

**INFLUENCE OF ZIYA GÖKALP'S NATIONALISM
PERSPECTIVE ON
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY (1923-1938)**

HAKAN SEZGİN ERKAN

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INFLUENCE OF ZIYA GÖKALP'S NATIONALISM PERSPECTIVE ON
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY (1923-1938)

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HAKAN SEZGİN ERKAN

YEDİTEPE UNIVERSITY

JULY 2020

PLAGIARISM

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ABSTRACT

Nationalism is an ideology with substantial effects in all aspects of society and state since its emergence. Indeed, nationalism has brought new approaches to intellectuals and decision-makers since the day of its inception. Although it was the key to gaining independence for many nations, it was also used as an opportunity for the destruction of multinational empires.

Coinciding with the Ottoman Empire's period of regression, the rise of nationalism also deeply affected the Ottomans as a multinational empire. Intellectuals and decision-makers of the era developed and implemented various movements to save the empire. Among these movements called Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism, the movement of Turkism had been the latest trend and the last resort. Nonetheless, it spread rapidly and created deep effects thanks to the Turkist intellectuals of the period.

One of the most important Turkist writers of the period, Gökâlp conducted many studies to inform the public, create a national Turkish identity and influence decision-makers. As a result of these studies he was referred to as the unofficial ideologist of the official Republican People's Party of the Committee of Union and Progress.

Gökâlp's systematic thinking system affected the Republic of Turkey in many areas. One of the most important of these effects was in the field of foreign policy. Indeed, Turkish foreign policy of the period was influenced and shaped by Gökâlp's comprehensive and systematic thinking structure.

This doctoral thesis is designed to elaborate on Ziya Gökâlp's view of nationalism and to investigate the elements that affected his modernist nationalist understanding. In

this line, answers will be sought for the following questions: Did Gökalp's understanding of nationalism affect the objectives and principles of Turkish foreign policy in 1923-1938? Are the principles of Turkish foreign policy clearly visible in the developments of the period? What are the effects of Gökalp's understanding of nationalism on Turkish foreign policy in 1923-1938?

Key Words: Ziya Gökalp, nationalism, Turkish foreign policy

ÖZET

Milliyetçilik ortaya çıktığı dönemden itibaren etkisini toplumun ve devletin her alanında hissettiren bir ideolojidir. Çıktığı dönemden itibaren entelektüeller ve karar vericiler üzerine düşünceler türeterek yeni yaklaşımlar getirdi. Birçok ulus için bağımsızlığını kazanmanın temel anahtarı olmasına rağmen diğer taraftan da çok uluslu imparatorlukların yıkılması için de vesile olmuştur.

Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun gerileme dönemine denk gelen milliyetçiliğin yükselişi çok uluslu imparatorluk olan Osmanlı'yı da derinden etkiledi. Dönemin entelektüelleri ve karar vericileri İmparatorluğu kurtarmak için çeşitli akımlar geliştirdi ve bunları uygulamaya koydu. Osmanlıcılık, İslamcılık ve Türkçülük olarak adlandırılan bu akımlar arasında Türkçülük akımı en son olarak gündeme gelen ve son çara olarak başvuru akımıdır. Bun rağmen dönemin Türkçü entelektüelleri sayesinde hızlıca yayıldı ve karşılık buldu.

Dönemin en önemli Türkçü yazarlarından birisi olan Gökâlp'te bu süreçte halkı bilgilendirmek, milli bir Türk kimliği oluşturmak ve karar vericileri etkilemek için birçok çalışma yaptı. Bu çalışmaların sonucunda da kendisi İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti'nin resmi Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkasının gayri resmi ideoloğu olarak anıldı.

Gökâlp'in sistematik düşünce sistemi Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ni birçok alanda etkiledi. Bu etkilerin en önemlilerinden biri de dış politika alanında gerçekleşti. Dönemin Türk dış politikası Gökâlp'in kapsamlı ve sistematik düşünce yapısından etkilendi ve buna göre şekillendi.

Bu doktora tezinde, Ziya Gökalp'in milliyetçilik görüşü, modernist milliyetçilik anlayışının hangi unsurlarından etkilendiği detaylı olarak incelenecektir. Bununla birlikte şu sorulara cevap aranacaktır: Gökalp'in milliyetçilik anlayışı 1923-1938 Türk dış politikasının hedeflerini ve ilkelerini etkilemiş midir? 1923-1938 Türk dış politikasının ilkeleri dönemin olaylarında açıkça görünmekte midir? Gökalp'in milliyetçilik anlayışının 1923-1938 Türk dış politikasına etkileri nelerdir?

Anahtar kelimeler: Ziya Gökalp, milliyetçilik, Türk dış politikası

To my two late uncles who passed away one after the other:



Serdar BELEK, who was as honest as the day's long and

Tamer BELEK, who was exemplary with his
industriousness

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	i
ABSTRACT.....	ii
ÖZET	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	viii
LIST OF TABLES.....	xi
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
INTRODUCTION	1
1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	5
1.1. Theoretical Roots of Turkish Foreign Policy.....	9
1.1.1. Constructivism.....	9
1.1.1.1. The Main Parameters of Constructivist Approach	17
1.1.1.1.1. Identity.....	18
1.1.1.1.2. Rules	19
1.1.1.1.3. Norms	20
1.1.1.1.4. Actors.....	22
1.1.1.1.5. Intersubjectivity	23
1.1.2. Westernization	25
1.1.3. Modernist Nationalism (Type of Turkish Nationalism)	29
1.1.3.1. Hans Kohn	34
1.1.3.2. Tom Nairn.....	36
1.1.3.3. Miroslav Hroch.....	38
1.1.3.4. Michael Hechter	41

1.1.3.5.	Karl W. Deutsch	43
1.1.3.6.	Elie Kedourie	44
1.1.3.7.	Ernest Gellner	44
1.1.3.8.	Eric Hobsbawm	46
1.1.3.9.	Benedict Anderson	47
2.	ZIYA GÖKALP’S NATIONALISM PERSPECTIVE	49
2.1.	His Life	56
2.2.	His Mindset	67
2.3.	Factors That Gave Birth to the Ideology of Turkish Nationalism.....	77
2.3.1.	Political Factors	86
2.3.2.	Economic Factors.....	95
2.3.3.	Socio-cultural Factors	100
2.4.	Turkish Nationalism in Ziya Gökalp’s Publications	103
3.	THE PLACE OF GÖKALP’S NATIONALISM IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY	112
3.1.	Key Objectives of Turkish Foreign Policy between 1923 and 1938.....	115
3.1.1.	A National State	116
3.1.2.	Reaching the Level of Modern Civilizations	119
3.1.3.	Full Independence	122
3.1.4.	Maintaining Peace	123
3.2.	Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy between 1923 and 1938	125
3.2.1.	Basic Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy between 1923 and 1938	125
3.2.1.1.	Supporting Status Quo	126
3.2.1.2.	Foreign Policy on the Axis of Nationalism	128
3.2.1.3.	Realist, Constructivist and Peaceful Foreign Policy	130

3.2.1.4.	Balance-Based Westernism	132
3.2.1.5.	Protection of Independence and Peace	133
3.2.2.	Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy between 1923 and 1938	135
3.2.2.1.	Mosul Issue.....	135
3.2.2.2.	Turkey-UK Mediterranean Treaty.....	138
3.2.2.3.	Ankara Pact (Turkish-British-French Treaty)	139
3.2.2.4.	Hatay Issue	143
3.2.2.5.	Payment of Ottoman Debts.....	146
3.2.2.6.	Membership in the League of Nations	149
3.2.2.7.	Nyon Conference for Mediterranean Security.....	152
3.2.2.8.	1925 Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression	154
3.2.2.9.	Montreux Convention.....	156
3.2.2.10.	The Issue of Fener Greek Patriarchate	157
3.2.2.11.	Population Exchange	159
3.2.2.12.	Balkan Entente Pact.....	161
3.2.2.13.	Sa'dabad Pact	163
4.	CONCLUSION	164
5.	REFERENCES	170

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1:The Starting Point of the Nation Forming Process in Europe (1800/1815) (Hroch's Classification).....	39
Table 2: Revolts in the 19th Century, Supporters and Consequences	91
Table 3: Lands Lost following the Russo-Turkish War 1877-1878	91

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Classification of Intellectuals of Approaches of Nationalism	30
Figure 2: Intellectuals Possessing Modernist Approach	32



INTRODUCTION

The Chimaera is a fire-breathing creature illustrated as a lion with the head of a goat and with a snake for a tail according to the Greek mythology. Though various heroes endeavored to defeat the creature in their voyages to its cave throughout history, they all turned into ashes with the fire of the Chimaera. Bellerophon, who headed to slaughter Chimaera with Pegasus by his side at the command of the King of Lycia, buried Chimaera sevenfold underground. Yet, the mighty fire of Chimaera persists to reach to the surface of the earth even though centuries have passed.

Just like Chimaera buried underground with its fire reaching out to the surface of the earth, nationalism has prevailed to ignite its fire no matter how many predicaments it has encountered and how much heroes have attempted to destroy it. Every state or society that needed it benefitted from its fire. Thus, traces of nationalism are observed in various areas ranging from domestic politics of countries, education systems and economic policies to foreign policies.

Not every nation's fire of nationalism commenced burning on its own. For this fire to ignite and to grow strong, nations experienced various phases and discovered this fire. Surely, leaders and intellectuals in every nation have provided various works to make society feel this fire in their hearts and minds.

Great numbers of Turkish intellectuals, statesmen and decision-makers starting from the Young Turks strived to enhance the fire of nationalism. Following the tough paths that fire of nationalism's attempt to reach the surface of the earth went through, fire burning underground reached out the surface of the earth with the foundation of the

Republic of Turkey. In Taha Parla's saying, who attributed the greatest importance to nationalism among Turkish intellectuals, Ziya Gökalp's place, which is depicted as the official ideology for Unionists and as the unofficial ideology for Kemalists, is rather particular. While Gökalp attempted to construct Turkish nationalism, he also strived for creating a complicated system touching upon the various policies and areas of the state, which he indeed succeeded. In its plainest condition, this aspect of Turkish nationalism, which can be explained as Turkification, Islamization and Modernization, provided a solid system consisting of opposite notions existing in harmony with one and other.

Just like Ziya Gökalp's ideas did not spring in one day, his ideas were not shaped on a moment's notice. Gökalp was influenced by pioneer intellectuals like İsmail Gaspıralı and Yusuf Akçura who also attempted to burn the fire of nationalism. Gökalp, who systematized their ideas, presented Turkish nationalism within a system.

The system, which was built by Ziya Gökalp, has been rather influential on social structure, economic structure and foreign policy areas as well. Gökalp, whose works are quite comprehensive and detailed, are the guides for decision-makers in every area, which cannot be restrained solely to a nationalism definition.

In this study, the making of fundamental dynamics of Turkish foreign policy which is not given enough significance in terms of Ziya Gökalp's nationalism's impacts and how Ziya Gökalp's nationalism have affected Turkish foreign policy between 1923 and 1938 will be dwelled on.

In this manner, in the first stage of the thesis, it will be essential to refer to constructivism as the theoretical basis. In the first part of this chapter, the concepts of

identity, tradition, belief and norm, on which Ziya Gökalp's concept of nationalism's impacts can be detected in the making of Turkish foreign policy, will be analyzed under constructivism. In the second part, Westernism, one of the common concepts of Ziya Gökalp and Turkish foreign policy will be urged upon by questioning whether there are common grounds in Turkish foreign policy and Ziya Gökalp's works through examining the position and functioning of Westernism and if so, what these common grounds are will be determined. In the third part of the first chapter, to comprehend Turkish nationalism under modernist nationalism emphasis, and Ziya Gökalp's concept of Turkish nationalism, modernist nationalism theory in which I assume Turkish nationalism is included, and the theory which argues the concept of nationalism appears only after the existence of societies, will constitute the last circle of the theoretical framework of the thesis.

In the second chapter of the thesis, I will discuss Ziya Gökalp's nationalism perspective. Herein, political, economic, socio-cultural factors that gave birth to Turkish nationalism will be tackled in-depth. In the final part of this chapter, the notion of Turkization- Islamization-Modernization, which is the ultimate outcome of Ziya Gökalp's concept of nationalism, will be the subject of analysis.

In the third chapter of the thesis, the position of Ziya Gökalp's conception of nationalism in Turkish foreign policy will be scrutinized. In this part, the association between the fundamental goals and features of Turkish foreign policy between 1923 and 1938 and the elements that Ziya Gökalp indicates for Turkish nationalism will be dwelled on. In the final part of this chapter, the incidents of the period and which factors were

benefitted from in the policies that were followed against these incidents and with which elements of Turkish foreign policy these overlap will be examined in detail.

In the concluding chapter of the thesis, answers for the following questions which are also our research questions are sought; Has Ziya Gökalp's conception of nationalism affected Turkish foreign policy? Which elements and insights in Ziya Gökalp's conception of nationalism have found their places in Turkish foreign policy?

1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Nationalism is not a concept that emerged out of nowhere or engraved into the minds of people as consciousness the minute they are born. Just like it is constructed, individuals learn and master the notions of nation and nationalism in time. The mercantilist structure came into being with the French Revolution and afterwards with the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848, required a common language due to the need of fast and efficient production, and on the other hand, it also required a common identity for defending and internalizing the interests of the state. For these two notions to be transferred to the younger generation, national education was utilized. Individuals, who receive a common education, speak a common language and learn nationalism through education, form the habit of behaving for the sake of the country and for the country.

Even though the nationalist movements, began with the French Revolution, were attempted to be stopped by the absolute governments, the fire of nationalism persisted to burn seven-floor under just like the fire of Chimaera. The French Revolution was the primary factor that ignited and deepened this fire. Nationalism, which commenced to spread in Continental Europe swiftly, threatened the empires the most as they incorporated various nations within. One of the empires that obtained its share was the Ottoman Empire. This period, which coincided with the regression period of the Empire, required Empire to struggle with the components defined as nations within its territory.

With the impact of the French Revolution, nationalism waves began to expand among ethnic factors within multinational empires. The moment this condition started to threaten the Ottoman Empire, intellectuals of the era suggested new movements of

thought to protect the integrity of the Empire. These movements labelled as Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism are the products of these depressed periods. Following the failures of Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism movement started to grow stronger. Despite the aforementioned fact, the national identity and conscience construction happened in the period of the Republic of Turkey. The official ideologue of the Party of Union and Progress (CUP), Ziya Gökalp, became the unofficial ideologue of the Republican's People Party and had great impacts on various areas in the mental construction of the Republic ranging from national identity to foreign policy.

With the establishment of Republic of Turkey, the fire of nationalism burning seven-floor under the surface improved with the process of national identity and conscience construction, and Turkish nationalism, possessing the modernist nationalism mindset, turned into a keystone penetrating every area. When the Turkish nationalism possessing the modernist mindset is examined, it can be observed that Turkish nationalism leaves great traces on foreign policy, too. That is why the theoretical cornerstones of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish nationalism share quite a few common points.

Theory or ideology is a whole of ideas that guide us to comprehend and solve a complication. Unfortunately, the application part, the inevitable curse of the theory, is the opposite brother shattering the perfection and smoothness of theory, and wrecking the gilding around it. Still, the reality that one's existence is not possible without the existence of the other needs to be acknowledged. Even though theory, a whole of ideas, emerged out of seeking answers for problems or a whole of problems, it is inevitable for theory to become old and become unable to answer questions.

Despite this, realism and liberalism have been able to preserve their places in the literature for about fifty years as two theories that have dominated the literature for a great deal of time and could come up with answers to many problems. When the struggle between the two theories is looked closer, realism is the by far the most hegemon theory of international relations.

Since the debate between realism and idealism, which is the first great debate of international relations, realism has established a great and a sublime hegemon in the international relations literature until the 1990s by growing stronger gradually. Indeed, the fact that realism could respond to the existing problems in the Cold War order and that international relations support realism in terms of its structure, has been favourable for this growth. Therefore, realism could survive the first three great debates on international relations without any dissolutions. If the existing world order and the Cold war had continued, realism would have gone through the fourth great debate, the debate between rationalism and reflectivism, successfully, which would have been indeed an indisputable reality. However, with the end of the Cold War, various themes of the Cold War such as power, security, self-help system and system stood out as less required than before. Moreover, in this new order, constructivism, which took over the leadership of reflectivists, began to underline the importance of concepts such as identity, tradition, belief and norms.

When the Cold War, which lasted for forty years, and even before that, the First World War are examined, the importance of aforementioned notions, counted as the themes of constructivism can be witnessed clearly. Within this condition, the main question that emerges is why these subjects possessing great importance for countries and

leaders have not taken part in international relations literature frequently? The answer to this question can be given as because states and countries acknowledge these themes naturally and already act in accordance with them, the importance of these themes are discerned in the power vacuum emerged after the Cold War.

Yet another important aspect of constructivism is that it does not strive for rejecting realism and liberalism, constituting the two feet of the international relations, by waging war on two theories. In Alexander Wendt's saying, the main purpose is to build a bridge between the two traditions (Wendt, 1992, p. 394). This means that Wendt (constructivism) rejects neither realist arguments nor the liberal ones. Yet, themes, which indeed existed since time immemorial but had not been in sight as practised instinctively, have become more of an issue in the world order after the Cold War. Thus, in this new world order in which the perception of threat is not ranked as the first, the themes of constructivism have come to the light even more.

Identity, beliefs, traditions and norms represented by constructivism have been the profound subjects of nationalism to which both modernist and primordialist approaches contribute explanations. Having said that, primordialists argue that these are pre-existing notions and states are established on to identity. Contrary to primordialists, modernists state that these notions are constructed as a result of the economic, political or socio-cultural transitions.

1.1. Theoretical Roots of Turkish Foreign Policy

The Turkish foreign policy between 1923 and 1938 is neither constructed on absolute power and power balances as the realists depict nor is constructed on the significance of international organizations which liberals attribute great importance to. In Turkish foreign policy built between 1923 and 1938, many variables and roots such as identity, norms, values, economic development and constructed intersubjectivity exist. Thence, the roots and basic understanding of Turkish foreign policy is too complicated to be comprehended and to be explained only by one theory's themes and approaches.

1.1.1. Constructivism

A theory is a collection of ideas and thoughts brought together to comprehend the world and to explain the political incidents as well as political occurrences. Researchers, academicians and intellectuals develop insights to clarify certain incidents, bring together divergent ideas and do so to seek solutions to a problem or a situation systematically. Yet, defining theory as the collection of ideas is far too assertive because only one theory may be inadequate to disclose the cases in international relations.

Theory helps us to explain international relations. (Dunne, Kurki, & Smith, 2013, p. v). The decisions of the states can be asserted from various angles. Each perspective or approach can present divergent frames and understandings for

people. In other words, it is not possible to explain every issue only with one approach and theory.

Each theory of the international relations attribute significance to various dimensions of international relations; however, each theory has the same purpose in their essence; to understand international relations and provide explanations for it.

International relations discipline is a discipline that emerged to grasp the relations among countries in the world as well as to comment on states' behaviours and to interpret policies of the countries at different levels of analyses. Therewithal, international relations discipline is dynamic with the aforementioned feature and is constantly altering.

As a result of this dynamic nature of the international relations, with the debates that constantly emerged, the discipline has attempted to grasp and interpret the world system and the alterations as well as the transition of the system through the Great Debates.

Surely, World War I was the most devastating disaster that the world has ever encountered with various aspects. In the aftermath of the war, international discipline created idealism arguing that humankind would act rationally and humankind would not dare to wage such a great war and armed conflicts would not take place. According to the idealist thinkers, expansion of education and democracy would strengthen the world public opinion and consequently, none of the governments would act against the common thoughts and understandings of

the world public. According to the idealists, together with the fact that war is a disease for international politics, it is also a situation in which only a small segment comes out with gains. To prevent such an incident from happening, and to create a world public opinion, with an organization like the League of Nations to which countries attend, they also stated that the usage of crude power can be eliminated from international relations (Dowding, 2011, p. 311).

In the period between the two World Wars, the main debate emerged in international relations is the debate between realism and idealism. This debate stemming from the two distinct ideas of human nature is labelled as the First Great Debate in the international relations discipline (Schmidt, 2012, p. 1). Even though which one came out as the victorious has not been determined, as a result of the fact that realism gained importance swiftly in the aftermath of the Second World War and that it reached to a dominating position in the international relations literature, the assumption that realists have won the First Great Debate is profoundly fair.

The Second Great Debate emerged after the Second World War is between Traditionalism and Behaviouralism (Benneyworth, 2011). Behaviouralists, who assert that the literature is dominated by the traditionalists, state that system observations and following the observations, causality in hypotheses and empirical testing should be focused on and they dwell on these (Kaplan, 1966, pp. 6-9).

Another debate emerged by the end of the 1980s is labelled as the Third Great Debate. This debate is the one that emerged in the period from the

emergence of the international relations discipline to 1990s, to its maturation. The debate, which emerged to bring about a new approach to the discipline that was dominated by realism and realist positivist approach and to present a post-positivist approach against the neo-realist hegemony, persists today. As a result of this debate, various approaches like critical theory, normative theory and constructivism have emerged.

Unlike positivism which indicates that international relations, states' relations and world politics can be measured by universal measurement methods, post-positivist approach advocates that in addition to objective criterion, factors aside from the relative reality and material factors should be accounted for. By contrast with the positivist approach which attributes significance to structure and makes agent passive, constructivism, normative theory, critical theory and feminist approach provides an active role to the agent.

Constructivism emerged within this debate and became more popular than the other approaches that are also products of post-positivism, and indeed became prevalent. Constructivism, which has contributed a new approach to the international theories of which the main purpose is to comprehend the international relations, developed distinct perspectives in the main issues of the international relations (Ateş, 2008, p. 214).

The very first participation of constructivism as an approach in the international relations discipline happened with the work titled 'World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations' by Nicholas Onuf. Onuf, in his work, advocates that society and individual,

perceived as agents, are constantly in interaction and continues to do so without any interruptions. According to Onuf, a language is a crucial tool in the process of social constructivism. Language is not only a tool of communication but instead, it is also a tool that has huge influential impacts on social relations and is one of the tools that possess the framing feature (Onuf, 1989, p. 23). In addition to the fact that this perception of language in constructivism makes it distinct from positivism, it also demonstrates that the relationship between structure and agent is subjected to change within their interaction. Surely, Onuf did not perceive the world only as a physical sphere as in the positivist approach. According to Onuf, alongside the physical sphere, the social sphere also exists and this social sphere is as crucial as the physical one. Individuals and societies construct one and other within the interaction of physical and the social spheres (Onuf, 1989, p. 40).

Together with the fact that Onuf's works possess great importance, constructivism secured its position in the literature with Alexander Wendt in the 1990s. Indeed, Alexander Wendt carried constructivism to significant levels in the international relations literature with his works namely; 'Constructing International Politics, Anarchy is What States Make of It, Identity Formation and the International State and Social Theory of International Politics.

Constructivist perspective advocates that every institution, identity and idea within the system are in constant interaction with one and other and that they are socially constructed. To put it differently, every definition, institution, notion that are given importance in the international relations discipline, all of them are socially constructed. According to this approach, the structure that realism defines

as the system is a whole of various ideas, insights, norms and traditions constituted by gathering together and influencing one and other. Within this whole, interaction persist to carry on constantly. Changes with this interaction grant new images and shapes to the society without hesitation.

Constructivist perspective attaches great importance to actors and the ideas of the actors. Within the framework of these ideas, a system and agent's response emerge. When a new idea enters the system, the responses of structure and agent are shaped again, and a new system and a new agent interaction come about.

States pose great importance in constructivism like they do in other international relations theories. Within the scope of this importance, the perspective of constructivism towards states is rather different from those of realist and liberal schools. According to the constructivist perspective, states are social actors. In a sphere where states are social actors, the interactions among states are regarded as the social sphere. Therewithal, it is accepted that interaction between state interests and ideas prevails and that this interaction is framed by the influences of norms, culture and institutions (Steans, Pettiford, Diez, & El-Anis, 2010, p. 194). In other words, together with economic and military factors that are physical factors, non-physical factors namely norms, cultures, traditions that contribute to interaction in the social sphere also exist. Thence, all actors in the social sphere shape their relations with other actors in accordance with the norms, traditions and cultures that they are influenced by (Hopf, 1998, p. 173).

The outcome that comes out of incorporating tradition, norms, belief and identity is indeed a result of contributions of various disciplines. To put it

differently, as a result of an inter-disciplinary approach, constructivism is nourished not only by the international relations discipline but also by other areas such as psychology, political science, sociology (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2007, s. 149)

Constructivism, which is nourished by various areas, has brought about a new approach with its definitions which have contributed to the literature. The main reason why constructivism is not valued as a theory is the utilization of norms, traditions, beliefs and identities in the making of international relations and foreign policy which are characterized as deficiencies by the positivist theories. For instance, from the realist perspective, constructivism acknowledges the elements of realism such as the fact that states seek power, that the system does not possess a specific hierarchical order and that state interests are priorities; however, having said that, constructivism also indicates that these arguments can change and can be shaped within social interactions (Özev, 2013, p. 512). In other words, the circumstances that realism considers as stable are not stable, instead, they are alternating factors. When an individual factor attaches importance to these factors, these inputs become meaningful (Wendt, , 1995, p. 73) and within the scope of the importance attached to the factors, actors build an identity through interaction. This identity improves following the interactions with tradition, norm, belief, space, culture and with other actors, and actors determine their interests according to this identity. Interests, identified according to the identity, become influential in the foreign policymaking process of states.

In his article ‘International Politics’, Alexander Wendt approaches to the issue as: “500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening for the United States

of America (USA) than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons, because the British are friends of the United States and the North Koreans are not, and amity or enmity is a function of shared understandings” (Wendt, 1995, p. 73). To put it differently, within the state interests that arose as a result of the identity construction of the USA, the fact that England possesses nuclear weapons does not pose any threats to the security of the USA meanwhile even a few nuclear weapons that North Korea has pose threats for the security of the USA.

Surely, the constructivist approach differs from other theories and approaches due to the importance it attaches to identity and identity construction while examining international relations.

With the end of the Cold War, all of the theories that were put forward by the theorists were about insights and perspectives on the new order that was to be established. Examples such as “The Grand Chessboard” by Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Clash of Civilization” by Samuel Huntington and “The End of History” by Francis Fukuyama were all approaches that presented insights and understandings to comprehend the new world that came about within the order following the Cold War.

Even though some of the providences of these three writers took place, one of the prominent arguments of the process following the Cold War was the fact that tradition, norm, belief and identity of countries gained more and more significance. Nevertheless, the issues to which constructivism attributes importance that is tradition, norm, belief and identities are not the only the prominent arguments of the period following the Cold War. In the foreign

policymaking processes of states, their traditions, norms, beliefs and identities present themselves clearly from past to the present.

When constructivism is considered within the framework of these theorists, the fundamental arguments of the constructivism can be summarized as:

- Analyzing the mutual interaction between structure and agency,
- Attributing importance to identities, norms and institutions in the foreign policymaking process,
- Pointing the significance of identity and culture in international politics;
- Comprehending how state interests are constructed, which is one of the fundamental parameters of foreign policymaking (Steans, Pettiford, Diez, & El-Anis, 2010, p. 184).

1.1.1.1. The Main Parameters of Constructivist Approach

Comprehending the parameters of constructivist approach pose great importance to discern the main dynamics of Turkish Foreign Policy created between 1923 and 1938, and also to detect how the nationalist movement of Ziya Gökalp shaped the foreign policy. To put it differently, when Turkish Foreign Policy between 1923 and 1938 is observed, the main parameters of the constructivist approach can be seen.

These parameters are as follows;

- Identity
- Rules

- Norms
- Actors
- Intersubjectivity

1.1.1.1.1. Identity

Wendt uses the definition of “socially constructed” for identity which is one of the most important themes of constructivism (Wendt, 1992, p. 397). Still, identity is not a term that is single-layered or that only defines a person. In addition to the fact that a person may carry various identities alongside the individual identity, these identities emerge due to the circumstances and to the conditions and reveal themselves (Alexander & Wiley, 1981, pp. 269-289).

Wendt proposes that there are four kinds of identity. These are personal or corporate, type, role and collective (Wendt, 1999, p. 224). Personal or corporate identity provides the basis for other identities as a social category. Personal/Corporate identities are the kinds of identity established within a specific structure by itself and actors of which are explicit formations. This identity type incorporates the other within itself as it also possesses the self (Fearon, 1998, pp. 44-68).

Type emphasizes that other identity type is in the cultural dimension and present the problem of methodological individualism. To clarify this statement which is not quite clear, characteristic features, attitudes, values, ways of behaviour, common points stemming from the

past, abilities, insights and experiences that individuals share, constitute this type of identity (Wendt, 1999, p. 226).

In the identity defined as role, a dependency on culture and taking the discussion to a step further, dependency on the other exist. Thus, it cannot be argued that this identity type emerged out of basic instincts or feelings. This identity type defines itself with the other (Wendt, 1999, p. 227).

Collective identity regards the relation between self and the other from the framework of logical consequences and identification.

Identification is a process related to comprehension. Within collective identity, self categorizes itself with the other. This process, which is designated as identification, is an issue-oriented situation. Besides, it comes to the fore as an inclusive notion which incorporates both self and the other. At the same time, this process goes beyond the identity conceptions that are named as role and type. To put it differently, even though self and other are different identities and they have distinct roles, collective identity is the one that forms a single unity by gathering them together and melting them in the same pot (Wendt, 1999, p. 229).

1.1.1.1.2. Rules

Constructivism handles rule within two different perspectives. For constructivists, rules are neither relative things that only weak ones follow

and strong ones ignore nor they are ethical codes that liberals proposed to be obeyed in international relations.

Constructivists divide rules into two categories as regulatory and constituent rules (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, p. 285). Regulatory rules are the ones that possess causal influence. To clarify, regulatory rules are the ones that are established to regulate an existing active situation or behaviour (Karacasulu & Uzgören, 2007, p. 38). Due to these rules, constructivism is not squeezed between the arguments of rules' already existing in the anarchical world and of states' only establishing the regulatory ones within their relative powers that neorealists advocate. Nor do constructivists are squeezed in the high-level importance that liberals attribute to the regulatory rules. Instead, constructivism argues that two types of rules are established by the actors following mutual interactions with other actors and advocate that only the existence rules stemming from interactions are important in real terms.

1.1.1.1.3. Norms

Norms, in its plainest definition, are general judgements that determine the scale of appropriate behaviour for actors possessing a certain identity (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, p. 286). Surely, constructivists emphasize the role of norms in human behaviours. Likewise, norms have great importance in foreign policy. In other words, foreign policy is not solely about national interests. At the same time, a foreign policy

movement should be appropriate and acceptable for international society or for the country that makes that foreign policy. Having said that, appropriate behaviours that are acknowledged by the society of the country, indeed frame the foreign policy of that country (Steans, Pettiford, Diez, & El-Anis, 2010, s. 187).

Surely, common understandings, friendships and approaches of societies coming from the past exist. Therewithal, the perceptions of threats of societies, consequently of countries, the ways of behaviours towards other actors and how these behaviours should be are conditioned with these social norms (Pevehouse & Goldstein, 2017, p. 97).

The identities and interests of states emerge out of behaviours that are labelled as norms and that are accepted by the international society in general (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010, p. 218).

One of the greatest examples of norms is the position of the European Union. Europe which experienced two devastating wars in the 20th Century in which millions of people died, has turned into a notion that does not even mention of the word war nowadays due to the changing norms of the European countries (Pevehouse & Goldstein, 2017, p. 98).

The conclusion that can be taken out of this situation is that norms are as dynamic and shifting as international relations. When the first half of the 20th Century is observed, it seems almost impossible that a country would send military or financial aid to a country that has no strategic,

politic or financial importance for it. However, in the aftermath of the Cold War, due to the influence of international norms, Turkey sent naval forces and financial aid to Somali- which did not have any strategic, political or financial importance for Turkey- to block pirates. As in almost 80 years, international norms have evolved into a position where each life is more valuable than interests.

1.1.1.1.4. Actors

Constructivism handles actors within a wide perspective. This wide perspective does not solely acknowledge states as actors like the realists do. Nor does constructivism promote states together with the international organizations as the actors like liberals do. For the constructivist approach, actors might be states. However, the actors of international relations could also be non-state actors like social movements, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, unions. To put it differently, interactions between states and non-state institutions exist and non-state institutions also have the ability to influence states as well as international norms and identities just like states' abilities to affect non-state institutions (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, pp. 699–732).

Unlike realist and liberal assumptions, constructivism attaches great importance to how actors define themselves and how they relate themselves with other actors. Hence, how actors can make changes to the

structure, whether they are states or non-state actors, has the same level of significance.

The fact that institutions can change structures is probable contrary to realist assumption. For instance, the anarchical structure of the international system which has been acknowledged as the foundation is a consequence of interactions between institutions and actors from the beginning of humanity to that time (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, p. 287). As a result of this interaction, what is called the state of nature occurred. Together with this, the same structure prevented a new wide scope war from happening through interactions with the institutions following the Second World War. In other words, war-like states may become peaceful states following the interactions or the vice versa could also be the case.

1.1.1.1.5. Intersubjectivity

The fundamental point of constructivism is that international relations is determined through the norms, rules, ideas, beliefs and values that are regulated, shared and institutionalized by the actors (Viotti & Kauppi, 2012, pp. 281-282).

Intersubjectivity does not solely refer to the general total of individuals' beliefs. Surely, intersubjectivity also means a structure defined by an interaction shared by the people (Jackson & Sørensen, 2010, p. 213).

Intersubjectivity also foresees that values can alter with the change resulting from the interaction between the actors of the incident or relations (Wendt, 1995, s. 160). To exemplify, the concept of being sovereign in a given territory, one of the fundamental principles of being accepted as a state, is acknowledged as a constant rule among intersubjectivity. The first three-quarters of the 20th Century passed by on the strictness of this principle. Therewithal, human rights, another issue that subjects shared among themselves and attributed great importance to, stood out. Within this newly emerged context, if a state commits crimes against humanity utilizing its right to being sovereign within its territory, the belief of intervening by overlooking the sovereignty of the state was born and indeed practised. In other words, the understanding among subjects altered and the new understanding of the holiness of human rights dominated the notion among subjects and a new consensus on this matter has improved.

Likewise, as another approach, colonization and exploitation of the wealth of a given country constituted the basis of economic interests and improvements among states for a long time. In the period when colonization existed, it was indeed practised actively through a consensus and, due to this fact, the First World War broke out. Yet, nowadays this consensus among subjects has broken down. The colonization by occupying one state by another one and exploitation of existing resources do not exist in today's consensus among subjects.

1.1.2. Westernization

Although only 3% of Turkey's territory is situated in the European continent, a strong Western influence on the country prevails. Turkey, which can also be counted as a Middle Eastern country when the regions encompassing the lands are considered, is the most Westernized country and the only country majority of which is Muslim and ruled by democracy among the countries in the Middle East (Oran, 2013, p. 21).

One of the notions inherited from the Ottoman Empire, Westernism, was compounded strictly with secularization policies in the Republic of Turkey. As one of the most outstanding revolutions seen in capitalist countries, the Republic on its own will and wish created a new Westernized identity by excluding the Central Asian identity and Islamic identity inherited from the Ottoman Empire and reflected the identities of the Empire.

Many of the intellectuals, who revolutionized the Turkish foreign policy and established the Republic of Turkey, acquired their Westernized and Western ideas from the Young Turks during their educations. Hence, the impacts of Westernism on Turkish foreign policy can be observed explicitly.

Westernism is not a geographical notion in Turkish foreign policy. Having said that, Westernism incorporates two meanings within. These are;

- Capitalism,
- A Secular and Democratic Civilization

The idea of Westernism rises upon four fundamental pillars. These are;

- **Historical Pillar:** Since the Battle of Manzikert in 1071, Turks rotated their directions constantly to the West. With the Ottoman Empire, having had limited interactions with the East but in contrast, interactions with other Western countries starting with the Byzantine Empire had kept the West as a priority both in terms of geography and mentality. Particularly with the Byzantine political ideology on which the Ottoman Empire settled, it westernized and shifted its direction to the West. Ottoman political ideology was built upon two notions just like the Byzantine political ideology. These notions were Justice and Order of the Universe (Nizam-ı Alem). The notion of Order of the Universe corresponds functionally to the taxis notion of Byzantine. Moreover, the notion Justice reminds us of the oikonomia notion of Byzantine as the least wrongful and the softest solution when it is used with ‘istimalet’ policy (Oktay, 2011, p. 32). Hence, the Western perspective in Ottoman Empire dates back to earlier times. After the French Revolution, Westernism in today’s sense began with the Tanzimat, and continued with the Young Turks and following them, with the period of Party of Union and Progress (CUP) (Oran, 1996, p. 353).
- Many of the intellectuals and those who received education at the state level in this period, graduated from Westernized schools

established as a result of the modernization movement in the military. The founder cadre of the Republic of Turkey implemented the changes, commenced in the period of the Ottoman Empire, even more strictly and faster.

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• **Socio-economic Pillar:** Since the Treaty of Balta Liman, which was the starting point of how Ottoman Empire began to be the market of the West, notable traders who traded with the West constantly were rather close to the West. Therewithal, the reconstruction model that the founders of the Republic of Turkey chose also turned Turkey's direction to the West (Oran, 1996, p. 353; Oran, 2013, p. 50).
- **Cultural Pillar:** Intellectual is, in essence, a Western notion. Building upon that, its meaning refers to a person that internalizes Western enlightenment before it arrives in her or his country (Kautsky, 1962, p. 46). The intellectual either receives an education in Western civilization or receive education in Westernized schools in his or her country to internalise this understanding. At the end of this education, the intellectual absorbs the whole of Western values and rises above society's consciousness level. Thus, intellectual captures the opportunity of detecting the flaws and the aspects requiring a change at first-hand (Oran, 2013, p. 51). Following the detection of flaws and deficiencies, intellectual attempts to alter these and to carry out a

top-down revolution. Founder intellectuals of the Republic of Turkey implemented modernization on foreign policy as well, just like they did on other spheres of society. Even though Western powers were fought, the target of the intellectuals was to reach to the level of contemporary civilization. The notion of modernization in Ziya Gökalp's conception of nationalism is not an ordinary bourgeoisie Westernism. Westernism refers to reaching the Western level which is the leading conception and state structure in every area including economy, social and cultural. To put it differently, West means integration of Western values into foreign policy rather than just geographical terms.

- **The Leader Pillar:** Among the factors that have affected Turkish foreign policy deeply, Atatürk's political and world view are prominent. Unlike Enver Pasha who led the Empire go into war, the fact that Atatürk was a realist and he valued internalization of Western values, entrepreneurship in economy and democratic perspective shaped the foreign policy in accordance with these. As Atatürk directed towards the West and could implement the balance of power principle actively, he had a great impact on the direction of Turkish foreign policy to be shifted towards the West. (Oran, 1996, p. 354).

The pillars of Westernism in Turkish foreign policy pose great importance to comprehend Westernism. However, one of the factors constituting the mental

structure of Westernism lies in Ziya Gökalp's notion of nationalism. This notion will be analyzed in the following chapter in depth.

1.1.3. Modernist Nationalism (Type of Turkish Nationalism)

Although various approaches exist within the frameworks of histories and roots of societies, to check whether there are any similarities between the language structures' of ancient civilizations and today's languages can be acknowledged as a credible approach. From this standpoint, the fact that Turkish history dates back to Sumerians seems detectable as a result of the structure of language.

In the beginnings of the 20th Century, Prof. Fritz Hommel disclosed that Sumerian is indeed Turkish (Hatiboğlu, 1979, pp. 29-30). Hence, the truth indicating that Turkish lineages go back to the Sumerians, one of the oldest civilizations of Mesopotamia, was uncovered. Besides, even though Turkish nationalism dates back to old times, instead of presenting a primordial approach, Turkish nationalism is found on nationalism based on sentiments and belongings. The saying of Atatürk ' ' How happy is the one who says I am a Turk ' ' is one of the approaches that underlines this belonging.

When the perspectives on nationalism are classified in a historical period, several approaches appear.

Figure 1: Classification of Intellectuals of Approaches of Nationalism

Primordialist Approach	Modernist Approach	Ethno-symbolist Approach
• Johann Gottfried Herder • Heinrich von Treischke • Clifford Geertz	• Tom Nairn • Michael Hechter • John Breuilly • Paul R. Brass • Eric J. Hobsbawm • Ernest Gellner • Benedict Anderson • Miroslav Hroch	• John Armstrong • Anthony D. Smith

Among these notions, the best approach to define Turkish nationalism is the modernist approach. Before diving into that, two other approaches require a brief introduction. In its plainest definition, the primordialist approach takes the existence of nations back to ancient times. In other words, according to this approach, nations are natural entities existing on their own since ancient times (Özkırımlı, 2016, p. 79). The primordialist approach indicates that there exists an emotional bond between the individuals and the ethnic group that they belong to (Geertz, 1973, p. 46; Geertz, 1994, p. 31).

Though the primordialist approach is a point of view to nationalism, it fails to explain nationalism notions emerged in societies after the French and Industrial Revolutions. Herein, the modernist approach helps to provide such explanations. Even though the sub-branches of modernist approach explain various distinct transitions, the common point of the modernists is; Nations have emerged with processes of industrialization, the establishment of central governments and urbanization(Özkırımlı, 2016, p. 102). From this point of view, factors that would legitimize modernist theory are as follow;

- Conditions for nationalism to appear in the ancient times did not exist
- Nations have become a necessity in the century of nationalism

In other words, according to modernists, nationalism is a product of modern times. It is a movement of thought that bases modern rational-legal legitimacy on people's will

Figure 2: Intellectuals Possessing Modernist Approach



Turkish nationalism is one of the nationalisms constructed, just as it is emphasized the most in the modernist approach. To comprehend the fundamentals of Ziya Gökalp's nationalism, one needs to absorb the modernist nationalism approach properly. According to modernism, concepts of nation and nationalism are the notions of the modern period. These concepts revealed themselves in the 19th Century following the requirement emerged with the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. In other words, initially, nationalism was formed then nation appeared onto this formation (Hobsbawm, 2012, p. 10).

Age of Absolutism, the period before nationalism, presented itself as a strong phenomenon, was the age in which the idea of nationalism grew and improved. Factors, altered with the Age of Absolutism, provided the proper environment for nationalism to emerge.

In this period when food market grew so much that the local governments could not control it and a stronger central authority was required and consequently, the state began to gather agents of use of force in its hands. Particularly, with the cross-border sales of the merchants, who paid heavy amounts of taxes, they began to get rich, which hampered the powers of major landholders.

In 19th Century conditions, in Europe, international trade accumulated in places where cities were many. Some of these cities had an important share of international trade and accumulated capital through merchants (Tilly, 2001, p. 227). With the merchants wishing to exceed their borders, the central authority

took its agents of use of force under control against the landlords (Tilly, 2001, p. 241). According to modernist input, nationalism arose with these transitions.

1.1.3.1. Hans Kohn

Kohn contributed one of the plainest definitions of nationalism.

According to him, nationalism is the highest level of loyalty that an individual feels for a nation-state. As stated by Kohn, nationality is not a strict and unchanging concept (Kohn, 1965, p. 9). A nation is the living strength of history. The notion of a nation can vary and differ in various ways. These differences can be language, region, political existence, traditions, norms and legacies and behaviours stemming from the past. On the other hand, these are not obligations for a nation to emerge. For instance, the United States of America (USA) is identified as a nation although it does not have a common history and past (Kohn, 1965, p. 10). Likewise, considering Switzerland, even though three or four different languages are spoken by the citizens of Switzerland, Swiss people are defined as a nation, too (Kohn, 1965, p. 10).

When the historical background of nationalism and the notion of the nation are considered, it can be indeed observed that wars before the French Revolution did not appeal to deep national feelings. Greeks experienced the first war among themselves that incorporated the main themes of realism (Thucydides, 1951). Italians fought against Italians until Italian unity was established (Kohn, 1965, p. 10).

According to Kohn, the most crucial elements of being a nation is the corporate will. Surely, Kohn defines this corporate will as nationalism. Even though this sentiment was observed before the 18th Century too, this sentiment had been individualistic and had not been felt as a whole by the people (Kohn, 1965, p. 10).

Still, though not in a national sense, communities separated their existence together from other people can be witnessed. These are the Ancient Jews and Ancient Greeks. However, despite this feeling of community, their ideas were not nation and nationality. The reason why they perceived themselves different from others did not lie in having a national consciousness but in other reasons. Jews separated themselves from other people because they thought they were chosen by God and lived together with other Jews. Thus, they have a common history and common expectations from the future. Yet, the thing that holds them together is not the notion of a nation or high levels of loyalty towards the nation, it is because they regard themselves as chosen (Kohn, 1965, p. 11). Although the situation is different in Ancient Greece, the mentality is the same. People who lived in Ancient Greece perceived themselves as superior to other people. Due to this superior self-perception, they separated themselves from other people and remained together. The situation is the same here, as well. The citizens of Ancient Greece did not separate themselves from other people because they were loyal to a nation, but because they perceived themselves superior to other people or communities (Kohn, 1965, p. 12).

According to Kohn, with the Wilson principles came about after the First World War, nationalism commenced to be utilized to praise individual rights and freedoms. Kohn argued the followings about Turkey. Turks under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal won a victory against the Greek army. With this victory, Turkey gained its independence and the right to be an equal state against other countries. Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, changed the medieval religious structure and instead established a secular republic to which European law system was integrated and democratized Turkish life-style (Kohn, 1965, p. 83). The second one among three Islamic countries¹ that were independent before the First World War, Iran, transformed the country with similar reforms of those of Atatürk.

Following the Second World War, nationalism had been an important factor in establishing a new order in society. With the decolonization period, many of the British colonies gained their independence. In the same period, countries came up with ways leading up to socialism, independent from the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of this period, the United Nations became one common meeting point for all races, nationalities and ideologies (Kohn, 1965, p. 91).

1.1.3.2. Tom Nairn

Nairn, who is a Marxist Scottish nationalist, dwelled on the dilemma of being both a Marxist and a nationalist. According to Nairn, this is a case of

¹ Ottoman Empire, Iran and Afghanistan were the three independent countries.

dilemma in national identity that emerges in an unsafe environment (Nairn, 1981, p. 397). Moreover, he states that nationalism is a historical failure of Marxism (Özkırımlı, 2016, p. 108; Nairn, 1981, p. 329).

Nairn claims that nationalism does not have a direct connection with urbanization increased after industrialization. Indeed, Nairn associates this with the uneven development of Europe starting from the 18th Century.

Following the Renaissance and Enlightenment, with the French and Industrial Revolutions, the insight that Europe would develop as a whole was dominant. The assumptions suggesting that states would adopt the capitalist economy and order and would accumulate wealth and other countries that did not so would follow the same path emerged as general judgements. However, development and progress in Europe did not happen as such. Countries that developed initially as well as becoming the centres of capital through the accumulation of wealth dominated other countries that could not do so. In addition to this, no other external power existed for underdeveloped countries to support and improve them (Özkırımlı, 2016, pp. 109-110).

Again, intellectuals were the ones who discovered the situation. Following the realization of the situation, intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries took responsibility. To make this improvement probable, they were required to do two things (Nairn, 1981, p. 340);

- Imitating the developed countries

- Establishing a society in the realization of its own identity against external powers

While doing this, intellectual attempted to bring people together to a common identity without looking at community's differences, colours, languages or roots and emphasized writing in a language that would be understandable for the community to acquire their support in their quest to form a common identity (Nairn, 1994, pp. 73-74).

When the countries that developed in this direction are considered, England, France and the USA do not need nationalism. Regarding the fact that capitalism gives birth to nationalism, economic condition for nationalism to emerge does not exist in these countries. However, due to constant interactions between the centre and neighbouring countries, it is inevitable for nationalism to appear in centre countries, too.

1.1.3.3. Miroslav Hroch

In his work titled the Revival of the Small European Nations I: The Nations of Northern and Eastern Europe, Hroch makes two crucial classifications and findings. The first one of these is the three stages of nationalism, and the other one is the division of states into two.

According to Hroch, in the period proceeding since the Middle Ages, eight nation-states completed their formations. These are England, Spain, Sweden, France, Denmark, Holland and Portugal. These states completed

their formations in the beginnings of the 19th Century and they are indeed homogenous in terms of ethnicity as well as having an improved culture. In addition to the aforementioned eight countries, Germany and Italy possess all these qualities mentioned except for not being able to establish their states (Hroch, 1993, pp. 3-4). The second group of states, labelled as a non-dominant ethnic group, are groups exceeding number thirty.

Table 1: The Starting Point of the Nation Forming Process in Europe (1800/1815) (Hroch's Classification)

		Western Europe & Northern Europe	Central Europe & Eastern Europe
State- Nations	Monoethnic State	France, Portugal, Netherlands	
	Multiethnic Empires	English in Great Britain, Castilians in Spain	Danes, Swedes, Russians, Germans in Habsburg Lands
National Culture without State		Italians	Germans
	Suppressed continuity of old statehood	Scots	Poles, Magyars, Norwegians, Czechs, Croatians
Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups	Interruption tradition of old statehood	Irish, Welsh, Bretons, Catalans, Basques, Flemish	Serbs, Bulgarians, Lithuanians, Romanians,

			Ukrainians, Greeks
	Without any tradition of statehood	Frisians, Corsicans, Galicians (in Spain)	Slovaks, Slovenes, Finns, Estonians, Belarusians, Serbs

(Hroch, 1995, p. 285)

Hroch divided nationalist movements and national movements.

According to his mindset, all the efforts shown to reach to the qualities to be a nation are national movements. Whereas according to Hroch, nationalist movements are the understanding that perceives that nation's values superior to all other values and interests. National movements are the efforts to reach this (Hroch, 1995, pp. 284-285).

Hroch divided the process starting from the national movements into three phases. In the first phase, named as Phase A, explanations are brought forth to the questions like what nation, language, history, notion are. The second phase, named as Phase B, is the period which the number of patriots increase in and characterized by these and a period in which a superiority is sought against many ethnic groups. In this period, when the non-dominant ethnic group shares the national identity and accepts it as a special value, mass movements emerge with Phase C (Hroch, 1995, p. 284). Indeed, the aims of the national movements reveal themselves in Phase B. Afterwards, overcoming the barrier set in front these movements needs to be done in Phase C. These aims set in Phase B generally consist of three main wishes according to the deficits identified. These wishes are (Hroch, 1995, p. 286);

- Formation of a national culture which takes local language as its base, and the usage of this language in various spheres like education, administration and economy,
- Having its elites and enterprising class, the abolishment of privileges and support of equal share,
- The right of self-government and realization of political wills including civil rights.

Hroch answered the question of why social conflicts in some regions of Europe brought national conflicts quicker by stating that the regions where national movements began and rose swiftly in the 19th Century were places of oppressive regimes. Nationalist discourse is the only solution here for ethnic groups who have not experienced politics when there is no chance of solving the problems through other means (Özkırımlı, 2016, p. 199). As opposed to this, Western Europe, where political culture level is high, differs from other regions as there is the possibility of solving problems through political ways (Özkırımlı, 2016, p. 199).

1.1.3.4. Michael Hechter

Hechter chooses to explain the notion of nationalism with the internal colonialism term. With this term, previously used by Lenin and Antonio Gramsci, Hechter analyzes the outcome that appears following the increased relationship between the core and the periphery (Hechter, 1975, pp. 8-9).

In the model, defined as the diffusionist model, three phases exist. In the first phase, before the industrialization, there is not any relation between core and periphery. In the second phase, these relations increase, and this stage is called the stage of industrialization. In that case, due to the increased interaction of core and periphery as diffusionists assume, they also argue that the similarities between the two regions would enhance. Thus, with the increased interaction with the core, periphery would become modernized. In the third and final phase, the welfare levels of the regions would be even and the cultural differences would be forgotten (Hechter, 1975, pp. 6-8).

As a response to diffusionist approach, Hechter argued that the progress does not unfold as such by stating that aforementioned phases are too optimistic and indicated that it is internal colonialism by using the definition previously used by Lenin and Gramsci.

According to this model, the increased interaction and relation between core and periphery would have distinct consequences. This situation would not create a unity as the previous model predicts, instead, the situation in which the core would establish political sovereignty on the periphery and a situation in which the core would exploit periphery would emerge. Consequently, the core would attempt to institutionalize the established order and protects the advantage of it. As a result, the core would attain a developed economic structure while the periphery would be its subsidiary as being dependent on the core (Hechter, 1975, p. 9).

In this way, as all of the decisions would be taken in the core, the core would benefit the most from those decisions and periphery would always be left behind the core. The same structure would apply to the division of social roles. Core would acquire important roles and would share them among its members. However, the ones from the periphery would not take part in this group (Hechter, 1975, p. 10).

1.1.3.5. Karl W. Deutsch

Among modernists, Deutsch is one of the theorists, who improved his approach by taking social communication as the basis. The modernization process is important for the harmonization between ethnic factors, and industrialization, the generalization of central education and communication. These processes are the first stage of nation-building (Deutsch, 1966, p. 124).

Following these processes, harmonization processes of society lead to generalization of communication, and if these processes spread among people fast, nationalism would be shaped (Deutsch, 1966, p. 125).

There exists a direct bond between the generalization of mass communication, and harmonization of distinct ethnic factors at the national level, the generalization of the transportation system, enhancing the literacy rate and expansion of trade networks. Within this scope, social

communication improves with national consciousness (Deutsch, 1966, p. 126).

1.1.3.6. Elie Kedourie

According to Kedourie, nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe in the 19th Century. Humanity was divided into nations and these nations establish their legitimate governments and administrations with their characteristic features (Kedourie, 1961, p. 9).

According to Kedourie, there are three elements of nationalism doctrine. These are the idea of self-determination, individual fulfilment through absorption in the state and struggle (Kedourie, 1961, p. 54).

In Kedourie's mindset, indeed, language, most visibly, constitutes the basis of division in international relations (Kedourie, 1961, pp. 63-64). That is why a clear distinction between racial nationalism and linguistic nationalism is not made.

1.1.3.7. Ernest Gellner

According to Gellner, nationalism is the principle that supports the necessity of harmony between political and national units and nationalism definitely belongs to the modern age (Gellner, 1983, p. 1).

According to Gellner, humanity has undergone three stages. These are (Gellner, 1983, p. 5).;

- Pre-agrarian
- The agrarian
- The industrial

In the pre-agrarian period, which is the first stage, there was no central authority or political power. Therefore, the emergence of notions of nation or nationalism was not on the agenda. In the second period, power distribution was determined according to status and culture in most of the central and political structures. In this period, culture was utilized as a tool by the elite to distinguish themselves from other classes. At the same time, the structure of the state was rather variational (Gellner, 1983, p. 5). In industrialized societies, the existence of a state is inevitable. Surely, nations and nationalism become necessities. Modern society attributes importance to class mobility and has a fluid-structure. The areas of expertise are closer to the previous period, so the general education provided to the public is quite significant. Thus, education systems of the industrialized societies demonstrate great similarities. People living in these societies do not have loyalty to a king, a belief or to land as they did in previous periods. These people bear loyalty for culture (Gellner, 1983, p. 36).

That is why nationalism is a product of industrialized society. Cultures that could keep up with the modern age and could reach to the potential of being a nation in industrial society are garden cultures. Whereas the cultures that could not achieve the potential of being a nation are wild cultures. Garden

cultures are protected carefully because states acquire their legitimacy from nationalism in this age (Gellner, 1983, pp. 50-52).

1.1.3.8. Eric Hobsbawm

Hobsbawm defines nation and nationalism notions as social engineering (Hobsbawm, 2013, p. 13). The definition of invented traditions is a set of habits and practices acknowledged evidently or muffledly. When existing practices are repeated constantly, certain values and norms are internalized by the people. At the end of the internalization process, a bond between the past and the present is built. Among these invented traditions, the most common and concrete one is national consciousness (Hobsbawm, 2013, p. 1).

According to Hobsbawm, the period in which the highest number of traditions were invented was between 1870 and 1814. Due to the political mobility occurred after 1870, the elite of the existing order was threatened with the political participation of the people. The biggest problem for the elite in this period stemmed from transition to mass democracy as a result of the political participation of ordinary people, and indeed they showed great effort to cope up with the threats as a result of the aforementioned transition.

The most preferred way in this period was to direct people to the ceremonies that were held periodically. In other words, habits and regular practices were being attempted to be created among the people (Hobsbawm, 2013, p. 12).

Hobsbawm advocates three ways to weld the people and the system. These are (Cannadine, 2013, pp. 54-55);

- Establishing new institutions (festivals, sports organizations)
- Creating ways of socialization (education system)
- Creating communities that signify the integrity of the groups (nation)

In his own words, Hobsbawm defines nationalism just like Ernest Gellner by referring to it as “the principle that anticipates the harmony of political and national units” (Hobsbawm, 1995, p. 23).

According to Hobsbawm, nationalism takes the pre-existing culture and turns it into nations, and even sometimes invents nations. At the same time, nationalism generally means wiping off the pre-existing cultures. Within this scope, nations come before nationalism (Hobsbawm, 1995, p. 24). To put it distinctly, nationalism creates nations.

1.1.3.9. Benedict Anderson

Anderson advocates that nation and nationalism are artefacts. According to Anderson, the “nation is an imagined community.” (Anderson, 2014, p. 20). The reason why it is imagined is that even the smallest nation’s members have the imagined community all in their mindsets even though they would not even recognize or meet with one and other. The moment when significant numbers of

people think that they have created a nation, indeed the nation begins to exist (Anderson, 2014, p. 20).

At the same time, the nation is limited. Even the biggest nation has its limits and beyond the limits, other people belong to other nations. None of the nations contemplates that it corresponds to the whole of humanity (Anderson, 2014, p. 21).

Moreover, a nation is at the same time sovereign. Surely, it appeared in a period in which the legitimacy stemming from the divine rights and dynasty of those who ruled eroded. Sovereignty passed on to the nation from these dynasties (Anderson, 2014, pp. 21-22).

A nation is also imagined as a community because no matter how deep the inequalities in the nation, the nation is an everlasting companionship and brotherhood (Anderson, 2014, p. 22).

2. ZIYA GÖKALP'S NATIONALISM PERSPECTIVE

The modernist perspective to the theory of nationalism puts forward that nationalism is a product of the modern period and industrial revolution. In this period, traditions were invented, a common education system was established, and most importantly, against monarchs who had acquired their legitimacy from God for centuries, rights and political participation commenced to expand towards the people.

In this new period, the people began to be attached to nationalism as an ideology rather than to land or a king and states started to utilize nationalism as a source of legitimacy.

Identity, which is attempted to be built in nation-building processes, is the cement of the nation. Through a common identity, selfness and understanding, people constitute a nation. For nations to come into being, members of the nation do not need to descend from the same root or the same tribe. In the process of Italian unification, the famous saying ‘‘We have made Italy. Now we must make Italians’’ of the Prime Minister of Sardinia Massimo d’Azeglio sheds light to this understanding.

Undoubtedly, the rise of nationalism affected the multinational empires the most. In multinational empires ruled by the absolute monarchy in which the people under the absolute ruler was considered as the subjects, for ethnic groups that did not have any other ways of solving problems and did not experience politics before as Hroch also touches upon, nationalist discourse turned out to be the only option (Özkırımlı, 2016, p. 199).

To tackle this issue, the Ottoman Empire declared Tanzimat (*Edict of Gülhane*) as the first step of turning people from subjects to citizens. With this declaration;

- All of the Ottoman Community's security of life and property were guaranteed regardless of the religion and sect they belonged to
- It was declared that taxes would be collected from everyone according to their means
- The military term was to be reduced
- The private property would not be limited, no subject's private property would be confiscated
- No executions without jurisdiction were decided upon
- Ministers could express their opinions freely

According to Şerif Mardin, it is not possible to talk about the 19th Century Turkish history of thought. Yet, it is possible to discuss sociological thought of 19th Century because the goals of the ideas appeared in this period were short-term, practical and search for the ways of solution for the state (Mardin, 1983, pp. 9-17). Edict of Gülhane was the exact product of this. With the Edict, declared practically, the equality of societies living in the Ottoman Empire was emphasized.

In the 19th Century, two major threats existed within the Ottoman Empire. These were the Tsardom of Russia and non-muslim nationalism. Thence, the fundamental aim of the efforts shown in the Tanzimat period was to block the separatism of non-muslims, who constituted 80% of the population (Çetinsaya, 2011, p. 54). Fuat Pasha underlined the internalization of all political and administrative institutions that were necessary and

obligatory for the security of Islam and to maintain its existence in Europe (Akarlı, 1978, p. 2).

The idea of Ottomanism, the first one of the three big political movements of the era, appeared in period commenced with the Tanzimat. The goal was to melt all Muslims and non-Muslims in the same pot through creating a national identity. Even though this insight was born firstly in the reign of Mahmut II², the actualization of it with the Edict of Gülhane corresponded to the beginnings of the period of Abdülmecid, who came after Mahmut II.

Before touching upon the idea of Ottomanism, the occurrence of Ottomanism and the mental structure of it need to be evaluated. Although the politics of Ottomanism, appeared in the 1830s, developed as a pragmatic solution, it turned into a conscious ideological formulation from 1868 onwards (Somel, 2011, p. 88). Initially, when the Ottomanism ideology is considered, it also signifies the breaking away from the sense of traditional Ottoman state. The thought of Ottomanism means the replacement of the concept of subject, which is divided into sections within the millet system, with a modern state based on equality before the law and citizenship principles.

Every community recognized officially by the state in the Ottoman Empire had autonomous status within themselves. As opposed to this, the clergy of these communities was accepted as an official of the Ottoman administration. When it was the 18th Century, within the Rum and Ermeni communities, who met with the Western

² The reason lying under this idea is acknowledged as the saying of Mahmud II who said "I only wish to see the differences among my subjects when they go into a mosque, synagogue or a church..." (Akçura, 2015, p. 222).

enlightenment, an independent and secular trade bourgeoisie began to rise, independently from the thoughts of the church (Somel, 2011, p. 90). Herein, problems between the administration of the Ottoman Empire and the leaders of the non-muslim subjects started to appear. The main reason for these problems was the fact that leaders of the non-muslim subjects could not sufficiently keep their communities under control.

As a result of Greece's establishment as a separate state in 1829, the newly developed insight in Ottoman bureaucrats was that the structuring of the non-muslim community coming from the past carried a separatist quality within. The resolution found after this was the fact that political loyalties should have been directed towards the Ottoman Empire not towards the communities.

Ottomanism emerged as a pragmatic solution to avoid diffusion as a result of this transition. Starting with the period after 1830 to 1913, Ottomanism altered and renewed itself from time to time. Although it converted into an ideology from a pragmatic perspective and identified with Ottoman liberalism, it failed to compete with the two rivalry ideologies namely the pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism following the Balkan Wars³. In fact, as a result of the contradictions of idea of Ottomanism, pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism appeared.

When the infrastructure of Ottomanism is considered ideologically, it is observed that there are three main ideas behind in the stage where it turned into an ideology from pragmatism. The first assumption of Ottomanism is that on the condition all factors living

³ The target population of the Ottomanism principle was the non-muslims who constituted the 40% of the Empire. Ottomanism lost its foundations and grounds with the process until the Balkan wars in which the majority of the non-muslim population began to be excluded from the Ottoman lands and with the Balkan Wars, this situation reached its highest level. Since the period in which creating a common identity came about, the non-muslims did not internalize this conceptualization by no means.

in the Empire were granted equal rights and freedoms and fundamental rights were provided, it was assumed that these people would latch on to the Empire (Çetinsaya, 2011, p. 266). After a while, when this idea sprang to be insufficient, as a second opinion, that if non-muslims got better economically and if the government provided necessary service to where they resided, they would not complain about the state, emerged. Ottoman Empire made all of its investments in the Balkans. Anatolia was ignored and all of the state's power was transmitted to the Balkans. Despite this, when it was the ends of 1860s, separatist movements began again in the Balkans (Çetinsaya, 2011, p. 266).

Young Ottomans and their criticisms began to rise in this period. The insight suggesting Muslims were treated as second-class citizens for the sake of satisfying non-muslims lay at the heart of Young Ottomans' criticisms. The solution of Young Ottomans in this period and at the same time the third solution of Ottomanism was the transition to Constitutional Monarchy. According to this mindset, if a parliament were opened and non-muslims received political equality, the separatism would be avoided (Çetinsaya, 2011, p. 266).

In this environment of conflicts of ideas and opinions, with the insight claiming that the Ottoman administration ignored Muslims, the notion of İttihad-ı İslam sprouted. Two fundamental reasons lie under this notion. The first one is the fact that caliphate gained importance as a result of the colonization of the Islamic world. The second one is the conservative response occurred after the Imperial Reform Edict (Özcan, 2001, pp. 70-71).

Pan-Islamism legitimized itself in two manners and made way for itself. The first one was the oppression that Muslims, who lived in Russian domination and territories

colonized by the Western countries, faced. This caused pan-Islamism to stand out together with the anti-Westernism and anti-Russian sentiment (Çetinsaya, 2011, p. 266).

While the idea of ‘İttihad-ı İslam’ emerged under the pan-Islamism legitimized itself through two ways, at the same time it was divided into two as the major and the small. In broad terms, this refers to the unification of all the Muslims living under the colonies of the Western states (England, France etc.) under the shadow of the Islamic Caliphate and an Islamic unification solely oriented towards Russia, from Crimea to Central Asia in the territories under Russian sovereignty (Çetinsaya, 2011, p. 267-268).

Although pan-Islamism idea demonstrated itself in these utopic insights, it has essentially two purposes. Following the non-muslim subjects who gained independence and upheavals in the Balkans, the first purpose was to tie Arabs and Circassians to the Ottoman Sultan, the Caliphate on common grounds created by the idea of Islam and the second purpose was to strengthen the connection between the centre and provinces, the population of which was mostly Muslim who lived away from the centre (Çetinsaya, 2011, p. 269).

The detachment between pan-Islamism (or İttihad-ı İslam) and utopic ideas dates back to 1878 Berlin Agreement in which the idea of Ottomanism de facto collapsed. With the Berlin Agreement, the Ottoman Empire lost a huge part of its non-muslim population. In this new demographic structure, the total population of non-Muslims decreased from 40% to 20%. While the idea of pan-Islamism became the official state policy from that point on, the two aims mentioned above turned into two targets of the state.

Yet there is another consequence of the 1878 Berlin Agreement aside from the purification of pan-Islamism from utopic ideas and collapse of Ottomanism. In addition to having been the biggest revenue point for the Empire, the lost Balkan lands were also the places where the Empire invested the most. Hence, to make up for this deficit and to maintain the places densely populated by Arabs, the Empire decided to invest in Arabia. By doing so, the Empire could meet the tax deficits and could acquire the loyalty of Arabs for the Empire. Cevdet Pasha explained this idea by saying that “...With the public works of the Anatolian and Arabian continents, it is possible to enhance our wealth...” (Özcan, 1997, p. 129).

When the Anatolian and Arabian geography is considered, even though the detection stating that most of the area is Muslim is accurate, there exist major differences in terms of sects and beliefs. Statesmen, who were aware of this, endeavoured to create a Muslim nation contingent upon the Caliphate through education which incorporated secular and religious elements through the insight of “a school and a masjid for every village” (Çetinsaya, 2011, p. 271). In other words, the state was organized as Muslim and to be in accordance with this, a Muslim identity was aimed to be built.

The idea of pan-Islamism was attempted to be implemented until the end of Abdülhamid II's reign. It continued until 1918 when almost all of the non-muslims broke away from the Empire with the Balkan Wars and with that, all Arab lands breaking away from the Ottoman Empire. The identity that the rulers of the Ottoman Empire attempted to build, for the second time, on a ground that did not exist collapsed. With the collapse of the ideas of Ottomanism and pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism began to rise. Pan-Turkism, which incorporated the founder factors of the Empire namely the traditions, norms and

beliefs, was recalled after two failed attempts and started to be implemented. This new understanding of identity, construction of which commenced in the Union and Progress period and finalized in the Republican period, succeeded, unlike the two movements before it.

In the achieved success of Turkism, in addition to the fact that decision-makers of the era notably Mustafa Kemal built it right and did not merge the movement with utopic ideas, the fact that Turkish identity based on three grounds identified as Turkification, Modernization and Islamization that Ziya Gökalp's accurately built had as much influence as other underlying reasons.

In fact, that is why Gökalp was named as the official ideologue of Party of the Union and Progress and the unofficial ideologue of the Republicans' People Party (Parla, 2009, p. 29).

2.1. His Life

Ziya Gökalp was born in Diyarbakır on 23 March 1876. The years he grew up in correspond to the reign of Abdülhamid. Gökalp, who grew up in this rule, is the ideologue of first the Second Constitutional Era in 1908 and of the Republican Revolutions in the 1920s.

Although those who are against the mentality and political opinions of Gökalp claim that he was Kurdish in terms of the province where he was born, Gökalp indicated that he regarded himself Turkish as an output of the modernist nationalism understanding. In Gökalp's concept of nationalism, language and culture pose great

importance, as it will be dwelled on later on. In his saying, though his grandfathers were in Kurdish or Arab regions, he indicated that he would not hesitate to identify himself a Turk as he also stated that nationality depends on upbringing (Parla, 2009, pp. 36-37).

The great grandfather of Ziya Gökalp, Haji Hüseyin Sabir possessed the timar of three villages and then he was appointed to Muftiate of Diyarbakır (Erişirgil, 2017, p. 23). Sıtkı Efendi, the son of Sabir Efendi, received a good education considering the period and worked in revenue offices in Rumeli provinces. He had two sons, and both of them received a good education. His younger son, Tevfik Efendi, rose to work in Provincial Record Office in his state duty where he started as an official at the lowest level and was appointed to head of the Provincial Government Gazette. Mehmet Ziya was the second son of Tevfik Efendi. He initially went to a local school, and from there he continued his studies at the Ottoman Military Academy.

Gökalp stated that his educational and cultural growth was directed by his father, and indeed he was greatly influenced by him. According to Gökalp, his father was a person who combined religiosity with free thought (Gökalp, 2018, p. 177). One of the incidents that Gökalp was affected mentally by was the last words his father told him the day he died: *‘‘Come here! I will tell you the mournful news. Today is a day of great sorrow for you and all your friends. As the greatest teacher of ours and the greatest man of the nation, Namık Kemal passed away....See, you will follow that man’s path. You will indeed become a patriotic man just like him and become a libertarian as much as him.’’* His father, in this speech of his, also gave voice to the injustices and oppressions he had to encounter, and the resistance he showed against

these. Gökalp indicated that he began to perceive the ideals of liberty, nation and motherland above anything else after this speech (Gökalp, 2018, p. 178).

One day, while his father was seeing a friend of his, his friend shared his opinions on how the nation would have gained an intellectual if Ziya had been sent abroad. His father's response to this opinion, in Gökalp's saying, revolutionized his life. His response was as follows: *‘‘The young people who go abroad for education can solely learn the knowledge and wisdom of Europe. They indeed become oblivious of national knowledge. Those who receive education at the madrasa, if they find good hodjas, they can have a good grasp of our religious and national insights. Yet, they would lack the knowledge of Europe. I believe that the most beneficial intellectuals for our country are the ones who know truths that should be known promptly for us. These truths exist wholly neither in European education nor in our national wisdom. Our young should learn French well on the one hand, while on the other hand, they should also learn Arabian and Farsi well! Afterwards, they should be perfectly competent on both Western wisdom and Eastern wisdom! Following this, they should be able to uncover the greatest truths required by comparison of these pearls of wisdom. If my lifetime manages to see it, I will attempt to raise Ziya in this manner.’’* (Gökalp, 2018, pp. 177-178).

Gökalp graduated from Diyarbakır Military Academy in 1890 and began his education at the Imperial School (*Mülkiye İdadisi*). While his education there at the İdadi, he learned French and both Arabian and Farsi thanks to the guidance of his uncle Hasip Bey. Thanks to his uncle, he also read about Islamic scholars and acquired detailed information about them. While Ziya Gökalp was studying at the

Idadi, he met Abdullah Cevdet who was in Diyarbakır due to the cholera outbreak and thanks to him, Gökarp began to read the pieces of European scholars. Abdullah Cevdet wished to harmonize the Eastern culture and Western technology and culture and to melt them together in the same pot, which was attempted to be implemented and taken as an example by Ziya Gökarp. For this reason, he suggested the translation of important pieces of Western and Eastern scholars into Turkish (Hanioglu, 1981, p. 183).

Gökarp, who started to write revolutionary poems in his last year at the Idadi, attempted to commit suicide due to severe depression he got in 1894 and fired a bullet to his head. Even though he was saved, the bullet could not be taken out (Ülken, 2006, p. xiii). Gökarp wrote that this depression was a disruption he felt of the clash between Westernist movement he received in high school and the Eastern movement he got from his family (Parla, 2009, p. 40). Gökarp explained his suicide by stating that the source of all his sufferings was his philosophical thoughts, in his writings in the journal Küçük Mecmua (Gökarp, 2018a, p. 184).

Gökarp came to Istanbul in 1896. He was enrolled in Baytar Mekteb-i Aliye (*Veterinary school*) which was the only free-boarding higher education institution he could study in. He received ten-month sentence due to the activities he took part in against the rule of Abdülhamid II. Afterwards, he was sent to Diyarbakır and could not complete his higher education. As a matter of fact, he became a member of the Committee of Union and Progress and met İshak Skuti and İbrahim Temo (Parla, 2009, p. 41).

Gökalp's actual encounter with Turkism and the development of his insight of pan-Turkism began in the meantime. Gökalp met Hüseyinzade Ali here who came from Russia, and with Hüseyinzade Ali's influence too, he examined the pieces of Léon Cahun, Ahmet Vefik Pasha and Süleyman Pasha (Gökalp, 2018b, pp. 23-25).

After his exile to Diyarbakır, he became the Vilayet Meclis Katibi (*Secretary of Provincial Council*). In 1907, he was given the position of head secretary of the Chamber of Commerce (Erişirgil, 2017, p. 49). Following the establishment of Second Constitutional Era, he was appointed to the supervisorship of Union and Progress Party's Diyarbakır, Bitlis and Van Desk (Parla, 2009, p. 42). In the same period, Gökalp began to teach courses in various bodies of the party. He attended to party congress held in Thessaloniki in 1909 as the delegate of Diyarbakır. Within the same year, he was appointed to primary school supervisorship in Diyarbakır. Following his uncle's last will, he married Cevriye Hanım, the daughter of his uncle.

He contributed to the publications of Dicle and Peyman Newspapers between 1904 and 1908. He began to write articles voicing the bad conditions of the peasantry in the local newspaper titled Diyarbakır (Tanyu, 1981, p. 25).

Gökalp went to Thessaloniki as a member of Union and Progress Headquarter in 1910. He started to teach sociology courses at the school of the Party. In the Ottoman Empire, as a course, the first sociology course was taught here. Gökalp published writings using various names during his stay in Thessaloniki. Gökalp, who wrote articles using the names of Demirtaş, Tevfik Sedat and Gökalp, also published in Genç Kalemler (*the Young Pens*) issued by Ömer Seyfettin. After the name Gökalp

was used in his writings in Thessaloniki, it remained as the name he utilized in all his writings (Heyd, 1980, p. 26).

In his first talk with Ali Canip (Yöntem), the editorial writer of the *Genç Kalemler (the Young Pens)*, the ideas advocating the abandonment of Arabian and Farsi orders, usage of a language closest to the public language which was done by the stories of Ömer Seyfettin, intrigued Gökarp's attention greatly. Following the influence of Yusuk (Akçura) Bey whom he met in Istanbul, Gökarp added up another stone on top of it here and began to advocate an independent language and grammar first for independence. According to this insight, whatever word was taken out of a foreign language, it had to be utilized according to Turkish grammar rules. Indeed, in this period, rules such as Turkish cem, Arabian cem, Turkish Arabian and Farsi izafi were used (Erişirgil, 2017, pp. 63-64). Though this movement named *Yeni Lisans (New Language)* movement drew many reactions from men of letters in Istanbul, it had great contributions to simplification of language.

Ziya Gökarp administered the youth wings in the party, yet despite this, he stayed away from active politics. In fact, he rejected all offers for active politics including the offers for taking part in the government. Gökarp was greatly influenced by four sociologists during his time in Thessaloniki. These were;

- Gabriel Tarde
- Gustave Le Bon
- Alfred Fouillée
- Emile Durkheim'dır

Emile Durkheim was to be referred to by Gökalp many times as the most favoured author in this life and in the sociology courses he taught at Istanbul University (Parla, 2009, p. 43).

With the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, the Union and Progress Party moved the headquarter to Istanbul. Following the movement of headquarters to Istanbul, Ziya Gökalp settled into Istanbul. Afterwards his settlement in Istanbul, he was appointed to the president chair of sociology at Istanbul University.

Gökalp, who searched for journals he could write in and publish his insights, realized the *Türk Yurdu* magazine. Ziya Gökalp began to publish his writings in *Türk Yurdu* magazine between 1912 and 1914. Following the collapse of Ottomanism with the Balkan Wars, pan-Turkism commenced enhancing. The idea of Turkification-Islamization-Modernization began to arise here. Indeed, Ottoman intellectuals sought various solutions to prevent the Empire from collapsing. The first one of these solutions was the Ottoman Modernization which started in the army. The administrators and the intellectuals of the era reckoned that they would be able to keep up with the West through modernization. With this idea that gained even more speed following the Tanzimat, Islamic opinions and turning back to the Islamic essence began to be discussed as well by a group of intellectuals. Some thought that the Ottoman Empire regressed because the Islamic understanding existing in the eras of Selim I and Suleiman the Magnificent was abandoned. According to Gökalp, ethical values and system of Islam could be adjusted to the present. With the pan-Turkism accelerating after the Balkan Wars, Gökalp, for the first time, thought of melting these three ideas in the same pot. Between 1912 and 1914, Gökalp, who

published his articles in *Türk Yurdu* magazine, dissented from Yusuf Akçura on fundamental issues. While Yusuf Akçura advocated that Turks of Russia were superior to Ottoman Turks as a civilization and the old Turkish customs needed to be revived among Turks, Gökâlp promoted that the old Turkish civilization had died and that Ottoman Turks would not accept this. Another issue on which Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökâlp disagreed was the language issue. Yusuf Akçura did not acknowledge the superiority of Istanbul accent. Moreover, he supported that the language should be purified from all foreign words and only Turkish words should remain in the language. As opposed to this, Gökâlp advocated that there could be foreign words in the language, yet Turkish Grammar should certainly be utilized (Erişirgil, 2017, pp. 87-88).

The articles that Gökâlp published in *Türk Yurdu* journal were published as a book after approximately four years in 1918. With his masterpieces he began to contribute after 1912, he wrote in many journals and magazines. When the journals that Gökâlp wrote for in this period are considered, reflections of distinct milestones of a complicated theory and mindset can be observed in articles that he wrote in various journals. For instance, *İslam Mecmua* in which he wrote between 1915 and 1916, was a journal of Islamic understanding advocating liberalism and nationalism as opposed to the Islamic understanding that supported traditional and retrospective mindsets. *Milli Tettebbular Mecmua* in which he wrote in 1915 was a journal that included nationalist research and insights. Again in the same year, the journal entitled *İktisadiyyat Mecmua* in which he published his articles advocated national economy. *Muallim* journal to which he contributed with his articles in 1916 and 1917 was a

journal that published research and articles about education methods. İçtimaiyyat Mecmua to which he contributed in 1917, was a journal that made publications on sociology. Surely, daily journal, Yeni Mecmua (*New Magazine*) was able to appeal to a high number of readers thanks to Ziya Gökalp. In other words, the approach and theories of Ziya Gökalp, which influenced all policies notably the construction of Republic's national identity and the foreign policy, are outcomes of a whole. The pieces of this whole exist in the articles Ziya Gökalp wrote in various journals and magazines. Herein, another fact that is revealed is that Gökalp is a man of thought who benefitted and read from various areas and renewed himself.

Even in the period when the Union and Progress Party was in power and Gökalp was in a crucial position in the Central Committee, Ziya Gökalp did not participate in active politics. Various innovations⁴ that he had proposed to the Union and Progress Party in that period were actualized after the Republic was established.

Between 1912 and 1918 was a period when Ziya Gökalp published his accumulation of knowledge with his writings in various areas. This period was also a preparation for the time between 1919 and 1921, and indeed it was a period of creating an infrastructure for the second period that would follow it.

With the dissolution of the last Ottoman Parliament on 18 March 1920, Gökalp was sent to exile in Malta. In this period, Gökalp got closer to pan-Turkism movement. Within this period, in which the Union and Progress was advocating

⁴ These innovations are

- Abolishment of the office of Shaykh al-Islam,
- Combination of secular and religious education,
- Making the Family Law in line with Europe and abolishment of religious implementations,
- Foundations' repealing and restructuring of the university.

Ottomanism, Gökalp, as he realized that multinational empires had come to an end, conducted various works on the identity that was to be created in the transition to a nation-state and reviewed his earlier works. Herein, the main point that Gökalp differs from the leaders of Union and Progress was that while the leaders of Union and Progress advocated pan-Islamism and Ottomanism (Parla, 2009, pp. 46-47) in the hope for saving the empire, he concentrated on pan-Turkism rather than Ottomanism and pan-Islamism to which he had already been remained distant as he thought the Empire was at a dead end. The period between 1919 and 1921 was the time when Ziya Gökalp benefitted from his earlier articles in which he had outlined the essentials of the Turkish nationalism and when he created a new approach. *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (*The Principles of Turkism*), the basis of which he prepared in this period was published in 1923.

Essentially, Gökalp did not have a key role within the Union and Progress Party. He never made it to the cadres that determined the fundamental policies. Both because he was ill-disposed towards politics and because of the coalitions that the Union and Progress Party developed to remain in power. Hence, his ideas could be partially implemented.

Gökalp was sent free from his exile in Malta in 1921. When he came back to Turkey, his chair at Istanbul University was not given back to him and he could not get any other duty either. Thereon, he went back to Diyarbakır and taught sociology and psychology at a secondary school and a higher teacher education school. *Küçük Mecmua*, he started to publish in June 1922, was a journal incorporating various subjects like culture, economy and politics as opposed to publishing in various

journals with different areas like the previous periods. In other words, Gökalg prepared the basis of this in the period between 1919 and 1921 when he worked on his old articles. This journal brought about new approaches to various movements of thought and became a pioneer. In the same period, he began to write regularly for Cumhuriyet Gazetesi (*the Cumhuriyet Daily Newspaper*), which would be compiled later on under the name of Çınaraltı Konuşmaları. Likewise, he started to publish his writings, which again would be published as Yeni Türkiye'nin Hedefleri (*the Goals of New Turkey*), in Yeni Türkiye (*New Turkey*) published daily in Ankara. In the same period, his publications came out in the newspapers Hakimiyet-i Milliye and Yeni Gün (*New Day*) and in Yeni Mecnua (*New Magazine*) which began to its publications again in Istanbul.

Gökalg was invited to Ankara to administer the department of translation towards the ends of 1922. In the same year, he published his piece titled Türk Töresi (*the Turkish Custom*) which is about the understandings of religion, culture, customs and law in Turkish people (Parla, 2009, pp. 48-49). In 1923, he published Türkçülüğün Esasları (*the Principles of Turkism*), a kind of instruction, in which the principles that would shape the national life are included. In 1947, his political writings in Yeni Mecnua (*New Magazine*) collected in the book entitled Fırka Nedir, and the book entitled Doğru Yol in which the principles of Republican People Party were explained were published.

From 1922 to 1924 when Gökalg passed away, he served as a deputy in the second legislation. In the same period, he took active parts in Education committee which regulated the new curriculum and changes in the education system in the

Parliament, and moreover, Gökalp participated in the preparations of the 1924 Constitution.

2.2. His Mindset

When the mindset of Gökalp's is examined retrospectively, they are several differences from the Second Generation of Young Turks. To understand these differences, it is necessary to capture the two different nationalism understandings among the Young Turks. There were two distinct groups in Young Turks, who focused on spreading nationalism and cooperation. The first group consisted of Ottoman Turks, whereas the latter were Turkish people who immigrated from Russia.

As mentioned before, Yusuf Akçura, İsmail Gaspıralı who were Turkish nationalists and intellectuals that were educated with the European system and witnessed the modernization of Europe, started to spread the idea of Turkish nationalism in the Empire after moving back. Before migrating back to the Empire, this group led Turkish nationalists against Tsarist Russia. In the period when these intellectuals tried to lead Turkish Nationalists in Tsarist Russia, the idea of Ottomanism, a project to create a supra-identity for many nations to live together in the Ottoman Empire, was dominant (Arai, 2011, pp. 180-181).

To understand Ziya Gökalp, the concept of Turkish nationalism of the era and how this concept emerged, it is necessary to evaluate the ideas of the second group which consisted of Yusuf Akçura and İsmail Gaspıralı.

The second group that Yusuf Akçura led, showed a great effort for the rights of Turks in Russia after the 1905 Russian Revolution. The period of 1905 and 1914 was the brightest years of Yusuf Akçura. Two crucial changes occurred during this period regarding the Turkish intellectuals living in Russia. The first one was the 1905 Russian Revolution and the second one was the Young Turks Revolution in 1908 (Georgeon, 1996, p. 51). The leaders, who could not make great progress regarding the struggles after the revolution in 1905, started to migrate to the Ottoman Empire after the Young Turk Revolution.

When the Constitutional Monarchy was declared in the Ottoman Empire in 1908, Turkism movement was the most backward one in terms of access to the publishing and reaching out to masses. Turkish nationalism established its foundation in this period. During this period there were three groups (which would become two in the following period) which led the Turkism movement. The first group consisted of Veled Çelebi, Necib Asım and Mehmet Emin who worked on pan-Turkism from a cultural perspective and emphasized on how rich and unique the Turkish culture was. The second group consisted of Ziya Gökalp, Ali Canib and Ömer Seyfettin who considered and evaluated Turkish as the primary language. This group was inspired by, read and evaluated Western writers because they settled in Thessaloniki which was a city that had constant contact with the West. The last group consisted of writers who immigrated from Russia to Istanbul such as Yusuf Akçura, Ahmed Ağaoğlu, Mehmed Emin Resulzade, Hüzeyinzade Ali.

Yusuf Akçura, who was in Russia with İsmail Gaspıralı during the 08 Revolution, was excited about the situation, in the beginning, however, later he was

disappointed like the other pan-Turkists because of the fact that the Young Turks were stuck in the idea of Ottomanism. Agreeing with this group who were fond of establishing many changes in Turkish society in the whole world, Yusuf Akçura considered what had been done insufficient and wrong regarding the fact that pan-Turkism, which was a common feature of Turkish people who migrated from Russia, did not find a place for itself.

The problem of Yusuf Akçura's with the Union and Progress started with the oath he had to take to enter the central committee. Akçura, who was convinced by Ziya Gökalp and was expected to enter the central committee of the Union and Progress, gave up because he did not want to take an oath on the Ottoman and Islamic phrases in the text (Togay, 1944, p. 65).

After this, Yusuf Akçura tried to remain his distance and independence from the Union and Progress. *Türk Yurdu* magazine, in which he published his articles and owned, was never under the control of the Young Turks (Bayur, 1952, p. 406). The most important issue that Yusuf Akçura had divergence with Young Turks was military having an active political role which would later be banned after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Another divergence he had was about excessive elimination of the role of the ruler (Georgeon, 1996, p. 63). In addition to these, the most important problem was Ottomanism ideology. Ottomanism was the official and applied ideology of the era which Akçura was against.

This divergence between Yusuf Akçura and Union and Progress continued until 1913. After the loss of the Balkans, the Union and Progress started to embrace pan-Turkism which was similar to the idea of Akçura. Ideas such as establishing a

national economy, adapting ethical norms of Islam to the modern world, were the crossing paths between the Union and Progress and Yusuf Akçura.

Even though Yusuf Akçura tried to put a space between himself and politics, he took an active role in Turkish Association (1908), Turkish Homeland Society (1911), and Turkish Union (1912) to spread pan-Turkism and educate the community. These institutions, in which Akçura was involved, were institutions that targeted all Turks and carried out societal duties. These institutions consisted of thinkers who were members of the third group mentioned above (intellectuals who migrated from Russia to the Ottoman Empire). This was the divergence they had with Gökalp. Gökalp thought that addressing the whole Turks was not realistic and the first aim should be to educate and transform the Turkish people living in the Ottoman Empire.

Akçura wrote articles in Sırat-ı Müstakim magazine published under the leadership of Mehmet Akif between 1909-1911. Intellectuals such as Ahmed Ağaoğlu, İsmail Gaspıralı and Ayaz İshaki, who migrated from Russia, made important contributions to the magazine. Even his ideas were similar to Islamic movement, he published articles about pan-Turkism in the magazine which was under the leadership of Mehmet Akif. In this magazine, Akçura published articles about the religion reform and problems of society (Georgeon, 1996, p. 67).

After the magazine had shifted to pan-Islamism followed by Tripoli War, Akçura ended his connection with the magazine. After that, Türk Yurdu (burada Turkish homeland kullanalabilir ama kaynaklarda Türk yurdu olarak geçmiş, bu yüzden hep Türk Yurdu olarak yazıldı.) magazine had started to publish, which was

the magazine in which Akçura published his opinions, revealed the true himself and his thoughts.

The magazine, also the official publication of the Türk Ocakları (*Turkish Hearths*), was managed by Akçura from 1911 until 1917. After Akçura went to Russia, the magazine was directed by the Türk Ocakları Central Committee (*The Central Committee of Turkish Hearths*) for a year, and then it stopped working until 1924. In line with Akçura's idea of uniting all Turks, the magazine had a crucial impact and was also followed by the Turkish world (Georgeon, 1996, pp. 67-68).

The path of Gökâlp and Akçura crossed in 1912 at the magazine. Gökâlp started to write in Türk Yurdu magazine after the Union and Progress moved its centre to Istanbul followed by the Balkan Wars. Türk Yurdu published in a wide area in the line of pan-Turkism and progressivism. Unification of Turks, having one and simple language, a transition to modern education, Turkish women to have a role in the society were among the topics that were written about. In fact, the magazine had a resemblance to the Tercümen which was published by Ismail Gaspirali. Since the general idea was unifying every Turk in the world, pan-Turkism was extensively emphasized in the publications. Pan-Turkism was another divergence that Gökâlp and Akçura had a conflict about. While Gökâlp defended a non-irredentist nationalism, Akçura talked about the idea that Turks all over the world should have a common homeland.

Under the chapter of "Turkish World", the problems of Turks all over the world were debated with the view of Turkishness. In addition, Türk Yurdu published information about the Turkish people in the whole world and especially the ones living

in Russia. The main aim was to spread pan-Turkism, which was considered as a cultural approach, among all Turks living in the world and to create an understanding of solidarity.

One of the common belief of Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akcura was the necessity of establishing a national economy and a national bourgeoisie. Therefore, economic problems had a place for themselves in *Türk Yurdu* magazine. The main aim was to teach the concept of economy to the Turkish bourgeoisie and how to develop themselves.

Another journal which was similar to *Türk Yurdu* magazine and that helped the establishment of Turkish nationalism was the *Tercüman* newspaper. With the title of owner and head writer of this newspaper, Ismail Gaspirali wrote articles about pan-Turkism and contributed to the newspaper.

According to Gaspirali, the main reason behind why the Islam world was undeveloped was education. Therefore, he developed a new modern education system called “*Usul-ü Cedid*” (Seydahmet, 1997, pp. 118-120). He thought that to prevent the assimilation of Turks under the oppressive regime of Tsarist Russia, to protect their lives and survive, the only solution was the unification around a common language. In this manner, he started to publish *Tercüman* newspaper. The newspaper was started to be published on April 22, 1883, which was published once a week. Later on, it continued its life as a daily newspaper after 1912 (Yaman, 2002, pp. 26-27).

After the 1905 Russian Revolution, Gaspıralı tried to find ways to send deputies to the Russian Parliament Duma to defend the rights of Turks living in Russia and to take part in the constitutional monarchy regime. He followed two paths to unify Turks that lived in Russia. Firstly, he sent a letter to the government about the demand for the rights of Turks that lived in Russia (Hablemitoğlu, 2004, p. 90). Secondly, an illegal Congress of Turks in Russia was formed in 1905. During this congress, the steps that should be taken for Turks in Russia, the representatives that would be sent to Duma and how those representatives were selected were among the debated topics.

As Tercüman Newspaper spread from Russia to the Ottoman geography and then to Egypt, Gaspıralı's thoughts and ideas were initiated with Russian Turks and evolved to develop ideas for Turks all over the world.

Gaspıralı claimed that there is not a nation called Tatar and he was the first person to defend that the Crimean Turks were indeed Turks whom they were formerly labelled as Tatar by Russia and Ottoman Empire. Moreover, he indicated that Tsarist Russia attempted to divide Turks through notions such as Tatar, Kazak, Kirgiz, Azeri, Turkmen (Hablemitoğlu, 2004, p. 10).

Gaspıralı defined the notion of Turk as such: ‘‘With regards to language and tongue, the communities and tribes known as Yakuts of Eastern Serbia, Turks of Serbia, Baraba, Kazak, Kirgiz, Karakalpaks, Bashkirs, Nogais, Kazan, Kumyks, Uyghur, Uzbek, Taranci, Sart, Azerbaijan and the Ottoman communicate in the Turkish language, and they are all Turks. Although Turks under Russia were granted the label of ‘Tatar’, this was a mistake and indeed an exception. Communities

Russians refer to as ‘Tatars’ and Bukharans refer to as ‘Nogais’ are indeed Turks.
“(Yüksel, 2003, pp. 31-32).

Gaspıralı defended that “There is no shame for being Turkish, rather it is something to be proud of regarding its history and culture” and tried to spread this idea to the Turks in all over the world (Hablemitoğlu, 2004, p. 31). The consciousness of Turkness was not defended because of the decline of the Ottoman Empire and other Turks living in the world under captivity under other states. However, he tried to eliminate this idea by defending that Turks would achieve great success in the future as well.

Gaspıralı explained the understanding of Turkishness by three pillars. These were improving education, developing the economy and politics. It was stated that to develop economy and politics, modernization of the education and providing a quality education were necessary. To be able to receive a quality and universal education for Turks, Ottoman Turkish was considered to become the common language. After this, to be able to develop in the fields of politics and economy, the useful ideas of the West should be spread among the Turkish world.

Gaspıralı emphasized the importance of language. According to Gaspıralı, it was necessary to develop a common language even Turkish people would live in different countries. Language unity would be strengthened with cultural unity. Thus, all Turks would have the same culture and language. When this was to happen, the Turkish nation would never disappear.

Often, Gaspıralı avoided political unity discourses. He defended that the Turkish nation concept should be embraced first by Turks for a political union. He thought the idea of political union, in the absence of developing such a mindset, would harm the Turkishness (Kırımlı, 2003, p. 22). The origin of this mentality derives from the domination of the Russian Tsarism over the Turks.

Gaspıralı's ideas about the simplification of language can be accepted as a middle way between Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp. Unlike Akçura, Gaspıralı considered Istanbul accent to be superior as Gökalp also did. However, unlike Gökalp, he agreed with Akçura about the elimination of all foreign words from the language. He defended the same idea both with Gökalp and Akçura regarding the removal of foreign rules (Toksoy, 2001).

Gaspıralı defined civilization as the people living in prosperity in an environment of trust and peace. Contemporary civilization meant that the number of people benefiting from civilization to be high (Yaman, 2002, p. 63). However, he considered European civilization differently. According to Gaspıralı, European civilization is the continuation of the Greek and Roman civilizations and these civilizations were formed based on benefit and prosperity of one group rather than all society (Gaspıralı, 2019, pp. 158-165). Gaspıralı claimed that the injustice was at the heart of this order and he stated that European civilization should be embraced only after being accounted by conscience and justice.

Gaspıralı also considered that the Jews, Greeks and Armenians in the Ottoman Empire were developed in trade, but the Turks were left behind in which he

claimed the reasons behind these should be investigated (Seydahmet, 1997, pp. 189-192).

He answered this question by directing it to all Muslims. He claimed that lack of education and ignorance affected Muslim societies badly, however, neither Islam nor Turkishness were the obstacles to achieve the level of developed countries and the abandonment of these concepts were not necessary at all.

Gaspıralı also underlined Turkish history. He accepted the fact that Turks were left behind, yet, it was also possible to move forward. He stated that this desire should be developed and the inertia on Turks should be eliminated. He stated that the only independent Turkish country was the Ottoman Empire and he emphasized that agriculture was the fastest way to develop after which industry should be followed. Considering economic independence as a precondition for political independence, Gaspıralı emphasized that the Empire should make use of the fertile agricultural lands.

The understanding of reliance in the Islamic world is another criticism that was stated by Gaspıralı. He stated that the concept of “it rains, we drink; it comes out of the ground, we eat” was the main reason for not developing as this situation eliminated the desire to progress among Muslims. According to Gaspıralı, the main reason why Turks were undeveloped was not linked to Islam. In essence, Islam was a religion that advocated progress (Hablemitoğlu, 2004, p. 88). However, the misunderstanding of the concept of reliance and bigotry were the reasons why Turks were underdeveloped. He mentioned that the Islamic Civilizations had been better than the West throughout the history, but stated that the Islamic civilization was left behind due to the reasons mentioned above (Devlet, 1988, p. 111).

Gaspıralı emphasized that Islam was an important factor for Turks in Russia to protect their identity. However, he did not have a pan-Islamist approach as it can be understood from the writings of Gaspıralı. The idea of using the ethical values of Islam for development, just like Gökalt, can be traced from his writings. In another saying, Islam should be the unifying factor for Turkish identity, yet, should not prevail the Turkish identity. Instead of a pan-Islamist idea, Gaspıralı argued that Turks should lead Islamic world after completing their economic and political development for the sake of the welfare of the Islamic world (Ortaylı, 1968, p. 18).

Most of the Young Turks, including Gaspıralı and Akçura, the peers of Gökalt, had the chance to go to Europe and had access to the publications and knew Europe better than Gökalt. However, none of them was able to reach to the systematic mindset that was created by Gökalt. Thus, the ideologic thoughts of Young Turks of the era were also problematic. Even though they emphasized liberalism on their thoughts, in practice they were illiberal. Since the main purpose was to save the Ottoman Empire, instead of a realistic ideology, they adopted pragmatic solutions which were directed to current problems.

2.3. Factors That Gave Birth to the Ideology of Turkish Nationalism

Turkish nationalism emerged as the collection of various factors resulting from the necessities of the era. Even though nationalism, the ideology began with the French Revolution, worried multi-national empires greatly, they could not come up with politics in this area that would be the cures. From the point when Ottoman Empire started to regress, it was attempted to hold non-Turkish communities together

and to create a common identity through the reforms and ideologies created such as Ottomanism and pan-Islamism.

Before diving into the factors that gave birth to Turkish nationalism as an ideology, it is necessary to dwell on the period until this course. The economic system of the Ottoman Empire was no longer a system based on exports which produced commodities. The main principle was the enrichment of the state and to hamper capital accumulation outside the state's control. The production made in the lands divided by the Ottoman Empire was utilized for provisionism, and the remainder of the agricultural product was acknowledged as an exportable product by the guilds with 15% rate of profit which was determined earlier.

Thus, for the Ottoman Empire to continue its existence, it needed to increase its lands. Hence, money going into the treasury would enhance (Genç, 2000, pp. 45-48).

After the Ottoman Empire reached its natural borders, another factor that had an impact on the Empire's budget was the Age of Explorations. While the Continental European countries made most of the trade in the Mediterranean Sea Ports before the Age of Explorations, this situation altered completely as a result of the Age of Explorations. The next step of this was the economic troubles that Ottoman Empire, localized gradually, began to go into as the Empire could not keep up with the system as opposed to Europe which evolved into a produced and export-based economy.

When it was the 19th Century, Ottoman Empire, which could not turn its traditional state structure into an economy based on production and export, within the

traditional order, initiated modernization steps in the army for the continuation of the conquests. The period commenced with the abolishment of the *Yeniçeri (the Janissaries)*, proceeded until the establishment of *Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye (the Mansure Army)*. The new army was regulated according to the European system and *Harbiye* was instituted in 1834 to raise military officers. Moreover, the governance system evolved into a cabinet system. In 1836, *Meclis-i Dar-ı Şura-yı Askeri* and *Meclis-i Vala-i Ahkam-ı Adliye* were established and decisions began to be taken through discussions. Officials were initiated to be appointed from the graduates of schools training officials and governors were put on the payroll directly from the centre.

Within this period, the centre was attempted to be strengthened and the influence of bureaucracy in state administration was enhanced rapidly. With the Treaty of Balta Liman signed with England on 16 August 1838, the authority to determine the taxes on imports and exports was taken away from the State. The most evident example of this was the fact that the tax named as the domestic transport tax was 0% for the foreigners, yet 8% for the local tradesman (Akyıldız, 2003, p. 40).

As a result of the problems that the Ottoman Empire encountered, the Empire chose to cooperate with England and France. The territorial integrity was attempted to be protected by the trade agreements signed with these two countries. The Tanzimat Reform appeared as an outcome of the same period. With the Tanzimat Edict (*Edict of Gülhane*) divisions among the subjects were equalized. Subjects turned into the people and all of the components within the Ottoman Empire were acknowledged as equal. The decision-makers and the intellectuals of the Ottoman Empire attempted to

build a common identity to save the Empire from collapsing. Herein, the recommended ideology was Ottomanism.

Following the modernization in the army, the next step of the modernization happened in politics. Together with the opinions of the writers such as Namık Kemal, Ziya Pasha, Şinasi, Ali Suavi, who constituted the Young Ottomans, modernization commenced expanding to the political sphere as well. With the Moratorium declared in 1875, an evident opposition occurred against Sultan Abdülaziz and Grand Vizier Mahmut Nedim Pasha. Through the cooperation of Hüseyin Avni Pasha and Mithat Pasha, Sultan Abdülaziz was dethroned, and Murad V succeeded to the throne instead. However, Murad V could not stay in the throne for a long time due to health issues, instead, Abdülhamid II was throned. In the same period, revolts broke out in the Balkans, and following the support of Western states to the revolts, European states demanded⁵ a conference for regulating the administrative mentality in the Balkans. The day when the Constantinople Conference gathered, the First Constitutional Period was declared, and Western intervention in the Ottoman domestic affairs due to the incidents erupted in the Balkans was wished to be prevented. Together with the Ottoman Empire, France, Russia, Italy, England and Austria- Hungary participated in the conference. As opposed to the approach of the Ottoman delegation, having stated that the Kanun-i Esasi was declared and there was no requirement for the conference in the constitutional regime, participatory states notably Russia indicated that the declaration of the constitution would not be a

⁵ The situation with the Ottoman Empire on 23 December 1876 was as such; notably Egypt, Serbia, Walachia, Crete, Lebanon and Moldavia acquired autonomy. In provinces of Serbia, Herzegovina and Montenegro, there were revolts and violent conflicts. Ottoman Empire came to a position in which it could not protect its lands and encountered with constant foreign interventions.

solution. Hence, as a result, the conference initiated on 23 December 1876, dissolved on 20 January 1877 (Kutlu, 2007, p. 42).

Following the inconclusiveness of the conference, England, wishing to prevent a war from erupting between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, assembled a conference in London. In the conference, to which England, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy attended, a protocol was signed and sent to the Ottoman Empire for signature. According to the protocol;

- All states that sent representatives to Constantinople Conference await for reforms in the Balkans,
- Ottoman Empire must actualize all the reforms guaranteed for Bulgaria and Bosnia-Herzegovina,
- A permanent peace on the issue of Montenegro must be made,
- Ottoman Empire must dissolve all troops in readiness brought for the war while preserving the troops brought for security.

Aforementioned decisions were made in the Protocol. While declaring the Protocol to the Ottoman Empire, England also informed the Empire about the case in which if peace was not maintained, the protocol would become invalid (Engelhardt, 2017, pp. 354-355). At the same time, the London Protocol was the first agreement in which all European countries united against the Empire (Uçarol, 2008, pp. 372-373). In other words, the balance of power that the Empire had utilized among the European states collapsed.

The London Protocol was rejected both by the Chamber of Deputies and Senate of the Ottoman Empire and the rejection of the Protocol was informed to all contracting states. Thereon, Russia, with the claim of protecting the rights of Slav people living in the Balkans, declared war against the Ottoman Empire.

Mithat Pasha and Abdülhamid II developed distinct perspectives towards the Russo-Turkish War known also as the War of '93'. While Mithat Pasha thought that England would intervene in the situation, Abdülhamid II considered withdrawing from the war by giving various concessions (Şimşir, 1970, p. 9). Mithat Pasha, by relying on the idea of Ottomanism with Kanun-i Esasi (*the Ottoman Constitution of 1876*), thought that all nations in the Balkans would support the Ottoman Empire. Nonetheless, the War of '93' resulted as a catastrophe for the Empire. During the war, all nations in the Balkans assisted Russians. In other words, the Berlin Agreement, formed as a result of the Treaty of San Stefano signed after the War, and the revision of it constituted the foundations of the Balkan nationalism (Karpas, 2008, pp. 11-13). The War of '93' was a turning point when the idea of Ottomanism began to regress though it preserved its existence firmly, and instead, pan-Islamism movement started to predominate. With the rise of the pan-Islamism idea, Abdülhamid II established his way of ruling, dissolved the Chamber of Deputies and abolished the Kanun-i Esasi.

In the period after War of '93', Ottoman Empire entered into a duration in which Abdülhamid II's influence was felt in the Ottoman Empire, and the authority of Caliphate was underlined as the source of legitimacy. The state attempted to please all segments and Muslim regions, having said that, it at least attempted to eliminate the discontent. With 1858 Arazi Kanunnamesi (*the Ottoman Land Code of 1858*),

ownership of private property was permitted and the process of Muslims' acquiring private properties was supported. Schools that taught younger generation education were opened up and attempts were made to expand education to Anatolia. With the openings of Mülkiye and Harbiye, educated young military officers and administrators began to be trained. In the same period, one of the main problems was the fact that many of the military college students that were trained as a result of the granting seats instead of a merit system, sided against Abdülhamid II and his administration understanding. Consequently, secret communities were established in places like Thessaloniki in which freedom was relatively better than other places. As a result of this, reactions and organizations made the declaration of the Second Constitution inevitable.

Following the declaration of the Second Constitutional Era, a major expectation that problems would be solved rapidly arose at every level of society. The Committee of Union and Progress assumed that Ottomanism would be actualized with the Second Constitutional Era and that all ethnic groups would reside without the slightest problem within the basic principles of French Revolutions namely, - equality, liberty, brotherhood and freedom under the roof of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, they were expecting the parliament in the making would constitute bridges of brotherhood among Arabs, Bulgarians, Serbians and Turks (Kabacalı, 2000, p. 21).

Yet, when the Second Constitutional Era began, the decline of the Ottoman Empire did not improve. Furthermore, industrial production could not be developed. Enrichment of the individuals was directly proportionate to working at the State

departments. Even though the Ottoman Empire turned into a perfect market for industrialized countries, hand manufacturing local producers were subdued confronted with the price competition. In that case, the state became the greatest source of power and wealth. Consequently, administrating the state opened great doors for those within. The first opposition to the trained military officers (known as the mektepli officers) who played important roles in the declaration of the Second Constitution, came from officers known as the alaylı and from the administrators of the previous period. These groups constituted the opposition wing of the new period began with the Second Constitutional Era. Indeed, the Union and Progress Party did not have integrity in this period. Despite the dominance of Ottomanism idea in the party, some embraced pan-Turkism, who had distinct insights on the economy, and who advocated that soldiers should abandon politics.

During the rule of Abdülhamid II, the administrative cadres of the Empire generally focused on revolts, the establishment of political order and maintaining distinct ethnic groups together. Apart from these, the main reforms were concentrated on the modernization of the army and staff establishment. Ottoman Empire could not give enough importance to the economy and economic development due to the concessions that were given as a result of the balance policy followed between the foreign states and Duyun-u Umumiye (*the Ottoman Public Debt Administration*). Hence, the economy and economic development entered the agenda only after the Second Constitutional Era. As the economy and bourgeoisie were monopolized by the non-muslims, the main finding of the thinkers like Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura and

İsmail Gaspiralı who supported pan-Turkism was that state could not be saved without creating a Turkish bourgeoisie.

The first step taken on this issue was to start a fight against structures began with the Treaty of Balta Limanı with England between 1838 and 1841 and in three years with France, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Spain, Portugal that almost zeroed the domestic production as well as spoiling the commercial unity. Especially, with the direction of the group led by Ziya Gökalp who supported pan-Turkism movement within the Union and Progress Committee, creating a self-sufficient economy with its industry and agriculture under the protection of customs walls turned into the prominent notion (Pamuk, 2014, p. 144). The contradiction here is that in the period when Ottomanism was advocated and attempted to be implemented, a national bourgeoisie in general excluding non-muslims was attempted to be created at the same time (Toprak, 1995, pp. 26-28).

Yet another perspective, lying in the basis of the ideas namely national bourgeoisie and national economy of pan-Turkism movement, the attempts to establish national banks. With the banking system implemented in all European countries, the state could provide the producers with direct financing without granting amounts from its budget. When the Ottoman Empire is considered, as the banking system was not improved, producer remained in between the loan sharks and the owners of iltizam. To prevent this, the banking system was required to be actualized.

With the encouragements done on this issue, sixteen Turkish Banks⁶ were established in the Ottoman Empire after 1909 (Ortabağ, 2018, pp. 306-308).

When it was 1913, pan-Turkism prevailed following the de facto collapse of Ottomanism and pan-Islamism. In fact, Teşvik-i Sanayi (*Law for the Encouragement of Industry*) enacted in 1913 is a clear illustration of this. With the law, Turks began to be given certain privileges such as tax immunities and free allocation of land.

Approximately one year later, on 3 September 1914, capitulations were abolished and the custom tariffs were increased first to 15% then to 30% (Toprak, 1995, p. 112).

The fundamental goal of the intellectuals, from the period the Ottoman Empire began to regress, was to save the Empire from dissolution. That is why pan-Turkism was ignored constantly and remained in the shadows to keep the non-Muslims who were non-Turks and Muslims together. Despite this, pan-Turkism surpassed all other movements as an inevitable end.

2.3.1. Political Factors

Nationalism emerges as a notion and a common identity only after a certain accumulation. Surely, it can be utilized to channelize people living in its lands and to create a common sense and identity alongside the fact that it can be used for a specific purpose by every country. The matter that should be underlined here is that before creating a common identity, there should be reflections of that identity in real life.

⁶For more details on the name of the banks, founders and capitals, please see (Ortabağ, 2018).

Primordial approach consecrates nations and nationalism by advocating that nationalism and national identity develop naturally and indeed, exist before states and interiorization of legitimacy is ensured in this manner. On the contrary, the modernist approach invents traditions to create a common identity and nationalist sentiments and states, due to the repetitions of these, the internalization takes place (Hobsbawm, 2013, p. 1). National holidays, memorial days and traditions through repetitions are attributed great importance by the agent of the state to make them internalized by people (Hobsbawm, 2013, p. 12). These are repeated in every new generation and by doing so, reaching to the same mindset and understandings are ensured. Thus, a newborn baby from the minute he begins to comprehend his surroundings, he starts to repeat the traditions and afterwards, commences internalizing her national identity and her nationhood and finally begins to support it.

Political factors that gave birth to pan-Turkism can be tackled in two groups as dwelled on before. The first one of these is Tsardom of Russia which was fought constantly during the 18th Century and which was the natural competitor of the Ottoman Empire due to its desire to gain access to the warm waters. One of the crucial facts concerning Tsardom of Russia is that pan-Turkism movement emerged in Russia stronger than it did in Ottoman Empire and that Turkish intellectuals living in Russia in the aftermath of migrating to the Ottoman Empire impacted pan-Turkism movement in Ottoman Empire greatly.

The rivalry between Russia and the Ottoman Empire commenced when the Grand Prince of Moscow Ivan⁷ IV became the Tsar of Russia following the annexation of the Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan. Selim II and Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokollu, who thought that the security of Crimea was threatened following the conquest of Astrakhan by Russians, decided to launch an expedition to Astrakhan. Following this expedition, which failed since Devlet I Giray of the Crimean Khan did not provide the necessary support, the rivalry between Russia and the Ottoman Empire initiated in real terms. The period when the rivalry was balanced coincided with the first quarter of the 18th Century.

The war parties of which were the Ottoman Empire, Austria and Russia between 1735 and 1739 was the only war that ended in favour of the Ottoman Empire with the support of England until the Crimean War. Ottoman Empire did not wage a full-scale war against Russia for approximately thirty years following the signing of the Treaty of Belgrad and Treaty of Nis.

The war that Ottoman Empire, Austria and Russia had in the years between 1735-1739 was the only war that ended in the benefit of the Ottoman Empire until Crimea War which was won with the support of Britain. As a result of the signing of the Belgrade and *Nis* Treaties, the Ottoman Empire did not have a large-scale war with Russia for about 30 years. With the end of the Ottoman-Russian War finalized by the signature of the Kucuk Kaynarca Treaty, Russia began its occupations on Ottoman Empire's lands. In addition to these occupations, Russia pursued Panslavist policies in the Balkans, it classified Turks

⁷ He is also known as Ivan the terrible.

in the occupied territories as Tatar, Baraba, Kazak, Kirgiz, Karakalpaks, Bashkirs, Nogais, Kazan, Kumyks, Uyghur, Uzbek and attempted to assimilate Turkish identity.

Crimea, which broke away from the Empire with 1774 the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca, became independent following the Crimea Treaty. It was occupied in 1783 and became a part of Russia. The Russian expansion accelerated as a result of the loss of Crimea, which was a buffer zone to block the Russians from spreading. As a result of the Russinization policy in Crimea, Crimean Turks were forced to migrate and Russians were settled in the region later on. When it was the ends of the 19th century, the number of Turks in Crimea decreased by approximately 70% in a hundred year.

When the Balkan nations, which were attempted to be kept in the hands of the Empire in addition to experiencing great sanctions in the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War, also known as the War of '93, helped Russia, the idea of Ottomanism began to be questioned. Hence, in this period, pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism movements commenced accelerating.

Turks, who received Western education in schools established by intellectuals like İsmail Gaspıralı in the regions that had been invaded by Russia and recognized their national identity, began to be organized and created publications so that Turks would not lose their identities and would not be assimilated. In the same period, various Turkish intellectuals migrated to the

Ottoman Empire. As it was touched upon before when the ideas of Akçura and Gaspıralı were mentioned, Turks residing in Russia developed a Turkish nationalism that in general incorporated all the Turks and anticipated the salvation of Turks from captivity (Özdağ, 2008, p. 176).

The fundamental goal of the movements namely Ottomanism, pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism was to save the Empire from dissolving. The main goal of Ottomanism which was the idea of ensuring the Balkan nations' loyalty to the Empire collapsed since nationalism in the Balkans was backed up by the Western countries notably by Russia.

One of the greatest factors that enhanced the rise of Balkan nationalism was the support of Pan-Slavism in the region by Russia. In other words, pan-Slavism led to the collapse of the idea of Ottomanism and led to the rise of Turkism instead.

Russia brought the Orthodox Christian identity into the forefront and utilized it to intervene in the Ottoman Empire's domestic affairs. The attempts were indeed found responses, which then led to the collapse of the idea of Ottomanism. Particularly with the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, the policy of pan-Slavism gained motion as Russians got the opportunity to guard the Orthodox residing in Ottoman soils (Köse, 2006, p. 115). Ottomanism policy that was attempted to be used against pan-Slavism was defeated as it could not create the necessary belonging and common identity.

Russia strived for the freedoms of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria in the Balkans, respectively and intervened in the region constantly both through wars and through agreements following the wars.

Table 2: Revolts in the 19th Century, Supporters and Consequences

Revolt	Supporters	Consequences
1807 Serbian Revolt	Russia	In 1816, privileges were granted to Serbians. In 1856, autonomy was granted.
1825 Greek Revolt	Russia, England, France	They became independent in 1829.
1876 Bulgarian Revolt	Russia	War was waged on the Ottoman Empire which did not accept the decisions following the Constantinople Conference. (Russo-Turkish War)

Table 3: Lands Lost following the Russo-Turkish War 1877-1878

War	Parties	Agreement
1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War (War of '93')	Russia (Romania, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria supported Russia.)	Treaty of San Stefano Independence was granted to Serbia, Romania and Montenegro. Principality of Bulgaria was established. Thessaly was left to Greece. Russia became the ultimate power in the Balkans. (With the intervention of the Western states, Russian dominance was attempted to be embanked by signing the Berlin Agreement.)
1878 Berlin Agreement	Prussia, Austria-Hungary, Russia, France, England, Italy and Ottoman Empire	Bosnia became a privileged province. The principality of Bulgaria was established. Cyprus was rented to England.

		Thessaly was left to Greece. Nis was left to Serbia. Kars, Ardahan, Batum, Artvin were left to Russia. Dobruja was left to Romania.
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Due to a few reasons, Britain was disturbed by the increasing expansionist policy of Russia after the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca. Firstly, after Russia, which had the desire for accessing the warm seas, received the support of Austria for the expansionist policy in the Balkans, Britain acted together with Prussia to maintain the balance in Continental Europe (Yüksel S. , 2019, p. 625). Yet another purpose of Britain was to secure the Indian road. Therefore, Britain was worried about that intervention of France to Egypt as Britain considered that this intervention would be a threat to its colonies. As a result of these developments, Britain decided on the necessity of the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire's territorial integrity, and sustained this policy from the end of the 18th century until the 1878 Berlin Conference at the end of the Crimean War. In 1878, it was decided that there is no future in maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and this policy was abandoned.

The Ottoman Empire, of which the territorial integrity was preserved with the support of Britain for about a hundred years, spent this period with the efforts to expand Ottomanism and to make the common identity accepted by the non-Muslims. Acknowledgement of Westernism and the progressive thinking of the West was a prominent policy during this period. However, with the Berlin Treaty that was signed in 1878 and after the loss of territories of which Ottoman Empire attempted to regain the loyalty towards the Empire with Ottomanism and in which the Empire invested in the past, the idea of Ottomanism was hampered. While this situation led to the increase of anti-Westernism, it also caused pan-Turkism to gain importance.

Another factor that accelerated the pan-Turkism movement was the occupation of Cyprus and Egypt by Britain. The pan-Turkism movement that began to acquire power with the 20th century, gained even more strength as a result of the continuing losses of lands and the lack of necessary responses of non-Muslim and Muslim communities living in these lands.

The rise of the idea of nationalism may develop as a reaction to a situation or an event. Even though the rise of Turkish nationalism was expected to accelerate with the loss lands since the last quarter of the 18th century, this situation happened later on. The reason behind this was that the intellectuals and administrators of the Ottoman Empire thought that Turkish nationalism would cause the Empire to dissolve. Even though with the idea of saving the Empire, the main aim in politics at the time, the policies of Ottomanism first and pan-Islamism later were implemented, Turkish nationalism, the pan-Turkism

movement rose with slow but steady steps. Russia's expansionist policies, its assimilation policy, applied to Turks living in Russian territory, and with the policies of European countries to divide the Ottoman territory, created the political factors that formed the ideology of Turkish nationalism.

2.3.2. Economic Factors

For the continuity of the Ottoman Empire and the avoidance in economic shortages, land reclamation was a must for the Empire. Each land that was claimed provided new revenues and cash flow for the economy. The economic system, in which agricultural order was essentially depended on, the formation of the bourgeoisie was blocked deliberately and consciously and in which trade was strictly controlled by guilds, went into a swift collapse.

To fix this issue and to provide continuity of the conquests, Ottoman administrators implemented reforms in the army and attempted to modernize it. As there were no new land proclamations in exchange for the extra burdens on the budget stemming from this modernization attempts and the constant state of war to preserve the existing land worsened the Ottoman economy considerably. Besides, the Age of Discovery and the Industrial Revolution were two significant improvements that had great impacts on the Ottoman economy. Ottoman Empire lost its influence on the Mediterranean Sea Ports to a great extend and trade roads changed directions. Moreover, the Ottoman economy remained conservative in starting mass production following the Industrial Revolution and consequently, production could not be raised.

With the absence of government support for the production of goods in an environment where there was no bourgeoisie, the Ottoman economy did not develop. This was because domestic merchants paid more taxes as a result of the influence of cheap goods produced in the West and concessions granted to the Western countries. In such an environment where there was no accumulation of capital, consumption economy occurred and domestic merchants and producers turned into small mediators working under the foreign merchants.

Encountered with the West's policies which depended on the production based on export and import restrictions, the economy of the Ottoman Empire turned into an economy that did not support export and dependent on imports as a result of concessions given to the West. Since the agriculture production did not to produce goods only to feed the population, high revenues could not be achieved from the agricultural production. In other words, due to the absence of bourgeoisie, any treaty that would push the government did not develop and mercantilism did not find a place for itself on the Ottoman soil (Zürcher, 2004, p. 33).

Capitulations and trade privileges that were handed in starting from 16th Century damaged the Ottoman economy greatly, which had not been industrialized. These rights took their most comprehensive states with the Treaty of Baltalimani in 1838. Although the capitulations started in the 16th Century had less bindingness as they were periodic, they became constant in the 19th Century and turned into a situation in which Ottoman merchants traded with lower taxes.

The reflections of the inability to adapt to the Industrial Revolution were experienced in Ottoman finance as well. With the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca signed in 1774, the need for foreign debt rose for the first time. In 1789, despite the applications to France, Netherlands and Spain for external borrowing, the applications were rejected (Pamuk, 1999, pp. 206-209). Thence, the Ottoman Empire did not receive external borrowing until 1854. From the first foreign debt that was received in 1854 with the occasion of the Crimean War, Ottoman Empire received external borrowing 15 times more in the following 20 years (Özdemir, 2010, p. 46).

Ottoman Empire declared moratorium for the first time in 1875 as it could not pay its foreign debts. The government that used up all the external borrowings and could only borrow from the Galata Bankers started negotiations with the Bankers in 1879. At the end of the negotiation,

- Salt revenues,
- Islamic Tithe tax revenues of silk cocoon of Bursa, Edirne, İstanbul, Samsun
- Spirit revenues,
- Stamp revenues,
- Tobacco revenues,
- Fishing revenues of Istanbul and its surroundings,

were handed to a special administration under Rüsum-u Sitte Administration. With the special administration that entered into service on

January 13, 1880, it was decided that 1 Million 100 thousand liras of the revenue collected were transferred to the claims and the remaining part was transferred to other debts of the state (Özdemir, 2010, p. 74).

Western states made requests to the Ottoman government to receive the claims from the same road. With these demands, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was established on December 20, 1881. Following the establishment of the Administration, areas that the state left as monopolies were given to foreign companies one by one.

In the process commencing from the Treaty of Baltalimanı to the introduction of the Industrial Promotion Law in 1913, non-Muslims and foreign merchants acquired great gains and wealth. Having said that, Muslims, many of whom were Turks and who earned their livings through agriculture and hand workman grew poor considerably (Kazgan, 2002, pp. 27-28). While non-muslims traded thanks to the advantages stemming from the privileges provided by the Western states, the fact that Turks grew poor gradually corresponded to the rise of Turkism. The Turkist writers notably Ziya Gökalp touched upon these issues. As a result of this, pan-Turkism movement stated that a national bourgeoisie was required to be created and with the Industrial Promotion Law introduced in 1913 and banks that were established in the same period, Turks' making trade was supported. Still, as the economic liberty understanding of the Empire was limited and as Turks fought in the front lines in continuing wars, a national bourgeoisie could not be formed.

While mercantilist policies were produced by the force of the bourgeoisie class established in Europe, the Ottoman Empire turned into an open market to preserve its existence.

Gökalp expressed his opinions on this matter in the journal *İktisadiyyat*. The common assessments of the writers of the Turkist movement on this matter were the establishment of a national bourgeoisie and the abolishment of capitulations and trade privileges. According to the writers, Turks could solely be protected from the imperialist West only when they gained economic independence.

Tom Nairn's detection on under-developed countries to enhance improvement complies with Ziya Gökalp's insights and with the pan-Turkism movement. According to Nairn, intellectuals of the under-developed countries choose two ways to solve this problem. These ways include imitating the developed countries and creating a society that is aware of its own identity against the outside powers (Nairn, 1994, pp. 73-74). Surely, intellectuals also attempted to gather the society under the umbrella of national identity namely; Turkism. Another detection of Nairn which promotes the idea of simplification of language to explain this identity to the public is parallel to Gökalp's idea of simplification of language.

As a result of the hegemony established by the West on Ottoman treasury as well as the inconceivable enrichment of the non-Muslims, the Turkist intellectuals of the era notably Gökalp developed various policies to overcome this issue. The idea of creating a national bourgeoisie and national economy and

the emphasis on industrialization and private property led to the increase in import duties first up to 15% then to %30 and even though these seemed as imitations of the Western mercantilist politics, they yielded results in short notice and provided balance on the budget.

Same policies were implemented more inclusively and in a more organized fashion in the Republican era as well. As it can be observed from the writings and mindset of Ziya Gökalp, creating a national bourgeoisie had been the initial purpose of the Republic. When the state acknowledged that bourgeoisie could not emerge out of its own, it supported the emergence and attempted to build a national economy. At the same time, securing the independence of the country complied with the ideas of the national economy and national bourgeoisie.

2.3.3. Socio-cultural Factors

The French Revolution was the first step of a huge transformation in Europe. Following the genesis of the notion of the nation state, multi-national empires were the most likely political units to be affected by it. As a result of the fact that the same period coincided with the period of regression of the Ottoman Empire, the inability to exert sufficient sovereignty in distant provinces, bribery of seats, defects in the economic structure and non-Muslim vassals' getting influenced by these ideas due to their closeness to the West, corresponded to the inability to prevent these movements from spreading.

Turks and the Turkish nationalism, which were the constituent elements of the Empire, never turned out to be the main ideology for the reason that it would lead the Empire to a dissolution. Instead, Ottomanism to bind non-Muslims to the Empire, Pan-Islamism to bind the Arabs to the Empire became the official movements of the Empire. Turkism was only to be recalled following the revolts of non-muslim actors who were not Turks at the same time.

From 1839, Edict of Gülhane, the fundamental goal was to block the nationalist ideas of the non-muslims to prevent them from breaking away from the Empire through satisfying them on social, political, economic issues. As a matter of fact, on this matter, the positive insights suggested that the loyalty on the Empire could be enhanced by the creation of an Ottoman identity were on the agenda. Nonetheless, none of these insights could avert the nationalist ideas and in time, non-Turkish factors broke away from the Empire one after another.

Since 1839, to hamper non-muslim nationalism, solutions including acknowledgement of fundamental rights and freedoms, providing economic development in the region and transition to constitutional order were implemented respectively, yet nationalist idea could not be averted (Çetinsaya, 2011, pp. 265-266). In the same period, Turkish nationalism was repressed as well and internalization of Ottomanism and later on pan-Islamism by Turks were aimed for.

Turkism movements in the Ottoman Empire can be detected in the language simplification initially. Ahmet Vefik Pasha, who was the pioneer of this case, gathered Turkish words in his book entitled 'Lehçe-i Osmani'. In this

period, continued with Süleyman Pasha, Pasha dwelled on the fact that the name of the nation is the Turkish nation by rejecting the word Ottoman nation (Gökalp, 2018b, p. 24). Moreover, he wrote Turkish history and Turkish Grammar book titled ‘Sarf-ı Türki’ to be taught in military schools (Gökalp, 2018b, p. 24).

In the same period, Namık Kemal, who wrote pieces by utilizing plain Turkish that the public could understand and who spoke for big audiences with his pieces that provided great contributions to the spread of Turkism idea, nourished pan-Turkism movement on certain levels.

The arguments that the Turkish language was a connection with other Turks living in the world and that Turkish was spoken from the Adriatic Sea to Great Wall of China and that these people were Turks, were indicated by Şemsettin Sami⁸ (Landau, 1995, p. 31).

In the ends of the 1800s, with the publications of writers such as Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura, Veled Çebeli, and Ömer Seyfettin, the idea of simplification of Turkish stood out and this idea was respected among the public consciously with these publications.

Writers such as Ahmed Ağaoğlu and Yusuf Akçura migrating from Russia together with Ziya Gökalp established the fundamentals of pan-Turkism through their works in language simplification. With the simplification done in the language and the simple and plain Turkish that spread around the people and thanks to the pieces that these writers wrote, the public got acquainted with pan-

⁸ The same idea was utilized by Süleyman Demirel, the 9th President of the Republic (Erşen, 2012, p. 124).

Turkism and the cultural growth of the Turkism movement reached to its maturity following the steps taken in the aftermath of the proclamation of the Republic.

When the point that pan-Turkism idea reached stemming from the language is considered, it can be identified as ‘‘artefact’’ as Benedict Anderson would call it. Even though Turkishness dates back to earlier times and as an identity dates back to the Great Hun Empire established in 220 B.C, this identity remained silent in the background in the times of the Ottoman Empire and then was established again. The aforementioned establishment commenced with language and established gradually as an ‘‘imagined community’’ as again in Anderson’s saying (Anderson, 2014, p. 20). The moment when Turks living in significant numbers in the Ottoman Empire thought of creating a nation, the notion of the Turkish nation was shaped and received its final status with the Republic. With the proclamation of the Republic and thereafter the abolition of caliphate and the abolition of the sultanate, sovereignty was transferred to the nation unconditionally.

2.4. Turkish Nationalism in Ziya Gökalp’s Publications

In his historical review of Turkism, Gökalp determined two types of Turkism in Europe. The first type of Turkism is a concept that can be defined as Turcophile or admiration for Turks. Indeed, Turcophiles in Europe bought Turkish art works by paying large amounts of money. The other type of Turkism in Europe, on the other hand, has revealed itself in Turkology studies. With archaeological excavations

carried out in various countries, supporters of this understanding have acknowledged that Turks were an ancient nation and formed high civilizations throughout history (Parla, 2009, p. 22).

These Turkic studies that Gökalp mentioned were widely used during the Republic period in the process of building a national identity. In this context, the Turkish Historical Society was established under the leadership of Atatürk to investigate Turkish history in addition to opening lecterns for Turkic studies. On the other hand, Abdulhamid II tried to prevent the rise of the Turkish movement and brought first the movement of Ottomanism and then Islamism in an attempt to maintain the integrity of the Empire. Gökalp mentioned that Mustafa Kemal was the one who united Turks under the ideal of Turkism and stated that if this had not been achieved, the efforts of everyone working for Turkism would fail (Gökalp, 2018b, p. 30).

According to Gökalp, Turkism is the rise of the Turkish nation. Within this framework, there are several analyses about the nation: These are:

- Racial Turkists
- Tribal Turkists
- Geographical Turkists
- Ottomanists
- Unionist Islamists
- Individualists

According to Racial Turkists, nation is synonymous with race. The simplest description of the concept of race is the categorization as white, black, red and yellow race. However, the science of anthropology has a different approach towards this description purporting a different categorization. However, it can be observed that none of the European nations belongs to only one of this racial regimentation. As a matter of fact, each nation harbors many of different types within itself (Gökalp, 2018b, p. 33).

On the other hand, Tribal (eponymic) Turkists are observed to be confused about the concepts of tribe and nation. While tribe refers to people from the same parents and people with no foreigners among them, communities had never been purified from foreigners even in ancient times. Yet, social characteristics are composed only by national nurture. Therefore, tribe does not have any importance for national character and tribal purity is not present in any society. Although the fact that ancient societies followed the ideal of tribe or eponym constituted a role model for the Turks, the problem is that ancient communities associated the ideal of a tribe with religion and accepted religion as part of their identity (Gökalp, 2018b, pp. 34-35).

According to Geographical Turkists, a nation is the sum of people residing in the same country. For instance, there are Persians and Turks in Iran, however, they are collectively called the nation of Iran. Nevertheless, not every community living in a country is called a nation due to differences in language and culture (Gökalp, 2018b, p. 35).

As much as gathering in a single country, a nation can be scattered across many countries as well. In this case, it would be wrong to characterize these nations

as different nations, since their language and culture are the same. For example, those living in Azerbaijan should not be called Azerbaijani as those living in Crimea should not be called Tatars to indicate a difference between them. The inhabitants here are Turkish with their language and culture (Gökalp, 2018b, p. 35).


Ottomanists' definition of nation is close to the definition of Geographical Turkists. According to Ottomanists, nation refers to all the subjects living in the Ottoman Empire. Yet, the underlying error of this condition is hidden in the previous definition. It is impossible to create a common society from nations whose culture is not united (Gökalp, 2018b, p. 36). The same applies to Islamic Unionists. Authors who advocate Islamic Unity define nation as the sum of all Muslims.

On the other hand, Individualists argue that nation is the community that an individual feels belonging to. However, this definition is not entirely true. Feeling is also very important for individuals. Nation is the community where the individual is raised, continues to live and shares the culture. Thanks to this upbringing, the individual shares all the feelings of the community where he/she lives. Hence, that individual will be upset when he/she comes out of that community (Gökalp, 2018b, p. 36).

After all these definitions, it would be useful to look at Gökalp's own definition of nation: Nation means a community that has its own peculiar culture. In this context, Turks can have one culture and one language. Thus, Turks living in other regions should not aspire to adopt different cultures and languages. According to Gökalp, the close ideal in Turkism must be the Ghuzz Unity. Nevertheless, this is not yet a political unity. All Ghuzz Turks must first unite under a single culture. The

distant ideal of Turkism, on the other hand, is Turan. In this regard, the word Turan refers to all branches of Turks. According to this understanding, all Ghuzz Turks will unite under this name and around a single culture. While Uzbeks, Tatars and Kyrgyz Turks have a different culture, they will feel that they have a common identity and unite under Turanism as the culture of Turks. To summarize, the distant ideal of Turks is to unite all Ghuzz, Kyrgyz, Tatars, Uzbeks and Yakuts under the name Turan and around the same language, culture and literature (Gökalp, 2018b, pp. 42-43).

After identifying the close and distant ideals of Turkism, it will be useful to tackle Turkism, Ghuzz-ism and Turanism respectively.



Civilization and culture are of great importance to the survival of a nation. Looking at Europe, it is possible to talk about a common Occidental civilization and other independent cultures under it (Gökalp, 2018b, p. 46). Language is the first example of the cultures of nations. In this vein, there were two languages spoken in

the last period of the Ottoman Empire. These were the official Ottoman language consisting of Turkish, Arabic and Persian and Turkish – popularly spoken but underrated. Comparing the two languages, it can be clearly seen that the Turkish language reflected Turkish culture in real sense. In this context, the difference between the concepts of civilization and culture should be examined correctly. Civilization refers to all concepts and practices transformed to one nation to another by means of procedures and imitation. However, culture is neither imitated nor done via a procedure (Gökalp, 2018b, pp. 48-49).

Another problem encountered in the last period of the Ottoman Empire was that the same dichotomy was also experienced in literature. Two different languages were also reflected in literature. As a matter of fact, Turkish was used in verbal stories, proverbs and epics while the Ottoman literature included imitating poems instead of individual stories and epics (Gökalp, 2018b, pp. 50-51).

The same dichotomy can be observed in morality as well. While Turks never boasted about their heroism and sacrifice and were not arrogant, Ottomans were just the opposite.

The view of Turkism on Islam was also different from those who advocated the movement of Ottomanism or Islamism. The reason for this lies in Turks' pre-Islamic belief. In the Tengri religion, the Tengri was considered as the God of Award. This God was not involved in punishment. Moreover, since this God was accepted to appear only with love and affection towards people, Tengri was welcomed by compassion. This situation continued as a tradition after Islam. This situation

continued as a tradition after Islam. Turks have identified Allah only with love (Gökalp, 2018b, p. 55).

Culture and civilization are critical for the continuity of a state. Yet, it can be argued that culture is more important than civilization. Gökalp evaluated this argument from the following perspective: “When a nation with strong culture but weak civilization enters into a struggle with another nation whose culture is weak, but civilization is advanced, the one with a strong culture always prevails.”

Throughout history, Turks have achieved many successes for maintaining their traditions, in other words, their culture, and prevailed against other states. From this point of view, Gökalp developed two answers to the question of why Ottoman Civilization was doomed to be demolished: Firstly, the Ottoman Empire was consisting of a temporary society like any other empire. However, not societies but communities have permanent continuity and communities only consist of nations. Nations living under the roof of the Empire can only temporarily forget their national selves. Secondly, as Western Civilization rose, Eastern Civilization declined, since the advanced Western Civilization was adopted by other civilizations as copy. The difference of Turkists was that they were fond of internalizing Western Civilization on the condition that they remained Turkish and Muslim. Yet, Turks had to first find and reveal their ambition (Gökalp, 2018b, p. 60).

Gökalp refers exactly to this situation defining Turkification, Islamization and Modernization respectively. Turks needed to first find their national identity and while doing so, they would remain Muslim and reach the level of modern

civilizations. These principles continued to be applied ad verbum in Turkish foreign policy.

In this context, building the Turkish identity was up to the elite since the public did not have sufficient education or qualifications for this job. Gökalp stated that the elites needed to identify with the public in order to be able to establish a national identity. This was a two-step interaction: First to obtain cultural background from the public and then to provide the public with advanced civilization opportunities. Therefore, it was first necessary to be full of Turkish culture in order to ensure nationalization (Gökalp, 2018b, pp. 63-64). Keeping this consideration in mind, the elite (Turkists) taught the nation its name and language with the policies implemented in conjunction with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. And the language they taught was one that was familiar to the public in contrast to the Ottoman language that had been disconnected from regular people. In this line, the elite were assigned to bring civilization to the people. In doing so, they needed to make sure internalization of Western civilization instead of the Oriental civilization or the Ottoman civilization as its sub-branch. Thus, Western civilization was brought in due to the lack of civilization in the public and when combined with the Turkish culture, it was assumed that Turks would simultaneously modernize (Gökalp, 2018b, p. 66).

Turks passed from three different civilizations throughout history. Firstly, they were subject to the Far Eastern civilization when they adopted the tribal state understanding. When they adopted the understanding of sultanate in state administration, on the other hand, they accepted the Oriental civilization. Finally,

after Turks adopted the understanding of national state, they accepted Western civilization. The adoption of the Oriental civilization by Turks and their acceptance of Islam coincided with the same period (Gökalp, 2018b, p. 71). Thus, the Oriental civilization is confused with Islamic civilization. Nonetheless, civilization and religion are different concepts.

Since the foundation of Western civilization is division of labor, large cities were formed in this civilization. In contrast, large cities were not formed due to the lack of division of labor and specialization in the Oriental civilization and thus, nations belonging to the Oriental Civilization were lagging behind (Gökalp, 2018b, pp. 77-78). Along with the establishment of the national state, Western civilization was therefore seen as necessary to adopt. When Turks accepted Western civilization, they inherited an international civilization in addition to benefiting from the cultures of all nations belonging to this civilization (Gökalp, 2018b, p.119). According to Gökalp, although this situation was realized during the Reform period and intellectuals endeavored to adopt Western civilization, efforts did not yield complete results and therefore failed to succeed. In the same vein, national arts collapsed due to the fact that there was no national production during the Reform period, and only consumption style was adopted from the West. After this collapse, Turks failed to ensure industrial development as they were already lagging behind the West (Gökalp, 2018b, p. 79).

In fact, another reason underlying the collapse of the Ottomanist idea can be found in this situation. Although the idea of Ottomanism tried to unite Western and Eastern civilizations, it failed to reconcile these two civilizations with contrasting and

different principles leading dichotomy in almost each institution. Along with the emergence of national state, Gökalp described the new conjuncture as follows: “I am from the Turkish nation, I am from the Islamic ummah, I am from Western civilization” (Gökalp, 2018b, p. 83).

3. THE PLACE OF GÖKALP’S NATIONALISM IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Nationalism is effective not only in the process of forming nation states, but also in the execution of the current system of states. Nationalism was invented to transform people with different cultures, languages and understandings living within a region into a more homogeneous structure. After this homogeneous structure is formed, it will be necessary for the state to maintain this structure by basing its nation, nationality and legitimacy on these concepts (Alpkaya, 2008, p. 156). In other words, nationalism continues to have influence in all areas.

In light of this information, it would be wrong to utter that there are no nationalism elements in a state's foreign policy or that a country's foreign policy is nationalist. Foreign policy harbors nationalism within its body and nationalism is required for states to be included in the current system.

As a matter of fact, it is possible to see the traces of nationalism in every action of foreign policy and in all designated foreign policy elements. The conflict between 'us' and 'the others' forms the basis of foreign policy when a state has a conflict of interest with another state in a certain field. In addition, these concepts are based on the concepts of nationality and nationalism. Thus, foreign policy is designed on the basis of nationalism.

In order to understand the relationship between foreign policy and nationalism, the fact that states raised customs barriers against other states and went on the path to protecting their own industry may also be a starting example for today's foreign policy. Indeed, in today's system of states, foreign policy is a whole of policies developed to protect the interests of a country and its citizens against other states.

Turkey gained its legitimacy and recognition by other states with the Treaty of Lausanne and took the first step in entering Western Civilization with the proclamation of the Republic. The precondition of being a member of the system of states was being a nation state and Turkey thus, established its nation state as well as building a national identity. In this context, Gökalp was an unofficial ideologist of the Republican People's Party and his thoughts had a large impact on many areas ranging from domestic politics to foreign policy. This effect manifested itself most clearly as Turkification, Islamization and Modernization.

In this line, it can fairly be accentuated that Turkification, Islamization and Modernization have been the basic principles of establishing the Turkish identity. As stated before, in the period of the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Turkism was the final surviving movement among the three movements – Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism – put forward to save the Empire. Those who advocated the Islamist movement outcast Turkism with the claim that Turkishness and Turkism excluded non-Turkish Muslims.

According to Gökalp, this assumption is completely wrong. Turkism contains nationality, while Islam contains internationalism. For this reason, the two are not opposites (Gökalp, 2018c, p. 19). At the same time, as those who adopted the Islamist movement stated, there is no conflict between Islam and modernization (Gökalp, 2018c, p. 20). Therefore, all three thoughts should be taken and applied in all areas. Indeed, these principles have been reflected in Turkish foreign policy. In the Lausanne Conference, the Turkish identity was introduced to Western states, the ethics of Islam were accepted, and modernization was set as an ultimate goal in practically all areas of life.

The Lausanne Peace Treaty was the treaty that ended the Period of National Struggle and also the revisionist approach in foreign policy. With this Treaty:

- Turkey took its place in the international area as a nation state and the West accepted the Turkish identity, while policies were shaped around the interests of the nation state and therefore the nation to include Turkish nationalism.
- Turkey further endeavored to become a member of Western civilization and in doing so, the country formed an ‘Islamic Turkism’, in Gökalp’s terms, that was different from Islamic countries. This difference from

other Islamic states was clearly demonstrated in the international area and foreign policy processes.

- In parallel with Gökâlp's understanding of nationalism, Turkey followed a non-irredentist policy in foreign politics of the country and reflected protection of its independence as the core of its foreign policy principles.
- As Gökâlp opposed, the country avoided the expansionist policy and protection of peace (pacts are best examples to this) became one of the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy.

3.1. Key Objectives of Turkish Foreign Policy between 1923 and 1938

Turkish Foreign Policy developed between 1923 and 1938 basically had four principles:

- A national state
- Reaching the level of modern civilizations
- Protection of independence
- Protection of peace

As Gökâlp underlined, Turkish intellectuals in this period applied to the public to receive a cultural decency and brought civilization to them. Additionally, they put the principle of Turkification into practice. In the same vein, they endeavored to manifest that being Turkish was not something bad. Organizations such as the Turkish Historical Society and the Turkish Language Society were established for this reason and to investigate Turkish history and language. At the same time, lodges and zawiyas were closed to promote an understanding of Islam based not on fear but love that had been

internalized by the first Turks. Furthermore, one of the main goals was to become a member of Western civilization and reach the modernization level of this civilization.

The reflections of this were also seen in foreign policy. Along with the establishment of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) on April 23, 1920, Ankara gained its legitimacy. In addition, the traditional legitimacy principle was completely abandoned, and legal legitimacy was adopted with the proclamation of the Republic in 1923. Thus, the inherent feature of traditional legitimacy – continuity – was replaced by *change* as the inherent feature of legal legitimacy (Oktay, 2014, p. 51).

As a result of the establishment of the nation state, the source of legitimacy changed, and foreign policy began to be shaped by the Parliament or TGNA representing the public in accordance with the interests of the nation. In the same period, the military was banned from politics as long as their military duties continued since this was a lesson learned from the period of the Committee of Union and Progress.

3.1.1. A National State

At the heart of the national state lies the concept of the nation state and nationalism. With the understanding of nation state, the right to sovereignty is stripped away from the person believed to be endowed with this right by God and given to people. Furthermore, the right to sovereignty has passed from kings to the people with the establishment of nation states. As the source of legitimacy has changed, the source of the principle of sovereignty has changed as well.

States have transformed and evolved with new understandings and political ideological apparatuses. In the system of monarchy, the political ideological apparatus of the state is fundamental laws. In the liberal era, when nation states emerged and when the

bourgeoisie was the dominant class, the parliament became the political ideological apparatus of the state (Althusser, 2014, pp. 16-17).

After the bourgeoisie revolution, the state apparatus covered the state presidency, government, administration, armed forces, justice institutions and all institutions that depended on these institutions. In this line, the ideological apparatus of the state ensured that the will of the people was represented through elected deputies by the right to vote. In the same vein, the government and thus, the head of the state became responsible for the policies pursued. Similarly, representatives in the parliament became responsible for their electorate (Althusser, 2014, p. 18). Political parties emerged on the basis of this design. Thanks to this system, each voter can express their own opinion by voting for a political party that reflects their point of view.

The infrastructure and superstructure that exists within all societies are seen as reflections of society. The general expectation is that the infrastructure is first built – which means the public reaches a certain level of awareness – and then a proper superstructure is formed. In cases where the superstructure is formed first, it must be based on the infrastructure to ensure its legitimacy (Althusser, 2014, pp. 42-43).

Gökalp explained this situation with the necessity of the elites to integrate with the public. Thus, it is thought that the elites with advanced education and awareness level would bring civilization by benefiting from people's aspiration.

The core of the Republic of Turkey after the establishment of the TGNA has been the understanding that “sovereignty rests unconditionally with the nation”, emerging as a concept valid in both domestic and foreign sovereignty. As a result of forming the

national bourgeoisie as well as the implementation of the principles of Turkification and Islamization, it is accepted that the modernization move will take place along with recognition as an independent state and an actor equal to others in the international system.

The Republic of Turkey, thus, fulfilled the principle of being a nation state as one of the pre-conditions of recognition in the international area and started to shape its foreign policy as an independent and equal nation state. This foreign policy is a non-irredentist foreign policy, as advocated by Gökbalp. As a matter of fact, supporting status quo and realism as the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy reflect Ziya Gökbalp's views.

For a national state, sovereignty belongs to the nation, not a particular person or a group. Hence, foreign policy must be shaped according to the interests of the nation (Kaynar, 1983, pp. 25-26). In this regard, the desire to be part of Western Civilization can only be fulfilled when foreign policy decisions are based on national sovereignty. Therefore, from 1920 onward, it has been emphasized that all representatives should take the authority only from the nation in international relations and international negotiations. Indeed, the reflection of this situation was evident in the London Conference. In response to the request of the Istanbul Government to have representatives from the Ankara Government in the delegation in Istanbul, it was underlined that sovereignty unconditionally rested with the nation and that the Turkish Grand National Assembly was the sole authority in foreign policy decisions with the power taken from the people.

Between 1923 and 1938, the principle that a national state and its sovereignty must be based entirely on people's will stood out in order to set the right goals in Turkish

Foreign Policy. In this regard, the concept of nation state and the interests of the nation must be brought to the forefront in order to prevent any particular person or group from deciding on foreign policy. As a matter of fact, nation state is a must in order to prevent any person or group from preferring their own interests, fame and authority over the interests of the nation as in the last period of the Ottoman Empire. Since foreign policy takes its legitimacy from the nation in a state where sovereignty rests with people, all decisions in foreign policy are thus legitimate as well.

In this context, a lot of effort had been made to ensure that the nation state goal was not compromised in Turkish foreign policy during the period of 1923-1938. Thus, the Turkish identity was promoted and brought into the forefront (Çakmak, 2013, p. 25). The interests of the Turkish nation were underlined in both negotiations and meetings during after the Treaty of Lausanne while setting out our foreign policy.

3.1.2. Reaching the Level of Modern Civilizations

Gökalp underscored the idea that it was an inevitable necessity to internalize Western Civilization. Accordingly, Gökalp reiterated that Turkish nationalism represented a philosophy of life. This philosophy focuses on the necessity of uniting under a culture and speaking the same language as well as being in solidarity as a nation. Within this framework, Gökalp's understanding of nationalism is more egalitarian than expansionist. The principle of Islamization, on the other hand, points out to the moral aspects of Islam. Therefore, it can fairly be stated that Turkification refers to cultural approach, while Islamization refers to moral approach (Parla, 2009, p. 65). These two

approaches overlap with Western Civilization. There is no contradiction or contention between them. The concept that Gökalp defined as modernization means achieving the industrial development of Europe. In this sense, modernization does not necessarily refer to taking Europe's lifestyle and moral values. The ideals of Turkification and Islamization reinforce lifestyle and moral values.

Gökalp advocated the idea that adoption of Western civilization was not a choice. He explained this with the following statement: "If we do not accept it, we will be prisoners of the Oriental states. We have to accept one of the two options: Dominating the Oriental Civilization or being condemned to the Oriental States. Today, the truth is now understood: In order to defend our freedom and our future against Europe, we must adopt the European Civilization. European civilization consists of positive sciences and industrial techniques, as well as legal institutions" (Erşan, 2006, p. 41). The obligation to adopt European civilization should not be considered only in domestic politics and social development. The same obligation applies to the foreign policy of the period. The Turkish nation strived to gain its independence in the period that began with the War of Independence. In addition, the nation set a goal to reach the level of modern civilizations by means of Turkish elites in order to ensure its independence in foreign policy.

Atatürk's question, "Which is the nation that aspired to adopt modern civilization and did not favor the Orient?" clearly explains the principle to reach the level of contemporary civilizations (Çaycı, 1992, p. 650). In order to be accepted by Western civilization, Turkish foreign policy was transformed in addition to developing the society, law and economy in accordance with Western system. As a matter of fact, changes such as the introduction of democracy, the declaration of the Republic, financial support to the

bourgeoisie, adaptation of laws to Western norms and elimination dichotomy in law and enacting the Law on Unification of Education had an impact on Turkish foreign policy and relations with both Western countries and Soviets were based on the principle of equality and reputability.

Another sub-heading of the idea of reaching the level of modern civilizations is rationality. It can be understood that there was no room for emotional decisions in foreign policy and that such decisions should only be made by rationality from Atatürk's words: "Our maxim is to act with reason, logic and intellect. The cases that fill our whole lives are the evidence of this truth" (Karal & İnan, 1946, p. 54). Furthermore, Ziya Gökalp explains this argument with the emphasis that Turkish nationalism is a non-irredentist cultural nationalism.

As stated before, one of the main objectives of Turkish foreign policy is to reach the level of modern civilizations and positivist mindset is among the primary driving forces to achieve this goal. In this line, Gökalp was inspired by Comte and Durkheim with regard to positivist frame of mind and reflected this influence in his own ideas as well (Türkdoğan, 2015, pp. 249-250). Within this framework, Turkish foreign policy integrated positivist thinking to ensure decision- and policy-making based not on beliefs but logic. In Turkish foreign policy, positivism is defined as first identifying and investigating the event in question and then making inferences and predictions according to the principles of logic. This principle was followed in foreign policy decisions made in 1923-1938 and the positivist mindset referenced by Ziya Gökalp was tried to be implemented as in Western civilization.

3.1.3. Full Independence

Since the period when the Ottoman Empire demanded support from a European state against another European state to ensure its survival, it started to lose its independence in foreign policy as well. This loss led to the perpetuation of capitulations by European countries to foster segregation and consequently, the Public Debt Council was established in 1881 leading to the complete loss of independence in foreign policy.

In order not to experience the same situation again, the Republic of Turkey needed to remove the capitulations and free itself from external interventions within its national borders. For this reason, one of the main goals of foreign policy was set as full independence. Atatürk stated his views on this issue in an interview with the French representative Franklin Bouillon during the National Struggle period as follows: “Full independence means, of course, to achieve full independence and freedom in all areas including political, financial, economic, judicial, military and cultural area. Being deprived of independence in any of these areas means complete deprivation of the nation and the country of full independence” (Özakman, 2005, p. 136).

Both the agreements signed during the National Struggle and the Lausanne Peace Treaty regulated the issue of full independence as one of the main objectives of foreign policy and one of the most important considerations. This principle was put forward as a precondition of being independent in foreign policy and had a place in Gökâlp’s thinking system. In this regard, Gökâlp underlined the need to create a national bourgeoisie for economic independence, as well as the need to end the privileges given to foreign traders. Therefore, Gökâlp uttered that Turkish identity and ethical structure of Islam needed to be internalized together with Western civilization to ensure the development of the

country as a fully independent and modern state prioritizing modern science and technology. Moreover, Gökalp also believed that political capitulations posed an obstacle to political independence in international relations (Gökalp, 2018b, p. 132).

3.1.4. Maintaining Peace

Revisionism and status quo are successive processes in the foreign policy making process. A state can update its foreign policy as revisionist when it thinks it can change international conditions to its own interests and will be able to do so. However, revisionism is never a foreign policy element that can be followed permanently. In an environment where states can obtain what they want, maintain their advantages or fail to achieve a desired result, they naturally tend to protect what they already have and follow a policy of supporting the status quo.

There are many variables to consider in following revisionist foreign policy. It is primarily important to determine the possible benefits and harms of the projected foreign policy to the countries in question as well their possible effect on national interests.

Countries that want to be revisionist in foreign policy often decide to use their hard power as soon as they realize that they have more power than the total power of other countries. This also means abandoning the policy of supporting status quo.

Turkish foreign policy remained solidly based on maintaining the status quo in the period between 1923 and 1938, except for short periods of careful revisionist moves regarding Hatay, Mosul and Straits. It was an obligation for Turkey to avoid conflicts and maintain peace not to risk the gains achieved by the Lausanne Peace Treaty and to fulfill the other foreign policy objectives mentioned above.

Within this framework, Ziya Gökalp advocated for international peace. Furthermore, he often accentuated that nations should be in solidarity instead of fighting (Polat, 2007, p. 238) and eliminate imperialism that causes wars (Tezcan, 1986, p. 67). As Turkish foreign policy was against it, Gökalp also strictly opposed to imperialism. According to Gökalp, nations are not enemies of each other by nature, however, imperialism and capitalism create this hostility. He advocated the idea that peace would be established naturally when imperialism and capitalism that disrupted peace were to be withdrawn from the international area (Tezcan, 1986, p. 67).

When it comes to the protection of peace, Gökalp attached annotation to the present state of the League of Nations. First, he argued that a league consisting only of European states could not represent the whole world. Instead, he asserted that the League would gain authority to represent as well as power when all nations — advanced or underdeveloped — become members of this community (Polat, 2007, p. 237). Another annotation attached by Gökalp was about putting nations under mandate. He claimed that a League that took nations under mandate – whereas they had to be free – could not be called the League of Nations (Tezcan, 1986, pp. 67-68). Further, Gökalp expounded to the League of Nations in direct correlation with the concept of nationalism. Gökalp criticized that whenever the West mentioned any international federation since the Middle Ages, this meant establishing a front of Christian nations (Tezcan, 1986, pp. 68-69). In consequence, he argued that the League of Nations would not suffice to protect peace in its current form, yet, it could be corrected by transforming it into another league or committee in the future (Polat, 2007, p. 233).

Gökalp considered that the protection of peace in foreign policy was one of the main goals of economic development as well. Therefore, he stated that if a country maintains peace, it would be easier to bring machines, engineers and craftsmen from Europe and to ensure development (Göksel, 1950, pp. 62-64).

3.2. Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy between 1923 and 1938

3.2.1. Basic Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy between 1923 and 1938

The Ottoman Empire had a revisionist policy structure by nature. Its economic revenues were largely from conquests and spoils of war. Thus, the Empire expanded its lands as much as possible to gain spoils and have more arable lands. Thus, the amount of tax entering the treasury increased as well as spoils.

However, with the end of expansion on reasons such as industrial revolution, geographical discoveries, etc., imperial foreign policy shifted from revisionism to supporting status quo. In the following period, the Ottoman Empire strived to maintain its survival by means of several balance policies and alliances, opposing any kind of change in foreign policy.

The Ottoman Empire was the most powerful state in Europe throughout the 16th and 17th centuries. Nevertheless, it was clear that the balance of power began to change by the 18th century. After that period, the Ottomans shunned isolationist foreign policy and tried to understand the policies of European countries. With the European States trying to expand towards Ottoman territory, especially Russia, the politics of balance of power became the key element of foreign policy. The Ottoman Empire opened embassies in Europe to implement this policy that included a strict follow-up of status quo in addition to closely following European politics (Hanioğlu, 2008, pp. 47-48). This status

quo foreign policy continued until the period of national struggle. Turkish foreign policy turned to revisionism along with the period of national struggle, yet, at status quo attitude was adopted after signing the Lausanne Peace Treaty.

The period between 1923 and 1928 harbored the process of nation building, acceleration of revolutions, and a rapid transformation to ensure that the society reached the level of modern civilizations. During this period, fundamental changes were made in society and in the state structure that had been inherited from the Ottoman Empire. One of the first highlights of these changes was the changing characteristics of the political order and foreign policy that had been going on for nearly three centuries.

3.2.1.1. Supporting Status Quo

The period of national struggle also means the demolition of the foreign policy supporting status quo. The Ankara Government rejected the Sevres Peace Treaty imposed on the Empire and decided that the only way to ensure the survival of Turks was the National Struggle. Until the Lausanne Peace Treaty, revisionism in foreign policy had been the primary principle. Furthermore, the primary goal was to establish a fully independent state that was to be treated equally by Western states within the borders of National Pact.

With the Lausanne Peace Treaty, revisionism was replaced by the principle of supporting status quo. As a matter of fact, the policy of supporting status quo – which was adopted with the Lausanne Peace Treaty – was also identified with Ziya Gökalp's

idea of non-irredentist cultural Turkism. Here, status quo means being satisfied with existing borders, not engaging in an effort to expand, and not pursuing an irredentist policy regarding Turks outside the country. With this policy, the main motto of foreign policy became: “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” (Oran, 2013, p. 47).

From this perspective, it is necessary to evaluate this motto in two ways: In domestic politics, a republic was established that could become a member of Western Civilization in cultural, political and economic terms by breaking from the Ottoman Empire. In this regard, the newly founded state and its system was not open for discussion in domestic politics. On the other hand, there were two messages in foreign policy: The first was to inform about the Ottoman being satisfied with the existing borders and not taking any initiative to expand the lands. Secondly, the Empire did not want any problem with the neighboring countries. Indeed, the pacts established one after another were a clear indication of this goal of zero problems with neighbors.

The primary reason for supporting status quo was the pan-Turkist policies that the Committee of Union and Progress tried to implement in the last period of the Ottoman Empire. Decision-makers who thought that expansionist policy would cause problems to the newly formed Republic of Turkey avoided irredentist policies, as Gökaltp emphasized during this period.

The second reason for supporting this policy was that the Ottomans did not want to have deteriorated relations with Russia – which they warred since the 17th century at intervals – and that they valued Russia as an ally. With the Non-Aggression Pact signed in 1921, it was guaranteed that a policy against Turks living in Russia would not be

pursued, while the same guarantee was provided by Russia that a policy of spreading communism would not be pursued in Turkey (Oran, 2013, p. 47).

Last but not least, the policy of following status quo was followed due the desire for establishing a new order and empowering the nation state. While nation states were built on solid grounds in European states as they completed their national unification long before the Republic of Turkey, this situation was very new for Turkey in its first years after the foundation. For nearly 200 years, the society was guided first by Ottomanism and then by Islamism. On the other hand, the society managed to recently recognize the principle of Turkism in real terms thanks to writers and intellectuals such as Ziya Gökalp, Ahmed Ağaoğlu, Ismail Gaspiralı and Yusuf Akçura.

3.2.1.2. Foreign Policy on the Axis of Nationalism

The principle of nationalism in foreign policy in 1923-1938 was significant for both the period of National Struggle and the process after the proclamation of the Republic.

However, this concept was not commonly used due to the conditions of the national struggle as well as the irredentist and adventurous policies that the Committee of Union and Progress pursued under the name of Turkism particularly in the last period of the Ottoman Empire.

On the other hand, this conjuncture changed after the establishment of the Republic. Along with the new Republic founded by the Turks as the final balance of the multinational Ottoman Empire, Turkism started to stand out. From this moment on, the concept of Turkism had often been used with firmness to transform society and to break

down the Ottoman perception that Europe had in mind for 600 years, as well as to strengthen the nation state.

In this context, Atatürk's statement that "Nations are a family and the Turkish nation is an honorable member of this family" overlaps with Gökalp's concepts of culture and civilization. Arguing that Turkish culture should be part of European civilization, Gökalp's thoughts are reflected on both Atatürk's words and foreign policy moves during this period (Armaoğlu, 1997, p. 186).

In the same line, Atatürk explained the principle of national politics with the following words: "The political profession that we openly have the opportunity to implement is national politics. There cannot be any greater mistake than being a daydreamer in the face of today's circumstances of the world and the truths that centuries have gathered in their characters. In order for our nation to live strongly, happily and continuously, the state must follow all national politics which must be compatible with and relying on our internal organization. When I say national politics, I mean this: To work for the welfare and development of the nation and the country within our own national borders, and above all, to maintain our existence by relying on our own strength and power... Not to engage people and cause harm in pursuit of excessive ambitions" (Giritli, 1980, pp. 190-191).

The Committee of Union and Progress basically had two objectives in the last period of the Ottoman Empire: To save the Empire from disintegration and to reclaim lost territories. After the movements of Ottomanism and Islamism collapsed, Turkism started to be implemented, however, this Turkism was considered as an expansionist movement. In other words, nationalism became an element of expansionist influences in foreign

policy. In the Republic of Turkey, on the other hand, nationalism is the principle of being treated equally by other states in foreign policy and strengthening the nation state. The foreign policy drafted on the axis of nationalism during the Republic period included a cultural Turkism, as Gökalp referred. Indeed, his words of not harming people and not pursuing excessive ambitions are a sign of non-expansionist nationalism and foreign policy.

3.2.1.3. Realist, Constructivist and Peaceful Foreign Policy

Turkish Foreign Policy from 1923 to 1938 also included the themes of realist school and constructivist approach. From the period of national struggle, foreign policy goals were realistic and accessible targets. Moreover, the National Pact was drawn within the framework protecting the national borders. Pan-Islamist or Turanist policies were included neither in the period of national struggle nor after the establishment of the Republic. Concordantly, the targets were realistically set and absolutely supported for legitimate reasons. Here, it is possible to see Gökalp's influence again.

From this perspective, Gökalp categorized three stages that incorporate the close and distant ideals of Turkism as pro-Turkey approach, Ghuzz-ism and Turanism, respectively. There is no expansionist purpose in neither of these three concepts. There is a constant reference to language and culture. The phrase, which is accepted as Ghuzz-ism, refers to the fact that all Ghuzz individuals shares the same language and culture. Turanism, on the other hand, means that Kyrgyz, Tatars, Uzbek and Yakuts speak the same language. As Gökalp did not include expansionism in these concepts, Turkish foreign policy did not allow expansionism in the same way.

During this period, Turkish foreign policy was also constructivist. As a matter of fact, concepts such as rules, norms and intersubjectivity – which are the themes of constructivism – were critical in the foreign policies of the term. With the goal of adopting Western civilization, Turkish foreign policy changed identity and enacted the rules of Western Civilization. International norms were integrated into foreign policy and good relations were built with all neighbors.

As can be understood from Atatürk's statements during this period, realism was evidently one of the fundamental elements of foreign policy of the term: "We have attracted hostility, evil intentions, hatred of the world upon this nation due to pretending to have done big and imaginary things... We have to look back into the legitimate situation rather than increasing the number of our enemies and their pressure on us by talking about concepts that we do not and cannot implement. Let's know our place... We are a nation that wants life and independence. We would sacrifice our lives only for this purpose" (Kocatürk, 1971, p. 20).

Within the scope of Turkish Foreign Policy between 1923 and 1938, it was aimed to create security cordons and alliances in all areas where the country perceived threats outside its borders. In fact, Gökalp's reflection can also be seen here. For Gökalp, Turkish nationalism is a cultural-normative system. Islam, on the other hand, is a moral-normative system. These two systems provided solidarity in society (Parla, 2009, p. 90). Additionally, Gökalp considered Islam a moral system by purging legal and political rules, and purported that Islam helped to provide solidarity and unity in society. It is seen that the same principles were reflected in foreign policy. In order to create and maintain solidarity by adhering to treaties against a common enemy, the first two of the principles

of Turkification, Islamization and Modernization designed by Gökalp for domestic politics were adapted to Turkish foreign policy by acting in accordance with the international law and norms. Therefore, the effects of Gökalp are also seen in this principle.

3.2.1.4. Balance-Based Westernism

According to Gökalp, it is unnecessary to assume that there is a contradiction between culture and civilization. The reason for this is that they both respond to different levels of needs. Indeed, when the Arabs fought against the Ottomans during World War I, ummah ceased to be a measure of international civilization. Hence, Islam turned into only a form of morality and social solidarity.

Gökalp's principle of Westernism does not mean to be under the mandate of the West or to imitate the west. Westernization or civilization that Gökalp often referred to meant the scientific, technological and industrial achievements of the West (Parla, 2009, p. 65). Westernization is a whole that includes science, politics, economics and social sciences, and the Turkish and Islamic society needs to accept Westernization as a whole. To explain the principle of Westernism, it is included in foreign policy as a principle that seeks to incorporate industrial development against imperialism and emphasizes rationality in decision-making processes.

The same applied to Turkish foreign policy. In that, representatives of foreign policy never imitated the West or acted like the satellite of the West. Instead, Turkish foreign policy was built on a balance between the East and the West. Good relations were maintained with the USSR (East) in the period when relations were also built with the West and cooperation agreements were signed.

The principle of Westernism harbored a feature that excluded imperialism in Turkish foreign policy. Considering that there was a struggle against imperialism in the War of Independence, the characteristics of the principle of Westernism evidently reveal. In other words, Westernism was chosen despite the West in Turkish foreign policy (Giritli, 1980, p. 219). In this regard, Westernism is not a geographical definition, but refers to adopting the values and progress of the West.

In the same line, rationality was prioritized in Turkish foreign policy during this period and alliances were formed against threats. Western values including humanism, modernity and respect for law manifested themselves in foreign policy. It was underlined in every area that war was not desired, and that war was essential only in cases where the country's security was at stake.

3.2.1.5. Protection of Independence and Peace

For Gökalp, the years between 1919 and 1921 when he was on exile were marked by his abandoning of the intellectual bond with the Committee of Union and Progress. While the Committee of Union and Progress experienced division between the movements of Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism during this period, Gökalp was considering the idea and political infrastructure of the transition from multinational empire to nation state. In other words, Gökalp was pondering upon and formulating the outlines of Turkish nationalism that was not expansionist during this period (Parla, 2009, p. 45).

Since the survival and the economy of the Ottoman Empire was structurally based on conquests and this order continued for approximately three centuries, Western societies and Russia initially thought that Turkey would pursue expansionist policies. Nonetheless, Turkish foreign policy reflected Turkish nationalism in a way that did not have an expansionist cultural structure. From this perspective, Turkish foreign policy between 1923 and 1938 was shaped around building only cultural relations with Turks living abroad and avoiding political relations in order to maintain the peace environment.

In this context, Gökalp argued that protection of peace was a necessity to ensure economic development as well. He asserted that Turkey could bring machinery and trained personnel from industrially developed countries and thus, ensure economic development. For this to happen, the precondition was a peaceful Turkey.

Therefore, Turkey adhered to all agreements made in this period to form a solid Turkish foreign policy, while attention was paid to the principle of “*Pacta sunt servanda*”⁹ although it had not yet been accepted as a principle of international law at the time. In addition, agreements were never amended unilaterally. The approval of all the states that were parties to the agreement were obtained and they were amended only under this condition.

On the other hand, independence is one of the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy. Although the Republic of Turkey was weak immediately after its established following the national struggle, the country authorities never gave Western states any

⁹ *Pacta sunt servanda* is defined in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention Law Treaties accepted in 1969 as follows: “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith” (Nations, 1969, p. 11). According to this principle, treaties are binding, and they must not be violated (Caşın, 2013, p. 479).

concessions that would obstruct Turkey's economic and political independence. Since foreign policy decision-makers were aware of the fact that the Ottoman Empire had lost its independence in foreign policy due to capitulations and commercial concessions, they attached great importance to independence in all areas.

3.2.2. Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy between 1923 and 1938

From 1923 to 1938, 13 important developments took place in Turkish foreign policy and several decisions were made in the face of these developments. These decisions demonstrate one or more of the characteristics of Turkish Foreign Policy, which will be examined in detail below.

3.2.2.1. Mosul Issue

Mosul was accepted within the borders of the National Pact, yet it could not be resolved in the Lausanne Conference and left for future negotiations. After the Lausanne Conference, a conference was convened at the Golden Horn on May 19, 1924 (Meray & Olcay, 1977, p. 335). In the conference, the Turkish side reiterated its theses and offered to give a share of the oil in this region to ensure reconciliation. However, the UK preferred to leave the issue unresolved and take it to the League of Nations – as its ultimate goal – and demanded Hakkari province as well for Nestorians (Saatçi, 2003, pp. 163-165). Without compromise upon this demand, the Conference ended on June 5.

After the issue was consulted with the League of Nations on September 20, 1924, Turkey underlined that the problem should be resolved by plebiscite, while the UK

demanded establishment of a commission arguing that the people were too ignorant for a plebiscite. The League of Nations Assembly set a line separating Mosul from Hakkari at a meeting in Bruxelles on October 24, 1924 (Kısıklı, 1999, p. 518). The commission adopted this line, called the Bruxelles Line, as border and decided to annex Mosul to Iraq. With this decision, it was settled that Iraq would remained under mandate regime for twenty five years and when the mandate regime would come to an end, the Kurds would prefer to stay in Turkey if they were not to ensure autonomy, therefore, it was finally decided to transfer the region to Turkey. In addition, Mosul was to be left to Turkey and Kirkuk to Iraq in case of partition (Yazıcı, 2011, p. 148).

However, Turkey objected to this decision arguing that the League of Nations was not authorized to take a binding decision on the issue. Upon this objection, the League of Nations applied to the International Court of Justice for an opinion on the matter. The Court ruled that the League of Nations could make a binding decision and finalized the commission's decision at the League of Nations session on December 16, 1925 (Turan, 1999, p. 267).

When looking at the Mosul issue in terms of the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy, it can be seen that it included the principles of supporting the status quo, nationalist axis, realist-constructivist and peaceful policy-making. In this regard, the Mosul issue was raised in Lausanne to annex Mosul to the country as it was deemed to be a part of the National Pact with an attempt to protect the status quo. Although Turkey acted to maintain its status quo based on the National Pact in its foreign policy, this issue was later finalized against Turkey through a series of conferences and the League of Nations.

Indeed, the annexation of Mosul to Turkish lands was also the product of a foreign policy that was evolving on the axis of nationalism. The Republic of Turkey had a cultural approach to Turkishness and therefore, Turkish authorities of the term claimed that they had the same culture with the local people here. At the same time, Turkey aspired to realize the National Pact on the grounds that Mosul oil resources were important for the Turkish nation.

In the wake of the Mosul issue, Turkish foreign policy was realist, constructivist and peaceful. First and foremost, Turkey definitely did not prefer to apply military power as an element of hard power and remained peaceful during the course of the issue. Furthermore, took a rational approach knowing the limits of its power.

After the Mosul issue was concluded against Turkey, Turkish foreign policy demonstrated a constructivist approach and sustained relations with Iraq within the framework of good neighborhood. As a consequence of the good neighborhood relations, Turkey managed to implement an important cooperation and defense organization called the Baghdad Pact.

In this context, it was important for protection of peace that there was no tendency to apply military operation or wage war in order to resolve the Mosul issue. As a matter of fact, the decision-makers of the term did not want to bring war on their country that had long been warring and thus, they sustained the non-expansionist principle of Turkish foreign policy during the course of the Mosul issue as well.

The Mosul issue, indeed, manifests four of the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy adopted during this period.

3.2.2.2. Turkey-UK Mediterranean Treaty

This treaty was one of the clear indicators of cooperation between Turkey and the UK. In this regard, Turkey was seeking its way to find allies to ensure its security in the Mediterranean and aimed to cooperate with the UK against Italy's threats. On the other hand, the UK believed that it could prevent a possible alliance between Italy and Germany and initially distanced itself from such an alliance over the Mediterranean. However, Britain's attitude changed since Italy began fortifications on the Aegean islands in October 1935. While the League of Nations decided to impose sanctions against Italy for its aggression, Turkey also supported this decision. As retaliation, Italy threatened Turkey and Greece for their support to the sanction decision, however, the UK and France declared that they would support these two countries in case they were attacked by Italy (Çelebi, 2015, p. 113).

Turkey joined a pact on January 22, 1936; however, this pact was unilaterally abolished by the UK when the sanctions imposed on Italy were lifted in July (Uzgel & Kürkçüoğlu, 2013, p. 273).

In this context, it can fairly be uttered that the Turkey-UK Mediterranean Treaty covers all the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy. As a matter of fact, Turkey opted for cooperating with the UK, one of the great powers of the period, to maintain its current status quo in the Mediterranean, thus taking measures against Italy's revisionist policies. In this regard, it is noteworthy that Turkey did not seek expansion or spread while cooperating in this areas. Therefore, Turkey followed a foreign policy on the axis of nationalism but not driven by expansionist aspirations.

Assessing the balance of power of the period, it can be observed that Turkey had realist approaches toward Italy which was threatening the security of the Mediterranean and therefore Turkey. Indeed, it was assessed that Italy would surpass Turkey when comparing the two countries in terms of power and thus, Turkey preferred to build cooperation. Maintaining peace was one of the main objectives of this cooperation.

As stated before, Turkish foreign policy was based on cooperation with the UK in the face of a threat from another country by following a balance policy but distorting the balance in its favor. Turkey had the advantageous position as the side that outweighed in the newly established balance.

The principle of independence and the protection of peace — the basic principle of Turkish foreign policy — was clearly in practiced in the post-Lausanne Treaty era as well. Upon threat perception against Turkey's independence in the Mediterranean, Turkey established alliances to achieve the protection of peace on this occasion.

In consequence, all the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy of the period can be clearly observed in the Turkish-British Mediterranean Alliance.

3.2.2.3. Ankara Pact (Turkish-British-French Treaty)

Among theories of international relations, idealism was the rising value in the aftermath of World War I. According to the idealist theory, the European States suffered great losses in World War I and they would never be re-committed to such a war. However, the thesis of idealists, who thought rational people could not afford the same

human loss in the same way again, collapsed in the early 1930s with the attitudes of Germany and Italy

Despite Germany and Italy's revisionist policies, Britain believed that war could be prevented thanks to its appeasement policy. At the same time, Britain avoided bearing the economic burden of a new war and therefore, considered it essential to continue its policy of appeasement for a long period of time. In 1938, Germany started to implement its expansionist policy, and this revealed that the policy of appeasement was not successful.

Following the developments closely, Turkey went on the path to balance its foreign policy by convergence with both the UK, France and USSR. Despite this policy of rapprochement, Turkey predicted that the war would outbreak soon and therefore, avoided the camps in Europe.

With Italy attacking Albania in 1938, Britain and France began to perceive a threat to the security of their colonies in the Middle East and thus, they agreed to ensure the security of the Mediterranean.

On April 13, 1939, Britain and France provided Romania and Greece assurance regarding their security in a declaration. The two countries that wanted to give Turkey the same assurance faced with Turkey's request for an alliance to ensure this security (Uzgel & Kürkçüoğlu, 2013, p. 275).

Within this framework, the Turkish government proposed a deal to Britain to prevent Italy from expanding in the Mediterranean and the Balkans during this period. An item was proposed for the agenda in order to balance this situation: Both Turkey and the

UK signing a treaty with the USSR. On the other hand, the USSR refused to agree with this treaty, thinking that Britain and France had not provided it enough support against Germany and preferred to sign a pact of non-aggression with Germany.

With the Anglo-Turkish Agreement signed in Ankara on May 12, 1939¹⁰ the two countries declared that they would cooperate in the event of a development that would lead to war in the Mediterranean.

A declaration of the same content was announced in Paris on June 23, 1939 with France. Turkey also informed the USSR of the situation and paid the utmost attention not to deteriorate the balance in foreign policy. The transformation of the declaration into an alliance treaty took place on October 19, 1939 (Aydın, 2013, pp. 422-424). According to this treaty, also known as the triple alliance or the Ankara Pact, all three countries would

¹⁰ 7 The provisions of the declaration of 7 items are as follows:

- i. "Government in the United Kingdom and the Turkish Government have entered into close consultation, and the discussions which have taken place between them and which are still continuing have revealed their customary identity of view.
- ii. It is agreed that the two countries will conclude a definite long-term agreement of a reciprocal character in the interest of their national security.
- iii. Pending the completion of the definitive agreement, His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government declare that in the event of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area they would be prepared to co-operate effectively (aide et assistance) and to lend each other all aid and assistance in their power.
- iv. This declaration, like the proposed permanent agreement, is not directed against any country, but is designed to assure Great Britain and Turkey of mutual aid and assistance should the necessity arise.
- v. It is recognized by the two Governments that certain matters, including the more precise definition of the various conditions which would bring the reciprocal engagements into operation, will require closer examination before the definitive agreement can be completed. This examination is proceeding.
- vi. The two Governments recognize that it is also necessary to ensure the establishment of security in the Balkans and they are consulting together with the object of achieving this purpose as speedily as possible.
- vii. It is understood that the arrangements above mentioned do not preclude either Government from making agreements with other countries in the general interest of the consolidation of peace" (Atabey, 2014, pp. 299-300).

give each other all the support they needed in case war broke out with the attack of a European State and spread across the Mediterranean (Yamaç, 2019, p. 218).

The Ankara Pact or the Turkish-British-French Treaty demonstrates all the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy during this period. The aim of the pact was to ensure maintaining the status quo in addition to including articles and measures to re-build the status quo in case of deterioration.

The Ankara Pact also included the principle of foreign policy on the axis of nationalism. Furthermore, the purpose of not being expansionist but endeavoring to protect own interests is also evident from the proceedings of this pact. As a matter of fact, all the pacts to be established during this period brought forward protection and defense of the Turkish nation and the Republic of Turkey.

The Ankara Pact also demonstrates the principles of realist, constructivist and peaceful foreign policy. Along with this Pact, Turkish foreign policy manifested itself as an approach where the country knew the limits of its power and built cooperation against any threat. At the same time, Turkey wished to take advantage of the deterrent power of the Pact in a peaceful manner.

Although Turkey signed the Pact with the two Western countries, it also kept informing the USSR — one of the elements of the balance in its foreign policy — in order not to allow the balance policy to deteriorate. In this regard, the principles of sustaining balance and Westernism also manifested here.

Furthermore, the Ankara Pact reflected the practice of protection of independence and peace as one of the fundamental principles of Turkish foreign policy at the time.

Indeed, Turkey approached the Ankara Pact with its aspirations to protect its independence against Italy's expansionist policy in the Mediterranean and Balkans and to prevent disruption of the peace environment in the international field.

In consequence, the Ankara Pact can be deemed to demonstrate all the fundamental principles of Turkish foreign policy of the period.

3.2.2.4. Hatay Issue

The provisions of the Franco-Turkish Agreement, signed on October 20, 1921, regulated granting special status to the region first called Sanjak and then Hatay, and clarified the borders between Turkey and Syria. Turkey demanded to confirm the regulations of this agreement in the Lausanne Peace Treaty since the Treaty was not ratified in the French Parliament. Article 3 of the Lausanne Treaty declared that the limit set out in the Agreement of October 20, 1921 was accepted, and the special status granted to Sanjak was thus confirmed also in the international area (Uzgel, 2013b, p. 281).

After the Lausanne Peace Treaty, the League of Nation's resolution to take Syria under French mandate entered into force on September 29, 1923. Although Turkey closely followed the Hatay issue, it was only in 1936 that Turkey took concrete stakes regarding the issue (Sökmen, 1992, p. 7).

However, the issue of granting Syria's independence was brought to the agenda in France due to the changing balance in Europe, France's failure to find oil in Syria, as well as the fact that expenditures on Syria undermined the French budget while the Popular Front came to power in France.

On September 9, 1936, a contract¹¹ was signed between Syria and France that the mandate regime would end within three years; upon this development, Turkey also demanded signing a similar contract for Sanjak. France opposed this proposal on the grounds that disintegration of territories of countries under the mandate regime was against international law. Upon the fact that the parties could not reach a consensus, it was decided to refer the issue to the League of Nations (Soysal, 1989, p. 532). On December 14, 1936, Swedish Sandler was appointed as a rapporteur by the League of Nations.

In the same period, Germany turned its foreign policy completely into a revisionist policy; however the UK intervened and convinced France to decide on the Sanjak region in favor of Turkey (Soysal, 1982, p. 371).

According to Sandler's report, Sanjak was accepted as a distinct entity and would remain independent in its internal affairs but affiliated to Syria in its foreign affairs (Altuğ, 1989, p. 44). A committee of five experts was established in accordance with the report and in addition, the status and Constitution of the Sanjak were drafted by this committee. On May 29, 1937, the status and Constitution submitted to the League of Nations Assembly was unanimously accepted (Soysal, 1989, p. 535). Although the report was approved by the League of Nations Assembly, this actually appeared to be only an interim solution until the date Syria gained its independence.

After the Turkish French Military Agreement was signed (July 3, 1938), a consensus was reached on the military situation of the Sanjak region as well (Dayı, 2002, p. 339). The parties agreed on keeping a maximum of 2,500 soldiers in Sanjak and

¹¹ This contract does not include any provision on the Sanjak region.

increasing this number only via mutual approval. This agreement further identified the location of the troops and an operation plan in the event of an attack on Sanjak from the sea or Syria. After the military agreement, all 22 Turkish deputies nominated for the 40-member Assembly were elected in the elections held on July 22 (Dayı, 2002, p. 339).

Following the declarations first with the UK and then France in the same period to ensure the security of the Mediterranean, Turkey stated that it would not enter the Triple Alliance unless the Hatay issue was resolved. Upon this development, an agreement was signed between Turkey and France on the Final Resolution of Territorial Problems between Turkey and Syria on June 23, 1939.

In 1936, the Sanjak Assembly, named Hatay by Atatürk, convened on June 29, 1939 and unanimously decided to join Turkey (Gönlübol & Sar, 1990, s. 138-139). Turkey accepted Hatay province and completed the annexation processes with its decision of July 7. Upon completion of the proceedings, the TGNA sent a delegation to Hatay for the annexation ceremony on July 23, 1939 (Dayı, 2002, p. 340).

Hatay was one of the two developments that can be counted revisionist between 1923 and 1938. Yet, the development regarding Hatay can be regarded to be based on the policy to protect the status quo since it was partially within the borders of the National Pact. As a matter of fact, Turkey was not inclined to resort to military power and coercion — the basic elements of revisionism — in the resolution of the Hatay issue. Hence, Turkey carried out the whole process in accordance with international law in cooperation with both France and the League of Nations.

Although it may seem like Turkish foreign policy, which formed the basis of Turkish nationalism with non-irredentist cultural values, did not apply to the issue of Hatay, in fact, Hatay was Turkish land within the borders of the National Pact and Turkey approached this issue from the perspective that people who shared Turkish culture and spoke Turkish language resided in the province. At the same time, Turkey resolved this issue through negotiations and consent as a member of the Western civilization rather than resorting to revisionist policy tools.

Within this framework, the Hatay issue also demonstrated realist, constructivist and peaceful foreign policy characteristics. As a matter of fact, Turkey exhibited a realist understanding in the Hatay issue, where it was disadvantaged in the balance of power, and did not enter into a power struggle with France. At the same time, Turkey constructed the process step by step before finalizing it. During this process, Turkey took a peaceful approach, avoiding all actions that would disrupt peace.

In the same vein, it can be asserted that Turkey took the utmost care to maintain peace in the Hatay issue. Therefore, ensuring the independence of Hatay on the occasion of its inclusion within the borders of the National Pact was important, yet the protection of peace was of the same importance for Turkey.

It can fairly be deduced from the above analyses that the issue of Hatay manifested all the three of the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy of the period.

3.2.2.5. Payment of Ottoman Debts

Although the issue of Ottoman debts concerned many countries, the majority of the debt was paid by the Republic of Turkey since it was its successor state. The issue of Ottoman debts became an agenda item with France due to the fact that the majority of the debts were borrowed from France. Article 46 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty¹² ruled that the Ottoman debts would be divided among the states detaching from the Empire. Article 47 stated that the distribution of these debts would be made by the Public Debt Council. Article 49, on the other hand, regulated that the payment plan would be left to a commission to be set up in Paris (Lozan Barış Antlaşması, 1923, s. 42).

On June 13, 1928, an agreement was signed between Turkey and the Representative of the Public Debt Council. According to this agreement, Turkey committed to paying 62% of the debts received before 1912 and 73% of the debts received afterwards (Uzgel, 2013b, p. 279).

The first payment was made in 1928, however, Turkey demanded that debt payments be regulated in a way that does not shake its economy due to the financial difficulty experienced in the following year by the effect of the emerging Great Depression (Kazgan, 2013, p. 52). As a result of the negotiations, the payment plan was

¹² Article 46 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty:

The Ottoman Public Debt, as defined in the Table annexed to the present Section, shall be distributed under the conditions laid down in the present Section between Turkey, the States in favor of which territory has been detached from the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, the States to which the islands referred to in Articles 12 and 15 of the present Treaty and the territory referred to in the last paragraph of the present Article have been attributed, and the States newly created in territories in Asia which are detached from the Ottoman Empire under the present Treaty. All the above States shall also participate, under the conditions laid down in the present Section, in the annual charges for the service of the Ottoman Public Debt from the dates referred to in Article 53. From the dates laid down in Article 53, Turkey shall not be held in any way whatsoever responsible for the shares of the Debt for which other States are liable. For the purpose of the distribution of the Ottoman Public Debt, that portion of the territory of Thrace, which was under Turkish sovereignty on the 1st August 1914, and lies outside the boundaries of Turkey as laid down by Article 2 of the present Treaty, shall be deemed to be detached from the Ottoman Empire under the said Treaty.

arranged in Turkey's favor on April 22, 1933 and the debts ended on May 25, 1954, when the last installment was deposited (Bayraktar, 2010, p. 42).

Within this framework, a foreign policy was followed on the axis of nationalism in terms of Ottoman debts, which were resolved with the most reasonable method. Turkey did not want to undertake all the liabilities and demanded that the Ottoman debts be distributed due to the multinational structure of the Empire and was successful in achieving this goal. When the debts started to cause regression in the Turkish economy due to the Great Depression, Turkey initiated the negotiation process for restructuring the debts by prioritizing the interests of the Turkish nation.

Indeed, Turkey did not adopt an imaginary approach by rejecting all the debts but preferred to follow a realist policy in this field. Turkey accepted to pay the debts, however, preferred to overcome the challenge by minimum damage by means of constructing the process step by step.

In this context, the Ottoman Empire had made many concessions in both domestic and foreign policy due to its debts and inability to repay them. The Empire lost its independence in domestic and foreign policy due to these concessions and failed to make the necessary moves to maintain peace. Hence, Turkey paid off the debts and abolished the Public Debt Council in order not to make the same mistakes and prevent the Council from intervening in the country's domestic and foreign policies.

Therefore, the issue of payment of the Ottoman debts reflects the three basic principles of Turkish foreign policy of the period.

3.2.2.6. Membership in the League of Nations

The League of Nations was established in accordance with the Wilson Principles with a bona fide approach to prevent war from happening again and resolving disputes between states (Boztaş, 2014, p. 165). After the Mosul issue was resolved, Britain began to urge Turkey to become a member of the League of Nations.

Yet, Turkey had serious hesitations about entering the League of Nations. First and foremost, becoming a member of an international organization where all nations were not represented was the main cause of hesitation of Turkey as a country that had fought against imperialism. Secondly, the League of Nations was perceived as disappointment in Turkish foreign policy since the League acted in the UK's direction in the Mosul issue (Esmer, 1944, p. 525). Thirdly, France and the UK were thought to actively manage the League of Nations according to their interests and wishes. Finally, Turkey paid utmost care to its relations with the USSR and becoming a member of an international organization that the USSR defined as an extension of imperialism would not serve the interests of Turkish foreign policy (Yalçın, 2000, pp. 216-217).

In this regard, Turkey required permanent membership in the League of Nations Council, taking into account the USSR's weight in foreign policy against the UK's indoctrination (Uluslan, 2008, p. 239). On the other hand, Turkey endeavored to implement a balance policy that would not offend either of the sides by becoming a member of the League — which would create a problem in the relations with the USSR — but also avoiding objection to the UK.

With the emergence of clear polarization in Europe in the early 1930s, the USSR changed its attitude toward Turkey's membership to the League of Nations. Moreover, the USSR withdrew its reservation and announced that Turkey could become a member of the League of Nations. Nevertheless, Turkey informed with Atatürk's request that it would not apply for membership to the League of Nations but assess the matter of membership only if there is invitation. Upon this development, it was unanimously decided at the suggestion of Spain to send Turkey an invitation for membership to the League of Nations (Barlas, 2017, p. 100). As a result of the approval of the Council of Ministers on July 9, 1932, Turkey's membership was unanimously adopted at the General Assembly on July 18, 1932.

Although Turkey became a member to the League, it added reservations to the sanction provisions of Article 16¹³ and coercive measures against an irredentist state given in Article 17¹⁴ on the grounds of its agreement and relations with the USSR.

¹³ The Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 16:

Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.

In this context, Turkey followed an active policy until the League of Nations completed its studies. In fact, the country served as Interim Member of the Council from 1935 to 1937 and as President of Council in 1937 (Barlas & Güvenç, 2014, p. 178).

Along with the polarization that began in the 1930s, Europe was divided into two group as revisionist states and status quo supporter states. In this line, Turkey preferred to become a member of the League of Nations order to maintain the status quo.

From this perspective, Turkish foreign policy's national approach that was not expansionist and strived to be included in Western civilization can be clearly observed in its attempt to become a member of the League of Nations as well. In fact, Turkey became a member of the largest international organization of Western civilization, which it wanted to be a part of.

Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon (The Covenant of the League of Nations, 1924).

¹⁴ The Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 17:

In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between States not Members of the League, the State or States not Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16 inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.

Upon such invitation being given the Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute and shall resort to war against a Member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.

If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

Within this scope, it can be uttered that Turkey acted realistically during this period by becoming a member of the League of Nations in order to construct international cooperation. Turkey's election as Interim Member of the Council between 1935 and 1937 as well as undertaking the Term Presidency is a reflection of the identity and foreign policy elements that the country strived to construct.

While becoming a member to the League of Nations, Turkey also negotiated with the USSR and maintained the balance by not giving up the East to take part in the Western alliance. Turkey strived to include the USSR within the League of Nations and thus, implemented the principle of Westernism based on balance.

In the same line, Turkey aimed to protect this balance at the League of Nations, which was the only international organization for the protection of independence and peace in that period. Thus, Turkey stood up for protecting independence and peacekeeping by standing against revisionist states within the balance of power after it became a member of the League of Nations.

3.2.2.7. Nyon Conference for Mediterranean Security

In 1937, the issue of the security of the Mediterranean was raised as a result of the sinking of merchant ships in the Aegean and Mediterranean, and the UK and France invited all countries adjacent to the Mediterranean and all those that had ships in the Mediterranean to convene in Nyon, Switzerland (Dilek, 2012, p. 1525).

Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Egypt, Yugoslavia and the USSR attended the meeting, while Germany, Italy, Spain and Albania did not attend (Belenli, 2019, p. 173). The meeting on September 11 reported that there would be counter-attacks to the submarines that attacked the ships. At the second conference in Geneva on September 17, on the other hand, the same provisions were deemed to apply to warships and aircrafts¹⁵. Turkey became a party to both agreements and took the necessary decisions for the security of the Mediterranean together with the participating countries (Çakmak Z. , 2009, p. 47).

Considering the security of the Mediterranean as its own security, Turkey followed a status quo policy and strived to prevent any change in the order and the borders by agreeing with many countries.

Therefore, Turkey opted for protecting its national interests with this agreement in line with its national politics, the first principle of which is to protect security and not to be caught up in the aspirations of adventurous expansion.

This agreement also implemented the principle of balance of power, an argument of the realist school, and aimed to preserve peace and independence by resolving the

¹⁵ 1. Every state participating in the conference will be obliged to protect the safety of its territorial waters.
 2. Submarine ships that violate the 1936 London Naval Treaty clauses will be considered pirate ships.
 3. Submarine ships will go only over the water in the open sea and if they disturb merchant ships, they will be treated as pirate ships.
 4. Any submarine ship will be destroyed if it sinks a merchant ship.
 5. After these decisions have been communicated to the Government of Rome, Italy will also be invited to secure its own waters.
 6. The British and French navies will jointly maintain general control in the Mediterranean.

power competition through a security union since the country would not be able to win this competition on its own.

In consequence, Turkey cooperated with Eastern countries while being in Western civilization, maintaining balance and implementing the principle of Westernism on the basis of a balance policy.

3.2.2.8. 1925 Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression

The first and most important treaty signed after the Lausanne Peace Treaty according to the conditions of the period was the 1925 Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression. As is mentioned above, the issue of Mosul was resolved against Turkey with the resolution of the League of Nations and therefore, Turkey acted wary of the West. For this reason, Turkey signed this treaty with the USSR on December 17, 1925 as a balancing element in foreign policy (Gökçen, 2007, p. 117).

According to the treaty, in case of an attack of the either sides, the other would remain impartial. The parties shall not attack each other. This treaty was envisaged to stay in force for three years, however, if either of the parties did not notify six months before the termination of the treaty, its term would extend for another year (Gökçen, 2007, p. 126).

The treaty clauses made in 1925 applied to the one in 1925 and the parties committed to enter into agreements with third party states provided that they obtained the approval of the other (Tellal, 2013, pp. 317-318).

As can be understood from the analyses above, maintaining the status quo with the USSR was one of the main objectives of Turkish foreign policy at the time. As a matter of fact, the USSR was one of the important allies of the period, both in terms of security and in terms of settling the relations with the West after the War of Independence. Turkey strongly supported the status quo in terms of the friendship of the USSR and organized foreign policy moves accordingly to ensure the continuation of the current order.

In this context, Turkey prevented any threat perception from its side to the USSR by maintaining its non-expansionist cultural Turkism, which formed the basis of the foreign policy on the axis of nationalism. Harboring many Turks in its country, the USSR became transparent and supportive in its relations with Turkey thanks to the implementation of this principle.

Within this context, relations with the USSR were built on a realistic and peaceful foreign policy and a common stance against imperialism. The two countries cooperation at the intersection of mutual interests and they fully complied with the provision of the treaties of 1925 and 1929 regulating that either of the parties would not become a member to international agreements or organizations without prior consent of the other.

In addition, Turkey never gave up the balance policy stipulated in both the 1925 and 1929 treaties. In this regard, Turkey always informed the USSR when negotiating with Western countries and acted in accordance with its balance policy as per the treaty.

Therefore, Turkey clearly demonstrated both its independence and the principle of maintaining peace based on the 1925 and 1929 treaties.

3.2.2.9. Montreux Convention

Upon the changing conditions in the international area,¹⁶ Turkey began to hold talks on the review of the straits section in the Lausanne Peace Treaty as of the beginning of the 1930s. After nearly six years of negotiations, sent a diplomatic note to the parties of the treaty on April 11, 1936, urging all sides to convene for changes to the status of the Straits (Aybay, 2020, p. 2733).

Ultimately, with the approval of all states that were parties to the Straits regime, the Montreux Convention was signed on July 22, 1936. Thus, Turkey's sovereignty regarding the Straits was precisely accepted via this convention. In this regard, both the juridical power and the right to place Turkish troops in demilitarized zones finalized Turkish dominance in the Straits. The convention also abolished the clause of the demilitarization of Imbros, Tenedos and Neandros (Aybay, 2020, p. 2734)

The Montreux Convention is another of the developments in which Turkish foreign policy can be considered revisionist. However, it would be wrong to assume that this development was truly revisionist. When regulating the Straits regime, Turkey received the approval of all countries that were parties to the convention and did not seek using military power to change the current structure.

The full control of a country's territory within its borders is one of the sovereignty rights of that country. The control of the Straits was left to the commission in Lausanne

¹⁶ The Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus Principle that first appeared in Roman Law is defined as "validity of convention depends on the circumstances of the time when it is enacted". Although the parties accept the principle of pacta sunt servanda from the moment that they sign the convention, the convention can be renewed to restore the acquisitions of the parties in consequence to significant change in the circumstances (Akyol, 1995, p. 82).

and the Turkish military was not allowed to deploy in the region. On the other hand, Turkey updated the treaty by evaluating the change of international conditions as well as its national politics. Despite appearing revisionist, this non-expansionist policy was a foreign policy move that thrived on the axis of nationalism.

In this context, Turkey acted realistically by following the changing circumstances regarding the Lausanne Straits Regime and initiated the process of reconciliation with the parties. At the same time, new order was built with this treaty and Turkey's peaceful approach was clearly demonstrated with no use of military force.

While the Straits Regime changed, Turkey made this change with the consent of both the USSR and the West. In addition, Turkey paid particular attention to the protection of the policy of balance as one of the basic principles of its foreign policy when amending the Straits regime.

Therefore, Turkey took initiatives to negotiate with the relevant countries to set a new order after understanding that the straits regime established in Lausanne posed a threat to the country's independence and peace in the polarizing Europe.

The issue of Montreux Convention reflects four of the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy of the period.

3.2.2.10. The Issue of Fener Greek Patriarchate

Fener Greek Patriarch, who was the only chaplain in the Byzantine Empire, became the director of the earthly affairs of his own community and responsible for the

actions of this community along with the other community heads within the nations system of the Ottoman Empire (Benlisoy & Macar, 1996, pp. 19-22).

In the 19th century, nationalist movements gained momentum and the nations in the Ottoman lands became independent as a result of uprisings, and they later started to establish their own churches. Following this development, the Fener Greek Patriarchate was referred to as *primus inter pares* among these churches (Benlisoy & Macar, 1996, pp. 59-60).

The Orthodox issue was the only excuse that foreign governments used for meddling in the internal affairs of the Ottoman state during its period of regression. In the Lausanne Peace Treaty, Turkey agreed to the remaining of the Patriarchate in Istanbul on the condition that its powers were limited only on religious issues and that its worldly powers were completely abolished (Erkan, 2017, p. 61).

The Republic of Turkey did not directly interfere in the Patriarch elections after that, however, did not condone the election of a Patriarch that the government did not approve. In all subsequent discussions with Greece, Turkey always stressed that the Patriarchate was a Turkish Institution within Turkey's borders and never compromised on this issue.

As a result of the abolishment of all the earthly powers of the Patriarchate in the Lausanne Peace Treaty, the patriarchate and therefore the patriarch had a great loss of power and authority compared to the Ottoman period. Turkey never allowed this status to be changed, both in the patriarchate elections and the population exchange, and maintained the status quo.

In order to strengthen the nation state as the basis of national politics and national state principles, it was necessary to restrict their authority in the institutions left over from the Ottoman Empire where authority was shared. As an element of foreign policy on the axis of nationalism, Turkey acted decisively on the status of the patriarchate to both prevent interference in its internal affairs and strengthen the nation state.

In addition, Turkey implemented the principle of protection of independence and peace in the resolution of the patriarchate issue. Moreover, the country officials strictly maintained their position on this issue in order to prevent interference in Turkey's internal affairs as well as preventing the transfer of the responsibility of the citizens of the nation state to another institution than the government.

The issue of the Fener Greek Patriarchate meets three of the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy of the period.

3.2.2.11. Population Exchange

After it was absolute that the foundation of Turkey would be nation state in the aftermath of winning the War of Independence, the final instruction given to the Turkish delegation was the exchange of Orthodox Greeks in Turkey and Muslims living in Greece. In this regard, Turkey aspired to establish a nation state as homogeneous as possible and rightfully did not want to include those, who lacked the feeling of belonging, in the nation building process, thus, decided to keep the borders of the exchange as wide as possible. With this exchange, Turkey wanted to prevent other countries from interfering in its internal affairs under the pretext of the Orthodox living in its territory.

This issue was discussed at the Exchange Sub-Commission, which was established at the Lausanne Conference. The first settlement was for the extradition of Civilian Prisoners and Prisoners of War and thus, the “Turkish-Greek Agreement on the Extradition of Civilian Prisoners and the Exchange of Prisoners of War” was signed by the parties (Meray, 2001, p. 82).

The Second settlement, the “Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations”, was signed on January 30, 1923. The exchange decision was made at the request of both sides, who wanted societies to become religiously homogeneous. The exchange resolved the problem of religious identity in both countries, yet, it had more urgency for Greece in economic terms. Receiving about 1,200,000 migrants by 1923, Greece needed the lands to be evacuated by Muslims for the coming new Greeks and wanted Greek migrants to quickly join production with their assets (Goularas, 2012, pp. 130-131). Under the convention, the Greeks of Istanbul were excluded from the exchange on condition that they had settled before October 30, 1918 and before the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest.

One of the actions that will facilitate the nation-building process with the establishment of a nation state is to build as homogenous a structure as possible. In this regard, it was important to exchange Greeks who supported the central powers and Greece during the national struggle with Muslims living in Greece in order to strengthen the nation state and facilitate the nation-building process. In this case, the principle of foreign policy was applied on the axis of nationalism.

Regarding the population exchange, Turkish foreign policy was shaped on the grounds of constructivism and its justifications were based on realist foundations. At the

same time, the issue of exchange also reflected implementation of the principle of realist, constructivist and peaceful foreign policy since Turkey followed a peaceful foreign policy with Greece in the post-exchange period and strived to minimize the problems with the Greeks living in Turkey.

The presence of Orthodox minorities had been a highly used argument by foreign governments to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. However, after the population exchange decision, this intervention was endeavored to be minimized. The population exchange manifests the principle of protection of independence and peace.

The subject of population exchange overlaps with the three of the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy of the period.

3.2.2.12. Balkan Entente Pact

One of the most suitable areas of expansion for revisionist states that were dissatisfied with the post-World War I order was regarded as the Balkan geography. In particular with the 1925 Pact of Locarno, the Balkan States attempted to cooperate among themselves to ensure peace and common security as a result of the lack of regulation or restrictions on Germany's eastern borders (Değerli, 2008, p. 124).

The first meeting in the process leading up to the Balkan Pact was held on October 5, 1930 as the First Balkan Conference in Athens, with the participation of Turkey, Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria. Three more conferences were held after the First Balkan Conference, and the Balkan Entente Pact was signed

between Turkey, Romania and Yugoslavia in Athens on February 9, 1934 (Soysal, 1989, p. 459).

The Balkan Entente was an alliance initiative against Italy and Germany, which acted as expansionists in the Balkans and threatened the current status quo. In this regard, Turkey tried to prevent this threat by going on a path to cooperation to maintain the status quo for its national interests. Thus, it can be accentuated that foreign policy principles on the axis of status quo supporting and nationalism apply to this development. 9hu

In the same line, Turkey chose the path of balance of power by adopting a realist approach after realizing that the hard power of Balkan countries could not cope with expansionist countries alone. An alliance was formed between Balkan countries to ensure the balance of power. The main purpose of the alliance was to protect the independence and peace of these countries. For this reason, the Balkan Entente Pact reflected the principles of protection of independence and peace through realis, constructivist and peaceful foreign policy.

The Balkan Entente Pact was carried out by Turkey constantly informing both the West and the USSR about the developments. In the same line, Turkey took the utmost care to ensure that the balance with the two sides would not deteriorate. In this way, the developments pertaining to the Balkan Entente covered the principle of Westernism based on balance.

In consequence, the Balkan Entente Pact manifested all the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy of the period.

3.2.2.13. Sa'dabad Pact

While Turkey secured its Western border with the Balkan Pact, it also wanted to achieve the same non-aggression treaty on its Eastern border. Against the border issues and Imperialist States' desire to establish domination on these countries, Turkey underscored its independence and aimed to demonstrate that it was on neither side.

In this context, Turkey wanted the UK to join the pact since Iraq was still affiliated with the UK despite the 1930 Treaty and its foreign policy was directed by the UK as part of that treaty. Thus, Turkey requested to send an invitation to the USSR for joining the pact as per the conditions of the treaty it signed with the USSR in 1929. Although the two countries were invited to the pact, there was no positive response. Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan convened on July 8, 1937 and signed the text of the pact in Sa'dabad Palace after Iraq resolved its border issue with Iran (Bilgin, 2016, p. 42). On June 25, 1938, the Sa'dabad Pact was officially established with the ratification of the Pact.

The Sa'dabad Pact was founded to maintain the current status quo, such as the Balkan Pact. The main purpose of the pact was to protect the national interests of the countries, and maintain their independence and peace, thus, they strived to merge with the regional countries to change the balance of power in their favor. Turkey wanted both the UK and the USSR to be invited to the pact as a prerequisite of its principle of Westernism on the basis of balance.

The issue of Sa'dabad Pact manifests all the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy of the period.

4. CONCLUSION

Nationalism is a concept that has an outstanding influence on both domestic and foreign policy, and despite globalization, its influence on societies never disappears. since its emergence, this concept has transformed nations and states with great influence on societies.

The Ottoman Empire needed to meet the concept of nationalism, yet, its discovery of Turkish nationalism was rather late compared to its counterparts, thus, the Empire was one of the states that felt the effects on nationalism most deeply by the nature of being a multinational empire.

The intellectuals and statesmen of the period, who were seeking solutions to prevent the fall of the Empire, implemented the principles of Ottomanism and Islamism before Turkism. After the nations — to which these principles addressed — started to disintegrate from the Empire, Turks and Turkism as the founding element of the Empire as well as its final balance emerged as the new recipe for survival.

As one of the most important figures in the Committee of Union and Progress, Ziya Gökalp advocated the idea of Turkism even during the period when the principles of Ottomanism and Islamism were applied, thus, was one of the intellectuals who strived to raise awareness of the people about Turkism through his articles.

The Turkish nationalism he tried to established can be defined by a modernist approach and conforms to the principle that national identity will be established by social, cultural and economic transformation of society.

Describing nationalism as a non-expansionist cultural nationalism, Gökalp expressed his ideas in a wide range of fields, from the economy to foreign policy, from domestic politics to the transformation of society, and associated these ideas with the principle of nationalism.

As an intellectual advocating harmony, Gökalp's thoughts significantly influenced the Committee of Union and Progress in the last period of the Ottoman Empire as well as the decision-makers of the Republic of Turkey after its foundation. His opinions and practical ideas regarding economy, foreign policy, domestic politics, society transformation, which are the sub-branches of the main branch of nationalism, were applied as models in the Republic of Turkey.

Although the relationship between nationalism and foreign policy is conundrum, the basic principles and goals raised in the developments in Turkish foreign policy at the time appear clearly in Gökalp's foreign policy approach.

In this regard, Gökalp's intellectual frame reflects the four main objectives of Turkish foreign policy: Being a national state, reaching the level of modern civilizations, full independence and the protection of peace. At the same time, Gökalp's intellectual ideas inspired the emergence of the five main principles of Turkish foreign policy of the period: Status quo supporting; foreign policy on the axis of nationalism; realist, constructivist and peaceful policy; Westernism on the basis of balance and protection of independence and peace.

When these principles are compared to the important developments of the period in foreign policy, it seems that these developments manifested an important part of the principles.



Table 1: Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy between 1923 and 1938 vs. Basic Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy between 1923 and 1938

Developments in Turkish Foreign Policy between 1923 and 1938	Basic Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy between 1923 and 1938					
		Status Quo Supporting	Foreign Policy on the Axis of Nationalism	Realist, Constructivist and Peaceful Foreign Policy	Westernism based on Balance	Protection of Independence and Peace
	Mosul Issue	x	x	x		x
	Turkey-UK Mediterranean Treaty	x		x	x	x
	Ankara Pact (Turkish-British French Treaty)	x	x	x	x	x
	Hatay Issue		x	x		x
	Payment of Ottoman Debts		x	x		x
	Membership in the League of Nations	x	x	x	x	x
	Nyon Conference for Mediterranean Security	x	x	x	x	x
	925 Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Non-	x	x	x		x

	Aggression					
	Montreux Convention		x	x	x	x
	Fener Greek Patriarchate and Ecumenical Issue	x	x			x
	Population Exchange		x	x		x
	Balkan Entente Pact	x	x	x	x	x
	Sa'dabad Pact	x	x	x	x	x

As can be seen clearly in the table above, the Basic Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy between 1923 and 1938 show themselves in the thirteen most important developments of the period. More specifically, it can be uttered that the objectives and principles of Turkish foreign policy were predominantly inspired by Gökâlp's thoughts. As a result of an investigation to determine the extent to which these principles influenced foreign policy of the period, it can be understood that many of these principles manifested themselves separately in each case of the aforementioned thirteen major developments.

As one of the most influential thinkers of his time, Gökâlp is considered as the unofficial ideologist of the Committee of Union and Progress and official ideologist of the Republic People's Party. Indeed, he had a great impact on the development of domestic and foreign policy with his thoughts in both periods.

The fundamental difference of Gökâlp's thoughts from his contemporaries was that he advocated an idea of a cultural Turkism that was not irredentist. Since this idea overlapped with the basic policy of the Republic of Turkey, Gökâlp was supported by the Republic People's Party in addition to benefitting from his well-structured thoughts. The fundamental ideas that were inspired from Gökâlp's thoughts in forming the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy included status quo supporting in foreign policy structure, developing foreign policies on the axis of nationalism, following peaceful policies based on constructing an order according to realist dynamics, being a member of Western civilization but also protecting own culture and identity, and the importance attributed to independence and peace.

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