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# BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE ON THE EVE OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1910-1914)

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by

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To my family

## APPROVAL PAGE

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## **ABSTRACT**

**Taner ÖZMEN**

**June 2014**

### **BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE ON THE EVE OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1910-1914)**

This dissertation is a study to determine a better understanding of the situation of the Ottoman Empire on the eve of the First World War, through the perspectives of the British Embassy in İstanbul and in the neighboring countries of the Ottoman Empire. In this study, the period covered is from 1910 to just before the First World War.

The first known relations between the Turks and the British date back to the Crusades. Once upon a time, the Ottoman Empire was one of the world's great powers, and she granted unilateral concessions to Britain, who had brought herself to global superpower status between the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After the proclamation of the Second Constitutional, the Ottoman authorities abandoned Abdülhamid II's pro-German policy and tried to adopt a pro-British policy, but why did relations between the Ottoman Empire and Britain not last and become adversarial? It can be said that there were two great factors in the shaping of British policy towards the Ottoman Empire. The first relates to the British interest in Ottoman territories, and the second relates to the policies followed by the British statesmen and diplomats in the Ottoman Empire, who misjudged the nature of the Sublime Porte's intentions. Britain hoped to obtain new colonies as a world superpower in the sovereignty regions of the Ottoman Empire, thus she abandoned her traditional policy, which was the protection of the integrity of the Ottoman territories. As of 1910 Britain was no longer going to be a savior for the Ottoman and she became more dangerous an enemy than the Ottoman's ancient enemy

Russia. The reasons for this attitude against Britain was Ottoman policy during the Tripoli and the Balkan Wars that had a great influence on the Ottoman's pro-German stance during Abdülhamid II's era, and Britain's attitude led her to ally with Germany during the First World War.

The principal aim of this study is to comprehensively reveal aspects of the political, military and economic situations in the Ottoman Empire, and her relations with Britain from the British perspective between 1910 and 1914. During this four-year period the Ottoman Empire had confronted many difficulties, such as the uprising in Albania, Havran, Yemen and the war with Italy in Tripoli, and the Balkan Wars. This study investigates which policies the Ottoman authorities followed throughout all these incidents and attempts to expose the political debates within the Ottoman Empire herself.

**Keywords:** The Ottoman Empire, Britain, Albania, Yemen, Rebellion, Tripoli War, Balkan Wars, First World War

## **KISA ÖZET**

**Taner ÖZMEN**

**Haziran 2014**

### **BİRİNCİ DÜNYA SAVAŞI EŞİĞİNDE İNGİLTERE’NİN OSMANLIYA KARŞI POLİTİKASI (1910-1914)**

Bu tez, Birinci Dünya Savaşı eşiğinde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun içerisinde bulunduğu durumu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun komşularındaki ve İstanbul’daki İngiliz Büyükelçiliğinin bakış açısıyla daha iyi anlaşılmasını sağlama çalışmasıdır. Bu çalışma, dönem olarak 1910 ve Birinci Dünya Savaşından hemen önceki dönemi kapsamaktadır.

Türkler ile İngilizler arasındaki ilişkiler Haçlı Seferleri’ne kadar uzanmaktadır. Bir zamanlar Dünya’nın büyük güçlerinden birisi olan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu İngiltere’ye tek taraflı imtiyazlar bahşederken, İngiltere 19. yüzyıl ve 20. yüzyıl başlarında kendini dünyada süper güç konumuna getirmişti. İkinci Meşrutiyetin ilanından sonra, Osmanlı yetkililer II. Abdülhamid’in Alman yanlısı politikasını terk edilerek İngiliz yanlı politikalar benimsenmeye çalışmışlardır, fakat neden iki ülke arasındaki bu dostça ilişkiler uzun soluklu olmadı ve düşman oldular? İngiltere’nin Osmanlı İmparatorluğuna karşı politikasının şekillenmesinde iki önemli faktör vardır. Bunlardan birincisi, İngiltere’nin Osmanlı toprakları üzerindeki çıkarları, İkincisi ise Osmanlı İmparatorluğundaki İngiliz devlet adamlarının ve diplomatlarının Osmanlı hükümetinin niyetlerinin doğasını yanlış anlayarak izlemiş oldukları politikalardır. İngiltere’nin dünya süper gücü olarak Osmanlı topraklarında yeni sömürgeler elde etmeği umduğundan dolayı, İngiltere’nin geleneksel olan Osmanlı’nın toprak bütünlüğünü koruma politikasından vazgeçmesine neden olmuştur. 1910 yılı itibarıyla, İngiltere Osmanlı için bir kurtarıcı olmaktan çıkıp

kadim düşman Rusya'dan daha tehlikeli bir düşman haline gelmiştir. Çünkü Trablusgarp ve Balkan savaşları esnasında İngiltere'nin Osmanlı politikası, Osmanlı'yı II. Abdülhamid dönemindeki gibi Alman yanlısı politika izlemelerine büyük etkisi olmuştur ve İngiltere'nin bu tutumu, Birinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında İngiltere'ye karşı Osmanlı'nın Almanya ile ittifak yapmasına neden olmuştur.

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun içinde bulunduğu siyasi, askeri ve ekonomik yönlerini ve 1910-1914 yılları arasında Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun İngiltere ile olan ilişkisini İngiliz bakış açısıyla kapsamlı bir şekilde ortaya çıkarmaktır. Bu dört yıllık dönemde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu birçok zorluklarla karşı karşıya gelmiştir, örneğin, Arnavutluk, Havran ve Yemen'de ayaklanmalar, Trablusgarp'ta İtalya ile savaş ve Balkan savaşları. Böyle bir durumda Osmanlı yetkililerinin bütün bu olaylara karşın izlemiş oldukları politikaların neler olduğunu ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun kendi içerisindeki siyasi gelişmeler ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, İngiltere, Arnavutluk, Yemen, İsyan, Trablusgarp Savaşı, Balkan Savaşları, Birinci Dünya Savaşı



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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

### Abbreviations used in this study

PRO	Public Record Office (London)
FO	Foreign Office
BOA	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
MV	Meclis-i Vükelâ Mazbataları
HR. SYS	Hâriciye Nezâreti Siyâsi Kısım
I.DUIT	İrade Dosya Usulü İrade Tasnifi
HR.TO	Hâriciye Nezâreti Tercüme Odası
TTK	Türk Tarih Kurumu

### Hijri Months

M:	Muharrem
S:	Safer
Ra:	Rebiyyü'l-evvel
R:	Rebiyyü'l-ahir
Ca:	Cemaziyü'l-evvel
C:	Cemaziyü'l-ahir
B:	Recep
Ş:	Şa'ban
N:	Ramazan
L:	Şevval
Za:	Zi'l-kâde
Z:	Zi'l-hicce

## **NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION**

In my dissertation, I preferred to use frequently Turkey instead of the Ottoman Empire, because it was mostly used in the British Annual Reports, and I also used the Sublime Porte referred to the Ottoman government. The names of the Turkish cities in the Anatolia and Balkans I preferred to use the modern Turkish terms, İstanbul, İzmir, Edirne, İşkodra, Üsküp, Selanik, Kosova and Manastır. For the Turkish cities in the Mesopotamia and Asia I preferred to use like, Bagdat, Basra, and Havran. I used English forms for the cities and regions in Africa and Arabia, Tripoli, Cyrenaica, Mecca and Jeddah. The modern Turkish spelling for the Turkish statesmen are used such as "Mahmut Şevket Paşa" is preferred instead of "Mahmud Shevket Pasha". In this study, I used both Hicri and Rumi calendar versions of the dates, especially in the Ottoman archival documents. There is a list above appears to show the reader for identification of the place names in all Turkish territories.

### **Names used in Notes**

İstanbul	Constantinople
İzmir	Smyrna
Edirne	Adrianople
Kosova	Kosovo
Selanik	Salonica or Thessaloniki
Üsküp	Skopje
Yanya	Janina or Ioannina
Manastır	Monastır or Bitola
İşkodra	Scutari or Shkoder
Bagdat	Baghdad
Basra	Bussorah

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## INTRODUCTION

The first known contacts between the Turks and British occurred during the time of the Crusades. The British merchant Anthony Jenkinson was able to obtain a personal trading license from Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent who was at Aleppo in 1553, but neither Anthony nor the other British merchants had taken advantage of the privilege. In 1575 the two well-known British merchants Edward Osborne and Richard Staper were encouraged by some of the leading statesmen to send Joseph Clement and John Wright to İstanbul to investigate the conditions of commerce and explore the possibilities of trade. Joseph Clement stayed in İstanbul for about eighteen months, after which he returned to Britain, and then Osborne and Staper decided to send William Harborne to İstanbul as their representative.<sup>1</sup>

On 15 March 1579 Queen Elizabeth had sent a letter via Harborne to the Sultan, Murat III, with the purpose of obtaining trading rights and privileges for British merchants as for French and Venetian merchants. However, Britain could not immediately achieve the granting of a capitulation "ahidname", and the promises were given to her by the Sultan for the future. Moreover, the Ottoman authorities were informed by Harborne about Britain and Queen Elizabeth. He stated that the Queen was not pagan and she had struggled against the Catholic Church; as a result of this information she would have probably won the sympathy of the Turks. In early March 1579 the three British merchants, Harborne, Osborne and Staper obtained a unilateral concession from the Ottoman Empire for the right of free trade as for the French, Venetian, Polish and German merchants.<sup>2</sup>

This privilege, which was given to Harborne, was the first official document to be given to the British as it was important, and such an exit permit was granted to

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<sup>1</sup>Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türk-İngiliz Münasebetlerinin Başlangıcı ve Gelişmesi (1553-1610)*. (İstanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1952), pp. 10-11.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

the British merchants as reported by the government of the Ottoman Empire, the letter from Murat III addressed to Queen Elizabeth. The diplomatic relations between the two countries was established in this letter on 15 March 1579.<sup>3</sup>

Britain attempted to enter friendly relations with the Ottoman Empire for commercial reasons, as well as a fear of attack by Spain, which was one of the most powerful states at that time. Spain had been an enemy of Ottoman Sultan since the period of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent, due to political and religious reasons. Undoubtedly, the share of Mediterranean trade had a great effect on this hostility. A commission came to İstanbul on behalf of Spain, they were attempting to convince the Ottoman Empire to make peace. Before Spain established peace with the Ottoman Empire, Britain somehow needed to have political or economic relations with the Ottoman Empire, and thus the purpose of preventing the attacks on Britain by Spain may not be successful, but it was thought that relations with the Ottoman Empire were necessary, to result in lesser destruction of Britain.<sup>4</sup>

The Levant Company was established with the support of the Queen of England on 11 September 1581, and it continued trading in the Eastern Mediterranean until 1825.<sup>5</sup> Besides the economic dimension of relations between the two states, there was also a political dimension. Harborne was appointed as the Queen's first ambassador in İstanbul on 3 May 1583 and he continued to serve until 1588.<sup>6</sup> On the other hand, the first permanent ambassador of the Ottoman Empire, Yusuf

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., pp. 20-22.

<sup>4</sup> Ali Kemal Meram, *Belgelerle Türk- İngiliz İlişkiler Tarihi*. (İstanbul: Kitapçılık Ticaret Limited Şirketi, 1969), pp.16-17.

<sup>5</sup> Necmi Ülker, "XVII. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında İzmir'deki İngiliz Tüccarına Dair Ticari Problemlerle İlgili Belgeler." *Belgeler Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi* (TTK) XIV (1992), pp. 261-320.

<sup>6</sup> Nicolae Jorga, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi*. Trans. Nilüfer Epceli. Vol. 3. (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005). p. 219.



Agah Efendi was appointed to London to begin his service, which ran from 1793 to 1797.<sup>7</sup>

The capitulation, which was obtained by Britain, was renewed in time, and if necessary new articles were added. Although this capitulation was expanded by adding new rights in 1601, it was last revised and renewed in 1675 and thus it had been approved by the new Sultan.<sup>8</sup>

Britain's imperialist designs had become active in the territories of the Ottoman Empire after the invasion of Egypt by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1789. While the British Prime Minister, William Pitt, was attempting to persuade the British parliament of the progress of the Russians in the Mediterranean basin, which would do serious damage to British interests in a number of ways. When the British merchants were expelled from North America, they turned their interest to India and the Ottoman territories. The mails, bullion and troops were dispatched by the British, who should enter into friendly relations with the Turks, then trade from Alexandria to Suez, which was the shortest and fastest way to reach India, and also more useful for British interests, rather than all the way from the Cape of Good Hope (Ümit Burnu). It should be noted that Britain was weak in the Mediterranean, and she had no naval bases in the Strait of Gibraltar (Cebelitarık Boğazı) until the invasion of Malta by the British in 1800, and even then there was also no British base in the Levant, the eastern Mediterranean basin.<sup>9</sup>

During the Russo-Turkish war of 1787-1792, Austria declared to her decision to join Russia with the aim of breaking down the Ottoman Empire, and the British Prime Minister saw the danger of Russian landing in the Mediterranean. This was

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<sup>7</sup> Yalçinkaya Mehmet Alaaddin, "Mahmud Raif Efendi as the chief secretary of Yusuf Agah Efendi, the first permanent Ottoman-Turkish Ambassador to London." *Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi*, 1994, pp.386-387.

<sup>8</sup> Mübahat Küçüköğlu, *Osmanlı-İngiliz İktisadi Münasebetleri I, (1580-1838)*. (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1974), pp. 30-33.

<sup>9</sup> Philip P. Graves, *Briton ad Turk*. (London: Hutchinson, Co. Ltd, 1941), pp. 11-12.

why he attempted to issue an ultimatum to Russia demanding for the war to stop, but he gave up his wish after harsh criticism of the British government.<sup>10</sup> Britain had been trying to prevent Russia's expansionism in the Mediterranean basin since 1791. It could be said that Britain's attempts delayed the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, but were not able to stop the internal decay of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, from 1878, when Britain realized that her policy towards the Ottoman Empire would give no effective result, she decided to change this policy, which was inevitable to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>11</sup>

The geographical position of Egypt was very important for the British colonies in India. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire received assistance from Britain to force Napoleon Bonaparte to leave Egypt in 1801.<sup>12</sup> Afterwards, Britain's attempt to invade Egypt had led to the deterioration of relations between the two countries and, as well as Russia, incited the people in the Balkans to stand against the Ottoman Empire. The attitude of these two states caused the Ottoman Empire to become closer to France.<sup>13</sup>

When Russia invaded Wallachia (Eflak) and Moldavia (Boğdan) which were territories of the Ottoman Empire, she eventually declared a war against Russia in 1806. In this war, Britain was allied with Russia against the Ottoman Empire, who was forced to give passage of the Dardanelle in 1807 by Britain who attacked on İstanbul by her navy. The state of war between Britain and the Ottoman Empire had ended with a peace agreement, called "Kale-i Sultânî", signed in Dardanelles on 5 January 1809.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, 4. vol. 2. part, (İstanbul: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2011), p. 215.

<sup>11</sup> Fahir Armaoglu, *19. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarih, (1789-1914 )*. (İstanbul: Alkım Yayınevi, 2006), p.45.

<sup>12</sup> İsmail Hami Danişmend. *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, 4. vol, (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1972), p. 79.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>14</sup> Rıfat Uçoral, *Siyasi Tarih (1789-2001)*, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2006), pp. 97-102. ; Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, *Türk -İngiliz İlişkileri (1923-1926)*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1978), p. 18.

The Greek war of independence in Morea in 1821 was obviously supported by Russia, in addition to which a large fund drive was organised in London, and three million pounds sent to the Greeks, who felt they were supported and that they were not alone.<sup>15</sup> The Governor of Egypt, Mehmet Ali Paşa was appointed by the Sultan to suppress the revolts, and he successfully quelled the rebellion of Morea. Britain, on the other hand, formally recognized the newly established Greek government, and had entered into political relations with Greece throughout the rebellion.<sup>16</sup>

In spite of the apparent success in suppressing the rebellion, Britain, Russia and France participated in the independence of Greece and if necessary, the Ottoman Empire was imposed on that was adjudicated by the Great Powers in the treaty of London on 6 July 1827. However, the fulfilment of the treaty of London was refused by Sultan Mahmud II, and the allied navies destroyed fifty seven Ottoman and twenty Egyptian vessels at Navarino, and 8,000 soldiers and sailors were killed within three hours. After this incident Britain and her allies hoped that their demands would be accepted by the Ottoman Empire, but the Sultan again refused their requests. However, when Edirne fell into Russia's hands, and threatened İstanbul, an agreement was reached on 14 September 1829, after which the Russian troops evacuated Edirne, and the Ottoman Empire was forced to recognise the independence of Greece.<sup>17</sup> On 3 February 1830, Britain and her allies once again came together in London to officially finalise the complete independence of Greece.<sup>18</sup> Thus, Turkish-British relations were to be interrupted once more.

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<sup>15</sup> Ömer Turan, *The Role of Russia and England in the Rise of Greek Nationalism and in Greek Independence*, Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi (OTAM), No. 10, Ankara, 1999, pp. 278-279.

<sup>16</sup> Meram, *Belgelerle*, p. 71.

<sup>17</sup> Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 2 vols., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 29-32., Graves, *Briton*. pp. 13-14.

<sup>18</sup> Meram, *Belgelerle*, pp. 78.

Another very difficult issue for the Ottoman Empire was to consider the revolt of Mehmet Ali Pasha in Egypt. When he defeated the Ottoman army in Konya, it led him to think that he was stronger than the Ottoman Empire, and in fact Mehmet Ali Paşa's power had come to threaten İstanbul, the Ottoman capital. Under these circumstances, Sultan Mahmud II requested assistance from Britain, but he did not receive any positive response, after which he accepted the Russian offer of assistance. The Russian fleet was anchored in front of "Büyükdere" and thousands of Russian soldiers were stationed in İstanbul. Britain and France were anxious about this situation and they pressured both the Ottoman government and the Governor of Egypt to reach an agreement, called "the Treaty of Kütahya", on 14 May 1833. On the other hand, the treaty of "Hünkâr İskelesi" was signed between Russia and the Ottoman Empire on 8 July 1833. Britain and France showed a positive reaction to this agreement. Moreover, there was no peace between both parties in the strictest sense, thus the Ottoman Empire hoped to obtain British assistance by signing the Baltalimanı Convention on 16 August 1838, and it provided extensive commercial concessions for Britain. War broke out again between the Ottoman Empire and Mehmet Ali Paşa on 24 June 1839 at "Nizip", and resulted in a victory for Mehmet Ali Paşa, and thereupon, a treaty was signed on 15 July 1840 in London for the settlement of the issue of Egypt between Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia.<sup>19</sup>

France did not participate in this treaty, because France was in favor of Mehmet Ali Paşa. The coast of Syria was blockaded by the allied Ottoman, British and Austrian navies and the troops were landed in Lebanon. At the same time, the British navy came to the front of Alexandria to begin to threaten Egypt. While all these things occurred, France, who supported Mehmet Ali Paşa, did not actually take the risk of entering the war. As a result, Mehmet Ali Paşa signed the Alexandria

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<sup>19</sup> Uçoral, *Siyasi*. pp. 176-178.

Convention with the British Admiral Charles Napier on 27 November 1840.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, the Governor of Egypt descends from father to son, thus the title was given to Mehmet Ali Paşa, with the tax to be charged on Egypt at a yearly sum of 80,000 “akçe” (small silver coin) going to the Ottoman Empire.<sup>21</sup>

During the process of question in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire signed a treaty in 1833 with Russia to gain her assistance, but this treaty was beneficial for Russia because, according to this treaty, excepting Russia, Turkey closed the straits to warships from all countries at a time of war. Therefore, the London Straits Convention was signed with Ottoman Empire, Britain, Russia, Austria, France and Prussia on 13 July 1841.<sup>22</sup> By this treaty, the Straits would be closed to warships of all powers in peace time and all countries would comply with this decision. There was another issue that increased the relations between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, which was Russia’s declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire on 4 October 1853, and so Britain signed an alliance treaty with the Ottoman Empire against Russia. The purpose of Britain was to prevent the establishment of Russian control over the Ottoman Empire and to protect the British interest, Straits, Mediterranean basin and the trade routes of India. As a result, Russia lost the war, and the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire was secured after signing the Paris Peace Treaty on 30 March 1856.<sup>23</sup>

It can be seen that the relations between Britain and the Ottoman Empire mostly continued progress with Russia. The Britain’s traditional policy had continued during the revolts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria in 1875-1876. When Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire, which led to Russia

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<sup>20</sup> Harold Temperley, *England and the Near East: The Crimea* (London: Longman Green Co., Ltd., 1936), p.133., Önder Kocatürk. *Osmanlı İngiliz İlişkilerinin Dönüm Noktası (1911-1914), İlişkilerin Bozulması ve İlk Krizler*, 1. Cilt. (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 2011), pp. 16-17.

<sup>21</sup> Meram, *Belgelerle*, p. 108.

<sup>22</sup> Halil İnalcık and Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, *Tanzimat*, (Ankara: Phoneix Yayınları, 2006), p. 90.

<sup>23</sup> Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, *Türk-İngiliz İlişkileri (1919-1926)*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1978), pp.22-23.

declaring war, it resulted in the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877-1878. The Ottoman Empire was defeated on both the Caucasus and the Balkan front, thus they requested a stop to the war, and as a result the Treaty of San Stefano was signed with Russia on 31 January 1878. Britain had declared neutrality during the war, but the treaty was opposed by Britain, because her interests would be jeopardised in the Levant, by the terms of the treaty. Therefore, she persuaded Russia to agree to hold a conference in Berlin while she abandoned the policy of protecting the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and made a promise to assist the Ottoman Empire in the Berlin Congress of 1878, but in return Cyprus was given to her to use as a base. In addition, the British ambassador in İstanbul, Henry A. Layard gave a warning to Sultan Abdülhamid II: if the Sultan does not accept Britain's protection agreement, the Ottoman Empire would not be assisted by her in the Berlin Congress, and the ambassador even threatened to use military force to occupy the island. Furthermore, Britain would not communicate with Russia about attaching the Ottoman Empire, therefore İstanbul would fall into Russian control, and the result would be the collapse of the empire.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, she was forced to accept Britain's demands, and the Convention of Cyprus was signed between Britain and the Ottoman Empire on 4 June 1878. As a result, the island was forcibly and secretly obtained by Britain.<sup>25</sup>

Britain's Ottoman policy was shaped mostly by her interests, as well as another important factor in the shaping of the British policy – to influence British politicians' attitudes towards the Ottoman Empire. For example, William Ewart Gladstone was elected to Parliament in 1880 as Prime Minister and British policy had changed to a negative direction towards the Ottoman Empire since 1878, and this was more clearly revealed by him, who was strongly "Turcophobe". It could be said that Russia was a permanent enemy of the Ottoman Empire, but Britain was the worst

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<sup>24</sup> Ahmet C. Gazioğlu, *İngiliz İdaresinde Kıbrıs (1878-1960)*, (İstanbul: Ekim Basımevi, 1960), p.12.

<sup>25</sup> Ahmet C. Gazioğlu, *Enosis Çemberinde Türkler*, (İstanbul: CYREP yay, 1996), p. 25.

enemy of the Turks during the era of Abdülhamid II. Britain even did nothing when the Ottoman Empire lost Tunisia to France in 1881, but she also invaded Egypt in 1882. Thus, the traditional Turkish-British friendship was disappointed and became embroiled.<sup>26</sup>

Britain's attitude towards the Ottoman Empire led Abdülhamid II closer to Germany, and the German influence began to show its influence on the Empire since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Hence, Germany began to secure a large number of commercial concessions, especially her desire for the Bagdat Railway line to Basra, which had attracted the attention of Britain: because this line extended as far as Basra, it could harm British interests. Therefore, she had also entered the competition to gain some concessions from the Ottoman Empire for the construction of the railway and even offered to build a separate line through near the Bagdat Railway. Britain's reaction was gradually increased after the concession of the Bagdat Railway was officially granted to the Germans on 5 March 1903. Britain was the only one who had commercial interests in Bagdat, Basra, and in the regions of southern Iran until 1903.<sup>27</sup>

Since 1902, the influence of the Great Powers had played a great role in the events that occurred in Macedonia, especially Austria, Russia and Britain, and their purpose was to add the Ottoman Rumelia into their colonies. New financial reforms were proposed to the Ottoman Empire by the Great Powers in Macedonia, but Sultan Abdülhamid II refused to accept their proposal, because Ottoman financial progress was directly opened up to direct foreign participation. The Sultan was forced to cede authority over Macedonia's finances by forming the International Finance Commission by the Great Powers on 8 May 1905. However, he did not accept their intervention. After that the Great Powers sent an international fleet of five ships to capture Midilli Island and the customs offices at Limni. As a result, the

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<sup>26</sup> Graves, *Briton*, p. 31.

<sup>27</sup> Kocatürk, *Dönüm Noktası*, p. 32.

Sublime Porte agreed to begin reform after the withdrawal of the Great Powers from the islands of Midilli and Limni.<sup>28</sup>

Britain and Russia had been struggling over the Straits, however Iran, Afghanistan and Tibet had also been included in this struggle since the second half of the nineteenth century. Britain was concerned about the attention Russia gave to these regions, because when Russia landed to create colonial territory over the Iranian zone, it could have harmed British interest in these regions as well as India. The imperialist ambitions of Russia in Manchuria had caused the war with Japan that resulted in Russia's defeat. This defeat led Russia to bring back her traditional policy for the Balkans and the Straits. Moreover, Britain, which had colonies in the Ottoman Empire, ended the struggle with Russia by signing the treaty of 1907. In addition to this, the alliance between France and Russia was already signed in 1894, and the Triple Entente group of powers was completed with the entry of Britain, on the road to the First World War. In opposition to the Triple Entente, with the exception of the Ottoman Empire, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy had already formed the Triple Alliance in 1882.<sup>29</sup>

Although the Anglo-Russian treaty of 1907 was signed less than a year ago, King Edward VII of England and Tsar Nicholas II of Russia met at Reval in the Gulf of Finland on 9 June 1908. The main purpose of this meeting was to form an Anglo-Russian alliance against Germany, however this aim was hidden and the meeting reached an agreement concerning a programme of reforms for Macedonia.<sup>30</sup>

Furthermore, Britain and Russia had reached an agreement at the Reval meeting to partition the Ottoman Empire, and rumours began spreading amongst the Turks. This alarming probability led to the Young Turks taking precautions before the

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<sup>28</sup> Shaw, *Modern Turkey*, p. 211.

<sup>29</sup> Armaoğlu, *19. Yüzyıl*, pp. 57-59.

<sup>30</sup> Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türkiye ve Rusya: XVIII. Yüzyıl sonunda Kurtuluş Savaşına Kadar Türk-Rus İlişkileri (1798-1919)*. (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1970), p. 135.



partition of the Ottoman Empire. The second Constitutional period was declared on 23 July 1908, for preventing the partition of the Ottoman territories, and this ushered in a new era of relations between the Turks and the British. The Young Turks began to adopt a pro-British policy, instead of the pro-German policy of Abdul Hamid. After the proclamation of the Second Constitution, particularly in Macedonia people seemed in a festive mood, and screamed 'Liberty', but this festival of freedom did not last long. The Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria's declaration of independence, and the Crete problem, created a new crisis atmosphere.<sup>31</sup>

The proclamation of the Second Constitution had changed the Turkey's policies towards Britain, who was beginning to be seen as a savior for Turkey, however, the Young Turks were to find themselves disappointed by Britain's expectations. Moreover, the attitude of British policy-makers and diplomats in İstanbul led to the deterioration of Turkish relations with Britain, and Turkey reverted back to her previous foreign relations where the Germans were chosen as a closed partner.

By 1910, riots had begun in the European provinces of Turkey and uprisings had occurred in the process leading up to the Balkan wars; likewise the Arab Sheikhs revolted in Africa. To suppress these revolts, the Turkish troops were shipped to Yemen and Asir from Tripoli, thus the last Turkish territory in Africa remained vulnerable and began an occupation by the Italians, who joined the race to obtain colonies as a sign of being a superpower like Britain, Russia and Germany at that time. But Italy, who was unable to enter the interior of the country, even a mile in, thus spread the war to the Aegean Sea and the Dardanelles.

The Tripoli War was seen as a chance for the Balkan states to create a great state like Great Serbia, Great Bulgaria etc., thus they took action to establish the Balkan Union, which declared war on Turkey. This created a high degree of risk

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<sup>31</sup> Aram Andonyan, *Balkan Savaşı*, Translated by Zaven Biberyan, (İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 2002), pp. 161-167.

for the safety of İstanbul, thus Turkey was forced to abandon Tripoli into the hands of Italy. After the completion of the Balkan Union, they went to war with Turkey by firing the first shot from Montenegro. In the First Balkan War, Turkey lost all lands in Europe, excluding İstanbul, but during the establishment of the Balkan Union, the Balkan states did not decide how to divide the share of the territories taken from Turkey. Thus the Second Balkan War was started by the Balkan states, who declared war on Bulgaria, who had obtained more territory than the other Balkan states at the end of the First Balkan war. The Sublime Porte evaluated this situation to regain Edirne again. The other great powers, even including Britain, opposed the Turkish action. Edirne is very close to İstanbul and is an important defensive line for the security of the country, and even in 1913 the military coup of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (Raid on the Sublime Porte) brought them to power amid rumours of abandonment of Edirne to the Bulgarians.

The main sources of my thesis are the annual reports of the British Embassy in İstanbul and in the neighboring countries of Turkey, which are in many ways quite explicated and give more detailed information on the political, commercial, military and social issues affecting Turkey.

In these reports, the British interest on the Turkish territories and some of their competitors, such as Russia and Germany's status in these regions, are discussed in detail. Until 1870, the British ambassadors provided only commercial information, while, after this date, they began to give weight to the social and political status of countries. The British ambassadors stationed in foreign countries reported on many topics including underground and aboveground resources, and ranging from transportation to health. The British ambassadors' reports literally became intelligence reports, with the establishment of military Consulates in the Turkish provinces since 1879, and these reports were submitted to the British

Foreign Ministry in the form of "Confidential Prints".<sup>32</sup> The British annual reports on Turkey for the years 1910, 1911 and 1912 were prepared by Sir Gerard Augustus Lowther, who was born in London on 16 February 1858, and entered the diplomatic service in 1879. He served in many places, respectively Madrid, Paris, Vienna, Sofia, Bucharest, Tokyo, and Budapest, after which he became Secretary of Embassy at Washington from July 1899 to November 1901, and he was Minister for Chile.<sup>33</sup> On 30 July 1908, Lowther arrived in İstanbul as the new British ambassador, and was greeted by a large crowd at Sirkeci station, including the members of the Committee of Union and Progress (the CUP), who drew fiery speeches that geared friendship between Turkey and Britain. The new ambassador's horses were unharnessed and his carriage was drawn to the British Embassy building by shouting cheers of "Long Live England and Long Live the First Ambassador." Thus, initially, Lowther's appointment was seen as a great opportunity for a complete reversal of British policy towards Turkey.<sup>34</sup> Later on, however, his appointment was considered to be a big disappointment to future relations between Britain and Turkey,<sup>35</sup> because the relations between them was worsening with each passing day and although pressure was applied by some of the leaders of the Young Turks against his methods, he did not change his stance in order to gain prestige.<sup>36</sup>

Lowther was replaced by Sir Louis Mallet as British ambassador at İstanbul in the late 1913, and the Young Turks saw this new appointment as a friendly act by

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<sup>32</sup> Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Majestelerinin Konsolosları: İngiliz Belgeleriyle Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki İngiliz Konsoloslukları, 1580-1900*. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004), pp. 201-205.

<sup>33</sup> The New York Times, "Sir G. A. Lowther Dead", 6 April 1916.

<sup>34</sup> Geoffrey Miller, *Straits: British Policy Towards The Ottoman Empire and the Origins of the Dardanelles Campaign* (Hull, University of Hull Press, 1997), p. 30. Akdes Nimet Kurat. *Türkiye ve Rusya*, p. 144. ; Necmettin Alkan, *Mutlakiyetten Meşrutiyete II. Abdülhamid ve Jön Türkler*, (İstanbul: Selis Kitaplar Yayınevi, 2009), p. 278.

<sup>35</sup> Marian Kent, "Great Britain and the End of the Ottoman Empire 1900-23", Marian Kent (ed.), *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, (London, Frank Cass, 1996), p. 165-197.

<sup>36</sup> Graves, *Briton*, p. 104.

the British government. Soon after, however, Mallet became embarrassed by a misunderstanding by the Young Turks about his purposes as ambassador.<sup>37</sup> The other main source of this study is the annual report on Turkey for the year 1913, which was prepared on Mallet's request by Henry Hamond Dawson Beaumont, charge d'affaires in İstanbul. He was born on 4 February 1867 and entered the diplomatic service in 1892.

These annual reports were not regularly updated and were not written under the pressure of informing head office about new events, new registrations and so on. Therefore, these reports were more reliable and were written with a wide timeframe, after broad observations. They also include recommendations to the British Foreign Ministry regarding what policies should be taken on each section. They contain information with intelligence value. The political and economic relations of Turkey with her neighbors were also included in these reports. In my thesis, the annual reports of the British Embassy in the neighboring countries of Turkey were also used to support my ideas and form new conclusions.

On the other hand, in the same period, the Ottoman archives documents can be determined by examining the terms of the First World War, and should contribute greatly to a better understanding of the process. The reason I chose this four year period was that there were many uprisings in various regions of Turkey, and three wars had occurred in such a short period of time on the road to the First World War, which caused the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. And to understand the causes of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, it is necessary to get to the root of the situation before the outbreak of the First World War.

In preparing this thesis, I used documents from the British National Archives in London and from the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives in İstanbul, as well as the

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<sup>37</sup> Joseph Heller, "Sir Louis Mallet and the Ottoman Empire: The Road to War." *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.12, No. 1 (1976), pp. 3-44.

British historians Gooch and Temperley, who had edited a collection of official documents in "British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914". In addition, the findings have been supported by memories and secondary sources, which have been studied and evaluated. There is considerable literature on the relations between Britain and Turkey, but there are limited books contain information about the annual reports on Turkey. Feroz Ahmad's book "The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics: 1908-1914" is one of the sources which covers the period before the First World War, and has used the secondary and primary sources, and particularly the British Foreign Office materials, to illustrate a British point of view on Turkey. It, however, completely lacks the Ottoman Archival documents that is a caveat of his book. The other book is Joseph Heller's, "British Policy towards the Ottoman Empire 1908-1914", which has mostly made use of the British Public Record Office documents, but a complete lack of reference to the Ottoman archival materials has led to biased results to acquire a balanced picture of Turkey. Moreover, Geoffrey Miller's book "Straits, British policy towards the Ottoman Empire and the origins of the Dardanelles Campaign" is also another study consulting British annual reports, albeit it partially, while there again is a total lack of Ottoman Archival materials. Further authors use the annual reports in their books, such as Halil Ersin Avcı's "İngiliz Gizli Raporu Türkiye 1908" and Ali Satan's series of books "İngiliz Yıllık Raporlarında Türkiye", that cover the British annual reports for Turkey between 1920 to 1926, and all these reports were just translated into Turkish.

This thesis analyses the political, social, military and economic background of the road to Turkey's collapse before the First World War and this study is comprised of three chapters, beginning with this introduction, which also contains a short overview of the history of the relations between Turks with British throughout history until 1910.

The first chapter elaborates Turkey's relations with her neighbors and the Great Powers. The demands for reform and the revolt of the people in the European provinces of Turkey will be examined in the period prior to the commencement of the First Balkan War. On the other hand, after the declaration of war by Italy against Turkey, the Balkan states turned it into an opportunity to declare war on Turkey, and the impact of this on Turkey will be explained. Moreover, the two Arab Sheikhs who rebelled in Yemen and Asir, with conflicts and agreements between Turkey, will also be scrutinised, and insight into the political and social situation in these regions given. The Kurds living in the Southeast Anatolia region, and their relations and conflicts with the Armenians in this region will be elaborated on, as will the reforms made for the large population of Armenians living in Eastern Anatolia through intervention by the Great Powers, who attempted to create an autonomous Armenian state in the region. Britain and Russia had attempted to intervene in the frontier conflict between Iran and Turkey for many years, and the Great Powers' conflicts of interest will be described to identify their policy towards Iran and Turkey on this issue. Nazım Paşa, who was appointed as Governor of Bagdat in the provinces of Turkey in Mesopotamia, applied a policy against the interests of the British in this region, and the political situation in Basra, Kuwait and Mosul will be discussed in this last part of this chapter.

The second chapter of this thesis deals with the annual reports of the British Embassy in the neighboring countries of Turkey and will be useful for a better understanding of the relations between Turkey and her neighbouring countries the road to the First World War.

The third and final chapter presents the economic situation of Turkey in the process leading up to the First World War, and in parallel with this, the Turkish authorities had attempted to reorganise the Turkish Army and Navy by making some reforms. Furthermore, the railway concessions in the Turkish territories, especially the Bagdat Railway concession, which was the one of most important

issues for countries such as Britain and Germany, who were in conflict of interests among themselves to gain railway concessions, and this will be revealed in this chapter. On the other hand, Cholera and the Plague appeared in the Turkish territories, and some prevention measures were taken against these diseases; this will be investigated to provide further comprehension of the situation in the country before the First World War. Finally, the Press in Turkey and the prominent men of the Sublime Porte will be discussed according to the British annual reports on Turkey.

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **ACCORDING TO THE BRITISH ANNUAL REPORTS ON THE FOREIGN AND INTERNAL SITUATION IN TURKEY, 1910-1914**

#### **1.1 Turkey's Relations with Foreign States**

The general policy of the Sublime Porte had not taken a very decisive direction between 1910 and 1914. The British ambassador in İstanbul Sir Gerard Lowther pointed out that the Ottoman cabinet was weak throughout the year, and the government officials who represented the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was the political organisation of the Young Turks, which consisted of junior ranking military officers. It may be said that the Grand Vizier İbrahim Hakkı Paşa and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mehmet Rıfat Paşa, were under the control of the CUP. In the meantime the Minister of War wished to make the Turkish army strong again. The Turks believed that if the army was strong enough, it would be easy to solve all other matters. Gerard Lowther, the British ambassador in İstanbul, pointed out that Mahmut Şevket Paşa the Minister of War, who had not given much consideration to where the funding for the army came from, stayed in Germany for a long time for education, and worked part of the time for the Krupp Company, and he was disposed towards the Triple Alliance.<sup>38</sup>

The main aim of the policy of the Young Turks, who had adopted Turkish nationalism for a single purpose, was to ensure domination over other communities in the Ottoman Empire<sup>39</sup> and not lose any more territory, and they had no

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<sup>38</sup> Sir Gerard Augustus Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, 14 February 1911, Confidential, FO/881/9811. *Annual Report for Turkey for 1910*, pp. 5-6.

<sup>39</sup> François Georgeon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)*. (Ankara: Yurt Yayınevi, 1986), p.39.



expectations of regaining the lost territories in the near future. According to Lowther, the Young Turks were frightened of the Bulgarian intervention in Macedonia, and there were some policies the Young Turks implemented to overcome the dissatisfaction of the Christians in those regions. However, he commented that the Sublime Porte followed repressive policies towards Christians in those territories where Muslim families had settled from Bosnia. Moreover, there was an increase in sympathy towards the Young Turks in Turkey, whereas there was undoubtedly an increase in feelings of hostility in the CUP towards Britain, Russia and France, who housed so many Muslims. For this reason, relations with the Triple Alliance was more sincere than with the Triple Entente. The Young Turks claimed that Britain and France put economic issues into the political questions, such as loans, however Germany and Austria were more careful, and the Young Turks expressed a more conciliatory attitude towards these powers.<sup>40</sup>

According to Lowther, Turkey should have friendly relations with two groups, and she should also refuse to enter into alliances, in addition to which her political independence should be protected until the reorganisation of the Turkish army and navy had been completed. There were some policies considered by the Sublime Porte opposing the possible existence of Greater Bulgaria, such as "the disarmament of Christians, the destruction of bands, the gradual elimination of Patriarchists and Exarchists, and the Muslims immigration in Christian villages".<sup>41</sup>

The Ottoman cabinet hoped to be neutral towards all Great Powers, but the powers behind the Sublime Porte were in favour of Germany, who thus obtained a very valuable concession of a section of the Bagdat Railway. Lowther stated that the relations with Turkey, along with the new regime, went from bad to worse and

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<sup>40</sup> Lowther, *Annual* of 1910, p. 6.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6

the responsibility of Yemen and Asir revolts were placed on Britain, but the accusations fell flat.<sup>42</sup>

Moreover, Turkey almost entered into conflict with Montenegro during the Albanian revolt, and her suspicions were increased against both Austria and Italy. A further sign of strained relations with Italy at the beginning of the year had ended with the Tripoli War. At the beginning of the war Turkey recognised that she had no sincere ally, and Germany's declaration of neutrality on war caused great disappointment in Turkey. Lowther pointed out that it had already become quite clear that Tripoli and Crete had already been lost, thus Turkey should focus their energy on reorganising their internal affairs. However, this assumption could not be true.<sup>43</sup>

Lowther stated that in Turkey there were patriots who wanted to save the country, but he claimed that it was doubtful how successful they would be, because in the past Turkey had acted as a powerful Empire. Unsuccessful implementation of policies blinded them to the possibility of an alliance between the Balkan states against Turkey. Internal disputes and the failure of reforms, as demanded by the Great Powers, ended badly for Turkey, left alone in Europe and unsupported.<sup>44</sup>

To permit the achievement of the new regime required peace for twenty-five years, and all of their effort and attention had been directed to perfecting the army, and they did make a significant achievement in this regard. But they made very little economic progress, and they showed no greater tendency towards a parliamentary system. The new regime in Turkey, with regard to Abdülhamid II, had the spirit of a less liberal and the parliamentary, and its only concept was nationalism and military service.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Sir Gerard Augustus Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, 31 January 1912, Confidential, FO/881/10,000. *Annual Report on Turkey for 1911*, p. 6.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>45</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 9.

Turkey wanted an alliance with Germany, who was already allied with Italy in the war of 1912, and Italy was given freedom of movement in Tripoli by Britain and France. The present Grand Vizier and the Minister of War claimed that Britain and France were responsible for this war, and their one word would be adequate to stop the war. The Tripoli War did not cause much excitement in Turkey, but the revolt in Yemen and Syria by Arab Sheikhs caused much anxiety. Moreover, Turkey realised – but too late – the fact that she was on the eve of another war with the Balkan states, thus the government decided to make necessary peace with Italy on 18 October at Lausanne.<sup>46</sup>

Lowther indicated that Turkey could not recognise what's happening around her and the Bulgarians and Serbians came to an agreement against Turkey, whereas Turkey believed that the Serbians would restrain from joining with Bulgaria because of Serbia's fear of Austria, and Greece was not supposed to participate in that union.<sup>47</sup>

Furthermore, According to Lowther, before waging war against Turkey, the Balkan states had not made an agreement to divide the Turkish territories amongst themselves, thus causing wars amongst them, distracting them from Turkey, who took advantage of this turmoil to recover Edirne. The Great Powers were not very excited about the outbreak of the war between Turkey and the Balkan states, and Turkey was too late to make reforms for her subjects in European territories. When the war appeared imminent, the immediate impact of the reform was indeed small. Lowther highlighted that Montenegro was the first to declare war on Turkey and it was followed by the other Balkan states. However, Turkey was not prepared for the war and it was believed that this war was halted by the Great Powers, but even

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<sup>46</sup> Sir Gerard Augustus Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, 17 April 1913, Confidential, FO/881/10280. *Annual Report on Turkey for 1912*, p. 6.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

the great friends of Turkey, both Germany and Austria had also declared their neutrality during the war.<sup>48</sup>

Towards the end of the year the armistice agreement between Turkey and the Balkan states, except for Greece, was signed in London. Turkey's military power was not as great as before, but even the Great Powers never expected that she was badly defeated by the Balkan allies. The purpose of the European policy was to maintain as much as possible the territorial status quo in the Balkans.<sup>49</sup>

### **1.1.1 Britain**

The attitude of the new regime in Turkey towards Britain was not friendly in 1910, because some of the reforms in Turkey demanded by Britain, such as equal rights for all nations living in the Empire, political and individual liberty, and extension of mobilisation, were incompatible with the constitutional regime. Lowther stated that the new regime was not capable of doing these, so they were acting hostile towards Britain.<sup>50</sup>

According to Lowther, "the Jews hate Russia and its government" and at that time the friendly relations between Britain and Russia was instrumental for the formation of anti-British feeling in the committee's circle of influential Freemasons. Moreover, the Syrian Arabs, Bulgarians and Greeks had lost all hope about a real constitutional regime in Turkey, because an active chauvinistic policy of the CUP was implemented against them. The Young Turks were able to eliminate these problems in order to deal with the Balkan states, and neo-pan-Islamism would create cooperation between all the Muslim leaders, especially in the Caucasus, India and Egypt.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid., pp. 6-7.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>50</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p.7.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., pp. 4-5.

The Cretan question was not in favor of Turkey who did not expect it and as well as about the frontier issues between Turkey and Iran from 1910 to 1914. The British had participated in a protest against Turkey with Russia, because these two great powers supported and helped the revolution in Iran, as in Turkey. The awaking of Muslims in India, Iran, and Egypt had provoked distrust in Britain towards Islam, and there was no doubt that the new regime in Turkey wished to have a direct relationship with the Muslims in these areas, a direct act against Britain. Furthermore, Turkey could not take a loan from French because of the British abstention, and a loan was taken from Germany on less advantages terms.<sup>52</sup>

The policy of the Sublime Porte towards Britain was dictated by the CUP who had committed political crimes in all their activities. The loss of their sovereignty over Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in Eastern Rumelia, did not create the idea of danger to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>53</sup>

The appointment of the pro-British Nazım Paşa as Governor of Bagdat seemed to be a signal of a conciliatory policy towards Britain. However, he also acted as his successor Mithat Paşa in order to modernise the town, thus the British subjects' buildings were illegally being pulled down. The last section of the Bagdat Railway line concession was granted to Britain by the Minister for Foreign Affairs Rifat Paşa for changing British attitude towards Turkey.<sup>54</sup>

Turkey took very severe measures to suppress the Albanian revolts, therefore the British government did not stay silent like the other powers, and the Albanians who did not want to pay taxes and had compulsory military service. Lowther asserted that the new regime did not have any more capacity than Abdülhamid's regime to make internal reforms without the assistance of Europe.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>53</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 7.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

After the declaration of war by Italy, the internal problems and the Straits issue were raised by Russia. Meanwhile Germany's assistance of was expected by Turkey, as usual, who wanted help from Britain to stop the war, however, Britain had already declared her neutrality. Nonetheless the Turkish hopes for British assistance were still high. With Britain's declaration of neutrality, troops, arms and ammunition were not allowed to pass through Egypt, which was under the British mandate since 1882 and that created general disappointment towards Britain, but Germany and Austria allied with Italy and this did not provide any difficulties for them in Turkey.<sup>56</sup>

In 1912 the attitude of Britain towards Turkey had been deeply disappointing to the Turks, but due to her critical position in difficult times, she had to request British assistance. However, she did not realise that Britain had had a relationship with Russia since the Treaty of Berlin. She had a little hope the British would intervene against Italy in order to protect the balance of the Mediterranean. The insignia of the Imperial Ottoman Orders of Dynasty was sent to the British King by the Sultan for changing the attitude of the British to the Italian war. The Turkish ambassador Tevfik Paşa in London said that it was a special mark of the Sultan's esteem, and it may have a significant impact on Muslims in India, which would be of great benefit to Britain. However, Lowther claims that in terms of the Italian war, if Turkey had free passage for her troops through Egypt, she would quickly be victorious, but this did not reflect the reality. Nevertheless, the attitude of Muslim in India could take such a position against Britain, and that would be very dangerous for the British authorities, but it was the fact that the influence of the Caliphate was decreased.<sup>57</sup>

According to Henry Beaumont, who was charge d'affaires of the British Embassy in İstanbul, after the military coup in 1913 in Turkey, the Young Turks won a

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

temporary victory which was not permanent, and they were subjected to Germany in all aspects. In addition, the disappearance of Grand Vizier Kamil Paşa would result in reducing the impact of the British in Turkey, but none of these prophecies materialised. This was followed by the military coup by the Young Turks who began to keep a tight control than ever before. During the negotiations in London, the Turks desperately spent too much effort in retaining Edirne, as they had a desperate desire that it would remain in the hands of the Turks.<sup>58</sup>

Beaumont acknowledged that Kamil Paşa the Grand Vizier was over 80 and tried of struggling. Whereas Enver and Talat Paşas, and the vast majority of the members of the revolution were younger and more active than the leaders of the revolution, which disposed corrupt people in authority positions. Enver Paşa and other officers could not impose their demands on the Sublime Porte without violence, but they determined to proclaim their demands peacefully whenever possible. However, there was no doubt that they were prepared to shed blood in the event of any risk. The circumstances of the murder of Nazım Paşa was an accident because, no doubt, the first bullet was fired by the deputy of the Minister of War.<sup>59</sup>

Beaumont claimed that the Young Turks exhibited a hostile attitude towards Britain, however this had repeatedly been denied by them. The first appeal was made to the British government for the introduction of reforms in Eastern Anatolia, where the Armenians were heavily populated and the motive may have been revenge to some extent, with a hope to play Britain off against Russia.<sup>60</sup>

A monopoly company was granted a concession for the construction and repair of the Turkish warships for thirty years, and it was apparently a Turkish company,

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<sup>58</sup> Sir Henry Hamond Dawson Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey. 4 December 1914, Confidential, FO/881/10523., *Annual Report on Turkey for 1913*, p. 14.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

but it was completely under British control. The arsenal of the Golden Horn (Haliç) with three existing dry docks and all its contents were left to the company by giving a special concession for contracts. A floating harbor would be made on the Gulf of İzmit, for building and repairing the largest warships at that time, and the Sublime Porte provided a land granted, or expropriated, for a first class naval base. The board of directors of the company consisted of three out of seven, or four out of nine Turkish directors, and it must be formed as a Turkish company working under Turkish company law. The Advisory Committee would consist of four British directors who control all operations and decide on all purchases exceeding 1.000 liras in value. The technical staff of the company may not have more than one hundred British subjects and, after ten years, at least half the technical staff must be Turkish subjects. The docks must be equipped to enable the construction of a ship's hull, and machinery of all types and sizes at the end of twenty years. According to the contract, for the next thirty years, all orders for naval construction and machinery would be placed in Britain.<sup>61</sup>

Beaumont described that at the end of February, Hakkı Paşa the Grand Vizier arrived in London to obtain British approval on some issues: the increase of the Turkish Customs duties, the abolition of foreign post offices, and Capitulations, and the status of various semi or entirely independent Arab leaders bordering the Persian Gulf, and the navigation of the Shatt-el Arab, oil concessions in Mesopotamia, as well as the modification of the Bagdat Railway concession and the rights and conditions of extension of the İzmir-Aydın railway.<sup>62</sup>

Beaumont argued that the concession of the Tigris and Euphrates Navigation Company was formed by Lord Inchcape. The main purpose of Lord Inchcape's role was to protect British interests in Mesopotamia from the advent of the Bagdat

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.



Railway. If the terminus of the railway line was in Basra, the river transport could compete with the Bagdat line.<sup>63</sup>

Hakkı Paşa and Lord Inchcape reached an agreement for navigation concessions on 12 December. According to the agreements, the company was registered as Turkish and Lord Inchcape formed an exclusive rights of navigation for sixty years by steam, electric, or motor boats on the Tigris and on the Euphrates. It was freed from all taxes and Customs duties.

The chairman of the company and half the Board of Directors must be Turkish subjects, however, the president and vice-president of the Council of Administration must always be British subjects. The company's shares were to be divided equally between Turkish subjects and British subjects, and it would offer to transport soldiers and government officials at a 50 percent discount rate. In the event of disputes between the Sublime Porte and the concession holder, the issue would be referred to the Hague Tribunal.<sup>64</sup>

According to the collective agreement between the British and German governments, they did not oppose "the acquisition by the Bagdat Railway interests of 40 per cent of the share capital of the navigation company to be allotted to Turkish interests in the first allotment, and the right, in respect thereof, to subscribe for a rateable proportion of further issues of capital," giving the Bagdat Railway a 20 per cent participation in the whole share capital of the navigation company.<sup>65</sup> However, the British and German governments could not reach an agreement with certain other issues, such as there should not be any change that would affect British interests in the political status quo in the Persian Gulf, and not to discriminate against British commerce on the Bagdat Railway.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

The biggest challenges for the British that arose out of the negotiations was to secure the right for construction feeder lines to the Navigation Company, and arrangements for the building of the ports were at Basra and Bagdat, and the extension of the German railway beyond Bara to the Iranian Gulf. On the other hand, the British government was ready to waive all claims to control on the Bagdat-Basra section of the Bagdat line and she agreed to support no railway competition in direct rivalry with the Bagdat Railway Company's lines or existing rights.<sup>67</sup>

The oil concession in Mesopotamia caused a conflict of interest between the British groups like D'Arcy and German groups like Deutsche Bank. A concession for petroleum exploration was granted to Germany through the Anatolian Railway Company by Imperial Firman to work any mines which might lie in a zone of 20 kilometers on both side of the railway, by articles 22 of the concession of 1903, however, this concession was terminated by the Sultan and in 1906 negotiations begin with the British group D'Arcy for the oil fields in the provinces of Mosul and Bagdat.

Beaumont asserted that Britain only had the İzmir-Aydın Railway Company in Turkey. On the other hand, the Italians had begun to appear with their own railway line and port plans in Antalya. Thus there would be a risk of conflict of interest between these two companies in that region.<sup>68</sup>

The French and German governments had official relations with Turkey, and they were able to secure a concession for hundreds of miles of railways and some important ports, involving the expenditure of millions of pounds, and large orders for French and German companies. On the other hand, a river monopoly was officially supported by the British government with a capital of 400,000 liras, and half an oil syndicate. Turkish statesman felt that Britain was offering very little in

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<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

comparison with the benefits offered by France, Germany and even Italy, who poured millions of pounds into Turkey. While Germany had already spent about 11,000,000 liras in the Bagdad Railway, and French bondholders controlled 50,000,000 liras of the Sublime Porte securities, the share of Britain in the public debt amounted to less than 5,000,000 liras.<sup>69</sup>

### **1.1.2 Germany**

Lowther stated that Germany's relations with Turkey were based on the influence of German officers on the Turkish army, and pursuit of their commercial interests from selling munitions of war to Turkey as in Abdülhamid II's period.<sup>70</sup> The previous year, Germany was very careful to take the position of the unconstitutional attitude employed by the Sublime Porte, even German newspapers were not allowed to make unfavorable comments, nor did the German government not say anything about the attitude of the Turkish troops and officials who had been violent during the disarmament in Macedonia and Albania. According to Lowther, the Turkish Army was always pro-German, because the Turkish officials were trained in Germany, and a large number of German officers were serving in the Turkish army. However, the attitude of Germany profoundly impressed the Turks during the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>71</sup>

On the other hand, Lowther asserted that there was always an ingrained opinion in Turkey that "Germany is not suspect as regards Ottoman territories, and she neither occupies any Turkish province nor has she any ambition to do so is the general view entertained by Turkey".<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 8.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

Lowther added that Germany's aim was to expand her commercial interests in Turkey via the Bagdat Railway, and the two large warships had been sold at high prices to Turkey in order to withstand the Greek warship Georgios Averof. On the other hand, Germany provided loans for Turkey, who could not get them from Britain and France.<sup>73</sup>

Lowther described that the new regime in Turkey followed the same policy as Abdülhamid II towards Germany who, therefore, was more active than the other powers. Moreover, Germany continued with the same policies as before, was a supporter of the CUP, who itself was clearly in favour of Germany compared to the other powers. This pro-German sympathy led her to secure a very valuable concession for the construction of branch lines in Alexandria. Mahmut Şevket Paşa, the Minister of War, stated that this valuable railway was very important for Turkey, thus she could not take the risk of displeasing Germany by granting a railway concession to the Americans.<sup>74</sup>

The Grand Vizier Hakkı Paşa was also pro-German. However, the German-Russian Potsdam agreement led to disappointment in Turkey. Germany sacrificed her interests to Russia in both Turkey and Iran with this agreement. The German ambassador explained that the agreement was based on the construction and connection of railways in Iranian territory, and there could not be a negotiation on Mesopotamia without Turkey, who was surprised and disappointed by Germany's attitude towards Italy during the war, because she had believed that Germany would stop the Italian war and "for a time it was strongly expressed that Turkey had made a great blunder in having given Germany her friendship".<sup>75</sup>

Germany's chief points of commercial interest in Turkey were the concession of the Bagdat Railway, and selling munitions of war. Thus protecting their commercial

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>74</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 8.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

interests in Turkey through the Anatolian Railway Company was defended by Deutsche Bank. Lowther stated that Britain protected her commercial interest in order to compete with Germany through National Bank, which only looked at financial and not political advantages in Britain's favour. The defeat of the Turkish army would cause Germany to lose much prestige in Turkey because the German instructors had been employed with the Turkish army for many years. The French press presented that "Turkey had unquestionably told its tale in favour of Germany, whose press, in the blackest moment of disaster, was always sympathetic".<sup>76</sup>

Lowther observed that the commercial influence of Germany had been expanding with each passing day in Turkey. The imposing of the railway terminus at Haydarpaşa, the German shops, the electric lighting companies, the tramways, and the power stations, indicated the German influence in Turkey. Despite the failure of German military training during the Tripoli and Balkan wars, the German military presence was greater than in previous years. The main line that connects the Sea of Marmara with the Iranian Gulf would be entirely completed with German funding. Although undoubtedly the terms and conditions were most difficult for Turkey, the benefits derived were proportional with the sacrifices that were made for the future of the country, and provided its political influence on Turkey, in addition to which, the order for railway materials could also provide great financial efficiency for Germany.<sup>77</sup>

Lowther assumed that the chief purpose of the German government was to secure sufficient guarantees for the payment of interest on the capital needed for the completion of the Bagdat Railway, before accepting the Turkish demands for the 4 per cent customs duties increase. Germany's policy claimed that the Balkan states should undertake a share of the Turkish Debt, and Germany opposed any claim for compensation from Turkey at the International Finance Commission in

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<sup>76</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p.11.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., pp. 18-19.

Paris. Beaumont highlighted that this policy aimed to maintain the integrity of Turkey. The purpose of this policy was to reorganise the Turkish army, and German Emperor William II had an invariably friendly attitude towards the Turks; in addition the policy of German was provided by the Emperor, who saw himself as the champion of Islam. Moreover, Germany wanted a free trade zone over the Turkish territories, but Russia could never accept the supremacy of German policy in İstanbul. The conflict of interest of the Great Powers on the Turkish territories seemed to secure the continuation of Turkish rule. If the present government successfully reorganised the country without interruption in the direction of peaceful, these two powers should agree to the continuation of Turkish rule.<sup>78</sup>

### **1.1.3 Austria-Hungary**

Austria had had almost no political influence in Turkey during the previous year, and her aim related only to commercial interests.<sup>79</sup> Lowther indicated that the resentments in Turkey towards Austria, over the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, seemed to have completely disappeared, but Turkey still had some suspicion towards Austria, whose aim was to have designs on Albania. Austria issued a semi-official warning to Turkey regarding their actions towards rebellions in Albania, but Austria could not do anything more because in this question she must act along with Germany.<sup>80</sup> On the other hand, a warning was given to Italy by Austria to stand away from the Albanian coast, and Turkey was therefore grateful for this warning.<sup>81</sup>

Lowther considered that Austria made a verbal proposal to the Great Powers for the granting of autonomy to Turkish territories in Europe, as it apparently

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 9.

<sup>80</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 10.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

supported the idea of the decentralisation policy that was being envisioned in Turkey, but Austria's purpose was to have much more of an effect on the Roman Catholics in Albania. Although both Italy and Russia could not oppose the Austrian proposal, it fell to the ground, but resulted in the popularity of Austria increasing among the non-Turkish nationalities of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>82</sup>

According to Beaumont, the relations between Austria-Hungary and Turkey was subordinated by Germany, but it may be said that Austria was in favor of Turkey's integrity more than her ally. Austria's policy had completely changed by the time of the Balkan wars, and the division of Turkish territories in Europe, and Austria was satisfied of that fact for their territorial ambitions. However, Austria did not have a special sphere as compared with other powers in Asiatic Turkey.<sup>83</sup> It indicated that the Great Powers already decided to divide up the Turkish territories, because the British had dominated Egypt and southern Iran, while the Russians had occupied northern Iran. Russia had a special sphere towards the Straits, thus when any other powers attempted to change a status quo in the Straits, they needed to be prepared for war with Russia in the Mediterranean Sea. The chief purpose of Austria was to secure and develop their commercial interests in the territories through a friendship with Turkey. Beaumont claimed that Austria had nothing further to bargain with for commercial concessions, because she had already satisfied her territorial ambitions at the expense of the Empire through her annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the seizure of the island of Adakale.<sup>84</sup>

#### **1.1.4 France**

Stephen Pichon, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, emphasised that France showed her friendship towards Turkey through loans, in return for which

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<sup>82</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 9.

<sup>83</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, p. 21.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

concession was obtained in Turkish territories, and Frenchmen were employed in Turkey's public services. The French intervention in Crete had always been directed towards conciliation, and in the first half of 1910, France's relations with Turkey were undoubtedly good. The Soma-Bandırma railway concession was granted to France after a long negotiation, but in the meantime, the concession was much sought after because a line from Damascus to Bagdat was withdrawn in the early stages of the negotiations. Another issue was about the status of Algerians in Turkey, an issue that was the subject of controversy for six months between the French ambassador and the Sublime Porte.<sup>85</sup>

In 1911, Lowther stated that the Turkish Finance Minister could not get a loan from France under the influence of Britain, but Germany provided a loan for him. Therefore, French relations with Turkey were cooled. However, it would be wrong to say that this had a direct effect on French trade in general, because Turkey had ordered six small gunboats and seventy-two mountain guns from France.<sup>86</sup>

The concession for building of road throughout the Ottoman Empire was also given to France, however, Lowther claimed that Turkey would not be able to pay for these works out of the ordinary budget, and therefore a loan contract was made for 2,500,000 liras, to pay for a portion of these roads. In addition, France obtained the concession for the building of the Hudeyde-Sana'a line.<sup>87</sup>

The concession for extension of the Albanian line to North Anatolia was also granted to France with a provisional contract. The construction of the Samsun-Trabzon port with a provisional contract was awarded to a British group of companies, but France were not satisfied.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 10.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 9.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.



After the fall of Hakkı Paşa's cabinet in 1912, Lowther pointed out that France had not politically played any special role in Turkey in 1911. The new cabinet would be formed as pro-British, which could be a benefit for Russia and France. However, the French ambassador in İstanbul was very pessimistic, because Turkey would always return to favour Germany.<sup>89</sup>

Although France was, as usual, the principal lender to Turkey, there was not much of an impact in Turkey throughout the year. Some irritations occurred in France against Italy, after which Turkey hoped that Italy might be in favour of Turkey. Whereas France, as did the other great powers, recommended that Turkey make peace and withdraw from Tripoli and Cyrenaica.<sup>90</sup>

Lowther argued that France's attitude towards Syria was still suspicions in the minds of the Turks. She officially declared that Syria was considered as reserved for her sphere of influence. Moreover France's attitude towards Turkey was clearly unfriendly during the Balkan wars. Two years before the French Revolution had been taken as a model for the Young Turks, who saw France as an intimate friend, while France was now unreliable and skeptical.<sup>91</sup>

Lowther added that France had greater financial interests in Turkey than any other powers, because approximately 54 per cent of the whole Turkish funding debt was held in Paris. There were many French schools, hospitals and religious foundations in the Turkish regions, which were very important and more numerous than the other powers', such as, Russia, Austria, Germany and Britain. Beaumont pointed out that Turkey was greatly influenced by France in an economic but not political way. France was only entrusted with the task of gendarmerie administration under General Baumann, however Britain had much effect on the reorganisation of the Ministries of Naval, Finance, Interior and Justice, as well as

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid., pp. 9-10.

<sup>90</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 8.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

Custom House, but Germany had an effect only at the Ministry of War. Syria was a center of French influence on the Turkish territories, and she had a monopoly of railways, harbor works, gas, and tramway companies in that region, but she also created a new and a second zone for the new concession of the railway in the Black Sea region.<sup>92</sup>

In return for continued French financial support for Turkey, Beaumont pointed out that France was granted a railway concession for the line between the German sphere in Anatolia and the Iranian frontier. Moreover, the railway line was also extended to Syria, and for ports at Eregli, İnebolu, Jaffa and Tripoli. In addition, three conventions were signed on 18 December at İstanbul dealing with pecuniary claims, such as the privileges of religious, charitable, and scholastic institutions, as well as the French government provisionally agreeing to a customs duties increase.<sup>93</sup>

#### **1.1.5 Russia**

Monsieur Tcharykow, Russian ambassador in İstanbul, endeavored to establish friendly relations with Turkey, therefore he turned a blind eye to the unconstitutional methods that had been followed by the Young Turks.<sup>94</sup> There were a small number of Russian subjects in Turkey, and specific cases of violations of the Capitulations, in which Russia had not much interest to intervene. The Russian Embassy had frequently been forced to make statements to the Sublime Porte about the encroachment of the Turkish troops on Iranian territory, but these had always been made friendly and did not seem to have caused much inconvenience.

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<sup>92</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, p. 19.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 9.

The Russian ambassador Tcharykow had put more effort into obtaining the concessions of the Samsun-Sivas railway, but he was not successful.<sup>95</sup>

For the improvement in relations between Turkey and Bulgaria, King Ferdinand visited the Sultan in spring on the instigation of Russia. On the other hand, Tcharykow offered a scheme to Turkey to obtain free passage for Russian warships through the Straits, and it could not be expected that Turkey had more intimate relations with Russia. İstanbul was to be granted to Turkey by Russia, and maintained the status quo in the Balkans.<sup>96</sup> The text of this plan was kept secret, and in case of possible attacks on the Dardanelles by Italy, Russia persuaded the European Powers to take immediate action to prevent Italy from attacking. Turkey would never voluntarily surrender on the question of the Straits, but she appeared much alarmed at finding herself in a confrontation with Russia.<sup>97</sup>

Asım Bey, who was Minister for Foreign Affairs, nervously turned to Britain to know what support would be given to Turkey under the circumstances. However, Sazonoff, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, rejected whatever his ambassador Tcharykof claims, and he stated that the problem had not passed beyond the first stage of the conversation.<sup>98</sup>

Lowther showed that the Russian ambassador believed in the future of the CUP's rule, and had demonstrated a marked favour on their behalf without ostensibly gaining any corresponding success.<sup>99</sup>

Tcharykow desired to accomplish the opening of the Straits to the Russian warships, and the railway question was settled into the basin of Asia, in addition to which he insinuated that, with regard to the Straits, Britain and France should support Russia's demands. Another purpose of Tcharykow's role was to assist

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<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 10.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 11.

Turkey and the Balkan states in understanding each other, thus a desire to bring about closer relations between Turkey and Russia. Nonetheless this proposal was opposed by Austria, because she had ambitions in Macedonia and Selanik.<sup>100</sup>

Tcharykof was succeeded by the new Russian ambassador Michael de Giers, who followed the same policy as his predecessor towards Turkey, and did not even conceal that in terms of the Italian conflict, the policy of the Russian government was pro-Italian. On the other hand, the new Russian ambassador was very insistent, especially in the matter of the Turkish-Iranian boundary, and he successfully obtained the withdrawal of all Turkish detachments from the disputed districts. Another important question related to building railways in the Black Sea basin, and Turkey was deprived of giving any concessions in that direction by the agreement of 1903.<sup>101</sup>

According to Russia's proposal, Turkey should not have any railway works east of a line through Erzurum and Diyarbakır for fifteen years, nor before that time could Turkey complete her other railways to extend all the way to that line. In return Russia would tear up the 1903 agreement. The Sublime Porte found it very difficult to agree with and claimed that "we are invited on the one hand to improve the position of our subjects in Asia Minor but we are deprived of the means of doing so by not being allowed to build railways."<sup>102</sup>

Beaumont demonstrated that the relations between Russia and Turkey almost reached breaking point in the last year, because Turkey reoccupied Edirne from Bulgaria, who was in a difficult situation with the other Balkan states, and towards the end of the December, the German commander Liman von Sanders was

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<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., p.12.

appointed as commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> (İstanbul) Army Corps, that caused an increased feeling of anger in the Russian government.<sup>103</sup>

Edirne was ceded to Bulgaria by the Treaty of London on 30 March 1913, thus Russia threatened a financial boycott, because Turkey reneged on the agreement, but Russia did not find support from the Entente states in having more of an effect in Turkey, and the Russian government was not ready to act without the support of the other powers. After a long hesitation, Russia came to agree with an accomplished fact of recapturing Edirne. On the other hand, the Russian government was concerned about the appointment of a German officer because his influence on the Straits may mean they are closed in any event of war with Germany, and therefore this event would greatly impact on Russian Black Sea trade. The Russian government claimed that if a state of siege were declared at İstanbul, Liman von Sanders would be the highest ranking officer in the Turkish army in the city of İstanbul. In response, the Grand Vizier pointed out that, in such a case, the command of the İstanbul troops would be undertaken by the military governor, and the decision on the closing of the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus must be assumed by the Cabinet of Turkey.<sup>104</sup>

Beaumont defended that Russia had played a leading role in pressing for the reform of Armenians in Eastern Anatolia. However, the Sublime Porte was extremely concerned about the impact of Russia on these regions, which were the frontier between Turkey and Russia. The Sublime Porte requested Britain's assistance against Russia in introducing reforms in the seven provinces in Eastern Anatolia, but Russia could not permit opportunities to pass to other great powers, because these regions were regarded as her own special sphere. This fear of Russia lead to Turkey becoming closer to Germany and also getting her support.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, p. 20.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

### 1.1.6 Italy

The Italian ambassador, Baron Mayor des Planches, who was Jewish and a freemason, arrived in İstanbul early in the spring, and he was well-intentioned towards the Young Turks and the CUP. Although he announced that there was no reason to show a special friendly attitude towards the new regime in Turkey, the Italian ambitions in Tripoli caused them to be viewed with suspicion. There was no evidence that indicated Italy was a partner in the Triple Alliance, and stood away from being close to two groups of Powers.<sup>106</sup>

According to Lowther, the Sublime Porte declared that Italy's wish was to be given all the concessions in Tripoli, but Turkey continued to fight against Italy. Moreover, an appeal was made to the British government for their opinion as to other great powers who must withdraw in favour of Italy in Tripoli, and the invasion of Italy must be stopped by these powers.<sup>107</sup>

On 18 April, the most striking incident was the attack by Italy on the Dardanelles, thus the Sublime Porte decided to lay mines closing the Straits. As a consequence, it dealt a major blow to international shipping, but Turkey had the right to close to protect herself and, on the other hand, the Italian attack cannot be acceptable on an important point for international trade.<sup>108</sup>

There were a few hundred men and some officers in Tripoli to battle against Italy, and it was very difficult to send aid to the battlefield, because of the distance from the mainland, and as also because the Great Powers declared their neutrality throughout the war. Moreover, a peace treaty was signed between Turkey and Italy at Ouchy on 18 October, 1912. Turkey assumed to withdraw their men and

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<sup>106</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, pp. 10-11.

<sup>107</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 11.

<sup>108</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 10.

officers from North Africa, and Italy undertook to evacuate the occupied islands when this condition was fulfilled.<sup>109</sup>

Beaumont alleged that Italy was more effective in Turkey compared with the previous year, and she was considered to be one of the Great Powers by the Sublime Porte until the Italian occupation of Tripoli, and many of the Turkish islands in the Aegean would have to place Italy in a different position.<sup>110</sup>

It can be said that the ambition for the imperialist expansion of Italy was a greater threat to the integrity of the Turkish territory. Beaumont also believed that although Italy stated that they did not have territorial ambition on the Turkish territories, she was ready to be prepared for every situation. The purpose was to obtain colonial territories, just as France did in Syria, Russia in Eastern Anatolia, Germany in İstanbul, Alexandretta and Anatolia, Britain in the Iranian Gulf, and France and Britain in İzmir. Italy was ready to make considerable financial sacrifices to further their imperialist ambitions.<sup>111</sup>

Concessions for a railway and harbour had been sought at Antalya and Marmaris because of the lucrative profit margin, and the concession was given without kilometric guarantees for works, which the Sublime Porte had no special interests in seeing carried out, and, therefore to continue the works would have been possible only with the aid of a subvention from the Italian government.<sup>112</sup> Furthermore, there was no hurry to end the dispute with Italy until Turkey became powerful at sea like the great powers, and regained her lost territories.

Beaumont explained that a huge embassy house was built by the Italian government in an obvious site, facing the Bosphorus, at a cost of two hundred thousand liras. Ten thousand liras had already been paid for the site alone, which

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, p. 21.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

was an indication of the wish to secure Italian interests in Turkish territories, because this construction was more ostentatious than the German embassy house, it was larger than the British Embassy, and it was more magnificent than the Russian Embassy. Italy attempted to make herself an imperialist power like the other great powers. Unfortunately, all these attempts by Italy did not meet with much success, and she remained unpopular in Turkey. Therefore Italy had confronted more than the usual difficulties and opposition for their prospecting missions in the neighborhood of Antalya.<sup>113</sup>

#### **1.1.7 Bulgaria**

After the Second Constitutional period, the Turkish authorities decided that, in order to ensure order in Macedonia, Lowther established that they needed a purposeful policy of decentralisation by disarming the Macedonian Christian population, and this had caused dissatisfaction among Macedonians towards the Sublime Porte, who had employed violent and brutal methods to implement their authority there.<sup>114</sup>

There was an improvement in relations between Turkey and Bulgaria previous year, and Monsieur Gueshoff, the Bulgarian Diplomatic Agent at İstanbul, declared a friendly policy towards Turkey. Bulgaria had realised that "if Bulgaria had allowed the moment to slip by when she could have attacked Turkey with some hope of success that opportunity is not likely to recur in the future." There were many events taking place, by the Selanik committee and in the Macedonian frontier, and there were casualties on both sides.<sup>115</sup>

Beaumont evaluated that after the Second Balkan War, reconciliation happened too quickly with Bulgaria as compared to the other Balkan states. The chief aim

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid., pp. 21-22.

<sup>114</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 6.

<sup>115</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 12.



was to regain Edirne from Bulgaria, and the city only remained in the hands of the Bulgarians for another four months. Bulgaria had a vain hope for involvement of the European powers to secure respect for the Treaty of London, because the city ceded to Bulgaria in this treaty. In October, Bulgaria was forced to make an agreement with Turkey, at the sacrifice of much of the territories which were conquered by her during the First Balkan War. However, she abandoned Edirne and only retained Dedeagac and Lagos.<sup>116</sup>

Beaumont analysed that racial and religious hostilities between Turkey and Bulgaria were not so easy to remove. A decisive factor in the situation was the attitude of the Romanian government who, apart from their desire for the permanent maintenance of the Treaty of Bucharest, was strongly interested in seeing that the reconciliation between Bulgaria and Turkey did not turn into a formal alliance.<sup>117</sup>

#### **1.1.8 Greece**

Throughout the year, the Sublime Porte was especially active with regards to Greece, and was driving out the Greeks living in Turkey as much as possible. Lowther claimed that the Greeks of Turkey had an irritating attitude towards the Sublime Porte, and constantly mentioned their national rights, which incensed the Turks. The Cretan problem seemed to be an excuse for Turkish action against the Greeks of Turkey.<sup>118</sup> On the other hand, Turkey had organised a successful boycott of Greek vessels, merchandise, merchants, shop keepers etc., and this had some impact on foreigners who were either bearing Greek names or had associations with Greek partners.<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, p. 22.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 6.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid., pp. 6-7.

There was an improvement in relations between these two countries thanks to the tactful attitude of Eleftherios Venizelos, Prime Minister of Greece, and Gryparis, the Greek ambassador in İstanbul. With regard to the question of Crete, there were some incidents being initiated by chauvinistic Greeks to negatively affect the relations between the two countries, but the Greek politicians had been very careful in this question and they preserved the sovereignty of the Sultan over the island. The boycott of Greece continued until the autumn and, as a result of the withdrawal of Italian shipping, the Greek vessels became a necessity and the boycott ended. Greece feared that the Italian attack on Tripoli exasperated Turkey, who would thus take revenge by attacking Greece, but this did not occur. Gryparis stated that the appointment of a Turkish Minister to Athens would create new hope for improving relations between Turkey and Greece, by maintaining the status quo in Crete.<sup>120</sup>

After the war, relations soured and the most pressing issue was that of sovereignty over the islands of Chios and Mytilene. According to Beaumont, Turkey believed that this issue was resolved in her favor. The biggest challenge for the Greek government is it wanted to return to the previous status quo in 1897, and maintain the capitulation rights of Greek subjects in Turkey, but these demands was refused by the Sublime Porte.<sup>121</sup> It was declared that all treaties, agreements and protocols with Greece would be annulled by Turkey because of the war.<sup>122</sup>

### **1.1.9 Montenegro**

Montenegro's relations with Turkey were friendly, but Lowther urged that the Montenegrin government had complained that Turkey would not carry out her engagements regarding the rectification of the frontier, which had never been

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<sup>120</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 13.

<sup>121</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, p. 22.

<sup>122</sup> BOA. MV, 170/75, Date: 16/Za/1330 (27 October 1912).

submitted to the Ottoman cabinet.<sup>123</sup> On the other hand, Turkey requested the disarmament of Malisors, and she complained that the Malisor insurgents were taking in refugees in Montenegro and being assisted by the Montenegrin officers. Montenegro applied to the Great Powers for the status quo of the frontier, where the Turkish troops had been placed, and which was protested by the Montenegrin government. The Russian ambassador asked the Sublime Porte to announce that she had no hostile intentions against Montenegro.<sup>124</sup>

Turkey's relations with Montenegro were strained because the Albanians were encouraged to revolt against the Turkish authorities and, it was felt, against Russia too.<sup>125</sup> There was no relations between Turkey and Montenegro like Serbia following the loss of Albania. The Sublime Porte made neither a separate peace treaty with Montenegro, nor renewed diplomatic relations.<sup>126</sup>

#### **1.1.10 Serbia**

The British ambassador Lowther reported that Turkey seemed to be on good terms with Serbia, and undoubtedly the visit from the King of Serbia to İstanbul was successful in terms of relationships. Serbia's most important desire was to have free passage of import, export and ammunition through the Turkish territories.<sup>127</sup>

The relations between Turkey and Serbia were ceased and lost their previous importance. When compared with the other Balkan states, Serbia had less Muslim and Turkish subjects, and there were almost no Serbian subjects under the control of the Sublime Porte. A definitive Treaty of Peace agreement between the Serbian and Ottoman governments was postponed until the end of the year, and there was

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<sup>123</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 13.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 9.

<sup>126</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, p. 23.

<sup>127</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 7.

not much progress in agreement in the hands of M. Pavlovich, who was the uncompromising Serbian representative.<sup>128</sup>

#### **1.1.11 Romania**

Relations with Romania were friendly, and in any conflict that may arise between Bulgaria and Turkey, Romania would mobilise her troops to the Bulgarian frontier. Lowther asserted that an unexpected visit by the Grand Vizier to Romania would create good relations with the King, so he would be in favour of Turkey, but Lowther received information from Rifat Paşa that no such agreement between these two countries had been signed, and the negotiations were only for economic interests.<sup>129</sup>

The British ambassador Beaumont discussed that Romania's role was to keep the balance in the Balkans, and she aimed to maintain the status quo created by the Treaty of Bucharest. The main interest of Romania was to continue her growing trade, especially in İstanbul, which may threaten the free passage of the Straits with an attack. Thus, the demand made by Romania was that Turkey should be strong enough against any attacks by the Bulgarians. Before the Balkan wars, Turkey had attempted to persuade Romania to menace Bulgaria by mobilising. However, she was unable to persuade Romania because she had nothing to offer in return, and they were too late for this mission. There was no doubt that Romania had a natural reluctance to unite its forces with a Muslim country. Therefore, by staying neutral, Romania hoped to benefit from having direct negotiations with Bulgaria, which she succeeded in doing.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 7.

<sup>130</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, p. 23.

### 1.1.12 United States

In İstanbul, the British ambassador Lowther noted that Mr. Straus, a strong Zionist, was appointed as American ambassador in İstanbul, and he had great support in his relations with the Sublime Porte from the Jews of Selanik. America also had an important scheme for building railways, much like other great powers, which was known as the "the Chester Scheme" and was claimed to be able to cover 2,000 kilometers of railways in Anatolia. The estimated cost of this scheme was about 20,000,000 liras, and it was accompanied by cession for mining rights in the territory twenty miles either side of the railway line.<sup>131</sup> This scheme was dangerous for German interests in the Bagdat Railway, therefore it was protested by the German ambassador and Mahmut Şevket Paşa, the Minister of War, who was in favour of Germany. It should be pointed out that Mahmut Şevket Paşa claimed that "no matter how great the scheme, the granting of it to America would not compensate Turkey for the loss of German friendship and support which this would entail".<sup>132</sup>

According to Lowther, the Grand Vizier always opposed this scheme because of his pro-German sympathies, and Germany's influence undeniably made itself felt in Turkey. Lowther believed that America might proclaim her rights, and once gained, appeal to take measures that might be very inconvenient, and in the case of the other great powers a feeling existed that any aggressive action might be checked by their rivals, so in the case of America, Turkey might be left to face her alone.<sup>133</sup>

The Chester scheme was discussed in the Turkish Parliament in the autumn, but discussion at the opening of the next parliament was shelved. Lowther emphasized that the combination of the Minister of Public Work and the German Embassy were

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<sup>131</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 11.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 12.

adequate to relegate this scheme, which presumably would not reappear. The American ambassador was active in trying to persuade the Sublime Porte to have an influence on the long-established privileges of the American educational and missionary establishments in Turkey.<sup>134</sup>

### **1.1.13 Iran**

The frontier problems between Turkey and Iran were removed by the declaration annexed to the Anglo-Turkish Agreement on 29 July 1913. The British charge d'affaires Beaumont remarked that the southern frontier between Iran and Turkey was defined by the protocol was signed on 17 November at İstanbul under the patronages of Britain and Russia. The purpose of the mediation was to control the Turkish territories in these zones, because if there was a disagreement on any particular point between the Turkish and Iranian delegates, the matter must be referred for mediation to the British and Russian representatives.<sup>135</sup> The decision of these commissioners must be binding for Turkey and Iran.

## **1.2 Demands, Uprisings and Wars in European Turkey**

Turkey was in a less satisfactory position towards the end of 1909 and her Ottoman subjects were confronted with enormous problems that they could not solve so these problems caused disappointment among them, because they tended to have high expectations of the benefits of the constitution of 1908. Lowther specified that the Ottoman subjects started to criticise any actions by Turkey's new regime even though it brought a number of good changes, and removed some negatives impacts. However, this disappointment continued among the ottoman subjects, because the new regime had not yet fulfilled the expectations of the

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<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, pp. 23-24.

people, and they believed that they may be put into prison if they criticised the new regime, and the martial law still existed alongside the parliamentary government. It might not be realistic to mention the constitution along with martial law.<sup>136</sup>

Furthermore, the festive mood, along with the proclamation of the constitution in 1908, did not last long among the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, who desired freedom and prosperity, however, they could not get the reforms they wanted from the new regime and they found themselves launching rebellions and wars against Turkey, who subjected them to intimidation, violence and oppressive policies of the CUP.

### **1.2.1 Albania**

The Albanians were divided into two great groups, the Glegs and Tosks, who had three religions: Islam, Orthodox Christianity, and Catholicism. The majority of the population was composed of the Glegs, who had a very strong tribal structure and lived in the mountains, hence they were very conservative and had very little communication with the outside world. On the contrary, the Tosks lived in the south and had more opportunity for contact with other people, and most of them were peasants mostly working on the large estates of Albanian landowners.<sup>137</sup> Northern Albania consisted of clans and tribes, given the designation of Malisors, who were divided into the five tribes of Klementi, Hoti, Kastrati, Gruda, and Skreli. In the east, the other tribes were called Shalla, Shoshi and Summa, and were under the confederation of the Mirdites. Most of the Malisors and Midrites were Roman Catholics.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>136</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 2.

<sup>137</sup> Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920* (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1977), p. 222.

<sup>138</sup> Wadham Peacock, *Albania, the Foundling State of Europe* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1914), p. 200.

According to Lowther, at the beginning of 1910 there was no confusion in northern and eastern Albania, because the Sublime Porte had pledged reform. For example, the Albanian language would be used with Latin or Arabic characters in schools, but the government wished for a selection of Arabic characters, therefore Muslims were supported in that respect. As a result, the new government of Ottoman Empire had succeeded in uniting the Muslim and Christian subjects in a revolt against Turkey. Meanwhile, Governor Mazhar Bey presented a scheme to the Sublime Porte to restore order in the region, which included the following features: compulsory military service, census, the pursuit of bandits and outlaws, the weakening by every means of the feudal beys, and the collection of arrears and taxes by the civil authorities.<sup>139</sup>

Lowther maintained that some of the villagers living in this region were displeased with the government, and they complained that there was no building of roads or opening of schools by the government. On the other hand, attempts by the villagers were more active, especially in Pristina, due to the increase in taxes, and they were resistant to conscription. The general uprising was seen as the only hope for achieving their goals. However, the uprising began at the start of April at Pristina and Ipek where peasants did not wanted to pay taxes to the government. These events did not seem too serious, and the government was able to persuade villagers to stop the rebellion. The ignorant peasants were provoked by the Austrian emissaries and the work of agitators.<sup>140</sup>

The British ambassador Lowther demonstrated that Şevket Turgut Paşa was sent with numerous troops to quell the insurgency in the region. Furthermore, new journals were to be suppressed and printing presses were confiscated, in addition

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<sup>139</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 27.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid., p. 28.



to which schools were closed at Ellassona, Koritra, and Elbassan, and the Latin alphabet was forbidden after successful campaign.<sup>141</sup>

Telegrams were sent from the 7<sup>th</sup> Army Corps, 2<sup>nd</sup> Army inspector in Manastir, and from the Governor of İşkodra and the Army Corps, about the rebellion which took place in Albania. The 7<sup>th</sup> Army Corps must take all necessary precautions and the Army regiment and division must be dispatched urgently to the Kosova province, and, further, what measures should be taken by the Ministry of War.<sup>142</sup>

Lowther illustrated that the hope of the rebels was to fulfill the government's reform promises, but their expectations were disappointed by the policy of the new government, and there many of the chiefs in both Muslim and Christian subjects went to the mountains or across the border and took refuge in Montenegro. The government declared martial law and marched on the region.<sup>143</sup>

Northern Albania was quiet at the beginning of October 1910, and the inhabitants of the region agreed to pay taxes, conscription, and renounce brigandage. In return, the government had promised to build roads, and to open schools etc. but all these promises were forgotten and there was hostility towards the peasants.<sup>144</sup>

Moreover, Lowther informed that there were between one thousand and two thousand Albanians who fled into the mountainous region to against Turkish authorities. The Roman Catholic Malisors of İşkodra had sought refuge in Montenegro, and a notice was declared towards the end of October, which included complaints against the government as follows: the arbitrary collection of the sheep-tax, irregularities in recruiting men up to the ages of 27 and 30, the appointment of Muslim officials in purely Christian mountain districts, and the overbearing

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<sup>141</sup> Ibid.

<sup>142</sup> BOA. MV, 166/85, Date: 26/Ce/1328 (5 June 1910).

<sup>143</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 28.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid.

attitude of Turkish officers and authorities towards people in these districts. The Sublime Porte response to this was that they should return home within 10 days, and the names and nationalities of the people who instigated the revolt were revealed by the Sublime Porte. As a result, the rebel requests for assistance could not be made by the Montenegrin government due to Austrian warnings. Thus, based on the promises of the Sublime Porte, the insurgents were persuaded to return home, for instance to reduce the cattle-tax, period of military service, to appoint non-Muslim officials in the Roman Catholic districts, and reopening the closed schools, and consequently the new policy of leniency was further manifested by the reopening of schools in Koritra, Elbassan, and some eighteen other locations.<sup>145</sup>

However, Lowther claimed that the Albanians still distrusted the Ottoman government, and the mountain refugees had suggested some conditions for their return at the beginning of December. Their requests were for a general amnesty for both Muslims and Christians, freedom to use their own language in schools, and the reopening of schools. In addition, all government officials must be Albanians, and ordinary, agricultural and commercial schools should be opened in the Albanian tongue, while the collection of taxes should be spent on the construction of roads and railways in Albania, with the government founding agricultural banks in that province.<sup>146</sup>

Lowther discussed that the Sublime Porte continued the new conciliatory policy and declared a general amnesty for political prisoners, and the inspection committee was sent through the country. Within a short time a number of schools were reopened and they were allowed to use the Latin alphabet, which was chosen for almost all the schools.<sup>147</sup> At the end of the year, the government's misguided

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., pp. 28-29.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., p. 29. ; Macfie, A.L, *The End of the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1923* (London: Longman, 1998), p. 65.

policies led to the Albanians uniting and acting together. Despite this breakthrough made by the government, there were still doubts about her.<sup>148</sup>

There were feelings of displeasure in the provinces of Albania, so the government decided to journey to those areas on behalf of the Sultan, which would not only have a positive effect on the state of affairs in Albania, but would also postpone and control the internal dissensions in the CUP, whose internal struggles became more evident towards the end of the February 1911, when it was clear that the more radical sections of the CUP appeared to be losing more ground both internally and abroad. As a result of this, Lowther pointed out that Talat Bey, the Interior Minister, resigned from his position because he was responsible for the policy of "Turkification", which was not achieved in Albania, Macedonia, Arabia, and Syria.<sup>149</sup>

The intelligence information indicated that the rebellious activities would be active again during the spring of 1911 in the provinces of Selanik, Manastir and Kosova, and therefore the Turkish Gendarmerie Organisation must be necessarily completed before spring in the above-mentioned provinces, and new soldiers were needed as quickly as possible, sending for the completion of the battalion.<sup>150</sup>

In 1911, Lowther explained that the Albanian question was becoming even more aggravating and the situation was worse than in the previous year. Turgut Şevket Paşa was sent to İşkodra with ten battalions to stop the Malisor tribe's uprising, which was developed in March, but his forces were not able to put down the rebellion. On the other hand, the Mirdite tribe joined with the Malisors tribe's uprising, which was still active in June, and the government had been given friendly warnings by Russia and Austria to encourage it to have a more conciliatory attitude

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<sup>148</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 29.

<sup>149</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 2.

<sup>150</sup> BOA. MV, 149/35, Date: 28/S/1329 (28 February 1911).

towards these two tribes.<sup>151</sup> After the failure of the counter rebellion in Albania, Mahmut Şevket Paşa went to the region to harshly suppress the uprising.<sup>152</sup> As a result of this successful campaign, the leader of the rebellion, İsa Boletin, and his friends sought refuge in Montenegro and the revolt failed to spread throughout Kosova.

On the 26 June it was announced that the armed Malisors were given 10 days, to be extended to 15 days, for their surrender along with their weapons, and the authorities decided to extend this a further 20 days, and this mission was given to Şevket Turgut Paşa from the Sublime Porte.<sup>153</sup> Lowther presented that the tribes claimed that all promises given to them by the Sublime Porte must be guaranteed by the Great Powers, after which negotiations were carried out between the Sublime Porte, the rebels and the King of Montenegro. In addition, the Sublime Porte made several offers, but these were ambiguous concessions. However, the refugees in Montenegro declared that if the offers would not be guaranteed by the Great Powers, they would not be obliged to accept.<sup>154</sup>

The King of Montenegro had maintained that it was difficult to recommend that the refugees return home on the Turkish promises, except their achievement was guaranteed by the Great Powers. At that time the King commanded that the refugees to leave the country. However, the Montenegrin government continued to keep refugees, which would cause an economic impact affected by Russia, who may refuse to supply pending the crisis, and who usually supported Montenegro. Apparently the Great Powers did not seem to provide a guarantee, so King Nicholas of Montenegro probably decided to satisfy himself with what prestige he had obtained as a mediator. Some privileges were guaranteed to the Malisors thanks

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<sup>151</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 31.

<sup>152</sup> Avlonyalı Süreyya Bey, *Osmanlı Sonrası Arnavutluk (1912-1920)*, (İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2009), p. 99. ; Bilgin Çelik, *İttihatçılar ve Arnavutlar II. Mesrutiyet Donemi Arnavut Ulusculuğu ve Arnavutluk Sorunu*, (İstanbul: Büke Kitapları, 2004), pp. 371-376.

<sup>153</sup> BOA. MV, 154/62, Date: 13/B/1329 (13 July 1911).

<sup>154</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 31.

to Montenegro and the effect of the Great Powers, such as: they had the right to bear arms, except in the town and markets; instruction in primary schools to be in the language of the country; half a kilogram of maize to be given daily to each individual until the next harvest, and one lira to be given to each adult. The Malisors believed that this apparent success to acquire privileges from the Sublime Porte was possible by means of rebellion. In addition, the Malisors hoped that the revolts would gradually spread to north and south Albania, but the government took action to prevent this.<sup>155</sup> Moreover, the Tosks had many reasons for complaining but they had no idea of revolt, and they were wealthier than the Gegs, thus the Tosks, who had more to lose, were reluctant to participate in any riot.<sup>156</sup>

It was pointed out that the Turkish officers had an idea of how to get rid of the current difficult situation: the mountaineers should be employed on behalf of the Sublime Porte to fight each other. Extension of the period of compulsory military service was one of the great aims for the decentralisation policy but, without taking into account local conditions, the implementation of this policy throughout the empire could be dangerous.<sup>157</sup>

Lowther asserted that the revolt in 1912 was more successful than the last two years, and the leaders of rebellion, who organised a revolt, were more successful than any other leaders of former movements. Lowther claimed that the Sublime Porte's decentralisation policy was the main cause of the rebellion. The Albanians were not satisfied with the government's policy of Turkification, and this policy had steadily increased the intensity of insurgency within three years.<sup>158</sup> The CUP had no intention to stop the progress of their Turkification policy, and if they could not achieve this politically it would try to accomplish it using military actions. The Sublime Porte found itself gravely embarrassed by the Italian war in Tripoli, and

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<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>157</sup> The Times, "*The Position in Albania*", 13 May 1910.

<sup>158</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 28.

Austrian and Italian took advantage of this opportunity to support and encourage the leaders of the rebellion against Turkey. <sup>159</sup>

On 6 January 1912, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Asım Bey, received a secret letter from Tevfik Paşa, the ambassador in London, wherein he stated that public opinion and the political surroundings of Britain were concerned by the situation of Rumelia, especially Macedonia, and it was pointed out that there would be confusion in the spring around these regions and, if it had occurred, the outcome of the current situation would be much worse, and it seemed to hurt a lot more than what Italy had done in the Tripoli War. Moreover, exciting articles were published in newspapers to aggravate concerns about the status of Macedonia. Tevfik Paşa pointed out that what was required to be done better in riot zones was to undertake on site investigations and define the complaints and demands of the inhabitants living in these areas, then find the solutions. Therefore, to satisfy the people of the region, the Sublime Porte should establish a mixed commission for Macedonia and Albania, which should be composed of a few Macedonians and Albanians and would be very useful, so it urgently sent for to go these regions that should be in favour of the government, because when Britain had complaints and confusion in the British colonial territories, a mixed commission was sent to the areas to solve the problems, which was always applied by the British government and always produced good results. Tevfik Paşa regarded Britain as friend of Turkey and some notable British figures advised him that these measures should be taken urgently into account to put an end to the rebellion in these regions. As a result of this, Asım Bey submitted a translation of this secret letter to the Grand Vizier's office on 15 January and he joined the idea of the mixed commission.<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

<sup>160</sup> BOA. MV, 226/99, Date: 16/M/1330 ( 6 January 1912), see Appendix I.

The Sublime Porte decided to establish three mixed commissions to be sent out, the first to Albania, the second to Kosova and Selanik, and the third to the eastern provinces. The task of the commissions was to define the people's requests and complaints throughout Rumelia and, according to the findings, to implement strict actions to remedy the problems before the spring.<sup>161</sup>

The remuneration for the members of the commission was determined at ten thousand piasters for presidents of the commission and five thousand piasters for other members. Moreover, it was decided that the president and foreign officers who would be paid about three hundred piasters and two hundred piasters for each day they were gone, went along with members of the commission. A commission was sent to the provinces of Kosova, Manastır, Selanik, İşkodra, Yanya and Edirne under the chairmanship of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Hacı Adil Bey, who had accompanied the two Civil Administration Inspectors, and one officer would be accompanied by each of the departments of Finance, Military academy, Gendarmerie, Courthouse, Public Works, and the Ministry of Education. Additionally, a foreign officer from the departments of the Ministry of Finance and the Gendarmerie would also accompany Hacı Adil Bey.<sup>162</sup>

The Turkish Foreign Minister received an article from the Turkish Embassy in Berlin that Turkey, as stated in the press, did not have a decreased enthusiasm for the war with Italy in Tripoli. However, this desire and eagerness may have occurred as a result of a land and sea disaster. Italy was concerned that Austria may interfere due to the war in Italy with Turkey, thus the Albanians were advised by Italy to stay comfortably in the region, but for two weeks, Italy was sending weapons and ammunition to Albania and the surrounding area. On the other hand, in alliance with the Bulgarians who were to preparing for the assassination in the provinces of Turkey, thereby Italy would garner European intervention on her side,

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<sup>161</sup> BOA. MV, 226/99, Date: 25/M/1327 ( 15 January 1912), see Appendix II.

<sup>162</sup> BOA. MV, 226/99, Date: 15/S/ 1330 ( 4 February 1912), see Appendix III.

which would create pressure on the Sublime Porte who would then accept the Italian assertion conditions, and hoped that the peace treaty would obligate Turkey with Italy. The Italian government would cause a disturbance in the Balkans in the spring, thus the signing of the peace treaty should be settled between the warring countries as soon as possible before then. There were some preparations so the Italians in Albania would not again be allowed to create any conflicting situations with the Malisors.<sup>163</sup> Moreover, Italy had sent money to the local chiefs in Albania for the purchase of weapons and equipment, and the revolt of 1911 was supported by the Italian-Albanian community within Italy and the children of Garibaldi, founder of modern Italy.<sup>164</sup>

According to Asım Bey, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, all the Ottoman subjects obtained equal justice, safety of life and property rights with the Kanun-i-Esasi (Basic Law) and of which non-acceptance was seen as a legitimate excuse for rebellion throughout Rumelia, but it was possible to temporarily restore peace in Macedonia. Moreover, he also stated that the action for infringement in Rumelia would be ineffective due to the overwhelming political power of the Sublime Porte. However, the British public should not be turned against Turkey which should use British diplomatic support against some states like Austria and Russia, whose principal concern was instigate their actions throughout the Balkans, thus Turkey should be careful not to be deprived of British political support. This is because, Britain was the only country without concerns with Turkish Rumelia and they sincerely desired the preservation of the status quo in the Balkans, the reasons for which should be announced by the Constitution's principles. In addition to this, he claimed that, in some political circles, they stated that it was impossible for the Turks to continue their authority over Europe, and the current situation of the

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<sup>163</sup> BOA. MV, 226/99, Date: 26/M/1330, (16 January 1912), see Appendix IV.

<sup>164</sup> Richard Bosworth, *Italy and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, in Marian Kent, ed., *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire* (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1996), pp. 54-55.



Balkans threatened the general peace of Europe. Thus the Balkans question must be precisely settled. This view was not yet reflected in the press release, and it should be destroyed before it become a formidable weapon in the hands of both exterior and interior Turkish enemies. For this mission the Sublime Porte should put an end to the dispute between the Turkish political parties and join with the government to reinforce the government's position.<sup>165</sup>

Lowther emphasised that Albania took a strong action to overthrow the structure of the CUP. The Turkification policy was enforced by the CUP for three years with repeated brutal military campaigns in European Turkey, where there would be inevitable confrontations, adding fuel to the fire.<sup>166</sup>

### **1.2.2 Rebellion in Kosova**

The Muslim uprising in Kosova was relatively different than the Catholic and Orthodox Christian revolts in the south and east of Albania, because according to Lowther, their aim was to achieve independence and their rebellions continued until the First Balkan War.<sup>167</sup>

The Foreign Minister, Asim Bey, received a telegram from the charge d'affaires in Athens. It claimed that the Serbian, Greek, Montenegrin and even Romanian governments, who were preparing their military, ordered ammunition for their armies. In March, according to rumors, confusion would inevitably emerge in Albania, hence the appointment of more experienced governors and commanders who would be sent these territories, and would be selected from well-known Albanians. Public works would be began and that would immediately win the hearts of the people in this region, and public order would be achieved.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>165</sup> BOA. MV, 226/99, Date: 25/M/1330 ( 15 January 1912), see Appendix II.

<sup>166</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 3.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>168</sup> BOA. MV, 226/99, Date: 22/S/1330 ( 11 February 1912).

The riots began in the province of Kosova at the beginning of May. This uprising can be divided into three periods, from 3 to 13 May, from 22 May to 7 June, and from 21 June to 19 August. The first two of these were met by the Sublime Porte with a mixture of force and compromise. However, due to the recent riots by disgruntled soldiers joining the resistance, the government was completely paralysed, and the rebels were victorious.<sup>169</sup>

There were between two thousand and three thousand Albanians who began to gather around Diakovce to fire on the town. This provocation was spread over a short period in Ipek and the Albanians attacked the Turkish troops and it had followed one another at Istok, Gussinji, and Vierza. Hacı Adil Bey, who was Minister of the Interior, assumed a tour in the affected areas in an attempt to restore order, and he was successful in securing a momentary cessation of trouble. When he returned to İstanbul at the end of the month, he was very optimistic about the overall situation in Albania.<sup>170</sup>

However, on 22 May, according to Hacı Adil Bey, the revolt broke out again and led to unrest in Albania, and the second period of revolt was to begin. The rebellion spreading beyond the line from Üsküp to Mitrovica was imminent. On 3 June there was a serious attack on Ipek, but they were repelled by the third division, and the Governor of Ipek was dismissed and replaced by someone more reconciliatory. There was an official claim of the government victory in the Ipek and Diakova districts, followed by an announcement in İstanbul newspapers that Albania had been restored for the second time.<sup>171</sup>

The third and final stage of the rebellion began with the Manastır desertions. On 29 May, Turkish troops refused to march on the Albanian revolts at Ferisovitch,

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<sup>169</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, pp. 28-29.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., p.29. ; Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılap Tarihi*, vol. II, part I. (Ankara: TTK, 1991). pp. 262-264.

<sup>171</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 29.

and there were some deserters. On 22 June, a few officers and men, under the leadership of Tayyar Bey, had fled. On 30 June, the number of these deserters totalled twenty-two officers and three hundred soldiers.<sup>172</sup>

Lowther reported that there was a special meeting of the Chamber in İstanbul, and a bill would raise the penalty for military interference in politics. Lowther claimed that the deserters had issued a notice that indicated that they proclaimed their loyalty to the Caliph, not to the CUP or the Young Turks. After a short time it was observed that the desertion was wide-spread, and these were carried out in connection with Hıfzı Vatan (the Patriotic Party) anti-CUP military league whose menacing nature was mysterious. This league's propaganda caused the spread of revolt in Abdullah Paşa's army corps at İzmir that almost broke out. According to a rumour, even the leaders of the movement were negotiating with the Bulgarian, Macedonian organisation under Milan Matoff.<sup>173</sup>

All the provinces of Ipek, Pristina, and Prizren were in rebellion, and Hasan Bey was the most effective man among the leading Albania chieftains. On 23 July, Pristina was seized by his followers, who threatened to progress south of Üsküp unless their demands were fulfilled by the Sublime Porte, such as the resignation of the Cabinet and a guarantee of a fresh election which must be free and fair.<sup>174</sup> Moreover, on the next day Ferisovitch was occupied. The CUP in İstanbul realised that their hours were numbered, thus the rebellion must be immediately put under control.<sup>175</sup>

Due to these circumstances, a commission of enquiry and negotiation was sent to Pristina under Marshal İbrahim Paşa and Ali Daniş, in order to investigate complaints made by the Albanians. The Albanian insurgences and a group of

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<sup>172</sup> Ibid.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., p.3.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

officers in Manastır fled into the mountains, which had caused political concussions in the government. Mahmut Şevket Paşa was replaced by Nazım Paşa as Minister of War, and on 16 July, Sait Paşa's cabinet resigned and Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa was appointed as the new Grand Vizier, and formed the "Great Cabinet" on 22 July 1912 before the Balkan wars, but he was not successful.<sup>176</sup>

Lowther investigated that although in general the demands of the Albanians were accepted, the revolts were not stopped, and Üsküp was occupied by them without any conflict on 15 August 1912. Moreover, some of the rebels marched on Köprülü, and from then even they threatened a descent on Selanik. By the second half of August they were satisfied with the sincerity of the government, which could be said to mark the end of the rebellion in Albania. Before the privileges were guaranteed by the Sublime Porte, and the Muslim insurgency in the province of Kosova was successful, it would be useful to trace the circumstances of the Catholic and Orthodox tribes' independence uprising in Western and Southern Albania around Elbasan and İşkodra.<sup>177</sup>

According to Lowther, the cause of the turmoil in those territories was the attempts by local authorities to raise a force of gendarmes from among the tribesmen. In the first week of June, tribal members, returning to their summer pastures, the government officials attempted to prevent them which caused more serious resistance. The news of the rebel success also acted as a provocation in other provinces, and this kind of news provoked rebels in other provinces as well. On 21 June, Malisors united with Mirdites and they succeeded in ambushing the Turkish division on Mat River, as there had also been attacks on Turkish posts in July.<sup>178</sup> At the beginning of August, the city of İşkodra was under siege by Malisors, and there were also attacks on the town of Tuz, near the border with Montenegro.

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<sup>176</sup> Ibid., p. 30., Said Paşa, *Sadrizam: Anılar*, Trans. Şemsettin Kutlu (İstanbul: Hürriyet Yayınları, 1977), p. 334.

<sup>177</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 30.

<sup>178</sup> Ibid.

Further attempts were made by the commission through negotiations, but the increasing threat of the Balkan war led to a temporary suspension of the activities of both the commission and insurgents.<sup>179</sup>

Lowther the British ambassador in İstanbul explained that the Albanian demands were based on the following three principles: The first program was prepared by Muslim rebels in the Kosova province, and this program called the Pristina programme consisted of fourteen articles, such as recognition of customary law and regional military, the right to bear arms, that local authorities should be knowledgeable about Albanian customs, and the Albanian language, and that Albanian should be taught in schools. Moreover, they demanded that the dismissals of the Hakkı and Sait Paşa cabinets. The second program was to recognise Albania as a national and geographical presence. The third program had been formulated by the Geg Albanians, who demanded that an Albanian National Assembly should be independent of the İstanbul Parliament, controlling its own finances and territorial forces, as well as the practice of regional military service. Geographically, Albania was defined in principle as covering four provinces; Manastır, Kosova, Yanya, and İşkodra. The above mentioned demands indicated anti-CUP feeling, and appreciable unity among the various sections of Albanian nationalists. The foreign powers encouraged the Christians in the east and south to the idea of Albanian decentralisation; this idea was too extreme politically and geographically. At the outbreak of the Balkan war in 1912, the Albanians, who were relieved to have their demands met by the Sublime Porte, believed to be in better condition in 1913 compared to previous years.<sup>180</sup>

The Albanian Muslims, such as Mithat Fraşeri, Murat Bey, Esat Toptani and İsa Bolatin,<sup>181</sup> and the Christian chieftains who desired the independence of Albania

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<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>181</sup> Ahmet Bedevî Kuran, *İnkılâp Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler*, (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1945), p. 317.

were threatened by the belligerents during the First Balkan War, thus İsmail Kemal Bey, the founder of the modern Albanian state, led these chieftains to convene the National Albanian Congress at Avalonya for the proclamation of the independence of Albania on 28 November 1912.<sup>182</sup> As a result of this, the Ottoman flag was taken down for the first time in 445 years and replaced with the flag of İskender Bey (Scanderbeg).

### **1.2.3 Macedonia, Edirne, and Southern Albania**

The intense pressure the CUP applied to the various races during 1910 in the European provinces of Turkey caused a decrease in the committee's popularity in these territories.<sup>183</sup>

It was stated by Lowther that there were complaints that the government was failing on issues such as road construction, opening of schools, and providing medicine for the poor, and this also caused discontent among the Turks. Therefore, many Turks who relied on the support of the rural class merged with the Democratic Party, which had achieved great support at the beginning of the year, and its rapid development and opposition to the government had alarmed the CUP. It was closed by the CUP in the Manastır at the end of May 1910, and arrested the president, Hasan Fehmi, together with other prominent men in the party. It was claimed that they were reactionaries and supported the Albanians in their revolt against the Sublime Porte, and they were sentenced to between two and three years' imprisonment. The CUP skillfully acted to control the growth of the Democratic Party in the Edirne province, and an agreement was out in place in İstanbul between the CUP and the leaders of the Democratic Party.<sup>184</sup> Lowther

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<sup>182</sup> İsmail Kemal Bey, *The Memoirs of İsmail Kemal Bey*, edited by Somerville Story, (London: Constable and Company Ltd, 1920), p.372.

<sup>183</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 29.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid.

remarked that the Sublime Porte policy caused the Bulgarian and Greek subjects to unite against her. These two subjects both had the same complaints, namely all teachers in schools had removed non-Ottoman subjects, the government officials and gendarmes showed a harsh and unjust attitude towards the people in these regions, and Muslim immigrants were established in their midst.<sup>185</sup>

Lowther also observed that the second procedure, "Ottomanism" in Macedonia, had been recommended to the CUP by the deputy, Doctor Nazım, and there were about two hundred thousand Bosnian Muslims trying to settle in Macedonia, and farms were purchased for them to cultivate. The Albanians and Bulgarians were not satisfied with this migration, and the CUP was also not satisfied because of their activities in the region. The Sublime Porte might even have the satisfaction of their return, but Austria was blocking their return. An anti-Greek boycott was established by the CUP, and it had a great effect on Greek goods and shipping during the summer. The Greek flag was removed from all Ottoman ports, and Greek traders, and even foreign traders with connections in Greece, were unjustly damaged by the boycott. The CUP was forced to establish a boycott in Edirne and Macedonia.<sup>186</sup>

Lowther reported that it was noticeable that there was a great leniency towards the Turks and Serbs, and Bosnians and other Muslim settlers and the natives were now quietly being armed, but the Christians sometimes had their weapons confiscated, and numerous Bulgarian subjects were forced to take refuge in Bulgaria. Therefore, after much discussion between the two governments, they could only be encouraged to return on taking significant guarantees of fair treatment.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>185</sup> Ibid., pp. 29-30.

<sup>186</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid., p. 31.

There were numerous political crimes during October and half of these crimes had been carried out by the Bulgarian organisation. There were four attempts to blow up the railways on the Üsküp line, and a fifth in Demirhissar. In addition, a further attempt in Kumanova was met with only partial success in November. The perpetrators claimed that all of these actions were the revenge of the rural population, and similar acts would follow in order to compel Europe to intervene on their behalf.<sup>188</sup>

The CUP was unpopular in these areas in the summer, and they began to worry about the isolation and security in these territories. Difficulties had broken out between the CUP clubs in Selanik, Üsküp, Manastır and Edirne. The CUP attempted to prevent the attitude against the government using a disarmament policy throughout Macedonia. This policy led to a reaction among those living in the area.<sup>189</sup>

According to Lowther, there were disputes between the Minister of Finance and Minister of War about the control of the military budget, and towards the end of the year there was also a lack of discipline amongst government officials. With regard to the Edirne province, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of the Interior visited the city in September, followed by the Sultan himself, which did not have the desired effect on the people. There was no more security in Edirne than in the previous year, and there were no funds to reconstruct the province. Only some of the roads were constructed and repaired by the French company.<sup>190</sup>

The table below shows the total number of crimes in the provinces of European Turkey during these period.

**Table I:** Total Number of Crimes in European Turkey, 1908 - 1912.<sup>191</sup>

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<sup>188</sup> Ibid., pp. 31-32.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid., p. 32.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid., p.33.

<sup>191</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 32. ; Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 33.



<b>Year.</b>	<b>Murders.</b>	<b>By Muslims.</b>	<b>By Bulgarians.</b>
1908	1,080	122	198
1909	291	62	48
1910	161	20	61
1911	439	70	123
1912	513	28	115

As seen in the table, the Ottoman subjects enjoyed a good atmosphere with the proclamation of the Second Constitutional, which had led to a large reduction in crime. In 1910, disarmament was quietly being continued by the CUP, and both the supporters and opponents of the Sublime Porte wanted to engage in re-arming. Under these circumstances, in 1911, the number of crimes more than doubled compared to the previous year, and it continued to rise further with the Balkan wars. Moreover, Muslims carried out about 302 crimes and Bulgarians about 545 of the total of 2,484 crimes between 1908 and 1912.

An increase in the amount of political crimes by the CUP in the provinces of European Turkey led to a decrease in its influence on these territories in 1911, but in the previous year it had exhibited a slightly more conciliatory policy. For example, despite the suspension of the Albanian newspaper, a printing press was opened at Manastır, and the most prominent Albanian chiefs were allowed to return home. At the same time, the CUP was continuing to provoke the various elements in Macedonia against each other by giving the same privileges to the Roman and Albanian Orthodox as to the Greek Patriarchate.<sup>192</sup>

According to Lowther the Bulgarians attempted several attacks on the railway at Selanik, but they did not cause much damage. These attacks may have had influence commercially and annoyed the government. Between the Bulgarian and Muslims several crimes had occurred, and this incited hatred towards each other. M. Volland, a Frenchman, was murdered at Florina, and the public prosecutor of

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<sup>192</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 28.

Manastır, who was anti-CUP, was assassinated, in addition to which the Bishop of Grevena, who was anti-government, was murdered. The Bulgarian "Internal Organisation" was ordered to stir up some conflict throughout Macedonia; the ultimate aim of this organisation was Macedonia's autonomy of, and they announced that they tried to get Europe's attention with bomb attacks and other incidents of violence. Three bombs exploded on the railway, and one bomb blew up a mosque at Ishtib, where a few Muslim deaths were unjustified, after which the Christian population of the town was attacked by Muslims.<sup>193</sup> This explosion resulted in the deaths of Muslims attacking Bulgarians: twenty were murdered and three hundred were seriously wounded.<sup>194</sup>

The CUP's influence was decreasing throughout the Balkans, and Enver Paşa was sent to Manastır to increase their effectiveness, but he failed. In terms of administration, there had been no improvement in Edirne. Lowther reported that the outbreak of war with Italy was not a serious impact in Turkey but, according to rumours, a secret circular was distributed to the police, containing the important news that the Sublime Porte had facilitated the arming of Muslims in Selanik and, in the event of an assault on the town by Italy, the Muslims were to attack all Christians.<sup>195</sup>

After the fall of the CUP cabinet, Lowther believed that Bulgarian activities in Macedonia were assisted and stirred up by the CUP extremists, and it appeared that the events would decrease in these provinces. There would be a reduction in the number of crimes committed, which may be due to the effects of the previous year's Ishtib massacre. In the first three months of 1912 there were two serious explosions and six dynamite attacks were carried out in July, and a brutal massacre took place at Kochana on 1 August. Six of the explosions occurred on the railway;

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<sup>193</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

seven of the explosions occurred in September. As shown in the table below, compared to the previous year there was an increase in the total number of deaths.<sup>196</sup>

With regard to the Kochana incident, in the morning of the first day of August, the Bulgarians exploded two bombs in the market place at Kochana. As a result, eighteen Bulgarians, four Muslims and two Jews were killed. Lowther stated that following these events, an immediate massacre of the Bulgarians began, however there was apparently no attempt by the government to prevent these attacks on Bulgarians. Many of the Muslim population in this region were armed with rifles. Until military intervention, the massacre had continued for three hours, and about forty Bulgarians were killed, with one hundred and twenty seriously wounded.<sup>197</sup> After this massacre, several arrests took place, but the instigators or perpetrators of this incident could not be found. According to Lowther, it was hard to say whether the Bulgarian organisation or the CUP's extremists were more to blame for the Kochana massacre, and the activity of the latter, in hampering the investigations in every possible way, would seem to show that they were not entirely innocent.<sup>198</sup>

The telegram shows that the Bulgarians would raise a rebellion in Macedonia in September 1912, and military officers and public servants would be killed. They would carry out bombing attacks for committing crimes in areas with a dense Muslim population, therefore the necessary military measures should be taken at the Bulgarian border to prevent these types of attacks, and Turkish officials should take into account any intelligence information.<sup>199</sup> It was very clear that all these conflicts were turned into a war between the Balkans and Turkey. The Balkan wars

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<sup>196</sup> Ibid.

<sup>197</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 32.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

<sup>199</sup> BOA. MV, 169/14, Date: 07/L/1330 (18 September 1912), see Appendix V.

were one of the most important steps in the process leading to the First World War.

#### **1.2.4 The Balkan Wars**

The Italian war in Tripoli was largely effective in starting the war in the Balkans. In 1912 Lowther reported that the CUP attempted to unify the empire through a policy of forcible Turkification, which was vigorously implemented across the various elements of the population in the empire. Therefore, the revolt started both in Albania and Macedonia. Due to the military-political crises in İstanbul, Europe had practically promised to save them in the case of any disaster situation. The relations between Turkey and her future allies were not bad at the beginning of 1912.<sup>200</sup>

On 1 August 1912, a bomb blew up in the bazaar at Kochana, in Macedonia, by the Bulgarian "Comitadjis", as a premeditated provocation that caused the massacre of over one hundred Slavs, which exasperated the Bulgarians.<sup>201</sup> There were major internal difficulties confronted by the new cabinet and the bloody attack on Berana led Turkey to declare war on Montenegro; and after the Kochana massacre, the Sublime Porte was unable to find and punish the criminals, on the grounds that they had caused a severe elevation of public feeling at Sophia.<sup>202</sup>

Lowther gave information that People poured into the streets in Sophia, and Belgrade started to ask for the war to start against Turkey. The Bulgarian cabinet was chaired by King Ferdinand, who claimed that if the Sublime Porte refused to make reforms in Macedonia, all the Balkan states would decide to propose the start of a war against Turkey. Furthermore, the Turkish Military Attaché in Sophia

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<sup>200</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 14.

<sup>201</sup> Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913, Prelude to the First World War, warfare and History*, (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 13.

<sup>202</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 4.

informed the Sublime Porte, via a telegram on 15 September 1912, which the Bulgarians were preparing for war.<sup>203</sup>

On 26 September 1912, a telegram was received by the Turkish Ministry of War advising that mobilisation and preparation for war was underway in Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, thus the Sublime Porte was reported to be prepared for her enemies. The Sublime Porte should initiate a general mobilisation now, and intelligence reports must be provided by the Turkish ambassadors and officers who were employed in these countries.<sup>204</sup>

The Balkan states had reacted against the Young Turks. Until the time of the crisis in Bosnia, in a united action against the Turks, the Balkans had been the biggest obstacle for the conflicting Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian claims to the Turkish province of Macedonia. After the Bosnia crisis, in order to consolidate the position of Russia in the Balkans, the formation of an anti-Austrian agreement between Bulgaria and Serbia was encouraged by Russia in order to create a Balkan alliance, so that when the time came for a solution to the problem of Macedonia, it had agreed to be guaranteed by Russia. Based on the assurance of the Russians, the Sophia and Belgrade governments formed a Balkan League in March 1912. Bulgaria and Serbia, individually, made agreements with Greece and Serbia. In terms of the war against the Ottomans in Tripoli with the Italians, the Balkan alliance acted hastily. The Balkan league was encouraged to oppose the spread of an Austro-Hungarian population into the Balkans by Russia, instead turning entirely to confront Turkey.<sup>205</sup> The main issue was that the Balkan conflict was not seen as a desire of the Balkan states to expand their territory, but to regard the Christians as needing reform in Macedonia.

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<sup>203</sup> Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi, İkinci Meşrutiyet ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı (1908-1918)*, vol. IX, (Ankara: TTK, 1999), p. 298.

<sup>204</sup> BOA. MV, 169/44, Date: 17/L/1330 (26 September 1912).

<sup>205</sup> Richard C. Hall, *Consumed by War: European Conflict in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century*, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1910), p. 10.

Because of war with the Balkan alliance, the Sublime Porte decided to dismiss all Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek, and Montenegrin officials who were employed in the Ottoman Public Dept Administration (Duyun-u Umumiye Idaresi), the Ottoman Bank, and Regie Administration, without indemnity and contribution.<sup>206</sup> With the outbreak of the First Balkan War, the Sublime Porte decided to increase customs duty tariffs on goods by a hundred per cent, which were imported from Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro into the Turkish territories.<sup>207</sup>

In the meantime, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Count Berchthold's, proposal was to establish a federal government in the European provinces of Turkey however, the Sublime Porte saw this proposal as interfering in the internal affairs of Turkey, in addition to which, the creation of a federal government in this land by Austria-Hungary would lead to more effects in the Balkans, therefore this proposal was rejected by the other states.<sup>208</sup>

Lowther had said that the Balkan allies were making extensive military preparations for the third week of September. On the last day of September, they had begun to gather soldiers around the neighborhood of Edirne. Bulgaria declared a general mobilisation, followed by Greece and Serbia shortly after, and Montenegro, who continued to gather the power of its military.<sup>209</sup>

Petar Plamenac, who was Montenegro's charge d'affaires in İstanbul, delivered Montenegro's statement on the declaration of war to the Sublime Porte on 8 October 1912, thus he would have left İstanbul and reported officially to his Ministry of Foreign Affairs, due to the Turkish Çetine charge d'affaires being ordered to immediately return to İstanbul accompanied by his officers and the Turkish officials in Montenegro, and strike back violently against the enemy. The

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<sup>206</sup> BOA. MV, 170/63, Date: 13/Za/1330 (24 September 1912).

<sup>207</sup> BOA. MV, 227/253, Date: 11/Za/1330, (22 October 1912).

<sup>208</sup> Aram Andoryan, *Balkan Harbi Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Sander Yayınları, 1975), p. 194.

<sup>209</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 15.

Turkish charge d'affaires should advise on the need for the embassy and consulate buildings, and for the preservation of their documents. Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece had recently also cut their relations with Turkey, thus military measures must be quickly taken and twice as much attention paid to the frontier areas. Moreover, Turkish troops would respond to the enemy's attacks by proceeding more violently. All the regions and towns would be aware of these orders, given by Mehmet Reşad V, who succeeded Aldülhamid II by forcing him to abdicate the throne.<sup>210</sup>

Lowther highlighted that Montenegro declared war on Turkey, but the negotiations were still ongoing, and on 13 October, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia made a common demand for the implementation of the reforms. Just two days later, negotiations with Serbia and Bulgaria ended when Turkey declared war on them on 18 October. War was also declared on Turkey by Greece. The fortress of Edirne was isolated within fifteen days, and when the Turkish troops were gathering in the lines of Çatalca, the Serbians had already occupied Üsküp, and the Greeks arrived at the front door of Selanik, entering the city on 8 November. The Bulgarians arrived at Çatalca, but they were prevented from immediately marching on İstanbul by the Turkish troops.<sup>211</sup>

The negotiations with Bulgaria were likely to be extended, thus an improvement in the defence of the Çatalca line was required. When this line became more vigorously resisted, there was no doubt that it would act in Turkey's favour upon a possible peace treaty with Bulgaria. The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Dmitriyevich Sazonof, stated that if a contract of reciprocity would not complete the peace treaty between allied countries, Bulgaria would attack İstanbul, but they would not be allowed to advance by Russia. It was stated that order and administration in the defense line of Çatalca was extremely important, therefore

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<sup>210</sup> BOA. MV, 227/239, Date: 25/October/1328 (8 October 1912), see Appendix VI. ; John D Tready, *The Falcon and the Eagle: Montenegro and Austria-Hungary, 1908-1914*, (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1983), p. 154.

<sup>211</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 16.

they should urgently report to Deputy Commander in Chief Nazım Paşa to fulfill the mission requirements.<sup>212</sup>

Lowther considered that when the Bulgarians invaded İstanbul, they would take into account the difficult political situation in the future, because Russia would not allow any powers to control İstanbul except her own. The Sublime Porte was powerless to protect the Straits, and to protect the foreign communities in Pera, thus Turkey requested that the Great Powers send warships to the Bosphorus. On 18 November, the conflict did not manifest in Çatalca until the Bulgarian's strong bombardments, but it was not a success.<sup>213</sup>

The defense of the Çatalca line was extremely important and it was a prop to establish a defensible position in the case of a withdrawal by the Turkish army from Çatalca. The establishment of a defensive line which would be situated in the purlieu of İstanbul, and the presence of two frontier defense lines such as Çatalca and İstanbul, would be extremely important politically to Turkey during the peace negotiations with her enemies. If the Turkish army was forced to withdraw from the Çatalca line, the troops could be saved from entirely vanishing and collapsing, and it was clear how much importance it held for the military aspects too. These defensive line were deemed necessary and the Sublime Porte therefore decided to inform the Ministry of War and Nazım Paşa, the Deputy Commander in Chief, ordering them to precipitately build the defensive line.<sup>214</sup>

Tevfik Paşa informed Edward Grey that the Grand Vizier wanted to know what Britain's attitude was: it was not possible for Bulgaria to enter İstanbul but, should such a thing happen, how would Britain react, and what would be done about it. Grey's reply was that Britain would act with the Great Powers.<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> BOA. MV, 171/9, Date: 6/Z/1330 ( 16 November 1912).

<sup>213</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 16.

<sup>214</sup> BOA. MV, 171/15, Date: 6/Z/1330, (16 October 1912), see Appendix VII.

<sup>215</sup> F.O. 49997/42842/12/44, Telegram No. 1065, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther, (Foreign Office, November 22, 1912), as published in George Peabody Gooch, Harold William Vazeille Temperley,



On the other hand, cholera had continued to spread from the Turkish soldiers, and an armistice had to be carried out between Turkey and Bulgaria on 4 December, but the Greek government refused to cease fire, so the war with Turkey continued. The reason for this was that the Greeks had not reached their objective, namely, that Epirus had not been conquered yet.<sup>216</sup>

The peace delegates met at St. James' Palace in London on 16 December 1912, and the Eastern Thrace, Edirne and Aegean islands came up with a proposal to leave the victorious states. The Turkish delegation rejected these proposals, stating that Edirne must remain under Turkish control and be ready to negotiate with Bulgaria on the modifications of frontiers. On the other hand, the Aegean islands should be under Turkey's control and the Sublime Porte was ready to renounce all dominance rights over Crete. On 6 January 1913 the negotiations were ended, because the Turkish delegates did not take into account the result of the war.<sup>217</sup>

According to the Hafız Hakkı Paşa, the Great Powers promised and guaranteed to protect the boundaries Turkey held before the war, but whether Britain or France claimed those at the end of the war, whichever side won, Turkey would keep the same boundaries as before. The Great Powers estimated that the Turks had to win the war, but when the Balkan states won the war they forgot their promises and the conference was broke up.<sup>218</sup>

Austria's Foreign Minister told his ambassador in İstanbul that Edirne would remain in the hands of the Turks at the end of the Balkan War. This prevented friendly relations between Bulgaria and Turkey, and it led to a new war between them, because the Bulgarians wanted to have Edirne under their control. On the

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*British documents on the origins of the war, 1898-1914*, IX volume. The Balkan Wars, Part II. The League and Turkey, (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1934), p. 186.

<sup>216</sup> Erickson, J. Edward, *Defeat in Detail : The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-1913* London: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003), p. 234.

<sup>217</sup> Necdet Hayta, *Balkan Savaşları'nın Diplomatik Boyutu ve Londra Büyükelçiler Konferansı (17 Aralık 1912-11 Ağustos 1913)*, (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, 2008), p. 157.

<sup>218</sup> Hafız Hakkı Paşa, *Bozgun*, (İstanbul: Tercüman Yayınları, 1970), pp. 21-22.

other hand, if the war continued, Turkey's territorial integrity would be jeopardised in the provinces of Syria and Armenia, which were devoid of troops.<sup>219</sup>

The Balkan wars could have been easily prevented by any of the European great powers, who had a serious attitude towards the Balkan states, and that should have been enough to prevent all the bloodshed in the Balkans. However, political calculations and thoughts predominated over ideals of humanity. The Triple Entente powers saw the Balkan Union fit for their own purposes and they hoped to create a force against the Triple Alliance. Whereas Austria-Hungary's ambassador in İstanbul, Marquis Pallavicini, hoped that Turkey would emerge triumphant from the Balkan Wars. He stated that, when the Balkan states were defeated and weakened from the war, Serbia in particular would be subjected to Austrian desires, and Pallavicini himself hoped to play a great role in the case of Albania. While the other group of powers declared, as a precautionary measure, that Turkey would emerge victorious from the war with the Balkan states and ensure the maintenance of territorial status quo after the war.<sup>220</sup>

Over the last four weeks, the military positions of the Turkish forces were at least developed, but they could not be guaranteed to save Edirne, and they still did not recover some of the lands and the islands under occupation. General Goltz, who had organised the Turkish army several years before the Balkan wars, declared that if there was a war with the Balkans, the Turks would have the upper hand without any foreign assistance, and he claimed that Turkey had defeated the succession against the Balkan states, which indicated that the commanders did not

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<sup>219</sup> F.O. 55901/42842/12/44, Telegram No. 1127, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther, (Foreign Office, December 30, 1912), in Gooch and Temperley, pp. 318-19.

<sup>220</sup> Tâlat Paşa, *Tâlat Paşa'nın Anıları*, (compiled by Mehmet Kasım), (İstanbul: Say Yayınları, 1986), p. 26.

prepare enough for the battlefield, whereas the Turkish enemies had been prepared for war for twenty seven years.<sup>221</sup>

Grey sent a telegram to Lowther in which he made recommendations to Tevfik Paşa, who claimed that the Turks had ever compromised on Edirne and for this reason Turkey should not have any expectations of the Great Powers, unless she gives up the town, but if the Turks offset up a debate on the town during the peace negotiations, then the Great Powers might put pressure on Bulgaria, and the Turks could overcome their current difficulties.<sup>222</sup>

On 8 January 1913, Grey sent a telegram to Lowther, the ambassador in İstanbul, stating that Tevfik and Reşid Paşas had visited him to advise that it was impossible to renounce Edirne. In response to this, the war starts again and would the Turks save Edirne by continuing the war? and if they were not successful in war, they might also lose additional territories.<sup>223</sup>

On 17 January 1913, Grey instructed Lowther to verbally tell the Grand Vizier or Foreign Minister of Turkey that none of the Great Powers would intervene to keep Edirne in the hands of the Turks, who would not regain Edirne by continuing the war and might even lose their other territories in the process.<sup>224</sup>

Negotiations in London were terminated and, on 17 January 1913, the Great Powers sent a diplomatic note to the Sublime Porte stating that she should stop being so insistent about Edirne and the Aegean islands, otherwise the war would

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<sup>221</sup> The New York Times, "*Thinks Turks Will Win*", October 5, 1912. ; The New York Times, *No Officers to Teach Men*, November 24, 1912.

<sup>222</sup> F.O. 1103/1/13/44, Telegram No. 11, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther, (Foreign Office, January 4, 1913), in Gooch and Temperley, p. 352.

<sup>223</sup> F.O. 1337/1/13/44, Telegram No. 11, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther, (Foreign Office, January 8, 1913), in Gooch and Temperley, p. 376.

<sup>224</sup> F.O. 2417/1/13/44, Telegram No. 39, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther, (Foreign Office, January 17, 1913 in Gooch and Temperley, p. 417.

start again and Asiatic Turkey would also be jeopardised. In such circumstances, the European powers would remain neutral.<sup>225</sup>

The three Turkish delegates told Grey that the Great Powers should intervene and the peace in Europe must not be allowed to be disturbed by the Balkan Allies who would have further demands: even if Edirne fell into their hands, peace would still not be granted. Grey's response was that the great powers believed that they would be able to protect the atmosphere of peace in Europe by remaining neutral, and they would not interfere before abandoning Edirne. The Turkish Delegates repeated that it was impossible to give up Edirne, prompting Grey to say that, in that case, the war would decide Edirne's fate.<sup>226</sup>

Tevfik and Hakkı Paşas told Grey that if Turkey was to cede Edirne to Bulgaria, she would probably gain nothing, because the Balkan Union would be spoiled by the unexpected success, and could assert further demands, which the Great Powers would not agree to. Thereupon Grey's response was that if Edirne were given to Bulgaria, and if the questions of Aegean islands were left under the control of the Great Powers, they may be able to propose that the Balkan Union make peace with Turkey. It was also possible that the Union might make further claims, in which case the Great Powers would tell them that "they were asking too much".<sup>227</sup>

The appointment of Kamil Paşa was not received well by the CUP, and the country recovered from poor conditions through attempts to awaken the public in favor of a military dictatorship under Mahmut Şevket Paşa, in order to save the country. Then Lowther stated that there were rumours about the loss of a large territory in Turkey's European territories, and Kamil Paşa's enemies were looking

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<sup>225</sup> Hanefi M. Bostan, *Said Halim Paşa*, (İstanbul: İrfan Yayımcılık ve Ticaret, 1992), p. 38.

<sup>226</sup> F.O. 5953/1/13/44, Telegram No. 81, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther, (Foreign Office, February 7, 1913), in Gooch and Temperley, p. 481.

<sup>227</sup> F.O. 8857/5729/13/44, Telegram No. 61, Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther, (Foreign Office, February 20, 1913), in Gooch and Temperley, p. 515.

for opportunities to attack Turkey, whereas his cabinet was about to request an armistice. Although victory for the Turks was close at hand after the unsuccessful attack on Çatalca by Bulgaria on 18 November of 1912, the CUP claimed that the provinces of Turkey were sold by Kamil Paşa, thus the CUP condemned him as a traitor.<sup>228</sup>

There was a Grand Council meeting in the Palace of Dolmabahce on 22 January to discuss the response to be given to the collective note offered on 17 January, and the common purpose of a peaceful solution was hoped for. Turkey was unable to continue the conflict with her enemies because of poor economical and administration functions. The next day the Ministers met at the Sublime Porte to give a final summary of the notes provided by the ambassadors. Assurances should be demanded from the Great Powers in terms of Edirne and the condition of the islands, as well as with regard to future economic support and the abolition of the capitulations. During the Chamber session, Enver Paşa, accompanied by Talat Paşa and forty armed soldiers, appeared at the Sublime Porte demanding to overthrow the cabinet, which was preparing to make ignominious peace on the advice of the Great Powers. Nazım Paşa, who was Minister of War, came out of the council chamber to ask what the commotion was.<sup>229</sup>

The CUP was concerned that Edirne was being handed over to the enemy's control, so on 23 January 1913 a military coup was attempted against Kamil Paşa's cabinet where they promised to regain Edirne, however, at that time the town legally belonged to the Turks. The conflict resulted in Nazım Paşa and his aide-de-camp, Captain Tevfik Bey (Kıbrıslı) being killed, and Nafız Bey was fatally injured. Kamil Paşa, the Grand Vizier, initially refused to accept the resignation of his cabinet without orders from the Sultan, but he was forced into it by Enver Paşa and drafted a letter of resignation, as a result of which, Mahmut Şevket Paşa was

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<sup>228</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 5.

<sup>229</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, p. 2.

appointed as Grand Vizier. During that time, several former ministers were released, but at the same time some were arrested. For example, the editor of the "İkdam" and İsmail Hakkı Bey, ex-deputy of Gümülcine, were arrested, and the agencies of the Sabah and İkdam were closed, while a number of supporters of the ousted government sought refuge in the embassies. Mahmut Şevket Paşa formed a new Ministry that did not include any of the ostensible leaders of the military coup.<sup>230</sup> It is important that Edirne was abandoned to Bulgaria through the Treaty of London on 30 May 1913, and the Enos-Midia line was accepted as a border between Turkey and Bulgaria by Mahmut Şevket Paşa's cabinet.<sup>231</sup>

This military coup had an immediate effect on negotiations, which were ended by the Balkan delegates in London on 29 January. The first task of the new Ministry was to redraft a reply to the collective demarche, and this was presented on 30 January. It agreed to the cession of the part of Edirne located on the right bank of the Meric river, however, the part on the left bank of the Meric river should be retained, because there were some mosques, tombs, and other places with historical and religious associations in that region. With regards to the islands, they lie very close to the Straits and so were necessary for protecting the capital of the Empire, and other islands that were an essential part of the Turkish Asiatic possessions, and defending Asia Minor.<sup>232</sup>

As a result of the coup d'état, on 23 January 1913 Kamil Paşa, the former Grand Vizier, was arrested and sent to Cyprus, where a few months later he died at the age 84.<sup>233</sup> Mahmut Şevket Paşa became the new Grand Vizier. The CUP took all the strength and power into their hands, but they could not do anything against their enemies. Finally, one of the worst contracts, the Treaty of London, was signed on 30 May 1913. Mahmut Şevket Paşa's cabinet claimed that Edirne was the former

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<sup>230</sup> Ibid., pp. 2-3.

<sup>231</sup> Nevzat Artuç, *Cemal Paşa: Askeri ve Siyasi Hayatı*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2008), p. 122.

<sup>232</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, p. 3.

<sup>233</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

capital of the Empire and the abandonment of the city would cause public indignation. However, the Turks did not succeed in repelling an attack by the enemy in the Şarköy and Çatalca battles, therefore the fortresses of Edirne, İskodra and Yanya fell into the hands of the Balkan states. On 11 June, Grand Vizier Mahmut Şevket Paşa was murdered by an armed group while driving his car near the Ministry of War. His death gave the CUP the chance they had been looking for and they ruled the country through despotism.<sup>234</sup>

Prince Said Halim, who was the grandson of the founder of modern Egypt, was appointed two days later as the new Turkish Grand Vizier. Following this appointment, there were a number of arrests and some changes made in the cabinet, such as Talat Bey becoming Minister of the interior, İzzet Paşa being appointed as Minister of War, and Halil Bey, who was President of the Turkish Council and a leader of the CUP. Osman Nizami Paşa, the Turkish delegate at the Peace Conference in London became Minister of Public Works.<sup>235</sup> The assassination of Mahmut Şevket Paşa enabled the new Ministry to consolidate their position against political competitors, and while most of them did not collaborate with the murderers, they may have sympathised with them. Five hundred prominent officials, journalists, deputies, and ex-officers were deported to Sinop. Moreover, 12 men were found guilty of murder, including Damat Salih Paşa, a son-in-law of Abdülhamid II, who was hanged on 24 June, while others were sentenced to death in their absence.<sup>236</sup>

Talat Paşa claimed that the Balkan states were permitted to declare war on Turkey and had a right to pluck off the Turkish land for themselves at the end of the war, but Turkey was not permitted to declare war on Bulgaria, and not given the right to take back their territories, which had been under Turkish rule for five

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<sup>234</sup> Hafız Hakkı Paşa, *Bozgun*, pp. 21-22.

<sup>235</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, p. 7.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid.

hundred years. Moreover, the Turkish ambassador in London, Tevfik Paşa, was met by Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, who said that if the Turks entered Edirne, they would not only lose the provinces of Turkey in the Balkans, but also İstanbul itself. The Russian and French Ministers for Foreign Affairs also threatened the Sublime Porte with the disappearance of the Empire.<sup>237</sup> Moreover, Cemal Paşa, who became the military governor of İstanbul after the 1913 coup, stated that the British policy threw off the mask and indicated its true face, because the British government attempted to prevent Turkish troops from crossing the Enos-Midia line through the British Embassy in İstanbul, and Grey claimed that the Turks would be heavily punished for this movement. The policy of the British government was completely hostile towards Turkey.<sup>238</sup>

The Treaty of London provided that Turkish troops withdrew from the Enos-Midia line, and all the territory along the Enos-Midia line should be abandoned to the Balkan Allies, except Albania, whose boundaries were to be drawn by the Great Powers, who would also determine the fate of the Aegean islands. Turkey would give up all her rights to the island of Crete, and no war indemnity would be extorted from Turkey.<sup>239</sup>

The Balkan states insisted on war compensation from Turkey, however, there were disagreements about the division of Macedonia among the Balkan states, who therefore had been forced to accept the proposals of the Treaty of London. The CUP overthrew the government by shouting that Edirne was being given to the Bulgarians, and a new cabinet was established by the CUP on 24 March 1913.<sup>240</sup>

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<sup>237</sup> Tâlat Paşa, *Paşa'nın Anıları*, p. 27.

<sup>238</sup> Cemal Paşa, *Memories of a Turkish Statesman, 1913–1919*, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1922), p. 48.

<sup>239</sup> Fahir Armaoğlu, *19. Yüzyıl*, p. 679. ; Jacob Gould Schurman. *The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913*, (The Floating Press: 2008), p. 72.

<sup>240</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, p. 4.





**Map I:** The Turkish territories occupied by the Balkan States at the close of the First Balkan War. Source: Leon Trotsky, *The Balkan Wars 1912-13: The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky*, New York: Monad Press, 1980, p. xi.

Bulgarian and Serbian forces attacked Edirne, and Şükrü Paşa was forced to surrender with his 50,000 troops. During that time the Turks lost about 10,000 soldiers, and both the Bulgarians and Serbians lost 7,000 soldiers, either killed or wounded. The fighting was simultaneously happening in front of the Çatalca line. Moreover, on 29 March the Turkish main army unsuccessfully launched an attack on the enemies even the two battleships Barbaros Hayrettin and Turgut Reis's assistance. As a result of the fighting, 5,000 soldiers were killed or wounded on

both sides.<sup>241</sup> However, the Balkan states were in conflict about how to share the spoils of the war, and they failed to reach an agreement on the territory of Macedonia. Thus a war started among the Balkan states, and as a result of this, the CUP had the opportunity to recapture Edirne.<sup>242</sup>

Lowther reported that on 31 March the British government communicated with Tevfik Paşa, the Turkish ambassador in London, to urge the acceptance of the Enos-Ergene- Midia line, as opposed to a direct line from Enos to Midia planned by Russia. If Turkey accept the Russian offer, it would be confronted with insuperable challenges, declaring the Turkey's incapability to pay an indemnity.<sup>243</sup> Moreover, the six ambassadors of the Great Powers, who had been in contact with the Sublime Porte, offered the Balkan allies some conditions, such as: the Enos-Midia line would be a border of Turkey and the allies, the fate of the Aegean islands would be left to the Great Powers control, the Turks must divest from Crete, and the Great Powers are not in favour of a demand for an indemnity. On 1 April these conditions were accepted without any question by the Sublime Porte but, on 10 April, Grey received a message which indicated that the Italian government was in favor of the Turks keeping the islands, which they hoped would be accepted by the British government.<sup>244</sup>

At the ambassadors meeting in in London on 11 April, the French ambassador wanted an international fleet to be sent to İstanbul, because it may be possible for Bulgaria to advance on İstanbul. Military operations were prevented in the Gallipoli peninsula and on the northern shores of the Sea of Marmara and Bosphorus, to protect freedom of navigation in the Straits. Although this proposal was supported

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<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>242</sup> Georges Castellan, *Balkanların Tarihi*, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1995), p. 389.

<sup>243</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, p. 4.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid.

by the Russian and British ambassadors, the other ambassadors reserved their decision.<sup>245</sup>

Bulgaria had gained more territories compared to the other Balkan states, and this led to a conflict between them on 30 June. Thus all the Bulgarian powers were referred to Serbia and the Greek frontiers. A few days later, Romania started to move towards Sophia. When these events took place, Thrace was left defenseless, and Bulgaria found itself in a very difficult situation, and it was an indisputable fact that Turkey should take advantage and attack and gain back its lost territories where there was a high Muslim population who were subjected to severe ill-treatment. The Turkish attack led to bloody retaliations in the district of Tekirdağ (Rodosto).<sup>246</sup>

Although the Turkish delegates had guaranteed that Turkey would not enter the war, in January, preparations were made silently and fast for the recovery of territories from the Balkan states. On 14 June, Tekirdag was taken back into Turkish control, and Turkish troops, under the control of Enver Paşa, entered Edirne without resistance following the recapture of Lüleburgaz.<sup>247</sup>

The morale of the nation was crushed, due to the reoccupation of Edirne on 23 July 1913, and this of course meant Russia was not at all satisfied, because she had been waiting for death and the legacy of the Empire. Russia wished to shrink Turkey in size by supposing Bulgaria was ready to fulfill her orders in Rumelia, and thanks to the formation of an autonomous Armenia in Anatolia, as per Russia's aim, Turkey would be surrendered by her enemies and thereby eliminate any risk for Russia, who still hoped to destroy Turkish relations with the Muslims in the

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<sup>245</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>247</sup> Ibid.

Caucasus, after which applying all her hopes and plans regarding İstanbul would be an easy task.<sup>248</sup>

Lowther stated that the Sublime Porte protested and was warned off by the British government, because Turkey violated the Treaty of London by attacking the Balkan regions. 16,000 square kilometers of lost territory and seven hundred and fifty thousand former Ottoman subjects were taken back without a shot being fired. Bulgaria collapsed, and on 10 August the Treaty of Bucharest was signed to remove the danger of future complications. On 21 August, the Sublime Porte wanted to contribute to finding a peaceful solution, and stated it had no desire to think about any further advance, except the line of the Meric River to Edirne. Bulgaria desperately asked for help from the Great Powers and, at the end of August, decided to enter direct negotiations with Turkey. General Savof, M. Natchovitch and M. Toshef came to İstanbul on 3 September, and the Treaty of Peace was signed by Bulgaria and Turkey on 29 September.<sup>249</sup>

The Bulgarian government was contrary to the decisions at the London Conference, but it compelled her to evacuate the lands she was still occupying. The Bulgarians must withdraw immediately from the field so it could begin to occupy by Turkey. Although Turkish military action had reached the line of Enos-Midia, during the withdrawal the Bulgarian detachments carried out oppressive activity by destroying and burning a Muslim village and town, and it was understood that the Ottoman subjects in Edirne might be completely ruined. Thus Turkey should be ordered to preclude public ruin and provide stability in the Balkans after the declaration of war by the Romanian government against Bulgaria. Moreover, the Enos-Midia line is very close to İstanbul and the Bosphorus, and its safety was necessary for the safety of Turkey. Therefore, the Sublime Porte should

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<sup>248</sup> Tâlat Paşa, *Paşa'nın Anıları*, p. 27.

<sup>249</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, p. 7. ; Ali İhsan Sabis, *Harp Hatıralarım: Birinci Cihan Harbi*, 1. Vol. (İstanbul: Nehir yayınları 1993), p. 31.

obtain a frontier that was essential for a favorable defense. It seemed that the lands on the south of the Meric River could be occupied by Turkey as a compulsory measure.<sup>250</sup>

The following table shows the estimated gains of land and population by the Balkan states and Albania at the detriment of Turkey, as divided out by the Treaty of Bucharest.

<b>States.</b>	<b>Area of Territory gained. Square kilom.</b>	<b>Population.</b>
Albania	32,000	880,000
Bulgaria	26,257	709,546
Greece	56,611	1,620,000
Montenegro	5,876	230,000
Serbia	39,047	1,210,000
<b>Total:</b>	<b>159,791</b>	<b>4,649,646</b>

**Table II:** The Loss of Population and Territories of Turkey in Europe.<sup>251</sup>

On 10 August, the peace treaty was signed in Bucharest by delegates from Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro with the observation of the Great Powers. According to the treaty, Bulgaria lost a large portion of the territory it had gained in Macedonia in the First Balkan War, and Romania gained the portion of the Dobrudja. Serbia gained Ochrida, Manastir, Kosova, Istib, and Kochana, and the eastern half of the region of Novibazar. The Epirus, southern Macedonia, Selanik, Kavala, and western Thrace were placed into Greek hands, and Bulgaria gained a portion of Macedonia, including the town of Strumnitza, western Thrace. After the Second Balkan War, on 29 September the Treaty of İstanbul was signed to obtain not only Edirne, but also Kirkkilisse and Demotica. As a result of the war, Turkey signed the treaty with Bulgaria on 29 September 1913. On the other hand,

<sup>250</sup> BOA. MV, 231/200, Date: 13/L/1331, (15 September 1913), see Appendix VIII.

<sup>251</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, p. 10.

the peace treaty was not as fast and smooth with Greece as with Bulgaria. The chief difficulties for the Greek government was to return to the status quo before 1897. The Greeks were forced let go of this issue, and the treaty was signed in Athens on 14 November 1913, and provided article 2 of the treaty for re-establishment of all agreements in effect at the date of the outbreak of enmities. Serbia also signed the Treaty of İstanbul on 14 March 1914.<sup>252</sup>



**Map II:** The Balkan Peninsula after the Wars of 1912-1913.

Source: Leon Trotsky. *The Balkan Wars 1912-13: The War Correspondence of Leon Trotsky*, (New York: Monad Press, 1980), p. xii.

<sup>252</sup> Frank Maloy Anderson, and Amos Shartle Hershey, (eds.), *Handbook for the Diplomatic History of Europe, Asia, and Africa 1870-1914*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 1913), pp. 439-443. ; Shaw, *Modern Turkey*, p. 298.

Edward Grey pointed out that both Turkey and Bulgaria, who were very injured and furious after the Balkan Wars, desired revenge against the same countries. For these reasons, when the First World War broke out, both countries had the opportunity they had been waiting for to exact their revenge and they did not feel uncomfortable helping each other to take advantage of this situation.<sup>253</sup>

### **1.2.5 The Cretan Question**

The assembly and the inhabitants of Crete had demanded the annexation of the island to Greece, along with Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bulgaria's declaration of independence, and they had also attempted to make interventions for the administration of the island on behalf of the King of Greece. It was pointed out that the autonomy of 1897 and the decision for annexation in 1908 were a significant milestone for the fate of the island. Moreover, according to an article published in the Berliner Tageblatt newspaper on the issue of Crete, Turkey had already abandoned the island twelve years previously and left it to its fate.<sup>254</sup>

According to Lowther, trouble arose from the action of the Cretan Assembly, when the newly appointed Executive Committee took an oath of loyalty to the King of Greece and, making changes in accordance with the requirements of the island, it decided to adopt Greek legislation, so Crete would be involved in Greek elections. Both these decisions were protested by the Sublime Porte, however, the Great Powers were not required to respond to Turkey. At the same time another question arose, regarding M. Zaimis, the former Minister of Greece, who was appointed High Commissioner of the Island until September 1911, and the Great Powers decided not to appoint a new commissioner to the island. However, the General Assembly

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<sup>253</sup> Viscount Grey of Fallodon, *Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916*, 2 vols. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1925), p. 174.

<sup>254</sup> BOA. HR, SYS, 43/34, Date: 26/B/1327, (13 August 1909).

of Crete refused to comply with this decision by the Great Powers, and Zaimis was prevented from entering the island. Following these incidents, applications were started by the Greeks to disregard the sovereign rights of Turkish inhabitants of the island. The decision of the General Assembly to annex Crete to Greece in 1908 was not recognised by the great powers.<sup>255</sup>

However, at all levels of local government, officers on the island had to take an oath in the name of the King of Greece in order to continue working. Cretan Muslims were forced to take the oath in the name of King George, and the Sublime Porte protested to four of the Great Powers, who responded through their representatives on 11 May at İstanbul. They pointed out that "the taking of the oath to the King of Greece by a part of the Cretan Assembly does not constitute a modification of the status quo", and the oath in the Cretan Chamber must not be taken into account as it is null and void on 19 May 1910.<sup>256</sup> The Muslim deputies and officers refused to take the oath, and as a deterrent the Cretan Chamber actioned a financial penalty and the non-payment of salaries. The Great Powers menaced the land troops and took control of the island, and the Cretan government had almost entirely lost its control over the island by 1911. The control of the island was still in the hands of the Great Powers, because it was not conducive to the island to abandon it to its fate, and the powers ordered a continuation of the status quo on the island. The six Great Powers together controlled the affairs of Crete initially, but two powers, Germany and Austria, decided to leave the group of six Great Powers and began to make an effort to become closer to Turkey.<sup>257</sup>

As a result, Lowther reported that the pressure of the Great Powers created Muslim deputies, who were allowed to participate in parliament without having to take the oath to the King of Greece.<sup>258</sup> However, M. Venizelos who was the head

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<sup>255</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 46.

<sup>256</sup> Ibid.

<sup>257</sup> Anderson, *Handbook for the Diplomatic History*, pp. 397-398.

<sup>258</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 47.



of the Executive Committee, received urgent requests by the Great Powers to allow the Muslim deputies to enter the Chamber without taking the objectionable oath, and the Chamber was prorogued about thirty days by Venizelos to delay the Muslim deputies in entering the Assembly.<sup>259</sup> However, on 23 November when the new parliament was opened, the Muslims once again were forced to take the oath in the name of the King of Greece. The Sublime Porte protested to the four powers, who informed the Turks that maintaining the sovereign rights of Turkey could in no way be affected by the actions of the Cretan Assembly.<sup>260</sup>

Turkey faced another provocation when M. Venizelos and five other Cretan deputies were nominated as candidates in the general elections that were held in the Greek National Assembly in August 1910. Ten days later, Tevfik Paşa communicated with the British government in a telegram from the Sublime Porte, which pointed out that there would most probably be a war with Greece in connection with M. Venizelos, who had become a member of the Hellenic Assembly. After that, M. Venizelos was forced, by the four powers, to resign his official position in Crete, and was instead appointed as Prime Minister of Greece after the election,<sup>261</sup> which enabled him to unite Crete with Greece on 1 December 1913.

Another issue was the appointment of the Islamic judge (kadı) for the Muslim population of Crete in 1911. In this year, the Turkish press reported on the problem of appointing kadıs who were ready to begin their posts in the island, but this created threats from the Christian Cretans, who would stop them from landing in the island by force. Thus the four embassies recommended the Sublime Porte postpone sending the kadıs. This offer produced reactions both among the Muslims

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<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

<sup>260</sup> Ayşe Nühket Adıyeke, *Fethinden Kaybına Girit, Türk Basınında Girit'in Yunanistan'a Katılması (1908-1913)*, (İstanbul: Babiali Kültür Yayıncılığı, 2006), pp.61-62, Lowther. *Annual of 1910*, p. 48.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid.

of Crete and on the mainland.<sup>262</sup> The announcement in the Greek press stated that the kadıs who were sent to the island would be executed by the Cretan Christians.<sup>263</sup> There were protests on this issue from Greeks both in Crete and Turkey. The Greeks in Crete believed that bringing the kadıs to the island was a threat to the freedom they had already gained.<sup>264</sup>

The four powers initially informed the Sublime Porte that they had chosen suitable kadıs from a list drawn up from the Sheikulislam, but the Greek government suggested that there was no need to send kadıs to the island at all, because the Muslim communities of Crete had been very well managed for a decade by the muftis without kadıs.<sup>265</sup> The solution provided by the four Great Powers was received better in Crete and Greece than in the capital of Turkey. However, the four Great Powers decided that the kadıs would be chosen by the Muslims on the island and the appointments must be allowed by the Cretan government without having to take an oath.<sup>266</sup>

The outbreak of the war in 1911 between Turkey and Italy led to Crete being neutral, by the protection of the Great Powers, who informed the Sublime Porte, and as a result of this decision, they had not allowed the lighthouses in Crete to be extinguished. The Italian station was withdrawn from Cretan waters, and Italy would not act as one of the protecting powers of the island as long as the war continued, but would be informed by the other three powers when they took any decision relating to the Cretan Questions.<sup>267</sup>

In 1912, Lowther alleged that Venizelos begged the British Minister in Athens to find a solution to the Cretan question, and he believed that the Sublime Porte

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<sup>262</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 45.

<sup>263</sup> Tahmiscizade Mehmed Macid, *Girit Hatıraları* (edits. İsmet Miroğlu – İlhan Şahin), (İstanbul: Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser, 1977), p. 116.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid., p. 127.

<sup>265</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 45.

<sup>266</sup> Adıyeke, *Fethinden Kaybına Girit*, p. 42.

<sup>267</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 46.

would be in favor of a compromise.<sup>268</sup> Lowther extrapolated that Turkey could easily be defeated in battle, and they believed that Turkey would almost certainly lose African territories, thus they refused to have even the smallest concessions with Turkey. The Minister for Foreign Affairs even declared that if the Cretan deputies were to allow into the Greek Chamber, the Sublime Porte would regard it as the cause of war. Under these unbelievable circumstances, the four powers decided to invite Austria and Germany to join them in an effort to find some solutions, however these forces refused to be part of the Cretan Questions.<sup>269</sup>

Cretan deputies were stopped from participating in the Greek Assembly by the three protecting powers, who decided to set up a naval demonstration in the sea before the reoccupation of Crete. However, this warning did not take into consideration the Cretan administration who sent deputies. Therefore, the twenty Cretan deputies were arrested by the British warships, but the opening of the Greek Assembly was postponed until the release of the deputies a few days later.<sup>270</sup>

In the meantime, M. Venizelos promised the representatives of the protecting powers at Athens that the Cretan deputies would not be permitted to enter into the Greek Assembly under any circumstances; even this promise was dangerous for his government. The Assembly was opened in June, after all the Cretan deputies had arrived in Athens. Venizelos was able to keep his promise and the Assembly was guarded by soldiers, to keep out the Cretan deputies who were trying to enter the Parliament building, and riots had occurred. A delegation was accepted by the government at the Parliament building. As a result of this, the Cretan deputies withdrew. Lowther pointed out that Venizelos promised assistance to the international status of the island, and had appointed Stephanos Dragoumis (former Prime Minister of Greece) as governor of Crete on 26 October 1912. The year of

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<sup>268</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 33.

<sup>269</sup> Ibid.

<sup>270</sup> Ibid.

1912 did not pass without the usual crop of murders of Muslims. These acts reached a critical number in the first four months of the year, and there was a significant number of Muslims leaving the island. These outrages against the Muslims were ceased after April, except for an isolated incident in Crete in September.<sup>271</sup>

According to Mahmut Şevket Paşa, the Grand Vizier, and the Minister of War, the Sublime Porte was urged to waive its rights over Crete and form an alliance with Greece, thus preventing another Balkan attack as they would not dare to attack Turkey then. In addition he recommended that the Sublime Porte get along well with Imam Yahya in Yemen, however, a number of troops were sent to crush him, but Mahmut Şevket Paşa claimed that in both cases he was right.<sup>272</sup> The solution to the Cretan problem had been found within the Treaty of London in 1913. According to article 4 of that treaty, the Sublime Porte yielded its rights over Crete.<sup>273</sup> The announcement was made for a union between Crete and Greece on 14 December 1913.

### **1.2.6 Samos Island**

With the beginning of the war between Italy and Turkey, some of the islands in the Aegean were captured by Italian forces, which caused agitation and was also felt on the island of Samos. While the elections were held on Samos Island, some people, who opposed Andreas Kopasis Efendi, the Governor of the island, attempted to stir up trouble so that he would be dismissed, thus he demanded from the Sublime Porte that forces should be urgently sent to the island. His demand was satisfied by the government, because he had gained the majority of

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<sup>271</sup> Ibid.

<sup>272</sup> Mahmut Şevket Paşa, *Sadrızam ve Harbiye Nazırı Mahmut Şevket Paşa'nın Günlüğü*, (İstanbul: Arba Yayınevi, 1988), p. 164.

<sup>273</sup> Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi*, vol. II part II, (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1991), pp. 312-313. ; Uçarol, *Siyasi*, pp. 440-442. ; Adıyeke. *Fethinden Kaybına Girit* p. 296.

the General Parliament in the elections. The Ministry of War was ordered to send a cruiser, two torpedoes and 400 soldiers to the island.<sup>274</sup>

Lowther asserted that Andreas Kopasis Efendi, who was the governor of the island, was extremely unpopular, and a Greek conspirator from Athens, Stavro Boridis, assassinated him with several shots on 22 March. The reason for this, according to Lowther, was that the activities of smugglers was under the strict supervision of Kopasis, therefore the assassination had to take place.<sup>275</sup> Whereas, in fact, the real reason for the assassination was sympathies towards Turkey.<sup>276</sup> After the assassination of Kopasis Efendi, his wife Eleni received a number of telegraph messages of condolence from people who saw him as a real "patriot", and his death had repercussions among the Sublime Porte and the press.<sup>277</sup>

Lowther reported that M. Sofoulis was the leader of the insurgency in Samos and the archenemy of Kopasis, but there was no evidence linking him to Kopasis' assassination. In May, the island's inhabitants reported to the representatives of the protective powers in İstanbul that they were uncomfortable with the presence of Turkish troops on the island. The Italian government promised that if the Turkish troops were withdrawn, the Italians would not disturb the island, but this did not happen.<sup>278</sup> Grigorios Vegleris, who was appointed as governor of Samos following Kopasis' assassination, attempted to reconcile the islanders, and he granted amnesty for all political offenders, except Sofoulis. However, this amnesty was not approved by the protective powers and all attempts at mediation ended in failure.<sup>279</sup>

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<sup>274</sup> BOA. MV, 142/44, Date: 18/B/1328 (26 July 1910).

<sup>275</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 34. ; Ali Fuad Örenç, "Andreas Kopasis: The Prince of Sisam." *The Journal of Ottoman Studies* XX, (2000), pp. 305-311.

<sup>276</sup> Northern Advocate, "*Assassinated Governor of Samos Island*", 26 March 1912, p. 5.

<sup>277</sup> Örenç, *The Prince of Sisam*, pp. 305-311.

<sup>278</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 34.

<sup>279</sup> Ibid., p. 34. ; BOA. MV, 165/65, Date: 23/May/1328 ( 5 June 1912).

Sofoulis continued attempts to annex Samos to Greece, and especially the Cretan Greeks assisted him in carrying out his desire for annexation. The British ship *Medea* was sent in order to avoid any possible conflict on the island, and shortly after the *Medea* left the Samos waters, but a sudden outbreak of the conflict caused it to immediately return. The number of outside supporters who joined the rebel forces was around three hundred, and among them a very small number of Cretans. Fierce fighting ensued and rebels marched towards Vathy, the capital of Samos, thus both British and French ships were landed to protect the lives of foreigners in the capital. A regular army division headquarters in İzmir asked the Ministry of War what kind of measures should be taken if the captains of foreign powers were attempting to disembark their troops at Samos Island. The Turkish cabinet discussed the subject on 10 September 1912 and the following decisions were taken: when any confusion takes place on the island, Turkish troops would be needed in order to appease the situation and to ensure the layout of the island. If the British and French troops were about to be landed on the island, the Governor of Samos and the commanders of these two powers should have a discussion to decide what necessary measures needed to be taken, and these must be reported to the Ministry of War and the Navy, as well as to the Minister of Internal Affairs.<sup>280</sup>

According to another source, the Independent Party in Crete sent six hundred men to Samos, but only three hundred of them eluded the British cruisers “*Diana*, *Medea* and the French cruiser *Bruix*” to join the revolt against the Turks on Samos. Their desire was to overthrow the Turkish garrison in Vathy, and declare the annexation of Samos Island to Greece. The Sublime Porte sent 800 soldiers from İzmir to deal with the rebels on the island.<sup>281</sup>

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<sup>280</sup> BOA. MV, 168/50, Date: 28/N/1330, (10 September 1912).

<sup>281</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 34. ; William. H. Beehler, Commodore, *The History of the Italian-Turkish War, September 29, 1911 to October 18, 1912*, (Annapolis: the Advertiser-Republican, 1913), p. 93.

However, the intervention of the protective Great Powers and their sending of warships to the island caused the Sublime Porte to withdraw its troops. Due to the issues in this situation, the protective powers decided to send their Consuls-General to İzmir. The Consuls-General warned M. Sofoulis that if he continued to create tension, the protective powers would not prevent the return of the Turkish troops to the island. The Consuls-General prepared a plan for comprehensive reforms in order to restore order on the island, but these reforms were postponed until the final settlement of the problem of the islands. Events remained perfectly calm in October after the departure of Consuls-General, and the British government's ship *Medea* was instructed to leave the waters of Samos. On 24 November, the annexation of the island to Greece was proclaimed.<sup>282</sup>

On 24 November 1912 a telegram was sent to the Sublime Porte through the province of Aydın by the principality of Samos, and it was pointed out that Sofoulis was to work towards annexation of the island to Greece and, although he was the president of the General Assembly of Samos, he was to establish a delegation for a provisional government on the island and grant the administration of the island to this committee, as well as hoisting the Greek Flag over public buildings. Thereupon, the Sublime Porte decided that a telegram should be sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs appealing to the protecting powers of the island, so the principality of Samos should be told to wait until the peace negotiations between Turkey and the Balkan states were complete.<sup>283</sup> The annexation of the island to Greece was announced on 24 November 1912, but the island was formally annexed to Greece on 30 May 1913, during the Treaty of London.

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<sup>282</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 34.

<sup>283</sup> BOA. MV, 171/73, Date: 25/Z/1330 (5 December 1912).

## **1.3 The Difficult Situation in Asiatic Turkey**

### **1.3.1 Adana**

After the incident that occurred the previous year in Adana, despite being a sedation, there was still continuing unrest at the beginning of 1910. The Christian population in the region was in fear because they thought they would come under attack again. The Muslims who participated in the massacre at Adana were executed for their alleged crimes, and this instigated feelings of hostility among the Muslims against Cemal Bey, the Governor of Adana, who was responsible for the execution of the Muslims, hence he was named "Giaour" (non-Muslim) by the local Muslim communities. The policies implemented by the Governor had caused wealthy Armenians, who had fled during the 1909 events, to return to Adana with the influence of Germany, which provided economic development in the region. The friendly attitude of the Governor towards the Christians isolated the Muslims and caused a negative reaction against him.<sup>284</sup>

Some slight differences with Germany related to the line of the Bagdat Railway produced significant changes in the Governor's uncompromising attitude, especially against the British vice-consul, and he played Britain off against Germany by establishing friendly relations with the British vice-consul. Lowther stated that Cemal Bey was a "man of words, not acts" and he was not very popular among Armenians, because after the 1909 events their houses had not yet been reconstructed and the Greek boycott of the CUP had created a sense of grievance against Christians.<sup>285</sup> Mass meetings were held at Mersin, which in a short time, caused the existing panic in Adana. The governor was a member of the CUP and he was zealous in implementing the new policy of the Committee, such as "Hellenes

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<sup>284</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 34.

<sup>285</sup> Ibid.



should not be allowed to plant their flag in Turkey, and ordering the local Ottoman Greeks to paint their houses white, instead of in the Greek colors.<sup>286</sup>

Towards the end of the year, a new problem had come up in Adana. The deaths of the two deputies of Adana led to an increase in the Governor's unpopularity because, after selecting two hodjas (spiritual teachers), the Governor was dissatisfied with them and ordered their resignation, instead imposing a CUP candidate on the elections, but he was unsuccessful in his mission. On 8 December, threatening posters were stuck up all over the town, deprecating the Committee's rule, and it was said that their days were numbered.<sup>287</sup> In 1910, the Committee's popularity was declining day by day in Adana, and in November this general unrest resulted in a panic. As a result, the British vice-consul recommended the presence of a British warship in the region, but there was no actual incident to justify taking such a step. Moreover, with regard to the rumours, an encrypted telegram sent from Adana stated that there was no any event in Adana, as per the consul's reports to their own authorities, and the rumours were completely unfounded.<sup>288</sup> The momentary outbreak of feeling was vented, especially since the dismissal of the Governor, through outspoken criticisms of the new regime.<sup>289</sup>

Lowther claimed that Germany had attempted in every possible way to create a more robust place for themselves in Adana throughout the year. The construction of the Bagdat railway was slowly continuing, and it was extended to almost the foot of the Taurus Mountains "where the tunneling started, and the earthworks and culverts were obvious." All existing privileges were nearly given to the German subjects, who had a large irrigation scheme and the canalisation of the Seyhan and Ceyhan Rivers, as well as they consistently carried out cotton cultivation.<sup>290</sup>

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<sup>286</sup> Ibid.

<sup>287</sup> Ibid.

<sup>288</sup> BOA. HR. SYS, 83/71, Date: 3/M/1330 (24 December 1911).

<sup>289</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 32.

<sup>290</sup> Ibid., pp. 34-35.

### 1.3.2 Syria

The year of 1911 had been an uneventful year for Syria. There was a separation between the Turkish and Arab members of the Beirut branch of the CUP. The Arabs constitutional privileges and the thought of being neglected by the Sublime Porte caused a general discontent in Syria with regards to the Sublime Porte. It could be said that many parts of the administration were weak because of the lack of sub-officials, such as in the small town of Haifa.<sup>291</sup>

Sami Paşa was sent to quell the uprising of the Druze and Bedouins at Havran in 1910, and Damascus had also been affected by this situation. The Christian population was frightened of a possible attack by the Muslims in these territories, due of the declaration of war between Italy and Turkey, and especially in Beirut, As a result, many Christians left the town and fled towards the interior of the country. The situation had become very serious in Haifa, therefore the British Consul was ordered to guarantee the dispatch of a British warship. However, such a step was unnecessary, because the local authorities used their power to maintain order in all parts of the Syria.<sup>292</sup>

The reform commissioners made some good changes in Damascus, despite the lack of funds, such as some road preparation. On the other hand, the committee's foreign policy and other policies implemented created high levels of a strong hostility towards the new regime.<sup>293</sup> The governor of Damascus, Fazıl İsmail Paşa, had adopted a pronounced anti-capitulation attitude in his relations with foreign consuls. The Arabs were opposed to the opening of schools unless education was in Turkish, which had been imposed as an official language. In fact, many new officials did not even know Arabic. Under these circumstances, the difficulties for the Young Turks increased rather than diminished at the end of 1910. The

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<sup>291</sup>Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 33.

<sup>292</sup> Ibid.

<sup>293</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 35.

Governor's attitude led to his dismissal on 13 December, and Fatih Paşa, who was appointed as the new Governor of Damascus, was more compatible. The new governor was forced to deal with difficult challenges. The Arabs did not hide their hatred of this new chain of events and, according to Lowther, the Governor's policies in the region caused a marked anti-European feeling, and at the beginning of 1911, Havran's rebellion had still not been fully suppressed.<sup>294</sup>

The armed Bedouins and Arabs attacked the Hicaz Railway without reason and destroyed it, and government officials were killed. According to Lowther, if the CUP had been patient and adopted the reform policies, they would have saved many lives and would have lost thousands of pounds. The overwhelming committee policy would cost them in Havran and Kerak, and the money lost could have been spent on road construction, education, and other improvements that would win the hearts of a population.<sup>295</sup>

In July 1910, unrest began to manifest amongst the Druzes at Havran, and the reason for this was a local blood feud that would be probably have been resolved through mediation, but the CUP easily found a pretext for applying its overwhelming policy and there were more than thirty battalions preparing to crush the Druses, who were to be forced into radical disarmament, as the committee had been drastically applied in Albania.<sup>296</sup> It was believed that the CUP considered the severity of the policy being implemented in Syria and Palestine as a policy of punishment for the Druze, but the committee could not be aware of the difficulties they would face in these territories. Sami Paşa, who was sent with twenty infantry battalions and four batteries of artillery to suppress the uprising of Druze,<sup>297</sup> did not implement a policy of violence, and despite orders from the CUP, he behaved

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<sup>294</sup> Ibid.

<sup>295</sup> Ibid.

<sup>296</sup> Ibid.

<sup>297</sup> Sina Akşin, *100 Soruda Jön Türkler ve İttihat ve Terakki* (Ankara: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1980), p. 187.

well towards the local people and he showed himself to be a good soldier. Sami Paşa arrived in the riot zone in October and was able to reach an agreement with the rebels. The CUP insisted that the rebels surrender unconditionally but this was refused by the Druses who, on the other hand, found themselves in desperate circumstances, thus they sent their women and children to other areas away from the fighting.<sup>298</sup>

Lowther explained that if sufficient assurance was given to the Druses regarding their protection from Bedouin raids, and this assurance was guaranteed by a great power, it was achieved at the last moment of their surrender. They made an application to the British consul at Damascus for the intervention of the British government. However, the British consul Mr. Devey in Damascus had not been able to communicate with the Druses representatives. Therefore, the chief of the Druses, Yahya Bey Atrash, visited Sami Paşa at Deraa. Yahya's proposals for compromise led to his arrest, and Sami Paşa ordered his troops to march towards Yahya's followers. This ended all hopes of the Druses and they retreated to Lijah in the north of Hauran. Sami Paşa entered Sweidah with his soldiers on 5 October and martial law was declared in the country. The rebels seized two Maxims, and 100 Turkish officials were lost. Sami Paşa moved to the north from Sweidah to Shubha, while the Bedouin tribes joined the revolt with the encouragement of the Druses, so the total number of rebels was increased to over 10,000. Sami Paşa immediately entered Shubha without any resistance, and he was ordered to carry out a census in the region.<sup>299</sup>

The Druses, who took refuge in Lijah, were encouraged to return to Shubha thanks to Sami Paşa's conciliatory attitude, and a disarmament had been launched. Druse recruits were collected without extreme violence, and about two hundred and fifty recruits arrived in Damascus in November 1910. Lowther stated that,

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<sup>298</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, pp. 35-36.

<sup>299</sup> Ibid.

while the young Druses were being conscripted for military service, they were told of their brotherhood with Turkish brethren who were waiting for them in the barracks with open arms. On the other hand, Lowther claimed that there was still a very bitter feeling and "the Druse mothers even begging that their sons might be killed rather than exposed to the dangers of a Turkish barrack". It could not be said that the Druses were totally conquered because the Turkish soldiers had great difficulty in making contact with the mountainous areas of the country.<sup>300</sup>

### **1.3.3 The Provinces of Yemen and Asir**

At the beginning of 1910, as a result of inactivity against Seyyid Idris in Asir, his strength had increased throughout the year, despite the expedition made against him in the autumn and which was officially declared to be successful.<sup>301</sup>

Meanwhile, Imam Yahya had made some suggestions to the Sublime Porte regarding the administration of Yemen. The Arabs may have had a favourable view of the constitution initially, but after a short time it had emerged that it was of no benefit to them. The government of Yemen had remained at the same time as the Abdülhamid regime, and there was always conflict between the Arabs and the Turkish tax collectors. The Turkification policies of the Sublime Porte were created in a short period of time and their impact was felt on the Arabs who had hoped for decentralisation.<sup>302</sup>

Moreover, the religious officials were not happy with the policy of Turkification, and Lowther stated that "the cry was raised that the binding link of the Caliphate had snapped" and the Arabs had entered into a struggle against the Turks. The Turkish Press attributed this movement to the British propaganda that attempted to hide the discomfort, and the CUP correspondents in Yemen reported that the

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<sup>300</sup> Ibid.

<sup>301</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 38.

<sup>302</sup> Ibid.

Arabs had started working in favour of an Arab Caliphate under the reign of the Egyptians, and this policy was actively encouraged by the Khedive of Egypt. Imam Yahya was still waiting for his chance to lurk in the mountains, but it was the fact that the Sublime Porte did not pay attention to his demands, and Seyyid Idris, whose powers were growing stronger with each passing day in Asir. The CUP apparently applied the divide and rule policy, as a result of which Seyyid Idris was played off against Imam Yahya. Both of these authorities bracketed with the Ismailian sect, whose religious chief was the Aga Khan, and was an alleged Anglophile. Imam, however, despite suffering intimidation and other abuse, did not fall into the trap, and he had assembled a large force. Seyyid Idris collaborated with Imam Yahya and simultaneously rebelled against the Turks.<sup>303</sup>

In 1911, the Sublime Porte was confronted with a huge problem caused by the uprising of Imam Yahya and Seyyid Idris. The total population of Yemen and Asir was around six million, and these regions had been in conflict with the central government throughout history.<sup>304</sup>

Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa knew Yemen well enough, and his constant advice was to enter into an agreement with Imam Yahya, because the mountainous region of Yemen was still under his control, and the Turkish troops were only able to invade coastal regions. This meant the authority of the Sublime Porte was always viewed suspiciously in these regions, but Talat Paşa opposed such a deal with Imam Yahya, and therefore this was left in abeyance until it became serious.<sup>305</sup>

Seyyid Idris complained that the new regime had undertaken to reform the country but instead they were forced to collect taxes from the people, and in an orderly manner in the Arab region, Turkification policies were implemented by the Turkish authorities. Two representatives with an ultimatum containing demands

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<sup>303</sup> Ibid.

<sup>304</sup> Ibid.

<sup>305</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 33.

were sent to İstanbul to the Sublime Porte, demanding that reforms in the region be discussed in the Turkish commission, but they paid no more attention to these representatives of Seyyid Idris.<sup>306</sup>

Therefore, Seyyid Idris declared a rebellion against the Sublime Porte, with a total number of rebels at about 80,000, 60,000 of whom were under Imam Yahya's control. The weapons were seized from the Turkish in Sana'a by Imam Yahya.

If Idris surrendered with his abettors within seven days of the letter from İzzet Paşa, the political crimes would be forgiven by the Sublime Porte, and the military movements would be stopped until the end of the specified day, otherwise, Seyyid Idris would be punished severely for his actions in the region.<sup>307</sup>

The thought of the Sublime Porte was that 30,000 armed soldiers were enough to get these two riots under control. However, without sufficient force, they may encounter great difficulties. This expedition had created discontent among the Muslim soldiers in Anatolia, therefore the troops were replaced with troops from the Empire's territory in Europe, and the situation in the region produced an increasingly serious challenge for the Sublime Porte. The thirty one heavy guns and automatic rifles battalions under the command of İzzet Paşa were quickly sent to the region. In addition, one of the largest cruisers "Hamidiye" was sent by the Sublime Porte to convey the general to Jeddah. The gunboats were sent to control arms trafficking in the Red Sea, but there were no captures there.<sup>308</sup>

At the beginning of the revolts, Menakha and Sana'a were surrounded by rebellions and cut all communication with the outside world. The siege of Menakha lasted for a month by Colonel Rıza Bey on 24 February, and subsequently the Arabs focused on Sana'a. However, the rebels advanced on several Turkish outposts with rapid progress and they passed into the hands of the rebels. However, on 2 April

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<sup>306</sup> Ibid.

<sup>307</sup> BOA. MV, 227/248, Date: 4/Za/1330 (15 October 1912), see Appendix IX.

<sup>308</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 34.

they were subjected to great losses and were defeated near Sana'a, which was recovered two days later by the Turkish troops. The Arabs had no idea how to use weapons and martial arts, and the rebels were fighting independently, so it was impossible to fight like a regular army. The Asir revolt continued and the capital, Ibha, was besieged by revolts. Between a thousand and thousand six hundred soldiers serving the Governor of Yemen were killed, and up to four hundred wounded by the rebels, however the Arabs had a loss of up to a thousand. On the other hand, a second bailout by the Sheriff of Mecca in the form of an attack took place, and they successfully entered Ibha in July.<sup>309</sup>

In Yemen the revolt was suppressed and the rebels retreated to the mountains. The Turks suffered heavy losses due to diseases spreading among soldiers, in particular the cholera epidemic was responsible for numerous losses. About five thousand regulars under the command of Grand Sharif of Mecca were lost, but about eight hundred were as a result of disease.<sup>310</sup>

The results of the expedition to Yemen were costly, such as the dispatch and maintenance of thirty thousand troops in the battlefield, which required between 3,000,000 liras and 4,000,000 liras.<sup>311</sup>

According to the agreement with Imam Yahya, the Turkish army clearly would be assisted by him, and İzzet Paşa stated that the 50,000 liras would be sent monthly to cover the administration of Yemen indefinitely and be reported to the Ministry of Finance.<sup>312</sup>

Imam Yahya had accept the Sublime Porte's terms, and these conditions were agreeable to him. A truce as agreed for four years and the imam gave back all inmates and achieved the freedom to manage these areas.<sup>313</sup>

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<sup>309</sup> Ibid.

<sup>310</sup> Ibid.

<sup>311</sup> Ibid.

<sup>312</sup> BOA. MV, 172/5, Date: 4/M/1331 (14 December 1912).

<sup>313</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 34.



The outbreak of war between Italy and Turkey showed also its effect in Yemen. When the Hudeyde was bombarded on 2 October, Imam Yahya declared a holy war and about one hundred thousand Arabs were offered to the command of the Sublime Porte, but the actions of the Italians blocked the dispatch of troops from Yemen.<sup>314</sup>

#### **1.3.4 Armenians and Kurds**

According to article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin 1878, action for the implementation of reforms started in the eastern Anatolia provinces of Turkey, but, like the other provisions of this agreement, had remained a worthless letter. The leader of the movement in these provinces was the old patriarch, Mgr. Ormanian who was deposed by the efficiency of "the Tashnag Armenians" at İstanbul, allied to the CUP.<sup>315</sup> On the other hand, there were some preparations to constitute a "Reform Commission" to take into consideration the proposal of the reformers by Reşid Paşa, the Minister of the Interior. According to this, the six provinces were divided into two groups, the first group was Bitlis, Van, and Erzurum, with the headquarters at Erzurum, while the second group was Sivas, Diyarbakır and Harput, with headquarters at Harput.<sup>316</sup>

The governor of the six provinces was dismissed, and each province had been reduced to a Sancak (region). Both groups, which were to be administrated by the commission headquarters, comprised of two Armenians, two Muslims and two foreigners, with a foreigner as president. Gendarmerie and police officers were to be provided by the Europeans, and European judicial inspectors would be appointed. Meanwhile, an offer was made to the Sultan about putting the Eastern

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<sup>314</sup> Ibid.

<sup>315</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p.26.

<sup>316</sup> Ibid.

Anatolia provinces under the mandate of Russia, just like Austria in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878, but this offer was refused by the Sublime Porte.<sup>317</sup>

On 21 April, the British government's directive instructed her ambassador Lowther to request the Armenian reforms be taken seriously by the Sublime Porte. The Turkish embassy in London, on 24 April, officially requested to have British officers, and that the effective management of the Gendarmerie troops was undertaken by the British government. Anatolia had already decided to partition. In addition to the specific regions mentioned above, and Trabzon also requested seven British Gendarmerie officers who were consulted by the Turkish embassy, as well as two Gendarmerie inspectors, two judicial inspectors, two inspectors of public works, two agricultural and forestry inspectors, and an inspector-general. The consultant had requested to be employed at the Ministry of Interior. On May 13, Tevfik Paşa was verbally reported on by the British government. Russia should be informed of the requests because some of the provinces had borders with Russia. Tevfik Paşa would not object to that, but the Sublime Porte hoped Russia would not take part in it. The British government claimed that there should be no possibility of trouble with the other great powers about the proposal of a consultant at the Ministry of the Interior, therefore it would be a good idea for the request to be terminated.<sup>318</sup>

On 25 May, M. Giers, the Russian ambassador at İstanbul presented the Armenian Reform to the Sublime Porte, as a memorandum to explain its significance for the Russian government. According to this, the Armenian Reform should be entirely different from reforms in other parts of Anatolia. The danger of creating a local autonomy would be dismissed as it was in Macedonia.<sup>319</sup>

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<sup>317</sup> Ibid.

<sup>318</sup> Ibid.

<sup>319</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

The Russian Foreign Minister, Sazanof, offered that the Triple Entente should take the matter into their own hands and a draft reform should be prepared by showing them in a friendly light to the Sublime Porte. If cooperation was not accepted by the three powers of the Triple Entente, Russia was freed from all agreements and ready to expand her interests in accordance with the conditions. On 28 May, the British government recommended that Russia should consult with the Sublime Porte about creating a scheme for the eastern Anatolia provinces, and reforms for the rest of the Asiatic Turkey should be discussed by the six ambassadors at İstanbul, or Russia should invite the other great powers to participate in creating a scheme for the reforms.<sup>320</sup>

On 31 March, Russia, in response to the latter of the two proposals made by Edward Grey, accepted. As a result, the basic principles of the desired reforms had been prepared on the basis of the plan organised by Britain, France and Russia in 1895, therefore the ambassadors of the Great Powers had been instructed to create the scheme for reforms. Under these circumstances, the Sublime Porte received a recommendation from the British government that the Turkish draft scheme should be taken into account relating to the 1895 proposals.<sup>321</sup>

According to this new Russian draft, the reform would take place in the six provinces of Sivas, Harput, Diyarbakır, Bitlis, Van and Erzurum, with the consent of the Great Powers; preferably a Christian European governor-general would be appointed for a period of five years by the Sultan, excepting some border areas, to oversee the process. Moreover, the six provinces were made to form one province.<sup>322</sup>

In these six provinces, all officers and judges would be appointed and dismissed absolutely by the governor-general. Gendarmerie troops and other military forces

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<sup>320</sup> Ibid.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid.

<sup>322</sup> Ibid.

would be necessary to ensure peace in the above mentioned provinces. A consultative council was established to assist the governor-general, including some European technical advisers.

There were equal numbers of Christians and Muslims in the Provincial Assembly. The Police and Gendarmerie were to be chosen equally from the local people, of who half should be Christians. Natives of the province were to fulfill their military service within the boundaries of their province. The Kurdish Hamidian Light Cavalry (Hamidiye Hafif Süvari) would be distributed. The officials were to be made up of half Muslims and half Christians, and there were some arrangements allowing the same rights for the local languages, (Turkish, Armenian and Kurdish), which were to be used and recognised. On the other hand, Freiherr von Wangenheim, the German ambassador, stated that these demands were excessive for the Armenians who were given an autonomous region, and which that led to the ultimate division of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>323</sup>

The Russian demands received full approval from the French government, because these reforms were examined in detail by all the powers, and were prepared in consultation with the Sublime Porte. The Turkish proposals were based on the reforms discussed by the six ambassadors in İstanbul. The procedure was accepted due to instructions from representatives of the Triple Alliance, who wished to be a part of the general scheme, and it was not possible to create a special regime for the Armenians only.<sup>324</sup>

The Russian proposal for a European Governor – an Armenian who lived in the eastern Anatolia provinces – was rejected by the other powers, but foreign control was approved by advisers and experts. The Kurdish Hamidiye Light Cavalry would

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<sup>323</sup> Ibid.

<sup>324</sup> Ibid.

be abolished by the Russian proposal. The Armenian and Kurdish languages were to be officially used side by side with Turkish.<sup>325</sup>

The Russian proposal for "regional military service" was strongly opposed by the German and Austrian representatives, with the objective of preventing an autonomous Armenian province in eastern Anatolia. At the end of the negotiations, it was decided that the six provinces were to be divided into two parts by the powers, as per the Turkish proposal, and that two inspector-generals should be appointed with the consent of the powers, and they should be given the power to nominate as well as dismiss all officers, including the governors.<sup>326</sup>

This proposal was accepted by the Sublime Porte, and reforms began in the regions. The Sublime Porte applied to the Great Powers for the appointment of two inspector-generals, who were allowed to appoint higher officials and judges by the Sublime Porte, one for Erzurum, Trabzon, and Sivas, and one for Bitlis, Van, Diyarbakır, and Harput. The number of Muslim and Christian members in the local administration councils would be equal of.<sup>327</sup>

The Sublime Porte offered up two British officers for the position of inspector-general, and both Mr. Robert Graves and Sir Richard Crawford were already employed at the Ministry of Finance in İstanbul.<sup>328</sup> However, the British government refused to appoint these two officers due of the Russian objections. Thus the application of reforms for the Armenian provinces had been delayed.

Finally, the German and Russian ambassadors agreed on the principles and details of the scheme, as well as the appointment of the two inspector-generals, with agreement that, appointment and dismissal of the two foreign advisers were under the control of the Commission of Inspection. General Assemblies had been

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<sup>325</sup> Ibid.

<sup>326</sup> Ibid.

<sup>327</sup> Ibid., p.28.

<sup>328</sup> Ibid.

elected by the members, who were to be equally made up of Muslim and non-Muslim. In times of peace, the soldiers were to serve within the boundaries of their territory. The Great Powers would disband the Hamidiye Cavalry. The local language was employed in laws, decrees and notices, and in the Courts of Law. Special taxes would be used to fund educational activities.<sup>329</sup>

The Sublime Porte was forced to make reforms for the Armenians, and the Great Powers tried to keep the Armenian situation out of the Balkan wars, thus the Armenians often hoped for relief from Turkish domination.<sup>330</sup> According to Joseph Heller, the Armenian question had been seen as an internal problem for Turkey until the start of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, therefore Grey had refused a suggestion that the Great Powers should not interfere with the question.<sup>331</sup>

The Sublime Porte had not accepted a specific scheme until the current year, but the British government did not hesitate to comply with the demand for the loan of an officer to the reorganisation of the gendarmerie. Together with the Armenian movement, the Turkish reverses in the Balkans also provoked a certain unrest among the Kurds.<sup>332</sup>

Lowther claimed that after the Constitution in 1908, a significant rapprochement between the Kurds and Armenians had occurred, but the Committee's preference should be a distinction between these two races. Therefore, throughout the year, the Sublime Porte announced intention of restoring the stolen Armenian territories to their legal owners. All other claims for a solution, referred by the Armenians to the local courts could expect little justice.<sup>333</sup> In other words, no adequate steps had been taken to give them back their rights.

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<sup>329</sup> Ibid.

<sup>330</sup> BOA. HR. SYS, 67/52, Date: 22/M/1332 (21 December 1913).

<sup>331</sup> Joseph Heller, *British Policy towards the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914*, (London: Frank Cass, 1983), p. 82.

<sup>332</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, p. 28.

<sup>333</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, pp. 38-39.

According to Lowther, the CUP's promise appeared that the problem was dissolved in itself and the evacuation of the Kurdish usurpers in the territories might be accurate. In the early stages of the year, CUP had not yet been prepared to apply its leveling policies to southeastern Anatolia. The CUP were concerned that the impact and hostile effects of the chiefs might cause an increase in rebellion amongst the Kurds. These ringleader chiefs fled to the border with Iran, and they ensured continuity of the old destructive habits to organize the rebellion against authorizes.<sup>334</sup>

In the end it was decided to satisfy the Kurds and the Kurdish regarding the sensitivity of the Deputy Governor of Bitlis, who lost his assignment, and instead, Tahir Paşa was appointed, who was a weak and incompetent man, and he almost played the Kurds' game. Meanwhile, the Governor and Mushir of Erzurum were in open disagreement, because the Mushir of Erzurum opposed any representative measures against the Kurds, and although the general feeling of Van was against the CUP, it was the only place to take measures towards the Kurds, but this resulted in a miserable failure.<sup>335</sup>

CUP was alarmed with the prospect of a possible Kurdish rebellion, and this could be divided into two parts. Firstly, the CUP could convince the Kurdish refugees to return and would be able to get the assistance they needed from the Armenians. CUP had a secret alliance with the Tashnaks (Armenian terror organisation), thus, while posing as upholders of Islam with the Kurds, the Armenian rebellions adopted anti-religious and anarchic principles, and were supported by the CUP. However, these policies were unsuccessful, and the only common side between the Armenians and the Kurds was their hatred against the CUP's policies.<sup>336</sup>

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<sup>334</sup> Ibid.

<sup>335</sup> Ibid.

<sup>336</sup> Ibid.

In October, Tahir Paşa's weakness and instability in Bitlis had caused him to be transferred to Mosul by the CUP, and he was replaced by a young officer, İsmail Hakkı Bey, who hoped to have a similar agreement with southeastern Anatolia and apply the CUP policy of leveling, which would attempt to be extended to the Kurds and Arabs, which may be more difficult than Albania.<sup>337</sup> Lowther explained that İsmail Hakkı Bey's first step was to declare martial law and find favour with the Kurds by approaching the two grandsons of Bedirhan Paşa, who had around 50,000 to 60,000 tribesmen, to be a force employed at the Iranian frontier.<sup>338</sup>

The Kurds had a strong distrust of the CUP, and it only managed to reduce the anarchic situation at Van and Bitlis towards the end of last year. Lowther claimed that the local authorities were not able to keep the Kurds within bound.<sup>339</sup>

According to Lowther, the Armenians adopted a provocative attitude towards their enemies, the CUP and the Kurds, and there had been no improvement on these issues, and they were talking frantically to achieve autonomy. Armenian killings were often seen on the land question and there no adequate steps had been taken to arrest and punish the perpetrators of these incidents. The Kurds of Khuyt were punished by sending an expedition against them, because their lawlessness had become obvious, but expedition was unsuccessful. The governor's request for more troops to be sent for the completion of the mission was refused by the Sublime Porte.<sup>340</sup>

Russia's propaganda campaign in the province of Bitlis caused Hamidiye officers to become disgruntled and great progress could be seen during the latter half of the previous year, and that the territory was being prepared for a Russian invasion. A higher than usual chronic unrest in southeastern Anatolia had been seen during

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<sup>337</sup> Ibid., pp. 3-4 .

<sup>338</sup> Ibid., p. 39.

<sup>339</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 32.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid.



the last year and, except for in the province of Erzurum, a considerable increase in the number of murders, robberies and assaults had been noted.<sup>341</sup>

The central government did not view the Armenians question as more insignificant than internal and external issues. As a result, the government's popularity had fallen in general and even the Armenian Tashnakists had started to rise against the CUP. Russia's propaganda had great influence over the Kurds and Armenians who lived in the territories adjoining the Russian frontier. The Sublime Porte feared throwing them into the arms of Russia, but not much effort was made by the government to rectify this situation.<sup>342</sup> This was no doubt a reflection of the Balkan wars, and in all of Turkey, especially among the Armenians in the Caucasus, this had a major impact, and it almost resulted in some harsh measures being used to fix the status of the Armenian population in southeastern Anatolia.<sup>343</sup>

The Armenian Patriarchate in İstanbul protested the central administrator's attitude towards the Armenians by resigning in the autumn and meetings were held in İstanbul by the Armenians, who claimed that the government should pay attention to their grievances. On the other hand, the Armenians had always been suspicious about the Turks' promises of reforms. They desired an autonomous Armenia under the protection of a great power, and they were awaiting the invasion of Turkey by Russia. According to Lowther, Armenians had always claimed that Britain was her champion, so she should not object to Armenian sympathy towards the Russians, because in the eyes of the Armenians, the Britain and Russia were regarded as allies.<sup>344</sup>

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<sup>341</sup> Ibid.

<sup>342</sup> Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>343</sup> Ibid.

<sup>344</sup> Ibid., p. 53.

### **1.3.5 The Question of the frontier between Turkey and Iran**

Mamesh and Nagirdeh were still under Turkish occupation, and this caused a strain in the relations with the Iranian government. The Turkish Grand Vizier pointed out that there was a lack of authority in Iran, and a lack of any guarantee that Russia would not invade these lands, and the presence of the Turkish troops in these areas was necessary for to protect the Sunnis from the Shiah.<sup>345</sup>

The Turkish Grand Vizier declared that this unequivocally Turkish territory was occupied by the Iranians and he claimed that the war had even been carried into Iranian territory. He wished to establish order in Iran, and a Turkish commissioner with a suitable Iranian commissioner should be appointed to investigate the problem, but he never mentioned the mediation by the Great Powers between Turkey and Iran.<sup>346</sup>

On 27 February 1910, the Iranian ambassador stated that he was informed by Rifat Paşa that Turkish soldiers had been ordered to withdraw from Sakız, which was undoubtedly in Iranian territory, in addition to which, the Mushir of Iran had received an order to withdraw all Turkish troops that were sent within the last few months. However, on 5 March, the Iranian ambassador complained to the Sublime Porte that the troops had not withdrawn from Solduz and Nagirdeh. However a great deal of aggressive action had been developed in these regions, for example in Anzal, Bool and Azihe, which were under Turkish occupation, and the Soujboulak Urmia regions had been forced to pay customs duties to the Turkish authority. In addition, some of the villages in these areas were forced to collect taxes, and the Soujboulak-Urmia and Urmia-Tabriz roads had been blocked, while Sheikh Abdullah was causing problems in Urmia. The Iranian government requested that the grievances should be immediately resolved by the Sublime Porte.<sup>347</sup>

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<sup>345</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 49.

<sup>346</sup> Ibid.

<sup>347</sup> Ibid.

The Russian ambassador received news from Urmia and Tabriz on 17 and 18 March that Turkish troops who had passed through Urmia and the western shore of the lake in the Dalsk district, now occupied them, and were in occupation of Urmia. Furthermore, taxes were collected by the Turks throughout the Urmia district, and customs houses were established at Jebelkend and Baranduz, where taxes were levied on all goods. The connection between Urmia and Tabriz was in danger due to Kurdish brigands, and the number of Turkish troops in the region increased by about five hundred infantry and four hundred cavalry. However, the British government's consul at Tabriz did not believe that the Turks were collecting taxes in the whole of the Urmia region. On 13 April, British and Russian representation was made to the Sublime Porte against increasing the number of Turkish troops in the Iranian territory, the collection of taxes and customs duties in the district of Urmia, and Russia also complained the about the appointment of "*kaymakams*" in Ushmu and Cheyrik by the Sublime Porte, and the collection of taxes in Baneh, Sedesht, Lahijan, Ushnu, Deshtebil, Mergavvar, Desht, Tergavvar, and in the district of Somia, Baradost and Solduz, as well as a large portion of the district of Soujboulak". Moreover, Turkish troops had occupied many places in Iran, for example; Khoi (Hoy), Kala Passova, Urmia, and Redjan.<sup>348</sup>

In July 1910, a fresh problem arose with the persecution of Christians by the Kurds in the Urmia district, at the instigation of the Turks. The Russian government recommended that representations should be made in which the French government should be invited to join as the protectors of the Roman Catholics in the East. Lowther pointed out that he presented a notice to the Sublime Porte about the persecution in Urmia and the events had happened in territories where there were Turkish authorities, and Lowther's notice concluded that these events had been carried out by the Sunni Kurds, so the Turkish authorities should apply

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<sup>348</sup> Ibid.

harsh measures to suppress these acts of persecution. In reply, Rifat Paşa stated that a notice had contained the cases, which were immediately investigated, and if they were accept it, steps would be taken to put an end to the oppressions; or it was for the Iranians to provide the solution to the problem.<sup>349</sup>

Towards the end of July, an attack on Iranian territory was reported. Turkish soldiers advanced from Kızıldize in the province of Bayezid into Iranian territory, and there were some encounters with the Iranians. The Turkish troops settled on the right bank of Injin Chai, and about an hour and a half later they marched onto the Iranian side. According to the Iranian consul-general at Erzurum, some Turkish inhabitants at Kızıldize had complained that the Turkish territory was encroached by Iranians through the right part of the Injin Chai, which was considered a frontier between Turkey and Iran, and claimed that some Iranian military groups were stationed in that region, so two battalions were sent across the Injin Chai by Mutasarrif without making any investigation into the incident. Following a battle between the two sides, the Turkish troops advanced a few miles up into Iranian territory and on the request that cholera had been seen in northern Iran.<sup>350</sup> In response to these incidents, the Russian government sent a protest to the Sublime Porte , demanding the restoration of the status quo.

According to the Governor of Erzurum, the Iranians were aggressive, and there was no proof to show that the territory belonged to them, because undoubtedly this territory was Turkish.<sup>351</sup> At the end of September, troubles appeared in Urmia. The Iranians attacked the law courts and plundered the town, and there was disorder in the Soujboulak as well. Due to the events in the two towns, the Turkish consuls had demanded protection for themselves. Thereupon the Ministry of Foreign Affairs admitted that a small detachment had been sent there, and at the

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<sup>349</sup> Ibid., p. 50.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>351</sup> Ibid.

beginning of October, an officer with nineteen troops left Bagdat for Kirmanshah to escort the Turkish consulate in these regions.<sup>352</sup>

On 20 November, Mr. Greig reported that Turkish military activities were not unusual in the districts of Mosul, but on 21 December he reported that there were about 1,250 men and a mountain battery that had left Kerkuk for the frontier, in addition to which, a day later he telegraphed that there were energetic military preparations underway at Kerkuk.<sup>353</sup> The Governor of Mosul told Mr. Greig that all these military preparations was to avoid any provocative action on the frontier.

Turkish troops occupied the following places: Somai district, Jebelkend, Urmia district, Soldus, Nagirdeh, Passova, Soujboulak, all apparently entirely east of the "contested zone"; Khoi, Dilman (Salmas), Mawana, Ushnu, Bana, on the eastern border of the zone; Tergavvar and Mergavvar, partly on the Persian side of the zone; and the Baradost district, Baranduz, Mamesh, Lahijan, and Serdesht, within the zone (the Grand Vizier tacitly admitted that Dilman and Passova are in Persian territory, while the Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that Ushnu, Solduz and Lahijan were Turkish). The occupation of Anbar, Reshagan, Passalo, Anzal, Bool, and Azihe were also complained about by the Iranian government.<sup>354</sup>

In January and February 1911, the British Vice-Consul at Mosul reported that a reinforcement of troops was being sent to the frontier province, and the Turkish garrisons were strengthened in Süleymaniye, Rawanduz, Bana and Serdesht. At the end of February the Turkish garrisons were sent into the Solduz district and to the Urmia-Khoi road as well.<sup>355</sup>

Russia and Britain offered the Sublime Porte a proposal for the establishment of a commission, and made the same offer to the Iranian government. However, the

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<sup>352</sup> Ibid.

<sup>353</sup> Ibid., p. 52.

<sup>354</sup> Ibid.

<sup>355</sup> Ibid.

Iranian foreign affairs minister claimed that they would be ready to join the commission when Turkey had withdrawn the troops from frontier territories. Turkey disagreed with Iran joining the commission and they wanted to send the conflicts to the Hague Tribunal. The Sublime Porte decided to offer a draft proposal to the Iranian government before responding to the mediating power's proposal. The draft proposal stated that there should be a Turkish-Iranian joint commission to meet in İstanbul to propose solutions for the frontier conflict. Because Turkey was opposed to British and Russian mediation, towards the end of April a draft protocol was presented to the Iranian government, who emphasised that proposals for changes should be discussed on the basis of the Treaty of Erzurum of 1847, and if article 9 of this agreement failed to reach a decision in the case, it would be referred to the Hague Tribunal. On the other hand, the Iranian government claimed that articles 2, 3 and 9 in the Treaty must be taken into consideration by the commission, and they also wanted them to be added to agreements previously realised.<sup>356</sup>

As mentioned, Turkey did not want the two Great Powers to participate in the commission between Turkey and Iran, therefore the disagreement of any issues between them would be referred to the Hague Tribunal, because British and Russian involvement in the frontier conflict would not be in favour of Turkish interests in these regions. Iran was already shared out between Britain and Russia, and Turkey was surrounded by them from the east and west.<sup>357</sup>

The Russian influence in Turkistan was approved by the British, and in return Russia recognised the British influence over Afghanistan and Tibet. The dispute over Iran resulted in it being divided up between them. Russia settled in northern Iran and the British in southern Iran. Between them they recognised an impartial

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<sup>356</sup> Lowther, *Annual 1911*, pp. 46-47.

<sup>357</sup> Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, p. 236.

and so-called independent Iran.<sup>358</sup> Turkey attempted to keep the two powers out of the frontier conflict, which was ultimately unsuccessful in finding a solution for the conflict with Iran. Russia and Britain offered a Mixed Commission to Turkey and Iran, which included British and Russian mediation in the frontier dispute case.<sup>359</sup>

Lowther pointed out that on 21 December 1911, a protocol was signed in Tehran between the Sublime Porte and the Iranian government to re-examine and find a solution to the frontier issue. The Iranian delegates were delayed in attending the Mixed Commission in İstanbul by their government, however they arrived in İstanbul on 9 March 1912 and the name of the Iranian delegates. They were İhtisham-es-Sultaneh, who was the Iranian ambassador at İstanbul, and was employed on previous frontier commissions, and Nazım-ul-Mulk, the ex-Vice-Governor of the Tabriz, who was also employed on previous frontier commissions, as well as İtila-ul-Mulk, who was Secretary to the Persian Embassy at İstanbul. The Turkish delegates were Hacı Adil Bey, who was Under-Secretary to the Grand Vizierate, Daniel Paşa, who was Lieutenant-General and employed on previous frontier commissions, and Ali Nadir Paşa, Brigadier-General, who was also employed on previous frontier commissions. Moreover, Messrs. Shipley and Minorsky were the delegates from the British and Russian governments in the Mixed Commission for the Turkish- Iranian frontier conflict.<sup>360</sup>

In November, Russia sent their troops from Khoi to Urmia; this route was under the control of Turkish troops, which led to increase in tension in the region. The Sublime Porte requested that the British government persuade Russia to abandon their dispatch of troops to Urmia, but the British government rejected this request.<sup>361</sup> On 11 January, it was reported by the British vice-consul at Mosul that,

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<sup>358</sup> Ibid., p. 363.

<sup>359</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 47.

<sup>360</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 38.

<sup>361</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 48.

according to information received by the Governor-General of that location, Urmia was occupied by Russian troops and they were about the siege of Soujbolak.<sup>362</sup>

Russia continued its occupation in those regions, for example, at the end of January, according to the Turkish Ambassador in Petersburg, Khoi, Salmas and Urmia had already been occupied by Russian troops, and the number of Russian troops in these regions was about 4,000. On the other hand, it was reported that Turkish troops had been reinforced on the Bayezid frontier.<sup>363</sup>

At the end of the February the Russian government reported that they never had any intention of invading the Turkish territories. According to Lowther, the Russians in the occupied territories remained outside the region as discussed by the Mixed Commission, and Turkey in the occupied territories was also out of the disputed areas. Therefore Turkey could not have discussed these problems in the Mixed Commission or they could not have referred the issue to the Hague Tribunal.<sup>364</sup>

In March Turkey received reports leading them to be very anxious, because Russia was advancing in northern Iran, which meant that the Turkish troops would be evacuated from the disputed territories on the Iranian frontier. However, the accuracy of these reports was denied by the Russian government, and the purpose of this mobilisation was to strengthen the troops in the Caucasus, and it was stated that this decision was taken into consideration two years ago. Assurances were given to the British government by the Russian government not to take action in these regions.<sup>365</sup> It is interesting to note that Mahmut Şevket Paşa, who was the Minister of War, stated that if Hoy, Urmia, and even half of Iran were given to Turkey, the latter had no desire to possess these regions.<sup>366</sup>

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<sup>362</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 37

<sup>363</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>364</sup> Ibid.

<sup>365</sup> Ibid.

<sup>366</sup> Ibid., p. 39.



According to the British ambassador in Petersburg, the points of dispute between Turkey and Iran were possibly referred to the Hague Tribunal, which was a somewhat pessimistic situation for Russia. In which case the Sublime Porte could prove land registration and administration by the authorities in territories claimed by them, and if this were so, and if the regions which were always considered to be part of Azerbaijan were given to the former country, therefore Russia would have to reconsider her policy relating to the frontier territories. If Iran retained the territories, Russia would not be afraid of the situation, but Iran should not be left unprotected on the frontier against Turkish troops who were under German officers. Under any circumstances Iran should have been told that, in the case of a dispute with Turkey, before taking any action, the mediator recommended that they should consult the British and Russian governments, and that one of the arbitrators must be Russian or English.<sup>367</sup>

The British government was aware that Turkey had collected documents, and Turkey would submit these documents to Iran, which would destroy Turkish-Iranian negotiations. In particular, the maintenance of the status quo at Mohammerah was considered by the Turkish to be a very important issue. Meanwhile, the Sublime Porte clearly intended to resort to the ultimate authority, the Hague Tribunal, especially as the British government highly appreciated it, and more points should be able to be resolved by the Mixed Commission. The Iranian delegates were accordingly advised by the two powers.<sup>368</sup>

The first two sessions of the Mixed Commission was held on 25 and 28 March. A proposal was made by the Russian government to the Sublime Porte. Britain also agreed to the frontier district in 1875, and the Commission adopted a temporary agreement on the basis of negotiations which the Sublime Porte should be encouraged to adopt. The third session of the Mixed Commission was held on 28

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<sup>367</sup> Ibid.

<sup>368</sup> Ibid.

March, and the Iranian delegates—in order to facilitate the subsequent negotiations—agreed to a mutual exchange of views, and an integral part of the Treaty of Erzurum in 1848 was an explanatory note added to the treaty.<sup>369</sup>

The two great powers' memorandum suggested that the frontier conflict between Turkey and Iran should be resolved on the basis of the Treaty of Erzurum. A British memorandum was presented to the Turkish ambassador on 18 July in London with a detailed map of Mohammerah. The British government had had good relations with the Sheikh of Mohammerah for sixty years, and there had been no trouble in that region. The British government was opposed to referring the issue to the Hague Tribunal. Russia promised that they supported the British in this regard, because Britain recognised the Russian influence in the north of Iran.<sup>370</sup> At first Russia attempted to communicate directly with the Sublime Porte about the frontier zone from Mount Ararat (Ağrı Dağı) to Süleymaniye and would offer to base it on the third article of the 1848 Treaty of Erzurum.<sup>371</sup>

According to Lowther, the British government stated that Iran should accept the British memorandum without doubt or delay, and Iran's interests would be protected in that region by the British government. Iran officially accepted the memorandum during the commission's session on 15 August. Iran claimed that there wasn't adequate time to talk about the frontier conflict, therefore the commission should be extended from 25 October in 1912 for three months. This request was made to the Sublime Porte, who accepted.<sup>372</sup> From the end March, events in general seemed very quiet in the frontier zone, with only one exception at the end of April. This was a collision between Turkish troops and Kotur Kurds who served the Simko (İsmail Aga), the chief of that region.<sup>373</sup>

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<sup>369</sup> Ibid.

<sup>370</sup> Ibid., pp. 39-40.

<sup>371</sup> Ibid. p. 40.

<sup>372</sup> Ibid., pp. 40-41.

<sup>373</sup> Ibid.

On 1 June, an identic note was presented to the Sublime Porte by the British and Russian governments requesting the evacuation of Turkish troops from the region, and drew attention to article 60 of the Treaty of Berlin that left the city and Kotur to Iran. On 12 July, the Sublime Porte denied that there had been any violation on its part of the article in question. The Sublime Porte pointed out that the Turkish territory was attacked by the Simko, and the aim of the Turkish troops was only to repel the attackers and return to pre-conflict positions in the region.<sup>374</sup>

According to a report from Tabriz, the number of Russian garrisons were being constantly increased in Urmia and Khoi, and at the end of October the number of Russian troops between these two regions would probably not be less than ten thousand. On 19 October 1912, the British government was informed that the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs had suggested to his government that Turkey should continue to evacuate the occupied territories in the frontier zone that had been with Iran since 1905, but Turkey would reoccupy these territories if they were awarded to her by the Hague Tribunal.<sup>375</sup>

Similar news were taken by the Russian government that the desire of the Sublime Porte was that when the Turkish troops evacuated the territories, the Iranians should be ready for occupation. Moreover, on 31 October 1912, Iran was made to promise to protect the Sunni Muslims who lived in those areas, and in return assurances were given to Turkey by the Iranian representatives in İstanbul. On 13 November, the British vice-consul at Mosul reported that the Pasve and Nagade (in Sulduz) regions were evacuated by the Turkish troops, and the Iranian ambassador (Ihtisham-es-Sultaneh) was informed that, with the exception of Kazli Gheul, Bulak Bashi, and Nefton in the extreme north of the frontier, those regions were occupied by Iran.<sup>376</sup>

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<sup>374</sup> Ibid., pp. 41-42.

<sup>375</sup> Ibid.

<sup>376</sup> Ibid.



The disputes between Turkey and Iran had rapidly increased for the frontier zone since the 1848 Treaty of Erzurum, initiated in 1912 under Russian auspices. With the mediation of Britain, it was concluded on 17 November 1913. The İstanbul Protocol was signed by the Russian and British ambassadors and Mahmud Khan, Iranian ambassador at İstanbul, as well as the Grand Vizier, concerning the southern frontier from Huveyze to the Persian Gulf. The Commission of Delimitation of the frontier had eight members; four members of which – one British, one Russian, one Turkish and one Iranian – had an assistant. If the Turkish and Iranian commissioners could not agree on any detail, it was to be referred to the British and Russian members, whose decisions would be binding. The entire frontier was to be marked out from the Serdarbulak plateau to the Russian-Turkish border and reach all the way to the Persian Gulf. The main lines would be as stated in the Treaty of Erzurum.<sup>377</sup>

## **1.4 Turkey in Mesopotamia**

### **1.4.1 Bagdat**

After the 31 March incident, Nazım Paşa opposed the Movement Army (Hareket Ordusu) formed in Selanik, thus he was at a variance with Mahmut Şevket Paşa and the CUP, who had put so much pressure on him and made him leave İstanbul; under these circumstances he was the most suitable man for the role of Governor of Bagdat. There were many critical tasks previously undertaken by him as he had the authority to deal with the VI. Army in the region. Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, the Grand Vizier, acted in accordance with the view of Talat Paşa, who was Minister of Internal Affairs and in favour of the CUP. The Governor of Bagdat, Şevket Paşa was dismissed and on 25 November in 1909, Şevket Paşa was appointed to the

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<sup>377</sup> Beaumont, *Annual of 1913*, p. 13.

role of Governor of Bagdat and he also became commander of the 6<sup>th</sup> Army Corps in Bagdat.<sup>378</sup>

The new governor of Bagdat arrived at Bagdat in May accompanied by the Deputy Governor, the armed forces and numerous officials. Relations between Nazım Paşa and the CUP were not friendly, and his appointment for this mission was because he had confronted difficult situations in these regions, but he was unable to cope with these difficulties and this would damage his reputation. The first instruction in Bagdat put an end to irregularities in Mesopotamia and reorganised the administration, as well as having plans to reform the 6<sup>th</sup> Army Corps. Nazım Paşa also probably tended to implement a policy of "Turkey for Turks" in these lands.<sup>379</sup> Another important issue was the public works in Bagdat. He intended to enable Sir. W. Willcocks to continue his irrigation works, and had negotiated a debt of two hundred thousand liras with the National Bank of Turkey in exchange for Bagdat municipal revenues.<sup>380</sup>

He had begun to work towards the reconstruction of the city, but a very considerable amount of valuable properties were demolished for the widening of roads and construction of new roads. He claimed that these private properties were in poor condition and posed a danger, so as not to have to pay out any compensation.<sup>381</sup>

This policy of Nazım Paşa's resulted in an excessive decrease in the values of land and compensation claims were implemented both by the locals and by foreigners. This particularly affected property belonging to British subjects and Messrs. Lynch and Lowther claimed that the governor wanted to damage Britain's

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<sup>378</sup> Nevzat Artuç, "Osmanlı Devleti'nin Son Dönem Irak Politikasına Bir Örnek: Nazım Paşa'nın Bağdat Valiliği (25 Kasım 1909- 15 Mart 1911)," *Belleten*, vol. LXXIV, No.271, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2010), p. 339.

<sup>379</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 40.

<sup>380</sup> Ibid. ; Artuç, *Son Dönem Irak*, p. 341.

<sup>381</sup> Lowther. *Annual of 1910*, p. 40.

interests.<sup>382</sup> Thus, the British ambassador in İstanbul, Sir Louis Mallet, expressed his displeasure to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs about Nazım Paşa's attitude in Bagdat.<sup>383</sup> Nazım Paşa's scheme continued, for example, the German Club garden walls and trees were pulled down without any notice. Thus was a dispute arose between Nazım Paşa and the German, Austrian, Italian and American consuls in Bagdat.<sup>384</sup> He was continuing to demolish the private property of British subjects and their complaints were referred to İstanbul for resolution. According to Lowther, Nazım Paşa was not popular with his own people and opposition to the governor began to appear in the press. He entered into conflict with almost all the members of the Ministry in İstanbul, and the local committee members were also not fans of Nazım Paşa, thus his governorship position was compromised. Finally, İsmail Hakkı Bey was unofficially sent to Bagdat as a deputy to investigate the governor. The Sublime Porte received a report from İsmail Hakkı Bey that violently criticised Nazım Paşa's activities. The Sublime Porte had great difficulty in controlling Paşa and towards the end of the year, his dismissal was seriously considered, and he was finally notified of his dismissal on 15 March 1911.<sup>385</sup> The government decided to temporarily appoint Yusuf Paşa as Governor of Bagdat until a new governor could be appointed.<sup>386</sup>

However, the accuracy of the reasons put forward for the dismissal of Nazım Paşa caused scepticism, because the people of Bagdat were comfortable with him and were not satisfied with the decision to dismiss him. This was demonstrated by telegraphs sent to the Sublime Porte from leaders of the various religious, namely, the Armenian Patriarch's deputy İspikos Efendi, the Chief Rabbi of Bagdat Davut Papa, the Jewish community chairman Aziz Levi, the Chaldean Patriarch's deputy

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<sup>382</sup> Ibid.

<sup>383</sup> Artuç, *Son Dönem Irak*, pp. 343-344

<sup>384</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 41.

<sup>385</sup> Ibid.

<sup>386</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 35

of Bagdat Archbishop Stefan, the Armenian Catholic Patriarch's deputy Kayliyos, the Assyrian Catholic Patriarch Salabiye, and the Greek Catholic Patriarch's deputy Romatinov. In other words, Nazım Paşa had gained their appreciation by applying the basic constitutional principles of justice, equality and safety without a compromising approach to all the non-Muslims subjects in these territories. Moreover, the people who wanted the dismissal of Nazım Paşa did not want there to be peace and tranquility in the regions, and those who wanted to gain some benefits from the confusion stressed that the complaints were unfounded.<sup>387</sup>

Following the dismissal of Nazım Paşa, who left Bagdat for Basra on 21 March, he was succeeded by the former governor of Adana, Cemal Bey. According to Lowther, Cemal Bey most probably followed his predecessor as this was evident in his speeches and anti-foreign sympathies.<sup>388</sup>

The British Consul in Bagdat had requested a total of five thousand four hundred liras from the Sublime Porte as compensation for losses. The Bagdat municipality could not afford this amount, thus it was paid with a cheque on 30 November by the Sublime Porte. The cause of the deterioration of the situation in Bagdat was the unlawful conduct of the Shammer Arabs, who organised attacks against Colonel Rıza Bey, while on the other hand, complaints had been received that the Iranian trade route had been blocked by brigands. Mesopotamia had some improvement for navigation tasks. Sir. John Jackson and Nazım Paşa had reached a tentative agreement on 13 February for the construction of works. The work began at the same time, but it could not be said that very rapid progress was made due to the lack of funds, which should have been given to the contractors by the Sublime Porte.<sup>389</sup>

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<sup>387</sup> Artuç, *Son Dönem Irak*, pp. 358-359.

<sup>388</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 35.

<sup>389</sup> Ibid.



#### **1.4.2 Basra, Kuwait and Mosul**

In March there was conflict between the Muntefik Arabs and Turkish troops in the vicinity of Nasriye and Shattrra. Forces under the command of Yusuf Paşa suffered a heavy defeat and he was called back to Bagdat. The Governor of Basra, Süleyman Nazif, arrived at Basra and did much to restore order. No banditry had occurred, nor any piracy or robberies on the river during his short administration. According to Lowther, Süleyman Nazif was a staunch advocate of the new regime and the governor was clearly imbued with the danger of British intrigues in the Persian Gulf. Although he attempted to limit British influence in those areas, there was an attempt to expand Turkish influence in the regions.<sup>390</sup>

The governor's methods were hasty and arbitrary and unfortunately succeeded in creating a series of unpleasant events during his administration, such as his confrontation with notables such as Seyyid Talib, Mübarek es-Sabah and Sheikh Hazal in the regions, who were in close contact with Britain. However, in February, the governor had friendly relations with Sheikh Hazal who promised to assist him in the arrest of some criminals, but some extreme events occurred in the spring and Sheikh Hazal did not end up assisting the governor as he was angry about the Mohamed El Chenan incident. Consequently, the governor sent a gunboat to Zein to arrest Chenan but Zein's inhabitants refused to surrender him, after which the region was bombarded and many houses were burnt and looted. After all, the Sheikh had requested protection from the British consulate in Basra.<sup>391</sup>

Regarding land registration, there were problems between the governor and Sheikh Mubarak of Kuwait. For instance, the Sheikh had purchased the palm garden at Fedaghia and when he applied to the government to register it his applications was refused because the Sheikh was not an Ottoman subject, which was also rejected by the Sheikh. The government's recommendation to the Sheikh

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<sup>390</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 43.

<sup>391</sup> Ibid.

was that his sons became Ottoman subjects then the land could be registered to them, but this suggestion was also rejected by the Sheikh. The Sheikh's proposal was to register under the name of one of his wives or he could be recognised as the nation of Kuwait, however this offer was not accepted by the government. The Sheikh seemed conciliatory during these discussions, and Zobeida was attacked by the Araps in July, which was done to get his revenge. Thereupon, the governor issued a decree that the Sheikh could not purchase land in the province of Basra. When the sons of the Sheikh became Ottoman subjects, after the death of Mubarak Paşa, the status quo of Kuwait would be in favour of Turkey, thus the British government feared for its position in these regions.<sup>392</sup>

Sheikh Hazal could not purchase land from Basra because he was a foreign national. However, Mubarak al-Sabah, the district governor of Kuwait was allowed to purchase land from the Ottoman territories, and the same criteria should be applied to the Mubarak al-Sabah as the district governor of Qatar Casım Essani, and Müntefik Saudis who did not enrol in a register of the Ottomans, in addition to which it must state in writing on the land title that he was a subject of the Empire.<sup>393</sup>

Tensions had increased in some areas in the province of Basra between the governor of Bagdat, Nazım Paşa, and the Governor of Basra, Süleyman Nazif. The intrigues of Nazım Paşa and the Commadore of Basra Hikmet Bey had a great effect on Süleyman Nazif's resignation. With the arrival of his successor, Hüseyin Celal Bey, there had been an alarming increase in security over the river and in Basra. In November, assassinations and robberies were taking place at night and the new governor was too weak to control these disorders. Mubarak al-Sabah was offered an annual revenue of four hundred liras by Hüseyin Celal Bey to be district

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<sup>392</sup> Burcu Kurt, "Irak'ta "Muktedir" ve "Müşteki" Bir İttihatçı: Süleyman Nazif Bey'in Basra Valiliği," *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi (Journal of Academic Inquiries)*. Volume: 7, Number: 2, 2012, p. 162.

<sup>393</sup> BOA. MV, 174/52, Date: 11/Ra/1331 (18 April 1913).

governor of the Sublime Porte, but he rejected the offer.<sup>394</sup> Saadun Paşa had a great influence in the regions, thus the Turkish authorities had attempted to control the local Sheikhs through him. However, the failure of his expedition against the Dhaff tribe had shaken his prestige. Lowther stated that nine of the leading Sheikhs of the Bebur tribe created a revolt against Saadun Paşa because of his merciless acts of cruelty. The revolts attacked and blockaded him in Nasirieh, and in June a small Turkish force was sent, but it was a little hesitant in military operations. On 13 July, a mixed civilian and military commission was sent to investigate the situation in Basra.<sup>395</sup>

The decision of the commission was to arrest Saadun Paşa on board the Marmaris, after which he was sent to Bagdad. At the beginning of 1911, the conflict between Saadun Paşa and Sheikh Mubarak had resulted in peace. The local CUP had been almost absent in Basra with regard to political affairs. The governor of Basra, Celal Bey, was succeeded by Hasan Rıza Bey, who arrived in Basra on 20 September. Lowther stated that Celal Bey had never hidden his anti-foreign sympathies. On the other hand, the new governor was reported to be a rational and enlightened person.<sup>396</sup>

At the beginning of the year, the Governor of Mosul was almost under the control of a clique of corrupt notables, mostly members of the CUP, and prominent among them was Sabonji Paşa, who attempted to frustrate the Governor's honest attempts at reform. Saffet Bey was sent by Nazım Paşa to investigate the situation in Mosul, and three members of the administrative council of Suleymaniye were dismissed after the investigation. Due to expectations of justice in Mosul, a rise occurred against Nazım Paşa and foreign influence by the reactionary paper "Nijah". This led to the British Consul protesting against the governor, and the

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<sup>394</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1910*, p. 43.

<sup>395</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 36.

<sup>396</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.

Turkish editor regretted that he had accepted the paper for publication. Fresh elections were run to assist the administrative council in improving the situation which, as a result of repeated instructions by the Central government, had so far been ignored. After the new elections, Sabonji Paşa was required to withdraw from his position as governor of Mosul and Tahir Paşa was found to be appropriate for the role of new governor to carry out the envisaged reforms in the region. In September, some Christian shepherds were killed by the "Jelki" tribe of Kurds and an expedition was organised to crush them, but it was a failure and the crimes were left unpunished.<sup>397</sup>

## **1.5 The Loss of the Last Turkish Territory in Africa**

### **1.5.1 Tripoli**

Italy belatedly entered the race for colonisation, and to prove herself to the other imperialist powers, turned her eyes to Tripoli, which was a Turkish region in Africa. Italy claimed that the attitude of Turkish officials in Tripoli went against Italian interests, and the pretext for the invasion was an Italian attack on the last remaining territory in North Africa. Before the decision to occupy, the colonial countries were convinced by Italy of the importance of Italian interests and, after receiving assurances of neutrality from the Great Powers, Italy went ahead and occupied the region.<sup>398</sup>

The Italian press complained that the governor of Tripoli, İbrahim Paşa, and the other Turkish officials, exhibited a systematic hostility against Italian interests and the local Arab press complained about the wishes of the Italian consulate officials

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<sup>397</sup> Ibid.

<sup>398</sup> Abdurrahman Caycı, *Büyük Sahra'da Türk Fransız Rekabeti*, (Ankara: TTK Yay., 1995), pp. 100-115.

and Italian interests.<sup>399</sup> According to Lowther, a young Italian girl was abducted in Adana and forced to convert to Islam. Moreover, two Italian subjects were murdered in Derna and government officials failed to find the criminals, in addition to which, there was the prospect of changing the balance of power in the Mediterranean, and the Italian press insisted on claims for compensation to Italy in Tripoli. All this consequently resulted in the opening of war on Turkey.<sup>400</sup>

The Italian fleet left for Spezia on 22 September, and the British government was informed on 26 September that the Tripoli problem would not be delayed in reaching resolution by Italy, thus the Italian cruiser had been seen on the shores of Tripoli the day before the ultimatum, which was given to the Sublime Porte on 29 September 1911.<sup>401</sup> In the first days of the Tripoli War, the public were greatly surprised and asked for assistance from the Great Powers in stopping the war. Moreover, Germany knew exactly what the Italians had planned, and Hakkı Paşa's cabinet was accused of being negligent for not providing a good defense of Tripoli.<sup>402</sup>

On the same day, Hakkı Paşa's government of resigned due to their policies during the Italian war. Sultan Mehmet Reşad V ordered that Sait Paşa was given the authority to establish a new cabinet between September 1911 and 16 July 1912.<sup>403</sup> The new government of Turkey attempted to stop the Italian declaration of war by raining telegrams upon its ambassadors, and diplomatic notes upon the Great Powers, who as always did not even raise a finger in defense of Turkish sovereignty.<sup>404</sup>

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<sup>399</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 38.

<sup>400</sup> Ibid.

<sup>401</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

<sup>402</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 4.

<sup>403</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 2.

<sup>404</sup> Feroz Ahmad, "War and Society under the Young Turks, 1908-18", Albert Habib Hourani, Philip Shukry Khoury and Mary Christina Wilson (eds), *Modern Middle East: A Reader*, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 1993), p. 128.

The Sublime Porte should not have relied on the friendship of any foreign states, because when the opportunity arose, undoubtedly they would immediately share out the Turkish territories among themselves, and even the states who seemed friendly towards the Ottoman Empire were waiting to for their chance to stab it in the back with a dagger. The Italians, who had battled in Tripoli, had become instruments of policy for the Italian government, and the Ottoman Empire should not expect any assistance, even from Britain.<sup>405</sup>

It was reported that the Sublime Porte had acted against the interests of Italy in Tripoli, which would be occupied by the Italians within 24 hours, and the invasion should be accepted unconditionally by Turkey. However, this ultimatum was not answered satisfactorily by the Sublime Porte, and without waiting for any answer, Italy declared war on 30 September 1911.<sup>406</sup> Lowther explained that the Turkish ambassador in London was begging for Britain intervention, but he was told Italy was an ally of Britain and it was indicated that the Sublime Porte should seek help from Austria and Germany.<sup>407</sup> Moreover, Hüseyin Cahit, who was an unofficial spokesman for the CUP, pointed out that if Germany would not deter her alliance to Italy from the Tripoli War with intervention on behalf of Turkey, then Turkey should begin to lean towards the Triple Entente.<sup>408</sup>

A telegram was sent to the German Emperor by the Sultan, in response to which a telegram was sent stating that it was not possible for Germany to provide intervention, but Turkey would be able to defend their piece of land as their glory. The Sultan was supremely despondent with the German Emperor's response, and even Sait Paşa asked the Turkish cabinet the management of Tripoli would be

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<sup>405</sup> BOA. HR. TO, 542/104, Date: 21/Z/1329 (13 December 1911).

<sup>406</sup> Ferdinand Schevill, *The History of the Balkan Peninsula: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, (Now York: Harcourt, Brace and Company 1922), p. 469.

<sup>407</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 38.

<sup>408</sup> Feroz Ahmad, "The Historical Background of Turkey's Foreign Policy," in Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis (Eds), *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 9-33.

given to Italy same as Britain in Egypt, but he envisaged dealing with this issue after he became Grand Vizier. Hakkı Paşa resigned on the same day that Italy declared war, and Sait Paşa was appointed as the new Grand Vizier, immediately after which a telegram was sent to the Turkish ambassador, Tevfik Paşa, about the administration of Tripoli. But in response, Britain stated that it was too late for to do this.<sup>409</sup>

Italy's movement was a pirate attack on Tripoli, and the Italian government carried out this attack leading to the invasion of Tripoli in order to prevent the grip of the British in Egypt and France in Tunis. It seemed that the triple alliance would probably also join the movement in Tripoli. It was claimed that the Italian war had been arranged by the European powers against Muslim independency. Moreover, it was pointed out that when the Ottoman Empire established its constitutional administration, it was always attacked by the states. For example, in 1877 Russia had declared war against Turkey and Italy had also declared war in the same way.<sup>410</sup>

The Great Powers declared that they were neutral in the Italian war, and Britain would allow military operations and shipments on Egyptian territory or in its waters. Sait Paşa tried to persuade the great powers to stop the war but he was not successful. Italy announced that Tripoli would not evacuate under any circumstances by them, whereas Turkey could not consent to losing any piece of land.<sup>411</sup>

Turkey then claimed that all the Italian subjects in Turkish territories would be deported and, especially in Selanik, boycotts of Italian goods began and customs duty had been increased by one hundred percent. With Italy's declaration of war,

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<sup>409</sup> İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnal, *Son Sadrazamlar*. 2. Vol. (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1982), pp. 1085-86.

<sup>410</sup> BOA. HR. TO, 542/115, Date: 6/M/ 1330 (27 December 1911).

<sup>411</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 39.

the Italians were no longer allowed to purchase property in the Turkish territories and Italian post offices were closed by the Sublime Porte, who also decided to prevent even Italian financial institutions, such as the Italian Bank. Orders were submitted to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance, Agriculture and Trade to take further actions to fulfill all these orders.<sup>412</sup>

From the beginning of the war, Turkey was expected to lose control of the sea and the Sublime Porte could not send the reinforcement force to the Turkish forces in Tripoli, where events were rapidly developing and there was panic in the town on 1 October, when many Jews and Maltese inhabitants took refuge in the British consulate. The Turkish authorities had refused to surrender on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of the month, after which the town was bombarded, and two days later they occupied the town without much force.<sup>413</sup>

Neşet Bey, who was deputy commander in Tripoli, pulled his forces towards the inner part of the town to be prepared to defend that area. On the other hand, cholera began to appear and rumours were spreading about a dispute between the Arabs and the Turks.

On 12 October, the first Italian garrison of about fifteen thousand troops under the control of General Caneva was landed and the representatives of the five great powers in İstanbul said that they could do nothing to stop the war. However, there was great concern about the spread of the war in the Balkans, because the Turkish destroyer Preveza was sunk by the Italians on the coast of Albania, and this made Austria very worried.<sup>414</sup>

The troops were sent to Yemen, Asir and Albania to prevent revolts in these regions and, after the declaration of Italian war, the money required for measures to be taken in Rumelia could not be provided until the beginning of the year,

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<sup>412</sup> BOA. MV, 159/129, Date: 19/Za/1329 (18 November 1911).

<sup>413</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 39.

<sup>414</sup> Ibid.



therefore a draft law was submitted to Parliament for approval for a supplementary payment of fifty million piasters for the Ministry of War.<sup>415</sup>

Turkey took measures to prevent the landing of Italian troops, and Turkish troops were immediately sent to the Yanya and Thessaly provinces. On the other hand, there was alarm in Greece, and two battalions of soldiers were shipped to Arta, a city in northwestern Greece.<sup>416</sup> Austria's ambassador in Rome made a strong statement against Italy, but the Italian government declared that their request was only to send troops to be landed in Tripoli, and did everything to keep the peace in the Balkans. Turkey pointed out that the military shipments were made by them only to protect the borders, and Greece's fears disappeared. Turkish officials were deported by the Italians after the invasion of Tripoli. In contrast, the Italians could not benefit from the capitulations and all Italian journalists in the country were ordered to leave Turkey within twenty four hours. While these events were occurring, the British government concentrated in securing the impartiality of the Red Sea. The Italian government's aim was to exclude Turkey from the Red Sea, and prevented them who sending munitions of war or troops via the Hicaz railway, Suez Canal and the Mediterranean.<sup>417</sup>

There had been violent battles in Tripoli and at the Tobruk Fortress, and Derna and Khoms were captured by the Italians towards the middle of October. On 18 October when Italian forces landed on the coast of Juliana, they were attacked by the Turks and Arabs, and as a result the Italians were repelled, with a loss of 200 men and many wounded. On the other hand, Bingazi had suffered a bombardment and the town was seized by the Italians on 21 October. The British Consulate was damaged and there were many deaths in the town from the bombardment by Italy. Lowther pointed out that when the Arabs remained in the town on 23 October, it

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<sup>415</sup> BOA. MV, 159/113, Date: 19/Za/1329 (18 November 1911).

<sup>416</sup> Lowther, Annual of 1911, p. 39.

<sup>417</sup> Ibid., p. 40.

caused the Italians to believe that the local Senussi Arabs, who would be satisfied with the new Italian authority, hoped to get rid of the Turks, however, the Muslim religious leaders in the region declared a jihad against the infidel invaders and started a guerrilla campaign against the Italian forces.<sup>418</sup> The Arabs rushed out of their houses and attacked the Italians in the narrow and winding streets. The result of this attack was the deaths of three hundred out of four hundred Italian soldiers.<sup>419</sup> After this attack, the Italian authorities implemented a policy of general disarmament among the Arabs in Tripoli, and the rebels who attacked the Italian forces, including women and children, were brutally shot. This massacre was mentioned in some parts of the African continental press and in the British press, and the Sublime Porte protested to the Great Powers.<sup>420</sup> When the Turkish officers were the head of the resistance forces in Tripoli, they began regular attacks against the Italian forces.<sup>421</sup>

On 26 October, a conflict occurred in Burmeliana Wells and Hany. Neşet and Ali Fethi Beys had armed forces consisting of nine thousand Turkish and Arab troops who attacked the Italians and broke down the Italian's line in the center. It was a great blow to Italy, but the Turks were repelled with approximately one thousand deaths.<sup>422</sup> The Italians lost thirteen officers, and three hundred twenty-one soldiers and one hundred and forty-two men were wounded.<sup>423</sup>

Lowther pointed out that aircraft had been used by the Italians for the first time in the history of the war and it was of great value in determine the position of the enemy. The Italians embarked on an adventure that would be confronted by great

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<sup>418</sup> Ibid., ; Bosworth, *the end of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 58.

<sup>419</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 40

<sup>420</sup> Ibid.

<sup>421</sup> İsrail Kurtcephe, "Trablusgarb'ın İtalyanlarca İşgali, Mustafa Kemal Ve Arkadaşlarının Direnişe Katılmaları", *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, 2. vol. no.6, (1990), pp. 361-375.

<sup>422</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 40.

<sup>423</sup> Kurtcephe, *Trablusgarb'ın İtalyanlarca İşgali*, p. 374.

difficulties in large areas of desert and in inland areas. According to Lowther, Italy had the chance to make peace on favorable terms while leaving the Sultan with only a shadow of sovereignty. There was not even a decisive victory, and the annexation of Bingazi and Tripoli was declared by Italy on 6 November, but the conflict continued.<sup>424</sup>

This annexation decision led to strong reactions in Turkey and the Great Powers immediately protested. Italy did not even have domination over two regions located on the beach while they declared the annexation, and dared not venture beyond the range of their ships' guns.<sup>425</sup> If the Great Powers recognised the Italian annexation of the two regions in North Africa, a capitulation would be denounced by Turkey. Meanwhile, Italy desired to put more pressure on the Sublime Porte by spreading the war to the Dardanelles and the Aegean Sea. The movement seemed to increase gradually in the Balkans. Many of the Turkish soldiers were concentrated at the Bulgarian borders, thus Bulgaria also seemed concerned about this and when the Turkish troops withdraw from borders, Bulgaria threatened Turkey with mobilisation. Thereupon, assurances were sent to Bulgaria by Turkey who pointed out that it was a pre-determined programme of training and instruction for the reservists. However, hostilities occurred on the European shore of Turkey and the Aegean Sea that could easily cause new confusion in these territories.<sup>426</sup>

Turkey was afraid of a possible Italian attack in the Dardanelles, thus they appealed to the great powers to prevent this, upon the great powers proclaimed that if it was deemed necessary, and they would have to take defensive measures.<sup>427</sup>

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<sup>424</sup> Hale Şıvgın, *Trablusgarp Savaşı ve 1911-1912 Türk-İtalyan İlişkileri*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1989), p. 96.

<sup>425</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1911*, p. 40.

<sup>426</sup> Ibid.

<sup>427</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

The closing of the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus would have a great effect on British interests and the interests of other neutral powers, and in the case of any action taken by Italy in terms of attacks on İstanbul and the Straits, the great powers would impose sanctions against Italy. The towns of Moka, Port Said Sheikh and Aqaba were bombarded by the Italians, whereupon – as usual – the Sublime Porte protested to the Great Powers.<sup>428</sup>

It was estimated that eighteen million liras was needed for the defense of the Straits, İzmir, Selanik, Erzurum and Edirne. This amount was paid at about two thousand three hundreds-odd liras annually over eight years in a number of installments. The rapid fire weapons required for the defense of the Dardanelles supplying about four hundreds liras. In the 1911 expenditures for war, it was decided to create a budget of one hundred and seventy-three million piasters. Heavy artilleries were required in order to protect the Straits, İzmir, Selanik and Erzurum from enemy attacks, and it was intended that they be supplied in 1912. An estimate could not be made as to when the Italian war would end, and it was pointed out that, when the Italians were confronted with difficulties they would probably attack the above-mentioned places, therefore the Sublime Porte should take some measures against this. It was clear that this required about two million and two hundred piasters and it was agreed that a request would be submitted to the Ministry of Finance.<sup>429</sup>

The situation reached an impasse in Tripoli and the Italian government no longer had any desire for carrying hostilities further, because the Turkish forces were continuously supported by troops and guns from the borders of Tunisia and Egypt.<sup>430</sup> The British government, however, took account of Italy's complaints and assurances were given to Italy, because Egypt was under British mandate and, for

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<sup>428</sup> Ibid.

<sup>429</sup> BOA. MV, 166/43, Date: 11/B/1330 (December 11, 1912).

<sup>430</sup> Lowther, Annual of 1911, p. 41.

declaring neutrality, the Turks would not be allowed to receive assistance through these territories. The Egyptian government had taken strict measures for the implementation of a neutral policy, which had caused increased reactions from the Turks, because Germany and Austria, who were Italy's allies, proclaimed their neutrality and allowed troops and munitions of war to pass through their regional dominance. Therefore, there were several articles in the Turkish press that exhibited hostile attitude towards the British government.<sup>431</sup>

At the end of December, a proposal was suggested by the Russian government, which explained that there should be a declaration of ceasefire between Turkey and Italy, in addition to which Turkey should withdraw their troops from Tripoli without signing or including any agreement. Thereafter, Italy should pay compensation to Turkey and then the Great Powers would recognise this annexation.

On 26 November, the combined Italian forces started to move forward with the result that the Turkish and Arab forces were completely discharged from the oasis. Towards the end of the year, though the Italians began to move slowly in Tripoli, Zanzur was captured on 17 December, but Italian troops were withdrawn in significant losses in the battle at Bir Tobras on 19 December. Lowther pointed out that both Turkey and Italy believed that the continuation of the war did not cost them anything and there was nothing to lose for Italy.<sup>432</sup>

On the other hand, the Tripoli War was seen as an opportunity for the Balkan states to create a Great Bulgaria, Great Serbia, and Great Greece, thus they began to act out their mission. This is why Turkey had to abandon Tripoli, which is located hundreds of miles away from the mainland, as the Balkans were very close to the Turkish capital. Therefore, they must have all their powers and concentration focused on the Balkans. As a result, the Sublime Porte was not able to protect

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<sup>431</sup> Ibid.

<sup>432</sup> Ibid., pp. 41-42.

North Africa against Italy, and Turkey was forced to sign the Peace Treaty of Ouchy with Italy in 1912. Moreover, it was pointed out that Russia was the biggest enemy of Turkey and the Eastern Army Commander, Abdullah Paşa, should launch an offensive against the Bulgarians. And if the Sultan wanted to save European Turkey, Enver Paşa should be recalled from Tripoli, and it was necessary that he should become a commander of the Turkish troops in Balkans.<sup>433</sup>

### **1.5.2 Italy's Tripoli War**

There was no further need for a war in Turkey. Turkey's activities during the war in Tripoli had always been limited in terms of money, weapons, ammunition, and officers in the Turkish-Arab forces, in addition to which Turkey's role had very little influence in Tripoli. However, the Turkish-Arab forces made brave attacks against the Italians, but this provided practically no benefit in terms of changing Tripoli's position.<sup>434</sup> The Sublime Porte was confronted with numerous difficulties in undertaking the defense of Tripoli, because Britain did not allow Turkey to send its troops to Tripoli through Egypt, which was already occupied by Britain, and she had declared her neutrality in the event of a war between Turkey and Italy.

Moreover, Turkey was not able to send their troops through the seas, because the Italian naval force was more powerful than the Turkish, who therefore could not undertake a successful war against the Italians in Tripoli.<sup>435</sup> Under these circumstances, Turkey decided to send in some young general staff officers –Enver Bey, Mustafa Kemal Bey and Fethi Bey – for defense organisation in Bingazi, Tripoli and Derna.<sup>436</sup>

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<sup>433</sup> BOA. HR. TO, 543/1, Date: 24/Z/1330 (4 December 1912).

<sup>434</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 12.

<sup>435</sup> Sina Akşin, *Siyasal Tarih (1908-1923)* in *Türkiye Tarihi - Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980*, 4th vol., Ed.Sina Akşin, (İstanbul: Cem Yayınları, 2009), p. 37.

<sup>436</sup> Erickson, *Defeat in Detail*, p. 73.

Nicolae Batzaria, a Vlach from Macedonia, stated that the senior officials in İstanbul believed that Turkey could not resist for more than fifteen days in Tripoli due to a lack of weapons and troops. However, as in Enver, many of the officers already knew the rules of guerrilla warfare from their struggle with the Christian nationalists in Macedonia pre-1908 and a small number of Turkish officers and agents, who understood the importance of public support, were organised to resist the Italian forces, who never conquered the inner lands of Tripoli.<sup>437</sup>

A few ports in Arabia were bombarded, the eastern coast of the Red Sea was blockaded, and Seyyid Idris, who was the head of the revolt in Asir, was supported, in addition to which the Turkish warship was sunk in Beirut, which had suffered damage due to the bombardments from Italy.<sup>438</sup>

In the meantime, the Great Powers were busy discussing the Russian suggestion towards the end of 1911 and, after a tedious exchange of views, agreed to ascertain at Rome on what terms Italy would be disposed to conclude peace, and, subsequently, if those terms seemed to offer a possible basis for mediation, to make a similar demarche at İstanbul. Turkey was confronted with the Italian war, and immediately after with the Balkan war, throughout the whole year. Some Ottoman cabinet members defended peacemaking, but some chauvinistic members were in favour of the war. If Italy had not declared war on Turkey, it would have resulted in the end of the CUP and, no matter how much damage the war caused to Turkey, they were secretly pleased, because the CUP again had a chance to revive its effect on the administration of the government.<sup>439</sup>

After the elections were held in February, the Sultan reopened the Assembly on 18 April 1912, and he stated that the Sublime Porte wished for peace with Italy,

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<sup>437</sup> Kemal H. Karpat, "The Memoirs of N. Batzaria: the Young Turks and Nationalism, *International Journal of Middle Eastern*, volume. 6 (1975), pp. 276-99.

<sup>438</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 12.

<sup>439</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5. ; Ahmed Feroz, *İttihat ve Terakki (1908-1914)*, Trans. Nuran Yavuz (İstanbul: Kaynak, 1995), p. 118.

who attacked their capital and the Dardanelles on the first day of the Assembly. However, before the Italian attack on the Dardanelles, which was heavily mined by the Turks, the Sublime Porte decided to close the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to foreign commercial vessels. There were about 140 vessels being shut out into the Straits and approximately the same number of vessels were waiting outside to enter the Straits. Representatives of the great powers stated that the Straits must be reopened for foreign commercial vessels.<sup>440</sup>

When Turkey had been feeling the need to completely shut down the Straits, she had legitimate rights to do so in accordance with previous circumstances. However, after the complete closure of the Dardanelles, the incoming foreign merchant ships were allowed to pass through the Straits with the guides.<sup>441</sup>

Nonetheless, the Sublime Porte was ordered to avoid the necessity of reopening, because the Straits was crucially important for the protection of Turkey. If the Great Powers wanted to reopen the Straits, they would give a guarantee there would be no further attack by Italy, but the Great Powers did not have such a consideration, because it would interfere with the rights of a belligerent country. However, in this regard the Sublime Porte was especially dependent on Russia, and the Straits were reopened on 16 May, despite the attack on the Dardanelles and the occupation of Rhodes with twelve islands in the Aegean. There was also another issue that an attack on İzmir or the Dardanelles may be contemplated, thus measures were put in place to satisfy the public purpose, with 35,000 soldiers stationed in the south of Gallipoli and sixty thousand troops were collected around İzmir.<sup>442</sup>

In addition, if Italy was successful in their two attempts at crossing the Dardanelles it may lead to a siege of İstanbul, and Turkey may lose the whole of

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<sup>440</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 13.

<sup>441</sup> BOA. MV, 164/39, Date: 18/Ca/1330 ( 5 May 1912), see Appendix X.

<sup>442</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 13.



Rumelia. The Sublime Porte took into account the possibility that, after the first Italian attack on 18 April 1912, Turkey had immediately taken action to strengthen its defenses of the Bosphorus. For this purpose, there were a large number of torpedoes and cannons purchased from Germany, and there was an increase in the number of troops tasked to defend the Straits. After the Italian onslaught, the Ministry of War and the Naval Ministry reviewed their deficiencies to draw up new plans for the defense of the Straits.<sup>443</sup> Turkish military expenditure increased steadily in response to the requirements of the Italian war, and Asım and Nail Beys were more cautious as Ministers in favour of peace. However, the idea of a European Conference, which had been constructively discussed in Rome, was explored in İstanbul, despite the increasing tendency to investigate some means of composing the dispute.<sup>444</sup>

Lowther tried to explain the situation by giving a few examples; "the cession to Italy of the whole coast, except one port to be reserved together with the hinterland to Turkey; the exchange of Libya for the Italian possessions, or part of them, in the Red Sea; the annexation of Libya to Egypt, and its administration by Italy on the lines of the British control in Egypt; or the declaration of the independence of the African provinces which Italy could then deal with as she pleased".<sup>445</sup> Turkey's internal affairs were also in a desperate situation, and peace should be achieved no matter the cost, but the treasury's condition was extremely poor.

Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa's cabinet was to ensure public order in Albania, and made reforms in Macedonia. He intended not to leave the Balkan states under the pretext of war. Therefore, negotiations were resumed at the end of September at Ouchy in Switzerland. After that the Balkan states immediately declared

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<sup>443</sup> İsmail Kurtcebe, *Türk-İtalyan İlişkileri 1911-1916*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1995), p. 312.

<sup>444</sup> Lowther, *Annual of 1912*, p. 13.

<sup>445</sup> Ibid.

mobilisation, and they started to send their troops to the Turkish frontier. The CUP interpreted student and public demonstrations as being in favour of war. The Montenegro government declared war on Turkey on 8 September 1912, and the Balkan war began. Then, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece declared war on Turkey. Under these circumstances, the Sublime Porte signed the Treaty of Ouchy with Italy on 12 October, to not fight on two fronts, and Tripoli and Bingazi were left to the Italians.<sup>446</sup> After that, the violence of the Balkan war began.

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<sup>446</sup> Hafız Hakkı Paşa. *Bozgun*, pp. 19-20.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **OBSERVATIONS ON TURKEY AS PER THE ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES OF TURKEY, 1910-1914**

#### **2.1 Understanding the Tripoli War**

Turkish-Italian relations had deteriorated continuously throughout 1910. The new regime in Turkey initially had not been inspired with much confidence as reported by the Italian diplomatic and consular officers in İstanbul. The establishment of the constitutional government in Turkey had the acceptance of Italy, who were not guaranteed to gain any financial advantages over the Turkish territories.<sup>447</sup>

In February 1910 Count Guicciardini, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, asked the Italian Parliament what they should do to protect the interests of Italy in Tripoli, and he replied that the Turkish territory in North Africa was strategically the most important, in terms of balancing of the powers in the Mediterranean and maintaining the integrity of Turkish territories in Africa, which had always been the Italian foreign policy, and this now became more important for Italy than ever before. The new regime in Turkey guaranteed that any infringement of the rights of the Ottoman subjects would not be tolerated.<sup>448</sup>

According to George W. Buchanan, the British ambassador at Petersburg, with the outbreak of the Tripoli War, Russia had declared its neutrality and the most important issue for her was not to damage the peace in the Balkans. The Russian ambassador in İstanbul was to personally guarantee İstanbul to Turkey on behalf

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<sup>447</sup> Rennell Rodd to Sir Edward Grey, 24 January 1911, Confidential, FO/881/9780. *Annual Report on Italy for 1910*, p. 7.

<sup>448</sup> Ibid. p. 8.

of the Russian government, and in return the Russian navy would have free passage into the Dardanelles Strait.<sup>449</sup>

Together with the rebellion in Albania, serious complaints began to arise in the Balkans and this gave Austria the opportunity to play a dominant role in these regions. M. Sazonof suggested that the solution between Italy and Turkey would be as follows: the Great Powers would mediate between them and persuade them to cease fire. To Italy, making a peace treaty with Turkey and officially leaving Tripoli and Cyrenaica was like Turkey was humiliated, thus they should be asked to withdraw troops from these regions, and it would be recommended Turkey receive compensation from Italy in return for these two regions. Sazonof believed that Italy would accept this solution. The Great Powers were to put serious pressure on Turkey to accept this proposal.<sup>450</sup> Russia was completely in favour of Italy during the Tripoli War and the closing of the Dardanelles damaged Russian trade, which had strengthened anti-Turkish sentiments in Russia.<sup>451</sup>

Fairfax L. Cartwright, the British ambassador in Vienna, stated that the Italian war over Tripoli was probably the original cause for the formation of the Balkan League against Turkey. There was no result from the mediation between Italy and Turkey, due to the Great Powers' different methods and thoughts on the war.<sup>452</sup> Moreover, Cartwright claimed that the continuation of the war in Tripoli should not cause complications in the Balkans, because there were good grounds to fear that the cause of insecurity towards the administration of the Young Turks was due to their incorrect Balkan policy, which would cause a civil war, and all the small Balkan states may be looking for an excuse to launch an attack on Turkey. On 17 July,

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<sup>449</sup> George W. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, 18 March 1912, Confidential, FO/881/10022. *Annual Report on Russia for 1911*, p. 5.

<sup>450</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>451</sup> George W. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, 17 January 1913, Confidential, FO/881/10175. *Annual Report on Russia for 1912*, p. 15.

<sup>452</sup> Fairfax L. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey, 15 February 1913, Confidential, FO/881/10244. *Annual Report on Austria-Hungary for 1912*, p. 15.

Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister, informed Cartwright that there was general dissatisfaction with the CUP and Sait Paşa's government throughout the army.<sup>453</sup>

Rumours continued that the next invasion of Italy would be on the islands of Chios and Mytilene, and the Sublime Porte was ordered to expel all the Italian subjects who lived in her territories, as a reprisal. The British ambassador in Rome, Rennell Rodd, stated that if such a step were taken, it should be abandoned and the Russian government were given assurances by Italy. And such a step would not occur, because Russia's concern was to show that the Sublime Porte may have another implied excuse to close the Straits. In any such case, if necessary, the Russian government must be given timely notice by Italy.<sup>454</sup>

In July, informal peace talks by the representatives of the Italian and Ottoman governments were launched in Switzerland and the negotiations between them were strictly confidential. Such discussions took place more than once, but they were rejected as semi-formal.<sup>455</sup>

According to Francis Elliot, the British ambassador in Athens, the Sublime Porte was ordered to mobilise the Turkish Nizam Divisions of Yanya and Kozani, while the Rediff divisions of Elbassan, Berat, and Yanya were called to duty with the outbreak of war with Italy. In addition to these, some of the reserves were assembled in Selanik. The Sublime Porte had the right to call up the Nizam and Rediff divisions, for the purpose of defense in the case of any possible Italian attack upon the Turkish territories, but it cannot be denied that these Turkish troops were conveniently placed for an invasion of Greece.<sup>456</sup> The mobilisation of Turkish troops

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<sup>453</sup> Ibid., pp. 16-17.

<sup>454</sup> Rennell Rodd to Sir Edward Grey, 18 February 1913, Confidential, FO/881/10194. *Annual Report on Italy for 1912*, p. 4.

<sup>455</sup> Ibid.

<sup>456</sup> Francis Elliot to Sir Edward Grey, 12 February 1912, Confidential, FO/881/10003. *Annual Report on Greece for 1911*, p. 3.

made the Greek government anxious, thus on 1 October, the Sublime Porte declared that all their acts were in defence of an Italian attack, and the Greek government was satisfied with this declaration, .<sup>457</sup>

On 8 October 1912, Montenegro declared war on Turkey, who was forced to ask for peace with Italy in Tripoli, because she could not fight on two fronts, despite Italy, who could not enter the interior parts of Tripoli, having the opportunity to formally annex the town. The annexation was recognised by Germany, Austria and Russia, and after a short time by Britain, but the recognition of France was delayed on 22 October, due to the regulation of the frontier in Tripoli and Tunus. Moreover, before the signing of the actual Treaty of Lausanne at Ouchy on 18 October 1912, the secret preliminaries of peace was signed by negotiators from both countries on the issue of Tripoli and Cyrenaica, on 15 October, and the mutual agreement was issued by an edict of the Sultan and a Royal Italian decree to pave the way for peace on 17 October.<sup>458</sup>

The Sultan's edict stated that the Sublime Porte was no longer able to defend the people of Libya from the devastating war which should be ended, because the Balkan Union was established by the small Balkan countries to act together against Turkey, for the creation of their own great national states by addressing the land of the Turks in the Balkan Peninsula. Thus the Sultan's edict explained that it had been decided to give full autonomy to the people of Libya, and the new government would respect their religious and traditional practices as before. Furthermore, Mehmet Şemseddin who was appointed as the Naib of Sultan for five years<sup>459</sup> in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, was tasked with representing the interests of all

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<sup>457</sup> Ibid.

<sup>458</sup> Ibid.

<sup>459</sup> İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal İnal-Hüseyin Hüsameddin, "Evkaf-ı Hümayun Nezaretinin Kuruluş Tarihi ve Nazırlarının Hal Tercümeleri V", (Simplified by Nazif Öztürk), *Vakıflar Dergisi*, vol. XIX (Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1985), pp. 61-89.

the Ottomans in these territories. Islamic laws would be implemented across the country and the "Kadi" would be appointed by the Sultan.<sup>460</sup>

According to a Royal Italian decree, a general amnesty would be declared to the people of Libya for their acts of hostility against Italy, who gave assurances about the freedom of religious rights of Muslims, and for the Sultan's name which would be included in public prayers as the Caliph. The appointment of a representative by the Sultan would be recognised and the salaries would be paid by local revenues. The administration of Waqfs maintained its rights and the appointment of a religious chief would be nominated by SheikhuIslam.<sup>461</sup>

When the Treaty of Lausanne was signed on 18 October 1912, the hostilities were to be put an end and Turkey's civilian officials and troops would be recalled from Tripoli and Cyrenaica. In return for this, the Aegean islands would be transferred – by Italy as an occupying power – to Turkey. The prisoners and hostages of war would be released and exchanged. The complete amnesty was to be announced to the inhabitants of Libya and the Aegean islands. Moreover, both countries would sign a commercial treaty to include the abolition of the capitulations, and the increase in Turkey of a tariff duties on Italian goods from 11 per cent to 15 per cent. Rennell stated that the terms of the treaty were faithfully carried out by Turkey and some good progress was made to defuse the tension in Tripoli at the end of the year.<sup>462</sup>

On the other hand, there had been little or no progress made yet in Cyrenaica, and a small body of regulars, who were attempting to support and organise the Arab resistance and were most probably unwilling to obey the orders from İstanbul, desired to continue to be forcible because they did not want to leave Tripoli in the hands of Italy, and some of the locals who came together to continue to fight

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<sup>460</sup> Rennell, *Annual for Italy in 1912*, p. 5.

<sup>461</sup> Ibid.

<sup>462</sup> Ibid., pp. 6-7.

against Italy. Even though Italy had agreed with the Sublime Porte, there was no doubt that many troubles facing the Italians still needed to be dealt with.<sup>463</sup> The war resulted in leaving Tripoli and Bingazi in the enemy's hands and both these territories were to become Italian colonies.

Henry Bax-Ironside, the British ambassador at Sophia, claimed that an article in the Bulgarian opposition press pointed out that the Italian war would leave Turkey in a difficult situation and would cause problems in the European part of Turkey. The Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Aehrenthal, hoped that, as a result of the Italian action in Tripoli and in Cyrenaica, there would not be any disturbances in the Balkans.<sup>464</sup> However, his hopes were dashed, and war erupted in the Balkans after the Tripoli War.

## **2.2 The Balkan Situation before the First World War**

The more radical political parties in Bulgaria were in close contact with the Albanian rebels and this became apparent from the negative impact on Turkish-Bulgarian relations. However, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Aleksandar Malinov, gave assurances to Asım Bey, the Turkish ambassador in Sophia that they were not attempting to benefit from Turkey's current difficulties in Albania and the Crete question.<sup>465</sup>

In the middle of May 1910, according to Lindley, the British Consul-General at Selanik, the tyrannies of Turkish soldiers caused a certain number of men to take to the mountains, and he foresaw that if these methods continued, it would create some serious trouble for the Turkish authorities in the Balkan Peninsula in the near future. The Sublime Porte had been working to clear Macedonia from the

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<sup>463</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>464</sup> Henry Bax-Ironside to Edward Grey, 20 January 1912, Confidential, FO/881/9987. *Annual Report on Bulgaria for 1911*, p. 6.

<sup>465</sup> Francis O. Lindley to Sir Edward Grey, 29 January 1911, Confidential, FO/881/9808. *Annual Report on Bulgaria for 1910*, p. 6.



Bulgarians, who were subjected to all kinds of repression and torture and forced to emigrate, and a large number of Muslim immigrants were settled in their midst, thus the Bulgarian population was troubled by the immigration policy of the Sublime Porte, and life was rapidly becoming impossible for the Christian inhabitants in Macedonia.<sup>466</sup>

The Russian Foreign Minister, M. Isvolsky, had his so-called plan in order to maintain peace in the Balkans by creating a Balkan Union under the leadership of the Sublime Porte. However, according to Cartwright, the British Ambassador in Vienna, the plan was in fact to target Austria-Hungary, and Austrian Foreign Minister Count Aehrenthal was aware of the plan and attempted to weaken it by detaching Turkey from the Balkan states and he was able to gain Austria-Hungary to the side of Turkey, and that must give moral support to the Young Turks' regime to accomplish Count Aehrenthal's mission, because the new regime in Turkey "was still in its infancy and struggling hard to throw out roots in the Ottoman dominions".<sup>467</sup> In the spring of 1910, although Turkish forces were sent to quell the rebellion rising in Albania, they did not succeed in maintaining order there and, in the early days of this problem according to the foreign newspaper's, rumours flew about that the Albanian rebels were provoked by Austria-Hungary and that caused frustration in Turkey. However, Cartwright claimed that Count Aehrenthal had no reason to provoke the Albanian revolt, and there was no credence to reports from İstanbul that the uprising was encouraged by Austria-Hungary. Count Aehrenthal reported to Cartwright that if Turkey was late in taking military action, they would lose their prestige and could be forced to make extensive concessions to the Albanians; the long duration of the rebellion in Albania showed the inadequacy and incompetence of the Turkish army.<sup>468</sup>

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<sup>466</sup> Ibid.

<sup>467</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>468</sup> Ibid.

Count Aehrenthal constantly refused to touch the issue of the Cretan question over the past year, despite there being were many crises relating to this matter, and it could be said that Count Aehrenthal, with this attitude, had achieved his aim to abolish the idea of generating a Balkan Union under the auspices of Turkey. According to Cartwright, the present government in İstanbul, which had a wonderful friendly relationship with the Triple Entente, also had a tendency in the direction of the Triple Alliance.<sup>469</sup>

Cartwright stated that the best way forward on this issue was for the Great Powers to advise the Sublime Porte to act with moderation in Albania. Count Aehrenthal asserted that the Young Turks were only considering unifying the empire and crushing all resistance to create a new, purely Turkish, race from the antagonistic elements throughout the country. In his opinion, the Young Turks were going too fast to achieve this goal, but on the other hand they were creating dangerous challenges in the lands under Turkish domination, for example, in Yemen and in Albania. Count Aehrenthal was concerned that if the Albanian uprising continued to the extent of the Turkish military operation it may cause Turkish public opinion to allege that Austria-Hungary secretly supported the rebellion, and this would cause a rift between Vienna and İstanbul, as well as between Vienna and Italy.<sup>470</sup>

According to the British ambassador in Vienna, when the Sublime Porte could not obtain loans from France and Britain, the loans were provided by Germany and Austria-Hungary, and this would ensure the progress of friendly relations between them. But according to rumours, Turkey would join the Triple Alliance, and the Grand Vizier, Hakki Paşa, informed Cartwright that Turkey had friendly relations with Germany and Austria-Hungary, despite the fact that Turkey did not participate

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<sup>469</sup> Ibid., pp. 7-8.

<sup>470</sup> Ibid., pp. 8-9.

in the Triple Alliance, and he declared that this participation would not provide benefits for Turkey.<sup>471</sup>

When the election was held by the CUP, the result did not satisfy Count Aehrenthal, because Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa, who was replaced by Hakkı Paşa as Grand Vizier, was satisfied with his sympathy and this meant that the new regime, according to him, took a step back rather than a step forward. Count Aehrenthal believed that the fall of Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa would weaken the future prestige of the Sublime Porte in the Balkans and Europe, and may make it more difficult for Turkey to negotiate with them. However, Cartwright highlighted that Count Aehrenthal officially continued to show the same friendly feelings towards Hakkı Paşa as he did for his predecessor.<sup>472</sup>

Cartwright stated that at the beginning of 1911 some things were not going well in İstanbul, and thus the new regime was losing its position with each passing day rather, than strengthening it throughout Turkey. There, however, remained high levels of dissatisfaction against the Sublime Porte since the previous year's riots, which took place in Macedonia and Albania. Count Aehrenthal wished to preserve peace in the Balkans, and he was concerned about a threat to that peace, whether from Turkey or the Balkan states.<sup>473</sup>

Cartwright explained that in early June, the situation in Albania had become worse, and the Turks were moving very slowly in suppressing the rebels. He pointed out that public indignation was arising in Europe regarding the cruelties committed in those regions by the Turks during the military operation against the rebels who fled across the border into Montenegro, and were followed by the Turkish forces to the Montenegrin frontier, which may have threatened peace in

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<sup>471</sup> Ibid.

<sup>472</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>473</sup> Fairfax L. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey, 11 February 1912, Confidential, FO/881/9998. *Annual Report on Austria-Hungary for 1911*, p. 17.

Europe.<sup>474</sup> Furthermore, Cartwright claimed that Count Aehrenthal was disappointed about the brutalities carried out by the Turks in Albania, although he did not say anything officially to the Sublime Porte. The British ambassador explained Aehrenthal's reasons: firstly, he believed that if Austria-Hungary was to act against the Sublime Porte it would be a bad example to all the Balkan states, because they were waiting for the right opportunity to attack Turkey; and secondly, if he intervened in the rebellion in Albania, his actions would be misunderstood in Italy, whose jealousy would be increased against the effect of Austrian in that part of the Adriatic.<sup>475</sup>

The immigration of the Serb inhabitants of the Berana district of the region of Novibazar had caused controversy with Turkey in the winter of 1910-1911. The situation deteriorated rapidly after the outbreak of the Malisor uprising in the early spring, and there was a significant threat over the course of the summer that Turkey could find herself in open conflict with Montenegro. Russia and then Austria-Hungary were put on alert and vowed to put pressure on the Sublime Porte, and the Malisors agreed to the concessions made to them and returned to their homes.<sup>476</sup>

The Sublime Porte began to pay attention to the Albanian Christians, and in the summer of 1910, powerful Turkish troops took action to disarm the inhabitants of the province of İşkodra under the command of Şevket Turgut Paşa. The Turkish army was moving from three sides: by the Drin valley in order to disarm the Shalja tribe, by Dibra to disarm the Mirdite, and by the valley of the Sem to disarm the Malisors.<sup>477</sup>

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<sup>474</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>475</sup> Ibid.

<sup>476</sup> Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey, 30 December 1911, Confidential, FO/881/9958. *Annual Report on Montenegro for 1911*, pp. 1-2.

<sup>477</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

The leaders of the tribes gave up their arms after being given promises by the Sublime Porte about the opening of schools and building of roads. These promises were not fulfilled, but "the Turkish officials began to arrive and put into operation laws which had been hitherto unknown in Albania respecting the levy of taxes, especially the "agnam", or "sheep-tax", and the enforcement of conscription. Sooner than submit to this treatment, many of the Malisors started to cross the Montenegrin frontier, and as they were hospitably received, the Sublime Porte thought it best to temporise; after some discussion between the Montenegrin government and Bedri Paşa, the Governor of İşkodra, a Turkish proclamation was published on 19 October, 1910, promising concessions to the refugees if they would return".<sup>478</sup>

Trouble erupted again in March and the Klementi tribe maintained their weapons, and some of the Turkish soldiers were enough to provoke violent actions from the tribe and more violent riots broke out at Tuzi. In military operations, the Turks were successful in isolating some of the tribes and the main part of the rebels had been exiled towards the border of Montenegro, where received a fresh immigration, and the rebels returned to their homes and began a long series of negotiations with the King of Montenegro and the Sublime Porte. In early April, the government of Montenegro informed the Great Powers of the difficulties caused by the presence of the Albanian refugees. After breaking the resistance of the insurgents at the end of May, the number of Turkish troops in northern Albania was increased, and the King of Montenegro made a further communication with the Great Powers for self-preservation. The army of Montenegro could be mobilised until a guarantee from the Great Powers was given to the King that they would not allow Turkish forces to turn their face against Montenegro.<sup>479</sup> King Nicholas declared that he was ready to convince the rebels if the fulfillment of the Sublime

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<sup>478</sup> Ibid.

<sup>479</sup> Ibid.

Porte's promises was guaranteed by the Great Powers. After detailed discussions, the Turkish Minister at Podgoritza was authorised to make verbal annotations, the most important of which being that "there should be a daily allowance of half a kilo of maize to each individual and that a Turkish lira should be given to each adult". Except for a few families from the tribe of Hoti, the Malisors returned to their country, and those who did not return to their homes claimed that, no matter the circumstances, they refused to live under Turkish sovereignty.<sup>480</sup>

Lowther noted that "the history of Montenegro is the story of a secular struggle against the Turkish invader". Montenegro's ammunition, armed with guns and supposed food aid for women and children were used for men who had escaped from Podgoritsa, and who were often active in the fight against the Turkish soldiers. It was pointed out that peace, however, could be achieved with the intervention of the King of Montenegro, and his recommendation to the Malisors was to accept the terms offered to them by the Sublime Porte. There was an improvement in terms of the solution of the problem of the Malisor uprising, whereby the two governments decided to form a mixed commission to organise the outstanding frontier conflicts that had been the cause of great strife and bloodshed for years.<sup>481</sup> However, this mixed frontier commission did not achieve the intended result in the autumn.

Russian Foreign Minister Sazonof told M. Danef, Prime Minister of Bulgaria, that "the Bulgarians were a young people, and the future of the Balkans was in their hands, however they must not spoil things by precipitation and, if they were to join Italy and make war on Turkey, Italy might make peace and leave them in the lurch. In any case they would not have the support of Russia."<sup>482</sup> The Russian minister in Sofia informed his government with an alarmist telegraph at the

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<sup>480</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>481</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>482</sup> Buchanan, *Annual on Russia for 1912*, p. 3.

beginning of July 1912 that Bulgaria was anxious about a military conspiracy in Turkey, and the Albanian uprising led to a dangerous movement in Bulgaria in favour of armed intervention.<sup>483</sup>

### **2.2.1 The Origins of the Balkan Wars**

The continuation of normal relations between Turkey and Russia would be prevented by the Slavs in the Balkans. Russia was alarmed that Bulgaria may occupy İstanbul during the First Balkan War, therefore the Bulgarian government was clearly stimulated by Russia regarding İstanbul, which would remain under Turkish sovereignty. However, Buchanan, the British ambassador at Petersburg, pointed out that if there were no resistance lines in Çatalca against Bulgarian progress, Russia's request to stop the Bulgarians would fail.<sup>484</sup>

Early in August 1912, the death of 12 people and a few injuries were caused by a bomb exploding at Kochana. An operation was launched by Turkish soldiers and polices in response to this attack to find the culprits. Meanwhile, the shopping areas were plundered by looters and “they were shot or trampled underfoot indiscriminately”. There were one hundred and twelve dead and over two hundred injured, and among these deaths, four Turks, two Jews and the remainder Bulgarian. The Bulgarian Minister in İstanbul was ordered to ask the Sublime Porte about the following three issues; for an impartial enquiry, for the prompt and exemplary punishment of the culprits, and for the adoption of adequate means to prevent any recurrence of such outrages.<sup>485</sup>

The Bulgarian press had called on the Bulgarian government saying it should be enraged and take energetic action regarding this massacre. The Sublime Porte sent

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<sup>483</sup> Ibid.

<sup>484</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>485</sup> Henry Bax-Ironside to Edward Grey, 14 January 1913, Confidential, FO/881/10524. *Annual Report on Bulgaria for 1912*, p. 10.

a commission of inquiry to the point, but the issue remained. On the other hand, M. Gueshof, the Bulgarian Agent in İstanbul, told the foreign representatives to make an effort to maintain friendly relations with the Sublime Porte despite the Kochana massacre. Protest meetings were held in the chief towns of South Bulgaria and Sophia. The most important of these meetings was held in Sophia on 13 August 1912, with an estimated thirty thousand people in attendance.<sup>486</sup>

In September and October, there was a congress of the CUP in Selanik that continued a policy of hostility towards Greece. They were even ready for the possibility of war with Greece, because she had not given up her desire for Crete and Epirus. According to Elliot, the British ambassador in Athens, however, a conciliatory policy was pursued by the Sublime Porte since the accession to power of Sait Paşa, the Grand Vizier. Moreover, Elliot asserted that the best proof of Sait Paşa's conciliatory stance was the attitude of Galib Kemali Bey, who was appointed in July 1911 at Athens as charge d'affaires, later becoming the Turkish ambassador at Athens from November 1913 to January 1919, and he had contributed greatly to the direction of the development of relations between the two countries. On the other hand, Venizelos also showed a sincere approach towards Turkey by avoiding Cretan oppressions, which would have created a state of war between Greece and Turkey. His attitude was having an impact on the Sublime Porte, who had been opposed to him a year ago, but now the government was in favour of him.<sup>487</sup>

Ralph Paget, the British ambassador in Belgrade, stated that Serbia completely took an aggressive stance on the war with Turkey, because her aim was to expand her territory in European Turkey, and succeeded in liberating her co-nationals from Turkish oppression and cruelty.<sup>488</sup> The Serbian government probably expressed its concern to the Sublime Porte about the disturbing situation in Macedonia, and its

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<sup>486</sup> Ibid.

<sup>487</sup> Ibid., pp. 4-5.

<sup>488</sup> Ralph Paget to Sir Edward Grey, 6 June 1913, Confidential, FO/881/10281. *Annual Report on Serbia for 1912*, p. 8.



anxiety about the wrongs inflicted on the Serb inhabitants in the region of Novibazar and the province of Kosova.<sup>489</sup>

Turkey predicted that Serbia had declared war on her, therefore some ninety truckloads of war material for shipment to Serbia was stopped by the Sublime Porte at Selanik in September. The Serbian government protested to the Sublime Porte, who asked to Serbia for assurance she would not use these war materials against Turkey. However, the Serbian government refused to give such an assurance and the discussion continued until the eruption of hostilities in the Balkans in October 1912.<sup>490</sup>

The Bulgarian Minister, M. Kalinkof, hoped that the Romanian government would be neutral in the case of an outbreak of war, and Titu Liviu Maioresco, the Prime Minister of Romania, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that Romania had not mobilised her army at the early stages of the war, and this was evidence of neutrality. She had not announced her neutrality in the current conflict as she did in the case of the Tripoli War. The following can be said about her sympathies to Turkey: the Romanian government was concerned to a certain extent, but she had been completely on Turkey's side. Moreover, the passage of military munitions for Turkey was concealed by the Romanian authorities, but her actual neutrality in the first Balkan war could be her apparent good intentions towards Turkey.<sup>491</sup>

When war was on the horizon at the beginning of October 1912, Romanian Prime Minister Maioresco explained Romania's attitude to George Head Barclay, the British ambassador at Bucharest, stating that she remained silent and had no intention of preparing for war, and would act in harmony as the Great Powers.

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<sup>489</sup> Ibid.

<sup>490</sup> Ibid.

<sup>491</sup> George Head Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, 4 January 1913, Confidential, FO/881/10161. *Annual Report on Romania for 1912*, pp. 1-2.

There was no sign of a tendency to prepare for mobilisation until the end of 1912, but Barclay pointed out that the truth was that Romania's military preparation during the whole term had somehow attracted attention from the outbreak of the First Balkan War.<sup>492</sup>

The formation of Great Bulgaria, which was the nightmare of the Romanian authorities in the Balkans, loomed on the horizon and, as a result, there were clearly signs of displeasure regarding the passive role played by the Romanian government in the First Balkan War, and rumours of the mobilisation of the Romanian army was strongly dismissed by the Romanian government. In a statement issued to the press on 29 October, the new coalition cabinet, which was at a meeting chaired by King Charles of Romania, decided that there was no need for such action. Rumours of Romanian's mobilisation suddenly began again, but this time she had every reason to think about mobilisation, because "if not encouraged, by government, who feel that with the fall of Edirne their leverage with Bulgaria would be lost, and who evidently think that a rattling of sabres is the best means of bringing the Bulgarian government to proceed without delay with the pending negotiations for the rectification of the Dobrudja frontier. At that time the atmosphere in Bucharest is unmistakably warlike".<sup>493</sup>

The attitude of the Romanian government in the First Balkan War wiped out the ordinary allegations of a secret military convention between Turkey and Romania. Before the outbreak of the Balkan War, the Romanian Minister at İstanbul was informed by the Sublime Porte that Turkish troops were concentrated in the region near the Bulgarian frontier, not only for manoeuvre purposes but also for the purpose of intimidating Bulgaria. Turkey desired Romania on her side and asked her to make some declaration that would frighten Bulgaria, but the Romanian government flatly refused the Turkish request. Nevertheless, Romanian

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<sup>492</sup> Ibid.

<sup>493</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

sympathies lay with Turkey in the Tripoli and First Balkan War. The neutrality of Romania in the Second Balkan War had hitherto been tinged with helpfulness towards Turkey. Both wars adversely affected trade for Romania and her exports was restricted in the ports of the Danube.<sup>494</sup> Turkey was given pressing advice by King Charles of Romania to immediately make peace with Italy and detach Greece from the Balkan League with the cession of Crete, and both belligerents were satisfied with his peace efforts. There were negotiations in İstanbul for the conclusion of a Turkish-Romanian commercial treaty during the summer, however they could not obtain any definitive conclusion due to an internal crisis in Turkey.<sup>495</sup>

In the middle of December 1912, the Montenegro government was in a less favourable position compared to her Balkan allies during the conclusion of the armistice. The Turkish frontier position at Tuzi was seized by the Montenegrins with the help of the Malisors and they did not face much resistance in taking Bijelopolie (Akova) and Plevlie (Taşlıca) in the region, and they attacked the Ipek, Plava and Gusinje together with her Serbian allies, and occupied Yakova, but their main purpose was the siege at İşkodra where they made little progress.<sup>496</sup> The German Minister at Çetine asked the Turkish commander of İşkodra, Hasan Rıza Paşa, to surrender their arms, but he rejected this request and continued fighting during the Peace Conference in London. After the murder of Hasan Rıza at the end of January, the Turkish troops were commanded by Esat Paşa, who was accused of Rıza's murder.<sup>497</sup> Numerous sources claimed that Hasan Rıza Paşa was murdered on the orders of Esat Toptani Paşa.

In 1912, Sazonof's policies were to ensure the continuity of peace between the Great Powers. He was given instructions by the Russian Tsar to provide any kind

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<sup>494</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>495</sup> Ibid.

<sup>496</sup> Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey, 10 March 1914, Confidential, FO/881/10422. *Annual Report on Montenegro for 1913*, pp. 1-2.

<sup>497</sup> Ibid., p. 2. ; Durham, M. Edith, *The Struggle for Scutari, (Turk, Slav, Albanian)*, (London: Edward Arnold, 1914), p. 254.

of assistance required to the Balkan states, but in this mission he should be careful not to push Russia into serious international complications.<sup>498</sup> Sazonof stated that Albania should be formed as an autonomous Turkish region, such as in Egypt, with the Prince of Egypt or the Governor-General. His fear was that Austria wanted İşkodra to be the capital of Albania and, as a defender, Austria may have the dominant influence on the Catholics. A very strong anti-Austrian feeling had developed in Russia and Sazonof could not give way about İşkodra without the full satisfaction of Serbia.<sup>499</sup>

There were disputes between Bulgaria and Serbia about sharing the spoils of the Turkish territories in Europe, and Sazanof telegraphed Sophia and Belgrade to become the mediator in the disputes between them. He warned the Balkan allies to send delegates to Petersburg regarding the situation in the Balkans, and the Russian Tsar also sent a telegram to the king of Bulgaria and Serbia, but this did not have much of an impact on the issue.<sup>500</sup> Sazonof's recommendation to the Great Powers was to prevent Turkey from withholding any territory beyond the line defined by the Treaty of London. He pointed out that a large fleet from the Great Powers would make a show of force against Turkey, who would be intimidated.<sup>501</sup>

Moreover, Sazonof told the British government that some of the Turkish ports should be put under siege and send a military shipment to the eastern Anatolia region; in this way, Turkey would be punished. He claimed that whatever the other Great Powers might say, Russia would never allow Turkey to recapture Edirne during the Second Balkan War, but later on he suggested that putting economic pressure on Turkey might be more appropriate. Sazonof was much more inclined to listen to the London and Paris counsels of moderation, and he suggested that

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<sup>498</sup> George W. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, 4 March 1914, Confidential, FO/881/10412. *Annual Report on Russia for 1913*, p. 2.

<sup>499</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>500</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>501</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

Turkey should be told that, unless it occupied Edirne, they would not receive any economic assistance. In addition, when the Turkish forces progressed beyond Maritza (Meric), this once again created severe cases, and so the French and British governments were asked to join Sazonof by calling back their ambassadors from İstanbul. Nevertheless, his appeal did not work, and the last movement of Turkey induced Russia to take severe measures and even to go to war against Turkey. Moreover, without waiting for a response from the British and French governments, Savonof was authorised by the Russian Tsar to recall his ambassador from İstanbul.<sup>502</sup>

Buchanan claimed that relations between Turkey and Russia were strained due to many reasons, for example, the reoccupation of Edirne and dispatch of the German Military Mission to İstanbul. However, although there was a significant improvement in relations between these two countries, it was difficult to predict how long it would last.<sup>503</sup>

When Turkey was defeated by the allied Balkan states, it caused feelings of anxiety in Vienna, having the same sense as the result of the Treaty of San Stefano at the gates of İstanbul on 3 March 1878.<sup>504</sup> The occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austrian troops was supported by Britain at the Congress of Berlin in 1878 due to a fear of the formation of a strong Slavic confederation under the auspices of Russian influence in the Balkans.<sup>505</sup>

The negotiations in London were terminated on 6 January 1913, and on 17 January the Great Powers sent a diplomatic note to the Sublime Porte stating that it should stop insisting on Edirne and the Aegean islands, otherwise the war would start again and Asiatic Turkey would also be jeopardised. In this case, the

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<sup>502</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>503</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>504</sup> Maurice de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, 19 February 1915, Confidential, FO/881/10543. *Annual Report on Austria-Hungary for 1913*, p. 2.

<sup>505</sup> Ibid.

European powers would remain neutral during the war, and Cartwright stated that this led to a military coup in Turkey on 23 January 1913 by the Young Turks, which caused the abandonment of all hope of peace. The hostilities between Turkey and the Balkan states recommenced on 3 February 1913.<sup>506</sup>

Serbia officially promised the Great Powers she would withdraw her troops from the Adriatic coast, in a communication in London on 8 January 1913, and this caused a relaxation of the tension between the countries. However, Austria-Hungary were not satisfied with that, because there were concerns over Albania between Russia and Austria. In particular, Austria saw İşkodra as the gateway to Northern Albania, and thus Montenegro could not be allowed to gain this town because she had a long deep-rooted patronage over the Catholic Albanians in that region. Russia began to feel that Austria was receiving support from Germany and she was acting in the direction of the Triple Alliance, and this would negatively affect relations between Russia and Germany. There was no sign of disarming from the side of Austria despite the Serbian promise, and this exasperated the Serbians.

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The Russian government had drawn the Great Powers attention to the sufferings of the civil population in the beleaguered towns of İşkodra, Yanya, and Edirne. On 13 March 1913, a collective representation was performed at Çetine, however, the Montenegrin government replied that only the foreign consuls and their countrymen were allowed to leave İşkodra.<sup>508</sup>

The British government warned the government of Montenegro about civil rights that, if they were exposed to ill treatment during the siege of İşkodra it could create a bad impression in London. There was a protest for bombardment by the embassy of Austria and, in accordance with the decision of the Conference of

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<sup>506</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>507</sup> Ibid.

<sup>508</sup> Count de Salis, *Annual of Montenegro for 1913*, p. 2.

Ambassadors, the civil population must be given the opportunity to withdraw from the town under siege, and this statement was supported by the ministers from Russia, Italy and Germany.

However, the Austrian government was not satisfied with the King of Montenegro's answer and, as a consequence, another strong communication took place on 23 March. As a result of this, necessary steps were taken to facilitate the evacuation of the civil population from the town, but the King of Montenegro did not allow any of the delegates from the Great Powers to accompany the his emissary, thus setting the stage for suspicion and failure of the negotiation with Esat Paşa and the Montenegrin side could not accept in good faith that he intended to implement his promise. Furthermore the difficulties were increased with a communication of orders, in cypher, on the subject from the authorities of İstanbul, and a direct rejection was afterwards assumed to be a demand for the transmission of an open message from the Grand Vizier to Esat Paşa".<sup>509</sup>

The attack vehemently continued at İşkodra on 31 March after a long hiatus. The delegates of Montenegro subsequently submitted a long memorandum to London, "urging on historical, geographical, and economic grounds the incorporation into Montenegro of Ipek, Yakova and İşkodra", and they claimed that the various tribes and population of İşkodra were in favour of the annexation of the town to Montenegro, but in this regard, these allegations were later proven to be a lie.

A notification, which indicated that the Great Powers would determine the destiny of İşkodra, was conveyed to the delegates of Montenegro on 11 March 1913 in a meeting of ambassadors, stating that to pursue operations for Serbia and Montenegro caused a useless and unnecessary bloodshed, which seemed to

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<sup>509</sup> Ibid.

Edward Grey to be criminal.<sup>510</sup> However, a response was provided a few days later, and the Christian quarter of İşkodra, the cathedral and the consulates were shelled by heavy gunfire. An identical representation was held at Çetine on 28 March, and was founded on the agreement about the northern and north western frontier of Albania. The Montenegrin government was urged to put a stop to the siege at İşkodra and cease animosities within the territories attributed to Albania, and immediately evacuate the region in question.

This meeting was followed by a new attack and a response to this failure given on 1 April, claiming that Montenegro was continuing a war against the Turks, and the Great Powers had announced their neutrality in the Balkan conflict, so Montenegro could not consent to their requests.<sup>511</sup>

The garrison who defended İşkodra had enough food to supply their needs, but the situation of the civilian population in the town had reached a critical stage during in April, and this caused numerous deaths from starvation. Although there was still sufficient meat for the garrison, they had almost exhausted their bread rations during the start of negotiations between Esat Paşa and the besiegers. After two or three days of arguments, a military convention was signed between them and, in the estimation of the Turkish garrison of twenty thousand the civil functionaries and population who were free to leave marched out with their arms, baggage and artillery.<sup>512</sup>

Esat Paşa betrayed the Turkish army with a hope of becoming the King of Albania, and on 7 April he made armistice with the Montenegrins. İşkodra had resisted for two hundred days following the declaration of war, which had resulted in the deaths of four thousand men, consisting of 80 per cent Turkish troops and

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<sup>510</sup> Ibid., p. 3. ; Viscount Grey of Fallodon, *Twenty-Five Years*, 1892-1916, 2 vols. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1925), p.101.

<sup>511</sup> Count de Salis, *Annual of Montenegro for 1913*, p. 3.

<sup>512</sup> Ibid., p. 4.



20 per cent Albanian. On the other hand, the Montenegro had lost about one thousand seven hundred men. The Turkish flag had been flying on the dungeon of the İşkodra fortress for four and a half centuries, and it passed into enemy hands on 12 April 1913.<sup>513</sup>

If the civilians wished to stay in the town, their individual rights should be respected by the new rulers of the town, and no further pillaging of the town should be allowed. At two o'clock on the morning of 23 April, the news of the capitulation was received at Çetine and declared by gunfire and the ringing of the church bells to let people know about the declaration.<sup>514</sup> Subsequently there were some serious disappointments and misgivings on the return of the Crown Prince two days later "when it was remarked that there were neither military trophies nor prisoners, and it became obvious that the seizure of the town had been owing to skilful negotiation rather than to an effective military operation". According to rumours, an agreement was signed between Esat Paşa and the Montenegrins.<sup>515</sup>

Pierre Plamenatz, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Montenegro, made a secret recommendation to Esat Paşa that if İşkodra was handed over to Montenegro he would be King of Albania, but subsequently he was dissuaded from this idea, because it could provoke the intervention of Austria and Italy regarding the question of İşkodra. There were no confessions on the presence of a formal agreement by Plamenatz, but the report stated that Esat Paşa would be given assurances by the Montenegrins of their support for him to become King of Albania, after a formal cession of İşkodra and the north of the Drin to the King of Montenegro.<sup>516</sup>

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<sup>513</sup> Bekir Fikri, *Balkanlarda Tedhiş ve Gerilla "Grebene"*, (Ed. Tülây Duran), (İstanbul: Tarihi Araştırmalar ve Dokümantasyon Merkezleri Kurma ve Geliştirme Vakfı, 2008), p. 57. ; Süleyman Kocabaş, *Avrupa Türkiye'sinin Kaybı ve Balkanlarda Panславизм*, (İstanbul: Vatan Yayınları, 1986), p.189.

<sup>514</sup> Count de Salis, *Annual of Montenegro for 1913*, p. 4.

<sup>515</sup> Ibid.

<sup>516</sup> Ibid.

The King of Montenegro declared that he would take the responsibility to surrender and a message was dictated to the British ambassador in Çetine on 4 May of 1913, to be carried to Edward Grey, claiming that he put the fate of İşkodra in the hands of the Great Powers.<sup>517</sup> On 14 May, the town was officially evacuated by the King to the International Forces under Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney.<sup>518</sup>

A conference, which was held in London in January 1913, attempted to solve the problems arising due to the war in the Balkans. However, the failure of negotiations on peace undoubtedly disappointed the Serbian government, who already foresaw a dispute with Bulgaria over the spoils of war. However, a second conference was held again in London on 30 May, and ended the First Balkan War, but the Serbian government's attitude was very different and gave evasive answers, seeming to be in no hurry to sign it. The aim of the Serbian government was to obtain as much time as possible in order to strengthen her defensive positions on her new southeastern frontier against Bulgaria, and hold the Bulgarian troops as long as possible in the neighborhood of Çatalca.<sup>519</sup>

The tension raised in June led to the outbreak of the Second Balkan War between Bulgaria and the Balkan allies. During this time Austria was closer to the side of Bulgaria, who began to rely on Austria's support. Turkey declared neutrality against the war, but on 10 June 1913, Count Pallavicini, the Austria-Hungary ambassador in İstanbul reported that the Grand Vizier was barely able to withstand the pressure of the Turkish army and Turkey would reap some of the benefits that were being requested in the event of war between the former Balkan allies.<sup>520</sup>

Bulgaria had gained more territories compared to the other Balkan states, which led to a conflict between them on 30 June. Thus the whole Bulgarian power (about

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<sup>517</sup> Ibid, p. 6.

<sup>518</sup> Ibid.

<sup>519</sup> Dayrell Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey, 12 March 1914, Confidential, FO/881/10435. Annual Report on Serbia for 1913, p. 8.

<sup>520</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

twenty thousand men) were referred to the Serbian and Greek frontiers. After a few days Romania started to move towards Sophia. In three weeks there were around two thousand Greeks soldiers killed out of a total of nineteen thousand. When these events took place, Thrace was left defenseless, and Bulgaria had found itself in a very difficult situation. It was an indisputable fact that Turkey should take advantage of this to attack, and gain back lost territories where there was a high Muslim population who was subjected to severe ill-treatment. The Turkish attack led to bloody retaliations in the district of Rodosto (Tekirdağ).<sup>521</sup>

Turkey had agreed to give up Selanik, but she refused to give up Edirne. The Bulgarian government imposed a war indemnity on Turkey, who did not accept it.<sup>522</sup> Russia had warned the Bulgarian government, because of her demands on İstanbul and the problems of the Straits, and also asked for support from the British government on these issues.<sup>523</sup>

When the Bulgarian forces were repelled from the lines of Çatalca, the Enos-Midia line was recaptured by Turkey. Along with these developments, it was hoped that Bulgaria would agree to renounce the war indemnity, and Edirne would probably be taken back by Turkey. The British charge d'affaires in İstanbul was informed by the Grand Vizier on 7 July 1913 that Turkey did not intend to attack Bulgaria, and "the military preparations were only intended as a hint that pressure could be used unless Bulgaria evacuated the Turkish territory up to the new frontier line".<sup>524</sup>

According to information received by the Bulgarian government from the Russian ambassador in İstanbul, the Turkish army was proceeding back to Edirne.

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<sup>521</sup> Francis Elliot to Sir Edward Grey, 20 May 1914, Confidential, FO/881/10474. *Annual Report on Greece for 1913*, p. 12.

<sup>522</sup> Henry Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey, 23 March 1914, Confidential, FO/881/10436. *Annual Report on Bulgaria for 1913*, p. 2.

<sup>523</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>524</sup> Ibid.

The Bulgarian King asked the Great Powers to recommend to the Sublime Porte not to violate the limits set by the London agreement, but the Turks had taken back Lüleburgaz and were about to occupy Viza. The Sublime Porte decided to reoccupy Thrace up to the line of the Maritza, because this line was necessary for the defense of İstanbul.<sup>525</sup>

On 16 August the Bulgarian government took an appeal to the Great Powers for guaranteeing the agreement of London, which ended the First Balkan War on 30 May 1913 and left Edirne in Bulgarian hands. Turkish forces were already 70 kilometers closer to the west of Maritza and they were advancing on Kırcaali and Gümülcine. Their progress really worried the Bulgarian government. On 16 July 1913, Turkish forces passed the Enos-Midia line and occupied Lüleburgaz. Three days later, Kuleliburgaz (Pityon) was occupied by the Turks, and a short time later, Edirne was passed back into Turkish hands without much resistance, but by the end of the month, the Turkish troops had withdrawn through Bulgarian territory.<sup>526</sup>

The estimated cost to Bulgaria of the Second Balkan War was 49,920,000 pounds. This amount, added to figures from before the war to consolidate the country's total debt, reached 75,000,000 pounds, as an approximate figure.<sup>527</sup>

Sir Dayrell Crackanthorpe, the British ambassador in Belgrade, pointed out that the Serbian government was seriously alarmed by the possibility of a joint Turkish-Bulgarian attack in the early autumn. He also stated that "the alliance between Greece and Serbia and the outstanding difficulties between Turkey and Greece over the islands question are factors tending to make Turco-Serbian relations very delicate in the immediate future".<sup>528</sup> On 10 July, Romania declared she would join the war against Bulgaria, and on 16 July she explained to the Great Powers the

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<sup>525</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>526</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>527</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>528</sup> Ibid.

reasons for this: she had neither a policy of conquest regarding an invasion of Bulgaria nor any intent to crush the Bulgarian army, however the military movement initially aimed to get across the Danube to ensure border security.<sup>529</sup>

There was no doubt Bulgaria hoped to defeat Serbia and Greece before Romania got involved in the war. Nonetheless, the Bulgarian forces were completely routed along the whole line with heavy losses on 9 July, while Romania was almost able to complete her mobilisation. On 11 July, Silistre was firstly occupied by Romanian forces from the Dobrudja, but all the necessary preparations had been completed for crossing the Danube, and on 15 July the troops began to cross Corabia. After one day, Nikolai Schebeko, the Russian Minister at Bucharest, who was supported by French Minister Jean Blondel in urging the stopping of advancing Romania, troops and her troops began to move in the direction of Sofia. Through the intervention of the Great Powers, especially Russia, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria was unable to find a solution, thus he applied to King Charles (Carol I) of Romania to stop the continuation of war, and his desire for peace was also conveyed to Serbia and Greece.<sup>530</sup> His offer to sign the peace Treaty of Bucharest on 10 August 1913 was accepted, and that concluded the Second Balkan War by defeating the Bulgarians. Through this treaty, Bulgaria abandoned Romania on the south of Dobruca and Balçik, as well as the lands south of the Danube. Moreover, Bulgaria was to dismantle the fortresses of Ruscuk and Sumnu within two years. The new borders were defined between Bulgaria and the other Balkan states. According to Article 6 of the Treaty of Bucharest, the Bulgarian army began to demobilise within twenty-four hours, and once this process was completed, the Bulgarian territories would be evacuated by the allies within a fortnight.<sup>531</sup>

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<sup>529</sup> George Head Barclay to Sir Edward Grey, 11 March 1914, Confidential, FO/881/10421. *Annual Report on Romania for 1913*, p. 7.

<sup>530</sup> Ibid., pp. 7-8.

<sup>531</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE TURKISH MILITARY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC APPROACH ACCORDING TO ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY, 1910-1914

#### 2.1 An Overview of the Turkish Economy from 1910 to 1914

The first modern budget for Turkey was established by Cavit Bey, the Minister of Finance, in December 1909 and a law was published in 1911, called the General Accounting Law (Muhasebe-i Umumiye Kanunu), for new legislation amended from the old in accordance with this modern budget.<sup>532</sup> Lowther stated that in the budget for the fiscal year 1909, there seemed to be an increase of 1,500,000 liras in overestimated receipts because there was no improvement in the economy compared to the last two years.<sup>533</sup>

Cavit Bey declared that there was a surplus of 2,000,000 liras at the end of the fiscal year in 1910, but the truth was that it was composed of loans for unexpended surplus in 1908-9, (respectively 4,700,000 liras and 7,000,000 liras nominal) to be used to decline the budget deficit of 5,322,198 liras for the year 1909-1910. Lowther pointed out that it would not be fair to blame it all on the Minister of Finance who was trying to organize the budget for the Ministry of War and, on the other hand, the full extent of economic control of expenditure was obvious from the discussions. Although the budget deficit declined, the Minister of Finance was forced once again to make inquiries about loans sources. Many competent

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<sup>532</sup> Erdoğan Kesinkılıç, "Yenileşme Dönemi Osmanlı Bütçeleri üzerine Genel Bir Bakış", OTAM, vol. 14, No. 14, (Oct. 2003), pp. 319-345.

<sup>533</sup> Gerard Augustus Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, 14 February 1911, Confidential, FO/881/9811. *Annual Report for Turkey for 1910*, p. 13.

observers pointed out that Turkey could not balance the budget deficit, and this appeared to be suspicious for the current and following financial years.<sup>534</sup>

The table shows the estimated budget deficit of the Sublime Porte for fiscal years as follows:

<b>Fiscal Year</b>	<b>Revenue</b>	<b>Expenditure</b>	<b>Budget deficit</b>
1909-1910	24,443,440	29,765,638	5,322,198
1910-1911	25,355,849	34,789,270	9,433,421
1911-1912	27,887,888	34,120,137	6,232,249
1912-1913	29,738,900	33,797,900	4,059,000
1913-1914	27,127,000	42,127,000	15,000,000
<b>Total:</b>	<b>134,553,077</b>	<b>171,972,205</b>	<b>37,419,128</b>

**Table III:** The Sublime Porte's budget deficit between 1909 and 1914 (in millions of lira).<sup>535</sup>

The fiscal expenditure of 1910-1911 for the Ministry of War was 8,771,929 liras, plus 4,717,252 liras for the manufacture of war materials, 1,131,908 liras for Public Works, and 1,598,745 liras for the Admiralty. Moreover, there were also some amount of budget of 2,600,000 liras to share between the Minister of War and for the Public Works Department. As a result of this, the expenses incurred caused an increase in total expenditure and the budget deficit for the current year was estimated at 9,433,421 liras.<sup>536</sup>

According to Lowther, the budget deficit in 1910 was a great loss for the Sublime Porte, but it would be covered by the surplus of 1909 which had not yet been spent. Turkey also purchased two war-vessels, the Barbaros Hayrettin and the Turgut Reis, from Germany. The Ministry of War spent more than 500,000 liras on

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<sup>534</sup> Ibid.

<sup>535</sup> This table is created base on information from the British annual reports on Turkey for the years 1910-1914.

<sup>536</sup> Ibid.

the campaign in Albania and the military operations in Havran and Kerak, which caused heavy damage to the Hicaz railway, as well as for the Yemen expedition. All these events showed that the Ministry of War required more money to reorganise the army. The year 1910 would be close, with a deficit of more than 7,000,000 liras, and the figures were indeed heavy within a budget of 25,000,000 to 26,000,000 liras.<sup>537</sup> Turkey had entered into a loan contract with the German group for 11,000,000 liras, which would cover its requirements.<sup>538</sup>

The total expenditure for 1911 was about 34,120,137 liras, of which 9,319,110 liras was assigned to the Ministry of War, 1,378,422 liras to the navy, and 1,130,331 to public works, in addition to which, 97,466 liras were allocated to the Samsun-Sivas Railway, 418,128 liras to the construction of roads, and 175,000 liras to the Mesopotamian Irrigation Works. Consequently, total expenses settled at 12,518,457 liras.

Cavit Bey hoped to reduce the budget deficit by about 5,000,000 liras through additional taxes on customs, temettu, petroleum monopoly etc., and a more direct administration of the Tobacco Regie.<sup>539</sup> Moreover, as seen in Table 3, the estimated deficit was 15,665,000 liras over two years.

Negotiations were opened at Paris in July for a loan between Cavit Bey and the Ottoman Bank, but two demands were made: adequate revenue as security, and the adoption of M. Laurent's plan for control of treasury operations by the Ottoman Bank.<sup>540</sup>

In 1910, Cavit Bey attempted to get a loan from Paris, because the Turkish economy was attached to France, and Turkey obtained loans through the Ottoman Bank, which was established by France in İstanbul, and these loans

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<sup>537</sup> Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>538</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>539</sup> Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>540</sup> Ibid., p. 15.



was guaranteed by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (Duyun-u Umumiye Idaresi). However, this borrowing process brought Turkey closer to Germany, because France imposed conditions that were unacceptable to the Turkish. The aim of the French bankers was simply to stall for time, and as a result of the efforts made to increase the budget deficit it was most probable that the conditions would be accepted, or even be inadmissible.<sup>541</sup>

Although Sir. E. Cassel suggested that Cavit Bey compromise with the Imperial Ottoman Bank, he still looked for loans from other groups of French banks (Credit Mobilier, Bernard Jarislowsky and Louis Dreyfus), and he made a contract with them on 8 August for a 4 per cent loan of 11,000,000 liras. The French government, however, claimed that if the Sublime Porte did not accept budget administration by a French adviser, Turkey would not obtain any loans from French banks. On the other hand, while Cavit Bey was in a difficult situation, he was assisted by the German bankers with loans of money. An agreement was signed between Cavit Bey and the Deutsche Bank, which provided a loan of 11,000,000 liras. The loan was secured on the receipts of the Customs of İstanbul, and the first part of the loan, 7,040,000 liras, was provided within twelve months, with second part, 3,960,000 liras, provided in 1912.<sup>542</sup>

The 1911-1912 Budget was prepared by Cavit Bey, and a large budget deficit had been seen of about 12,518,457 liras, but Nail Bey became Minister of Finance and announced that the estimated expenditure would not be reached. The revenue would be surpassed by at least 2,500,000 liras, and the budget deficit would not actually reach 5,500,000 liras.<sup>543</sup> Nail Bey estimated that the budget deficit would be 3,550,000 liras within a revenue of 29,700,000 liras. Moreover, the estimated expenditure did not include extraordinary expenses, and he failed in this estimate,

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<sup>541</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

<sup>542</sup> Ibid., pp. 16-17.

<sup>543</sup> Gerard Augustus Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, 31 January 1912, Confidential, FO/881/10,000. *Annual Report on Turkey for 1911*, p. 17.

because the deficit was more than 20 percent of the total revenue of Turkey. However, Nail Bey's methods had gained huge popularity in the Turkish Cabinet. The free control over the state treasury by the Ministry of War was still the one serious blot on the Turkish financial administration, and the Minister of War Mahmut Şevket Paşa had a great impact on Nail Bey in the previous year, but Nail Bey had restarted attempts at resolving this issue, and it appeared there were serious financial irregularities within the Ministry of War.<sup>544</sup>

There were also other more significant projects for port works at Samsun-Trabzon and the French railway system in Albania and northern Anatolia. All these projects were costly for Turkey. In addition, the construction of roads had cost 2,500,000 liras and was settled by the Rouvier group of banks.<sup>545</sup> Trade in the country also seemed to be developing up to the end of autumn, but the Albanian and Yemen campaigns and the Italian war in Tripoli led to acute financial trouble, as they had cost about 1,000,000 liras in the first three months.<sup>546</sup>

Turkey was in a difficult financial position in 1912 because of large and uncontrolled expenditure by the Ministry of War.<sup>547</sup> The Turkish Cabinet decided to get loans of about 1,250,000 liras from the Ottoman Bank to meet the budget deficits of 1912-1913.<sup>548</sup>

According to Lowther, Cavit Bey estimated that the budget deficit would be 4,059,000 liras within a revenue of 29,738,900 liras, thus the estimated the expenditure would be about 33,797,000 liras in the fiscal year 1912-1913. The extraordinary expenditure was about 2,000,000 liras, which was covered by a loan. It was stated that 1,750,000 liras was the deficit on the last year, and also no

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<sup>544</sup> Ibid., pp. 17- 18.

<sup>545</sup> Ibid.,p. 18.

<sup>546</sup> Ibid.

<sup>547</sup> Gerard Augustus Lowther to Sir Edward Grey, 17 April 1913, Confidential, FO/881/10280. *Annual Report on Turkey for 1912*, p. 19.

<sup>548</sup> BOA. MV, 227/143 Date: Unknown.

attempt was made to cover the deficit of the total expenses of the Italian war in the budget. Moreover, in September, the Minister of Finance claimed that 8,000,000 liras were spent over the course of the Italian war, in addition to which the Balkan war in February had cost approximately 100,000 liras daily.<sup>549</sup>

According to Lowther, between October 1911 and March 1913, Turkey had spent a total of about 23,000,000 liras, therefore the total deficit on 1 March, 1913 would be about 29,000,000 liras. At the end of the war, Turkey would have borrowed at least 23,000,000 liras. As expected based on the previous year, the decrease in revenue was very large. A large amount of active military service exemption tax was paid by those who did not wish to join active service, something like 2,920,000 liras in comparison with 1,312,000 liras in the same period for the previous year.<sup>550</sup>

The Italian and Balkan wars placed a very heavy strain on resources, and in order to meet these expenses, the Turkish treasury was forced to borrow money from creditors for these two wars. Lowther pointed out that while the war continued, however, it was not possible to get formal foreign government loans, and the temporary advances from various sources had been driven to acquire, at relatively high rates of interest.<sup>551</sup>

On 1 May 1912, Nail Bey was provided a four per cent loan from the Imperial Ottoman Bank. It was about 10,320,000 liras (or £ 9,091,200) and the loan was in two portions of 7,500,240 liras (or £ 6,818,400) and 2,580,000 liras (or £ 2,272,800). The annuity was secured chiefly on the Customs of Selanik, İzmir, Edirne, Bursa and Beirut, but before this the Sublime Porte was required to pay the annuities on the 1902, 1901, 1905 and 1908 loans, in addition to which about

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<sup>549</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1912*, p. 19.

<sup>550</sup> Ibid.

<sup>551</sup> Ibid.

4,500,140 piasters (or £ 40,000) had to be paid, out of the surplus of the tithes, to the Imperial Ottoman Bank.<sup>552</sup>

The prolonged war would naturally have significant impacts on the commercial and financial condition of Turkey, therefore Lowther stated that there should be a moratorium on the current situation, but on the recommendation of the Turkish Chamber of Commerce, the proposal was refused.<sup>553</sup>

The Administration of the Public Debt was the most important service act for providing progress of the Government between March and June. A total amount of 1,039,000 liras was guaranteed by 3 percent with the customs surtax, and then a further amount of 1,000,000 liras.<sup>554</sup>

In April 1913 the Societe des Phraes renewed their contract for 25 years, and advanced 500,000 liras at 7 per cent, while in August, Tobacco Regie advanced 1,500,000 liras at 6.25 per cent for the renewal of their concessions on similar terms.

The Taksim barracks and Stock Exchange building were sold to a Franco-German syndicate for about 500,000 liras and there were advances from the Anatolian Railway Company of about 200,000 liras, from the Bagdat Railway Company 224,000 liras, from the Agricultural Bank 300,000 liras, from the Imperial Ottoman Bank 350,000 liras, in two accounts, from the İstanbul Municipality 62,000 liras, and a further advance of 100,000 liras from the Tobacco Regie.

The Sublime Porte bought the dreadnought battleship "Rio de Janeiro", which was built for the Brazilian government in Britain, but the Perier operation in December caused a dramatic collapse in the economy and shook up the Brazilian government, who thus hoped to dispose of the battleship, which was kept the

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<sup>552</sup> BOA. İDUİT, 187/18, Date: 18/Ca/1330 (May 5 1912).

<sup>553</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1912*, p. 21.

<sup>554</sup> Henry Hamond Dawson Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey. 4 December 1914, Confidential, F O/881/10523., *Annual Report on Turkey for 1913*, pp. 28-29.

name Sultan Osman I.<sup>555</sup> Negotiations had begun for a large consolidated loan, despite this being not completed until 1913, and there was no addition to the funded debt, which amounted to 130,520,477 liras in March 1913.<sup>556</sup>

Beaumont stated that Turkey had been getting by for many years by borrowing money, and the ordinary revenue was not sufficient to meet the ordinary expenses, and no effort had been made to balance the budget. The regime of Abdülhamid and the Young Turks exhibited differences in management in this regard. Over the previous two years the new regime could not be criticised as the war had prevented it from attempting to make any reform until the new Turkish regime in had had time to put the state institution in order.<sup>557</sup>

The financial statement of revenue and expenditure were still not complete in 1913-1914, but the figures indicated that the revenue was sufficient. In 1913-14 the ordinary expenditure approved amounted to 42,127,000 liras, of which 13,170,000 liras were supplementary credits. Therefore it was obvious that the deficit would be approximately 15,000,000 liras.<sup>558</sup> The extraordinary budget covered the building of the Samsun Railway at 845,000 liras, road building at 286,000 liras and extended over more than ten years, and a capital amount of 4,500,000 liras was to be devoted to the navy, and on which, up to the end of the 1912-13 fiscal year, 738,000 liras had been spent. A further 3,000,000 liras had since been added to this fund for the buying of the Sultan Osman I., purchased from Messrs. Armstrong in December.<sup>559</sup>

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<sup>555</sup> Ibid., p. 29. ; Bernd Langensiepen and Ahmet Gülerüz, *The Ottoman Steam Navy, 1828-1923*, (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1995), p. 17.

<sup>556</sup> Beaumont, *Annual for 1913*, p. 29.

<sup>557</sup> Ibid.

<sup>558</sup> Ibid.

<sup>559</sup> Ibid.

## 3.2 The Army and Navy of Turkey

### 3.2.1 Army

There was much military progress and many innovations in Turkey during 1910, and one of these was that Christians were incorporated into the Turkish Army. Therefore, Christians and other non-Muslims became suitable for military service, as sanctioned by the Chamber in 1909. The application of this law was accepted by the Christians and the Young Turks.<sup>560</sup>

On behalf of the Greeks, the ecumenical Patriarch required the establishment of separate quarters for the Christian soldiers, who would not appreciate having to occupy the same barracks as the Muslim soldiers. But these kinds of demands could not be accepted by the military authorities. Moreover, another argument was the adoption of Christians as Turks in military schools. The Turks were uncomfortable with the fact that the Christians had equal rights. The Christians were not happy about being recruited into military service, therefore they were doing everything they could to get out of military duty.<sup>561</sup> As a result, conscription records had very little demand in other parts of the Empire, for example only two hundred seventy men enlisted for military service from the entire province of Mosul.<sup>562</sup>

After the fall of Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa's cabinet at the beginning of the year, Mahmut Şevket Paşa became Ministry of War in the new cabinet, and it was undeniable that the Turkish army improved in every aspect thanks to him.<sup>563</sup> Why did the Turkish army need so much money and collided with the Minister of Finance for the cause of excessive expenditure? It was explained that the Turks had lost

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<sup>560</sup> Beaumont. *Annual for 1913*, pp. 21-22.

<sup>561</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>562</sup> Ibid.

<sup>563</sup> Ibid.

many wars since the Turkish-Russian war in 1806. A result of the loss of a large part of their territory had caused the Turks to grieve and they protected themselves from any foreign aggression or interference, therefore the army would require a great portion of the budget. The roots of the conflict was the idea of the Ministry of War, and it caused many struggles with the Ministry of Finance, and Mahmut Şevket Paşa, who was the Ministry of War, obtained all the credits he wanted from the budget.<sup>564</sup>

The Turkish army was trained and educated by German officers, such as the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff. In addition, some of the institutions set up in Turkey such as regiments of infantry, cavalry, and artillery were commanded by German officers. When there was a cholera outbreak in İstanbul, it was necessary for the Sublime Porte to diminish the number of troops. Nevertheless, there were seventy-one battalions, twenty-eight squadrons, and one hundred and sixty field guns. Even though the total number of troops was officially seventy thousand, it presumably did not exceed forty thousand. In 1910 there were about thirty two thousand redifs who were on active service, and about fifty thousand received instruction; around seven thousand were embodied, but dismissed immediately. In relation to the plan of campaign, of which the fortification of Edirne was the key issue, concessions had been granted for the railways from Babaeski to Kırkkilise, forty kilometers, and from Soma to Bandırma, one hundred and ninety kilometers. Another railway concession of military importance had been given for a line of two hundred kilometers, from Homs to Tripoli. There were not more than two hundred thousand men in the army at the end of the year. The Minister of War was granted 5,250,000 liras to purchase military materials. There were also two expeditions into Albania and Havran.<sup>565</sup>

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<sup>564</sup> Ibid.

<sup>565</sup> Ibid., pp. 23-25.

The military events that had occurred throughout the year resulted in the need for a new organisation for the Turkish military, which was divided into four armies that had an army inspector-general with a staff of inspecting officers for several arms and departments. The division of the army is explained in the table below.

Army	Headquarters	Zone	Number of	
			Army Corps	Independent Divisions
I.	İstanbul.....}	Romania.....}	4	...
II.	Selanik.....}	Macedonia and Albania.}	3	3
		Syria.....}	1	...
III.	Erzincan.....}	Kurdistan.....}	3	...
IV.	Bagdat.....}	Mesopotamia.....}	2	...
			13	3

**Table IV:** The division of the army of Turkey.<sup>566</sup>

The table shows that there were thirteen army corps and three independent divisions within these districts in the army. There were two main reasons for the army to undergo a reorganisation but it was impossible to do this immediately due to financial and political reasons.

There were a lot of problems to be solved by the Sublime Porte in 1911, however she was required to send a military intervention to the Yemen and Albania to deal with rebellions, and the war with Italy. At the beginning of 1912, the Sublime Porte was more powerful in Macedonia, Albania and on the Greek frontier than in the same period in the previous two years.<sup>567</sup>

In Yemen, the road from Hudeyde to Sana'a was where the Turkish posts and garrisons were bested by rebellions of Imam Yahya, who proclaimed a jihad against

<sup>566</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1911*, p. 24 A.

<sup>567</sup> Ibid., p. 24 B.



the Turks, and therefore İzzet Paşa was sent to command the 31<sup>st</sup> infantry battalion, six mountain batteries, and three machine gun squadrons, with 15,000 men to quell the rebellion in February 1911.<sup>568</sup>

In addition to this, Lowther pointed out that 12 battalions were shipped to the Red Sea ports of Loheia and Konfuda, where İzzet Paşa was in cooperation with the Sharif of Mecca who recaptured some provinces from the hands of Seyyid Idris in Asir.<sup>569</sup> İzzet Paşa was successfully fulfilling his mission for Imam Yahya, but Turkey would be detrimental to the maintenance of military action in Yemen, because the war had begun with Italy, and İzzet Paşa received orders from the Sublime Porte to reach an agreement with Imam Yahya. The result was an agreement made on 13 October 1911 to carry out some reforms to solve the revolt in Yemen.

According to Lowther, the reform proposals of the Sublime Porte was that Yemen be divided into two administrative regions, with the coastal region held by the Sublime Porte, but the country's mountain region and the interior having an autonomous status under the administration of Imam Yahya, and public works would be taken into account, such as road building, telegraphs etc.<sup>570</sup> According to Lowther, there were fifty battalions in the expeditionary force of about thirty-five thousand men, and twenty-six battalions of the local army corps. Nearly 30 per cent of the total Turkish expeditionary force had been lost in Yemen and Asir, and that expedition had cost three thousand Turkish men through fighting, disease and the effects of the climate.<sup>571</sup>

There were four Albanian riots, interludes between the Second Constitution in 1908 and the First Balkan War over a short period of time. The uprising in Ipek,

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<sup>568</sup> Ibid., p. 24 C.

<sup>569</sup> Ibid.

<sup>570</sup> Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol.5 (Ankara: TTK, 1956), p. 237.

<sup>571</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1911*, p. 24 C.

Pristina, and Velçetrin broke out in 1910. The government officials were murdered and the main cause of the revolt was the declaration of martial law in these regions. The reform proposals consisted of the removal of the taxes and the replacement of military conscription law, the collection of weapons from the hands of the people etc. Initially the force sent was under the command of Şevket Turgut Paşa, who had eighteen nizam, sixteen redif battalions, three field and six mountain batteries of quick-firing guns, and twenty machine guns to suppress the rebellion, and furthermore, it could be said that the total number of troops was fifty thousand men for the force operating in Malisia, northern Albania.<sup>572</sup>

However, Mahmut Şevket Paşa, the Minister of War, took tough measures to put an end to the rebellion. Towards the end of 1910, a third Albanian revolt broke out between the Catholic Albanian Malisors who received assistance from Austria, and the Orthodox Malisors from Montenegro. In May and June of 1911, forces were sent under the command of Abdullah Paşa and fought with great difficulty in the mountainous terrain. Some of the rebels took refuge in Austria and Montenegro, which led to diplomatic efforts with the Sublime Porte. An agreement was made between the rebels and the Sublime Porte following a Russian intervention. The objective of this agreement was based on tax exemption, the authority to bear arms etc., which led to the end of the uprising.<sup>573</sup>

The last Albanian revolt took place in 1912 by Albanian Malisors who had the right to bear arms under the previous agreement. The Albanian rebels demanded that Sait Paşa's cabinet be replaced by Kamil Paşa, and a new election should be organised to select new deputies, and military service that was made in Albania. The government officials must be Albanian or understand and speak the Albanian language well. A group of Young Turks officers had great difficulties successfully defending against the Italian forces in Tripoli. Whereas Rıza Nur, Prince Sabahatin

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<sup>572</sup> Ibid.

<sup>573</sup> Karal, *Osmanlı*, p. 246.

and Halâskâr Zâbitân (Savious Officers), supported the Malisor rebels and their demands. As a result of this situation, Mahmut Şevket Paşa was forced to withdraw as Minister of War, and Sait Paşa to withdraw as Grand Vizier. The CUP lost its power following the withdrawal of Sait Paşa's cabinet on 17 July 1912. Therefore the last Albanian revolt had the effect of a coup d'état on Turkey.<sup>574</sup>

There were approximately eighteen thousand Army reserve soldiers who were untrained and in the Redif battalions about thirty-five thousand men were embodied for training, and the Redif battalions signed up for active service and for reasons of public security numbered one hundred thirty-five thousand men in 1911. Ninety quick-firing field guns were purchased from Krupp and one hundred eighty machine guns also ordered from Germany in 1910. On the other hand, in 1911 they ordered eighty-eight quick-firing field guns from Krupp, seventy two quick-firing mountain guns from Creusot in France, one hundred machine guns, one hundred thousand common shell, seventy-five thousand shrapnel, forty million rounds of rifle ammunition, and two hundred ammunition wagons, mostly from Germany.<sup>575</sup>

The Turkish army purchased six Marconi (an Italian inventor) field sets of wireless telegraphy, and a naval wireless telegraph station had been established on the Okmeydanı, on the Pera (Beyoğlu) side of Golden Horn. Moreover, the Minister of War had enforcement the agreement of Parliament for the purchase of a fleet of military transports, and six ships of four thousand and five thousand tons were bought, three from Britain and three from Germany. All these ships were to be used for the military transport of troops to Yemen and Albania.<sup>576</sup>

Turkey was hopeless both politically and in terms of military efficiency and the Albanian revolts and the war in Tripoli had been unfortunate for Turkey. A change

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<sup>574</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1911*, pp. 247-48.

<sup>575</sup> Ibid., p. 24 E.

<sup>576</sup> Ibid.

of government and internal unrest made this current bad situation even worse.<sup>577</sup>

Italy was able to put pressure on Turkey without the need to occupy the Turkish mainland, because Turkey did not have the power to defend all her islands, and only a few small garrisons were maintained to defend the largest islands, namely Rhodes, Chios, and Mityleme. Italy seized the island of Stampalia (Koçbaba Adası) from Turkish rule on April 23, and fifteen islands passed temporarily from Turkish rule in early May. Italy began its occupation of the Turkish islands respectively.<sup>578</sup>

The only resistance, in terms of occupying islands, came from Rhodes. Most of the troops were conveyed from Tobruk in seven transports and escorted by eight warships under the command of General Ameglio, and landed at Kalitheas on the east coast of Rhodes on 4 May. The Italian troops were mobilised under General Ameglio to the city of Rhodes, where there were only one Turkish battalion with six guns and nine hundred and sixty men, who began to retreat inland towards Psithos which was more suitable for defense, whereas there were ten thousand forty men under Ameglio.<sup>579</sup>

Therefore General Ameglio did not encounter any serious resistance, and he arrived in Rhodes, and as a result, a successful military operation was carried out by Ameglio on 16 May, and they marched on Psithos. The occupation of Rhodes was achieved with only minor losses of nine deaths and twenty wounded.<sup>580</sup> The Italian fleet went to the Aegean Sea to carry out a naval demonstration on the Turkish coasts.<sup>581</sup>

Italy had not made an actual attempt against the integrity of Turkey in Asia and Europe. The sinking of a gunboat using multiple bombardments at the port of

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<sup>577</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1912*, p. 21.

<sup>578</sup> Ibid.

<sup>579</sup> İsrail Kurtcephe, *Rodos ve Oniki Ada'nın İtalyanlarca işgali*, OTAM (Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi), p. 212.

<sup>580</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1912*, p. 21. ; Şerafettin Turan, *Rodos ve 12 Ada'nın Türk Hâkimiyetinden Çıkışı*, Cilt XXIX, Sayı 113 (1965), pp. 89-90.

<sup>581</sup> Beehler, *The Turkish-Italian War*, p. 69.

Beirut and the Red Sea coast of Turkey led to a continuation of the war against Italy. Italian naval operations in the Red Sea had a negative impact on Turkey's position in Yemen. In addition, Seyyid Idris was encouraged by Italy to continue the revolt against the Turks in Asir. If the Italian war had not happened, the Turkish troops would have already suppressed Seyyid Idris, and were sent to Yemen in 1911, and Imam Yahya had been already overpowered by the Turks. The rebellion of Seyyid Idris gained some local success against the Turkish troops, and took the Farsan Islands which were indebted to Italy's assistance of money, arms, and ammunition.<sup>582</sup> Seyyid Idris hoped that the Italian war would have a great impact on Turkey in Yemen, with another impact being serious financial problems in the country due to war expenditure for the Turkish troops.

The peace seemed to be so far away between Turkey and Italy because the Italians occupation of the Turkish islands. As a result of this, Mahmut Şevket Paşa took immediate action, as a precautionary measure, to form two great armies, one for the defense of the Gallipoli Peninsula, and the other placed in the İzmir. These two important locations were very crucial to protecting the mainland from any possible Italian attack in the near future. Moreover, around fifty thousand soldiers were being kept under arms at the Dardanelles, and approximately sixty thousand troops around İzmir.<sup>583</sup>

Lowther claimed that in early March, precautionary measures were taken against a possible Albanian movement against Turkey, who started to collect reservist troops from Asiatic Turkey, and the standing armies in Macedonia and Albania were reinforced by approximately thirty thousand to forty thousand reservists. There were three rebellions in the region of Ipek and Diakova early in May, but these were easily suppressed by Ferik İsmail Fazıl Paşa. However, large

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<sup>582</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1912*, p. 22.

<sup>583</sup> Ibid.

revolts were renewed at the end of May, and around forty thousand men were actively employed in the middle of June to suppress the revolt.<sup>584</sup>

Lowther stated that there was a conflict between the Radical and Conservative elements of the CUP, and the moderates was gaining the sympathy of the public even though they had no particular programme. Politicians had continued opposition of the CUP throughout the year, and they finally gathered under the name Freedom and Alliance Party (Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası) on 21 November 1911. This was established by Colonel Sadık Bey, because he left the army and became an active politician, and he declared his programme would be "the non-interference of officers in politics and hostility to the introduction of freemasonry in the Turkish army as a political instrument".<sup>585</sup>

Moreover, this political organisation emerged as the official opposition to the CUP, and the Christians, Arabs and Albanians who joined this party also wanted separation from Turkey,<sup>586</sup> but this did not create too much of a feeling of confidence among the Christian elements in the Empire. Colonel Sadık Bey's opposition of CUP propaganda led to great strides in the Turkish army, which was always seen as a last resort by the leaders of the CUP in constitutional Turkey.<sup>587</sup>

A modification of article 35 of the Constitution was questioned by the CUP, in other words the proposed replacement of the Sultan's authority was to dissolve the Chamber, but they could not get the result and the Chamber was officially abolished by the Sultan on 17 January 1912, to enable the new elections, which were held again pursuant to this article of the Constitution.<sup>588</sup>

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<sup>584</sup> Ibid., p. 23.

<sup>585</sup> Ibid.

<sup>586</sup> Hakkı Altınbilek and Naci Kır, *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Türk Harbi, Kafkas Cephesi 3ncü Ordu Harekâtı*, vol. II Birinci Kitap, (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 1993), p. 12.

<sup>587</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1911*, pp. 3-5.

<sup>588</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1912*, p. 2. ; Ali Birinci, *Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası: II. Meşrutiyet devrinde İttihat ve Terakki'ye karşı çıkanlar* (Dergah Yayınları, 1990), pp.124-130. ; Ahmed Feroz, *İttihat ve*

Sait Paşa's cabinet consisted mainly of members of the CUP, and the elections, which were held in 1912, became known as the Big Stick Elections ("Sopalı Seçimler"). The opposition had declared the elections to be illegitimate, and a group emerged from the army and called themselves Halaskar Zabitan (Savious Officers), and who had relations with the rebels in Macedonia, and the Freedom and Alliance Party (Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası) in İstanbul. Its aim was to end the CUP government.<sup>589</sup>

Halaskar Zabitan demanded the resignation of Sait Paşa's Cabinet. Because there was doubt these elections results that caused the CUP to control the Sublime Porte. However, the social unrest, political turmoil, Turkish-Italian war, and revolts in European Turkey led to a resignation from the government. As a result, Sait Paşa resigned on 16 July 1912 and Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa became the Grand Vizier, and who intended to put an end to the CUP's influence on the Sublime Porte. Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa believed that the European powers would not allow a war to go ahead in the Balkans, thus the battalions who were summoned under arms for the purpose of training about one hundred thousand soldiers were disbanded by his cabinet. On the one hand, the battalions were demobilised from the army, and new battalions were being conscripted by the army, and neither the soldiers nor officers knew each other due to changed positions.<sup>590</sup> The Turkish army were defeated in the Balkan wars by the Balkan allies, and this led to the resignation of Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa on 29 October 1912.<sup>591</sup>

Lowther pointed out that the internal affairs administration of the CUP had, within three years, resulted in dissatisfaction and frustration throughout the country, as people were infuriated by the shameless impudence of the elections,

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*Terakki (1908-1914)*, Trans. Nuran Yavuz (İstanbul: Kaynak, 1995), p. 134.

<sup>589</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1912*, p. 2.

<sup>590</sup> Talat Paşa, *Paşa'nın Anıları*, p. 26.

<sup>591</sup> Rifat Uçarol, *Bir Osmanlı Paşası ve Dönemi, Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları. 1976), p. 434.

and the country was convinced to reopen the Dardanelles by the attitude of Europe. The CUP was, however, no more successful at international politics than at internal administration. From the standpoint of Parliament, the cabinet was no doubt in critical condition as were relations between the nations, so there was an urgent need for a strong government.<sup>592</sup>

The collapse of Sait Paşa's cabinet had created overall relaxation in Turkey, and there was hope about the formation of a strong liberal government whose purpose was to rid the nation of the CUP's oppression. Although public opinion demanded that Kamil Paşa be appointed Grand Vizier, the CUP attempted to convince the Sultan that Kamil Paşa's goal was to depose him, but he was appointed as Grand Vizier by the Sultan because there was a weak hope that his relations with Britain might be useful for Turkey, and he seemed to be a liberal statesman in Europe, which might be turned into a benefit for the Sublime Porte. His appointment caused the CUP's extremists to sink into despair.<sup>593</sup>

Following the Second Constitutional Revolution of 1908, there was a constant struggle for political power and the CUP emerged victorious from this struggle. Had the Balkan wars not been such a catastrophe, the CUP may have been abolished from the political stage by the anti-Unionist governments of Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa and Kamil Paşa.<sup>594</sup>

Everything went very quickly from bad to worse and, on 30 September, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece had mobilised their army against Turkey, who declared mobilisation of its army on 1 October. The Italian war had left Turkey in a difficult situation, the cause of these incidents was blamed on the previous government, but Nazım Paşa made a big mistake to underestimate their enemies' power and capacity. Some effort was made to minimise the displeasure within the country,

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<sup>592</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1912*, p. 3.

<sup>593</sup> Ibid.

<sup>594</sup> Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 37.



for example, the trained soldiers who had been dismissed were recalled and worked for the mobilisation plan. Turkey's mobilisation plan had been slower and more unwieldy compared to her neighbors, and it was left to do battle in three different boundaries. This was an inevitable consequence of Turkey not being able to simultaneously defend all its borders.<sup>595</sup>

Lowther observed that when mobilisation was announced on 1 October, the Turkish military power in Europe numbered not more than one hundred and fifty thousand men. The military power was divided into three borders to be spread over a wide area in eastern Thrace, western Macedonia and Albania. Turkey was still nominally at war with Italy, hence it was not possible to transport troops by sea from Anatolia to the west. Reinforcements were to be sent from Asia and had to pass through İstanbul or some port east of the Dardanelles, which was one of the biggest difficulties for mobilisation.<sup>596</sup>

About eighty thousand troops passed through İstanbul towards the war zone on 14 October, and approximately thirty thousand men had arrived in Thrace by sea via Rodosto. In addition to these, the local troops numbered about one hundred and fifty thousand with some fifty thousand garrisoned in Edirne, with a detached force of twenty thousand at Kırcaali.<sup>597</sup>

The Ottoman Parliament's session should have been opened in early November to commence the general election, but this was impossible because the majority of people living in Anatolia were serving in the army sent to Rumelia for the First Balkan War. Thus, on 24 October 1912, the Turkish authorities decided to postpone the election until a more appropriate time.<sup>598</sup> Excluding the garrisons of İşkodra and Yanya, the province of Novibazar had already been occupied by the

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<sup>595</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1912*, p. 24.

<sup>596</sup> Ibid., pp. 24-25.

<sup>597</sup> Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>598</sup> BOA. MV, 10/25, Date: 13/Z/1330 (24 October 1912).

Montenegrins, and the number of troops was about one hundred and twenty thousand, divided between Üsküp and Manastır, and approximately sixty thousand men were stationed in Selanik and in the Struma valley. On 26 October, Üsküp was occupied by the Serbs, and after a two-day battle at Kumanovo, the Turkish army of the Vardar was defeated with of sixty-four guns. Another Serb army took the offensive against the province, and tried to unite with the Montenegrins on the Sancak, and the entire north-west of Albania was occupied towards the end of month. There were six Greek divisions able to cross the border on 18 October to occupy Elassona and Diskata, and the Turkish forces were defeated at Sarantoporon. The Serbian army assisted a Bulgarian division in operations to defeat the Turkish force and occupied Ishtib.<sup>599</sup>

The Turkish army of the Vardar, who withdrew towards Manastır, were followed by the Serbs. Nearly twenty thousand troops joined the Serbs near Perlepe on 3-4 October and, after some stubborn resistance, the Serbs lost about five thousand soldiers and ten guns. As a result of this, the southwestern direction of Manastır was opened up to the Serbs. On 25 October Kozani was occupied, and Karaferia on the 29 October by the Greeks, who were, opposed by about thirty thousand but Turkish army retreated the Greeks from these regions on 2 November. The Turks advanced swiftly on Selanik, because there were about twenty-five thousand men defending the region, under the command of Hasan Tahsin Paşa.<sup>600</sup>

Lowther considered that on 5 November the Bulgarian column had taken Serres, however they were approaching Selanik. On 8 November Hasan Paşa decided to compromise with the Greeks, who entered Selanik victorious the next day. The Turkish army was defeated by the Serbs, and broken up in a battle at Manastır, which lasted four days. The Turkish army consisted of three corps of about fourty thousand men under the command of Rıza Paşa, whereas the Serbian army had

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<sup>599</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1912*, p. 25.

<sup>600</sup> Ibid.

more than one hundred thousand men. Despite the brave resistance of the Turkish army, the Serbs entered Manastır on 19 November. As a result of this battle, ten thousand men and fifty guns were lost by the Turks. Thus, except Yanya, the whole of Albania and Macedonia were lost by Turkey within one month of the start of hostilities with her neighbors.<sup>601</sup>

Lowther the British ambassador in İstanbul revealed that the main Turkish army in the eastern range of motion and the eastern army were concentrated under the command of Abdullah Paşa, between Babaeski and Kırkkilise (Kırklareli). This army was composed of seven corps and over two hundred thousand men. In fact, there were not more than one hundred and fifteen thousand men who were collected for four army corps, and who were in an unformed and disorganised condition. By 21 October Abdullah Paşa had already received orders to attack from the Minister of War. The Bulgarian second army attacked the north and west of Edirne, and their first and third army had crossed the east of the Tunca River to advance from Kırklareli to Edirne. On the other hand, the eastern army tried to take the offensive against Bulgaria on 22 October, however, the small troops was given orders to attack very late. The war between Turkey and Bulgaria began around the Gerdelli, west of Kırklareli. The eastern army was defeated by the Bulgarians in a short time, therefore on 22 and 23 October 1912, the Turks lost the war of Kırklareli and retreated to Lüleburgaz. However, the Turkish army were defeated and fled back to the Çatalca line in the battle of Pınarhisar-Lüleburgaz. Lowther stated that the Turkish army had nothing to eat and no ammunition during the war.<sup>602</sup>

On 3 November the Turkish army was ordered to withdraw to the Çatalca lines, and Nazım Paşa personally took command of the army. The order for the withdrawal of the army led to the loss of the entire organisation and adaptation in the Turkish army, in addition to which the weather conditions were very bad with

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<sup>601</sup> Ibid.

<sup>602</sup> Ibid., pp. 25-26

heavy rain and the roads were seas of mud. Thus many guns and other wheeled vehicles had to be left behind and abandoned to the Bulgarians, but the Bulgarians was failed again to pursue the Turkish troops. The main Bulgarian force did not achieve the success they expected on the battlefield until 7 November, and The Turkish army quietly gathered on the lines of Çatalca until 12 November.<sup>603</sup>

During withdrawal, the cholera epidemic had made an appearance among Turkish troops, and the epidemic was communicated to the Bulgarian army by the advancing Turkish army over the same ground. Neither army was in good condition when the Bulgarians began attacking the Çatalca lines on 17 November. This attack was defeated in practice, but it did not seem to succeed despite continuing for two days, and after a short time negotiations were started regarding a suspension of hostilities. Yaver Paşa's corps were taken captive by the Bulgarian force under the command of General Kovacheff before the armistice was completed near Dedeagac (Alexandroupolis) on 2 December.<sup>604</sup> Thus, west of the Çatalca line, the whole of Turkey in Europe was in the prevalence of the allies, except the Gallipoli Peninsula and the fortresses of Edirne, Yanya, İşkodra, which were gallantly holding out. From 2 December until the end of the year, although there was no record of any event of military interest, the war still continued with Greece, who was not a party to the armistice. Meanwhile, the Turks were bringing in fresh troops from Asia in order to strengthen their position at Çatalca.<sup>605</sup>

There were approximately one hundred and fifty thousand to two hundred thousand Turkish troops under Ferik İzzet Paşa who made an effort to progress from the Çatalca lines, but they did not succeed. Furthermore, the Sublime Porte prepared to transfer about twenty thousand men to the north coast of the Sea of Marmara. The poor weather condition affected disembarkations of Turkish troops

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<sup>603</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>604</sup> Ibid.

<sup>605</sup> Ibid.

at Eregli and Pirot (Şehirköy), and in Bolayır the Bulgarians repelled the Turkish troops, who eventually returned to İstanbul. Although there were some small landing forces at Podrina on the Black Sea, they were repelled back to their ships with enormous losses. The peace process had been damaged by the lack of success of these operations, as well as serious financial problems. The Sublime Porte announced that they were ready to agree a frontier line drawn from Yesilköy on the Black Sea to the Meric River, leaving Ineada, Lüleburgaz and Babaeski to Turkey, as long as the reinforcements of Edirne and Kırkkilise were dismantled.<sup>606</sup>

Beaumont insisted that during the ceasefire, the Turkish army in Thrace was focused behind the Çatalca lines and had successfully defended against the Bulgarian advance. The western armies had nothing left except the garrisons at Yanya and İşkodra. Some of the scattered troops, who fled from Manastır, were at large in the country to the north of Yanya. At the end of January, the overthrowing of Kamil Paşa's government and the assassination of Nazım Paşa destroyed any hopes for peace, and hostilities resumed again at the beginning of February. Enver Paşa had begun to play a significant role in military projects. Ongoing military operations was continued with some vigour in the first few weeks, but the weather conditions were poor. The Bulgarians did not accept the Greece's offer to cooperate in the progress to the Gallipoli peninsula, but they accepted cooperation with the Serbians at Edirne, which indicated that the main goal of the Bulgarians was to capture Edirne. There was some offensive movements initially by the Turks against the advance of the Bulgarians in order to repel them from the Çatalca lines. It should be said that the weather conditions led to operations ultimately dropping down into aimless fighting with infrequent bombardments, and this course of events lasted until the end of March.<sup>607</sup>

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<sup>606</sup> Beaumont, *Annual for 1913*, p. 3.

<sup>607</sup> Ibid. p. 30.

These encounters continued for a few days without any conclusive results and, immediately after the fall of Edirne, the second ceasefire was auctioned, in the middle of April. The hostilities started up again at the beginning of February at the Gallipoli peninsula, and the Bulgarians mobilised towards the Bolayır. Moreover, the Turks created a scheme against the progression of the Bulgarians, to land their fleet at Şarkköy. According to the Turkish scheme, they attacked the Bulgarians from the left side, with the Bolayır garrison at the same time cooperating from the west. However, this scheme did not give Turkey the desired result, and Şarkköy was occupied by the Bulgarians. The Turkish scheme was going very slowly and there were bad weather conditions, so they retreated from Bolayır with the large losses.<sup>608</sup> Edirne was occupied by the Bulgarians with the determination of the outcome of the attack between February and March.

After the terms of peace at the end of May, there were many troops collected from Turkey in Asia who were landed behind Çatalca and its vicinity. However, the CUP was afraid that Grand Vizier Kamil Paşa was going to give up Edirne in exchange for peace. Therefore the famous "Raid on the Sublime Porte" was organised to lead the army group into the government building, and Kamil Paşa was forced to resign at gunpoint.<sup>609</sup> As a result of this, the CUP took full power, and Ahmet İzzet Paşa became Minister of War, while Mahmut Şevket Paşa was appointed Grand Vizier. The Turkish army was composed of eight army corps, and for the defense of Çatalca it comprised the divisions of the three active and three reserve corps that had been organised from the remains of the European and Anatolian troops. There were also two corps from Syria and Erzurum that had about two thousand men. The other armies were maintained in the Gallipoli peninsula and around İzmir.<sup>610</sup>

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<sup>608</sup> Ibid., p. 30-31.

<sup>609</sup> Ali Fuat Türkgeldi, *Görüp İştiklerim*, (Ankara: TTK, 1984), pp. 87-88. ; Ziya Şakir, *Yakın Tarihin Üç Büyük Adamı: Talat, Enver, Cemal Paşalar*, (İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası 1944), pp. 99-104.

<sup>610</sup> Beaumont, *Annual for 1913*, p. 32.

A new mission of the German Army was created, in order to facilitate the implementation of the Turkish army, and the members of the mission started to come to Turkey at the end of December. The commander of the 1<sup>st</sup> (İstanbul) Army Corps served under General Liman von Sander, who was appointed as a commander, but this appointment was not well received by Russia.<sup>611</sup>

### **3.2.2 Navy**

With the proclamation of the second constitution in Turkey, the Ottoman Navy and National Aid Society "Donanma-yı Osmani Muavenet-i Milliye Cemiyeti" was one of the aid organisations that saved Turkey from its poor situation, and was established on 19 July 1909. Every aspect of the country was deteriorating and this also showed itself in the condition of the Turkish Navy. The purpose of this aid organisation was to strengthen the Navy, and this shows that the Turkish economy was in a poor state at that time, and is understood from the collection of money from people who had hoped to have as strong a navy as the other great powers. A declaration was sent to collect money from the public and it stated: Fellow Ottomans! Now the whole world is looking at us, these poor people who were captive nations in the hands of a cruel enemy until yesterday, and they wonder will these poor people help to create a strong Turkish Navy with public subvention?, and what did you do at the sacrifice of national honour and dignity test? These poor people bought the battleships Barbaros Hayrettin and Turgut Reis before, but now four torpedo destroyers "Yadigar-ı Millet, Muavenet-i Millîye, Numune-i Hamiyyet and Gayret-i Vataniye", two dreadnoughts and five excellent transport ships have been purchased.<sup>612</sup>

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<sup>611</sup> Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>612</sup> Donanma-yı Osmanî Muavenet-i Milliye Cemiyeti, İstanbul, Osmanlı Matbaası, 1327 (1909), p. 2. See Appendix XI.

The Sublime Porte already decided to renew their navy with the assistance of the British or the other powers, however British assistance was be welcomed by Russia, because with a strong navy Turkey may interfere with Russian interests in the Black Sea, and their further objectives for Anatolia and Mesopotamia. However, Britain should not have left the Turkish Navy in the hands of the Germans, who had a significant effect on the Turkish army.<sup>613</sup>

Turkey requested the loan of a naval consultant from Britain to manage the reorganisation of the almost non-existent Turkish navy. Between February 1909 and September 1914 Britain sent three consecutive naval missions to Turkey, the first led by Admiral Douglas Gamble (February 1909-March 1910), the second by Admiral Hugh Williams (April 1910-April 1912); and the last led by Admiral Arthur Limpus, until he was posted to Malta in September 1914.<sup>614</sup>

Lowther clarified that in 1910 the reorganisation of the Turkish navy was not apparent, but efforts were made by British officers, under Rear-Admiral William, to reorganise the navy over the next two years. There were approximately five thousand officers and two thousand four hundred seamen in the navy. The arsenal was in a poor condition at Kasımpaşa, and it needed a lot of money to become efficient. In addition, the naval magazine was located on the hill behind Kasımpaşa, and it was not suitable for the storage of ammunition. The arsenals, which existed at Izmit, Karaman, and Basra, did not have a suitable place for repairs, and Izmit only had a few empty workshops. The storehouses were placed in the arsenal and were required in respect of need for repair.<sup>615</sup>

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<sup>613</sup> Önder Andaç Uğurlu, *İngiliz Devlet Arşivi Gizli Belgeleri: Türkiye'nin Parçalanması ve İngiliz Politikası 1900-1920*, (İstanbul: 2005), p, 136. ; Erol Ulubelen, *İngiliz Gizli Belgelerinde Türkiye*, (İstanbul: 2009, Belge:184), p. 92.

<sup>614</sup> Chris B. Rooney, "The International Significance of British Naval Missions to the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 34, No.1 (1998), p. 1.

<sup>615</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1910*, p. 27.



This is an organised list of all of the active fleet of the Ottoma Empire.

<b>Battle Ships:</b>	Maximum Speed. Knots
Mesudiye.....	14
Barbaros Hayreddin.....	
Turgut Reis.....	
<b>Cruisers, second-class:</b>	
Hamidiye.....	18
Mecidiye.....	
<b>Torpedo gunboats:</b>	
Peyk-i Şevket.....	20
Berk-i Satvet.....	
Torpedo gunboats, repair ship: 'Tîr-i Müjgân.....	34
4 turbine Schichau torpedo-boat destroyers.....	
4 Norman torpedo-boat destroyers.....	25
11 Ansalde torpedo-boats.....	19
4 French torpedo-boats.....	18
<b>Obsolete vessels:</b> <sup>616</sup>	
Asar-ı Şevket.....	13
Fethi Bülend.....	13
Avnullah.....	12
Muini Zafer.....	12

**Table V:** Ships of the Turkish Navy: Battleships, Cruisers, Torpedo Gunboats, and Obsolete Vessels.<sup>617</sup>

The general condition of the ships in the fleet was adequate, except Mecidiye, and the guns were also in good working order. The two German vessels was renamed Barbaros Hayreddin and Turgut Reis and were purchased at a high price to resist the Greek battleships Averoff.<sup>618</sup>

According to Lowther, the Turkish dockyard was divided into two parts, the repair shops and the docks, and had been repaired by a French company. Captain

<sup>616</sup> Abidin Dav'er, "İkinci Abdülhamit Devrinde Donanmamız", *Resimli Tarih Mecmuası*, Vol. 3, Issue 29, (May 1952), pp. 1486-1491.

<sup>617</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1910*, p. 27.

<sup>618</sup> Ibid.

Blake, who was a retired naval officer, had control of the engineer department with the assistance of one English engineer-lieutenant and six British foremen. The constructor's department was in a similar situation compared with the previous three years, and the foreign constructor provided the only chance for any new developments. However, İsmail Hakki, who was the current constructor versus the foreign constructor, would not deprecate having a man under him. A great number of repairs and alterations were carried out by local firms.<sup>619</sup>

The Sublime Porte had ordered a new dreadnought battleship from Messrs. Armstrong, which should be delivered by June 1913. There were ten gunboats under construction in France. There were several motor-boats delivered by Messrs. Thornycroft to be put into service on the Tigris and Euphrates.<sup>620</sup>

The naval school at Halki had sixty cadets at the time, and a British naval instructor. After the declaration of the second constitution, twenty cadets were successful in their examination for the twenty vacancies, and more than one hundred and twenty boys came to school on the opening day with their relatives, who had persuaded the authorities to allow them entry into the school.<sup>621</sup>

The conscripts were annually selected from among all the Muslim and Turkish subjects aged 20.<sup>622</sup> Moreover, the navy had strongly protested against the conscription of non-Muslims, the Greeks, Armenians, and Jews, who were conscripted along with the Muslims. A certain number of non-Muslims lived in the barracks, where separate divisions were made for each belief, and no difficulties had yet been encountered. The work was done by dockyard workmen because there were no artisan ratings in the navy, and the officers fulfilled much of the substantial work for the navy in roles such as artificers, electricians, mechanics,

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<sup>619</sup> Ibid.

<sup>620</sup> Ibid.

<sup>621</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1911*, pp. 25-6.

<sup>622</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

torpedo instructors etc. There were approximately ten thousand men who physically fit, hardworking and extremely obedient, but they had no initiative and would be told completely what to do. Lowther pointed out that the Turkish navy was in a poor state.<sup>623</sup>

Turkey had suffered great losses during the Turkish and Italian war in Tripoli. Italy captured the yacht Trablus, which was used for preventing smugglers, and the torpedo boats of Tokat, Alpagot, and Hamidyeh were either sunk or wrecked while attempting to escape on the Albanian coast. In addition, the Golden Horn (Haliç) gunboat, which was sunk by its officers after they had to evacuate to prevent it falling into Italian hands, had the duty to act as an outpost in front of the islands of Titan and Sanafir at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. The coasts of Tripoli and Bingazi had been blockaded by three Italian gunboats since 25 September 1911, and after five days Italy demanded the surrender of the Turkish gunboats Seyyad-ı Derya and Derne, which in the end shared the same fate as the Haliç gunboat.<sup>624</sup>

The Turkish navy had played a negative role in the wars of 1912, and there was not much change in the development of the conditions of naval administration. The Turkish navy was clearly defeated in the war with Italy, and there was presumably reasons for the purely passive role it adopted. The Turkish navy was not permitted to venture outside the Dardanelles when any Italian naval vessels were in the Aegean Sea. The Turkish navy vessels spent most of the year lying in the shelter of the Straits, therefore they did not have enough power to dispute the command of the sea and repelled any Italian attack on the Straits.<sup>625</sup> When the war broke out, a few small boats away from the sea were sunk or captured by the

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<sup>623</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>624</sup> Ibid., p. 28. ; Askeri Tarih Araştırmalar Dergisi, Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı (ATASE), Ankara, issue: 21, (11 February 2013), p. 26-47.

<sup>625</sup> Lowther, Annual for 1912, p. 27. ; Beehler, *Italian-Turkish War*, p. 97.

Italians. For example, Asar-i Tevfik was sunk at the port of Beirut, and two similar ships at İzmir and Selanik.<sup>626</sup>

Lowther pointed out that "the Turkish fleet was, on paper, about a match for the Greek one and it is difficult to find an excuse for its inaction". Nonetheless, it is a fact that the Greek navy wandered around the Aegean Sea as it desired and was able to seize all of the Turkish islands. The Turkish navy could not fulfill its mission in the wars, and its failure could not be imputed to the men or to the young officers, as it would be wrong to blame them. Because, even though they were deprived of a good education, they had a few opportunities to make changes to the Turkish navy. For example, after the Hamidiye Cruiser was torpedoed by the Bulgarians in the Black Sea, it was able to successfully return to İstanbul in a sinking condition. However, it can be said that the failure of the navy could be blamed on the commanders of the fleet and their strategies during the war.<sup>627</sup>

After Rear-Admiral Williams retired from the mission of reorganising the Turkish navy between April 1910 and April 1912, Rear-Admiral Limpus was sent to İstanbul as a consultant on 30 April, and had undertaken the training of the Turkish navy between May 1912 and September 1914.<sup>628</sup>

During the year the docks and arsenal repair shops continued to serve the Turkish fleet for some time in Haliç, but the following few years of mismanagement would incapacitate them for the government, whereas they could be made great use of in terms of merchant shipping, and thus they became a source of income rather than expense to the government. There had been much questioning of the construction of the new arsenal in the Gulf of İzmit, with a floating dock for large vessels, among people who were not qualified in the matter, but no decision seemed to have been taken. There should be a new arsenal for Turkey to keep a

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<sup>626</sup> Lowther, Annual for 1912, p. 27.

<sup>627</sup> Ibid.

<sup>628</sup> Ibid.

navy in, but the installation and management of the necessary works and plant should be put in the hands of a really competent firm over a many years, with the idea of equipping and working it on with sound and businesslike principles.<sup>629</sup>

The Turkish fleet was kept busy at sea by the Greek fleet in January that year. Ramiz Bey was the commander of the fleet but Tahir Bey was helping, albeit for a short time. The fleet made periodical cruises in the Sea of Marmara, carrying out various gunnery and torpedo exercises, but these cruises remained limited due to lack of oil for lubrication. There had been almost no serious repairs to the fleet until a co-interested company of docks and arsenals (Armstrong, Vickers) was formed, and the contract signed in December. This was expected to be completed in the summer of 1914, and the fleet would go for a cruise in the Mediterranean.<sup>630</sup>

In the first stage of the war, although the Greek battleship Averoff had a great opportunity against the Turkish navy, they did not really appreciate this. Both the Turkish and the Greeks got back without further damage, and during the war the battleships Barbaros and Mesudiye lost eighteen men, with fourth one wounded.<sup>631</sup>

The battleships Barbaros Hayreddin and Turgut Reis were badly damaged, and Mesudiye were at the same time fighting against the Averoff, which showed great fire and manoeuvre, puzzling the Turkish flagship. This sort of firing skill required much experience, so how did the Greek naval officers learn this skill in such a short time; during the first stage of the war they were not as successful as in second stage of the war. The battle lasted three hours and the battleships Barbaros Hayreddin and Turgut Reis lost 4 officers, with thirty-seven men killed and ninety-two wounded. Beaumont claimed that it was surprising that "the gunners of the

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<sup>629</sup> Ibid., pp. 27-28.

<sup>630</sup> Ibid., p. 33.

<sup>631</sup> Ahmet Gülerüz-Bernd Langensiepen, *Navy*, p. 32.

Averoff were either pensioned officers of some European Powers or else Greeks serving in the American navy.”<sup>632</sup>

### **3.3 The Conflict of Interest for the Concession of the Railways**

Over the last twelve months, the question of the Bagdat Railway had entered a new phase in which the balance of advantage seemed to rest decidedly with the Germans. The new situation was created by the Russia-German agreement at Potsdam on 19 August 1911, which declared that Germany recognised Russian supremacy in the north of Iran, and Russia would not be opposed to the construction of the Bagdat Railway by the Germans. Moreover, Russia also encouraged a link between the northern Iranian railway systems with the Bagdat railway.<sup>633</sup> Lord Curzon who was the Governor General of India claimed that the Potsdam agreement was a blow straight to the heart of British Empire in India, therefore the construction of the final sections of the line should be blocked by the British government.<sup>634</sup> According to Earle Edward, diplomatically, the Bagdat Railway traversed a territory that became an international danger zone.<sup>635</sup>

The Bagdat Railway concession of 1903 facilitated the construction of the ports in Basra and Bagdat, which was granted to the Germans who had rights of navigation on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and that destroyed the monopoly of the British Lynch Company, which had a concession for navigation on these two rivers since 1831.<sup>636</sup> However, this company regularly conducted the navigation and it was too costly, so the people in the regions were looking forward to the

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<sup>632</sup> Beaumont, *Annual for 1913*, pp. 33-34.

<sup>633</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1911*, p. 42.

<sup>634</sup> Earle Edward Mead, *Turkey, The Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway, A Study in Imperialism*, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1924), p. 199.

<sup>635</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>636</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 190-191.

Bagdat Railway.<sup>637</sup> Moreover, the Bagdat Railway concession would be a very serious threat to British interests in the Persian Gulf, Suez and India.<sup>638</sup>

Tevfik Paşa, the Turkish ambassador in London, sent a telegram to the Turkish Foreign Minister on 9 November 1909, in which he pointed out that some disputes would occur between Germany and Britain due to the Bagdat Railway concession, and he emphasised that the greatest impact would be to Turkey's political and economic relations with these two countries. Therefore, a proposal was submitted with a solution to this problem, and to achieve reconciliation between these two countries. According to this proposal, the Anatolian Railway Company was to give approval to the British capitalists so they had the same authority and degree of rights as the German capitalists with regards to the inspection of the necessary share and works enterprises. Tevfik Paşa's response to the Minister of Foreign Affairs was given to the Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Charles Hardinge, during Edward Grey's absence in London, and Hardinge said that a union consisting of British capitalists for the Bagdat Railway were no longer available in London, and his desire was for the matter to be solved, and even before the British government reached an agreement with the German capitalists, this compromise had turned into conflict after some unfavorable conditions were put forward. Tevfik Paşa was told by Hardinge that he asked the British capitalists ideas about this work and he had expressed his satisfaction with the concern of the Sublime Porte.<sup>639</sup>

Britain requested that a portion of the railway line from Bagdat to Basra be granted to a British company, or the concession for an alternative railway line given to this company. The British government claimed that they had held a dominant

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<sup>637</sup> İlber Ortaylı, *İkinci Abdülhamit Döneminde Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman Nüfuzu*, (Ankara: A.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayın No: 479, 1981), p. 99.

<sup>638</sup> Morris Jastrow, *The war and the Baghdad Railway; the story of Asia Minor and its relation to the present conflict*, (Philadelphia and London: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1917), p.100. ; Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi-İkinci Meşrutiyet ve Birinci Dünya.Savaşı (1908-1918)*, vol. IX, (Ankara: TTK, 1999), p. 360.

<sup>639</sup> BOA. HR. SYS, 108/62, Date: 25/L/1327 ( 9 November 1909), see Appendix XII.

position in the region for a long time, thus this was the only way they were able to protect their trade. An increase in customs duties would have the most effect on British trade and, as a result of the increase in revenue, it was allocated to the German railway company, and German influence had developed against British control of the region.<sup>640</sup>

Tevfik Paşa received a telegram from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that an increase of 4 per cent customs duties of surplus revenues was not enough to guarantee funds for the Bagdat line, and this had been adopted by the German government and the Bagdat Railway Company, and the situation had already been reported to the British government, after which it was accepted by the French government. A contract was signed for the extension of the railway line from Bulgurlu to El Helif, and the construction of that line was allocated by the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt. In addition, the extension of the railway line from El Helif to Bagdat was a decision to be taken in the future by the company, resulting in a 4% increase in customs duty, who had guaranteed in writing not to seek a share of the revenue, and for the construction of these lines were be collected by surplus of tithes. Edward Grey pointed out that if this line was constructed by Turkey in its own name, no one had a right of appeal.<sup>641</sup>

Charles Hardinge reported that if the Bagdat-Gulf section of the Bagdat railway construction and operation were not eligible for the concession and only given to British investors, this line should be built in cooperation with the German investors. Although this British offer was accepted by M. Gwinner, who at the same time was the director of the German Deutsche Bank, it was refused by the German government.<sup>642</sup> Tevfik Paşa stated that Britain did not want to have all the railway lines carried out by the Germans, because the British were afraid of losing their

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<sup>640</sup> BOA. HR.SYS, 109/9, Date: 15/T/1326 (28 July 1910), see Appendix XIII.

<sup>641</sup> BOA. HR.SYS, 109/1, Date: 1/S/1328 (12 February 1910).

<sup>642</sup> BOA. HR.SYS, 109/5, Date: 22/R/1328 (3 May 1910), see Appendix XIV.



commercial dominance over these territories, which could not pass to the control of any other powers.<sup>643</sup> Britain claimed that the Bagdat and Basra railway line threatened British commerce in these territories. The British demanded to be given a railway concession by the Sublime Porte without guarantees to the British company from El Helif to Bagdat.<sup>644</sup> Britain should protect their interests in Asiatic Turkey from a wide range of threats by trying to engage the Entente powers into the project, with Britain controlling the section between Bagdat and the Persian Gulf.<sup>645</sup>

The British demands were divided into three issues: firstly, the construction of the Bagdat-Gulf section should be constructed by an international company and should involve an equal share of participation from all powers, in other words, the Sublime Porte should participate 40 per cent, and, French, German and British capitalists 20 per cent each, and an invitation should be sent to Russia to participate in the construction of the Bagdat-Gulf section. British should have wider rights than the other powers, and these spacious rights should continue after the end of the Bagdat railway concession. The British required that the port be placed under the control and administration of the new company. Moreover, if the railway needed to be extended from the Gulf to Kuwait, this issue should only be taken into consideration by Britain and Turkey.<sup>646</sup>

Secondly, in terms of the Persian Gulf questions, the British claimed that the Sublime Porte should renounce all claims on "the Arabian littoral south of Ojeir, in Muscat, and over the Trucial chiefs"; in other words, Turkish sovereignty should not be recognised in these territories. The autonomy of the Sheikh of Kuwait should be recognised by the Sublime Porte, and in return Britain was ready to recognise

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
<sup>643</sup> BOA. HR.SYS, 109/3, Date: 29/Ra/ 1328 (12 April 1910).

<sup>644</sup> BOA. HR.SYS, 109/9, Date: 15/T/1326 (28 July 1910), see Appendix XII.

<sup>645</sup> Francis Harry Hinsley, (ed.) *British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey*, (Cambridge: University Press, 1977), pp. 151-152.

<sup>646</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1911*, pp. 43-44.

the Sultan's reign over Kuwait.<sup>647</sup> Turkey had to accept the rights of Britain in the Gulf, such as buoying, lighting, police, and sanitary arrangements, and the establishment of a collaborative British-Turkish commission should be considered to deal with this.<sup>648</sup>



**Map IV:** Turkish Railways in 1914, John. B. Wolf, *The Diplomatic History of the Baghdad Railroad* (New York: Octagon Books, 1973).

<sup>647</sup> Ibid. p. 44.

<sup>648</sup> Ibid.

Lastly, an increase of 4 per cent import duties can only occur with the consent of the British, along with Turkey, that there must be a guarantee for British interests in Bagdat, such as "the recent demolitions at Bagdat, and also provided the veto of the Sublime Porte on the borrowing powers of Egypt were removed. With a suitable settlement on these points British would agree to the surtax for a fixed period and to the continuation of the existing 3 per cent surtax". The Sublime Porte was prevented from making a formal response to the British counter-proposals by the outbreak of the Malisor rebellion, and the ensuing chaos, and then by the war with Italy and the change of Ministry, but Lowther pointed out that there was a strong feeling in Turkey against Russia entering into the question of the railway.<sup>649</sup>

Controlling the administration of the Gulf section became essential for Britain. The Turks would propose that involvement in the new company should be confined to Turkey, Britain, Germany, and France, however Turkey should have less than 25 per cent share of participation in that company, so that the remaining capital investment was shared among the other three powers, and the combined British and French interests would be superior to that of the other two participants.<sup>650</sup>

On 2 March 1911, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs received a telegram from Nebil Ziya Bey, consul in Buşir. The Sublime Porte was considering giving the concession for the railway line from Bagdat to Kuwait to foreigners, but Nebil Ziya stated that this concession would be objectionable if granted to them, because it was of great importance in terms of politics and commerce. After solving the issue of Kuwait, to prevent damage to the port of Basra, the construction of the line on behalf of the Sublime Porte would be more beneficial for Turkey. Nebil Ziya explained that the spreading policy of the British in these regions should be prevented by permanently assigning a steamboat to shuttle between Basra and

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<sup>649</sup> Ibid.

<sup>650</sup> Ibid.

Necd in the Turkish coasts and to fly the Turkish flag. Moreover, mail processing and ordinary and important works should be immediately provided by the Sublime Porte and Kuwait should be constituted to the sub-governorate and abandon to Mübarek Paşa. In addition, he suggested that a religious court should be established in Kuwait, so that the goods, which secretly entered Iraq without tax, were to be subjected to customs duties demanded by official tax collectors.<sup>651</sup>

The objective would seem to be two-fold: firstly, Chester and Darcy planned to enter into petroleum areas and, secondly, to gain command of the through traffic from the Gulf to Iran over the considered international Gulf-Bagdat line, with all the opportunities this provided for the discriminating treatment of trade.<sup>652</sup> Lowther suggested that the British should inform the Sublime Porte that they considered themselves to be entitled to be consulted as to any arrangement that might impact the interests of the future Gulf-Bagdat railway.<sup>653</sup>

Negotiations were held in London between Britain and Turkey regarding the plans to make Kuwait the terminus of the Bagdat railway line, but this was abandoned during the negotiations, which was considered as a great success by the Sublime Porte, because the Bagdad line would not be the terminus of a country which was under the influence of Britain. If the railway line was to have a terminus at Kuwait, the British government could at any time interfere in its administration. Therefore, it was decided that Basra would be the terminus for the line, however it did not facilitate a satisfactory improvement for shipping due to some difficulties encountered in terms of ship management, especially in this section of Shatt al Arab.<sup>654</sup> The concession for the Tripoli-Homs railway line was granted to a French company (Regie Generale des Chemins de Fer), and was one hundred kilometers long. The construction was rapidly undertaken to open up to traffic as soon as

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<sup>651</sup> BOA. HR. SYS, 104/20, Date: 1/Ra/1329, ( 2 March 1911).

<sup>652</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1911*, p. 44.

<sup>653</sup> Ibid.

<sup>654</sup> BOA. HR. SYS, 111/16, Date: 5/June/1328, (18 June 1912).

possible, and there was no kilometric guarantee for the line. The Bandırma-Soma railway line construction, part of the concession, which was about one hundred and ninety kilometers in length, was granted to the same French Company at the end of the July, and it would form an extension to the Sea of Marmara of the company's line branches from the main system in İzmir-Afyonkarahisar at Manisa to Soma. When this line was completed, it would be one of two overland routes, while the other would run via Haydarpaşa-Eskisehir and Afyonkarahissar between İstanbul and İzmir. The line of construction was due to be completed within three years.<sup>655</sup> Lowther stated that "funds for the building of this railway were to be raised by the issue of 77,832 government bonds of 500 Fr. each, bearing interest at 4 per cent, and redeemable during the period of the concession".<sup>656</sup>

The Hudeyde-Sana'a railway line was about three hundred kilometers long, and the contract was signed in September 1909 on behalf of David Elie Leon Bey, of Paris, and the maximum limit of the cost of construction (7,200 liras per mile), was determined by the government and included the cost of construction of a port at Cibana. A concession covering a period of ninety-nine years was given to David Leon and the construction was prepaid at about 6,200 liras per kilometer. The concession for the Jeddah-Mecca railway line was sixty miles long, and this line was to be managed by the Hedjaz Railway administration.<sup>657</sup>

The concession for the construction of the Samsun-Sivas railway was granted to the French company and it was about three hundred and seventy kilometers in length. This company had done extensive research in the autumn, but "a careful and independent examination of the trace was done between Samsun and Havza, a trace some seventy kilometers inland by the Public Works Department". The government hoped the local contractors would also join the first part of this line,

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<sup>655</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1910*, p. 19.

<sup>656</sup> Ibid.

<sup>657</sup> Ibid.

thus tenders were put out asking them to participate on behalf of the government, and however the conditions were not good enough to invite the contractors. Moreover, the department decided to separate the section into ten different lots because this may attract small local contractors who were only granted permission for the construction of earthworks, bridges and small culverts.<sup>658</sup>

The railway at Babaeski-Kırkkilise was a branch of the main İstanbul-Edirne line. It was about 50 kilometers in length and was granted for forty-seven years and undertaken by the Oriental Railway Company. Furthermore, the İstanbul and Yeşilköy railway line, located between the capital and Yeşilköy, was to be doubled, and this was planned to start in the early spring.<sup>659</sup>

The construction of the Bagdat Railway line was actively continued both from the terminus at Bulgurlu towards Adana, and also from Adana itself, and the section on the Bulgurlu side had almost been completed.<sup>660</sup>

Syria-Homs railway line was 82 kilometers long, and this line joined the Rayak-Aleppo system at Homs. The concession of this line was given to the Regie Generale des Chemins de Fer in October 1909 and it was completed in March 1911, but was only opened to traffic in June.<sup>661</sup>

There were some railway projects under construction. The concession of the Hudeyde-Sana'a (Yemen) railway line was granted to Leon of Paris and the Banque du Commerce et de l'Industrie (Rouvier's Bank) in 1910, but the firman of concession was declared in 1911. There were many difficulties in constructing this railway line, because the line stretched up into the highlands of the Jebel, therefore it had to be surveyed carefully. The construction of the Hodjeila railway line was about one hundred and twenty kilometers inland, from Hudeyde to Cibana, with a

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<sup>658</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>659</sup> Ibid.

<sup>660</sup> Ibid.

<sup>661</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1911*, p. 19.

length of seventeen kilometers. However, construction had been blocked by military operations in the country. It can be said that the first trains started to run on the first three kilometers on 19 December 1911, and it was announced that trains would be run through to Hudeyde in January 1912.<sup>662</sup>

The concession for the Soma-Bandırma railway line connected the İzmir-Kasaba with İstanbul, which was granted to the Regie Generale in 1910. The construction was continued by concessionaries, and the line would be completed in November 1912. The construction of the Babaeski-Kırklareli railway line was forty five kilometers in length and it was undertaken in the summer by the Oriental Railway Company. The line would be opened to traffic in March 1912.<sup>663</sup>

### **3.4 Sanitary Affairs in Turkey**

#### **3.4.1 The Cholera Epidemic**

In 1910 there was a large outbreak of cholera in Turkey. In particular, a large epidemic in Russia via the Russian-Turkish border broke out in the province of Erzurum on 15 July.<sup>664</sup> The cholera epidemic was still prevalent in Russia and thus the necessary measures should be taken for preventing its spread to İstanbul.<sup>665</sup> The disease appeared in Trabzon in September, and gradually increased in many provinces of Anatolia and Mesopotamia during the autumn months. However, this epidemic did not lead to more deaths, and it was dying out towards the end of the year, however it was advancing its effects, albeit slowly, on İzmir, and a few other areas. Moreover, in the European provinces of Turkey, there was a similar low prevalence rate of cholera. The first case occurred in İstanbul on 13 September

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<sup>662</sup> Ibid.

<sup>663</sup> Ibid., pp. 19-20.

<sup>664</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1910*, p. 53.

<sup>665</sup> BOA. MV, 143/29, Date: 12/Ş/1328, (19 August 1910).

1910 and there were one thousand two hundred cases, resulting in the death of over seven hundred among the civil population in the capital until the end of the year. On the other hand, in Rodosto, Tuzla in the Gulf of Izmit and elsewhere, soldiers were fatally affected by cholera.<sup>666</sup>

The cholera epidemic spread to several regions of Iran at the end of summer and autumn. It was the most widely spread in the valley of Tigris and the Shatt-el-Arabs, and a severe cholera epidemic was introduced into Tripoli by Italy through the Mediterranean. Although these outbreaks of cholera had virtually disappeared towards the end of 1910, the disease was revived in the spring and summer. Although cholera was most common in the provinces of the Empire, a group of pilgrims, who were already infected, landed in Beirut, Aleppo and other regions via land or water routes. Furthermore, the disease was seen in Mecca on 26 December 1910, and it spread to Medina, Jeddah, Yanbo and Hudeyde in the early days of 1911.<sup>667</sup> There was no form of serious health organisation for diseases in Turkey, and almost everything consisted of simple measures. During that time, the Council of Health Issues, which was tasked with preventing a disease epidemic from entering the country or spreading to other counties, belonged to the Foreign Ministry.<sup>668</sup>

From the second half of 1910 until January 1911, there were one thousand three hundred and eighteen cases, resulting in about seven hundred ninety-three civilian deaths being recorded, as well as many cases among the troops in İstanbul.<sup>669</sup> The cholera epidemic led to at least eighteen thousand eight hundred and seventy-six

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<sup>666</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1910*, p. 53.

<sup>667</sup> Ibid., pp. 53-54.

<sup>668</sup> Ekrem Kadri Unat, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda 1910-1913 Yıllarındaki Kolera Salgınları ve Bunlarla İlgili Olaylar", *Yeni Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları* I, (1995), p. 57.

<sup>669</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1911*, p. 49.



cases and over twelve thousand one hundred forty-three deaths in 1911 throughout the empire.<sup>670</sup>

When the cholera epidemic occurred in İstanbul and other provinces, fifty syringes from the factory in France, costing 512 liras and two ratio machines were purchased from the same factory in addition to some necessary medicines and sanitary materials. The total cost was 24,857.30 piasters.<sup>671</sup> The epidemic reached its peak in September, and then there was a steady decline, but a number of cases of disease were still occasionally seen among the troops until the end of the year.<sup>672</sup>

About 3,000 liras were required to prevent the spread of the epidemic in İzmir. It would not be possible to pay this amount out of the budget, so about 1,500 liras and the payment of unexpected expenses was paid by the state treasury.<sup>673</sup>

The cholera epidemic spread again and that resulted in many deaths over a large area of the European and Asiatic provinces of the Empire. Moreover, the epidemic was recorded in Syria, in Mecca, Jeddah, in Adana, at İnebolu on the Black Sea, at Yanya in Albania, and in the town of Barbary in Tripoli at the end of 1911. The disease was revived in the form of an epidemic and was almost inevitable in 1912. The disease was much less active in Russia than in the previous years. A small outbreak occurred between the middle of June and the beginning of November. In comparison with the previous year, three thousand, three hundred and thirteen cases were recorded in 1912, whereas there were two hundred and sixteen thousand cases in Russia in the last year. The disease was again epidemic in Italy, and it had spread to a certain extent to Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, France, Spain, Tunisia and Iran. Some of these countries were limited to a very few cases.<sup>674</sup> A law was put in place on 5 September 1912

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<sup>670</sup> Unat, *Kolera Salgınları*, p. 61.

<sup>671</sup> BOA. MV, 154/18, Date: 07/H/1327 (20 June 1911)

<sup>672</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1911*, p. 49.

<sup>673</sup> BOA. MV, 152/70, Date: 29/C/1911 (28 May 1911).

<sup>674</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1911*, p. 49.

that decreed that there was a provision of 3,000,000 piasters of supplemental funding from the Ministry of Interior's budget for prevent of cholera throughout the Empire.<sup>675</sup>

The disease did not lead to severe cases in İstanbul until the end of November, as a result of the Balkan war, and it appeared among the refugees who fled the city. There were two thousand two hundred thirty-five cases, which resulted in the death of one thousand one hundred forty-six refugees between 5 November and 30 December 1912. The epidemic increased excessively in December, and resulted in five hundred and forty cases and two hundred and twenty-nine deaths.<sup>676</sup>

In the same period, the cholera was doing some very serious damage to the Turkish troops at the Çatalca line, and that resulted in the deaths of forty thousand troops,<sup>677</sup> and the dying troops were sent to the Sirkeci terminal in İstanbul. However, the authority ordered that patients could not be allowed to enter Sirkeci, and they were stopped and treated in Yeşilköy. Lowther pointed out that, after a while, an effort was made by the authorities to stop all cholera patients or suspected carriers, and all who had been in contact with them, at Yeşilköy, some seven miles away from the walls of İstanbul. Some tents were put up in the fields and open spaces in Yeşilköy, but so many people died without shelter or treatment of any kind.<sup>678</sup>

The sick and dying soldiers were put in mosques, namely the Hagia Sophia Mosque (3,600), the Blue Mosque (1,200), Nuru Osmaniye (450), and the Mahmut Paşa Mosque (1,250), as ordered by the Ottoman Ministry of War Health Department.<sup>679</sup> According to Lowther, there were between seven hundred and one

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<sup>675</sup> BOA. MV, 227/197, Date: 23/N/1330 (5 September 1912).

<sup>676</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1912*, p. 43.

<sup>677</sup> Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Makedonya'dan Orta Asya'ya Enver Paşa*, vol. II (İstanbul: Remzi Kitapevi, 1971), p. 363.

<sup>678</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1912*, p. 43.

<sup>679</sup> Hikmet Özdemir, "Salgın Hastalıklardan Ölümler 1914-1918", (Ankara: TTK, 2005), p. 62.

thousand five hundred troops that died in the Hagia Sophia Mosque. A special meeting was held to discuss measures of disease control under the chairmanship of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 17 November. At the same meeting, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the Board required extra funds to complete its mission to control the outbreak of cholera, and these funds were to be used by municipal and military authorities.<sup>680</sup> A total amount of 20,000 liras was agreed to enable the opening of hospitals in various parts of the capital, and a cholera hospital consisting of portable buildings had been put up at Yeşilköy.<sup>681</sup>

### **3.4.2 Plague Outbreaks**

The plague epidemic began in Jeddah on 5 January 1910, and there were ninety-nine cases resulting in ninety-seven deaths, then it disappeared in May. The plague spread from Jeddah to Loheia and to some regions in Yemen. An imported case was seen in Mecca, and some cases were carried by the pilgrimage ships to the Tor lazaret (Sinai).<sup>682</sup> On the other hand, the plague took the form of an epidemic in Bushire on the Persian Gulf between April and June, and several cases were seen in Basra. Occasional cases were reported in Beirut in April, and in Antalya in October.<sup>683</sup> The disease appeared to varying extents in many parts of Egypt during 1910 and 1911.<sup>684</sup>

The plague then moved to Batum, which is located on Georgia's Black Sea Coast, thus two decrees were sent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs between 22 and 25 December 1910, with an order to provide the funding for a steamer for Kastamonu (south of the Black Sea or Sinop) and two steamers for Trabzon, for the prevention

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<sup>680</sup> Lowther, Annual for 1912, p. 43.

<sup>681</sup> Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>682</sup> Lowther, Annual for 1910, p. 54.

<sup>683</sup> Ibid.

<sup>684</sup> Ibid.

of the spreading of disease throughout the country and for the preservation of the coasts.<sup>685</sup>

An outbreak of plague began again in Jeddah on 14 January 1911, and thirty-seven cases resulted in thirty-two deaths up to 18 April, but the number of cases was lower than compared to the previous four years.<sup>686</sup> A few cases of disease occasionally occurred in Antalya, İstanbul, İzmir, and Lebanon. More serious outbreaks were reported in Bushire, Bahrain and Muscat between April and June. The number of cases was very high, with eighteen to twenty-four cases per week at Bushire and Muscat, but at one time there were several hundred cases reported per week and, for the most part, these cases resulted in deaths in the islands of Bahrain.<sup>687</sup>

The outbreak of plague was seasonal in Jeddah between 13 January and 4 March in 1912, and it was limited to cases occurring in the area. Two cases of plague occurred in Antalya between June and July, and the disease had taken the form of an epidemic in a few places, such as in many parts of the Kirghiz steppes, and some parts of Egypt throughout, the year.<sup>688</sup>

A sharp outbreak of pneumonic plague was seen in the area 7 kilometers away from the port of Algiers in July, and there were between ten and fifteen cases in Casablanca in September.<sup>689</sup> The plague reappeared in Bushire, on the Iranian Gulf, in February, and reached its peak in the form of an epidemic at the end of April 1912, and this caused between one hundred and fifty to one hundred and sixty cases per week, but disappeared towards the middle of June.<sup>690</sup>

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<sup>685</sup> BOA. MV, 147/20, Date: 20/Z/1328, (25 December 1910).

<sup>686</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1911*, p. 49.

<sup>687</sup> Ibid.

<sup>688</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1912*, p. 44.

<sup>689</sup> Ibid.

<sup>690</sup> Ibid.

### 3.4.3 The Muslim Pilgrimage

The plague existed among the returning pilgrims of 1909-1910 from Jeddah, therefore precautions were taken by the Alexandria and İstanbul Boards of Health on pilgrims returning by sea and land routes. The descending pilgrimage of 1910-1911 was declined due to cholera and plague in the summer and autumn in these areas.<sup>691</sup>

By taking precautions, the government were willing to prevent especially the pilgrims of Russia from entering İstanbul, but the main difficulty was it was impossible to distinguish between passengers and pilgrims. In the Mediterranean, the Turkish lazarets were full soon after the extensive occurrence of cholera, and the Jeddah lazaret was not enough, therefore in November, the board of Alexandria was asked to allow pilgrim ships from the north to do their quarantine at Tor. As a result, the Board unanimously agreed to this request because of the reality.<sup>692</sup>

The outbreak of cholera did not have a major impact on the pilgrims in 1910, and the returning pilgrims did not cause a serious spread over Turkish territories. It was noteworthy that, in spite of the infected pilgrims returning via the Hejaz Railway, there were just three cases resulting in two deaths in the lazaret of Tebuk in 1911.<sup>693</sup>

A few cases of the disease landed at the Tor lazaret (Sinai) from the ships returning from Jeddah or Yambo. The descending pilgrimage of 1912 fell mostly in the summer and autumn months.<sup>694</sup>

In the pilgrimage season of 1909-1910 there were about 6,084 pilgrims travelling by railway from Damascus, and over 1,862 pilgrims from Caiffa traveled to Medina. A total number of 15,222 pilgrims turned back using above-mentioned

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<sup>691</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1910*, pp. 54-55.

<sup>692</sup> Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>693</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1911*, p. 50.

<sup>694</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1912*, p. 44.

line and underwent their quarantine measures in the Tebuk lazaret. In the previous year about 5,421 pilgrims had travelled and 14,126 returned. Significant expenses had been incurred in connection with the Tebuk lazaret in 1910.<sup>695</sup>

The Tebuk lazaret had been active in the last four seasons. In the returning pilgrimage of 1910-1911, 20,435 pilgrims were placed in quarantine for five days at the Tebuk lazaret, whereas this number was 15,233 in the previous year. As mentioned previously, there had been three cases, two of them resulting in death. A decrease had occurred in the pilgrimage season of 1911-12.<sup>696</sup> About 16,294 pilgrims passed through the Tebuk lazaret to go to Medina. In the previous year, only 7,946 pilgrims had gone to the Hejaz in this way.

In the fiscal year of 1910-11, a total of about 1,286,178.10 was reached piasters in the Tebuk Lazaret, but the expenditure was only 580.660 piasters. The expenditure was not only for quarantine, but also constructions. The Tebuk lazaret was at capacity and full of pilgrims, thus no more pilgrims could be taken in. About 280,000 liras were reserved by the mixed commission for construction and repairs.<sup>697</sup>

In the descending pilgrimage of 1911-1912, about 15,270 pilgrims passed via the Tebuk lazaret from Syria to Medina. The cholera caused three deaths among them in the hospital of the lazaret. In the same year 16,885 pilgrims returning from Hac (pilgrimage to Mecca) were cordoned and many cases of enteritis and dysentery were seen among them, but there were apparently no cases of cholera. Over the past year, the Tebuk lazaret had extended its area to enable the accommodation of 10,000 pilgrims.<sup>698</sup>

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<sup>695</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1910*, pp. 55-56.

<sup>696</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1911*, p. 50.

<sup>697</sup> Ibid.

<sup>698</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1912*, p. 44.

### 3.5 The Press in Turkey

The press law, which was implemented by a court-martial, severely impeded the restriction of journalism, especially the newspapers that were in opposition of the Sublime Porte. On the one hand, in general, the "Tanin", "Ikdam" and "Yeni Gazete" strongly supported the views of the government. On the other hand, the two newspapers, "Seda-yı Millet" and "Muahede" were directed against the Sublime Porte.<sup>699</sup>

Lowther remarked that Ahmet Samim, the young journalist and the editor of "Seda-yı Millet", was assassinated by the CUP. It could be said that he had been threatened by the CUP as a result of his writings. Moreover, the "Muahede" was able to persist for about one month, but, it had to attempt to keep publishing under four different titles.<sup>700</sup>

When an article was published under the title "on the political free-masonry of those in high places - to be continued", the editor and the manager of the "Muahede" were arrested by the Sublime Porte, and shortly after the paper collapsed because it published an article which contained violent attacks on Talat Bey, the Minister of the Interior.<sup>701</sup>

Lowther pointed out that the "Tanin" was the most influential Turkish newspaper and a pro-CUP tool. On one occasion, it claimed that it had no connection with the CUP, but its two prominent writers, Hüseyin Cahit and Ismail Hakki, were both deputies and also leading members of the CUP. Ismail Hakkı, who was a deputy of Bagdat, made a trip to Mesopotamia at the end of the year and he began writing a series of articles for "Tanin" in which he addressed issues relating to Turkey. Lowther stated that all the Turkish press had acted neutrally with regard to the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. There were some Turkish illustrated papers,

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<sup>699</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1910*, p. 65.

<sup>700</sup> Ibid.

<sup>701</sup> Ibid.

such as the "Kalem", "Cem" and "Eşek", which were the most famous satirical humour magazines, which were suspended for a short time.<sup>702</sup>

The "Surat-ı Müstakim" (Straight Path) was a weekly Pan-Islamic magazine and enjoyed a large circulation in the Turkish religious world. The "Kursi-i Millet" was run on vigorous anti-European lines but it appeared for a short time.<sup>703</sup>

Furthermore, the "Osmanishch Lloyd" and "Jeune Turc" were local newspapers that were published in languages other than Turkish. The "Osmanishch Lloyd" represented the German Embassy, and it mostly denigrated the Triple Entente, especially British and Russia, and in these counties the press published articles that were unfavorable to the Turks. Lowther stated that its news was republished by "Tanın", and many Turkish officers read German as "it aims at influencing their minds", and were pro-German-Austria and anti-Russian and British.<sup>704</sup>

The "Jeune Turc" seemed to have two characters, a Zionist character, and a medium in French of the advanced ideas of the CUP. Samuel Hochberg, who was its nominal proprietor, was a German Jew from Hamburg, and he was a professor at the school of Alliance Israelite Universelle at Mosul and Isfahan. He changed his first name into the Muslim form of "Sami". The newspaper was financed by Zionist institutions called "the Anglo-Palestine Trading Company" that was registered in Britain and an offshoot of the Judaic Colonisation Association (J.C.A) which had Polish Jews, Caucasians, Muslims, Armenians, and Cretans on its staff. It was generally anti-Russian and anti-Triple Entente in its foreign policy issues, and Lowther asserted that it was also Pan-Islamist and seemed to be enjoyed in anti-Christian and anti-European articles that were concerned with matters relating to Egypt, Iran, Central Asia, and Arabia. In addition, it frequently mentioned in its

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<sup>702</sup> Ibid., pp. 65-66.

<sup>703</sup> Ibid., p. 66

<sup>704</sup> Ibid.



articles the benefits of wholesale of Jewish immigration to Turkey, especially in Mesopotamia.<sup>705</sup>

The "Şehrah" was a newspaper published under different names by the deputy Lutfi Fikri, and the head writer of the newspaper, Zeki Bey, was murdered after he wrote several violent articles discussing anti-government thoughts and the methods of the CUP. Zeki Bey's murder remained unsolved, as did those of two other writers, Hasan Fehmi and Ahmet Samim. This kind of news was directed against the government and the CUP. When Sait Paşa's cabinet came into power, the court-martial had issued a proclamation forbidding the press from attacking either the government as a whole, or individual ministers. The aim of this statement was to prevent criticism of the government, as well as the danger of such an attack on the court-martial itself.<sup>706</sup>

The reduced effect of the "Tanın", which caused immense growth of the Opposition press, was still run by Hüseyin Cahit, deputy for İstanbul, but he changed his neutral foreign policy after the Italian war, and he recommended a settlement be reached with Russia by opening the Straits. In another very important article it was stated that Turkey was in a difficult situation because of Pan-Islamism and it could not be said that the Sublime Porte had any great desire to intervene in the internal affairs of Egypt. Lowther stated that this attitude was most probably becoming more common in Turkey; as proof of this, the circulation of the Pan-Islamic weekly newspaper "Surat-i-Mustekim" had declined and Iran's situation was discussed heavily by Turkish newspapers, and there had not been an explosion of pro-Muslim feelings as expected.<sup>707</sup>

The main outlets of Turkish public opinion were the İkdâm (anti-committee), the Yeni Gazete (anti-Committee), the Sabah (non-committal), the Terdcüman-i

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<sup>705</sup> Ibid.

<sup>706</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1911*, p. 60.

<sup>707</sup> Ibid., p. 61.

Hakikat" (committee), the Tanın (semi-official committee) and the Tasvir-i Efkar (committee).<sup>708</sup>

In the first half of the year, a temporary collapse of the CUP had made a bad impression on their agencies. According to Lowther, the journalists who were in competition with each other acted wisely by holding their tongues, and in some cases also left İstanbul. Therefore, a new period of occultation started for the "İkdam", the "Yeni Gazete", the "Tasvir-i Efkar", and even the "Tanın". In such a case, it should be stated that the "Sabah" was only edited by an Armenian, "Vicar of Bray".<sup>709</sup>

Moreover, the CUP had a number of ephemeral supporters along with its regular agencies. For example, the "Hikmet" was a politico-religious newspaper and the "Hilal-i Osmani" was administrated under CUP patronage by the Egyptian Nationalist Sheikh Shawish, who was the editor of the newspapers. Lowther stated that there was an increased tendency of the CUP newspapers to strike the Pan-Islamic note and this could be seen especially in the "Tasvir-i Efkâr" newspaper.<sup>710</sup> With the start of the Balkan war, a spirit of patriotic harmony reigned among all the newspapers towards the end of the year, and although they had different ideas towards government actions related to the negotiation of the cease fire and the peace agreement, all of them agreed a bias in the disparagement of Europe in its relations with Turkey.<sup>711</sup> According to Lowther, there were many newspapers in languages other than Turkish, and they were read particularly by the communities whose mother tongues were used in the publication, namely, the "Jeune Turc", the "Turquie", the "Stamboul", the "Levant Herald", the "Moniteur Oryantal", the "Gazette Financière", and the "Osmanische Lloyd".<sup>712</sup>

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<sup>708</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1912*, p. 50.

<sup>709</sup> Ibid., pp. 50-51.

<sup>710</sup> Ibid., p. 51.

<sup>711</sup> Ibid.

<sup>712</sup> Ibid.

### 3.6 Prominent Men of Turkey

The CUP was succeeding in drawing supporters into its meshes by means of spurious freemasonry. Emmanuel Carasso was the most influential deputy in Selanik, and he was also the founder of an Italian freemasons lodge called "Macedonia Resurrected". The lodge was the headquarters of the Young Turks and all the top Young Turk leaders were members. Moreover, Carasso had a great impact on the officers and civilians who adopted freemasonry with the aim of Jewish influence throughout the Ottoman Empire, and Lowther explained that "it appeared as if the new movement were rather a Jewish than a Turkish revolution".<sup>713</sup>

A few examples can show the effects of freemasonry on the new Turkish regime, such as Cavit Bey who was a gifted crypto-Jew and freemason, and becoming the deputy of Selanik and Minister of Finance. Moreover, Talat Paşa, also a freemason, he was appointed Ministry of the Interior, while Hakkı Paşa was appointed Grand Vizier of the Empire, so it could be said that the most of the officers on the court-martial were freemasons.<sup>714</sup>

Twelve new lodges were started within a year in İstanbul and many of them were across Macedonia, and all these lodges were administered only by Jews, not Greek, Armenian or other Christian element. The Jews and the Turks were principally for the Young Turks movement, but all the Ottoman subjects such as Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, and Bulgarians were excluded from this. A Turk, who was predominantly a soldier, attempted to prevent his competition for predominance over the army under constitutional systems. Lowther stated that the Turkish economy could not stand for a week without the support of the Armenians, Greeks and Ottoman Jews, but the Young Turks seemed to have only allied with the Ottoman Jews, whose ultimate goal was to capture the Turkish economy, and

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<sup>713</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1910*, p. 3.

<sup>714</sup> Ibid.

the Young Turks did not have good attitudes towards foreigners and other races within The Ottoman Empire. In addition, the Jews were occupying important positions in the CUP and they had a great influence on Selanik. Nazım Bey was said to be Jewish and he was the one of the most influential members of the Selanik committee. He supported bringing 200,000 Romanian Jews into Macedonia, and some millions of Russian Jews into Mesopotamia and Palestine, which was the final objective of the Jews.<sup>715</sup>

**Musa Kazım:** He became Sheikh al-Islam, in support of the CUP, and was around 50 years of age. He was of humble origin, and originally from Eastern Anatolia. He was a coarse man, and "lacks both real learning and refinement from the Islamic scholarly standpoint". He was s religious preceptor to the son of the Abdülhamid's favourites many years ago. Shortly after the revolution, he joined the CUP and then became senator. After the dethronement of Abdülhamid II, he joined one of the new politico-masonic lodges, and although the predecessor of Sheikhlislams had argued that it was incompatible with Sunni Islam, he was the first Sheikhlislam who enrolled in Masonic lodges.<sup>716</sup>

**Colonel Mahmut Muhtar Bey:** He served as Minister of the Navy. He was the son of Gazi Muhtar Paşa, was commissioner of the old regime in Egypt. He spoke both French and German fluently. He was wealthy thanks to his marriage with Princess Nimet, the daughter of Khedive Ismail Paşa. After the revolution in 1908, he became the commander of the İstanbul army corps and implemented strict Prussian military methods that produced among the garrison a frame of mind that was one of the main reasons for the mutiny 31 March 1909. It was considered that he should temporally leave İstanbul, and he was sent off to be the Governor of İzmir until his nomination to the Ministry of Marine.

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<sup>715</sup> Ibid., pp. 3-4.

<sup>716</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1910*, p. 11.

**İsmail Bey (Gümülcine):** He was one of the founders of the CUP. Following the assembly of the Turkish Chamber, he was elected as vice-president of the Committee party. He had a decisive character, and played an important role in the overthrowing of Abdülhamid II and Kamil Paşa. He was uncomfortable with the Committee's despotic practices, thus he developed opposing views to the CUP. He fearlessly opposed the reactionary methods of the government. During the disarmament in Albania and Macedonia, the CUP showed brutal behavior towards the people and he opposed the committee's terrorist methods used to slap down the Opposition press, and political opponents in the capital. His attitude towards the CUP caused him to receive a number of threatening letters.<sup>717</sup>

**Lütfi Fikri Bey:** He was deputy of Dersim and was also a lawyer. He was the son of the former Governor of the region. He spoke fluently and effectively in Parliament, but not more than the Minister of Finance, Cavit Bey. He launched an attack on the government during the torture discussion. He presented some samples of the instruments of torture used in the course of the court-martial trials. After that he received some threatening letters and he was careful if going out after dark.<sup>718</sup>

**Ferit Bey:** He was Deputy of Kütahya, and he was disturbed by the despotic methods of the committee, thus he participated in the opposing views. During the old regime, he used shuttle diplomacy between Cairo and Geneva to overthrow the Abdülhamid regime. He received a special study of foreign and international questions. He was formally appointed as a political editor of the committee tool, Council of the Community, "Şura-yı Ümmet". He was a good speaker and a master of a modern simple Turkish style.<sup>719</sup>

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<sup>717</sup> Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>718</sup> Ibid.

<sup>719</sup> Ibid.

**Rıza Nur Bey:** He was deputy of Sinop and initially a supporter of the CUP. He was the most important member of the Assembly during the year 1910. He was sentenced to more than three months in prison for belonging to a secret reactionary association over the course of 1910.<sup>720</sup>

**Ahmed Nesimi Bey:** He was the committee deputy of İstanbul and was one of the official delegates of the Selanik committee. He had previously worked at the Foreign Ministry. He was also a member of the board of the National Bank. He was from Crete and spoke fluent French and Greek.<sup>721</sup>

**Hayri Bey:** He was a quiet and humble deputy of Nigde. He was a genuine patriot and an assiduous worker. He also served as a Minister of the Pious Foundations at that time, and was one of the committee candidates for the Ministry of Justice.

**Hacı Adil Bey:** He was the chief secretary of the CUP, and was the adopted son of a worthy customs official. He was a man of intelligence, moderate views and honesty of purpose. He also held the position of Governor of Edirne for over a year.

**Mustafa Nail Bey:** He was appointed to the post of Ministry of Finance and at the time of revolution he was probably about 50 years of age. His personal character was high and he was an intelligent teacher, as well as a student of economics. He was elected as a deputy in 1908 and was a moderate member of the committee.<sup>722</sup>

**Hulusi Bey:** In early July, he was appointed as the Minister of Public Works in Hakkı Paşa's cabinet. He was known as a skilled civil engineer and was about 50 years of age. After completing his education in Germany, he took part in the ministry for many years and worked his way up to the post of Permanent Under-

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<sup>720</sup> Ibid.

<sup>721</sup> Ibid.

<sup>722</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1911*, p. 14.

Secretary. He was retained in the Cabinet formed at the beginning of October by Sait Paşa, but three months later he decided to eliminate Hulusi Bey. His attitude towards the Chester scheme was it was seeking to destroy rather than defend in the Camber. He did not have same idea as his colleagues in the matter of irrigation in Mesopotamia, and his attitude towards the British contractors interested in this work gave rise to suspicion.<sup>723</sup>

**Mustafa Asım Bey:** He was a former Turkish Minister in Stockholm, after which he served in Sofia. At the beginning of October 1911, he became Minister of Foreign Affairs in Sait Paşa's Cabinet and was about 45 years of age. He lived abroad for about twenty five years, and his appearance was European rather than Turkish. His wife was Hungarian. He spoke French fluently and had a friendly relationship with Britain, but he had a suspicious attitude towards Russia. He did not join any parties but he supported the CUP with all his heart and was less popular in the government.<sup>724</sup>

**Mavrogordato Efendi:** He was Greek and, after the announcement of the Constitution, served for some months as the Minister of Mines for the second time. He was from a good local Greek family, and under the old regime he was a member of the Council of State. Moreover, he was an intelligent man, but did not have a strong character.

**Sinapian Efendi:** Mavrogordato Efendi was succeeded by Sinapian Efendi in October, an Armenian Catholic known for many years as a talented lawyer with no political connections. He was a member of the law department for many years, thus he had technical knowledge.<sup>725</sup>

**Damat Ferid Paşa:** He was brother-in law to Sultan Abdülhamid II, and he was a member of the Senate. He was known as a student of prehistoric

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<sup>723</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>724</sup> Ibid., pp. 14-15.

<sup>725</sup> Ibid., p. 15.

anthropology, but was given the chance to gratify his taste for modern politics by the revolution. He presented the constitution of Midhat Paşa to the Senate a few years earlier, and it was said to be quite democratic enough for Turkey in its current state of development. He was the head of the Entente Liberate (Hurriyet ve Itilaf Fırkası).<sup>726</sup>

**Colonel Sadık Bey:** He was in the Manastır garrison and had played an important role behind the scenes in the restoration of the constitution during the previous year. He was more powerful in military circles and was influential in a quiet way. By the beginning of 1911, he had defined himself with the "dissidents" from the committee ranks. Afterwards he resigned his commission and published a manifesto criticising the committee's interference with the government. He was one of the founders of the Entente Liberate and was one of the most active members of that party.

**Mavroyeni Bey:** Towards the end of the year he was appointed ambassador to Vienna. He was a Greek over the age of 65 and was Ottoman Minister at Washington many years ago, but he had not held any diplomatic missions for over a quarter of a century. For a short time he became Prince of Samos Island under the old regime. After the Constitution he was appointed as a senator. Moreover, he spoke both English and French fluently and was an intelligent man.<sup>727</sup>

**Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa:** He was the father of General Mahmut Muhtar Paşa. He was appointed as the Grand Vizier at 70 years of age in July 1912. He played a great role in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, thus he was given the honorary title of "Gazi". For many years, he was the representative of the former Sultan in Egypt and, after the revolution of 1908, he returned to İstanbul but did not play a

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<sup>726</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>727</sup> Ibid., p. 17.



salient role in policy. For a while before his appointment as Grand Vizier, he became President of the Senate.<sup>728</sup>

**Reşid Paşa:** He was the Turkish delegate on the London Peace Conference, and he had the respectable career of a Turkish diplomat. He was Ambassador for many years in Rome and then in Vienna. Shortly after the Italian war began, he was offered a position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Said Halim Paşa. He accepted the post, but subsequently did not accept the offer. His action caused great resentment in Said Halim Paşa, whereupon he was not able to be reinstated in his embassy and he had been unemployed for over a year. He came from a good family, and was intelligent, very courteous, and good-tempered, but did not have a strong character.

**Ohannes Efendi Kuyumcuyan (Ohannes Paşa):** He was appointed as Governor of Lebanon in December 1912. Before that he had worked as deputy foreign minister for three years, and at the beginning of his career he had been an advisor at the Embassy in Rome for 10 years. He presented himself as timorous and un-enterprising during his time as Under-Secretary and he was a man of nervous character. Nevertheless, he was well-intentioned, honest and knowledgeable.

**Sait Bey:** After Ohannes Paşa, he was appointed as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and he was the first Muslim to occupy the post for a long series of years. This assignment was made when a Christian, Gabrial Efendi, was Minister. For many years, he had served as the Turkish delegate on the International Board of Health and was a talented officer.<sup>729</sup>

**Prince Said Halim:** After the military coup in January, he was appointed as President of the Council of State and became Grand Vizier in June following the

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<sup>728</sup> Lowther, *Annual for 1912*, pp. 17-18.

<sup>729</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

assassination of Mahmut Şevket Paşa. He was the grandson of the Governor of Egypt, Mehmet Ali Paşa. The Abdülhamid regime was not in favour of him and he was one of the members of the current government. When evaluated according to European standards, he could be described as a gentleman. He loved luxury and was the only man to hold receptions and dinners. A large part of his personnel staff was Egyptian and he attempted to show a semi-oriental splendor. He had strong feelings of like and dislike. He was supple and conciliatory, and when he disagreed with the arguments of other people, he was nevertheless always ready to listen to them. He was always optimistic. Moreover, Prince Said Halim had a relationship with Serif Pasha who was his brother in law and anti-committee. The "Mechersutiette" (Constitution) was published in Paris by Şerif Paşa and conducted a campaign against the government. Prince Said Halim did not have a dominant personality and served in the role of figurehead for, rather than leader of, the government.<sup>730</sup>

**Talat Paşa:** He was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs and was one of the most striking figures in the CUP. Although he was a minor official at Selanik before the revolution and on an annual salary of 100 liras, he played an important role in the revolution of 1908 and 1909. He had a humble personality and he was tall and heavily built, plus he had a high capacity, was full of energy and absolutely fearless. He had intense patriotic feelings and he was not interested in the pursuit of personal interests even though he had many opportunities to do this.<sup>731</sup>

**Enver Paşa:** Enver Paşa was as equally brave as Talat Paşa, but under the influence of personal vanity, and he was much more brutal than Talat Bey. He was the youngest member of the ministry at just over 30 years of age. He was short, light-skinned, bright-eyed, and gentle. He looked very attractive when he smiled,

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<sup>730</sup> Beaumont, *Annual for 1913*, pp. 39-40.

<sup>731</sup> Ibid., p. 40.

but with an occasional gleam suggestive of hardness and even cruelty. He was fairly quiet and secretive.

For a long time he was glad to stay in the background until the revolution in Turkey, which was managed by a secret group for whom he had become one of the more effective and powerful members. At the end of December he became Minister of War. Whether he had the military capability for this or not had not yet been proven. He organised the Arabs against the Italians in Tripoli and after he returned to Turkey, did not have an opportunity to show how much capacity he had had in the Balkan wars. He did not have much of an impact during the Balkan Wars, but he probably did have an impact on the organisation for the retrieval of Edirne. He left his mark as Minister of War by deciding to dismiss the incompetent and inadequate civil servants in the army. He never went anywhere without being accompanied by four or five generals and his lieutenant, as well as always having a car behind him. His education, methods and sympathies were German, and when he was a military attaché in Berlin, his character and career had exerted a strong influence and he was supported by the German government.<sup>732</sup>

**Cemal Paşa:** He was born in İstanbul and was a soldier from a family that came from Mitylene. In December, before he became Minister of Public Works, he was the Military Governor of İstanbul. He was honest and creative, but he had a violent character. He had great energy and determination. He had a sense of patriotism degenerating into chauvinism that prevented him from seeing the facts. He had lacked the qualities of statesmanship that Talat Paşa had acquired.<sup>733</sup>

**Halil Bey:** He was the President of Parliament and the purest Turk of all the ministers. He quoted the glories of the past history of the Ottoman Empire in inflammatory speeches of which the refrain was revenge. He had not received a good education and had a narrower perspective but "like most Turkish politicians

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<sup>732</sup> Ibid.

<sup>733</sup> Ibid.

he was changeable in his views and influenced by considerations which are not directly germane to the question at issue".<sup>734</sup>

**Cavit Bey:** He was the Minister of Finance, and had Jewish parents who came from Selanik. He was highly eloquent and very intelligent and had one of the highest levels of capacity. He had sympathy with the French rather than the Germans and had no malice towards the British. He was less daring than Enver, Talat and Cemal, who were afraid of nothing in terms of reaching their goal.<sup>735</sup>

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<sup>734</sup> Ibid., pp. 40-41.

<sup>735</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

## **CONCLUSION**

In the first quarter of the twentieth century, there were men in Turkey who had faith in saving the country from ruination. Britain and Russia had competed in the race to create colonies in the Turkish territories and this contention ended with the treaty of 1907. Moreover, when the British and Russian Emperors met at Reval in June 1908 it caused rumours among the Turks, who were concerned that the partitioning of the Turkish territories had been decided in this meeting by these two Great Powers. Thus, the Young Turks hoped that they could immediately mobilise to save the country from disintegration with the declaration of the Second Constitution on 23 July 1908.

The Young Turks attempted to make reforms along with the constitutional government to prevent the fragmentation of Turkey, but this cannot be considered to have been successful. According to British ambassador Lowther, the new regime was no more skillful in administration than Abdülhamid II in terms of making internal reforms without European aid.

Turkey was in poor condition in every aspect during the process leading up to the First World War. In particular, all the financial difficulties made themselves apparent in social, political and military fields. The Young Turks believed that if the Turkish army was strong enough, it would be easy to overcome the other problems in the country. In this context, they firstly began the reform of the army with Germany's assistance, who increased her influence on Turkey in this way, but on the other hand Britain did not want the Turkish navy to come under the same German influence as the army. Furthermore, the reorganisation of the Turkish army, and particularly the strengthening of the navy by purchasing battleships, made Russia anxious, because Russia did not want Turkey to have a powerful navy in the Black Sea.

There was an air of festivity with the proclamation of the Constitution of 1908, especially in the Balkans. The people's shouts for freedom did not continue long and, shortly afterwards, riots and wars took place throughout the Empire. There were more than ten Ottoman governments in a short period of time between the proclamation of the Second Constitution of 1908 and the First World War, and some of these governments followed a pro-British and a pro-German policy. After 1910, Turkey hoped for support from Britain, who did not give her any assistance during the Tripoli and Balkan Wars, and this was the biggest reason for the pro-German policies of the Sublime Porte against Britain, who had already abandoned her traditional policy of protecting the territorial integrity of Turkey.

The tension in the Balkans was increased further by the Albanian revolt under the influence of nationalist ideologies and with the involvement of the Great Powers. There were many Albanian revolts in the Balkans before the beginning of the Balkan wars, and these revolts were violently suppressed by Turkish troops. The creation of an autonomous Armenia in the east of Turkey was supported, especially by Britain and Russia, and this caused an increase in Turkish suspicions against the British government. In 1911, Lowther stated that Britain should not appeal against the sympathy of the Armenians towards Russia, because the Armenians always regarded Britain as their champion and Britain was allied with Russia in the eyes of the Armenians.

The most evident proof of this alleged alliance between Britain and Russia was seen in the First World War. In this war, both the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente had already been formed for many years. The Triple Alliance was established by an agreement between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy in 1882. On the other hand, Russia and France formed the Triple Entente in 1894, completed with the inclusion of Britain in 1907. A share of the Turkish territory was the only reason for her inclusion in The Triple Entente. However, with the proclamation of a constitutional government in 1908, the Young Turks saw Britain

as their saviour, but shortly after they began to see her as an enemy more dangerous than Turkey's ancient enemy the Russians.

The Arab Sheikhs started a revolt against Turkish rule in Yemen and Asir, and due to this, the Sublime Porte decided to dispatch Turkish troops from Libya to the rebel regions, therefore Tripoli was left defenseless. Meanwhile, Italy desired to prove herself to be like other great imperialist powers of the world, thus she declared a war on Turkey in Tripoli. The Entente Powers turned a blind eye to Italy's invasion of Tripoli. The Turks understood they should not trust the Entente Powers. On the other hand, Germany had remained silent in the battle of Tripoli, because she had been an ally of Italy since 1882.

However, the Sublime Porte had a close relationship with Germany compared to Britain, so it could not be said that the only reason for this relation was due to the pro-German Enver and Talat Paşas, because in the minds of the Turks, Germany had no imperialist ambitions regarding Turkish territories and they had not been subjected to any German invasions throughout history. However, Britain settled in Cyprus in 1878 and invaded Egypt in 1882. France occupied Tunisia in 1881. Another reason for the Sublime Porte to have closer relations with Germany was the need for the loans provided by her. Britain and France were using the economic status as a political interference in the internal affairs of Turkey, but Germany was only trying to obtain economic concessions.

Turkey afraid to spread the Tripoli War to the Balkans, because the Italians could not enter a mile into the interior of Tripoli, thus she spread the war to the Aegean Sea and the Dardanelles Strait. Therefore, the Turks were forced to leave Tripoli to Italy.

The Balkans are very near to the capital of the Ottoman Empire, thus the Turks considered that if any war began in the Balkans, it would be the beginning of the end of the empire. Unfortunately their fears were fulfilled when the small Balkan states, who were dreaming of becoming a Great Bulgaria, Great Serbia, and Great

Romania through the partitioning of the Turkish territories, especially the province of Macedonia, formed the Balkan Union to open a war on Turkey who sought the intervention of the Great Powers. However, including Britain, the Great Powers did not intervene in the Balkan Wars as they did in the Tripoli War, but Russia was trying to increase her influence over the Armenians and Britain also sought to consolidate its position in the north of Iran, and especially in the Bagdat region. In the First Balkan War, the Turks, except for İstanbul, had lost all their lands in Europe. As a result of this war, Bulgaria had gained more lands than all the other Balkan states. But this situation mobilised the other Balkan states, who declared a war on Bulgaria, and launched the Second Balkan War by attacking the Serbs in June 1913. This situation turned out to be a great opportunity for Turkey to regain Eastern Thrace which is still the most important defensive line for İstanbul and Turkey.

Moreover, had peace been made, along with some economic development, instead of the revolts and wars that took place before the First World War, there might not have been so severe an impact of internal and external factors on the Sublime Porte. However, this was impossible, because the Young Turks overthrew constitutional governments in the early stage of the Second Constitution of 1908. The Sublime Porte had needed, for a long time, to focus on internal affairs and economic fortitude, which could have helped Turkey to strengthen in many ways, such as socially, politically and militarily. But the imperialist ambitions of the Great Powers did not expect "the Sick Man of Europe" (the Ottoman Empire) to die, thus they would kill him at the first opportunity and share out his heritage.

The Young Turks attempted to make reforms to prevent fragmentation of the empire, but their unsuitable policy could not achieve this aim. This led to a revolt of non-Turkish subjects against the Sublime Porte, because the Young Turks adopted a policy of Turkification of non-Turks, and when they could not implement this policy in a legitimate way, they used guns or military operations without



hesitation in order to achieve their goals. This policy had failed in Albania, Macedonia and Arabian regions, and it was also met with displeasure amongst the people. On the other hand, the Turkification policy had a positive effect during the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. In addition, many reforms were made in the army, and this was shown to great effect during the First World War with many successes, but the defeat of Germany, who was Turkey and Austria's ally in the war, also resulted in the defeat of Turkey. If the Turks were defeated in the Dardanelles Strait by their enemies, whose battleships passed through the Straits, perhaps today there would be no independent republic for the Turks. Although many countries arose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire in three continents, over 100 years after the First World War the conflict has continued both internally and externally in those countries, despite the different types of regimes. Peace and tranquility will not come soon and it seems the conflict will continue for many years.

## Appendix I

[illegible]

**This telegram from Tevfik Paşa the Turkish Ambassador in London to Asım Bey, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, who submitted its translation to the Grand Vizier's Office on 15 January 1912, (BOA. MV. 226/99, January 6, 1912).**

Bâb-ı Âli

Hariciyye Nezâreti

Umuru Siyasiyye Müdüriyyet-i Umumisi

İkinci Kalemi

Adet 1588

Huzuru Sami-i Hazreti Sadaret Penahiye

Maruzu Çakeri Kemineleridir

Londra Sefâreti seniyyesinden şimdi alınan bir telgrafnamenin tercümesini ber-vech-i zîr arz-ı müsâraat eylerim.

Avrupa-yı Osmaninin ve bilhassa Makedonya'nın hal ve mevkii İngiliz efkâr-ı umumiyesi ile mahâfil-i siyasiyesini endîş-nâk edip haber verilmiş igtîşâât önümüzdeki ilkbaharda ser-zede-i zuhur olduğu takdirde ahvalın pek ziyade kesb ve haset ederek selâmet-i devleti İtalya ile olan muharebemizden daha ciddi surette tehlikeye ilkâ edeceği istidlâl olunuyor. Zaten birkaç günden beri gazeteler Makedonya'nın ahvâli hakkında sûret-i müheyyic neşrederek şimdiden izhar-ı endişe ediyorlar. Ahâlî-i mahalliye'nin metâlib ve şikayatını mahallinde tahkik ve bunları indel-icap Avrupa'ca matlûp olan esas ile kabil-i telif bir surette is'âf ahaliyi vesâit-i mümkün ile tatmin etmek üzere Makedonya ve Arnavutluk'a birer muhtelit ve bi-taraf komisyonun acilen ve aynı zamanda izamı Hükûmet-i Osmaniye'nin menâfi'i iktizasından heyet-i tahkikiyede birkaç Makedonyalı bulunması dahi pek ziyade fevaid-i bi-hakkın olur ve bu suret teşkili buraca ziyadesiyle hüsnü tesir hâsıl edeceği gibi anasır-ı ecnebiyeye mensup erbâb-ı ihtilâlin tahkikât ve tedvirat-ını dahi akim bırakır. İngiltere müstemlekatında şikayat ve igtîşâât vukuunda heyet-i tahkikiye izamı usulü İngiltere hükûmetince daima tatbik edilmiş ve daima netâic-i hasene husule getirmiştir. Makedonya ve Arnavutluk'ta hoşnutsuzluğu bi-eyyi-hâl teskin etmek igtîşâât'a nihâyet vermek için bu tedbirin hemen ittihazını buradaki dostlarımızın en ileridekileri tavsiye etmektedir.

Tevfik Paşa Hazretlerinin birer komisyon izamı hakkındaki mütalâa-i musırrânelerine kemal-i ehemmiyet ve ısrarla iştirak eylediği de arz-ı müsâraat eylerim.

Ol bâbde emr-ü-ferman Hazreti Veliyy-ül- emrindir.

Fî 16 Muharrem 1330 ve 24 Kânunuevvel 1327

## Appendix II

باب عالی  
دائرہ خارجہ  
قلم مخدوم  
۱۶۶۰

جہو فی حقہ جہو فی

مرد و هم که این  
کتاب ۷۷  
تاریخ و ۱۶۷۷  
نوروز مذکره عربی و  
در اول و دوم  
۷۷  
تاریخ و ۱۶۷۷  
نوروز مذکره عربی و  
در اول و دوم  
۷۷  
تاریخ و ۱۶۷۷  
نوروز مذکره عربی و  
در اول و دوم

ایده جیم بورده بعلی سیلره «ترک او دیاره» بقای غیر نال اولدی و وضعیت حاره سده او دیار عمومی تریله سوله سوله  
 صورده قلمده یولردی «موضوع ختا اولدی» روایتیک روزانه ییخی تخار ایدم بوم بر جانه فطارت در جود خانی زانه و ندرت تقریر  
 ایله «توقعتی» تریله اولانه «توقعتی» ترک خانی ورنه اظرف و کفر بیده دهسه رسد و حاله کفره بعلیه و بیدره  
 امی صحنه بیدره که اضلاده لایق دیره ک قایم راضا رفی حکم و او دیار قایدیه قایم سلاطنته حدره اییم ییله قایم  
 ایده جیم انتی خیمه اییم حکومتیه لایق بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره  
 بیری شایک تریله بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره  
 ولایت عثمانیه صدره لایق بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره  
 مسوب و لایق بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره  
 و حاله بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره  
 لایق بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره  
 حاضیه طریقه  
 ۱۹  
 ۱۹

روم ای رانلوی و لایق بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره  
 بولکیدی تکلیف بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره  
 بیدره بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره  
 قدر بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره  
 ولایات هالینه «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره «توقعتی» بیدره  
 ۱۹  
 ۱۹

This telegram was sent to Asım Bey Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey by Tefik Paşa Ambassador in London and it contains information about the situation of Macedonia and Albania, (BOA. MV. 226/99, January 9, 1912).

Bâbiâlî Daire-i Hâriciyye  
Kalem-i Mahsus 1330  
Huzur-u Sami- i Hazreti Sadâret- Penahiye  
Maruzu Çakeri Kemineleridir

27 Kanunievvel [1]327 tarihli ve 1217 numrulu tezkire-i aciziyeye zeyldir. Londra sefiri Tevfik Paşa hazretlerinden vârid olan tahriratın tercümesi ber-veçhi-zir arz olunur. Avrupa'yı Osmani'de bilhassa Makedonya ve Arnavutluk'da cereyan eden ahvalın birkaç zamandan beri mühim bir renk kesbettiği telgrafımla Hükümet-i Seniyye'nin nazar-ı dikkatine arz etmiştim. Müşâhede olan ahval-i iğtişâsiyye ister Bulgar ihtilâl komitelerinin tertip gerdesi olsun ister bazı müttefik devletlerin teşvikatı eseri bulunsun havali-i mezkûre ahâlisinin âdem-i hoşnutsuzluğunun ve efal-i ihtilâliye teşebbüsün esbabı Avrupa hususuyla İngiltere efkâr-ı umumisi nazarında işbu kıtada temâdî eden emniyetsizliğe ve memurumuzun harekât ve muâmelât-ı keyfiyesine ve alel-husûs ibkâ edilmiş cinâyât-ı fiil-i hakikilerinin durusu ve tecziyelerine hükümet-i mahalliye'nin mesela Grevena Rum papazı vakıasında olduğu gibi manzûr olan tereddüdüne mâtuf bulunmaktadır. Birçok ihtilâl cemiyetlerinin tahrikât-ı eseri olan vaziyet-i hakikiye hakkında gerek matbuat ve gerek efkâr-ı umumiyyeyi tenvir maksadına mâtuf olan ikdamat-i ilkbaharda vukuatın cereyan ettiği mahallerde bulunan gazete muhabirlerinin ifâdât-i ma'kûsesi ve müesserat-ı gayr-i tabiye taht-ı tazyikinde hareket eden memurîn-i mahalliye'nin taraftarlığı ve gaddarlığı ve muâmelât-ı keyfiyesi tarafından vuku bulan ihbaratı muvacehesinde hiçbir netice-i müsemmere netice-i müsemmere bahsetmiyor. Bu suretle Kanunu Esasi ilanıya iade olunan adâlet-i mütesaviye ve emniyet-i can ve mal mevaiddinin adem-i ittihazı Rumeli vilayetimizdeki kıyam ve isyan için bir mazurini meşrûa gibi telakki olunuyor. Hergün İngiliz gazeteleri Makedonya vaziyet-i şekliyesinden bahsediyorlar ve işbu vaziyetin Balkanlar'da sulhü ihlal edebileceğini hatta devletimizin bakayasını bile sarsabileceğini imaya kadar varıyorlar. Bu hal devam edecek olursa esasen Balkan komitesi bu işle iştigale başladığı cihetle meselenin İngiliz parlamentosuna dahi aksetmesi melhuzdur. Hükümet-i Seniyye'nin kuvve-i kâhire sayesinde işbu harekât-ı ihtilaliyyeyi akim bırakması ve Makedonya'da muvakkaten iade-i âsâyiş ettirilmesi mümkündür. Fakat İngiliz efkâr-ı umumiyesini aleyhimize çevirmemeğe ve bu suretle Avusturya ve Rusya gibi müttefikdar bazı hükümetin tahrikâtına karşı İngilizlerin müzaheret diplomatikâsından mahrum kalmamağa eylemekliğimiz vecâibinden İngiltere'nin Avrupa-yı Osmani'de alakadar olmayan tek devlet olduğu ve Balkanlar'da statûkonun muhafazasını hâlisâne arzu ettiği cihetle bu Makedonya meselesinde aleyhimize dönmemesine gayret ve bunun için devlet-i müşarûnileyhyeye Kanunu Esasi ile ilan olunan adalet, emniyet, müsavat esaslarının bil-cümle anasıra sebâten tatbik olunacağını havi mevaiddin incazına (?) çalıştığımız delâil-i maddesiyle işaret etmekliğimiz lazımeden olduğuna kaniim. Ahalimiz ihtiyâcât ve şikayat ve

emellerine mahallinde suret-i cedide kesb-i vukuf etmek ve kendilerinin imkan müsaade olduğu derecede arzularını is'âf ile hükümete rabt ve bu suretle ecnebi müşfiklerin tahrikatına bir set hasıl teşkil eylemelerini temin için bilâ-ifade-i zaman muhtelit tahkikat komisyonları teşkil edilerek Rumeli vilayetiyle Arnavutluğa izâmı hakkında nezd-i 'ali-i nezâret-penahilerinde ne derece ısrar etsem azdır. Komisyon Kralı namını taşıyan bu gibi komisyon usulü burada cari olup pek nâfi netâic-i temin etmiştir. Bu komisyonlar sırf avari olup parlamentonun katiyen dahli olmaksızın kuvve-i icraiye tarafından tayin edilir. Maruzatıma hitam vermeden evvel şurasını da ilave edeceğim ki, Burada bazı mahâfil-i siyasiyede Türklerin Avrupa'da bakayası gayr-i kâbil olduğu ve vaziyet-i hazırasında Avrupa sulh-ü umumisini tehdidattan Balkanlar meselesinin suret-i katiyede halli lüzumu mevzu' bahs olduğu rivayetlerinin deveran ettiğini istihbar eyledim. Böyle bir cereyan-ı efkârın derece-i vehameti zat-ı devletlerince takdir edilir. Matbuata henüz aksetmemiş olan işbu efkarın gerek harici ve gerek dahili düşmanlarımız yedinde müthiş bir silah haline girmesine meydan vermeden imhası zımnında beyinlerindeki ihtilaflara nihayet vererek kabineye dahilen mevkiini tahkim ve Avrupa kabilelerine karşı selâmet-i memlekete hasr-ı mesai ile bilineceğini temin edecek emniyeti bahsetmelerini hükûmet-i seniyyenin fark-ı siyasiyemizden talebe sarf-ı makderetin eylemesi ve bu mesele ile cidden iştigal etmesi derece-i vücubededir. Paşa-yı müşarunileyhin tercümesi balada arz olunan tahrirat-ı mahremanesini ahîren telakki ettim. Emr-î fehimâneleri üzerine vekâleten riyaset eyledim. Meclis-i Vükelâda Rumeli ve Anadolu vilayet-i Osmaniyesine sadr-ı esbak Ferit ve Hüseyin Hilmi Paşalar hazeratıyla Âyân-ı kiramdan Reşid Akif Paşa hazretleri riyasetlerinde ve cihet-i Maliye, Mülkiye, Adliye ve Maarif ve Jandarmaya mensup zevattan mürekkep muhtelit üç komisyonun serian teşkili ile birincisinin Arnavutluk, ikincisinin Kosova ve Selanik ve Üçüncüsünün vilâyet-i şarkiyeye izamı ve ahalinin sebeb-i şikâyetlerinin bir suret-i adilane ve sahihada tetkikiyle izalesi esbabının behemehâl ilkbahardan evvel temini hakkında verilen kararın mevki-i tatbiki bir an evvel konulması lüzumu gösterir ve pek mühim bazı mütalaatı hâvî olmakla nazar-ı dekayik-i beyn-i fehimanelerine arz ederim. Ol babda emr ü ferman hazreti veliyy'ül-emrindir.

25 Haziran [1]330 2 Kanunisani [1]327


Rumeli ve Anadolu vilayetlerine gidecek heyetlere verilecek meblağ

Bu heyetleri teşkil edecek olan memurin her türlü masraflarına mukabil olmak üzere evvela hin-i 'azimetlerinde maktuan reis 10 bin ve diğerlerine 5'er bin kuruş tayinat sır kâtiplerinden avdetlerine kadar beher gün için reis ile ecnebi memurlara 3'er yüz ve diğerlerine 2'er yüz kuruş ve vilayet ahalisinden refakatlerine alacakları zevata da beher gün için 2'er yüz kuruş verilecektir.

19 Kanunisani [1]327







The telegram from Tevfik Paşa Ambassador in London to Asim Bey Turkish Foreign Minister, (BOA. MV. 226/99, February 4, 1912).

#### Mazbata


Hariciye Nezareti'nin miyâne-i acizanemde kıraat olunan tezkirelerinde Rumeli vilâyetinin hâl-i mevkî'i İngiltere efkâr-ı umumiyesi ile mahâfil-i siyasiyesini pek ziyade endişe-nâk edip haber verilen iğtişâştan ilkbaharda serzede-i zuhûr olduğu takdirde ahvalin kesb-i ehemmiyet edeceği istidlâl olunmakta ve oralarda cereyan eden ahval birkaç zamandan beri mühim bir renk iktisab etmekte olup İngiltere'nin

bu meselede aleyhimize dönmemesine gayret ve Kanunu Esasi ile ilan olunan adalet, emniyet, müsavat esaslarının bil-cümle anasıra seyyanen tatbiki temin edecek delail-i maddiyenin iraesine sarf-ı makderet olunması lazımeden bulunduğundan ahalinin ihtiyâcât ve şikâyet ve metâlibini mahallerinde tahkik ve bunları indel'- icap Avrupaca matlûp olan esas ile kabil-i telif bir surette ve imkânın müsaadesi derecesinde is'âf ederek ahaliyi vesait-i mümkün ve münasip ile tatmin ve hükümetine rabt ve imale ile ecnebi müşevviklerin tahrikâtına hâil teşkil eylemelerini temin için bilâ-ifâde-i vakt-i muhtelit tahkikat komisyonları izamına lüzumu acil bulunduğu Londra Sefâret-i seniyyesinin iştiratına atfen dermiyân olunmuştur.

Sûret-i iştirata nazaran vilâyet-i mezkûrede emn ve sükûnun muhafazasıyla hâdisât-i igtîşâât'iyenin men'i vukuunu kâfil ve temin-i efkârı ve tatmin-i ahaliyi mucip tedâbir-i fiile ve acileye tevessül edilmesi muktazi bulunduğundan bu babda Dâhiliye Nezâretince ittihazına lüzum gösterilen tedabire dair ittihaz olunan mukadderatın hemen tatbikine teşebbüs edilmekle beraber zikr olunan vilayâtı devr ve teftiş ile ahalinin şikâyet ve müsted'âyâtını tahkik ve mezkûr vilayetlerin baharda ıslaha ve imariyesini ve ahalinin ihtiyâcât-ı hakikiyesini tetkik etmek ve netice-i tahkikat ve tetkikatta mahallince yapılacak mevaddı hemen mevki'-i icrâyâ vaz eylemeleri ve bu hususatta her nezarete Rumeli'nde bulunan teşkilatı ve memurunu üzerinde haiz nüfuz ve salâhiyet olunarak esnâ-yı devr-iteftiş-e cihet-i askeriyyeye vukû' bulacak müracaat ve ihtaratı dahi nazar-ı dikkat ve itinaya alınmak ve Rumeli'ndeki bil'umum memurin devletten irâde-i seniyye-i Padişahî ile mensup olanlara mesuliyet deruhte edilerek ledel'hace işten el çektirdi. Diğer memurini dahi indel-iktiza azletmek salâhiyetini haiz bulunmak üzere Dâhiliye Nâzırı Hacı Adil Beyin Kosova, Manastır, Selanik, İşkodra, Yanya ve Edirne vilayetlerine izamı ve müşarunileyh iki mülkiye müfettişiyle Maliye, Harbiye, Jandarma, Adliye, Nafia, Maarif memurlarına devair-i müteallikasınca intihap olunacak birer zâtın terfiki ve bu zatın mevadd-ı ıslahiye hakkında bil'ahire muktazi beyan edecek şube memurlarına intihabı ve bu heyetin refakatinde Maliye Nezaretinde ve Jandarma'da müstahdem ecnebilerden dahi münasip bir zevâtın bulundurulması ve vilâyet-i mezkûrede ahval ve ihtiyacat-ı mevkiyyeye vakıf ahali-i mahalliyeden münasip görülecekleri icap ederse maiyetine almak üzere müşarunileyhe mezuniyet itası ve zarûri'l- ihtiyâç olan masarif-i seferiye ve saireye mukabil Nazır-ı müşarunileyh hin-i azimetinde tevdian 10 bin ve terfik olunacak memurlara 5'er bin ve hareketlerinden avdetlerine kadar her gün için Nazır-ı müşarunileyh ile ecnebi memurlara 3'er yüz ve diğerlerine 2'şer yüz ve vilayetlerce iltihak edecek zevâta her gün için 2'şer yüz kuruş Dâhiliye Nezaretinin harcırah tertibinden itası bit-tezekkür kaleme alınan irâde-i seniyye lâyhası leffen arz ve takdîm kılınmakla katıbe-i ahvalin.

Fî 15 Safer (1)330 ve 22 Kanunisani (1)327.

## Appendix IV



**The telegram from Osman Nizami Paşa the Turkish Ambassador in Berlin to the Foreign Ministry of Turkey, (BOA. MV. 226/99, January 16, 1912).**

Bâb-ı Âlî

## Daire-i Hariciyye

Kalem-i Mahsus 1225

Huzuru Sami-i Hazreti Sadaret Penahiye

## Maruzu Çakeri Kemineleridir

Mesâil-i hazıraya dair Berlin sefaret-i seniyyesinden Berlin sefâret-i seniyyesinden vârid olan tahriratın suret-i tercümesi ber vech-i atidir. Maruzat-ı atiyenin enzâr-ı dikkatlerine arzını vecibeden addeyledim. İtalya matbuatına atf-ı nazar olundukta muharebenin tevîd ettiği şevk-âmizin tenakus etmediği görülür. Bu arzu ve şevk ancak berrî veya bahrî felaket vukuu neticesinde münker olabilecektir. İşte o zaman Giolitti kabinesi sükût ederek bizce şâyân-ı kabul şerâit dâhilinde akd-i musâlaha mümkün olacağı muhtemeldir. Hâriciyye nazırı Mösyö Kiderlen Vahter geçen gün musâlahanâmeyi imza edecek İtalya kabinesinin şimdiki kabinenin gayrı olamayacağını söylemiştir. Maa-mâfih Mösyö Giolitti'nin bir çare-i hal taharrisine başladığına dair bazı alaim görülmektedir. Mösyö Giolitti'nin iş adamı ve mahrem ısrarı "banka komiseriyle" müdürü Mösyö Jolie tarafından yazılmış olup tesadüfen manzur-u çakeranem olan bir mektupta kendisinin kabine reisi ile vuku' bulan mükâleme esnasında müşarunileyhin katiyen ilhak kelimesini istimal etmediği ve Amerikalının Trablus ve Bingazi İtalya kraliyetinin hâkimiyetine tabidir mealinde olduğunu söylediği zikredilmektedir. Fil-vaki hâkimiyet-i tâmme ile ilhak tabirleri beyninde büyük bir fark mevcut değilse de Mösyö Giolitti'nin şu sırada ilhak kelimesinin istimal edilmesinden bahsetmesi kaziyesini manidar buluyorum. İtalya'nın berayin-i harpde Avusturya'nın müdahalesi endişesi ile Arnavutlar'a rahat durmalarını tavsiye etmiş olduğunu gayet mevsûk bir mebaadan biliyorum. Fakat İtalyanlar iki haftadan beri Arnavutluk'da gayet hararetli bir surette teşvikatta bulunuyorlar ve o havalie külliyeti esliha ve mühimmat ithal ediyorlar. Aynı zamanda Bulgarlarla bil-ittifâk Memâlik-i Osmaniye'de suikastler ifâi-na hazırlanmaktadırlar. İtalya bu suretle Avrupa'nın müdahalesini celp ile Hükûmet-i Seniyye üzerinde tazyikat icra ettireceğini ve bizi dermiyân ettiği şerâit dâhilinde akd-i sulha mecbur edeceğini ümit ediyor. Mösyö Giolitti işi bir an evvel başa çıkarmak istediğinden ve İtalya hükûmetinin ilkbaharda Balkanlar'da karışıklık zuhuru muhakkak olduğu fikrinde bulunduğundan teşebbüsât -ı vakia bir an evvel alal-husûs karların erimesinden evvel hazfina isal edilecektir. Ahval-i mesrûdenin vukuu halinde İtalya menafine muvafık bir musâlaha akdine muvaffak olunacağını derpiş etmekte ise de muhârebe ile meşguliyeti hasebiyle Avusturya'yı harekâtında serbest bırakmaktan tevîd edecek tehlikeleri dahi nazar-ı mülâhazadan dûr tutmaktadır. İtalya'nın bâzı ihzarata zemin teşkil eden Arnavutluk'a imâle-i nazar şimdiden bazı müsaadat-ı makule itası ile zuhûru melhuz bulunan karışıklıkların önünü almak ve Malisörlerle yapılan tecrübe-i sû-i seferin tekrar meydana verilmemek icap ettiği fikrindeyim. Bu hususun evvelce vukû'bulan maruzat-ı çakeranemi müeyyid malumat-ı âtiyeyi arz ile iktiza-yı hale göre tedâbîr-i müessese ve acilenin ittihazı keyfiyetinin lazım geldiğinde emr-ü havale buyrulmasını temennî eylerim. Emr-ü ferman hazreti veliyy'ül-emrindir. 26 Muharrem 1330 ve 3 Kanunisani 1327.

# Appendix V

مجلس شورای ملی		مجلس شورای ملی	
شماره	تاریخ	شماره	تاریخ
۵۴۱	۱۳۹۱	۵۴۱	۱۳۹۱
<p>حاضر بولنامه ذوات تمامک اساسی</p>			
<p>مجلس شورای ملی در روز دوشنبه ۱۳۹۱/۹/۱۴</p>			
نوع	عدد صفحات	اوراق و طریقی	تاریخ و احوالی
...	...	...	...
<p>خلاصه مالم</p> <p>بغیر از آنکه در این ماکه و نیاره حرکات اختلالیه با شدیه جقدیه و ضابطه و ملوکیه فقط واسطه در جمع بولنامه محدوده بولنامه که جنبه ای که در کتابیه جقدیه و محدوده مجاد و قضا و ده قویه تشکیلده و نیمه رهبریه موجودیت کوتاه و در بعضی حقیقتی که در این ماکه و نیاره حرکات اختلالیه با شدیه جقدیه و ضابطه و ملوکیه فقط واسطه در جمع بولنامه و در بعضی حقیقتی که در این ماکه و نیاره حرکات اختلالیه با شدیه جقدیه و ضابطه و ملوکیه فقط واسطه در جمع بولنامه</p>			
<p>قلماری</p>			
<p>جست و جوی و مکتوب و نامه و مکتوب و در بعضی حقیقتی که در این ماکه و نیاره حرکات اختلالیه با شدیه جقدیه و ضابطه و ملوکیه فقط واسطه در جمع بولنامه و در بعضی حقیقتی که در این ماکه و نیاره حرکات اختلالیه با شدیه جقدیه و ضابطه و ملوکیه فقط واسطه در جمع بولنامه و در بعضی حقیقتی که در این ماکه و نیاره حرکات اختلالیه با شدیه جقدیه و ضابطه و ملوکیه فقط واسطه در جمع بولنامه و در بعضی حقیقتی که در این ماکه و نیاره حرکات اختلالیه با شدیه جقدیه و ضابطه و ملوکیه فقط واسطه در جمع بولنامه</p>			

This telegram from the Border Commissiner of Turkey to the Foreign Minister of Turkey, (BOA. MV. 169/14, September 14, 1912).


### Hulâsa-i Meâli

Bulgarların bu ay zarfında Makedonya'da hâreket-i ihtilaliyeye başlayacakları ve zabitan ve memurini katl ve İslamların müctemi bulundukları mahallerde bomba atmak gibi cinayetleri irtikâp eyleyecekleri ve hududa mücavir kazalarda komite teşkilatı vahim bir surette mevcudat göstermekte olduğu hakkında istihbaratı mutâzammin Bulgaristan hudut komiserliğinden alınan telgrafnamenin lefiyle Harbiye nezaretinden vârid olan 5 Eylül [1]328 tarihli ve 654 numrulu tezkire ve melfufu okundu.

### Kararı

Cihet-i 'askeriye ve mülkiyece dâima müteyakkızane hareket ve tedabir-i mukteziyenin istikmaline müsaraat ve gayret olunarak mahâll-i asayiş bir hâl ve hareket zuhuruna imkân bırakılmamış ve her türlü takidat ve tebsirata rağmen istihbâr ve mâni mümkün olamayan bir hâdisе zuhur edecek olur ise taraf-ı sadâretten evvelce icra ve tevârîh-i muhtelifede tekid olunan tebliğat dairesinde kuvve-i zabita ve ledel'icap kuvve-i askeriye ile derhal temin-i asayiş ve mütecasirlerin derdestine itina olunarak işe ahâlinin her ne suretle olur ise müdahale etmelerine ve sunufu ahali beyrinde mücadele ve mücaraha ve mukatele vukuuna ve hâdisenin tevsiine ve mahall-i saireye sirayetine meydan vermemesi zımnında Rumeli vilayeti memûrîn-i mülkiye ve askeriyesine vesâyâ ettikte ve acile icrasının Dâhiliyye ve Hârbiye Nezâretlerine iş'ar-ı ve Bulgaristan'da ber-devam olan tehyicat ve istihzarata nazaran Meclis-i Vükelâ kararıyla evvelce yazıldığı veçhile cihet-i askeriyece tedâbir-i ihtiyatiyenin ittihazına müsaraat edilmesi labüd Bulgaristan hududundaki kuvve-i askeriyenin her türlü ihtimalata karşı hududu müdâfaa ve muhâfaza edebilecek bilâ-ifâde-i vakt iblâğı ve bu tertibat ve sevkiate zâhiren sonbahar manevralarının vesile ittihazıyla tahşidatın ikmalinden sonra evrak-ı havadisle bu yolda neşriyât-ı münasebede bulunulması hususunun Hârbiye Nezâretine ilâveten izbarı tezekkür kılındı.

## Appendix VI



This is an order of the Sultan Mehmed Reşat V. to Çetine charge d'affaires for return back to İstanbul because of the declaration of war by Montenegro, (BOA. MV. 227/239, October 8, 1912).

### İrâde-i Seniyye Lâyhası

Karadağ hükümetinin Devlet-i Osmaniye'ye bu günden itibaren ilân-ı harp ettiği ve Karadağ Maslahatgüzarının Dersaâdet'ten müfârekat edeceği Maslahatgüzar mumâileyh tarafından Hariciyye nezâretine resmen ve kariren bildirilmesine binâen Çetine Sefâret-i Seniyyesi maslahatgüzarının hemen Dersaâdet'e avdet etmesi ve düşmanlarımıza müstaînen billâh kemal-i şiddetle mukâbele edilmesi Meclis-i Vükelâ kararıyla tensip olunmuştur.

Bu irâde-i seniyyemizin icrâsına Hâriciyye ve Hârbiye nâzırları memurdur.

### Mâzbata

Bugün zeval-i saat 11 buçukta Karadağ maslahatgüzarı Mösyö Plamenac tarafından Hariciye Nâzırı efendiye Bâbiâlî'de bit-tezekkür tevdî' ve sûret-i tercümesi leffen arz ve takdim olunan notada Karadağ hükümetinin bu günden itibaren Devlet-i Osmaniye'ye ilân-ı harp ettiği ve kendisinin Dersaâdet'ten müfârekat edeceği ve Çetine'deki maslahatgüzarımıza pasaportlarının verileceği beyan olunmasına binâen hemen Çetine'yi terk ile Dersaâdet'e avdet etmesi zımında Çetine maslahatgüzarımıza tebligât-ı acile ve sefâret-i seniyye maiyet memurlarıyla Karadağ'daki şehbenderlerimizin suret-i hareketleri sefâret-i seniyye ve şehbenderler ebniyesinin ve evrakının sûret-i muhafazası hakkında vesaya-yı lâzime icrası ve umum süfera-yı Osmaniyyeye malumat ve talimat-ı muktaziye itası hususunun Hariciye Nezâreti'ne havalesi ve Bulgaristan ve Sırbistan ve Yunanistan'ın da kariben kat'ı münasabat ve icra-yı muhâsamet etmeleri melhûz olduğundan icap eden tedbir-i mütemmime-i askeriyyenin bir dikkat-i fevk eyleyerek son derece süratle ikmâli ve serhadlerce takayyüdât ve tebsirata bir kat daha itina ve düşmanlarımızın muhâsametine kemâl-i şiddetle mukabele edilmesi icap edenlere evâmîr-i acile verilmek ve Harbiye Nezâreti'ne tebliği ve umum vilâyata ve liva-i gayr-ı mülhakaya malumat itasıyla beraber teçhizat ve sevkiyatı askeriyyenin bir kat daha tesriine bezl-i ihtimâm ve gayret edilmesinin ilaveten ve katiyen tavsiye olunmasının ve Karadağ hükümeti tarafından ne suretle ilan-ı harp edildiğine ve Saltanat-ı seniyyece tedbir-i lazime ittihaz ve icap edenlere evâmîr-i muktaziye i'tâ olunduğuna dair yarınki ceride-i resmiye ve evrâk-ı havadis ile bir beyanname-i resmi neşrinin Dâhiliye Nezâretine iş'arı tezekkür ve tanzim olunan irâde-i seniyye lâyhası leffen arz ve takdim kılınmış olmağla katıbe-i ahvalde.

26 Şevval 1330, 25 Eylül 1328



## Appendix VII

[illegible]

**The telegram from Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey to Nazım Paşa Deputy Commander in chief, (BOA. MV. 171/15, October 16, 1912).**

#### Hülâsa-i Meâlî

İstanbul etrafında bir hattı müdafaa tesisi hakkında Harbiye Nezâreti'nin işârî sebk eden müzakerata tevfikân vuku' bulan tebligâta cevâben nezâret-i müşarunileyha vekâletinden vârid olan tezkire okundu.

#### Kararı

Mezkûr tezkerede bir hattı müdafaa kullanılacak efrâdın yalnız istihkâmat işiyle meşğul olacaklarına ve sadece kazma ve kürekçilikten ibâret olan bu hizmette bulunacak efrâdın Silahlarıda bulunmayacağına binâenaleyh bunların bu hattı müdafaanın müdafaanın müdâfileri olmayacaklarına ve ateş hattında bulunmayacaklarına nâzaran tasâvvur olunan mahâzire bit-tâbi mahal kalmayacağı ve esâsen bu hâtı medâfaa için ayrıca müdâfi ve top ihzârı mutâsavver olmayıp yalnız maazallah ordunun Çatalca'dan ricatı hâlinde kendisine medâr-ı isnâd olmak üzere hazırlanmış bir mevzi bulundurmaktan ibaret olduğu ve firarilerin toplanması ve hastalığın men'-i sirâyeti için esâsen tertibat-ı lâzime ittihâz olunmuş olmakla hatt-ı müdâfaa teşkilâtı'nın bunlara bir tesiri olmayacağı ve Dersâdet civarında bir hatt-ı müdâfaa tesisi ve müzakerat-ı sulhiyye esnasında elimizde Çatalca ve Dersâdet hudud-u müdâfaası gibi iki kat bulunması siyâsetimiz için medâr-ı istinat olacağı gibi hudânegerde Çatalca'dan ordu çekilmeye mecbur olur ise âni büsbütün mahv ve muzmahill olmaktan vikâye edecek bir ricatgâh olmak akabiyle askerlikçe de hâiz-i ehemmiyet bulunacağı gösterilmiş ve suret-i iş'ara nazaran mezkûr hattın tesisi muktezâ görünmüş olmağın serîan ifayı muktezâsının Vekâlet-i müşarunileyh ile Baş Kumandan Vekili Nazım Paşa'ya iş'arı tezekkür kılındı.



## Mâzbata

Hükûmet-i Seniyye Balkan düvel-i müttefikasıyla bir sulh ü medide esası üzerine Londra konferansında teati-i imza etmiş ve Bulgaristan hükûmeti buna tevfi kan tahliyesine mecbur olduğu araziyi işgalde devam etmiş olmasıyla işbu araziden hemen çekilmesi ve bu esnada halen ve birinen bir güne zayiata meydan verilmemesi İstanbul'daki murahhas vasıtasıyla hükûmet-i mezbûreye tebliğ edilmiş ve bil-vasıta alınan muvafakata ve ol babda şeref-sadır olan irade-i seniyye hazreti padişahiye binâen geçen Pazar günü Ordu-yı Hümayun bu araziyi işgale mübaşeret etmiş idi. Ordu-yı hümayundan Harekâta mübaşeretin üçüncü Salı günü akşamı müşkilâta tesadüf etmeksizin Midye-Enez hatt-ı müstakimine muvasalat etmiş ise de Bulgar müfrezeleri çekildikleri yerlerde her türlü kavâid-i düveliye ve insaniye hilâfına olarak İslâm karye ve memlekatını tahrip ve ihrak ettiğinden ve bu hal ile Edirne vilayetindeki teba'-i Osmaniye'yi kâmilten mahvedeceğı anlaşıldığından bir taraftan buna mani olmak ve diğer taraftan Romanya hükûmetince de ilân-ı harbe vesile addolunacak derecede nazar-ı itinaya alınan Balkan muvazenesini temin etmek ve Midye-Enez Hattı payitahtımızla boğazlara pek yakın olduğundan bunların emniyetini celp ve müdafaaya elverişli bir hudut istihsâl eylemek üzere Ordu-yı Hümayunun Meriç nehrinin şarkındaki araziyi işgal etmesi elzem görünmüş ve şu kadar ki bu esnada müsademe vukuuyla sefk-i dimaya mahal kalmamış ve şimalde münasip bir surette tahdid edilmek üzere arazi-i mezkûreyi tahliye etmesinin buradaki murahhası vasıtasıyla Bulgaristan hükûmetine teklifi tezekkür ve bu esasa ibtinaen Ordu-yı Hümayunun Edirne de dâhil olmak üzere Meriç nehrinin şark tarafını şimdiden işgal etmesi hususuna irade-i Seniyye-i Hazreti Padişahi buyrulması bâbında ve katıbe-i ahvalde emr-ü ferman.

13 Şevvâl (1)331 ve 4 Temmuz (1)329

## Appendix IX

[illegible][illegible]

**A draft law of amnesty for Seyyid Idris and his abettors,** (BOA. MV. 227/248, October 15, 1912).

## İdris ile avanesinin affı hakkında kanûn lâyihası

İdris ile avanesi cerâim-i âdiye müstesna olmak üzere cerâim-i siyasiyelerinden dolayı afv olunmuşlardır. Bu kanunun icrasına Dâhiliye ve Adliye nâzırları memurdur. Bu kanunun Meclis-i Umumi'nin küşadında kanuniyeti tasdik ettirilmek üzere muvakkaten icraya vazını irade ederim.

## Hülasa-i Meâli

Mazbata, 4 Zilkade (1)330, 2 Teşrinievvel (1)328.

İdris ve avanesi arz-ı inkiyâd etmek şartıyla mazhar-ı afv-ı âli olduklarının maa-hazâ kendisine.

## Kararı

Asir'de harekât'-i isyanda bulunmakta olan tahriran vâki olacak tebliğ tarihinden itibaren 7 gün zarfında gerek kendisi gerek avanesi arz-ı muâvenet etmedikleri halde şediden tedip ve tenkil olunacaklarının Yemen kuva-yı umumisi kumandanı İzzet Paşa tarafından bir mektup ile mumaileyhe tebliği ve bu mektubun bir neccab-ı mahsûsa tevdiân ve serian irsali ile İdris'e hangi tarihte teslim edildiğinin telgrafla bildirilmesi ve bu müddet zarfında dehâlet ettiği surette harekât-ı askeriyeye fasıl verilerek keyfiyetin işarı ve aksi takdirde tenkilata şiddetle devam edilmesi zımında müşarunileyh İzzet Paşa'ya telgraf yazılması ve Mekke-i Mükەرreme Emaretiyle Hicaz vilayetine ve Harbiye ve Hariciye ve Dâhiliye Nezâretlerine malumat verilmesi tezekkür ve afv-ı âli hakkında tanzim olunan madde-i kanuniye lâyihası leffen arz ve takdim kılınmış olmakla kâtibe-i ahvâlde.

## Appendix X


[illegible]

**The order of Sublime Porte to the Foreign, Military and Navy Ministries for the Merchant Ships which were to be allowed to pass through the Dardanelles Strait, accompanied by guide ships, (BOA. MV 164.39, May 5, 1912).**


Çanakkale Boğazı'nın tamamen seddinden sonra Rus limanlarından hareket edip el-yevm Haliç'de ve Marmara denizinde bulunan sefainin boğazdan imrârıyla bâde yine tamamen muâmele-i seddiye icrası Sör Edward Grey tarafından Londra sefiri Tefik Paşa'ya ve İngiltere sefiri canibinden Hâriciyye Nâzırı beyefendiye beyan olunduğu ifâde-i vakiadan anlaşılmakla keyfiyet ledel müzâkere yalnız Haliç'de ve Marmara'da içtima eden sefain-i ticariyenin imrarları Rusya hükümetinin teşebbüsâtına nihayet vermeyeceğine ve Rus teşebbüsâtı devam ederse İngiltere'nin nazariyatını tağyîr etmeyeceği muhbirim olmamasına nazaran lüzum his olundukta boğazın tamamen seddi hakkındaki hukuku meşruamız istimâl olunmak üzere bundan evvelki şerait dâhilinde yani sefainin kılavuz vasıtasıyla memur muayyenden imrarına müsaade itası tensip edilmiş olmakla ana göre icra-yı icabının Hariciyye, Harbiye ve Bahriye, nezâretlerine tebliği tezekkür kılındı.



## Appendix XI



**This is a picture of Battleship Yadigar-ı Millet.**  
 (Donanma-yı Osmanî Muavenet-i Milliye Cemiyeti, p. 5.)



**This is one of the picture of five transport ships which were purchased from Britain.**  
 (Donanma-yı Osmanî Muavenet-i Milliye Cemiyeti, p. 6.)

## Appendix XII

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Londra Sefâret-i Seniyyesi  
Hâriciyye Nezaret-i Celilesine  
Hususi

Bağdad Şimendiferin'den dolayı Almanlarla İngilizler arasında tahaddüs eden ihtilâf hakkında bir suret-i tesviye bulunmak üzere İngiltere sermayedarının mutâlebâta ve şeraitin neden ibaret olduğunun suret-i münasibede istifhâmına ve İngiliz sermayedarının yüzde 50'inde iştiraki me'mûl idüğüne dair Fî 21 Teşrîn-i Evvel sene tarihli tahrîrât-ı aliye-i nezâret-penahileri vâsıl oldu.

Sör Edward Grey Londra'da bulunduğundan, Sör Charles Hardinge ile son mülakatım esnasında meseleyi mevzu' bahs eyledim. Sör Charles Hardinge, İngiltere'de Bağdad şimendiferi için elyevm İngiliz sermayedarlığından mürekkep bir sendika mevcut olmadığını ve meselenin esasen hallini arzu edinilmekte olup hattâ mukaddemâ işle alâkadar olan Alman sermayedarını ile ihtilâf hâsıl olmuş iken bil'âhire bir takım şerâit gayr-i makbûl dermeyân edilmesi üzerine i'tilâf vâki ihtilâfa müncerr olduğunu söyledikten sonra bu işe iştirâk edebilecek sermayedarının fikrinin istihrâc edeceğini ve bu vesile ile Hükûmet-i Seniyye-ce gösterilen müessir muvâlâta mûcib-i memnûniyyet olduğunu beyân eyledi. Sör Edward Grey'in avdetinde müşârun-ileyh ile de tekrar müzâkerât-ta bulunarak alacağım cevabı derhâl nezâret-i celilelerine başkaca iş'âr eyleyeceğim tâbi olunmuş olmakla ol bab'da emr-ü ferman hazreti men-lehül emrindir.

Fî 27 Teşrîn-i Evvel [1]325 Londra Sefiri

Londra Sefâret-i Seniyyesine


Bağdad şimendiferin'den dolayı Almanlar İngilizler arasında tahaddüs edip her iki memleketle olan münasebât-ı iktisadiye ve siyasîyyemiz üzerinde sû'î teessür eden İhtilâfın izalesi ve hukuk-u hâkimiyetimize muvâfık sûrette tarafeynin te'lîf-i çareleri tahaddî olundu. Gerek hisse ve gerek işletme umûrunun teftişi hususâtında İngiliz sermayedarının Almanya sermayedarını derecesinde hâiz-i hukuk ve salâhiyyet almalarına Anadolu demiryolu şirketinin istihşâli muvafık ve mümkün olacağı anlaşıldığından tarafeyn vekilleri ba'de Nafia nezaretine davet edilmek üzere evvel-emirde ingiltere sermayedarının görüş ve şerâiti neden ibâret olduğunun sûret-i münasebe ve gayr-i resmîyede isti'fâda ve iş'ar-ı temennadır.

Fî 21 Teşrîn-i Evvel [1]325

## Appendix XIII

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This telegram was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey by the Turkish Embassy in London, (BOA. HR, SYS. 109/9, July 28, 1910).

Hâriciyye Nezaret-i Celîlesine

Devletlü Efendim Hazretleri

Muharrerat-ı mütekaddime-i senâver-i mütalâasından keyfiyet bil-etraf malumu nezaret-penahileri buyrulduğu veçhile Bağdat'tan Basra körfezine yapılacak olan temuryolu yeniden bir mesele-i mühime şeklini almışdır. İngiltere hükümeti Almanları bunun inşasından feragat ettirmek için istimali lâzım gelen ve sail ve vesaitin istihsalini idare-i meşrutamıza karşı ibraz etmekte olduğu temayülât dostane müstesnâ olmak üzere daima bizden aramaktan ve binâenaleyh İngiliz sermayedarına müvazi ikinci bir hat imtiyazı verilmesini talep ve kâh El-Halif'ten öteye ve Bağdat'a doğru yapılması mukavele icabından bulunan aksama ait kilometre teminat nakdiyesi verilmemek için evvelce muvafakat gösterdiği yüzde dört gümrük resmi mutazammının talepleri üzere iş bir sureti tesviyeye rabt edildikçe ita edilemeyeceği hakkında nazar-ı dikkatimizi celp etmek gibi evzâ'dan hâli kalmamakta idi. Maliye Nâzırı Cavid Beyefendinin şu Aralık Londra'da bulunmasından bil'istifade birlikte Sör Edward Grey ile Sör Charles Hardini görölerek esnâ-yı müşâverede halli elzem mesâil-i saire

sırasında bu da mevzu bahs oldu. Her ikimiz de El-Halif'ten ilerisinin kilometre teminatı henüz verilmediğini ve fakat hattın El-Halif'de çıkmaz sokak halinde kalması ne mukâvele-i mün'akidde ne de menafi'-i milliyemizl kabil-i te'lif olamayacağı bil-beyan hattın bay-i hâl Bağdat'a temdidi muktazî idüğünü ve oradan sahil-i bahre kadar olan kısmın evvelceden vaat ettiğimiz vechile Hükûmet-i Osmaniye nam ve hesabına inşa ettirilmek için Alman sermayedarlarının andan feragata tevafuklarını istihsal üzere sarf-ı mesai edildiğini söyledik. Bade Cavid Beyefendi bunun için mahsusen Berlin'e dahi gidip çalışacağını müşârün-ileyhe ilaveten beyan etmekle onlar da cevaben bu işin daha vazih bir surette anlaşılması zımında vukufu malumat-namesi bulunan bir memuru müşârün-ileyh nezdine göndereceklerini ve netice-i müzakereye göre fikr-i mütalaalarını bildireceklerini beyân eylediler.


Ertesi gün memur mumaileyh gelip kendisiyle görüştü ve hattın Bağdat'tan Kuveyt'e kadar tarafımızdan yapılmasına bir şey denmeyip ancak Kuveyt limanının İngiliz sermayedarları canibinden inşası münasip olacağı bildirilmiş ve mir-i müşarunileyh bana muvâfakat göstermemesi üzerine hattın tensip edilecek bir noktada sahile isali hususu becâ görülmüş fakat bunun için Almanlar'la görüşüldükten ve muvafakatlari istihsâl olunduktan sonra icâb-ı halin icrası takarrür etmiştir.

Bunu müteakip mir-i müşarunileyh bütçemizin kavânini için patent vergisinin memâlik-i Osmaniye'de sakin teba'-i ecnebiyeye dahi tatbiki ve petrol inhisarı vazı lüzumunu delâil-i lâzime ile derpiş etti. Edward Grey bu mesailin muahedata talikinden bahisle muhtacı tetkik bulunduğunu söylemesine mukabil mir-i müşarunileyh muahedat-ı mevcudedede buna dair kuyût ve şurût bulunmadığı cevabını verdi. Senâverleri dahi İngiltere ve Fırat petrol ihracatında alakadar olmadıklarını ikmâl-i mütalâa siyakında tefhim ettiğimde bunun için muvafakata mütemayil olduğunu temin etti. Ancak petrol inhisarı vaz'ında dâhil-i memalikimizde mevcut menabiin atiyen göstereceği menâfi-i azimeyi nazar-ı dikkatinden dûr tutmamak yani ecbebi ithalatının göstereceği kâr'a kanaatle birçok seneler bağlanmamak lüzumunu mir-i müşarunileyhe ihtar ettim. Cavid Beyefendi umuru maliye ve iktisadiyeye vakıf bir zat olmasıyla memleketimizin terakki ve tealisine hâdim tedabir ittihazında tecvîz'i kusur etmeyeceği aşikâr bulunmağla mücerred vuku'-ı hâle zat-i daverilerinin muttali olması maksadıyla işara müsaraat kılındı ol bâbda emr ü fermân hazret- i men lehül emrindir.

Fî 15 Temmuz [1]326

Londra Sefiri

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Londra Sefâret-i Seniyyesi  
Hâriciyye Nezaret-i Celilesine  
Hususî ve Mahremane

Bu günkü tarihli ve resmî Fransızca tahrîrât-ı senâveriye melfuf muhtıra mütalaasından keyfiyet malumu nezâret-penahileri buyrulacağı veçhile Alman sermayedarının Osmanlı namı tahtında inşa etmekte oldukları Bağdad ve Basra hatt-ı kebirinin El-Halif'den Bağdad'a müntehî olacak kısmın dahi kilometer teminat akçesinin irâe ve temininde Hükûmet-i seniyyece isti'câl olduğuna ve bu ise kadîmden beri Irak yani Bağdad ve Basra havalisinde İngiltere'nin iktisat nokta-i nazarından hâiz bulunduğu hakk-ı rüçhan-ı mükteseb-i muhal bulunduğu bahanesiyle mukaddemâ muvâfakat göstermiş olduğu yüzde dört gümrük resmi munzamının ita-sından nükûl edileceği ve ba'dema devleteyn arasındaki münâsebâtın devamı Bağdad'tan Basra Körfezi'ne yapılacak hattın bi-eyyi-hâl İngiliz sermayedarını tarafından teminatsız ve Osmanlı şirketi olarak yaptırılmasına vabeste bulunacağı anlaşılmağa beyânât-ı sabıkaya muhâlif olarak Dersaadet'ten İngiltereye sefâretine gönderilen şu tâlimat-ı ceridenin ne gibi esbabdan münbais idüğünü istizâhı zımında dünkü Pazartesi badezzuhur Sör Charles Hardinge nezdine azimetle Hükûmet-i Osmaniye'nin bidayet-i inkılâptan beri İngiltereye ibrazından hâli kalmadığı hüsn-i niyet ve muavenetin takdîriyle bunun bir kat daha teşyid ve tahkimine bâdî olacak muamelât-ı cemileye muntazır bulunduğumuz bir zamanda Sör Gerard Lowther'ın nezd-i Bâb-ı âli' de tehditkârane bir hareket icrasına memur edilmesi bâdî-i hayret olduğunu söylerim.


Müşarünileyh cevaben ve gayet mahremane bir surette ifâdât-ı âtiyeyi serd eyledi. Bağdad şimendiferinin Basra Körfezi'ne kadar olan kısmının inşa ve işlettilmesinin imtiyazı münhasıran İngiliz sermayedarlarına verilmek münasip değilse hiç olmazsa Alman sermayedarıyla müştereken yapılması lâ-büdd ve muhikdir. Binâenaleyh şimdiye değin bu bâbda bid-defeat vukû bulan teklifimiz Alman sendikasının re's-i karında olan Mösyö Gwinner tarafından bu kerre kabul edilmesine rağmen Almanya hükûmeti bu itilafa rıza göstermeyip istirkab ve inhisar fikriyle redd-i cüretini iltizâm etmiştir. Mukaddemâ dahi beyân eylediğimiz üzere müvazi iki hat inşası ne kâyd ve şarta mebnî mübteni olursa olsun tarafeyn menafine muvafık olmayacağını biliyoruz.

Lâkin size şiddetli görünen teşebbüsümüz ancak Alman hükûmeti'nin ısrar ve taannüdünü izâleye sizi ikrâr içindir ve şu maksadımız zinhar muhalifinin sem-i itlâna varmamalı zira itilâf yerine ihtilâf artar ve bil'âhire bizden ziyade siz mutazarrır olursunuz. Bizimle hattın inşası müzakereye girdiğinizi, Almanlar haber alır almaz bizimle uyuşmaya şitâbân olacakları bi-istibâhdır. Hükûmet-i Seniyye'nin bu iş hakkındaki tasavvur ve kararına vukufum olmadığı için bit-tabî la ve neam ne bir cevap ita ne de mütalâa irad etmeyip talimâta intizar edeceğimi söylemekle iktifâ eyledim. Yalnız teklif-i vakıamda hattın mebd-i Bağdad ve müntehisi Kuveyt olması bilhassa nazar-ı dikkatimi celp etti. Çünkü vaktiyle keşfiyat için Alman

mühendislerin Kuveyt'e kadar gitmeleri üzerine İngiltere hükümeti Kuveyt'in Necid sancağına olan merbutiyetini tasdik etmemiş ve müteakiben keyfiyet bir mesele-i siyâsiye rengini almasıyla oraya Sefâin-i Harbiye sevki ve Hindistan vali-yi umumisini izâm gibi hadisâta sebep olarak nihâyet ül-emr tarafeynden hiç biri orasını işgâl etmemek ve sabıkada olduğu misüllü hale bırakmak şartıyla meselenin kapanmış olduğu henüz hatırlardadır. Binâen-alâ-zâlik eğer İngilizler Almanlarla müştereken hatt-ı mezkurun Kuveyt'e kadar inşası hakkında İtilâf hâsıl ettikleri anda mahâll-i mezkurun memâlik-i Osmaniye'den bulunduğunu resmen tasdik ettirmek elzemdir. Aksi tâkdirde azim mahâzîr ve mazarrata mâruz kalmış oluruz. Ol babda emr-ü ferman hazret-i men-lehül emrindir.


Londra Sefiri Kebiri 20 Nisan [1]326

## Appendix XV



**Sir Gerard Augustus Lowther, 1st baronet (Ambassador at İstanbul 30 July 1908- 7 July 1913), bromide print by Walter Stoneman, 1916 (©National Portrait Gallery, London).**

## Appendix XVI



**Sir Henry Hamond Dawson Beaumont, (Charge d'affaires in İstanbul July-August 1914), bromide print by Walter Stoneman, 1920 (©National Portrait Gallery, London).**

## Appendix XVII



**Edward Grey, 1st Viscount Grey of Fallodon, (British Foreign Secretary, December 1905- December 1916) by Henry Walter Barnett bromide print 1900-1903, (©National Portrait Gallery, London).**



## Appendix XVIII



**Ahmet Tefvik Paşa, (Ambassador in London 1909-1914).**

(Source: Şehbal, 15 March 1328 [1910], p. 39).

## Appendix XIX




**Asım Bey, (Turkish Foreign Minister, October 1911-July 1912).**

(Source: Şehbal, 15 October 1327 [1909], p. 43).



## Appendix XX



**Küçük Mehmed Sait Paşa, (Grand Vizier, September 1911- July 1912).**

(Source: Şehbal, 01 July 1328 [1910], p. 57).

## Appendix XXI



**Kıbrıslı Kamil Paşa, (Grand Vizier).  
(August 1908-February 1909 and October 1912-January 1913).**

## Appendix XXII



**Portrait of Mahmut Şevket Paşa, (Foreign Minister, January 1910-July 1912, and Grand Vizier January-June 1913), by Fausto Zonaro (Italian, 1854 - 1929).**

### Appendix XXIII



**Prince Mehmet Said Halim Paşa, (Foreign Minister, January 1913- October 1915 and Grand Vizier, June 1913- February 1917).**

## Appendix XXIV



**Enver Paşa, (Member of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), Military Attaché at Berlin 1909, Libya 1911, Balkan 1913, Minister of War in the end of December, 1913).**

(Source: Şehbal, 15 May 1325 [1907], p. 5).



## Appendix XXV



**Nazım Paşa, (Governor of Bagdat 25 November 1909-15 March 1911 and Minister of War 23 July 1912-23 January 1913).**

(Source: Şehbal, 01 December 1325 [1907], p. 17).

## Appendix XXVI



**Mehmet Cavit Bey, (Minister of Finance, June 1909-May 1911, May 1912-July 1912, and again March 1914-November 1914),**

(Source: Şehbal, 15 August 1325 [1907], p. 10).

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**BOA. MV.** 10/25, 142/44, 143/29, 147/20, 149/35, 152/70, 154/18, 154/62, 159/113, 159/129, 164/39, 165/65, 166/43, 166/85, 168/50, 169/14, 169/44, 170/63, 170/75, 171/9, 171/15, 171/73, 172/5, 174/52, 226/99, 227/143, 227/197, 227/239, 227/248, 227/253, 231/200.

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