



KADİR HAS UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
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**EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS
SYRIA**

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MASTER'S THESIS

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MASTER'S THESIS

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Kadir Has University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master's in the Program of International Relations.

ISTANBUL, APRIL, 2019

I, NUSRETTİN YENİCE;

Hereby declare that this Master's Thesis is my own original work and that due references have been appropriately provided on all supporting literature and resources.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	v
ÖZET	vi
ABBREVIATIONS LIST	vii
TABLES LIST	viii
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I: THE CONCEPT OF EUROPEANIZATION	10
1.1 Definitions and Dimensions of Europeanization	12
1.2 Outcomes of Europeanization and De-Europeanization	20
1.3 New Institutionalism and Two Logics of Europeanization	22
1.4 Mechanisms of Europeanization	24
1.4.1 Mechanisms for Member States	24
1.4.2 Mechanisms for Candidate States.....	29
1.4.2.1 External Incentives Model	30
1.4.2.2 Alternative Models	38
CHAPTER II: EUROPEANIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY	44
2.1 Europeanization of Member States' Foreign Policy	45
2.1.2 Sociological Institutionalism and Europeanization of Foreign Policy	46
2.1.3 Rational-Choice Institutionalism and Europeanization of Foreign Policy	48
2.2 Europeanization of Candidate States' Foreign Policy	50
2.3 Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy	54
CHAPTER III: EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SYRIA	73

3.1 The European Union (EU) Foreign Policy Towards Syria Before 2011	74
3.2 Tracing the EU's Impact on Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Syria Before 2011	78
3.2.1 The Period Between 1999 and 2004	78
3.2.2 The Period Between 2005 and 2010	82
3.3 The European Union (EU) Foreign Policy Towards Syria After 2011	86
3.3.1 EU's Support for the Syrian Opposition	88
3.3.2 EU's Migration Policy towards Syrian Refugees	93
3.3.3 EU's Efforts to Stem the Influx of Foreign Terrorist Fighters, Funds, and Arms to Da'esh	95
3.3.4 EU's Efforts to Support and Strengthen the anti-Da'esh Forces	98
3.4 Tracing the EU's Impact on Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Syria After 2011	100
3.4.1 Turkey's Support for the Syrian Opposition: Pushing and Europeanization	100
3.4.2 Turkey's Migration Policy towards Syrian Refugees: Pushing and Europeanization	107
3.4.3 Turkey's Efforts to Stem the Influx of Foreign Terrorist Fighters, Funds, and Arms to Da'esh	113
3.4.4 Turkey's Efforts to Support and Strengthen the anti-Da'esh Forces: De-Europeanization on YPG	116
CONCLUSION	124
REFERENCES	129

ABSTRACT

YENİCE, NUSRETTİN. *EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SYRIA*, MASTER'S THESIS, Istanbul, 2019.

As of the end of 2004, when the 'credibility of EU conditionality' began to decrease in Turkey, Turkey's prospect for the European Union (EU) membership decreased. Although Turkey had lost its prospect for EU membership to a large extent, the country maintained its alignment to the CFSP *aquis* in general as well as in Syria. Even after 2004, Turkish foreign policy towards Syria harmonized with the European Councils conclusions on Syria which related to the Hariri assassination, the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and the relaunching of Syria-Israel peace talks. This thesis claims that the motivation for Turkey to align itself with the CFSP *aquis* in general as well as with the EU Councils conclusions on Syria, was the '*desire* for EU membership' rather than the prospect of EU membership. Moreover, after 2005 the 'desire for EU membership' not only facilitated Turkey's alignment to the Councils conclusions but also led Turkey to bargain *vis-a-vis* with the EU on the Syrian refugee crisis and on the implementation of the restrictive measures against the Syrian regime. In such a bargaining process, Turkey used its power as a bargaining chip *vis-a-vis* the EU to improve its accession process to the Union. In this context, this thesis examines the Turkish foreign policy towards Syria after the 1999 Helsinki Summit, including Syrian civil war, in the framework of the conditionality mechanism of Europeanization concept.

Keywords: Europeanization, Conditionality, Bargaining, De-Europeanization, Turkish Foreign Policy, Syrian Civil War.

ÖZET

YENİCE, NUSRETTİN. *TÜRKİYE’NİN SURİYE’YE YÖNELİK DIŞ POLİTİKASININ AVRUPALILAŞMASI*, YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ, İstanbul, 2019.

2004 yılı sonu itibariyle, Türkiye’de Avrupa Birliği (AB) koşulsallığına olan güven azalmaya başlayınca, Türkiye’nin AB üyeliğine olan umudu da azalmıştır. Fakat Türkiye AB üyeliğine olan umudunu büyük ölçüde kaybetse de, hem genelde AB’nin Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikasına (ODGP) hem de AB’nin Suriye dış politikasına olan uyumunu korumuştur. 2004’ten sonra bile, Türkiye’nin Suriye’ye yönelik dış politikası AB Konseyi’nin Hariri suikasti, Suriye askerlerinin Lübnan’dan çekilmesi ve Suriye-İsrail barış görüşmelerinin yeniden başlatılması ile ilgili olan sonuç bildirimleriyle uyum sağlamıştır. Bu tez, Türkiye’yi hem genelde ODGP müktesebatına hem de AB Konseyi’nin Suriye ile ilgili sonuç bildirimlerine uyması için motive eden unsurun, AB üyeliğine olan umuttan ziyade ‘AB üyeliğine olan *istek*’ olduğunu iddia eder. Dahası, 2005 sonrasında ‘AB üyeliğine olan *istek*’ sadece Türkiye’nin AB Konseyi sonuç bildirimlerine uymasını kolaylaştırmamış, Türkiye’yi Suriye iç savaşı sırasında, Suriyeli mülteciler krizi ve Suriye rejimine karşı uygulanan kısıtlayıcı önlemler üzerinden AB ile pazarlık etmeye de itmiştir. Böyle bir pazarlık süreci içinde, Türkiye gücünü bir pazarlık kartı olarak Birliğe olan katılım sürecini ilerletebilmek için AB’ye karşı kullanmıştır. Bu bağlamda, bu tez Türkiye’nin Suriye’ye yönelik dış politikasını 1999 Helsinki Zirvesi’nden itibaren, Suriye iç savaşı dahil, Avrupalılaştırma kavramının koşulsallık mekanizması çerçevesi içinde inceler.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Avrupalılaştırma, Koşulsallık, Pazarlık, Avrupasızlaştırma, Türk Dış Politikası, Suriye İç Savaşı.

ABBREVIATIONS LIST

CEECs	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
ECTC	The European Counter Terrorism Centre
EU	European Union
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EPC	European Political Cooperation
FSG	Friends of Syria Group
FTFs	Foreign Terrorist Fighters
HI	Historical institutionalism
JDP	Justice and Development Party
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OOB	Operation Olive Branch
OEP	Operation Euphrates Shield
PA	Positive Agenda
PNR	Passenger Name Record
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PYD	Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party
RCI	Rational Choice Institutionalism
SDF	Syrian Democratic Forces
SI	Sociological institutionalism
SNC	Syrian National Council
SOC	Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces
TFP	Turkish Foreign Policy
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
YPG	People's Protection Units

TABLES LIST

Table 1. Facilitating factors and mediating mechanisms which enabled the transformative role of EU's conditionality on Turkish policy towards Syria after 1999 and Outcomes of Europeanization	5
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INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the 1999 Helsinki decisions that granted Turkey a candidacy status, Turkey carried out various reforms in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria; so that, the country would eventually become a European Union (EU) member (Kubicek, 2005; Öniş, 2003a; 2009; Müftüler-Baç, 2005; Kirişci, 2004; Açıkmeşe, 2010). In the same vein, since the EU's acceptance of the Turkish candidacy in 1999, Turkish foreign policy (TFP) has been transformed by the EU's conditionality mechanism to some extent (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007; Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, 2010, p.415; Kirişci, 2006, p.29). For example, along with other factors, Turkish foreign policy towards Greece and Cyprus altered by the EU's 'conditionality' mechanism especially in the first half of the 2000s (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007; Uluğ-Eryılmaz, 2014; Ulusoy, 2008b, p.312). In the same context, the EU has put pressure on Turkey to normalize its relations with Armenia in every progress report for Turkey.¹ In this regard, Turkey -at least- tried to reconcile its dispute with Armenia (Evin et al., 2010, p.14). Likewise, with the EU accession prospect, Turkey began to establish good relations with Iraq and Syria. In sum, the EU's impact has caused some "changes" in both Turkish domestic and foreign policies throughout the Europeanization process, namely these changes have been induced by the EU to some extent. However, this does not mean that Turkey, as a candidate state, has an entirely passive role in this change process. To be more specific, the reforms which are required by the EU must be endorsed by targeted states and they have last say on whether these reforms would be implemented. In this context, the behaviors of targeted states are carried out by two logics when they respond to the EU's demands relating to the reforms or other policies. First one is the 'logic of consequences' which acts in accordance with the Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) that assumes the actors as who have a fixed set of preferences and behave entirely instrumentally in order to maximize the attainment of their preferences (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp.944-5). Second one is the 'logic of appropriateness' which acts in accordance with the Sociological institutionalism (SI) which attempts to explain actors' behaviors in more of a sociological manner rather than to assume actors as purposive, goal-oriented or rational (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp.949).

¹ Since 1998 the European Commission has prepared progress report for Turkey in order to evaluate Turkey's advancement in terms of the standards for EU candidacy and membership.

Socialization requires “frequent as well as dense contacts” between the EU and the external actor (Schimmelfennig, 2012, p.8), so it takes a long time in which candidate states are not fully able to act according to logic of appropriateness; therefore, strategic interest-based behaviour, namely ‘logic of consequences’ is more likely for candidate and potential candidate states (Goetz: 2005, p.262; Börzel and Soyaltın, 2012, p.10). For this reason, the EU follows a strategy of conditionality “in which the EU sets its rules as conditions that the [candidate states] have to fulfil in order to receive EU rewards” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.663). The rewards vary from financial and technical assistance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2017, p.3) to ‘promise for full membership’ which is the most effective one (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.665). The promise of reward must be credible even if the reward is membership, otherwise target candidate state’s policy makers may limit the role of conditionality (Kirişci, 2007, p.7). Namely, there must be ‘credible conditionality’ which facilitates the adoption of EU rules and policies (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.666). As a matter of fact, ‘the credible EU conditionality’ was pointed out as an facilitating factor for the transformation of Turkish domestic and foreign policy from 1999 until 2005 (Tocci, 2005; Müftüler-Baç and Güney, 2005, p.290; Saatçioğlu, 2011; Kubicek, 2011; Uluğ-Eryılmaz, 2014; Öner, 2014; Yılmaz, 2016a).

In this context, under the CFSP chapter of the 1998-2004 progress reports for Turkey, the EU regularly directed Turkey to improve its bilateral relations with Syria. Turkey as a candidate state is expected to arrange its foreign policy in line with the CFSP since the CFSP Chapter of community acquis invite candidate states for “full compliance” (Hisarlıoğlu, 2015, p.71). Namely, the EU conducted the conditionality mechanism through the CFSP acquis. As a result, along with the other exogenous and endogenous factors which will be mentioned in the Chapter III, EU’s conditionality had considerable impact on Turkish foreign policy to transform Turkey’s relations with Syria towards good neighborly relations. At that time, the EU had credibility in Turkey and thus Turkey had EU membership prospect until the end of 2004. Therefore, ‘credible EU conditionality’ and ‘prospect of the EU membership’ enabled the transformative role of EU’s conditionality on Turkish policy towards Syria until the end of 2004. However, although ‘credibility of EU conditionality’ and ‘prospect of the EU membership’ decreased in

Turkey after the end of 2004 (Kubicek, 2011, p.922; Açıkmeşe, 2010, p.145; Öniş, 2015, p.23-34; Yılmaz, 2016a; Boşnak, 2016, p.84; Börzel and Soyaltın, 2012; Öner, 2014, p.26; Sipahioğlu, 2017, p.56; Günay and Dzhic, 2016, p.532; Tocci, 2014, p.5), the country maintained its alignment to the CFSP *acquis* in general as well as in Syria. To be more specific, the military presence of Syria in Lebanon, assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri and strained Syrian-Israeli relations were the three main challenges over EU-Syrian relations in the early second half of the 2000s. The EU Council had common positions concerning with these three main challenges; in this regard, the EU demanded Syria to a) withdraw its troops from Lebanon in accordance with the 1559 UNSC Resolution, b) cooperate with the UN investigation commission in accordance with the 1595 and 1636 UNSC Resolutions, c) relaunch its efforts to make progress on the Middle East peace process. At that time, Turkey pressed Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon and to cooperate with the international community on the investigation into the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Likewise, Turkey's efforts to mediate Syrian-Israeli peace process seems to be in lined with the EU's common position. At this point, this thesis argues that the *pulling* version of the improvement of accession, which stems from the desire for the EU membership and which requires the adoption of the EU rules, policies or practices in the situation of low rate or lack of credible conditionality and low adoption costs, explains Europeanization of Turkish policy towards Syria between 2005 and 2010 in the cases of Hariri assassination, withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and relaunching of Syria-Israel peace talks.

Another important point of this thesis is that the external incentive model is a bargaining process in which “the EU draws heavily on its superior bargaining power to set and enforce its conditionality” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.675). The superior bargaining power, which resulting from asymmetrical interdependence between the EU and candidate states, provides the Union with great advantage vis-a-vis the candidate states to control a bargaining process (Sedelmeier, 2011, p.14). However, when the subject is Turkey, its economic strength, political power and self-understanding as a regional power “render its relations with the EU far less asymmetrical” than Western Balkan and current candidate countries (Börzel and Soyaltın, 2012, p.11). In that case, as Turkey's relations with the EU become “far less asymmetrical”, it is possible to say that

Turkey can use its power resources “vis-a-vis the EU” to improve its accession process. As the “power can be conceived in terms of control over outcomes” (Keohane and Nye, 2011, p.10), any tools that give the ability to control outcomes can be considered as power resource. In this context, if Turkey acquire an ability to affect EU’s expected foreign policy outcomes then the asymmetrical interdependence which is in favour of the EU can be broken, and with this ability Turkey can bargain vis-a-vis with the EU to improve its accession. In this context, with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Turkey acquired an ability to affect the EU’s expected foreign policy outcomes which aimed to carry Syrian opposition to success and to stem Syrian refugee flows. Because, helping the Syrian opposition succeed against the Syrian regime (especially until 2014), and reducing the flow of Syrian refugees into Europe were a main priority for the EU during the Syrian Civil War, Turkey had the potential to facilitate this.² With such power, Turkey attempted to bargain vis-a-vis with the EU on the Syrian refugee crisis and on the implementation of the restrictive measures against the Syrian regime. Thus, Turkey was able to brake asymmetrical interdependence, which is in favor of the EU, and was a chance to improve its accession by pushing the EU to have ‘credible conditionality’ and to open new negotiation chapters. In the end, after Turkey was persuaded through ‘credible conditionality’, the country aligned itself with the EU’s directions which demanded Turkey to impose restrictive measures on the Syrian regime and to implement the Readmission Agreement. At this point, this thesis argues that the *pushing* version of the improvement of accession, which stems from the desire for the EU membership and which requires an active involvement in a bargaining process vis-a-vis the EU to improve accession process in the situations of low rate or lack of credible conditionality and high adoption costs, explains such type of bargains between the EU and Turkey in the cases of

² As of 2014, the atmosphere of Syrian civil war began to change. The rapid rise of the Da’esh played an important role in the transformation (radicalization) of the Syrian opposition (Ulutaş et al., 2015, p.15). From January 2014, Da’esh entered into a war against the Syrian oppositions and invaded the Eastern part of the country to a great extent including Raqqa and Deyru’z Zur (ibid). Da’esh effect was not limited only in Syria, it also began to threaten Europe. The participation of 2.500 foreign fighters from the Western European countries in Da’esh and likelihood return of these fighters has worried the European countries (Kardaş and Özdemir, 2015). In addition, in 2014, the Syrian refugee crisis began to threaten the Union seriously (Özcan, 2017, p.20). As a result, the EU began to securitize its discourses on the Syrian civil war in 2014; for example, the discourses of EU such as “Assad must go”, “regime must be changed”, “democratic transformation must be provided” were replaced by securitized discourse such as “ensuring the security of our citizens”, “migration crises”, “fight against Da’esh” (Özcan, 2017, p.8). Therefore, as of 2014, the ‘carrying Syrian opposition to success’ began to be dimmed in the EU’s main priorities in Syria.

imposition of restrictive measures on Syria and implementation of Readmission Agreement.

Table 1. Facilitating factors and mediating mechanisms which enabled the transformative role of EU’s conditionality on Turkish policy towards Syria after 1999 and Outcomes of Europeanization

Period	1999-2004	2005-2010	After 2011	
Outcome	Europeanization	Europeanization	Europeanization	De-Europeanization
Main Mechanism	Conditionality	Conditionality	Conditionality	---
Facilitating Factors and Mediating Mechanism	Credible Conditionality, Prospect, Low Adoption Costs (No Mediating mechanism)	Desire, Low Adoption Costs and the Pulling	Desire and the Pushing	---
			Credible Conditionality, Prospect (No Mediating mechanism)	---
Cases and Actions	a) Establishment of good neighborly relations with Syria	Alignments to the EU a) Council Conclusions on Syria related to the Hariri assassination, b) the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and c) the relaunching of Syria-Israel peace talks	a) The imposition of restrictive measures on Syria and b) the implementation of Readmission Agreement	De-Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy: A case on People’s Protection Units (YPG)

In line with the Table 1, the main hypothesis of this thesis are that a) ‘credible conditionality’, ‘prospect for the EU membership’ and ‘low adoption costs’ enabled the transformative role of EU’s conditionality on Turkish foreign policy to establish good neighborly relations with Syria between 1999 and the end of 2004, b) ‘desire for the EU membership’ and ‘low adoption costs’ as the facilitating factors and the *pulling* version of the improvement of accession as the mediating mechanism enabled the transformative role of EU’s conditionality on Turkish policy towards Syria between 2005 and 2010 in the cases of the Hariri assassination, withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and relaunching of Syria-Israel peace talks, c) Through the *pushing* version of the

improvement of accession, Turkey obtained ‘credible conditionality’ that provided Turkey with ‘prospect for the EU membership’. Thus, ‘credible conditionality’ and ‘prospect for the EU membership’ enabled the transformative role of EU’s conditionality on Turkish foreign policy towards Syria after 2011, in the cases of the imposition of restrictive measures on Syria and the implementation of Readmission Agreement. In this context, the main research question of the thesis is that which factors and mechanisms enabled the transformative role of EU’s conditionality on Turkish policy towards Syria after 2011? In addition, this thesis does not argue that Turkey has undertaken an uninterrupted and continuous Europeanization process which is too optimistic. For instance, although there has been an convergence between the EU and Turkey policies on fighting against Da’esh -to some extent, this thesis refrained from referring it as Europeanization. Moreover, this thesis puts forward de-Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy on the case of People’s Protection Units (YPG).

In the case of the case selection, there is no study which specifically examines the case of Syria in the framework of the Europeanization of TFP. The studies usually address the the case of Syria briefly within the general framework of the Europeanization of TFP towards neighboring countries such as Cyprus, Greece, Iran, Iraq and Armenia (Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, 2010; Altunışık, 2009; Terzi, 2008; Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007). Also, the literature on Europeanization of TFP often highlights the EU’s transformative power on TFP towards good neighbourly relations. But this may not always be the case, the case of Syria shows -along with other factors- how TFP was transformed from good neighbourly relations to coercive foreign policy actions by the EU’s impact.

In the case of the methodology, process tracing allows distinguishing alternative explanations empirically and it can show us which explanation/s is/are causally more important in foreign policy change (Moumoutzis, 2011, p.621). Also, it helps to reveal whether Europeanization of foreign policy is carried out through socialization or strategic calculation (ibid). Throughout the study, “one carefully maps the process, exploring the extent to which it coincides with prior, theoretically derived expectations about the workings of the mechanism” and “the data for process tracing is overwhelmingly qualitative in nature, and includes historical memoirs, interviews, press accounts and documents” (Checkel, 2005b, p.6). However, process tracing may not be enough alone;

therefore, using a causal mechanism “is an important ingredient of a full and convincing causal explanation which consists of stating the causal factors and causal mechanism” (Haverland, 2003, p.5). That is to say, utilizing from process tracing can be more efficient when it trace the work of a causal mechanism (Checkel, 2005b, p.6). For this reason, this thesis offers the *improvement of accession* as a mediating causal mechanism. The ‘improvement of accession’ gives answers for the question of “How Europeanization may work in a candidate state, in the situations of low degree or lack of credible conditionality”. The *pulling* and *pushing* are the two versions of the improvement of accession and both them stem from the desire for the EU membership. The theoretical perspective of them is the ‘RCI’, namely the aim of both is to benefit from the EU’s membership advantages; thus both of them are operationalized in accordance with the ‘logic of consequences’. In that case, on the one hand, through tracing the pulling or pushing, we can able to understand that ‘desire for the EU membership’ is rooted in interest based impetus- RCI. On the other hand, ‘desire for the EU membership’ may bases on ‘logic of appropriateness’ -SI. In fact, the RCI and SI are not mutually “exclusive” (March and Olsen, 1998, p.952) but this thesis approach for ‘desire’ is from the perspective of RCI. The pulling can be assumed as the efforts made by given candidate state to prove its intention for the EU membership. For example, candidate states may adopt EU rules, policies or practices as a result of the logic of consequences even in the situation of low rate or lack of credible conditionality. The Pushing version requires an active involvement in a bargaining process vis-a-vis the EU. If candidate states have enough power to use as a bargaining chip vis-a-vis the EU and if they have desire for the EU membership then they may try to push EU to improve or speed up their accession by actively bargaining.

In the context of data collection, this thesis mainly relies on qualitative datas. At the first stage, the books, academic articles and conference documents will be used to introduce the concept of Europeanization. The secondary sources will continued to be used to introduce Europranization of Turkish foreign policy, to detect the gaps in the literature and to hinge this thesis arguments. Also, the primary sources will be used to underpin this thesis arguments empirically. In this context, for the side of the EU, the progress reports prepared by the EU Commission, Strategy Papers, Council Conclusions, Commission

directives and recommendations, EU's declarations, European Parliament recommendations, discourses and statements made by the EU and members states' representatives and so on will be used. For the side of Turkey and other actors, the national documents relating to regulations on laws and constitutional changes, political parties programmes and their election manifests, official declarations made by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and declarations of other actors such as the Syrian National Council, reports prepared by Turkish Ministries, discourses and statements made by states' representatives (such as the President and the Ministers), interviews with state representatives and with other related actors, and so on will be used.

The structure of this thesis consists of three chapters. In the Chapter I, different definitions, dimensions and mechanisms of Europeanization will be introduced. The definitions of Europeanization will be analyzed through top-down, bottom-up and horizontal dimensions of the concept and then new-institutionalism and its two logics ('logic of consequences' and 'logic of appropriateness') will be presented to explain operating principles of causal mechanisms. The mechanisms of Europeanization will be divided into two sections as 'mechanism for member states' and 'mechanism for candidate states'. Under the title of mechanism for candidate states, the hierarchical top-down relationship between the EU and the applicant states and the importance role of 'credible of conditionality' in the adoption process will be emphasized. Also, *credible conditionality trilogy* will be introduced as the indicator of 'credible of conditionality' and the relation between 'credibility of the conditionality' and 'prospect of the EU membership' will be shown. Lastly, the absence of interest based mechanism, which can explain candidate states's Europeanization in the situation of low rate or lack of credible conditionality, will be pointed out and then the *improvement of accession* will be dedicated to fill this gap.

In the Chapter II, Europeanization of the member states' foreign policy will be analyzed from the perspectives of the Sociological Institutionalism (SI) and Rational-Choice Institutionalism (RCI). Europeanization of the candidate states' foreign policy will be analyzed only from the perspective of the RCI. Because, strategic interest-based behaviour is more likely for the candidate and potential candidate states (Goetz: 2005, p.262; Börzel and Soyaltın, 2012, p.10). Therefore, the literature on candidate states

mostly concentrated on the RCI. Nevertheless, some examples will be given from the SI perspective. In addition, the pulling version of the *improvement of accession* will be tested under this chapter. The findings show that although ‘credibility of conditionality’ and ‘prospects of the EU membership’ decreased in Turkey after the end of 2004, the country maintained its alignment with the CSFP acquis.

In the Chapter III, at the first stage, the EU’s foreign policy towards Syria until 2011 will be presented and then Turkish foreign policy towards Syria until 2011 will be evaluated through the EU’s conditionality mechanism. The ‘credible conditionality’, ‘prospect for the EU membership’ and ‘low adoption costs’ will be pointed out as facilitating factors that enabled the transformative role of EU’s conditionality on Turkish foreign policy to establish good neighborly relations with Syria between 1999 and the end of 2004. For the 2005-2010 period, ‘desire for the EU membership’ and ‘low adoption costs’ as facilitating factors and the pulling version of the improvement of accession as the mediating mechanism will be pointed out as the contributors for the transformative role of EU’s conditionality on Turkish policy towards Syria. At the second stage, the EU’s foreign policy towards Syria after 2011 will be evaluated under the two research titles (‘EU’s Support for the Syrian opposition’ and ‘EU’s Migration Policy Towards Syrian Refugees’) which are selected in accordance with the EU’s own Arab Spring policy. In the same context, Turkish foreign policy towards Syria after 2011 will be evaluated and traced under the parallel research titles to find out the EU’s impact. But before detecting the factors which facilitated the adoption of EU directions, Turkey’s bargain with the EU on the Syrian refugee crisis and on the implementation of the restrictive measures against the Syrian regime will be explained by the *pushing* version of the improvement of accession which assumes that in the situations of the low rate or lack of ‘credible conditionality’, if candidate states have enough power to use as a bargaining chip vis-a-vis the EU and if they have desire for the EU membership then they may try to push EU to improve or speed up their accession by actively bargaining. In the final, the ‘credible conditionality’ and ‘prospect for the EU membership’ will be pointed out as the factors which enabled the transformative role of EU’s conditionality on Turkish foreign policy towards Syria after 2011, in the cases of the imposition of restrictive measures on Syria and the implementation of Readmission Agreement.

CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPT OF EUROPEANIZATION

This chapter aims to explain the mechanisms of Europeanization as a whole. In this context, after linking Europeanization to Integration theories, various definitions, dimensions and mechanisms of Europeanization will be introduced. The definitions of Europeanization will be analyzed through top-down, bottom-up and horizontal dimensions of the concept, and then new-institutionalism and its two logics ('logic of consequences' and 'logic of appropriateness') will be presented in order to explain the operating principles of causal mechanisms.

Unlike the member states of the EU, candidate states are not included in the EU's legal-institutional structure; thus, they have no or very little influence to shape EU policies (Vachudova, 2005, p.63; Sedelmeier, 2011, p.6; Goetz and Dyson, 2003, p.2; Grabbe, 2002; Heritier, 2005). Therefore, it would be helpful to differentiate the mechanisms of Europeanization for candidate states from member states. On the one hand, mechanisms for candidate states will be introduced in the context of the hierarchical top-down relationship between the EU and the applicant states that reflects a power asymmetry. On the other hand, the role of candidate states in the adoption process of EU rules will be underlined. In this context, along with other factors, the importance of the 'credibility of conditionality' will be emphasized as a facilitating factor for the adoption of EU rules. The relation between 'credibility of conditionality' and 'prospect of the EU membership' will also be explained.

For decades, the literature on the relationship between the European Union and its member states mainly concentrated on the conceptualization of European integration and theoretical debates were dominated by two competing paradigms of intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism which disagree on the role of member states' action at the European level (Börzel, 2003, p.2). According to the intergovernmentalist approach, states act according to their interests; therefore, the primary source of integration lies in their interests (Börzel, 2003; Hoffmann, 1982;

Moravcsik, 1991, p.56). In this view, the role of supranational institutions is downplayed since states are accepted as dominant actors of European integration (Bergmann and Niemann, 2015, pp.170-1). On the contrary, neo-functionalist approach privilege supranational actors such as the European Commission, European Parliament as well as the European Court of Justice which aim at extending their supranational rules over the Member states in order to achieve collective gains (Börzel, 2003; Haas, 2004; Stone-Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997, p.299). In the 1990s, students of these two major paradigms became increasingly interested in the impact of EU processes and institutions on the Member states in order to theorize the domestic impact of the EU (Börzel, 2003, p.3). According to intergovernmentalist scholars, European integration enhance the control of national governments rather than eroding their dominance as they have executive control at the European and domestic levels (Börzel, 2003; Milward 1999; Moravcsik 1994); on the contrary, neofunctionalists or supranationalists suggest that the sovereignty of states is diluted in the European arena by collective decision-making and by supranational institutions (Börzel, 2003; Marks et al., 1996; Sandholtz, 1996).

As suggested by Radaelli, “Europeanization would not exist without European integration” but the relationship between Europeanization and theories of integration needs to be further studied (2000, p.6), since the theoretical studies of European integration and Europeanization studies have not often been clearly linked (Graziano and Vink, 2013, p.39). Of course there is a relationship between them, but Europeanization is not considered as an integration theory. Theories of integration, for instance, “seek to explain why the enlargement process is happening, that is the ontological stage of research, whereas Europeanization is post-ontological in being concerned with the effects of the enlargement process” (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003, p.310). Integration theories focus on the issue whether European integration strengthens or weakens the state, whereas Europeanization analyzes the role of domestic institutions in the process of adaptation to Europe (Radaelli, 2000, p.6). Therefore, integration theories are considered to be insufficient to explain differential impact of the EU on the member states (Börzel, 2003). It can be thought, due to the above reasons “much of the literature on European integration refers to the domestic impact of the European Union as Europeanization” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p.1) rather than labelling it directly with those

integration theories. Besides, Europeanization is not restricted to EU member states, but also it is applicable for non-members (like Switzerland and Norway) or candidate countries (Vink, 2003, p.64). Consequently, in order to understand the impact of the EU, the concept of Europeanization should be defined thoroughly.

1.1 DEFINITIONS AND DIMENSIONS OF EUROPEANIZATION

Since the 1990s Europeanization has become a concept with increased popularity in academic research (Vink and Graziano, 2008, p.3). The concept has become prominent, but the definitions of it became disputed in the field of European Studies (Hang, 2011, p.136; Bomberg and Peterson, 2000, p.3). The definitions are usually specific to individual works without a clear general agreement on the specific dimensions of Europeanization (Moumoutzis, 2011, p.608; Radaelli, 2004; Radaelli and Pasquier, 2006; Flockhart, 2010, p.789). Some scholars consider Europeanization as a top-down process, while others argue that it must be seen both from bottom-up and horizontal approaches (Hang, 2011, p.136).

Top-down Europeanization seeks to explain the domestic changes triggered by the European Union (as a supranational unit) on policies, politics and polities in its member states and in third countries (Börzel and Panke, 2013, p.118).³ In other words, top-down Europeanization is the process by which domestic laws and rules are aligned to EU level requirements (Carter and Pasquier, 2006, p.12). For example, the road haulage project, appeared in the mid-1980s, provides cabotage liberalisation for non-resident hauliers in foreign domestic markets through the regulations made by European Community. In this context, the liberalisation of cabotage removed the protection of national transport markets, so that states were no longer able to restrict the access of non-resident hauliers to the domestic market (Heritier and Knill, 2000). Thus, domestic tariff regimes for road

³ The “policies, politics, polity” are the dimensions of Europeanization in which “the domestic impact of Europeanization can be analyzed and processes of domestic change can be traced” (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.60). Accordingly, “policies” cluster deal with the change in policy standards, instruments, and problem solving approaches, policy narratives and discourse; “politics” includes interest relation of the actors such as civil society institutions, political parties and other interest groups; “polity” deal with the change in intergovernmental relations, political institutions, judicial structures, economic institutions and state-society relations (ibid).

transport, which promoted the market position of national hauliers, were changed by the member states in order to align themselves with the regulation made at the European level. Therefore, the changes at the domestic level triggered by the European Union are the dependent; the rules, norms and decisions emerged at the European level (as a supranational unit) are independent variables according to the top-down research desing of Europeanization. In this context, the top-down definitions of Europeanization are formed by different scholars with various approaches.

According to Ladrech (1994, p.69), “Europeanization is an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC [European Community] political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making”. Changes in organizational logic refer to the national adaptation processes to EC’s changed or changing environment; in other words, national policy-making processes change with developing behaviours or practices inspired by the new rules and the procedures emanating from the EC (Ladrech, 1994, pp.71-2). In this context, Europeanization is understood as ‘national adaptation’, which refers to “the adaptation of national institutional structures and policy-making processes in accordance to the development of European integration” (Harmsen and Wilson, 2000, p.14). This ‘national adaptation’ suggests that the Europeanization is a top-down process from the supranational level to the national level (Wong, 2017, p.146).

Buller and Gamble (2002, p.17) define Europeanization as “a situation where distinct modes of European governance have transformed aspects of domestic politics ”. In other words, the ‘governance approach’ is embedded in their definition. As Kohler-Koch (1999) and Pierre and Stoker (2000) suggest, governance is defined “as the processes, methods or style of governing which bring about conditions for ordered rule and collective action” (cited in Buller and Gamble, 2002, p.18). On the one hand, their definition comprises the concept of multi-level governance which “refers to a particular kind of relationship between several institutional levels. The basic idea here is that in multi-level governance, actors, arenas, and institutions are not ordered hierarchically but have a more complex and contextually defined relationship” (Pierre and Peters, 2005, p.83). On the other, it also comprises Kohler-Koch’s governance approach, in which the governance approach is a collective action reached at EU level (as a supranational unit)

without government (Kohler-Koch, 1998). For example, in the European Community (EC), policies are decided at the European level and decisions impact citizens in each member state, but there is no delegation of political power to directly related top decision-making authority at the European level; that is to say, although there is no government, citizens are governed (Kohler-Koch, 1998). According to Buller and Gamble (2002, p.19), their distinct modes of governance implies that the European governance will be influenced by national interests and “global forces”. However, here, an argument must be focused on who changes domestic politics, rather than who influences? Otherwise, it seems inappropriate to assume that global forces direct European governance. Unlike multi-level governance, which involves integrating processes at different institutional levels (Pierre and Peters, 2005, p.83), Kohler-Koch’s governance approach gives answer to the question of who transform or change domestic politics, such as the European Community. Consequently, as domestic changes occur according to the decisions of an independent authority with no government at the European level, their definition fits to the top-down model of Europeanization [Auel (2013, p.3), Lyons (2014, p.3)].

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) have used ‘governance approach’, but they divide the EU’s governance system into two dimensions of internal and external. They mainly focus on the “external” dimension which is mostly applicable to the non-member countries (ibid). The governance of non-member states is based on hierarchical system which undermine their autonomy over their legislation (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009, p.797), because, the ultimate reward (membership) depends on the adoption and implementation of the EU rules and regulations into the national legislation system (Kirişci, 2007).⁴ That is to say, Europeanization of non-member states are carried out by top-down policy transfer on the basis of hierarchical external governance (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009, p.796).

According to Goetz and Dyson (2003:20), “Europeanization denotes a complex interactive ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ process in which domestic polities, politics and public policies are shaped by European integration and in which domestic actors use

⁴ Adoption of the rules, “includes the transposition of EU legislation into domestic law, the restructuring of domestic institutions according to EU rules, or the change of domestic political practices according to EU standards” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.662).

European integration to shape the domestic arena”. In this context, Europeanization is understood as a distinct part of a dynamic interaction across levels, that is to say, institutional adjustments made by national executives to EU membership are “as much bound up with the projection of domestic preferences onto the EU level as with the reception of EU laws and policies” (Goetz and Dyson, 2003, p.15). Simply, they have exhibited greater sensitivity to address the more diverse conditions linking the EU and the local level (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2008, p.25), but in the final, they accept downloading as the defining property; and uploading as the secondary or accompanying property of Europeanization (cited in Açıkmüşe, 2010:134).⁵

Bottom-up Europeanization seeks to explain how member states shape EU policies, politics and polities at the European level (Larsen and Olsen, 2010, p.4). According to Börzel (2002, p.195), “member states seek to shape European policy-making according to their interests and institutional traditions”. In this context, national and sub-national institutions act at the European level in order to influence European policies (Swianiewicz, 2014, p.7). Thus, process starts at the member states’ level and results in changes at the European level (Müller and Flers, 2010). In fact, as the member states shape European policies to which they have to adapt later (Börzel, 2003, p.19), the process can be extended further. Namely, Europeanization process starts and finishes at the domestic level (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2008, p.41). Member states may harmonize their high standards at the European level, so that they can shape European policies. For example, in environmental policy, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, together with the Austria, Sweden and Finland, have repeatedly shaped European policies according to their domestic preferences and priorities (Börzel, 2002, p.197). Influence capacity of a given member state is also important to affect European policies. Germany, France and Britain (before Brexit discussions) are powerful or influential in negotiations, but its is hard to demonstrate what resources convey power or which outcomes demonstrate that one country has been influential (Moravcsik, 1998, p.53). Economic and geopolitical power (Moravcsik, 1998, p.5), industrial capacity, capacity to push other member states in European negotiation process, coalition-building and interest accommodation skills

⁵ According to Goetz and Dyson (2003, p.15), “it seems sensible to distinguish between Europeanization’s properties ‘downloading’ and its ‘accompanying’ properties ‘uploading’, to provide an internal coherence to the Europeanization concept.

(Börzel, 2002, p.196), political weight on a given issue, ability for a particular national success in a given policy area, ability at winning an argument by convincingly discussing (Wallace, 2005, pp.36-42 [cited in Copsey and Pomorska, 2010]), veto right and the power of the chair (Tallberg, 2008), and “drawing on moral” as pro-European citizens which can be converted into “common good oriented norm advocates and create normative pressures upon other states” (Panke, 2009, p.5) provide power or influence capacity to a given member state. Therefore, member states may have different power sources in different ways and even small member states may have capacity to influence European policies. For example, thanks to its capacity to push other member states in European negotiation process, Denmark succeeded in transforming its national plan for the aquatic environment into the urban waste water and nitrate directives, and Netherlands persuaded other member states to adopt high standards for small car and truck emissions (Börzel, 2002, p.199). The considerable important role of Belgium in the creation of the Economic and Monetary (EMU) is another example to the implementation of bottom-up Europeanization. Because of the two destructive world wars experience, Belgium’s fixed position is in favour of deeper European integration; therefore, the EMU was important objective of Belgium as an essential element of the political integration. In this vein, Belgium prepared its proposals to prevent the Commission becoming isolated, and negotiated hard and tenaciously during the negotiations on the monetary dimension of the Single European Act in 1985 (Maes and Verdun, 2005).

Olsen (2002) distinguishes five possible uses of Europeanization which is (a) changes in external territorial boundaries, which means the territorial reach of Europeanization is not limited to the European continent, it changes as the Union’s political space expands through enlargement; (b) developing institutions at the European level, which signifies centre-building with a collective action capacity at the European level; (c) domestic impacts of European level institutions, which means the change in core domestic institutions understood as a consequence of the development of European-level institutions, identities and policies; (d) exporting governance procedure and policy specific for the EU beyond EU borders, which focuses on relations with non-European actors and institutions in order to understand how Europe finds a place in a larger world order; (e) a political unification project, which can be understood as a degree to which

Europe is becoming a more unified and stronger political entity. Firstly, 'developing institutions at the European level' corresponds to the bottom-up and 'domestic impacts of European level institutions' to the top-down perspectives. Secondly, Europeanization as 'a political unification project' tell us that it is an interactive process and "there is no single dominant and deterministic causal relation" (Olsen, 2002, p.942). Therefore, the study of Europeanization does not fit easily "the language of dependent and independent variables and the logic of regression analysis", and the transformation may occur on the basis of "a multitude of co-evolving, parallel and not necessarily tightly-coupled processes" (Olsen 1996, p.271). However, Olsen's proposition leads researchers into the 'problems of actors' domain where they can clearly define Europeanization processes neither as top-down nor bottom-up (Larsen and Olsen, 2010, p.6). Similar problem can be experienced in other scholars' perspectives (such as Featherstone and Kazamias, 2000; Radealli, 2000; Major and Pomorska, 2005).

Featherstone and Kazamias (2000, p.6) examine Europeanization "in terms of the fit or misfit between the national setting and EU-level commitments, and the response of domestic actors to this process". They assume Europeanization to be a two-way process, between bottom-up and top-down pressure, and recognize Olsen's proposition (Featherstone and Kazamias, 2000, pp.6-7). According to Radealli (2000, p.4), Europeanization refers to "processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies". In this view, Europeanization is not only understood as domestic impact of Europe, but also as creative uses of Europe by member states, that is to say, Europeanization is "an interactive process, rather than a simple process of unidirectional reaction to Europe (Radealli and Exadaktylos, 2010, p.193). Major and Pomorska conceptualised three complementary dimensions of the Europeanization (uploading, downloading and crossloading) as "ongoing and mutually constitutive process of change linking national and European levels." (Major and Pomorska, 2005, pp.1-2). This ongoing and mutually constitutive process perspective (also other authors' perspective mentioned above) has

little methodological help as the boundaries between cause and effect, dependent and independent variable become blurred (Major, 2005, p.177; Müller and Flers, 2010). In order to cope with this problem, “bracketing” notion can be useful as a methodological device to distinguish periods which focus on, on the one hand, member states level; and on the other, the effect of EU institutions and processes on these states (Müller and Flers, 2010). Thus, uploading and downloading are separated and examined as different dimensions in the Europeanization process (ibid).

For example, Risse et al. (2001, p.3). define Europeanization as “the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with the problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules”. They recognize causal processes go both ways from domestic level to the EU and vice versa (Risse et al., 2001, p.4), but they brackete this complex causal processes (Olsen, 2002, p.942). According to them, “although the causality between Europeanization and domestic structure runs in both directions, we have chosen to emphasize the downward causation from Europeanization to domestic structure” (Risse et al., 2001, p.12). The “emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance” is also understood as “the institutionalization at the European level of a distinct system of governance” (Olsen, 2002, p.929). In the context of institutionalization, “Europeanization is understood as a process of institution-building at the European level in order to explore how this Europeanization process impacts upon the member states” (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.59). That is to say, institutionalization is carried out by institution-building. Basically, institution building or developing institutions at the European level means “centre-building with a collective action capacity, providing some degree of co-ordination and coherence” (Olsen, 2002, p.923). Here, the dynamics and outcomes of European level institutional developments are engaged with national and subnational actors which have a choice between alternative forms of organization and governance (Olsen, 2002, p.929). In addition, the ‘problem-solving’ approach used in this definition points out that the institutional change is the product or outcome of the voluntary agreements of the relevant actors (Olsen, 2002, p.929). Consequently, as the institutional developments depend on national and

subnational actors, their definition can be attributed to bottom-up Europeanization [Müller and Flers (2010), Dyson (2008, p.151)].

Finally, Börzel defines Europeanization as a “process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making” (1999, p.574). Based on her idea, Europeanization is a two-way process which entails a bottom-up and a top-down dimension (Börzel, 2002). Accordingly, “member states do not simply passively ‘download’ policies from the EU, but also ‘upload’ their preferences to the EU level” (Bache 2008, p.10). In this uploading vein, “they may proactively shape European policies, institutions, and processes to which they have to adapt later” (Börzel, 2003, p.19). Thus, “domestic policies are exported to the European level and subsequently adopted by other member states” (Börzel, 2002, p.197). As understood, Europeanization starts at the domestic level in order to form policies or institutions at the EU level, and then these policies or institutions subsequently diffuse over member states, thus, as this process starts at the domestic level it is a bottom-up dimension of Europeanization (Vink and Graziano, 2008, pp.9-10). Although, she acknowledges Europeanization as a two-way process she gives priority to domestic level, it seems Europeanization process is bracketed in favor of domestic level in her perspective.

Horizontal Europeanization focuses on policies, politics and polities transfers between/among the member states along the way of European integration (Costa and Brack, 2014, p.49). According to the horizontal approach, policy transfer is usually assumed to be a voluntary process. The governments evaluate each other's different methods and measure the success of various policy alternatives; at the final phase, they adopt best practices voluntarily (Bomberg and Peterson, 2000, p.10). Horizontal Europeanization can operate in a whole range of policies covered by what is known as the “Open Method of Coordination” where the EU does not act as a supranational unity (Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004, p.7). In the matters of unemployment, justice and home affairs and monetary policy, the EU’s role is mediator or facilitator of cross national policy transfer (Bomberg and Peterson, 2000, p.12). In other words, EU institutions bring national policy-makers and opinion leaders together and facilitate the exchange of ideas which may diffuse into national practices (Lenschow 2006, p.59). For example, in 1997, a new Employment Title of the Amsterdam Treaty gave the EU an objective to reduce

unemployment in Europe, but the Treaty made no reference to common action or common policies; instead, it committed member states to work together in order to develop a coordinated strategy for employment through their policies and national practices; thus, the EU's role was to facilitate cooperation and policy transfers between member states rather than imposing a new policy on member states (Bomberg and Peterson, 2000, p.27). From this point of view, as the policy transfers between member states are carried out voluntarily and without a supranational pressure, it is more appropriate to assume that such type of policy transfers are carried out through horizontal Europeanization.

It is important to note that Europeanization does not always result in convergence (Radaelli, 2000, p.6). Namely, member states (also candidate states) have different responses to European policies (Heritier and Knill, 2000) and they can change the outcome of Europeanization. Thus, adaptation of European policies is carried out at different degrees which lead different outcomes of Europeanization (Radaelli, 2000; 2003).

1.2 OUTCOMES OF EUROPEANIZATION AND DE-EUROPEANIZATION

Different degrees of the adaptation can be observed on the outcomes of Europeanization. According to Radaelli (2000;2003), there are four expected outcomes of Europeanization: Inertia, Absorption, Retrenchment and Transformation. 'Inertia' means lack of change; it occurs when targeted government finds EU's policies, practices too contrast for its domestic policy and institutional arrangements (Radaelli, 2003, p.36). Inertia may in the forms of lags, delays in the transposition of EU directives or sheer resistance to EU-induced change, if the resistance sustain long period then inertia produce crisis (Radaelli, 2000, p.14). 'Absorption' denotes the changes made by given member or candidate state without a significant modification of domestic policy (Radaelli, 2003, p.37). While actors absorb certain non-fundamental changes, they maintain core feature of existing policy (Radaelli, 2000, p.15). 'Retrenchment' is a resistance against the EU's requirements (Börzel, 2003). This phenomenon may lead national policy to negative change; thus, given country may become "less European than it was" (Radaelli, 2003: 38). "Transformation" is the accurate adaptation of the EU's rules and policies into the

domestic policy and institutional structure (Radaelli, 2003, p.37). Transformation is the replacement of existing policy with a fundamentally new ones which are prescribed by the EU and alters the core feature of existing policy; therefore, 'transformation' requires high level degree of domestic change (Börzel and Risse, 2000). In addition, although Radaelli says that Europeanization is a process not consequences/outcome (Radaelli, 2000), many authors - as can be seen throughout the this thesis- refer Europeanization also as an outcome without evaluating its degree. In this vein, this thesis adopts Europeanization as an outcome; because it does not evaluate its cases in terms of different degrees of Europeanization with the exception of de-Europeanization.

The Europeanization of foreign policy may reverse and result in 'de-Europeanization' which is also an outcome of Europeanization (Müller and Flers, 2010). Foreign policy divergence between the EU and a candidate state is an indication of de-Europeanized foreign policy (Wong and Hill, 2011). De-Europeanisation, Retrenchment, Backsliding, De-Europeanizing, De-Europeanization terms are close to each other. 'De-Europeanisation' is defined as distancing of society and politics from the European system of norms, values and policy expectations (Düzgit and Kaliber, 2016:6). 'Backsliding' means breaching of EU principles such as principles of liberal democracy (Düzgit and Kaliber, 2016). 'De-Europeanizing' means attempting to rid itself of any perceived restraints imposed by European foreign policy (Wong and Hill, 2011). 'De-Europeanization' means "the partial or complete re-nationalization of domestic politics, policies and polity as a result of a member/candidate country's negative reactions to the adaptation pressures generated by the EU" (Ovalı, 2015, pp.3-4). In sum of all these definitions, it is plausible to assert that diverging, distancing and displaying negative reaction are important determinants for de-Europeanization. In this context, appropriate de-Europeanization definition for thesis is that de-Europeanization of foreign policy is diverging and distancing from the EU's common foreign policy and displaying negative reactions against the adoption pressure generated by the EU.

In addition, it is important to understand what motivates member or candidate states when they reject and resist the EU's requirements or when they try to upload their policies or when they download EU's policies, rules and norms. That is to say, the root of member and candidate states' behaviour do not come out from the blue. There must be some

reasons to explain their intentions. For instance, in the context of downloading dimension, member and candidate states do not passively download new arrangements. Whether the requirements will be adopted or shape of the adaptations depend on the actors preferences. Some actors may resist or oppose to EU induced changes while others adopt them at different degrees (Radaelli, 2000, p.14). In that case, the question of “what are the things that shape actors’ preferences or behaviors” comes to fore. In order to answer this question, the perspectives of new-institutionalism offer viable explanations.

1.3 NEW INSTITUTIONALISM AND TWO LOGICS OF EUROPEANIZATION

Institutions are described as the rules, routines, norms, and identities that determine the actors’ political behavior (March and Olsen, 2005, p.13). According to new-institutionalism, “the choices of individual political actors cannot be understood in a vacuum, but must be placed in specific institutional context”; thus, political behaviour is understood in terms of either individual calculations of self interest or the impact of broader social forces (Harmsen, 2000, p.58). The three variants of the new institutionalism; Rational Choice Institutionalism, Sociological Institutionalism and Historical Institutionalism offer different explanations for the reasons of actors’ preferences.

Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) assumes that the actors have a fixed set of preferences and they behave entirely instrumentally in order to maximize the attainment of their preferences (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp.944-5). The ‘logic of consequences’ is the main conjecture of the RCI. The logic of consequences is based on the assumption that “man’s natural proclivity is to pursue his own interests” (Brennan and Buchanan 1985, p.IX). In this sense, the decision making process of the actors comprises deliberate consideration of alternatives, assessment of outcomes and preference-driven choices, and its key feature is the presence of calculated choice between alternatives, so that they decide on action which serves their interests best (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp.944-5; Schulz, 2014, p.2). In short, actors act rationally by weighing the costs and benefits of different strategy options (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.63). In addition, institutions may influence actors’ strategic calculation but not the first determinant of their interests

(Harmsen, 2000, p.59). That is to say, the RCI denies that institutions produce actors' behaviors (Lowndes, 2010, pp.64-5). Instead, if the actors find participating in institutions will be better for their interests, then they may accept to be constrained by institutions (Peters, 2005, p.48).

Sociological Institutionalism (SI) attempts to embrace institutions in much sociological manner rather than to assume actors as purposive, goal-oriented or rational (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.949). According to SI; the procedures, norms, symbols, cognitive script, moral templates and culture guide actors' behaviours and construct their behaviours socially (ibid, p.947). Interest formation and decision-making processes are shaped by the institutions in which actors are embedded, in other words, institutions assumed to be political environment or cultural context which shape actors' interests (Thielemann, 2001, p.6). The 'logic of appropriateness' is the main conjecture of the SI. The logic of appropriateness is interpreted as an appropriate act to the institutionalized practices which produced by mutual understandings of what is true, right, and good (Olsen 2007, p.3). As opposed to logic of consequences, the cognitive and normative components are decisive for the rule adaptation, therefore, the actors comply with the rules as long as the rules are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate (March and Olsen, 2004, p.3).

In fact, in the decision making processes, the actors not only evaluate expected consequences but also they consider the rules which are embedded in their identities and political environment; for this reason, "political action generally can not be explained exclusively in terms of a logic of either consequences or appropriateness", namely the 'logic of consequences' and 'logic of appropriateness' are not mutually "exclusive" (March and Olsen, 1998, p.952). In this context, this thesis do not deny the Sociological Institutionalism, the main conjecture of which is the logic of appropriateness, but evaluates its case from the theoretical lens of the Rational Choice Institutionalism, the main conjecture of which is the logic of consequences.

Lastly, Historical institutionalism (HI) stands between the RCI and SI (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.940; Steinmo, 2008, p.126). According to HI, the behaviours, attitudes and strategic choices actualize in a particular time within social, political, economic and cultural contexts rather than emerging independently from the time or place (Steinmo, 2008, p.127). Therefore, history matters because the best understanding of social reality

can be achieved through tracing temporal processes and sequences over time (Pierson, 2000, p.264). From the HI perspective, actors' behaviour is not fully strategic but bounded by their worldview and their action depends on the interpretation of their situation, in this context, institutions provide actors moral or cognitive templates for interpretation of their situation (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.939). Thus, the institutions provide actors strategically useful information from the history while affect their identities, self-images and preferences (ibid), but the institutions are also the outcome of the political strategies made by actors. That is to say, "the institutions... can shape and constrain political strategies in important ways, but they are themselves also the outcome (conscious or unintended) of deliberate political strategies of political conflict and of choice" (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992, p.10).

1.4 MECHANISMS OF EUROPEANIZATION

As explained above, Europeanization is a cause of domestic changes triggered by subnational, national or sub-national units of the Europe or by interactions between these units. Now, it is time to ask how these changes happen according to new-institutionalism perspectives described above? And what are the devices that link the dependent and independent variables of Europeanization? In order to answer these questions, different mechanisms were created in line with the new-institutionalist approaches.

1.4.1 Mechanisms for Member States

In the first stage, as a causal mechanism, there must be a 'misfit' or 'mismatch' (Börzel and Risse, 2000, p.5), which refers an incompatibility between European-level processes, policies and institutions and domestic-level processes, policies and institutions (Börzel, 2003, p.5; Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.58). In the absence of an elaborate policy structure, misfit between European institutions and the domestic structures may inflict significant costs, therefore, "an effective strategy to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs of European policies is to upload national policy arrangements to the European level"

(Börzel, 2002, p.196). This stage is called as “pace-setting” which involves the active shaping of European policies by member states’ domestic preferences (Börzel, 2002, p.197). Once these domestic policies are exported to the EU level by pace-setters, subsequently reflected over other member states (ibid). In a sense, an another misfit emerges for those other member states. Thus, Europeanization exert ‘adaptational pressure’ on domestic institutional structures of those member states (Risse et al., 2001, p.7).⁶ That is to say, at this stage, European policy making may trigger domestic change by “prescribing specific institutional requirements with which Member States must comply” (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002, p.257). In such a case, “Member States [may pursue] different strategies in responding to Europeanization” (Börzel, 2002, p.193). In line with the RCI, these strategies or mechanisms may be ‘pace-setting’ (or uploading which explained above), ‘foot-dragging’ or ‘fence-sitting’. Unlike pace-setting, foot-dragging “aims at stopping or at least containing the attempts of other Member States to upload their domestic policies to the European level” (Börzel, 2002, p.203). If European policies considered too costly, member states may try to block or delay in order to prevent policies costly effects or at least they may try to achieve some compensation for implementation costs (ibid, p.194). For example, although Germany was recognized as the world’s largest electricity generating capacity from wind in the 1997 White Paper on Renewable Energies Sources (RES), Germany was not able to upload its Renewable Energy Act based on feed-in tariff scheme during the negotiations of the 2001 first European directive on the promotion of electricity from RES (Solorio et al., 2014). Germany attempted to influence policy developments at the European level through unilateral action but the efforts were hindered by the Commission’s proposal which required the harmonization of national support schemes based on Tradable Green Certificates (TGC) which fits better into liberalized internal energy market (ibid). Germany ignored the TGC model and tried to convince the rest of the member states to the benefits of its feed-in tariffs; thus, Germany adopted the role of a ‘foot-dragger’ in

⁶ Degree of the adaptational pressure depends on the fit or misfit between European institutions and the domestic structures (Risse et al., 2001, p.7). The “goodness of fit” determines the degree of pressure for adaptation generated by Europeanization on the member states (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.61). Accordingly, “the lower compatibility (fit) between European institutions, on the one hand, and national institutions, on the other, the higher the adaptational pressures.” (Risse et al., 2001, p.7). Therefore, if European norms, rules, and the collective understanding are largely fit with member states at the domestic level, there may no compliance problem between the EU and domestic levels (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.61).

order to avoiding the implementation costs of the TGC (ibid). Fence-sitting is neither promoting specific policies at the European level nor preventing the attempts of others (Börzel, 2002, p.206). Fence-sitters may build coalitions with pace-setters and footdraggers or they may stand neutral position (ibid). For example, although the UK did not opt to be a part of the Banking Union (BU) she embraced a constructive fence-sitter role in the building process of the BU in order to help fight with the sovereign debt crisis (Quaglia, 2017, p.10).⁷ In addition, during the negotiations on the Banking Union, British policy-makers supported non-euro area members in the European Banking Authority (EBA) when they demanded an EBA voting reform which would prevent a euro area majority from imposing its own rules on non-euro area members, thus, the UK embraced the fence-sitter role once again by carefully negotiating specific issues which were significant for non-euro area countries (Quaglia, 2017, p.10).

In terms of the domestic structures, in line with the RCI, European policies or “ the misfit between European and domestic processes, policies, and institutions provides societal and/or political actors with new opportunities and constraints to pursue their interests.” (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.58). At this point, the capacity of actors is a sufficient condition to exploit these opportunities and avoid the constraints (ibid, p.64). In a country’s institutional structure, some actors may have more influence to pursue their interests, while others are constrained by them (Featherstone et al., 2012, p.56). Therefore, “whether such changes in the political opportunity structure lead to a domestic redistribution of power depends on the capacity of actors” (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.58). The ‘multiple veto points’ and ‘absence of formal institutions’ are mediating factors influence these capacities in a negative way (ibid).

The veto players can be individuals such as the President, influential ministers and army officials or collective actors such as political parties which called as partisan veto players or legal institutions (such as the Constitutional Court and the Parliament which called as institutional veto players⁸) whose agreements are required for a change of status quo

⁷ The Banking Union (BU) was the main response of the euro area members in the European Banking Authority against the sovereign debt crisis which began in Greece in 2010 and then extended to Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The BU was proposed to rebuild financial market confidence in both banks and sovereigns through stabilising the national banking systems (Quaglia, 2017).

⁸ For example, according to the German Basic Law, there are three institutional veto players in German domestic political system: the Bundestag (the German federal parliament), the Bundesrat (the German

(Tsebelis, 1995;2000). In a country's institutional structure, decision making power is spread over various layers and institutions/actors, so adaptation to the EU requirements is difficult as there are various actors with different interests (Sittermann, 2006, p.15), and those who are against the adaptation to the EU requirements (veto players) have an impact on other domestic actors' initiatives (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.64). Especially, in a coalition governments or in a situation where majority rule is required to a change in the status quo, the multiple partners may come up with different agendas and acting as veto-players (Denca, 2010, p.55; Tsebelis, 1995; Hagan et al., 2001). For example, the liberalization of telecommunication markets in the EU was launched through the introduction of the 1987 Green Paper which aimed to future reforms on liberalization of the telecommunication market, and Germany, as a member state of the EU, was required to take EU's legislation in its domestic law (Stahle, 2007). Between the 1990-1994 election period, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) / the Christian Social Union (CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) were in governmental coalition and together they had 398 of total 662 mandates. However, since the privatization law required 441 votes to be passed, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) played a role as a third partisan veto player (ibid). Consequently, initial policy position of the SPD, which was opposed the reform and closer to the status quo, delayed the adaptations of EU's legislation related to liberalization of the telecommunication market against the CDU/CSU- FDP coalition who was in favor of the privatization, namely, EU's legislation (ibid). In sum, increase of veto players with different interests will reduce actors' ability to make significant policy changes (Tsebelis, 1999, p.591). Thus, "the more power is dispersed across the political system and the more actors have a say in political decision-making, the more difficult it is to foster the domestic consensus or 'winning coalition' necessary to introduce changes in response to Europeanization pressures." (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.64).

The 'formal institutions' can provide actors with material and ideational resources necessary to exploit European opportunities and to promote domestic adaptation (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.58). Although the European political structures may offer domestic

legislative body which consist of sixteen federated states represents of Germany), and the Constitutional Court. The Bundestag can be broken down into a number of partisan veto players. For example, "the centre-right majority coalition government elected in September 2009 comprises three partisan veto players: the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP)" (Jensen et al., 2016, p.638).

actors additional resources, many actors are unable to exploit them when they lack the necessary action capacity (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.65). That is to say, the problem which inhibit adaptation is the lack of sufficient resources (such as manpower, money, expertise) to exploit the new opportunities (ibid). For example, in the United Kingdom, Equal Opportunities Commission provided women's organizations tools to enjoy from the EU's equal pay and equal treatment directives in order to advance gender equality, however in France, French women did not have enough capacity to cope with those veto players, who resisted the implementation of the EU equal pay and equal treatment policies, since there was a lack of formal institutions such as in the UK (Jupille and Caporaso, 1999).

In line with the SI, European policies do not always prescribe concrete institutional requirements nor modify the institutional context of strategic interaction, but may trigger domestic adjustments indirectly by altering the beliefs and expectations of domestic actors through socialization (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002, p.258). Socialization has been identified by social scientists as a "process by which social interaction leads novices to endorse expected ways of thinking, feeling and acting" (Johnston, 2001, p.493). Socialization implies "an agent switches from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness; this adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions", in course of time actors behave appropriately by learning what is socially accepted in a given setting or community (Checkel, 2005a, p.804). From this perspective, the actors motivated by internalized identities, values, and norms, and in course of time, they begin to accept EU as a "formal organization of a European international community defined by a specific collective identity and a specific set of common values and norms"; finally, they embrace rule adoption as the rule appropriate and legitimate rather than for a strategic gain (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, pp.667-8). Thus, actors are socialized in an environment consist of new norms and rules through processes of social learning and redefine their interests and identities accordingly (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.66). Therefore, adaptation of the EU's rules is more likely when a strong societal and political identification with the EU's norms and values exist in a country (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.67).

The 'change agents' is a mediating factor that facilitates the internalization of new norms and the development of new identities (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.67). Change agents or norm entrepreneurs persuade domestic actors to redefine their interests and identities by using moral arguments and strategic constructions and by engaging them in the processes of social learning (ibid). In this context, 'framing' can play an important role in the process of the persuasion of veto players. Framing is "basically confined to altering the 'cognitive input' into these opportunity structures rather than directly affecting these structures." (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2002, p.262). Accordingly, European policies not only affect the outcomes but also the reform process of domestic reforms in which European framing can play a decisive role in bringing about a consensus among domestic veto players by affecting the beliefs and expectations on national reforms. (ibid, p.263). For example, in the period of accession for EU membership, Croatian political elites tried to build European identity through framing unpopular idea with pro-European claims such as the 'European idea' which provoked the "Croatia is European and belongs in the EU" slogan, and they repeatedly reminded how the EU has helped Croatia to gain its independence and win the war (Subotic, 2011, p.317).

1.4.2 Mechanisms for Candidate States

As discussed by Olsen (2002) earlier, the territorial reach of Europeanization is not limited to the European continent, it changes continuously since the Union's political space expands through enlargement, which acts as a tool of Europeanization and which leads to domestic structural changes to include new members. In this context, as the Europeanization concept can be applied to the candidate states (Wallace, 2001), the causal mechanisms can be established and used in order to advance the conceptual understanding of enlargement (Sedelmeier, 2001). An important point here, unlike member states, candidate states are not included into EU's legal-institutional structure; therefore, they do not have a say in shaping EU policies, and this fact continues until they became full members - even thereafter (Vachudova, 2005, p.63). That is to say, there is a hierarchical top-down relationship between the EU and the applicant/candidate states that reflects a power asymmetry, as opposed to the member countries; therefore, the applicant/candidate states are downloaders of the EU institutions and policies and they have very weak

capacity to upload their preferences to the EU level (Sedelmeier, 2011, p.6; Goetz and Dyson, 2003, p.2; Vachudova, 2005; Grabbe, 2002; Heritier, 2005).⁹ This does not mean that candidate states have entirely passive roles. Rather, Europeanization mostly attributed to a bargaining process between the EU and a candidate state, and between the domestic actors as well; therefore, the outcomes of this process depends on the targeted government which conducts intergovernmental bargaining with the EU and on domestic actors' bargaining power as well (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004).

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier put forward three mechanisms for the Europeanization of candidate states. These are the “external incentives”, “social learning” and “lesson drawing” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004).

1.4.2.1 External Incentives Model

The external incentives was widely employed in order to understand the transformation process of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) (Grabbe, 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). Today, although it is not widely employed as much as before (Steunenberg and Dimitrova, 2007; Kirişci, 2007; Börzel, 2010), it still largely maintains its explanatory power in order to understand the transformation process of candidate states (Schimmelfennig, 2008; Simmons, 2011, pp.133-5; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008; Sedelmeier, 2011; Henriksson, 2015). Basically, the external incentives model is a rationalist bargaining model which assumes actors as strategic utility-maximizers that concerning the maximization of their own power and welfare (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.663). According to this model, the EU follows a strategy of conditionality “in which the EU sets its rules as conditions that the [candidate states] have to fulfil in order to receive EU rewards” (Schimmelfennig and

⁹ As an exceptional case, on the negotiations of accession treaty “Spain obtained a declaration stating the commitment of the EC to help Spain make its accession compatible with the maintaining and promotion of its national interests in Latin America” (Torreblanca, 2001). In addition, although candidate states do not have a say in formulation of EU common policies, they are able to join political dialogues as well as certain consultation mechanisms (Akçapar, 2007, p.61). According to the Annex II of 2002 Copenhagen Summit Presidency Conclusions, “the objective of these consultations will be for the European and non-EU European allies to Exchange views, and to discuss any concerns and interest raised by these Allies, so as to enable the European Union to take them consideration. As with CFSP, these consultations would enable the non-EU European Allies to contribute to European Security and Defence Policy and to associate themselves with EU decisions, actions and declarations on ESDP” (cited in Akçapar, 2007, p.61).

Sedelmeier, 2004, p.663). Conditionality is the main policy strategy of the EU in the enlargement process (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003; Sümer, 2009, p.99). Conditionality is operable for member states but it is considered more seriously by candidate states since the candidate states “have a strong incentive than existing member states to implement EU policies because they are trying to gain admission” (Grabbe, 2002, p.2). However, even if candidate states have a strong incentive to implement EU policies, adaptation or implementation of EU rules and policies is not carried out easily; because, candidate states and its domestic actors have a crucial role in the process of rule adaptation. To be more specific, in line with the RCI, states and domestic actors guard cost-benefit balance when they encounter with the adaptation of EU rules. In this context, outcomes of their cost-benefit balance/calculation depends on the ‘determinacy of conditions’, ‘size and speed of rewards’, ‘size of adoption costs’ and ‘credibility of conditionality’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004).

According to the ‘determinacy of conditions’, candidate states are more likely to adopt EU’s demands when they are clear enough -it is called as the ‘clarity of the EU’s demand’ (Sedelmeier, 2011, p.12). Also, EU’s demands must be in the form of conditions for rewards, otherwise these rules will not be adopted (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.664). According to the determinacy hypothesis, “the effectiveness of rule transfer increases if rules are set as conditions for rewards and the more determinate they are” (Sedelmeier, 2011, p.12). Determinacy provides information which determines the exact steps needed to reap the promised reward (Smith, 2016, p.10).

The decisions of target government may also change according to ‘size and speed of rewards’; smaller or more distant rewards will be less likely to motivate a candidate state’s preferences (Smith, 2016, p.10). The rewards vary from financial, technical assistance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2017, p.3) to promise for full membership which is the most effective one (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.665). According to rewards hypothesis, “the effectiveness of rule transfer increases with the size and speed of rewards” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.665).

Moreover, adoption costs are reflected over the candidate states and its domestic actors in different forms (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.666). Firstly, candidate states’ government may give priority for the security of their state or their regime and

power rather than EU membership (Schimmelfennig, 2007, p.130). Thus, Europeanization as an external pressure may challenge to domination of local elites; therefore, the local elites would perceive Europeanization as a threat to their local ownership (Nonne, 2016). As a result, the local elites, reform actors and decision makers may become veto players. At this point, as mentioned above, the veto points are a crucial factor as a role player who can delay or slow down the reform process triggered by the EU. Therefore, “the greater the distance among and the number of veto players, the more difficult it is to change the status quo” (Tsebelis, 2011, p.19). Secondly, adoption costs may take the form of opportunity costs when new rules and norms imposed upon target government. A target government may be forced to give up formerly made arrangements in order to comply with the EU’s demand or it may be forced to forego alternative rewards offered by other actors (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.666). Thirdly, when there is a “bad fit” between the national and the EU pre-existing policies, the size of adoption costs increases and policy change at the national level would be only partial; whereas, when there is a “good fit” between the national and the EU pre-existing policies then adoption of EU policies is more likely; because, “although the pressure for change is high, the cost to do so is low, so change occur easily” (Ruano, 2011, p.16).

Lastly, the size of adoption costs can be characterized by the promise for reward even the reward is sizeable like ultimate membership (Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004, p.432). To be more specific, the promise of reward must be credible even if the reward is ultimate membership -the most effective one (Kirişci, 2007, p.7). The candidate states must be convinced about the rewards that they will receive when they fulfill the EU’s demands (Sedelmeier, 2011, p.12). If a doubt occurs in a target state about the ultimate reward (membership), it may limit credibility of conditionality and thus it may influence adoption costs; because credibility of conditionality influences the cost-benefit calculation of policy-makers who are responsible for calculating governmental adoption costs (Kirişci, 2007, p.2; Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004, pp.432-3). In addition, the EU may threaten candidate states to withhold rewards in case of non-compliance in order to facilitate rule adaptation, (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.666). The target state must be convinced about the fact that rewards would be withheld by the EU if the conditions are not met (Smith, 2016, p.61). In sum, according to the ‘credibility of conditionality’

hypothesis, “the likelihood of rule adoption increases with the credibility of conditional threats and promises.” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.666).

At this point three indicators will shed light on this thesis to measure ‘credibility of conditionality’. These are: the ‘EU’s commitment’, ‘member states’ commitments’ and ‘coherent implementation of conditionality’. This trilogy was gathered together by Açıkmеше (2010) by utilizing from the studies of Eralp (2009), Ulusoy (2008a) and Öniş (2008). The trilogy can be considered as sum of exogenous facilitating factors in order to explain the dynamics of Europeanization of a candidate country (Açıkmеше, 2010). Also, these are practicable to determine the degree of credibility of conditionality. Because, the case of Turkey demonstrated that if the indicators of this trilogy are in low rate then the EU’s credibility or credible conditionality is in decline. Saatçiođlu (2011), used two of them (‘EU’s commitment’ and ‘coherent implementation of conditionality’ or ‘consistency of conditionality’) to determine credibility of conditionality in the case of Turkey accession. By putting ‘member states’ commitments’ on Saatçiođlu (2011)’s contribution, this thesis acknowledges them as the indicators of the credible conditionality by labeling them as *credible conditionality trilogy*.

The ‘EU’s commitment’ or the “EU’s institutional commitment” is an important sign of EU’s credibility or credible conditionality (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2017, p.9). A commitment from the EU level is given in “an ongoing accession process where the EU upgrades applicants’ accession status (in parallel to their preceding compliance with the membership criteria) by offering them intermediate, official steps towards membership” (Saatçiođlu, 2011, p.25). For example, the 1999 Helsinki decisions which granted Turkey a candidate status were a great sign of EU commitment to Turkey’s accession (Açıkmеше, 2010, p.142) and it subsequently increased ‘credibility of conditionality’ in the eyes of Turkey (Saatçiođlu, 2011). In other words, the 1999 Helsinki decisions “boosted the credibility of the EU conditionality both in the minds of political elites and the public” (Uluđ-Eryılmaz, 2015, p.350; see also Saatçiođlu, 2011; Öniş, 2006, pp.282-3). The positive stance of member states towards a candidate country namely the ‘member states’ commitments’ are also vital for the targeted country to receive credible conditionality; if member states have a negative stance towards targeted candidate state’s accession then the credibility would reduce (Öniş, 2008). For example,

since France and Germany switched alliances and stopped supporting Turkey's membership, there was some "certain loss of credibility" emerged in Turkey towards the EU (Öniş, 2008). The EU's implementation of conditionality "in a relatively coherent manner and formulating accession strategies on an equal-footing with the other candidates" (Açıkmeşe, 2010, p.143) and the consistency of EU's decisions in regards to candidate states' compliance are also important to perceive conditionality to be credible (Saatçioğlu, 2011, p.25); because, credibility of conditionality increases with the "EU's coherence and consistency" and decreases with the absence of them (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2017, p.4). For example, due to the sluggish accession process of Turkey – in the last quarter of the 2000s, only one chapter was provisionally closed, only 12 opened and a few left to be opened- "the EU was losing its credibility in the application of its accession strategies coherently and legitimately" (Açıkmeşe, 2010, p.145). That is to say, EU's inconsistent application of conditionality decreased the EU's credibility and 'credibility of conditionality' in Turkey (Saatçioğlu, 2011, p.28).

Another important point that needs to be specified is the relation between 'credibility of the conditionality' and 'prospect of the EU membership'. In line with the RCI, the 'logic of consequences', reflects the demands conditionality: "Do X to get Y. In the case of the EU, the Y could be aid or trade benefits, but the evidence suggests that it is the prospect of membership that acts as a real catalyst to spur political change. There is no assumption that values or core beliefs of previously 'reluctant democrats' will immediately change" (Kubicek, 2005, p.364). In that case, the prospect of EU membership is determined by RCI; namely it emerges in accordance with the actors interests. So that, it emerges as the Y is not aid nor trade benefits but it is the 'promise for the EU membership' which is the most effective reward offered by the EU. The promise for the EU membership is not enough alone, it must be credible (Kirişci, 2007, p.7). Namely, the candidate states must be convinced about the rewards that they will receive when they fulfill the EU's demands (Sedelmeier, 2011, p.12). Therefore, the degree of the prospect of the EU membership is closely related to the 'credibility of the conditionality'. Therefore, it's hard to claim 'prospect of the EU membership' presence in the absence of credible conditionality.

Lastly, the external incentive model is a bargaining process in which "the EU draws heavily on its superior bargaining power to set and enforce its conditionality"

(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.675). The superior bargaining power, which resulting from asymmetrical interdependence between the EU and candidate states, provides the Union with great advantage vis-a-vis the candidate states to control a bargaining process (Sedelmeier, 2011, p.14). However, when the subject is Turkey, its economic strength, political power and self-understanding “as a regional power render its relations with the EU far less asymmetrical” than Western Balkan and current candidate countries (Börzel and Soyaltın, 2012, p.11). In that case, as Turkey’s relations with the EU are “far less asymmetrical”, it is possible to say that Turkey can use its power resources vis-a-vis the EU to improve its accession process.¹⁰ As the “power can be conceived in terms of control over outcomes” (Keohane and Nye, 2011, p.10), any tools that give an ability to control over outcomes can be considered as power resource. In this context, if Turkey acquire an ability to effect EU’s expected foreign policy outcomes then the asymmetrical interdependence which in favour of the EU can be broken, and with this ability Turkey can bargain with the EU to improve its accession. However, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) do not show any clear way for the bargaining processes between the EU and accession countries. That is to say, if a candidate state attempts to improve its accession process by actively bargaining with the EU, we can’t explain such case by any mechanism in Europeanization literature. Likewise, although ‘credibility of the EU conditionality’ decreased in Turkey after the end of 2004, the country maintained its alignment to the CFSP acquis. That is to say, the credibility of EU conditionality hypothesis which says that “the likelihood of rule adoption increases with the credibility of conditional threats and promises.” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.666), can not explain such a situation. In this context, ‘the improvement of accession’ is dedicated to explain such anomalies.

¹⁰ In terms of the power resources, economic and geopolitical power (Moravcsik, 1998, p.5), industrial capacity, capacity to push other member states in European negotiation process, coalition-building and interest accommodation skills (Börzel, 2002, p.196), political weight on a given issue, ability for a particular national success in a given policy area, ability at winning an argument by convincingly discussing (Wallace, 2005, pp.36-42 [cited in Copsy and Pomorska, 2010]), veto right and the power of the chair (Tallberg, 2008), and “drawing on moral” as pro-European citizens which can be converted into “common good oriented norm advocates and create normative pressures upon other states” (Panke, 2009, p.5) provide member states power or influence capacity. In sum, as the “power can be conceived in terms of control over outcomes” (Keohane and Nye, 2011, p.10), any tools that give an ability to control over outcomes can be considered as power resource.

The improvement of accession appears in the situations of the low rate or lack of ‘credible conditionality’ or lack of credible accession ; namely in the situations of the low rate or lack of ‘prospects for the EU membership’. The improvement of accession stems from the desire for the EU membership, not prospect. The presence of ‘desire for the EU membership’ does not entirely exclude the presence of ‘prospect for the EU membership’ but in the situations of the low rate or lack of ‘credible conditionality’, the desire is thicker than the prospect to encourage targeted candidate state for the EU membership.

There are two versions of the improvement of accession, the Pulling and Pushing. Both of them stem from the desire for the EU membership. The theoretical perspective of them is the RCI; because, the aims of the two are to improve accession to the Union so as to gain maximum benefit from the EU’s membership advantages. Thus both of them are operationalized in accordance with the ‘logic of consequences’. On the one hand, through tracing the pulling or pushing, we can able to understand that ‘desire for the EU membership’ is rooted in interest based impetus- RCI. On the other hand, ‘desire for the EU membership’ may bases on ‘logic of appropriateness’ -SI. In fact, the RCI and SI are not mutually “exclusive” (March and Olsen, 1998, p.952), but this thesis approach to ‘desire’ is from the perspective of RCI.

The Pulling version is not included in a bargaining process, it is a passive and soft indicator of the desire for the EU membership. The pulling can be assumed as the efforts made by candidate states to show its intention for the EU membership. In this context, candidate states may adopt EU rules, policies or practices as a result of the logic of consequences even in the situation of low rate or lack of credible conditionality. The ‘low adoption costs’ is an important factor for the operationalization of the pulling. When there is a “good fit” between the national and the EU pre-existing policies then adoption of EU policies is more likely; because, “although the pressure for change is high, the cost to do so is low, so change occur easily” (Ruano, 2011, p.16). In addition, commitment for the EU accession is an important factor to estimate conditionality effect on the foreign policy changes. Because, the governmental commitment increases the possible effect of the conditionality on targeted state (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003). Therefore, the governmental commitment is an important factor to determine the pulling. The explanation of commitment is not only related to the logic of appropriateness but also it

may given as a result of the logic of consequences (Tocci, 2005, p.80). Here, the approach is the commitment given by targeted state as a result of the logic of consequences. For example, even though the ‘credibility of conditionality’ began to decrease in Turkey as of the end of 2004, the country aligned itself with the CSFP acquis while retained its commitment strategically for the EU accession. Lastly, in the foreign policy area, the high general alignment rate to the EU’s statements and decisions increases the likelihood presence of the ‘pulling’ and vice versa.

The Pushing version requires an active involvement in a bargaining process vis-a-vis the EU. If candidate states have enough power to use as a bargaining chip vis-a-vis the EU and if they have desire for the EU membership then they may try to push EU to improve their accession by actively bargaining. The pushing is eligible for the situations of high adoption costs. The size of adoption costs can be characterized by the eventual membership (Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004, p.432) and ‘credibility of conditionality’ (credibility of eventual membership) may influence the adoption costs (Kirişci, 2007, p.2; Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004, pp.432-3). Therefore, in the situations of low rate or lack of ‘credible conditionality’ targeted state may push EU to obtain credible conditionality, to raise the size of reward or to open new chapters in order to reduce adoption costs. For example, after 2010, in the situation of the low rate credible conditionality and high adoption costs, Turkey attempted to bargain with the EU on Syrian refugee crisis; the country pushed the EU to obtain credible conditionality, to raise the size of reward and to open new chapters. In addition, success of the pushing is more likely when given state acquire a strong ability or power to affect EU’s expected policy outcomes. Lastly, the pushing is not uploading which means projection of national policies to the EU level. For example, when the Syrian refugee crisis erupted in Europe, Turkey had the power to affect EU’s expected policy outcomes which aimed to stem refugee flows to Europe. With such power, Turkey pushed the EU to open new chapters in exchange for the adoption of the migration policy which was prescribed by the EU rather than project its own migration policy to the EU.

Lastly, when the credible conditionality is obtained through the improvement of accession, the ‘prospects for the EU membership’ may increase again. Aforementioned

prospect has not to be higher as before 2005 and it may lose its effect in a short time. It depends on the size and continuity of credible conditional.

1.4.2.2 Alternative Models

The external incentives model produce rule adoption in a bargaining form for EU membership. The ‘social learning’ and ‘lesson-drawing’ are two alternative models for Europeanization of candidate states, which can not be operationalized in a bargaining form (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004).

As explained under the title of Mechanisms for Member States. From the perspective of the SI, the actors motivated by internalized identities, values, and norms; and in course of time, they begin to accept EU as a “formal organization of a European international community defined by a specific collective identity and a specific set of common values and norms”; finally, they embrace rule adoption as the rule appropriate and legitimate rather than for a strategic gain (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, pp.667-8). Therefore, adaptation of the EU’s rules is more likely when a strong societal and political identification with the EU’s norms and values exist in a country (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.67). In other words, if a member or candidate states’ elites and public positively identifies themselves with the EU, the governments are more likely to adopt EU rules and policies (Sedelmeier, 2011, p.16).¹¹ According to Subotic (2011), for example, when the EU demanded Croatia to full cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on war crimes suspects, Croatia responded it positively and began to cooperate with the ICTY; because many Croatian political elites and people were identify themselves with the EU’s norms and values; thus, the EU accession requirements on war crimes were seen to be legitimate demands by them.

Another point that should be added is the distinction of different learning logics. Jack Levy (1994, p.283) defines learning as “a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the

¹¹ In addition, the “legitimacy of the EU’s demands and process” is an important factor for the operability of the socialization mechanism. Accordingly, if substantive rules codified internationally or in the EU’s own *acquis* then rules are more likely to be perceived as legitimate by a candidate state; therefore, the rules must be normatively consistent and political appropriateness consensus on these rules should be wide as possible (Sedelmeier, 2011, pp.15-16), and these rules and demands must be appropriate for European collective identity, values and norms (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005, p.18).

observations and interpretation of experience”. Learning may originate from the socialization or strategic reasons (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006). On the one hand, social learning or ‘thick learning’ is associated with sociological mechanisms of Europeanization that involves internalization of EU-imposed practices (Dabrowski, 2011, p.4). Accordingly, actors are socialized in an environment consist of new norms and rules through processes of ‘social learning’ and redefine their interests and identities accordingly (Börzel and Risse, 2003, p.66). Based on interviews with the Kosovan officials in the Ministry of Public Administration and in the Ministry of Finance, for example, the Kosovan officials have learned the EU’s officials’ working principles and methods during the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) meetings with the EU since 2009; today, they want Kosovo institutions to be in EU standards as they admire the EU's principles of justice, transparency, accountability and mutual trust (Shala, 2017, 56). On the other hand, as opposed the social learning, actors do not change their behaviours immediately when they enter into a new group, so internalization of EU practices take long time (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006, p.8). In other words, actors cannot embrace the rules through socialization when they immediately participate in a group’s dynamics; therefore, socialization does not imply internalisation of the behavioural rules at its first stage (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006, p.8). Thus, “before internalisation occurs, socialization may be better perceived as a strategic action undertaken by actors, pursuing their interests and resulting from rational cost-benefit calculations” (ibid). For example, as stated by a Romanian diplomat, “before 2007 we learned regulations, procedures and the acquis, with an accent on acquis; after 2007 we learned regulations, procedures, acquis and responsibility, with an accent on regulations and procedures” (cited in Popescu, 2010, pp.56-57). That is to say, the social learning is more likely to occur together with the EU membership. Therefore, it is hard to understand candidate states decision-making logic through socialization, because socialization takes long time which candidate states are not fully able to act according to logic of appropriateness; so, strategic interest-based behaviour is more likely for them (Goetz: 2005, p.262). In this context, ‘thin learning’ is a rational choice mechanism “which correponds to an interest-driven and strategic reorientation of policy practices without changing their core features in order to accommodate EU-imposed policy rules” (Dabrowski, 2011, p.4). This kind of learning occurs when an actor “learns how to cope

with a problem without changing preferences” (Radaelli, 2008, p.244). Actors readjust their strategies according to the new requirements in order to allow them to achieve their unchanged goals (Radaelli, 2003, p.38; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006, p.4).

The ‘lesson drawing’ is an important form of learning, but in addition, learning involve updating of new skills and procedures, or change of beliefs over time as a result of experience; therefore, it should not be equated with lesson drawing (Levy, 1994, p.287). The lesson drawing occurs when there is a domestic dissatisfaction with the status quo (Rose, 1991a, p.10) without any EU incentives or persuasion (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.668). In such situations, on the one hand, policy makers scan programmes in effect elsewhere and interpret them with the “prospective evaluation of what would happen if a programme already in effect elsewhere were transferred here in future” (Rose, 1991a, p.3). In this context, policy-makers review and compare EU’s rules in operation elsewhere, if they believe that those rules resolve dissatisfied situation at home then they may intend to adopt; in short, “a state adopts EU rules, if it expects these rules to solve domestic policy problems effectively.” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.668). On the other hand, policy makers constantly draw the lessons from their own past (Rose, 1991b, p.1; Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996). When they begin searching for lessons, their own country’s past is a productive field to be scanned (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996, p.351). By searching the past, policy makers “learn not only what has worked but can learn what not to repeat” (ibid).

In sum, except of few cases the applicant/candidate states are downloaders of the EU institutions and policies (Sedelmeier, 2011, p.6; Goetz and Dyson, 2003, p.2; Vachudova, 2005; Grabbe, 2002; Heritier, 2005). Therefore, this thesis adopts top-down dimension of Europeanization. The top-down relationship between the EU and candidate states undermines candidate states’ autonomy over their legislation (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009, p.797). Because, the ultimate reward (membership) depends on the adoption and implementation of the EU rules and regulations into the national legislation system (Kirişci, 2007). Thus, this thesis accepts the definition of Europeanization as “the adoption of EU rules in non-member states” which includes “the transposition of EU legislation into domestic law, the restructuring of domestic

institutions according to EU rules, or the change of domestic political practices according to EU standards” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.662). In the political aspect of the foreign policy area, the adoption of EU rules and policies can be considered to be alignment to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Because, in such a top-down relationship, the candidate states are expected to transform their foreign policies in line with the CFSP since the CFSP Chapter of community acquis invite candidate states for “full compliance” (Hisarlıoğlu, 2015, p.71).

In the case of the theoretical approach, the RCI and SI are not mutually “exclusive” (March and Olsen, 1998, p.952). So, this thesis does not deny the SI, but it has to make its justification since its theoretical perspective is the RCI. In this context, the socialization requires “frequent as well as dense contacts” between the EU and the external actor (Schimmelfennig, 2012, p.8), so it takes long time in which candidate states are not fully able to act according to logic of appropriateness; for this reason, strategic interest-based behaviour, namely ‘logic of consequences’ is more likely for candidate and potential candidate states (Goetz: 2005, p.262; Börzel and Soyaltın, 2012, p.10). Moreover, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) committed EU accession strategically in its 2007 and 2011 election manifestos (Balkır and Eylemer, 2016). So, the ‘logic of consequences’ is eligible to be applied on Turkey. Consequently, this thesis evaluates its case from the theoretical lens of the Rational choice institutionalism the main conjecture of which is the logic of consequences.

In the framework of the external incentives, this thesis uses the ‘conditionality’ as a causal mechanism to explain Europeanization process of Turkish foreign policy towards Syria. Accordingly, the EU follows a strategy of conditionality “in which the EU sets its rules as conditions that the [candidate states] have to fulfil in order to receive EU rewards” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.663). The conditionality mechanism is conducted into the hierarchical top-down relationship between the EU and the applicant/candidate states, but this does not mean that candidate states have entirely passive role. Because when they encounter with the adaptation of EU rules they guard cost-benefit balance; namely they are rational actors who are the strategic utility-maximizers that are concerning the maximization of their own power and welfare (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.663). In this context, outcomes of their cost-

benefit balance/calculation depends on the ‘determinacy of conditions’, ‘size and speed of rewards’, ‘size of adoption costs’ and ‘credibility of conditionality’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). But the effectiveness of the conditionality is more related to the ‘credibility of conditionality’ and ‘size of adoption costs’ (ibid, p.663). Because, even the reward is sizeable like ultimate membership, which is the most effective one, the promise of reward must be credible (Kirişci, 2007, p.7). The importance of the size of adoption costs varies according to the context of conditionality.¹² In the context of the *acquis* conditionality, the size of adoption costs can be characterized by the promise of reward, even the reward is eventual membership (Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004, p.432). Namely, if promise of reward is not credible, the credibility of conditionality decreases and adoption costs increases; because credibility of conditionality influences the cost-benefit calculation of policy-makers who are responsible for calculating governmental adoption costs (Kirişci, 2007, p.2; Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004, pp.432-3). At this point, it is plausible to focus on ‘credibility of conditionality’ as an important determinative factor for the adoption of EU rules, policies and practices. In this context, two connections of the credibility of conditionality enables this thesis to do better evaluation on its case. Firstly, in some extent, the degree of credibility of conditionality can be measured by the ‘credible conditionality trilogy’ which consists of the ‘EU’s commitment’, ‘member states’ commitments’ and ‘coherent implementation of conditionality’. Secondly, prospect for the EU membership may facilitate the adoption of EU rules, policies and practices but it depends on the degree of credibility of conditionality. Therefore, it is hard to claim high presence of prospect in the absence of credible conditionality.

Finally, candidate states may adopt EU rules, policies or practices as a result of the logic of consequences even in the situation of low rate or lack of credible conditionality. Through the *pulling*, they may try to pull the EU to improve their accession by adopting EU rules, policies or practices. The strategic governmental commitment for the EU

¹² “In the context of democratic conditionality, domestic adoption costs severely limited the effectiveness of EU conditionality – even when it was credible and rewards were sizeable. Authoritarian governments turned down the offer of membership rather than accept the political power costs of adopting liberal democratic rules. By contrast, in the context of *acquis* conditionality, variation in the size of domestic adoption costs only accounted for the speed of rule transfer but did not matter systematically for its effectiveness” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.663). Democratic conditionality is a subset of the political conditionality which is explained under the title of ‘Europeanization of Candidate States’ Foreign Policy’.

accession and low adoption costs are the important traces to find out the pulling. In addition, in the foreign policy area, the high general alignment rate to the EU's statements and decisions increases the likelihood presence of the *pulling*. Thus, EU's conditionality mechanism can be enabled by the mediating mechanism which is called here as the *pulling*. For example, even though the 'credibility of conditionality' began to decrease in Turkey as of the end of 2004 (Kubicek, 2011, p.922; Açıkmüşe, 2010, p.145; Öniş, 2015, p.34; Yılmaz, 2016a; Boşnak, 2016, p.84; Börzel and Soyaltın, 2012; Öner, 2014; Sipahioğlu, 2017, p.56), the country aligned itself with the CSFP *acquis* in the situation of low adoption costs whilst retained its commitment strategically for the EU accession.¹³ Lastly, in the situations of low rate or lack of credible conditionality and high adoption costs, if candidate states have enough power to use as a bargaining chip vis-a-vis the EU and if they have desire for the EU membership then they may try to push EU to improve their accession (namely to reduce adoption costs) by actively bargaining. In the end, if the pushing being managed to obtain 'credible conditionality' then 'credible conditionality' and 'prospect for the EU membership' may enable the transformative role of EU's conditionality on targeted candidate state. For example, after 2010, in the situation of the low rate or lack of credible conditionality and high adoption costs, Turkey attempted to bargain with the EU on the Syrian refugee crisis and on the implementation of the restrictive measures against the Syrian regime. The country pushed the EU to obtain credible conditionality, to raise the size of reward and to open new chapters in order to reduce adoption costs. In the end, through the pushing version of the improvement of accession, Turkey obtained 'credible conditionality' that provided Turkey with 'prospect for the EU membership'. Thus, 'credible conditionality' and 'prospect for the EU membership' enabled the transformative role of EU's conditionality on Turkish foreign policy towards Syria in the cases of the imposition of restrictive measures on Syria and the implementation of Readmission Agreement. Lastly, Both pulling and pushing stem from the *desire* for the EU membership not from the prospect. Because, its hard to claim presence of high prospect in the absence of credible conditionality.

¹³ Decline of the 'credibility of conditionality' is due to decline of the EU's and member states' commitment and lowered consistency in the EU's implementation of conditionality (Saatçioğlu, 2011; Öniş, 2008).

CHAPTER II

EUROPEANIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

The main purpose of this chapter is to present Turkish foreign policy in the framework of the Europeanization concept. In this context, at the first stage, Europeanization of member states foreign policy will be evaluated within the context of the Sociological Institutionalism (SI) and Rational-Choice Institutionalism (RCI) separately in order to understand what are the things that influence member states's preferences before they decide on a specific foreign policy choice. Since the theoretical perspective of this thesis is the RCI, the Europeanization of candidate states will be explained with an emphasis on logic of consequences while not fully excluding the logic of appropriateness. That is to say, some examples will be given within the context of the SI as well. At the second stage, Europeanization of Turkish domestic policy will be introduced in the context of the EU's conditionality before entering into the foreign policy area. Also, the facilitator role of the 'credible conditionality' and 'prospect for the EU membership' in the adoption process of the EU induced reforms into the Turkish domestic policy, between 1999 and 2005, will be pointed out. In the same context, Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy will be introduced until the end of 2004. As the 'credibility of conditionality' and 'prospect for the EU membership' began to decrease in Turkey with the end of 2004, 'desire for the EU membership' as a facilitating factor and the *pulling* version of the improvement of accession as the mediating mechanism which enabled the transformative role of EU's conditionality on Turkish policy towards its immediate region and neighbors will be put forward in order explain Turkey's alignments to CFSP.

2.1 EUROPEANIZATION OF MEMBER STATES' FOREIGN POLICY

The usage of Europeanization term as a process of domestic adaptation in foreign policy has increased with the growing importance of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the late 1980s, and especially with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) after 1991 Maastricht Treaty (Featherstone, 2003, p.10). In the area of the CFSP, “member states have a choice in whether they pursue foreign policy through the EU, through other international institutions, or whether they rely on bilateral channels or even unilateral moves in pursuit of their national interests” (Gross, 2009, p.XII). Because, in the CFSP structure, the decisions are taken unanimously by the member states rather than by specialized representatives (Major, 2005, p.182; Moumoutzis, 2011, p.613). That is to say, member states have veto right against the policies which they do not want to implement. Therefore, the CFSP maintains its intergovernmental structure since the member states have continued to be main actors (Major, 2005, p.183). In the context of Europeanization, this case generates some challenges to apply Europeanization in the foreign policy area. Because, the EU induced changes at the national level, namely Europeanization, are not as clearly detectable in the second pillar, which concerns with the CFSP, as in the first pillar which has supranational character (Major, 2005, p.183).¹⁴ Fortunately, it does not mean we must exclude Europeanization from foreign policy area, because Europeanization has observable effects over the foreign policy area as well. At this stage, Europeanization of foreign policy will be examined through the Sociological and Rational Choice institutionalism, as well as in terms of the dimensions of top-down, bottom-up and cross-loading Europeanization.

¹⁴ The 1992 Maastricht Treaty renewed the European Union under a single body of “three pillars”. The first pillar also known as the European Communities pillar in which the European Community (EC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, which does not exist any more since July 2002) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EUROATOM) were placed. Issues related to customs union, single market, common agricultural policy, economic and monetary union, social and environmental policies were handled in the first pillar -it was the only pillar with supranational character. The second pillar concerns with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which was established upon the European Political Cooperation (EPC). The third pillar concerns with the Justice and Home Affairs such as the Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters. The pillars were abandoned on 1 December 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, as the EU obtained a consolidated legal personality.

2.1.2 Sociological Institutionalism (SI) and Europeanization of Foreign Policy

In the field of CFSP, “ you can always say no. And if you are really serious about your no, nobody can stop you from blocking it. But this is rarely seen”, stated by a national diplomat (cited in Juncos and Pomorska, 2011, p.1105). The answer of ‘why representatives of member states avoid to say no’ could be reached through the SI. To be more specific, although there is a lack of mechanisms that could enforce member states to comply with EU’s foreign policy positions, national foreign policymakers incorporate EU’s norms, practices and procedures through EU level interactions (Moumoutzis, 2011, pp.614-5), which entails the processes of socialization (Smith, 2004; Wong, 2017; Bulmer and Radaelli, 2004, p.7; Moumoutzis, 2011, p.615). Here, the socialization occurs in the dynamic interactions between the EU officials and bureaucrats of the member states (Ladrech, 2010, p.198). During these interactions, national foreign policy makers internalize EU behavioural rules, and then they begin to think foreign policy issues with these internalized rules (Moumoutzis, 2011, p.615). At this point, Socialization matters because it induces a certain level of trust and devotion among elites and decision makers to a common enterprise (Smith, 2000, p.617).

In this context, ‘elite socialization’ is an important process since it facilitates domestic adaptation to foreign policy cooperation. Accordingly, through CFSP’s club atmosphere and prolonged participation to the CFSP, the decision makers and lower-level (who prepare the decisions and communicate with their EU partners) elites get closer with each other’s foreign policy positions and they learn that national foreign policy is strengthened by political cooperation, not weakened (Smith, 2000, p.619). Therefore, member states’ representatives become enthusiastic to coordinate their policy actions, to share information, to consult other national delegations, etc., in short to comply with common procedural norms (Müller and Flers, 2010; Juncos and Pomorska, 2011). Thus, compliance is achieved through embedded norms and practices rather than a bargaining process (Smith, 2000; 2004). According to a survey, the majority of respondents (83.9% percent) from the CFSP Council working groups showed that they consulted other national delegations prior to formal meetings ‘always’ or ‘most of the time’ (Juncos and Pomorska, 2011, p.1105). This finding verifies Smith’s argument that national diplomats adopt consultation and information-sharing norms before a decision has been taken (Smith,

2004, p.122; 2000, pp.615-6; Juncos and Pomorska, 2011, p.1105). Besides, 96.4% percent of the respondents stated that consensus-building (as a common norm) is the predominant behaviour in CFSP negotiations rather than hard bargaining (Juncos and Pomorska, 2011, p.1105). In sum, socialization is an important facilitator to reach foreign policy cooperation, so what about the real source of the socialization of European foreign policy?

Firstly, the source of the socialization is mostly attributed to the Brussels based committees which have ability to shape actor's interests and identity (Lewis, 2005; Juncos and Reynolds, 2007; Cross, 2010). For example, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) plays a key role in Brussels-level information gathering, consultation, cooperation and consensual decision-making (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007). In the PSC structure, informal norms and rules are considered by member states and routine interactions facilitate cognitive processes such as socialization and learning; thus, such a structure can shape not only actors' strategies but also lead, in the long term, to a reconstitution of actors' preferences and identities (ibid).

Secondly, the source of the socialization can be attributed to the 'problem-solving norms' which "have built trust among EU states and have created a climate conducive to the forging of common positions on a number of difficult issues" (Smith, 2000, p.617). The problem-solving norms encourages EU member states to reorient themselves toward a 'problem-solving' as opposed to bargaining model decision-making (Smith, 2000, p.615). These problem-solving norms have built trust among EU states for the common foreign policy positions on a number of difficult issues, and these common positions are used as reference points by EU member states in future situations; thus, such political cooperation working methods creates a "feedback effects into European domestic politics which help to reinforce the system in the absence of sustained central leadership by EC organizations" (Smith, 2000, p.617).

Thirdly, other than above mentioned approaches, socialization of European foreign policy can be attributed to 'cross-loading' transfers. Accordingly, "Europeanization in foreign and security policy operates through a voluntary horizontal (cross-loading) process of change. It appears as a learning process about good policy practice, but the EU's role is limited with "offering a forum for discussion and platform for policy transfer" (Major and

Pomorska, 2005, p.3). The cross loading covers the idea that the EU offers the arena for change, it also deals with “where domestic change might not only be generated at the EU level but might come indirectly through the transfer of ideas, norms and ways of doing things that are exchanged from and with European neighbours, domestic entities or policy areas.” (Major, 2005, p.186). Therefore, “EU being the frame for change rather than its origin” (Major and Pomorska, 2005, p.3). Wong expresses cross loading dimension of the socialization of the European foreign policy as “a way of blending the national and federal impulses to create a transnational and culturally integrated Europe” and conceptualized it under the ‘identity reconstruction’ which leads to the emergence of shared norms and values among policymaking elites in relation to international politics (Wong, 2017, p.147-51).

2.1.3 Rational-Choice Institutionalism and Europeanization of Foreign Policy

Member states tend use the Union as a shield for their national policy preferences (Tonra, 2015, p.185; Wong and Hill, 2011). In this way, individual member states try to increase their international influence through EU since the Union has a strong presence in the world (Wong, 2017, p.155). Thus, the projection/uploading of national policies becomes more attractive when member states cannot attain their goals through unilateral action, or when they wish to externalize national problems to EU level (Müller and Flers, 2010; Pomorska 2007; Tonra, 2013, p.5). In this context, foreign policy cooperation is perceived “as an important instrument that allows Member States to pursue their national interests more effectively” (Müller and Flers 2010). For example, in 1982, the UK successfully Europeanized its sanctions against Argentina during the Falklands conflict; and in 2004-5 France and Germany was seeking to Europeanize their national preferences in order to increase political dialogue with China and to end the arms embargo imposed since 1989 (Wong, 2017). These examples may partially verify the arguments that European foreign policy making is dominated by the ‘big three’ of France, Britain, and Germany (Lefne, 2012), or larger member states portray a ‘shaper’ role rather than ‘taker’ in European foreign policy making processes (Gross, 2009; Miskimmon, 2007). But it is not completely true. For example, Poland was successful in uploading its energy import policy preferences on to the EU in order to encourage member states to gain a common

position against energy dependence on Russia (Roth, 2011). Likewise, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden played important roles in shaping the humanitarian dimension of the ESDP. They successfully uploaded their proposal even if the UK was against it (Jakobsen, 2009).

From the downloading perspective of Europeanization, member states may strategically participate in common policies to advance their interests (Checkel, 2005a; Schimmelfennig and Thomas, 2009; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006). In the context of CFSP, it can be expected that “adaptation follows a strategic calculus; actors may adapt to EU policies and positions because they are willing to trade the losses of one round of negotiations against the higher benefits of a subsequent round, gained by accomplishing a cooperative reputation” (Müller and Flers, 2010). Strategic adoption may stem from different strategic reasons. For example, Juncos and Pomorska (2006, pp.10-1) revealed how national bureaucrats follow the code of conduct during their interactions with their counterparts in order to achieve their goals, not because “it is the right thing to do”. Accordingly, the national representatives in the Council Working Groups try to be constructive in the discussions in order to gain legitimacy and credibility which can provide them strong position, and make their voices heard in the negotiations (Juncos and Pomorska, 2006, p.11). In a sense, member states may contribute to the foreign policy cooperation at the EU level but at the same time they seek for a chance to upload their foreign policy preferences (Tsardinidis and Stavridis, 2005). Another example is Greece’s support for Turkey’s EU membership in 1999, based on a rational choice model that Turkey’s deepening relation with the EU will serve best for Greece’s security interests (Economides, 2005; Agnantopoulos, 2013). It should be kept in mind, member states retain their veto rights over the whole realm of foreign, security and defence policy; therefore, they intend to only adopt policies which they see to be in their strategic interest (Tonra, 2015).

Finally, foreign policy transfers may be conducted through cross-loading interactions based on strategic interest. For example, France’s trade and investment relations with China were copied from the ‘German model’ through learning and voluntary emulative transfer; France wanted to benefit from this model since it provided Germany with great export success in China (Flers and Müller, 2012, p.30). Likewise, British and Dutch’s policies,

which aimed to attract Japanese foreign direct investment in the 1980s, was emulated by other EU member states (Wong, 2017, p.159).

2.2 EUROPEANIZATION OF CANDIDATE STATES' FOREIGN POLICY

As stated above, there is a hierarchical top-down relationship between the EU and the applicant/candidate states that reflects a power asymmetry; therefore, the applicant/candidate states are downloaders of the EU institutions and policies and they have very weak capacity to upload their preferences to the EU level (Sedelmeier, 2011, p.6; Goetz and Dyson, 2003, p.2; Vachudova, 2005 ; Grabbe, 2002; Heritier, 2005). As stated above again, in the process of this top-down relationship, the EU mainly follows a strategy of conditionality “in which the EU sets its rules as conditions that the [candidate states] have to fulfil in order to receive EU rewards”, or in some cases candidate states adopt EU's rule as these rules are appropriate for them (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). In this context, the EU's conditionality strategy is conducted in two forms as ‘political conditionality’ and ‘acquis conditionality’.

Political conditionality used by the EU to promote fundamental rules, such as human rights, liberal democracy and the rule of law which are based on the 1993 Copenhagen criteria (Tocci, 2007; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005).¹⁵ These fundamental rules not only transform national domestic politics but also affect candidate countries' relations with their neighbors for the solution of disputes and peaceful resolution of any conflicts (Hisarlioğlu, 2015, p.73). In fact, the Agenda 2000¹⁶, the Helsinki Presidency

¹⁵ In 1993, at the Copenhagen European Council, member states have set conditions for candidate countries in order to apply a coherent enlargement strategy (Djordjevic, 2008, p.81). These conditions are known as accession criteria, or Copenhagen criteria which consists of (1) “political criteria: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”; (2) “economic criteria: a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and market forces”; (3) “administrative and institutional capacity to effectively implement the acquis and ability to take on the obligations of membership”.

¹⁶ The Agenda 2000 was released in July 1997 by the European Commission to evaluate Candidate and potential candidate states progress in terms of economic, political criteria and the countries' ability to implement the acquis. The Agenda 2000 clearly emphasized that “before accession, applicants should make every effort to resolve any outstanding border dispute among themselves or involving third countries”.

Conclusions in 1999¹⁷ and the Constitutional Treaty (Treaty of Lisbon)¹⁸ emphasized EU's fundamental rules which call candidate states to improve relations with their neighbors and to peaceful resolution of the conflicts (Tocci, 2007; Hisarlıoğlu, 2015, p.73). Thus, although the EU has not formally stated that the resolution of disputes within the candidates' neighbourhood is a political criteria (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007, p.268), the Union has correlated political conditionality with the peaceful resolution of disputes (Hisarlıoğlu, 2015, p.73). According to Aydın and Açıkmeşe (2007, p.269), "this type of conditionality deriving from EU values and incrementally introduced into progress reports could be labelled as conditionality through de facto political criteria". For example, Turkey's dispute with Greece and Cyprus being handled under the title of 'Political Criteria' in the progress reports for Turkey (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007).¹⁹ Likewise, Croatia's problematic relation with Slovenia; the controversy between Romania and Hungary, deriving from Hungarian ethnic minority rights in Romania; Serbia's controversy with Kosovo; and Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro's relations with neighboring countries was/have been monitored and evaluated under same title.²⁰

¹⁷ According to fourth paragraph of the Helsinki Presidency Conclusions in 1999, the candidate states "must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues."

¹⁸ Likewise, the related fundamental rules also emphasized in Article 21 of the Constitutional Treaty. Accordingly, the Union strains to work for cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to, "consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law; preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders".

¹⁹ Greece and Turkey had come to the brink of war on numerous occasions until 1999 (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007). In 1995, Turkey threatened Greece with war in order to deter any action of Greece that may have expand its coastal waters from six to 12 miles in the Aegean; and again in 1996, the two countries came to brink of war over islets in the Aegean Sea (Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, 2010:414). In the case of Cyprus, In 1974, the Greek military junta in Athens attempted to install pro-enosis Nicos Sampson as president. However, this attempt was resisted by Turkey in accordance with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee; on 20 July and 14 August 1974, Turkey landed troops in Cyprus and occupied the northern part (about %36 of the island); in 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared independence under the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Uluğ-Eryılmaz, 2015:163-4). in 2004 United Nations' unification plan (Annan Plan) rejected by Greek Cypriots (75.83% against) while Turkish Cypriots approved it by a clear majority (64.91% in favour): Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Cyprus Issue (summary)', *Official website*, viewed 25 July 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-issue-summary_en.mfa.

²⁰ As the boundaries of the republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) had not been drawn legally, these two of Yugoslavia's successor states have disagreement over territory in Piran Bay and the Gulf of Trieste, since their independence declaration in 1991 (Bickl, 2017, pp.7-8); Please see

However, this does not mean such kind of conditionality deriving from EU values must be evaluated under the title of Political criteria, rather the issues related to peaceful resolution of the conflicts were also evaluated under the CFSP chapter in some cases, that is to say, evaluated through the CFSP *acquis* (Aydın and Açıkmеше, 2007, p.268). For example, Slovenia's problematic relation with Croatia, deriving from border demarcation, was monitored and evaluated mostly under the CFSP chapter²¹. Likewise, Turkey relations with its Eastern and Southern neighbors (such as Armenia, Syria, Iraq) are monitored and evaluated under same chapter since 1998.²² In such top-down process, the candidate states are expected to transform their foreign policies in line with the CFSP since the CFSP Chapter of community *acquis* invite candidate states for "full compliance" (Hisarlıođlu, 2015, p.71).²³ The evaluation of target candidate state's foreign policy made in given candidate state's regular progress Reports; thus the Commission retains its control over candidate states by monitoring and regular assessment mechanisms; besides, the Commission's recommendations act as effective leverage to affect institutional and policy change (Ladrech, 2010, p.203; Hisarlıođlu, 2015, p.72; Uluđ-Eryılmaz, 2015, p.273).

The nuts and bolts, either in the form of the Political or *Acquis*, through the conditionality the EU has pressed candidate states to shape their international relations especially with their neighbours. As indicated above, the Commission regularly evaluated Croatia's

progress reports for Croatia, from 2005 until 2012. In the case of Kosovo, on 17 February 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence on 17 February 2008. Except of Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain, EU states recognised Kosovo independence while Serbia initiated an active campaign to defend its territorial claim over Kosovo and established an extensive lobbying effort to prevent Kosovo's recognition by other states (Economides and Ker-Lindsay, 2015). Also please see progress reports for Serbia from 2009 until nowadays; See progress reports for Montenegro from 2012 until nowadays; See the 1999, 2001, 2002 progress reports for Romania ;See progress reports for former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia from 2005 until nowadays; See progress reports for Albania from 2010 until nowadays; See progress reports for Montenegro from 2012 until nowadays; See 1998,1999,2001 progress reports for Slovenia; See progress reports for Turkey from 1998 until nowadays.

²¹ Please see the 1998, 1999 and 2001 progress reports for Slovenia.

²² Please see the progress reports for Turkey from 1998 until nowadays.

²³ According to CFSP Chapter of community *acquis*, "The common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the European security and defence policy (ESDP) are based on legal acts, including legally binding international agreements, and on political documents. The *acquis* consists of political declarations, actions and agreements. Member States must be able to conduct political dialogue in the framework of CFSP, to align with EU statements, to take part in EU actions and to apply agreed sanctions and restrictive measures. Applicant countries are required to progressively align with EU statements, and to apply sanctions and restrictive measures when and where required".

dispute with Slovenia, Serbia's with Kosova and Turkey's with Cyprus in their annual progress reports to change these countries' (Croatia, Serbia and Turkey) attitudes towards their neighbours. As a result, the EU has achieved some success through the conditionality by offering them Candidacy or Membership reward. For example, in the case of Croatia, the country has committed to working closely with Slovenia to resolve their border dispute in response to Brussels' demands to act as a peaceful regional leader and Slovenia's vote against the Croatian accession process (Johnson, 2014, p.16). With the following border deal, the main obstacle was removed for Croatia's entry to the EU; thus, Croatia adopted a constructive position for the peaceful resolution of disputes in order to obtain ultimate reward that EU membership (Johnson, 2014, pp.15-6; Kyris, 2013, p.8). Likewise, opening accession negotiations and ultimately EU membership provided enough incentive for the Serbian political elites to soften its relation with Kosovo and to start a process of normalization of relations (Economides and Ker-Lindsay, 2015). In the same context, it is hard to understand transformation of Turkey's relation with Greece and her Cyprus initiative without EU's incentive to opening accession negotiations and ultimately EU membership (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007). That is to say, the EU's incentive (promise for EU membership) seems to be a driving force to adopt EU's rules and norms in these countries. From this point of view, it is hard to understand their decision-making logic through socialization. Because, as underlined above several times, socialization requires "frequent as well as dense contacts" between the EU and external actor (Schimmelfennig, 2012, p.8), so it takes a long time in which candidate states are not fully able to act according to logic of appropriateness (Goetz: 2005, p.262; Börzel and Soyaltın, 2012, p.10). However, this does not mean that socialization has no operability in the studies of Europeanization of candidate states. In some cases, the intense relations/interactions between a candidate state and the EU may trigger a slow process of socialization even before the EU membership. For example, when Poland became an active observer to the EU in 2003, its diplomats were allowed to attend meetings inside the Council. As a result of these pre-accession participations, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its diplomats began to change slowly in organizational structure, institutional culture and everyday practices (Pomorska, 2007) . Likewise, Hungary and Slovakia have experienced similiar socialization process when they were observer in the Council's meetings for one year, between April 2003 and May 2004 (Denca, 2009,

pp.13). An another example from the SI, the EU's adaptational pressure, which aimed to include Slovenia and Latvia into the foreign-aid policy, resulted in positive way as these countries were under 'peer pressure' or social influence, which stemmed from the EU candidacy, to adjust EU's norms (Henriksson, 2015).

2.3 EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

"It is no longer possible to think of the EU and Turkey independent of one another when considering Turkey's foreign policy" stated by the then Foreign minister of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoğlu.²⁴

The westernization process of Turkey dates back to the Ottoman modernization movement of the 19th century (Açıkmeşe, 2010, p.138; Oğuz, 2015, p.126). With the 1839 rescript of Gülhane (Tanzimat Fermanı), Western legal ideas such as ensuring the security of life and property for all citizens, justice in taxation, transferring the powers of the sultan to the parliament were accepted in accordance with the Westernization (Akça and Hülür, 2006). After a short time, the 1856 Islahat Imperial Edict (Islahat Fermanı), which endowed the non-Muslims same rights as the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire, was enacted in order to obviate inequalities between the non-Muslims and Muslims living in Ottoman Empire's territory (Oğuz, 2015, p.126).

The westernization of Turkey was continued during and after the creation of the new modern Turkey Republic. The formation of the new Republic was based on Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's principles which are considered to be a project of westernization, secularization and modernization (Oran, 2018, p.22). In this context, various reforms were adopted in order to create a modern European state (Müftüler-Baç, 2005, p.17). For example, the Arabic alphabet was abolished and replaced with the Latin alphabet in 1928, the Penal Code was adopted in 1926 which is based on the 1889 Italian Criminal Code, the Execution and Bankruptcy Code was adopted in 1929 which based on 1889 Swiss Federal Code, the Commercial Code was transferred from Germany, Italy and France,

²⁴ Davutoğlu, A. 2010 'Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy', *Foreign Policy magazine (USA)*, 20 May, viewed 20 December 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/article-by-h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu-published-in-foreign-policy-magazine-usa-on-20-may-2010.en.mfa.

and so on (Vardar, 2014). In the period of post World War II, having membership in European affiliated organizations has been interpreted as a necessary for the westernization (Öniş, 2003a, p.17). In this context, Turkey has retained its European stance by participating in various European organizations, such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation in 1948, the Council of Europe in 1949 and the NATO in 1952 (Açıkmeşe, 2010, p.138; Müftüler-Baç, 2005, p.19).

In 1959, Turkey applied for European Economic Community (EEC) and in 1963 the country became an Associate member of the European Communities (EC) (Müftüler-Baç, 2005, p.19). With the 1963 Ankara Agreement both Turkey and the EEC were committed to establish customs unions step by step (ibid). Although the 1971 and 1980 military coups in Turkey and the 1974 Turkish military intervention in Cyprus brought tension to relations, Turkey has not abandoned its European pathway (Narbone and Tocci, 2007, p.234). In 1987, Turkey applied for full membership but the application was rejected by the European Commission in 1989, partly because Turkey was considered insufficient in terms of democratic conditions (Tocci, 2014, p.2) and partly because the 1989 Commission's Opinion on Turkey's application recommended the completion of transitional period of Turkey's association for the formation of customs union rather than opening accession negotiations (Müftüler-Baç, 2005, p.20; Kirişci, 2004, p.88). Nevertheless, the country's application was considered as "eligible" for full EU membership instead of being completely rejected (Tocci, 2014, p.2). In 1995, as foreseen in the Association Agreement of 1963, the Customs Union agreement which finalized the transitional period of Turkey's association, was signed between Turkey and the EU (Müftüler-Baç, 2005, p.20) and subsequently came into force in 1996 (Kirişci, 2004, p.88). But the accession process did not begin immediately after the Customs Union agreement, instead the 1997 Luxemburg summit underlined that Turkey still did not meet the standards for EU candidacy but maintained Turkey's eligibility for EU membership (Tocci, 2014, p.2). In addition, although a candidate status was not given to Turkey at that time, the European Commission begun to prepare progress reports for Turkey in 1998. Since then, the EU has been keeping Turkey under its observation in order to evaluate Turkey's advancement relating to the standards for EU candidacy and membership (Müftüler-Baç, 2005, p.20; Tocci, 2014, p.2). Finally, at the Helsinki summit

of December 1999, the European Council decided to give candidate status to Turkey. However, in order to open accession talks, Turkey had to make progress on the Copenhagen criteria especially on minority rights, political and civic freedoms, abolishment of the death penalty and torture, and move the army away from the policy making process (Kubicek, 2005, p.365). In the wake of the Helsinki summit, Turkey began to carry out major reforms from freedom of expression to abolition of the death penalty. Some authors highlighted the facilitator role of the Turkish military in this reform process (Heper, 2005a; 2011; Sarigil, 2007). The role of civil society actors in this reform process was highlighted as well (Öniş, 2003a; Göksel and Güneş, 2005; Tocci, 2005; Kubicek, 2005; 2011; Açıkmeşe, 2010). Some authors interpreted this reform process as an instrument, which used by the Justice and Development Party (JDP), to please the pro-EU Turkish electorate and to weaken its secular opposition - the military and high court (Saatçioğlu, 2010; Zaras, 2013). In the same vein, Günay and Dzihic suggested that the JDP used Europeanization as an apparatus to consolidate their influence over the state (2016). Finally, like Schimmelfennig et al. (2003), many authors attempted to explain the changes through EU's 'conditionality' mechanism (Müftüler-Baç, 2005; Narbone and Tocci, 2007, p.240; Açıkmeşe, 2010; 2013; Kubicek, 2005; 2011; Yılmaz, 2016a, p.90).

In line with the conditionality logic, "the EU has used the membership carrot to put pressure on Turkey" to induce reforms (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003, p.507). In this context, after the 1999 Helsinki summit Turkey has carried out various reforms in order to meet Copenhagen criteria; that is to say, in order to be a member of the EU (Kubicek, 2005; Öniş, 2003a; 2009; Müftüler-Baç, 2005; Kirişci, 2004; Açıkmeşe, 2010). To have candidate status, on 3 October 2001, an immense Constitutional package with 34 amendments which include extension of the freedom of expression; in November 2001, a new Civil Code which attempt to provide gender equality in marriage; on 2 August 2002, a new package which abolished the death penalty and revised the Anti-Terror Law and released broadcasting and education in languages other than Turkish; in January 2003, a new package which revised the Penal Code for torture; in July 2003, a new package which changed the composition of the National Security Council (NSC) and strengthened the civilians in its body; on 7 May 2004, a new constitutional reform package which made ten major amendments to give constitutional assurance on freedom

of the press and to abolish the State Security Courts and to repeal the selection of one member of the Higher Education Council (YÖK) by the General Staff and to abolish and replace death penalty with aggravated life sentence were adopted by Turkish governments (Müftüler-Baç, 2005; Kubicek, 2011). In sum, the reforms which were made until the end of 2004, intensely concentrated on “freedom of expression and association (including for Kurds), elimination of torture, curtailing rights of the military, and abolition of the death penalty” as demanded by the EU and its Copenhagen Criteria (Kubicek, 2011, p.915). As a result, at that time, the ‘conditionality’ mechanism was implemented successfully by the EU in order to push Turkey to the reforms (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003, pp.508-9; Narbone and Tocci, 2007, p.240; Açıkmeşe, 2010; Kubicek,2011; Yılmaz, 2016a, p.90).

At this point, ‘the credible EU conditionality’ was pointed out as an important facilitating factor for the reform process of Turkey from 1999 until 2005 (Tocci, 2005; Terzi, 2008; Saatçioğlu, 2011; Kubicek, 2011; Öner, 2014; Yılmaz, 2016a). However, most of the authors preferred to use ‘the prospect of the EU membership’ term, in order to show its facilitator role in this reform process (Kubicek, 2005; Açıkmeşe, 2010; 2013; Göksel and Güneş, 2005; Kirişçi, 2004; 2011; Müftüler-Baç, 2005; Öniş, 2003b; 2015; Tocci, 2014). But there is no clear explanation over its ties with the conditionality. In fact, when the ‘credibility of the EU conditionality’ began to decline in Turkey at the end of 2004 (Kubicek, 2011, p.922; Açıkmeşe, 2010, p.145; Öniş, 2015, p.34; Yılmaz, 2016a; Boşnak, 2016, p.84; Börzel and Soyaltın, 2012; Öner, 2014; Sipahioğlu, 2017, p.56), Turkey’s EU membership prospect declined (Günay and Dzihic, 2016, p.532; Öner, 2014, p.26; Öniş, 2015, p.23; Tocci, 2014, p.5). According to Kubicek (2005, p.364), in line with the RCI, the ‘logic of consequences’ reflects the demands of conditionality: “Do X to get Y. In the case of the EU, the Y could be aid or trade benefits, but the evidence suggests that it is the prospect of membership that acts as a real catalyst to spur political change. There is no assumption that values or core beliefs of previously ‘reluctant democrats’ will immediately change”. In that case, the prospect of membership bases on logic of consequences, because it emerges as the Y is not aid nor trade benefits but it is the ‘promise for the EU membership’ which is the most effective reward offered by the EU. The promise for the EU membership is not enough alone, it must be credible as well

(Kirişci, 2007, p.7). Namely, the candidate states must be convinced about the rewards that they will receive when they fulfill the EU's demands (Sedelmeier, 2011, p.12). Therefore, the degree of the prospect of the EU membership is closely related to the 'credibility of the conditionality'. If the indicators point credible conditionality then we can say that there is prospect for the EU membership. After the 1999 Helsinki summit, EU's and member states' commitment and consistency in the EU's implementation of conditionality provided Turkey credible conditionality (Saatçioğlu, 2011; Öniş, 2008). At this stage, the 'credible conditionality trilogy' will be applied to measure the degree of the credibility of conditionality.

With the 1999 Helsinki summit the EU had committed to Turkey's accession rather than confirming Turkey's eligibility for membership as in the 1997 Luxembourg presidency conclusions nor offering an alternative partnership; for this reason, "Helsinki decisions were a great sign of EU commitment towards Turkish accession" (Açıkmeşe, 2010, pp.142; Saatçioğlu, 2011). The 'EU level commitment' was coupled with the 'member states' commitment', the European countries such as the UK, Scandinavian countries, Greece, Germany and France supported Turkey's accession (Açıkmeşe, 2010, pp.142-3; Eralp, 2009; Öniş, 2008). Lastly, with the Helsinki presidency conclusions, the preparation of Accession Partnership documents for Turkey, as for the other candidates, to stimulate and support reforms in the light of the political and economic criteria, indicates the existence of 'coherent implementation of conditionality' that formulated accession strategies on "an equal-footing with the other candidates relieved Turkey about being treated in double-standards" (Açıkmeşe, 2010, p.143). In sum, the positive directional stance of the trilogy provided Turkey 'credible conditionality' and increased its prospect for the EU membership. With the credible conditionality, "Turkish elites believed that if they implemented reforms, they could join the EU" (Kubicek, 2011, p.918). In fact, with the credible conditionality not only Turkish governmental elites, but also Turkish civil society actors and military elites supported the reforms which were demanded by the EU.

The role of civil society actors, who pushed for further Europeanization, was important in this reform process (Öniş, 2003a; Göksel and Güneş, 2005; Kubicek, 2005; 2011; Açıkmeşe, 2010). As shown by Kubicek (2005, p.368), "many prominent business,

academic, and human rights organizations ... have launched many projects with EU partners, lobbied for Turkish accession in Brussels, and put pressure on the Turkish government to adopt various reforms”. However, although the civil society movements had lobbied for years in order to push reforms they could not have succeeded without a credible EU accession process, because “an increasing credibility of Turkey’s EU accession process has served to raise the credibility of civil society actors”, thus the domestic critics who were against their reform claims was reduced as there was a credible EU accession process (Tocci, 2005, p.81). Contribution of the military to the reforms, especially in the NSC structure, is also worth a mention. In the perception of the military elites, the EU membership was an appropriate step for the modernization and westernization which pioneered by Atatürk; therefore they were willing for reforms even if these reforms were against them (Heper, 2005a; b; Sarıgil, 2007, p.49). However, the military elites and its Kemalist establishment saw EU accession “as an important provider of security, acts as a source of guarantee”; as a matter of fact, the raise of the credible EU accession raised “the readiness within the military to step out of politics” (Tocci, 2005, p.82). Consequently, the high ‘credible EU conditionality’ facilitated the adoption of the reforms required by the EU (Tocci, 2005; Açıkmüşe, 2010; Kubicek, 2011; Yılmaz, 2016a; Öner, 2014, p.23) and increased the ‘prospect of the EU membership’.

On the eve of 2005 Turkey had ‘sufficiently’ fulfilled the political criteria, so that the December 2004 European Council set up the date of 3 October 2005 to begin accession talks (Narbone and Tocci, 2007, p.235). However, with the December 2004 European Council decisions, credibility of EU conditionality and prospect for the EU membership began to fall in Turkey. Decline of the ‘credibility of conditionality’ is due to decline of EU’s and member states’ commitment and lowered consistency in the EU’s implementation of conditionality (Saatçioğlu, 2011; Öniş, 2008).

Firstly, the December 2004 Brussels summit decided that the negotiations with Turkey are “an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand” and if Turkey could not fulfill the requirements of the membership obligations, the negotiations may result in the “strongest possible bond”.²⁵ Although the details of “the

²⁵ European Council, 2004, *Presidency conclusions of 16-17 December*, Brussels, viewed 18 December 2018, https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/files/Zirve_Bildirileri/PresConc_17122004.pdf.

strongest possible bond” were not specified in the document, the “privileged partnership”, which backed by Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel ahead of the Brussels Summit and German Christian Democrats led by Angela Merkel, was the most prominent for it (Saatçioğlu, 2011, p.28; Karakaş, 2007, p.34). Thus, despite the given official EU candidacy status to Turkey, the December 2004 Brussels summit decreased the credibility of EU commitment and prospect of the EU membership in Turkey (Saatçioğlu, 2011). In addition, the provisionally closure of only one chapter (science and technology) and a few left opened chapters by the 2006 Council decision indicates that there was a lack of ‘EU commitment’ (Açıkmeşe, 2010, p.145).

Secondly, in the aftermath of the December 2004 Brussels summit, the issues related to the possible negative impact of Turkey’s underdeveloped economy and Turkish workers on Europe, cultural compatibility and security concerns began to be widely discussed in Europe (Ulusoy, 2008a, p.58). As a result, the political actors in the European capitals, mostly in Germany, Austria and France began to criticize Turkish membership (Ulusoy, 2008, p.58; Öniş, 2008, p.41; Açıkmeşe, 2010, p.145). The leaders of centre-right parties Merkel in Germany and Sarkozy in France formed a grand coalition which backed the privileged partnership model for Turkey as an alternative to EU membership; thus, member states attitudes which supported Turkey’s accession reversed (Açıkmeşe, 2010, p.145). Namely, after the end of 2004, EU’s member states drew their commitments back on Turkey’s membership to the Union.

Thirdly, in October 2005, initiating of the negotiations on an open-ended basis which had not been foreseen for previous candidates (Saatçioğlu, 2010, p.28) and then suspension of the negotiations with Turkey on the eight of the 35 chapters in December 2006 (since Turkey resisted to implement the Additional Protocol of the Customs Union which requires the admission of Greek-Cypriot aircrafts and ships to the Turkish ports) led Turkey to perceive a “double-standards” in the ‘EU’s implementation of conditionality’ (Açıkmeşe, 2010, pp.144-7). In sum, negative directional stance of the trilogy decreased the ‘credibility of conditionality’. As a result, credibility of the EU conditionality (Kubicek, 2011, p.922; Açıkmeşe, 2010, p.145; Öniş, 2015, p.34; Yılmaz, 2016a; Boşnak, 2016, p.84; Börzel and Soyaltın, 2012; Öner, 2014; Sipahioğlu, 2017, p.56) and prospect

for the EU membership declined in Turkey (Günay and Dzhic, 2016, p.532; Öner, 2014, p.26; Öniş, 2015, p.23; Tocci, 2014, p.5).

Consequently, the 2002-2005 period which was labeled as the “golden age of Europeanization” has lost its momentum in the reform process and left its place to the “loose-Europeanization” which signifies “a certain loss of enthusiasm and commitment on the part of the government to what had previously been the focal point of Turkish foreign policy efforts” (Öniş, 2008, pp.40-5). Also, an euroskeptic coalition in Turkey started to criticize the EU about its double standards (Yılmaz, 2016a; Gülmez, 2013; Kubicek, 2011). In the fronts of the JDP and the Republican People's Party (RPP), the sincerity of the EU to accept Turkey was highly questioned and the EU's ‘double standards’ against Turkey was condemned (Gülmez, 2013). Moreover, the party leaders from the JDP and the RPP considered the EU as “a unified block against Turkey”, and in particularly Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy were largely criticized by them (ibid). In the case of the NGOs, although some pro-EU NGOs, such as IKV and TÜSIAD, continued to support Turkey's accession while they expressed their disappointment about the privileged partnership and the partial suspension of negotiations in 2006 (Yılmaz, 2016a, p.92). In the case of the public opinion, the positive perception of the Turkish people to the EU has declined, for example according to the surveys, the positive view of Turkish people to the EU membership was around 50% in 2006 (Öniş, 2008, p.41) and 48% in 2009 whereas it was 73% in 2004 (Kubicek, 2011, p.922). In addition, since 2010 with an increasing euroskepticism, Turkey has undergone a ‘de-Europeanization’ process (Balkır and Eylemer, 2016; Cebeci, 2016; Saatçioğlu, 2016; Yılmaz, 2016a; b) which is defined as “the distancing of society and politics in Turkey from the European system of norms, values and policy expectations” (Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber, 2016, p.6). In the academic studies, de-Europeanization trend was investigated in the Turkish political parties' discourses (Balkır and Eylemer, 2016; Alpan, 2016); in the Turkish judicial system (Saatçioğlu, 2016); on the media freedom in Turkey (Yılmaz, 2016b); on the fundamental rights and freedoms in Turkey (Cebeci, 2016); and finally, on the civil society organizations (Kaliber, 2016; Boşnak, 2016).

The nuts and bolts, since the EU's acceptance of the Turkish candidacy in 1999, not only Turkish domestic policy but also Turkish foreign policy has been transformed by the EU's

conditionality mechanism to some extent (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007; Kirişci, 2006, p.29 Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, 2010, p.415). Along with the other factors, for example, Turkish foreign policy towards Greece and Cyprus altered by the EU's conditionality mechanism especially in the first half of the 2000s (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007; Uluğ-Eryılmaz, 2014; Ulusoy, 2008b, p.312). In the same context, the EU puts pressure on Turkey to normalize its relations with Armenia in every progress reports for Turkey. In this regard, Turkey -at least- tried to reconcile its dispute with Armenia (Evin et al., 2010, p.14). Likewise, with the EU accession, Turkey began to create good relations with Iraq and Syria.

At this stage, different types of foreign policy conditionality which experienced by Turkey will be used in order to introduce Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy in a classified framework. According to Aydın and Açıkmeşe (2007), Turkish foreign policy has undertaken three types of foreign policy conditionality in the post-Helsinki process. These are conditionality through “acquis criteria”, “political criteria” and “de facto political criteria”.

Firstly, “conditionality through political criteria” is the most essential conditionality type that a country (any country wishing to join the EU) must inevitably fulfill the conditions to the membership, otherwise negotiations with this country cannot begin (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007, p.268). Even if the negotiation has begun, “if a condition is stipulated as part of the political criteria, non-compliance during the negotiations may lead to suspension of talks, delaying membership.” (ibid). For example, the National Security Council (NSC) was established by the 1961 constitution to serve as a platform for the military to voice its opinion on matters of national security (Sakallıoğlu, 1997, p.157). With the 1973 amendments the NSC's primary function extended to making recommendations to the government, and its position was enhanced with the 1982 constitution which gave priority to NSC's recommendations to be considered by the Turkish Council of Ministers and which changed number and weight of senior commanders participating in the NSC at the expense of civilian members (ibid, pp.157-8). Under these conditions, it was not possible to carry out negotiations with the EU as that was a matter for the EU; therefore, since 1999 the EU has pressed Turkey to change the NSC composition and its dominant role through reforms (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007,

p.269). As a result of the EU's impact, on 23 July 2003 the Turkish Parliament passed a reform package that changed the structure and working procedures of the NSC, and in August 2004 a new civilian Secretary General of the Council appointed by the government; thus, EU's impact changed the balance within the NSC in favour of civilians and abolished NSC's recommendations' pressure on the President and Prime Minister (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007, p.269; Heper, 2005b, p.37). In other words, the NSC's role in policy making process was limited and its military prepotency composition was changed through the conditionality mechanism (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007; Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, 2010, p.415). At this point, the facilitator role of the Turkish military in this reform process is worth to remind here again (Heper, 2005a; 2011; Sarıgil, 2007). In addition, some authors interpreted the NSC reforms as an instrument which used by the Justice and Development Party (JDP) to please the pro-EU Turkish electorate and to weaken its military secular opposition (Saatçioğlu, 2010; Zaras, 2013).

Secondly, "even though the EU does not officially and formally state that the resolution of disputes within the candidates' neighbourhood is a political criterion" the Union has evaluated Turkey's neighbourhood relations with Greece and Cyprus under the political criteria chapter in every progress reports of Turkey, in this way another type of conditionality being formed through the "de facto political criteria" (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007, p.268). Two historic rivals Greece and Turkey had come to the brink of war on numerous occasions until 1999 (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007). In 1995, the Turkish threatened Greece with war in order to deter any action of Greece that may have expanded its coastal waters from six to 12 miles in the Aegean, and again in 1996 the two countries came to brink of war over islets in the Aegean Sea (Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, 2010, p.414). In the case of Cyprus, In 1974, the Greek military junta in Athens attempted to install pro-enosis Nicos Sampson as president. However, this attemption was resisted by Turkey in accordance with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee; on 20 July and 14 August 1974, Turkey landed troops in Cyprus and occupied the northern part (about %36 of the island); in 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared independence under the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Uluğ-Eryılmaz, 2015, pp.163-4). Although, the dispute on island of Cyprus still continues between Turkey and Southern Cyprus (also between Turkey and Greece), Turkey had a constructive attitude towards the Cyprus conflict in the first half

of the 2000s. In fact, since 1998 the Cyprus issue and since 2001 border disputes with Greece has been evaluated under the political criteria subsection in the progress reports for Turkey. Thus, the EU has put pressure on Turkey through progress reports for the resolution of disputes with Greece and Cyprus, so that Turkey would be awarded membership reward (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007, pp.271). In this context, after 1999, Turkish foreign policy began to evolve its stance towards the Cyprus issue in searching for win-win outcomes to solve problems through dialogue; for example, the acceptance of the Annan Plan by Turkey is a concrete result of Turkey's changed stance towards the Cyprus issue (Terzi, 2008).²⁶ Thus, it is suggested that, along with the other factors Turkish foreign policy towards Greece and Cyprus was altered by the EU's conditionality mechanism (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007; Uluğ-Eryılmaz, 2014; Ulusoy, 2008b, p.312). According to Müftüler-Baç and Güney (2005, p.290), Turkey began to change its foreign policy understanding towards Cyprus issue when its accession to the EU became credible in the first half of 2000s. In other words, Turkey believed that if the related conditions on Cyprus are met then the reward (eventual membership) will be obtained (Uluğ-Eryılmaz, 2014). In addition, Good personal relationship between the Turkish and Greek foreign ministers - İsmail Cem and George Papandreou- which favoured constructive dialogue for a resolution and the 1999 earthquakes in Turkey contributed two countries rapprochement (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007, p.270). In addition, the EU's financial support to the NGOs in Turkey and Greece (Rumelili, 2005), mutual interests understanding between the EU institutions and Turkish NGOs (Göksel and Güneş, 2005, p.70) and "the gradual transformation in Turkey's foreign policy together with a push for solution from societal sectors both in Turkey and Northern Cyprus" (Ulusoy, 2008b, p.327) are also some factors that facilitated Greek-Turkish and Cyprus-Turkish rapprochement.

Thirdly, according to "conditionality through the CFSP acquis", "conditionality in the CFSP chapter directs Turkey to progressively align with EU statements, and to apply sanctions and restrictive measures when and where required"; in this way, TFP is getting

²⁶ However, in 2004 United Nations' unification plan (Annan Plan) rejected by Greek Cypriots (75.83% against) while Turkish Cypriots approved the Plan by a clear majority (64.91% in favour): Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Cyprus Issue (summary)', *Official website*, viewed 25 July 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-issue-summary_en.mfa.

closer to the CFSP (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007, p.272). For example, along with the other factors which will be summarized below, Turkish foreign policy towards central and northern governments of Iraq had undertaken an Europeanization process. Before Turkey's accession to the EU, Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq was mainly intensified by military measures against the PKK terrorist organization structuring in Iraq (Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, 2010, p.416). With the preparation of the progress reports for Turkey, the EU began to press Turkey to develop good relations with Iraq. For example, the 1998 Progress Report for Turkey (PRT) highlighted the "recurrent strains in relations with Syria and Iraq, particularly over water rights and the Kurdish question" and stressed its note again in the 2002 PRT (European Commission, 1998, p.51; 2002, p.129). In this context, especially after 2004, although Turkey continued to use of military means, the country began to create good relations with Iraq and gradually came to accept its the federal structure (Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, 2010d, p.417-9). Since 2004, special representatives from Turkey have been in constant contact with Kurdish administration in Erbil (ibid, p.418). In May 2008, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs met with Nechirvan Barzani - the prime minister of the Kurdish regional government; in July 2008, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Jalal Talabani -the President of Iraq- and the two leaders signed a strategic partnership agreement; in October 2008, a Turkish delegation traveled to Baghdad to meet with Massoud Barzani - the president of the Kurdish administration- who in turn visited Ankara in June 2010, in the meetings the two sides explored the possibility of cooperating against the PKK (ibid). In the final, the EU appreciated Turkey since the country developed positive relations with Iraq and Kurdish regional government.²⁷ In the case of Armenia, the EU puts pressure on Turkey to normalize its relations with this country in every progress reports. In this context, Turkey -at least- tried to reconcile its dispute with Armenia (Evin et al., 2010, p.14). In October 2009, Turkey and Armenia signed an agreement to establish diplomatic relations and open their border (Evin et al., 2010, p.14; Kanbur and Bernat, 2013, p.89). Unfortunately,

²⁷ The Commission stated that "Turkey supports the EU efforts to ensure stability in Iraq and has maintained close diplomatic relations with this country, including contacts with the Kurdish regional government" (European Commission, 2008, p.84) and that "bilateral relations with Iraq continued to develop positively. Turkey maintained close contacts with Iraqi authorities. Several high-level visits took place, including those by vicePresident Adil Abdul Mahdi and Kurdish regional government President Massoud Barzani" (European Commission, 2010, p.95).

Turkey has been forced to step back because of the raised criticisms in Azerbaijan and in Ankara which accused Armenia of altering the agreement's terms, consequently, the deal has not been ratified by the either parliaments (Evin et al., 2010, p.14; Kanbur and Bernat, 2013, p.89). As discussed below, Turkish foreign policy towards Syria has also undertaken Europeanization process after the 1999 Helsinki summit. In short, the EU effected Turkey to transform its political relations with its immediate neighbors from the way of coercion to a cooperative and constructive foreign policy creation to some extent (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007, p.274; Aras and Polat, 2008; Altunışık, 2009; Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, 2010; Kirişci, 2006, p.22; Terzi, 2008; Özcan 2008). In addition, Europeanization is not the only factor that effected Turkey's relations with its immediate neighbors. There were also other factors that reduced the adoption costs. In this context, "a snapshot of TFP towards the Middle East would show us a more complicated picture" and reveal that Europeanization is not the only factor explaining these changes (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007, p.272). For example, constructive policies of the coalition government between 1999-2002 and then Justice and Development Party (JDP) had also influenced Turkey's new foreign policy openings toward the Middle East countries; likewise, the September 11th attacks and 2003 Iraq War had great impact on Turkish foreign policy since these cases led the evolutions in the regional and international systems (Altunışık, 2009, p.143). Turkey's security considerations related to the United States and Iran's expansionist policies in the region (Oğuzlu, 2010, p.658) and the aim of gaining economic incomes from the region through trade relations (Kirişci, 2009) were also influential in the establishment of good relations with its immediate neighbors.²⁸ Lastly, together with the conditionality, the internalization of TFP with the EU foreign policy norms, methods and practices -namely the diffusion of EU norms- is also considered to be an alternative mechanism to explain the change of TFP towards its immediate neighbors (Altunışık, 2009; Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, 2010).

²⁸ According to Kirişci, since mid-1990s Turkey has been in the process of becoming a "trading state". Accordingly, foreign policy makers " increasingly coming to recognize that Turkey's national interest cannot be solely determined in terms of a narrowly defined national security, and that economic considerations such as the need to trade, expand export markets, and attract and export foreign direct investment are just as important" (Kirişci, 2009, pp.33-4).

Europeanization of Turkish Foreign Policy: Desire and Pulling

“If you ask if they [Turkey’s citizens] want Turkey to become an EU member, 60 to 65 percent still say yes. But if you ask: Do you believe Europe will accept Turkey, 60 percent say no” said by the then Prime Minister R.T. Erdoğan.²⁹

As indicated above, the credibility of conditionality began to decrease after the end of 2004. Therefore, the 2002-2005 period which was labeled as “golden age of Europeanization” has lost its momentum in the reform process and left its place to the “loose-Europeanization” which signifies “a certain loss of enthusiasm and commitment on the part of the government to what had previously been the focal point of Turkish foreign policy efforts” (Öniş, 2008, pp.40-5). According to Öniş and Yılmaz (2009), Turkish foreign policy entered a new period which is called as a “soft Euro-Asianism” after 2005. Soft Euro-Asianism means that “foreign policy activism is pursued with respect to all neighboring regions but with no firm EU axis as was previously the case” (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009, p.13). But, this does not mean the EU had no more impact on Turkish foreign policy. According to Davutoğlu (2008, p.82), Turkey “considers its membership process to the EU” while conducting “its synchronization policy in Eurasia”. Namely, Turkey’s membership process to the EU and its Eurasia policy are integral parts of each other; that is to say, these two policies are complement not compete with each other (Davutoğlu, 2008). An important point, after 2005 Turkey overly used its soft power and took the role of a “benign regional power” when it was actively involved in regional issues (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009, p.17-8). At this point, Turkey’s foreign policy doctrine in 2000s -which was formulated by Ahmet Davutoğlu, the chief foreign policy adviser to the Prime Minister- set a path towards soft power oriented multilateral interactions with neighbors in order to increase Turkey's leadership potential in its region (Oğuzlu, 2010, p.678). In this context, Turkey’s foreign policy activism, which covers Turkey’s mediator and facilitator roles in its region, was raising Turkey's leadership potential since these roles consolidated its power in its region. However, the European Commission often

²⁹ *Spiegel Online*, 2007, ‘If the EU Doesn't Want Us, They Should Say it Now’, 16 April, viewed 5 January 2018, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/spiegel-interview-with-turkish-prime-minister-recep-tayyip-erdogan-if-the-eu-doesn-t-want-us-they-should-say-it-now-a-477448.html>.

invites and encourages Turkey to promote peace, stability and security in its region (European Commission, 2004, p.153; 2005, p.128; 2006, pp. 69-70; 2007, p.74; 2008, p.82; 2009, p.87). That is to say, there was a “good fit” between the Turkish and EU foreign policies.³⁰ Thus, the “good fit” reduced the adoptions costs of the alignments to the CFSP chapter in which the EU often invites Turkey to promote peace and stability in its region. It should be noted that Turkey's aspirations to be a regional power does not necessarily imply that the country disregarded its alignment to the CFSP acquis nor gave up the bid for EU membership. On the contrary, along with other benefits of the EU membership, a non-member state bids to join EU to increase its own external power (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002, p.551). Correspondingly, the III. Erdogan Government Program stated that “since we came to power, we have seen full membership as a strategic target ... to become a more effective and decisive actor in regional and global problems”.³¹ In this context, Turkey’s foreign policy activism which was trying to increase and consolidate Turkey's leadership potential in its region whilst claiming itself as a ‘regional power’ had to be harmonized with the CFSP acquis. Otherwise, a misfit or divergence would have occurred between the CFSP and TFP; thus, the way of the EU membership would have been much worsen for Turkey and its regional power role would have been jeopardized. As a matter of fact, Turkey’s foreign policy activism seems to be in lined with the CFSP acquis.

In this context, in the aftermath of the Israeli President Shimon Peres and the Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas meeting in Ankara in 2007, the EU appreciated Turkey for its contribution to the Middle East peace process which in lined with the EU position.³² Likewise, as discussed in the next chapter, Turkey’s mediating efforts in the Israel-Syria

³⁰ When there is a “good fit” between the national and the EU pre-existing policies then adoption of EU policies is more likely; because, “although the pressure for change is high, the cost to do so is low, so change occur easily” (Ruano, 2011, p.16).

³¹ TBMM, 2011, ‘III. Erdoğan Hükümeti Programı’, *Official Website*, 13 July, viewed 7 February 2019, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/HP61.htm>.

³² The Commission stated that “Turkey has been playing an active and constructive role in the Middle East. In line with the EU position, Turkey continued to support the Middle East peace process, including the Annapolis process. Turkey expressed support for Palestinian unity and reconciliation. In November 2007, the Presidents of Israel and of the Palestinian Authority made speeches before the Turkish Parliament” (European Commission, 2008, p.82).

conflict appreciated by the EU since they were in line with the EU position. In the case of Iran, Turkey's foreign policy was also in line with the EU's common position.³³ Turkey had "supported EU efforts to obtain long-term guarantees for the implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its Nuclear Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA by Iran" as well as "the Union's proposals for a possible Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Iran" (Aydın and Açıkmüşe, 2007, p.273).³⁴ In addition, during and after the Georgia war in August 2008, Turkey played a conciliatory role between Moscow and Tbilisito and created several initiatives for the establishment and also the implementation of the Caucasus Stability Pact (Üstün, 2010). According to Üstün (2010), although the EU-Turkey relation has been in turbulence because of the domestic reform progress in Turkey, "Turkey's transformation process in the foreign policy domain, especially her policy towards the Black Sea region, was not affected negatively ... the advice of the EU has been seriously considered, as evidenced by Turkey's actions in response to the EU's insistence on the implementation of the Caucasus Stability Pact".

Moreover, in a broader context, Turkey maintained its high alignment to the CFSP acquis until 2010. In 2006, "Turkey's broad alignment with EU sanctions and restrictive measures, statements, declarations, and demarches has continued" (European Commission, 2006, p.69). In 2007, Turkey aligned itself "with 45 out of 46 Common Foreign and Security Policy declarations", 97.8 % alignment (European Commission, 2007b, p.74). In 2008, "Turkey aligned itself with 109 out of 124 CFSP declarations", 87.9 % alignment (European Commission, 2008, p.83). In 2009, "Turkey aligned itself with 99 CFSP declarations from a total of 128 declarations", 77.3 % alignment (European Commission, 2009, p.87). In 2010, Turkey aligned itself "with 54 out of 73 the relevant EU declarations and Council decisions (74 % alignment)" (European Commission, 2010, p.95). It is hard to consider such high rate alignments to be a chain of coincidences. Turkey wished to improve its EU accession process through its alignments to the CFSP. To be more specific, the screening process of chapter 31 (CFSP chapter) was completed

³³ The Commission stated that "Turkey supports the EU position on Iran's nuclear programme and encouraged Iran to engage in a diplomatic solution of the crisis in line with the June 2008 offer of the E3+3" (European Commission, 2008, p.82); "Turkey has supported all statements related to Iran nuclear programme. In the context of talks with high-level Iranian officials, Turkey encouraged compliance with international requirements (European Commission, 2007, p.74).

³⁴ Also, see Chapter 31 of the 2006 progress report on Turkey.

back in 2006 but screening reports of this chapter are still pending for approval at the Council. Since the screening reports are not officially sent to Turkey, the potential opening benchmarks of those chapters are not communicated. As a matter of fact, in the context of the Europeanization, the aim of Turkey's alignment to the CFSP was to receive the screening report for chapter 31. As stated by Davutoğlu, "Turkey's alignment with EU common positions within the CFSP is around 80%. However, I have to remind that while Turkey is being encouraged to develop its foreign policy as a complement to and in coordination with the EU, Turkey has still not received the screening report for Chapter 31".³⁵ As understood, the country demanded its reward (screening report) in return for its alignments to the CFSP.

Lastly, commitment for the EU accession is an important factor to estimate conditionality effect on the foreign policy. Because, the governmental commitment increases the possible effect of the conditionality on targeted state (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003). The explanation of commitment is not only related to the logic of appropriateness but also it could be given as a result of the logic of consequences (Tocci, 2005, p.80). Here, the approach is the commitment given by targeted state as a result of the logic of consequences. In this context, the JDP strategically gave its commitment to work towards EU membership in its 2007 election manifesto. The text says that Turkey's policy priorities in its immediate region and its EU membership process are the integral parts of each other and besides the bilateral relations "the JDP considers EU-Turkey relations within the framework of global and regional peace and stability including the perspective of a strategic vision".³⁶ According to Balkır and Eylemer (2016, p.36), "the text particularly concentrated on economic and foreign policy benefits. The evaluation of Turkey–EU relations within a strategic vision in a manner instrumental to coping with global and regional risks can be assessed as a reflection of this pragmatic approach". Thus, the JDP strategically gave its commitment to the EU membership in its 2007

³⁵ EU-Turkey Association Council, 2011, *49th meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council (19 April 2011)*, UE-TR 4805/11, Brussels, 19 May, viewed 7 February 2019, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%204805%202011%20INIT>.

³⁶ JDP (AKP), 2007, 'AK Parti Seçim Beyannameşi [JDP Election Manifesto]', June, viewed 8 February 2019, https://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/AKP_beyanname-2007.pdf.

election manifesto. Likewise, the JDP committed EU accession strategically in its 2011 election manifesto, according to text: “Turkey’s EU accession is strategically important as a way of accommodating democratic standards in our country, developing our trade relations and further strengthening our relations with Europe. EU membership will transform Turkey into a more efficient and decisive actor in regional and global problems” (cited in Balkır and Eylemer, 2016, p.37).

In sum, although ‘credibility of conditionality’ and ‘prospect for the EU membership’ began to decrease in Turkey after the end of 2004, the country maintained its alignment with the CFSP acquis while retained its commitment strategically for the EU accession. Turkey’s mediating efforts between the Israeli and Palestinian, its posture towards the Iran’s nuclear activities and its conciliatory role between Moscow and Tbilisi seem to be in lined with the CFSP acquis. Moreover, in a broader context, Turkey maintained its high alignment to the CFSP acquis until 2010. Thus, the *pulling* version of the ‘improvement of accession’, which requires the adoption of the EU rules, policies or practices in the situation of low rate or lack of credible conditionality, explain such type situations. Through the pulling, which is an indicator of the desire, Turkey tried to improve its accession. In other words, through its alignments to the CFSP acquis, the country tried to improve its accession. As Davutoğlu said, Turkey wanted to receive the screening report for Chapter 31 in return for the country’s high alignments to the CFSP.³⁷ Thus, the aim of the alignments was to improve Turkey’s accession. In addition, Turkey’s foreign policy activism towards its immediate region are also seem to be fit with the Davutoğlu’s doctrine which seeks to increase Turkey’s leadership potential in its region through soft power oriented multilateral interactions with neighbors. But, this does not necessarily exclude the EU’s impact on Turkey’s foreign policy activism. As stated by Davutoğlu (2008, p.82), Turkey “considers its membership process to the EU” while conducting “its synchronization policy in Eurasia”. Namely, Turkey’s membership process to the EU and its Eurasia policy are integral parts of each other; that is to say,

³⁷ EU-Turkey Association Council, 2011, *49th meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council (19 April 2011)*, UE-TR 4805/11, Brussels, 19 May, viewed 7 February 2019, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%204805%202011%20INIT>.

these two policies are complement not compete with each other (Davutoğlu, 2008). As a matter of fact, there was a “good fit” between the Turkish and EU foreign policies. Thus, the “good fit” reduced the adoptions costs of the Turkey’s alignment to the CFSP. Lastly, as the then Prime Minister R.T. Erdoğan said in 2007, “If you ask if they [Turkey’s citizens] want Turkey to become an EU member, 60 to 65 percent still say yes. But if you ask: Do you believe Europe will accept Turkey, 60 percent say no”.³⁸ One can deduce from here that the desire for the EU membership would be the predominant motivation for the Turkey’s alignments to the CFSP rather than prospect. Besides, theoretically, its hard to claim the presence of high prospect for the EU membership in the situation of lack of credible conditionality. Consequently, since Turkey’s foreign policy activism, which claims itself as a “benign regional power”, in lined and harmonized with the CFSP acquis, Turkish foreign policy towards its immediate neighbors exposed to the conditionality effect through the CFSP acquis. Thus, ‘desire for the EU membership’ and ‘low adoption costs’ as the facilitating factors and the pulling version of the improvement of accession as the mediating mechanism enabled the transformative role of EU’s conditionality on Turkish policy towards its immediate region and neighbors between 2005 and 2010.

³⁸ *Spiegel Online*, 2007, ‘If the EU Doesn’t Want Us, They Should Say it Now’, 16 April, viewed 5 January 2018, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/spiegel-interview-with-turkish-prime-minister-recep-tayyip-erdogan-if-the-eu-doesn-t-want-us-they-should-say-it-now-a-477448.html>.

CHAPTER III

EUROPEANIZATION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SYRIA

This chapter aims to examine Turkish foreign policy towards Syria in the framework of the Europeanization concepts. At the first stage, the EU's foreign policy towards Syria until 2011 will be presented and then Turkish foreign policy towards Syria until 2011 will be evaluated through the EU's conditionality mechanism. For the 1999-2004 period, 'credible conditionality', 'prospect for the EU membership' and 'low adoption costs' will be pointed out as the factors which facilitated the transformative role of EU's conditionality on Turkish foreign policy to establish good neighborly relations with Syria. For the 2005-2010 period, 'desire for the EU membership' and 'low adoption costs' will be pointed out as the facilitating factors and the *pulling* version of the improvement of accession will be applied as the mediating mechanism to explain Turkey's alignments to the EU Council Conclusions on Syria which demanded Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon in accordance with the 1559 UNSC Resolution, to cooperate with the UN investigation commission in accordance with the 1595 and 1636 UNSC Resolutions and to relaunch its efforts to make progress on the Middle East peace process. At the second stage, the EU's foreign policy towards Syria after 2011 will be evaluated under the two research titles ('EU's Support for the Syrian opposition' and 'EU's Migration Policy Towards Syrian Refugees') which were selected in accordance with the EU's own Arab Spring policy. In the same context, Turkish foreign policy towards Syria after 2011 will be evaluated and traced under the parallel research titles to find out EU's impact. But before detecting the factors which facilitated the adoption of EU directions, Turkey's bargain with the EU on the Syrian refugees crisis and on the implementation of the restrictive measures against Syrian regime, will be explained by the *pushing* version of the improvement of accession which assumes that in the situations of the low rate or lack of 'credible conditionality' and high adoption costs, if candidate states have enough power to use as a bargaining chip vis-a-vis the EU and if they have desire for the EU membership then they may try to *push* EU to improve their accession by actively

bargaining. Consequently, for the post-2010 period, the *pushing* version of the improvement of accession will be applied as the mediating mechanism, which provided Turkey ‘credible conditionality’, in order to explain Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy towards Syria in the cases of the imposition of restrictive measures against the Syrian regime and the implementation of Readmission Agreement. In addition, in order to refrain from too optimistic approach, which attributes the most things to Europeanization, this thesis do not see all convergences between the EU and Turkey policies as Europeanization. In this context, for instance, although there has been an convergence between the EU and Turkey policies on fighting against Da’esh -to some extent, this thesis refrained from referring it as Europeanization. Moreover, this thesis puts forward de-Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy on the case of People’s Protection Units (YPG) in this chapter.

3.1 THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SYRIA BEFORE 2011

In the Cold War period, although Syria’s sliding to the Soviet camp made the West anxious, unlike the USA, the EU chose to establish good relations with Syria and with this respect the Union signed a Cooperation Agreement with this country in 1977 (Santini, 2008, p.12). The 1977 Cooperation Agreement is accepted as the legal basis for the EU and Syria relations.³⁹ With the Cooperation Agreement, the EU and Syria agreed to promote economic cooperation and strengthen their trade relations (Delattre, 2010, p.2). In the framework of this agreement, a duty-free access to the European market had been opened for Syrian industrial goods (Dostal and Zorob, 2009, p.58). Also, this agreement provided Syria with the European technical assistance and financial support to help its development path (Delattre, 2010, p.2). It can be argued that since the increase of refugees and illegal activities or other potential threats from unstable neighbouring countries would be jeopardize the Union, establishing zone of peace, prosperity and security in its

³⁹ European External Action Service (EEAS), 2016, ‘EU-Syria relations, factsheet’, 14 July, viewed 13 December 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/6769/EU-Syria%20relations,%20factsheet.

neighbourhood would be serve the EU's own interest (Wallace, 2003), and “especially in the Mediterranean region due to its strategically essential position in creating a ring of friends” (Eralp and Üstün, 2009, p.2). In this context, in the first half of 1990s the EU initiated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in order to create an area of cooperation, dialogue, peace and stability covering its Southern Mediterranean partners including Syria (ibid). On 27-28 November 1995 at the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Syria agreed to the Barcelona Declaration which established the EMP; thus, Syria and other Mediterranean countries and the 15 EU member states and the 5 non-EU member states of the time came together under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or Barcelona Process.⁴⁰

The Barcelona Process comprises three baskets. The economic basket aims to establish a shared prosperity and free-trade area in the Mediterranean through the economic and financial partnership; the political and security basket aims to create a common peace and stability area through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue and promotes the principles of the rule of law, human rights, democratic values and good governance; lastly, the cultural basket aims to encourage cultural understanding and exchanges between societies.⁴¹ The Association Agreements between the EU and Mediterranean country partners based on bilateral legal status and set out the conditions for these three baskets of the Barcelona Process, namely conditions of the economic, political, social and cultural cooperation between the sides.⁴² In 1998, negotiations for the EU-Syria Association Agreement were begun. In the early 2000s when Bashar al-Assad came to power the negotiations were intensified; thus, the EU and Syria agreed on a first draft in

⁴⁰ The Mediterranean governments from Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and the Palestinian Authority; and the EU member states of the time Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom, Sweden from the EU member states; and the non-EU member states of the time Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, Macedonia, Turkey signed the Barcelona Declaration in 1995: *Barcelona Page*, ‘The Barcelona Process or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’, viewed 13 December 2018, https://www.barcelona.com/barcelona_news/the_barcelona_process_or_euro_mediterranean_partnership.

⁴¹ European Union, 2011g, ‘Barcelona Declaration and Euro-Mediterranean partnership’, *Official Web Page of the EU*, 08 September, viewed 13 December 2018, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:r15001>.

⁴² European Union, 2011h, ‘Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements’, *Official Web Page of the EU*, 10 March, viewed 13 December 2018, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM%3Ar14104>.

2003 and then the agreement initialled by the negotiators in 2004 (Delattre, 2010, p.3). However, the Agreement was withheld by the EU because of the political reasons which were linked to the UNSC Resolution 1559 in September 2004 calling Syrian forces to withdraw from Lebanon and Syria involvement in Lebanese affairs including the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri in February 2005 (Dostal and Zorob, 2009, p.17). In the Presidency conclusions of 23 March 2005, The EU Council called Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to withdraw all Syrian troops from Lebanon.⁴³ In this regard, The European Parliament emphasized the importance of the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanese territory for the future of the Association Agreement.⁴⁴ In addition upon them, the reluctance of Syrian government to cooperate with the United Nations investigation commission in regards to Hariri assassination further strained the EU's relations with Syria (Kirişci, 2006, p.3). The EU Council conclusion of 7 November 2005 called Syrian authority to cooperate unconditionally with the investigators.⁴⁵ In this regard, The European Parliament emphasized the importance of the cooperation with the UN investigation commission for the future of the Association Agreement.⁴⁶

Eventually, as a result of international pressures the Syrian authority withdrew its troops from Lebanon in 2005 (Gupta et al., 2016) and then handed over the suspects of the Hariri assassination to the UN-appointed prosecutor (Kirişci, 2006, p.78). The European Parliament report of 11 October 2006, noted the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanese territory as a positive development for the future of the Association

⁴³ European Council, 2005a, *Presidency conclusions of 22-23 March 2005*, 23 March, Brussels, viewed 25 December 2018, <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7619-2005-REV-1/en/pdf>.

⁴⁴ European Parliament, 2005, *Resolution on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, 23 February, viewed 25 December 2019, <http://www.radicalparty.org/en/content/european-parliament-resolution-euro-mediterranean-partnership>.

⁴⁵ Council of the European Union, 2005, *Council conclusions of 7 November on Syria and Lebanon*, 7 November, Brussels, viewed 20 December 2018, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/eu-council-conclusions-on-syria-and-lebanon-meeting-of-the-external-relations-council-eu-press-release-non-un-document/>.

⁴⁶ European Parliament, 2006, *The European Parliament's recommendation to the Council on the conclusion of a Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement ...*, 10 October, FINAL A6-0334/2006, viewed 13 December 2018, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2006-0334+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN>.

Agreement.⁴⁷ In regards to Hariri assassination, the interim reports that prepared by the head of United Nations investigation commission in June 2006 was found satisfactory by the EU in terms of Syria's cooperation efforts with the UN investigation commission.⁴⁸ In addition, increased tension between Syria and Israel over the Golan Heights and the Palestinian issue were also the foreign policy challenges for the EU-Syria relations as these issues threaten the Middle East peace process.⁴⁹ In the Presidency conclusions of 15 July 2005, the EU Council called Syria to relaunch its efforts to make progress on the Middle East peace process.⁵⁰ In this regard, Syria manifested its willingness to resume negotiations with Israel (Santini, 2008, p.44-5). On 19-21 May 2007, Israel and Syria had launched peace talks mediated by Turkey and negotiating teams had held indirect talks in Istanbul (Migdalovitz, 2010, pp.40). As a result of these positive steps taken by the Syrian authority, the EU relations with Syria revived. In 2007, the Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and National Indicative Programme 2007-2010 for Syrian Arab Republic was released by the European Commission.⁵¹ In the late of 2008, the draft of the EU-Syria Association Agreement was updated and revised version of the agreement was reinitialled on 14 December 2008.⁵² On 27 October 2009, the EU called Syria to sign the Association Agreement but the Agreement was never signed or ratified.⁵³

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ European Commission, 2007a, *Syrian Arab Republic Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and National Indicative Programme 2007-2010*, viewed 13 December 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/csp-nip-syria-2007-2013_en.pdf.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ European Council, 2005b, *Presidency conclusions of 16-17 June*, Brussels, viewed 18 December 2018, <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10255-2005-REV-1/en/pdf>.

⁵¹ European Commission, 2007a, *Syrian Arab Republic Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and National Indicative Programme 2007-2010*.

⁵² Council of the European Union, 2010, *Human rights and democracy in the World: Report on EU action - July 2008 to December 2009*, 11 May, Brussels, viewed 13 December 2018, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%208363%202010%20REV%201>.

⁵³ Ibid; European Commission, 2018a, 'European Neighbourhood Policy And Enlargement Negotiations: Syria', *Official Web Page of the EU*, 18 December, viewed 13 December 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/syria_en.

3.2 TRACING THE EU'S IMPACT ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SYRIA BEFORE 2011

3.2.1 The Period between 1999 and 2004

During and after the World War I instability prevailed in regards to Turkey-Syria relations (Zahra, 2017, p.31). Since the Arabs (including in Syria) rebelled against the Ottoman Empire during the World War I, they has been labeled as the ones who “stabbed Turks in the back” in the eyes of the Turkish (Demirtaş, 2013, p.112). During the Cold War period the tensions remained between Turkey and Syria since these two countries were in the opposite blocs, Turkey was -and still is- a member of NATO while Syria was one of Russia’s allies (Zahra, 2017, p.31). Additionally, there were also other factors that instigated the Turkey-Syria tensions. In 1970s, Syria began to support the Armenian Secret Army for Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) (ibid). In the 1980s, the Syrian government allowed the PKK to shelter in the Syrian controlled area, Lebanon's Bekaa Valley (Kanat, 2012, p.234). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the launching of Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolian Project, which included the construction of huge dams on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the water problem came to the fore; in such a situation, the water and PKK cases were entangled, thus the water and PKK cards were used against each other by the sides (Kanat, 2012, p.234; Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009, p.9). In the early 1990s, Syria and Greece signed a defense agreement, which included permission for Greek planes to use Syrian air bases in case of a conflict with Turkey (Kanat, 2012, p.234). Moreover, throughout 1990s Syria’s logistical support to the PKK continued and Syria had territorial claims over the Hatay province of Turkey (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009, p.9). As a result of such background, the Turkish public increased its pressure on the Turkish government for the adaptation of harsher measures against Syria; thus, Turkey initiated coercive diplomacy against Syria that resulted in the expulsion of Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the PKK, from Syria in 1998 (Demirtaş, 2013, p.113). Following the extradition of Abdullah Öcalan to Turkey, the Adana Agreement, which ended the Syria and the PKK deal, was signed between Turkey and Syria in 1998 (ibid, p.116).

It is possible to say that the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy started back in 1999 with the capturing of Abdullah Öcalan but December 1999 Helsinki summit which declares Turkey as a candidate state, had also considerable impact on Turkish foreign

policy towards Syria (Kirişci, 2006, pp.19-22). As indicated in previous chapter the 1999 Helsinki summit, which provided Turkey credible conditionality and thus prospect for the EU membership that facilitated the adoption of the EU related domestic reforms, was also an driving force for Turkey to transform its political relations with its immediate neighbors ‘including Syria’ from the way of coercion to a cooperative and constructive foreign policy creation (Aydın and Açıkmeşe, 2007, p.274; Aras and Polat, 2008; Altunışık, 2009; Müftüler-Baç and Gürsoy, 2010; Öniş, 2003b; Kirişci, 2006, p.22; Terzi, 2008; Oğuzlu, 2008, pp.15-16; Özcan, 2008).

As specified in a previous subsection, with the 1977 Cooperation Agreement the EU began to establish good relations with Syria and with the 1995 Barcelona Declaration the Union attempted to deepen its relations with this country. In the early 2000s, when Bashar al-Assad came to power the EU-Syria relations was enhanced and finally the Association agreement was initialled by the both sides in 2004. As a matter of fact, the EU not only enhanced its relations with Syria but also pressed and encouraged Turkey, in the CFSP chapter of the progress reports for Turkey until 2010, to establish good relations with this country. Turkey, as an applicant state, had to comply with the EU’s demands. Because, the candidate states are expected to transform their foreign policies in line with the CFSP since the CFSP Chapter of community acquis invite candidate states for “full compliance” (Hisarlıoğlu, 2015, p.71). At this point, this thesis does not argue that the EU’s impact is the single cause on TFP towards Syria. There were also other factors which reduced the adoption costs of the establishment of good neighborly relations with Syria. For example, constructive policies of the coalition government between 1999-2002 and then Justice and Development Party (JDP) had also influenced Turkey’s new foreign policy openings toward the Middle East countries; likewise, the September 11th attacks and 2003 Iraq War had great impact on Turkish foreign policy since these cases led the evolutions in the regional and international systems (Altunışık, 2009, p.143). In addition, Turkey’s security considerations related to the United States and Iran’s expansionist policies in the region (Oğuzlu, 2010, p.658) and the aim of gaining economic incomes from the region through trade relations (Kirişci, 2009) were also influential in the establishment of good relations with Syria. In sum, all of these factors emerged a “good fit” between the national

and the EU pre-existing policies.⁵⁴ Thus, these factors reduced the adoption costs of the establishment of good neighborly relations with Syria which prescribed by the EU. Here the argument is that besides these and other possible factors, the EU had also influenced TFP towards Syria after the 1999 Helsinki summit.

As a matter of fact, since 1998 the EU has monitored Turkey's relations with Syria closely under the 'CFSP chapter' of the Progress Reports for Turkey (PRTs). It is clear that the EU was pressing Turkey to develop good relations with Syria. In 1998 PRT, for example, the EU highlighted Turkey's recurrent strains in relations with Syria in same paragraph with Greece, an EU Member State, which means that the EU was considering Turkey's good neighborly relation with Syria to give her candidacy or membership status.⁵⁵ In 1999 PRT, the same problem was highlighted (European Commission, 1999, p.42). The 2000-2004 PRTs welcomed Turkey's cooperation with Syria as successful development and encouraged for further cooperation (European Commission, 2000, p.67; 2001, p.89; 2002, p.129; 2003; 2004, pp.153-5).

Interestingly, shortly after the 1999 Helsinki summit, Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer's attendance at the Syrian leader Hafiz al-Asad's funeral ceremony in June 2000 demonstrated that Turkey wanted to advance and deepen its relation with Syria (Altunışık and Tür, 2006, pp.238-9; Kanat, 2012:239). In the progress, in 2001, Turkey and Syria took steps to clear landmines in parts of the Turkey-Syria border area (European Commission, 2001, pp.89). In June 2002, during the visit of Syrian Chief of Staff General Hassan al Turkomani, the agreement which included mutual exchange of military personnel, mutual invitations for monitoring war games, and military training was signed by the sides (Altunışık and Tür, 2006, p.240). In November 2002, Justice and Development Party (JDP) came to power first time. The JDP was quite positive to undertake immediate legal reforms required by the Copenhagen criteria towards

⁵⁴ When there is a "good fit" between the national and the EU pre-existing policies then adoption of EU policies is more likely; because, "although the pressure for change is high, the cost to do so is low, so change occur easily" (Ruano, 2011, p.16).

⁵⁵ "There are a number of contentious issues in the Aegean area between Turkey and an EU Member State, Greece, including disputes about the demarcation of the continental shelf ... There are recurrent strains in relations with Syria and Iraq, particularly over water rights and the Kurdish question. It should be noted that on 20 October 1998 Turkey and Syria signed an agreement on security issues committing Syria to ending all support for the PKK." (European Commission, 1998, p.51).

accession (Bilgin, 2008, pp.414-7). In the 2002 PRT, the Commission stated that “In its [Turkey] 1998 Report, the Commission concluded that ... There are recurrent strains in relations with Syria and Iraq, ...” but “since the 1998 Report, ... Relations with neighbours have developed positively”. In the 2002 reporting period, “Turkey has sought to improve its bilateral relations with neighbouring countries”; for example, “a military agreement has been signed with Syria accompanied by the implementation of a number of confidence-building measures” (European Commission, 2002, pp.128-9). Thus, the EU continued to encourage Turkey to improve Turkey-Syria bilateral relations and encouraged for further cooperation. The 2003 and 2004 PRTs made similar evaluations concerning the Turkey-Syria bilateral relations (European Commission, 2003; 2004, pp.153-5). In this context, the JDP government continued to improve its bilateral relations with Syria and several ministerial visits took place between the countries during 2003 (European Commission, 2003). In 2004, steady improvement in bilateral relations with Syria was recorded with the first official visit by Syrian President to Turkey in 50 years (European Commission, 2004, p.153). The visit of Syrian President led to the introduction of various agreements in economic, trade, tourism, aviation and maritime area (ibid). During Syrian President Bashar al-Asad’s visit the institutional framework for economic relations was established and the two sides decided to open up a consulate in Gaziantep and border centers in several Turkish cities to facilitate trade in the border regions (Altunışık and Tür, 2006, p.241).

As understood, under the CFSP chapter of the progress reports for Turkey, the EU regularly directed Turkey to improve its bilateral relations with Syria. Namely, the EU conducted the conditionality mechanism through the CFSP acquis. As a result, along with the other exogenous and endogenous factors mentioned above, the EU had considerable impact on Turkish foreign policy to transform Turkey’s relations with Syria towards good neighborly relations. Lastly, as proved in previous chapter, the EU had credibility in Turkey and thus Turkey had prospect for the EU membership from the 1999 Helsinki summit until the end of 2004. Therefore, the ‘credibility of conditionality’, ‘prospect for the EU membership’ and -as mentioned above- ‘low adoption costs’ due to a “good fit” between the Turkish and EU pre-existing policies facilitated the transformative role of

EU's conditionality on Turkish foreign policy to establish good neighborly relations with Syria between 1999 and the end of 2004.

3.2.2 The Period between 2005 and 2010

As indicated in previous subsection, there were three main challenges over the EU-Syria relations in the early of the second half of the 2000s. These are the military presence of Syria in Lebanon, assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri and strained Syria-Israel relations. Also, the EU Council had common positions concerning with these three main challenges; in this regard, the EU demanded Syria to **a)** withdraw its troops from Lebanon in accordance with the 1559 UNSC Resolution, **b)** cooperate with the UN investigation commission in accordance with the 1595 and 1636 UNSC Resolutions, **c)** to relaunch its efforts to make progress on the Middle East peace process. As stated by Davutoğlu “it is no longer possible to think of the EU and Turkey independent of one another when considering Turkey's foreign policy”.⁵⁶ In this context, without thinking the Turkish foreign policy independently from the EU, Turkey, as a candidate state, must align itself with the Union's common positions. Because, the candidate states are expected to arrange their foreign policies in line with the CFSP since the CFSP Chapter of community acquis invite candidate states for “full compliance” (Hisarlıoğlu, 2015, p.71). Besides, under the CFSP chapter of the progress reports for Turkey, the Commission clearly stated that in order to achieve progress in regards to membership, “Turkey should ensure that its national policies and practice conform to the EU's common positions, should defend these positions in international fora” (European Commission, 2002, p.129; 2003; 2004, p.155) and “Turkey should also continue to promote stability and security in its region, namely the Balkans, Caucasus, Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East” (European Commission, 2003; 2004, p.155).

As a matter of fact, at that time, Turkey was pressing Syria to withdrew its troops from Lebanon (Kirişçi, 2006, p.77). For example, during his visit to Syria in April 2005,

⁵⁶ Davutoğlu, A. 2010 ‘Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy’, *Foreign Policy magazine (USA)*, 20 May, viewed 20 December 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/article-by-h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu-published-in-foreign-policy-magazine- usa_-on-20-may-2010.en.mfa.

Turkish President A. Necdet Sezer emphasized the importance of Syrian troops withdrawal from Lebanon in line with the expectation of the international community and he was promised by the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad over the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in accordance with the 1559 UNSC Resolution.⁵⁷ Likewise, Turkey was also pressing Syria to cooperate with the international community on the investigation into the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (Kirişci, 2006, pp.78-79). For example, in November 2005, Abdullah Gül, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, visited Syria and urged the Syrian authorities to fully cooperate with the UN investigation commission in accordance with the 1636 UNSC Resolution.⁵⁸ Namely to hand over suspects of the Hariri assassination to the UN commission (Kirişci, 2006, p.78). Subsequently, on the 25th November 2005, the Syrian authorities allowed the UN investigators to question five officials over the assassination of Rafik Hariri.⁵⁹ Turkey's efforts were appreciated by the EU in the 2006 PRT. The Commission stated that "Relations with Syria continued to develop positively. Turkey has exerted efforts to convince the Syrian leadership to comply with international requests, in particular as concerns UN Decision 1636 in relation with the UN Commission's investigation into the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri" (European Commission, 2006, p.70).

Lastly, Turkey's efforts to mediate Syria-Israel peace process was also in line with the EU's common position. After Turkey had got involved with the issue in April 2007, the mediation activities between the sides intensified (Migdalovitz, 2010, pp.40). On 21 May 2008, Turkey announced that Israel and Syria had launched peace talks under the auspices of Turkey.⁶⁰ On 15-16 June 2008, the second round of the indirect peace talks between

⁵⁷ *Hürriyet News*, 'Onurlu cumhurbaşkanı hoşgeldiniz', 13 April, viewed 19 December 2018, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/onurlu-cumhurbaskani-hosgeldiniz-311456>.

⁵⁸ *BBC Turkish*, 2005, 'Gül, Şam'da Esad'la görüştü', 17 November, viewed 16 December 2018, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2005/11/051116_gul_update.shtml.

⁵⁹ *The Guardian*, 2005, 'Syria agrees to UN interviews', 25 november, viewed 22 December, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/nov/25/syria.unitednations>.

⁶⁰ Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008a, 'Press Release Regarding the Indirect Peace Talks between Syria and Israel under the auspices of Turkey', *Official website*, 21 may, viewed 17 December 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no-81---21-may-2008_-press-release-regarding-the-indirect-peace-talks-between-syria-and-israel-under-the-auspices-of-turkey-_unofficial-translation_.en.mfa.

Israel and Syria was completed in Turkey.⁶¹ During 2008, Turkey mediated indirect talks between Israel and Syria; as a result, in the 2008 PRT, Turkey was appreciated by the EU once again for being a contributor to the Middle East Peace Process. the Commission stated that “Turkey has been playing an active and constructive role in the Middle East. In line with the EU position, Turkey continued to support the Middle East peace process ... Turkey brokered indirect talks between Syria and Israel with a view to preparing a peace agreement between the two countries. In May and in June 2008 two rounds of indirect talks took place in Istanbul.” (European Commission, 2008, p.82-3).

By the way, while Turkey aligned itself with the EU’s common positions, the country continued to improve its relations with Syria. In this context, in 2007, ratification of the Free Trade Agreement between Turkey and Syria led to burgeoning economic ties, and the introduction of the visa-free travel scheme in 2009 contributed to the proliferation of tourism (Altunışık, 2016, p.39). The countries started to have joint meetings with the establishment of the High Level Cooperation Council in 2009. Erdoğan and Assad’s families developed close personal relations and even holidayed together (Altunışık, 2016, p.39). In addition, the two countries agreed on the dam project on the Orontes (Asi) River, called the Friendship Dam, and the agreement of it was signed by the sides a few months before the beginning of the Syrian uprising (ibid).

Consequently, as discussed in the end of the previous chapter, Turkey’s foreign policy activism, which claims itself as a “benign regional power”, in lined with the CFSP acquis. In this case, as revealed above, Turkish foreign policy towards Syria was also in lined with the CFSP chapter. Although the credibility of conditionality and the prospects for the EU membership decreased in Turkey after the end of 2004, the country aligned itself with the EU Council conclusions whilst it retained its commitment strategically for the EU accession. In addition, Turkey’s foreign policy activism in Syria which tried to persuade Syria to cooperate with the UN investigation commission and to withdraw its troops from Lebanon and which mediated Israel-Syria peace talks can also be considered

⁶¹ Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008b, ‘Press Release Regarding the Peace Talks Between Syria and Israel Under the Auspices of Turkey’, *Official website*, 16 June, viewed 21 December 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_106---16-june-2008_-press-release-regarding-the-peace-talks-between-syria-and-israel-under-the-auspices-of-turkey.en.mfa.

to be the attempts to consolidate Turkey's power and to raise Turkey's leadership potential in its region. In this context, Davutoğlu's doctrine which seeks to increase Turkey's leadership potential in its region through soft power oriented foreign policy actions (Oğuzlu, 2010, p.678) is also a driving force for the Turkey's foreign policy activism in Syria. That is to say, there was a "good fit" between the Turkish and EU policies.⁶² Thus, the "good fit" reduced the adoptions costs of the alignment to the CFSP on these three cases. Consequently, the *pulling* version of the 'improvement of accession', which stems from the 'desire for the EU membership' and which requires the adoption of the EU rules, policies or practices in the situations of low rate or lack of credible conditionality and low adoption costs, explains Europeanization of Turkish policy towards Syria between 2005 and 2010. Therefore, 'desire for the EU membership' and 'low adoption costs' as the facilitating factors and the pulling version of the improvement of accession as the mediating mechanism enabled the transformative role of the CFSP conditionality on Turkish policy towards Syria between 2005 and 2010 in the cases of the Hariri assassination, withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and relaunching of Syria-Israel peace talks.

⁶² When there is a "good fit" between the national and the EU pre-existing policies then adoption of EU policies is more likely; because, "although the pressure for change is high, the cost to do so is low, so change occur easily" (Ruano, 2011, p.16).

3.3 THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SYRIA AFTER 2011

In the “EU's response to the ‘Arab Spring’: The State-of-Play after Two Years” document, the EU presented its Syria policy within the context of Arab Spring.⁶³ Therefore, a brief overview of the EU's Arab Spring policy would be helpful to determine our research titles.

Prior to the Arab uprisings, the EU supported authoritarian North African regimes to cope with illegal immigration and terrorist activities (Noutcheva, 2015, p.22; Dandashly, 2015, p.38; Tömmel, 2013, p.36; Börzel and Hüllen, 2014, p.1045).⁶⁴ This fact was remorsefully acknowledged by the EU commissioner Stefan Füle. According to him “Europe should have backed democrats not dictators” (cited in Börzel and Hüllen, 2014, p.1045). With the Arab Spring, ‘a window of opportunity’ opened to the EU to support democratic movements and thus to alter repressive regimes (Tömmel, 2013, p.36; Dandashly, 2015; Börzel et al., 2015, p.141). The EU did not miss this opportunity and began to support democratic movements in the North African countries (Dandashly, 2015; Noutcheva, 2015, p.22; Börzel et al., 2015; Börzel and Hüllen, 2014, p.1045). Insomuch that, “democracy promotion as a goal became a priority with the outbreak of the Arab Spring events” for the EU (Dandashly, 2015, p.53). Almost from the very first days of the Arab Spring, the EU has expressed its political commitment for the political transition of the North African regimes.⁶⁵ In this context, firstly, the Union supported opposition movements politically whilst it strengthened its support with the restrictive measures against the North African regimes. In Tunisia, the Union gave its support to the

⁶³ European Union, 2013, *EU's response to the ‘Arab Spring’: The State-of-Play after Two Years*, 08 February, viewed 05 December 2018, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/135292.pdf.

⁶⁴ the Arab uprisings or Arab Spring is a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests that shook down the Arab world (Salih, 2013, p.184). The uprisings started in Tunisia on 18 December 2010 following of Mohammed Bouazizi's self-immolation in protest against corruption and ill-treatment (ibid). Within a year, the wave spread on Tunisia, Egypt and Libya that resulted in the overthrow of these regimes (ibid). The domino effect of the revolutionary wave reached Syria on 15 March 2011, when protesters wrote anti-regime slogans on walls in Deraa (Akilli, 2017:937). After protesters and their families harshly treated by the police, the protests spread and intensified in Syria (ibid). Syrian civil war still continues, with causing hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths, and forcing millions of Syrians to leave their homes and became refugees (Akilli, 2017, p.937).

⁶⁵ European Union, 2013, *EU's response to the ‘Arab Spring’: The State-of-Play after Two Years*, 08 February, page:2.

Tunisian opposition and imposed restrictive measures against the regime staffs including former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and his wife (Council of the European Union, 2011a).⁶⁶ In Libya, the Union gave its support to the National Transitional Council (NTC), which was established by Libyan oppositions, and imposed restrictive measures against the regime staffs including the former Libyan Muammar Gaddafi (European Council, 2011a; Council of the European Union, 2011b).⁶⁷ In Egypt, the EU consistently supported the opposition movements and imposed restrictive measures against the regime staffs including the former Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak and his family members (Council of the European Union, 2011c; European Council, 2011b; Council of the European Union, 2011d; Council of the European Union, 2011e). Likewise, as shown below, the Union has supported the Syrian opposition as well as imposed restrictive measures against the regime staffs including Syrian leader Bashar al Assad. Secondly, the EU did not give up its own security interests while giving its support for the opposition movements in these countries (Dandashly, 2015; Noutcheva, 2015, p.22; Börzel et al., 2015; Börzel and Hüllen, 2014, p.1045). The control of borders and migration flows, market liberalization and secure energy supply were in the EU's security agenda (Tömmel, 2013, p.34) but the migration flows were more prioritized by the EU during and after the uprisings (Tömmel, 2013, p.27; Dandashly, 2015, p.39; Noutcheva, 2015, p.22). The "EU's response to the 'Arab Spring': The State-of-Play after Two Years" document denotes migration flows, especially from Syria, as "outstanding security challenges".⁶⁸ In the post revolution period, the EU has quickly begun to revive its relations with Tunisia, Egypt and Libya and somehow the Union has widely able to prevent migration flows from these countries through its financial and technical assistance

⁶⁶ European Union, 2011a, *Statement by Catherine Ashton and Stefan Füle on the situation in Tunisia*, Brussels, 10 January, viewed 20 January 2018, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/118752.pdf;
European Union, 2011b, *Joint Statement by Catherine Ashton and Stefan Füle on the situation in Tunisia*, Brussels, 17 January, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/118873.pdf.

⁶⁷ *BBC News*, 2011, 'EU to open Benghazi office to aid Libya rebels', 11 May, viewed 05 December 2018, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13358887>; *BBC News*, 2011, 'Libya: Catherine Ashton opens EU office in Benghazi', 22 May, viewed 05 December 2018, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/mobile/world-africa-13494248>.

⁶⁸ European Union, 2013, *EU's response to the 'Arab Spring': The State-of-Play after Two Years*, 08 February, page: 1.

(Dandashly, 2015). However, in the case of Syria, the civil war still continues to threaten EU with its border security and migration issues.

Lastly, beyond the EU's Arab Spring policy, from 2014 the rise of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da'esh) in Syria and its effects beyond the Syrian borders, began to threaten Europe.⁶⁹ In the face of such a threat "Isolate and defeat Da'esh" became one of the EU's main objectives in Syria, in the middle of the Syrian civil war (Council of the European Union, 2015b, p.18). Along with other instruments which searching for lasting political solutions in Syria, "Stem the influx of foreign terrorist fighters, funds, and arms to Da'esh" and "Support and strengthen the anti-Da'esh forces" are two main strategies of the EU to isolate and defeat Da'esh (ibid). In this context, these two strategies are also vital to understand EU's Syria policy during the civil war. Therefore, they are also selected here as research titles.

Consequently, in line with the EU's Arab Spring policy "support for the Syrian oppositions" and "migration issues"; and in line with the Isolate and defeat Da'esh objective, "Stem the influx of foreign terrorist fighters, funds, and arms to Da'esh" and "Support and strengthen the anti-Da'esh forces" are the four research titles of this thesis to evaluate EU's foreign policy towards Syria and to compare it with Turkish foreign policy towards Syria after 2011.

3.3.1 EU's Support for the Syrian oppositions

The domino effect of the revolutionary wave reached Syria when protesters wrote anti-regime slogans on walls in Deraa on 15 March 2011 (Akilli, 2017, p.937). The protests spread and intensified in Syria when protesters and their families were harshly treated by the police (ibid). Only three days later, on 18 March, the High Representative Catherine Ashton called the Syrian authorities "to ensure the protection of peaceful demonstrators".⁷⁰ On 26 March 2011, Catherine Ashton urged the authorities "to exercise

⁶⁹ The Council stated that the ISIS "poses a clear threat ... to Europe directly. It has sponsored terrorist attacks on our soil and against our citizens overseas. The EU will use all its relevant tools to tackle the threat posed by ISIL/Da'esh and its violent ideology" (Council of the European Union, 2015b, p.2).

⁷⁰ European Union, 2011c, *Statement by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on the crackdown of demonstrations in Syria*, Brussels, 18 March, viewed 06 December 2018,

the utmost restraint across the country and to meet the legitimate demands and aspirations of the people...”.⁷¹ On 7 April 2011, the European Parliament called Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to “put an end to the policy of repression of political opposition and human rights defenders” and “to promote the process of democratic transition in Syria and to establish a concrete agenda for political, economic and social reforms”.⁷² Likewise, on 12 April 2011, the Council of the EU called Syrian authorities to “respond urgently to the legitimate demands of the Syrian people including through the lifting of the state of emergency” (Council of the European Union, 2011f). Thus, at the beginning of the civil war, the Democratic Movements in Syria, namely the Syrian oppositions was supported by various units of the EU, from the Council to the Parliament.

In the context of the restrictive measures, the EU has responded the violent repression by gradually extending restrictive measures since protests began in Syria and suspended its cooperation with the Syrian government under the ENP.⁷³ On 9 May 2011, the Council of the EU adopted an embargo decision on exports of arms and equipments that could be used for internal repression, as well as visa ban and assets freeze (Council of the European Union, 2011g). On 24 June, the Council of the EU implemented a regulation expanding restrictive measures on additional persons and entities who/which were responsible for the violent repression against civilians (Council of the European Union, 2011h). On 23 August, fifteen Syrian individuals and five entities were added to the list of asset freeze and travel ban (Council of the European Union, 2011i). On 2 September, the Council of the EU imposed new measures on Syrian oil import to the EU (Council of the European

http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/20160313172652/http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/120039.pdf.

⁷¹ European Union, 2011d, *Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the situation in Syria*, Brussels, 26 March, viewed 06 December 2018, http://collections.internetmemory.org/haeu/20160313172652/http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/120326.pdf.

⁷² European Parliament, 2011a, *Resolution of 7 April 2011 on the situation in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen*, Strasbourg, 7 April, viewed 07 December 2018, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2011-148>.

⁷³ European External Action Service (EEAS), 2017, ‘The EU and the crisis in Syria’, *Official website of the EU*, 20 September, viewed 15 February 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/22664/eu-and-crisis-syria_en.

Union, 2011j). On 13 October and 14 November, the Council of the EU tightened and reinforced the restrictive measures on Syria. Thus, the EU strengthened its support for the Syrian opposition by its restrictive measures (Council of the European Union, 2011k;L).

However, the pressure of the Syrian regime pushed Syrian oppositions to a more challenging path to establish a new democratic system. In order to help them, a large group of Syrian opponents from all parts of the world began to organize abroad with the EU's support. For example, in June 2011, the Syrian opponents held a conference in Brussels in which a strong message was given to the Syrian regime to end the massacre against its people and to leave the post of President.⁷⁴ On 8 July 2011, High Representative Catherine Ashton emphasized their key role in the national dialogue process.⁷⁵ In addition, on 10 October 2011, the Council of the EU called Syrian President Assad to step down and welcomed the efforts of the political opposition to establish a united platform and assessed the creation of the Syrian National Council as a positive step forward. (Council of the European Union, 2011m).⁷⁶ In the ongoing process, as Russia and China vetoed the United Nations (UN) initiative which would facilitate a solution in Syria, the Friends of the Syrian People Group (FSG) emerged in a search for an alternative solution (Miş, 2012, p.226). In fact, on 5 February 2012, after Russia and China vetoed a resolution at the UN Security Council, France President Nicolas Sarkozy said that "France is not giving up" and his country in touch with Arab and European partners to create a "Friends of the Syrian People Group".⁷⁷ Even before Sarkozy, on 10 October

⁷⁴ *Ikhwan Online News*, 2011, 'Closing Statement of the National Coalition's Conference to Support Syrian Revolution', 6 June, viewed 08 February 2018, <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=28683>.

⁷⁵ High Representative Catherine Ashton stated that "I want to stress again that a genuine national dialogue must be fully inclusive and take place without fear and intimidation. The opposition must play a key role in such a dialogue": European Union, 2011e, *Statement by the High Representative Catherine Ashton on the situation in Syria*, Brussels, 8 July, A 272/11, viewed 10 March 2018, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/123589.pdf.

⁷⁶ On 23 August 2011, The first core of the Syrian National Council (SNC) was established in İstanbul (Sandıklı and Semin, 2012, p.15). On 2 October 2011, a group of activists announced the creation of the SNC in İstanbul. The main objective of the SNC is to fulfill the wishes of the Syrian people, step down Assad regime and establish a Syrian government which represents all the Syrian people (Sandıklı and Semin, 2012, p.15).

⁷⁷ Irish, J. 2012, 'France, partners planning Syria crisis group: Sarkozy', *Reuters World News*, 5 February, viewed 08 February 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-france/france-partners-planning-syria-crisis-group-sarkozy-idUSTRE8130QV20120204>.

2011, Italy foreign minister Franco Frattini said that they “would very much like to have programmes if possible, roadmaps” for the SNC and “to have some alternative proposals, which should be frankly discussed at the level of the international community”.⁷⁸ With such support from Europe, on 24 February 2012, the first meeting of the Friends of Syria Group (FSG) was held in Tunisia with the participation of more than 60 countries and representatives from the European Union, the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, the Arab Maghreb Union and the Cooperation Council for the Arab Gulf States.⁷⁹ Moreover, on 10 December 2012, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (SOC or the National Coalition) was recognized as “legitimate representatives” of the Syrian people by the EU (Council of the European Union, 2011n).⁸⁰ On 20 April 2013, the SOC declared that the Supreme Military Council (SMC) is operating under its command.⁸¹ In addition, the 20 April 2013 declaration of the SOC emphasized its need for the weapons to defend themselves. The following month, the Council conclusion of 27 May 2013 welcomed the 20 April 2013 declaration of the SOC (Council of the European Union, 2013a). Moreover, the 27 May

⁷⁸ Rettman, A.2011, ‘EU takes step toward recognition of dissident Syria council’, *euobserver News*, 10 October, viewed 08 February 2018, <https://euobserver.com/foreign/113877>.

⁷⁹ Friends of Syria Group, 2011, *the Chairman's Conclusions of the FSG*, 24 February, Tunisia, viewed 08 February, <https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/02/184642.htm>.

⁸⁰ After the establishment of the SNC, the US foreign minister Hillary Clinton claimed -during her visit to Croatia on 2 November 2012- that the SNC did not represent Syria alone but a broadly participatory opposition structure, in which Kurds and Nusayrs were represented, should be created (Sandıklı and Semin, 2012, p.17). Within such an agenda, in November 2011, the SNC gathered together in Doha (ibid). End of the meetings, on 11 November, a new opposition framework was formed consisting of all the members of Syria under the name of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (SOC or the National Coalition) (ibid).

⁸¹ Syrian Opposition Forces (SOC), 2013, *Declaration by the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces*, 20 April, viewed 13 February 2018, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/Declaration-by-the-National-Coalition-for-Syrian-Revolution-and-Opposition-Forces-20-April-2013.pdf. In addition, on 1 November 2011, the SNC developed a plan to set up a Supreme Military Council (which consists of different military groups representatives) to support Free Syrian Army. In December 2012, the rebel leaders across Syria announced the election of new 30 members for unified command structure called as the Supreme Joint military Command Council or the Supreme military Command (SMC). In the following days they gathered together in Antalya to held a conference for an election; the conference was attended by more than 260 rebel commanders as well as security officials from the United States, Britain, France, the Gulf States, and Jordan (O’Bagy, 2013, p.9).

2013 Council declaration on Syria, allowed the possible export of arms to Syria which could be done by the member states (Council of the European Union, 2013b).

Consequently, as understood, the EU eagerly and consistently supported the Syrian opposition and used its restrictive measures as an instrument to contribute oppositions struggle vis-a-vis the Syrian regime. In this context, one can conclude that carrying Syrian opposition to success vis-a-vis the Syrian regime was one of the EU's priority in the early part of the Syrian civil war.

Need for Turkey's Support

Basically, as one of the EU's priority was to carry Syrian opposition to success vis-a-vis the Syrian regime in the early part of the Syrian civil war, Turkey became an important strategic actor in the eyes of EU. In this vein, the EU Council conclusion of 20 June 2011, committed to 'work together' with Turkey to address the situation in Syria (Council of the European Union, 2011o). In addition, as suggested by Stefan Füle (2011, p.19-21), Turkey as an important regional player has a great potential to play an important part in the ongoing transformation in the neighborhood and Turkey's support to democracy will reinforce and complement EU's action on democracy promotion for the realization of particular needs and the will of the Syrian people.⁸²

Consequently, Turkey had an incredible potential to carry Syrian opponents to success. Take a short glance at Turkey's support to Syrian opposition confirms its importance role. As a widely acknowledged fact, Turkey actively involved in organizing the Syrian opposition (Altunışık, 2016, p.40; Demirtaş, 2013, p.117; Hinnebusch, 2015; Phillips, 2017). The establishment of the Syrian National Council (SNC) was mainly based in Turkey and also the Free Syrian Army (FSA) established its command and headquarters in Hatay (Turkey) in October 2011 (Altunışık, 2016, p.41). Moreover, Turkey's involvement in regime change included all kinds of support to the opposition (ibid), from political and economic support to the military aid and training activities to the Syrian oppositions (Demirtaş, 2013, p.117). That is to say, it is hard to say that the establishment

⁸² Stefan Füle served as the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy from February 2010 until October 2014.

of the SNC could have taken place and the Syrian opponents could have carried out an effective struggle against the Syrian regime without Turkey's support.

3.3.2 EU's Migration Policy Towards Syrian Refugees

Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Syrian refugee flows to the Europe has threatened the Union (Benvenuti, 2017). According to the 2012 Frontex Annual Risk Analysis, Syrians' application for asylum filed at the air borders in 2011 increased from under 300 (in 2010) to over 700, the document also stressed the significant number of illegal border crossings attempts to Greece.⁸³ Nonetheless, the real threat from the Syrian refugee crises began to hit EU in 2014 (Özcan, 2017, p.10) when the Greek authorities frequently sent back Syrian refugees from Greek territorial waters and lands (Rittersberger-Tılıç, 2017, p.13). In the summer of 2015, the number of Syrian refugees who attempted to enter Europe rose steeply (Heck and Hess, 2017, p.35). In the early autumn of 2015 the refugee crisis reached the peak by hitting the EU seriously (Rittersberger-Tılıç, 2017, p.13). The number of refugees arriving to Europe increased from 542,680 (in 2014) to 1,255,640 in 2015 (İçduygu and Şimşek, 2017:85). In 2015, 857,363 people arrived Greece and 579,518 people crossed to Serbia; 556,830 people to Croatia; 388,233 people to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; 378,604 people to Slovenia to reach Germany and Nordic countries (Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2017, pp.62-3). The cross border migrant flows from Syria, forced Germany to strict border controls at its frontiers with Austria; only days after, Austria imposed new measures at its borders with Hungary, Italy, Slovakia and Slovenia (Scipioni, 2018, p.1365). Some European countries such as France, Denmark, Sweden and Austria suspended the Schengen temporarily and some countries such as Slovenia and Austria tried to block migration flows by metal fences (Fakhoury, 2016, p.71). That is to say, EU's Schengen system that allows free movement for European citizens was challenged by the Syrian refugee crisis (Rittersberger-Tılıç, 2017, pp.12-3). In these circumstances, the situation and purpose of the EU was summarized by Donald Tusk, the EU Council President, in two sentences,

⁸³ FRONTEX, 2012, *Annual Risk Analysis 2012*, Warsaw, April, viewed 15 November 2018, http://www.statewatch.org/observatories_files/frontex_observatory/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2012.pdf.

“the threat today is that of the disintegration of Europe,” and ‘our main goal is to stem the flow of migrants to Europe’ (cited in Düvell et al., 2018, pp.228-9).

Need for Turkey’s Support

At this point, Turkey’s strategic importance was raised once again since the country has a potential to stem the flow of migrants to Europe (Adam, 2017; Fakhoury, 2016, p.74; Heisbourg, 2015, p.15; Phinnemore and İçener, 2016, p.449; Turhan, 2016, p.471; İçduygu and Şimşek, 2017; Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2016, p.54; Düvell et al., 2018, p.229). Because, even at the very beginning of the Syrian civil war, the 2012 Frontex Annual Risk Analysis document pointed Turkey as a critical crossing point of the illegal transition attempts to Greece.⁸⁴ In 2015, from June to the end of September more than 334.000 (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2016, p.53), in October 221,663 and in November 151,249 refugees entered Greece from Turkey (Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2017, p.64). Therefore, ending border crossings from Turkey was the EU’s main goal to stem migration flows (Düvell et al., 2018, p.229). Consequently, the Syrian refugee crisis demonstrated that “the survival of the Schengen area largely depended on Turkey’s discretion in cooperation” (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2016, p.54). As stated by Jean Claude Juncker -the President of the European Commission-, “Turkey holds the key” to solve the Syrian refugee crisis and thus to rescue the EU’s Schengen system.⁸⁵ Likewise, French President Francois Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel referred to Turkey as being a key actor for the protection of the EU’s external borders (cited in Turhan, 2016, p.471).

⁸⁴ FRONTEX, 2012, Annual Risk Analysis 2012, Warsaw, April.

⁸⁵ *Bianet News*, 2016, ‘EU Meeting Protocol Leaked: Erdoğan Corners EU via Refugees’, 09 February, viewed 16 November 2018, <https://m.bianet.org/english/other/171924-eu-meeting-protocol-leaked-erdogan-corners-eu-via-refugees>.

3.3.3. EU's Efforts to Stem the Influx of Foreign Terrorist Fighters, Funds, and Arms to Da'esh

In the 16 March 2005 Council conclusions on the EU regional strategy, Da'esh is pointed out as “a clear threat to our partners in the Middle East, a threat to wider international security and to Europe directly” (Council of the European Union, 2015b, p.2). Regarding the EU's regional concerns, firstly, Da'esh terrorism damages a lasting Middle East peace and its influence may spread from Iraq and Syria to other countries and lead further destabilisation in the region (ibid, p.13). In this regard, the EU Global Strategy published in 2016 states that “our security at home entails a parallel interest in peace in our neighbouring and surrounding regions” (European External Action Service, 2016b, p.14). Secondly, Da'esh threat involves of a opportunity cost of losing Syria and Iraq as trade partners and energy providers (Council of the European Union, 2015b, p.13). Thirdly, Da'esh's barbaric acts against the peoples of Syria and Iraq result in violence and violation of human rights (ibid, p.2). In this regard, the EU Global Strategy states that “we will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted engagement further afield. We will act globally to address the root causes of conflict and poverty, and to champion the indivisibility and universality of human rights” (European External Action Service, 2016b, p.17). Therefore, together with the compelling reasons of self-interest for the EU to increase its engagement in Syria, “as an important actor in the region, the EU has a responsibility to ensure that it uses its influence and its numerous instruments effectively and coherently to defend human lives, human dignity and rights ...” against Da'esh in the region (Council of the European Union, 2015b, p.35).

Regarding the EU's concerns about Union's security, firstly, the chain of Da'esh's terrorist attacks in European countries which started with the Jewish museum killings in Brussels on 24 May 2014 and the attacks on the Charlie Hebdo magazine in Paris on 7 January 2015 which is likened to “A French September 11th.” and then Bataclan attacks in Paris (November 2015), the attacks at the Brussels (March 2016), Nice (July 2016), Berlin (December 2016), Manchester (May 2017), Barcelona (August 2017) created a major threat against Union's security on its soil. As stated by the Council, Da'esh poses a clear threat because “it has sponsored terrorist attacks on our soil and against our citizens

overseas” (Council of the European Union, 2015b, p.2). Secondly, the EU’s concerns is also related to the likelihood return of European Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) who participated in Da’esh in Syria or elsewhere; because this FTFs, who have gained combat experience in a conflict region, can carry out terrorist attacks in Europe. According to the The Soufan Group (TSG) Foreign Fighters report which is founded by the EU, by December 2015 more than 5,000 fighters from member states of the EU alone have made the trip to Syria; based on official estimates, almost 3,700 of the total 5,000+ European Union foreign fighter contingent come from France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium and between 2011-2016 approximately 1,200 are estimated to have already returned.⁸⁶ To be more specific, according to EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2017 prepared by the European Police Office (EUROPOL), returning of FTFs “who have received prolonged ideological indoctrination, military training in the use of weapons and explosives, or have gained combat experience during their stay in a conflict region”, poses strong security threat to the EU as this experience will have increased their proficiency in terms of carrying out attacks in the Union (EUROPOL, 2017, p.14). In short, as stated by the Council “the threat to the EU's security posed by EU nationals (and others) who have joined terrorist groups as foreign terrorist fighters” (Council of the European Union, 2015b, p.13). In the face of such a threat, the EU took necessary measures against Da’esh in order to defend and secure the Union and region and to stop violence and violation of human rights perpetrated by Da’esh.

In this context, in october 2014 the Council endorsed the EU counter terrorism/foreign fighters strategy and called the High Representative/Vice President to develop an EU comprehensive regional strategy against Da'esh threat (Council of the European Union, 2014). According to the EU counter terrorism/foreign fighters strategy, with particular focus on foreign fighters, the Council decided to improve cooperation with third countries to identify foreign fighters and counter terrorist financing, to build regional capacity to prevent weapons from seeping out of Syria and Iraq and to strengthen border security in

⁸⁶ The Soufan Group, 2015, “FOREIGN FIGHTERS: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq”, *The Soufan Group*, December, Available <https://wb-iisg.com/docs/foreign-fighters-an-updated-assessment-of-the-flow-of-foreign-fighters-into-syria-and-iraq/>; see also Scherrer, A. 2018, ‘The return of foreign fighters to EU soil’, *European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS)*, viewed 20 March 2019, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/621811/EPRS_STU\(2018\)621811_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/621811/EPRS_STU(2018)621811_EN.pdf).

countries surrounding Syria and Iraq (Council of the European Union, 2015a). In March 2015 the Council adopted “the regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da'esh threat”. The March 2015 Strategy comprises a detailed version of the EU counter terrorism/foreign fighters strategy and allocated EUR 1 billion Euro for the implementation of the strategy (Council of the European Union, 2015b). In April 2015, the Council and the European Parliament adopted new rules to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing (Council of the European Union, 2015c). In October 2015, the Council adopted conclusions on the measures to fight trafficking in firearms (Council of the European Union, 2015d). In December 2015, European Council called related units for stepping up action against terrorism to enhance information sharing, implement systematic and coordinated checks at external borders, take further action against terrorist financing, strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation with countries in the Middle East and North Africa, Turkey and the Western Balkans (European Council, 2015c). In January 2016, The European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) was launched in order to increase information sharing and operational cooperation with regard to the investigation of foreign terrorist fighters and the trafficking of illegal firearms and terrorist financing (EUROPOL, 2016a). In April 2016, the Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted a directive on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data collection system regarding passengers flying to and from the EU in order to prevent and detect terrorist offences (Council of the European Union, 2016a). In May 2016, the Council reviewed the implementation of ‘the regional strategy for Syria and Iraq as well as the Da'esh threat’ and adopted new conclusions; accordingly, the EU will increase its counter-terrorism action and continue to cooperate with third countries to counter radicalisation and to stop terrorist financing (Council of the European Union, 2016b). In March 2017, the Council adopted a regulation to reinforce the checks against relevant databases on all persons, including EU citizens and members of their families who are not EU citizens when they cross the external borders (Council of the European Union, 2017). In June 2017 the European Council reaffirmed its commitment to prevent and counter violent extremism and to tackle terrorism financing and to fight against online radicalisation (European Council, 2017). In addition to these measures, as stated below, the EU has supported anti-Da'esh Forces’ military campaign against Da’esh.

3.3.4 EU's efforts to Support and Strengthen the anti-Da'esh Forces

In December 2014, the first ministerial level meeting of the Global Coalition against Daesh brought together the ministers from 60 partner countries in Brussels (European External Action Service, 2014). Today the Coalition has 80 members including the EU. The Coalition not only takes the military actions against Da'esh but also works on “tackling Daesh’s financing and economic infrastructure; preventing the flow of foreign terrorist fighters across borders; supporting stabilisation and the restoration of essential public services to areas liberated from Daesh; and countering the group’s propaganda” (Global Coalition, 2019). The EU is a non-military partner in the Global Coalition to counter Daesh which aims to enhance cooperation with countries in the region on counterterrorism and to develop projects on counter-terrorism, counter radicalisation, domestic and border security (ibid). But it does not mean that the EU against military operations of the Global Coalition. Although the EU has not been tasked by the European Council to engage at the level of the EU in military operations, the Union supports the efforts of the Coalition “including military action in accordance with international law” (Council of the European Union, 2015b, p.18). In addition, the EU politically backed the Global Coalition to supply of lethal and non-lethal equipment to the moderate opposition in Syria and to train them, insofar as this is practicable (ibid).

Lastly, which is the most controversial issue between the European Union and Turkey in Syria is the EU’s political support to the People’s Protection Units (YPG) fighting against Da’esh in its claimed region Rojava.⁸⁷ For example, when Da’esh attacked the YPG in Kobane -a Syrian town bordering Turkey- in the last quarter of 2014, a number of Kurdish protestors met with the President of the European Parliament, Martin Schulz in Brussels on 7 October 2014. Following the meeting he stated that “I fully shared their concern ... specifically on the situation in the border town of Kobane in Syria. I reiterated the support of the European Parliament for the international coalition fighting against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq” (European Parliament, 2014a). In addition, in the 22 October 2014

⁸⁷ The People’s Protection Units (YPG) is a Kurdish military force in northern Syria which known as the militia of Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD). Turkey recognizes the YPG/PYD as a terrorist organization working against Turkey’s territorial integrity. In addition, present geography of Rojava consists of Afrin (overthrown by the Olive Branch Operation), Kobane and Jazira cantons in northern Syria along the borders with Turkey.

European Parliament debate in its plenary session about the situation in the Syrian city of Kobane, many Member of the European Parliament called and pressed Turkey to do more to help Kurds fight against Da'esh in Kobane (European Parliament, 2014b). However, it should be noted that the EU's political support to the YPG is not given on a large scale; because, the EU member states do not talk with one voice regarding the YPG by and large. In this context, some European states away from the YPG because of its ties with the Syrian regime; as a matter of fact, the YPG and Syrian regime forces cooperated in Hassakeh (Salih, 2015, p.9). For example, in March 2015 the Secretariat of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs emphasized that "the UK has consistently made it clear that it will be very difficult to provide any support to the PYD while they maintain links to the Assad regime" (The UK Foreign Affairs, 2015). Also, the member states have concerns that Kurdish attempts to control local Arabs areas would provoke the new conflicts in Syria and empowerment of the YPG would also risk for the territorial integrity of Syria (Barnes-Dacey, 2017, p.3; Kızıllkan, 2019, p.328). Lastly, although the Council stated that "EU support for Kurdish armed resistance to Da'esh must be accompanied by strong assurances to the states of the region of continued EU respect for their territorial integrity" (Council of the European Union, 2015b, p.16), some member states like Germany and Belgium are reluctant to engage with the PYD openly due to the concerns about Turkey which recognizes the YPG as a terrorist organization working against Turkey's territorial integrity (Özer and Kaçar, 2018, p.186). Because Turkey is an important actor to fight against Da'esh and is a key crossing point for Syrian refugees arriving in Europe, so any action which anger Turkey would undermine the fight against Da'esh and jeopardize the Schengen area (ibid). Additionally, in March 2015 the UK stated also that "we are concerned that the PYD maintains some links with the PKK" (The UK Foreign Affairs, 2015). On the contrary, in February 2015, French President François Hollande hosted co-leader of the PYD, Asya Abdullah, at the Elysee Palace, "much to the ire of Turkey" (Salih, 2015, p.9; see also Taştekin, 2015) and his successor Emmanuel Macron's office said in a statement: "He assured the SDF [which contains the YPG forces] of France's support for the stabilization of the security zone in the north-east of Syria, within the framework of an inclusive and balanced governance, to prevent any resurgence of Islamic State" (Irish and Pennetier, 2018). In addition, in January 2016, the co-chair of the PYD, Saleh Muslim, attended an international conference in the European

Parliament (European Parliament, 2016). Consequently, it is appropriate to say that the EU's approach towards the YPG is "protective but sceptical" during the Syrian civil war (Yırcalı, 2017, p.14; Kızılkın, 2019, p.328).

So far, the EU's foreign policy towards Syria after 2011 was evaluated under the specified titles, after here Turkish foreign policy towards Syria will be evaluated and then compared with the EU's under the same titles to determine the convergence or divergences between the EU and Turkey policies, in a framework of the Europeanization concept.

3.4 TRACING THE EU'S IMPACT ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SYRIA AFTER 2011

3.4.1 Turkey's Support for the Syrian opposition: Pushing and Europeanization

At the beginning of the Syrian uprisings, Turkey tried to convince Syrian leader Bashar al Assad to make minor reforms (Itani and Stain, 2016, p.3; Demirtaş, 2013, p.116) rather than announcing restrictive measures or calling him to step down. Hence, on 13 May 2011, Erdoğan said, Bashar al-Assad "might have been late in implementing reforms, however, it is too soon to call him to step down".⁸⁸ On the other hand, Turkey was actively supporting the Syrian opposition; for example, on 31 May - 3 June 2011, the Syria Conference for Change took place in Antalya, in which the participants called the Syrian president to step down.⁸⁹ That is to say, Turkey was supporting the Syrian opposition politically without breaking its relations with the Syrian regime. Namely, the initial response of Turkey to the Syrian uprising was balanced between the Syrian regime and opposition (Demirtaş, 2013, p.112). Whereas, on 23 May 2011, the EU suspended its cooperation with the Syrian Government and Turkey did not announce any restrictive measures against the Syrian regime until the end of November 2011 whilst the EU has

⁸⁸ *DÜNYA Online News*, 2011, 'Erdoğan: It is soon to call ASAD to step down...', 13 May, viewed 07 February 2018, <https://www.dunya.com/gundem/erdogan-it-is-soon-to-call-asad-to-step-down-hamas-is-not-a-terrorist-haberi-144941>.

⁸⁹ Syrian Oppositions, 2011, *the Final Declaration of the Antalya Opposition Conference*, 04 June, viewed 08 February 2018, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dmas/dv/antal/antalya.pdf.

gradually extended its restrictive measures since the beginning of the civil war. It is probable that the postponing of the restrictive measures is a tactic to keep the Syrian regime within Turkey's balance game. Otherwise, it would be more difficult to maintain the balance between the regime and opposition. But, in terms of the restrictive measures, Turkey's balance game was not in line with the CFSP. As indicated above, the restrictive measures were the complementary item of the support for the Syrian opposition. For this reason, Turkey was expected to announce restrictive measures against the Syrian regime. Because, in line with the conditionality mechanism, the candidate states are expected to transform their foreign policies in line with the CFSP since the CFSP Chapter of community acquis invite candidate states for "full compliance" (Hisarlioğlu, 2015, p.71). However, the effectiveness of the conditionality is more likely when there is 'credible conditionality' (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.663). As discussed above, it's hard to claim the presence of credible conditionality after 2005. At this point, this thesis' assumption is that in the situations of the low rate or lack of 'credible conditionality', if candidate states have enough power to use as a bargaining chip vis-a-vis the EU and if they have desire for the EU membership then they may try to *push* the EU to improve their accession by actively bargaining. Firstly, this was an situation of low rate or lack of 'credible conditionality'. Secondly, as can be understood from the JDP's 2011 election manifesto in which the party gave its commitment for EU accession, Turkey had desire for the EU membership. Lastly, Turkey had enough power to use as a bargaining chip vis-a-vis the EU. Because, one of the EU's priorities was to carry Syrian opposition to success vis-a-vis the Syrian regime and Turkey had the potential to do it. Namely, Turkey acquired an ability to affect EU's expected foreign policy outcome which was wishing to carry Syrian opposition to success.⁹⁰ According to Stefan Füle (2011, p.21), Turkey's support to democracy will reinforce and complement

⁹⁰ Superior bargaining power, "resulting from asymmetrical interdependence in favour of the EU, is a precondition for the ability of the EU to withhold rewards if its conditions have not been met" (Sedelmeier, 2011, p.14). However, when the subject is Turkey, its economic strength, political power and self-understanding "as a regional power render its relations with the EU far less asymmetrical" than Western Balkan and current candidate countries (Börzel and Soyaltın, 2012, p.11). In that case, as Turkey relation with the EU "far less asymmetrical", it is possible to say that Turkey can use its power resources vis-a-vis the EU to improve its accession process. As the "power can be conceived in terms of control over outcomes" (Keohane and Nye, 2011, p.10), any tools that give an ability to control over outcomes can be considered as power resource. In this context, if Turkey acquire an ability to effect EU's expected foreign policy outcomes then the asymmetrical interdependence which in favour of the EU can be broken, and with this ability Turkey can bargain vis-a-vis the EU to improve its accession.

EU's actions on democracy promotion for the realization of particular needs and the will of the Syrian people.

In this context, on the one hand, the 'misfit' between the EU and Turkey's foreign policies on restrictive measures had to be fixed in order to achieve a strengthened cooperation in Syria affairs. For this reason, the EU pressed Turkey to align itself with EU's restrictive measures on Syria (European Commission, 2011a, p.106). On the other hand, conditionality must be credible otherwise 'adoption costs' would increase (Kirişci, 2007, p.2; Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004, pp.432-3). In this context, in the absence of credible conditionality, adoption of restrictive measures on Syria would have been too costly for Turkey. Because it may destroy the Turkey's 'zero problem with neighbors' policy, indeed, it was so. Therefore, as there was no credible conditionality there had to be a concrete instrument which provide Turkey 'credible conditionality' to reduce adoption costs. In fact, such instrument was demanded by Davutoğlu even before the Syrian civil war in July 2010 at the Turkey-EU Political Dialogue Meeting in İstanbul, and its necessity reiterated on 19 April 2011 while Syrian civil war was intensifying. In this regard, on 19 April 2011, Davutoğlu gave a speech at the 49th meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council in Brussels. Davutoğlu said:

I have put forward certain proposals to enhance Turkey-EU strategic political dialogue during the first Turkey-EU Political Dialogue Meeting in İstanbul on 13 July 2010 ... Since then, we have been awaiting for concrete steps to be taken. For example, the Foreign Affairs Council held on 12 April where Libya was discussed could have been yet another opportunity to this end. We take note of EU's readiness to intensify its existing dialogue with Turkey on foreign policy issues of mutual interest. However, we do not see any enthusiasm from the EU side to coordinate its policies with Turkey at institutional level.⁹¹

An important note, the proposals to enhance Turkey-EU strategic political dialogue includes that "the development of Turkish-EU strategic dialogue in different areas will not be a substitute to progress in accession negotiations but rather complement them".⁹²

⁹¹ EU-Turkey Association Council, 2011, *49th meeting of the EU-Turkey Association Council (19 April 2011)*, page: 3.

⁹² Ibid.

Namely, Turkey demanded ‘credible conditionality’ for its cooperation in the foreign policy issues.

In this context, during 2011 Turkey *pushed* EU to have credible conditionality, namely to reduce adoption costs. As a matter of fact, during 2011 a number of meetings were held between the EU and Turkey, from enhanced political dialogue to political dialogue at director level, also a number of high level visits from Turkey to the European institutions took place and foreign policy issues relating to regions such as the Middle East were regularly discussed (European Commission, 2011a, p.4). As a result of these meetings and visits foreign policy dialogue between the EU and Turkey stepped up on Syria and on 12 October 2011, the Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges Paper 2011-2012 released a fresh agenda called as ‘Positive Agenda’ (PA) based on the search for progress in Turkey's alignment with the EU.⁹³

The PA “is the instrument that aims to put the relationship between the EU and Turkey in order and accelerate the negotiation process, which has been on the shelf for a very long time” (Demiral, 2014, p.1012). The PA is not an alternative to the accession negotiations but should be supportive and complementary to this process.⁹⁴ A broad range of common interest areas such as foreign policy dialogue, alignment with the European Union acquis, practical progress on visas and such were included into the PA and one of the priorities of the Agenda “working jointly on foreign policy challenges like Syria”.⁹⁵ Although the Commission stated clearly that the PA will work in the accession process, initially there was a weak doubt if the PA replace the accession negotiations (Akçay,

⁹³ European External Action Service (EEAS), 2011, *2011 Annual Activity Report*, p. 7, viewed 10 March 2018, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/20121017_eeas_aar_2011_en.pdf; European Commission, 2011b, *Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012*, Brussels, 12 October, p. 19, viewed 09 December 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/strategy_paper_2011_en.pdf.

⁹⁴ European Union, 2011f, ‘Stefan Füle’s keynote speech for the dinner of the TUSKON/EPC Conference (İstanbul 17-18 November 2011)’, *Press Release*, viewed 10 March 2018, <https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/news/stefan-fule-commissioner-enlargement-and-european-neighbourhood-policy-2299>.

⁹⁵ Stefan Füle, 2011, ‘Enlargement Package 2011: Address to the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) of the European Parliament’, Brussels, 12 October, viewed 16 May 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-11-652_en.htm; European Commission, 2012a, ‘EU-Turkey: Commissioner Stefan Füle to launch positive agenda’, *Press Release*, 16 May, viewed 10 March 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-358_en.htm?locale=en.

2017, pp.45-6).⁹⁶ In order to resolve these doubts, on 9 November, Stefan Füle and Egemen Bağış emphasized that the PA is not to replace, but to complement the accession process.⁹⁷ On 17-18 November, Stefan Füle visited Turkey and gave a speech about the PA. In his speech, he emphasized the PA's role as a complement to accession process.⁹⁸ In this context, -along with the other factors that pointed out below- after Turkey being convinced, on 22 November 2011 (following month of which the Council of the EU called al-Assad to step aside [The European Union, 2011o]) Turkish Prime Minister R.T. Erdoğan called Bashar al Assad to step aside.⁹⁹ On 30 November 2011 the country announced restrictive measures against Syria including a travel ban, a freeze of assets, trade restrictions (European Commission, 2012b, p.88), prohibition of selling weapons and military equipment and prevention of transferring weapons and military equipment from third countries in Turkish national airspace and territorial waters.¹⁰⁰ On 13 December 2011, the European Parliament welcomed the economic sanctions imposed by Turkey.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ Stated by the Commission, "The Commission will work to launch a new virtuous circle in the accession process with Turkey. Based on a pragmatic approach and incorporating concrete steps in areas of common interest, a joint understanding of constraints and a search for progress in Turkey's alignment with the EU, a fresh and positive agenda should be developed, to enable a more constructive and positive relationship": European Commission, 2011b, *Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011-2012*, Brussels, 12 October, p. 19, viewed 10 March 2018,

https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhoodenlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/strategy_paper_2011_en.pdf.

⁹⁷ European Commission, 2011c, 'Statement by Commissioner Stefan Füle following his meeting with Egemen Bağış Turkish Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator', *Press Release*, 09 November, viewed 10 March 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-772_en.htm.

⁹⁸ Some parts of Stefan Füle's speech: "Ladies and gentlemen, let us avoid any misunderstandings: the positive agenda is a complement to, not a replacement for the accession process."; "The "positive agenda" provides a realistic and feasible way to inject new life into EU-Turkey relations in general, and into the accession process in particular."; "This agenda will build on the achievements of the accession process and our joint interest, and give a new momentum to our relations": Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, 2011, 'Stefan Füle's keynote speech for the dinner of the TUSKON/EPC Conference', İstanbul 17-18 November 2011.

⁹⁹ *Hürriyet Daily News*, 2011, 'Avoid Gadhafi's fate, Erdoğan tells Assad', 23 November, viewed 10 March 2018, <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/avoid-gadhafis-fate-erdogan-tells-assad-7525>.

¹⁰⁰ *TRT News*, 2011, 'Suriye'ye 9 Yaptırım Kararı', 30 November, viewed 10 March 2018, <http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/suriyeye-9-yaptirim-karari-18198.html>.

¹⁰¹ European Parliament, 2011b, *European Parliament resolution on the situation in Syria*, 13 December, viewed 11 February 2019,

Consequently, as suggested by Börzel and Soyaltın, various power resources such as “economic strength, political power and self-understanding as a regional power” render Turkey relations with the EU are “far less asymmetrical” than other candidate states (2012, p.11). In that case, Turkey’s ability to affect EU’s expected foreign policy outcome, which aimed to carry Syrian opponents to success, broke asymmetrical interdependence which is in favour of the EU and provided Turkey power resource to vis-a-vis the EU in this bargaining process. Thus, Turkey got a chance to *improve* its accession by *pushing* the EU to have ‘credible conditionality’. Here, the PA is a concrete form of the ‘coherent implementation of conditionality’ which one of the indicators of the ‘credible conditionality trilogy’. In this sense, Turkey’s *pushing* for ‘coherent implementation of conditionality’ had succeeded. According to Egemen Bağış, “the Positive Agenda process between Turkey and the EU is a result of Turkey’s efforts, which **pushed** the bloc to come with the idea” and Bağış sees the PA as “a diplomatic success for Turkey”.¹⁰² Although the PA was found inadequate to improve Turkey’s accession process (Demiral, 2014), the initial cheery mood of Egemen Bağış reveals that Turkey found some prospect for the EU membership (at least at a low degree) as the PA is a form of ‘coherent implementation of conditionality’.¹⁰³ In addition, the Commission’s contribution to release the PA and the European Commissioner, Stefan Füle’s attempts to convince Turkey about reliability of the PA are the signs of the ‘EU level commitment’. Lastly, it is hard to say that there was also ‘member state’s commitment’; because, French

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B7-2011-0722&language=EN>.

¹⁰² *Hurriyet Daily News*, 2012, ‘Positive agenda is a diplomatic success’, 12 September, viewed 10 March 2018, <http://www.hurriyetcailynews.com/positive-agenda-is-a-diplomatic-success-29920>.

¹⁰³ Nevertheless, after the PA, the process of negotiations between the EU and Turkey began to experience a revitalization (Akçay, 2017, p.47). For example, on 14 June 2012, Turkey adopted “Turkey-EU Positive Agenda: Enhanced EU-Turkey Energy Cooperation”, in Stuttgart. The document accepted Turkey as an energy bridge and potential energy center and emphasized strengthening of this situation that would be beneficial for both Turkey and the EU (Akçay, 2017, p.47). Also, In June 2013, the Council agreed to open Chapter 22 -Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments- (European Commission, 2013, p.4), which was opened the negotiations on 5 November 2013, after a long time of three and a half years as the last accession conference took place in June 2010 (Demiral, 2014, p.1013). Please see more for the “Turkey-EU Positive Agenda: Enhanced EU-Turkey Energy Cooperation Has Been Adopted”: Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012a, ‘Turkey-EU Positive Agenda: Enhanced EU-Turkey Energy Cooperation Has Been Adopted’, *Official website*, 28 June, viewed 10 March 2018, https://www.ab.gov.tr/47912_en.html.

leader Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel were still against Turkey's accession to the Union.¹⁰⁴ That is to say, in the context of the *credible conditionality trilogy*, 'member states's commitment' was not provided. But the PA, namely 'coherent implementation of conditionality' and 'EU level commitment' provided Turkey some 'credible conditionality' and thus 'prospect for the EU membership' (at low degree or short size) to announce restrictive measures against the Syrian regime and to call the Syrian leader to step aside. In addition, with the exception of the EU's impact, the USA was also pressing Turkey to impose further measures against the Syrian regime (Miş, 2011; 2012). Also, Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries recalled their ambassadors from Syria and the Arab League condemned the Syrian regime several times and announced restrictive measures (ibid). Namely, there was a pressure on Syrian regime from the Arab world which also would effect Turkey to break its balance game in Syria. Lastly, with the escalation of the Syrian civil war Turkish government was beginning to see the Syrian civil war as an internal issue due to the historical/cultural ties with the Syrians and its security concerns.¹⁰⁵ That is to say, the historical/cultural ties and security concerns has also caused Turkey to take harshly measures against the Syrian regime. In sum, there were also other endogeneous and exogenous factors which caused Turkey to announce restrictive measures against the Syrian regime. But, the EU's impact important enough not to be overlooked. Thus, in the end of the such a bargaining process, Turkish foreign policy Europeanized through the CFSP conditionality. That is to say, through the pushing version of the improvement of accession, Turkey obtained 'credible conditionality' that provided Turkey with 'prospect for the EU membership'. Thus, 'credible conditionality' and 'prospect for the EU membership' enabled the transformative role of EU's conditionality on Turkish foreign policy towards Syria in the case of the imposition of restrictive measures.

¹⁰⁴ *Deutsche Welle Act*, 2011, 'Turkey not fit for EU accession: Sarkozy', 26 February, viewed 08 November 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/turkey-not-fit-for-eu-accession-sarkozy/a-14875593>; Özlem, G. & Reimann A. 2011, 'Erdogan Urges Turks Not to Assimilate', *Spiegel Online*, 28 February, viewed 08 November 2018, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/erdogan-urges-turks-not-to-assimilate-you-are-part-of-germany-but-also-part-of-our-great-turkey-a-748070.html>.

¹⁰⁵ The then Prime Minister, R.T. Erdoğan stated that "the Syrian issue is our internal issue. Because we have 850 kilometers border land with Syria ...": *SABAH News*, 2011, 'Davutoğlu Suriye yolcusu', 7 August, viewed 10 March 2018, <https://www.sabah.com.tr/dunya/2011/08/07/davutoglu-suriye-yolcusu-407105365435>.

3.4.2 Turkey's Migration Policy Towards Syrian Refugees: Pushing and Europeanization

When the Syrian uprisings were broken out in the spring of 2011, Turkey's initial response to the Syrian refugee flows was the introduction of "open door policy" which welcomed all Syrian refugees unconditionally (Heck and Hess, 2017, p.42). The legal status of the Syrian refugee initially was referred to as 'Syrian guests' but when the numbers of refugees overran 100,000 a new directive adopted by the Turkish government in October 2012 introduced a 'temporary protection regime' for Syrian refugees (Memişoğlu and Ilgıt, 2017, p.324). Two years later in October 2014, a Regulation on Temporary Protection allowed the Syrians to access social services such as education, medical care, social aid and the labour market (ibid). In addition, in January 2016 a Regulation on work permit was passed which facilitates the Syrians' application for work permits (İçduygu and Şimşek, 2017, p.86). On the one hand, in the case of the costs of refugees to Turkey, since the beginning of the Syrian uprisings the country has spent more than 25 billion USD for Syrian refugees and is still hosting more than 3 million warworn Syrians (Adam, 2017, p.53). In the context of labor market and security issues, the Syrian refugees are targeted to increase unemployment and decrease informal and formal employment (Esen and Binatlı, 2017). Also they have been associated with the crimes and terrorism (Koca, 2016, p.72). An another aspect of the Syrian refugee crisis is that Syrian refugees flows gave Turkey an extraordinary bargaining power vis-a-vis the EU to improve its accession process to the Union (Okay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2016; Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2017; Benvenuti, 2017; Düvell et al., 2018, p.229; Fakhoury, 2016, p.74; Adam, 2017, p.45; Icoz and Martin, 2016, p.443; Phinnemore and İçener, 2016, p.449; Turhan, 2016, p.477; Rittersberger-Tılıç, 2017).

In that case, Turkey acquired an ability to affect EU's expected foreign policy outcome which aimed to stem Syrian refugee flows. Thus, with such power, Turkey was able to break asymmetrical interdependence infavor of the EU and got a chance to *improve* its accession by *pushing* the EU to have 'credible conditionality' and to open new negotiation chapters.¹⁰⁶

Since 2003 the EU was unable to persuade Turkey to sign the readmission agreement which requires the getting back of irregular immigrants who pass the EU via Turkey (Bürgin, 2016, p.110). Because, while the EU induced Western Balkan countries with visa liberalisation in return for the readmission agreement, Turkey was offered only visa facilitations (ibid). That is to say, there were ‘double standards in EU’s implementation of conditionality’. Fortunately, in June 2012 member states mandated the Commission to start a visa liberalisation dialogue with Turkey (ibid). On 16 December 2013 the EU and Turkey signed the readmission agreement and simultaneously the visa liberalisation dialogue was launched with Turkey (European Commission, 2014a, p.63). The visa liberalisation incentive offered by the EU is an important factor for Turkey to sign the Readmission Agreement (Bürgin, 2016). But, there should have been credibility as well for the implementation of the agreement. Because, an incentive or a reward alone is not enough, in order to conduct an effective conditionality the candidate states must be convinced about the rewards that they will receive when they fulfill the EU’s demands (Sedelmeier, 2011:12). That is to say, there must be ‘credible conditionality’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.666).

In the context of the *credible conditionality trilogy*, during the visa liberalisation process, the Commission had a crucial role to start visa liberalisation dialogue and to sign Readmission Agreement with Turkey; for example, the Commission concerned to maintain the credibility of the EU with arguing that “Turkey should be offered the same conditions as those applied in the Balkan precedent” (cited in Birgün, 2016, p.110). That is to say, there was a ‘EU level commitment’ from the Commission. Also, there was a signal for the ‘coherent implementation of conditionality’; because, in June 2012 when the European Council mandated the Commission to start talks with Turkey on visa

¹⁰⁶ Superior bargaining power, “resulting from asymmetrical interdependence in favour of the EU, is a precondition for the ability of the EU to withhold rewards if its conditions have not been met” (Sedelmeier, 2011, p.14). However, when the subject is Turkey, its economic strength, political power and self-understanding “as a regional power render its relations with the EU far less asymmetrical” than Western Balkan and current candidate countries (Börzel and Soyaltın, 2012, p.11). In that case, as Turkey relation with the EU “far less asymmetrical”, it is possible to say that Turkey can use its power resources vis-a-vis the EU to improve its accession process. As the “power can be conceived in terms of control over outcomes” (Keohane and Nye, 2011, p.10), any tools that give an ability to control over outcomes can be considered as power resource. In this context, if Turkey acquire an ability to effect EU’s expected foreign policy outcomes then the asymmetrical interdependence which in favour of the EU can be broken, and with this ability Turkey can bargain vis-a-vis the EU to improve its accession.

liberalisation, the implementation of conditionality was stated on an equal-footing with the other candidates (such as Western Balkan countries) that relieved Turkey of being treated in double-standards. In the context of the ‘member states’ commitment’, in 2012 when Francois Hollande came to power as French President, his assessments on Turkey’s accession demonstrated shifting attitude of France from opposing to supporting Turkish accession (Phinnemore and İçener, 2016, p.454). Thus, as a key player in the formation EU’s policies (Turhan, 2016), France committed support for Turkey’s accession. As a result of these three indicators, Turkey provided some “credible conditionality” and subsequently Turkey’s prospect for the EU membership increased at low degree. At that time, the ‘credibility of conditionality’ was enough to sign the 2013 Readmission Agreement but it was unsatisfactory for implementation. Firstly, the visa liberalisation incentive is given in return for the implementation of the Readmission Agreement but the implementation of the agreement would be commenced with an Action Plan (Aka and Özkural, 2015, pp.263-4). However, the joint Action Plan between the EU and Turkey - which was built on the visa liberalisation dialogue, the visa roadmap and the provisions of the EU-Turkey readmission agreement- was reached at the end of 2015.¹⁰⁷ As the Action Plan is a complementary element for the implementation of the agreement, its absence may undermined the credibility of the implementation of conditionality. Secondly, Germany was so sceptical about Turkey’s accession. For example, on the 23rd February 2013, Chancellor Angela Merkel asserted her support for the opening of a new chapter in Turkey’s accession talks, on the other hand, in June 2013, when Turkey expected the launch of talks on Chapter 22, Germany -as a key player in the formation of EU’s policies- vetoed the launch of the chapter even though 25 member states of the EU adopted a common position to open it (Turhan, 2016, p.470). Thus, the uncertain commitment of Germany may be an another factor that reduced the ‘credibility of conditionality’ in the eyes of Turkey. For this reason, although Turkey signed the Readmission Agreement in December 2013 the ‘credibility of conditionality’ was not

¹⁰⁷ European Commission, 2015, ‘EU-Turkey joint action plan’, 15 October, viewed 27 March 2019, [https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO-15-5860_en.htm](https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5860_en.htm).

provided at a satisfactory degree; therefore, the implementation of Readmission Agreement was partially fulfilled by Turkey on border management.¹⁰⁸

In mid-2015, the escalation of the Syrian civil war caused enormous refugee flows to the EU by crossing the Aegean sea route via Turkey; thus increased refugee flows “gave a new meaning to the prompt implementation of the Readmission agreement” (Turhan, 2016, p.471). In the 2014 and 2015 progress reports for Turkey, the EU called Turkey to implement the Readmission agreement fully and effectively vis-a-vis all member states (European Commission, 2014, p.4; 2015, p.69). However, hosting of Syrian refugees has been costly for Turkey.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, as mentioned above, the low rate of credible conditionality added on them and increased adoption costs for the implementation of the Readmission agreement on the border management.¹¹⁰ Therefore, in the situation of high adoption costs and low credible conditionality, Turkey tried to reduce adoption costs by *pushing* the EU not only to get credible conditionality for the visa liberalization but also to open new chapters and to get an economic grant. In this context, during German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s visit to Turkey on 18 October, Turkey stressed its demands for the launch of accession talks on chapters 15, 17, 23, 24, 31 and asserted that if the conditions will not met then there would be no deal (cited in Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2016, p.56; Turhan, 2016, p.472). Besides, Erdoğan’s meeting with Juncker and Tusk in November 2015 demonstrates that Turkey was bargaining hard by pushing the EU for the opening of new chapters (cited in Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2016, p.59). It seems that the visa liberalization was a weak incentive in the eyes of Turkey; therefore Turkey *pushed* the EU to improve its accession process on new chapters as well. The *pushing* efforts of Turkey had succeeded; because, according to ‘the 29 November 2015

¹⁰⁸ According to the Commission’s visa implementation report of 20 October 2014, “The number of irregular migrants managing to cross Turkish borders irregularly, undetected by the Turkish border agencies, remains relatively high”, “the Commission considers that Turkey fulfils only partially the requirements” of the border management part (European Commission, 2014b, p.7).

¹⁰⁹ Since the beginning of the Syrian uprisings the country has spent more than 25 billion USD for Syrian refugees and still hosting more than 3 million warworn Syrians (Adam, 2017, p.53). In the context of labor market and security issues, the Syrian refugees are targeted to increase unemployment and decrease informal and formal employment (Esen and Binatlı, 2017). Also they have been associated with the crimes and terrorism (Koca, 2016, p.72).

¹¹⁰ If the conditionality is not credible, then adoption costs would increase (Kirişçi, 2007, p.2; Lavenex and Uçarer, 2004, pp.432-3).

Meeting of heads of state or government with Turkey' which activated the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, Turkey's accession process will be re-energised and new negotiation chapters will be opened; the EU will hand over 3 billion Euro to improve the situation of Syrians in Turkey; and the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish citizens will be accelerated to be finalized by October 2016, in return for Turkey's efforts to stem irregular migration flows (European Council, 2015b). In March 2016, the EU and Turkey agreed on a revised version of the 29 November 2015 deal. Accordingly, "all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey"; "for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled to the EU"; "Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new sea or land routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU"; in exchange, "the visa liberalisation roadmap will be accelerated vis-a-vis all participating Member States with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016"; "the EU will mobilise additional funding for the Facility of an additional 3 billion euro up to the end of 2018"; "preparatory work for the opening of other Chapters will continue at an accelerated pace without prejudice to Member States' positions in accordance with the existing rules" (European Council, 2016).

It is important to clarify that the conclusions of the 29 November 2016 deal between the heads of state/government and Turkey and its revised version which committed to open new chapters and to lift visa requirements, is a sign of 'EU's commitment' towards Turkey accession. In addition, A specific date was given to Turkey to finalize the lifting process of visa requirements. Also, the implementation of conditionality was stated on a more concrete ground with the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan. Therefore, we can say there was a presence of 'coherent implementation of conditionality' for Turkey. In addition, in October 2015, Angela Merkel expressed her support for Turkey's accession by clearly referencing that "Germany is ready this year to open Chapter 17, and to make preparations for (chapters) 23 and 24" (cited in Turhan, 2016, p.472). Although it is argued that there was not a significant change of Merkel's position to Turkey's accession (Phinnemore and İçener, 2016, p.454), Germany's support for Turkey accession was expressed several times in the mid-2015; besides, on 23 October 2015, Merkel held a meeting with Greek

Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades to persuade him for the opening of chapters 23 and 24 (Turhan, 2016, p.472). Therefore, this time Germany's commitment to Turkey's accession seemed more credible; thus it added a plus point to the "member states' commitment" clause. In the case of the Greek Cyprus, the attitudes of Nicos Anastasiades was opposing the opening of Chapters 23 and 24 while he gave his consent to the launch of talks on Chapter 17 (Turhan, 2016, p.472).

Consequently, although the continuation of Cyprus' unilateral blocking of chapters (23 and 24) damaged the EU's credibility in the eyes of Turkey (Turhan, 2016, p.472), it seems that the credibility of conditionality was enough for the implementation of Readmission Agreement. As a result, the number of refugees crossing the EU via Turkey has been gradually reduced from 211,663 in October 2015 to 3,447 in August 2016 (Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2017, p.64) and Turkey started to take back migrants from Greece as of 4 April 2016 (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2016, p.60).¹¹¹ Thus, after such a hard bargaining process, the Syrian migration policy of Turkey Europeanized through conditionality. That is to say, through the pushing version of the improvement of accession, Turkey obtained 'credible conditionality' that provided Turkey with 'prospect for the EU membership'. Thus, 'credible conditionality' and 'prospect for the EU membership' enabled the transformative role of EU's conditionality on the implementation of Readmission Agreement – at that time. In addition, the chapter 17 on economic and monetary policy and chapter 33 on Financial and budgetary provisions have been opened in exchange for Turkey's efforts to stem migration flows (Adam, 2017, p.45). By the way, the EU failed to lift the visa requirement by June 2016 (Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2017, p.69) and Turkey has received \$1.7 billion from the EU as of September 2018, stated President Erdoğan.¹¹²

¹¹¹ According to the Commission's visa implementation report of 4 May 2016, "through actions in the area of border management, the Turkish authorities have managed to substantially reduce the number of persons irregularly crossing from the Turkish territory to the Greek islands" (European Commission, 2016a, p.4).

¹¹² *Hürriyet Daily News*, 2018, 'Erdoğan: UNSC standing idle to oppressions in World', 25 September, viewed 15 November 2018, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-calls-for-security-council-reform-in-un-address-137228>.

3.4.3 Turkey's Efforts to Stem the Influx of Foreign Terrorist Fighters, Funds, and Arms to Da'esh

Like the European countries Turkey is targeted by the Da'esh and its FTFs, said Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu (Çevikcan, 2015). As a matter of fact, firstly, Da'esh killed more than 300 people with 12 attacks between March 2014 and January 2017 in Turkey (Bayramoğlu, 2017). The July 2015 Suruç attack, October 2015 Ankara Train Station attack, January 2016 Sultanahmet attack and January 2017 Reina Nightclub attack are some of Da'esh attacks in Turkey. Such an evil chain clearly indicates that "Da'esh seems to treat Turkey as one of its exclusive targets" (Bayramoğlu, 2017). That is to say, Turkey has no less suffered from Da'esh attacks than European countries. Secondly, like the European countries Turkey has been under the treat of FTFs. Based on official count, according to the Soufan Group report, about 2000-2200 foreign fighters with Turkish identity, who are likely to participate in terrorist organizations such as Da'esh, were detected by the authorities and these fighters appear to return home in greater numbers than those from elsewhere; accordingly, the Turkish authorities had imprisoned 600 citizens for joining Da'esh and Jabhat al-Nusra by November 2015.¹¹³ Moreover, non-Turkish FTFs pose a treat for Turkey when they pass to conflict zone and return to their home; for example, in March 2014 three Turkish citizens were killed by Da'esh FTFs during their return (Yalçınkaya, 2016, p.33). In the face of such a threat, Turkey took necessary measures against Da'esh and its FTFs. In this context, even before the Da'esh became a great threat, in line with the Security Council resolutions 2178(2014) and 2199(2015), on 30 September 2013 Turkey took necessary measures to fight against Da'esh's financial resources (Turkish National Newspaper- Resmi Gazete-, 2013). In the early 2014, Turkey established Risk Assessment Teams (RATs) in various airports, bus terminals and border crossing points in order to stop and intercept FTFs; the RATs checked 22,000 foreigners and conducted around 13,000 interviews by March 2018 (Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). The country deported more than 6,000 foreigners who suspected of having link with terrorist organizations and detained 10,725

¹¹³ The Soufan Group, 2015, "FOREIGN FIGHTERS: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq", *The Soufan Group*, December, viewed 27 March 2019, <https://wb-iisg.com/docs/foreign-fighters-an-updated-assessment-of-the-flow-of-foreign-fighters-into-syria-and-iraq/>.

persons including 5,161 foreigners and arrested 3,588 persons who have link with Da'esh, al Nusra and al Qaeda (ibid). Also, the Measures at the Turkish-Syria and Turkish-Iraq borders are enhanced with additional personnel, patrols and equipment by the Turkish government (Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). Lastly, after 2015, the government started the construction of a security wall with 3 meters high on Syria border to prevent illegal crossing and smuggling activities, as of today 688 km has been constructed.¹¹⁴

It is important to note here, at the beginning of the FTFs crisis, both Turkey and the EU blamed each other on their lax border controls (Çevikcan, 2015). According to Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the problem was arising from the insufficient intelligence cooperation between the sides (ibid). On 12 January 2015, Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu spoke at a joint press conference held with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin, he said “we support every kind of intelligence not to accept foreign fighters” and explained that “Turkey has deported 1,500-2,000 people and put restrictions on a further 7,000 people from entering the country in order to prevent terrorism”.¹¹⁵ In the aftermath of the deadly attack on the French Charlie Hebdo magazine, on 19 January 2015 at the EU foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels, the EU leaders stepped for cooperation intelligence ; accordingly, the EU agreed to share intelligence not only with member states, but also with Turkey (European External Action Service, 2015). Thus, by November 2016, approximately 7,670 persons from the EU member states were put on the no-entry list by the Turkish government due to being affiliated with terrorism and since they may cross the conflict zones (EUROPOL, 2017, p.12). Between November 2016 and June 2017 approximately 260 new persons from the EU member states were added on the no-entry list and 772 European individuals were arrested/deported at the border cities while trying to cross the conflict zones by June 2017 (Turkey Ministry of

¹¹⁴ *CNN Turk*, 2018, ‘Suriye sınırına örülen duvara 'Kulekol' desteği’, 11 December, viewed March 27 2019, <https://www.cnntrk.com/turkiye/suriye-sinirina-orulen-duvara-kulekol-destegi?page=1>.

¹¹⁵ Nurbanu, K. 2015, ‘Davutoğlu, Merkel issue unity message against terror, racism’, *Daily Sabah*, January 12, viewed 27 March 2019, <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2015/01/12/turkeygermany-discuss-bilateral-relations>.

Interior, 2017a, pp.57-8).¹¹⁶ Consequently, especially after 2015 by the end of 2016, the flow of jihadists travelling to conflict zones abroad - especially Syria and Iraq - has apparently continued to decline in a number of countries, including the Netherlands, France, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Germany and Switzerland (EUROPOL, 2016b, p.27; 2017, p.12). In 2017, “there were considerably fewer EU-based FTFs travelling to conflict zones and a diminishing number of returnees” (EUROPOL, 2018, p.26). In 2018, the flow of jihadists travelling to conflict zones was very low and today the European jihadist movement is in a process of reorientation (EUROPOL, 2019, 40). As a result, it is plausible to say that, along with the EU’s other international and domestic efforts, the EU-Turkey intelligence cooperation has also helped to reduce the European jihadists travellings from and to Europe. In this context, the Commission noted Turkey and EU member states cooperation on detecting FTFs who want to cross Turkey to reach Syria or Iraq and pointed out Turkey’s counter FTFs efforts (European Commission, 2016b, p.84; 2018b, p.44; 2019, p.44-5).

However, although there is a cooperation and convergence -to some extent- between the EU and Turkey to counter FTFs threat, it is hard to consider it as Europeanization. Because, both sides were suffering excessively from the FTFs and have perceived them as a security threat against their soils. In addition, there was no any bargaining attempt which Turkey use the FTFs issue as a bargaining chip against the EU to improve its accession to the Union. That is to say, there was no ‘pushing’ effort made by Turkey. Lastly, it is hard to say that it is ‘pulling’; because between 2011 and 2019 Turkey’s alignment to the EU’s declarations and decisions is around 37% (European Commission, 2011a; 2012b; 2013; 2014a; 2015; 2016b; 2018b; 2019). However, as underlined before, in 2005 and 2006 Turkey broadly aligned itself to the EU’s declarations and decisions and between 2007 and 2010 the rate of Turkey’s alignment is around 80 %. That is to say, Turkey was/is not as much eager as in between 2005 and 2010 to adopt EU’s declarations and decisions in the situation of low credible conditionality. Namely, Turkey was not eager enough to ‘pull’ the EU after 2010. Therefore, more plausible to say that Turkey's

¹¹⁶ As of 16 June 2017, 53,781 persons from 146 Countries were put on the no-entry list by Turkish authorities “due to being affiliated with terrorism and since they may cross the conflict zones” (Turkey Ministry of Interior, 2017a, p.58).

help (or cooperation) to the EU on FTFs issue, the most likely, due to Turkey's security concerns.

3.4.4 Turkey's efforts to Support and Strengthen the anti-Da'esh Forces: De-Europeanization on YPG

From the formation of the Global Coalition, September 2014, Turkey has played a full role in the Coalition's military efforts to defeat Da'esh; in this context, Turkey has: Allowed its airspace to be used by Coalition aircraft for both combat and non-combat roles; participated in all joint planning efforts for counter Da'esh operations in northern Syria; allowed over 60 aircraft with over 1,200 personnel to be deployed in counter Da'esh operations; neutralized a total of around 4,550 Da'esh elements in Iraq and Syria; hosted the "Train and Equip" program; trained 7,000 Iraqi security personnel for the fight against Da'esh (Global Coalition, 2019). In addition, on 24 August 2016 Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield (OEP) with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) forces in about a 100 km border line between the Azaz-Jarablus region, in northern Syria, in order to clean its borders from Da'esh elements (Kasapoğlu and Ülgen 2017; Yeşiltaş et al., 2017).¹¹⁷ During the OEP lasting about 7 months, Turkey eliminated 2,647 Da'esh members and destroyed 4 tanks, 29 artillery pieces, 97 vehicles, 621 buildings and 61 defensive positions, 28 command and control centers, 17 weapon storages, and 11 VBIEDs which belonging to Da'esh; at the end of the OEP, Turkey ensured secure zone by clearing Da'esh from 2,015 square kilometers area (Global Coalition, 2019; Kasapoğlu and Ülgen, 2017, p.2). the EU's stance on Turkey's involvement in Global Coalition military campaign against Da'esh is quite positive; the Commission praised Turkey's contributions to the Global Coalition (European Commission, 2016b, p.91). Regarding the OEP, there was no negative reaction from the EU. The Commission made its statement about the OEP without any criticism; accordingly, "following the terrorist

¹¹⁷ Turkey main objective is to clean Da'esh elements from its border but it was not the only aim. The National Security Council of Turkey also stressed that the elements of PKK / PYD-YPG will not be allowed to form a terror corridor along the northern border with Syria (National Security Council of Turkey, 2016). That is to say, Turkey also want to "block the YPG/PKK, a PKK offspring in Syria, from carving out a corridor by taking control of the east-west line in the north of Syria" (Yeşiltaş et al., 2017, p. 9-10).

attacks by Da'esh, Turkey strengthened its engagement with the coalition and launched several air strikes and ground operation 'Euphrates Shield' against Da'esh positions in Syria" (European Commisiion, 2016b, p.23-4). Moreover, a delegation of leading members of the European Parliament visited Turkey on 25 August 2016 and they voiced their support for the Jarablus operation in Syria.¹¹⁸ Consequently, so far there is a convergence between the EU and Turkey on fighting against Da'esh, to some extent.¹¹⁹ However it is hard to say same thing for their perceptions of YPG/PYD.

The People's Protection Units (YPG) is a Kurdish military force in northern Syria which known as the militia of Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD). According to the reasoned judgment which was taken by the 2nd Heavy Criminal Court of Mardin on 17 September 2014, the PYD and YPG is accepted as a derivative and branch of the The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) which is recognized as an "armed terrorist organization in line with Article 314 of the Turkish Criminal Law no 5237 and it is deemed as a terrorist organization by all Turkish courts, the Turkish Court of Cassation, the European Court of Human Right as well as many countries" (Turkey Ministry of Interior, 2017b, p.59). However the EU does not recognize the YPG as a terrorist organization; moreover, as indicated above, the Union support and protect the YPG for being a well partner to fight against Da'esh in northern Syria. In such a case, a crisis between the EU and Turkey signaled its coming during the Daesh attacks on Kobane and bursted out with the Operation Olive Branch (OOB) in Syria's northwestern Afrin region. Kobane, Afrin and Jazira are the cantons of claimed Rojava region in northern Syria -along the borders with Turkey- where the PYD declared its autonomy on 30 January 2014 (Acun and Keskin, 2017, p.22). After mid-September 2014, the Da'esh militants intensified its attacks on Kobani. In the early of October 2014, the co-chair of the PYD, Saleh Muslim demanded Turkey's help to Kobane including the transferring of other Kurdish forces and heavy

¹¹⁸ Kart, E. 2016, 'European Parliament voices support for Jarablus operation', *Hürriyet Daily News*, 25 August, viewed 27 March 2019, <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/european-parliament-voices-support-for-jarablus-operation-103228>.

¹¹⁹ Although there is a convergence -to some extent- between the EU and Turkey on fighting against Da'esh, it is hard to consider it as Europeanization due to same reasons which was pointed out just above to explain Turkey's help (or cooperation) to the EU on FTFs issue.

weapons to Kobane via Turkey.¹²⁰ In the side of the EU, on 20 October, the Council called Turkey to “open its border for any supply for the people of Kobani” (Council of the European Union, 2014, p.1). On 22 October, the European Commission stated that “it is crucial that the recent decision by Turkish authorities to authorize the passage of Iraqi Peshmerga fighters to Kobane translates into concrete action. The EU has publicly called on Turkey to open its border for supplies to reach the people of Kobane” (European Commission, 2014c). Lastly, on 22 October many Member of the European Parliament accused Turkey of not doing enough to help Kurds fight against Da’esh in Kobane (European Parliament, 2014b). In response, on 29 October, Turkey allowed the Peshmerga forces (armed forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq) to cross from Suruç/Şanlıurfa to Kobane.¹²¹ However, Turkey ignored the transferring of weapons to the YPG; in this context, the Turkish President R.T. Erdogan said that Turkey cannot say “yes” to sending weapons to the PYD.¹²² On the contrary, the European Parliament resolution of 18 September 2014 welcomed the decision of individual member states which provide military material to the Kurdish regional authorities (European Parliament, 2014c). Regarding the issue, at the end of September 2014, Turkish President Erdoğan criticized the EU member states by saying that “when you look at its [PKK] branches, you see that they are all fed from Europe. All financial support is coming from there- arms, too. Why didn’t this terror organization ever trouble these European friends? ...”.¹²³ Consequently, it is clear that there was a disagreement between the EU and Turkey especially on supplying military material to the YPG/PYD. With the Kobane case this

¹²⁰ Ateş, H. 2014, ‘Kobani’ye yaşam koridoru’, *Milliyet News*, 6 October, viewed 26 March 2019, <https://www.sabah.com.tr/dunya/2014/10/06/kobaniye-yasam-koridoru>.

¹²¹ *Milliyet*, 2014, ‘Peşmerge Kobani’ye geçti’, 1 November, viewed 26 March 2019, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/gundem/pesmerge-kobaniye-gecti-1963233>; in addition, by 10th November 2014 Turkey sheltered 200,000 refugees from Kobani, please see: UNICEF, 2014, ‘Kobani’den gelen mültecilere UNICEF’ten kış yardımı’, 11 November, viewed 26 March, <https://www.unicef.org/turkey/bas%C4%B1n-b%C3%BCltenleri/kobaniden-gelen-m%C3%BCltecilere-uniceften-k%C4%B1C5%9F-yard%C4%B1m%C4%B1>.

¹²² BBC News, 2014, ‘Erdoğan: ‘PYD’ye silah göndermeye ‘evet’ diyemeyiz’, 19 October, viewed 26 March 2019, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/10/141019_erdogan_pyd.

¹²³ Daloğlu, T. 2014, ‘Will Turkey put 'boots on the ground' in Syria?’, *Al-Monitor*, 20 September, viewed 26 March 2019, <https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/turkey-united-states-syria-coalition-isis-military-action.html>.

disagreement became evident but the crisis between the EU and Turkey bursted out with the Operation Olive Branch (OOB).

On 20 January 2018, the Turkish Armed Forces and allied Free Syrian Army launched the Operation Olive Branch (OOB) which aimed to clear terrorists affiliated with the PKK (YPG) and Da'esh elements from the Afrin region of Syria (Özçelik and Acun, 2018).¹²⁴ Following the launching of the OOB, the High Representative (HR) of the EU, Federica Mogherini -with her statements- and the European Parliament -with its resolutions- took up their positions against the OOB on behalf of the EU. In response, Turkish officials slammed the High Representative because of her remarks and criticized the European Parliament. On 22 January, the HR Federica Mogherini stated that “I'm extremely worried and will discuss this among other things with our Turkish interlocutors”.¹²⁵ On 24 January, Presidential spokesman, İbrahim Kalın responded Mogherini's expression by saying that “Turkey has been decisively fighting against all terror groups including Daesh, [the] PKK, and [the Gülenist Terror Group] FETÖ. Some people are expressing concern and using an anti-war rhetoric when it comes to the PKK/PYD-YPG [Democratic Union Party-People's Protection Units] is a double standard and hypocrisy. These will never deter Turkey”.¹²⁶ On 16 February, the HR Federica Mogherini stated that “we urge our Turkish friends to show restraint in their military actions” and underlined “the target of military operations needs to continue to be Da'esh and the UN listed terrorist organisations” (European External Action Service, 2018a). On 19 March, she reaffirmed her remarks by saying that “we have stated from the beginning that military escalation, military activities not targeted directly against Da'esh or Al-Nusra - the listed UN terrorist organisations - should be absolutely avoided, because the common sense and the common work was aiming at de-escalating the military activities, and not escalating them”

¹²⁴ Also see the declaration of Turkish Armed Forces: *Takvim News*, 2018, ‘TSK: Zeytin dalı harekati başladı’, 20 January, viewed 26 March 2019, <https://www.takvim.com.tr/guncel/2018/01/20/tsk-zeytin-dali-harekati-basladi>.

¹²⁵ *Presstv*, 2018, ‘EU's Mogherini 'extremely worried' about Turkish offensive in Syria’, 22 January, viewed 27 March 2019, <https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2018/01/22/549840/Federica-Mogherini-Turkey-Kurdish-militants-Afrin>.

¹²⁶ *Daily Sabah*, 2018, ‘Presidential spokesman: EU's Afrin remarks expose double standards on Turkey’, 24 January, viewed 27 March 2019, <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2018/01/24/presidential-spokesman-eus-afrin-remarks-expose-double-standards-on-turkey>.

(European External Action Service, 2018b). Within the same day, Turkey's EU Minister Ömer Çelik has slammed the HR Federica Mogherini's remarks by saying that "The EU has been pursuing a wrong policy toward Turkey's fight against terrorism from the very start. Instead of pledging support, they have only been criticizing" and "they tell us to fight only against terror organizations listed on the U.N.'s terror list. Are we going to wait for years so that terror organizations that launch rockets on our soil be listed on the U.N. list?".¹²⁷ For the side of the European Parliament, the Parliament's response was harsher than the HR Federica Mogherini's statements. The Parliament resolution of 8 February 2018 referred the OOB as a Turkish military intervention in Kurdish majority region of Syria and warned "against the continuation of disproportionate actions" (European Parliament, 2018a). The resolution of 15 March 2018 referred the YPG as Kurdish forces and urged the Turkish Government to "withdraw its troops and play a constructive role in the Syrian conflict" (European Parliament, 2018b). In response to the European Parliament resolution, Turkey's EU Minister Ömer Çelik criticized the Parliament by saying that "efforts to depict a terror organization as the representative of all Kurds are inhumane" and he added "We do not producing new clashes. We are fighting against the establishment of a terror corridor. We are not just watching events like others, we have save the oppressed from the hands of terror organizations".¹²⁸ If we examine this case in the following context of de-Europeanization:

According to the de-Europeanization definition in the context of foreign policy, de-Europeanization of foreign policy is diverging and distancing from the EU's common foreign policy and displaying negative reactions against the adoption pressure generated by the EU. In this context, with the Kobane case a divergence between the EU and Turkey on YPG became evident. During the Operation Olive Branch, Turkish foreign policy was distancing from the EU's foreign policy on YPG; moreover, Turkish officials were displaying negative reactions against the EU's remarks and proposal. Therefore, as the conditions for de-Europeanization were in place, Turkish foreign policy has been de-Europeanized on the case of YPG.

¹²⁷ *Hürriyet Daily News*, 2018, 'Turkey slams EU's top diplomat over Afrin remarks', 19 March, viewed 27 March 2019, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-slams-eus-top-diplomat-over-afrin-remarks-128988>.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*

In sum, as of 1998 until 2010 the EU regularly directed Turkey under the CFSP chapter of the progress reports to improve its bilateral relations with Syria. Namely, the EU conducted the conditionality mechanism through the CFSP acquis. As a result, the EU had considerable impact on Turkish foreign policy to transform Turkey's relations with Syria towards good neighborly relations. The constructive policies of the coalition government between 1999-2002 and of the JDP, Turkey's security considerations related to the United States and Iran's expansionist policies and the aim of gaining economic incomes from the region through the trade relations are some factors which facilitated Turkey-Syria rapprochement and created a "good fit" between the national and the EU pre-existing policies and which reduced the adoption costs of the establishment of good neighborly relations with Syria as prescribed by the EU. Until the end of 2004, the EU had credibility in Turkey and thus Turkey had prospect for the EU membership. Therefore, the 'credibility of conditionality', 'prospect for the EU membership' and 'low adoption costs' enabled the transformative role of EU's conditionality on Turkish foreign policy to establish good neighborly relations with Syria between 1999 and 2004. After the end of 2004, Turkey's foreign policy activism towards Syria was in lined with the EU Councils conclusions which demanded Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon in accordance with the 1559 UNSC Resolution, to cooperate with the UN investigation commission in accordance with the 1595 and 1636 UNSC Resolutions and to relaunch its efforts to make progress on the Middle East peace process. In this direction, Turkey pressed Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon and to cooperate with the international community on the investigation into the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Likewise, Turkey's efforts to mediate Syria-Israel peace process was in lined with the EU Councils conclusions. However, as the credibility of conditionality and the prospects for the EU membership decreased in Turkey after the end of 2004, it is hard to claim their major facilitator roles. Therefore, the *pulling* version of the improvement of accession, which stems from the desire for the EU membership and which requires the adoption of the EU rules, policies or practices in the situation of low rate or lack of credible conditionality and low adoption costs, explains Europeanization of Turkish policy towards Syria between 2005 and 2010. In addition, Turkey's foreign policy

activism in Syria which tried to persuade Syria to cooperate with the UN investigation commission and to withdraw its troops from Lebanon and which mediated Israel-Syria peace talks can also be considered to be the attempts to consolidate Turkey's power and to raise Turkey's leadership potential in its region. In this context, Davutoğlu's doctrine which seeks to increase Turkey's leadership potential in its region through soft power oriented foreign policy actions (Oğuzlu, 2010, p.678) is also a driving force for the Turkey's foreign policy activism in Syria. That is to say, there was a "good fit" between the Turkish and EU policies. Thus, the "good fit" reduced the adoptions costs of the alignment to the CFSP on these three cases. As a result, 'desire for the EU membership' and 'low adoption costs' as the facilitating factors and the pulling version of the improvement of accession as the mediating mechanism enabled the transformative role of EU's conditionality on Turkish policy towards Syria between 2005 and 2010 in the cases of the Hariri assassination, withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and relaunching of Syria-Israel peace talks.

With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, Turkey acquired an ability to affect the EU's expected foreign policy outcome which was wishing to carry Syrian opposition to success. Because, one of the EU's priorities was to carry Syrian opposition to success vis-a-vis the Syrian regime and Turkey had an incredible potential to do it. With such power, Turkey *pushed* EU to have credible conditionality in exchange for its cooperation and alignment to the CFSP. As a result of meetings and visits which were made during 2011, foreign policy dialogue between the EU and Turkey stepped up on Syria and on 12 October 2011, a fresh agenda called as 'Positive Agenda' (PA), which bases on a search for progress in Turkey's alignment with the EU, was released by the Commission. The PA which was a form of 'coherent implementation of conditionality', and 'EU level commitment' from the Commission provided Turkey with some 'credible conditionality' and 'prospect for the EU membership' to announce restrictive measures against Syria on 30 November 2011 -along with the other factors mentioned above. Thus, in the end of the such a bargaining process, Turkish foreign policy Europeanized through the CFSP conditionality. That is to say, through the pushing version of the improvement of accession, Turkey obtained 'credible conditionality' that provided Turkey with 'prospect for the EU membership'. Thus, 'credible conditionality' and 'prospect for the EU

membership' enabled the transformative role of EU's conditionality on Turkish foreign policy towards Syria in the case of the imposition of restrictive measures on Syria. Likewise, Turkey acquired an ability to effect EU's expected foreign policy outcome which aimed to stem Syrian refugee flows. With such power, Turkey was able to break asymmetrical interdependence which is in favor of the EU and got a chance to improve its accession by *pushing* the EU to have 'credible conditionality' and to open new negotiation chapters. The 'EU's commitment', 'coherent implementation of conditionality' and 'member states' commitment' provided Turkey with 'credible conditionality' and 'prospect for the EU membership' for the implementation of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement. Thus, after such a hard bargaining process, the Syrian migration policy of Turkey Europeanized through conditionality. That is to say, through the pushing version of the improvement of accession, Turkey obtained 'credible conditionality' that provided Turkey with 'prospect for the EU membership'. Thus, 'credible conditionality' and 'prospect for the EU membership' enabled the transformative role of EU's conditionality on Turkish foreign policy towards Syria in the case of the implementation of Readmission Agreement. As a result of EU's conditionality the number of refugees that crossing the EU via Turkey has been gradually reduced from 211,663 in October 2015 to 3,447 in August 2016. Lastly, although there is a cooperation and convergence -to some extent- between the EU and Turkey on fighting against Da'esh and counter FTFs threat, it is hard to consider it as Europeanization. Turkey's help (or cooperation) to the EU on fighting against Da'esh and counter FTFs threat, the most likely, due to Turkey's security concerns. In addition, with the Kobane case a divergence between the EU and Turkey on YPG became evident. During the Operation Olive Branch, Turkish foreign policy was distancing from the EU's foreign policy on YPG; moreover, Turkish officials were displaying negative reactions against the EU's remarks and proposal. Therefore, as the conditions for de-Europeanization were in place (diverging, distancing and negative reactions), Turkish foreign policy has been de-Europeanized on the case of YPG.

CONCLUSION

Since 1998 the EU has monitored closely Turkey's relations with Syria under the 'CFSP chapter' of the progress reports for Turkey. It is clear that the EU pressed Turkey until 2010 to develop good relations with Syria. Turkey, as an applicant state, had to comply with the EU's demands. Because, the candidate states are expected to transform their foreign policies in line with the CFSP since the CFSP Chapter of community acquis invite candidate states for "full compliance" (Hisarlıoğlu, 2015, p.71). Namely, the EU conducted the conditionality mechanism through the CFSP acquis. As a result, Turkish foreign policy towards Syria was transformed from the coercive foreign policy actions to good neighborly relations by the EU's conditionality. In addition, the constructive policies of the coalition government between 1999-2002 and of the JDP, Turkey's security considerations related to the United States and Iran's expansionist policies and the aim of gaining economic incomes from the region through the trade relations are some factors which facilitated Turkey-Syria rapprochement and created a "good fit" between the national and the EU pre-existing policies and which reduced the adoption costs of the establishment of good neighborly relations with Syria as prescribed by the EU. In the first half of the 2000s, the EU had credibility in Turkey and thus Turkey had prospect for the EU membership. Therefore, 'credible conditionality', 'prospect for the EU membership' and 'low adoption costs' enabled the transformative role of EU's conditionality on Turkish foreign policy to establish good neighborly relations with Syria between 1999 and 2005.

After 2005 Turkey overly used its soft power and took the role of a "benign regional power" when it actively involved in regional issues (Öniş and Yılmaz, 2009, p.17-8). But, Turkey's aspirations to become a regional power do not necessarily imply that the country disregarded its alignment to the CFSP acquis nor gave up from the EU membership. On the contrary, along with other benefits of the EU membership, a non-member state bids to join EU to increase its own external power (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002, p.551). Correspondingly, the III. Erdogan Government Program stated that "since we came to power, we have seen full membership as a strategic target ... to become a more

effective and decisive actor in regional and global problems”.¹²⁹ In this context, although Turkey had lost its prospect for the EU membership, the country maintained its alignment to the CFSP acquis in general as well as in Syria. The military presence of Syria in Lebanon, assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri and strained Syria-Israel relations were the three main challenges over the EU-Syria relations in the early of the second half of the 2000s. Besides, the EU Council had common positions concerning with these three main challenges; the EU demanded Syria to a) withdraw its troops from Lebanon in accordance with the 1559 UNSC Resolution, b) cooperate with the UN investigation commission in accordance with the 1595 and 1636 UNSC Resolutions, c) to relaunch its efforts to make progress on the Middle East peace process. At that time, in parallel with the EU Councils conclusions, Turkey pressed Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon and to cooperate with the international community on the investigation into the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. Likewise, Turkey’s efforts to mediate Syrian-Israeli peace process seems to be in lined with the EU Councils conclusions. In addition, Davutoğlu’s doctrine which seeks to increase Turkey’s leadership potential in its region through soft power oriented foreign policy actions (Oğuzlu, 2010, p.678) is also a driving force for the Turkey’s foreign policy activism in Syria. That is to say, there was a “good fit” between the Turkish and EU foreign policies. Thus, the “good fit” reduced the adoptions costs of the alignment to the CFSP on these three cases. Consequently, the pulling version of the improvement of accession, which stems from the desire for the EU membership and which requires the adoption of the EU rules, policies or practices in the situations of low rate or lack of credible conditionality and low adoption costs, explains Europeanization of Turkish policy in such situations. In this context, ‘desire for the EU membership’ and ‘low adoption costs’ as the facilitating factors and the pulling version of the improvement of accession as the mediating mechanism enabled the transformative role of EU’s conditionality on Turkish policy towards Syria between 2005 and 2010 in the cases of the Hariri assassination, withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and relaunching of Syria-Israel peace talks.

¹²⁹ TBMM, 2011, ‘III. Erdoğan Hükümeti Programı’, *Official Web page of the Turkey’s Parliament*, 13 July, viewed 7 February 2019, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler/HP61.htm>.

With the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in March 2011, Turkey acquired an ability to effect EU's expected foreign policy outcomes which aimed to carry Syrian opposition to success and to stem Syrian refugee flows. Because, both carrying Syrian opposition to success and stem Syrian refugee flows to Europe were the EU's priorities in its Syria policy and Turkey had an incredible potential to do it. At this point, this thesis' assumption is that in the situations of the low rate or lack of 'credible conditionality' and high adoption costs, if candidate states have enough power to use as a bargaining chip vis-a-vis the EU and if they have desire for the EU membership then they may try to push EU to improve their accession by actively bargaining. In this context, with such power, Turkey *pushed* EU to have 'credible conditionality' (to reduce adoption costs) in exchange for its cooperation and alignment to the CFSP. As a result of meetings and visits, which were made during 2011, foreign policy dialogue between the EU and Turkey stepped up on Syria and on 12 October 2011 a fresh agenda called as 'Positive Agenda' (PA), which bases on a search for progress in Turkey's alignment with the EU, was released by the Commission. The PA was announced as a complementary part of the accession negotiations and one of the priorities of it "working jointly on foreign policy challenges like Syria". The PA which was a form of 'coherent implementation of conditionality', and 'EU level commitment' from the Commission provided Turkey with some 'credible conditionality' and 'prospect for the EU membership' to announce restrictive measures against Syria on 30 November 2011 -along with the other factors mentioned above. Thus, in the end of the such a bargaining process, Turkish foreign policy Europeanized through the CFSP conditionality. That is to say, through the pushing version of the improvement of accession, Turkey obtained 'credible conditionality' that provided Turkey with 'prospect for the EU membership'. Thus, 'credible conditionality' and 'prospect for the EU membership' enabled the transformative role of EU's conditionality on Turkish foreign policy towards Syria in the case of the imposition of restrictive measures on Syria. Likewise, Turkey's bargaining power in regards to the Syrian refugee crisis broke asymmetrical interdependence, which is in favor of the EU, and gave Turkey a chance to improve its accession by *pushing* the EU to have 'credible conditionality' and to open new negotiation chapters (to reduce adoption costs). The 'EU's commitment', 'coherent implementation of conditionality' and 'member states' commitment' provided Turkey with 'credible conditionality' and 'prospect for the EU

membership' for the implementation of the EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement. Thus, after such a hard bargaining process, the Syrian migration policy of Turkey Europeanized through conditionality. That is to say, through the pushing version of the improvement of accession, Turkey obtained 'credible conditionality' that provided Turkey with 'prospect for the EU membership'. Thus, 'credible conditionality' and 'prospect for the EU membership' enabled the transformative role of EU's conditionality on Turkish foreign policy towards Syria in the case of the implementation of Readmission Agreement. As a result of EU's conditionality, the number of refugees that crossing the EU via Turkey has been gradually reduced from 211,663 in October 2015 to 3,447 in August 2016.

Lastly, although there is a cooperation and convergence -to some extent- between the EU and Turkey on fighting against Da'esh and counter FTFs threat, it is hard to consider it as Europeanization. Because, both sides were suffering excessively from the Da'esh and its FTFs and have perceived them as a security threat against their soils. In addition, there was no any bargaining attempt which Turkey use the Da'esh and its FTFs as a bargaining chip against the EU to improve its accession to the Union. That is to say, there was no 'pushing' effort made by Turkey with this regard. Lastly, it is hard to say that it is 'pulling'; because between 2011 and 2019 Turkey's alignment to the EU's declarations and decisions is around 37%. However, in 2005 and 2006 Turkey broadly aligned itself to the EU's declarations and decisions and between 2007 and 2010 the rate of Turkey's alignment was around 80 %.¹³⁰ That is to say, Turkey was/is not as much eager as in between 2005 and 2010 to adopt EU's declarations and decisions in the situation of low credible conditionality. Namely Turkey was not eager enough to 'pull' the EU after 2010. Therefore, Turkey's help (or cooperation) to the EU on fighting against Da'esh and counter FTFs threat, the most likely, due to Turkey's security concerns. In addition, with the Kobane case a divergence between the EU and Turkey on YPG became evident. During the Operation Olive Branch, Turkish foreign policy was distancing from the EU's foreign policy on YPG; moreover, Turkish officials were displaying negative reactions against the EU's remarks and proposal. Therefore, as the conditions for de-

¹³⁰ As underlined before, in the foreign policy area, the high general alignment rate to the EU's statements and decisions increases the likelihood presence of the 'pulling' and vice versa.

Europeanization were in place (diverging, distancing and negative reactions), Turkish foreign policy has been de-Europeanized on the case of YPG.



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