

DIMENSIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE IN TURKEY:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
AKP GOVERNMENT AND DSP-MHP-ANAP COALITION

by
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ABSTRACT
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continuity, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi AKP [Justice and Welfare Party],
Demokratik Sol Parti DSP [Democratic Left Party]

This thesis assumes a substantial change in the Turkish foreign policy, specifically in the traditionally “sensitive” policy areas such as the Armenian issue, Cyprus conflict, Turkish- Greek relations and those with the EU. Therefore, the study aims to analyze the dynamics of foreign policy restructuring. For this purpose, foreign policy actions of the ruling AKP government and its predecessor DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition are compared and contrasted for illustrating the causes and dynamics of policy changes.

Literature on foreign policy restructuring cites three general factors affecting governments’ decisions to redirect their foreign policy intentions and actions that explain change and continuity of a state’s external relations: 1. International, 2. Domestic, and 3. those relating political agency and decision-making process.

Based on the comparative case findings, the analysis shows that domestic factors most influence foreign policy change: low regime vulnerability, together with a high level of political cohesiveness, and a novel orientation to foreign policy, positively

impact foreign policy change. From those relating to political agency and decision-making, a strong leadership is predicted positively with the cohesiveness factor. Low level of opposition and polarization, as well as decision-making process, however, show no impact on foreign policy change. The study reveals that international factors are not a decisive factor for change per se but can be meaningful depending on the nature and stage of the development; the impact of international factors is found issue specific. As a final point, dimensions of domestic regime change and bureaucratic rigidity were not found applicable for this research.

ÖZET

TÜRKİYE’DE DIŞ POLİTİKANIN BOYUTLARI:
AKP HÜKÜMETİ VE DSP-MHP-ANAP KOALİSYONU’NUN
KARŞILAŞTIRMALI ANALİZİ

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk dış politikası, dış politika değişimi, dış politika
devamlılığı, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP),
Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP)

Bu tez Türk dış politikasının “hassas” konuları olarak nitelendirilen Ermeni meselesi, Kıbrıs sorunu, Türk-Yunan ilişkileri ve Avrupa Birliği ile ilişkiler gibi dış politika alanlarında son dönemlerde siyasi davranış değişikliklerinin söz konusu olduğu varsayımına dayanmaktadır. Bu yüzden, çalışmanın amacı günümüz Türk dış politikasındaki yeniden yapılandırma dinamiklerini incelemektir. Bu çalışma, mevcut dış politika değişikliklerinin sebeplerini ve dinamiklerini tanımlamak amacıyla iktidardaki AKP hükümeti ve bir önceki DSP-MHP-ANAP koalisyonunun dış politika aksiyonlarını karşılaştırmakta ve kıyaslamaktadır.

Dış politikanın yeniden yapılandırılması literatürü, hükümetlerin dış politika niyet ve aksiyonlarında yön değiştirme kararlarını etkileyen ve devletin dış ilişkilerinde

değişim ve sürekliliği açıklayan üç genel etkene yer vermektedir: 1. Uluslararası faktörler, 2. İç politika faktörleri ve 3. Siyasi temsil ve karar alma süreciyle ilgili olan faktörler.

Karşılaştırmalı vaka araştırması bulgularına dayanarak yapılan analiz, dış politika değişimini en çok iç politika faktörlerinin etkilediğini göstermiştir: düşük rejim zedelenirliği, yüksek seviyede siyasi bağlılık ve dış politikaya yönelik yeni ve farklı bir oryantasyonla birleşince dış politika değişimi üzerinde olumlu bir etkiye sahip olmuştur. Siyasi temsil ve karar alma süreciyle ilgili unsurlar arasından güçlü liderlik, siyasi bağlılıkla olumlu bir etkileşim içindedir. Muhalefetin ve kutuplaşmanın seviyesi ile karar alma süreci dış politika değişimi üzerinde hiç etki göstermemişlerdir. Çalışma salt uluslararası faktörlerin dış politika değişimi için belirleyici olmadığını, ancak gelişmenin doğası ve aşamasına bağlı olarak anlamlı olabileceğini ortaya koymaktadır. Böylelikle uluslararası faktörlerin etkisi duruma özeldir. Son olarak, incelenen vakalar için iç politikadaki rejim değişimi ve bürokratik bükülmezlik boyutları uygulanabilir bulunmamıştır.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

During one state's course of foreign policy, various changes can take place. Some of these changes in external relations are minor and/or gradual whereas others, major and/or sudden. This research is interested in offering a further understanding to the study of foreign policy transformation within the context of contemporary Turkish foreign relations. For this purpose, foreign policy actions of the ruling AKP government and its predecessor DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition are analyzed by addressing the following questions.

1. What has changed with AKP's foreign policy compared to that of the previous Turkish government? What happened in Turkish Foreign Policy before and after AKP?
2. What causes change in foreign policy? What are the dynamics of such a change?

This study relies upon the fore mentioned assumptions that there has been a change in Turkish foreign policy with AKP Government, so the basic aim is to analyze the dynamics under which this change took place, by employing foreign policy restructuring literature.

Turkish foreign policy actors have been generally following a status quo approach and positional attitude in major foreign policy issues of the country such as the Armenian issue, Cyprus conflict, Turkish- Greek relations, and relations with the EU, issues which were causing major obstacles in Turkey's integration with the international community. AKP's predecessor DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition was again not an exception to the rule: based on the Coalition Protocol¹ and the Program of the Government², the coalition partners set EU membership as a goal, but underlined that they would not

¹ <http://www.belgenet.com/hukumet/57hprotokol.html>

² <http://www.belgenet.com/hukumet/program/57-1.html>

make any compromises concerning national rights or interests. Following the traditional line in Turkish foreign policy, DSP-MHP-ANAP declared a continuation with the policies protecting and improving the already gained rights of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Accordingly, the coalition partners gave for example their full support to Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş, who walked away from the table of UN sponsored talks for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict. For the improvement of relations with Greece and Armenia, DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition laid down rather offensive preconditions in their Government Program such as, for Greece, to stop supporting terror acts in Turkey, or, for Armenia, to stop the invasion in Azerbaijan.

However, it can be claimed that with the current AKP Government, Turkish foreign policy underwent a shift in the above listed traditionally ‘sensitive’ foreign policy issues. Initiating with the Program of the 58th Government³ of November 2002, AKP has been employing a different tone regarding foreign policy: reaffirming the full membership to the EU as Turkey’s main goal, AKP underlined its decisiveness for fulfilling the conditions and working for opening of accession negotiations. Concerning the relations with Greece, AKP assured continuing to build ground for the resolution of political conflicts. Most notably, the Government Program called for finding a solution of the Cyprus Conflict by all means. In this framework, policy initiatives have been taken such as the full support to the Annan Plan in Cyprus. Although AKP made no special reference to the Armenian issue in its Program, in practice, it again showed a problem solving approach by offering to the international community unlimited access to Turkish historical resources for investigation of Armenian allegations. Thus, the foreign policy orientation of AKP deviated considerably from its predecessor, DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition.

The following study endeavors to compare AKP’s foreign policy with the previous government’s foreign policy with the aim of demonstrating the causes of the changes in Turkey’s foreign policy orientation on the above mentioned sensitive foreign policy issues.

³ Summary translation made by the author. For the entire text in Turkish language, please look at: <http://www.belgenet.com/hukumet/program/58-3.html>

The cases for comparative case study were selected on the basis of their contemporary nature, and with the aim of highlighting the change of foreign policy concerning the country's major issues in the context of subsequent governments⁴.

The study furthermore aims to contribute to the existing theoretical literature on foreign policy restructuring by applying the analytical dimensions derived from the literature to the Turkish context and analyzing their individual impact on the transformation of the Turkish foreign policy.

For studying the causes and dynamics of foreign policy change, foreign policy restructuring literature is employed, which provides a list of analytic dimensions to map out such a change. Further in this chapter, the literature on foreign policy restructuring will be introduced.

In Chapter Two *Introductory Chapter on Turkish Foreign Policy*, important milestones and foreign policy developments with the accompanying domestic background from the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 until 1999 will be illustrated.

Chapter Three *Analysis and Application 57th Government of Turkey*, presents an in depth analysis of DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government's foreign policy along the analytical dimensions derived from the literature review in Chapter 1, whereas Chapter Four *Analysis and Application 58th and 59th Governments of Turkey*, applies the same analysis along the same dimensions to AKP Government's course of foreign policy. My timeframe for the comparative case study covers the period from 18 April 1999 Elections until 29 May 2005, which was the end of the data gathering process.

Finally, Chapter Five *Findings and Conclusion* attempts to answer the above stated research questions. It summarizes the main findings of our comparative case study and offers a refinement to the existing foreign policy restructuring literature.

⁴ The limitation concerning the case selection for this comparative case study is that DSP-MHP-ANAP was a coalition government, while AKP governs Turkey as a single party. Despite the difference of the type of government, for the purposes of this study, i.e. focusing on foreign policy change, the two cases were compared and contested.

Literature Review

Although foreign policy has evolved as a separate field of study under the political science/ international relations umbrella starting from 1960s and 1970s, foreign policy change or restructuring is still insufficiently explored phenomena and there is a limited literature available on them. Aside from some early attempts, the literature on foreign policy has predominantly developed focusing rather on conditions for stability than change. Academic interest on foreign policy change, evident only after the 1990s, was to a certain extent due to the new realities at international arena. The end of Cold War and the emergence of remarkable changes in world affairs led to a reorientation in foreign policies of many states. Thus, the concept of foreign policy restructuring started to receive increasingly more attention in the scholarly literature.

One of the early works regarding the study of foreign policy change is James Rosenau's *The Study of Political Adaptation* (1981)⁵. In his work, Rosenau argues that foreign policy is essentially an adaptation mechanism for nation-states to changes in their environments. Thus, foreign policy changes are most likely to occur when new needs and demands occur both domestically and externally.

A significant milestone in the foreign policy change literature is taken by Kal Holsti's *Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World* (1982)⁶. Holsti's contribution is crucial in defining and explaining why foreign policy restructuring occurs. He differentiates normal foreign policy change, which is slow and incremental from foreign policy restructuring, which is quick, non-incremental and fundamental. Holsti addresses why foreign policy restructuring occurs and under which conditions. He concludes that foreign policies of smaller, developing and more peripheral states are more likely to experience such a major shift.

⁵ Rosenau, J. N. 1981. *The Study of Political Adaptation: Essays on the Analysis of World Politics*. New York: Nichols Publishing.

⁶ Holsti, K. J. (ed.) 1982. *Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World*. London: Allen and Unwin.

In his work *Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: the Problems and Possibilities of Détente* (1988)⁷, Kjell Goldmann examines the contradictory tendency of states to adapt to changing conditions on one hand and to stick to previous policies on the other. He deals with the question of change and stability in foreign policy and its effect on the process of détente between US and USSR.

The article *Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy* by Charles Hermann (1990)⁸ adds to the literature on foreign policy restructuring, the role of the decision process for foreign policy change. According to Hermann, policymakers can either anticipate the changes in their environment; respond just in time or after suffering dramatic consequences. Furthermore, policymakers have the capacity to act as agents of change.

The edited volume *Foreign Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to Global Change* by Rosati, Hagan and Sampson III (1994)⁹ is one of the rare sources, which deals extensively with the concept of foreign policy restructuring from a theoretical perspective. It is one of the most recent and most comprehensive additions to this literature. This volume attempts to answer the following three research questions:

1. What is foreign policy change and restructuring?
2. What are the sources of foreign policy change? What bodies of theoretical knowledge and thought contribute to an understanding of foreign policy change?
3. To what extent does the study of change and restructuring contribute to an understanding of foreign policy and international relations?

In this volume, Volgy and Schwarz (1994) define the concept of foreign policy restructuring as “a fundamental and comprehensive change in foreign policy orientation of a nation, over a very short period of time, as manifested through behavioral changes in a nation’s interactions with other actors in international politics”¹⁰.

This definition implies the following series of properties:

⁷ Goldmann, K. 1988. *Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: the Problems and Possibilities of Détente*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

⁸ Hermann, C. F. 1990. “Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy.” *International Studies Quarterly* 34:3.

⁹ Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). 1994. *Foreign Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to Global Change*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

¹⁰ Volgy, T. J. and Schwarz, J. E. 1994. “Foreign Policy Restructuring and the Myriad Webs of Restraint.” in Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). *Foreign Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to Global Change*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press., p.25.

- Multidimensional change/co variation in behavior; e.g. change in verbal behavior in trade, in organizational activity, in diplomatic behavior.
- Focus on behavioral manifestations of change, i.e. intentions of change are ignored.
- Inclusive nature: at least two broad types of changes are included:
 - i) Changes in policy direction, ii) Changes in participation
- Temporal dimension: incremental changes excluded
- Threshold value of the quantity of change: minor changes excluded

Thus, three basic factors, which affect the nature of foreign policy change and restructuring, are the level, scope, and time frame of change.

There are forces inside and outside the state, which hold back such major changes occurring in foreign policy. According to Volgy and Schwarz, these forces can be categorized as bureaucratic, regime, resource, global and regional *webs of restraint*.


Rosati (1994) puts forward a theoretical model for understanding the dynamics of continuity and change in foreign policy. According to his model,

Foreign policy is a cyclical process in the sense that it tends to experience continuity which is eventually interrupted by change, followed by another period of continuity that eventually again will be interrupted by change. The cyclical nature of the process develops from the interaction of the state, the society and the environment, which generally acts to produce a political process that reinforces continuity, but which also, eventually produces contradictions to the status quo that contribute to change.¹¹

¹¹ Rosati, J.A. 1994. "Cycles in Foreign Policy Restructuring, The Politics of Continuity and Change in US Foreign Policy" in Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). *Foreign Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to Global Change*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press., p.222.

Rosati illustrates his model with the following figure¹²:

Figure I: Rosati's Cyclical Model of Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy.




According to Rosati, bureaucracy, high level policy makers, political systems with varying degrees, international patterns and constraints, such as agreements, commitments, commercial relationships as well as international law and regulations constitute sources of stability and foreign policy continuity, whereas maladaptive policy and crises lead to transition and foreign policy change.

Foreign policy patterns resulting from a period of transition can range from intensification, meaning no or little change, to refinement covering minor changes or reform that includes moderate changes until restructuring, which implies major changes. Hagan and Rosati (1994) propose that in order to explain foreign policy change, multi causal explanations should be taken into account, which reflect the complex interplay of governmental, domestic, and international factors. According to the authors, the third mechanism of foreign policy change, the policy making process, is best viewed within the context of the other two sources of foreign policy as diagrammed below¹³.

¹² *ibid.* p. 227

¹³ Hagan, J. D. and Rosati, J. A. 1994 "Emerging Issues in Research on Foreign Policy Restructuring" in Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). *Foreign Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to Global Change*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press., p.272.

Figure II: Hagan and Rosati's Multi causal Explanations for Foreign Policy



For Hagan (1994), the effect of domestic factors on foreign policy change is of crucial importance. One of the sources of foreign policy restructuring is domestic political regime change, which implies that a new leadership group or coalition of groups comes to power and takes control of the authoritative policy making bodies of the government. Hagan makes a typology of domestic regime change as follows:

Type I: A change in the predominant leader

Type II: A major factional or coalition shift

Type III: A regular exchange of power between contending mainstream parties and groups

Type IV: A political revolution bringing to power an “antisystem” group or coalition.¹⁴

According to Hagan, a domestic regime change leads to foreign policy restructuring only under the conditions when political actors with different orientations to foreign affairs come to power and the new regime enjoys a political cohesiveness. Here, political cohesiveness refers to coherence and consistency among those who represent the new regime about the foreign policy orientation. Foreign policy restructuring is further effected by political system conditions such as the strength of

¹⁴ Hagan, J. D. 1994 “Domestic Political Regime Change and Foreign Policy Restructuring” in Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). *Foreign Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to Global Change*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press., pp. 144-146.

political opposition to the regime, the level of polarization over foreign policy issues, regime vulnerability, and political system structure, i.e. the degree of accountability and institutionalization of the new regime.

Hagan puts forward the following dimensions of foreign policy restructuring:

- Accommodation vs. Confrontation: “This dimension refers to a regime’s propensity to deal with adversaries through diplomatic bargaining as opposed to confrontational strategies....”¹⁵
- Independence/Interdependence of Action vs. Contacts/Multilateral Ties: “This dimension is the degree of autonomy a government tries to maintain in its foreign policy actions.”¹⁶
- Level of Commitment: “...refers to the degree to which current actions limit future options.”¹⁷

The most recent contribution to the literature on foreign policy restructuring is Jakob Gustavsson’s *“How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change”* (1999). The author reviews six different models including those of Hermann, Rosati and Goldmann that have been designed to explain why governments occasionally choose to make radical changes in their foreign policies and presents a model on his own, which he applies to the Swedish Government’s 1990 reorientation on membership in the EC/EU¹⁸. In brief, Gustavsson argues that the field should focus on the simultaneous occurrence of changes in fundamental structural conditions, strategic political leadership, and the presence of a crisis of some kind.

There is a shared understanding among the authors of foreign policy restructuring literature that a “need exists for a synthesis and the development of an integrative theory”¹⁹, which “observes the combined importance of international and domestic structural conditions, political agency and the decision-making process.”²⁰

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p. 157

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 158

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p. 159

¹⁸ Gustavsson J. 1999. “How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?” *Cooperation and Conflict*, Sage Publications, 34: 1, pp. 73-95.

¹⁹ Hagan, J. D. and Rosati, J. A. “Emerging Issues in Research on Foreign Policy Restructuring” in Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). *Foreign Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to Global Change*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press., p.275.

²⁰ Gustavsson J. 1999. “How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?” *Cooperation and Conflict*, Sage Publications, 34: 1, p. 92.

Operational Definitions of Analytical Dimensions

The literature review above suggests that there are three main factors that affect foreign policy restructuring. The first two factors consist of independent variables that can lead to a dramatic change in foreign policy, while the third factor involves intervening variables that would restrain such a change²¹:

- A. International Factors
- B. Domestic Factors
- C. Political Agency and Decision-making Process

Based on the above general categories, Table I below summarizes the analytical dimensions which will be applied to the two cases in order to analyze foreign policy restructuring of the previous DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition and the current AKP government.

²¹ The literature review suggests that the trigger for foreign policy change is most likely to come from international or domestic factors. However, it is important to note that political agency and decision-making process may also be sources to initiate a change under special circumstances. For example, depending on the style of a leader, a foreign policy change can be triggered by leadership.

Table I: Summary Table of Analytical Dimensions of Analysis

A. International Factors
a.1. Change in Systemic Conditions
a.2. Regional Developments
a.3. Foreign Commitments
B. Domestic Factors
b.1. Domestic Regime Change
b.2. Different Orientations to Foreign Policy
b.3. Political Cohesiveness of the New Regime
b.4. Strength of Political Opposition to the Regime
b.5. Level of Polarization over Foreign Policy Issues
b.6. Regime Vulnerability
C. Political Agency and Decision-making Process
c.1. Bureaucratic Rigidity
c.2. Leadership Dynamics
c.3. Decision-making Process

A: *International factors* are comprised of (1) changes in systemic conditions, (2) foreign commitments, and, (3) regional developments.

a. 1. : Changes in systemic conditions reveal significant developments and alterations concerning the existing international system. These may include changes in the type of polarity such as from bipolar to multi polar in the post Cold War era, or such developments like September 11th, which led to unilateral acts of a hegemonic power. “The type of global system existing at any point in time may restrict or enhance the flexibility of states and their decision-makers to change the direction of their foreign policies”²². For example, it is more likely for governments to make a foreign policy

²² Volgy, T. J. and Schwarz, J. E. 1994. “Foreign Policy Restructuring and the Myriad Webs of Restraint.” in Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). *Foreign Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to Global Change*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press., p.32.

restructuring in the context of a multi polar system as compared to the bipolar system as during the period of Cold War, since conditions of multi polarity increase the flexibility of all actors for deviating from hegemonic leadership of superpowers.

a. 2. : In addition to global considerations, regional developments are on the agendas of governments. Regional developments include factors such as “the degree of regional integration and competition as well as the existence and intensity of a regional conflict”²³. For example, especially since the end of the Cold War, governments increasingly became more conscious of their regional roles, which can be considered as a source for foreign policy restructuring. Developments such as the enlargement of the EU or the two Gulf Wars can be considered as examples for regional developments.

a. 3. : Foreign commitments are the international ties of governments, usually with legal consequences, that shape the foreign policy being followed. “Commitment refers to the degree to which current actions limit future options”²⁴ through the allocation of resources or the generation of expectations in others. Examples of major foreign commitments are the signing or breaking agreements or deployment of resources abroad (military forces or foreign aid). Lesser commitments rest on verbal behaviors such as promises and threats to act. Governments have national resources at hand to fulfill their commitments.

B: *Domestic factors* include (1) domestic regime change, (2) different orientations to foreign policy, (3) political cohesiveness of the new regime, (4) strength of political opposition to the regime, (5) level of polarization over foreign policy issues, and (6) regime vulnerability.

b. 1. : Domestic regime change involves an exchange of governing power between contending groups in a state. According to Hagan (1994)²⁵, this exchange may take a variety of forms ranging from revolutions to a regular change of government through elections. A new government can provide a potential ground for a foreign policy restructuring, if the government represents a coherent set of novel ideas and different orientations to foreign policy, and if these ideas are shared by the members of the government.

²³ *ibid.* p.35.

²⁴ Hagan, J. D. 1994 “Domestic Political Regime Change and Foreign Policy Restructuring” in Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). *Foreign Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to Global Change*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press., p. 159.

²⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 143-146.

b. 2. : Different orientations to foreign policy involve a new set of policy preferences and strategies of the new regime in power for dealing with foreign policy issues, if the new regime differs from its predecessor on the identification and assessment of threats and issues. According to Hagan (1994), “it is, in effect, the ‘national interest’ of the country as defined by the group or coalition currently in power”²⁶.

b. 3. : Political cohesiveness of the new regime entails coherence and consistency among those who represent the new regime about the foreign policy orientation. Here, the type of government, i.e. whether the government is formed by a single party or a coalition of different political parties, plays an important role.

b. 4. : A strong political opposition can also be a source affecting foreign policy change. It is useful to consider the strength and intensity of opposition, i.e. dissenting actors with the ruling party about foreign policy preferences. Political opposition institutional in character is performed by the opposition party, the legislature, the military etc. The ability of the new regime to retain power over the long term usually necessitates support of these institutions. Political pressures of the opposition may point to constraining as well as inducing effects.

b. 5. : According to Hagan (1994)²⁷ the level of polarization over foreign policy issues concerns the extent to which actors in a regime and opposition have substantive differences over foreign policy issues. The level of polarization asks whether there is a consensus on the basic identification of threats and problems facing the state and on the basic strategies for coping with those threats. Political constraints are further intensified as foreign policy debates become tied up with the political competition for office.

b. 6. : Regime vulnerability concerns the threats at systemic level to the existing political system structure, which involves structural arrangements and political norms governing the relationship of the government with the opposition and the wider polity, and the threats to territorial integrity such as terrorist acts. For example, the potential risk that a government could lose its office increases the level of regime vulnerability. This removal may be caused by political opposition challenging the control of the new

²⁶ *ibid.* p. 146.

²⁷ Hagan, J. D. 1994 “Domestic Political Regime Change and Foreign Policy Restructuring” in Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). *Foreign Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to Global Change*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press., pp. 155-156.

government such as the military, or by the political uncertainty within the government itself such as losing support of factions or coalition members.

C: *Political Agency and Decision-making Process* entails (1) bureaucratic rigidity, (2) leadership dynamics, and (3) decision-making process.

c. 1. : Bureaucratic rigidity concerns policy incrementalism, which holds back a government's ability to transform foreign policy. "Much of the conduct of foreign policy is a function of bureaucracy which tends to act as a major source of continuity over time"²⁸, i.e. for the maintenance of the status quo. Bureaucratic rigidity is likely to lead to a difference of opinion between the government and the bureaucrats over foreign policy issues and may reveal itself in form of criticizing, procrastinating or even hindering of government's actions by the bureaucracy.

c. 2. : Leadership dynamics involve the position and influence of a political party leader within his or her party. This factor is central for governmental political processes at a micro level as a condition for the implementation: a strong leadership, meaning a leader with a high support of his party members, is more likely to have the capacity for implementing a comprehensive change in foreign policy, while a weak leadership inhibits the possibilities for foreign policy restructuring.

c. 3. : Decision-making process concerns the way how foreign policy decisions are made at a micro level²⁹. Policy changes usually occur after entering and passing through a decision-making process, where policymakers launch a political proposal, place the new policy option on the political agenda and manipulate the political process by acting in a strategic way, in order to bring about the desired outcome. The decisions concerning foreign policy restructuring may be made on a participatory basis, i.e. by involving various policymakers into the process, or in a more authoritarian way, i.e. the process may be dominated by one policymaker or a group of policymakers.

²⁸ Rosati, J.A. 1994. "Cycles in Foreign Policy Restructuring, The Politics of Continuity and Change in US Foreign Policy" in Rosati, A.J., Hagan, J.D., and Sampson III, M.W. (ed.). *Foreign Policy Restructuring, How Governments Respond to Global Change*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press., p.229.

²⁹ For simplicity purposes, only the formal decision-making process will be examined in this study.

CHAPTER 2

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER ON TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter briefly describes the major foreign policy issues faced by Turkey and the corresponding policies and orientations followed by Turkish foreign policy makers, for the period starting from the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 until mid 1999, parallel to important landmarks concerning the domestic as well as international political environment. In this period,

Turkey has faced four major foreign policy challenges. The first, in the early and mid 1920s, saw the challenge of consolidating the emerging state of Turkey, especially through external recognition; the second came with the Second World War and the need to remain outside of a conflict that raged all around, spanning most of Europe and the Middle East; the third came with the territorial and security challenge from the Soviet Union, especially during the early period of the Cold War; and the fourth coincided with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of bipolarity, and the need to navigate carefully through the transitional period in the international system³⁰.

For the sake of simplicity, this lengthy period is chronologically divided into three subsequent phases, taking the Cold War as the turning point affecting Turkey's contemporary history. Hence, the following pages demonstrate the essentials of Turkish foreign policy before, during, and after the Cold War era.

³⁰ Robins, P. 2003. *Suits and Uniforms, Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War*. London: Hurst& Company. p. 1.

Turkish Foreign Policy before the Cold War

For many countries, one of the most important foreign policy objectives throughout history has been security, i.e. protecting the independence and sovereignty of their country from foreign threats. This goal has been particularly significant for Turkey, because its mere existence was threatened in the aftermath of World War I. Turkey has emerged as a completely sovereign state only after fighting a War of Independence and signing a new peace treaty, the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, with the victorious powers of World War I. Thus, “the foreign policy objectives of this new state - the Republic of Turkey- were very much colored by the experiences and the hardships that it underwent to claim its independence and territorial integrity”³¹.

Turkish foreign policy from 1923 until the end of World War II in 1945 is usually characterized as “cautious, realistic and generally aimed at the preservation of the status quo and the hard won victory of 1923”³². In this period, Turkey basically followed “a policy of neutrality in international disputes”³³ to preserve its long sought independence. Furthermore, Ankara made serious efforts for improving its relations with neighboring countries throughout 1920s and 1930s, by signing friendship treaties and/ or forming various regional pacts and alliances based on the fundamental principle of ‘peace at home and peace in the world’ laid down by Republic’s founding father and the first President, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,.

“Two basic issues dominated Turkish foreign policy during the Atatürk years. The first was the Montreaux Treaty on the Straits (the Bosphorus and Dardanelles). The second was the Hatay dispute”³⁴. Both of these issues were leftovers from the Lausanne Treaty and resolved through modifications favoring Turkey’s interests. The Montreaux Treaty of 1936 replaced the collective security system run by the League of Nations, and acknowledged Turkish sovereignty over the Straits. Concerning the Hatay (Alexandretta) dispute, this territorial issue between France and Turkey was taken to the

³¹ Çelik, Y. 1999. *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*. Westport: Praeger Publishers. p. 29.

³² Zürcher, E. J. 1993. *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris. p. 209.

³³ Çelik, Y. 1999. *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*. Westport: Praeger Publishers. p. 30.

³⁴ Gültaşlı, S. & İlter, K. *Turkish Foreign Policy in the 20th Century*.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_02_00&d=probe&fn=FOREIGN.HTM lastly accessed on 1 May 2005.

League of Nations with the consent of the two parties, and resolved peacefully following the free elections and plebiscites held in Hatay, so that this territory eventually joined Turkey in 1939.

World War II disrupted the favorable international conditions and Turkish foreign policy actors faced a more complicated picture during the World War II. “Ankara devoted considerable energy to stay out of the war, as it felt that the country was not ready militarily, economically, or politically to be involved in another major war so soon...Its strategy was termed ‘active neutrality’.”³⁵ “Although İsmet İnönü, the Turkish President during the War, faced enormous pressure from the Allied Powers to take part in the war, he was able to save his country from having to participate in the war”³⁶. Turkey succeeded in remaining neutral until the very end of World War II, and declared war on Germany and Japan in March 1945 for practical purposes, i.e. in order to be invited to the forthcoming United Nations Conference. Although Turkey’s wartime policies were strongly criticized by the Allied powers, the young Turkish Republic saw it as a great political success, asserting its independence and sovereignty while protecting its territorial integrity³⁷.

In this first period from 1923 to 1945, Turkey was a single party state run by *CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* [Republican People’s Party] except for the two very short-lived and unsuccessful multiparty democracy experiments. “Although the 1924 Constitution placed all power in the Grand National Assembly as the only legitimate representative of the sovereign will of the nation... the voting ... was not much more than a formality”³⁸. Due to the authoritarian nature of the regime,

...the decisions that were made during the 1923- 1945 period, especially foreign policy decisions, thus emanated from the upper echelons of the CHP. Foreign policy was not an area that was open to debate, and not even the opposition parties (during their brief existence) questioned the validity of the decisions taken by the CHP leadership in this area.³⁹

³⁵ Çelik, Y. 1999. *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*. Westport: Praeger Publishers. pp. 31.

³⁶ Gültaşlı, S. & İlter, K. *Turkish Foreign Policy in the 20th Century*. http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_02_00&d=probe&fn=FOREIGN.HTM lastly accessed on 1 May 2005.

³⁷ Çelik, Y. 1999. *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*. Westport: Praeger Publishers. pp. 31-32.

³⁸ *ibid.* pp.33-34.

³⁹ *ibid.* p. 35.

Turkish Foreign Policy during the Cold War

In the aftermath of World War II, the US and the Soviet Union emerged as the strongest major powers; the world was divided into two conflicting camps led by each. Through the formation of this bipolar international system, foreign policy decision-making in Turkey became largely defined by the role that Ankara played in the international system. The necessity of building close ties with the West in order to protect national security became apparent for Turkey as early as 1945 with growing Soviet demands. Turkish policy makers recognized that Turkey would only be able to avert the Soviet threat if it formed a close alliance with the other superpower, the United States. Washington welcomed Turkey's alignment with the US by including Ankara in the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and further supporting it with substantial financial and military assistance through the Marshall Plan.

The first important foreign policy goal of Turkey in the late 1940s and early 1950s was gaining admission into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which was established in 1949. The then Prime Minister Adnan Menderes saw the Korean War as an opportunity to show Turkey's allegiance with the Western bloc and sent Turkish troops there. Turkey finally joined NATO in 1952, so that Turkey's role in the alliance for the next four decades became mainly serving as NATO's southern flank and containing the Soviet threat.

In the 1950s, Ankara entered into a number of regional alliances under the guidance of the Americans. One of them was the Balkan Pact formed in 1953 among Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. The other one was the Baghdad Pact in 1955 with Britain, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran, later transformed into the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1960. Both of these regional alliances remained mere political gestures and were not strong and effective enough to deal with Cold War realities.

A significant development in the European continent was the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, which was augmented by the European Community (EC) with the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Turkey, interpreted this regional cooperation development as a rational extension for consolidating its position as an integral part of the West, and submitted its application for membership as early as 1957. Turkey signed an Association Agreement, the so called Ankara Agreement with the EC in 1963, which outlined the terms and conditions

of Turkey's association with the Community, and set three stages. The first stage (preparatory stage) moved forward without major problems and Turkish and European officials launched the second stage (transitional stage) in 1973. However, both Turkish inner political turmoil at that time and the severe economic crisis in the 1970s, prepared the ground for not making the necessary steps to accede to the next stage of the Ankara Agreement. As Turkey suspended its relations with the EC at the end of the 1970s and experienced another coup as early as 1980, Greece managed to become a full member of the Community in 1981, which created further difficulties in Ankara's relationship with the Brussels. The normalization of the relations with the EC became possible gradually after the 1983 Elections in Turkey, and particularly after the submission of Turkish application for full membership in 1987 by the then Prime Minister Turgut Özal.

Çelik (1999) argues that, this strictly Western oriented foreign policy behavior of Turkey during the Cold War years was interrupted first, during the eruption of the first Cyprus Crisis in 1963-64 and the second, in 1973-74. There were several reasons why Turkish foreign policy behavior strayed from its regular parameters during the Cyprus conflicts. The first crisis occurred at a time of détente between the superpowers, so Turkish policy makers felt more able to engage in foreign policy behavior that was independent from American interests. Consequently, the so called Johnson letter led to the realization that the US would not assist Turkey if its own security were not at stake. With this awareness, Ankara attempted to diversify Turkey's foreign relations, e.g. Turkey became an associate member of the European Community in 1964. By the time that the second Cyprus Crisis occurred, therefore, Ankara was reevaluating the US commitments to Turkey and attempting to pursue a more balanced foreign policy, so Ankara acted against the advice of the US, carried out a military operation in 1974 and took control of the northern part of the island⁴⁰.

Despite these shifts in foreign policy behavior in the Cyprus context, increased Cold War hostilities in the late 1970s such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution prompted Turkish foreign policy to be aligned once again with American interests. Thus, it may be concluded that for the most of the Cold War period Turkey remained Western in its foreign policy orientation.

⁴⁰ Çelik, Y. 1999. *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*. Westport: Praeger Publishers. pp. 48-51 and pp. 59-61.

Another major component of Turkish foreign policy that remained unwavering during the Cold War period was the desire to stay out of the conflicts of Middle Eastern region, except for the activist policy in the late 1950s in the context of the regional organization referred as the Baghdad Pact. Ankara remained strictly neutral during the Iran-Iraq War, and maintained diplomatic relations with both Israel and the Arab states.

In sum, Turkish foreign policy until the end of the Cold War can be characterized with the strategies of affiliation with the West and non-intervention in the Middle East. Regardless of the government in power, there has been a continuity and consensus among decision makers to follow a foreign policy based on the international commitments.

Before 1989 international experts and practitioners tended to view Turkey as a bit player in a global game played between two blocs operating within one main international relations system. Turkey's loyal membership to NATO and earnest desire to deepen its relations with the EC tended to confirm this impression.⁴¹

The Cold War years also witnessed drastic changes in the Turkish domestic arena. It was not until the end of World War II that Turkey had its first real experience with multiparty democracy. Besides CHP, Demokrat Parti DP (Democratic Party) under the leadership of Adnan Menderes entered the political scene, caught the majority of electoral votes in 1950s and formed the government. With the entry of the DP into Turkish politics, the decision making arena expanded by including a diverse group of people such as industrialists, commercial groups, landed interests and the peasantry. Thus the different composition of the governing party reflected different priorities of the party-the focus on the liberalization and development of the Turkish economy- as well as the convergence of economic and foreign policy. Based on the merits of misgovernment and corruption, DP was removed from the office by the military coup d'état in May 1960.

1961 Constitution marked a new era in Turkish politics with its emphasis on civil and political rights. Political movements and parties from each side of the political spectrum flourished, and the society started to polarize between leftist and rightist movements. This period showed a highly fragmented party system, which consequently led to numerous coalition governments. Economic crises of the 1970s added further complications to political problems of the country. Finally, the polarization and

⁴¹ Robins, P. 2003. *Suits and Uniforms, Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War*. London: Hurst& Company. p. 1.

insurgencies between political extreme groups, the highly fragile party system, and the economic problems added up to another military coup in September 1980.

Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era

Fundamental changes have taken place in the structure of the international system with the end of the Cold War. The era of bipolarity came to an end following the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. These developments had significant repercussions for many countries' foreign policies including that of Turkey. The foreign policy arena was dominated by uncertainty and disagreement, which inevitably led to a search for a new foreign policy orientation. The changes in international system opened up new opportunities but also brought new challenges for Turkey.

At first sight, the end of the Cold War seemed to reduce threats to Turkey's national security and territorial integrity, since the immediate Soviet threat was lifted. Simultaneously, however, the collapse of the bipolar system brought some predictions that Turkey, whose place in the world had been defined by NATO membership and alliance with the US, had lost its strategic importance. Questions were raised about Turkey's ability to handle its new position and multiregional geopolitical importance. With the end of Cold War,

Turkey has gone from being a peripheral player in a global, bipolar conflict to being a central actor in a raft of actual or potential regional conflicts; as a state, it has literally gone from flank to front. The reality then is that Turkey is simultaneously both of less and of more strategic importance than it was before 1989.⁴²

Kut (2001) underlines that

On one hand, Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s inherited many issues from previous years: Relations with the European Union, Cyprus Conflict and Turkish-Greek conflicts still had primary importance for Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey's areas of interest have suddenly become diversified in the post-Cold War period.⁴³

⁴² Robins, P. 2003. *Suits and Uniforms, Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War*. London: Hurst& Company. p. 12.

⁴³ Rubin, B. and Kirişçi, K. (ed.). 2001. *Turkey in World Politics, an Emerging Multiregional Power*. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. p.10-11.

During the 1990s, Turkey, as never before during the Cold War, found itself with both the will and the opportunity to take an active approach beyond its borders. Despite failures to achieve some of its goals, in this new era Turkey's efforts were generally quite successful.

One considerable shift in Ankara's foreign policy strategies was due to Turkey's involvement in the politics of the Middle East. After Iraq seized Kuwait in 1990, Turkey was one of the first countries to ally with the US and to join the United Nations coalition against Iraq. By playing a central role in the First Gulf War, the then political leadership led by Turgut Özal clearly wanted to demonstrate Turkey's continued allegiance to its Western allies as well as highlight the country's strategic importance as the only democratic, pro-American, Islamic country in the Middle East. "The Iraq-Kuwait crisis proved to be an important success for Turkey, especially in reaffirming the predominance of the geostrategic view of Turkey within policy circles in the US."⁴⁴ The First Gulf War crisis also revealed Ankara's new policy supporting multilateralism and internationally sanctioned military intervention in conflicts where Turkey was not directly involved.

The close cooperation between the US and Turkey succeeded in strengthening of relations in the aftermath of the First Gulf War. Turkish and American policy makers continued sharing similar views and cooperating in a multiplicity of issues. One example was the war in Bosnia Herzegovina. Neither of the two countries was willing to take unilateral action, whereas they both called on the international community to help Bosnian Muslims. Another example was the relations with Moscow. Both the US and Turkey wanted to remain on friendly terms with Russia while making sure that Moscow did not expand its influence in the former Soviet republics. Accordingly, the US supported Turkey's efforts to find new ways to cooperate with Russia and the formation of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) project in 1992.

In the post-Cold War era, Ankara, quickly recognizing newly independent states from Central Asia to the Balkans, developed diplomatic, economic, and aid relations with these ex-communist states as well as participating in international efforts to solve conflicts from Nagorno-Karabakh to Bosnia Herzegovina. Turkish troops served simultaneously in peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania. In the Balkan, Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asian areas, Turkey tried to influence the

⁴⁴ Robins, P. 2003. *Suits and Uniforms, Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War*. London: Hurst & Company. p. 17.

developments using not only its geopolitical position but also its historical and cultural ties with the newly independent states.

It is important to note that

the changes in Turkey's foreign policy after the Cold War did not derive from any revision of the basic principles, objectives or even priorities of Turkey's foreign policy. Any new features were a result of the change in political geography and relationships outside Turkey. In other words, there has been no change in Turkey's foreign policy line of the status quo, but a change of the status quo in the regions surrounding Turkey.⁴⁵

In brief, post-Cold War Turkish foreign policy can be outlined as a pragmatic policy that supports the international community's consensus positions, advocates multilateral cooperation, and remains cautious. Turkey's principal orientation remained still toward the West and Europe and an alliance with the US. However, it can be said that developments after the Cold War presented an environment that both enabled and required Turkey to pursue a more active foreign policy.

Turkish could not stabilize in the 1990s either politically, or economically. The political scene was dominated by fragile coalition governments, and Turkey had to deal with serious economic crises. Furthermore, the regime vulnerability was extremely high due to the continuing acts of terror of separatist Kurdish terrorist organization PKK.

⁴⁵ Rubin, B. and Kirişçi, K. (ed.). 2001. *Turkey in World Politics, an Emerging Multiregional Power*. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. pp. 9-10.

CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION
THE 57th GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY

The 57th Government of Turkey came to office following the 18 April 1999 Elections⁴⁶. According to the election results, *DSP Demokratik Sol Parti* [Democratic Left Party] gained 22.17 % of the votes and became the first party, which was followed by *MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* [Nationalist Movement Party] with a percentage of 17.98 %, *FP Fazilet Partisi* [Virtue Party] with 15.39 %, *ANAP Anavatan Partisi* [Motherland Party] with 13.22 % and *DYP Doğru Yol Partisi* [Right Way Party] with 12.03 %. *CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* [Republican People's Party] and *HADEP Halkın Demokrasi Partisi* [Peoples' Democracy Party] could not enter the Parliament due to the 10 % threshold.

The President Süleyman Demirel gave the duty to form the government to Bülent Ecevit. According to the coalition agreement of 28 May 1999, the 57th Government was formed as a coalition government composed of three political parties: DSP, MHP, and ANAP. The government received the vote of confidence in the Parliament on 9 June 1999. Bülent Ecevit, the leader of DSP became the Prime Minister of the 57th Government. The other two coalition partners Devlet Bahçeli from MHP and Mesut Yılmaz from ANAP were the two Deputy Prime Ministers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was mainly run by İsmail Cem and later for a short period by Şükrü Sina Gürel from DSP. However, concerning foreign policy issues, Mesut Yılmaz had a notable position, since he was responsible for Turkey- EU relations⁴⁷. The 57th Government of

⁴⁶ <http://www.belgenet.com/secim/secim1999.html>

⁴⁷ <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/hukumetler/57hukumet/gorev-dagilimi/gorev-dagilimi-yeni.htm>

Turkey remained in office until 18 November 2002, following the 3 November 2002 Elections.

According to the Coalition Protocol⁴⁸ and the Program of the Government⁴⁹, the coalition partners made the following commitments concerning foreign policy:

- Continuation of a peaceful foreign policy based on Atatürk's principle of "peace at home and peace in the world"
- Aim of foreign policy: becoming an active party in bilateral and multilateral international relations, while protecting Turkey's rights, interests and sensitivities.
- The first precondition for conducting relations with any foreign country or international institution: no support to the secessionist terror in Turkey.
- Turkey's full membership to EU is a natural right derived from history, geography, and agreements. Turkey's goal to be a full member with equal rights and status to other members will be sought but in return, there would be no compromises of national rights or interests.
- Priority areas: Balkans, Middle East and Caucasia; improvement of relations with Islamic countries.
- Following an active and consistent policy with Turkic states with the aim of improving cooperation in economic, social, cultural and political arenas.
- Improvement of already deep rooted and good relations with USA based on common and reciprocal interests.
- Improvement of relations with Black Sea Economic Cooperation member states, particularly with the Russian Federation.
- Improvement of relations with China.
- Continuation of policies protecting and improving the already gained rights of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.
- Preconditions for improving relations with Greece:
 - Greece should stop supporting terror acts in Turkey,
 - Greece should accept dialogue for the resolution of bilateral conflicts,
 - No connection with Turkey-EU relations should be made.
- Preconditions for initiating relations with Armenia:

⁴⁸ <http://www.belgenet.com/hukumet/57hprotokol.html>

⁴⁹ <http://www.belgenet.com/hukumet/program/57-1.html>

- Armenia should stop the invasion in Azerbaijan,
- Armenia should give up its hostile campaign against Turkey in international arena.
- Active support to Bosnia and Kosovo.

During the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, developments concerning traditionally “sensitive” policy areas such as the Armenian issue, Cyprus conflict, Turkish-Greek relations and the relations with the European Union that were inherited from previous periods, continued to occupy the heavy foreign policy agenda of Turkey. The following gives a detailed account of related events in this period:

Turkish-Greek Relations: Period of Rapprochement

PKK leader Öcalan's capture in 1999 led to weakening of Turkey's relations with a number of countries that had protected him including Greece, on the grounds that its officials hid the terrorist leader at the residence of the Greek ambassador in Kenya⁵⁰. Thus, the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition inherited already tense relations with Greece. The two countries had been in dispute with one another concerning various issues, including the airspace over the Aegean and Greece's support of the PKK. The picture was further complicated, since Athens had been successful at using its disputes with Ankara to its advantage by blocking EU assistance to Turkey⁵¹.

Under these unfavorable circumstances, Foreign Minister İsmail Cem sent a letter to his Greek counterpart George Papandreou in May 1999 proposing cooperation with Greece to jointly combat terrorism⁵². Cem precautionously underlined that the cooperation proposal he had recently extended to Greece should not be seen as an indication of a retreat from Ankara's position, and that any improvement in bilateral ties depended on Greece's termination of its support for the terrorist PKK organization⁵³. Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou accepted Cem's offer by saying that Greece was willing to talk to

⁵⁰ Turkish Daily News. Elections Over: Back to Foreign Policy Agenda. 18.4.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_18_99&d=probe&fn=FOREIGN2.HTM

⁵¹ *ibid.*

⁵² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 6.6.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=06_06_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁵³ *ibid.*

Turkey about combating terrorism but was not yet ready to sign an agreement on the issue⁵⁴.

Meanwhile, Greece continued to block any large EU steps towards Turkey at the 3-4 June 1999 Cologne European Council, so that the then 15-member bloc appealed to Turkey to continue with economic and political reforms until the Union took up Turkey's case in six months at the Helsinki Summit. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit criticized the EU for using Greece as an excuse to block Turkey's entrance into the Union⁵⁵.

Greece and Turkey agreed to hold talks to discuss issues such as terrorism, tourism and trade in an incremental effort to improve relations⁵⁶, which could be interpreted as a cautious step toward better relations while avoiding for that time being contentious topics such as Cyprus⁵⁷. The first leg of the long-anticipated talks between Turkey and Greece ended in a positive atmosphere in Ankara in August 1999⁵⁸. However, Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou received intense criticism at home from opposition parties and Greek media.⁵⁹

The skeptics about Turkish- Greek rapprochement in both countries gave in after a killer quake in Turkey that was followed shortly by another one in Athens. On 17 August 1999, an earthquake with the strength of 7.4 of the Richter scale hit Turkey's northwestern industrial heartland early in the morning, causing massive damage and record deaths. In a show of support towards its neighbor, Greece was the first country that ordered its emergency services to help Turkey deal with the devastating

⁵⁴ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 4.7.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_04_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁵⁵ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 13.6.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=06_13_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁵⁶ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 4.7.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_04_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁵⁷ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 1.8.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=08_01_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁵⁸ *ibid.*

⁵⁹ *ibid.*

earthquake⁶⁰. This traumatic event marked a turning point in both countries' public opinion towards each other. Turkey's ambassador publicly thanked Greece for rushing aid to Turkish earthquake victims, saying he had been overwhelmed by offers of help⁶¹.

Starting from August, Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou hinted that the recently accelerated rapprochement between Turkey and Greece might result in the lifting of the longstanding Greek veto on EU funds for Turkey⁶². In September 1999, praising the growing atmosphere of solidarity between Turkey and Greece, Foreign Minister İsmail Cem stressed that the generous human response should stimulate 'political acts' of the same proportions by both sides⁶³. The same month, Greece declared that it would not create any problems with the EU providing financial aid for Turkey to overcome the devastation caused by the earthquake⁶⁴.

At a weekend meeting of EU foreign ministers, Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou gave signals of a potential change in Greek foreign policy declaring that his country was ready to let Turkey into the 15-nation union. Papandreou was quoted that the killer earthquake that hit Turkey 'created new climate', and that 'human warmth came out of this tragedy. A message came out ... that we must work for peace'⁶⁵.

Still in a process of coping with the disastrous impact of the 17 August earthquake, Turkey took immediate action to assist in the search and rescue efforts following a quake that shook Athens. Turkish search and rescue team AKUT was sent to Athens for participating in rescue activities⁶⁶.

⁶⁰ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 22.8.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=08_22_99&d=probe&fn=Dom2.htm

⁶¹ *ibid.*

⁶² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 29.8.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=08_29_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁶³ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 5.9.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=09_05_99&d=probe&fn=Dom2.htm

⁶⁴ *ibid.*

⁶⁵ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 12.9.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=09_12_99&d=probe&fn=Dom2.htm

⁶⁶ *ibid.*

Following these sad experiences in both countries, Greece and Turkey decided to form a joint emergency response team to deal with natural disasters⁶⁷. The UN General Assembly adopted, without a vote, a resolution that noted with satisfaction the decision by Greece and Turkey to establish a joint, standby disaster response unit⁶⁸.

Despite the warm atmosphere, critical issues between Turkey and Greece remained untouched. Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou, addressing Turkish academicians and journalists during his İstanbul visit in October 1999, underlined that Greeks were highly suspicious of Turkey's intentions in the Aegean Sea and of its policies over Cyprus⁶⁹. The same month, Turkish concerns about the upcoming Helsinki Summit revealed, as Prime Minister Ecevit expressed his hope that Greece would lift its veto on Turkey's entry into the EU⁷⁰.

The foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey promised to work toward friendship but continued not to mention key disputes or challenges that lie ahead. "The [confidence-building] process is moving along positively and much more quickly than expected... Already the tensions we used to encounter constantly have begun to dissipate", Foreign Minister Cem told reporters after meeting his Greek counterpart Papandreou in Greece⁷¹.

Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou declared that there could be no final rapprochement with Turkey until there was a settlement regarding Cyprus...and that Cyprus remained the main obstacle to achieving closer relations⁷², whereas Turkish

⁶⁷ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 26.9.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=09_26_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁶⁸ *ibid.*

⁶⁹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 10.10.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=10_10_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁷⁰ *ibid.*

⁷¹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 31.10.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=10_31_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁷² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 5.12.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=12_05_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

President Süleyman Demirel warned Greece that the recently improved relations could deteriorate again, if Greece objected to Turkey's bid for the European Union⁷³.

At the 10-11 December 1999 Helsinki European Council, Greece did not object to Turkey's candidacy and Turkey was finally granted candidate status by the EU. However, the EU offer explicitly called on Turkey to resolve its long-standing disputes with neighboring Greece before full membership negotiations could be launched⁷⁴.

Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis welcomed Turkey's EU candidacy conveying his hope that it would help resolve many of its chronic disputes with Greece, but added that the road to lasting peace 'would be long and difficult'⁷⁵. Prime Minister Ecevit replied that the EU candidate Turkey would do its utmost to solve its territorial disputes with Greece before the 2004 deadline for a negotiated solution set by the EU⁷⁶.

In January 2000, Papandreou repeated that Greece continued to support a settlement on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions, envisaging reunification through the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with a single international identity⁷⁷.

Besides Cyprus issue, arming and military remained thorny issues between Turkey and Greece despite the rapprochement. Greek military officials declared that Greece would not slow its costly military build-up despite the recent thaw in relations with longtime rival Turkey. Similarly, the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) declared discomfort about the current situation and complained about Greece's reluctance to launch a dialogue on basic military and security issues. The Turkish military was under the impression that Greece has not shown any sign of goodwill towards the resolution of disputes, and was instead increasingly arming itself⁷⁸.

⁷³ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 12.12.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=12_12_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁷⁴ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 19.12.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=12_19_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁷⁵ *ibid.*

⁷⁶ *ibid.*

⁷⁷ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 16.1.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_16_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁷⁸ Turkish Daily News. Turkish military sees no goodwill from Greece. 21.3.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_21_00&fn=FOR.HTM

Another problematic issue between the two rivals concerned the Halki Orthodox Theological School. Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou, on a landmark visit to Turkey, met Patriarch Bartholomew I and pressed for the reopening of Halki School closed by the Turkish authorities nearly 30 years ago⁷⁹.

In February 2000, Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem visited Greece and signed five cooperation deals with his counterpart⁸⁰. Thus, putting aside their main differences, the two countries, which were looking for areas of cooperation, signed a total of nine uncontroversial agreements encompassing cooperation on culture, maritime trade, customs administrations, science and technology, economic and technical studies, cooperation in combating terrorism and organized crime, tourism, the environment and the promotion and protection of investments⁸¹.

The contacts also continued at prime ministerial level. The Turkish and Greek Prime Ministers met and vowed to keep on improving their 'very positive' ties, and Simitis reiterated his support for Turkey's bid to join the European Union⁸².

Business leaders from both countries met in Athens and declared banking, shipping and tourism would be among the most promising possible joint ventures between Greece and Turkey in the current climate of détente⁸³.

Greek diplomats arrived in Turkey to help coach their Turkish counterparts on how to prepare for EU membership⁸⁴.

⁷⁹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 30.1.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_30_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁸⁰ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 13.2.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_13_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁸¹ Turkish Daily News. Will Cem and Papandreou Be Able to Begin Discussing Thorny Issues? 13.2.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_13_00&d=probe&fn=FOREIGN.HTM

⁸² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 20.2.2000

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_20_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁸³ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 27.2.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_27_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁸⁴ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 5.3.2000

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_05_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

Although Greece announced to participate for the first time in a multinational military exercise organized by Turkey⁸⁵, the concerns over Cyprus issue clouded this attempt and Greece pulled out of the military exercise in March 2000 after realizing the maneuvers could be held over northern Cyprus⁸⁶.

The reelection of Simitis Government in Greece was kindly welcomed by Turkey and raised hopes that Greece would continue a policy of rapprochement with traditional rival Turkey⁸⁷. Turkish government closely watched the new Greek government's cabinet composition with regard to possible effects on improved Turkish-Greek relations⁸⁸.

In May 2000, Foreign Ministers Cem and Papandreou were given 'Statesman of the Year' awards by the US East-West Institute⁸⁹.

On 19 May 2000, Turkish warplanes made a historic landing on Greek soil to join NATO exercises, displaying the remarkable improvement in relations between the longtime regional rivals⁹⁰. However, the Turkish General Staff, clarifying news and comments in the Turkish media that Turkey might agree to dismantle its Aegean army as a goodwill gesture to Greece, issued a written statement denying that it was prepared to abolish that army⁹¹.

While Greek Premier Simitis said further improvements in relations between Greece and Turkey would depend on finding a peaceful solution to the division of

⁸⁵ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 12.3.2000
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_12_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁸⁶ *ibid.*

⁸⁷ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 16.4.2000
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_16_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁸⁸ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 23.4.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_23_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

⁸⁹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 7.5.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=05_07_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

⁹⁰ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 28.5.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=05_28_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

⁹¹ *ibid.*

Cyprus since 1974⁹², the Greek government continued with its good will gestures such as the lifting of visa requirement for Turks who want to visit Greek islands for one-day trips⁹³.

Despite considerable improvement in relations, in August 2000, Greek government spokesman Dimitris Reppas accused Turkey of being ‘stuck in the past’ and lacking in democracy, as he commented after Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem claimed the rights of the Muslim minority in Northern Thrace were not being respected⁹⁴. However, Greece also declared its will to retain a climate of good relations with traditional rival Turkey⁹⁵. The next month, Kostas Simitis underlined that Turkey faced a long road to joining mainstream Europe and needed constant reminders of what is required to meet that goal⁹⁶.

Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit hinted at Turkey’s irritation with the slow pace of progress in ties with Greece and said that the time had come to discuss fundamental territorial disputes⁹⁷.

Furthermore, Turkish military underlined the fact that although efforts have been made to decrease tensions between traditional rivals Greece and Turkey, more work needed to be done⁹⁸.

In a further sign of warming ties, Turkey and Greece submitted a joint bid to host the 2008 European Soccer Championship⁹⁹, and a Turco-Greek media conference was held in Istanbul¹⁰⁰.

⁹² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 9.7.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_09_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

⁹³ *ibid.*

⁹⁴ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 6.8.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=08_06_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

⁹⁵ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 3.9.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=09_03_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

⁹⁶ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 10.9.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=09_10_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

⁹⁷ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 17.9.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=09_17_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

⁹⁸ *ibid.*

⁹⁹ *ibid.*

Although the defense ministers of Greece and Turkey declared that there was a common interest from both sides to realize that the cost of armaments is a truly great burden on both nations, Turkey and Greece continued to have problems in the context of joint NATO exercises¹⁰¹. The Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey agreed to resolve bilateral differences within the NATO and in bilateral talks by announcing agreement on confidence-building measures in November 2000 in Budapest. Moreover, Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, paying the highest-level visit from Turkey to Greece in 12 years on 3 November 2000, once again called on Athens to discuss methods to solve disputes between the two countries¹⁰². Greece pledged to help traditional rival Turkey work towards membership of the EU. In this friendly atmosphere, Turkey and Greece began discussing a set of measures designed to prevent potential conflicts over territorial disputes in the Aegean Sea¹⁰³.

“Let's make the probability of war zero, let's cut defense spending”, Sabah newspaper quoted Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou as telling a group of Turkish journalists in Athens¹⁰⁴.

However, despite all these efforts, Cyprus conflict remained at the core as the thorniest issue on Turkish and Greek agendas. Greece continued with its position claiming that Turkey was responsible for the lack of settlement of the dispute and added that this situation would not help Turkey on its way to EU membership¹⁰⁵.

¹⁰⁰ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 8.10.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=10_08_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁰¹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 22.10.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=10_22_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁰² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 5.11.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=11_05_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁰³ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 19.11.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=12_10_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁰⁴ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 8.4.2001.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_08_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁰⁵ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 28.1.2001.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_28_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

In sum, during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, a significant improvement in Turkish-Greek relations is observed, which basically concerned low politics issues. The policies on controversial issues like the Aegean and Cyprus remained unresolved and continued to be an obstacle.

Relations with the EU: Candidacy

Ankara froze its political ties with the EU after that body decided to exclude Turkey from the list of candidates eligible for full membership in 12-13 December 1997 Luxembourg European Council. However, if the EU displayed a more positive approach towards Ankara in the upcoming summit in Cologne, the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition was likely to resume the suspended dialogue¹⁰⁶.

To Turkish leaders' disappointment, the 3-4 June 1999 Cologne European Council decisions¹⁰⁷ did not include any reference as regards to Turkey, leaving the issue of Turkish candidacy to the Helsinki Summit at the end of the year. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder expressed regret that Germany could not manage to secure any rapprochement between Turkey and the European Union during its presidency, which ended at the Cologne Summit. Schroeder said that they aimed at outlining an explicit calendar for advancing the Turkey-EU rapprochement but failed to do that due to the objections of 'a few Union members'¹⁰⁸, indirectly referring to Greek veto.

In the period from Cologne to Helsinki Summit, Turkish foreign policy issues were highly intertwined, such as the connection between Turkey's relations with the EU concerning its human rights issues, particularly with respect to the Öcalan case and the Kurdish minority, and with Turkish- Greek relations. As discussed before in more detail, Turkish- Greek rapprochement starting with the earthquake led to a considerable improvement in bilateral relations and a lift of Greek objection to Turkish candidacy. The developments concerning the Öcalan case and the Kurdish minority are discussed in more detail under the analytical dimension of B 2 Regime Vulnerability.

¹⁰⁶ Turkish Daily News. Elections Over: Back to Foreign Policy Agenda. 18.4.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_18_99&d=probe&fn=FOREIGN2.HTM

¹⁰⁷ Cologne European Council 3-4 June 1999. Presidency Conclusions. Obtainable from
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm

¹⁰⁸ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 13.6.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=06_13_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

10-11 December 1999 Helsinki European Council decisions, marking a historical change in Turkey- EU relations, finally granted candidate status to Turkey and included the following on Turkey's candidacy:

The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as noted in the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reforms towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria.

Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States.

Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a). Turkey will also have the opportunity to participate in Community programmes and agencies and in meetings between candidate States and the Union in the context of the accession process.

An accession partnership will be drawn up on the basis of previous European Council conclusions while containing priorities on which accession preparations must concentrate in the light of the political and economic criteria and the obligations of a Member State, combined with a national programme for the adoption of the *acquis*. Appropriate monitoring mechanisms will be established. With a view to intensifying the harmonization of Turkey's legislation and practice with the *acquis*, the Commission is invited to prepare a process of analytical examination of the *acquis*.

The European Council asks the Commission to present a single framework for coordinating all sources of European Union financial assistance for pre-accession¹⁰⁹.

Prime Minister Ecevit pledged rapid human rights and democratic reform to meet criteria set by the EU for eventual entry talks¹¹⁰. Foreign Minister İsmail Cem met EU officials in Brussels and said that Turkey could make quick progress towards EU membership terms following the Helsinki decision underlining that the granted candidate status would help to make necessary political and institutional reforms¹¹¹. The clear political will of Turkey was also appreciated by the EU officials. However, soon after Helsinki, human rights issues started to create tensions between Turkey and the

¹⁰⁹ Helsinki European Council 10-11 December 1999. Presidency Conclusions. Obtainable from http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm

¹¹⁰ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 26.12.1999. http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=12_26_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

¹¹¹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 6.2.2000. http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_06_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

EU¹¹². Predominantly, the problems regarding the Kurdish minority led to severe polarizations such as the EU Commissioner for Enlargement Verheugen's use of the phrase the "Kurdish problem", which was interpreted by Ecevit as 'racism' for blaming Turkey's 15-year campaign against Kurdish separatist terrorists on ethnic division¹¹³.

In April 2000, the EU conveyed Turkey its disappointment of the slow pace of human rights reforms since the country had achieved candidacy for EU membership in December¹¹⁴. Moreover, Ankara's failure to abolish the death penalty remained an obstacle to better relations as it sought membership in the EU¹¹⁵.

In July 2000, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit appointed his coalition partner Mesut Yılmaz as Deputy Prime Minister for Relations with the European Union, and declared that Turkey would fulfill conditions for EU membership 'earlier than anticipated'¹¹⁶. Soon afterwards, a European Union Secretariat was formed under Prime Ministry¹¹⁷.

In August 2000, after holding out for 34 years, Turkey signed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in a step towards joining the European Union¹¹⁸.

Turkey's main concern was that the Accession Partnership Accord would not include references to Turkish-Greek and Cyprus disputes, which was being prepared by

¹¹² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 27.2.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_27_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

¹¹³ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 26.3.2000 .

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_26_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

¹¹⁴ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 16.4.2000 .

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_16_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

¹¹⁵ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 11.6.2000 .

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=06_11_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹¹⁶ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 16.7.2000 .

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_16_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹¹⁷ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 27.8.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=08_27_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹¹⁸ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 20.8.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=08_20_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

the European Union¹¹⁹. Finally on 8 November 2000, the European Commission made public the Accession Partnership Document for Turkey¹²⁰. The document set short and medium-term goals for Turkey including democratic, economic, judicial, and social reforms. The Accession Partnership Document also referred to the Cyprus dispute in its short-term measures. Turkey accepted an EU road map to membership, despite the reservations over Cyprus demands, and confirmed that it would do everything necessary to meet requirements for sweeping democratic and economic reforms¹²¹. Now it was Turkey's turn to prepare the National Accession Program, which would delineate the road map to be followed by this country”¹²².

Prime Minister Ecevit asked the Prime Ministries of the EU in a letter to remove the Cyprus segment mentioned in the short-term measures of the Accession Partnership Document¹²³. Moreover, he issued a harsh warning to the EU, stating that Turkey would not be fooled by ‘nonsense’ on Kurdish minority rights and that the EU had ‘duped’ Ankara with regard to Cyprus and the Aegean. Also Foreign Minister İsmail Cem claimed that the EU made a big mistake in the Accession Partnership Document by referring to the Cyprus issue in the document's short-term priorities section¹²⁴.

The direct reference to Cyprus in the short term measures was changed to the following:

4.1 Short term

Enhanced political dialogue and political criteria

In accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, in the context of the political dialogue, strongly support the U.N. Secretary General's efforts to bring to a successful conclusion process of finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, as referred in the point 9(a) of the Helsinki conclusions.

¹¹⁹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 24.9.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=09_24_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹²⁰ Partnership for the Accession of Turkey obtainable from
<http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e40111.htm>

¹²¹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 12.11.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=11_12_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹²² Now It's the National Accession Program's Turn. Guzin Yildizcan. 19.11.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=11_19_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹²³ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 19.11.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=11_19_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹²⁴ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 26.11.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=11_26_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

4.2 Medium term

Enhanced political dialogue and political criteria

In accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, in the context of the political dialogue, under the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the U.N. Charter, make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues, as referred in point 4 of the Helsinki conclusions.¹²⁵

Preparation of the National Programme proved to be more difficult than expected. Amidst escalating tensions among coalition partners and the General Staff, Ankara announced that Turkey's priorities would be pivotal in the preparation of the National Program. Coalition leaders who met to discuss the details of the National Program apparently could not reach a compromise and postponed their final decision.

As a parallel development, Turkey refused to change its policy over the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) despite intensified pressure coming from the EU and the United States, stating that Turkey would not approve ESDP access to NATO unless Turkey was also included in the decision-making process¹²⁶.

The economic crisis in Turkey that resulted from a political crisis emerged at a time when were intensified relations between Turkey and the European Union. This situation raised concerns whether the latest negative developments would damage Turkey's bid for EU membership. While EU circles in Ankara tend to downplay the significance of the crisis, analysts have voiced concerns that Turkey's position was getting weaker in the EU on the eve of the presentation of the National Program¹²⁷.

Finally by the end of February 2001, coalition leaders and top military officers were able to reach a compromise regarding with the National Program at National Security Council (MGK) meeting¹²⁸, which was approved by the Cabinet on 19

¹²⁵ 2000: A Year of Ups and Downs With the EU. 7.1.2001.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_07_01&d=probe&fn=foreign.htm

¹²⁶ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 17.12.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=12_17_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹²⁷ Economic crisis damages Turkey-EU relations. 25.2.2001.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_25_01&d=probe&fn=foreign.htm

¹²⁸ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 4.3.2001.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_04_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

March¹²⁹. Turkey declared its National Program of Action for the eventual membership in European Union in a bid to express its readiness to launch far-reaching reforms¹³⁰.

In August 2002, Turkey's Parliament voted in favor of abolishing the death penalty in peacetime, and following a landmark two-day marathon session, the Parliament adopted a major reform package aimed at preparing the country for European Union membership¹³¹.

In sum, relations with the European Union continued at good speed during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition. However, Turkish foreign policy actors remained suspicious, divided and cautious on EU's demands on cultural rights and the role of the military in politics.

Cyprus Conflict

Concerning the resolution of the conflict, Turkey's and Turkish Cypriots followed a status quo approach during DSP-MHP-ANAP government.

Prime Minister Ecevit, rejecting a call from G8 countries for the resumption of UN sponsored talks between the two communities, stated that "there has been peace in Cyprus since the Turkish peace operation"¹³². The Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying the acknowledgement of the existence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) is the only way that can lead to the resumption of bilateral talks in long-divided Cyprus¹³³. This positional attitude was framed as making no concessions on the Cyprus problem¹³⁴. There was a great deal of harmony between the Turkish government and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş, who persistently said

¹²⁹ National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis of 19 March 2001 is obtainable from EU Turkey Communication Platform
<http://www.euturkey.org.tr/abportal/content.asp?CID=866&VisitID={ED128AAA-77B1-4135-89B5-836D9BE2F8E4}&Time=110>

¹³⁰ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 25.3.2001.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_25_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹³¹ Turkish Daily News. 2002 in Perspective. 5.1.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_05_03&d=probe&fn=politics.htm

¹³² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 27.6.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=06_27_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

¹³³ *ibid.*

¹³⁴ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 18.7.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_18_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

“No solution will be found in Cyprus without accepting the reality that there are two separate states on the island and without looking at those two states as equals”¹³⁵.

Attending the 25th anniversary celebrations of the Turkish intervention on Cyprus in July 1999, Ecevit warned in Nicosia that if the solution on the island was not based on a two-state confederation, an ‘enhanced’ integration between Turkey and the KKTC would be the alternative¹³⁶.

Meanwhile, United States was also encouraging parties to find a just and lasting solution to the dispute. Thomas G. Weston is named special coordinator¹³⁷. Cyprus problem was declared to be ‘one of President Clinton's major foreign policy priorities’¹³⁸.

In August 1999, Turkish Cypriot President Denktaş attended UN-sponsored proximity talks in New York¹³⁹, which ended without success. Starting from 3 December 1999, a new round of proximity talks was held¹⁴⁰.

Concerning the Helsinki European Council decisions, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş commented that the EU decision was a ‘Greek blackmail’ and would only serve to solidify the division on the island¹⁴¹, whereas he welcomed Turkish candidacy saying that it could help Europe better understand the problems of the divided island of Cyprus¹⁴².

Another round of proximity talks in Geneva again ended with no concrete results¹⁴³. The UN Security Council urged Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders to

¹³⁵ *ibid.*

¹³⁶ *ibid.*

¹³⁷ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 8.8.1999.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=08_08_99&d=probe&fn=DO M2.HTM

¹³⁸ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 29.8.1999.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=08_29_99&d=probe&fn=DO M2.HTM

¹³⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 12.12.1999.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=12_12_99&d=probe&fn=DO M2.HTM

¹⁴¹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 19.12.1999.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=12_19_99&d=probe&fn=DO M2.HTM

¹⁴² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 2.1.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_02_00&d=probe&fn=DO M2.HTM

¹⁴³ *ibid.*

continue talks on reunifying the Mediterranean island and expressed hope that progress on substantive issues could soon be made¹⁴⁴.

With the assignment of the new UN envoy Alvaro de Soto, Cyprus traffic gained pace again. Conditions, de Soto told¹⁴⁵, for ending the unofficial partition of Cyprus were more favorable than ever, adding his hopes that improving relations between traditional rivals Greece and Turkey could provide the necessary impetus to help solve the 26-year division of the island¹⁴⁶.

In March 2000, EU Commissioner for Enlargement Verheugen repeated EU's invitation for Turkish Cypriots to participate in the accession talks, but Denktas once again refused the offer saying that Turkish Cypriots were willing to open separate talks with the EU, but would never accept joining the Greek Cypriot delegation.¹⁴⁷

The Turkish government was fully supporting Denktas for his re-election as President. Furthermore, the International Atatürk Peace Award of 2000 was given to Denktas. On 24 April, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas is sworn in for his fourth term as President.¹⁴⁸

A new round of proximity talks were scheduled to resume on 5 July in Geneva.¹⁴⁹ UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, with the help of American and British envoys was drafting a new 'set of ideas', which would officially be conveyed to the two sides during the proximity talks, and if the two sides agreed on the package, the two Cypriot leaders would 'fill in the gaps' in the subsequent face-to-face stage¹⁵⁰. However, the third round of U.N.-brokered indirect peace talks aimed at reuniting Cyprus's Greek and Turkish communities broke off for consultations after a week of secret shuttle

¹⁴⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 26.3.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_26_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

¹⁴⁷ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 2.4.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_02_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

¹⁴⁸ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 30.4.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_30_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁴⁹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 21.5.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=05_21_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁵⁰ Turkish Daily News. Cyprus: New 'set of ideas' in offing. 11.2.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_11_00&fn=for.htm

diplomacy in Geneva¹⁵¹. The next round of U.N.-brokered indirect Cyprus peace talks was scheduled due Sept. 12 in New York¹⁵². However, Denktas ruled out the possibility of a direct meeting between himself and his Greek Cypriot counterpart Glafcos Clerides until he declared that he is not the president of the entire island¹⁵³.

Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for negotiations between the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in which each party “represented its side -and no one else- as the political equal of the other” at the start of the fourth round of the proximity talks¹⁵⁴. Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktas conferred with U.N. officials, while Greek Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides awaited clarification by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan before deciding whether or not to return to talks on Cyprus¹⁵⁵. After a two-day boycott, Greek Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides returned to the table¹⁵⁶. Turkey, in solid support of Turkish Cypriots, urged the United Nations to accept the existence of two separate states on Cyprus as a means to end the island's decades-old division¹⁵⁷. Denktas toughened his stance by saying that talks to reunite the divided island could be drawn out indefinitely unless his state's authority in northern Cyprus is acknowledged by Greek Cypriot rivals¹⁵⁸. Under these circumstances, the fourth round of the Cyprus proximity talks concluded in New York, without much progress. New round of proximity talks were scheduled to resume in Geneva in November¹⁵⁹, which again ended without visible progress and with a renewed warning

¹⁵¹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 16.7.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_16_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁵² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 3.9.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=09_03_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁵³ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 10.9.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=09_10_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁵⁴ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 17.9.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=09_17_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁵⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 24.9.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=09_24_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁵⁹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 1.10.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=10_01_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

that the process will be ‘long and drawn-out’, whereas Turkey underlined U.N. proposals at the Cyprus talks marked a step backwards in pursuit of a settlement on the divided island, and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas added that he might shun a further round¹⁶⁰.

Turkey’s position was crystallized after the Cyprus summit held at the Presidential Palace that unless the existence of the KKTC was acknowledged and the equality of the two sides on the island was established, continuation of the proximity talks process would only be a ‘waste of time’. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit supported the pulling out of Turkish Cypriots from the U.N.-sponsored peace talks¹⁶¹, while Alvaro de Soto, the U.N. special envoy for Cyprus, reportedly asked Turkish officials to convince Denktas to take part in the sixth round of proximity talks to be held at the end of January 2001¹⁶². Similarly, the United States urged Denktas to take part in next round of U.N.-sponsored peace talks¹⁶³. However, Denktas was not convinced¹⁶⁴ saying that he would not attend more U.N.-mediated talks over Cyprus unless he received the international recognition accorded to rival Glafcos Clerides¹⁶⁵.

Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) signed a protocol envisaging enhanced economic and financial cooperation between the two countries and finalizing the plans to transfer a credit to the KKTC¹⁶⁶. Foreign Minister İsmail Cem,

¹⁶⁰ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 12.11.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=11_12_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁶¹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 26.11.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=11_26_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁶² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 3.12.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=12_03_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁶³ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 17.12.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=12_17_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁶⁴ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 24.12.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=12_24_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁶⁵ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 28.1.2001.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_28_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁶⁶ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 14.1.2001.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_14_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

declared that if Greek Cypriots became EU member, there would be no other option for the KKTC but to integrate with Turkey¹⁶⁷.

By the end of July 2001, Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktas finally agreed to meet U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in New York¹⁶⁸ and in December 2001, Denktas was convinced to return to the negotiating table. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit welcomed the resumption of talks on Cyprus, which he said might ‘open a few doors’.¹⁶⁹

A solution to the Cyprus problem should be seen as “a win-win situation”, Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou told the U.N. General Assembly, calling on Turkey to show the necessary political will to make such a settlement possible¹⁷⁰.

In October 2002, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan began two days of talks with the leaders of Cyprus in hopes of progress toward a last-minute deal to reunite the island before the EU decided to invite the Greek Cypriots to join the bloc. However, this last attempt was not fully exhausted either, since Denktas had a heart surgery in New York¹⁷¹.

In sum, despite the pressure and efforts of international community to find a solution to the conflict before the [Greek] Cypriot entry to the EU, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots continued to follow a positional attitude and walked away from the negotiations.

Armenian Issue

In June 1999, Turkey reacted strongly to the opening of a monument commemorating the so-called Armenian genocide in a small French city. “It is obvious that the opening of the monument aims at fanning hostility against Turkey and the

¹⁶⁷ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 22.4.2001.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_22_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁶⁸ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 29.7.2001.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_29_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁶⁹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 9.12.2001.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=12_09_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁷⁰ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 17.9.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=09_17_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁷¹ Turkish Daily News. 2002 in Perspective. 5.1.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_05_03&d=probe&fn=politics.htm

Turks and harming relations between Turkey and France”, a Foreign Ministry statement declared¹⁷².

Another example was concerning a statement by the Israeli Education Minister Sarid that the so-called Armenian genocide accounts should be included in high school textbooks¹⁷³. As a retaliatory move, Turkish government instructed the Cabinet not to participate in Israel's national day reception¹⁷⁴. This small crisis could be overcome after the Israeli Foreign Minister Levy sent a letter to Foreign Minister Cem clarifying that Israel maintained its position that the issue should be left for historians¹⁷⁵.

A bigger crisis occurred when the U.S. House International Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Human Rights passed a resolution calling on President Clinton to officially label the alleged killings of approximately 1.5 million Armenians by Ottoman Turks from 1915 to 1923 a genocide. From the Prime Minister to Turkey's Armenian Patriarch, Turks expressed anger and disappointment¹⁷⁶. Although the Clinton administration dissociated itself from a congressional resolution recognizing the accusations, a crowd of sympathizers to the far-right MHP protested outside the U.S. Embassy. Turkey's Chief of General Staff Gen. Kivrikoğlu declared that the United States should study its own past. Turkey's National Security Council (MGK) joined the debate by stating that the claims brought to the U.S. House of Representatives' agenda by fanatical Armenians regarding the so-called genocide were viewed by the MGK with great regret¹⁷⁷. President Ahmet Necdet Sezer telephoned President Bill Clinton to express concern about the pro-Armenian resolution in Congress. Ignoring Turkish

¹⁷² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 13.6.1999.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=06_13_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

¹⁷³ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 30.4.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_30_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁷⁴ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 14.5.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=05_14_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁷⁵ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 28.5.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=05_28_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁷⁶ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 24.9.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=09_24_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁷⁷ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 1.10.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=10_01_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

condemnation and warnings from the Clinton administration that relations with Ankara could be damaged, the U.S. House of Representatives committee approved the resolution. Chief of General Staff Gen. Kivrikoğlu canceled a trip to the States in protest. Moreover, Turkey warned the United States that its jets could lose the use of the Turkey's Incirlik air base to patrol Northern Iraq¹⁷⁸.

This crisis could be overcome only after the U.S. President Bill Clinton expressed his 'deep concern' and potential 'far-reaching negative consequences' for the United States, so that the decision was withdrawn. Prime Minister Ecevit sent a letter to Clinton in order to thank him for his efforts to make a resolution possible¹⁷⁹.

By the end of 2000, the Armenian allegations caused renewed problems with France. Turkey warned France that relations between the two countries will be damaged if its Parliament passed a bill accusing Ottoman Turks of a massacre of Armenians in 1915¹⁸⁰. Turkey reacted strongly to a resolution passed by the French Senate recognizing a so-called Armenian genocide¹⁸¹. Turkish Defense Ministry cancelled a \$149 million deal with a French firm to launch a spy satellite in retaliation to the genocide allegations¹⁸².

In sum, DSP-MHP-ANAP Government followed a strict and reactionary status quo policy, by resorting to threats and retaliations to those who would sympathize with these allegations concerning the Armenian genocide allegations.

In this chapter, foreign policy of the 57th Government of Turkey will be described and analyzed according to the dimensions drawn in Chapter I.

¹⁷⁸ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 8.10.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=10_08_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁷⁹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 22.10.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=10_22_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁸⁰ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 5.11.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=11_05_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁸¹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 12.11.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=11_12_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

¹⁸² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 28.1.2001.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_28_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

A: International Factors

A.1. Change in Systemic Conditions

DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition era witnessed two post- Cold War American presidents with markedly different world views. The first one was Bill Clinton, the 42nd US President who has been in office for two terms starting from 1993 and continuing until 2001, when he handed over the US Presidency to George W. Bush, the 43rd US President, who is currently serving his second term as well.

Clinton's initiatives in foreign policy during his first term included a successful effort in September–October 1994 to reinstate Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been ousted by a military coup in 1991; the sponsorship of peace talks and the eventual Dayton Accords (1995) aimed at ending the ethnic conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and a leading role in the ongoing attempt to bring about a permanent resolution of the dispute between Palestinians and Israelis.¹⁸³

Clinton's success was not limited to foreign policy initiatives. "Clinton was handily reelected in 1996, buoyed by a recovering and increasingly strong economy. Strong economic growth continued during Clinton's second term, eventually setting a record for the country's longest peacetime expansion"¹⁸⁴.

Clinton's successful presidency term was unexpectedly shadowed over a private life issue. "In 1998, he became...the second US president to be impeached"¹⁸⁵.

After conclusive evidence of his affair [with Monica Lewinsky, a White House intern] came to light, Clinton apologized to his family and to the American public...The House of Representatives in 1998 approved two articles of impeachment, for perjury and obstruction of justice. Clinton was acquitted of the charges by the Senate in 1999. Despite his impeachment, Clinton's job-approval rating remained high.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³ Encyclopedia Britannica Profiles. The American Presidency. Clinton, Bill.
<http://www.britannica.com/presidentsWebapp/article.do?articleID=215395>

¹⁸⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ Encyclopedia Britannica Profiles. The American Presidency. Clinton, Bill.
<http://www.britannica.com/presidentsWebapp/article.do?articleID=9003019>

¹⁸⁶ Encyclopedia Britannica Profiles. The American Presidency. Clinton, Bill.
<http://www.britannica.com/presidentsWebapp/article.do?articleID=215395>

“Still, while suffering so many headaches at home, Clinton and his administration successfully continued in their role as Washington's global peacemaker”¹⁸⁷.

In foreign affairs, Clinton ordered a four-day bombing campaign against Iraq in December 1998 in response to Iraq's failure to cooperate fully with United Nations weapons inspectors (the bombing coincided with the start of full congressional debate on Clinton's impeachment).

In 1999 U.S.-led forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted a successful three-month bombing campaign against Yugoslavia designed to end Serbian attacks on ethnic Albanians in the province of Kosovo.

In 1998 and 2000 Clinton was hailed as a peacemaker in visits to Ireland and Northern Ireland, and in 2000 he became the first U.S. president to visit Vietnam since the end of the Vietnam War.

He spent the last weeks of his presidency in an unsuccessful effort to broker a final peace agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians.¹⁸⁸

While US foreign policy during Clinton's Presidency can be characterized with rather multilateralist and conflict resolution oriented foreign policy behavior¹⁸⁹, i.e. acting more cooperative and flexible for the resolution of bilateral and international conflicts¹⁹⁰, in 2001 the Presidency was handed over to the Republican George W. Bush with a different set of foreign policy preferences from his predecessor.

Narrowly winning the Electoral College vote over Vice President Al Gore in one of the closest and most controversial elections in American history, George W. Bush became the first person since Benjamin Harrison in 1888 to become president despite having lost the nationwide popular vote. He was narrowly reelected in 2004, defeating Democratic challenger John Kerry.¹⁹¹

Bush's and his team's world view prefers unilateralism over multilateralism. Although US' unilateralist approach became even more obvious after Sept. 11th atrocities, this approach based on a unipolar system that does not exclude the use of a military force, has been evident from the beginning of Bush's first term.

¹⁸⁷ Turkish Daily News. Man of the Year: Bill Clinton. 1.1.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_01_00&fn=FOR.HTM

¹⁸⁸ *ibid.*

¹⁸⁹ For more information on Clinton's Foreign Policy see Rubinstein A. Z. Shayevic A. Zlotnikov B. (eds.). 2000. The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader. New York: M.E. Sharpe. Chapter 1-5.

¹⁹⁰ For analytical evidence see Walker S. G., Schafer M., Young M. D. (eds.). Presidential Operational Codes and Foreign Policy Conflicts in the post-Cold War World in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 43 No. 5, October 1999. Sage Publications. pp. 610-625.

¹⁹¹ Encyclopedia Britannica Profiles. The American Presidency. Bush, George W. <http://www.britannica.com/presidentsWebapp/article.do?articleID=9126475>

In foreign affairs, the Bush administration announced that the United States would not abide by the Kyoto Protocol on reducing the emission of gases responsible for global warming (the United States had signed the protocol in the last days of the Bill Clinton administration) because the agreement did not impose emission limits on developing countries and because it could harm the U.S. economy. The administration also withdrew from the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and attempted to secure commitments from various governments not to extradite U.S. citizens to the new International Criminal Court, whose jurisdiction it rejected. To many of Bush's critics at home and abroad, these developments reflected a dangerous unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy.¹⁹²

Systemic conditions changed abruptly, as on 11 September 2001 four American commercial airplanes were hijacked by al-Qaeda terrorists and were deliberately crashed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York, and destroyed part of the Pentagon building outside Washington DC. “The crashes—the worst terrorist incident on U.S. soil—killed some 3,000 people and prompted calls around the world for a global war on terrorism”¹⁹³.

Bush toughened his rhetoric and charged the Taliban government of Afghanistan with harboring the al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. US administration managed to build an international coalition against terrorism with UN and NATO support. Massive bombing campaign on Afghanistan that started as early as October 2001, forced the Taliban from power. Bush worked with various ethnic and political factions in Afghanistan to establish a stable regime there that would run compatible to American interests.

In sum, a remarkable change in systemic conditions occurred from multilateralism towards unilateralism due to the handover of the American Presidency and the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001. However, no direct impact is detected on foreign policy change in Turkey during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition concerning the sensitive issue areas such as the Cyprus conflict, the Turkey-EU relations, Turkish Greek relations and the Armenian issue.

¹⁹² Encyclopedia Britannica Profiles. The American Presidency. Presidency.
<http://www.britannica.com/presidentsWebapp/article.do?articleID=230038>

¹⁹³ *ibid.*

A.2. Regional Developments

Two important regional developments during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition were the war in Kosovo, and EU enlargement.

A2. Kosovo

Since mid March 1999, Yugoslavia had been the scene of severe bombardment by NATO, aimed at stopping the systematic ethnic cleansing being carried out against Kosovo's Albanian population¹⁹⁴. The Kosovo issue and the bombardment of Yugoslavia appeared to be the most immediate and inevitable foreign policy issue Turkey had to deal with right after the 18 April 1999 election campaigns.

Turkey's involvement in the conflict had multiple aspects: Militarily, Turkey has participated in the NATO air strikes with air force jets flying combat air patrol (CAP) missions to protect the bombers¹⁹⁵. Turkish forces were deployed in southern Kosovo, an area where ethnic Turks are concentrated, as part of the NATO peacekeeping force known as KFOR¹⁹⁶. From humanitarian aspect, Turkey furthermore agreed to admit ten thousands of Kosovar refugees into its borders, who have left their war-torn province in order to seek safety in Turkey and found shelter there after fleeing Serbian violence¹⁹⁷. In addition, based on its cultural and historical links with the region, Turkey provided substantial humanitarian assistance to the region on its own initiative.

Once the security was reestablished in Kosovo, Kosovar refugees in Turkey returned to their country starting from June 1999¹⁹⁸. According to the Turkish Interior

¹⁹⁴ Turkish Daily News. Elections Over: Back to Foreign Policy Agenda. 18.4.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_18_99&d=probe&fn=FOREIGN2.HTM

¹⁹⁵ *ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 27.6.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=06_27_99&d=probe&fn=DOMESTIC2.HTM

¹⁹⁷ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 9.5.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=05_09_99&d=probe&fn=DOMESTIC2.HTM

¹⁹⁸ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 4.7.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_04_99&d=probe&fn=DOMESTIC2.HTM

Ministry, the number of refugees returning from Turkey to Kosovo reached 15.000 by mid July¹⁹⁹.

In sum, the operation in Kosovo was a joint effort based on UN Resolutions under NATO umbrella, which Turkey fully supported. However, this development itself had no impact on foreign policy change in Turkey in the traditionally sensitive issues.

A2. EU Enlargement

The EU has a history of successful enlargements. The Treaties of Paris in 1951, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and Rome in 1957, establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and EURATOM, were signed by six founding members: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The EU then underwent four successive enlargements with Denmark, Ireland and UK in 1973, Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986, and Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995.

In March 1998 the EU formally launched the process that would make a new enlargement possible. With the following applicant countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Turkey.

Enlargement is one of the most important opportunities for the European Union at the beginning of the 21st century. It is a unique, historic task to further the integration of the continent by peaceful means, extending a zone of stability and prosperity to new members.²⁰⁰

At its summit in Luxembourg in December 1997, the European Council decided that the enlargement process should encompass

...the European Conference, a multilateral framework bringing together ten central European countries, Cyprus and Turkey, which was launched on 12 March 1998;

the accession process, covering ten central European countries and Cyprus, which was launched on 30 March 1998;

the accession negotiations, which the European Council decided to open on 31 March 1998 with six countries, as recommended by the European Commission: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 25.7.1999.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_25_99&d=probe&fn=DO M2.HTM

²⁰⁰ European Union EU Enlargement A Historic Opportunity

http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/index_en.htm

²⁰¹ Luxembourg European Council 12-13 December 2004. Presidency Conclusions.

Obtainable from http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/032a0008.htm

Cyprus conflict was highly intertwined with Turkey-EU relations. The conflict on the island had already become part and parcel of the EU enlargement agenda due to the membership applications of Turkey in 1987 and of Cyprus in 1990. Concerning the feasibility of the Cypriot membership, the EC suggested that the question of the division of the island was to be resolved first: "...The Community considers Cyprus as eligible for membership as soon as the prospect of a settlement is surer..."²⁰² However, EU made a u-turn in Corfu and Essen European Councils in 1994 stating that Cyprus would be included in the next enlargement. Essen Summit in December 1994 called for a settlement of the Cyprus problem that would bring territorial unity and integrity of the country in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions, while deciding at the same time that the next enlargement of the EU will contain Cyprus²⁰³. The final blow for Turkey and Turkish Cypriots came when in December 1997 Luxembourg European Council, a date was given to Cyprus to begin the accession negotiations with the EU, whereas Turkey was denied the status of a candidate country²⁰⁴.

Although the Helsinki European Council granted candidate status to Turkey, at the same time it stated that: "If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition..."²⁰⁵ Ankara was promoting a policy under which Turkey and Cyprus could become members of the European Union simultaneously, but as two sovereign states, whereas countries such as Britain sought the full membership of Cyprus first²⁰⁶.

At this stage of EU enlargement,

While the Republic of Cyprus had been making rapid progress in the accession negotiations, the conflict-settlement efforts were not moving forward. The European Union responded negatively to Turkish-Cypriot demands and requests,

²⁰² Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership. Obtainable from

http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/cyprus/op_06_93/index.htm

²⁰³ Essen European Council 9-10 December 1994. Presidency Conclusions. Obtainable from http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00300-1.EN4.htm

²⁰⁴ Luxembourg European Council 12-13 December 2004. Presidency Conclusions. Obtainable from http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/032a0008.htm

²⁰⁵ Helsinki European Council 10-11 December 1999. Presidency Conclusions. Obtainable from http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm

²⁰⁶ Turkish Daily News. Turkey maneuvers to help Denktas lead in opinion polls. 9.3.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_09_00&fn=FOR.HTM

such as recognition by the international community and the removal of the trade embargo on the TRNC. The European Union promised to respond with incentives, including a small amount of annual financial aid, in return for a settlement that was favorable to the European Union's enlargement project. In the UN-sponsored process, Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash twice walked away from the negotiations. On November 2001, Turkey threatened to annex the TRNC if the RoC joined the member states of the EU.²⁰⁷

In sum, during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, EU's enlargement process was continuing at good speed, whereby Turkey was one of the candidates. This regional development had different types of impacts on the change of Turkey's foreign policy. While it was a catalyst factor and thus had a positive impact concerning Turkish-Greek relations and relations of Turkey with the EU as discussed earlier, it had no impact on the Armenian issue. Moreover, it had a negative impact concerning the Cyprus conflict, which led to a toughening of Turkish foreign policy in this issue.

A.3. Foreign Commitments

Major foreign commitments during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition covered a wide range of issues: Militarily, Turkey engaged in commitments in the context of NATO operations in Kosovo (KFOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF). A significant development was that starting from August 2002, Turkey assumed the lead of the second ISAF mission after Britain²⁰⁸.

Economically, the coalition government signed final agreements pertaining to the Bakü-Ceyhan project, which aimed at the transfer of Azerbaijani petroleum to Western markets through a pipeline passing through Turkish territory. The other party countries were Azerbaijan and Georgia. The agreements, namely the Full Handover Agreement, the Transit Country Agreement, the Guarantee Documents Agreement and the Host

²⁰⁷ Eralp, D.U. & Beriker, N. *Assessing the Conflict Resolution Potential of the EU: The Cyprus Conflict and Accession Negotiations*. Security Dialogue. Vol 36 No 2. June 2005, p. 184.

²⁰⁸ Turkish Daily News. 2002 in Perspective. 5.1.2003.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_05_03&d=probe&fn=politics.htm

Country Agreement, are being seen as a major step in the implementation of the project²⁰⁹.

Politically, the major new commitment during DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition can be considered as the National Program with the EU, whereby Turkey declared its political and economic targets in line with the Accession Partnership Document, and committed itself to fulfill these in a given schedule with the ultimate aim for joining the EU.

In sum, Turkey's major commitment was towards the EU, which had no impact on foreign policy change in the Cyprus conflict and the Armenian issue, but a positive one concerning Turkish-Greek relations and Turkey-EU relations.

B: Domestic Factors

B.1. Domestic Regime Change

As stated before, 57th Government of Turkey came to office following the 18 April 1999 Elections, whereby DSP gained 22.17 % of the votes, MHP 17.98 % and junior coalition partner ANAP 13.22 %. The surprise coalition partner of the 57th Government was the far right nationalist MHP.

Neither the experts conducting opinion polls nor the politicians had predicted that the MHP...would finish second. That came as a big surprise. Those who are wary of the nationalist views of the MHP, which has won 130 parliamentary seats, are not prepared to accept the argument that the MHP may have changed...

The suspicions about the MHP...will determine the nature of the coalition government to be formed. DSP leader Bülent Ecevit ... stressed on the day after the election that forming a coalition government with the MHP would be mathematically very easy but politically quite difficult...

But since the two parties do not have enough deputies to win a vote of confidence, they would still have to seek the support of ANAP. In fact, ANAP Chairman Mesut Yılmaz has already announced that his party is prepared to provide that support.²¹⁰

²⁰⁹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 22.10.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=10_22_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²¹⁰ The Dove Flew and the Wolf Ran. KEMAL BALCI. 25.4.1999.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_25_99&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

The President gave the duty to form the government to Bülent Ecevit, who – – after extensive talks and bargaining– – was able to form the coalition on 28 May 1999, overcoming the above mentioned difficulties. Despite the continuous differences of opinion among the coalition partners and widely shared expectations of a breakup of the coalition from the beginning, 57th Government of Turkey was able to stay in office until the early elections 3 November 2002, where all three of the coalition partners faced a huge defeat.

In sum, the 57th Government of Turkey came to office through regular elections, which led to the formation of DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition. However, no linkage was detected between the regime and foreign policy change. The study, thus, demonstrated no applicability of the domestic regime change dimension to foreign policy change.

B.2. Different Orientations to Foreign Policy

Except for the improvement of relations with neighboring Greece, which was dealt in detail above, the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition did not show a different foreign policy orientation from its predecessors. The coalition basically continued with the traditional carrot and stick policies and pro status quo approach on major foreign policy issues such as the Cyprus conflict, Armenian issue or the US-Turkey and EU-Turkey relations. Even in the context of Turkish Greek rapprochement, it might be argued that the problem solving efforts were mainly limited to low politics issues, and were not able to touch the essential conflicts between the two countries such as the Aegean and Cyprus.

In sum, Turkish foreign policy makers continued with the status quo in the major issues of the country. Thus, foreign policy orientation in this period had a negative impact on foreign policy change, i.e. led to continuity.

B.3. Political Cohesiveness of the New Regime

During DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, the degree of cohesiveness among the coalition partners was very low and fragile. Coalition partners' differences of opinion and different world views revealed in many instances, most notably on the Öcalan issue and on the relations with the EU.

Concerning the Öcalan issue, Prime Minister Ecevit and his biggest parliamentary ally Bahçeli disagreed in public over whether to push for the execution of Kurdish

terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan. Bahçeli clearly supported the death penalty for Öcalan and rejected warnings that the execution would damage Turkey's hopes of becoming a full member to the EU²¹¹, whereas Ecevit warned his coalition allies that Turkey's bid to join Europe would suffer, if it did not delay the legal process against Öcalan²¹².

Finally after long discussions, the coalition government decided to postpone the execution of Öcalan until the European Court of Human Rights completed a review of the case²¹³.

Another example of a low degree of cohesiveness among coalition partners occurred with regard to the election of the new President. Prime Minister Ecevit warned of possible turmoil in Turkey's coalition government after a consensus to re-elect President Süleyman Demirel apparently broke down. The gradual escalation of tension between Ecevit and Yılmaz over a constitutional amendment to change the procedures for the election of the president resolved only after long debates.²¹⁴ Prime Minister Ecevit was in favor of amending the Constitution so to allow President a second term in power²¹⁵. After convincing Yılmaz, coalition parties submitted to Parliament constitutional reforms designed to allow President Demirel to stand for a second term²¹⁶. However, a different opinion also came from MHP leader Bahçeli saying “In democracies, nobody is indispensable”, indirectly referring to President Demirel²¹⁷. On 29 March 2000²¹⁸ and 5 April 2000²¹⁹, the coalition government failed two times to

²¹¹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 16.1.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_16_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

²¹² *ibid.*

²¹³ *ibid.*

²¹⁴ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 27.2.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_27_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

²¹⁵ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 5.3.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_05_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

²¹⁶ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 12.3.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_12_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

²¹⁷ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 2.4.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_02_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

²¹⁸ *ibid.*

²¹⁹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 9.4.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_09_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

gather enough votes to pass a constitutional reform. After this parliamentary defeat, Prime Minister Ecevit urged his two coalition allies to stand united behind a single candidate to replace President Demirel²²⁰, a decision he repeatedly warned might destabilize the coalition government²²¹. On 24 April, coalition leaders eventually agreed to name Constitutional Court Chief Justice Ahmet Necdet Sezer as their joint candidate. Later the opposition leaders also agreed to back Sezer. Thus, on 5 May 2000, Sezer was elected 10th president of Turkey with a clear 330-vote majority in the 550-seat Turkish Parliament²²².

On 6 May 2000, citing deep differences in democratic understanding between himself and Prime Minister Ecevit, State Minister Mehmet Ali İrtemçelik from ANAP resigned from his post²²³. On 8 May 2000, at the request of Prime Minister Ecevit, President Demirel sacked State Minister Sadi Somuncuoğlu from MHP from the Cabinet²²⁴ due to entering the race for Presidency, despite a government decision to back Sezer²²⁵.

The sensitivities due to EU reforms added up to the already obvious lack of cohesiveness among coalition partners. For example, although Prime Minister Ecevit frequently stated the need for the lifting of the death penalty, MHP strongly opposed it, saying that this would encourage Kurdish separatists²²⁶. Similarly, Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz's statement that the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) could broadcast programs in Kurdish initiated a fierce debate. Despite the coalition government announcing that it accepted the Accession Partnership Document, the differing views held by the coalition's two right-wing partners, MHP and ANAP,

²²⁰ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 16.4.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_16_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

²²¹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 23.4.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_23_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

²²² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 14.5.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=05_14_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²²³ *ibid.*

²²⁴ *ibid.*

²²⁵ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 28.5.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=05_28_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²²⁶ Coalition survives rift in June. İlnur Çevik. 9.7.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_09_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

regarding the document, surfaced with this development. The EU's demand that Turkey should grant cultural rights to Kurds was sparking a sharp debate in Turkey, with some politicians and military officers suggesting that Europe's price for membership might be too high²²⁷.

In sum, during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, the degree of cohesiveness among the coalition partners was very low and fragile, most notably on the Öcalan issue and on the relations with the EU. Thus, it could be asserted that the lack of political cohesiveness negatively impacted foreign policy change.

B.4. Strength of Political Opposition to the Regime

The main opposition party FP was very much concerned with its own problems. The most important issue on pro-Islamic FP's agenda was the closure case against it at the Constitutional Court on charges that is the successor of the already banned RP. Officials of the FP argued before the Court that their party was not guilty of anti-secular activities and should not be banned, while Turkey's powerful military accused FP of assisting in the rise of radical groups²²⁸.

Another weakening factor for FP was the inner competition for leadership. FP leader Recai Kutan announced that he would be a candidate for the chairmanship at the party congress on 14 May 2000, whereas the 'reformist' wing inside the FP launched a bid for control of the party with Abdullah Gül announcing his candidacy for the party leadership elections²²⁹. Kutan could only be narrowly re-elected as chairman beating the challenge from reformists who called on the party to concentrate more on social issues and less on religion²³⁰.

²²⁷ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 19.11.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=11_19_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²²⁸ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 30.1.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_30_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

²²⁹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 12.3.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_12_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

²³⁰ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 21.5.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=05_21_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

In July 2000, Former Prime Minister and leader of the banned RP Necmettin Erbakan was permanently barred from politics due to the Court of Cassation's confirmation of a one-year jail sentence imposed on the politician. Erbakan would be required to serve a four-month reduced sentence in jail. FP started intensive bargaining with the coalition parties in order to have overturned the one-year jail sentence and lifelong political ban imposed upon Erbakan²³¹, while Former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan appealed to the European Court of Human Rights in an attempt to avoid being jailed²³².

In June 2001, the Constitutional Court decided to close down the main opposition party FP and banned two of its deputies on charges of being the center of fundamentalist activity²³³. On 20 July 2001, Turkish Islamists launched the new Saadet Partisi (SP) so that some 51 deputies of the banned FP joined the new party²³⁴.

The conflict within Turkey's main opposition party FP reached a peak when Greater Ankara Mayor Melih Gökçek demanded the establishment of a brand new center right party²³⁵.

Military

Military's role was sensed strongly during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government. In April 2000, Turkish military declared that it is 'unthinkable' that the generals should not have a say on who will serve as the country's next president. "The Armed Forces have certain ideas about the principles and desired qualities of, for

²³¹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 9.7.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_09_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²³² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 30.7.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_30_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²³³ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 1.7.2001.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_01_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²³⁴ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 29.7.2001.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_29_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²³⁵ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 7.1.2001.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_07_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

example, the person who will be president”, a military statement said, adding, “Such thoughts are conveyed to the parties concerned when deemed necessary”²³⁶.

It is more remarkable that the Prime Minister accepted the role of the army by saying “The armed forces' interest in the presidential election is very natural”. Ecevit also disclosed that Kıvrıkoğlu visited him and “relayed his expectations and wishes regarding the presidential election. Those are the wishes of a valuable commander who ... knows the country's problems very well”²³⁷.

The relations of the coalition government with the military became tense in the context of EU reforms. Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz was quoted as saying that Turkey's powerful military fears that adopting the reforms required for European Union membership could lead to a breakup of the country²³⁸.

A former deputy chief of General Staff retired General Çevik Bir indicated the military's sensitivity by stating that the National Security Council (MGK) might be a marginal topic for the West, but that Turkey needed the military in the MGK and that the West should support it²³⁹. Moreover, the military declared on 7 December 2000 its concern about PKK using Turkey's path to EU membership to win politically what they failed to achieve in armed struggle²⁴⁰.

However, the military strongly denied press reports that it opposed possible membership in the EU. Stressing that to attain the level of civilized nations was a target set forth by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic, the military emphasized that it was impossible to think that the Turkish military would be against integration with the western world. While giving an open support to the EU membership policies, the military stated that its point was they did want to negotiate

²³⁶ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 23.4.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_23_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

²³⁷ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 23.4.2000
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_23_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

²³⁸ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 10.9.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=09_10_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²³⁹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 26.11.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=11_26_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²⁴⁰ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 10.12.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=12_10_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

some terms and the membership should not mean accepting each and every EU condition²⁴¹.

President

When Sezer was elected as the 10th president of Turkey, he was not well-known to political circles, unlike his predecessors Özal and Demirel, who both served as Prime Ministers before and later became Presidents. Sezer's political leanings remained unexplored.

However, it was notable that on the day that Sezer was announced as a presidential candidate, he said that the presidential powers granted by the Constitution exceeded the boundaries of a parliamentary democracy. He emphasized that he would be a neutral president and also stressed his commitment to Atatürk's principles and secularism. Sezer also signaled he would take the lead in taking steps towards democratization in Turkey. Thus, Sezer became President with support from across the whole political spectrum, enjoying both inner- and extra-parliamentary support, which was the case for the first time in Turkey²⁴². This provided him with a uniquely strong role.

In sum, during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, opposition actors' were the main opposition party FP, the military, and the President Sezer. However, the strength of political opposition performed by these actors varied. The main opposition party was concerned more about its inner turmoil and the closure case, thus performed a rather weak opposition concerning foreign policy issues. The traditionally strong military in Turkey, although having reservations about the EU conditions, created no major obstacle to government's policies. Similarly, the newly elected President Sezer has not yet asserted his power and influence in the foreign policy area during DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition. Thus, the overall strength of political opposition in this period remained low. The study demonstrated that low political opposition showed no impact on foreign policy change in traditionally sensitive policy areas.

²⁴¹ Military questions EU conditions. 21.1.2001.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_21_01&d=probe&fn=foreign.htm

²⁴² Turkish Daily News. A New Era: President Sezer. 7.5.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=05_07_00&d=probe&fn=week.htm

B.5. Level of Polarization over Foreign Policy Issues

The level of polarization over foreign policy issues remained low except for two instances. First, concerning the Öcalan case, a certain tension revealed itself both among coalition partners and between the coalition and other political actors. Secondly, as regards to the Turkey-EU relations, the reform demands of the EU led to further polarization over military's role in Turkish politics and extension of more cultural rights to ethnic minorities. In sum, there was a polarization limited to certain sensitivities. However, this factor had no impact on foreign policy change in major issues of the country.

B.6. Regime Vulnerability

DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition endured a governmental period of high regime vulnerability derived from various sources. The fact of being a coalition government, particularly a coalition composed of parties with totally different worldviews, caused vulnerability itself and raised calls for early elections from the beginning.

In 2000, MHP insisted on sending Mesut Yılmaz, the leader of their junior coalition partner ANAP, to the Supreme Court to face charges of corruption and irregularities. While Yılmaz was cleared of all charges against him, this created a rift within the coalition²⁴³. Yılmaz's appointment to the Cabinet as Minister for EU Affairs further complicated relations between the two parties²⁴⁴.

Another source of vulnerability was the Kurdish issue. During this period from 1999 to 2002, although Öcalan was captured, Turkey had to deal with continued separatist terrorism by PKK. Turkish military was actively fighting terrorists, mainly in Southeastern Turkey. The Emergency Rule (OHAL) had to be routinely extended by the Parliament²⁴⁵. Turkish Chief of General Staff Gen. Kıvrıkoğlu ruled out the possibility

²⁴³ Coalition survives rift in June. İlnur Çevik. 9.7.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_09_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²⁴⁴ Cracks in the Coalition Veneer? Ayla Ganioglu. 12.11.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=11_12_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²⁴⁵ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 2.4.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_02_00&d=probe&fn=DOM2.HTM

of downsizing forces in the country's Southeast for that time being²⁴⁶ since the pressure and threat continued to exist.

Furthermore, Öcalan's legal process complicated the picture. Turkey captured Öcalan in Kenya and then tried him for treason for leading a campaign for Kurdish autonomy in which tens of thousands of people were killed. In 1999, a Turkish court sentenced him to death by hanging, holding him responsible for the deaths of the thousands of people who have been killed in the conflict since 1984. The government has delayed the execution until the European Court of Human Rights ruled on Öcalan's appeal.

However, the case could prove an additional irritant between Turkey and Europe at a time when anger at conditions laid down for EU membership is running high in Turkey...A court ruling against the death penalty and criticism of the legal process would provoke a harsh reaction in Turkey where nationalistic sentiment runs strongly on the issue. It could also, especially if coinciding with a rift with the EU on membership conditions, stir up disunity between government coalition parties.²⁴⁷

Only after the EU reform packages passed from the Parliament in October 2002, State Security Court formally lifted the death sentence passed on PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Court commuted Öcalan's death sentence to life imprisonment in line with the law that lifted the death penalty except for times of war²⁴⁸.

Another source of vulnerability for the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition was due economic crises.

The first occurred in November 2000, while Turkey was implementing the standby agreement that was signed in December 1999 with the IMF. The goal of the program was to bring in economic stability and cause inflation to fall. Indeed, this stability program was considered as the last chance for Turkey. A small deviation meant a return to the days of chaos. The DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government seemed determined to implement the stability program. However, on 21 November, it was

²⁴⁶ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 30.4.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_30_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²⁴⁷ Turkish Daily News. Öcalan Case: Another Possible Crisis Between Europe and Turkey. 26.11.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=11_26_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²⁴⁸ Turkish Daily News. 2002 in Perspective. 5.1.2003.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_05_03&d=probe&fn=politics.htm

revealed that the implementation was in fact not on track. As the crisis that started in the banking sector, spread and turned into a fiscal crisis, \$7 billion left Turkey in a fortnight. Turkey could get over this crisis only with \$7.5 billion additional funds provided by IMF again²⁴⁹.

On 19 February 2001, Turkey faced an ever bigger crisis. For the first time in the history of the National Security Council (MGK), a prime minister stormed out accusing the President of preaching at him in a manner ‘beyond the rules of politeness or the traditions of the state’ and that ‘a very serious state crisis’ has arisen. President Sezer was criticizing Ecevit for sheltering corruption and irregularities. This incident prompted a sharp fall in Turkey's markets, showing the underlying fragility of the country's troubled economy²⁵⁰. Thus, the seventeenth standby agreement was interrupted and the crisis upset all of the economic balances²⁵¹.

The latter crisis raised questions about the credibility of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and the ability of the economy administration of the country, while the opposition parties were calling for early elections²⁵². As a remedy, Ecevit invited Kemal Derviş to Turkey to restore the country's financial credentials.

A former academic and adviser to Ecevit in the 1970s, Derviş was Vice President for poverty reduction and economic management at the World Bank. Turkish media hailed Derviş as the savior of the economy, though he repeatedly underlined that this was team business. Commentators underlined that Derviş would be a key figure in Turkey's relations with the IMF, the World Bank and the U.S. Treasury²⁵³.

“There will be a single boss, a single ruler and defender of the economy”, *Sabah* newspaper columnist Bilal Çetin wrote. “Turkey found the most appropriate, the best

²⁴⁹ 2000 Was Rough for the Turkish Economy: We Expected Welfare but Found Crises. Yalcin Simsek. 7.1.2001.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_07_01&d=probe&fn=econp.htm

²⁵⁰ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 25.2.2001.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_25_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²⁵¹ Turkey Always Does Same. Yalcin Simsek. 25.2.2001.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_25_01&d=probe&fn=politics.htm

²⁵² Crisis Raises Political Heat On Government. Yusuf Kanli. 25.2.2001.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_25_01&d=probe&fn=politics.htm

²⁵³ Derviş: Turkey's new super-minister. Claudia Parsons. 4.3.2001.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_04_01&fn=for.htm

name for this mission”. “Kemal Derviş from the World Bank...is presented as a magician of the economy by some people”, said Ali Sirmen, columnist in *Cumhuriyet* newspaper. “Although he refuses such labels and says that one person cannot handle this task alone and that it is a matter of team work, it is hard to show this reality to a society which is accustomed to be distracted with magicians and miracles”. Derviş’s appointment as a super minister caused some tension within the coalition. *Radikal* newspaper reported that MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli had threatened to dissolve the coalition rather than give up his party's economic responsibilities. Bahçeli was quoted as saying he supported the appointment only out of ‘courtesy to the coalition’ but at least Derviş might help Turkey win new loans²⁵⁴.

On 14 April 2001, Kemal Derviş laid out the economic program to pull the country out of the economic crisis but warned that he needed unyielding support in Parliament to succeed and attract foreign financial support²⁵⁵. According to the MHP, Derviş was acting like a fourth partner in the coalition and regarded himself as an equal of the coalition leaders, not just a cabinet minister²⁵⁶.

The coalition’s vulnerability grew further with 75 year old Ecevit’s health problems. In May 2002, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit was hospitalized two times. Economy Minister Kemal Derviş made the first statement calling for early elections to decrease uncertainty, which was followed by opposition parties. Ailing Prime Minister Ecevit confronted growing calls for his resignation, insisting he was in good shape and would remain at the head of the government.

By June 2002, besides Ecevit’s health condition, MHP leader Bahçeli declared that his party would oppose key rights reforms sought by the European Union and if necessary would abandon the coalition and pave the way to the establishment of a new government. On 7 July 2002, Bahçeli finally called for early elections on November 3.

The opposition within DSP became evident. First, Prime Minister Ecevit's former right-hand-man Deputy Prime Minister Hüsametdin Özkan resigned, which was

²⁵⁴ Papers warn Derviş won't work miracles. 4.3.2001.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_04_01&fn=for.htm

²⁵⁵ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 22.4.2001.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_22_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²⁵⁶ Alarm Bells Ringing for Coalition. 3.6.2001.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=06_03_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

followed by Foreign Minister İsmail Cem's resignation, who announced the creation of the Yeni Türkiye Partisi (YTP).

In mid July 2002, coalition leaders agreed to early elections on 3 November after their government lost its majority in Parliament.

In August, Economy Minister Derviş resigned, and formally joined the CHP to run for November elections.

In sum, during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition the regime vulnerability was very high due to the Kurdish issue, economic crises, and Ecevit's own health problems. Regime vulnerability factor weakened the potential of the coalition to make major changes and, thus, had a negative impact on the foreign policy change, i.e. led to continuity.

C: Political Agency and Decision-making Process

C.1. Bureaucratic Rigidity

During the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government, a major issue between the government and bureaucracy indicating to a bureaucratic rigidity was not revealed in mass media. However, at this point, it might be important to underline the friction between Yılmaz and Cem. Relations with the EU were mainly the Foreign Ministry's responsibility, until İsmail Cem had to share this responsibility with Yılmaz. This caused a certain climate of coolness between the two. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit announced that Yılmaz's responsibility was limited to coordinating EU-related activities at domestic level, and that the 'external coordination' continues to be the Foreign Ministry's responsibility. However, it was not always easy to draw that line clearly.²⁵⁷. Thus, Yılmaz preferred to work with his 'own' bureaucracy by forming the Secretariat General for the EU Affairs under the Prime Ministry.

In sum, the study revealed bureaucratic rigidity factor was not applicable to foreign policy change during this period.

²⁵⁷ The Compass Is in Yılmaz's Hands. Kemal Balcı. 23.7.2000.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_23_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

C.2. Leadership Dynamics

The DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government was headed by the veteran politician Bülent Ecevit from DSP, who fulfilled the duty of Prime Minister four times before the 57th Government. In his political career of almost fifty years, he was known as a left wing, secular politician whose name was identified with freedom and honesty. Throughout his career, he had to make many bold decisions including the Cyprus intervention in 1974²⁵⁸. Ecevit, as the founder of DSP enjoyed unchallenged authority and solid support of his party members until the last months of the 57th Government.

Ecevit, when he headed the CHP in the pre-1980 coup, had to struggle with several opposing factions, so he did not want such elements of potential rift within his new party when the DSP was founded in 1985. Bülent Ecevit and his wife selected even the local party people very carefully and immediately weeded out any potential form of dissent²⁵⁹. On 29 April 2001, Ecevit was re-elected chairman of the ruling Democratic Left Party (DSP) despite claims that he would retire and name a crown prince to replace him²⁶⁰.

Devlet Bahçeli, as the more moderate and conciliatory leader of far right nationalist MHP after Alparslan Türkeş, had support from his party. Bahçeli was re-elected as the chairman of the party at the General Convention in 2000²⁶¹.

Mesut Yılmaz was able to cast 921 of the 1,227 votes at ANAP Convention, winning a comfortable victory despite criticism from rival candidates who blame Yılmaz for halving the party's electoral strength in his 10 years as leader²⁶².

²⁵⁸ Turkish Daily News. Ecevit ends five-decade political career. 1.8.2004.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=08_01_04&fn=dom2.htm

²⁵⁹ Winds of Opposition in the DSP. Ayla Ganioglu. 6.5.2001.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=05_06_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²⁶⁰ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 6.5.2001.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=05_06_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²⁶¹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 12.11.2000.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=11_12_00&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

²⁶² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 12.8.2001.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=08_12_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

In sum, the leaders of the coalition parties were individually strong in their political parties, but the leadership of the coalition was weak. This diluted foreign policy change, i.e. led to continuity.

C.3. Decision-making Process

During the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government, foreign policy decisions were taken according to the 1982 Constitution²⁶³ with its main emphasis on a strong executive authority. According to the Constitution, the main actors of foreign policy decision-making are the President, the Parliament, Prime Minister and the Cabinet, National Security Council, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The 1982 Constitution transformed the Presidency from a symbolic post into an active and powerful one, but still the President shares his executive authority with the Prime Minister. The Parliament is the main legislative body. Yet the President may send the legislation back to the Parliament for reconsideration. If the Parliament passes the same law again, the President has to sign it. Although Ahmet Necdet Sezer was not excessively using his executive powers, he employed the Presidential veto option more frequently than previous Presidents.

The Prime Minister is the effective head of the executive branch and the coordinator and supervisor of the Cabinet. According to Article 109 of the 1982 Constitution, ministers are nominated by the Prime Minister and appointed by the President.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible of conducting foreign policy on behalf of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. Thus the Foreign Minister is a key figure in implementation of the foreign policy decisions.

National Security Council (MGK) is an advisory body headed by the President and composed of the Prime Minister, Chief of the General Staff, the Ministers of National Defense, Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs as well as the Commanders of the Army, Navy and the Air Force and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie, so it is composed of five civilian and five military key figures. The National Security Council's formal function is to provide to the Council of Ministers its views concerning national security policy of the state but practically speaking, the National Security

²⁶³ 1982 Constitution (the version before the 7 May 2004 amendments can be obtained from Türk Anayasa Hukuku Sitesi <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982ay-eski1.htm>

Council represents, in a way, the strong influence and involvement of Turkish military in civilian politics.

During the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, the role of National Security Council was a hot issue, since one of the stickiest issues of the Accession Partnership Document was the status of the National Security Council in Turkish politics. European politicians have frequently remarked that the EU could not accept that the Turkish military was too powerful in politics. The EU Commission has told Turkey through the document that the status of the National Security Council should be retailored in a fashion that would be equivalent of its similar institutions in EU countries. Despite the Chief of General Staff General Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu claimed that the Turkish military was fully backing the policy of integration with the EU, he also voiced his caution as well. The government found itself in a difficult position to find a formula that would both please the EU and not offend the military²⁶⁴.

Again during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government, the Parliament for the first time since the approval of the 1982 Constitution passed the biggest Constitutional amendment package of 37 articles in line with Turkey's National Program, in an extraordinary session on 17 September 2002. The most crucial articles of the package were basic rights and freedoms, broadcasting in Kurdish and capital punishment²⁶⁵.

In sum, foreign policy decision-making in this era was based on the 1982 Constitution with an emphasis on executive power and an influential role of the National Security Council (MGK), but this factor had no impact on foreign policy change.

Summary of the Findings

During the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, the study revealed the following findings about foreign policy change:

²⁶⁴ Military questions EU conditions. 21.1.2001.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_21_01&d=probe&fn=foreign.htm

²⁶⁵ Though Constitutional Amendment Marathon Kicks Off on Sept.17. Ayla Ganioglu. 9.9.2001.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=09_09_01&d=probe&fn=dom2.htm

Concerning international factors, change in systemic conditions had no impact. Regional developments proved to be issue specific. While the war in Kosovo did not lead to a foreign policy change, EU enlargement's impact varied from issue to issue. It had a positive impact on foreign policy change regarding Turkish-Greek and Turkey-EU relations, whereas it had no impact on the Armenian issue. In relation with the Cyprus conflict, European enlargement had a negative impact on foreign policy change, i.e. led to continuity. Foreign commitments also provided issue specific findings: In Turkish-Greek relations and Turkey-EU relations, they had a positive impact, i.e. led to foreign policy change, whereas concerning the Cyprus conflict and the Armenian issue, the study revealed no impact on foreign policy change.

Concerning domestic factors, domestic regime change was not applicable; different orientations to foreign policy, political cohesiveness of the new regime, and regime vulnerability had a negative impact on foreign policy change, while low political opposition and low polarization had no impact.

Concerning political agency and decision-making process, bureaucratic rigidity was not applicable; leadership dynamics had a negative impact, whereas decision-making process had no impact on foreign policy change.

The next chapter deals with an in depth analysis of foreign policy change of the ruling AKP Government along the same analytical dimensions.

CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION
THE 58th AND 59th GOVERNMENTS OF TURKEY

The 3 November 2002 Elections resulted with a remarkable electoral victory of *AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* [Justice and Welfare Party]²⁶⁶. According to the election results, AKP gained 34.28 % of the total votes and secured 363 of 550 seats in the Parliament, so it formed the new government as a single party. *CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* [Republican People's Party] that was not able to enter the Parliament in the 18 April 1999 Elections, ranked second in 3 November 2002 Elections with 19.39 % and this time was able to enter the Parliament with 178 parliamentarians. AKP, despite having an ongoing legal party closure case, became the first political party in Turkey's electoral history that won the government without having a definite candidate for the Prime Minister position. AKP's party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was not allowed to run for the 3 November 2002 Elections as a parliamentary candidate, since he served four months of a 10-month jail sentence for Islamist sedition in the late 1990s and was therefore banned from the Parliament. He could enter the Parliament only later through the 9 March 2003 Parliamentary Renewal Elections of Siirt, a small city in Southeastern Turkey. Once Erdoğan was elected as the Siirt MP from AKP, Abdullah Gül, who formed the 58th Turkish Government, resigned and left his Prime Minister seat for Erdoğan.

²⁶⁶ More information on 3 November 2002 Elections is obtainable from <http://www.belgenet.com/secim/3kasim.html> (in Turkish) and http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=11_05_02&fn=feature.htm (in English)

It was the first time after 1987 Elections that a single party was able to cast enough votes to form the government on its own. With this electoral success, AKP chronologically became the fourth party, which formed a one-party majority government, since 1950: *DP Demokrat Parti* [Democratic Party] had formed governments three times on its own, *AP Adalet Partisi* [Justice Party] and *ANAP Anavatan Partisi* [Motherland Party] had managed it two times each. Furthermore, AKP became the political party that won the second largest number of seats in the Parliament, after DP's 419 seats in 1957 Elections²⁶⁷.

Again it was the first time after 1946 that only two political parties were represented in the Parliament. 3 November 2002 Elections witnessed the biggest political 'purification' of the Turkish Republican history: for the first time, 89 % of the parliamentary seats were replaced with 490 newly elected MPs. Most significantly, all three coalition partners that formed the previous government were not able to pass the 10 % threshold. *DSP Demokratik Sol Parti* [Democratic Left Party] gained only 1.22 % of the votes, whereas *MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* [Nationalist Movement Party] scored 8.36 % and *ANAP Anavatan Partisi* [Motherland Party] 5.13 %. In total, the coalition partners suffered a decrease of 68 % of votes altogether as compared to 1999 Elections. Similarly, the two opposition parties represented in the previous Parliament namely *DYP Doğru Yol Partisi* [Right Way Party] and *SP Saadet Partisi* [Happiness Party] lost a significant number of votes and remained below the 10 % threshold. Thus, one can argue that all of the mainstream parties of the 1999 polls suffered a humiliating defeat. Only the *GP Genç Parti* [Young Party] of media-business tycoon Cem Uzan was coming closer to the threshold. With 3 November 2002 Elections, only 54.67 % of the total valid votes could be represented by the two political parties that entered into the Parliament and 45.33 % of the voters' choices could not be corresponded at parliamentary level due to the threshold problem.

Following the elections, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer designated Abdullah Gül to form the new government, since AKP's party leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could not become a Prime Minister because of the court verdict banning him from making parliamentary politics. Thus, the 58th Turkish Government was formed by AKP under Gül's leadership on 18 November 2002. This first AKP government stayed in office until 14 March 2003, when it was replaced by the 59th Government that was formed by

²⁶⁷ <http://www.belgenet.com/secim/3kasim.html>

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who became the Prime Minister, following the Siirt Elections. During the 58th Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was run by Yaşar Yakış, whereas in the 59th Government, which is still in office, Abdullah Gül became the current Foreign Minister of Turkey.

According to the Program of the 58th Government²⁶⁸ announced on 23 November 2002, AKP made the following commitments concerning foreign policy:

- Following a prejudice- and obsession-free, realist foreign policy respecting territorial integrity and sovereignty and based on mutual interests, which would suit Turkey's historical and geographical position.
- Redefinition of foreign policy priorities according to the changing global and regional realities, and setting of a new balance between these realities and Turkey's national interests. In this framework:
 - Harmonizing with a long term perspective Turkey's foreign policy with the global and regional conjuncture based on new dynamics.
 - Cooperation with official research centers, foreign policy institutes and international relations departments of universities.
 - As a stabilizing factor in its region, Turkey will take more initiatives in the nearby crisis areas and attempt to contribute to the resolution of these crises in a more concrete way. Turkey will follow an active diplomacy, which would not just observe the regional and continental developments, but also direct them.
 - Making efforts for the establishment of security and stability in nearby regions and enhanced efforts for the continuation of neighborly relations based on dialogue, thus contributing more to regional cooperation, which is also an important element for Turkey's economic development.
- Continuing close relations with Europe. Placing the relations with European countries to the top of the foreign policy agenda.
- Full membership to the EU is the main goal. Working for the opening of accession negotiations. Decisiveness for fulfilling Copenhagen Criteria fully. In this framework:

²⁶⁸ Summary translation made by the author. For the entire text in Turkish language, please look at: <http://www.belgenet.com/hukumet/program/58-3.html>

- Development and strengthening of legal reforms passed from the Parliament and ensuring their full application.
 - Working for fulfilling the economic criteria and financial cooperation.
- Continuation of efforts to participate in European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), parallel to Turkey's contribution so far to NATO. Continuation with military activities under NATO, UN and OSCE frameworks.
- Enhanced cooperation in various fields with friends and allies.
- Supporting international cooperation against terrorism. Making active efforts for decreasing the tensions between religions and cultures that escalated by Sept.11th attacks, and securing a global peace environment. Mobilizing our rich historical accumulation based on cultural pluralism and dialogue.
- Continuation of lengthy and overwhelmingly defense based relations with the US, and expansion of cooperation to other areas like economy, investment, science and technology.
- Good neighborly relations with the Russian Federation.
- Continuation of relations with our neighbor Greece based on mutual economic interests, and by creating a security environment through these relations, building ground for the resolution more complicated political conflicts.
- Necessity to find a solution of the Cyprus Conflict by all means. This resolution should not allow any danger for the continuity of the future Turkish presence in the island. In this framework, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's peace initiative is welcomed, while foreseeing a negotiation process for a durable resolution of the conflict that would guarantee Turkey's national interests and the presence and sovereignty of the Turkish Cypriots.
- Improvement of relations with Middle Asian Turkic Republics.
- Concern about the continuing violent conflict in Middle East. Commitment for a sustainable peace. Continuation of efforts along the UN Resolutions for ensuring of peace that end ongoing suffering of Palestinians. Contribution to the creation of peace by maintenance of good relations with both Palestine and Israel.
- Policy on Balkans to be developed and reshaped if necessary in the light of historical, cultural and economic relations. Developing economy based projects for decreasing tensions and sustaining peace in the region.

- Special attention to be given to relations with the Arab world. Enhancing bilateral relations and making efforts for increasing dynamism and international credibility of Islam Conference Organization (ICO).
- Making efforts for mobilizing the potential for cooperation under Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BECO).
- Worries about the uncertainty in Iraq. Underlining the significance of Iraq's territorial integrity and political unity whose alteration might affect the balance in Middle East. Iraq should fully apply UN Resolutions, abandon any weapons of mass destruction, and follow peaceful neighborly relations. Favoring a place for Iraq in the international community and a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
- Enhancing relations with China and Japan based on mutual respect and productive cooperation.
- Adding to our traditional foreign policy dimensions of Atlantic and Europe, a Eurasian policy. In this framework, cooperation under Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO).
- Ensuring a rational and systematic coordination of efforts among Turkey's memberships to various international and regional organizations.
- Leaving Cold War paradigms behind, making efforts to contribute to the link of Caucasasia with Middle East and Balkans in economic terms.
- Facilitating conditions for Turkish citizens living abroad.

The Program of the 59th Government²⁶⁹, which was made public on 19 March 2002 by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, included the following additional highlights on Turkish foreign policy, in addition to repeating and confirming the Program of the first AKP Government:

- Sept. 11th attacks started a new era in political history. This new era brought the pain and suffering of the unipolar world order. Turkey has always been a central factor in global power systems, and is naturally affected by these new developments. Turkey's regional *Lebensraum* corresponds to high risk geopolitics. Turkey's domestic and foreign policy dimensions are closely interrelated. Turkish foreign policy directly affects the economy of the layman, and similarly, a strong and high quality domestic politics is the guarantee for Turkey's global and regional interests.

²⁶⁹ Summary translation made by the author. For the entire text in Turkish language, please look at: <http://www.belgenet.com/hukumet/program/59-4.html>

- Facing the changing global and regional realities, Turkey needs to redefine its foreign policy priorities and set up a new balance between these realities and its national interests. In this framework, the 59th Government is determined to continue and to develop further the realist and visional foreign policy approach of the first AKP Government.
- Turkey is stability factor in its region. Based on this feature, Turkey will take more initiatives in nearby crisis areas and attempt to contribute to the resolution of these crises in a more concrete way. The approach developed by the first AKP Government concerning the crisis in Iraq succeeded to be a serious model for the world and was appreciated. Turkey will continue with the active diplomacy. The performance laid by the first AKP Government regarding the crisis in Iraq will be maintained exactly.
- Our party supports US' war against global terrorism started after Sept. 11th and it became the first party to express the need for common grounds for combating global terrorism. Both our governments share the same understanding. However, we are concerned about the confusion and methodological mistakes arising regarding this issue.
- Our government's is in favor of ending of uncertainty in Iraq. We hope that the conflict in Iraq will be resolved under UN framework. However, in case our political, military and economic interests are threatened, we will swiftly take the most appropriate decisions arising from our special circumstances. Our government attributes special importance to the preservation of Iraq's territorial integrity and political unity. We desire that Turkmen, Arabs, Kurds, and other populations constituting Iraq continue living together peacefully.
- Our government will maintain its relations with US based on historical depth and mutual respect in the most dynamic way. It is natural that there are some differences of perception and approach towards the crisis in Iraq between Turkey and US. Certainly, every country evaluates each event according to its political position. Despite these differences, the basic strategic and political reality is the ally relationship between Turkey and US. Our government desires to enhance relations and cooperation with US along the mutual interests and to the benefit of our populations and constituting a dimension of regional stability.

- Turkey is a part of the system European political values. We have succeeded to produce a considerable activity and to receive a date for accession negotiations. We thank CHP for supporting the legislation of harmonization package.
- During the first AKP Government, Turkey succeeded to be granted its well earned place in European Security and Defense Identity.
- Concerning the Cyprus Conflict, we invite all politically interested parties, particularly EU member states and Greece, to be sensitive for a resolution based on dialogue and sustainable peace. In this framework, we underline that UN Secretary General's plan is on the table, that he has offered his good offices in the resolution process upon parties' consent, and that TRNC President Mr. Denktaş's has invited the Greek Cypriots to the negotiation table.
- Concerning Middle East, we support the roadmap and the vision for reform in US President Bush's speech on 14 March 2002.

For the sake of simplicity, we will cover the period of the two AKP Governments starting from 3 November 2002 Elections and still continuing as a whole. During this period, developments concerning traditionally "sensitive" policy areas such as the Armenian issue, Cyprus conflict, Turkish-Greek relations and the relations with the European Union that were inherited from previous periods, continued to occupy the heavy foreign policy agenda of Turkey. The following gives a detailed account of related events in this period:

Turkish-Greek Relations

During the AKP government, Turkish- Greek relations continued on a good basis despite two small-scale crises occurred in 2005. One of them was related to the Aegean problems, the other one concerned friendly relations.

In April 2005, Turkish Foreign Minister Gül and his Greek counterpart Moliviatis agreed to deepen their cooperation by introducing three more confidence-building measures in the Aegean and pledged to support efforts to develop multidimensional bilateral ties²⁷⁰.

Turkish and Greek authorities managed to defuse tension in the Aegean after coast guard boats from both countries confronted each other in a standoff near the disputed Kardak (Imia) rocks in January 2005, whilst the foreign ministers of the two countries

²⁷⁰ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 17.4.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=10986>

announced new confidence-building measures²⁷¹. Turkey reiterated that there was no plan to revise Turkey's Aegean policy, after a Greek newspaper quoted Gül as saying that he had no objection to canceling a parliamentary statement declaring any Greek attempt to extend Greece's territorial waters to 12 miles as *casus belli*. While Parliament Speaker Arınç from AKP suggested that the policy should be revised in light of the current Greek-Turkish rapprochement, Turkish General Staff declared it as a state policy, which is still valid and in force²⁷².

The crisis concerning friendly relations happened due to the desecration of the Turkish flag during a goodwill visit by Turkish officers and military students to the Greek War College in April 2005. Soon after this incident, Greek military officials ordered an investigation²⁷³, and the Turkish General Staff received a letter of apology from its Greek counterpart²⁷⁴.

The same month, Foreign Minister Gül appealed to the media to support improvement in Turkish-Greek relations and avoid coverage that could discourage politicians in both countries from pursuing conciliation efforts²⁷⁵.

In sum, the rapprochement process in Turkish-Greek relations that was initiated by the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition continued and developed in this period.

Relations with the EU

Turkey-EU relations entered a new phase during the AKP Government. Copenhagen European Council decisions of 12 December 2002 confirmed that

The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.²⁷⁶

Prime Minister Abdullah Gül and the then unofficial leader of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan emerged from Copenhagen disillusioned. Even so, Gül underlined the

²⁷¹ *ibid.*

²⁷² Turkish Daily News. Top general says *casus belli* is state policy. 14.4.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=10771>

²⁷³ *ibid.*

²⁷⁴ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 1.5.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=12138>

²⁷⁵ *ibid.*

²⁷⁶ Copenhagen European Council 12-13 December 2002. Presidency Conclusions. Obtainable from http://europa.eu.int/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm

fact that an EU invitation to begin entry talks after a 2004 review is a step forward in the Muslim country's decades-long effort to join the affluent bloc²⁷⁷.

After successful legislation of reform packages in Turkish Parliament during 2003, European Commission evaluated Turkey's progress as the following:

Overall, in the past 12 months Turkey has made further impressive legislative efforts which constitute significant progress towards achieving compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria. Turkey should address the outstanding issues highlighted in this report, with particular attention to the strengthening of the independence and the functioning of the judiciary, the overall framework for the exercise of fundamental freedoms (association, expression and religion), the further alignment of civil-military relations with European practice, the situation in the Southeast and cultural rights. Turkey should ensure full and effective implementation of reforms to ensure that Turkish citizens can enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms in line with European standards. Furthermore, Turkey should provide determined support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.²⁷⁸

President of the European Parliament Pat Cox arrived in Ankara for talks on 1 March 2004, becoming the first European Parliament head to visit Turkey. Cox praised Turkey for the reform steps it has accomplished but urged the country to commit itself to implementing the reforms, if it is to succeed in its ultimate goal of EU membership²⁷⁹.

On various occasions, US administration reiterated its strong support for Turkey's bid to join the EU. "Including Turkey in the EU would prove that Europe is not the exclusive club of a single religion, and it would expose the supposed 'clash of civilizations' as a passing myth of history"²⁸⁰ Bush said in a speech delivered in Istanbul.

On 6 October 2004, Turkey managed to get its long-awaited positive recommendation from EU Commission executives to start accession talks²⁸¹, but the

²⁷⁷ Turkish Daily News. 2002 in Perspective. 5.1.2003.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_05_03&d=probe&fn=politics.htm

²⁷⁸ European Commission. 2003 Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession. 5.11.2003. Obtainable from http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/docs.htm#regular_reports

²⁷⁹ Turkish Daily News. Year 2. 2.1.2005.

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=2755>

²⁸⁰ Turkish Daily News. Year 2. 2.1.2005.

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=2755>

²⁸¹ Communication of 6 October 2004 from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's

go-ahead came with several conditions attached. Rebuffing last-minute efforts by Ankara, the Commission said in its report that talks could be suspended if Turkey backtracked on democratization and human rights reforms. Such a suspension would require a qualified majority vote from EU ministers. Accession talks would 'be an open-ended process whose outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand', the Commission reported. It proposed no opening date, leaving the final decision on whether-and-when to EU leaders at European Council of 17 December 2004. The start of talks, according to the Commission's recommendation, is conditional on Turkey bringing into force outstanding legal reforms, most notably of the Turkish Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, which are in the pipeline²⁸².

Finally, 16-17 December 2004 Brussels European Council decisions included a date to start accession negotiations with Turkey:

...Turkey fulfills the Copenhagen political criteria; the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay. The European Council welcomed the decisive progress made by Turkey in its far-reaching reform process and expressed its confidence that Turkey will sustain that process of reform...

The European Council welcomed Turkey's decision to sign the Protocol regarding the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement, taking account of the accession of the ten new Member States...

In this light, it welcomed the declaration of Turkey that 'the Turkish Government confirms that it is ready to sign the Protocol on the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement prior to the actual start of accession negotiations and after reaching agreement on and finalizing the adaptations which are necessary in view of the current membership of the European Union'...

The European Council, while underlining the need for unequivocal commitment to good neighborly relations welcomed the improvement in Turkey's relations with its neighbors and its readiness to continue to work with the Member States concerned towards resolution of outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter...

It requested the Council to agree on that framework with a view to opening negotiations on 3 October 2005.²⁸³

As early as 28 January 2005, the French National Assembly agreed upon a package of constitutional changes that includes a legal obligation to hold a referendum on the entry of any new members to the European Union, including Turkey,

progress towards accession. Full text obtainable from

<http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e50015.htm>

²⁸² Turkish Daily News. Year 4. 2.1.2005.

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=2770>

²⁸³ Brussels European Council 16-17 December 2004. Presidency Conclusions.

Obtainable from http://europa.eu.int/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm

which was later discussed and approved by the French Senate in mid February 2005²⁸⁴. French electorate voted overwhelmingly 'no' in the referendum held on 29 May 2005 on the first European Union constitution.

Although the French vote was believed to have been swayed, at least in part, by strong public opposition to the prospect of EU membership for Turkey, Erdoğan declared that France's overwhelming rejection of the European constitution in a referendum does not pose an 'obstacle' to Turkey's position in its efforts to join the European Union, and that Turkey would continue enthusiasm and determination to undertake whatever measures necessary in the negotiation process and begin accession talks with the EU on 3 October 2005 as scheduled²⁸⁵.

Dismissing criticism of slowness and disorientation in the government's preparations for upcoming accession talks with the EU, AKP Government appointed the Cabinet's youngest minister Ali Babacan as the chief negotiator for accession talks with the EU²⁸⁶ and assured that Turkey would sign a protocol extending Turkey's customs union agreement with the European Union to new EU members, including Greek Cyprus, in a near future²⁸⁷. As part of one of the major EU harmonization efforts, the new Turkish Penal Code (TCK) became effective as of 1 June 2005 despite widely held reservations, particularly by the journalists criticizing the code for limiting the press²⁸⁸.

In sum, this period was marked with Turkey's long awaited receiving of a date for accession negotiations. AKP Government has been making efforts to prepare the country for the upcoming negotiations including reshaping of foreign policy, particularly by the extension of the Customs Union Agreement to the new member states including [Greek] Cyprus.

Cyprus Conflict

Ahead of the Copenhagen European Council of 12 December 2002, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented to Greek and Turkish Cypriots a revised blueprint for a

²⁸⁴ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 20.2.2005.

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=6383>

²⁸⁵ Turkish Daily News. Erdoğan urges EU to overcome French 'no'. 1.6.2005.

<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=14699>

²⁸⁶ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 29.5.2005.

<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=14410>

²⁸⁷ Turkish Daily News. Turkey to sign key EU protocol soon. 1.6.2005.

<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=14714>

²⁸⁸ Turkish Daily News. Penal code comes into force. 1.6.2005.

<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=14692>

comprehensive settlement of the power-sharing problem on the island²⁸⁹. However, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş accused the EU of seeking to build a ‘Christian fortress’ around Turkey and effectively ruled out a deal to reunite Cyprus before Copenhagen Summit. Ten thousands of Turkish Cypriots started to take to streets to call for the reunification of divided Cyprus before it enters the EU, organizing large pro-EU rallies, which were clearly signaling the growing pressure on Denktaş to accept Annan Plan²⁹⁰.

In March 2003, Cyprus peace talks collapsed after an inconclusive meeting in The Hague between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced the end of efforts to reunite Greek and Turkish Cypriots before the island signed an accession treaty to the European Union²⁹¹. European Commission warned Turkey that its bid to join the EU could suffer after the failure of UN-brokered talks to reunite Cyprus²⁹².

In April 2003, Foreign Minister Gül did not attend the EU summit where Greek Cypriots signed the treaty of accession. Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş commented that the signing of an EU accession treaty by the Greek Cypriots sealed Cyprus's partition and reunification was only possible with Turkey's entry into the bloc²⁹³. In July 2003, Denktaş declared dead the Annan plan to unite Cyprus²⁹⁴. Turkey signed a far-reaching customs union framework agreement with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) in August 2003, despite EU's criticism²⁹⁵.

²⁸⁹ Turkish Daily News. 2002 in Perspective. 5.1.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_05_03&d=probe&fn=politics.htm

²⁹⁰ *ibid.*

²⁹¹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 16.3.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_16_03&fn=dom2.htm

²⁹² *ibid.*

²⁹³ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 20.4.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_20_03&fn=dom2.htm

²⁹⁴ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 20.7.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_20_03&fn=dom2.htm

²⁹⁵ Turkish Daily News. Yearly Round-up. 4.1.2004.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_04_04&fn=politics.htm

In December 2003 elections, Turkish Cypriots voted for the Mehmet Ali Talat's pro-EU Republican Turkish Party (CTP), which formed a coalition government with Serdar Denktaş's Democratic Party (DP)²⁹⁶.

Upon UN Secretary General's invitation, Greek Cypriot leader Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş met in New York in February 2004 under the auspices of the United Nations for a critical meeting in search of a deal to unify the island before it finally joins the EU on 1 May 2004²⁹⁷. Later in March 2004, Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece joined the talks in Bürgenstock in last-ditch talks on Annan Plan, where the leaders again failed to bridge their differences²⁹⁸.

Greek and Turkish Cypriots voted on the Annan Plan to reunite Cyprus in a historic referendum on 24 April 2004, with Turkish Cypriots voting 64.9 % in favor of the plan and Greek Cypriots voting 75.8 % against. Thus, the plan became null and void due to the Greek Cypriot rejection²⁹⁹. While [Greek] Cyprus became a full member to the EU on 1 May 2004, Turkish Cypriot leadership started to advocate in US and EU capitals an end to the isolation of Northern Cyprus based on their strong 'yes' in the referendum.

At 16-17 December 2004 Brussels European Council, Turkey and the EU sealed a historic agreement to open membership talks on 3 October 2005 after reaching a hard-won compromise deal to bridge sharp differences over Cyprus, which had even threatened to bring the negotiations to a halt. The landmark decision, which would open a new era for Turkey and the 25-nation bloc, came after Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced to his EU counterparts the Turkish government's readiness to sign a protocol extending its customs union agreement to all members of the EU including the Greek Cypriot government before the effective opening of accession negotiations³⁰⁰.

In February 2005, the AKP government hosted Greek Cypriot main opposition leader Anastasiades in Ankara. Greek Cypriot leadership protested this visit by saying

²⁹⁶ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 18.1.2004.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_18_04&fn=dom2.htm

²⁹⁷ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 15.2.2004.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_15_04&fn=dom2.htm

²⁹⁸ Turkish Daily News. Year 2. 2.1.2005.
<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=2755>

²⁹⁹ *ibid.*

³⁰⁰ Turkish Daily News. Year 4. 2.1.2005.
<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=2770>

that Anastasiades could only reflect his own party's [Democratic Rally Party (DISI)] views of the Cyprus dispute during his visit to Turkey³⁰¹.

Meanwhile, both Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leadership repeatedly voiced their will for a permanent resolution to the Cyprus dispute reiterating that it was the Greek Cypriots who should take a step forward in order to pave the way for reaching a resolution formula. Turkish Cypriot Foreign Minister Serdar Denktaş appealed to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan to work to resume reunification talks on the divided island and added that the reluctant Greek Cypriot leadership must take steps to resume the stalled peace process³⁰².

Turkish Cypriots reelected pro-reunification leader Mehmet Ali Talat, who formed a coalition government with Serdar Denktaş in March 2005, and announced that he would run presidential elections in mid-April³⁰³.

Starting from March 2005, Turkish Foreign Ministry officials started to discuss with the EU Commission the details of a protocol that would extend Turkey's 1963 Association Agreement to the new members states including [Greek] Cyprus³⁰⁴ and eventually agreed on the text of the protocol³⁰⁵.

Simultaneously, Erdoğan was pressing Greece and [Greek] Cyprus to take steps to facilitate a resumption of peace talks, emphasizing that they should be the first to act as Turkey has already done its share³⁰⁶. Greek Cypriot leadership, criticizing Annan's reunification plan as biased and started to discuss possible modification proposals by assembling the National Council³⁰⁷.

On 1 May 2005, after the historical electoral victory in presidential elections, pro-reunification leader Mehmet Ali Talat took over the presidency in Turkish Cyprus from veteran Rauf Denktaş, the head of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

³⁰¹ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 20.2.2005.

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=6383>

³⁰² Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 27.2.2005.

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=6942>

³⁰³ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 6.3.2005.

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=7516>

³⁰⁴ *ibid.*

³⁰⁵ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 3.4.2005.

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=9808>

³⁰⁶ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 20.3.2005.

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=8645>

³⁰⁷ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 17.4.2005.

<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=10986>

(KKTC) since its establishment in 1983, underlining his commitment to work for peace on the island³⁰⁸. He issued a fresh call for Greek Cypriots to resume reunification talks, and asked United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to launch a new initiative for resolving the Cyprus dispute. Supporting Talat, Turkey reiterated Ankara's position for a UN plan as the best option for a just and equitable Cyprus resolution³⁰⁹.

In sum, AKP Government realized a major change in Turkish foreign policy over Cyprus by fully supporting the Annan Plan, and actively promoting a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Armenian Issue:

Armenian issue became one of the top regional issues for AKP government in 2005. Since 2005 was the 90th anniversary of the Armenian losses during the World War I years, Armenia and the influential Armenian Diaspora launched a new and stronger initiative for internationalizing the issue and pressuring Turkey to recognize genocide allegations. Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül described the Armenian allegations of genocide as one of the most important foreign policy matters for Turkey while briefing members of Parliament on Turkey's foreign policy agenda³¹⁰.

As early as February 2005, the so-called Armenian genocide allegations overshadowed the 53rd meeting of the Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Commission as a French deputy sparked harsh reactions from Turkish deputies when he displayed Turkey's recognition of the so-called genocide as a condition for its membership to the EU³¹¹.

In March 2005, CHP leader Deniz Baykal met with Prime Minister Erdoğan for exchanging views on how to counter Armenian claims, while the Armenian government turned down a proposal offered by Erdoğan for a joint study to be conducted by Turkish and Armenian historians on the event³¹².

³⁰⁸ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 1.5.2005.

<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=12138>

³⁰⁹ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 15.5.2005.

<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=13258>

³¹⁰ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 8.5.2005.

<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=12692>

³¹¹ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 27.2.2005.

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=6942>

³¹² Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 13.3.2005.

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=8069>

As a response, Turkey called on countries having upheld Armenian allegations of genocide to take the challenge to prove the validity of the charges and maintained the debate was manipulated by the powerful Armenian Diaspora³¹³.

In April 2005, a letter signed by Erdoğan and Baykal was sent to the British House of Lords and House of Commons as part of a united effort by the government and the opposition to initiate an offensive campaign to counter the Armenian genocide allegations³¹⁴.

Meanwhile, Turkey provided new documents to shed light on a period in the late Ottoman Empire in response to Armenian allegations of genocide, as Armenians across the world have increased efforts to win international recognition for their charges in the run-up to 24 April, which was the 90th anniversary of the alleged genocide³¹⁵.

A statement urging dialogue and compromise released by Brussels two days before the 90th anniversary of the alleged Armenian genocide came as a relief to Ankara³¹⁶. Another relieving development for Turkey was that the US President George W. Bush did not use the word 'genocide' in an annual statement for the Armenian lobby and instead praised Erdoğan's proposal to establish a joint commission to study the genocide allegations³¹⁷.

Upon these developments, Armenian President Robert Kocharian sent a letter to Erdoğan stating that Yerevan accepted the earlier offer by Ankara to set up a joint research committee, but asking Ankara not to put forward any preconditions for starting talks. However, Turkey and Armenia failed to agree on conditions for taking steps to improve their non-existent ties, with Ankara calling for a academic study of Armenian allegations of genocide, whereas Yerevan insisted that political relations must be established first³¹⁸.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signaled that Turkey could establish political relations with neighboring Armenia, while historians studied events during

³¹³ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 27.3.2005.
<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=9225>

³¹⁴ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 17.4.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=10986>

³¹⁵ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 24.4.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=11556>

³¹⁶ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 1.5.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=12138>

³¹⁷ *ibid.*

³¹⁸ *ibid.*

1915 and 1918 in a bid to clarify whether Armenians during the Ottoman Empire were subject to a genocide campaign³¹⁹. This raised Armenian expectations, which was reflected in Armenian Prime Minister Margarian's words that the closed border with Turkey might be opened by the end of the year 2005³²⁰.

Erdoğan declared that Turkey planned to launch a counter-attack on countries whose Parliaments recognized as genocide the 1915 killings of Armenians, while Armenian Foreign Minister Oskanian urged the EU to put more pressure on Turkey to normalize relations with his country³²¹. To Turkey's relief, EU term president Luxembourg's Prime Minister Juncker made it clear that the EU could not become involved in the controversy over whether the killings of Armenians under the rule of the Ottoman Empire early last century was genocide and that the issue should be left to the Turks and the Armenians³²².

In sum, AKP Government made a significant change of foreign policy by opening up all state's resources related to Armenian allegations of genocide, and signaling to establish political ties with Armenia.

Further in this chapter, foreign policy followed by the 58th and 59th Governments of Turkey until June 2005 will be described and analyzed according to the analytical dimensions drawn in Chapter 1.

A: International Factors

A.1. Change in Systemic Conditions

One of the most important systemic developments since the end of Cold War is the issue of transatlantic relations, more precisely the growing gap between Europe and

³¹⁹ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 8.5.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=12692>

³²⁰ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 22.5.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=13860>

³²¹ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 22.5.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=14410>

³²² *ibid.*

US. Although Europe is not monolithic and still includes transatlanticist European countries like Britain, Italy and the new NATO members, anti-Americanism is a growing phenomenon across Europe. According to Robert Kagan, this is due to the major power gap between US and Europe. Thus, “Europe is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation”³²³, whereas

...the United States...remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might.³²⁴

According to Robert Jervis, “the fundamental objective of the current Bush doctrine- which seeks to universalize U.S. values and defend preventively against new, nontraditional threats—is the establishment of U.S. hegemony, primacy, or empire”³²⁵. He argues that “the large European states have every reason to be concerned about US hegemony and seek to constrain it; they understandably fear a world in which their values and interests are served only at Washington’s sufferance”³²⁶.

Turkish foreign policy during the AKP Government found itself at a point of choosing critical positions in this state of flux. Although problematic, Turkey tried to cooperate and support both US and Europe in a way, since Turkey has deep rooted relationships with both parties, which are based among many other factors also on economic interdependence.

In September 2002, the US administration announced a new National Security Strategy in line with its unilateralist world view which has been gradually more apparent since Sept. 11th atrocities.

It was notable for its declaration that the United States would act ‘preemptively’, using military force if necessary, to forestall or prevent threats to its security by terrorists or ‘rogue states’ possessing biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons—so-called ‘weapons of mass destruction’.³²⁷

³²³ Kagan, Robert. Power and Weakness in Policy Review, Jun/Jul2002, Issue 113, p. 3

³²⁴ *ibid.*

³²⁵ Jervis, Robert. The Compulsive Empire in Foreign Policy, Jul/Aug2003 Issue 137, p. 83

³²⁶ *ibid.* p. 85

³²⁷ Encyclopedia Britannica Profiles. The American Presidency. Presidency.
<http://www.britannica.com/presidentsWebapp/article.do?articleID=230038>

In November 2002 the Bush administration successfully lobbied for a UN Security Council resolution providing for the return of weapons inspectors to Iraq, which according to US' claims continued to possess weapons of mass destruction.

For several weeks the United States and Britain tried unsuccessfully to secure support from France, Russia, and other Security Council members for a second resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force against Iraq, though administration officials continued to insist that earlier resolutions provided sufficient legal justification for military action. As debate in the Security Council dragged on, antiwar sentiment outside the United States increased dramatically, leading to massive peace demonstrations in several major cities throughout the world, especially in Europe.³²⁸

Finally Bush ended up with a unilateral decision and ordered the War on Iraq, called Operation Iraqi Freedom, to begin on 20 March 2002. By mid-April US forces entered Baghdad and forced Saddam's regime from power.

Stabilizing postwar Iraq, however, proved difficult; in the months immediately after the war, one U.S. soldier, on average, was dying daily as a result of attacks by Saddam loyalists and other Iraqis opposed to the occupation. Meanwhile, hundreds of sites suspected of housing or producing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction were investigated. As the search continued into the following year, critics of Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair accused both of having exaggerated the threat posed by Saddam in order to win public support for the war. Saddam, who had gone into hiding during the invasion, was captured by U.S. forces in December 2003.³²⁹

2004 was the election year in the States. Bush focused his campaign basically on the war on terrorism, and succeeded to be reelected with a slim majority of the electoral and popular vote. Through reelection, however, Bush managed to gain a strong mandate, which can be interpreted as a public support to the continuation of US' unilateralism. This was also reflected in the statements regarding Iran and Syria indicating that American hegemony was becoming more forceful and unilateral.

In sum, systemic conditions during the post Sept 11 era reflected strong US dominance and unilateralism in world politics. However, this had no direct and viable impact on change of Turkish foreign policy in major issues such as Turkish-Greek relations or the Cyprus conflict.

³²⁸ *ibid.*

³²⁹ *ibid.*

A.2. Regional Developments

The two important regional developments for Turkey during AKP government were the War on Iraq, and the EU enlargement.

A.2. War on Iraq

Underlining the fact that Turkey was one of the most effected countries from the First Gulf War, AKP Government made it clear from the beginning that they are in favor of avoiding of a second war on Iraq and for the resolution of the conflict under UN framework³³⁰. In the eve of the War on Iraq, Turkey hosted numerous high level officials and politicians who came to discuss Turkish support for the U.S. position against Iraq and in the anti-terror campaign. On 4 December 2002, US Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz said that his country is looking at investing hundreds of millions of dollars to upgrade Turkish military bases that could be used in a war with Iraq³³¹. Turkish Parliament approved a six-month extension of the Northern Watch, the mandate that allowed U.S. warplanes to use İncirlik air base to patrol a "no-fly" zone over northern Iraq³³². While Turkey was refraining from concrete promises of support for a U.S. war on Iraq until initial results of United Nations weapons inspections are clear, John Taylor, the U.S. Treasury Department's undersecretary for international affairs, said that the United States and Turkey have agreed on the overall shape of an aid package to help Turkey's struggling economy withstand a possible war in neighboring Iraq, on 28 December 2002 after two-day talks in Ankara³³³. Turkey followed an active diplomacy to prevent a U.S.-led war in neighboring Iraq: Prime Minister Gül made a tour to Middle East countries Syria, Egypt and Jordan, and Kürşat Tüzmen, State Minister in charge of foreign trade, lead a Turkish business delegation to Baghdad, as a sign of Turkey's opposition to any war in neighboring Iraq. Tüzmen also delivered a letter to Saddam Hussein from Prime Minister Gül, appealing to Iraq to comply with UN resolutions to ward off a possible U.S.-led war³³⁴. Furthermore, the foreign ministers of Iraq's neighbors Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria meet in

³³⁰ AK Parti MGYK'sı Toplandı. 9.11.2002 <http://www.akparti.org.tr/>

³³¹ Turkish Daily News. 2002 in Perspective. 5.1.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_05_03&d=probe&fn=politics.htm

³³² *ibid.*

³³³ *ibid.*

³³⁴ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 19.1.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_19_03&fn=dom2.htm

Istanbul on 23rd January 2003 to discuss ways to avert a potentially destabilizing U.S.-led war on Iraq. They urged Saddam Hussein to cooperate fully with U.N. arms inspectors to avoid a war that would have ‘devastating consequences’ on the countries of the region. Meanwhile, Iraq urged Turkey to reject U.S. requests for military support in any attack on Baghdad³³⁵.

In the same period and almost contradictorily, upon AKP Government’s approval, U.S. inspectors began arriving in Turkey to examine military bases and ports in this key U.S. ally for a possible operation against neighboring Iraq, and the Turkish military began shipping additional military supplies to units along the Iraqi border to reinforce them ahead of a possible U. S. operation on Iraq³³⁶. In a key decision on 6 February 2003, the Turkish Parliament voted to allow the United States to begin renovating military bases and ports for a possible Iraq war, a first step toward allowing U.S. combat troops into the country³³⁷, and on 8 February 2003, Turkey and the United States sign an agreement laying out the legal and financial framework for U.S. plans to renovate Turkish bases ahead of a possible war in Iraq³³⁸. While anti-war sentiments were growing in the Turkish public, another blow came from the European countries to Turkey’s potential support to US: France, Germany and Belgium split NATO by formally vetoing a plan to boost Turkish defense in the event of a US-led war on Iraq, an action U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld denounces as ‘a disgrace’. NATO called a special meeting of its 19 nations' envoys for an emergency meeting after the veto by three members. Turkey immediately requested emergency consultations under NATO's mutual defense treaty, the first time in the 54-year history of the alliance that a member nation formally invoked Article 4 of the founding treaty to force such talks³³⁹. Finally, on 19 February 2003, days after breaking a stalemate over planning in the event of war with Iraq, NATO, meeting without France, approved the urgent deployment of

³³⁵ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 26.1.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_26_03&fn=dom2.htm

³³⁶ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 2.2 2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_02_03&fn=dom2.htm

³³⁷ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 9.2 2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_09_03&fn=dom2.htm

³³⁸ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 23.2 2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_23_03&fn=dom2.htm

³³⁹ *ibid.*

AWACS radar aircraft, Patriot missile systems and chemical-biological response units to Turkey³⁴⁰.

The United States offered Turkey an economic aid package that includes about \$6 billion in grants and up to \$20 billion in loan guarantees in a bid to secure Ankara's support for an invasion of Iraq. On 25 February 2003, AKP Government asked Parliament to authorize the deployment of 62,000 US combat troops, 255 warplanes and 65 helicopters, but disagreements on the conditions of the U.S. deployment delayed the key parliamentary vote. The bill also asked legislators to authorize the deployment of Turkish troops abroad³⁴¹. On 1 March 2003, in a stunning reversal that could undermine U.S. war plans and seriously strain ties with Washington, Turkish Parliament failed to approve a motion allowing in U.S. combat troops to open a northern front against Iraq³⁴².

Signaling impatience with the Turkish government, the United States began moving Navy ships out of the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, where they could launch long-range cruise missiles on a path to Iraq that would not go over Turkey³⁴³, and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell urged Turkey to keep its forces out of northern Iraq during any U.S.-led military action due to concerns of a possible conflict with the Kurds³⁴⁴. On 19 March 2003, the AKP Government asked Parliament to grant the US military permission to use Turkish airspace in an Iraq war, and in a long-delayed decision to give partial support to the United States to open a northern front against Iraq, Parliament finally voted to pass a government motion allowing the US to use Turkey's airspace for airborne attacks against Iraq³⁴⁵.

Foreign Minister Gül declared that Turkey was determined to send its troops across the border into northern Iraq to contain a possible refugee flow and prevent any attempt by Iraqi Kurds to break away from Iraq³⁴⁶. However, both EU leaders and US

³⁴⁰ *ibid.*

³⁴¹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 2.3 2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_02_03&fn=dom2.htm

³⁴² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 9.3 2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_09_03&fn=dom2.htm

³⁴³ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 23.3 2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_23_03&fn=dom2.htm

³⁴⁴ *ibid.*

³⁴⁵ Turkish Daily News. Yearly Round-up. 4.1.2004.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_04_04&fn=politics.htm

³⁴⁶ *ibid.*

Administration issued warnings to Turkey not to lead to further complications by dispatching troops to northern Iraq³⁴⁷.

US officials said that the United States has scrapped plans to move U.S. troops through Turkey into northern Iraq and instead would send the 4th Infantry Division from Texas to Kuwait to join a thrust into Iraq from the south, and on 22 March 2003, US evacuated İncirlik Air Base in southern Turkey³⁴⁸.

On 2 April 2003, Turkey and the US agreed on a basis for shipping supplies for US forces in northern Iraq through Turkey and to set up a coordination mechanism to avert possible friction in northern Iraq, in a major step to patch up ties damaged after Turkey's rejection of U.S. requests to deploy troops here³⁴⁹. Furthermore, Ankara declared having agreed in principle to a US request to send Turkish soldiers into neighboring Iraq for postwar peacekeeping duties. On 17 July 2003, Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry Uğur Ziyal presented an extensive package of proposals for Turkish assistance to the US efforts to restructure Iraq in the aftermath of the war during his trip to Washington. Among the measures is a proposal to use part of an \$8.5 billion U.S. loan to Turkey in the restructuring of Iraq³⁵⁰.

In July 2003, a crisis occurred between Turkey and US, when American forces raided a Turkish Special Forces' office in the northern Iraqi city of Sulaymaniya and detained 11 soldiers, reportedly on the grounds that the soldiers were plotting to kill the governor of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. An escalation of the crisis was averted when the United States eventually freed the Turkish soldiers, but in Chief of Staff Gen. Hilmi Özkök's words, this incident has created 'the biggest crisis of confidence' between Turkish and US armies. On 16 July 2003, the United States endorsed a statement expressing regret over the detention of Turkish soldiers³⁵¹.

On 22 September 2003, Turkish and US officials signed a long-awaited deal on the release of an \$8.5 billion loan for Turkey. Upon that development, in October 2003, Turkish Parliament voted in favor of a government motion to send peacekeeping troops to neighboring Iraq, which was welcomed by the United States. However, next month, Turkey called off this offer to send peacekeeping troops, faced by a fierce opposition by the Iraqi Governing Council.

³⁴⁷ *ibid.*

³⁴⁸ *ibid.*

³⁴⁹ *ibid.*

³⁵⁰ *ibid.*

³⁵¹ *ibid.*

On 28 January 2004, U.S. President George W. Bush met with Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the White House and Bush gave Erdoğan assurance that the United States would not support an expansion of autonomy for Kurds in neighboring Iraq. “I assured him of the United States' ambitions for a peaceful and democratic Iraq that is territorially intact”, Bush told reporters after the meeting³⁵².

In November 2004, after US President won a second term in office, Foreign Minister Gül said the U.S. presidential victory has provided US President an opportunity to review and fine-tune his much-criticized foreign policy, particularly on the Middle East and Iraq³⁵³.

On 30 January 2005, Iraqis voted in their country's first free election in 50 years, which Turkey appreciated as a “step towards the establishment of a democratic regime” in the neighboring country³⁵⁴. Iraqi polls showed that Kurdish groups got the second largest share of seats in the Iraqi assembly after Shiite Arabs and a key role in the formation of the transitional government. Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Jalal Talabani declared victory in the ethnically mixed city of Kirkuk³⁵⁵.

During her high-profile talks in Ankara in February 2005, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reiterated Washington's commitment to a unified Iraq and reassured Turkey that the U.S. would not tolerate terrorist groups in the country, in remarks likely to help patch up the strained ties between NATO allies Turkey and the United States³⁵⁶. Moreover, US Ambassador to Turkey, Eric Edelman said Turkish-US relations have gone through ups and downs over disagreements on Iraq, but the relationship between the two allies was a strong one that cannot be reduced over just one issue³⁵⁷.

Turkish Foreign Ministry dismissed criticism that Turkey's Iraq policy was shaped by concerns over the fate of Kirkuk and the rights of Turks' ethnic kin, the Turkmens.

³⁵² Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 1.2.2004.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_01_04&fn=dom2.htm

³⁵³ Turkish Daily News. ‘Will they give a date?’ discussion dominates November. 5.12.2004. <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=831>

³⁵⁴ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 6.2.2005.
<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=5283>

³⁵⁵ *ibid.*

³⁵⁶ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 13.2.2005.
<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=5862>

³⁵⁷ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 20.2.2005.
<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=6383>

The ministry claimed it had embraced a strategic perspective that covered all aspects of the Iraqi situation³⁵⁸.

An opinion piece in The Wall Street Journal bluntly described what the writer termed a "poisonous atmosphere" that was disintegrating US-Turkish relations. On 18 February 2005, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül played down this article that described Turkey as the 'sick man of Europe' reaffirming that the Turkish-US alliance had strategic importance for both sides regardless of what the Turkish or US media said³⁵⁹.

In April 2005, Foreign Minister Gül said that the annual extension of permission for the use of İncirlik air base by a US-led coalition would meet an additional US request to benefit from the base as a logistics hub for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan³⁶⁰, and later, the Turkish government approved this request about the use the İncirlik air.

Jalal Talabani, the new president of Iraq, pledged to improve relations with Turkey in a broad range of areas and underlined that Iraqi Kurds wanted a united Iraq with a federal and democratic structure³⁶¹. Iraq and its neighbors opened a two-day meeting in İstanbul, the first gathering since landmark elections in the war-torn country and the formation of an Iraqi interim government³⁶². On 27 May 2005, in the first high-level contact with the new Iraqi administration, Turkey and Iraq agreed to cooperate on a broad array of issues ranging from security to business ties in a sign of solidarity between the two neighbors³⁶³.

In sum, during the AKP Government, the war in the neighboring Iraq occupied Turkey's agenda for a very long time. Although Turkey was affected by the war in many ways, particularly related to the Kurds in Northern Iraq, the war itself had no impact on other major foreign policy issues of the country such as the Cyprus conflict or Turkey-EU relations.

³⁵⁸ *ibid.*

³⁵⁹ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 27.2.2005.
<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=6942>

³⁶⁰ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 24.4.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=11556>

³⁶¹ *ibid.*

³⁶² Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 8.5.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=12692>

³⁶³ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 29.5.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=14410>

A.2. EU Enlargement:

On 1 May 2004, EU welcomed ten new members to the Union.

The latest enlargement, from 15 to 25, is the biggest in Union history. It has its roots in the collapse of communism, symbolized in the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which offered an unexpected and unprecedented opportunity to extend European integration into Central and Eastern Europe.... The ten newcomers, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, joined formally on 1 May 2004, the culmination of a long process of preparation and negotiations....By the end of 2002 – less than 13 years after the break-up of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War – the eight central and eastern European countries had completed their negotiations and were ready to join, together with the two Mediterranean islands.³⁶⁴

This development in the region was meaningful in the sense that “the 2004 enlargement of the European Union finally heals the rift opened up by the East-West confrontation and the Cold War”³⁶⁵.

Immediately after the collapse of communism around 1990, the European Union supported the democratization process in the former communist countries and provided technical and financial assistance as they introduced market economies. By the mid-1990s, trade agreements were in place, giving central and eastern Europeans preferential access to EU markets for most of their exports. Similar agreements with Cyprus and Malta date from the 1970s. The actual entry negotiations to agree the terms whereby the new EU countries assume the rights and responsibilities of membership took place between 1998 and 2002. The entry date was set for 1 May 2004.³⁶⁶

For Turkey, the 2004 enlargement was also significant, since [Greek] Cyprus became a full member. Thus, the EU enlargement had a positive impact on foreign policy change of Turkey concerning the Cyprus conflict. EU enlargement also affected positively Turkey-EU relations and Armenian issue. However, concerning the Turkish-Greek relations, it had no impact on foreign policy change, since Turkey and Greece have already been in a rapprochement process since the earthquakes in 1999.

³⁶⁴ Overviews of the European Union Activities Enlargement In Brief
http://www.europa.eu.int/pol/enlarg/overview_en.htm

³⁶⁵ Europe on the move: More unity and More Diversity. The European Union’s Biggest Enlargement. Directorate-General for Press and Communication Manuscript completed in November 2003, p.1 obtainable from
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/move/41/en.doc>

³⁶⁶ *ibid.* p.3

A.3. Foreign Commitments

The most significant commitments Turkey realized during the AKP government were related to the pre-accession process to the EU.

Concerning military commitments for European security, AKP continued with Turkey's official position so far and favored a link between Turkey's commitments to NATO and to the EU. This was reflected in Gül's following words: "NATO is one of the most successful organizations in history. Another one is the EU... Strategic partnership between NATO and EU should be in line with improving European Security and Defense Policy"³⁶⁷. In December 2002, EU and NATO finally reached an agreement as the two accepted Turkey's demands on European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). "Turkey's agreement to the comprehensive deal reached in December 2002 regarding the participation of non-EU European allies in ESDP, opened the way for the finalization of the permanent arrangements between the EU and NATO and to the subsequent implementation of the Berlin Plus agenda"³⁶⁸.

Along with its military foreign commitments to NATO, Turkey assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)³⁶⁹ in Kabul starting from February 2005, its second term leading the NATO-led troops since the force was established after the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001³⁷⁰.

Regarding the improvement of human rights records, AKP government led Turkey into significant legal commitments. In 2003, "Turkish Parliament ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights³⁷¹ and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights³⁷² and Protocol No 6 to the Convention for the

³⁶⁷ Başbakan Abdullah Gül NATO Parlamenterler Asamblesi 48. Genel Kurulu Kapanış Oturumuna Katıldı. 19.11.2002 <http://www.akparti.org.tr/>

³⁶⁸ European Commission. 2003 Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession. 5.11.2003. p. 16. Obtainable from http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/docs.htm#regular_reports

³⁶⁹ More information on ISAF commands available at ISAF website at http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/about/about_history.htm

³⁷⁰ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 20.2.2005. <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=6383>

³⁷¹ Full text available at UNHCR website http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm

³⁷² Full text available at UNHCR website http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cesr.htm

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms^{373,374}, the latter banning the death penalty in peacetime, a symbolic move demonstrating Turkey's commitment to human rights as it waits to open talks on EU membership. Peter Schieder, the Head of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, welcomed the move as 'a step of huge political significance'³⁷⁵. In 2004, Turkey ratified Protocol No 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms³⁷⁶, eliminating capital punishment, also in wartime, as Turkey sought to meet EU membership criteria. Thus, in March 2004, the Monitoring Committee of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly approved a special report recommending that Turkey be dropped from a list of countries monitored by the Strasbourg-based human rights watchdog for democratic deficiencies, a major stride in Turkey's efforts to join the European Union³⁷⁷.

AKP government fulfilled a major and long awaited commitment to the European Court of Human Rights. In December 2003, settling a major dispute with the Council of Europe, Turkey paid 1.12 million Euros in an unprecedented gesture to compensate a Greek Cypriot woman Loizidou, for depriving her access to her property on the Turkish side of Cyprus as ruled by the European Court of Human Rights in a controversial 1998 verdict³⁷⁸.

On 12 May 2005, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the 1999 trial of terrorist PKK/Kongra-Gel leader Abdullah Öcalan, in which the now-defunct State Security Court (DGM) sentenced him to death for 'treason through separatism', was unfair because Öcalan was given insufficient access to the case files and because restrictions were imposed upon his lawyers during the trial process³⁷⁹. Currently, the

³⁷³ Full text available at Council of Europe website

<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/114.htm>

³⁷⁴ *ibid.* p.17

³⁷⁵ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 16.11.2003.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=11_16_03&fn=dom2.htm

³⁷⁶ Full text available at ECHR website

www.echr.coe.int/Convention/webConvenENG.pdf

• ³⁷⁷ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 7.3.2004.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_07_04&fn=dom2.htm

³⁷⁸ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 7.12.2003.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=12_07_03&fn=dom2.htm

³⁷⁹ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 15.5.2005.

<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=13258>

Justice Ministry is continuing to thoroughly evaluate the ruling of the European court for a retrial for terrorist PKK leader Öcalan³⁸⁰.

In sum, the AKP Government's major new foreign commitments were of legal nature and related to the pre-accession process to the EU. Fulfilling these commitments was crucial, since it reinforced foreign policy change in all major issues ranging from the Cyprus conflict, Turkey-EU relations, Turkish-Greek relations to the Armenian issue.

In this period, the factors regional developments (EU integration) and foreign commitments interacted with each other.

B: Domestic Factors

B.1. Domestic Regime Change

As stated before, AKP came to office with a regular change of government through elections. 3 November 2002 Elections resulted with an overwhelming victory of AKP, so that AKP formed the 58th and 59th Turkish Governments as one-party majority government.

AKP won a massive landslide victory capturing 34 % of the votes and 363 seats in Parliament in the elections. CHP was the only other party that managed to win seats in Parliament by gaining 19 % of the votes and 178 seats. Nine seats went to the independents. All the partners of the coalition government and the main opposition party were left out of the Parliament after having failed to clear the ten percent threshold. Previous Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit conceded defeat in national elections, saying his government committed political suicide by giving in to early polls³⁸¹.

The 28 March local elections in 2004 can be evaluated as a vote of confidence for the current AKP Government, where AKP scored a major victory, winning approximately 43 percent of votes. The result strengthened government's mandate to

³⁸⁰ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 22.5.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=13860>

³⁸¹ Turkish Daily News. 2002 in Perspective. 5.1.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_05_03&d=probe&fn=politics.htm

pursue more liberal economic and political reforms and gave it strength to push through the Cyprus road map³⁸².

Although there are occasionally rumors about early national elections, party officials dismiss such rumors, confirming the polls would be held on schedule on 3 November 2007 with the AKP electing the next president in May of 2007³⁸³.

In sum, AKP came to office with a regular exchange of power through democratic elections. However, the type of exchange was not applicable to foreign policy change.

B.2. Different Orientations to Foreign Policy

The AKP Government claims to pursue having a novel foreign policy vision, which Erdoğan repeatedly defined and described in his various ‘Call for Nation’ speeches as an “active, dynamic, decisive and calculative foreign policy”³⁸⁴ based on multilateralism. Erdoğan underlined that “Turkey would not reach anything by accepting deadlocks, following passive wait and see policies, creating paranoid fears, and isolating itself from the world”³⁸⁵.

One basic characteristics of AKP’s foreign policy vision is that it is progressive instead of pro status quo: “We are not in an effort to protect the status quo neither in foreign nor domestic policies. This status quo needs to be changed. This [change] is a strategy itself, an accumulation of tactics. Therefore, we would never make a step contrary to our national interests. If we are about to make any step, we would contact first with the opposition, NGOs and with those circles who have a say in this matter, then we would take the necessary steps to be taken”³⁸⁶. In another speech on 22 January 2004, Erdoğan states: “In a world that changes ever day, it is obvious that nothing would be gained with a static foreign policy understanding, with arguments that belong to yesterday and with strategies that were not updated. As government, we based our policies on this fact from the start, and we have put our foreign policy vision to the

³⁸² Turkish Daily News. Year 2. 2.1.2005.

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=2755>

³⁸³ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 24.4.2005.

<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=11556>

³⁸⁴ Başbakan Erdoğan'ın Ulusa Sesleniş Konuşmasının Tam Metni. 22.1.2004.

<http://www.akparti.org.tr/>

³⁸⁵ *ibid.*

³⁸⁶ R.Tayyip Erdoğan CHP Genel Başkanı Deniz Baykal'ı Ziyaret Etti...22.11.2002

<http://www.akparti.org.tr/>

front, that would move Turkey to the future and transform it into an influential and powerful world power”³⁸⁷.

An unpublished group research³⁸⁸, where the author has personally participated, analyzed AKP Government’s Foreign Policy for the period from November 2002 until January 2004. The data used was composed of the statements and intentions of AKP, which were made public through mainstream newspapers and websites. A total of 1873 entries were codified and categorized with the aim of examining the toolbox AKP applied while conducting its foreign policy. The research revealed that AKP Government relied on a combination of traditional diplomatic and conflict resolution tools: 59% of AKP Government’s foreign policy was composed of traditional diplomacy tools, while the remaining 41% of foreign policy activities belong to the conflict resolution toolbox³⁸⁹.

In sum, AKP came to office with a different set of orientation to foreign policy, which is described as active, dynamic, decisive, and multidimensional by the party leader Erdoğan. Furthermore, AKP Government started to make use of problem solving approach in major foreign policy issues of the country such as the Cyprus conflict. This clear difference of AKP’s foreign policy orientation had a positive impact on foreign policy change.

³⁸⁷ Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın Ulusa Sesleniş Konuşmasının Tam Metni. 25.2.2005 <http://www.akparti.org.tr/>

³⁸⁸ Ağırdır, Y., Bozbağ, F. M., Ersoy, M., Karaege, M., Kesler, A., Özalp, E., Paker, D. & Tezel, A. Ö. (2005). *AKP Government’s Foreign Policy: Content Analysis*. [Final project for the course CONF 604 - Foreign Policy and Conflict Resolution instructed by Nimet Beriker]. Unpublished Manuscript. Sabancı University, İstanbul. Turkey

³⁸⁹ Conflict Resolution tools were further divided into two subcategories:

Transformative Interventions and Structural Interventions.

Stern and Druckman (2000) defines conflict transformation as “the efforts to reach accommodation between parties in conflict through interactive processes that lead to reconciling tensions, redefining interests, or finding common ground”. Thus, transformative interventions are those foreign policy tools that aim restoring relations, such as third party interventions. On the other hand, “structural prevention involves creating organizations or institutionalized systems of law and rules that establish and strengthen non violent channels for adjudicating intergroup disputes, accommodating conflicting interests and transforming conflicts by finding common ground”³⁸⁹.

Consequently, structural interventions are those foreign policy tools that aim changing the structure of conflict. The above research revealed that the conflict resolution toolbox of AKP was composed of 57% transformative versus 43% structural interventions.

B.3. Political Cohesiveness of the New Regime

AKP, using the advantages of being one party government and its high party discipline, shows a politically cohesive picture to a great extent. However, in some instances different voices have been heard, basically over domestic issues.

In September 2004, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's insistence on criminalizing adultery under the new Turkish Penal Code (TCK) framework was one of such instances³⁹⁰.

In January 2005, debates regarding the best way to govern Turkey can be said to have dominated the agenda. The ruling AKP Government was divided by presidential system debates. While Justice Minister Cemil Çiçek was favoring a presidential system for permanent stability, AKP parliamentary group deputy leader Faruk Çelik, known for his close ties to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, said that he personally preferred strengthening the parliamentary system to implementing a presidential system³⁹¹.

Rumors hinted that the AKP debates were not limited to the presidential system. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, speaking at a meeting held at the AKP Central Executive Committee (MYK), mentioned the rumors of a Cabinet shakeup. "We are not going to change the Cabinet simply because the media wishes it. Necessary alterations can be made when and if the time comes," said Erdoğan. Rumors include Erdoğan's desire to form a more united government by replacing some ministers who voiced his disagreement with certain government policies³⁹².

In February 2005, a Council of Europe commission report criticizing Turkish efforts in maintaining European standards of religious freedom sparked a debate within the ruling party over whether Turkey should keep a reference to religion on identity cards and continue compulsory religious classes in schools³⁹³.

³⁹⁰ Turkish Daily News. Year 3. 2.1.2005.
<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=2759>

³⁹¹ Turkish Daily News. Week. 9.1. 2005.
<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=3347>

³⁹² *ibid.*

³⁹³ Turkish Daily News. Last week in perspective. 20.2.2005.
<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=6383>

Over differences of opinion with Erdoğan, Culture and Tourism Minister Erkan Mumcu resigned from both his Cabinet post and from AKP. His surprise resignation created a stir in a comparatively stable political environment³⁹⁴.

In May 2005, Parliament Speaker Bülent Arınç's statement that Parliament had the power to abolish the Constitutional Court if it deemed it necessary to do so has caused a major political controversy³⁹⁵. Furthermore, AKP parliamentary group discussed a headscarf case filed by Leyla Şahin at the European Court of Human Rights, with some deputies criticizing government arguments calling for a continuation of the ban³⁹⁶.

In sum, despite some minor incidents, AKP Government proved to be highly cohesive in this period. This high degree of cohesiveness positively impacted foreign policy change.

B.4. Strength of Political Opposition to the Regime

Opposition to AKP Government has been performed basically by three groups of actors: the main opposition party CHP, political parties outside the Parliament, and the powerful military establishment in Turkey. The strength of opposition of these groups has differed considerably.

According to the election results CHP became the second party that entered the Parliament, and hence the main opposition party. Right after the elections, Erdoğan made a visit of good will to CHP leader Baykal and requested their support for the EU bid³⁹⁷. These mutual visits continued during both AKP Governments. CHP leader Baykal commented that “these visits constitute a message on their own; regardless of the topics discussed...We are working for developing a new common understanding concerning foreign policy”³⁹⁸.

³⁹⁴ Turkish Daily News. Last week in perspective. 27.2.2005.
<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=6942>

³⁹⁵ Turkish Daily News. Last week in perspective. 8.5.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=12692>

³⁹⁶ Turkish Daily News. Last week in perspective. 29.5.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=14410>

³⁹⁷ Seçim Sonuçlarının Ardından Anlamli Ziyaret. 5.11.2002 <http://www.akparti.org.tr/>

³⁹⁸ R.Tayyip Erdoğan CHP Genel Başkanı Deniz Baykal'ı Ziyaret Etti...22.11.2002
<http://www.akparti.org.tr/>

In this period, CHP was basically occupied with its inner problems, so the opposition remained weak. “Ever since the elections the CHP... has been unable to meet the expectations of the Turkish left. Its popularity has continued to slide in each and every public opinion poll held since then. In the meantime, rather than cementing its unity – – for a change – – and concentrating its efforts on fulfilling its opposition role in Parliament, the CHP, under Deniz Baykal, turned more and more inward. A ‘Be it small, be it mine’ policy was pursued, and eventually all prominent personalities became disgruntled or expelled from the mainstream party of the Turkish left”³⁹⁹. Especially after local elections in March 2004, CHP leader Deniz Baykal received widespread criticisms and protests that his party has failed in polls⁴⁰⁰. In July 2004, Deniz Baykal received a vote of confidence from 781 out of the 1,058 delegates in an extraordinary CHP convention⁴⁰¹.

Starting from November 2004, the reelected Şişli Mayor Mustafa Sarıgül from CHP “started a nationwide campaign to replace Baykal...Opposition to Baykal's rule saw a new chance to remove him in Sarıgül. As support for Sarıgül increased..., CHP leadership publicly blasted Sarıgül and two deputies were sent to Istanbul to investigate the charges of corruption. Their report was the basis of the application submitted to the CHP Supreme Disciplinary Board (YDK) that asked for Sarıgül's dismissal from the party...It was on Jan. 3, 2005, that the YDK surprisingly took the decision to reject the application to dismiss Sarıgül from the party. Soon after, Baykal released a statement calling for an extraordinary party congress sometime in January”⁴⁰².

“CHP ... is undergoing a transformation. If it's successful, we'll have a truly social democrat party. The CHP will be free from its Kemalist past and will lose its identity. Mustafa Sarıgül is being used to realize this transformation. ... It seems the criticism is focused on the CHP's nationalism. In fact, while the CHP sincerely supports EU membership, it has adopted a Kemalist nationalist and republican stance with respect to

³⁹⁹ Turkish Daily News. CHP needs not a leader but transformation. TDN Editorial by Yusuf Kanlı. 9.1.2005. <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=3336>

⁴⁰⁰ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 11.4.2004. http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_11_04&fn=dom2.htm

⁴⁰¹ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 20.6.2004. http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=06_20_04&fn=dom2.htm

⁴⁰² Turkish Daily News. Civil War within the CHP. 9.1.2005. <http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=3359>

Cyprus (and most probably soon for the Aegean Sea as well) and minorities. It tries not to deviate from moderate secularism”⁴⁰³.

On 5 February 2005, the 13th extraordinary party congress of the CHP was held in Ankara, and resulted in the victory of Baykal who collected 674 while the mayor won 460 votes⁴⁰⁴. Later, Baykal’s rival Mustafa Sarıgül was dismissed by the party's Supreme Disciplinary Board (YDK), where he was charged with violating party bylaws during the congress⁴⁰⁵.

Similarly, parties outside the Parliament were also very much concerned with their inner dynamics rather than performing a strong opposition to AKP.

Following the 3 November 2002, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, DYP leader Tansu Çiller and ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz stepped down as the leaders of their parties after defeat in elections. In December 2002, DYP elected Mehmet Ağar as its new leader at a general convention. In January 2003, Ali Talip Özdemir, is elected leader of ANAP, which later changed leader and elected Nesrin Nas as its first female leader of the party. In October 2003, MHP re-elected Devlet Bahçeli as its chairman.

In December 2003, former Prime Minister and veteran politician Bülent Ecevit announced that he would step down as leader of DSP at the party's convention scheduled to be held after local polls. On 25 July 2004, ending an active political career that spanned nearly half-a-century, he stepped down from the leadership of his center-left DSP. Delegates later elected Zeki Sezer, a former Cabinet minister, as their new leader.

In February 2003, Cem Uzan, one the closest rivals of AKP during the elections, was re-elected GP leader. He had to deal with business problems, partly caused by AKP. In June 2003, the Energy and Natural Resources Ministry announced it has canceled deals with two power distributors, namely Kepez Elektrik and Cukurova Elektrik, controlled by the controversial Uzan group and seized the plants operated by these two companies. The ministry says the companies have persistently violated provisions of the concession agreements they have signed with the government to run

⁴⁰³ Turkish Daily News. Change and the CHP. 13.1.2005.
<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=3629>

⁴⁰⁴ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 6.2.2005.
<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=5283>

⁴⁰⁵ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 27.3.2005.
<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=9225>

power stations and distribute electricity⁴⁰⁶. In July 2003, the Banking Supervision and Regulation Agency (BDDK) canceled the banking license of İmar Bank owned by the controversial Uzan group, a day after it seized control of its management⁴⁰⁷. Moreover, the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (RTÜK) decided to halt the broadcasting of television channels owned by GP leader Cem Uzan, for using the broadcasts in favor of unjust benefit for the TV station owner⁴⁰⁸. In August, after calling on leading telecommunications equipment maker Motorola for arbitration talks over a multi-billion dollar dispute, the Uzan family resigned from the board of Telsim, the number two mobile operator in Turkey⁴⁰⁹. In February 2004, Turkish authorities backed by police take over management of some 219 companies owned by the controversial Uzan Group in order to collect on the group's estimated \$6 billion in debt to financial authorities⁴¹⁰.

Chief of General Staff evaluated AKP's electoral victory as the realization of the public's choice⁴¹¹. Erdoğan argued: "Our military does not mix into politics. The area of authority of the military is defined by the Constitution. Concerning security our military has a defined area of duty; similarly the area of duty of the institution of politics is also defined"⁴¹².

However, the EU institutions were not satisfied with the level of military involvement in Turkish politics. One example for that was that the European Parliament's committee on foreign affairs in its annual assessment report on Turkey declared that the Turkish military constituted an obstacle to the development of a democratic and pluralist political system in the country⁴¹³.

In May 2003, Chief of Staff General Hilmi Özkök refused to even mention the word 'coup', acknowledging that the military had concerns about some of the actions

⁴⁰⁶ Turkish Daily News. Yearly Round-up. 4.1.2004.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_04_04&fn=politics.htm

⁴⁰⁷ ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ ibid.

⁴⁰⁹ ibid.

⁴¹⁰ Turkish Daily News. Year 1. 2.1.2005.

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=2737>

⁴¹¹ AK Parti MYK'sı Toplandı. 5.11.2002 <http://www.akparti.org.tr/>

⁴¹² Erdoğan İsveç Başbakanı Goran Persson'la Bir Araya Geldi. 27.11.2002
<http://www.akparti.org.tr/>

⁴¹³ Turkish Daily News. Yearly Round-up. 4.1.2004.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_04_04&fn=politics.htm

and applications of the AKP government but stressed that these could be solved through dialogue between institutions⁴¹⁴.

On 30 July 2003, Turkish Parliament passed the seventh harmonization package concerning EU reforms; a landmark legal reform to curb the political influence of the powerful military⁴¹⁵. On 7 May 2004, in an effort to advance Turkey's bid to join the EU, the Parliament cast a 457-8 vote to approve a set of constitutional reforms that would abolish State Security Courts (DGMs) and introduce civilian supervision over military expenditures⁴¹⁶.

Although the strength of military in political affairs was limited by various parliamentary decisions, still the powerful presence is felt over controversial issues. In March 2005, a statement from the General Staff released after local celebrations called Nevroz, during which some Kurdish groups were seen dragging the Turkish flag on the streets, underlined that the Turkish Armed Services was determined to defend the country and its flag to the last drop of blood, just like its forefathers, warning those who misinterpreted its patience and aloofness⁴¹⁷. Similarly, following the *casus belli* policy discussions in the Aegean Sea, Deputy Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Başbuğ said tension and incidents that could occur around the country would have a harmful effect on the unity of the nation, calling on people to allow authorized institutions to handle any provocative or illegal acts⁴¹⁸. Another example came in April 2005, as the Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök signaled that the conditional support of the powerful military for Turkey's EU membership bid could wane, if the country continued to be pressured for further concessions on Cyprus and if the EU allowed itself to be used as an intermediary by the PKK in dictating to Turkey the PKK's separatist demands wrapped in the form of cultural rights⁴¹⁹.

In addition to the opposition parties and the military, the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer displayed some sort of opposition by using his veto power during the AKP

⁴¹⁴ *ibid.*

⁴¹⁵ *ibid.*

⁴¹⁶ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 16.5.2005.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=05_16_04&fn=dom2.htm

⁴¹⁷ Turkish Daily News. Will AKP be able to continue wielding power with momentum provided by EU reforms? 27.3.2005.

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=9276>

⁴¹⁸ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 17.4.2005.

<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=10986>

⁴¹⁹ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 24.4.2005.

<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=11556>

government. The President holding a veto record among Turkish Presidents so far has returned 32 bills of the current government headed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan⁴²⁰.

Despite the weakness of the opposition, an important note on the AKP government relations vis a vis opposition is that the current government appears more willing than previous governments to provide information to Parliament, though only after the issues under discussion are somewhat finalized either by the Foreign Ministry or at the government level⁴²¹.

In sum, the opposition's strength varied from actor to actor. However, this factor had no direct impact on foreign policy change in the major issues of Turkey.

B.5. Level of Polarization over Foreign Policy Issues

Substantive differences of opinion and a high level of polarization were revealed concerning the Cyprus conflict. Previous Foreign Minister Şükrü Sina Gürel accused Erdoğan for contacting Greek Prime Minister Simitis before the 3 November 2002 Elections confirming that the Cyprus Conflict and Turkish-Greek problems would be solved more easily. These accusations were denied by AKP⁴²².

In December 2002, Erdoğan, making AKP's position clear, urged a solution in Cyprus and attacked hardliners in Turkey, saying they deserved criticism because of a 40-year failure to formulate a solution⁴²³. The sides of the polarization became obvious, when veteran Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş replied that he would step down, if Turkey pressured him to accept the Annan Plan, what he considered an unacceptable deal to reunite Cyprus, but he carefully added that he had not yet seen any such pressure from Turkey⁴²⁴. Erdoğan continued to call for a shake-up of Turkish policy on Cyprus and urged Denktas to take Turkish Cypriots' protests against his rule into

⁴²⁰ Turkish Daily News. President Sezer holds veto record. 24.4.2005.

<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=11569>

⁴²¹ Turkish Daily News. And Gül briefs Parliament. TDN editorial by Yusuf KANLI. 5.5.2005. <http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=12471>

⁴²² AK Parti Genel Başkan Yardımcısı Bir Basın Açıklaması Yaptı. 14.11 2002 <http://www.akparti.org.tr/>

⁴²³ Turkish Daily News. 2002 in Perspective. 5.1.2003. http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_05_03&d=probe&fn=politics.htm

⁴²⁴ *ibid.*

consideration⁴²⁵. As a response to AKP's pressures, Denktaş threatened Erdoğan by saying that Turkey should find another negotiator to replace him, if it disagreed with his stance⁴²⁶. Turkish Land Forces Commander Gen. Yalman declared a UN peace plan to unite Cyprus could be a recipe for violence, providing crucial backing for Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş⁴²⁷. Hence, Denktaş rejected the revised Annan Plan, raising the tension by describing it as 'trickery' and 'sleight of hand'⁴²⁸.

Before the elections in Northern Cyprus, the debate between AKP and Denktaş heated up again. In September 2003, Foreign Minister Gül said that Denktaş should win the support of the Turkish Cypriot people. Gül made this statement in response to Denktaş's claim that he would continue struggling for the Cyprus cause by rallying the support of the mainland Turkish people, even in the event of an election defeat⁴²⁹.

Despite AKP's clear position for 'yes', Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş campaigned for a 'no' vote in the 24 April 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan⁴³⁰.

Before the upcoming presidential elections in Northern Cyprus, Denktaş criticized the AKP's policy on Cyprus and said that his disagreement with the AKP government was the reason he had decided not to seek a new term as president⁴³¹, whereas Erdoğan justified his government's pro-settlement stance, which was publicly attacked by Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş⁴³². Siding with Denktaş, CHP leader Deniz Baykal visited Northern Cyprus to show appreciation and gratitude to veteran leader Rauf Denktaş, before he handed over the Presidency to Talat⁴³³.

The decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on the Öcalan Case in 2005 was another example where foreign policy issues became highly polarized.

⁴²⁵ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 12.1.2003.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_12_03&fn=dom2.htm

⁴²⁶ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 2.2.2003.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=02_02_03&fn=dom2.htm

⁴²⁷ *ibid.*

⁴²⁸ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 2.3.2003.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_02_03&fn=dom2.htm

⁴²⁹ Turkish Daily News. Last Four Months of 2003. 4.1.2004.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_04_04&fn=Dom2.htm

⁴³⁰ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 11.4.2004.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=04_11_04&fn=dom2.htm

⁴³¹ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 27.3.2005.

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=9225>

⁴³² *ibid.*

⁴³³ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 10.4.2005.

<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=10411>

Before the decision was officially announced, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli warned if Öcalan were to be retried, it would cause a public outcry, adding that the domestic supporters of terrorism would try to incite ethnic provocation⁴³⁴. CHP leader Deniz Baykal said it is unacceptable for Turkey to tolerate such a decision, if it ordered that Öcalan should be retried, criticizing the AKP government's nonchalant attitude towards the anticipated decision of the on the retrial of Öcalan⁴³⁵. Opposition parties were united in their criticism of the government after the European court's decision that Öcalan's trial was unfair⁴³⁶.

Whereas State Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Şahin from AKP defended that Öcalan decision was a matter that should not be exaggerated, CHP continued to criticize the AKP government's submissive stance towards ECHR's decision⁴³⁷. The issue was further polarized as the Members of the Martyrs' Mothers Association and ultra-nationalists staged small-scale protests across Turkey protesting the European Court's ruling that the 1999 trial of the terrorist PKK leader Öcalan was unfair⁴³⁸.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reversed the criticisms diverted to AKP by stating that previous governments were to blame for violations of the rights of terrorist PKK leader Öcalan, accusing those who criticized his government for not doing enough to ensure the European court ruling favored Turkey⁴³⁹.

In sum, Cyprus conflict and Öcalan case were the major polarized issues. However, the study did not reveal a direct impact of the level of polarization on foreign policy change.

⁴³⁴ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 8.5.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=12692>

⁴³⁵ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 15.5.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=13258>

⁴³⁶ *ibid.*

⁴³⁷ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 22.5.2005.
<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=13860>

⁴³⁸ *ibid.*

⁴³⁹ *ibid.*

B.6. Regime Vulnerability

Concerning the regime vulnerability during the AKP government, two traditional fault lines in Turkish politics need to be taken into consideration. The first one is the Kurdish issue; the second one, political Islam.

Concerning the Kurdish issue, the AKP government found itself in a relieved atmosphere due to the decrease of separatist terrorist activities after the capture of Öcalan, so AKP could realize and implement numerous reforms concerning the Kurdish minority.

As early as November 2002, Turkey's broadcasting authority authorized state radio and television to air limited programs in the once-banned Kurdish language, a step toward meeting EU membership requirements⁴⁴⁰. In addition, Turkey ended curfews and restrictions on gatherings in two predominantly Kurdish provinces, Diyarbakır and Şırnak, ending 15 years of emergency rule in southeastern Turkey and fulfilling a requirement toward joining the European Union⁴⁴¹.

At the beginning of 2003, Turkish Parliament adopted a bill paving the way for the retrial of former imprisoned pro-Kurdish Democracy Party (DEP) deputies, including Leyla Zana, as part of a second reform package aiming to harmonize with EU laws⁴⁴².

In July 2003, overturning a veto by the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, AKP managed to pass the sixth harmonization package including the proposed elimination of Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law that has been criticized for limiting freedom of expression⁴⁴³. The same month, a partial amnesty law was accepted, a move which the government expected to pave the way for disarmament and the return to Turkey of a significant number of PKK terrorists, mostly based in northern Iraq, in exchange for less severe punishment⁴⁴⁴.

⁴⁴⁰ Turkish Daily News. 2002 in Perspective. 5.1.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_05_03&d=probe&fn=politics.htm

⁴⁴¹ *ibid.*

⁴⁴² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 26.1.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_26_03&fn=dom2.htm

⁴⁴³ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 20.7.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=07_20_03&fn=dom2.htm

⁴⁴⁴ Turkish Daily News. Yearly Round-up. 4.1.2004.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_04_04&fn=politics.htm

Despite the announcement of PKK/ KADEK of an end of a five-year unilateral cease-fire with Turkey first in 2003⁴⁴⁵ then again in 2004⁴⁴⁶, AKP continues with the reforms. In September 2003, the Interior Ministry issued a circular, ordering local authorities to allow Kurdish families to give their children Kurdish names⁴⁴⁷. In November, Turkish authorities allowed Kurdish writers from Iran, Syria, Iraq, Turkey, and Sweden to convene a conference in the southeastern province of Diyarbakir in their own language for the first time in 20 years⁴⁴⁸.

On 14 March 2004, the first school to teach Kurdish opened in the southeastern province of Şanlıurfa, two years after Parliament passed a law allowing such schools⁴⁴⁹.

On 7 June 2004, Turkey began long-delayed broadcasts in ethnic languages, first airing 30-minute programs in the Bosnian language. Short programs in Arabic, Circassian and two Kurdish dialects, Zaza and Kirmanji, were also scheduled to air on state radio and television⁴⁵⁰.

Same month, the Supreme Court of Appeals ordered the release of Leyla Zana and three other Kurdish ex-deputies from Ankara's Ulucanlar prison⁴⁵¹.

As the polarization over ECHR's decision on Öcalan case increased in April 2005, Prime Minister Erdoğan underlined AKP's position that the terrorist PKK/Kongra-Gel and the Kurds of Turkey should not be confused with one another⁴⁵².

In May 2005, the event that the Turkish flag was dragged through a street during the local Nevroz celebrations escalated the tension over the country's Kurdish minority. Furthermore, General Staff's statements that terrorist infiltration into Turkey was

⁴⁴⁵ Turkish Daily News. Last Four Months of 2003. 4.1.2004.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_04_04&fn=Dom2.htm

⁴⁴⁶ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 6.6.2004.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=06_06_04&fn=dom2.htm

⁴⁴⁷ Turkish Daily News. Last Four Months of 2003. 4.1.2004.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_04_04&fn=Dom2.htm

⁴⁴⁸ *ibid.*

⁴⁴⁹ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 21.3.2004.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_21_04&fn=dom2.htm

⁴⁵⁰ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 13.6.2004.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=06_13_04&fn=dom2.htm

⁴⁵¹ *ibid.*

⁴⁵² Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 17.4.2005.

<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=10986>

continuing⁴⁵³, and an armed struggle with the outlawed PKK has resumed within Turkey⁴⁵⁴, created concerns.

Concerning regime vulnerability, the political Islam issue also proved to be problematic for the AKP government.

As early as January 2003, the powerful military accused Prime Minister Gül of encouraging ‘anti-secularist activities’ in its first public attack on the new government⁴⁵⁵.

On 23 April 2003, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, high-ranking generals of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and main opposition party CHP leader Deniz Baykal boycotted a traditional reception in protest over women's use of Islamic-style headscarves, highlighting tensions between the ruling AKP and the secularists⁴⁵⁶.

In August 2003, Supreme Military Council (YAS) decided to sack 18 officers and noncommissioned officers for pro-Islamic leanings despite reservation from Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan⁴⁵⁷.

In September, another conflict highlighted clashes between the governing party, and the secular establishment, as the Court of Appeals’ chief judge Özkaya commented that the proponents of ‘limitless religious freedom’ are united with supporters of an Islamic state⁴⁵⁸.

In October 2003, powerful military warned about the government plans to reform religious *imam-hatip* schools. “We have difficulty understanding why the number of graduates from the imam-hatip schools should increase from the current 25,000”⁴⁵⁹, said Deputy Chief of General Staff Gen. Basbuğ.

On 29 October 2003, almost all the deputies in the ruling AKP, except for the Cabinet members, boycotted the official Republic Day Reception marking the 80th

⁴⁵³ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 15.5.2005.

<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=13258>

⁴⁵⁴ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 22.5.2005.

<http://www.tdn.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=13860>

⁴⁵⁵ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 12.1.2003.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_12_03&fn=dom2.htm

⁴⁵⁶ Turkish Daily News. Yearly Round-up. 4.1.2004.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_04_04&fn=politics.htm

⁴⁵⁷ *ibid.*

⁴⁵⁸ Turkish Daily News. Last Four Months of 2003. 4.1.2004.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_04_04&fn=Dom2.htm

⁴⁵⁹ *ibid.*

anniversary of the foundation of modern Turkey, after President Sezer refused to invite their wives, many of whom wear Islamic-style headscarves⁴⁶⁰.

In November 2003, Turkey was shaken with two Islamic terrorist attacks connected with al-Qaeda terror network. The first one occurred on 15 November, as suicide bombers detonated truck bombs nearly simultaneously outside two synagogues in İstanbul filled with worshippers, killing at least 25 people and wounding 303 others⁴⁶¹. On 20 November, trucks packed with explosives blew up near the headquarters of the London-based HSBC Bank and British Consulate General in İstanbul. This second set of attacks killed at least 27 people and wounded more than 400. British Consul General Roger Short was among those killed⁴⁶².

In February 2005, a student amnesty bill that would benefit hundreds of thousands of students who were expelled from universities since 2000 was passed by the Parliament⁴⁶³, after causing many debates whether the bill included those who were expelled due to the headscarf issue.

The headscarf debate heated again in May 2005, as Constitutional Court Chief Justice Bumin declared that any attempt to lift the headscarf ban would violate the Turkish Constitution and the European Charter of Human Rights, which created turmoil at the top of the state hierarchy.

CHP leader Deniz Baykal and Higher Education Board (YÖK) Chairman Erdoğan Teziç urged government members to refrain from making provocative statements on the issue of the headscarf ban and claimed that Bumin's comments had been referring to legal facts.

In sum, regime vulnerability was low during the AKP Government due to the ceasefire of the PKK. Thus, the decrease of Kurdish separatism threat made it easier for AKP to initiate and/or implement foreign policy change. Low regime vulnerability reinforced foreign policy change in this period.

⁴⁶⁰ *ibid.*

⁴⁶¹ *ibid.*

⁴⁶² Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 30.11.2003.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=11_30_03&fn=dom2.htm

⁴⁶³ Turkish Daily News. Last Week in Perspective. 20.2.2005.

<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=6383>

C: Political Agency and Decision-making Process

C.1. Bureaucratic Rigidity

This study has not encountered any evidence or indication reflected in the mass media suggesting that there was a conflictual issue between the foreign policy bureaucracy and the AKP government. Thus, the bureaucratic rigidity factor was not applicable to foreign policy change.

C.2. Leadership Dynamics

The strength and influence of AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's leadership was clearly evident by the process that eventually led him to the Prime Minister seat. The charismatic and popular party leader Erdoğan was not able to enter the Parliament initially, since he was legally banned from elections.

As early as 9 January 2002, the Constitutional Court ordered the leader of AKP, Erdoğan, to step down as a founding member. On 17 April 2002, a national television broadcasted the video tape recording of the speech Erdoğan made in Rize province in 1992, criticizing the Turkish Armed Forces, politicians and the secular regime. The chief prosecutors of both the Ankara State Security Court (DGM) and the Erzurum DGM, and the chief prosecutor of Rize province, decided to examine the video cassette. On 19 April 2002, The Constitutional Court declared that Erdoğan would not be eligible to run for Parliament because of a prior conviction for inciting religious hatred. The then Chief of General Staff Gen. Kırıkoğlu accused Erdoğan of 'spitting hatred' against the military. AKP leader referred to the statements of Kırıkoğlu as to 'cast a shadow on Turkish democracy'.

This was not the only accusation diverted to Erdoğan. On 24 May 2002, the AKP leader gave an hour-long deposition in an inquiry into whether he may have breached a Turkish corruption and bribery law after newspapers report that he has a fortune of \$1 million. On 6 June, the acting chief prosecutor in Ankara formally charged the popular leader Erdoğan with illegally accumulating wealth, adding to the politician's legal woes. Furthermore, on 26 July 2002, the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor's Office filed a suit

against 18 suspects, including Erdoğan, on charges of "bidding fraud" regarding the billboard tenders of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality.

At the beginning of September 2002, the Diyarbakır State Security Court cleared the criminal record of AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, enabling him to run in 3 November polls. According to this decision, the Criminal Records Office announced that Erdoğan's records were erased. However, the Court of Cassation served a deadly blow to the ambitions of AKP leader Erdoğan to become the country's next prime minister. The court upheld the ruling of the Diyarbakır State Security Court refusing a demand by Erdoğan's lawyers that the criminal record be cleaned because the amended Penal Code Article 312 no longer included the crime for which he was sentenced. The controversial Article 312 regulated penalties for crimes against the state; furthermore, both the Constitution and the elections law stipulate that people sentenced under that article cannot run for public office even if pardoned. Finally, on 20 September 2002, the High Electoral Board ruled that Erdoğan could not run on 3 November due to his conviction on former charges. In October, Erdoğan stepped down as founding member of his party, remaining as chairman, in line with a recent decision of the Constitutional Court. Still, he could not avoid that a party closure case was filed against AKP on grounds that the party didn't completely obey the decision of the top court when it kept Erdoğan as its chairman. Starting from 1 November 2002, the Constitutional Court began examining the petition to ban AKP. The Court gave the party 15 days to prepare a defense against a case to block party leader Erdoğan from being party head and thus relieved the party before the crucial parliamentary elections⁴⁶⁴.

However, his presence was highly sensed also during the first AKP Government. AKP Central Executive Board (MYK) endorsed Erdoğan with full power to determine the Prime Minister⁴⁶⁵, who made his choice for Abdullah Gül. Gül and Erdoğan worked in full harmony, so that Gül continued as Foreign Minister in the 59th Government as well.

In December 2002, the Supreme Elections Board (YSK) decided to cancel elections in the southeastern city of Siirt and the Parliament, overturning a presidential

⁴⁶⁴ The course of events leading to Erdoğan's ban from the Parliament is extracted from Turkish Daily News, 2002 in Perspective, 01.05.2003.

http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_05_03&d=probe&fn=politics.htm

⁴⁶⁵ AK Parti MYK'sı Toplandı. Arşiv. 05.11.2002 <http://www.akparti.org.tr/>

veto by Sezer, made constitutional amendments that paved the way for AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to become Prime Minister⁴⁶⁶.

By January 2003, Erdoğan was acquitted on charges of irregularities regarding his earnings and assets⁴⁶⁷.

On 9 March 2003, AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won a seat in Parliament by a massive margin in Siirt by-elections, and on 14 March, he was formally appointed Prime Minister to lead Turkey's 59th government.

The closure case against the AKP was dropped on 25 March 2003⁴⁶⁸.

In October 2003, preparing to mark its first year in office, Prime Minister Erdoğan was unanimously re-elected by delegates in AKP's first convention. Erdoğan's leadership and popularity remained unchallenged since then.

Thus, AKP leader Erdoğan represents a strong leadership with extensive electoral and delegate support. Moreover, Erdoğan's unchallenged leadership and AKP's high political cohesiveness reinforce each other. Thus, during the AKP Government, the factor leadership dynamics had a positive impact on foreign policy change.

C.3. Decision-making Process

During the AKP Government, the 1982 Constitution is still in force. Thus the basic foreign policy decision-making mechanism and major foreign policy actors have remained the same as before. However, in accordance with EU demanded reforms, AKP was able to pass from the Parliament some significant legislative changes that altered the civilian-military balance at National Security Council (MGK) in favor of civilians and that created a transparency to this institution.

On 15 January 2003, the Parliament approved a bill amending the National Security Council (MGK) law in line with a prior constitutional amendment. With the

⁴⁶⁶ Turkish Daily News, 2002 in Perspective, 01.05.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_05_03&d=probe&fn=politics.htm

⁴⁶⁷ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 26.1.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_26_03&fn=dom2.htm

⁴⁶⁸ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 30.3.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=03_30_03&fn=dom2.htm

new amendment, Deputy Prime Ministers and the Justice Minister became MGK members, while the MGK decisions will be counted as 'recommendations'⁴⁶⁹.

On 10 December 2003, the Parliament approved a bill designed to lift the secrecy surrounding the personnel and work of the military-dominated National Security Council (MGK), as a move undertaken as part of Turkey's efforts to catch up with the EU standards⁴⁷⁰.

In conclusion, there have been significant legislative changes related to the foreign policy decision. However, the study revealed no impact of this factor on foreign policy change.

⁴⁶⁹ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 19.1.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=01_19_03&fn=dom2.htm

⁴⁷⁰ Turkish Daily News. The Week in Perspective. 14.12.2003.
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/oldeditions.php?dir=12_14_03&fn=dom2.htm

CHAPTER 5

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

Findings of the Comparative Case Study

The comparative case study at hand rests upon the assumption that there has been a foreign policy restructuring in contemporary Turkish foreign policy with the current AKP Government, i.e. a major difference from its predecessor DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition. The following analysis summarizes the case findings and shows, which of the analytical dimensions drawn in Chapter 1, affected Turkish foreign policy of both governments.

Dependent variable foreign policy change was evaluated according to the following evaluation criteria: (1) positive impact suggests that the factor affected foreign policy change positively, i.e. induced it. (2) no impact means that the factor did not affect foreign policy change at all, i.e. the factor neither reinforced nor weakened foreign policy change. (3) negative impact suggests that the factor affected foreign policy change negatively, i.e. led to the continuity instead of change, and, (4) not applicable means, although drawn from the literature, that a factor revealed irrelevant to determine foreign policy change.

The following table summarizes case findings according to the evaluation criteria defined above:

Table II: Summary Table of Findings along the Analytical Dimensions of Analysis

	CASE I DSP-MHP-ANAP COALITION	CASE II AKP GOVERNMENT
A. International Factors		
a.1. Change in Systemic Conditions	No impact	No impact
a.2. Regional Developments Kosovo / War on Iraq EU Enlargement: Cyprus conflict TR-EU relations TR-GR relations Armenian issue	No impact Negative impact Positive impact Positive impact No impact	No impact Positive impact Positive impact No impact Positive impact
a.3. Foreign Commitments: Cyprus conflict TR-EU relations TR-GR relations Armenian issue	No impact Positive impact Positive impact No impact	Positive impact Positive impact Positive impact Positive impact
B. Domestic Factors		
b.1. Domestic Regime Change	Not applicable	Not applicable
b.2. Different Orientations to Foreign Policy	Negative impact	Positive impact
b.3. Political Cohesiveness of the New Regime	Negative impact	Positive impact
b.4. Strength of Political Opposition to the Regime	No impact	No impact
b.5. Level of Polarization over Foreign Policy Issues	No impact	No impact
b.6. Regime Vulnerability	Negative impact	Positive impact
C. Political Agency and Decision-making Process		
c.1. Bureaucratic Rigidity	Not applicable	Not applicable
c.2. Leadership Dynamics	Negative impact	Positive impact
c.3. Decision-making Process	No impact	No impact

A: International Factors

a. 1. : DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government's tenure corresponded with the late years of Clinton era and the first years of Bush's Presidency. In this period, a remarkable change in systemic conditions occurred from multilateralism towards unilateralism due to the handover of the American Presidency especially following the devastating Sept. 11th attacks. However, the research revealed no impact of this factor on foreign policy change during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, which continued to follow its foreign policy on traditionally sensitive issues such as the Cyprus conflict, Turkish-Greek relations, Turkey-EU relations and the Armenian issue regardless of changes in systemic conditions.

AKP government's tenure corresponded with the period, when President Bush was hardening his unilateralist approach, and the transatlantic relations were worsening, particularly due to the War on Iraq. However, despite these changes, AKP's foreign policy was not affected by the systemic conditions. The study revealed no direct impact of this factor on Turkey's foreign policy change. At this point, it is important to note that Turkish Parliament's rejection of a motion that would have allowed the opening of a Northern Front from Turkey caused considerable tension in US-Turkey relations. However, aside from this significant incident, AKP government's policies remained impervious.

In sum, findings suggest that change in systemic conditions had no impact on foreign policy change pursued by either DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition or AKP government.

a. 2. : Concerning regional developments, important developments occurred both during the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition and AKP Government.

War in Kosovo and EU enlargement process were the two main regional events during the coalition government. Although Turkey was fully supporting the US led NATO operation in Kosovo, this development had no further impact on foreign policy change of Turkey in other issues. During the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, the EU's enlargement process was continuing at good speed, whereby Turkey's candidate status was acknowledged at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 as well. The EU enlargement process had a mixture of types of impacts in various issues of Turkish foreign policy. While it was a catalyst factor and thus had a positive impact concerning

Turkish-Greek relations and relations of Turkey with the EU, it did not affect the Armenian issue. Moreover, it had a negative impact concerning the Cyprus conflict, since [Greek] Cyprus was also one of the candidates, which led to a toughening of Turkish foreign policy in this issue.

For AKP Government, the two important regional developments were the War on Iraq and again the EU enlargement. Although the war in the neighboring Iraq dominated Turkey's foreign policy agenda for a long period, the study revealed no direct impact of it on a change concerning other major foreign policy issues. However, findings showed that EU enlargement process had a mainly impacts on various issues. It had a positive impact on foreign policy change regarding the Cyprus conflict, Turkey-EU relations and the Armenian issue. Changes of Turkish foreign policy in the context of the resolution attempts of Cyprus conflict were remarkable. Parallel to the developments on the island and in full conformity with the UN efforts, Turkey made a dramatic shift in its position by fully supporting the Annan Plan at the expense of polarization with Denktaş. The conciliatory approach of AKP on the island represented a noteworthy deviation from the status quo approach followed by Turkey until then. EU enlargement had no particular impact on Turkish-Greek relations that continued to improve.

In sum, the analysis indicates that regional developments' impact on foreign policy change can be evaluated on a case by case basis.

a. 3. : DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition as well as AKP Government continued to fulfill the political, economic, legal and military foreign commitments of Turkey towards outside actors. For both periods, commitments in EU context played a significant role. During the coalition government, the National Program was on the top of the agenda. The current AKP Government overwhelmingly dealt with legal commitments for advancing in the pre-accession to the EU such as the abolishment of death penalty.

Similar to regional developments, foreign commitments varied in their impact on foreign policy change along various issues. During the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, except for the Cyprus conflict and the Armenian issue, where they had no impact, they led to change both in Turkish-Greek relations and Turkey-EU relations. On the other hand, foreign commitments had a positive impact on foreign policy change in all four of the above mentioned major issues.

This analysis concludes that as in the case of regional developments, the impact of foreign commitments on foreign policy change can be evaluated on a case by case basis.

B: Domestic Factors

b. 1. : Both governments came to office through regular elections. 18 April 1999 Elections resulted in the formation of a coalition between DSP, MHP and ANAP, three different parties with different worldviews. 3 November 2002 Elections on the contrary showed an overwhelming victory of AKP and led to the formation of a one party government in Turkey after decades. However, the analysis for these two cases reveals that the domestic regime change factor was not applicable to foreign policy change.

b. 2. : Concerning different orientations to foreign policy, DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition did not present a wholesale new set of orientation with the exception of rapprochement of relations with Greece. For the general conduct of foreign policy during this period, it can be said that a status quo approach was followed, which included carrot and sticks policies. On the contrary, the study revealed that AKP Government came to office with a totally new set of orientations to foreign policy defending a dynamic, proactive, multidimensional and multilateral approach stimulated by a liberal worldview and conflict resolution approach.

The analysis shows that different orientations to foreign policy had a positive impact on Turkish foreign policy's change during the AKP Government, whereas the lack of them had a negative impact for the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, i.e. led to continuity in foreign policy.

b. 3. : DSP-MHP-ANAP Government was a coalition government based on the compromise of these three coalition partners. However, this compromise was not functioning smoothly in many cases concerning domestic as well as foreign policy issues. Coalition partners found themselves at odds with each other particularly on the Öcalan case and Turkey-EU relations. Political cohesiveness of the DSP-MHP-ANAP proved to be so low that the coalition eventually dissolved due calling of one of the coalition partners, MHP for early elections.

On the contrary, AKP Government showed a considerably high degree of cohesiveness. Although some different voices were heard in a few issues, for the most part, the Government stood firmly and unequivocally behind the policies followed.

The analysis concludes that political cohesiveness had a positive impact and contributed towards foreign policy change in AKP case, whereas the coalition suffered from a low degree of cohesiveness that led to continuity in foreign policy.

b. 4. : The political opposition's strength varied from actor to actor, but generally proved to be low in both cases. During the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, the main opposition party FP was dealing with its closure case and inner turmoil for party leadership posed by the reformist wing that eventually dissolved and formed the AKP. Military and President continued to be strong actors in foreign policy making. In general, the coalition had no major disagreements with the powerful military establishment, but concerning the EU demanded reforms, the coalition's efforts were slowed down by military's opposition. Although President Sezer was elected during this period with coalition parties' support, the relations between Sezer and Ecevit got so tense that triggered an economic crisis initiated by this political crisis.

During the AKP Government, the main opposition CHP was also dealing with the inner party politics, particularly with Sarıgül's quest for party leadership. Thus, the opposition was weak to perform a strong opposition towards AKP. Military and President continued to be strong in this period as well: AKP- military relations proved to be more problematic due to the moderate Islamist roots of the party and strictly secular character of the powerful military establishment. The President Sezer showed an opposition to the governmental policies in many instances by using his veto power granted by the Constitution. However, AKP could overcome presidential vetoes through its firm majority in the Parliament.

The analysis reveals that the low strength of political opposition had no impact on foreign policy change during both DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition and AKP Government.

b. 5. : During the coalition government, the level of polarization got high concerning the Öcalan case and Turkey-EU relations, whereas AKP Government faced polarization basically over Cyprus conflict. However, in both cases, there was not a change in foreign policy due to the level of polarization, so the analysis shows that the low level of polarization had no impact on foreign policy change.

b. 6. : The regime vulnerability sources for DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition were being a coalition government, continued problems concerning the Kurdish issue and economic crises. The high level of vulnerability, i.e. the potential risk of losing the government, led in this case to a continuity of status quo policies. During the AKP Government, regime vulnerability decreased considerably concerning the Kurdish issue, so the government could more easily legislate and implement some reforms without facing this major threat, but a new source of vulnerability was evident for the AKP case: the Islam issue. The pro Islamist character of AKP created unfavorable conditions

between the party and the secularist military and President. However, this tension was rather limited to domestic issues such as the headscarf issue and did not affect AKP's foreign policy considerably.

In sum, high regime vulnerability had a negative impact on foreign policy change during the DSP-MHP-ANAP, whereas the lessening of it had a positive impact and led to foreign policy change during the AKP Government.

C: Political Agency and Decision-making Process

c. 1. : Concerning bureaucratic rigidity, in both cases, the study did not reveal sufficient data. Thus, this factor was not applicable to foreign policy change.

c. 2. : During the AKP Government, the charismatic leader Erdoğan enjoyed solid support from his Cabinet and party members. Thus the leadership dynamics in the AKP case created favorable conditions supporting the change in foreign policy, whereas Ecevit's leadership was not as strong as Erdoğan's, so the previous government had to deal constantly with intra coalition problems among the leaders, which led to compromise policies, and thus to a continuity of the status quo. In other words, strong leadership in AKP had a positive impact on foreign policy change, whereas the relatively weak leadership of the coalition had a negative impact.

c. 3. : For both periods of government, the 1982 Constitution draw the basics of the foreign policy decision making. However, for the case of DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, the role of military was more obvious due to its strong influence through National Security Council MGK. AKP Government, relying on its strong parliamentary support was able to increase the number of civilians in the MGK and created more transparency of this institution. However, findings revealed no major impact of decision-making process on foreign policy change.

Conceptual Refinements

Based on the comparative case findings above, it appears that domestic factors have most influenced foreign policy change.

Among them, regime vulnerability is one of the most crucial environmental factors: a highly vulnerable regime is more likely to preserve the status quo in foreign policy, rather than taking the risk of making major changes. On the contrary, the relief

of threats to the regime encourages governments to initiate and implement foreign policy changes.

The two other domestic factors, different orientations to foreign policy and political cohesiveness of the new regime have also an underlying impact on foreign policy change:

The first one is different orientations to foreign policy. A government with a new set of foreign policy orientations is more likely to realize a foreign policy change, whereas the lack of different orientations to foreign policy again leads to continuity in foreign policy. The nature of the new orientation, i.e. conflict resolution oriented or traditional diplomacy oriented is not a determinant factor by itself but is meaningful within the whole package.

The second one is the political cohesiveness of the new regime. A high degree of cohesiveness provides favorable conditions for foreign policy change, while less cohesive and fragmented governments find it difficult to make such changes.

Political cohesiveness and leadership dynamics are factors that reinforce each other's effect. A strong leadership is more likely to secure cohesiveness compared to a weak leadership. The study exposes that strong leaders have a positive impact on foreign policy change, whereas weak leaders lead to continuity in foreign policy.

It is important to note that the study shows that the low political opposition and polarization, as well as decision-making process have no major impact on foreign policy change. Furthermore, the factors of domestic regime change and bureaucratic rigidity are not applicable to foreign policy change in this research.

Among the international factors, regional developments and foreign commitments deserve special attention. Both of these factors are issue specific and highly situational, meaning some regional developments and foreign commitments can have a positive impact on foreign policy change on specific issues, while others can affect foreign policy change not at all or even negatively. Thus, the study reveals that the impact of regional developments and foreign commitments can be evaluated on a case by case basis. At this point, it is also important to add that foreign commitments are not a decisive factor, but become meaningful when they are considered with other factors such as regional developments.

The study shows that change in systemic conditions have no immediate impact on foreign policy change for the period under inquiry.


Concluding Remarks provide a brief account of the factors that lead to change and continuity.

Concluding Remarks

The results of the study provide the following schemas for foreign policy change and continuity.

Figure III summarizes the package of factors that have a positive impact on foreign policy change:


Figure III: Factors for Change



Thus, low regime vulnerability, parallel with a different orientation to foreign policy, a high level of political cohesiveness, and a strong leadership, all positively impact foreign policy change. Regional factors and foreign commitments can interact and be meaningful depending on the nature of the development.

Figure IV summarizes the factors that have a negative impact on foreign policy change, i.e. that lead to continuity.

Figure IV: Factors for Continuity



Thus, high regime vulnerability, parallel with the lack of a different orientation to foreign policy, a low level of political cohesiveness, and a weak leadership, all

negatively impact foreign policy change. Regional factors and foreign commitments can interact and be meaningful depending on the nature of the development.

Discussion

This thesis is based on the assumption that there has been a foreign policy change in Turkey with the current AKP Government in office, as compared to its predecessor DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition. This change was particularly evident in the traditionally “sensitive” policy areas such as Turkish-Greek relations, Turkey- EU relations, the Cyprus conflict, and the Armenian issue. AKP Government governing Turkish foreign policy since 3 November 2002 Elections made bold steps in the above mentioned policy areas. While using the traditional diplomatic toolbox, AKP brought to the scene a novel rhetoric and Conflict Resolution oriented policies. These novelties are especially observed in the context of the Cyprus conflict and the Armenian issue.

The study aims to analyze the causes and dynamics of this foreign policy change. For this purpose, analytical dimensions drawn from the foreign policy restructuring literature are applied in form of a comparative case study to both cases, i.e. DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, and AKP Government. Despite the limitation that the types of governments under inquiry are different, one being a coalition, the other a single party government, the selection of cases was aimed as to reflect the change aspect by selecting subsequent governments. Furthermore, this choice of selection made it possible to highlight current Turkish foreign policy.

In contemporary Turkish foreign policy, the analysis shows that domestic factors influence foreign policy change the most. Regime vulnerability is the key environmental factor that affects change or continuity of foreign policy. Low regime vulnerability positively impacts change. The findings of the study as discussed above in length, basically confirm with Hagan’s findings (1994) who wrote on domestic factors’ effect on foreign policy change. Both studies endorse that foreign policy change is most likely to occur when political actors with different orientation came to power and enjoy a high cohesiveness. The findings of the current comparative case study also point out to the mutual reinforcement of strong leadership and high cohesiveness. Regional developments and foreign commitments are issue specific, thus, can interact and be meaningful depending on the nature of the development.

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