

ISMĀ'ĪL RUSŪHĪ ANḲARAVĪ AND TĪZĀḤŪ'L-ḤĪKEM

A Thesis Submitted to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

Bilal Kuşpınar

Institute of Islamic Studies
McGill University, Montreal
March 1995

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	<i>iv</i>
Resumé	<i>v</i>
Acknowledgment	<i>vi</i>
List of Abbreviations	<i>ix</i>
Note on Transliteration	<i>x</i>

PART ONE THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ANĀARAVĪ

CHAPTER ONE THE LIFE OF ISMĀ'IL ANĀARAVĪ

1. His Early Life 2
2. As A Mevlevi Şeyh in Istanbul 12

CHAPTER TWO THE WORKS OF ANĀARAVĪ

- Preliminary Remarks 19
1. Şerhü'l-Mesnevî 20
 2. Cāmi'ü'l-Āyāt 31
 3. Fatihü'l-Ebyāt 32
 4. Minhācü'l-FuĀarā' 34
 5. Hūccetü's-Semā' 35
 6. Fütühāt-ı 'Ayniyye 36
 7. Zübdetü'l-Fühūs fī Nakşi'l-Füşüş 38
 8. Miftāhu'l-Belāġa ve Mişbāhu'l-Feşāha 39
 9. Er-Risāletü't-Tenzihīyye fī Şe'ni'l-Mevleviyye 40
 10. Mişbāhü'l-Esrār 41
 11. Şerh-i Hadīs-i Erba'īn 42
 12. Hall-i Müşkilāt-i Mesnevî 42
 13. Makāşid-ı Āliyye fī Şerhi't-Tā'iyye 43
 14. Şerh-i Kaşidetü'l-Mimiyye'l-Hamriyye 44
 15. Cenāhü'l-Ervāh 44
 16. Simātü'l-Mūkinīn 45
 17. el-Hikemü'l-Münderice fī Şerhi'l-Münferice 45
 18. Derecātü's-Sālikīn 46
 19. Risāle-i 'Uyūn-i Isnā 'Aşere 47
 20. Risāle-i Uşūl-i Tarīkat-ı Mevlānā 47
 21. Tuĥfetü'l-Berere 48
 22. Sülūknāme-i Şeyh Ismā'il 48

23. Nisāb-ı Mevlevī 49
24. Divān 50
25. His Other Works 51

CHAPTER THREE ANḲARAVĪ'S INTELLECTUAL PERSONALITY 52

PART TWO THE TRANSLATION OF *HAYĀKIL AL-NŪR* AND ANALYSIS OF *İZĀHŪ'L-ḤİKEM*

CHAPTER ONE *İZĀHŪ'L-ḤİKEM*

1. Remarks on *Hayākil al-Nūr* and *İzāhü'l-Ḥikem* 62
2. A Note on Editing and Rendering 65
3. Brief Descriptions of the Manuscripts 68

CHAPTER TWO PROLEGOMENA

- Introduction 74
1. The Definition of Wisdom 78
 - 1.1 The Use and Benefit of Wisdom 79
 - 1.2 The Subject-matter of Wisdom 79
 2. The Science of Wisdom 79
 - 2.1 Divine Science 80
 - 2.2 Physics 81

CHAPTER THREE SUHRAWARDĪ'S PROLOGUE

- Concepts of Light and Temple 85

CHAPTER FOUR THE FIRST TEMPLE

1. The Nature of Body 101
2. The Theory of Definition (*al-ḥadd*) 107

CHAPTER FIVE THE SECOND TEMPLE

1. The Proofs for the Existence of the Soul and Consciousness 116
2. The Rational Soul and Its Characteristics 121
3. The Faculties of the Rational Soul 128
 - 3.1 External Senses 129
 - 3.2 Internal Senses 131
4. The Animal Soul 137
5. The Relation of the Rational Soul to God 146

6. Is the Rational Soul Pre-eternal? 158

CHAPTER SIX THE THIRD TEMPLE

The Rational Modes 162

CHAPTER SEVEN THE FOURTH TEMPLE

1. The Attributes of God 172
2. The Function of Light in the Metaphysics of Suhrawardī 161
3. The Emanation of the First Light 185
4. The Hierarchy of the Worlds 196
5. God as a Preponderant Being 198

CHAPTER EIGHT THE FIFTH TEMPLE

1. Kinds of Motion 208
2. The Motion of the Celestial Spheres 211
3. The Generosity of God in the Creation of the World 221
4. The Hierarchy of Existing Beings 228

CHAPTER NINE THE SIXTH TEMPLE

1. Immortality of Soul 235
2. The Condition of the Soul After the Death of the Body 240

CHAPTER TEN THE SEVENTH TEMPLE

1. The Visionary Imagination 253
 2. The Divine Souls 259
 3. The Function of the Paraclete (*al-Faraqlīṭ*) 264
- EPILOGUE 272

CHAPTER ELEVEN A GENERAL EVALUATION 275

PART THREE
THE TEXT OF *ĪZĀḤŪ'L-ḤĪKEM*
AND TEXTUAL VARIANTS

TEXT OF *ĪZĀḤŪ'L-ḤĪKEM* 290

TEXTUAL VARIANTS AND NOTES 375

BIBLIOGRAPHY 404

ABSTRACT

This study is an attempt to bring to light an important Ottoman Turkish work of theosophy entitled *İzāḥü'l-Ḥikem (Elucidation of Wisdoms)*, written by Ismā'īl Anḳaravī (d. 1631) as a commentary on the treatise *Hayākil al-Nūr (The Temples of Light)* by Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (d. 1191). The study consists of three main parts. The first part provides a detailed account of the life and works of the author, Anḳaravī, with an emphasis on his scholarship in the context of the Ottoman learned class. The second part, which is the main body of this research, presents a chapter by chapter analysis of the significant issues discussed in Anḳaravī's commentary, in comparison with the commentary of Jalāl al-Dīn Dawwānī (d. 1502), by whom he seems to be influenced. This section is an investigation of Anḳaravī's reformulation of Ishrāqī wisdom within the framework of his orthodox mystical views. In the last part, on the basis of all available manuscripts, which are collated, a reliable text for edition is established.

R É S U M É

Cette étude est faite dans le but de faire connaître un travail important de théosophie, intitulé *Īzāhū'l-Hikem (Élucidations des Sagesses)* écrit par Ismā'īl Anḳaravī (m. 1631) en turc ottoman comme commentaire du traité intitulé *Hayākil al-Nūr (Les Temples de Lumière)*, écrit par Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (m. 1191). Cette étude consiste en trois parties. La première partie traite en détail de la vie et des livres de l'auteur Anḳaravī, en insistant surtout sur sa personnalité intellectuelle dans le contexte de la classe des intellectuels Ottomans. La deuxième partie est la partie la plus importante de cette recherche, elle présente, chapitre par chapitre, une analyse des sujets significatifs discutés dans le commentaire d'Anḳaravī d'une façon comparée avec celui de Jalāl al-Dīn Dawwānī (m. 1502), par qui il semble avoir été influencé. De plus, cette section est un approfondissement de la compréhension d'Anḳaravī, dans le cadre de sa vision mystique et orthodoxe, de la sagesse ishrāqīe. Dans la dernière partie, tous les manuscrits accessibles sont collationnés en vue d'une édition critique.

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T

It is indeed not only a pleasure but also a duty for me to acknowledge the debt that I owe to numerous dear colleagues and several distinguished scholars whom I have consulted in many areas before and during the preparation of this study. First and foremost, I am greatly indebted to my supervisor, Prof. Hermann Landolt for having been my guide in understanding many intricate problems of both Ishraqi philosophy and mystical doctrines, and in kindly locating as well as translating the Persian couplets in the text under study. It was he whom I interrupted many a time with questions, and it was he who has been most generous and patient in answering them. His contribution to the thesis was immense, particularly his critical comments and profound insights at the last stage of the work certainly deserve special appreciation here. All in all, without him this work would never have taken its present shape. Again his keen interest in promoting the study of Ottoman thought was extremely encouraging.

I am also deeply grateful to Dr. Ahmet Karamustafa for his valuable comments on the technical aspects of the Ottoman translation as well as on the first part of the thesis. I am also grateful to Alparslan Acikgenç, for having kindly supervised my academic pursuits at different levels in Turkey, and also to Mr. Selahaddin Hidayetođlu, the distinguished Instructor in the Ottoman Divan Literature, Selçuk University, for having kindled in me a love

for the *Mesnevi* of Mevlana Jelal al-Din Rumi and for having clarified some complicated parts of the manuscript at hand.

My sincere appreciation is due to the faculty and staff of the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, particularly to its director, Dr. A. Üner Turgay, and to the members of the Faculty of Theology, Selçuk University, especially its rector, Prof. Halil Cin. Both these institutions provided much-needed grants and welcome encouragement during my Ph.D. program. Thanks are also due to the members of the Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul, the Mevlânâ Museum Library, and Yusuf Ağa Library, Konya, for extending to me their kind permission to use the materials and facilities there.

At this time, I would like to take the opportunity to extend my thanks to Mr. Adam Gacek, Head of the Institute of Islamic Studies Library, McGill University, for helping me in sorting out the calligraphic styles of the Ottoman Turkish scripts; also, to Mr. Stephen Millier for reading the whole of my thesis in typescript and thus bringing to my notice the technical flaws and the linguistic shortcomings therein. I would also like to thank the Public Services Librarian, Miss Salwa Ferahian, Mr. Wayne St. Thomas, and all the other staff of the Institute of Islamic Studies Library for their generous help in finding the required sources. Furthermore, I wish to express my gratitude to my close friend Dr. Fevzi Günüç, who used to be the Director of the Library at Mevlânâ Museum, Konya, and who is now the Professor of Islamic Fine Arts and Calligraphy at Faculty of Theology, Selçuk

University, as well as to Dr. Bekir Topalođlu, Professor of Kalam at the Faculty of Theology, Marmara University and vice-director of the Centre for Islamic Studies, Türkiye Diyanet Vakfi, Istanbul, for their assistance in helping me to obtain microfilms from the Libraries of Mevlānā Museum and Suleymaniye, respectively.

Above all I am forever indebted to my wife for her wholehearted support in many unselfish ways and for her encouragement in the most challenging circumstances.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- EI2* *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, new ed., vol. 1-, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1954-
- GAL* Brockelmann, Carl. *Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur*. 2nd ed., 2 vols. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1943-49.
- GALS* Brockelmann, Carl. *Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur: Den Supplementbanden angepasste Auflage*. 3 vols. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1937-42.
- Hayākil* Suhrawardī, Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī. *Hayākil al-Nūr* in *Oeuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques: Opera Metaphysica et Mystica II*). Ed. with an introduction by S. H. Nasr. Tehran: Département d'Iranologie de l'Institut Français de Recherche, 1970. (Persian translation of the *Hayākil*)
- H-I.* Suhrawardī, Shihāb al-Dīn. *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, in the *Oeuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques II*. Ed. H. Corbin. Tehran: Académie Iranienne de Philosophie, 1977.
- H-N.* Suhrawardī, Shihāb al-Dīn. *Hayākil al-Nūr*. Ed. Abū Rayyān. Cairo: Maktabat al-Tijāriyyah, 1957.
- I-H.* Ankaravi, Ismail Rusūhī. *Īzāḥū'l-Ḥikem*. Süleymaniye Library, Istanbul. MS. 1747 (occasionally citations refer to the section of appendix for the textual variations.)
- Les Temples* Suhrawardī, Shihāb al-Dīn. *Le Livre des Temples de la Lumiere*, in *L'Archange Empourpre Quinze Traités et Recits Mystiques*. Trans. H. Corbin. Paris: Fayard, 1976.
- SH-H* Dawwānī, Jalāl al-Dīn. *Shawākil al-Ḥūr*. Eds. M. 'Abdul Ḥaq and M. Yousuf Kokan. Madras: Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, 1953.

NOTE ON transliteration

The system of transliteration adopted in this study for Arabic, Ottoman and modern Turkish languages is that of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES)*, with slight modifications.

The title of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī's work, *Mathnawī*, unless otherwise indicated or quoted from elsewhere, is always transliterated as *Mesnevī*.

Finally, the titles of the references are usually cited in abbreviated forms after their first appearance.

PART ONE

THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ANḲARAVĪ

CHAPTER ONE

THE LIFE OF ISMĀ'ĪL ANĀARAVĪ

1. His Early Life

AnĀaravĪ's full name is Ismā'Īl b. Aĥmad RusūhiddĪn BayrāmĪ, MevlevĪ, AnĀaravĪ.¹ He is also referred to in biographical sources under a variety of brief appellations: RusūhĪ AnĀaravĪ², RusūhĪ Dede³, Ismā'Īl EfendĪ⁴, Ismā'Īl Dede⁵, Őeyh Ismā'Īl⁶ and Ĥazret-i Őāriĥ.⁷ Among them,

¹ KĀtib Āelebi, *Kahsf al-Zunūn*, ed. ŐerafettĪn Yaltkaya (Istanbul: Ma'ārif Maĥba'ası, 1362/1943), vol. 2, p. 1877; Ismā'Īl al-BaghdādĪ, *Īdāĥ al-Maknūn FĪ al-Dhayl 'alā Kashf al-Zunūn* (Istanbul: Ma'ārif Maĥba'ası, 1364/1945), vol. 1, p. 53.

² Ismā'Īl al-BaghdādĪ, *Hadiyyat al-ĀrifĪn Asmā' al-Mu'allifĪn wa Āthār al-MuŐannifĪn* (Istanbul: Milli Eĝitim Basimevi, 1951), vol. 5, p.218.

³ Can Kerametli, *Galata MevlevĪhānesi Divan EdebiyatĪ Mūzesi* (Istanbul: TŪrkiye Turing ve Otomobil Kurumu, 1977), p. 29; H. Algar, "AnĀaravĪ, RosŪĥ al-DĪn Esmā'Īl b. Aĥmad", *Encyclopaedia Iranica* (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), vol. 2, p. 100.

⁴ MuŐafā SĀĥĪb (SĀĥĪb Dede), *SefĪne-i NefĪse-i Mevleviyān* (MıŐır, 1283), p. 37; Avram Galanti, *Ankara Tarihi* (Istanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1950), p. 102; ĀlĪ CānĪb, "Ankarada YetiŐen MeŐhŪr SĪmĀlardan AnĀaravĪ Ismā'Īl EfendĪ", *ĤayĀt MecmŪ'ası* 1 (1927), p. 3; Nihad Sami Banarlı, *Resimli TŪrk EdebiyatĪ Tarihi* (Istanbul: Milli Eĝitim Basimevi, 1976), vol. 2, p.699.

⁵ Abdalbaki GŪlpınarlı, *MevlĀnĀdan Sonra MevlevĪlik* (Istanbul: InkĪlap Kitabevi, 1953), p. 143; Meĥmed Sureyyā, *Sicill-i 'OsmĀni* (Istanbul: Maĥba'a-i Āmire, 1308), vol. 1, p. 352; Evliyā Āelebi, *Seyāĥatnāme* (Istanbul: Zuhuri DanıŐman, 1971), vol. 2, p. 102; KĀtib Āelebi, *Fezleke* (Istanbul: CerĪde-i ĤavĀdis Maĥba'ası, 1287), vol. 2, p.148.

Rusūhī, from the Arabic, *rusūkh* meaning "being well rooted in knowledge",⁸ was used by Ankaravī himself as a pen-name (*mahlaş*) in his poetry⁹, while Hāzret-i Şāriḥ (the Excellent Commentator) was fairly attributed to him by his contemporaries as well as his successors as an honorific title because of the wide-spread reputation that he had gained through his celebrated commentary on the *Mesnevī* of Mevlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī.¹⁰ These two complimentary epithets which took precedence over the others, were referred to in the laudatory couplets of the renowned poet of the Ottoman Divan literature of the eighteenth century, Şeyh Gālib:

⁶ Nev'i Zāde 'Atāī, *Hadā'iku'l-Ḥakā'ik Fī Tekmilet-i Ş-Şakā'ik* (Istanbul, 1268), vol. 2, p. 765; Muḥammad Amīn b. Faḍlullah al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāsat al-Athar fī A'yān al-Qarn al-Ḥādī 'Ashar* (Beirut: Maktabat Khayyāt, n.d.), vol. 1, p. 418; Şemseddīn Sāmī, *Ḳāmūsu'l-A'lām* (Istanbul: Mihrān Maṭba'ası, 1306), vol. 1, p. 439.

⁷ "İsmāil Rusūhī Efendi," *Başlangıçından Günümüze Kadar Büyük Türk Klasikleri, Tarih, Antoloji ve Ansiklopedi* (Istanbul: Ötüken-Sögüt, 1987), vol. 5, p. 101; "Rusuḥī İsmail Ankaravī," *Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi*, eds. Ezel Enverdi, Mustafa Kutlu and İsmail Kara (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1990), vol. 7, p. 359; Gölpınarlı, *Mevlevîlik*, p. 143.

⁸ Qur'ān, 3:7

⁹ Banarlı, *Resimli Türk Edebiyatı*, p. 700. One of his outstanding verses that contains this pen-name is as follows:

Gel (Rusūhi) nin sözünü dinle semā'a āşık ol
Key teküne beyne ehlilaşkı min ehlişşerefi.

See Bursalı Mehmet Tāhir Efendi, *Osmanlı Müellifleri* (Istanbul: Meral Yayınevi, 1974), vol. 1, p. 120.

¹⁰ Kerametli, *Galata Mevlevihānesi*, p. 30; Gölpınarlı, *Mevlevîlik*, p. 143.

Ey kâşif-i esrâr-i nihân Hâzret-i Şârih
Rû-pûş-i tecellî-i'iyân Hâzret-i Şârih
Olmuş lakabın'ilm-i ledünnide Rusûhî
'İrfân ile memdûh-ı cihân Hâzret-i Şârih¹¹

O! the Excellent Commentator, the uncoverer of the hidden mysteries
The Excellent Commentator, the coverer of clear theophany
Your nickname was declared as Rusûhî in divine knowledge
The Excellenct Commentator, You are celebrated all over the world with gnostic knowledge.

As his surname suggests, Ismâ'îl Rusûhî was born in Ankara. His exact date of birth is still unknown to us. Nevertheless, it is recorded in some reliable sources that he was born around the late tenth century A.H.¹² Except for his father's name, Aḥmad, nothing is known about his family.¹³ After having learned Arabic and Persian to an exceptionally high level, Anḳaravî began to study the exoteric sciences related to the Shari'a such as tafsîr, ḥadîth, kalâm, fiqh, and ḥikmah (theoretical wisdom). Later he studied the esoteric sciences related to the taşawwuf (mysticism) and ṭarîqa in which he became a unique master of his time.¹⁴

¹¹ Banarlı, *Resimli Türk Edebiyatı*, p. 700.

¹² Sâmi, *Ḳāmūs*, p. 439.

¹³ *Büyük Türk Klasikleri Ansiklopedi*, vol. 5, p. 101. Only one source, whose reliability will be discussed later, tells us that his father was an Imam. See, Necati Elgin, "İsmail Ankaravî (Mesnevî Şârihi Rusûhî Dede)," *Anıt* 30 (1960), p. 33.

¹⁴ Sâmi, *Ḳāmūs*, p. 439; 'Umar Riḍâ Kaḥḥāla, *Mu'jam al-Mu'allifîn* (Damascus: al-Maktaba al-'Arabiyya, 1376/1957), vol. 1, p. 259.

During his sojourn in Ankara, Ismā'īl Dede first became acquainted with the Bayrāmī order in which he was later to be promoted as far as the post of the *şeyhlik*.¹⁵ In the meantime he is also said to have obtained an *icāzet* (authorization) from the Khalvatiyya Order.¹⁶ No indication has been found in the sources as to how or through whose influence he became affiliated with the latter Ṭarīqah. As Erhan Yetik has argued,¹⁷ though it is easy to account for his relationship with the Bayrāmīyya because of the fact that it was the predominant order of his time and region, and also because his family was then closely connected to it, it is difficult, however, to establish even his affiliation with the Khalvatiyya, let alone his *icāzet* therefrom.

Towards the end of his stay in Ankara as a Şeyh of Bayrāmī order, Ismā'īl Rusūhī contracted a severe eye disease that prevented him from

¹⁵ 'Ali Enver, *Semāhāne-i Edeb* (Istanbul: 'Ālem Maṭba'ası, 1309), p. 81; Gölpınarlı, *Mevlevîlik*, p. 143.

¹⁶ Ismā'īl Rusūhī Ankaravī, *Mecmū'ātu'l-Leṭā'if ve Meṭmūratu'l Me'ārif*, known as *Şerḥu'l-Mesnevī* (Istanbul: Maṭba'a-i 'Āmire, 1289/1872), vol. 1, p. 11. This is the only reference in which Ankaravī is reported to have held a certificate from the Khalvatiyya, a Sunnī order that appeared first in Anatolia with the lodge of Akhī Yūsuf Khalvatī in Niğde at the end of the thirteenth century. Cf. M. Fuad Köprülü, *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*, trans. and ed. by Gary Leiser (Albany: State University of New York, 1992), p. 101

¹⁷ Erhan Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravī Hayatı, Eserleri ve Tasavvufî Görüşleri* (Istanbul: İşaret Yayınları, 1992), p. 53.

pursuing his studies.¹⁸ It is reported that he had long suffered from this painful disease and had begun to despair of his situation, so much so that he thought that it would be impossible for him to recover and continue his studies. Then, upon receiving "spiritual illuminations" (*işārāt-i ma'neviyye*),¹⁹ he immediately headed to Konya where first he made a visit to the sacred tomb of Mevlānā with a supplication for healing his eyes, as is well-articulated in his own couplet below:

It is these people who by their glance turn the earth into life,
It is hoped that they render at least the edge of the one eye
seeing.²⁰

Consequently his prayers were answered when he met Bostan Çelebi I (d.1040/1630), one of the descendants of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī and the then chief Şeyh of the Mevlevī lodge, who not only miraculously restored Ankaravī's eyesight by the "elixir of his effective glance" (*nazar-ı iksīr*)²¹ but also played a vital role throughout the remainder of his life. His encounter with Bostan Çelebi I has been characterized by some prominent writers as

¹⁸ The disease is specified as "cataract" in some of the classic biographical sources. See, for instance, Enver, *Semāhāne*, p. 81.

¹⁹ Bursali Mehmet Tāhir, *Meşāyih-i 'Osmāniye'den Sekiz Zātin Terācim-i Ahvāli* (Istanbul: Kütübhāne-i İslām, 1318), p. 21.

²⁰ "Onlar ki, nazarlari ile toprađı kimya ederler / Umulur ki bir gözün kenanni olsun görür hale getirirler." Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravī*, p. 53.

²¹ Enver, *Semāhāne*, p. 81.

"a turning point",²² simply because from then onwards he, having given up the chief position of Bayrāmī Şeyh that he had held for a long time, entered into a new environment, which was to shape his career from that point onwards.

Ismā'īl Ankaravī now became a faithful disciple of Bostan Çelebi, who instilled in him the fundamental principles and teachings of the Mevleviyye, including its ritual and devotional practices. And under the auspices of this celebrated Süfi Şeyh in the Mevelevīhāne (Mevlevī Derviş Convent) of Konya, he fully and successfully passed through what is called the *çile*, a kind of spiritual training, which is a prerequisite for a novice, and which consists of engaging in religious ascetic exercises for a period of forty days before admission to the order of Mevleviyye. Right after the completion of his *çile*, he was appointed as *halīfe* to the Galata Mevlevī Convent²³ of Istanbul in 1019/1610,²⁴ a position which he took over from 'Abdi Dede who was then holding the chief post (*postnişin*) and who also had founded the Kasım Paşa Mevlevī Convent of Istanbul.²⁵

²² Ibid.; Cānib, "Ankaravī Ismā'īl Efendī," p. 3.

²³ This was the first Mevlevī Lodge, built at the time of Bāyazīd II by Iskender Paşa in the year 897/1491, which coincides with the numeric value of the term "al-rusūkh", a pen-name attributed to Ankaravī. See, Meḥmet Ṭāhir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, vol. 1, p. 120; Kerametli, *Galata Mevlevihanesi*, p. 30.

²⁴ Elgin, "Ismail Ankaravī," p. 33; see also *Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 7, p. 359.

²⁵ Meḥmet Ṭāhir, *Meşāyih-i 'Osmāniye*, p. 21.

Before embarking upon a review of his life as a chief Şeyh in Istanbul, it should be noted that a few Ottoman sources relate somewhat different accounts with regard to his first association with the Mevlevî Ṭarīqah. In his eminent work, *Sicill-i 'Osmāni*, known also as *Tezkira-i Meşāhir-i 'Osmāni (The Biographical Scroll of the Prominent Ottoman Dignitaries)*, Meḥmet Süreyyā records that Ankaravî became a Mevlevî after he had come to Istanbul and further adds that he served for some time as "a chief lecturer on the *Mesnevî*" (*mesnevîhān*) at the Galata Mevlevîhāne, then acceded to the post of *Şeyhlik* in lieu of 'Abdi Dede.²⁶ But such an anecdote is not only inconsistent with the preceding accounts but also its factuality is disputable on two grounds: in the first place, as all other reliable sources unanimously narrate it, he, long before his arrival in Istanbul, had been affiliated with the Mevlevî Order especially in Konya, though, as will be indicated shortly, one additional account interestingly predates it even prior to Konya.²⁷ There is further evidence, as Yetik shows,²⁸ that he went to Istanbul not at his own will but was sent there by his master, Bostan Çelebi I, to take up the position of *halīfe*. In the second place, it should be recalled again that in search of a remedy for his eyes, he proceeded to Konya from his home city, Ankara, where he had been

²⁶ Süreyyā, *Sicill-i 'Osmāni*, p. 352.

²⁷ Elgin, "Ismail Ankaravî," p. 33.

²⁸ Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravî*, p. 54.

serving as a committed preacher for the Bayrāmī Order. So, in contrast to what Süreyyā claims, most sources agree that he entered into the Mevlevī Order in Konya.

However, in the introduction to his work entitled *Fütūḥāt-i 'Ayniyye*, Anḳaravī himself cites the following brief story, which contains considerable information about his eye-disease:

During the time when I had sound eyesight, I was occupied commenting on the *Mesnevī*...Once I had completed the third volume, by Divine Destiny, an ailment contaminated my eyes; a cataract fell upon them, which so severely affected the pupil of my eyes that it curtailed their sight for a certain span of time, as if they had ceased to see and read. After some time, so faithful to the Almighty but so depressed as I was, fortunately I found expert optical help from the people of the Spiritual Path, whose affectionate medical preparation removed the curtain from my eyes, and thus rendered them bright and full of light...²⁹

Apparently the text quoted above tells us that Ismā'īl Anḳaravī had become infected with the serious eye-disease while in the process of writing his commentary on the *Mesnevī*. So it suggests two possible implications: either he, long before being initiated into the Mevleviyye, might have begun to study the *Mesnevī* possibly in Ankara (because, as has already been shown, his eyes were cured in Konya); or he might have been contaminated a second time with the same eye-disease after he had joined the Mevlevī Order. The first assumption sounds too weak on the ground that Anḳaravī,

²⁹ Anḳaravī, *Fütūḥāt-i 'Ayniyye* (Istanbul: Maṭba'a-ı Aḥmed Kāmil, 1328/1910), pp. 3-4.

as will be seen later, commenced composing the commentary during his sojourn as a Mevlevī Şeyh in Istanbul and completed it around 1037/1627.³⁰ However, the second possibility, indicating that he had the disease twice, once in Ankara and the other time in Istanbul, is relatively more tenable and is still in line with Evliyā Çelebi's brief remark, which imparts that "he remained blind for seven years, yet he continued unfailingly to deliver lectures on the holy *Mesnevī*".³¹ A similar conclusion is also drawn in Yetik's monograph solely on the basis of Ankaravī's own words in *Fütūḥāt-i 'Ayniyye*, which were quoted above.³² On the other hand, basing himself on the same passage, Ālī Cānib, who has written a short essay on Ankaravī's life, presumes that the painful disease might have lasted for quite a long time.³³

Incidentally, another short article,³⁴ written by Necati Elgin and

³⁰ Banarlı, *Resimli Türk Edebiyatı*, p. 699. H. Algar "Ankaravī, Rosūḳ," p. 100.

³¹ Evliyā Çelebi, *Seyāḥatnāme*, pp. 101-102.

³² He also cites Ankaravī's lamentation and invocation to God in his couplet:

O my Lord! Shed light on my eyes out of Your Grace.
Grant pleasure in my heart out of Certainty.

Quoted in Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravī*, p. 54.

³³ Cānib, "Ankaravī Ismā'īl Efendī," p. 403.

³⁴ See note 13 above for biographical details. Mr. Necati Elgin's succinct research paper, published in the periodical *Anıt*, comprises, besides some of Ankaravī's poems, a few fragmentary letters transcribed from the original manuscripts in the archives of the Museum of Mevlānā in Konya.

based on the information derived from an unknown classical source, yet for some reason either overlooked or not consulted by Yetik, informs us that Ismâ'îl Ankaravî went to Egypt in 1008 for a period of seven years to study various disciplines, entering during this time into the Mevlevî Order in which he was eventually promoted to the lectureship of the *Mesnevî*. Moreover, during that period, the report continues, tobacco emerged for the first time, and among the Egyptian 'Ülēmā there began to take place serious debates as to whether smoking is lawful, in which Ankaravî also took an active part, sometimes arguing very harshly with the *muftis* (jurisconsults) of the four legal schools (*madhāhib*). Afterwards, he departed from there to Ankara.³⁵ More surprisingly, the same article goes on to relate that while residing in Ankara, he initiated courses on reading and teaching the *Mesnevî*; but he at the same time became a target of accusations and of relentless attacks by a group of envious and mischievous people. So, because of these unfair allegations, he suffered a great deal and consequently fell victim to an eye disease.³⁶ The rest of the story gives more or less the same information as was presented above, namely his visit to Konya, his encounter with Bostan Çelebi I, and his appointment as *halîfe* to Istanbul, etc.

Be that as it may, despite its ever questionable authenticity, it is the only report I have ever found that casts considerable light not only on

³⁵ Elgin, "Ismail Ankaravî," p. 33.

³⁶ Ibid.

Ankaravî's life prior to Ankara but also on his former education. One can quite reasonably believe that he spent a long time in Egypt, given the fact that he has authored, besides Persian and Turkish works, at least few remarkable Arabic writings, which will be discussed later. Given however the extreme confusion that exists surrounding Ankaravî's early career, it is best to exercise maximum caution in drawing conclusions as to the circumstances of his joining the Mevlevî Order.

2. As a Mevlevî Şeyh in Istanbul

Needless to say, the important but at the same time critical part of Ankaravî's career began with his appointment to the position of *şeyhlik* at the Galata Mevlevîhâne in 1019/1610. From this time up until his death in 1041/1631, he held this prestigious post, occupying himself mainly with reading and teaching the *Mesnevî* to his novices, preaching and delivering lectures, composing his treatises and works, and so forth. During his tenure of 21 years as a şeyh, İsmâ'îl Ankaravî, having displayed a simple, humble and pious personality, became an exemplary model both to his disciples and to the lay adherents who would come to the centre for his sermons. Almost all the classical and modern sources attribute to him a number of excellent moral qualities and hold him in remarkably high esteem. They also confer on him world-wide fame for his overall knowledge of both exoteric and esoteric disciplines. Kâtib Çelebi, for instance, portrays

him as "a highly knowledgeable, religious and ascetic person".³⁷ Similarly, Evliyā Çelebi sums up his major characteristics as follows: "He is extremely humble, derviş and erudite, like an ocean of spiritual treasure; and he is also well-grounded in the knowledge of the Shari'a, and always careful not to commit sins."³⁸ His remarkably profound knowledge and commendable integrity singled him out as "a unique person in the *ṭarīqa* (mystic order) and *taṣawwuf* (mysticism) of his century".³⁹ Some other sources too cite more or less the same remarks but in conceptually different forms; for the sake of space, we avoid repeating them here.⁴⁰

Despite his notable position among the venerable scholars of his time, like some other Sufis, Ismā'īl Rusūhī was at times at the centre of controversy and became the target of vehement criticism on the part of his colleagues. As we know, the epoch in which he lived witnessed so many intense struggles and even bitter clashes between the doctors of the Shari'a, known as "Ülemā", who taught the Scripture and the Islamic sciences on a strictly formal basis in the medreses, and the people of *ṭarīqas*, known as Sufis, who cultivated spiritual and mystical knowledge in private *ṭarīqa* convents. The confrontation between these two groups took

³⁷ Kātib Çelebi, *Fezleke*, p. 148.

³⁸ Evliyā Çelebi, *Seyāhatnāme*, p. 103.

³⁹ Sāmī, *Ḳāmūs*, p. 439.

⁴⁰ See for instance, 'Aṭāī, *Ḥadā'īku'l-Ḥaḳā'ik*, p. 765; al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣāt al-Athar*, p. 318.

on various forms, depending on the circumstances and people involved. They are described in historical accounts of this period under such headings as "'Ülemā' versus 'Ürefā' or Meşāyih" and "Medrese vs. Ṭarīqa".

Throughout the seventeenth century, a similar confrontation erupted between the advocates of the Khalwatī and Mevlevī orders and the followers of Kadizade, known also as the "Kadizadeliler" or "fakılar".⁴¹ It was these people who became notorious in Ankaravī's time for having adopted extreme negative attitudes towards not only the adherents of those two Ṭarīqa but the cemetery caretakers as well. The leader of these people,

⁴¹ The term "kadizadeliler", composed of two components, "kadi" (judge) and "zade" (son), means literally "the followers of judge's children, while the term "fakılar", derived originally from the Arabic term, "faḳīh" (jurist), but afterwards ironically deformed to "fakılar", signifies "jurists". Both of these names were simultaneously given to a group formed by Meḫmet Efendī of Balıkesir (1582-1635), best known as "kadizade". The members of the group were preachers by profession. The Kadizadeliler, under the direction of Kadizade Meḫmet Efendī, adopted for themselves the famous work, *Ṭarīkat-i Muḫammediye* by Meḫmet Efendī of Birgivi (d.1573) as a code of ethics for acting and preaching. Although the ideas and theories presented in the book were severely criticized and some parts of it even rejected by the prominent scholar, Ebussuūd Efendī, the Şeyhülislam (chief-jurisconsult) of that time, it remained continuously in circulation among those preachers. Kadizade Meḫmet Efendī became increasingly active at the time of crisis and tribulation that arose immediately after the death of Sultān Aḫmed I. At this particular time he acted in disguise as a real protector and defender of the Shari'a. Ironically, he claimed that all the miserable events of that time were happening because of the negligence of the Shari'a and because of the practices exercised by the People of Ṭarīqa which were contrary to the Shari'a. Moreover, he is reportedly said to have supported the sanction decreed by Sultān Murad IV against smoking by issuing a verdict (*fetvā*) for its prohibition. See for more information, Muştafā Nūrī Paşa, *Netāyicü'l-Vuḳū'āt {Kurumlar ve Örgütleriyle Osmanlı Tarihi}*, transform. into modern Turkish by Neset Cagatay (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1979), vol. 1-2, pp. 341-2.

Kadizade Mehmet Efendi, according to Kātib Çelebi, used to deliver simple and superficial lectures, since he had no knowledge of natural sciences. He would also scorn particularly the Mevlevīs by portraying them as "the holy ones who kick the floor-boards and blow the whistle..." Because of the insulting language he employed in his sermons, he was condemned by Sivāsī Efendi and Ankaravī as "a heretic and infidel who denied the Saints".⁴² Not only Kadizade himself but all his followers under the pretext of the defending of the Shari'a, voiced loud opposition to almost all the mystic practices, ranging from "supererogatory prayers" to "derviş ritual ceremonies", audition (*semā'*) and whirling (*rağs*), by maintaining that these are violations of Islamic teachings. Ismā'īl Ankaravī exerted his utmost effort in order to counter such attacks and hence composed a book on this controversial subject in which he attempted to prove the legitimacy of *semā'* from a religious viewpoint.⁴³ According to some sources, upon the order of the sultān he began to write this book and completed it "in a lucid and convincing style" within three days, submitting it to a committee headed by Şeyhülislām Yaḥyā Efendi, who approved it with great admiration.⁴⁴ Moreover, due to his strong support for the ritual practices of the ṭarīqas in

⁴² Kātib Çelebi, *The Balance of Truth*, trans. G.L. Lewis (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957), pp. 136-137.

⁴³ The title of the book is *Huccetü's-Semā'*, a work which will be discussed in the section of this thesis devoted to Ankaravī's works.

⁴⁴ Sāḳıb Dede, *Nefīse-i Mevleviyān*, p. 38.

general and "performing semā'" in particular, he earned special courtesy and commendation from some venerable Sufi leaders especially from 'Azīz Maḥmūd Hūdāi (d.1038/1628), then şeyh of the Celvetī order and tutor of Sultān Aḥmed I (d.1617).⁴⁵

The supporters of Kadizade, clinging to a narrow definition of Islam, gradually gained popularity and prestige among the state authorities. So much so that they persuaded them to implement a restrictive form of Islam based merely on hadith and law and influenced them to close Sufi centres and imprison some Sufi Şeyhs. Ismā'īl Rusūhī himself suffered from these persecutions, as he laments in his commentary on the *Mesnevi*:

While I, as a humble person, had been teaching and preaching in our abode, I found myself in an unpleasant situation and charged by a group of selfish and envious people with false accusations and then driven out of my domicile to exile. Even they made an attempt to kill me. Fortunately, my Lord saved me from their plot and conspiracy.⁴⁶

No further account is supplied there as to when and how this incident occurred; but it is a historic fact that it was only the Kadizadeliler at that

⁴⁵ Meḥmet Ṭāhir, *Meşāyih-i 'Osmāniye*, p. 22. See also for a detailed exposition of the Kadizadeliler movement, Madeline C. Zilfi, *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman Ulemā' in the Postclassical Age (1600-1800)* (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988), pp. 129-181; Ismail Hakki Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1983), vol. 3, pp. 343-366.

⁴⁶ Anḳaravī, *Şerḥü'l-Mesnevi*, vol. 2, p. 226; also see, Yetik, *İsmail-i Ankaravī*, pp. 55-6.

time who attacked Sufi convents.⁴⁷

In spite of these hardships and afflictions, Rusūhī Dede carried on his undertakings with remarkable success and gained progressively more popularity in his milieu through his lectures and writings. During his long tenure in the post as a Mevlevī Şeyh, he conquered the hearts of not only the murids (novices) who were reading the Mesnevī under his supervision but also so many other people, young and old, who used to come regularly to the Tekke to listen to his sermons.

Ismā'īl Rusūhī, while still holding his post of *şeyhlik*, died in 1041/1631 and was buried in the courtyard of the Galata Mevlevīhāne. The year of his death, 1041 coincides with the term "hitām" (completion) according to the *abcd* numeration.⁴⁸ Over his tomb was built the present

⁴⁷ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 3, pp. 363-374; M. Nūrī Paşa, *Netāyicü'l-Vukū'āt*, p. 341, n. 37.

⁴⁸ See for example: 'Aṭāī, *Ḥadā'īku'l-Ḥaḳā'ik*, p. 765; "Ankaravī Ismail Rūsūhi," *Türk Ansiklopedisi* (Ankara: Milli Eđitim Basimevi, 1941), vol. 3, p. 66; *Büyük Türk Klasikleri Ansiklopedi*, vol. 5, p.101; Enver, *Semāhāne*, p. 83; Algar, "Ankaravī Rosūk," p. 101; Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravī*, p. 58; Kerametli, *Galata Mevlevīhānesi*, p. 30; Sāmī, *Ḳāmūş*, p. 439; Gölpınarlı, *Mevlānādan Sonra*, p. 143; Avram Galanti, *Ankara Tarihi*, p. 103; M. Ṭāhir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, p. 118; *Meşāyih-i Osmāniye*, p. 22;; Banarlı, *Resimli Türk Edebiyatı*, p. 699; Tahsin Yazıcı, "Ismā'īl Rusūkḳ al-Dīn Ismā'īl b. Aḳmad al-Ankarawī," *Eİ2*, vol. 4, p. 190; Elgin, "Ismail Ankaravī," p.31; Cānib, "Ankaravī Ismā'īl Efendī," p. 5; Fahir İz, *Eski Türk Edebiyatında Nesir* (Istanbul: Osman Yalçın Matbaa, 1964), vol. 1, p. 148; Aḳmed Ateş, "Mesnevīnin Onsekiz Beytīnin Mānasi," in *60. doğum yılı münasebetiyle Fuad Köprülü Armağani* (Istanbul: Osman Yalçın Matbaa, 1953), p.38.

The following sources, however, record his death as 1042/1632: Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-Zunūn*, vol. 1, p. 630; Kaḳḳāla, *Mu'jam al-Mu'allifīn*, vol. 1, p. 259; Muḳibbī, *Khulāşāt al-Āthār*, vol. 1, p. 418; Brockelmann, *GALS*, vol. 2, p. 662; and some others indicate 1040/1630: Evliyā Çelebi,

türbe (dome) by Hālet Sāīd Efendi (d.1239/1823) in 1235/1829, then şeyh at the Centre. And the following lines, composed by Selim Recāi, known also as Bīgānī Dede, as a tribute to Anḳaravī, are inscribed over the entrance gate of his tomb:

Rāh-i Mevlānāda ey Gālib budur Şeyhüŝ-Şüyüh
Ḥazret-i Şāriḥ Rusūhī kıdve-i ehl-i Rusūh.⁴⁹

O Gālib! Here is the Master of the Masters in the path of Mevlānā
He is the Excellent Commentator and Rusūhī, and he is the
exemplary model for the people of Rusūh.

Seyāhatnāme, p. 102; Mehmed Süreyyā, *Sicill-i 'Osmāni*, vol. 1, p. 352; al-Baghdādī, *Hadiyyat al-'Ārifīn*, vol. 1, p. 218.

⁴⁹ Kerametli, *Galata Mevlevihānesi*, p. 30.

CHAPTER TWO

THE WORKS OF ANĀARAVĪ

Preliminary Remarks

Ismā'īl Rusūhī Dede wrote, especially while presiding as the Şeyh over the Galata Mevlevī convent, numerous books on a variety of subjects ranging from mysticism to poetry. His main interest, however, lied in his interpretations of the major works, besides the selected segments of the Qur'ān and Prophetic sayings, of prominent mystical thinkers and poets such as Rūmī (d.672/1273), Ibn al-'Arabī (d.639/1240), Ibn al-Fāriḍ (d.632/1235), Jāmī (d.898/1492), etc. At present, despite the fact that figures varying from 20 to 40 are cited in several reliable documents,⁵⁰ we are unable to determine the exact number of his entire writings. In his noteworthy study on the life and works of Anāaravī, Dr. Yetik has been able to trace, after personally visiting many of the libraries in Turkey, and mainly in Istanbul, the titles as well as locations of twenty-four books written by

⁵⁰ In *Semāhāne-i Edeb* (p. 82), A. Enver indicates that Anāaravī authored more than forty books, yet there he specifies no more than three titles. M. Tāhir, on the other hand, attributes to him in one place (*Osmanli Müellifleri*, vol. 1, pp. 118-120.) twenty books, and in another twenty-two. (*Meşāyih-i Osmāniye*, pp. 23-6). However, in both he is inconsistent not only with regard to the numbers but also the titles of a few books.

Ankaravî.⁵¹ My present research, however, with the substantial aid of the newly documented and computerized catalogues of those libraries, and with the help of a number of western biographical sources of which Yetik seems to have had no knowledge, increases the number of the titles to as many as thirty three. In what follows, I will annotate the 24 books I have examined and I will list the remainder at the end of this chapter.

1. *Şerhü'l-Mesnevî* or *Mecmû'atu'l-Letâ'if ve Meṭmûretu'l-Me'ârif*

This is Ankaravî's vast commentary on the *Mesnevî*, which appears under several different names in some sources, though its exact title, as he himself has specified it, is *Mecmû'atu'l-Letâ'if ve Meṭmûretu'l-Me'ârif* (*The Collection of Subtleties and the Hidden Store of Knowledge*).⁵² For instance, Kâtip Çelebi and some other writers, including Reynold Nicholson, named it *Fâtiḥü'l-Ebyât*,⁵³ which, as will be seen from its own heading, is wrong, for this is, though attached by Ankaravî to the *Mecmû'at*, a separate book in its own right, devoted to an explanation of the first eighteen couplets of the *Mesnevî* and of certain difficult concepts.⁵⁴ Meanwhile,

⁵¹ Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravî*, pp. 65-121.

⁵² Ankaravî, *Şerhü'l-Mesnevî*, vol. 1, p. 2.

⁵³ Kâtip Çelebi, *Kashf al-Zunûn*, vol. 1, p. 1087; Brockelmann, *GALS*, vol. 2, p. 662; Reynold A. Nicholson, *The Mathnawî of Jalâlu'ddîn Rûmî* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1926), vol. 2, introduction, p. xiii.

⁵⁴ Ankaravî, *Şerhü'l-Mesnevî*, vol. 2, p. 2.

Mehmet Tāhir entitles it "Şerḥ-i Mesnevī Şerīf el-Müsem mā Mefātiḥü'l-Ebyāt",⁵⁵ while Ismā'īl Paşa (al-Baghdādī) designates it as "Fātiḥü'l-Ebyāt fī Şerḥi'l-Mesnevī",⁵⁶ both of which are incorrect, in so far as Anḳaravī's own title is concerned. However, for the sake of convenience, I will henceforward call it briefly *Şerḥü'l-Mesnevī* or only *Şerḥ*.

Owing to his enormous commentary on the *Mesnevī*, Ismā'īl Rusūhī occupied a central place not only in Mevlevī circles but in the entire world of Ottoman literature as well. Even after his death, this work has long played a significant role as being the primary authority for teaching the *Mesnevī*; and his name and work have always been demanded in the certificates (*icāzetnāmeler*) issued for candidates who seek to be appointed to the position of *mesnevīhān* (i.e. a lecturer on the *Mesnevī*).⁵⁷

Despite this, Abdalbaki Gölpınarlı, a contemporary researcher on the *Mesnevī* and the Mevleviyye, though he has great respect for Anḳaravī's commentary in comparison to those of others, yet asserts that the celebrity it gained in the Mevlevī milieu in the past is disputable on several accounts. First of all, Gölpınarlı thinks that Anḳaravī perhaps did not consult other important works of Mevlānā Jalāl al-Dīn, or that he did not study them with due care and attention. Secondly, as it appears from Anḳaravī's work,

⁵⁵ Mehmet Tāhir, *Meşāyih-i 'Osmāniye*, p. 23.

⁵⁶ al-Baghdādī, *Hadiyyat al-Mu'allifin*, vol. 1, p. 218.

⁵⁷ Gölpınarlı, *Mevlevilik*, p. 143; Algar, "Anḳaravī Rosuk," p. 100.

continues Gölpınarlı, he has not looked into the *Maqālāt* by Shams al-Tabrīzī, which could have been in fact of great use to him in explaining some of the stories in the *Mesnevī*. Moreover, he seems to have been ignorant even of Rūmī's own explanation of one of the couplets of the *Mesnevī*, illustrated fully in the latter's *Fīhi Mā Fīh*. One other reason why Anḳaravī does not merit such reputation is, Gölpınarlı goes on to say, that he has not shown due care in the selection of an authentic version of the *Mesnevī* amongst a number of others as a basis for his commentary. For this reason, the text he has chosen, he claims, is replete with defects and is even distorted in many places. Besides, since he was not well-educated in the Persian language, or rather, since his knowledge of Persian was merely based on books, he failed to comprehend some of the complex idioms in the *Mesnevī*. The last discrediting factor is that Anḳaravī made an additional commentary on an alleged seventh volume of the *Mesnevī* and falsely ascribed it to Mevlānā Rūmī. It is for all of these reasons, concludes Gölpınarlı, that the wide recognition Anḳaravī gained from his commentary was not duly deserved.⁵⁸

All of these criticisms are of course important and yet need to be ascertained in the light of careful analysis, an analysis which would base itself on all the volumes of Anḳaravī's *Şerḥ* comparing it with other reliable commentaries. But such an extensive study lies beyond the scope of the

⁵⁸ Gölpınarlı, *Mevlevīlik*, p. 143.

present research and above all it certainly requires at least more than a couple of independent dissertations. Nevertheless, only some important facets will be highlighted in a summary fashion.

When one puts aside the issue of Anḳaravī's "false ascription" of an additional volume to the *Mesnevī*, which is indeed controversial, and confines oneself only to various investigations of his commentary, one can acquire a fair evaluation with regard to its credibility as well as its adequacy. A cursory glance at the introduction to the *Şerḥ* reveals that Anḳaravī, as he declares there, long before embarking on its composition, made a thorough study of a number of eminent books in a variety of disciplines, ranging from Qur'anic exegesis {e.g., *Anwār al-Tanzīl wa Asrār al-Ta'wīl* by Qāḍi Bayḍāwī (d.791/1388), *Irshād al-'Aql al-Salīm ilā Mazāyā al-Qur'ān al-Karīm* by Abū al-Su'ūd (d.982/1574), *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Azīm* by Ibn Kathīr (d.774/1373)}, *al-Kashshāf 'an Ḥaqā'iq al-Tanzīl* by Ibn 'Umar Zamakhsharī (d.545/1144), *Majma' al-Bayān Fī Tafsīr al-Qur'ān* by Ibn al-Ḥasan Tabarsī (d.540/1153)}, to ḥadīth {e.g., *al-Jāmi' al-Şaḥīḥ* by Bukhārī (d.260/870) *Mishkāṭ al-Maṣābiḥ* by Kātib al-Tibrīzī (d.647/1237), *Mashāriq al-Anwār* by Ibn Muḥammad Saghānī (d.560/1257), *al-Jāmi' al-Şaghīr* by Shaybānī (d.210/804)}, to taṣawwuf {e.g., *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* by Ibn al-'Arabī, *Dīvān* by Ibn al-Fārīd, *'Awārif al-Ma'ārif* by Shihāb al-Dīn Abū Ḥafṣ al-Suhrawardī (d.640/1234), *Kitāb Istilāḥāt al-Şūfī* by 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī (d.730/1330)}, to kalām {e.g., *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*, *Sharḥ al-'Aqā'id*},

to hikmat {e.g., *Hayākil al-Nūr* by Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī}, to Shari'a {e.g., *Mishkāt al-Anwār* by al-Ghazālī (d.512/1111)},⁵⁹ to Islamic Jurisprudence {e.g., *Kitāb al-Hidāya* by Muḥammad Ibn Qāsim (d.891/1489), *Ṣadr al-Sharī'a* by Burhān al-Dīn Maḥbūbī (d.744/1347)}, to lexicography {e.g., *al-Ṣiḥāḥ Tāj al-Lughah* by Ismā'īl ibn Ḥammād al-Jawharī (d.404/1003), and *al-Nihāyah Fī Gharīb al-Ḥadīth wa al-Āthār* by Ibn al-Athīr (d.630/1232)}.⁶⁰ So no doubt that this commentary, according to its author, is the product of a long survey based not only on his own opinions but also on knowledge and wisdom derived from those sources enumerated above. Moreover, in the ensuing lines he stipulates that, unless fully equipped with the knowledge of those books, no Mesnevīhān should engage in teaching the *Mesnevī*.⁶¹ This alone may be good enough to show the care he took in preparing his *Serh*, not to mention his 21 years of service in the Mevlevīhāne where he would have had the opportunity to become closely acquainted with the various versions of Rūmī's work.

Nonetheless, against Gölpınarlı's serious criticism, many scholars and those, in particular, who are experts in the *Mesnevī*, present or past, have acknowledged the importance of Anḳaravī's commentary. R. Nicholson, for example, has referred to it as "the complete translation of the *Mathnawī*" in

⁵⁹ It is interesting to note that Anḳaravī himself regards Ghazālī's *Mishkāt al-Anwār* as a book on Shari'a. See, *Ṣerḥü'l-Mesnevī*, vol. 1, p. 2.

⁶⁰ Ibid. p. 2.

⁶¹ Ibid.

Turkish"⁶² and has placed it in the first rank of those commentaries from which he profited most in preparing his English translation.⁶³ Similarly Tahsin Yazıcı describes it as "the most popular work, until recent times, explaining the *Mathnawī*".⁶⁴ Again in his book entitled *Eski Türk Edebiyatında Nesir (Prose in Ancient Turkish Literature)*, Fahir İz cites Ankaravī's *Şerh*, in addition to that of Sarī 'Abdullah (d.1071/1661) and that of Ismā'īl Ḥakkī of Bursa (d.1137/1727), as the most celebrated of commentaries.⁶⁵ It should also be recalled again that owing to his *Şerh*, he has been honoured by Şeyh Gālib with the title of "Ḥazret-i Şāriḥ", which has already been quoted above.⁶⁶

One problem which still needs to be resolved is that of the aforementioned apocryphal seventh *deftter* (volume) of the *Mesnevī*, which was commented upon by Ankaravī and for which he has become the target

⁶² Nicholson, *The Mathnawī*, vol. 2, p. xiii.

⁶³ Ibid., p. xvi. Some other commentaries listed by Nicholson are as follows:

Şarḥ-i Mathnawī-yi Mawlānā-yi Rūmī (Persian) of Walī Muḥammad Akbarabadi,
Mukāshafāt-i Raḍawī of Muḥammad Riḍā (Persian),
Şarḥ-i Mathnawī of Muḥammad 'Alī (Baḥru'l-Ulūm) (Persian),
al-Manhaj al-Qawī of Yūsuf b. Aḥmad al-Mawlawī (Arabic),
Şarḥ-i Mathnawī-yi Sharīf of 'Ābidin Pasha (Turkish).

⁶⁴ Yazıcı, "Ismā'īl Rusūkh," p. 190.

⁶⁵ İz, *Eski Türk Edebiyatında Nesir*, p. 148.

⁶⁶ Refer to footnote 11 above.

of severe criticism by so many followers of the Mevleviyye, including some Şeyhs as well as other *Mesnevî* commentators. According to Kâtib Çelebi, or as he is better known in the west, Hâjjî Khalîfa, the apocryphal seventh volume of the *Mesnevî* appeared around 1035/1625 at the time when the fifth volume of Ankaravî's commentary was still in progress.⁶⁷ Then Ankaravî reportedly set aside the fifth volume and embarked upon a commentary on the supposed seventh volume of Rûmî's work, the colophon of which claims that it was copied in the year 810/1407.⁶⁸ There has been a long debate and even sometimes heated discussions among scholars about not only the authenticity of this volume and its questionable place among the other volumes, but also over how and by whom it was written. All in all, two main propositions have been advanced regarding this complicated matter, one for its acceptance as formulated by Ankaravî himself in his preface to his commentary on that volume, the other for its rejection as dictated by several authorities in their various writings. Rather than going into detail, which is impossible for us to do here, we would like to talk about only one aspect of the whole issue, which will shed considerable light on Ankaravî's confrontation with the Kadizadeliler.

In a letter composed by Cevdet Paşa (d.1311/1893), one of the famous Ottoman historians, in response to Âbidin Paşa (d.1325/1907),

⁶⁷ Kâtib Çelebi, *Kashf al-Zunûn*, vol. 1, p. 1088.

⁶⁸ Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravî*, p. 72. Kâtib Çelebi dates it as 814/1411 (*Kashf al-Zunûn*, vol. 1, p. 1088).

another commentator on the *Mesnevî*, who had requested that the former read and send him his remarks regarding his commentary, valuable information is supplied as to the composition of the "seventh volume". Cevdet Paşa states in his letter that the "seventh volume" of the *Mesnevî*, with its many strange ideas and theories disparaging Sufi precepts, was deliberately forged by a person called Hüsameddîn in an attempt to attack directly the doctrines of Şeyhü'l-Ekber (the greater Şeyh), Muhy al-Dîn Ibn al-'Arabî. The same letter further adds that although the volume in question is essentially incompatible with the rest of the *Mesnevî*, İsmâ'îl Rusûhî had to write a separate commentary on it, acting apparently in a seemingly conciliatory mood towards the Kadızadeliler, for whom Şeyhü'l-Ekber, Ibn al-'Arabî was no doubt "a greater enemy" (*'adûvv-i ekber*).⁶⁹ In other words, İsmâ'îl Ankaravî, according to Cevdet Paşa, certainly knew that the entire *Mesnevî* consists of six volumes, yet because of the circumstances he lived in, particularly because of the Kadızadeliler's adversarial attitude against him, he had not only to defend its validity but to comment on it in order to reconcile the ideas presented there with those included in the other volumes.

With such an assertion, some writers are in disagreement at least to some extent. In his short essay written in Ottoman Turkish, 'Alî Cānib finds

⁶⁹ Cevdet Paşa, *Tezâkir*, ed. Cavid Baysun (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1986), vol. 4, pp. 229-236.

Cevdet Paşa's allegation that Ankaravî commented on the "seventh volume" in order to appear "seemingly kind" (*cemîle*) to the Kadızadeliler unfair and baseless and even incompatible with reality. For, as his contemporary Kâtib Çelebi has shown,⁷⁰ Ankaravî spent most of his later life in confrontation with the supporters of Kadızade Meḥmet Efendi, whom he courageously condemned as a "heretic" (*mülhîd*) and an "infidel" (*zindîk*), and against whom he composed the work *Hüccetü's-Semâ'* with the aim of proving the legitimacy of the mystical practices.⁷¹ The same idea is supported by Yetik with a rather balanced assessment. He says "it is admissible that Ankaravî was wrong in his acceptance of the seventh volume, but it is not appropriate to claim that he did so just because he wanted to be kind to the Kadızadeliler. On the contrary, he was always in conflict with those people."⁷²

However this might be, İsmâ'îl Rusûhî Dede, due to his approval of this pseudo-volume of the *Mesnevî*, has become a target of criticism especially among the Mevlevî Şeyhs. For instance, during Ankaravî's own lifetime, Şabûhî (d.1088/1667), the Mevlevî Şeyh of Yenikapı in Istanbul, reportedly declared that "for some unknown reason, he has commented on the false volume, but if he attempts to to read it, I would come at once and

⁷⁰ Kâtib Çelebi, *The Balance of Truth*, p. 137; *Kashf al-Zunûn*, vol. 1, p. 630.

⁷¹ Cānib, "Ankaravî İsmâ'îl Efendî," p. 405.

⁷² Yetik, *İsmail-i Ankaravî*, p. 69.

destroy the pulpit over his head".⁷³

Throughout his whole commentary on the *Mesnevî*, İsmâ'îl Ankaravî made extensive use of Ibn al-'Arabî's doctrines in explaining Jalâl al-Dîn Rûmî's teachings. For this reason, as Aḫmed Ateş aptly remarks, it is extremely difficult to perceive Rûmî's own mystical thoughts as distinct from those of Ibn al-'Arabî, so intimately has Ankaravî blended the two. Moreover, even after Ankaravî, his influence continued to prevail over succeeding commentators⁷⁴ on the *Mesnevî*. In this connection, one can cite, as an example, Sarî 'Abdullah (d.1071/1661), whose commentary entitled *Cevâhir-i Bevâḫir-i Mesnevî* is equally composed in the light of Ibn 'Arabî's theosophy of "waḫdat al-wujûd".⁷⁵

There is no doubt that in order to reach a fair and complete judgment about Ankaravî's commentary on the *Mesnevî*, an independent study is indispensable; nonetheless, in face of the critical comments of Ateş, one must inevitably concur, if not with all, then at least with some of the charges of Gölpınarlı against Ankaravî, such as for instance that he did not show

⁷³ Gölpınarlı, *Mevlevîlik*, p. 143.

⁷⁴ Mehmed Tâhir provides, in addition to Ankaravî, a list of Ottoman commentators on the *Mesnevî*: Şeyh İsmâ'îl Hakkî, Sarî 'Abdullah, Şeyh Abdulmecîd Sivâsî, Pîr-i Paşâ, Sirûzi Hasan Zarîf-i Kulşenî, Şeyh Şalâhuddîn 'Uşşâkî, Yûsuf Sîne-i Çak Mevlevî, Şâir Nahîfî, Muştafâ Bosnavî, Mûtercim Ravzatu's-Safâ Kemâlî Efendî, Şeyh Muhammed Nakşibendî, Şem'î, Şabûḫî Dede, Derviş 'Âlem-i Mevlevî, Sûdî, 'Abdullaṭîf Efendî, and 'Âbidin Paşâ. (*Meşâyih-i 'Osmâniye*, pp. 23-4).

⁷⁵ Ateş, "İbn 'Arabî," *El2*, vol. 3, p. 711; idem, "Mesnevînin Onsekiz," *Fuad Köprülü Armağani*, p. 38, n. 1.

due care in explaining the text in accordance with Rūmī's own ideas. In fact Anḳaravī adopts a similar approach, as we shall see below, in his commentary *Īzāḥū'l-Ḥikem*, to the extent that he fails to interpret the text of the *Hayākil* within the framework of Suhrawardī's Ishrāqi philosophy.

Anḳaravī's *Şerḥü'l-Mesnevî* was translated in rather abridged form into Arabic by Çengi Yūsuf Dede (d.1080/1669) and published under the title *al-Manhaj al-Qawî fi Sharḥ al-Mathnawî* in Cairo, 1289/1872. The complete work was also translated into Persian by 'Ismat Sattārzāde and published under the title *Şerḥ-i Kabîr-i Anḳaravî bar Mathnawî-yi Ma'nawî-yi Mawlavî*, Tehran, 1348(solar)/1970. Meanwhile, although it has not yet been rendered into English, nevertheless, Nicholson has used it extensively in the footnotes of his translation of the *Mesnevî*.

The original Ottoman version of *Şerḥü'l-Mesnevî*, has up to now been published several times, yet none of these editions have included the apocryphal seventh volume. The first edition came out in 1221/1806, the second in 1241/1845, and the third in 1251/1835 in Egypt. It was thereafter published twice in Istanbul, 1257/1841 and 1289/1872 respectively. All of these editions appear in six volumes with the exception of the last one which divides the sixth volume into two parts.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ See for details, Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravî*, p. 77; Yazıcı, "Ismā'îl Rusūkh," p. 190; Algar, "Anḳaravî Rosuk," p. 100.

2. *Cāmi'ū'l-Āyāt (The Collection of the Qur'anic Verses)*

As is narrated in the preface to his *Şerḥ*, Ismā'īl Anḳaravī, during his short visit to Mevlānā's tomb, composed the present work upon the order of the chief Mevlevī Şeyh Bostan Çelebi. In this book, he explains all the Qur'anic texts and Prophetic sayings as well as other Arabic phrases scattered throughout the *Mesnevī*.⁷⁷ Written in Ottoman Turkish, the work chronologically precedes both the commentary and his work *Fātiḥū'l-Ebyāt*, which will be reviewed immediately after the present one. When compiling the work, Anḳaravī utilized a variety of Qur'anic exegesis; among them, those of Bayḍāwī and Zamakhsharī take precedence.

Interestingly enough, the book under examination, despite the fact that its author assigned to it a specific title, is cited in *Hadiyyat al-Ārifīn*⁷⁸ under the title "al-Fātiḥat al-'Ayniyya Sharḥ Mā Waqa'a Fī Kitāb al-Mathnawī Min al-Abyāt al-'Arabiyya", which is incorrect, and in *Mu'jam al-Mu'allifīn*⁷⁹ by the somewhat extended title, "Cāmi'ul Āyāt Fī Sharḥ Mā Waqa'a Fī Kitāb al-Mathnawī Min al-Āyāt wa al-Aḥādīth wa al-Abyāt". This whole confusion possibly arises from Anḳaravī's integration of this book into the forthcoming one.

Up until now, this very important work of Anḳaravī has not been

⁷⁷ Anḳaravī, *Şerḥū'l-Mesnevī*, vol. 1, p. 2.

⁷⁸ al-Baghdādī, *Hadiyyat al-Ārifīn*, vol. 1, p. 218.

⁷⁹ Kaḥḥālā, *Mu'jam al-Mu'allifīn*, vol. 1, p. 259.

published, nor has it been made the subject of inquiry in academic circles. A number of manuscript copies are available in various libraries.⁸⁰

3. *Fātiḥū'l-Ebyāt* (The Opener of the Verses)

From the preface to this work, written in Ottoman Turkish, one can obtain an account as to when and how it came to be written. There it is related that Ismā'īl Anḳaravī, while lecturing on the *Mesnevī*, was requested by his disciples to commit to writing his comments upon the first eighteen couplets (*bayts*) of the *Mesnevī*. During that time, he was deeply engaged in the preparation of another work. So, as soon as he had finished it, he embarked upon this formidable task⁸¹ and thus completed it around 1034/1623-4.⁸² Afterwards, he integrated his previous work, viz., *Cāmi'ū'l-Āyāt*, first into the present one, and then both into the *Şerḥū'l-Mesnevī*.⁸³

⁸⁰ Some of the copies are as follows: Istanbul, Süleymāniye Kütüphanesi, Pertev Paşa, MS. nos. 239, 255/1, Şehid Ali Paşa, 1159, and Istanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi, MS. no. 341.

⁸¹ Anḳaravī, *Şerḥū'l-Mesnevī*, vol. 1, p. 2.

⁸² Cānib, "Anḳaravī Ismā'īl Efendī," p. 403.

⁸³ Anḳaravī makes a metaphorical analogy between these three works and three verses from the Qur'ān. He says, in brief summary: though *Cāmi'ū'l-Āyāt* and *Fātiḥū'l-Ebyāt* are in fact two separate books, yet I have combined them in accordance with the wisdom behind this verse; "he has made the two seas to flow freely so that they meet together." (Qur'ān, 55:19). However, in so far as they are distinct from each other in their contents, they represent the hidden secret of the verse, "between them there is a barrier which they cannot pass". (Qur'ān, 55:20). Consequently, out of these two sources (books), came forth numerous subtle realities and beautiful knowledge, just as the following verse intimates: "There come forth

Due to its attachment to the first volume of the *Şerḥ*, in some classical sources, like *Kashf al-Zunūn*, the *Fātiḥū'l-Ebyāt* is wrongly recorded as the title of the commentary.⁸⁴ In another book,⁸⁵ it is again misidentified as "Fātiḥū'l-Ebvāb".

In this treatise, the author has expounded not only the first eighteen verses but also certain difficult words scattered throughout the whole poem.

In the meantime, it should be noted that in the short essay by A. Ateş, the present work is the subject of investigation in comparison with several other commentaries. There Ateş notes that Anḳaravī and other commentators, though they exerted their incredible skills and efforts and thus explained every word and even every letter of those eighteen couplets in a fascinating manner, nevertheless failed to interpret them within the framework of Jalāl al-Din Rūmī's system.⁸⁶

This book is available in print as an annex to the beginning of the

from them pearls and coral." (Qur'ān, 55:22) Thus taken Ismā'īl Anḳaravī seeks to demonstrate that, in his eyes, his two former works are just like oceans of knowledge out of which comes forth the last one, i.e., *Şerḥū'l-Mesnevī*, like pearls and coral. (*Şerḥū'l-Mesnevī*, vol. 1, p. 2.)

⁸⁴ Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-Zunūn*, vol. 1, p. 1587.

⁸⁵ *Türk Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 3, p. 66.

⁸⁶ See for detail, Ateş, "Mesnevīnin Onsekiz Beyti," *Fuad Köprülü Armağanı*, p. 38, n. 1.

first volume of *Şerhü'l-Mesnevî*.⁸⁷

4. *Minhâcü'l-Fuḳarâ* (Method for the Dervishes)

Probably this is Anḳaravî's most important work next to his commentary on the *Mesnevî*. Written around 1034/1624⁸⁸ in an eloquent Ottoman style, it consists of three principal chapters, each having ten subheadings. The first one delineates the main characteristics of the Mevlevî Order, its practices as well as its central concepts such as "halîfe", "şeyh", "ṭālib", "murşid", "sefer", "semâ", "muḳābele", etc. The second part attempts to cultivate in the dervishes the pre-requisites of the Ṭarîqa with an emphasis on the observance of the fundamental obligations of the Shari'a, ranging from "tawhîd" (unity), "prayer", "alms giving", "fasting", and "pilgrimage" to such issues as "celibacy", "marriage" and struggle with "nafs", and so on. As for the last chapter, it concentrates on the progressive stages and degrees of the Sufi path (*sūlūk*), e.g. "wakefulness", "repentance", "reckoning", "fleeing from creation to God", "fear", "humility", "sincerity", "perseverance", "chastity", "gratitude", "knowledge", "wisdom", "certainty", "inspiration", "ecstasy", "compassion", "purity", "vision", "unveiling", and so forth.

⁸⁷ Manuscript copies may be found in Istanbul Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hacı Maḥmud Efendi, MS. no. 2638; Istanbul Nuruosmaniye, MS. nos. 343-4; Konya Mevlâna Müzesi Yazmalar, MS. no. 2083.

⁸⁸ Kâtib Çelebi, *Kashf al-Zunûn*, vol. 1, p. 1877.

A thorough examination of the present work, which was actually already done by Dr. Yetik, unveils the fact that it is a product of extensive research based on various eminent sources, ranging from those of tafasir (exegeses of the Qur'ān), of ḥadīth, to those of taṣawwuf (mysticism).⁸⁹ Among other books, *Manāzil al-Sā'irīn* of 'Abdullah al-Anṣārī (d.481/1088-9) forms the basis of Anḳaravī's present work.⁹⁰

Minhācū'l-Fuḳarā was published first at Bulak in 1256/1840 and later in Istanbul in 1296/1869.⁹¹ To the end of the latter edition, which has a list of contents according to subject, another work of his entitled *Ḥucceṭū's-Semā'* is annexed.

5. *Ḥucceṭū's-Semā'* (The Proof for the Audition)

This succinct treatise was composed around 1027/1617⁹² with the aim of defending such Mevlevī practices as "semā'"(singing) and "rakṣ" (whirling), both of which, besides other rites, were harshly condemned by the Kadizadeliler. It consists of three main parts, all of which attempt to prove by various Qur'anic verses and *aḥādīth* that "rakṣ", "semā'" and "def"

⁸⁹ Yetik provides a list of authors and works used by Anḳaravī in his *Minhāc*. (*Ismail-i Ankaravī*, pp. 28-9, 142-3).

⁹⁰ Yazıcı, "Ismā'īl Rusūkh," p. 190.

⁹¹ A few chapters of *Minhāc* are available in the French translation, See Marijan Molé, "La Danse Extatique en Islam," *Les Danses Sacreés in Source Orientales VI* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1963), pp. 252-278.

⁹² Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-Zunūn*, vol. 1, p. 630.

(drum) respectively are permissible from the Shari'a point of view.

In compiling *Hüccetü's-Semā'*, İsmā'īl Rusūhī was largely inspired by the work of Majd al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī al-Ghazālī entitled *Bawāriq al-İlmā' fī al-Radd Man Yuḥarrim al-Samā'*.⁹³

This work of Ankaravī, which is also cited in other sources as "Ḥujjat al-Samā' fī Ḥall İstimā' al-Ghinā,"⁹⁴ was originally written in Arabic,⁹⁵ later translated by the author himself into Ottoman Turkish and published twice only in the latter language together with the *Minhācū'l-Fuḳarā* in 1256/1840 at Bulaq, and in 1286/1869, at Istanbul.⁹⁶

6. *Fütūḥāt-ı 'Ayniyye (Ocular Conquests)*

As we are told in the introduction to this work, while he was busy completing the third volume of his commentary on the *Mesnevī*, İsmā'īl Ankaravī suddenly contracted a severe eye-disease and hence became

⁹³ This book together with Ibn Abī al-Dunyā's *Dhamm al-Malāḥī* was translated into English by J. Robson. See for the reference, J. Robson, ed. with intro. and trans. *Tracts on Listening to Music Being Dhamm al-malāḥī by Ibn abī'l-Dunyā and Bawāriq al-ilmā' by Majd al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī al-Ghazālī* (London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1938). Also cf. Aḥmad Muḥammad al-Ṭūsī, *Samā' wa Futuwwat*, ed. Aḥmad Mujāhid (Tehran: Kutubhāna-i Munchihri, S1360), pp. 15-26.

⁹⁴ Brockelman, *GAL*, vol. 2, pp. 590.

⁹⁵ Dr. Yetik refers us for the original Arabic version to Süleymaniye Library, Pertev Paşa Section, MS 255/2. (*İsmail-i Ankaravī*, p. 87, n.1.)

⁹⁶ T. Yazıcı indicates that it was printed in a separate edition too, but so far I have not been able to trace it. (Yazıcı, "İsmā'īl Rusūkh," p. 190.)

unable to continue this laborious task. After some time, thanks to his spiritual physician, he recovered from the pain and was able to see as before. Thereupon, with the aim of showing his gratitude to God for providing such efficient healing, he set out to write a commentary on the first chapter of the Qur'ān; and after having completed it around 1037/1627, he named it *Fūtūḥāt-i 'Ayniyye*.

The whole book is made up of seven main chapters, the first dealing with the virtues of the Qur'ān, the second and third with the exoteric as well as esoteric meanings of the "isti'ādha" (seeking refuge in God) and "basmala" (beginning with the name of God) respectively, the fourth and fifth with the meanings of "fātiḥa" (opening) and "sūra" (chapter) respectively, the sixth with the various names of "Sūrat al-Fātiḥa", and the last with a full explanation of the whole *Sūra*, including the external reasons for its revelation.

Notwithstanding its title as such, assigned by the author himself, Kātib Çelebi calls it somewhat erroneously by the name of "al-Fātiḥatü'l-'Ayniyye",⁹⁶ while Ismā'īl Paşa cites it under two wrong titles, one, like Çelebi's but with some additions, "...Sharaḥ Ma Waqa'a Fī Kitāb al-Mathnawī" and the other, "al-Fātiḥatü'l-'Ayniyye".⁹⁷ M. Ṭāhir, in addition to referring to it under its correct title, calls it in one instance "al-Fātiḥatü'l-

⁹⁶ Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-Zunūn*, vol. 1, p.1214.

⁹⁷ al-Baghdādī, *Hadiyyat al-'Ārifīn*, vol. 1, p. 218.

'Ayniyye fī Tefsīr-i Sūreti'l-Fātiḥa",⁹⁸ and in another "Tefsīr Sūret-i Fātiḥa el-Müsemma bi'l-Fātiḥati'l-Ġaybiyye".⁹⁹

Fütūḥat-i 'Ayniyye, written in Ottoman Turkish and inspired by various prominent interpretations of the Qur'ān, was published in Istanbul, 1328/1910.

7. Zūbdetu'l-Fūḥūṣ Fī Naqṣi'l-Fuṣūṣ (The Core of the Investigations on the Portrayal of the Bezels)

The book under review was written as a commentary on Ibn 'Arabī's abridged version of *Fuṣūṣ al-Hikam*, entitled *Naqsh al-Fuṣūṣ*, and based largely on 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī's Persian translation of the latter, called *Naqd al-Nuṣūṣ*.

Apart from *Şerḥü'l-Mesnevī*, the present work can be taken as another indication of Anḳaravī's interest and love for Ibn 'Arabī's theosophy. In the book, while explaining the wondrous characteristics of every prophet, Anḳaravī masterfully embellishes them with the relevant couplets from the *Mesnevī*. Therefore, from this angle, the book represents a kind of combination of two conceptually diverse but mystically identical doctrines, maintained by two great thinkers of Islam, Jalāl al-Dīn of Afghanistan and Ibn 'Arabī of al-Andalus.

Another striking aspect of the book is that it masterfully delivers its

⁹⁸ M. Ṭāhir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, vol. 1, p. 119.

⁹⁹ M. Ṭāhir, *Meşāyih-i 'Osmāniye*, p. 25.

message in three languages, Arabic, Persian and Ottoman, which of course confers further credit upon the scholarship of its author, namely Anḳaravī.

This work was published in Istanbul in 1328/1910.¹⁰⁰

8. *Miftāhū'l-Belāga ve Mişbāhū'l-Feşāha (The Key for the Accurate Expression (Eloquence) and The Lamp for the Oratıon)*

The very first pages of this book give a substantial account as to how it came to be written. There it is related that once a few "spiritual sons" of Ismā'īl Anḳaravī, among them the derviş 'Āmil¹⁰¹ and Muḥammad Şādiq Çelebi, the descendants of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, commenced, with their desire to learn the science of articulation and poetry, to read under his guidance the book called *Talkhīş* by Khaṭīb Dimashqī.¹⁰² However, since they were then not mature enough to comprehend it, they became frustrated and distressed. So in order to help them, Anḳaravī, basing himself mainly on that book by Dimasqī, compiled his own work and thus entitled it *Miftāhū'l-*

¹⁰⁰ Anḳaravī, *Zūbdetū'l-Fūḥūş fi Naḳşı'l-Fūşūş* (Istanbul: Metin Matba'ası, 1328/1910). Manuscript copies may be found in Istanbul Süleymaniye, Şehid Ali Paşa, MS nos. 1215, Halet Efendi, MS. no. 256.

¹⁰¹ Kātib Çelebi identifies as him "derviş ğanem," not "derviş 'amil." (*Kashf al-Zunūn*, vol. 1, p. 1769.)

¹⁰² The full title of the book is *Talkhīş al-Miftāh fī al-Ma'ānī wa al-Bayān*, compiled by Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Qazwīnī (739/1338), known as Khātib Dimashqī. (Gölpınarlı, *Mevlānā Müzesi Yazmalar Kataloĝu*, vol. 2, p. 275). Besides *Talkhīs*, Anḳaravī also utilized *Manāzir al-Inshā* of Maḥmud b. Muḥammad al-Gīlānī, known as Hāce-i Cihān. (Ibid. and M. Ṭāhir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, vol. 1, p. 119).

Belāġa ve Mişbāhū'l-Feşāha,¹⁰³ which represents the first scholarly work of its kind, written in Turkish on Ottoman philology (*edebiyāt-i osmāniye*).¹⁰⁴

The book consists of four chapters, the first one dealing with the meanings of words and terms, called "me'ānī"; the second with the science of style in speech (*'ilmū'l-beyān*); the third with the subject-matters of the science of verbal embellishments in rhetoric (*'ilmū'l-bedī'*); and the last imparting certain instructions about the art of letter-writing.

So far it has been published only once in Istanbul, 1284/1898.¹⁰⁵

9. *er-Risāletū't-Tenzīhiyye Fī Şe'ni'l-Mevleviyye* (*The Treatise of Clearance on the Position of the Mevleviyye*)

This succinct treatise, composed in Arabic, aims at repudiating the objections of a preacher, known as Şeyh İbrāhim (1033/1623), on the ritual ceremonies of the Mevlevī Order. It contains, besides an introduction, three epistles and five responses to the critical questions about *semā'* in reference to the *aḥādīth* of the Prophet about "the singing and dancing" of the "habaş" (Ethiopian) that took place during the "happy days of the two

¹⁰³ Ankaravī, *Miftāḥū'l-Belāġa ve Mişbāhū'l-Feşāha* (Istanbul: Tasvīr-i Efkār Matba'ası, 1284/1898), pp. 2-4.

¹⁰⁴ M. Tāhir, *Meşāyih-i 'Osmāniye*, p. 25, n. 74.

¹⁰⁵ See footnote 103 above. Some of the manuscripts of this work are located in: Konya Mevlānā Müzesi Yazmalar, MS. no. 2252; Istanbul Süleymaniye Hacı Maḥmūd Efendi, MS. no. 2872.

feasts".¹⁰⁶

Dr. Yetik, basing himself on Brockelmann's statement, mistakenly assumes that it was published in Leiden,¹⁰⁷ when in fact it is only available in manuscript at Leiden University Library MS 1892.

10. *Miṣbāḥü'l-Esrār (The Lamp of the Secrets)*

This is a short mystical commentary, composed in Arabic, and inspired largely by Ghazālī's (505/1111) *Mishkāt al-Anwār*, on the famous Qur'anic verse 24:35, known as "the verse of light" (*āyat al-nūr*). Besides an introduction that gives, after a statement glorifying God, preliminary information about its preparation as well as some of the names of the commentaries of the Qur'an utilized therein (e.g. those of Bayḍāwī and Zamakhsharī), the treatise has four small parts, the first dealing with light and its nature, the second with the notions of "miṣbāḥ" (lamp), "mishkāt" (niche) and "zujāj" (glass), the third with the nature of "the sacred olive tree" (*al-shajarat al-zaytūna* : *al-mubārakah*), and the last with the subject of guidance (*hidāya*).

This invaluable treatise, which appears in Brockelmann's work, in

¹⁰⁶ Kātib Çelebi, *Kashf al-Zunūn*, vol. 1, p. 856. The two happy days are the two occasional feasts, i.e. that of Ramadan and that of sacrifice.

¹⁰⁷ Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravî*, p. 90. For the manuscript copy, see Süleymaniye Nafiz Paşa, 395/2.

contrast to the author's own identification, under the title "Maṣābīḥ al-Asrār",¹⁰⁸ has not yet been published.¹⁰⁹

11. Şerḥ-i Ḥadīs-i Erba'in (The Commentary on the Forty Hadiths)

In this work, Ismā'īl Rusūhī Dede has commented on forty *ḥadīths* related exclusively to a variety of Sufi practices such as audition, singing, whirling, etc.¹¹⁰ By doing so, he sought to defend the Mevlevī Ṭarīqa against those who claimed that these practices were an innovation (*bid'a*) and corrupt (*ẓalālet*).¹¹¹

The work, compiled in Ottoman Turkish and not published, features a number of quotations from the *Mesnevi*.¹¹²

12. Ḥall-i Muşkilât-ı Mesnevî (The Resolution of the Difficulties in the Mesnevi)

Ankaravî composed the present work at the request of his companions who asked him to resolve, as he had attempted in his previous

¹⁰⁸ *GALS*, vol. 2, p. 662.

¹⁰⁹ For manuscript copies, Süleymaniye, H. Mahmud Efendi MS no. 2872/1; Biblioteca Vaticana, (Vat.Turco), MS no. 137/1-2; Königliche Bibliothek Zu Berlin (Türkischen Handschriften), MS no. 26.

¹¹⁰ Kâtib Çelebi, *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, vol. 1, p. 1037.

¹¹¹ Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravî*, p. 106.

¹¹² See for the various manuscripts, Süleymaniye Nāfiz Paşa, MS. no. 184, Lala Ismā'īl, MS. no. 15/2.

work, *Fātihū'l-Ebyāt*, some of the more obscure lines¹¹³ in the rest of the *Mesnevī* other than the first eighteen couplets, as well as to reveal Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī's intent in the stories related throughout the *Mesnevī*.¹¹⁴

So far only one copy of the work, and an incomplete one at that, has been discovered in manuscript form.¹¹⁵

13. *Maḳāşid-ı Āliyye Fī Şerḫi't-Tā'iyye* (*The Commentary on the Poem of Tā'iyye*)

As its title implies, this work in Ottoman Turkish was written as a commentary on Ibn al-Fāriḍ's famous poem entitled *al-Tā'iyya*.¹¹⁶ In the *Maḳāşid* Anḳaravī first analyzes the whole according to the rules of Arabic grammar and later explains them one by one.¹¹⁷

A number of manuscript copies are preserved in different libraries.¹¹⁸

¹¹³ Algar, "Anḳaravī Rosūḳ," p. 100.

¹¹⁴ Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravī*, pp. 109-110.

¹¹⁵ Istanbul Bayezid Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi, Veliyyüddīn, MS no. 1672. (See, Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravī*, p. 110).

¹¹⁶ Yazıcı, "İsmā'īl Rusūkh," p. 190; M. Tāhir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, p. 119, idem, *Meşâyih-i Osmaniye*, p. 24; Kaḫḫāla, *Mu'jam al-Mu'allifin*, vol. 5, p. 259; Baghdādī, *Hadiyyat al-Ārifin*, vol. 1, p. 218.

¹¹⁷ Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravī*, p. 97.

¹¹⁸ Istanbul Belediye Kütüphanesi, MS nos. 1755; Süleymāniye Hālet Efendi, MS no. 220; Biblioteca Vaticana (Vat. Turco), MS. no. 137/5.

**14. *Şerh-i Kaşîdeti'l-Mîmiyye'l-Hamriyye*
(Commentary on the Poem of "al-Mîmiyya al-Khamriyya")**

Just after the composition of the preceding book, Ankaravî again was requested by his close friends to commit to writing his comments on another poem of Ibn al-Fāriḍ entitled *Kaşîdat al-Mîmiyya al-Khamriyya*. As in the case of *Maḳāşid*, he also analyzes here the entire poem in the light of Arabic grammar, and then provides a detailed mystical explanation for each of the couplets therein.¹¹⁹

The book, written in Ottoman Turkish about 1030/1620-1),¹²⁰ has never been printed.¹²¹

15. *Cenāhü'l-Ērvāh (The Wing of the Spirits)*

This Ottoman Turkish study was realized by Ankaravî during one of his visits to Konya. The principal aim of the book, which is replete with couplets from the *Mesnevî* is to acquaint people more with the unity of God.¹²²

This work, like many others by Ankaravî, has never been

¹¹⁹ Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravî*, p. 99.

¹²⁰ Charles Rieu, ed. *Catalogue of the Turkish Manuscripts in the British Museum* (London: British Museum, 1888), p. 237.

¹²¹ For its copies; Biblioteca Vaticana, (Vat. Turco), MS. no. 137/6; Süleymaniye, Halet Efendi, MS. nos. 727/2, 796.

¹²² Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravî*, p. 101.

published.¹²³

16. *Simāṭu'l-Mūkinīn (The Rank of the People of Certainty)*

The present work, written in Arabic, deserves special attention, for it provides us with an example of Anḳaravī's proficiency in that language. In this succinct commentary devoted to the introduction of the *Mesnevi*, the author aims to explain Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī's initial remarks in a nice and lucid fashion.

The work, which is recorded in some sources under rather a long title,¹²⁴ is available in manuscript form in various libraries.¹²⁵

17. *el-Ḥikemü'l-Münderice Fī Şerḫi'l-Münferice*¹²⁶ (*The Scroll of Wisdom on the Commentary on al-Munfarija*)

This is Anḳaravī's commentary, composed in Ottoman Turkish, on

¹²³ Manuscript copies are located in; Süleymaniye, Re'īsü'l-Küttāb, MS. no. 1188/4; Biblioteca Vaticana, (Vat. Turco), MS. no. 137/11.

¹²⁴ "Simāṭu'l-Mūkinīn Fī Şerḫi'l-Alfāzi'l-'Arabiyyeti'l-Wāqī'at Fī Dibājat al-Mathnawī". (M. Ṭāhir, *Meşāyih-i 'Osmāniye*, p. 25; al-Baghdādī, *Hadiyyat al-'Ārifīn*, p. 218.)

¹²⁵ For some of its manuscript copies, Istanbul Topkapı Sarayı Revan Köşkü, MS. no. 451; Süleymaniye H. Hüsnü Paşa, MS. no. 659; Biblioteca Vaticana, (Vat. Turco), MS. no. 137/2.

¹²⁶ Dr. E. Yetik reports that this book was designated in M. Ṭāhir's short essay *Meşāyih-i 'Osmāniye* as "Şerḫu Қаşidetü'l-Münferide" instead of "münferice," which, based on my verification, appears to be an incorrect statement on Yetik's part, for it bears exactly the same title as it is here. Besides, the page number he refers to, p.25 is supposed to be p.24. (Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravî*, p. 85 and n. 1.) In addition, the same author, i.e., Mehmed Tahir, in his other eminent work, gives its full title as "Şerh-u Қаşidetü'l-Münferice el-Müsemā bī ḥikemi'l-Münderice". (*Osmanlı Müellifleri*, vol. 1, p. 119)

the famous classical poem of Abū al-Faḍl Yūsuf b. Muḥammad (513/1119) entitled *al-Qaṣīdat al-Munfarīja*, which consists of some 35 couplets.

It was printed three times, first in Bulak, 1300/1882, and a second and third time at Istanbul, 1314/1896 and 1327/1909 respectively.¹²⁷

18. *Derecātü's-Sālikīn* (The Degrees of the Sufi Initiates)

Taking the work *Manāzil al-Sāirīn* by 'Abdullah b. Muḥammad al-Harawī (481/1088) as a prototype for himself, Ismā'īl Rusūhī has set down in Ottoman Turkish the present tract under ten chief headings, and each in turn dealing with ten progressive stages in the spiritual development of a dervis. As Dr. Yetik indicates, it seems more or less a recapitulation of the third chapter of the *Minhācū'l-Fuḡarā*.¹²⁸

The text of *Derecātü's-Sālikīn*, which has been identified under a number of disparate titles,¹²⁹ is preserved in manuscript form in various libraries.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ Yetik asserts that it was published only twice (*Ismail-i Ankaravī*, p. 86); thus he seems to have no knowledge of its publication in Istanbul by H. Hüseyin Efendi Maḡba'ası, 1314/1896.

¹²⁸ Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravī*, p. 114.

¹²⁹ In both *Asmā al-Mu'allifīn* (vol. 1, p. 218) and *Meṣāyih-i 'Osmāniye* (p. 26), it appears as "Minhācū's-Sālikīn", while in the *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi Türkçe Yazmalar Kataloġu* (vol. 1, p. 57) it appears under the title of "Irṣadū's-Sālikīn".

¹³⁰ Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, MS. nos. 175, 271. (*Topkapı Saray Müzesi Kütüphanesi Türkçe Yazmalar Kataloġu*, vol. 1, p. 57.) British Museum, MS no. Harl 5490/3. (*Catalogue of the Turkish*

**19. *Risāle-i Úyūn-i Isnā Áşere*
(*The Treatise on the Twelve Distinguished States*)**

This treatise, written in metrical verse form in Ottoman Turkish, consists of twelve chapters, each having an Arabic title of its own. The following subjects, involving mainly the various means to accomplish spiritual perfection, are treated in the work: purification of the soul, abstinence, the nearness to the verifiers (*ehl-i taḥkīk*), mystical maxims of the celebrated Sufis, love and passion, unity, knowledge, hidden knowledge, remembrance of God, prayer and supplication and so on. These topics have been at times adorned with the author's own beautiful Persian poems.¹³¹

This fascinating work has not yet been published.¹³²

**20. *Risāle-i Uşūl-i Ṭarīkat-i Mevlānā*
(*The Treatise on the Foundations of the Path of Mevlana*)**

As can be seen from its title, the present study, compiled again in Ottoman Turkish, is a brief historical exposition of the Mevlevī Order. Initially, it was written in response to a question with regard to the

Manuscripts in the British Museum, p. 235); Süleymaniye, Hacı Mahmud Efendi, MS. no. 2674.

¹³¹ This description has been extracted in summary from Yetik's book, *Ismail-i Ankaravî* (p. 105).

¹³² For manuscript copies, see Istanbul Universite Kütüphanesi Türkçe Yazmalar Bölümü, MS. no. 6394 (Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravî*, p. 105); Biblioteca Vaticana, (Vat. Turco), MS. no. 137/9.

prerequisites and necessary procedures for the initiation into the aforementioned ṭarīqa. In addition to such matters as the methods of the Mevleviyye, the tasks and proper conduct of the novices (*murīds*), and entry into the *semā'*, it also explains that by virtue of an unbroken chain of transmission by Sufi masters prior to Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, that the Mevlevī Order is connected directly with Ālī b. Abī Ṭālib, the fourth caliph and son-in-law of the Prophet.

Up until today, it has not been printed.¹³³

21. *Tuḥfetü'l-Berere (The Gift of the Righteous)*

Ismā'īl Ankaravī wrote this book as a gift for his close Mevlevī fellows, and expounds in it a variety of couplets selected from the *Mesnevī* in the light of the Qur'an and the sayings of the Prophet. He also occasionally illustrates his points with quotations from his own poetry.¹³⁴

This Ottoman Turkish work has not yet been published.¹³⁵

22. *Sūlūknāme-i Şeyh Ismā'īl* *(The Instruction for the Path of Şeyh Ismā'īl)*

This is a short description of the principles and practices of the

¹³³ Konya Mevlānā Müzesi Yazmalar, MS. no. 1661/16 (See also Gölpınarlı, *Konya Mevlānā Müzesi Yazmalar Kataloğu*, vol. 1, p. 246.) Istanbul Süleymaniye, Nāfiz Paşa MS. no. 352.

¹³⁴ Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravī*, p. 108.

¹³⁵ Süleymaniye, Hacı Hüsnü Paşa, MS no. 736.

Mevlevî Ṭarīqa, which explains in Ottoman Turkish how the *zīkr* should be performed and how to seek help from the deceased spirits of the venerated Sufi Masters such as Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d.110/728), Dhū al-Nūn al-Miṣrī (d.248/859), Junayd al-Baghdādī (d.298/910), Ibn al-'Arabī and Mevlānā.¹³⁶

Like the previous work, this has not been published either.¹³⁷

23. Niṣāb-ı Mevlevî (The Origin and Status of Mevlevî)

This book, composed in Persian at the request of the Şeyhulislām Yaḥyā Efendi (d.1053/1643) in the year 1041/1631,¹³⁸ -thus the latest of all- is of great concern to us, simply because it discloses Anḳaravî's full competence in that language. In its content and style, it has close affinity with the *Minhācū'l-Fuḳārā*, which was, as noted before, composed in Ottoman Turkish. It is on this account that some contemporary writers, like Gölpınarlı, have assumed wrongly that it was an Arabic translation of the latter or vice-versa.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravî*, p. 113.

¹³⁷ Istanbul Üniversite Kütüphanesi, Turkish Manuscript Section, MS. no. 6394.

¹³⁸ Gölpınarlı, *Mevlānā Müzesi Yazmalar Kataloĝu*, vol. 2, p.163.

¹³⁹ Gölpınarlı, in his catalogue, records the title of the book *Nisāb-i Mevlevî* as "Nisāb al-Intisāb" and asserts that the latter is an Arabic translation of *Minhācū'l-Fuḳārā*. (Idem, *Mevlānā Müzesi Yazmalar*, vol. 2, p. 241).

The whole book comprises three major chapters, first explaining the "Ṭarīqa, second the "Shari'a", and last the stages and states of the Path.¹⁴⁰

It is available in manuscript form in various libraries.¹⁴¹

24. *Dīvān*

The present book, which, in some reference sources, appears also under the title of "Murattab *Dīvān*",¹⁴² is the sole collection of Anḳaravī's poetry. As we have remarked before, he wrote under the pen-name of "Rusūhī" numerous couplets and poems in different forms and in three languages, Arabic, Persian and Ottoman Turkish.

As far as I have been able to discover, the only extant manuscript copy of the *Dīvān* has been preserved among the Turkish Collection of the Vatican Library, registered under the MS no. 137/8, folios 365-367.¹⁴³

In addition to the works which have been enumerated above, the following titles are also attributed to Anḳaravī. However, since I was not able

¹⁴⁰ Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravî*, p. 117.

¹⁴¹ Konya Mevlânâ Müzesi Yazmalar, MS. no. 2104 (Gölpınarlı, *Mevlânâ Müzesi*, vol. 2, p. 163); Süleymaniye, Lala İsmâ'il, MS. no. 231 (Yetik, *Ismail-i Ankaravî*, p. 118), Süleymaniye, Serez MS. no. 1524.

¹⁴² M. Ṭāhir, *Meşāyih-i 'Osmāniye*, p. 26; idem, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, vol. 1, p. 119.

¹⁴³ Ettore Rossi, *Elenco Dei Manoscritti Turchi Della Biblioteca Vaticana* (Città Del Vaticano, 1953), p. 118.

to have access to them, I will only cite their titles and locations.

His Other Works

25. *Müntebahāt Min Minhāci'l-Fuḳarā*,¹⁴⁴
26. *Risāle Fī Haḳḳ-i Semā-'i Mevlevī*,¹⁴⁵
27. *Tarīkatnāme*,¹⁴⁶
28. *Mefātihü'l-Ġayb*,
29. *Miftāhu'r-Rahīm ve Keşfü'l-Kerīm*,
30. *Vaşiyetnāme*,
31. *Kıta' Min Şerhi'l-Mesnevī*,
32. *Taşavvufī Bir Gazel*.¹⁴⁷

Mention should be made in this connection that Brockelmann ascribed mistakenly to Anḳaravī two more books, *Kitābü'l-Hitāb* and *Tühfe-i Hassākiye*, both of which were in fact composed by Ismā'īl Haḳḳı Bursevī (d.1138/1725).¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ This work, located in the Süleymaniye Library, Hacı Maḥmūd Efendi, MS no. 2987 and also registered in the computerized list of the Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, İslami Araştırmalar Merkezi (IAM) (Centre for Islamic Research) (no. 40762), is a kind of synopsis of the *Minhācū'l-Fuḳarā*. Although it is catalogued under the name of Anḳaravī in these two records above, its authorship, nevertheless, is not certain. Based on the date of its transcription, 1100/1688, Dr. Yetik has reached the conclusion that it was composed as a handy manual for the Mevlevī novices by someone else, not Anḳaravī. (*İsmail-i Ankaravī*, p. 120).

¹⁴⁵ Biblioteca Vaticano, (Vat. Turco) MS. no. 137/7 (folios. 349-364). See for the reference n. 143 above.

¹⁴⁶ M. Ṭāhir, *Meşāyih-i 'Osmāniye*, p. 26.

¹⁴⁷ These four works located in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi are documented in the new computerized list of the collections of the manuscripts under the following numbers respectively: (IAM), MS nos. 39003 (28), 39004 (29), 81917 (30), 48826 (31), 21537 (32).

¹⁴⁸ Brockelmann, *GALS*, v. 2, p. 662.

CHAPTER THREE

ANĶARAVĪ'S INTELLECTUAL PERSONALITY

In the light of the preceding detailed account of AnĶaravĪ's life and works, we shall attempt now to determine first his intellectual status within the Ottoman context, a difficult task due to his multifarious personal involvement and literary activities, and then his primary purpose in composing the commentary under study, *Īzāhü'l-Hikem*, which is to be thoroughly examined in the next part. In this endeavour, we shall refer, wherever needed, to the actual text of *Īzāh* so as to establish at least with some degree of precision the academic preparation of the author.

First of all, three distinct factors can be discerned in the intellectual background of AnĶaravĪ: sufism, orthodox Islam¹, Islamic dialectical theology (Kalām) and philosophy. Each requires particular consideration, for each seems to have played a notable role at various levels in his scholarly engagement in general and in the structural preparation of his commentary in particular. As was clearly seen in our survey of his life and works, and as will also be noted in the coming analysis of the Ottoman text, these three

¹ See for the various usages of the term "orthodox" (sunni) in the historical context of Islam, Marshal G.S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: The Classical Age of Islam* (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1974), vol. 1, p. 278, n. 18.

approaches are manifested in somewhat paradoxically intermingled fashion.

To begin with, there can be no doubt that Sufism as a system of thought, and particularly that of the Mevleviyye order, to which Anḳaravī was intimately attached, provided him with the basic framework for the majority of his principal concerns and scholarship. Of course the man who had the greatest influence on his mystical training was Mevlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, the spiritual progenitor of the Mevleviyye, whose *Mesnevī* contributed the most significantly to shaping Anḳaravī's mystical life. Although the bulk of his mystical writing consists of works explaining the theoretical and practical aspects of the Mevleviyye as well as its principles and regulations for its initiates, nevertheless, a number of them are commentaries on certain important Sufi treatises and poems, e.g. Ibn al-'Arabī's *Naqsh al-Fuṣūṣ* and Ibn al-Fāriḍ's *al-Tā'iyya*. Thus, besides the teachings of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, we find the doctrines of several venerable Sufis, and particularly those of Ibn al-'Arabī, forming substantial elements in his mystical background.

In addition, Anḳaravī, as will be noticed later in the second part of this study, holds such prominent mystics as Junayd al-Baghdādī (d.909), Maṣṣūr al-Ḥallāj (d.923), Bāyazīd al-Bisṭāmī (d.873), etc., in great reverence whenever he speaks of their respective controversial statements. He appears to have studied them and to have used them at times for various purposes. With respect to their seemingly conflicting views over the literal

meaning of religious texts, he, as a committed Sufi, advocates their esoteric meaning, which can be grasped not by naive reasoning, but through mystical experience; yet at the same time he continues to maintain, as a "staunch orthodox," complete reliance on the Scripture, thus trying to achieve harmony between the views of Sufis and of upholders of Shari'a.

However, due to his overriding concern for such reconciliation, his state of mind seems unsettled and rather filled with anxieties and uncertainties with respect to the major issues related both to mystical and philosophical doctrines. As a concrete example of this, one can cite his brief treatise entitled *Ḥüccetü's-Semā'* in which he attempts vigorously to defend "performing and listening to music" not with a rational and critical approach but by bringing ample proofs from the *aḥādīth* of the Prophet as well as by making references to the favourable statements of some great Sufis. The very same conciliatory yet ambivalent attitude of Anḳaravī, as will be seen, permeates almost all his thinking throughout the commentary under discussion.

Orthodox Islam occupies, after Sufism, a secondary, but nevertheless fundamental, position in the intellectual background of Anḳaravī. As has already been mentioned, he lived at a time when the Kadizadeliler, "shari'a-minded preachers of Islam," enjoyed great popularity among the Ottoman state dignitaries. But in spite of the common similarities between all that these people advocated and what Anḳaravī defended in the name of Islam,

both maintaining for instance a belief in the "unquestionable authority" of the Qur'an and hadith, the latter differed drastically from the former in supporting an eclectic orthodoxy that accommodates Sufi doctrines. This sort of eclectic, orthodox Islam can be regarded as a kind of "orthodox sufism," which gives legitimacy not only to the controversial statements of the prominent Meşāyih but also to all the rituals practised in Sufi circles such as "zīkr-i cehrī" (chanting God's name aloud), performance of the *semā'* and the *devrān* and *raḡṡ*. Therefore, Anḡaravī's aversion to the Kadizadeliler, as far as it appears to us, was not due to their adherence to the Shari'a, but because of their "rigid and narrow-minded" interpretation of the holy texts and thus their complete rejection of Sufi doctrines and practices.

In addition to these two domains above, Sufism and orthodox Islam, one can also discern elements of kalām or Islamic theology, and philosophy, particularly Ishrāqī philosophy, in the background of Anḡaravī's intellectual life. Despite the prevalent negative attitude to the rational sciences among the Ottoman 'Ülemā during the seventeenth century, Anḡaravī along with some others took an interest in those areas. Kātib Çelebi, for instance, as G.L. Lewis points out, displayed his overt loyalty to the philosophy of Suhrawardī, when he remarks in his *Kashf al-Zunūn* on Shīrāzī's commentary on *Hikmat al-Ishrāq*:

It has been said that this book contains certain statements that

cannot be reconciled with the sacred law. I say that those who hold this view are perhaps incapable of reconciling them with the sacred law. They should not say, because they are incapable of doing it, that it is impossible.²

Kātib Çelebi also states that from the beginning of the Ottoman Empire up to the time of the Suleyman the Magnificent, scholars did not fail to read and study the philosophical sciences and even combined them with the study of the sacred sciences such as tafsīr, ḥadīth and fiqh.³ But later, especially in Anḳaravī's time, the Kadizadeliler's strict adherence to the basic Islamic sciences and their desire to return to and follow the practices of the Prophet and his companions led them to adopt a new formulation of sciences. These were classified by their intellectual master, Birgivi, in his *Ṭarīḳat-i Muḥammediye*, as (i) the sciences whose study is obligatory, e.g. the essentials of religious duties (catechism), (ii) the sciences whose study is contingent upon certain conditions (otherwise it is forbidden), e.g. astronomy and kalam, and (iii) the sciences whose study is recommended, e.g. medicine.⁴ Moreover, Kadızade himself denounced in his sermons those who were involved with the study of logic and philosophy, saying: "who'd give a farthing for philosophy? Before it what shrewd banker bows

² Kātib Çelebi, *The Balance of Truth*, p. 10.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-6.

⁴ See for more details, Semiramis Çavuşoğlu, "The Kadizadeli Movement: An Attempt of Şeri'at-Minded Reform in the Ottoman Empire," Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1990, pp. 267-274.

the knee? and who sheds a tear if a logician dies?"⁵

In spite of such vehement opposition on the part of the Kadızadeliler, Anḳaravī, following the tendency of his time, to combine the study of philosophy with that of the Islamic sciences, courageously undertook the task of commenting on *Hayākil al-Nūr* and hence of accommodating it within the confines of orthodox Islam, albeit coloured with mystical notions. His conciliatory position in this respect, namely being a defender of Sufism and an advocate of orthodox Islam, is more or less reminiscent of Ghazālī's, who already found a place for Sufism in the latter, especially in his voluminous work *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn (Revival of the Religious Sciences)*. But, as we have noted before, Anḳaravī paradoxically refers, without basis, to Ghazālī's *Mishkāt al-Anwār* as a product of Shari'a, while describing Suhrawardī's *Hayākil al-Nūr* as a book of wisdom.

Such an arbitrary treatment is of great interest to us in ascertaining Anḳaravī's literary standing. However great the differences between the two works in their approach and contents, there are a number of areas in which their views coincide, some of which will be seen below. For now, suffice it to say that the main theme of these two books lies in their common thesis, that "the reality of all things can be perceived only through light (*nūr*)."
Probably the most noticeable difference between them is that Ghazālī's work begins with the famous light-verse of the Qur'ān and the Prophetic

⁵ Kātib Çelebi, *The Balance of Truth*, p. 136.

hadith concerning the light and the veils of the light, and then goes on to concentrate extensively on describing the people who seek the truth, listing them under four successive categories: (i) the theologians, (ii) the esoteric (*al-bāṭiniyyah*) or those who follow the infallible imam (*al-imām al-ma'ṣūm*), (iii) the philosophers, and (iv) the Sufis. Ghazālī ends his discussion by eliminating the former three and favouring the last, i.e., the Sufis, who can attain knowledge of the reality of things with certainty.

It is most likely therefore that Anḳaravī based his exceptional identification of the *Mishkāṭ* as "a book on Shari'a" upon his personal reading, and certainly not upon a careful examination of it⁶, which would have led eventually to a fairer assessment. However arbitrary his treatment may be, it leaves us with two immediate implications: one is that this book, inasmuch as it speaks authoritatively of Sharī'a or on behalf of Shari'a, would require, as an authority, full submission to all that it contains. The other is that since it defends a kind of Sufism which seemingly fits into the limits of Shari'a and serves as the only way to lead to the truth, it would likewise demand a whole-hearted acceptance of Sufism on the part of the upholders of orthodox Islam. In addition, this would imply that Anḳaravī sought the same *praiseworthy* status for his own treatise *Miṣbāḥu'l-Esrār*, which is similar in style and content to the *Mishkāṭ*. Of course such a claim

⁶ See for an extensive and critical analysis of the *Mishkāṭ*, Hermann Landolt "Ghazālī and Religionswissenschaft, Some Notes on the *Mishkāṭ al-Anwār*," *Asiatische Studien/Etudes Asiatiques* 45 (1991), pp. 19-72.

would depend on the reader acknowledging that the authenticity and credibility of the work *Miṣbāḥ*, like *Mishkāṭ*, cannot be questioned at all.

Now with these considerations in mind, one can understandably ask as to why Anḳaravī chose to write a commentary on a work to which, in terms of its subject-matter, he attached considerably less value. As will be seen shortly, the introduction to *Īzāḥū'l-Ḥikem* contains a brief statement setting forth Anḳaravī's purpose in composing the work. According to this statement, the work was written in response to a request from a student of philosophy, who happened to be among the followers of 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib that the difficult and ambiguous points in *Hayākil al-Nūr* be explained and resolved.

However, a full analysis of the contents of the commentary shows us that the statement of purpose as declared in the introduction seems less than satisfactory and even appears to be nothing more than a literary device whereby the author exhibits his humility before undertaking this task. For, as will be discerned in the following chapters, a statement as such hardly reflects the extent of the author's real purpose in drafting the work.

Besides one passage where Anḳaravī makes an explicit confession with regard to his real purpose, several other considerations strongly suggest that he intended *Īzāḥū'l-Ḥikem* to serve not necessarily to elucidate the crucial and complicated matters in the *Hayākil* but mostly to remove the stigma of the heretical scent of *ittiḥād* (unification) and *ḥulūl* (incarnation)

from the notorious utterances of certain renowned mystics, and thus to justify the coincidence of their doctrine with "Islamic orthodoxy." As a matter of fact, this aim is expressly pronounced by Anḳaravī himself towards the end of the second temple, where he comments on the relation of the rational soul to God: "... it was because of this particular reason that this humble person felt compelled to set down the present commentary..."⁷

Thus even from this perspective alone, *Ṭẓāḥū'l-Ḥikem*, like *Ḥüccetü's-Semā'*, appears to have been composed with a view towards the circumstances with which Anḳaravī was confronted in his time. In other words, the real objective that he seeks to achieve in the entire book, rather than the one that he pretends to profess in the introduction, is to prove to the Shari'a-minded people, like the Kadizadeliler who opposed not only the rituals and practices of the mystics but also their doctrines, that these are in complete harmony with Islam.

With these considerations in mind and without in any way wishing to underestimate his achievement as a leading figure and prolific writer, particularly in Mevlevī tradition, we turn now to embark upon a careful inquiry into his commentary *Ṭẓāḥū'l-Ḥikem*, comparing it with Dawwānī's commentary, and observing at the same time how faithful or unfaithful he was to the philosophy of Suhrawardī.

⁷ See p. 148, n. 101.

PART TWO

THE TRANSLATION OF *HAYĀKIL AL-NŪR*
AND ANALYSIS OF *ĪZĀḤŪ'L-ḤIKEM*

CHAPTER ONE

ĪZĀḤŪ'L-ḤIKEM (ELUCIDATION OF WISDOMS)

1. Remarks on *Hayākil al-Nūr* and *Īzāḥū'l-Ḥikem*

To begin with, *Hayākil al-Nūr*, which is the subject of investigation in Ankaravi's above-titled commentary, is in fact one of the most important works of Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī (1155-1191) in it he presents an overview of the essentials of his own mystically oriented philosophy in a very concise but at the same time extremely complicated fashion. This is, as H. Corbin indicates, one of the earliest books of his that "delivers in its brevity an excellent and rapid view of the entire Ishraqi doctrine."¹ In terms of its style and content, it has a distinctive place not only among his other works but also in the whole tradition of Islamic philosophy in general and that of Sufism in particular.

Apart from a prologue and an epilogue, the treatise on the whole consists of seven main chapters, the first dealing with terrestrial objects, especially with the definition of body, the second with the inquiry of the soul and its faculties, the third with three logical and ontological modes (necessary, impossible and contingent), the fourth with God, His attributes and the hierarchy of the worlds, the fifth with the celestial spheres and souls as well as the process of illumination, the sixth with the immortality of the

¹ Corbin, *Les Temples*, p. 33.

soul, and the last with issues related to prophecy and eschatology. Each chapter is called a *haykal* (body or temple), the meaning and significance of which will be discussed in detail in its due place.²

To date, the Arabic text of this important work of Suhrawardī has been published in two editions³ as well as an edition of an early Persian translation.⁴ There have also appeared French,⁵ Turkish -both Ottoman⁶ and modern-⁷ and Dutch⁸ translations. Yet, to the best of my knowledge,

² Refer to Suhrawardī's Prologue below.

³ See for the two different editions in Arabic, Suhrawardī, *Hayākil al-Nūr*, ed. M. Abū Rayyān (Egypt: al-Maktabat al-Tijāriyya al-Kubrā', 1957); idem, *Hayākil al-Nūr*, ed. Muḥyiddīn Şabri al-Kurdī (Cairo, 1333 ?).

⁴ See, Suhrawardī, *Oeuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques (Opera Metaphysica et Mystica III) (Majmū'a-i Āthār-i Fārisi)*, ed. with intro. S. H. Nasr (Tehran: Department d'Iranologie de l'Institut Francais de Recherche, 1970), pp. 84-108.

⁵ See, Suhrawardī, "Le Livre des Temples de la Lumiere (Les Temples)," in *L'Archange Empourpre: Quinze Traités et Recits Mystiques*, ed. and trans. H. Corbin (Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1976), pp. 33-89.

⁶ Yūsuf Żiyā, who wrote extensively on Suhrawardī's philosophy in the periodical *Miḥrāb* (1339-1340/1923-1924) vol. 1, pp. 27-36, 54-59, 73-76, 118-123, 145-150, 213-215, 245-248, 348-350, 379-381, 456-462, 483-486, 657-685), rendered *Hayākil al-Nūr* into Ottoman Turkish in the year 1339/1923 and published it in the same periodical. (See, *Heyākilü'n-Nūr*, in *Miḥrab* 1 (1340/1924) pp. 578-595) It is surprising that, although Ziya occasionally makes references to Dawwānī's commentary and also is aware of the existence of that of Shīrāzī, yet he seems to have no knowledge of Ankaravi's *İzāḥü'l-Ḥikem*.

⁷ So far three complete editions have appeared. See, Sühreverdī, *Nur Heykelleri*, trans. Saffet Yetkin in Şark İslam Klasikleri (Istanbul: Milli Eđitim Basımevi, 1947, 1986 and 1988). It was also partly translated by Hilmi Ziya Ülken. See, idem, "Şehabeddin Sühreverdī, Nur Heykelleri," in *Türk Feylesofları Antolojisi I* (Ankara: Yeni Kitapçı, 1935).

it has not been fully rendered into English up until now. The present work, therefore, will undertake this formidable task.

Meanwhile, it should be noted also that long before Anḳaravī, two prominent Persian thinkers wrote commentaries upon the *Hayākil al-Nūr*. Jalāl al-Dīn Dawwānī (d.1502) composed a remarkable work under the title *Shawākil al-Ḥūr (the Shapes of the Houris)*, the Arabic text of which was critically edited and published by M. ʿAbdul Ḥaq and M. Yousuf Kokan in 1953. Indeed, we shall make extensive use of this work not only for the purpose of comparison with Anḳaravī's but also in order to elaborate on the issues overlooked in the commentary of the latter. Sometime after Dawwānī, Amīr Ghiyāth al-Dīn Manṣūr Shīrāzī (d.1542) wrote another commentary in Arabic, which appears to be somewhat of a reply to Dawwānī's, entitled *Ishrāq Hayākil al-Nūr li Kashf Ḍulumāt Shawākil al-Ḥūr (Illumination of the Temples of the Light for the Discovery of the Darkness of the "Shapes of the Houris")*. However, no attempt has been made to undertake a study of the latter work. Both of the commentaries by Dawwānī and Shīrāzī reflect the extent of the influence of Suhrawardī in Persia, as Anḳaravī's does in Anatolia.⁹

⁸ S. van den Bergh, "Des Tempels van het Licht," in *Tijdschrift voor Wijbegeerte*, Januari 1916, pp. 30-60. This reference has been quoted from Corbin, *Oeuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques III*, p. 150, n. 14.

⁹ See for Suhrawardī's influence in other parts of the world, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "The Spread of the Illuminationist School of Suhrawardī," *Studies in Comparative Religion* 6 (Summer 1972) : 141-52.

The commentary under examination, i.e., *İzāhü'l-Hikem*, besides its intrinsic value for the study of Islamic thought, has, in spite of its conciseness, at least three fundamental aspects to its credit: firstly, it is an evidence of the interest in the philosophy of Suhrawardī on the part of a member of the Ottoman learned class in the seventeenth century; secondly, it throws considerable light on the philosophical as well as mystical activities of Ottoman intellectuals during that period. Lastly, as a product of a prominent Sufi, it provides a different insight into the understanding of the *Hayākil*, which is in turn considered to be a conspectus of the whole Ishraqi philosophy.

2. A Note on Editing and Rendering

The method used for the editing of the manuscripts is more or less the same as that which was followed in the dissertation of Dr. Ahmet Karamustafa, submitted to the Institute of Islamic Studies of McGill University, now available partly in publication, entitled *Vāḥidī's Menākib-i Ḥvoca-i Cihān ve Netīce-i Cān*,¹⁰ which is also, like mine, a critical study of another Ottoman Turkish text. I was able to obtain four manuscripts of *İzāhü'l-Hikem*, which I have collated on the basis of one of them (S= Şehīd

¹⁰ See, Ahmet T. Karamustafa, *Vāḥidī's Menākib-i Ḥvoca-i Cihān ve Netīce-i Cān: Critical Edition and Analysis*, Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures 17, eds. Sinasi Tekin and Gönül A. Tekin. (Harvard University: Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 1993.)

‘Alī Paşa 1747).¹¹ This manuscript, which has been paginated and numbered in lines, is reproduced here in order to facilitate the access to the original text.

My choice, among others, for Şehīd ‘Alī Paşa MS, is not simply due to the fact that it bears the date of its transcription and the name of its scribe, but mainly for practical reasons, and even rather for its pure appearance and excellent condition. That is to say, this particular manuscript, i.e., S 1747, despite its numerous minor errors, and slight additions and omissions, is considerably more clear, neat and legible than the others. At the end of the thesis I have indicated the textual differences of the other manuscripts as well as modifications and corrections required in the annexed facsimile reproduction.

Now I would like to state briefly the method I have followed in the translation of the *Hayākil* as well as in the analysis of the commentary of Anḳaravī. Needless to say, the study of the text of the *Hayākil*, due to its complicated style and highly sophisticated technical language, is fraught with immense difficulties. In spite of its bewildering complexity, I have attempted to render it fully into English. I have based my translation on the already published edition by Abū Rayyān, including its footnotes, Dawwānī's commentary, Persian version as well as on the text of Süleymāniye

¹¹ This manuscript copy is also cited in the list of H. Ritter's early article on Suhrawardī's works. See, Helmut Ritter, "Philologika IX: Die vier Suhrawardī." *Der Islam* 24 (1937), p. 284.

manuscript annexed here. In rendering the text, I have exerted my full capacity in order to meet two requirements: (i) faithfulness to the text, and (ii) intelligibility of the English expressions. In order to maintain accuracy, I have tried to stick as closely as possible to the original text, while making a sincere attempt at presenting the ideas there in a simplified and straightforward manner. All in all, being well aware of my shortcomings, I have exercised all my skills in order to approximate the original in form as well as in content. In addition, I have divided each temple into various numbered paragraphs so that the reader can easily compare the rendered text of *Hayākil* with its corresponding interpretation.

As to the analysis of the contents of *Īzāḥū'l-Ḥikem*, due attention has been paid to bringing out Anḳaravī's own views as differing from and concurring with Dawwānī's in interpreting Suhrawardī's ideas in the *Hayākil*. To be more specific, my primary role in this endeavour has been mostly analytical rather than critical for one simple reason, that is, the desire of presenting Anḳaravī's formulation of Suhrawardī's Ishraqī teachings side by side with Dawwani's in a comparative manner. Thus such a systematic and comparative presentation will enable the reader to see, without external intervention, the points of divergence and concurrence between these two commentators in their respective interpretations of the *Hayākil*. My overall and critical assessment of Anḳaravī's commentary, however, will appear under its own separate heading entitled "A General Evaluation," placed at

the end of the second part of the thesis.

3. Brief Descriptions of the Manuscripts

The following four manuscripts of *İzāh-ı Hikem* were consulted for the purpose of establishing a critical edition.

S Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, İstanbul, Şehid 'Alī Paşa, no. 1747

25x15,7 cm., 43 folios, 17 lines. Headpiece in late style. Stitched in light red paper. Arabic text in red and clear *nesih*, Turkish in bold black and clear *nesh-i ta'lik*, copied, according to the colophon, by Hacı Muştafā Kaşşabaşazāde in *Zû'l-ka'de* 1045/1635. In the margins of some pages there are notes, some of which are comments and others corrections by the copyist.

C Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, İstanbul, Cārullah Efendi, no. 993/1

22x13,5 cm., 31 folios, 23 lines. *Nesih* in small size, neat and very nice round hand. The Qur'anic verses, hadiths, headings, and names in red. Arabic text and poems underlined. Some letters added in red. Some comments and corrections in the margins. Name of copyist not mentioned.

V Biblioteca Vaticana, Turchi, no. 137/10

28,3x15 cm., 19 folios (375-394ff), 33 lines. Written in clear and small *rik'a* but exhibiting also many features of *kıрма*. Rubrication in red. Some comments in the margins of some pages. Ownership statement dated 1223/1808-1809. Name of copyist not mentioned.

M Mevlânâ Müzesi Yazmalar, Konya, no. 2039/5

24x13,5 cm., 33 folios (197-229ff), 19 lines. Clear *nesih* displaying many elements of *divân* and *rik'a*. Arabic text in red. Subtitles underlined. Name of copyist not mentioned.

CHAPTER TWO

PROLEGOMENA

It has been customary among Muslim writers to commence their work with an initial statement of glorification to God and salutation to the Prophet, as is the case with the present author of the commentary on *Hayākil al-Nūr*. But just after having praised God, and before extending his greetings to the Prophet and his family, Ismā'īl Anḳaravī, basing himself mainly on the Qur'ān, sets out to characterize the distinguished aspects and states of "the people of wisdom" (*eşhāb-i hikmet*). It is God, he says, to whom alone countless praises are due, the all-Wise (*Ḥakīm*), Donor (*Vehhāb*), Clement (*Ḥalīm*), Unlocker of the Doors (*Müfettiḥü'l-Ebvāb*), and the Cause of all Causes (*Müsebbibü'l-Esbāb*), who has made "the people of wisdom" and "the people of natural insight" (*erbāb-ı fitnat*) the honourable recipients of His beautiful favours, as has been illustrated in the following two verses: "He (God) grants wisdom to whom He pleases; and he to whom wisdom is granted receives indeed a benefit overflowing. But none will grasp the Message except men of understanding."¹ "... (it is for them) the Beatitude (*tūbā*) and a beautiful place of return".²

Anḳaravī continues by stating that God, who is the Absolute Creator

¹ Qur'ān, 2:269

² Qur'ān, 13:29.

and Master of the "Nun" and "Qalam" (pen) by which men can record",³ made the "people of wisdom" along with "the scholars of Scripture" (*'ülemā-i dīniyye*), and "the gnostics of certainty" (*'ürefā-i yaḳīniyye*) who are the disclosers of the hidden wisdom, worthy of this divine message: "We gave him wisdom and sound judgment in speech and decision."⁴

Anḳaravī's intent in quoting all the verses above, which underscore first and foremost the notable place of the people of "ḥikma", might have been to establish, although he has not stated it expressly, a legitimate ground for engaging in the study of "ḥikma" in general and undertaking the present commentary in particular from a Qur'anic standpoint. It is not clear at this point, however, what he means by the term "ḥikma", which is usually rendered in English as "wisdom" in order to avoid any confusion that can easily arise in mind due to its equivocal nature. "Ḥikma" which originally derives from the Arabic word "ḥukm", meaning, according to al-Jurjānī, "to put the thing in its right place",⁵ has been sometimes used interchangeably in the sense of "philosophy" (*felsefe*), which, in turn, denotes only

³ Qur'ān, 68:1. "Nun means either a fish or an ink holder, or it may be just the Arabic letter of the alphabet....The reference to ink would be an appropriate link with the Pen in the verse.." 'Abdullah Yūsuf 'Ali, *The Holy Qur'ān, Text, Translation and Commentary* (Brentwood, Maryland: Amana Corporation, 1989), p. 1506, n. 5592.

⁴ *I-H*. 1a4-12; Qur'ān, 38:20.

⁵ Sayyid al-Jurjānī, *al-Ta'rifāt*, ed. 'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Umayra (Beirut: 'Ālam al-Kutub, 1987), p. 125 (the article "al-ḥukm").

"Hellenistic philosophy".⁶ "Ḥikma", which is more spiritual in its nature and broader in its content than "felsefe", was taken by the majority of the early Muslim philosophers to embrace the whole field of knowledge within the bounds of human endeavour, ranging from the theoretical sciences to the practical ones. In his outstanding treatise on the classification of rational sciences, Ibn Sīnā, for instance, who has exercised tremendous influence upon succeeding generations of philosophers, considered "ḥikma" to be an art by means of which man acquires the knowledge of every being, a knowledge which he puts in practice in order to elevate himself to the level of the intelligible world.⁷ So, "wisdom", according to him, inasmuch as it comprises necessary knowledge and necessary action, is indispensable for the perfection of the human soul.

As for Anḳaravī, as far as the present commentary is concerned, he adopts in its entirety, as will be seen shortly, Ibn Sīnā's definition, subject-matter and divisions of "wisdom". In his principal work, *Minhācū'l-Fuḳarā*, however, he offers a somewhat more extensive description of "wisdom" that goes far beyond Ibn Sīnā's present account. In one particular passage of the same book, he states that "wisdom", in the eyes of a "divine sage" (*el-ḥakīmū'l-ilāhī*), is twofold: (i) explicit wisdom (*manṭūḳ 'anhā*), i.e., the wisdom about which one can talk, and (ii) implicit wisdom (*maskūt 'anhā*), i.e., the

⁶ A.M. Goichon, "Ḥikma," *El2*, vol. 3, p. 378.

⁷ Ibn Sīnā, "Aqsām al-'Ulūm al-'Aqliyya," *Majmu'at al-Rasā'il*, ed. Muḥyiddīn Ṣabrī al-Kurdī (Maṭba'at Kurdistān al-'Ilmiyya, 1328), p. 225.

wisdom about which one remains silent. The first group for its part consists of two subdivisions, (i) the sciences of religion (*'ulūm-u şer'iyye*), and (ii) the rational sciences (*me'ārif-i akliyye*), which, in turn, are further divided, in accordance with Ibn Sīnā's scheme, into theoretical and practical wisdom. As to implicit wisdom, it contains mainly two kinds of significant knowledge: (i) intuitive or mystical knowledge (*'ulūm-u ledūnnī*), and (ii) knowledge of the truth behind the hidden secrets (*esrār-ı ḥakīkī*), such as the afflictions of certain people, the death of children and their eternal dwelling along with their fathers in hellfire, etc. Since all of these events have been concealed to us, Anḳaravī says, we ought to keep silent about them.⁸

Thus he extends the scope of "wisdom" to cover all the branches of general sciences (whether they be theoretical or practical), the sciences of religion and the knowledge of mystical and spiritual truths. It is perhaps on this ground that he, as we have noted above, has assigned "Qur'anic wisdom" to all three classes of people, i.e., the doctors of religion, philosophers, and sages or sufis, for all of them, as far as the Qur'ān is concerned, partake in "ḥikma".

It is evident that Anḳaravī has so far displayed no interest or desire in discussing the status of "philosophy", particularly the question of its legitimacy from the point of view of *shari'a*, a controversial issue which had

⁸ Anḳaravī, *Minhācū'l-Fuḳarā*, pp. 214-5; also cf. al-Jurjānī, *Ta'rifāt*, p. 125.

already received wide-spread publicity in the Islamic world.⁹ Nor has he attempted to reconcile religion and philosophy or mysticism and philosophy. On the contrary, he has taken it for granted that wisdom, regardless of whoever possesses it, is, as the Qur'ān says, "an overflowing benefit" to its owner.

Since my purpose here is not to enter into a detailed study of wisdom, which merits extensive research on its own, I will continue to present Anḳaravī's introduction in a summary fashion.

In extending the salutations to the Prophet Muḥammad, our author employs considerably subtle yet lucid language in which he epitomizes some of the qualities of the prophet as follows:¹⁰

He is the intercessor for all creatures.
He is the Imam of Guidance.
He is just like a pupil of the eye for all Prophets.
He is the Luminous Light for the eyes of all Saints.
(In his ascension to God) "his sight has never swerved."¹¹
"He says nothing out of his own desire".¹²
He was selected as an exemplary model.

⁹ Ibn Rushd, for instance, wrote his treatise *Faṣl al-Maqāl*, in order to justify the study of philosophy from the standpoint of Islamic Law. See, Ibn Rushd (Averroes), *Kitāb Faṣl al-Maqāl (On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy)*, trans. with intro. and notes by George F. Hourani (London: Luzac and Co., 1961).

¹⁰ *I-H.* 1a14-1b2.

¹¹ *Qur'ān*, 53:17.

¹² *Qur'ān*, 57:3.

Then Anḳaravī, in accordance with Sufi terminology, sees Muḥammad, fully invested with such beautiful traits, as someone who sheds on the entire world drops of the water of life (*ma'ū'l-ḥayāt*) and the ocean of wisdom (*deryāy-ı ḥikmet*). So, the dead hearts of all children of Adam are brought into (new) life out of this "life-bestowing drop of water", so to speak.¹³ In saying so, Anḳaravī merely makes an allusion to one of the frequently cited ḥadīth in Sufi circles, that reads: "the first thing created by God was Intellect (*al-'aql*) and the rest of all human beings bear flashes radiated from that intellect."¹⁴

After these preliminary remarks, Şāriḥ Rusūhī goes on to explain why and how he has composed this commentary. In addition, he also gives us a brief summary of the study of wisdom developed by the earlier Muslim thinkers. In what follows, I will try, confining myself exclusively to the Ottoman text, to give at best an approximative translation of Anḳaravī's own words. This is significant, for it will certainly reveal his literary style and method as well as his scholarly personality. My own remarks will be confined to the footnotes.

Introduction

Let us turn to the topic. This ailing and thirsty, poor and humble derviş, namely Şeyh Ismā'īl Mevlevī Anḳaravī -may God facilitate

¹³ *I-H*. 1a14-1b5

¹⁴ *I-H*, 27b1-3; see also chapter seven, p. 180, n. 68.

both mundane (*şūrī*) and spiritual (*ma'nevī*) wisdom¹⁵ for him and his this-worldly and other-worldly brethren- states: while the Wise and Benefactor, the Clement and Judge bestowed upon Luqmān of the heart (or Paradise) the gift of the mystery of the verse "We indeed gave wisdom to Luqmān,"¹⁶ this ailing one, thirsty and craving (for wisdom), could never be content and continuously opened the narcissus of my days and violet of my nights in the

¹⁵ In his *Minhācū'l-Fuḡarā*, which was written primarily, as noted in the preceding chapter, in order to help the dervishes to learn and follow the teachings of the Mevlevī path, Anḡaravī employs these two terms, i.e., *şūrī* and *ma'nevī*, in conjunction with the gradual stages of a dervish's personal development. There he ascribes two principal journeys to a *fakīr* (derviş) to undertake. The first one, called *sefer-i şūrī*, meaning simply to travel from one place to another, is a journey on which the dervish sets out to seek and circulate knowledge. During this pursuit, he visits some eminent masters and receives therefrom the knowledge of Shari'a, namely the knowledge of religious commandments and prohibitions. In a sense it is a kind of *formal* knowledge, which is, as the Prophet pointed out, incumbent on all Muslims so as to enable them to practice properly the religious duties. The second type of journey, designated by Rusūhī as *sefer-i ma'nevī*, is a long and toilsome journey experienced by a dervish when he is traversing through the spiritual stages in his attempt of internal development. Such a journey, he emphasizes, is exclusive to the people of God alone, comprises four gradual stages:

(i) *Seyr-i ilallāh* (journey to God): the mystic passes from the level of selfhood (*nafs*) to that of real existence (*vūcūd-i ḡakīkī*). At this early state, he removes the veil of multiplicity and arrives at the state of unity.

(ii) *Seyr-i fi'llāh* (journey in God): at this stage, the mystic assumes and appropriates all the divine names and attributes.

(iii) *Seyr-i ma'allāh* (journey with God): this is a stage by which the mystic develops such close intimacy with God that he feels united with Him. Therefore it is also named "union" (*aḡadiyyat*) and "...of but two bow-lengths or (even) nearer" (*qāba qawsayn aw adnā*). (Qur'ān, 53: 9)

(iv) *Seyr-i 'anillāh* (journey away from God): after having passed beyond all the stages and attained union with God, the sufi returns to the world of multiplicity where he begins training the novices of the spiritual path. This journey is referred to as the state of abiding after annihilation (*bekā ba'de'l-fenā*) or the state of self-awareness after being intoxicated (*şehv ba'de'l-mahv*) or the state of separation after union (*farḡ ba'de'l-cem*). In the final state, the mystic is able to observe unity in diversity and vice versa. See for more details, *Minhāc*, pp. 47-53.

¹⁶ Qur'ān, 31:12.

rosegarden of my life with the breeze of the meaning of "O my Lord, increase me in knowledge."¹⁷ Then, that Donor of gifts and Uncoverer of veils bestowed on me so many jewels and ornaments of wisdom and (so many) gems of the benefits of grace and munificence that it was preposterous to think that this imperfect one had the worthiness or the aptitude for them. Rather, this was because I knew the tutty-like dust of the feet of the dervishes of Celālu'l-Ḥaḡḡ ve'l-Millet ve'd-Dīn Mevlānā, the master of gnostics¹⁸ -that king of lovers and proof of wayfarers, treasure (and) storehouse of symbols of truth and certainty, beholder of the beauty of the unity of the Lord of the worlds- to be collyrium mixed with ground pearls for the eye of my heart and (because) their elixir glances worked alchemy on the copper of my existence.¹⁹ Afterwards, this humble and imperfect one, while celebrating the name of God and remaining ever grateful to Him for His favours, and being in compliance with the verse "call to the way of Your Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching,"²⁰ used to call people, after preparing a (substantial) remedy through the mixture of the (spiritual) liquor of "wisdom" with the medicine of "admonition," from the narrow and defiled path to the straight. Moreover, while taking inspiration from (the verse) "they spend out of what we have provided for them",²¹ I would take

¹⁷ Cf. *Qur'ān*, 20:114.

¹⁸ Anḡaravī of course refers to Mevlānā Jelāl al-Dīn al-Rūmī, the founder of the order of the Mevleviyye Dervişes.

¹⁹ The "elixir" stands for, in the *Mesnevī*, the "şeyh", while "copper" represents the "needy" or "despicable evil". *Mathnawī*, II/3343-3345, trans. by Nicholson. In *Dīwān-i Shams-i Tabrīzī* (verse n. 9003), however, "love" is regarded as "elixir", whereas "sensuality" as "copper". "Your sensuality is copper, and the light of Love is the elixir. Love's light transmutes the copper of your existence into gold." W. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Love* (Albany: State University of New York, 1983), p. 215.

²⁰ *Qur'ān*, 16:125. The complete verse was commonly referred to by both theologians and philosophers in support of what G. Hourani calls "three Aristotelian reasoning": "al-ḡikma", meaning "wisdom" but suggesting also philosophy; "al-maw'īza", meaning "preaching" but suggesting also oratory and rhetoric (*al-khiṡāb*); and "jadal", meaning "debate" but suggesting dialectic. See, Ibn Rushd, *On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy*, p. 49, 92, n. 59.

²¹ *Qur'an*, 2:3

pleasure in delivering the desired subsistence as well as the unrevealed accounts of the Lovers to the disciples according to their capacity. Finally, one day, a student of wisdom among the virtuous and tenacious followers of the "Father of Dust"²², requested me to compose a commentary on the *Hayākil* of Şeyh Shihāb al-Dīn, the Excellency, so that the difficult matters and ambiguous points therein should be determined and thus resolved. As a humble dervish, I first refrained for some time from such an undertaking. Then the meaningful content of the following holy saying compelled me to do it: "Explain as much as you can. Do not keep it in your memory; God warns you..."²³ For this reason, I, though being weak in knowledge and lacking the capacity, decided to comment on that book, lest I might contravene to the admonition: "Do not repulse the petitioner".²⁴

To begin with, having carefully examined a few commentaries²⁵ and having also studied several works on geometry, I derived therefrom numerous pearls of wisdom along with the knowledge of inward and outward matters. Thus I have composed it in the Turkish language; yet it would have been quite possible for me to put it in Arabic or even in Persian. However, since I was admonished by the ḥadīth, "make it easy, do not make it difficult, for God rebukes those who

²² This is a nickname attributed to the fourth caliph, 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib, the son-in-law of the Prophet. According to one ḥadīth, narrated by Sahl Ibn Saīd, this was the most cherished name for 'Alī, for it was given to him by the Prophet himself. "Once 'Alī got angry with his wife, Fātima, and went out of his house and slept near a wall in the mosque. The Prophet came searching for him, and someone said: He is there, lying near the wall. The Prophet came to him, while 'Alī's back was covered with dust. The Prophet started removing the dust from his back, saying: "Get up, O Abū Turāb !" See, *Saḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, trans. M. Muḥsin Khān (Lahore: Kazi Publications, 1983), vol. 8, p. 143, ḥadīth no. 223.

²³ I was not able to verify it.

²⁴ Qur'ān, 93:10

²⁵ Although Anḳaravī does not specify, it seems clear that by commentaries he means *Shawākil al-Ḥūr* (SH-H) by Jalāl al-Dīn Dawwānī, to which we shall refer here a great deal in this study, and *Ishrāq Hayākil al-Nūr Li Kashf Zulumāt Shawākil al-Ḥūr* (Illumination of the Temples of the light for the Discovery of the Darkness of the "Shapes of the Houris") by Ghiyāth al-Dīn Mansūr Shīrāzī, as well as the Persian version of *Hayākil*.

make it difficult", I have found no better language than Turkish to interpret it in a clear and eloquent way so as to make it easy to the weak and fatigued mind. I have chosen this way in particular, because it would be easy for a teacher to articulate it, and it would be equally easy for a student to memorize it. I have given no preference to sophisticated expressions, nor have I utilized metaphorical words, so that even men of little understanding may enjoy and conceive of it. I have entitled it *Īzāḥü'l-Hikem (Elucidation of Wisdoms)*, and have set down at the beginning three different introductions with the aim that the disciple of wisdom become acquainted with what the science of wisdom is, for it is an obvious fact that a science cannot be known unless its introductory principles be established at the outset.

Thus the first introduction lays down the definition of "the science of wisdom", since it would be futile to study a science unless its definition has been specified.

The second introduction explains the use and benefit of the science of wisdom, for it is only when this aspect is known that its pursuit will be more desired. That is to say, the specification of its use and benefit would be an impetus for research into that science.

The third introduction explains what the subject-matter of the science of wisdom is.

1. The Definition of Wisdom:

To begin with, "wisdom is a science which is concerned with the real natures of things as they are, as well as with the appropriate action required".²⁶ That is, the science of wisdom consists of the knowledge of the concrete and contingent beings emanated in order from the Necessary Existent Being. These (contingent) beings are composed of spiritual substances and corporeal ones, namely (i) intellects, (ii) souls, and (iii) bodies. The last category includes the nine celestial spheres²⁷, the four main elements,²⁸ and the three kingdoms of nature; mineral, vegetable and animal. One has to study

²⁶ Cf. Ibn Sīnā, "Aqsām al-'Ulūm al-'Aqliyya," pp. 225-43.

²⁷ These spheres will be mentioned one by one very shortly.

²⁸ (i) Fire, (ii) air, (iii) water and (iv) earth.

carefully the precise natures, characteristics and properties -be they interior and exterior- of all the above-mentioned things. Also their advantages and disadvantages must be well understood. Moreover, all of them should be examined entirely in their own context and boundaries. It must be recalled here that the beloved Prophet has pleaded as follows: "O my Lord! show me things as they really are."

1.1 The Use and Benefit of Wisdom:

As to the use and benefit of wisdom, it is to perfect the human soul with the aid of gnosis. In so doing, the soul, when separated from the body, may be safeguarded from suffering for its false beliefs and preoccupations with worldly vanities. "Every heart attains happiness by wisdom / Every problem finds solution by wisdom."

1.2 The Subject-matter of Wisdom:

The science of wisdom deals with the matters proper to its own subject-matter. The science of medicine (*'ilm-i ṭibb*), for instance, takes the human body as its own subject-matter, since the physician occupies himself with the matters proper to the human body, like certain diseases attached to the human body. In like manner, the subject-matter of astrology or astronomy (*'ilm-i nūcūm*) is the heavenly bodies, since the astrologer or astronomer deals with the issues related to the structure of these bodies and their observations. Again the science of (Islamic) jurisprudence (*'ilm-i fiqh*) is involved with judicial matters and religious obligations such as prayer, fasting, almsgiving, pilgrimage and so on.

2. The Science of Wisdom:

Now let us return to the science of wisdom. It is of two kinds: (i) practical (*'amalī*) wisdom, and (ii) theoretical (*naẓarī*) wisdom.²⁹ The latter is also subdivided into two: (a) divine science (*'ilm-i ilāhī*),³⁰

²⁹ It is interesting that Anḳaravī, unlike Ibn Sīnā, gives precedence to "practical" over "theoretical" wisdom.

³⁰ This is called at the same time *ilāhiyyāt*, viz. metaphysics as is the case with Ibn Sīnā, or *falsafa al-ūlā*, viz. first philosophy, as is the case with al-Kindī. But both two names have been used by the former

and (b) physics (*'ilm-i tabi'ī*).

2.1 Divine Science:

The subject-matter of divine science is absolute Being (*vūcūd-u muṭlaq*), since the sage (*ḥakīm*) of divine science deals with the matters that are proper to absolute Being. According to the sages, absolute Being is the Truth by itself (*zāt-i ḥaq*), and is entirely free from matter and form; and it is one and eternal. They proclaim as well that incorporeal intellects too are devoid of matter and form and beyond any dimension; and they are designated, in the terminology of the Scripture, as angels. Furthermore, the heavenly and human souls are also free from matter and form, while yet having control over these two.³¹

interchangeably. See, Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifā'*, *al-Ilāhiyyāt I*, eds. G. C. Anawati and S. Zaid (Cairo: Al-Maṭba'at al-Āmiriyya, 1380/1960), pp. 3-9.

³¹ As is seen in his brief presentation of the contents of divine science (*'ilm-i ilāhī*), Anḳaravī touches upon mainly three subjects: the Absolute Being (*vūcūd-u muṭlaq*), incorporeal intellects (*'uḳūl-ū mūcerred*), and celestial and human souls (*nūfūs-ū semāvi ve beṣerī*). In fact, this is a summarized but somewhat modified version of the early Muslim philosophers' account of metaphysics. Al-Kindī, known as the first Arab philosopher, defines philosophy as "the knowledge of the real natures of things" and deems what he terms *falsafa al-ūlā* (first philosophy) "the noblest part of philosophy", and discusses therein mainly the First Truth (*al-Ḥaqq al-Awwal*) and some other matters almost similar to what has just been mentioned. For details, see, al-Kindī, *al-Kindī's Metaphysics: A Translation of al-Kindī's Treatise "On the First Philosophy (fī al-Falsafah al-Ūlā)*", trans. with intro. and commentary by Alfred L. Ivry (Albany: State University of New York, 1974).

Likewise, al-Fārābī, renowned as the Second Master after Aristotle, in his short epistle, *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm (The Enumeration of the Sciences)*, has assigned three primary divisions to divine science, the first dealing with the existing things and their properties and accidents, the second with the incorporeal beings as well as the principles of other sciences, and the last with the First Being (*al-Mawjūd al-Awwal*) or the Truth (*al-Ḥaqq*) and its attributes. Al-Fārābī, *Iḥṣā' al-'Ulūm*, (Beirut: Centre de développement national, 1991), pp. 35-36.

Ibn Sīnā also proposes more or less the same aforementioned subjects for the study of metaphysics. But his presentation seems to be more systematic and elaborate. For him, the most important question to be

2.2 Physics:

The subject-matter of physics is body, for the sage of this science inquires into the matters proper to corporeal body such as primary matter (*heyūlā*), shape, nature, finiteness, motion, rest, time, place and the like. So the sages who deal with the science of nature claim that each corporeal body, composed of (primary) matter and form, possesses its own natural property. What is intended by nature here is the cause of motion or rest of a being. Every corporeal body is par excellence finite, and so are the spheres (*eflāk*).

The sphere of Aṭlas,³² called the Throne³³ in the language of the Scripture, encompasses all the spheres. There lies no other sphere beyond the Throne. All the spheres, on the contrary, are located in the hollow of God's Throne. The eighth sphere, which is termed by the sages the starry sphere or the sphere of the Zodiac,³⁴ is situated inside the Throne. This sphere is designated, in the language of Scripture, as the Seat (Divine Pedestal).³⁵ It is also called the sphere of the fixed stars,³⁶ in the hollow of which the sphere of Saturn³⁷ is situated. After this comes the sphere of

discussed in the field of metaphysics is the "Being qua Being" or what he called "the Necessarily Existent Being" (*al-Wājib al-Wujūd*). In addition, the following issues constitute the subject-matter of metaphysics: the attributes of the Necessarily Existent Being, the ultimate causes of all caused beings, the principles of the sciences, unity, multiplicity, cause and effect, particularity and universality, perfection and imperfection and so on. Ibn Sīnā, "Aqsām al-'Ulūm al-Aqliyya", p. 240; idem, *al-Shifā', al-Ilāhiyyāt I*, pp. 3-9, 14-15.

³² This is the ninth sphere.

³³ 'Arṣ.

³⁴ *Burūc*.

³⁵ *Kūrsī*

³⁶ *Felek-i Sābit*.

³⁷ *Felek-i Zūḥal*.

Jupiter³⁸ under which the sphere of Mars³⁹ falls. Beneath Mars, there comes the sphere of the Sun,⁴⁰ which is followed by the sphere of Venus⁴¹. Then the sphere of Mercury⁴² comes, underneath which the sphere of the Moon⁴³ falls. Just after the Moon, there comes the Fire,⁴⁴ below which the Air (atmosphere)⁴⁵ is located. Under the Air, there is Water,⁴⁶ which is followed by the Earth.⁴⁷ Thus, all these nine spheres and the other four sub-lunary spheres are situated in a geocentric hierarchy where each preceding one encircles the ensuing one, as has been clearly shown in the circular diagram.⁴⁸

Each body has a motion peculiar to itself. Motion is defined as the transition of a body from the place which it formerly occupied to that which it presently occupies. Time consists of the motion of the spheres. A year comes about as a result of the sun's turning round its own sphere only once. A month consists of a single rotation of the moon around its own sphere. Winter takes place when the sun is far from the earth, while summer occurs when it is close to it. The season of spring happens when the sun is close to the earth at the equinox, while that of autumn takes place when it is far from it at the equinox. Each body has a place pertaining to itself. Place is said of a thing, a certain amount of which makes a line, if it is long. If it has length and width, then it is called a surface. If, on the other hand, it

³⁸ *Felek-i Muşterî.*

³⁹ *Felek-i Merrîh*

⁴⁰ *Āfitāb.*

⁴¹ *Felek-i Zühre*

⁴² *Felek-i 'Uṭārid.*

⁴³ *Felek-i Kāmer.*

⁴⁴ *Kürre-i Nār.*

⁴⁵ *Kürre-i Hevā*

⁴⁶ *Kürre-i Āb.*

⁴⁷ *Kürre-i 'Arz.*

⁴⁸ See, *I-H.* 5a8-16.

has length, width and depth, in this case, it is named body, which will be delineated, God willing, in detail.⁴⁹ Place is likewise said of the inside of a body, which touches the upper surface.

It becomes evident then that the sphere of Atlas has no place, while being itself a place for all the other spheres. Each sphere with respect to another which it either contains or encircles is considered as a place. The sages term this world the "world of generation and corruption". Here generation means that an object comes into existence in a given form, whereas corruption means that the existing object is stripped of its form, and thus is transformed into another. All the elements can be transmuted into one another, except the primary matter of the celestial bodies. That is, since the primary matter of the celestial bodies is completely free, it never turns into another form. But other elements, in contrast, are susceptible of transformation, as in the case of fire when it is in the workshop of the blacksmith, which turns into air. Likewise, the earthenware pot which fire is set over, is transformed into air. It is on this ground that they have named the world of elements the world of generation and corruption, which we have so far discussed. All of these things which are attached to bodies accidentally are accidents. To sum up, it is evident that the subject-matter of physics is body, whereas that of divine science is Absolute Being. God who is the ultimate resort knows what is best and most correct.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ That is, in the First Temple whose subject matter is concerned exclusively with the body.

⁵⁰ This whole text has been translated from *I-H*. 1b12 to 5b15,

CHAPTER THREE

SUHRAWARDĪ'S PROLOGUE

O Deity of the worlds.¹ O eternally Subsistent! Strengthen us with (the aid of) the light, maintain us in the light, assemble us under the light. Make the end of our pursuits in accord with your will. May our ultimate aim be the one which prepares us to meet you. We have troubled our own souls,² though You are never avaricious with your superabundance. Those who are imprisoned in darkness stand at Your Portal, awaiting mercy and seeking liberation from captivity.³ Good is your custom; and evil, O my God, is (because of) your destiny. By Your exalted Glory, You make those things which are noble, and human beings are not in a position to exact vengeance. Bless us in our remembrance (of You) and remove evil from us. Give success to the right-doers. Peace be upon the chosen (*Muṣṭafā*)⁴ and all his family. This is the treatise of *Temples of Light*. May God sanctify the souls receptive of the guidance as well as the intellects leading to it (i.e. guidance).⁵

¹ This initial phrase exists only in *I-H*. 5b16. Although it appears neither in Dawwānī's commentary nor in Shīrāzī's, H. Corbin seems to have included it in his French translation. (*Les Temples*, p. 41)

² "They said: 'Our Lord! We have burdened our own souls. If You do not forgive us and bestow Your Mercy upon us, we shall indeed be in loss.'" (Qur'ān: 7:23)

³ Abū Rayyān gives the following reading for the last part: "...seeking good". (*H-N*. p. 45.)

⁴ Anḳaravī (*I-H*. 7a13) and Abū Rayyān (*H-N*. p. 47, n. 4, MS B) have: *muṣṭafīn* (those who are chosen). Again in *I-H* 7a12, the phrase "give success" (*waffiq*) appears to be "be courteous" (*raffiq*).

⁵ *H-N*. p. 46; *I-H*. 5b16, 6a2,10,12,13,6b2-4,7-9,11-12,17, 7a1-3,8,10,12-14,7b1; *SH-H*. pp. 6, 10-17. It should be noted here that this whole prologue is missing in the Persian version of *Hayākil*. As far as I have been able to determine, no justifiable ground for such omission can be found either in Suhrawardī's own writings or in the studies so far carried out on him by others. For instance, H. Corbin, a distinguished authority in this field,

The Concepts of Light and Temple

O Deity of the worlds!

Anḳaravī first translates this phrase as "O Worshipped by the worlds" and then explains the term "ālam", which has been rendered above as "world". He says that "ālam", according to the sages, is a general name that denotes "everything besides God". It is so comprehensive that it includes in itself all the intellects, souls, the four elements, i.e., water, air, earth, and fire, the three kingdoms of nature, i.e., mineral, vegetable, and animal, and the like. From all of these, one can infer the existence of God.⁶

O eternally Subsistent!

At this juncture, we encounter a crucial term, that is, "qayyūm", which is, as was first explained by al-Dawwānī⁷ and re-emphasized by Anḳaravī,⁸ the active participle form of "qāim". It technically means, says Anḳaravī, "self-subsistent". With respect to existence, it would signify the Necessary Existent (*Wājib al-Wujūd*) on which all other beings depend for their existence. To put it another way, all of existence is of two types: the self-

simply relates this fact without making any further point. (*Les Temples*, p. 75, n. 1).

⁶ *I-H.* 5b17-6a2.

⁷ *SH-H.* p. 6.

⁸ *I-H.* 6a3-10.

subsistent, i.e., that which necessarily exists by virtue of itself, and existence by virtue of another. All existing beings fall into the latter category, in so far as they derive their existence from the former, which needs nothing for its own existence. In effect, Anḳaravī expounds "qayyūm" with the aid of Ibn Sīnā's famous division of being as "the necessarily existent by virtue of itself" (*wājib al-wujūd*) and "the possibly existent" (*mumkin al-wujūd*) whose existence becomes necessary by virtue of another.

Strengthen us with the light!

Both commentators, i.e., Anḳaravī and Dawwānī, unanimously agree on the apparent meaning of "light" as "knowledge", yet they differ in their further interpretation. The former, approaching the term from a Sufi perspective, reads the whole phrase as follows: "fortify us with the shining lights radiated from the gnosis of Your Essence; make our souls powerful with the profound mysteries of the knowledge of Your attributes."⁹ Dawwānī, however, remaining mainly in the line of Ishrāqī tradition, notes that "knowledge" is light by which the true natures of everything become manifest; and the human soul possessed of such knowledge, becomes perfect after having attained the stage of spiritual conjunction with the separate intelligibles (*al-mufāraqāt*). These intelligibles are, according to the

⁹ *I-H.* 6a11-2.

Peripatetics, ten intellects, whose natures are nothing less than "light" for the Illuminationists.¹⁰

Maintain us in the light!

To this Anḳaravī suggests only one exegesis: "Keep us firm in the light of Your oneness (*tevhīd*)."¹¹ Şāriḥ Dawwānī, for his part, once again identifying "light" with "knowledge", offers several explanations for it. In sum, the phrase stated above first has the sense of seeking help from God to make us free, by means of "nūr", from all doubts and fancy ideas so as to reach absolute knowledge by journeying upwards from the certainty of knowledge (*'ilm al-yaqīn*) to that of sight (*'ayn al-yaqīn*) and finally to that of truth (*ḥaqq al-yaqīn*). All of these three stages will be touched upon in our analysis of the commentary on the next sentence from Suhrawardī's text. According to another meaning, it indicates yearning for the persistent conjunction (*ittiṣāl*) with the sublime lights.¹²

Gather us under the light!

"May God unite us with the sublime incorporeal lights just after our souls have departed from our bodies!" This is how it is explained by Rusūhī

¹⁰ *SH-H.* p. 10.

¹¹ *I-H.* 6a12-3.

¹² *SH-H.* pp. 10-11.

and Dawwānī. Nevertheless, the latter's further exegesis raises a more problematic issue, debated particularly among the medieval thinkers of Islam, that is, the separation of the soul from the body and its conjunction with the "splendid principles (*al-mabādi' al-'āliyah*). Dawwānī states that the human soul, during this conjunction, may go through three successive stages. At the first one, owing to the lights which issue forth from the first principle (*al-mabda' al-awwal*), the soul is able to see objects which can be known (*ma'lūmāt*); this is called the certainty of knowledge (*'ilm al-yaqīn*). At the second stage, it may have a vision of the separate Substance or Intellect (*mufāriq*)¹³ and all the beings that exist therein, which is named the certainty of sight (*'ayn al-yaqīn*). At the final stage, the human soul culminates in a full conjunction with that Intellect.¹⁴

Şāriḥ Anḳaravī, in his commentary on this sentence, discusses the notion of "light" and its divisions, and does so exactly in the terms in which they are defined and classified by Suhrawardī in his *Hikmat al-Ishrāq*.¹⁵ To begin with, "light" can be defined as "that by which things become visible".¹⁶ For Suhrawardī, it is a self-evident reality which need not be made known nor explained, for "there is nothing more manifest than light

¹³ This echoes undoubtedly Ibn Sīnā's concept of "Active Intellect" (*al-'Aql al-Fa'āl*).

¹⁴ *SH-H*. pp. 11-12.

¹⁵ *H-I*. pp. 107-108.

¹⁶ *I-H*. 6a15.

itself";¹⁷ yet it is the one which renders all else manifest.¹⁸ This is in a certain way reminiscent of Ibn Sīnā's primordial concepts of "existent" (*mawjūd*), "thing" (*shayʾ*) and "necessary" (*ḍarūrī*) whose intentions, he declares, are so essentially imprinted in the human soul that they do not need definitions at all.¹⁹ So it seems that, as some modern researchers have claimed, Suhrawardī has substituted "light" for "existence".²⁰

It is true that the origin of Suhrawardī's notion of "light" goes back to that of Ibn Sīnā's on "existence". It also goes without saying that he, strictly following the latter, has neither assigned a definition to nor given any explanation for "light". Furthermore, just as "existence" has become the very foundation of Ibn Sīnā's so-called rational philosophy, known as Peripatetic, so did "light" become the very basis of Suhrawardī's intuitive tradition, known as Illuminative. Whatever they may have in common, no one can identify the one with the other, because, as some contemporary scholars of Islamic philosophy have pointed out²¹, the metaphysical nature of "light"

¹⁷ *H-I*. p. 106.

¹⁸ *H-I*. p. 113.

¹⁹ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ilāhiyyāt II*, p. 29.

²⁰ For instance, T. Izutsu states that Suhrawardī has transferred "existence" to "light". Idem, *The Concept and Reality of Existence* (Tokyo: The Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1971), p. 144.

²¹ J. Walbridge treats such an identification with caution on the ground that Suhrawardī denies any objective reality outside the mind to existence. What is real for him is only the light itself, not the concepts that are found in the mind. See his *The Science of Mystic Lights* (Cambridge: Harvard

as conceived by Suhrawardī remains far distinct from that of "existence" as set out by Ibn Sīnā. Nevertheless, it is extremely interesting to observe how Anḳaravī presents Suhrawardī's concept of "light" in terms of Ibn Sīnā's concept of "intellect," and in what follows we will highlight the similarities and differences between these two.

In accordance with Suhrawardī's terminology, Anḳaravī divides light into two chief categories:

(i) Accidental light or material light (*nūr hey'eṭ*), like the sun and its like. Were the sun, for instance, not to exist, no object in the world could be seen.

(ii) Abstract light or immaterial light (*nūr mūcerred*) or pure light (*nur mahd*), like the immaterial intellects devoid of bodily association, and the rational souls acting upon and governing bodies.²²

At the very root of Suhrawardī's division of light there lies his division of "thing" (*shay*) into two:

(i) That which is light (*nūr*) and beam (*daw'*) in its own self (*nūr fi ḥaqīqat nafsih*), which is further subdivided into two:

(a) Accidental light (*al-nūr al-āriḍ*), which is a "form" (*hay'a*) for something else; e.g., the sun.

(b) Immaterial light (*al-nūr al-mujarrad*), that is not a "form" for

University Press, 1992), p. 40.

²² *I-H.* 6a15-6b2.

something else.

(ii) That which is not light and beam in its own self, which is further subdivided into three:

(a) Dark substance (*al-jawhar al-ghāsiq*), which is independent of place.

(b) Dark form (*al-hay'a al-ẓulmāniyya*), which is a form for something else.

(c) Isthmus or interval (*al-barzakh*), which is body.²³

The above scheme might be ultimately reduced, again in congruence with Suhrawardī's own terminology, to two main categories:

(i) that which is self-sufficient and whose perfection depends on nothing else except itself, which is called "independent" (*ghanī*).

(ii) that which is conditional on something and whose essence and perfection rests exclusively on something else; this is called "dependent" or "indigent" (*faqīr*).²⁴

Thus the pure or immaterial light falls, according to Suhrawardī, under the first category, whereas the accidental or material light comes under the last one.

A thorough analysis of Suhrawardī's whole ontology in which "light" becomes the main principle for determining the interrelationship of things,

²³ *H-I*. p. 107.

²⁴ *H-I*. p. 107.

clearly demonstrates that it owes much of its origin to Ibn Sīnā's ontology in which, as we have already pointed out, "existence" determines the network of relations among beings. What is more, even Ibn Sīnā's division of things with regard to "existence" into "necessary" (*ḍarūrī*), "possible" (*mumkin*) and "impossible" (*mumtani*)²⁵ corresponds more or less to Suhrawardī's two-fold division of things on the basis of "light" into "independent" (*ghanī*) and "dependent" (*faqīr*). Hence, as Ziai has aptly pointed out,²⁶ the notions of "the Necessary Existent" (*wājib al-wujūd*) and "the non-existent" (*ma'dūm*) in Avicenna's system find their counterparts in Suhrawardī's as that of "the Absolute Independent" (*al-ghanī al-muṭlaq*) and that of "the absolute dependent" (*al-faqīr al-muṭlaq*) respectively.²⁷

The second possible ground for Suhrawardī's aforementioned division might have been his conception of the cosmic roles of Orient (*Mashriq*) and Occident (*Maghrib*), a conception which Ibn Sīnā originally formulated about two centuries before him.²⁸ In Suhrawardī's view, sacred geography,

²⁵ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ilāhiyyāt*, vol. 2, p. 35.

²⁶ Hossein Ziai, *Knowledge and Illumination: A Study of Suhrawardī's Hikmat al-Ishrāq* (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1990), p. 169.

²⁷ Ziai translates the former as "absolutely rich" and the latter as "absolutely poor". (Ibid.)

²⁸ Ibn Sīnā, apart from one of his later works, entitled *Mantiq al-Mashriqiyyīn* in which he spoke of "an oriental wisdom", in his famous trilogy, *Ḥayy Ibn Yaqzān*, *Risālat al-Tā'ir* which was translated by Suhrawardī into Persian, and *Salaman wa Absal*, dealt at some length with the so-called sacred geography of "the Orient of light" and "the Occident of darkness". For the historical account of the terms orient and occident or

whether real or symbolic, consists of two principal regions; (i) the Orient which is the origin of light and thus represents the source of knowledge, and (ii) the Occident which is the world of darkness or matter (*ghāsiq*) and so typifies ignorance.²⁹

May our ultimate aim be the one which prepares us to meet you.

Anḳaravī is now concerned with the question of how each man can prepare his rational soul for its meeting with God, which will take place, as Dawwānī indicates, in the *Maḥshar*, the arena of congregation on the Day of Resurrection.³⁰ The best way to succeed in this, Anḳaravī proclaims, is to replace human attributes with the Divine Attributes and human self with the Divine Self, and finally to reach a state of permanency with God.³¹ While putting it in a Sufi context, he speaks of the two stages in man's preparation to encounter God. The first is the complete negation or annihilation of self (*fenā ve maḥv*), which leads eventually to the second

light and darkness, refer to the following writings: H. Corbin, *En Islam Iranien Aspects Spirituels et Philosophiques*, vol. 2 (Paris: Gallimard, 1971); idem, *Terre Céleste et Corps de Résurrection de l'Iran Mazdéen à l'Iran Shī'ite* (Buchen/Chastel, 1960), pp. 189-21; Corbin, "Prolégomènes II" in *Oeuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques*, vol. 2, pp. 5-99; R. Arnaldez, "Isḥrāq" and Isḥraqiyyūn", *EI2*, vol. 4, pp. 119-121; S. H. Nasr, *Three Muslim Sages* (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 1988), pp. 52-63.

²⁹ *H-I*, pp. 107-109.

³⁰ *SH-H*, p. 12.

³¹ *I-H*, 6b4-7.

stage, which is subsistence (*beḳā*) in God. Hence with such a conspicuously mystical interpretation, Anḳaravī no doubt attempts to place Suhrawardī as well as his Illuminative doctrine in the Sufi tradition.

We have troubled our own souls.

This means, for Mevlevī Rusūhī, that we have wronged our souls, since we have become so preoccupied with physical matters and so addicted to worldly desires.³² For Dawwānī, however, it signifies that we have burdened our souls because we have adopted for them a kind of conduct tainted with evil habits, which will eventually become an impediment for us in our attempt at reaching true perfection.³³

You are never avaricious with Your superabundance.

In spreading the rays of His Light, God never acts niggardly. On the contrary, Anḳaravī comments, all that exists in reality is just like a drop from His gracious ocean and a piece of ray from His luminous courtesy.³⁴ On the other hand, "stinginess" (*bakhl*), as Dawwānī puts it, is an imperfection peculiar to man only; therefore it is by no means found in God, who is the

³² *I-H.* 6b7-8.

³³ *SH-H.* p. 13.

³⁴ *I-H.* 6b9-11.

most generous.³⁵

Those who are imprisoned in darkness stand at Your Portal, awaiting mercy and seeking liberation from captivity.

Man, in the eyes of Suhrawardī, lives in this world as a captive of darkness and is in desperate need of God's mercy so that he can be set free. Dawwānī explains in his commentary on this passage that man is in such a miserable situation because of his excessive indulgence in physical pleasures and lustful desires, and that without God's benevolence he will not be able to save himself from the severe consequences of that situation.³⁶

Anḩaravī goes further and reminds us of the fundamental ingredients of the external world, namely matter and form. Thus only when man has become liberated from the bondage of the passions and vanities of this world, a world which is made up of matter and form, then will he be able to join the sublime incorporeal lights.³⁷

Human beings are not in a position to exact vengeance.

God, as Suhrawardī has already pointed out, is absolutely generous and independent (*ghanī*); but man, in contrast, is simply nothing as

³⁵ *SH-H.* p. 13.

³⁶ *SH-H.* p. 13.

³⁷ *I-H.* 6b13-16.

compared to God and totally dependent (*faqīr*) on Him, let alone in a position to exact vengeance for wrongs which he has suffered. Anḳaravī, following partly Dawwānī,³⁸ comments that since the human soul has become so obsessed with base and sensual desires that it cannot attain knowledge (*'ulūm*) and gnosis (*me'ārif*), both of which enable him to realize true perfection.³⁹ Suhrawardī has made this explicit in the following invocation to God:

O God bless us in our remembrance (of You) and remove evil from us. Give success to the right-doers. And peace be upon the chosen one.

Anḳaravī offers two meanings to "remembrance" (*zīkr*). One is "knowledge" and "gnosis"; the other is to remember the beginning and the end of the world (*mebde ve me'ād*). Therefore he interprets the whole phrase as follows: May God grant man "knowledge" and "gnosis" in abundance or may God make him remember his beginning and end.

"Knowledge" (*'ilm*), according to Ismā'īl Rusūhī, is to know a thing along with all its concomitants (*levāzimihī*), whereas "gnosis" (*ma'rife*) means to comprehend the same thing just as it is, its nature (*ḥaḳīḳatihī*), its essence (*zātihī*) and its properties.⁴⁰ Precisely speaking, in "'ilm" we

³⁸ *SH-H*. p. 14.

³⁹ *I-H*. 7a9-11.

⁴⁰ See for a detailed explanation, Anḳaravī, *Minhācū'l-Fuḳarā'*, p. 267.

conceive of something by means of its form, but in "ma'rifa" we perceive it just as it is.

Anḳaravī continues his commentary by stating that man ought to supplicate God to eradicate all barriers, like "ignorance" and "laziness", which hinder man from gaining "knowledge" and "gnosis".⁴¹

Contrary to Dawwānī, who restricts God's peace and blessing to the Prophet Muḥammad only,⁴² Anḳaravī, reading the phrase as *al-muṣṭafīn* (the chosen ones) instead of *al-muṣṭafā* (the chosen one), extends it accordingly to all the rulers (*sultāns*) who were designated by God to carry out the Divine mission (*risālet*).⁴³

This is the treatise of the Temples of Light.

The title which Suhrawardī himself assigns to his work, has two components: one is "hayākil", the plural form of "haykal", meaning literally "temple"; the other is "nūr", denominating merely "light", which I have already discussed at some length and which I will continue to deal with throughout this study.

Şāriḥ Rusūhī as compared to Dawwānī, explicates the notion of

⁴¹ *I-H.* 7a10-11; *SH-H.* p. 14.

⁴² *SH-H.* p. 14. He makes it very clear that he, as the most perfect and dignified messenger, was sent for all mankind.

⁴³ *I-H.* 7a13-14.

"haykal", basically identifying it with "ṣūra:" (form), and thus labelling the book under discussion as "The Book of Forms". He also asserts that "since Şeyh Suhrawardī -may God sanctify his secret- has expounded in this treatise the forms of the sublime abstract lights, of the rational souls and of the Divine lights, he has conveniently named it *Hayākil al-Nūr*".⁴⁴

As for Dawwānī, he provides us with a relatively detailed account with regard to the historical development of the term "haykal":

Haykal originally means shape or form (*al-ṣūrah*). The ancient sages had assumed that the stars constitute the shadows and forms (*hayākil*) of the incorporeal lights. Therefore, they had set up for each of the seven planets (stars) a theurgy (*ṭilism*), made of a metal, which was suitable to its own structure and time. And they would place each of these theurgies in a house built, in conformity with a horoscope, in a location appropriate to the star. Then they used to go to the houses at certain times and execute there certain (theurgical) activities such as fumigations and others, which correspond to the star and its respective time. Thus, they would gain an advantage from the theurgical activities, and (moreover) they would make those houses magnificent and then call them (precisely) the *Temples of Light (Hayākil al-Nūr)*⁴⁵ because of their being the sites of these theurgies (or theurgical affairs), which were the forms of the stars which themselves were the temples of the supreme lights. Therefore the author has accordingly named this treatise *Hayākil al-Nūr (Temples of Light)*, whose purpose is to set out the moods (*al-aḥwāl*) of the incorporeal lights. So, each chapter of this treatise, together with the explanations as well as the terms that it

⁴⁴ I-H. 7a15-7b1.

⁴⁵ Suhrawardī himself has used the term temple in the same sense, i.e. house, in his *Kitāb al-Talwīḥāt*, wherein he says: "They visit the Divine Temples (*al-hayākil al-ilāhiyya*) and the dwellings of the Saints (*al-masākin al-anbiyā*) and their like. Suhrawardī, *Kitāb al-Talwīḥāt*, in *Opera Metaphysica et Mystica I*, ed. H. Corbin (Istanbul: Maārif Matbaası, 1945), p. 96.

contains, would resemble a place of theurgy whose contemplation would lead inevitably to the contemplation of these lights. This is the opinion I have, yet God does know best what is concealed in (the hearts of) His servants.⁴⁶

In his major work, *Hikmat al-Ishrāq*, Suhrawardī uses the term "haykal" in connection with the human body. In one particular place, for instance, he says that all the internal faculties in the body are in a way a shadow of what is in "the managing light" (*al-nūr al-isfahbad*), which is the rational soul, or an icon within the temple, which is the body. In other words, the temple, i.e., the body, becomes a theurgy for the rational soul, just as the imaginative faculty becomes an icon or image for the faculty of reasoning of the same soul.⁴⁷

On another occasion, he emphasizes that once the rational soul has become illuminated by the supreme lights, it becomes like a governing light (*al-nūr al-mudabbir*). Then all the illuminations it receives are reflected on the corporeal temple, namely, on the body, as well as on the psychic spirit (*al-rūḥ al-nafsānī*).⁴⁸

⁴⁶ *SH-H.* p. 16. Cf. *Les Temples*, p. 34. In the following lines of the French translation, Corbin mentions that "Temple of the Light" is used in Ismā'īlī philosophy in connection with the term *lāhūt* (the divine nature) of the Imam. (*Les Temples*, p. 35.) See also Mehdi Aminrazawi, "Suhrawardī's Theory of Knowledge," (Ph.D. dissertation, The Temple University, 1989), p. 67.

⁴⁷ *H-I.* p. 214.

⁴⁸ *H-I.* p. 254. Also cf. "*al-ṣulṭān al-nūrī*" to be examined in the second Temple of the present study and also *H-I.* p. 207.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE FIRST TEMPLE

I. All that can be pointed to by sensible perception or indication is (called) body, i.e. that which is possessed of length, width and depth. Bodies partake in the (concept of) corporeality. It is indispensable that any two things participating in one thing should be differentiated from each other by virtue of something else. (Accordingly, all bodies should be distinguished from one another by some other things.)¹ Those things by which bodies are distinguished are the (accidental) forms (*hay'āt*).

II. The essential concomitant is that which is inseparable from (the essence of) an entity. To ascribe a quality to something is either necessary, like the quality of "even" to the number four or that of "corporeality" to man, or possible, like the position of "standing" or "sitting" to man, or impossible, like ascribing "horseness" to a man. That which is indivisible in the imagination can have no dimension nor can it be pointed to; because, otherwise the side of a thing in one direction would be other than the side of that thing in another direction. Thus it would become divisible in the mind.²

As one can easily see, this temple, the shortest of all, deals on the whole with two important issues: one is concerned with the question of "body," a question which is the most essential and occupies a relatively

¹ The text in parenthesis exists only in *I-H*. 8a11 and in *H-N*. p. 47, n. 6, MS 2M.

² *H-N*. pp. 47-8; *I-H*. 7b5, 8a2-3, 6-7, 8-9, 11, 13-14, 8b3-5, 7, 8, 10-12; *SH-H*. pp. 17-21; *Hayākil*, pp. 84-5.

central place here; the other, which is in a way a corollary of the former, involves the theory of definition (*al-ḥadd*).

1. The Nature of Body

I. In the first place, the concept of "body", (translating, for the most part accurately the Arabic term "jism") generally denotes something corporeal like man, bird or tree, etc., as distinguished from something incorporeal like God or soul. Broadly speaking, it is a term that stands for every object of experience which, for Suhrawardī and other philosophers, constitutes a point of departure in the formulation of metaphysical as well as epistemological doctrines.

Before proceeding to Suhrawardī's conception of body, Aṛiḳaravī, following Dawwānī, introduces some geometrical definitions about "point", "line", "surface", and "body":

(i) A thing which can be perceived by the senses but which cannot be divided into any dimensions at all is called point. It is termed also an individual existent (*vūcūd-i ferd*) or an atom (*cūz-ī lā yetecezzā*);

(ii) if that thing is amenable to being divided in only one dimension, then it is called a line;

(iii) if it is divisible in two dimensions -length and width- it is called a surface;

(iv) if it is capable of receiving division in three dimensions -length,

width and depth- then it is called a body. In addition, there are six directions, two for each of these three dimensions,³ all of which -length, width and depth- are deemed by Suhrawardī as accidental.⁴

As regards the nature of body, there are basically two different doctrines which prevailed in medieval Islamic philosophy prior to Suhrawardī.

(i) The Peripatetic thinkers maintained that body is composed of matter (*hayūlā*) and form (*ṣūra*). This doctrine has its origin in Aristotle's famous distinction between matter and form, which is known as hylomorphism. According to this theory, matter as a substratum is passive but receptive of the form which in turn is active. In other words, the former is the principle of potentiality, while the latter is that of actuality. Furthermore, both of them are incorporeal and indivisible in themselves, yet their composition, the body, is corporeal and divisible.

(ii) The Mutakallimūn (doctors of theology) held the view that body is composed of what they call "the smallest particles", namely atoms. More precisely, in the eyes of these people, as will be elaborated further by Anḳaravī below, what makes up a body is the combination of some particles which are indivisible and homogeneous in themselves.

The first view, viz. the Peripatetic conception of body, was repudiated

³ *I-H.* 7b1-16.

⁴ Suhrawardī, *al-Talwīḥāt*, p. 9.

by Suhrawardī and replaced with what Dawwānī terms "the corporeal form (*al-ṣūratu'l-jismiyya*) or "the form itself" (*'ayn al-ṣūra*).⁵ As both two commentators put it, this is also the view of the School of Plato.⁶

One of the reasons for Suhrawardī's repudiation of the Peripatetic view of body, could be the fact that, as Majid Fakhry has noted,⁷ a combination of matter and form as such does not fit into the system of Ishrāqī tradition, least of all into the process of "illuminative emanation" according to which all existing beings proceed from the principal source of all reality, namely from the Light of Lights, through a downward process of gradual illumination from the higher to the lower.⁸ Even Suhrawardī himself claims that the duality of matter and form does not enter in the process of illumination at all.⁹

Thus, for Suhrawardī, body is not a composite of matter and form. On the contrary, it is pure magnitude (*al-miqdār*).¹⁰ And the magnitude of the entire world by no means augments nor diminishes. A mustard seed,

⁵ *SH-H*. p. 18.

⁶ *I-H*. 8a3-6; *SH-H*. p. 18.

⁷ Majid Fakhry, "Al-Suhrawardī's Critique of the Muslim Peripatetics (*al-Mashshā'ūn*)," *Philosophies of Existence Ancient and Medieval*, ed. Parviz Morewedge (New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 1982), p. 281.

⁸ This is to be discussed in the fourth temple.

⁹ Fakhry, "Al-Suhrawardī's Critique of the Muslim Peripatetics," p. 281.

¹⁰ *H-I*. p. 75.

for instance, possesses no "matter" capable of receiving the whole magnitude of the world, as the Peripatetics contended.¹¹

To sum up briefly, according to Suhrawardī, body is but "self-subsistent magnitude". No thing exists in the world which is liable to admit "magnitude" and "form", not even matter. In fact matter as such does not exist, and its substantiality is "pure" or rather a "mental entity" (*i'tibār 'aqliyyi*).¹² Therefore the body, as perceived by the senses, is not to be identified with the Peripatetic "substance".

With regard to the second doctrine about body, Anḩaravī at once declares that the Mutakallimūn rejected the idea of hylomorphism as maintained by the Peripatetics and affirmed instead the view of atomism. In their view, he proceeds, body is not a combination of matter and form, but is rather a composition of atoms.¹³

Anḩaravī goes on to illustrate the atomist view with a concrete example. Let us suppose a body (*cism*), he says, is divided into the smallest units or monads, to the point where it can be in no way further subdivided in the mind or in the imagination. In the end there would remain at least one single tiny "particle" (*cūz*) or "single substance", which is designated in the terminology of the Mutakallimūn as an "atom" (*cevher-i*

¹¹ *H-I*. p. 79.

¹² *H-I*. p. 80.

¹³ *I-H*. 8b-14-5.

ferd).¹⁴ This smallest particle, according to the Mutakallimūn, is not amenable to further division whether in mind or in imagination. Therefore an atom as such would become completely incorporeal and imperceptible.

Such an atomist view of body appears inappropriate and totally unacceptable to both Avicenna and Suhrawardī for one reason in particular. Since nothing which is indivisible in mind and imagination can assume any dimension, it cannot actually exist. In other words, only those things which are found in dimensions and thus are called bodies can be perceived by the senses. And division of bodies into length, breadth and depth would be

¹⁴ The orthodox Mutakallimūn developed a metaphysical system based on atoms and accidents and made it the basis of their proof for the world's creation. According to them, the world as a contingent being is composed of both atoms, the indivisible particles, and accidents. Each atom is a substance but, contrary to Aristotle's view of the infinite divisibility of matter, no longer divisible ad infinitum. Atoms, created continuously by God, when united with one another, make up bodies which are one and identical in themselves but different in their accidents. The ultimate cause for their divergent accidents is again God. The interesting point is that, in the eyes of the Mutakallimūn, atoms are neither material nor permanent; on the contrary, they have momentary existence. In short, they are every moment created and annihilated by the direct intervention of God. A doctrine as such allowed the Muslim theologians to vindicate the existence of God and the creation of world by Him. (For the atomistic theory of the orthodox theologians, one may refer to these primary sources: Muḥammad al-Shahrastānī, *The Summa Philosophiae of al-Shahrastānī: Kitāb Nihāyat al-Iqdām fī 'Ilmi al-Kalām*, ed. and trans. A. Guillaume (London: Oxford University Press, 1934); Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī, *al-Ibāna fī 'an Uṣūl al-Diyāna* (Hyderabad, 1948); for a critical analysis see, Harry Austryn Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Kalām* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 472-490; Majid Fakhry, *Islamic Occasionalism and Its Critique by Averroes and Aquinas* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958), pp. 22-55).

possible only on a potential, not on an actual level.¹⁵

However, Rusūhī Anḳaravī, who seems to have intermingled Suhrawardī's physics with the Peripatetics, especially when explaining how the bodies are differentiated from one another -holding that what is common in bodies is the matter, but that what is distinct in them is the form-¹⁶ continues to maintain the same confusion and hence ascribes division not to the body itself but to its matter alone:

...of the body, that which is capable of receiving division is called matter. It is known that the matter cannot be separated from the form and vice-versa. Both of them on the contrary exist (simultaneously) in the body. But a statement as such, which belongs originally to the philosophers (*ḥükemā*), would entail necessarily that the world is pre-eternal (*ḳadīm*). This theory (*delīl*), however, is unacceptable to the Scripture (*Şerī'a*). Therefore, the explicit theory that holds that body is a compound of atoms, belongs to the scholars of Kalām. They adhered to this view of atomism (i.e. *cevher-i ferd*) so that they avoided having the idea of "the pre-eternity of the world".¹⁷

Thus Anḳaravī, having made no distinction between the Peripatetics and Suhrawardī on the question of body but rather combining both under one category as philosophers, displays overt sympathy towards the Mutakalimūn, for he finds their view agreeable to the precepts of the Scripture. Furthermore, he reinforces his appreciation by the following

¹⁵ See for Ibn Sīnā's elaboration, *Ilāhiyyāt II*, pp. 63-65, 111-114; and for Suhrawardī's criticism of atomism, *H-I*. pp. 88-89.

¹⁶ *I-H*. 8a12-13.

¹⁷ *I-H*. 9a9-15.

Persian verses:

O ! You whose mouth is the (smallest) particle which cannot be divided.

O ! You whose waist is the length which has no width and depth
With Your speech you have split the imaginary into two halves
Therefore your mouth is the object of the discourse of the philosophers.¹⁸

2. The Theory of Definition (*al-ḥadd*)

II. The second part of this temple deals with the question of "essential concomitant" (*lāzim al-ḥaqīqa*) a concomitant which is inseparable from the essence of the thing.¹⁹

To elucidate this, Anḳaravī, having taken the term "ḥaqīqa" in logical context as "māhiya" (quiddity), has recourse to the definition of man proclaimed first by Aristotle and adopted after him by almost all the logicians, particularly by the Peripatetics. According to Aristotle, "man" is defined at best as "rational animal" (*ḥayawān nāṭiq*). For "rationality" and "animality" constitute the two real *ḥaqīqas* of man. Whenever "man" is envisaged, these two major characteristics occur to mind forthwith. Without them, "man" cannot be conceived of at all.²⁰

In referring to this celebrated example, Anḳaravī's principal aim, so

¹⁸ *I-H.* 9a17-9b2.

¹⁹ *H-N.* p. 47.

²⁰ *I-H.* 8a15-8b3.

far as it appears, is to make it a worthy basis for his elaboration of Suhrawardī's statement regarding the inseparability of the "essential concomitant" from the essence of an entity." In other words, he, interpreting the whole text strictly in terms of Aristotelian logic, takes *lāzim al-ḥaqīqa* as "quiddity," which instead is supposed to be "essential concomitant, as is from clear Suhrawardī's attribution of "corporeality" to man. In doing so, therefore, Anḳaravī seems entirely incognizant of the fact that the latter launched a relentless attack against this conventional theory of definition and substituted it with what Ziai has termed "the illuminationist theory of definition". It is for this reason that Dawwānī, being fully aware of this, makes no mention of Aristotle's definition of man; on the contrary he explains the phrase in question in the same context as did his master Suhrawardī.²¹

A brief survey of Suhrawardī's repudiation of the Peripatetic theory of definition would be useful at this point. According to him, Peripatetic logic, in the first place stipulates that a thing to be defined must have two predicable universals, one a "differentia" (*al-faṣl*) and the other a "proximate genus" (*al-jins al-qarīb*) . In the case of "man," "rational" stands for the former and "animal" for the latter. These two, insofar as "man" is concerned, become, according to the Peripatetics, inherent in and inseparable from him.

²¹ *SH-H.* p. 20.

But for the Ishrāqī master, Suhrawardī, neither "rationality" nor "animality" can give the exact definition of "man" on two grounds: first of all, these two, leaving aside many other essential characteristics of "man", would be insufficient for a true definition. The most complete definition, contends Suhrawardī, is the one which contains a synthesis of all the necessary constituents of the thing to be defined altogether in a synthesis. The second reason for the insufficiency of the classical definition is that it takes as the "differentia" for "man", that of "rationality", which is posterior to "man" himself. How intelligible is it, Suhrawardī argues, to define "man" with something which comes after "his existence"? ²²

Therefore any particular object to be defined may be qualified with essential (*dhātī*) as well as accidental (*araḍī*) attributes. If an attribute as such is essential, like "parity" for the number "four" or "corporeality" for "man", then it would become necessary for and inseparable from it. So much so that, as Dawwānī articulates it very eloquently, inasmuch as it exists either in the mind or in reality, it would be an indispensable

²² *H-I*, pp. 20-21. According to Suhrawardī, one of the two components of the definition of man, "animal" represents the general essential (*al-dhātu'l-āam*), called genus (*jins*), while the other represents the particular essential (*al-dhātu'l-khāṣṣ*), called differentia (*faṣl*). This is the simple understanding of the Peripatetic philosophers. However a definition as such, leaving aside all necessary constituents of man, does fail to convey the true nature of man which is, according to Suhrawardī, the soul itself. In fact, rationality, the capacity of reasoning, which is posterior to the soul must be replaced by the latter. See, for a detailed account, Ziai, *Knowledge and Illumination*, pp. 118-127.

concomitant for it.²³

If the attribute, on the other hand, is accidental to the object, like "sitting" or "standing" postures for "man", in that case it would become only contingent, for neither the object's subsistence (*thubūt*) nor its annihilation (*intifā'*) would depend on that attribute. Strictly speaking, no position, -for instance, sitting or standing- has anything to do with man's very existence.²⁴

Consequently, there are only two possible modes of attribution, necessary and contingent. Beyond these two, no other mode of attribution is possible. An example of this, as illustrated by Suhrawardī, is the attribution of "horseness" to "man," which is categorically false and absurd, because the former is distinct in its very nature from the latter.

²³ *SH-H.* p. 20.

²⁴ *SH-H.* p. 21.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE SECOND TEMPLE

One Proof:

I. You are never unaware of yourself, while there is no part of your body of which you are not occasionally forgetful. The whole is perceived only through its parts (together). But if you yourself were an aggregation of all of your bodily parts, then you would remain constantly unheedful of yourself, while forgetting them (i.e., the parts). Therefore, you are beyond this body and its parts.

Another Proof:

II. Your body is subject to a continuous dissolution and cessation. Had your body not eliminated (but stored) the foodstuffs that the nutritive faculty had supplied before, then it would have become over-enlarged in proportion to the newly incoming foodstuffs. And if you yourself were a body as such or a part of it, your very self identity would change at every instant; whereas there is with you always a cognizant substance through which you are yourself, and not through your body. For if the latter were true, how would you be (identical with) the body which is constantly dissolving, and yet be unaware of it? Therefore you are far beyond these things.¹

A Further Proof:

III. You perceive an object only through the occurrence of its form in your mind. In that case, it is necessary that whatever object you perceive, that which occurs in your mind should correspond to that object. Otherwise, you would not perceive it as it is.²

On the other hand, you comprehend concepts (*ma'ānī*), shared by a multitude of things (like animality). You comprehend it in such a way that it becomes equally applicable to both "elephant" and "fly". Hence the form of the object, which occurs to your mind (e.g. animality), is free from any consideration of measure, for it corresponds equally to the small as well as to the big. (Not only the

¹ *H-N.* p. 49 including footnote 4, *MS B*; *I-H.* 9b17, 10a5-6, 11-11, 15-16, 10b10, 12-13; *SH-H.* pp. 24-25, 30; *Hayākil*, pp. 85-6.

² *H-N.* p. 50.

form) but its substratum in you is also free from the measure. Thus the substratum is your rational soul, since that which is not measurable cannot be inherent in a body.³ Therefore, your soul is neither body nor corporeal. Since it is beyond any dimension, it cannot be perceived (by senses) at all. It is one (*aḥadiyya*) and unfathomable (*ṣamadiyya*); it cannot be divided in the imagination (*al-awhām*) at all.⁴

Since, as you know, it is not said of the wall that it is either blind or seeing, because blindness is attributable only to those who have the capacity to see, God and the rational soul, and some other beings besides these two, which will be mentioned,⁵ are neither bodies nor corporeals. They are neither interior to the world nor exterior to it, and neither inseparable (*muttaṣil*) nor separable (*munfaṣil*) (from it). All of these (characteristics) are in fact some of the accidents of the bodies. But that which is not a body is free from them (i.e. the accidents). So, the rational soul is a substance which can by no means be indicated by the senses. It is the very nature of the rational soul to govern the body and conceive of its own essence as well as of objects. Then, how would it be fair to conceive of this sacred quiddity (*al-māhiyya al-qudsiyya*) as a body, while it moves the spiritual joy and emotion and thus makes haste to abandon the world of bodies, seeking the world of infinity?⁶

The External and Internal Senses

IV. This rational soul has perceptive faculties some of which are external. These are the five senses: touch, taste, smell, hearing and sight. There are also some other perceptive faculties which are internal: one is the *sensus communis*. This is, with respect to the five senses, just like a pool into which flow five streams. It is by this sense that the forms dreamt are perceived by direct vision and not by means of fantasy. Another internal faculty is that of representation. This is a store for the *sensus communis*, which

³ Dawwānī reads this sentence as: "That which is not measurable cannot be inherent in a body which is measurable". (*SH-H.* p.36)

⁴ *H-N.* p. 50; *I-H.* 11a15-12a8; *SH-H.* pp. 35-37; *Hayākil*, 86.

⁵ By others he means intellects, celestial as well as terrestrial souls, which will be discussed later. (*H-N.* p. 64).

⁶ *H-N.* pp. 50-51; *I-H.* 12a10-11, 16-17, 12b1-2, 7-8, 15, 13a10, 11-12, 13b1-3; *SH-H.* pp. 37-39; *Hayākil*, pp. 86-87.

preserves the forms, after they are absent from the senses. Next is the cogitative faculty whose function is to combine and separate and invent. Another one is the estimative faculty which, due to its judgments, may come into conflict with the intellect. Suppose, for instance, a man who stays at night alone with a dead corpse. Now his intellect assures him that there is nothing to worry about, yet his estimative faculty strikes him with fear. Moreover, it may conflict with the intellect particularly on matters beyond the sense perceptions. So much so that people who strictly follow the judgments of the estimative faculty may reject all that exists beyond the perceptible realities. However, these people never think that their own intellects, estimative faculties, their imaginations as well as souls cannot be perceived by the senses. Even what is perceived in the body is not its essence but only its outward appearance. Among the internal senses, there is also a retentive faculty by which all the particular events and situations are recalled. Each of these internal senses has a proper location in the brain. Should the location of a particular sense be damaged, its function would become deficient, while the functions of all other senses would remain intact. From this one may conclude that all the faculties differ from one another and that each possesses its own proper location.⁷

V. The animals have the faculty of appetence (*shawqiyya*) which consists of two parts: One is the faculty of desire (*shahwāniyya*) which was created to acquire convenient things. The other is the faculty of anger (*ghaḍabiyya*) which was created to repel inconvenient things. They (animals) have also the motive faculty which causes movement (of the limbs). The bearer of all the motive and perceptive faculties is the animal soul (*al-rūḥ al-ḥaywānī*). It is a subtle steamy body, generated from the subtlety of the mixture, and issued forth from the left ventricle of the heart. After having received the governing light (*al-ṣulṭān al-nūrī*) from the rational soul, it begins to spread throughout the body. If this animal soul possessed no such subtlety, it would not circulate in all the areas where it penetrates. If an obstacle were to prevent it from penetrating into a certain limb, that limb would die. The animal soul is the mount on which the rational soul exercises its governing activities. So long as the animal soul is in a healthy condition, the rational soul exerts its control and power over the body. But once the former is broken

⁷ *H-N*. pp. 51-53; *SH-N*. pp. 39-40, 43-45, 47-50, 53-54, 56-58, 60-61, 63-64; *I-H*. 13b7-9, 14b2-5, 10-11, 16, 15a1, 5-7, 10-13, 16-17, 15b1, 4-5, 12-13, 16-17; *Hayākil*, pp. 87-88.

up, the latter's control of body would cease.⁸

The animal spirit is different from the Divine Spirit (*al-rūḥ al-ilāhī*), which was included in the discourse of the Prophets.⁹ What is meant by this, (i.e. Divine Spirit) is the rational soul, which is one of the Lights of God the Exalted, a light to which no place can be assigned, which springs forth from God and which returns to Him.¹⁰

The First Assumption:

VI. A group of people, having once realized that it (i.e., the rational soul) is immaterial, considers it to be God the Exalted. They have indeed strayed away (from the right), for God is One, yet souls are multiple. Otherwise, were the soul of Zaid and that of 'Amr one and the same, then one of these two would perceive all that the other perceived. Similarly every single person could become cognizant of whatever all other people know. But this is not the case. How can the faculties of the body capture the Deity of the Deities? How can they hold Him hostage to the passions and blindly make Him a target of trials under the haphazard blows? Again how can the movements of the heavens have control over Him?¹¹

The Second Assumption:

Another group has assumed that it (viz. rational soul) is a part of Him (God). This is false too, because, as it has been demonstrated, God is not corporeal. Therefore, how can a non-corporeal being as such be divided and partitioned? Besides, who can divide Him?

The Third Assumption:

VII. Other thinkers have assumed that the rational soul is pre-eternal (*qadīm*). But they have not realized that if this were so, they would encounter the question: What propelled the soul to quit the spiritual

⁸ *H-N.* p. 53-54; *I-H.* 16a8-10, 15-16, 16b11-14, 17a5-7, 10-11; *SH-H.* pp. 69, 77, 80; *Hayākil*, 88-89.

⁹ *Hayākil* adds: "in the Holy Qur'ān". (p. 89); and *SH-H.* (p. 81) and *H-N.* (p. 54, n. 5) include: "in divine revelation".

¹⁰ *H-N.* p. 54; *I-H.* 17a14-15, 17-17b1; *SH-H.* p. 81; *Hayākil*, p. 89.

¹¹ *H-N.* p. 54-55, including p. 55, n. 5, ms. B; *SH-H.* p.81-82; *I-H.* 17b5-6, 19b16-17, 20a13-15; *Hayākil*, pp. 89-90.

world and life and join in the world of death and darkness? Who would dominate and capture such an eternal soul? How could it surrender to the attraction of the faculties of even a suckling infant so as to be brought down from the spiritual as well as luminous world? Moreover, how would it happen that all the souls have become distinguished from one another in pre-eternity, though once they had been one and the same in genre, and had no substratum, nor place nor activeness nor passiveness before entering the body, as they do after entering the body? It would be impossible for it to be first one and then be divided and distributed (proportionally) amongst the bodies, for that which is incorporeal is not capable of having divisions. On the contrary, it is originated simultaneously with the body at the moment when the latter has full aptitude to receive the former. For instance, when the wick of a lamp becomes ready to receive flame from the fire, as you see, no diminution in the intensity of the fire will take place. By the same token, it is not surprising that when the rational soul comes into being at the very moment of the preparedness of the body, no diminution would arise on the part of the Giver of the soul.¹²

Şeyh Suhrawardī, having delineated the notion of body in the preceding temple, now moves on to inquire into the question of soul. His current investigation evolves mainly on two successive levels, which may be termed briefly (i) "the demonstration of the soul" and (ii) "the elimination of some opinions about its nature".

In his discussion of the first level, he begins by attempting to establish the existence of the soul by referring to the proofs already utilized

¹² *H-N*. pp. 55-6; *I-H*. 21b10-11, 16-22a1, 4-5, 8-10, 22b8-10, 14-16; *Hayākil*. pp. 90-91. Incidentally, Dawwānī elaborates his commentary on the Giver to the effect that He is of two kinds: The Near Giver that is the Active Intellect, and the Remote Giver that is the Superior Principle, or in Corbin's rendering "the First Principle". *SH-H*. p. 95. *Les Temples*, p. 77, n. 23.

particular by Avicenna. Later he proceeds to show, again in the light of Avicenna's arguments yet with some modifications, that the soul is not a physical entity but entirely immaterial.

In his discussion of the second level, he tries to refute several theories on the question of soul maintained by some philosophers and mystics whose names are not specified.

1. The Proofs for the Existence of the Soul and Consciousness

I. Suhrawardī, like Avicenna, initially adopts not the term "soul" but that of "self" or "essence", which is designated by the former as "anā'iyya" and by the latter as "inniyya" or "anniyya".¹³ Nevertheless, the further elaboration of these three notions by both thinkers gives rise to one and the same reality.

In the first place, an attempt is made by Suhrawardī to demarcate between "ana'iyya" (human self) and "badan" (human body) with an implicit reference to Avicenna's concept of the "floating man"¹⁴. Man's

¹³ See, Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt ma'a Sharḥ Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī*, ed. Suleymān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1957), vol. 2, p. 319.

¹⁴ Based on this particular concept, Avicenna develops a significant theory about the soul, especially in his *al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt*, (vol. 2, pp. 319-320). There he refers to an individual man, supposedly suspended in the air in such a state that his eyes do not see his limbs and his limbs do not touch one another. Even in this adverse situation, Avicenna adduces, he still remains conscious of his "inniyya" (himself). Incidentally, Avicenna's doctrine of "floating man" has been an inspiration not only for eastern thinkers, like Suhrawardī, but for western thinkers as well. Amongst the latter, Rene Descartes (1596-1650), for instance, who has been recognized

introspective contemplation, both Avicenna and Suhrawardī argue, leads him ultimately to the very existence of a profound inner reality, a reality which makes him ever conscious of himself. A reality as such is not something dependent on the body. Nor is it a part of its constitution. On the contrary, it is very subtle in its nature and in fact transcends the physical body.

II. One of the ways in which Suhrawardī aims to vindicate his claim that the soul is wholly immaterial and totally distinct from the body is by demonstrating, as was shown in the text translated above, that the former, as opposed to the latter, is in no way amenable to transformation (*taḥallu*) or dissolution (*sayalān*). Actually it is the body which is vulnerable to these processes in the course of which it digests and assimilates the materials supplied by the nutritive faculty. Without these two systems the body would end up as an enormous hulk.

Thus the soul that makes man feel conscious of himself cannot be identical with the body nor even a part of it. Otherwise, it too would

as the founder of modern thought, has emulated this theory and formulated it in his own celebrated expression: "I think; therefore I am"; or in latin "Cogito ergo sum." This is the starting point of his scepticism about his personal existence at the end of which he comes to a realization of the existence of God. Refer for the various usages of the term "inniyya" to A.M. Goichon's French translation of *al-Ishārāt, Livre Des Directives et Remarques* (Paris, 1951), pp. 304-307; see also Shlomo Pines' article "La Conception de la Conscience de Soi chez Avicenne et chez Abū'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī," in his work entitled *Studies in Abū'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī Physics and Metaphysics* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979), vol. 1, pp. 181-258.

undergo, like the body, a constant process of transformation. However, in so far as it keeps man aware of his essence, not by means of physical sensation but by its very nature, it stands far beyond the change and transformation of the body.¹⁵

The soul is therefore neither the body nor one of its constituents, simply because it is not affected at all by the alteration of the latter. Besides, any possible change in the body, both Dawwānī and Anḳaravī comment, such as increase or decrease in its shape, takes place due to its natural heat (*ḥarāra*) and humidity (*ruṭūba*).¹⁶ If the heat becomes effectively dominant over the humid, Anḳaravī notes, the humid decreases; but if the case is the reverse, then the heat diminishes.¹⁷

All that has been said so far about the human soul is, according to both commentators, also true of the animal soul. Even Suhrawardī himself, as both commentators declare, made a clear indication to this effect.¹⁸ In other words, besides man, an animal too has a permanent soul (*nefs-i bākiye*). If the horse, for instance, possessed no such permanent soul, it would at every moment be transforming and changing. But this is not so,

¹⁵ *H-N.* p. 49; *I-H.* 10a5-16.

¹⁶ *SH-H.* p. 24; *I-H.* 10a1-2.

¹⁷ *I-H.* 10a3-5.

¹⁸ *I-H.* 10b2-5; although Dawwānī refers to the *Talwihāt* (*SH-H.* p. 29) of Suhrawardī, there seems to be no direct statement of this nature therein. Probably Dawwānī wants this meaning to be read into the passage.

no mention is made of the existence of the inanimate soul in his above-stated works. Dawwānī, however, records a dialogue which he says took place between Avicenna and one of his disciples by the name of Bahmanyar. In this anecdote, the latter poses questions to the former about the difference between the essence (*dhāt*) or the soul of man and that of animal; whereupon the former, i.e. Avicenna, distinguishes between these two with difficulty.²³

Be that as it may be, one still remains dubious as to whether plants and inanimate entities can perceive of their existence. Even if it is admitted that they possess souls apart from their bodies, how can they become aware of the dissolutions and transformations of these bodies?

On the other hand, it should be noted that Suhrawardī's main concern here, as it appears in the text, is simply to contrast "the permanence of the perceiving substance" (*al-jawhar al-mudrik*) of man, which is called "human soul", with the change (*tabaddul*) of the human body. Despite this fact, the commentators, Dawwānī and Anḳaravī, as has been noted, have gone too far and have without any basis attributed to him and to Avicenna the idea that animals, vegetables and even inanimate entities have, like human beings, permanent souls by which they become aware of themselves. As far as Avicenna is concerned, he first divides souls, in his book of psychology, into three categories: vegetative, animal

²³ *SH-H.* p. 29.

and rational, and later assigns to each several faculties. Yet, he, in contrast to what Dawwānī and Anḳaravī claim regarding him, has never ascribed the faculty of perception to the vegetative soul, but only the following three faculties: nutrition, growth and reproduction.²⁴ Therefore, inasmuch as they lack the perceptive faculty, the vegetables cannot perceive themselves.

Possibly for the same reason, the two editors of Dawwānī's *Shawākil al-Ḥūr*, M. Abdul Haq and M. Yousuf Kokan have given the following explanation: "The growth of the plants is manifest, yet their consciousness (*shu'ūr*) is unknown. There is no ground for the existence of the perpetual consciousness in animals; and it is known that there is no transformation (*tabaddul*) in an inanimate entity."²⁵

2. The Rational Soul and Its Characteristics

III. One of the fundamental functions of the human soul as conceived by the Peripatetic philosophers is the capacity to obtain knowledge by virtue of its external as well as internal senses. This is generally known as the acquisition of knowledge, which involves two different processes: (i) abstraction (*tajrīd*), and (ii) perception (*idrāk*). Both of them operate in a reciprocal interaction between the knower, called subject, and the thing to be known, called object. In such a relation, the knower first abstracts the

²⁴ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Najāt, Min al-Gharaq Fi Baḥr al-Ḍalālat*, ed. M. Taki Dānīshpazuh (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Dānīshgāh-i Tehran, 1985), p. 318.

²⁵ *SH-H.* p. 29. n. 2.

image of an object in the external reality by means of the external senses of the soul, and then perceives it as a form by means of its internal cognitive faculties.

Taking a position more or less similar to that of the Peripatetics at least on the question of sense-perception, Suhrawardī stresses the principle of the correspondence between the form of the object perceived in the mind and the object itself in reality. Should a correspondence as such not occur, the perception in its true sense cannot be actualized.

Şariḥ Anḳaravī illustrates this with the following example which he has borrowed from al-Dawwānī: let us suppose, he argues, that you saw a figure (*şübḥ*) far off in the distance and perceived it, say, as a horse, yet it turns out to be a man. In that case you perceived the figure according to the form that occurred in your mind, not according to the object itself. Therefore, the rational soul does not perceive a thing as it is, unless the form of that thing should correspond to it.²⁶

According to Suhrawardī's statement regarding the rational soul in the *Hayākil* and elsewhere, it may be stated that he believed it to be:

1. Conscious of itself,
2. Independent of the body,
3. Free from measure,
4. Immaterial,
5. Occupies no place,
6. A substance
7. Monadic (*aḥadiyya*),

²⁶ *I-H.* 11a11-14; *SH-H.* p. 35.

8. Unfathomable or impenetrable (*ṣamadiyya*).

Although the first six characteristics have already been set out, even if not in every instance explicitly, in some of Avicenna's works,²⁷ nevertheless, the last two, related to the immateriality of the soul, seem to be Suhrawardī's own.

In tackling the issue of the unity of the soul, Ismā'īl Anḳaravī at first adheres to Dawwānī's exegesis of *Hayākil* in which the latter states: "the soul is not divisible into proportional pieces".²⁸ Afterwards, the former goes further and places it in strictly theological scheme, while characterizing it as an "atom" (*cevher-i ferd*) which subsists by virtue of its own essence.²⁹ Such a little but significant addition exhibits once again his close empathy towards the school of orthodox Kalam.

As to the "ṣamadiyya" of the soul, which is rendered here, though somewhat inaccurately, as "unfathomable," or as Corbin puts it, "impenetrable," Anḳaravī suggests almost the same interpretation as Dawwānī's:

The soul is unfathomable. That is to say, it is free from matter

²⁷ See, for instance his *al-Ishārāt*, his *al-Shifā'*, particularly the part entitled *al-Nafs*, viz. *De Anima*, and the small treatise entitled "Risāla Fi al-Kalām 'alā an-Nafs an-Nāṭiqa" in the book, *Aḥwāl al-Nafs Li Ibn Sīnā*, ed. A.F. al-Ahwānī (Beirut: Dār lḥyā 'al-Kutub al-'Arabiyya, 1371/1952), pp. 195-199.

²⁸ *SH-H.* p. 36.

²⁹ *I-H.* 12a4

(*heyūlā*). (Properly speaking) it is neither matter nor form. And "ṣamad" literally signifies that which has no hollow (*cevf*); in this sense matter is like a hollow, inasmuch as it becomes the bearer of both the form and parts (of the body).³⁰

Dawwānī goes even further than Anḳaravī, stating:

...the bearer (*maḥall*) is analogous to the interior (*al-bāṭin*) (of the body) just as the dweller (*ḥāll*) is to the exterior (*al-zāhir*). Similarly, with respect to existence, the perceived form is manifest, while the matter is hidden, which requires proof.³¹

Thus, according to their interpretation of Suhrawardī, the soul, inasmuch as it is one and aloof from matter and form, is not even divisible in the imagination (*al-wahm*), let alone in reality. But the body, in contrast to the soul, is infinitely divisible in the imagination, though not in reality.

In this connection, Dawwānī turns his attention to the function of the estimative faculty, one of the five internal senses which both commentators deal with in more detail later. The perception of the faculty of estimation, he states, would be applicable only to matter and form, the two components of the body.³² Or as Anḳaravī paraphrases it more precisely, this faculty perceives only "the particulars" (*cūz'ıyyāt*).³³ That is why, they both argue,

³⁰ *SH-H.* p. 37; *I-H.* 12a6-7.

³¹ *SH-H.* p. 37.

³² *SH-H.* p. 37.

³³ *I-H.* 12a12.

it usually stands in opposition to the intellect (*al-'aql*) about "the existence of the abstract entities" (*thubūt al-mujarradāt*), for it builds its judgment entirely on the basis of the existing beings (*mawjūdāt*). It follows accordingly that every existing being would be either inside or outside the other being; no other possibility exists. But an adjudication which recognizes no other possibilities would be inconclusive, even misleading, because it would lead its practitioners to go so far as to deny all that exists beyond sensible objects (*al-maḥsūsāt*).³⁴

Suhrawardī, in order to substantiate this argument, proceeds Anḳaravī, has appealed to a simple illustration, according to which, no one can say about the wall that it is seeing or that it is blind, for these two properties, viz. "vision" and "blindness", would be attributable only to the beings peculiar to them.³⁵ Then exactly in the same manner, since the soul remains exclusively beyond such a dichotomy -inside/outside- it would not be even perceptible to the estimative faculty, let alone be divisible.

Again for Suhrawardī, alongside the other immaterial beings such as God, the intellects, the celestial and terrestrial souls, the rational soul has no association with any of the accidents, like interiority (*dākhil*), exteriority (*khārij*), separability (*munfaṣil*) and inseparability (*muttaṣil*). All of these

³⁴ *SH-H.* p. 37; *I-H.* 12a13-14. Actually, both commentators try to paraphrase Suhrawardī's own words, quoted in the beginning of this chapter. (See also, *H-N.* p. 52.)

³⁵ *I-H.* 12a15-16.

accidents can be attached only to bodies, not to incorporeal entities, which are absolutely transcendent and incommensurable. As it has already been noted, the rational soul is an abstract substance; and in being so, Anḳaravī stresses, "it is clothed in an unremovable garment of subsistence (*ḳabāy-i beḳā*)."³⁶ Since it is neither a form nor an accident, it is totally immune from annihilation (*fenā*) and destruction (*zevāl*).³⁷ Furthermore, Dawwānī asserts that it is a self-evident truth that the rational soul subsists by itself and never becomes an accident to the others.³⁸

The notion of "nuṭq", one of the two ingredients of *al-nafs al-nāṭiqa* (the rational soul) is also a subject of discussion in Anḳaravī's commentary. There it is recorded that this term, in the Arabic language, is evocative of two different meanings: one is "speaking" and the other is "reasoning". Despite the fact that the former, which signifies merely the "sounds" made by the pronouncement of the various letters, is immediate and ostensible (*al-zāhir*) in its connotation, nevertheless it is not the meaning intended here but rather the latter. This is because what constitutes man, Anḳaravī indicates, is not the ability to talk but the power to comprehend the intelligibles and distinguish between right and wrong, good and bad. In other words, the essence of man is his ability to reason, not simply to speak.

³⁶ *I-H.* 12b11.

³⁷ *I-H.* 12b12-13.

³⁸ *SH-H.* p. 38.

Otherwise even the parrot, which can learn to talk by training, would be a man too. On the other hand, there are some people in the world who cannot speak, like those who are dumb, yet who can still think and reason.³⁹ Man, by this noble substance, viz. *al-nafs al-nāṭiqā*, is thereby distinguished from the rest of the beasts. It is by this soul, again, that he comprehends the existence of the intellects, pure souls, celestial bodies, the four elements, the three kingdoms, as well as all the signs on the earth, in the sky and in the oceans, thereby acquiring virtues and attaining happiness.⁴⁰

Among the functions of the rational soul, Anḳaravī adds, there are two more. One is to exercise control over the body and safeguard it. The other is to choose, as much as its capacity permits, what is best and

³⁹ *I-H.* 13a1-4. This issue in fact involves the theory of definition, a subject which was discussed in the first temple. It must be noted, however, that, long before Anḳaravī, some outstanding thinkers such as like Abū Najā al-Fāriḍ (d.?) and Ibn Taymiyya (d.728/1328) dealt at great length with the equivocal aspect of the term "nutq", and thereby levelled a severe attack on Aristotle's definition of man as a "rational animal" (*ḥayawān al-nāṭiq*). The question was: Is man a talking animal or a reasoning animal? For instance, according to al-Farid, since the concept of "natiq" evokes in the mind first and foremost the idea of "talking" rather than that of "reasoning", Aristotle's definition as such fails to render the true essence of man. Therefore, man cannot be defined as "*ḥayawān al-nāṭiq*". See, for Ibn Taymiyya, *Kitāb al-Radd 'alā al-Manṭiqiyyīn (Book of Refutation to the Logicians)*; for Abū Najā al-Fāriḍ, *Kitāb al-Khamsīn Mas'ala Fī Kasr al-Manṭiq (Book of the Fifty Questions for the Demolition of the Logic)* MS 7473 British Museum; an edition of the latter work appears in the collection *Manṭiq wa Mabāḥith-i Alfāz Majmū'a-i Mutūn wa Maqālāt-i Tahqīqī (Collected Texts and Papers on Logic and Language)*, eds. by M. Mohaghegh and T. Izutsu (Tehran: McGill University, Institute of Islamic Studies Tehran Branch, 1974)

⁴⁰ *I-H.* 13a6-9.

suitable for its own perfection.⁴¹ Furthermore, the soul knows by itself not only its own essence but those of all other things. This means, Anḳaravī elaborates, that it conceives of both all the existing beings in external reality as well as their quiddities by various means and through explicit proofs. In fact in its own perceptive substratum it retains the concepts (*taṣavvurāt*) and assents (*taṣdikāt*).⁴²

Hence, such a sacred and noble substance always wishes to return to the place of its spiritual origin, a place whence it has first come into the physical world. Dawwānī, however, is not concerned here with the return of the soul to the world of infinity, as Suhrawardī articulates it, but rather with the spiritual joy and emotion that occurs to it during its contact with the Divine illumination. Hence he describes it in terms of "the brethern of separation" (*ikhwān al-tajrīd*) as "ease" (*al-basīt*).⁴³ The brethren, according to Anḳaravī, are the gnostics (*aṣḥāb-i me'ārif*) and saints (*erbāb-i ṣūhūd*), for in their experience, the soul easily quits the body and joins the infinite world.⁴⁴

3. The Faculties of the Rational Soul

⁴¹ *I-H.* 13a13-14.

⁴² *I-H.* 13a15-13b1.

⁴³ *SH-H.* p. 39.

⁴⁴ *I-H.* 13b6-7.

IV. After having delineated the main characteristics of the rational soul, Suhrawardī moves on to examine the faculties affiliated with the soul. As will now be seen, his classification, as well as description of the faculties, seems quite similar to Avicenna's. To begin with, he, like Avicenna, assigns mainly two groups of senses and faculties to the rational soul. The first group, called "external", consists of five senses:

- (i) Touch (*al-lams*),
- (ii) Taste (*al-dhawq*),
- (iii) Smell (*al-shamm*),
- (iv) Hearing (*al-sam'*),
- (v) Sight (*al-baṣar*).

The second group, named "internal", is also composed of five:

- (i) Sensus Communis (*al-ḥiss al-mushtarak*),
- (ii) Representation (*al-khayāl*),
- (iii) Cogitative faculty (*al-fikriyya*),⁴⁵
- (iv) Estimation (*al-wahm*),
- (v) Retentive faculty (*al-ḥāfiza*).

3.1 External Senses:

(a) Touch:

This is a faculty which is spread over the entire surface of the skin.

It senses basically four diverse circumstantial states: hot and cold, moist

⁴⁵ Avicenna refers to this faculty in two different contexts: in the first context, it is applied to animals and hence called "mutakhayyila" what Fazlur Rahman has translated "sensitive imagination"; in the second context, it is attributed to man and thus labelled "mufakkira" again what Rahman has rendered "rational imagination". See for a detailed treatment of these faculties by Avicenna, Rahman's translation in *Avicenna's Psychology*, pp. 26-31 and commentary, pp. 73-83.

and dry. In addition, it also gives an impression about the following: light and heavy, smooth and rough, soft and hard.⁴⁶

(b) Taste:

This sense is located in the nerves spread out over the tongue, and perceives the taste through the moisture that comes out of "the squeezed juice".⁴⁷

(c) Smell:

This faculty, which is located in the two lobes (*zāīdatayn*) of the front part of the brain, perceives smells and odours by means of the air.⁴⁸

(d) Hearing:

This sense is located in the nerves dispersed over the surface of the ear cavity. It perceives the sounds by means of the air which enters the ear.⁴⁹

(e) Sight:

This faculty is located in the nerves of the two pupils of the eyes. It perceives lights and colours as images imprinted on the humours of the eyes. An example of this would be a mirror, which reflects images.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ *I-H.* 13b15-14a1.

⁴⁷ *I-H.* 14a2-4.

⁴⁸ *I-H.* 14a6-7.

⁴⁹ *I-H.* 14a7-9.

⁵⁰ *I-H.* 14a16-14b1.

3.2 Internal Senses:

The internal senses too consist of a hierarchy of five faculties. Each of them, like the external ones, becomes an instrument of perception for the soul, each occupies a distinct place, although, unlike the others, only in the brain, and each has a separate function in the process of receiving information. In what follows, based on the data gathered from Dawwānī's and Anḳaravī's commentaries, I will present a brief exposition of these faculties:

(a) *Sensus Communis* (Common Sense):

It resides in the forepart of the front ventricle of the brain.⁵¹ This faculty behaves as a sort of "pool" into which flow all the sensible forms transmitted from the external world by the five "streams", i.e. the five external senses.⁵² All the forms of objects -whether perceived through touch, smell, hearing, sight, or taste- are first received by the common sense, which, among the other internal senses, is the closest to the external ones.

In addition, Suhrawardī ascribes one more function to this faculty, that is, it visualizes (*yushāhidu*) the forms, even in dreams, in a direct and

⁵¹ *SH-H.* p. 48; *I-H.* 16a5.

⁵² This example, which is included in H-N. p. 52, n. 1, MS B, exists in Anḳaravī's and Dawwānī's commentaries, H. Corbin's French translation, the Persian translation (*I-H.* 14b3-4; *SH-H.* p.49; *Les Temples*, p. 44, *Hayākil* p. 87) as well as in the Ottoman translation by Yūsuf Żiyā (pp. 580-581).

visible manner without the interference of the imagination. "As it combines in itself the images (*muthūl*) of all the transmitted forms, it perceives them by direct vision."⁵³ In other words, as Anḳaravī puts it, the common sense perceives the forms, not only in wakefulness but also in sleep or in a dream, by way of designation (*al-ta'yīn*) rather than by representation (*al-takhayyul*). In the former case, the person who falls asleep can envision an individual form away from its referent in external reality. This he does, in the absence of the five senses, due to his common sense, and not by virtue of his intellect, which conceives only universals, and not particulars.⁵⁴

(b) The Representative Faculty:

This faculty is situated in the back part of the front ventricle of the brain.⁵⁵ The major function of this faculty is to act as a storehouse (*khizāna*) for the forms received from the *sensus communis* in the absence of the sensed objects.⁵⁶

(c) The Cogitative Faculty:

In the first place, it should be noted that in his present commentary on the *Hayākil*, Anḳaravī places the cogitative faculty in the fourth place

⁵³ *H-I*. p. 210.

⁵⁴ *I-H*. 14b11-15.

⁵⁵ *SH-H*. p. 53; *I-H*. 16a6.

⁵⁶ *I-H*. 14b15-15a2; *SH-H*. p. 53.

after the faculty of estimation.⁵⁷ This may also have been the case in the Persian version, which omits this faculty, although it speaks of "five".⁵⁸ Nevertheless, Suhrawardī himself often presents the same order adopted here by Anḳaravī, thus placing the cogitative, or what Corbin qualifies, the "active imagination,"⁵⁹ before the estimative faculty.⁶⁰

As for the location and function of the faculty in question, "it is situated in the middle ventricle of the brain near the vermiform process."⁶¹ Its main task is to work on the images and forms stored in the faculty of representation, and thus separate and combine them in various ways. In general it takes on two different roles, depending on its respective functions, one with respect to the intellect (*'aql*), when it is called "cogitative" (*mutafakkira*), and the other with respect to the estimation (*wahm*), when it is termed "imaginative" (*mutakhayyila*). Moreover, at all times and in all

⁵⁷ I-H. 15b5-6.

⁵⁸ *Hayākil*, p. 87.

⁵⁹ Corbin, *L'Archange Empourpré*, p. 113. Since the active imagination would be serving the intellect that has control over it, it would be accordingly termed "intellectual imagination". (Ibid. p. 129, n. 79.)

⁶⁰ Hermann Landolt, "Suhrawardī's Tales of Initiation", *J.A.O.S.* 107 (1987), p. 479. However, Suhrawardī's *Hayākil* and also in his "Risāla fī l'tiqād al-Ḥukamā", (*Oeuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques II*, p. 269) the hierarchy of the faculties appears to be in the same order as Avicenna's.

⁶¹ Neither Dawwānī nor Anḳaravī indicate the location of this faculty. Here we have quoted from Avicenna's doctrine of *al-Nafs* which was formulated briefly in his *al-Najāt* and translated by Fazlur Rahman into English. (*Avicenna's Psychology*, p. 31.)

conditions, -day and night, awake and asleep- it remains constantly active and in motion without reposing.⁶² Besides, in sorting out certain images and combining them with others, it is able to imagine even nonexistent entities such as "a man who has two wings or a horse without a head and two legs".⁶³

(d) The Estimative Faculty:

Next in the hierarchy of the internal senses comes the faculty of estimation (*wahm*), which resides in the rear part of the middle ventricle of the brain.⁶⁴ As already explained in detail, the estimative faculty, due to its close dependency on the particular "meanings" and "intentions" inherent in the sensible objects, is highly inclined to make judgments, which are, though seemingly acceptable and convincing to itself, yet in most cases in contradiction to the wise decisions of the intellect. In addition to the aforementioned illustration of the wall, Suhrawardī cites at this stage another remarkable example to reinforce the current point. Imagine, he says, a person who stays one night in company with a corpse; such a person would be subject to two disparate states of mind: fear and security. If he acts upon the misleading counsel of his *wahm*, he would experience fear and worry, unless he has given a feeling of security by the prudence

⁶² *I-H.* 15b6-12; *SH-H.* pp. 54-55.

⁶³ *SH-H.* p. 53.

⁶⁴ Anḳaravī says: "It is located in the middle of the brain".(*I-H.* 16a7) In asserting this, he differs both from Dawwānī and Avicenna.

of his intellect.⁶⁵ That is why Suhrawardī cautions people not to fall into the pitfalls of their *wahm*, which would lead them eventually to the denial of the existence of the intelligibles as well as the spiritual beings such as heavenly souls and intellects.⁶⁶ As far as its function is concerned, it perceives, as stated above, "meanings" or "intentions", not forms, derived from individual objects. It also performs, particularly in man, the additional task of assessing these "meanings" and "intentions", thereby letting him make inferences with reference to the outward appearance of objects, not to their essence.⁶⁷

(e) The Retentive Faculty:

This is situated in the rear ventricle of the brain.⁶⁸ Its primary function, as outlined in the *Hayākil*, is "to recollect the individual incidents (*al-waqā'i*) and situations (*al-aḥwāl*)."⁶⁹ The retentive faculty, termed also "memory" and "recollection", acts as a storehouse for "intentions" and "meanings" transmitted from the estimative faculty and retrieves them for it when needed.⁷⁰ In terms of the function it performs, according to

⁶⁵ *H-N.* p. 52. *I-H.* 15a5-10. Cf. Ibn Sīnā's example of wolf and child. (Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology*, p. 31.)

⁶⁶ *H-N.* p. 52; *I-H.* 15a11-16.

⁶⁷ *I-H.* 15b1-4; *H-N.* p. 53.

⁶⁸ *SH-H.* p. 61; *I-H.* 16a7-8.

⁶⁹ *H-N.* p. 53.

⁷⁰ *I-H.* 15b14-16; *SH-H.* p. 63.

Dawwānī, it is analogous to the representative faculty whose task, as explained before, is to store the "images" and "forms" of the common sense.⁷¹

To sum up, each of these internal faculties, invested with a specific function, occupies a distinct location on its own in the brain. Should damage occur to anyone of these locations, Suhrawardī warns, the respective faculty would fail to function, whatever the rest remained intact or not.⁷²

The following diagram can give the reader a clear picture of how these faculties are arranged:

- The External Senses**
(Touch, Smell, Hearing, Sight and Taste)
The Sensory Data
- The Internal Senses**
1. Sensus Communis
Receptive of Sensible Forms,
 2. Direct Visualization of sensation
(Storehouse of the forms and images)
 3. Cogitation
(Sorting out the formes and images)
(Contrast, separate and recombine)
 4. Estimation
(Apprehension of "meanings" and "intentions")
(Judgment in conflict with the intellect)
(Evaluation and inference)
 5. Retention
(Storehouse of "meanings" and "intentions")
(Serving for the estimation)

Before concluding this part, it should be pointed out that, in his

⁷¹ *SH-H.* p. 61. Cf. Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology*, p. 31.

⁷² *H-N.* p. 53.

extensive exposition of the internal senses, Şāriḥ Dawwānī draws attention to one significant matter.⁷³ There he notes that in contrast to his present treatise, *Hayākil*, Suhrawardī in his other works seems to abandon the traditional classification by combining the three faculties, representative (*khayāl*), cogitative (*mutakhayyila* or *fikriyya*) and estimative (*wahm*) in one single identity. This is most obvious in his *magnum opus*, *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, where he clearly remarks: All these three faculties, though taken conceptually in various descriptions, are in reality one and the same faculty.⁷⁴

4. The Animal Soul

V. It again seems unusual that Suhrawardī's investigation of the soul vis-à-vis that of the Peripatetics advances in the opposite direction in so far as the present epistle is concerned. The latter group, whose most prominent representative was no doubt Avicenna, who first classified the souls into three, vegetative, animal and rational, later scrutinized them one by one but in a strict order, beginning with the first one, the simplest, and culminating with the last, the most complicated, Suhrawardī, however, has altered this conventional approach in giving precedence to the rational soul, which has already been discussed, then proceeding to set out the

⁷³ *SH-H.* p. 65.

⁷⁴ *H-I.* p. 210.

specifications of the animal soul, which we will now review in the light of Anḳaravī's and Dawwānī's commentaries.

Animals possess principally two kinds of faculties: (1) that of appetite (*shawqiyya*), which in turn has two sub-branches, that of desire (*shahwāniyya*) and that of anger (*ghaḍabiyya*); and (2) that of motion.⁷⁵ The task of the faculty of desire is to draw one closer to the things which are beautiful, useful and convenient, while that of anger is to impel one to repulse the things which are ugly, harmful and inconvenient. As to the motive faculty, it causes the physical movement of the limbs.

In addition to all of the above, there are three more faculties, which are common to both animals and vegetables. These are as follows: (1) the nutritive faculty (*ghāḍiya*), whose function is to supply food and substitute it with what has been dissolved; (2) the faculty of growth (*al-namā'*), whose task is to enlarge the various parts of the body without which they cannot reach their due perfection, and (3) the reproductive faculty (*muwallid*) which separates a part from the body out of which it generates another individual body. Moreover, many other supplementary faculties perform some kind of ancillary service to the nutritive faculty. Among them, the following play

⁷⁵ This faculty, according to Avicenna, again has two sub-branches: (1) active (*fā'il*) and (2) impulsive (*bā'itha*). The function of the former is "to contract the muscles and to pull the tendons and ligaments towards the starting point of the movement, or to relax them or stretch them so that they move away from the starting point". (Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology*, p. 26.) The function of the impulsive faculty is twofold: to provoke what is desirable and to repulse what is harmful. (Ibid.)

important roles: attraction (*cāzibā*), retention (*māsika*), digestion (*hādima*), and expulsion (*dāfi'a*), etc.⁷⁶

All of these faculties, including the perceptive ones, are located wholly in the animal soul or in Suhrawardī's own precise terms, in "the animal spirit" (*al-rūḥ ḥaywānī*), which is a subtle steamy substance (*jirmun laṭīfun bukhāriyyun*), generated from "the mixture of the subtle (*laṭīf*) humours", just as the limbs are made up from the mixture of the dense (*kaṭhīf*) humours.⁷⁷ The animal soul is split into two divisions, one ascending to the brain and thus cooling it, i.e. the so-called spiritual soul (*rūḥ nafsānī*); the other moving down through the liver and thus providing it with the nutritive, growth and reproductive faculties, i.e. the so-called natural soul (*rūḥ ṭabī'i*).⁷⁸

Next, based on his own notion of "the governing light" (*al-ṣultān al-nūrī*), Suhrawardī somehow develops an intimate relationship between the animal spirit and rational soul. In this context, he says that when the animal spirit has acquired "the governing light" from the rational, it spreads out throughout the body. That is to say, the former circulates and operates in the human body at the behest of the latter.

It is interesting, nevertheless, to note that in Suhrawardī's own

⁷⁶ *I-H.* 16a-16b11.

⁷⁷ *I-H.* 16b16-17.

⁷⁸ *I-H.* 17a2-5. See also *SH-H.* p. 78

Persian text of *Hayākīl*, the concept of "al-ṣultān al-nūrī" appears in a somewhat different form as *kiswat-i nūr*⁷⁹, meaning "the cloak of light", which is, in H. Corbin's view,⁸⁰ relatively more exoteric. Similarly Anḳaravī, who has no comments on this controversial concept, replaces, without any justification, the term "yaktasiba" (received) as recorded in both Dawwānī's versions and the text of *Hayākīl al-Nūr* as edited Abū Rayyān, with that of "yaktasī" (clothed), which fits exactly the above-mentioned Persian term, "kiswat".⁸¹ This merely shows either that Anḳaravī, as noted on several occasions, might have taken as a basis for his commentary the Persian *Hayākīl*, or that the Arabic original text should read "yaktasī" in spite of its printed form as "yaktasiba". However, the last possibility may be easily discarded in so far as the term "yaqbalu", the synonym of "yaktasiba", is recorded in a similar argument in *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*.⁸²

With regard to the significance of this crucial notion of "the governing light", Dawwānī presents two discrete explanations:

By *al-ṣultān al-nūrī*, is meant the mode of the light which it (the animal spirit) obtains from the soul (i.e. rational soul). By this mode of the light, it is prepared to receive faculties from the Giver of the Forms (*wāhib al-ṣuwar*). For the relationship of the rational with the

⁷⁹ "After having received the cloak of the light from the rational soul..." *Hayākīl*, p. 89.

⁸⁰ *Les Temples*, p. 76, n. 16.

⁸¹ *I-H*. 17a1-2; *Hayākīl*, p. 89.

⁸² *H-I*. p. 207.

animal soul equips the latter with subtlety and light. Or what is meant by it (i.e. *al-ṣultān al-nūrī*) is the animal faculty itself which is ready to receive the other faculties...⁸³

So in his view, the concept in question comes to denote either "a type of light", receptive to "the so-called faculties" or merely "a separate animal faculty", prepared to accommodate the other faculties. Irrespective of its two possible denotations, its main function, as underlined here, is to prepare the animal spirit to receive the faculties, which are still to this point left unstated, from the Giver of the Forms, viz. the Active Intellect (*'Aql al-Fa'āl*). But interestingly enough, Henry Corbin at this juncture has taken the phrase "those faculties" (*tilka al-quwā*) as "those forms" (*tilka al-ṣuwar*), partially because he might have been inspired by the notion of "wāhib al-ṣuwar" (the Donor of the Forms), a notion which belongs originally to Avicenna.⁸⁴ Therefore, such an understanding would be valid in so far as Avicenna's epistemology is concerned, according to which all the forms that constitute the foundation of knowledge proceed from the Active Intellect by way of communion (*ittiṣā*) between that Intellect and the rational soul. However, this kind of interpretation seems distant from Dawwānī's present intention, which, though not specified, is to indicate that the faculties of both

⁸³ *SH-H.* p. 78.

⁸⁴ His rendering of the text is: "Il faut entendre par ce term la modalité de lumière qui est actualisée pour le pneuma depuis l'âme pensante. Par cette modalité, le pneuma devient apte aux formes émanant du Donateur des Formes." (*Les Temples*, p. 76, n. 16.)

motion and perception, essential to the animal soul, are bestowed upon it by the Giver of the Forms. Meanwhile, Suhrawardī himself in another place designates these faculties as "luminous" (*al-quwā al-nūriyya*) without enumerating them.⁸⁵

It is interesting to note in this context that Ghiyāth al-Dīn Shīrāzī, another outstanding commentator of the *Hayākil*, proposes a somewhat different explanation to Dawwānī's, one which reads, in Corbin's French translation, as follows:

L'auteur entend par ce terme la chose (*amr*) qui est le principe des activités. C'est ce qui est reçu de l'immatériel (*mojarrad*) qui est la Lumière... On peut également supposer que l'auteur entende sous ce terme la force vitale qui rend apte à recevoir ce que dispensent les autres énergies de l'âme. Quant à la modalité de lumière dont fait état le commentateur (Davani), elle est ici complètement inopérante.⁸⁶

Shīrāzī, having ruled out Dawwānī's exegesis on "al-sultān al-nūrī" which holds that it is a mode of light, offers two plausible alternative interpretations for it. In the first place, taking inspiration from the famous Qur'anic verse; "they ask you about the Spirit. Say: The Spirit is (something) from the command (*amr*) of my Lord and of knowledge you have been given but little",⁸⁷ Shīrāzī identifies "al-ṣultān al-nūrī" with the

⁸⁵ *H-I*, p. 207. "This spirit (animal) is the bearer of the luminous faculties".

⁸⁶ *Les Temples*, p. 76, n. 16.

⁸⁷ Qur'an, 17:85.

"amr" of God. In so doing he wishes to suggest somehow, though not explicitly, the idea of its unknowability. That is to say, it would be a waste of time for a human being, possessed with limited knowledge, to speculate, as does Dawwānī, on the nature of such a delicate entity, which is entirely hidden in God's own treasure. This is the first explanation submitted by Shīrāzī to the concept of *al-nūr al-ṣultānī*. In the second alternative, he describes it as a "vital power", a power which is able to receive all that the soul disposes for it. In doing so, he seems to draw closer to Dawwānī's second view, viz. that it is an animal faculty. In this sense, the governing light would be, for both commentators, a physical force that puts the animal spirit into operation over the body.

The whole discussion to this point leads us inevitably to one of the most complicated questions, long debated among philosophers as well as mystics in the Muslim world. That is, "what is the relationship between the soul (*nafs*) and spirit (*rūh*)? Are they identical?"

At first one should admit that it would be impossible to deal with such a complex and difficult question within the limited scope of the present dissertation. Besides, much research on this specific subject has already been carried out by several distinguished scholars.⁸⁸ Moreover, one can find both in the *Qur'ān* and in a variety of collections of the Prophet's

⁸⁸ See for instance, D.B. Macdonald, "The Development of the Idea of Spirit in Islam," *Acta Orientalia* (1931), pp. 307-351, reprinted in *The Muslim World* 22 (1932), pp. 25-42, 153-168.

ḥadīths that these two concepts, i.e. "rūḥ" and "nafs" have been sometimes so interchangeably used that it is impossible to distinguish clearly their respective meanings. Roughly speaking, the Qur'ān, besides the verse narrated above which underscores the unknown aspect of the spirit, refers elsewhere to the souls (*anfus*) that will be taken away from human beings at death,⁸⁹ and also to the three stages of the soul's development, i.e. (i) the soul inclined to evil (*al-nafs al-ammāra bi'l-sū'*),⁹⁰ (ii) the blaming soul (*al-nafs al-lawwāma*),⁹¹ and (iii) the soul at satisfaction (*al-nafs al-muṭma'inna*).⁹² In view of these two apparently inconsistent usages, one still awaits a tenable answer to the question of which one of them, "rūḥ" or "nafs", will be removed from the body and kept away till the Day of Resurrection.

Ignoring this dilemma for the time being, let us revert to Suhrawardī's own doctrine of the soul. As has been observed, he has so far spoken of the animal spirit (*al-rūḥ al-ḥaywānī*). But he uses the term "ḥayawān" in the present context not as "a genus", under which all living beings, including men, might be subsumed. It is, in contrast, restricted exclusively to animals per se, as distinguished from vegetables and human beings. And even after

⁸⁹ Qur'ān, 39:42.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 12:53.

⁹¹ Ibid., 75:2.

⁹² Ibid., 89:27.

having been invested with and ennobled by "the governing light", the animal spirit becomes operational, penetrating throughout the body at the prerogative of the rational soul.

Thus regardless of the function that it performs in the human body, the animal spirit, according to Suhrawardī, is different in origin from the rational soul. It is in effect, as he points out in the *Hayākil*, other than the Divine Spirit (*al-rūḥ al-Ilāhī*), which is often referred to in the Prophet's hadith, and as well as the Persian translation indicates, in the Holy Qur'an.⁹³ On the other hand, he makes it very clear in the *Risāla fī I'tiqād al-Ḥukamā'* that the Divine Spirit is nothing less than "the human spirit" (*rūḥ al-insān*), whose origin is not in this world.⁹⁴ It is the rational soul itself,⁹⁵ constituted of light from the Lights of God from whom it originally springs and to whom it ultimately returns.⁹⁶ So in Suhrawardī's complex terminology, the three concepts, "divine spirit", "human spirit" and "rational soul" are one and the same thing, and are peculiar only to human beings, as opposed to the animal spirit peculiar only to animals.

To reinforce this, Dawwānī repeats the same Qur'anic verse

⁹³ *Hayākil*, p. 89.

⁹⁴ Suhrawardī, "Risāla fī I'tiqād al-Ḥukamā'," p. 267.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

⁹⁶ *H-N.* p. 52.

above,⁹⁷ while Ankaravi makes it more specific by stating that it is "the breath of the Lord" (*nefha-i rabbānī*) and thereby implies another verse: "When I have made him and breathed unto him of My spirit, do you fall down by prostrating yourselves unto him."⁹⁸

Furthermore no permanent place or location in this world can be appointed to the rational soul at all, simply because it is a "divine immaterial light" which originates in God and returns to Him, as is indicated in the verse: "O soul! in satisfaction! Return to thy Lord."⁹⁹

5. The Relation of the Rational Soul to God

VI. Having thus formulated the main characteristics of the rational soul, Suhrawardī next moves on to correct some of the mistaken notions and assumptions with regard to its nature. To begin with, as has been already firmly established, the rational soul, in his view, is a sheer light and has nothing to do with matter and place. In this sense, it may have at least some sort of affinity with God, who is also pure light, immaterial and beyond time and space. But this does not mean that it is identical, as some people have falsely assumed, with God Himself. Nor can it be termed God at all.

⁹⁷ Qur'ān, 17:85; *SH-H.* p. 81.

⁹⁸ Qur'ān, 15:29. *I-H.* 17a16.

⁹⁹ *I-H.* 17b4-5. *Hayākil*, p. 89. It is significant that Ankaravī, as has been stated on several occasions, seems to depend almost entirely on the Persian translation of *Hayākil* as the basis for his commentary.

In fact these two, irrespective of their similarity in so many aspects, are absolutely separate from each other.

In the first place, God, Suhrawardī contends, is one, while the souls are multitudinous. The evidence is the fact that the perceptions of two different persons are never alike; if they were, they both would perceive the same reality in exactly the same manner, and hence they would have exactly the same knowledge, which is impossible; these facts prove the multiplicity and diversity, not the unity, of the souls.

At this juncture, Anḳaravī intervenes in the discussion by making the somewhat groundless allegation against some of the commentators of the *Hayākil al-Nūr*, without revealing their names, of having misinterpreted Suhrawardī's intention in claiming that certain people, having once accepted the soul to be immaterial, have named it God:¹⁰⁰

O you who seek the infinite lights. You should know that in some of the commentaries of this book it is explicitly mentioned that Şeyh Shihāb al-Dīn's allusive blame here aims at such eminent Muslim Sufi Şeyhs as Bāyazīd al-Bisṭāmī, Junayd al-Baghdādī, Mevlānā, Abū Saīd and the like, who all are the possessors of the (spiritual) powers (*zevī'l-iḳtidār*). But in doing so they have indeed committed a grave error and are utterly at fault (*ḡalaṭ-i maḥẓ*). Assuming such a baseless allegation would mean that thousands of the respected and sincere saints have gone astray from the right path. Again it would imply the denial of Saints' annihilation in God as well as of their realization of the secrets of His unity. As a matter of fact, it was because of this particular reason that this humble person felt compelled to set down the present commentary on this book. For

¹⁰⁰ *I-H.* 1:7b5-6. Abū Rayyān's edition reads: "they imagined it to be God." (*H-N.* p. 54)

each of these sultans (i.e. Sufi Masters) is in effect a true Divine Sage and also a King of limitless secrets.¹⁰¹

In the succeeding lines, Anḳaravī expresses once again his fidelity to the path of these eminent mystic gnostics and asks somewhat sarcastically how those anonymous commentators, whose inconsistent theories which in effect resemble the web of a spider,¹⁰² could vilify people who distinguished themselves with the profound knowledge of the hidden realities?¹⁰³

Having said so, Anḳaravī commences to paraphrase a number of remarkable sayings and couplets, articulated usually in a state of rapturous ecstasy, by several renowned mystic saints, some of whom were executed for those theopathic utterances. Among them, he cites first the following statement: "there is naught inside my cloak except God." This he wrongly attributes to Junayd al-Baghdādī's, which was in reality uttered by Abū Saīd ibn Abī al-Khayr (d.1049).¹⁰⁴ The same exclamation, continues Anḳaravī, is recounted with some additional variation in the work entitled *Yūsuf-*

¹⁰¹ *I-H.* 17b9-18a1.

¹⁰² Cf. "The parable of those who take protectors other than Allah is that of the Spider who builds (to itself) a house but truly the flimsiest of houses is the Spider's house if they but knew". (Qur'ān, 29:41)

¹⁰³ *I-H.* 18a1-2.

¹⁰⁴ *I-H.* 18a8-9. See for the story of how Abū Saīd made this ecstatic exclamation, Reynold A. Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 73.

Zuleyhā by Ḥamdi Çelebi, the son of the renowned Akşemseddīn: "The world is the rays of the light of God/ In the cloak of the existence there is nothing besides God."¹⁰⁵ Then comes Bāyazīd-i Bisṭāmī's notorious utterance: "Glory to me! How great is my Majesty! There is no deity save me, therefore worship me."¹⁰⁶ Next follows Manşūr al-Ḥallāj's astonishing proclamation: "I am the Truth".¹⁰⁷ Finally, Anḳaravī quotes the following verses:

The vessel is subtle and fine, so is the wine,
 They look like each other, the matter then is intricate,
 It looks as if it is only wine without a vessel,
 Or as if it is only a vessel without wine.¹⁰⁸

I am the one whom I love, and the one whom I love is me,
 We are two spirits incarnated in our body,
 When you see us, you will also see him,
 When you see him, you will see us too.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ *I-H.* 18a11

¹⁰⁶ *I-H.* 18a12-13

¹⁰⁷ *I-H.* 18a13.

¹⁰⁸ This couplet was wrongly attributed by Anḳaravī to the Sufi Şeyh Junayd; it in fact belongs to the eminent poet Abū Nuwās who died around 200/815; see, Ghazālī, *Le Tabernacle Des Lumières (Michkāt al-Anwār)*, trans. by Roger Deladrière (Paris: Editions Du Seuil, 1981), p. 104, n. 52. Anḳaravī also gives its Persian version in his commentary, 18a16-17. Nevertheless, Junayd too articulated a statement to this effect: "The colour of the water is the colour of the vessel containing it." (Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism*, p. 159.)

¹⁰⁹ *I-H.* 18b1-2. This verse of al-Ḥallāj is found in his *Dîwân* with a slight difference in the personal endings in the second part of it: "when you see me, you see also him; when you see him, you see me as well. See, Ḥusayn Manşūr Ḥallāj, *Le Dîwân D'al-Ḥallāj*, ed. and trans. by Louis Massignon

Anḳaravī admits that to the adherents of discursive philosophy, who rely only on pure reasoning, these verses and the like may appear, at least outwardly, to be suggesting both the incarnation (*ḥulūl*) and unification (*ittiḥād*) of the soul with God. However, this is not the case for the people of vision or intuition (*eshāb-i ṣūhūd*), for they, in contrast to the rational thinkers, comprehend them not simply in their literal sense. In the eyes of these people, mystical expressions such as these connote neither of those notions, i.e. "ḥulūl" or "ittiḥād", both of which pose danger to the unmitigated unity of God,¹¹⁰ for the former would cause alteration (*muḡāyeret*) in His Essence, while the latter would yield duality (*isniyyet*).¹¹¹

On the other hand, according to the mystics, continues Anḳaravī, all things that exist besides God, are the appearance or rather phenomena of the names; and all the names are the manifestations of the essence (*zāṭ*) and of the attributes; yet the names represent neither the essence nor something other than the essence. However, since the name is nothing other than what it denotes, it may be identified with the essence itself.¹¹²

At this point, Anḳaravī, who avoids giving any further account with

(Paris: Cahier du Sud, 1955), p. 93.

¹¹⁰ *I-H.* 18b12-17.

¹¹¹ *I-H.* 18b17-19a1.

¹¹² *I-H.* 19a2-4.

respect to the nature of the relationship between the names and the things named, refers us to some of his other writings such as *Miṣbāḥu'l-Esrār* and *Cenāḥū'l-Ervāḥ*,¹¹³ both of which, he claims, furnish an adequate explanation of this matter.¹¹⁴

In the *Miṣbāḥū'l-Esrār*, a mystical treatise devoted to the interpretation of the famous Qur'anic verse known as *āyat al-nūr* (verse of light), Anḳaravī defines light along similar lines as do Ghazālī in his *Mishkāt al-Anwār* and Suhrawardī in *Hayākil al-Nūr*. There he declares that "the light is the cause of the appearance of the names that represent the essence, attributes, actions and the true natures of the beings".¹¹⁵ Thanks to the light, things become visible and known. By means of such an analogy, he wants to show implicitly that what the Sufi perceives in external reality are not things themselves nor their true essences but rather their manifestation through the radiation of the light. In other words, two things, (i) God and (ii) whatever things exist other than He should be demarcated sharply from each other. In the eyes of the Sufis, what is absolutely real is the former, while the latter are merely the phenomena. On no ground can these two separate entities be united nor indwelt into each other.

¹¹³ See for their bibliographic descriptions, Part One, Chapter II, Anḳaravī's works, pp. 41, 44.

¹¹⁴ *I-H*. 19a5-6.

¹¹⁵ Anḳaravī, *Miṣbāḥū'l-Esrār*, Biblioteca Vaticana, MS. no. 137/1, folio. 2, lines. 31-2.

Despite this, says Anḳaravī, some of the prominent theologians and traditionalists (*ehlū'l-uṣūl*), attempted to flatly reject the profound expressions of the Sufi masters (*meṣāyih*) on account of the fact that they smack of *ḥulūl* and *ittiḥād*. Among them, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, for instance, has formulated the following argument:

If two things are united, in such a union, then either both must be simultaneously everlasting (*bāqī*) or temporal (*fānī*), or one of them; must be everlasting and the other temporal. If they both were everlasting, then there would arise a duality between them, in that case they would not become united. If both, in contrast, were temporal, (which is impossible) since God is absolutely everlasting, then again no union would take place between them. On the other hand, if one of them were everlasting and the other temporal, in the same manner, they would not become united at all, because an existing being cannot be a non-existing one. This is (the argument) for the rejection of union (*ittiḥād*). As for the incarnation (*ḥulūl*), it is taken by those who repudiate it in the sense of *nūzūl*. The dweller (*ḥāl*) means the descending (*nūzūl*), while the bearer (*maḥall*) is the abode (*mekān*) of the dweller. So every dweller either needs a bearer or not. If it is in need of a bearer, then it would not deserve to become the Necessary Existent (*Vācibū'l-Vücūd*). If it needs not, it would be exempt from being a bearer. Therefore, *ḥulūl* and *ittiḥād* are false. No doubt that the doctrines of *ḥulūl* and *ittiḥād* as well as of *tenāsūh* (transmigration) are groundless and unacceptable not only to the intellect but also to the Scripture.¹¹⁶

Against Rāzī's above assertion, Anḳaravī contends that when the words of the *meṣāyih* are taken in their profound context rather than in their bare appearance, it will be discerned that none of them smack of either of

¹¹⁶ *I-H.* 19a10-19b2. See for the original Arabic text, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maḥālib al-'Āliyah min al-'Ilm al-Ilāhī*, ed. Ahmad Hijāzī al-Ṣafā' (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 1987), vol. 2, pp. 104-5.

these two concepts, *ḥulūl* and *ittiḥād*. And again he emphasizes that each of those expressions requires a deeper understanding and interpretation. Although it would have been possible for him, he argues, to put forward numerous proofs for both philosophers and theologians, in order to show the concealed meanings of these words, he avoids doing so and instead prefers to let his master, Mevlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī speak for him:

If the intellect could discern the true way in this question,
Fakhri Rāzī would be an adept in religious mysteries;
But since he was (an example of the saying that) whosoever has not
tasted does not know,
His intelligence and imagination (only) increased his perplexity...¹¹⁷

When expounding Suhrawardī's statement that reads that "God is one, yet the souls are various," Anḳaravī at once comes to grips with the question of whether the rational soul is identical with God or not, a question that again directly concerns the Sufis' rapturous expressions, especially Ḥallāj's exclamation, "I am the Truth". Anḳaravī's intent at this juncture is mainly to prove that the words of the *meṣāyih* would not endanger at all the unity of God.

According to him, these superior people, i.e., the Sufis, do not assert

¹¹⁷ *I-H*. 19b9-11. The translation of the verses have been quoted from Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, *The Mathnawī of Jalāluddīn Rūmī*, ed. and trans. by Reynold A. Nicholson (London: Cambridge University Press, 1934), vol. 6, p. 248. Cf. Annemarie Schimmel, *The Triumphal Sun: A Study of the Works of Jalāloddīn Rūmī* (London: Fine Books Ltd., 1978), p. 14.

that the rational soul is identical with the Truth (*Ḥaḳ*); neither do they claim that it is separable from It. But they consider it rather "a sheer Divine light" (*pūr nūr-i Raḥmānī*) and "a breath from the Glorious Majesty" (*nefha-i Subḥānī*). So, for them, the soul in its essence is not distinct from the Truth.¹¹⁸

On the other hand, Anḳaravī maintains that the multiplicity (*kesret*) of the souls, in contrast to what some people allege, never involves any defect or flaw in God's essence. Multiplicity as such can be better understood in the parable of a man standing in front of several mirrors and seeing himself in manifold images there. But, despite his multiple representations, he is still one and the same person, because what is reflected in those mirrors is not his essence, which is one, but his image, which appears multiple.¹¹⁹ By the same token, from the rays of the sun, which shine over many houses, it cannot be inferred that the sun is multiple. Nor can it be said that the rays reflected in those houses do not effuse from the sun. Nor even can it be claimed that the light shed on one particular house is different from the light on another. All in all, the multitudeness of the rays posits no multiplicity in the sun.¹²⁰

Finally all of these arguments lead Anḳaravī to another question

¹¹⁸ *I-H.* 20a2-4.

¹¹⁹ *I-H.* 20a5-6.

¹²⁰ *I-H.* 20a7-10.

raised in Suhrawardī's statement: "The souls are multitude, because what Zaid perceives is different from what 'Amr does." In reply to this, Anḳaravī writes:

That the soul is one does not necessarily entail that all men should partake in the same perception, because God the Almighty, the Lord of men, has granted perception and knowledge to them in accordance with their aptitudes. Therefore, it is not possible for someone to perceive in exactly the same way that another perceives. It is nevertheless true that every one can perceive what others can but on different levels, because each individual possesses on his own a different body and a different power of estimation and imagination, and he may happen to be in a different occupation and position towards the luminosity and darkness and so on. So all of these may of course become a hindrance to accurate perception. Therefore, one's perception is not the same or identical with that of others.¹²¹

So, for Ṣārīḥ Anḳaravī, the diversity of perceptions cannot form the basis for the claim that souls are myriad. The diversity as such is due not to the multitude of souls, but rather to the varying degrees of the powers of imagination and estimation that people possess as well as the accidental situations they are in. All may play a considerable part -positively or negatively- in the process of perception. In some cases all these elements may even constitute to certain extent what Anḳaravī calls " a thick veil" for the seer. The more he removes the veil from his eyes, the more he increases his power of perception.¹²²

¹²¹ *I-H.* 20b2-9.

¹²² *I-H.* 20b9-10.

Şāriḥ Dawwānī likewise finds Suhrawardī's aforementioned argument too weak for the simple reason he believes that the diversity of perceptions arises out of the tools (*al-ālāt*), namely the external and internal senses, as well as their limitations, and not because of the multiplicity of souls. Strictly speaking, all perceptions are dependent upon those tools. Certain tools produce certain perceptions, and because some perceptions require a variety of tools, perceptions may vary in their content.¹²³

Thus one may infer from the arguments which both commentators have set forth that, although people do differ in perception, they, however, may partake in one and the same rational soul. But whereas Dawwānī stops short of stating this explicitly. Anḳaravī, by contrast, approaching the issue strictly from a Sufi standpoint, takes an overt position in support of the oneness of the soul by quoting a verse from the Qur'an: "O! People. Fear your Lord who created you from one soul."¹²⁴ Immediately after this, however, he acknowledges that his investigation may fall short of proving the unity of the souls. Therefore, without prolonging the discussion, he wants to conclude it with the couplet: "The animal spirit is myriad/ The

¹²³ *SH-H.* pp. 82-3.

¹²⁴ Qur'ān, 4:1. In this verse, the notion "nafswāḥida" has been translated by A. Yūsuf Ālī as "a single person", while M. Pickthall and Arthur J. Arberry render it as "a single soul". See, A. Y. Ali, *The Holy Qur'an, Text, Translation and Commentary*, p. 183; M. Pickthall, *The Meaning of the Glorious Qur'ān, Text and Explanatory Translation* (Karachi: Taj Company Ltd, n.d.), p. 73; A. J. Arberry, *The Qur'ān Interpreted* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 72.

human soul is one."¹²⁵

In parallel to the issue of the unity of the souls, Anḳaravī once again draws our attention to Suhrawardī's words: If the rational soul were one, as they proclaimed, then the physical faculties of the body would seize "the Lord of Lords" and control it".¹²⁶ By this statement, he says, the philosophers aim directly at the utterances of the *meṣāyih* such as "I am the Truth", "Glory to Me! How great is my Majesty!", and "There is nothing under my cloak except God". The real obscurity lies in this very simple question: who utters such exclamations? who is "ana" (I), for instance, in Ḥallāj's expression of "ana'l-Ḥaqq"? According to Anḳaravī, it was definitely the Truth Itself which made them utter those expressions. This can be better illustrated by the example of a coin whose middle part remains in the flames of the fire until it gets fully red. When taken out from the fire, if it could cry out, it would utter: "I am the Fire" (*Ana al-Nār*). And its utterance would be real to a certain extent, though its essence has not become entirely that of fire. Likewise, he proceeds, when the *meṣāyih* are completely drowned in the manifestation of God, at that stage, anything that issues forth from them emanates directly from God.¹²⁷ After all, this is indeed an extraordinary state and exceptionally unusual mystical experience

¹²⁵ *I-H.* 20b12-15.

¹²⁶ *I-H.* 20b16; *H-N.* p.55.

¹²⁷ *I-H.* 21a5-11.

that can be discerned and at best appreciated by only those who attain it.¹²⁸

In continuing his analysis of the second Temple, Anḳaravī, based on his failure of understanding correctly the text, finds inconsistency in Suhrawardī's two statements with regard to the nature of the rational soul. While on the one hand Suhrawardī holds that the soul is an immaterial substance, he on the other hand implies that it may be captured and controlled by the physical faculties of the body. These two statements, however, cannot be reconciled, since an immaterial entity in no way falls under the dominion of the material. Thus according to Anḳaravī, it would seem that Suhrawardī has confused the function of the animal spirit, which has a direct access to the body and its organs, with the rational soul which dominates and governs them.¹²⁹ However, this is not the case, simply because Suhrawardī's intent at this point, contrary to Anḳaravī's reading, is to show those identifying the soul with God that, despite their immaterial nature, the former, as opposed to the latter, are multiple and variable in its actions due to its affiliation with the physical perceptive faculties.

6. Is the Rational Soul pre-eternal?

VII. In the last part of this Temple, Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī deals

¹²⁸ *I-H.* 21a12-3.

¹²⁹ *I-H.* 21b4-6.

mainly with two critical, inter-related questions about the rational soul. First, is it a part of God? Second, is it pre-eternal (*qadīm*)? In the first place, he firmly states that, as opposed to what certain people assert, the rational soul is not a part of God because the latter, as an utterly immaterial Being, can suffer no division or partition in His Essence. Not only is the soul distinct from God, it is also, again unlike Him, not pre-eternal.

Both Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī argue that the soul is indivisible and that it is, nevertheless, not pre-eternal; on the contrary it is originated simultaneously together with the body. Therefore, body is the principle of individuation (*mummayyiz*) which accounts for the apparent multiplicity of souls.

However, for Anḳaravī, there is nothing wrong in considering the rational soul to be part of God, provided that the former should be taken as a light effused from the latter, which is the absolute Light.¹³⁰

On the other hand, Anḳaravī opposes the idea of the creation of the soul concurrently with the body on the basis of the Qur'ān and *ḥadīths* of the Prophet. Yet far from bringing any concrete evidence from these two sources, he rather takes it for granted that it is undoubtedly true that "the creation of the souls took place thousands years before that of the bodies or even that of the heavens (*asmān*) and earth (*zamin*)".¹³¹

¹³⁰ I-H. 21b15.

¹³¹ I-H. 22b1-2.

In doing so, Anḳaravī seeks to form, though by no means explicitly, a scriptural ground for the pre-existence of the soul. This becomes more obvious when he speaks of the concept of pre-eternity within the framework of the medieval Muslim philosophers. The notion of eternity, he says, is generally looked at in one of two ways. According to the first one, it is attributed to that which has no first cause, like the Necessary Being (*vācibū'l-vücūd*), which is eternal (*ezelī*). Eternal in turn denotes that which has no beginning nor ending. According to the second interpretation, eternity is ascribed to that which has no beginning in time such as intellects, rational souls, heavenly souls, spheres, planets, stars, the four elements, and so on. These are also designated as "beings generated in essence" (*muḥdath al-dhātī*). In the terminology of the philosophers, the term "muḥdath" is said of something, which is preceded by time.¹³² Then the rational soul, like intellects and some other heavenly bodies, exists in pre-eternity, simply because it is not originated in time.

¹³² *I-H. 22b2-8.* "Something eternal would be either in essence or in time. Eternal in essence is something that has for its essence no beginning by which it comes into existence. Eternal with respect to time means something that has no beginning for itself in time. Similarly, temporal (*muḥdath*) is of two kinds: one of them is the thing that has a beginning by which it exists; the other is the thing that has a beginning in time..."(Ibn Sīnā, *al-Najāt*, pp. 532-33.) In brief, eternal would be: 1) eternal in essence, 2) eternal in time; finite would be: 1) finite in essence 2) finite in time.

CHAPTER SIX

THE THIRD TEMPLE

I. Rational modes (of describing existence) are of three kinds: necessary, possible and impossible. Necessary is said of the one whose existence is of necessity. Impossible is said of the one whose non-existence is of necessity. Possible is said of the one whose existence and non-existence are not of necessity.

II. Possible becomes either necessary or impossible by virtue of another. The cause is that which necessitates the existence of another. Possible cannot become existent by itself; if for instance it necessitated the existence of itself, it would become necessary, not possible. In that case, it (i.e., possible) needs a cause that preponderates its existence over its non-existence. Once the cause is fully complete, then the caused comes into existence without any delay.¹ All things that condition the existence of a thing are determining factors in the causality of that thing,² whether they be will, time, place, conjunction and receptive substratum or other than this. Should the cause not exist completely or should one or more parts of it be lacking, the thing caused does not come into existence. Therefore, once all the required conditions are fulfilled and all the redundant ones eliminated, the existence of a thing would become

¹ Here I prefer Corbin's translation, which I find more suitable than the others. For example, in one of two modern Turkish translations, it is rendered: "When the cause is completed, the existence of the maker of the cause does not change." (Ülken, "Şehābeddin Sühreverdî, Nur Heykelleri," in *Türk Feylesofları Antolojisi I*, p. 68. In the other, the rendering is similar to Corbin's: "once the cause is completed, the caused one which is necessitated by the former, comes into being." (Yetkin, *Nur Heykelleri*, 1988 ed., p. 12.) In the printed Ottoman translation, however, it reads: "when the cause has been completed, the existence of the caused does not differ from that cause." (Ziyā, *Hayākilü'n-Nūr*, p. 583.)

² H-N. p. 57, n. 7.

necessary.³

The Rational Modes

I. At the very outset, I should like to note that throughout the whole chapter, Ismā'īl Anḳaravī makes no substantial comment of his own but merely renders the text as literally as possible into Ottoman Turkish. In spite of this, I will refer to his translation, whenever the occasion demands.

To begin with, it is a well-known fact that it was Avicenna who, for the first time in the history of Islamic philosophy, developed "a new kind of cosmological theory" based on these three metaphysical notions: necessary, possible (contingent) and impossible. This theory was systematically devised in an attempt to prove the existence of God and differed a great deal in its distinctive style and content from the other two celebrated theories, the "cosmological" and the "ontological".⁴

Suhrawardī, clinging to Avicenna's terminology, here articulates these three modes in his own terms rather than in those of the latter. First of all, he maintains, like the latter, that necessary (*wājib*), impossible (*mumtani'*) and possible (or contingent) (*mumkin*) are mental modes (*jihāt*). Among

³ *H-N*. pp. 57-8; *I-H*. 23a3-6, 14-5, 16, 23b4-6, 12-4; *SH-H*. pp. 96-103; *Les Temples*, pp. 46-7; *Hayākil*, p. 91.

⁴ See for a full analysis of this theory, Herbert Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in the Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 281-310.

them the first one is attributed to something whose existence (*wujūd*) is necessary, the second to that whose non-existence (*'adam*) is necessary, and the last to that whose existence and non-existence are not necessary.⁵

In Anḳaravī's simple language, "necessary" is said of something whose existence is certainly necessary, and "impossible" is said of something which has no existence at all like "the partner of God" (*ṣerīk-i bārī*).⁶ It is surprising, in this case, that while he illustrates the mode of impossible with the notion of a "partner of God", he seems to avoid, at least in the present context, qualifying God as necessary. He might have been hesitant, for whatever reason, to characterize God in the terminology of the philosophers.

II. As for the mode of possible, it is defined by Suhrawardī as something which is necessary or impossible by virtue of something else. The word "something else" becomes more clear and meaningful in Anḳaravī, when it is substituted with the notion of "cause" (*sebeb*). Possible

⁵ *H-N*. p. 57. These primary concepts, according to Avicenna, though not strictly definable, can be, nevertheless, conceivable to us by means of "a designation (*ism*) or clue (*'alāma*). (Ibn Sīnā, *Ilāhiyyāt I*, p. 29.) Thus he explains them first in the terminology of logic: "Necessary signifies the perpetuity of existence, impossible the perpetuity of nonexistence, and possible signifies no perpetuity of existence and nonexistence". (Idem, *al-Najāt*, p. 29). In metaphysics, however, he stresses particularly the term "necessary" and thus invests it with much the same meaning as Suhrawardī does in the present context: "Necessary denotes certitude of existence. And existence is conceived better than nonexistence." (Idem, *Ilāhiyyāt I*, p. 36.)

⁶ *I-H*. 23a8-9.

existence would become necessary existence by virtue of the existence of another, which is called a "cause". It is again this cause by virtue of which a thing could be non-existent. In other words, the possible, as Anḳaravī sees it, comes into existence out of non-existence by virtue of that cause. And when this cause disappears, it turns back to the state of non-existence from that of existence.⁷ So, cause by itself implies an existent being. The existence of the cause necessitates the existence of something else.

On the other hand, possible existence is not existent of itself, for, if it necessitated the existence of itself, it would no longer be possible, but wholly necessary. Hence, it demands something that enables it to exist, or as Suhrawardī puts it, something that gives preponderance to its existence over its non-existence.⁸ This means that the cause that brings it into existence cannot be possible, otherwise, it would lead to a vicious circle. Consequently, it should be dependent on a cause which is necessary by itself.⁹

In the next stage of his argument, Suhrawardī examines "the relationship between the cause and the caused." In any causal process, there are some conditions and elements which play an essential role. Among them, Suhrawardī cites the following: will (*irāda*), time (*waqt*), place

⁷ *I-H.* 23a10-13.

⁸ *H-N.* p. 57.

⁹ *I-H.* 23b2-3.

(*makān*), conjunction (*muqārin*) and receptive substratum (*maḥall qābil*). When the cause is complete, those conditions fulfilled and the impediments removed, the thing caused immediately and necessarily comes into existence.¹⁰

Şāriḥ Dawwānī provides a good explanation of what receptive substratum means. A substratum is receptive of something by whose existence it becomes existent. Strictly speaking, a substratum would become necessarily existent by virtue of the existence of what it receives. This may be more clearly seen in the reciprocal relationship between matter (*al-hayūlā*) and form (*al-şūrah*). The former occupies the position of recipient of the latter. That is to say, the existence of matter becomes necessary through the existence of form.¹¹

¹⁰ *I-H.* 23b15-6.

¹¹ *SH-H.* p. 102.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE FOURTH TEMPLE

I. It is not admissible that two (different) things be necessary with regard to existence, for, in this case, both of them would become partners in the necessity of existence. This therefore requires that between the two there should be a separating factor on which the existence of either one or both of them would depend. Yet that which is dependent on something is (only) contingent being. If (on the other hand) there is no separating factor between them, then they are not two different things but only one thing.¹

II. Bodies and (accidental) forms are multiple, whereas, as we have shown, the Necessary Existent is one. (Since they are multitude) they cannot be necessarily existent but contingent and they all need a preponderating agent, which is the Necessary Existent by virtue of Itself.² The Necessary Existent is not composed of parts; otherwise it would be caused by them. Moreover, these quasi-compounding parts cannot be necessary, because, as we have already explained, as far as existence is concerned, there cannot be two different Necessary Existents at the same time.

III. An attribute is not necessary by itself; if it were so, it would not be in need of a substratum. Thus the Necessary Existent is not a substratum for attributes. Neither is it possible for It to bring those attributes into existence in Itself, for the thing which is one cannot be affected by Itself. When we move one of our limbs, the agent (*fā'il*) that moves it is one thing,³ and the recipient (*qābil*) is another thing.⁴ But the Necessary Existent is absolutely one in every

¹ *H-N.* p. 59; *I-H.* 24a8, 9-10, 12-3, 17-24b1; *SH-H.* pp. 103, 104, 106; *Hayākil*, p. 92.

² "Bi dhātīhi" (by virtue of itself) which exists in ms. B of *H-N.* (p. 59, n. 4), appears in Anḳaravī as "li dhātīhi" (*I-H.* 24b8.)

³ i.e. intellect. (*Les Temples*, p. 48.)

⁴ i.e., limb. (*Ibid.*)

respect.⁵

Out of two opposites, the one which is nobler belongs to Him (viz. the Necessary Existent).⁶ How could it be possible for someone, who is deficient, to confer perfection upon the one who is perfect? Anything that involves plurality such as partition and composition is impossible for the Necessary Existent. It is the Truth who has no opposite nor peer to Himself. He cannot be related to anywhere. To Him belongs the supreme Glory, the most complete Perfection, the most exalted Nobility, and the most intensive Light. He is not an accident, for it would then need a bearer by which His existence subsists. Neither is He a substance, for He would partake along with the other substances in (the nature of) substantiality and need something that particularized Him. It is the bodies that signify Him by their diversified forms. Had the bodies not particularized them, there would have been no diversity at all in their shapes, magnitudes, forms, accidents and movements, and none even in the stages and orders of the chief elements of the universe. Had the corporeality necessitated the forms of the bodies, then the forms would not have been diverse but rather identical with one another in those bodies.⁷

IV. All bodies (*ajsām*) participate in corporeality, yet they differ from one another in enlightenment⁸ This means that the light is an accident in the bodies, and the luminosity of the bodies is their manifestation. Since the accidental light is subsistent in something

⁵ *H-N.* pp. 59-60; *I-H.* 24b6-8, 11-12, 13, 15, 17-25a1, 6-7, 8-9, 12; *SH-H.* pp. 113-17; *Hayākil*, pp. 92-93.

⁶ Persian translation (*Hayākil*, p. 93, l. 7.) and ms. B of *H-N.* (p. 60, n. 6.) insert here: "Because He is the giver of the full perfection." See for another connotation of the same statement, Suhrawardī, *Kalimat al-Taṣawwuf*, in *Three Treatises by the Master of Illumination (Sa Risāla az Shaykh-i Ishrāq)*, ed. N. Gholi Ḥabībī (Tehran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1397/1977), p. 98.

⁷ *H-N.* p. 60; *I-H.* 25b1-2, 6-7, 10-14, 16-17, 26a1-4; *SH-H.* pp. 117-122; *Hayākil*, pp. 93-94.

⁸ "According to the light they do or do not receive." (Les Temples, p. 49.)

else and existent not for itself,⁹ it is not manifest to itself.¹⁰ Were it to subsist by itself, it would become light to itself {and manifest to itself, and also it would become cognizant of its essence}.¹¹

V. Our rational souls are manifest to themselves; that is why they are subsistent lights.¹² We have explained¹³ that they are originated (*ḥādīth*)¹⁴ and that they need definitely a preponderant principle and that they cannot come into existence through bodies, because one thing cannot bring into existence another thing, which is nobler than itself. Therefore, their preponderant principle must be an immaterial light. If this light is the Necessary Existent, then this is exactly what is desired.¹⁵ If, on the other hand, it is not so,¹⁶ in any case it (the

⁹ Dawwānī's commentary reads: "and does not exist by itself" (*SH-H*, p. 123), whereas Corbin's French translation reads: "and does not exist by itself for itself". (*Les Temples*, p. 49) It is rendered in the Persian version as "its existence does not belong to itself." (*Hayākīl*, p.94, l. 7.)

¹⁰ Anḡaravī's text reads (*I-H*, 26a15): "it is manifest to its essence", which is in stark contrast to all the other editions. In *SH-H* (p. 123) it reads: "it is not manifest in essence" (*fa laysa zāhir al-dhāt*), whereas in *H-N* (p. 61) it appears as: "it is not manifest by indication" (*fa laysa zāhir al-dalālat*). The latter is probably a misreading for "zāhiran lidhātihī". The Persian version has "zāhir-i khūd". H. Ziya Ülken, however, who partially rendered *Hayākīl al-Nūr* into modern Turkish script, seems to have committed a grave mistake in the interpretation of this phrase: "Arizi olan nur, başkası ile kaim olduđu ve vücudu kendisile olmadığı için zahir demektir." (Since the accidental light subsists by something else and does not exist by itself, it is called manifest.) (Idem, "Şehābeddin Sühreverdi, Nur Heykelleri," p. 60.)

¹¹ The phrase in brackets is missing in *H-N* probably by mistake.

¹² "Anwārun qā'imātun bi nafsihā" (self-subsistent lights). (*Les Temples*, p. 49.)

¹³ See above in the Second Temple.

¹⁴ "They have a beginning in time". (*Les Temples*, p. 49.)

¹⁵ Corbin renders: "Our problem has been resolved." (*Les Temples*, p. 49.)

¹⁶ *I-H* (26b12), *Hayākīl* (p. 95) and *Les Temples* (p. 49) read: "If it is the possible being", which is also accurate and appropriate to the context

chain of causes) will end with the Necessary Existent, the Living and Subsistent.¹⁷

VI. Soul is a living and subsistent entity; and thus it signifies the Living and Self-subsistent. The Self-subsistent is manifest (to its own essence).¹⁸ It¹⁹ is the Light of Lights, free from both bodies and all those (things) which are affiliated with them. And It is concealed because of its utter manifestness.²⁰

VII. The One in every respect is so unique that in Its Essence It never permits any plurality, engendered by diverse motives and wills all of which not only necessitate plurality but also demand a cause, as do the bodies. Therefore, Its direct action must be necessarily one. (If there were two,) the demand of the one from the two different things would be distinct from that of the other. In that case, there would eventually arise multiplicity without there being any intermediary in the exigency of two different things. Therefore, the first which is necessitated by the first would be also one without having any plurality in itself. It is not a body that involves diverse forms, neither is it a form that requires a substratum, nor is it a soul that needs a body. But on the contrary, it is self-subsistent²¹ and cognizant of itself as well as of its Creator.²²

concerned.

¹⁷ *H-N.* p. 61; *I-H.* 26a9-10, 12-13, 14-15, 26b1-2, 5-7, 11-12, 14-15; *SH-H.* pp. 123-124, 126-127; *Hayākil*, p. 94.

¹⁸ "Lidhātīhi", which exists in *I-H.* (26b16) and appears as "bidāhtīhi" in *SH-H.* (p. 127). In *Les Temples* (p. 49) it reads: "it is essentially manifest by itself to itself."

¹⁹ "It" in the Arabic text appears to be "huwa" not "hiya"; therefore, it refers to directly the Necessary Existent, not the soul.

²⁰ *I-H.* 26b15-27a1; *H-N.* p. 62; *SH-H.* pp. 127-128; *Hayākil*, p. 94.

²¹ "Self-subsistent substance". (*I-H.* 27a15; *SH-H.* p. 132; *Hayākil*, p. 95, l. 8; *Les Temples*, p. 50.)

²² *H-N.* pp. 62-63; *I-H.* 27a4-6, 8-9, 11-15; *SH-H.* pp. 127-129, 132; *Hayākil*, pp. 94-95.

VIII. It is the first (originated) light²³, and nothing is nobler than that light, to which all contingent beings finally return. It is a substance, which is possible in itself and necessary by virtue of the First (i.e. God). Its relation to the First as well as its vision of the Glory²⁴ of the First results in another sanctified substance. In contemplating both its own contingency and deficiency in respect to the First Grandeur, it gives rise to (the existence of) one other heavenly body. Similarly, the second sanctified substance, in its turn, by contemplating the one above itself generates another immaterial substance, and by contemplating its own deficiency a heavenly body. (And this process thus goes on) as far as the sanctified immaterial and intelligible substances multiply, as do the simple celestial as well as terrestrial bodies too.²⁵

IX. The sacred intelligible substances, though they are (independently and constantly) active, serve, nevertheless, as mediators for the generosity of the First (Light), which in turn becomes active by them. Just as the stronger light prevents the weaker one from illuminating independently, the Necessary Predominant Might, because of its abundant effusion and perfect power, does not equally permit the mediators to become independent. So, It remains beyond the infinity, and It is by itself out there in every (new) state and affair.²⁶

X. You must know that the worlds are three in number.²⁷ (1) The

²³ French translation adds this: "without an intermediary", which exists in none of the versions of the *Hayākil*. (*Les Temples*, p. 50.)

²⁴ "Jalālihi". But *I-H.* (27b6) gives "jamālihi" (His Beauty). *Hayākil* has both. (p. 95, l. 14.)

²⁵ *H-N.* p. 63. See also with slight textual variation, *I-H.* 27a16-17, 27b5-10; *SH-H.* pp. 133-4; *Hayākil*, p. 95.

²⁶ Cf. Qur'an, 55:29. *I-H.* 28a15-17; *H-N.* p. 63; *SH-H.* pp. 134-135; *Hayākil*, p. 96.

²⁷ Ghiyāth al-Dīn Shīrāzī claims that the number of the world, according to Suhrawardi, and his Ishraqi as well as Sufi followers, is four, and that for the majority of the philosophers it is three. He enumerates four kinds of worlds as follows: 1) the world of intellects, separated from the bodies. 2) the world of bodies, which encircles the Spheres and elements. 3) the world of Souls attached to the celestial as well as elemental bodies. 4) the world

first one is what the philosophers call "world of Intellect" ('*Ālam al-'Aql*). Intellect, in their terminology, is a substance which remains beyond the sensory designation. As such it exercises no control over the bodies. (2) The (second one is the) world of the Soul ('*Ālam al-Nafs*). The rational soul, though it is neither a body nor any dimension, (certainly) exercises control over the world of bodies. The rational souls are divided into, (i) those which act in the heavens, and (ii) those which act in human species. (3) The (third one is the) world of bodies. It also is divided into (i) the ethereal world (*athīrī*), and (ii) the world of elements ('*unṣūrī*').²⁸

XI. Among the dominant lights, namely the intellects, there is one which is our father, the lord of the theurgy of our species and the donor of our souls as well as the consummator of their both theoretical and practical perfection. This is the Holy Spirit or in the language of the philosophers, the Active Intellect. All of these dominant intellects are the divine immaterial lights. The First Intellect is the first on which rests the existence²⁹ and upon which illuminates the light of the First.³⁰ While descending, the intellects continue to redouble and multiply (their numbers) along with the increasing illuminations.

XII. As for the other intermediary intellects, in terms of causality and their intermediate position, they all are nearer to us; however, amongst them the remotest one is the nearest because of the intensity of its manifestness. So, the nearest of all is the Light of lights. Do you not see that out of (two different colours) black and white on one and the same surface, only white appears closer to us, for it corresponds most to the manifestation ? The First Light stands

of Imagination ('*Ālam al-Mithāl wa al-Khayāl*), designated as *Barzakh* (intermediary). This last type of world was also named by the ancient philosophers "world of forms". (*Les Temples*, pp. 78-9, n. 39.)

²⁸ *H-N.* p. 64; *I-H.* 28b10-13, 15-16, 29a2; *SH-H.* p. 136; *Hayākil*, p. 96.

²⁹ *H-N.* (p. 65) reads: "from which the existence proceeds." *Hayākil* (p. 97, l. 3) and *Les Temples* (p. 52) have the same, whereas *SH-H.* (p. 140) reads: "with which the existence terminates."

³⁰ One of the modern Turkish translators has rendered wrongly this phrase as follows: "The first illumination emanated from the First Intellect." (Yetkin, *Nur Heykelleri*, (1988), pp. 20-21.) On the contrary, however, the first origin of light is the Light of lights, ie. God.

at the highest height and at the nearest nearness. Glory be to the One who is at the remotest remoteness with respect to His rank, but He is at the nearest nearness with respect to His penetrating light of infinite intensity.³¹

XIII. The First (Being) as a preponderant principle is perpetual and always necessitates whatever is other than Itself. Accordingly, Its act of preponderance constantly perseveres because of the necessity of Its existence. As to the contingents, they are altogether dependent on nothing else than It. Moreover, there was nothing prior to them but only It (i.e., the First). It is dependent upon neither time nor condition, -as is the case (for instance) with our own actions, which we may delay, say for instance, until Thursday, or subordinate to the condition of the arrival of Zaid or that of the availability of an instrument- because none of these (conditions) was there before the contingents. The First, the Almighty, is in no way changeable, for, otherwise this would make Him desire something, which in fact He does not, or render Him potent, when He was never not so (impotent). Once you know that the rays radiate from the Sun, not the Sun from the rays and that the rays persevere by the perpetuity of the Sun, then you must never wonder at how the Truth (God) takes care of justice. So, what sort of damage can the Sun suffer from the perpetuity of its rays and the constancy of the small particles in its light?³²

1. The Attributes of God

I. Having borrowed the concept of Necessary Existent (*Wājib al-Wujūd*) from Avicenna, who originally devised it to serve a fundamental function in his proof of the existence of God, Suhrawardī proceeds to analyze the same concept within the framework of his illuminative

³¹ *H-N.* pp. 65-6; *I-H.* 29a4-7, 12-14, 17-29b1, 4-5, 6, 9-10; *SH-H.* pp. 137, 140, 142-143; *Hayākil*, pp. 96-97.

³² *H-N.* pp. 66-7; *I-H.* 29b12-13, 16-17, 30a1-2, 5, 7-8, 10-11, 13-14; *SH-H.* pp. 143-145, 147; *Hayākil*, pp. 97-98.

philosophy. His analysis, which has its sources again in the thought of Avicenna, outlines the essential descriptive "features" of that notion. He initially seeks to establish the oneness of the Necessary Existent, and hence God, based on several hypotheses.

The argument which Suhrawardī puts forward for the uniqueness of the Necessary Existent runs as follows: if we imagine that two separate entities were to share in the same necessity of existence simultaneously, then without doubt there would have to be a distinguishing element (*fāriq*), or in terms of logic a differentia, (*faṣl*) between them. But this will lead us eventually to the unavoidable conclusion that the existence of either one or both of them would be dependent upon this differentiating factor, which is impossible, simply because, in such a case, neither of them would any longer be necessary but contingent. Therefore, the Necessary Existent is solely one.

Such an argument, which takes at least its main features again from Avicenna,³³ is not adequate, according to Anḳaravī, to prove the oneness

³³ Avicenna has dedicated a chapter exclusively to the oneness of the Necessary Being in his enormous work, *al-Shifā', Ilāhiyyāt I*, under the chapter entitled "on that the Necessary Being is One". Therein he, after having eliminated various possible assumptions about the nature of the Necessary Being, has arrived at the conclusion that God as a Necessary Being by virtue of Himself is absolutely one. In addition to this, in the following parts of the same book, he also derives from an extensive analysis of the same concept a number of traits of God such as simple, incorporeal, pure intellect, truth, most beautiful, etc. (See, idem, *Ilāhiyyāt I*, pp. 43-54.)

of God, for it has been forcibly deduced from philosophers' malicious doubts and fanciful imaginations, which are not immune to confusion and blunder. It would even be worthless as a proof, he stresses, for the people who have already attained the vision of the Necessary Being, the Almighty, by the profound intuition of their sound minds and pure hearts.³⁴ In saying so, Anḳaravī undoubtedly seeks to remind us of the significance of the Sufi's self-ecstatic experience of the unity of God.

Dawwānī, on the other hand, remains rather on the borderlines of the philosophical tradition within which he first analyzes the notion of *wujūb* in conjunction with that of *wujūd*. In referring to al-Fārābī's and Avicenna's explanations, he says that the Necessary Being is the real and incommensurable existent. It is an existent, although not in the sense that it necessitates the existence of a subject, nor in that it appends or superadds existence to necessity or to other than necessity. By contrast, the Necessary Existent is by its very nature purely and absolutely distinct in itself and completely free from all external peculiarities. Furthermore, its existence is the very essence of itself.³⁵

Dawwānī, having elucidated the concept of the Necessary Being from the Peripatetic point of view, embarks upon an explanation of what he describes as "the taste of the people of Ishrāq". In the eyes of these

³⁴ *I-H.* 24b3-6.

³⁵ *SH-H.* p. 110.

people, he says, the light is in reality only one entity and not multiple in number at all. Yet in terms of its intensity, weakness, perfection and imperfection, it could be graded in variable degrees ranging from the most complete level of perfection, which is necessarily independent, to the most deficient level, which is fully dependent.³⁶

II. Next Suhrawardī discusses the relationship between the Necessary Existent and possible beings. He once again underlines the fact that in contrast to the former, which is One/single in every respect, the latter are multiple and comprise all heavenly as well as terrestrial entities. In addition, these contingents continuously require, for their actual existence, what he has termed "a preponderating principle" (*murajjih*), which is nothing less than the Necessary Existent Itself.

But how can one relate such a Unique Being to its so-called attributes? Or to put it in simpler terms, if God possesses attributes, how can it be possible that One God is associated with manifold attributes? And do they have the same nature as does the Former? These and similar controversial questions occupied a central place in the works and writings of both theologians and philosophers, especially in medieval times. Regardless of the extensive discussions and arguments both for and against elaborated in those books, these problems still remain unsettled and enigmatic.

³⁶ *SH-H.* pp. 111-112.

In his approach to the problem, Suhrawardī takes a negative attitude and establishes firmly that God, due to His very unity and necessity, does not allow Himself to be a substratum for attributes. This is because God, as a Necessary Being, is self-sufficient and independent, whereas the attributes are dependent and always need an abode, so to speak, for themselves.

To use Anḳaravī's own expression, the attributes of God are contingent and therefore not necessary, because they exist by virtue of something else not by virtue of themselves. As long as they are contingent, they stand in need of a preponderating principle, i.e. God, for their existence. In this case, God would be both acting and receiving, as in the case of a man whose intellect is in command and whose body responds to it.³⁷ This is impossible for God on account of the fact that this would make His immaterial essence composite.³⁸

Dawwānī, in his turn, remarks that the soul as an acting agent would sometimes be in a receiving position too. For instance, in the case of a person, he argues, who is treating his soul in order to safeguard it from spiritual diseases, the soul will be functioning simultaneously as both an agent and a recipient, which would mean that it is no longer one. In fact it

³⁷ *I-H.* 25a10-11. Dawwānī takes the agent as soul (*nafs*) and recipient as body (*badan*). (*S-H.* p. 116). But the Persian translation, as in Anḳaravī's, reads it as "intellect" instead of soul. (*Hayākil*, p. 93, l. 6.)

³⁸ *I-H.* 25a3-6.

is not really one in the true sense of the term, in so far as it comprehends many modes in itself. Furthermore, the real "one" is by definition a single entity that has no multiplicity in its essence nor in its attributes at all.³⁹

III. It is, then, only God as a Necessary Existent, who indeed deserves to be described as true unity. That is why Suhrawardī clearly isolates Him by all means from the attributes, which, not only by their plurality but by their obvious need of a substratum, definitely jeopardize His unmitigated unity. Meanwhile, it seems extremely difficult for one who believes on the one hand that God is absolutely one and maintains on the other that He possesses attributes, to reconcile the two, i.e., the unity of God and the diversity of His attributes. As has been already pointed out, this serious but exceedingly complicated issue had been the focus of long debates mainly among the two contending groups, theologians and philosophers in the medieval Islamic epoch, the former, as they classify themselves, being the supporters of the so-called orthodox Islam, while the latter representing pseudo heretical position.⁴⁰

³⁹ *SH-H.* pp. 116-117.

⁴⁰ For example, see Ibn Rushd, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence)*, trans. Simon Van Den Bergh (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), vol. 1, pp.186-221. In this remarkable book, the sixth chapter is devoted to a discussion of the attributes of God in which Ibn Rushd first resumes Ghazali's attack against the philosophers and then enunciates his own understanding of the issue. See also for a good summary of the differences between the doctrine of the Sufis and that of philosophers on the attributes of God, 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī, *The Precious Pearl al-Jāmī's al-Durrah al-Fakhirah Together with his Glosses and the Commentary of*

Clearly aware of this paradoxical situation, Anḳaravī chooses to declare his stance in favour of what he himself terms "the people of orthodox order (*mezheb-i sūnnet ve ehl-i cemā'at*)".⁴¹ He states that from what philosophers have said as regards the attributes of God, it can be inferred that the attributes are regarded as something other than God and that they are, moreover, all originated (*mūh̄des*). However, according to the orthodox school, they are neither God Himself nor other than Himself. The latter school, he adds, is also in agreement with some other theological sects (*firka*) on the co-eternity of those attributes with God.⁴²

Be that as it may, in Suhrawardī's succinct formulation God is unequivocally and absolutely one. Such a uniqueness brings in itself another attribute to Him: Perfectness (*kamāl*). His perfectness is in no way analogous to that of man. He is above any sort of deficiency and beyond any given location. He is the Truth who has no peer or rival. After all, He merits the possession of what is the nobler of two opposites, namely, as Dawwānī shows in a diametrical contrast, existence vis-à-vis absence, potency vis-à-vis weakness, knowledge vis-à-vis ignorance, perfection vis-a-vis imperfection. Since God, as Anḳaravī puts it, is the creator of Perfection

‘*Abd al-Ghafūr al-Lārī*, trans. with intro. and notes by Nicholas Heer (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979), p. 43, par. 27; p. 44, par. 28; p. 98, par. 20.

⁴¹ *I-H.* 25a15.

⁴² *I-H.* 25a15-25b1.

(*Kemal Āferin*), crowned with every excellence, He bestows perfection upon all incomplete and caused beings.⁴³

Dawwānī goes on to comment that in so far as He is the cause for uncovering the objects, God has the Knowledge; in so far as He is the principle of efficacy for the contingents, He has the potence; in so far as He is the principle of His overall Knowledge, identical with His essence, He has the will to particularize that which is the more proper of two contingents.⁴⁴

Another feature which Suhrawardī ascribes to God in the *Hayākil* is the fact that He, because of His simplicity and unity, disavows any sort of "composition" (*tarakkub*) or "embodiment" (*tajassum*). The former represents, in Suhrawardī's thought, Dawwānī says, "mental composition" (*al-tarakkub al-dhihnī*), whereas the latter stands for something more than the simple body or corporeality. By virtue of this, the cardinal idea that the Necessary Existent is one is further supplemented.⁴⁵

For a wise man, Dawwānī adds further, it is quite evident that God is the most perfect and most noble Being, because He himself is the real source of all goodness, perfection and nobility.⁴⁶ This could be better illustrated by the relationship between the sun and the world, where the

⁴³ *I-H.* 25b3-6.

⁴⁴ *SH-H.* p. 117.

⁴⁵ *SH-H.* p. 119.

⁴⁶ *SH-H.* p.120.

former in itself is fully light that enlightens the latter. Similarly, God in Himself is utter perfection that perfects all beings.

2. The Function of Light in the Metaphysics of Suhrawardī

IV. We have indicated on several occasions that the notion of light constantly stands as the cornerstone of Suhrawardī's philosophy of illumination. The fundamental role it plays in that system can be fully observed particularly in his *magnum opus*, *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*.⁴⁷ Nonetheless the book which forms the subject of Anḳaravī's commentary, *Hayākil al-Nūr*, highlights the principal aspects of its function rather in a terse style.

Suhrawardī, having postulated explicitly that light is the very basis of all reality, proceeds to formulate his initial proposition that light enters bodies accidentally and makes them appear and thus exist in reality, this in accordance with the degrees of its intensity. There may be bodies, however, which do not come into existence because of a shortage of the light. In the meantime, it should be noted as well that Suhrawardī has

⁴⁷ See for the full account of the theory of light developed by Suhrawardī, *H-I*. pp. 106-260. For a comparative study of the same theory with the Ancient Greek and Persian traditions and particularly with Platonic philosophy, refer to, H. Corbin, *En Islam Iranien, Aspects Spirituels et Philosophiques* (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1971) vol. 2 passim. For interpretation of the significant role of light in Suhrawardī's epistemology, see these two recently published works: Yazdi, *Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992); Ziai, *Knowledge and Illumination*.

elsewhere substituted the body (*jism*) for isthmus (*barzakh*), a notion which plays a somewhat cryptic role in his philosophy.⁴⁸

V. According to Suhrawardī, since bodies are not naturally capable of subsisting and thus actually existing by themselves, they are not found in a state of manifestation unless they are accidentally enlightened by an

⁴⁸ The term "isthmus" is suggested by H. Ziai and M. Fakhri as a translation for "barzakh" (pl. *barāzikh*) in the passage where Suhrawardī states: "the isthmus is the body" (*al-barzakh huwa al-jism*). (Ziai, *Knowledge and Illumination*, p. 170; Fakhri, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, p. 332.) It seems to me, however, that Suhrawardī is in fact inconsistent in his use of the term, which he employs in several instances. In the first place, he applies it to the bodies falling between that which is not light in itself and is independent of substratum, called "obscure substance" (*al-jawhar al-ghāsiq*) and that which is again not light in itself but a form for something else, called "dark form" (*al-hay'at al-zulmāniyya*). If the light is removed away from the bodies, they remain dark. (*H-I*, p. 107.) When it is a consideration of the location of the bodies, Ziai interprets it as "intermediary". In other place, however, Suhrawardī claims that "every *barzakh* is dark substance". (*H-I*, p. 108.) In this sense, although it initially is not a body, nevertheless later it may turn into body when it becomes receptive of light. In another place, he first makes divisions of the *barāzikh* and then says that "every monodic body is that which is not composed of two different *barzakhs*" (*H-I*, p. 187), which implies that it is something more basic than body. Therefore, as far as the relevant contexts in which Suhrawardī uses the term *barzakh* or its plural form, *barāzikh*, are concerned, it plays a triple role in the *Isḥrāqī* system: (i) it is simply a body receptacle of light; (ii) it denotes, as Prof. H. Landolt has suggested, "the physical world", regardless of whether it consists of terrestrial or celestial bodies, (see his "Suhrawardī's 'Tales of Initiation'," p. 477.); (iii) it has an eschatological function too, as H. Corbin pointed out: "...le barzakh a une signification eschatologique: c'est l'entre-deux-mondes, entre ce monde-ci et le saeculum futurum..." (See his translation of Suhrawardī's treatise "Strophes Liturgiques et Offices Divins {*Waridāt wa-Taqdīsāt*}," chapter in *L'Archange Empourpré*, p. 510, n. 92.) Cf. also its occurrence in the various contexts of the Qur'an, 25:53, 55:20, 23:100.

extraneous source that makes them visible. This is because by their very nature they are unable to perceive themselves. More accurately speaking, they in themselves possess no perceptive power that could enable them to subsist and exist by themselves, for, as Dawwānī and Anḳaravī have remarked: "a thing's perception of its own self, in Suhrawardī's view, means manifestation of that thing to itself".⁴⁹ If this is the case, then what kind of entity or being is able to conceive of itself? To this question, Suhrawardī responds, it is the rational souls which are manifest to themselves; therefore, they are all subsistent lights.

To this group, Dawwānī adds also all the animal souls on the ground that these too are apparent as well as perceptible to themselves but certainly in a different manner from the rational ones, which perceive of themselves by means of consciousness (*wijdān*), while animal souls do this by means of intuition (*ḥads*).⁵⁰

The souls as subtle lights do subsist by themselves and not by virtue of something exterior or inferior to them, e.g. bodies. This self-subsistence, as Suhrawardī has emphasized, enables them to become aware of their nature. Such an awareness or rather "self-awareness", which always involves light, marks the starting point of the process of knowledge in Suhrawardī. That is to say, a person only becomes cognizant of his own

⁴⁹ *I-H.* 26b2-3; *SH-H.* p. 123.

⁵⁰ *SH-H.* p. 126.

essence by means of such an immaterial light as rational soul, and he shares this consciousness with all other self-cognizant things.⁵¹

In any case, it is by an immaterial light that self-awareness is realized. This is in effect tantamount to what Fazlur Rahman calls "self-luminousness",⁵² which finds its real definition in Suhrawardī's own expression: "Everyone who conceives his own essence is a pure light; and every pure light is manifest to, and cognizant of its own essence".⁵³ It can therefore be deduced that the entire system of epistemology in the Illuminative Tradition operates exclusively within the scope of pure light, which may be conveniently identified with "self-consciousness".

It is for this reason that Suhrawardī here expressly confirms that rational soul is an immaterial light, sustained by its own essence, yet preponderated and engendered by the Necessary Existent. In other words, despite its superiority over the body, so long as it continues to be contingent, it needs for its actual existence the Necessary Being,⁵⁴ i.e., God, who is all-Living, Self-subsisting and Eternal and the most intensive light (*al-nūr al-shadīd*). Or as Dawwānī interprets: "He is the most perfect appearance, for He is not only manifest (*ẓāhir*) to Himself but also the

⁵¹ Ziai, *Knowledge*, p. 151.

⁵² Rahman, *Selected Letters of Shaikh Aḥmad Sirhindī* (Karachi: Iqbal Academy, 1968), p. 17.

⁵³ *H-I*. p. 114.

⁵⁴ *I-H*. 26b10-11; *SH-H*. p. 126.

cause (*muzhir*) for the appearance of others."⁵⁵

VI. It is interesting, however, that Suhrawardī attributes more or less the same characteristics of God to the rational soul. He even tries to prove the self-subsistence and eternity of the former through the very nature of the latter. He reasons that although the rational soul is self-subsistent and alive, nevertheless, due to the very nature of its contingency, it is not completely self-existent, and hence requires either another contingent or a necessary being to enable it to exist. But the former also stands in need of either another contingent or necessary, being, producing a continuous chain which goes an *ad infinitum*. Therefore, the rational soul ought to have an ultimate Necessary Being which causes it to exist, that is God Himself.⁵⁶

The Necessary Existent or God, nevertheless, is quite distinct from the rational soul in such a way that, although both of them are abstract lights, the former is the Light of all the lights including the latter as well. In other words, being the origin of all lights, It is the most intense light. That is why, for Suhrawardī, (and this is true also for al-Ghazālī),⁵⁷ God, due

⁵⁵ *SH-H.* p.120.

⁵⁶ *SH-H.* p. 127.

⁵⁷ The way Suhrawardī presents his ideas about the intensity of the Light of light corresponds almost exactly to the way in which Ghazālī set out his theory of light in his later work entitled *Mishkāt al-Anwār*. There he expressly states: "Glory to the One who hides Himself from the creation because of His utter manifestness; and He is veiled from them because of the illumination of His light". (Idem, *Mishkāt al-Anwār*, ed. Abū al-'Alā' 'Aḥīfī (Cairo: Dār al-Qawmiyya, 1382/1964), p. 64.) In spite of this affinity and many other common views shared by these two Muslim philosophers, they,

to His utter manifestness, remains hidden from the world. This is explained in Dawwānī's commentary by the maxim: "Something that goes beyond its extremity turns back to its opposite extremity".⁵⁸ Hence, God's extremely intensive luminosity would be the immediate cause of His invisibility.

3. The Emanation of the First Light

VII. Suhrawardī, after having delineated the major features of God with an emphasis on His Unity, Necessity and Luminosity, moves on to inquire into the process of emanation (*ṣudūr*) as described in the Peripatetic philosophy, or as it is designated in the Illuminative tradition, irradiation (*ishrāq*). The difficulty for Suhrawardī, as well as for certain of his

however, differ from each other in many ways. To enumerate all the points on which they disagree, unfortunately exceeds the scope of this study. Nonetheless, one significant point should be made here. Suhrawardī was put to death, according to some writers, for putting forward certain "unorthodox" ideas, contrary to the basic tenets of the Scripture. If so, then one could have quite fairly and equally accused al-Ghazālī, known as the Proof of Islam and the devoted defender of so-called orthodox Islam, of having held the similar opinions at least in his *Mishkāt*. Therefore, Suhrawardī's sentence was not simply due to his ideas but most likely because of the still obscure political intrigues. For the questionable issue as to what extent Ghazālī may be considered to have been an orthodox Muslim thinker, see the recently published article by H. Landolt, "Ghazālī and Religionswissenschaft," pp. 19-72.

⁵⁸ *SH-H*. p. 128: "al-shay' idhā jawaza ḥaddahu in'akasa 'ala diddihī". The same phrase has been reiterated by al-Ghazali too with a slight difference; see his *Mishkāt al-Anwār*, p. 62. Cf. its English rendering: "things that go beyond one extreme pass over to the extreme opposite." Ghazālī, *al-Ghazālī's Mishkāt al-Anwār ("The Niche For Lights")*, trans. with an intro. by W.H.T. Gairdner (Lahore: SH. Muḥammad Ashraf, 1991), p. 117.

predecessors, such as Avicenna, who has built his doctrine of cosmology upon that process, lies at the root of this theological question: How is it possible that intellects or lights, multiple in number, can proceed from One Necessary Being? How can one compromise the plurality of the former with the unity of the latter?

To begin with, Suhrawardī declares that inasmuch as He is essentially one, God generates by a process of illumination the first incorporeal light, which is also numerically one and immaterial. In saying so, his primary intent consists first and foremost in securing God's unmitigated unity even at this very early stage of emanation. The initial argument he formulates for this purpose comprises two closely interrelated notions: motives (*dawā'*) and wills (*irādāt*). These two terms, as one can easily discern from his own words, operate at the human level and are thereby related to the psychic functions of mind. But in so far as his psychology is concerned, they are confined mainly to the functions of the rational soul rather than those of the brain or mind. Whatever they may be, the point to be underscored here is the fact that motive and will are by no means attributable to God, for they would generate inevitably in mind a sort of diversity that causes multiplicity. This may be better understood in the light of Dawwānī's comments: "the incentives would induce Him (i.e. God) to various actions, and wishes would either follow these incentives or not."⁵⁹

⁵⁹ For "incentives" he uses the term "bawā'ith". (*SH-H*. p. 128.)

This means that various actions would result from various motives and wills, so both would lead to such an assumption that God is no longer one in His essence.

In this argument, Suhrawardī, according to Dawwānī, aims at refuting both the view of the Mu'tazilite school which denied God's will but admitted the flow of multiplicity from Him by virtue of diverse motives, and that of the Ash'arite school which believed firmly in God's having a will, making it the very foundation of everything including multiplicity, but not by virtue of diverse motives.⁶⁰

Since, Dawwānī goes on, He has no miscellaneous desires and wishes, then whatever action proceeds from Him must be one. In other words, if two different actions did flow from Him, then He would have to have two different demands dependent upon two separate directions in His essence,⁶¹ which is impossible.

VIII. Therefore, from God as such, who is not only unique in Himself but in His actions too, emanates the First, which is also one and resembles Him in many aspects. This First that overflows from Him, designated by Suhrawardī in conformity with his own technical vocabulary as "the First Light", and by Anḩaravī in conformity with the Peripatetic cosmology as "the

⁶⁰ *SH-H.* p. 129.

⁶¹ *SH-H.* p. 129.

First Intellect",⁶² should of necessity be both one and immaterial. It cannot be corporeal, in that this would require It to have shape, place, quantity, etc., nor form, which always dwells in object, nor soul, which needs body for its action.⁶³ Moreover it must be an independent substance that subsists by itself and apprehends its own essence as well as that of its own Originator.

Suhrawardī's whole theory of emanation seems have been modelled mainly on Avicenna's cosmology. To put it even more explicitly, the latter's cosmology, which operates entirely within the world of intellects and which features a descending order beginning with the First Intellect and ending up with the Tenth, i.e. Active Intellect, is reiterated in exactly the same pattern in Suhrawardī's system, albeit with two marginal modifications. The first is that the notion of intellect in the former is substituted for that of light in the latter. The second is that in Suhrawardī, the series of lights overflowing from the Pure Light, i.e. the Light of Lights, terminates not with the Tenth, viz. Active Intellect, as in the case of Avicenna, but, by contrast, far exceeds the number ten. He does believe, nonetheless, that the series of lights is finite in number.⁶⁴

⁶² *ʿAql-i Evvel (al-ʿAql al-Awwal)*. (I-H. 27a10.)

⁶³ *SH-H*. p. 132.

⁶⁴ In the treatise under examination, viz. *Hayākil al-Nūr*, the author Suhrawardī has of course given a succinct summary, so to speak, of his *Ishrāqī* wisdom, but not in the detailed form one might have expected from the author of *Hikmat al-Ishrāq*. Besides, he has shown no great care in the

In his interpretation of Suhrawardī's account of emanation, Anḳaravī first outlines the whole system and then substantiates it by referring us to the following Prophetic hadith, which is wide-spread in mystic circles:

God created first the intellect and said to it to draw near, and so it drew near. Afterwards, He commanded it to ponder, and so it pondered. Then He stated: "Upon my Might and Glory! I have never originated a creature more noble than you..."⁶⁵

In his small treatise entitled *Miṣbāḥū'l-Esrār*, Anḳaravī restates the same hadith in somewhat detailed and elaborated fashion while at the same time displaying his allegiance to the mystical path:

...before the manifestation of His (viz. God) attributes, He displayed first the most apparent of all apparent things, the Light of lights, that is the spirit of his chosen and beloved Muhammad. This spirit is, according to the Sufi Ṣeyhs, the Moḥammadan essence (*al-ḥaqīqa al-Muḥammadiyya*), is called by the Sages (*al-Ḥukamā'*) the First Intellect, the First Cause and the Supreme Pen (*al-qalam al-a'lā*), as was reported in this hadith: "The first that God created was the intellect. The first that God created was the pen. The first that God created was my light, and the first that God created was my spirit."⁶⁶

In the ensuing lines of the same treatise, he notes that, regardless of how

former book, to distinguish clearly his own views from the Peripatetic ideas. Therefore, one should refer, for his comprehensive doctrine of emanation, to the his latter work. (*H-I*. pp. 131-139.)

⁶⁵ *I-H*. 27b1-3. The hadith that "the first thing God created was the intellect" is quoted mostly by the Sufis among Sunnis. See William C. Chittick, *Faith and Practice of Islam Three Thirteenth Century Sufi Texts* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), p. 211, n. 76.1.

⁶⁶ Anḳaravī, *Miṣbāḥū'l-Esrār*, folio 3, lines. 27-31.

it is referred to by the various schools (Muḥammadan essence by mystics, First Intellect by philosophers, First Pen by theologians, etc.), the ultimate analysis of all these terms, though conceptually diverse, may be conveniently reduced to one and the same reality, i.e. the Light by which all the essential names of God, His attributes and actions, as well as the true natures of the beings, become visible.⁶⁷

Basing himself on this same prophetic tradition, Anḳaravī goes on to comment that the first light, brought into being by the Necessary Light and then placed at the zenith of all contingents, exhibits on its own three different illuminative roles. At the very outset, it visualizes the Glory (*Celāl*) and Beauty (*Cemāl*) of its Originator, thereby giving birth to another dignified light, called the Second Intellect. In its second vision (*mūṣāhede*), it apprehends its own essence and necessity, so that it gives rise to a heavenly soul (*nefs-i semāvī*), called the universal soul (*nefs-i kullī*). At last, it perceives the contingency as well as the inadequacy of its own essence, thereby bringing into existence a heavenly body (*cūrm-ū semāvī*), i.e. is the sphere of Aṭlās, or as it is described in the terminology of the Scripture, the Magnificent Throne (*'arṣ-i mecīd*).⁶⁸ Among these three visual roles of the first light, Anḳaravī remarks, the first one, namely its vision of God's Beauty

⁶⁷ Ibid., folio 3, lines. 31-34.

⁶⁸ I-H. 27b11-17.

and Glory, holds the most esteemed place.⁶⁹ It is for this reason that this particular vision generates the Second Intellect which takes up its rank just after the first.

The universal soul, he further adds, moves and governs the throne just as the rational soul does the body. In other words, the motion of the throne takes place because of its love and yearning for the First Intellect.⁷⁰

The Second Intellect, in its turn, also executes a triple function exactly similar to the first one. Through a vision of its creator, it brings about the third intellect. And through the perception of its own necessity, it originates the soul of the starry sphere,⁷¹ while by the perception of its own contingency it issues forth the body of the starry sphere.⁷² This process is repeated until it reaches the creation of the simple celestial as well as terrestrial bodies.⁷³

Here it must be pointed out that in the original Arabic version of *Hayākil al-Nūr*, Suhrawardī ascribes therein only two kinds of visions to the intellect; vision of its originator and that of its contingency. Anḳaravī, however, who bases himself most likely on the Persian translation,

⁶⁹ *I-H.* 27b12.

⁷⁰ *I-H.* 28a2-3.

⁷¹ "Nefs-i Feleki'l-Bürūc".

⁷² "Cürm-ü Feleki'l-Bürūc".

⁷³ *I-H.* 28a8-9.

increases this number to three with the addition of the vision of its necessity.⁷⁴

The commentator Dawwānī talks relatively less about the process of effusion of the lights. Rather, he offers a meticulous explanation for certain phrases in the text in the light of Suhrawardī's other works. While reviewing the expression, "al-nūr al-ibdā'ī al-awwal," meaning "the first originated light," he draws attention to the four elements which play no role whatsoever in the original existence of the First Light: (1) matter, (2) time, (3) an instrument, and (4) a mediator.⁷⁵ To this, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Shīrāzī, according to Corbin's explanatory notes,⁷⁶ puts forward a counter-argument, indicating that it is true that the First Light is preceded neither by matter nor by an interval of time, but to say that it is the only one which is brought into existence without an intermediary, as Dawwānī does, would be incorrect. This is because not only that Light but all the Archangelic Dominant Lights can be described as *ibdā'īya*⁷⁷ as well (meaning that they

⁷⁴ On this matter, Corbin, who follows the Persian version in his translation of these lines, says that the Arabic text omitted the third dimension of contemplation. (*Les Temples*, p. 78, n. 36.)

⁷⁵ *SH-H*. p. 133.

⁷⁶ *Les Temples*, p. 78, n. 34.

⁷⁷ Cf. Ibn Sīnā's definition of *ibda'*: "If <*muḥdath*> {the generated} comes into existence after its sheer non-existence, then this would mean that it emanates from a cause; therefore this type of emanation would be that of origination (*ibdā'*). (Idem, *Ilāhiyyāt I*, p. 267.)

all were originated without any mediator).⁷⁸ Therefore what best specifies the First is the mere fact that it is the First.⁷⁹

IX. At the end of his investigation of the intellects, Suhrawardī touches briefly upon the functions that they perform, saying that the sacred intelligible substances, in that they are all active intellects, serve as mediators for the generosity of the First Existent. But this intimates, though not explicitly, that in order to exercise His generosity the First Absolute Being stands in need of intercessors. This would be inconceivable and even contradictory to the view that God is the uncaused originator of the intellects. This obvious dilemma, overlooked for unknown reasons by Anḳaravī, does not escape Dawwānī's attention, who brings forward a plausible resolution to it. By this, the actual goal of the Sages, he asserts, is to establish viable means for themselves whereby they could justify safely the emanation of the "multiplicity" from the unity, i.e. from the unity of God. In doing so, they do not disavow God's effect upon the intellects.⁸⁰ So, the concept of intermediacy, for Dawwānī, could possibly mean "dependency" in the sense that intellects are made subservient to their Originator inasmuch as they serve as His assistants in circulating His luminosity, so to speak.

⁷⁸ This was partly reproduced in the footnote to Dawwānī's commentary by the editor. (*SH-H.* p. 133, n. 2.)

⁷⁹ *Les Temples*, p. 78, n. 34.

⁸⁰ *SH-H.* p. 135.

The lights, whose strengths vary with the degrees of their intensity are graded in such a way that the more powerful one becomes dominant over the less powerful when the inter-relation amongst them runs in a downward manner, which is accordingly characterized by Suhrawardī as the order of domination. On the other hand, if the inter-relation operates in the reverse direction, namely, in an ascending order from the lower to the upper degrees of intensity, then it is defined as that of love.⁸¹ Such inter-relations, however, cease to exist ultimately in the "Necessary Dominant Light", because, as an Absolute Independent Being, It may reach anywhere by virtue of Its own unlimited power.

4. The Hierarchy of the Worlds

X. Of the three worlds that Suhrawardī classifies in his *Hayākil al-Nūr*, i.e. that of *'uqūl*, that of *nufūs*, and that of *ajsām*, the first one has no direct connection with the last. The reason is that every intellect, like every soul, is a pure substance,⁸² and none of them can be perceived by senses. The rational soul, which unlike the intellect operates as a perceptive power of the universals⁸³, governs the human body. All bodies, as

⁸¹ "The lower light cannot encompass the higher light, because the higher light dominates the other...When the lights are multiplied, the higher has a domination over the lower, while the lower has a love and desire (*shawq wa 'ashq*) for the higher."(*H-I*. pp. 135-6.)

⁸² *SH-H*. p. 136.

⁸³ *SH-H*. p. 136.

Anḳaravī puts it, are of two groups: (i) celestial bodies (*el-ecsāmü'l-felekiyye*) that constitute the ethereal world, and (ii) elemental bodies, which are composed of the four elements (*'anāşır-ı erba'a*) and three kingdoms of nature (*mevālid-i selāse*).⁸⁴ Meanwhile, in *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, Suhrawardī adds one more world, called "the world of imagination" (*'ālam al-Mithāl*),⁸⁵ where exist "the suspended forms and the regent angels".⁸⁶

XI. Suhrawardī has singled out one dominant intellect out of all the others, providing for it about six vivid descriptions:

- (a) Our Father (*Abūnā*),
- (b) The Lord of the theurgy of our species (*Rabbu Ṭilsimi Naw'inā*)
- (c) The Donor of our souls (*Mufīḏi Nufūsinā*),
- (d) The Perfecter of them, i.e. our souls (*Mukammilihā*)
- (e) The Holy Spirit (*Rūḥ al-Quds*)
- (f) The Active Intellect (*al-'Aql al-Fā'āl*)

Interestingly enough, Anḳaravī, while commenting on this important matter, specifies the number of these intellects as "ten," calling the last one "the Active Intellect," which is somewhat exceptional to the general Sufi understanding, particularly to the followers of Ibn 'Arabī, who, as H. Landolt points out, regards as "a lower angel by the name of Ismā'īl",⁸⁷ and not as

⁸⁴ *I-H.* 29a4. Also refer, for a brief account of these worlds, to the Prolegomena of Anḳaravī, the first chapter of Part II.

⁸⁵ *H-I.* p. 243. Suhrawardī also calls it *'ālam al-takhayyul* by which we would be able to compose images and forms in our mind. See his "Kitāb al-Lamahāt," in *Three Treatises*, ed. Najaf Gholi Habibi (Tehran: Imperial Iranien Academy of Philosophy, 1397/1977), p. 175.

⁸⁶ *H-I.* p. 243.

⁸⁷ Landolt, "Suhrawardī's Tales of Initiation," p. 480.

"a Holy Spirit" or "Gebrail" to which Anḳaravī makes no objection. On the contrary, he takes it exactly in the sense that Suhrawardī gives it, and even goes further when he interprets it as "the governor of the world of elements",⁸⁸ which brings him closer to the thinking of the Peripatetics in this area.⁸⁹

Anḳaravī illustrates the term "mufīḍ" by the term "bakhshende", a word of Persian origin meaning "the giver", which he has borrowed most likely from the Persian translation of *Hayākil*.⁹⁰ At the same time he identifies all the incorporeal intellects with the Archangels or Cherubim (*Karūbiyyūn*).⁹¹

Incidentally, Suhrawardī's description of the Active Intellect as Father might have drawn the criticism of his opponents⁹² for the simple reason that in treating the notions of Active Intellect or Holy Spirit as synonymous

⁸⁸ *I-H.* 29a9-10.

⁸⁹ For the development of the concept of Active Intellect in Peripatetic philosophy, see Herbert A. Davidson, "Alfarābī and Avicenna On the Active Intellect", *Viator* 3 (1972), pp. 109-178.

⁹⁰ *I-H.* 29a10; *Hayākil*, p. 96, l. 20. In the meantime, it is worth mentioning that Suhrawardī himself has designated the Active Intellect as "rawanbakhsh", meaning "the donor of the souls", that exactly corresponds to the present context. (*H-I.* p. 201.) In addition, he labels it as Gabriel, the proximate father, the Giver of the life and virtue, the Governing light, and the lordly agent of the human being (*Isfahbad al-nāsūt*). (*H-I.* pp. 200-201.)

⁹¹ *I-H.* 29a12; cf. Ibn Sīnā, *Ilāhiyyāt II*, p. 435.

⁹² Corbin, "Le livre Du Verbe Du Soufisme", *L'Archange Empourpré*, p. 176, n. 29.

with that of Father, he may have been regarded as demonstrating to some extent sympathy towards the Trinitarian doctrine of Christianity. However, he was firmly of the opinion that Christians were mistaken in claiming that God has a son. In their books, he alleges, the term "Father" (*al-ab*) is used in the sense of "Principle Originator" (*al-mubdi'*), that is, the Necessary Being.⁹³ On the other hand, the relationship between the Holy Spirit and the Word (*Kalima*), viz. the Son, must be understood in the scheme of causal linkage (*al-tasabbub*).⁹⁴ It is just like the relation of our visual perception to the sun. In other words, for Suhrawardī, the Holy Spirit is the Bestower of the human species which informs all human beings, including Jesus, as is seen in the address by the Holy Spirit to Mary, the mother of Jesus: "I am only a Messenger of Your Lord to grant a pure son to you".⁹⁵

Be that as it may, the Active Intellect, in Suhrawardī's view, has several important functions related to the terrestrial world. It is this particular intellect that gives us the souls and perfects them theoretically and practically.⁹⁶ Like all other intellects, it is a light with powerful illumination.

XII. Among the intellects, the First Intellect at first, according to

⁹³ Suhrawardī, *Kalimat al-Taṣawwuf*, p. 115.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Qur'an, 19:19; Suhrawardī, *Kalimat al-Taṣawwuf*, p. 104.

⁹⁶ This is in a way reminiscent of Avicenna who already held that the rational soul is perfected through theoretical and practical wisdom but not the Active Intellect. See Ibn Sīnā, "Aqsām al-'Ulūm", p. 225.

Suhrawardi, originally receives illumination (*ishrāq*) from the Light of lights, while the Second One receives illumination accordingly from both the First and the Light of lights, and hence this gradual process of illumination continues until they are multiplied in number.⁹⁷

All the intermediary intellects between the First Principle and those which are illuminated, or caused, as Dawwānī puts it, by the Former, seem nearer to us in terms of causality. Yet, as far as the intensity of light is concerned, the intellect at the remotest distance in the above sense is actually the most proximate one,⁹⁸ because it is the nearest to the source of luminosity, namely the Light of lights.

5. God as a Preponderant Being

XIII. In the last section of this Temple, Suhrawardī concentrates on one particular characteristic of God, i.e. what Suhrawardī calls "Murajjih", and which I have rendered here as "Preponderating Principle," indicating "an agent tipping the scales of a contingent in favour of its existing".⁹⁹

By this notion, a great deal of stress is once again laid upon the fact that God, being Self-Subsistent, Alive, Pure Light, and Necessary Existent, is absolutely free in His own actions, and in contrast to the contingents, He

⁹⁷ *SH-H.* p. 142.

⁹⁸ *SH-H.* p. 142.

⁹⁹ See for the various usages of this term by several Muslim philosophers in medieval times, Davidson, *Proofs for Eternity*, pp. 56, 162.

is not dependent upon anything except Himself, nor is He determined by any condition and time as in the case of man. However, this does not mean, according to Dawwānī, that God has no choice. On the contrary, He definitely possesses an eternal will (*irāda qadīma*) that precedes His action not in time but in essence.¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, Suhrawardī's primary goal here, Dawwānī specifies, is to substantiate the pre-eternity of God's own actions.¹⁰¹

Finally, the idea that "the rays of the sun persevere by the perpetuity of the latter" raises a serious question, as Anḳaravī points out, one which in fact menaces a particular doctrine of Orthodox Islam. In applying the idea of God, Suhrawardī implies that the permanence of all the contingent beings, all of the intellects, souls and both heavenly and earthly bodies, endure by virtue of the permanence of God just as the rays of the sun continue to exist by virtue of the perpetual existence of the sun. This crucial idea is contrary to what the Orthodox Muslim holds. But Anḳaravī tries to resolve this issue by making reference to a Qur'anic verse: "...Everything that exists will perish except His own face..."¹⁰² One can avoid, he argues, this inevitable consequence when we take "the thing" (*şey*) to be "the

¹⁰⁰ *SH-H.* p. 143.

¹⁰¹ *SH-H.* p. 144.

¹⁰² Qur'ān, 28:88; *I-H.* 30b2.

essence of that thing", not the thing itself.¹⁰³ Furthermore, al-Bayḍāwī, the great exegete of the Qur'an, has found it acceptable to refer the personal pronoun "hu" (him or it) at the end of the word "wajhahu" (his or its face) to the thing itself, namely the essence of the thing.¹⁰⁴ In acknowledging this exceptional interpretation, we can deduce that "everything that exists will perish except its quiddity.

¹⁰³ *I-H.* 30b1.

¹⁰⁴ *I-H.* 30b2.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE FIFTH TEMPLE

I. You should know that every generated event (*ḥādīth*) requires a generated cause¹. And the same reasoning equally applies to the latter cause too. It follows necessarily then that the series (of causes) would regress (*yatasalsal*) infinitely without a beginning, so long as the same logic continues to repeat itself for every initial generated cause. But without doubt this (chain) ceases with something, which is necessarily renewed in itself and succeeded by itself.² That which requires renewal for itself is motion. Now, it is enduring circular motion (only), among all the others, that never ceases and thus is proper to be the cause of generated events. This is the motion of the celestial spheres. It is this motion again which is the cause of the events taking place in our world.

II. Given that the First Agent is unchangeable, It cannot be the [immediate]³ cause of the temporal motions. If there were no motions of celestial spheres, no event would take place. On the other hand, the motions of the celestial spheres are not of (their) nature, since a celestial sphere departs from every point towards which it (initially) aimed (to move); whereas natural movement, when it gets to the point where it aimed, stops, because it cannot escape by nature from what it desires. Therefore, its motion (i.e., the motion of the celestial sphere) cannot be other than voluntary motion.⁴

III. What sets the sphere in motion is by all means its own soul. The soul's action in moving the body of the sphere is a kind of choice. But the movement of the body of the sphere through the motion of the soul is of a coercive sort. If we consider the body of the sphere

¹ Instead of "cause", *H-N.* (p. 68) has "something".

² This complete phrase exists only in *SH-H.* (p. 148) and ms. M1 of *H-N.* (p. 68, n. 4.)

³ *Les Temples*, p. 54.

⁴ *H-N.* pp. 68-9; *I-H.* 30b3-6, 8-9, 10-11, 13-14, 15-16, 31a2-5, 15-16; *SH-H.* pp. 147, 150-153; *Hayākīl*, 98-99.

to be one thing on its own and its soul to be another on its own, (we understand that) the motion of the sphere takes place through the movement of the soul (of that sphere). In this case, the motion of the sphere would be coercive with respect to its soul. But if we assume them (i.e. the sphere and its soul) together to be one and the same thing, its motion (i.e. the motion of the sphere) would be volitional.⁵ Therefore, it is alive and perceptive.⁶

IV. The celestial spheres need not be fed nor grow up nor engender. They have no passion nor rival nor resistant for themselves in their existence. They even have no wrath. Their motion is not for the inferior, because the inferior has no value for them at all.⁷

V. Now, when we purify ourselves from the preoccupations of the body and contemplate the grandeur of God, the Light of the Glory⁸ that spreads out and the Light that effuses from that Glory upon the beings, we find in ourselves shining flashes and orienting illuminations and we also visualize lights and thus attain our goals.⁹ What do you think about the individuals¹⁰ whose forms (*hay'āt*) are noble, whose shapes (*ṣuwar*) are perpetual and whose bodies are changeless, and which are secured from corruption by virtue of their remoteness from the world of oppositeness? They have no impediment at all, and therefore they continuously take illuminations from the Supreme Lights of God as well as aid from the divine

⁵ The whole text up to here is omitted both in *I-H* and *Hayākīl*.

⁶ *H-N*. p. 69; *SH-H*. pp. 153-4; *I-H*. 31a16.

⁷ *I-H*. (31b3-4) and *Hayākīl* (p. 99, l. 6) read: "Their motion is not for the lower world (*al-'alam al-sufli*), because that world has no value for them." The whole phrase is omitted in *Les Temples*.

⁸ "al-khurra al-bāsiṭa" instead of which *I-H*. has "al-ajrām al-bāsiṭa", does not exist in *Hayākīl*.

⁹ Yūsuf Ziyā and H. Ziya Ülken have rendered the last phrase as: "We visualize the lights so that we will be liberated from the needs." (Ziyā, *Hayākīlū'n-Nur*, p. 12; Ülken, "Şehabeddin Sühreverdi, Nur Heykelleri," p. 72.)

¹⁰ The Persian translation reads: The divine noble individuals (*ashkhāṣṣ karīm rabbānī*). (*Hayākīl*. p. 99) Anḳaravī, accordingly, reads "ilāhiya" for "al-hay'a". (*I-H*. 31b14.)

subtleties. On the other hand, had their desire been not persistent, their movements would have been discontinued.¹¹

VI. Each celestial soul has a beloved from the Supreme World, which is different from the beloved of another (celestial soul).¹² It (the beloved) is a dominant light and at the same time it is, by its own light, the cause of the existence and perpetuity of the celestial soul. It is also an intermediary between the celestial soul and the First, the Almighty.¹³ By this intermediary, it (i.e., celestial soul) visualizes the Glory of God and thereby obtains His Blessings (*barakātihi*). From every illumination (*ishrāq*), originates a movement. And through every movement, it becomes prepared to receive another illumination. And by the renewal of the movements, the illuminations perpetually renew themselves, as do the movements by the renewal of the illuminations. Owing to such reciprocal continuous renewals, the generation of the temporal events in the inferior world take place. If, on the other hand, these illuminations and movements did not take place, then from the generosity of God, no more than a limited amount would emerge, and besides, the emanation from His superabundance would cease, (which is unlikely) for the First Almighty permits no alteration in His own essence even, nor does It cause an alteration (in that emanation). Therefore, owing to the generosity of God as well as the persistent ecstasy¹⁴ of the divine lovers (*ushshāq al-ilāhīn*), the temporal events continue perpetually. The movements of the celestial souls are for the benefit¹⁵ of the inferiors (*sāfilīn*). These movements, however, do not bring the things into existence, but rather they create aptitudes; and the First Truth

¹¹ *H-N*. p. 70; *I-H*. 31b5-6, 8-9, 10-11, 13-15, 17-32a2, 5; *SH-H*. pp. 155-157; *Hayākil*, p. 99.

¹² That is, each celestial soul has its own beloved.

¹³ *Hayākil* reads "God the Almighty" (*Ḥaqq Ta'ālā*) (p. 99, l. 18), whereas *I-H*. has "the First Truth" (*al-Ḥaqq al-Awwal*) (32a11.) Corbin renders it as "le Premier Etre" (the First Being). (*Les Temples*, p. 55.)

¹⁴ Abū Rayyān's edition (*H-N*), in contrast to the text found in Dawwānī (*SH-H*) and Anḳaravī (*I-H*), replaces ecstasy (*wajd*) with existence (*wujūd*). The Persian translation (*Hayākil*, p. 100, l. 6), however, mistakenly has "wa ḥaddī", which does not fit the present context properly, and therefore should read "wajdī".

¹⁵ "Nafa'a", not "taqa'a" as *H-N* (p. 71) has it.

grants for everything that which corresponds to its own aptitude. Since the Agent is never altered, the thing caused by that Agent is renewed only by virtue of the renewal taking place in the aptitude of the recipient. A given thing may renew its effect and vary in the course of the renewal of the states of the recipient and by the alterations of those states but not by those of its own state. Consider, for instance, a single man who neither moves nor changes, but appears to be moving to the one(s) facing him, say, mirrors, for example, which reflect him in such various images as small, big, pure or impure (depending on the shapes of the mirrors). So, his appearance (in those mirrors) in diverse figures as such - whether he be small or big or pure or impure- would not be due to the person himself who is the possessor of the image nor due to his change but certainly because of the (variable) capacity of each mirror. Therefore the Grand and Almighty Truth has tied stability with stability and change with change so that He perpetuates the good and maintains the effusion persistently without stopping His benevolence, for His generosity¹⁶ is neither incomplete nor defective nor is it cut off on either side (i.e. it has no beginning and no end).¹⁷

VII. Generosity means to donate that which is convenient without demanding anything in compensation for it,¹⁸ (because) whosoever donates in order to obtain compensation is penurious. Whereas the rich is the one who is self-sufficient in his essence and perfection and needs nobody other than himself. The absolutely rich is the One whose Existence is by His own Essence, that is the Light of lights (*Nūr al-Anwār*). He has no purpose in His creation. On the contrary, His own Essence is indeed overflowing with benevolence. He is the absolute Sovereign, and the absolute Sovereign is the One on Whom depends the essence of everything, though His own Essence

¹⁶ Dawwānī says, "His existence" (*wujūdihī*). (*SH-H.* p. 167.)

¹⁷ *H-N.* pp. 70-72; *I-H.* 32a7-8, 10-13, 16, 33a1-2, 3-5, 7-8, 10-33a1, 2-3, 6-8, 12-14, 33b2, 7-8, 10-11; *SH-H.* pp. 157-163, 165, 167; *Hayākil*, 99-101.

¹⁸ Suhrawardī seems to have borrowed this definition of "jūd" from Ibn Sīnā who has already articulated it in his *al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt*, (vol. 3, p. 555): "al-Jūd huwa ifādatu ma yanbaghī la li'awaḍin", which was rendered into French by M. Goichon as follows: "La générosité est le don de ce qui convient sans égard à une compensation." (Idem, *Livre Des Directives et Remarques*, p. 398.)

belongs to nothing.

VIII. It is inconceivable that the "existence" (*al-wujūd*) be more perfect than it is, as it is, because the Essence of the Truth never requires that which is lower in value, (at the expense of) leaving aside that which possibly might be higher. On the contrary, what is indispensable for His Essence is that which is higher and the highest. Similarly, the reverse of the light is higher than the reverse of its reverse. Therefore it is impossible that existence be more perfect than it is as it is. And that which is impossible cannot enter into the capacity of anyone who has potency.¹⁹

IX. Those who prolong the discourse on the subject of Good and Evil are the people who assume that the one which is higher turns towards the one which is lower and also imagine that God has no other world beyond this clod of darkness²⁰ and that beyond these creatures²¹ He has no other nobler creatures. But they know not whether if all what actually happened had happened otherwise, this would have necessarily given rise to wicked events as well as corruption of the world-order in a manner incomparable to what they now imagine. Hence, this is the utmost possible stage of the order. The world that has no scope for diseases and defects is another world to where the pure ones amongst our souls will return. It is not the case that those sacred and sublime beings have no occupation other than uncovering the veils of decency, taking away the sucking (orphan) infants from the arms of their nurses, inflicting sufferings on the innocent, implanting (the seeds of) ignorance, leading the souls astray, honouring the ignorant, and grieving the erudite. (No), their business, in contrast to all, this is to meditate upon the lights of God the Exalted in every respect. The motions of these souls result in some inescapable consequences conducive to harm (of inferior worlds). If, on the other hand, they were in such a position that they would be beneficial for them (rather than harmful), then this could inflict harm on some other worlds, because they move not for the sake of the inferior worlds. However, their motions are indeed due to something that falls on them from the eternal radiations as well as

¹⁹ *H-N*. pp. 72-73; *I-H*. 33b13-15, 34a2, 3-4, 6-8, 12-13, 14, 16-17; *SH-H*. pp. 168-171, 174, 177; *Hayākil*, pp. 101.

²⁰ I.e. "ālam al-'anāšir" (the world of elements). (*SH-H*. p. 178.)

²¹ I.e. "al-ḥayawānāt nātiqihā wa ṣāmituhā" (human beings and beasts). (*SH-H*. p. 178.)

from the divine lights. Both the great reverence that seizes them in the divine stations and the sacred dominant irradiations become so overwhelmingly influential on them that they cannot glance at even their own essences, let alone those of others. Nevertheless, they know all that is manifest and hidden; nothing escapes their knowledge and that of their Lord.

X. (All) that has been said regarding the necessary perpetuity of their movements can serve as a proof for the demonstration of the celestial bodies and also for their not being composed of the elements as well as for their being secured from corruption. Were they composed of them, they would eventually disintegrate and their movements would not be perpetual. Therefore, they have nothing to do with elements at all. In this connection, the warm moves only upwards by nature, just because it is light; whereas the cool moves downwards, for it is dense. And the humid admits and quits with ease a formation, conjunction and disjunction; the dry hardly admits them. The celestial spheres are not distorted at all, and they move not in a straight line nor towards the centre nor from the centre. Their movements, in contrast, are circular, turning around the centre. So, they are neither dense nor light nor warm nor cool nor humid nor dry. But they are of a fifth nature and surround the earth. If they were not so, i.e. if the sky did not surround the earth, the sun, when it sets in the west, could return to the east only by doubling the day. So, all the heavenly bodies are spherical, surrounded by one another, alive, rational, lovers of the sacred radiations, and obedient to their Originator; and there is nothing mortal in the ethereal world.²²

XI. The first established²³ relation that takes place in existence is the relation of the Existing and Subsisting Substance to the First Eternal Self-Subsistent. This relation is the mother and the noblest of all relations. It (i.e. the former) loves the First (i.e., the latter); and the First, due to Its Self-Subsisting Light, is so victorious and dominant over the other that It makes it too incapable to comprehend It and fathom the very essence of Its light. The relation mentioned here comprises two dimensions: Love (*maḥabba*) and domination (*qahr*). And one of these two dimensions is nobler than the other.

²² *H-N.* 73-76; *I-H.* 34b6-7, 8-9, 10, 11-13, 16-17, 35a1-4, 9, 11-12, 16-17, 35b1, 4-5, 7-8, 9-10, 11-12, 14-17, 36a3-6, 10, 12-13, 16, 17, 36b1; *SH-H.* pp. 177-183, 186-187; *Hayākil*, 101-103.

²³ "Established" (*thābit*) does exist only in *SH-H.* (p. 189.)

The same relation prevails throughout the universes in such a way that all the various groups of the beings become joined to form a pair. So, all substances are divided into corporeal and incorporeal; and incorporeal is dominant over the corporeal, and it is also an object of its love.²⁴ Then one of the two sides becomes inferior. Similarly, immaterial substance is categorized into two groups: one is that of the superior and dominant, the other is that of the inferior in rank, dominated and caused²⁵. Again, bodies too are classified too into ethereal and elemental. Some of the ethereal bodies are subdivided into those leading to bliss and those leading to domination, even they are further divided into two luminaries, one of which is the like of Intellect and the other the like of Soul. In the same manner, there is a superior one and an inferior, and the one on the right and the one on the left; and there is also the orient and the occident. Among animals, there is male and female. So, the perfect forms a couple with the imperfect so as to conform itself to the principal relation. He knows (this to be true), who understands the word of God: "And of everything we have created pairs, that you may perhaps contemplate."²⁶ Since the Light is the noblest of the beings, the noblest of the bodies is the most luminous. This is the most sacred father, sovereign, *the powerful Hurakhsh*, the triumphant over darkness, the master of the sky, the Maker of day, the fully strong and perfect, the thaumaturge (the possessor of the wonders), the most magnificent of divine form, spreading its radiations over bodies but receiving nothing from them. (In this sense) it is the most perfect image of God and His most Magnificent Face. After this (i.e., the sun), ensue some other great sovereign beings, particularly the happiest sovereign and the owner of the good and blessings. Glory be to the One Who originates it, Blessed be God, the best of the Creators.²⁷

²⁴ "and its cause" (*SH-H.* p. 190; *Les Temples*, p. 60; *Ẓiyā, Heyākilū'n-Nūr*, p. 591; Yetkin, *Nur Heykelleri*, p. 28.)

²⁵ Instead of "caused" (*ma'lūl*), *Dawwānī* has "passive" (*munfa'il*). (*SH-H.* p. 190.) However, Corbin has both. (*Lees Temples*, p. 60.)

²⁶ *Qur'ān*, 51:49.

²⁷ *H-N.* pp. 77-79; *I-H.* 36b4, 6-9, 11-12, 14, 17-37a1, 4-5, 8-10, 11-12, 14-15, 17-37b1, 3-5, 6-7, 8-9, 10-12, 14-16, 38a1-4; *SH-H.* pp. 189-193; *Hayākil*, pp. 103-105.

1. Kinds of Motion

I. Suhrawardī now begins his inquiry into actual events that take place in the world. The difficulty he faces here, one which thinkers prior to him faced as well, consists in accounting for the relationship of these events with one another within the constraints of time and space as well as with the One, which is beyond those limitations.

The preliminary argument construed by Suhrawardī aims at ruling out the possibility of an endless chain of causes between any two successive events. He begins first by re-confirming the already established physical fact that every incidence (*ḥādith*)²⁸ taking place in the domain of time requires a cause (*sabab*) or, as Dawwānī puts it, a spatio-temporal factor (*amr*), or a condition (*shart*) or an instrument (*ālat*).²⁹ That cause in its turn needs another cause, beginning a process which goes on without interruption into the infinity. It may well stop, however, with something which is subject to renewal and change by itself. Although time undergoes renewal and change, yet its renewal is not with respect to itself, but with respect to its locus, that is to say motion, because "time is the measure (*miqdār*) of motion."³⁰ And motion is said of every state of being which cannot be

²⁸ Suhrawardī defines *ḥādith* in another place as follows: "all that which was not existent in a certain time and then did exist is hadith". (*H-I*. pp. 172-3.)

²⁹ *SH-H*. p. 148.

³⁰ *SH-H*. p. 148.

conceived as stable.³¹ If this is the case, then the real cause of the events should be nothing other than motion.

But what kind of motion is at work here? Straight or rectilinear motion (*al-ḥaraka al-mustaqīma*)? Or circular motion (*al-ḥaraka al-dawriyya*)? According to Dawwānī's evaluation, it cannot be straight motion, for, in that case, it would be liable to be broken off. That is to say, it would no longer be continuous motion; on the contrary, it must be interrupted or cease somewhere, because every distance or length, irrespective of the direction in which it goes, is limited on the ground that all dimensions are finite. More accurately speaking, there occurs in between every two rectilinear movements a period of time for rest or pause.³² Although Suhrawardī, as Dawwānī points out, disagrees to a greater or lesser extent with the arguments put forward, nevertheless, he concedes that rectilinear motion, unlike circular, cannot be perpetual.

II. In addition, Dawwānī gives a detailed account of another of Suhrawardī's proofs as it appears in the latter's work entitled *al-Muṭāraḥāt*. In this book, Suhrawardī first divides the rectilinear motion into three types: (i) natural (*ṭab'iyya*), (ii) coercive (*qaṣriyya*), and (iii) volitional (*irādiyya*), and later demonstrates that straight motion is limited and interrupted, while

³¹ *H-I*. p. 172.

³² *SH-H*. p. 149.

circular motion is limitless and uninterrupted.³³

Anḳaravī for his part reduces these three motions into two main divisions: (i) movement that takes place through someone's force, like the movement of a stone thrown by someone, and (ii) movement that takes place because of the very nature of the moving thing. The latter is also subdivided into two: (i) movement of which the moving thing is conscious, called volitional, like the movement of men and animals, and (ii) movement of which the moving thing is oblivious, called natural, like the movement of a bag made of skin which moves through the wind on the water, or like the movement of a stone that falls on the ground.³⁴ Natural movement always goes towards its centre and never moves far beyond that centre.³⁵ Therefore, since it is not an unceasing motion, it cannot be a cause for events.

If these three types of movement, as Suhrawardī indicates elsewhere, were to remain within the world of elements or corporeals or in the strict sense of the term, within the realm of *barāzikh*,³⁶ they would cease to exist in a certain period of time. Moreover, when they occur within the limited boundaries of the dimensions (*ab'ād*), they are not perpetual at

³³ *H-I*. p. 173; *SH-H*. p. 149.

³⁴ *I-H*. 31a5-11.

³⁵ *I-H*. 31a11-12.

³⁶ *H-I*. p. 173.

all. On the contrary, whenever the mover, for instance a physical body, dissolves or passes away, its movements and actions accordingly come to a halt.

In this case, physical bodies by themselves cannot constitute the real cause of the movements of spatio-temporal events, which fail to exist for ever. Thus it would seem that the celestial spheres, which are in ceaseless motion, must be the ultimate cause for these events. Moreover, the motions of the celestial bodies are not only perpetual but are also volitional. They are neither natural nor coercive, for, were they natural, they would cease at a definite point and thus would be rectilinear. Were they coercive on the other hand, they would be dependent on the strength of the mover, and thus once again they would be moving straight and would stop at a particular point.³⁷ In addition, Dawwānī adds that every coercion in itself involves an evil, but there is no evil whatsoever in the celestial spheres. They are, in contrast, pure good (*khayr maḥḍ*).³⁸

2. The Motion of the Celestial Spheres

III. As we have seen in the preceding lines, Suhrawardī has set forth that every celestial sphere possesses a voluntary motion on its own. Now he embarks upon an inquiry into the source of this motion and its relation

³⁷ *SH-H.* p. 152.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

to the body of the celestial sphere.

The soul of the sphere is the real source of the motion of the sphere. This causes a serious problem for Suhrawardī who has already admitted that the motion of the sphere is of a voluntary nature. Is the soul of the sphere something distinct from the sphere itself or its body? If it is separate from the sphere, then the sphere would no longer be moving voluntarily. On the contrary, it would be forced to move by the former, i.e. by the soul.

This may be better understood by the example of the earth, as illustrated by Dawwānī. The body or mass of the earth is one thing on its own and its form or shape another. This being the case, the latter is the cause of the movement of the former. So, the earth has a movement constrained by its form.³⁹ It is for this reason that Suhrawardī states: "on the assumption that both the sphere and its soul would be one and the same, it would have a volitional motion." Besides, Anḩaravī interestingly comments that "the celestial spheres are alive and perceptive of both their essences and their movements."⁴⁰

IV. Celestial spheres have nothing to do with the worldly bodies which necessarily undergo nourishment, growth and generation as well as corruption. Furthermore, they have, as has been already emphasized, circular movement as opposed to the terrestrial bodies which have

³⁹ *SH-H.* p. 154.

⁴⁰ *I-H.* 31a16-17.

rectilinear movement.⁴¹ Because the celestial spheres are all perpetual, they are never subject to generation and corruption.⁴²

Again, passion, anger, oppression and resistance, all of which are characteristics of bodies, cannot be attributed to the celestial spheres which are totally immaterial. All of these qualities cause alteration and passiveness in the beings to which they attach.⁴³

Furthermore, all celestial spheres are higher and nobler than the terrestrial bodies; therefore, their movements are not for the sake of the latter. Above all, they are the real agents that affect the terrestrial bodies.

V. Şariḥ Anḳaravī states that, according to Suhrawardī, once we purify ourselves from the preoccupations of our bodies and meditate upon "the magnificent Truth" (*Kibriyāy-i Ḥaḳ*), the celestial bodies (*ecrām-i eflāk*), the terrestrial bodies (*'anāşır*) and the lights which radiate upon the beings, we will discover in our souls the shining lights (*envār-i lāmi'a*)⁴⁴, that is to say, the very lightnings (*zātü'l-bürük*), and also the manifest secrets (*esrār-i sātī'a*), that is to say, the very illumination (*zatü'ş-şürük*).⁴⁵ As soon as these spiritual joys occur to us, Anḳaravī concludes, we no longer have

⁴¹ *SH-H.* p. 154.

⁴² *SH-H.* p. 155.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ The very same word exists also in the Persian translation. (*Hayākil*, p. 99, l. 9.)

⁴⁵ *I-H.* 31b7-12.

desire for the corporeal world.⁴⁶

Dawwānī, on the other hand, turns his attention to a particular term, *al-khurra*, which occurs at this point in Suhrawardī's *Hayākil* and which I have rendered as "the Light of the Glory". This term was employed by Suhrawardī in several of his other works with almost the same connotation as is found here.⁴⁷ Dawwānī relates on the authority of the prominent commentator of the *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī,⁴⁸ that "al-khurra" (=Xvarnah), a term of Pahlavi origin, designates, according to Azerbaijani Zoroastran who is the author of the Book of the Zend, the Light that radiates from the very Essence of God and determines the hierarchy of the creatures. Again it is this Light by means of which all kinds of arts and activities are facilitated. Furthermore, this term had been compounded with that of "Kayān"⁴⁹ by the ancient virtuous rulers, for instance by the ruler Kay Khusraw, as noted by Suhrawardī in his *al-Alwāḥ al-'Imādiyya*, and is

⁴⁶ *I-H.* 31b12-13. The Persian translation imparts almost the same connotation with a slight difference. "So that we experience the spiritual delights which have no similarities in this world." (*Hayākil*, p. 99, l. 10.)

⁴⁷ See, for instance, the following works by Suhrawardī: *H-I.* p. 157; *al-Alwāḥ al-'Imādiyya*, in *Three Treatises*, p. 70; *Kitāb al-Mashāri' wa al-Muṭārahāt*, in *Opera Metaphysica et Mystica I*, p. 504.

⁴⁸ For Shirazi's full explanation of the word, refer to Suhrawardī, *Le Livre De La Sagesse Orientale*, trans. H. Corbin. (Paris: Editions Verdier, 1986), pp. 336-7.

⁴⁹ "Kayyān" is the name of a dynasty from Kayanides (Iranian Kingdoms); see *Les Temples*, p. 71.

considered also by those rulers as a light that arises in the soul.⁵⁰ So, these two notions together denote the divine light that radiates from God upon the soul.

Dawwānī states that a profound reflection upon this sort of light, according to Suhrawardī, will enable us to experience and visualize in our souls the very essence of the illumination. And through this illumination we consequently arrive at a stage at which we forsake all the demands of this elemental world and thereby try to attain the world of light. Moreover, all that we find at this stage are the divine individuals whose forms and status in no way resemble the earthly ones, for they are entirely eternal and free from deterioration.⁵¹

Anḳaravī however finds this view contrary to the Holy Scripture and the Prophetic Tradition.⁵² One possible reason for this is that he might have read Suhrawardī's text as "ashkhāṣ karīmatin *ilāhiyya*" (divine noble individuals) instead of "ashkhāṣ karīma *al-hay'āt*" (divine noble forms). Although such reading, as Dawwānī himself admits, is also acceptable and compatible with some of the manuscripts, Anḳaravī may have misread it deliberately in order to emphasize his objections to doctrines which hinted

⁵⁰ *SH-H.* pp. 155-6; Suhrawardī, *al-Alwāḥ al-'Imādiyya*, p. 70, French translation of the latter by Corbin entitled "Le Livre Des Tablettes," in *L'Archange Empourpré*, p. 111; see also *Les Temples*, p. 71.

⁵¹ *SH-H.* p. 157.

⁵² *I-H.* 31b17.

at polytheism.

Let us return once more to what Suhrawardī has termed "the divine individuals", which are interpreted by Dawwānī as "celestial bodies" (*al-ajrām al-falakiyya*).⁵³ The celestial bodies, as opposed to the terrestrial ones, receive unceasing illuminations from the sublime lights of God and even continuously desire to obtain illuminative assistance from those lights and thus move perpetually.

VI. The dominant light (*nūr qāhir*), for Suhrawardī, plays a role intermediate between God, from whom it receives its own existence and continuity, and the celestial soul to which it gives existence and continuity. Again it is by this supreme light that the celestial soul can observe the Glory of God as well as His luminous benedictions. Thanks to this mysterious observation, there emerges an illumination which, in turn, originates a movement on the part of the celestial soul. In other words, the celestial soul can attain a vision of God's gracious luminosity only by virtue of its own movement, generated by the illumination of the dominant light.

Whatever movement the celestial soul performs and whatever illumination the dominant light grants to it, the true nature of the reciprocal relationship between these two is, as Dawwānī rightly puts it, still unknown to us, for we live in an alien world.⁵⁴ It is certain, nevertheless, that at the

⁵³ *SH-H.* p. 156; *I-H.* 32a6.

⁵⁴ *SH-H.* pp. 157-8.

very bottom of this interaction, there lies one essential impetus, so to speak: the love for the Divine Light. The celestial soul, because of its love for the dominant light, namely the angelic light, and then God, proceeds to move by means of the illumination it obtains. Moreover, every movement enables it to receive another illumination, "as is the case of a man who prepares himself through the religious devotional practices to receive the sacred flashes of lights."⁵⁵

To explain this movement in more detail, Dawwānī refers us to the ecstatic life of the secluded mystics (*ahl al-tajrīd*), who indeed experience in their souls a sacred but somewhat irksome (*muz'ijan*) ecstasy, whereby they commence to move by dancing, clapping hands and turning around. Through this joyous movement, they become ready and apt to receive more and more the flashes of the lights till the ecstatic state, for one reason or another, comes to an end. This is the secret of the spiritual musical audition (*samā'*).⁵⁶ Meanwhile, Dawwānī's explanation of *samā'* as such throws some light not only on the cosmological significance of that concept but on the intrinsic connection between Sufis' actual practices and philosophers' theories.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ *SH-H.* p. 158.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Similar mention is made also in Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī's *Mathnawī*:
Like ardent lovers, he discerned in the sound of the rebeck the
image of God's call to man.

The lament of the clarion and the threat of the drum bear a faint

Even Plato, the chief of philosophers, is reported to have experienced almost the same ecstasy, particularly when he sought to pray at which time he would set in motion the strength of his soul through the audition of certain melodies which move the soul by the power of domination (*qahr*) and love (*maḥabba*).⁵⁸

It is surprising, however, that no explanation to this effect is given by Anḳaravī, which one would not expect of a *Mevlevī* Şeyh who, as we have seen in the first chapter of this thesis, stood firmly in defense of the performance of the mystical ceremonies, including *samā'*, against the judicial authorities of his time. After all, he could have at least made mention of Dawwānī's remark on this issue, because he, as we have indicated on several occasions, made great use of his commentary in certain places, though without naming him.

Anḳaravī takes Suhrawardī's expression of "divine lovers" to mean "celestial spheres" (*eflāk*), and thus goes on to interpret the passage in question along exactly the same lines as Dawwānī does. According to their

resemblance to that universal trumpet.

That is why philosophers say that these melodies are derived from the turning of the spheres.

What people sing with bandore and voice is the sound of the heaven's revolution.

(*Mathnawī*, Book 4, 731-4, quoted from William C. Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Love, The Spiritual Teachings of Rumi* (Albany: State University of New York, 1983), pp. 325-6.)

⁵⁸ *SH-H*. p. 158.

interpretation, it is thanks to both the generosity of God and the perpetual ecstasy (*wajd*) of the divine lovers, viz. celestial spheres or souls, that temporal events are continuously happening. It is noteworthy that both commentators have read the term *wajd* (ecstasy) instead of *wujūd* (existence), the latter being reading in Abū Rayyān's edition of *Hayākil al-Nūr*.⁵⁹ Dawwānī further continues to explain that these divine lovers, devoid of all material connections, closely emulate and resemble the divine lights which are the intellects.⁶⁰

Owing to the ever-lasting generosity and luminosity of God, every entity receives what is suitable and pertinent to its own aptitude (*al-isti'dād*), which is generated by the celestial souls. More precisely, it is God who creates things and annihilates them, but it is the movement of the celestial souls that furnishes them with aptitude.⁶¹ In addition, this aptitude as such functions as a principle of change in existing beings. This would mean that for Suhrawardī, God, though being the absolute Agent and Originator of everything, cannot be the cause of change, merely because He is never amenable to change in His essence nor is He changed by anything else.⁶²

⁵⁹ *I-H.* 32b10-11; *SH-H.* p. 160; *H-N.* p. 71.

⁶⁰ *SH-H.* p. 160.

⁶¹ *I-H.* 32b13-17. Cf. *H-I.* pp. 195, 211.

⁶² *I-H.* 33a1-2. "As is known, the dominating lights in no way receive alteration, since their alteration would only be possible via the alteration of (their) Agent that is the Light of lights. This is indubitably impossible, for there is no alteration in Him (i.e. God) nor in them (i.e. the dominating

Therefore objects, as Anḳaravī comments, are liable to change not by themselves but by the aptitudes bestowed upon them by the celestial souls. A single man, for instance, who does not display movement and change, when he faces several mirrors whose volumes, capacities and qualities are variable, will certainly appear in diverse images such as smaller if the mirror is small, bigger if it is big, brilliant if it is neat and dreary if it is dingy.⁶³ Nonetheless, it does not show at any rate that he is transforming or transfiguring, since all changes that are reflected in the mirrors take place not because of the various forms of the man but rather due to the positions and states of the receptacles.

For Dawwānī, that man stands for the cause (*'illa*), the various mirrors for the objects (*mawādd*), the diversity of these mirrors for the diversity of the aptitudes, and the diversity of the images for the diversity of forms and accidents.⁶⁴ This being the case, all changes and differences observable in the world result from the various manifestations of the Cause, namely the Light of lights. Anḳaravī gives his support to Dawwānī's remark by stating expressly that "the diversity of the objects never entails a flaw in the Essence (of God)".⁶⁵

lights)." *H-I*. p. 200.

⁶³ *I-H*. 33a9-10.

⁶⁴ *SH-H*. p. 163.

⁶⁵ *I-H*. 33b1.

By his crucial statement that "in order to perpetuate the good (*khayr*) and maintain the effusion (*al-fayḍ*) God has linked stability (*thabāt*) with stability, and change (*ḥudūth*) with the change," Suhrawardī intends, declares Anḳaravī, to differentiate between the heavenly bodies and terrestrial or elemental ones in such a way that the former are stable in respect to God whose essence is also stable and who is their perfect cause; and since the caused do not enter into conflict with their cause, they must necessarily be stable.⁶⁶ As for those temporal incidents which occur in the lower world, even though they take place as a result of the movement of the celestial spheres, they are subject to alteration.

3. The Generosity of God in the Creation of the World

VII. According to Suhrawardī, God, as the most perfect Light, is the ultimate source for all the generosity and mercy prevailing throughout the universe. His incomparable generosity, as Anḳaravī articulates it, being in no respect deficient, recognizes no beginning nor end; therefore It is ceaseless".⁶⁷

Generosity consists simply in giving something valuable without taking or even expecting a substitute for it. In practical language, it may possibly be identified with the term charity which consists in making a

⁶⁶ *I-H.* 33b3-5.

⁶⁷ *I-H.* 33b12.

donation to a person or an organization deserving it. However, when this notion is employed with respect to God, it has to be taken in such a wider context that it signifies, without exception, every single act of God. That is why, as Suhrawardī explains, it is God who most clearly deserves to be called generous, simply because He is, needless to say, Self-Sufficient, Self-Subsistent and Self-Existent. Above all, He is the absolutely rich (*al-ghanī al-muṭlaq*), hence He can dispense with whatever exists besides Him.⁶⁸

In other words, as Anḳaravī expounds, God, as the Light of lights and the most affluent Being, is in no need of anything for His own Essence and Perfection except Himself.⁶⁹ Moreover, "His Essence is a pure and great distributor of blessings."⁷⁰ He has no purpose in His act whatsoever. Therefore, as Dawwānī interprets, "nothing can induce Him to execute His

⁶⁸ One can find obvious affinity between Suhrawardī's definition and that of Ibn Sīnā who describes, in his *Ilāhiyyāt*, the notion of "jud" along with that of "khayr". He says that the former applies mostly to the Giver or Agent (*Fā'il*), while the latter applies to the recipient (*Qābil*). Thus the Agent represents the one from whom the act of "jūd" proceeds, whereas the recipient symbolizes the one who accepts it. (Ibn Sīnā, *Ilāhiyyāt II*, p. 296.) In another passage of the same work, he makes it even more clear that "jūd" means full benefaction, since it would become "khayr" with respect to the receiver, and "jūd" with respect to the donor. (Ibid. p. 298.) He at the same time identifies *wājib al-wujūd* (necessary being) with *al-khayr al-mahḍ* (absolute good).

⁶⁹ *I-H.* 34a1.

⁷⁰ *I-H.* 34a3.

action for any matters whatsoever."⁷¹

As a matter of fact, the issue at stake involves one of the great controversial problems of kalam, i.e. whether God is led to act by a motivating or inducing factor (*bā'ith*) or not. Of course, an affirmative response to this question yields another potential series of questions: What could motivate Him to act at one given matter in preference to another? Or on the other hand, what could prevent Him from acting at a given time? To what extent would these motivating factors lead Him to act? Or simply, is it possible for God to act on one matter but not on another? Leaving aside all these questions of detail, Suhrawardī, like Avicenna,⁷² goes to the heart of the matter and denies any motivation to God by simply noting that "He has no motivation in His act".

VIII. On the other hand, God's overall generosity eventually leads Suhrawardī to affirm his notorious but rather problematic principle of *al-imbkân al-ashraf* (nobler possibility),⁷³ according to which, whatever actually exists is the most perfect of all, and it is not conceivable that it would become more perfect than it is. This remarkable but controversial postulate,

⁷¹ *SH-H.* p. 170.

⁷² Avicenna, especially when trying to prove the eternity of the world, deals largely with this matter and thereupon concludes that no given moment could have induced Him to bring the world into existence. (See *Ilāhiyyāt II*, p. 378 ff.)

⁷³ John Walbridge describes it as the "most noble of contingency". (Idem, *The Science of Mystic Lights*, p. 65.)

which was foreshadowed to a certain extent by Avicenna⁷⁴ and also touched on by Ghazālī in a conceptually somewhat different form,⁷⁵ occupies a substantial place in *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*.⁷⁶ There Suhrawardī discusses at great length the theory of emanation in conjunction with this principle. But here what concerns us most is not the exposition of that theory, nor even the principle itself, but one of its implications that appears in *Hayākil al-Nūr*. That is, that existence can be no more perfect than it is.

In Anḳaravī's comments on the relevant passage, the emphasis is

⁷⁴ Cf. Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt*, vol. 3, pp. 190 ff. In the meantime, Yazdi, drawing a comparison between Avicenna's understanding of the same principle and that of Suhrawardī's, reaches the following conclusion: "To my understanding the Avicennan (principle of emanation) that from one, no more than one can issue forth has actually been the intellectual source of inspiration for Suhrawardī's rule of "nobler possibility". Avicenna assigned the principle of "nobler possibility" to the "descending system", Suhrawardī provided his rule of "posterior possibility" (*al-ḥikmān al-akḥṣā*) to the "ascending system". (Idem, *The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy Knowledge by Presence*, p. 193.)

⁷⁵ E. Ormsby, who has discussed this subject at length, singles out four different versions of al-Ghazālī's crucial statement with regard to the perfectness of the actual being. These are as follows: (i) "There is not in possibility anything whatever more excellent, more complete or more perfect than it is". (*Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*), (ii) "There is not in possibility anything more wonderful (*abda'*) than the form of this world or more excellent in arrangement or more complete in construction." (*al-Imlā' fi Mushkilāt al-Iḥyā'*), (iii) "Nothing in possibility is more excellent than they, nor more perfect". (*Kiṭāb al-Arba'in*), and (iv) "All existing things, from the number of the stars and their measure, the earth's shape and that of animals and everything that exists, exist as they do only because it is the most perfect way to be..." (*Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa*) (Eric L. Ormsby, *Theodicy in Islamic Thought: The Dispute Over al-Ghazālī's "Best of all Possible Worlds"* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 35-7.)

⁷⁶ *H-I*. pp. 154-167.

put wholly on the connection between the status of this world and the nature of God. There it is stated that all that actually exists in this world is the most complete of all that is possible; if it were otherwise, namely were it possible to be more complete than it is, this would lead to the inescapable consequence that God chose inferior things over superior ones. But, says Anḳaravī, this is entirely unacceptable, because God's Essence is the most dignified, and therefore His Essence must be perfect and noble too.⁷⁷ This point is more clearly specified in Dawwānī's comments. According to him, if God can be assumed to have favoured what is less perfect, this would attribute such despicable properties as "ignorance," "weakness" and "stinginess" to Him.⁷⁸ Above all, such an assumption would fall in contradiction to His already established incommensurable generosity.

This point has been made more clearly by Anḳaravī who illustrates it with the following example: had the body of an idol an aptitude, the Necessary Existent, God, could have given it a rational soul, for He invested everything with the best possible existence that fits best their aptitudes,⁷⁹ as these verses from the Qur'ān attest: "the doing of God Who perfected

⁷⁷ *I-H.* 34a9, 11-13.

⁷⁸ *SH-H.* p. 171.

⁷⁹ *I-H.* 34b3.

everything";⁸⁰ "...our Lord is He who gave to each (created) thing its form and nature, and further, gave (it) guidance."⁸¹

IX. But as to Suhrawardī, there is no point, for him, in prolonging speculation on this matter. Anyone who does so, he claims, presumes wrongly that superior beings pay attention to inferior ones. Such a person would not think of the existence of another world beyond the present, i.e., the world of elements⁸², nor would he even assume, apart from the existing things in this world, the existence of other entities such as intellects and celestial as well as rational souls⁸³, which are, because of their emanation from the higher beings, nobler than and superior to the former. Such a person, as long as he remains unaware of this fact, continues to stretch the discourse in vain.⁸⁴

One world, Anḳaravī comments, which is free of any calamity or tribulation, is the world to which our souls will return.⁸⁵ And all heavenly

⁸⁰ Qur'ān, 27:88. In fact Suhrawardī interprets this Qur'anic verse as confirming the very same idea: "Existence cannot possibly be more complete and more perfect than it is, as is indicated by the revelation: *God's handiwork, who has made all things very well* (27:88), alluding to the secure and solid order." Suhrawardī, *al-Alwāḥ al-'Imādiyya*, p. 36, trans. by W. Chittick in his work, *Faith and Practice of Islam*, p. 217, n. 83.10.

⁸¹ Qur'ān, 20:50.

⁸² *SH-H.* p. 177.

⁸³ *I-H.* 35a5.

⁸⁴ *SH-H.* p. 179.

⁸⁵ *I-H.* 34b17.

souls that exist in the superior worlds busy themselves exclusively with the contemplation of the divine lights.⁸⁶ Above all, they are illuminated thoroughly by the "luminosity of the First Principle and of the intellects".⁸⁷ Because of their immense preoccupation with illumination by the divine lights, they have no concern for inferior entities.⁸⁸ Despite this, they know all the things that are both visible and invisible and all the incidents that take place in the temporal world.⁸⁹

X. Again, Anḩaravī continues to explain that all the celestial bodies remain entirely secure from deterioration, for they are not composed of the elements. If this were otherwise, they would not be in a perpetual process of movement but rather in a temporal one.⁹⁰

Further evidence for the incorruptibility of the celestial bodies consists in the fact that they all are free, in their very construction, from being hot, cold, humid or dry. None of these dispositions affect them, because each displays on its own a distinct nature, which is by no means suitable to the celestial bodies. On the contrary, these four dispositions, as Dawwānī

⁸⁶ *I-H.* 35a10.

⁸⁷ *SH-H.* p. 180.

⁸⁸ *I-H.* 35b3-4.

⁸⁹ *I-H.* 35b6

⁹⁰ *I-H.* 35b9, 13.

comments, belong exclusively to the four worldly elements.⁹¹

All the celestial spheres or planets, for Suhrawardī, are alive, since they, as noted before, exhibit a volitional movement. They are at the same time rational (*nāṭiqā*), just because they are cognitive (*mudrika*) of universals (*kulliyāt*).⁹² In addition, since they have adoration for their principles, viz. the beloved lights, they desire to resemble them.⁹³ Due to this desire, they move continuously, remaining obedient to their originator.

4. The Hierarchy of Existing Beings

XI. The closing section of this temple, which was misplaced by Anḳaravī at the very beginning of the forthcoming one, i.e. the sixth temple, concentrates on describing the viable interactive relationship that operates within the hierarchy of the existing entities in general and lights in particular. That system is based mainly on two principal concepts: that of adoration (*īshq* or *maḥabba*) and that of domination (*qahr*).

In attempting to set up the system of correlation in the scheme of lights, Suhrawardī begins first by describing the intimate relation between the subsistent substance, which is the first intellect" for Anḳaravī⁹⁴ or the

⁹¹ *SH-H.* p. 183.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ *SH-H.* 186; and cf. *Ishārāt*, vol. 3, p. 624.

⁹⁴ *I-H.* 36b5-6.

"first caused" for Dawwānī, and the Eternal Self-Subsistent, which is the Necessarily Existent Being by Itself and Originator for other than Itself.⁹⁵ This relation as such, being an overall source and representing the noblest one and a unique archetype for all other relations, appears either in the form of adoration (*ishq*) in which the first caused cherishes the First Cause, i.e. God, by aspiring to resemble Him, -between the two, no obstacle exists at all,⁹⁶ or in that of domination (*qahr*) in which God overwhelms the first light by virtue of His fully intensive and Self-Subsisting Eternal Light, so much so that the latter finds itself incapable of grasping the nature of the former's Essence and Light.⁹⁷ This can be further illustrated by the example of the sun as given by Dawwānī. The bright light of the sun dazzles a person's eyes so intensively that it renders them almost incapable of seeing even the things around that person, let alone the sun itself.⁹⁸

In other words, the relation just described operates in two dimensions, one descending and the other ascending. The former, characterized here as domination, runs from the one placed above, which is the cause and higher, towards the one below, which is the caused and lower. The latter, designated as adoration, works in the reverse direction,

⁹⁵ *SH-H.* p. 189.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ *I-H.* 36b9-11.

⁹⁸ *SH-H.* p. 189.

namely from the one below upwards to the one above. Nonetheless, the term love (*maḥabba*), as it is defined in Suhrawardī's *Hayākil* and other works⁹⁹, also combines in itself these two dimensions -domination and adoration. For love becomes domination on the side of Cause, and adoration on the side of the caused.¹⁰⁰

This relation, which is portrayed in Dawwānī's commentary as active (*fi'lī*) and passive (*infi'ālī*),¹⁰¹ prevails over all other relations existing in the universe. As Anḳaravī states, for example, corporeal bodies are dominated by souls, souls by intellects, and intellects by the Necessary Being.¹⁰² Each one in turn takes a place either superior to the one below or inferior to the one above. The principal determining factor for such ranking is the intensity of luminosity.

In the tangible world, there appear two existing lights, the sun and the moon. The former resembles the image of intellect, for it is a radiating agent; the latter, however, looks like soul, for it receives radiation and thus stands in a relatively passive position.¹⁰³ The sun is the noblest of all existing beings, because it is the most luminous of all. It is just like the

⁹⁹ "Each superior light has domination over the inferior, and each inferior light has adoration and amour for the superior." (*H-I*. p. 136.)

¹⁰⁰ *SH-H*. p. 189.

¹⁰¹ *SH-H*. p. 190.

¹⁰² *H-N*. 36b15-16.

¹⁰³ *SH-H*. p. 191.

sacred father, because "it is the source of light from which life emerges, as well as the fosterer of three kingdoms".¹⁰⁴ Moreover, the sun is, in the Pahlavi language, the Hurakhsh, i.e. so powerful a light that nothing eclipses it; on the contrary it overwhelms all.¹⁰⁵ This is because it bestows light upon all stars, yet it borrows no light from any of them. In this sense, it is like God who spreads light upon all receptacles and dominates all other lights.¹⁰⁶ "In brief, (God) the Light of lights is the sun of the intelligible worlds."¹⁰⁷

It is interesting to note here that Dawwānī explains the phrase "al-wijhat al-kubrā" (the most magnificent face), attributed to the sun and thus to God, in comparison with the term "Qibla". He states that in ancient religions (*al-nawāmis al-qadīma*) as well as in those which succeeded them, the direction of prayers was towards a fire, called the "daughter of sun", as if it were produced by the latter because of its existence and appearance at all times and in all places, as opposed to the sun.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ *SH-H.* p. 192.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ A similar analogy is also drawn by al-Ghazālī: "...the relation of the sum of things to Allah is, in the visible analogue, as the relation of light to the sun." (*Idem, Mishkāt al-Anwār*, p. 112.)

¹⁰⁷ *SH-H.* pp. 192-3. cf. also Corbin, *Les Temples*, p. 82, n. 72.

¹⁰⁸ *SH-H.* p. 193.

CHAPTER NINE

THE SIXTH TEMPLE

I. You should know that soul does not perish [with the annihilation of body],¹ for it possesses no substratum. So it has neither something contrary to it nor has it a rival to (itself). It continues to exist permanently along with the principle that perpetuates it. In between soul and body, there is but an accidental attachment caused by desire. The annihilation of this attachment does not cause the annihilation of the substance.²

II. You know that the pleasure and pain which each faculty experiences are only measured in proportion to the capacity of its perfection and perception. The pleasure and pain of every object are peculiar to itself. Thus the fragrant objects (perfume) pertain to the sense of odour, and the objects of taste to the sense of taste, and the touchable objects to the sense of touch and the like. So for everything there is something that fits it. As for the perfection of intellectual substance, it is by way of contemplation of the gnostic knowledge: knowledge of God, knowledge of worlds, knowledge of order and in sum all knowledge related to the affairs of origin and return (*al-mabda' wa'l-ma'ād*)³. It (perfection) is also (obtained) by way of transcending the faculties of body. Otherwise (if these conditions were not met), it would become imperfect. The pleasure and pain (the intellectual substance feels) are dependent on (the degree of) perfection or imperfection it has.⁴

That which is delightful or hateful (delicious or odious) may sometimes be obtained without sensing pleasure and pain. For instance, a man who receives a blow or becomes greatly intoxicated,

¹ This phrase is omitted in *I-H*.

² *H-N*. p.80; *I-H*. 38a7-9, 13-5; *SH-H*. pp.193-4, 199; *Hayākil*, p. 105.

³ Translated by Corbin as "genesis and eschatology" in *Les Temples*, p. 61.

⁴ *H-N*. p. 80; *I-H*. 38a17-38b1, 4-6, 9-11, 15, 17; *SH-H*. p. 199; *Hayākil*, p. 105.

cannot feel the harm caused by that blow; nor even can he feel the pleasure resulting from the presence of his beloved. In so far as soul is preoccupied with body, due to its being intoxicated by nature, it takes no pleasure in virtues nor pain in wickedness.

III. But when the separation of soul from body takes place, miserable souls are chastised because of their ignorance and miserable state in darkness as well as their yearning for the sensory world, -although "between them and their desires is placed a barrier..."⁵ Their faculties have been stripped off; so they no longer have eyes to see nor ears to hear. The luminosity of the sensory world remains far beyond their reach, nor can the light of the sacred world reach them. They stay perplexed in darkness; and darkness means the absence of light. Once they are cut off from the two lights, they begin to be overwhelmed by fear, dread, affliction and anxiety as a necessary consequence of darkness. Therefore, whosoever alters the mood of his spirit, he will fall in darkness and sorrow, as in the case of the people of melancholia, upon whom fear and anxiety also fall. This being the case, it will be even more so with the states of those who fall in darkness, being desperate for liberation and experiencing pain and being associated with anguish (*al-ḥasarāt*).⁶

IV. As for the virtuous and excellent souls, being in proximity to God, "they obtain that which no eye has seen and that which no ear has heard and that which no human mind has conceived,"⁷ by contemplating the Lights of God and plunging in the ocean of light.

⁵ Qur'an, 34:54.

⁶ This word is substituted with *al-ḥaṣharāt* (insects) in Anḳaravī's commentary (*I-H.* 40a1), in Dawwānī's (*SH-H.* p. 202), in the Persian translation (*Hayākil*, p. 106). (*H-N.* pp. 81-2; *I-H.* 39a2-4, 10-12, 14-17, 39b5-7, 9-11, 15-40a1; *SH-H.* pp. 199-202; *Hayākil*, p. 106.

⁷ The statement in quotation marks alludes to the famous ḥadīth of the Prophet: "I have prepared for my righteous servants things which have never been seen by an eye, or heard by an ear, or imagined by a human being." (*Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, vol. 4, pp. 307.) Cf. "No soul knows what is hidden for the delights of the eye." (Qur'ān, 32:17.), and "...eye has not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God has prepared for them that love him." (Bible, I Corinthians 2:9.)

Thus to them occurs by *habitus*⁸ the *angelic state* in which happiness lasts forever. These souls return to their father, who, as an irresistible and crushing force as well as the possessor of the excellent theurgy, stands victorious (dominant) over the heads of the dragons in the darkness, and a father who, being a very close neighbour to the Beneficent God, crowned with the coronet of proximity in the Sovereignty (*Malakūt*) of the God of the worlds, is the Holy Spirit. And they (those souls) are drawn by this Spirit, just as an iron needle is attracted by a magnet.⁹

V. Just as there is no direct relation between the faculties of sense perception and the soul, -for the perception of the soul is more complete and comprehensive than that of the faculties-nor even between the lights of God, the spiritual entities and sensible objects, there is likewise no direct relation between the intellectual pleasure and the sensuous pleasure.¹⁰

VI. The First loves only His own essence; and His essence is beloved by Himself as well as by others. No pleasure amounts to the pleasure of those who are near to Him. When the virtuous souls come out of the darkness of the temples to the splendour of *Jabarūt* (Might) and thus rise over¹¹ the nobilities of *Malakūt*, then to them will be revealed by the Light of God all that which has no common measure with what is visible to the eyes by the light of the sun. Anyone who denies (the existence of)¹² the spiritual pleasures is analogous to the one who is impotent and thus denies sexual pleasure. For such a person would regard the beasts as superior to

⁸ I have read the text as "bi'l-malaka," and not as "wa'l-malaka" as it appears in the text. Cf. Suhrawardī's similar statement in the introduction to *H-I*. (p. 13.)

⁹ *I-H*. 40a6-9, 12-3, 16-40b2. The whole passage from the end of this line up to the end of this temple is left out of Anḳaravī's commentary (*I-H*).

¹⁰ *H-N*. pp. 82-3; *SH-H*. pp. 199-204; *Hayākil* (incomplete), p. 106

¹¹ Instead of "ashraqat" that exists in both the base text of *H-N* and *SH-N*, I have taken "ashrafat" as it appears in ms. B of *H-N* (p. 84, n. 2).

¹² *Les Temples*, p. 63.

the angels and spiritual beings.¹³

1. Immortality of Soul

I. This temple, which is integrated by Anḳaravī into the beginning of the seventh temple and which is even incomplete in his version, deals at great length with the immortality of the rational soul. It must be immediately pointed out that for this temple Anḳaravī, in comparison with the previous ones, provides relatively little commentary and even leaves untouched some passages therein which deserve particular attention.

As we have seen in the second temple, Suhrawardī, like Ibn Sīnā yet in different form, first denies the pre-existence of the human soul and later asserts that it comes into existence at the same time with the body. As is well known, the latter's argument for this rests generally on his proposition that the relation between soul and body is one of substance and corporeality. Furthermore, he employs the very same argument to demonstrate the immortality of the soul.¹⁴ Suhrawardī for his part acknowledges the immortality of the soul, yet develops a new argument based upon his notion of light. But broadly speaking, it is true also for him, as for Ibn Sīnā, that the soul does not pass away with the corruption of the body, because it is an immaterial substance and independent of the latter.

¹³ *H-N*. pp. 83-4 (including n. 3), *SH-H*. pp. 204, 206-208; *Hayākil*, pp. 106-107.

¹⁴ See for Ibn Sīnā's detailed account of the immortality of the soul, Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology*, p. 62 ff.

The apparent attachment between the two is rather of accidental, caused by desire. More precisely, the body, corporeal in its entirety, is not a locus for the soul, which is pure substance. This being the case, the death of the former does not entail the destruction of the latter.

Suhrawardī thus emphasizes that soul persists, even after the death of body, along with its principle (*mabda'uhā*). Anḩaravī explains this point by saying that the cause (*'ille*) of the rational soul is permanent (*bāḩi*), the caused (i.e. the soul) becomes permanent too.¹⁵ Yet he does not specify as to whom or what this cause refers to. For Dawwānī, however, that principle is the intellect (*al-'aql*), which is also its cause and ultimately finds its source in the Necessarily Existent Being, God.¹⁶ In other words, it is, as Corbin expresses it (basing himself on Suhrawardī's own terminology), the tenth intellect, the Holy Spirit, the "Donor of forms" or its father.¹⁷

Dawwānī explains Suhrawardī's statement that "the rational soul possesses no substratum" by saying that whatever perceives its own essence, is independent and is neither dependent upon, nor a qualifier for, others at all. Besides, the soul, as a self-conscious immaterial substance, has no opposite (*al-didd*), for it is not an accident inhering in the body. On the other hand, the contrast in fact is applicable only to those things which

¹⁵ *I-H.* 38a12-3.

¹⁶ *SH-H.* p. 194.

¹⁷ *Les Temples*, p. 83, n. 80.

are accidents and which are amenable to dimension and disparity, like whiteness and blackness.¹⁸ Moreover, it has no rival which could compete with and thus cancel it out, as in the case of two mutually exclusive forms such as water and air.¹⁹

It is true, Dawwānī continues to argue, that the soul comes into being together with a given body, a body with its proper qualities (*ṣifāt*) becomes ready to receive the soul. In other words, the body and its qualities are prerequisites for the origination of the soul (*ḥudūthihī*) but not for its persistence (*baqā'ihī*).²⁰

In Dawwānī's commentary, one can find a comparative analysis of the relationship between body and soul within the two schools of philosophy, peripatetic and illuminationist. On the genesis of the soul as well as its survival after the corruption of the body, these two schools are in complete agreement. The illuminationist philosophers, nevertheless, differ from the peripatetics in identifying the soul as a pure immaterial light (*al-nūr al-mujarrad*). So, for them, the soul, as an immaterial light, does not perish at all, and nor does it admit of privation (*'adam*) in itself, for it is manifest to its essence. Since it is linked originally to the superior lights, it continues to

¹⁸ *SH-H.* p. 194.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *SH-H.* pp. 194-5.

survive so long as the latter do.²¹ Moreover, the soul's degree of perfection is commensurate with its self-consciousness or manifestness to itself. At this point, Dawwānī underlines the significance of the notion of "degrees of luminosity," a notion which manifests a marked originality in Ishrāqī philosophy. He states that all what appears as accidents is, itself, a degree of luminosity; the individuality of the soul is, therefore, permanent.

On the other hand, each faculty that the rational soul possesses experiences pleasure and pain on different levels according to the capacity of its perfection and perception. That is to say, all the senses, smell, touch, taste, sight and hearing, as well as the internal senses, whatever fits their respective power of perception and perfection.²²

II. But as for the perfection of the intellectual substance (*al-jawhar al-‘āqil*), it is realized through contemplation of the gnostic knowledge of God and His attributes (*ṣifātihī*), of the worlds (*‘awālim*) and the order and events that exist in those worlds, and of the matters which pertain to both the origin and end of life. Moreover, the intellect needs to be released from the faculties of the body as well as all that they are attached to. In other words, the intellect can accomplish its real perfection by two important means: (i) thorough knowledge or gnosis (*al-ma‘rifā*) of those things just mentioned, and (ii) complete remoteness (*al-tanazzuh*) from the faculties and their

²¹ *SH-H.* p. 198.

²² *I-H.* 38b4-5; *SH-H.* p. 199.

preoccupations.²³ So, the pleasure and pain that the intellect experiences depends on the perfection that it acquires by those two means.

Dawwānī interprets pleasure (*ladhdha*) as "the perception of the perfection" and pain (*alam*) as "the perception of the lack of perfection".²⁴ Both pain and pleasure can be experienced, according to Suhrawardī, even without the help of the senses. In stating this, says Dawwānī, Suhrawardī makes an explicit indication to the pleasure and pain of the intellect as opposed to that of senses. One would be delighted, for instance, at the acquisition of contemplative perfection. Moreover, the pleasure which one receives from such perfection is more complete and delightful than that which he acquires from sensory perfection. By the same token, the loss of contemplative perfection is more painful than that of sensory perfection.

However, the soul, in so far as it is preoccupied with the body, does not feel pain as a consequence of all that is reprehensible and vicious. Nor does it take pleasure in all that is admirable and virtuous. This is because the soul becomes entirely intoxicated by "the natural disposition of the body" (*ṭabīʿat al-badan*), which is described, according to some exegetes, as the tree forbidden to Adam.²⁵ The soul can be liberated from such intoxication,

²³ *SH-H.* p. 199.

²⁴ *SH-H.* p. 200.

²⁵ *SH-H.* p. 200.

Anḳaravī remarks, only when it departs from the body.²⁶

2. The Condition of the Soul After the Death of the Body

III. After its separation from the body, the soul, if it is in a miserable condition due to its ignorance of and desire for the world of senses, would become afflicted with grief. In such a situation, it is deprived of not only the radiation of the sensory world but also the sacred light, which is, according to Dawwānī's comment, the light of the world of intellect.²⁷ That is to say, the rational soul in this miserable state is cut off from two lights: the light of sense (*nūr al-ḥiss*) and the light of intellect (*nūr al-'aql*).²⁸ In Anḳaravī's interpretation, they are the light of hearing (*sāmi'a*) and that of sight (*bāṣira*).²⁹

Whatever these lights may be, once they are cut off, the soul falls into total darkness in which it consequently becomes confused and bewildered by fear, worry and anxiety. As an example of this Suhrawardī points to melancholiacs (*al-malikholyā*), who fall victim to a kind of spleen or madness which, as Dawwānī interprets, alters their thinking and

²⁶ I-H. 39a17-39b1.

²⁷ SH-H. p. 201.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ I-H. 39b13.

reasoning from the state of natural flow to that of corruption.³⁰ Or as Anḳaravī comments, the natural disposition and temperament of their animal spirit would undergo an alteration.³¹

IV. As for the virtuous and excellent souls (*al-ṣālihāt al-fāḍilāt*), they are near to God and obtain, according to one of the Prophet's hadith, those beautiful things which no eye has seen, which no ear has heard and of which no human mind could ever conceive. In his comments on this issue, Anḳaravī declares that these are the people who, having ever occupied themselves with doing good deeds (*a'māl-i ṣaliḥā*), render their souls virtuous. Some of them constitute the following groups: prophets (*enbiyā'*), saints (*evliyā'*), well-doers (*ṣūleḥā*) and believers (*mū'minīn*).³²

Dawwānī, for his part, prefers rather to describe these souls in strictly philosophical terminology as the "perfect souls". So, of the two components of Suhrawardī's phrase above, *al-ṣālihāt al-fāḍilāt*, the latter, in Dawwānī's understanding, refers to the souls which attain "theoretical perfection" (*al-kamāl al-'ilmī*), while the former denotes the souls which attain the "practical perfection" (*al-kamāl al-'amalī*).³³ These rational souls contemplate the

³⁰ *SH-H.* p. 201.

³¹ *I-H.* 40a1, 3.

³² *I-H.* 40a9-10.

³³ *SH-H.* p. 202. This is reminiscent of Avicenna's division of philosophy into two theoretical and practical, both of which, according to him, aim chiefly to perfect human soul. (See above n. 7, in the Prolegomena.)

Necessarily Existent Being, the superior beings and all the marvellous things of the world of light. Moreover, they come into complete contact with the immaterial lights whose luminosity is never exhausted. They are so deeply submerged, Dawwānī goes on, in the radiations effused from the sublime principles or beings mentioned above that they attain the state of angelicity (*al-malakiyya*) in which they are completely immune from physical stain, passion and impurity. As a result they begin living there "a sheer contemplative life" (*al-ḥayāt al-'aqliyya al-ṣirfa*).³⁴ At this stage, they can even reach the rank of angels,³⁵ where they enjoy continuously contemplating their beloved supreme lights and thus take pleasure in their illumination. According to Anḳaravī, however, when these virtuous souls happen to be in those two states, they become equipped with the Divine power and delighted with both *physical* and spiritual pleasures.³⁶ It should be noted at this moment that Anḳaravī, by adding "physical pleasures" to the virtuous souls, not only deviates from the original text of the *Hayākil*, but in fact aims to place its author, Suhrawardī within the fold of orthodox Islam.

Anḳaravī goes on to explain that all of these virtuous and excellent souls ultimately return to their father, the Holy Spirit, who is the principal origin and lord of their species. It is from him that they receive knowledge

³⁴ *SH-H.* p. 202.

³⁵ The term "malakiyya" is substituted in Dawwānī's commentary with the term "malā'ika," meaning angels. (*SH-H.* p. 202.)

³⁶ *I-H.* 40a14-5.

of the unseen (*ġaybiyye*), of Scripture (*dīniyye*) and of the mysterious certainty (*esrār-i yaḳīniyye*).³⁷ Besides, this Holy Spirit, according to Suhrawardī, "stands victorious over the heads of the dragons in the darkness".³⁸

The phrase "heads of the dragons in the darkness" is elucidated by Dawwānī as follows:

These are the human temples, which are the abode of the dark forces. As for the lord of the species (the Holy Spirit), he is the one who trains these temples until they attain their perfection. Again it is he who pours forth the souls over these temples; afterwards he liberates the former from their lowly (depressing) state, leading them, as far as their capacity permits, towards perfection.³⁹

▶ The Holy Spirit as such, in Suhrawardī's eyes, is "an irresistible and crushing force", which means, according to Dawwānī's explanation, the destroyer of all those dark idols (*al-aṣnām*).⁴⁰ When it is seen in a mystical sense, as Corbin states, it comes to denote that the father, the Holy Spirit, causes the destruction of the corporeal temple, which is the human body, and thus sets free "the spiritual temple", which is the soul, by leading it to its rank of spiritual individuality and perfection.⁴¹

³⁷ *I-H.* 40b3-5.

³⁸ *H-N.* p. 86.

³⁹ *SH-H.* p. 203; cf. Corbin's translation in *Les Temples*, p. 84, n. 89.

⁴⁰ *SH-H.* p. 203.

⁴¹ *Les Temples*, p. 84, n. 89.

In this connection, the Holy Spirit, portrayed by Suhrawardī as "the owner of the excellent theurgy," is conceived of by Dawwānī as "the possessor of the human form,"⁴² which is the best and noblest of all the forms. This interpretation is confirmed by the Qur'anic verse: "certainly We have created man in the best of mould."⁴³ Being the principle and originator of the human species, the Holy Spirit is very near to God, even the nearest in an absolute sense, according to some Sufi masters.⁴⁴ And it dwells in the world of *malakūt*, namely the world of souls, which is intermediary between the world of *jabarūt* (i.e., Intellects) and that of *mulk* (i.e., bodies). The world of *malakūt*, which is also called the "minor world" (*malakūt-u kuchuk*) in the *Partaw-nāmāh*, Suhrawardī's other Persian treatise on light, has control over the corporeal world.⁴⁵

V. Towards the end of the present temple Suhrawardī puts emphasis on the dichotomy between the faculties of sense perception and the soul, between spiritual entities and sensible objects, and between the pleasure

⁴² "Rabb al-naw" corresponds exactly to the Peripatetic concept of "Giver of forms" (*Dator formarum* = *Wāhib al-suwar*), which is the Active Intellect (*al-'Aql al-Fa'āl*). For a comparative analysis, see, Corbin, *Avicenna And the Visionary Recital*, trans. by Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); L.E. Goodman, *Avicenna* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 144-5, 151-2; Davidson, "Alfārābī and Avicenna on the Active Intellect," pp. 109-178.

⁴³ Qur'an, 95:4.

⁴⁴ *SH-H*. p. 203.

⁴⁵ Suhrawardī, *Partaw-nāmāh*, in *Oeuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques: Opera Metaphysica et Mystica III*, p. 65.

of intellect and that of the senses. This important section, however, has been overlooked by Anḳaravī for some unknown reason. One can justifiably question his doing so by considering the fact that he, as has been so far observed in this research, made extensive use of Dawwānī's commentary, which itself does contain the complete text of the *Hayākil*. Besides, as we have often noted, he has also consulted to a certain extent the Persian text, which, though not complete, yet does include the section at stake. In view of these two facts, one can presume that Anḳaravī's reason for such an omission must have been deliberate. This can be best explained with reference to his position as an advocate of what he might call orthodox Islam. He might have found the content of the rest of this temple, which concentrates largely on the intellectual and spiritual pleasure and pain of the soul after the death, incompatible with the orthodox view of Islam. Although Suhrawardī makes no explicit indication as to whether he would deny bodily resurrection⁴⁶ -a doctrine which would appear contrary to the literal meanings of the Scripture, and in support of which philosophers had

⁴⁶ In fact Suhrawardī's affirmation of the world of "Suspended Images" (*al-muthul al-mu'allaqah*), which lies between the spiritual and physical worlds, allows him to develop his own theory of eschatology, a theory which differs from that of Avicenna especially in recognizing, though by no means explicitly, the resurrection of the body. It is in the world of images where "imagination takes place of sense perception", and it is there that "the resurrection of the body takes place, the divine figures (such as angels) become real and all the prophetic eschatological statements come true." Fazlur Rahman, "Dream, Imagination and 'Ālam al-Mithāl," *Islamic Studies* 3 (1964), p. 170.

advanced quite a number of arguments that were later repudiated by al-Ghazālī[̄] nevertheless he insists on purely spiritual states of the soul in the realm of the intelligibles, to the exclusion of the states of the body. Because of this implication, it is most likely that Anḳaravī[̄] avoided purposely dealing with such a controversial issue and thus neglected this part. But all in all, such an attitude proves once again his attempt at making Suhrawardī[̄] appear "orthodox." Now I shall continue to explain the text, relying only on Dawwānī[̄]'s commentary.

First of all, Suhrawardī[̄]'s contention that there is no direct relation between the sensible faculties and the soul is explained by Dawwānī[̄] as saying that what the soul perceives by its rational faculties is more complete, more comprehensive, more ample and more precise than what it perceives by its sensible faculties. The perception of the latter, in contrast to that of the former, involves exterior entities which are finite, not the realities which are interior and infinite. Apart from this, all that is conceived through rational faculties persists along with the survival of the soul, whereas all that is perceived by the senses perishes with the demise of the instruments, namely the external and internal senses.⁴⁷ Meanwhile the same sharp distinction above is extended also by Suhrawardī[̄] to between the pleasure of the sensible faculties and that of the rational faculties. So in brief, not only the rational faculties themselves but also their way of

⁴⁷ *SH-H.* pp. 203-4.

perception, including all that they perceive and taste, are nobler and more superior than the sensible faculties.

As far as the spiritual entities and Divine lights are concerned, they possess their own distinct form of contemplation, which operates exclusively on the basis of the concept of love or amour (*'ishq*). To begin with, the First, i.e., the Necessarily Existent, loves His own essence. Amour, as Dawwānī explains on the basis of Ṭūsī's commentary on the *Ishārāt*, is the delight (*ibtihā*) at the presence of the beloved, while desire (*shawq*) is the motion towards the realization of that delight, which can be conceived either when the beloved, although absent, becomes present in a certain way or when it becomes present only in the imagination. So in the First Being as well as in other intellects there is only love, no desire, whereas in the celestial souls, love and desire are found together.⁴⁸

VI. The essence of God, Dawwānī goes on to comment, which is perfect in every respect, becomes an object of love both for Himself and others. And both of them take pleasure in visualizing that essence.

⁴⁸ *SH-H*. p. 203. Dawwānī has extracted this detailed analysis of love and desire from Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī's commentary on Avicenna's *Ishārāt*. There he explains that the volitional movement emanates either from sensible representation (*taṣawwur ḥissī*) or from intellectual comprehension (*taṣawwur 'aqlī*). In the case of the former, the incentive (*dā'*) is either concupiscent (*shahwānī*) or irascible (*ghaḍabī*). But in the case of the latter, there is no incentive as such, simply because it is the intellect from which it proceeds. So the movements of the celestial spheres more or less resemble the movements which proceed from our practical intellect. (Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt ma'a Sharḥ Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī*, vol. 2-3, p. 568.)

However, since God's visualization is more complete than that of others, the pleasure He obtains therefrom will be equally stronger and more delightful than that of all others. Furthermore, "there is no one near the splendour of His Majesty, because of other's annihilation in that splendour."⁴⁹

At the end of this *haykal*, Suhrawardī, reverting once again to the conditions of the righteous souls, declares that when they are entirely freed from the temples of darkness, they rise towards the splendour and illumination of the worlds of *Jabarūt* and *Malakūt*. The former, which, as noted before, is the world of intellects, is called thus because, as Dawwānī expounds, it is indispensable for the fulfilment of the natural perfection as well as the preservation of the rational soul. In the world of *Jabarūt*, the soul witnesses "the splendid beauty of the Divine lights", while in the world of *Malakūt*, the world of souls, it becomes illumined by the celestial souls.⁵⁰

When the souls have ascended to these noble stations, to them will be unveiled by the Light of God all that is immeasurable with all that is visible to the eyes by the light of the sun. This will generate ample spiritual pleasure in the beholder of that Light, which is distinct from any material pleasure and to which Dawwānī brings as an example the following verse: "Is one whose heart Allah has opened to Islam, so that he has received

⁴⁹ *SH-H.* p. 206.

⁵⁰ *SH-H.* p. 207.

enlightenment from Allah..⁵¹ To this he adds also the hadith: "I pass the night with my Lord who provides me with food and drink."⁵²

Rejecting such spiritual pleasure is tantamount, in Suhrawardī's view, to the denial of sexual enjoyment. While commenting on this issue, Dawwānī, quoting from the *Partaw-nāmah*, states that after separation from their bodies, all that these souls will visualize in those luminous stations is incommensurate to all that they have visualized in the present world. Nevertheless, there are souls or mystics who visualize in this world what would be superior or at least equal to what the others will visualize in the next world. In support of this idea, Dawwānī relates on the authority of Sahl b. 'Abdillah al-Tustarī that "some gnostics visualize God in this world in a more perfect way than others visualize Him in the hereafter."⁵³ But those who are preoccupied and even obsessed with the physical pleasures of the world in which they live presently may not be able to perceive the spiritual pleasure of the angels and the sanctified entities, namely the pleasure of the intellects and the celestial souls.

⁵¹ Qur'ān, 39:22.

⁵² Wensinck, *Concordance*, vol. 1, p. 235.

⁵³ *SH-H.* p. 208.

CHAPTER TEN

THE SEVENTH TEMPLE

I. The rational souls are from the substance of the *Malakūt*. The faculties of body as well as their preoccupations diverted them from their own world.¹ However, once the soul has become strengthened with (the aid of) spiritual virtues, and once the dominance of the physical faculties accordingly has grown weaker by the diminution of the nourishment and the prolongation of insomnia, it becomes free and even occasionally hastens to join the sacred world. Then it enters into communion with its sacred father² and acquires thereof knowledge (*ma'ārif*). At the same time, it also communes with the celestial souls, which are cognizant of not only their motions but also the necessary consequences of those motions. Regardless of whether it is asleep or awake, it acquires from them (i.e. the celestial souls) knowledge of the unseen (realities) in the same way that a mirror receives the image of the object facing it.³

II. It so happens that the soul contemplates something intelligible to which the faculty of imagination assigns a corresponding form. That form is reflected in the sensory world exactly in the same way as the sensed images are mirrored in the treasure of the representation. In this state, the soul either contemplates various wondrous forms confided in it or hears some words articulated to it [without seeing the articulator]⁴ or a hidden reality⁵ appears to it or an apparition occurs as if it is ascending and descending. However, in the case of an immaterial entity which is seen in apparition, such ascent and

¹ "From its own cause". (*H-N*. p. 85.)

² It is replaced by "sacred spirits" in *Hayākil* (p. 107, l. 12).

³ The whole text to this point is lacking in Anḳaravī's commentary. *H-N*. p. 85; *SH-H*. p. 209; *Hayākil*, p. 107.

⁴ *Les Temples*, p. 64.

⁵ Abū Rayyān's edition reads "a concrete reality". (*H-N*. p.85.)

descent would be impossible, for it is released of the concomitants of the material bodies. An apparition in fact is a corporeal shadow which imitates the spiritual states of that entity. As for dreams, they are also an imaginative imitation of what the soul visualizes [in the spiritual world].⁶ By this I mean the authentic and genuine dreams, not the muddled ones which emanate from the facetious fantasy of the devil.⁷

III. The divine⁸ souls sometimes move with a sacred joy. Then the Light of the First Truth rises upon them to which surrender all the elements in the world. It is evident to you that a piece of heated iron, because of its contact with the fire, takes on (the colour of) the latter, and it also executes the same action [for instance, burning]⁹ as does the fire. In that case you should not be astonished at the fact that when the soul is illuminated, enlightened and irradiated by the Light of God, all the creatures obey it just as they obey the sacred beings. Among those who are in quest for the Orient,¹⁰ there are people who turn their faces towards their "Sacred Father,"¹¹ seeking light. Thus to these people, certain sacred splendours become conspicuous, just as the visit of the guest becomes known by the flashes surrounding him. In fact the guidance of God reaches the chosen people who, raising their hands,¹² await the heavenly sustenance. When their eyes are opened, they find God dressed in the garment of glory. His name is above the domain of the *Jabarūt*, and underneath the beams of His light there is a group of people

⁶ *Les Temples*, p. 64.

⁷ *H-N*. pp. 85-6; *SH-H*. pp. 210-11; *I-H*. 40b5-9, 15-41a1, 5-7; *Hayākil*, pp. 107-108; *Les Temples*, p. 64.

⁸ In the base text of *H-N*. (p. 87), "muta'alliha" (divine) is replaced by "nāṭiqa" (rational).

⁹ This exists only in Dawwāri's commentary. (*SH-H*. p. 212)

¹⁰ "Mustashriqīn", which is omitted in *Hayākil*, is translated by Corbin as "the pilgrims of the mystical Orient". (*Les Temples*, p. 64.)

¹¹ "Sacred" is omitted in both *I-H* and *H-N*.

¹² This is omitted in *H-N*.

beholding Him.¹³

IV. It is incumbent upon the one endowed with the faculty of inner perception to believe firmly in the verity of the messages of the prophets as well as in the fact that the parables of the prophets point to the realities, as it is stated in the Qur'ān: "Such are the parables We set forth for mankind, but only those understand them who have knowledge,"¹⁴ and as one of the prophets has admonished as saying: "I would like to open my mouth in parables."¹⁵ Therefore, the prophets are entrusted with the revelation, while the supreme epiphany,[the pure spirit and light],¹⁶ the Paraclete, is entrusted with the interpretation and explanation, as the Christ forewarned when he said: "I shall go to my Father and your Father in order that he send you the Paraclete who will inform you by virtue of interpretation."¹⁷ He also said: "The Paraclete whom my Father will send to you in my name will instruct you in all things."¹⁸ The phrase "in my name" is meant to indicate that He will be called Christ, for He will be anointed [or consecrated]¹⁹ by the Light.²⁰ To this is made an allusion in the Qur'ān: "afterwards it is for us to explain it."²¹ The term "afterwards"

¹³ *H-N*, pp. 86-7; *SH-H*, pp.212-3; *I-H*, 41a10-11, 13-4, 16-7, 41b3-4, 7-10; *Hayākil*, p. 108.

¹⁴ Qur'ān, 29:43.

¹⁵ Bible, Matthew 13:13, 35.

¹⁶ This part is included in both *SH-H* (p. 215) and *Les Temples* (p. 65).

¹⁷ Cf. Bible, Saint John 14:16, 15:26, 20:17. See also *Les Temples*, p. 65.

¹⁸ Bible, Saint John 14:26.

¹⁹ *Les Temples*, p. 65.

²⁰ The whole sentence exists in *I-H*, *SH-H*. And it also appears in ms. B of *H-N*. (p. 88, n. 4) but just before the phrase that "...will instruct you in all things."

²¹ Qur'ān, 75:19.

(*thumma*) refers to the passage of time.²²

There is no doubt that the lights of the *Malakūt* descend in order to help those who are worried and depressed and that the beams of the sacred light spread upon them and that the Divine path is opened [to the one who knocks upon its door],²³ -[indeed, the donor of knowledge is "the one who is on the clear horizon, he does not withhold niggardly the knowledge of the unseen"²⁴]²⁵- as in the case of a sudden streak which heralds the real lightning at night when the wind of tornado blows out. [God said to us: "It is He who sends the winds as heralds of glad tidings, before His Mercy".²⁶]²⁷ Thus, the beam of light draws near to the one who experiences it, as this person approaches the beam, ascending to it. Then the road to the sacred world is opened for the ascension to the elevated dwellings to which the *barāzikh* are forbidden.²⁸ (Most of their attachments cannot reach.)²⁹

1. The Visionary Imagination

I. Among the subjects the last temple generally deals with are the following: the messages of the prophets (*al-nubuwwāt*) and their miracles

²² The last sentence is omitted both in *H-N* and *I-H*. (*H-N*. pp. 87-8; *SH-H*. pp. 213-216; *I-H*. 42a1-3, 7-12; *Hayākil*, p. 108.

²³ *Les Temples* (p. 65.) borrows it from the comments of Dawwānī. (*SH-H*. p.216)

²⁴ Cf. Qur'ān, 81:23-4.

²⁵ This whole statement exists only in *SH-H*. (pp. 216-7).

²⁶ Qur'ān, 27:63.

²⁷ This whole line exists in *Les Temples*; it is also included in Dawwānī's own comments.

²⁸ *H-N*. pp.88-9; *SH-H*. pp. 216-217.

²⁹ This is quoted from Dawwānī's own comments. (*SH-H*. p. 218)

(*al-mu'jizāt*), the wonders of the saints (*al-karāmāt*), the mystical stations (*al-maqāmāt*), and dreams (*al-manāmāt*). As can be seen in the translation above, a considerable part of this temple is omitted both in Anḳaravī's commentary and the Persian translation.

At the very outset, we are emphatically reminded that the rational soul, being an immaterial substance, originally belongs to the world of *Malakūt*, whence it is being attracted by the faculties of the body and their preoccupations and thus drawn into the transient world (*al-'ālam al-sufī*).³⁰ The same rational soul, however, provided that it regains its spiritual strength and purity by adorning itself with excellent virtues and by exercising three ascetic practices -eating less, speaking less, and sleeping less³¹- can liberate itself from those engagements and rejoin the sacred world and so make contact conveniently with its own sacred father as well as with the celestial souls or the sacred spirits (*arwāḥ-i qudsī*), as the Persian text puts it.³² At this crucial juncture, the soul receives knowledge from both the father (who is, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the Holy Spirit or Active Intellect, and the Lord of the human species) and the celestial souls. The communication between the soul and the Holy Spirit is elaborated in Dawwānī's commentary as follows:

³⁰ *SH-H*. p. 209.

³¹ To these is also added "less conversation with multitude." (See, *SH-H*. p. 209, n. 2)

³² *Hayākil*, p. 107. l. 12.

It is the Lord or Angel of the species to which the soul belongs and from which it obtains knowledge, as Hermes sketched it out in a recital: an entity among the supreme lights has conversed with me of the spiritual realities as well as gnostic knowledge. Then I asked him: "Who are you?" He said to me: "I am your Perfect Nature."³³

This Perfect Nature (*al-ṭiba' al-tām*), a notion of Hermetic origin, serves particularly in Ishrāqī Tradition as a "celestial father", characterizing what Corbin terms *unio mystica* between the superior world of *Malakūt* and our world in general, and between the angel of the human species and the mystic in particular.³⁴

The soul's contact with its own father at the same time enables it to communicate with the celestial souls, who are conscious of their motions as well as of the consequences of those motions, namely the events taking place in this world.³⁵ As a result of such union (*ittiṣāl*), which may occur both in moments of consciousness and in dreams, the rational soul would be able to acquire knowledge of the unseen realities, which would mean, according to Dawwānī, the knowledge of all matters in the past as well as in the future.³⁶ Suhrawardī depicts it as a reflection of the images in the mirror-like soul, and Dawwānī further specifies it, in complete harmony with

³³ *Les Temples*, p. 85, n. 99; *SH-H*. p. 209.

³⁴ See for a detailed account of how this was understood by both Ishrāqī philosophers and Shi'ite theosophers, Corbin, *En Islam Iranien: Aspects Spirituels et philosophiques*, vol. 2, pp. 89, 117, 134, 137-138, 297-307.

³⁵ *SH-H*. p. 209.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

mystical language, as a disclosure (*al-kashf*) of the intelligible forms to the soul.³⁷

II. This brings us eventually to Suhrawardī's doctrine of imagination³⁸ and its role in the visionary experience of the prophets and divine sages as well as the mystics. To begin with, once the rational soul enters into communication with the celestial souls and immaterial intellects,³⁹ it commences to contemplate (*mushāhada*) an intelligible entity to which the imaginative faculty attributes a particular form, which in turn is echoed in the sensory world, just as a form transmitted by the senses from that world is reflected in the so-called pool of the faculty of representation. Subsequently, the soul begins to visualize the various forms which are contained in it, which are extraordinary, according to Dawwānī, in terms of beauty (*ḥusn*), subtlety (*latāfat*) and sublimity (*'aẓamat*). The visualization as such takes place more or less in the same way as the divine revelation occurs to the prophets.⁴⁰ In this connection, Dawwānī relates the saying

³⁷ *SH-H*. pp. 209-210.

³⁸ See for a brief analysis of the doctrine of dream and imagination among the Muslim thinkers such as al-Farabi, Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, Ibn al-'Arabī, etc., Rahman, "Dream, Imagination and '*Ālam al-Mithāl*,'" pp. 167-180.

³⁹ "'Ukūl-ü mücerrede," a phrase which, although it exists neither in *H-N* nor in *SH-H*, is used by Anḳaravī along with *nūfūs-u semāvī* (heavenly souls). (*I-H*. 40b9-10.)

⁴⁰ See for various forms of revelation, the Qur'ān, 16:102-3, 26:192-199, 42:51-2, etc.

of the Prophet Muḥammad: "the Angel sometimes appears to me in the form of man and thus speaks to me."⁴¹ It is also reported, Dawwānī continues, that the Prophet saw the angel Gabriel at one time in the form of Dihya al-Kalbī, an Arab youth of reputed beauty (*jamāl*), and at another in His own form.⁴²

Apart from visualizing the forms, the soul, according to Suhrawardī, may hear (*yasmāʿ*) various articulated sounds and formulated words, as in the case of the Prophet to whom the divine message was revealed sometimes as a buzzing sound or sometimes in a written form, like the tablets of the Prophet Moses.⁴³ It is also possible that an unseen reality may be disclosed (*yatajallā*) to the soul in a form other than those figures or images; for example, it is unveiled directly to the mirror-like soul.

On the other hand, according to Suhrawardī, an apparition or a vision (*shabḥ*) may well appear to the soul. An apparition is in effect a shadow imitating the spiritual aspects of a given corporeal entity. Dawwānī explains this completely within the framework of Suhrawardī's notion of light. He says, it is known that an apparition is simply a shadow of the immaterial light, and all the attributes included in that apparition are equally the shadows of the spiritual attributes of that light. Again the bodies as well as

⁴¹ *SH-H.* p. 210.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.* Cf. *Qur'ān*, 27:7-8.

their attributes are the shadows of their luminous lords and attributes of these lords. Similarly, these luminous entities as well as their attributes are in their turn the shadows of the Light of Lights and of Its perfect attributes; and all of these attributes are identical with the essence of this Unique Light, for they all are exhausted and perish in the unity of Its essence, even while they are being manifested in multiple forms. Therefore, in the final analysis, Dawwānī emphasizes, "the whole universe is a shadow of the Light of Lights".⁴⁴

Next Suhrawardī turns his attention to dreams, which he divides into genuine and confused. He regards the first type as "an imaginative imitation of what the soul visualizes or contemplates" out of the various meanings and intentions (*ma'ānī*) dissociated completely from the sensible forms.⁴⁵ "One can enjoy witnessing genuine dreams, provided that one reduces the occupations of one's external senses and frees oneself from fantasy and thus becomes cognizant of supersensible realities."⁴⁶ The second type, on the other hand, is merely the product of demonic fantasy; and since it is muddled with fictitious images, as Dawwānī explains, it cannot be interpreted. Moreover, because it is whispered by Satan to the soul, it has no cogitative value for anybody. On the contrary, it keeps the soul from

⁴⁴ *SH-H.* p. 211; cf. *Les Temples*, pp. 85-6, n. 102.

⁴⁵ *SH-H.* p. 211.

⁴⁶ *H-I.* p. 237.

comprehending the true realities.⁴⁷

2. The Divine Souls

III. The souls of those who have attained theosophy (*muta'alliha*)⁴⁸ are occasionally moved to rejoice at the beatitude of the light illuminated by the First Truth, i.e. God. Basing himself on *Partaw-nāmah*, Dawwānī explains this by saying that regardless of how this light comes to fall upon them, whether it be through a mediator or not, it takes its source from the upper and sublime world, not from the lower and mundane world. And it has nothing to do with knowledge and intelligible forms; on the contrary, it is a kind of sacred irradiation (*shu'a' qudsī*), disclosed to the soul engaged in theosophy. In this particular state, a light, which is more luminous than the light of the sun, may occur in the common sense. The light as such is in fact the elixir of knowledge and power (*qudrat*). That is to say, thanks to this light, so many forms of knowledge and gnosis occur to the visionary theosopher that it would be impossible for him to express them clearly.

⁴⁷ *SH-H*. pp. 211-2.

⁴⁸ Cf. Suhrawardī's usage of this term in his classification of the philosophers: (i) the divine philosopher (*ḥakīm ilāhī*) who is efficient in theosophy (*ta'alluh*) but deficient in theoretical philosophy (*baḥth*); (ii) the theoretical philosopher who is deficient in theosophy; (iii) the divine philosopher who is efficient in both theosophy and discursive philosophy, etc. (*H-I*. p. 11-2; cf. Ziai, *Knowledge and Illumination*, p. 175. See also for a general account of the term *ta'alluh* in some of the Iranian thinkers, Corbin, *En Islam Iranien*, vol. 2, pp. 41, 46, 69, 79, 335, 362, vol. 3, p. 288, vol. 4, pp. 21-2, 421.)

Furthermore, in addition to knowledge also occurs to him tremendous spiritual power whereby all the earthly elements are made subservient to his command.⁴⁹

Suhrawardī's analogy in this context casts considerable light on the issue at stake. He says that a piece of iron, for instance, once having been heated by the fire, not only takes on the colour of the latter but also its action.⁵⁰ Likewise, a soul, as soon as it is illuminated (*ashraqa*), enlightened (*istināra*) and irradiated (*istiḡā'a*) by the Light of God, is miraculously endowed, as Dawwānī remarks, with divine power and knowledge. To this soul, then, all the "earthly creatures" (*al-akwān*) become obedient and subservient.

Whose soul or souls are considered to be in this category? In fact no restriction other than *muta'alliha* (attainment of theosophy) is set by Suhrawardī. For him, it is these souls upon which the Light of God radiates. But for Ismā'īl Anḳaravī, these are the souls of the prophets (*enbiyā'*) and the saints (*evliyā'*); and not only the earthly creatures, he stresses, but also

⁴⁹ *SH-H.* p. 212.

⁵⁰ The same analogy is also advanced by Suhrawardī in his treatise entitled, *Risāla fī 'l-tiḡād al-Ḥukamā'*. There he says: "the soul becomes noble and its faculties become strong, so it exercises an immense influence in this world, when it has contact with the Holy Spirit and thereby receives knowledge from Him. Moreover, it acquires from Him a luminous faculty as well as an influential power, exactly in the same way as an iron becomes heated by the fire and thereby acquires a luminous mode as well as a particular property of the fire. This stage finds its realization in the saints or friends of God (*awliyā'*)..." (Suhrawardī, *Oeuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques II*, pp. 270-1; cf. idem, *L'Archange Emproupré*, p. 23.)

the sublime beings (*mevcūdāt-ı 'ulviyye*) are rendered obedient to them.⁵¹

Among those who are in quest after the Orient or Ishrāq (*al-mustashriqīn*),⁵² or as Corbin renders it, among the pilgrims of the mystical Orient,⁵³ there are people, who, according to Dawwānī, are the divine sages (*muta'allihūn*)⁵⁴ and, according to Anḳaravī, are the saints and the prophets⁵⁵. They all turn their faces or, as the former commentator notes, "the direction of their hearts" towards their sacred father, i.e. the Holy Spirit,⁵⁶ seeking light from Him. Thus by the light they receive from the Holy Spirit, they are inevitably exposed to what Suhrawardī terms "the sacred splendours" (*jalāyā al-quds*), which refer, according to Dawwānī, to "the supreme lights" (*al-anwār al-'āliya*),⁵⁷ and according to Anḳaravī, to "the unveilings" (*tecelliyāt*).⁵⁸

In the subsequent lines of the same passage, Suhrawardī's concern

⁵¹ *I-H.* 41b1-2.

⁵² The term is currently used to signify "orientalists," i.e. scholars who study, Islam particularly in the West. See Corbin, *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital*, p. 160, n. 40; *Les Temples*, p. 86, n. 106.

⁵³ Refer to n. 13 of this chapter.

⁵⁴ *SH-H.* p. 212.

⁵⁵ *I-H.* 41b5.

⁵⁶ *I-H.* 41b6.

⁵⁷ *SH-H.* p. 212.

⁵⁸ *I-H.* 41b7.

is confined rather to the prayers of a certain group of people to God and His bestowal of guidance upon them. According to him, the people whom God's guidance definitely reaches are the chosen people, who, opening their hands, seek "heavenly providence" (*al-rizq al-samāwī*).⁵⁹ "Opening hands" is intended to imply, according to Dawwānī, the full preparation and participation on the part of the members of this praying elite in a mute form of prayer (*lisān al-ḥāl*), upon which God effuses His light and to which, therefore, He surely responds.⁶⁰ In such a concentrated state of worship, they appeal to God to bestow upon them "luminous sustenance" (*al-samāwī al-nūrī*),⁶¹ meaning, according to Qutb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, gnostic knowledge (*ma'ārif*) and mystical disclosure (*kashf*).⁶² Then as soon as their eyes are opened, they all of a sudden encounter God, clothed in a magnificent garment, i.e. the predominant glorious Light, which prevents all the other lights from reaching It.⁶³ These select people, according to Anḳaravī, are composed mainly of two groups, (i) the prophets, and (ii) the saints, each of which are distinguished with the honourable status of prophethood (*nūbūvvet*) and sainthood (*vilāyet*) respectively. Besides, through their own

⁵⁹ The same statement recurs in exactly the same form in the *Ḥikmāt al-Ishrāq*. p. 246.

⁶⁰ *SH-H*. p. 213.

⁶¹ *SH-H*. p. 213.

⁶² Corbin, *Le Livre De La Sagesse Orientale*, p. 427, n. 15.

⁶³ *SH-H*. p. 213.

personal talent and the gift granted by God, they both acquire knowledge of many gnostic divine sciences. Nevertheless, they, Anḳaravī stresses, are still unable to comprehend the essence of God. Therefore, they repeatedly make the following confession: "Glory be to You! We could not comprehend You in the true sense, though You are known".⁶⁴

The name of God, on the other hand, stands far above the realm of the *Jabarūt*. This simply refers, according to Dawwānī, to the fact that God's name dominates the circle of the intellects, which in turn encircle all that fall underneath them.⁶⁵ There is another group of people besides which is constantly subjected to the irradiation of God's light. These people are characterized by Dawwānī as "the perfect hermits or ascetics" (*ahl al-tajrīd al-tāmm*) who visualize, besides other dominant lights, the Light of Lights. This particular stage is more elevated in rank than the one in which *ishrāq* is followed by the power of control over the world of elements,⁶⁶ because the people of the former stage are profoundly immersed in their visualization.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ *I-H.* 41b14-17.

⁶⁵ *SH-H.* p. 213.

⁶⁶ Dawwānī refers here to the power exercised by the *mustashriqīn*, referred to above.

⁶⁷ *SH-H.* p. 213.

3. The Function of the Paraclete (*al-Faraqlīt*)

IV. In the last section of the present temple, just before the epilogue, Suhrawardī devotes most of his attention to dealing with the enigmatic nature and identity of the Paraclete in particular and its mysterious relation to the institution of prophethood in general. He begins first by underlining the necessity and the verity of the messages of the prophets, which, he claims, cannot be doubted by anyone who is invested with insight (*mustabṣir*) or, as Anḳaravī puts it, by those who are intelligent (*'ūḳelā*).⁶⁸ It is equally true that the messages of the prophets⁶⁹, revealed by God through various means but in most cases by the intermediacy of the Angel Gabriel, are conveyed to people in the discourse of parables (*amthāl*),⁷⁰ all of which refer in their essence to the realities and truths, which in turn

⁶⁸ *I-H.* 42a4.

⁶⁹ The function of a prophet, according to Suhrawardī, is in the first place to call people to worship God (*H-I.* p. 247), which somewhat differs from Avicenna's understanding that holds: "the prophet is the link between the celestial and terrestrial worlds, a link necessary for achieving the divine 'good order' (*nizām al-khayr*) in the sublunar world." Ibn Sīnā, *Fī Ithbāt al-Nubuwwat*, ed. Michael Marmura (Beirut: Dār al-Nahār, 1968), p. xiii.

⁷⁰ Cf. "symbols" (*rumūz* or *marāmiz*) and "hints" (*imā'*) in Avicenna's system of prophecy. For him, it is the primary obligation of a prophet to convey his message in the form of symbols and hints to the masses so that they might grasp it more easily. This is because "God commanded him to speak to people according to the capacity of their intellects." See for more information, Ibn Sīnā, *Fī Ithbāt al-Nubuwwat*, p. 48; idem, *Ilāhiyyāt II*, pp. 441-443; Peter Heath, *Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna With a Translation of the Book of the Prophet Muḥammad's Ascent to Heaven* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), pp. 149-169.

are intelligible, as the Qur'ān remarks,⁷¹ only to the well-versed in knowledge. The significance of parables in fact was already an established fact in some of the divine books which appeared long before the Qur'ān. "I would like to open my mouth in parables."⁷²

The point to be underscored here is that, according to Suhrawardī, the missions of the Prophets are distinct from that of the Paraclete. He says that *tanzīl*, which, as Dawwānī explains, means "the revelation of the realities in the form of parables",⁷³ is confined to the prophets, while *ta'wīl* (interpretation) and *bayān* (explanation) are confined to the Paraclete, "the most supreme theophany and the spiritual light". In other words, the function of the prophets, Dawwānī goes on, is to perfect human souls which vary from one another in terms of their capacity, through the revelation presented in the form of parables. Since all the prophets are commanded by God to speak to people according to their intellectual capacities, they accordingly transmit the divine truths to them in parables.⁷⁴

As for *ta'wīl*, it is defined by Dawwānī as follows: "to trace the Scriptural precepts from their apparent forms to their inward meanings."⁷⁵

⁷¹ Qur'ān, 29:43.

⁷² Bible, Matthew, 13:13, refer also to n. 19 of this chapter.

⁷³ *SH-H.* p. 214.

⁷⁴ *SH-H.* pp. 214-5.

⁷⁵ *SH-H.* p. 215.

Namely, it is a kind of discovery of the metaphysical truths concealed in the exterior forms of the religious law.⁷⁶ *Bayān* on the other hand is to "explain these truths by removing the veils from those above-mentioned forms".⁷⁷

Both of these two important tasks are attributed to the prerogative of the Paraclete, whose nature is yet to be discussed. According to Dawwānī, the term Paraclete, of Hebrew origin, simply denotes the person who distinguishes (*al-fāriq*) between truth and falsehood. Here it is applied, he says, to the one who represents the epiphany (*mazhar*) of the *walāya*, that is, the esoteric aspect (*bāṭin*) of the *nubuwwa*, announced by Jesus Christ: "I shall go to my Father and your Father, namely my Lord and your Lord,"⁷⁸ in order that he send you the Paraclete who will inform you by *ta'wīl*.⁷⁹ As Dawwānī suggests, this is an implicit indication of the coming of the Prophet Muḥammad, who would be the seal of the prophets. In other words, "the edifice of prophecy" (*nash'at al-nubuwwa*) is culminated and thus terminated with Muḥammad, who, therefore, must be the Paraclete at

⁷⁶ Corbin indicates that the very same definition of *ta'wīl* is also given by Nasir Khusraw and Isma'īlis. See, *Les Temples*, p. 87, n. 114.

⁷⁷ *SH-H.* p. 215.

⁷⁸ Dawwānī says that the ancients used to call the first principles (*al-mabādī*) "fathers", but not in the sense that the Christians understand. (*SH-H.* p. 215.)

⁷⁹ *SH-H.* p. 215.

least in respect to all the divine revelations prior to his time.⁸⁰ However, the Prophet himself, like other prophets, is, as Suhrawardī has shown in the text above, entrusted only with conveying a literal revelation to the public. This therefore requires the eventual intervention of others, apart from the prophets, who will fulfil the double missions of *ta'wīl* and *bayān* of this exoteric form of revelation, as the Qur'ān implicitly suggests it: "afterwards it is for us to explain it."⁸¹ This alludes, according to Dawwānī, to the manifestation of the form of *walāya*, peculiar to the Prophet Muḥammad alone:

To unveil fully the spiritual truths and realities, revealed to the Seal of the prophets, who had uttered them in the forms of laws and commandments (*ṣuwar al-awḍā'*), and to uncover those truths and realities from the above-said forms was not convenient in his time. However, this would be actualized by the advent of the one who is the Paraclete and the epiphany of the *walāya* particular to him (i.e., the Prophet Muḥammad).⁸² In fact, the Seal of the prophets disclosed all that was then supposed to be disclosed during the chain of prophecy; so much so that nothing remained untouched from the exterior forms (of the religious laws) save the uncovering of the subtle veils from the eyes so that they could visualize the beauty of those spiritual realities. That is why he has become the Paraclete of all the prophets as well as the discloser (*al-kāshif*) of the truths imparted to these prophets. Nevertheless, some of those subtle veils still remained (to be uncovered) and they all demanded the prophetic intervention. The (task) of removing these veils is confined to the epiphany of his own particular *walāya* which in turn takes into

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Qur'ān, 75:19.

⁸² Corbin specifies it as "the Muḥammadan *walāya*". (H. Corbin, *Face De Dieu et Face De L'Homme* (Paris: Flammarion, 1983), p. 331.

account that which suits the capacity of the time.⁸³

Thus it is obvious that, for Dawwānī, Suhrawardī's intent in ascribing the twofold functions, viz. *ta'wīl* and *bayān*, to the Paraclete under the name of "the supreme epiphany" can be conveniently extended to include the chains of the Imams who succeeded the Prophet Muḥammad. However, it is indeed too precarious to extend the same idea of the Paraclete as far as to identify it, as Corbin does,⁸⁴ with the twelfth Imām of the Shi'ite Tradition, though the quoted text above to some extent alludes to this effect. One can safely deduce, nevertheless, from what Dawwānī has so far stated, that the Paraclete is seen to embody two roles, one as the Seal of the prophets, i.e., the Prophet Muḥammad, the other as the *walī* of the *awliyā'*⁸⁵ (the saint of saints) or the Imām of the Imāms. The former is responsible for announcing the literal revelation or "exoteric (*ẓāhir*) aspect of the religious precepts" to people mostly in the form of parables, whereas the latter is charged with the task of unveiling the "esoteric (*bāṭin*)

⁸³ Abstracted in a summary fashion from *SH-H*. p. 216.

⁸⁴ "It can be well understood that Dawwānī, converted to the Shi'ism, identifies the Paraclete whom Suhrawardī talks about with the twelfth Imam, Seal of the Muḥammadan *walāya*." (*Les Temples*, p. 87, n. 115.)

⁸⁵ See for the role of the *walāya* in Shi'ism and Sufism, H. Landolt, "Walāya", *Encyclopedia of Religion* (New York: MacMillan, 1987), vol. 15, pp. 316-23.

realities".⁸⁶

Incidentally, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Shīrāzī, another famous commentator on the *Hayākil*, regards the Paraclete as "the one in whom is deposited the knowledge of the Book; that is to say, the person who knows both the *tafsīr* (literal exegesis) and the *ta'wīl*, after the mission of the prophets is completed."⁸⁷ Corbin, basing himself on the last-quoted statement, declares that, for Shīrāzī too, the Paraclete is none other than the Imam who has the knowledge of the Book.⁸⁸

The Ottoman commentator Anḳaravī, however, who translates the text with some elaboration, specifies the Paraclete as the Prophet Muḥammad:

In fact, the Holy Jesus (*Ḥazrat-i 'Isā*), may peace be upon him, having foretold the coming of the Sovereign (*Sultān*) of the prophets, stated: "I go to my Father and your Father so that he would send you the Paraclete, namely the Prophet who could explain to you every difficulty." He further continued to say: "the Paraclete whom my Father sends to you in my name would teach you the knowledge

⁸⁶ See for a thorough critical analysis of the idea of the Paraclete in a Shi'ite context: Corbin, "L'Idée du Paraclete En Philosophie Iranienne," (chapter) in *Face De Dieu et Face De L'Homme*, pp. 311-358; idem, *En Islam Iranien*, vol. 4, pp. 430-453; idem, *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabi*, trans. by Ralph Manheim (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 88-9; idem, *Oeuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques II*, pp. 40-4. For the function of the Paraclete in the other two Abrahamic faiths, particularly in the Johannine perspective, refer to Corbin, *Temple and Contemplation*, trans. by Philip Sherrard with the assistance of Liadain Sherrard (London: Islamic Publications, 1986), pp. 337-8; idem, *En Islam Iranien*, vol. 4, pp. 393-4, 410-430.

⁸⁷ Corbin, *Face De Dieu*, p. 331.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 332.

of all things." Meanwhile, the Holy Jesus' pronouncement of "my Father sends him in my name" is because he is purified by the Light and because he is entirely immersed in the light, which is indicated as a glad-tiding in the Glorious Qur'ān. Therefore it is obligatory for us, O Muḥammad!, to explain the nature of everything that is mentioned in the Qur'ān.⁸⁹ Besides, the Holy Christ stated: "I have informed you of this before (he would come), so that all of you should believe in him."⁹⁰ That is to say, "I have notified you about the Paraclete before his appearance, hence you ought to believe in him." So, from this it is well understood that to believe in all the prophets is mandatory.⁹¹

It is evident then that Anḳaravī's goal lies in stressing the advent of the Prophet Muḥammad, following the Prophet Jesus who had already announced it, saying: "my Father sends him in my name". This is, for Anḳaravī, an explicit indication of that fact, simply because he, i.e., the Prophet Muḥammad, is anointed with the light (*yumassih bi'n-nūr*), as is the case with the Prophet Jesus, whose name is also Christ (*Masīḥ*). It is therefore his view that the Paraclete would be the last Prophet only, not the Imam of the *walāya* at all.

However, Anḳaravī does not comment on the term "afterwards" (*thumma*) in the Qur'anic verse cited in the Arabic text of the *Hayākil*, which indeed, as Dawwānī proclaims, bears an allusion to the intervention of a person apart from the Prophet Muḥammad in the matters involving

⁸⁹ This is the explanation of the Qur'anic verse, 75:19.

⁹⁰ Cf. Bible, Deuteronomy 18:15, 19.

⁹¹ *I-H*. 42a12-42b8.

bayān.⁹² In other words, the term *thumma* intimates to a certain extent a change in either the person or the time. In either case, however, it may no longer concern the Prophet Muḥammad himself but, as Corbin declares, "his own Paraclete". This may possibly mean, again for Corbin, "the twelfth Imām, who will wrestle with the ta'wīl, as the Prophet himself wrestled with the *tanzīl*."⁹³

⁹² *SH-H*. p. 216.

⁹³ *Les Temples*, p. 88, n. 116.

EPILOGUE

O Our Lord! We believe in You.⁹⁴ We confirm the messages of Your prophets. We know that Your *Malakūt* contains stages.⁹⁵ We also know that You have divine servants⁹⁶ who are seeking to gain access to light by light,⁹⁷ though they sometimes relinquish light for darkness⁹⁸ so as to gain access to the former by the latter. In so doing, they would acquire through the behaviour of the senseless people⁹⁹ some kind of consolation for the eyes of the Sages.¹⁰⁰ In fact You have made promises to them and also sent to them the heralds of winds so as to carry them to '*Illiyyīn*'. Thus they celebrate Your Glory,¹⁰¹ convey Your sacred Books,¹⁰² are suspended on

⁹⁴ Dawwānī interprets this to mean: We believe in the necessity of Your Existence as well as in the attributes of Your Perfection. This is in effect an indication to the knowledge of both the Essence of the Necessary Being and His attributes. (*SH-H.* p. 218.)

⁹⁵ "Varying in ascent and descent, and upward and downward." In lieu of *marātib*, Dawwānī says, some manuscripts have *ma'āb*, meaning return of the souls after being released from their bodies to their abode. This implies the knowledge of the spiritual lights. (*SH-H.* p. 218.)

⁹⁶ i.e. the people of *tajrīd*. (*SH-H.* p. 218.)

⁹⁷ Dawwānī interprets: "They seek to reach the contemplation of the sublime lights through the excellent faculties and the intellectual perfection." (*SH-H.* p. 218.)

⁹⁸ Dawwānī comments that they sometimes tend to move or deviate from the superior luminosity to the inferior darkness, namely, to strengthen the physical faculties. (*SH-H.* p. 219.)

⁹⁹ i.e. the people who are entirely engrossed in the (physical) nature. (*SH-H.* p. 219.) Or those who do not persist in leading one path. Commentary of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Shīrāzī, cited in *Les Temples*, p. 89, n. 124.

¹⁰⁰ This is an explanation of this Prophetic saying: "the sleep of the Sage (*'ālim*) is a kind of worship." (*SH-H.* p. 219.)

¹⁰¹ i.e., the lights of Your Glory and Beauty. (*SH-H.* p. 219.)

¹⁰² Dawwānī interprets this to mean: "So they comprehend the real natures of Your verses and signs, revealed to the people of felicity." *Ibid.*

the wings of Cherubs,¹⁰³ ascend by the rope of luminosity¹⁰⁴ and seek the aid of solitude in order to obtain acquaintance [with the people of *Malakūf*].¹⁰⁵ It is these people who ascend to heaven,¹⁰⁶ while still residing on the earth.¹⁰⁷

Awaken, o my Lord, the souls who slumber in the beds of insouciance so that they remember Your name¹⁰⁸ and sanctify Your Glory. Perfect our portion of knowledge¹⁰⁹ and patience, for these two are the roots of all virtues. Grant us consent to Your Destiny.¹¹⁰ Make chivalry¹¹¹ the ornament¹¹² and *Ishrāq*¹¹³ the path for us.¹¹⁴ You are indeed the most generous and Your

¹⁰³ "Karūbiyūn", the Luminous Angels. (Ibid.) According to Shīrāzī, these sublime Angels have no attachment to the corporeal bodies at all. See *Les Temples*, p. 89, n. 128.

¹⁰⁴ Namely, by the lights that effuse from the supreme principles upon the souls of those people. (*SH-H.* p. 219.)

¹⁰⁵ Basing himself on Dawwānī's commentary, Corbin includes it in his translation.

¹⁰⁶ "By their illuminated souls." (*SH-H.* p. 220.)

¹⁰⁷ I.e. while they are together with their bodies. (Ibid.) The whole epilogue up to this point, including the passage preceding it (i.e. beginning with "it is no doubt..") is completely omitted in Anḳaravī's commentary. (*H-N.* pp. 89-90; *SH-H.* pp. 218-220.)

¹⁰⁸ "On the tongue and in the heart." (*SH-H.* p. 220.)

¹⁰⁹ This means, according to Dawwānī: perfect the human soul in both theoretical and practical faculties. The former becomes perfect by the knowledge of the natures of things, while the latter by following the middle course between extremism and inextremism. (Ibid.)

¹¹⁰ This is the tranquillity of the soul with regard to the decrees of the predestination. (*SH-H.* p. 222.)

¹¹¹ The collection of all virtues and beautiful qualities. (*SH-H.* p. 223.)

¹¹² It is the ornament that pertains to man. (Ibid.)

¹¹³ I.e. the radiation of the sacred lights upon the souls. (Ibid.)

¹¹⁴ I.e. to the perception of the perfection. (Ibid.)

benevolence encompasses all the worlds.¹¹⁵ God the Almighty is indeed generous to anyone who seeks aid. May peace, blessing, greetings and pleasure be upon His Messenger.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ This sentence is not included in *H-N*.

¹¹⁶ *H-N*. p. 90; *SH-H*. pp. 220, 222-4; *I-H*. 42b9-14; *Hayākil*, p. 108.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

A GENERAL EVALUATION

In this thesis, I have examined Anḳaravī's commentary *Īzāḥü'l-Ḥikem* in close comparison with Dawwānī's *Shawākil al-Ḥūr*. The two commentaries present to us two different interpretations of the base text, *Hayākil al-Nūr*, from two different perspectives and with two different orientations. Although, in some places, especially in the explanations of the technical terms such as "qayyūm," "haykal," "nūr," "intellect," etc., Anḳaravī seems to have followed Dawwānī quite strictly in the interpretations of many crucial points, however, he has employed what I may conveniently call "*his own conciliatory strategy*" in an apologetic manner, a strategy which he begins with an unstated objective and which aims essentially, though by no means very successfully, at placing Suhrawardī in the mainstream of "Orthodox Sufism" with the help of sometimes forcibly developed arguments and sometimes sentimentally quoted verses. In his attempt at elucidating the fundamental terms and ideas embodied in Suhrawardī's text, Anḳaravī makes extensive use not only of Ibn Sīnā's *Shifā'* and Dawwānī's commentary *Shawākil*, but also of his mystical background, in particular his Mevlevī heritage.

Interestingly enough, as has been clearly pointed in the first part of the thesis, Suhrawardī's *Hayākil*, for Anḳaravī, was nothing less than a book of wisdom, definitely not a book of Shari'a as in the case of Ghazālī's

Mishkāṭ. Regardless of such contrast, both philosophers and theologians along with the Sufis have, in his eyes, been the honourable recipients of God's beautiful favours on different levels. In accordance with this consideration, Anḳaravī reproduces a detailed account of Ibn Sīnā's conception of wisdom without discussing there its relevance, if any, to the *Hayākil al-Nūr*. An account as such in fact constitutes only a part of "wisdom" as he views it in his *Minhācū'l-Fuḳarā'*.

In the first temple a great deal of emphasis is laid on the explanations of "the nature of body" and of "the definition." Against the Peripatetic doctrine that body is composed of matter and form, known as *hylomorphism*, Suhrawardī proclaimed that it is *pure magnitude*, which was explained by Dawwani as "the corporeal form" or "the form itself," a doctrine which had its origin in the school of Plato. Anḳaravī, mindful of Suhrawardī's repudiation, instead adheres to the Mutakallimūn's view of body, which maintains that it is rather a composition of atoms. However, his insistence on atomism has only one justification for him, that is, the avoidance of the idea of the "pre-eternity of the world," which is in apparent conflict with the Shari'a. In complete contrast to Dawwānī's extensive explanation of body within the Ishrāqī context, Anḳaravī at times seems to have mistakenly confused Suhrawardī's concept with that of the Peripatetics, especially in his ascription of division to matter and not to body itself.

Furthermore, the conventional definition of man as a "rational animal"

appeared so natural to Anḳaravī that he wrongly replaced Suhrawardī's notion of "essential concomitant" (*lāzim al-ḥaqīqa*), which in fact represents in this context the "corporeality" (*jismiyya*) of man, with the Aristotelian concept of "quiddity" (*māhiya*), which in turn stands for "the rationality" (*nuṭq*). Thus the whole discussion becomes complicated by his apparent ignorance of the fact that Suhrawardī repudiated this classical definition and substituted it with his own theory, which holds that the most complete definition can be achieved at best through the synthesis of all the necessary constituents and essential concomitants.

In the second temple, Anḳaravī, again basing himself upon Dawwānī's *Shawākil*, describes in full detail the characteristics of the rational soul, its external and internal faculties, and the respective functions and locations of these latter in the brain. According to Suhrawardī's description, which rests partly on Ibn Sīnā's doctrine, the soul is a self-subsistent substance, immortal, and originated simultaneously with the body, which cannot be corrupted with the death of the latter. While Dawwānī focused on the ontological status of the rational soul with a stress on its intimate rapport with the Active Intellect as it was conceived of within the Ishrāqī school but with some blending of Peripatetic concepts, Anḳaravī, who in most cases limits himself merely to reporting what the former stated with no interjection of personal opinion, gives weight sometimes to its divine aspect by relying much on the verses of the Qur'ān.

However, Anḳaravī's extensive intervention was seen especially in the discussion of Suhrawardī's elimination of the three false assumptions on the nature of the soul: (i) that it is identical with God, (ii) that it is a part of God, and (iii) that it is pre-eternal (*qadīm*). The first assumption was rejected by the Illuminationist master on the ground that while God is absolutely One, the souls are multiple; therefore the unity of the former cannot be compromised in any way by the multiplicity of the latter. The example that he provided for this argument was the case of two different individuals who, owing to their separate respective souls, perceive different things, not one and the same thing at all. The second assumption was also refuted by Suhrawardī on the basis that since God is not corporeal, He cannot have division or partition in Himself; thus the soul, which is also incorporeal, cannot be a part of It. The last assumption was rejected on the grounds that the idea of pre-eternity of the soul would imply the pre-existence of a possible location for it to have first existed, and then been forced to descend to the world. This however would be impossible, because soul as a pure light has no natural inclination to descend to inferior beings. Therefore, he concluded that it is originated simultaneously with the creation of the body.

Anḳaravī's extensive analysis of the foregoing three assumptions represents an endeavour, on the one hand, to safeguard the absolute uniqueness of God and to defend, on the other, the venerable status of the

Sufis. This is another instance in which he sought to reconcile two seemingly opposing views, "Orthodoxy" and "Sufism," in the course of his reading of the relevant passages of the *Hayākil*. However, in the naiveness of this attempt as such, he failed to determine the exact position of Suhrawardī with respect to crucial points. The reason for this seems to lie partly in his efforts at defending and securing Suhrawardī from the so-called "baseless allegations" of the other commentators of the *Hayākil*, who arguably misinterpreted the former's statement that soul is neither identical with nor a part of God as an attack against the Sufis. This is also partly because of his personal background, namely his profound love and concern for the Sufis, as well as his environment, dominated by Shari'at-minded people. All of these factors with which he was confronted inevitably prevented him from satisfactorily elucidating the notions and ideas of Suhrawardi as manifested in the *Hayākil*.

In defending Suhrawardī, Anḩaravī claims that the former's motive in repudiating the identity of the soul with God was not aimed at casting blame on the Sufis for their ecstatic utterances, which are suggestive apparently of that crucial idea. He also argues that none of the mystical expressions as uttered by the prominent Sufis bear, in their profundity, connotations of incarnation or unification, both of which certainly threaten the unmitigated unity of God. Instead of substantiating this point however, he, after criticizing both philosophers and theologians for their inadequacies in

understanding the hidden and mysterious meanings of these words, justifies it simply by a couplet from the *Mesnevī*.

Again we found Anḳaravī taking a strong position in support of the oneness of the rational soul, a position which was contrary to Suhrawardī's stance and strengthening his argument by verses from the Qur'ān. But his unique contribution in this undertaking consists in his counter-example to Suhrawardī's statement: "The souls are multitude, because what Zaid perceives is different from what 'Amr perceives." The diversity of the perceptions, according to Anḳaravī, is not due to the multiplicity of the souls, but rather because of the powers of the estimations and imaginations as well as the occupations and situations which are variable from one individual to another. Therefore, he concludes, people may share in one and the same soul, yet differ in their aptitude and faculties of perception.

With regard to the creation of the soul, Anḳaravī takes issue with Suhrawardī, rejecting the latter's view that it is originated simultaneously together with the body, and instead clinging to the view that it was created long before the creation of the body.

Throughout the third temple, Anḳaravī limits himself simply to the task of paraphrasing all that Suhrawardī has stated with regard to the nature of the three metaphysical modes, necessary, possible, and impossible, all of which had been already amply treated in Avicenna's philosophy.

In the beginning of the fourth temple, we found Anḳaravī to be highly critical of Suhrawardī first for his philosophical argument, which was set forth to prove the oneness of God, and later for his view regarding His attributes. In these two successive stages of his criticism, Anḳaravī displays overtly two uncompromising positions, one in support of Sufism and the other in support of Islamic Orthodoxy. According to the first stage of Anḳaravī's criticism, the argument advanced by Suhrawardī for the unity of God, which was based on the assumption that it would be impossible for God, as the Necessarily Existent Being, to share in His Essence the necessity of existence with other being, (which would render Him contingent), is deemed by him insufficient and even worthless vis-à-vis the actual experience of the gnostics who, without the intermediary of any theoretical argument, have attained directly the vision of His unity by their profound intuition and pure hearts. But it is clear to use that his substitution of Sufi doctrine for Suhrawardī's argument, which was originally formulated by Avicenna, was not due to its lack of a solid foundation, nor because, as he claims, it was forcibly deduced from the fanciful imagination of the philosophers, but rather out of his conviction in the veracity of the Sufi path. This alone compelled him to take it for granted and not bother to offer any further proof for its veracity. All this considered, one cannot afford to belittle, for the sake of love and sympathy for the Sufi path, the value of the philosophical argument which was systematically developed by both

Avicenna and Suhrawardī, and which played essential role in their respective metaphysics.

In the second stage of his criticism, Anḳaravī attacks Suhrawardī's denial of the attributes of God. Suhrawardī's stand on this particular point was purely philosophical and was dictated mainly by his overriding concern to safeguard God's absolute unity by isolating Him from the plurality of the attributes. This time Anḳaravī's point of departure can be found not in his mystical conviction but rather in his commitment and loyalty to "the people of Orthodox Islam," who held that the attributes of God are not He nor are they other than He. Without discussing how these attributes can be properly predicated of God, he rather takes it for granted that the view of so-called Orthodox Islam is valid and acceptable in the light of the Scripture.

In the same chapter, we witnessed that Anḳaravī, after reviewing point by point Suhrawardī's whole system of effusion of lights in conjunction with Avicenna's system of emanation of intellects, substantiates it from the religious standpoint by referring to a hadith widely-cited among the mystics: "God created first the intellect and said to it to draw near, and so it drew near..." This first created intellect, which in fact was supposed to be "the first emanated" in accordance with the terminology of the philosophers, was referred to respectively as "the first light" in Ishrāqī thought, "the supreme pen" in dialectical theology, and "the Muḥammadan spirit" in mystical language. Consequently, all of these conceptually diverse terms are

ultimately reduced by Anḳaravī, as was shown in his other treatise *Miṣbāḥü'l-Esrār*, to the one and very same reality, i.e. light in accordance with the famous light-verse found in the Qur'ān.

What seemed rather surprising to us at this very point was that, despite his adherence to the school of Orthodox kalam, Anḳaravī readily approves of the philosophers' theory of emanation, a theory which aimed essentially at dissociating God's unity and His direct relation to His creation from the changing and varied plurality of the world by establishing between the two a series of immaterial mediating intellects or lights and assigning each a threefold contemplative action. But Ghazālī, so-called most prominent representative of Orthodox kalam and a scholar for whom, as we have noted before, Anḳaravī had profound respect, deemed the whole theory to be inconsistent with the Qur'anic view of creation and therefore repudiated it. Instead of discussing or compromising the legitimacy of the philosophers' doctrine of emanation, Anḳaravī rather found himself driven to concede to it and affirm it in the light of the above-mentioned hadith.

Another conciliatory position adopted by Anḳaravī reveals itself in his interpretation of Suhrawardī's crucial statement that "the rays of the sun persevere by the perpetuity of the latter." The implication of this expression is that all contingent beings, besides God, are also permanent. This apparently unorthodox idea is resolved by Anḳaravī in his reference to Bayḏāwī's interpretation of the famous Qur'anic verse: "...Everything that

exists will perish except His own face (*wajhahu*)."(28:88) By referring "hu" (him or it) at the end of the word *wajhahu* (his or its face) to the essence of the thing, he accordingly renders it as follows: "everything that exists will perish except its quiddity." In so doing, Anḳaravī makes an obvious allusion to the fact that the idea of the eternity of the world can be reconciled with the sacred text.

In the fifth temple, Anḳaravī for the most part summarizes the three types of motion, natural, coercive and volitional, in strict conformity with Dawwānī's detailed account in his *Shawākil*. In full compliance with Suhrawardī's conception, he notes that the celestial spheres, which are found in perpetual volitional motion, are the ultimate cause for physical events. He also admits that the soul's contemplation of these celestial spheres along with its detachment from the preoccupations of the body would lead to the sudden emergence of illumination in that soul. It should be noted here that while Dawwānī connected the mystics' practice of *samā'* with the movement of those spheres to which Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, as it was shown, already made an allusion in his *Mesnevī*, nevertheless Anḳaravī, though being an adherent of the Mevlevī Path and a follower of Dawwānī in most cases, makes no mention of it.

In his elaboration of Suhrawardī's celebrated conception of *al-imbkān al-ashraf* (nobler possibility), which postulates that owing to God's overall generosity, the existing world is the most perfect of all possible worlds,

Anḳaravī credits it with some Qur'anic verses, e.g. 27:88, 20:50.

Anḳaravī's treatment of the sixth temple, which was partly omitted and partly incorporated into the beginning of the seventh temple in his commentary, merits particular consideration here, for it exhibits a considerable failure on his part to deal properly with some crucial issues. In the first place, he offers here considerably less comment than he did in preceding temples, and shows relatively less care in his approach. In expounding the immortality of the rational soul, for instance, he feels content with saying that since its very cause is permanent, it is accordingly permanent too; yet he provides no further account, as Dawwānī did, as to whether that cause can be ascribed to God or to the Active Intellect.

Again, while interpreting Suhrawardī's account with regard to the pure states of the souls after separation from their respective bodies, Anḳaravī not only avoids dealing with the issue in its own context but also for some reason distorts the text by adding more to it which in fact does not fit into Suhrawardī's system. In other words, he conspicuously errs in ascribing, besides spiritual pleasures, "physical pleasures" to the delights of the virtuous souls, which were conceived by him as the souls of the prophets, saints, well-doers and believers. His purpose in so doing, apparently, was to place Suhrawardī in the circle of "orthodox Islam" by making him approve of bodily resurrection. In fact, the Ishraqi master, as far as the present text is concerned, first put emphasis on the sharp distinction between sensible

objects and spiritual entities, and between sensuous pleasure and intellectual pleasure, and later expressly stated that once the virtuous souls have attained the angelic state, they would be delighted with purely spiritual pleasures, remaining in purely spiritual states. Moreover, he insisted that the denial of such pleasure would on the earthly plane be equivalent to the denial of sexual enjoyment.

We have seen that a considerable part of the last temple, in which Suhrawardī dealt with his theory of visionary imagination, was deleted in both *Īzāḥū'l-Hikem* and the Persian translation. In view of the fact that Anḳaravī made extensive use of Dawwānī's commentary, which itself contains the complete text of *Hayākil*, his omission certainly demands some explanation. It could have been due to the fact that he might have found Suhrawardī's thesis of visionary imagination inconsistent with what he regarded as "orthodox sufism," on the ground that such imagination should not be assigned to people other than the prophets and saints. How could anyone, apart from the latter, enter into contact with the supreme divine beings and thus acquire from them a revelation of the spiritual realities? This was more likely the question that agitated Anḳaravī's mind, and caused him to be pre-occupied with a certain type of orthodoxy rather than oriented with the true spirit of the Ishrāqī philosophy.

His subjective attitude continued to show itself in his delineation of the "identity of the Paraclete" to which Suhrawardī attributed the twofold

mission of *ta'wīl* (interpretation) and *bayān* (explanation), while confining that of *tanzīl* (revelation) exclusively to the prophets. Based on the announcement of Jesus Christ -I shall go to my Father to you the Paraclete who will inform you by *ta'wīl*-, Dawwānī had first identified him, i.e. the Paraclete, with the Prophet Muḥammad at least in respect to all the divine revelations preceding him, and then later designated him as "Walī" and "Imām" with respect to his double tasks. However, his careful scrutiny of the term "afterwards" in the Qur'anic verse (75:19) led him rightly to the conclusion that the task of *bayān*, meaning to remove the subtle veils from the spiritual truths confided in the words of the prophets, is confined to the "Imām" or "Walī", the epiphany of his respective *walāya*. Against this reasonable interpretation, Anḳaravī, having identified the Paraclete strictly with the last Prophet, ascribes all three functions exclusively to him but without commenting on the crucial term "afterwards," which has a direct bearing on the intervention of persons apart from the Prophet in the matters concerning *bayān*. His concern, as was the case in so many other issues, was concentrated rather on the theological connotation of the term in question, i.e., Paraclete, which represented for him a clear-cut evidence of the advent of the last Messenger. However, this supposedly rational endeavour, on the part of Anḳaravī, to vindicate the exclusive validity of the Prophet as a seal of all the prophets, while neglecting at least the possibility of the Imām in the succession of the *walāya*, could hardly be considered to

be a consistent one.

Therefore, all things considered, it is clear that Anḳaravī, being a mystic, has made the theosophical text of *Hayākil* serve his uncompromising position in reconciling the mystical views of Suhrawardī with Orthodox Islam and in dedicating himself also at times to the repudiation of the so-called heretic views of the philosophers by using the weapons of the Mutakallimūn.

PART THREE

THE TEXT OF *İZÂḤÜ'L-ḤIKEM*
AND TEXTUAL VARIANTS

(FACSIMILE OF MS 1747)
(Istanbul Süleymâniye Library, Şehid 'Alî Paşa)

حمدی حساب اول حکیم و هاب و حلیم مفتوح الابواب و مسبب
 الاسباب حضرت لکنی که کردن عقول اصحاب حکمت و ارباب فطنته
 زیور جواهر زوایا شبنام نفس مستطاب و من توتی الحکمه
 ففداوتی خیر اکثرا و مایند کرا لا اولوالالباب
 ایله فرین قبلوب ماصدق عالی طوبی لهم و حسن مناب
 اکرامی ایله عالی جناب اولشد و شای فصوص شمدن اول خالق بچون
 و مالک نون و القلم و ما بسطرون اولنا
 عالم اسرار بروز و کوزه که نفوس ناطقه علماء دینیه و عرفاء
 یقینیه صراف نفود حکمت مکنون و طوحی شرب انسان
 کاف و نون قبلوب علی سبیل البدل هر بیرینه و اسماء
 و اینیاه الحکمه و فصل الخطاب قولینک
 مظهر بدر دینیه صوابدن حالی اوندوغنی شک و اربناب
 بوقدر و صلوات صلوات خدا و شجیات شجیات
 بی همتا اول شفیع الوری و امام الهدی ضیاء دیده اولبارکن

5

(2) 10

باغ مازاع البصر و ما طلع بلبل کوبای و ما یبسط عن العوی
 بجباه و مقندا اعنی حضرت محمد المصطفیٰ نیک روفه معلما
 یوما ینوما مبلغ و مهدی اولسونکه . ماء الحیوة در بای حکمند
 بر قطره فی که عالمه نثار بیورد بلبل اموات قلوب بنی آدم اول
 قطره دن اجبا اولوب هر بری ربنا حییتنا دیو
 شکر و ثنا بجزه تحصیل سفای فریت و تکبیل اسرار راه
 قبلش در . دانشی ال و اصحاب کرامت استیناسری
 اوزورینه اولسونکه هر بری مجوسان حیطة حدس و حواس
 و کونه نظران حظه عقل و قیاس اولنای و تبه بنواس
 نقابنده و لمان و دیجور حایس بیولابنده ما بزم
 و حیران فالنکره ره نما در ربیت حکیم عقل الکر حرفی حکمهای
 باب دین سازد محکمهای یونانی اما بعد بو غلبین و غلبیل
 و نقیر و ذلیل اعنی شیخ اسماعیل المولوی الانقروی جسر الله
 و لاخوانه الدنیوی و الاخروی انحکم الصورتی و المعنوی
 تقریر و بیان ایدوب دیرکه . وقتا کم اول حکیم و نشان و بیم
 و دیتان لغمان جنازه اسرارایت و نقد ایتنا لغمان الحکمة
 دن موببت و کرامت بیورد ب لکن بو غلبیل و غلبین و عطشان

5

10

15

13

برو جمله بر بان اولوب ماكلشن جياتند و ايتا سترن روز
 و بنفشه شبنم سيم مفهوم اللهم زدني علماً موجب ايله شگفته
 فلور دم ناپس اول و اهب العطا باء و كاشف الغطا با
 اولقدر جواهر ما و زو ابر حکم و فزاید فو اید لطف و کم ارزانی بود
 بیور دیلر که ما بو پر نقصانک اكا استحقاق و اسعدادی .
 محالندن ایدی بلکه اول سلطان العاشقین و برهان التلکین
 نخبه کنوز رموز حقیقت و یقین ناظر جمال وحدت رب العالمین
 اعنی جمال الحق والملة والدين مولانا و مولی العارفين مقرر تکتب
 فقر استک خاکبای تو بناسارینی دبرغ دله کحل الجواهر بیلد و کدن
 و انک زفر اکبر تا بزرگی مست و جودم کجا قیلد فدن در پس
 بو حقیر کثیر التقصیر وخی شمس ذیل ابدوب اول نعمانک شکرین ادا
 و اول اللانک ذکر بیدم اجر ابدوب کماهی بر موجب ادعی
 الی سبیل ربک بالحکمة و الموعظة الحسنة اثره
 حکمت و ادویه نصحت ایله مزاج قلوب خلق علاج نبلوس
 منبوق سقامتدین طریق استقامت دعوت ابدوم و کماهی بر فخرای
 و مار زقناهم بفضون جناب بیچونک از زان ابلدوکی
 آرزاق اشواق و اسرار عیانی هر طالبه استحقاقی مقداری اتیان

5

10

(4)

15

(5)

ایلمدن لذت طونردم و الحاصل هر کون بو تراب اقدام اصحاب
فضا بلدن به طالب حکمت شیخ شهاب الدین حضرت نرنک متن
هجا کلین شرح انک افتضا ایدوب مشکلات و معضلاتک
کشف و حل اتم سنی رجا ایلدی بو فقیر به تورا راجتنا ببلد
اول معرفت ثاب بو حدیث شریفک مفهوم مسرت ملزو مرز ابراه
ایلدیکه الحدیث قال علیه السلام

5

استطاعه
پس بوقبیل البضاعة و قدیم الا

بر فحوی و اما السائل فلا تنهر مجانبت و مخالفت قیلید
شرح کتابه کسبی و مبادرت قیلدم او اولابعض شره و مطالعة قیلوب
و بعض کتب هندسیه مراجعت ایدوب تتبع قیلدم بو نوردن
نجه فراید و فواید حکمت و جو ابروز و اهر معرفت استخراج ایدوب
ترکی عبارت اوزره منتظم و مرتب قیلدم اگرچه زبان مجسم
و سان عرب اوزره نمهند و مهندب قیلن ممکن ایدی لکن

10

8) حدیث شریفندن

خشیت ایدوب و بو کلام عبرت آیزدن رغبت ایلدم که

15

9) و علی العالم ان یعلم ما قد علم و یرفوق الضفیف

فی الذهن و لا یجب من بلا اهل البلاد

ولا على كليل الفهم كذا ان كنتم من قبل من الله
 عليكم پس ضعيف الذهن رفعت وكليل الفهم شفقت
 ومرمت تركي عبارتيك ايله نسيه ونسيه انه دن، اولي واخرى
 بر طرفي دخی بولدم پس درسی معلم آسان وحفظی متعلمه مستهان
 اولدوشدن، اوزری بوشور، طرزى اختيار قبلدم، اولدور،
 عبارات واستعارات دخی اقدام وابتهاام قبلدم، تا انعام
 قلبه دخی بوزن بر خوار دار، و حصه دار اولدور، و بوکه ابرضا الحکم
 و بکل اد و پروب، و قبل الافتتاح اوج مقدمه اوزره ابراد ایلدم
 تا طالب حکمت بیلکه علم حکمتدن مراد ندر زیرا هر علم مقدمه
 مفهوم اولینجه اول علم معلوم اولمز مقدمه اولی علم حکمت حدیثی
 بیان ایدر زیرا هر علم که حد داننده نه نشی ایدوکن معلوم اشک
 انک طلبنده فایده اولمز مقدمه ثانیه فایده علم حکمتی بیان
 ایدر زیرا بر شیک فایده سی معلوم اولینجی تخصیله مجدوساعی
 اولفه باعث و باوی اولدر مقدمه ثالثه علم حکمتی چون
 موضوع اولدوغن بیان ایدر اولاحد علم حکمت اولدر الحکمة
 هي العلم بحقایق الاشياء على ماهي عليه والعمل
 بقتضاه یعنی علم حکمت عبارتدر معرفت اعیان موجودات

5

10

15

ممکنه دن که علی وجه الترتیب واجب الوجودن صادر و بتاً ^{اولد} اولد
 اوزره یعنی جوهر روحانی و جسمانی که مراد عقول و نفوس
 و اجسام و اجسام دن مراد افلاک نسو و عناصر اربعه
 و موالید نلته در یعنی معادین و نبات و حیوان پس ^{بوتور} بوتور
 احوالنه و خواصنه و اوصاف ظاهره و بالهنه سنه و مصالح
 مفاسدنه مطلع اولد و قد نصکره و جمیع اشباهه حقیقی اعطا
 ایدوب و حدون تعدی و تجاوز قیلمیه بننه کم حضرت حبیب خدا
 اللهم ادرنا الاشیاء کما هی بیورد و ذلری بو
 ذکر اولئان کلامک کواهدر اما فاینه حکمت اولدر که
 تحصیل معرفت ایله تکبیل نفس شربیت قبله قدره یا روح
 مفارقت بدن قبله قدره نصکره اعتقاد انا فاسم و
 اشتغالات بدنیه رذیه سببی ایله معذب اولمیه نظم
 اولور حکمتله حاصل کام هرذل اولور حکمتله حل هر مشکل نظر
 اما موضوع علم حکمت اولدر که بخت اولنه شول عارضانه
 عارض اولور اول موضوعک اوزر رینه مثلاً موضوع علم
 طب بدن ان نذدر زیرا طبیب شول عارضانه بخت ایلر که

5

10

15

عارض اوله بدن انسانه امراض مختلفه دن کجه مرض کبی وهسو
 صنوع علمه نجوم اجرام سماویه دیندر زیر انجم شمول عارضه دن
 بحث ایله که عارض اوله اجرام سماوییه شکلات و رصدن
 و موضوع علم فقه مکلف اولنلدر زیر ائقیه نفوس
 مکلفه اوزره نکالیف شرعیه دن عارض اولان شیلدن بختیل
 سلوة و زکاة و صوم و حج کبی دخی بونک امثالی پس
 علم حکمه کله لم علم حکمت ایکی نوع اوزرینه در نوع اولنه
 عملی در لر نوع ثانی کنه نظری در لر و حکمت نظری دخی ایکی
 قسم در قسم اولنه علم الهی در لر قسم ثانی سنه علم طبیعی
 پس علم الهینک موضوعی وجود مطلقه زیر احکیم
 علم الهیدن شوال عبارت اندن بحث ایله که وجود مطلق اوزره عارض
 اوله مثلا حکما دیر که که وجود مطلق که مراد ذات حقدر
 عاریدر ماده و صورتدن، و واحد در قدیم در و عقول مجرد
 دخی عاریدر ماده و صورت و جهتدن که زبان شرع
 ملائکه دید کلریدر و نفوس سماوی و بشری داخی ماده
 و صورتدن مجرد لر در و لکن ماده و صورتدن متصرفدر
 و موضوع علم طبیعی جسمدر زیر احکیم علم طبیعتدر
 جسک اوزره

5

10

15

عارض اولان عارضان دن بخت ایلر بیولوی و صورت و
 طبیعت و نهایت و حرکت و سکون و زمان و مکان و بولور
 امثالی اولان شیلردن یعنی حکما علم طبیعتدن بخت ایلر در لکه
 هر جسم بیولوی و صورتدن مرکبدر و هر جسمک بر طبیعت^{فایده}
 وارددر و معنای طبیعت اولدر که بر شبنک حرکات و سکاتنه
 سبب اولد و هر جسم حد ذاتندن متناهی بیدر جمله دن بری
 افلاک متناهی بیدر ز بر افلاک اطللس که زبان شرعدن عرش
 دید کلیدر جمع افلاکی مجیددر و عرشک وراکنده یعنی^{سند}
 بر فلک دخی یوقدر کل افلاک بو عرش مجیدک جو فنده در و
 نامنکه بونک ایچنده در حکما اکا فلک البرهوج در لر سان^{شرعدن}
 کرسی دید و کلیدر و بوک فلک ثابت دخی در لر پس بونک ایچنده
 زخل پس فلک مشرقی اذن صکن فلک مزج انک تحتنده
 فلک انساب انک تحتنده فلک زهره اذن نصکره فلک عطارد
 اذن صکره فلک مری و بونک نخسند کره نار و بونک تحتنده
 هوا و بوند نصکره کره اب اذن صکره کره ارض و بوجله^ک افلاک
 نسه و اگر کره اربعه بری برینی مجری اولوب بری برینی جو فنده
 المشدر ننه کم شکل دایره دن فهم اولور و هر جسمک بر حرکت

5

10

15

مخصوصه سی و ارد در معنای حرکت اولدر که بر جسم محل اولدر
 حصولدن صکره محل ناینده حاصل اوله سپدر و زمان عبارتند
 حرکت افلاکدن و بر بیقل عبارتندر افنا یک کند و فلکنده بر کره
 دورندن و برای عبارتندر فرک کند و فلکنده بر کره دورندن و درخت
 شتا عبارتندر افنا یک زمینه بعدندن و باز عبارتندر افنا یک زمینه
 فریندن و بچار عبارتندر افنا یک زمینه اعتدال المیه فریندن
 و کوز فصلی عبارتندر افنا یک زمینه اعتدال البله بعدندن
 و هر جسم بر مکانی
 وارد و یعنی
 مکان اولدر که
 هر گاه که
 بر مقدار
 اوله
 و اول
 مقدار که طول
 اوله
 اول مقدار که طول
 اکا خط در ل و اگر
 عرضی اولورسه اکا سطح در ل و اگر طول و عرضی و عرضی اولورسه
 اکا جسم در ل و ان شد عن قریب زیاده ایضاح اولنوره

5

10

15

و مکان جسم حاوی تک باطنه در لکه که مناسب اوله اول جسم محو تک
 سطح ظاهرینه بوجه دن معلوم اولد بیکه فلک اخلص لامکاندر
 ولکن جمیع افلاک اول مکانی دره و هر فلک نسبت ایلد بری برینه
 حاوی و شامل اولد و غنی جیشتدن مکان مشابه سنده دره و حکما و عالم
 کون و فساد در ا عالم کون د بیکه معناسی اولد که بر شیبی بر صورت
 موجود اولد کسیدره و دخی عالم فساد دیکه معناسی اولد که
 بر شیبی اول صورتی منحل و فاسد اولوب صورت اخریه تبدیل
 اولد کسیدر پس جمیع عنقریبات بری بیرینه منقاب اولد ^{لای} الایوب
 اجسام فلکی دکل یعنی بیولای اجسام فلکی خلق اولوب آخر صورت منقاب
 اونز سابر عنقریبات اولور نته کم انش کره اینکر انز هوا بر تبدیل
 اولد و غنی کبی و دخی نندن انش اولان چولکک ایچند هوا بر منقلب
 اولد و غنی کبی پس عالم عنقریبات کون و فساد دیکر کوی بو جهندند
 و بو وجوهی که ذکر ایلدم اجسام عارض اولان عارضات دندر پس معلوم
 اولد بیکه موضوع علم طبیعی جسم و موضوع علم الهی وجود مطلق در
 و الله اعلم بالصواب والیه الرجوع والمآب پس حضرت شیخ ^{بشیر} بالدرین
 قدس الله سره بیورر لکه یا الهی العالمین یعنی ای عالم که
 معبودی عالم حکما سازنده ماسوی التمسک کسیدر یعنی

5

10

15

عقول و نفوس و عناصر اربعه و مواید نلمسه کبی دخی بونله مانند عالم و بید و کلری ذات باری یانکه استدلال اولند و غندند یا قیوم قائم لفظ تک صیغه مبالغه سبدر اصلی قیوم در علی وزن فعل پس کلمه واحد در واو و یاء جمع اولوب و او یاء قبلندی بعدالا قیوم اولدی - فعل و زنده اولق جایز دکلمه زیر افو و ما اولق لایم کلوردی ، و معناسی ای کندو ذائبله قائم و وای کل شی مقوم دیکدر یعنی وجود ایکی نوع اوزرینه در بری قائم بالذ اندرز واجب الوجود و قیوم دخی دیرله و بری دخی وجودی غیر ایله قائمدر ممکنات موجوده کبی بونوعه ممکن الوجود دیرله و قائم بالغیر دخی دیرله زیر وجودی ذات واجب الوجوده محتاج اولد و غندن اوزی ابدنا بالنور بیزی مؤید قبل انوار شاره معرفت ذائک ابله و نفوس سزی قوی قبل اسرار علوم صفاتک ابله و ثبتنا علی النور بیزی ثابت قبل نور توحیدک اوزرینه و احشسنا الی النور بیزی ثابت قبل نور توحیدک اوزرینه جمع ابله بیزی انوار عالیه مجرده ابله مفارقت بدند نضکره نور که در کوه انکله اشیا مبصره اولد و نور ایکی قسم اوزرینه برینه نور هیئت دیرله نور افتاب کجه و بوکه بکزر اکوانیاب کسه عالمه اشیا مرتبی اولمزدی . و بر قوسی دخی نور مجرد و نور محضدر

رغاء

5

10

15

لان

غفول مجروده که تعلقات اجسادن بریدر لره و نفوس ناطقه کبی که
 مشرفلر مد بر لردر و اجعل منتهی مطالب بارضاک بزیم غایت
 مطلوبی و بناده رضای شریفک نبلق و اقصی مفاصد ناما
 بعد نالان تلقاک بزیم نخبابت مقصود مزی اول شی فل که
 نفوس ناطقه مزی سنگ ملا فاکه مستعد فله اول شی دن مرا
 سفانکی صفات حقیر و و ذاتکی ذات حقیر محو ایدوب نهای حقیقه باقی
 او قدر ظلمنا نفوسنا بزیم ظلم ایلدک نقل بز اوزر لذات
 جسمانی و شواغل بدینیه مبتلا او مقلد لست علی الفیض
 بضنین یعنی فیوضات انوار که نجیل و کلسن بکلیه جمیع ایمان
 موجود اینج اولان موهبت و عطیت بکار لظنکدن بر فطره و انوار
 بخشیدن بر ذره در اسادی الظلمات بالباب قیام
 بنظر ون الرحمة و بر جون فک الاسیر یعنی السیران ظلمات
 طبیعت که فید هیولی و صورنده مقید لردر در کاه و نکلن فایم و لوز
 تویع رحمتک ایدر لره و ایند طوز لره که السیر بند شعوت و بند دام صفت
 دن خلاص اولوب انوار مجروده غالبه ملحق اولدر نظیر
 شکفته کلبن خود از بهر نزهت مست توستر کلبن کبیتی چرانو داری
 الحیرد بک والشرفضاءک خیر سنگ عادتکدر و شرفضا و قدر کلک

5

180

15

اثر پیر و انتم بالمجد السنّی تقصّی المکارم سن مجد عالی الیه
 متصف سن مرحمت و کرمت اقتضای ابر سن * و ابناء النواست
 لیسوا بمراقب الانتقام ناسوتدن مراد نشأت انابتد در
 یعنی فرزندان ناسوت که ان اندر محل انتقام و کلدر در زبر ابونکر اکثر
 عشرتی و صفاسی نفسی جسامت ابله ملوث ایدوب لذابت
 حیوانیت ابله تلذذ اولقدر بلکه بونری موابتد فواید علوم و معارفه لرزان
 قبل که کمال مرحمت و مکر متکلّه الیوة و فنی اولان اولدر ننته کم بقول
 ابله اشارت بیورر بارک الله الذکر ای بارک الله فی الذکر
 و بکدره برکت و پرسون حق انسانه علوم و معارفدن و با خود
 بداء و معادن اکدن و دفع السوء و دفع الیسون علوم
 و معارفه مانع اولان ضرر لری موجهالت و بطالت کبی و دخی اسبابند
 و رفوق المحسنین رفقت و احسان الیه محسن قوللر و که
 وصل علی المصطفین و خلقکدن رسالت ایچون مختار و طفی
 قبلد و غلک سلخانه * رحمت ابله هنرم هیا کل النور
 بودر نوره منسوب اولان صور نکر کتابی زبر اهیکل اصلنده
 صورته درلر * و حضرت شیخ قدس سره * صور انوار مجردات
 عالیة و نفوس ناطقه * و انوار الهیة دن بو کتابه بیان * ابتدا کیچون

5

10

15

هياكل يدى قدس الله النفوس القابلات الله سبحانه
 وتعالى باک البسوان قابل اولان نفسى و مثا كل روحانية دن ^{نظير} و بيان
 نورانية دن مديات اچون هوشى بونلردن انتفاع اچون الهيكل
 الاول پس حضرت شيخ قدس سره هم اولان تعريف جسم ابدوب بيورده
 كل ما بقصد اليه بالاشارة المحسبة فهو جسم
 5
 يعنى هر شئي كه اشارت حسي اتمكه قصد اولنه اول جسم دن
 وله طول و عرض و عمق و جسم طول و عرض و عمق اولن لار
 ذيراجسم بو اوچندن عبارتند در اي طالب حكمت و اي عاشق اراد مؤمن
 ذهن و قوا كه مبرهن و لاج و طبع نقاد كه روشن و واضح اولنوكه
 10
 ارباب هندسه نك اصطلاحنده بر شئي كه اشارت حسيه ايله
 اشارت قابل اوله اكر اول شئي من كل الجهات قسمت پذير اولمزيه
 اكا نقطه درل وجود فرد و جزؤ لا يتجزى دخی درل اكر برجهنده
 قسمت پذير اولورنه اكا خط درلر و اكر ايكي چهنده قسمت پذير
 15
 يعنى طول و عرضندن اكا سطح درل اما عمقندن قسمت قبول اتميه
 و اكر اوج جهندن قسمت قبول ايدرسه بنى طول و عرض و عمقندن
 جسم درلر پس شش جهات اكا درلر كه ايكي خط طولك ايكي
 جانبندن و ايكي خط عرضك ايكي جانبندن و ايكي خط عمقك ايكي

جانندان و عنی خطک اعلا دن اسفلنه وارنجه عنق در لر و خطک
 اسفلدن اعلا کنه وارنجه سطح و سمک دیر لر و الاجسام
 تشارکت فی الجسمیه جمیع اجسامک مشارکتی وارد بری
 برینه جسمیتده بوندن مفهوم اولان بودر که شنگک فتده جسم
 هیولی و صورتدن مرکب و کلدرد بلکه جسم عین صورتدر نیتکم
 مذوب افلاطونده بودر و کل مشنرکین فی شئی یلزد و افزایما
 بشئی اصر و برشی که مشترک اوله برشیدن لازمدر که اول یکی
 شینگک مابیتتی برشیتی یله فرق اولنه فالاجسامر یلزدن بکون
 بینهما نمایند با مور پس امدی اجسامک جسمیتده
 مشارکتی اولدیه لازم کلدو که مابیلری تمیز اولنه برنجه امور
 و مابیتت به الاجسامر و هو الحیات و شول شئی که
 اجسام انکله نمیز اولنور اکا بیتت و صورت در لر و اما شول
 شینده که اجسامک مشارکتی وارد در اکا هیولی در لر و لازدر
 الحقیقه لذاتعالا بنفک عنهما بر شینگک حقیقتی اکا در لر که
 اول شیتی انکله دار اولوب موجود اولمش اوله مثلا حقیقت
 انسان حیوان ناطقدر زیرا انک انسانیتی حیوان ناطق
 اولسبلدر اگر حیوان ناطق اوله انک اولزدی پس بر شینگک لازم جوتی

5

10

15

اول ششک ذابدره پس اول ششک ذانندن حقیقتی منفک اولوب
 جداد و شمره ننه کم حیوانیت انسانک لازم ذاتی در ماهره محله که ان
 اوله صفت حیوانیت دخی بولنم می مفرور و وصف الشئی
 قد بکون ضرور یاله کالزوجیه للاربعه و الجسمیه
 للانسان بشرشک صفتی گاه ضروری اولوب ذانندن منفک
 اولمز اربعدن زوجیت وانانندن حسبت منفک اولدوغی کبی
 وقد بکون ممکنا کالقیام و القعود له و گاه اولور که ممکن
 اولور انسانک قبای و قعودی کبی و بکون ممنوعا کالفرسینه^{له}
 و گاه اولور که ممنوع اولور انسان فی فرسینه ابله صفت لوق کبی بزرا
 مستعد که انسان فرس اوله الذی لا ینجزی فی الوهم لاجوز
 ان بکون فی جهة وان یشار الیه لان ما منه الی جهة
 بکون غیر ما منه الی اخری فینقسم وهما حفرت شیخ
 رضی الله تعالی عنه چون توزجسم اند که نضار استدیکه جزائی حسبی
 بیان ایلیمه یعنی بیولی و صورتی پس علمای کلام در لکه جسم بیولی
 صورتدن مرکب دکدر بلکه جوهر فردن مرکب در زبر اجزائی
 پاره پاره ببلک ناشول حده دک که نه عقلده ونه وهدده قطع نده
 قادر اوله و من کل الوجوه قسمت پذیر اوله اول بهر فردی

5

10

15

متجزی اولی یعنی منقسم و منقطع اولی نه عقله و نه و موده پس بواره
 اولین جزو و جوهر فرد در لر پس خضر شیخ بواهل کلامک دلیل جتین
 رد و ابطال جوهر فرد ابدوب در که شول شیخ که متجزی و پاره اولیه
 نه و موده و نه عقله لایق و جایزه کلدی که اول شیخ جتین اوله و انک
 ذاتنه اشارت حسیه ایل اشارت اوله اما بر شیخ که اشارت حسیه^{ایله}
 مشار الیه اوله اول شیخ جتین اولورسه اول شیدن که بر جانبی فنی
 جتین اولورسه جانب اخری اول جانبک غیره اولور زیر اجانب بینی
 جانب سارنگ غیره و جانب فونی جانب تختک ضدی اولق
 لازم کلور پس بولیه او بیجا و هما منقسم اولق اولور پس جسمه بر شیخ
 قابل تجزیه و انقسام اوله اول قابل تجزیه اولنه میولی دیرل بوجله دن
 معلوم اولدیکه میولی صورتدن و صورت میولی دن ابرولوب
 جواد و شکر ایکسیده جسمه موجود دلدر اما حکمانک بر قولدن
 قدم عالم لازم کلور بود دلیل شرعاً ممنوعدر دلیل واضح علمای^{کلامک}
 جسم جوهر فرد دن برگیرد بونلک جوهر فرد اثبات اندلری قدم
 عالمدن فرار ابد کلندن دره بوا بیک با بیننده حجج و مناقضات
 نهایی می بودر اگر اقتضای اول نور شرح موافقه و متعاصده
 طلب ایلد و ماعی ای ائده جزو لای تجزی همان است

Nur

5

10

15

طولی که عرض عمق ندارد میان نیست کردی بنطق نقطه موهوم را دو نیم
 پس مطلب کلام حکیمان در میان نیست الهیکل الثانی انت
 لا تعقل عن ذاتك ابد او ما من جزء من اجزاء بدنك
 الا وتنساه احيانا - بوجاهت مقدمه و جدا بندر اثبات تجرد
 نفسه پس تعریف جسم قبله بدن مسکونه استدی که نفس ناطقه بیجان
 جسم دکلدرا و اجزای بدن دخی دکلدرا در که سن غافل دکلس کند و
 وانگدن ابدی و هیچ اجزاء بدنمکن بهر جزو بقدر الا احيانا انی نسیان
 ایدرسن اما هرگز کند و کی او نترسن ولا بدرك الكل الا باجز
 یعنی اول بدنک اجزاسندن برین نسیان ایندکه کلیسی مدرک
 اولزنا اول جزو معلوم اولینجه مجوعی معلوم اولزنا فلو کنت انت
 هذه الجملة ما كان يستمر شعورك بذاتك مع نسیانها
 فانت و رآه هذا البدن و اجزائه اگر ذاتک سنک
 بدنن و یا بعضی اجزاسندن عبارت اولیدی سنک ذاتک شعور
 نسیان ایله بیلد اولیدی و حاصل البرهان تحقیقا نفس جمیع
 مشعور بهادره و بدن و اجزای جمیع او فائده مشعور به دکلدرا
 پس نفس نه بدنر و نه اجزاسیدر پس نفس ناطقه جسم دکلد و کی صحیح
 طریق آخر بدنک ابدی فی التحلل و السیلان بسبب تصرف الحر
 در

5

10

15

العزیزہ فی الرطوبات البدنیۃ یعنی سنگ بدنک ابدی
 نقصانده و داخی اکیلوب کتمده در حرارت طبعینک رطوبات
 بدنیۃ ده عملی سبی ابله پس حرارت رطوبتده عمل ابله رطوبت
 نقصان اوزره اولور و رطوبت حرارت ده عمل ابله حرارت
 نقصان اوزره اولور و اذا انت الغاذیۃ بما تاتی ان لم یحلل
 من بدنک العتیق عند ورود الجدید لعظم بدنک جدا
 قوت غاویۃ برشی ابناء ایلدکن اگر یکی قوتک ورودی قتیذ
 بدن عتیقکن نقصان اولسه بدنک عظیم اولیدی اما
 هر بار قوت غاویۃ بر لقمه ایلله بدنکی تجدید ایلدکن بدن عتیقک
 نقصان پذیر اولور در فلوکت انت البدن او جزاً آمنه
 لتبدلت انا نبتک کل حین پس اثبات ایلدیکه اگر سنگ
 سفلیک بوجمله بدنن و یا بدنک بر جز و ذن عبارت
 ایسه پس دایما کندوک یعنی ذاتک تبدل و تغیرده اولور
 یعنی سنه ما ضده اولان ذاتک تمدیکه سنه ده بر غیر ذخی اولور
 تنگ بدنک تغیرده اولدوغی کبی و لما دام الجوهر المدرك
 مینک قانت انت لا ببدنک و قنایم سنگ مدرک
 اولان عالم اولان جوهرک دایم اولدی ایسه پس سن سن سن

5

10

15

نور الهی سنانه بدن کاونه اجزا اسندن به جز اوسن حتی مصنف
 غیر کتابند بودلی با اثر نفوس حیوانانه دخی ایراد المشرک
 زیر اسائر حیوانانک دخی نفوس باقیه سی اوله فرضا جمله دن
 فرسد و حد ذاتی بدنی کبی کل جن ده تبدل و تعیر اوزره
 اولور دی اما حدس جانب بونک خلافتن حکم ایل زیر افر کنس
 ذاتی مدر کرده مع هذابدنی تبدلوم ایکن و اسائر حیوانانک
 نفوس مجردہ کی اولق معرور درہ اما بو حکمای متقدمینک مذہبدر
 بعضی حکما نباتانہ و جمادات دخی اثبات تمسک درنتہ کم شینک دخی
 بعض رسالہ سنده قلوبی وار در اقتضا اولنورہ شفا دہ
 و اسائر کتب حکما دہ طلب اولنہ کیف و تحلل سن نہ حاله
 عین بدن اولور سین حال بوکہ بدنک تحلل دہ و نقصانده اوله
 و لیس عندک مند خبر حال بوکہ اول تحلل و تبدلدن سنک
 قتیکہ خبر بو قدر فانت و داء هذہ الاشیاء بولم
 اولیمو سن بو آشیانک در اسنده نور ربانی و نفعہ سبحانہ
 پس سنک سنک بدنہ پادشاهک شہرستانہ تعرف ایلدوکی
 کبیرہ طریق آخره لانددک انت شیاء الایضو
 صورتد عندک پس سن برشی ادراک ابره مزسن اولدوکی

5

10

15

نفکة و نفکة صفاتہ مغایر اولہ ^۱ انا اول شینگ صورتی سنگ
 ذہنکرم حاصل اول قفلہ ادراک ایدرسن فاندہ یلزمران بکون
 ما عندک من الشئی الذی اد رکتہ مطابقا له تخصیص
 ذہنکدن ادراک ایلد و گک شینی لازمدرکه مطابق اولہ ^۲ ماہیتندہ
 ادراک ایلد و گک شینی ^۳ یعنی بر شینی بدم بک سنگ بلکلک اولد که
 اول شینگ صورتی سنگ ذہنکده حاصل اولہ ^۴ پس اول صورتی
 ذہنکده حاصل اولد شد ^۵ لازمدرکه اول بلد و گک شینگ مطابق
 ومانلی اولہ و الا لہ بکن اد رکتہ کما هو
 اگر اول شینگ که ماہیتندہ ^۶ و حد دانندہ ^۷ چه اربہ ^۸ مطابق ادراک
 انک انی کا ہو بلش اولورسک بلکہ غیرنک تصورین ادراک
 اتش اولورسک ^۹ مثلا بر محل بعید و بر شیخ کور و ب فوس تصور قلیک
 اتان اولہ ^{۱۰} پس ذہنکده حاصل اولان صورتہ مطابق ادراک اتش
 اولورسک ^{۱۱} پس ثابت اولد که نفس ناطقہ کا ہو بر شینی ادراک بلز
 الا شول صورتی که ذہنکده حاصل اولدی ^{۱۲} اول شینگ مکر مطابق
 و عقلت معانی بیشترک ^{۱۳} فیها کثرون ^{۱۴} بر دخی مقدمات
 دلیلدن بر مقدمہ بیان ایدر که سن ^{۱۵} بچه معنالردن بر شینی عقل
 ایدرسن که اول شینی مشترکدر اشبای کثیره ماہیتندہ ^{۱۶} کالجیوانہ

5

7

10

15

فانك عقلتها على وجه يستوي نسبتها الى
 القبل والذابيه. يعني مطلقا جوائنت كبي كس اول جنت
 تعقل ايدرسن. بو وجه اوزره كه انك نسبتی فیلد و سبلكه منوبدر
 فوسوز نه اعندك غير ذات مقدار، پس اول صورت جوائنت
 كه سلك فمكده حاصل اولشدر ذات مقدار دكلدر، لانه انفا
 الصغبر والكبير، زير اول جوائنت كو بك مقدارده و بو بك مقدار
 مطابقت اول ذابيه، و فیلد مطابقت بلد و كی كبی پس اول تصور
 ابلد و لك جوائنت اكر ذات مقدار اولیدی، كو بك جوائنه و بو بك
 جوائنه مطابقت انبیدی. زير اذوی القدار دن، بهر شئی بو قدر كه ضمیر
 وكبره بالبداهه معاطبق اوله، فمجاها منك ايضا غير متقدر
 پس اول صورتك سنده حاصل اولشدر، اول صورتك محلی دخی غیر
 متقدر در، وهو نفسك انطاقا، و اول محل دن مراد
 نفس ناطقكدر، مالا بتقدر لا يتخلل في الجسم
 پس محالدر شول شئی كه مقداری اولیه، و شول جسم حلول ابلیه كه متقدر
 اوله، زير اكلی جسم بذاته متقدر در، پس ثابت اولد كی نفس ناطقه
 نه جسم در و نه جسم ایندزه بننه كم بیورر، و نفسك غیر جسم
 ولا جسمایه، زير اكلی جسمانی دخی متقدر در محلی سبی ابله

5

10

15

ولا يشار إليها لتبرها من الجسم والجهة وخی
 اول نفس ابشارنده اولز جسمدن و جسمانی اولده دن و جسدن ترا^{بت}
 و برائی اولدوغندن اونزی و هی احدیته و اول نفس فرج
 منقسمدر اجزای مقدار بیته و جو هر فرد دره و جودی ذاتی ایلد^{قائده}
 و صمدیته وخی اول نفس صمدیته یعنی ماده دن بریدر بیولی
 و صورت کبی و کلدر زیر اصد لغتده جونی اولمانه در او پس بیولی
 جو فضا به در اجزاء و صورته محل اولدوغنی جثیتدن لانتسها
 الاوهام اصلا و نفسی اصلا اوها م تقسیم ایدر فرج هر فرد
 اولدوغندن اونوری پس اجزای مقدار بیته و اجزای ماده بیته منقسم^{اولز}
 و لما علمت ان الحائط لا یقال له اعمی و لا بصیر فان
 الاعمی لا یقال الا علی من یتصح ان یتبصر بعض
 اوها م ثبوت مجردانده منازعه فیلده به از بر اوهم جزئیاتی مدکر
 حکم ابلرکه ککل موجودات عیاد اخلدره و با خارجدر پس بو اوها می
 دفعدن اونوری بیورر لکه و فنا کم بلدک ایه دیواره ده کور و کوچی
 دینر خاز بر اعمی دینر الاشول کبه که اول ک که کور مکشانند
 اولاه پس دیواره اعما و بینا و یک ممکن اولمز فالباری و النفس
 الناطقه و غیرهما مآ سنیاتی ذکره لیست جسم

5

10

15

ولا جسم اینه فیه لاد اخله العالم ولا خارجه
 ولا متصله ولا منفصله پس بعض او هام مجرد باری
 مقر و معترف اولوب لکن مجرد نفس ناطقه شبه لری اولدوغندان
 بیان ادوب : بر که اگر واجب الوجوده و اگر نفس و عقول مجرد
 اگر مطلقا عالم دن خارج و منفصل طو ترکیب شدن در که ذوق
 و اتصال اوله ، اگر مطلقا داخل و متصل طو ترکیب شدن در
 خارج و منفصل اوله ، کل هذا من عوارض الاجسام
 منزله عن امالین جسم پس دخول و خروج و اتصال
 و انفصال بوجه عوارض جسم اندر پس باری و عقول مجرد
 و نفوس ناطقه منزله در رله عارضات اجسام دن پس نفس مجرد
 اوله کسی ثابت اولدیه مجرده قبای بقادن غیر خلیف اولمز زب زوال
 فنا جسم و جسمانیة ملا بدیه پس نفس ناطقه صورت و عرض بلکه
 مجرد اولدیه انک فنا سی وز و آلی مستغدره پس هلاکت بدن نقشه
 نسبت بر صانع زو آل آلت و بر فارسه ضیاع مرکب و آت کبیده
 فالنفس الناطقه جوهر ، پس نفس ناطقه جوهر در که کند
 ذاتی ابله فایدر غیر بدن شئی و نفس ناطق ابله صفیند و بدن
 مراد بر نطق ظاهر و کله در که تلفظ حروف و تکلم الفاظ اوله

5

10

15

نیتہ کم نطق ظاہر اولہ انسان متحقق اولورہ اولکم اولادیم کبی و کما
 نطق ظاہر متحقق اولورہ ان نیت متحقق اولورہ نیتہ کم طوطبیدہ اولدو غنی
 بلکہ نطقدن مراد ادراک معقولات و فکر و رؤیت اقتدار و
 محمودہ و مذمومہ تمیزانکہ امکاندر و بوخاصہ و ادراک انسانہ بچون
 ویر بلیشہ کہ انی مبدائی اول معرفتہ و صفات کمال و نفوت جلالت
 ادراکنہ سلسلہ وجودہ اولان عقول مجزودہ و نفوس مطحورہ اجرام
 انلاک و عناصر اربعہ و موالید نلثہ و افان و انفس ظاہر اولایا نیت
 بینات باہرہ فی بیلکہ وسیلہ قبلہ سنہ تا کسب سعادت و تحصیل تعزیت
 ابدہ سن پس انک اشرف مخلوق اولہ کسی بوسبند نہ
 لا یتصور ان یقع الیہ الاشارة الحسیۃ نقض
 بر جوہر کہ اکا اشارہ حسیہ و نوعی تصور اولنر منشانہ
 ان یدبک الجسم و یعقل ذاته و لانیاء اول
 نقل شانند نہ کہ نہ بر جسم فیلورمانہ کبینی حفظ انک کبی و بحکم الامکان
 کالانہ و لایق اولان شیئہ تدبیر انک کبے ماو کند و ذاتی دخی ذابنلہ ادراک
 ایدوب و سایر اشیاہی دخی ادراک ایلر و بو نفس ناطقہ ان
 جمیع موجودات خارجیہ و ماہیات اشباہہ طرق صحیحہ و ادلہ
 صریحہ ایلہ عالم و صور تصورات مطابقہ و تصدیقات یقینہ

نطق
 نیت

5

10

15

صحیفه مدرکه سنده قائم دور و کینف بتوهم الانسان هذه
 الماهيته القدسيه جسا و اذا طربت طربا روحا
 تكاد يترك عالم الاجسام و تطلب ما لا يتاها
 بوماهيت قدسيه انسان ينجم جسم توهم البلم كان بوكه فخر طرب
 روحاني البلمه طرب قلوب عالم اصلي في سن طلب قلوبه ^{بولور} قريب
 عالم اجسامي ترك البلمه و عالم بني نهايت كه ذات و صفا حفر
 طلب قلوبه نيتم ارباب شهود و اصحاب معارف بسرور و هذه
 المنقش لها قوى من مدركات ظاهره و هي الحواس
 الخمس اللبس و الذوق و الشم و السمع و البصر
 بيان ماهيته نفدن فارغ اولد به قوى شك بيانه شروع البني
 در كه بونفس ناطقه انسانيه اكون و ارد مدركات ظاهره دن بچ
 قوتى و ارد دره و قوتى ايكى نوع دبر برى مدر كه معنى ادراك ايكى و برى
 محر كه معنى تحريك ايكى و مدر كه دخی ايكى نوع دره برى ظاهره در و برى
 دخی باطنه دره اما مدركات ظاهره اول حواس حسه در كه اول لاس
 و لمس بر قوت در كه جلد بدنه و ظاهر تنه ساريدر پس كيفيات
 حرارت و برودت و رطوبت و يبوست و در و بونلادن غير كيه
 خفت و ثقلت و سلامت و وحشوت و وصلابت و لبنت كى دخی

5

10

15

بود که بجز شیندر کمی جمله سی بسله نهد اولور، و ایکنجی سی ذوق قدره و ذوق
 اول فوندر که لنگ سطح ظاهر نده اولان عصب مفروضه فوندره
 اول عصبده اولان رطوبت واسطه سیله طعمی ادراک ایدره هر که اول
 عصبه وارد اولور سه انگ طعمی طوزره و اوچینجی سی شدره و ششم بر فوندر که
 دماغه مقدمه اولان لیمین ذابن بن که شامه راس ندر در انده
 وضع اولشدره کیفیت راکمه ابله متکلیف اولان هو او واسطه سیله رواج
 طنبیه ادراک ایدره دور دنجی سی سمع دره و سمع بر فوندر که صماخه سطح
 باطنده مفروض اولان عصبده وضع اولشدره پس اصواتی ادراک ایدره
 شول هوای منوجه در که انگ واسطه سیله یا قلع عینف و باق شدره
 سیبی ابله حاصل اولوره پس اول فرع و قلعدن و یا بود که بجز شیندر اولان
 بر هو او صد حاصل اولق ابله منوج ایدوب اول باطن صماخه مجاور اولان
 هوایه و اصل اولینجی پس اول عصب مفروضه باطن صماخه در انگ
 اوزره رینه جلد طبل کمی بر دری شدره اولشدره اول هوای منوج
 اکا واقع اولد و فده بر ضنین حاصل اولوب اول توت که اول عصب
 مفروضه وضع اولشدره انی ادراک ایدره و بشنجی سی بعد در
 ربه اول فوندر که حقیقته اولان عصبینده وضع اولشدر
 واضوا و الوانی ادراک ایدر رطوبتین و جلد تینده صوری منطبع

5

10

15

اولیٰ بی ایه بنه کم مرانده منطبع اولدوغی کبی پس اول جرم
 شفاف واسطه سی ایله ادراک ایدر و قوی من مدركات
 باطنه كالحس المشترك الذي هو بالنسبة
 الى الحواس الخمس كحوض تنصب فيه اقطار
 خمسة ٥ و بوقفس اطفه نك پش قوی سی ونخی واردره مدرکات باطنه
 کآن نقشه بر بزی الت ادراک اولندره اولاحت مشترک که اول حواس
 خمسة ظاهره یه نسبت شول حوض کبیر که اکابش ارمق منصب اولا
 یعنی جمله محسوسات که ملوسات و مذوفات و شمومات و سموعات
 و مبصرات کبی پس بولر پش نهر کبی در که احسن مشترک کن جمع اولور لر
 وهو الذي يشاهد صور في المنام معانية لا على سبيل
 التخييل بوحس مشترك صور منامن واقوده معاین و مش ابد اولور
 على طريق التخييل وكل ملكة على سبيل التقيين دره رزیرا علی وجه التخييل اولا
 غیر مدرک اولور یعنی تا بم نومنده خارجه و جودی اولین صور جزوی
 ابره حواس ظاهره سی معطل اولن ایه پس اول صور جزوی بی
 مشاهده قبلان عقل و کل بلکه حس مشترک در زیر عقل مدرکات کلدر
 ومن الحواس الباطنة الخيال وهو خزانة الحس المشترك
 حواس باطنه دن اولان حس ایکنج سی خیالدر که حس مشترک خزانه کبیر

5

10

15

تبقى فيه الصور بعد زوالها عن الجواسق اول جماله با
 ظهوره شول صور که حواس ظاهره دن زایل و غائب اوله و منها
 الوهم ينازع العقل اول حواس باطنه دن اولان قوتک
 او چینی سی و همدرد و هم حواس ظاهره دن غیر یی به متابعت الیه و دایما
 عقله و عقلک ممکنه نازعت و انکار الیه دره حتی ان المنفرد
 بمیت باللیل یؤمنه عقله و همه حتی رجا یغلب تخوفیه
 فینفر الانسان حتی شول غایبه انکار الیه که اگر بر که شب تاریکه
 بر میتد بر محله اوله ، عقل اول که تک و همین امین قبولر انادهم
 اول که بی تخوف الیه ، مبادا حرکت الیه . البتد بومیتدن بنی که
 در از اولور که غالب اولوب . ان فی متنفر قبولر و هو نجالف
 العقل فی امور غیر محسوسه و هو هم امور غیر محسوسه
 یعنی معقولانده عقله مخالفت الیه حتی ان لذین یتبعون
 قضایاه ینکرون ما وراء المحسوسات حتی شول که که
 متابعت احکام و هم ایدر لر ، انرا ما وراء محسوسه منکر لر . یعنی
 مراتب معقولات و درجات روحانیات و دلیالات و خوارق عادات
 بوجه کسبه و بوجه همتا و مانند شینیره انکار ایدر لر . و لم یفکر
 ان عقولهم بل اوها هم و تخیلاتهم و نفوسهم لا یحس

5

10

15

الآ السطح الظاهر دون سماه وارباب وهم تفكر انزلكه
 تحقفا بوزنك عقولك بلكه او بهامى ونجملانى ونفوسى احاسن المراد له
 ان اجسامك سطح ظاهرسن ادراك ايدر لره سطح باطنه بسن ادراك
 ايدر مزله جسمك سمكى واعلا سبدره ومنها القوة الفكرية التي بها
 التركيب والتفصيل والاستنباط اول حواس باطنه دن
 دور دخى سى قوة متفكره دره وبقوة فكريه ايله تركيب وفضل سور
 واحكام اولوره واستخراج صنابع وخدمت بوزنك اولوره ونصير صور جانور
 وحيوانات قلوب اندام اعضا تركيبى ببرى بزندن تفصيل ايدوب
 وسور دن بر صورت اخزى دخى تركيب ايلك كى بقادر دررد
 ارام اتموب ررد ونسب ده ونوم ده وبفظة ده حركت اورزدر
 هر بار بوقوتى عقل استعمال قبله قوت متفكره در لره و بر بار بوقوت
 وهميه استعمال قبله قوت متميله در لر ومن الحواس الباطنة
 الحافظة الذي بها ذكر ساير الوقايع والاحوال الخيرية
 واول حواس باطنه تك بشيخى سى قوت حافظه دره بوقوت حافظه وملك
 خزانه كى كبيده بر صورت جزويكه وهمدن غايب اولسه بوقوت
 حفظ ايدوب ضبط ايدر ولكل من الحواس الباطنة موضع
 من الدماغ يخنض به ونجبل باختلاله وبذلك عرف قاير القوى

5

10

15

و اختصاصاً بمواضعها و حواس باطنه در هر برنیک معین
 و مخصوص به بر موضعی دارد که دماغه هر بار که اول موضع تحمل اول
 قوی دخی خلل پذیر اولور که بو معنی ابله نهم اول نور قوی نیک تغا بر و اختلا
 پیری برندن معینی بری خلل پذیر اوله سبزی سلامت اوزره ^{غذ} قالد
 معلوم اولور که پس حس مشترک موضعی دماغک تجویف اولند
 و چنانک موضعی دماغک تجویف اولنک آخر جو ننده دره و موضوع
 و هم دماغک مابیننده دره و موضوع قوت حافظه دماغک تجویف
 اخرنه دره کتاب تشریحده بولده واقع اولند در و للمحبوبات
 قوه شوقیه ذات شعیه منها شهوانیه جبلت یجلب
 المنافع لا حیوانات ایچون ایمی قوا واردره برینه قوت شوقیه
 در لکه اولدخی ایکی نوعدر برینه قوت شهوانیه در لکه هر نشی که
 کند و به نافع و موافق اوله هانی کند و به جلب انک ایچون خلق اولنشد
 و برینه دخی قوت عضیه در لره اول نسنه که طبعه ملایم و موافق
 اولیه انک دفعدن او توری خلق اولنشد برینه کم بیورر لره
 و غضبیه خلقت لدفع مالا بلا یبر و قوه محرکه تباش
 التحریک و برینه دخی قوت محرکه در لرات و اعضاء تنی
 بحسب الارادت تحریک ایلر و بونلردن مایه حیوانده و بناده

5

10

15

7.

اوج قوت داخلی وارد در برینه قوت غادیه در لکه ماده غذاده تصرف
 ایلیوب اول غذائی شبیه جوهر متغذی از او بدل میخلل اولوب قوت جدید
 حاصل اولوره اگر بدل میخلل اولسه بقای حیوان و نبات ممکن است
 و برینه داخلی قوت نامیه من الغماه در لکه و بوهر قوت در که بونده متغذیک
 اجزاسنده زباده لک حاصل اولور اگر بو قوت اولیبیدی نبات حیوان
 کالنه یتشیددی ، اوجینی سینه قوت مولد در لکه بوهر قوت در که
 کند و ماده سندن بر پاره جدا ایدوب اندن بر شخص آخر حاصل اولور
 و قوت غادیه بر پنجه قوت داخلی خدمت ایدره قوت جازیه که غذائی
 جذب ایدره و قوت ماسکه که غذای حفظ ایدره و قوت باضیه که
 غذای پنجه ایدوب مستعد غادیه ایدره و قوت دفعیه نقلت
 و بری دفع ابلر و حامل جمیع قوی المدرکه و المحرکه هم روح
 و هو جبر لطیف بنولد مر لطافته الاخلاط و کثافته
 الاعضاء و تنبعث من الجویف الایسر من القلب و ینبت
 فی البدن بعد ان یکنسب السلطان النوری من النفس الناطقه
 و جمیع قوی مدرکه ، و قوت محرکه ، حاملی روح حیوانیدر ، و روح حیوان
 جرم لطیفدر که ، اخلاط لطافته ، حاصل اولور و کثافته
 اعضاء اولور ، قلبک تجویف ایسندن منبعث اولور و ظهور اولور

5

10

15

وکثافتدن جمیع بدن متفرق اولور نفس ناطقه دن نور سلطانی انشاء
 انشاء قلند دن صکره پس بوروج حیوانی تک بر شقی که دماغه صغره
 ایزر و معتدل قیوب تبرید دماغ ایدر اکاروج نفعانی در لر
 شقی ثانی سی دخی جکره کیدر و جکره قوت بنائی و پرور غادیده نامیه
 و مولن کبی اکاروج طبیعی در لر و لولا لطافته ماسری فیما
 سری و اذا وقعت سده تمنعه عن النفور الى عضو
 يموت ذلك العضو پس بوروج حیوانی تک لطافتی اولسه
 بدن ساری اولمیدی و فجن منفذنه بر سده واقع اولسه که ان نفوذ
 منع ایله عضوه کجکه اول عضوه روح ساری اولدو غنندن اولور
 وهی مطبیه تصرفات النفس الناطقه مادام فی البدن
 و اذا انقطع انقطعت تصرفاتها و بوروج حیوانی
 مطبیه و واسطه نفس ناطقه دره مادام پیرنده اولدو فجن و غیر
 روح حیوانی بدن منقطع اولسه نفس ناطقه بند تصرفاتی دخی
 منقطع اولور و هذ الروح الحيوانی غیر الروح
 الاهی الذی یاتی فی کلام النبوات و بوروج
 حیوانی روح الهینک غیری در که نغمة ربانیدر بنده کم
 کلام نبواته کلور فانه یعنی به النفس الناطقه الاهی

5

10

15

هي نور من انوار الله لا في عين بل من تعالي
 وتحقق بوروح الالهي كـ . مقصود نفس ناطقه در حق انوارين
 بر نور در جهانده و مكالده و كدر . بلكه الله دن كلمه حق جوع
 ايدر نينه كم كلام مجيد نده ، يا ايتهها النفس المطمئنة ارجو
 الى ربك بيورلدي و جماعة من الناس لما نطقوه
 ان هذه ليس جسمية تو سمو انها الباري تعالي
 و بر نيه جماعت مشايخ صوفيه اسلاميه دن و فقاكم ببلد بله كـ
 نفس ناطقه جسم و جسماني دظدر . و ظن ابلد بلكه بوروح الالهي حقد
 و باري دره اي طالب سر آر الهي ، و اي راغب انوار نامتناهي
 بيل و اكاء اول كـ . بو كتابك بعضي شر و حنده شيخ شهاب الدينك
 بو عريضي حضرت بايزيد و جنيد و مولانا و الي سعيدي كـ كياره
 و بونلر امثالي اولان زوي الاقتداره در ديوتعريح انشدر
 اما غلط محض و خطاي فاحش قبلت در . بزر ابو نرك
 زعمدن هزار هزار اولياي عظام و اصفياي كراي سلك اهل ضلالت
 انتظام قيلمق اولور . و اويانك حقه و صلتن . و حقل سر و حدتن
 انكار انكلي اشعار ايدر ، و بو فقيرك بو كتابه شرح ياز مسنه باعث
 اصل بو محل علت مستفله اولندر ، زير ابو سلطانك هر بر بي كلمه

5

10

15

وپادشاه اسرار نامتناهی • ایکن بونکر کبیوت العناک اولان دلایل
 وبراہین نامناسب ایلہ اسرار حقیقت ارباب شہودی تزییف
 ایلدک قرار ایلہ لری سغرب و سنجب اولدوغندن اوتوری •
 بو فغیر زار عنای ولایت شمار • و شرفاء کرامت دثار • طرفدن
 حکماء بلاہت مدار • ہر پنجہ یادکار اشعار قیلدم • او لامشایخ و بلاہت
 ایانک مدخل فبہ اولان • بعض کلمات و ابیانن تحریر و تسطیر ایلدم •
 و تانبہ حکمانک • و اہل کلام و اصول و بلغانک • افا و بلین فبغیر و تغیر
 ایلدم • جملدن بری حضرت جنید بغدادی بیورر لکہ یسر
 فی جبتی سوی اللہ نینہ کم حضرت جنیدک کلام در بار لونی
 ان شمس الدین ذادہ حمد جلیلی بومف زینجا لرندہ تصریح و نظم بیور
 نظم ہمہ عالم ضیای نور اللہ • لیس فی جیبہ الوجود سواہ • رحمۃ اللہ
 و حضرت بایزید بطامی قدس سرہ سبحان ما اعظم شأنی
 لا الہ الا انافعدونی و حضرت منصورک انما الحق
 دیمسی • و حضرت جنید بو بیت شریفی بیورر مثل نظم
 رقی الزجاج و رقیہ الخمر • فشاہا و تشاکل اللام • فکانتہا حمر و لا قدح •
 و کانتہا قدح و لا خمر • زینتہ کم فارسی ترجمہ فینن شد از صفائی و لطائف
 در ہم آمیخت زک جام مدام • کما ہمہ جامت بنت کونی می با درت کونی جام

5

10

15

و حضرت منصور یوینی بیورر لر - انا من اهو و من اهو انا
 سخن روحان حللنا بدنا فاذا ابهرتنا ابهره فاذا ابهرته ابهرنا
 و شیخ عطار حضرت لری بیورر لر ای روی در کشیده بیازار آمده

خلفی بدین طلسم گرفتار آمده غیر تو هر چه هست سراب نمایش است
 که اینجا اندک است نه بسیار آمد و حضرت مولانا بوغزل رعنا لری بیورر لر

5

نظمه ان پادشاه اعظم در بسته بود محکم پوشیده دلق دم امروز بر در آمد
 ولد ان سرخ فبای که چو م پار بر آمد امسال در بن خرقة زنگار بر آمد
 آن ترک که پارینه بیغاشش بیدی اینست که امسال عرب وار بر آمد

ولد ای دوست ز اهر مکان می جسم مردم خبرت ز این وان می جسم
 دیدم بتو خویش را تو خود من بودی جملت زده ایم گز تو نشان می جسم
 بر نقش خود است فتنه نقاش کس نیست درین میان خونش

10

نتر بس بوجه کلمات صور تا حلول و اتحاد معنا کنی شعرا و لوب
 و در باب عقول و اصحاب شهودک اسرار ندن فانی خیر اولد و قلند

هر بر ابله کند و طبیعت و کند و ز عملر نجه و دلایل عقلیه ابراد ابد و ب
 و بونلرک مراد لری حلول و اتحاد در دپوب مباحثه قبلور لر حال لکه

15

پس بونلرک دلایلی مینه کند و لک شکوک و او هامن ز انیل قبلور
 بجه عارف و اصل اولد و غی مرتبه دن نه حلول و نه اتحاد نه اثبیت و نه

و نه مغایرت که نه مرید و نه مراد و ار بلکنی ماسوی اللہمی بیلکہ کور منزل
 زیر اجمیع اشیا بظاہر اسما و جمیع اسما بظاہر ذات و صفات
 و اسمائے عین ذات و نه غیر ذات کہ واسم مستادن غیر اولیٰ الما مقلد عین
 ذات در کہ در لکہ اگر فحافت تطویل اولیٰ علی التفضیل مراتب ذات
 و صفات و اسمائی تقریر قبلوردم اگر اقتضا اول نور سہ بواسر اردن
 بر مقدار مصباح الکسار نہ و داخلی جناح الارواح نام رسالہ لبرزہ
 بیان قبلیت در کہ انلرہ مطالعہ قبلیتہ کہ بعض اہل کلام و اہل اصول
 کتب مشایخہ بوموال اوزرہ کہ اولان کلماتدن رایجہ حلول اتحاد
 تو تم ایدوب ہانی دلایل عقلیہ ایلہ ابطال قبلیتہ کہ جملہ دن بری خبر
 امام فخر رازی بیورر لکہ اگر ایکی شیئی متحد اولر حصول
 اتحاد باہر ایکی شیئی معاً باقی و باہر ایکی سی معافانی و باہر بری
 باقی و بری فانی اولدن خالی اولر پس اگر ایکی سی معاً باقی اولر
 ما بینلر نہ اثنبیت اولمش اولور اتحاد اولر و اگر ایکی سی فانی اولر
 پس حق با بقدرہ سبب اتحاد اولر نہ و اگر بری بانی بری فانی اولور سہ
 کذلک اتحاد اولر نہ زیرا موجود عین معدوم اولر نہ و ابطال مذہب حلول
 ایدوب دیر کہ حلول نزول مناسنہ در و حال نزول و بکلر
 و محل خاک مکانی درہ پس ہر حال البتہ بہ محتاج محلدر باد کلدر

5

10

15

۲۰۲

اگر محتاج محل اولورسه واجب الوجود اولغه لایق اولمز و اگر محتاج اولمز
 ایسه مخلدن منزّه اولور پس حلول و اتحاد باطلدر شبهه یوقدر که
 مذمب حلول و اتحاد و تاشیح شرعاً و عقلاً باطلدر اما یو کبارده
 بو اصل احوال دن بریشنی قابل دکلدر اگر چه بحسب الظاهر کلامی
 منقهم اولان بودر لکن معنایری یور ایجه دن مهتر ادر و هربری
 نجه ناول و توجیهه محتاجدر اگر چه حکما و اهل کلام جانبینه نجه حجت
 ابراز انک قابل ابری لکن حضرت نولانا تک بو ایات هدایت
 سماتی برهان قاطع و انوار لامع و ساطع مشایخ سنده اولدوغندن
 بر این و دلایل ترک اولندی کردین ره از خرد ره بیس بدی
 فخر رازی رازوان دین بدی پای استدالیان چوپین بود
 پای چوپین سخت بی تکلیف بود علم کان از هونفشدنی واسطه
 ان نیاید همچو رنگ ماشیه عشق اینجا همچو خرد کل بحفت
 شرح عشق و عاشقی هم گفت پس دیده بینش ارباب دانش
 اشعه انوار جمال حقندن و مشاهد کیفیت هوبت دن بطلان وجود
 مطلقدن نبره و خیر دار اولدوغنه شبهه و شایبه یوقدره و دخی
 زعم ایدوب دیدلر که قد ضلوا ضللاً لا یبعثوا ان الله
 واحد و النفوس کثیره یعنی شول جماعت که نفس ناطقه

۵

10

15

حقد و بد بلیه انگر گراه لرد و حقدن بعید اولش لرد زبر الله بر در
 و نفوس کینه در یعنی چو قدره پس بوجامعت نفس ناخفه به حقد
 و بیز لر لکن حقدن ابروده دینز لر بلکه هر تور تمانی و نقیحه سبحانی در که
 ذات حقدن ابرود کلدر و نفوس کشرتی وحدت ذات خلل دیر فرزند کم
 شخص واحد مرابای کینه به بختی جمال قبله کشرت صورتی که
 هر بر مرانده حاصل اولش در اول شخصک کند و ذانته کشرت لازم کلمز
 مثال آخر بود که افتاب عالمتاب که جمیع خانه لر طلوع اید و
 ضیا کس اوله ظاهر اند و خانه دن وحدت افتاب نقصان کلمز و بیوت
 کینه ده اولان نور افتابک کلدر دینلر و بر خانه ده اولان نور خانه
 آخرد و اولانک غیر بیدر بودنی دینلر پس بودید و کمر مضمونی سوال
 مقدر ایدوب جواب و بر که یعنی کسن در سک که نفوس ناخفه
 کانوار الشمس نور واحد در و جمیع نفوس بر در دیرک جوایت
 در که لو کانت نفس زید و عمر و واحدة لادزک
 احدها جمیع ما در که الآخر و لا اطلع کل الناس علی
 ما اطلع علیه و احد منهم و ایس کذا اگر زید و بزرگ
 نفسی واحد اولیدی بر نیک ادراک ایلد و کئی آخر دخی ادراک ایدیدی
 و جمیع ناس بر بر نیک مطلع اولد و غنه مطلع اولیدی حالیکه

5

10

15

بویله و کلدرون بودی نفک مغزق اولاسنه دلیل اولمز اولابرجواب بودی
 نفس واحد اولسبده کل ناس بر بیر نیک ادراک ایلد و کنی ادراک الملک
 لازم کلمز زبر اجناب رب العبادت هر کک روحنه بحسب الاستعداد
 بر ادراک و علم و بر شد که بر نیک ادراک ایلد و کنی آخر ادراک ایلد
 بیدد کلدرون و بردنی بود که نفوس ناطقه ادراک کللی فیلوب
 و بری بیر نیک ادراک ایلد و کنی هر کس مطلع اولیق قابلدنه لکن هر
 شخصک بدنی و او هام و خبالاتی و اشتغالاتی و حجات نورانی
 و ظلمانی بود که مانند اولنل ادراک نغمه مانند پس بر نیک ادراک
 ایلد و کنی شیبی بری ادراک ایلمز پس هر کس که روی خود بجای تقدر
 از الة قبلدیه اولقدر ادراک زباده اولوز نبت کم ایت کریمه دانی
 وحدت نغمه دلالت ایدر که یا ایها الناس اتقوا ربکم الذی
 خلقکم من نفس واحدیه و یزکم بوجیه قیزدن جمله نفوسک
 شیبی واحد اولسنی لازم ستور مزه بلکه جفقت واحده اولند و عن
 اشعار ایدر که در مجلده بساحت کثیره واربره هر کس نفسی تقدر ایلمز
 بومقدار ایلد اکفا اولنه ^{ان} نغمه در روح حیوانی بود و نفس واحدی
 در قد استاسر قوی البدن الله الالهه و نسحر
 اگر نفس ناطقه واحد اولیدی قوای بدن اول معبود لک معبودی

5

10

15

آنچه اسیر قیلوردی و آنچه مستخر قیلوردی کابس حکمانک بوجه کلانی
 مشایخک انما الحق دینسندن و ما اعظم شانی و لیس فی
 جبتی سوی الله و بونله مانند کلمات ایملرندن ناشی در
 نیاس ایدر لکه اول انما لفظنی تلفظ ایلمین نفس ناطقه اول
 و بونله نفس حق دیر و جهان الوجوه بو کباردن بر کسند بواسل معنا
 ذامب اولامشدره بلکه بونلرک وجودندن انما الحق و سبحانی ما اعظم
 شانی دین بنه صدر مثلا بر آهین پاره میان اشد و نام حرمت تجمل
 ابرنجبه دک طورسه ما بعد طشره چقد قدر انما النار دینه دعواسی صحیح در
 اما بومقدار وارکه ما هبت بالکلیه نار اولمز همچنان مشایخ دخی بجای ذاته
 مستغرق اولسه لکه اول حالده هر نه صدور ایدر سه بالذات حقد
 بوسوز مزده به نسبت در بوخه عرفانک حالی بوسانده شرح اولمق قابل
 دکدره پس لا یعرف ذالفضل الا بونلرک حالنی بنه مقام
 و اصل اولان بیلور کا و داخی بوده معلوم اولاکه قوای بدن نفس ناطقه فی
 قیلمر بلکه بدن انک اسیر بیدر ما و اول سلطان مدبر در و بجعله دهن
 شهوات و تعرضه بلیات متقلبات فی حبس عشوات
 و محکم علیها حرکات السموات اگر نفس ناطقه خدا اولیدی
 قوای بدن انی شهوات قیلور میدی و انی بیبانه عرض قیلور میدی

5

10

11

12

و ضبط عشوانده منتقلب اولور میدی اغشو اگوردوه پودر لکه دایما ضبط و
 دن خالی اولور نه پس تشیل ایدوب دبر که تا اگر نفس خدا اولیدی ناته ایچی کیلنانه
 دو شمه ده منتقلب اولور میدی تا و داخی دور حرکت سبوات اگا حکم نیلور میدی
 بوکلامنده تناقض وارد در زیر ایا فارقوده و دیدیکم کافس ناطقه جسم جسمانی
 دکلدرد پس بر شی جسم جسمانی اولایجون ربین شهوات اونزه و مودن بلنانه
 و ضبط عشوانده اولان جسم در روح حیوانی در و حرکات سماوی اجسام
 حکم ایدره بوخه نور الهی به حکم قبلتره بلکه اولیا تک جانی ایچنده آسمان معنوی
 وارد که با بوسه اتمک حاکمدر نینه کم حاکم سنائی حضرتی بیورر لرست
 آسمان خواست در ولایت جان ماکار فرمای آسمان جهمان ۶
 و جماعه نو هموا آنها جز مننه و هو ز بیغ فانه لما برهن غلبه
 انه لیس جسمه فلیف تجزئی و بنفسه جزوید و جماعت
 آخر تو تم ابلد بلر که نفس ناطقه حاکم جزویدر بوبله بلک اغشاد بالظن
 زیر ابونک اوزرینه بر همان اولندی که تحقیقا اول نفس جسم دکلدرد نجبه
 منقسم و متجزئی اولور که بر پاره می نفس اوله و بر پاره می حق اوله حقیقت
 جزو دکلدرد لکن نور حق اولد و معنی جهندن جزو منابه سنده در دبر لر
 و آخرون نو هموا قد معاولم یعلم انها لو کانت کاز عمو
 فالذی انجاها الی مفارقة عالم القدس و الحیوة و العلق

5

10

15

بعالم الموت والظلمات و برجاعت آفر نو تم ایله که نفس طافه
 قدیمه و بلمدیلر یعنی که اگر اول نفس زعم اندکری کبی ایش ایته پس
 نه آنی عالم قدس و حیوندن مفارقته مایل فیلوردی و عالم مرت
 و ظلمه تعلق نه شیئی مایل ایلردی من الذی قهر القدیوم و حبسه
 و کیف سحره قوی الصفل الرضیع حتی انجذبت من
 عالم القدس والنور و نه نشنه در که قدیم اولان شیئی بو عالمه
 ندر و جس ایلردی و نیجه اول نفسی قوی طفل ذر ضیع عالم قدس
 و نوردن مجذب فیلوردی و کیف امتاز بعضها عن بعض
 فی الازل و نوعها متفق و لا مکان و لا محل و لا فعل
 و لا انفعال قبل البدن و لاهیات مکتسبه و نه
 حال ایله بعض نفس بعضیندن عالم ازله ممتاز اولوردی حال بو که نوعی
 و حقیقی واحد در و ازله خود نه مکان و نه محل و نه انفعال دار در که
 نفک مابینی بونلر ایله تمیز و تشخیص اولنه و بو جمله ایسه اوصاف مدبره
 پس نفوسک مابینی ازله تمیز اوله مشس اولور و عدم امتیاز ایسه سنده
 اما بعد الموت ممتاز اولور اکتاب بیئت و انفعال سیمی ایله و هم آتی
 پس بو جمله کلامدن منفرم اولان بودر که ارواح قبل الاشباح مخلوق اولیه
 بلکه هر که نفسی بدینله مفا خلق اولور مع هذا بوبله دکلدرد زبر ابات

5

10

15

و اخبارک دلالت ابلدوکی اوزره ارواح اجسامدن بکنه زمین واسماندن
 هزار و صد هزار سال مقدم اوله بولماید و کنه خود ریب و کان بو قدر قدیمی
 دخی ایکی نوع اعتبار انمشدر اعتبار اول اولدر که معلول اول اولیه که
 واجب الوجود کی زیر از بیدر و ازل اکا در لر که ابتدا سی اولیه و ابتدا اکا در
 انها سی اولیه و اعتبار ثانی اولدر که ابتدا سی زمانی اولیه عقول مجرد و نفوس
 ناطقه و نفوس سماوی و افلاک و کواکب و عناصر اربعه کی پس بنظر محدث
 ذاتی دخی در احکام زلجه و لفظ محدث انرا اصطلاحند و اول سینه اطلاق
 مسبق زمان اوله یعنی زمان تک اوزرینه سبقت نش اوله و لا
 یصح ان یکون واحده فتقسم و ستوزع علی الابدان
 فان ما لیس جسمانی لا یجری بل هی حادثه مع البدن
 و لاین و کدر که نفس ناطقه اوله و ابدان واجب متفرق اوله زیر برشی
 جسم اولیا یجی اف می قبول بلز پس بوا بر از ابلدوکی اوزره معلوم اولو کیه
 نفس ناطقه قدیم و کدر بلکه حدوث بدن ایله معا حادث اولو لازم کلور
 کما رأیت فتیله مستعدة لیستغیل من النار
 من غیر ان ینتقض منها شیء فلا تتعجب من حصول
 النفس الناطقة عند استعداد البدن من و اهلها
 ینتقم سن کور کون بر استعداد او مشقبتی که نار دن اشتعال اولنو

5

10

15

اول شدن بر شیئی منتقض اولدوغی حالده پس تعجب ایله که کانتفاطه
 بذله معاً حاصل اولوب و اول نفک و ایمندن بر شیئی منتقض اولیه
 الهیکال الثالث الجهات العقلية وهي
 ثلاثة واجب و ممتنع و ممکن فالواجب ضروري الوجود
 الممتنع ضروري العدم و الممكن ما لا ضرورة له وجوده
 و لا في عدمه و الممكن يجب و يمتنع من غيره - جهات
 عقلية روح دره بری واجب بری ممتنع بری ممکن - واجب اکادیر لکه
 وجودی البته ضروری اولاندیره و ممتنع اکادیر لکه البته وجودی اولیه
 شریک بری کبی و ممکن اکادیر لکه باوجود و عدمده ضرورت
 اولیه
 و ممکن الوجود - واجب الوجود اولور غیر نیک وجودیه و اول غیره
 سبب در لر - و ممتنع الوجود اولور اول سبب اوله یعنی ممکن
 عدمدن وجوده اول سبب ایله کلوره و وجوددن عدم اول سبب
 اولدوقده کیدر و السبب ما يجب به وجود غیره سبب اولدیر
 انک وجوددن غیر وجود حاصل اوله و امکان لایکون موجوداً
 بذاته ولو اقتضه الوجود لذاته کان واجباً لامکانا
 ممکن کند و ذابله موجود اولمزه اگر کند و ذاتی وجودین اقتضا ایله
 اولمز واجب اولوردی فلاید من سبب برنج وجوده علی عدمه

5

10

15

اگر افتقاری وجود بجز سبب البتة لازم است که بر سبب انگ و بودنی عدمی اوزره توجیح
 ایلیه پس اول سبب دخی ممکن اولى قابل و کلدیره زبراد و رسل لازم کلور
 ایکیسیده بالکلره پس بینه لازم اولور که واجب الوجود بالذاته منتفی اولره
 و هو المطلوب و السبب اذا تم لهم يتخلف عنه وجود المسبب
 و کل ما ینوقف علیه الشئ فله مدخل فی السببینه کان ارادة
 او وقتا و مکانا او محلا فابلا و غیر ذلك فبج سبب تمام اوله
 اولد و قد سببیک وجودی البتة انذن تخلف بجزا و هر شئی که بر شئی انگ
 اوزر بینه توقف ایلیه اول ینوقف اولان شئیک سبب در مدخلی وارد یعنی
 اول موقوف علیه اولان شئی حاصل اولینجه موقوف علیه اولان شئی حاصل اولور
 و موقوف موقوف علیه اگر ارادة اولسون او اگر وقت و اگر مکان اولسون
 و با محلی که اول معینه قابل اولسون و دخی بونک کی غیر شئی اولسون پس
 حاصل اوله موقوف علیه حاصل اولور و اذا لم یوجد السبب او بعض
 اجزائه لا یحصل الشئ و اذا حصل جمیع ما ینبغی فی وجود الشئ
 و ارتفع جمیع ما لا ینبغی وجب الشئ ضرورة و بر گاه که بر شئیک
 وجوده لابن اولان شئیک تبعی حاصل اولوب و ما لابن و مانع اولان منع
 اوله البتة بالضرورة اول شئیک وجودی واجب اولور وجوده کلدیره
 اثبات واجب الوجود در دلیل اخذ دخی بود که حکما ابراد بجز در شئیک

5

10

15

شک بود که اگر موجودانه سبب اولانی واجب الوجود بالذات اعتبار
 ایزک مقصود حاصل در، یعنی وجود واجب الوجود بالذات در، اگر
 اول سببی ممکن الوجود اعتبار ایزک پس البته لازمند که هر سبب انگ
 وجود یعنی وعدیتی از زهره نه هیچ المیه، پس اگر بوسی واجب الوجود اعتبار
 مقصود حاصل، و اگر ممکن الوجود اعتبار ایزک نه اکادخی بر سبب مزج لا
 پس با دوره و با تسلسل لازم کلور، ایکی سبده باطل در، زیرا البته وجود
 ممکنات واجب الوجود بالذات منتهی اولور، و هو المطلوب الحسب کل
 الرابع لا یصح ان یحسب کون شیء ان نهما واجب الوجود
 لاین دکدر که عالمه ایکی واجب الوجود اوله لانها لواشتر کافی
 وجوب الوجود فلا بد من فارق بینهما زیرا اگر ایکی واجب الوجود
 وجوب وجودده اشترک ایسه هر پس ایکی سبک مابینتی بزرگ ایدگی شی
 لازمدر والا این متصور اولمز لر فیتوقف وجود احدیما
 او کلیمهما علی الفارق پس ایکی واجب الوجود اعتبار قبلدنده
 نمکوز فارق و تمیز اولان شی با هر ایکی سبک حالی اولور و یا تنها بزرگ حالی اولور
 برینک اولمز پس اول فارق موقوف و واجب الوجود اعتبار ابلد و کمز
 موقوف علیه اولمش اولور و هر نه شی که بر شیء وجودی توقف ایسه واجب الوجود
 اولمز ممکن الوجود اولور و لا یکن ان یکن شیءان لا فارق

5

10

15

بینہما فانہما یکونان واحدا پس یکی شبک میانہما فارق اولور
 ایکسیدہ ممکن الوجود اولور، و اگر فارق اولور ایکی شئی اولور شئی واحد اولور
 پس اول شئی واحد واجب الوجود در تعالی و تقدس پس معلوم کرد
 بر او ہام و خیالات طبع لیم و ذہن سقیم اولان نلسبل کرد بخ عفل سلیم
 و قلب مستقیم در اکثرین جناب واجب الوجود مرتبہ شمودہ و اصل بکن
 بود لایل بی طاہلہ ترک احتیاجی تلز و الاجسام و الہیات کثیرہ
 و قدینا ان واجب الوجود واحد فلیست ہی واجبہ فہمی
 ممکنہ فینحاج الی مرجع ہو واجب الوجود لذاتہ ابام
 و صور کثیرہ در و بزبان ابلدک کہ واجب الوجود بر در پس اجسام صور
 واجب الوجود اولورہ بکہ ممکن الوجود اولور و اجسام و صورہ البتہ بر مرجع
 لازم کرد و مرجع واجب الوجود بالذاتہ و واجب الوجود لا یشوب
 و اجزاء فیكون معلولہا و قابل دکلدر کہ واجب الوجود اجزادن
 مرکب اولو کہ اجزائک معلولی اولو ثم لا یكون تلك الاجزاء واجبہ
 زیرا اجزائک معلولی اولان واجب اولور پس اول اجزاء دخی واجب الوجود
 اولون قابل دکلدر لما یسنا ان لا واجبین و الوجود زیرا بزبان ابلدک
 وجودہ ایکی واجب اولور پس محالہ کہ واجب الوجود اجزادن مرکب اولو
 و الصفہ لا یجب بذاتہا و الا ما احتاجت الی محلہا

5

10

15

فواجب الوجود ليس محلا للصفات وقابل دكلدر که صفات است
واجب اوله که بالذات اگر صفات الله واجب الییدی محله احتیاجی اولر ذمی
چونک محلدن مستغنی اولما یحیی ممکن اولور، و قابل دکلدر که واجب الوجود اول
صفاتک محلی اوله که زیر که صفات ممکنه به بر مرجح لازمدره، یعنی فاعل و قابل
اولن لک که ولایق دکلدر که واجب الوجود هم مرجح اوله و هم قابل اوله زیرا که
بویله اولور سه کند و داننده ترکیب اولن لازم کلور فان الشیء الواحد
لا یستأثر عن ذاته زیرا شیء واحد کند و دانندن اثر پذیر اولر که
زیرا مؤثر غیر می و مؤثر ذاتی غیر می لک و نحن اذا نصر فنا عضو الننا
یلکون الفاعل شیئا و القابل شیئا اخر بر که که بینه کند و عضو
نزدن به عضوی تصرف ایسک معلومدر که فاعل که متصرفن مراد که
اولدر که عقل زدر و قابل عضو ندر، به فاعل شیء غیر می، و قابل شیء غیر می
اولور فواجب الوجود واحد من جمیع الجهات و الوجوه
بس فاعل شیء قابل شیء اولما یحیی واجب الوجود اجزای فاعلی و قابل می دن
منزهدر و من کل الوجوه و الجهات واحددر حکما تک بو قولنده جنفا
غیر ذات اولور و محدث اولن لازم کلور اما مذہب سنت اهل جماعت
نه عین ذات و نه غیر ذات اعتبار فیکسن بعضیله خود عین ذات
طوشلدر و صفات الله قدیم اولد و غنه اهل سنت و جماعت بعضیله

5

10

15

متفوق در پس ثانی الیه و اه من کل متقابلین اشرفیها
وهو بعضی الکمال من هم و قاصر پس اول باری بچوندر اشرف
جمع مقابلات مثلا وجود و عدم متقابلدر، لکن اشرف وجود در و قدرت و
متقابلدر، و علم و جهل متقابلدر، و کمال و نقص متقابلدر، یعنی آنچه چوندر وجود در
و علم و کمال و آنچه بود که بگز متقابلدر، کمال افزین بی کمال اولاد معلول و قاصر کمال
اعطایند و کل مایوجب نکترا من تجسد و ترکیب مستنع علیه
و الحق لا یضد و لا یندک و لا ینسب الیه ابن زهری زنی که گفتی
کثرت قبله جسمیت و ترکیب کبی و واجب الوجود اوزر و اطلاق محالدر
قابل دکلدر که و واجب الوجود ک خدی و ندی اوله و قابل دکلدر که
بر مکانه انتاب قبله جمیع نواقص جسمیتدن منزله و مبتددر اوله
الجلال الاعلی و الشرف الاعظم و النور الاشد الندر
جلال اعلی و شرف اعظم و نور اشد لیس بعرض فمحتاج الی حامل
یقوم به وجوده و لا یجوز هربشارک الجواهر فی حقیقه
الجوهریه عرض دکلدر که مایه منقده اوده و بدین که عرض کما محتاج و اوله
انکه قیام اوله و جوهر دکلدر که جوهر الیه جوهر تنیده و شک اوله
و یفتقر الی محض دلت علیه الاجسام با احتلا
هیاتها و جوهر دکلدر که متفوق محض الیه محض اوله که اجسام

5

10

15

محض اوزر و دلالتی وارد در هیئت مختلف اولیای الهیه فلو لا محضها
 ما اختلفت اشکالها و مفادیرها و صورها و اعراضها
 و حرکاتها و مراتب احکام العالم و نظامها و لو اقتضت ^{الجسمیة}
 هیئاتها لا تفتت منها ارجسک محضی و لیبیدی مختلف
 الاشکال اولیبیدی و مفادیر مورک و اعراض و حرکاتی مختلف اولیبیدی
 لیکن مختلف در زیر اهرجسک محضی وارد و اگر محض اولیبیدی
 مراتب ارکان عالم اولیبیدی و اگر جسمیت اقتضای هیئت الهیه ابدی جمله
 هیئات اجسام متفق اولیای لازم کوردی بویله خود و کلد ریکه جمیع اشیا تک
 محضه واجب الوجود در واسطه الهیة کل الاجسام
 تشارکت فی الجسمیة و تفارقت فی الاستنارة و عند
 الاستنارة اجسام جسمیته بری برینت شارک در و بری برینت
 ما بینلری استناره و عدم استناره ابله فرق اول نور فالنور بیده عرضیه
 فی الاجسام و النور بیده الاجسام ظهوریها پس نوریت اجسام
 و ضیاء و نوریت اجسام ظهوریها عبارتند و لما کان نور عارض
 فیامد بغیره فلیس وجوده لنفسه ظاهر لذت عارض
 اکادیر لکه انک فیامی غیر ابله حاصل اولی و فتاکم نور عارضک فیامی غیر ابله
 حاصل اولوب و وجودی نفسی ظاهر بقدمه زیرا اب یک وجودی کند و تک

5

10

15

ذابني ظاهر قبله فلو قام بنفسه لكان نور النفسه مكان
 ظاهر النفسه فكان مدر كالذات الكرتسي اليه
 قائم اوليدى كند وفتنك نوري اولوب وكندوى ظاهر فيلوب وذاتنى
 مدرك اولوردى پس معلوم اولد بكة نفوس ناطقه كندونى ظاهر فيلوب
 وكندونى مدرك اولوب وكندو ذاتى اليه قائم اولنددر وفتن سنا قد
 انما حادثه ولها مرجح ولا يوجد لها الاجسام اذ
 لا يوجد الشئ ما هو اشرف منه وفتن ناطقه في بيان
 ابلدوك حادثه وحادثة البنده به موجود مرجح لازم ذكره وجودنى عد
 اورزه ترجيح ابله واجسام تابق دكلدر كه موجود مرجح نفوس ناطقه اول
 زير ابريشى پس كندون اشرف اولاشئى موجود مرجح اولامره
 ايضا نور مجرد پس نفوس ناطقه تك مرجح نيز نور مجرد
 واجب الوجود فهو المراد وان يمكن فينتهي اليه والوجود
 اكر اول نور مجرد واجب الوجود به معصود واصل وكر يمكن الوجود اب
 بس جميع ممكنات واجب الوجود منتقه اولور بذاته الحى القين
 والنفس هي قيوم دل على الحى القيوم وحب الوجود حى
 نفس ناطقه حى فيوندر كه على حى قيوم دلالت ابده وهو ظاهر لذاته
 و نور الا نوار مجرد عن الاجسام وعلابقتها وهو

5

10

15

۸

محتج بشده ظهوره و اول واجب الوجود کند و ذاتی ظاهر میگی
 و اجازت و علایق اجازت مجرد اولان نور لک نور بره و اول
 شده ظهور نندن خفاده در ^{فصل} اول واحد من
 جمع الوجوه الذی لا ینکثر فی ذاته اختلاف دواعی و اط
 موجبه لکثره و محوجه الی السبب کالوجبت الاجسام
 الیه من کل وجه یعنی باری سبحانه و تعالی بقابل دکل
 ذاته اختلاف دواعی کثره اوله و اراده که موجب کثره اوله و اجسام کسب
 کثره محتاج اوله اول داعی ذاته تکثر بلز فاعلیت ما یوجب
 بالاول شئی واحده لا کثره فیه اول شئی که حضرت واجب
 اول وجوده کلشدر شول شئی در که ذاته کثره بوند و بوکاعقل
 در لر و لیس بجسم فبمتلف فیه هیات و عقل
 جسم و کله که انده اختلاف هیات اوله و لا هیات یحتاج
 الی الخلل و دخی بیثنده دکل که محایه محتاج اوله و لا نفس
 فیمحتاج الی بدن و دخی بفسده دکل که بدنه محتاج اوله
 هو جوهر قائم مدبر لذاته و لباریه بل که بر بومر در که قائم
 ذاتی الی و باری الیه و مدبر که ذاتی و خالقنه و هو الخوار الابد
 الاول لا ممکن شرف منه منتهی امکانات و اول
 بر نور در که سرحه ممکنات ده انذن اشرف و اللف بر دخی

واراده

5

10

15

بنیتکم حضرت رسول اللہ پیور کر کہ اول مخلوق شد عقل
 قال له اقبل فاقبل ثم قال له ادبر فادبر ثم قال عزرتي
 وجملا الى ما خلقت خلقا اشرف منك الى امره و
 هذا النور تمكن في نفسه و واجب بالاول و عقل
 اول كنهه و ذاته نسبت ممکنه اما واجب در ذات خالق اليه فيقتنه
 نسبة الى الاول و مشاهدة جماله جواهر قدسيا حرد
 بنظره الى ذاته و وجبه حصل منه نفس و بنظره
 ام كانه و نقص ذاته بالنسبة الى كبرياء الاول جرم سماوي
 و هكذا الجوهر القدسي الثاني الى ان كثرت جواهر
 مقدسه عقلية و اجسام بسيطة بس عقل و كنه
 اوج اعتباري و ارد رسول جهند نيكه خالقك جلال و جان مشاهده قبله
 بود غابت شريف اولد و غندن بر شئي شريف و في اقتضا ابدركه ر بوبور
 اخردركه عقل ثاني در نر و شول جهند نيكه كند و ذاتي و جو بيتي ادراك البر
 بو اعتبار اليه انذن نفس سماوي حاصل الوب الكانفس كل بيزا و شول
 جهند نيكه كند و ذاتي و نقصني ادراك البر بر جهند نظر بليته بر اعتبار
 مشاهد نسبت اولدركه اول مشاهده جلال خالق تينيز و الدر افغامي
 جرم سماوي ايدركه اول فلک اظلم در كه سان شرعه الكا عرش مجيد و ديكر

5

10

15

و نفس کل عرشک مدبر و محرکی در مابینه کم نفس ناطقه بیزم اجامی
 محرک و تدبیر ابد و کیچی و اناک حرکتی و شوقی و عشقیدر که عاشق
 عقل اولدر مابینه کم اول دخی معلول اولور ما و داعی عقل ثانی اوج مرتبه اعتبار
 و لنوب خالقنک جلال او کبر باسن ماسده کا ایکنجی کند و اناک
 و جوینی ادراک او بجنجی کند و اناک امکان و نقصی ادراک پس خالقن
 ماسده قبلد یعنی جهندن عقل ثالث حاصل اولوب و ادراک و جوینی
 نفس فلک البروج و ادراک امکان و اشدن جرم فلک البروج حاصل اولدی
 پس بر سوال اوزره ما عقول عشره و اناک شمه ظهور ابد و ب جواهر عقلی
 و نفوس سماوی و اجسام بسیط کثیر اولدیلر و بسببک معناسی اجسام
 غیر بره اولورسه اول شیدر که اصلا اجزای اولیه و اراک مره اعتبار اولور
 جزوی کلی سینه مشابه اولانه در لرت و الجوهر المقدسه العقلیه
 وان کسانت فعالة الا انها و سابطه جود الاول هو
 الفاعل به و بوجوه قدسیه عقلیه نک و اگر چه هر بریک فعلی
 واردر اما بونلر و سابطه جود حق در رکر که فاعل مطلق اولدر و بوجوه
 انجی و سابطدر و کما ان النور الاقوی لا یکن النور
 الا ضعف من الاستقلال بالانارة فالنور القاهر
 الواجبه لا یکن الوسابطه من الاستقلال لو فور فیضه
 و کمال قوته و کیف و هو و آءمالا ینتهی فکل شان فی
 شان

5

10

15

29

بنیت کم نور قوی نور ضعیفه نمکین و بر مز تا اول نور ضعیف اناده مستقل
اولا پس قوت قاهره حضرت واجبی داخی بود سابقا نمکین و بر مز که ما
تا هر بری فعل ایجاد مستقل اول لالر شوندن او توری که ^{الک} ^{فرض}
و فرنی و کثرتی و کمال قوت و قدرتی بونلره وجود فو شدرا مثلا جرخ کردو
دور بی سیر ابله بعضی کس ^{اولد} ^{نور} نک که کوبگی سعادت و که نخوست
فلانک طالعی کشاده فلانک ساره سی نخوست و بلزاده دیوب انلاک
و نجوم اسناد ایلد و کبری کبی اگر چه بحسب الظاهر بونلردن اینه حقیقته بر
وسایط بین الیه ما موز ما منزل ما و مانع ما و معطی ما بنه حضرت حق
نیاض مطلقه ما و هر شانده و هر کارده حفاک ^ش وارد که کال قدرتی ناشاد
و حانته الهیکل عالم از العالمه ثلثة عالمه لستیه حکما عالم
العقل و العقل فی اصطلاحهم کل جوهر لا یشار الیه
بالاشارة الحسبیه و لا ینصرف فی الاجسام ابضا
بلکل که عالم عند الحکماء اوج قسده بر نیه عالم عقل در لر و عقل بونلر اصلا ^{جند}
شول جوهره در لر که اشارت حبه ابله اکا اشارت ممکن اولیه و داعی اجسام
نصرف الیه و النفوس الناطقة تنقسم الی ما ینصرف فی الماد ^{یات}
دالی ما فی نوع الانسان و الکنی سنه عالم نفس ناطقه در لر اگر چه جسده
منصرف در کن بونلر و اشارت حبه ابله اشارت اولنر و نفس ناطقه

5

10

15

یکی نفسد و دیگری سما و باندۀ معرفت قیلور و دیگری نوع انسانده بولنور
 و عالم الجسم و بتسم بتقسیم الی اثیری و عنصری
 او چچی سنه عالم اجسام در لر جسمده یکی نفسد بری اثر برده
 انلا کرده و بری عنصر بر یعنی عناصر لبعه و موالید ثلثه دره و من جمله
 الاوار القاهرة ایضه العقول ابونا طلسم نوعنا و مفیض
 نفوسنا و میکلها هو روح القدس المسیم عند الحکماء بالعقل
 الفعالم و کلهم انوار مجردة و انوار قائمه تکس جمله سندن بری یعنی
 عقول عشرون اوله عقل عاشرون بر عقل ذمی صدر ابیر که اکا حکما عقل فعال در لر
 و سان شریعه روح القدس دیکل کورده پس نوع عقل فعال مدبر عالم عنصر باند
 و بونک بینه نسبتی یا یکبیرت و بر نوع ان تک طلسم در و بخشندۀ نفوس بیدر
 و داعی نکیل و زربیه فلج بیدر و جمیع عقول انوار الهیدر کا و مجرد لر در کسان شریعه
 اندر ملائکه کزوبی دیکل کورده و العقل الاول اول ما بینیه به الوجود و اشراق
 علیهم ذر الاول و تکثرت العقول بکثرة الاشراف و نغضا
 عنها بالنزول و الوسايط و عقل اول اولدر که وجود انک اوزه رنیه
 مبنی اوله کلندر و نور باری اول انک اوزه رنیه اشراق ایدوب و کثرت نغضا
 اشراقان کثرت عقول لازم کدی نزول و وسایط الی بنیه کم ذکر اولندی
 دان کانت اقرب الی نامن حبت العلیة و الوسائط الا ان

5

10

15

ممکنات که توقف البییدی کما فی افعالنا اذا تأخرنا ما لها الی یوم القیوم
 مثلا او الی یحیی زید او نستر الدننه کم بز فعله یزنی تأخیر فیلد و غیرگی
 مثلا و برز که بنجشنبه کون شول ابشی ابلرین و یا زید کلد کده شو یله بر کار قبولورین
 و یا شو یله برالت مبر اولور سه فلان مصلی نیلورین و یک بو یله متوق قدر وقتیه
 والنه اذ قبل جمیع الممکنات للیس شی من ذلك چون جمیع ممکنات
 اول وقت و شرط والت دن به شی بوق اولدیه • و عقدن غیر اولدغی ثابت
 او بیجا ناپس جمیع اشیا عقدن غیریه متوقف اولور • و لیس متغیر لیر مبر
 برید او بقدر بعد ان لیر بقدر و لایق دکلر که خدا متغیر اولدغی
 استیه و قادر اولدغی و غندن هکله قادر اولدغی **تعالی شانده عما یقولون**
 ولما علمت ان الشعاع من الشمس دلیس الشمس **الشعاع**
 وان دام بر و مده فلا ینعجب من لون الحق یا بالقیس
 چون بلدک که شعاع افتاب ندره و افتاب شعاعدن دکلره پس عجب دکلر که
 شعاع افتاب لیر دایم اولد و ما اذا بصر الشمس دوام شعاعها
 او بقاء ذرة فی نورها و افتاب شعک نوری نه زبان و بر
 و با خود وجود نور افتاب لیر ذرات باقی الیه نه نقصان لاری اولور افتاب
 بو کلادن متغیر اولان عقول مجزوه و نفوس ناطقه و بر ممکنات اجسام
 و غیره ذلک ذات باقی ایلد با بقدر یا بشخصه یا بنوعه و یک اولور پس ندر

5

10

15

اهل سنت جامعه نما لغيركم اشياءكم ذاتي مراد اول نورسه قابلد نشيكم
 كل شئ هالك الا وجهه آيتنه فاضى بيضاوى ضميرى شينه ارجاع انكى
 بايزه كور مشدر ^{المجمل الخامس اعلاه}
 ما حدث يستدعى سببا حادثا ويعود الكلام الى سبب الحادث
 فينبغي ان يتدلسل الى غير النهاية اسباب حادثه بحيث
 لا يكون لها مبداء بل كل كه برنه شئى كه حادثه بر سبب حادثه افتقار
 وكما في اول سبب حادثه عودت فيلسك اولدى بر سبب حادثه افتقار نشي اولدى
 پس نه نهايت نسل لازم كلور شول حجتند كه كه ايند اولبه فان المبداء
 الحادث عابده اليه الكلام زير الكرم مبداءى سبب حادثه
 ضوما ركنك كلام كادى عابده اولور والامر الواجب التجدد وهو الحركة
 والذى يصح ان لا ينقطع من الحركات الدوريه المستمرة
 وبر شئى كه تجددى واجب اوله اول حركتدره ونول حركت كه انقطاعى اولبه كه
 حركت دوريه در كه دوام واستمرار اوزر دوريه التى لا يصلح ان يركن
 سببا للحوادث التى في عالمنا ابله حركت دوريه در كه بينهم عالمه دوره
 حوادث سبب اولفه صالحه دره واذا لم يتغير الاول فلا يكون سببا
 للحركة الحادثه فلو لا حركات الاخلاق ما صح حدوث حادثه
 حق سبحانه ونعالى تغيرات ونبدلان منزه ومبته اور لا بعد كلدر كه حركت

5

10

15

سبب اوله اگر حرکت افلاک اولمیدی هرگز عالم حادث حدوث انیدی
 و حرکات الافلاک لیست طبیعیه فان الفلاک
 بفاروق کل نقطه قصدها و المتحرک طبعاً اذا
 وصل بحیث قصدها و وقف اذ لا یهرب بالطبع عن
 مطلوبه معلوم اوله که حرکات متحرک اوزره اگر برکت تک فوقی
 سیب ابله اولورسه حرکت قشری در لر نیت کم بر کاشش برکت آینه و اگر
 محرک کند و ذاتندن اولان فوت سیسی ابله حرکت قبلورسه بوده یکی زود
 اگر متحرک کند و حرکت شعور طوزسه ایا حرکت ارادتی انک و حیوانک
 حرکتی کبی و اگر حرکت شعوری بوقی ایه ایا حرکت طبیعی در لر مثلا
 بر بل ابله طولو طولم البته صویک استنه کلد و کی کبی و یا بر کاشش که بوقار دن
 آشنه حرکت قبلوب دوشد و کی کبی زیر انحرک که طبیعی اوله البته کند
 مرکز بنده حرکت قبلور و انذن تجاوز انز چون بمقدم معلوم اوله
 افلاک حرکتی طبیعی دکلدر زیرا حرکت طبیعی مقصد در مرکز بنده و کده انذن
 زباده حرکت انز پس حرکت افلاک بوبلد دکلدر زیرا افلاک بر جزوی
 مرکز بنده انزه زار انبوب دائم الحکمه دیر فلیس الا ان حرکت
 ارادید فی حق مدرک پس افلاک حره کسی ارادید و افلاک
 حتی در کند و حرکتی ذالین بنی مدرکدر و افلاک غدا به و نشو و نما به

5

10

15

وتوليد حاجتي بوقدر فلا شهوة ولا مزاحمة ولا مقاوم
 لهما فلا غضب عنهما زيرا ان لا ك شخصوني بوقدر وودي كما لازم
 ومقاوم بوقدر پس غضب ودي اولزه فليس حركتها للعالا ليد
 السفلى اذ لا قدر لهما عندهما وانما ك حركتي عالم سفلي يكون
 وكقدر زير عالم سفلي ك فتنه مقداري بوقدر . ثم نحن اذا
 نطهرنا عن نسوا على البدن وتاملنا كبرياء الحق والايام
 والبسيطة ما چون بز نفس بيزي شو اغل بيته جمانه
 بك قلوب وكبرياء حق واجرام افلاكى وغنا صرى تفكر فيك والنور الفايدي
 على الموجودات وحق موجودات اوزره فايض اولان نوري تامل فتنه
 وجدنا في انفسنا ايرر قادات برين وشر وقادات
 تشريق كند و تفكر بيزه بز بولوز نجه انوار لامعه كه ذات البروق
 ونجه اسرار لامعه كه ذات الشروق در پس بولوا ايزه روعا بيزه حاصل اوله
 عالم اجسامك فتنه رغبتى فلز و شاهدنا انوار او قضينا انوار
 نما فذلك باشخاص كرمية الهية دايمه الصور
 ثابتة الاجرام پس شك فلك الهى اولان ومكرمة الاشخاص
 ودايمه الصور وثابتة الاجرام اولان شيزه ندر كه عالم سفلي ك فتنه
 رغبتى اوله بولكاي كتاب الله وسنة محمدا من القدر دايمه

5

10

15

عن عالم التضاد فهي لا شاغل فلا ينقطع عنها شروق
 انوار الله المتعاليه و امدان اللطائف الالهيه اوبده
 انخام كبريه فادون امين وعالم تضادون ابد وشواغل بدنيه دن مجرد
 و هرگز شروق انوار رب الغزه المردن منقطع اولزمه و امدان لطائف الهيه ذات المردن
 منقرض اولزمه و لو ان مطلوبها غير منصرفه له نفس هت حركتها
 بس افلاك مقصود و مطلوبی منقطع و منقرض اولما یجی حركاتی دخی منقرض اولزمه
 ینه بوندن قدم عالم و حوادث لازم كلور فلکل معشوق من العالم
 الاعلی هو نور قاهر و سببه و محرک نفوس فلکدن بزی
 ابجون عالم اعلی دن بر مطلوب و معشوق وارد که اول نور قاهر در وانرک
 هر برینک سببی در که امد او ابر کبیده و واسطه بینه و سن
 الحق الاول و اول نور واسطه در فلک ابله حق مابینده من لدنه
 یتشهد جلاله و بیان بر کانه و ارکانه فینبعث من کل
 اشراق حركه و یستعد بکل حركته اشراق تامه
 انوار جلال الهی ابله و برکات انوار الهیه بر و اصل اول پس هر اشراق دن
 بر حرکت حاصل اولوب و هر حرکت سببه ابله بر اشراق آفر مستعد اولور
 15 و در تجدد الاشراقات بتجدد الحركات پس تجدد
 اشراقات دائم اولدی بتجدد حركات سببی ابله و بتجدد حرکت دائم اولدی

5

10

15

تجدد اشرفات سبب الیه ملک و دام بتسلسلها حدوث
 الحاد ثات فی عالم السفلی اشرفات ما و حرکاتک تسلسلی
 دائم اولسندن حدوث حادثات دخی عالم سفلیه دائم اولدی فلولا
 اشرفاتها او حرکاتها الیه یحصل من جود اللد قدر غیر متناه
 و انقطع فیضه فهو اگر اشرفات و حرکات افلاک اولیدی حقیقت
 جودندن قدر غیر متناهی حاصل اولوب فیض انوار الیه منقطع اولیدی
 اذ لا یقدر فی ذات الحق الاول فیوجب التبعیر فاستمر تجد
 حدوث الحاد ثات ما یزیر احقک ذاته بقدره یقدر که بموجب تغییر فیض
 اود باس حقیقت و بما جودی سبب الیه حدوث حادثات دخی مستمر اولدی
 به جود دائم لعشاق الهیته ما و دخی اول عشاق الهیته که افلاک
 انکر و جودی دائمی سی سبب الیه باقی اولدی و یلز در من حرکاتها نفع فلیکن
 و اول افلاک حرکت سندن عالم سفلی برنج نفع لازم کدی و لیکن
 حرکات افلاک توجد الاشیاء تحقیقا انلاک حرکاتی
 بر شئی ایجاد و اعدام قادر و کدر و لکنها تحصیل الاستعدادات
 و لکن استعداد تحصیل اندر و یحصل الحق الاول لطرفی
 ما یلیق با استعداد و حق تعالی اعطاء و ایجاد قیلو بر شئی
 استعدادی کلا بقدر و اذ الی تغییر الفاعل فتجدد الشئی

5

10

15

ذات

لتجدد قابله بما جرتكم فاعل مطلق كقدر تجددي وتغيري قابل لكل
 بس هر شيك تجددي استعدايتك قابليتني اوزر دور و التغيري
 يجوز ان يتجدد اثره ويختلف تجدد حال القوابل واختلافها
 كالاختلاف حاله ثمة وجايز دورك بر شيك اثرى مجددا اولوت بحسب
 اختلاف حال قوابل مختلف اوله پس بر شيك اثرى مختلف اولدن ^{علائق}
 حالى مختلف اولز وليتغير الانسان بفرض شخصه لا يتحرك
 ولا يتغير ويحرك الى مقابله ضربه بالاشارة من ايا مختلفه
 بالصغير والكبير والصفاء وكدره اكر بو حالى فهم قيلق اثرى
 ايك لا ندر كره ان اغبار الميه فضاير شخصه كحركه وتغير الميه ولا كى مقابله
 بر نجه مرات مختلفه ككى كبير وكى صغير وكى صافى وكى بر كدر تحريك الميه پس
 شخصك صورت واحده سى م اياى مختلفه رونما اولدوقه بنينه كدر
 فيحدث فيها منه سورته مختلفه بالصغير والكبير
 وكمال ظهور اللون ونقصانه لا يتغير
 الصورة واختلافه للقوابل پس اول مراباده اول شخص
 نجه صورت مختلفه هر اينه نك مقدار نجه ظهور وحدوث ايدوب آينه صغيره
 كو بگ و كبريه بوبك ومقادير كال ظهور لون وكدر اوله آينه دو نقصان لون
 بولنه اول شخص موزنك صورتى متغير اولز بلكه اختلاف استعداد و قابل

5

10

15

34

هر شیئی اقتضا ایند و کند که در تجلی باشد پس اشیا مختلفند ذات ظلال
 و ربط الحق جل کبریا و البتات و الحدوث بالحدوث و بشر
 پس همی معالی ربط ابدی به ثباتی بنانه و حدوثی حد و نثره یعنی اجسام اولی
 سماوی و عنصری در ثبات او مشروطه ثبات ذات حقه زیر احقذانی
 نایبدره و اجسام اولی در نخبه بندره زیر معلول علت تامه دن مختلف المیز و ربط
 ابدی حادثی یعنی شمول حوادث که عالم سفلی در حادث اولی افلاک حرکتی
 سینه ابدوره و هو المبدء والغایده فی ذلك لید و در الجبر
 و یثبت الفیض و وجه اشباک مبدء و غایبی ذکرتک جمله سنده
 یعنی ربط ثبات بیثبات و حدوث بحدوث و نثره شدن و توری که تاخیر و فیضی
 و اتم اولا و لان لا ینفاهمی رحمه فان جوده لیس
 ما یورد الناقص و لا منقطع الطرفين و و اخی تناهی اولیه
 زیرا انک جودیه نقصان طاری اولی و اوان و اخری بوقدر که منقطع الطرفين
 اوله و الجواد افاده ساینچی لا لعوض عن فعل لعوض
 یناله فهو فقیر و المعنی هو الذی لا یحتاج فی ذاته و کماله الیشیه
 و الفیض المطلق هو نور الانوار لا عرض له فی صوره
 جود برشی در که حد داننده لاین اولا انی بخش ایدوب فاده فیلمند در کبره
 بی عوض اوله و هر کم بر فعلی لعوض اشاسه که فایده سی کا عاید اولیه

5

10

15

و غنی مطلق ذات و کالذو غیره محتاج و کدر و غنی مطلق حدای تعالی در
 نور انوار در وضعنده غرضی بود بر بل ذاته ذات فیاضه الرحمة
 بلکی ذات باکی فیاض رحمت و بخشاینده عطیعت در وهو المملک
 المطلق هو الذی منه ذات کل شیئی و لیس ذاته من شیئی
 اول بر حک مطلق در که جمیع اشیا تک ذاتی اندند و آنک ذاتی بهر چیز
 دکدر که والوجود لا ینصق وان یکون اتم مآهون
 علیه فان ذات الحق لا یقتضی الاحس و یتزلک
 الاشرف و هر موجودک وجودیکه عالمه موجود اولش در اول
 اولدوغی وجودن تمامه وجود تصور اولی محالدر که بیدت
 هر چه هست انجان می باید آن چیز که آن نمی باید نیست نتر اگر
 اول شیک حد ذاته اولان وجودندن بر غیره تمامه وجود قابل اولدی
 پس ذات حق اشرفی تر که ابد و باخته اقتضای اش اولدی بل
 یلزم ذاته الاشرف بلکه ذات شریفه لایق اولان بنه شریفه
 یا ان عکس النور اشرف من عکس عکس عکس عکس عکس
 نور اشرفدر نورک عکسک عکسک عکسک عکسک عکسک و انتم
 مآهون علیه الوجود محال و المحال لا یدخل تحت دائرة
 قادر پس وجود هر موجود حد ذاته اولدوغندن تمامه اولی محالدر

5

10

15

و محال تحت قدرة قادر و داخل د کدره یعنی اگر بدن بشه تک استعدادی
 او بیدی اگا و اهب الوجود نفس ناطقه اعطا فیوروی پس همچنان بر
 نظر تک جمعا حکمه موافق اینک استعداد نه کوره وجودن و سائر مؤنثن
 اعطا انشدر صنع الله الذي اتقن كل شئ و دخی بر محله ده کلمه
 اء على كل شئ خلقه ثم هدى بآيات عجيب و قدرة غايبه ايش زنده
 و انما يطول حديث الخبير والسر من يظن ان للعالمى النفا
 الى المسافل جبر جبر و شری شول کشى تطویل المبرکه عانک سافل
 التفانى وارظن المبر او هو ليس الله و راء هذه المدره المظلمه
 عمالهم باخوذ تجمل المبره حضرت حق بوظام پر کالج اولان عالمک
 و راسده نجمه عالی بوفدک و و راء هو لیا آخلاق و بو خلافتک
 و راسده نجمه خلایق بوق فیاس المبر و نه جلم الله و وقع تالیق
 ما هو علیه اللزم من الشرور و اختلال النظام شی لا
 نسبة له الى ما بنوهمه الا ان هذه المافى ما یكون من الظلم
 بونوهمی و بیا کما بمر کر ما بو علیهاک غیری واقع اولیدی و شرکبیر و اختلال
 لازم کلور دمی و بو نظام عالم بر نظام که بونک و راسده بز نظام دخی بونر
 و العالم الذي لا يتطرق اليه العاهات عالم آخر الله رجمی هو ان
 من نفوسنا شول عالم که عاهات و بلیات اکانزل او نر بر عالم آخر که

5

10

15

۱۲۶
 ۵
 ۱۰
 ۱۵
 ۱۶
 ۱۷
 ۱۸
 ۱۹
 ۲۰
 ۲۱
 ۲۲
 ۲۳
 ۲۴
 ۲۵
 ۲۶
 ۲۷
 ۲۸
 ۲۹
 ۳۰
 ۳۱
 ۳۲
 ۳۳
 ۳۴
 ۳۵
 ۳۶
 ۳۷
 ۳۸
 ۳۹
 ۴۰
 ۴۱
 ۴۲
 ۴۳
 ۴۴
 ۴۵
 ۴۶
 ۴۷
 ۴۸
 ۴۹
 ۵۰
 ۵۱
 ۵۲
 ۵۳
 ۵۴
 ۵۵
 ۵۶
 ۵۷
 ۵۸
 ۵۹
 ۶۰
 ۶۱
 ۶۲
 ۶۳
 ۶۴
 ۶۵
 ۶۶
 ۶۷
 ۶۸
 ۶۹
 ۷۰
 ۷۱
 ۷۲
 ۷۳
 ۷۴
 ۷۵
 ۷۶
 ۷۷
 ۷۸
 ۷۹
 ۸۰
 ۸۱
 ۸۲
 ۸۳
 ۸۴
 ۸۵
 ۸۶
 ۸۷
 ۸۸
 ۸۹
 ۹۰
 ۹۱
 ۹۲
 ۹۳
 ۹۴
 ۹۵
 ۹۶
 ۹۷
 ۹۸
 ۹۹
 ۱۰۰

بنیم جانگیر بزرگ مرجع در و لیس ان العوالمی القدیب لاشغل
 لهم غیر همتک الاستان ورفض ایام عن حصانند
 مرضعات وایلهما البری و غرس علم الجاهلیة و اعواء
 نفوس و ترفیه جاهل و تعذیب عالم و عوالمی
 عقول نجرده و نفوس ناطق در و نفوس سماویدر همتک استاردن غیر
 و ایام بی کتابی مادر مهر بانگدن ایدوب یتیم اید کلرندن غیر می و خلق ایلام ایدوب
 رنجیده نیلد و کلرندن ماعدا و علم جاهلیتی دیکد کلرندن ماعدا و نفوس انخوا
 و جاهلی زنیه و دکش و عالمی معذب و بر بلا قبلد کلرندن غیر می کار لری و اشتغالی
 بو قدر قباس الیم بل اغماشغلهم مستاده انوار اللامین مشهد
 بلکی بونکر استقلال اشتغالی مشهده انوار جلال عزتدر و یکندم
 حرکتها الوارند ضروریات و عادات الی وضع تصرفهم
 لتصررت بها عوالم الی اخر علی انما لا تتحرک لانتها کلین
 بو عالم سفلی تک حوادث و وقایع ایچون حرکات افلاک لزوم ضروری الیه
 لازم اولان شیلر دندر اگر افلاک دوری تقدیر اولنسه بروضعه که
 منفعت فلورینه اول حرکات ایله ضرر ایشور عوالم افر تکلیف که افلاک
 حرکتی عالم سفلی ایچون دکدر بل یرمی الیهما من اصواء
 القوی سیده و انوار اللامیه و سدر طمان الاستان

القدسية مالا يمكنها من المنصر الى ذواتها فضلا عن آداب
 بله يونلره واصل اولور اضواء قيوमित وانوار لا هوتيت ماوسلطان
 اشعه قدسية دن پنجه شبلره كه مكن فلر يونلره كند و ذالبرنيه مانظره فاند
 فالدر كند ولرون غيري به نظر لري اولاه و مع ذاك هي عامه بكل حاجي
 و خفي لا يغرب عن علمها و علومها بار بها . يونك برله بو افلاك
 جميع جلي و خفي و وقاب و حوادث ما يونكر علمدن و بار بكت عالمند
 و تبديل على ثبات اجرام السماوية كونها غير مركبة من العناصر
 و امنها من الفساد اجرام سماوية تك ثباته دليل عنصريه من
 او ما سبده و دخی فاد دن امين او ما سبده و ما ذكر و جوب
 دوا و حرکاتها حرک لرنیک دوامی واجب او ما سندن به مقدار
 ذکر اولدی فلر کانت مرکبة فتخلت و ماد مت حرکاتها
 هي غير عنصريه اصلا اگر عناصر دن مرکب اولدی ^{نقص} خلون
 اوزره اولدی و حرکت لري دایم اوليه ایدی پس افلاك عناصر دن
 و کلور و لما كان الجار ضعيفا لا يتحرك الا الى فوق
 و البارد ثقيل لا يتحرك الا الى اسفل و الرطب يقبل
 الشکل و ترکده و الاتصال و لا انفصال بسهولة
 و اليابس يقبلهما بصعوبة چون حار اولان ضعيف

5

10

15

و دایما حرکتی جانب علامه درط و بار و اولان ثقیله درط و حرکتی اسفله درط
 و رطبت اتصال و انفصال و تشکلی و ترک تشکلی است ننگه قبول ایدر
 و با بس بر او صافی صعوبت ایدر قبول ایدر و الافلاک غیر
 منحرفه اصلا و لا منفرکه علی الاستقامه لا الی المکرز
 و لا عنه و حرکاتهاد و ربه علی الوسطی لا تقبله و لا
 خفیفه و لا خاره و لا بارده و لا رطبه و لا یابسه
 و اجرام فلک منحرق اولوب پاره لمر و استقامت اوزره حرکت لمر
 نه مرکز و نه مرکز دین طشرویه و حرکتی مرکز اطرافنه وسطا اوزره
 دور ایدر پس افلاک نه ثقیل و نه خفیف و نه حار و نه بارد و نه رطب
 و نه یابس در فنی طبیعه خامسه ^{فهمه بالاضمن} و افلاک طبیعی بو طبایع
 اربعه دن غیر طبیعت خامسه در و افلاک جمیع ارضی محیط در
 نینه کم اشکال افلاکی ابتدای کتابه و تصویر ایدم ، و اوله محیطه بالارض
 لکان الشمس اذا غربت لم يرجع الی الشرق ^{بالتی} لکن اکر ارضی محیط او لم یایدی شمس
 غروب ابله و کده مشرقه رجوع ایدایدی اتانهار ای یکی ایدایدی یعنی نینه
 مغربن مشرقه ظاهر عودت قبله و قدن صکره نههار ایکی اوییدر اما بویه کله
 فالسّموات کربّه محیطه بالارض پس سماوات کریدر و بیری بینه محیط
 و دریدر ما و ما طقدره یعنی ادراک ایدر بیدر ما تا سفینه لارضی آء

5

10

15

القدس مطبوعه لمبدعها ولا مبت في عالم لا نير وعاشق
 انوار قدس دره وخالقته مطبوعه وعالم اشرفه . يعني انكاده هيج
 اولزه بلكه جميعه زنده در لره **الهيكل السادس**
 اول نسبة في الوجود نسبة الجوهر القائم الى الاقوال القبوم
 اول نسبت که وجوده لازم کشفه جوهر قائم قیوم او زن نسبت
 عقل اولدر که واجب الوجوده اولان نسبت او تشدر نهی در جميع النسب
 و اشرفها و بونب جمع نسبک اتی و اشرفیدر و عاشقو الاقل
 و الاول فاهر له بنور قیومینه فها بعجزه عن الاحاطة
 و الاکتاه بنور و بوجوه قائم عاشقدر قیوم اوله و قیوم اول
 نور قیومینه اتی قائم در بر فها که اول جوهر قائم عاجز الی نور قیومی
 و احاطه الی دون فاشتمله النسبة علی محبة و نور و الطرف الولد
 اشرف من الآخر فسری پس بونب مشتمله یکی نسبی بری
 محبت و بری فها طرف محبت اشرفیدر طرف آخردن که اول فها در
 فسری حال تلك النسبة في جميع العوالم جميع عالمه و تشدر
 نسبت و اریه بونب جایسنه سرت اشدر یعنی اجسام مقبوره
 نفوس و نفوس مقبوره عقول و عقول مقبوره واجب الوجود
 بنیه کم ذکر اولندی اذ دوحه الاقسام فانقسمت جوهر

5

10

15

الى اجسام و غير اجسام لازم كلكي كم جوهر يكي قسمه منفسد
 برى اجسام برى غير اجسام بعنى عقول و نفوس و غير الجسود
 قاهره و معشوقه جوهر كه غير جسم اوله جسمى قاهره و جنبك موشو
 واحد الطرفين اخس و لذلك انقسم الجوهر المفقار
 الى قسمين على قاهر و نازل فى المرتبه منفعلى مقهور
 و جوهر كه بر طرفى اخس و بر طرفى شريفه ان يكون جوهر مفارق كى قسم
 منفسد بر على قاهر و برى مرتبه ده نازل و منفعلى مقهور ده
 و الاجسام الى ثرى و عنصرى و اجسام دنى يكي قسمه
 برى ثرى بعنى فلكى و برى عنصرى بل قابل السعادات
 و قابل الفخر و اثيريه دنى تفاوت و ارد كه كى قابل سعادات
 و كى قابل فقر در قابله النيران اللذات احدهما مثال
 العقل و الاخر مثال النفس بلكه نيرانه دنى منقسم
 بعنى انساب و ما هتاه كه انساب عقل مثالنده و ما هتاه نفس
 در بل العلوى و السفلى و ايسامى و الباسمى بالشرق
 و الغرب بل الذكر و الانثى من حيوان و عالمه
 اجسامه دنى علوى و سفلى كى و صاع و صول و شرق و غرب
 و حيواناته ارگك و ديشى كه حته از دوج طرفه كامل

5

10

15

مع ناقص ناسباً بالنسبة الأولى بس نظام علدن
 او توری مزدوج اولدی هر ناقص و کامل تماماً سب اولان سبت
 اول یعنی عقل اولک واجب الوجوده نسبتاً يفهم ذلك
 من يفهم قوله تعالى ومن كل شئ خلقنا زوجين
 لعلکم تذکرون فم المبرو یعنی هر کده فهم ایلدی بوایت که بربنک
 معینت ما ولما کان النور اشرف الموجودات و اشرف
 الاجسام انوارها چونکم نور اشرف موجودات اولدی به
 اشرف اجسام اولدر که نوری زیاده اوله وهو القدر الاول
 الملك و اول نوری زیاده اولان شون ظلماتدن پاک اولان شد که
 بهیتم وجود بزده مارتبت ملکیت ما و ابوب مثالی سنده دره اشرف
 الشدید قاهر الفسق رئیس السبواء فاعل النهار
 کامل القوی و اول افتاب به نور شدید الورد خسر در که ظلمات
 ازاله اید بکبیر و اسمانک رنبر در و نهار که سبب معاشن جانور
 در انک فاعلی در و کال قدرت انکدر و صاحب العجايب
 الهیة الالهیة الذی يعطی جميع الکائنات ضوئها
 و لا تاخذ منها مثال الله العظیم و صاحب عجایب
 و هیئت الهیة تک عظیمی اولدر الحقیر معدن نور در که جمیع کائنات نور

اعطاء ابدوب الله اعظم کبھی نبی اندن المزمون و بعضی اصحاب السادات
 المعظمون سیمما السيد الاسعد صاحب الخیر والبرکات
 جل من ابدعه و تفک من صورہ فتبارک الله احسن
 الخالقین و اول ثمن صکره انک اصحابی کہ کواکب شمہ و ماہ کہ
 سبادتہ معظم اولی شکر درہ علی الخصوص سید نبک بخت صاحب السعادات
 والخیرات والبرکات کہ مشتم برہ نہ عظم پادشاهدرہ اولکہ بونکر
 ہر برنی کتم عدمن وجودہ کنوردی اھیکل السابع اعلم ان الذفر
 لا تبطل لانتسابہست ذات محل ولا ضدہا ولا امر احمد
 ومبدو و ہادایم فیدوم بہ بلکل کہ نفس ناطقہ بطلان بدیہ
 باطل اولز زبراکہ بدن محل نفس و کلہ ما نا ملندن اکابر بتبدل و تغیر
 کلہ و باطل الیہ و دوافی ضدی مزاجی دمی بوقدر کہ فضا ضدہ و مزاجک
 طبر انندن عبارتندہ پس ضدی زائیل اولق ایلم فانی اولہ و نفس ناطقہ
 علی باقیدہ معلول دخی باقی اولورہ دوام علت سبب الیہ و لیس
 بینہما و بین البدن الی علاقہ ضدیہ شوقیہ لا تبطل
 ببطلانہما الجوھر و نقلہ بدن مابیندہ بمان علاقہ شوقی و عرضی
 واردہ پس بدتک بطلانندن تعلق عرضی سسی اولان جوہر فنا
 کلز و تعلم ان کل لذتہ کل قوہ بحسب کمالہا و ادراکھا

5

10

15

39

وكذا املها ولذبة كل والمه بحسب ما يخصه
 معلوم مدركه هر قوتك لذتی اول قوتك كالی وادراكی مقدار بدره
 و همچنان المی دخی لذتی ادراك ایلدوکی مقدار بدره بو قوبین هر برینک
 المی ولذتی اول مقدار اولور که اول قوتینک هر برینه مخصوص اوله و الشیم
 يتعلق بالمشروبات والذوق بالمذوقات والنسب
 وكذا نحوها فكل ما يليق به مثلا الم ولذت شم مشومانه
 الم ولذت ذوق مذوقاته وملك لمونه وشد مشومانه وحرک
 مبخراته بس بزرگ هر برینه تعلق المین الم ولذت اول قوتینک کالی مقدار
 ادراك ایلر و کالی الجوهر العاقل لا تتقاسم بالمعارف
 معرفة الحق والعوالم والنظام وبالجملة امر المبدأ
 والمعاد والسنه عن القوى الباقية وجوه عقلك
 کالی منتقش اولمقدر معرفت حقین بجه معارف الیه و داجی
 منتقش اوله عوالمک معرفتی الیه و نظام عالمک معرفتی الیه وبالجملة
 مبداء و معادنی بلمک کله و قوای برینیه دن پاک و طاهر اولمق الیه
 و نقضه فی خلاف ذلك یعنی جوهر عقلک نقضه نواد صافک
 خلافیدر یعنی معارف حقین هر معرفت الیه منتقش اولما مقیدر
 و يتعلق لذاته بالمه بجمعا و متعلق اولور جوهر عقل لذتی

5

10

15

والى بركمى اعتبار ايله 6 يعنى معارف الهية ايله منتقى اولق و الى بركمى
 لذت المائق والذيد والمكروه قد يصلات بدو و خصوص
 لذة و البه به سكتة او سكر شديد لا يتاكد
 بالضرب ولا يتلذذ بحضور المعشوق شديد و الى
 جان بدن مفاقت ادين لذيد و مكره اولان نشة لرقيه
 و اصل اولور اول لذتك صفات 6 و اول بلا و كراهتك جفانت
 ادراك ايلز نيتة كم بركمى ناكاه سكتة عارض اوله 6 بره و خصوص
 اعضا حركت و حواسدن معطل اولور و يا خود سكر شديد اوله
 بوصف ايله بوصف اولان بحضور معشوقدن استلذاذ و ضرب
 شديدن اضطراب ايلدو كى كى فالنفس مادامت مشتغلة
 بهذا البدن لا يتاكد بالرد ايل ولا يتلذذ بالفضايل
 لشكر الطبيعة بس نفس كه مادام بو بدنك بو اسنة مشتغل
 اولدوچه رذائل بدنية دن متألم ايلز و فضائل عقلية دن تلذذ ايلز
 مزيز اسكران طبيعتدر فاذا فارقت تبعد نفوس
 بالاشقياء بالجمل والهيئات الرديئة الظلمانية و
 والشوق الى عالم الجسم و حيل بينهد و بين
 ما يشتهون چون بو عالمدن مفاقت ايله لر سكر طبعه

5

10

15

طبیعتی زایل اولدوقده نفوس اشباحا جلالی سیمی الیه منته
 اولوب و بیات رتبه بدنیة ظلمتیه و عالم اجسام و محسوسات
 اریز و مند و مشوق اولدوقلری سیمی الیه و ایجا گرفتار اولوب مضرب
 حال بوکمه بونلر الیه مقصودلری مابیننده نجه حجب و موانع حاصل اولدور
 5: سلبت قواهمر لا عین باحسره و لا اذن سامعه
 ینقطع عنها ضوء عالم المحسوس و لا یصل الیه نور
 القدس حیوان فی الظلمات و معنی الظلمة عدم النور
 پس نفس ناطقه بدن من مفارقت قیلدوقده سبب اولنور اندن قوای
 ظاہره و باطنیه کس پس جلالی سیمی الیه نه چشم بنیاونه کوش
 اولوب و عالم قدس دن بونلر و بر نور و اصل و حاصل اولدوغندن
 10: ظلمتیه حیوان و عقبات بلینده و لمان و سرگردان اولدور فانی قطع
 عند النور ان و تسلط علیه الفرع و الهیبت و الخوف
 لانها من لوازم الظلمة نور سامعه و باصره اندن منقطع اولدوقده
 اکاهیبت و خشیت و مخافت حواله اولور که لوازم ظلمت دندر و همدا
 15: من تغیر مزاج روحه و حاصل فیه ظلمة و کدوره و کاصحاب
 المالیجی لیاة بتسلط علیه الفرع و الهیبت و تکلیف حال تن
 فی الظلمات مع الباس عن التخلص و صاحب المودیات

و مقارنہ الخسرات انگوذو کہ برکت نیک مزاج روح جوانی
 متغیر اولہ نخلت و کدورت اندہ حاصل اولورہ اصحاب مابلولیا و ارباب
 سوداچی مزاج روحی نخل اولدوغندن بونلر وک اوزرینہ فرغ و مہوم ^{منسلط}
 اولوب بلا واضطرابن حالی اولمز پس شول کسنتک عالی نچہ اولور کہ ظلمت
 دو شوب نکلصدن نامبد اوله و مصاجبت مودیات و مقارنت خسرات
 مبتلا اولد نفوذ بامد من بئذہ البیات و اما الصالحات الغائبات
 فتعال فی جوہار اللہ مالا عین رات و لا اذن سمعت
 و لا حظ علی قلب بستر مشاہدہ انوار الحق و الانجاس
 فی البحر النور و اما شول جماعت کہ اعمال صالحیہ مشغول اولوب
 نقلی فاضل قبلت در انبیا و اولیا و صلحا و مؤمنین کی انور جوہار ^{حفدہ}
 مالا عین رأت و لا اذن سمعت مشاہدہ انوار حفدہ و اصل و بائیل
 اولوب نور در بالرنده غوام اولور لر، فیحصل لها الملكیة و ملکیتہ
 لہ بنسأھی لذاتہا و لا ینقضی سعادتہا پس اول نفس
 ملکیت و ملکیت حاصل اولور و قدرت الہی و قوت نامتہای بہ
 موصوف اولوب لذت روحانی و جسمانی فی جمع انیکہ اولور و ایدئی ^{مادہ}
 منقرض اولمز فتترجع الی ایہا القائم بالسطوة الفاہرہ
 علی روس العنصریات شدید المرۃ القاصمۃ

5

10

15

صاحب المثلث الفاضل جار الله الكري المتوج
 بتاج القرية في ملكوت الله العالمين بروح القدس
 جوكم نفس انساني هو اجسديته وهو اوهوس نفاني دن غلام بولا
 باي مسي كه روح القدس را كامرا جعت ايله وان دن نجه معارف غيبية
 و دينية و علوم اسرار يقينية تلقى ايدر و قد يتفوق ان يشاهد
 النفس امر اعقليا و تخاكيه المتخيلة وانعكس الى عالم
 كما كان انعكس منه صور مختلفة الى مدن التخييل فبشاهد
 صور اعجيبه تناجيه او بسمع كلمات منظومة او بنجل
 الامر الغيبية متفق عليه در كه نفوس ناطقة عقول مجردة و نفوس
 سماوية من شاهده امور عقلية ايدر و اول شاهده قبله و غي امر عقلية
 شاهده قبله و تجليله مناسب اولان صور حية به پس متخيلة دن
 حس مشتركة منعكس اولور ننه كم عالم مدن صور مختلفة منعكس اولور
 تجليله و اول شاهده اعتباري ايله شاهده ايلر نجه صورت عجيبه
 انكسوز سويلشور و كاه اولور كه نجه كلمات منظومه ايشيدر و كاه امر غي
 اكانمايان و منجلى اولور يتو ادى الشيوخ مكانه بصعود و انيزر
 و الفارق ذو الشيوخ يمتنع عليه الصعود و النزول بتجريد
 عن لوازم الاجسام بل الشيوخ ظل له جسماني حاكي ادو الله

5

10

15

الروحانية مثلا مرغی انجلیں کورینور بہ شخص کہ صعود ایدر
 و با نزول ایدر مفارق ذو شخص صعود و نزول الملک محالدر زیرا
 متفارق مجرد در لوازم اجاد من مابین صعود و نزول دن بلکه
 اول صورت شخصدر اولان مفارق انک سائے جسمانی سیدر
 احوال روحانیتہ مشابہتی اولشدر و المناجات ایضا منہا
 محاکات خیالیہ لملشاہدۃ النفس اعنی المفارقة
 لا الاضغاث التي تحصل من ملائمة شیطان الخبیث
 و افعی صحیحہ دخی مشابہت خیالیہ درکہ مشاہدہ تقدرہ اضغاث
 و احلام اولان دکدرکہ قوت متخندہ تک لعیندن حاصل اولور و قدر
 تطرب النفوس المناطیة طریبا قدسیا و تشرق علیہا
 نور الحق فیتخضع لها العنصریات و نفوسنا لمان مزب
 قدسی الیہ تطرب قبلہ و فلنرہ ہ و بولمہ نور حق کلی قبولت جمع عنصریات
 بولمہ تابع و خاض اولورہ و لما رأیت الحدیدۃ الیامیدۃ تتسبب
 بالنار لجاورنہا و تفعل فعلجا چون سن کور سنکہ بہ حد بدکم
 شدت آتش مجاورتی سبب الیہ رنگ آتش مشابہ و مماثل اولہ انک
 فعلن قبولور فلا تتجرب اشرف النفس و اسۃ خادمت
 بنور اللہ فاطاعتها الا کوان اطاعتها للقدسین

٤٢

العلم على المستبصر ان يعتقد صحة النبوات وان
 ما هو يشير الى الحقايق كما ورد في المصحف وتلك الامثال
 نضر بها للناس وما يعقلها الا العالمون بنسب
 عقلايه واجبره كصحت نبوات انبياء اعتقاد اليه لره وبونكر استا
 اشيا نك حقايقه اشارت ايد بيلدره نينه كم قران عظمه وانع
 اولد كيد اول مثالري كه بيه خلفه بين البروزه پس اول مثالري
 تعقل الهمز الا عالم اولد ك كما انذر المسيح حيث
 قال اني ذاهب الى ابي وابيكم يبعث لكم الفار قليط
 الذي ياتيكم بالتاويل وقال ان الفار قليط الذي
 يرسله ابي باسمي هو يعلمكم علم كل شئي وقوله
 باسمي لانه يمسح بالنور وقد اشير اليه في المصحف
 حيث قال ثم ان علينا بيانده نيتكم حضرت عيسى
 عليه السلام سلطان انبيائك كل سني اعلام ايوب وديكم بن
 كيد روم بابام وسينر ك بابا كينه حتى كونده رر سينر فار قليط
 يعني شول پيغامبري كه تاويل ايد رر سينر هر شكله و دني و ديكيه اول
 فار قليط كه بنم بابام كونده رر بنم نامده اوله كرك و اول سينر
 جميع اشيا نك علمي نعلم ايدر و حضرت عيسايك يرسله

5

10

15

ابى باسىمى قولى يىنى نيم ناممله كو
اولدو وعندن دره زير اسنفة

پريارت واقع اولمشدركه كنجفعا بيرم
نت كه بيان ايليه وزهر شيد حقيقتي كه قرآنده واقع اولمشد
وواي حضرت مسيح پورزر كه هاني قدا خبر نكده همد فداي
حتي اذ اكان ذلك تو منوا به يعني بن سببه خبر بردم
اول فار قليب طهوره كلردن اول لازمه كه اكا ايمان كتوره
پس بوجردن معلوم اولدكم جميع انبياء ايمان واجيدر حائمه
الكتاب ايضا الله النفوس السائيات
في مرقد العفوان ليدن كرو اسك وبقدر مسوا مجدك
وكل حصته من العمل ولتصبر فانتما ابو الفضائل
وادر قنارضا بالقضاء واجعل الفتوة سبيلا
والاشراق جليسننا انك انت بالجود الاعم على
العالمين منات ماحق سبحانه وتعالى جامه خواب غفلته
اولان نفوس نايبي بيدار ايليه تا سنك اسم شريفكي يارب ذكر ايله
وسني و مجدكي تقدس متنزه ايليه لره غايبدن مخاطبه التفات
در لركه تا و كامل قيلم بيرم حصته لرغزي عندن لوصبردن زير ابريكسي

5

10

15

٤٤

الروح على المستبصر ان يعتقد صحة النبوة اذ ابله قضاكم رضاكى يارب حسن بركة
 كالمهد بشير الى الحقايق كما ورد في المصحف في بين الميوبر تحقيقا جميع عالميه
 نضربها للناس وما يعقلها الا العالمود آمننا وصدقنا دين
 عظامه... صحت نبوته وانذ وعاطم دارم... زانكم من نبوة كنهكم رزم

قد وقع الفراغ من تحرير هذه النسخة اللطيفة القيمة
 في يوم الاربعاء من ذوى العقدة الثمينة
 على يد عبد الضعيف المذنب المحتاج
 الى رحمة الله تعالى الحاج مصطفى
 الشهر بقباب باسرى ذاده
 سنة خمس واربعين
 والف

5



- 1a2 (C) (V) (M) do not include **حضرتلرينه** .
- 1a3 Corr. to **يؤت** .
- 1a3-4 Qur'ān 2:269.
- 1a5 Qur'ān 13:29.
- 1a6 (M) **اولمشلردر** .
- 1a7 Corr. to **ن**. Qur'ān 68:1.
- 1a8 (M) **برون وكمونه** .
- 1a9 Corr. to **سرای بستان** (C) (M) (V).
- 1a11 Qur'ān 38:20.
- 1a12 Corr. to **خالی** (C) (M).
- 1a13 Before **صلات** , (M) inserts **وعطية** Corr. to **نجبات** (C) (M).
- 1a14 After **امام الهدى** , (C) (V) (M) add **حدقه انبياء** .
- 1b1 Qur'an 53:17, 3.
- 1b3 (M) ins. **قطرة** before **ماءالحيوة** .
- 1b5 Cf. **ربناحييتنا** with the Qur'ān 40:11.
- 1b11-12 The meter of the verse is:
- Mefā`īlun / Mefā`īlun / Mefā`īlun / Mefā`īlun
Mefā`īlun / Mefā`īlun / Mefā`īlun / Mefā`īlun
- 1b13 Corr. to **يسرته له** (C) (M) (V).
- 1b15 (S) **منان** appears to be **حنان** in (C) and (M); both two words being attributes of God fit to the present context.
- 1b16 Qur'an 31:12.
- 2a2 Qur'ān 20:114.
- 2a4 Corr. to **ارزاني** .
- 2a12-13 Qur'ān 16:125.
- 2a16 Corr. to **ومما رزقناهم ينفقون** (C) (M) Qur'ān 2:3.
- 2a17 **تعليم ايلمدن** (M); **انفاق ايلمدن** (S) (C).

2b6-7 Ins. the ḥadīth: **ولا توغى فيوعى الله عليك ولا توغى فيوكى الله عليك.**

2b8 Qur'ān 93:10

2b9 Corr. to **مبادره** (C) (M).

2b14 Ins. this ḥadīth: **يسروا ولا تعسروا لعن الله المعسرين** (C) (M).

2b15 Corr. to **كلام حكمت أميزه رغبت ايلدم** (C) (M).

2b17 Corr. with addition to **ولا يعجب من بلاهة اهل البلا دة** (C) (M).

3a1 Qur'ān, 4:94.

3a4 Delete **دخى** (C) (M). After **متعلمه**, (M) reads **آسان**.

3a11 Read **ايتمسك** (S) (C) (M).

3b4 Read **بو مذكوراتك**.

3b8 Ḥadīth

3b12 **اخلاق رديه** (M)

3b13 The meter of the verse is:

Mefā`lun / Mefā`lun / Fe`ūlun

Mefā`lun / Mefā`lun / Fe`ūlun

3b16 **علم فقه افعال** 4a4 . **هو** 4a1 Delete **بدن انسانيدر** (M). **مكلفيندر** (M)

4b3 Just after **اولان شيلردن**, the ms. (M) adds the following:

تعريف هيولى يى ما يقبل الصورة ديو تعبير بيور مشلر

4b7 Read **زبان شرعيده**.

4b8 The last word of the line is **اوتة سنده**.

4b11 The last phrase of the line is **بونك ايچنده فلك**.

4b12 Read **فلك مشترى**.

4b13 The line ends with the term **عطارد**.

4b16 **در كه** corr. to **واكر** (C).

4b17 Corr. to **مفهوم اولور** (C) (M).

5a9 Read **واردر و معنای**

5b4 **بو** corr. to **بوکه** (M).

5b5 Read دیررل

5b7 Corr. to منخلع (C) (M) (V).

5b10 This line in ms. (M) seems to be different both in content and meaning from the mss. (S), (C) and (V), and thus reads as: آتش کره آب و خاکدن
هوایه تبدیل اولمدینی کبی

5b11 Corr. to چوملك (C) (V). The phrase و دخی التنده آتش اولان is omitted in the ms. (M).
چوملك ایچنده هوایه منقلب اولدوغی کبی

5b13 The word معلوم above the left-hand side is the last word of that line.

5b16 یا اله العالمین is not included in Abū Rayyān's edition of *Hayākil al-Nūr* (H-N). However, it appears in the French translation as "Dieu des Mondes". (*Les Temples*, p. 41).

6a1 مانند is deleted in (M).

6a4 The ending word of this line is الادغام.

6a13 Read the beginning of the line: نور توحیدك اوزه رینه

6a13-14 Delete this wrongly repeated phrase in (S) and (V): بیزی ثابت قیل
نور توحیدك اوزه

6a18 Insert اشیا between عالمده and اولان (M) (C) (V).

6b1 Read بریدرلر .

6b7 انفسنا is seen as نفوسنا in (M) and (C).

6b12 و یرجون الرحمة is seen as only یرجون فك الا سیر in H-N.

6b15 Add بهیمت اولمه to the beginnig of the line. (M) (C) (V)

6b16 Persian couplet.

6b17 والش شر جزائك (M)

7a1 وانت (M) (C) (V) and H-N.

7a2 الناسوت (M).

7a5 Ins. نفسلرینی قاذورات after (M) (C) (V).

7a6 Corr. to فوائد and موائد (M) (C) (V).

7a8 بارك في الذكر (H-N. p. 46.)

7a12 ووفق appears as ورفق in H-N.

7a13 Corr. to مختار

7b1 Ins. القابلات just after للهدی (M) (C) (V)

7b2 روحانيه يه (M) (C)

7b3 و does not exist in
دخى بونلردن انتفاع ايچون (M) (C) نورانيه يه
(M)

7b11 Read قسمت بذير .

7b15 Ins. قسمت بيله before .

8a2 After سمك , read سطح .

8a8-9 Cf. H-N.

8a10 Read ما بينلرى تميز اولنه .

8a11 Corr. to الهيئات (V) (C)

8a12 does not exist in (M).

8a12-13 (M) omits from line 12, اكاھيئت to line 13, هيولى ديرلر .

8a17 Read اكر حيوان ناطق اولمسه انسا اولمزدى .

8b13 In the place of Read end of
قدس سره (M) has رضى الله تعالى عنه .
the line as: استديكه اجزائى جسمى .

9a1 Read و نه و همده .

9a5 (M) skipped حسيه ايله .

9a9 The beginning word is منقسم اولوق لازم . Corr. to لازم كلور
(M).

9a12 Corr. to حمانك بو (M) (C) (V)

9a13 عالم is deleted in (M).

9a15 Instead of مناقضا , (M) contains منازعات .

9a16 شرح مقاصد and شرح مواقف are the titles of two famous theological
works of al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī and Ibn al-Taftazānī respectively.

9a17 After رباعى , read طلب ايله , (S) (M) (V) and نظم in (C).

9b4 The last two words are اثبات مجرد .

9b5 Read نفسر .

9b6 Ins. at the beginning of the line ايده كه (C) (M) (V)

9b8 ولا يدرك الكل الا باجزائه does not exist in H-N, but included in *Les
Temples*

9b17 Read تصرف الحرارة .

9b17-10a1 The phrase بسبب تصرف الحرارة والغريزة في
الرطوبات which does not exist in H-N, appears as Dawwani's own comments in SH-H. (p. 24.)

- 10a7 Corr. to ورودی قتنده (C) (V) (M)
- 10a8 Corr. to عظیم اولوردی.
- 10a9 The first word is هر بار.
- 10a10 Read نقصان بزیر المہ دہدر. And after انت, ins. هذا.
- 10a11 In the place of انائیکہ, the ms. (M) has انیتک.
- 10a12 Read the first word as سنلک and the last word as ایش.
- 10a13 Delete و in کندوک and read it کندک as in (M) and (C).
- 10a14 Read یعنی سندہ. Corr. to شمڈیکہ سندہ (C) (V).
- 10a17 Delete ی in دائم.
- 10b5 (M) omits فرس.
- 10b6 Read بدن تبدلده ایکن.
- 10b8 By شیخ Anḳaravī means Ibn Sīnā.
- 10b9 Delete the small dot between رسالہ سندہ and تلویح. By Shifā', Anḳaravī refers to Ibn Sīnā's eminent work, Kitāb al-Shifā'.
- 10b10 H-N ins. کیف یکن after.
- 10b14 The last word is سبحانی سن.
- 11a1 In (C), الا does not exist.
- 11a2 Corr. to اولمقلہ.
- 11a3 تحقیق corr. to تخصیمر.
- 11a4 Read ماہیتده اول.
- 11a5 Delete بلدم as in (M).
- 11a15 (M) has ہر دخی بو instead of دخی.
- 11b3 بر وجہ (M)
- 11b6 Corr. to کچوک (M) (V).
- 11b7 Delete بہ from ذبابہ (M) (C) (V).
- 11b9 Corr. to ایتمزدی.
- 11b12 Delete the small sign over مراد at the end of the line.
- 11b13 Before مالایتقدر, H-N ins. لان.
- 11b15 Corr. to کل.
- 12a1 لتبریہا is omitted in (C), which appears as لتبديہا in H-N and as

لتبرئها in Dawwānī's SH-H. And الجسم does not exist in H-N, SH-H and Les Temples.

12a10 Delete ي in الحائط.

12b4 In the place of ديركه , (M) has بيوررکه .

12b8 Corr. to عنها .

12b10 Delete the second ر in منزه درلر .

12b11 Read the last word as زوال .

12b12 Add و to the very beginning of this line.

12b16 Corr. to مستغنيدر . Delete the last word and thus read it as صفتلندقلرندن .

13a1-2 محقق seems to be محقق in (M).

13a3 Instead of رويت , (M) has نيت .

13a5 Between نعوت and لك ins. جماللك .

13a7 Read اولان آيات .

13a10 In the place of اليه , H-N has عليه .

13a12 يدبر corr. to يدبر (C) (V), and this word comes to exist as يدرك in (M), which would be also meaningful in the context.

13a13 After جسم , (M) ins. ادراك .

13a14 و between كماله and لايق is omitted in (M) and (V).

13a16 طريق is replaced by طريق in (M).

13b1 Delete ي in قائم .

13b3 After تطلب , (M) ins. مالايينتهى .

13b4 جسم is substituted with اجسام in (M).

13b5 The last word of this line is اولورکه .

13b10 (M) has ايليوب ايده لم instead of ايليوب .

13b11 (M) has بيوررلرکه in the place of درکه . Delete the second ي in واردر ; and corr. to انسانيه .

13b15 Delete ت in ظاهرنده (C).

13b17 Corr. to صلا بت and خشونت , سلا ست .

14a1 The first word appears as بونلره in (M).

14a5 Read لممين زائدتين .

14a12 Corr. to مفروشه .

14b3-5 H-N omits the phrase from line 3, الذى to line 5, خمسة ; SH-H, however, is exactly the same as here.

14b11 Ins. و after منامده .

14b12 In the place of التعين , (M) has اليقين .

14b13 The last word is مشاهده .

15a2 Delete ي in زائل and غائب .

15a3 Between الوهم and ينازع H-N and SH-H ins. وهو الذى .

15a6 ربما يغلب exists neither in H-N nor in SH-H; and they both, instead of تخويفه , have يخوفه وهمه .

15a7 The phrase فينفر الانسان does not exist in H-N and SH-H. In the place of فينفر , (M) has ينتفر و and (C) has قبل .

15a9 Read the last word as كرك .

15a10 Corr. to آن اولوركه (M) (V).

15a15 Just after ولايات , (M) and (C) ins. وكرامات .

15a16 Corr. to شيلرى .

15b1 To the very beginning of the line, H-N and SH-H add بل لا يحس من الجسم .

15b2 Delete the last word اوله (M), (C), (V).

15b5 Read the last word as اولانك after which (M) ins. قونيك .

15b7 Corr. to حرفت (M), (C), (V). Read the last word جانوران .

15b8 Delete in اندام . Corr. to اعضا .

15b9 After وصور , ins. متخذة (M), (V), (C). Delete كى به and corr. to ودائما . Just after قادر در , delete ر , and read the rest as .

15b10 Read روز وشب ده .

15b11 (M) ins. هربار right after كه .

15b13 Corr. to سائر and الجزئية . After التى , H-N and SH-H ins. يكون .

15b17 Read مع سلامه ماسواه . H-N and SH-H ins. تغاير القوى and يختل . اختلاله after من الحواس .

16a2 Corr. to مختل .

16a4 Delete ي in سائر .

- 16a8 Corr. to تشریحده .
- 16a9 In the place of جبلت , H-N has جعلت . The last term appears as لجلب in (C).
- 16a10 Instead of المنافع , H-N and SH-H put الملائم .
- 16a13 Corr. to غضبيه .
- 16a15 Corr. to غضبية .
- 16a16 Delete the first ی in وبرينه .
- 16a17 Corr. to الإراده .

- 16b3 After ممكن , add اولميیدی (M) (C) (V).
- 16b4 In (M) and (C), بوندن does not exist. And corr. to بوندن .
- 16b6 Corr. to يتشمزدي after كمانه . Corr. to also متولده .
- 16b7 Read برباره جدا .
- 16b8 Corr. to بر نيجه and to جاذبه .
- 16b11 Corr. to جميع . H-N and SH-H add الحيوان after الروح .
- 16b12 Just after لطيف , H-N and SH-H ins. بخارى > Instead of يتولد , H-N has مولد . Corr. to لطافة .
- 16b12-13 وكثافة الاعضا exists neither in SH-H nor in H-N.
- 16b14 Corr. to يكتسى or يكتسب .
- 16b15 Corr. to روح .
- 16b16 Read لطافتندن .

- 17a1 The first word كثافتندن does not exist in (C) and (M). متفرق appears as متصرف in (M). Delete the last word اكتسا .
- 17a4 Corr. to كيدر .
- 17a5 Cf. لطافته with H-N.
- 17a8 Read the last word as نفوذدن .
- 17a12 Right after الناطقة , H-N and SH-H ins. وتتمصرف النفس .
- 17a12 Read هر قچن .
- 17a14 Delete the last الا .

- 17b1 After الله , (M), SH-H and H-N ins. تعالى القائمة . After الله تعالى , (M) continues to add شرفها والى الله تعالى غبرتها , which appears in SH-H and H-N as مشرقها والى الله مغربها that is entirely suitable to the context.

17b3 Corr. to **وينه حقه رجوع** . Read the ending phrase: **جهاتده** .

17b4-5 Qur'ān 89: 27-8.

17b6 Instead of **ليس** , SH-H and H-N have **غير** . Corr. to **توهموا** 17b11
Corr. to **ابى سعيد** .

17b12 Corr. to **ذوى** .

17b13 **قلتشلردر** does not exist in (M).

17b14 The last word is **اهل ضلا له** .

18a1 Corr. to **العناكب**. And **كبيوت العناكب** is replaced by **كبيت
العنكبوت**

18a3 In the place of **قرار**, (M) has **زعم** .

18a5 Read **بلا هت** . And Before **يادكار**, ins. **جواب** (C), (M) and (V). Instead
of **اشعار قلدتم** , (M) has **تجريد الندى** .

18a9 See for Abū Sa'īd's saying, Nicholson, *Studies in Islamic Mysticism*, p.
73.

18a9-11 From **كم نيته** line 9 up to the end of the line 11, (M) skipped.

18a12 **سبحانى** (M) (C). On this celebrated saying of Bāyazīd, refer to Abū
al-Ḥasan al-Hujwīrī, *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*, ed. V. Zuhkofski (Tehran: Mu'assasat-i
Maṭbū'at-i Amīr Kabīr, 1957), p. 327; Muḥammad 'Abdur Rabb, *Persian
Mysticism Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī* (Dacca: The Academy for Pakistan Affairs,
1971), p. 141.

18a15-16 The couplet was wrongly attributed by Anḳaravī to Junayd
al-Baghdādī; in fact it belongs to Abū Nuwās (d. 200/815). Ghazālī, *Le
Tabernacle des Lumières (Mishkāt al-Anwār)*, p. 104, n. 52. Ghazālī,
however, quotes the same couplet without specifying any name for its
ownership. See, Ghazālī, *Mishkāt al-Anwār*, p. 57.

18a16-17 The meter of the poems:

Fāilātun / Mefāilun / Feilun

Fāilātun / Mefāilun / Feilun

Feilātun / Mefāilun / Fa'lun

Fāilātun / Mefāilun / Fa'lun

18b1 (M) ins. بيتى شريفى after

18b1-2 Al-Huṣayn b. Maṣṣūr al-Ḥallāj, *Le Dīwān D'al-Ḥallāj*, ed. and trans. into French by Louis Massignon, Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1955, p. 93. Its meter is:

Mefāʿlun / Fāilātun / Fāilun

Fāilātun / Feiʿlātun / Feilun

Feilātun / Fāilātun / Fāilun

Feilātun / Fāilātun / Fāilun.

18b6 *Diwān-ı Kāmil-i Shams-i Tebrizī Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmi* ed. Bediūzzamān Furūzānfar, Tehran: Intishārāt-i Jāwidān, 1352, no: 845, p. 338.

18b7-8 *Ibid.*, no: 654, p. 259.

Mefūlu / Mefāʿlu / Mefūlu / Faʿlun.

18b13 After عقول, (M) ins. اسيه. Read as بى خبر .

18b16 Ins. this phrase into the empty place:

مصراع چراغ بيوه كجا شمع آفتاب كجا واين الثريا من يد المتناول

18b17 Read اوها من .

18b18 Delete the last ونه .

19a6 Anḳaravī, *Miṣbāḥ al-Asrār; Janāḥ al-Arwāḥ*

19a9 Before دلائل, (M), (C) and (V) ins. بعض

19a10 (M) (C) (V) ins. فعنده, before حصول

19a10-19b2 See for its original Aabic text, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliya min al-ʿIlm al-Ilāhī*, vol. 2, pp. 104-5.

19a16 Ins. in empty place (after نزول) ايديجى (M) (V) (C).

19a17 يا corr. to په

19b14 Mevlānā Rūmī, *Mesnevī*, Book V 4144ff. See for English translation, Nicholson, *The Mathnawī of Jalāluddīn Rūmī*, vol. 4, p. 248.

Fāilātun / Fāilātun / Fāilun.

19b17 النفوس كثيرة does not exist in H-N.

20a2 After جماعت, (M) ins. عاليه

20a8 Read آفتابه And in the place of نقصان, (M) has خلل

20a11 اكر which is seen over the line is supposed to be between يعنى and سن

20a14 Delete ا in لاطلع

20b1 Before نفسك, (M) ins. حقيقت

20b2 Corr. to ادراك after ايلدوكنى

20b4 Corr. to ايلمسه

20b8 In the place of the first ادراك, (M) (C) (V) put ادراكات

20b11-12 Qur'an 4:1

20b15 Read روح انسانى بود. Mevlana, *Mesnevī*, Book II 188. The meter is:

Fāilātun / Fāilātun / Fa`lun

Fāilātun / Fāilātun / Fa`lun

20b16 After ثم, SH-H and H-N ins. كيف. And corr. to تسخره

21a2 Corr. to مشايخ

21a5 Read معنای

21a9 Read همچنان

21a11 After بو سوزمзде, (M) ins. علمای, (C) and (V) ins. مهجوبه.

After بو لسانه كلمز, (M) reads حالى

21a12 Ins. in empty place ذووه مقتضاسنجه

21a15 Corr. to تعرفه. And متقلبا does not exist in SH-H

21a17 Before شهوات, ins. رهين (M) (V) (C). The phrase from وانى to the end of the line, 17 is skipped in (M).

21b1 Delete ي in دائما

21b4 Ins. و between جسم and جسمانى (M) (C).

21b5 Ins. و before جسمانى

21b9 The meter is:

Fāilātun / Mefāilun / Feilun

Fāilātun / Mefāilun / Feilun

21b10 *عليه* appears as *على* in SH-H and H-N.

21b12 Read *باطلدين*

21b15 Read *مثابسندهدر*

21b17 In the place of *انجاها* , H-N has *الجاها*

22a3-4 Delete *ي* in *مائل* . The phrase from the line 3, *عالم موت* up to the line 4, *ايلردى* is skipped in (M).

22a5 Corr. to *سخره* and to *الطفل* . Instead of *قوى الطفل* *سخره قوى الطفل* جذبتها قواى الرضيع , H-N has *الرضيع*

22a9 *ولا محل* precedes *ولا مكان* in H-N.

22a10 Corr. to *مكتسبة* after which H-N and SH-H add more the following:
كما يكون بعدالبدن

22a14 Read the last word as *محالدر*

22a16 *قبل* is skipped in (M).

22b3 Corr. to *دخى*

22b4 Instead of *ابتدا* , (M) has *ابد* . And read the last phrase as *اكادرلرکه*

22b7 Read the ending part as *اول شيئه اطلاق ايدرلرکه*

22b10 The first word is *فان* . After *مع البدن* , ins. the following phrase which exists only in H-N: *اذا تم استعداده لقبولها* .

22b15 Corr. to *غير* . In the place of *ينتقمز* , H-N and SH-H have *ينتقم*

22b16 After *واهبها* , SH-H and H-N add *شيئ*

23a1-2 *منتقمز* exists in (M) as *منتقم* which fits as a derivative of *ينتقم* to H-N and SH-H.

23a6 *من غيره* is replaced with *بغيره* in H-N and SH-H.

23a7 *اوچدر در* corr. to *اوچدر* .

23a7-8 The phrase from *برى ممکن* , line 7 up to *اولاندر* , line 8 is skipped in (M).

23a16 SH-H and H-N add *ولو* just before *اذ* .

23a17 After فلا بد , SH-H and H-N ins. له .

23b4 Read لم يختلف .

23b5 Ins. ا after وقتا .

23b6 Delete اوله .

23b8 Corr. to سبباً .

23b12 SH-H and H-N ins. السبب after بتمامه .

23b13 After الشئ , SH-H and H-N add ضرورة . The phrase from لا يحصل to the end of the line 13 is skipped in (V). After الشئ , (M) comments further the following: قولى بوكه دلالت ايدر .

23b17 Read the last word as شك يقدرکه .

24a1 Delete the mistakenly repeated phrase in the preceding page, 23b17.

24a4 The last word is قيلورسك .

24a5 Corr. to لازمدر and read the ending word as مرجح .

24a9 Corr. to لانهما and after this ins. حينئذ (C) (V).

24a10 بينهما does not exist in H-N.

24a12 Read اثنيت .

24b1 After واحداً , H-N adds شيئاً .

24b5 Read مرتبه شهوده

24b6 Delete دلائل ي in دلائل . باطلية is replaced with بي طائله in (M).

24b7 Instead of واجبة , SH-H and H-N have واجب الوجود .

24b8 Corr. to اجسام .

24b11 Read لازمدرکه اول .

24b12 The first syllable is من .

24b13 Suhrawardī's citation is skipped in SH-H.

25a2 اوله is skipped in (M).

25a6 Before فان الشئ , SH-H and H-N add لايجوزان يوجد فى ذاته صفات لها

25a8 In the place of مؤثر , (M) has متأثر . In SH-H and H-N فى عضولنا appears as عضولنا

25a12 الجهات does not exist in SH-H and H-N.

25a17 The last word is فرقه

- 25b2 Between **هو** and **يعطى** , SH-H and H-N ins. **كيف**
- 25b3 Before **مثلا** , (M) ins. **واردر**
- 25b11 After **الأعلى** , SH-H and H-N add **والكمال الأتم**
- 25b14 Read **محلّه مفتقر اوله**
- 25b15 The phrase from the line 14, **مفتقر اوله** up to the line 15, **جواهيرايه** is skipped in (C).
- 25b16 The phrase **ويفتقر الى مخصص** to the end of which SH-H adds **مميز عن غيره** does not exist in H-N.

- 26a1 In the place of **مخصص** , (C) has **حال**
- 26a3 **احكام** is replaced by **اركان** in SH-H and H-N, which seems more suitable to the context.
- 26a4 Instead of **لا تفقت** , SH-HSH-H and H-N have **لما اختلفت فيها**
- 26a10 Instead of **الإستنارة** , H-N has **الإستنادة** , lacking also **وعدم الإستنارة**
- 26a13 After **الأجسام**, read **ظهورها** .
- 26a15 Before **ظاهر** , SH-H, H-N ins. **فليس** ; and in the former the complete phrase reads **فليس ظاهر الذات** and in the latter **فليس ظاهر الدلالة** .

- 26b1 Corr. to **ذاتى** .
- 26b1-2 From the line 1, **فكان** , to the line 2, **لذاته** , does not exist in SH-H and H-H.
- 26b5 In the place of **اولندندر** ,(C) has **اولندر** and (M) has **اولمدى** .
Read the end of the line as **و نفوسنا قد بينا** , and between these two SH-H, H-N ins. **الناطقة** .
- 26b11 Add to the end of the line **فان كان** .
- 26b13 Instead of **ان امكن** , which is the same as in the Persian translation of Hayakil, SH-H and H-N have **ان لم يكن** .
- 26b15 The whole Arabic phrase reads in H-N: **والنفس قائم دلت على الحر والقيوم** .
- 26b17 Before **نور** , ins. (M) (C) (V). Corr. to **علا نُقها** .

- 27a4 Corr. to the last word, **ارادة** .
- 27a6 **من كل وجوه** does not exist in H-N and SH-H.

exists in H-N (p. 62) and SH-H (p. 129) is skipped: يجب ان يكون فعله بلا واسطة واحداً فإن اقتضاء احد الشيئين غير اقتضاء الاخر ، فيلزم في مقتضى الشيئين بلا واسطة التكثر .

27a11 Read فيختلف .

27a12 Read the last phrase as ولا هيئة فيحتاج .

27a14 The line ends with بل .

27a15 In the place of لذاته , H-N and SH-H have لنفسه .

27a16 The last word is الإبداعي .

27a17 Read لا يمكن اشرف .

27b1 The last word is العقل. For the ḥadīth see, Abū Nu'aym al-Isfahānī, Ḥilyat al-Awliyā (Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Sa'āda, 1971-79), vol. 7, p. 318; Ghazālī, Mīzān al-'Amal, ed. S. Dunya (Cairo: Dar al-Ma'ārif, 1968), p. 331.

27b3 Corr. to الى اخره (M) (C) (V).

27b4 نور is substituted with الجوهر in H-N, SH-H.

27b6 جماله appears as جلاله in (M), H-N, SH-H. جواهر seems as قدسياً وأخر in H-N, SH-H. The line ends with

27b7 The phrase from the beginning of the line to نفس does not exist in H-N and SH-H. Read the last word as و بنظره الى .

27b8 Read the ending part: جرماً سماوياً .

27b9 Before ان الى , SH-H (p. 164) and H-N (p. 63) ins. يقتضى بالنظر الى ما فوقه جوهر مجرداً بالنظر الى نقصه جرماً سماوياً .

27b11 Corr. to خالقك .

27b13 وجوديتنى is replaced with وجوديتنى in (M).

28a5 وجوديتنى appears as وجوديتنى in (M). And before او چنجى , (M) ins. كندو ذاتك وجوبنى ادراك ايدر .

28a12 Corr. to وسائط .

28a13 به appears as بها in (M) (C) (V).

28a14 In the place of اما , (M) has لكن .

28a17 The first word is الواجبة .

28b11 لا يشار is replaced with لا يقصد in SH-H, H-N.

28b15 The following line that exists both in H-N (p. 64) and SH-H (p. 136) is skipped: النفس الناطقة وان لم تكن جرمانية وذات جهة إلا أنها

في السماويات . Read the ending word: تتصرف في عالم الأجسام .

28b17 Corr. to بونلرده . The phrase حسي ايله اشارت is skipped in (C)

29a2 After عالم الجسم , the word الجسم does not exist in SH-H, H-N.
اثري appears to be اثيرى in (M).

29a4 Read من جملة .

29a5 Before طلسم , (M) (C) does not exist in H-N and SH-H. Before و , and H-N, SH-H ins. ورب .

29a6 After بالكمالات العلمية والعملية , SH-H and H-N add مكملها

29a8 After برده دن , (C) ins. برده دن .

29a12 Read مايبتنى به . In the place of يبتنى , H-N has ينتشئى .

29a15 Between كثرت and تضاغف ins. و (M) (C) (V).

29b1 The first word is اقربها . Just after من , H-N and SH-H ins. جهة .

29b4-5 The phrase from the line 4, اذا , up to the line 5, اقرب , is replaced by the phrase, ان كانا في سطح يتراءى البياض in H-N (p. 65) and SH-H (p. 142).

29b7 Read the last word as الادنى .

29b9 After على البعد , read الابد من جهة علو رتبته .

29b10 After المتناهى , SH-H, H-N ins. شدة .

29b11 Delete three dots () in مرتبة سي .

29b12 The Arabic text reads : واذا كان الأول هو المرجح والمرجح : دائم (M) (C) (V). After الأول , SH-H, H-N ins. موجبا , and after فان كانت تلك الأمور قديمة . both ins. سواه

29b13 To the very beginning of the line, H-N, SH-H add لوجوب وجوده .

29b16 Read توقف .

29b17 Just after the Arabic text, ins. this missing phrase: وجميع
ممكنا تدن اول اندن غيرى بر شى يق ايدى (M) (C) (V). After this ins.
also the following Arabic text: ولا وقت ولا شرط ليوقف عليه (M) (C) (V). Before و رضى , ins. و جميع (V). Before و رضى (C) (M).

30a1 اخرنا appears in H-N, SH-H

30a4 قيلورين is replaced by اشلريز in (M) and بشاررين in (C) (V). Before كبي , (M) ins. كبي .

30a5 Read و آلت .

30a7 The phrase from پس to the Arabic word وليس is skipped in (M). After بمتغير ليريد ماالم .الأول تعالى . H-N and SH-H ins. و ليس .
30a8 Corr. to the very first word يرد .
30a9 (M) ins. تعالى before حق سبحانه و .
30a11 Corr. to من كون الحق قائماً بالقسط .
30a14 ذرة is seen as ذرات in SH-H and H-N. Corr. to شعانك . The word نوري is substituted with دوامى in (M) (V) (C), that fits most edaquately to the context here. Corr. زياده (M) (V) (C). ريان

30b2 Qur'an 28:88

30b4 In the place of ما حدث , (M) (C), SH-H and H-N have حادث; and in that of شيئاً , H-N has شيئاً .
30b5 Instead of يتسلسل , H-N has ينشأ .
30b8 المبدأ is substituted with المبتدأ in H-N.
30b9 Corr. to عائد .
30b10 To the end of the line, H-N adds لذاته .
30b14 Between اللحوادث and التى , H-N (p. 68) and SH-H (p. 148) ins. ولا تنصرم هو مالاً ففلاك وهى سبب الحوادث .
30b15 Corr. to يتغير . Between this and الأول , SH-H, H-N ins. الفاعل.
30b16 للمركات الحادثات appears as للحركة الحادثة .
30b17 Separate لايق from دكلدر . Read the last word as حاته به .

31a1 Corr. to اولميدي .

31a3 Corr. to نقطة . Delete ي in طبعا (M) (V) (C).

31a4 In the place of الى حيث قصد , H-N and SH-H have بحيث قصدها .
In (M) اذا لا يهرب appears as اذا لا يهرب .

31a6 Corr. to قسرى (M) (C). Instead of اتسه , (M) has حركت ايتدرسه .

31a8 ارادى appears as ارادتى . Before انسانك , ins. ديرلر (M) (C).

31a16 Read فهى حى مدرك , before which the following long passage that exists in H-N and SH-H is missing in all four manuscripts of Ankaravī's commentary:

مفيض حركة الفلك نفسه ، فتحريكها لجرم الفلك تحريك اختياري ،
وتحرك جرم الفلك بتحريكها تحرك قسرى ، فإن اخذنا جرم الفلك
شيئاً على حدة فتكون حركته بسبب تحريك النفس قسرية بالنسبة

الى النفس. وإن أخذنا هما معاً شيئاً واحداً فحركته حركة ارادية.

31b1 Just before فلا شهوة , ins. نمو , (A.R., p.69).
والأ فلا ك لا حاجة لها تغذ و نمو .

31b2 Before فلا غضب , H-N ins. في الوجود .

31b4 In the place of السفلى , H-N and SH-H have السافل. Read the last word of the Arabic phrase as عندها .

31b6 Read شوغل البدن . Instead of الأ جرام , the last word of the line, H-N and SH-H have الخرة .

31b7 Ins. into the empty place غواشي (M) (C) (V)

31b9 على is substituted with من لدنه in H-N, SH-H.

31b17 appears as لبعدها in H-N, SH-H.

32a4 Read رب العزه .

32a8 Between الأ على and هو , H-N ins. يغاير معشوق الأ خر . And just after بنوره , H-N, SH-H add ممده .

32a10 Corr. to أمداد ايديجيدر (M) (C) and to بينه و بين .

32a12 does not exist in (M) (V) (C) and H-N, but in SH-H instead exists as وانواره (p. 157).

32a13 Between تا and مشاهده , (M) ins. اول .

32b4 The phrase قدر غير متناه exists as الا قدر متناه in H-N (p.71) and SH-H (p. 159).

32b9 The last letter is و .

32b10 Suhrawardī's citation is replaced by بوجود دائم لعشاق إلهين in H-N (p. 71) and SH-H (p. 160). However, in Hayākil (Persian), p. 100, l. 6, the print has سبب بوجدى بسبب وحذى دائم which most likely should be read سبب بوجدى بسبب وحذى دائم , which suits Anḡaravī's version.

32b11 In the place of انلرك , (C) has انك . And وجدى does not exist in (M).

32b17-33a1 The Arabic phrase from فتجدد , line 32b17 to the قابله , line 33a1, is substituted with لم يتجدد الشيء المعلول له الا بتجدد in H-N (p. 71) and with فيتجدد الشيء المعلول له بتجدد in SH-H.

33a4 (M) ins. ائرى before واحدك .

33a5 Read the last word as فاعلينك .

33a6 Corr. to ليعتبر (A.R.) (D) (M) (C) (V)

33a8 The Arabic phrase exists as بالصغر والكبر والصفاء والكدر in (M) (V) (C) as well as in SH-H and H-N with the exception of the last word that appears in the latter as الكدورة .

33a13-14 The Arabic text from line 13, للقوابل up to line 14, لتغير reads in H-N (p. 72) as follows: لاختلاف صاحب الصورة وتغيره بل . And لاختلاف للقوابل is skipped in (M).

33b2 Ins. بالثبات between الثبات and الحدوث .(M) (C) (A.R.) (D)

33b3 The phrase from ايلدي to حدوثه is skipped in (M).

33b6 Ins. يحدثه before يعنى (M) (C).

33b7 Corr. to the first word سببى . Between ذلك and ليدوم, SH-H and H-N ins. الربط . Corr. to the last word فيضى .

33b11 In the place of ما يرد الناقص, H-N (p. 62) and SH-H (p. 167) have بآبتر ولا بناقص .

33b13 Corr. to والجود .

33b15 Between المطلق and هو, H-N (pp. 72-3) and SH-H (p. 170) ins. هو الذى وجوده من ذاته .

33b16 Read حد ذاتنده .

34a1 Corr. to خدای .

34a2 Ins. هيج between صنعنده and غرضى . And فياضة الرحمة appears as فياض للرحمة in (V), H-N, SH-H.

34a4 The phrase from هو to the end of the line is replaced with لأن الملك المطلق هو الذى له ذات كل شئ وليس ذاته لشئ in H-N (p. 73) and SH-H (p. 170).

34a5 Read the ending part as هيج بر شيدن .

34a6 In the place of مما, H-N has ما .

34a7 الأفس عليه does not exist in H-N. Corr. to الأفس .

34a8 After الأشرف, H-N, SH-H ins. الممكن .

34a10 نثر (prose) as opposed to بيت Persian verse.

34b2 واهب appears as واجب in (V) (C).

34b4 Qur'an 27:88.

34b5 Qur'an 20:50.

34b6 Read the first word as وانمايطول and the last as التفات.

34b8 Corr. to ليس before which H-N, SH-H ins. أن.

34b9 After عالم, SH-H, H-N ins. آخر.

34b10 The Arabic phrase exists in H-N (p. 73) and SH-H (p. 178) as وأن ليس له تعالى وراء الديدان خلأوق اشرف .

34b11 Replace the illegible text with ولم يعلم أنه لوقع على غير .

34b13 appears as يمكن in SH-H, H-N.

34b14 Read the end as اختلال نظام .

34b16 The last word is القاهرة, which appears in H-N and SH-H as الطاهرات .

35a3 Read وايلام البرئ وغرس . The word علم which appears in SH-H as الملل does not exist in H-N. Corr. to إغواء .

35a4 Before جاهل, H-N ins. عن .

35a9 H-N, SH-H ins. كل just before مشهد .

35a11 Corr. to تؤدي الى ضرر (p.74). before which H-N ins. لو عادت .

35a16 Instead of يرمى, (M) has يوصل, and H-N and SH-H have يرمى .

35a17 Between وسلطان واللاهوتية and وما يغلب عليها من الهيبة فى المواقف الإلهية .

35b1 Corr. to من النظر . The last word is دونها .

35b3 appears as اولمز in (M). قلمز

35b4-5 Cf. Qur'an, 10:61, 34:3.

35b5 Read لا يعزب شئ . Ins. باريتها (H-N, SH-H).

35b6 Corr. to علمندن; and read the ending part: خالى دكلدر . The phrase باريسنك علمندن is skipped in (C).

35b7 In the place of اثبات, (C) and H-N have ثبات .

35b9 Ins. من before وجوب (M) (C) (V).

35b11 Corr. to لتحللت (M) (C) (V). وما دامت does not exist in H-N.

35b13 The ending word is مركب .

35b14 must be corrected to خفيفا in (M) (C) (V), H-N, SH-H. Persian Hayakil has سبك (خفيف) . And H-N also ins. طبعا between لا الا .

35b15 Corr. to يتقبلا and to يتقبل (C) (M) (V).

35b17 Corr. to يقبلهما. Instead of ضعيفدر, (M) (C) (V) have خفيفدر.

36a4 Corr. to منخرقة (SH-H). This word is substituted with منحرفة in H-N.

36a5 Before حركاتها, H-N, SH-H ins. بل.

36a6 Corr. to ولا يابسة. Delete the dots over ولا حارة.

36a7 Corr. to منخرق (M) (V). The last word is ايلمز.

36a10 After خامسة, read the Arabic citation as فهي محيطة بالأرض, which does not exist in H-N.

36a12 Corr. to ابتداء. The Arabic text appears as ولو لا احاطة السماء بالأرض in H-N, SH-H.

36a13 The illegible Arabic text is الى المشرق الا بان ينثنى النهار.

36a14 الا نهار ايكي ايليدي is skipped in (M).

36a15 Corr. to اوليدي.

36a16 Before كرية, SH-H, H-N ins. كلها, and after محيطة they both again ins. بعضها ببعض. Delete بالأرض, and instead ins. حية ناطقة (M) (C) (V).

36b1 Corr. to مطيعة.

36b2 Corr. to خالقنه.

36b3 Delete ه in دررلر.

36b3 Delete الهيكل السادس, because, according to H-N and SH-H, this is the last part of the Fifth Temple; therefore instead ins. خاتمة الهيكل.

36b4 After القائم, SH-H, H-N ins. الموجود.

36b5 Delete the last ه, in وجودده.

36b7 Before عاشق, H-N, SH-H ins. هو.

36b8 Between له and بنور, SH-H, H-N ins. غاب عليه.

36b10 Corr. to the last word اكتناه.

36b11 فاشتمك appears as فاشتمل in (M) (C) (V), and فاشتمت in H-N, SH-H, which is rather compatible with the present context. After النسبة, H-N ins. المذكورة على طرفين.

36b12 Delete فسري (M) (V) (C).

36b14 Read the ending part as عالمده هر نقدر.

36b15 Read مقهوره.

36b16 واجب before مقهور is skipped in (C).

36b17 Corr. to ازدوجت (M) (C) before which H-N, SH-H ins. حتى.

- 37a3 Before معشوقه, H-N, SH-H ins. هو. Read the last word as معشوقيدر.
- 37a4 To the end of the line, H-N, SH-H ins. للمادة.
- 37a5 After قسمين, the whole Arabic citation reads in H-N (p. 78): قسم عال قاهر وقسم نازل فى المرتبة منقهر معلول. Persian Hayākil and SH-H have منفعل مقهور which is the same as Anḳaravī's I-H.
- 37a6 Read ايكى قسمه.
- 37a7 Delete the small dot over مقهوردر.
- 37a9 Between بل and قابل, H-N (p. 78) and SH-H (p. 190) ins. انقسم بعض الاجسام الاثيرية الى.
- 37a10 In the two places of قابل, H-N, SH-H have قائد.
- 37a14 Read والمتيامن والمتياسر.
- 37b1 Corr. to تاسيا.
- 37b2 Read تامناسب.
- 37b4-5 Qur'an 51:49
- 37b10 The whole line from the beginning up to هو is skipped in (M). And corr. to ابوت (C) (V). Read the last word رخش.
- 37b14 قدرت is replaced with قوت in (M) (V) (C).
- 37b15 In the place of جميع الكائنات, H-N has الاجرام and SH-H has جميع الاجرام.
- 37b16 Before مثال, H-N, SH-H ins. هو. Read عجائب.
- 37b17 اولدر appears as اودر in (C). Corr. to كائناته; and read the last word as نورنى.
- 38a6 Corr. to عظيم (M) (C) (V).
- 38a7 (M) ins. وجوده and عدمدن صحراى. Replace الهيكل السابع with الهيكل السادس (H-N, SH-H).
- 38a8 Between لا تبطل and لأنها SH-H and Les Temples ins. ببطلا ن البدن.
- 38a10 Read تا محلدن.
- 38a14 عرضية does not exist in H-N.
- 38a15 Read همان.
- 38a17 Before كلمز ins. لا زم (V) (C). The word كل that precedes لذة does

not exist in (M), (C), (V), H-N, SH-H. Between **قوة** and **بحسب**, H-N, SH-H ins. **انما تكون**. Read **كمالها**.

38b1 Corr. to **المها**. Between **كل** and **والله**, H-N, SH-H ins. **شيء**.

38b3 The first word is **همچنان**.

38b5 Between **الذوق** and **بالمذوقات**, and **وللمس** and **بالملوسات** H-N, SH-H ins. **مايتعلق**.

38b7 Read the first word as **الم** and the last one as **بصرك**.

38b10-11 (M) (C) and (V) mss. slip the whole Arabic phrase from line 10, **وداخي** up to line 11, **البدنية** into line 12, just before **ووالعوامل**.

38b15 **نقضه** appears as **نقصه** in H-N and SH-H, and as **نقيضه** in (M). **نقضى** is substituted with **نقيض** in (M).

38b16 **منتقش** is skipped in (C).

38b17 Instead of **بهما**, (M) has **جميعا**.

39a2 **يصلان** is replaced with **يحصلا** in H-N, SH-H. Corr. to **حصول**.

39a3 Ins. **كمن** between **الم** and **به** (C) (M) (V) SH-H, H-N.

39a4 Before **ولا يتلذذ**, ins. **الشديد** SH-H, H-N.

39a5 Read the last word as **نفسه**.

39a6 Read **جفاسنى**.

39a7 The ending part is **بر مرضدركه**.

39a14 Corr. to **تتعذب** and **فارتت** between **النفس** and **البدن**. H-N ins. **تتعذب**.

39a15 In the place of **الهيئات**, H-N and SH-H have **الهيئة**.

39a16 **الجسم** is replaced with **الحس** in H-N, SH-H. Just before **وحيل**, SH-H ins. **كما قال تعالى**.

39a16-17 Qur'ān 54:34.

39b1 Delete **طبيعتلرى**.

39b7 **ويعنى الظلمة** is substituted with **حيارى** in H-N. The phrase **اذا الظلمة لا معنى لها الا عدم النور**, which appears as **عدم النور** in SH-H (p. 201), does not exist in H-N.

39b9 (M) (V) (C) add **شوالرى** to the end of the line.

39b11 Read **دلهان**.

39b12 Between **والخوف** and **الفرع**, H-N, SH-H ins. **والهموم**.

39b14 Corr. to **ولهذا** (M) (C) (V).

40a1 In the place of الخشرات, (M) and H-N have الحشرات. Delete two dots over كَمْسَنَه نَك.

40a3 Read مختل.

40a5 Read the last word as خشرات.

40a6 The last word is الفاضلات.

40a7 Ḥadīth: A.J. Wensinck, *Concordance et Indices de la Tradition Musulmane*, vol. 4, p. 451.

40a9 بحرالنور (SH-H); بحرالنور (C) (V) and (H-N).

40a11 In the place of the Ḥadīth ما لا عين رأت و لا اذن سمعت (M) has the Ottoman rendering of it: كوزلرگوممش و قلقلر اشتممش. Corr. to حقه (M) (C) (V).

40a12 Thw second الملكية is skipped in (V) and is substituted with الملكة in H-N.

40a13 لايتناهى لذاتها does not exist in H-N.

40a14 والملكيت is skipped in (M).

40a15 Ins. قادر اولور between ايتكه and اولور (M) (C). قادر اولور is mistakenly repeated twice in (C).

40a16 القاهرة does not exist in H-N.

40b2 بروح appears as روح in H-N and SH-H.

40b3 Read هواجس.

40b4 The first word is باباسى كه.

40b5 Just before و قد يتفق, insert the following long passage that exists in both H-N (pp. 83-85) and SH-H (pp. 203-209):

كما تنجذب إبرة حديد إلى مغناطيس لايتناهى و كما لا نسبة للقوى إلى النفس أكمل و أشمل من إدراك القوى ولا لأنوار الله والقديسين إلى المحسوسات فلا نسبة للذة إلى اللذة. والأول عاشق لذاته فحسب معسوق لذاته و لغيره ولا يصل إلى لذة (هويته به) لذة. و سينكشف للنفوس الفاضلة اذا ابرزت من ظلمة الهياكل إلى سنى الجبروت و اشرقت على شرفات الملكوت ما لايناسبه انكشاف الأجسام للأبصار. بنور الشمس. و من انكر اللذات الروحانية فهو كالعنين إذا أنكر لذة الجماع. (و قد رجح البهائم على الملائكة والقديسين (Dawwānī, p. 208) (الهيكل السابع) النفوس الناطقة من

جوهر الملكوت وإنما يشغلها عن عللها هذه القوى البدنية فإذا
قويت النفس بالفضائل الوحانية وضعف سلطان القوى البدنية و
غلبتها بتقليل الطعام وتكثير السهر تتخلص أحيانا إلى عالم القدس
وتتصل بأبيها المقدس و تتلقى منه المعارف و تتصل بالنفوس
الغلكية العالمة بحركاتها وبلوازم حركاتها و تتلقى منها المغيبات
فى نومها و يقظتها كمرآة تنتقش بمقابلة ذى نقش.

40b7-9 The phrase from line 7, **فيشاهد** up to line 9, **الغيبى** (i.e. the whole Arabic citation is slipped into line 13, just before **واول** in (M), (C) and (V).

40b8 In the place of **منظومة**, H-N has **منطوقة** (p.85)

40b9 **الأمر العينى** (H-N, p. 85)

40b15 Corr. to **يتراى الشبه كأنه يصعد** (C) (M). H-N ins. **على تقدير**.
كانه between **الشبه** and **المحاكاة**.

40b16 Corr. to **ذو الشبح** (M) (C) (V).

40b17 Corr. to **بل الشبح**. And **حاكى** is replaced with **يحاكى** in SH-H₁ and H-N.

41a2 **شخص** is substituted with **شبح** in (M).

41a3 Corr. to **بلكه**.

41a6 Corr. to **اعنى**. And **لمشاهدة** appears as **لما يشاهد** in H-N, and **بما يشاهد** in SH-H. Read the last word as **المفارقة** in the place of which H-N has **المناجات الصادقة** and SH-H does only **الصادقة**.

41a7 Instead of **ملاعية** H-N and SH-H have **دعابة**. Read the last word as **التخيل**.

41a10 Instead of **المتألها** H-N has **الناطقة**.

41a11 H-N and SH-H ins. **الاول** after **الحق**. The phrase **فتخضع لها العنصریات** does not exist in H-N and SH-H.

41a13 **تابع** is skipped in (M).

41a14 After **فعلها**, SH-H ins. **مثلا**, **من الأحراق مثلا**.

41a16 In the place of **اشرقت النفس**, H-N has **استشرقت** and **من النفس** and SH-H **واستنارت**. Before **واستنارت**, H-N ins. **من نفس اشرقت**.

41a17 **الأكوان** is replaced with **الأنوار** in H-N.

41b1 Add to the end of the line **مستشرق و مستنقى** (M) (V).

41b2 Add to the end نيتكم .

41b3 The last word is وجوههم . Between المستشرقين and رجال ,
H-N ins. لأنوار الله .

41b6 Read در يدلرى جانبه در . Ins. (M) or اندن (C) (V) just after
انوار التماس و اقتباس . Read the end القدس .

41b7 The whole line is: ايدرلر و بونلره منجلى اولور تجليات قدسيه .
Suhrawardī's arabic citation is ان هداية الله before which SH-H (p. 212) and
H-N (p. 87) ins. كما أنذرت الزورة ذات الألق حيث ألققت .

41b8-10 The whole text is: ادركت قومًا اصطفوا باسطة ايديهم ينتظرون
الرزق السماوية فلما انفتحت أبصارهم وجدوا الله مرتديا بالكبريا
(H-N, p. 87; SH-H, pp. 212-213) اسمه فوق نطاق الجبروت .

41b8 The phrase باسطة ايديهم does not exist in H-N and SH-H.

41b11 Read the beginning چنكم هداية الله بر قومه

41b12 Read سماويه درلر . Corr. to بصر , and read the end as بصر
بصيرتلىرنى .

41b14 The last word is نبوت .

41b15 The unreadable part of the line is: انبياه وويلات اولياية موهبت

41b16 Read مع هذا ينة ادراك كنه

42a1 Delete the illegible word at the beginning of the line and instead ins.

يجب على

42a2 Corr. to امثالهم .

42a2-3 The phrase beginning with تلك و in line 2 and ending with العالمون
in line 3 is a verse from the Qur'an 29:43.

42a4 Read the last word as امثالى .

42a7 To the beginning of Suhrawardī's citation كما انذر , H-N (pp. 87-88)
and SH-H (pp. 214-215) add the following: وكما انذر بعض النبوات (انى
أريد أن أفتح فمى بالأمثال)، فالتنزيل موكول إلى الأنبياء
، والتأويل والبيان إلى المظهر الأعظم الفارقليطى

42a7-8 حيث قال does not exist in H-N and SH-H.

42a8-10 Cf. Bible, Saint John 14:16, 26, 15:26, 20:17.

42a9 ياتىكم is replaced with ينبئكم in H-N, SH-H.

42a10 علم does not exist in H-N and SH-H.

42a12 Qur'an 75:19.

42a13 Corr. to **ديديكه** (M) (V).

42a15-16 The phrase from **هر شكلي**, line 15 up to the end of line 16 is skipped in (M).

42a17 Corr. to **تعليم** (C) (V).

42b1 Add the following phrase to the end of the line after deleted **كو** :

كوندر ديدوكي ممسوح بالنور (C) (M) (V).

42b2 Read the end as **مستغرق** and then ins. **نوردر و قرآن عظيمده**.
اشارات (M) (C) (V).

42b3 Read the beginning as **پر بشارت** and after **كه** add **الحقيقا بيزم**
اوزريمزه واجبدركه يا محمد (M) (V) (C)

42b4 The first word corr. to **سكا** (M) (V) (C). Read the last word as **المشدر**.

42b5 Corr. to **دخي حضرت** and read the end **بهذا قبل أن يكون**.

42b8 Corr. to **خاتمة** before which the following long passage that exists in both H-N (pp. 89-90) and SH-H (pp. 216-220) is omitted:

ولا شك أن أنوار الملكوت نازلة (لإغاثة) الملهوفين وأن شعاع
القدس ينبسط وأن طريق الحق يفتح كما اخبرت الخطفة ذات البريق
ليلة هبت الهجا والنير يدنوقبلته صاحبها وهو يدنو من النير
صاعداً انفتح له سبيل القدس ليصعد إلى (رحاب) مبعث البرازخ
الأكبرين. ربنا آمننا بك،واقررنا برسالتك وعلمنا أن ملكوتك
مراتب، وأن لك عباداً متألّهين،يتوسلون بالنور إلى النور على
أنهم قد يهجرون النور للظلمات ليوسلوا بالظلمات إلى النور
فيحصلون بحركة كحركات المجانين قرة عين العقلا وعدتهم فأرسلت
إليهم رياحا مبشرات لتحملهم إلى عليين ليمجدوا سبحانك وليحملو
أسفارك (وليتعلقوا) بأجنحة الكروبيين وليصعدوا بحبل الشعاع
وليستغيثوا بالوحشة والدهشة لينالوا الأنس أولئك هم الصاعدون
إلى السما وهم القاعدون على الأرض.

42b9 **الناعسات من النفوس** is substituted with **النفوس النائمات** in
H-N and SH-H.

42b11 **كامل** appears as **اكمل** in H-N.

42b12 **حليتنا** corr. to **سبيلنا** (Abū Rayyān). **الرضا و القضا** (H-N, SH-H)

42b13 **حليتنا** corr. to **سبيلنا** (H-N, SH-H)

In the place of **منان** (M) has **يا وهاب**.

42b14 Delete **ما** preceding **حق**. Read the last word as **غفلتده**.

42b15 Corr. to **نائمه** ئ and read the next word as **بیدار**. Delete the small dot (.) over **ایلیه**.

42b16 Corr. to **تقدیس** (M) (C) (V). Read the last word as **ایدوب**.

42b17 Corr. to **حصه لریمزی** (M) (V) (C).

43a1-4 I transcribe the first four lines which are mistakenly intermingled with those of the preceding page in the process of copying from the microfilm:

Line 1: فضائلك اصلیدر و بیزه نصیب ایله قضایه رضاکی یا رب سن: بیزه

Line 2: فتوتی طریق ایلویور و روشنالغی رفیق ایلویور تحقیقا: جمیع علمنه

Line 3: جود و عمل معطی و وهاب سن. آمنة و صدقنا. بیت:

Line 4: هر که خواند دعا طمع دارم زانکه من بندئه کنهکارم (This does not exist in (M) (V).

43a5 Read the ending part as **اللطيفة الشريفة**.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 'Abdullah, Yūsuf 'Alī. *The Holy Qur'ān, Text, Translation and Commentary*. Brentwood: Amana Corporation, 1989.
- Abdur Rabb, Muḥammad. *Persian Mysticism Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī*. Dacca: The Academy For Pakistan Affairs, 1971.
- Algar, Hamid. "Anqarawī, Rosuḳ-al-Dīn Esmā'īl." *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987. Vol. 2 : 100.
- 'Alī Cānib. "Anḳara'da Yetiſen Meſhūr Sīmālardan Anḳaravī Ismā'īl Efendī." *Hayāt Mecmū'asi* 1 (1927) : 3-5
- 'Alī Enver. *Semāhāne-i Edeb*. Istanbul: 'Ālem Maṭba'ası, 1309.
- Aminrazavi, Mehdi. "Suhrawardī's Theory of Knowledge." Ph. D. Dissertation. The Temple University, 1989.
- Anḳaravī, Ismā'īl Rusūhī. Refer to Part One, Chapter II : 20-51.
- Arberry, Arthur, J. Trans. with intro. *The Qur'ān Interpreted*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Arnaldez, R. "Ischrāq and Ischrāqiyyūn." *EI2*. Vol. 4 : 119-121.
- al-Ash'añ, Abū al-Ḥasān. *al-Ibāna: 'an Uṣūl al-Diyāna'*. Hyderabad, 1948.
- Ateſ, Aḥmed. "Ibn Al-'Arabī." *EI2*. Vol. 3 : 707-711.
- . "Mesnevīnin Onsekiz Beytinin Mānası." 60. *Doğum Yılı Mūnasebetiyle Fuad Köprülü Armağanı*. Istanbul: Osman Yalçın Matbaası, 1953. 37-50.
- al-Baghdādī, Ismā'īl (Paſā). *Hadiyyat al-'Ārifīn Asmā' al-Mu'allifīn wa Athār al-Muſannifīn*. 2 vols. Istanbul: Vakālat al-Ma'ārif, 1951.
- . *İdāḥ al-Maknūn Fī al-Dhayl 'alā Kashf al-Zunūn*. Istanbul: Ma'ārif Maṭba'ası, 1364/1945.

- Banarlı, Nihad Sami. *Resimli Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*. 2 vols. Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1976.
- Başlangıçtan Günümüze Kadar Büyük Türk Klasikleri: Tarih, Antoloji, Ansiklopedi.*"İsmâîl Rusûhî Efendi." Vol. 12 : 101-102.
- Bible: the Holy Bible, Containing the Old and New Testaments* (King James Version). The Gideons International and National Publishing Company, 1978.
- Brockelmann, Carl. *Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur*. 5 vols. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1937-1949.
- al-Bukhârî, Muḥammad b. Ismâ'îl. *The Translation of the Meanings of Şaḥîḥ al-Bukhârî*. 9 vols. Trans. M. Muḥsin Khān. 6th ed. Lahore: Kazi Publications, 1983.
- Çavuşoğlu, Semiramis. "The Kadızadeliler Movement: An Attempt of Şeri'at-Minded Reform in the Ottoman Empire." Ph.D. dissertation. Princeton University, 1990.
- Cevdet Paşa, Aḥmet. *Tezâkir*. Ed. Cavid Baysun. 4 vols. 2nd ed. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1986.
- Chittick, William C. *The Sufi Path of Love The Spiritual Teachings of Rumi*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983.
- . *Faith and Practice of Islam Three Thirteenth Century Sufi Texts*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992.
- Corbin, Henry. *Avicenna and the Visionary Recital*. Trans. W. R. Trask. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
- . *En Islam Iranien*. 4 vols. Vol. 2, *Sohravardi et les Platoniciens de Perse*; vol. 4, *Aspects Spirituels et Philosophiques*. Paris: Gallimard, 1971-2.
- . *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabi*. Trans. Ralph Manheim. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969.
- . *Face De Dieu et Face De L'Homme Herméneutique et Sufisme*. Paris: Flammarion, 1983.

- . *Philosophie iranienne et Philosophie comparée*. Paris: Editions Buchet / Chastel, 1985.
- . *Temple and Contemplation*. Trans. P. Sherrard with assistance of L. Sherrard. London: Islamic Publications, 1986.
- . Ed. *Terre Céleste et Corps de Résurrection de l'Iran Mazdéen à l'Iran Shi'ite*. Paris: Buchet / Chastel, 1960.
- Davidson, Herbert A. "Alfārābī and Avicenna on the Active Intellect." *Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 3 (1972) : 109-178.
- . *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- . *Proofs for Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Dawwānī, Jalāl al-Dīn. *Shawākil al-Ḥūr Sharḥ-i Hayākil al-Nūr*. Eds. with intro. and notes. M. 'Abdul Ḥaq and M. Yousuf Kokan. Madras: Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, 1953.
- Elgin, Necati. "Ismail Ankaravî (Mesnevî Şārihi Rusūhî Dede)." *Anit* 30 (1960) : 31-36.
- Evliyā Çelebi. *Evliyā Çelebi Seyāhatnāmesi*. Ed. and transform. into modern Turkish by Zuhuri Danişman. 2nd ed. 15 vols. Istanbul: Zuhuri Danişman, 1971.
- Fakhry, Majid. *A History of Muslim Philosophy*. 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.
- . *Islamic Occasionalism and Its Critique by Averroes and Aquinas*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958.
- . "Al-Suhrawardī's Critique of the Muslim Peripatetics (al-Mashsha'un)." *Philosophies of Existence Ancient and Medieval*. Ed. Parviz Morewedge. New York: Fordham University Press, 1982. 279-284.
- al-Fārābī, Abū Naşr Muḥammad. *Iḥşā' al-'Ulūm*. Beirut: Centre de développement national, 1991.

- al-Fāriḍ, Abū al-Najā. *Kitāb al-Khamṣīn Mas'ala Fī Kasr al-Mantiq*. In *Mantiq wa Mabāḥithi Alfāz Majmū'a-i Mutūn wa Maqālāt (Collected Texts and Papers on Logic and Language)*. Eds. M. Mohaghegh and T. Izutsu. Tehran: McGill University, Institute of Islamic Studies Tehran Branch, 1974.
- Flügel, Gustav. *Die Arabischen, Persischen und Türkischen Handschriften der Kaiserlich-Königlichen Hofbibliothek zu Wien*. Vol. 1. Wien: Druck und Verlag der K.K. Hof-und Staatsdruckerei, 1865.
- Galanti, Avram. *Ankara Tarihi*. Istanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1950.
- Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad. *Al-Ghazālī's Mishkāt al-Anwār*. Trans. W.H.T. Gairdner. Lahore: Muḥammad Ahsraf, 1991.
- . *Mishkāt al-Anwār*. Ed. Abū al-'Alā 'Afīfī. Cairo: Dār al-Qawmiyya, 1382/1964.
- . *Mizān al-'Amal*. Ed. S. Dunyā. Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1965.
- . *Le Tabernacle des Lumières (Mishkāt al-Anwār)*. Trans. Roger Deladrière. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1981.
- Goichon, A.M. "Ḥikma." *EI2* Vol. 3 : 377-378.
- Gölpınarlı, Abdalbaki. *Mevlânâ Müzesi Yazmalar Kataloğu*. 2 vols. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1967-1972.
- . *Mevlânâdan Sonra Mevlevîlik*. Istanbul: Inkilap Kitabevi, 1953.
- Goodman, Lenn E. *Avicenna*. London and New York: Routledge, 1992.
- Gutas, Dimitri. *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988.
- al-Ḥallāj, Ḥusayn Manṣūr. *Le Dîwân d'al-Hallāj*. Ed. and trans. Louis Massignon. Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1955.
- Heath, Peter. *Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) With a Translation of the Book of the Prophet Muhammad's Ascent to Heaven*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992.

- . "Ibn Sīnā's Journey of the Soul." *Journal of Turkish Studies Türklük Bilgisi Araştırmaları* 18 (1994) : 91-102.
- Hodgson, Marshall G.S. *The Venture of Islam*. 3 vols. Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1974.
- al-Hujwīrī, Abū al-Ḥasan. *Kashf al-Maḥjūb*. Ed. V. Zuhkofski. Tehran: Mu'assasa-i Maṭbu'āt-i Amīr Kabīr, 1957.
- Ibn Rushd (Averroes), Abū al-Walīd. *Kitāb Faṣl al-Maqāl (On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy)*. Trans. George Hourani. London: Luzac & Co., 1961.
- . *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut: The Incoherence of the Incoherence*. 2 vols. Trans. Simon Van Den Bergh. London: Oxford University Press, 1954.
- Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Abū 'Alī al-Ḥusayn. *Aḥwāl al-Nafs Li Ibn Sīnā*. Ed. A.F.al-Ahwānī. Beirut: Dār Iḥya al-Kutub al-'Arabiyya, 1371/1952.
- . "Fī Aqsām al-'Ulūm al-'Aqliyya." *Majmū'at al-Rasā'il*. Ed. Muḥyiddin Ṣabrī al-Kurdī. Cairo: Maṭba'at Kurdistān al-'Ilmiyya, 1328. 225-243.
- . *Fī Ithbāt al-Nubuwwat*. Ed. and intro. Michael Marmura. Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1968.
- . *al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt*. 3 vols. Ed. S. Duniyā. Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Babi al-Halabi, 1947.
- . *al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbīhāt Ma'a Sharḥ Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī*. Ed. Sulayman Duniyā. 4 vols. Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1960.
- . *Livre Des Directives et Remarques*. Trans. A.M. Goichon. Paris: J. Vrin, 1951.
- . *al-Najāt, Min al-Gharaq Fī Baḥr al-Dalālat*. Ed. M. Taki Dānishpazhūh. Tehran: Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tehran, 1985.
- . *al-Shifā': al-Ilāhiyyāt*. 2 vols. Eds. G.C. Anawati and S. Zayid. Cairo: al-Maṭābi' al-Āmira, 1960.
- . *al-Shifā': Avicenna's De Anima*. Ed. Fazlur Rahman. London: Oxford University Press, 1959.

- al-Isfahānī, Abū Nu'aym. *Ḥilyat al-Awliyā'*. 10 vols. Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Sa'āda, 1971-1979.
- İz, Fahir. *Eski Türk Edebiyatında Nesir: XIV. Yüzyıldan XIX. Yüzyil Ortasına Kadar Yazmalardan Seçilmiş Metinler*. 2 vols. Istanbul: Osman Yalçın Matbaası, 1964.
- Izutsu, Toshihiko. *The Concept of Reality of Existence*. Tokyo: The Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1971.
- al-Jāmī, 'Abd al-Raḥmān. *The Precious Pearl al-Jāmī's al-Durrah al-Fakhirah together with His Glosses and the Commentary of 'Abd al-Ghafūr al-Lārī*. Trans. with intro. and notes by Nicholas Heer. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979.
- al-Jurjānī, Sayyed Sharīf. *al-Ta'rīfāt*. Ed. 'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Umayra. Beirut: 'Ālam al-Kutub, 1987.
- Kātib Çelebi, Muṣṭafā b. 'Abdullah. *The Balance of Truth*. Trans. with intro. and notes by G.L. Lewis. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957.
- . *Fezleke-i Kātib Çelebi*. 2 vols. Istanbul: Cerīde-i Havādis Maṭba'ası, 1286-87/1871-72.
- . *Kashf al-Zunūn*. Eds. Şerafettin Yalçın and Kilisli Rifat Bilge. 2 vols. Istanbul: Ma'ārif Matbaası, 1941-43.
- Kaḥḥāla, 'Umar Riḍā. *Mu'jam al-Mu'allifīn Tarājim Muṣannifī al-Kutubi al-'Arabiyya*. 15 vols. Damascus: Maṭba'a al-Taraqqi, 1957.
- Karamustafa, Ahmet T. *Vâhidī's Menakib-i Ḥvoca-i Cihān ve Netīce-i Cān, Critical Edition and Analysis*. In *Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures* 17. Eds. Şinasi Tekin and Gönül A. Tekin. Harvard University: Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, 1993.
- Kerametli, Can. *Galata Mevlevihānesi Divan Edebiyatı Müzesi*. Istanbul: Türkiye Turing and Otomobil Kurumu, 1977.
- al-Kindī, Abū Yūsuf. *al-Kindī's Metaphysics: A Translation of "On the First Philosophy (Fi al-Falsafa al-Ülā)"*. Trans. with intro. and commentary by A.L. Ivry. Albany: State University of New York, 1974.

- Köprülü, M. Fuad. *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*. Ed. and trans. Gary Leiser. Albany: State University of New York, 1992.
- Landolt, Hermann. "Ghazālī and 'Religionwissenschaft' Some Notes on the Mishkāt al-Anwār." *Asiatische Studien (Etudes Asiatiques)* 45 (1991) : 19-72.
- , "Suhrawardī's 'Tales of Initiation'." *Journal of the American Oriental Society*. 107 (1987): 475-486.
- , "Walāya." *Encyclopedia of Religion*. Vol. 15 : 316-323.
- Lifchez, Raymond., ed. *The Drevish Lodge, Architecture, Art and Sufism in Ottoman Turkey*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.
- Macdonald, D. B. "The Development of the Idea of Spirit in Islam." *Acta Orientalia* (1931) : 307-351; reprint. in *The Muslim World* 22 (1932) : 153-168.
- Mehmed Süreyyā. *Sicill-i 'Osmānī or Tezkire-i Meşāhir-i 'Osmāniye*. 4 vols. Istanbul: Matba'a-i 'Āmire, 1308-14/1890-97.
- Mehmed Ṭāhir (Bursali). *Meşāyih-i 'Osmāniyeden Sekiz Zātin Terācim-i Aḥvālī*. Istanbul: Kütübhanē-i Islām İbrāhim Hilmī, 1318.
- , *Osmanlı Müellifleri*. Eds. and transform. into Modern Turkish by A. Fikri Yavuz and Ismail Özen. 3 vols. Istanbul: Meral Yayınevi, 1974.
- Molé, Marijan. "La Danse Extatique en Islam" in *Les Danses Sacrées: Sources Orientales VI*. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1963. 145-280.
- Morewedge, Parviz. "A Philosophical Interpretation of Rūmī's Mystical Poetry: Light, the Mediator, and the Way." *The Scholar and the Saint: Studies in Commemoration of Abū'l-Rayhān al-Bīrūnī and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Rūmī*, ed. Peter J. Chelkowski. New York: New York University Press, 1975.
- Muḥibbī, Muḥammad al-Amīn ibn Faḍl Allah. *Khulāṣat al-Āthār fi A'yān al-Qarn al-Ḥādī 'Ashar*. 4 vols. Beirut: Maktabat Khayyat, n.d.
- Muṣṭafā Sāḳīb, known as Sāḳīb Dede. *Sefīne-i Nefīse-i Mevleviyān*. Egypt, 1283.
- Naimā, Muṣṭafā Efendī. *Tārīh-i Naimā*. Transform. into modern Turkish by

- Zuhuri Danişman. 6 vols. Istanbul: Zuhuri Danişman Yayınevi, 1967-1969.
- Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. "The Spread of the Illuminationist School of Suhrawardī." *Studies in Comparative Religion* 6 (1972) : 141-152.
- . *Three Muslim Sages*. Lahore: Suhail Academy, 1988.
- Nicholson, Reynold A. *Studies in Islamic Mysticism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
- Nev'izāde 'Aṭāī, 'Aṭa'allah b. Yaḥyā. *Ḥadā'ikū'l-Ḥakā'ik fi Tekmiletş Şakā'ik*. 2 vols. Istanbul: 1268/1852.
- Nūri Paşa, Muştafā. *Netayicū'l-Vuḫū'āt: Kurumları ve Örgütleriyle İslam Tarihi*. 2 vols. in 1. Ed. and transform. into modern Turkish by Neşet Çağatay. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1979.
- Ormsby, Eric L. *Theodicy In Islamic Thought: The Dispute over al-Ghazālī's "Best of All Possible Worlds"*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Pertsch, Wilhelm. *Verzeichniss der Turkischen Handschriften. Vol 6 of Die Handschriften-verzeichnisse der Konigliche Bibliothek zu Berlin*. Berlin: A. Asher and Co, 1889.
- Picthall, M. *The Meaning of the Glorious Qur'ān, Text and Explanatory Translation*. Karachi: Taj Company Ltd., n.d.
- Pines, Shlomo. *Studies in Abū'l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī Physics and Metaphysics*. 2 vols. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979.
- al-Qashānī, 'Abd al-Razzāq. *A Glossary of Şūfi Technical Term (Iştilāḥāt al-Şūfiyya)*. Trans. Nabil Safwat. Ed. David Pendlebury. London: The Octagon Press Ltd., 1991.
- Rahman, Fazlur. *Avicenna's Psychology: An English Translation of Kitab al-Najāt, Book II, Chapter IV*. London: Oxford University Press, 1952.
- . "Dream, Imagination and 'Ālam al-Mithāl." *Islamic Studies* 3 (1964) : 167-180.
- . *Selected Letters of Shaikh Aḥmed Sirhindī*. Karachi: Iqbal Academy, 1968.

- al-Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn. *al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀliyah min al-ʿIlm al-Ilāhī*. Ed. A. Hijāzī al-Ṣafāʾ. 9 vols. in 5. Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1987.
- Redhouse, J. W. *A Turkish and English Lexicon, Shewing in English the Significations of the Turkish Terms*. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1974.
- Rieu, Charles. *Catalogue of the Turkish Manuscripts in the British Museum*. London: British Museum, 1888.
- Ritter, Helmut. "Philologika IX: Die vier Suhrawardī." *Der Islam* 24 (1937) : 270-286.
- Robson, J. Ed. with intro. and trans. *Tracts on Listening to Music Being Dhamm al-Malāhī by Ibn abi'l-Dunyā and Bawāriq al-ʿIlmāʾ by Majd al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī al-Ghazālī*. London: Oriental Translation Fund, 1938.
- Rossi, Ettore. *Elenco Dei Manoscritti Turchi Della Biblioteca Vaticana*. Città Del Vaticano, 1953.
- Rūmī, Jalāl al-Dīn. *Dīwān-i Kāmil-i Shams-i Tabrīzī*. Ed. B. Furūzānfar. Tehran: Intishārāt-i Jāwidān, 1352.
- . *The Mathnawī of Jalālu'ddin Rumī*. Ed., trans. and annotated by R. A. Nicholson. 8 vols. London: Cambridge University Press (Luzac), 1925-1940.
- Sāmī, Şemseddin. *Ḳāmūsul-Aʿlām*. 4 vols. Istanbul: Mihrān Maṭbaʿası, 1306-1316.
- Schimmel, Annemarie. *The Triumphal Sun A Study of the Works of Jalāloddin Rumī*. London: East-West Publications, 1977.
- al-Shahrastānī, Muḥammad. *The Summa Philosophiae of al-Shahrastānī: Kitāb Nihāyat al-Iqdām fī ʿIlm al-Kalām*. Ed. and trans. Alfred Guillaume. London: Oxford University Press, 1934.
- Sharif, M. M. *A History of Muslim Philosophy*. 2 vols. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrosowitz, 1963-1966.
- Suhrawardī, Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā. *al-Alwāḥ al-ʿImādī*. In *Three Treatises by the Master of Illumination (Sā Risāla az Shaykh-i Ishrāq)*. Ed. N. Gholi Ḥabībī. Tehran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1977.
- . *L'Archange Empourpré: Quinze Traités et Récits Mystiques*. Trans. H. Corbin. Paris: Fayard, 1976.

- . *Hayākil al-Nūr*. Ed. M. 'Ali Abū Rayyān. Egypt: Maktabat al-Tijāriyyah, 1957.
- . *Hayākil al-Nūr*. In *Oeuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques: Opera Metaphysica et Mytica III (Majmū'a-i Āthār-i Fārisī Shaykh al-Isrāq)*. Ed. with intro. S. H. Nasr. Tehran: Department D'Iranologie De L'Institut Francais De Recherche, 1970.
- . *Hikmat al-Isrāq*. In *Oeuvres Philosophiques et Mystiques (Majmū'a-i Muşannafāt-i Shaykh-i Isrāq)*. Ed. H. Corbin. Vol. 2. Tehran: Academi Iranienne de Philosophie, 1977.
- . *Kalimat al-Taşawwuf*. In *Three Treatises by the Master of Illumination*. Ed. N. Gholi Ḥabībī. Tehran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1977.
- . *Le Livre De La Sagesse Orientale (Kitāb Hikmat al-Isrāq) Commentaires de Qoţboddīn Shīrazī et Molla Şadra Shīrāzī*. Trans. and notes by Henry Corbin. Paris: Verdier, 1986.
- . *Risāla fī l'tiqād al-Ḥukamā'*. In *Oeuvres Philosophiques et Mytiques*. Vol. 2. Ed. H. Corbin. Tehran: Academi Iranienne de Philosophie, 1977.
- . *al-Talwihāt*. In *Opera Metaphysica et Mystica I*. Ed. H. Corbin. Istanbul: Māārif Matbaasi, 1945.
- Türk Ansiklopedisi*. "Ankaravî Ismail Rūsūhî." Vol. 3 : 66.
- Thackston, Wheeler M. Jr., trans. *The Mysyical and Visionary Treatises of Shihābuddin Yaḥyā Suhrawardī*. London: Octagon Press, 1982.
- Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi*. "Rusuḥî Ismail Ankaravî." Vol. 7 : 359-360.
- al-Ṭūsī, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad. *Samā' wa Futuwwat*. Ed. Aḥmad Mujāhid. Tehran: Kutuphāna-i Manuchihri, 1981.
- Ülken, H. Ziya. "Şehabeddin Sühreverdi, Nur Heykelleri." *Türk Feylesofları Antolojisi I*. Ankara: Yeni Kitapçı, 1935. 60-76.
- Uzunçarşılı, İsmail Hakkı. *Osmanlı Tarihi*. 8 vols. 3rd ed. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1983.

- Walbridge, John. *The Science of Mystic Lights*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
- Wensinck, A.J., et al. *Concordance et Indices de la Tradition Musulmane*. Leiden: Brill, 1936-1969.
- Wolfson, Harry A. *The Philosophy of Kalām*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.
- Yazıcı, Tahsin. "Ismā'īl Rusūkh al-Dīn Ismā'īl b. Aḥmad al-Anḳarawī." *EI2*. Vol. 4 : 190.
- Yetik, Erhan. "Ankaravi Ismail b. Ahmed Rusuhî." *İlāhiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 3 (1989): 119-35.
- *Ismail-i Ankaravî: Hayati, Eserleri ve Tasavvufî Görüşleri*. Istanbul: İşaret, 1992.
- Yazdi, Mehdi Hairy. *Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy Knowledge by Presence*. New York: State University of New York, 1992.
- Yetkin, Saffet. Trans. *Nur Heykelleri*. Istanbul: Milli Eđitim Basımevi, 1988.
- Yūsuf Ziyā. Trans. *Heyākilü'n-Nūr. Miḥrāb* 1 (1340/1924) : 578-595.
- Ziai, Hossein. *Knowledge and Illumination A Study of Suhrawardī's Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990.
- Zilfi, Madeline C. *The Politics of Piety: The Ottoman 'Ulemā in the Postclassical Age (1600-1800)*. Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988.