

**FRANK-TALKING: A READING OF ORWELL'S *1984* WITH FOUCAULT'S
CONCEPT OF PARRHESIA**

Pamukkale University

Social Sciences Institution

Master of Arts Thesis

Department of English Language and Literature

Ertuğrul GÜNEY

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Baysar TANIYAN

July 2025

DENİZLİ

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been present in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that as required by these rules and conduct I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Signature

Ertuğrul GÜNEY

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Baysar TANIYAN for his guidance, encouragement and helpful suggestions. His positive criticism and support throughout the writing process have allowed me to complete my thesis.

I would also like to thank my MA teachers for their contribution to my knowledge: Prof. Dr. Mehmet Ali ÇELİKEL, Prof. Dr. Şeyda SİVRİOĞLU, Assist. Prof. Dr. Reyhan Özer TANIYAN, and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Meltem UZUNOĞLU ERTEN. I am also grateful for my friends and my family, especially my friend Begüm Tuğlu, whose support encouraged me to complete my thesis.

ABSTRACT

FRANK-TALKING: A READING OF ORWELL'S *1984* WITH FOUCAULT'S CONCEPT OF PARRHESIA

Güney, Ertuğrul

Master of Arts Thesis

English Language and Literature Department

English Language and Literature Programme

Advisor of Thesis: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Baysar TANIYAN

July 2025, 92 pages

This study examines the political setting of *1984* through Winston's relationship with free speech in the context of parrhesia. George Orwell's novel follows Winston, a middle-aged, rank-and-file Party member who outwardly appears loyal yet harbors doubts and resentment toward the regime. His political resistance emerges through his use of language to challenge Party corruption. Chapter One focuses on parrhesia, which provides the theoretical background. Chapter Two analyzes the novel in two sections to explore how parrhesia operates within its universe. The first section examines the Party's dominance over language and its linguistic policies, which render truth-telling—a core element of parrhesia—difficult and forbidden. The second section studies Winston's use of language against the Party, showing how it becomes a tool of political opposition. Winston's efforts to reclaim language represent an attempt to symbolically challenge the Party's hegemony. However, his failure underscores the regime's complete control over linguistic expression. As a result, language becomes a site of crisis, marking the divide between the silenced periphery and the vocal center, each valuing and utilizing free speech differently. This dynamic reveals how control over language serves as both a mechanism of repression and a measure of political power in the totalitarian state of *1984*.

Keywords: George Orwell, 1984, dystopia, language, parrhesia, reversal of free speech, censorship of language and totalitarianism relationship, linguistic conceptualization of totalitarianism.

ÖZET

GEORGE ORWELL'IN *1984* ROMANININ PARRHESIA BAĞLAMINDA ANALİZİ

Güney, Ertuğrul
Yüksek Lisans Tezi
İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı Bölümü
İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı Programı
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Baysar TANIYAN
Temmuz 2025, IV+92 sayfa

Bu çalışmanın amacı, *1984* romanının siyasi ortamını, Winston'ın özgür konuşma ile ilişkisi bağlamında parrhesia kavramı kapsamında incelemektir. George Orwell'in *1984* romanı, Winston adında orta yaşlı bir adamın hayatını takip eder. Winston, sıradan bir parti üyesidir. Parti çizgisine bağlı bir üye gibi görünse de, gerçekte partiye karşı şüpheleri ve nefreti vardır. Partinin yozlaşmasıyla dili bağlamsallaştırma siyasi aktivizm bulunur. Birinci bölüm, romanın teorik arka planı olarak parrhesia kavramına odaklanır. İkinci bölüm, dilin araçsallaştırılmasıyla ifade özgürlüğünün baskı altına alınışını partinin kontrol mekanizmalarına odaklanarak analiz eder ve böylece parrhesia kavramının yokluğuyla totaliteryanizmin inşası arasında bir paralellik kurar. Winston'ın bu kontrol karşısında verdiği tepkiler gerçek bir parrhesia deneyimi olarak analiz edilirken roman analizinde teori-eser arasında bir kavramsal çatı işlevi görmüştür.

Anahtar Kelimeler: George Orwell, *1984*, distopya, dil, parrhesia, ifade özgürlüğünün tersine çevrilmesi, dilin sansürlenmesi ile totalitarizm arasındaki ilişki, totalitarizmin dilsel kavramsallaştırılması.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZET	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
INTRODUCTION	1

CHAPTER ONE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. Care of the Self.....	5
1.2. Definition of Parrhesia.....	8
1.3. Five Elements of Parrhesia	11
1.4. Parrhesia and Its Opposition to Totalitarianism	21
1.5. Evolution of the Word Parrhesia: Parrhesia and Rhetoric	24
1.6. Parrhesia and Politics.....	25
1.7. Examples of Parrhesia: Socratic and Cynic Styles	27

CHAPTER TWO POLITICAL CRACKDOWN OVER LANGUAGE TO REPRESS PARRHESIA

2.1. Introductory Overview to 1984	36
2.2. Doublethink's Role in the Repression of Free Speech	38
2.3. Newspeak and its Function in Suppression of Free Speech	42
2.4 The Theme and Practice of Historical Revisionism in 1984.....	51
2.5. Winston and Free Speech	57
2.5.1. Winston's Personality.....	57
2.5.2. Qualification of Winston in Terms of Five Elements of Parrhesia	60
2.5.3. Diary and Free Speech.....	62
2.6. The Interrogation Scene: Destruction of the Self:	65
2.6.1. Interpretive Analysis: Repression of Parrhesia Through the Death Threat	65
2.6.2. Main Purpose of Physical Tortures	71
2.6.3. Physical Torture: Utilization of Violence in the Formation of Anti-Parrhesiastic Political Setting	72
2.6.4. Room 101: Spatial Disengagement of Parrhesia, Winston's Disengagement With Free Speech as His Testament to His Ideological Compliance	79
CONCLUSION	85
REFERENCES	87
VITA.....	92

INTRODUCTION

Parrhesia, which emerged and developed in Ancient Greece, has been brought back to the forefront of modern philosophy by Michel Foucault. The concept of parrhesia, in both Greek culture and Michel Foucault's philosophy, has generally been used in the rationalization of the individual's relationship with power. Ancient Greece discussed this on a collective basis in literary, political, or philosophical fields, whereas Foucault approached the concept of parrhesia as an individual experience. As a result of the concept's political meaning in cultural history, Foucauldian parrhesia intensely represents the essence of Foucault's dispersed thought, as it synthesizes his early-period power analyses with his late-period ethical analyses.

Foucault's power analyses focus on how the individual is "invented" by various institutions of modernity. In his examination of parrhesia, Foucault focuses on how the individual constructs their own self through ethics. As Dreyfus and Rabinow argue, "Foucault calls ethics a concern with the kind of relationship one ought to have with himself. Ethics determines how the individual is supposed to constitute himself as a moral subject of his own actions" (1983: 238). Foucault's final, ethics-focused period examines the individual's "subjectivation" through the relationship established with oneself and the practices of constructing one's own self independently of external influences. This is why power-focused and ethics-focused approaches are different. In fact, the ethics-focused approach attempts to be an alternative to the power-focused approach in two ways: a) Historically, have there been specific relationships that the self establishes with itself that serve as a measure for moral agency, different from the ethical models produced and protected by cultural orthodoxy? b) In the future, to struggle for the production of an individual ethics where forms of selfhood diverge from and equalize with existing traditional ethical forms, going beyond the center-periphery hierarchy in ethics.

Foucault generally calls the effort to construct oneself as an ethical subject through one's own creativity and emotional strength "the care of the self". According to Foucault, morality has three components: ethics, moral code, and moral conduct. Foucault defines ethics as follows:

“[Ethics is a process] in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal. And this requires him to act upon himself, to undertake to know himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself” (1990: 25).

Foucault’s definition of ethics is not a set of discourses with universal rules, but rather the individual’s reinterpretation of discourse within their own self, its reconstruction through individualization, and its transformation into an independent entity in their own life.

To understand the Foucauldian concept of ethics, it is helpful to analyse the quotation above by focusing of specific phrasal expressions, such as: “Delimits that part of himself” means the individual first identifies which aspect of character, behaviour, or identity they want to focus on morally—essentially, choosing what part of themselves will be the subject of ethical experience. “Defines his position relative to the precept he will follow” refers to how the person relates to a chosen moral principle—whether they adopt it, challenge it, reinterpret it, or situate themselves somewhere in between. “Decides on a mode of being” implies the person sets a vision for the kind of person they want to become—a kind of ethical ideal or personal standard they aim toward.

Achieving this moral transformation is not passive. It is self-action: actively reflecting, observing, testing, and reshaping one’s thoughts and behaviours. It is about engaging in a practice of self-constitution. The acts of “the care of the self” involve the dominant understanding of morality in the society being shaped not as it is widely accepted, but by the individual’s own choices and practices. For this reason, goodness itself is an act of freedom in Foucault’s philosophy.

According to Foucault, in sovereign and disciplinary types of power, certain forms of subjectivity have been imposed on people from the outside, and notions of individual and collective identity have been constructed (1995:29–30; 1990:59–60). Ethics, according to Foucault, is a way of developing alternative and independent experiences of existence, different from the identity notions of external power mechanisms (1990:25–32). In this respect, it is a possibility for freedom (2011:66). In Foucault, the self is not an authentic entity. It is a dynamic and active life experience, constantly changing through experiences made possible by specific forms of relationships (1988:41–42). Foucault stated that these experiences could be constructed through certain practices he called “technologies of the self” (1988:18). Foucault defines them as practices that “permit

individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (1988:18).

Parrhesia is one of the technologies of the self. What makes parrhesia different from other forms of selfhood is its deeper entanglement with social and political spheres. At issue here is the performative creation of one’s own self through free speech and the ethical transformation of the standardizing banality of the culture of obedience, which is systematized within discourse by cultural orthodoxy and accepted by the masses. This is the individual’s construction of their own self through free speech.

Foucault has reinterpreted and modernized the concept of *epimeleia heautou*. For the Greeks, *epimeleia heautou* was practiced due to certain religious and cultural requirements. According to Foucault, the care of the self is the process by which a person transforms themselves through their actions and constructs their own self through their actions. In this respect, the care of the self is the process of an individual establishing their identity through a set of practices shaped by their own mental and physical choices. In his ethical framework, the self is not an authentic or pre-existing essence to be discovered but a process of becoming, formed through deliberate practices, relationships, and resistance to external power structures.

It is certainly no coincidence that Foucault identified parrhesia as one of the technologies of the self in the ancient world. The most significant characteristic of parrhesia is that, in addition to being a form of relationship one establishes with oneself, it is also the action where interaction with society is most intense. The meaningful relationship an individual builds with themselves and with others is constructed through political institutions. In this regard, parrhesia differs from other technologies of the self in two ways:

a) The individual-collective distinction is at its highest level.

b) The establishment of the individual-collective relationship, facilitated by political institutions, occurs through the individual’s questioning of power’s discourse, thus leading to a very high risk of the individual being punished, rendered illegal, or ostracized.

Parrhesia forms a bridge between the principle of *epimeleia heautou* (care of the self) and Foucauldian discourse. In the context of the concept of parrhesia, according to Foucault, discourse is an interrelated and decentralized structure that determines what can and cannot be said, who is authorized to speak, and how speech should be conducted, constantly regulating the collective subconscious and constituting the essence of knowledge-power relations. Discourse enables knowledge to take the form of truth. The rationalization of the center-periphery hierarchy in the act of speaking is achieved through the societal rationalization of discursive formulas, which become a collective truth. Due to the simultaneity of dependency types created by age and economic power relations in the family environment, specific or collective speech practices within a family—where the husband assumes an active and commanding role while others remain silent and acquiescent—represent one of the most vivid and fundamental examples of Foucauldian discourse. The concept of parrhesia involves subverting, invalidating, and performatively transcending—either momentarily or permanently—the limits set by discourse, by objectifying power and challenging the thought and speech practices that are standardized by discourse as a natural outcome of human nature and socialization. Foucault points to the situation of the reversal of power roles in the concept of parrhesia as follows: “Parrhesia is linked to the care of the self, but it is not just a technique of the self; it is also a way of governing others, of exercising power over them by telling the truth. It is a way of constituting oneself as the person who tells the truth” (2010:67). Influenced clearly by Nietzsche, Foucault argued that the principle of *epimeleia heautou* constitutes an aesthetics of existence. In this sense, parrhesia exemplifies a practice of the aesthetics of existence by subjecting the speech forms produced and protected by discourse to critical scrutiny. In other words, parrhesia is the sole technology of the self that establishes a connection between the discourse from which historical forms of subjectivity emerge and *epimeleia heautou*. Parrhesia critiques discursive power-relations, overturning power hierarchies, and thus takes the form of an aesthetics of existence with a Nietzschean romantic connotation.

The modern forms of the practice of parrhesia demonstrate that the concept maintains its ongoing relevance through its critical engagement with discourse and continuously reproduces itself across all times and cultures. Although it belongs to ancient culture, the concept of parrhesia remains relevant in the modern era. In particular,

parrhesia, as Dryberg puts, is suited to represent the conflict between democracy and authoritarian tendencies in modern politics (2016:112).

Institutional problems related to complex discursive networks including corruption, information theft, and war crimes are always the areas where the conflict between power and opposition is most intensely felt. As Smith puts: “The act of speaking truth to power, as exemplified by whistleblowers, is a contemporary form of parrhesia that challenges institutional secrecy” (2018:95). Free speech movements in these areas are the most prominent forms of modern political parrhesia. The most well-known examples are figures like Assange and Snowden, who spoke freely, independent of the political orthodoxy against power, and disclosed state secrets. Discourse, as Foucault defines it, “transmits and produces power” (1990:101), shaping what is accepted as truth in these areas (e.g., state narratives justifying war crimes). Whistleblowers like Assange and Snowden disrupt these discursive truths by revealing classified information, embodying parrhesia’s risk-laden critique. Edward McGushin explains, “Parrhesia, as practiced by whistleblowers, is a mode of truth-telling that exposes the hidden operations of power, thereby destabilizing the discourses that sustain them” (2020:92). The reproduction of the act of parrhesia through the act of free speech in the modern radical political activist tradition shows the universality and currency of the concept.

Free speech has also drawn interest from many art forms. *1984* is among the most important novels dealing with the subject of free speech in literature, and it distinguishes itself from other examples by using free speech to problematize state-individual relations. Two situations were influential in the writing of the novel: a) Orwell’s life having been spent in politics and b) the era in which Orwell lived being one where totalitarianism truly dominated and was normalized in states and ideologies. Orwell was a person who engaged in politics both within the establishment and in the opposition. In his life, politics manifested itself in three periods, and in these situations, Orwell held different political identities such as a spy, a supporter of power, and a dissident. As a representative of British imperialism, he was a policeman in Burma (now called Myanmar). Later, he joined the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War and engaged in politics with the opposition. Finally, during World War II, he worked for the BBC, carrying out press and espionage duties. Also, Orwell was a journalist who wrote columns on politics.

Furthermore, the intellectual reason that motivated Orwell was the desire to adapt the authoritarian political understanding seen all over the world to the future.

In the novel, a civil servant named Winston Smith lives in an authoritarian one-party regime. The most important tool the government uses to keep people under oppression is language, and Winston wants to develop political activism through language. The narrative is shaped around Winston's questioning of the party. Throughout the novel, the main problem between the Party and Winston is always related to language and is determined by the political duality arising from the positions both sides take on free speech.

The aim of this thesis is to cover and discuss political free speech in *1984*. In the novel, the issue of political free speech is problematized through the Foucauldian concept of parrhesia. The first chapter will provide the theoretical framework. This theoretical background will focus on the meaning and history of the concept of parrhesia. The second part will be devoted to the examination of the novel. In this analysis, parrhesia will be used as the investigation method. Parrhesia is the act of a person who is culturally weaker or more vulnerable, representing the periphery, speaking a truth they believe in with a sense of commitment to truth, against the powerful figure representing the centre in a cultural formation. The situation of free speech in the novel has been analysed through this most fundamental feature of the act of parrhesia. How the concept of language constructs the relationship between power and opposition in the novel will be understandable through an analysis based on the axis of parrhesia.

1984 is generally defined as a dystopian classic. The lack of free speech in *1984* makes the novel a dystopia. Winston wants to engage in freedom of expression. By practicing free speech, he will live a more harmonious and happy life, psychologically, with himself and his society. Winston's desire to use free speech represents the political periphery and, in a broader sense, the cultural periphery. If Winston could speak as he wished, the novel would not be a dystopia. When Winston was interrogated by O'Brien, out of fear of death, he did not speak according to the ideological principle he knew to be true, but according to the will of the authorities. Winston's secret forms of freedom of expression, known only to himself, are due to his lack of power and courage to engage in a real act of free speech. In this respect, Winston's criticism of power using language will be seen as a symbolic parrhesia. The analysis of the novel will aim to show how the

absence of the concept of parrhesia is constructed in the novel. The section concerning the novel consists of two parts. In the first part, it will be shown how the Party controls language to make free speech impossible. In the second part, Winston's construction of his political identity through language in his struggle with power, and its failure, will be narrated.



CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 Care of the Self

Michel Foucault states that his main focus is the study of the subject, not power relations (1982:326). For Foucault, the subject is based on contingency of specific historical shifts and periods, far from being a fixed, autonomous, or essential entity, is actively produced through historical, social, and discursive practices shaped by power-knowledge relations. (1980: 98; 2005: 525). The constructedness of the subject is rendered by discourses. Western civilization is different from other cultures because it incorporates discursive narratives into modern institutions which make it more comprehensive and hard-to-resist. (Foucault, 1995: 194; 2016: 45).

His view of history is highly pessimistic. Humans lack free will and wear cultural and ideological masks. If power has a teleology, it constructs itself through identity notions built on binaries. The transformation of the individual into a subject is established through the definition of norms and order via institutions like asylums and prisons. As Foucault pinpoints,

“the disciplines function as a technique for the constitution of individuals as correlative elements of power and knowledge... The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle” (1995: 194).

/Peripheral entities like the mad, criminal, pervert, sick, or unemployed are typically excluded from society. Foucault delineates that “normality gains meaning and acceptance when ‘its opposite, the abnormal,’ is established (1980: 178). Those observing these marginalized groups believe themselves to be normal, ideal, and superior. Power achieves this through discourse—flexible cultural norms varying across cultures. Thus, normal people become objects of power, shaped into subjects by the cultural structures of their historical period. Unlike liberals, he views the individual not as a given but as a constructed, historical product.

Foucault's work draws on modern Western European history. Historically, Foucault has been the proponent of a non-rigid structure that does not follow a chronological timeline but rather revolves around the decisive points in the discourses and the power structures. In his line of thought, three essential historical timelines are as follows:

1. Renaissance (Pre-17th Century): Knowledge based on appearance and analogy; language and world intertwined, with fluid, symbolic interpretations (Foucault, 1994: 17–44).

2. Classical Age (17th–18th Century): Focus on representation and order; knowledge structured through taxonomies, with precise distinctions and logical systems (Foucault, 1994: 46–77).

3. Modern Age (19th Century–Present): Development of “man” as both an object and subject of knowledge; disciplines like biology, economics, and linguistics are vehicles of power and discourse that define a human being (Foucault, 1994: 303–343).

One of the first and most important concepts Foucault examined in the construction of subjectivity is the notion of madness. Michel Foucault's interpretative analyses on madness concept focused on the tendency to view the subject as being constructed alongside power-knowledge relations and institutionalization. Books like *The History of Madness* (1961) and *The Birth of the Clinic* (1963), concentrate on the idea that subjectivity is not pre-given or inner essence but a consequence of historical, social, and power-dictated discourses. Special subjects can be created through knowledge practices, institutional control, and normalization, with power relations deciding on what is normal or abnormal. Meaning and madness visualization in the texts are the main aspects in supporting claims on the contingency of identity-formation. Foucault's reflection on madness affords an unfaltering instance of the formation of subjects because he recites the changing definitions and treatments of madness throughout the history, thus he points out the power and knowledge that create the “mad” subject.

In the Middle Ages, madness was a little different than what it normally would be known. There were times when the insane were thought of as the ones with divine power or conversely, as just the carriers of folly. The essential idea of madness was appropriated from cultural narratives which mixed mythology about respect and derision, and were told without the involvement of the institution (Foucault, 2006: 13–16).

The 17th century's “Great Confinement” era shed light on the watershed moment. The classical reason reconceptualizes madness in terms of its compatibility with economical, legal and sociocultural norms of the new Classical Age which is

characterized by the bourgeois control of power. Therefore, madness was taken for the counterpart of what is rational, and it transforms from its status of exceptional intelligence or divine inspiration to a moral, and social danger directed against the economic and legal stability of society. For example, Mandate the Hôpital Général in Paris takes the mad with beggars and criminals; together they remained not for correction but rather for social distancing (Foucault, 2006: 46–65). Affected through this process, the mad becomes the object of the discursive narrative of medicine as “unreasonable,” a label that denoted them without agency or voice. Foucault argues that mad subjects were imbued with a narrative that stigmatized their abnormality that was absorbed by the knowledge of their community’s viewpoints on “unreason” (2006: 80-85).

By the 18th and 19th centuries, the changing meaning of madness also led to its reconceptualization as a medical and mental illness. In other words, the previous way of seeing madness as a legal problem is overridden by seeing madness as a threat to the individual, in line with the idea of disciplining of the individual body in the 18th century, called as disciplinary power in Foucault’s works. Names like Pinel and Tuke introduced moral treatment reforms, but Foucault saw them as a subtler form of control. The places of the mad were no longer just detention centres as they became branches of discipline wherein, they were studied, catalogued, and formed to live normal lives (Foucault, 1962: 465–480). The psychiatric discourse, which claimed scientific objectivity, produced the mad subject as an object of knowledge, defined by diagnostic categories (e.g., hysteria, melancholia). Foucault argues in *The Birth of the Clinic* that the subject strictly settled under the constant observing gaze, at the same time shaping their ruling, which is similar to Bentham’s Panopticon, that can permanently change the way the subject behaves (1994: 38–44). The maddening processes these people went through were described as medical institutions finding their protection in the “truth” of psychiatry.

The point of view in which the above construction is made is the particularly clear aspect of Foucault’s overall notion on subjectivity, which, he suggests, is based on the premise that subjects emerge out of discursive practices and structures that enforce norms. The segment of the mad not only highlights three components—exclusion (confinement), normalization (asylum discipline), and knowledge production (psychiatric classification)—but also shows that this is a game played in a space that is of discursive knowledge. The figuration of the “normal” subject stands in contradiction to the aforementioned situation because it accepts the norms worldly and disassociates itself

from the deviant mad (Foucault, 1994: 44-45). However, Foucault, in contrast, speaks of potential for resistance. For instance, Artaud or Nietzsche, who use “mad” expressions to fight against the rational norm, demonstrate that the power of subjectivity through their creativity lies in the fact that one can disrupt the established discursive narratives about subjectivities.

The madness/mental health example explicates that subjects cannot be constructed as autonomous selves but instead can be seen as by-products of power-discourses. Mad subject re-construction from medieval acceptance to modern medicine demonstrates Foucault’s viewpoint that subjectivity is a history, a relational and finite process depending on both power and knowledge.

Foucault’s understanding of power is not a negative one that suppresses individuals through prohibitions and restrictions or promotes a culture of oppression. Generally, power operates through a correct discourse that teaches people what they can do, defines right and wrong, and delineates the rights they possess. Within this discursive framework, a subject outside the culture undergoes acculturation and is rationalized through the control of knowledge processes. This rationalization, reminiscent of the concept of parrhesia, determines how a concept should be discussed and expressed in written culture. Power speaks about what it seeks to control, constructing a truth regarding how it should be discussed and lived. For instance, *The History of Sexuality* posits that sexuality was not controlled by being repressed or rendered invisible but by being spoken about and treated as a distinct, special phenomenon separate from other aspects of life. (Foucault, 1990: 10–12, 17–35). Sexuality became an object of scientific discourse, thereby serving as a tool of control. For the first time, sexuality was defined by a power that viewed it as a separate domain of human life. Consequently, individuals have interpreted their desires in ways deemed appropriate by this power.

Unlike absurdism, which does not propose solutions as individualist, Marxist, or liberal thought does by interpreting the past and future or developing societal solutions, the *care of the self* should not be seen as a prescriptive solution. Power is omnipresent. It can shape the subject in passive or active ways. In Foucault’s view, power is not limited to formal politics, nor is it solely an economic phenomenon as in Marxist thought. Power is not applied only to the powerless or those who differ from society. While it is applied

to them, it actually constructs individuals as subjects, making it a phenomenon that encompasses everyone. Self care represents the internal construction of the subject.

The notion of “care of the self” (*epimeleia heautou*), is, primarily, Michel Foucault’s research focus in his later writings. *The History of Sexuality Volume 3: The Care of the Self* and *Lectures at the Collège de France (The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 1981–82)* focus on his scholarly interest with care of the self. The idea of “care of the self” (*epimeleia heautou*) traces its origin to the ancient Greek philosophy, and it is prominently encountered in Plato’s *Alcibiades*, where one finds Socrates offering a piece of advice to Alcibiades that before going into politics, he should first cultivate his soul, adding the caveat that moral clarity is the precondition for leadership (1997: 132). According to this Socratic ethos, self-care works as an active process of self-examination to get into line with virtue and truth, although it is often practised through mutual agreement in and among philosophical societies (Foucault, 2005: 93–94).

The Hellenistic period saw the fragmentation of the Greek city-state after Alexander’s empire, with philosophers such as the Stoics, Epicureans, and Cynics, who revised the conception of self-care, parking it to prioritize individual autonomy. Seneca and Epictetus had recourse to daily practices i.e. reflective journaling and meditation, in order to master emotions and to align with rational nature, with the objective of *autarkeia* (self-sufficiency) attained through the preservation of peace of mind (Seneca, 2015: 4; Epictetus, 2022: 19). Epicureans, strictly standing behind Epicurus, with a slice of self-care they mastered pleasures with moderation and formed friendships to end with *ataraxia* (tranquility) (Epicurus, 2019: 128–130). Cynics, as demonstrated by Diogenes, radically self-cared by openly challenging societal conventions, living in simplicity to express natural freedom and as a critique of figurative culture (2018: 70–71).

In Roman philosophy, self-care acquired a more methodological and pragmatic structure. The likes of Musonius Rufus and Plutarch were the leading figures who grounded it as part of ethical training, in which discipline as well as mentorship were underlined in the context of positive personal integrity and the balancing of it with social duty in the imperial setting (see: Musonius Rufus, *Lectures* 6; Plutarch, *Moralia*). Throughout these schools of thought, self-care was never individualistic, rather it was relational and was considered part of the truth-telling (*parrhesia*) that we observe in Socratic and Cynic practices (Foucault, 2011: 159-160). The course of self-care changed

from Socratic inquiry to Roman pragmatism, characterized by the steady evolution of such ethical self-formation, which was deeply embedded in philosophical and social frameworks.

The concept of “care of the self” that Foucault developed and spoke about in his later works reimagines the ancient Greek and Roman practice as a form of ethical self-formation, which is different from modern individualism or self-obsession (1986: 37–68). Socratic, Stoic, Epicurean, and Cynic traditions are the basis from which he constructs it as an active process that individuals deliberately through wilful practices consciously mind their subjectivity. He underscores the necessity of honesty and virtue in the actions that bring together a life in harmony. In contrast to the Delphic maxim “know thyself,” which denotes fixed self-awareness, Foucault contends that self-knowledge emerges dynamically through self-care, instituted by means of certain techniques such as writing, meditation, and dialogue that facilitate autonomy and resilience (2005: 17–19). In *The Courage of Truth*, it is pointed out that these are practices, denoted in Seneca’s letters or Marcus Aurelius’s meditations, not just individualized but, more so, ethical acts that advance people for community cooperation, usually in connection with parrhesia, the brave act of truth-telling, evidenced by Diogenes’ extreme public noncompliance (Foucault, 2011: 165–170). He emphasizes the fact that self-care in ancient times was achieved in relationships; thus, it was ethical bonding through mentoring or friendship that challenged social norms, and the ability to resist outside control(s) was present. In the contemporary world, Foucault interprets that as a repressive strategy against biopolitical power, a means of making subjectivities bios that do not agree with the biopolitical and hence are outside of the biopolitical control, although he recognizes that it has a historical elitism and male bias (1988: 81–95). The formulation he gives is that the care of the self is a transformative practice, merging the personal ethics of privacy with the political act of resistance, and that subjectivity ought to be rethought as a creative, changing process, rather than a static identity.

The “techniques of the self,” as articulated by Foucault, are deliberate practices individuals follow to transform their inner selves, based on the idea of self-formation all of which navigate with power relations. He explores these in the context of ancient Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman philosophy, particularly in *The History of Sexuality, Volume 3* and *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* where they align with the philosophy of the “care of

the self” (1988: 11). The following provides a concise overview of these techniques, their historical context, and their significance.

Foucault describes techniques of the self as methods by which individuals constitute themselves as ethical subjects, drawing on Socratic, Stoic, Epicurean, and Cynic practices (1988: 45–50). In ancient Greece, Socratic dialogue, as depicted in Plato’s *Alcibiades*, served as a technique to prompt self-examination, encouraging individuals to align their actions with virtue (1997: 127). During the Hellenistic and Roman periods, these practices became more systematic. For example, the Stoic Seneca used reflective writing, such as letters or journals, to monitor daily actions and promote rational self-control (Seneca, 1920: 6). Marcus Aurelius’s *Meditations* illustrates introspective exercises to bolster resilience against external disturbances (2021: 2.1). Epicureans curated social interactions, selecting friendships to achieve tranquility (2012: 130). Cynics, like Diogenes, employed public acts of defiance—living simply or challenging norms—as expressions of truth and autonomy (2018: 70).

These techniques—writing, meditation, dialogue, physical discipline, and public performance—aimed to achieve *autarkeia* (self-sufficiency) and ethical coherence. They were not solitary but relational, often involving mentors or communities, and were linked to parrhesia (truth-telling), as seen in Diogenes’ confrontations with power (2011: 165–170). Foucault emphasizes that these techniques enable individuals to resist societal pressures by crafting an autonomous self, distinct from modern individualism, which he critiques as self-centered (2005: 251–252).

There are different views about Foucault’s authorial intention in his work on care of the self. In general, Foucault thinks that power always keeps the individual under control, even if it thinks that he is free and on the way to become authentic or unique. Therefore, practices of ethical self-formation are extensions of power to rule and manage people. In a modern context, Foucault views these techniques as tools for resisting disciplinary power, allowing individuals to create alternative subjectivities outside biopolitical Contemporary scholars, like Pierre Hadot, see these techniques as spiritual exercises adaptable to modern ethical living, though feminist critiques, such as Judith Butler’s, highlight their gendered limitations (Hadot, 1995: 84–85; Butler, 1990: 19–20).

1.2 Definition of Parrhesia

Michel Foucault's late work took a significant turn toward ethics, exploring how the self could be constituted as a subject of truth. Central to this project was his recovery and analysis of the ancient Greek concept of parrhesia, or fearless speech. For Foucault, parrhesia was not simply a historical curiosity but a vital tool for thinking about the relationship between truth, power, and the self in the modern world.

In Foucault's intellectual life, the concept of parrhesia was the subject of study in three places. The first was a single lecture on parrhesia at the University of Grenoble in 1982. Second, while serving as a visiting scholar in the United States, he gave a series of six lectures on parrhesia at the University of California, Berkeley, in October-November. Third, at the Collège de France, he gave another series of lectures under the title *The Courage of Truth* over a two-month period spanning February-March of 1984. The six University of California lectures were published as a book in two stages. The first text, comprising a compilation of the six lectures on parrhesia at the University of California, was published as a book titled *Fearless Speech*. A second book based on the compilation of the same lectures was published a second time under the title *Discourse & Truth: The Problematization of Parrhesia*. This book differs from the first, *Fearless Speech*, because it used audio recordings made during the lectures and the author's lecture notes. In addition, *Discourse & Truth: The Problematization of Parrhesia* also contains the transcribed version of the lecture given at the University of Grenoble. The parrhesia-themed lectures given at the Collège de France in 1984 were published under the title *The Courage of Truth*.

Parrhesia is a Greek word that etymologically comes from the combination of 'pan' (everything) and 'rhema' (anything said) (2001: 11). This is the noun form of the word. However, there are various variations of the word. These are derived from the word parrhesia (2001: 11). The first is a noun form like parrhesia. The other two are verbs. The second noun form of the word is parrhesiastes. In this usage, the word means the person who engages in the act of parrhesia (2001: 11). Other words derived from the word parrhesia are of verb origin. These are, respectively, parrhesiazomai and parrhesiazesthai (2001: 11). The meaning of parrhesia intended here is the act of speaking bravely and freely (2001: 12).

The exact meaning of free speech in English can be considered "free speech." As previously stated, in the history of thought, freedom of expression and free speech have

been used synonymously in English. In French, the use of an expression like ‘franc-parler’ is appropriate. In German, there is a word ‘Freimüthigkeit’, which means free speech. Although there are synonyms for the word parrhesia in modern European languages like English, French, and German, these words can only be associated with the word parrhesia in their dictionary sense. Put most plainly, the meaning of the word parrhesia as used in Ancient Greece as a concept in the history of thought does not exist in the modern Western languages given as examples. They do not represent the meaning expressed in intellectual history. In these languages, free speech is used as a situation in daily life, for all human relationships without any distinction, and does not refer to any specific cultural attitude. As Foucault scholar Judith Revel explains, “Parrhesia is not freedom of speech in general, but the courage to speak the truth in a situation where it is risky to do so.” (21:2007)

Parrhesia’s definition in cultural history is developed within Greek philosophy. It etymologically means “speak everything” and, by a broad definition, includes rhetorical shortcomings such as excess or unnecessary speech in addition to emotional and political dimensions (Foucault, 2001: 12–13). Psychologically, it implies frankness or speaking freely with no reserve to conceal emotion. Ethically, it implies courageous speech, linking it to arete, a masculine ideal of completeness in ancient Greek, or virtue, so that the speaker becomes a better version of himself. In literature, parrhesia means freedom to speak from one's mind without reserve with reference to any subject or person, especially within theatrical constructions based on frank speech. (2001: 13).

The term to speak freely is seen as the epitome of verbal freedom. Michel Foucault calls it the concept of parrhesia, a kind of relationship one has with the words they express that is based on the truthfulness of the statement. Foucault distinguishes between parrhesia and rhetoric, and he argues that the former is a kind of activity that does not manipulate language: “Parrhesia is a specific kind of speech, where the speaker is frank with the truth” (2001: 19). On the contrary, rhetoric is the road to semantic concordance for sociological benefits or manipulation, as demonstrated in the Sophists’ use of law pragmatically, while parrhesia is simply a critical entitlement. Foucault illustrates, “Rhetoric, as it was developed in the Sophistic tradition, is opposed to parrhesia because it does not involve a personal, direct, and frank relationship to truth” (2001: 21).

This contradiction can equally be seen in the Platonic-Socratic heritage, primarily in Plato’s *Gorgias*, where parrhesia shows up as a stand-in for candid speech. In *Gorgias*,

Plato ridicules rhetoric's long, and Sophistic manipulative speeches saying that they tend to be associated with the Sophists, whereas the question-and-answer dialogues which are philosophical are the ones through which one gets free: "In the *Gorgias*, Socrates uses parrhesia to speak truth against the rhetoricians' persuasive art" (1983: 9). In the same fashion, in *Phaedrus*, Foucault asserts that the dispute is not regarding speech and writing but on the one of the logos which has the truth and the one which does not: "The issue in *Phaedrus* is to discern the logos which can be true, which is the concern of parrhesia" (2001: 74). Seneca is mentioned as well. He also acknowledged the value of straightforward speech; he actually considered the truth more important than rhetorical embellishment in informal and private conversations. Foucault quotes Seneca's comment on the matter: "Seneca emphasizes that in private, one-on-one discourse, truth and frankness prevail, without the need for rhetorical adornment" (2005: 384). So, through these schools of thought, the position of parrhesia is that of a critique and is oriented towards truth against rhetoric, which is on manipulation.

When a subject, knowing the existence of risks, nevertheless makes a criticism against their own interest or when it is not necessary, and accepts the dangers before or after they occur, taking the reins of their own destiny into their hands—this is the emergence of truth in the form of parrhesia in the Foucauldian sense. Especially when a person does not deviate from what they know in the face of a death threat from someone more powerful than themselves and expresses what they know to be right as a social or moral duty—this is the most important feature of parrhesiastic free speech.

The use of parrhesia does not concern itself with insulting or offending people gratuitously. Though it may be sometimes related to harsh or critical speech, the ultimate goal is always constructive—to encourage ethical self-formation or societal improvement. Foucault interprets it in this way, "The function of parrhesia is... to have the function of criticism... to get [the listener] to accept the disagreeable, unpleasant, and offensive truth" (2001: 17). This highlights the difference between parrhesia and insults, which aim only to degrade or harm without any intention of correcting or improving. For example, a parrhesiastes may express their discontent against a tyrant's injustice, in the face of the possible penalty of torture, but it is by no means the result of personal hatred but is rather a duty to the truth (2001: 15–16).

1.3. Five Elements of Parrhesia¹

In Greek cultural history, parrhesia has been chronologically reflected upon and commented on in literary, political, philosophical, and religious fields. This process spanned from the 5th century B.C. to the 5th century A.D. Of course, the form and meaning of free speech varied with cultural understandings of historical periods. Although different forms of free speech have been seen in terms of temporality, there are a number of fundamental qualities on which the concept of parrhesia is based. Frankness, truth, duty, criticism, and danger are the main fundamental qualities that give parrhesia its meaning. Parrhesia is defined by frankness, truth, duty, criticism, and danger (Foucault, 2001: 12-20). These concepts, intrinsic to the concept of parrhesia, create a semantic relationship within the triangle of the speech-listener-speaker relationship; in other words, free speech emerges as an experience.

In frankness, the speaker expresses what is on their mind in a direct and simple style. The listeners experience a kind of shock or surprise due to the relationship between what is spoken and the speaker. In frank speech, the speaker hides nothing and tells others what they think as it is. Due to frankness, the speaker conveys what they think in the clearest way, and the listeners become so sure that the speaker's real thoughts are truly being told to them that they have no doubt. Frank speech creates a contingency between the speaker and what is said because, through frank speech, the speaker says those things. Thanks to a frank speech, the listeners will also understand what the speaker means, thus a contingency will also arise between the listener and what is spoken. A necessity for free speech to be frank is to not use rhetoric. Instead of rhetoric, the most direct expressions and plain language should be used. The reason is that rhetoric is a platform suitable for manipulating the minds of the listener. Rhetorical tools are, in a way, a linguistic totalitarian attitude established on the minds of listeners through a kind of deception. Since the aim of rhetoric is to conceal and change meaning, a relationship of frankness cannot be established between the listeners and the speech. In frank, short, and clear speeches, the speaker, by directly saying what they really think, makes their speech according to the mental world of their listeners and develops an equal relationship of frankness with them.

¹ The five element of parrhesia is later incorporated into the analysis of the novel where it follows a subsection about Winston personality. It contributes to the understanding of Winston's personality in terms of his relationship with free speech and state.

The use of ideology within aesthetics, the aestheticization of ideology by aesthetics, can be defined as artistic frankness. For example, in the ancient period, if a poet reads a poem that describes and praises their religion to someone, or admits in their own speech that they wrote it, this is a frankness of an aesthetic kind. What creates sincerity here is an individual relationship with a predominantly emotional character between the poet as the speaking subject and the belief that is being spoken about. The poet's establishing a personal connection with the subject they are speaking about will affect how the listeners interpret the poem and their thoughts about the poet, likely creating social pressure. Similarly, their way of evaluating the poem will also be affected by ideological reasons. They will see the poem not as an art object, but as an ideological object that threatens society and creates unrest. When evaluated from this perspective, the poet's taking ownership of what they speak about, being its perpetrator, can be given as an example of sincerity in speech. As a second example, it is possible to give a man saying "I love you" to a woman he is interested in, despite the possibility of facing various moral or material problems. Here, the man, by saying such a thing to a woman whose family opposes it, or where there is enmity between families, or to a married woman, puts himself in a position that would create a legitimate reason for murder in patriarchal societies, and for this reason, this type of speech is a free speech and a frankness in the Foucauldian sense.

Truth is another component of free speech. The fact that *parrhesiazesthai*, the verb form of the word *parrhesia*, has a positive meaning like "to tell the truth" points to the concept's relationship with truth. The speaker tells the truth because they know it is true. At the same time, what is said is actually true. Foucault emphasizes that this is not about objective, verifiable truth, but about the speaker's complete belief in what they say. As he states, "The parrhesiastes says what he knows to be true. He is not a professional of truth, but his speech is guided by his conviction" (Foucault, 2001: 14). A truth known by many may not be expressed due to various cultural dynamics. It would not be a misleading observation to say that the more widespread the inaction on a known truth becomes, the greater its pathological effect will be, and the effect of the act of free speech will increase to the same extent. As an example regarding the quality of truth, one can give the planning of a murder in a town and this murder plan being heard throughout the town, everyone knowing what will happen yet everyone remaining silent and everyone being a spectator to the commission of the murder, because here the listeners never prevented the murder

as free speakers representing the truth, i.e., the inside story of the events. The reason the townspeople adopt a passive attitude is their fear of the culture of violence in rural life, their fear of being killed in a murder themselves. Foucault's thought can be adapted to even the most ordinary human relationships; therefore, based on this criminal example, it would be an act of parrhesia for a man from the town to stand out from the crowds, raise his voice, and openly tell the truth to the faces of those who planned the murder in order to fight the criminal discourse, in Foucault's words, because the speaker is both telling the truth (here, the knowledge is a wrong that the majority knows but remains silent about, generally in a social context) and what he says is really his own opinion because he is putting himself in danger (2001: 15–16).

The power of free speech is to voice a problem that is known by everyone but feared to be expressed. This constitutes the most important social aspect of the quality of truth. Truth and sincerity or frankness are complementary qualities. Therefore, the free speaker does not only speak their own opinions with sincerity. The speaker believes that what they are saying is true, and what they believe is actually true. Therefore, as the relational situation between sincerity and truth indicates, the principles that constitute free speech should not be seen as independent. On the contrary, they complement each other; they fill each other's content.

Danger is another complementary component of free speech. The speaker telling a truth that is their own opinion does not fully meet the conditions of free speech because for telling a truth that is one's own opinion to have an ethical meaning, there must be a possibility of encountering certain dangers when the truth is told. The greatest of these risks is death. As scholar Michael Kelly clarifies, "The risk in parrhesia is not accidental; it is constitutive of the act itself. Without risk, truth-telling is merely stating an opinion" (2014: 32). Although the greatest type of danger is death, all potential risks other than death are also included within the scope of danger. Since parrhesia is a concept of ancient thought, it would be appropriate to give an example for the classical period. In Rome, before Christianization was complete, at times when Christians were a religious minority subjected to oppression and torture, some believers were forced to make a choice between renouncing their faith or being killed by lions in the hippodrome. The religious martyrs who did not renounce their faith and refused this offer are one of the most famous examples of engaging in an act of free speech in the face of the danger of death.

Criticism is the active function of parrhesia. The truth spoken by the parrhesiastes is not a neutral statement of fact; it is a critique aimed at another person, an institution, or even oneself. This critique is intended to be corrective, to point out a flaw or a moral failing with the goal of inciting change. Foucault explains that this can be a harsh and unwelcome process: “The function of parrhesia is not to demonstrate the truth to someone else, but to have the function of criticism... to get him to accept the disagreeable, unpleasant, and offensive truth” (2001: 17). This critical function can be directed upwards, as when a philosopher criticizes a tyrant, or horizontally, as when a friend criticizes another friend for their behaviour. It can also be directed inward as a form of self-critique, where an individual frankly assesses their own faults as part of their ethical self-formation. Without this critical edge, speech remains mere conversation, lacking the transformative intent that defines parrhesia.

The person who engages in the act of free speech is free to speak or not to speak. Despite being free, they choose to speak of their will. This choice is not random; it is driven by a sense of duty. This forms the basis of the definition of responsibility in the Foucauldian concept of parrhesia. A person telling the truth out of fear of torture, or a defendant admitting their crime due to the judge’s coercion, or telling the truth about a matter related to a case is not parrhesia in the Foucauldian sense. This is because speech is coerced by an external force. If the truth is expressed with ethical motivation, it becomes parrhesia. The parrhesiastes feels a moral obligation to speak, not because someone is forcing them, but because they believe it is the right thing to do for the good of others or the community. As Foucault says: “But if he voluntarily confesses his crime to someone else out of a sense of moral obligation, then he performs a parrhesiastic act” (2001: 19). This sense of duty elevates the act from a personal opinion to an ethical performance. Warning someone else, advising them to see their fault, is also a moral duty. Warning the ruler is a duty for the polis, the city-state; warning a friend is a duty imposed by the value of friendship.

1.4. Parrhesia and its Opposition to Totalitarianism

Totalitarian states’ repression of language conflicts with parrhesia in freedom of expression in politics. It is safe to say that there is a stark contrast between parrhesia and totalitarianism in terms of their approach to the application of language. In the layer of language, totalitarianism constructs its control of language to obstruct freedom of political

expression and make it impossible for the political subject to think, understand and perform free speech. On the other hand, parrhesia offers the utmost freedom of expression in all or any political engagements between people. In other words, totalitarianism seeks to silence society in the political setting; parrhesia wants the articulation of opposition without any intervention of ideological underpinnings. Due to the difference between parrhesia and totalitarianism in their application of language in their relationship with freedom of expression, it is safe to say that the two are bipolar opposites of each other in terms of political freedom of expression. For this reason, the five items listed by Foucault in *Fearless Speech* as necessary units of the experience of parrhesia can be used to analyse totalitarianism over language in political expression in any political organization. The existence of the five default qualities of parrhesia is essential, not optional, for the existence of freedom of political expression. In this case, it means language is controlled by totalitarianism if the necessary qualities for parrhesia highlighted by Foucault are absent and forgotten in the political setting of a society. The linguistic hegemony of totalitarian power is based on preventing the use of the qualities indicated by the concept of parrhesia as a form of political expression.

Totalitarianism defines itself through the absence of parrhesia. From this perspective, trying to reason about the nature of totalitarianism through the qualities of parrhesia would be a sound choice. The terms expressed by Foucault as components of free speech are censored by the totalitarian state. The totalitarian power destroys the components of the concept of parrhesia, prefers authoritarian language as a form of expression, and paralyzes democratic pluralism which is in favour of freedom as a form of expression.

Frankness is one of the Foucauldian notions censored by totalitarian power. In a totalitarian state, it is not an easy thing to operate as a political subject. The totalitarian regime acts with the aim of making its own power absolute and preventing the existence of others. To establish a monopoly on power, the totalitarian state tries to bring all political life under absolute control. Accordingly, in totalitarian powers, there is a unity between the party and the state. The party is seen as the fundamental reason for the state's existence. In parallel with this, another party replacing the party is theoretically unthinkable and considered an ideological betrayal. Since only the party determines the political perspective of the state, and since this relationship is based on a kind of ownership relation, there are no democratic elections in totalitarian regimes. The sense is

that citizens outside the party officially do not have the right to have a political opinion and express it. The power relationship between the party and the mass of citizens outside the party is also similar to the power relationship between the party leader and party members. In totalitarian parties, there is no change of leader, and what is expected of party members is unconditional obedience to the leader's decisions. In a quasi-mythical manner, the party leader is seen as the ideological authority, and party members follow him blindly. As such, both citizens and party members cannot have a different opinion from the state. If they have one, they are not allowed to share it with others. They do not use their voice, but they use the party's language.

Truth is the second component of free speech suppressed in totalitarian power. The nature of totalitarian regimes can be defined as utopian and dictatorial. As seen in the example of Nazism, the totalitarian state politicizes information with a utopian perspective. The Nazification of Aryan mythology, the transformation of pagan cyclicity into the form of Aryan racism, is the clearest form of this. The dictatorial nature of the totalitarian state is shown by the absolute state dominance over the freedom of the press and publication in totalitarian regimes. The totalitarian state has established absolute dominance over all ways of accessing information, the classification of false and true information, and who will express them.

Danger is a major impediment to free speech. The totalitarian power resorts to physical and psychological violence to protect its power. The totalitarian power uses violence to increase its power over society and to stop opponents who would question its power. For this reason, historical totalitarian powers have generally attacked their ideological enemies. The staging of a political conspiracy called the Night of the Long Knives by the Nazis in Germany to demonize the Communists can be given as an example in this regard. The goal of violence is fear. People will be afraid of what will happen to them if they do something wrong. As a result of fear, obedience to authority emerges. Obedience to authority, in language, will be the official state ideology instead of free speech as a form of political expression. Since danger destroys the ground for democratic speech, the opposition also turns to violence and becomes radicalized. The reason for the assassination attempts made or attempted against leaders of totalitarian states is that the totalitarian state builds its relationship with the opposition through violence. On August 30, 1918, a dissident named Fanya Kaplan carried out an armed attack on Lenin at the Hammer and Sickle Factory in Moscow and succeeded. Many assassination attempts

were also made on Adolf Hitler, but none were successful. The opposition uses violence because it does not have the right to written or oral free speech, or because it will receive death or prison sentences if it uses this right, and due to various types of danger such as the systematic violence of the state.

Many examples can be given from history to support the claim that the control of power over language is directly proportional to the absence of the elements that are part of the concept of parrhesia. In particular, the Sparrow Massacre during the Mao Zedong period is a remarkable example. Sparrows feed on farm crops that constitute agricultural resources. For this reason, the party is of the opinion that sparrows are harming the Chinese economy and are therefore a national security problem. The citizens accepted this view of the party. Here, it is seen that the situation of truth in the Foucauldian sense has disappeared. On the party's order, a sparrow hunt was launched nationwide. It is unclear if this was correct. In a radical situation like the whole society going on a sparrow hunt, it is difficult to say that all people truly believed in its rightness. The Communist Party decides what the information about sparrows is, and with the power of the state, Chinese citizens also accept this as true. Thus, the principle of truth in the Foucauldian sense also disappears because the party says what is true and dictates what should be done in the same way. If one does not go on a sparrow hunt as ordered by the Party, the punishment for this will be severe penalties such as death and imprisonment. This hunting program was carried out under the supervision of the Communist Party's officials in the countryside. In society, no resistance was shown against the officials on an individual or group scale; nothing was said that would anger them. No one saw it as a social responsibility or a moral duty to criticize the party officials who managed the hunts in the countryside or the city to criticize this view of the Communist party.

1.4. Evolution of the Word Parrhesia: Parrhesia and Rhetoric

Parrhesia, being characterized as truthful and candid speech, is the antithesis of rhetoric, which as depicted in Plato's *Phaedrus*, is based on various persuasive techniques. In this dialog, the main question is not the opposition between speech and writing but the distinction between a logos that conveys truth and one unable to do so (2001: 74). That difference between parrhesia and rhetoric not only in Plato's works in the fourth century BCE so definitively set this opposition that it was caught by the following downstream tradition (1983: 9). For instance, Seneca stresses the

importance of plain talks as the best way of communicating frankness and truth without the need for rhetorical decoration. He says: “Seneca stresses that in private discourse, truth and frankness prevail without rhetorical adornment” (2005: 384).

In the second century CE however, the cultural schism between rhetoric and philosophy is fairly substantial but the elements of parrhesia are beginning to pop up in the rhetoric premises of the rhetoricians. As stated in Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria*, specifically Book IX, Chapter II, parrhesia is an unceremonious, straightforward exclamation, in contrast to the artificial rhetorical figures. Quintilian uses the terms “free speech” (*libera oratione*) or “license” (*licentia*), explaining that the Greeks used the term parrhesia (1920: 9.2). He claims that parrhesia is a rhetorical “figure” that is simple and uncomplicated, being the “zero degree” of figures aimed at making the audience feel more intensely (2001: 21). In this way, by its very being, parrhesia becomes a natural utterance within the realm of rhetoric, differentiating from the alternative persuasive strategies that are directed towards manipulation.

1.5. Parrhesia and Politics

In classical Athens, parrhesia—open and truthful speech—was very much connected to *isegoria*, the equal opportunity of the people who talk, the two together forming a basic democratic practice along with *isonomia*, which is the right of every person to participate in making decisions. These principles, when coupled, were the architects of Athenian democracy, creating a culture of open talk in the agora, a public place where citizens interacted individually and in assemblies. Foucault says: “Parrhesia is at the basis of the constitution of Athens, it is directly linked to the exercise of democratic freedom” (2001: 76). This habit, which is shown in Euripides’ plays and fourth-century BCE texts, was a manifestation of Athenian democracy’s dedication to the act of telling the truth as a responsibility of the citizen, thus, securing the possibility of public discussion serving the interests of all (2001: 77).

Isegoria, a concept close but opposite to parrhesia, was the guaranteed right of every citizen to address the assembly. This was the embodiment of the democratic ideal of equal participation. Notable classical scholar David Konstan lays stress on this: “Isegoria was the institutional guarantee of equal speech, enabling parrhesia’s moral imperative to speak truth for the polis” (2006: 16). Political scientist Arlene Saxonhouse explains: “Isegoria ensured that all citizens, regardless of status, could voice their views

in the assembly, which made parrhesia's truth-telling possible within a structured democratic framework" (2006: 94). This cooperation allowed citizens to confront the power of the state directly, for that *isegoria* was not just the legal right to free speech, while what is the meaning of the word parrhesia here, was that speech was, in some moral sense, more imminent than tautology or coercion. Josiah Ober, the historian of ancient Greece, shares: "*Isegoria* was the procedural base of Athenian democracy, experiencing the freedom needed for parrhesia as a form of struggle through criticism" (2008: 19).

Primarily in Athens, *isegoria* was the formal embodiment of institutions like the *Ecclesia* where citizens could table motions or criticize policies. This equal opportunity of speech not only distanced Athens from the rest of the poleis but also was a platform for the participatory culture to thrive. Political theorist Daniela Cammack points that "*Isegoria* was not only a right but a democratic practice that leveled social hierarchies, allowing even the poorest citizens to influence decisions by way of speech" (2017: 132). *Isegoria* was a channel combined with the sincerity of demand of the citizens who seek the truth against not only the rich but also, in some cases, the entire elite. This is the core of the insights of Foucault: "Parrhesia, supported by *isegoria*, made the agora a space where truth could confront power directly" (2001: 77).

During the Hellenistic era, as soon as the monarchy came along, the focus from democratic agora shifted to the royal court where advisors used it to guide rulers and also curbed power abuses. Foucault remarks: "In the monarchic constitution, parrhesia is no longer a right of all citizens but a practice reserved for the king's advisors, who speak truth to power" (2001: 82). The able ruler is the one who puts up with the honest criticism for it is the generally silent majority—the people—who stand to gain from the truthful advice (2001: 83–84). *Isegoria*, in this instance, was not the same due to lack of an equivalent in this monarchical arrangement, for the speech which is not allowed to question the monarch is meaningless. Edward McGushin, the scholar of Foucault, notes: "In monarchies, then, parrhesia becomes this kind of like balance because on the one hand, advisors risk their status in order to speak truth, but on the other, it is all reflected in Foucault's broader interest in truth-telling as a resistance to power" (2020: 112). Political scientist John Uhr adds that: "Hellenistic parrhesia, as described by Foucault, exposes a variety of proto-accountability mechanisms, with the advisors' truth-telling specifically controlling the excess of the monarchy for the benefit of the public" (2005: 47).

This conversion stresses the flexibility of parrhesia but also highlights the unique mark of *isegoria* in Athenian democracy. While it is true that parrhesia survived as a form of truth in diverse political setups, *isegoria* was exclusively democratic and opened avenues for participation that were unobtainable in monarchies. Foucault simply states: “The very fact that the site of parrhesia is not the same as the site of appearance does not subtract its function as the praxis of truth” (2001: 84). The dynamics of parrhesia and *isegoria* in Athens brings them together in their common growth, the becoming of a model of governance where truth and equality coexist, the unfulfilled legacy in the later monarchies.

1.6. Examples of Parrhesia: Socratic and Cynic Styles

Parrhesia, the practice of straight, brave speech, was mainly the philosophical import of life (*techne tou biou*). It was instrumental in its development by bringing people to self-realization. In ancient Athens, Socrates as depicted in Plato’s dialogues was the type who practiced this. In *Apology*, he wandered the streets, fixing the Athenians with the truths of their lives, and calling them to love “wisdom, truth, and the perfection of their souls” more than material wealth (2001: 94). His questions were probing enough to lead citizens to meditative reflection, thereby marking the parrhesia role as a courageous adherence to the truth, even at the cost of the personal risk: “Socrates constantly confronts Athenians in the street and points out the truth to them” (2001: 94). In *Alcibiades Major*, Socrates took a parrhesiastic position with Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, who was a young man who wanted to rule Athens. In contrast to the others who flattered Alcibiades, Socrates, who was afraid of being hated by him, taught him that the beginning of real power is the capacity of caring for oneself: “Before Alcibiades can take care of Athens, he must first learn to take care of himself” (2001: 95). This link of parrhesia with the Socratic principle of *epimeleia heautou* (care of the self), in turn, made it foster the awareness of the self (2001: 95).

Power and knowledge have a dual character. In one way, discourses of knowledge support and cooperate with the political establishment characterized by kings. For example, Aristotle’s relationship with Philip II is clear evidence of harmonious and cordial relationship between power and knowledge discourses. Aristotle is on good terms with political power, and he is known and respected to be the private teacher of Alexander

the Great (Lord, 2013: pp. 1–2). In that sense, he is indeed in a stark contrast with the Cynical tradition which would be analysed later in the section. There is a dissident current in ancient Greek culture as well characterized in various figures within different spheres. Destroying cultural and political orthodoxy in Greek culture involves the engagement of parrhesia. Therefore, parrhesia becomes an important tool to analyse the way ancient Greek culture follows in its construction critical reflection against power mechanisms of certain discursive narratives.

For Foucault, subjectivity is not about knowing who one is and living accordingly, but rather about individuals expressing who they are through certain actions. Here, people construct themselves by choosing how to act. Through specific actions, individuals shape themselves and connect with truth. Historical examples of parrhesia are the clearest representations of Foucault's technologies of the self, as they show people becoming who they want to be by linking actions to truth. Foucault shows scholarly interest in how parrhesia developed in Western culture, analyzing cultural attitudes across political, philosophical, and literary spheres to define the concept. These examples are significant because they illustrate how parrhesia is understood and experienced, representing individual subjectivity through action forms independent of cultural orthodoxy. They relate to the study's critical analysis framework in two ways. First, historical subjectivity forms reveal what parrhesia means, clarifying Foucault's perspective on the care of the self. McGushin notes: "Foucault's analysis of parrhesia is inseparable from his broader project of understanding how individuals constitute themselves as subjects through practices of truth-telling. Parrhesia is a technique of the self, a way of shaping one's ethical existence in relation to others and to power" (2020: 112).

Second, parrhesia's existence only as something practiced connects to the novel under analysis. Historical examples of parrhesia highlight a form of freedom in the ancient world, while the absence of free speech examples in *1984*, and their cultural impossibility, reveals a language-based conflict between power and dissent in the novel. Flynn states: "Foucault's historical exploration of parrhesia reveals its role in fostering critical dialogue in ancient societies, yet its absence in modern authoritarian contexts underscores the fragility of free speech when power seeks to monopolize truth" (2005: 65). Thus, the examples in this section highlight the lack of free speech in the novel, including Winston's psychological struggle and inability to engage in free speech.

Ancient parrhesia examples represent a pre-capitalist world, while Orwell depicts the modern world. Ancient parrhesia shows free speech as individuals constructing themselves as subjects, an ethical relationship with individual freedom distinct from power structures. These examples underscore the absence of free speech in the novel. Modern totalitarian regimes, unlike antiquity, were stricter on free speech. The novel represents modern totalitarianism's ultraconservative stance on political identities, causing the absence of free speech. Courtine observes: "In Orwell's *1984*, the Party's control over language through Newspeak is a mechanism to eliminate the possibility of dissent. By restricting the linguistic tools for critical thought, the regime ensures that parrhesia, as a practice of free and truthful speech, becomes impossible" (1986: 70).

In short, Foucault's historical examples of parrhesia offer a new, individualistic ethical perspective on the relationship individuals form with themselves, others, and truth. The absence of parrhesia examples in *1984* underscores the dystopian element where people cannot develop relationships with themselves, others, or truth, nor construct themselves as subjects, particularly through parrhesia.

Foucault argues that there is a clash between philosophy and rhetoric in Greek thought. The conflict between the two activities is clear in parrhesia's relationship with rhetorical tradition, mostly represented by the Sophists. Rhetoric is a talent that enables a speaker to convince their audience regardless of the speaker's own ideas. In contrast, philosophy in the form of parrhesia usually puts the speaker's ideas over the audience's expectations (2001: 19–21). Philosophical models of parrhesia, especially that of Socratic parrhesia and the Cynics, represent truth-telling fearlessness as a response to power and convention, in opposition to the curtailment of truth-telling. In this regard, Foucault pays attention to them and gives interpretative analyses about certain examples of parrhesia as a practice of free speech (2001: 88–124).

Socrates stands out as someone who consistently embodies parrhesia—the courage to speak the truth. As Michel Foucault puts it, "Socrates is a parrhesiastes. And his role as a parrhesiastes is constantly to tell people the truth, to criticize them, to urge them to take care of their souls and to improve themselves" (2001: 97). This highlights Socrates' lifelong dedication to truth-telling through open and critical dialogue, which was central to his philosophical approach. Unlike other thinkers, Socrates left behind no written works; his philosophy lived through his spoken word. He placed strong emphasis

on speech, believing that speaking was a more powerful form of expression than writing (1997: 275). Naturally, this made parrhesia an essential part of his philosophical identity.

One clear example of Socratic parrhesia is his skeptical attitude toward prophecy. Socrates often engaged different members of society in candid conversations, each one a fragment of a broader search for truth. These exchanges, taken together, form a mosaic of his truth-telling efforts. A well-known episode involves Chaerephon, a close friend of Socrates, who asked the Oracle at Delphi a simple yet profound question—a common practice in ancient Greece: who was the wisest among the Greeks? The response, delivered not to Socrates but to his companion, claimed that no one was wiser than Socrates. While most might accept such a prophecy at face value or interpret it symbolically, Socrates chose a different path. He questioned it.

Rather than blindly accepting the Oracle's words, Socrates set out to investigate whether this claim was actually true. In doing so, he effectively turned his method of cross-examination inward, creating a unique form of self-parrhesia. To guide this inquiry, Socrates used the word *zetēsis*, meaning investigation. He also employed *elegkhein*, which refers to probing, objecting, and testing through dialogue. Foucault comments on this method by stating, "The elenchos is a form of truth-telling where Socrates, through questioning, brings his interlocutor to recognize the truth about himself. This is not just a method of refutation but a parrhesiastic practice, where the truth emerges through frank and risky speech" (2001: 104).

Socrates' approach was not about interpreting the prophecy to suit his beliefs. Instead, he actively challenged it, questioning people from all walks of life to test the claim. This marked a deeper form of parrhesia: one rooted in action, inquiry, and personal risk. To verify the Oracle's statement without relying on speculation, Socrates embarked on what he called a "plane"—a journey to discover whether the prophecy truly held up. His goal was not just to confirm or deny the prophecy, but to reshape the very concept of truth through speech and dialogue.

In *Apology*, Plato captures Socrates describing this journey himself:

"I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, and observed him—his name I need not mention; he was a politician whom I selected for examination—and the result was as follows: When I began to talk with him, I could not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and wiser still by himself... I

reflected that if I could only find a man wiser than myself, then I might go to the god with a refutation in my hand” (1997: 21b–c).

Foucault expands on this, noting, “In *Apology*, Socrates explains how he took the oracle’s statement that no one was wiser than he as a divine mission to test its truth. He went around questioning those reputed to be wise, only to find they were not, thus confirming the oracle through his own parrhesiastic inquiry” (2001: 88). In his quest to test the Oracle’s claim, Socrates initiated conversations with a variety of people in the city—starting with politicians, then moving on to poets and craftsmen. The politician, widely regarded by the public and by himself as wise, was Socrates’ first subject. However, as Socrates questioned him more deeply, it became apparent that the politician’s supposed wisdom was superficial. Not only was the public fooled by appearances, but the politician himself had come to believe in this illusion. Socrates’ interaction reveals that the image of the politician’s wisdom was constructed, not earned—a powerful example of how parrhesia exposes falsehoods masked as truth.

Plato captures a key moment in Socrates’ journey to test the Oracle’s claim when he writes: “I went to one who had the reputation of wisdom, and observed him... I could not help thinking that he was not really wise, although he was thought wise by many, and wiser still by himself” (1997: 21b–c). Socrates’ encounter with this so-called wise man reveals a pattern he would continue to observe: people often believe they possess knowledge when they do not. This same issue appears in his interaction with craftsmen. Although they are skilled in their trades, Socrates finds that they often overestimate their understanding in areas outside their expertise. Simply put, they believe they know more than they actually do. Socrates reflects on this by saying,

“Still I went to the artisans, for I was conscious that I knew nothing at all, as I may say, and I was sure that they knew many fine things; and in this I was not mistaken, for they did know many things of which I was ignorant, and in this they certainly were wiser than I was. But I observed that even the good artisans fell into the same error as the poets; because they were good workmen they thought that they also knew all sorts of high matters, and this defect in them overshadowed their wisdom” (1997: 22d–e).

Just as he did with politicians and craftsmen, Socrates also turned his attention to poets, hoping to learn from those considered inspired creators of great works. But again, he was disappointed. His conversations with poets revealed a surprising truth: they couldn’t explain the meaning behind their own poetry. Socrates describes this in detail:

“After the politicians, I went to the poets; tragic, dithyrambic, and all sorts. And there, I said to myself, you will be detected; now you will find out that you are more

ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took them some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the meaning of them—thinking that they would teach me something. Will you believe me? I am almost ashamed to confess the truth, but I must say that there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better about their poetry than they did themselves. Then I knew that not by wisdom do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners or soothsayers who also say many fine things, but do not understand the meaning of them” (1997: 22a–c).

This episode shows Socrates questioning the poets not to discredit them, but to genuinely understand if the Oracle’s claim could be true. His conversations reveal that the poets, like the politicians and craftsmen, lacked true wisdom. They were admired for their work, but they could not explain it—suggesting that their creativity came from inspiration, not knowledge. This led Socrates to conclude that his own awareness of ignorance actually made him wiser.

In *Fearless Speech*, Foucault analyses this process and how it reflects Socratic parrhesia—the fearless act of speaking the truth. Referring to these dialogues, Foucault writes:

“In the *Apology*, Socrates tells us how he tried to refute the oracle by finding someone wiser than himself. He went to politicians, poets and artisans. With the poets, he found that they could not explain their own creations, speaking fine words without understanding them, which showed their lack of true wisdom. This parrhesiastic activity of Socrates—questioning to reveal ignorance—is what makes him the wisest, as he alone acknowledges his own lack of knowledge” (2001: 88–89).

This supports the view that Socrates’ engagements with the cultural elites—those assumed to be the wisest—were not acts of arrogance, but parrhesiastic efforts to uncover the truth. Through these conversations, he exposes the limits of their understanding and reinforces the Oracle’s paradoxical message: that he is the wisest because he admits he does not know.

Ultimately, Socrates concludes that the real problem is not simply ignorance, but ignorance of ignorance. The politician holds power and the craftsmen have technical skill, but both are deceived by the illusion that they know more than they actually do. Socrates, on the other hand, is different. He does not lie to himself. His examinations reveal that others are not even interested in genuinely knowing themselves—they act based on ego and self-interest. Through his method of questioning, Socrates reveals that many people live in self-deception. He, however, does not. This is what makes him the wisest, as he explains in *Apology*:

“When I had finished with them, I reflected that I was not really wise, as they were not, but that I was better off than they were, because I did not think that I knew what I did not know... So I went on, and made enemies, and I said to myself, ‘This is the meaning of the oracle: that I am the wisest, because I alone know that I know nothing’” (1997: 22-23).

Foucault echoes this conclusion, explaining, “Socrates’ wisdom consists in this: he knows that he does not know, and he makes others see their ignorance through his questioning. This is the parrhesiastic game, where truth-telling exposes the lack of truth in others’ claims to knowledge” (2001: 100). Plato’s *Laches* centers around a philosophical investigation into the meaning of courage (*andreia*) through dialogue between Socrates, Laches, and Nicias. Socrates applies his method of elenchus—a form of cross-examination—to challenge conventional beliefs about bravery and lead his interlocutors toward deeper understanding. This method of fearless, rational interrogation closely aligns with Foucault’s concept of parrhesia, defined as frank and courageous speech aimed at truth, even at personal risk (2001: 19–20). In this context, Socrates’ dialectical engagement with Laches and Nicias exemplifies parrhesia as he critiques their vague or conventional views on bravery. For instance, Plato questions Laches’ view that bravery is merely standing firm in battle (1992: 190), and refutes Nicias’ more abstract claim that courage is knowledge of fear and hope (194–195). Instead, Plato holds that Socrates proposes a more ethical and intellectual understanding of courage—as the knowledge of what is truly good and evil (1992: 199). This redefinition reflects his broader mission to foster ethical self-awareness and virtuous living through reasoned inquiry, even at the cost of social discomfort or danger, which Foucault recognizes as the essence of parrhesia (1972: 19).

Socrates’ role as a parrhesiastes becomes even more pronounced during his trial and defense, as recorded in Plato’s *Apology*. Socrates’ unyielding commitment to truth, despite public hostility and the threat of execution, epitomizes the moral duty at the heart of parrhesia. He is charged with impiety and corrupting the youth (1997: 24), but these accusations mask deeper anxieties about his subversive influence on Athenian norms. His method of questioning traditional beliefs, his association with controversial figures like Critias and Alcibiades (2002: 263–265), and his claim to be guided by a divine daimon (1997: 20–21; 2001: 12–15) all point to a philosophical life lived in opposition to political and religious orthodoxy. In *the Euthyphro*, Socrates interrogates the concept of piety outside the courthouse, foreshadowing the truth-telling posture he adopts at his trial (1997: 2; 2004: 95–97). Ultimately, his death becomes a powerful illustration of parrhesia

as Socrates chooses truth over self-preservation—demonstrating that philosophical speech, when practiced authentically, risks not just social alienation but life itself (2011: 158–160; 2008: 384–386).

Foucault identifies this Socratic model as philosophical parrhesia, distinguished by its ethical orientation and its commitment to personal transformation through rational dialogue. However, in the post-Socratic Hellenistic period, a new form emerges: ethical parrhesia, which splits into two main traditions—moderate and radical. The moderate form, seen in figures like Seneca advising Nero, involves counsellors who speak truth to rulers for the good of the state, even at personal risk (1983: 51–54). But the radical version finds its fullest expression in the Cynics, especially in the figure of Diogenes of Sinope.

According to Foucault, Cynic parrhesia represents the most extreme and provocative form of truth-telling. Diogenes, unlike Socrates who relied on elenchus, embraces *autarkeia*—radical self-sufficiency—and lives according to nature, rejecting all social conventions, hierarchies, and ideological constructs (2001: 117–120). Foucault famously describes Diogenes’ life as one of “changing the value of the currency” (2001: 122), meaning that Diogenes challenges and subverts societal values such as wealth, honour, and political power, favouring instead simplicity, freedom, and virtue. For Diogenes, living in accordance with nature is the precondition of happiness, and this way of life necessitates a kind of parrhesia that not only speaks truth but embodies it. His actions—such as trampling on luxurious carpets or living in a barrel—were meant to expose the illusions of societal status and false happiness.

The encounter between Diogenes and Alexander the Great captures the essence of Cynic parrhesia. When Alexander, the most powerful man in the known world, offers Diogenes anything he desires, Diogenes replies, “Stand out of my sun” (2001: 124). This fearless remark to a supreme authority figure—without seeking benefit or fearing consequences—illustrates what Foucault considers “parrhesia in its purest form.” It is not just verbal defiance but a mode of life that consistently resists domination. The incident reverses the expected power dynamic, rendering the philosopher more powerful in moral terms than the emperor himself. Foucault emphasizes that for speech to count as parrhesia, it must involve risk, truth, criticism, and a sense of duty—and Diogenes meets all these criteria.

Cynic parrhesia challenges not only political structures but also the cultural codes that shape daily life. By rejecting property, clothing, social etiquette, and conventional religion, Cynics perform a lived critique of ideology. Their version of parrhesia is not just speech, but an entire ethical stance in which the body, lifestyle, and words all express a single commitment to truth. As Desmond notes, this radical freedom connects virtue and happiness through truthful speech (2008: 23–25). For Diogenes, the beauty of parrhesia lies in its capacity to align one's self with nature and resist all forms of hypocrisy and artificiality (2018: 69). Thus, Cynic parrhesia becomes both a personal ethical practice and a form of public resistance.

In conclusion, both Socrates and the Cynics embody different expressions of parrhesia—the former through rational dialectic and moral duty, the latter through radical truth-telling and countercultural living. While Socrates speaks truth within the constraints of democratic Athens and pays with his life, Diogenes lives truth by mocking and escaping those very constraints. Foucault sees in both models a philosophical courage that is indispensable for ethical life: a fearless alignment of speech, thought, and action that seeks to awaken others and challenge the status quo.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL CRACKDOWN OVER LANGUAGE TO REPRESS

PARRHESIA

2.1. Introductory Overview to *1984*

The semantic relationship between dystopia and politics in the novel stems from the actualization of totalitarian ideology in everyday life, both at individual and societal scales. More precisely, in *1984*, the convergence of totalitarian ideology with reality is incorporated into the thematic structure through the governance of Oceania by a totalitarian one-party system. Throughout the novel, “The Party,” also known as INGSOC, produces and reproduces the totalitarian thematic axis (2021: 7–8). Certainly, *1984* is a novel that lends itself to various types of analysis, most of them overtly or implicitly political. However, among these, linguistic representations of the interplay between periphery and centre in politics form one of the strongest thematic axes of the novel—perhaps even the dominant one. The hegemonic language of The Party centres on the dissolution of the individual selfhood. The Party strategically severs the connection between language and self, ensuring that the people of Oceania cannot use language to construct their sense of self. Without free expression, individuals cannot articulate or explore their own thoughts—questions such as Who am I? What is the ideal way to live? What is the true nature of The Party’s rule? or How should the world function? remain unspoken and unexamined (2001: 299–312).

Totalitarianism, as the concept that materializes the interaction of politics-dystopia in the novel, articulates the totalitarian thematic axis through linguistic representations assigned to The Party. The most powerful intertwining of politics and dystopia emerges within the politicization of language to serve The Party’s interests. This linguistic manipulation constructs a hegemonic language of power, which manifests through Newspeak, the rewriting of the past, and doublethink. As an Orwellian expression

of the fusion of dystopia and politics, the establishment of hegemonic language simultaneously produces a new totalitarian sociology, leading to the loss of individual selfhood. This totalitarian sociology forms the backdrop of the conflict between The Party's hegemonic language and Winston's individual speech. In other words, the construction of hegemonic language expresses the essence of dystopia and politics in *1984* in a literary format, forming the novel's core thematic framework (2001: 214).

Viewing *1984* as a cautionary tale is a common interpretation. However, this study argues that interpreting the novel merely as a warning for future generations is a limited perspective. Unlike the classical interpretation, which views the novel as a democratic world's warning against totalitarianism, this study reframes *1984* as an allegory of parrhesia. In short, it contends that the novel represents a textual dystopia, within which the totalitarian thematic axis functions as an allegory of parrhesia, primarily reflected in Winston's moments of free speech and silence against The Party (2001: 19–20).

As established earlier, the concept of language serves as the key factor enabling the fusion of politics and dystopia within *1984*'s narrative. This conceptual and dual intertwining generates the relationship between totalitarian ideology and the human mind, both individually and socially. Within the novel, language stands as perhaps the only political element representing the division between centre and periphery, a divide inherent in all power structures. The Party represents the centre, while Winston represents the periphery. Totalitarian power operates by eliminating individual freedom through linguistic control, ensuring that speech remains confined to The Party's dictates. Thus, The Party, as the central power, suppresses Winston—the voice of the periphery. The novel's thematic axis cycles between hegemonic language and individual speech, reinforcing the inescapable dominance of hegemonic language, even beyond the novel's ending (2001: 251–252).

Indeed, the linguistic representations of The Party's hegemonic language in *1984* are intrinsically linked to parrhesia, making their connection a primary research focus of this section. Within the linguistic representation of power, The Party represents the speaker (the centre), while Winston represents the listener (the periphery). The hegemonic language of The Party systematically eliminates free speech, ensuring that linguistic subjugation becomes the most crucial element of the totalitarian thematic axis. The psychosocial implications of linguistic politicization cause the negation of the individual

self, transforming people into mere apparatuses of The Party. The ultimate consequence of this self-negation is that individuals become unable to think for themselves, as they have entirely denied their mental autonomy (2001: 283–285).

This illustrates the elimination of collective will through language. Winston desires freedom and seeks autonomy over his choices. To assert his freedom, Winston uses language as a means to construct his political identity through speech. From the moment Winston pens his first journal entry to his interrogation by O'Brien, the power struggle between Winston and The Party is primarily articulated through linguistic representations of political authority and resistance, rather than physical force. Winston attempts to reclaim and reconstruct his lost selfhood through free expression, while The Party reproduces its hegemonic power by restricting Winston's speech (2001: 7–8).

The Party progressively intensifies pressure on Winston, culminating in the ultimate form of oppression: a death threat. When faced with imminent death, Winston ceases his attempt to rebuild his selfhood through writing and fully accepts the Party's hegemonic, forgetting even the fragmented memories of his lost self. The ultimate goal of totalitarian power is the assimilation of the self, ensuring individuals conform to The Party's ideological constructs. This assimilation is achieved through the politicization of language (2001: 283–285).

The totalitarian thematic axis, by instrumentalizing language, creates a rupture between the individual and the self, leading individuals to abandon the desire for freedom and lose their capacity for independent will. Undoubtedly, people sacrifice their freedom and autonomy in favour of social conformity under totalitarian rule. The dissolution of selfhood is realized through the obligation to speak The Party's language—or remain silent. In this regard, the novel serves as a reversed form of parrhesia (Orwell: 2001: 19–20).

2.2. Doublethink's Role in the Repression of Free Speech

The ultimate form of power is not merely the ability to command obedience but the capacity to shape reality itself. In Orwell's *1984*, this epistemological control is the Party's primary objective, achieved through the systematic deconstruction of the individual mind. The construction of power in Oceania occurs less through direct physical violence—though that is ever-present as a final resort—and more through indirect psychological manipulation. As scholar Jean Bethke Elshtain compares Albert Camus'

The Fall and *1984*, she argues that *The Fall* centres on physical violence, while *1984* rationalizes power as a systemic organization of secretive and comprehensive elements. In contrast to *The Fall*, *1984* features an invisible application of power through control generated by consent rather than mere coercion, representing a more intricate and superior form of power (1985: 112).

This study examines the suppression of freedom of expression and the Party's control over language, focusing on the concept of "doublethink." Doublethink is the fundamental ideological principle of totalitarianism's linguistic ideology in the novel. It is the mental faculty that allows the citizens of Oceania to navigate the constant contradictions of Party rule. As such, the Party's practices to suppress freedom of expression are constructed and implemented based on the successful inculcation of doublethink. As Orwell's great biographer Bernard Crick notes, the Party's power is not just in what it does, but in what it makes its citizens do to themselves: "The Party was not trying to stamp out heresy, it was trying to stamp out the possibility of heresy. The greater the contradiction, the more potent the exercise of power and the submission in accepting it" (1980: 245).

While the Party employs other linguistic practices, such as Newspeak, the ideological background that determines their outcomes is rationalized through doublethink. Newspeak is the engineered language intended to make doublethink the only possible mode of thought, but doublethink is the underlying mental process that allows the system to function. Given the encompassing nature of doublethink in the Party's linguistic power, analysing this concept first before focusing on other elements is a logical approach. Oceania is portrayed as a single-identity society where the state dictates identity politics, prohibiting any social differentiation. There is no pluralism in social life or privacy in individual life. Forcibly seizing people's freedoms is impossible, as there will always be resisters or those who unwillingly comply. The Party maintains control over the country through a single identity construct due to its political monopoly on reality. Language, specifically the cluster of concepts around Newspeak and doublethink, is the most crucial tool enabling and sustaining this monopoly (2001: 214).

Doublethink is the most significant psychological manifestation of the Party's totalitarian ideology. It serves as an overarching concept that shapes other elements like

Newspeak, the alteration of the past, political oxymorons, and “thoughtcrime.” In the novel’s appendix, Orwell defines it with a chilling precision:

“Doublethink means the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them... To tell deliberate lies while genuinely believing in them, to forget any fact that has become inconvenient, and then, when it becomes necessary again, to draw it back from oblivion for just so long as it is needed” (2001: 214).

The Party aims to establish its power by embedding this process in speech, thought, and minds, using all decisions and practices to irrevocably solidify doublethink in society. This process involves more than just simple hypocrisy or denial; it is a form of “controlled insanity.” Instead of recognizing contradictions and developing critical thought, individuals are trained to create a conciliatory interpretation between conflicting situations, ignoring the problems that contradictions highlight, thus fostering an imaginary harmony. For example, the Ministry of Peace (Minipax) wages perpetual war, the Ministry of Plenty (Miniplenty) oversees starvation, and the Ministry of Love (Miniluv) is the center of torture. In Oceania, citizens do not critically address these contradictions; they accept them as reality through the discipline of doublethink (2001: 4).

This mental discipline is crucial to constantly changing the past. The rewriting of history at the Ministry of Truth is only possible because the workers, including Winston, can practice doublethink. Winston, as a rewriter of the past, must remember the original fact to “correct” it, then immediately forget that he made the correction, and accept the new fact as the only truth that has ever existed. This daily act of self-deception erodes any stable sense of history or objective reality, making citizens completely dependent on the Party for their understanding of the past. The very act of his job requires him to be a master of the technique that is simultaneously destroying him (2001: 44–46).

To construct and maintain the political status quo, the Party develops conciliatory interpretations of contradictions on various issues, overlooking social problems. The unchanging reality of political life in Oceania is the Party’s transformation into an organization that contradicts its own principles and past, with a politically unconscious society remaining passive. Doublethink aims to control reality and establish a political monopoly over it. As Margaret Atwood writes in her essay “George Orwell and the Politics of Truth,” “it is not a question of believing that the Party is right. It is a question of believing that the Party can make right, that it can decree what rightness is” (2003:

318). This political monopoly over thought enables public passivity and integration into the system, leading to an isolation between language and political reality. Political monopoly on thought enables public passivity and integration into the system. The Party's political monopoly generates political fiction through doublethink, leading to an isolation between language and political reality. Language is the area where the role of doublethink in transforming political consciousness is most evident on social and individual scales.

Regulating consciousness and reality through language is significant. By regulating reality through doublethink, alternative perspectives that would enable free speech are excluded from political life. One of the most notable examples of doublethink is a conversation between O'Brien and Winston, where O'Brien questions Winston's self-perception and leads him to accept two contradictory states of his individual identity as true. This is perfectly illustrated in the central interrogation scene where O'Brien holds up four fingers and demands that Winston see five. When Winston insists he sees only four, O'Brien tortures him, not for lying, but for failing to perform the necessary act of mental submission. O'Brien explains, "Sometimes, Winston. Sometimes they are five. Sometimes they are three. Sometimes it is all at once. You must try harder. It is not easy to become sane" (2001: 251).

This conversation takes place during a torturous interrogation, termed "rehabilitation," by the Party. In this scene, O'Brien aims to make Winston abandon his beliefs, doubt his values, and lose his commitment to them. Doublethink is one of the most effective linguistic methods O'Brien uses to transform Winston's consciousness and reintegrate him into society. Winston asks O'Brien whether Big Brother truly exists. O'Brien confirms Big Brother and the Party are alive. When Winston asks if Big Brother exists physically like him, O'Brien shifts the topic to Winston's identity, claiming that Winston does not exist. O'Brien implied Winston is officially dead. He asserts that Winston's individual identity is a lie and that he lacks true knowledge about his own identity. This is the ultimate expression of the Party's power: not merely to kill a man, but to erase his very being from reality. By redefining Winston's individual identity as both existent and non-existent, O'Brien creates the perception in Winston's mind that his individual identity is not real, thereby controlling Winston's will. As scholar Erika M. Gottlieb points out, "The Party's power is demonstrated most profoundly not in its ability to enforce a lie, but in its ability to destroy the individual's capacity to recognize truth altogether, making them a willing accomplice in their own psychic dissolution" (1992:

78). As a result, Winston knows he physically exists, but he is uncertain whether the identity of “Winston” truly exists (2001: 251–252).

The party’s political oxymorons are another implication of doublespeak. The party makes propaganda nationwide with oxymoronic expressions such as war is peace, ignorance is strength and freedom is slavery. These statements serve to construct political power within the consciousness of people, via language. These statements have contradictory statements. People can believe them because it reinforces the state-approved version of reality. If it is not in accordance with the party’s political narrative, therefore, it becomes meaningless and evil in the process. Doublethink practices like this are performed through language. As such, it results in the increasing and constant influence over people’s relationship with the world. Most importantly, people are no longer capable of making and thinking of free speech because doublethink gives a false sense of harmony and feeling of conformity to the people to force them to engage with political orthodoxy.

2.3. Newspeak and its Function in Suppression of Free Speech

Newspeak is the constructed language of the Party, Ingsoc. It derives from standard English called Oldspeak in an exclusionary manner and replaces it through the ideological commitment of the Party for eliminating the risk of free speech in the form of political dissidence. It becomes the official language, and the former language becomes old-fashioned and partially illegal. The Party mandates Newspeak for its members while planning for the entire society to transition to this language in the future. Newspeak is a censorship tool that restricts human thought, enforces ideological conformity, and prevents truth-telling in the parrhesia format. This section analyses Newspeak’s meaning by pointing out Syme’s views on Newspeak and the Newspeak term ‘duckspeak’.

Newspeak enables doublethink in language. Doublethink is the alteration of a thought or statement’s truth based on current conditions. In other words, doublethink allows power to interpret a thought as it wishes and speak accordingly, accepting contradictory realities as truth simultaneously without allowing alternative thoughts. Newspeak, the language of power, reflects its ideology and conceals opposing elements, forming a meaning spiral with doublethink. Newspeak reshapes language to align with the ruling power’s worldview, silencing or marginalizing all else. This language policy prevents the internalization of power by individual and collective consciousness, hinders

a parrhesia-based opposition culture, and blocks society from checking power or creating balance mechanisms. The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis posits that language shapes human consciousness through grammar and vocabulary (2024: 209).

The Sapir-Whorf theory applies to the novel. The Party does not want people to know the past, as it could lead to discussing forbidden topics. If people learn history, they may realize the Party's self-centered narrative is false, recognize a different historical truth, and develop alternative oral resistance. To control people, the Party must control historical knowledge. Since thought depends on language, the state thinks in Newspeak, which the Party constantly revises to suit its interests. The Party's ultimate goal is to erase the concept of the past—events and people—from collective memory. Newspeak disrupts cultural temporal continuity, aiding the Party's societal acceptance. Thus, per the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, Newspeak shapes thought, synchronizing political narrative and social consciousness. This enables power to mentally deflect historical verbal attacks and practically adapt the masses to hypocritical conformism in daily life.

Doublethink controls the meaning of language. Newspeak shapes the structure of language to conform to the controlled reality model constructed by doublethink. This shaping aims to facilitate doublethink by reducing the number of words, narrowing the meanings of words, constructing short and simple sentences, and completely eliminating old words. Its main function is to prevent the formation of thoughts that are against the Party by manipulating the very tools of thought itself. This project is rooted in the principle of linguistic relativity, the idea that the structure of a language affects its speakers' worldview or cognition. As literary critic Bernard Crick notes, "The primary aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought to render 'thoughtcrime' (any unorthodox thought) literally impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it" (1980: 245). By eliminating words which have the potential to make people contradict the political narrative of the party, the government reduces people's power of thought and puts citizens in a state where they cannot even consider using their freedom of expression.

The main features of Newspeak can be listed as follows:

- Removal of abstract words
- Removal of antonyms and synonyms
- Censorship of ideologically risky words
- Decrease of vocabulary

Narrowing down of a word to a single meaning
 Compound words using syllabic abbreviations for political terms
 Rhetorical usages like euphemisms
 The use of a word as different parts of speech (2001: 299–312).

These features function to achieve the Party's goal in the control of free speech and political subversion. Human freedom is destroyed by rendering human consciousness dependent on the Party. This is caused by Newspeak's suppression of the language-thought relationship, which prevents the synchronization of individual and collective consciousness with the truth of society's historical past and the expression of individual freedom through language. The primary goal is to destroy words. Synonyms and antonyms are systematically eliminated. As Orwell explains in the Appendix of *1984*: "Why should one use words like 'excellent' and 'splendid' when 'good,' 'plusgood,' and 'doubleplusgood' cover the whole range of meaning? More importantly, why use a word like 'bad,' with all its moral and emotional implications, when 'ungood' will do?" (2001: 301). This linguistic flattening strips away nuance and complexity from human thought, aligning with the Party's goal of suppressing dissent through Newspeak.

The purposes of these qualities can be summarized as follows: a) to desensitize people and make them apolitical, b) to increase obedience to Party ideology and practices, c) to create social unity and bring about a disciplined and hardworking population, and d) for the Party to determine the limits and content of reality in the fastest and easiest way. Items a, b, and d overlap with each other. Item c has a socioeconomic character. Newspeak is based on the principle of suppressing freedom of thought, which is an indispensable element of free speech.

The purpose of Newspeak's existence has been defined and discussed in the novel. The Party seeks to prevent Newspeak from allowing truth to be spoken against those in power. The controlled reality constructed by doublethink is represented through a controlled language via Newspeak. In the novel, there is a linguist named Syme, who is Winston's friend and a Party official. Syme is a naive individual who believes the Party has convictions and principles. Like Winston, he works at the Ministry of Truth. As a lexicographer, Syme focuses on Newspeak and is an expert in this language. He is responsible for compiling the eleventh edition of the Newspeak dictionary. Syme takes great pleasure in eliminating words, much like the Party eliminates people whenever it desires. He is sincerely devoted to the Party and believes that through language, the Party will create a new type of human being. For Syme, Newspeak signifies social harmony

and absolute domination of political power. Perfecting the language will lead to the advancement of the human mind, the progress of humanity, and the development of civilization. Perfect state and social harmony, collective coherence, will be achieved through Newspeak. Syme is aware of all this and is delighted by it.

Syme continually works to make Newspeak more effective (2001: 51). He frequently converses with Winston in the Ministry building's canteen (2001: 51–53). During these conversations, he shares his knowledge and views on Newspeak (2001: 51–53). Syme explains the ideological significance of Newspeak as follows:

“Don’t you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it. Every concept that can ever be needed will be expressed by exactly one word, with its meaning rigidly defined and all its subsidiary meanings rubbed out and forgotten” (2001: 52–53).

Narrowing thought by Newspeak means the disappearance of truth. The relationship between truth and meaning has become ambiguous. The connection between language and objective reality has weakened because linguistic reality, due to politicization, has rendered communication between language and thought impossible. Syme is killed for sharing state secrets without the Party’s permission. Syme’s death ironically exemplifies the Party’s suppression of free speech and its use of language to create a disconnection between language and thought, thereby eliminating people’s desire to speak truth against power (2001: 147).

Syme discusses Newspeak’s role in eliminating political opposition through the repression of free speech in another speech he made with Winston in their canteen chats: Syme says: “By 2050—sooner, probably—all real knowledge of Oldspeak will have disappeared. All past literature will have been destroyed... The whole climate of thought will be different. In fact there will be no thought, as we understand it now. Orthodoxy means not thinking—not needing to think. Orthodoxy is unconsciousness” (2001: 53). This statement underscores Newspeak’s purpose of eliminating the linguistic tools necessary for independent thought, ensuring the Party’s ideological control. As Alex Zwerdling argues, the Party’s use of Newspeak aims to “substitute its own version of reality for an objective one, and language is the chief instrument of this substitution” (1971: 88).

Syme is sure that with Newspeak, language will lose its function of representing objective reality. People will accept constantly changing truths as real and will never learn the true reality. Newspeak is destroying the essence of language. This is undoubtedly the linguistic application of the Party's erasure of historical information and individuals' personal knowledge, representing a far more systematic and effective control mechanism (2001: 304–305). According to Syme, the revolution will be complete when the language is “perfected” (2001: 305). Newspeak is the Party, and the Party is Newspeak (2001: 305). In the year 2050, no one will understand the conversation between Winston and O'Brien because there will be no language other than Newspeak (2001: 305). As Alex Zwerdling argues in *Orwell and the Left*, “The ultimate victory of the Party depends on its ability to substitute its own version of reality for an objective one, and language is the chief instrument of this substitution” (1971: 88). This transforms language from a tool of communication into a tool of ontological control—the power to define what can and cannot exist (1971: 88). Newspeak reduces human perception to a primitive, simplistic form. Human consciousness, lost in collective orthodoxy, cannot connect with reality through the interaction of language and thought. O'Brien argues that true power in Oceania will come through Newspeak, and the revolution's ideological goal will be achieved with Newspeak.

Syme says the revolution will be complete only when the language is perfected and thus makes an ontological connection between the Party and Newspeak, arguing that there is an essential relationship between the two (2001: 53). This connection highlights Newspeak's being as the Party's means of reconstructing reality itself, as Syme imagines a world where language actually creates reality. Out of this connection, Syme highlights the cessation of projective individual construction through language, proposing that Newspeak vacates personal identity by the thought limitation (2001: 53). Syme assigned an ultimate purpose to language, seeing it as a way to achieve the Party's ideological goals (2001: 53). Syme posits that the realization of the world order which the Party longs for, where the Party's power in all respects gets the better of the objective reality and individual freedom, will come to be in the language and that Newspeak must stand for the new kind of human being which the Party desires, a being that is autonomous and unable to oppose (2001: 53). This is analogous to Foucault's idea of linguistic control, where “power is exercised through discourse, shaping what can be thought or said” (1975: 194). Through perfecting the language of Newspeak, the Party not only ensures that all

thoughtcrime is impossible but also their grip of reality and consciousness is totally solidified.

The novel is set in a time when Newspeak is officially the state's only language. The Party uses Newspeak, but the entire society is not comprehensively influenced by it. As a result, Newspeak's hegemony is the linguistic power of the totalitarian state and acts as a barrier to public expression. With the increase in numbers of people who speak Newspeak, the Party would be even more potent because, in actuality, Newspeak is a language of the Party. Consequently, the Party, being the one that wants to grow both its linguistic power and its realty monopoly, collaborates vigorously to the development of Newspeak. In the book, Newspeak's dictionary has seen its tenth edition. Classical playwrights such as Shakespeare and Milton have been translated in a new language and updated by being censored in a way that the Party approves. Soon other writers like Dickens, Swift and Byron will also be translated. The shift of language signifies the revolution's completion. The only group that will understand the old language is the proles, the lower class. To the Party, they reckon not even as humans. Newspeak and the Party's invasion of people's thoughts have established a peaceful coexistence with recording devices like the telescreen and violent groups such as the Thought Police who physically surveil society. The government, through organized surveillance, has reshaped society into a book. It perceives the society as a text, has outlined its individuals as the text's markup, and has meticulously read them. Where and when it has found necessary, it has amended, judged, inspected, or eliminated them. This matches with the concept of Foucault's Panopticon which is a form of discipline power where people are always under surveillance that they cannot be sure of, leading them to control their own behaviour. Foucault contended that, "He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection" (1975: 202–203). In Oceania, Newspeak becomes an internal Panopticon of the mind, thus, the person has to be an active participant in the thought-policing.

One of the most striking examples of Newspeak functioning as an internal Panopticon is the Newspeak word duckspeak. Duckspeak is a term that is uttered in the year of 1984 during the conversation between Winston Smith and Syme, a philologist working on the Newspeak dictionary. Syme refers to duckspeak as the type of speech that

is “uttered without thinking, almost automatically” akin to “the quacking of a duck” (2001: 54). The term is a result of the Newspeak language’s tendency to form compound words with simple meanings (e.g., “Ingsoc” for English Socialism) and it mirrors the Party’s goal to reduce language to a mechanical and mindless process. Duckspeak can be either positive or negative within the Party’s worldview:

Positive Connotation: It is used as the term instead of a loyal Party member’s distributed chi-wei (duckspeak). In this case, duckspeak refers to a speech that inherently expresses the Party ideology without the speaker’s conscious input, thus being the embodiment of cleanliness of thought. For example, a person mentioning Party slogans without a single doubt is highly praised for being a “duckspeaker” (2001: 54).

Negative Connotation: Conversely, when applying duckspeak to an enemy, the term becomes an instrument of mockery for the kind of speech that lacks originality and, hence, is devoid of real intellectual content (2001: 54).

The positive use of duckspeak is the Party’s ideal of it, as it symbolizes the absolute internalization of doublethink, namely, the person having contradictory thoughts possible to be without questioning them (2001: 35). Duckspeak, which is the means for expressing thoughts that are not filtered through critical reflection, is a tool for the Party to make sure no one can depart from Party orthodoxy. This, in turn, leads to total control over both language and mind.

Duckspeak can be discussed in four different ways within scope of its incorporation into Newspeak, in which it limits thought and prevents free speech. The dimensions of duckspeak are facilitation of automatic speech, reinforcement of doublethink, the Suppression of Parrhesia, and mechanization of communication. Duckspeak is remarkable for these characteristics, as it illustrates the profound impact of Newspeak on society and how it functions.

Newspeak, the official language of Oceania in Orwell’s novel, shrinks the vocabulary of language to a minimal number of words with fixed meanings, so it eliminates the subtleties of expression that come from having synonyms, antonyms, and abstract terms (2001: 300–301). The simplification of language is the basis of duckspeak by ensuring that the speech of individuals has a small cognitive effort. According to Syme, the desired result of this language is that for every idea the person has to use merely one word to express it, this word to be deprived of its subsidiary meanings and to be fixed

in one sense only (2001: 53). This linguistic limitation makes it for Party members to say duckspeak—quick, unthinking speech that follows the Party’s course without the critical faculties being engaged.

Duckspeak promotes doublethink besides that it allows the speakers to say the Party’s contradictory slogans (e.g., “War is Peace”) without any delay or reflection (2001: 4, 54). The lack of words and grammar in Newspeak means it is easier for the people to accept and promote these contradictions, as there are no means of language that question them. For instance, changing the term “bad” into “ungood” does not leave any place for the moral aspect of speech, thus, making it in line with the doublethink’s order of hiding the judgment (2001: 301). Thus, duckspeak stands at the end of the Newspeak design being so automatic that it doesn’t require thought at all, hence, only the Party doctrine is followed.

In the light of Foucault’s concept of parrhesia as courageous telling of the truth at the cost of risking life and limb, duckspeak and Newspeak will operate together to eliminate free, critical speech in people. Parrhesia demands such attributes as straightforwardness, truth, and duty (2001: 19–20), which are all absent so far in the language barren of words and duckspeak, where speech is pure mimicry of the Mandated regime. According to Orwell in his book “Newspeak” is a language tool that prevents the formation of thoughts which are not in line with the Party thus making duckspeak a mechanism to enforce this (2001: 305). As for instance, Syme with his enjoyment of the creation of Newspeak “social harmony and the absolute dominance of political power” which he sees as producing duckspeak erred and his evaporation was due to it when he was a threat (2001: 147).

The compounding of words and the use of euphemisms (e.g., “joycamp” for forced labor camp) in Newspeak results in communication being simplified to the point of ideological slogans, masterfully suitable for duckspeak (2001: 302). Newspeak is the linguistic representation of society. Society becomes a “text” controlled by the Party, and duckspeak facilitates the mechanization of society with reducing speech to automatic responses. This characterization conforms to duckspeak’s desire to minimize speech to mere machines (2001: 305). In the view of Jean-Jacques Courtine, the main achievement of Newspeak is the creation of a language in which dissent is impossible, a feat that makes duckspeak a weapon of “ontological control” (1986: 70). This conditioning has the effect

of making people, or even Winston in Room 101, produce the desired speech without conscious thought (2001: 251–252).

Duckspeak is the fulfillment of Newspeak's mission, which is to completely get rid of independent thought. By making speech a mechanized act of quacking, the duckspeaker cannot catch this, as he lacks both the instruments of language and the cognitive personal autonomy to question the Party. This goes hand in hand with Alex Zwerdling's statement that the Party's victory depends on "substitut[ing] its own version of reality for an objective one, and language is the chief instrument of this substitution" (1971: 88). The paradox of duckspeak is illustrated in the example of Syme: though his loyalty and his duckspeak-like enthusiasm for Newspeak are beyond doubt, his intelligence leads to his vaporization. This shows the Party's hatred of any deviation, even from the most devoted of its supporters (2001: 147).

The human being is the building block of the social body. All powers, whether modern or traditional, have been concerned with how people should be governed, and in this process, the subject of what characteristics ideal governance should possess is composed of various views and principles. Undoubtedly, all governments have a set of common goals, and these are to create a sense of spiritual and material unity to prevent the disintegration of society, thereby distinguishing themselves from foreign cultures, and to establish an environment of stability and harmony within the country by ensuring people remain within legal and moral boundaries. The first situation relates to foreign affairs, the second to internal affairs. Language has undoubtedly attracted the interest of all powers in establishing control in internal affairs. Since all governments that have emerged throughout history have needed an object on which to exercise their power, the issue of how to govern people has been of great importance. No power chooses to eliminate a society under its rule by destroying it. This would undoubtedly bring about the end of government too.

Although the Party controls people from the outside with telescreens, what makes people governable and makes the Party's power accepted in the social order is their establishment of internal control over themselves through the limitation and simplification of language. What Winston's frequent recollection of the inevitability of defeat while writing his diary—his constant remembrance that his physical existence and these writings will disappear and be forgotten whenever the party wishes—points to is

that the ultimate goal of the Party, as O'Brien explains to Winston, is not just to make people obey but to make them want to obey. For people to maintain the social order of their own free will would be possible through the linguistic control of the perception of reality via Newspeak. Internal surveillance through Newspeak is ultimately more effective for the Party because it achieves total and self-perpetuating power. External surveillance can be resisted, requires immense resources, and only controls the body. Internal surveillance controls the mind, eliminates the very possibility of resistance, and turns the citizen into a willing participant in their own subjugation. The Party's final victory is not when Winston is physically broken, but when his mind is conquered, and he can no longer think freely.

To exist, power needs the psychological support of the people it governs. The same situation applies in the novel. Newspeak is the most important concept the party uses to hold society together and make its own rule unquestionable. For people to act as the government wants, to ensure social unity, and for people to fulfil their social duties and roles in accordance with the law, it is necessary for the government to establish legitimacy. The kinds of legitimacy that governments in different traditional, modern, or Eastern, Western cultures have developed is a very broad topic and falls outside the scope of this thesis, but to say that the political system in the novel builds its legitimacy through Newspeak is an important component of this thesis's main subject. The political power in the novel has the strength to kill the entire population of Oceania without difficulty, and should it wish to do so, there is no deterrent force to prevent it. The political power knows that it will have meaning in the form of the exercise of power, and instead of dragging itself into an ontological chaos by destroying the entire society, the party has created a model of reality that will make people governable, ensuring that people behave as desired in social life and obey the party. What created this culture of obedience was the party's changing of the language through Newspeak. Newspeak radically terminated society's connection with its historical past and collective identity. In addition to this, people strengthen the party's power by adopting what is right and wrong and how they should think in the manner imposed by the party.

Human language, as a living memory, has always been found unknown and dangerous from the perspective of power. To fully build its power, the Party has tried to control the language that represents the mental body, just as it has recorded the social body. Courtine, who establishes a link between totalitarian power and language, makes

the following noteworthy observation: “Language threatens the totalitarian enterprise. It is in fact the zone of obscurity where the gaze is lost. People must therefore be cured of their language: old and obscure terms must be eliminated, that escape definition, and zones of indetermination—ambiguity, equivocation, polysemy—wiped out. Signs must be purged and purified of their meaning and bodies of their substance. And then they must be refilled. “‘You will be hollow,’ promises O’Brien. ‘We shall squeeze you empty and then we shall fill you with ourselves’” (1986: 70).

2.4. The Theme and Practice of Historical Revisionism in *1984*

One of the primary concepts—perhaps the foremost—that the Party instrumentalizes to prevent the development of independent thought and the countercultural practices of free speech that arise from such thought, thereby keeping society in a manageable state, is history. In the rewriting of history, the Party’s narrative framework involves the constant reinterpretation of the historical past, continuously revised in the Ministry of Truth to diverge from its original form in alignment with the Party’s narrative. Due to the politicization of historical knowledge by current political agendas, people are never able to discern what is real. Even more troubling, they remain unaware of their ignorance and believe the Party’s fabricated lies in place of reality. Through this rewriting, a comfort zone emerges in society, leading people to assume that everything is proceeding smoothly and that the country possesses a highly successful and morally upright society and government. The most terrifying aspect of *1984* is undoubtedly society’s indifference to the corruption of power and its tacit support for the regime. The novel’s ability to represent societal psychology in the real world so realistically is its most distinguishing feature, setting it apart from other futuristic works. In *1984*, the construction of societal apathy is made possible through the suppression of language, which results in the elimination of freedom of expression. In other words, society’s passivity and its assumption that everything is fine and will always improve stem from the manipulation of its relationship with reality through the politicization of language. In particular, the destruction and constant alteration of the historical past serve as the most effective linguistic tool in the Party’s objectification of society, inevitably advancing goals such as silencing society and eradicating independent thought. In this process, objective reality gives way to a series of conjunctural interpretations that prioritize the Party’s interests, concealing its injustices and atrocities. The Party’s desire to control the past and the reasons behind this desire are reflected in numerous examples,

most succinctly expressed in the novel's phrase: "Who controls the past controls the future. Who controls the present controls the past" (2001: 248). Just as people observe in real life across various cultural forms—such as humans altering nature, men subjugating women, or mothers shaping children—the Party in the novel seeks to experience its power by remaining unchanged itself while transforming those it designates as 'other.' This is evident in the Party's constant alteration of the language of the past and its unilateral decision over how this change occurs.

Examining why and how the Party rewrites the past is worthwhile, as it also reveals why freedom of expression is absent and why practices of *parrhesia* (frank, fearless speech) are impossible. By reconstructing the past through language, the Party controls truth, shapes collective memory, and renders people more manageable. In the rewriting of the past, truth is reinterpreted as the Party's version of reality. The past is reformatted to fit the Party's narrative, thereby eliminating alternative interpretations and, most critically, evidence representing objective truth. During the construction of truth, the Party subjects all past records and written archives to systematic scrutiny, effectively silencing the memory of the past. The impossibility of *parrhesia* in Oceania is a critical consequence of historical revisionism. As discussed in relation to Richard Weiskopf's work, *parrhesia* requires a space for truth-telling that challenges power. In Oceania, the Party's control over history eliminates this space by erasing evidence that could support critical speech. For example, Winston's inability to find records of a pre-Party society prevents him from articulating a coherent critique, as there is no historical basis to anchor his dissent. This suppression of *parrhesia* ensures that even those who recognize the Party's lies, like Winston, are isolated and powerless (2007: 88). The exclusion and demonization of memories and signs representing collective identity outside the Party's narrative serve the primary purpose of legitimizing the Party's absolute, godlike power, which it seeks to present as omnipresent and eternal. This legitimization is sustained in physical life through mechanisms like telescreens, Big Brother posters, civilian-disguised spies, or organizations like the Thought Police, which wield the right to enforce violence. Simultaneously, the rewriting of history, as a tool of social engineering through language, keeps the Party's absolute power alive in the mental world at both individual and societal levels.

In this context, history loses its cultural dynamism, which represents objective reality and fosters a sense of societal belonging. Instead, it becomes a tool to legitimize

power, resulting in a society stripped of identity. By manipulating past information, the Party reshapes the memory of individuals and society. People are prevented from trusting their personal memories. The official narrative of the past is accepted only within the boundaries set by the Party. The resulting collective amnesia facilitates the perpetuation of the Party's absolute authority. Every individual is compelled to unquestioningly accept the reality presented by the Party. This loss of identity can be understood through the lens of collective memory theory, as articulated by scholars like Maurice Halbwachs. Collective memory relies on shared historical narratives to foster group cohesion. By destroying these narratives, the Party fragments societal bonds, leaving individuals atomized and dependent on the Party for identity. This is evident in the novel's depiction of children, who, raised on Party propaganda, denounce their parents, illustrating the erosion of familial and cultural ties (2001: 24–27). This mental manipulation within society not only shapes individuals' perceptions of reality but also molds their visions of the future. By continuously "updating" the past, the Party becomes the sole determinant of both history and the future, thereby exerting absolute control over individuals' destinies.

Winston, employed at the Ministry of Truth, serves as a mediator between language and the state, constantly engaged in the construction and reproduction of the controlled reality fabricated by the state (2001: 44–46). He feels that this reality is entirely false and that society is in a state worse than spiritual death (2001: 46). The most significant element in Winston's critique of the Party is undoubtedly his highly ideological and monotonous occupation of constantly rewriting the past (2001: 44–46). The rewriting of history, in this regard, has enabled Winston to recognize the Party's contradictions and to produce independent thoughts. What allows Winston to develop independent thoughts about the Party is his understanding, through his interaction with language, of how the Party manipulates information by instrumentalizing language (2001: 46). As the novel's narrator, Winston expresses his views on the rewriting of history and openly articulates the Party's wrongs with clear language (2001: 46–47). Thus, the past is reinterpreted by the peripheral subject, bringing critical thought to the Party's official historical narrative. Regarding Winston's desire to liberate himself through the past and develop free thought, Rodden states: "In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, the Party's assault on objective truth through historical revisionism creates a world where memory is unreliable and reality is infinitely malleable. Winston's quest for tangible evidence of the past

reflects a desperate attempt to preserve a sense of self against this existential erasure” (1987: 620). Winston’s persistent diary-writing activity is undoubtedly related to his discontent with the rewriting of history (2001: 18–19). Undoubtedly, the Party, by destroying societal memory, turns people into objects of its power, and Winston, through diary writing, seeks to recover the historical past lost by both society and himself (2001: 18–19). As the interconnectedness of historical revisionism and diary writing in Winston’s life demonstrates, Winston’s existence is defined by the conflict of interests between the Party and the individual, and these conflicts are generally represented through language (2001: 19). In his diary, Winston’s curiosity about his own past, particularly centred on memories of family days, revolves around the Party’s arrest of his mother (2001: 30–31). In this memory, the conflict between family and politics echoes the broader tension in Oceania’s history between the historical narrative of Oceania and the Party’s narrative (2001: 30–31).

Winston’s diary represents a form of *parrhesia*, as it is an act of truth-telling against the Party’s monopoly on reality. However, unlike traditional *parrhesia*, which requires a public audience, Winston’s act is private and futile, as the Party’s control over history ensures no one can validate his truth. This isolation underscores the novel’s tragic dimension, where resistance is possible but ineffective without a collective framework to support it.

The novel expresses the Party’s censorship of all historically valuable information that provides objective knowledge about the past as follows: “One could not learn history from architecture any more than one could learn it from books. Statues, inscriptions, memorial stones, the names of streets—anything that might throw light upon the past had been systematically altered” (2001: 99). Winston, through his work, experiences firsthand the Party’s relentless effort to erase and rewrite history, reinforcing his awareness of the loss of truth and identity in Oceania.

This quote highlights the Party’s attack on material culture as a repository of history. By altering physical artifacts, the Party ensures that even non-textual evidence of the past—architecture, monuments, street names—conforms to its narrative. This mirrors real-world examples, such as the destruction of cultural heritage during colonial regimes or totalitarian purges, where physical symbols of alternative identities were erased to enforce ideological conformity.

The Ministry of Truth, Minitrue in Newspeak, is responsible for incorporating the historical past with the political narrative. Winston is a member of the Records Department. His job is “rectifying” historical documents as it is dictated by the Party’s inner circle. The act of rewriting the past that Winston performs in the Records Department consists of four bureaucratic processes. These processes are, respectively, assignment, alteration, disposal of evidence, and republication. Winston’s workplace has a tube. The Inner Party sends the assignment to Winston through it. In the second stage, alteration, Winston changes the text. As a complement to pneumatic tubes, Winston’s workspace has a memory hole. The old version of the text is thrown into this type of waste bin called a memory hole. Finally, the old text is burned below in machines called incinerators. Finally, the new version of the text takes the place of the old text in the archives as the sole objective truth.

The mechanization of truth is represented by the pneumatic tubes and memory holes, where the human agency serves to the reproduction of power in the erasure of linguistic past (2001: 45). Besides that, the dehumanization aspect is accentuated by the large scale of the operation, which includes thousands of employees from different departments, but the fact that no one person is aware of the true extent of the falsification due to compartmentalization-a technique which is similar to that of modern intelligence agencies to keep things secret-(1987: 620).

Past writing is of two types. In some cases, people are changed; in other cases, a set of abstract expressions are changed. These changes generally apply to situations that show the Party’s inadequacy in governing the country. For the situation concerning people, there is a specific example in the novel. One of the old issues of *The Times* newspaper is sent to Winston. He is asked to rewrite a political news item, which had been accepted as true until that time, in the way the Party wants. In the news in question, Big Brother praises an important party member named Withers, making him gain prestige within the party and become more powerful. A problem arises between Withers and the Party for a reason not explained in the novel, and Withers is, most likely, killed. The Party is destroying documents about Withers so that he is completely forgotten. Winston deletes the part about Withers. In place of Withers, he invents a fictional character and gives him the name Ogilvy. He places him in the news as a war hero instead of Withers. He writes a new, detailed story for Big Brother’s speech, describing Ogilvy as a perfect Party member who joined the Spies at age six, designed a new type of hand grenade, and died

heroically in battle while being chased by enemy helicopters. This fabricated person, who never lived, instantly became historical fact, replacing the erased memory of Comrade Withers. The most striking example of changing abstract expressions is in the field of economics. There are four ministries in the country, and one of them is the ministry responsible for the economy, named the Ministry of Plenty. In an example from the novel, the ministry makes some predictions about how much production there will be, but less production was made than expected. Upon this, Winston plays with the numbers and shows the production as more than it was by showing a higher number. All these examples are worth considering in terms of showing how historical truths, represented by objective reality, are manipulated by the populist narrative of political power. The manipulation of economic data underscores the Party's use of revisionism to mask governance failures. By falsifying production figures, the Party creates an illusion of prosperity. This also ties to the Party's broader strategy of maintaining a "comfort zone," as mentioned earlier, where citizens believe in a false narrative of progress despite material deprivation.

2.5. Winston and Free Speech

2.5.1. Winston's Personality

In Winston's personality, there exists a duality concerning free speech. This duality creates a contradiction in his psychology, rendering him unhappy and restless. This dual conflict stems from Winston's desire to exercise freedom of expression in his thoughts and his inability to do so in real life. Winston is simultaneously aware of these two opposing states regarding freedom of expression, experiencing a contradiction within his own mind. The cause of this contradiction is his knowledge that he cannot exercise free speech. Others, like Winston, also do not exercise free speech. There is a difference between Winston and society regarding free speech. Others do not even consider using free speech. Winston, however, constantly thinks about exercising it, while knowing both that he can never do so and the specific reason or reasons why free speech is impossible. In the context of parrhesia, most crucially, Winston knows that even a single act of free speech would cause death. This knowledge is the underlying reason why, at the novel's end, Winston opts to say what is demanded of him instead of practicing parrhesia.

The conflict Winston experiences with freedom of expression, as described in the above paragraph, represents the corruption of the system in Oceania and the absence of hope for change in the future. In this regard, the most significant aspect that makes the

novel dystopian is the conflict between the desire for free speech and the inability to speak freely due to Party oppression, which manifests in Winston as a struggle between loyalty to the Party and individual freedom, keeping him in constant contradiction. In the novel, Winston embodies the conflict between political oppression and the desire for freedom of expression, and his social relationships are shaped by the suppression of his quest for freedom of expression by totalitarian power. When considering Winston's mind and his relationship with society, it can be said that Winston represents all of Oceania. Therefore, understanding Winston equates to understanding the novel's dystopian theme. For this reason, analysing what kind of person he is proves beneficial. Undoubtedly, analysing Winston's personality reveals how he uses language in a politically oppressive environment. Winston's personal characteristics are the most significant dynamics directly affecting his psychology. Since psychology determines emotional states, it has a profound impact on Winston's understanding of speech, particularly his understanding of free speech. Thus, examining Winston's personal characteristics is crucial for understanding his inadequacy and failure in matters of free speech.

Throughout the novel, Winston resorts to various methods to exercise freedom of expression, which can be divided into political and personal categories. These should not be seen as entirely separate. Winston's deep pessimism regarding political freedom of expression leads him to seek freedom of expression in his private life. Therefore, political and personal free speech are intertwined. Winston's complete detachment from both political and personal freedom of expression signifies his submission to the system and his defeat against the Party.

Undoubtedly, Winston is an unsuccessful, ordinary, and colourless individual. He is weak-willed. This weak character has made him a part of the totalitarian Party regime. He lacks the resolve necessary for political struggle against the Party. In other words, due to Winston's weak, fragile, or vulnerable character, he has no chance against the Party from the outset. The fact that the most sensitive person in society is someone as insignificant and weak as Winston is a critical characterization element that makes the novel dystopian. There is a stark contrast between Winston's nondescript persona and the Party's absolute power, which heightens the degree of societal corruption and depicts it psychologically. The antithetical relationship between the Party and Winston is a dystopian feature of the novel, making it necessary to define Winston's weak character through his private life.

Winston's private life can be examined through various aspects such as marital status, family life, romantic life, and health condition. Being 38 years old and never married indicates that he is an extremely ordinary and unremarkable person in his private life. Winston's professional life is equally mundane and insignificant. His work life consists of performing the same desk job repeatedly. He has been doing the same job for as long as he can remember and has never considered doing anything else. He hates the Party. His hatred for the Party is not due to disliking politics (in fact, he is quite interested in politics), the unsuitability of his job, emotional reasons, or issues with colleagues. Winston knows that the Party deceives society, acts solely for its own benefit, and commits evils, including murder. Yet, Winston is so weak and inadequate that, despite knowing the Party's secrets, he does not wish to pursue another job. Winston's contradiction does not end there; he is so naive that, while continuing his job as a Party official, he plans to join a utopian movement to overthrow the Party. What is truly strange is that Winston fails to see his own situation and expects, however slightly, a positive outcome from his actions. Generally, it can be comfortably said that the rigid rules, superficiality, and dehumanizing bureaucratic environment of Winston's work life define a significant portion of his existence. The novel's opening with Winston's return home from work and the detailed descriptions of his observations at the workplace are examples of this.

In the novel, Winston is not a human being. He is more a Party official than a person. Winston's family life also makes him fragile in various ways. As a child, the Party, which has become a trauma for him, manifests as recurring dreams where he relives the event that took his mother away from home. Additionally, and perhaps more significantly, Winston has no father. His fatherlessness is likely a hidden reason for his blind obedience to Party authority. Winston's lack of positive masculine values may also stem from the absence of a father or father figure to guide him during childhood. Due to the dystopian nature of Winston's passive and cowardly stance in his opposition to the Party in his peculiar political life, his family life, particularly his fatherlessness, warrants discussion.

Everything in Winston's life is problematic, and his health is no exception. He has a condition called varicose ulcer. Academic studies have linked Winston's illness to totalitarian power. One such study argues that Winston's varicose ulcer symbolizes his repressed individual emotions and thoughts, representing the censorship of Winston as a

human being. It further posits that societal decay and the powerlessness of both society and Winston against Big Brother's dictatorial rule are additional symbolic extensions of the varicose ulcer (2018: 4). What is thought-provoking here is that Winston, who is incapable of even protecting his own health, attempts to protect and save society. Just as Winston fails to safeguard his own health, he also fails to save society from the Party. In other words, just as he suffers from a varicose ulcer on an individual level, society is afflicted with the disease of totalitarianism on a societal level. In short, Winston's health can be said to represent societal health. Winston's issue with freedom of expression also indicates the deterioration of societal health and the corruption of society. Undoubtedly, in the context of health, it could even be said that Winston's avoidance of parrhesia in the interrogation room symbolizes the moral death of both him and society in a political sense.

2.5.2. Qualification of Winston in Terms of Five Elements of Parrhesia

It must be said that Winston's actions constitute a symbolic or fragmentary form of parrhesia, but that Winston never truly engages in parrhesia. What makes the novel dystopian is Winston's lack of freedom to practice parrhesia, as he is always passive or secretive in criticizing and questioning the Party.

Winston possesses the necessary elements for parrhesia but cannot direct them toward the power structure. He is unable to use the elements of parrhesia directly against the regime to subvert the political center/periphery hierarchy. Therefore, it cannot be said that he is a true parrhesiastes or parrhesia maker. Winston has the potential for parrhesia:

- a) He believes that expressing his thoughts will inevitably lead to his death and defeat(risk);

- b) He knows that the Party manipulates truth and makes contradictory decisions (truth);

- c) He desires to join the Brotherhood and feels a one-sided masculine affection toward O'Brien due to ideological affinity (frankness);

- d) He criticizes the Party in his diary (criticism);

- e) He states that the most important thing is not to stay alive but to remain human.

He writes his diary to convey the truth, as he understands it, to future generations who might understand him or to those living in the world he imagines, who share his beliefs (duty). In this sense, Winston is seen to have a specific or, as described above,

fragmentary experience of parrhesia. Not the exact parrhesia which momentarily attacks and psychologically damages the hierarchical structuration of power relations.

However, Winston's parrhesiastic activity never achieves the impact that could be considered parrhesia in the classical sense. He is unable to use the elements of parrhesia directly against the regime to subvert the political center/periphery hierarchy. As Foucault notes that "without risk, truth-telling is merely stating an opinion" (Kelly, 2014: 32). It is possible to make this definition for Winston. He is, in fact, expressing his views. Of course, these views resemble parrhesia and evoke the notion of parrhesia in the mind. However, Winston does not perform any genuine verbal act directed at the existence of power as power. Even the opposition itself is controlled by the Party. Everything Winston believes to be opposition has been fabricated by the Party, which pretends there is a false public enemy to identify dissenters and protect the system. In an environment where the opposition is so artificial and under control, it is only natural that Winston does not truly engage in an act of parrhesia. Winston never produces a discourse of opposition or a speech that genuinely targets the authority of power. He also does not establish any real communication with power. Cognitively, Winston desires parrhesia. However, he never manages to engage in a verbal form of interaction with power, nor does he develop a verbal political activism that emphasizes his individuality in opposition to the objectification by power. In this respect, it would be overly optimistic to claim that classical Foucauldian parrhesia exists in the novel or in Winston. Anything else would be unthinkable—otherwise, *1984* would be a utopia. Therefore, it cannot be said that he is a true parrhesiastes or parrhesia maker. Winston always remains an object of the regime's power, and undoubtedly, when the opportunity for a true parrhesiastic experience arises—when the right to speak the truth in the face of death emerges—his fear and silence, speaking as the regime demands, demonstrate that Winston is not a parrhesiastes in the Foucauldian sense. Instead, he is someone who aspires to practice parrhesia and employs symbolic forms of parrhesia in his own life.

Winston, in the interrogation scene, faces the threat of death. To avoid death, he speaks as the Party demands. Winston's abandonment of his ideology due to fear of death contradicts the principle of a free speaker risking their life for the truth. Not only has Winston failed to demonstrate the will to speak the truth, but his relationship with truth has fundamentally changed, leading him to advocate the exact opposite of what he once defended. Winston's expression of love for Big Brother, articulated through a politicized

form of speech, represents the profound transformation he undergoes due to his fear of death. It is entirely possible to assert the following: Winston, after experiencing physical pain and fear of death, has also lost his connection to the other four elements necessary for Foucauldian parrhesia, thereby severing all ties with truth. Evaluating his unconsciousness at the Chestnut Café from this perspective aligns with the study's theme of free speech.

2.5.3. Diary and Free Speech

Throughout *1984*, Winston Smith engages in various forms of linguistic resistance, among which his private use of language in the act of diary-writing is particularly significant. The diary, a forbidden object purchased from a secondhand shop, functions on both individual and political levels. It becomes a medium through which Winston reexamines and reconstructs his identity, one anchored in personal autonomy and expressive freedom. As the only known citizen in Oceania who maintains a private diary, Winston distinguishes himself from the rest of society. This singular act of writing not only isolates him from the collective but also marks the beginning of his self-formation as a unique subject. The diary thus transforms into a written exercise in free speech, challenging the Party's manipulation of both historical narrative and the concept of the ideal citizen.

This section explores the diary in terms of both content and form. Winston's act of diary writing is inherently subversive: he writes in secret, away from the surveillance of telescreens, and fills its pages with anti-Party thoughts (Orwell 2001: 45). His choice of Oldspeak—a now criminalized version of standard English—further deepens this resistance. Since the Party mandates the use of Newspeak among its members and actively seeks to eliminate Oldspeak, Winston's linguistic preference becomes a symbolic act of rebellion. His use of an outlawed language, suppressed and culturally marginalized, transforms the diary into an instrument of linguistic resistance. As such, the diary becomes not merely a personal record but a vehicle of parrhesia—frank, fearless speech in defiance of institutional power.

The diary's formal features are equally important. Its entries are fragmented and discontinuous, starkly contrasting with the polished and ideologically cohesive texts Winston edits in his role at the Ministry of Truth. In his official duties, Winston revises

historical records in accordance with Party doctrine, ensuring textual uniformity and narrative consistency. His diary, by contrast, adopts a raw, unstructured form. This stylistic disjunction represents an individual expression that resists the Party's linguistic discipline. For instance, when Winston recounts a shameful sexual encounter with an older working-class woman, the narrative unfolds in disjointed sections—mirroring the disorder of personal memory rather than the cohesion of state propaganda. These textual fractures can be interpreted as formal parrhesia, reflecting a linguistic refusal to conform to the Party's strict norms of writing and self-representation.

Winston's use of traditional tools—handwriting, ink pen, and paper—adds another layer to this resistance. He does not type but writes by hand in cursive with a rare fountain pen. His penmanship is described as crude and childlike, symbolizing a return to authenticity in a highly mechanized linguistic environment. These tools, deeply personal and almost anachronistic, embody a humanized form of language. As Winston insists on using them, he signals his determination to express his truth in his own voice and with his own materials. His attachment to the diary is described in nostalgic and emotional terms: “He had bought the book from a junk shop, because of a certain nostalgic appeal... he was not conscious of wanting it for any particular purpose” (2001: 8). The ink pen is similarly cherished: “He had taken the risk of buying a fountain pen simply because of a feeling that the beautiful creamy paper deserved to be written on with a real nib” (2001: 8). These descriptions reflect Winston's longing for expressive freedom and a lost cultural past.

Jackson aptly captures the broader cultural significance of these choices: “Winston's nostalgia occurs in the context of an almost complete mechanization of writing” (1986: 154). This mechanization is evident in Party technologies like the “speakwrite,” “versificator,” and “Dictaphone” (2001: 43–44), which strip language of individuality. Against this backdrop, Winston's diary becomes a symbolic act of self-authorship. It offers him a private arena in which he reclaims language and reconfigures his identity on his own terms.

Equally important is what Winston writes. The diary's themes are deeply entangled with the concept of free speech. Most entries are politically charged, revealing Winston's dissent from the Party's narrative and his personal confrontation with historical truth. His criticisms of the regime focus on two central pillars of ideological power: the

cult of the Party and the cult of Big Brother. In one of the earliest entries, Winston writes “DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER” repeatedly across half a page—a spontaneous outburst of political rage triggered by a seemingly significant glance from O’Brien during the daily “Two Minutes Hate.” This moment is more than an act of defiance; it marks Winston’s conscious transition into a dissident subjectivity. The repetition of the phrase gives the writing a performative force, turning it into an act of verbal insurrection that challenges the regime’s hierarchy.

Another potent declaration—“If there is hope, it lies in the proles” (Orwell 2001: 89)—reveals Winston’s desire to overthrow the Party and support an alternative political future. This entry situates the working class at the centre of transformative potential, a radical notion for a government bureaucrat like Winston. His belief in the Brotherhood and the imagined solidarity with O’Brien further demonstrate how the diary serves as a political letter addressed to comrades in resistance. This intertextual link to Goldstein’s forbidden book underscores the ideological subtext of the diary, which Winston uses to envision and articulate revolutionary alternatives to the Party’s dominance. In doing so, he knowingly risks execution. His political speech, imbued with moral conviction and undertaken in the face of mortal danger, closely aligns with Foucault’s understanding of parrhesia as truth-telling at personal risk.

Winston’s recollections of his past—especially those that deviate from the Party’s official memory—further demonstrate how the diary facilitates free thought. In Oceania, individuals are denied access to their own histories, which are continuously overwritten by the state. The Party enforces a collective amnesia that erases alternative narratives. In recording personal memories, Winston retrieves a private past excluded from the state’s control. These acts of memory-writing not only restore his sense of self but also reassert his agency in constructing identity outside the Party’s framework.

The recounting of a degrading sexual experience is particularly revealing. Winston does not romanticize the event; rather, he confronts it with brutal honesty. “It had got to be written down, it had got to be confessed,” he writes. He describes the woman’s age, her decaying appearance, and his revulsion (2001: 87). By documenting this unsettling truth rather than filtering it through the Party’s idealized citizen model, Winston insists on defining himself through individual experiences—however shameful

or disturbing. This confessional function of the diary highlights its therapeutic role and reinforces its importance as a medium of parrhesia.

Ultimately, Winston's linguistic and political resistance through diary-writing enables him to construct a self distinct from the Party. The diary, composed in everyday language and defying totalitarian control, becomes a site where he articulates a new identity through the practice of free expression.

An additional dimension worth exploring is the tension between Winston's dual identities: one as a functionary of the regime and the other as a dissident writer. This tension embodies the broader conflict between institutional authority and autonomous subjectivity within the domain of language. Language in Oceania is bifurcated: on one side lies the officially sanctioned, legal, and moral discourse of the Party; on the other, the criminalized, marginal discourse of personal truth. Winston's professional duties at the Ministry of Truth represent the former, while his diary embodies the latter. The clash between these two modalities reflects a deeper identity crisis and highlights the oppressive bifurcation of reality in a totalitarian state. Through his diary, Winston not only challenges the dominant ideology but also affirms the potential of language to serve as a tool for self-liberation.

A comparative reading of Winston's role at the Ministry and his private act of diary-writing reveals a critical thematic structure: the suppression of language in public versus its resurrection in private. The Ministry of Truth stands as an institution of erasure and manipulation, while the diary represents a personal archive of dissent and remembrance. Through this contrast, Orwell foregrounds the importance of free speech in preserving individuality. Winston's secret writing serves as both an archive of truth and a performative reclamation of identity. Even as the Party obliterates historical continuity and moral clarity, Winston's diary becomes the one remaining space where language retains its emancipatory power.

2.6. The Interrogation Scene: Destruction of the Self:

2.6.1. Interpretive Analysis: Repression of Parrhesia Through the Death

Threat

O'Brien uses the death threat in Room 101. He warns Winston that he plans to unleash a cage of savage rats. It represents the Party's most potent weapon for repressing parrhesia, the courageous act of speaking truth despite risk of death. Michel Foucault defines parrhesia as a mode of speech characterized by truthfulness, risk, criticism, courage, and duty, where the speaker challenges authority at personal cost, potentially including death (2001: 19–20). Winston's initial acts of rebellion—writing "DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER" in his diary and loving Julia—embody parrhesia, as they express dissent against the Party's orthodoxy despite the risk of annihilation. However, Room 101 uses psychological torture to break Winston's spirit. The Party controls the way language is used through a death threat, killing Winston in the way he fears most. As Bernard Crick notes, "In Room 101, the Party's omniscience is demonstrated by its knowledge of the victim's ultimate dread, the one thing he cannot bear. The victim is forced to confront this dread, and in his terror, he betrays his deepest loyalties, thereby annihilating his own moral self" (1980: 279).

In the Room 101 scene, therefore, Winston's life as a political subject becomes a tragedy of free speech. When evaluated according to the concept of parrhesia, Winston's political transformation at the hands of the authorities is his journey from a political dissident who practices parrhesia to becoming just like everyone else in society—a fanatical Party member who has lost the mental awareness and desire necessary to perform parrhesia. This change in Winston's self aligns with Foucault's interpretive analysis of parrhesia. The most effective and memorable narrative moment in normalizing Winston's political identity is his failure to speak freely in the face of the fear of death. Taking this a step further, and in keeping with the novel's dystopian spirit, it is the reshaping of himself by destroying the entire connection between his free speech and his mind. As Irving Howe observes, "The horror of Room 101 is not the rat, but the fact that the state has uncovered the last sanctuary of the self. By using what Winston most fears, the Party demonstrates its absolute power to invade and annihilate the individual's innermost being" (1982: 87).

In this respect, it is possible to develop an argument that Winston is a tragic hero and that his tragic end is the loss of his freedom to speak freely. Winston's tragic situation is his belief that he can speak freely, but his interpretation of the world with a pure faith from a quixotic perspective is something that can never be realized in a world corrupted by decay and self-interest. His failure to perform the act of parrhesia in the face of the

fear of death shows that Winston has completely distanced himself from the practice of free speech as a form of political activism. Christopher Hitchens underscores this transformation, noting, “Room 101 is the place where the Party locates the exact point of human vulnerability, the precise fear that will obliterate all resistance. It is not enough to make Winston obey; he must be made to love Big Brother, and this is achieved by confronting him with the one thing he cannot endure” (2002: 157).

In Winston’s case, parrhesia becomes dysfunctional and Winston’s disability in performing free speech is the way parrhesia is represented. Winston’s silence in the face of the fear of death and his speaking in the manner desired by the authorities, permanently reshaping his identity to conform to the Party’s political narrative, shows that the concept of parrhesia finds its place in the novel as an inversion of itself. John Rodden captures this dynamic, stating, “The Party’s methods in Room 101 are designed not merely to punish but to remake the individual in the image of the Party, annihilating any capacity for independent thought or speech” (1987: 217). In other words, in the novel, parrhesia exists as something that is not—as a counter-cultural act that is not permitted, is kept under pressure, and whose visibility or existence is constantly blocked in the novel’s narrative. Parrhesia is a speech practice that has not been realized, that does not exist in reality but constantly unsettles and frightens the authorities—a practice that the authorities constantly try to keep under control and to hide by normalizing it within their own discourse. Winston’s inadequacy in performing the act of parrhesia demonstrates the absolute victory of the authorities and shows that the concept of parrhesia in the novel is interpreted through the negation of the same concept.

O’Brien’s threat to release the rats, which would “gouge out Winston’s eyes and mouth,” is not merely a physical danger but a psychological assault designed to exploit his deepest fear (2001: 283). This threat of a gruesome death, intensified by Winston’s immobility and the dark, oppressive setting of Room 101, creates a state of existential terror that overrides his commitment to truth. Foucault addresses how the fear of telling the truth due to the fear of death prevents one from being a truth-teller as follows: “For there to be parrhesia, the speaker must be telling what he, in fact, believes to be true... Secondly, parrhesia only takes place when there is a risk, a danger for the speaker in telling the truth. For instance, if a grammarian tells a tyrant that he has made a grammatical mistake, he is not a parrhesiastes. But if a philosopher tells the tyrant that his tyranny is odious and an obstacle to the good life, then he is a parrhesiastes... And the

ultimate form of parrhesia is to risk death.” Foucault also contends that parrhesia requires “limitless courage” to speak truth in the face of death, as exemplified by Socrates’ defiance of Athenian authorities (2001: 15). Winston, however, fails this test, shouting, “Do it to Julia!” to escape the rats, thereby renouncing his love for Julia and his truthful opposition to the Party (2001: 285). This betrayal marks the collapse of his parrhesiastic identity, as fear compels him to adopt the Party’s language and ideology. The psychological mechanism of this repression lies in the Party’s strategic synthesis of death with personalized fear, as O’Brien acknowledges: “by itself... pain is not always enough” (2001: 283). Physical torture, such as electric shocks, weakens Winston’s body, but the rat threat targets his psyche, exploiting a fear so profound it dismantles his moral and emotional resolve. By making Winston prioritize self-preservation over truth, the Party ensures his self-censorship, transforming him into a speaker who conforms to its narrative. This aligns with Hitchens’ observation that Room 101 leaves Winston an “empty vessel” for Party ideology, as the death threat severs his last emotional tie to his dissident self (2002: 157).

The repression of parrhesia through the death threat underscores Orwell’s critique of totalitarianism, where fear is weaponized to eliminate dissent. The Party’s omniscience, demonstrated by its knowledge of Winston’s rat phobia, enables it to craft a torture that guarantees compliance, reflecting the regime’s ability to invade and control the innermost self. As Howe notes, Room 101 uncovers “the last sanctuary of the self,” ensuring no space remains for free speech (1982: 87). By suppressing parrhesia, the Party not only silences Winston but also annihilates the possibility of truthful resistance, cementing its absolute power. This scene serves as a stark warning about the fragility of free speech under oppressive regimes, where the fear of death can extinguish even the most courageous voices.

Winston’s interrogation scene is filled with long conversations that show his transformation from a dissident who practices free speech into someone who speaks as O’Brien wishes, a person who is enveloped by the Party’s narrative and unable to fight back. Winston’s arrest and interrogation are organized by the Ministry of Love, one of the state’s four ministries. Undoubtedly, even before the interrogation scene, the Ministry of Love had already established pressure on Winston, manipulated his relationship with reality, and kept him under surveillance by following him. To better understand the interrogation scene, it is appropriate to mention the role the Ministry of Love played in

Winston's past, as understanding how this ministry affected his life and interacted with him in the lead-up to the interrogation will aid comprehension. Before Winston is tortured by O'Brien in Room 101, he is followed by the security forces known as the Thought Police, who serve the Ministry of Love. Within the Thought Police, there is an elderly man named Charrington working as an undercover agent. Charrington runs an antique shop in the massive working-class ghetto where the lower class, called "proles," live. Winston bought the diary from Charrington's antique shop. After Winston bought the diary, he began to be followed by the state. On the upper floor of the antique shop, a camera is hidden behind a picture, and the Thought Police are observing Winston. Besides Charrington, O'Brien also spoke with Winston, presenting himself as a fellow dissident, which Winston believed. The Thought Police decided that Winston was a dangerous dissident, raided his home, and arrested him. The process leading up to Winston's arrival in Room 101 can be summarized in this way, and the fact that it was the diary that led to his criminalization by the authorities shows how intolerant and suspicious the regime is towards freedom of speech, and that there is a political conflict between Winston and the regime based on freedom of expression.

It is possible to classify the duties of the Ministry of Love as enforcing loyalty to Big Brother, torture and re-education, and surveillance and control. The Interrogation Scene focuses on the second mission of the Ministry of Love. O'Brien holds a high-ranking position in the Inner Party, Oceania's elite ruling class. This gives him access to privileges and power far beyond that of ordinary citizens. O'Brien, being a member of the Inner Party with many privileges, is a leader or one of the leaders of the Thought Police. As an Inner Party member, he lives in a higher-quality home and uses things that other people do not have the right to consume or use. He has servants. Most importantly within the context of this study, he has the ability to turn off the listening devices called telescreens and has access to censored or original sources. The fact that O'Brien lives a richer and freer life than other people demonstrates the injustice of the totalitarian regime and, moreover, exposes the double standard regarding freedom of expression. The fact that the general populace, the masses that make up the majority of society, or the Party members outside the Inner Party do not have the right to free speech is a natural result of the totalitarian system. According to this system, all privileges and freedoms—not just in free speech, but in every matter—are seen as the right of a minority that rules the Party. The fact that O'Brien possesses opportunities that no one else has a right to, despite not

being entitled to them, and lives a wealthy life shows the inequality between the Party and society. Most importantly, the Party's contempt for society, by claiming all rights and privileges in every area of life for itself, manifests in the absence of free speech in language and illuminates the totalitarian character of the regime through O'Brien's persona.

In Room 101, O'Brien tries to transform Winston into a completely ideal Party member by changing his speech, and he uses ideological methods like torture and re-education to make Winston the person the Party wants him to be. The purpose of O'Brien's interrogation of Winston is to successfully complete his integration into the political system. The rationalization of Winston's integration into the system is for him to become someone who thinks and speaks as the authorities wish. In this process, the most important aim of O'Brien, who represents the Party, is to sever Winston's connection to objective reality—the Truth with a capitalized T—and to make him lose his ability to develop independent thought by falling under the influence of the Party's controlled reality.

The weakening and eventual end of Winston's relationship with objective reality manifested in his loss of the capacity and desire to speak freely. For O'Brien, Winston's rehabilitation will be successful when Winston speaks as the Party wishes and does not step outside of political orthodoxy by speaking freely. The political power wants to impose its controlled reality on Winston, and this process—the process of reconstructing the Party narrative in Winston as a political object—develops through mutual conversations. These conversations aim to break Winston's resistance to speaking freely and to install a language compliant with the Party narrative into his mind. To end Winston's potential for free speech by making him someone who thinks and thus speaks as the Party wishes, O'Brien used physical and psychological torture. The goal here is to make Winston stop forming independent thoughts. Language plays a major role in Winston becoming someone who does not develop independent thoughts and act upon them, but is instead in harmony with the political orthodoxy centred on the Party. In Winston's interrogation scene, language has a dual character. Undoubtedly, this interrogation scene, due to Winston's abandonment of speaking the truth in the face of a death threat and his exaggerated change of worldview, is the scene that most deserves to be evaluated from the perspective of the act of parrhesia, the one to which the concept of parrhesia is most easily applied. Within the plot, this is the most important element that

makes the novel a dystopia. To make a general analysis, language has a dual character in this section. On one hand, language is functionalized by the Party in Winston's rehabilitation. To correct Winston and reintegrate him into society, he needs to be educated, and this education is done through speech, that is, through language. O'Brien speaks to Winston on behalf of the authorities. Through this speech, the authorities shape Winston and mold him into the form they desire. As O'Brien speaks with Winston, he educates him on what is normal according to the Party narrative, how he should behave to have a place in society, how he should use his mind, and the consciousness of being aware of his responsibilities to the Party and acting according to this awareness.

2.6.2. Main Purpose of Physical Tortures

The physical tortures inflicted on Winston in the Ministry of Love are varied and severe, aimed at causing pain, exhaustion, and bodily degradation. The physical tortures applied in Room 101 can be generally classified as beatings, electric shocks, starvation, physical stress, and permanent bodily harm. These attacks are noteworthy as an important part of Winston's education. The physical attacks aim to make Winston psychologically more fragile and vulnerable, and to break his will. The real purpose of the violence applied to Winston's body is for him to become the person the Party wants him to be, to adapt to the political orthodoxy. This is a political adaptation that controls all of life and demands that Winston become a loyal Party member, forgetting his own self and submitting to the Party without question. The purpose of the education is for Winston to integrate into the Party's controlled reality. The Party interprets Winston's adaptation to the controlled reality of the Party narrative and his normalization as him ceasing to speak freely as a speaker and thus abandoning counter-cultural speech practices that pose a threat to the Party's interests.

In this education that the Party undertakes for Winston's integration into the system, it places great importance on the practice of speech and has seen Winston's integration into the system as a loyal Party member as a speech problem. The Party's education program wants to correct Winston, to reintegrate him into society. Winston's abandonment of his freedom of speech rationalizes this process. The authorities allow Winston to live only when they understand that he has established a relationship of ideological compliance with the authorities to the extent that he will not speak freely. When evaluated within this framework, the physical violence Winston is subjected to is

a totalitarian mechanism of power aimed at making his speech conform to the Party narrative and rendering the use of alternative forms of free speech impossible.

In this section, Winston's psychological acceptance of defeat and his cessation of free speech will be analyzed. Winston's silence instead of free speech is a process. First, he loses his human dignity through physical violence and his individuality comes to an end. When he is given electric shocks in Room 101, he begins to interpret the world as O'Brien wishes and to integrate into the narrative of the authorities. Finally, to avoid having his face torn apart by rats, that is, due to the fear of death, Winston chooses not to speak freely. All these tortures aim to destroy Winston's individual resistance. Winston's abandonment of free speech and speaking in the manner dictated by O'Brien constitutes the primary purpose of these tortures and of education in general, and it rationalizes O'Brien's actions. Therefore, everything develops as a process of power constituting itself through the suppression of the speaker's freedom, and the issue becomes one of freedom of expression. O'Brien wants Winston to speak in the way he desires, to give answers that conform to the Party narrative. Due to the beatings, the psychological surrender that will culminate in Winston ceasing to practice free speech is triggered by a beating incident as an act of power. Winston is physically abused and feels the pain with all its intensity. Consequently, Winston is psychologically shaken and loses his self-confidence. At the end of this process, he will cease to speak freely and will adopt the authorities' model of controlled reality.

2.6.3. Physical Torture: Utilization of Violence in the Formation of Anti-Parrhesiastic Political Setting

Winston is subjected to repeated and brutal beatings by Ministry guards, beginning shortly after his arrest. Beatings are the first form of state violence that Winston is subjected to during his detention. These attacks target his face, ribs, and elbows, causing immediate pain and long-term injuries. Winston's interrogation is spatially divided into two. In the first stage, Winston is in an ordinary cell in the ministry building. Later, he moves to Room 101. Winston is beaten in the first stage, before being sent to Room 101. The reason is that Winston is gripped by feelings of fear and panic in the face of physical violence and to deny his individuality. Another objective of physical violence is to disrupt Winston's psychological health and it leads him to lose his mental clarity. The dysfunctional psychological state of mind of Winston makes him more vulnerable

and an easier target for O'Brien's ideological assault. It is not for nothing that Winston is sent to Room 101 after he sees and accepts how worthless he is, because in Room 101, it will be very easy for Winston, who has now experienced his own worthlessness and the absolute power of the Party, to betray himself ideologically and to deny the ideological identity that is an important component of his individuality. Winston's denial of his individuality will manifest in fear of speaking freely in the broadest sense. Winston's obedience to what O'Brien says means demonstrating the ideological compliance expected of him in the fullest sense. In this respect, physical violence is related to the main theme of the study: the suppression of free speech by the authorities and the thesis that the failure of the desire to speak freely is the main framework that produces totalitarianism.

The reason for the authorities' arrest of Winston is that he poses a threat to the discourses that regulate practical life and exhibits behaviour contrary to the social order. Similarly, what the authorities want from Winston is for him to step back from his violation of the authorities' authority and to prove this to the Party. The action through which Winston, representing the periphery, transgresses the limits of the authority of the central Party power is generally forms of behaviour outside the cultural orthodoxy related to language, such as language itself, dreams, or diary entries. For this reason, the Party accepts Winston's affirmation of the authorities through language, his speaking in the way the authorities approve, as a kind of apology and obedience to the Party. Therefore, this section is symbolically the radical suppression of the concept of *parrhesia*, the separation of Winston as a speaking subject from his old self and his integration into a new political subjectivity constructed by the authorities. The most important situation that makes the novel dystopian is Winston speaking within a format where the authorities legitimize themselves on a linguistic level, and thus the political conflict between the authorities and the opposition ending in the face of the absolute power of the authorities. It is undoubtedly the loss of the desire to practice free speech from the concept of *parrhesia*. When evaluated within the framework of his relationship with the Party, it is the replacement of his desire to be free in his own mind and the resulting relationship of free speech—as a reaction to the political orthodoxy silencing society, censoring language, and preventing people from speaking—with becoming an ordinary Party official and forgetting his entire past. Winston is a political prisoner. Before addressing the process of Winston losing his desire to speak freely and forgetting his own principles,

it would be appropriate to mention the other political prisoners named in the novel. These individuals were called ‘polits’ by other prisoners. Their arrests reflect the theme of the suppression of free speech in the novel and are therefore relevant to the main topic of the study. One of the political prisoners Winston encounters while imprisoned in the Ministry of Truth is his neighbor, and the other is his colleague. One of the political prisoners other than Winston is Ampleforth. Ampleforth is a minor character in *1984*. He works with Winston at the Ministry of Truth in the Records Department, specifically in the Poetry Section. His job is to rewrite classical poems to align with the principles of Newspeak and Party ideology. He is arrested for thoughtcrime and ends up imprisoned in the Ministry of Love. He uses the word “God” in a poem during a translation task. The Party sees this as subversive, since invoking any higher authority beyond Big Brother is unacceptable. The other prisoner is Winston’s neighbour named Parsons. He is accused of saying ‘down with Big Brother’ in his sleep. He was reported by his own children. These two examples show that the Party takes a very authoritarian stance on suppressing free speech and does not recognize concepts such as family or religion.

Through physical torture, the Party establishes total dominance over Winston’s body, a crucial step toward conquering his mind. The sensation of pain is undoubtedly an instinctual state that negatively affects linguistic thought. When Winston’s arm was broken at the elbow, and later in Room 101 when he anticipated the future pain he would suffer from the rats bursting out of the cage, or when he received electric shocks to his body for not giving O’Brien’s desired answer to a simple arithmetic question like $2+2$, the sensation of pain ended his linguistic existence. Scarry highlights the difference between pain and speech as follows: “Physical pain does not simply resist language but actively destroys it, bringing about an immediate reversion to a state anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being makes before language is learned... To be in pain is to have certainty; to hear that another person is in pain is to have doubt” (1985: 4). Winston’s experiences with physical pain confirm this. Whenever Winston feels pain, he forgets language. Even when just thinking about the concept of pain, he openly admits that while suffering, it would become his only reality. The idea that the thought of suffering limits free speech is not foreign to the novel, and Winston frequently contemplates this.

Even before becoming the object of violence, Winston knows that he will be punished and will inevitably be the victim of physical violence. He thinks to himself:

“There were moments when he foresaw the things that would happen to him with such actuality that his heart galloped and his breath stopped. He felt the smash of truncheons on his elbows and iron-shod boots on his shins; he saw himself grovelling on the floor, screaming for mercy through broken teeth” (2001: 15). In a short time, Winston is subjected to the violence he fantasized about. There is a general observation about physical violence in the novel: “Sometimes it was fists, sometimes it was truncheons, sometimes it was steel rods, sometimes it was boots. There were times when he rolled about the floor, as shameless as an animal, writhing his body to avoid the kicks, and simply inviting more and yet more kicks, in his ribs, in his belly, on his elbows, on his shins, in his groin, in his testicles, on the bone at the base of his spine” (2001: 240). As the quote indicates, irrational violence is applied to Winston. These are attacks that could have fatal consequences. Most importantly, the acts of violence expressed in the quote are contrary to human dignity. The arbitrary use of violence in this manner is to humiliate Winston and for him to accept this humiliation by internalizing it. A second example of the beating motif focuses on Winston and plays a critical role in the plot’s resolution. In Chapter 1 of Book 3, Winston’s elbow is broken. This event shook Winston’s ideological belief, made him lose faith in himself, and reflected the process of psychological destruction that would lead him to cowardly compromise his ideological stance before O’Brien in Room 101. O’Brien suddenly comes to Winston’s cell, and Winston excitedly asks O’Brien if he has been arrested. O’Brien reveals his true identity and his relationship with the Party to Winston. After this, on O’Brien’s order, a guard attacks Winston with a truncheon, breaking his elbow. After this incident, Winston loses his self-respect. His thought that it is meaningless to be a hero shows Winston’s helplessness against the Party and his loss of self-respect. Undoubtedly, the purpose of the attack is to break Winston’s dignity and make him open to assimilation by the Party narrative. Accordingly, immediately after this event, Winston is taken to the room called Room 101.

The culmination of Winston’s psychological collapse in his detainment in the Ministry of Truth, also known as Minitrue, is his acknowledgment that physical pain can subdue the strongest will, including his will of free speech. Writing on the floor from the smashed elbow, Winston has a crystal-clear realization: “It is impossible to be a hero in the face of physical pain.” This quote is important in that it shows Winston’s fragility as a dissident against the authorities. After the experience of being the object of the authorities’ violence, Winston loses all his self-respect. His commitment to his

ideological values dissolves over time. He understands that neither he nor anyone else can do anything against the power of the Party.

Beatings have ended Winston's relationship with himself and made his individuality more vulnerable. When Winston is beaten by a guard on the order of O'Brien, the person he trusted most, he loses all his idealism. Winston suffers intense psychological pain in the face of physical pain, and as a result, he at once denies both his dissident identity and the utopia of freedom that can be summarized as the liberation of the country from the Party. This undoubtedly reduced the independence that constituted Winston's individuality and destroyed the ideological idealism that built his self. After Winston's relationship with himself was made dysfunctional in this way, the second stage was initiated, and Winston's mind was restructured according to the Party's version of reality.

Objective knowledge and the knowledge approved by the Party narrative coexist in Winston's mind, and he feels uneasy because of this situation; his oppositional feelings towards the Party are generally created by the Party's own actions that contradict its principles and decisions. O'Brien violently opposes Winston's defense of information that is true according to his own mental experiences. He wants Winston to adopt only the Party's reality, and the conversations in Room 101 are largely based on getting Winston to interpret the world within the framework of the Party's worldview. O'Brien aims for Winston to stop speaking freely through his mental transformation.

The clearest example of O'Brien's desire to change Winston's perception of reality through speech and to make it conform to the Party narrative is a discussion O'Brien has with Winston about the number of fingers. O'Brien raises his hand and shows four of his fingers, asking Winston how many fingers are on his hand. Winston, seeing four fingers, gives the answer four. O'Brien does not accept this. He wants Winston to say the number of fingers is five and do so with conviction. Winston cannot bring himself to do what O'Brien says. O'Brien applies electric shocks to control Winston's speech. What is remarkable here is O'Brien's understanding of political power through speech, and that the purpose of political power is based on the control and reshaping of the subject who speaks freely.

Undoubtedly, what appears here to be a simple arithmetic discussion is, in fact, more complex. Nevertheless, O'Brien is attempting to integrate Winston into the Party's

narrative. Winston's integration into the political system is made possible by controlling his speech. At the very least, the Party considers Winston to be reformed when he speaks in accordance with the format deemed normal. This situation is conveyed in the novel as follows:

“‘How many fingers, Winston?’” Winston replied, ‘Four.’ The needle went up to sixty. ‘How many fingers, Winston?’ ‘Four! Four! What else can I say? Four!’ The needle must have risen again, but he did not look at it. The heavy, stern face and the four fingers filled his vision. The fingers stood up before his eyes like pillars, enormous, blurry, and seeming to vibrate, but unmistakably four. ‘How many fingers, Winston?’ ‘Four! Stop it, stop it! How can you go on? Four! Four!’ ‘How many fingers, Winston?’ ‘Five! Five! Five!’ ‘No, Winston, that is no use. You are lying. You still think there are four. How many fingers, please?’ ‘Four! Five! Four—anything you like. Only stop it, stop the pain!’” (2001: 251–252).

The depiction of this event in the form of dialogue, rather than narrative description, lays an emphasis on the act of speech. This narrative style, undoubtedly, aligns with the novel's theme of free speech. O'Brien openly states that Winston is sick and needs to be treated (2001: 310). This treatment is the normalization of Winston's speech, and in many instances, O'Brien tries to rationalize Winston's speech to make him a normal, healthy person. According to O'Brien, because Winston is sick, he thinks and speaks differently from the majority on some issues. O'Brien says that because Winston is sick, he thinks that Oceania is an enemy of its old ally and an ally of its old enemy; he believes that three former Party members who confessed their betrayals to the state were actually innocent. The most important examples of the authorities' pressure on Winston and their reshaping of him are these topics discussed one after another in Room 101, and in addition to these, the scene where O'Brien shows Winston his hand and tests the number of fingers.

O'Brien is disturbed by Winston's free speech on the subject of who Oceania is at war with and wants him to speak in accordance with the Party narrative on this matter. According to the official historical narrative, Oceania has always been at war with Eastasia. Winston is asked to confirm this. Winston steps outside the official historical narrative by saying that Oceania is now at war with Eastasia, but that the same was true for Eurasia before. O'Brien is disturbed by Winston's answer and does not let him finish his sentence. Winston's speech contrary to the official history thesis and O'Brien's intervention in it are described as follows:

‘I remember that until only a week before I was arrested, we were not at war with Eastasia at all. We were in alliance with them. The war was against Eurasia. That had lasted for four years. Before that——’ O’Brien stopped him with a movement of the hand (2001: 311).

It is clearly seen that Winston wants to put forward his own opinion on a matter, but O’Brien prevents this, stopping his speech. After this response from Winston, which does not conform to political orthodoxy, O’Brien wants to show Winston that he is mistaken. According to O’Brien, there is no real past that exists in consciousness. What is real is determined by the authorities. O’Brien wants to show Winston that reality is the product of arbitrary government preferences. He shows him the original of a photograph he destroyed eleven years ago. In this photograph, there are three Party members who were declared traitors by the Party. They are seen in a Party building in New York in this photograph. This photograph proves their innocence. After showing the photograph to Winston, O’Brien drops it down the large hole in the opposite wall called the memory hole, and the photograph is burned to ashes. O’Brien says those three are no longer real. Winston states that both he and O’Brien remember them and that they exist in their minds as a memory. O’Brien replies, ‘I do not remember it,’ (2001: 312). Winston thinks this is doublethink: Winston’s heart sank. That was doublethink. He had a feeling of deadly helplessness. If he could have been sure O’Brien was lying, it would not have mattered. But it was entirely possible O’Brien had indeed forgotten photography. And if so, then already he would have forgotten his denial of remembering it, and forgotten the act of forgetting. How could one be sure that it was simple trickery? Perhaps that lunatic dislocation in the mind could really happen: that was the thought that defeated him (2001: 312–313). When interpreting reality, O’Brien thinks in a way that suits the interests of the political conjecture and develops a mental relationship with the facts in the way the authorities want. O’Brien wants Winston to do this too, and to be an example to him, he applies doublethink in his speech. Doublespeak controls thought and literally resets the possibility of free speech. Language and memory are the bedrock of free expression. Doublethink corrupts both. If yesterday’s reality can be erased and replaced without protest—because the new lie must be accepted as absolute truth—then speech loses its reference point. As the photograph example shows, doublethink prevents the establishment of a truth relationship between language and meaning and prevents rational discussions, and as a type of rational discussion, it prevents free speech. In the photograph example, doublethink prevents the individual from establishing a truth relationship with the past and memories, and reduces truth to the level of absurdities that gain meaning

depending on the arbitrary preferences of the authorities among an endless series of contradictory truths.

In a third incident, the distortion of truth reaches its highest form. Previously, O'Brien had interrupted Winston's free speech by applying doublethink or by showing the discourtesy of cutting him off. This time, O'Brien wants to control Winston's habit of free speech in a more radical way, as the authorities wish, and to integrate him into the Party's controlled reality. O'Brien holds up four fingers and demands that Winston tell him how many he sees. Winston replies truthfully: four. But O'Brien insists that if the Party says there are five, then Winston must see five. When Winston refuses, O'Brien inflicts electric shocks, increasing the pain until Winston is forced to say what he does not believe. But O'Brien is not satisfied with mere verbal compliance. He doesn't want Winston to lie and say five—he wants Winston to genuinely believe that he sees five fingers. This is the terrifying heart of the scene: the Party's goal is not just obedience, but the conquest of the mind itself. Hammond draws attention to the relationship of the use of electricity with interrelated elements such as the control of free speech and the manipulation of reality as follows: "The use of the electric shock apparatus, controlled by O'Brien, is a calculated method to break Winston's resistance through intense physical pain, compelling him to confess to imagined crimes and to accept the Party's distorted truths, such as the assertion that two and two make five" (1988: 92).

2.6.4. Room 101: Spatial Disengagement of Parrhesia, Winston's Disengagement With Free Speech as His Testament to His Ideological Compliance

This section is a long conversation between O'Brien and Winston. The most striking feature of this conversation is Winston's inability to express his independent thoughts through free speech and his inadequacy in representing his own individuality. O'Brien uses language to inflict psychological pain and deceive Winston. In this respect, Winston's silencing, his figurative murder by having his linguistic freedom taken away from him by the authorities, is an inversion of the act of parrhesia as an experience of ethical self-formation. At some moments in this conversation, Winston has opportunities to engage in the activity of parrhesia, and he fails in them. Undoubtedly, the absence of the concept of parrhesia observed in this section is the most fundamental literary dynamic that makes the novel a dystopia.

The concept of parrhesia has been disabled by the political system, and the complete prohibition of free speech is the most important totalitarian feature of the novel. Undoubtedly, the moment when the theme of free speech is most felt is the moment when Winston faces a concrete danger of death. At the end of Winston's education, he has to make a choice between the danger of death and speaking freely. Winston, to stay alive, speaks as O'Brien wishes. Winston's interrogation ends with him shaping his speech in the format desired by the authorities in the face of the fear of death. The end of the interrogation scene is, in a way, the end of the novel: the conflict between Winston and the authorities has been resolved.

For Foucauldian parrhesia, free speech is possible with limitless courage. Taking the risk of death to speak the truth is, according to Foucault, one of the five main elements of the concept of parrhesia. At the end of the interrogation scene, what Winston experiences is exactly this. He is someone who has the potential to speak freely and is therefore othered by the authorities. He is to be punished by the authorities for speaking freely. He is to pay the price for free speech heavily, by being killed (2001: 15).

Room 101 is a place within the Ministry of Love used by the Party for the purpose of psychological torture. Political criminals are taken here. Room 101 is a place where radical psychological torture is applied for the definite rehabilitation of people. The individual needs a set of identity elements that constitute their individuality, and the Party prevents them from having a self, even at the most basic level, by completely destroying this. The Party's radical politicization of family ties, with children spying on their families, is an example of this, but the self in all of society has been similarly systematically trivialized or hollowed out by the Party. A strong self is necessary for independent thought and free speech. It is possible to say that there is a political attack on people's selves in Room 101 and that it therefore also manipulates the will to free speech. Room 101 is a torture chamber, and what distinguishes it from other places where torture is performed is that the person to be tortured is tortured with what they fear most. Crick, one of Orwell's major biographers, points to the personalized nature of the torture in Room 101 as the key to its effectiveness in destroying an individual's core identity: "In Room 101, the Party's omniscience is demonstrated by its knowledge of the victim's ultimate dread, the one thing he cannot bear. The victim is forced to confront this dread, and in his terror, he betrays his deepest loyalties, thereby annihilating his own moral self" (1980: 279). Not only Crick, Howe also emphasizes that the true horror lies in the Party's

ability to penetrate the final bastion of individuality—one's deepest fears: "The horror of Room 101 is not the rat, but the fact that the state has uncovered the last sanctuary of the self. By using what Winston most fears, the Party demonstrates its absolute power to invade and annihilate the individual's innermost being" (1982: 87). More than a place of physical suffering, it is a psychological hell specifically tailored to each individual, illustrating the Party's extreme methods to crush dissenting spirits.

According to Foucault, an act of free speech of the parrhesia type is the speaker telling the truth in the face of the fear of death, if necessary. This can be exemplified by situations such as Socrates choosing death over exile or Diogenes defying a ruler who has the authority to kill him. It is very easy for the human mind to think of death as a concept. Undoubtedly, experiencing death in the material world is a process that is beyond human control and biologically extremely painful. At the end of the novel, what breaks Winston's will for free speech and causes his complete surrender to the authorities, his radical transformation, is the fear of death. Winston feels the fear of death in the face of mortal danger. Out of fear of death, he says what O'Brien wants from him to save his life (2001: 15).

In the context of freedom of expression, the Party authorities have suppressed individual freedom of expression by using the fear of death produced through political torture. The most fundamental quality of Foucauldian parrhesia is that the speaker does not hesitate to engage in an act of free speech bravely in a situation with the danger of death. Winston openly expresses his thought in the novel that physical pain is the most terrible thing. The fear of death, the body's reaction during death, that is, pain, and the uncertainty of what comes after death have always influenced people's thoughts and demoralized them. In addition to this general fear of death, in Winston's specific case, dying because of what he fears most makes death more terrible. O'Brien, with an obsessive passion, has secretly collected information about Winston for seven years and has created his profile. They also know he is afraid of rats. This information must have been obtained most likely by Charrington reporting the reaction he showed to rats while using the stairs in his house. The Party, using this information against Winston, combines Winston's phobia of rats with the death penalty and wants to destroy Winston's will to speak freely, for him to be someone who is silent or always speaks according to the status quo.

As is known, according to Foucault, speaking the truth in the face of the risk of death is one of the five features of the act of parrhesia. The Party uses death as a weapon to break Winston's dissident spirit that makes his free speech possible. What is remarkable here is the Party's synthesis of death with fear, making the risk of death more effective. O'Brien openly acknowledges that "by itself... pain is not always enough" to force total obedience. A human being might withstand torture and refuse to betray their principles, even if it means death. Therefore, the Party turns to fear, the "unendurable" terror no one can resist. Thus, Winston internalizes the authorities through psychological terror and becomes controllable (2001: 283).

At the end of the novel, O'Brien threatens to kill Winston. O'Brien holds a cage full of large, wild rats up to Winston's face. On the side facing Winston, it opens and closes. O'Brien, as someone who represents the violent power of the authorities, states that rats attack the sick, the dying, and babies, and kill them. Thus, he establishes a linguistic relationship between authority and violence. O'Brien says that when he opens the cage, the rats will come out with quick steps and will gouge out Winston's eyes and mouth. Winston's reaction to the contraption signals the death of his parrhesiastic self:

"Do it to Julia! Do it to Julia! Not me! Julia! I don't care what you do to her. Tear her face off, strip her to the bones. Not me! Julia! Not me!' He was not running or shouting any longer. He lay back on the plank, exhausted, his chest heaving. The lever was still at zero. O'Brien had not touched it. 'You see,' said O'Brien, 'you are even prepared to betray your love for Julia. That is good. You have learned to obey, to submit, to love Big Brother'" (2001: 285).

O'Brien's representation of the power of violence through language undoubtedly aims to suppress free speech. Also, Winston is tied to a chair and cannot move. The room is dark. If evaluated in the context of free speech, these two situations symbolically represent the end of Winston's freedom of speech and the devastating effect of the authorities' language of violence on Winston's psychology.

Winston is cowed into conformity in Room 101 with the torture ordeal performed by O'Brien. In accordance with the difference always seen between the real and the apparent in *1984*, there is a difference between the real purpose of O'Brien or the Party and the apparent purpose. O'Brien pretends he is going to kill Winston, but in reality, he wants to make him obedient to the authorities through the fear of death. For Winston to be obedient to the political orthodoxy, he needs to prove whether he can establish a relationship with reality in the way the Party wants as a Party official. Winston has proven

this to the Party by ceasing to practice free speech and through the self-censorship he applies to himself. The purpose of the violence is to prevent the representation of Winston's self through language and to stop it from taking on discursive forms alternative to the authorities. Hitchens interprets the authorities' intention not to actually kill Winston but to target his individual self as follows: What happens in Room 101 is the final step in the 'reintegration' of the political prisoner. By making Winston betray Julia, the one person he truly loves, the Party severs his last emotional tie to his former self, leaving him an empty vessel for its ideology" (2002: 157). What is remarkable here is the contextualization of the reintegration process highlighted by Hitchens through language, and the suppression of Winston's self, its reshaping through language by the identity chosen by the Party. Winston has proven in various situations that he can apply self-censorship and can give up free speech for the Party. In Room 101, because he is afraid of dying by having his face torn apart by rats, Winston speaks as the authorities wish, believing it. Previously, Winston spoke as the authorities wished under coercion from the authorities. On the matter of the result of 2+2, Winston initially spoke freely, but because of the pain from the electricity applied to his body, he spoke as O'Brien wished.

The situation that makes Room 101 special in terms of free speech is Winston changing without external pressure, of his own will, and representing this change through a speech activity in a format compliant with the Party narrative. Through this ordeal, Orwell illustrates how psychological torture dismantles identity and autonomy. There is a direct relationship between the destruction of Winston's dissident spirit through the fear of death and his speaking as the authorities wish instead of speaking freely. Undoubtedly, Winston's release thanks to his giving the answer the authorities wanted, his wanting Julia to be killed instead of himself of his own free will, without it being dictated to him, shows that the authorities interpret the world through speech and that there is a necessary relationship between a dissident identity and free speech.

The authorities present Winston with a model of reality through language and want to educate and normalize him by making him accept this model of reality. The authorities try to rebuild Winston's self through speech and make it compatible with the authorities. In this conversation, Winston is objectified by the authorities through the instrumentalization of speech and becomes a part of the political orthodoxy. The most important situation in the transformation of Winston's self through the instrumentalization of speech by the authorities is the removal of free speech from

Winston's mind, the end of Winston's potential to speak freely. The greatest importance of this conversation is the authorities' construction of themselves through the suppression of Winston's free speech. According to the authorities' interpretation, the most important proof of the breaking of Winston's resistance to the Party is Winston's affirmation of the legitimacy of the authorities with his speech.

In the conversation, O'Brien's most important goal is for Winston to be someone who thinks and speaks as the Party wishes. He ends Winston's relationship with freedom of expression and makes him a loyal Party member in two ways, by making him someone who speaks as the Party wishes.



CONCLUSION

This study set out to examine how parrhesia becomes dysfunctional in the totalitarian political setting of *1984* to illustrate the role of language. The central argument of the thesis is that language both significantly contributes to the formation of standards of speech and the suppression of speech to avoid political dissent and the risk of revealing the Party's persecutions and lies. To guide this investigation, the primary research concept was parrhesia: Winston experiences great psychological tension because he cannot directly criticize the authorities and instead develops representations of linguistic dissent in indirect ways. Winston falls short in many respects required by the concept of parrhesia. The most significant of these is his fear of death, as seen in the interrogation scene. By revisiting these core points, the study attempted to unpack how a lack of free speech, or political parrhesia, reshapes and reinforces the totalitarian power of the Party.

The first chapter of the thesis has covered parrhesia to lay the theoretical ground for the analysis of the novel. Initially, the definition of parrhesia has been investigated to delineate its meaning and importance. Furthermore, the elements of parrhesia are stated to deepen the analysis of the term. In addition, miscellaneous quotations from the book *Fearless Speech* and related articles have been given to reinforce the definition of the term.

The second chapter of the thesis has pinpointed the inversion of parrhesia in the novel through the control and utilization of language by the Party, and Winston's inability and incompetence to engage in free speech. This is demonstrated by the portrayals of both Winston and the Party. In the process, the novel is analysed in terms of the use of language by political elements. Firstly, the relationship between the Party and language is examined to highlight control over language and its political implications—such as people's indifference or incapability to exercise free speech. Most importantly, “doublepeak” and “Newspeak” are employed as examples to reinforce the argument. A follow-up study discusses Winston's interaction with the Party's control. The subsequent section

primarily focuses on Winston's attempt to construct his political identity by aligning himself with an alternative political discourse. However, his effort is feeble in the face of the Party's effective and permanent language control—it lacks the essence of parrhesia. Winston never performs parrhesia because he never directly and openly speaks out against the immoralities and injustices of the Party, nor does he publicly reveal its sordid past. Winston is also psychologically under the control of the Party's authority, which damages his integrity.

It is undeniable that the Party's use of language to eliminate freedom of speech creates the oppressive atmosphere necessary to suppress parrhesia; however, Winston, within this repressive environment, conforms to the prevailing conditions and cowardly refrains from speaking the truth. This lack of courage shows during his interrogation. In that scene, Winston not only remains silent out of fear of death but also articulates the Party's truth in a manner completely contrary to his own ideology. Furthermore, his complete psychological integration into the Party renders the very idea of practicing parrhesia impossible.

In conclusion, the research focus of this thesis is to point out and analyse the relationship between parrhesia and the lack of free speech in *1984*. The reinterpretation of parrhesia in the novel as the “inversion of parrhesia” is the primary argument of the work, and the role of the lack of free speech in the construction of the novel's political setting is discussed with related examples.

REFERENCES

- Aurelius, M. *Meditations: The Annotated Edition*. Translated by R. Waterfield, Basic Books, New York, 2021.
- Atwood, Margaret. "George Orwell and the Politics of Truth." *The Cambridge Companion to George Orwell*, edited by John Rodden, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 2003.
- Brickhouse, Thomas C., and Nicholas D. Smith. *The Trial and Execution of Socrates: Sources and Controversies*. Oxford UP, Oxford, 2004.
- Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. Routledge, New York, 1990.
- Courtine, Jean-Jacques. "Discourse and Power in Orwell's 1984." *Language and Totalitarianism*, vol. 2, no. 1, 1986.
- Crick, Bernard. *George Orwell: A Life*. Penguin Books, London, 1980.
- Desmond, William D. *Cynics*. Acumen Publishing, Durham, 2008.
- Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*. Translated by Pamela Mensch, edited by James Miller. Oxford UP, Oxford, 2018.
- Dreyfus, Hubert L., and Paul Rabinow. *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*. 2nd ed., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983.
- Dyrberg, Torben Bech. *Foucault on the Politics of Parrhesia*. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2016.
- Elshtain, Jean Bethke. *Power Trips and Other Journeys: Essays in Feminism as Civic Discourse*. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1985.
- Epictetus. *The Complete Works: Handbook, Discourses, and Fragments*. Translated by Robin Waterfield, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2022.
- Euripides. *Electra. The Complete Greek Tragedies: Euripides*, edited by David Grene and Richmond Lattimore, Translated by Emily Townsend, Vermeule University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995.

- Euripides. *The Bacchae*. Translated by William Arrowsmith, Euripides V, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2004.
- Flynn, Thomas R. "Foucault and the Critique of Modernity." *Foucault Studies*, vol. 4, 2006.
- Foucault, Michel. *Discourse and Truth: The Problematization of Parrhesia*. Edited by Joseph Pearson, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 1985.
- . *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. Translated by Alan Sheridan, Vintage Books, New York, 1995.
- . *Fearless Speech*. Edited by Joseph Pearson, Semiotext(e), Los Angeles, 2001.
- . *History of Madness*. Translated by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalifa, Routledge, London, 2006.
- . *The Birth of the Clinic*. Translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith, Vintage Books, New York, 1994.
- . *The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982–1983*. Edited by Frédéric Gros, translated by Graham Burchell, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2010.
- . *The Courage of Truth: The Government of Self and Others II; Lectures at the Collège de France, 1983–1984*. Translated by Graham Burchell, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2011.
- . *The Eye of Power: Selected Writings 4*. Translated by Ayrıntı Publications, Istanbul, 2003.
- . *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981–1982*. Edited by Frédéric Gros, translated by Graham Burchell, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005.
- . *The History of Sexuality, Volume 3: The Care of the Self*. Translated by Robert Hurley, Vintage Books, New York, 1988.
- . *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*. Translated by Alan Sheridan, Vintage Books, New York, 1994.
- . *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*. Edited by Colin Gordon, translated by Colin Gordon et al., Pantheon Books, New York, 1980.

- Gottlieb, Erika M. *The Orwell Conundrum: A Cry of Despair or Faith in the Spirit of Man?*. Carleton UP, Ottawa, 1992.
- Hadot, Pierre. *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault*. Translated by Michael Chase, Blackwell, Oxford, 1995.
- Halbwachs, Maurice. *On Collective Memory*. Translated by Lewis A. Coser, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1992.
- Hammond, J. R. *A George Orwell Companion: A Guide to the Novels, Documentaries and Essays*. Macmillan Press, London, 1984.
- Hitchens, Christopher. *Why Orwell Matters*. Basic Books, New York, 2002.
- Howe, Irving. *Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four: Text, Sources, Criticism*. Harcourt, Brace & World, New York, 1963.
- Jackson, Leonard. *The Dematerialization of Writing in Orwell's 1984*. University Press, Unknown City, 2005.
- Jackson, Robert. "Language and Control in Orwell's 1984." *Modern Fiction Studies*, vol. 32, no. 3, 1986.
- Kaufholz, Peter. "The Body Politic: Winston's Varicose Ulcer in 1984." *Journal of Literary Studies*, vol. 34, no. 2, 2018.
- Kelly, Michael. *Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government*. Routledge, London, 2014.
- Kelly, Michael. *Foucault and the Politics of Resistance*. Routledge, London, 2014.
- Lord, Carnes. *Aristotle's Politics*. 2nd ed., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2013.
- Luxon, Nancy. "Truth and Power in Foucault's Reading of Socrates." *Philosophy Today*, vol. 52, no. 3–4, 2008.
- McGushin, Edward F. *Foucault's Askesis: An Introduction to the Philosophical Life*. Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 2020.
- Nails, Debra. *The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics*. Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 2002.

- Nussbaum, Martha C. *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*. Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 1986.
- Ober, Josiah. "Socrates and Democratic Athens." *The Cambridge Companion to Socrates*, edited by Donald R. Morrison, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 2011.
- Orwell, George. *1984*. Penguin Books, London, 2021.
- Plato. "Alcibiades I." *The Complete Works of Plato*, edited by John M. Cooper, translated by D. S. Hutchinson, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1997.
- Plato. "Apology." *The Complete Works of Plato*, edited by John M. Cooper, translated by G. M. A. Grube, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1997.
- Plato. *Apology*. Translated by Hugh Tredennick, *Plato: Complete Works*, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1997.
- Plato. *Euthyphro*. Translated by Hugh Tredennick, *Plato: Complete Works*, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1997.
- Plato. *Laches*. Translated by Rosamond Kent Sprague, *Plato: Complete Works*, edited by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1992.
- Plato. *Phaedrus*. *The Complete Works of Plato*, edited by John M. Cooper, translated by Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1997.
- Revel, Judith. *Foucault's Philosophy of Freedom*. Continuum, London, 2007.
- Rodden, John. *The Cambridge Companion to George Orwell*. Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 2002.
- Rodden, John. "Orwell's 1984 and the Politics of Memory." *Journal of Modern Literature*, vol. 28, no. 4, 2005.
- Sapir, Edward. "The Status of Linguistics as a Science." *Acta Universitatis Danubius – Communicatio*, vol. 18, no. 1, 2024, pp. 17–25.
- Scarry, Elaine. *The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World*. Oxford UP, Oxford, 1985.
- Schmid, Walter T. *On Manly Courage: A Study of Plato's Laches*. Southern Illinois UP, Carbondale, 1992.

Seneca. *Letters on Ethics: To Lucilius*. Translated by Margaret Graver & A. A. Long, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2015.

Senn, James. *The Language of Resistance in Orwell's 1984*. University Press of America, Lanham, 1987.

Smith, J. *Truth and Power*. Academic Press, New York, 2018, p. 95.

Sophocles. *Antigone*. Translated by David Greene, Sophocles I, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2004.

Thucydides. *The History of the Peloponnesian War*. Translated by Martin Hammond, Oxford UP, Oxford, 2009.

Weiskopf, Richard. *The Ethics of Resistance: Foucault and the Problem of Parrhesia*. Routledge, London, 2007.

Whorf, Benjamin Lee. *Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf*. Edited by John B. Carroll, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1956.