; France in 1870 and Sweden in 1890 that were democratic but not economically developed ; on the other hand a Kuwait, Nazi Germany, Cuba, or Congo-Kinshasa were highly developed economically but non-democratic societies (Rustow, 1970: 352). Author does not deny there is a positive correlation – he acknowledges Lipset’s smart choice of using the term “requisites” instead of “prerequisites”, meaning he made a difference between cause and correlation but highly disagrees with considering economic development as a cause (Rustow, 1970: 342). Making clear the difference between function and genesis, author proposes the real prerequisite for democracy are a sense of national unity, serious conflict and adoption of democratic rules (Rustow, 1970: 361).

Barrington Moore argues that modernization does not absolutely lead to democracy; taking into account of evaluation the cases of England’s industrial revolution, France’s 1789 revolution and communist revolution in Russia, only in England did revolution lead to democracy as both in France and Russia the revolutions did not lead to democracy. In response author argues with his statement “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” - the existence of a developed and independent bourgeoisie is the precondition on base of which economic

development is to take place and cause democratization. In the absence of bourgeois class, economic development may lead instead of democracy, authoritarian rule like fascism or communism.

The cornerstone of modernization theory does not rely in simply the correlation between the variables but also in what do socio-economic structures of society act like – establishers or sustainers? The process of democratization enfolds both of them, but they are not the same. The flaw of modernization theory is that many studies dealt with levels of democracy while it has been vague whether socio-economic structures promote new democracies or sustain the existing ones. The first to assay this aspect were Przeworski and Limongi in 1997: they analyzed the establishment of democracies and autocracies.

Authors collected data to measure the probability of regimes shift from democracy to autocracy or vice versa. Their findings suggest that rising income levels work in favor of switches to democracy: poor countries with income below \$1000 are likely only one tenth to shift to democracy while as capita per income increase so does the chances for democracy. Rich countries with GDP above \$7000 are 28 times likier to embrace democratic regimes. Their findings though have been accounted as a framework for the sustenance of democratic regimes - rising income states reflect a prevalence of transitions to democracy over the opposite.

In an interview with The Graduate Institute Geneva, Kaushik Basu - Professor of Economics at Cornell University discussing the relationship between economic development and democracy argues democracy promotes development/growth while authoritarian regimes are characterized or stimulate crashes. Now if we go to South America –Latin Countries- we can see how some countries have experienced crashes but the level of democracy has not been fully established. On the other hand there is China which has experienced unimaginable growth but yet is not a democratic country – So how does this correlation respond to this situation? China is also the country which has experienced crashes and a democratic regime does not tolerate such. Analyzing India as the country of contrasts and as a counterexample author states that every model has limitations and somehow expectations and only by common sense and intuition can we allow our self to fit theories as responsive to the need of building hypothesis. Roughly the position of the

author lies on the belief that democracy is the stable system which raises greater hope of doing well but nothing is guaranteed.

Princeton political scientist, Carles Boix discussing about the causes of democratic transitions and democratic consolidations bases his argument on economic development being as a causal factor leading to democracy. According to author in a long run there is a correlation between economic modernization and democratization , but in the same time when taking a look at the history of democratization we can see waves of democratization and the main reason for that is the international environment so there is ground to take into analysis the role of international system. Drawing a proportion of countries that have been democratic since 1800 and the average world income, author says that we can see a relation between growth and democracy and in the same time boom and busts therefore it cannot be only democratic development that leads to democratization.

This theory has been criticized for its flaws when being unable to fit within its claim for democracy and economic growth to be both sides of the same coin: China, Qatar, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates are rich but non-democratic whereas India is considered to be democratic but is not rich.

2.2 Structural Theory – Social Classes and Democracy

There is a second school – Structuralism - on the correlation between development and democracy, where is argued that development has a positive impact on democratization but it emphasizes the role of social classes in the development of democracy (Grugel, 2002: 52).

Structural analysis is based on the class antagonisms of capitalist societies and considers conflict as unavoidable integral part of democracy (Grugel, 2002: 56). Democracy is strongly linked with conflict seen as normal pattern of emerging democracies and puts an emphasis on history, class conflict, and socio-economic factors as an explanatory frame project.

Known as Barrington Thesis , theory confirms that there is a strong relationship between development and democracy, but that is because at a certain point, especially in Europe institutions changed and led to rule of law, property rights, growth and development but also to liberal political institutions.

Barrington Moore proposes that it is the interrelationship of three social classes which affected democratization: the peasantry, landed upper class, and bourgeoisie, and it would be the type of the revolution of the country which would regulate the country's regime:

- Bourgeois revolution, with examples from England, France, and the United States, would take shape at the Puritan Revolution, French Revolution and American Civil War – This type of revolution would produce a democratic regime characterized by capitalism and parliamentary democracy (Barrington, 1973: 413).
- The second type of revolution is the one which includes capitalism but the absence of revolutionary surge, which produced fascism.
- The third type is the Communism one, where Russia and China having peasant's origin made possible the communist regimes.

According to author, out of these three revolutions, it is the bourgeois revolution which produces westerns democratic regimes (Barrington, 1973: 413-414).

For Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens (Huber, 199: 74-75) democracy is strongly bonded with the concept of counter power to bourgeoisie by middle class which includes farmers, craftsmen, merchant and white collar employees. Therefore democracy is to be achieved and prospered only under the condition/ requirement that dominant groups are to be counterbalanced by subordinate classes.

Gariorowski and Power (1998) argue that socio-economic factors are the foundations of democracy; therefore any approach of democratization should be framed in a structural perspective to give a satisfied understanding of political change.

This theory is limited in its scope of focus: it only frames as democracy those societies that were product of social class's antagonism, a formula that only finds implication in Europe. Canada is a democratic country but democracy has not been a product of social structures'

antagonism; New Zealand is a democratic country but neither has it been an output of class's conflict. Therefore this argument is limited to geographical meaning – Europe mostly.

2.3 Transitional Theory – Agency centered approach

According to Transitional approach democracy is not a product / outcome when meeting economic conditions, but it is in fact created by committed actors which are engaged in compromise. This theory comes as a counter argument to Modernist and Structuralism approaches as following:

They state that democratization does not take place all around the globe, but only on specific areas in which economic standards have been met or class structure is adequate, while as for Transitional view of point democracy can be created independently. The most prominent figure is Rustow, who criticizes modernization on the basis of the claim that democracy is created on one condition, that of a unified state. The author then argues that the path to democracy is a product of prolonged and inconclusive political struggle (Rustow, 1970: 352), going through three stages, which later will be transfigured as liberalization, transition and consolidation:

1. Precursory phase
2. Decision phase – Role of leaders making decisions among choices is crucial
3. Habituation phase – Embracing new system.

Schmitter, O'Donnell and Whitehead in their paper titled "*Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*" see democratization as a product of skillful - with some luck – of political negotiations between authoritarian regime and democratic opposition. Agreement, interaction and skillful bargaining would be keywords in their theory about causes of democratization.

O'Donnell focuses his argument on the Delegative Democracies (DD) differing them from representative ones; author argues DD are not institutionalized, but enduring; they do not tend to go back to authoritarian regimes but they also do not seem to become representative

ones (O'Donnell, 1994: 55). Developing his argument on the democratic transition O'Donnell, author stresses not one transition but two: The first is the transition from authoritarian regime to the democratically elected government and the second is the transition from the elected government (DD) to the representative democracy/institutionalized democratic regime. What are the factors which carry the transition to a successful outcome? For the author there is no guarantee but the crucial element which affects the success rate of the transition is the building of a set of institutions which would act a rudder for the distribution of political power (O'Donnell, 1994: 56).

Transitional Approach leaves out , considering unimportant the role of civil society in the construction of democracy ; Yet Przeworski (1991) – an agency based author – would suggest that popular movements have had a crucial in democratization of a regime when standing against elites, whose interests have violated the rights of the citizens in an authoritarian political environment.

2.4 The State, Civil Society and Globalization

This theory has based its argument in three elements: State, Civil Society and global order. State being the heart of the political power, it becomes central in democratization as the concept itself is related with the change or transformation of state to democratic and its role in the process weighs heavily. Civil society is that entity which has the power and ability to impact change to state - Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) consider democracy to be a product of reforms in a capitalist state , which is to be understood as the access of social groups into the transformation of a state (Grugel, 2002: 66).

Can be democratization understood unless it is projected in a global structure? When Huntington (1991) argues about waves of democratization, it was placed in a global trend with waves and counter waves of states heading to democracy or authoritarian regimes. Even theories that are constructed on an interstate analysis cannot ignore the role of international factors as a determinative impact in the democratization process. Globalization being a display of power dynamics, it has a fundamental impact on states and other actors. The interaction of these three elements varies from democratization to democratization and their reciprocal action draws differing patterns.

Jean Grugel embarks the argument that economic development enriches living standards and public goods are made possible, therefore community has the possibility to interact in the political and economic order creating so a dense civil society (Grugel, 2002: 240). Yet, author states that capitalism itself cannot lead to democracy, as it exists independently from democracy and there is no following pattern of each other (Grugel, 2002: 240). Capitalism empowering subordinated groups will enable the above to challenge politics. The emphasis falls on global political economy which as a structure will favor business' interests over workers and it will weaken the ability of government for fairly distribution in community. It's globalization which constitutes the appeal of democracy, which being primarily concerned with market – led development and liberal democracy has created a path toward democratization, however dependent democracies (Grugel, 2002 : 241). Yet, according to author, globalization alone is not enough to explain democratization, therefore global capitalism and technological revolution are to be included in the frame.

2.5 External influence- International motivator of democratization

This approach of explaining democratization process through the lens of international f/actors found breakthrough during Cold War but has been considered inferior by internal focused explanatory theoreticians considering them (external factors) as complementary factors rather than primary (Lipset, 1995; Huntington, 1991; Burton, 1992; Przeworski, 1995). Ending of Cold War brought into attention arguments on international aspects of democratization and it was until late 1990s and early 2000s that it started to be treated as a theory.

The role of international influence on democratization has been theorized by Diamond as “globalization of democracy” (Diamond, 1999:49). He bases his argument on Huntington's Third Wave where democratization was a process of snowball effect. Regional politically, economically and culturally alike countries seem to affect each other – one country's successful democratic transition and its political, economic and cultural model becomes “change of familiar alternatives” for the neighbors (Wiesenthal, 1996:3).

For Huntington - who constructed the concept of democratic transition - describes three waves of democratization between XIX-th century and 1990 and gives five reasons for

these transitions out of which three include external factors: 1. Change in international politics ; 2. Spin over effect and 3. Catholic Church impact.

While studying South and Eastern Europe Pridham builds a theoretical framework regarding external factors' influence to be economic, political, cultural using coercive/persuasive and direct/indirect (Pridham, 1994:11).

Schmitter identifies four international dimensions in the democratization process: contagion as part of snowball effect; control from more powerful actors; consent vis-à-vis with domestic actors and conditionality enforced by multilateral institutions (Schmitter, 1996:4-24, 28-31).

One of the contemporary theories regarding external factors - Linkage and Leverage theory constructed by Levitsky and Way in 2005- is acknowledged as a ground standing one who identify linkages (Economic, geopolitical, communication and transnational civil society) and leverage (size, military and raw size of a state; conflict of interest with international actors' policy and supporting regional powers) as two independent variables which determine the effect of external influence on democratization (Livitsky and Way, 2005 :33).

This theory has been criticized by Tolstrup for its structural determination ignoring the "openness criterion"; domestic actors entitles by author as "Gatekeeper elites" are claimed to be as much determinant as linkage and leverage (Tolstrup, 2010:13).

2.6 Discussion

Analyzing the roots of democracy, Modernization Theory is focused on why and how democratization begins- Stressing economic development as the engine of regime change from authoritarian to democratic one, which together while correlating form a positive relationship.

Structural approach supports the argument of the impact of economic development to democratic change, but does not consider it as the only game in the city; conflict between classes is an integral entity of democracy and the phenomenon itself is to be considered normal.

Transition studies, on the other hand focus on the political process of constructing democracy underlining the role of elite in the negotiation process while shifting from authoritarianism to democracy.

Globalization approach constructs its argument on three columns: State, civil society and global order as crucial in the dependent nature of national actors to international system.

External influence as a cause of democratization seeks to leave the domestic lens and wide our scope of analysis, claiming international f/actors as drivers to democratic changes.

Internal factors based approaches of democratization – Modernism, Structuralism, Transnational, State and Civil Society theories - led by Lipset's theory on the positive correlation between economic development and democracy are grounded on empirical data, but are flawed when it goes to identify what causes democratic transition – They describe but not identify causes. So, Lipset's theory, enriched later with the additional HDI indicator by Diamond, is explanatory but does not identify – It explains that economic development and democracy go together but cannot prove that one causes the other. This model constructed in 1959 in a contemporary post-modernist and globalist world order cannot explain the causes of democratization, but only proves a correlation of coexistence between economic development and democracy. These theories do not provide sufficient explanations vis-à-vis international dimension of democratization.

I find external influence as cause of democratization to have a grounded analyses in their argument: Democratization as a process, in a globalized world, is incited by external f/actors which can be grouped in two: Structural approach identifies size, geographical location and ties without world and two mogul actors USA & EU as external f/actors which cause to democratization; actor based approach claims local elites cannot be kept out of picture to explain the process.

International aspects of democratization, both structural and actor bases approaches, crosses the obstacle of explanatory analysis and brings in a cause identifying pattern of discussion which fits globalism pattern of politics. Identified actors who become the pushers of democratic agendas - US and EU – are empirical proved and offer a new wide perspective of understanding democratization.


Both of them have applied the political conditionality as the mean to carry on democratization in developing countries. This paper takes into analysis the impact of USA's "Carrot and Stick" policy while importing democracy globally which has been referred as "Promoted democracy" in Sub-Saharan Africa. Western countries led by USA have been granting since post-Second World War donations to developing countries, with an emphasis on Africa; this financial aid has turned to be the rudder of democratization process in the continent – by exercising aid leverage - either accelerating or preventing democratic reformation of the governments. As double standards have been used in the process, naturally the question of what motivates the external influence's actors to behave in certain ways. Promoted democracy has been shadowed as the leading democratization course either by blurring its understanding or not identifying its motivation.

Kenya and Uganda offer an excellent example, maybe the most adequate one, to project an analysis on promoted democracy as an external influence accelerator in the democratization process – Kenya's democratization has deeply been impacted by aid suspension/cutting while in the case of Uganda international donors have not exercised foreign aid leverage.

CHAPTER III – THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK

Studies of democratic transition focusing on the external influence as a driver for transition have been added lately in the account of this field, relating them mostly with globalization epoch. Works of Levitski & Way, Schmitter, Whitehead and Pridham were the first to build theoretical background of external influence's role as a prerequisite for democratic transition. Arguments of external influence's account are based on the structure-actor debate; these accounts have given an analysis about the actors who play an active role in promoting democracy and factors which affect the success rate of the process.

Figure 1. External Influence on democratization: Promoting democracy



External influence approach answers *who, how and to what degree do external actors influence democratization* – Question to these have been forming two approaches in explaining the external influence : 1. Those who put emphasis on the structure – Muller, Whitehead, Kopstein and Reilly, Levitski and Way, Schmitter , Pridham- and authors who underline the role of actors – Tolstrup, Yilmaz, Vachudova.

Structural accounts of external influence claim size and power of a state, geographical location and political & economic ties with the external actors determine the rate success of external influence in promoting democracy. Muller, Whitehead, Kopstein and Reilly give account to structuralism approach of external influence while developing the framework of political conditionality vis –a – vis leverage and linkage. Actor based approach of external influence theory underlines the role of domestic leaders as equally important to determining external influence's success rate – internal governments should be treated as a linkage factor. On the account of actors being equally important as determinants to the process Tolstrup presents Gatekeeper elites theory in 2010 which is shaped as a criticism to structuralism's determinisms on primary determinants.

Regarding actors, two mogul names – EU and USA- have been subject to the works in this field considering them main external actors who export democracy through regions (Pridham 2002, 2005; Engert and Knobel 2003; Emerson 2005; Smith 1994; Whitehead 1996; McFaul 2009). There is the second division in the theory which claims not actors, but democratic transition itself is a product of a diffusion process (Huntington 1991; Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Bunce and Wolchik 2006; Kern 2010).

Analyzing democratic transition through the lens of international influence offers a wide scope of understanding why and how's of the political phenomena, even though these accounts have been criticized for using macro-data and ignoring micro-data which would give explanation to those cases who don't fit in the big picture. It is important to stress that no account on democratic transition has been able to fit under its scope all cases “due to *openness criteria*” (Kopstein & Reilly, 2000:14).

The most prominent argument of external influence is political conditionality and its “democracy promotion” dimension. Considered to be post- Cold War's instrument of democratization, political conditionality has been applied by both USA as part of renewed foreign policy in '90s and European Union (member states and organizations) in EU enlargement and former colonies.

3.1 Political conditionality and democracy promotion

Policy based conditionality or political conditionality is external influence's language of operation – it is the ground of relationship between foreign assistance (mostly financial aid) and recipient country. Since early '80s EU member states, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and USA started to exercise significant influence domestically in aid-receiving countries. Political conditionality and democracy promotion have been the core features of new international order post – Cold War. Framed as the process due to which democratic governance is intruded by an external actor to a target state, it incorporates a gamut of peaceful and forceful strategies (Hobson and Milja, 2012: 3). Strategies include diplomacy, funding of development assistance programs, political and economic leverage on the target country, foreign aid suspension/cutting, and visa & trade sanctions (Burnell, 2000: 4).

Schmitter and Brouwer's arguments on the account of external influence develop the concept of "democracy protection" as parallel to democracy promotion and stress the differences between the two: democracy protection – unlike democracy promotion – aims not to lift out of power non-democratic regimes but rather seeks to make existing ones effective (Schmitter and Brouwer, 2000, 4).

Pridham's arguments on political conditionality are forged in his studies about democratization process in Eastern and South-eastern Europe, where author cures the existing accounts by identifying the actors and classifying them as unilateral, bilateral or multilateral- International organization, governmental organizations or other trans-national actors. It was the first author to bring into life the concept of conditionality as part of transition to democracy (Pridham, 1994: 11).

Antoine Sadia, on the other side, emphasizes two subtypes of democracy promotion: "direct promotion" which assists the empowerment of present political and social actors and "indirect promotion" which consists in establishing the ground work for framing a proper context in which democratic transition can take place (2013, 30).

Fierro relates political conditionality as “second conditionality” and differentiate it from “first generation”: while political conditionality includes both political and economic leverage, first generation is only economic conditionality –it focuses on only implementing economic reforms in the country receiving financial aid (Fierro, 2003, 95).

Promotion of democracy can be implemented bottom-up from civil society – nongovernmental organizations, citizens and syndicates - and/or top-down which includes state, institutions and political society ; however an integration of both dimensions of promotion can be used to achieve better results (Dipama & Parlar Dal, 2015, 112).

“Contagion, Control and Consent” approach by Laurence Whitehead when developing his argument on political conditionality determines international dimensions of democratization, identifying three labels under which international factors are grouped: Contagion, Control and Consent (Whitehead, 1996:4). Each of the groups can be considered in relation to actors, motivations and processes.

Contagion – Ignores actors and their motivations; classification of states is entirely bases on the processes. Firstly after dividing countries based on simple schema, next step is to see their geographical distribution and how it narrates democratization trends. On the basis of contagion, geography becomes a crucial determinant in the political democratization allowing us to build some predictions about next countries to embrace democratic changes. Known as the “contagion through proximity”, this model offers predictions on democratizations, but there are examples that do not fit into contagion logic due to its limitations. Therefore this model has flow on explaining *when a sequence begins, when it ends, what it excludes or the order of the democratization* (Whitehead, 1996:6).

Control – As a product of power politics, control has pattern many democratic transitions as counter balancing moves by USA on one side and USSR on the other side. Contrary to contagion, this international dimension of democratic transition offers ground for satisfactory answers about speed, directions and limits – dynamics of transition (Whitehead, 1996:10).This dimension excludes from narrative actors, process and

motivations, solely relying on the pattern of balance of power between concurrent ideologies – American democracy vs Communist Russia and Cuba.

Consent – Here role and motivation of international actors are included as basis of the explanatory arguments of democratization. But not only – is an analysis of domestic actors also part of the diagram to construct the pattern of transition. Author names four aspects upon which new democracies are based:

- Territorial limits :
- International structures
- Transnational groupings constitution of domestic actors
- International demonstrational effects.

This dimension offers a more detailed perspective of democratization in the attempt to include into logical elements into rationalizing democratization. Whitehead's argument is supported and enlarged by Schmitter who identifies the international/external factors and the rationality of their actions (Schmitter, 1996: 4-24, 28-31). He states four international dimensions of political democratization, adding the fourth dimensions besides three of Whitehead – Conditionality.

Fourth dimension – Conditionality- when democratization process comes on condition – Not only does the target state embrace democratization but in this case is an award which has to be earned, on conditions. These conditions are of course necessity for internal democratic reforms to gain membership in the multilateral organization – European Union is the most prominent example.

Table no 1: Combination of Pridham, Whitehead and Schmitter arguments on international dimension of democratization

	Basis of action	
	Coercion	Voluntary
Unilateral	Control	Contagion
Multilateral	Conditionality	Consent

Source: Chih-Chieh Chou

By and large, political conditionality is based on a mutual agreement between the donor and benefiter according to which the benefiter receives aid and in return goes through political and economic reforms to foster improvement of human rights, democracy, good governance and rule of law (Saltnes, 2013: 1). Political development, to which the recipient country is asked to tuck with, includes boosting of civil and political rights and a responsible government who will be hold accountable for its actions and performance (Crawford, 2001: 1). Upon this mutual agreement donor will threaten to suspend and terminate aid if target country fails to meet the reforms – negative conditionality.

Negative conditionality includes diminishing, suspending and cutting/terminating financial aid and other non-financial benefits when target country's government does not implement de juro and de facto the reforms for which the donations have been granted. In other words in case of failing to foster political liberalization negative measures from critics and warnings to suspension and termination of aid, trade and diplomatic benefits (Kreutz, 2005: 6).

Positive conditionality on the other hand institutionalizes a positive correlation between financial aid assistance and democracy performance. Here aid is leveraged as “carrot” to countries that perform pleasingly in democratization process in terms of change rather than in level of democracy.

3.2 Negative conditionality - External leverage on democracy

This study examines promoted democracy via negative conditionality that is implemented by leverage from external actors. “Leverage and Linkage” approach invoices Western actor's success in exporting democracy on two amendable factors: Linkages and Leverages. Linkage and leverage are primary structural determinants (and do not bargain on the solidness of these two factors) product of history and geography and contain the core of their argument (Levitski & Way, 2005:33).

Success in promoting democracy by external actors is conditioned by the interaction level of leverage and linkage to the target state.

Table 2. Leverage and Linkage determinants of promoted democracy

	Western Leverage	Linkage to the west
WHAT DOES IT DEFINE?	How vulnerable are authoritarian regimes to external influence?	How consistent are the ties between target state and Western actors (USA, EU or multilateral organizations)
ELEMENTS	Size, military power and economic potential of the target state	Economic linkage
	Supported or not by other external actors in case of resistance	Geopolitical linkage
	Existence of conflict of interest in external actor's policy agendas	Communication linkage
	-	Social linkage
	-	Transnational civil society linkage

Source: Levistki and Way, 2005

Leverage determinant:

1. Size of the country, military capacity and economic indicators of a country are important elements of a target country as they determine its potential – The bigger the size, military power and economic potential the better the chances of the country to be independent from external influences.
2. If the target state has the support of other external actors like regional powers, than even if state's size, military or economic indicators are not sufficient to put at hold external influence, support by another power would play a crucial role in shielding it from outside influence.

3. Generally the presence of a conflict with external actor's agenda would be somewhat a disadvantage on pre-calculation outcomes.

Linkage determinant:

1. Economic linkage: Foreign investments, public debt, loans from transnational banks, level of export-import determine the economic framework of a target country's on the basis of which policies are made.


2. Geopolitical linkage includes membership in international organizations, treaties and conventions signed and part of Constitutions and diplomatic relations determine whether the country has a strong linkage or not

3. Social linkage is such an important parameter when evaluating linkages because in a globalized world migration, tourism, minorities and education in the West has become the most present and real social reality in today's life style

4. Communication linkage evaluates internet connections; Western media's presence in the country in a global world often determines how people think, how people decide good and bad, how people decide.

5. Transnational civil society linkage, which is quite a structure in nowadays with NGOs and international organizations operating in a target country, can channel domestic civil society's initiatives.

Figure 2. External leverage on democracy by Levitsky and Way



To authors, leverage determinant undisputedly indicates strength of the external actor's predisposition to influence, but alone cannot bring change – otherwise it would have been a

mathematical formula pattern solved problem. What makes or determines the rate success of external actors on promoting democracy in a target country is the density of linkages – It's the decisive factor as it affects the motivations of decision makers in both actors. The denser the ties, the more can external factors exercise pressure to target state. Therefore density of linkages explains why some attempts to import democracy have been successful and some others not so much (Levitsky & Way, 2005: 22-23).

CHAPTER IV – ANALYSIS

This chapter analyses the impact of international influence while answering *why Kenya, despite sharing the same political and economic legacy, is more democratic than Uganda?* Findings are found in the role of external actors (ODA international donors) in Kenya and Uganda: whether or not have they leveraged domestic regimes by suspending and/or cutting foreign aid – essential for the aid dependent Kenyan and Ugandan economies- to glide political and economic reforms.


This chapter analyses the role of external influence in the process of democratization in Kenya and Uganda: it examines the work and influence of international actors in shaping domestic political reforms which have empowered democratization in respective countries. International actors who have played a significant role in Kenya and Uganda are World Bank, UK and USA - their financial aid has been acting as a “rudder” of democratic reforms. By suspending, reducing and cutting financial aid international donors have obliged domestic governments to undertake reforms toward political liberalization thus potentiating the process of democratization.

Crucial to understanding the impact of external donors in Kenya and Uganda is underlying the need of domestic economy to foreign aid. Having suffered economic and political wastage under colonial rule, neither of the countries was in any position to conceive itself without the presence of foreign financial aid. Natural resources and raw materials had been utilized by colonial powers and when in 1953 European Community was established, former colonial powers and respective colonies laid foundation for common economic relationships.

Under Article 182 – 187 of European Economic Community Agreement the clause of “associative corporation” was included which acted as the cornerstone for future economic bilateral and multilateral relationships (Monar, 2002: 123). In post-independence period former colonial powers established development politics for the ex-colonies – Development Aid was to become the mechanism for assisting development of new countries (Alemazung, 2010: 71).

As argued in the Introduction section of this research economic development is a present element here. After all Lipset's argument on the positive correlation between economic development and democracy is proved in the cases of Kenya and Uganda – A more economically developed Kenya is more democratic than less developed Uganda. The following shows a graph of GDP data for both Kenya and Uganda in a comparative structure from independence to 2015.

Figure 3. Kenya and Uganda: Comparing GDP in capita, 1980 - 2016



Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, 2016


The discussion here is based on the elements/indicators which act as establishers/sustainers: economic development from this data can be judged to act as both. Data shows that Kenya has been historically more developed than Uganda and also data shows that Kenya historically has been more democratic than Uganda, so it's common sense to project a hypothesis here and treat it as a flaw of this research. Yet, economic development cannot be understood without analyzing the context of where does it come from and how is it impacting politics. Economic development cannot be either establisher or sustainer for neither Kenya nor Uganda.

From the moment Kenya and Uganda gained their independences respectively in 1963 and 1962, both countries were economically destroyed: no capital available, no financial institutions to carry on economic reforms, no skilled working force, therefore none of the two was situated better than the other. Even if in the following years we can see from the data that Kenya started to differ from Uganda, actually democratic development did not

start till early '90s when international donors started to exercise aid leverage against aid-dependent countries. Having their source of income mostly from international donors, domestically neither Kenya nor Uganda was able to establish significant funds from taxation: as the time went by, development assistance foreign aid which was supposed to empower domestic development, turned out to become the engine of the economy. High public debt, increasing loans from internationals, higher level of import than exports characterized the economy in 1990's when the democratic transition started to take place. Economy was not doing good enough to trigger democratization: all the economic data was a product of the "darling" donations from the Westerns. Even in the '80s donations were impressive but they did not drive political changes: Until 1990's both Uganda and Kenya have been under non-democratic regimes. When Kenya in 1990s lost its 'darling' donor status, 2/3 of foreign aid was cut and under aid leverage for almost 10 years democratic transition took place successfully. On the contrary a richer Uganda in 1990s did not become more democratic than Kenya, as aid leverage was not exercised against Museveni government. Uganda still continues to be the least democratic country in the region due to the lack of external influence: is in the top 5 donor 'darling' receivers in the region – so economy is performing better- but its regime is as non-democratic it was when performed poorer financially. The difference relies on the role of foreign aid policies as drivers of democratic reforms.

Foreign aid aimed promoting economic and social development and forage rule of law while the new nations were getting democratized. But international aid did not empower domestic economic development – instead donations became the engine of African economies, turning Kenya and Uganda into economies depended on international aid; domestic governments were and are subject to financial restrictions: if the donations are suspended or cut it has been a matter of time to engage with the reforms required by donors. Donations acting as "carrot" and suspension/ cutting acting as "stick" have been rutting democracy perspective in both countries.

Figure 4. Role of foreign aid in Kenya and Uganda



In the case of Kenya international actor's pressure in 1991 to implement political liberalization gave a big push-up to democratic reforms in the country by legalizing multi-party politics – eventually this led to the victory of Kibaki in 2002, the most pro-democratic regime in Kenya. In Uganda, on the other side, international donors have not done serious attempt to frame democratization in the region. Uganda represents the precedent of Western donors not exercising pressure for democratic reforms – not a matter of “can” rather than “I don’t want to” in exercising pressure toward domestic government due to certain economic agendas. Though there have been critics against Uganda for its non-democratic ruling regime, actually donors have not been taking joint action against Kampala to pressure democratic reforms via their donations that are crucial to an agriculture based economy.

4.1 External Influence from Western donors – both sides of the coin

To what extent has external influence been able to address democratization in Kenya and Uganda? What has been the role of international actors – as donors could either pull the trigger or choose to have one ear deaf and one eye blind- since post-independence in channeling democratic events in countries with no prior political culture of democracy? Donors via their financial support mechanisms can exercise conditional aid assistance which has since 1990s been the “carrot and stick” policy able to shape democratic perspectives in the countries tied to this donations. Donors have either been supporting reformist leaders or pushed up democratic development in the region or they have turned one blind eye and their “democracy accelerating” option has seized to function. This economic-political maneuver has especially been affective in Sub Saharan Africa - countries are aid-dependent and donors’ actions on restriction of funds has been influencing democracy more than any other region.

4.1.1 Promoting democracy in Africa

Post – independence democratization process in Sub-Saharan Africa has not been the same case as Eastern and South Eastern European countries where democracy has been promoted under EU conditionality pattern; here democracy has either been accelerated or prevented according to donors’ interests. Post-independence African countries embraced democracy during third wave of democratization, but in the reverse wave by ‘80s autocratic regimes spread into African politics and few countries could be count as democratic. Therefore in 1990s Western governments intended democratization of the continent to be the cornerstone of their financial aid (Brown, 2013:1). Today by 2018 Freedom House has declared as “Free” only 10 African states out of 54 (Tunisia, Namibia, Senegal, Botswana, Ghana, South Africa, Benin, Cape Verde, Mauritius and Sao Tome and Principe) ; 21 “Partly-free” and 23 “Not-free” countries. To what is the unsuccessful non-democratic trend in African countries billed? Lack of previous democratic rule of the countries, domestic policies characterized by lust driven elites and Western foreign policies which cared more for pushing away communism rather than preoccupying for democracy in

Africa, offer a scope of understanding why promoted democracy via Western donors in Africa has not met the same success as EU conditionality democracy promotion in Europe.

Why African countries are bounded to donations and investments?

Due to Africa's lack of technology, democratic institutions, domestic rule of economy and unskilled work force donations and investments from the Western countries have been crucial to African governments to run the country. Rich in raw materials but absence of technology to make use of them and lack of skilled workers to proceed with the refining process has caused foreign investments to be indispensable for country's funding policies to move on. Domestic taxation is not able to provide the necessary budget to carry reforms needed for the development of the country; therefore assistance has been the light at the end of the tunnel. Overall African economies are poor pre-capitalist ones that are unable to support democratic regimes – nepotism, patron-client networks and not self-sufficient colonial institutions act as an obstacle in the shift attempts from rural population to modern urban societies which would fuel the establishment of middle class. In this scope even civil societies – severely fought by political elites – would seek for international funding and support in their struggle against human rights 'abuses. Incapable to hold development on its own and constrain external pressure, democracy in Africa has been a matter of compliance or not with the interests of Western's foreign policy.

Why do donors offer financial assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa? What motivates Western countries to financially aid African countries?

It is important when studying phenomenon's pattern to identify the causes of it and to understand what motivates the cause itself. In this scope as external influence has been shaping democratization process in XX-th century, the motivations for the action of influence itself is the cornerstone of understanding the whole process. Motivations change time to time, country to country, power to power; yet there is a common sense logic that concludes in an universal not written agreement identifying as motives donor's own

interests – an integration of political and economic structures which better serve to the donor's interest in their attempt to empower itself, to attain power as the primary bases of any political action. The following argument will be divided into two periods: Pre and post-Cold War.

Pre-Cold War Western donor's influence in Africa

Independences from colonialism took place from 1940s – 1960s characterized by a post-independence regional trend of authoritarian regimes. Cold War has been the main preoccupation of Western donors led by USA who would support financially countries which had a geopolitical importance during this era, like the case of Kenya. When donations started to flow before '90s, it was more due to their contribution to supporting West against communism that was stretching more and more. Therefore during Cold War era Western countries were more occupied with superpower rivalry against communist Russia and the value of African countries would be that of 'satellite countries' geopolitical importance ; other that corruption and human rights abuses under autocratic regimes that backed up Western's foreign policy had no attention.

Dictators like Mobutu SeseSeko (Zaire), Museveni (Uganda), Moi (Kenya) are some of the examples of how support for democracy to African countries has been according to their foreign policy interests rather than really supporting democratic development in the region. Mogul Western donors have been USA, France and United Kingdom – they adopted strong economic and political ties with Africa for their own interests; on the other hand other donors like Nordic countries were more focused on human rights approaches but their impact was that of a soft power, not a husbandry wrist-taking attitude.

Nordic countries supported Sub-Saharan countries with financial aid providing development in the human rights area and in return these countries would line up in the struggle against apartheid politics in South Africa. By early 1990 autocratic regimes ruled 38 out of 45 Sub-Saharan countries (Ake, 1996:135). Botswana, Gambia and Mauritius

held the flag of democracies while the other part of Africa became the hub of illiteracy, poverty and autocratic regimes.

Post-Cold War Western donor's influence in Africa


After the fall of Berlin Wall – symbolizing the end of Cold War – support to Sub-Saharan Africa has been under the scope of promoting human rights, rule of law, democratic institutions under the exaltation of Fukuyama who proclaimed the victory of Liberal Democracies - The fall of Communism marked the historic moment of political and economic liberalism of unipolar USA. In the post-Cold War period, democracy as a political regime became the agenda of the West.

Donations make the perfect instrument to control fragile states that happen, besides geopolitical value, to be a great economic hub for raw materials and oil. Foreign policies are constructed on pan-regional politics of maintaining a balance of power between moguls of international community. From 1990 to 1998 the number of democracies reached 23 (Radelet, 2010: 93).

After Cold War was officially won by Western powers, New World Order came into life: As there were no more competitive power and ideology, capitalist imperialism was the trigger of the triumphant liberal democracies: it included democracy promotion to non-democratic countries which would widen the pond of states where political liberalism would be followed by economic liberalization – free market, more access to natural resources.

The more a country would show concern about human rights and democratic principles, the greater the aid received – Freeze aid in case the ruler would not step down or liberalize its politics. Liberal democracy goes hand to hand with liberal economy and support global peace and security creating a pond of similar states that do not oppose the agenda of the Western countries.

Figure 5. New World Order's components



Self-interested behavior motivates donor's external influence via financial aid instruments, which become the "Stick and Carrot" policy regulator; in many cases authoritarian rulers have been supported, have been granted financial aid regardless of their non-democratic regime - Mobutu SeseSeko (Zaire), Museveni (Uganda), Moi (Kenya). Therefore external pressure for democratization has been a double standard process driven by foreign policy interests and need for natural resources.

Global capitalist economy which is becoming a worldwide platform of markets can only be accomplished when not only imposed but also wanted: Liberal democracy as a political regime where human rights are guaranteed and protected by law has become a global thirst; together with it liberal economy is part of the package – together they become the cornerstone of the New World Order driven by global capitalist economy which enables powers to bear their crown of political hegemony.

How do donors affect African democracies?

They use financial donations as "the rudder" to channel the current of democracy in respective countries. The policy dialogue between the donor and government includes provision and cancellation of financial assistance, public criticism, support of opposition or non-governmental organizations; they can build bridges of communication between government and opposition or support anti-government movements and their donations

have often been the bases for funding election's organization, monitoring and certification. Donor's diplomatic attitudes background has set a culture of conjunction between political liberalization & economic liberalization or/and free votes & free markets (Brown, 2007: 4). Using a combination of carrot (financial aid for development) and stick (freezing aid) Western donors have been promoting democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is considered to make up political conditionality. Prevention from financial aid has been waived to authoritarian regimes that did not apply political or/and economic liberalization. Stick's bitter taste has been applied to South Africa due to its apartheid politics; Zimbabwean government due to corruption in the country and abuse of human rights and Kenya's government when it was accused for misusing external aid to the country. "Carrot policy" in the form of donations for further development in the country has been increased when and if the countries would embrace democratic reforms or support donor's policies geopolitically.

According to Evans, external influence by donors to target countries has been implied via custodian, demiurge, midwifery and husbandry politics (Evans, 1995: 77-81). In the custodian role donor plays the referee who makes sure rules are followed and obeyed; in the demiurge role donors become the external actor that provides goods for the target country; in the midwifery role donor does not interfere directly, but instead urges domestic actors to work together; and finally in the husbandry role donors do not tend to be all gentle and soft when trying to bring together domestic actors – it includes some push-over attitude.

For Thomas Carothers aid to developing countries has been that of 'political assistance' according to which if assertive knowledge and proper institutions are implied than democracy is logically to take place (Carothers, 2009:5-19). After the aid is provided, countries themselves are expected to embrace democratic development. An USA approach for democratization quest relies on specialized human factor as the rudder of overcoming authoritarian regimes – if people will prefer democracy as their political regime than elites would not risk undermining their legitimacy and would run democratically.

In conclusion “Stick and Carrot” policy have been the means by which external influence is exercised in Africa promoting democracy in the continent. If democracy becomes desirably than the field work becomes easier – better education, establishing middle class and supporting development are crucial ingredients to human factor’s effectiveness in supporting liberal democracy is the adequate regime. While financial aid provides short-term support for foreign policy’s agenda, its effects in the quality of human capacity will be a long term support for social and economic development in the region.

4.2. Can we measure democratic transition?

Theoretical approaches of the keystones on the basis of which one regime is to be considered democratic or not include Dahl’s distinction between Poliarchy and Democracy, where Democracy is utopic - the stage in which the government fully addresses citizens’ requirements and Poliarchy – which we call Democracy – an intermediate stage where the quality of the democracy is measured by the conditions in which individuals can maximize the attainment of their goals through the use of social mechanism (Dahl and Lindblom 1976).

Maximization of such goals is achievable via Three Opportunities and Eight Institutional Assurances. The scale in which Opportunities and Institutional Assurances are present in one society, determines the quality of the Poliarchy (Dahl, 1971).

Huntington brings a world inclusion analysis and description of the democratizing process by dividing it in three waves, each matching a counter wave. Therefore the author is focused on the separation between democracy and autocracy on the basis of attributions in a maximalist picture. The trends of democratization are organized on periods of time where group of countries under the Spillover effect would hit the run toward democratization or versa autocratic regimes. Not only crucial attributes like multiparty system, participation, and contestation but also civil right are included as a part of a wider inspection on democracy.

Quantitative models to measure the process of democratization are displayed as following:

Table No.3 – Summary of democratization's quantitative models

	Freedom House	Polity IV	Przeworski
Criteria of analysis	Political Rights and Civil Liberties since 1972	Type of regimes: Democracy/Autocracy since 1800	Contestation to lawmaking and law execute institutions since 1946

Source: Pippa Norris, Harvard University, 2008

– **Democracy Score by Freedom House**

Since since 1999, Freedom House has continuously each year been measuring the quality of Democracy by evaluating Political Rights and Civil. Taking into evaluation Political Rights – PR, Civil Liberties – CL, provides Freedom Rating- FR and scores which give a table of ranking democracies. Each country score is based on two numerical ratings—from 1 to 7—for political rights and civil liberties, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. The results of Kenya are as following:

Political Rights include the Right to vote, to compete for public offices, to participate in the election process, to elect Representatives who will accountable and responsible for public policies, whereas Civil Liberties include freedoms of belief, expression, rule of law, organizational rights (Freedom House, 2017). The evaluation of the presence of the above Rights and Liberties undergoes an arithmetical analysis in points and the pattern of the results gives the below classification:

- 1.00-2.99 Consolidated Democracy
- 3.00-3.99 Half consolidated Democracy
- 4.00-4.99 Transitionary Democracies

- 5.00-5.99 Half consolidated authoritarian Regimes
- 6.00-7.00 Consolidated authoritarian Regimes

– **Polity IV Project**

This project analyses democracy scores of 167 countries by making a classification in six groups of the regimes and describing their democratic transition in the above timetable.

This model offers us a theoretical and quantitative basis which enables the measurement of democracy theoretically and statically comparable. Theoretically authors agree that democratization is mainly the shift from an authoritarian regime to a consolidated regime. Consolidation is the stage in which democracy is the only game in the town in attitude, behavior and constitutionally (Linz and Stephan, 1996). How can we apply such an measurement?

By evaluating the following standards:

1. Political and Economic development
2. Real political participation via elections and accountability of representatives
3. The existence of multi power centers which balance and control each other
4. Political Rights and Civil Liberties

What this model evaluates is if the executive institutions can be controlled by legitimate constraints such as Judiciary and Legislative system, but other tools might involve military as well. Secondly, the presence of institutions via which citizens can articulate their political will and lastly Civil Liberties give this approach a broader inclusion in contrast with minimalist approaches.

– **Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi: Competitive Democracy**

This model is a minimalist approach of evaluating, which measures the level of democracy by the ability to contest one regime and replace it with another one. It is

required to have a multiparty system which can freely participate and compete in the elections and citizens have to power to overthrow one regime if not suitable to their interests in a representative democracy (Norris, 2008). This comes in accordance with Dahl's requirement for Participance and Contestation, where the existence of many parties it is the people's stick to channel their preferences if standards of governance not met by the party in lead. Of course it has its critics for having minimalized democracy to ability to contest, but it produces reliable data to actually drive comparison.

The above instruments through mostly of which today we draw lines of comparison have their own critics on the way about the validity of the process. First of all, to make comparison we should have a universal definition, globally accepted of what democracy is. In general we can say democracy is rule by the people, but does this generalization respond to the need of including fairly the components to be analyzed in such comparison (Lindberg and Teorell, 2011). Making compares, requires to mutually agree about the nature of what is being compared – Considering it's state fully and not questionable, because how can we otherwise built an approach of comparison if we do not serve our selves a concept , widely accepted and agreed on its nature. Here is where the differences come as democracy has been understood or at least interpreted differently by different actors in space and time.

Secondly the above indicators of measuring democracy and it's transition base their analysis on the modern states, as mentioned above, usually starting from 1940 – Precisely IEL was a project founded by Wall Street Journal in 1995; Freedom House in 1941 and Polity IV Project though that has been founded in 1800 it's work is based on the timetable starting 1946 to nowadays. The question is raised about the timetable taken in consideration in evaluation, leaving out XIX-th century.

Thirdly, if we agree on the nature of democracy and have a general acceptance on its components in the basis of which we will project comparison, what do we do with the different background, historical legacy, culture, economic development and other adding circumstances that characterize one country? We cannot for sure neglect them, because it's

these factors that have shaped the institutions and the institutions in which the political regime is based on.

Fourthly, what is the methodology to be used? Do we minimize or minimize the conceptualization of democracy? Do we ignore the details so that via a big picture we can allow ourselves enabling the comparison by putting aside features like a long run historical timetable, economic indicators, institutions so that we can construct conclusions based on a limited group of variables? If doing so it means that only crucial variables will be taken into analysis like the nature of the elections – free or not- or party participation in the elections as political rights and leave out the picture very important factors like democratic performance, accountable leaders, freedom of expression and therefore it's to be doubted if the research is accurate as its exclusive nature minimizes beyond limits in order to achieve results. Therefore, it's no wonder that parties would come into power via fair elections just to escape from being acknowledged as autocratic regimes, but their performance it is simply not democratic.

Or on the other side do we take into consideration all the circumstances/ features be political liberties like participation and contestation, financial, historical background, civil liberties in a full contest? If so, we take also upon us the responsibility to analyze them properly, and maybe not being able to arrive in conclusion as the differences may construct answers in relativity basis. Robert Dahl requires analyzing the democratic nature of polyarchies based on two attributes: Participation and Contestation. For Dahl a polyarchy is democratic when the following elements are present : 1) elected officials ; 2) Free and fair elections; 3) inclusive suffrage ; 4) the right to run for office; 5) freedom of expression; 6) alternative information and 7) associational autonomy (Dahl, 1998). Both of the methods have met critics on the way , it's required to firstly build the theoretical ground on which Uganda and Kenya can be accurately be compared to understand the differences, similarities and to arrive in conclusions.


How to compare? There is no agreement about standard criteria to measure democratization of a country, where to shift more weight in a multi criteria study or which method to use. This study finds it's accurate to take into analysis a combination of Polity IV and

Democracy scores by Freedom House to build a case of comparison between Kenya and Uganda.

Polity IV: Comparing their results in Polity IV Index which measures their democracy, in an evaluation from 1800-2013 Kenya has been classified as a Democracy (6 to 9) while Uganda as Autocracy (-10 to -6).

Figure 6. Polity IV Index, Kenya and Uganda

Polity IV Index




Source: Polity IV, 2018

While Kenya has, since independence, been able to maintain blue color (symbolizes democracy) and only during mass killings in 2007 elections it regressed to autocracy. From 1970 -1990 during one-party system, the lowest score was that of -7 which have been increasing the past 20 years and now it is classified as democracy.

On the other hand, Uganda has been politically unstable with two “C” (Coup d’état), one “S” (State failure) and purple, green & black dashed lines which symbolize interruption. Right now it is classified as an “Autocracy”.

Freedom House: Comparing democracy in Kenya and Uganda to show which of one has applied a more liberal, democratic country than the other the following graph shows each country’s score by Freedom House. Political Rights and Civil Liberties are the columns on which the evaluation is based:

Figure 7. Kenya and Uganda: Comparing Freedom House’s scores, 2001 - 2018



Source: Freedom House Reports, 2018

For Kenya Civil Liberties’ best scores of “3 point evaluation” have been achieved in 2004 - 2009 and 2012 , as after it matches “4 point evaluation” score of PR. Worst scores of “5 point evaluation” have been graded from 1998 – 2002 and altogether established

Uganda has never been able to perform better than 5 (five) in Political Rights with eight “6 point evaluation” and eleven “5 point evaluation” ; while as for Civil Liberties six “5 point evaluation” and thirteen “4 point evaluation” have been granted to Uganda resulting in mostly “Partly free” status.

4.3. Democracy promotion: Case of Kenya

Kenya's democratization process has been impacted by international donor's financial aid suspension, which have played a crucial role in the process. Especially '90s are the most significant ones as it was donors' joint attitude against one-party system - exercise of pressure by suspending and cutting donations was the mechanism to be praised for constitutional changes leading to multi-party elections.

The role of external actors (international donors) in domestic democratization in Kenya can be classified as below:

- Before 1990s the amount of foreign aid was to be increased from year to year (with only one insignificant case of aid suspension) while Moi regime was consolidating its non-democratic rule
- From 1991 to 2000 foreign aid is used to leverage Kenya : international aid was suspended and/or cut while pressuring Moi government to implement reforms for political and economic liberalization
- From 2000 and on there has been an increase of 583% in donations from the West with occasional aid suspension


Table 4.External influence on Kenya's democratization process

	1980s	1990s	2000 -
Role of donors	Threats with no action on policy implementation; Donors did not use leverage for human rights improvement, rather kept financing as long as Kenya was supporting western foreign policy in regards to communism during Cold War.	Donors start to exercise their leverage to Moi government in order to grasp domestically political and economic liberalization. This resulted in cutting and suspending 2/3 of Foreign Aid and reformation took place.	Foreign aid has been increasing since, especially during Kibaki government as a reward for democratic reforms taking place. Nevertheless the increase of corruption has been criticized by donors, followed by £83 million aid cut by EU in 2004 and \$21 million by USA in 2017

Source: Joseph Figaro, University of Denver, 2012

Donations in Kenya from early '60s to nowadays have had a constant increase, from \$ 49.12 M (1962) to \$ 2.18 B .The role of western donors started to take a significant role in late '70s, got consolidated in 1980s and since then have become the driver of Kenyan economy.

Figure 8.Donations received from Kenya, 1962 – 2016



Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016

The biggest donors in Kenya have been G7 countries and multilateral organizations. G7 countries include United Kingdom, United States of America, Germany, France, Italy, Japan and Canada; multilateral organizations (which mainly invested) include International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group. From 1963 – 1970 United Kingdom has been the biggest donor covering from 40 % - 86% of donations in Kenya; USA donations in Kenya have been issued since post-independence but started to focus its attention only in the early '80s. Multilateral organizations on the other hand started to play a role in Kenya during middle '70s – their donations covered more than 60% of the total financial aid. The biggest donors of foreign aid include United Kingdom, United States of America and World Bank.

Role of external influence via international donors is not to be understood as proportional to the amount of ODA invoiced to Kenya, rather in a different pattern: in order for domestic government to implement political and economic reforms toward democratization

international donors either suspended or cut the financial aid. Table no.3 offers a summary of donor's role as instigators of domestic reforms on political and economic liberalization.

Table 5.Domestic political events in Kenya and international donors 'attitude

Year	Domestic political events	Reaction from international donors
1980	• Agreement between Kenya and USA was signed in April, which gave to USA naval and air access at the Kenyan port of Mombasa and air field of Embakasi and Nanyuki.	USA's financial aid to Kenya from 1978 to 1990 is increased by 763%.
1982	• One-party system is legalized -KANU becomes the sole party in Kenya. • Political censorship, human rights violation and media suppression increase	Donors in the following three years cut only USD 58 million. There was tension between Moi regime and international donors, but no serious threats were issued against Moi rule.
1984	• Anti-government protest start, especially from education sector;	
1986	• Lawmakers who were critical to government were imprisoned; • Constitutional amendments stated the executive power as superior to legislative and judiciary	
1988	• Constitutional amendments again were made: Executive branch is given the right to dismiss judges and detain without trial. • Moi was reelected as President and in the aftermath many opposition leaders were detained.	By 1988 though the amount of financial aid was doubled to USD 832 million.
1990	• Opposition leaders – Rubia, Matibia and Odinga- were	From 1991-1994 Kenya was under the pressure of international donors

	arrested with no trial ;	for its failings in economic management, governmental transparency and respect for human rights;
1991	• Moi government agree to implement reforms for political liberalization • National Assembly amendments Constitution: abrogates one-party system and multi-party elections are reinforced. • Presidential candidate is required to win at least 25% of the vote	With the initiative of USA, other western donors agree to establish a joint line pressuring Moi government to implement reforms on political liberalization; Non-humanitarian aid suspended as a leverage for political and economic reforms;
1992	• New political parties are instituted: FORD , SDP , KNDA, PUJ and NO; • First legal protest is held by FORD • Opposition accuses government for the violence outbreak in the west region • Women protesters are attacked by police while demonstrating for the liberation of political prisoners • In the elections of 1992 Moi government wins the elections but 88/180 seats in the parliament were won by the opposition; • Elections are contested as not-free by Kibaki	International donors suspend \$350 million from OAD to Kenya
1994	• Escalating violence in Raft Valley; • NGOs are deregistered ; • Opposition leaders are arrested without trail	• Germany cuts its aid to Kenya; • Denmark blocks aid until the situation of human rights is to be re-evaluated.
1995-1997	• Transparency of government fails; corruption obstacles economic development; • Non-democratic psychologic and physical methods are used	• In July 1995 international aid donors and Kenyan government officials met in Paris to discuss about the


	against detains.	derogating status of human rights. • World Bank suspends aid over corruption scandal • By 1999 foreign aid is reduced to 2/3 – From \$900 million to \$300 million.
2002-2012	• In 2002 presidential elections are won by Kibaki – FORD opposition party. Elections are praised as free and fair by international community; • Human Rights are to be improved; • Government accountability to be sanctioned as a tool for democratic rule; • Opposition parties are recognized and given role in the accountability of government • Executive, Legislative and Judiciary share the same power; • In 2004 Anglo – Leasing “affair” scandal on corruption went public; • In 2007 presidential elections violence breaks out – Kenyatta Junior is to be accused for their incitement; • Overall democratic and economic liberalization took place.	• Due to the corruption allegations in 2004, European Union cuts £ 83 million to Kibaki government. • Due to the political liberalization taking place in the country during Kibaki regime, international donors increase the level of the donations up to 583% reaching \$ 2.65 billion (As part of the post-Cold War agenda of western donators to support financially nations that embrace democratic reforms).
2017	• Corruption at Health Ministry allegations are issued	USA suspends \$ 21 million to Health Ministry of Kenya

Source: Joseph Figaro, University of Denver, 2012

- **Before 1990s** donors did not issue serious threats against domestic non-democratic governments - rather donations were still flowing. Donor's pressure for reformation during Moi government in '80s did not produce any significant results. Reforms were

initiated but as donors would not cut or suspend significantly financial aid, there was no implementation of rule of law. There was no leverage on Kenya to reform itself as the donations were being granted nevertheless - donors boosted their support for Moi government despite aggravating governance and violence in civil liberties in the scope of consolidating Moi's personal power. Non-democratic rule of Moi received annually donations for its development assistance, while applying capitalism and pro-Western foreign policy which made it to be in the top five countries to profit from donations.

Figure 9. Donor's financial aid to Kenya, 1963 -1990



Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016

As the country was facing economic crisis during '80s, this made Kenya's economy even more depended on financial aid therefore the conditions to successfully implement democratic reforms were convenient; but there was no pressure from external donors to wield domestic political adjustments. Joseph Figaro argues the poor impact of international donors during '80s as a deed of the limited nature of donors to force their will on Kenya (2012). Actually this finding is not correct – it was not a matter of possibility of the donors (in a foreign aid –depended nation donors can drive the necessary reforms) but rather an issue of will. In the rivalry between democratic Western and communist East during Cold War, donations from western countries not only in Kenya, but globally were used as an instrument of blocking the expansion of

communism – even if that meant supporting authoritarian regimes as long as they did not line along communist Russia.

In this sense, Kenya's stronger relations with its former colony forged Kenya's pro-Western attitude during Cold War. Kenya was thought to have a predisposition to become a socialist party due to bitter colonial experience with Great Britain. The biggest opposition party at the time in Kenya was that of Kenya People's Union led by Odinga – a socialist party. So when one-party system was established in Kenya during these years, it actually did not bother West, as long as it was fit to their Foreign Policy – anyway Western countries, especially USA had already raised precedent even in Latin America of their preference of authoritarian regimes as long as they would keep communism away.

While there was a tension between donors and Moi regime about the one-party system, it only resulted in suspending \$ 53 million in the aftermath of three years – which was not a noteworthy punishment as annually an average flow of \$ 350 million was issued.

And as the data indicates above Western countries were the biggest donors of the time, lead initially by UK and from 1980 we can see the role of USA starts to take a significant position. USA would establish military basis in Kenya's coast which shaped a new era of bilateral relations between the two. During Cold War Kenya and USA established strategic partnership – a partnership that brought military and financial assistance – this was the moment when interdependence takes shape. Kenya offered its Mombassa port – USA now had access to both Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa. This partnership offered Kenya a unique opportunity to provide leverage into Western donors, which explains the great amount of donations that were received during this period. Kenya's foreign policy alignment alongside western interests actually was the bases of inhaling many investments.

- 1990 -2000 As Cold War was over, which meant there was no more crucial need for an undisputable ally in Eastern African region - US in a joint attitude with other donors criticized Kenya for its domestic non-democratic regime, misapplication of economic funds, human rights abuses and one-party system. The frequency of aid suspension was proportional to country's fail of embracing reforms. During this decade Moi

government became for the first time accountable for its non-democratic rule. International actors rose against deteriorating domestic corruption and government had to initiate political and economic reforms while becoming more and more accountable in front of donors.

Donors established a joint attitude using their aid policies to promote democratic reforms in Kenya under the official warning to Kenya that unless democratic reformation would take place, it would lose its darling donor immunity. USA froze \$5 million in military aid programs and another \$8 million in development assistance. Canada, Germany, Sweden and Denmark joined USA together with Finland, Australia and UK releasing official statements of criticism against Moi regime.

The most significant moment in external donors' role in the democratization process in Kenya has been aid cut of \$350 million until political liberalization would take place – it included international demands for pluralism, rule of law, fighting corruption. It took less than a week for Kenyan government to implement political liberalization, which included:

- National Assembly amends Constitution by abrogating one-party system and legalizing multi-party elections in 1991
- Political parties are legally recognized: FORD, SDP, KANDA, PUJ and NO are established
- In 1992 presidential elections for the first time opposition held 88 out of 188 seats in parliament

Despite the progress in political liberalization, Moi regime yet was to resist by either declaring illegal FORD or arresting opposition leaders during their pro-democracy rally (Throup & Hornsby, 1998: 77). Such reverse caused international donors to suspend more financial aid until Kenya would undergo critical democratic reformation (Throup & Hornsby, 1998: 86). Due to international insistence pressuring Kenya's regime via World Bank Foreign Aid policies, in 1991 reformation was re-energized and enriched with more reforms (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997: 182).

It is important to stress that western donors during '90s never shielded down in their criticism against non-democratic regime of Moi. During 1994 events – escalation violence

in Raft Valley; non-governmental organizations deregistered and opposition leaders get arrested without trail – donors not only did they decrease their amount of aid, but Germany and Denmark block aid until situation on human rights was to be improved.

In overall the impact of international donors has been crucial during '90s as by 1999 foreign aid was reduced by 2/3 – from \$900 million to \$300 million and this decade to nowadays remains the most crucial reformation age in Kenyan democratization.

➤ 2000 -nowadays Democratic reformation which took place in the previous decade eventually led the first fair and free presidential elections which were won by Kibaki in 2002. International donors have supported his liberal regime – this time foreign aid was increased as a reward for the democratic achievements driven by Kibaki government:

- Human Rights are to be improved;
- Government accountability to be sanctioned as a tool for democratic rule;
- Opposition parties are recognized and given role in the accountability of government
- Executive, Legislative and Judiciary share the same power.

The most significant impact from donors has been met in 2007 when ethnic conflicts spread through the country and resulted in the death of more than 2000 people for which they held accountable Kenyatta. During the second term of Kibaki as president , domestic politics unable to settle ethnic tensions internally, it was the intervention of donors in the elections of 2012 which brought into power Kenyatta putting at rest ethnic conflicts.

The role of the donors has been supporting to democratic reforms mainly led by Kibaki and later followed by Kenyatta partially. Yet, their voice has been critical to the raising corruption, which was followed by a cut of £83 million from European Union in 2004 and lately in 2017 USA cut \$21 million from Kenyan Ministry of Health.

Yet, the role of donors since Kenyatta has come into power has been blurry – The results from Freedom House show a regress in Political Rights and Civil Liberties from 2012 when

new government was formed, but besides critical reports on its democratic performance, Kenya has not faced any significant obstacle like aid cut/ suspension.


4.4 Democracy promotion: Case of Uganda

International donor's financial aid suspension leverage has been limited in Uganda's democratization process, or better to say most of the time it has been missing. While in the '90s the region of East Africa was transformed politically via foreign aid leverage, in Uganda western reformation bargaining was either non-sufficient or absent.

Having been supported by donors especially since 1986, aid-dependent Uganda has been profiting under its "darling" status from Official Development Assistance (ODA): Foreign Direct Investments, debt forgiveness, loans and Democratic Development Assistance. Unlike other eastern African neighbors –which have been under donor's democracy account check - Uganda has not been held accountable for its non-democratic rule. There have been threats, critics and warnings but significant aid suspension or cutting has been missing. Though since late 2000s internationals are working toward holding Uganda accountable under human rights violation, lack of political reforms and corruption allegations, aid suspension/cutting has not been significant – at the best aid cut was 7% in 2014. Uganda's government budget is 50% - 65% highly leaned on donations – therefore if international actors had implied their restrictions on Uganda by exercising aid conditional policy, for sure democracy would have been in better shoes.

By and any large donations in Uganda from independence to nowadays have had a constant increase, from \$ 28.77 M (1962) to \$ 1.75 B .The role of western donors as generators of financial aid started to take a significant role in 1980s and since then have become the driver of Ugandan economy.

Figure 10. Donations received by Uganda, 1962 - 2016



Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016

Like in the case of Kenya, the role of external influence via international donors is not to be understood as proportional to the amount of ODA invoiced to Uganda, rather in a different pattern: in order for domestic government to implement political and economic reforms toward democratization international donors either suspend or cut the financial aid. Democratization has been pushed up by donors when they exercise aid leverage to propel domestic government implement political and economic liberalization. Below table offers a summary of donor's leverage on Uganda by suspending or cutting aid aiming reforms on political and economic liberalization.


Table 6. Domestic political events in Uganda and international donors 'attitude

Year	Domestic political events	Reaction from international donors
1986 -2005	Museveni comes into power ; Constitutional changes take place: One party-system operates functions till 2005	No aid leverage from international donors. From 1986 to 2005 ODA increase by \$ 1 billion. While the rest of the region's foreign aid during '90s is suspended by 2/3, in Uganda it got increased by \$ 192 million.
2005	Constitutional changes on presidential terms (Extends the terms of presidents till death)	Only Ireland – as a token of demonstration about the need for political reforms – decides to cut aid by \$ 2 million (from \$ 32 million to \$ 30 million). This initiative was not followed by other donors.

2007	Aid misuse and corruption allegations against Museveni government	European Union, United Kingdom and World Bank declare that \$300 million aid would be cut in the light of corruption allegations. Actually only \$41 million aid assistance were cut, while in the coming years corruption index shows decline in improvement.
2011	Presidential elections are contested as unfair	International community criticizes Museveni government for unfairly results, but no leverage is exercised by donors.
2012	Corruption allegations on the misuse of donations are attested	UK suspended the remaining £11.1m from £26.9m (already £15m had been paid before allegations came into light). Other donors did not join UK in blocking aid to Uganda.
2014	President Museveni signs Anti-gay law	Considered as human rights violation for its discrimination content based on sexual orientation or gender identity, the first common joint-attitude against Uganda is established. Totally \$ 115 million of foreign aid was cut – first reactions were as following: Norway suspended \$ 8 M; Denmark suspended \$ 9 M and Netherland cut \$9.6 M.
2016	Presidential elections are contested as unfair	For the second time presidential elections which gave another term to Museveni are domestically and internationally contested but again no foreign aid leverage was implemented.
2018	Mismanagement , fraud and corruption on the funds for refugees granted to Uganda	UE, UK and USA have threatened Uganda to cut significant aid over allegations for the mismanagement of \$350 million. Commission responsible for the investigation is raised.

While in the other countries of eastern region in Africa donations started to flow since '70s, in Uganda foreign aid prior to 1986 has been limited due to its internal political turmoil, conflicts, cruel & devastating Amud's military regime and lack of institutions. Therefore before Museveni came into power the influence of international actors in a destabilized Uganda has been insignificant – lower donations compared to other Eastern African countries and no pressure to the landlocked non-democratic Uganda. Below figure no.7 offers a comparative analysis of the donations received by Uganda and its neighbors:

Figure 11. OAD to Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Ethiopia, 1962 -1986



Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016


If for the other neighbors aid started to penetrate in the region vigorously in 1970s, for Uganda it took 16 (sixteen) years to have a “darling” status among donors. While in 1990s Sub-Saharan African countries were held accountable for their non-democratic rule & violence of human rights and foreign aid was suspended / cut until reform for political and economic liberalization were taken, for Uganda this process never took place. Foreign aid has negatively affected democratization in Uganda due to its lack of political leverage on Museveni government: political conditionality could have been exercised – but failed to do so- in the following non-democratic events:

- As one-party system was abolished during 1990s in SSA (to achieve this political transformation during the decade donors cut 2/3 of ODA), in Uganda it lasted till 2005. This year on one side marked the most important political reformation in the democratization process in Uganda; but on the other side just as this achievement marked democracy in country, Museveni implemented a reverse step by amending Constitution and extending presidential terms (From a maximum of two terms, presidents in Uganda can rule until their death if elected). There were critics among international community, but only Ireland – as a token of demonstration about the need

for political reforms – decided to cut aid by \$ 2 million (from \$ 32 million to \$ 30 million). No other donor followed.

- 2007 and 2012 corruption allegations of mismanagement, fraud and corruption of donations were followed by threats and warnings from donors: European Union, United Kingdom and World Bank declared that \$300 million aid would be cut in 2007 but only \$41 million aid assistance was suspended, while in the coming year's corruption index worsened; in 2012 Ireland raises charges of corruption against Kampala stating that its common €12m donation together with Norway, Denmark and Sweden were channeled into the private account of prime minister instead of being used for its purpose to aid peace recovery and development program in northern Uganda. In 2012 UK cut £11.1m from £26.9 m (already £15m had been paid before allegations came into light). No donor, including Ireland, Norway, Denmark or Sweden joined London to exercise political leverage in Uganda. Corruption Index by International Transparency from 2001 has been publishing evaluation about the level of corruption worldwide on an evaluation from 0 to 100 – 0 are the most corrupted, generally failed states and 100 the most democratic countries. Data for Uganda is in the following graph:

Figure.12 Corruption Index, Uganda: 2001-2017



Source: Transparency International, 2018

Records for Uganda start in 2001 and hence it has kept strongly its position in the red area – most corrupted countries: in 2007 it scored 28 and in 2012 hit 29. If

leverage would have been properly exercised in both cases the coming years would have shown improvement, but as the data indicates after 2012 corruption increased to 25 which makes Uganda the most corrupted regionally.

- 2011 and 2016 presidential elections were both contested domestically and internationally as unfair and not free – yet no aid was suspended or cut, no foreign aid leverage was implemented.

The only case in which donors have exercised aid leverage to Uganda was in 2014, when President Museveni signs Anti-Gay law which severed punishments up to death for homosexuality: Totally \$ 115 million of foreign aid was cut – first reactions were as following: Norway suspended \$ 8 M; Denmark suspended % 9 M and Netherland cut \$9.6 M. Additionally USA imposed visa restriction, cancels \$ 2 million funding for Ugandan community policing program & \$ 3 million aid for the establishment of national public health institute and cancels regional military exercise. It was the only case in which foreign aid leverage was implemented and successfully achieved in only 8 (eight) months the annulation of the law as in August 2014 Constitutional Court of Uganda declared Anti-Gay law as null and invalid.

Despite critics, donors have not played any significant role in exercising their truly full power to leverage non-democratic Museveni regime for political reformation. Their limited “stick” policy on Uganda’s one-party policy has shown an indirect support for no-party political culture taking place in the country due to the stability Museveni government brought into country. For Brett (1996) the support of donors to Uganda has been mostly implemented in the areas of security and built of institutions as the Museveni government was willing to face failures, yet he ignores the relationship between official Kampala and West. In fact government of Museveni and international donors have shared a mutual line of interests in the region on the cost of not intervening in the domestic politics: this good likelihood of Museveni-donors relationship has been tested by Uganda’s critique to Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir government, intervention in Somalia in 2000s – strategic political moves which enabled Museveni to strengthen the connection with donors. Aftermath of these

events would find Museveni's Uganda as a promoter in the region for donor's interests for regional stabilization.

USA – the greatest donor in Uganda - has financed Elections Comity to ensure real pro multi-party election environment via the fund project named "Donor Democracy and Good Governance". Despite elections have been highly criticized for Museveni's usage of public taxpayer's money to support his electoral campaign, he still is internationally recognized as the head of Uganda's government and his ongoing rule is supported even though donors are aware of his non-democratic regime style.

One of the critics that go to donors is corruption: there has not been any international joint campaign to ban foreign aid to Uganda for its high levels of corruption. On these accounts, Central Bank of Kenya has criticized the practice of donors who channel money to NGOs directly via banks, which means as long as donations are processed this way aid cannot be controlled. Mwenda in 2006 criticizes donors for the high level of public debt: more than 90% of Ugandan debt is to be invoiced week and unsuccessful reforms conceived by World Bank since 1981.


By and large, political and economic reformation would have taken place in Uganda if Museveni government had not been subsidized regularly by foreign aid.

4.5 Foreign aid leverage: A comparison of Kenya and Uganda

Kenya and Uganda share a common political and economic legacy as their regional events have impacted both of them until their independences respectively in 1963 and 1962 sharpened the start of differences between the two. After British colonialism was retracted from both countries, both their economies and institutions were undeveloped and to be built from the scratch. The role of the international donors in both countries has been latent until mid '70s when USA and multilateral organizations started to permeate regionally. From 1962 to 1972 amount of donations for both countries has been comparatively not with great differences- Uganda has received less donations than Kenya - The average of donations to Kenya has been \$ 56 million while for Uganda has been \$ 25 million. This was due to their internal political events – Kenya despite non-democratic regime of Kenyatta & Moi, has not been through political turmoil unlike Uganda which has suffered the most severe

political conditions in the region. During this time international donors would not be lurking for criticism against countries but only offer continuous assistance which somehow established interdependency – the reality that hit countries in the coming years.


Figure 13. Donations received by Kenya and Uganda, 1962 - 2016



Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016

During Cold War the Western donors did not criticize financial aid receiving countries – all the donations would go them as long as their foreign policy did not crash with Western's interest and communism was kept off the shore. From 1971 to 1990 as Cold War had separated World in two ideologies, international donors were not concerned about level of democracies rather than stopping the enlargement of communism around the globe. If we check the data, we can see how the amount of donations increases in both of countries, with main donors USA and multilateral organizations: EU institutions, World Bank, International Monetary Fund. From 1975 to 1990 -15 years- Kenya receives a total of \$ 7.6 billion, while Uganda receives \$ 3 billion. If comparing to previous 12 years Kenya had received only \$ 849 million while Uganda \$ 331 million. The enormous carried investments in the region owned to Cold War as Western countries were trying to block the expansion of USSR any further. For these reasons investments were increased by 800%.

Figure 14. Donations received by Kenya and Uganda from multilateral organizations



Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016

The role of multilateral organizations keeps increasing continuously in Uganda while for Kenya in middle '80s has a decrease as that gap was overdone by USA's donations in Kenya who was a vital key supporter for USA during Cold War. It was Kenya that due to the successful leverage exercised by Moi government attracted the attention of donors and supported Western interests in the region by giving USA the right to establish a military base which gave it access to Horn of Africa.

The difference of international influence in Africa would start in 1990: As the Cold War was won by West, USA in the quality of the unipolar power in world, started to promote democracy around the world and this is the moment when criticism from donors actually affected Kenya's democratization. US in a joint attitude with other donors criticized Kenya for its domestic non-democratic regime, misapplication of economic funds, human rights abuses and one-party system USA froze \$5 million in military aid programs and another \$8 million in development assistance; in 1991 12 FORD leaders were arrested while Canada, Germany, Sweden and Denmark joined USA together with Finland, Australia and UK releasing official statements of criticism against Moi regime. They blocking \$350 million out of \$ 1 billion of foreign aid until political liberalization would take place – it included international demands for pluralism, rule of law, fighting corruption. During '90s Kenya was under pressure of international to reformat its self with no compromise in the process.

In 1991 multi-party system was brought back into constitution. This was the cornerstone of democratic development in Kenya which eventually led to the electoral win of Kibaki in 2002 – The most democratic layer of Kenya's politics.

If we analyze the amount of donations from 1990 to 2000 received by Kenya and Uganda we can see how Kenya during '90s has received less financial aid than Uganda – a restrictive policy from the donors that accelerated democratic rule of Kibaki from 2002-2012 which forged further democratic reforms for Kenya.

As for Uganda this joint action never took part. The only cases when Uganda faced blockage from donors was in 2012 and 2014: In 2012 United Kingdom, upon corruption allegations for mismanagement and fraud, stated that it would not proceed with the remaining £11.1m from £26.9m (already £15m had been paid before allegations came into light) – yet this was never taken to the level of a joint action likewise in the case of Kenya until democratic reforms were undertaken; secondly in 2014 when the Anti-Gay law was signed by Museveni \$115 million aid was cut as a protest for Uganda's anti-gay policy and it took only eight months for the validity of law to be nullified by Constitutional Court of Uganda. As we look at the data above, while Kenya got punished for its non-democratic rule, Uganda's received donations were increasing all the way long - criticism with no action was a silent way of approving governance of Museveni who still runs the country. Uganda's biggest failure is the high level of corruption: neither in 2007 or in 2012 - when corruption allegations came into light - donors did not add action to their criticism against Uganda. Actually it is foreign aid which sustains – indirectly – corruption by subsidizing Museveni government and the incompetence of its administration.

As a conclusion due to Western donors' "stick" policy in 1990s Kenya went through democratic reforms which led to the democratic rule of Kibaki for two terms – his impact stretches influence even nowadays; Uganda has not been pressured and /or leveraged for political transformation due to the close ties between Museveni's government and western donors.

5. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis is an analytic research paper that has sought to analyze the role of the external influence as the primary cause of democratic transition while answering *why Kenya, despite sharing the same political and economic legacy, is more democratic than Uganda?* Applying the theory of External f/actors as influencers of democratization, findings are that democratic transition starting 1990s is a political phenomenon generated not by interstate f/actors but an output of democracy promotion via political conditionality.

Especially since post-WW2 cases of democratization worldwide have been a result of external interference while the two major powers – USA and USSR – were in a constant struggle for power. Therefore other states would only operate under the umbrella of the Big Powers and arguments claiming interstate f/actors to have been the driver of democratization face limitation while trying to bring into life the explanatory formula. But, on the other side external influence offers a broad understanding and an adequate explanatory analysis which matches the patterns of democratization and explains why have there been differences in the level of democracy besides sharing same political, economic and social structures and being in the same region.

In the democratization process under the scope of external influence there are two mogul actors who have been shaping politics worldwide: USA and European Union. Both of these actors have used financial aid to carry out political dominance over domestic governments. Exercising the so called “political conditionality” this study finds that in the Sub-Saharan region the role of donors led by USA, EU (member states and organizations) has been a double-standard process consequently producing different results for different countries. Their donations have either acted as an accelerator or preventer. On understanding the double-standard policy, this study looks deeper and identifies the motives of donors.

Their motivations lie into their foreign policy’s interests:

During Cold-War donations would be acting as the “Carrot” for rewarding countries that would allow Western countries to build military basis in their territories due to their geopolitical location. Therefore it was not a matter of democratic development or not, but a

matter of government's attitudes that would please or not the interests for Western's foreign policy. As during Cold-War period the governments were mostly authoritarian, characterized by one-party politics and violence of human rights little did international donors to change the situation keeping thus one eye blind and one ear deaf.

After the fall of Berlin Wall – symbolizing the end of Cold War – support to Sub-Saharan Africa changed scope of support: now promoting human rights, rule of law, democratic institutions were the demands of donors in order to proceed with their financial aid. If the country would not meet such requirements the local government would face lack of funds to run the country. Kenya is the perfect example of this change in attitude when in 1991 faced international joint cut off aid until multi-party system was constitutionally re-legalized.

Why this new agenda? This study finds that it was due to the New World Order – Unipolarity of USA is the leading power in the world and in order to stretch its dominion via globalism it needed countries that are alike. Therefore capitalist imperialism became the trigger of the triumphant liberal democracies: it included democracy promotion to non-democratic countries which would widen the pond of states where political liberalism would be followed by economic liberalization – free market, more access to natural resources. Liberal democracy goes hand to hand with liberal economy and support global peace and security creating a pond of similar states that do not oppose the agenda of the Western countries.

Kenya and Uganda – two countries in the Eastern Africa with the same colonial legacy – respectively in 1963 and 1962 gain their independence and since then their starting point has been the same but progress different. Yet Kenya has performed a better democracy than Uganda – Why different results when countries are similar politically, economically and socially?


This study's findings are as following:

- External influence as a primary cause of democratization is incited by the changes of balance of power in the international system and the rate success depends greatly on the interests of mogul powers, who hold the monopoly of financial aid.

- In case of Africa, their rich lands of natural resources and geopolitical importance has been target of international actor's agenda and democratic development has been a double-standard product of external influence. Political elites since post-independence tend to be authoritative and have not embraced democratic reforms unless donors have used their financial aids to bend their non-democratic attitude; also rural population, lack of middle class, low income economies have not empowered civilian resistance against their governments.
- In both Kenya and Uganda international donors (USA, EU member states, World Bank and International Monetary Fund) have exercised negative conditionality to promote democracy in the region. The increasing level of donations has not been proportional to the level of democracy; therefore there is no positive correlation between the two. Instead democracy has been promoted via aid reduction, suspension and termination.
- Kenya has performed better in democratization due to the foreign aid leverage implemented during 1990s from international donors led by USA – During this decade 2/3 of total aid was cut until political and economic reformation took place: one-party system was replaced with multi-party system; opposition parties were registered and competed in presidential elections; civil liberties and political right got improved significantly. All this reformation led to the win of 2002 elections by Kibaki who ruled 10 (ten) years of democratic events in Kenya.
- Uganda never faced serious aid leverage from donors: year by year donations have been increasing and democracy declining as Museveni's power has been subsidized by donations. Due to the lack of leverage and poor exercise of negative conditionality Uganda's democratization process has been very slow – while the other neighbors annulled one-party system during '90s , in Uganda it would happen only in 2005. Yet, though donors are aware of authoritarian regime of Museveni, leverage is not exercised due to strong ties between donors and Museveni.

APPENDIX 1

Figure 1. External Influence on democratization: Promoting democracy



APPENDIX 2

Table no 1: Combination of Pridham, Whitehead and Schmitter arguments on international dimension of democratization

	Basis of action	
	Coercion	Voluntary
Unilateral	Control	Contagion
Multilateral	Conditionality	Consent

Source: Chih-Chieh Chou

APPENDIX 3


Table 2. Leverage and Linkage determinants of promoted democracy

WHAT DOES IT DEFINE?	How vulnerable are authoritarian regimes to external influence?	How consistent are the ties between target state and Western actors (USA, EU or multilateral organizations)
ELEMENTS	Size, military power and economic potential of the target state	Economic linkage
	Supported or not by other external actors in case of resistance	Geopolitical linkage
	Existence of conflict of interest in external actor's policy agendas	Communication linkage
	-	Social linkage
	-	Transnational civil society linkage

Source: Levistki and Way, 2005


APPENDIX 4

Figure 2. External leverage on democracy by Levitsky and Way



APPENDIX 5

Figure 4. Role of foreign aid in Kenya and Uganda



APPENDIX 6

Figure 5. New World Order's components

Liberal democracy	• Political Rights • Civil freedoms • Free and fair elections
Liberal economy	• Free market with limited state interference as a regulator in economy • Empowerment of private sector
Global Peace and Prosperity	• The more congenial states are to each other, the slander the chance of conflict between the group

APPENDIX 7

Table No.3 – Summary of democratization's quantitative models


	Freedom House	Polity IV	Przeworski
Criteria of analysis	Political Rights and Civil Liberties since 1972	Type of regimes: Democracy/Autocracy since 1800	Contestation to lawmaking and law execute institutions since 1946

Source: Pippa Norris, Harvard University, 2008

APPENDIX 8

Figure 6. Polity IV Index, Kenya and Uganda


Polity IV Index



Source: Polity IV, 2018

APPENDIX 9

Figure 7. Kenya and Uganda: Comparing Freedom House's scores, 2001 - 2018



Source: Freedom House Reports, 2018

APPENDIX 10

Table 4. External influence on Kenya's democratization process

	1980s	1990s	2000 -
Role of donors	Threats with no action on policy implementation; Donors did not use leverage for human rights improvement, rather kept financing as long as Kenya was supporting western foreign policy in regards to communism during Cold War.	Donors start to exercise their leverage to Moi government in order to grasp domestically political and economic liberalization. This resulted in cutting and suspending 2/3 of Foreign Aid and reformation took place.	Foreign aid has been increasing since, especially during Kibaki government as a reward for democratic reforms taking place. Nevertheless the increase of corruption has been criticized by donors, followed by £83 million aid cut by EU in 2004 and \$21 million by USA in 2017

Source: Joseph Figaro, University of Denver, 2012

APPENDIX 11

Table 5.Domestic political events in Kenya and international donors 'attitude

Year	Domestic political events	Reaction from international donors
1980	Agreement between Kenya and USA was signed in April, which gave to USA naval and air access at the Kenyan port of Mombasa and air field of Embakasi and Nanyuki.	USA's financial aid to Kenya from 1978 to 1990 is increased by 763%.
1982	- One-party system is legalized -KANU becomes the sole party in Kenya. - Political censorship, human rights violation and media suppression increase	Donors in the following three years cut only USD 58 million. There was tension between Moi regime and international donors, but no serious threats were issued against Moi rule.
1984	Anti-government protest start, especially from education sector;	
1986	- Lawmakers who were critical to government were imprisoned; - Constitutional amendments stated the executive power as superior to legislative and judiciary	
1988	- Constitutional amendments again were made: Executive branch is given the right to dismiss judges and detain without trial. - Moi was reelected as President and in the aftermath many opposition leaders were detained.	By 1988 though the amount of financial aid was doubled to USD 832 million.
1990	Opposition leaders -- Rubia, Matibia and Odinga- were arrested with no trial ;	From 1991-1994 Kenya was under the pressure of international donors for its failings in economic management, governmental transparency and respect for human rights; With the initiative of USA, other western donors agree to establish a
1991	- Moi government agree to implement reforms for political liberalization - National Assembly amendments Constitution: abrogates one-party system and multi-party	


	elections are reinforced. • Presidential candidate is required to win at least 25% of the vote	joint line pressuring Moi government to implement reforms on political liberalization; Non-humanitarian aid suspended as a leverage for political and economic reforms; International donors suspend \$350 million from OAD to Kenya
1992	• New political parties are instituted: FORD , SDP , KNDA, PUJ and NO; • First legal protest is held by FORD • Opposition accuses government for the violence outbreak in the west region • Women protesters are attacked by police while demonstrating for the liberation of political prisoners • In the elections of 1992 Moi government wins the elections but 88/180 seats in the parliament were won by the opposition; • Elections are contested as not-free by Kibaki	
1994	• Escalating violence in Raft Valley; • NGOs are deregistered ; • Opposition leaders are arrested without trail	• Germany cuts its aid to Kenya; • Denmark blocks aid until the situation of human rights is to be re-evaluated.
1995-1997	• Transparency of government fails; corruption obstacles economic development; • Non-democratic psychologic and physical methods are used against detainees.	• In July 1995 international aid donors and Kenyan government officials met in Paris to discuss about the derogating status of human rights. • World Bank suspends aid over corruption scandal • By 1999 foreign aid is reduced to 2/3 – From \$900 million to \$300 million.
2002-2012	• In 2002 presidential elections are won by Kibaki – FORD opposition party. Elections are praised as free and fair by international community; • Human Rights are to be	• Due to the corruption allegations in 2004, European Union cuts £

	improved; • Government accountability to be sanctioned as a tool for democratic rule; • Opposition parties are recognized and given role in the accountability of government • Executive, Legislative and Judiciary share the same power; • In 2004 Anglo – Leasing “affair” scandal on corruption went public; • In 2007 presidential elections violence breaks out – Kenyatta Junior is to be accused for their incitement; • Overall democratic and economic liberalization took place.	83 million to Kibaki government. • Due to the political liberalization taking place in the country during Kibaki regime, international donors increase the level of the donations up to 583% reaching \$ 2.65 billion (As part of the post-Cold War agenda of western donators to support financially nations that embrace democratic reforms).
2017	• Corruption at Health Ministry allegations are issued	USA suspends \$ 21 million to Health Ministry of Kenya

Source: Joseph Figaro, University of Denver, 2012

APPENDIX 12


Figure 8. Donations received from Kenya, 1962 – 2016



Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016

APPENDIX 13


Figure 9. Donor's financial aid to Kenya, 1963 -1990



Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016

APPENDIX 14


Figure 10. Donations received by Uganda, 1962 - 2016



Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016

APPENDIX 15


Figure 11.OAD to Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Ethiopia, 1962 -1986



Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016

APPENDIX 16

Figure.12 Corruption Index, Uganda: 2001-2017



Source: Transparency International, 2018


APPENDIX 17

Table 6.Domestic political events in Uganda and international donors 'attitude

Year	Domestic political events	Reaction from international donors
1986 -2005	Museveni comes into power ; Constitutional changes take place: One party-system operates functions till 2005	No aid leverage from international donors. From 1986 to 2005 ODA increase by \$ 1 billion. While the rest of the region's foreign aid during '90s is suspended by 2/3, in Uganda it got increased by \$ 192 million.
2005	Constitutional changes on presidential terms (Extends the terms of presidents till death)	Only Ireland – as a token of demonstration about the need for political reforms – decides to cut aid by \$ 2 million (from \$ 32 million to \$ 30 million). This initiative was not followed by other donors.
2007	Aid misuse and corruption allegations against Museveni government	European Union, United Kingdom and World Bank declare that \$300 million aid would be cut in the light of corruption allegations. Actually only \$41 million aid assistance were cut, while in the coming years corruption index shows decline in improvement.
2011	Presidential elections are contested as unfair	International community criticizes Museveni government for unfairly results, but no leverage is exercised by donors.
2012	Corruption allegations on the misuse of donations are attested	UK suspended the remaining £11.1m from £26.9m (already £15m had been paid before allegations came into light). Other donors did not join UK in blocking aid to Uganda.
2014	President Museveni signs Anti-gay law	Considered as human rights violation for its discrimination content based on sexual orientation or gender identity, the first common joint-attitude against Uganda is established. Totally \$ 115 million of foreign aid was cut – first reactions were as following: Norway suspended \$ 8 M; Denmark suspended % 9 M and Netherland cut \$9.6 M.
2016	Presidential elections are contested as unfair	For the second time presidential elections which gave another term to Museveni are domestically and internationally contested but again no foreign aid leverage was implemented.
2018	Mismanagement , fraud and corruption on the funds for refugees granted to Uganda	UE, UK and USA have threatened Uganda to cut significant aid over allegations for the mismanagement of \$350 million. Commission responsible for the investigation is raised.

APPENDIX 18


Figure 13. Donations received by Kenya and Uganda, 1962 - 2016



Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016

APPENDIX 19

Figure 14. Donations received by Kenya and Uganda from multilateral organizations



Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016

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