

RADICALISATION OF POLITICS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: THE CASE OF FATSA
DURING THE LATE 1970s

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ABSTRACT

RADICALISATION OF POLITICS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: THE CASE OF FATSA DURING THE LATE 1970s

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Urban space is an arena of conflicting interests. Seldomly dominated has the opportunity to express its identity on and through urban space as the exploited and oppressed groups lose their voice within the insititutionalised channels of representation. On the other hand, the localised voices do not have the chance to change the urban meaning and the power structure. In the 1970s, urban social movements were seen as an alternative form of interest representation which could challenge the dominant power relations and create a new urban meaning. Yet, such movements were largely failed to mount such a challenge to the dominant urban system partly due to their localised forms.

In Turkey, 1970s witnessed to a radicalisation of political life including the urban areas. The mobilisations such as the New Municipalism and Squatter Movements supported by radical youth movements were the examples of emerging radicalism of that period.

In the late 1970s, a relatively small Black Sea town, namely, Fatsa underwent a radical transformation when one of the radical left wing movement took control of the municipality in the byelections. After a long period of domination of mainstream parties upon the municipality, a self declared revolutionary movement won the local elections with their independent candidate and came to power in Fatsa Municipality. If this was possible it was largely due to active involvement of the prestigious local actors in this process. In other words, a sucessful articulation of a national revolutionary group with influencial local actors created a unique situation by

bringing them to power in this particular municipality. This change was followed by the rise of new and novel forms of municipal policies and of participatory mechanisms. In the identification of problems and their solutions the participation of local population is seen as the key element by the new administration.

This thesis examines the rise and decline of Fatsa experience as one of the example of radicalisation of urban politics by linking the experience to the contextual features of local politics. It is claimed that to explain the Fatsa experience it is not enough to look at either to the (national) contextual features or the local specificities such as the status of those local actors etc. A satisfactory approach has to take both local specificities and national contextual features into account within a syntetic framework.

Keywords: Urban Social Movements, Local State, Leftwing Municipalities

ÖZ

YEREL DÜZEYDE SİYASETİN RADİKALLEŞMESİ: 1970'LERİN SONUNA DOĞRU FATSA ÖRNEĞİ

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Kent mekanı çatışan çıkarların alanıdır. Temsiliyetin kurumsallaşmış kanallarında, sömürülen ve baskı altındaki grupların seslerinin kaybolması nedeniyle, bu kesimler kentsel mekanda nadiren kimliklerini ifade şansını yakalarlar. Öte yandan, yerelle sınırlanmış grupların da kentin anlamını ve iktidar yapısını değiştirme şansı yoktur. 1970lerde kentsel toplumsal hareketler, baskın güç ilişkileriyle mücadele edebilecek ve yeni bir kent anlamı yaratabilecek alternatif bir çıkar temsiliyeti biçimi olarak görüldüler. Fakat bu tür hareketler, bir ölçüde de yerel formları dolayısıyla, baskın kentsel sisteme meydan okumalarında başarılı olamadılar.

1970ler Türkiye’de kentsel alanlar da dahil olmak üzere siyasal yaşamın radikalleşmesine tanık oldu. Yeni Belediyecilik ve radikal gençlik hareketleri tarafından desteklenen Gecekondu Hareketleri gibi hareketlenmeler o dönemde ortaya çıkan radikalleşmenin örnekleriydi.

1970lerin sonunda, küçük bir Karadeniz kenti olan Fatsa, ara seçimlerde radikal sol kanattan bir hareketin belediyeyi kontrol altına almasıyla birlikte, radikal bir dönüşümün içine girdi. Merkez siyasi partilerin belediye'deki uzun süreli hakimiyetlerinden sonra kendini devrimci olarak adlandıran bir hareketin çıkardığı bağımsız adayıyla seçimleri kazandı ve Fatsa Belediyesinde iktidara geldi. Böyle bir durumun gerçekleşmesi mümkün olduysa bunda sürecin içerisine dahil olan ileri gelen yerel aktörlerin önemli bir yeri vardır. Diğer bir deyişle, etkili yerel aktörlerle başarılı bir şekilde eklenmiş olan ulusal düzeydeki bir devrimci hareket, belirli bir belediyede yerel aktörleri iktidara getirerek özel bir durum yaratmıştır. Bu değişimi yeni belediye politikaları

ve katılımcı mekanizmaların ortaya çıkışı izlemiştir. Sorunların belirlenmesinde ve çözümlenmesinde yerel halkın katılımı yeni yönetim tarafından ana unsur olarak görülmüştür.

Bu tez, kentsel politikaların radikalleşmesinin bir örneği olarak Fatsa deneyiminin yükseliş ve düşüşünü yerel politikaların kavramsal özelliklerine bağlayarak incelemektedir. Fatsa deneyimi anlatılırken sadece ulusal kavramsal özelliklere ya da yerel aktörlerin statüleri gibi yerel özgün koşullara bakmanın yeterli olmayacağı iddia edilmektedir. Tatminkar bir yaklaşım, hem yerel özgün koşulları hem de ulusal düzeydeki kavramsal özellikleri sentezleyen bir çerçeve içinde ele almalıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kentsel Toplumsal Hareketler, Yerel Devlet, Sol Kanat Belediyeler

To My Family...

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CDP: Christian Democrat Part in Italy

DEV-GENÇ: Devrimci Gençler Birliği (The Union of Young Revolutionists)

GAPLAN: Planning Cabinet in Porto Allegre

FKF: Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu (The Federation of Idea Clubs)

JP : Justice Party (Adalet Partisi (AP))

ICP: Italian Communist Party

ILP: Italian Liberal Party

IRP: Italian Republican Party

ISP: Italian Socialist Party

NMP: Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP))

NSP: National Safety Party (Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP))

RPP: Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (RPP))

THKP-C: Türkiye Halkın Kurtuluşu Partisi Cephesi (The Front of Turkey Liberation of People Party)

TÖB-DER: Türkiye Öğretmenler Birliği Derneği (The Association of Turkish Union of Teachers)

TÖS: Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası (Teachers Syndicate of Turkey)

TWP: Turkish Worker's Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP))

WP: Worker Party (Partido dos Trabahalderes (PT))

CHAPTER 1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Aim

In the late 1970s, a relatively small Black Sea town, namely, Fatsa underwent a radical transformation when one of the radical left wing movement took control of the municipality in the byelections. After a long period of domination of mainstream parties upon the municipality, a self declared revolutionary movement won the local elections and came to power in Fatsa Municipality. If this was possible it was largely due to active involvement of the prestigious local actors in this process. In other words, a successful articulation of a national revolutionary group with influential local actors created a unique situation by bring them to power in this particular municipality.

This change was followed by the rise of new and novel forms of municipal policies and of participatory mechanisms. In the identification of problems and their solutions the participation of local population is seen as the key element by the new administration.

As soon as such change took place, this remote Blacksea town became famous and came under close scrutiny of national government. Every movement of the mayor and his close team were closely observed by the media and government as well as the security forces.

Just before the military intervention of 1980, the mayor was arrested and activities of the movement in power was declared as illegal. Thus it is important to analyze the question of what happened during this short period so that the movement in power was seen as a threat by the political centre. The answer of such question could not be given by referring on to the local politics as the movement itself was aiming at a radical transformation of the Turkish society and the state. Nevertheless, it is also important to understand the urban dimension of such mobilization and this thesis exactly aims at such a dimension without ignoring the larger scale political processes.

What happens when a radical movement takes the control of a small town municipality in a remote part of Turkey. What kind of a crisis does such a development give rise in the political

system? Perhaps more importantly, why and how does such a radical departure from the institutional form of politics come into being? This thesis aims to answer these questions by applying an actor oriented approach without losing sight of the contextual features of local politics.

There are two arguments with reference to the case study. The first one is concerning the development of social movements. The key question is that if the urban social movements have potential to change the urban meaning and affect the urban politics. Can the urban social movements be an equipment of constituting hegemony? If so, do the urban movements have potential to affect the urban social structure? Then, what are the basic characteristics of the urban social movements and in what conditions do the urban social movements find bases to develop?

The second argument concerns the relationship between the local state and political centre. What is the position of local state position within the state structure? Besides, what are the distinguishing features of the local state vis a vis the other levels of the state apparatus. If there is a specificity of the local state then it is possible to consider the local state as an arena of power struggles. This is especially important for the challenging groups who question the state power. Given the relevance of this debate within our subject, we will discuss the question of specificity of local state in the theoretical part of the thesis.

1.2. Scope

It would not be realistic to argue that local politics has its own dynamics and logic independent of the supralocal processes. It is clear that under capitalism cities lost their independent status to the national states. Therefore in order to understand what happens in a particular locality it is necessary to look at the wider processes and forces. On the other hand it is also a fatal mistake to read off the local processes from national dynamics. Localities and local processes have their own specificities and specific dynamics which could not be read off from larger scales. Therefore, it is necessary to combine bottom up and top down analysis in the study of local social and political processes.

The most important feature of the modern cities is that urban space is an arena of power struggles and a distinctive sphere of struggle among various conflicting interests. These conflicts are shaped around two different logics. The first one is the perception of the urban space as a living place and from this point of view emphasis is placed on the use value of the urban space. The other one is the perception of the urban space as an instrument for capital accumulation and

rent-seeking activities. While the first one sees the urban space concrete entity, for the second approach the urban space is abstract item subject to market transactions. These two logics constitute the basis of the urban politics and the urban struggles.

Along with institutionalized forms of struggles, (urban) social movements represent an important source of urban change (Aslan, 2004; 23). The effects of these social movements can be seen directly in the changes of urban meaning. Likewise, in the analysis of the urban politics and the urban meaning the relation between the politics and economics and social classes and state are the defining factors.

In order to construct a hegemonic project, it is necessary to come together around the state apparatus. This is also true for the local hegemonic projects. From this point of view, local state could be seen as an arena of struggles for hegemony. Yet along with such institutionalized strategies, other non-institutionalized forms of struggles such as urban social movements are of importance in the sense that they could bring a new logic to the urban sphere.

The term urban social movement is first introduced by Castells in the beginnings of 1970s as an agency of radical urban change. Taking the attention from production to reproduction sphere, Castells argued that urban conflict could not be reduced to workplace conflicts as claimed by many traditional Marxists. For him, urban areas as the strategic sites of reproduction of labor power were also the key scales of collective consumption. In this respect, the struggles given around collective consumption give rise new forms of struggles and forms of organizations such as urban social movements.

Although his theory of urban social movement has become highly influential in urban studies, his theory was not without criticisms. First of all, Castells conceptualized the urban social movements as the unique forces to change the urban social structure and social meaning by ignoring other sources of change. Secondly, the urban social movements are historical products both in terms of the context they emerge and in terms of their own evolution. Yet it is widely claimed that Castells failed to appreciate these critical points.

Although our case study is about a radical mobilization around local government in Turkey, it should be mentioned that such mobilizations are not unique to Turkey. In different periods and geographies, similar forms of radical mobilizations took place within different contexts. Two different experiences are taken into account in the scope of this study as the radical left-wing municipalities; Porto Alegre and Bologna. Both examples contain the direct participation of the

social base in the development of the urban policies. In addition, in the both examples the main emphasis was placed on the use value.

In Turkey, the Fatsa experience does not represent the only form of radical mobilization during the 1970s. There were various neighborhood based mobilizations supported by left wing organizations. One of the well known examples of such mobilizations is 1 Mayıs District which emerged as a squatter settlement with the active support of left wing political groups. Likewise the radicalization of the 1970s was not limited to the left wing movements. There were also such radical mobilizations within the left wing parties and so-called New Municipalism Movement was an example of such change within the institutionalized political system.

Fatsa experience is an interesting one in terms of its categorization. It is not easy to include Fatsa experience to the category of an institutionalized political mobilization. Yet it is also problem to see it as an urban social movement as the claim of the movement was to take power at the municipal level which is highly unusual for an urban movement. Likewise, the movement was hardly a local one. Nevertheless, we will employ the urban social movement literature to understand the dynamics behind such mobilizations.

1.3. Methodology

One of the main methodological problems in the urban studies literature is inadequate data documentation in radicalization of the 1970s. There have been few studies on these issues including the case of Fatsa. Given this situation, it is not easy to carry out a research on this subject as there is limited study on the subject. Then, this situation makes such a case study more valuable as it would contribute to the accumulation of knowledge in such an understudied subject.

As we mentioned above the study draws upon the urban social movement literature even if the Fatsa case does not meet the all characteristics of urban social movements.

Data collection in this thesis relied on different methods and techniques. In the first place, there was a single study on Fatsa case and it is used whenever necessary. However, the bulk of the information came from those activists of the period through the interviews carried out with them. Totally 24 people took part in in-depth interviews. These 24 people involved both the supporters and the opponents of the movement, which provided the study with multi dimensional insights. Additionally, national newspapers of this period were also reviewed to highlight the perception

of the Fatsa mobilization in the national press. The written documents such as court defenses of those preselected members of the movement were also used in the case study

In order to provide a theoretical framework to the discussion about the urban social movements and the development of the radical left-wing politics in the urban space, the following chapter examines main theories about the subjects. Chapter two is composed of three sections. In the first section, power struggles in the urban space and, with reference to this struggle, the characteristics of urban social movements will be explained. In urban social movements section, basic discussions held around the concept will be examined and subsequently development, incidence and militancy of urban social movements will be discussed. In the second part of chapter two, structure of local state and conflicts between the local and central government will be explained. Results and effects of conflicts on the generation of the urban politics will also be discussed in this chapter. In the second part of chapter 2, the structure of local state will be the main focus for analysis in order to identify the conflicts between the central and local state. Next, the specific structure of left-wing municipalities will be analyzed with reference to the particular cases: Red Bologna and Porto Alegre. This section will be provided the important dynamics and local characteristics for such analysis.

In Chapter III, characteristics of urbanization in Turkey will be studied. Besides the characteristics of urbanization process, the political struggles rose in the urban space will also be taken into account. Scope of urban politics in Turkey in the 1970s will be examined in this chapter and samples will be analyzed will be given to search for the effects of urban social movements on provision of public services. The examples of “New Municipalism” and as a squatter movement “1 Mayıs District” will be given in this chapter. While the first sample case (New Municipalism) dealt with the radicalization of municipalism in 1970s, the second sample case (1 Mayıs District) dealt with radicalization of urban population.

In Chapter IV, the case of Fatsa Municipality in 1979 will be analyzed. In this chapter, power relations in city of Fatsa and administrative structure in Fatsa Municipality will be presented. Subsequently, basic issues of various types of struggles within this context will be examined. In order to discuss the subject matter in its unique historical context, internal dynamics and precedence of left-wing movement in the city will be presented in this section. Method of studying Fatsa case is built on in-depth interviews with various actors and examination of written formal and informal documents both in that period and then after.

In the last chapter, the findings of the case study will be discussed.

CHAPTER 2

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study aims to examine the power relations in urban space and the effects of urban social movements in changing urban meaning. This chapter consists of three sections: In the first section, the formation of the urban social movements in accordance with the characteristics of urban space and the characteristics of the social movements will be discussed. In the second section, local state will be concentrated on with its position in the overall state organization. Next, in the third section, Red Bologna and Porte Alegre experiences will be discussed as the samples of different radical municipal experiences.

Urban space is one of the key sites of struggle among conflicting interests in capitalist societies. The power of different groups in the society varies according to their structural positions. Conflicts taking place in the urban space are the outcomes of the relations of these different interest groups. Groups who have different interests in urban space and urban politics are formed and developed around these different interests. These interests create power relations in the urban space, hence, modern cities are subject to the power relations. The power struggles and the conflicts shaped around these relations have effects in the reproduction and transformation of the urban space. Thus, it is possible to say that the struggles take place in the urban space are a part of overall power relations in the society. With this context, the groups aim to preserve or change the power relations require taking the importance of control on urban space into consideration. (Şengül, 2001).

There are two different and conflicting logics which shape urban space. The first one is the perception of the urban space as a living place with its use value. The other one is the perception of the urban space as an instrument for capital accumulation around the rent seeking activities with its exchange value. While the first one sees the urban space as a concrete setting, the second approach perceives it in abstract terms, as something to be sold or bought. These two different perceptions of the urban space are the main conflicts. The balance between these two different approaches is defined by the political struggles which include urban social movements as well (Şengül, 2001; 27). From this point of view, the social movements in urban space may be considered as part of overall power struggles, because it is important to control space in order to sustain the existing power relations or create an alternative one (Şengül, 2001).

The function and the meaning of the urban space are also determined by the power relations. The conflicts around the exchange value and the use value in the urban space and the social movements derived from these conflicts determine dynamics of any city in both local and global spheres. That is to say, both macro and micro level politics are formed by the conflicts that occur in the urban space. Consequently, urban politics is influenced by power relations, and vice versa.

From this point of view, urban social movements are located at the heart of urban politics (Castells, 1977). So, urban social movements may be considered as threat against the existing socio-political system and the hegemony of the dominant classes. In other words, (urban) social movements exercised around the formal administrative system and existing power relations, may challenge the existing hegemonic structure. With this perception, it is necessary to put power struggles into the wider context of class-relations both in urban, national and global level, so that the historical process of the class structure has to be considered in the analysis of the urban conflicts and the formation of the struggles as well.

In an analysis of the urban politics and the urban meaning; the relations among the politics and economics, social classes and the state are defining factors. The effect of the urban actors on urban space is a hegemonic process and it is developed by the conflicts and struggles. Since the urban space is subject to power relations, it is important to construct a hegemonic project over and to sustain the existing urban meaning of the city. Therefore, to understand and analyze the urban politics and struggles in the urban space, it is necessary to build a hegemony oriented approach (Şengül, 2001; 28).

According to Gramscian perspective, different political powers attempt to control political, economic and cultural processes by manipulating social groups with their hegemonic projects and strategies. In this process, while some social groups construct alliances around the hegemonic projects, there are some other groups which stay against this hegemonic bloc. Meanwhile, hegemonic processes are continuous processes because of the ever existing counter hegemonic structures in the society. That is to say, hegemonic projects should revise and re-define themselves in order to have their continuous dominance against the counter-hegemonic blocs. Hegemonic relations always include resistance. This resistance may be influential or not, but there always exist potential threats for the existing hegemonic structure. Therefore, hegemonic structure should be built on power bloc and have the sufficient support of its grassroots (Gramsci, 1971).

The general state structure has vital importance in the construction of hegemony due to its function in hegemonic processes and presenting the partial interests as if they are the general

interests of the society. State can represent the partial interests of certain groups as if they are the interests of the society as a whole. Except for the radical break off periods, the hegemonic processes are organized around the state structure. It is possible to say that, state is not only an administrative instrument but also the maintainer of the reproduction of power relations and hegemonic processes.

In capitalist societies, although the working classes organize in various forms as pressure groups, they can not construct a hegemonic bloc because they, in most cases, fail to construct a hegemonic bloc due to their limited opportunities to control the state apparatus as successful as the capitalist classes (Şengül, 2001; 29). The projects of the working class movements generally have the characteristics of affecting the institutional structure from outside, therefore remain marginal. However, this does not mean that they cannot influence policy making processes. At this point, it is necessary to mention that, state is not a single or monotonous structure; rather the internal state structure is also the subject to power relations. Positions taken in this internal structure may enable the implementation of hegemonic project. Still it may be bounded with different constrains. These positions can be either on the national level or local level.

Urban politics is subject to hegemonic projects and urban struggles are part of the functions of these hegemonic processes. From this point of view, there are two important variables in the urban sphere in accordance with the distribution of urban resources (Şengül, 2001; 30). The first one is the distribution of urban resources for urban development issues, which is related to power relations and hegemony of different groups. The transfer preferences are influential in characteristics of urban struggles. Respectfully, class movements have great importance in urban struggles. It is seen that, in the rising periods of the working class struggles and increase in influence of social policies, the resources transferred to the social consumption issues also rise, on the other hand, when the influence of capital in urban policies is powerful, the resources are slided to capitalist sectors (Şengül, 2001; 31).

As we noticed above, in order to constitute a hegemonic project, it is needed to come together around the state apparatus. This is also valid for the local hegemonic projects. Meanwhile, in the local level, it is important to control the urban space in construction of the hegemonic projects. If hegemonic processes are developed around (local) state apparatus, then, the locus of the hegemonic processes will be the local state.

Hegemony oriented approach provide an understanding of urban social movements from a wider perspective which includes the economic and political sphere in urban movements.

Besides the generation of urban social movements, the incidents and militancy of urban social movements are related to the hegemonic processes held in the urban sphere (Şengül, 2001). Scope of this study, requires examining the effects of the urban social movements to the power structure of the cities. To do this, the characteristics of the urban social movements and the discussions held around, will be focused. So, the question needs to be answered in analyzing the issue of urban social movements is put as follows: “under what conditions the urban movements have the incidence and the militancy to change the urban meaning”.

2.1. Urban Social Movements

Until 1970s, studies on urban social movements and power relations were revolved around the scope of and framework of political science. However, the specific character of these issues also require of an analysis of urban sociology. The reason why urban sociology could not be influential in the subject matter is that urban sociology is generally understand as a field of study in the ways of life in urban, housing, patterns of kinship, neighboring and friendship, urban social problems such as crime, and the spatial structure of urban space etc.. On the other hand, although it was crucial in analyzing the urban space, political structure of urban space which is including urban politics, local government, pressure groups and other parties was excluded by urban sociology. In the beginning of 1970s, Castells’ studies brought politics of the urban to the context sociology of urban (Pickvance, 2003; 102).

In his analysis of urban space, collective consumption becomes important in Castells studies. According to Castells, urban meaning is formed by the characteristics of collective consumption urban space. Accordingly, Castells argues that, urban social movements are organized around the collective consumption issues because they are separated from the urban movements just because of its aim to change the urban meaning. Urban meaning is defined by the collective consumption and the social relations of space.

One of the important contributions of Castells on urban politics literature is the “urban social movements”. Before examining Castells’ definition of urban movements it is necessary t to mention that Castells’ works are divided into two periods. While his early studies are based on a structuralist and class-based approach, his latter studies are based on independent urban social movements.

2.1.1. Urban Social Movements in Castells' Theory

Castells constructs his early studies on structural Marxist perspective with an Althusserian view. According to Castells, analyzing the space as an expression of the social structure means the analyzing space which is shaped by the issues existing in the economic and the political systems and effects of these issues on the social practices. (Castells, 1977)

In his early works, Castells original position bases on three issues: (a) redefinition of urban in terms of social relations of space and as for the process of the reproduction of labor power; (b) intervention of state as a provider of 'collective consumption' facilities arising from contradictions in the social system; (c) the determinant effect of structure and class struggle on state action, with a tendency to shift towards the latter as the key influence (Lowe, 1986, 14).

Castells strongly emphasizes "collective consumption in the urban space" and "social relations of space" and both his early works and latter works based on these terms. What is held in the urban space is the collective consumption, and urban politics is shaped with reference to reproduction of collective consumption issues. In the bases of urban movements, urban collective consumption has a very central position. Collective consumption is not the only issue that influences the urban space. It is also a mean of state intervention to space and as well as the means of controlling and reproducing the urban space. Therefore, the core of urban movements varies according to the politics held around the collective consumption issues.

In "The Urban Question", Castells argues that state intervention to space occur in the urban space which is the fundamental moment for the process of the reproduction of labor power as well as the urban conflicts. In this intervention process, state's major role is the regulation and maintenance of capital accumulation processes under the hegemony of capital. In addition, the significance of state intervention in the process of reproduction of labor power is not only as a functional requirement of mature capitalist economies, but also, as the source of a range of contingent problems and issues (Lowe, 1986; 14).

The conflicts derived from the capitalist reproduction relations are also exercised in the urban space which create class struggles. These struggles around the mentioned conflicts are defined as the source of urban social movements, and in the final analysis there are class struggles. In this framework the actors are the abstract working class or the consequent organization of them as urban social movements. (Şengül, 2001; 17). In other words, the urban social movements have strong links with other movements and the class-based structures. Moreover, Castells says that an "urban movement" becomes an "urban social movement" if it is carried into the working-class

movement. The importance of the link between movements lies under the conscious struggle against the total political system and connects the struggle groups against the capitalist structure. Castells clearly mentioned that if there is no link between urban movements and the other social movements, they might not become urban social movements but only become instruments of participation within a general, collective institutional objective (Castells, 1977; 378). From this point of view, the evaluation of the political importance of an urban movement is possible only through construction of relationships between power relations and social classes.

However, in the structuralist framework of Castells, historical background of urban actors and the urban social movements are not examined sufficiently (Lowe, 1986; Pickvance, 1985, Şengül, 2001). That is to say, actors come together in the scope of existing situation and thus historical struggle is not taken into account. It is the Castells' structuralist view where the actors and the struggle are defined by the existing structure.

To sum up, Castells early works are based on the collective consumption and social relations of space. State's major role is the regulation of the overall system provision of collective consumption goods. Finally, state provides the sustainability of existing hegemonic structure. In capitalist societies, state is responsible for the reproduction of the capitalist system. From this point of view, struggles arise in urban space are results of capitalist reproduction processes. Urban actors come together in scope of social processes held in urban sphere around collective consumption issues. Meanwhile, class-based movements are important in development of urban struggles, hence, movements generated in cities becomes urban social movements if they have relations with the working-class movement and if they aiming at challenging the whole political system.

The latter works of Castells highly differ from his early works. Issues of collective consumption in the urban space are still at the center. However, in another study (*City and Grassroots* (1983)) he put emphasis on the individual actors rather than class movements. He emphasized that "a new form of social cleavages arising from collective consumption but not depended on the class system per se for their existence in the social system, or as a source of political conflict" (Lowe, 1986, 20). In "City and Grassroots", he mentions the importance of effects of the technological and economic development in formation and meaning of space with corresponding effects of actors. Beside the tensions arisen with technological and economical processes, new issues such as meaning of space for individuals and new social interests define the area for struggle (Castells, 1983; 291).

At this point, Castells rejects the primary role of class relations in urban social transformation. Accordingly, the correlation between class movements and urban social movements is not influential in changing urban social relations.

Castells defines the term urban meaning in his book “The City and Grassroots” as the “synthesis of the historical form and specific model or ‘goal’ of a city”. Urban meaning is the fashioned out form of the conflict between different stakes and values of different groups and actors. Urban meaning is underpinned by particular functions of a city. That is to say, urban meaning is beneath on historical function of a city. Finally, urban meaning and urban function combine to produce urban form, ‘the symbolic spatial expression of the processes that materialize as a result of them’ (Castells, 1983).

Castells claims that new urban meaning can be produced by any one of the four social powers: dominant class, dominated class, social movements and urban social movements. The dominant class has the opportunity to restructure and change the existing urban meaning by using its institutional power. Secondly, when a dominated class achieves a revolution, the revolution may bring changes in the urban meaning. Thirdly, a social movement may be able to develop its own meaning and then change the pre-existing urban meaning. And finally, movements against the institutionalized urban meaning and the effect of the dominant class over this meaning may change the urban meaning. It is this last one that is named as urban social movement (Lowe, 1986; 33). From this classification, Castells reaches to point that only the last one, the urban social movement is where the urban oriented movements which may change the social structure and the urban meaning. In other words, point of emphasis in urban social movements is the urban meaning. It is possible to say that, urban social movements have become more important in the latter works of Castells.

In his latter works, Castells pays less attention to influence and importance of political parties or class based organizations in development of urban social movements. He mentions that if there are non-class-based consumption facilities in the urban space, then struggles in the urban space may be consumption-based political movements, which are independent from the political parties and other political movements.

This approach to urban social movements not only downplays the social classes but also he downplays the social movements shaped around the state, political parties and the other organizational structures. Castells emphasizes pluralist nature of urban politics. This pluralist structure of urban movements manages to change the urban meaning because collective consumption facilities are non-class-based. Hence, there is no need to construct a relation

between urban social movements and class-based organizations. The non-institutionalized urban social movements are organized around this non-classed collective consumption processes. At this position, Castells downplay the influence of political parties and movements shaped around the political parties. He claims that political system is a part of state structure and the movements organized in this political system aims to control the state. This institutionalized structure is negotiative. In the sense that, the civilian and non-institutionalized characters of social movements have more strong position against the status quo Therefore, urban social movements may introduce alternatives to the existing state structure.

The characteristics of urban movements should have three goals in collective consumption, community culture and political self-management; they must be aware of their role as an urban social movement; they must have connections with the mass media, professionals and political parties; and finally, they must be politically autonomous of any party. In this model, any urban movement is subject to possible evaluation (Lowe, 1986: 47).

After these explanations, it is possible to say that, in his latter works, Castells construct a relationship between the middle class and struggles in the urban space. (Şengül, 2001; Lowe, 1986; Pickvance, 1985). As can be seen, in the latter works of Castells the concept of participation and the characteristics of the social movements related with the participation quite varied from his early works. In his early works, he emphasizes the connection between urban social movements and political parties, and so the social movements and the class-based struggle. He mentions that if there is no connection between these movements, it cannot be talked about an urban social movement, what is practiced will be an urban movement around participation issues rather than an urban social movement. However, in his latter works, he totally rejects his ideas and defends the autonomous character of urban social movements.

Castells formulation is criticized in some aspects. First of all, Castells defines the state as an instrument which sustains the dominant reproduction relations. He emphasizes the role of the state in the reproduction of the social relations. However, it is criticized that the state structure is not monotonous and single. State is also subject of power relations and the policies are developed around these power relations (Şengül, 2001; Pickvance, 1985; Saunders, 1981). Şengül mentions that sometimes decisions taken by the state may be beneficiary for the working class and this is not only the result of the pressure coming from the social groups but also the results of the internal struggle formed around the institutionalized political structure (2001; 23). Therefore, in the evaluation of urban changes, it is important to take into consideration the state's internal power relations and the struggles occur in the bureaucratic structure. In the critique of Castells' studies the structure of the local state, which may be controlled by radical groups in order to

develop a new urban meaning, is also emphasized (Şengül, 2001; 24). State cannot be thought as a monotonous structure. Conflicts between the local and the central government mechanism and the hierarchy between them cannot be ignored in any analysis of urban transformation. This power struggle is formed around the social struggles. Therefore, social classes and social movements are important actors for the changes in urban meaning. From this point of view, Pickvance criticize Castells for ignoring urban actors such as urban politicians, land-owner and financial institutions which constitute the characteristics of local political structure (Lowe, 1986; 48). Another important point that Pickvance criticizes Castells is that he ignores the social basis and historical background of the social movements. Therefore, it is hard to examine different urban movements and make a comparative analysis between them (Lowe, 1986; 50).

To sum up the critics about the latter works of Castells it can be said that Castells makes a pos hoc rationalization as he ignores the state structure and the struggles shaped around the state structure, local political issues and the role of the urban actors in the development of the urban policies and the historical background of the urban social movements.

2.1.2. Development of Urban Movements

Castells has great contributions to the analysis of urban social movements. However, both his early and latter works ignore the important points of urban political structure. Although Castells' model is applicable to any urban social movement, it is not adaptable to every local political system, because local systems and the specific meaning of urban space are changing according to overall political system, social conditions, local relations, structure of the social bases and the historical background of urban movements. Castells pay little attention to local and internal dynamics of different movements. Castells construct his theories as thought in the global level and accept that they are applicable in all countries, but he ignores characteristics of the movement and characteristics of the context in which the movement exists (Pickvance, 1985; 35).

Pickvance defines urban social movements starting from a different classification and draws a context in the incidences and militancy of urban social movements. He examines how the aspects of the context within which urban movements develop, and draws a categorical framework in order to compare different urban movements. Pickvance defines four types of urban movements and these movements are shaped around three basic urban demands: Collective consumption, local level of political process and spatial proximity (Pickvance, 1985; 32-33).

“Type 1” urban movements are revolved around the issues of provision of housing and urban services which are generally found in the rapid urbanizing societies or in societies where state intervention in consumption has failed to keep pace with urbanization for various reasons. He puts the squatter settlement movements into this kind of movements. According to him Type 1 urban movements is related to demand for collective consumption goods.

“Type 2” urban movements are also the subject of collective consumption. In these types of movements, Pickvance refers to access to housing and urban services. The movements are related to the over access to consumption facilities which includes issues such as financial access (public housing, bus fares etc.), level of provision of services (frequency of clinics, staffing levels etc.) and eligibility of housing and coverage of services (allocation rules, school catchments area etc.).

“Type 3” movements are concerning the control and management. This control and management may concern housing and urban services or political institutions in case of no provider of these services. Actors of these movements demands for participation in town planning for self-management of public housing schemes etc.

“Type 4” movements are defensive movements and these kind of movements may be against ‘physical threats’ to housing and neighborhoods such as demolition, urban renewals, or commercial development, or may be against ‘social threats’ such as the arrival of the people from different races, different social classes etc.

Pickvance emphasizes that the urban movements may contain different aims and may take part in various types. That is to say, an urban movement may be defined in one or more types of urban movements. According to Pickvance, to define the types of urban movements, comparison of the urban movements is not enough, because the important points in the analysis of the urban movements are their militancy and incidence. Therefore, in order to evaluate and compare the urban social movements, focusing on development patterns and effects of movements are more necessary than defining them.

Moreover, by criticizing Castells for ignoring historical process of urban movements, Pickvance draws contextual features of urban movements for a deeper understanding of the movements. He points out five contextual features effecting the urban movement experience and then, he mentions that they can be sub-models on classifying the urban social movements (1985; 40-44):

The first contextual feature is the rapid urbanization. In the rapid urbanization process, attitude of state towards the demands of actors in rapid urbanization process determine the role of actors in

urbanization process and accessing the urban services. The level of the accession to urban resources and services has effects on urban social movement. The existence of a democratic system is also worth to mention in order to determine incidence and militancy of urban movements since demands of the actors of rapid urbanization process are also subjects of the political parties in order to gain votes. Therefore, the demands of the actors may be responded in democratic systems since different parties try to gain the votes by responding the demands.

Another feature that affects the incidence and the militancy of an urban movement is the state actions on (collective) consumption and responses to the actions. This is relevant both in provoking demands and in response to these demands. The primary way through which state action provokes urban demands is the state intervention to (collective) consumption. Once this occurs, it triggers off additional demands through a series of demonstration effects. The second way of state action is the state responses to demands of movement. State acts as an incentive structure affecting the creation of urban movements and the types of demand they are likely to put forward.

The third contextual feature Pickvance defines is the political context. Political context has three aspects: the ability of formal political institution to express urban conflicts; cultural understanding about the scope of urban politics; and the existence of broader political movements. If the political institutions effectively respond to demands of the urban movements, then the urban actors do not seek for alternative channels. With respect to this, the existence and influence of political parties are important in this topic. Urban movements can express demands through political parties. On the other hand, cultural understanding of politics is also significant. Cultural understanding of scope of urban politics point to people's perceptions of state and urbanization. Another important point is the existence of broader political movements. Existence of broader political movement may affect the incidence and militancy of the urban movements, and moreover, the broader political movements may be the cause for an urban social movement.

The fourth contextual feature that Pickvance mentions is the role of middle class in urban social movements. The existence of middle class in urban social movements is important because this class have time, money, personal contacts and organizational relations. That is to say, they have time and power to deal with urban affairs. Another point is that, for the middle class, the city is a living place; it is not only a place that provides employment opportunities but also it is a living unit based on use value. Hence, the situation of middle class and its participation in urban social movements may change the character of urban movements.

The last contextual feature is the general economic and social conditions. Conditions of raised expectations and social tension generate both statist and libertarian demands in which movements go towards the popular control and collective consumption. In periods of affluence and implementation of big projects, the defensive movements are also plentiful. On the other hand, in conditions of economic crisis conditions the social expenditures are decreased or cut off. Under such circumstances, it is likely to endure three types of movements; those concerned with non-financial aspects to housing and urban services, which may not impose any cost to the state; defensive movements around the housing and neighborhood for reasons other than large state-construction projects; and movements caused by few state expenditures.

Pickvance's suggestions of classifying the urban social movements provide a comparative method between different urban social movements occurred in different places and at different times. This method enables drawing a framework that examines under what circumstances urban social movements take place and develop. Pickvance's suggestions do not construct on are not an alternative model but provide a number of key propositions about causal mechanisms of urban movements' mobilization (Lowe, 1986; 180). However, Lowe criticizes Pickvance's suggestion because of the problem that whether the model adequately explains the relationship between the specified societal features, and the existence of certain types of urban movements (1986; 180). In addition, Lowe mentions that Pickvance not only defines relations between movements and societal features, but claims to predict their existence: "The logic of our argument has been that societies share positions on the five societal dimensions should have the same movement experience, other things being equal" (Lowe, 1986; 181).

Lowe (1986; 185) suggests that under the heading of political process, the urban social movements considerations must be made of:

- 1- The structure and political history of the local administrative system and its interaction with the central level – the theme of central/local relations.
- 2- The party political system in the society and its effectiveness in mediating social conflict. (This is essentially the same as Pickvance notion to the ability of formal political institutions to express political conflict)
- 3- The osmosis of activists between urban movement and the party system, and also the existence of social movement in the wider cultural/political sphere creating alternative sources of activism.
- 4- The identification of those economic and social forces that underpin the national and local state. The presence or absence of which decisively effects the policy strategies of the local authorities and the tactical range available to urban protest movements.
- 5- The need to be sensitive to intra-national variations in urban movement experience.

These topics enable us to analyze the pre-conditions and development of urban social movements and to make a comparative analysis.

In the following chapters this study will explain the Fatsa experience with reference to Pickvance's and Lowe's suggestions. First of all the historical context is needed to be addressed. As can be understood from the explanations above, the historical context of city where urban social movements occurred is important. Therefore, in analysis of urban social movements, it is significant to look at the historical roots of the movement and draw a broader social and political context. This will provide us the understanding of local level social, political and administrative structure. Awareness of the historical conditions is also an important feature to determine bases and the development of urban movements.

Secondly, again with reference to Pickvance's suggestions, this thesis hypothetically claims that Fatsa experience is a kind of Type 3 movement which need to be considered in mentioned contextual features. That is to say, a control and management activity had taken place in Fatsa in the local political context and this movement needs to be analyzed with reference to state actions, political context (the ability of formal political institutions to express urban conflicts, cultural understanding about the scope of urban politics, the existing of broader political movements), effects of the middle class in the movement, and the economic and social conditions. Therefore, Pickvance's methodology is going to be used in the analysis of Fatsa experience and besides explaining the events lived in 1979-80 period, the incidence and militancy of the movement will also be explained within the contextual features.

2.2. Urban Development and Local State

In this section, theories about local governments and the segregation between the central and local governments as well as conflicts that occur between these will be studied. The question of why local governments exist, what their role in the state structure is, and how power and authority is distributed among the central and local government and any conflicts that might exist in between will be answered in these section.

In its historical progression, it is seen that any local government theories that exist, is based on a stated theory (Şengül, 2001; 43). In this framework; although all theories have their places in the state structure, there exists a great difference in their answers to the questions of what the state is, where local governments are positioned in this state structure and from where the local governments originate from. Şengül examines the local government theories in the framework of three basic state paradigms: Pluralist, Weberian and Marxist (2001; 43). He mentions that each

paradigm has its own home domain and when they are examined out of this domain, the paradigms lose their power and coherency. For the pluralist paradigm, this domain is the individuals or the groups based on these individuals; for the Weberian or so called managerialist paradigm, the domain is drawn as the bureaucratic structure and institutional arena; whereas in the Marxist or so called class-oriented paradigm, the domain is shaped by the struggle between the capital accumulation and social class. Another important concept pointed out by the author is that although the paradigms have integrity in their home domain, there exist different approaches within the paradigms (2001; 44). This happens, when one paradigm is examined by intervening into the home domains of other paradigms. The third point he makes is the transformation of the approaches to a certain paradigm in time (2001; 44). Each approach has scrutinized their starting point and then made new suggestions for the present conditions without sacrificing the home domain. This is generally caused by the efforts of approaches to keep up with the present conditions and the changing environment. However, this also brings a methodological problem in that theories generally bring an explanation and make generalizations by using a specific case that occurred in a certain time and space. This generalization or so called the “theoretical empiricism” make explaining different local government experiences difficult, even in their society, which is another reason of the securitization of the theories in time.

In the history of local government theories the Second World War may be seen as a turning point. Local government practices have been developed in mainly two periods in the post-war period. The first one being the Keynesian Period or the Welfare State Period, while the other being the Neo-liberal period which is still in progress. Before analysis local state theories in detail, this section will provide brief information on the characteristics of the mentioned era.

The most important characteristic of welfare state period is the implementation of social policies and delivery of social services. In implementation of social policies, the urban space have gained more importance. Various kinds of social services like education, health services, housing and similar are widely held in the urban space. These services are called the “services of collective consumption” in Castells’ studies. Meanwhile, urban space is the subject of collective consumption as well as of the reproduction facilities. Therefore, local government becomes one of the most important agents of the state mechanism as they organize the collective consumption in the welfare state period. This has also been reflected in local government theories in the welfare state period.

On the other hand, welfare state period had not been experienced in the same way in different countries. In fact, the practices of developed countries and third world countries are completely different from each other. In developed countries, social policies became the core of politics, but

in the third world, due to several reasons (mainly financial) main characteristics of the welfare state period was not central to state policies. From this point of view, it can be concluded that studies about the role of local governments in Welfare State period, especially deal with local government practices of developed countries.

However, welfare state politics fell to regression and by the early 1980s, a new period has begun which is still in progress: the neo-liberal period. Neo-liberal period is completely different from the welfare state period. In this period, groups having capital resources and power dominate politics. The important notion of this period is that social services have decreased in both quantity and quality, some cases even completely eliminated. The role of local government has changed in the state structure as well as in the distribution of local services. Hence, the local state theories have been transformed in the way of new political comprehension in order to better align with the present situation. However, as this time period exceeds the scope of the case study in this thesis.

After this brief description on these two major periods in development of local government theories, next section will move on to local government theories themselves.

2.2.1. Pluralist Theory of Local Government

Pluralist theory is based on the effects of the actions of individuals and groups founded on an individual basis in the decision making processes (Şengül, 2001; 45). Pluralist theory argues that power is distributed equally among all individuals and these individuals are free to organize or join in any type of group. The state is a mediator between these groups. Although balance among these groups can shift, the balance can be established again with pressure of opposition from other groups, in time. Pluralist theory claims that the decision making mechanisms are shaped with the consensus of these diverse collection of groups and each group can potentially become part of the decision making process.

This approach denies the class-based society and claims that individuals have the power to affect policy making process. Every individual has a chance to reach power and the system does not allow monopolies to be formed and monopolized by a certain group. The social resources are distributed equally in the society. In addition to this, state is defined as a neutral structure in its functions and independent from the interest of certain groups. However, state has the power to intervene the civil society in order to prevent conflicts in the society (Ersoy & Şengül, 2002; 15).

The impartiality of state is provided with the elections according to pluralist theory (Ersoy & Şengül, 2002; 16). This also means that the pluralist theory accepts that democracy is handled by the elected officials; not by the individuals directly. However, these elected officials can change in the elections if common interest is damaged or if the state creates pressure on civil society. As can be estimated, such a political comprehension, political parties become important agents as they are the political organs of the civil society which have the power to change the political authority.

Another point of interest in the pluralist theory is the position and status of politicians. According to Dahl, an important name of the classical pluralist theory, politicians are the professional individuals who spend full-time political activities. They are the experts and therefore they have the power of authority in their professional area. However, they cannot use this power to put pressure on individuals because civil society has the power and resources to eliminate them. (Ersoy & Şengül, 2002; 25).

Pluralist theory is against the bureaucratic state as well as a centralized government which does not let participation of different groups in the decision making processes. Hence, local governments have great significance in the pluralist theory. Besides the distribution of power in the state organization, local governments are also important because participation to local government policy making process is easier than participation to central government policy making process (Şengül, 2001; 45).

To sum up, it can be concluded that pluralist theory is based on the participation of individuals in the decision making process and claims that the power holders in the state mechanism is the civil society, so called the individuals or the groups, not the politicians, bureaucrats or the state itself. The pluralist theory completely denies the class relations and the influence of the class-based ideology in state mechanisms. Pluralist theory, on the other hand, does not provide a well-formed definition of state.

2.2.2. Urban Managerialist Theory

Urban managerialist theory is based on Weberian perspective of politics, sociology and administration. Urban managerialist theory accepts the state as an independent power structure. State is a centralized organization with its bureaucratic structure and holds the power in its hands. From this perspective, urban managerialist focuses on the centralized state with its independent power. Centralized power of state is important in the analysis of urban managerialist theory. As

the power is held by the central government especially in the development of the nation state, power of the local government has been weakened and reduced (Şengül, 2001; 46). On the other hand, whilst the influence area of state is extended, the responsibilities of local governments are increased and its autonomy is declined.

There exist two different, even conflicting approaches in the framework of urban managerialist theory, about the position of local governments in state structure. The first approach suggests that local governments are part of the central government which is complementary complements the functions of the central government in the local area. Therefore, there exists a division of labor between the central government and local governments. In addition, local governments not only deal with the local duties but also represent the power of the center on the locality (Şengül, 2001; 47). One of the branches of this argument states that an important function of the local government in the state structure is to provide legitimacy for the state. On the other hand, the first approach does not define the functions of local governments but mentions that local government is a complementary unit for the central government.

The second approach also acknowledges the functionalist and complementary character of local government but it also claims that there may be conflicts between central government agencies and local governments in this functionalist framework. The second approach in the managerialist framework resembles the studies of Ray Pahl. The term “urban managers” is used by Pahl (1975) in his studies.

Pahl recognizes the unity of state and the state as a power holder. According to Pahl, urban studies should focus on the inequalities existing in urban system. Basic argument of urban managerialist approach depends on the acceptance of the inequality in urban systems (Ersoy & Şengül, 2002; 53). This inequality is at delivery of urban services. Inequalities in the space are caused by the products of the socio-ecologic system which implies the whole decisions and the activities of urban managers. The term “urban managers” means not only the bureaucrats but also the municipal council members, social workers, real estate agencies and the group of people affecting access to the urban services. Ideologies of urban managers create urban socio-ecology and therefore, the inequalities result from the opinions and decisions of the urban managers. That is to say, the structure of the urban distribution is formed by urban managers who have rights and opportunity to make public decisions.

Important point in this framework is that urban managers are not affected by class relations or struggles. Especially in his early works, Pahl accepted the urban managers as independent elements of the urban system. This acceptance has been criticized by urban theorists. In his later

works, with the influence of the critics, Pahl has changed his theory and accepted the urban managers as being not an independent variable but dependent to relations occurred in the urban system. In addition, Pahl claims in his later works that local governments are mediators between the central government and private sector as well as central government and local people. (Şengül, 2001; 47). This argument recognizes the importance of economic structure of urban system and also the importance of limitation brought by central government to local governments. Hence, Pahl goes beyond the Weberian paradigm in his later works.

In conclusion, urban managerialist theory adds an important notion to local government theories by emphasizing the effect of urban managers in the urban system. However, this static structure denies the relations that occur in the urban space and attributes the power solely to decision makers. The political and social structure of the locality is not considered in this theory. In addition, the role of local governments in the state structure is not defined clearly, but it is said that conflicts can occur among bureaucratic elites.

2.2.3. Dual State Thesis and Local Governments

Dual state thesis is based on the studies of Alan Cawson (1978) and Peter Saunders (1979) which focus on corporatism in the late capitalist developments and new inequalities in urban space. They construct their theories on administrative problems that occur in modern industrialized society which can be solved by organizing different levels of state, in different social bases, with different styles, and through making a new distribution of functions of the state (Ersoy & Şengül, 2002; 67).

The dual state thesis has four main discussions (Ersoy & Şengül, 2002; 71):

1. Division of corporatist interests and competitive interests.
2. Problems that occur in the relations of different state levels.
3. Differentiation between class-based “production policies” and group based “consumption policies”.
4. Relative autonomy of politics and ideology.

Saunders noticed that, the dual state thesis is constructed as an idealization of the Weberian Perspective. Dual state thesis brings the core of different theories together. The difference of the dual state thesis from the others is the separation of functions of central and local state. Saunders supports the idea of collective consumption stated by Castells and also mentions that urban space is at the center of collective consumption processes (Saunders, 1979). Therefore, urban sociology

needs to focus on the sociology of consumption in the urban space. In such a system, the state requires organizing consumption in the urban space and form the urban public policies.

According to Saunders, central government organizes the production related activities whereas the local governments deal with the organization of consumption related activities. This is a functional division in the state mechanism which is defined by the term dual state mechanism. Saunders does not search an ideological accompaniment in this division of function and the so called dual state mechanism.

Table 1: Dual Politics Thesis

	Production Policies	Consumption Policies
Social Base	Class Interests	Consumption Groups Interests
Means Interest Mediation	Corporatist	Competitive
Intervention Level	Central government	Local State
Dominant Ideology	Private Ownership Rights	Citizen Rights
Appropriate State Theory	Instrumentalist (Class Paradigm)	Pluralism (Group Interest Paradigm)

Source: Ersoy & Şengül, 2002; 73

Table above has a separation of the functions of central government and local state. The relation between them is not sufficiently defined. It is seen that local government has autonomy in the state structure because of the division in functions, but this division shows that there exists a complementary character in the relationship of central and local government. An important point in this approach is that, there exist no conflicts between local and central government resulting from the division of functions, since their functions are separated clearly from each other.

Saunders is criticized because of this distinct separation between the functions of state mechanisms. According to these critics (see Harrington (1983), Duncan and Goodwin (1988)), there exists a reciprocal relationship between the consumption and the production sphere. Production determines the consumption and vice versa. Therefore, it is not possible to say that the relationship between central government and local governments is only complementary. There may also be conflicts and tension between them.

Besides, dual state thesis is also criticized by being eclectic, non-historical and ethnocentric. In other words, dual state thesis does not have any historical roots. Therefore it is hard to generalize and apply the dual state thesis for all conditions in any period of time.

After these brief explanations of Pluralist and Weberian approaches, next section will discuss the Marxist approaches of local state theories.

2.2.4. Structuralist Approach

Structuralist approach define the structure of social and political system behind scenes. According to structuralist approach, in a theoretical explanation in social sciences, the origin must be set on the implicit structures that lie under the observable events. Individuals are the unconscious bearer of the ideologies. In order to understand their positions in the system, it is needed to focus on what sorts of power and relations force and direct them.

In the political analysis of state, structuralist approach focuses on class relations instead of individuals. Poulantzas claims that capitalist state cannot be thought of as independent from class relations. State is neither an instrument of class domination nor a power structure independent from the class relations. State is the reflection of the balance among class powers in any society. “The capitalist state cannot be thought of as a ‘thing’ set apart from classes, but can only be analyzed as the ‘condensate’ of the political relations between classes.” (Saunders, 1979; 181-182). The state is “relatively autonomous” of any class in short term. It serves to unify the divergent fractions of capital under the hegemony of the monopoly fraction by safeguarding the capitalist accumulation processes against the immediate demands of different fractions. State also resolve the unity of the working class by undermining its solidarity through short-run class compromises and reforms. The consequence of this is that in the short run the state is seen as relatively autonomous, although in the long run, the interests of the monopoly capital can be seen in the state mechanism.

Poulantzas suggests that in order to understand the existence of state and analyze the state structure, it should focus on reproductive activities of state. State provides reproduction of the existing system, namely capitalism. By manipulating the mode of reproduction, the state provides unity and integrity for the system (Ersoy & Şengül, 2002; 78). Although the state has an independent character from the domination and oppression of any class, the reproductive activities of the state overlap with the interests of dominant classes. The important point in the Poulantzas analysis is the state’s role in the maintenance of the system. State has a “relative autonomy” in the implementation of reproductive activities which is accepted by the society with consent. However, it should also be kept in mind that the relative autonomy of state is used for realizing the interest of the dominant class. In capitalist societies, state uses its role to prevent the interest of bourgeoisie even if the bourgeoisie is unaware of this role. On the other hand, with its relative autonomy, state hinders the development of class based organizations by using the

concept of “citizen”. This means that, by its relative autonomy, state takes the consent of the individuals and uses the power to hinder the opposition groups and prevent a possible reaction against the state. On the other hand, some social groups may not have opportunities to force state to realize their interests due to spatial untidiness and lack of organizational skills (Ersoy & Şengül, 2002; 80).

The structuralist approach finds its way in the urban studies with Castells. In the first part of this chapter how Castells examined urban politics and the concept of urban social movements was discussed. Analysis of state in Castells works, put the class struggles at the core of urban politics especially in his earlier works. Castells also recognizes the state as a mechanism which reduces the conflicts of non-capitalist classes. The state tries to eliminate the conflicts among the classes in order to enhance and develop the reproduction of the capitalist accumulation processes (Saunders, 1979; 182-183).

In the reproduction of the capitalist system, urban space has importance because reproduction of labor is held in the urban space. Urban system is the source of the reproduction of labor power. State provides this with the organization of collective consumption services like housing, education etc. Hence, as an organizer of the collective consumption services, local governments have importance in Castells’ theory. According to Castells, state is an instrument of the dominant class and the role of state is determined with the reproduction of the system in accordance with the interest of dominant classes. In order to safeguard the interest of the dominant classes, state can exercise its power on to opposition groups. Another important point in this argument is that state can intervene in the formation of space using its power, in order to provide the maintenance of reproduction of the system. Castells explains the reason of state’s role in urban services in conciliation with social conflicts, safeguarding the interests of the capital groups in the long-term and providing the reproduction of labor power. On the other hand, problems occur in the urban space can be solved if conditions of class struggle exists and if in such a condition people become organized politically (Ersoy & Şengül, 2002; 90). Castells argues that problems in urban space are derived from the structural problems of capitalist system. These problems can be eliminated by urban social movements which mean politically organized groups coming together to resolve the problems of urban space (see part 1).

Castells was criticized for generalizing his analysis as it does not depend on a specific place and time. That is to say, role and power of the state in different locations have not been considered by the structuralist theory. Therefore, this theory constructs a general framework for the state and determines the role of state in the capitalist society (Ersoy & Şengül, 2002; 91). In addition to that, although Castells has made an analysis for the urban space, the position of local

governments and the relations between local and central government have not been identified. In the structuralist theory, local governments are seen as part of the central government, which organizes collective consumption services on behalf of central government in order to provide for the reproduction of the system.

2.2.5. Instrumentalist Theory

Basically, instrumentalist approach claims that state is an instrument of the dominant class. Miliband mentions that bias in the function of the state is caused by three notions: class background of those who administer it; the power exerted over them by business interests; and the dependence of state on the capitalist accumulation process (Saunders, 1986; 161). According to Milliband, these three notions give a thorough explanation of the instrumentalist structure of state from a Marxist perspective. Even though state is the instrument of the class dominance, there is a spontaneously overlapping relation between the power of state and that of dominant class. Since those in power enjoy same degree of independency, a relative autonomy is also exists. Mode of production is not the determinant of political action, but it is same kind of a constraints. Indeed, political leaders' relative autonomy stems from these constrains. How to use this autonomy is a question that heavily depends on the coercion bared by the leaders and their own values. Miliband is cautious in what is to be determined as a class instrument, saying that the state is relatively autonomous from the capitalist class and its fractions. "The existence of conflicts between the different sectors of capital, even though they may be less significant than the interests which bind them together, nevertheless implies that the state, in mediating between them, must be in a position to distance itself from any one of them" (Saunders, 1986; 162). Milliband explains a relative autonomy of state but this relative autonomy is different from relative autonomy conceptualization of Poulantzas.

Instrumentalist approach arises with Cyntia Cockburn's study in the local state theories. Actually, Cockburn's study "Local State" has both instrumentalist and structuralist characteristics (Ersoy & Şengül, 2002; 35). Cockburn defines the state as an instrument of the dominant class and she does not separate the local state from the whole state structure. The "local state" is seen as a local extension of the central government.

The term "Local State" is used by Cockburn referencing the position of the local governments in the whole state structure. According to Cockburn, local governments are a small piece of the whole state structure and local governments should be analyzed as a part of overall state structure (Cockburn, 1977; 42). The important point in Cockburn's theory of local state is that it does not

accept the autonomy of local state in the capitalist system although it may be in legal terms (Ersoy & Şengül, 2002; 38).

In explaining why local governments exist and how it becomes an instrument of the state are not determined in Cockburn's study. Cockburn notices that local governments are the agents of state as local authorities and as the state is an instrument of the dominant class, local state is also an instrument of the state. On the other hand, if local state is just an extension of the central government and does not have originality, so why does central government need local state? This question has not been answered in Cockburn's theory (Duncan & Goodwin, 1988).

According to Cockburn, local state take its role in the reproduction process through the detailed management of families and institutions locally. At this point, it differs from the central government institutionally but not socially (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; 33).

In her analysis, Cockburn reduced the role of local state as being an agent of central government which is under the influence of dominant class. Cockburn ignores the conflicts that may occur between two political units which are constructed on differentiated social and political processes.

2.2.6. Uneven Development Theory and Local Governments

Another important theory local state is Uneven Development Theory which has been constructed by Simon Duncan and Mark Goodwin. Duncan and Goodwin considered the local relationships and social structure in the analysis of local governments, rather than their functions.

Local governments have relative autonomy and this characteristic provides them with ability to move autonomously in supporting local interests. Duncan and Goodwin notice that local governments are the only elected governmental unit besides the parliament in the overall state structure and this situation gives them relative autonomy in reflecting the local interest in their structure. In other words, local governments are intensely related to the local interests and therefore, policies of local governments change according to local interests. The activities of local governments become legitimate with the elections. That is to say, although the scope of services of the local state is shaped by the central government, since they are elected, they gain a relative autonomy.

According to Duncan and Godwin, degree of relative autonomy is determined with the local characteristics. Local social relations gain importance in analysis of Uneven Development theory.

Local social relations are also a reason for the existence of the local governments. Ignorance of local social relations in various local state theories is the main criticism of Duncan and Goodwin to them. If local governments are only an extension of central government in locality, and then why does central government need local governments? This is a key question in the analysis of uneven development theory. The reason for the existence of local governments given by the differences of local relations. Each local region has specific characteristics and policies implemented in local level are shaped with these relations. To put it in other way, local relations determine the local policies and therefore, social relations of the society should be examined, in the analysis of local politics.

On the other hand, any influence on local government allows the variations to be expressed in terms of policy variation and different levels of service provision. Although restrained by central government and by centrally imposed legal statutes, local government enjoys a degree of relative autonomy in its actions. Thus local government law is primarily concerned with the power than duties, and essentially establishes a legal framework within which local authorities are given discretionary powers to act. (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; 5).

In the analysis of Duncan and Goodwin, the important point in administrative structure is not the institution which carries out the services, but the attitudes of this institution on how the services would be carried out. These choices determine the variations between the state institutions, which may in turn lead to conflicts among them.

These determinations bring Duncan and Goodwin to another point. Local state is not only an agent of central government but also unit of state in which the expectations and experiences of local people are accumulated as well as which alternative services can be carried out in compatible with local needs. Therefore, local state can be used by central government as a mechanism which controls local powers. Since local state accumulates local power in its own structure, local power relations find their ways in the whole state structure as well. However, local interests and interest of the state can be in conflict. That is to say, as a representative of local interests, local state can be in conflict with central government.

By criticizing Castells, Duncan and Goodwin supposed that urban analysis should includes not only collective consumption issues but also production processes. They claim that Castells has provided an urban analysis with a new perspective, however, urban space is not shaped by the collective consumption issues only. Duncan and Goodwin suggest that if state cannot produce urban services, there cannot be consumption. As an example, if the state does not produce social

houses, whatever housing policies are implemented, the housing will continue to be a problem in most of the cases.

The important points in Duncan and Goodwin's analysis are to synthesize different approaches and to emphasize the relations between local factors. In a broader sense, non-local factors as well as the relation between the policy processes and economic processes are considered. In constructing these relations, they are referring various examples in various spaces in order to mention the importance of variations in local characteristics. Duncan and Goodwin analyze "real mechanisms and processes that produce particular events and situations, and do this by integrating economic and political analysis" (1988; 29). The specificities of local situation do not only affect the outcome of local processes, but also "those general processes are themselves created by conscious active individuals".

In analyzing the local state, first of all, analysis should bear in mind that particular events and end-results are inevitably bound to historical and spatial characteristics. Secondly, if social relations are created and carried through by active individuals, the reason on how society comes to this point, and why their understanding and actions are "unevenly developed" should be examined (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; 29).

According to Duncan and Goodwin the concept of "local state", which has been developed by Cockburn, is useful in the analysis of local governments. The term local state enables us to define the conflicts that occur between local state and the central government. In addition to this, Cockburn's analysis depends on class relations and therefore makes it easier to relate the capitalist system and its nature of uneven development with existence of local governments. However, Duncan and Goodwin do not accept that local state is just a local arm of the central government. Duncan and Goodwin suggest that local state is an agent of the central state but on the other hand the relation between the central state and the local state may be in conflict. In addition, although Duncan and Goodwin support the ideas of Cockburn about class relations in local government, they do not analyze the position of local government in the framework of its functions. The important point in the analysis of the local state is not its functions but the area of struggle in local state structure.

The core of Duncan and Goodwin's theory depends on the social relationships which determine the whole structure. In this theoretical framework, function of local state stay in secondary position, whereas conflicts occur in local social life and influence of the social relations on local governments system become more important.

State forms and actions can then be linked to changing relations between groups of people instead of being left as socially inexplicable organizational forms or bundles of given functions. Just as the capitalist state is a historically formed social relation, so are state institutions at the local level. (...) A successful theory then should be able to relate historical differences and changes in state behavior to those social processes crucial in causing such specific situations. Also, if these crucial processes are different for national and sub national state institutions, then we can talk about a 'theory of the local state'. (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; 38)

According to Duncan and Goodwin, local relations cause uneven development on individuals and also on space. That is to say, relations are unevenly developed over space, in time even for the same person in different situations (Duncan & Goodwin, 1988; 41). The important point is that, because the social relations are unevenly developed, there arises a need for different policies in different places. Hence, local state is needed in order to formulate and carried out these variable policies. Central state can go through difficulties in dealing with the local relations but local state can balance these relations.

According to Duncan and Goodwin, there exists an uneven development among the local regions. Local variations are derived from differences in implementation of policies, conscious political choices at the local authority or existing patterns of need, pre-existing decisions on delivery modes, service type and spending may cause to local variations. On the other hand, centrally imposed financial systems may also cause to local variations. But according to Duncan and Goodwin, whatever the reason for local variation is, there exists a local authority variation in the politics and service delivery which causes the uneven development in the local level (Duncan & Goodwin, 1988; 6-7).

Duncan and Goodwin define the uneven development as the uneven process of development that is derived from the particular characteristics of capitalism (1988; 62). Uneven development in space and time is derived from processes of capitalist production and social reproduction. Development in one place and at a time is causally linked to underdevelopment elsewhere, development in one area of life is causally linked with underdevelopment in another. The logic of uneven development consists of the opposed but simultaneous tendencies towards the differentiation and equalization of the levels and conditions of production.

According to Duncan and Goodwin, generation of local state is a "double-edge" sword. (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; 41). Uneven development means that local groups are constituted and differentiated with respect to local strengths and importance. Local groups use local state institutions to express their own interests, but these local interests may be contrary to general interests. Since, local interests represented in local state institutions, local state may fall into conflict with national state's interests.

Duncan and Goodwin claim that in capitalist system, society becomes more differentiated day by day. This differentiation makes the administration more complex. Then, need for local state to act for specific local situations should be analyzed in the scope of this situation. If uneven development had been not the subject of society, the local units of state would have not been needed (Ersoy & Şengül, 2002; 101).

Duncan and Goodwin's analysis is important in determining the position of the social relations in local governments. Besides, their approach underlines local variations and the need for differentiated administrative structures in various localities. In addition, local variations and their reflection in local state structure may lead to conflicts between central government and local state. Therefore, local state is not only the local agent of central government, but have a conflicting relation with the central government resulted from the influence of local social relations.

2.2.7. A Critical and Integrative Approach as a Conclusion

In order to determine the role of state in the urban space, it is needed to determine the role of the local state as well as relations between local state and central government. Following Poulantzas and Jessop, Şengül mentions that analysis of state both in the local and national level cannot be made without evaluating the role of the social and economic relations (2003; 184). In other words, thinking of the state as an absolute power holder without referring social power processes will not be complete analysis. From this point of view, the position of local state in the whole state mechanism also determined with the socially developed power relations.

In the methodological analysis of local state as well as national state, three dimensions of are needed to be considered (Şengül, 2003; 184):

1. The institutionalized structure and internal organization of state,
2. Representative mechanisms existing both in the internal structure and outside of state,
3. Intervention forms of state to the relations outside the state.

Besides the conflicts occurring outside the state, the conflicts also occur in the internal structure of state as well. State is also the subject of inner differentiations, conflicts and separations in the relations. Because of this reason, it will not be accurate to evaluate the state mechanism as a monolithic structure. There can be conflicts among the units of the state and therefore, state has not the integrity in itself. Şengül mentions that the integrity of state depends on the projects aimed at developing the integrity of it. (2003; 185).

The question of why local state exists can be better explained in the scope of the uneven development of capitalist social relations (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; Şengül, 2003). As Duncan and Goodwin mention, because of the uneven development of social relations, there exists a need for differentiated political approaches in order to control these variations. Hence, local governments are needed in order to implement different policies in consistence with the different needs of local variations. But on the other hand, because local interests are represented in the local government structure, the interests of the local level and the national level may conflict. Local groups can use their power, which is represented in the local government structure, in conflict with national power structures.

To conclude, local state is both an agent of the central government which control local relations and implement centrally determined policies and also agent of local power structure in which local groups can defend their own interests.

Considering representation of groups in state mechanism, it is seen that, on the one hand there exists a structure which let participation in a pluralist way, but on the other hand, a structure exists which block participation channels in state mechanism (Şengül, 2003; 186). Representation modes do not only exist outside state structure but also in the internal state structure, too.

In the comparison of representation between local and national levels, local governments are recognized to be more participatory. According to this view, corporatist representation models are included in local government structures. However, local governments also include social power relations as well as inequalities in themselves. Therefore, acceptance of local governments as a more participatory unit without evaluating the structure of local governments in a wider scope will result with space fetishism (Şengül, 2003; 187). In addition, participation discourse in local governments also contributes the legitimization of the state.

To conclude, it should be kept in mind that local state is a part of a whole state structure which control local variations and implement policies in consistent with local needs. One of the important roles of local governments is contribution to legitimization process of state system while considering the interests in national level. On the other hand, because local state is an administrative unit which is formed by the local power relations it is not possible to say that local state is a unique local arm of arm of central government.

2.3. Left-Wing Municipalities

In this section, two foreign left-wing municipal experiences will be explained briefly, one from Europe and the other one from South America. The first one is from Italy, Bologna, in which the communist municipal administration was in power. The period between 1960-1980 in Bologna will be focused. The second example is from Brazil, Porto Alegre, which is a well-known and important local government experience in contemporary world. The importance of these experiments lies under the comprehension of the urban land with its use value rather than exchange value. In order to make an effective and people oriented administration, both experiments give great importance to participation of the urban dwellers.

As explored earlier, both of them will be evaluated briefly focusing on core points which make them different from the other municipal administrations. Then, historical development of left-wing administration in both and afterwards will be discussed for explaining their policies and implementations briefly to see how radical changes occur in local political culture in the capitalist system.

2.3.1. Red Bologna

Bologna is part of the region of Emilia-Romagna in central Italy. It is also known as “Red Bologna” or “Communist Bologna” as its socialist-communist tradition goes far before the First World War. Bologna was the largest Italian city under the control of left-wing parties before First World War. On the other hand, with the Mussolini’s Fascist Regime, there appeared a break in the left administration in the city. But after the liberation, coming after Second World War, the left tradition began to take part in the political process of Bologna quickly again (Parker, 2001; 287). It will be focused on the years between 1960-1980 periods of Bologna local administration.

In the post-war period, Italy was administrated by central parties under the domination of Christian Democrat Party (CDP) with support of smaller parties like Italian Liberal Party (ILP), Italian Republican Party (IRP) until the end of the 1950s. In early sixties, political process was opened to leftist again and Italian Socialist Party (ISP) began to take part in administration. However, their politics were rather standing in the central left. In the late 1960s, general radicalization of Italians led an opposition to central reformist politics and increased working class militancy. Besides, student unrest brought new dimensions to the Italian Politics. It was also a part of general phenomenon of middle class radicalization in all around the world (Jaggi and Schmid, 1977; 10-12). In the early sixties, working class became aware of the structural problems

of capitalist system and a strong working class struggle came to scene in Italy. In this period, Italian Communist Party (ICP) began to be strengthened as well.

On the other hand, in the post-war period, a rapid industrialization process was in progress in Italy. Yet, policies developed for industrialization had great effects in the agricultural sector and mass migration was started from rural area to industrialized cities in the early 1950s. It led to urban crisis because of the insufficient collective consumption services like schools, hospitals etc. Large scale urban movements developed until the late 1960s. But the working-class struggle was still dominant in the political arena (Lowe, 1986; 157).

However, the urban needs and the rising urban movements affected the left-wing parties and urban problems came to the agenda of them. This was foreseen with the active participation of the people into decision making process in order to cope with the urban problems. In the local elections held in 1970 and 1975, Italian Communist Party became the second party after Christian Democrat Party. Italian Communist Party came to power in 29 cities including Bologna. In the victory of the ICP, the general conditions in Italy and workers' as well as their struggle against the central government had great importance.

Bologna has a strong socialist - communist tradition and the communist did not come to power in the city with the election of 1970. The city was governed by the communist before the election.

The urban crisis caused by the rapid urbanization had been experienced especially in the Northern Italian cities, but Bologna was not affected from this crisis in a drastic manner (Jaggi and Schmid, 1977; 8). Because it was not affected by the migration so much, Bologna managed to preserve its social structure (Parker, 2001; 287). Although in the beginnings of the 1950s, a financial crisis had occurred in Bologna and all factories ceased production, the workers continued to work collectively and development of Bologna was provided by the collective works of the workers. In time, Bologna began to export the production to the other cities of Italy. Therefore, Bologna had not experienced the crisis that shook the country as a whole drastically. In addition, the workers in Bologna became middle-class with their small establishment. However, this middle-class stratum was equipped with socialist-communist ideology.

Economic and political stability and long-standing tradition of class struggle were important notions for implementing socialist policies in Bologna. Besides, the long tradition of communist groups, provide a more stable political base for the communist local government. Schmid asked a member of the local government in Bologna the reason of the success of Bologna about experience and he has answered as "We have had time to make mistakes – and to correct them."

(1977; 32). It is an important point to think about the municipal services and policies in the scope of this long-standing time period.

An important notion in the local policy of the communists in Bologna was the 'decentramento' which was supposed to divided the city into smaller units in order to make people participate more effectively (Jaggi and Schmid, 1977; 35). However, this division of the city could not become effective until 1960s. One of the reasons of for this inefficiency is the comprehension of concept of participation by the communists. According to Party manifesto, participation was meant activation of people in decision making process. That is to say, "people have several different functions in the working out of plans, their controls, giving advice, co-operation and constructive criticism, as well as in helping determine needs and decisions" (Jaggi and Schmid, 1977; 36). In sixties the vanguard of the Party about participation of people became reality. People had the right to intervene in all important plans. The participation of the people into city administration was one of the distinct features of the communist administration. In order to provide the effective participation, "neighborhood committees" were established in 1966 and in 1974 the legal duties of them were determined (Jaggi and Schmid, 1977; 39):

- To formulate guidelines for city budget, for urban and economic development, for the local supply and organization of traffic and economic technology; to grant appropriate licenses, building permits and economic patents.
- To take every initiative possible towards the improved supervision of education, health and leisure-time institutions.
- To elect the mayor's assistant by a two-thirds majority
- To set up Work Committees on education, local planning, traffic, sport and tourism, social security, trade and culture.

Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and the Party of Proletarian Unity all voted for the new law but Italian Liberal Party and Neo-Fascists did not accept. Neighborhood committees became the most important agent.

Bologna Municipality gave utmost importance to planning of the city. Planning measures deployed between 1960 ad 1970 reflected the growth of awareness in Italian labor movement and in planning offices responsible for Bologna. There are two important features in the preparation and the implementation of the city plan. First of all, the plan should develop a housing policy which prevented urban land from land speculators and should create a public housing policy. Secondly, thousands of Bolognese participated in the preparation of the city plan as well as the implementation. All basic provisions were discussed, approved or altered in part in the neighborhoods (Jaggi and Schmid, 1977; 50). This participation made the people the owners of the plan.

The Housing Policy of the municipality was also important. First of all, municipality tried to solve the problem by cooperatives and prevented the intervention of private firms to housing process in order to hinder land speculators and made the process cheaper. The co-operatives were non-profit organizations and every citizen could become a member of these co-operatives. Another important dimension of the housing plan was to preserve the historical structure of Bologna by building new residential areas out of the city center.

To prevent social and historical structure of Bologna, municipality also gave importance to public transportation. According to municipality, traffic problem had also political dimension and it needed to be dealt with (Jaggi and Schmid, 1977; 63). An efficient public transport system was established which provided workers not only travel more quickly but also travel free-of-charge in the rush hours.

Besides mentioned policies, Bologna local government gave importance to developing social policies considering the needs of neighborhoods. Education, public health, elders and other groups were considered by the municipality as well as the neighborhood committees. It can be said that policies were developed from a wider scale considering the future of the city as well as the Bolognese. Yet, Bologna was a part of a capitalist country and the thing they did was not a revolution but rather creating a solution for the problems with planning the future. As Jaggi and Schmid have mentioned

The Communists in bologna have not solved the crisis of capitalism in one area; nor have they developed a conception of socialism in one city. Rather, they have offered a perspective on what it is possible to achieve within a determinate social system. (1977; 7).

To sum up, Bologna Communist Municipal Government was affected from the Keynesian policies. However, the projects of the Bologna Communist Governments did not have direct relations with the Keynesian policies, since they were not directed by the capital accumulation. They constructed a different system which did not depend on profit oriented mechanism of market.

2.3.2. Porto Alegre

Another important municipal experience in the contemporary world is Porto Alegre which is located in the Rio Grande de Sul State of Brazil. Worker's Party (WP) (*Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT)) has been in power since 1988 in Porto Alegre and tries to establish a participatory municipal government.

Brazil was under dictatorship between the years 1964 and 1980. However, in the late 1970s, following changes in international conjecture and strengthening of civilian movements, the dictatorship began to lose its power. Social movements like Landless Workers (*Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra – MST*) have become effective in this period. Besides, urban population began to mobilize around urban issues in the neighborhood associations in that period. This mobility gave rise to the collapse of the dictatorship and in the early 1980s, pluralist political system was established in Brazil again. With the beginning of the pluralist system, left-wing movements began to gather around WP (Gret and Sintomer, 2004; 20). WP was established in 1980 and become a legal political party in 1982.

Power of WP in local governments started with elections held on 1985. Although, in the first power period, WP could not reach the model of participatory municipal government, they began to receive support from masses with their efforts. In 1988 elections, WP won the municipal administration of more than 30 cities including Sao Paulo, Porto Alegre. The domination of WP in the municipal power started with the 1988 elections. WP's aims in municipal administration were based on 'popular participation' and 'inverting priorities', i.e. responding first and foremost to the articulated needs of the majority (Macaulay, 1996; 212). Basic question of WP in order to put forward a model in the administration was "How to create a democracy in radical sense?". WP was aiming at the participation of urban movements to decision making mechanisms and increasing their effectiveness in municipal councils (Gret and Sintomer, 2004; 24). Then, Participatory Budget mechanism has come to the program in the municipalities that was WP in power.

In Porto Alegre, there has been a historical past in urban movements that goes before the municipality of WP. Union of Neighborhood Associations in Porto Alegre (UAMPA) was established in 1983 in order to prevent clientalism in the institutions. WP came to power in such circumstances and existing movements influence the policies of the WP in Porto Alegre.

The aim of the municipality is to establish a participative mechanism which exceed the technocratic, populist and clientalist governance system. The participatory budget mechanism is suppose to bring the control of public and to create a new public area out of the state (Genro and Souza, 1998; 43). In the early periods of mayoralty of WP, the participation to the neighborhood meetings in the scope of the participatory budget were high but they were not efficient because the needs of the neighborhoods exceeded the capacity of municipality (Genro and Souza, 1998; 28). Then, the municipality decided to make a program and arrangements in the tax system. Efficiency of neighborhood meetings were started in 1990 after drawing the borders of municipal

policies. That is to say, municipality defined the priorities in the scope of its capacity by considering the demands of the neighborhoods.

Participatory budget mechanism in Porto Alegre brings four decision making mechanisms together: Execution, Legislation, Civil Society and Special Institutions of the participation mechanism. Firstly, the internal organization of the municipality, was given importance to establish an effective relation with the neighborhoods and implement the participatory budget. GAPLAN (Planning Cabinet) was established as an upper organization. GAPLAN is working in coordination with the other departments of the municipality. The second mechanism is legislation which makes the decisions of the distribution about budget and etc. Thirdly, there is the civil society which is defined by people rather than organizations. This point gives its distinct character to Porto Alegre experiment from other participatory mechanisms because civil society does not constitute only people organized under a name but taken as the whole. One of the important decisions of the municipality is to end the power of the organized people in the decision making mechanisms. They try to make all people participate in to process. The participation should be the target by for each neighborhood and community may take a part as they(Gret and Sintomer, 2004; 37). Finally, Special Institutions of the participation mechanism is composed of joint organizations between the civil society and the administration.

The participatory budget process spreads through overall year. In the 16 neighborhood organizations, five thematic commissions has been established in Porto Alegre. The thematic commissions consist of five topics: transportation and traffic; health and social aids; education, culture and entertainments; economic development and taxes; organization and development of city which includes the housing, cleaning, environmental arrangements etc.

Although in the beginning WP municipal government faced problems in the establishment of the participatory budget mechanism, in time, and with experience, they managed to establish an effective participative mechanism in municipal government which prevents clientalist structure and patronage relations. It should be noticed that WP administration is in power in the period of neo-liberal policies are being implemented in the urban space. WP administration in Porto Alegre implements their politics without excluding capital groups rather it reserves bargaining power with the capital groups in order to distribute the capital accumulation throughout the city (Genro and Souza, 1998; 8). In addition, the participatory budget mechanism is not related with the governance mechanisms improving in Europe (Gret and Sintomer, 2004; 36). It is a political process in order to change the political culture in the local level.

CHAPTER 3

3. TURKISH URBANIZATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

This section will focus on the urbanization process of Turkey during 1970s. Within the scope of this study, the subject will be undertaken through the framework of the relations between the state, class and the reproduction process. Before beginning, it is worth mentioning that the studies about the urbanization process in Turkey can be divided into two categories. These categories are derived from the methods used in the studies focusing on the urbanization process in Turkey (Aslan, 2004; 61).

The first one examines the urbanization process through the basic indicators of urbanization like migration, industrialization, technology and etc. The common point of this type of studies is that they focus on the urbanization process in monographic urban places. The difference between them stems from the fact that they use different and specific indicators for examining the urbanization process of the specific area¹.

The second type of studies explains the urbanization process by utilizing the method of periodization. In these studies the process of Turkish urbanization is divided into three categories. The first period covers the years between 1923-50; the second period covers the years between 1950-1980; and the third and last period covers the years from 1980 till present. Şengül (2001) names these periods as Urbanization of (Nation) State, Urbanization of Labor Power and Urbanization of Capital by considering the relations between the state, class and the reproduction process operating in the urban space (2001; 64). In these three periods, the actors as well as the relations that occur in the urban space have changed. In the scope of this work, the process of Turkish urbanization will be explained from this framework and the focus on the issues and the conditions that define each period.

First of all, it needs to be mentioned that although different periods defined have distinct characteristics, it should also be kept in mind that every period carries some features of the previous (Şengül, 2001; 63). In other words, when started into a new period, the structure and

¹ Examples of these studies: Kıray, M. (1988), *Ağır Sanayiden Önce Bir Sahil Kasabası: Ereğli*, Bağlam Yayınları:İstanbul ; Erder, S., (1996) *İstanbul'a Bir Kent Kondu: Ümraniye*, İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul

actors of the previous period have not completely been eliminated. This indicates a historical and dialectical relation between the structure and actors of each period.

3.1. Urbanization of (Nation) State Period: 1923-1950

In the first period covering the years between 1923-1950, and named as urbanization of (nation) state period, basic characteristics of urbanization process are marked by a transition from a system which depended on the land regime of Ottoman Empire to a system that puts the nation state and modernization to its center (Şengül, 2001; 65). Although there are important break offs in the socio-spatial characteristic of these two periods, and, although there exists a clear distinction between the land regime and urban stratification of Ottoman Period and the Republican Era, the Republican Period can also be viewed as a continuation of the previous period, because modernization process has been started during the Ottoman period and modernization process in the Nation State bases on late Ottoman Period historically (Tekeli, 1998).

The vanguard of Kemalist bourgeois revolution was middle class. Hegemony of the middle class was dominant in modernization and nationalization process. In the modernization project of newly emerged Republic, cities had been given importance in order to construct a modern Turkish nation state. In this period, local development was under the strict control of the central government but, on the other hand, the whole urban development process like urban politics, urban ideology etc. were under the hegemony of the middle class. In other words, local processes were also dominated by this new middle class. It should also be noticed that, the subjected middle class' members did not only include the members of the state bureaucracy but also the members of middle class, from other economic sectors.

Nation state period has two basic characteristics. One of the important points in the establishment of the nation state is to construct a centralized state structure and the other one is to bring the people together around a defined identity. The spatial characteristics of this period had also been shaped around these two basic concerns. Three essential reflections of these characteristics of the nation state politics in the development process which also concerns the urbanization can be mentioned. First of all, in order to abolish the hegemony of Istanbul, Ankara was declared as the capital city, as a symbol of the new state hegemony in Anatolia. Secondly, in order to construct a nation, central government gave importance to development and statue of Anatolia. Thirdly, investments held by the state in the scope of statist development were distributed throughout

Anatolia. The homogeneity in the state investments throughout Anatolia provided industrial development of small cities² (Şengül, 2001; 71).

Related with dynamics created by scarce resources, existence of excluded groups and inner conflicts that occurred in the Kemalist ideology, the spatial scenario of the nation state had been narrowed and development of the cities had not realized as expected (Şengül, 2001; 71). Hence, Istanbul saved its power, and as we will see, in the next period it became the center of development.

In the administrative organization of the cities, national state envisaged local government structure that is dependent to central government but it also tried to create technically and economically equipped local government structure in order to create modern cities. On the other hand, the technically equipped municipalities had not been managed. This stems from the fact that, although local governors were given many responsibilities, they could not handle these duties (Şengül, 2001; 74). One of the important reasons for this failure stems from the policy of central government which was foreseeing the industrialization as the core of the development. The resource allocation was done for industrialization but local governments could not benefit from the resources. This caused a decrease in the municipal activities and the urban development was suspended.

With regard to the internal structure of the local governments, it is seen that, the mayors were appointed by the central government whereas the municipal council members were elected in the first period (Şengül, 2001; 103). Besides, in this period, dependency of local state to central government was high and the sphere of influence of local governments was low. Hence, local governments generally dealt with the interest of the local notables. The middle class members became effective in orienting the urban politics which also serves to their individual interests. The progress provided for the structuralization of the middle class' domination in the urban areas had been continuing till the Ottoman Period.

The nationalization strategy of the central government had given importance to industrialization and to decreasing the resources and power of the municipality. In addition, the power of the national state on the municipalities was realized. The decreased capacity of the municipalities and dependency to the central government caused municipalities to implement policies for the interest of local notables and middle class. Therefore, the effect of the middle class in the urban politics had risen. All of the above mentioned issues had affected the development of the modern

² The development of Ereğli from a small county to an industrialized city can be explained with this reason (Kıray, 1988)

urban space: However, the ideal of creating modern cities had faced a great obstacle with the migration of the masses to cities after 2nd World War.

3.2. Urbanization of Labor Power: 1950-1980

After the Second World War, a rapid migration from the rural areas to cities was seen. One of the basic reasons of the migration in early 1950s was the mechanization of the agricultural production with the help of the Marshall Aids. State chose a new path for the accumulation process which was based on the rural development. On the other hand, with the mechanization of the agricultural production, the rural population began to migrate to the city centers³. It can be said that the effect of the rural development and the rapid mechanization of agriculture was felt dramatically in the cities. Although the population of the cities were increasing, the policies of the state on the urban space had not yet been improved and the same policies were implemented (Şengül, 2001; 76).

Another important development that had occurred in early 1950s was the engagement of the import substitution policies in order to decrease the import of the consumption goods. After the Second World War, Keynesian accumulation strategies became the core point in Western countries, whereas in the underdeveloped countries import substitution strategies were dominant. State has a central position in the orientation of the capital accumulation in both strategies. However, although the state had assumed to manage the over accumulation of capital in the developed countries, state implemented its strategies with insufficient capital accumulation in the underdeveloped countries. From the urban perspective, in the developed countries, the intervention of the state to the urban space was high and the urban services were improved. On the other hand, because of the insufficient capital accumulation, the resources were directed to industrialization rather than being allocated to the development of the cities. This was the condition in Turkey as well.

The little intervention of the state to urban spaces also created a legitimization problem (Şengül, 2004). The urbanization was directed by the local communities (Şengül, 2001; 77). That is to say, state had forsaken the urbanization process to the local communities.

The migration created a new social class in the cities; the urban poor. State had no policy for this problem and this was an unexpected situation for the urban development. On the contrary, the

³ The mechanization of the agricultural sector started with the sudden increase in the number of the tractor in 1949. The number of the tractor was 1756 in 1948, whereas it increased to 9170 in 1949, to 161585 in 1950, to 27000 in 1951 and to 31415 in 1952 (DİE, Summary of Agricultural Sector Statistics: 1939-1959).

role of the state and the influence of the local state, or the central government were low in the urbanization process and there was no solution for the newly emerging problem. Therefore, the urban poor who had migrated from the rural areas tried to find a solution in order to survive in the cities. For the solution of their housing problem, they built squatters. For the solution of unemployment problem, they had begun to take part in the informal economy. This situation also shows that, local communities had created their own solutions in the urban center.

In the beginning of the 1950s, during the first years of the construction of the squatter houses, there occurred conflicts between state and the squatters. Squatters were a threat for the authority of state which had guaranteed the mutual exchange of the private property and market. The squatters occupied the urban land illegally and disregarded the planning rules as well as the rights of private ownerships. On the other hand, squatters were obstacles for creating modern cities and modern city dwellers (Şengül, 2001; 78). Not only the state, but also the settled middle class city dwellers had negative attitude towards squatters. The squatters were threatening their life style with their habits they inherited in the rural areas. The immigrants coming from the rural areas impeded their own cultural improvement. On the other hand, new urban social class had not ended the influence of the middle class; i.e. the members of middle class continued to share the urban space, but they had begun to become second in position.

Although the state had efforts in order to demolish the squatters, in time, it became unable to cope with them. It was known that, tools of the urban governments were not sufficient, but the problem was growing. The state could not deploy an alternative solution for the squatters. In order to deal with the situation, state had to stand against the squatters during the 1950s. However, as it was unable to cope with them, state began to accept the existence of the squatters in the beginning of the 1960s.

It should also be mentioned that squatter dwellers had not been politically mobilized when they first came to the cities. Their attitude towards the private ownership did not relate to communist ideology. In contrast, the first comers generally voted for the conservative parties and saved their conservative world views till the beginning of the 1970s. Therefore, it was not possible to discuss the radicalization of the squatter dwellers in that period. Their spatial existence did not occur with reference to a political project (Şengül, 2001; 79). One of the important reasons of them not becoming politically mobilized was their heterogeneous community structure. The immigrants were not homogeneously settled in the cities; rather they preserved their rural characteristics and their relations. Besides, the settlements were diversified with respect to the dwellers' ethnic roots, their origins, etc. In order to gather the squatters under a political ideology, there was a need for

political pioneering. However, until the beginning of the 1970s neither they nor the others could manage to hold such a position.

As mentioned above, in the beginning of the 1960s, the state had begun to change its attitude towards the squatters. Although the demolition did continue, positive attitudes appeared. This was rather related to the rising population of the squatters; because, in time, the political balance had begun to change with their voting preferences. On the other hand, state did not make any efforts for the reproduction of the labor power, as the squatter dwellers solve this problem by themselves. They became the cheap labor power and provided the reproduction by themselves. The state tried to integrate the labor power into the system (Şengül, 2001; 82). Another important point in the attitudes of the state towards the squatters was shaped around the ineffectiveness of the state in the urban space. As mentioned above, the ineffectiveness of the state created a legitimization problem which might give way to a crisis in the cities. However, the state had produced buffer mechanisms in order to prevent crisis. For example, state gave the property right to squatters.

On the other hand, there appeared a leftist move which gave importance to the social equity and justice. Especially, the social base of the Kemalist Groups began to redefine the social base which also affected the attitude of the local governments. The discourse had begun to shape on the basis of social justice. Especially in the Republican People's Party municipalities, a new stream arose. As presented in the following sections in more details, local governments had begun to produce social policies for the squatters. This new comprehension is called "New Municipalism". The New Municipalism had become important throughout the country as it was aimed at bringing a new area for the municipalities.

On the other hand, a left-wing view had begun to appear among the squatters as well. The political mobilization of the squatters was started in this period, especially by the second generation of the squatters. One of the important points in this attitude is derived from the changing characteristics of the squatters. In time, the squatter had begun to compare their position in the cities not with considering their life in the rural areas but considering the position of the middle class (Şengül, 2001; 85). They wanted to benefit the collective consumption services. It also created a new conflict area between the local state and squatters.

One of the important reasons in the political mobilization of the squatter was the rising left-wing movements throughout the country. The rising left-wing movement was two sided. On the one hand, workers' struggle was rising in the pioneering of Revolutionary Workers Labor Union Confederation. In addition, TİP was managed to take part in the parliamentary. On the other

hand, a left-wing movement was rising on illegal base which generally composed of university youth, especially in the big cities. Left-wing groups had begun to be dominant in the squatter areas and new conflicts arose in these places especially in the 1970s. On the other hand, rightwing movement had also begun to rise. The struggle was severe and in big cities, squatters became more important for the rising movements especially in the late 1970s. The central government was in the hand of conservative parties, Conflicts became more severe in the big cities. One of the important examples of the integrity of left-wing movements to the squatter areas was the 1 Mayıs District, as we will explain in more detail.

It can be understood that, the urbanization process throughout the 1950s was shaped around the issue of migration from the rural areas. This time period can be divided into three by considering the attitude of state towards the squatters. In the beginning, state was completely against the squatters but could not manage to eliminate the problem. In time, with the rise of their population, state attitude changed and the squatters had begun to be accepted as an urban issue. Besides, the rise in the population of the squatter also changed the balance of the political support. On the other hand, state attitude towards the squatters was also changing because of their supply of labor power. Coming to the 1970s, a new comprehension had begun to shape on the basis of social justice. This was not only the subject of the big cities but also reflected other cities as well. RPP won the local elections in nearly all the municipalities of the big cities. The New Municipalism affected their policies but as we will see, this comprehension created conflicts with the central government as well as in the internal structure of RPP.

This period was closed with the coup d'état of September 12th, 1980 and a completely new period has started which still continues. Besides, the military intervention, the economic decision which was taken by the imposition of IMF was also an important dimension in the starting of a new period. We are going to quickly overlook to this period in the following part.

3.3. Urbanization of Capital: 1980 and After

After the economic decision taken on the 24th of January in 1980, which has implied giving up the import substitution strategies, and coup d'état of 12th of September, 1980, a new period began in Turkey. Within the context of urban development, it can be said that, the policies shifted from use value to exchange value of urban space. In this period, cities have become more important in the national policies and big investments have begun to flow in the cities. It can be stated that, an absolute hegemony of the capital groups was realized in the urban space. State also supported this development by its policies. An important consequence has been the inequality realized in

urban service provision in the sense that while great amount of infrastructure budget were aroused for the investments of the big capital, an overall decline in the quality and quantity of urban services was also observed. With a more generalized explanation, neo-liberal policies have shaped the urban space.

As this period exceeds the scope of the study, the details of the period will not be mentioned. In the next section, two examples from the period of 1970s, which are going to explain the New Municipalism and 1 Mayıs District development, will be discussed.

3.4. Urban Movements During 1970s

3.4.1. New Municipalism

As mentioned before, with the increase in the immigrant population coming from the rural areas to urban centers, there occurred crucial urban problems. Although changes had begun in the beginning of the 1950s, the problem became more drastic when come to the end of 1950s. In early 1950s, state attitude was severe against the squatters and was they were forced to leave the cities through demolishing their houses. On the other hand, the number of the new comers was rising day by day and local governments could not produce alternatives for the solution of this newly emerged urban problem except for the demolishment of squatter houses. However, the attitude of local governments towards the squatters had begun to change by the first years of 1960s. The municipalities could not take part in the reproduction of the labor power because of scarce resources they have. On the other hand, the squatters became seats of cheap labor power and the state did not need to give so much effort for the reproduction of the labor power in the cities as the squatters could manage it by themselves. In other words, the intervention of the state in the reproduction of labor power was limited and the reproduction was held at the local level within local communities and the institution of family institution. However, it is difficult to say that squatters had the chance to be represented in the urban political structure.

In addition, rising population of the squatters caused changes in the political powers and local communities of the squatter settlements had begun to be important in the late 1960s. On the other hand, urban problems were being defined as structural problems (Şengül, 2001; 104). Besides, left-wing movements began to rise throughout the country. In the pioneering of the middle class, “urban left-wing movement” which tried to shift the focus to urban inequalities and social justice began to be effective in major cities. This discourse found its place in the left-wing parties but the development of the movement materialized in RPP generally (Şengül, 2001; 105). RPP began to reshape its discourse and redefine its political base again. The discourse began to change and the

concepts of social justice and equity became important in the redevelopment of the discourse. RPP had foreseen that the development would start from the rural areas in the national level. Besides, they viewed the squatter areas of cities as the practical basis of their discourse on social justice and equality. In the 1973 elections, RPP won nearly all metropolitan municipalities and the period of “New Municipalism” continued till 1980.

The core point of New Municipalism was to give priority to use value of the urban space rather than exchange value. In parallel with this aim, RPP municipalities began to follow more comprehensive strategies which focused on the development of the collective consumption services. However, the steps of this comprehensive project had not been planned, but they had rather been developed in the implementation process (Şengül, 2001; 84). The municipalities began to produce necessary municipal services as well as developing projects considering the urban poor. For example, municipalities established asphalt factories in order to cover the roads, established bakery factories in order to provide cheaper bread for the society and developed policies for the improvement of the public transportation. Being the most important one, municipalities tried to develop housing projects in order to cope with one of the biggest problems of cities: squatter houses (Tekeli and Gülöksüz, 1990; 374). Hence, it can be said that municipalities began to intervene to the responsibilities of the central government (Şengül, 2001; 107). What is an important consequence is that, these new strategy and the projects had taken support of the masses in the cities.

The experience of Izmit municipality is a good example for public housing project of New Municipalism. Izmit Municipality had developed a public housing project, called “New Settlement Project”, which was considering low income workers (Aslan, 2004; 75). The important point in the project was the participation of the target group to the development of the project and the project were shaped considering the needs of the workers. In order to achieve this, municipality organized meetings in the districts and in labor unions as well as conducting a questionnaire in order to determine the needs of the low income groups.

Another important public housing project was developed in Ankara Municipality by Mayor Vedat Dalokay in 1974. The project was called “BrightHouse” (Akkondu) which was referring the program of RPP called “BrightDays” (Akgünler). The project was planned by the Director of Social Housing Department of the Municipality. According to the project, the municipality would expropriate the land, develop infrastructure, provide technical resources, and later sell the lots to low and middle-income groups (Batuman, 2006; 69). The project of the Ankara Municipality was criticized largely by the other groups. The important point in the critiques was that municipality could not utilize land speculation “to profit”, even for raising funds and preferences of middle-

income rather than low-income groups. In addition, it was criticized that such kind of a project could not be a solution to the problem of squatters as inhabitants of squatter areas could not buy the houses built. It can be said that, although the projects were successful especially from the participatory point of view, they could not provide a solution for the squatter settlements. Another objection was that satellite cities were not the solution; but rather the solution should be found within the existing residential areas. Nonetheless, these projects are the indicators of the New Municipalism.

As mentioned before, urban left-wing movement was generally carried by the middle class. Actually, although urban governments of New Municipalism tried to provide a participatory mechanism in the urban management, the representation of the low income groups could not be achieved. Middle class members and local notables continued their domination throughout the 1970s as well. The urban left-wing view generally represented in the body of mayor, but the mayors felt into conflicts with municipal councils. The improvement of the collective consumption services which was the sign of the effort for fostering use value of the urban space generally criticized by the council members who were giving priority to the exchange value of the space (Şengül, 2001; 105). On the other hand, behaving if they were independent, there appeared conflicts in the internal structure of RPP because of the attitudes of the mayors.

The conflicts of the mayors who were advocates of the view of the urban left-wing view not only fell into conflict with the municipal administration but there were also severe tensions between the mayors and the central government. Whereas the local governments were usually handled by RPP, the central government was conservative for most periods and this differentiation caused severe conflicts between the municipalities and the central government. The central government tried to limit the resources for the municipalities. On the other hand, municipalities sought ways to improve their autonomy vis a vis the central government.

An important contribution to this discussion can be made by considering the local governments in the developed countries. As stated earlier, local governments were implementing social policies during the Keynesian period but they were also agents of the central government in order to orient the capital accumulation to urban services. Local governments did not fall into conflicts with the central government as they were working in close relations with the central government in the sense that state intervened to the public space through the agent of local government (Cockburn, 1977). On the contrary, in Turkey, local governments fell into deep conflicts with central government and they were put into the scope of an autonomous structure (Şengül, 2001; 107). It means that, local governments were seen as a part of civil society whereas in developed countries, in which Keynesian policies were implemented, local governments were seen as an

important agent of the state structure. Besides, municipalities behaved as they were organizing a social movement or a political party independent from the national scale.

New Municipalism brought a new attitude to the development and implementation of municipal services. On the other hand, the urban left-wing movement was a middle class movement and in many instances it was not able to reach lower classes. Although the municipalities developed projects, these projects were only supported by the lower class groups but not owned by them. Besides, local governments were seen as a threat for the unity of the state projects and there occurred conflicts between them. In addition, local governments gave rise to the legitimacy crisis of the state which has grown as a big problem through the late 1970s. The New Municipalism ended with the coup d'état of September 12th, 1980.

New Municipalism was not a movement experience flourished through the demands of a base but rather was a managerial movement in the administrative structure of the municipality. Although it was supported by the masses, the policies implemented within the scope of New Municipalism were not demanded by the masses. The contextual features of the movement in its militancy and incidence is said to lie under the local state actions on the collective consumption issues and the general political context of the period (Pickvance, 1985). Besides, the role of the middle class is also important.

3.4.2. 1 Mayıs District

Urban left-wing movement rose in 1970s and developed in the integrity of the municipal structures; more radical left-wing movement had rose in the late 1960s. They were struggling to become influential in cities as well. Radical left-wing movement, especially seen in the large cities, focused on squatters and developed the discourse in the scope of the sheltering right. According to left-wing movement, housing problem was a component of class struggle and hence, it should be dealt with. After the 1971 military note, radical left-wing groups began to organize in the squatter settlements.

One of the significant examples of analyzing radical left-wing movement in cities was held in a squatter settlement, 1 Mayıs District⁴ in Istanbul. The name of the district was changed and now it is called as Mustafa Kemal District. The district is located in Umraniye subprovince of Istanbul, now. We are going to explain the events occurred in the late 1970s in the district.

⁴ “1 Mayıs” means 1st of May in English.

The number of squatter settlements was increasing in the mid 1970s in the region. In the very beginning, there were groups who had been selling the public land and building the houses on it in that area. (Aslan, 2004; 99). With the increased development rate of squatter settlements, there appeared squatter mafias (or gangs) who had also indirect relation with the local authorities in the big cities. Besides, disinterest of the local governments towards squatter settlements made them act freely. They were also influential in 1 Mayıs District. The first settlements were held under the control of squatter mafia in 1 Mayıs District.

However, with the rising influence of the left-wing movement in squatter settlements, there appeared a dual power in 1 Mayıs District. According to squatter dwellers, squatting was under the control of mafia in the district and this condition had to be changed urgently. This was an area of struggle as well. Both power structures were illegal in the district (Aslan, 2004; 101).

Left wing movements were gaining the support of the squatters with the program they foresaw as the core of the squatter settlements. Besides struggling against the mafia, the organization of the left-wing movements tried to construct an alternative urban system which derived from the solidarity and the representation of the urban poor living in Istanbul. They began their activities with this framework and developed a program. However, before implementing the program, they abolished the influence of mafia with the support they gained. After the abolishment of influence of mafia, a public committee was established and general framework of development of squatter settlements was prepared. It was supposed that solidarity should have to be established and land would have to be distributed by considering the needs. Moreover, in order to prevent the utilization from the land, everyone should have had only one squatter house (Aslan, 2004; 104). In time, the committee became the organizer of the daily life in the squatter settlement. An important point in the establishment of the committee is that they were appointed Uskudar subgovernor in order to become a legal association but their appointment was cancelled because there was no registered district as “1 Mayıs” (Aslan, 2004; 109).

The Public Committee of 1 Mayıs District began to work in May 1977. In August, the name of the district was defined as “1 Mayıs” which was referring to the protests on 1st May of 1977. It had been rejected by some squatter dwellers but this “radical” name was begun to be used for the squatter settlement.

The left-wing movement paid attention to planning of the district. However, it was hard to implement an “ideal plan” because of the previously constructed houses. The first plans of the district were shaped in the scope of the existing situation. However, in September 2nd, 1977, a big demolition operation was organized by state forces in the district, in which armed conflict

occurred and nine people were killed. After the big demolition, although there was demoralization among the squatters, the struggle continued and new plans were prepared. There are several important points in the preparation of the plans. First of all, the public committee asked for help from the UCTEA⁵ (Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects). Besides, from several universities, students with left-wing ideology came to take part in the development process. The plans were prepared by considering the future development of the district as well as building a healthy settlement. Plans were made with focus on the public land as it was accepted that only public land could be used for public interest (Aslan, 2004; 117-124).

The district began to take attention of the mass media. However, the focus of news about the district was the domination of left-wing movement in the district rather than squatter settlements and problems that the dwellers had. With the rising tension in the district, in March 1978, state organized a big operation to the district. After the operation, some of the members of the public committee were put into jail and the others were forced to leave the district. After this second big operation to the district, the left-wing influence in there began to decrease because of demoralization. In other words, the collapse of the public committee meant the collapse of the organizational unity in the district (Aslan, 2004; 153).

After the abolishment of public committee, a new committee was established and was called the Committee of Aldermen which had different characteristics from the previous one. Generally, they did not completely support the previously held activities. They made efforts in order to legalize their district and they began to establish relations with local authorities. Although the legalization of the district could not be managed till 1980s, they managed to establish a legal cooperative, which also provided the hindering of the black-market in the district, in the first hand. Then, a school and a clinic were established in the district. After the military coup in 1980, the district was legalized under a different name; Mustafa Kemal District⁶.

1 Mayıs District experience is an important example for the urban struggles in Turkey during the 1970s. In this example, it is seen that, broader political movement had affected the urban struggle and an urban movement began to rise. The aim of the movement was to create an alternative solution in the squatter settlements on the socialist base. The urban movement that occurred in 1 Mayıs District can be evaluated in the framework of urban movements drawn by Pickvance (1985). There existed a rapid urbanization process in which the state intervention failed (Type 1). In addition, there existed a defensive struggle in the 1 Mayıs District (Type 4) and also a self

⁵ TMMOB – Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği

⁶ For more information about “1 Mayıs District”: Aslan, S. (2004), 1 Mayıs Mahallesi: 1980 Öncesi Toplumsal Mücadeleler ve Kent, İletişim: İstanbul

planning activity held by the squatters (Type 3). On the other hand, these kind of left-wing activities were held in the 1970s in different squatter settlements. In the big cities, squatter areas became important centers in the development and struggle of the left-wing groups.

CHAPTER 4

4. FATSA EXPERIENCE

4.1. Political and Administrative Structure of Fatsa

Fatsa is a relatively small town located in the Black Sea Region of Turkey, and an important subprovince in the Ordu Province. The population of the town center is 64.087⁷ in population census of 2000. In 1977, the population of Fatsa town center was 19.546⁸. The economy of Fatsa is based on agriculture, primarily hazelnut farming, with a secondary income coming from fishing. The town has little in the way of industry, with most of the residents involved in hazelnut production in some way.

As a whole, Fatsa cannot be defined as a settlement that is dominantly urban in character since its economy is based on agriculture. It is known that economic activities of city dwellers do not depend on agricultural activities (Keleş, 1998; 75). Fatsa has both rural and urban characteristics as the dwellers of Fatsa also deal with hazelnut agriculture. This point is important when evaluating urban development and urban movements in Fatsa because, as mentioned in the theoretical framework, an important feature of the urban struggle is its derivation from urban issues. Class relations are important in the development of urban struggles, but in the Fatsa case we need to consider both its rural and urban characteristics in order to analyze the rise of the social movement correctly. The class relations in Fatsa are shaped around agricultural economic activities, while there exist urban issues in the city center. For this reason, when analyzing the urban issues of Fatsa we need to consider the social relations of both the rural and urban bases.

The class struggle in Fatsa is based on the relation between the peasants and merchants. However, it has to be mentioned that the hazelnut merchants or notables also have large hazelnut gardens, and so it can be difficult to make a distinct separation between who is a peasant and who is not. For purpose of this thesis, it can be said that the struggle is generally shaped around the relations between the peasants living in poverty and the merchants.

As the basic economic activity of the Fatsa subprovince is hazelnut farming, the city center is not economically productive, but is rather a market for the local produce. Of course the city center

⁷ www.yerelnet.org.tr/belediyeler/index.php?belediyeid=127383 – 12.10.2006

⁸ www.yerelnet.org.tr/belediyeler/belediye_secim.php?belediyeid=127383&yil=1977#yil -12.10.2006

accommodates public services, as well as small tradesmen and merchants and professionals such as lawyers, pharmacists, doctors etc., and is where the civil servants live.

An important political feature of Fatsa is its ethnic structure, which affects the political structure of the subprovince. Besides the Turks, there are also Georgians present in the social structure; and in addition to Sunnis there are also a number of Alevi Muslims. The ethnic conflicts are seen in the political influence of the ethnic groups, but physical conflicts deriving from ethnic differences are rare in Fatsa. During the interviews conducted in the preparation of this thesis it was found that the Georgians are generally conservative and nationalist, whereas the Alevis are generally socialist.

Coming to the dominant political groups in Fatsa, during the 1970s the political power was in the hands of the social democrats. The table below gives us the local election results from four elections over a 14-year period.

Table 2: Local Election Results in the Fatsa Subprovince by Years

Year	Population	Parties	Mayors	Municipality Council
1963	6.841	Justice Party (JP)	1.171	1.138
		Republican People's Party (RPP)	1.630	1.571
1968	9.738	Justice Party (JP)	1.492	1.334
		Republican People's Party (RPP)	1.918	1.718
		Turkish Workers' Party (TWP)	90	85
1973	14.266	Justice Party (JP)	576	575
		Republican Trust Party (RTP)	-	159
		Republican People's Party (RPP)	2.598	2.189
		Democrat Party (DP)	-	175
		National Safety Party (NSP)	-	213
		Independents	1.262	-
1977	19.546	Justice Party (JP)	1.265	1.397
		Republican People's Party (RPP)	2.515	2.614
		National Safety Party (NSP)	169	208
		Democrat Party (DP)	-	269
		Independents	1.358	74

Source: www.yerelnet.org.tr

As can be seen from the table that the RPP were significantly ahead of the other parties, while the right-wing was dominated by the JP. It can also be concluded from these results that independent candidates also had a strong position in the local politics of Fatsa.

When we asked about the social and political structure of Fatsa before 1979 during the interviews made in the scope of this study, it was generally believed that Fatsa had a democratic structure, and that the RPP was dominant in the political arena. Ertuğrul Günay, ex-parliamentarian of Ordu, said:

...The strong left-wing influence throughout the 1970s and the existence of the RPP in the political arena allowed the left-wing factions to become stronger. The right-wing movements such as Ülkü Ocakları were rising where the rightist base was stronger, while left-wing factions were rising where the leftist base was stronger. The development of Revolutionary Path can be explained in this way.” (From interview)

The opinion of Zeki Muslu, who was the Fatsa RPP candidate in the 1979 elections, is also noteworthy:

Between 1977 and September 14th, 1979, the RPP was stronger, allowing the left-wing movements to find a base to develop easily. It was easy for them to organize activities such as theatre, concerts and festivals under the roof of Halkevleri or TÖB-DER. The people of Fatsa could join these communities, as they were social democrats. All of these leftist groups, I need to emphasize all of them, were geared towards making the people vote for the RPP in the general elections, pre-elections etc., although they were standing at the edge of the RPP. (From interview)

Rahmi Yangın, who is a hazelnut merchant in Fatsa and a former member of the Justice Party, also comments on the roots of the RPP in Fatsa: “The political root of Fatsa was based on the RPP. These people grew up under the wings of the RPP, but later disclaimed the party.”

The political domination and power of the RPP in Fatsa was an important element in the development of the left-wing movement in the 1970s. In addition, beginning in the 1960s, left-wing movements and groups started to find a base in Fatsa. In the rest of the country a political mobilization process was continuing, and the activities of the left-wing were rising. Bringing these two points together, it can be seen that the growing left-wing movement in Turkey found a base in Fatsa due to the political culture of the town. As Pickvance notes, a broader political mobilization and a cultural understanding of politics are important notions in the development of urban social movements (Pickvance, 1985; 42-43). Clearly, the political and social structure of Fatsa gave rise to the development of a radical left-wing movement in the 1970s. In addition, as Ertuğrul Günay and Hüseyin Uygun mentioned in their interviews, it is generally accepted that right-wing movements are stronger in areas where the right wing political actors are dominant, whereas left wing movements are stronger where the left political culture is rooted. This is the case for Fatsa, in line with the rest of the country. It can be generalized that in the development of

an urban social movement the political and social structures and their historical roots are important.

4.2. The Evolution of Left-Wing Movements

4.2.1. Before 1977

Across the country, political movements had been rising in the late-1960s. It is important to consider the effects of the rising political movements in order to understand the movements in Fatsa better, because although the period that will be examined covers the late 1970s, it is a political process that needs to be defined from a historical point of view. The developments in the political sphere in the late 1960s also had an affect on the political and social struggles in Fatsa.

A political mobilization began in the late 1960s in Fatsa. There are a number of groups that affected the political structure at the time, three of which are worth particular mention: The First one is the Federation of Ideas Club (*FKF – Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu*) was an important political organization during the 1960s among university students (Uyan, 2004; 19). The ideology of the FKF was brought to Fatsa by the youths from the town who had been continuing their education elsewhere in the country. Secondly, the Teachers Syndicate of Turkey (*TÖS – Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası*), which had one of its points of origin in Fatsa (Uyan, 2004; 20). And thirdly, Turkish Workers' Party (*TİP – Türkiye İşçi Partisi*), which established a branch in Fatsa and had taken part in the elections of 1968. In the subprovince organizational structure of TİP, we come across a well-known name, Fikri Sönmez, who was later to become the mayor of Fatsa, and who took part in the establishment of TİP in the subprovince, becoming the chairman of the local organization after Ziya Yılmaz.

Political organizations established in Fatsa were dominated by the middle class. Although the basic political struggle in Fatsa was shaped around the agricultural activities, and in the rural areas the middle-class organizations (TÖS, FKF, Halkevi) had affects on the political mobilization of Fatsa. Therefore, it can be said that political mobilization of the middle-class in Fatsa was important. The role of the middle class is also emphasized in the analyses of Castells and Pickvance (Castells, 1983; Pickvance, 1985), who underline the role of the middle-class in the development of social movements.

As mentioned above, the social and political structure of Fatsa needs to be considered in the scope of the peasants' activities, and therefore the roles of the above groups were different to those of other places. Although the city center was also an important area in the struggle to gain

public support, the development of the left-wing movement should be considered in accordance with the rural struggles.

An important event that needs mentioning in order to understand the beginnings of the peasant movements in Fatsa is the Beyceli Village example. Beyceli Village, small village in Fatsa, can be considered as one of the most unique village movements in Turkey in that period. In the late 1960s the youth of Beyceli village began to publish a one-sheet newspaper called “Green Fatsa” (Yeşil Fatsa), which supported the ideologies of the FKF. The owner of the newspaper was Ertan Sarıhan (who died later in Kızıldere with Mahir Çayan) and the responsible editor was Zeki Sarıhan. The newspaper began highlighting the problems of the villagers, and organized activities in the village of Beyceli as well as in the neighboring villages. The one-sheet newspaper had a marked affect on the people of Beyceli, who became more aware of their problems and later began discussing them. The year of 1967 was a turning point for the Beyceli villagers. The most important problem of the village was related to the lack of road infrastructure, and the villagers had been demanding a proper road for several years but had had their plight ignored by the state authorities. The villagers organized a meeting during which they decided to march to Ordu in order to present their demands to the governor. Approximately 100 villagers marched to Ordu, a journey that took two days, stopping at every community along the way to explain their plight. The governor of Ordu met with village representatives and promised to construct the road, after which the marchers returned to their village in trucks provided by the governorship of Ordu.

The march had a great affect in Fatsa and was the first peasant’s movement in the region. The success of the march led to the organization of a further meeting on poverty, which only brought limited participation, but the Beyceli march had created a base for the left-wing movement to reach the people, and the focus of the movement became the poverty of the hazelnut peasants and the hazelnut sector.

In the 1960s, the left-wing movement had been rising in the country, with more and more people participating in left-wing groups. Severe conflicts between right-wing and left-wing groups began to occur in the early-1970s. The discourse developing in the country and the resulting affects on the political status quo brought about a requirement by the state to curb the growth of left-wing movements. The state intervened in the armed conflicts that were occurring, trying to take control and put down the radical groups. Leaders of the radical left-wing groups were arrested and Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnan and Yusuf Aslan were sentenced to death. Mahir Çayan, Cihan Alptekin, Ertuğrul Kürkçü and Ömer Ayna made plans to intervene in the death

sentences, but became aware that they could not stay in Istanbul, Ankara or anywhere else⁹. They decided to go to Fatsa due to the strong organizational structure of the left-wing in the town, and plans were made to kidnap British military officers from Unye Military Radar Base in the Unye subprovince of Ordu. While the plans were being finalized, the state learned of their location, and Fatsa and Unye were laid siege by soldiers. The group managed to kidnap two soldiers from Unye and escaped to the Kızıldere village of Tokat. The group comprised 10 people, of which three were from Fatsa: Ertan Sarihan, Ahmet Atasoy and Nihat Yılmaz.

In Kızıldere they came face to face with the state powers, and all except for Ertuğrul Kürkçü were killed in the resulting armed battle¹⁰. The events in Kızıldere echoed in Fatsa due to the deaths of three of Fatsa's residents. The state powers made additional arrests in Fatsa, one of which was Fikri Sönmez, who was imprisoned for 22 months.

After the Kızıldere event, Fatsa became a point of focus for the country as a place where the radical left had been rising, and strict controls were laid down in the town (Uyan, 2004; 21). Hence, one of the places most deeply affected during the 12th March Military Note was Fatsa¹¹. The rising social movements and the power of the left were diminished, especially after the Kızıldere event. The political mobility of society and the activities of the left-wing groups had been drastically reduced in the martial law period across the whole country, but the events in Kızıldere and the resultant military pressure were felt even more so in Fatsa.

The 12th March Military Note had had a marked affected on the rising left-wing movement, which was a great shock for the leftists. After the 12th March Military Note, the radical left suffered defeat and the groups began to disperse around the country. In the post-12th March period it took long time for the leftists to assemble in an organizational structure (Müftüoğlu, 1988; 2251). The previous organizations had collapsed and conflicts continued among the radical left groups, resulting in a separation in the radical left. Although there had been several groups in the radical left political area, the 12th March defeat and the effects of the post-12th March period

⁹ Mahir Çayan was one of the leaders of the illegal radical left-wing front called People's Liberation Party – Front of Turkey (Türkiye Halkın Kurtuluşu Partisi – Cephesi (THKP-C)). The others were also the revolutionist and supported THKP-C as well as the other revolutionist movements like the People's Liberation Army of Turkey (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (THKO)).

¹⁰ For the detailed information about the “Kızıldere” event, look at, Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, 2187-2188

¹¹ In the late 1960, as being in whole around the world, the social movements were increasing. Especially, university youths were highly politized. The conflict between the rightwing and leftwing groups began to be severe. Besides, there were problems in the central government central government structure. For stopping the rising politization of people, the conflicts and governmental problems, in 12th March of 1971, military gave a note to the government. The Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel was resigned at that date.

brought about a change in social conditions from the previous period, and the focus and methods in the left-wing began to change.

In the post-12th March period, the existing radical left-wing movements in Fatsa had begun to decrease under the strict state control in Fatsa, making the situation difficult for the leftists. In this period, the radical right movements, taking advantage of the weakened left-wing, found an arena from where they could spread their activities around the country, including Fatsa. The rising radical right was based on the nationalist view, with members from Ülkü Ocakları¹² or similar organizations, and the radical right-wing began to rise in Fatsa and conflicts broke out between the right and left.

The conflicts between the radical right- and left-wings defined the politics in the 1970s in Fatsa. The focus of the struggle for the left wing had shifted from the basic problems of Fatsa's socio-economic structure to defending itself against the radical right. The attacks of the right wing groups were on the rise and the struggle area of the left-wing groups began to shrink. In 1975, the radical left-wing decided to unite under the Halkevi roof.

The chief of the Halkevi branch office of Fatsa was Kemal Kara, who was working as an apprentice for Fikri Sönmez in his tailor's shop. Kemal Kara and some of his left-wing friends had been attacked several times by rightists, and in 1977 Kemal Kara was killed in such an attack in which it was claimed a police officer had also taken part. This was not the first attack against a left-wing supporter, but it was the first that had resulted in death. Kara's death raised anger in society, and people from the radical left and other groups began to take up a position against the radical nationalist right-wing groups, which were forced into retreat, leaving the left-wing groups space to develop their activities. However, the right-wing groups had not been totally removed from the political arena of Fatsa.

Another important event that occurred in 1977 was the publishing of the Revolutionary Path Periodical, the ideologies of which attracted a number of revolutionists in a period when the left-wing had been divided by internal conflicts, aside from the conflicts that were breaking out between the right- and left-wings. The internal conflicts in the left created ideological separations that stopped the left-wing groups from coming together. That is to say, in many places leftists could not manage to be effective in their struggle due to conflicts with the right and their own inner conflicts. However, it cannot be said that the left-wing groups were not influential. Around the country, a struggle area was being developed by the left-wing groups, despite the fact that the

¹² Ülkü Ocakları is a radical nationalist organizational structure.

left-wing factions were in conflict with each other, with each left-wing faction trying to gain sovereignty in certain places.

In Fatsa, the leftists came together around the Revolutionary Path Periodical, while other leftist ideologies could not find base to develop their struggle area. The leftist domination of Fatsa was in the hands of Revolutionary Path. With the exclusion of the right-wing groups from the political arena of Fatsa, the left-wing had begun to develop their struggle. In addition, as Sedat Göçmen mentions, an ideological clarity in left-wing politics emerged due of the development of one ideological structure (Uyan, 2004; 38) in Fatsa.

It will be useful to explain briefly the ideological views of Revolutionary Path before explaining the pre-election activities of the leftists in Fatsa.

4.2.2. Left-Wing Movement in Fatsa During Late 1970s

First published on 1st May, 1977, the Revolutionary Path Periodical began to spread around the country and people began to come together around the ideas of Revolutionary Path. People that read and supported the ideas in the periodical came to be known as “Revolutionary Pathists”. The manifest of the periodical published in the first issue defined Revolutionary Path as a movement with the basic aim of establishing a proletariat party. However, the conditions for establishing a party were not suitable, but resistance against capitalism needed to continue (Müftüoğlu, 1988; 2251).

An important theory on which the Revolutionary Path ideology was based was the “Concrete Analysis of Concrete Situations” analysis. (Müftüoğlu, 1988; 2251). Revolutionary Path politics gave importance to the struggle against “fascism” and accepted it as a revolutionary struggle. They claimed that the state was “fascist” in character, and that the country was suffering under a “fascist” regime. The radical right-wing groups, especially the nationalist groups, were being nourished by this fascist structure and a struggle had to be held against this condition (Müftüoğlu, 1988, 1989). This point of view highly differentiated from the views of other left-wing factions and became a separation point¹³. Revolutionary Path defined the struggle against fascist groups and the state as a core issue, and made people come together around this struggle area.

¹³ For more information about the Revolutionary Path and the other leftwing factions of the period look at *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, 1988, Fascicle 7.

Revolutionary Path put the struggle against fascism at the center of their organizational development. In order to resist fascist attacks, the Revolutionary Path Periodical proposed to construct a wide range of alliances. This would have provided a strong resistance front, bringing people together in solidarity. To construct such a union, Revolutionary Path proposed the formation of “Resistance Committees”.

The basic aim of the Resistance Committees was to bring people together against fascist groups and create a power structure by uniting people around this struggle. Besides joining forces against “fascism”, the Revolutionary Path movement saw the Resistance Committees as revolutionist organizations in which people could take part. The Resistance Committees were seen as “the nucleus of the revolutionary public authority”. That is to say, Revolutionary Path envisaged the Resistance Committees as a unit under which the people would become conscious of their power (Müftüoğlu, 1988; 2251; Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi; 1988, 2258). With the inner comprehension of the powers of those that came together under the roof of the Resistance Committees, Revolutionary Path believed that the Resistance Committees would create a revolutionary alternative against the existing system (Müftüoğlu, 1988; 2251). Therefore, resistance against the concrete situation had been created by the Resistance Committees, which was also accepted as a revolutionary unit in which people became aware of socialist ideas.

Revolutionary Path gained unexpected popular support, and sales of the periodical reached approximately 1.5 million. The ideology of the Revolutionary Path Periodical began to spread, along with the formation of committees. In time, the committees began to intervene in daily life, besides resisting against radical rightist groups. In places where the radical right was weak the Resistance Committees turned to the organization of daily life. For example, in the squatter neighborhoods, the Resistance Committees dealt with the problems of urban spaces, such as roads, electricity, water etc. (Müftüoğlu, 1988; 2251; Pekdemir, 1988; 2346). It would be wrong to associate this kind of struggle only with Revolutionary Path, because other left-wing factions had also begun to take similar steps. In the squatter areas of the metropolis there were various groups that could execute activities¹⁴. Other activities of the radical leftists in the squatter neighborhoods dealt with the organization of daily life. The key approach of Revolutionary Path was the formation of the Resistance Committees, which provided for the development of local level politics and facilitated the participation of the people in the activities held, aside from the struggles against the rightists. This resulted in different approaches in the local organizational

¹⁴ The study of Sukru Aslan can be examined as an example of squatter movements and the activities held by the leftist groups in squatter areas; Aslan, S. (2004), 1 Mayıs Mahallesi, İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul

structures of the Revolutionary Path movement. The Resistance Committees of different areas held different activities according to the needs and characteristics of the location. Thus, the Revolutionary Path movement developed a more localized political view, able to overcome local problems and create a local based struggle area.

In the scope of this explanation we can turn back to analyzing the Fatsa movement and the events that developed in 1977 and after.

4.2.2.1 Fatsa After 1977

The year of 1977 was a turning point for Fatsa. The death of Kemal Kara changed political focus in Fatsa, and with the regression of the rightist movement from the political stage, the left-wing movement turned its attention towards different struggle areas. The Revolutionary Path Periodical had begun to be effective among the leftists ideologically while the activities held under the roof of Halkevi and TÖB-DER were continuing, but ideological clarity began to be established with the Revolutionary Path Periodical. Sedat Göçmen says: “After gaining clarity in the political sphere in Fatsa, we investigated the problems in the Fatsa society; what problems the rural people came across, and what the problems of Fatsa were. As Revolutionary Path, we tried to make a class analysis and then made a program. We took this into consideration and tried to understand what would happen if we intervened as a central movement, how would the cadres be shaped” (Uyan, 2004; 38).

After becoming a power in the political life of Fatsa, the Revolutionary Path circle began to develop policies consistent with Fatsa’s needs. As previously mentioned, local politics were important in the Revolutionary Path ideology, and the position of the central organization of the periodical was supporting local activities both ideologically and technically, however a centralized organizational structure did not exist in the Revolutionary Path movement. Coming to the characteristics of the Fatsa movement, it can be seen that especially the teachers played a key role, which can be explained by the influence of the teachers’ labor unions in Fatsa, and in time they had articulated to the movement.

At this point it is necessary to mention the development of the Resistance Committees in Fatsa, as they were the structures that the Revolutionary Path envisaged in the organization of societies. The Resistance Committees had different characteristics in Fatsa from other places because the rightists had been eliminated from the political arena. Ahmet Özdemir clarified the situation:

The Resistance Committees or People Committees that Revolutionary Path envisaged in that period were different in Fatsa. Revolutionary Path envisaged becoming organized with the

relations established through the Resistance Committees, but the Fatsa experience did not shape in this way. Inversely, the Fatsa experience occurred on the basis of the problems in Fatsa, and finding a solution to the problems. (...) After a point, while we were discussing the Resistance Committees, we became aware that the fascists were not attacking in Fatsa anymore and questioned the need for Resistance Committees, however at this point, the nucleus of the people's power was articulated to these committees.

Sebahattin Akyazı, who took part in political activities in Fatsa, explains the development of Resistance Committees:

The Resistance Committees began to be established on different bases in different places. Different in Fatsa, different in Çorum... For example, in Çorum, the struggle (between the left and right) continued to be severe. In some of the neighborhoods of the big cities they were developed differently, but the Resistance Committees that developed in Fatsa were aimed at eliminating the black market.

From the above explanations it can be concluded that the primary struggle area of the Resistance Committees had changed in the case of Fatsa, and that the leftists had begun to deal with the problems of the people and had developed an area of influence. Daily politics and class conflicts became the subjects of the leftists. The activities that were carried out by the Revolutionary Path circle began to focus on addressing the problems of the hazelnut peasants, and the periodical prepared a hazelnut issue in 1977. It can be said that the class-based struggle began to take shape in Fatsa with the influence of Revolutionary Path in the political arena.

The relations between the hazelnut peasants and the hazelnut merchants and usurers had become the focal point of the left-wing movement. This area of struggle not only existed in Fatsa, but across the entire region where hazelnut agriculture was taking place. For this reason the Revolutionary Path movement started more comprehensive works into the issue, which extended beyond the borders of Fatsa.

It will be useful to mention some points about hazelnut agriculture in order to understand the conditions at the time. The market price of the hazelnut was determined by the state, but was generally lower than what was expected and did not cover the cost of production of the hazelnut peasants. In addition, the Union of Agricultural Cooperatives for the sale of Hazelnuts (Fiskobirlik) was not able to buy hazelnut crops on time and delayed payments. The peasants' dependency on the merchants had been rising, but the prices that merchants gave stood below that defined by the state. Because of the needs of the peasants, especially those in poverty, hazelnuts were generally sold to the merchants in order to get the money immediately. This situation empowered the merchants in the market.

Another problematic area that the peasants came across was their need to sell their produce to the merchants prior to harvesting, which kept peasants indebted to the merchants. Additionally, the

peasants often had to borrow money from the merchants or usurers at high rates of interest, which sometimes led to interest payments that were higher than the borrowed amount¹⁵.

Ahmet Özdemir stresses the importance of the hazelnut meetings and the development of the radical left wing activities related with hazelnut farming:

The struggle in Fatsa was shaped around the historic problems in the hazelnut sector, which began with “End to Exploitation in the Hazelnut Sector” meetings. The main source of income in the region is the hazelnut, and there is exploitation in hazelnut production from the merchants and the usurers. The struggle began under the banner End to Exploitation in the Hazelnut Sector, and brought people together in the Fatsa and Ordu regions. The counter parties came together under the roof of Ülkü Ocakları and the Nationalist Movement Party. The reason for the rise of the fascist movement in Fatsa after 1974 was related to protecting the profits of the merchants in hazelnut production. The NMP and Ülkü Ocakları brought together the people who had an interest in maintaining the environment of exploitation. (From the interview)

Sedat Göçmen expressed the problem that occurred in hazelnut production and the problem of usury:

The usurer problem was serious in Fatsa, Ordu and Giresun. In those times, the legal interest rate was approximately 10%, while the usurers were implementing interest rates of between 200-300%. You had to sell hazelnuts directly to the merchants. There was also coercion. When someone went into debt, it was nearly impossible to pay it off.

The left-wing movement that developed after 1977 focused on this issue and started to work on the problems of the hazelnut peasants. This was not a new struggle area for the left-wing movement, as the struggle had been continuing off and on since the 1960s. In 1978, the End to Exploitation in the Hazelnut Sector meetings were organized in the regions where hazelnut farming was being carried out. There were eight meetings organized in Fatsa and in the nearby villages. Participation was high and the meetings were effective.

The positive results of these meetings were two-fold. Firstly, the mass movement managed to affect the prices that were to be announced by Ecevit’s government; and secondly, the radical left movement began to be accepted by people, and mass support had begun to develop. The meetings were not only organized in Fatsa but in the whole region, bringing left-wing groups and peasants together. The Revolutionary Path circle was also supporting the meetings, and tried to influence people against the policies in hazelnut agriculture. The hazelnut meetings were an important area of propaganda for the leftists.

While the relations between the peasants and the leftists were strengthening, activities were held in order to eliminate the problems of hazelnut peasants and workers. The movement in Fatsa had

¹⁵ Actually, these conditions still exist. The conflicts among merchants, peasants and State are still continuing on the same basis.

begun to struggle against the merchants and usurers. The merchants, as the power holders in the hazelnut sector, were the main problem. As mentioned, the interest rates on money borrowed from the merchants were very high, and it was very hard to rid the farmers of their dependency on the merchants. The leftists had begun to struggle against the merchants, attempting to stop exploitation. The struggles were severe, and merchants were even threatened by left-wing groups. One of the biggest, and possibly most important actions of the left-wing groups, which also highlighted their existence against the dominant groups, was the raid on the trade establishments of the merchants, during which the left-wing groups tore up the promissory notes of the peasants. This was clearly very important in the transformation of relations in Fatsa. Hüseyin Uygun explained the key elements of the struggle against the merchants:

Usurers forced many people into debt and life became insufferable for the people. Lands were mortgaged and even taken from their owners... This was a common event. The people were powerless as the laws did not protect them; everything was on the side of the local dominants. When the revolutionist raided the offices of the usurers, they took the promissory notes and publicly tore them up... It was marvelous; a taboo was collapsed, an impossible thing was done. This event showed that these strong people (the merchants) were actually not strong enough when the people became organized. They were resisted and overwhelmed when the people came together.

The left-wing group had intervened in a problematic area and had succeeded in organizing the peasants against the merchants, breaking their influence. However, it was impossible to remove the relation between the merchants and the peasants completely, as it was a structural problem. The relations continued, but the influence of the merchants was impeded. Fikri Sönmez explained the situation in his court defense:

When it came to July 1980, the people's organized conscience in Fatsa succeeded in pressuring down the interest rates, once at the levels of 100-200%. Hence, the usurer merchants had to withdraw from this field of exploitation. Even borrowing money at interest had become a trading activity between two people. In fact, usury was a structural problem. It could not be eliminated totally with only the struggle of the people of Fatsa.

The struggle against the usurers and merchants let the left-wing movement gain the support of the hazelnut peasants, and brought about an increase in the power of the leftists. This was an important area in the development of a social movement in Fatsa. It can be said that the power of the left-wing groups in the political arena of Fatsa increased with the notions of the class struggle, and in time, as their influence was rising, their interventions into different issues increased. The power of the leftists in Fatsa had been derived from the class struggle based on the relations in the hazelnut sector, providing them with an area of influence that expanded over time.

4.2.2.2 Fatsa Municipality

The year of 1977 witnessed to another important event; the local elections. As mentioned above, the RPP won in the election of 1977. RPP candidate Nazmiye Komitoglu, a retired teacher from Fatsa, became mayor and the municipality council was formed by 16 RPP, eight JP, one NSP and one DP members.

Immediately after the elections, Nazmiye Komitoglu became ill and began treatment for cancer. With this situation, a period in which the deputies led the municipality began. Although Nazmiye Komitoglu tried to continue to work as mayor, her illness did not allow her stay in Fatsa. The deputies of the mayor, Kemal Burnaz and Cevat Biricik, tried to manage the works, but problems began to appear in the municipal administration and services. Hüseyin Uygun, who was a worker in Water Bottling Enterprise of the municipality in that time, mentioned that the absence of the mayor was affecting the works of the municipality, and in that period, permanent decisions had to be taken:

You cannot expect great efficiency from works which are carried out by an attorney, and this was what happened. Kemal Burnaz and Cevat Biricik became deputy on a rotating basis, working with good intentions trying their best. (...) The deputies made efforts to improve with good intentions, but being a deputy, it was difficult to create permanent solutions. They began waiting for the election. Only the routine works by the municipality were carried out. It would be unfair to evaluate the success of this period because of this problem. I do not think that they benefited from the ongoing situation as I know that no permanent or radical decisions were taken. (From the interview)

Kemal Burnaz, who was the deputy of the mayor and a member of the Municipality Council from RPP, said:

The lack of a mayor in the municipality was, of course, a major problem. Did I deal with the municipality or carry out my own official works? As the municipality was not my own work... Maybe if I had plans to become a candidate for the mayoralty I would have dealt with the municipality more effectively. (From the interview)

In the municipality administration, because of the illness of the mayor, an administrative gap had occurred. One of the basic results of the lack of municipal authority was felt in the market of Fatsa where stockpiling and black marketeering was becoming part of everyday life.

Besides the void in the municipal administration, a number of structural problems were also affecting municipal services. Firstly, the economic resources of the municipality had not been used effectively. The Fatsa Municipality drew income from the distribution of Office Flour¹⁶, the Harbor and the Water Bottling Enterprise and the resources of the municipality had been

¹⁶ In that period, flour, known as "Office Flour", was sent to the municipalities for distribution to the markets. It came from the Soil Products Office, which is a State Agricultural Organization.

distributed to the private sector, meaning the income from these resources was low. Other sources of income, such as the animal and vegetable bazaar, had not been controlled and the municipality was in financial crisis. However, this was not the primary reason for the poor situation in the municipality. The administrative gap had also prevented the creation of permanent solutions to the financial problems. It has to be mentioned that this problem did not emerge only after the 1977 election, as it had existed during the previous administrations. At this point, it may be useful to note the comment of Süleyman Çürüksu, who was the Justice Party candidate for mayor in the 1977 elections:

When I was a candidate in the 1977 local elections, three or four people who could be effective in bringing voters came to me to request the contract for the distribution of the Office Flour, suggesting that they could support my election campaign. I said that they were the fifth or sixth people that had made such requests. "If I had accepted your suggestions without informing any of you, I could have taken a vote from each of you. To whom do I give the distribution? I don't want to be thought of as a liar in the future." However, Nazmiye Komitoglu was elected, who gave the distribution of the Office Flour to a known person.

As can be seen, the resources of the municipality were distributed to the periphery of the dominant political power, and these resources were used as propaganda by the candidates.

Another issue that occurred in the municipality during the mayoralty of Nazmiye Komitoglu was related to financial problems. The municipality could not pay even the wages of the workers. Local newspaper Güneş wrote in its 12th January, 1979 issue that the municipality could not pay the wages of its workers, and so the administration of the municipality had to go to Ankara in order to obtain money from the central government:

The municipality was suffering from a financial crisis. Last week, a threat of strike action by the workers resulted in promise that their wages would be paid by 25th January. Three million Liras was needed in order to pay the three-months of back wages and monthly salaries of the workers. Tomorrow, assigned people will go to Ankara in order to obtain the money. We are wondering from which fund they will find this money.

Additionally, due to the lack of controls, the tendency to use illegal electricity and water, and to construct unlawful buildings increased in the deputy period of the Fatsa municipality which failed to intervene in these unlawful events. As Hüseyin Uygun and Kemal Burnaz mentioned, the deputies preferred to continue with the existing structure instead of dealing with problems and finding solutions.

Problems were also arising in Fatsa in the delivery of municipal services and the authority of the municipality was decreasing, hindering the decision-making processes. Meanwhile, the activities of the opposition groups were rising and they had begun to gain popular support.

Opposition to the problems came together with the works of the leftists. With the elimination of the right-wing from the political stage, the leftists began to deal with the basic problems of Fatsa, carrying their ideas to the Resistance Committees in order to establish a discussion base. They had begun to take support from the masses and create a legitimate base for their activities. The interpretation of Kemal Burnaz, who was a deputy to Mayor Nazmiye Komitoğlu, is important in understanding their approach to the activities of the leftists and the lack of municipal authority:

Both in the left-wing and right-wing movements, but especially in the left-wing, the core is to weaken the authority and power of the state. After weakening the authority of the state, support from the public can be gained. Therefore, I think that the authority of the state had consciously been weakened. Actually, this existed in the main aims of the movement. How was the authority weakened? In that period, Fatsa was administered by the deputies. There was no governmental integrity here. (...) In the other parts of Turkey the same conditions were evident. It was basically a correct tactic. Firstly, all the state authority is weakened, and then the works will be carried out. It is the rule of the revolutionists. The revolutionists have always done this.

He clearly mentioned that the authority of the state institutions was weak in Fatsa, but tied the reason of the lack of the state authority to the activities of the leftists. However, this did not explain the void in the authority. Whether the opposition groups decreased the state authority, or whether the movement had risen because of the gap in the local state authority is a difficult question to answer.

It is clear that besides the existing class-based problems in Fatsa, the gap in the local state authority had been affected by the rising of a social movement in Fatsa. As Pickvance suggests, a political context is one of the most important indicators in the development of urban movements (1985; 43). Pickvance says that the ability of formal political institutions in expressing urban conflicts and broader political movements can affect the development of urban movements. If political institutions are effective in responding to the demands of urban movements, then urban actors do not seek alternative channels. In the Fatsa case, formal institutions like the municipality or local authorities could not respond to the needs of society. Then, the rising political and social movement began to respond to the needs of society using alternative channels. The effect of a broader political movement is also relevant in the Fatsa case. As mentioned, Turkey had been politically mobilized in that period, and political movements were rising. The movement rising in Fatsa was also part of a political movement rising around the country. Therefore, from both sides, the political context was crucial in the development of the left-wing movement in the case of Fatsa.

What were the problems into which the leftists needed to intervene within the framework of the municipal services? It is necessary to mention, before starting to explain the actions of the leftists, that they had already gained popular support prior to the election period.

As discussed, one of the basic problems of Fatsa was associated with hazelnut production. It was not a new conflict area, but it was at the root of the class conflict of Fatsa. For this reason, the struggle in hazelnut production became the focus of the leftists throughout the period of the left-wing movements. The leftists positioned themselves near the peasants, whereas the rightist sided with the merchants. From the 1960s onwards, the leftists had tried to transform the balance of power in hazelnut production. Coming to the late-1970s, the struggle also continued in this framework, and the Revolutionary Path circle also focused on this area. In 1977, the Revolutionary Path Periodical prepared a special issue on the hazelnut sector and the leftists tried to organize the hazelnut growers and laborers against the existing system. While the struggle continued in hazelnut production, another area came to the agenda of the left-wing movement; the struggle against the black market.

4.2.2.3 Struggle Against the Black Market

In the late-1970s, as a result of giving up import substitution economic policies, the country came across the problem of scarcity of basic consumption goods. The policies were based on supporting inner consumption with import goods. Because of problems experienced in the supply of foreign exchange, the import goods could not be supplied, and the rate of the supplied goods for inner consumption began to decrease, and an economic crisis became apparent in the country. Resources were scarce, and people needed to queue in order to buy basic goods, such as sugar, flour, oil, cigarettes etc. These goods began to appear on the black market at increased prices. The problem could be seen all over the country, in addition to Fatsa. Besides the conflicting left-wing and right-wing views and the revolutionary movements, the scarcity of consumer products and the result of this situation, the black market economy led to a deepening of the crisis in the country.

The black market economy and stockpiling became a basic problem of daily life in Fatsa, but neither the municipality nor the other state institutions could implement a solution to the problem of stockpiling as the influence of the municipal police force was low. Stockpiled goods were selling at inflated prices on the black market. However, the rising left-wing movement focused on the problem in Fatsa and those believed to be stockpiling were followed. The struggle against black marketeering became an important issue for the left-wing movement. It came to a point when youths from the left-wing movement began to make unexpected attacks on people who had been determined as stockpilers. The left-wing group confiscated the goods, which were then sold to people at market value, and the proceeds given to the market owner. The municipality's forces

were called to stop the actions of the leftists, but the raids continued regardless. In time, the control mechanism of the market passed into the hands of the leftists.

The struggle against black marketeering gained the support of the masses because although the consumption products were scarce, the black market was totally illegal and made people desperate. The struggle against the black market increased the power of the left-wing movement. Like the struggle against the usurers and merchants, the black market was also related to tipping the balance of power in favor of the merchants.

Consumption goods were scarce all over the country, but stockpiling was a problem that the authorities needed to deal with. The lack of authority in the municipality was a significant cause of the development of the black market. Zeki Muslu, who was the RPP candidate in the 1979 elections, stressed on this point:

The gap in the municipal authority allowed the emergence of a black market. The black market flourished in the Month of Ramadan, and in the absence of oil the youth persecuted the shopkeepers. They distributed the goods they had taken from those shops to the public.

As Muslu mentioned, it was especially in the Month of Ramadan that the scarcity of basic consumption products raised reactions to the ongoing situation. The products were not only scarce, but also if they were found, they were sold at inflated prices. On that point, the activities of the leftists gained legitimacy in the minds of the people. The people interviewed during the study mentioned especially that the connection between the left-wing movement and the people became highly developed with the struggle against the black market, especially in the Month of Ramadan of 1978-1979. Ahmet Özdemir explained that people began putting their trust in those who had managed to overcome this problem:

The struggle against the black market was a concrete example for the people, and with the struggle, the support and the confidence of the people was gained. The people mostly remember the Month of Ramadan 1978-1979, when people generally need the basic consumption goods. However, in that period these goods were absent or fell onto the black market, and were sold at high prices. People were in difficulty, and because of this they put their trust in those who could eliminate the problem. The revolutionists were the people who were trusted in that period.

It can be said that the gap in the local state had thus been closed by the left-wing movement.

How did they overcome the problem? Ahmet Özdemir briefly explained the struggle against the black market:

Firstly, the control of commodities that went onto the black market was started from the small shops. Think of these small shops as grocery stores... It had been determined that the small markets were stockpiling and selling these stocked commodities at black market prices. Then, the municipal police forces were called to these shops and the determined

commodities were sold to people at market prices. During the selling of the goods, the situation was explained to the people. The Revolutionists made speeches to the crowds about their struggle against the black market. Later on, this became a tradition.

After the death of Nazmiye Komitoglu, Kemal Burnaz became the deputy. In his period, the police forces of the municipality were also called to address the sale of black market goods. It was the duty of the revolutionist to find the stocks, which they did. In time, everyone began to take part in this process, even children. The children would see who was selling what goods, and reported the situation to the revolutionists, who then ended the situation, joining forces with the municipal forces. The final circle of the struggle was aimed at the big merchants who operated black markets, for this last area of the struggle, the gendarmerie and police forces would come to the venue.

It can be seen that, starting from the small shops, the control mechanism was developed by obtaining the support of people, and then making them a part of the struggle against the black market. The black market was seen as a common problem, and with the increasing power of the left-wing movement people could also be a part of the activity. In addition, although it was the duty of the municipal forces, the people took the control of the situation and then acted together with the municipal forces.

A significant example of the struggle against the black market was aimed at a merchant of Fatsa who was also a member of the Municipal Council. During our interviews this event was referred to as the “big event”¹⁷.

It was determined that Cevat Biricik, who was a member of the Municipal Council in those days, had been stockpiling. It was Monday, and on Mondays a bazaar was set up in Fatsa, when the villagers would come to the city center. It was known that on Mondays, people could come together and have the chance to buy goods cheaply, as from somewhere stockpiled goods would be taken out. They were thinking “This is done by the revolutionists”. Every Monday, there occurred similar things. We saw that the shop of Cevat Biricik was closing; the shutters were pulled down, but crowds had begun to gather. It was possibly a phone call from the shop that brought the gendarmerie and police, who started firing into the air in order to disperse the crowd. Meanwhile, at every opportunity, the revolutionists tried to explain the situation to people. “Look at this, how the state saves the black marketeers! Does the state protect you or the black marketeers?” We were witnessing a situation that showed where the state was positioned. This was such an example that made us more legitimate. This was an example of the change in the situation, as after that event the police forces, as well as the military forces, chose not to position themselves close to the black marketeers.

This was the turning point in the struggle against the black market. First of all, an unexpected raid was carried out on the trading establishment of a powerful person, who was also a member of the Municipal Council. Secondly, the event gave the leftists the opportunity to expose the relations between the interest groups and the state powers. This situation proved the lack of authority, as well as the relations between the state institutions and the power holders; and thirdly, the left-wing movement secured a more confident place in the mind of the people. It is said that after this event, black marketeering came almost to a stop, or only continued in a

¹⁷ This event is also explained in the court defenses of Fikri Sönmez and Ahmet Özdemir.

secretive fashion. It can be claimed that because the relations of the state institutions and the power holders had now been exposed, the leftists gained power in the socio-economic structure of Fatsa.

At this point, it is necessary to mention the view of the opposite side, which agreed that the black market was unacceptable but did not support the methods of the left-wing movement. Zeki Muslu from the RPP was of the opinion that the actions of the left-wing movement may have been justifiable, but claimed that the legal organs had had to intervene in the problem:

In that period, I said: “You are committing a crime. As a citizen, you cannot take and distribute the goods from the shop of a man, even if he is a black marketeer. If the man is a black marketeer, file a petition to the mayor, sub-governor or crown prosecutor. Say that this man is a black marketeer, put two watchmen (on his shop) to stop him from removing the goods, and then when the police arrive, take the goods from the man and distribute them to the people under the control of police, removing the need for a chargeable offence.” However, our friends did not accept such a method, but rather believed in survival through their own means. They said: “No, we will not call the man of oligarchy, nor the prosecutor, nor the police. We do it ourselves!”. When you do not inform the state powers of a crime, you are making the crime of the shopkeeper justifiable by your illegal intervention.

The right-wing saw the activities against the black market as an intervention into their proprietary right. They claimed that it was an activity held by force, and that the left-wing movement had created an atmosphere of fear. Ziya Toprakbastı, who was a tradesman in Fatsa and a member of the NSP, said that the actions against the black marketeers were not normal because the leftists were: “...confiscating the goods of the shopkeepers by force. They were opening the shop by force and distributing the goods.” Rahmi Yangın, who was a merchant in Fatsa and a former JP member, also gave a similar opinion, saying that the leftists had assumed the duties of the state:

They aided the people in need in order to win adherents. Needs could be met from the black market, but they were sold at high prices. They found the stocks, took out the goods and then distributed them. They were taking on the duties of the state. Where was the state control in that period? They were doing this in order to gain the popular support of the people. They were not deploying democratic ways.

While the other political groups criticized the left-wing movement, the struggle against the black market was effective, and just before the election period the left-wing movement gained a significant success from the struggle against the black market. By gaining the support of the masses and making the people participate in the struggle against the black market, the number of stockpilers decreased and the power of the leftists was strengthened.

The relations between the state institutions and the black marketeers are an important factor in this struggle. This subject has different dimensions; first of all, stockpiling and black marketeering were illegal, and was actually a situation that the legal institutions had to deal with. However, the lack of authority and the conflicts in the municipal administration created an

opportunity for the left-wing movement that they took. Their activities brought popular support and they established an opposition block against the black market, which also paved the way for the strengthening of the movement. Moreover, the event in which a Municipal Council member was the subject also brought a chance for the left-wing movement to show the reality of what they had been saying to the people. The merchant was a member of the municipal administration, he called the police forces, and conflicts occurred between the people and the state powers. After this event, it would not be wrong to claim that the left-wing movement gained more power and support from the masses.

4.2.2.4 Before the Election

While the struggles were continuing, the mayor of Fatsa Nazmiye Komitoglu passed away, and by-elections came to the agenda. Komitoglu's death was not a surprise for the municipality administration or for the society. The mayor was unable to fulfill her duties after the elections, and everybody was expecting an election. In the pre-election period, firstly we need to explain the activities and position of the left-wing movement and then talk about the legal election campaign period. Whether the elections had been held or not, the left-wing movement in Fatsa had managed to gain power in daily life, and had created an area of influence. The activities of the leftists had been supported by the masses, and so had become a power structure and a pressure group in the political life of Fatsa.

With the coming of the by-elections to the agenda of Fatsa, the left-wing movement had begun to discuss what position they would stand in the elections. Although the Revolutionary Path circle had boycotted the general elections, in some places they decided to support the independent leftist candidates in the local by-elections in Hozat (a subprovince of Tunceli), Malatya and Fatsa. Ahmet Özdemir explained the attitude of the leftists in Fatsa, who came together around the Revolutionary Path circle:

Revolutionary Path followed a different political process to other organizations in the 1979 elections. This was a different political decision, saying "no" to central government, but "yes" to local government. Indeed, this was a decision like the participation in the local elections and the boycotting of the general elections. This decision was criticized by all the left apart from the Revolutionary Path at that time. It was said: "In the end, both of them are power. You are boycotting one of them while you welcome the other, you should be boycotting both of them. What type of an inconsistency is this?" However, when we look at the previous dynamics of Revolutionary Path, we see that a conscious decision was made putting particular emphasis on local relations: in the Resistance Committees the local balance of power was reorganized; the process of empowerment was to take place at a local level resulting in a ripening in future power relations, starting at a local level. Revolutionary Path nominated a candidate not only in Fatsa, but also in several places that it could enter in the 1979 elections. Tunceli was also one of them.

The general view of the Revolutionary Path about the separation of the general elections and the local elections is shaped in the words of Oğuzhan Müftüoğlu, who was a member of the central committee of Revolutionary Path (quoted by Uyan, 2004; 54):

...Municipalities, certainly, were a part of the central administration; however, they had a relative autonomy and difference, and we decided to stand in the elections in Malatya, Hozat and Fatsa, these being the first development areas of the local initiative. It was the decision of our committee in Fatsa, the revolutionary group, for Fikri Sönmez to be chosen.

As mentioned before, Revolutionary Path had a local political view that was focused on local problems. As Müftüoğlu mentioned, the relatively autonomous character of the local governments and the services carried out by local governments led to a separation in the attitude towards the general and local elections.

The attitude of the Revolutionary Path circle towards the municipal governments can be evaluated with the acceptance of the relative autonomy of the local governments. Although it was accepted that the local state is part of the state structure, their approach to the local state can be thought of in line with Duncan's and Goodwin's theory of the local state (1988), which is based on the idea that the local state is an agent of the national state at a local level, but also has a relative autonomy in the state structure as it also includes local interests. In the case of Fatsa, it can be claimed that the decision of Revolutionary Path about the local elections was based on the conflicting character of the local state in the state as a whole. In addition, setting aside the structural problems existing in the entire state structure, local government was seen as a power in which the left-wing groups could implement their policies. Moreover, from a Gramscian perspective, in order to establish a new hegemonic structure, the power groups came together around the state institutions (Şengül, 2001; 28). It is important to control the urban space in order to construct hegemonic projects. Therefore, although the movement had not aimed at obtaining local state power in the beginning, but had gained power in Fatsa, their decision to enter the local elections can be evaluated within the expansions of this framework.

While the left-wing movement had become powerful in the politics of Fatsa, they did not aim to obtain the municipality. There is a common view that the movement in Fatsa was not a systematically organized movement aimed at becoming powerful in the local state, but it was organized with the aim of transforming daily life in Fatsa. Ahmet Özdemir and Sedat Göçmen explained the non-systematic character of the Fatsa experience:

Fatsa is not an application of an experience that was previously theorized nor was it systematic. On the contrary, it is an example where the local relationship was planned within limits, theorized from the experiences gained from passing through various progresses. While saying that, to realize a local government understanding in Fatsa, the dream of "Fatsa of the future" was a dream that existed in everyone's mind in the beginning. In that period, we were neither in a position nor structure to investigate local relations or any other

examples. We had only Fatsa in our hands. We began by saying, “How we can change Fatsa?” and joined the elections with this frame of mind. (Ahmet Özdemir, from the interview)

Actually, we were not thinking about the local government experience in Fatsa at that moment. We did not say “We do this and that in the local government. (...) We were not familiar with the laws of the municipality. However, we were changing this society. We were criticizing the capitalist system. We had a desire to change the world. We believed that we would be able to make this with the power we felt inside us. (...) Fatsa was not constituted following an obvious example. (Sedat Göçmen, from the interview)

As Ahmet Özdemir and Sedat Göçmen mentioned, the leftist movement had not been shaped by referencing an existing systematical development, but the core of the movement was the struggle against capitalism. The activities were held around this theme, and the aim was to make the people the authority and to be able to solve the problems with the people. The elections were an opportunity for the movement, but the movement had not planned on taking part in the elections. It can be mentioned that the movement had the potential to intervene in the political decisions, or implement them with the power and support they had gained. Sebahattin Akyazı, who took part in the movement also stresses this point:

(Even if we were not to take part in the elections, or if we were unable to win) the group had authority in terms of intervention into the municipality, influence and directing the municipality. There existed other official institutions apart from the municipality, and revolutionists were even intervening in them. They had the ability to direct them to an accurate point. In a way that shaping was in favor of the revolutionists... There existed that potential, that power.

It is understood that the decision to take part in the by-elections with an independent candidate came to the agenda of the left-wing movement in the process of daily practices. The municipal power was seen as a good alternative for the left-wing movement in order to implement their wishes, but with municipal power or not, the activities of the movement in the political and daily life of Fatsa would have continued. Their election campaign showed traces of their attitudes to the elections. Before coming to the campaign held in the pre-election period it would be useful to hear the ideas of those from the movement.

While the left-wing movement had decided to join the elections, they were criticized by the other political actors. The Ordu parliamentarian of the RPP in that period, Ertuğrul Günay, had declared his ideas about the elections to them. He criticized the movement because they were not a legal political actor, and suggested that they could get together under the roof of a political party. He explained what he thought about the subject during our interview with him:

I offered some warnings. Democracy is directed by political parties. I was thinking that the independent candidates out of the political parties would experience difficulties in taking services from the central government. Whether good or bad, we were in power in that period, and in addition we were claiming during the election campaign period that we would be in power. We were trying to explain the subject like this: “We are a candidate for power and there are works we have started while we have been in power. Do not divide the power

with an independent candidate, do not break it into pieces. If another party comes to power after the elections, you will again live the troubles of being independent. Other than that, if we do not come to power, the JP or the parties of the National Front will come to power, and you will live more difficulties as a left-wing administration. Whole parts of Turkey are in relation with each other. In Turkey, anyone is allowed to do any exception. For this reason, giving votes to the political parties, and appropriate with tradition in Fatsa, giving the votes to the RPP, will be safer, it will be more positive.

The JP member and others criticized the movement's activities from a different standpoint, saying that the movement had created an atmosphere of fear and that their actions had been illegal. Therefore, they denied support to the candidate of the left-wing movement, citing the pressure and the power of the left-wing movement while forming an atmosphere of fear.

The election had come to the agenda in Fatsa prior to the death of Mayor Nazmiye Komitoğlu, and the candidacies had begun to be talked about by the political groups. The left-wing movement was growing, while the other parties were regressing. Especially in the RPP there were new divisions appearing. The RPP was the strongest political party in Fatsa, however, especially with the illness of the mayor and the shortcomings of the deputy period in the municipality, there were divisions in the RPP group. Fikri Sönmez, who would eventually become the independent mayor, explained the situation in Fatsa before the election in his court defense of 1984:

The election campaign had been started long before the legal election period began. When Nazmiye Komitoğlu had become bedridden due to her illness, the election for the Municipality of Fatsa came to the agenda in late-1978, and was on the public agenda. However, because of a lack of harmony and separations in the inner structure of the RPP, presenting an independent candidate in the elections came to the minds of people. If I do not remember the date wrongly, in March of 1979, many people whom I knew and who were from the RPP or were supporting the RPP, came to me. They said that there was a separation in the RPP, they could not determine a good candidate and they would not support the candidate of the RPP in the election. They were seeking a candidate, and they said that if I became an independent candidate, they would support me. I said them: "It is risky work, I have not taken part in elections up until now. The people of Fatsa know me. They know me because of my struggles. However, I have not lived a pre-election campaign period, and so I need to think about it. If there is a tendency as you have mentioned, I will think about the candidacy." So I held meetings in several neighborhoods and in the cafés, and saw that I had the support of people who had no interest in the municipality, nor the usurers, moneylenders, black marketeers and profiteers.

As can be seen, long before the legal election campaign period, election campaigns had started, and the name of Fikri Sönmez had been raised by numerous people. The question "Who was Fikri Sönmez, and why is he thought of as a candidate?" then came to people's minds.

Fikri Sönmez was a well-known name in Fatsa, even before he became mayor. He was born in 1938 in a village of Fatsa as a child of a Georgian family. After finishing primary school in the village, he began to work as an apprentice with a tailor, a profession that he continued throughout his life. He began taking an interest in socialist ideas at the beginning of the 1960s and took part

in socialist movements and politics all through his life. He was instrumental in the establishment of the Fatsa Subprovince Organization of the Turkish Workers' Party and also took part in the executive branch of the subprovince organization, becoming the president of the subprovince organization after Ziya Yılmaz. He joined the anti-imperialist demonstrations organized by DEV-GENÇ against the 6th Fleet in Istanbul and Izmir. Especially after 1968 he played a part in organizing the hazelnut peasants and workers, and in the same year he participated in the organization committee of the hazelnut meetings, during which he acted as spokesman. He was arrested and then judged because of a meeting that resulted in the Samsun-Trabzon highway being closed for 12 hours. In the 12th March period, he was arrested again for helping Mahir Çayan and his friends in the Unye- Kızıldere events and stood trial in Istanbul for being a member of THKP-C, for which he was imprisoned for 20 months. In the late-1970s he took part in the development of the left-wing movement in Fatsa. Again, he worked in the organization of the Hazelnut and Poverty Meetings and was one of the spokesmen.

Fikri Sönmez explained his political actions during his court defense of 1984:

For many years I have taken part in the struggles held in my region against exploitation in the hazelnut sector, black marketeering and against those with an interest in them. I took part in such meetings organized in the region as "End to Exploitation in the Hazelnut Sector" and "High Cost of Living", among others. I made speeches at these meetings on subjects such as exploitation in hazelnut farming, the policy of minimum price, the high cost of living and unemployment. Because of these activities, I am known by wide range of people. Because of these kinds of activities, whereas I might have won the confidence and affection of many of the people living in Fatsa, I also might have won the antipathy of some exploiters.

In order to explain the character of Fikri Sönmez and his works more objectively, it would be useful to hear the opinions of those who we interviewed in the scope of our study:

AHMET ÖZDEMİR

Fikri Sönmez was a person who took part in the whole political process in Fatsa after the 1970s. However, did Fikri Sönmez graduate from university? No. I said this to highlight his theoretical level of thought, his approach and his comprehension of events. He was a public leader. How a public leader contributes to political literature and how much he or she takes from such literature, Fikri Sönmez was like that. He was a very intelligent person and a friend who had taken part in the whole discussion process.

SEDAT GÖÇMEN

Everything was brought to Fikri Sönmez before we brought it to the committees. I wouldn't want you to misunderstand him as an organizational figure, he was much like a bigger brother to all of us. Everyone would talk about their problems and concerns with him and we would advise them to tell it to the committees.

ZEKİ MUSLU

Fikri Sönmez was a tailor, a very honest person who loved dialog very much, he had not a trace of evil in him. One of the special virtues of Fikri Sönmez was his speaking ability. He had a tone of voice that inspired people. While carrying out his job as a tailor, whether it be

the books he had read or the words to which he had listened, he could explain them to people in the peasant's and citizen's language.

HÜSEYİN UYGUN

His life, since his youth, had been devoted to the revolutionist struggle. In addition, both his human relations and public relations as being an artisan made Fikri Sönmez stand out. Fikri Sönmez did not only deal with politics; when you look at his life you will see that he was the manager of a sports club, and a manager and an active member of an association; also, he was a person who had good relations with the people in any situation without any problem. Nobody doubted his honesty. As a result, the name of Fikri Sönmez had a large consensus behind it.

LÜTFÜ TOPALOĞLU

Fikri had a considerable influence in that group, in that community. He had experienced as well as being talented; he had a good knowledge of speech. He was an experienced person. Moreover, he made good discoveries.

DOĞAN ÇELEBİ

Fikri Sönmez was a brilliant proletarian intellectual at that time, and acted according to his class. Although he graduated only from primary school, actually I don't know whether he graduated or not, he was a socialist person who devoted himself to the socialist ideology, accepted this duty from the heart, had a profound belief in this struggle, and improved himself by taking part in the struggle. There may be many people who were superior to him ideologically or theoretically, but I don't think that there existed such a person that could integrate with the society as much as he could, or had such a charismatic personality. Fikri Sönmez had the ability to communicate easily with people from any walk of life. That was what made him different. However, the movement was a social event, and only the duty to lead was given to him.

SÜLEYMAN ÇÜRÜKSU

Fikri Sönmez was a talented speaker of that time, who had the support of the people... Fikri's contributions led to success in the election. I can say this frankly. Fikri was good at human relations. I mean, we could not discuss much with the people who followed him, but we could discuss many things with Fikri.

Both the right-wing and the left-wing stressed his past, his relations with people and his art in public speaking. He was seen as a public leader and as a big brother of the leftists. His political experiences were important in the development of the left-wing movement, and also his relations with people were important in being able to reach the people; he was understandable. With the elections coming to the agenda in Fatsa, the candidacy of Fikri Sönmez was no surprise as he was well-known, honest and experienced, and hence discussions of the candidacy centered around his name. In the inner discussions of the left-wing movement about a candidate, two names were discussed, but Fikri Sönmez was accepted by the majority.

The position of Fikri Sönmez in the political and social life of Fatsa can be evaluated in the scope of Gramscian theory of intellectuals. According to Gramsci there are two kinds of intellectuals organizing and directing society in the political sphere. The first is the "traditional" professional intellectual, whose position in covering the needs of society has a certain inter-class aura about it,

but derives ultimately from past and present class relations and conceals an attachment to various historical class formations. Secondly, there are “organic” intellectuals, who are the element of a particular class in thinking and organizing their class relations and struggles. An important point in the definition of “organic” intellectuals is that their job characteristics are not important in organizing the society, their function is in directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they originally belong to (Gramsci, 1971). Fikri Sönmez aligns well with the definition of the organic intellectual, as he belonged to a particular class and had affects on the people belonging to the same class. He had taken part in the political struggle throughout his life, but was not a literarily or scientifically educated person.

An important point in the discussions of the name Fikri Sönmez was his influence in the winning of the election. While it is claimed that the name Fikri Sönmez was important in the victory, it is also said that the left-wing movement would have won the local election with any candidate due to the power they held.

SEDAT GÖÇMEN

We were in such a condition that we would have succeeded with any candidate in Fatsa. The name of Fikri Sönmez was accepted by the movement, as well as by the central organization and the people.

RAHMI YANGIN

Being the founder, Fikri Sönmez became the head of the party in that period. The actions (of the time) would have occurred with or without Fikri Sönmez. They would find another candidate and the works would continue. In fact, it was not imperative that Fikri Sönmez took part in the mayoralty elections at that time. It would happen with or without him. Actually, Fikri Sönmez was more moderate, the people who managed them were harder. Fikri Sönmez was a well-known name.

LÜTFÜ TOPALOĞLU

They could not have been elected without Fikri Sönmez. Fikri has considerable influence in that group, in that community. He was a veteran (of the movement) as well as a talented person; he had good command of speech. He was an experienced person.

SEBAHATTİN AKYAZI

In fact, there could be no one that could be more effective than Fikri Sönmez because revolutionists had identified with him.

DOĞAN ÇELEBİ

It could not be said that Fikri Sönmez carried out the whole struggle, it was derived from the public potential. Fikri Sönmez was the spokesman of that public potential. This is a cadre movement. It cannot be considered that Fikri Sönmez would be able to lead alone in that kind of movement. Everyone had a mission in this social struggle. The mayoralty was given to Fikri Sönmez and he performed his duty. The committee duty was given to someone else; the duty of base of the struggle was given to another. This is division of labor. That duty was given to Fikri Sönmez; he performed this duty well in the process.

AHMET ALTUNTAŞ

An individual is important of course. They could have nominated another candidate, but I don't think that that candidate could have collected as many votes as Fikri Sönmez. Fikri Sönmez had been accepted and liked by the public. If he had been a candidate from the RPP, the RPP would have won the mayoralty.

As can be seen, for some the name was important, for the others it was a social movement and a cadre movement of which Fikri Sönmez was a member. It can be concluded that the opinions of Fikri Sönmez were based around the fact that he was an important and well-known name in the left-wing movement. However, the power of the left-wing movement went beyond the name. On the other hand it should be kept in mind that the name Fikri Sönmez brought a prestige to the left-wing movement and surely brought a positive atmosphere to the actions of the left-wing movement, which was generally composed of young people.

4.2.2.5 The Election Campaigns and the Elections

The election was to be held on August 24th, and the election campaign period was begun. From the point of the left-wing movement, as they had gained the support of the masses with their actions of long before the election period, it was a little different from an ordinary election campaign as they did not need to prove their legitimacy to the voters. Their attitudes towards the elections were a little different, as they were already active and influential in the politics of Fatsa. RPP candidate Zeki Muslu said during our interview that whether the elections were being held or not, the leftists carried out activities every day. That is to say, the elections were not at the center of the activities of the leftists because they executed their activities in the daily life of Fatsa anyway. Hüseyin Uygün, who was a worker in the municipality at that time and is now a teacher in Fatsa, as well as the chairman of the Fatsa branch of the Teachers' Syndicate, said:

The struggle would continue even if the election had been lost, or even not participated in. Actually, there was no reason to change or to give up this struggle. In my opinion, obtaining the municipality made things easier, but if it had not been won, the struggle would certainly have continued. Of course it was very useful; it made the evolution of the revolutionary process easier.

Although the candidate of the left-wing movement was the strongest candidate, they began campaigning in the neighborhoods.

Before describing the election campaign, it may be useful to present Fikri Sönmez's road to becoming a legal candidate. He had difficulties in his application for candidacy, and was attacked several times during his campaigning. Fikri Sönmez claimed that these were aimed at hindering his candidacy, because it was clear that he was the strongest candidate. In his court defense of 1984, he explained the events from just before the election (Aksakal; 1998).

In order to apply for candidacy, Fikri Sönmez went to the Election Commission of the subprovince and took a list of the items he needed to become a candidate. When he had finished preparing the documents he submitted them to the Election Commission, and asked if anything else was required. As Fikri Sönmez knew, independent candidates needed to pay in order to enter the election. The judge said this only applied to the independent candidates looking to enter the general elections and that he would not need to pay. He applied to the Election Commission 15 days before the deadline for applications. Just three hours before the deadline for applications the judge called Fikri Sönmez saying that his candidacy money was needed, amounting to 57,600 TL, which was a huge sum at the time. If he had not been able to come up with the money his candidacy would have become void. However, Fikri Sönmez, aware that there would be a fee, had previously collected 50,000 TL, and in the three hours until the deadline he managed to raise the remaining 7,600 TL and paid the money. After this event, the candidacy of Fikri Sönmez became definite.

Another event that was related by Fikri Sönmez was the postponement of the elections. After the candidates had been determined and the legal campaign period had begun, a group from the opposing parties went to Ankara to explain the situation in Fatsa, demanding a postponement of the elections for an indefinite period of time, which had happened in Malatya. In Malatya, the mayor was murdered and the elections were postponed in order to allow time for the movement to calm down and prevent conflicts. The president was Bülent Ecevit at that time, who rejected the suggestion, stating that the situation in Fatsa was different to that in Malatya. However, on October 14th, 1979 by-elections were due in several regions, and Ecevit suggested postponing the Fatsa elections until that time. It was thought that in that time period the ongoing situation could be changed. Consequently, the by-election held in Fatsa was postponed until October 14th.

Fikri Sönmez claimed during his court defense that the postponement was aimed at hindering the activities of the left-wing movement, because he was the strongest candidate. However, more important events occurred during the campaign period, Fikri Sönmez suffered attacks from radical right-wing people. Some 19 days before the election, Fikri Sönmez was shot in the leg by radical rightists while entering his house. He went to the police station and gave a description of the attackers. Although he knew the attackers, who were from his neighborhood, and could give their exact names, the attackers could not be caught. Following this attack Fikri Sönmez decided not to go home until after the elections. One week later, in the same place, a relative of Fikri Sönmez was shot while climbing out of a taxi, being mistaken for Fikri Sönmez. He and the taxi driver were injured and the attackers began to be investigated. The house of Fikri Sönmez went

under police protection, as well as the offices of Halkevi and TÖB-DER, in order to stop the attacks.

The attacks did not come to an end. A café where Fikri Sönmez had been speaking during his election campaign was attacked by radical rightists after Fikri Sönmez had finished his speech and had left the building. Two people died in the attack, one of which was an attacker and the other Tevrat Güler, who was a resident of the Kurtuluş neighborhood. One of the attackers, Sezai Güngör, was the man who had previously attacked Fikri Sönmez, and his name was given to the police.

This event was a turning point in Fatsa that created social aggression. Fatsa came under the control of the state powers and the remainder of the election period saw no more trouble. The opposition groups began to use this situation against the leftists. However, the rightist attacks were condemned and the perpetrators had to leave Fatsa. This last attack was the end of the rightist attacks in the town of Fatsa until the mid-1980s.

At this point, it is important to state the position of the other political groups, who claimed that the results of the election were clear long before a vote had been cast. The attitude of the left-wing movement had created a different atmosphere in Fatsa. The conflicts had been shaped from a severe base, both because of the general condition of the country and because of the activities of the leftists against the dominant classes of Fatsa. Those outside the movement said that the movement had created an atmosphere of fear. However, the struggle by the leftists was against the ongoing system and the need for them to create their own hegemony. To come together against the ongoing hegemony and try to construct an alternative surely needed a struggle, which needed to be shaped according to the general conditional needs of the time. Therefore, while the actors of the existing political system did not accept the actions and methods that the leftists used in order to obtain and preserve power, the left-wing movement performed their political development from a different base. Consequently, it can be said that the left-wing movement had put pressure on the other political actors because they were trying to demolish their hegemony and preserve the organizational unity and the power they had gained.

These conditions affected their attitudes during the election period. At this point, we will give some more information on the members of the RPP and JP.

The chairman of the subprovince branch of the RPP was Kemal Burnaz, who was also a member of the Municipal Council and a deputy of the mayor. Kemal Burnaz said during our interview

that he did not wish to stand as a candidate in the elections. The RPP organization had begun to search for a candidate. Zeki Muslu, who became the candidate of RPP explains the situation:

In the past, the RPP had proposed 5-10 candidates for nomination. We visited all of them with Kemal Burnaz and proposed candidacy. Nobody wanted to be a candidate. They said that they had given up politics out of fear, as if to say “the snake that does not bite me can live forever”. Kemal Burnaz told me that my name had been put forward for candidacy. I was 33-34 years old at that time and said “it is too early for me”. I was a teacher. Finally I said, “Yes, the RPP is the party in power, and if this, the largest party in Turkey, cannot find a candidate, I will be the candidate!”

In this way, Zeki Muslu became the candidate of the RPP in the by-elections.

The JP also admitted that the result of the election was predictable, but they also worked towards the election. Their candidate was Ali Rıza Özmağden. Süleyman Çürüksu, who was a key person in the subprovince organization of JP and the former candidate of JP in the 1977 elections, gave his opinion of the time:

The candidacy of Fikri Sönmez was an open vote-closed consent. I struggled courageously in the pre-election period. As a party member, I presented a candidate and he got almost 200 votes. The thread was broken off in Fatsa due to open vote-closed consent. Everybody was aware of which way to vote. They did not go to any other candidates because they believed that those people would lose the election. Arab Zeki (Zeki Muslu) formed a group and worked with these people, we formed a group with Lütfü Topaloğlu and worked together. Arab Zeki polled 500-600 votes, we worked and also got 500-600. They got the rest.

Although there existed an undisputable domination by the radical leftists, other political groups also entered the elections and ran their election campaigns. However, they mentioned that everyone could perform their election workings, but the political atmosphere at the time was not normal. Kemal Burnaz stated that in the pre-election period anyone could have come across a direct threat, as it was not a normal campaign period:

Of course it was normal to feel restless while talking about something. There was no direct threat against anyone, but people could feel that there may be a threat if they used contemporary methods of campaigning. You could do nothing without caution.

Ertuğrul Günay, who was the Ordu parliamentarian of the RPP and who took part in the election campaign in Fatsa, said that they could run their campaigns, but said that the atmosphere in Fatsa had affected the election campaigns:

Of course, there was a different atmosphere, stemming from the influence of a youth group that numbered a few hundred people. There was an atmosphere that needed everybody to be more controlled, but it did not come from any violence or any pressure. I think a youth group with radical left ideologies elected an intelligent candidate – a candidate that had the possibility to draw votes from other places as well – and they won the election. There were no serious events during the election period. I was not faced with a serious problem anywhere. It was easy to carry out our election preparations with our candidate. I did not come across any challenging questions or situations that disturbed me. We had a strong group, which can be seen from the election results. We were not facing the prospect of zero

votes, and we were not facing any violence or difficulties. There was no pressure on us that prevented our movements or speeches.

Abdullah Çam and Zeki Muslu explained some of their experiences during their election campaign:

The election had been decided before polling day. When we went to the cafe houses, we found nothing except chairs. (Abdullah Çam)

When I was speaking, usually someone among the crowd wanted to ask a question or wanted to cause a problem. They would collect 20-30 children and tell them to run out of the café house during my speech. This was of course done to make people think a bomb had exploded or something similar. I've lived through all these. (Zeki Muslu)

It can be understood that the others from the left-wing movement had been affected by the political atmosphere during their election campaigns, which raised the question of what methods had been used by the radicals in the election period?

First of all, it is important to mention that although the election was postponed for approximately two months the leftists did not lose power in that time. Ahmet Özdemir gave his views on the pre-election period:

The election campaign had a long run. Fortunately, the election in August was postponed, which gave us a little bit more experience and time. We were developing, whereas the opponents were dissolving. So, time was ticking in our favor.

The radical leftists said that they had not developed a different program specifically for the elections. Sedat Göçmen stated that the political activities that they had carried out before the elections and during preparations had opened the doors to the municipality:

We had won the election long before 14 November, 1979 with our activities. We did not win the elections with the help of activities held during the election campaign; but we won the elections with our understanding and because of our intervention into all kinds of problems of people. (Sedat Göçmen, quoted by Uyan, 2004; 55)

The main slogan of Revolutionary Path in the election campaign was “Speech, Authority, Decision, Power to the People”, referring to absolute power to the people. This was not the slogan of the left-wing movement in Fatsa but the slogan of Revolutionary Path across the whole country. It stressed the direct participation of the people in the whole decision-making process. As can be understood from the slogan, the core policy of the radical leftists was to put the people in the center of the activities they would hold after the elections. They said that they would not make any promises, but that they would plan their actions with the participation of the people. In this scope, the points Ahmet Özdemir put forward are important:

Our election activities were a study on how to prepare a program. We went to the neighborhoods one by one and said, “We do not make any promises”, and talked with people about how we could work with them. We asked them to list the problems of the municipality

and problems affecting them. We prioritized the problems according to urgency so that we would know where to begin if we won the election. While determining the problems with the people, we also determined the organizational schema that would be used to solve the problems. The idea of neighborhood organizations emerged from these studies. After coming to power, we immediately established the Neighborhood Committees.

In their works in the neighborhoods, the program of the radical leftists had been developed and had become rich. During the election campaign period, the leftists prioritized the activities that they needed to deal with first, which were determined with the participation of the people.

It can be useful to mention the comparison of Zeki Muslu about the campaign of the left-wing movement and the RPP in order to understand the discourse of both sides.

There was almost no difference between our election campaigns. They were against usury, as was I. They were against the robbery, as was I. I was one of them, but I did the same thing as social democrat. I did not use force, preferring the state to do this legally. That was the difference, these were the separation points.

Zeki Muslu put the differences between the radical leftists' discourses and their own social democratic discourse very clearly. Radical leftists did not need institutions in order to cope with problems, and may behave outside of the legal framework because their basic discourse was developed against the structure of the existing system. That is to say, the radical leftists were looking to establish a new hegemonic structure. On the other hand, the RPP, as being a social democratic party, stressed the need for the legal base. This was something derived from how they were positioned within the system. Radicals thought that the state was also a part of the powered of the capitalists, and that the problems of the system would continue unless alternative methods were put in place. On the other hand, the RPP did not suggest changing the balance of power, but rather planned to solve the existing problems in the system.

It is clear that the actions of the radicals before the election guaranteed them success. On the other hand, it was obvious that the municipality would provide the left-wing movement a broader scope of influence. The election in Fatsa also had an importance on a wider scale. There existed a rising political movement around the country, and the Fatsa movement was being discussed externally as well. However, becoming the subject of discussion in a wider scope had created other dangers for Fatsa. As mentioned, the conflicts sometimes became severe and threatened the lives of the people. Aware of this, the leftists tried to decrease the tension and avoid provocations. Mehmet Gümüş gave an example of such precautions:

It was obvious that we would win the election, but we were worried about an assassination. I mean, an assassination attempt may have been made against the RPP candidate, and it might have been seen as an offense of the leftists. Although Zeki Muslu was not yet known, we provided for his security. We protected him in order to ensure his safety while he was speaking and avert any trouble. Zeki did not accept that individually, but we protected him anyway.

The election campaign of the leftists was underway and victory by leftists was seen as a near certainty by the community. The power of the left-wing movement was obvious among the other groups. In an article in the local Güneş newspaper by Sıtkı Pazarbaşı, who was known as a supporter of the central rightist parties, before the election, he gave reasons why the left-wing movement had become powerful and made estimations about the results of the elections:

People are asking us which candidate will win the election. I can say that the independent candidate Fikri Sönmez will win the mayoralty. It is not necessary to be a soothsayer or an intelligent person to know this. If we turn the clock back a few years, we can see all the truths clearly.

It is not those who like the independent candidate Fikri Sönmez that will win him the election; it is those who do not like him and who do not wish him to become mayor anymore, and worry about his mayoralty, that will win him the election and make him the mayor of Fatsa Municipality. How is this so? ... The lack of trade morality of the profiteers, selling goods for 10 liras one day and the next day saying that the goods have run out, and three days later selling the goods for 50 liras... The manufacturers, saying to people that the sacks of hazelnut hulls have run out and then selling trucks of hazelnut hulls to other cities at a price so much over the market price determined by the municipality, despite the fuel demands of the people whose children are shaking in the freezing cold of the winter months... The hoarding black marketeers, who have forgotten the holiness of the Ramadan month and make their conscience blind for just one kilo of olive oil... The owners of the petrol stations, smuggling petrol although there are drivers who cannot find petrol while they are trying to get sick people to hospital in time... The firms, saying that “the gas has run out” while the people have been waiting in the queue for a long time, and then transferring the gas to the black market... The hoarders, saying that the most important foodstuffs have run out, and creating artificial crises from time to time while stockpiling foodstuffs... Above all, the administrators of the municipality and the other administrators, thinking that their works are finished after determining the market price and not thinking to control the implementation of the market price as necessary... These are the ones who will allow Fikri Sönmez to become mayor.

He explained the power of the left-wing group and the reasons they had gained this power very clearly. This article is an important one, which provided legitimacy to the left-wing movement in their actions. The article also clarified the problems that were occurring in Fatsa and the ineffectiveness of the authorities.

The by-elections were held, and as expected Fikri Sönmez won. Fikri Sönmez took 3,096 votes; RPP candidate Zeki Muslu took 1,133 votes; and JP candidate A. Rıza Özmaden took 859 votes. In the 1977 elections, the candidate of the RPP took 2,515 votes, the JP candidate took 1,265 votes, the NSP candidate took 169 votes and the independents took 1,358 votes. The NSP did not participate in the by-election of 1979. When the two results are compared it can be seen that the groups had taken their fixed votes, but that independent candidate Fikri Sönmez took the votes of a more expanded section of the community.

Table 3: Results of the By-election of 1979

Independents (Fikri Sönmez)	3,096
RPP (Zeki Muslu)	1,,133
JP (A. Rıza Özmaden)	859
TOTAL	5,088

However, the results of the election were rejected by the other candidates, arguing that the independent candidate had used surreptitious methods to win the election. Critics said that the leftists had brought many people from outside of Fatsa who were not registered as voters in the town. From the RPP side, the criticism came from candidate Zeki Muslu:

I applied to the head of high election committee, Judge Süleyman, with a list of approximately 1,260 people who were not eligible to vote in Fatsa. Some 1,600 people were not from Fatsa. They came from Korgan, Kumru, Samsun and Çarşamba to vote in Fatsa.

From the JP, these claims were declared by Lütfü Topaloğlu:

Many voters came from outside of Fatsa. They were from Aybastı, Ordu and Terme, so many voters from regions both near and far were registered on the voters list. Is this an inconceivable thing, 400-500 people neither from Fatsa nor its villages? “You will write them down as voters”; “How can it be?” “It can be”... In my opinion, it was not a normal election atmosphere.

Such claims also found their way into the comments of Sedat Göçmen:

... a new organization structure for the election... There was an organization in Fatsa before the election, but we reorganized it for the election. It became a more widespread and broad organization. With this new organization and through other actions we looked to inspire our friends living in the villages of Fatsa use their votes in Fatsa itself. They had houses both in Fatsa and the village. We wanted them to use their votes in Fatsa.” (Sedat Göçmen, quoted by Uyan, 2004; 74)

Consequently, during the election period the left-wing movements made the people participate in the elections held in Fatsa. However, it cannot be understood from the election results how many people came from outside Fatsa, and to what extent the results were affected, because the totals of the polled votes of 1977 and 1979 are so close to each other. In fact, the number of valid votes in the 1977 election (5,307) exceeded those of the 1979 election (5,088). It was possible that there were people from the city center who did not vote in the 1979 election, and that some people may have come from outside for the elections, but the numbers cannot show this.

Claims were also made that people had been forced to vote a certain way at the ballot box, but no information to prove this was made available. It is obvious, however, that the atmosphere created by the left-wing movement had affected the voters.

Before ending the election period it would be useful to pay tribute to the opinions of those outside the movement on the victory of independent candidate Fikri Sönmez. While they criticized the election process, they also mentioned the rightfulness of Fikri Sönmez's victory.

Abdullah Cam, who was a member of the RPP in those times, said that the people had given their votes to Fikri Sönmez because of the existing situation:

Some people claimed that people gave their votes to Fikri Sönmez under the pressure of guns, but do they not consider the price of olive oil, salt and the other things, nor the struggle against the usurers, poverty etc... You cannot even say usurer to anyone today; there are usurers in the management boards; today even the imam is a usurer in this country. Did the disgracefulness that existed in the municipal power of the RPP not affect the people enough to give their votes to Fikri Sönmez.

Abdullah Cam's comments were in line with the article of Sıtkı Pazarbaşı from the time, which is given above.

Kemal Şendur, who was a craftsman and was known as a conservative, said that everybody had gone to the ballot box without force:

There were two or three candidates. People gave their votes to who ever they wanted. Although people are now making accusations that pressure was put on voters, there was no pressure.

Hüseyin Uygun said that the left-wing movement had worked effectively in the election period:

Certainly the revolutionists did not force voters. The revolutionists had worked really hard. They worked ward by ward, home by home with a great effort.

To conclude, in the pre-election period the left-wing movement had gained absolute domination, and the activities of the leftists before the election period became the theme of their campaign. The eventual outcome of the election was clear in the minds of people because of the political domination of the left-wing movement.

4.3. Left-Wing in Power

The independent candidate of the left-wing movement, Fikri Sönmez, became the mayor with a large majority. However, the mayoralty of Fikri Sönmez cannot be thought of as being won just with his name, but was rather a victory of the left-wing movement. After the election, the activities of the left-wing movement began to shift towards problems that could be solved by legal means. Before the election, the left-wing movement had not acted from a legal base, or they had used the legal channels only at the end of the events. Instead, they used the power they had gained and the support of the masses. As mentioned several times during our interviews with

different people, the activities could be thought of as illegal, but were seen as legitimate as they were supported by the people.

With the victory in the by-elections, the power of the leftist movement increased. To gain the power of the municipality was a bonus for the left-wing movement, bringing many advantages in the implementation of their political views and the formation of a new hegemony. At this point it would be useful to remember the Gramscian perspective. In order to construct a hegemonic structure or implement a hegemonic process, the power blocks come together around the state power (Şengül, 2001; 29). Referencing this point, taking the control of the local state had created a new arena for the left-wing movement in which a new hegemonic structuralization could be formed. An important point here that we need to mention in the post election period is the activities that took place after gaining the power of the municipality. In this section, we will give more details on the activities of the leftists, as well as the differences in their methods from their predecessors. After presenting the activities of the left-wing movement, the power structure in the municipality and Fatsa and some criticisms will be examined.

4.3.1. The Internal Organizational Structure of the Municipality and the Establishment of the Public Relations Office

The left-wing movement had gained an important power in the municipality; however this was a new area for them, as they did not know about the internal structure or the execution of the municipality. On the other hand, they had taken the responsibility of establishing an alternative administration as they were criticizing the existing power relations. In a speech made by Fikri Sönmez to his colleagues before the elections he stressed:

I may win the election here, but what are we going to do after winning? To be in the opposition has a comfortable side, you can criticize everything, and you can refer to everything as bad. What will we do if the voters say “take the power and lead!”? (quoted by Uyan, 2004; 55).

At that point they had begun to discuss the situation, and decided that the resources were scarce in the municipality, and that moreover, if they came to power, it was possible that there would be further decreases in the existing resources. For this reason they decided to address everything with the people. This view was the starting point in their political activities. It was not an odd or new position, but rather was the basic discourse that they had promised. After the election, their policy-making principles were also based on this discourse. However, the municipality was a new area for them. Ahmet Özdemir explained their position just after the election:

On the one hand, by looking at municipality we were learning about its internal processes. There wasn't anybody we knew working in the municipality, we didn't have a friend working as mayor at that time. In this sense, the municipality was unfamiliar to us. On the other hand we were trying to understand the municipality, who was doing which jobs, why and how? What kinds of problems existed, and why? You progressed by observing and understanding.

While the leftists had gained the mayoralty power, the internal structure of the municipality had been formed in the 1977 elections. The by-election was held only to elect a new mayor, the Municipal Council and the commissions did not change. Therefore, there was a dual power structure in the municipality. Sedat Göçmen explained the dual power structure of the municipality:

There was the Municipal Committee, Municipal Council, municipality employees, and we had not attempted to stop them from working. We didn't have any members on either the Municipality Committee or the Municipal Council. When Fikri Sönmez was elected the RPP, JP and other parties had been in the municipality. How could we make decisions? At this point we had physical and material strength; our vote potential was clear. Fikri Sönmez explained everything to the people and went to the council with these decisions, having gained public approval. He asked the opposing members the reasons why they were standing in opposition, and asked them to explain why they were opposing.

After planning a program and defining the activities to be carried out as a priority, Mayor Fikri Sönmez gathered the Municipal Council together and made a presentation of his plans. This speech was claimed later in the courts to have been a threat towards the members of the Municipal Council. In his defense Fikri Sönmez explained his intentions with the speech:

While opening the first council meeting, I said "I'm an independent mayor, of course I have a political thought and a certain view of the world, but I was elected as a mayor by a democratic election in a parliamentary system through the support of a large amount of people, in Fatsa nobody had ever won this much of the vote. If you try to prevent my operations for political reasons, as in the past, everything will change. (...) In the council meeting I said, "Politics is done here, I'll work in line with my political view and I'll yield everything for the benefit of the public. If you oppose my demands for public benefit and do not pass them in the council, I'll go to the public and complain about you. I meet with them each week to give them the details." That was a threat. It was true, but they had no claim of illegality.

During that Municipal Council meeting, the establishment of a Public Relations Department came to the agenda. The establishment of the Public Relations Department and the establishment of Municipality Committees in the neighborhoods had been decided as the primary activities of the new administration. The establishment of the Public Relations Department can be said to have been the first activity of the new administration. In the first Municipal Council meeting, the establishment of the Municipal Committees (or "Public Committees") and the "End to the Mud" campaign was also presented to the council members for discussion.

The Public Relations Department was later to be referred to by several sources, and in the court indictments, as the Public Relations Committee, in a reference to the Resistance Committees. In

addition, in the court indictments, this formation was said to have been launched as a part of the Revolutionary Path Organization. However, both Fikri Sönmez and those that took part in the municipality administration stressed that the establishment of the Public Relations Department had been approved by the Municipal Council, and was a department of the municipality, not a committee.

There were talks of a Public Relations Committee. This isn't a committee. This is a department of the municipality. This type of department exists in the developed municipalities. An agency that had been unavailable before my mayoralty was established to provide a service to the public. (Fikri Sönmez, from his Court Defense of 1984).

Ahmet Özdemir, who worked in the Public Relations Office during the mayoralty of Fikri Sönmez, also said in his court defense of 1986 that the establishment of the Public Relations Office had been approved by the Municipal Council and the Municipal Commission, and that the Public Relations Office personnel had begun to work with the approval of these organs. Working in the Public Relations Office alongside Ahmet Özdemir were Seher Ertop and Aynur Tandoğan. Ahmet Özdemir had been a teacher, but resigned and began to work in the municipality. It is important to note that during the mayoralty of Fikri Sönmez, no personnel of the municipality were fired or removed from their positions. Only seven people started work at the beginning of the mayoralty of Fikri Sönmez, and a new department had been established; the Public Relations Office.

The Public Relations Office had two basic functions. Firstly, it was charged with following and facilitating the works of the people in the municipality; and secondly, it controlled the activities of the municipality in the neighborhoods and listened to the people in order to determine their problems and expectations from the municipality. Fikri Sönmez explained the duties of the Public Relations Office in his court defense:

The Public Relations Office, especially in the Fatsa Municipality, has two functions. One is to redirect the flow of citizens to other agencies. Citizens apply to this agency for faster redirection, and this agency works for accelerating this in the municipality. Beside this, it audits all of the activities of the municipality in Fatsa on site, listens to the problems of the citizens and accelerates traffic, executing its duties in the name of the municipality and the mayor. Aside from these, it has no other duties.

Ahmet Özdemir defined the duties of the Public Relations Office in a similar way, clarifying the duties more specifically in his court defense of 1986:

Generally, its duty is to form a link between the public and the municipality, as can be understood from its name. To determine the problems of the public related with municipality, to research these problems, to transmit its research results to the related units of the municipality, to declare the works of the municipality through the press and through meetings with the public are the duties of this agency. It should also deal with the socio-cultural problems of the citizens working in allocation units. With the established study program, the Public Relations Agency undertook these duties:

- With “End to the Mud” campaign, to start opening the roads and to make the citizens participate in the cobbling works
- By forming Municipality-Public Committees in all neighborhoods to provide communication between the municipality and the public
- To hold meetings at pre-determined times, to confirm the problems of the citizens in these meetings and to discuss suggestions for their resolution
- To arrange public festivals
- To establish a municipality library
- To form a municipality Children’s Choir, a Municipality Public Choir and folk dancing groups
- By holding meetings in the municipality, to assess the suggestions, demands and criticisms of the public
- To highlight the works of the municipality through the press ...etc.

It is seen that the Public Relations Office had been charged with important activities, which showed the differences of the new administration from the previous ones. Therefore, it can be said that, the new administration of the municipality gave importance to the Public Relations Office, as they had made this department responsible for implementing activities consistent with the activities they had held before coming to power.

The Public Relations Office was going to be the first organ that dealt with the problems of the people, and would also deal with the internal structure of the municipality. Sedat Göçmen and Ahmet Özdemir defined the structure of the public relations department as a problem-solving organ, as well as being an organ that would form a different relationship between the people and the municipality.

The main center for problem solving was the Public Relations Office. People with problems were coming to this agency. Even people from the Public Committees would come; it was often crowded. (From the interview with Sedat Göçmen)

“The establishment of the Public Relations Office stemmed from the need for an internal organization to carry out such duties as organizing a neighborhood committee to improve public participation into processes that concerned the neighborhood residents, the internal organization of the municipality should have been organized in the same way. A person who comes to the municipality with his/her issues should be directed to the correct office, accelerating the traffic through the system. At that time we said that it was a unit that provides direct and first communication with public.” (From the interview with Ahmet Özdemir)

Ahmet Özdemir also detailed the position of the Public Relations Office in the internal structure of the municipality. Besides establishing a different relation with people, one of the most important activities held in the Public Relations Office was to organize the relations between the other departments, making the departments more effective. The internal structure of the

municipality was organized in a similar manner to the Public Relations Office. Different departments had established such kinds of groups in their departments, and the problems of the departments were forwarded to the related organs in the municipality.

The formation of other areas was similar to this. For example, there was such an organizational structure in the internal structure of the municipality. We called this the “inner formation”. These formations were later launched as “public courts”. The people in the municipality came together and formed a committee in order to discuss their internal problems. For example, we formed a committee with two or three people in a branch of the municipality. Then, in time, these committees began to discuss their internal needs with the civil servants and workers.

On the other hand, the Public Relations Office was a department where the political understanding and the activities of the left-wing movement were explained. That is to say, it had also the characteristics of being a part of the political process. It can be said that the Public Relations Office was also a department where the policies of the municipality were explained to public. As mentioned above, the left-wing movement extended its arena of activity through the Public Relations Office, and with the establishment of the office, people went to the members of the Public Relations Office before they met with the other departments. The importance of this is that the Public Relations Office did not only provide for the organization of the internal structure of the municipality and establish a new and different relation with the people, but also created a control mechanism for the leftists. This point is important, because although the leftists gained power in the municipality, it was not enough because they had only won the mayoralty. In order to construct a new understanding, or hegemony, there was a need to build such a control and implementation mechanism. As we will see in the following sections, the establishment of the Public Relations Office and the Public Committees in the neighborhoods provided the leftists with a direct link to the people, and the elimination of the existing power mechanisms or power holders, whether in the municipality or in Fatsa as a whole.

Actually, Public Relations Offices were not unknown in municipal administrations. As in the past, today’s municipalities have such departments that carry out similar activities. The important difference in the Fatsa Municipality’s Public Relations Office was the difference in comprehension. The Public Relations Office in Fatsa had important responsibilities which shaped the policies of the municipality. It was a policy making department as well as a control mechanism. Therefore, when comparing the contemporary departments and the one in the Fatsa Municipality, it should be kept in mind that the municipal administration had not been changed during the mayoralty of Fikri Sönmez, but the internal structure had been reorganized and controlled through the Public Relations Office. It should also be kept in mind that the Public Relations Office was based on a legal structure.

At this point, it will be useful to explain the internal structure of the municipality. As mentioned above, no personnel of the municipality had been fired or moved to another department upon the arrival of Fikri Sönmez as mayor, and the main departments of the municipality were left as they were. After taking the mayoralty of the municipality, Fikri Sönmez organized a meeting with the personnel of the municipality. It was said that the personnel were in fear of being fired, but at this meeting Fikri Sönmez said that no one would be removed or fired, as they were continuing to perform well in their jobs. Hüseyin Uygun, who was working in the municipality during the mayoralty of Fikri Sönmez, said that the duties of the municipality personnel were clarified during that meeting:

The positions of the all the municipal personnel had not changed. All personnel continued to work in their current positions. In the first meeting with the municipal personnel, the mayor gave the following promise not to change any of the current positions held by the personnel: "No one will be moved from his/her position, everybody will stay in their position, but our working principles and ways will be followed. We are trying to produce a service for the benefit of the public. The principle of honesty is in the foreground. We will ignore the corruption that we heard about before; we will consider them as never having occurred. We are going to evaluate you through the works that you will carry out from now on." As none of the positions held were going to change, we once again reminded ourselves of the right way to perform as civil servants. This, at the end, of course produced good results.

In addition, in order to determine the problems and analyze the ongoing situation, meetings were organized by the mayoralty and Public Relations Office each week with the chiefs of the departments. This provided them with the information on the internal progress of the municipality and gave way to a more effective utilization of public services in the municipality. One of the workers of the municipality, Ahmet Altuntaş, attended these meetings:

The mayor met with the heads of the eight or nine departments of the municipality, of which I was one, at the end of each week. We talked about the problems we had come across that week and what we needed to solve them.

4.3.2. The Establishment and Activities of Public Committees

An important characteristic of left-wing municipal administrations is the additional importance placed in public participation, and more importantly, providing a wide range of people with the opportunity to participate and be effective in the decision-making processes. The basic aim of such participation is to make the masses the authority, or give the power to the public rather than to a certain interest group. To analyze the characteristics of the participation mechanisms and the aims of the participation goes beyond the limits of this study, however, it is important to mention that one of the basic characteristics of the public participation, which is the basic difference between the different political ideologies, is the position of the participators in the decision-making processes.

In the Fatsa Municipality, in order to facilitate the participation of the people in municipal activities and in the decision-making process, the left-wing administration decided to establish Municipal Committees in each neighborhood. Actually, it was not an unfamiliar organizational structure for the left-wing movement in Fatsa, because the left-wing movement had come together under the roof of the Resistance Committees. However, the structure and aim of the Municipal Committees were different from the Resistance Committees. The need to establish the Municipal Committees and also the discourse laid out under the Municipal Committees can be found in the court defense of Fikri Sönmez:

Local governments are the administrative structures in which democracy can be implemented best. (...) Municipalities are relatively independent from the central government. Although this independent character of the municipalities had not been evident, there is no rule that says it cannot be carried out. The Municipality of Fatsa has seen this character, and had begun to carry it out. People had participated in the administrative mechanism. All the decisions taken by the municipality had been discussed with the people. The municipality did not carry out any plans that had not received the consent of the people. With one sentence, the people had become decision-makers. This is a requirement of democracy. As result of having the right to speak and take decisions in the municipality, various issues were solved that had been waiting for a solution in the Fatsa Municipality. The works carried out with the opinion and consent of people were an absolute success. People owned the decisions given by them and it was tried to implement the decisions as soon as possible.

Fikri Sönmez had stressed the relative autonomy of the local governments. Following Duncan and Goodwin, it can be said that local governments cover the local interest groups, and therefore reflect on the relations with local groups. In the case of Fatsa, the municipality was relatively externalized from the capitalist groups, and they tried to make the people the decision makers.

Besides providing participation, it was aimed with the Municipal Committees to play a part in finding solutions to Fatsa's problems. As mentioned above, the left-wing movement avoided making promises during their election campaign, but rather explained their plans and the services they would provide, emphasizing the participation and help of the people in the processes. The need for the establishment of Municipal Committees and the participation understanding of the left-wing movement in Fatsa was also explained in the court defense of Ahmet Özdemir:

How would people participate in the administration? The answer to this question can be given by examining why the previous administration had failed. A municipality that wished to serve had to take the support of people from every dimension. The municipal personnel had to be trustworthy, both in their inner relations and in their relations with the public. In the relations formed with the public, people should be able to express their problems easily to us; they should be able to point out our faults. They should have the right to speak on the subjects that concern them, they should be able to give their own approval to the decisions related to the rules they are obliged to follow. (...) This means that people can bring their problems and solutions to the municipal administration and have the right to have a say in the decisions taken by the municipality, and fulfill the responsibilities given to them by these decisions. Believing that problems would be only be solved by integrating the scarce resources of municipality with the people's physical and mental powers needed such a

comprehension. So, the Municipality (Public) Committees established in Fatsa were formed in order to facilitate this comprehension.

In the first Municipal Council meeting, the establishment of the “Municipal Committees” was discussed. In the seven neighborhood of Fatsa, 11 Municipal Committees were decided to be established. Ahmet Özdemir explains the establishment of the Municipal Committees:

It was something that we had not formed before, but we came to the formation stage through constant discussion. Actually, the formation of the committees was managed very easily; just after the election, we put the neighborhoods into an order; Kurtuluş District would be held on that day, Samaria District would be held on that day... We hosted similar meetings in each neighborhood, prioritized the problems, discussed who should solve these problems, determined responsibilities, and then started working.

During the Municipal Council meeting, the establishment of Municipal Committees was criticized by the other political groups, especially by the JP members. They suggested that the neighborhood units could be based on the existing elements, such as the Board of Aldermen and the neighborhood headmen. According to them, there was no need to hold elections to determine the Municipal Committees as the existing neighborhood administrative units should have been used. One of the members of JP, Süleyman Çürüksu, explained this view during our interviews:

In my opinion, Public Committees should be formed; however, this committee should include a group of people who are older than a certain age. Committees are useful. The sub-governor, the headmen of the districts, the Board of Alderman, people who are socially active, should be in the Public Committees. In addition, the media should be on the committees to announce things to the people, to direct people... This is what the duty of the Public Committee is. This can be managed by organizing frequent meetings. These meetings can concern the whole city or can be organized only as neighborhood meetings. How can we call the committees established in those days as Public Committees? If the committees only included radical revolutionists that committee could not be a Public Committee. The NAP, RPP and JP should also be included in these committees. Everybody will take part. The neighborhood will select them. Who will they select as members? Those people who are retired and give their time to social activities.

The aims of the leftists did not overlap with the approach of the JP members. First of all, the headmen of the neighborhoods were criticized by the leftist. They supported that the headmen were also part of the existing patronage relations. Especially in the distribution of the consumption productions, leftists claimed that the headmen became the elements in corruption. Fikri Sönmez expressed his thoughts on the headmen:

Coming to the headmen; they are another subject. They have made the municipality a farm for years. Headmen put pressure on the mayors. They are dominating the neighborhoods. That is to say, they are dominating the votes of the neighborhood and they are a pressure element for the mayors as they are effective in the renovation of the municipality. For years it has been going on like this. One of the important subjects that need to be given attention is the subject of headmen. Before becoming a headman, they have been either a tailor, or a shoe-seller, or from any other job. However, after taking the position of headman, they open a grocery, or a shop in which construction materials are sold. This point needs to be given attention. The reason for this is that they are dominating the municipality and exert pressure on the mayor. They take the distribution of the basic consumption goods, for which the municipality is actually responsible. For years, it has been like this. Cement comes, the

headman distributes it. Iron comes, the headman distributes it. Olive oil comes, the headman distributes it. They distribute, but how? Whether they give the goods to their friends or sell goods worth 10 liras for 50 liras, they are subjects of the black market. This is a fact well-known by the people of Fatsa. In this subject, the headmen have an interest. Secondly, as an example, an illegal construction is seized and sealed by the municipality in a neighborhood, as it is contrary to the improvement plans, laws, and regulations. Then, the headman phones the mayor. This has occurred both in my mayoralty period and in the previous periods. “Mayor, the election period is coming, what are you doing? The property you have sealed belongs to a popular man. There are many votes behind him. Tolerate him, condone.” Then, on the third day the seal on the construction has been moved and construction has been started again. The headman takes 10,000 liras or more from the man who is popular in his neighborhood. I can see no other reason why he would show interest. I do not know, as I have not witnessed it and cannot say anything about it. (...) There are people who use illegal electricity and water. When they have been determined, the headmen force the mayor to implement their rules by threatening the mayors with votes in the election etc. During my period as mayor, these opportunities have been taken from the hands of the headmen. The functions of the headmen in these matters have ended.

Secondly, the leftist had been aiming abolish the existing structure and make people participate in the activities of the municipality directly.

These opinions were explained to the members of the Municipal Council along with the need for founding Municipal Committees. Then, in the seven neighborhoods of Fatsa, the Municipal Committees were established and elections were held to determine the members of the committees. Depending on the size of the neighborhoods, the number of representatives on the neighborhood committees varied from three to seven. The candidates were determined by the inhabitants of the neighborhoods, and the closed voting-open counting system was used. Prior to the elections, the problems of the neighborhoods were determined, and it had been discussed who could overcome the problems. Then, the determination of the candidates and the election stage took place. Mehmet Gümüş, who was a teacher in Fatsa and a member of the Sakarya Neighborhood Municipal Committee, explained the structure of the Municipal Committees:

The activities of the municipality and how people could participate in the administration were explained. After explaining the processes, people were asked to determine their candidates. Those elected became a connection between the municipality and the people. In some places there were 10 candidates, in other places there were 15. Both revolutionists and other people could participate. Even a rightist could win. For example, in our neighborhood a woman who was known to be a prostitute was elected to the Neighborhood Committee. I am saying this in order to underline the democracy that existed. Nobody was told whom they should elect. After the military intervention, even the people from the right-wing who were committee members in their neighborhood were judged, and were sent to prison for two and a half years, although they had no relations with the left-wing.

As mentioned above, the committees were not only composed of left-wing sympathizers, but also sympathizers of other political groups. Ahmet Altuntaş, who was a worker in the municipality in that period, noticed this point:

The people who were elected to the committees were all ordinary and liked people in their neighborhoods. What did they do in the municipality? They distributed the hazelnuts hulls given by the municipality in their neighborhood. They contacted with the people in this

scope. Most of them had not supported the left-wing parties. They were people who were liked in their neighborhoods. The neighborhoods gave this duty to them. The inhabitants of the neighborhood proposed them to deal with the problems of the neighborhood people in the municipality.

Kemal Burnaz also stressed that although they were criticizing the activities of leftists and did not participate in the committee meetings, he also stated that the committee members were ordinary people.

In our neighborhood of Ayazlı there were five people on the committee to provide a connection to the municipality. They were all punished, although they had no relation with the revolutionist ideas or the other movements. There were people that did have revolutionist ideals, but none of them resorted to violence. It could be seen from the surface that the committees were composed of ordinary people.

In particular, the right-wing criticized the committees as not being a participative mechanism, but was rather arenas where the leftists showed their power. Lütfü Topaloğlu, who was the chairman of the JP subprovince organization, expressed his opinions during our interview:

We did not know the members of the committees, but it was generally a group of children. There were no elders in the committees, they were formed by 18-20 year-old youths. There were also Resistance Committees in each neighborhood, and some of the projects were carried out by them! With their suggestions, roads would be opened; constructions began with their suggestion, following their wishes and guidance. (...) I cannot say there was public participation. Participation was rather forced. I saw that participation in these committees was not derived from supporting the movement, but rather was an action that people did to protect themselves by attending the committee meetings. For this reason, people I knew very well were participating. Even people from famous families or notables were participating. They did not say that they supported the movement from the heart, but they had to be in the meetings.

However, Lütfü Topaloğlu mentioned that he had never participated in the meetings of the committees. On the other hand, Rahmi Yangın, a member of JP and a merchant, participated in to the Sakarya Neighborhood Committee, but now denies his relations:

Because I have not had any contact with them, I do not know any of them; but yes, there were Public Committees. However, the committees were established for the interests of the left movement, not for the interests of the people. It was just done for self promotion.

Ziya Toprakbaşı also said that the participation to the meetings was forced:

They made 80% of the participation in Public Committees by force. They chose people from the public whose opinions were closest to theirs, their own sympathizers.

However, the members of the committees and the sympathizers of the left-wing movement rejected these opinions. One of the members of the Kurtuluş neighborhood committee, Kemal Şendur, who was also a conservative, noted that he had been elected to the committee upon the suggestion of the neighborhood inhabitants, as with the others. Also, people we interviewed in the framework of this study said that an average of 300 people participated in the meetings of the committees.

At the meetings of the committees with the municipality they tried to include public participation. That is to say, although the elections were held, in the meetings it was not only those who had been elected to the committee that took part, others participated too. During the meetings, the problems were determined and prioritized, and solutions were discussed, and afterwards the decisions taken were explained to the people.

Coming to the activities of the Municipal Committees, it can be said that they became mediator organs between the municipality and the public. Besides dealing with neighborhoods problems, the struggle against the black market was also begun by the Municipal Committees. In addition, the distribution of scarce resources – such as hazelnut hulls which are used as fuel and are important for the people, the stocked products – was carried out by the Municipal Committees. The municipality sent the products to the Municipal Committees, who distributed them or determined the amounts to be given to which people. In addition, the Municipal Committees were organs where the people came and raised their problems or suggestions. Zeki Muslu defined the committees:

They were the people who had esteem in their neighborhood, who made connections with the municipality in order to give the names of the people living in their neighborhood that were in need, and in order to pass on the matters that the neighborhood demanded from the municipality. This was the committee. In that period, I referred to these kinds of organs as “Neighborhood Units”, they established them as “Public Committees”.

Meanwhile, the intervention areas of the Municipal Committees were expanding, and they began to deal with not only the problems in the municipal services in the neighborhood, but also with the social problems of the neighborhoods. In time, the name of the Municipal Committees changed, being referred to as Public Committees. Depending on the source, both names are used to define these committees.

The items to be discussed by the Public Committees were determined by the committees themselves. As stated by Hüseyin Uygün, a committee member and a worker in the municipality, the issues discussed by the committees were determined by the inhabitants of the neighborhood. There was no agenda for the committees, but some duties were given to them by the municipality, such as the distribution of the scarce consumption goods. Problems and their solutions were discussed in the committees. The Sakarya Neighborhood Committee can be given as an example to explain the internal organizations of the committees.

An important problem in the neighborhood was related to the improvement of a local stream, which had been neglected by the previous administration. The new municipality was willing to deal with the problem, but the resources of the municipality were not sufficient for the

construction. In the neighborhood committee it had been decided that if the inhabitants of the municipality could come together for the improvement, the problem could be overcome. For this reason, a new committee was established within the existing committee; the “Stream Improvement Committee”. Mehmet Gümüş, who was a member of this committee, explained the process:

In the Sakarya Neighborhood there was a cleanliness problem with the stream. The stream had been threatening public health for years. The limited finances of the municipality prevented them from carrying out the clean-up works. The Sakarya Neighborhood Committee had determined this problem and several meetings to discuss the problem were held. In order to overcome the problem, the committee looked to the people to participate in the process. It was said in these meetings that if the people came together hand in hand, if the energy of the neighborhood was brought together, the problem might be overcome. One of the dimensions of the work required finance, and so money was collected. In fact, we elected a new committee under the banner of “Stream Improvement Committee”. I do not remember now how many people were on that committee, but there were even merchants. With the pioneering of the merchants, money was collected.

As can be seen from the explanation of Mehmet Gümüş, the Public Committee of the Sakarya neighborhood developed a different solution in order to overcome a neighborhood problem in the internal structure of committee, and so it could be said that the Municipal Committees had begun to be shaped individually around their own neighborhood’s problems.

However, in time, complaints from some of the committees began to be raised, especially regarding the distribution of the scarce consumption goods. It was an unexpected situation when the people complained about the committees, saying that the new system was similar to the previous one, and that patronage relationships were still continuing in the distributions. These complaints were discussed by the municipality and decisions were quickly made, owing to the great importance placed in the committees. However, the activities of the committees were successful in general, and Fatsa had begun to attract the attention of the rest of the country. It can be said that the Fatsa municipality and its activities were under the control of the society and the state both negatively and positively. Clearly these conditions created risks for the leftists in Fatsa and they needed to pay attention to the activities they held. Although they tried to establish direct democracy in the Public Committees, and had not intervened in the elections to appoint members of the Public Committees, they decided that some of the members of the committees were not suitable. Although they had left the decisions regarding the members of the committees to the inhabitants of the neighborhoods, some of the members of the committees had proved to be problematic. Besides the complaints related to the distribution activities, there were also people who did not agree with the attitude of the leftists. For example, in the Sakarya Neighborhood a woman who had been known to have earned a living from prostitution was elected to the committee, a situation that was not appropriate to the attitude of the leftists at the time. The leftists needed to intervene in the situation, and went to speak with her. After talking with the

woman, she chose to stand down from committee membership and a new member was elected. It is not known who had chosen the woman as a candidate, or how the election process was held, but it was said in the interviews that the leftists were unaware of the situation, and had not known about the woman, and therefore had not intervened before the elections.

Although this is an extreme example, it was considered that the structure of the committee had not been constructed as hoped. In the light of this and following discussions it was decided to make new elections in the Public Committees. The second election was held around three months after the first election. Ahmet Özdemir explained the need for a second election period:

There were two elections to select the Public Committees. (...) As the needs of the process grew larger, the responsibilities became clearer, and as a result we had to go through second elections. While carrying out the projects in Fatsa, we were under the spotlight of the whole country and had to be sure we were not making mistakes that may affect the movement. We sought to solve problems on a neighborhood scale. As a result of this, even a policeman's wife would bring her problems to you. (...) The first election had happened spontaneously, and we did not want to intervene in the selection process, as it may have caused a reaction against the movement. So we went to work with the people they chose. However, we saw that some people who were unsuitable for our program had been elected. There were many reasons for this. People had chosen candidates who were close to them, but who were not the people most suitable for the job. Some of the elected members took improper advantage of the mission they were undertaking. In the example of the Sakarya District... a woman who was believed by some to be a prostitute had been nominated. Did the women nominate her or the men? It was likely to have been the men who chose her, as the number of men who voted for her was very high. We did not know the position of the elected woman before the election. Additionally, our revolutionist lady friends did not know about this. After we learned of this, we met with her. We said to her: "Under these circumstances, in a committee like this, it will not be proper for you to be here, it can be hard for us". We told her that it would be prudent for her to step down, and she behaved reasonably and did so, and so it was not necessary to hold a second election. In other districts some other negative issues arose; for example, the unfair distribution of goods by people who wanted to maintain the traditional habits, became an issue in one neighborhood. These matters began to draw criticism from the people... They had voted in the elections, but started to say "your committees are doing this...". These issues brought a second election to the agenda. The voters would again be the people from the neighborhood, but this time we decided to put forward our own candidates, in addition to those put forward by the communities. The quality of the committee had been weak, and because of this we had to make changes.

Although the elections for the committees had been held without any pressure from the leftists, in time, their intervention into the situation became necessary in order to make the Public Committees, in their opinion, more effective. There were sympathizers of the left-wing movement that were elected to the Public Committees, but it is worth mentioning that radical nationalists were excluded from the committees, and had actually been completely eliminated from the political arena of Fatsa.

Without a doubt, the Public Committees were also political institutions, and were a means of promoting the ideologies of the leftists. It was also a politicization process. In the Public Committees, during the execution of their municipal activities, the requirements of the new

ideologies were explained to the people by the leftists. Ahmet Özdemir clearly defined the role of the Public Committees:

The Public Committees were formed to solve the people's problems in the municipal sphere and integrate the people with the municipality in the process of trying to find solutions to the problems. Besides this, they had the duty of politicizing those established relations.

With the Public Committees, the people of Fatsa were participating in the left-wing administration structure. The average number of people active in the Public Committees was given as approximately 3,000, which is a significant number, as the population of the center of Fatsa in that period was around 20,000.

Sedat Göçmen and Zeki Muslu put forward an important point related to the Public Committees:

We could not make 20,000 people active in Fatsa, but we saw 3,000-4,000 become active in the process. Every moment was vibrant. That is what we did... Did the headmen or the Municipality Council see such success? I think we had shown our difference there. (From the interview with Sedat Göçmen)

They did what the Municipality Council members or the headmen were obliged to do. If it was me, I would have made the headman the head of those four or five neighborhood units. (From the interview with Zeki Muslu)

These approaches raise another important point about the municipal administration and the Public Committees. As mentioned earlier, in order to bring them power in the municipality, the left-wing movement brought the people into the decision-making processes, aiming to both legitimize their activities and steer away from the existing patronage relations. However, the participation mechanisms should not be misconstrued as being a way of strengthening the power of the leftists. It was an important political process for the leftists, as they aimed to block the patronage relations and limit the power holders. The comments of Sedat Göçmen and Zeki Muslu highlighted that the establishment of the Public Committees, the functions and power of the Municipal Council and Municipal Commission had narrowed. This was another dimension of the Public Committees.

Up until now, we have explained how the Public Relations Office and the neighborhood Public Committees had existed as participatory mechanisms in the decision-making and problem-solving processes, but it also needs to be mentioned that the people could easily go to the municipality to voice their concerns and highlight their problems themselves. The municipal administration tried to construct a strong relationship with people and bring them into the political processes. The participation mechanisms legitimized the activities of the municipality against the existing system.

However, the Public Committees were not completely separated from the existing system. It would be an exaggeration to claim that the Public Committees were “organs of public power and authority”. The Public Committees were rather a nucleus of public authority, but not an absolute authority. The contribution of Oğuzhan Müftüoğlu, who was in the central organization of the Revolutionary Path Periodical, needs to be underlined in this regard:

In a system like this, in a society surrounded by the rules of capitalism, to expect real public democracy, a real direct democracy, to appear is not realistic. This was only an example of “participatory democracy”. We have to take this example as a method of administration that changed its direction over time in accordance with the growing power of the people and the workers. It is not possible to realize a direct democracy that breaks this system while the state, capital, capitalism, the profit of the private sector, which is based on individual benefits, are standing. For this reason we did not define these kinds of committees as the power of the people; we just saw them as a nucleus of public power. We saw them as a part of participatory democracy and as a method of expression which would enable people to see the superiority of an administration in which the power of the people had been improved in the decision-making mechanisms. (quoted by Uyan, 2004; 104)

As he mentioned, beside the physical duties of the committees, they were also used as an organ to show to the people the extent of their own authority and power. At the very end, although they were not legal but were legitimate, it could not be said that they were completely independent from the existing system. They were the part of the municipal administration, and the administration was working within the legal framework.

In a criticism from Süleyman Çürüksu about the organizational and administrative structure of the Public Committees, he said that the borders of the activities of such a participatory organ should be clearly defined, and the needs of the whole should be considered:

In my opinion, Public Committees should be formed; however, these committees should be formed by people who are older than a certain age. Committees are useful. Sub-governors, headmen of the districts, the Board of Alderman, people who are socially active, these are the people who should be on the Public Committees. In addition, the media should be in the committees, to announce the issues to the people, to direct the people... This is what the duty of the Public Committee is. This can be managed by organizing frequent meetings. These meetings can concern the whole city or can be organized on a neighborhood basis. How can we refer to the committees established in those days as Public Committees? If the committees only include radical revolutionists, that committee cannot be a Public Committee. The NMP, RPP and JP should also be included in these committees. Everybody will take part. The neighborhood will select them. Who will they select as members? Those people who are retired and give their time to social activities.

From the comments of Süleyman Çürüksu, the differentiation between the attitudes towards the understanding of participation and the power structure can be easily seen. The Public Committees established in Fatsa were aimed at creating a power structure in which the people were at the center; however, the view of the opposition was shaped around participation in which the rules and the relations of the existing system were preserved, but where a discussion-based organization existed. One of the understandings rejects the existing power relations, whereas the other preserves it and tries to develop and improve it.

To conclude, the Public Committees became an important base for the left-wing movement and for the municipal administration. Public Committees, in time, became legitimized organs of the

municipal activities. It should be kept in mind that in the administration only the mayor had come from the left-wing movement, as the other agents of the municipality had come from the other political groups. The leftist mayoralty had not changed the structure of the municipal administration, but had created another power structure using the Public Committees, which were established out of the legal administrative structure. Therefore, the power of the leftists in the presence of the existing power holders was strengthened with the committees, and as we will see in the following sections the Public Committees helped in the execution of municipal activities.

4.3.3. The “End to Mud Campaign” and the Opening of the Roads

During the Nazmiye Komitoğlu administration, deputy Kemal Burnaz had started work on the infrastructure and sewer system in Fatsa, however, the works were incomplete. The streets of Fatsa were full of mud from the ongoing construction and the rainy climate, and public health was coming under threat. The infrastructure and sewer system works in Fatsa emerged as the most urgent problem requiring attention.

The new municipal administration and the Public Committees had decided to solve the problems of infrastructure and clean the streets of Fatsa as a priority. However, the problem was bigger than they had first thought. Fikri Sönmez organized a meeting with the municipality personnel in order to understand the problem more deeply and to discuss the solution. However, it was realized that it would be very difficult to solve the problem with the existing resources. Fikri Sönmez spoke of the situation and the meeting in his court defense:

I called for the technical personnel and the engineers of the Technical Department of the municipality to talk about this matter. I wanted them to present a report on the solution to the issue. I told them I was not a municipal employee, and hence I asked them to prepare a report explaining in what time frame, under what conditions and at what cost these problems could be overcome. However, being used to the previous administrative system, during which they were told “ok, take your money...”, they thought “there is no need to calculate this; even if all the resources of the Fatsa Municipality are used, this cannot be managed in four years. Even if the state spends lots of money on this problem, the works you mentioned cannot be managed in four years.”

This was a serious problem which could not be disregarded. An idea was raised among the leftists that if every house cleaned their own front yard it would be easier to deal with the problem, using the participation of the people in the solution when the resources of the municipality were not sufficient. As mentioned earlier, the leftists recognized the people as the most important part and resource of the municipality. With this in mind, a campaign was organized aimed at clearing the streets of Fatsa of mud and closing the holes that had been

opened. Sebahattin Akyazı, who was in the left-wing movement, commented on the development of the campaign:

In that period, the municipality did not have the same resources as the previous administrations, and tried to solve numerous problems with the existing resources and with the collective labor of the people. For example, the construction of the roads, the cleaning up of the roads and the works to the sewer system etc. were all covered by the End to Mud Campaign. The problems were being solved with collective labor. When you are trying to implement such changes in a big city, in the process of change manpower is a very important asset.

The left-wing administration and the movement placed great importance in the organization of the campaign. The mud was a major problem in Fatsa that needed to be solved, but as the resources of the municipality were scarce, a solution was not going to be easily achieved. However, they had to overcome the problem, and if they managed to do so they would have also validated the different approach of the leftists. In this regard the campaign was important for of two reasons: firstly, if the campaign was successful, then one of the biggest problems in Fatsa would be solved in a few days. Secondly, if the campaign went as well as the leftists thought it would, they would have the chance to show that they could manage the municipal activities with collective labor. In addition, people would become a part of the campaign, they would see the success and they would have become owners of the activities. Therefore, the campaign was formed to both solve the problem and to give the people an understanding of the power of sharing and participating in the processes. It was going to be a “shocking activity”. (Explanations of Ahmet Özdemir and Sedat Göçmen, quoted by Uyan, 2004)

The main ideas and targets of the campaign were discussed with the general public, as well as with the members of the Municipal Council and Municipal Commission. It was decided that by mid-November the campaign was going to begin under the banner of the “End to Mud Campaign”.

Before starting, a program of works was prepared by the technical personnel of the municipality and the needs were listed. Alongside the participation of people in the campaign, technical equipment and vehicles from the neighborhood municipalities were requested for use in the campaign, and state institutions such as the Public Waterworks Administration (DSİ) and the State Highways Administration (TCK) were contacted in order to request their strongest vehicles and personnel for six days. The neighborhood municipalities and the state institutions sent their equipment and vehicles to Fatsa municipality. Beside the equipment that came from the official institutions, vehicles and tools from the people of Fatsa were also requested. Fikri Sönmez listed them as follows:

We obtained equipment and vehicles from the neighborhood municipalities – the Municipality of Ordu, Perseme, Unye, Yalikoy, Medreseonu, Bolaman, Ilca, Gürgentepe, Upper Camas, Lower Camas, Catak, Catalpinar, Aybasti, Korgan and Kumru – and put them into the service of the Municipality of Fatsa for six days. Secondly, the equipment of the strongest institutions of the state, such as the Public Waterworks Administration and the General Directorate of Highways, were also taken for six days. Besides this, we wanted the cars of the people living in Fatsa who were willing to donate them to the campaign for one day. The municipality supplied the petrol for these vehicles. Thinking that the cars and big vehicles could not work in the narrow roads, we requested tractors and wheelbarrows if they had them, and put them to work in these places. In addition, 10 people from each village joined the campaign with pickaxes and shovels.

With the aid of the state institutions, the neighborhood municipalities and the people, the scarce resources of the Fatsa Municipality had been extended before the start of the campaign. The ability of the Fatsa municipality in finding resources from various places is a significant point. The leftists used the resources of other institutions in order to overcome the problem. If they had not done so, the time needed to solve the problem would have been longer, as the municipality staff had said to the mayor. Sedat Göçmen explained why this method had needed to be adopted:

Our country has limited resources, but there is a waste of resources in Turkey. For example, every municipality has a grader, but it does not work every day. Graders and trucks are everywhere... But they are never fully utilized... In addition, there is the thinking of "you are helping me today, tomorrow I will help you". I don't think that these are solutions that require much intelligence, but are more a comprehension, an approach... There was a collective understanding in Fatsa while clearing the mud; people came to help from the villages and from other cities. We also invited the municipalities of the JP and RPP to Fatsa. One of them gave a truck; one gave its grader. A task which could have taken months or years was finished in a very short time. After that, we sent the equipment to the villages of Fatsa to begin work there.

The attitude of other municipalities and the state institutions towards this issue is noteworthy. Although the Fatsa Municipality and the left-wing movement were to be criticized and would be excluded by various institutions, as we will see in certain cases in the following sections, the requests of the municipality were accepted positively, and the municipalities and state institutions reacted to the needs of the municipality of Fatsa.

The campaign was started on November 13th, 1979 after obtaining the vehicles. In the first two days, participation in the campaign was low, but in the following days, especially with the help of women, participation increased. The role of women was important in the campaign. Aside from the workers from the Fatsa municipality, the workers of other municipalities, and those from the left-wing movement, the participation of the men was low. However, the work on the streets was intense. The women of Fatsa began cooking for those working in the campaign, and forced their husbands to join the campaign. Ahmet Özdemir explained the participation in the campaign:

The participation of the local people to works such as the opening of the roads, furnishing cobblestones, clearing the mud and breaking down walls was at a level of 30%, or maybe less. The level in the first days of the campaign was only 10-15%. Not everyone approached the work with the same enthusiasm, since not everybody had undertaken such work before.

Day by day, women became more effective in the work. They directed their husbands to work in the campaign; they made our meals and distributed them in the streets. The women began participating in the process much earlier than the men.

The participation of women in the campaign should be underlined. The attitude of the women towards the municipality was more positive and they adapted to the situation more easily.

Owing to a lack of experience, in the first days of the campaign there were problems in the planning stages. However, in the following days, the campaign was developed and the sources directed to the needs of the campaign began to be used more efficiently. At the end of each day, meetings were organized in order to determine the problems that had been faced and new working schedules and new dimensions were added to the campaign. Ahmet Özdemir said that the usage of the resources was generally shaped during the implementation of the campaign, and because of this the objectives of the campaign was widened. Although the campaign was begun to remove the mud from the streets of Fatsa, it continued with the cobbling of the roads after the mud was cleared.

One of the specific features of the End to Mud Campaign was that thousands of people came and started to carry out the work in the streets. We did not have good planners, but our ordinary people learned the advantages of good planning. We had made mistakes in planning; but we saw, we criticized, and we analyzed these at the meetings at the end of each day. We also agreed that the End to Mud Campaign should not be limited to clearing the mud. We asked ourselves, “for what reason are we clearing the mud? We should widen the scope of the campaign”, and then we said “let’s make the roads wider”. We had added the widening of the roads to the campaign. There were places that needed to be demolished, they were added to campaign. The swamps needed draining, and that was added to the scope of the campaign. The roads needed to be furnished, that was also added. We made this campaign much broader than first envisaged, covering a huge area, with the involvement of lots of people and very good planning. In a week, a very special experiment had been carried out, the experiment of the End to Mud Campaign.

The campaign was completed successfully and the resources had been used effectively, with the planned works being completed in five days. It was an unexpected result. At the end of five days, Fikri Sönmez made a press statement announcing that on 18th November the clearing of the mud and the cobbling of the streets had been finished. The campaign had a rather shocking effect on people. Zeki Muslu explained the importance of the campaign:

At that time, you could not lay asphalt and you could not furnish cobblestones, as the municipality did not have the money or the sources of income. The citizens were living in mud. When a cobbling campaign was announced, hundreds of trucks and people came. It can be said that they came because they wanted to, or that they were scared, but it was not only the employees of the municipality but also the general public who carried out the cobbling campaign in their own streets and areas. It was one of the best works for me.

The great success of the End to Mud Campaign brought new dimensions to the activities of the left-wing municipality. The most important problem in Fatsa had been eliminated within a few days, but what was more important was that the works had been carried out with the participation

of the people. In the interview with Kemal Burnaz, who was the deputy of the previous mayor, he said that Mayor Fikri Sönmez and his team had managed to involve the people very effectively, but in his opinion it was an abnormal situation:

Work on the sewer system had been initiated during my period as deputy. After the work had begun, it rained, which is the most annoying thing during substructure works. The citizens had lived through lots of difficulties and the city was carrying out such works for the first time, and there was no public support. What happened after Fikri had been elected? Campaigns were organized, such as the End to Mud Campaign... There were people who had come from outside. You cannot do such a work in normal times. (...) The participation of the people was a significant difference that you would not see in other municipalities.

The End to Mud Campaign is a good example of a radical municipal approach. With the campaign they managed to overcome a big urban problem, using existing resources as well as collective manpower.

The success of the campaign provided the leftists with an incentive to deal with other urban problems. As they had begun to construct the roads, they decided that the highway problem of Fatsa could be overcome if it was approached in a similar way to the End to Mud Campaign. There were only three entrances to the city center from the Samsun-Ordu highway, which passes close to Fatsa. In addition, the roads in the city were of poor standard and were too narrow. This problematic area had begun to be addressed by earlier municipal administrations, but before these roads could be improved there were buildings which needed to be demolished. Although the roads were shown in the city plan, the plan had not been implemented by the previous administrations due to the power structure and the patronage in Fatsa. The Municipal Council had determined the buildings that needed to be demolished, and had clarified the roads that needed widening. There were places which had been expropriated by the municipality, but demolition had not begun and the implementation of the city plan had not been carried out for several reasons.

First of all, there were further properties that needed to be expropriated or demolished before the roads could be widened or extended. However, some of these buildings belonged to notables, who put pressure on the municipal administration in order to avoid the expropriation of their land or buildings, although they were shown in the city plan as being situated on areas where the new roads were to be built. As the land owned by the power holders could not be expropriated, other people began resisting in order to retain their properties. Therefore, the compulsory purchases and the implementation of the city plan became an unsolvable problem. In addition, the municipality did not have sufficient funds to pay all the compensation and make the necessary compulsory purchases.

This problematic issue came to the agenda of the left-wing municipality. The places that needed to be compulsorily purchased or demolished were determined, with the properties of the power holders chosen as the first areas for demolition. Ahmet Özdemir explained the decisions taken regarding the compulsory purchases and the situation under the former municipal administrations:

When an official known to have been involved in a matter of impropriety looks to demolish the property of a person who is aware of this, he is not in a position where he can make such demands. Both sides have something to lose, and so look out for themselves. Although decisions on which properties were to be demolished had been taken, they could not be implemented due to corruption in the previous municipal administrations. Since we were not involved in those power relations, they did not have that hold over us. The difference between the administrations was that we had not been tarnished with a bad reputation.

As it was outside of the existing, corrupted power relations, when the mayoralty of Fikri Sönmez took a decision of expropriation or demolition, the property owners could not resist. Under previous administrations the property owners had been obliged to act in accordance with public interest, but the corrupted power relations at that time were seen as unfair and they had resisted the expropriations. In our administrative period, he could not ignore his obligations, as we had not been involved in the previous corruption. Did the property owners suffer? Of course they did. But the difficulties were endured for the sake of public interest.

We used persuasive methods towards the people resisting the processes. We had the political power, which was supported by many and made the process easier. There had been racketeers and hoodlums in Fatsa that had prevented some works from being carried out. However, when we came to power and began to work, although they tried to contest, they saw that it was not easy to stand against such a broader political movement that stretched beyond the borders of Fatsa, and they had to consider our strength.

As can be expected, the power of the left-wing movement provided a major opportunity in the intervention of the municipality into the urban space. From the very beginning, the left-wing movement had struggled against the power holders in Fatsa, and this was a part of this struggle. Kemal Burnaz said during our interview that the compulsory purchases had been made during his administration, however in many places the authority of the municipality had been ignored. He explained the situation:

There was a place belonging to people from Bursa, to whom I paid expropriation money, but they refused to leave the property and I was unable to open the road, even after sending in the municipal police forces. There was an area located south of Fatsa, and I paid there too, but again I could not open the road for the same reason. Fikri came and opened all of them in just one day. I had made expropriations for the opening of the roads, and partly I had succeeded, but only with conflicts.

Kemal Burnaz said that the previous administration had experienced difficulties in the opening of the roads due to the resistance of the people against the municipal power, and that the municipality did not have enough money to avoid the resistance of people against the expropriations:

I had no money, none! That property was valued at 100 million, and I had only 10 million. How could I expropriate a property costing 100 million with only 10 million? I would go to

the Development Assessment Committee and set the price at 10 million, after which I could make the expropriation, but the man would then go to court to demand the remaining 90 million liras. However, this did not happen later (under the mayoralty of Fikri Sönmez). Some people took no expropriation money, some of them accepted the amounts offered. The municipality called the man and said, “we will give you this money and we build the road through here”, and the man would say: “thanks”, and be gone. In my period, under the normal municipality, if you called that man he would raise hell about it.

As stated by Kemal Burnaz, the power of the Fikri Sönmez administration was different to that of the previous administrations. However, the earlier activities of the left-wing movement should be also be taken into account. The left-wing movement was struggling against the power structure prior to entering the municipality, and had struggled against the black market and the usurers before the election. When new roads needed opening or land needed expropriating, the power that the left-wing movement had gained and the power of the municipality were always considered.

As was mentioned, the demolitions and compulsory purchases began with the properties of the notables. The first place demolished was the bakery house owned by the Erdems, which had been planned to be demolished, but could not up until that time due to the strength of the family. It was a conscious decision to begin with the bakery of the Erdems, as it would prove the intentions of the municipality and showed that there would be no discrimination. The bakery house of the Erdems was demolished and the road was opened. After this event, resistance against the municipality on the matter decreased, and the opening of the roads began immediately, following the methods used in the End to Mud Campaign. Ahmet Özdemir noted that the demolition of the Erdems’ bakery house first gave legitimacy to the demolition and compulsory purchase of the properties. He explained the process of expropriation:

At that time, after one building had been demolished, the others began to fall like dominoes. The first to be demolished was Erdem’s bakery near the brook. When this bakery had been demolished it was said that nobody could stand against the process. The places belong to the powerful people were demolished first, followed by the rest after brief conversations with the owners and after money had been given. The properties had a specific market value. When you expropriate, you pay the expropriation values on this price. Some of the expropriation values were paid before; some were paid during the process. There were people who suffered from the process, but they were paid. There was also the “betterment value”. When you build a road, the land close to it will increase in value, so the owner can make up the deficit.

Zeki Muslu noticed the relationship between the notables and the municipal administration in the opening of the roads and the implementation of the city plan:

During that period, two or three roads were opened after the restaurants and bakeries built on the routes were demolished. The owners of the shops could not say anything... They could not resist. When they (the municipality) said that they would demolish, they demolished. Anyway, the place of the shops was illegal. The organizational power of Fikri Sönmez stopped people’s reactions. We had heard when we were children, in the periods of other mayors, that when the owners of the bakeries and restaurants who were close friends of the mayor said: “Do not demolish my shop, I earn my living from this shop”, the Mayor would

say “Okay, I will not demolish yours”, despite the fact that the shop was cutting the road in half.

Fikri Sönmez spoke on this subject during his court defense. One day, a man from the Kurtuluş neighborhood came to Fikri Sönmez to speak about his land, which was shown as a recreation site in the city plan. The man said that he wanted to give his land, but it had been known that this man had previously been unwilling to do so. Fikri Sönmez asked the man why he had come to offer his land, and asked him whether he had been forced. The man said that the previous administrations had come to him to expropriate his land before completing the main expropriation works in the city center. He had thought that before coming to his turn for expropriation, there were problems in the city center that the administrations had to deal with first. However, the Fikri Sönmez administration had solved the problems in the city center, and the man said that there was no longer a need to resist, stating that he felt it was his duty to give his land. In Fikri Sönmez’s court defense he stated that the man had made the following comment:

...after the opening of the roads in the first phase, surely my turn will come. Although the roads in the city center had not been opened they told me that it was my turn, and this offended me. The citizens could not walk around the marketplace as the roads were closed. But without reason, they came to take my land for a road which was to be built 10 years later. I resisted them for this reason. If the road passes here it will be a cheerful place and the value of my land will increase. I am not crazy, I also know this business, I can benefit from this. But it offended me when they came to take my land instead of other places and lands. Because of this, I was not giving my land.

The expropriation of the properties of the power holders had a marked affect the thoughts of the people. After showing clarity in the execution of the works, the consent and the trust of the people was increased towards the workings of the municipality. In the construction of the roads, the people were also considered as a part of the activity, as they had been in previous projects. The consent of the people was important in order to build the power of the municipality as well as the struggle against the existing hegemony.

The opening of the roads and the compulsory purchases were carried out according to the city plan, which had been prepared by an earlier administration. However, as the opening of the new highways came to the agenda after the End to Mud Campaign, a new city plan also came to the agenda of the left-wing municipality. It can be said that the municipalities ideas went far beyond the existing plan, and in order to implement their plans related to the opening of new roads a new city plan was required, and professionals were called in order to revise the plan. Ahmet Özdemir explained the situation and the process:

We were acting according to a city development plan that had been prepared earlier. However, after the End to Mud Campaign, when it was decided to open the roads, a new city plan was needed. Experts were called from Ankara and a planning research was carried out with the support of our friends in the technical department. This work was finished in a very

short time; and included parallel roads, side roads, areas to be reopened... 1/5000 and 1/1000 scale plans were drawn up during that process over the course of two months.

We can not give a certain date when the project to open the roads ended because the municipality was dealing with the construction of new roads and implementing the new city plan for the entire administrative period of Fikri Sönmez. However, the time was not ripe for implementation of the whole plan because of the military intervention in Fatsa. It was mentioned during our interviews, and can still be seen in Fatsa, that some buildings that were supposed to be demolished during the administration of Fikri Sönmez are still standing. However, in an eight-month period, the works on the new roads and the extension of existing roads went forward; four new roads were constructed and the entrances to the city center from the Ordu-Samsun highway was rose to seven. A new main street was also constructed, which is still one of the most important in the town. Also, the new roads were established to the periphery of Fatsa, providing connections to the villages from Fatsa. To conclude, it can be said that Fatsa got its own road network during the administration of Fikri Sönmez. The people of Fatsa, whether from the left or right, still talk about the roads constructed during that time, and it has been said that no one would ever again be able to make such progress in the municipality.

The municipality was implementing new policies in the urban space, and the legal base existed for its activities. The compulsory purchases and demolitions can be evaluated as an activity aimed at changing the existing balance of power, and it was the use value, not the exchange value, of the urban space that was considered by the municipality.

The importance of this municipal activity was accepted by all of the people we spoke to, but there were also criticisms that the actions of the leftists were non-democratic. However, it was accepted that they had managed to open the roads, which would not have been possible using democratic routes. The conflicting point in this activity between the leftists and the rightists was whether the consent of the people had been taken or not, and there were criticisms of the power of the left-wing movement, the power of the Revolutionary Path circle. As Ahmet Özdemir mentioned, the Revolutionary Path circle was outside of the existing power relations. How municipal power had been used was different from previous approaches to the meaning of administration, and the municipal administration, and the relations that existed around the municipality, were also different. The activities were shaped in the framework of these understandings in the opening of the roads. Therefore, the basic area of conflict was the power of the left-wing movement, not the activities they carried out.

Kemal Burnaz, who started the process of compulsory purchases, said that the Fikri Sönmez administration had created an abnormal situation that had given them free range to do what they

wanted without coming across resistance. According to Kemal Burnaz, the power structure they had created hindered the resistance of the people. He stated that if such activities had been attempted during his administration, the resistance and the struggle of the people against the municipality would have been higher.

Another criticism was that although it was important and necessary to give Fatsa a comprehensive road network, legal procedure had been disregarded. Lütü Topaloğlu, who was a member of the Municipal Council from JP, said that it was an important municipal service, but the city plan had been changed:

There had been no worthwhile projects before, only minor works had been made, such as parks, gardens. During Mr. Fikri Sönmez's period, the roads were opened both in the center and in the periphery of Fatsa. Mayor Sönmez opened the main thoroughfare of Ulusu Street, half of which existed in the city plan. However, some roads were opened without consideration of procedure.

Rahmi Yangın also commented on the methods employed by the left-wing movement:

Do you know how this good thing happened here? This good thing happened here because of fear and pressure. Fikri did lots of important things; he opened a lot of roads, he worked hard, but not to the citizens' demands, only to satisfy his own desires. The roads were opened at the request of the administration of that time. He provided a good service to Fatsa, but not in democratic ways. We are thankful to him. Maybe this is a form of democracy too. The works that could not be done, the roads that could not be opened because of the vote issue, were opened during Mr. Fikri's period.

A more accurate critique came from JP member Süleyman Çürüksu, who noted that if there had been chances to open the roads, why had the other municipal administrations not dealt with the problem. He also said that Fikri Sönmez had worked fairly:

I can say to everyone that Fikri did what nobody could do in this Fatsa. The government had expropriated the lands, but nobody could go and demolish the buildings. He (Fikri Sönmez) said, "The government has paid for it. We are going to take this building down tomorrow", and he did it. Was it legal? It was not. However, maybe this was what was needed. This is one side of the argument, but on the other side it must be said that you cannot substitute yourselves into the position of the judiciary. Both have negative and positive aspects. Fikri did what the municipality had to do, had been unable to earlier. He opened the roads. I did not vote for him, I did not approve of the leftist movement, but if these roads could have been opened, why had it not been done? Why could they not be opened until Fikri Sönmez came? The land had been expropriated. I can say that Fikri Sönmez worked honestly. In spite of my belief that his way of coming to power was wrong, Fikri worked honestly and carried out works that needed to be done.

As we mentioned, the resolute and interventionist approach of the municipality, and thus the leftists, was criticized by other quarters. On the other hand, the participation of the people in the municipality's activities and the legitimacy of the activities in the public eye changed the opinions of the critics at the time. As an example of this, the comments of Kemal Şendur, who was a member of the Public Committee, hold relevance:

The roads that were been opened in Fikri Sönmez's period, could not have been carried out by any other mayor. They were working, they were integrated with the public. The previous administrations only looked for money. The present ones are the same.

The opening of the roads is still accepted as the most important and difficult municipal service carried out in that period. The success of the campaign and the participation of the people helped in the development of new projects. An important point is that the people were part of the activities carried out by the municipality. The campaign was not expected to come to a successful conclusion, but the surprising success reinforced the trust that the people put in the leftists. By taking the consent of the people and facilitating their participation made life easier for the leftists.

4.3.4. Fatsa Municipality Public Culture Festival

The campaigns and the works held in the streets of Fatsa were managed successfully with the participation and help of the people of Fatsa, and other problems, such as black marketeering and the activities of the usurers, came close to being eliminated. The meetings of the Public Committees were continuing with increased participation, and it can be said that the power of the leftists was increasing day by day, starting from the beginning of their struggle. As we frequently notice, the activities of the municipality were aimed at changing the balance of power and the existing system.

One of the activities carried out by the municipality deserves mention, due to its affect on the daily life of the people of Fatsa: The Fatsa Municipality Public Culture Festival.

While the municipal activities were continuing, a culture festival was planned by the municipal administration, and in February 1980 the idea was brought before the Municipal Council. The council decided to organize a Public Culture Festival in April, and money was allocated for the organization of the event.

Oğuzhan Müftüoğlu, who was in the central organization of the Revolutionary Path Periodical, explained the development of the idea for a festival (Uyan, 2004; 116):

...There seemed to be stagnation in the places where the left-wing was active, where the fascist pressures had been broken, where there was relative comfort. On the one hand, the left-wing was becoming dominant; but on the other, the existing bourgeois culture, along with its degenerative and individualistic nature, still existed, and it was not possible to launch a new understanding. We were considering organizing activities to deepen the cultural activities and develop the people's consciences in the places where the inner conflicts, the conflicts of left- and right-wing, had been eliminated.

The Public Culture Festival came out of this. Müftüoğlu mentions that Fatsa was a special place and an experiment for the leftists around the country. The interest in Fatsa was increasing, but as Müftüoğlu mentioned, the activities of the leftists began to seek ways to avoid stagnation of their activities. Müftüoğlu continued his explanations, explaining the special position of Fatsa (Uyan, 2004; 117):

Think about a place that was known as a leftist republic, the Fatsa Republic, in the newspapers, on television, everywhere... But when you looked at the life there, the city had not yet rid itself of the negativities seen in the rest of the country. The Fatsa Culture Festival was developed during conversations with our friends in the town. A committee in which artists and intellectuals took part met in Ankara, and in a week to ten days had made preparations for the festival.

Ahmet Özdemir, who took part in the organization of the Public Culture Festival, explained the ideas behind the development of the Public Culture Festival during our interview:

The Public Culture Festival was aimed at creating a new ideological focus, and could be thought of as a social transformation project that considered the permanency of the works that people had handled collectively. The people's hearts and desires had been added to the process of transformation, and the festival addressed the development of their aesthetic and artistic sides. We needed to discuss how we could do this. The festival was an effort to improve cultural life and was a cultural process appropriate to the transformation process.

The Public Relations Office of Fatsa municipality began organizing the Public Culture Festival, receiving support from various places. As Müftüoğlu mentioned, the Revolutionary Path circle helped in the organization of the festival from Ankara, and made connections with people who could participate. People living in Fatsa were also to take part in the activities at the festival. Ahmet Özdemir explained the organization process:

We were given lots of support during the organization of the Public Culture Festival. We tried to speak to many people who had been involved in such organizations in Turkey, who could become a part of the program. We had a different approach to the nature of such a festival. It was possible that an event such as the Fatsa Public Culture Festival had never been done before. (...) The festival was to venter on the people taking part directly from Fatsa, the local people... We had a theatre group coming from the Turkish Syndicate of Teachers. Our friends put on a play in the festival. The children's choir and the public choir took part in the festival with musical performances.

After completing the organization of the festival and calling the artists, groups, associations, writers, scientists, intellectuals and press etc., invitations were sent to the governors and other important institutions. The list of invitees and performers was given during the defense of Ahmet Özdemir:

The Presidency of the Republic, the Prime Ministry, political party leaders, democratic institutions, municipalities, the press and Turkish Radio and Television were invited to the festival with special invitations. Turkish Television covered the opening and final days of the festival, which was declared as "illegal" in later court indictments. During the opening ceremony of the festival, messages from the President of the Republic and the Prime Ministry were read. Representatives from the local governments of our district joined to the

festival, even the sub-governor of Fatsa made a speech, and said “welcome” to the thousands of people who had come, despite the rain.

Mayor Fikri Sönmez also made a speech at the opening ceremony, in which he underlined the aim of the festival. His speech was published in the April 1st, 1980 issue of the local Güneş newspaper:

The patient and rightful struggle of the public of Fatsa has created its own administration in Fatsa today. Today, rather than a mayor, the public is in the administration of the municipality. The people of Fatsa manage themselves, and are part of the administration. They are in a deep struggle in the fight against fascism, to break the pressure of the dominant classes on people, by being in the administration.

The Fatsa Public Culture Festival is a part of the struggle that our people are making against fascism, price increases and oppression. This cannot be thought apart from the struggle. This is the festival of people in Tariş, Cibali and Gultepe, who are struggling against pressure and fear, and also of the people who protested the Maraş Massacre of 24th March all over the country.

This is the festival of the people who raised this fight.

Culture is a commitment of the fight and the values that the public has created for itself. It is a means of transferring the reactions of the public, spreading its own culture, its own fight, making a system, growing and developing. Culture, in spite of being distorted by the dominant classes in an effort to maintain their degenerate culture, has this potential.

For us, the activities at the festival will remain forever in the homes, neighborhoods, villages, farms and factories after the festival is over. That's our comprehension of culture and the festival.

The activities held in the Public Culture Festival were listed in the court defense of Ahmet Özdemir:

- In two film theaters, movies were shown and panels and forums were organized throughout the week.
- In another film theater, cartoons were shown, painting exhibitions were held and poems were read during the day. In the evenings there were performances by poets, the Fatsa High School Choir, the Children's Choir, the Middle East Technical University Choir and folk dancing groups, who put on shows throughout the week.
- Another film theater was used for theater plays, which were put on by the Ankara Children's Theatre, the Halkevi Theater and the Ordu Municipality Black Sea Theatre. The theatre exhibitions continued the plays that had been prepared for a week after the festival. Performances were made twice a day. Before the opening of the doors, lots of discount-price books were sold to the public in front of the cinema.
- Requests had been made to the publishing houses and democratic institutions for books to be donated to the people of Fatsa. As a result, children's books which had been published by Ankara Municipality were handed out to thousands of students with a ceremony. Other books were given to the participants and to the people of Fatsa.
- Sporting competitions were held with the participation of 30 football teams from the villages and neighborhoods.
- Cycling and athletics events took place.

- Competitions in composition, reading and poetry were held.

It can be useful to list the subjects of seminars and the participators in order to underline the diversity of the festival, held in a small subprovince of Turkey (Uyan, 2004; 127-128):

- The topic of the first panel in the Fatsa Public Culture Festival was “Television Serials”. Assoc. Prof. Ünsal Oskay, Can Yücel, Oğuz Türkyılmaz, Asis. Tuğrul Eryılmaz and Yılmaz Dağdeviren participated in the panel as speakers, which was chaired by Özkan Yıldırım

- Arslan Başer Kafaoğlu, Yazgülü Aldoğan, İbrahim Hitay, Şükran Ketenci participated in the “Function of the Press” panel as speakers.

- Can Yücel, Murat Belge and Ali İhsan Mıhçı were the speakers on the “About Culture” panel.

- Mayor Fikri Sönmez, Meral Çakmak, Mustafa Ünüvar, and an attorney from the Chamber of Architecture participated in the panel on “How Must the Public Municipality Operate?”

- The last panel was based on “The News Policy of TRT”. Mahmut Tali Öngören, Emin Galip Sandalcı, Eser Ünür and Nili Tılaber participated in the panel, which was chaired by Oğuz Türkyılmaz

As can be seen, these activities were on an intellectual level that was unfamiliar to the people of Fatsa. However, participation at the festival was high. From the tickets sold, participation was determined as being in the region of 35,000, which is higher than the population of the town of Fatsa. However, the people from the villages of Fatsa came to the city center. It was noted that the number of people that attended the festival was high despite the fact that the activities were unfamiliar to the people of Fatsa. Ahmet Altuntaş gives some details on the people that visited the festival and the activities that were organized:

A magnificent festival, organized by a metropolitan municipality, had been held. Famous poets, artists and writers came to the festival. I was shocked when I saw those writers in Fatsa. I joined a panel in which Aslan Başerkafaoğlu and Murat Belge were also participating. One night, I saw the artists and their paintings closely, and I said “are they crazy?” Their behavior was strange to me. When you said something to the man he replied in a very different way. It was weird for me. Now it is not strange for me, but this was 25 years ago. Famous artists like Selda Bağcan and Ali Asker came to display their paintings. This cultural activity was useful in Fatsa, people went out onto the streets. It was summer, but people generally stayed at home in the evenings. This festival brought people out onto the streets, where they stayed until 1 o'clock in the morning.

As can be seen, the activities held during the festival were alien to the people of Fatsa, and the differences between two contrasting arenas, the Fatsa subprovince and the metropolis, were evident. However, participation was high, and the people of Fatsa tried to join in all of the activities. After the end of the festival, many of the performances were carried to the villages to allow people see what they had missed.

As the participation to the activities and the number of people was high, and the hospitality of the people was good, the visiting participants of the festival left Fatsa with positive feelings. The

festival organized by the municipality was discussed after the participants had returned to their own cities. The festival in Fatsa was reported in the press by those that had taken part. The critiques were positive, but some events raised serious discussions. The Fatsa Children's Choir was central to many of the discussions, with criticisms that the songs the children had sung were extraordinarily political. Ahmet Özdemir, who was the director of the Children's Choir, defended the issue:

The issue of the Children's Choir was symbolic of the process that was growing in Fatsa. I am saying this for those from outside Fatsa. It (the political nature of the songs) was not abnormal for the people who had lived this process directly, because children were a part of that process in Fatsa. We were talking about a transformation process; if the hazelnut was a problem, the children could have an interest in the hazelnut too, as children were also gathering hazelnuts and were a part of the hazelnut farming sector. Their parents took them to the bazaar and the children became interested in the problem. They were aware of usurers and loan sharks; in other words, the children were not outside of this business. These issues were spoken of in the home, and the children were aware of the problem. They were involved enough to understand the extent of, and their relationship to, the problems.

We were not the kind of people who manipulated our children. We gave direction when they requested and had a hand in some matters. Some things we told them, others they found out for themselves. We focused on their main emotions when we were writing the lyrics to the songs, and many of the song lyrics were written by the children themselves. The experiences that children had been through had made them more political.

It is seen that the experiences of the people of Fatsa could be reflected onto the whole population. However, the process gained speed in order to establish the "new way of life" quickly. Therefore, some activities were seen as not coming from the people, but from the implementation of the left-wing movement's views. In addition, the organization of the Public Culture Festival showed the influence of the middle-class in the movement. That is to say, the activities held during the festival and the organization of the festival, which was done with the help of the Ankara committee of the Revolutionary Path Periodical, carried a nucleus of middle-class influence.

What was achieved by the festival? Did the leftists reach the target that they were hoping to? These are the key questions in the evaluation of the aims and results of the activities held in the Public Culture Festival. However, finding an answer to these questions is difficult, as the festival was a part of a hegemonic process. Ahmet Özdemir's interpretation of the results of the festival project follows:

We could not reach the desired aim in the Public Culture Festival. It was a long-term project. If activities are continued there may be stagnation. That's all. The Fatsa Public Culture Festival would have a marked affect on other festivals organized in Fatsa, but for the people in Fatsa it was a very special event.

As Ahmet Özdemir mentioned, cultural activities need to continue in order to construct a strong base. However, the festival held by the municipality had been a starting point of the transformation process that could not be continued because of later events. The Public Culture

Festival needs to be considered as an important activity of the left-wing movement, and as part of a hegemonic process, and hence, as an effort to establish a cultural hegemony in the society. The activities of the municipality were successfully continuing, but in order to change the balance of power, socio-cultural relations needed to be reorganized in order to drive home the understanding.

4.3.5. Other Activities of the Municipality

The End to Mud Campaign and the Public Culture Festival were two activities that differentiated the Fatsa Municipality from other municipal administrations, alongside the leftists approach to the administration of municipal services. In this part, some other activities of the municipality will be explained in brief.

In the June 6th, 1980 issue of the local Güneş newspaper, a speech by Mayor Fikri Sönmez at the meeting of the Municipal Council was published. Fikri Sönmez explained the activities, item by item, carried out by the municipality in the preceding eight months:

- The Cobbling Campaign
- New Roads (Demolition of the Muharrem Çebi Restaurant, Erdem Paycı Bakery, the shop that belongs to Erişler, construction of Sivaslar Road, district roads, İmam Hatip back road, Mandıra Hospital Road, Evkaf District roads, widening of roads in different parts of the city).
- Renewal of damaged cobblestone roads during the sewer system operations.
- Reparation of blocked water channels during the sewer system operations, one kilometer of new sewer system in the Kurtuluş District, repair of sewer systems in some neighborhoods, flooding problems in the Sakarya District. Pipe production at the sewer system contractor's pipe factory at Bolaman, and production of bricks with a new machine.
- The vehicles of the Municipality have been increased. The Village Union's bulldozer and loader have been given to municipality with a protocol. Yassıtaş and Meşebükü village roads were opened by municipality. A minibus, donated by a worker in Germany, is running the hospital road route. Bottled water is carried by our vehicles. ... The fire engine, promised to the municipality by the Ministry of Tourism, has not been sent due to political reasons. Also, a service depot has been constructed that will repair all kinds of vehicles.
- Important steps have been taken to address the electricity and water problems. We provided water to the areas that were lacking at little expense and with more effort. We have made repairs to the electricity infrastructure.
- We have issued a new order to the water bottling facilities and have cancelled the Fatsa dealership, we are doing our own.
- We stopped the distribution of flour by private operators,
- The bus stations are now working under municipality control, and have brought 200,000 liras to the municipality. We have stopped the unfair competition between private operators.

- The Directorate of Infrastructure is very important for a municipality. Now unlawful construction is being controlled. We are preventing theft of electricity and water. A new development plan is being drawn up.
- New shops are being set up for the municipality. The projects of the Bank of Provinces are under the close supervision of our municipality.
- Local revenue has been disciplined and increased.
- Municipality employees have been disciplined and a collective contract has been signed.
- The Public Culture Festival brought important activities to Fatsa, Fatsa has been promoted.

Problems I would like to solve in my mayoralty period

- Open the roads that need to be opened
- Repairs to the road infrastructure
- Finish municipality constructions
- Finish the shops in the market area
- Create a cattle market area
- Create a modern vegetable market area
- Create an industry area bazaar
- Construct a dormitory building
- Find a permanent solution to the Demas Hospital road problem
- Stream improvement
- Prepare the city plan
- Construct a park on the site of the car parking area near the coast
- Build the Evkaf, Mandıra, Çullu and Kurtuluş roads

Some of the activities above need to be underlined. As can be seen from several items, the municipality was trying to collect resources by itself. The equipment needed for various municipal projects had begun to be supplied from the municipal institutions, while the existing equipment and vehicles of the municipality had been repaired. Moreover, the establishments privatized by previous administrations had again been brought under the control and management of the municipality, such as the water bottling enterprise and the distribution of flour. Other resources of the municipality, such as the incomes from the bazaars, harbor etc., were controlled, and so the financial resources of the municipality increased. Ahmet Özdemir stated during our interview that the daily income from the harbor controls alone exceeded the total annual income of the municipality, meaning that the income of the municipality had seen an unexpected increase. While the eight-month income of the municipality in the previous administration was

12 million TL, during the administration of Fikri Sönmez, the three-month income of the municipality reached 23 million TL (Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mucadeleler Ansiklopesi 1988; 2381). Additionally, besides the rise in income from the resources of the municipality, projects were being carried out with minimum expense with the participation of the people, using and repairing the existing resources. This situation allowed a strengthening of the resources and equipment of the municipality, turning the municipality into an institution that could overcome its needs with its own resources. It may be useful to give an example of the usage of existing resources and the participation of the people in the municipal activities from an explanation by Fikri Sönmez:

At the time I became a mayor, there had been water problems in one-third of the city. In the Hastanebaşı, Akıl Tepesi, Çullu and Mandıra districts there had been no water for many years. I completed the water depot by evaluating the municipality resources and through the support of the public. The water depot had been built but had not been working. A water pump was needed to be obtained from the Bank of Provinces but there weren't any water pumps, and so I repaired the old pumps, made them useable for water, and solved the water problems in these districts (...) While carrying out this task, the Sakarya Public Committee worked very hard. They took on the work of laying pipes between the water depot and the water pump. Our municipality hadn't enough workers for this task, and digging trenches for the pipes would be very time consuming, so the public did the digging. We laid the pipes and made the water flow.

The municipality's use of resources was clearly very efficient, and the resources were not distributed or privatized. In addition, services were not provided from the private sector.

The increases in the income of the municipality also allowed an improvement in the conditions of the municipal staff. As mentioned in the speech of Fikri Sönmez, an agreement had been held with the municipal staff. In the previous administration the salaries of the workers would often not be paid, as the municipality was in an economic depression. By increasing the resources of the municipality, Fikri Sönmez saw to it that the municipality not only began to pay the salaries of the workers on time, but also made increases:

Through a collective contract that was signed between the Fatsa Municipality and the Ordu Department of Public Services Labor Union on 31st May, 1980, the workers' wages were increased by 150-300%, affecting some 600 municipality workers. If we had been approaching this situation according to utilitarian principles, we could have set aside less money for the workers and more for the revolutionists, but this did not happen. (From the interview with Ahmet Özdemir)

As we mentioned before, the relations between the municipal administration and the municipal staff needed to be strengthened in order to provide a good working environment and prevent the municipality from the spread of rumors. It had been stated at the beginning of the mayoralty of Fikri Sönmez that no changes were to be made in the positions of the municipal staff, but also it had been pointed out that the new administration would be different from the previous ones. He stated that wrongdoings by the personnel would be accredited to the whole administration of the

municipality. The mayoralty wanted the staff to avoid actions that could lead to rumors about the municipality, and also show self-sacrifice in the works of the municipality.

The attitude of the municipal administration was based on some known instances where certain staff had been involved in corruption while in the service of the municipality. The new administration of the municipality aimed at avoiding such events and clearly stated this to the staff. The municipal administration, in turn, promised the personnel that they would be paid on time. The collective bargaining between the workers and the municipal administration was also important from this point of view.

Sedat Göçmen explained the attitude of the administration and the position of the workers in the municipality during our interview:

We had started to transfer money that was destined to be diverted into some people's pockets to public benefit, this is what had been understood from the business of a governing a city... Some people were acting tough and saying "I will not let you open a road here", to which it was replied, "Sorry brother, if this road has come this far, then it will continue!" As a result somebody would get hurt. There are too many people who act tough like this, or people who are wealthy. To have no pity for this people is important in the creation of an effective urban project. The progressive expansion of incomes has a different importance... we made a deal with the workers and municipality employees. "Previously you may have accepted bribes, but we will increase your salaries." We increased salaries by over 20%, and said, "As a result of this, your service will be perfect." After this, I don't think people were as likely to accept bribes again. In case of complaint, they would see what happens to them. At this point, I think we succeeded. We cleared both the employees and the municipality of any charges of bribery in the future. In a word, our money and assets or taxes all belonged to the municipality.

It was mentioned during our interviews that the municipality workings were also evaluated by the workers as being good, and the workers were willing in their jobs. The people we interviewed who worked in the municipalities underlined this situation. Ahmet Altuntaş was one of them:

I always exemplify that people had been working in the municipality not because of the salary, but because they believed in the work. Years ago I was an employee in the municipality, but I had never thought about my salary. It was always in my mind not to harm the municipality, not to instigate rumors about it. I was an administrator... For example, a man from Bafra used to come to buy water. Although Saturdays and Sundays were our days off, when the man came on Saturday we always loaded his truck, because otherwise he may say that he had gone to Fatsa and waited two days just for a truck of water. We never kept that man waiting, we worked with such faith.

An important example of the attitude of the municipality towards the solving of problems was given in the court defenses of Fikri Sönmez and Ahmet Özdemir, and was a self-criticism of the municipality. This example is important as it was seen as being over and above the municipal activities.

Fatsa municipality made a decision to limit parking spaces, and illegal parking began to be punished with a fine from the municipality. However, the decision of the municipality was criticized by the people, despite being no different from the applications of the other administrations. Fikri Sönmez explained the matter:

In those years, due to a lack of garages, parking spaces and car parks, random parking in the city became a problem, bringing complaints from tradesmen who said that cars parked in front of their shops obscured the view of the shop windows, and often blocked the entrances. The businesses of the shopkeepers were suffering because of this. Additionally, pedestrian and vehicle circulation in the city was being affected and traffic accidents had increased. All of the people of Fatsa were complaining about this situation. After receiving both written and verbal complaints on this matter, I ordered the relevant departments of the municipality to come up with a solution. The Department of Public Relations and the Municipal Police Department started an operation in which people parking in undesignated areas were fined. In spite of the fine, the operation ended in failure. People continued to park in the same places. Furthermore, car owners who came to municipality wanted this operation to be stopped. The basis of their complaints was: “The municipality and Traffic Department must show us sufficient car parks and garages before handing out fines when we disobey your orders, otherwise the operation will not be democratic. We have to work. Where will we park our vehicles?” I stopped the operation immediately and I arranged a meeting with the car owners, drivers and all those concerned at Cem Cinema. I discussed the situation with them, telling them that parking cars illegally in the city caused a loss of trade, blocked pedestrian circulation in the city and sometimes even caused traffic accidents. I said that the municipality couldn’t provide garages and car parks at that time, adding that we would solve the problem in time, and that people would have to make self-sacrifices until then. Then, I listened to their opinions and we arranged temporary places for parking. From that day onwards, nobody parked their cars outside of the designated places, and the people began warning drivers who parked their cars carelessly before the Traffic Department took action. The problem was solved like this. Being democratic is like this. Our municipality pays attention to not being non-communal and not disconnected from the public. Our municipality had seen that the public never helps when decisions are made on their behalf without consultation, even if those decisions are for their own benefit. Whenever a problem was discussed with them, they attended to that problem and acted responsibly, as much as the municipality.

This example is important in evaluating the attitude of the people towards the municipality. Discriminating between the past and present municipal administrations is an important point, as it shows that the people accepted the special nature of the municipality, and the alternative methods implemented by the municipality that considered the needs of the people, which would not have been implemented by other municipalities. Hence, it can be claimed that a new understanding had begun to be shaped in the mind of the public.

When looking at the projects planned for implementation, it can be seen that they were a continuation of the previous activities of the left-wing movement, but the time was not available to continue these projects. The activities that had been carried out were a clear indication of the different approach to municipal workings. In a short period of time, using the available resources efficiently, important municipal services were carried out in Fatsa. Lütfü Topaloğlu expressed his opinions about the municipal activities:

The Fikri Sönmez administration took a hand in problems that had been existing all along. Radical steps were taken in the opening of the roads and streets and in the application of the development plan. We were pleased about this. Compared with the former municipality, which had lacked authority, we can say that very important tasks were performed. There was a feel-good factor generally. However, our municipality did not manage to save itself from outside influences.

The external influences that he noticed were the radical characteristics of the left-wing movement, which were being criticized by other political groups. It is understood, however, that the municipal activities had the support of the other political groups.

Another point that can be useful in the evaluation of the characteristics of the municipal activities was mentioned by Ahmet Özdemir during our interview. His comments referenced the general mentality behind the municipal activities. He said that the projects undertaken in the Fatsa municipality were also being carried in other places as well, using the methods used by the Fatsa Municipality:

The mentality that was prevalent in Fatsa was also transferable to the nearby villages. We immediately started to solve similar problems in the villages using the same methods. Accordingly, requests for services and equipment were similar. We handled the festival in this way. For example, we carried out the End to Mud Campaign in Fatsa, but immediately planned the same work in the nearby villages, where they had started solving some of their own problems with the collective methodology. Since the public had started to solve their own problems, there was no longer a need for the government's limited problem-solving mechanisms.

Such a comprehension allowed the left-wing movement to extend the scope of their interventions, and as was mentioned by Ahmet Özdemir above, the problem solving mechanisms of the state agencies were limited. This argument derives from several issues that were notable in the activities of the left-wing movement, not only in the activities of the municipality. As it has been mentioned, the problems that occurred in daily life in Fatsa had begun to be solved through the Public Committees. Even conflicts in family life were solved in the Public Committees. Some principles were determined in order to organize the daily life of the members of the movements. For example, the consumption of alcohol and gambling were forbidden among the leftists because they were big problems in the social life of Fatsa that were affecting families. Although such intervention was strange for the left-wing movement, according to the conditional needs of the day this prohibition was a positive step, and especially more women were joining the movement in order to highlight the existing problems in their home lives resulting from these habits. A number of similar such examples of interventions into social life can be found.

4.3.6. Relations with the Municipal Council

In order to understand the balance of power in the municipality, it is necessary to look at the relations between the mayoralty and the left-wing movement and the Municipal Council. As we mentioned before, the Municipal Council was composed of 16 RPP, eight JP, one NSP and one DP members. Although the RPP was standing in the left-wing as a social democratic party, there was always the possibility of opposition from the members of the Municipal Council the left-wing movement. In addition, despite coming from the left-wing movement, the RPP members were also a part of the exiting power structure. However, as can be expected, the strongest opposition came from the JP members in the Municipal Council.

From the very outset of his term as mayor, Fikri Sönmez tried to come together with the members of the Municipal Council on a regular basis, for several reasons. First of all, Fikri Sönmez was the only representative in the municipal structure coming from the left-wing movement. Secondly, the left-wing movement was inexperienced in municipal processes, and retained the existing staff in their positions so that they could draw on their experience in these processes. Thirdly, had not abolished the legal framework in the municipal processes, but rather preferred to carry out their actions within this legal framework.

However, it is likely that there were conflicts between the members of the Municipal Council and their political groups. The Municipal Council was a powerful structure, whereas, the mayoralty was standing in a weak position. On the other hand, the left-wing movement had the support and backing of the people, and used this backing to change the balance of power in the municipality, as well as to break the power of the Municipal Council. The first speech of Mayor Fikri Sönmez with the members of Municipal Council highlights their position before the Municipal Council:

When I opened the first council meeting, I said that I was an independent mayor, that I had a political vision and a certain world view, but that in the council system I had been elected mayor with the majority of public votes after a democratic election, such a large number of votes for a candidate was unprecedented. I said, “As in previous years, when you try to throw a spanner in my works for political reasons, things will change”.

At this meeting of the Municipal Council, I said: “Here we deal in politics, I will work with my own political view and I will bring everything which is in the public interest to the council. If just for political reasons, you act in a partisan spirit and deny my demands, then I will make complaints about you to the public. I arrange meetings every week with public, I will tell everything.” This was a threat. They had no claim to say that I made them sign something that was illegal. Nobody in the Municipal Council could say that they “disagreed to the approval of a law, but the mayor made me sign it”, because any law that was claimed to be approved under compulsion was for the good of the Fatsa people, and was approved with the public’s co-decision. Of course, a Municipal Council member’s job is to participate in actions for the public good, to consider otherwise is unthinkable. I would resist for the Fatsa people when they tried to block these with partisan actions. This was what I did. However, everybody in the municipality, every political group could make their own politic.

Both the council members and the mayor were appointed by the votes of the public, and as such are representatives of a particular political view. I had, being an independent mayor, my own ideas that I would follow.

As can be seen from the above comment, the leftists used the power of the people. The meetings of the Municipal Council were announced to people so that they could participate. In addition, the meetings of the Municipal Council were broadcast from loudspeakers in the municipality. Everything was held before the public. This proved to be a pressure mechanism on the Municipal Council members. Fikri Sönmez underlined in his speech that he had threatened to report members of the Municipal Council to the public if they made decisions against the interest of the society. In addition, as he mentioned, the support of the Municipal Council was necessary, and they held the majority. The left movement also had political power and aims, hence the mayor also had chance to declare what he thought. However, as the mayor was independent and in a minority in the Municipal Council, it was necessary for the Municipal Council Meetings to be declared to the public, from whom the mayor took his power.

Ahmet Özdemir explained the process:

We changed the Municipal Council meetings and made them open to the public. In that period, we broadcast the speeches to every neighborhood using loudspeakers; everything that was said in the meetings could be heard by the public. We invited people to come to the municipality when there was a council meeting. Because of this, the council members began to choose their words very carefully. During the election campaign, we had analyzed the position of the Municipal Council, and after winning the election we expressed our concerns directly to the Municipal Council. The mayor said: "We don't have a duty to ourselves; we have a duty to the Fatsa people. So, we will work for the public good. Both the public and the municipality will work to solve problems together. Some of our colleagues can think differently, can suggest different methods, and they can even hinder progress, but we have an agenda here; our agenda is the will of the people. We will act for the good of the public. You can block some of the proceedings that are for the good of the Fatsa people, and your majority is enough to do so, but the Fatsa people will hear your decisions, I will take the final decisions to the Fatsa people. So, declare your opinions knowing this. Make your decisions according to public needs." None of the matters raised were opposed.

In almost all of the interviews, it was said that the members of the Municipal Council were relaxed during the meetings. The members could express themselves without fear. However, the fact that public could witness the meetings made them control themselves when speaking. Also, the power of the left-wing movement was strong, which also had a controlling influence. However, in general the members were comfortable in talking, and were called for meetings much more frequently than in previous administrations.

The main opposition group in the council was the JP. Although the RPP was accepted to be part of the existing power structure, they generally supported the decisions of the mayoralty. However, discussions between the right-wing JP and the left-wing movement often became heated. For example, as we mentioned before, the JP members did not support the idea or the

structure of the Public Committees, as they desired to maintain the existing institutions and use them as a municipal instrument. However, the left sought to distance itself from the existing structure and tried to establish new structures in the way of their understanding. Ahmet Özdemir explained the situation:

Although some complaints were made - generally from the JP side - it was only a demand that the headmen and the Board of Aldermen should take positions in the Public Committees, which failed to be find approval from the other council members. Finally, these decisions that had been approved by the Public Committees became municipality decisions and were affirmed. In other words, the will of the public was affirmed, even from those in opposition to the mayoralty.

A JP member of the Municipal Council, Lütfü Topaloğlu, said during our interview that speaking was sometimes avoided, however, in general there was peace and quiet to express their ideas. Speaking on the broadcasting of the Municipal Committee meetings to the public by loudspeaker, he said:

We were speaking in measured terms. So as not to draw criticisms from the public, we were smartening ourselves up, trying to speak correctly. We could give and defend our opinions. Some works that were against regulations were done, so we could not participate in them.

An important point expressed by Ahmet Özdemir was that the ideas of the left-wing movement and the plans came to the Municipal Council after much work had been done on them, so that the relations of cause and effect could be clearly seen. Disagreements occurred due to the conflicting ideas of the different political ideologies in the problem solving mechanisms:

They analyzed their protests and critiques among themselves, of course, and analyzed them in this way: "We used to approach this issue in this way, but now this issue is approached in other way. I wonder if we are right or if they are right." Two different political views existed at that time. One was in favor of the will of public, with its own priorities and solutions, while on the other side there was an opposing view with different priorities and solutions. If something was antagonized, it was antagonized within the relations of cause and effect. The question of whether this was done with a level of maturity can be answered as "no", as the discussion period was not long enough.

When conditions became worse around the country, including Fatsa, the relationships between the leftists and the opposition groups were to change. Although they had been building good relations with the members of the Municipal Council, in time, the members of the Municipal Council were accused of being agents of the central government. Lütfü Topaloğlu explained the change in position:

From time to time, the movement was subjected to searches by the police and soldiers in the municipality council. "The municipality is under pressure from the soldiers and police" was said. "There is no need for this, we are working for the public, why use pressure?" I answered that it was not to exert pressure, but for security. They were coming for security reasons.

It is clear that although the mayoralty was working legally, the power in making decisions did not come from the Municipal Council. The approval of the Municipal Council was important, but the Public Committees were even more so. In the indictment of the Fatsa court it had been claimed that the legal institution of the municipality had been eliminated by the mayoralty of Fikri Sönmez and with the establishment of the Public Committees. Ahmet Özdemir answered these claims in his court defense:

I have witnessed discussions on this issue between council members. None of council members were told "why are you taking on such a duty?" Anybody who wanted to serve the municipality could be assigned, regardless of his objective, his political view, whether he was a party member or not. However, it seemed as if the council members had little time for either municipality services or council meetings, which were held once or twice a month. At one of the meetings that was open to public, although one member said that he would take on a duty raised by the Public Committees, but after discussions it was decided that he was merely boasting. It was decided that any council member or headman was free to take on this duty if he wanted to. The public had chosen those who would serve.

Although none of the legal channels had been eliminated in the municipality, the council members were also invited to join the Public Committees because the mayoralty believed that the works needed to be done immediately, and would not be overcome if the Municipal Council was involved.

At this point, it is worthwhile mentioning again the position of the Public Committees. The Public Committees were the subject of one of the most important and controversial disagreements between the left-wing movement and the other political actors, as well as the Municipal Council. Public Committees had become a legitimization organ of the municipal activities and were the mediators between the public and the municipality. However, the position of the Public Committees was not accepted by the Municipal Council because the Public Committees had become a power structure outside of the municipal structure. The power of the mayoralty and the movement was derived from the Public Committees. The Public Committees became a problem between the local state and the central government in time. There had been no legal base for formation of the Public Committees, which were seen as independent organs that were affecting the local authorities. Therefore, in time, Fatsa began to be seen as being administrated by the Public Committees, which were non-governmental and illegal organs. This was a problematic issue in the state structure, because although everything in the municipality was carried out on a legal base, the power of the Public Committees was seen as illegal. Ahmet Özdemir replied to criticisms of the Public Committees:

Neighborhood committees, Municipal Committees and Public Committees had no official character on paper, and this was the basic factor in our problems. It was like we were acting against the law, but it was a requirement. We had chosen a legitimate base for ourselves, which was a base that we always had faith in. It was a relationship that had no corruption. The Parliament had made no law legitimizing Neighborhood Committees. How could we find a legal base?

Fatsa became divided into 11 neighborhoods and we got rid of the post of headman, because we felt it was open to corruption and we couldn't work in this way. However, the headmen were free to participate or join in the activities of the committees. Anyone working at any level of government, even the police, was permitted to take part in the committees.

It can be said that relationship between the Municipal Council and the municipal administration was conflicting, but there was never any attempt by the mayoralty to interfere in the decision-making processes of the Municipal Council, despite the power struggle between the Municipal Council and the mayoralty based on ideological differences. It cannot be said that the Municipal Council had been eliminated and that the actions of municipality were illegal; rather, the Municipal Council generally accepted the decisions of the municipality and in some cases criticized its activities. It is obvious that there was pressure on the Municipal Council that derived from the power of the Public Committees and the left-wing movement.

4.3.7. Central government and Local State Relations: Towards the End...

From the beginning of the election period, the movement in Fatsa was under the strict control of the state, and after Fikri Sönmez had gained the mayoralty as an independent candidate Fatsa became one of the most scrutinized places in the country. The activities held in Fatsa were seen and shown with exaggeration by those living outside of Fatsa. The echoes of Fatsa were loud both in the right- and left-wing. Events in Fatsa found their way into the press, and hence Fatsa became a subject of interest. From the left-wing point of view, Fatsa was an important experience that needed to be supported. On the other hand, the right-wing media channels had begun to attack Fatsa, portraying it as a threat to the unity of the state and country.

On November 25th, 1979 there was a change in the government of Turkey, and the third Nationalist Front government came to power led by the Justice Party (Süleyman Demirel became prime minister) with the support of the Nationalist Movement Party and National Safety Party. The NMP and NSP only supported the JP government, and did not hold seats in the government.

Especially after the Nationalist Front came to power, and the conflicts between the left- and right-wings were escalating around the country, the conflict between the central government and the Fatsa municipality came to the forefront with more fervor. As the situation in Fatsa had become well known around the country, the negative views of Fatsa began to intensify. From the left side, Fatsa was observed with great interest, but on the right side, to be from Fatsa had become a crime.

An important affect of this position on the municipality was seen in the economic sphere. Fatsa had begun to experience difficulties in obtaining necessary resources. The scarcity of consumption goods made obtaining resources more difficult. Goods distributed by the state, such as oil, cigarettes etc., stopped being sent to Fatsa, although they were distributed in other provinces. An interesting example of the “economic embargo” on the Fatsa municipality was seen at the Samsun Oil Office (T.P.O).

The oil and fuel-oil needs of the municipality were generally obtained from the Oil Office in Samsun. However, the officers rejected the demands of the municipality, stating that oil was scarce and they did not have enough to give to the Fatsa Municipality. Fikri Sönmez explained their attitude in his court defense:

Our municipality was under economic pressure, we could not find petrol, we could not take our legal quota. When I sent our tanker to the Samsun depot the man in charge there said to the official from Fatsa Municipality: “Why did you come to Samsun?” to which the man from the Fatsa Municipality replied, “We have come to take petrol.” The Samsun official responded: “Do not you have anything to do? Petrol comes from Russia by ferry to your mayor, you will not come again, will you?” This was the mentality we were facing. Does this not bring into question the honor of the government? Why should we have to beg for petrol to provide services in the municipality? The Fatsa Municipality was singled out for such treatment.

The official from the Fatsa Municipality was Ahmet Altuntaş, who was a manager at the water-bottling enterprise of the municipality. In order to clean the bottles they needed fuel-oil, but the Samsun office refused to sell to him. Ahmet Altuntaş explained his experience in Samsun during our interview:

We needed fuel-oil to wash the bottles – it was called gas number 6. We were having to use central heating oil to wash the bottles. I went to Samsun with an official letter. The man at the Petrol Office, having seen that we were from the Municipality of Fatsa, said, “I do not give gas to the Fatsa Municipality”. We went to an oil station called “Toroslar” and bought the oil from there at a higher price. State institutions buy goods from the state, but we were not allowed to.

This problem was also mentioned by JP member Lütfü Topaloğlu during our interview:

One side the mayoralty was saying to us: “You are the government; you belong to the party in power, you represent the power. The municipality needs money and petrol. You should also help the public’s municipality.” We would go to Samsun and beg them for fuel; we tried to help as much as possible. In Samsun we were told: “Go and get it from Moscow, you’ve got nothing to do with us; you are not connected to us. That’s how they acted. Here was a place in opposition, a specific place, a famous place in the world. The government’s involvement was clearly evident in the situation. On one or two occasions there was no petrol to fuel our cars, when we spoke to the officials in Samson, they would say: “What are you asking? I cannot find even 1 lt. gas, how am I supposed to get to you”. They unwillingly sent two or three oil drums. We used to say “We need to carry on with our lives; help us to continue our services.”

As Lütü Topaloğlu mentioned, in order to continue to provide municipal services, oil was needed. The attitude of the Oil Office forced the municipality to find other sources. One option was to obtain the petrol from private petrol stations, and another was to purchase from the international lorry drivers. Ahmet Özdemir explained some of the ways they would obtain petrol:

At that time, we were being supported by the owners of the trucks transporting goods to Iran or Iraq along the TEM Road. They gave petrol to us from their own stocks. They did not give it for free of course. Also, we obtained petrol from the owners of the trucks that were transporting anchovies all over the country. We coped with this problem with the help of people outside of Fatsa with which we had relations. If we had cut all these relations, we would have had to find an alternative petrol source in Fatsa.

The economic embargos made the municipality draw up a more effective economic program. As it has been seen, the resources of the municipality were being used efficiently and certain manufacturing establishments had been taken back under municipal control. The participation of the people in municipal services made implementation easier. Hüseyin Uygun, during our interview, said that using resources efficiently, being content with the existing resources, sharing the existing resources equally and also sharing resources with the other municipalities were ways of coping with the financial difficulties. Other municipalities, whether they were JP or RPP, had helped the Fatsa Municipality during the End to Mud Campaign, but their help did not end with the completion of that campaign. Although there was a rising reaction against the Fatsa Municipality and Fatsa society as a whole, in particular the neighboring municipalities stood in solidarity with the town. The methods being implemented by the Fatsa Municipality in the execution of local projects were also being taken up by the other municipalities (Uyan, 2004; 174). This is an important point in drawing reaction from the state, because the relations of Fatsa Municipality with others in the area were facilitating the spread of their ideologies to other neighborhoods. As we have frequently mentioned, popular support of the movement and the municipality was increasing day by day.

On the other hand, because of ideological separations, Fatsa was seen as a threat to the unity of the state. Especially in places where the nationalists were strong, to be a man from Fatsa began to be accepted as a crime. The attitude of the Samsun Oil Office personnel was only one example, but attacks on people from Fatsa when they left the town were beginning. There are several impressive examples on this subject that we learned during our interviews (with Lütü Topaloğlu, Süleyman Çürüksu, İsmet Hoşafıoğlu, Kemal Şendur and others). For example, an imam was attacked in Samsun because he was from Fatsa. In Ordu, a secondary school student was attacked by students from Ordu, again, because he was from Fatsa. It can be said that while the methods of the municipality were drawing interest around the country, negative impressions about Fatsa were escalating. The main actor behind this negativity was clearly the central government – which was using the nationalist issues in its politics, which were widely seen in the press.

It can be easily comprehended that the conflicts between the central government and local state were shaped around ideological differences. Although the Fatsa Municipality was operating from a legal base, it was seen as a revolutionary movement as the power of the central government was in the hands of people with directly opposing political ideologies.

Fatsa continued to be a key area in the country and was becoming the focal point of state reactions after the JP took control of the government. The JP government appointed new governors to administrative provinces throughout the country, including Fatsa. The new governor of Ordu, Hikmet Gulsen, organized two operations in Fatsa, on January 24th and March 8th, 1980, during which the municipality offices were searched by force and municipal personnel were assaulted. Throughout these operations Mayor Fikri Sönmez was not allowed to enter the municipality offices¹⁸.

The aim of the operations was to show that the state was in control of the entire country. The military and police tried to prove the illegality of the municipality. While they failed to find any evidence to this effect they did succeed in demoralizing the people of Fatsa and spread fear in the community.

Regardless of this pressure, the municipality continued its activities. In May of 1980, investigators came from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to carry out investigations into the municipality, but they also failed to uncover any illegality, and actually thanked the municipality personnel (From the court defense of Ahmet Özdemir).

While tension was rising in the country, Fatsa was begun to be referred to as “The Rescued Region”, “the city of no entry without a passport”, “Little Moscow” and “the Republic of Fatsa” by the nationalists and rightist press. Such propaganda was aimed at building a reaction against the movement in Fatsa and its municipal administration, and was finding support in the public.

At this point, the right wing political actors in Fatsa began to search for ways to regain power. Their main concern in Fatsa was the lack of state authority. Both the RPP and JP circles said that the revolutionary movement had gained strength in Fatsa due to the lack of state control, and

¹⁸ The local Güneş newspaper published a press statement of Fikri Sönmez on March 14th, 1980. Mayor Fikri Sönmez stated that the operations had been carried out in order to demoralize the society of Fatsa. In these operations, the municipality was treated as an illegal institution, and neither the mayor nor the members of the Municipal Council were allowed into the municipality. Fikri Sönmez claimed that the investigation, executed by hundreds of military and police forces, had been held illegally, and condemned the investigation process. (Uyan, 2004; 174).

were seeking to re-establish the authority of the state. Although the legal institutions of the state were working in Fatsa, the power and the hegemony of the left-wing movement narrowed their influence. Therefore, it can be claimed that when talking about the hegemonic structure of state they really meant the authority of the state.

Süleyman Çürüksu, a member of the JP, said during our interview that they had decided to visit Ankara to talk with Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, who was also the leader of JP, in order to explain the situation in Fatsa and ask for help.

I am the one of three people responsible for the appointment of Read Akaka to the Fatsa governorship, the others were Torso Recap and Kemal Sensory. We did not know him at that time, we asked Süleyman Demirel to appoint someone who could bring state control to Fatsa. Reşat Akkaya said: "I will bring back government control", and he was assigned.

On April 20th, 1980 a new governor was appointed to Fatsa by the central government; Reşat Akkaya. Reşat Akkaya was appointed to Ordu in order to re-establish the authority of the state and end the existing situation.

At this point it would be valuable to give an idea of the general condition in Turkey. As we mentioned, Turkey was subjected to severe and armed conflicts between the right- and left-wing movements, and deaths were increasing day by day. The massacre of Kahramanmaraş can be given as an example to clarify the situation in the country at the time. On December 21st, 1979, a Sunni nationalist group launched an attack against the Alevi citizens that lasted for five days, resulting in the deaths of 111 people. The Alevi citizens were seen as "communists" by the nationalist groups, and attacks were aimed at "clearing" the communists from Maraş¹⁹. The events in Maraş were one of the more extreme at that time, but armed conflicts were occurring all across the country and there were numerous massacres. On the other hand, in Fatsa and the Ordu province there was relative calm. In June 1980, the Milliyet newspaper published a map showing the level of conflict in the different regions of the country. Ordu was shown as white, meaning that it was one of the calmest provinces in Turkey. The armed conflicts that were erupting in different regions of the country did not spread to Fatsa. Fatsa was a different and dangerous experiment according to the central government, because a new hegemonic structure had begun to be established that was having an affect on other places. Then a new governor was appointed to Ordu.

Who was Reşat Akkaya? Reşat Akkaya was known as a staunch supporter of the Nationalist Movement Party. He had been chief of the Konya, Eskişehir, Mersin and Ankara police

¹⁹ For more information, see Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, 1988, İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul; pp. 2336-37

departments in different periods, and had been relieved of duty on several occasions because of his extreme methods in support of radical nationalist actions. His extreme behavior was even noted in his employment record²⁰. It is clear that in order to take the power back in Fatsa the state had appointed a radical nationalist governor in a bid to curb the revolutionary movement.

The following is a press statement of governor Reşat Akkaya from 2nd May, 1980, published in the local Güneş newspaper (Uyan, 2004; 176):

“THE POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE SHOWN IN ORDU”

With the return of Governor Hikmet Gülsen to the central government, Reşat Akkaya has taken over the duty of Ordu governor, beginning his duty on Monday. The governor has made it clear that he will do his best to stop the terrorism, and has stated that the government’s power will be restored after he has prepared a team that he can work with.

Governor Reşat Akkaya said the following in summary:

I can make this clear: we will work with the public to give services in Ordu. I cannot inform you of my plans until I have prepared my own team. We have been chosen to serve here.

After he became governor of Ordu, Reşat Akkaya wrote a letter to the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, Alparslan Türkeş, in order to request his help in forming his team. It has to be noted that Alparslan Türkeş had not won a seat in the government²¹.

The conditions in Fatsa changed after Reşat Akkaya took up his position. First of all, he formed a cadre from radical nationalists, and began to launch attacks on the municipalities of Ordu. Not only did he attack the Fatsa municipality, but also the municipalities of the RPP, which accounted for most of the municipalities in Ordu. In addition, Reşat Akkaya tried to increase tension, and especially Fatsa became the focus of his efforts. Fikri Sönmez explained the situation after Reşat Akkaya became governor in his court defense:

On one side we had the major newspapers in Istanbul publishing news about me, accrediting me with comments that I had not made, and spreading false rumors about me and Fatsa. On the other side, Reşat Akkaya and his team members were trying to sway public opinion by using these newspapers and weaken Fatsa. The propaganda campaigns referred to Fatsa as, among other things, the “Rescued Area”, “the city of no entry without a passport”, “Little Moscow”, “the city that is managed by committees”, “the place apart from the country land”, “the red sun will rise on Fatsa” etc... The preparations to validate an attack against Fatsa came to a conclusion with Operation Target_of 11th July, 1980.

²⁰ For more information about Reşat Akkaya, see *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, 1988, İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul; pp. 2381; Uyan, M. M.(2004), *Toplumsal Dalgalanın Kırılışı*, Arayış: Ankara; pp. 176-190

²¹ The letter of Reşat Akkaya to Alparslan Türkeş was included in the court indictment of the Nationalist Movement Party after the 1980 coup d’état. In addition, his letter was published in the newspapers. (Uyan, 2004; 177; *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, 1988; 2381)

The Fatsa municipality attempted to deny the claims being made by the press, but it was difficult to maintain the trust of the public:

Although we tried to discredit the propaganda campaigns around the country, it was not enough to change the people's views of Fatsa. The relations of the more organized state institutions reached further than our own relations. The state's use of the press and other media was more effective than our attempts to discredit the state in the propaganda process. This increased with the arrival of Governor Reşat Akkaya. (From the interview with Ahmet Özdemir)

Fatsa was shown as a target in the press²². The struggle in Fatsa turned into a severe conflict between the power of the central government and that of the local government.

Another point worth mentioning is that the process of establishing a new hegemony in Fatsa was progressing at great speed, and the power of the leftists was increasing every day, but in time uncontrollable events began to occur. Minor conflicts among individuals turned into conflicts between the left- and right-wings, although not based on political issues. While the members of the revolutionary movement tried to prevent such battles, they were too numerous and were increasing every day. In addition, as the power of the leftists was increasing, more people began to declare themselves as revolutionaries, and began to act accordingly. However, they were not, and their activities caused problems in the revolutionary movement.

In the light of this, it is noteworthy to give place to the comments of Lütü Topaloğlu:

There was a famous governor; Reşat Akkaya... He was brave, but like a crazy man. He used to say to us: "You are scared; that's why these things are happening to us." I would reply: "We are trying to be as brave as we can. It doesn't make sense to blame this on fear. You are the government now; if cannot protect yourselves, how can you ever hope to protect us? I am a lawyer, could you give me a gun and certificate? You cannot. It doesn't make any sense talking like that." We had many arguments at that time.

Ertuğrul Günay, ex-parliamentarian of Ordu, explained the situation in Ordu after the JP took control of the government:

The governor from the RPP government left after 1979. Up until his departure there had been no violence in Ordu, but the JP came to power in the central government, but the RPP was still strong at Ordu, which disturbed the nationalist parts of society. The municipality in Fatsa was at the left side, and lots of municipalities in Ordu were RPP, including Central Ordu, Ünye, Akkuş and Perşembe. In 1977 we won many municipality seats. The existence of a radical left-wing municipality in Fatsa disturbed the JP government and the members of the Grand National Assembly, and they were looking to take this power from the RPP and its members. In 1980, a police commissioner who had been removed from Ankara Police Headquarters because of his tendentious attitudes was assigned as governor of Ordu by the JP, despite being a militant NMP supporter. Reşat Akkaya harassed the mayors in Gürgentepe, Çamaş, Aybastı before Fatsa as well as the general public there. Reşat Akkaya brought terrorism back to Ordu, where the JP and RPP existed in unity, and where the NMP had no standing. First, he created an atmosphere of terror using his powers as governor.

²² To see the examples from the newspapers, please look at the appendix part.

Then, he opened Ülkü Ocakları and Hergün newspaper offices in the counties. This was a conscious effort of the governor aimed at creating discord. He would walk towards mayors with the intention of beating them. I remember that ordinary RPP followers were taken from their homes by the police and beaten, and I had to go to Fatsa for this reason. I hadn't gone to Fatsa for six months, but for this reason I had to go to Fatsa.

Two of the points raised by Ertuğrul Günay are important. First of all, radical nationalists had begun to organize in Fatsa and its neighborhoods. Secondly, Reşat Akkaya had attacked RPP mayors and members of the RPP. One of the mayors attacked by Reşat Akkaya was Ekrem Aydın, the mayor of the subprovince of Gürgentepe. A teacher who was known to be progressive was killed in Gürgentepe, and a big funeral was organized. After the funeral, Reşat Akkaya raided Gürgentepe, assaulting the mayor before imprisoning him²³. RPP members were also assaulted by the state powers, which brought RPP parliamentarians to Ordu in order to intervene in the methods of Reşat Akkaya. However, it was too late, because Ordu had become the focus of the central government.

While the implementations of Reşat Akkaya were continuing, Fatsa was also being discussed by the central government, in the Council of Ministers and also in the General Staff.

At the beginning of July, Çorum was subjected to an attack by radical nationalist groups, similar to the one in Kahramanmaraş. However, the attack was repelled by the revolutionary forces, but Çorum had fallen into a severe conflict, and the Alevi citizens were attacked again. While the armed conflicts were continuing in Çorum, President Süleyman Demirel answered a question from a journalist about Çorum with the comment, "Put Çorum to the side, look at Fatsa". Although Çorum was experiencing much bloodshed, the president still chose to point to Fatsa.

4.4. Limits to Radicalism: Operation Target

An extended period of waiting began in Fatsa at the beginning of July, and the eyes of the country were on the town. A military intervention was expected in Fatsa and tension was high. Mayor Fikri Sönmez invited the leaders of other political groups and made a press statement with them on July 10th in order to explain the situation and ease the tension. RPP subprovince chairman Feridun Karamolla, JP subprovince chairman Lütfü Topaloğlu and NSP subprovince chairman Cevat Kibar came together with Fikri Sönmez, and stated that Fatsa was in peace and that the news being published about Fatsa was an exaggeration of the real condition. The statement was given in the Cumhuriyet newspaper on July 11th:

NO ACTION IN FATSA, BUT THE PUBLIC IS UNCOMFORTABLE

²³ Published in the Cumhuriyet newspaper on June 23rd, 1980.

RPP, JP and NSP local branch chairmen agree that Fatsa is a peaceful town. Mayor invites Demirel to Fatsa.

The calm in Fatsa continued yesterday, but the public is uncomfortable due to reports that the town had been enclosed by military units.

JP local branch chairman Lütfü Topaloğlu said that some of the news published in the Istanbul newspapers was exaggerated, adding that such news would harm the people of Fatsa. Topaloğlu said that they were in peace, but that the news had caused significant discomfort in the town.

RPP local branch chairman Feridun Karamolla said that contrary to the claims, it would be incorrect to say that Fatsa was overrun by communists, declaring that soldiers may come and make searches, but the public are pleased with their lives.

NSP local branch chairman Cevat Kibar said that some reports in the newspapers had made to shock the public, stating that the news was being published as a play of the capital. The NSP local branch chairman added that there were no disturbances in the town.

The Mayor of Fatsa Municipality Fikri Sönmez said that the propaganda had started after the appointment of Reşat Akkaya to Ordu as governor, and that he was creating the stories. He said: “These are signs of aggression towards Fatsa. They are preparing the Turkish public for aggression in Fatsa. They want to show Fatsa as an administration which is independent from the Turkish Republic.

The sincerity of the press statement was initially questioned, but as we can see from our interviews, the press statement of the political leaders of Fatsa was sincere. Although the other political actors stated that they did not agree with the existing situation, the press statement was not widely published. Zeki Muslu expressed his thoughts on the press statement:

It was cozy. The NMP were not in Fatsa at that time. There were only the JP, NSP and RPP. We give thanks to our elder brothers Lütfü and Cevat. They did not make their comments under pressure. They made them with sincerity.

However, military troops had begun to be amassed around Fatsa in preparation for an operation. Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren visited the Black Sea Region and inspected the troops in Ordu and Samsun on July 9th. While the visit of Kenan Evren was continuing, the Hürriyet newspaper published that Operation Target had begun in Fatsa. However, there had been no operation on that day. The operation would begin two days later²⁴.

After midnight on July 11th, the troops started to move through Fatsa on Operation Target²⁵. Radical nationalists, with their faces covered by masks, were used in the operation. Nearly 300 people were put into jails and temporary custody in the warehouse of the Meat and Fish Institution in Fatsa. Fikri Sönmez was among those arrested, as well as the Public Committee members, although they had no relation with the revolutionary movement.

²⁴ See Appendix B, p.p. 175

²⁵ The name of the operation in Turkish is “Nokta Operasyonu”.

The operation signaled the end of the Municipality of Fatsa. After the operation Reşat Akkaya made a press statement, in which he stated that the people who had been causing great pain in Fatsa had been arrested. One of them was the mayor, who had come to office with the votes of the people. The state powers did not imprison the Municipal Council members. The target was the independent mayor and the members of the left-wing movement.

Fatsa continued to feature in the written press, and many comments were made²⁶. The operation was one of the largest held in that period after the 12th September coup d'état. The state had not such operations in places like Yozgat, Çorum and Kahramanmaraş. It is understood that Fatsa had become the greatest threat to the state structure. In the process of the operation, state used every instrument in order to legalize the state intervention. The operation, however, should be evaluated as not only being made against the municipality, but also the social movement which had risen in Fatsa and had begun to establish a hegemonic structure. The municipality was only an instrument for establishing the hegemony of the movement.

After Fikri Sönmez was sent to jail for 40 days, he could not be reached; nobody knew where he was. In the last days of August, 1980 he was arrested and taken to Ordu Prison²⁷, but not before being tortured.

Meanwhile, the operations were continuing in Fatsa in order to capture the people who had escaped from the state powers. Strict controls were implemented in the subprovince during the investigations. Additionally, activities of right-wing groups began to rise in Fatsa and control of political power began to pass the right-wing groups. There were problems in the municipal structure, as can be expected. As it has been mentioned, the state powers had not intervened into the Municipal Council, and the council was charged with selecting a deputy to the mayor. The Municipal Council selected three deputies over the course of August, however all of them resigned from their duties, the last on 22nd August²⁸, and a void occurred in the municipality. There was still the question of Fikri Sönmez's location. The state appointed the sub governor as mayor of Fatsa. In conclusion, it can be seen that state authority was completely established after Operation Target in Fatsa.

²⁶ For more information, please look at the Appendix B

²⁷ An interview with Fikri Sönmez in Ordu Prison was published in the Hürriyet newspaper on September 4th, 1980. For a part of the interview, please refer to the Appendix B.

²⁸ It can be seen the news of the deputies in the Demokrat Newspaper on August 6th and 22nd of 1980.

CHAPTER 5

5. CONCLUSION

Fatsa experience, despite its short life span, is an exceptional incidence in various ways. In the first place it is exceptional in that a political movement which was outside the institutional political system took control of one of the relatively small scale municipality by contesting the mainstream parties in a local by-election. It is also exceptional in that after taking control of the municipality, the new administration challenged traditional way of 'doing business' by introducing novel ways of running the municipality. Municipal services were designed to be provided in a participatory manner. Likewise, black market and the forces behind it were challenged for the first time in the region. Yet, the mayor and the council member who came to power with popular voting had to give up their power with the intervention of the security forces.

In this concluding part, the question of how such an incidence took place in such a place in an exceptional way would be further elaborated. To do this, it is again turned back to the social movement literature discussed in the theoretical section. The model proposed by Pickvance to explain the rise of Revolutionary Path movement in Fatsa as a radical municipal administration will be employed.

As was discussed earlier, Pickvance identifies five contextual features to explain the rise of urban movements;

- Rapid urbanization as an indicator of existence of objective deprivation
- The state action
 - State intervention in consumption or collective consumption
 - State responses to the movements and its demands
- Political Context
 - Ability of formal political institutions to express urban conflicts
 - Existence of broader political movements
 - Cultural understandings about the scope of urban politics
- Level of development of middle class
- General economic and political conditions

The first factor is the level of objective deprivation and Pickvance associate this with the rapid urbanization. Such a criterion is especially valid for the large cities which faced rapid urbanization as it often leads to the deprivation of large segment of migrant population. As such,

this is not the case for Fatsa as it did not undergo a rapid urbanization during the period in question. However, in the 1970s, the town suffered similar economic problems which were faced many large as well as small towns and cities. Increasing economic difficulties associated with black market etc created hard conditions for the large section of population in the city. Thus, it would not be unfair to argue that relative deprivation which stimulates the rise of urban mobilizations is valid for Fatsa.

Second contextual feature is the state response to the urban movements and their demands. With some qualification, I would like to consider this will be considered in the framework of the state response to such mobilization which comes from outside the institutionalized political structure. In this case, it is obvious that there was little tolerance towards such mobilization by the state. Such intolerance towards such mobilizations partly explains why such mobilizations rarely take place. However it becomes highly important to explain why such a mobilization took place and found support in public in Fatsa. In my view part of the reason is the legitimating crisis which faced by the Turkish state during this period. During this period, the state institutions failed to reproduce themselves as main guardians of the political system and there was an increasing questioning of the political system as well. Thus it is in this environment that Fatsa experience emerged as an unusual attempt to question the dominant political structure in general and in local government level.

Third aspect, political context, is also relevant to this discussion. Ability of formal political institutions to express urban conflicts is particularly important to explain the Fatsa experience in that as we mentioned above, the dominant political institutions including the political parties underwent a deep crisis of legitimacy. They ever increasingly lost the trust and support of population of Fatsa. Second political contextual factor, existence of broader political movement is also relevant to the case of Fatsa. It is obvious that Fatsa experience, despite its local specificities, is not simply a local mobilization. It developed as a part of a wider political mobilization and without such a larger mobilization it would be highly unlikely to see such an experience to be realized in such a small town. This is also related to the third element of the political context, namely, cultural understandings about the scope of urban politics. As is well known, for a long period local politics in Turkey has been seen as a subset of the national politics and people usually acts on political front within the framework of national politics including the local elections. For this reason, it may be content that without such national level mobilization, such a mobilization could not be realized with the initiative of the local actors. However, this had a price as we have seen later on in the defeat of the movement.

Fourth contextual feature is the level of development of middle class and this is also important in explaining the incidence and militancy of Fatsa movement. However this needs some qualification in so far as the local actors are concerned. As far as supra-local actors of the movement are concerned it is highly obvious that middle class actors and students are the primary supporters of the Fatsa experience. Many of the novel ideas belong to this group. As far as local actors are concerned, including Fikri Sönmez, although they are not strictly middle class, they acted as the organic intellectuals of the municipal movements and brought their prestige and accumulation to the political scene. This is highly important in the initial success of the movement.

Finally, the general economic and political conditions of the country during this period also need some attention as they are also important in explaining the rise of Fatsa movement. As well known, overall economic conditions of this period were highly problematic as the import substitution industrialization reached to a crisis state. Likewise, there were also adverse economic conditions in agriculture. Given the Fatsa's economy was highly dependent on the hazelnuts, the adverse conditions affected the city as well. Likewise the rise of 'black-market' was also an important source of dismay among local population. It was these conditions that Revolutionary Path and its local arms successfully exploited during the late 1970s.

If they were successful in this it was also the political conditions of the country along with specific political balance of power in the city itself. In the late 1970s, the whole political system was in doldrums given the lack of political stability along with the economic ones. The governments of this period failed to establish a political stability and in both urban and rural areas there were a political turmoil and increasing political violence and clashes among various left and right wing groups. Such a political instability and the failure of the governments in restoring political order also paved the way for the Revolutionary Path to take control of the city. As we mentioned if this was realized in Fatsa, rather than other places, then we have to refer to the local forces along with the national level explanations to explain this local specificity. In addition to his conditions, when talk about that period, it should be in mind that Cold War Period was also influential in the analysis of the political conditions in the country.

Another topic that needs to be mentioned in this concluding part is the relations of local authority with central government authority. Again, mentioned in the theoretical part, local state and central government relations can be subject to conflicts although local state is an agent of central government. Cockburn mentions that local state is the local arm of overall state structure in the local level, which enables the central power to control the local relations. According to Cockburn, local state is a part of existing hegemonic structure and takes part in the reproduction

of the system. The main duty of the local state is the reproduction of the system in the local level. Although Cockburn has brought an important expansion to the relations of the local level politics and central power, she has not concluded that local power and central power can be in conflict since local state is a part of hegemonic structure.

On the other hand, although Duncan and Goodwin accept the term 'local state' used by Cockburn, they criticized Cockburn since she has not considered local power relations and uneven development of capitalist system. In their theory 'Uneven Development', they claim that different localities have different features and local state is shaped in accordance with these local characteristics. Local state represents the local power relations. As the urban space is subject to hegemonic processes and different hegemonic projects try to take a part in the urban politics, there exist conflicting power relations in the local level which affect the position of local state. Therefore, local state is affected from the local power conflicts and so, local characteristics are important in the formation of the local state. Hence, different localities have different local state structures.

As local relations impact upon the local state structure, there can be conflicts between central power and local state if there are conflicting hegemonic structures between local level and national level. That is to say, since the local state structure is a part of local hegemonic structure, there can be appeared conflicts between local state and central power. Therefore, state structure is not a unique and monolithic one, rather it can feature conflicts within.

The same explanation above is valid in Fatsa case. Both national level political conditions and local level conditions have given rise to the development of the left-wing movement. A new hegemonic project came into being in the local level and by chance found its way through the channels of the municipal administration. Following the unexpected death of the mayor, by-elections came to the agenda and left-wing movement took the power in the municipality. Nevertheless, this hegemonic project was absolutely contrary to the existing national hegemonic projects. Not surprisingly there arose severe conflicts between local state and central power which resulted in a military operation. By the way, it is important to add that several mediums of manipulation have been employed by the central power in Fatsa prior to the direct military intervention.

The point to be questioned here is why the central power used such a severe method in Fatsa. The answer can be found in the activities of the municipality and the leftwing movements which were aiming a transformation process. The movement in Fatsa was determined to change the existing power relations and they began to enjoy a popular support. However, it cannot be said that the

project was successfully completed since the period was short and the general conditions did not provide such a possibility.

Moreover, the position of the left-wing movement in Fatsa Municipality differed a lot from the other left-wing groups' positions. The movement which had chance to take part in the municipal administration in Fatsa did not have ties with legal political parties. That is to say, the independent mayor was not a representative of a legal political movement such as a communist or a socialist party which was the case with Bologna and Porto Alegre. In this sense, Fatsa experience cannot be considered a systematic one which was shaped within the legal framework of politics. This was also a handicap for the development of the hegemonic project in the local level.

On the other hand, although the socio-economic characteristics of Bologna, Porto Alegre and Fatsa highly differ from each other, the common point of them is the similarity of development of the municipal activities, the way these activities were handled. The encouragement of people to participate in the decision making processes of municipalities, is certainly the core point in the activities of each case and experience. Besides, from a broader perspective, it can be said that in all three cases the use value of the urban space has been brought to the foreground. However, there is an important remark to be kept in mind: While the time periods of Bologna and Fatsa cases overlap, Porto Alegre is a case of contemporary neo-liberal period.

To sum up, Fatsa experience shows that both national and local conditions have their impacts on the development of the local politics. Besides, counter hegemonic projects developed in the local level are likely to encounter a severe oppression. In conclusion, one can say , to fulfill a hegemonic project the continuation of the activities as well as the reproduction of the comprehension must be provided.

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12 September 2006

APPENDIX

Figure 1: Hürriyet – July 9th, 1980, Banner Headline



Figure 2: Milliyet, July 9th, 1980, Banner Headline



Figure 3: Hürriyet, July 10th, 1980, Banner Headline



Figure 4: Milliyet, July 10th, 1980, First Page



Figure 4.1: Milliyet, July 10th, 1980, Inner Page



Figure 5: Hürriyet, July 11th, 1980, Banner Headline



Figure 6: Cumhuriyet, July 11th, 1980, Banner Headline



Figure 7: Tercüman, July 11th, 1980, First Page



Figure 8: Cumhuriyet, July 12th, 1980, Banner Headline



Figure 9: Hürriyet, July 12th, 1980, Banner Headline



Figure 10: Milliyet, July 12th, 1980, Banner Headline



Figure 10.1: Milliyet, July 12th, 1980, Inner Page



Figure 11: Tercüman, July 12th, 1980, First Page

12 Temmuz 1980
Cumartesi

Halk'a ve okuyucularına
Tercüman

Her Sabah Dünya'ya Yeniden Kurulur Her Sabah Taze Bir Başlangıçtır

İŞTE FATSA Uzun süredir militanların kontrolunda bulunan Fatsa'ya dün devlet gücü - ri girdi. İlçede görülen, bir tek duvarın dahi "komünist bildirisi, afiş ve yazı - sız" olmadığıdır.

FATSA'YA DEVLET GİRDİ

● Dün 3.30'da başlayan hareket sonunda ilçe ev-ev arandı. Barikatlar yıkıldı. Belediye Başkanı Fikri Sönmez dahil 300 kişi gözaltına alındı

● Çamaş'ta assubayı öldürenlerden 4'ü yakalandı. Ay - rica 22 tabanca 7 tüfek ele geçirildi.

● Vali 04.15'ten itibaren sokağa çıkma yasağı konuldu - ğunu açıkladı ve "Devletli Fatsa'ya getirdik. Fatsa - lılar artık suskunlar zümresi olmaktan kurtarıldı" dedi.

● CHP Fatsa'ya bir heyet gönderdi.

öportajı
DİSTLER
LÜMAN
YOR !..

afılar:
AKIN

KEMAL ÖNDER VE ADEM BİLİR
FATSA'DAN BİLDİRİYOR

Ordu'nun Fatsa ilçesinde günler - den beri "Başladı başlıyor" denilen hareket dün yapıldı. Dün sabah 03.30'da başlayan ve 04.15'ten iti - baren sokağa çıkma yasağı da uy - gulan hareket sonucunda 22 ta - banca, 7 av tüfeği ve çok sayıda ya - saklanmış yayın ele geçirildi. Bir (Devamı Sa: 12 Sü: 5 de)

Dün de 4'ü
İstanbul'da
6 kişi öldürüldü

● Ankara'da bir bekçi, İs - tanbul'da bir AP'li mu - hasabeci ile bir MHP'li

CHP Ort
görüşt
dev


AK
'CH
bu
ge

● Parti Mecl
rultayı ist
"Keman ve
ses çıkmay
yor" dedi.

CHP Ortak
de devam ed
Bozkurt ve N
dan sonra top

ECEVİT
Türkiye
açıkça

● CHP Gene
den CHP
getiremey

ÖZEL BİRLİK Ordu'da üslenen özel komando birliği, dün sabah Fatsa'ya geç - ti ve hareketi başlattı.

Figure 12: Tercüman, July 13th, 1980, First Page



Figure 13: Cumhuriyet, July 13th, 1980, Banner Headline



Figure 14: Tercüman, July 13th, 1980, First Page



FATSA'DA OLAY VAR MI?

Nazlı Ilıcak

Tercüman Gazetesi, 13 Temmuz 1980

Fatsa'da olay var mı yok mu? Eğer bu ilçeyi Sovyetler birliğinin 18'inci eyaleti gibi görmeyi içinize sindirir, Azerbaycan'ın, Kırım'ın, Türkistan'ın kaderini paylaşmaya kolayca razı olursanız, Fatsa'da olay yok. Hele hele maksadınız Türkiye'yi, halk cumhuriyeti haline getirmekse, Paris komünü'nü hatırlatan bu "kurtarılmış bölge"ye bakıp da hayallerinizin gerçekleştiği zehabına bile katılabilirsiniz.

Ama Türkiye bir bütündür, parçalanamaz düşüncesine sahipseniz:

“Ben ezelden beridir hür yaşadım, hür yaşarım.

Hangi çılgın bana zincir vuracakmış şaşarım”

Mısraları kalbinizde heyecan dalgaları uyandırıyorsa, Mehmet Akif’in:

“Sen şehit oğlusun, incitme yazıktır atanı,

Verme dünyaları alsan da bu cennet vatanı”

Öğüdüne hala kulak veriyorsanız, Fatsa’da olay vardır...

Bir ilçe düşününüz ki, belediye reisi, “halk komiteleri, devrimci hareketin gereği olarak kuruldu” desin, etrafı “düşmana” (!) karşı barikatlarla çevrilsin, düzeni Mahir Çayan’ların, Deniz Gezmiş’lerin izinden giden DEV-YOL’cular sağlasın!

...Tabii herkes hadiseyi kendi düşünce yapısına göre değerlendiriyor. Bakan, fakat görmeyen, daha doğrusu faşizmden başka tehlike görmeyen bir cins iseniz, tıpkı Ecevit gibi konuşursunuz: “Fatsa’da maksatlı olarak kargaşalık varmış gibi gösterilmeye çalışılıyor.”

Hem Türkiye’de kurtarılmış bölgelerin mevcudiyetinden yakınacaksınız, hem de Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin önderliğinde girişilen hareketi kınayacaksınız...Hükümet taraf tutuyormuş! Ya koskaca ordu, büyük rütbeli komutanları... Onlar da hükümetin oyununa mı geliyor? Fatsa’da olay yok... Sırf Demirel’in “faşizmi yerleştirme planları” tahakkuk etsin diye mi 300 kişi gözaltına alınıyor...

Yoksa Ecevit’e bu sözleri sarf ettiren “komün” müsveddesini, yeniden devletin ele geçirmesi mi?

Bundan 6 ay kadar önce Fatsa’da bir halk şenliği tertiplenmiş, oraya Siyasal Bilgilerden birkaç profesör çağırılmış. Profesörlerden biri çıkmış, demiş ki: “Fatsa’daki gelişmeler karşısında heyecandan gözlerim yaşıyor. 1871’de ilk defa Paris’te işçi iktidara geldi. Bir asır sonra Fatsa’da tarihi bir olaya sahip oluyoruz”...

Fatsa, belki de Sovyetler Birliği’ne yakınlığı dolayısıyla pilot bölge olarak seçilmiş ilçelerden biridir. Sol kesim 1960’ların başından beri, burada yoğun faaliyet göstermiştir. Fatsa, 1971’li takip eden günlerden eylemcilerin önemli bir sığınağı haline gelmiştir. O tarihte terzilik yapan Belediye Başkanı Fikri Sönmez’in dükkânı, Türk Halk Kurtuluş Partisi Cephesi’nin (THKP-C) irtibat merkeziydi. Mahir Çayan, Ertuğrul Kürkçü, Cihan Alptekin ve Ömer Ayna, Deniz Gezmiş ve arkadaşlarının asılmalarını önlemek maksadıyla İngiliz teknisyenlerini kaçırmayı, Fatsa’nın, Yapraklı köyünde planlamışlardı. İngiliz teknisyenler bilahare, Tokat’ın Niksar ilçesinin

Kızıldere köyüne götürülmüş, güvenlik kuvvetlerinin baskını neticesinde, samanlıkta saklanan Ertuğrul Kürkçü haricinde, bütün teröristler ölü olarak ele geçirilmişlerdi. Etraflarının sarıldığını anlayan eylemciler 4 İngiliz'i kurşuna dizmişlerdi. Operasyonda, önemli üyelerini kaybeden THKP-C büyük bir darbe yemişti. Bilahare bu örgütün izinden gittiklerini beyan eden bir çok grup türemiştir. Bunlardan en mühimi DEV-YOL'dur. DEV-YOL Güney Amerika devrim modelini benimsemiştir. İşte Fatsa'ya bu örgüt hakimdir ve Şili'de Allende'nin kurduğu halk komiteleri, devrim komiteleri adı altında Fatsa'da da faaliyet halindedir.

Ecevit'e göre olay yoktur... Fatsa barikatlarla çevrilmiş, halk komiteleri yönetimi ele geçirmiş, Kızıldere failleriyle yakın ilişki içinde bulunan bir belediye reisi, ilçenin tek hakimi gibi davranıyor... Ve Fatsa'da olay yok, sadece "devlet güçleri kargaşalık yaratıyor". Devlet başkaldıranların estirdiği terörü göremezden gelip de, devlet teröründen bahseden çirkin bir zihniyettir bu. Cinayet işlerken, yakalanırim endişesiyle bir yandan da "imdat adam öldürüyorlar" diye bağırarlara has bir siyasi kurnazlıktır bu... Tablo apaçık meydandadır.

Türkiye semalarında orak-çekiçli değil, ayyıldızlı bayrağın dalgalanmasını isteyenler için Fatsa'da olay vardır. Komünistin kızılına değil, bayrağının altına sevdalananlar için Fatsa'da olay vardır. İstiklal Marşı'nı Enternasyonal Marşı'na tercih edenler için, Fatsa'da olay vardır. Ve eğer, milli birlik ve beraberlik şuuru içinde inançla
"Ben ezelden beridir hür yaşadım, hür yaşarım
Hangi çılgın bana zincir vuracakmış şaşarım"
diyebiliyorsanız, Fatsa'da olay vardır. Bu "hayasızca akını" durdurmak için elbette devlet kuvvetleri Fatsa'ya girecektir. Girmiştir de...

Figure 15: Tercüman, July 22nd, 1980, Serial



FATSA'DA “SOL GİTTİ “SAĞ” GELDİ

Bülent ERANDAÇ

4 EYLÜL 1980 – HÜRRİYET

(...) Açıklamalarıyla, yönetimiyle, davranışlarıyla Türkiye'nin gündemine giren ve devletin yaptığı en büyük operasyon ile cezaevine konan Fatsa belediye başkanı Fikri Sönmez ile Ordu'nun yeni yapılmış cezaevinde konuştuk.

Yakalandıktan ve güvenlik kuvvetlerince sorguya çekilmeye başlandıktan sonra kimsenin görmediği, neler yaptığı, nerede olduğu merak edilen Fatsa belediye başkanı Fikri Sönmez, Ordu valisinin emri ile on gün önce Fatsa'daki tutuklandığı binadan Ordu'nun cezaevine getirildi.

Fatsa Belediye Başkanı'na bakanlar kurulu kararı ile Fatsa Kaymakamı mansup belediye başkanı olarak atanırken, Ordu valisi tarafından Fatsa'da devlet kurduğu iddia edilen Fikri Sönmez cezaevindeki görüşme yerine bitkin geldi.

Saçları dağınık, gözleri kanlı, sakalları biraz uzamış ve yorgun idi. Konuşmasına “Ah” diyerek başladı. “İşkence edildi bana, kimseye göstermediler, iki kemiğim halen kırık, beni nasıl tutuklayacaklarını uzun süre bulamadılar. Polisler, Yozgat'tan, İstanbul'dan gelen polisler, beni öldürmek üzere iken namusum üzerine söylüyorum polisler beni öldürmek üzere iken Yozgat Komando Birliği Yüzbaşı Ersin beni kurtardı. Polisleri dağıtarak beni ellerinden aldı. “Bu adam belediye başkanıdır ne yapıyorsunuz ?” dedi. Bu yüzbaşı kurtardıktan sonra bir trafik kazasında ölmüş, çok üzuldüm.” dedi. Bazı iddialarda bulundu. Konuşmasını şöyle sürdürdü:

DEVLETE SAYGILIYIM

“Ben Fatsa'da devlet organlarının yerine geçen bir düzen kurmadım. Barikatları ben kurdurmadım. Bizi ezmeden buraya kimse giremez demedim. Halkın dertlerini dinleyen, sıkıntılarını azaltan, kendi seçtiği belediye başkanına fazla geldi diye suçlanamaz. Gazetelerde hakkımda çıkan benim söylediğim şeyler yalandır. Ben devlete saygılı bir insanım. Devlete saygılıyken, devlet düşmanı dediler. Bu sözler, Fatsa'da karaborsa yapamayanlar, soygun yapamayanlar, kaçakçılık yapamayanların sözüdür. Çok ezildim, yapmadığım şeyler için suçlandım. Ben bir belediye başkanının nasıl başarılı olduğunu gösterdim. İşte bu kıskanıldı.”

OLAYLAR ARTACAK

“Fatsa'da olaylar artacak, durmayacak. Fatsa'da olanlara üzuldüm, böyle olmamalıydı.” diyen Fikri Sönmez, “Çıkınca gene belediye başkanı olacağım. Seçim olsun gireceğim. Beni yine seçecekler” dedikten sonra şunları söyledi:

“Ben Fatsa’da yeni bir şey yapmadım. Cumhuriyet’e saygılıyım, devlet organları çalışıyordu. Barikatlar, dıştan silahlı saldırı olacak denildiği için bazı vatandaşlar tarafından konmuş olabilir. Büyük olmaları baskınlardan korkanların bilmeden yaptıkları bir şey olsa gerek. Amacım demokratik hakların savunulmasıdır. Türk devletinin yıkılmasına karşıyım. Türk devleti ebediyete kadar yaşayacaktır. Halkın sıkıntılarını halletmek için somut çözümler getirdim.”

“Fatsa’da komün düzeni kurduğunuz söyleniyor?” şeklindeki soruya, Sönmez “Hayır. Türk Devletinin düzeni vardır. Sıkıntılar çoktur,, bunları halletmek lazım.” cevabını verdi. “Bu söyledikleriniz daha önceden söylediklerinizle çelişkili olmuyor mu?” şeklindeki soruya, “Ben daha önce söylediğim iddia edilen şeyleri söylemedim. Şimdiki sözlerim benim sözlerimdir.” dedi.

Fikri Sönmez, belediye binası altında bulunan cübbelerin de aleyhinde kullanıldığını belirtti. “Bunlar tiyatro oyunu için hazırlanan dekor kostümleridir. Ben mahkeme kurmadım, neden kurulsun, devletin mahkemeleri vardır. Savcılarımız, hakimlerimiz vardır. Onlar tek yargı kurumu olarak gerekeni yaparlar. Zaten böyle bir şeyi nasıl yaparım? Bunu düşünemem bile.” cevabını verdi.

“Tutuklanmak, cezaevine konmak sizi sarstı mı?” şeklindeki soruya Sönmez, “Sarstı. Ben başkan olarak hizmet yapmak isterdim. Üzüldüm.” dedi.

Sessiz şekilde koğuşuna çekildi.