

The Knowledge of Contingent A Priori Truths, Performatives and
Pragmatic Inferences

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Nazif Muhtaroglu

Boğaziçi University

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The Thesis of Nazif Muhtaroglu

is approved by:

Assoc. Prof. İlhan İnan :
(Committee Chair)

Prof. Dr. Stephen Voss :

Assist. Prof. Ali Karatay :

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Naming is the miracle of Adam, the father of all human beings.

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ABSTRACT

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Saul Kripke claims that there are contingent a priori truths. His argument for this claim depends on his account of naming. By assuming his account of naming, I try to improve his argument by adding two premises expressing the satisfaction of the success conditions of the naming activity and using that name. In characterizing the naming activity, I make use of the notion of performatives. In formulating a valid inference from premises to the conclusion, I appeal to the notion of pragmatic inferences. The gist of my argument for the a priority of Kripke's contingent truths is that the knowledge of the mentioned two premises provides the correct grasp of the necessary and sufficient elements in order to grasp the proposition that is considered to be a contingent a priori truth. So this proposition is known just by grasping it without further investigation.

KISA ÖZET

Olumsal ve A Priori Doğruların Bilgisi, Performatifler ve Pragmatik Çıkarımlar

Nazif Muhtaroglu

Saul Kripke doğruluğu a priori olarak bilinebilen olumsal önermelerin varlığını iddia etmektedir. Bu iddiası için verdiği argüman kendi adlandırma görüşüne dayanır. Ben ise bu tezde Kripke'nin adlandırma görüşünü kabul ederek, verdiği argümanı, bu argümana iki öncül eklemek suretiyle geliştirmeye çalışacağım. İlk öncül adlandırma eyleminin başarılı olabilmesinin şartlarının sağlandığını ifade ederken, ikinci öncül dile sokulan ismin kullanımının başarılı olabilmesi için gerekli şartların sağlandığını ifade etmektedir. Bu meyanda, ilk öncülü karakterize ederken performatif kavramından, öncüller ve sonuç cümlesi arasındaki geçerlilik ilişkisini tanımlarken pragmatik çıkarım kavramından yararlanacağım. Olumsal doğruların nasıl a priori bilinebildiğine dair verdiğim argümanın temel dayanağını bahsi geçen öncüllerin bilgisinin olumsal ve a priori olarak bilinen doğru önermenin kavranması için gerekli ve yeterli elemanları sağlaması oluşturmaktadır. Yani bu önerme ekstra bir incelemeye gerek duyulmadan sadece kavranmakla bilinebilen, bir önermedir.

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Introduction

There has been a debate whether a priority, necessity and analyticity are co-extensive ever since Kant initiated this discussion by introducing synthetic a priori truths. Two centuries after him in the 1970's, Saul Kripke revived this discussion by presenting contingent a priori truths.

There are philosophers who consider the Cartesian Cogito to be contingent and knowable a priori. It is controversial whether there are many kinds of contingent a priori truths or not. However, if it is possible to mention different kinds, we must distinguish Kripke's case from the other ones. The kind Kripke proposes depends on his account of naming. The metaphysical status of the sentences expressing such truths is contingent because of his accounts of rigid and non-rigid designators. As far as the epistemological status of the sentences in question is concerned, they are known a priori for the reference fixer (RF) who is the man determining the referents of the rigid or non-rigid designators because he "automatically" knows this kind of sentences (Kripke, 1980, 56).¹ Since Kripke's remarks on this kind of truth were considered to be very puzzling and odd, almost nobody argued for its possibility.

In contrast to the replies to Kripke, I think that he has a correct intuition for the possibility of contingent a priori truths. In this thesis, I will argue that contingent a priori truths are possible assuming Kripke's account of naming but not as he does. I see some defects in his argument. In *Naming and Necessity*, he does not care about the conditions of naming an object and using its name successfully in constructing his argument. However, there are some philosophers who draw our attention to these conditions. Scott Soames (2002) and Alan Berger (2005) are the first ones that come to my mind. I will attempt to show that the possibility of contingent a priori truths Kripke mentions also depends on these conditions.

¹ The phrase of "knowing the sentences" must be considered to be short for "knowing the proposition the sentence in question expresses." This distinction will be explicitly made later, but I assume it in this stage.

So I will try to improve Kripke's argument by adding two new premises expressing these naming and use conditions. The first premise is a happy utterance of a performative in which the rigid designator in question is introduced. I call it a "naming performative." Relating contingent a priori truths to performatives is not totally new. For example, Robin Jeshion clearly stated that contingent a priori truths depend on performatives; however, she did not give an argument for that claim and did not analyze the issue in depth (Jeshion, 2002, 63). The second premise is a sentence like "The conditions of successfully using the rigid designator in question are satisfied for me" or like "I can successfully use the rigid designator in question." Since these are report sentences, they are not considered to be performatives. I call this premise the "use premise." And I call the sentence expressing contingent a priori truth the "target sentence." As far as the dependence relation between the conclusion and the premises is concerned, I will argue that the RF's knowledge of the two premises pragmatically entails his knowledge of target propositions by postulating a pragmatically valid inference. In characterizing the inference in question, I will make use of the concepts of pragmatic inferences, Grice's implicatures, entailment and presupposition relations. The first two chapters are devoted to critically present Kripke's argument for contingent a priori truths and its development as I tried to characterize above. In the third chapter, I will discuss the success conditions of naming an object and using the name in question so that I complete the presentation of the necessary tools to discuss the a priority of target propositions.

In the literature, the attacks on Kripke's argument for contingent a priori truths focus on his claim that they are knowable a priori. Even though there are some arguments in the literature that aims to refute the contingency of this kind of truths, the discussions with respect to this issue are centered on the epistemological dimension of target sentences. For this reason, I take the contingency aspect of the target sentences for granted and discuss their epistemological status. The fourth chapter is devoted to the analysis of the knowledge claims

with respect to target sentences in general. In the first part of this chapter, I will try to establish that the RF knows the target-sentences a priori, if he validly and pragmatically infers them from his knowledge of naming performatives and use premises under the assumption of Kripke's account of naming. As the gist of the argument, I will attempt to demonstrate that the a priority in question stems from RFs' correct grasp of the names in question and their meaningful usage. What I will argue for is that an RF has a correct grasp of a name by knowledge of the relevant naming performative and has a correct grasp of its meaningful usage by knowledge of the relevant use premise.

In the second part, I will attempt to determine the place of our case in the history of epistemology. One of the big traditions related to this issue is the Maker's knowledge tradition. The fundamental idea behind this tradition is that the maker knows what he makes or creates. I will discuss whether the knowledge of contingent a priori truths is an instance of the maker's knowledge or not and relate this discussion to another issue of whether target sentences are informative or not.

In the fifth chapter, I will construct some replies to my argument for contingent a priori truths from the main criticisms of Kripke's argument, which belong to William Carter, Keith Donnellan and Nathan Salmon. These replies poses a difficulty for the a priority of target sentences in the following way. Some of the naming and use conditions are external to the RF, so the RF can have an access to them only by means of appealing to experience. If on the other hand, the knowledge of target sentences depends upon these conditions that are cognized in an a posteriori way, how can we claim that the knowledge of target sentences is a priori? In addition, is there an extra premise other than the mentioned two that is known a posteriori? If there is such a premise that has a justificatory role on target sentences, then the target sentences seem to be known a posteriori, too. I will certainly give some counter arguments to these criticisms by maintaining the idea that these conditions do not have any

justificatory role in knowing target sentences. Since their role is other than justification, they do not affect the a priority in question. Furthermore, the knowledge of the two premises is sufficient to know the target proposition.

To sum up, I can say that the general project in this thesis is to show that the possibility of the knowledge of Kripke's contingent a priori truths for an RF depends on his knowledge of naming performatives and use premises under the assumptions of Kripke's account of naming, the plausibility of performatives and pragmatic inferences.

I. Kripke's Contingent A Priori Truths

I.1 The Presentation of Saul Kripke's Argument for Contingent A Priori Truths

In order to be able to grasp Saul Kripke's argument for contingent a priori truths, we must firstly look at his account of naming because this argument originates from his ideas on naming.

Kripke's approach on this issue is closely related to the direct reference theory whose main contemporary proponents are Paul Ziff, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Hilary Putnam and Keith Donnellan. This theory of naming depends mainly on the intuitions of John Stuart Mill on proper names. According to Mill, proper names have no meaning other than their referents; they are attached to the objects themselves and are not dependent upon the continuance of any attribute of the object. Direct reference theory can be considered to be an attempt to enlarge this intuition to all kinds of names. One of the considerable implications of this theory is that names have no descriptive content attached to them as Frege or Russell had thought. For example, "Aristotle" does not mean the man who satisfies the description of the teacher of the Alexander the Great. It is difficult to consider Kripke to be a philosopher who is completely committed to this theory. He nowhere claims that proper names have no semantic content other than their referents. Actually he distinguishes himself from the proponents of direct reference theory with the following remark: "There are writers who explicitly deny that names have meaning at all even more strongly than I would" (Kripke, 1980, 32). One of the writers he mentions is Paul Ziff, as we learned from a footnote (Kripke, 1980, n.9).

On the other hand, Kripke rejects the thesis that proper names are synonymous with some descriptions used for identifying the referent. Kripke's main concern in *Naming and Necessity, Lecture I* is to answer the question of how we can plausibly speak of a referent

across possible worlds. If we consider identifying descriptions of referents to be synonyms of names, then we could not talk about the same referent across possible worlds in which it does not satisfy the description in question. Take Aristotle again. He is the teacher of Alexander the Great in this actual world, but he might have been a soldier and not a teacher. We can consistently hold that he is not the teacher of Alexander the Great in a different possible world. However, interpretation of names in terms of definite descriptions does not allow this talk across possible worlds. Kripke focuses on the question of how names do refer to individuals and introduces the term “rigid designation.”

In *Naming and Necessity* he defines “rigid designation” in the following way.

Let’s call something a *rigid designator* if in every possible world it designates the same object, a *nonrigid or accidental designator* if that is not the case. And a rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called *strongly rigid* (Kripke, 1980, 48).

He clearly says in the same passage that the referents of rigid designators are not required to exist in all possible worlds. Because of that he introduces the term “strong rigidity.” Later he modifies the definition of “rigid designator” and says the following in a letter to David Kaplan: “A designator of an object *x* is rigid, if it designates *x* with respect to all possible worlds where *x* exists, and never designates an object other than *x* with respect to any possible world” (Kaplan, 1989, 569).

One important thesis of Kripke with respect to this issue is that names are rigid designators. This is an intuitive thesis according to Kripke. For instance, the name “Nixon” designates the same individual in every possible situation in which he exists, even though he does not have properties he has in the actual world. Even if he had lost the US President elections in 1968, it is not the case that he would not have been Nixon. On the other hand, the description “The US President in 1968” refers to Nixon in this world, but to somebody else in another possible world. For example, Humphrey might have been the President in 1968. So in

a possible world, the description in question refers to Humphrey. As a result, this description is a non-rigid designator. And let's give an example for "strong rigidity." If God exists, the term "God" can be considered in this category, because He is in all possible worlds.

Rigid designators are introduced by a person in a special ceremony called "initial baptism." In this ceremony, the person called "the reference fixer" (RF) fixes the referent of a rigid designator in one of two ways. Firstly, the reference of a name may be fixed by ostension, if the reference fixer (RF) has acquaintance or is in direct contact with the object. For instance, the father of a newborn male baby names him "Abraham." Secondly, the reference of a name may be fixed by description. In this case, the RF may be in direct contact with the referent or he may not. The RF fixes the referent of "Venus" by using the description "the brilliant star which occurs firstly in the evening" and also by appealing to sense experience. On the other hand, Leverrier fixed the referent of "Neptune" by using the description "the planet that caused perturbations in the orbit of Uranus" without appealing to sense experience of the planet.

Contingent a priori truths appear in special cases where the reference of a name is fixed by a procedure, that involves description. The description can be introduced with or without ostension. This leads to two types of contingent a priori truths. In the first class, the RF fixes the referent of the term (more clearly the rigid designator) by ostension and by using a description. Kripke gives examples of the standard meter stick in Paris and the water which is 100 degrees centigrade for this category. The RF has acquaintance with the standard meter stick and the water in these cases and uses the following descriptions to fix the referents: "the length of standard stick (S) in Paris at t" and "the temperature at which water boils at sea level". As a prototype of this category, the following sentence can be given as expressing contingent a priori truth given the conditions of this category. **S1**: One meter is the length of S in Paris at t.

In the second class, the RF fixes the referent of a name only by means of a definite description without appealing to ostension. The Neptune example belongs to this category. The following sentence can be considered as a prototype for this category. **S2**: Neptune is the planet, which causes such and such discrepancies in the orbit of Uranus.

The descriptions used in S1 and S2 do not give the meaning of “one meter” or “Neptune” and they are not synonymous with these terms, but they are used to fix the referents of these terms, according to Kripke. This is an important distinction because it determines the metaphysical status of these sentences. For instance, if the description “the length of S in Paris at t” gave the meaning of “one meter”, then S1 would express a necessary truth as does the sentence “Bachelors are unmarried males.”

Instead, the RF uses the description “the length of S in Paris at t” to fix a certain length which he wants to mark out. He marks it out by an accidental property, namely the length of the stick in Paris at t. In other words, the length the RF wants to mark out happens to be the length of the stick in Paris at t in this actual world. But, in some counterfactual situations, namely in some possible worlds, the stick might have been longer and in some shorter, if various stresses and strains had been applied to it. Because of that, in terms of the metaphysical status, “One meter is the length of S in Paris at t” expresses a contingent truth (Kripke, 1980, 55-56).

According to Kripke, the truth that S1 and S2 type sentences express is contingent because any sentence of the form “*m* is the *H*” where ‘the *H*’ is a non-rigid designator and ‘*m*’ is a rigid designator expresses a contingent truth. If one expression is a rigid designator and the other is not, then there is an object such that in some world one of the expressions refers to it and the other does not. But then the sentence will be false with respect to that possible world, and hence not necessary.

With respect to the epistemological status of “m is the H” type sentences, Kripke states the following:

It would seem that he (the RF) knows it a priori. For if he used stick S to fix the reference of the term “one meter”, then as a result of this kind of “definition” (which is not an abbreviate or synonymous definition), he knows automatically, without further investigation, that S is one meter long (Kripke, 1980, 56).

With these remarks, Kripke relativizes a priority to the RFs. In other words, the truths these peculiar sentences express are known a priori not by everybody but by RFs. And his justification for that claim that they know it a priori is that the RF automatically knows them without any investigation.

There are some controversies about the contingency of “m is the H” type sentences. However, in this thesis, I will not deal with their contingency-aspect. I will take it for granted. The main problem with these sentences is how the truths they express are known a priori if they are knowable in the first place. As we will see later, most attacks on Kripke with respect to this issue are because of his claim that these truths expressed by these sentences can be known a priori.

I.2 The Problem with the Contingent A Priori

There is a fundamental problem in Kripke’s argument for contingent a priori truths. In *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke does not care about the conditions of successfully naming an object and of successfully using the term introduced for the object in question. In fact, the following remarks by him give the impression that any name can be introduced successfully without satisfying any criteria.

A rigid designator ‘a’ is introduced with the ceremony, ‘Let “a” (rigidly) denote the unique object that actually has the property *F*, when talking about any situation, actual or counterfactual.’ It seemed

clear that if a speaker did introduce a designator into a language that way, then in virtue of his very linguistic act, he would be in a position to say ‘I know that *Fa*’, but nevertheless ‘*Fa*’ would express a contingent truth (Kripke, 1980, 14).

Nevertheless, these remarks do not clearly show that Kripke accepts that naming is performed successfully in any context.²

Now, I will give arguments for the need of criteria for successfully naming and using names.

Arguments for the Need of Criteria for Successfully Naming

Successful naming depends on certain conditions. For this claim, I offer two arguments. In the first place, consider the following question. Does an RF have a right to unconditionally introduce any name in the initial baptism? If the answer is *yes*, we must accept some absurd results. For instance, consider the procedure of naming a baby. Let’s think of a man who says “I will name the first baby born today in this hospital ‘Abraham’,” but who is neither a family member of the baby in question nor an official responsible for naming. In short he has no right to name this baby. Does his intention to name this baby in this case make sense? It seems that by his saying “Abraham” the baby is not named.

In the second place, if I am allowed to unconditionally name objects, I can successfully answer many questions without knowing the exact answer and provide contingent a priori truths as answers. Consider the following example. Somebody asks “How many rooms are there in this building?” I reply by saying that “Let the term ‘duba’ refer to the number of the rooms in this building” and answer the question by saying: “duba rooms” and “Duba is the

² In an unpublished lecture given in Mexico in 1996, Kripke clearly admits that successful naming must be performed under certain conditions. He gives the following example. He asks what his height is. Then he says “one kripke” as an answer. After that, he finds this answer problematic because of not considering some conditions in naming and claims that it must be given in terms of the metric system to people who live in the metric community. So he clarifies the quoted vague expression in *Naming and Necessity*. However, he does not specify in detail what these conditions are. Nor does he mention the conditions of successfully using the terms introduced in initial baptism.

number of the rooms in this building.” In this case, “There are duba rooms” expresses a contingent truth that is also a priori for me. However, I do not know the exact number of the rooms. Knowing these contingent truths in no way satisfies the curiosity of people in conversation. In other words, the answer “duba rooms” is uninformative for me and for the person who asked the question.³

An Argument related to successfully using Names

Considering only the conditions of successful naming is not sufficient in analyzing contingent a priori truths. Conditions of using a term successfully must also be considered in this analysis. The following argument aims to justify this claim.

Think of the following case. Language experts in the Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Center) introduced the name “bilgisayar” for the English-word “computer” and “belgegeçer” for the English word “fax.” After this introduction, Turkish people adopted the word “bilgisayar” and began to use it. However, they did not adopt the word “belgegeçer” and they still use the word “fax.” Experts introduced both of the words successfully, but in their initial baptism experts did not know whether people would adopt these words or not. Actually, one of them has been adopted and the other one was eliminated. Since in the initial baptism, experts could not know which one would be adopted and used by people, we must distinguish the conditions of successfully using a term from the conditions of successfully introducing it. In addition, elimination of “belgegeçer” but not of “bilgisayar” shows that successfully using a term depends upon certain conditions. Otherwise both of the words would be accepted and used successfully. So we must consider the conditions of successfully using a term too, if we want to improve Kripke’s argument for contingent a priori truth.

³ This argument is due to İlhan İnan. The gist of this argument goes back to David Cowles’ intuitions. In his “The Contingent A Priori,” he gives this thought-experiment: suppose that somebody introduces the name “alpha” as a rigid designator of the actual number of the planets, whatever it is. According to Kripke’s line of reasoning, he is in a position to know the truths expressed by “Alpha numbers the planets” and “There are alpha planets” a priori. However, he does not know to which number ‘alpha’ refers (Cowles, 1994, 140).

II. The Development of Kripke's Argument

My main task in this thesis is to show that contingent a priori truths are possible, and Kripke's examples can be regarded as genuine instances of them. What I must do for that purpose is to explain how they are possible. There may be many ways to justify this possibility but I will try to do it by improving Kripke's argument for this possibility. In Kripke's case, the possibility of a priori knowledge of contingent truths is related to the reference fixer who performs the act of naming in the initial baptism case. So I will explore under what conditions he knows contingent a priori truths. And this is the main task of this chapter. How they are knowable a priori or whether some people other than RFs know them a priori are topics of later chapters. So in this chapter, I will first present the tools which I will use in constructing my argument for this target, and later in the second part of this chapter, I will introduce my argument that aims to repair the gaps and defects mentioned in Kripke's argument for that purpose.

II.1 The Tools

II.1.1 Performatives

J. L. Austin's idea of performatives may help us in characterizing what happens in initial baptism. In uttering sentences expressing contingent a priori truths, we should know that the names in these sentences were introduced successfully. According to Austin, happy performative utterances have the function of expressing the act of successfully naming. In this regard, I will try to present Austin's notion of performatives and try to develop it as much as it fulfills the purpose of this thesis.

In his *How to Do Things with Words*, Austin introduces the “performative-constative distinction,” which is quite new for Western philosophy.⁴ Although he rejects this distinction in the end of that book, I will assume it in this thesis. Austin includes all true or false sentences under the heading of “constatives.” Descriptions and reports are examples he gives for this category. After that, he presents a category of sentences or utterances that are sensible but neither true nor false. They are used to perform an action. The peculiar action mentioned in the sentence is performed by saying or in saying the sentence. Austin calls these sentences or utterances “performative sentences” or “performative utterances,” or, for short “performatives” (Austin, 1976, 6). For instance, if somebody wants me to promise him to do his homework, I can perform this act of promising by saying “I promise you to do your homework.” If a teacher wants to give an order to his students, he says “I order you to do it.” and by saying these words the act of ordering is performed. Austin gives some other examples:

“I name this ship *Mr. Stalin*”

“I welcome you”

“I advise you to do it”

These examples apparently differ from constative sentences like “This table is brown” or “There are three glasses on this table.” While the latter ones describe an existing reality independent of the speaker, the former ones are uttered by the speaker to bring actions into the world. By saying or in saying these sentences we are doing something. Take the sentence “I name this ship *The Queen Elizabeth*.” In uttering this sentence, I am doing something, namely *naming* rather than *reporting that* I am naming.

⁴ Although this distinction is new for Western philosophy, it has been known as “inshai” and “haberi” expressions in Islamic theology and jurisprudence since the Middle Ages. While “inshai” expressions are defined as sentences that lead to actions by being said, “haberi” expressions are sentences that aim to describe the world or report information about it. Similar words such as “inşa” and “haber” are still used in today’s Turkish. See Tahsin Görgün (2000).

The most explicit form of the performative can be seen in sentences beginning with “I” as above. However, there are some other modes of performative, according to Austin. They can be presented in different grammatical forms. For instance, “Open the door” is a performative that can be reduced to the explicit form “I order you to open the door” (Austin, 1976, 73).

While constatives are true or false, performative utterances are “happy” or “unhappy.” The happiness of a performative utterance depends on some conditions, namely “felicity conditions.” If felicity conditions are met, a performative utterance is considered to be happy (Austin, 1976, 14). Austin claims that there are some necessary conditions common to all happy performative utterances. They are categorized into three main groups:

- A. (i) There must be a conventional procedure having a conventional effect. (ii) The circumstances and persons must be appropriate as specified in the procedure.
- B. The procedure must be executed (i) correctly and (ii) completely.
- C. Often, (i) The persons must have the requisite thoughts, feelings and intentions, as specified in the procedure, and (ii) If consequent conduct is specified, and then the relevant parties must do it (Austin, 1976, 15).

In the A-condition, Austin claims that the performatives have a conventional nature. And related acts must be performed according to these conventions. For instance, there are conventional procedures for marriage ceremonies relative to cultures. In Christian societies, this ceremony is performed in churches, by a priest, with a clearly defined procedure. If some of the conditions are inappropriate to this conventional procedure, then the purported act is disallowed by them. For instance, if a random individual instead of a priest says the words of the marriage ceremony, the ceremony is not considered to be carried out. Austin calls these performatives having inappropriate A-conditions “misinvocations.”

The B-conditions are related to the application of the conventional procedure. The rules of the procedure must be followed correctly and completely. The unhappiness related to these conditions does not stem from the fact that there is no conventional procedure. The procedure exists, but it isn't applied as purported. For instance, sometimes people cannot find a good name for their children even though the conventional procedure already exists. Or the application of the procedure may be vitiated by errors or omissions. In both cases, the act is not carried out. Austin calls these performatives having conditions blocking the performance of an act "misexecutions."

A and B conditions have a similar status. When they are violated, the purported act is not performed. In such cases, the performative utterance is "null" or "void" in Austin's terms.

C-conditions can be considered to be internal to the speaker and hearers (to all the participants of the conversation or ceremony). According to Austin, sincerity is an important condition in this category. If the participants do not have the expected thoughts and feelings sincerely, the performative utterance is again unhappy, even though the purported act is carried out. Austin calls these performatives having conditions that cause defects in purported acts although they do not hinder them from being performed "abuses." Insincere promises and unfelt congratulations can be classified under this category.

"Performatives" and "happiness" are very crucial notions in my account of contingent a priori truths. In order to be able to understand my arguments in a more clear way, I want to make some modifications of Austin's characterizations of them.

First of all, Austin uses both of the expressions "performative sentence" and "performative utterance." So what kind of a thing is a performative? Is it a sentence or an utterance of it? This is an important question. If it is a sentence, then happy performatives are performatives which can be regarded as happy without being used by somebody because sentences are types of word sequences and utterances are specific uses of them. However, it is

more reasonable to predicate happiness of peculiar utterances than predicating it of sentences. The reason is that “I name this baby ‘Cenk’” is happy when uttered by the father of the baby and unhappy when uttered by an ordinary person. So the same sentence is happy in an utterance and unhappy in another one. For this reason, I will take performatives as a kind of sentence in my thesis and predicate happiness of specific utterances of performative sentences.⁵

Secondly, one more modification with respect to performatives is needed. Even if the purported act of the performative utterance is not carried out, it is still an utterance of a performative, although it is unhappy. So a performative must be defined as a sentence that has a *potentiality* to bring about an action. Even if the action is not achieved in uttering or by uttering certain sentences, these sentences are clearly distinguished from non-performatives by their peculiar property of potentiality to give rise to definite actions.

Thirdly, Austin considers A, B and C conditions to be general felicity conditions common to all happy utterances of performatives. However, we face many counter examples to this claim. Consider A-conditions. Here, Austin claims that a conventional procedure is necessary to be able to perform an action with words. When we look at his examples of weddings, ship launchings etc., we see that he mainly focuses on highly formal, ritualistic or ceremonial situations. He does not care about ordinary conversations much. However, performatives are also uttered in conversations, which do not follow any conventional procedures. This is an important criticism directed at Austin by Strawson and his followers. According to Strawson, a speaker’s intention has a central role in communication, and successful communication can be maintained without conventional procedures. Strawson

⁵ What is happy or unhappy is particular utterances of performatives. So “happy performatives” is not a correct expression according to this categorization. However, so as not to use cumbersome expressions too much, I may use the phrase “happy performatives” in some places, and wherever I use it, I mean happily used performative sentences.

makes use of Paul Grice's notion of non-natural meaning and claims that an act is performed by arousing in the addressee the awareness that it was the speaker's intention to achieve a certain communicative goal and to get the addressee to reach this conclusion on the basis of his or her having produced a particular utterance (Strawson, 1979, 29). As an example, consider the sentence "Shut the door." In one context, this expression can be used to perform an act of ordering, in another context an act of requesting, in another an act of advising. With respect to this example, the specific conditions of a conversational case, not some conventional procedures, allow the hearer to identify which act is intended. So the acts related to performatives need not be conventional, they can also be conversational.

In addition to conventional and conversational acts, we can also mention purely mental acts with respect to performatives. I can utter a performative and perform an act without speaking and without even aiming to communicate with somebody else. As Fodor says, nothing prevents us from enriching by declaration the mental 'language of our thought' by giving a certain name to an object, a certain definition to a new concept or meaning to a new symbol (Fodor, J.A., 1975). Consider the following case. Assume that I am trying to prove a mathematical conjecture. In the process of proof, I am finding an important equation. I name it and use the name along with the proof. This act of naming is successful without addressing anybody else. It is also a purely mental act. So some acts employing performatives are neither conventional nor conversational, as in this purely mental case.

These counter examples show that evaluating the happiness of performative utterances in terms of context dependent felicity conditions is more sensible than characterizing it in terms of general felicity conditions. Given these examples, I consider felicity conditions to be context dependent in this thesis. Using this result, I characterize the happiness in terms of two necessary conditions as follows: An utterance of a performative is happy if the purported act is carried out appropriately to the context. This characterization suggests two necessary

conditions for an utterance of a performative to be happy. Firstly, the act related to the performative must be carried out. Secondly, the execution of this act must be appropriate to the circumstances of the context. Since these circumstances differ from context to context, we cannot give general appropriateness conditions. By this characterization, I do not aim to give a general definition of happiness. However, I emphasize the more important properties of a happy utterance. These features are related to our issue of Kripke's contingent a priori truths. The examples of the standard stick and Neptune belong to a scientific context. I will discuss the felicity conditions of naming that are peculiar to a scientific context in the next chapter.

II.1.2 Pragmatic Inferences

The second important technical tool, which will be used in my argument, is “pragmatic inference.” What we will need in constructing the argument in the second part of the chapter is an inference from performatives to declarative sentences. Since performatives have no truth-value and declarative sentences have, a valid inference from performatives to them cannot be given semantically. The reason is that semantic or logical inferences are possible only within the domain of sentences having truth-value. In such a case, an inference from performatives to a declarative sentence must consider more than what is said in these sentences. For that, we appeal to an inference that also considers the speaker's role in inferring, namely pragmatically valid inferences instead of semantically valid ones. For that purpose, I will consider three main categories of pragmatic inferences: implicatures, entailments and presuppositions.

II.1.2.1. Implicatures

In his *Studies in the Way of Words*, Paul Grice introduces a new term which he calls “implicature-implicate” into the literature. What is implicated is distinct from what is said in a

sentence. What someone has said is closely related to the conventional meaning of the words or the sentence he has uttered. On the other hand, what is implicated is more than what is said in the sentence. The implicature is not captured by the conventional meaning of words (Grice, 1991, 24-25).

Grice divides implicatures into two main categories: conventional implicatures and non-conventional ones. In conventional implicatures, established conventions allow us to interpret the sentence without considering any other special or contextual factors. Since I want to focus on contextual factors and the speaker's role in inferences, I do not consider Grice's conventional implicatures here.

What I will consider is Grice's account of conversational implicatures, which is a provisional account of a kind of non-conventional implicatures, according to him (Grice, 1991, 86). The conversational implicatures are essentially connected with certain general features of discourse. There is a set of over-arching assumptions guiding the conduct of conversation. These arise from basic rational considerations and may be formulated as guidelines for the efficient and effective use of language in conversation to further co-operative ends. These guidelines are a general "Cooperative Principle," and four "maxims" specifying how to be cooperative:

Cooperative Principle: Contribute what is required by the accepted purpose of the conversation. *Maxim of Quality:* Make your contribution true; do not convey what you believe false or unjustified. *Maxim of Quantity:* Be as informative as required. *Maxim of Relation:* Be relevant. *Maxim of Manner:* Be perspicuous; avoid obscurity and ambiguity, and strive for brevity and order (Grice, 1991, 45–46).

These maxims specify what participants have to do in order to converse in a maximally efficient, rational and co-operative way. They are not arbitrary conventions but rather describe rational means for conducting co-operative exchanges. These maxims generate inferences

beyond the semantic content of the sentences uttered. Such inferences are by definition conversational implicatures. As an example, consider the following dialogue.

Ali: Are you going to do your homework?

Bilal: I am going to Zeki's party.

If this was a typical exchange, Bilal meant that he is not going to do his homework. But the sentence he uttered does not mean that he does not do his homework. Hence Bilal did not *say* that he is not going to do the homework; he conversationally implicated it. The implicature in this dialogue is explained in terms of the Maxim of Relation and is therefore called a "relevance implicature." Bilal would have infringed the Maxim of Relation, it is claimed, unless his contribution were relevant to the purpose of the conversation. If Bilal is being cooperative, then he is trying to answer Ali's question. Given that going to the party is incompatible with doing homework, Bilal must have intended to communicate that he is not going to do his homework.

Grice gives the definition of conversational implicature as follows: *S* (speaker) conversationally implicates *p* (*proposition*) iff *S* implicates *p* when: (i) *S* is presumed to be observing the Cooperative Principle (*cooperative presumption*); (ii) The supposition that *S* believes *p* is required to make *S*'s utterance consistent with the Cooperative Principle (*determinacy*); and (iii) *S* believes (or knows), and expects *H* (*hearer*) to believe that *S* believes, that *H* is able to determine that (ii) is true (*mutual knowledge*) (Grice, 1991, 30-31). In this definition, Grice mentions the speaker's implicature instead of sentence implicatures in this case. This is because there are context dependent factors affecting the conversation. Because of the peculiarity of the case where people try to communicate, only the speaker could implicate something by considering special conditions of the case and general maxims of conversation.

According to Grice, an important property of conversational implicatures is cancelability. By adding some phrases or sentences, one can cancel the implicature of a sentence (Grice, 1991, 44). Let's consider the following example the form of which is well known as "Moore's paradox." If I assert "The USA is not right in conquering Iraq, but I do not believe it," I cannot be accused of asserting a contradictory sentence. Logically, this is consistent. The cancelability of implicatures is a big problem in characterizing the inference from performatives to declarative sentences as implicatures, because there is a necessary link between them, as we will see later. So can we modify Grice's account of implicatures so that it enables us to formulate a necessary link between what is said and what is implicated?

I answer this question positively and offer a new version of implicature called "strict implicature." For any performative, its felicity conditions or the implications of them can be regarded as non-cancelable implicatures. For instance, if I utter the performative "I name this baby 'Abraham'," then I must accept that the baby exists; the word "this" indicates that I am pointing to it and I cannot point to something that is not existent. Therefore, "existence of the baby" is a felicity condition of this utterance of the performative. If I did not accept that the baby exists, then its felicity conditions would be violated, which would result in an unhappily used performative. So given the condition that the speaker happily utters the performative above, the implicature "The baby exists" must be necessary for the speaker. Otherwise, there would be a contradiction for the speaker. So the sentence "The baby exists" is a non-cancelable implicature for the person who utters the performative "I name this baby 'Abraham'." Thus, implicatures of performatives concerning felicity conditions are necessarily connected with performatives. These special kinds of implicatures can be defined in the following way. A sentence A is a "strong implicature" of a performative P iff it is a felicity condition or it follows necessarily from at least one of its felicity conditions. Take the performative "I apologize to you." Assume that sincerity is a felicity condition for its happy

utterance. Then the sentence “I am not fooling you” is a strong implicature of this performative, since it follows necessarily from the sincerity condition. However, the inference from performatives to declarative sentences is not sufficiently illuminated yet. What kind of a necessary link is it? We should also try to answer this question.

II.1.2.2 Entailment

The entailment relation between declarative sentences is a well-known relation that is closely related to the notion of validity. Any declarative sentence A entails another declarative sentence B, iff there is no possible way in which A is true and B is false. It is also said that B necessarily follows from A if A entails B. Since this relation is defined between declarative sentences without considering the speaker’s role in inferring, it can be called “semantic entailment.”

Following the intuition found in the definition of “semantic entailment,” “pragmatic entailment” can be defined by considering the factor of the speaker in the following way: a set of sentences A pragmatically entails a sentence B iff there is no possible way in which a speaker accepts A and does not accept B. As an example, suppose that I chose McDonalds as the place to eat my lunch today. After that I say “I declare McDonalds as the place to eat lunch today.” If I happily uttered this performative or accept its utterance in the relevant case as happy, there is no way for me not to accept the sentence “McDonalds is my place for lunch today” as true. In this case, the performative strictly implicates or more specifically, pragmatically entails the sentence expressing that McDonalds is my place for lunch today. The reason is that the last sentence pragmatically follows from a felicity condition of the performative, namely the sentence “I chose McDonalds as the place to eat lunch today.”

II.1.2.3 Presupposition

The term “presupposition” is first introduced by Gottlob Frege. He uses this term where he deals with the absence of the reference of a sentence, namely a sentences which is neither true nor false. According to Frege, the absence of a truth value of a sentence is closely related to the notion of presupposition. However, Frege does not give a detailed analysis for this notion; he mentions it in a footnote (Frege, 1993, 25-50).

After him, in 1952, P. F. Strawson gives a detailed analysis of presuppositions and changes the type of presupposition Frege mentions. According to his definition, a statement S presupposes a statement S' iff the truth of S' is a pre-condition of the truth-or-falsity of S (Strawson, 1952, 175). The consequent of this bi-conditional means that S entails S' and the negation of S also entails S'. However, S' does not entail S, nor entail the negation of S. So the presupposition relation is defined in terms of entailment relation but is distinct from it. Let's see an example Strawson gives in order to understand this notion. The statement “The king of France is wise” presupposes the statement “There is a king of France.” Here, the latter statement is a precondition of the truth or falsity of the statement “The king of France is wise.” It is also a precondition of the truth value of the statement that “The king of France is not wise.” If the statement “There is a king of France” were false, then both of the sentences “The king of France is wise” and “The king of France is not wise” would be truth-valueless, namely neither true nor false. In Strawson's account, presupposition is a relation between statements.⁶ So these kinds of presuppositions are known as “semantic presuppositions.”

After Strawson, in 1954, Wilfrid Sellars made important contributions to the analysis of the notion of presupposition. He introduces the term “speaker's presupposition” and analyzed it in terms of speaker's and hearer's beliefs. According to Sellars, what is presupposed in some utterance of “The king of France is wise” is that the speaker believes that there is a king

⁶ Strawson means a specific utterance of a sentence in a particular occasion when he uses the term “statement.”

of France and moreover he believes that the hearer does so. The hearer must have the same presupposition as the speaker has because they aim to engage in a successful communication.

In Sellars's case, presupposition bears no relation to truth conditions but is related to conditions for successful communication (Sellars, 1954, 197-215). In order to clarify his notion of speaker's presupposition, let's consider the following dialog as an example:

Bob: Florida is the best place to visit this holiday.

Robert: I think, Chicago is the best.

In this dialogue, both Bob and Robert try to decide a place to visit in their holiday. So both of them already decided to visit somewhere. Otherwise, their conversation would be pointless. In other words, they presuppose to visit somewhere in the holiday. Bob presupposes this and believes that Robert does so (and vice versa). Because of that he suggests a place. This short conversation shows that there is something that both of them must presuppose for a successful communication. This example gives an idea of how people rather than sentences presuppose something.

Although Sellars considers just conversation cases including speakers and hearers in characterizing the notion of speaker's presupposing, it is also possible to characterize this notion without including hearers, just by appealing to speakers.

Considering the remarks of both Strawson and Sellars, we can define a pragmatic inference which can be called "pragmatic presupposition" in the following way. However, in my definition, I am using the term 'sentence' instead of Strawson's term of "statement," and I am excluding the role of hearer as shown in Sellars case because the speaker's role is enough in the characterization of "presupposing" relation in terms of the purposes of this thesis. (1) A sentence A pragmatically presupposes another sentence B iff the speaker presupposes B by uttering A. (2) The speaker presupposes B by uttering A iff he must accept B in order to accept A or not-A. In other words, if the speaker presupposes B by uttering A, A or not-A

pragmatically entail B, but B pragmatically entails neither A nor not-A. In this definition, the speaker's presupposing a sentence by uttering another sentence is presented as a pragmatic presupposition between sentences and characterized in terms of the relation of pragmatic entailment.

Let's give an example. While I am happily uttering the performative "I name this baby 'Abraham'," I pragmatically presuppose that the baby exists. However, my unhappily uttering this performative does not necessitate that this baby does not exist. It may exist, and the performative in question may fail to be happily used for another reason.

As an important point, I do not say that pragmatic entailments or presuppositions are not subclasses of strong implicatures. It is possible that there are pragmatic entailments and presuppositions which are also strong implicatures. However, it is also possible that there are pragmatic entailments and presuppositions which are not strong implicatures.

II.2 Presentation of the Main Argument

In this chapter, I am interested in the preconditions of the RF's knowledge of the sentences that purports to express contingent a priori truths. For short, I call these sentences "target sentences," and the proposition they express "target propositions." The discussion of whether the RF's knowledge of them is a priori or not is a topic of another chapter. So my task is to explain under what conditions an RF knows target propositions. The argument I will present in this part of the thesis will partly serve to explain the possibility of contingent a priori truths. This explanation will be completed in the next chapters.

The RF knows target propositions under some circumstances. The possibility of this knowledge for an RF depends firstly on Kripke's account of naming and especially his notion of rigid designation. Secondly, it depends on the plausibility of the heuristic devices of

performatives and pragmatic inferences. These are general preconditions in order to be able to assert meaningfully the target sentences. In this thesis, I assume the plausibility of them.

In addition to these general preconditions, there are also specific conditions. The RF's knowledge of target propositions depends on two premises which are peculiar to the kind of target sentence. The first premise expresses a happy utterance of a performative of the form "I declare that..." that brings about the act of naming an object. I call it a "naming performative." The second premise states that the conditions of successfully using the terms presented are satisfied for the RF. It is a declarative sentence of the form "I can use ... successfully." I call this premise a "use premise" and the proposition it expresses a "use proposition." In the first chapter, I gave arguments for why these premises must be considered to be preconditions of the RF's knowledge of target propositions. However, in *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke does not clearly deal with these preconditions. By presenting these premises I aim to improve Kripke's argument and repair the gaps in it.

As far as the dependence relation between the target sentences and each of these two premises is concerned, I argue that an RF's knowledge of both of the premises pragmatically entails the knowledge of the target proposition for him.

I want to stress an important point in this argument. While the knowledge of the use premise and the target proposition is propositional in kind, the knowledge of the naming performative is not. However, there is no problem in making knowledge-claims of performatives. There are different kinds of knowledge other than propositional ones. Just consider the knowledge-how claims. I can meaningfully claim that I know how to swim or how to repair computers. These are not examples of propositional knowledge. Along the same line, I can also claim that I know how to name something. This example gives an intuition to us about how to evaluate the knowledge claims concerning performatives. One very important

distinction between the knowledge of performatives and propositional knowledge is that we require a specific utterance of the performative to be happy instead of true in the former case.

Now, I will try to present the specific preconditions of the RF's belief in target propositions in detail.

II.2.1 Naming Performatives

To relate the conditions for successfully naming to the issue of the contingent a priori, I follow Robin Jeshion's idea that sentences expressing contingent a priori truths depend in a sense on performatives (Jeshion, 2002, 63). In fact, Kripke intimates this idea by considering the knowledge of contingent a priori truths as a result of a linguistic act (Kripke, 1980, 14). Kripke draws attention to the role of the linguistic act of naming in knowing the peculiar propositions in question, but he does not clearly state what kind of a role it is and does not analyze it systematically. What I will try to do is to take this act of naming as a precondition of an RF's knowledge of target propositions and interpret it in terms of Austin's performatives. Because of that, I call the special kind of performatives here "naming-performatives."

Kripke mentions two kinds of sentences expressing contingent a priori truths, namely S1 and S2. In S1 type sentences, the rigid designator is introduced by a description and ostension as in the example of the standard meter. In S2 type sentences, the rigid designator is introduced only by a description without the observation of the object as in the example of Neptune. So the initial baptisms of these rigid designations in hand are different. Because of that I propose two different naming performatives for these two different kinds of target-sentences, namely N-P1 for S1 and N-P2 for S2:

N-P1: I declare that "one meter" rigidly refers to a certain length in all possible worlds, which is to be the same as the length of S in Paris at t in this world.

S1: One meter is the length of S in Paris at t.

N-P2: I declare that “Neptune” rigidly refers to a certain planet in all possible worlds, which is the same as the one that causes such and such perturbations in the orbit of Uranus.

S2: Neptune is the planet which causes such and such perturbations in the orbit of Uranus.

As an important point, the “I” in the N-P1 and N-P2 refers to the RF who performs the act of declaration.

As far as the felicity conditions are concerned, we must firstly determine in which context these naming performatives are uttered. As I said earlier, both the standard meter and Neptune examples belong to a scientific discourse. They are scientifically technical terms. So the felicity conditions we are looking for in this initial baptism case are conditions of naming in a scientific discourse. However, I postpone the discussion of what they are to the next chapter of this thesis.

II.2.2 Use Premises

In addition to conditions of successful naming, we must also consider the conditions of successfully using a name. For that purpose, I offer a new premise expressing the satisfaction of these use conditions. Since this sentence will be of a report form, I will not consider it to be a performative. It can be regarded as a declarative sentence expressing the satisfaction of the conditions of successfully using the term. I call it a “use-premise” and the following use-premises, namely U-Pr.1 for S1 and U-Pr.2 for S2 can be offered:

U-Pr. 1: I can successfully use the name “one meter.”

U-Pr.2: I can successfully use the name “Neptune.”

I claim that the knowledge of the target propositions can be validly and pragmatically inferred from the knowledge of the naming performatives and use premises. So the arguments for the two different cases will be in the following way:

1. Case:

N-P1: I declare that “one meter” rigidly refers to a certain length in all possible worlds, which is to be the same as the length of S at t in this world.

U-Pr.1: I can successfully use the name “one meter.”

(T-S1): One meter is the length of S in Paris at t.

2. Case:

N-P2: I declare that “Neptune” rigidly refers to a certain planet in all possible worlds, which is the same as the one that causes perturbations in the orbit of Uranus.

U-Pr.2: I can successfully use the name “Neptune.”

(T-S2): Neptune is the planet which caused such and such discrepancies in the orbit of Uranus.

Again, the “I” refers to the RF. If we can show how the RF validly infers the knowledge of target-sentences from the knowledge of naming performatives and use premises, we can make a contribution to the way of establishing a link between contingent a priori truths, and successfully naming and using procedures. For this reason, I will consider pragmatic inferences concerning these arguments in the next step.

II.2.3 Pragmatic Inferences

The validity of the inference from the knowledge of a naming performative and a use premise to the knowledge of the target proposition can be maintained by appealing to pragmatic inferences which consider also the speaker’s role in inferring instead of semantical ones. I arrived at this idea by means of the work of Andrzej Wisniewski who formulated valid inferences for arguments that include questions as premises. He calls them “erotetic

implications” (Wisniewski, 1996) and since the questions do not have a truth value, these implications can be considered to be pragmatic inferences. What I will try to specify for our case is a kind of pragmatic inference for arguments that include naming performatives.

My thesis is that the knowledge of the two premises together pragmatically entails the knowledge of the target proposition for the RF. Separately considered; the knowledge of the premises does not entail this conclusion.

On the one hand, the knowledge of the naming performative alone pragmatically entails just the belief of the target proposition but not its knowledge. Consider the standard meter case as an example to illuminate this point. The RF by his decision determines that “one meter” refers to the length of the standard stick in Paris at *t*. He might have decided something else, but as soon as he decided in this way and made a happy declaration, he must believe that one meter is the length of the standard stick in Paris at *t*. His happy declaration strictly implicates this conclusion because this conclusion pragmatically follows from his decision mentioned above that is a felicity condition for the performative in question. However, this is just a piece of belief for the RF because in order to be able to assert the conclusion as a piece of knowledge he must also know that the use-conditions for the term “one meter” are satisfied. Without the knowledge of the use premise, the conclusion is only a belief about the semantic content of “one meter” for him.

On the other hand, the knowledge of the target proposition pragmatically presupposes the knowledge of the naming performative. Put differently, the knowledge of the target proposition pragmatically entails the knowledge of the naming performative, but the latter does not pragmatically entail the former. This is so because knowledge of the naming performative is a precondition of the knowledge of the target proposition.

I have some doubts as to whether the knowledge of the target proposition pragmatically presupposes the knowledge of the use premise separately. To learn how to use a term comes

after we have learned what its semantic content is. As a life experience, we come to know use conditions after we know the naming conditions. So in this sense, when we know a use premise we already know the relevant naming performative. Thus if we say that the knowledge of the target proposition pragmatically presupposes the knowledge of the use premise, we implicitly assume that the former pragmatically presupposes also the knowledge of the naming performative. Nevertheless, if there is a way to treat the epistemic status of the use premise independently from the naming performative's one, we can say that the knowledge of the target proposition pragmatically presupposes the knowledge of the use premise separately, too.

III. Naming and Use Conditions

I maintained that the possibility of contingent a priori truths in Kripke's examples depends on some preconditions. By assuming the general preconditions of Kripke's account of naming, the plausibility of performatives and pragmatic inferences, I aimed to show whether contingent a priori truths are possible under these assumptions. For this purpose, I argue that the a priori knowledge of some contingent truths for an RF depends on the knowledge of two particular premises, namely the happy utterance of the relevant naming performative and the truth of the relevant use premise. Now, I will attempt to show the conditions that make a naming performative happy and a use premise true. The reason is that the knowledge of these two premises depends on the knowledge of their conditions. If the RF in question does not know that the success conditions of naming an object are satisfied, he does not know that the relevant naming performative is uttered happily either. Similarly, if he does not know that the success conditions of using the name introduced by the first premise, he does not know that the use premise is true.

As I said earlier, the conditions of happily naming an object and successfully using this name are dependent upon a scientific context if we consider Kripke's two types of examples. So I will deal with some conditions concerning a scientific context, but not all conditions of naming an object and using this name in any scientific context. It is possible to mention many different scientific contexts but I restrict my discussion only to the conditions related to the Neptune and the standard meter cases. I do not claim that I will give an analysis of all the conditions relevant to these two cases. My intention is to focus on the conditions that have cardinal importance and ignore the less crucial ones.

To begin with, I discriminate these conditions into two categories in terms of the RF's access to them. I call the conditions to which the RF has an internal access "internal conditions" and the conditions external to him "external conditions". The internal conditions

that I will consider are intentions of several kinds. The external conditions which will be discussed are the position of the scientific community and the RF, the existence of the objects in question, the external conditions of a de re attitude towards the objects and the need for a buck stopper. I will discuss the conditions under these headings and try to figure out to which category they belong: naming or using.

III.1 Internal Conditions

The internal conditions I will consider are mainly related to the intentions of an RF.

First, I want to focus on the ways in which a term is introduced. There are several ways of introducing a term: by ostension, by description or by description with ostension etc. So an RF must choose one of the ways in introducing a name into language. In other words, the RF must have a specific intention to appeal to a way of naming an object. In the standard meter case, the RF has an intention to use a description with ostension in introducing the name “one meter” into language. In the Neptune case, the RF has an intention to use a description without ostension in introducing the name “Neptune.” The intention in the naming ceremony is not necessarily the same as the intention in using the name. I may introduce the name of my baby only by ostension, but then I can use this name with descriptions. For instance, although I can introduce the name “Abraham” by pointing to the baby, I can use it by saying that “Abraham is the first baby in our family.” The intentions with respect to the ways of introducing a name and using it are different in these two cases, but in both situations the RF has a specific intention.

Secondly, another important point is with which function the descriptions in the target sentences are introduced or used. If a description is introduced as an abbreviation or a synonym of the name in question, then the target sentence expresses a tautology namely a necessary truth. If it is introduced only with the function of fixing the reference of the name in

question, then the target sentence expresses a contingent truth. Thus this distinction is very crucial. Because of that, the RF must intend to introduce a description with a function of fixing the reference of the name in order to assert contingent truths. This is in fact what the RF does in the initial baptisms of “one meter” and “Neptune” according to Kripke. By introducing the description “the length of S at t” the RF fixes the referent of “one meter,” he does not give a synonym of it. The description “the planet which causes perturbations in the orbit of Uranus” is also introduced to fix the reference of “Neptune.” This intention must be preserved whenever these names are used, if the RF wants to assert contingent truths. If he does not use the descriptions in question with the intention of reference fixing, he may not have a priori knowledge of some contingent truths. So this kind of intention is a use condition as well as a naming one.

The descriptions in question may have two functions, as Kripke points out: reference fixing or synonym giving. By fixing the referents of proper names and using them, the RF calls attention to a specific object; he has an epistemic access to that particular thing and so has a *de re* attitude toward that object. A *de re* attitude is simply an attitude toward a specific object. Since the referents of the names both in the standard meter and Neptune cases are singular things, this condition becomes more important in terms of our goal. It seems to me that the RF must have a *de re* attitude toward the particular objects in these cases in naming them as well as in using these names. Whether having a *de re* attitude toward an object requires the satisfaction of some external conditions is a topic of discussion. I postpone the discussion of these conditions to the part of this chapter where the external conditions will be discussed.

Thirdly, the role of the preference of the RF in fixing the referent of the name is another important point. Kripke has realistic intuitions.⁷ He does not consider the role of the RF to be

⁷ Let me briefly explain what I mean Kripke’s realistic intuitions. The RF in question does not stipulate the rigidity of the term “one meter” or arbitrarily determines that this term will be used as a rigid designator. What

a creative activity with respect to the extra linguistic reality. So the stipulations the RF makes do not have a function of creation. The RF chooses the description “the length of S at t” from many other descriptions in fixing the reference of “one meter,” but he might have chosen “the length of S at w” or “the length of K at t” as well. In the Neptune case, the RF focuses on the description “the planet which causes perturbations in the orbit of Uranus” from many other descriptions related to astronomical events. He uses it to fix the referent of “Neptune.” The stipulations in question mean selections or making specifications. Thus if the RF fixes the referent of “one meter” by stipulating that “one meter” is to be a rigid designator of the length which is in fact the length of S at t, he intends to select this description from many other ones to fix the reference of “one meter.” As a result, the RF’s intention to select a certain description is also a felicity condition of the happy utterance of a naming performative. This condition must also be considered to be a use condition because it is related to the referent of the name. And the referent must be the same in any use of the names in question.

III.2 External Conditions

The external conditions I will discuss can be classified under the headings of the position of the scientific community and the RF, the existence of the objects in question, the external conditions of the RF’s de re attitude toward objects and the need for a buck stopper. Let’s begin to discuss them.

he stipulates is that a certain term (“one meter”) will be used as the rigid designator of a certain length whose existence does not depend on the RF’s stipulation. Kripke’s semantic analysis illuminates or clarifies his metaphysics. He expresses the necessary or contingent relations in a clear way with this rigidity notion. But it is not true that his semantics gives rise to or creates his metaphysics. Kripke is a realist and according to him, metaphysical facts are independent of subjects including the reference fixers of rigid designators. Reference fixers do not determine or shape metaphysical facts by introducing some rigid or non-rigid designators. Instead, they have intuitive knowledge of modal facts. And also there are some conditions for introducing a rigid designator. Every term cannot be introduced as a rigid term. A baptizer determines only which word will be used as a rigid term; he does determine a linguistic fact, he does not determine the rigidity, namely an extra linguistic fact.

III.2.1 The Position of the Scientific Community and the Reference Fixer

A scientific community plays an important role in the introduction of scientific terms. If such a community does not accept the proposed names, we cannot mention a successful naming ceremony. So a scientific community's acceptance of the suggested names is a condition of successful naming. The acceptance-community need not include all scientists, but there must be authoritative ones in it. Think of a PhD thesis committee: it consists of three or five people. If this committee approves, the PhD is considered to be accepted. Similarly, a scientific name can be accepted by a committee consisting of three or five authoritative members.

What is crucial in this case is that the committee has good reasons to accept the suggested names. And these good reasons can also be regarded as conditions of a successful naming. First, the scientific community does not evaluate the suggestions of an ordinary person. The RF of the proposed name must be an appropriate person. Maybe he is also an authoritative scientist, a PhD candidate or the like. However, this is not enough. The RF must convince the scientific community with a good reason for why he introduces that name in question. Does he make some unifications or an important explanation or prediction by introducing this name? What a function does the introduction of this name fulfill? In short, the name has to do some work.

Let's turn back to our two cases of the standard meter and Neptune. The name "Neptune" is introduced by an authoritative scientist Leverrier in 1846 and this name is accepted for the planet it refers to from many other alternatives by the scientific communities in Europe at that time. The names "Janus" and "Oceanus" were also suggested for the same planet, but "Neptune" is accepted (Moore, 1996, 30). Leverrier's work on this planet was more substantive. His work also brought an explanation of the perturbations in the orbit of

Uranus according to Newtonian physics by postulating this planet. On the other hand, in the standard meter case, in 1790, the National Assembly of France requested the French Academy of Sciences to present an invariable standard for all the measures and all the weights. The Academy appointed a commission for that purpose and it assigned the name “meter” to the unit of length. We do not know whether the whole commission or only one person fixed the referent of “one meter.” In any case, there is no obstacle to accepting the whole commission as reference fixers of this name. The function of this invariable standard is obvious. Since it is invariable it makes life easy. It is a heuristic and calculating tool which is very useful in any area of life such as commerce, trade and building etc.

Can these naming conditions be considered to be use conditions as well? For a name to be used widely, the small committee which accepts the suggested name may not always be sufficient. Think of the PhD theses which are accepted, but almost no scientists know them. The situation is similar for the usage of names. It seems that if some prominent scientists who have a capacity to orientate some other ones use these names, these names may be used by many other scientists. The role of the RF and his good reasons for introducing a name cannot be ignored. If the RF is authoritative enough and has a big impact on many scientists, *his* introduction of a name can by itself lead to widely use of this name. If by introducing this name he brings a solution to a prominent problem or performs some very important work, the name can be used widely as well as being accepted. It seems that there is a degree of strength in naming conditions. If the naming conditions are strong enough they can be regarded as use conditions as well. But it is not so easy to determine this degree of strength.

III.2.2 Existence

Is it necessary that the reference of a name exists? The answer to this question depends on what do we mean by “names.” There are philosophers who claim that there are non-

referring names. These names purport to refer but fail. They have no referent. A common example they give is “Vulcan.” They seem to be right on this issue if we consider the following cases.

Non-referring names seem to be very important in scientific research activities and rational debates. Consider people discussing the existence of God. One of them tries to prove that He exists, the other one tries to reject this thesis. In order to meaningfully debate this issue, it seems that both of them should use the term “God.” Otherwise, they would be talking about different things whose proof or rejection is meaningless. In such a discussion, the man who tries to reject God’s existence, obviously does not accept His existence but uses the term “God.” As another example, a mathematician tries to prove that the biggest prime number does not exist. He certainly can name it and tries to prove this thesis. As far as research activities in science are concerned, a scientist formulates a hypothetical entity and tries to figure out whether it exists or not. He can introduce a term for this hypothetical entity before his research and need not to presuppose that it exists.

In my opinion, these examples suggest that we need non-referring terms but not non-referring names. It seems to be reasonable to consider the terms in the examples not to be genuine proper names. They are just terms and to deal with such cases, it is sufficient to agree that they are non-referring terms. We need not to consider them also to be names and accept the problematic notion of non-referring names.

Let me explain why formulating non-referring names is problematic. I think that we can consider proper names to be individual constants in standard logic. It seems to me intuitively plausible because this is what we are doing when analyzing the logical structure of everyday sentences. For instance, we can symbolize the sentence “John is a student” with “GA” where “G” is the predicate “...is a student” and “A” is the individual constant, namely the proper name “John.” Even though there may be some criticisms of this symbolization, as a

common practice, I find it plausible and think that we should seriously take into account this practice. Taking this for granted, there is an important implication here. By means of the logical rule of existential generalization we can make an existential claim on the basis of a sentence including an individual constant. For instance, consider the sentence “John is a student” again. By existential generalization, we can claim that “there is at least one thing that is a student.” This logical rule is based on the existence of the referent of the individual constant in question. Since the referent exists, we can claim that there is at least one thing that is a student. To preserve the intuition behind this rule I think that “existence” of the referent must be considered to be a naming condition.

As far as the referents of the names in question are concerned, there is a point I should emphasize. The referent of “Neptune” is a planet, namely a concrete object and the referent of “one meter” is a property, namely an abstract object. There is a debate about whether abstract objects exist or not. I agree that there are problems in formulating their existence, but this is a general problem. It is not a problem just for me in this thesis. I think that dealing with this problem will go beyond the content of this thesis. So I assume that abstract objects such as properties exist and it seems to me plausible because we name many abstract objects and use these names successfully. For instance, the numbers: 2, 3 and 4, etc.

Let’s discuss whether “existence” can be a use condition or not. Assume that we introduced a name for a baby but just after this introduction the baby in question died. Can we not use this name because of the fact that its referent does not exist any more? The commonsensical answer to this question is that we use the name successfully even if its referent does not exist any more. It is a common linguistic activity that we use names whose referents do not exist or live any more. If I want to mention my late grandfather, I say “Yusuf Muhtaroglu” and everybody in my family understands to whom I refer. People in Turkey use the proper name “Ataturk” successfully even though its referent died in 1938. Thus, I don’t

consider “existence” to be a use condition. Let’s connect this issue to the rule of existential generalization. According to standard predicate logic, if I use an individual constant in a sentence, I can make an existential claim in any time. And this seems to pose a problem for my considerations. However, standard predicate logic refers to valid inferences without considering the time factor. Because of that, it is not sufficient to capture some valid inferences. Let’s focus on the sentence “John is a student” again. Assume that John has died. In that case, it is not legitimate to infer that there is at least one thing that is a student. However, the rule of existential generalization allows it. So there is a problem. I think that we can resolve this problem by modifying this rule. And the modification is the introduction of tense logic. In the tense logic, we are allowed to make the following inference. “John was a student” and so “There was at least one thing that was a student.” Thus in this case, we do not need to assume the existence of the referent of the name “John.” As a result of this discussion, to be able to use a name successfully its referent must be existent once, but it is not necessary that the object exists at any time.

III.2.3. External Conditions of a De Re Attitude

In this part, I want to discuss whether a de re attitude toward an object has external conditions. I will consider two of them that are important in terms of this thesis. One of them is “the existence of the object” and the other one is “the experience of the object.”

To begin with, as I said earlier, by saying only a word such as “John,” I couldn’t name anything because naming requires something to be named. In our case of proper names, the referents of the names are singular, particular objects. We must have an attitude towards them if we want to name them. And an attitude directly about a particular object is de re attitude as mentioned before. So in order to form a de re attitude, we need to have an object. In other words, its concept should be instantiated. And if an existent object ceases to exist, we still

have a de re attitude toward it. Think of a man who died. He existed but does not exist any more. If we had a de re attitude toward him when he was living, we still preserve this attitude after he died. I can directly think of my grandfather now, even though he died 2.5 years ago. Thus, in that sense, “existence” is a condition of a de re attitude. So this attitude requires that the object once existed but does not necessitate that the object exist in any time when we directly think of it.

The second important condition that I will discuss is the experience of an object around which there is a big debate. Keith Donnellan argues that by introducing names via definite descriptions (without ostension), one cannot form de re belief about the objects to which the names purport to refer (Donnellan, 1997, 57). As Ilhan Inan points out, he seems to assume that having a particular object in mind is necessary to form a de re belief about it (Inan, 1997, 116). In “The Contingent A priori and Rigid Designators,” Donnellan seems to assume that Leverrier could not have Neptune as a specific object in his mind until he spotted it on the telescope. So Leverrier was not be able to form a de re belief about this planet until its discovery. There are also many philosophers taking the view that acquaintance or perceptual contact with concrete objects is necessary to form de re beliefs about them (Jeshion, 2002, 54).

In my opinion, the experience of an object or the perceptual contact with it is too strong a condition to form a de re attitude toward it. It seems to me plausible to argue for having a de re belief about an object that is not experienced by anyone. I appeal here to Robin Jeshion’s idea that “the descriptive reference fixing act itself can foster a shift in thought from de dicto to de re, and thereby enable the stipulator to get into a different belief state” (Jeshion, 2002, 66). Let’s consider the Neptune case. The RF refers to this planet by the description of “the planet which causes perturbations in the orbit of Uranus.” He thinks about Neptune through an identifying description that is uniquely satisfied by this planet. His first belief state is de

dicto.⁸ That is to say, he does not firstly think of an object but a description and then tries to find an object to fit this description. Since this description is not used to give a synonym of Neptune, in contrast to fix its reference, the RF uses this arbitrary description as a means to arrive at the reference. By means of this description he focuses on its reference, changes his mental state and directly considers the object. He believes that there is a particular object even if he does not know anything about it. Names introduced by reference fixing descriptions with or without ostension can alter one's mental state. By introducing a name in this manner, we open a file in our mind as Jeshion says (Jeshion, 2002, 67). The reason for opening such a mental file is that there are or will be some dossiers to be classified under a common heading. The opening of such a file in mind is the beginning of de re attitudes toward an object. In this way, we can think directly about objects without experiencing them and form de re beliefs about them.

III.2.4 The Buck Stopper

In an unpublished lecture mentioned before, Kripke introduces the term “buck stopper” as an answer to a particular question that has a function of satisfying curiosity about the object or task of the question. In an example he gives, an American who doesn't know anything about Mexico comes to Mexico, goes shopping and asks the price of something which he wants to buy; he is clearly not satisfied with an answer of “25 Peso.” He wants to hear the price in terms of dollars. “15 US dollars” is a satisfying answer for him and can be considered to be a buck stopper. Now the question is whether a term must be a buck stopper in order to be introduced happily as a name and to be used successfully. I will restrict this discussion to our names “one meter” and “Neptune.”

⁸ A de dicto attitude is simply an attitude toward a proposition whereas a de re attitude is an attitude toward an object.

Let's remember the attack on the knowledge claim with respect to the contingent a priori truths in the first chapter. I ask what the number of the rooms of this building is. You say: let "duba" rigidly refer to the number of the rooms in this building. Then you reply to me by saying "Duba is the number of the rooms of this building." Do you know the exact number of the rooms of this building, in this case? There is obviously a puzzle here. The answer does not satisfy in any sense our curiosity. Our Neptune and the standard meter examples can be constructed in the same way. For instance, I ask: what is the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus? You say: let "Neptune" rigidly refer to the planet which is the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus. Then you continue: Neptune is the planet which is the cause of the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus. You cannot introduce "duba" or "Neptune" in this manner. So we should formulate a naming condition that is responsible for the satisfaction of our curiosity in such cases. And this condition is that the name in question is also a buck stopper.

Okay, then what makes a term buck stopper? In this case, "Neptune" does not seem to be a buck stopper, but is there any other case in that we can consider this term to be a buck stopper? My opinion is that a term is a buck stopper relative to a context. In the case mentioned above, by introducing the name "Neptune" we do not add anything to the already existing level of knowledge and as a result, we do not satisfy our curiosity in any way. However, if the context were different, the result would be different too. Consider that no one knows that there is a planet responsible for the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus. Leverrier asks himself whether there is such a planet or not. After some mathematical calculations, he theoretically comes to know that it exists. In this case, he introduces the name "Neptune" that satisfies him in a sense and functions as a buck stopper. However, this does not mean that he is completely satisfied and his curiosity disappears. In fact, we can mention degrees of the satisfaction of the curiosity. Nevertheless, his introducing "Neptune" in such a way satisfies

his curiosity to a degree. And such a satisfaction, even though it is not to a high degree, is sufficient to consider the name “Neptune” to be a buck stopper.

Let me explain what I mean by the different levels of satisfaction of our curiosity. Leverrier postulated Neptune only by means of some mathematical calculations based on the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus. His knowledge that there is a planet responsible for the perturbations was theoretical before he spotted it on the telescope. He had some satisfaction with this theoretical knowledge about that planet, but it was not a complete satisfaction. In 1846, Neptune was observed by telescope (Moore, 1996, 22). When it was observed, it could be seen as a point in the sky. By this observation, he was satisfied more maybe, but again not completely. Because there were many questions to be answered: what is its mass, what is its distance from the sun, what kind of materials and substances does it have etc. In 1989, Neptune was visited by the spacecraft *Voyager 2* (Moore, 1996, 84) and it brought much more information about this planet, but there are still questions to be answered. A person may be satisfied with an answer to a certain degree, but not completely. His curiosity may continue about a particular object. In the Neptune case, we could not easily state a certain boundary of satisfaction for any RF. Thus, it is more plausible to mention degrees of satisfaction here and any degree of satisfaction (low or high) is sufficient to accept a name as a buck stopper.⁹

The meter case is a bit different. We cannot see such a long degree of satisfaction in this case. When the RF sees the stick, he grasps its length, and is satisfied with this visual experience. There are no more questions to be asked about this length. The difference between this case and the Neptune case is that the ontological statuses of references of the terms in question are different. While “Neptune” refers to a concrete object, “one meter” refers to an abstract entity. The reference of “one meter” is not the stick, but rather its length at t . And this particular length is the same as the stick’s length at t in this world, but the actual

⁹ As an important point, the beliefs associated with a buck stopper are not synonymous with it. They are just used to fix the referent of the term in question.

stick's length may vary under certain conditions. The referent of "one meter" is invariable in all possible worlds, and independent of the stick S in that sense. It is a certain property.

However, Neptune is a concrete object which has many properties. We cannot grasp all its properties in a short time. We discover them in time. So it seems that there is no degree of satisfaction of the curiosity in our meter case.

What is the role of a buck stopper in terms of use conditions? Since we required that a name must be a buck stopper to be able to introduce it, it is a buck stopper whenever we use it. So the name's being a buck stopper can also be regarded as a use condition.

IV. Knowledge Claims

In this chapter, I will examine the a priority of the target propositions. The main task of this chapter is to show that the RF has a priori knowledge of them. The secondary aim is to discuss whether the RF's a priori knowledge in this case fits the tradition of "maker's knowledge." This provides a wider perspective to see the place of Kripke's contingent a priori truths in the history of epistemology.

IV.1 A Priori Knowledge

The terms "a priori" and "a posteriori" are introduced into philosophy by Immanuel Kant. They are epistemological terms. In other words, they refer to the ways characterizing how we know something. Let's begin with Kant's definition of a priority. In a passage in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he defines *a priori cognitions* as follows:

Now such universal cognitions, which at the same time have the character of inner necessity, must be clear and certain for themselves, independently of experience; hence one calls them *a priori* cognitions. (Kant, 2000, B 3-4)

According to this definition, a priori cognitions are independent of experience as well as being clear and distinct. However, clearness and distinctness can be considered to be conditions of any cognition. So the condition of independence of experience is important if we want to distinguish a priori cognitions from a posteriori ones.¹⁰ Experience here can be understood as sense experience. But what does independence mean in this regard? Kant gives a clue in another passage: "Although all our cognition commences with experience yet it does not on that account all arise from experience" (Kant, 2000, B xvii). Let's consider the sentence "Hesperus is Hesperus" to understand what he means by the expression

¹⁰ A posteriori cognitions are simply the cognitions that are known by appealing to experience.

“independently of experience.” This sentence states that Hesperus is identical to itself. To be able to understand this sentence, we must know what “Hesperus” means. For that, we must appeal to experience because only by so doing can we form the concept of Hesperus. If so, can we say that the proposition expressed by the sentence “Hesperus is Hesperus” is not known a priori? Appealing to experience to form the concept of Hesperus is not an obstacle for knowing the proposition in question a priori, according to Kant, because every cognition begins with experience. Therefore, we should illuminate what the role of experience is in a priori cognitions. Let’s consider a passage from *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*:

... all analytic judgments are a priori even when the concepts are empirical, as, for example, “Gold is a yellow metal” ; for to know this I require no experience beyond my concept of gold as a yellow metal. It is, in fact, the very concept, and I need only analyze it without looking beyond it elsewhere. (Kant, 1996, 2.b)

In this passage, Kant considers analytic judgments. Analyticity is not my point in this thesis. And he gives a disputable example of an analytic truth that gold is a yellow metal as well. This is not a topic I want to discuss here either. What is important is that he mentions some a priori judgments whose concepts are empirical. He gives the concept of *gold* as an example and seems to assume that knowing the yellowness of gold a priori does not require any experience other than the experience that is necessary to have the concept in question. Whether the concept of gold is really a yellow metal is another topic of discussion which I don’t discuss in this thesis. Nevertheless, Kant points out different roles of experience in having a concept and knowing a judgment.¹¹ This difference is quite crucial in this thesis.

Kripke gives illuminating remarks about this issue. According to him, a person’s a priori knowledge of something is the same as his believing it true on the basis of a priori evidence

¹¹ Kant’s term “judgment” has a subjective or intersubjective connotation. I used this word when I paraphrasing his ideas, but I do not assume that the target sentences expresses judgments in Kantian sense. I am using the term “proposition” instead of the term “judgment.”

(Kripke, 1980, 35). In other words, the precondition of a priori knowledge is having a priori evidence. So if the justification or warrant is a priori then the knowledge can be regarded as a priori. Nathan Salmon makes a distinction between grasping a proposition and justifying it which is in accordance with Kripke's intuition on a priority. In Salmon's view, we need experience to grasp the proposition such as one the sentence "Hesperus is Hesperus" expresses, but we do not need experience in justifying it (Salmon, 1988, 202). That is to say, we need some experience to grasp this proposition but we do not know that this sentence is true because of having some experience. So grasping the proposition in a correct way¹² is sufficient for being justified in knowing it. The justification for the truth of this sentence is that it is in the form of " $x=x$," " x " refers to Hesperus in this sentence, but it can refer to Phosphorus in another sentence. In any case, the truth value of all the sentences of this form is the same. We know the truth of them by means of this form that is independent of experience. So in defining a priori knowledge, we should look at the justification.¹³ If we can justify the proposition independently of experience, then we can say that we know it a priori. On the other hand, in grasping a proposition we may rely on experience and this does not affect the a priority of the proposition. While we can grasp " $x=x$ " without experience, we need experience to grasp "Hesperus is Hesperus." However, we don't need experience in justifying the truths of both sentences. Thus both of them are knowable a priori even they are grasped differently. In this thesis, I will use a priority in the sense that Kripke and Salmon mention.

Kant, in his definition, identifies a priori cognitions with universal ones which have a character of inner necessity. In other words, he regards both necessity and universality as criteria of a priority. What is important in this claim is that a priori cognitions cannot fail to be

¹² I do not assume that this is the only correct way of grasping a target proposition. Let's assume that the referent of "Hesperus" is fixed by a definite description in this case. And the description in hand is not synonymous with it. If "Hesperus" was introduced differently but successfully, then we would grasp it in a different way but again correctly.

¹³ Similarly, if we want to characterize the knowledge in question as an externalist one, we can use the term "warrant" instead of "justification" that recalls the internalist view. In this thesis, I will not discuss which type of knowledge is more appropriate for our case.

universal or necessary. This is what Kripke strictly rejects by presenting contingent a priori truths. Now I want to discuss Kripke's argument for the a priority of contingent truths.

Let's consider what Kripke says about the a priori knowledge concerning the standard meter case:

What then, is the *epistemological* status of the statement 'Stick S is one meter long at t', for someone who has fixed the metric system by reference to the stick S? It would seem that he knows it *a priori*. For if he used stick S to fix the reference of the term 'one meter', then as a result of this kind of 'definition' (which is not an abbreviate or synonymous definition), he knows automatically, without further investigation, that S is one meter long (Kripke, 1980, 56).

Kripke's first important point in this passage is that the knowledge of 'Stick S is one meter long at t' is a priori for the RF, not for anybody else. A priority is *relativized* to the RF who fixes the reference of the rigid designator "one meter." Secondly, he implicates that the a priori knowledge in this case depends on the act of reference fixing. This point emerges more clearly when we look at some other passages that are about the sentences expressing contingent a priori truth. For instance, look at this characterization: "... statements whose a priori truth is known via the fixing of a reference" (Kripke, 1980, 122).

Let's begin with the second point. By his act of reference fixing the RF introduces a new name into language. He himself stipulates that a certain name refers to a specific object. Since this stipulation is his own decision, he does not need to learn it from somewhere else. In this sense, this act of stipulation seems to give rise to a priori knowledge of target propositions. However, we should not forget that the happiness of this act of reference fixing depends on some conditions. The RF must know that these conditions are satisfied in order to be able to know that the naming performative is happy. So his knowledge of the naming performative does not include just a stipulative element but also the knowledge of success conditions. So

the reason for RF's knowing target propositions a priori is not just his stipulative act of reference fixing.

My answer to the question of how the RF knows the target proposition a priori is that this a priori knowledge stems from his correct grasp of the target proposition and this grasp depends upon the following two things: first, the semantic content of the name in question and second, the meaningful usage of the name. His knowledge of the first premise shows that he correctly grasped the semantic content of the name and his knowledge of the second premise indicates that he correctly grasped the meaningful usage of the name. So his knowledge of these two premises provides him with a correct grasp of the necessary elements in order to be able to understand the target sentence. And there is no other premise that is known a posteriori by the RF in justifying the conclusion. As a result, by means of the knowledge of these premises, he correctly understands the target sentence and by this understanding he knows it a priori. His justification for knowing the target proposition a priori is just his correct grasp of this proposition. Although he needs some experience to grasp the target propositions correctly, he does not rely on any experience in justifying it.¹⁴ Thus I express the connection between the premises and the conclusion by saying that the RF's knowledge of the premises pragmatically entails the a priori knowledge of the target proposition for him, even though the premises do not semantically entail the conclusion.

As far as the first point is concerned, I want to discuss whether the a priori knowledge of target propositions is limited only to the RFs. Is it possible that people other than the RFs can have a priori knowledge of them? In my opinion, yes, it is possible. Since the a priori knowledge of target propositions depends upon a correct grasp of the semantic content of the

¹⁴ The RF needs experience to grasp the semantic content of a name and its meaningful usage because he must know the success conditions of naming an object and using the name in question. Some success conditions are external to him and are knowable only a posteriori. I will discuss this issue with respect to the contemporary literature in the last chapter.

name in question and its meaningful usage, anybody who has this kind of grasp, knows the target propositions a priori.¹⁵

Even if some other people can have a priori knowledge of target propositions, doesn't an RF have a privileged status? It may have, but this privileged status does not affect the a priori priority in this case. Everybody who has the required grasp has the a priori knowledge of contingent truths in question. Okay, then what kind of a privileged status can the RF have? The RF is responsible for introducing a term into language. He initiates the process that will result in knowing contingent a priori truths. His function is simply a pragmatic one. In addition, we can also meaningfully mention a group of RFs. A term may be introduced by a convention among the members of a group. Think of a scientific community that will introduce a name for a specific scientifically important object. One of them offers for example "X," another suggests "Y," somebody else says "Z." In this case, they should agree upon one of the suggestions. Most likely, the name that is offered by the person who convinces the rest with stronger reasons will be agreed upon. So the name in question will be introduced by the decision of the whole group, not by that of just one person.¹⁶

The arguments beginning from the second chapter till now aim to answer the question of how contingent a priori truths are possible. This possibility depends on some general and specific conditions. The general conditions are Kripke's account of naming and the plausibility of performatives and pragmatic inferences which I assume in this thesis. The peculiar conditions are the RF's knowledge of naming performatives and use premises. What I tried to show so far is why these specific conditions are necessary. In addition, I will consider the main possible criticisms to the a priori of target propositions in the next chapter.

¹⁵ I thank Ilhan Inan because he drew my attention to this point. George Bealer also has a similar view. He holds that whoever determinately understands the term introduced by a baptizer (RF) is in a position to know our target propositions a priori (Bealer, 2002, 108).

¹⁶ I consider here just the possibilities, what I am focusing on this thesis is an RF's knowledge of contingent a priori truths.

IV.2 Maker's Knowledge

The RF's knowledge of contingent a priori truths reminds us of an important tradition in epistemology, namely the "maker's knowledge tradition." In this part of this chapter, I will discuss whether the RF's knowledge of contingent a priori truths fits this tradition and draw some important results from this discussion about whether target propositions are informative or not.

The maker's knowledge tradition simply maintains that an agent knows what he makes or creates. Whether this is the only way to know something or not is a controversy among the members of this tradition. In this thesis, I will consider a weak definition of the term "maker's knowledge" and assume that one way to know something is to make it. A first question to consider is whether this prospect is one of knowledge at all. When you look at a garden, you have knowledge of the tree which you see. In this case the representation of the tree has come to fit the world. Your belief is true and justified. That is the pattern for perceptual knowledge. When, at the Ford Company boardroom, you draw the blueprint of next year's model, you perhaps have knowledge of next year's car. But in this case, the direction of fit runs the other way; the world will come to fit the blueprint. Your belief is true, and justified. But is it knowledge? As a common sensical intuition, the answer is yes. This looks like a pattern for maker's knowledge, the special knowledge you have of something in virtue of making it.

The origin of this tradition goes back to ancient philosophy. Even in the *Meno* we face examples of maker's knowledge. In the *Meno*, Socrates demonstrates that a slave boy of Meno's household can learn certain facts of geometry. What he shows in this regard is that the diagonal of a square produces twice the area of the original square. In other words, he constructs three more equal squares to the original one and constructs a new square from the diagonals of them and in that way reaches the square whose space is twice the original one.

This method of demonstration shows that Socrates' knowledge of this geometrical fact depends on his making something, namely constructing lines. Construction in geometry is widely used among ancient mathematicians. For instance, one of the proofs of the Pythagorean Theorem is performed by constructing three squares whose lines are also the lines of the triangle in question. Another sample of proof is of the theorem that the sum of the internal angles of a triangle is equal to the angle of a straight line. This proof is done by constructing a line parallel to one of the lines of the triangle. All these examples show that construction is widely used in ancient Greek to attain knowledge of some geometrical facts.

In medieval philosophy, many philosophers tried to explain the nature of the knowledge of God by appealing to the tradition of maker's knowledge. Since the notion of God is in the center of philosophy at those times, this tradition became very important. Maimonides described such knowledge in these terms:

There is a great difference between the knowledge which the producer of a thing possesses concerning it and the knowledge which other persons possess concerning the same thing. Suppose a thing is produced in accordance with the knowledge of the producer. The producer was then guided by his knowledge in the act of producing the thing. Other people, however, who examine this work and acquire knowledge of the whole of it, depend for that knowledge on the work itself. For instance an artisan makes a box in which weights move with the running of water and thus indicate how many hours have passed... His knowledge is not the result of observing the movements as they are actually going on; but on the contrary, the movements are produced in accordance with his knowledge. The producer of the water-clock has maker's knowledge of the water-clock, in the same way that God has knowledge of us (Maimonides, 1995, III, 21).

The distinction between God's makings and human beings' creative activity became more important after the Renaissance. Many philosophers have worked on the limits of the knowledge of making. For instance, Giambattista Vico claimed that God knows the natural

world because He has made it and since we are not agents responsible for its creation; he questioned the epistemological reliability of natural science whose aim is to attain the knowledge of reality (Vico, 2002, 330-345).

He maintained, on the other hand, that history, the science of culture and society, is the only legitimate form of knowledge we have, since it is knowledge of a human creation. For this reason, he gave philology, as a science of signs and of interpretation, a capital role in the constitution of human knowledge. For Hobbes, as well as for Locke, knowledge results from names and definitions we ascribe to things and from connections and deductions we make starting from these definitions. To them, only in these cases do we have demonstrable science. Therefore, geometry and politics (as well as morals for Locke) are sciences because the concepts they are made of are a human creation, and so there can be knowledge of what they are about. However, in relation to the physical world, our knowledge is limited, and can only be hypothetical or probable.

Kant is another important figure in the tradition of maker's knowledge in the modern period. He tries to justify a priori knowledge by appealing to the idea of active mind. In Kant's view, the most fundamental laws of nature, like the truths of mathematics, are knowable a priori because they make no effort to describe the world as it really is but rather prescribe the structure of the world as we experience it. In his words, "we can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them" (Kant, 2000, B xviii). By applying the pure forms of sensible intuition and the pure concepts of the understanding, we achieve a systematic view of the phenomenal realm but learn nothing of the noumenal realm.

After this presentation of the maker's knowledge tradition, I want to discuss whether Kripke's intuitions concerning the knowledge of contingent a priori truths fit this tradition. At first glance, it seems that Kripke belongs to this tradition. The RF makes the length of the standard stick in Paris one meter and determines that Neptune is the planet which causes

perturbations in the orbit of Uranus. Since the making or determination belongs to him, he knows what he makes or determines. However, we should raise the question whether the making or determination in Kripke's examples is synonymous with the ones in the mentioned examples of the maker's knowledge tradition.

When we consider the examples given above, we see that the agents make some extra linguistic things. What they create becomes a part of reality. In the blueprint example, the agent makes a car, in Maimonides' example a water clock. God creates nature and human beings create social, cultural, political etc. institutions which are not linguistic facts. Let's think of the institution of marriage. Human beings determine how a marriage ceremony will be held, and according to this determined procedure it is performed and realized. What humans know is the realized marriage ceremony whose procedure was determined by them. Geometrical facts are also extra linguistic. Although they do not belong to physical reality, they cannot be considered to be purely semantic facts.

On the other hand, in Kripke's examples, the RF only names the planet in question "Neptune" and names the length of the standard stick "one meter". He neither creates the planet nor makes the length of the standard stick so much. What he does is naming already existing reality. So what he brings about are only semantic facts. In many places of *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke argues that the name of an object might be different in a counterfactual situation. For instance, Nixon might be called other than "Nixon", but he cannot be a person other than Nixon, namely himself (Kripke, 1980, 49). Therefore, the certain length which is the length of the standard stick in Paris at t in this world can be called other than "one meter," but it is the same length in all possible worlds. The RF does not create this length in the naming ceremony; in contrast he recognizes it or marks it out by means of the contingent length of the standard stick in Paris at t. What are brought about in Kripke's case are semantic facts, not extra linguistic facts.

Can we consider knowledge of contingent a priori truths to be instances of maker's knowledge under these circumstances? If we have such an intuition that naming is not making, we cannot consider a priori knowledge of contingent truths to be instances of maker's knowledge. Actually, with this intuition, I assume that we do not make linguistic facts. Therefore, in my view, the a priori knowledge of contingent truths here is not genuine instances of maker's knowledge tradition.

One important conclusion of this discussion is that the RF does not bring new information about some contingent facts of the world by introducing a name. Although he has knowledge of the target propositions, they are uninformative for him. Kripke actually accepts this point. Look at the following passage:

If someone fixes a meter as “the length of stick S at t”, then in some sense he knows *a priori* that the length of stick S at t is one meter, even though he uses this statement to express a contingent truth. But, merely by fixing a system of measurement, has he thereby *learned* some (contingent) information about the world, some new *fact* that he did not know before? It seems plausible that in some sense he did not, even though it is undeniably a contingent fact that S is one meter long (Kripke, 1980, 63, n. 26).

The unformativeness of the target sentence does not pose a difficulty for its being knowable a priori. If we agree that “Hesperus is Hesperus” is knowable a priori, there is no obstacle to accepting target sentences as being knowable a priori. However, if the target sentences are uninformative, it seems that they have no peculiarity, no difference from some trivial truths such as the Hesperus example above. Is it the case that this kind of sentences has no important role? I do not think so. I think that these target sentences play a very crucial role.

Target sentences serve like foundation stones which prepare a basis for the construction of a web of relations. Target sentences are the most fundamental sentences in which genuine names occur. In other words, after the satisfaction of its naming and use conditions, a name is

firstly used in a target sentence.¹⁷ So a genuine name begins to be used properly with these sentences in a language. Names are semantic heuristic devices which are used to connect many things to each other and construct holistic webs, conceptual schemes. A name has an organizational role in thought. The standard meter example illuminates this point more clearly. If one accepts the target sentence related to the standard meter and uses the metric system, one begins to evaluate every length in terms of metric system. Think of the following case. I ask you what your height is. And you reply to me by saying “look at me, don’t you see it?” Even though I see your height, I am not satisfied with that answer; I want to know your height in terms of the metric system. And this stems from my desire to relate all lengths to each other and construct a holistic web about lengths. And the term “one meter” serves as a basis for that aim. Since it is established as a standard, it clearly shows the important role of names in organizing many different things under a framework. The assertion of a target sentence by its RF serves to inform other people about the genuine names by means of which people can construct a common culture and make life easier.

¹⁷ There are also target sentences that express necessary truths. For instance, if the referent of “2” is fixed by a rigid definite description such as “the first prime number”, then “2 is the first prime number” expresses a necessary truth.

V. Criticisms

In this chapter, I will consider three main criticisms that are directed at Kripke's argument for contingent a priori truths in the literature. In the first part of this chapter, I will present and reconstruct them as potential replies to my argument for the a priori knowledge of target propositions. In the second part, I will attempt to reply to them.

V.1 Presentation of the Criticisms

V.1.1 William Carter's Argument

According to William Carter one of the preconditions of knowing target propositions is the existence condition. He states this by the following remark: "Before we can know that it is true that S has the property of being one meter long, or has any other property, we must know that there is such an object as S." Then he adds that our knowledge of its existence is clearly not a priori (Carter, 1976, 105). Thus, Grey Ray calls this "the existential complaint argument" (Grey, 1994, 121).

Carter's argument can be interpreted in the following way. The existence of any object about which we talk in target-sentences is a felicity condition of the happy utterance of the appropriate naming-performative. And the RF's knowledge that such an object exists is not a priori. If this is so, the target propositions cannot be known a priori by the RF because their knowledge depends on his knowledge of the satisfaction of the happiness conditions of naming performatives which include the existence condition that is known only a posteriori. Carter's argument seems to focus on happiness conditions of naming performatives that are known a posteriori, or state their necessity to know target propositions. So his criticism can be regarded as an attack on the a priority of target propositions.

V.1.2 Keith Donnellan's Argument

In "The Contingent A priori and Rigid Designators," Keith Donnellan considers the Neptune case that includes a naming procedure involving only using a description without ostension of the referent in question. For this case, Donnellan argues that we can successfully introduce the name "Neptune" whose referent could not be observed in the initial baptism. However, we cannot use that name to form *de re* beliefs about its referent until we observe its referent because in order to form *de re* attitude toward this planet, we must have it in our mind according to Donnellan. And he seems to assume that Leverrier did not have it in his mind until he spotted it in the telescope. In this regard, he makes a distinction between "knowing that a sentence expresses a truth and knowing the truth the sentence expressed" (Donnellan, 1997, 51). He gives the following example to grasp this distinction: If I do not speak German and one of my reliable friends who speaks says to me that a certain sentence in German expresses a truth, I know that this sentence expresses a truth but do not know what the truth is. To know the truth the sentence in question expresses I must understand the sentence. He applies this distinction to S2 type sentences and claims the following (on my interpretation): That S2 expresses a truth can be known a priori, but the truth S2 expresses cannot be known because knowing the truth S2 expresses depends on forming *de re* attitude toward the referent of the name used in S2. Since we did not have it in our mind and so could not form a *de re* belief about it, we cannot know the truth S2 expresses (Donnellan, 1997, 54-57).

In terms of my argument for contingent a priori truths, Donnellan's argument poses a difficulty for knowing the target propositions that stems from the knowledge of the conditions of successfully using a name. In the Neptune case, Donnellan seems to accept observation of the object as a use condition for its name and give it a justificatory role in knowing the relevant target proposition. So the relevant target propositions seem to be known only a

posteriori. We can generalize his argument in the following way. If one of the use conditions is known a posteriori, how can we claim that the RF knows the target proposition a priori? The RF's knowledge of any target proposition depends on his knowledge of a use premise as well as his knowledge of a naming performative.

V.1.3 Nathan Salmon's Argument

When Salmon mentions contingent a priori truths, he considers only S1 type sentences which depend on a naming procedure that involves ostension and using a description. He makes a distinction between "the semantic content of a sentence and the meta-theoretic proposition that S is true" (Salmon, 1993, 121), and applies it to S1 type sentences. After that, on my interpretation, he claims that the meta-theoretic proposition that S1 is true is knowable a priori because it is a general proposition that the phrase 'one meter' refers to whatever length the stick S has at t, if S exists. On the other hand, he asserts that the semantic content of S1 is knowable only a posteriori because the semantic content of S1 is a singular proposition including the referent of "the length of S at t" that is known only by means of experience. Thus the singular proposition S1 expresses can only be known a posteriori by the RF (Salmon, 1988, 203).

Salmon's argument can be reconstructed in the following way. To know target propositions, the RF needs one more premise other than the two premises mentioned and this premise states the RF's visual experience of the referent of the name in question. Since this premise is known by appealing to experience and has a justificatory role in knowing the target proposition, the target proposition is known a posteriori by the RF.

V.2 Replies to the Criticisms

There are three types of possible criticisms to my argument for contingent a priori truths. The first type is related to the conditions of successfully naming an object, and the second one is about the conditions of successfully using the term introduced for the object in question. The common point in these two criticisms is that the external conditions that are known by appealing to experience pose a difficulty for the a priority of target propositions. The third type does not care about the role of naming and use conditions in knowing a target proposition but considers the premises' role in such knowledge. The argument simply is that one premise that is known a posteriori is missing in my argument. Now, I will try to give counter arguments to the arguments that aim to refute the possibility of contingent a priori truths and show that the a posteriori knowledge of these external conditions does not threaten this possibility.

V.2.1 The Counter-Argument concerning the Naming Conditions

As I argued in the third chapter, there are some external conditions for successful naming that are known only by appealing to experience. (For instance, the existence of the referent of a name or the suggested name's acceptance by a scientific community). Then we must answer the following question: if the knowledge of external conditions is necessary to perform the act of naming happily and the knowledge of the target proposition depends on the knowledge of the naming performative, isn't it that the knowledge of the target proposition is a posteriori because of the fact that the knowledge of external conditions is a posteriori?

At first glance, it seems that the knowledge of external conditions has a justificatory role in knowing the target propositions, but it is not so actually. The knowledge of success conditions of a naming performative is necessary in order to grasp the semantic content of the name introduced by this performative correctly. Even though the knowledge of external

conditions is a posteriori, it is knowledge for the required grasp. Grasping the semantic content of the name is necessary for grasping the target proposition. So a posteriori knowledge of external conditions has no role in justifying the target sentence. In contrast, it partially helps grasping the target proposition. The semantic content of the name in a target sentence is grasped by experience, but the target proposition is not justified by this experience.

V.2.2 The Counter-Argument concerning the Use Conditions

There are also some external conditions for using a name successfully. That the community adopts a name and widely uses it can be given as an example. Clearly, such conditions require appealing to experience. In other words, some of the conditions of successfully using a term are known a posteriori. And if one of the preconditions upon which the knowledge of target propositions depends is the knowledge of use premises, how can we know the target propositions a priori?

If an RF knows the use premise, this shows that he correctly grasped the meaningful usage of the name introduced by the relevant naming performative. Again, here the a posteriori knowledge in question provides the RF with a correct grasp of the meaningful usage of a name and partially helps him to grasp the target proposition correctly. Since the a posteriori knowledge in hand is for grasping the target proposition but not for justifying it, there is no threat to its a priority.

V. 2. 3. The Counter-Argument concerning the Extra Premise-Hypothesis

As far as Salmon's requirement of visual experience as a justification for knowing the cognitive semantic content of the target proposition is concerned, I think that this analysis is counter-intuitive. Let's begin with his distinction between the semantic content of a sentence

and the meta-theoretic proposition that S is true. Consider the sentence “Hesperus is Hesperus.” As far as I understand, the meta theoretic proposition that “Hesperus is Hesperus” is true is known a priori because it is in the form of “ $x=x$.” Every sentence in this form is true. I know that meta theoretic proposition a priori, even though I don’t know its cognitive semantic content. However, in order to know what this sentence really means or to understand its cognitive semantic content in his terms, I need to know what the semantic content of “Hesperus” is. And for that I must appeal to experience. One of the main points of my thesis is that if experience is needed for such cases, it is not for the justification of the target proposition but for grasping it. And in this case, by experience we grasp the semantic content of the name “Hesperus” and by this grasp, we come to understand the sentence “Hesperus is Hesperus” that is of the form “ $x=x$.” Our grasp of the content of a sentence of this form does not pose a difficulty for its a priori knowability. So Salmon’s treatment of the semantic contents of these type propositions separately is not what we normally do. We know such propositions a priori by understanding its cognitive semantic content at the same time. In addition, the visual experience is in fact not necessary to know target propositions. The Neptune case is an example for this and I argued for this thesis in the chapters before.

Does an RF need an extra premise that is known a posteriori in order to know the target proposition? If the answer is *yes*, then he seems to know the target proposition a posteriori too because he uses that premise to justify it.

However, my answer to this question is *no*. I argued that the knowledge of the mentioned two premises pragmatically entails the a priori knowledge of the target proposition. The reason is that the two premises in question provide the RF with the grasp of the necessary and sufficient elements to grasp the target proposition. And grasping the target proposition is sufficient to know it without any other justification. This case is similar to knowing the proposition expressed by the sentence “Hesperus is Hesperus.” Grasping the term “Hesperus”

in a certain way correctly is sufficient to know that proposition. Similarly but not exactly in the same way, if we grasp the name “one meter” in a certain way as it is happily introduced by an RF with the reference fixing description “the length of the standard stick S in Paris at t” and its meaningful usage, we come to know the proposition that one meter is the length of S in Paris at t on the basis of this grasp. We do not need to know any other premise that is a priori or a posteriori.

Conclusion

Despite the huge literature on contingent a priori truths, this topic has not been examined in depth sufficiently. In this thesis, I aimed to construct another perspective on the issue by appealing to performatives and pragmatic inferences. By doing this, I hope to contribute to the improvement and justification of Kripke's argument for the possibility of contingent a priori truths. I tried to show that this possibility depends on some general and particular conditions. Assuming the general conditions of Kripke's account of naming, the plausibility of performatives and pragmatic inferences, I attempted to justify the thesis that contingent a priori truths are possible under these assumptions. In doing this, I tried to justify the claim that the a priori knowledge of some contingent truths for an RF depends on the knowledge of two particular premises, namely the naming performative and the relevant use premise. Since the knowledge of these premises provides the RF with a correct grasp of the name in question and its meaningful usage, the RF knows the relevant target proposition just by this grasp, and so he knows it a priori.

In this project, I considered three important criticisms of Kripke, which can also be considered to be replies to my ideas. The first two objections are derived from external conditions of naming objects and using their names, the a posteriori knowledge of which is regarded as a difficulty for the a priori knowledge of target propositions. I replied to them by showing that external conditions do not have a justificatory role in knowing the target propositions a priori. The last objection aims to add a new premise that is known a posteriori and has a role in justifying the target propositions. I replied to it by showing that grasping of the name and its meaningful usage is sufficient to come to know the target proposition.

Apart from the contingent a priori debate, the analysis of target sentences led me to the issue of foundations of languages. I recognized that this type of sentences has a foundational role in organizing thought and constructing a web of relations of many kinds.

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