

T.C.
MARMARA ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER ANABİLİM DALI
İNGİLİZCE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER BİLİM DALI

**THE EMERGENCE OF CYPRUS PROBLEM BETWEEN
1945-1954**

Yüksek Lisans Tezi

BARIŞ GÖRGÜÇ

İstanbul, 2006

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Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Ayşegül SEVER

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Acknowledgements

Within a period of nine years the very nature of the process was particularly difficult for my wife (the then fiancée). Even the time of our marriage was delayed several times just because I haven't finished my thesis. Thus she is the most important person in my life to deserve a whole-hearted "thank you". Behind her, my fellow Muzaffer Şenel, a Ph.D. candidate from Marmara University given the enormous support all the time and showed something more than friendship. My family had of course tried to encourage me at all times of hopelessness. My dear friend and lecturer Prof. Dr. Jouni Suistola from Near East University in Cyprus given his time to read the whole thesis and advised many things to be corrected. Also my friend a Ph.D. candidate from Oulu University in Finland Bora Tolga Oktaş never missed to give support and given his time to read the work. Many thanks to all those people mentioned above from my heart.

Moreover Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ayşegül Sever deserved the most thanks merely because of her really professional way of tutorship and patience.

If this work would be able to fulfil a small gap in the subject area the greatest share is for those people mentioned above. However, naturally all the errors are under my responsibility.

Abstract

This thesis is aimed to fulfil a small gap for the history of the Cyprus Question by concentrating on the very emergence of it as an international issue. Generally almost all the works dedicated to say something about the Cyprus Question are failed to put enough emphasis on the term we focused i.e. 1945-1954. The importance of the period could not adequately understand by the academic and diplomatic circles of Turkey. Surprisingly there were so many fruitful sources in the English language which we widely benefited.

As the succeeding foreign ministers of Turkey Necmettin Sadak from Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP/Republican People's Party) and Fuat Köprülü from Demokrat Parti (DP/Democrat Party) used the identical words about Cyprus as “there is no Cyprus Question for Turkey”. We tried to find out whether they were sincere in their words or had other views about the issue.

An international spectrum was tried to be given by the positions of interested parties on the fate of Cyprus with different reasons. Those were Britain; the USA, Greece and naturally Turkey. The positions of the Turkish and Greek societies on the island, dealt within their mother countries' chapters.

Öz

Bu tez Kıbrıs Sorunu'nun uluslararası bir mesele olarak ortaya çıkışına odaklanarak bu alandaki küçük bir boşluğu doldurmayı amaçlamaktadır. Genelde Kıbrıs Sorunu hakkında bir şeyler söylemeye adanmış eserlerin hemen tümü bizim incelediğimiz 1945–1954 sürecine yeterli ilgiyi göstermemişlerdir. Bu sürecin önemi Türkiye'nin akademik ve diplomatik çevrelerince yeterince anlaşılamamıştır. Şaşırtıcıdır ki İngilizcede bizimde geniş bir şekilde faydalandığımız pek çok yararlı kaynak mevcuttur.

Birbirini takip eden dış işleri bakanları CHP'den Necmettin Sadak ve DP'den Fuat Köprülü Kıbrıs hakkında benzer şeyleri (“Türkiye için Kıbrıs diye bir mesele yoktur”) söylemişlerdir. Biz onların bu sözlerinde samimi mi yoksa konu hakkında başka fikirlere mi sahip olduklarını bulmaya çalıştık.

Kıbrıs'ın kaderi ile farklı nedenlerle ilgili tarafların duruşları verilerek uluslararası bir bakış açısı ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. Bunlar Britanya, ABD, Yunanistan ve doğal olarak Türkiye'dir. Adadaki Türk ve Rum toplumlarının duruşları anavatan kabul ettikleri ülkelerin bölümlerinde incelenmiştir.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM BETWEEN 1945 – 1954

BARIŞ GÖRGÜÇ

Introduction

The primary aim of this study is to illustrate the Turkish governments' reactions and the Turkish public opinion towards the emerging Cyprus issue during the term between 1945-1954. What this work attempts is to discover whether Greece, Britain and the USA in general and Turkey in particular had a profound, long ranged, clear cut foreign policy on the issue of Cyprus and its fate from 1945 to 1954. In an attempt to disclose the emergence of the Cyprus Problem as an international subject and a major foreign policy issue of Turkey since the end of the Second World War, we preferred to concentrate on the matter by giving adequate historical reference initially, and later to tackle the main interested parties namely the USA, UK, Greece and finally Turkey. The main emphasis has been put on the changing - or in fact the emerging – Turkish policy line regarding Cyprus. However due to the nature of the study as an international one the detailed analyses of Greek / Turkish Cypriots and Greeks and their political interactions are given less attention .

We preferred to limit this thesis within the scope of a decade long period, i.e. 1945-1954; in order to have sufficient place to put forward our ideas widely discussed. The years we focused are important for global as well as regional politics. The period starts from the end of W.W.II. which in 1946 was followed by Churchill's "Iron Curtain Speech" declaring the emergence of Cold War. Later the process on the Eastern Mediterranean region led from a European, mainly the British dominated one to a volatile conjuncture to create a power vacuum which later was filled by the USA in terms of the rivalry against the USSR and the Eastern Bloc. Meanwhile the year 1954 meant a turning point because of the rise of the Cyprus Question by the involvement of the United Nations merely because of the Church of Cyprus' and Greece's promptings.

The first chapter will present a brief picture of geographical and historical background of the Cyprus Problem. In the historical part the period after the 1878 Treaty which led Britain to lend the island from the Ottoman Empire, has been stressed. After the eruption of WW.I, the Ottoman Empire and Britain found themselves in the opposing alliances, leading to the British annexation of Cyprus. In the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey renounced all her claims on the island by the articles of 16, 20 and 21.

Ankara also argued that this was not contrary to the Misak-I Milli (National Oath) in which Cyprus had not been mentioned. Meanwhile Britain declared Cyprus as a Crown Colony in 1925. From 1925 to 1960 Cyprus had a governor and was de jure in a status of a British territory.

In the second chapter, British, Greek, and American perspectives are widely discussed.

In the British perspective decolonization, NATO alignment with the Cold War, and the status of Suez Canal were the three main motives for the implementation of a policy on Cyprus. Generally speaking it is important to note that the British Foreign Office, Colonial Office, and the Chief of Staff had always conflicting views about Cyprus. Though the foreign policy makers of Britain were well aware of the decolonization and its future impact on British dominions, they did their best to stop the process or at least to control the fora. They tried to slow down the ENOSIS demands by giving more political rights and liberties. However it did not work. Afterwards, they tried to use the Turkish population on the island as a balancing factor against the Greek demands. On the other hand NATO alliance against the Communist block served pretty well for Britain to prevent the mainland Greeks to mobilize their brethrens on the island demanding a union with Greece. Britain put Turkey to the game, even though she had no counter claims on the issue because of the Lausanne Treaty. Thanks to American sensitivity to the alliance Britain kept the two ethnic mother countries of the island's population under control.

The British stance on Suez was also an important factor for them to stay on Cyprus or to leave Cyprus. Having an authority on the Canal region meant different things for the different ministries. The Foreign Office, for example, argued that having a base at Suez means that there is no need for Cyprus; Colonial Office on the other hand never accepted any kind of argument claiming that any part of a colonial territory would be abandoned, because Britain had other colonial territories; and the Chief of Staff underlined that even if Britain had a base at Suez they needed Cyprus – and the more if they didn't have.

First of all the historical euphoria of Greeks called Enosis (Enosis – the union of the island with Greece - as an idea Enosis grew out of the successful Greek revolution of the 1820s and was firstly applied in Crete) has a very important role in the case of

Cyprus. Greek Cypriots preferred Enosis rather than the creation of an independent state. Greece, for its part, preferred Enosis to be achieved once again and that Cyprus, like a number of other islands, would be united with the Hellenic motherland. The dream of uniting all formerly Greek lands to the motherland spread during the nineteenth century. At first the movement was confined to the small educated segment of society, but as the general population became literate, the Megali Idea (grand idea in Greek), as it was often termed, found ever more adherents. The Enosis movement had some notable success. After World War II a number of islands off the Turkish coast became Greek, namely the Island of Crete which was returned to Greece in the nineteenth century, and the Dodecanese Islands. Cyprus's unification with Greece faced two significant obstacles: the island's proximity to Turkey and distance from Greece, and the presence of a substantial Turkish Cypriot minority¹ who had lived on the island for hundreds of years. Either obstacle by itself could conceivably have been overcome, but together they posed in the end an insurmountable barrier to Enosis.

In addition to the fatigue of Italian war and German invasion during the Second World War Greece had experienced a devastating civil war which caused enormous humanitarian casualties and led the country divided into enemy blocs. As a consequence Greece was starving for international support in both economic and political terms. The two most important supporters were the USA and Britain. At the governmental level Greece did not officially try to inflame the Cyprus problem as an internationalized one, because the Americans and British did not support it. Until 1953 a stable government in Greece was a dream. Between the years of 1948-1952 twelve different cabinets tried to serve. Nevertheless, every Greek politician from communists to nationalists had a demanding position on Cyprus, no matter what the other views were. From 1951 onwards Greek politicians repeatedly demanded Cyprus to be united with Greece, i.e. Enosis. It was quite surprising that meanwhile Turkey refrained herself even from celebrating the 500th anniversary of the Conquest of Istanbul excessively not to harm its relations with Greece. Turkey kept the anniversary even under the ordinary level of annual celebrations. It created dissatisfaction in some nationalist circles. However

¹ Note that Turkish population on the island had never identified itself as minority, because they have settled the island almost four centuries. Although we used the term “minority” in order to sign the Turkish

Greece tried her chance at every opportunity towards the Enosis with no respect to Turkish cautiousness over the mutual friendship. It was obvious that both states perceived their friendship and the role of Cyprus on extremely different terms. In the Greek perception, Turkey, who officially renounced all her claims by the Treaty of Lausanne, was not a party in the matter. This meant that their demands for Enosis had nothing to do with Turkey. They primarily asked Britain to give the island to them in return for military bases both in Greece and Cyprus. At the same time they used Philhellenes and their lobbies to get support from the USA.

Meanwhile, Greek population in Cyprus was targeted with “Enosis and only Enosis” despite the British offered constitutional benefits and civil-political rights. The Orthodox Church supported by the Ottomans during their reign as the national representative, represented by Makarios from 1950 onwards, was the most enthusiastic pro-Enosis institution. The Church was even more active than any Greek politician or their counterparts on the island. AKEL, the successor of the Cypriot Communist Party, ironically followed a pro-Enosis line mostly because it tried to deter the Church from being the most important socio-political institution. Both the Church and AKEL tried their best to convince the mainland politicians and activate Greek people for the unification. They also asked international support at every possible occasion, such as the UN meetings, bilateral or multilateral meetings of Greece, and, even later at Bandung.

Nevertheless, as mentioned before, although those critical years passed by within the terms of political instability and civil war, almost all Greek politicians had similar ideas on Cyprus and Enosis. But because of the above mentioned reasons Greece gave the impression that she had no particular well-formulated Cyprus policy. To a great length the Greek policy was propelled by the Cypriot Church and Makarios.

Within the process the United States had no particular policy on Cyprus. Naturally she examined the question in terms of her global strategies’ and its sub branch Mediterranean policies as a spot to be handled with care. Initially the USA preferred to act according to the first impacts of decolonization and her Wilsonian principles dealing with self-determination. It was understandable for the Americans to support the Greek

people on the island, it is a matter of trying to be loyal to the original text references. The term widely preferred by the Greek and mostly shared by the British and American.

case because of the Greek lobbies and the statistics about the island's demographic structure. In 1947, for example they acknowledged that they were favoring a solution of Cyprus to be a Greek territory. But after British protested that they were talking about a British territory and not about a remote island in the pacific, they lowered their positions, that is, they did not intend to deal with the matter unless they would be forced to do so. Meanwhile AKEL's election victories on the island as a communist party made Americans anxious about their initial support to the Cypriot Greeks with a possible future communist regime. With the Cold War and particularly after the Korean War especially after the news came that thousands of American soldiers were saved by the Turkish Brigade, Turkey gained popularity in America. This gave Turkey the long awaited chance to enter the NATO together with Greece. By this, America started to be more careful on Cyprus which was a very sensitive issue among her three important allies, namely Britain, Greece and Turkey. They refrained from giving support to any of the parties. But they followed a line of appeasement and conciliation. Until 1954 when Greece officially asked the United Nations to start tackling the Cyprus issue, the USA tried to keep the three allies from any kind of conflict which would seriously damage NATO's position in the region against the growing communist threat.

In the last chapter the development of the Turkish position will be discussed.

Until the 1960s, Turkish foreign policy was wholly based on close relations with the West, particularly on the friendship of the United States. Turkey sent troops to Korea and joined NATO (1952) and the Baghdad Pact (1955). This Western-oriented policy derived from fear of the Soviet Union, dependence on U.S. military and economic aid, and Turkey's desire to be accepted as a secular, democratic, Western state. Though because of those threat-alliance requirements Turkey refrained from being passionate or at least outspoken, it is not correct to assume that Turkey was disinterested in Cyprus until Greece raised the question of Enosis. Ankara only wished to avoid drawing attention to the issue and hoped that the British would remain adamant in their determination to stay on the island. Furthermore, Turkey considered the question as a domestic one between the government of the island and its Greek inhabitants. Only when Athens stepped in, by submitting the problem to the United Nations, did Ankara feel obliged to respond. However, claiming that the Turkish government was so indifferent until the pressure from the press and the public opinion forced it to deal with

the matter which directly related with the national security of the country could just be a *prima facie* explanation. Sometimes, governments use the press to tell some foreign policy matters, those of which they can not officially speak about. The silence of the government(s) despite the vocal pursuance of the subject by the press can only be explained by this way. The demonstrations and emotional campaigns of the youth particularly the university students would also be linked with that policy.

It is worth of mentioning that all the serving governments of RPP and DP from 1945 to 1954 didn't have much different Cyprus policy. During one party rule of RPP, Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak and his first multi-party system successor from DP, Fuat Köprülü also said several times that "there is no Cyprus Question". This position had a legal ground that Turkey renounced all her rights over Cyprus and the island did not pose any problem as long as it would stay under Britain, a NATO ally. The only point of concern was the less than two hundred thousand Turks living in Cyprus, and more importantly the strategic importance of the island and historical factors. So long as Cyprus was under British control Turks felt that it constituted security support for them. In Greek hands the opposite would be the case, given long distance separating island from Greece and Communist strength in Cyprus. On historical grounds Turks pointed out that Cyprus has never belonged to Greece whereas it was held by the Ottomans almost for four centuries and then voluntarily turned over to British as a counter service of the protection against Russian attack in 1878. The examples of former Ottoman islands given to or handed by Greece - particularly Crete and the Dodecanese Islands - were warning points for Turkey. They regarded those as dangerous precedents for Cyprus. But it should be recalled that Turkey had no argument against the British sovereignty on Cyprus. Basically there was no problem of Cyprus for Turkey unless the island was given to Greece.

As of the references of the thesis, mainly Turkish and English academic studies are used. Regarding the original sources, American and British published archive documents were also very fruitful. Furthermore, the memoirs of the Turkish, British, and Greek politicians, who were the decision makers during the period of 1945 – 1954, were benefited. Contemporary memoirs of journalists were also valuable. Finally, eleven newspapers (both Turkish and Cypriot) of the period have been used as a resourceful but also as laborious and time-consuming original source.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL POINTS OF IMPORTANCE IN PRE-COLD WAR ERA

Cyprus is an island of 3572 square miles in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is 141 miles in length and its widest point 59 miles breadth. It is an island of mountain The Northern shore faces Turkey, from which at the nearest point it is only 43 miles distant; Syria is 64 miles to the east, while the Greek mainland is 500 miles away.

Cyprus is located between the three old continents and seen as the gate of the Greater Middle East trans-roads. Throughout the history it lies at the heart of the dominance rivalry over Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Therefore many civilizations and empires, kingdoms, and states have lived. The first human settlement was in the Neolithic period, at a date now calculated as well before 6000 BC. The immigration of settlers from Greece, which began in about 1200 BC, led to the Greek kingdoms covering almost the whole of the island and to the dominance of the Greek language. Since then Cyprus has come under the influence or control of the various people that have exercised power in the Eastern Mediterranean – Phoenicians, Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, the Greek Monarchies of Alexander the Great and his successors, the Roman Empire from its successive capitals of Rome and Constantinople, Frank Crusaders, Genoese, Venetians, Turks and more recently, the British.

Cyprus was annexed by the Roman Republic in 58 BC and, along with Cecilia on the coast of Anatolia, was made into a Roman province. One of the most important events in the Roman period was the introduction of the Christianity. The Apostle Paul, accompanied by Barnabas (later St. Barnabas), a native of the Cypriot Jewish Community, preached there in about AD 45 and converted the proconsul, Sergius Paulus. By the time of Constantine I the Great, Christians were numerous in the island and may have constituted a majority.²

² For more information on Cyprus history see; **Alastos**, Doros, *Cyprus in History: A Survey of 5.000 Years*, Zeno Publisher, London, 1976; **Hill, Sir George**, *A History of Cyprus*, Cambridge University Pres, Cambridge, 1972; **Gürel, Şükrü Sina**, *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1870-1960): Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika*, Cilt II, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 1984; **Maier, Franz Georg.**, *Cyprus from the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, translated by Peter George, Elek Books Ltd., London, 1968; **Panteli, Stavros**, *A New History of Cyprus from the Earliest Time to the Present Day*, East-West Publications, London, 1984.

After the division of the Roman Empire (AD 395) Cyprus remained subject to the Eastern, or Byzantine Empire at Constantinople, being part of the Diocese of the Orient governed from Antioch(Antakya). In ecclesiastical matters, however, the Church of Cyprus was autocephalous- i.e., independent of the Patriarchate of Antioch- having been given that the privilege in 488 by the Emperor Zeno. The archbishop received the rights, still valued and practiced, of carrying a scepter instead of a crosier and writing his signature in ink of imperial purple³.

Throughout the Middle Ages, Cyprus enjoyed a reputation in Europe for immense riches where its nobles and merchants (especially Famagusta merchants) were concerned. The kings of Cyprus had kept alive the crusading idea, and the island remained a base for counterattack against Muslims. The vie between Genoa and Venice for control of Cyprus' valuable trade, resulted in Genoa's seizing Famagusta and holding it for almost a hundred years. This led to a rapid decline in the island's prosperity. In 1426 a marauding expedition from Egypt overran the island, which from then on paid tribute to Cairo. The last Lusignan King James II (reigned 1460-73), seized the throne with the help of an Egyptian (Mameluke) force and in 1464 expelled the Genoese from Famagusta. After, his death, the island was seized by the Venetians. It remained a Venetian possession for 82 years until its capture by the Ottomans.

Ottoman Turks started the conquest of Cyprus in 1570 and captured Nicosia; the following year Famagusta fell after a long siege. The Ottoman rule lasted for more than three centuries. The Latin Church was suppressed and the Orthodox hierarchy was restored and with the abolition of feudal tenure the Greek peasantry acquired inalienable and hereditary rights to land. In the 18th century the Orthodox Archbishop was made responsible for tax collection.⁴

As mentioned above, after the conquest the Ottomans abolished feudalism and restored Greek Orthodox Church to its former position.⁵ By abolishing the aristocratic order the Greek Orthodox Church became the central institution in the Greek Cypriot

³ For further information on the intensifying influence of the church see, **Englezakis, Benedict**, *Studies on the History of the Church of Cyprus 4th –20th Centuries*, translated by: Russell Norman, edited by: Ionnou, Silovan and Misael, Varioum Publisher, London, 1995.

⁴ **Gazioğlu, C. Ahmet**, *İngiliz İdaresinde Kıbrıs II, Bugünlere Gelmek Kolay Olmadı 1878-1952*, Cyrep, Lefkoşa, 1994, p. 15.

⁵ **Bölükbaşı, Süha**, *The Superpowers and the Third World Turkish – American Relations and Cyprus*, University Press of America, London, 1988, p. 20.

community. Church was authorized to collect state taxes. On the other hand sultans gave additional privileges to archbishops and strengthened their power. They also ended the Latin persecution of the Greek speaking Christians and encouraged Turkish settlers to go to Cyprus and form a Turkish Cypriot community.⁶ About 20.000 Muslims (including the garrison, nominally 3.666 strong) were settled in the island in the immediate aftermath of the Ottoman conquest. After the year 1571, when the Ottomans conquered the island, they settled and retained there until 1878. There were times when Turkish Muslims outnumbered Greeks: according to prominent historian Drummond, in 1750 even 75% of the total population of 200.000 was Turkish and only 50.000 was Greek.⁷ Kyriakides points out that only one-fourth of the population was Turkish when Ottoman rule ended in 1878.⁸

There were Turkish uprisings in 1764 and 1833; the best known uprising of Muslim and Orthodox was in 1764 when the Ottoman governor was killed in reaction to his decision to double the taxes.⁹ It is interesting to note that although the two communities had lived together in the island for centuries they didn't have a single commercial partnership. But the above mentioned example proved that they would come together in cases of common vital needs of their societies.

The idea of Enosis, (union with Greece) emerged in the 19th century. A key historical event occurred in 1821 when the Ottoman governor of the island ordered the punishment of a number of Orthodox clerics, including the Archbishop of the island. They were hanged on suspicion of interference and sympathy with the rebellion in mainland Greece against the Ottoman rule. They were famous as martyrs in the Enosis struggle that gathered momentum after Ottoman rule was replaced by the colonial rule.¹⁰

The sultanate's various imperial proclamations in the 19th century promising reform had no effect in Cyprus, where local opposition prevented their application. The Greek

⁶ **Kitsikis, Dimitri**, *Yunan Propagandası*, trans. Hakkı Devrim, Kaynak Kitaplar, İstanbul, 1976, p. 19.

⁷ **Öksüzöğlu, Oktay**, *Dünyüyle Bugünüyle Kıbrıs Türkleri*, Hamle Basım Yayın, İstanbul, 2003, pp. 62-64

⁸ **Kyriakides, Stanley**, *Cyprus: Constitutionalism And Crisis Government*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1968, p. 6.

⁹ **Alastos**, pp. 273-274.

¹⁰ **Norton, Augustus Richard**, "The Roots of Conflict in Cyprus", in Kjell Skielsbaek (ed.), *The Cyprus Conflict And The Role Of United Nations*, Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institut NUPI Rapport, Number 122, November 1988.

Cypriots as a precedent for similar action seized upon the cessation of the Ionian Islands in 1864 by Britain in Cyprus¹¹.

The British had been offered Cyprus three times in years 1833, 1841 and 1845¹². On 12 July 1878, Admiral Lord John Hay, the Commander of the British Fleet at the Straits took over the island in the name of British Empire; and Sir Garnet Wolseley started to work as the first British High Commissioner of Cyprus on 22 July 1878¹³. Britain's interest in Cyprus was purely of a strategic nature. Britain, under Premier Disraeli in 1874 was very concerned about Russian imperial expansion in Balkans, as well as the safeguarding of the routes to her empire in Asia. Disraeli was convinced that Cyprus would constitute a critical base for the protection of the route to India. Britain applied pressure to the Ottomans. Unable to deal with internal dissent and external pressure by the big powers the Ottomans concluded the "Cyprus Convention" with Great Britain.

By agreement with the British Government, the island was assigned by the Sultan Abdulhamid II in 1878 to be "occupied and administrated by England". The purpose of this concession was on the other hand to reward the British for their support during the Turco-Russian war of 1877 – 1878 and to enable British imperial power to be available to support the countries of the Near East and above all Ottoman territories also in the future against Russian imperialist aggression. To this end the island was regarded by Disraeli and his colleagues as a convenient Place d'armes¹⁴. After the signing of the Cyprus Convention in 1878, Britain's Ambassador to Istanbul, Henry Layard, warned his Foreign Minister Lord Salisbury for the growing Enosis campaign in both the island and Greece:

"On point of view it would be better to increase the population of the island in favor of Muslims rather than Greeks. In his letter

¹¹ **Crawshaw, Nancy**, *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece*, G. Allen & Unwin, London, 1978, p. 23.

¹² **Kitsikis**,

¹³ **Hill**, p. 295.

¹⁴ **Macmillan Harold**, *Tides of Fortune 1945-1955*, Macmillan, London, 1969, p. 661.

Baring¹⁵ wrote me that the Turks are ready to accept the new administration and to be peaceful subject. However, the Greeks do not have the same ideas for the islands given to Britain. They will do anything appropriate to push forth the Turks from the island. They will try for the union of the island with Greece”¹⁶.

When retaining nominal sovereignty, Ottomans gave Cyprus to Britain as a base to deter further Russian encroachment on the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain wanted to protect British routes to India. When the British took over the island in 1878, “the bi-communal character of the Cyprus society had already been formed and consolidated”.¹⁷ Both communities on the island have still different perceptions about British rule. Greek side considers it as the first step toward union with Greece, while the Turks at first sight regarded the British occupation as provisional and subsequently as a fact that would prevent Greek Enosis ambitions.¹⁸ Remembering that Britain had recently (in 1864) restored the Ionian Islands to Greece, the Greek Cypriots welcomed Britain’s arrival confident that their plea for union with Greece, i.e. Enosis, will be granted.

The Greek patriots were now winning general support both in the island and throughout the Hellenic world, as well as much sympathy outside. They were supported by the Orthodox Church, which controlled a great part of the agricultural and urban land and the sympathy of the people. The Church had long been respected as defenders of Hellenic tradition during the centuries of Ottoman domination. Successive Archbishops of Cyprus had projected the interests of their people, as had leading ecclesiastics in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. In 1882 a legislative council was introduced with six officials and nine Greeks and three Turkish elected members. The Greek members’ constant disruptive demands for Enosis led to an alliance of Turks and officials

¹⁵ Cromer, Evelyn Baring, (1st) Earl of, Viscount Errington of Hexham, Viscount Cromer, Baron Cromer of Cromer, also called (1883-92) Sir Evelyn Baring (b. Feb. 26, 1841, Cromer Hall, Norfolk, England - d. Jan. 29, 1917, London), British administrator

¹⁶ **Kurat, Yuluğ Tekin**, *Henry Layard’ın İstanbul Elçiliği 1878-1880*, AÜDTCF yayınları, Ankara, 1968, pp. 39-40.

¹⁷ **Theophylactou, Demetrios, A.** *Security, identity and nation building: Cyprus and the European Union in comparative perspective*. Avebury/Ashgate, Aldershot, 1995, p. 78.

¹⁸ **Northerdage, F.S.**, *Descent From Power: The British Foreign Policy 1945-1973*, London, 1974, p. 232.

regularly outworking them.¹⁹ Meanwhile, Macmillan argued about the lack of competence for Britain to refrain the Greek majority of the island from Enosis:

The Ottomans had nevertheless kept tolerable order in the island by their own methods of casual administration... The British authorities in the first two generations of their rule had met with little... It is used to say in the early centuries of Ottoman Empire the Turkish governors kept the peace by hanging an Archbishop at suitable intervals. In spite of occasional temptations, recourse to such simple methods was now impracticable²⁰.

With the outbreak of World War I, Britain and the Ottoman Empire found themselves on opposing sides. Seizing upon this opportunity Britain announced unilaterally that it annulled the 1878 Convention and annexed the island in November 1914. The Ottomans did not accept the annexation but were unable to intervene at that time. In 1915 Great Britain offered Cyprus to Greece in the return for entering the war on her side at a moment when the Serbians were in a perilous state. The Greek Government refused the offer. At the end of the war the Cypriots pressed earnestly for their claims to Enosis to be recognized at Versailles and blamed Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos for the coolness of his advocacy. Venizelos was preoccupied with the hope of obtaining Eastern Thrace and Izmir and did not want to compromise his efforts by asking too much. In Northern Epirus the Greek population had equal justifiable claims but these were not pressed, neither was the Dodecanese²¹ freed from

¹⁹ **Baker, Colin**, *Retreat From Empire: Sir Robert Armitage in Africa and Cyprus*, Tauris Academic Studies, New York, 1998, p. 99.

²⁰ **Macmillan**, p. 662.

²¹ Dodecanese, Modern Greek DHODHEKÁNISOS, group of islands in the Aegean Sea, off the southwestern coast of Turkey, and constituting the *nomós* (department) of Dhodhekánisos, Greece. The city of Rhodes is the administrative centre. The name Dodecanese means "12 islands." The term has been applied at various times to groups differently composed and numbering more than 12. The main islands of the Dodecanese group, with their Italian names in parentheses, are: Kárpáthos (Scarpanto), Pátmos (Patmo), Kásos (Caso), Astipálaia (Stampalia), Lipsoí (Lisso), Léros (Lero), Kálimnos (Calino), Nísiros (Nisiro), Tílos (Piscopi), Khálki (Calchi), Sími (Simi), Rhodes (Rodi), and Cos (Coo) and the outlying Kastellórizon (Castelrosso). Their land area is 1,031 square miles (2,670 square km). The islands were a part of the ancient Greek world, and Rhodes and Cos have long histories. In neither the Hellenistic nor the Roman Empire periods did the islands function as a single political or geographic unit. In the Byzantine Empire the theme (province) of the Dodecanese included the Cyclades islands as well. The Dodecanese group came to be fixed at 12 islands during the long Turkish administration of them, which began in the 16th century. The Turks recognized 12 of the islands, "the 12 Sporades," as being entitled to special treatment since they had voluntarily submitted to Turkish rule. But the larger and richer islands of Rhodes and Cos had submitted involuntarily to Turkish rule and were given no special privileges. Turkish rule of the islands lasted until May 1912, when during the Italo-Turkish War Italian forces seized the islands--

the Italian rule.²² Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos stated on the subject on 3 February 1919;

*'You may ask that why we do not put forward a claim for the island of Cyprus. There are certain reasons for that. The most important among is that we believe Britain who had helped us to have the Ionian island, which led the Greek Kingdom to be enlarged significantly on 50 years ago, will be gracious enough to give the island to us[Greece]. Britain has already offered Cyprus to Greece after the war'*²³.

The sovereignty of Cyprus, left by Disraeli - nominally in Turkish hands - at least had formally passed to Britain under article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in July 1923, by which Turkey recognized annexation of Cyprus, proclaimed by the British Government on 5 November 1914. This treaty had not merely been signed by British and Turkish Government. It had also been signed by Greeks; it bore, indeed, the famous and honored name of Venizelos and the Greek Governments made any reservations at the time. Nevertheless, as a result of the Greco-Turkish war of 1920-1922, Greek refugees from Anatolia had fled into Cyprus in such numbers as to destroy the old balance between the populations there were now 400.000 Greeks against some 100.000 Turks. A new situation had thus emerged, in which no diplomacy, however, patient or

except Ikaría (which was occupied by Greek forces in November) and Kastellórizon (which remained Turkish). Secret treaties on the future of the islands, drawn up by the Allies during and after World War I, led to a dispute between Italy and Greece over which nation should have jurisdiction over the islands. In 1919 an agreement was reached whereby Italy would cede the Dodecanese to Greece with the exception of Rhodes, which was to have broad local autonomy. Subsequent Italian Governments, however, unilaterally denounced the accord with Greece and refused to carry it out, and Italy used a special article in the Treaty of Sevres (1920), whereby Turkey had ceded to Italy all rights and titles to the Dodecanese and Kastellórizon, to enforce its claim on the Dodecanese. Italian sovereignty over the islands was confirmed by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Italian rule over the Dodecanese was firm and efficient but never popular. Italian became the official language, and in 1925 the Dodecanesians were obliged to take Italian citizenship. As a result, considerable migration from the islands to the United States occurred. After World War II the islands temporarily came under British occupation, with Greek participation. The conference of foreign ministers in Paris agreed in 1946 that the islands should pass to Greece; they were formally ceded in 1947.

²² **Clogg, Richard**, *Modern Yunanistan Tarihi, [A Concise History of Greece]*, Translated by Dilek Şendil, İletişim yayınları, İstanbul, 1997, p. 42.

²³ **Kitsikis**, p. 21.

imaginative, seemed able to reconcile the conflicting claims.²⁴ At that time, Turkish population in the island was 51 339 according to the 1921 census.²⁵

Treaty of Lausanne was signed on 24 July 1923 after the Turkish War of Independence. Besides other matters the future status of Cyprus has also been decided. With the Treaty Turkey accepted the annexation of the island by Britain. In the Treaty of Lausanne there are three particular articles dealing with the status of Cyprus, namely 16, 20, and 21:

- “Article 16: Turkey hereby renounces all rights and titles what so ever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and islands other than those fore which her sovereignty is recognized by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned

The provisions of the present Article do not prejudice any special arrangements arising from neighbourly relations which have been or may be concluded between Turkey and any limitrophe countries.

- Article 20: Turkey hereby recognizes annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on 5 November 1914.
- Article 21: Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on 5 November 1914 will accrue British nationality subject to the conditions laid down in local law and will there upon loose their Turkish nationality. They will however have the right to opt for Turkish nationality within two years from the coming into force for the present Treaty, provided that they leave Cyprus within twelve months after having so opted Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the coming into force of the present Treaty who, at that date, have acquired or are in process of acquiring British nationality in consequence of a request made in accordance with the local law, will also thereupon lose their Turkish nationality.

²⁴ Macmillan, loc.cit.

It is understood that the Government of Cyprus will be entitled to refuse British nationality to inhabitants of the island who, being Turkish nationals, had formerly acquired another nationality without the consent of the Turkish Government.²⁶”

By the Treaty of Lausanne, signed after Turkish procrastination helped by French and Italian intrigue, Turkey renounced all claims on Cyprus. The future of Cyprus far from being left in the air by Article 16 of the Lausanne Treaty as Greek propagandist sometimes suggest, was irrevocably settled under that Article – settled by the parties concerned, Great Britain and Turkey.²⁷ And by Article 21 of that Treaty, the Turks in Cyprus were given two years within which to decide whether they wished to conform to the new status of Cyprus.²⁸ Those who wished to remain Turkish citizens would have to leave the island. Therefore, Turkish Cypriots who opted to remain had no rights to claim more than the protection of their minority rights when the future destiny of the island was being argued over.²⁹ At the time that Great Britain acquired controlled over Cyprus, an agreement was reached that Turkish speakers on the island who so wished could immigrate to Turkey. It is worth of noting that although some did – Ottoman officials who lost power and authority in Cyprus - the overwhelming majority remained on the island. However this does not mean that the number of the immigrants was deniable with respect to the deterioration of the demographic balance.

The Cyprus conflict has also greatly contributed to the bitterness of discussions on the treatment of Greek minorities in Greece. The further developments in the relationship between the two communities will determine the fate of those historic ethnic communities –Greek or Turkish - which the two world wars left, isolated among majorities in other nations.³⁰ This found itself with the particular example of Western Thrace case at Lausanne. Turkey’s position on this matter evaluated as another reverse

²⁵ See the Appendix I: Table of the population.

²⁶ For the full text of the Treaty of Lausanne see the official internet site of Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs <http://www.mfa.gov.tr>.

²⁷ **Seligman, Adrian**, *The Turkish People of Cyprus*, Turkish Press Attache’s Office, London, 1956, p. 53.

²⁸ **Mackenzie, Compton**, *Greece in My Life*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1960, p. 132.

²⁹ *ibid.*

³⁰ **Vali, Ferenc A.**, *The Bridge Across Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey*, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971, p. 224.

for Turkey at Lausanne was the Greek refusal on strategic grounds to allow a plebiscite to be held in Western Thrace, where the population was 80 per cent Turkish”. But Turkey accepted this too. And for a good reason, she realized that Greece might one-day make a similar demand for a plebiscite in Cyprus. And since Cyprus would always be of even greater strategic importance to Turkey than Western Thrace was to Greece, she wished to be sure that, if ever Britain left the island, Turkish claims to it on strategic grounds alone would, by precedent, override any possible Greek claims³¹.

The Greek Leader, Venizelos explained views on the right of self-determination that ‘the determination of the fate of countries in dispute’ and added;

*“is not a matter of majorities and minorities, but a question settled by treaties; nevertheless one must admit that my democratic principles incline me to accept the recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination; nevertheless one must admit that this right does not constitute the only factor which affects the solution of a question concerning the attribution of territories inhabited by mixed populations”*³².

The Turks noted these pronouncements but did not question them. Seligman pictured the situation like “what was sauce for the Turkish goose at Lausanne would make a fine hot soup for the Greek gander if there were ever any future demands for self-determination in Cyprus.”³³ The only party who could be validly concerned was Turkey herself, to whom the island was demonstrably of the utmost strategic importance and to whom it had formerly belonged.³⁴ As an example of misjudgement of the population change after the Lausanne Turkish government led the high school graduates of Turkish Cypriots to pursue their education at the mainland. Thus, ninety percent of the Turkish Cypriot students after their secondary education have been coming to Turkey for university education. However, they should get the Turkish citizenship according to Lausanne. Besides the students many Turkish Cypriots immigrated to

³¹ Seligman, p. 51.

³² Ibid., p. 52.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., 53.

Turkey so that there were even groups of a whole village. Almost 300,000 Turkish Cypriots living in Turkey was the result of that Treaty.³⁵

In 10 March 1925 Cyprus became a Crown Colony and at last an effort was made by the Colonial Office to shoulder its responsibilities.³⁶ And the High Commissioner, Sir Malcolm Stevenson (1918-1925) became the Governor, and he served twenty month as the Governor of Cyprus. He was assisted by a nominated executive council and a legislature comprised of the governor's nine officials and fifteen elected members, three chosen by Muslim community and twelve by the non-Muslim community.

After Lausanne, the pro-Enosis campaign of the Greek Cypriots gradually accelerated. The British did not want to come across the "pro-Enosis" Greek population with no Turkish community to oppose it.³⁷ In those years it had never been thought that one day this Turkish community would fight for the island's destiny.³⁸ According to imperial perspectives of the British, there were two possible ways of meeting this rising challenge of Enosis. One of which was what Ronald Storrs the second Governor of Cyprus, (1926-1932), called 'an oriental method of administrative tactics'. This was a kind of English imperialism in the East, involving the abolition of the Tribute in 1928, making the most of new imperial legislation for Welfare and Development, and most importantly recognizing fully the Greek ness of the Greeks. The second method of resolving the apprehensions of British supremacy was much simpler: Coercion.³⁹ The temptation to fall back on the use of force, or what one contemporary analysts of the British Empire referred to as 'the medicine of the body politick',⁴⁰ was particularly felt in the British Mediterranean between the two world wars.

In 1929 A Greek Cypriot delegation asked Britain to cede Cyprus to Greece and was met with a sharp refusal: the matter was not to be discussed. It returned dissatisfied

³⁵ **Alasya, Halil Fikret;** *İngilizler İdaresinde Kıbrıs'ta Tatbik Edilen Politika, Kıbrıs ve Türkler*, Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, Seri III, Sayı B2, Ankara, 1964, p.78

³⁶ **Mackenzie**, p. 133.

³⁷ **Georghallides, George S.,** *Cyprus and the governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The causes of the 1931 crisis*, Cyprus Research Centre, Nicosia, 1985, p. 44.

³⁸ **Kitsikis**, pp. 20-21.

³⁹ **Holland, Robert,** *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959*, Oxford University Pres, New York, 1998, p. 9.

⁴⁰ **Hancock, W.K.,** *The Medicine of The Body Politick*, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Vol. I, Problems of Nationality 1918-1936, Oxford, 1936, pp. 393-485 quoted in **Holland**, Ibid.

to the island. In October 1931 pro-Enosis disturbances followed tight measures to secure a balanced budget, imposed over the heads of legislature, and attempts to curb the use of schools for nationalist propaganda by transferring control of school teachers from Greeks and Turks to British officials. There were wide spread riots by Greek Cypriots, refusal to pay taxes, boycott of British goods, burning a police car, and the Governor's residence,⁴¹ killing six civilians, wounding thirty civilians and thirty-eight policemen, and 400 arrests. Governor Storrs reacted severely and called in the army and navy from Egypt.⁴² After the riot, the Greek members of the legislature resigned and subsequently the constitution was revoked and direct powers of legislation were given to governor. The elected municipal councils were abolished meetings of more than five people require official permission. The flying of Greek flags and the ringing of Church bells other than for religious services were banned and press censorship was imposed. All the bishops, save one, and the Archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Church, who had led the demonstrations, were exiled. The governor ruled, advised by an executive council of four officials, one Greek and one Turkish non-official. The White Paper on the disturbances recorded prophetically: "until the shadow of the union with Greece is finally removed from the political horizon the leading inhabitants of Cyprus are not likely to come forward in large numbers to support the government, to co-operate openly in the progress of their country under British rule".⁴³

During the Second World War, 30.000 Cypriots joined the British army, being assured that they were fighting "for Greece and for freedom". Many thought this included the freedom for Cyprus to join Greece, although the colonial secretary in Cyprus said 'we hope to keep it that way'. The Governor added that "The Colonial office has many more important things to think about than a remote island half the size of Wales".⁴⁴ With Greece as an ally of Britain, there was a spontaneous outbreak of nationalism on the island, which it was not in Britain's interest to restrain.

⁴¹ "On 21st October 1931, when rioting Greeks burned down the inflammable mid-Victorian military wooden bungalow diverted from Ceylon to Cyprus by Sir Garnet Wolseley in 1878 for use as Government House". For further information about the riot and its implications see, **Luke, Harry Sir**, *Cyprus: A Portrait and an Appreciation*, George G. Harrap, London, 1973.

⁴² **Baker**, p. 99.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 100

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

The laws were relaxed and displays of Greek nationalism became a normal political manifestation of life. This led to some complacency on the part of the government. Municipal elections were restored in 1943, in accordance with the British policy that successful experience in local government should precede constitutional advance at the centre to those returning after the war, Cyprus was still a quite little island, one might say a sleepy island, but this was on the surface. There were strong undercurrents of dissatisfaction with the continuation of the British administration. Further fomenting ethnic tensions was the classic British policy of recruiting different groups for different functions in the colonial administration; in Cyprus the police for the Turks, the bureaucracy for the Greeks.⁴⁵

Anthony Eden, the then British Foreign Minister, told after his secret meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Kukri Saraçoğlu in Cyprus in 1941 that:

*When I told Mr. Churchill of my experience, he gave the story of his first visit to Cyprus. This was in the early years of the century, When Mr. Churchill was a young Minister at the Colonial Office. As he approached the island in a destroyer, he was impressed to see a large crowd assembled on the shore to greet him with flags and banners. He thought this splendid, for he had not dared to hope that his renown has spread so fast and so far. He commented upon this to the captain. "Wait till you get nearer" was the reply. This was Mr. Churchill's first experience of an Enosis demonstration.*⁴⁶

There were many other examples of misunderstandings that the British saw the Enosis demands deniable. Due to this British had no chance to satisfy Greek Cypriots with some more political rights. With a proportion of almost 80% of the population the Greek Cypriots were overwhelmingly pro-Enosis. Though it might be apprehensible within a highly volatile World politics it should be argued that the lack of a concrete policy on Cyprus the British also failed to have a pro-active role in Cyprus despite some unlink able terms. Even the idea that the "British Empire is not for sale" questioned many times on different circles of the serving governments and parliaments.

⁴⁵ Pollis, Adamantia, "The Role of Foreign Powers in the Structuring of Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus", in Vangelis Calotychos (ed.), *Cyprus and Its People: Nation, Identity and Experience in an Unimaginable Community (1955-1997)*. Westview Press, Boulder, May, p. 94.

⁴⁶ Eden, Anthony, *Full Circle*, Cassell, London, 1960, p. 395.

CHAPTER II

PERSPECTIVES OF INTERESTED PARTIES: BRITISH, GREEK AND U.S. PERSPECTIVES

To understand the Cyprus problem we should look at the historical roots of the problem and the policies of the related parties during the emergence of the problem. How did they behave? What circumstances did affect the policies? What are the main arguments of related parties? Therefore, Chapter II of this study comprises the perspectives of the related parties on the Cyprus Problem. We try to explain the views and policies of the interested parties in a chronological order. British, Greek and US perspectives are scrutinised in a detailed form.

2.1. British Perspective

*Britain was the state that put Turkey into the game.*⁴⁷

Politically, Cyprus may have passed in 1878 from Turkey to England. But Cypriot society began to pass from its Ottoman to its English period only in the second decade of 20th century.⁴⁸ It was pointed out while from the point of view of the anonymous, deep and silent history of their mental outlook it is questionable whether the Cypriots have even [now] been delivered from the Ottoman rule.⁴⁹ Britain in order to maintain her position, had to rely more and more on the Turkish minority and encouraged the same minority to oppose the claim of the Greek majority to national self-determination. The British sought to counter the Greek hopes by bringing Turkey in to the picture and giving the Republic of Turkey rights in Cyprus, which they had signed away at Lausanne⁵⁰. In the Article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in 24 July 1923, by which Turkey recognized the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British government on 5 November 1914. Not only had the British and Turkish

⁴⁷ **Papandreou, G. Andreas**, *Namlunun Ucundaki Demokrasi*, Translated by: Semih Koray and Mehmet Emin Yıldırım, Bilgi Yayinevi, 2nd ed., Istanbul, 1988, p. 163,

⁴⁸ For further readings for the British perspectives on Cyprus during interbellic years and till the foundation of the Cyprus Republic, see, **Eden**, op.cit.; **Macmillan**, op.cit.; **Louis, WM. Roger**, *The British Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951 Arab Nationalism, the United States and Post-War Imperialism*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984; **Kelling, George Horton**, *Countdown to Rebellion: British Policy in Cyprus, 1939-1955*, New York, 1990.

⁴⁹ **Englezakis**, p. 422.

⁵⁰ **Vanezis P. N.**, *Cyprus The Unfinished Agony*, Abelard-Schuman, London, 1977, pp. 7-8.

governments signed this Treaty; the Greeks had also signed it.⁵¹ The 'letters patent' approved by British King George V turned Cyprus a Crown Colony on 10 March 1925⁵². The British Government, as the sovereign power, was the party to introduce Turkey into Cyprus. Britain's aim was to benefit from Turkey's close and growing relationship with Turkish Cypriots in the future.⁵³ The Turkish opposition to the Greek Cypriots inspired by Britain, resulted in a virtual civil war in Cyprus, and outside Cyprus, in a confrontation between Greece and Turkey. In the end, the British policy succeeded in blocking the union of the island with Greece, but made the continuation of British rule impossible.⁵⁴ As mentioned above both communities on the island has different perceptions about British rule. Greek side considered it the first step toward union with Greece, while Turkish Cypriots at first sight regarded British occupation as provisional and subsequently as a fact that would prevent Greek unification.⁵⁵

In late 1940, when Britain and the Greece were the only two countries in Europe still resisting fascism with arms, while the Greek army was still repulsing Mussolini's invasion, there was a renewed enthusiasm among Cypriots for the Hellenic cause. Sir Michael Palaiet, the British Ambassador in Athens, recommended that the island be ceded to Greece on simple grounds of cementing Anglo-Greek solidarity. Edward Warner and Pierson Dixon of the Middle East Department of the Foreign Office seconded him in this. These men proposed that Cyprus be swapped for permanent naval facilities at Suda Bay in Crete. Some officials in the Foreign Office overruled this idea. They did so in the vain hope that a postponement of Greek claims in Cyprus and the Dodecanese Islands would help bring about a pro-British policy in Turkey. Turkey got its way here, as it had the Hatay Question with the French in Syria before the war and for the same reasons.⁵⁶ But it remained, until February 1945, obstinately neutral and often neutral with a pro-Axis inclination.

The French from the commencement of the war were anxious to use Cyprus as an advance base for aircraft on seaward patrols, especially towards the Italian

⁵¹ Macmillan, p. 661

⁵² Çay, Abdülhaluk, *Kıbrıs'ta Kanlı Noel-1963*, Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, Ankara, 1989, p. 23

⁵³ Dikerdem, Mahmut, *Ortadoğu'da Devrim Yılları*, Cem Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1990, p. 124

⁵⁴ Vanezis, pp. 7-8

⁵⁵ Northerdge, p. 232

⁵⁶ Hitchens, Christopher, *Cyprus*, Quertet Books, London, 1984, pp. 153-154

Dodecanese Islands, and for giving depth to the air defences of Beirut. The British on the other hand did not wish Cyprus to grow into a defensive commitment involving forces that could ill be spared. For attacking the Dodecanese Islands sites at the South-western Anatolia could be much more suitable if Turkey would consent to their use.⁵⁷ British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, for example, hinted that the Cyprus problem would be resolved when the war had been won. Churchill, the then Prime Minister, also made some vague allusions to the post-war settlement of the problem. The wartime governor of the island, Charles Campbell Wooley, stated without equivocation that Enosis was not being considered, but it is probable that the Greek Cypriots heard only the voices that they wanted to hear.⁵⁸

All British governments have been equally determined to retain British sovereignty over Cyprus. Therefore, as a prominent Turkish professor of International Law Sevin Toluner states, British were against the claim of self-determination in respect that this has an irredentist aim rather than the well-known concept of self-determination.⁵⁹ Since the World War II the Labour Party and the Conservatives have tried to satisfy the Cypriot with economic reforms and measures of self-government. It was against a background of rising Communist influence that on 23 October 1946 Clement Attlee's Labour Government sought to establish a more liberal regime.⁶⁰

Ernest Bevin,⁶¹ who succeeded Eden (Labour took over on 26 July 1945), received similar request. A telegram from the Leontios Leontos of Paphos 'Topoteretes' who was the locum tenens⁶² on 7 September, on the occasion of the meeting of Allied Foreign Ministers asked that Cyprus might be ceded to Greece on condition that the Greek Government granted Britain military rights and bases in Cyprus and also a base

⁵⁷ Panteli, p. 173.

⁵⁸ Solsten, Eric; (ed.), *Cyprus: A Country Study*, 4th ed., Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1993, p.24

⁵⁹ Toluner, Sevin; *Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı ve Milletler Hukuku*, İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 1977, p. 20

⁶⁰ Bullard Reader Sir (ed.), *The Middle East A Political and Economic Survey*, Third Edition, Oxford University Press, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1958, p. 151

⁶¹ Bevin Ernest b. March 9, 1881, Winsford, Somerset, Eng.--d. April 14, 1951, London), British trade unionist and statesman, one of the most powerful British union leaders in the first half of the 20th century. He also proved to be a forceful minister of labour and national service during World War II and foreign secretary in the immediate post-war period.

⁶² Locum Tenens: The bishop who temporarily runs the Church until a new Archbishop elected. Between the years 1933-1947, Archbishop could not be elected. Therefore Leontios Leontion of Paphos 'Topoteretes' chaired the Orthodox Church as the "Locum Tenens".

and other rights on the mainland or in the islands.⁶³ The growing demands of the Greeks for the Enosis compelled the British Government to define the British stance on the Cyprus problem. It took Bevin and his advisers more than a year to adopt a definite position against the cession of Cyprus. By late September 1946, he was persuaded to sanction the formula that no change in the status of the island is contemplated.⁶⁴ Bullock in his book on Ernest Bevin's life pointed out the views of Bevin on the problem: "Bevin in 1946 was considering that, Cyprus would encourage the Russians to ask for a base in the Aegean and he thought the island should be demilitarised."⁶⁵

It is also important to note the differences between the British Foreign Office and the Colonial Office. The officials of both offices had different views on the topic: The Foreign Office was willing to reconsider its position over Cyprus, but from the point of view of the Colonial Office bureaucracy the cession of a Crown Colony, apparently on grounds of national self-determination, would set a dangerous precedent affecting British possessions elsewhere. Therefore the Colonial Office officials were adamant that such a move should not materialize.⁶⁶

A delegation to London and to the conference of the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the Allies at Paris in 1946, led by the acting Archbishop of Cyprus, asked for Enosis. Delegation hoped that the Labour Government would give independence in accordance with Indian case. It was rebuffed. The new Labour government in Britain repeated the time-worn formula that no change in the status of the island was contemplated; but it allowed the former exiled Cypriot leaders to return, and offered a new constitution.⁶⁷ According to Mackenzie, British stance and the reason of refusal is so simple that: "...the reason given was that Cyprus was necessary to Britain because she had a base at Suez."⁶⁸ In 1954, another delegation came to London to ask for independence, and again refused by the British. The reason of refusal as British has been holding on the

⁶³ Panteli, p. 202.

⁶⁴ Louis, pp. 215-216.

⁶⁵ Bullock, Allan, *The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin*, Vol.3, Foreign Secretary, London, 1983, p.243.

⁶⁶ Louis, pp. 204-207.

⁶⁷ Stephens, Robert, *Cyprus: A Place of Arms*, Pall Mall, London, 1966, p.123

⁶⁸ Mackenzie, op.cit., p. 136

island was that Cyprus was necessary to Britain because she did not have a base at Suez.”⁶⁹

In the Italian Peace Treaty signed in Paris on 15 February 1947 Italy ceded the Dodecanese Islands to Greece. Turkey, from whose coast most of the islands are only a few miles distant, raised no objections, for her wartime record, compared with that of Greece, left her in a weak position to protest. Despite this, Britain showed no signs of willingness to hand Cyprus over to Greece.⁷⁰ A timely cession, it was reasoned, could bolster the popularity as well as the pro-British orientation of the post-war Greek regime, which faced formidable challenges from both the extreme Right and the Communist Left. The powerful British Ambassador in Athens, Reginald Leeper shared this assessment, and for some time, Foreign Secretary Bevin seemed attracted to it too.⁷¹

The Labour Party in the UK wanted to move away from direct rule in order to introduce a more progressive regime. The Greek Cypriot once again regarded this as not far reaching enough and the slogan ‘Enosis and only Enosis’ was formulated, becoming a popular Greek Cypriot response.⁷² To this had to be added the uncertainty about Egypt and the continued use of the Suez base which increased the importance of Palestine as the one territory (apart from Cyprus) directly under British rule and the one of the alternative to Egypt acceptable to the Chief of Staff as the main base for British forces in the Middle East.⁷³ The then Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin thought that Palestine, with its uncertain political future, was too great a risk to send millions on developing a major base and headquarters there. Cyprus would encourage the Russians to ask for a base in the Aegean and he thought the island should be demilitarized. His preference was for Kenya, making use of Mombassa as a port, and at the same time providing an alternative for the defence of the Indian Ocean, once facilities in India were withdrawn.⁷⁴ It is important to note Woodhouse’ statement on why Britain needs Cyprus. He pointed out that the British hardly ever used it [Cyprus] for the ostensible

⁶⁹ Further information on British stance in the Middle East within that period, see, **Sever, Ayşegül**, *Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye, Batı ve Orta Doğu 1945-1958*, Boyut Matbaacılık A.Ş., İstanbul, Ekim 1997

⁷⁰ **Stephens**, p.123.

⁷¹ **Kelling**; op.cit. pp. 68-69, 72

⁷² **Richmond, P. Oliver**, *Mediating in Cyprus the Cypriot Communities and the UN*, Frank Cass Publisher, London, 1999, p. 73.

⁷³ **Bullock**, p. 171

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

purpose of establishing a place d'armes.⁷⁵ Under Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Office was well disposed towards the option Enosis; however, imperialist sentiment in Britain prevented this as well as the offer of a constitution in 1947. In considering British reactions towards Archbishop Makarios⁷⁶ mobilization of Greek and international public opinion on behalf of Cyprus' self-determination in 1950-1955, this objective acquired primacy in British policy with Eden at the Foreign Office. The colonial regime had never understood, let alone sympathized, with the political aspirations of the Greek Cypriots.⁷⁷

On May 7 of 1948 the British government put forward its own proposals for a constitution. It offered an important step forward. For the first time, the Greek elected members of the legislature would be able to form an effective majority which could no longer be blocked by the traditional combination of British officials and Turkish-elected members. The legislature was to consist of 22 elected members, 18 elected on the general electoral roll and 4 from the Turkish communal roll and only 4 officials. Moreover, the casting vote would no longer belong to the governor but to an independent chairman chosen by him. If we remember the old system put forward the idea to balance the Greek Cypriots by not giving the chance to have the majority of the votes except in cases which they would be supported by either the Turks or the British officials; i.e., the British tended to control the Greek Cypriots by the compounding votes of the Turks plus the colonial officials. At the same time, though an important step forwards the Winster Constitution barred any discussion of the status of Cyprus nor did it provide for full self-government. The British governor was to have reserved powers

⁷⁵ **Woodhouse C.M.** see Introduction part of Panteli.

⁷⁶ Makarios III, original name MIKHAIL KHRISTODOLOU MOUSKOS (b. Aug. 13, 1913, Pano Panayia, Paphos, Cyprus--d. Aug. 3, 1977, Nicosia), archbishop and primate of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus. He was a leader in the struggle for Enosis (union) with Greece during the post-war British occupation, and, from 1959 until his death in 1977, he was the president of independent Cyprus. The son of a poor shepherd, Mouskos studied in Cyprus and at the University of Athens and later at the School of Theology of Boston University. He was ordained in 1946, became bishop of Kition (Larnaca) in 1948, and on Oct. 18, 1950, was made archbishop. During that time Makarios became identified with the movement for Enosis, the archbishop of Cyprus having traditionally played an important political role during the Turkish period as ethnarch, or head of the Greek Christian community. Opposing the British government's proposals for independence or Commonwealth status, as well as Turkish pressures for partition in order to safeguard the island's sizable Turkish population, Makarios met with the Greek prime minister, Alexandros Papagos, in February 1954 and gained Greek support for Enosis. He was soon suspected by the British of being a leading figure in Colonel Georgios Grivas' terrorist organization. Makarios, however, preferred political bargaining to force, negotiating with the British governor in 1955-56.

over defence, external affairs and finance as well as over laws affecting minorities and constitution itself.⁷⁸

The British administration tended to be criticised at local and international level for its 'toleration' and even 'encouragement' of the Cypriot Communists. The influential editor Cyrus Sulzberger for instance, argued in the New York Times 17 May 1949: "It is understood the Colonial Office has feared that the encouraging of the conservative parties among the Island's predominantly Greek population would serve only to build up the idea of Enosis... As a result communism has been permitted to spread while Greek nationalism has been held in check."⁷⁹

After the World War II, the significance of Cyprus in the eyes of British strategists and political leaders underwent a change. Their withdrawals from India was followed by the withdrawal from Palestine, and by the early 1950's envisaged even the abandonment of Egypt and the Suez Canal. Cyprus remained the only British-held territory in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, as the demand for Enosis was being pressed more strongly than ever before, the British hold on Cyprus became less negotiable. But Cyprus had obtained a determined and shrewd leader in the person of Makarios III, Archbishop and the Ethnarch of the island.

British diplomacy used both the strategic importance of Cyprus and Turkish reactions in an effort to induce the Americans to openly support it on Cyprus. On the eve of the 1951 Ethnarchy plebiscite, Lord Jellicoe, Second Secretary of the Embassy in the Washington, proposed to the State Department a statement discouraging Enosis. The Americans had no intention of issuing such a statement that would be reflecting Greek Cypriot opinion. Instead, Leonard Cromie, the Desk Officer for Greece, made Jellicoe regret his attempt to use the Turkish card: United States diplomats at that point disapproved the expressions of Turkish interest in Cyprus.⁸⁰ According to Stefanidis Jellicoe was told that the British had better 'allay popular suspicions that they were encouraging the ilhak (annexation) agitation as a counterweight to Enosis and pursuant

⁷⁷ Kelling, p. 182

⁷⁸ Stephens, pp. 127-128

⁷⁹ Sulzberger, L. Cyrus; *A Long Row of Candles: Memories and Diaries, 1934-1954*, NYT Publications, London, 1969, p.305 see also Sulzberger's article from New York Times, 17 May 1949,

⁸⁰ Jellicoe's letter to Attlee 23.2.1949. FRUS 1949, VI, p. 171

to the age-old policy of 'divide-and-rule'.⁸¹ In this respect, moreover, an interesting reminder was put forward in the House of Commons by Clement Attlee who said that, when he had been Prime Minister, "the military" never thought Cyprus satisfactory as a base.⁸² The British also tried to get benefit from the entry of Greece and Turkey into NATO in order to extract an undertaking from both countries to respect British sovereignty over Cyprus. But the American government, seeking the extension of NATO in earnest, was firmly against this kind of manoeuvres of Britain.⁸³ However British did not give up trying their chance even after both Greece and Turkey were formally approved by the North Atlantic Council on 20 September. And they proposed the expressed exclusion of Cyprus from the operational responsibility of the Council. However the Americans resisted this as an unnecessary provocation.⁸⁴ The North Atlantic Council eventually agreed that Cyprus would lay aside the NATO area, but this was not communicated to either Greece or Turkey.

On 2 May 1951, Bevin's successor in the Foreign Office, Herbert Morrison, made it clear to Ambassador Melas of Greece in London that the British government had no intention of discussing the Greek proposals and ruled out any change of the status of Cyprus for the foreseeable future. In the mean time, the clamour of Cyprus provoked a Turkish reaction, which the Greek Prime Minister Sophokles Venizelos had wished to avoid.⁸⁵ In between these two public interventions there was a hitherto unrecorded private encounter during a NATO meeting in Rome in November 1951, between Eden, then British Foreign Secretary, and Averoff, later to be Greek Foreign Minister but at that time an under-secretary in the Foreign Ministry. The meeting on 26 November 1951 was arranged by the British Ambassador in Athens, Sir Charles Peake, who had been disturbed by the effect on Greek opinion of the Cyprus plebiscite in the previous year and the subsequent vote in favour of Enosis in the Chamber of Deputies. Averoff proposed Eden that in return for the union of Cyprus with Greece British should keep what bases she needed in the island. In addition, she should be granted

⁸¹ **Stefanidis, D. Ioannis**, *Isle of Discord, Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem*, Hurst Company, London, 1999, p.10.

⁸² **Woodhouse, C.M.**; *British Foreign Policy Since the Second World War*, Hutchinson, London, 1961, p. 209.

⁸³ FRUS, 1951, V, p. 537.

⁸⁴ FRUS 1951, III, pp. 586-601.

bases on a ninety-nine years' lease in four places in Greece including Cephalonia in the Ionian Island and Suda Bay in Crete. According to Averoff, Eden's reaction was rough and angry.⁸⁶ The British Foreign Minister replied the Greek Foreign Ministry's under-secretary by saying:

*"The British Empire is not for sale. ... In every country the government has to be able to stand up to the pressures exerted on it... We have sent one of our best Ambassadors to help you... The matter is closed it is non-existing... If I had known we were to discuss an issue that does not exist, I would not have agreed to this meeting... I can not take up a question that does not exist: Get that into your head!"*⁸⁷

It was quite clear that the meeting had been set up to provide the British with an opportunity to deliver a top level warning in the strongest possible terms. Naturally enough, the outcome of Averoff's meeting with Eden which resulted with a fiasco on Greek perceptions was communicated not only to the Greek government but also to Makarios. In December 1951, British Government decided in principal to transfer the joint headquarters in the Middle East to Cyprus. They authorized the expenditure of up to half a million pounds on preparatory work. According to Eden, Turkey welcomed this predictive decision.⁸⁸ Cyprus as an air base was within range of the Persian Gulf, but the island unfortunately had no natural harbour. The cost of building one would have been very high. Britain did not do so and was to pay dearly for that omission.⁸⁹ Although the growing size of battleships, cruisers and their accompanying flotillas had made the harbours no longer suitable for modern navies, by a strange turn of events the island had now once more become essential to enable to both defend the colonial power Britain's vital communications and to carry out their obligations to NATO and similar leagues. The abandonment of Egypt caused British military authorities to choose Cyprus as the alternative base, and the British foreign perspective was busily occupied in organising- perhaps on too ambitious a scale- a replica of the old installations that

⁸⁵ **Averoff, Tossizza Evangelos**, *Lost Opportunities: the Cyprus Question, 1950-1963*, New York, Aristide D. Caratzas, New Rochelle, 1986, pp. 15-17.

⁸⁶ **Averoff**, p. 22 and **Stephens**, pp. 133-134.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ **Eden**, *op. cit.*, pp. 391-392.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

Britain had so long enjoyed in Cairo and on the Canal. Furthermore, the new importance of air power made the island more strategic and vital for military aircraft.⁹⁰

Meanwhile the Greek politicians, Greek Cypriots and philhellenes anywhere in the World were carrying on their attempts for the internationalisation of the issue. But they were cautious enough to give guarantees to Britain. The assurances were basically on two dimensions. First to claim that there was nothing against the British interests in the region but it was just a case of self-determination. Secondly in case of British hesitation to lose the island as a naval and air base any place would be given to Britain whether in Cyprus or Greece. Against the given guarantees of the Greek government, the British handled the case of internationalisation quite seriously. From the commencement of the problem they tried to have American support on two accounts; first to restrain the Greeks and secondly to avert an eventual discussion of the Cyprus question before the UNSC. Makarios wrote a letter to Sir Andrew Wright, the Governor of Cyprus (1949-1954), to demand a plebiscite to the right of self-determination that could pave the way for union of the island with Greece. Wright answered the letter of Makarios and he simply rejected to discuss the matter.⁹¹ At the British Embassy, in Athens, the Greek Prime Minister Field-Marshal Papagos⁹² met Eden, Churchill's heir apparent, who was on a convalescent cruise in the Mediterranean following a serious illness. Much to the dismay of the British ambassador to Athens Sir Charles Peake,⁹³ Eden refused to discuss Enosis then or ever. 'Britain' he said 'will never give up the island. A violent quarrel followed.'⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Macmillan,

⁹¹ *Dünya*, 13 May 1953

⁹² Papagos, Alexandros (b. Dec. 9, 1883, Athens, Greece--d. Oct. 4, 1955, Athens), soldier and statesman who late in life organized a political party and became premier (1952-55) of Greece.

Papagos, commissioned in 1906, saw his first service in the Balkan Wars (1912-13). He took part in the Greek invasion of Turkey (1919-22), won promotion to the rank of major general (1927), and became corps commander and minister of war (1935); the following year he was appointed as chief of staff. Although at the time of the Italian attack on Greece (October 1940), he conducted, as commander in chief, a passive, basically defensive campaign, he nonetheless succeeded in driving the Italians back into Albania. His defences soon crumbled, however, under the later German onslaught (April 1941), and he was taken to Germany as a hostage. Liberated in 1945, he directed post-war operations in Greece against communist guerrillas and was appointed field marshal in 1949.

In May 1951 Papagos resigned as military commander in chief to form a new political party, the Greek Rally, which soon became the strongest political force in Greece. Enjoying wide popularity and modelling himself after Charles de Gaulle, Papagos led his party to a decisive victory in the elections of November 1952 and became premier. He died in office.

⁹³ Charles Peake was the British ambassador to Athens from 1951 to 1957.

⁹⁴ Panteli, p. 252.

The British Minister of State for the Colonies, Henry Hopkinson's restatement of Eden's 'never' had turned from being simply a British colonial problem into an international matter - events 'dragged Cyprus into the stock-market of world affairs'. It also obliged the Foreign Office to take a closer interest in what formerly had been primarily a Colonial Office matter. They argued that retained sovereignty over Cyprus was essential for Britain to discharge its treaty obligations to the Arabs states, NATO, Iraq, Libya, Turkey and Iran. The matter was further internationalised by the world Council of Churches publicly recognising 'the right and fitness of the people of Cyprus to determine for themselves their future statuses'.⁹⁵

Towards the end of the 1953, when the Greek Cypriots engaged in bringing the issued to the international level, the voices on Cyprus were raised gradually in Turkey. Turkish government issued a statement reflecting Turkish stance. In this statement, Turkey stressed that on the one hand, at present, there was no Cyprus question, and Turkey was satisfied with the current status of Cyprus. On the other hand, with this statement, Turkey friendly warned Britain that she could not take any decision without first having official opinion and consent of the Republic of Turkey. Turkish public opinion at that time would be expressed as if there was to be a change, it should be in favour of Turkey not to Greece. According to Stefanidis, the awareness of these perils had so far prevented the British from playing the Turkish card themselves and the communication of the Greek decision to raise the Cyprus question at the UN helped the Foreign Office overcome earlier misgivings.⁹⁶ On 24 February 1954, the British Ambassador in Ankara asked the Turkish government to express their opposition to the raising of the Cyprus question to Washington and to Athens as well. They agreed on the first score but were reluctant to approach the Greeks. As mentioned just above, for Turkey, there was no Cyprus question. On the other hand, Turkey pointed out that if a problem arose Turkey might involve them in a substantial discussion of the matter and thus under the common Anglo-Turkish position. Turkish government also made it clear that it expected the question, if it ever arose, to be settled on a tripartite basis (Turkey-

⁹⁵ Baker, p. 114.

⁹⁶ Stefanidis, p. 54.

Britain-Greece). Turkish and British agreed that the British and Turkish Embassies in Washington should co-ordinate their actions.⁹⁷

There were other factors contributing to the gradual intensification of the struggle in Cyprus throughout 1954. In June, as part of the preparations for a new agreement with Egypt providing for the replacing of British troops in the Suez Canal Zone by civilian technicians, it was announced in London that British Middle East Land and Air Headquarters would be transferred to Cyprus.⁹⁸

Eden's chronicle of his Cyprus policy constantly brings out more concern than the Turks themselves then showed for advancing the Turkish case on Cyprus. He utters not one word of sympathetic understanding for the feeling of the Greek Cypriots or Greece herself. He regarded some attitudes unfavourable for the Greeks adopted by Turkey as natural, reserving his contempt for Greek extremism and for those who thought that the troubles in the island were due to British imperialism consists of one peoples' ruling another against the latter's will for the sake of formers strategic or economic interests, then there never was a more clear cut case of it than Cyprus. It is another question whether such imperialism may sometimes be justified on the ground of preventing worse evils than it entails. Eden writes:

*The action, which the British government could take, was circumscribed by international considerations. First, came the strategic value of the island. Our military advisers regarded it as an essential staging point for the maintenance of our position in the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf. There must be security of tenure. It was not then thought enough to lease certain sites on the island from some future administration on whose policies we could not depend.*⁹⁹

The British Ambassador Roger Makins in Washington conveyed a message about Cyprus to the US President Eisenhower from his government on 20 September

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Eden, p. 396

1954: Message was emphasised on the strategic importance of the island for British national interest in relation to the stability and defence of the Middle East and continued as:

- *The international airing of this question has already done enough harm to Anglo-Greek and Greek-Turkish relations. During the recent NATO exercise 'Keystone', Greek and Turkish officers could scarcely be brought to talk to each other. A decision on Cyprus at the UN might well put a strain on Greek-Turkish relations, which they could not bear.*
- *The only people who can profit by this controversy are the Communists.*
- *This is not a question of self-government in a colony but one of transferring one, indeed two, ethnic groups from one sovereignty to another...*
- *We are to develop normal democratic constitutional process in Cyprus... Cyprus has the highest standard of the living in the Middle East and the second lowest death rate in the world.*¹⁰⁰

Contrary to the Eden's view the Greeks evaluated the matter within a very different perspective. They were claiming that the Cyprus question did not constitute a political issue between Britain on the one hand and Greece and Turkey on the other. But they concluded, the Cyprus issue is purely a question of self-determination and concerns the British Government and the Cypriots people only and it can be extended so as to concern the Greek Government. Whenever the Greek Government, in understanding the feelings of the Greek and especially the Cypriot people, acts as the people's right of self-determination.¹⁰¹ British Prime Minister Anthony Eden thought that it was very important that if their plans for a conference with the Greeks and Turks on Cyprus turned out to be what they have hoped, they should be prepared to formulate as soon as possible a long-term development plan for the colony. This would give the Cypriots something to look forward to and might even have some effect over the years on their attitude towards the British connection. If the offer of a liberal constitution was to be made after the conference, it would be good if the development plan could be made public at the same time. Education, to Eden, was particularly important. There might be

¹⁰⁰ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 710-712

much to be gained by provision of an institution of university status, linked with British universities, which would help to wean the Cypriots away from the cultural attraction of Athens.¹⁰² Therefore, on the other hand, Macmillan felt concerned at this time at the little understanding in world opinion of the fervour of Turkish emotion about Cyprus. He behaved as if their alliance with Turkey as the first consideration in British policy in that part of the world. When their discussions with the Governor were concluded, he made some comments upon this in a message to President Eisenhower:

*Clearly British rights in Cyprus could not be challenged under international law. Yet under the developing pressures at work throughout the old British Empire, the principle of self-government and, ultimately, of self-determination was being generally applied. If our strategic position could be effectively guaranteed, we had no desire to prevent this evolutionary process applying to Cyprus as well as elsewhere. Our whole interest, therefore, lay in a peaceful solution; all the more did we desire this, since both the Greeks and the Turks were our allies and friends, bound together by the recent engagements of NATO and constituting the Eastern flank of that defensive system.*¹⁰³

The Turkish press meanwhile declared that if the Greek-Cypriots on the island were given enough autonomy to enable them to establish Greek rule there, the Turkish alliance with Britain and Greece would have no more than paper value.¹⁰⁴ Respectively, in an effort to neutralize the Greek case for Enosis, British Prime Minister Eden encouraged Turkish leaders to express their opposition more forcefully as he wrote in his memoirs; ‘Full Circle’: “The Turkish newspapers had hitherto been more outspoken than the Turkish government, which have behaved with restraint. It was as well, I wrote on a telegram at that time, that they should speak out, because it was the truth that the Turks would never let the Greeks have Cyprus.”¹⁰⁵ Eden’s strategy of emphasising Greek-Turkish differences on Cyprus in harmony with the famous ‘divide at impera’

¹⁰¹ **Eden.**, op.cit, pp. 398-399

¹⁰² **Ibid.**, p.397

¹⁰³ **Macmillan**, p.662

¹⁰⁴ **Eden**, p. 399

¹⁰⁵ **Ibid.**, p. 400

(divide and rule) strategy work in the short-term, although in the long-run it failed to save the island to Britain. Turkey's support for the continuation for British rule in the Cyprus suited British purposes.

Some observers of the question, like Stephens, have argued that Turkey's policy was shaped in response to British prodding on the question of Enosis.¹⁰⁶ Is this a persuasive hypothesis? Would Turkey have become directly involved in the dispute had the British not encouraged her? Greeks have argued that Turkey would not have accepted Enosis regardless of British policy. On the other hand, it was not impossible that Greece could have won Turkish consent if Turkey had been offered facilities on the island, such as a military base to satisfy her security concerns and special safeguards to ensure that the Turkish community would be well treated¹⁰⁷.

Although there were many clashes among the British authorities who dealt with Cyprus on different lengths; and the decade could not be appraised to show the British Foreign Policy on straight, solid, long lasting, and unchangeable Cyprus Policy there was one thing almost stagnant. After it was proved insufficient to give some more political rights to the settlers in the island they followed one way. The British perspective within the period of our study was based on simply to revert all kinds of Enosis demands. This policy was not very easy to pursue in an era of self-determination and decolonisation. By this it was difficult to get international support for the British even from the USA initially. The emerging Cold War meanwhile served very much for it. Britain reminded USA that Greece and Turkey the two NATO allies very sensitively located against the Soviets would go into even war because of a British territory i.e. Cyprus. Having the American support by this way it started to provoke Turkey to be a side merely against the Greek irredentism concerning a former Turkish territory with an undeniable Turkish population.

¹⁰⁶ Stephens, p. 54.

¹⁰⁷ Bahcheli, Tözün, *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955*, West View Press, London, 1990, p.38.

2.2. GREEK PERSPECTIVE

The dynamism and sense of national unity that had characterised the early Venizélos years gave way to bitterness and vengefulness that was to poison the country's political life throughout World War I and the inter-war period. Greece was driven by the "National Schism", a division of the country into irreconcilable camps supporting either King Constantine I or his Prime Minister Venizélos. The King on the World War I. advocated neutrality, while Venizélos was an enthusiastic supporter of the Triple Entente -Britain, France, and Russia- which he regarded as the alliance most likely to favour the implementation of Greece's remaining irredentist ambitions. The entente had, indeed, in an effort to lure Greece into the war, held out the attractive prospect of territorial gains for Greece at the expense of Turkey, which had aligned itself with the Central Powers.¹⁰⁸ Increasingly bitter disagreements between King Constantine I and Prime Minister Venizelos resulted in the latter twice resigning in 1915, despite a convincing electoral victory.

Venizélos brought Greece, hitherto neutral, into the war on the side of the entente. Naturally, he expected to reap the reward for his loyalty at the Paris Peace Conference.¹⁰⁹ In May of 1919, Greece was permitted to land troops to invade Smyrna (Izmir), the major port city in Anatolia (Asia Minor), with its large Greek population. The Greek army started to invade the Western part of Anatolia. Greece was a major beneficiary of the Treaty of Sèvres of August 1920, the peace treaty signed with the defeated Ottoman Empire. However, for the Turkish nationalists, galvanized by the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), the treaty was from the outset a dead letter and the Greek invasion of Western Anatolia a challenge they were prepared to meet. In elections of November 1920, Venizelos was defeated, and the exiled King Constantine I was restored to his throne after a bogus plebiscite to the manifest displeasure of Britain and France. Meanwhile, the military situation in Western Anatolia steadily deteriorated; Turkish troops challenged the invasion and stopped the further expansion. In August/ September 1922, the war between Greek and Turkish armies

¹⁰⁸ Çukalas, Konstantin; *Yunanistan Dosyası*, translated by: Şeyla, Ant Yayınları, İstanbul, 1970, p. 28.

¹⁰⁹ Holland, p. 33.

resulted in a rout of the Greek armies in Anatolia. A military junta seized power in 1922 as King Constantine abdicated.

At a peace conference in Lausanne an exchange of populations between Greece and the newly established Turkish Republic was agreed upon. It might in fact have encouraged the Turks to raise the question of large Turkish minority in Western Thrace and Thrace's annexation to Turkey. Significantly the criterion that was used for determining who was a Greek and who was a Turk was religion. It was neither language, nor culture, nor ethnicity. One consequence of this was the exchange of many tens of thousands of Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians for Greek-speaking Muslims. The Orthodox Patriarchate was allowed to remain in Istanbul, as were the Greek inhabitants of that city and of the two islands, Imbros (Gökçeada) and Tenedos (Bozcaada), which straddled the entrance to the strategically sensitive Dardanelles. In return, the Muslims of Western Thrace were allowed to remain in. As Clogg pointed out an influx of some 1.3 million refugees (including significant numbers from Russia and Bulgaria) strongly tested the social fabric of a country prostrated by some 10 years of intermittent war.¹¹⁰ Nonetheless, leaving aside the prejudice¹¹¹ they encountered on the part of the indigenous population, the process of their integration into Greek society was remarkably successful. Note that, however, The agreement signed by Turkey and Greece for the return of the civilian prisoners and for the exchange of prisoners of war on 30 January 1923 in Lausanne should not be mixed with The Treaty of Lausanne signed in 24 July 1923 there were also remarkable problems arose from the former agreement.

In 1928 Venizelos made a political comeback, two years after the downfall of the short-lived military dictatorship headed by General Theodoros Pangalos in 1925-26. Although Venizélos initiated a good-neighbour policy with Italy and Greece's Balkan neighbours and brought about a remarkable rapprochement with Turkey,¹¹² his government was knocked off course by the repercussions of the Stock Market Crash on Wall Street in 1929. Because Greece was dependent on the export of agricultural products such as olive oil, tobacco, and currants and on migrant remittances, it was

¹¹⁰ Clogg; pp. 48-62.

¹¹¹ For the examples of prejudice against the immigrated Greeks see, Clogg, pp. 48-51.

severely affected by the slump in world trade.¹¹³ Moreover, after four years of relative stability, politics reverted to the confusion of the early 1920s. The political arena was once again polarized between supporters of Venizélos and of the monarchy. Fear of a royalist restoration lay behind another attempted coup by Venizelist officers in March 1935.¹¹⁴ Venizélos was forced into exile in France, where he died shortly afterward, but not before he had urged his supporters to effect reconciliation with the king.

King George II had been restored to his throne. Like Venizélos in exile, the king on his return to Greece was in a conciliatory mood. However, elections in January 1936 produced a deadlock between the two main parliamentary blocs, the Venizelists and the royalists. Both blocs engaged in secret negotiations with the communists, hitherto an insignificant force, which now, with 15 seats in the 300-seat parliament, held the balance of power.¹¹⁵

In 21 October 1931 Greek Cypriots rioted in favour of Enosis. To respond Greek Cypriots' claims, Turkish Cypriots called for Taksim (partition). Greek nationals initiated the movement for the [Greek] Cypriot right of self determination, but their uncompromising and hostile stand against the British administration created fear among the Turkish Cypriots, as to the possibility of living under the power of another colony administration. The net result of their anxiety about Greeks was the resurgence of Turkish nationalism¹¹⁶. As Markides pointed out the riots of [Greek] Cypriots ironically, prompted the British to abolish the Legislative Council, which had been created by the colonial government. It was a political body, composed of laymen, which could conceivably have challenged the authority of the Church. Now it disappeared, leaving Greek Cypriot communal leadership in the hands of Greek Cypriot Church. For the ensuing years of colonial rule there would be not an alternative political leadership and no significant political parties existed in Cyprus with the exception of, the Greek Cypriots' communist party (KKK; Kommunistikon Komma Kyprou).¹¹⁷

¹¹² **Gürün, Kamuran**, *Dış İlişkiler ve Türk Politikası, 1939'dan Günümüze Kadar*, SBF Yayınları, 531, Ankara, 1983, p. 371.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ **Çukalas**, p. 31.

¹¹⁵ For further information see, **Koliopoulos S. John** and **Veremis M. Thanos**, *Greece The Modern Sequel From 1821 to the Present*, Hurst&Company, London, 2004.

¹¹⁶ **Tamkoç, Metin**; *The Turkish Cypriot State*, K. Rustem and Brother, London, 1988, p. 43.

¹¹⁷ **Markides, C. Kyriacos.**, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*, Yale University Press, London, 1977, p.12.

During the inter-war years, both Turkey and Greece adopted a hands-off attitude towards Cyprus. A statement made by Greek Premier Venizelos after the anti-British riots in Cyprus during a parliamentary meeting in 18 November 1931 in order to warn the Enosists about the terrible economic conditions of Greece and the need for foreign support, explains why Greece did not directly interfere in Cypriot politics until the 1950s:

*Crucial and more than crucial interest of Greece impose the necessity of undisturbed friendship with Great Britain... In fact we have right to demand of the Greek inhabitants of these islands [i.e. Cyprus and Dodecanese] that they be less egotistical*¹¹⁸.

Venizelos assumed that Britain would grant self-government to Cyprus and that this would lead to Enosis. He spoke against untimely Enosis attempts, which could cost Greece Britain's support¹¹⁹. Greek and Greek Cypriots were agreed on the goal of Enosis. They were hopeful about the cessation of Cyprus in favour of Greece as happened in the case of Ionian Islands in 1864. On answering the question of why the Greeks and Greek Cypriots were so pleasant to the British, Sir Robert Armitage, who was the ninth Governor of Cyprus from 1954-1955, replied:

*Indeed official Ethnarchy policy has always emphasised the peaceful and orderly nature of the struggle. Greek Cypriots who feel a psychological need for Enosis are not blind to the material consequences. Many dread union with Greece for this alone... The Cypriot leaders have repeatedly emphasised, as indeed the metropolitan Greeks have too, that there is nothing anti-British about the Enosis movement.*¹²⁰

Therefore official Greek indications of a desire to negotiate with the British government over the future of Cyprus went further back than 1949 which was the date mentioned in the explanatory memorandum of the first Greek recourse to the UN. At the governmental level in Greece, in spite of a desire not to offend Britain, some of the

¹¹⁸ **Attalides, Michael A.**, *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1979, pp. 59-60.

¹¹⁹ **Markides**, p. 123.

¹²⁰ **Baker**, p.106.

highest officials nevertheless periodically made statements calling for the union of Cyprus with Greece¹²¹. At the very nadir of its power, when its members had escaped from Athens and had taken refuge in Crete, in May, 1941, the Greek government, through its Prime Minister, Emmanuel J. Tsouderos, had raised the matter perhaps stimulated by Anthony Eden's suggestions during his second visit to Athens, in February, 1941, that the future of Cyprus would be settled after the war in talks between the two governments.¹²² In a luncheon address in London on 15 November 1941, Greek Prime Minister Tsouderos stated, "I visualise a great Greece including North Epirus, the Dodecanese, Macedonia, and Cyprus,"¹²³ which provoked a protest from Foreign Secretary Eden.¹²⁴ In 1942, a memorandum on post-war Greek claims addressed to US government and also communicated to the British government. It was emphasised that the memorandum had drawn attention to the Cyprus question and had expressed the hope of Greek government that Cyprus issue would be settled directly between Greece and Britain.¹²⁵ Greeks did not want to take Turkey into consideration on Cyprus issue. According to Greek claims the Turkish rights in Cyprus had enclosed by the Treaty of Lausanne, i.e. Article 20 that Turkey accepts the annexation of Cyprus by Britain. On the other hand, as Macmillan emphasises that it 'hardly seemed very relevant; for the Greeks have never had any rights in Cyprus at all.'¹²⁶

Greek governments abided by the Cyprus policy of Venizelos until the early 1950s. They did not actively support the Enosis struggle of Greek Cypriot, but they made it clear that they looked favourably upon Enosis.¹²⁷ Greek Prime Minister, Emmanuel Tsouderos, for instance, sent a memorandum to the US administration in 1942 asking for American support of the right to self-determination for [Greek] Cypriots.¹²⁸

¹²¹ **Vali**, p.30.

¹²² **Xydis, G. Stephen**, *Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958*, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1967, p. 6.

¹²³ **Barham Wendell Richard**, *Enosis: From Ethnic Communalism to Greek Nationalism in Cyprus, 1878-1955*, Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1982, quoted from **Vali**, p. 30

¹²⁴ **Vali**, p. 30.

¹²⁵ **Xydis**, p. 6.

¹²⁶ **Macmillan**, p. 665.

¹²⁷ **Louis**,

¹²⁸ FRUS 1942, Vol. II, 1962, p. 825,

Despite insisting that the Greek argument on Cyprus was short and simple: self-determination¹²⁹ Greeks and Greek Cypriots claimed self-determination to reach Enosis not for independence of the island as a self-governing entity by the inhabitants of the island. In other words the claim for “self-determination”, in theory, opens in independence, however, in case of Cyprus in practice, Enosis. This kind of irredentism suggested the incorporation of Cyprus in the Greek State by a vote either of the Parliament or the people. It was assumed (and rightly so) that the overwhelming majority of the Greek population wanted union with Greece. In a plebiscite, it was thought that only the Turkish 18 percent and possibly many of the communists (who would vote for independence) would oppose Enosis.¹³⁰

Greek Cypriots were only repeating for their own island the claims that other Greeks had made throughout the Hellenic world and successfully applied at intervals against the old and disintegrating Ottoman Empire. However, the Turkish Cypriots might be willing to accept a self-governing Cyprus if a method could be forged by which their community could be effectively secured against inequality and subjugation.

Thus, the Greeks demanded the end of the British rule was under the guiding principles of this era, which together were enshrined in the charter of the United Nations – anti-colonialism and self-determination. All Greek territories (Cyprus included, being considered by the Enosists as an ancient homeland of Hellenism) should be united under the roof of the same state. Eastern Orthodoxy and the Greco-Byzantine mystique formed the genuine wellspring of the drive for unification with Greece although-it was asserted-the Megali Idea was no longer to be relied on.¹³¹

Macmillan emphasised the British view as “on the basis of international law, Greece’s position was weak. She could put forward no claims to sovereignty except those of sentiment, language and race.” But these were strong indeed. Yet Cyprus had never belonged to Greece. It was a part of the Byzantine Empire but the old Greek tradition had been enriched by the culture of Western Europe both under the Lusignan

¹²⁹ **Foley, Charles;** *Legacy of Strife*, Penguin, Baltimore, 1964, p. 185.

¹³⁰ **Ibid**

¹³¹ **Xydis**, p. 132

dynasty of the Latin kingdom of Cyprus and under the Republic of Venice. From 1571 to 1878 Cyprus was the part of the Ottoman Empire.¹³²

The situation in Cyprus during World War II, was silent. According to Denktash Enosis has completely been blocked under the strict laws of British within 1931-1945¹³³. After 1941 political parties were again allowed in Cyprus. The secret communist party now openly function as the progressive party of the working people, known by the initials of its Greek name: AKEL.¹³⁴ On the other hand Enosis was muted; the Greek Cypriots watched the struggle of their co-nationals against the axis powers with sympathy. The island itself was considered to be in danger after the Axis invasion of Crete.¹³⁵ During the Greco-Italian War of 1940-1941 persistent rumours began to circulate that Greece and Britain were about to link together, their war fortunes by a settlement of Cyprus question. As mentioned before, the then Greek Prime Minister Emmanuel J. Tsouderos in his meeting with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in February 1941 requested a settlement between the two governments on the future of Cyprus after the end of war.¹³⁶ Whether such an idea had been entertained at all by the British Foreign Office is very doubtful. But that in Greece, as well as in Cyprus, people looked upon it not as something possible but as quite within the bounds of probability is unquestioned¹³⁷.¹³⁸ Many Cypriots volunteered for service in the British armed forces, especially after Greece was at war, too. In 1945 more than 10,000 Cypriots were under arms, more than half of them overseas, and they served with gallantry in Greece, France, Ethiopia, Syria, North Africa and Italy.¹³⁹ Due to Cyprus Regiment and Greek defence against Italians, as the Greek writer Alastos expressed that, a warm feeling of admiration and of gratitude swept Britain on behalf of the Greeks. Sir (then Mr.) Compton Mackenzie, expressing this feeling in an article

¹³² Macmillan, pp. 660-661

¹³³ Savcı, Kemal, *Özgürlüğüm Zaferi Kıbrıs*, Ayyıldız Matbaası, Ankara, 1976, p. 21.

¹³⁴ AKEL : Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou (Reform Party of the Working People), founded on 14 April 1941 at Skarinouas a successor of banned Communist Party of Cyprus (KKK : Kommunistikon Komma Kyprou). Vali, p. 234.

¹³⁵ Vali, p. 234.

¹³⁶ Xydis, p. 6.

¹³⁷ Alastos, p. 367

¹³⁸ Reynolds News, issue of 12 January 1941, quoted from Alastos, op.cit., p. 367

¹³⁹ Bullard, op.cit., p. 150

published in *Reynolds News* stated that Britain 'should immediately declare her intention to cede Cyprus to Greece after the war'

20 May 1941, German parachutists landed to Greece. Greek Prime Minister Emmanuel Tsouderos and his government and the King of Greece went to exile in Crete after the German invasion. He immediately told the British Ambassador that he expected a solution to the Cypriot question, and that in the event of his government being compelled to evacuate Crete it should be allowed to establish itself in Cyprus where they would be 'Greeks among Greeks'.¹⁴⁰ Britain refused to consider this proposition. According to Tsouderos, British refrained because it would have given cause to the Germans to attack the island, which was unfortified. As Cyprus was belligerent and to the Germans enemy territory, the specific reason advanced for the refusal was entirely invalid.¹⁴¹ On the other hand, Tsouderos continued insisting on Enosis. In November 1941, he in a public address given in London mentioned that 'Cyprus as part of post-war Greece'. The British response came immediately. The Governor of Cyprus, Charles Campbell Wooley, strongly emphasised that the transference of the island to Greece was not under consideration.¹⁴²

The period 1940-1950 was marked by the growth of Enosis movement. Throughout the decade Greek Cypriots lobbied in London for Enosis and with the help of Philhellenes in Britain to the idea was entertained in London as well. However, these efforts did not produce tangible results. With the end of WW II., the Greek Cypriots renewed their drive for Enosis, but Britain which appreciated the island's strategic value against the axis powers did not endorse the Enosis movement. Greece also had to act in a reserved manner as it depended heavily on economic and military aid from London.¹⁴³

As mentioned above, between 1931 and 1945, the movement of Enosis was in mute. After the 1931 riot, some of the priests were sent to exile. An amnesty promulgated after the end of W.W. II., priests came back to island and Enosis campaign was reactivated. The Turkish community was against the Enosis but not Britain.¹⁴⁴ As the Turkish writer Metin Tamkoç and many others in Turkey stress after 1945, the

¹⁴⁰ **Alastos**, op.cit., p. 368.

¹⁴¹ **Ibid.**

¹⁴² **Solsten**, op.cit., p. 24.

¹⁴³ **Louis**, op.cit. p. 85.

¹⁴⁴ **Kemal**, p. 21.

Greek Orthodox Church leadership and the communities in Cyprus have been provoking for the union of Cyprus with Greece. For internal political reasons the Greek government was obliged to orchestrate the movement for Enosis by diplomatic and military means.¹⁴⁵

With the end of Second World War in 1945 the campaign for Enosis was intensified once again. The belief among Greek Cypriots that Britain might cede Cyprus to them in line with the general trend of de-colonisation in the world and the strength of nationalist fervour among Greek Cypriots. The Greek-Orthodox Church, taking advantage of the principle of self-determination which had become universally accepted after the Second W.W. was determined to have this principle applied only to the Greek Cypriots, ignoring altogether the existence in Cyprus of the Turkish Cypriot Community.¹⁴⁶ While the co-existence of Greek and Turkish in Cyprus spatially amalgamated, there was no part of the island where the Turks had clustered themselves into a majority; equally there were few areas where a Muslim presence was almost wholly absent.¹⁴⁷

It is important to note that after the end of W.W.II, however, Greek governments, not the Greek Cypriots, refrained from pressing for Enosis for a while. They were almost exclusively preoccupied with promoting the northward claims of Greece before the Council of Foreign Ministers at the Paris Peace Conference or with trying to get British and /or American economic aid for reconstruction while internally facing a new Communist led uprising. It was only the Communist Party of Greece that clamoured for Cyprus on anti-British, anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist grounds.¹⁴⁸ However, the propaganda of Enosis has never been ended. After the end of W.W. II, the Greeks flourished their demands with the new ones. On 30 May 1945, as Panteli stresses, in an introductory address to the committee of foreign affairs, the Greek Premier, Petros Voulgaris, clarified Hellenic claims under the headings of ‘justice and security’: ‘Justice’ required that “the territories inhabited by Greeks should be handed over to Greece. He repeated that all Greek islands, no matter how far away, should return to their embrace of their motherland”. The Greek Cypriots were welcomed and

¹⁴⁵ **Tamkoç**, p. 43.

¹⁴⁶ **Ertegin, Necati Münir**, *The Cyprus Dispute*, Rüstem&Brother, Oxford, 1984, p.2.

¹⁴⁷ **Holland**, p. 12.

rejoiced when they heard the activities of Greek lobbies in the USA. The USA Congressional Record, on 21 June 1945, informed to all allied representatives at the San Francisco Conference on an appeal of Hellenic Right Claims Association of America which requested that Cyprus should be ceded to Greece in exchange for any naval base on the island which has required for the preservation of peace.¹⁴⁹

As soon as the war ended, Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, was flooded with telegrams. The Greek-Cypriots' campaign for Enosis coincided with the period of accelerating decolonisation. They argued that Cyprus deserved her freedom as much as any other Afro-Asian colony attaining its independence from British rule.¹⁵⁰ In May 1945, the Major of Paphos, Gatopoulos, requested self-determination and said that 'the promises of the visitors of a free and just world should also be applied to the [Greek] Cypriots'. On the 18 July 1945, the AKEL General Secretary, Andreas Fantis, expressed his belief that 'Cyprus would be nationally rehabilitated and ceded to mother Greece'. The Cypriots Brotherhood of Athens proclaimed a resolution that claimed Enosis.¹⁵¹ On the other hand, as Adams notes, the Cypriot peasantry and manual worker, whose opposition had improved little after decades of British rule, grasped AKEL's message of social reform¹⁵² rather than primarily stressed on Enosis. In 1945, British government believed that the British possession of Cyprus served important strategic interest and were unwilling to yield. For the Greek-Cypriot leaders this meant organising a struggle like that of other colonial peoples seeking their liberation. To sum up, in the political climate of the immediate post-World War II era, even though the Clement Attlee's Labour Party government (formed on 26 July 1945) the British wanted to move away from direct rule and recognise the rights of self-determination of Afro-Asian British colonies. The Greek Cypriots hoped for Cyprus that the slogan of 'Enosis and only Enosis' was formulated.¹⁵³ Solsten noted the fact that the proposals of the British did not come close to fulfilling the anticipations and ambitions of the Greek Cypriots.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁸ Xydis, p. 6.

¹⁴⁹ Panteli, p. 202

¹⁵⁰ Bahcheli, p.32

¹⁵¹ Panteli, p. 202.

¹⁵² Adams, T.W; *AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus*, Stanford University, California, 1971, p.25

¹⁵³ Richmond, p. 85.

¹⁵⁴ Solsten, p.26

It is emphasised that the Greek Cypriots' claims of self-determination was very different from that of other colonial people. As Darwin expressed as 'to those seeking to fit such phenomena [self-determination] in the form of post-war decolonisation, the case of Cyprus might appear as an 'extraordinary and baffling inconsistency'.¹⁵⁵ The Greek Cypriots did not claim self-determination for independence which means, self-government of inhabitants of island. Their claims differed from independence, as they has been envisaged the transfer of sovereignty from one state to another- from Britain to Greece. Therefore, the Greek-Cypriot aspirations were not the same with the claims of self-determination of other British colonies in Afro-Asia. Turkish Cypriots, as mentioned before, would be ready to accept self-determination, if their rights were effectively guaranteed against inequality and repression¹⁵⁶ that would be securing by the method of political equality of two sides- Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. As Ertegin stresses, the fact that no Cypriot nation ever existed in the island, but there have always been two entirely different ethnic communities. Therefore the rights of self-determination could be applied to and be exercised by the two communities separately.¹⁵⁷

In August 1945 Greeks played the Enosis card in purely British circles. The Greek Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos planned a visit to London in September 1945 to request the cessation of Cyprus to Greece. Damaskinos's private secretary, the poet George Seferis and the British Ambassador in Athens, Sir Reginald Leeper, prepared a plan for making the visit coincide with an announcement of Enosis with the help of Philip Noel-Baker and the distinguished British conservative politician and historian C. M. Woodhouse, who had acted as liaison officer with the wartime Greek resistance.¹⁵⁸ However the project failed. To learn how the project was defeated, we have to look at Hitchens. He claims that C. M. Woodhouse sent a letter to Hitchens to explain the issue:

'Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and the Foreign Office were favourable disposed, but the Colonial Office and the Chiefs of Staff strongly objected. I need not list their reasons, which are obvious.'

¹⁵⁵ **Darwin, John**; *Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat From Empire in the Post-War World*, London, 1988, p.190

¹⁵⁶ **Macmillan**, p. 663.

¹⁵⁷ **Ertegin**, op.cit., p.2.

¹⁵⁸ **Hitchens**, p. 37.

Bevin had been in office only for a few weeks and he did not feel confident enough to force it through the cabinet. So that was that'.¹⁵⁹

The Greek Foreign Minister, Constantine Tsaldaris issued the first official statement referencing to the question of Cyprus during his opening remarks in the Greek parliament on 17 May 1946. In the course of his speech, Tsaldaris restated Greece's territorial claims on neighbouring countries but he emphatically added that Greece was not asking for Cyprus.¹⁶⁰ On the other hand, toward the end of year 1946, as Greek Prime Minister Constantine (Konstantinos) Tsaldaris attempted to raise Cyprus as possible compensation for the rejection of Greece's claims on Albanian and Bulgarian territory at the Paris Peace Conference. This provoked Bevin's angry retort that Cyprus could not be handed to a country that "was on the point of going Communist".¹⁶¹ On 28 February 1947, the visit of the Greek Cypriot delegation to Athens prompted the Greek parliament to adopt a unanimous resolution expressing the hope that Britain would accept friendly talks with Greece on the question of Enosis.¹⁶²

Under the peace treaty with Italy in Paris, the Dodecanese Islands and Rhodes were ceded to Greece in 1947. Although this event had much in common with the subsequent demand for a union of Cyprus and Greece, the Turkish government considered it unwise to oppose the merger of the islands with Greece, regardless of reports in newspapers about some popular and military pressure. At that moment, Turkey still expected some Soviet action against her borders; and in view of her wartime neutrality, she did not feel diplomatically strong enough to object to an aggrandisement of Greece, a victim of Nazi aggression. Such an opposition also would have had the effect of weakening the Greek government, already in jeopardy because of communist conspiracies and revolts. Ankara therefore resolved to show reticence. Subsequently the council of ministers extended the demilitarisation of other Greek islands in the Aegean to the Dodecanese.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁹ **Hitchens**, p. 37.

¹⁶⁰ **Terlexis, Pantazis**, *Greece's Policy and Attitudes Toward the Problem of Cyprus*, June 1968, New York, p. 82

¹⁶¹ **Kelling**, p. 72

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73 and **Crawshaw**, p.35-36

¹⁶³ **Vali**, p. 227.

In early 1947, Phanar Greek Orthodox Patriarch Maksimos Vaparcis who took the place of Patriarch Benjamin who died on 17 February 1946, met in Istanbul with the Bishop of Kitium, Mihael Mouskos, the future Makarios III of Archbishop of Cyprus Orthodox Church. Maksimos shared his observations on Turkish Government's views on Cyprus issue with Mouskos: "Turkey has no intention to deal with the case of Cyprus. Ankara administration will be unrelated with any problem to be occurred outside of her frontiers in this critical conjecture of the world".¹⁶⁴

The Church was the most important institution over which the Greek Cypriots had control during our study period. The Cypriot Orthodox Church was autocephalous and had been since at least AD. 488. Thus, it was centuries older than either the Turkish or the Greek states.¹⁶⁵ After the Ottoman conquest, Turks abolished feudalism and re-established the Greek Orthodox Church to its former dominant position.¹⁶⁶ Despite the presence of an Ottoman governor, the Church was authorised to collect state taxes and the archbishop was elevated to the status of *milletbashi* (Ethnarch), the national leader or spokesman for the Greek population.¹⁶⁷ From 1878 to 1955 the Church continued to act to the Greek Cypriot people as a moral framework, thus making it to a nation.¹⁶⁸ Until the end of our period (1955), Church of the Cypriots was inevitably dominated by Ottoman attitudes in the same degree as the whole Cypriot society and Cypriot mentality were dominated by Ottoman attitude.¹⁶⁹ The last Archbishop of Cyprus invested with the berat of an Ottoman Sultan was Sophronios II, who became Archbishop in 1865, thirteen years before the British occupation, and held the seal until his death in 1900.¹⁷⁰

Of the five Archbishops of 20th century only one i.e. Cyril III is entitled to be qualified as a churchman. As Luke emphasises, the others frankly made Enosis their primary, indeed almost their exclusive concern, to the damage of the spiritual welfare of

¹⁶⁴ **Fırat, Melek.**, "1945-1960 Yunanistan'la İlişkiler", Baskın Oran ed. Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt I 1919-1980, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001, p. 585.

¹⁶⁵ **Baker**, p. 98

¹⁶⁶ **Bölükbaşı**, p. 20

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ **Vanezis**, p.5

¹⁶⁹ **Englezakis**, p.422

¹⁷⁰ **Luke**, p. 183

their ancient, much ignored church.¹⁷¹ Cyprus had been without an Archbishop since the death of Kyrillos III on 16 November 1933 and until 1947, as mentioned before *Locum Tenens* were at the chair of Cyprus Orthodox Church. The first elections since 1916 were held in 1947. A new Archbishop was elected and the church question thus finally settled.¹⁷² Leontios Leontiou who was the Bishop of Paphos 'Topoteretes' and served as 'Locum Tenens' 1933-1947, was elected as a new Archbishop on 20 June 1947.¹⁷³ The Church started propaganda again for Enosis. A delegation headed by Archbishop Leontios Leontiou went to London in 1947 to plead the cause of union with Greece once more, only to be told by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Arthur Creech Jones, that the question was "irrevocably closed."¹⁷⁴ Archbishop Leontiou died on 26 July 1947. Elections for a new archbishop were held on October 1947. AKEL was effective in previous elections, but it failed in the one held on October 1947. In this election, AKEL decided to oppose the aged Bishop of Kyrenia, Makarios II, and to support the Bishop of Derkon, who had earlier been the patriarchal representative of the election of Leontios Leontiou. The veteran nationalist campaigner however defeated the latter by 40 votes to 26 and thus became Makarios II, Myriantheus.¹⁷⁵ Xenophon Koumparides who was the adherent of Makarios II, took sole command of the nationalist forces that served for Enosis. The most important event in his era was the Enosis plebiscite of January 1950. He died on 28 June 1950 and Makarios III, Mouskou, who was the Bishop of Kition since 13 June 1948 became the new Archbishop.¹⁷⁶ At this point it should be noted that in the political climate of the island toward the end of the 1940s, there were 34 Greek political parties of which 20 were right-wing, 12 left-wing and two combined; there were also three Turkish parties making together 37 political parties in an island whose population in 1949 was only 475 886¹⁷⁷ (85 660 Turkish, 381 166 Greek).

The restoration of the hierarchy in 1948 in its first phase under Makarios II saved the working class movement from political totalitarianism, while after 1950,

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 181

¹⁷² Panteli, p. 199.

¹⁷³ For further information on the election process of Archbishop see, Pantelli, pp.199-201.

¹⁷⁴ Munro, John & Khuri, Zahi; *Cyprus: Between Venus and Mars*, Caravan Books, Beirut, 1984, p.104.

¹⁷⁵ Panteli, p. 201.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 202.

under Makarios III, it secured, slowly but surely, the free organisation and progress of working class people within a framework of democratic polycentrism and solidarity.¹⁷⁸ When Archbishop Makarios III ascended the throne of Saint Barnabas in 1950 he promptly assumed, and was accorded by his followers, the style of an Ethnarch, a function peculiar to an empire which not only no longer included Cyprus but had itself being superseded. In other words he affected to maintain an Ottoman practice long after the constitutional basis of the practice had vanished.

For the Greek people of Cyprus their liberation from the regime of colonial rule was a question of the life or death or of their human identity if not of their Greek identity. Confronted with an occupying power, which based its right to be there on its financial and military strength, the Church inspired its subject people with faith in the spirit and with confidence in itself, in its dignity, its history, its calling, and in the power of justice.¹⁷⁹ In 1948, King Paul of Greece provoked further British protests as well as excitement in Cyprus and Greece, by stating that “Greece certainly desires and will continue to desire the union of Cyprus with Greece. It is difficult to understand why this has not been affected.”¹⁸⁰ Even at the height of fighting in July 1948 King Paul himself reaffirmed the claim on Cyprus. In an interview with Cyrus Sulzberger, the influential foreign editor of the New York Times, the King repeated the offer of strategic bases to Britain anywhere on Greek soil. His statement provoked the first in a long series of British demarches on Cyprus. As a result and after some American prodding, the ageing Prime Minister Themistoklis Sofoulis issued a statement discouraging further public discussion of the issue.¹⁸¹ On 14 December 1949, Greek Foreign Minister, Constantine Tsaldaris denounced as “irresponsible” all public discussion of the Cyprus question and stated in parliament that the government continued to adhere to the line set forth by ex-Prime Minister Themistoklis Sofoulis who was died in June 1946, claimed the cessation of Cyprus to Greece. As Stefanidis pointed out,

The raising of the matter of that moment, he added, might well harm the Greek case. Then, replying to one of the deputies supporting a

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p.198.

¹⁷⁸ Attalides, p. 7.

¹⁷⁹ Englezakis, p. 450.

¹⁸⁰ New York Times, 28 July 1948, quoted from Vali, p. 30

¹⁸¹ Kyriakides, p. 36.

motion in favour of Enosis, Tsaldaris went as far as to warn that making statements 'about a people which is not under Greek sovereignty' amounted 'to open intervention which we ourselves always try to reject when it concerns us'.¹⁸²

Still on 15 December 1949 it was continued. The successor of Sofoulis, Greek Prime Minister Alexander Diomidis, gave a press despatch, in which he emphasised the 'delicacy' of the circumstances and the 'necessity' for maintaining close collaboration with Britain and the United States, on assistance 'the satisfactory solution of all national problem depended'. Then, Diomidis asked for the stopping of public excitement about Cyprus. These statements, Tsaldaris' speech in particular aggravated sharp-worded criticism in the Greek press, which did not fail to attribute them to British pressures. As a leading newspaper, To Vima put it, 'anything discouraging which the Greeks might say to the Cypriots would have no effect on them.'¹⁸³

On 27 September 1949, as its sister party in Greece met defeat, AKEL took the first step towards the path of internationalisation by publicly offering the Ethnarchy its co-operation in promoting the cause of Enosis before the United Nations. The next move came on 23 November 1949, when the AKEL-controlled city councils addressed a message to the UN Security Council denouncing British domination and declaring the ardent desire of the Greek Cypriot population for union with Greece. AKEL asked for a plebiscite under UN auspices to ascertain the people's will. Shortly afterwards, it started collecting signatures to support its proposal.¹⁸⁴ On 5 December 1949, Ethnarchy Council decided to organize a plebiscite for Enosis. In 1950 the Greek Church held an unofficial plebiscite of the Greek Orthodox population in Cyprus, with the reported result that about 95,73 % of the people who participated in the plebiscite expressed a desire for union with Greece.¹⁸⁵

The January 1950 Enosis plebiscite was made through the signing of the petition note-book. The note-book stayed open for two weeks, from 15 to 30 January 1950. Approximately absolute majority of the Greek Cypriots gave signature in favour of

¹⁸² Stefanidis, p. 9.

¹⁸³ Ibid.,

¹⁸⁴ Crawshaw, pp. 46-47

¹⁸⁵ Averoff, p. 8.

Enosis. Alastos, from the Greek perspectives, emphasises the importance of the Enosis plebiscite:

*The plebiscite provided a secure, moral foundation upon which to rest the claim for Enosis. After seven and a half centuries of alien rule the Cypriot [Greek], impelled forward by their consuming faith in the future of their nation, a faith which never allowed them to loose hope had, with this irrevocable act of history demonstrated conclusively to the world the road they wished to follow*¹⁸⁶.

It can be said that Makarios had played his hand with skill. But in the long run his smartness turned against himself. The official entry of Greece upon the scene had inevitably invited the official entry of Turkey. After the plebiscite concluded, the newly formed coalition government under General Nikolaus Plastiras was already under British pressure. The Prime Minister professed embarrassment over the visit of the Cypriot delegates who had been discouraged quietly, and assured Sir Clifford Norton, the British Ambassador, that he had no intention of making an issue out of Cyprus.¹⁸⁷ But Cyprus had obtained a determined and shrewd leader in the person of Makarios III, Archbishop and Ethnarch of the island. He was imbued with the pan Hellenistic spirit and a determination to liberate [his] island from foreign domination. Makarios who had an unprecedented political and spiritual power as an archbishop was on a path for the independence. Although his speeches were full of Enosis demands he was acting toward an independent state. He failed, however, to exhibit political subtlety in dealing with British parliamentary leaders. Furthermore, he felt the contempt often found in Greeks toward Turkey and the Turks and thoroughly misjudged the strength of Turkish reactions in the island and in Turkey herself.¹⁸⁸

In the latter part of the 1940s, public opinion in Greece was overwhelmingly pro-Enosis, and a wide spectrum of political forces including the Communists and the Church campaigned in favour of it. Yet, Greek governments were facing civil war and political instability at home and thus were not in a position to strive for the unification of Cyprus with Greece. Up to 1950's Greek governments did not openly support the

¹⁸⁶ Alastos, p. 381

¹⁸⁷ Averoff, pp. 11-12.

Enosis struggle of Greek Cypriots, however they made it known that they looked favourably upon it. Another reason of Greece's "hands-off" policy was that during those years they were dealing with political instability at home. They were not in a position to think of the unification of Cyprus with Greece.¹⁸⁹ In 1950, George Papandreou, the then Interior Minister, discouraged a pro-Enosis Cypriot delegation by saying that Greece was 'Breathing today with two lungs, one British and one American, and therefore it could not let alone the Cyprus problem to cause her suffocation'.¹⁹⁰

Pressure has been building up for several years for presentation of the Cyprus issue to the General Assembly (GA) by the Greek government. Since 1950 the publicity and the propaganda toward this end have been intensified. Greek nationalist feeling had been strongly arisen at home, while the Greek Orthodox Church hierarchy in Cyprus – and even the Cypriot Communist Camp – has raised a mounting clamour for Enosis. Notwithstanding periodic statements of support for Enosis by Greek leaders, however, Greek governments were content to wait for more favourable conditions before pressing for the island's union. They worked until 1950. The Greek-Cypriot nationalist leaders, on the other hand, were impatient and decided to take the initiative in the early 1950s. It is possible that in the early 1950s, the mild reactions of Turkish leaders to renewed Greek-Cypriot calls for Enosis led the Greeks to believe, or hope, that Turkey would remain aloof. Moreover, it suited Greek policy to proceed on the assumption that Turkey had no legitimate grounds to become engaged in the Enosis dispute. Any recognition of Turkey as a party would invite a Turkish veto.

In 1950, following the Enosis plebiscite on the island, 200 deputies in the Greek parliament signed a petition expressing support for the island's union with Greece. Enosis campaigns in the country made Cyprus a national issue. A Pan-Hellenic Committee for the Cyprus Struggle was formed under the chairmanship of Archbishop of Greece. Makarios spoke over Athens Radio urging more active participation in the Enosis struggle.¹⁹¹ Former Defence Minister of Greece, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, asked Britain to give the island to his country, which was a demand shared by all parties

¹⁸⁸ Luke, pp. 183-85.

¹⁸⁹ Gürün, p. 378

¹⁹⁰ Markides, p. 123.

¹⁹¹ Bahcheli, p. 34.

in Greece. Otherwise he warned, the Communist would try to benefit from this.¹⁹² Accordingly a Cypriot delegation went to Greece, 205 of 250 parliamentarians in Greece signed a declaration for Enosis.

General Plastiras' government for example refused to receive the volumes of the 1950 plebiscite presented by the Cypriot national delegation, because the government was apprehensive that this gesture might create misunderstanding and hard feelings between Greece and Britain.¹⁹³ In the meantime both Grivas, as leader of the extreme right-wing royalist organisation 'X' in Greece after the W.W. II (Grivas was a former career officer in the Greek army, born and bred in Cyprus) and Makarios had contacted Papagos, the commander-in-chief, hero of the nation in the Albanian War against Italy and of the anti-Communists in the Greek Civil War. He had become the leader of a new Gaullist type political party: "The Greek Rally".¹⁹⁴ The Americans who wanted a strong government in order to achieve political and economic stability openly backed the new party. Grivas in his memoirs claims that in January 1951, he was given a promise of full support by the Greek chief of staff, General Kosmas, who was close to Papagos. But as Papagos came nearer to the responsibilities of the political power, he kept aloof from Grivas' plans, though remaining sympathetic. Makarios secured a promise from Papagos that, when he came to power he would take up the Cyprus question.¹⁹⁵ In March 1951 after the Communist-led unconventional warfare had been stamped out, Greek PM Sophocles Venizelos not only publicly raised the question in the Greek parliament but also conferred with Sir Clifford Norton, the British Ambassador in Athens, on the matter. He reiterated the proposal the King had made about the establishment of British bases on Greek territory.¹⁹⁶ The Greek government informed the State Department about this offer. Greek Prime Minister Venizelos said in Cumhuriyet newspaper that he was feeling a real sorrow about some of 'our (Greek) friends' attitudes about Cyprus. He continued:

*Turkish-Greek friendship has a vital importance for both countries.
Our ties of friendship still awake as strong as ever. Because, if as*

¹⁹² **Cumhuriyet**, 24 January 1950.

¹⁹³ **Terlexis**, p. 90.

¹⁹⁴ **Stephens**, p. 134.

¹⁹⁵ **Stephens**, p. 134.

¹⁹⁶ **Xydis**, p. 7.

*proposed, Cyprus to be Greek territory in the future, this would not create any risk for Turkey. I perceived that it is sufficient to give the example of the island, which belongs to Greece, closer to the Anatolian shores than Cyprus.*¹⁹⁷

It is important to emphasize that as Xydis pointed out all Greek political leaders at this point were agreed that the question of Cyprus should be promoted within the framework of traditional Anglo-Greek friendship and also concurred with the idea of offering to Britain bases in Greece.¹⁹⁸ The Greek political leaders did not want to take Turkey into consideration on Cyprus issue. As mentioned before, according to Greeks Turkey had lost all her rights over Cyprus with the Treaty of Lausanne; therefore, Cyprus issue should be settled only between Greece and Britain.

During this period of changing coalition governments in Greece, Archbishop Makarios began to make contacts among Greek political leaders. He also met, in July 1951, in Cyprus Colonel Grivas who had already begun secret planning with a group of Greek nationalists and Cypriot exiles in Athens for armed struggle to drive the British out of the island.¹⁹⁹ Greeks sought to find a legal base to their demands about Cyprus, and asked opinions from prominent jurists, such as Professor Alessandro Alvarez who was Chilean Prof. of International Law. He said in 1951:

*“No argument can justify this Turkish claim i.e. if the Turks have as they pretend, the right to claim separate self-determination in the case of Cyprus. The people of Cyprus will express its opinion in its entirety, as a whole, and the political future of Cyprus will be determined by the will of majority.”*²⁰⁰

In Greece, after the elections of 20 September 1951, a coalition formed under partnership of Venizelos and Plastiras on late October. The new government made now reference to Cyprus in its statement. This was severely criticised in parliament even by their own party members such as Loukis Akritas, a Plastiras supporter of Cypriot origin, who asked the government how it intended to work for Enosis. The Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Venizelos was non-committal. He admitted that the

¹⁹⁷ **Cumhuriyet**, 7 March 1951

¹⁹⁸ **Xydis**, p. 7

¹⁹⁹ **Holland**, p. 17-19.

delicacy of the matter and its effect on Anglo-Greek relations accounted for its omission from the statement of government policy.²⁰¹

Greece reflected the pressure from Great Britain, NATO and the USA to her public opinion and Greek Cypriot leaders, particularly Makarios. In 1951, when he was Prime Minister, Sophokles Venizelos refused to bring the issue to the United Nations. He also refused to succumb to pressures exerted upon him by Makarios when in 1952 he came to his office at the foreign ministry and told him: 'I shall expose you before the Greek people for refusing to bring the issue before the UN.' He told Makarios "you can expose me before anybody you want and with whatever accusations you find appropriate, but I will not allow you to direct the foreign policy of Greece."²⁰² According to some Greek writers the USA was sympathetic with Greek views about Cyprus, on the other hand, the conjuncture was not suitable to support such a claim.²⁰³ Sophokles Venizelos the then Greek Foreign Minister stated the position of the United States during a parliamentary meeting:

*"I must before this Assembly that the US government at that time was strongly opposed to any initiative Greece might take to bring the issue before the UN. The phases usually employed in trying to convince us were: 'we sympathise with your case, but we are in no position to help you' or 'the international situation does not favour such an appeal'. This is why I refused to bring the issue to the UN in spite of heavy pressures by Makarios aimed at reconsideration of my position."*²⁰⁴

It might be argued that Greece has pursued a more 'nationalist' policy on Cyprus in comparison with Turkey. Yet, Greece had not been able to formulate a policy different from the sphere of Western interest. Greek Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelos, for instance, even wanted to form a federation between Greece and Turkey during his visit to Turkey.²⁰⁵ Venizelos visited Turkey between 29 January- 5 February 1952 and said that "the friendly Greek-Turkish relationship is as strong as we will put

²⁰⁰ Bitsios, Dimitri, *Vulnerable Republic*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Salonica, 1975, p. 12.

²⁰¹ Crawshaw, p. 64

²⁰² Terlexis, p.92.

²⁰³ Ibid., p. 94.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

forward both countries will be one and same country soon.”²⁰⁶ He was forced to deal with Cyprus question on governmental level in 1951. On the other hand, Venizelos was in doubt about possible desires of Turkish Government on Cyprus while Britain withdrew from the island. In reply to his concerns about Turkey’s possible reaction, Menderes relaxed him by saying that the matter will be solved within the Turkish-Greek friendship.²⁰⁷ Venizelos, on 22 February 1952, stated that “Cyprus problem is a matter only between Greece and Britain”.²⁰⁸ One day later, on 23 February 1952, AKEL announced the desire for disarmament in Cyprus. Meetings which were calling for Enosis were held around Greece. The Greek authorities indeed were welcomed. Yet it is obvious that there was no correlation between the meeting calling for Enosis and the Greek government which claimed these meetings should be stopped. On answering the questions about the Enosis meetings in Greece, the Greek Governor General of Western Thrace replied: “This subject is related only with the Cypriots. He was well aware of the risk that the case would be linked through the Turkish population in his region. He continued that the Greek government decisively hinders these kinds of meetings. Some youth are a bit hot-blooded. There is an idiom ‘children eat plum, adults’ teeth set on edge’”.²⁰⁹ Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Venizelos went to Lebanon to discuss the matters of the cession of Cyprus to Greece and Mediterranean security with Lebanese and Syrian authorities.²¹⁰ Greek Archbishop who was in Cyprus at that time went to Beirut in order to discuss the matter of Cyprus with Venizelos.

In 1952, the year Greece and Turkey became members of NATO, the Greek government continued its approaches to the British government. In May 1952, Venizelos, the then Foreign Minister, spoke to the British Ambassador in Athens, Sir Clifford Norton, and handed him, for transmission to Lord Halifax, an unofficial note on the issue. In June and July 1952, other demarches were made either in London or in Athens, and the standing Greek offer of bases in Greece was reaffirmed.²¹¹ At the time, although the Greek government firmly rejected the persistent pleas of Makarios for

²⁰⁵ **Güvenç Nazmi**, *Kıbrıs Sorunu Yunanistan ve Türkiye*, Çağdaş Politika Yayınları, İstanbul, 1984, p. 39.

²⁰⁶ **Fırat**, p. 587.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p.598.

²⁰⁸ **Cumhuriyet**, 24 February 1952.

²⁰⁹ **Cumhuriyet**, 30 May 1952

²¹⁰ **Cumhuriyet**, 18 May 1952

recourse to the UN, its representatives at the seventh session of the Assembly directly or indirectly again referred to the Cyprus question both in the general debate and in the Third and Fourth Committees. That session, by adapting the earlier mentioned Resolution 637 which called upon member states to promote the right of self-determination among non-self-governing peoples, inaugurated a new period in the organisations history during which self-determination issues became the subject of considerable debate.²¹²

Archbishop of Athens visited Deputy PM Venizelos on June 1952. Makarios also joined that meeting and Archbishop of Athens asked Venizelos to act for the sacred case to put on the agenda of UN. He was replied by Venizelos that the government would do anything it could do for the case and would support the matter at the UN.²¹³ Greek Minister of State, Varitus, visited Istanbul on July 1952, replied the question if there was a problem between his country and Turkey because of Cyprus: 'There is excitement and demonstration about Cyprus. But, whenever we talk about Cyprus, Turkish and Greek friendship would come to mind.'²¹⁴ On the other hand, Deputy Prime Minister Venizelos announced the Greek desires for Enosis in his acceptance of the Student Committee representing a high school from Cyprus that 'Greek government has never given up the demand to have a united Greece with Cyprus.'²¹⁵ In his US visit in early December 1952, Makarios demanded the Greek Americans to work for Enosis²¹⁶. The then Prime Minister Papagos expressed his governments' foreign policy line in the Parliament and touched the Cyprus question: 'Government with no doubt, will work for what is necessary with respect to the realities of today'; about this issue which is an emotional subject for the Greek nation as a whole.²¹⁷

In October 1952, Grivas went to Cyprus to begin a five months study of a possible armed campaign and to plan the smuggling of arms into the island. Young men of the two Greek Cypriot youth movements, OXEN [OHEN (OXEN: Orthodoxos Christianiki Enosis Neon: Orthodox Christian Union of Youth. OHEN: Despite

²¹¹ Xydis, op.cit., p. 8.

²¹² Ibid.

²¹³ *Cumhuriyet*, 23 June 1952.

²¹⁴ *Akşam*, 12 July 1952

²¹⁵ *Akşam*, 17 July 1952

²¹⁶ *Hürriyet*, 2 December 1952.

²¹⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, 19 December 1952

Stephens used OXEN, **Panteli** and **Crawshaw** for example prefer to use OHEN for the same organisation)] and PEON (Pankyprios Ethniki Organosis of Neolaias: Pancyprrian National Organisation of Youth.) were chosen to receive and store smuggled arms. The preparations continued throughout 1953 for action in Cyprus on two levels: The public level of diplomacy and the secret level of armed conspiracy. Grivas returned to Greece in February 1953 with a completed plan for military action and he sent a copy of the plan to Makarios.²¹⁸ According to Grivas, the Archbishop at first accepted the need for the use of force but wanted to confine it to sabotage, excluding guerrilla operations. He began to draw to back from this position, however, when the new Papagos government sought to discourage the whole enterprise, making it plain that it did not wish to be involved.²¹⁹ On the other hand, some other commentators did not share the view that Makarios wanted to keep Grivas out of Cyprus at all costs, nor Papagos gave an order for his arrest when he was on the point of leaving for Cyprus.²²⁰

In the world arena the year 1953 featured Stalin's death (5 March), and the Korean Armistice (27 July). In the Balkan arena it witnessed, on February 25, the signing of the Ankara Pact – a five year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation among Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey – and, in the Greek sector, the conclusion of a US-Greek agreement, on October 12, on the use of naval and airbases in Greece.²²¹ A new bout of pro-Enosis activity was started with 1953. Greek Cypriot leaders used every opportunity to publicize the Enosis. On 16 February 1953, Makarios went to London, and as Stefanidis points out, according to the British, he was able to attract more local attention than any other Cypriot visitor before him. He was received by the Archbishop of Canterbury, the liberal party's leader Clement Davies, and Labour MPs., and met the press.²²² King Paul, however, who was visiting London privately assured the British Foreign Office that he would avoid Makarios 'like poison'. The Archbishop's stay in London coincided with the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement giving Sudan independency in three years time. This caused bitter comment in Cyprus as well as speculations regarding ultimate British intentions. Makarios for one thing had little difficulty in

²¹⁸ **Panteli**, p. 203.

²¹⁹ **Vanezis**, pp. 8-10.

²²⁰ **Grivas Georgios**, *The Memoirs of General Grivas*, Ed. by **Charles Foley**, Longmans, London, 1964, pp. 18-19

²²¹ **Xydis**, p. 8.

reassuring his flock that Enosis was 'round the corner'.²²³ After London, Makarios embarked on a three-week visit to Athens to also meet Papagos the then PM. They appeared together before the press. The Prime Minister maintained a facade of reserve. Once more, the British were irritated by Makarios' royal reception, this time by Queen Frederica. Charles Peake, the British ambassador to Athens, was able to extract a pledge from Foreign Minister Stefanos Stefanopoulos that the government would consult him prior to any future visit by Makarios.²²⁴

When Makarios was in Athens, the campaign for Enosis gradually accelerated among the Greeks. Demonstrations and meetings were held almost every day in Athens and other major cities of Greece. Sometimes demonstrations were bloody. For example, on 4 March 1953, twenty policemen were injured in a clash with university students demonstrating for Enosis and walking through the British Embassy in Athens.²²⁵ Oath of the Members of the Fighting Committee in Athens for the Union of Cyprus (12 members including Makarios and Grivas) on 7 March 1953 was as follows:

*"I sever in the name of the Holy and Consubstantial and Indivisible Trinity to keep secret, sacrificing even my life, suffering even the harshest tortures, all that I know or will hear regarding the question of the Union of Cyprus. And I shall obey blindly the relevant orders given to me from time to time."*²²⁶

Makarios returned to Cyprus 21 March 1953, and held a meeting to announce a new phase in the struggle for Enosis. First, as his predecessor had done in 1949, he would call the Governor to hold a plebiscite; failing this, he would appeal for UN intervention, and to that end he professed readiness 'to seek the support of every nation and accept help from every hands even from dirty hands.'²²⁷ In re-launching this plebiscite idea, Makarios was propelled by a resolution of the Seventh General Assembly, which was to advance the principle of self-determination towards recognition as a fundamental collective human right. The above mentioned Resolution

²²² Stefanidis, op.cit., p. 42.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid., pp. 42-43.

²²⁵ *Cumhuriyet* and *Hürriyet*, 5 Mart 1953

²²⁶ Reddaway, John., *Burdened With Cyprus: The British Connection*, Weidenfelt and Nicolson, London, 1986, p. 73.

637A (VII) of 16 December 1952 recommended that member states '*shall support the principle of self-determination of all peoples and nations*' and '*shall recognise and promote the realisation of the right of self-determination of the peoples of non-self-governing territories who happened to be under their rule*'; the ruling powers, the text went on, *should facilitate the exercise of this right, whereas the will of the affected people could be ascertained 'through plebiscites or other recognised democratic means*'.²²⁸ Armed with this text of UN Resolution Makarios wrote a letter to Governor Sir Andrew Wright, on 27 April 1953, asking him to put the latter recommendation into effect. London authorised a short and sharp reply, reiterating the closed matter position.²²⁹

Greek Foreign Minister Stefanopoulos restated that Greece desired Cyprus. However, in his talk in Parliament he avoided to reply a question about what his government would do when the subject was to be submitted in the UN. At the same parliamentary meeting a deputy from the Dodecanese Islands said that Cyprus should share the fate of the Dodecanese.²³⁰ In reaction to Stephanopoulos's statement on Cyprus, Turkish National Students Federation (TMTB) declared on 2 June 1953 the Cyprus matter as the national cause.²³¹ From that time onwards, Turkish press continuously dealt with the matter. Furthermore in every possible occasion in the parliament, furthermore, the deputies talked about the cause. However, the government did not take steps, which the public opinion demanded until the subject went to the UN and even later.²³²

During Queen Elizabeth II's coronation in early June 1953, demonstrations for Enosis were spread out around the island. Greek Cypriots boycotted festivities, and disturbances were widespread, especially secondary school students played the leading part in demonstrations causing disturbances. In several major cities of the island they disrupted the official parade, tore down Union Jacks and clashed with police as well as

²²⁷ Stefanidis, p. 43

²²⁸ See, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 637VII/16.12.1952 (Agenda Item 30.A/Res/40). See also Xydis, p. 492, for the resolution to be adopted and the opposition of colonial powers particularly Britain to that; and US perception as well.

²²⁹ Stefanidis,

²³⁰ Dünya, 26 May 1953

²³¹ Hürriyet, 3 June 1953

²³² Gürün, p. 383

Turkish Cypriots.²³³ During the impressive display of pro-Enosis sentiment, Archbishop Makarios criticized the official line of Greek Foreign Policy on Cyprus, which he found illusory. He demanded from Greece, as the mother country of Greek Cypriots, an immediate recourse to the UN. He added a thinly veiled irritating threat to the government of Greece while trying to attract the attention of the US by saying, that if Athens continued to hesitate to take the lead for the sacred national question, he warned that the Cypriots would stretch out 'both right and left hands to accept help offered from both East and West.'²³⁴ At the same time the Greek PM Papagos visited Turkey. During his visit to Turkey between 16-20 June 1953, no comment on Cyprus was made. When Papagos returned to Athens, the Greek newspapers wrote a claim that Soviet Russia will ask Cyprus to be united with Greece from the UN.²³⁵ On governmental level, the relations between Turkey and Greece were seen as good. On the other hand by autumn, however, this façade of harmony was somewhat tarnished. This time, the regular anti-Enosis campaign in Turkey was combined with a wave of protest against the alleged ill treatment of the Muslim minority in Greek Western Thrace.²³⁶ On August 1953, Archbishop Makarios addressed a petition to the new Secretary-General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjöld, requesting him to bring the Cyprus question before the General Assembly. Makarios wrote to the Secretary General of the UN:

"An open unimpeachable plebiscite was held on January 15, 1950, the result of which was that 95.7 percent of the Greek inhabitants or 80 percent of the whole population of Cyprus by their vote expressed their determination to be incorporated into the Greek state by the organic union of this island with its mother-country Greece".²³⁷

He also gave reference to the Resolution 637A (VII) -which called upon member states to promote the right of self-determination- in order to have a legitimate ground for his demand. However, Hammarskjöld did not give an answer as Makarios expected, by the reason, that this kind of demand could only be an issue on the agenda, in case of

²³³ Kelling, p.127

²³⁴ Crawshaw, p.54, Kelling, p.127

²³⁵ Dünya, 27 June 1953

²³⁶ Dünya, 2 September 1953

²³⁷ Salih, Halil İbrahim; Cyprus, The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State, University of Alabama Press, USA, 1978, p.8

a member state to request for it.²³⁸ The American Ambassador in Athens, Cavendish W. Cannon, warned Washington on communist engagement to the Cyprus issue: “If Greek government does not sponsor complaint, some Iron Curtain or Arab state would, in Alexis Kyrrou’s (Alexis Kyrrou was serving as Greek Consul at Nicosia when recalled to Athens on November 1, 1931, at the request of British authorities in Cyprus following Greek Cypriot violent demonstrations for Enosis) opinion [union of Cyprus with Greece], probably do so, which would work to advantage of Communist in Cyprus, perhaps increasing their following from 30 to 50 percent of population.”²³⁹ Archbishop Makarios, on 9 September 1953, sent a letter to Field-Marshal Papagos for seeking the support of the Greek government: “We are entitled to, and demand, such support because what the Cypriots want is not self government or autonomy or independence but union with Greece”.²⁴⁰

In the event, Makarios neither visited the UN nor sought support for his petition from a third country. An earthquake²⁴¹, which hit Cyprus severely on 10 September 1953, also contributed him to change his plans. It is important to note that Makarios knew that Alexis Kyrrou, the Greek Permanent Representative to the UN, intended to express Greece’s interest in Cyprus to let the door open for future action. During the Security Council debate on Morocco on 31 August 1953, Kyrrou had made it clear that in supporting the inscriptions of any item before UN, his delegation upheld ‘the special interest of Greece’. He had further explained that his country entertained the possibility of eventually bringing the matter before the General Assembly, as a last resort, a cause dear to every Greek heart.²⁴² Kyrrou stated Greek(s) desires for the self-determination of Cyprus to the unification of island to Greece. During the General debate on 21 September 1953, he referred to the Archbishop’s petition -that call for plebiscite on the self-determination- to Hammarskjöld. He pointed out that, despite heavy domestic pressures, his government had decided, not to raise the Cyprus question in the hope that

²³⁸ Reddaway, p. 73.

²³⁹ FRUS 1952-1954, VOL. VIII., p. 678

²⁴⁰ Reddaway, p. 73.

²⁴¹ Akşam, 11 September 1953.

²⁴² Stefanidis, p. 46.

Britain would agree with bilateral talks. Otherwise, he concluded, the door to UN always remained open.²⁴³

While Grivas was in Cyprus, the Greek elections of 16 November 1952 had resulted in a landslide victory of Papagos and the Greek Rally. Papagos was a vain man, and at that time he was still a symbol and hero of the anti-Communist struggle.²⁴⁴ Before the election, a new electoral law enacted which supported the Papagos's victory. His party had gained half of the total vote and 239 out of the 300 parliamentary seats. Makarios asked Papagos to redeem his pledge and bring the Cyprus problem before the UN. In an interview with Robert Stephens in June 1965, Stefan Stefanopoulos, who was the Foreign Minister of Papagos Government, stated that Papagos insisted that Greece should first make a direct approach to Britain, whom he considered to be friendly to Greece and to himself. The opportunity to do so arose in the autumn of 1953 when Eden visited Athens during a convalescent cruise in the Mediterranean following a serious illness. Peake, the British Ambassador arranged a meeting between Eden and Papagos. The meeting concluded as a disaster for Greeks. Eden refused to discuss Cyprus, which he said Britain would never give up. In the words of Stefanopoulos:

*'Eden was ill and Papagos, a blunt soldier, was not very diplomatic. Eden pronounced the fatal word "never". Papagos came back and said to me [Stefanopoulos] in an outraged voice: "he [Eden] told me [Papagos] never -not even we shall see".'*²⁴⁵

The refusal of Greek claims by the British stimulated Greek official support for the Enosists. It is still a matter of conjecture how far Eden's refusal to discuss matters with the Greek leader also led to secret official encouragement for Colonel Grivas to organise an armed revolt in Cyprus and go to the island to lead it in person. Papagos-Eden meeting was the beginning of the end of the traditional framework of Anglo-Hellenic friendship.²⁴⁶ After spending three weeks resting in Crete, Eden went to Athens to attend an organized meeting with Greek Prime Minister Papagos, before going back to Britain. Pending the Papagos-Eden meeting the Greek government sought

²⁴³ Ibid., pp. 46-47.

²⁴⁴ Stephens, p. 135.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Holland, p. 32

to dissuade Makarios from flying to New York. The task was entrusted to Alexis Kyrou, who also confided to the Archbishop that there was to be a 'high level approach' to the British. Makarios was seemingly unimpressed and leaked the information to the Cypriots newspapers. Stefanopoulos asked the Americans to lend a hand in changing the Archbishop mind.²⁴⁷ The State Department refused, estimating that the Greek government once more was in a search of an alibi for a difficult decision. The Embassy was instructed to remind Stefanopoulos that, although the US did not wish to become a party to the problem, it still did not think it useful for the Greeks to press it.²⁴⁸

On 22 September 1953, he met the Greek Prime Minister, Field-Marshal Papagos at the British Embassy. At the meeting, as Stefanidis pointed out, two strong and vain personalities clashed.²⁴⁹ Given the prominence accorded to this particular event by many people, including Papagos, it is worth citing to subsequent account. First, that of the British Ambassador, Peake, who was present at the meeting. Peake wrote about Papagos's wishes on Cyprus. According to Peake, Papagos again raised the question and intended to strictly secretly talk with secretary, Eden. On the other hand, Eden even refused to discuss it. On the topic Peake continued as:

*Mr. Eden said he feared that no discussion about Cyprus, whether private or no, could be fruitful. His position was that he could not consider, either now or in any predictable future, any change of sovereignty. In reply to a question from the Ambassador, Mr. Eden agreed that the House of Commons would in no circumstances consent to any change in the status of Cyprus. In this matter we, like Greece, had to undergo the discipline of democracy. While in Greece there was a disposition to see Cyprus come to Greece in the UK there was an opposite disposition, equally firmly held.*²⁵⁰

²⁴⁷ FRUS 1952-1954, VIII., pp. 676-677

²⁴⁸ FRUS 1952-1954, VIII., pp. 677-678

²⁴⁹ Stefanadis, p. 48.

²⁵⁰ Record of conversation between Papagos and Eden, 22 September 1953, quoted from Stefanidis, p. 47.

In reply to a question of the Ambassador, Field-Marshal Papagos agreed that his question was one based upon emotion. Then Papagos expanded his arguments to claim a change of sovereignty over Cyprus from Britain to Greece as in the case of 1864 Ionian Islands. To response these arguments Eden said:

*Cyprus has never in fact belonged to Greece, and the only link between the two countries was a common language and the hierarchy of the Orthodox Church. After all there was a considerable Greek population in Alexandria and New York, but he did not suppose that the Greek Government was demanding Enosis for them.*²⁵¹

Papagos disappointed and said that, “if this was to be out attitude, there hardly seemed any point in going on with the discussion. With this the Secretary of State and H. M. Ambassador agreed”.²⁵² Then, Papagos, put forward his intention to how the Cyprus issue would be solved ‘within the traditional Anglo-Hellenic Friendship’. According to Papagos, the Greek government found itself following the Ethnarchy’s appeal, and he claimed that:

*....why it [the Greek Government] did not sponsor it, and insisted upon the need for finding a solution of the Cyprus problem to be found through bilateral friendly talks; these talks should particularly reinforce the good relations which we wish to have with Great Britain.*²⁵³

Eden, in reply to Papagos’s arguments, said: “I shall repeat what I have said on other occasions that for the British government there exists no Cyprus question, either at

²⁵¹ Record of conversation between Papagos and Eden, 22 September 1953, quoted from **Stefanidis**, p. 47.

²⁵² Record of conversation between Papagos and Eden, 22 September 1953, quoted from **Stefanidis**, op.cit., pp. 47-48

²⁵³ Record of conversation between Papagos and Eden, 22 September 1953, quoted from **Stefanidis**, p. 48.

present or in the future”.²⁵⁴ On the refusal of Greek arguments by the British Foreign Secretary Eden, Papagos expressed the Greek intentions: “The Greek government will handle this matter [unification of Cyprus with Greece] in the way that it deems best and most expedient, and that it assumes full and absolute freedom of action”.²⁵⁵ Just the day after the meeting of Papagos and Eden on 23 September 1953 Greek Representative to the UN, Alexis Kyrrou tried their chance once again. Kyrrou delivered a speech in the General Assembly that his country preferred to discuss the Cyprus question mutually with Britain rather than at the UN. He added that the majority of the population in the island was in favour of the union with Greece. Furthermore, his government would seek a way of discussion with Britain in a friendly manner.²⁵⁶ However he had no results. Greece resolved to raise the matter at the UN but by that the Greek Cypriots had decided to take a hand in making their own future.

The core of that meeting was leaked out to the Greek press in Athens and in Nicosia, which reported the Field-Marshal Papagos offended. On 15 October 1953, the Greek Ministry for Foreign Affairs directed a formal note and an *aide mémoire* to the British Embassy in Athens, recording the Papagos-Eden meeting and hitting a note of warning. In view of the negative British attitude the Greek government assumed full freedom of action in the future. The British considered this a belated reservation of the Greek position, which had not been made during the Papagos –Eden meeting. To the British Ambassador Charles Peake it was no more than a face saving gesture, designed to placate the champion of Enosis in Greece and Cyprus. The British Foreign Office for its part determined not to reply to the Greek note and relied on Peake to repeat the British position whenever essential.²⁵⁷

During 1953, Greek Turkish relations had remained as close as ever on the surface at any rate. After the signing of the tripartite Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with Yugoslavia in February, the two countries were busy transforming it into a military alliance. In mid-June Papagos and Stefanopoulos paid a state visit to Turkey. The Balkan Pact and the friendship offensive of the new Soviet leadership to

²⁵⁴ Record of conversation between Papagos and Eden, 22 September 1953, quoted from **Stefanidis**, p. 48.

²⁵⁵ Papagos told the parliament about this conversation (between him and Eden) on 7 February 1955, quoted from **Stefanidis**, pp. 47-48

²⁵⁶ **Dünya**, 23 September 1953

Ankara, following Stalin's death dominated talks. Cyprus was not a topic, but some in Athens and Nicosia found cause for optimism in the passage of the joined communiqué, which stated that no question existed between the two countries that could not be solved in a friendly manner.²⁵⁸

Until 1954 Greece rejected Archbishop Makarios' suggestions that Greece should raise the Cyprus question at the UN. When in 1952 Makarios threatened the then Greek Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelos by saying that 'I shall expose you to the Greek people for your refusal [i.e. to have the recourse to the UN,]. Venizelos replied 'you may do whatever you wish... But you shall not be allowed to dictate the foreign policy of Greece'.²⁵⁹

From 1954 onwards, As Gürel notes Greece was encouraged by the Turkish government's policy. Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos, for instance, said that Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister sent messages to them that "a minor issue like Cyprus can not damage Greek-Turkish friendship".²⁶⁰ The British withdrawals from India in 1947 and from Palestine 1948 attracted the mainland and Cypriot Greek for a union or annexation. However, the common goal of NATO prevented Greek governments to pay much attention to the Cyprus question despite the pressures from the public opinion in Greece and the Greek Cypriots.²⁶¹ According to American official documents, 'remarks of Greek Ambassador to Turkey John D. Kalergis to Embassy counsellor on 5 March 1953 to effect Turks would not object on official level to union Cyprus with Greece. Embassy considers this opinion incorrect.' It is already disproved by fact Turks have now made formal representation to Greek government for first time. Americans believed Turkish position essentially as stated by Birgi, i.e., Turks are seriously concerned and will demand voice in any decision alter present status of Cyprus.²⁶²

²⁵⁷ *Stefanidis*, p. 48

²⁵⁸ **Armaoğlu Fahir**, *Kıbrıs Meselesi 1954-1959 Türk Hükümetinin ve Kamuoyunun Davranışları (Karşılaştırmalı bir inceleme)*, AÜSBF Yayınları, Ankara, 1963, p. 17

²⁵⁹ **Markides**, p. 124

²⁶⁰ **Gürel, Şükrü Sina**, "Türkiye ve Kıbrıs Türk Toplumunu Tarihten Geleceğe Kısa Bir Değerlendirme", *Yeni Kıbrıs Dergisi*, Cilt. V, No. 1, Ekim-1987, p. 24

²⁶¹ **Armaoğlu, Fahir**, "1955 Yılında Kıbrıs Meselesinde Türk Hükümeti ve Türk Kamuoyu", *SBF Dergisi* Cilt.XIV, No. 2-3, Temmuz-1959, p. 58.

²⁶² FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 683-684

Greek Prime Minister Papagos made a statement on 23 March 1954 about his decision to send the question to the UN meeting which would be held on September 1954.²⁶³ However on 1 April 1954, Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü once again repeated himself with the words ‘Turkey has no question of Cyprus’.²⁶⁴ Greek Ambassador to Washington Athanase Politis expressed the opinion that his government has considerable influence with Cypriot leaders and even more with the Ethnarchy on 24 June 1954.²⁶⁵ According to Politis the British at this time (28 July 1954) would be completely inflexible on any move which threaten their sovereignty over Cyprus referring to the British withdrawal from Egypt.²⁶⁶

The misgiving arose among the Greek Cypriot leadership on July 1954 after a month that Britain decided to transfer their headquarters to Cyprus. On 28 July 1954 the Minister of State for the Colonies, Henry Hopkinson, announced the offer of a new constitution for Cyprus. It provided for a minority of elected members in the legislature and so was a step backwards from the Winster Constitution rejected by the Greek Cypriot in 1948. This was bad enough, but worse was the accompanying statement in the House of Commons in which the minister said of Cyprus: ‘there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent’. The word ‘never’ now uttered again but this time in public, was glossed over later in the debate by Sir Winston Churchill, then still the Prime Minister. But it powerfully stirred feelings in Cyprus and in Greece.²⁶⁷

On 16 August 1954 Greece by the approval of Papagos applied UN General Assembly to put the self-determination right to Cyprus. According to George V. Melas, the Greek Ambassador to Washington, the Turkish government had not acted as a free agent in taking a stand against the Greek resolution but had, in fact, been subjected to great pressure. Ambassador Melas clearly implied on 23 December 1954 that the British government had put such pressure on the Turks.²⁶⁸ The Turks were at once relieved that there was to be no Enosis and the constitution proposed was obviously safe. The Greek Cypriots reacted more slowly but the two principal impressions gained were, first,

²⁶³ **Halkın Sesi**, 24 March 1954

²⁶⁴ **Milliyet**, 2 April 1954; see also **Stefanidis**, p.55.

²⁶⁵ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 692

²⁶⁶ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 700

²⁶⁷ **Stephens**, p. 136

genuine disappointment and surprise that the constitution outlined was less liberal than the 1948 offer or even the pre-1931 arrangement. Second, there was a feeling that the whole thing had been ill-timed and that the correct moment to say 'no Enosis' and to introduce the constitution would have been after the Cyprus question had foundered at the UN. Every one would then be saying that the widely advertise reference having failed, it was time to have a change of policy and the public would have been less inclined to feel that something was being imposed on the people by force.²⁶⁹

In 1954 the population of Cyprus numbered 515.000 of whom 80 percent were Greek orthodox and 18 percent Turkish Muslim. Most of 626 villages were either Greek or Turkish, although 15 percent were mixed.²⁷⁰ When Greek Cypriotes emigrate, they go to the Great Britain, not to Greece (The same is true with the Turkish Cypriots although we have other examples immigrated to Turkey in thousands). In 1954 Cypriote immigrants in to the Great Britain and Commonwealth totalled 3,688 those to Greece 5 (five). The official figures for the twelve months following the throwing of the first bomb in 1955 were respectively over 4000 and 1 (one).²⁷¹ The Greek Cypriots in London who had bunched in a great community after these immigrations replied the mainland politicians and Makarios who asked them to work much for Enosis: "We are first Britons and then Philhellenes. When your radio insulted us everyday and your university proclaimed hatred against our people the least that we, your friends, could do was to remain silent."²⁷²

The year 1954 was sterile and frustrating. The British government did not budge from its position, namely that there was no such thing as a Cyprus question. They insisted that the only issue was the eventual granting of a constitution to Cyprus. As Bitsios emphasizes that Greeks and Greek Cypriots also remained their unchanged arguments: Enosis within a set date and at the UN General Assembly, which a little later discussed the problem, it was decided "not to consider the item further". Again there was a complete deadlock.²⁷³

²⁶⁸ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 751

²⁶⁹ **Baker**, p. 112.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

²⁷¹ **Luke**, p. 176.

²⁷² **Bitsios**, p. 24.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

It had always been expected, particularly after Lausanne that London would hand over Cyprus to Greece. The Greeks considered the future of the island a matter between themselves and the British. The Turkish intervention was an unpleasant surprise for them. They firmly believed that the British instigated the Turkish government's interference in Cypriote affairs to prolong their domination over Cyprus. Without such British intrigue – so they thought - Turks would not have opposed Enosis. They also believed that Ankara and the Turkish press have artificially stirred up Turkish nationalist emotions. Turkish Prime Minister Menderes only wished to distract public attention from the deplorable economic situation and other sources of discontent by focusing it on Cyprus, or so this line of reasoning went.

Three decades of the involvement by Greece and Turkey in Cyprus after Lausanne may be summed up in the following terms: Greece wanted to strengthen its existing ties with the Greek Cypriot community and, encouraged by the persistence of the Enosis movement, increasingly viewed Cyprus' ultimate union with Greece as a realisable national goal.²⁷⁴ As mentioned before, the Greek argument on Cyprus was short and simple: the unification of island to Greece: Enosis; without regard on Turkish Cypriots' rights. The Greeks call for the right of self-determination, therefore, was only a step to reach Enosis. As known the right of self-determination envisages political sovereignty and independence to the peoples of the country. On the other hand, in the case of Cyprus, the means of self-determination, in practice, was the unification of island with Greece. According to Greek perspectives, the Turkish rights in Cyprus were defined by the Treaty of Lausanne, i.e. Article 20 that Turkey accepts the annexation of Cyprus by Britain. Cyprus issue should be, therefore, settled only between Greece and Britain. Greeks were concerned for the involvement of Turkey into the issue. The big mistake of the Greek governments of the 1950's had been to undermine the seriousness of the Turkish interest in Cyprus. They were under the impression that the very cautious and peaceful reaction of the Turkish government was a sign of weakness and that Turkey could be neutralised by an alliance such as the Balkan Pact and with a few friendly statements or gestures, designed to remain merely on paper.²⁷⁵ It is now well

²⁷⁴ **Ateşin, Hüseyin Mehmet;** *Kıbrıs'ta İslami Kimlik Davası*, Marifet Yayınları, İstanbul, 1996, p.163; **Bahçeli**, op.cit., p. 30-31

²⁷⁵ www.kktc.pubinfo.gov.nc.tr.

understood that Greek governments misunderstood Turkish governments' silence and felt that they were free to act any kind of manner and policy on the case.²⁷⁶ It was certainly a fault of Greek statesmen to evaluate the reactions and views of Turkish press, public opinion, and deputies of the parliament and even of the government, as nothing or meaningless.²⁷⁷

Meanwhile in the island the colonial secretary had an interview with Archbishop Makarios and reported him as entirely non-committal. The Archbishop travelled immediately afterwards to Athens, where he brought every pressure he could to bear up on the Greek government to inscribe the Cyprus issue up on the agenda of the UN before the London Conference opened. He did not hesitate to make strong statement in Athens itself, which could only embarrass the Greek government if they wished to find a solution. It was clear that Archbishop Makarios was out to make as much difficulty as possibly. This he did in private and in public. On July 16th at a press conference he said: "The Cyprus question does not constitute a political issue between Britain on the one hand, Greece and Turkey on the other. The Cyprus issue is purely a question of self-determination and concerns the British government and the Cypriot people only, and it can be extended so as to concern the Greek government, whenever the latter, in interpreting the feelings of the Greek and especially the Cypriot people, acts as the people's mandatory for the safeguarding of the islands' right of self-determination."²⁷⁸

2.4. American Perspective

This chapter aims to disclose the American perspectives on the emerging Cyprus issue as an international problem. Although we are here not primarily concerned for the positions of Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain they will be mentioned on appropriate occasions in order to clarify the subject and the United States foreign policy formulation on the matter. United States of America within the decade long period of 1945-1954 did not have a specific foreign policy about the fate of the island of Cyprus. Until the Truman Doctrine in 12 March 1947 which legitimized the role of her as a superpower having the "rights and obligations" also for the Eastern Mediterranean on which Cyprus

²⁷⁶ Gürün, p. 383.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 384

²⁷⁸ Eden, p. 399

was located, the USA viewed any problem on Cyprus as an internal matter of her ally Great Britain. By the cited doctrine her policy started to change but not further to a particular issue. It was rather considered as a sub-branch of bigger foreign policy area. The most important pillar of the policy on Cyprus was the prevention of any major conflict among her three very important allies on the region namely the Great Britain, Turkey and Greece.

Moreover under the conditions of Cold War, gravely polarized the world into two enemy blocks i.e. NATO and Warsaw Pact, America refrained from directly intervening the problem except warning particularly the Greeks (both the mainland politicians and the Greek Cypriots having religious or political title) not to endanger the NATO Alliance by provoking Great Britain or Turkey who had vital interests on the island. British position was clear that the matter as a colonial one regarding merely herself. Turkey on the other hand followed a policy solely based on the alliance's principles of solidarity. Thus even though having an undeniable Turkish population on the island Turkey did not change her position based on the Treaty of Lausanne with which she accepted the annexation of the Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on 5 November 1914. Despite the conflicting issue of decolonisation which the USA supported in principle and subsequent tolerance of Enosis (the idea to unite Cyprus with Greece) demands of Greek Cypriots and later the Greeks as well, primarily bound on ethnic proportion of the island dominated by the Greeks, she refrained from giving official support to the continuous demands of the Greeks.

While the role of the US in the Mediterranean after the WW II has not been exactly imperial, it has certainly been hegemonic. The US Sixth Fleet has been the dominant sea-power in the Mediterranean since 1946; it was introduced in the Eastern Mediterranean a year later in 1947, mainly to demonstrate military support for Greece and Turkey, in whose security the US had declared a special interest in March with the Truman Doctrine.²⁷⁹ In the international field the USA was firstly important as a source

²⁷⁹ **Stearns, Monteagle;** *Entangled Allies, US Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*, Council of Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1992, p. 2.

of funds and secondly for its inherent anti-colonialism, which could be exploited to sway international opinion.²⁸⁰

Superpowers like the US need wide peripheral vision and skilful diplomacy if their influence is to achieve maximum effect at minimum cost. The replacement of the British by the US influence in Greece and Turkey in 1947 and later in Cyprus might have been expected to bring the replacement of British perceptions by American perceptions, and the formulation of policies better adapted to the changing situation in all three countries. As Stearns shows, instead of formulating fresh Greek, Turkish and Cypriot policies based on new assessment, Washington tried, often clumsily, to fit Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus into its Soviet policy –the policy of containment.²⁸¹ As early as 1947, on 25 March, the New York Congressman Emanuel Celler had drawn the attention of Congress to the Island's strategic importance.²⁸²

In setting the priorities of US foreign policy, principles were 'easily reconciled with the defence requirements and economic opportunities' and increasingly became 'subordinated to the more urgent problem of anti-communism'.²⁸³ In the case of Cyprus, this reconciliation proved no easy matter, as the US had to take the conflicting interests of its allies into account. Yet as inter-allied relations deteriorated, this position never became official policy. Being aware of both Greek national aspirations and British imperial interests, American planners were primarily concerned with continuing Soviet expansion in an increasingly important region.²⁸⁴

By the Truman Doctrine of 12 March 1947, the continued mutual interests of United States and Britain started to be differentiated in terms of their world-views about Cyprus. The USA, at that time, shaped her policy according to the goals of a world power and dealt with the case as a sub-branch of Eastern Mediterranean security. Meanwhile Truman submitted his draft about the assistance to Greece and Turkey to the Foreign Relations Committee. He pointed out Cyprus in a paragraph supporting the hand-over of the island to Greece.²⁸⁵ As Kelling points out the State Department's version of this episode was the following: The paper on Cyprus was 'included

²⁸⁰ Woodhouse, C. M.; *The Apple of Discord*, Hutchinson, London, 1948, p. 244.

²⁸¹ Stearns, p. 17.

²⁸² Woodhouse, *The Apple of Discord*, p. 244.

²⁸³ Louis, p.409.

²⁸⁴ Darwin, p.145.

accidentally' into the material on Greek policy given by the Department to the press. It was intended for use 'without attribution' to its source and not as 'fixed and final US policy'. This injunction was disregarded, and certain paper reported that the United States favoured the cession of Cyprus to Greece. As a result, the State Department withdrew the paper in question and omitted any reference to Cyprus in its final statement of policy.²⁸⁶ Kirk stresses at that point that 'although the paragraph was omitted from the draft later probably because of the protests from British, a leakage of information from the State Department gave rise to reports that the American government favoured Enosis'.²⁸⁷

Since March 1947, when the Truman Doctrine announced a new era in US relations with Greece and Turkey the US government has betrayed uncertainty about where these two states should logically be situated in the spectrum of the American relations with the rest of the world. They have never fitted comfortably into the global maps with which we were most familiar.²⁸⁸ Such a long-standing security relationship might have been expected to cultivate in its beneficiaries sufficient trust to assure smooth relations among them. Greece and Turkey, after all, were believed their sense of insecurity in the face of post-war Soviet policy. In recognition of the obligations of mutual security, the USA extended generous military assistance to Turkey and economic assistance to Turkey and Greece.²⁸⁹

According to Sulzberger, the American military experts were unwilling to accept Greek gifts, even though the offer might at first sight seem strategically attractive. They stated the hidden dangers in unyielding terms: "by accepting bases in Crete and the Aegean Islands, we" as Americans and our NATO allies, "should strengthen the present Russian case for the bases in the Black Sea Straits" of Bosphorus and Dardanelles, "and encourage the Russians to argue that they were as much entitled to bases in the Aegean Islands" with particular reference to the Dodecanese and "Crete as we were... we are faced... with acquiring, not necessarily permanently, the right to potentially valuable bases but" on the other hand Sulzberger continued to argue the challenges of bipolar

²⁸⁵ **Kirk, George**; *The Middle East, 1945-1950*, Oxford University Press, London, 1954, p.76

²⁸⁶ **Kelling**, p.80

²⁸⁷ **Kirk**,

²⁸⁸ **Stearns**, p. 8.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

system as “the risk of accelerating Russian infiltration around Turkey, Greece, and the Greek Islands, and permanently sacrificing our sovereignty over the only British possession in the Eastern Mediterranean”.²⁹⁰

Meanwhile, partly in response to persistent British requests, the Americans did seek to discourage further Greek moves, above all a possible recourse to the UN.²⁹¹ Venizelos was reminded that both the State Department and the Pentagon opposed a change in the status of the island. The Turkish card was also thrown in and Venizelos was told that the State Department did not doubt the sincerity of Turkish feeling on Cyprus.²⁹² After Greek Prime Minister Venizelos clearly got the message, he gave the assurances the US sought. However he pointed out that he could not take Herbert Morrison’s reply to the Greek note as final.²⁹³ In May 1951, just a few months after the parliamentary decision on Cyprus, the Greek Premier replied a question from a journalist, as the Greek demand for the cession of Cyprus still stood, despite that the, international conjuncture did not pave the way for its realisation.

In a preliminary meeting on Cyprus, between the US and Britain, which took place in Washington on 10 July 1951, the divergence of the views of each side was clearly seen.²⁹⁴ In which one sees the subject according to her global parameters, and the latter handles the subject as a national concern on a colonial matter. Although they agreed to avoid the airing of the question at the UN, both parties had different views as to how to achieve this.²⁹⁵

However as a whole, British and American attitudes operated on different wavelengths. As Notherdge points out there was a little American sympathy for British resistance to the Greek demand for the union of Cyprus with Greece.²⁹⁶ When the conflict threatened to embroil Greece and Turkey, which had joined NATO in 1952, American pressure was thrown on the side of early British withdrawal from Cyprus.²⁹⁷

American views on Cyprus were well-known to parties directly concerned. According to American official documents, in the early 1950s, the US was not a party in

²⁹⁰ **Sulzberger**, pp. 311-312

²⁹¹ FRUS 1951, V, p.531

²⁹² FRUS 1951, V, pp. 533-534

²⁹³ FRUS 1951, V, p.534.

²⁹⁴ **Kelling**, pp. 106-107.

²⁹⁵ See for these different views, FRUS 1951, V, pp.539-540

²⁹⁶ **Notherdge**, p.186.

the problem but did regard it useful for Greek government press matter. The Americans in 1952 still believed that the Cyprus issue was the matter between friends rather than one for discussion in UN.²⁹⁸ On 18 July 1952, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson asked to the US Embassy in Athens to point out to Greeks in a suitable occasion that 'further agitation of Cyprus issue might well endanger whole structure of Greek-Turkish amity, toward development of which governments and peoples of both countries, have devoted much care with such outstanding results'. Venizelos in particular may have been impressed by this line as he claimed much credit for existing cordiality between two countries. About their judgements on the issue Acheson pointed out that regardless of the implications of Averoff's version of Turkish attitude toward problem²⁹⁹ sharp Turkish reaction could be expected would the Greeks bring matter to UN.³⁰⁰

The US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles planned a short holiday visit to Cyprus in April 1953, without 'any political implications' as he said. Thus, his ignorance to the critical situation in Cyprus, and the risk of a further step by the Enosis activists to submit their case to him or even to create violent disturbances worried the British authorities including the Governor of Cyprus, and Foreign and Colonial Offices. Nevertheless, the British were able to get Dulles to drop that idea, by diplomatic channels, without 'officially' handing the subject. Coincidentally it was the time when the British Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden fell seriously ill³⁰¹ and set sail for a convalescent journey in the Mediterranean on the advice of the doctors. Dulles did, however, come to Athens as part of his Near Eastern tour. In Greece he met Prime Minister Papagos on 27 May 1953. Papagos connected the Cyprus question with the Greek interest to join the projected Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) and gave a brief but earnest profile of his governmental policy about the issue. Papagos

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ FRUS 1952-1954 Vol. VIII., pp. 674-675.

²⁹⁹ Telegram 5387, June 19 (1952), reported that Evangelos Averoff, Greek Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, told Peurifoy in Athens on June 18 that in his discussions with the Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister during the Greek royal visit to Turkey, the Turks would not discuss Cyprus Enosis, stating that they themselves had strong interests therein because of former possession of the island and the Turkish minority there. They assured the Greeks that would not let the British play them off against the Greeks in discussing Cyprus. Peurifoy reported that Averoff said that if and when the Greeks secure Cyprus, they will make ample provision for the Turkish minority and will grant the British whatever bases they want on a 99-year lease. Quoted from FRUS 1952-1954 Vol. VIII, p. 675, footnote: 6

³⁰⁰ FRUS 1952-1954 Vol. VIII., pp. 674-675

³⁰¹ This illness forced Eden to be out of office for half a year.

replied his many times heard views as ‘his government was seeking to find a solution to the problem within the framework of Anglo-Greek friendship’. He added that ‘this was an issue that no Greek government could afford to ignore’. Dulles replied that the whole scheme was proceeding slowly, but if it ever involved ‘an area so historically important to Greece’, her position would be ‘carefully considered’.³⁰² The US Secretary of State hardly seemed to realise what was really at stake.

Before the Papagos-Eden meeting, Makarios wanted to take support from Americans. The Greek Government was opposed Makarios idea to try to involve the US into the question. On the other hand the USA did not want to become a party in the problem.³⁰³ According to the Americans, the question should be resolved within the respect of the interests of the concerned parties, namely, Britain, Greece and Turkey, without creating any problem that might harm the unity of free world. Athens charged Alexis Kyrrou with a duty of dissuading Makarios from his thoughts of raising the question at the UN.

On 26 August 1953, the Greek Permanent Representative to the UN, Alexis Kyrrou, approached Makarios and urged him to abandon to appeal to the UN on grounds that without the US support it would merely invite failure and work to profit the Soviets, and confided that Greek government contemplated a high level approach to the British. Meanwhile Makarios rejected Kyrrou’s plea and “has since leaked to Cypriot Press intimation that high level conversations are being contemplated, thus jeopardising prospects of their success” not to risk the counterbalance at the Eastern Mediterranean. This would be particularly, he continued “unfortunate at time when government is increasing Greek forces in Korea” against the communist rivals. It appears likely that, unless Makarios can be restrained, “Papagos may feel his posture as Paladin in other words champion of Greek nationalism obliges him to take over leadership of this campaign”. At the same record, Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos “would appreciate prompt response so that Papagos might be informed of American position before he speaks with Eden who arrives Greece in August 30 of 1953”.³⁰⁴

³⁰² FRUS, 1952-1954, IX, pp. 156-157.

³⁰³ FRUS, 1952-1954, VIII, pp. 677-678.

³⁰⁴ FRUS 1952-1954, VOL. VIII., pp. 676-677.

Papagos had already decided to open the Cyprus issue with Eden when Makarios appealed to him in August. Before Eden to come to Greece for his recovery, Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos communicated with Charles Yost, American Chargé d'affairs in Athens, about the content of the Papagos' approach. Firstly, the Prime Minister would propose the immediate granting of self-government which should be followed up by a plebiscite in two or three years; this would allow, the Cypriots to choose between independence, union with Greece or some status within the Commonwealth.³⁰⁵ Stephanopoulos also told Yost that, if the meeting with Eden was vain, the Field Marshall 'would fell obliged to support' Makarios' charge in the UN.³⁰⁶

Incidentally, the US Ambassador in Athens, Cavendish W. Cannon, had already suggested a Turkish approach to Washington asking for the US to be efficient to stop the Greek recourse to the UN, while the State Department would have approved a similar approach from Athens demanding support for the UN meeting. On 26 February 1954, the Director of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Muharrem Nuri Birgi, expounded the Turkish position to the US Ambassador in Ankara, Avra Warren. Birgi stressed that a Greek recourse to the UN would provoke Turkish opinion and jeopardise the existing good relations between the two countries.³⁰⁷ A week later on 10 March 1954, Warren and the State Department received an official memorandum containing Turkish views on Cyprus. Ankara came out in favour of the status quo and expressed concern with Greek intentions. This was probably the first time that a set of Turkish arguments against Enosis, emphasising geography and security, was officially advanced.³⁰⁸ It should be noted that both Birgi and Ambassador Erkin, targeted Kyrou, the then Director-General of the Greek Foreign Ministry, as the prime mover of the Greek claim on Cyprus.

The Turkish demarche to Athens was eventually attempted on 15 March 1954 on the heels of Eden's statements in the House of Commons. Yet it proved both ill-timed and out of place as Turkish Ambassador in Athens, Kemal Tarray chose the evening reception in honour of German Chancellor Conrad Adenauer to speak to

³⁰⁵ The variety of the options proposed by Papagos, could be a sign of idea that he was still thinking to find a solution within the context official talks with the colonial Britain, as still a very important ally.

³⁰⁶ FRUS, 1952-54, VIII, pp. 676-677

³⁰⁷ FRUS 1952-1954, VIII, pp. 680-681

³⁰⁸ FRUS 1952-1954 VIII, pp. 681-683.

Stephanopoulos about the ill-effects of the Cyprus venture on Greek Turkish co-operation. Under the circumstances he managed to convey his message in a diluted form. The British were further dismayed to find out that the Menderes government, which then faced a re-election campaign, was reluctant to undertake further and stronger demarches. The Turks made it clear that at that point after the signing of the Bled Military Alliance³⁰⁹ on 9 August they attached greater importance to the Balkan Pact and the Greek promises to improve the position of the Muslim minority in the Western Thrace. The British witnessed further signs of what they interpreted as Turkish equivocation. For example on the occasion of a Turkish Cypriot visit in early July, a government spokesman in Ankara while reaffirming that Turkey favoured the status quo, denied press reports that there had been Athens to prevent Greece from bringing the issue before the UN.

Although the signs of honeymoon between Greece and Turkey still on the surface there were other views started to flourish in the Turkish Government. On 1 April 1954, Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü, replying to a question in parliament, reaffirmed the position that there was no Cyprus question nor was a change in the status of the island desirable, but Turkey had every right to consider herself primarily interested party.³¹⁰ This statement caused some uneasy comment in the Greek press and reports of an official Turkish representation, as Stefanidis emphasises, saw the light. Their denial by the Greek Foreign Ministry complicated matters.³¹¹ Turkish Ambassador in Athens, Kemal Tarray protested to Alexis Kyrou, the then Director-General of the Greek Foreign Ministry, that this created difficulties for his [Turkish] government in the midst of its election campaign. He then asked that his approach to Stephanopoulos during Adenauer's reception to be considered a formal representation. As a result, the Greek Foreign Ministry issued a correction, conceding that the Turkish government had conveyed in a friendly way its doubts about unpleasant repercussions of a Greek recourse to the UN. If a solution was forthcoming, it was added, Greece was ready to accept any international guarantee safeguarding the position of the Turkish Cypriots. Papagos also declared his personal commitment to improving the lot of the

³⁰⁹ **Sander, Oral;** *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*, İmge Yayınevi, 4. Baskı, Ankara, 1994, p. 215.

³¹⁰ **Milliyet**, 2 April 1954.

³¹¹ **Stefanidis**, p. 55.

Turkish minority in Western Thrace. Yet the Greek government failed to explain its position on Cyprus to the Turks, in view of its recourse to the UN. Menderes' visit to Athens on 7 June 1953 was the most obvious opportunity but it was not taken.³¹²

The Government of the US was not prepared to accept the importance and reality of the Turkish interest. The reason of that was narrated by the then British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, as follows 'an American official commented ironically, in reply to our [British] explanations, that his government was well aware of the Turkish interest, but that there was no Turkish lobby in the United States'.³¹³ The FRUS dated 8 February 1954 clarifies how the US tried to take a stance in replying to 28 January 1954 dated British Aide-Mémoire where the British requested the US support for following: firstly, maintenance of status quo; secondly, discouragement of the Greeks from pressing their Enosis claims; and finally, the opposition the attempts of Greek government to discuss the Cyprus issue in the UN. Despite the fact the Americans were avoiding to bind themselves, the American response was not certain. However, it was affirmative for 'the US continues to share the British view that united strategic interest of both countries demand the preservation of the current status of Cyprus'; and 'confirmation that the United States will continue to deter Greek government from pressing its claims to Cyprus'; on the other hand for that 'agreement to inform the Greek government that the United States would oppose putting the Cyprus question on the agenda of the General Assembly or its discussion by the UN', on the topic, the US officers avoided to limit themselves.³¹⁴ On 7 July 1954, the American officials stated the US response to 28 January 1954 dated British Aide-Mémoire asking for the US position on Cyprus and requested a support to persuade the Greek Government not to raise the Cyprus question at the UN. The American stance on Cyprus issue was clarified as:

*Although American strategic interest no longer requires a continuation of British sovereignty over Cyprus, we [the Americans] do not desire a change at this time.
...We [the Americans] have urged and will continue to urge the Greeks not to raise the issue in the United Nations; but if they [the*

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Eden, p.414.

³¹⁴ FRUS 1952-1954, VOL. VIII., p. 679

*Greeks] do we [the Americans] will have to balance our [American] support of the British against our [the American] interest in the principle of self-determination...
... If the question goes to UN, the Greeks may obtain considerable support from anti colonial powers.³¹⁵*

On 5 April 1954, the Greek Ambassador in Washington Athanase G. Politis called the Department of State about the present status of the Cyprus question. He reviewed some of the developments of the past few months. Last September when British Foreign Minister Eden was convalescing in Athens, Greek Prime Minister Papagos met with him and tried to talk about the Cyprus issue with Eden. Eden stressed that it was a closed question as far as the British were concerned and that it could not be discussed. Despite the British refusal to talk about Cyprus, Papagos insisted on the issue. He, then, addressed a note to the British on 15 November 1954 suggesting bilateral talks. This note was completely ignored.³¹⁶ According to Americans, 'the intransigent attitude of the British in refusing even to discuss on any basis a problem so close to the hearths of the Greeks made it impossible later for Papagos to accept an invitation to visit London'. On 15 March 1954, Eden re-announced the same statement with regard to Cyprus –no discussions policy– in the House of Commons as he had made on previous occasions. The Greeks, therefore, dismayed. On the other hand, British newspapers were suggesting that the British government should adopt a more a flexible attitude.³¹⁷ The US did not want any problem(s) among NATO partners [Britain and Greece] to destroy European unity against the Communist world. Furthermore the US did not want to create a party of interest from Turkey about the issue which is different from the British perspective. The US was evaluating the issue a matter which would endanger the vital NATO integrity and tried to prevent Turkey from intervene the conflict as a party against Greece. From the American perspective it was important to maintain NATO allies in the Eastern Mediterranean region.

The Greek Ambassador Politis, indicated that he agreed completely with the American analysis of the consequences of raising the Cyprus question to the UN and

³¹⁵ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 694

³¹⁶ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 685

³¹⁷ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 685-686.

that his government felt the same way. As William O. Baxter, the then Acting Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, narrated that:

*He [Greek Ambassador, Politis] stated that more than once that it was the firm desire of his government not to put this question to the UN, but that the pressures were so strong that it was hard to see how Greece could resist some positive action in the absence of any modification of the intransigent British stand. Ambassador repeated what many other Greek officials have frequently said, 'if the British would only agree to talk to us [Greeks] in a friendly fashion and admit that there is a problem between us'. As in the case of other officials he did not indicate what would be the terms of reference of such talks but did imply that some public indication of a British willingness to discuss the matter might make it possible for the Greek government to postpone to some indefinite future time the formal raising of this question.*³¹⁸

The US government has set its traditional liberal view of the relevant charter provisions and because they have consistently and publicly adhered to the principle of the right of discussion in the GA³¹⁹ on 21 September 1954. In a letter from the acting Secretary of Defence Robert B. Anderson to the Secretary of State on 19 May 1954 states as follows:

*The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that base facilities in Cyprus are important to US strategic interest in the Mediterranean area. Accordingly they would prefer those arrangements which are most likely to permit their continued use by the armed forces of the US. The Department of Defence is not willing to go beyond this statement of US military interest, or to take a position in a dispute between two of our allies in which US interest is not clearly affected*³²⁰.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill said to Douglas MacArthur that Cyprus and Jordan might be better than Suez for redeployment of British troops on 25 June 1954.³²¹ The USA was against the introduction of Cyprus question in the UN. According to the American perspective, time was wrong to raise such a question in the UN that would cause serious and undesirable consequences. The US Administration did

³¹⁸ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 685-687

³¹⁹ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 713-715

³²⁰ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 687

not want any dispute among its Allies in Mediterranean. On 28 July 1954, the then US Secretary of State, Dulles, in his personal message to the Greek Foreign Minister, Stephanopoulos, stated that the US government believed that for the security and the defence of the free world, required the fullest cooperation and continuing mutual sympathy of Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey'. These were the very countries primarily concerned with the future of Cyprus.³²² Dulles wrote to Stephanopoulos that if the Cyprus question was raised in the UN at that time the union of Cyprus with Greece would be accepted. He then warned Stephanopoulos that:

On the other hand, public debate would expose and increase the differences, which exist among Greece Turkey and the UK on this difficult subject. Such a development would be particularly unfortunately at a time when you are wisely seeking to strengthen your country's ties with Turkey and Yugoslavia. I [Dulles] believe there are deep popular feelings in Turkey on the subject of the Cyprus, which could not be ignored by the Turkish government. I [Dulles] need not to point out that any differences exist between your country, the UK and Turkey would offer opportunity for mischief, which the Soviet Union is always seeking. I [Dulles] therefore wish to express to you my profound conviction that a UN debate on Cyprus at this time would not achieve the goal which you desire, that it would have serious effects on Greece's friendly relations with her NATO and her two Ankara Pact partners, and that it would, by its disruptive effect on free world unity, militate against the best interest of your own country³²³.

Dulles also mentioned about the US views to the solution of Cyprus problem that involves primarily the Cypriots and the UK.³²⁴ However, the Secretary of State is also 'cognizant of the interests of Greece and Turkey'. He, therefore, stated that 'the question is capable of being resolved by the Cypriots and the United Kingdom and that this can be approached in gradual stages'.³²⁵ The Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in his letter to Turkish Ambassador Feridun Cemal Erkin on 21 September 1954 stated that:

³²¹ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 690

³²² FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 697.

³²³ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 698.

³²⁴ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 698; and FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 737.

'The US remains convinced that discussion of the question in the GA will lead no solution and will serve only to intensify existing friction and thereby prejudice Western unity. This government has concluded, therefore, that its major objective i.e. to lessen inter-Allied tension, can best be furthered if it abstains from voting on inscription of the question on the agenda. It is believed that a negative vote by the US would not, in any case, keep the item off of the agenda and that by abstaining this government will retain greater freedom to exert a moderating influence on other delegations.

If the item is placed on the agenda the US government intends to the all that it can to discourage its development. It will seek to avoid any debate on the application of the principal of self-determination and it will actively oppose passage of any resolution. It will, moreover, urge moderation by all parties in any discussion of the question with a view to facilitating eventual rapprochement between the interested governments.

Dulles pointed out his view to Erkin as:

*'I am sure you will appreciate that the above position is based on this governments firm conviction that it is the best means of endeavouring to dispose of the issue in a manner which will due the least harm to the unity of the Western world.'*³²⁶

On 8 October 1954, the US Secretary of State Dulles in his conversation with Lodge, the US Representative at the UN, expressed his views on Greek attitudes. He said 'We [the USA] should note to go on record against the Greeks; both because of the importance of the colonial issue in the world and because of our [American] own public opinion.'³²⁷ On 2 November 1954, Dulles wrote to the President of the USA Eisenhower on American views on Cyprus issue. He pointed out that the Americans envisaged that the proper place for negotiations about Cyprus was on the island and not in the UN. And he called, therefore, the Greek government to influence the non-Communist [Greek] Cypriot leaders to start serious negotiations with the British looking toward to self-government. He also mentioned the US plan to encourage the British to negotiate with the [Greek] Cypriots.³²⁸

³²⁵ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 698.

³²⁶ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 716-717.

³²⁷ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 719.

³²⁸ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 721-722.

William O. Baxter, the then Acting Director of the Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, came together in a conversation with the Ambassador of Greece to Washington, Athanase Politis, on 16 November 1954. Baxter warned Politis to postpone to raise the Cyprus question in the UN. Politis, thereupon, stated that 'the public opinion on this question [Cyprus] is running so high in Greece that it will be very difficult for the Greek Government to agree to a motion for postponement'. Baxter, then, explained his views that 'he could not understand what advantage the Greek government hoped to achieve in pushing this issue that would in any way balance the tremendous harm it is doing to Greek relations with Great Britain and Turkey'.³²⁹

On 6 September 1954, in his personal message to the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, the then Acting Secretary of State expressed the views of the US Government. He stated: 'this government is giving most urgent and serious consideration to this problem but has not yet reached a final decision as to its position when the Greek item is presented in General Committee.'³³⁰ According to the Americans, in 1954 Greek government underestimated the strength of Turkish reaction. Americans wished that Ankara should make its views known to Greece in order assure against any possible misunderstanding when question raised the UN. The Americans were well aware of Turkish feelings on Cyprus. On the other hand, they warned Turkey to understand American view that Western unity was of paramount importance. The US did not want any dispute or war at the Eastern Mediterranean where the Communism would be spread. Washington, therefore, hoped that:

*Turkish government will seek to discuss question in frank and friendly manner with Greek government and that Turks while making their position clear should also show desire to work for mutually satisfactory solution of problem so that it will not poison NATO relationships or jeopardise future Balkan alliance.*³³¹

As mentioned initially the USA did not deal with the growing tension on the island mainly raised by the Greek Cypriots for the unification of Cyprus with Greece. The predominantly Greek population was important but not as important as the vital

³²⁹ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 729

³³⁰ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 703.

³³¹ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 703-704

interests of NATO and its strategic security paradigms. After the end of the Second World War and the emergence of a bi-polar system and its fruit Cold War America started to deploy a foreign a foreign policy over the Eastern Mediterranean region. This was clearly seen in the Truman Doctrine of 1947 which declared the American support to Greece and Turkey against any aggression from the Communist Bloc.

American views on Cyprus between 1945 and 1954 can be summarized as following: The best way to resolve the question was the direct negotiations between British and the Cypriots. Clearly here the word “Cypriots” means the Greeks demanding Enosis. On the other hand, Greece and Turkey were the very countries primarily concerned with the future of Cyprus, should be taken into consideration. Basically, thanks to the international systemic changes and the island’s three-fourth population, Greece had valid demands in terms of decolonisation process and self-determination principle. Meanwhile Turkey, former ruler of Cyprus more than three centuries should also be considered because the island was only 70 kilometres from the vitally important Turkish Mediterranean coastline. New international system led the USA to strengthen her relations with the allies on the region and more importantly obliged her to extinguish any kind of major conflict among the three countries tied to the Cyprus issue. The US did not want any dispute or war at the Eastern Mediterranean where the Communism would be spread, and the USSR would gain popularity. Any war among its allies would cause disruptive effects for free world security and defence.

In 1945-1954, the USA opposed the introduction of the question in the UN. This would led to scrutinize the alliance and mislead the Soviet Bloc to act as if there is no or weak solidarity among the NATO allies of Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey. As mentioned before, according to Americans, time was wrong to raise such a question in the UN and it would result serious and undesirable consequences for the free world. Furthermore the US was in a position not to consider Turkey as a party to have a say on the subject more than the Greeks or the British. The American government was well aware of the Turkish interests. However, that there was no Turkish lobby to affect the US Congress. Consequently, American policy was based on her global vision; naturally any potential conflict between her allies would damage this policy, and should be controlled if not possible to stop. The only vital goal was to stop the expansion of

Communism and any matter on the region should be dealt according to that prime concern.

CHAPTER III

TURKISH PERSPECTIVE

*Even if there has been no single Muslim Turk living in Cyprus, Turkey should have a Cyprus question.*³³²

Turkey also dipped into the Cypriote morass without adequate diplomatic preparation and without the backing of interested powers particularly the USA. Concerning Cyprus, it should be asked whether Turkey's policy realistically stood as high in her hierarchy of interests as she proclaimed and her actions appeared to indicate. Had Atatürk been alive, of course, one could question whether he would have considered the attitude of his country on Cyprus compatible with the status quo policy he had advocated. On the other hand a change in Turkey's geo-strategical status quo, intended that the exchange of Greek sovereignty for British rule over the island that it demanded Turkey's opposition.³³³

Since the World War II, the international status of Turkey and Greece has developed along remarkably parallel lines: both were subjected to Soviet-communist pressures; both sought assistance from the western powers; the Truman Doctrine was simultaneously applied to both of them; they were admitted to NATO on the same day; together they concluded the Balkan Defence Pact with Yugoslavia; and both obtained an associate status in the European Economic Community. But the same "geographical fatalism" that drove them along on a parallel track brought them once more to a collision course over Cyprus. Turkish Korean gambit was an act of astute diplomacy, which contributed much to the opening of the gateways of the west to her. Having been admitted to NATO and other European and Atlantic organizations, Ankara appeared to

³³² **Davutoğlu Ahmet**, *Stratejik Derinlik Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, Küre Yayınları, 5th ed., Istanbul, 2001, p. 179.

have relaxed her erstwhile watchfulness; she avoided examining the issue only in the light of Turkish national interest.

There were 400,000 Greeks against some 100,000 Turks in 1950s in Cyprus. A new situation had thus emerged, in which no diplomacy, however patient or imaginative, seemed to be able to reconcile the conflicting claims.³³⁴ Throughout the 1950s Turkey's Cyprus policy evolved as a reaction to Greek and Greek Cypriot actions. During these years Turkey's policy-makers refused to accept that there was a Cyprus question as such.³³⁵ Even, in the conditions of ethnic strife in Cyprus as a foreign policy concern Cyprus was not a high priority issue for Turkey until the middle of the 1950s.³³⁶

In the North and East Communist countries menaced Turkey; to the southeast laid the disturbed and not too friendly Arab world. To the west and southwest were the Greek islands. She has seen a swing to the left at the recent Greek elections and heard Athens Radio's suggestion that, in the event of Enosis, Greece could control the British base on Cyprus in favour of her friends. She has also noted the frequent references from radio, press and pulpit to Greek expansionist aims in Thrace and Asia Minor (Anatolia). She can hardly be blamed, therefore, for assuming that the only ports she can still count on receiving assistance from the West in the event of war were the three southern ones,³³⁷ i.e. Antalya, Mersin, and Iskenderun, so long as Cyprus remained in friendly hands.

With the requirement to have a bridge between the 1950's and the Post-Lausanne era it should be pointed Atatürk's dominating, and inspiring personality had directed and shaped the Turkish Republic. At his death in 1938, his closest associate, İsmet İnönü, was elected as the president. With the approach of war, foreign affairs assumed greater importance. An alliance with Britain and France was concluded on 19 October 1939, but it was not implemented because of Germany's early victories. After June 1941 Germany's invasion of Russia, there was popular support for an alliance with Germany, which seemed to offer prospects of realising old Pan-Turkish aims. Although

³³³ **Vali**, p. 356.

³³⁴ **Macmillan**, p. 662.

³³⁵ **Bölükbaşı**, p. 37.

³³⁶ **Pollis**, p. 96

³³⁷ **Seligman**, p. 49

a non-aggression pact was signed with Germany on 18 June 1941, Turkey clung to non-engagement or in Deringil's terms "an active neutrality,"³³⁸ until an Axis defeat became inevitable; it entered the war on the Allied side on 23 February 1945. The great expansion of Soviet power exposed Turkey in June 1945 to Soviet demands for control over the Straits. It was also suggested that a large area of North-eastern Anatolia be ceded to Soviet Georgia. This caused Turkey to seek and receive US assistance; US military aid began in 1947 (providing the basis for a large and continuing flow of military aid), and economic assistance began in 1948.

The war also brought changes in domestic policy. The most notable change in the post-war years was the liberalisation of political life. The Allied victory had made democracy more fashionable; accordingly, the government made concessions allowing new political parties, universal suffrage, and direct election. From a split within the RPP, the Democrat Party (DP) was founded in 1946 and immediately gathered support. Despite government interference, the DP won 61 seats in the 1946 general election. In his declaration of July 12, 1947, İnönü stated that the logic of a multiparty system implied the possibility of a change of government. Recep Peker resigned and was succeeded by more liberal prime ministers in Hasan Saka (1947-49) and Şemseddin Günaltay (1949-50). Other restrictions on political freedom, including press censorship, were relaxed. The first mass-circulation, independent newspapers were established during the period. Other political parties were established, including the conservative National Party (1948); socialist and communist activities, however, were severely repressed.

The DP won a massive victory in the 1950 elections, claiming 54 percent of the vote and 396 out of 487 seats. The RPP won 68 seats; the National Party, 1. The DP victory has been attributed variously to social change, a desire for economic liberalisation, better organisation, and religious hostility to the RPP, and a bad harvest in 1949.³³⁹ Perhaps the ultimate reason, however, was simply that in 27 years the RPP had made too many enemies. DP was now in power and Celâl Bayar was elected as a president and Adnan Menderes became Prime Minister, a post which for the first time

³³⁸ **Deringil, Selim**, *Denge Oyunu 2. Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, Şubat 2003, p. 56.

came to surpass that of the president in importance. The political fortunes of the Democrat government closely reflected the economic changes. In the 1954 elections - the Democratic peak - the DP took a majority of the votes and most of the seats; the RPP took about one-third of the vote and many of the remaining seats. Subsequent economic difficulties led to mounting criticism within and outside the DP.

We here want to discover whether Turkey had a foreign policy about Cyprus within the process of 1945-1955. In the aftermath of the Second World War, Turkey as an active neutral party had faced serious criticisms from the victorious powers particularly the USSR. As Georghallides stresses Turkey's "active neutrality was not welcomed by the great powers. In the end of war Soviet leaders had begun to condemn Turkey's neutral posture".³⁴⁰ Basically Russians were blaming Turkey in respect that the latter did not enter the war and caused the casualties of millions and enormous devastation for the countries entered the war. The other point for criticism was the behaviour of Turkey toward Germany to which she sold chromium during the war. It is to be mentioned that above quoted metal is strategically important for its value for the war equipments such as tanks. In short Soviet Union denounced Turkey as a country helped Germany with some means out of an entrance to the war with their side. Nevertheless it should be noted that Turkey didn't sell those materials only to Germany but the other powers including Britain which was the enemy of The Third Reich. Greece was also unsympathetic toward Turkey and did not agree with the Turkish claim that Turkey had helped Greece against German invasion. Though the Turkish politicians argued that it was not clear whether Turkey had such a treaty obligation, the fact was that Germany invaded Greece in 1941 and Turkey did not actively support her neighbour. Furthermore, Turkey entered the war with Germany and Japan only in the spring of 1945 when the war was almost over.

It is striking that since the beginning of British rule in 1878 the paramount political aim of the Turkish Cypriots has remained constant: No to Enosis a simply majority rule (which to them meant domination by the Greek majority). This is a typical defensive position of a threatened community, which fears a worse fate if it becomes

³³⁹ For further information see, **Arcayürek, Cüneyt**, *Şeytan Üçgeninde Türkiye*, Bilgi Yayınevi İstanbul, 1982; and **Oran**, *Batı Bloku ...* pp. 486-494.

³⁴⁰ **Georghallides**, p. 13

under the rule of majority nation. Never in their history have Turkish Cypriots ever considered the possibility that they would be treated fairly by the numerous Greek Cypriots or under the Greek administration in the event of Enosis.³⁴¹

The sovereignty of Cyprus, left by Disraeli- at least nominally- in Turkish hands, had formally passed to Britain under Article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in July 1923, by which Turkey recognised the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on 5 November 1914. This treaty was not only been signed by British and Turkish Governments; it was also signed by Greeks. It bore, indeed, the famous and honoured name of Venizelos. Nor had the Greek Government made any reservations at the time. Nevertheless, as a result of the Greco-Turkish war of 1920-22, Greek refugees from Asia Minor had fled into Cyprus in such numbers as to destroy the old balance between the populations.³⁴²

With the benefit of hindsight, several writers have remarked that the diplomats at the Lausanne Conference who separated Greek and Turkish peoples and territories failed to anticipate the political future of Cyprus.³⁴³ At the time, Greece and Turkey had issues of greater magnitude to worry about than that of the long-term future of the island. Furthermore, the British had no intentions to give away their security interests. Ismet İnönü who was Turkey's negotiator at Lausanne, later stated that he did not even bring up the question of Cyprus at Lausanne because the most important problem he had to tackle was eliminating the economic and juridical capitulations.³⁴⁴

According to the Treaty of Lausanne, those Cypriots who wanted to retain their Turkish nationality were required to do so within two years. Within the next two years 9,310 out of 62,000 Turkish Cypriots immigrated to Turkey. While the Turkish government encouraged the emigration, the British created a variety of bureaucratic difficulties in order to retain a sizeable Turkish community in Cyprus. Turkey's policy was in accord with its overall policy of exchanging the Greek minority in Turkey for the Turkish minorities in Greece and elsewhere. Britain opposed the Turkish emigration

³⁴¹ **Bahcheli**, p. 24

³⁴² **Macmillan**,

³⁴³ For example, see, **Stephens**, p. 104

³⁴⁴ **Erim, Nihat**, *Bildiğim ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler İçinde Kıbrıs*, Ajans Türk Matbaası, Ankara, 1975, pp. 1-2

because it did not want to face in the future a pro-Enosis Greek population with any Turkish community to oppose it.³⁴⁵

It remains to be established whether Turkish reactions to Enosis were mainly defensive or, since the return of Cyprus to Turkey was increasingly propagated, if they signify a further departure from the Kemalist renunciation of claims on former Ottoman possessions. This renunciation, enshrined in the so-called National Pact of 1920 (Misak-ı Milli) and Article 16 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923, served Mustafa Kemal's efforts towards to an establishment of a homogeneous Turkish nation state. However, respect for the status quo never became an axiom of Turkish foreign policy which remained flexible enough in order to take advantage of favourable international circumstances. This was demonstrated, still in Atatürk's time, by the successful revision of the Straits regime, in 1936, and the acquisition of the Hatay-Alexandretta province from French-dominated Syria, on the eve of W. W. II.³⁴⁶

At the time, with the treaty of Lausanne, Great Britain acquired control over Cyprus, and an agreement was reached that Muslims and Turkish speakers on the island who so wished could immigrate to Turkey. It is worth of noting that although some did – mainly the Ottoman officials who lost power and authority in Cyprus – the overwhelming majority remained on the island. After the declaration of Cyprus as a British crown colony in 1925, the Turkish Cypriots were invited to choose between “repatriation” to Turkey or permanent settlement in Cyprus

Turkish population in the island has decreased from one-fourth to one-fifth during and after the interbellic years.³⁴⁷ For example, the population at the end of 1956 was estimated 531,000 and showed an increase of 18 per cent since the census of 1946. The Turks(the Sunni Muslims), who had settled in Cyprus since the Ottoman conquest, numbered 80,548 in 1946, less than one-fifth of the total population.³⁴⁸ In those years it was never thought by the British that one day these Turkish Cypriots would fight for the island's future. The Turkish Cypriots looked upon Enosis as “a change of colonial master for the worse” and opposed it.³⁴⁹ Enosis, that is the colonisation of Cyprus by

³⁴⁵ For further information on immigration of Turkish Cypriots from Cyprus to Turkey see, **Ateşin,**

³⁴⁶ **Vali,** p. 55, 69, 353

³⁴⁷ **Çukalas,** p.181

³⁴⁸ **Bullard,** p. 147-148

³⁴⁹ **Ertegin,** p.3

Greece and spiritual expansion, had been in total disregard of the right to liberty of the Turkish Cypriot community.³⁵⁰ Turkish Cypriots traditionally opposed Enosis and once they observed “the demonstrated capacity of the Greeks for violence became increasingly horrified with the prospect of becoming a helpless minority within an unfriendly Greek state”.³⁵¹ Sir Richmond Palmer who was the Governor of Cyprus 1933-1939 told Sunday Times of March 25, 1956³⁵² “Enosis originally meant, and still in its proper connotation means, the ‘restoration of the Empire of Byzantium’, and a further dismantlement of what was once called the ‘Turkish Empire’ including the liquidation of the Turkish conquests of both Constantinople and Cyprus... The Turks, who have so far behaved with great moderation, deeply resent this Enosis ideal of their own downfall – and justifiably – and it may well lead to war between Greece and Turkey if the agitation continues.”

The core of the Cyprus question was not only the relation between the two ethnic groups. One of the other main problems was the strategic importance of Cyprus on the Eastern Mediterranean region. Britain was aware of its coming withdrawal from Cyprus due to the independence movements after the W.W.II. For this end British decided to save a base on the island and prevent Enosis.³⁵³

Hence historical circumstances themselves delayed early involvement by Turkey in the construction of ethnicity in Cyprus. Despite a tendency by some writers to conflate Ottoman and Turkish rule, the Turkish nation, Turkish national identity and nationalism did not emerge until the early twentieth century as the Ottoman Empire disintegrated. It would be wrong to doubt the intense of the Greek consciousness of the Greek Cypriotes of to-day, but it would be equally mistaken to suppose that this consciousness has always manifested it self in a politically nationalistic form.³⁵⁴ Greeks considered Turkish nationalism was a defensive reaction and response to the overpowering rise of nationalism among peoples within the Ottoman Empire and, more proximately, to the latter’s ultimate defeat during World War I.³⁵⁵

³⁵⁰ **Necatigil, Zaim**, *The Cyprus Conflict: A Lawyer’s View*, Kema Ltd., Nicosia, 1981, p. 2

³⁵¹ **Stavrinides**, p. 33

³⁵² Quated from **Küçük Dr. Fazıl**, *The Cyprus Question – A Permanent Solution*, Halkın Sesi Yayınları, Nicosia, 1957, p. 7.

³⁵³ **Papandreu**, p.162

³⁵⁴ **Landau**, M. Jakob, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, Brill, Leiden, 1974, p. 180-196.

³⁵⁵ **Pollis**, p.95

Despite the repudiation of irredentist trends by official ideology Atatürk's death and the watershed of Second World War facilitated a relative revival of Pan-Turkism its proponents aspired to the eventual union of Turkic populations, 'from the Eastern Mediterranean to Sin kiang, and from the Volga to Southern Anatolia'.³⁵⁶ To them Cyprus was a small but accessible piece of former Turkish territory that was being claimed by an untrustworthy friend and erstwhile foe. Playing up the spectre of Greek encirclement, Pan-Turkist zealots energetically advocated the recovery of the 'Green Island'.³⁵⁷ They were active in the Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association (CTCA) (Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği), which was founded in Istanbul in 1946 and undertook to foster closer links between the Turkish community on the island and the Turkish motherland.³⁵⁸

The standard-bearers of Turkish nationalism played a more important part in public agitation on Cyprus: the popular press and the University student movement.³⁵⁹ Even these factors, however, were never allowed to dictate the course of Turkish foreign policy. Rather, the governments of Ankara³⁶⁰ proved able to exploit and manipulate nationalist and irredentist sentiments at will, while keeping the entire anti-Enosis movement under discreet but effective control.³⁶¹

There was no policy vis-à-vis Cyprus comparable to those of the Greek irredentist movement during the 19th and early 20th centuries. As yet a Turkish identity, as distinct from a Muslim one, had not been constructed. Efforts by the Turkish State to reconstruct the identities of the Muslims on Cyprus into ethnic identity did not start until the early decades of the twentieth century after the Kemalist revolution, which

³⁵⁶ Landau, p. 193-194.

³⁵⁷ For the Pan-Turkist claim on Cyprus and Turkish nationalist perceptions of the Cyprus question see, Landau M. Jakob, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study of Irredentism*, C.Hurst & Company, London, 1981, p. 115, 118, 127, 131-132; Tachau Frank, "The Face of Turkish Nationalism as Reflected in the Cyprus Dispute" *The Middle East Journal*, Vol.XIII, No:3, Washington,1959, p.263, 267-268, Ioannides, P. Christos, *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, New York, 1991, pp. 63-64, 75-76

³⁵⁸ Landau, *Pan-Turkism...*, p.150.

³⁵⁹ Kelling, pp. 110-111, Crawshaw, pp. 42-45, Vali, pp. 58-60, regarding the strongly nationalistic attitudes of the Student Community in Turkey, Landau, *Radical Politics...*, p. 30 and passim, Armaoğlu Fahir, *Kıbrıs Meselesi*, .

³⁶⁰ Within the period we are studying on i.e.1945-1954, Şükrü Saraçoğlu (1943-1946), Recep Peker (1946-1947), Hasan Saka, (1947-1949), Şemsettin Günaltay (1949-1950), Adnan Menderes (1950-1960) served as Prime Minister; Hasan Saka (1944-1947), Necmettin Sadak (1947-1950), Fuad Köprülü (1950-1957) were the Foreign Ministers.

³⁶¹ Ioannides, p. 76, 80-83, Landau, *Pan-Turkism...*, p.132

established the modern Turkish State. However there were signs that the Turkish community constructed their unity not on the religion solely but on Turkish nationalism even more. Few of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, political and religious was also opposed to the secular reforms in Turkey.³⁶² The Islamic clergy aligned itself with the opponents to the secularism of Mustafa Kemal's Turkish nationalism. In addressing the role of education in developing a sense of separate Greek and Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, a Greek-Cypriot scholar wrote:

*The important of this cultural aspect of ethnic differentiation can not be adequately emphasised. It provided the context within which the two Cypriot communities became conscious of their primordial attachments and the basis of their socialisation into Greek and Turkish nationalism respectively. As a result, a commonly shared system of social communication that could conceivably form the basis of an integrated Cypriot society was precluded from developing.*³⁶³

In Cyprus the ghost of Byzantine-Ottoman imperial heritage still survived; it remains for the successors of Venizelos and Atatürk to exercise this last remnant of theocratic-ethnic obsolescence. And Cyprus clearly was external to the Turkish heartland: it was not an integral part of the newly created Turkish nation.

The conflict over Cyprus which made Turkey and Greece once more fall apart came at a time when the two nations could "afford" to feud.³⁶⁴ There appears to be paradox in Turco-Greek relations, both ethnic and politic: logic and reason compel them to collaborate; tradition and emotions separate them. They display hatred and contempt toward each other, yet they are drawn together by self-interest, rivalry, or the admiration of what is different between them. Like a feuding couple they are enthralled by the "I can not live with you or without you" syndrome. If one would examine this relationship

³⁶² Attalides A. Michael (ed.), *Cyprus Reviewed*, Zavallis Press, Nicosia, 1977, p. 44.

³⁶³ Kitromilides M. Paschalis, "From Co-Existence to Confrontation: the Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus", in Attalides A. Michael (ed.), *Cyprus Reviewed*, p.44,

³⁶⁴ Davutoğlu, p. 178.

by the method of ethnic distance, one would be bound to find an extremely wide and often changing rank of ethnic references.³⁶⁵

Assuming that Cyprus is a question vitally affecting Turkey's national interest, it should be asked whether she has been skilful in protecting these interests since the late 1950's. Originally, Turkey's political and legal positions were weak; had the British supported Turkey diplomatically, her political motives would have been abortive. Her legal position was even more tenuous; Cyprus was a British possession, formally ceded to London under the Lausanne Peace Treaty, and Ankara had no right to oppose a transfer of sovereignty over the island to Greece.³⁶⁶

On 18 March 1941, Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu met his British counterpart Eden in Cyprus which was kept secret from the Turkish public for a long time and returned to Turkey on 21 March. During the war Western sources were talking about Turkey's demands on Dodecanese Islands from Italy. Churchill might have been given approval for Turkish demands in the name his country. However, he was concerned that Cyprus would also be subject of Turkish demands after the Aegean islands.³⁶⁷ An interesting note here was, on January 1942, Stalin proposed the Dodecanese to be given to Turkey while some regulations could be done for Greece on the islands.³⁶⁸

In 1945, The Soviets refused to renew the 1925 Treaty of Friendship with Turkey, and this prompted the latter, not only to form closer ties with West, but also to increase the strength and efficiency of her army.³⁶⁹ On 21 December 1945, Pravda Newspaper published letters of two Georgian professors.³⁷⁰ According to the letters those professors the cities of Ardahan, Artvin, Oltu, Tortum, İspir, Bayburt, Gümüşhane, Trabzon and Giresun belonged to Georgia and were occupied by Turkey unlawfully, and consequently, they should be given back to her.³⁷¹ They demanded for a

³⁶⁵ Georghallides, p. 14.

³⁶⁶ Vali, Ibid., p. 357

³⁶⁷ Arcayürek, p. 29.

³⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 158

³⁶⁹ Seligman, p. 46

³⁷⁰ For the Turkish copy of the two Georgian Professors' letters see Gençlik kitabevi, İstanbul, 1946

³⁷¹ Söz, 24 December 1945

direct say and involvement in the management of navigation through the Turkish straits and also included some territorial claims.³⁷²

With the end of Second World War in 1945 the campaign for Enosis was intensified once again. The Greek-Orthodox Church, taking advantage of the principle of self-determination which had become universally accepted after the Second W.W. was determined to have this principle applied only to the Greek Cypriots, ignoring altogether the existence in Cyprus of the Turkish Cypriot Community which comprised one-fifth of the total population of the island. In fact, as no Cypriot nation existed and as the peoples Cyprus comprised two entirely different ethnic communities, the principle of self-determination could not be applied to the peoples of Cyprus as a whole. This principle and right of self-determination could only be applied to, and be exercised by, the two communities separately. Failure to do so would have meant the denial of the right of self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot community.³⁷³

The main motive for Turkey not to deal with the case passionately after the W.W.II was not her perception that Cyprus was only a matter finalised by the Treaty of Lausanne. However, the aim of non-interventionist policy was purely not to damage her position within the Western world.³⁷⁴ Turkey's neutrality in the war further circumscribed her ability to influence minority affairs such as the Western Thrace with Greece or Cyprus with Britain. It was only after 1945 that a nationalist Turkish Cypriot movement manifested itself primarily as a reaction to Enosis. Even then, it would retain a strong Islamic trait.³⁷⁵ Although the movement was very rudimentary and fragmented,³⁷⁶ at least until 1950, there is no doubt that it has been used by Turkey but particularly by Britain as a counterweight to Greek Cypriots irredentist claims and activities.³⁷⁷ Moreover, its influence on Turkish foreign policy should not be overestimated. Turkish Cypriot activists could attract the attention of nationalistic

³⁷² **Georghallides**, p. 14

³⁷³ **Ertegin**, p.2

³⁷⁴ **Mavroyannis D. Andreas**, *Kıbrıs Sorununun Türk-Yunan İlişkilerine Etkisi*, Metis Yayınları, İstanbul, 1990, p. 129

³⁷⁵ For the development of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus see, **Hill**, pp. 350 - 502, **Bahcheli**, p. 27

³⁷⁶ For a detailed analysis of Turkish Cypriot political fractions and later parties and leaders see **Gazioğlu**, op.cit.

³⁷⁷ As early as January 1947, the Cyprus Minority Association (KATAK: Kıbrıs (Adası) Türk Azınlığı Kurumu), reacting to the recrudescence of Enosis, asked for the return of the island to the Turkey. **Hill**, p.563-564

circles and the press in Turkish cities but they never assumed independent role of the Etnarchy and its energetic supporters in Athens.

Turkey had assumed that her geopolitical and regional interests were identical with those of the US. Both post-W.W.II leaders, İnönü and Menderes considered Turkey's alliance with the US essential for Turkey's security, and hence, tried to co-operate with the US even in areas unimportant to Turkish national security interest. Turkey was eager, for instance, to associate itself with American Middle East policies during the 1950s.³⁷⁸

Although Turkey renounced its sovereignty over Cyprus at Lausanne, and even sought to encourage the bulk of Turkish Cypriot to immigrate to the mainland, its interest in the islands' affairs and future destiny grew bigger as it developed closer ties with an increasingly secular and nationalist Turkish community on the island.³⁷⁹

Bayar guaranteed İnönü that the foreign policy line of newly proposed party (DP) would not be different from the 'one-party' (RPP).³⁸⁰ DP took great care and attention not to take a position on foreign policy during their years as the opposition party.³⁸¹ Bayar proved this argument on his first parliamentary speech as the head of opposition on which he said that they were together with the government on foreign policy on May 1947.³⁸²

The Turkish Cypriots distrusted representative government because they feared that it would end in transferring political control to the Greek majority and in bringing about Enosis. They preferred the status quo of British rule. Opinion among British administrators in Cyprus was divided between those who thought it would be worth trying to introduce a liberal constitution and seeing what happened and those who were convinced that the result would be at best a damaging fiasco and at worst an intensification of Enosis agitation by Greek Cypriot politicians armed with the status of ministers and elected representatives, accompanied as always by an equally violent reaction from an elected representatives of the Turkish community.

³⁷⁸ Bölükbaşı, p. 2

³⁷⁹ Ateşin, p. 17; Bahçeli, p.30-31.

³⁸⁰ Toker, Metin, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları 1944-1973, Tek Partiden Çok Partiye 1944-1950*, Bilgi Yayınevi, 4th Printing, İstanbul, 1998, p. 81

³⁸¹ Ibid., p. 94

³⁸² Ibid., p. 179

The Dodecanese islands present another type of conflict. The Turkish minority (about 25,000, mostly on the Island of Rhodes) was not mentioned either in the Peace Treaty of Lausanne or by the convention concerning the exchange of Greek and Turkish population of January 30, 1923, because these islands passed under Italian sovereignty after World War I. After the cession by Italy to Greece in 1947, the Greek government's stance was that ethnic minority in question, whereas the legal view of the Turkish government was that they were entitled to the protection under the Lausanne Treaty as non-exchangeable Muslim-Turks. It appeared that, leaving aside the juridical side of the question, a de facto solution for their non-discriminatory treatment could easily be reached.³⁸³ Note that the Dodecanese and Crete were always seen as bad precedents in Turkish memory about the Greek expansionism.

Turkey recognised Britain's annexation of Cyprus in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne and encouraged Turkish Cypriots to immigrate to Turkey. In Turkish leaders' eyes, the settlement at Lausanne had created a strategic balance between Greece and Turkey. Even though Lausanne merely formalized the losses of the First World War, Turks regarded this recognition as equivalent to territorial sacrifice. Many Turks believed that, in spite of their nation's, victory over the invading Greeks, Turkey had made significant territorial sacrifices by accepting to Greek sovereignty over Western Thrace (with its Turkish majority) and, especially, the islands that circle her Aegean coast.³⁸⁴ All Turkish governments in power after the Second World War thought that they could stop the provoking and imbalanced conducts of Athens about the annexation of Cyprus, with a sedate manner.³⁸⁵ Because of the improvement in Turco-British relations in 1930s, Turkey had little concern that the island might be used as a staging ground against itself. Especially during the 1940s and 1950s Turkey was in favour of British sovereignty over Cyprus because it believed that the British presence on the island would function as a deterrent against Soviet expansionism in the Middle East. Turkish government also did not expect that Britain would ever decide to leave island. It is not surprising that the foreign minister of the RPP government, Necmeddin Sadak,

³⁸³ Panteli, p. 260-261

³⁸⁴ Bahcheli, p. 31

³⁸⁵ Torun, Şükrü, *Türkiye-İngiltere ve Yunanistan Arasında Kıbrıs'ın Politik Durumu*, Phd.Thesis at Paris University, 1956, p. 112.

told the National Assembly on 30 October 1948 that ‘there is not a Cyprus problem as such’.³⁸⁶

Turkey’s passive attitude regarding the 12 Islands (Dodecanese) hand-over to Greece after Italian and German invasions encouraged the Greeks on their “annexation of Cyprus” campaign and led them to intensify their groundless claims over the ‘Green Island’.³⁸⁷ Pro-Enosis manifestations in Greece did not fail to provoke the reaction of the Turkish press, a section of which lashed out against Enosis and criticised the Republican People’s Party (RPP) government for neglecting the Turks of Cyprus. To be sure President İsmet İnönü did receive a Turkish Cypriot delegation in November 1948 and the Turkish Foreign Ministry sought British assurances that there was no intention to hand the island over to Greece.³⁸⁸ For the first time, press polemics on account of Cyprus seemed to cast a cloud over the Greek-Turkish rapprochement.

With the cat was well and truly out of the bag and the punctilious care taken by the Turkish representatives at Lausanne fully justified they had, in fact been less concerned over possible Greek attempts later on to gain control of further Aegean Islands, like the Dodecanese. Because once Turkey’s western ports were no longer her main supply ports, a few more or a few less Greek islands covering her Western approaches made very little difference to the overall strategic picture. But they were determined to make sure that Greek claims to Cyprus could never override their own. Consequently, they accepted the Greek refusal to hold a plebiscite in Western Thrace and the insistence upon the rewarding of Article 16.³⁸⁹

This becomes particularly obvious when you examine the Treaty of Lausanne itself. By that treaty Turkey accepted the cession of the Dodecanese to Italy (and later to Greece) because Cyprus was safely in British hands and the approaches to Turkey’s southern supply ports therefore secure.

It must indeed be clear even to the most ardent Philhellene that either Cyprus or the Dodecanese can be Greek, but not both, unless Turkey is to be virtually surrounded

³⁸⁶ Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya, *İkinci Adam*, Vol. 3, Remzi Kitabevi, Ankara, 1975, p. 217

³⁸⁷ Ibid., p.115

³⁸⁸ Crawshaw, p. 45

³⁸⁹ Seligman, p. 53-54

by hostile and potentially hostile powers, a position which she will in no circumstances accept or allow.³⁹⁰

One of the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community, Rauf Raif Denktaş, criticised the governmental policy of Turkey as follows: ‘preservation of the status quo and protection of the Cypriot Turks’ rights under British rule was the policy Turkey persistently pursued. In a period of decolonisation, Turks on the island were insisted on the continuation of colonial administration mostly because having not known the reasons that Turkey paid attention to conduct a policy on the case.³⁹¹

With the influence of Cypriots in Turkey a “Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association” was founded in 1948 in the island. At the same year some support under the name of ‘cultural assistance’ has started. The awakening time for Turkey on Cyprus was 1948.³⁹² As Lord Winster’s constitutional plan failed amid a wave to Enosis agitation, the press, led by a newly published daily, *Hürriyet*³⁹³ commenced a campaign asserting the Turkish interest in the fate of the island and vehemently opposed the Greek Cypriot aspirations. Many of the arguments subsequently advanced against the session of the Cyprus to Greece were first articulated in that period. The emphasis was put on the island’s importance to Turkey’s security due to its geographic proximity, and the danger of its falling under Communist control with respect to growing popularity of AKEL. In this respect, Enosis was projected as another plot of international communism – a staple of Turkish propaganda over the following years. This campaign was endorsed by leading figures of opposition, such as Celâl Bayar, the future President of the Republic. Bayar reportedly warned that the Turkish people would not remain indifferent to the fate of Cyprus, as it had been the case with the Dodecanese.³⁹⁴ Student organizations championed the anti-Enosis cause in the streets of Ankara and Istanbul and irredentist slogans were increasingly heard.³⁹⁵ The ease with which the campaign died down, after Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak assured the public that the Britain would never consent to give Cyprus away, strengthened suspicions in Greece that the

³⁹⁰ Mavroyannis, p. 135

³⁹¹ Denktaş, Rauf, *12’ye 5 Kala Kıbrıs*, Butik Matbaası, Lefkoşa, 1966, p. 17

³⁹² Ateşin; p.179

³⁹³ *Hürriyet* (Liberty) was founded by Sedat Simavi, a journalist born on Rhodes, it rapidly gained a largest circulation in Turkey, mostly because its emotional line on Cyprus issue.

³⁹⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, 21 December 1948

³⁹⁵ Armaoğlu, Fahir, “1955 Yılında Kıbrıs...” pp. 57-58.

turmoil in the closely controlled Turkish society was inspired by the British and abetted by the Turkish government.

Following a large demonstration in Nicosia in favour of Enosis and autonomy on 3 October 1948, the National Popular Party of Turkish Cypriots (the predecessor of the Cyprus is Turkish Party – Kıbrıs Türktür Partisi) protested and sent telegrams to Turkey expressing its annoyance.³⁹⁶

It perhaps happened only after 1945 that a nationalist Turkish Cypriot movement manifested itself primarily in reaction to Enosis. Even then, it would retain a strong Islamic trait. Although it was rudimentary and fragmented, at least until 1950 this movement would try to be fully exploited by Britain and Turkey as a counter to Greek irredentism.

In spite of the post-war improvements in Greek-Turkish relations, Turkish leaders' strategic concerns vis-à-vis Greece remained. Already feeling hemmed in by Greek islands in the Aegean, the Turks felt that Greece's sovereignty over Cyprus would enable it to control access to its southern ports of Mersin and Iskenderun thereby completing Turkey's encirclement. These concerns were at the hearth of Turkey's objection to Enosis then and later.³⁹⁷

On January 1949 for example, Turkish government did not give permission to 100 students coming from Cyprus to Turkey concerning that Britain would protest it. An interesting information at a newspaper on 6 January 1949 created excitement among the Cypriot Turks. In the news it was pointed out that a strong propaganda was being carried out in Turkey for the cession of Cyprus to Turkey. Moreover, though it was marked that these efforts are unofficial it is a reality that the government has a share in this activity.³⁹⁸

The public opinion or better to say represented by the mass circulating newspapers trying to attract the people in Turkey is as strong as united over this issue as it is in Greece. And nothing is more certain than that any major retreat by a Turkish government over Cyprus would very quickly lead to its fall with possible serious consequences to Turkey's neighbours and indeed to Middle East stability as a whole.

³⁹⁶ **Panteli**; p.206

³⁹⁷ **Bahcheli**, p. 36

³⁹⁸ "Türkiye'de Kıbrıs'ın Alınması İçin Propaganda", **Hürsöz**, 6 January 1949

Turkish feelings were further aroused after the announcement of Etnarchy's decision to hold a plebiscite. In Cyprus, the spectre of Enosis apparently prompted the existing two rival Turkish Cypriot organizations to merge into a single federation. During a mass meeting on 12 December 1949, the organisation issued an appeal of protest, which was widely circulated abroad. After calling attention to the Turkish presence in the island a whole set of arguments was advanced against Enosis: Greece had never ruled Cyprus; its 'Greek-speaking' inhabitants were not really of Greek origin; the island was much closer to Turkey than to Greece; speaking of self-determination, the Greek majority should not be regarded in isolation from the wider context of Turkish Anatolia; Cyprus affected the security of neighbouring countries; Greece was incapable of administering and defending it; Enosis agitation was actually a 'Communist manoeuvre'; the status quo served both the security of the island and the protection of its minorities. The protest ended with a counter claim: 'if Great Britain ever wishes to abandon the island, then we claim it to be returned to Turkey, the ex-suzerain, its nearest neighbour, and the only state in the Near East able properly to defend Cyprus'.³⁹⁹

The announcement of the Etnarchy plebiscite seemed to ring the bell for the Turkish Cypriot leaders. The spectre of Enosis apparently prompted the existing rival parties to bury their differences and merge into a single Federation of Turkish Associations (FTA). The Turkish Cypriot press demanded that the governor intervene and stop the process. Failing this the FTA organized protest meeting against Enosis and dispatched a representation to Turkey,⁴⁰⁰ where the ground had been prepared by student demonstrations and angry press comment. Eventually Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak came out and reassured the public that there was no reason of worrying since Britain was determined to retain her sovereignty and the Greek government displayed a 'prudent' attitude. Sadak had already conveyed to the British Ambassador Turkey's interest as well as anxiety about Cyprus. On 21 December, he told Sir Noel Charles that his government would keep calm about Cyprus so long as the

³⁹⁹ **Crawshaw**, p. 48

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, **Gazioğlu**, p. 125

British stood pat; if, however, if things changed, then it would have to protect its own mainly strategic interest.⁴⁰¹

Britain's aim was to benefit from Turkey's close and growing relationship with Turkish Cypriots in the future.⁴⁰² In Turkey there were a new bout of demonstrations and press polemics against Enosis. This time Foreign Minister Sadak's assurances to the Grand National Assembly were received amid cries for the return of Cyprus and the Dodecanese. There is also evidence that Sadak's appeal for calm was, at least in part, the result of American prodding. At the same time, the Turkish government expressed its concerns to the British. Sadak told the British Ambassador, Sir Noel Charles, that his government would not make an issue as long as Britain showed no intention handing Cyprus over to Greece and the latter continued to take a 'sensible attitude'. Yet, if a change in the status quo was envisaged, Turkey 'would be fundamentally concerned'. Sadak justified Turkey's interest mainly on strategic grounds. This statement had a considerable impact on the British. As Ambassador Charles pointed out, it departed from the British interpretation of Turkish foreign policy since the end of the war, i.e. that Turkey would not object the acquisition of territory on her southern flank by a friendly Greece.

It is clear, therefore, that on purely practical as well as on moral and political grounds, Turkey would prefer to remain allied with the West. The question was if she would be allowed to, or would the dispute over Cyprus develop so dangerously in the end as to force her into a war with Greece?⁴⁰³

Turkish public opinion's behaviour in 1949-1954 was concentrated on following points:

- It is a grave mistake for Greece to create a Cyprus problem during a period when Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean security was under the Communist threat and Turkish-Greek co-operation was vital.
- Cypriot Communists were playing a role more than the ordinary Greek Cypriots. This creates anxiety in Turkey.

⁴⁰¹ Stefanidis, p. 10

⁴⁰² Dikerdem, p. 124.

⁴⁰³ Seligman, p. 47.

- The Island of Cyprus is a vital territory for the security of Turkey. Turkey could not stand a weak Greece which might fall under Communist influence both inside and from Cyprus. For Turkish security requirements, the island should either retain under British sovereignty, or if Britain would decide to withdraw from, the island should be given to its former sovereign, Turkey.
- If Cyprus would be given to Greece, whole Anatolian shores would be encircled by Greece situation which Turkey could never permit. Misbehaviour of Greece toward the Turks both in Western Thrace and the Dodecanese is well known. Turkey could not leave some 80-100 thousand Turks to the arbitrary and destructive Greek administration.⁴⁰⁴

Even Şemsettin Günaltay who had been a teacher in the island in 1906-1909 did not give any different remark about the Cyprus issue in his term. The Turkish Cypriots rejoiced his premiership. Naturally, they hoped to see a more active role from his government.⁴⁰⁵ However he was the Prime Minister when his Foreign Minister Sadak on 23 January 1950 replied to Cevdet Kerim İncedayı's question about Cyprus that for Turkey there was no Cyprus Problem.

Exactly, from 1950 to 1954, until the internationalization of the Cyprus question, the Turkish parliament denied the existence of the Cyprus problem. In February 1950, however, when Necmettin Karadayı,⁴⁰⁶ a member of the Turkish Parliament, was speaking in a session, he was holding two bottles in his hands, one filled with blood, the other with soil. He said to the Turkish Parliament: "this is the blood of Cyprus, and this is the soil of Cyprus." His speech was very nationalistic and there was a lot of applause from all the members of the parliament. As he was leaving, he was cheered as one of the

⁴⁰⁴ Armaoğlu, 1955 Yılı..., p. 59

⁴⁰⁵ Halkın Sesi, 15 January 1949

⁴⁰⁶ In the book "Demokrat Parti Dış Politikası" same author Hüseyin Bağcı, gives the name of Cevdet Kerim İncedayı about the same event with the date of 23 January 1950, (İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, 1990), p.101 (see also Hurriyet, 25 January 1950)

defenders of the Cyprus cause. But then nothing happened, as usual. The people started to forget.⁴⁰⁷

The reason is that the Turkish Government at that time wanted Turkey to become a member of NATO. Turks were fighting together with Greek soldiers in Korea, and what is more important, in 1952, the Turkish President Celal Bayar⁴⁰⁸ and the King of Greece (Paul I 1947-1964) had been visiting Athens and Ankara respectively. “There were wonderfully good relations between the two countries. But in the year 1953, the Greeks suddenly started to make a lot of noise. They said, “the British should leave the island. We have to decolonize ourselves to emancipate ourselves,” so the British had to leave the island.”⁴⁰⁹

In an Article written by a prominent Turkish Cypriot political figure, M. Necati Özkan, after the plebiscite he argued that the only solution for the Greek Cypriots was a population exchange, which would save their settlement in Greece. He added ‘unless otherwise you do not go, you would loose your national sentiments.’⁴¹⁰

On the other hand during these years Turkish leaders were trying to better their relations with Greek leaders through the Balkan Pact. They were “anxious to coordinate Turkey’s Cyprus policy with Britain and the U.S. and to compromise on its stated objectives.”⁴¹¹ All this had a considerable bearing on political developments in Balkan countries. The ‘Northern Peril’ was seen as immediate, pressing almost intangible threat so much so that Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey felt the need to enter into international alliances to protect their frontiers. The Soviet Union was continuing to be a threat for the Turks and Turkey did not want to have different opinions than her NATO allies.⁴¹²

There were other reasons for Turkey’s unwillingness to let Greece gain a strategic advantage. The Greek civil war during 1945-1949 demonstrated the power of the communist elements in Greece; despite their defeat, the possibility of the

⁴⁰⁷ **Bağcı, Hüseyin**, “The Situation During Cold War”, Doğramacı, Emel and etc; ed. *Proceedings of the First International Congress on Cypriot Studies*, Eastern Mediterranean University, 1997, p.88.

⁴⁰⁸ see **Zafer**, 28 November 1952

⁴⁰⁹ **Bağcı**, *The Situation...*,

⁴¹⁰ **İstiklal**, 16 January 1950

⁴¹¹ **Bölükbaşı**, p. 37

⁴¹² *Ibid.*, p. 25

Communist Party gaining power in the future remained. This, and the substantial following of it AKEL, the Communist Party in Cyprus, increased Turkish misgivings.⁴¹³

However they were expecting other nations and Britain to respect the rights of Turkey in Cyprus. We can at that point conclude that during the beginning of 1950's Turkey did not determine a Cyprus policy. Due to this fact the Turkish governments were willing to compromise in Cyprus.

It was primarily Britain who was the instigator of Turkey's involvement at the political level as negotiations began for a solution to the Cyprus problem. The same perception of the identity of interests also led Turkey to co-ordinate its Cyprus policy with that of Britain and the US. Turkey shared the American view that a Turco-Greek conflict over Cyprus would destabilise NATO and play into the hands of the Soviet Union. Therefore, during the 1950s, Turkish decisions-makers were anxious not to antagonise Greece.⁴¹⁴

DP's new Foreign Minister Köprülü has interpreted the plebiscite as a 'game played by USSR and the Communists in order to demolish the friendship between Turkey and Greece.'⁴¹⁵

Although there is an opposition from a prominent journalist arguing that Köprülü was against the government's passive policy on Cyprus and claimed that they (DP) would act in a different manner.⁴¹⁶ Köprülü has always undermined the importance of the subject. Metin Toker as a journalist in Paris following the UNGA which in the autumn of 1950 met there instead of New York, for that time obtained the information from his Greek colleagues that their government ordered the Greek delegation in UN to put the Cyprus question on the agenda. Toker informed the Foreign Minister of Turkey about this news. Köprülü's impression was as 'No!, Really! ' He even had no hint that the Greeks have motivated to do so. Greeks was stopped by some last minute diplomatic manoeuvres⁴¹⁷.

Initially, Turkey expected that the new Enosis campaign of the 1950s would fizzle in the manner of previous attempts. Given Britain's determination to hold on to

⁴¹³ Mavroyannis, p. 129, Bahçeli, p. 37

⁴¹⁴ Bölükbaşı, p. 19

⁴¹⁵ Güvenç, p. 45

⁴¹⁶ Bağlum, Kemal, *Anı Politik, 1945-1960*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara, 1991, pp. 47-48

Cyprus, Turkey did not expect island's sovereignty to change hands. However, although the initial official Turkish reaction to Enosis was restrained, the Turkish public was clearly concerned with the island's fate. The demonstration in Ankara and in Istanbul in 1950, in response to the Church organized Enosis plebiscite in Cyprus, and subsequent anti-Enosis activities by student groups during the succeeding years, showed the depth of Turkish domestic interest in the future of their compatriots there.⁴¹⁸

In the Turkish Republic, neither the CHP(CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi : Republican People's Party founded by M. K. Atatürk, and ruled the country 27 consecutive years from 1923 to 1950) at the time in power, nor later on the Democrat Party (DP), made even one statement related to Cyprus. There was no Cyprus question for Turkey in the year 1950. Governments were not exchanging any views about it, even the foreign minister of the time, Necmettin Sadak who also worked as a journalist precisely the editor of Akşam Newspaper (CHP), was very angry with the journalist when he was asked, whether there were any problem in Cyprus. He said, "Gentlemen, there is no Cyprus question."⁴¹⁹ It is worth of wondering that how the journalist could ask about a non-existent matter.

In the 1950's Turkey's Cyprus policy developed as a reaction to Greek and Greek Cypriot actions. During the early 1950's Turkish policymakers refused to accept that there was a Cyprus question as such. They were satisfied with the British sovereignty because it prevented soviet expansionism. Turkish leaders most of the time emphasised that they did not see any reason for a change in the status quo of Cyprus.⁴²⁰

Unlike their Greek neighbours Turkish community had never claimed for independence or even autonomy. The possibility for the Turks to reject Enosis was not more than their brethren showed in another island, Rhodes when it was given to Greece in 1947.⁴²¹

Inadequately organized among themselves, they aimed at drawing attention to their plight in Turkey. Until the early 1950's, the Turkish nationalist position was that,

⁴¹⁷ **Toker, Metin**, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları 1944-1973, DP'nin Altın Yılları 1950-1954*, Bilgi Yayınevi, 2nd printing, İstanbul, 1991, pp. 51-52

⁴¹⁸ **Kitsikis**, p. 58. **Bahçeli**, p. 36

⁴¹⁹ **Bağcı**, *Demokrat Parti...*, p. 88

⁴²⁰ **Armaoğlu**, *Kıbrıs Meselesi ...*, pp. 24-25, **Sönmezoğlu, Faruk**, *Türkiye Yunanistan İlişkileri ve Büyük Güçler Kıbrıs, Ege ve Diğer Sorunlar*, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000, pp. 16-17

⁴²¹ **Çukalas**; p.182

should Britain decide to leave Cyprus, the island should be reverted to Turkey. They passionately lobbied their cause with the help of Turkish Cypriots which were studying in Turkey. By 1948, the issue was taken up by the Turkish media and a Turkish Cypriot delegation visited Turkey.

At the end of the Second World War Turkey had been transformed by a remarkable bloodless revolution from a one-party rule into a multi-party democracy. Even more remarkable was that in the elections of 1950 the old ruling party, RPP headed by İsmet İnönü, had been heavily defeated and replaced in power by the new Democratic Party (DP), led by Adnan Menderes, with a program of greater freedom in business, religion and politics.⁴²²

Celal Bayar was elected as President on 20 May 1950. President Celâl Bayar, an old associate of Kemal Atatürk and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, were then ruling Turkey. Like many of their compatriots they were still obsessed with fear of the USSR, a fear dating back to the first year after the war (1945-1946), when the Russians had tried to win control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and to annex certain border areas of Eastern Anatolia. The government of the Democratic Part (DP), which came to power in May 1950, did not desist from the line of its predecessor. Aspiring to a greater role for Turkey within the Western world, it studiously sought to build up an image as a loyal and energetic ally of the 'Free World' leaders, Britain and the United States. This was reflected in the substantial Turkish Participation in the Korean War and the bid for NATO membership. It also provided the context of close co-operation with Greece, and, later, Yugoslavia. With regard to Cyprus these broader considerations dictated a prudent line. Thus, during its first four years in office, the Menderes government generally refrained from publicly involving itself in the Cyprus dispute, unless provoked by Greek initiatives or pressed in parliament. On the domestic scene, however, it proved much more tolerant than its predecessor did to the incipient Islamic revival and the growth of Pan-Turkist tendencies, which found a convenient outlet in the claim for Cyprus.⁴²³ Although demonstrations and large scale public events were discouraged, irredentist propaganda freely circulated and the views of Turkish Cypriot activist were regularly

⁴²² Stephens, p. 131

⁴²³ Landau, *Radical Politics...*, pp. 173-174, 194, 200-201, Tachau, pp. 267-269

reported.⁴²⁴ Occasionally, the government chose to tighten things up. This happened in the case of the Turkish League for the Protection of Cyprus, an irredentist organization that was dissolved in late 1950 or early 1951.⁴²⁵ It countenanced, however, the activities of the more subtle CTCA and the Student's Federation, which undertook to strengthen the links between the Turkish Cypriots and the mother country by organising visits and exchanges particularly of businessman, students and teachers, and by raising funds. To this worthy end, not only Turkish but also British business concerns in Turkey were required to contribute. The outbreak of Korean War suited with Turkish government's interest. The war led the public opinion in Turkey to turn their attention from Cyprus at least temporarily.

Turkish Cypriots by the newspapers on the island were closely following the Korean War. Besides ordinary curiosity, they dealt with the similarities between Cyprus and Korea. The latter was also in a position of a colony and if she would have the chance to be free, a chance for Cypriot Turks in the same way might occur.⁴²⁶ Of course they regarded this as a chance to Turkish sovereignty to be reached.

Between 1950 and 1954 the Cyprus question only rarely broke through the surface of the international politics. The world itself was pre-occupied with much bigger things. During the last years of Stalin the Cold War was at its height. The Korean and Indo-Chinese war were raging, Greek and Turkish troops were fighting in the UN army in Korea, the Turks with particular distinction. Greece and Turkey were busy with their own political and economic affairs. Elsewhere in the Middle East attention was focused on the crises faced in Egypt and Iran by an expiring British Labour government and a new Conservative administration. Apart from two minor public occasions, one private, the Cyprus issue seemed to be dormant. On February 11 of 1951, the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos, son of the Great Eleftherios Venizelos, asked in parliament for the union of Cyprus and Greece. But his speech was an unavoidable reply to a statement made in the House of Commons by the British Minister of State, Kenneth Younger who had said that no official demand for Enosis had been received from the Greek

⁴²⁴ Ioannides, pp. 80-83

⁴²⁵ Bilge, Suat, "The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey", in Karpat H. Kemal (ed.), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, 1950-1975*, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1975, pp. 137-138, That the Menderes government had little difficulty in checking or even suppressing nationalistic organizations, whenever this served wider policy objectives.

government. In November 1951, Greece raised the Cyprus question in the Trusteeship Community of the UN during the meeting of the General Assembly in Paris. The Greek delegate pointed out that while Libya had become an independent state, Cyprus though more advanced in every way was still a British colony.⁴²⁷

Although the government seemed aloof to the Cyprus issue there were some concerned politicians about the case. Such as Zonguldak Deputy Abdurrahman Boyacıgiller who asked the government at the beginning of the year 1951, to give information to the parliament about the pursued Cyprus policy⁴²⁸. But generally members of parliament did see nothing different than the government did. For example during the budget discussions on the GNA Nazlı Tılabar, a parliamentarian from Istanbul said on the subject matter after the Foreign Minister Köprülü's speech: 'Both our and the Greek nations and parliaments expressed their sincere intentions for the friendship between them. In such circumstances all the interested governments should avoid Cyprus from being a problem of anxiety.'⁴²⁹

After the Greek Premier Venizelos put the Enosis as a foreign policy subject on 16 March 1951, Turkish Foreign Minister Köprülü refused to admit that Turkey had a Cyprus problem. The subject matter was discussed in GNA on 24 February 1951 in which the (non-) policy of the government about Cyprus was criticised by the deputies both from the ruling (DP) and the opposition (RPP) parties.

The official silence of the Turkish government was first broken in spring 1951, after Venizelos had openly admitted the Greek claim on Cyprus. Köprülü's statement to *Hürriyet* on 21 April was as much an expression of concern as it was a remainder of Turkey's interest. Its essential message was that, if the question of Cyprus, ever arose his country would seek to participate in any settlement in order to safeguard her rights. At the same time, however, Köprülü was careful to stress the overriding need for Greece and Turkey to stand together unreservedly on international issues, particularly in view of their joint bid for NATO membership.⁴³⁰ Subsequently, as further proof of good

⁴²⁶ Konuk, O. Necati, "Ankara Mektubu", *Hürsöz*, 8 December 1950

⁴²⁷ Stephens, p. 133

⁴²⁸ *Ulus*, 3 January 1951

⁴²⁹ *Ulus*, 25 February 1951

⁴³⁰ *Hürriyet*, 21 April 1951

will, the Menderes government would discourage the visit of Turkish deputies to Cyprus.⁴³¹

Turkish Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü said in an interview in the daily *Hürriyet* on 21 April 1951 that Turkey was ‘closely concerned’ with the fate of Cyprus due to its geographic proximity, historical ties and Turkish community. He saw no reason for a modification of the status quo of Cyprus. He declared that his government would not permit this to happen in the future ‘without our participation and due regard for our rights’.⁴³² Turkey officially conveyed to the British and in July 1951 to the Americans their concern. The Turkish Ambassador in Washington, Feridun Cemal Erkin, continued to say that Turkey is expected to be a party to any future re-opening of the Cyprus question as his Foreign Minister Köprülü stated before⁴³³

RPP Secretary General Kasım Gülek’s statement on 20 April 1951 was given much space in *Halkın Sesi* Newspaper on 21 April. Even though Turkish public opinion was more concerned about the growing Enosis campaign than were Turkish officials 1954-1955, the government did convey its position in 1951 when Foreign Minister Köprülü made the following statements to a Turkish newspaper:

*It is only natural that we are closely concerned with Cyprus, considering its geographical proximity and importance, and the presence of our compatriots who constitute an important community with whom we have maintained historical ties. We do not see any reason for a change in the legal status of the island. Should any changes in the existing arrangements be seriously considered, we shall not permit such changes to take place without our participation and due regard for our rights.*⁴³⁴

The Turkish Foreign Minister went on to say that the activation of the Cyprus issue was harmful “especially at a time when serious threats to the very existence of the free world makes it imperative for all free and friendly to stand together unreservedly.”⁴³⁵ Köprülü’s reference to the prevailing cold war reflected the major

⁴³¹ Stefanidis, p.212

⁴³² *Hürriyet*, 21 April 1951

⁴³³ FRUS 1951, V, pp. 532-533

⁴³⁴ Gönlübol, pp. 294-295

⁴³⁵ Ibid.

preoccupation of his government with the problem of security in the face of perceived threats from the Soviet Union. Of course, Greece, too, shared these concerns regarding the Soviet Union, as was demonstrated by her eager membership in the Western Alliance and the short-lived Balkan Pact.⁴³⁶

Three months later, the Turkish Embassy in Washington raised the Cyprus question with State Department apparently for the first time since Menderes had come to power. Like the British and the Greeks, Ankara attributed particular importance to the potential role of the US in the dispute. The representation was prompted by an allegation in a semi-official Greek newspaper, that an American Diplomat had envisaged twenty years of British administration in Cyprus, after which there could be a bilateral, Anglo-Greek settlement. Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Feridun Cemal Erkin, summed up the views of his government as follows: ‘the Cyprus question was an artificial one’ since the island was part of the British Empire and Commonwealth; although there was no need for a change in the status quo, Turkey reserved her rights; the clamour for Enosis and self-determination was inspired by self-seeking Greek politicians: the Cypriots were not really Greeks, but ‘an island people of the Mediterranean who adhere to the Greek Orthodox religion’; by sponsoring self-determinations for the Cypriots, Greece invited trouble with her own minorities.⁴³⁷

The Foreign Minister of the DP government, Fuad Köprülü made a similar statement on 20 August 1951: ‘we do not see any reason for a change in the status quo of Cyprus. But if there would be a change... Our rights have to be respected...’ Köprülü added that under the current world conditions which ‘required unconditional solidarity of free nations,’ issues such as the Cyprus problem should not be raised.⁴³⁸

Turkey has forcefully defended the Turkish Cypriots claims as to their Turkish heritage, identity and their contention that they are a part of the Turkish nation.⁴³⁹ The rights and wrongs of the Cyprus question were rapidly becoming irrelevant to the main issue, which has long ago ceased to be a purely Cypriot issue. It had now resolved itself into nothing more or less than a determination on the part of Turkey not to be encircled

⁴³⁶ **Bahcheli**, p. 36

⁴³⁷ FRUS 1951, V, pp. 534-535

⁴³⁸ **Bilge**, p. 351

⁴³⁹ **Pollis**, p. 95

by a chain of unfriendly bases, and a corresponding Greek ambition to achieve that very goal.

During the previous years Turkey had spent very large sums of money on the modernisation and development of Mersin and İskenderun and certainly its ports. But if Cyprus whose air bases dominate those ports, become Greek; or even if it were controlled by Greek Cypriots who choose to remain neutral in an East-West conflict thereby enormously complicating the defence of convoys using Turkey's southern harbours. Then the strategic value of İskenderun and Mersin would be seriously reduced. Indeed Turkey would feel herself virtually surrounded and, in the event of attack by Russia, isolated from her main allies.⁴⁴⁰

This, at any rate, is how Ankara saw it. Since the Turkish Cypriot line seems largely to be dictated by Ankara. Seligman points out that 'we must try to determine how much justification there is for Turkey's fears, and also how resolutely she is likely to oppose any settlement, now or in the future, which might or could give the Greeks control of Cyprus.

Turkey's uncompromising attitude over Cyprus was due to mere annoyance or injured vanity or even to British promptings behind the scenes. It ought to be made clear to all that, quite apart from the immediate strategic and political considerations involved, the Turkish government could and would at the moment be prevented by the Turkish peoples themselves from making any further material concessions over Cyprus.⁴⁴¹

It might be argued that Greece has pursued a more 'national' policy on Cyprus in comparison with Turkey.⁴⁴² At this time (1951) Turkish position became clear. There was a growing anti-Greece- Enosis press and radio propaganda campaign and the emergence of Turkey was purely against Enosis claims. Moreover though not very strong there were some comments in Turkey that the island should be reversed to Turkey which meant the Turkish version of Enosis i.e. iltihak. Turkish Cypriots sent a delegation to Turkey and the normally good relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots showed early signs of breaking down with demonstrations on both sides. The

⁴⁴⁰ Seligman, p. 49-50

⁴⁴¹ Ibid., p. 44

⁴⁴² Güvenç, p. 39

Turkish government reassured the delegation that the island would not be surrendered to Greece and that sovereignty would remain with Britain, they told Britain, that they would expect to be consulted on any future moves. Britain however, did not try to enlist Turkey's support because, in the official view of both countries, there was no Cyprus question.⁴⁴³

“The Turkish Cypriots regarded the continued efforts of the Greek Orthodox Church and the Greek Cypriots to turn Cyprus into a Greek island as provocative and detrimental to their legitimate rights. Because all Turkish Cypriots believed what was ‘freedom’ for the Greek Cypriots was ‘enslavement’ for the Turkish Cypriots. ‘Freedom’ to the Greek Cypriots was synonymous with Enosis, whereas, this to the Turkish Cypriots meant neo-colonization and forced exodus from Cyprus.”⁴⁴⁴

At the end of 1951, the former Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak, who was at that time the editor of Akşam newspaper, said the Hür Söz newspaper's correspondent Ahmet Gazioğlu “Until the time I left the foreign office there was no case prepared to conduct our policy on Cyprus.”⁴⁴⁵

Relations between Greece and Turkey were highly friendly at this time. In 1952, there were no less than four top-level visits one country to the other. King Paul paid a visit to Ankara, Turkish President Celâl Bayar and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes to Athens, Greek Deputy Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelos to Ankara. These visits had a marked impact on the attitudes of the public in both Greece and Turkey. Moreover, the two countries were working in close co-operation in every sphere. In foreign policy, it was their common aspiration to be admitted to membership of NATO which at that time was all-powerful, and after a considerable amount of diplomatic activity this goal was eventually attained in 1952, once the doubts felt by certain Western countries, had been overcome. Thus in February 1952, Turkey and Greece took its place for the first time as a full member of the alliance at a meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers in Lisbon. Greece sent a delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister, Sophocles Venizelos, and including the Minister of Coordination Georgios Kartalis.

⁴⁴³ Baker, p. 101

⁴⁴⁴ Ertegin, p.2

⁴⁴⁵ Gazioğlu, p. 480

Turkish Independence Party (Türk İstiklal Partisi) Leader, Mehmet Necati Özkan continued his mission in the name of Turkish Cypriots and met authorities from the Arab countries and he said to Cumhuriyet that those Arab governments were refusing the attempts for the union of Cyprus with Greece. He added that in case of future discussion in the UN all Middle Eastern countries would demand that Cyprus to be given back to motherland, i.e. Turkey.⁴⁴⁶

In the case of Cyprus, the Turks were content for the British to rule the island indefinitely, particularly after ties between Britain and Turkey were cemented through their alliances within NATO and the Baghdad Pact. However, in Turkish eyes the prospect of Greek annexation of Cyprus would substantially tilt the bilateral strategic balance at Turkey's expense. The Lausanne balance had already been modified in Greece's favour when the Italian ruled Dodecanese islands were granted to it in 1947 as part of the post-war settlement. Turkey was unable to oppose the cession of the Dodecanese to Greece even if it had wanted to because of its weak bargaining position as a result of its neutrality during the Second World War. By the 1950s, however, Turkey's status in the West had improved substantially. Turkish troops had served with distinction in Korea, and Turkey emerged as a central actor in the Western strategic designs in the Middle East.⁴⁴⁷

The Turkish interest was brushed away with the argument that any interest Turkey might have had been formally extinguished by the annexation and by the Treaty of Lausanne and that the problem was therefore reduced to ensuring adequate constitutional safeguards for the Turkish Cypriots. On the contrary, those who argued the case for taking full account of Turkish interests pointed to the proximity of Cyprus to Turkey. To its historical association with Turkey during the three hundred years of Ottoman rule immediately preceding the British occupation to the understandable fears Turkish minority about being subjugated to the Greek majority in Cyprus if a British government were to yield to the pressure for Enosis – with all the damaging consequences that would then ensue for NATO⁴⁴⁸ the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey would be against this tendency.

⁴⁴⁶ Cumhuriyet, 25 May 1952

⁴⁴⁷ Bahcheli, p. 31

⁴⁴⁸ Reddaway, p. 15

Turkey's primary interest in Cyprus apart from simple national pride was the concern for her own security. The future of the Turkish Cypriot community seems to have been of secondary importance though did not mean unimportant. The concern for security evinced in Ankara was based on old suspicions of Greek expansionism and on new fears arising from Greek weakness.⁴⁴⁹ These motives were obviously conflicting but the contradictions resolved themselves in the argument that the combination of a weak Greece and a strong great power, brought about either by alliance or conquest, posed a serious threat to Turkey. The Turks recalled that the alliance between Greece and Britain had led to the campaign in Anatolia after the W.W. I. They pointed out that the German conquest of Greece in the W.W. II had brought German forces to Crete and Aegean Islands. Next time, they argued, it might be Russia, a more formidable enemy, who would make use of Greek territory. Had not the Communists still a powerful influence in Greece and Cyprus, despite their defeat in the Greek Civil War? Greece already controlled islands covering all Turkey's major Mediterranean outlets except for her southern ports of Mersin and İskenderun. These ports were vital for the supply of central Anatolia and the eastern frontier would be vulnerable to air attacks from Cyprus. Greek control of Cyprus therefore threatened Turkey with complete encirclement from the West and South. It was true that Greece and Turkey were now allies in NATO against Russia but NATO might last not forever.

PM Menderes and Foreign Minister Köprülü did not made a statement about Cyprus before their departure from Turkey to Britain.⁴⁵⁰ The US in the mean time refused to give visa to a Communist committee seeking to make attempts in the UN about Cyprus.⁴⁵¹ Menderes who was in London in 13-18 November 1952 did not reply a question on Cyprus, though he said all the matters concerning Turkey were discussed during his contacts with British authorities.⁴⁵² What it constant for the term we observed on Turkey's perception was that she looked at the case always on the terms of NATO interest and western security. Turkey believed that the only way to stop the island to go Greece was through the support of the Western alliance.

⁴⁴⁹ Weakness should be understood as from the Turkish perception is that Greece is so weak and defenceless against Communism within herself.

⁴⁵⁰ **Cumhuriyet**, 14 October 1952

⁴⁵¹ **Hürriyet**, 14 October 1952

⁴⁵² **Cumhuriyet**, 20 October 1952

First discussion about Cyprus in the UN happened on 1952 at the 3rd Commissions' 454th meeting. 24 November 1952 Greek delegate Dimitris Lambrios put forward the idea of self-determination to be issued on Cyprus. He disclosed that Britain has promised to give Cyprus back to Greece in 1915, with the condition to enter the war at the side of Allies. He also argued that the right to self-determination is one of the most important subjects to be discussed on the UN. In reply to Lambrios, Turkish delegate Adil Derinsu claimed the same right for the Turkish community, because Turks were living on the island for centuries and certainly Greeks were not the only inhabitants of the island. According to Derinsu Turkish government would support their kin in all aspects.⁴⁵³

When it became fairly clear that Turkey was in no immediate danger of invasion from the Soviets, Cyprus emerged as Turkey's major foreign policy concern. The Turkish community on Cyprus was one of the matters that İnönü had considered as a lost cause in the Lausanne Conference of 1923. If Greece had not become involved, as far as Turkey was concerned the issue was a dormant one. But the question became a live wire when Enosis or union with Greece became a possibility. The intricacies of diplomacy and policy relating to the island deserve both a separate study. What might be noted passing, however, is that Cyprus had emerged as the most consistent issue in the post-Kemalist foreign policy. The determination to protect the security of the Turkish community has got unwanted consequences, and the cost of alienation in the international community remains one of the burdens on Turkish foreign policy.⁴⁵⁴

The improvement of relations, which followed, lasted well until the mid-1950's and the common membership of NATO in 1952 and the Balkan pact in 1953 contributed to it. Yet, the start of the Greek-Cypriot Enosis activities in the mid-1950's led to a gradual deterioration of Turco-Greek relations because Greek public opinion forced the Greek governments to support the Greek Cypriots' Enosis drive, whereas Ankara sided with the Turkish Cypriots' struggle to oppose Enosis'.⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵³ **Tülümen, Turgut**, *Hayat Boyu Kıbrıs*, Boğaziçi Yay. İstanbul, 1998, p. 10-11

⁴⁵⁴ **Deringil, Selim** "Turkish Foreign Policy since Atatürk" Dodd, Clement (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy New Prospects*, Eothen Press, Cambridgeshire, 1992, p. 5.

⁴⁵⁵ **Bölükbaşı Süha**, "The Turco-Greek Dispute" in Dodd Clement (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy New Prospects*, Eothen Press, Cambridgeshire, 1992, p.29.

The Turkish Cypriot community feared that it would be unable to protect its right as a community if Cyprus was united with Greece. Turkish Cypriot leaders frequently protested against the Enosis movement. In one such protest, a former member of the legislative council sent a telegram to the Committee of Supply of the British Parliament suggesting that the Muslims were unanimously opposed the cession of the island to Greece, which would amount 'to delivering peaceful people into the hands of those of the Greeks would have to act as ruining and destroying them.'⁴⁵⁶ The Turks argued that if Britain decided to give up Cyprus, it should return it to Turkey. Admittedly, there were religious groups or individuals in the Turkish community who did not favour the secular orientation of Kemalist Turkey⁴⁵⁷ but they were not the strongest group among the Turkish Cypriots. As an example of the strength of the other group having mostly secular founders, in 1953 more than 100 branches of the Cyprus – is – Turkish Association were set up in Turkey to enlighten public opinion.⁴⁵⁸ Turkish associations in Cyprus also tried to influence the British authorities by putting forward counter claims to the Greek and the Greek Cypriots. For instance, they sent a telegram to the British Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, declaring that they were against the union of Cyprus with Greece stronger than ever.⁴⁵⁹ 21 April 1953 Turkish National Student Federation organized demonstrations in Istanbul and Ankara and the date was announced as the day of Cyprus.

Before the year was out, Turkish papers began criticising the government for its failure to react to the growing evidence that Greece intended to press her claim on Cyprus. The Menderes government issued a statement to the effect that while there was no Cyprus question at present, Britain could not possibly take any decision without first having the official opinion and consent of the Turkish government. The Secretary-General of the opposition RPP, Kasım Gülek was even more outspoken: the Turks, he said, were satisfied with the current status of Cyprus. However, if there was to be a change, this change should be made in favour of Turkey. The effect of these statements on Greek attitude was negligible and Ambassador Peake reported that both the King and

⁴⁵⁶ Hill, p. 510

⁴⁵⁷ Bahcheli, p. 26

⁴⁵⁸ Bullard, p. 153

⁴⁵⁹ Cumhuriyet, 6 July 1952

Papagos seemed to discount the dangers for either the Balkan Pact or Greek-Turkish relations.⁴⁶⁰

An article published in Cyprus Mail argued that there was no proof of the Greek ness of the Christians in the island, though there was a link of language. That newspaper added 'if Britain would leave Cyprus it is obligatory to give back to its real owner, Turkey.'⁴⁶¹

Meanwhile Turkey was trying to settle good relationship with her neighbours and even some others such as the so called weakest link in the communist Bloc. Yugoslavia had been in a very delicate situation ever since its breach with Moscow in the summer of 1948 and its expulsion from Cominform. Economically it was in dire straits, because it had suddenly found itself without trading partners, and in addition it was isolated, weak and exposed to a host of perils. So, step by step, very cautiously, at first, it started mending its relations with Greece to a lesser extent with Turkey. Eventually, after in numerable meetings, official visits and negotiating sessions, a 'Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation' between the three countries was signed in February 1953 and a 'Military Cooperation Pact' in August 1954. This new entente was something that all patriotically minded parties in Greece had worked for, and it was broad about true the determination of three party leaders representing a cross-section of the political spectrum; namely, Plastiras, Venizelos and Papagos.

During 1953, the formal ties of friendship and alliance between Greece and Turkey appeared to grow stronger then ever. The two countries successfully promoted the conclusion of the Balkan Pact with Yugoslavia and worked together to transform it into a military alliance. Yet, by autumn 1953, renewed press polemics threatened to tarnish this bright picture. A temporary increase in arrivals of illegal immigrants from Western Thrace to Turkey led to recriminations about the alleged ill-treatment of the Muslim minority in Greece.⁴⁶²

The second half of 1953 also witnessed an increased Turkish interest in Cyprus. This was manifested in matters such as the appointment of teachers, student exchanges,

⁴⁶⁰ Stefanidis, p.54

⁴⁶¹ Zafer, 24 April 1953

⁴⁶² Stefanidis, p. 213

the election of a new Mufti,⁴⁶³ and the general welfare of the Turkish Cypriots. The traffic of visitors representing educational, business and religious interest, reached such dimensions that by early September the governor sought to have it curtailed. As a result on 3 October, an official of the British Embassy discussed the Governor Sir Andrew Wright's complaints with Orhan Eralp, the diplomat in charge of Cyprus affairs at the Turkish Foreign Ministry. The British pointed out that, at a time when the Greeks were making trouble, it was in Turkey's interest to avoid adding to the difficulties to the Cyprus administration. The point was taken by Eralp, who expedited to assert the identity of interest between the two powers on the Cyprus issue.

Turkey did not pay much attention to the subject and the developments concerning the island's future status for several reasons despite the ongoing fresh initiatives taken by the Greek Cypriots and Greece itself. Perceiving the case within the narrow boundaries of the Treaty of Lausanne and reluctance to give an impression of intervention to the internal affairs of an ally⁴⁶⁴ limited Turkey to deal with the matter just by expressing their sensitivity on Enosis and the position of their kins. The hopes and fears of the Turkish government were summarised by the British Embassy in Ankara, in November 1953, as follows:

*[The Turks] unquestionably welcome British sovereignty over the island, though they perhaps have little confidence in our management of the Enosis question; indeed, they fear that we may allow our selves to be pushed off the island, and for that reason do not want their case to go by default. But their desire, nevertheless, is to avoid, for as long as they possibly can, becoming embroiled.*⁴⁶⁵

Turkish governments' initial political engagement in Cyprus was in large amounts as a result of pressure from the British. The British negotiators insisted that both Greece and Turkey had national interest in Cyprus and should participate in the negotiations on the future of the island. Significantly those proposed options were principally a response to GB's definition of the problem as one involving Turkey's

⁴⁶³ Ateşin, p.145

⁴⁶⁴ Sönmezoglu, p. 18

⁴⁶⁵ Stefanidis, p. 214

national interest and on pressure from the Turkish Cypriots. At that time it was not an affirmation of the Turkish ness of the Turkish Cypriots nor was it an indication that Turkey was embarking on an irredentist policy. Gradually however, Turkey modified its non-expansionist policy and began to view the Turkish Cypriots⁴⁶⁶ as a Turkish community asking for their vital needs such as vitality and recognition. Initially, Turkey's position despite the fact that the Greek Cypriots nationalist movement for Enosis with Greece was gaining momentum, that violence against the Turkish Cypriot was widespread, nevertheless was cautious; either the island should remain under British rule or, if that not feasible it should be reverted to Turkey.

Nevertheless in early 1954, Turkish President Celal Bayar was still able to refer to Turkish-Greek cooperation as "the best example of how two countries who mistakenly mistrusted each other for centuries have agreed upon a close and loyal collaboration as a result of recognition of the realities of life." The possibility might be discussed whether the Turks might use their influence on the Greek government to dissuade the latter from pressing its claim or from raising the issue in the meeting of the UN at 1954. Although Turkey has tried to dissociate itself as much as possible from agitation on the Cyprus question, it has firmly stated its intention of being heard if the status of Cyprus should change basing its interest on the large Turkish population in the island. Now that close ties existed between Greece and Turkey, the Turkish government might be able to exert a helpful influence on its neighbour.⁴⁶⁷

Until August 1954, the attitude of the Menderes government neatly fitted into this pattern. Following the first – and not so effective – representation to the Greek government in March, Ankara avoided further *démarches*. These attitudes which mystified the British and misled the Greeks, was described by the official in charge of Cyprus affairs at the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Orhan Eralp, in the following terms. The Cyprus question was considered an Anglo-Greek problem; no further *démarche* to Athens was desirable; if the issue was raised at the UN, Turkey 'would not wish to take vigorous line' there, and might even decide to abstain; in view of the sensitivity of the Turkish press on Cyprus, no action should be taken which might incite a campaign against Greece; nothing should be done to endanger the progress of the Balkan alliance

⁴⁶⁶ Pollis, p. 97

⁴⁶⁷ FRUS 1952-1954, VOL. VIII., p. 680

which was 'considered more important than the Cyprus question'. Similar views were expressed to the Americans well into the summer 1954 combined with assurances that inflammatory actions or statements would be avoided.⁴⁶⁸

Köprülü's statement shows that given the Soviet threat, Turkey was against an internal quarrel within the western camp over an issue as peripheral as Cyprus. Second, Turkey did not propose an alternative to British sovereignty. Köprülü stated that Turkey's rights had to be respected, but he did not spell out what these rights were because neither he nor the rest of the government had determined what Turkey's Cyprus policy should be. The opposition was in no better shape. İnönü said on 28 August 1954 that he was 'against a revision of the status quo in Cyprus' but he too, failed to offer an alternative.⁴⁶⁹

In a telegram from the Ambassador in Turkey Warren to the Department of State on 26 February 1954, Turkey's Foreign Ministry Under-Secretary Muharrem Nuri Birgi, briefly summarized Turkish position. He said, to raise the issue of Cyprus' union with Greece in UN would evoke sharply critical reaction in Turkey and jeopardize existing good relations with Greece. For this reason Turkish government has been most careful to avoid any action or statement on Cyprus which might inflame public opinion. No formal representation has ever been made to Greek government although it has been intimated indirectly several times that Turkish government hoped Greek government would not officially support agitation for Enosis. Foreign office now considered formal representations and Birgi considered it likely that they will be made. Turks would stress argument that to raise the issue in UN would benefit only common enemy. Furthermore, Arab-Asiatic bloc could be expected to utilize it to maximally for own ends. Birgi expressed personal view that Kyrrou (Alexis Kyrrou was serving as Greek Consul at Nicosia when recalled to Athens on November 1, 1931, at the request of British authorities in Cyprus following Greek Cypriot violent demonstrations for Enosis.) may be personally active in pushing action by Greek government since his appointment as the Secretary General of Foreign Ministry because he had strong personal feelings on

⁴⁶⁸ FRUS 1952 – 1954, VIII, pp. 680-681

⁴⁶⁹ Soysal, Mümtaz, *Dış Politika ve Parlamento*, SBF Yayınları, Ankara, 1964, p. 240

subject. He reminded that Kyrou was expelled from Cyprus by British some years ago because of his anti-British activities.⁴⁷⁰

Turkish Ambassador in Washington, Feridun Cemal Erkin, stated on 10 March 1954, he was not authorised to leave anything into the State Department in written form, but showed Mr. Byroade (Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of the Near Eastern Affairs at State Department of the USA.) a memorandum in which the Turkish views were rather fully expressed and which may be summarised as follows: Although the question of the union of Cyprus with Greece has been a controversial one for many years, the Turkish government has taken to note of it and has always attempted to play down any press agitation because the Enosis issue has never before been officially supported by the Greek government. It has been the view of the Turkish government that there was no reason for any change in the status quo, but it must now expressed its concern at the Greek government's announced intention of presenting this question in the UN. It must be noted that many of the arguments in favour of Enosis are based on the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants and on national affinities. The Turkish government wishes to point out that it is not international custom to decide questions of sovereignty solely on the basis of majority wishes of the population but that are also equally important geographical considerations which must be taken into account. The present is not an opportune time for this question to be raised; nor is it right for Greece to state that it is forced into this move because of public opinion in favour of Enosis instead of trying to counteract propaganda favouring Enosis. Any public airing of this issue will have a seriously adverse effect upon relationships in NATO and among the three countries which have recently signed the Ankara Pact. Only the Soviet Union stands to profit by such action. The possession of Cyprus would be of no advantage to Greece, nor is it of vital necessity to that country. It is only a matter of 'domestic policy speculation'. With regard to security, Cyprus is so far greater importance to Turkey than Greece. The Turkish government does not consider it a valid argument that Greece would be willing to make bases available to its allies following the annexation of Cyprus. It is generally known that the Communists and the Greek political parties are making use of this issue for their own selfish and short-sighted ends.

⁴⁷⁰ FRUS 1952-1954 Vol. VIII, pp. 680-681

Ambassador Erkin said that he wished to point out his personal opinion that the return of Mr. Kyrrou to Athens is partly responsible for the more aggressive Greek policy on Cyprus. Mr. Kyrrou himself a Cypriot, was some years ago declared *persona non grata* by the British when he was Greek consul in Nicosia and was forced to leave the island. The Ambassador feared that Mr. Kyrrou was using his position as Secretary General of the Greek Foreign Office to promote a personal policy that may get Greece so deeply involved that it can not turn back.

Mr. Byroade said that we had in the past used our influence with the Greek government in an effort to keep this question from being brought up in the UN, believing that it was a matter between Greece and Great Britain. The Department is now in the process of re-evaluating its views in the light of the announced intention of the Greek government to seek the inclusion of the Cyprus problem on the UN agenda.⁴⁷¹

In 30 March 1954 the US Ambassador in Turkey Warren sent a letter to the Department of State about the comments referring to Turkish aspect of the Cyprus question: Turks felt that Enosis campaign was carefully built with Archbishop Makarios as front man with a secret encouragement of the Greek government. Turkey was concerned precisely with the development now approaching critical stage. The Turks appeared to believe that Secretary-General of the Greek Foreign Ministry, Kyrrou was personally involved.

In view of the above, was there any change of a timely Greek-Turkish understanding on Cyprus? According to Bahcheli, such a thing was not inconceivable, if Turkey had been offered strategic facilities and special safeguards for its community on the island.⁴⁷² Clearly, the Menderes government did nothing to encourage such a prospect, although it is equally true that the initiative had to come from the Greek side. In early June 1954, Turkish Ambassador to Athens Kemal Tarray's intervention cancelled the only recorded attempt at broaching the subject. If the Turks had ever contemplated an understanding, the Papagos government failed to cultivate them.

The Turkish press, of course, went on with its anti-Enosis polemics. In the spring, as Turkey went to the polls, the popular press led by *Hürriyet* demanded that the government should abandon its 'inaction' and came out in a support of the Turkish

⁴⁷¹ FRUS 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 681-683

⁴⁷² **Bahcheli**, p. 38

claim on Cyprus. Failing to do so, it threatened, might cost the party in government many votes. The fundamentals of Greek-Turkish friendship were cast in doubt. A disquieting feature of this campaign was its thinly-veiled threats against the Greek minority in Istanbul and its institutions. The Patriarchate, in particular, was taken to task for failing to take a stand against Enosis and condemn Makarios' meddling with politics. *Hürriyet* went as far as to allege its involvement in the annexationist project.

Its low profile notwithstanding, the Turkish government on appropriate occasions continued to remind its allies, particularly the British and the Americans, of its views and special interest in Cyprus.⁴⁷³ The Grand National Assembly publicly reaffirmed this interest, whereas instances of Greek awkwardness, as in the case of the *dèmenti* of Tarray's representation, served a similar purpose. Ankara would wait to repeat its views more forcefully and widely after the Greek appeal was placed before the UN, on 20 August 1954.

The signing of the pact with a firm commitment by all parties to the active observance of its terms was very much in the interest of Greece and Yugoslavia. But it was clear that the strength of that commitment would depend largely on the maintenance of good relations between Greece and Turkey, which had now deteriorated sharply as a result of the bitter dispute between them at the UN.⁴⁷⁴

The outcome would depend partly on the course of the events that were beyond the control of Greece and the Cypriots. In other words, on pure chance up to a point, partly on the nature of popular reaction in Cyprus and also in Greece and Turkey, and partly, though to a lesser extent on the way the issue was handled by the government. Averoff as the Foreign Minister of the Greece placed the government action last, because in many cases its policy would inevitable have to be adapted to outside events and the state of public opinion.⁴⁷⁵ When issues of the national concern are set in motion by deep-rooted popular feeling, there is virtually no stopping them.

The reasons put forward by the Turkish diplomat Orhan Eralp were more apparent than real. Turkey had no obligatory reason to intervene publicly in the dispute, unless the Greeks realised their threats and resorted to the UN – and until well into the

⁴⁷³ For the first full-length communication of Turkish views made by Ambassador Erkin on 10 March see, FRUS 1952-1954, VIII; pp. 681-683

⁴⁷⁴ **Averoff**, pp. 35-36

summer the Turks appear to doubt that this would be the case. The negotiations leading to the tripartite Balkan alliance was a further restraining factor. A responsible attitude, argued on several occasions, served the Turkish case better than any tactics of recrimination. Last but not least, the Turkish government had to look after its interest in Western Thrace, which had a larger Muslim population than Cyprus. Surely, Ankara did not wish to upset Athens pending the realisation of Papagos' assurance to meet Turkish grudges and improve the lot of the Turkish minority in the Western Thrace.

Turkish reactions to the Greek claims on Cyprus in the period under discussion were influenced by two largely incompatible considerations. The first one was the distrust of Greek motives and intentions in seeking territorial aggrandisement along the coastline of Anatolia. The second one was the need to preserve Greek-Turkish friendship for security reasons of a more immediate character.⁴⁷⁶ Turkish press has played an important role for Cyprus question to get the attention of the community. But the government's interest for the case was not created or developed by the press. As a matter of fact it is not true to say that the press and even the public opinion had the power to direct government's policies. Turkey started to have an official policy on Cyprus by the circumstances appeared. The situation in Greece was no more different than Turkey. If some obligatory speeches from the government are excluded, the actual Enosis campaign was circulating within the sphere of press and some interest groups and certainly the students. On the other hand, Turkey increased her cultural assistance to the Turkish Cypriots from 1950 onwards. These kinds of assistance helped them to preserve the identities and to prepare for a long conflict.

This campaign was not unrelated to Cyprus. As the Greeks made their intention to resort to the UN clear, the tone of anti Greek comment in Turkey grew shriller and increasingly ominous. As a section of the Greek press retaliated and the ensuing war of worlds prompted the British Embassy to give some thoughts to yet another exchange of populations between the two countries. In this connection, the British diplomats observed that the prosperous Greek Community of Istanbul had little incentive to emigrate to Greece, where as Western Thrace Muslims, despite the pretensions of the popular Turkish papers, were not particularly welcome in Turkey owing to their

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 38

⁴⁷⁶ Bahcheli, p.207

‘reactionary’ (i.e. Islamic) outlook.⁴⁷⁷ Whether this clamour was officially inspired or not, the Turkish government successfully used it in order to extract concessions that would strengthen its ties with the Turkish community. In this task, it was greatly aided by Greek Prime Minister, Field Marshall Papagos’ eagerness to appease Ankara in view of the recourse to the UN. Thus, during 1954 Greece recognised the Turkish ethnic charter of the minority and, under the term of new cultural convention, Ankara was given considerable control over educational, cultural and religious affairs in Western Thrace.

The Turkish government was also concerned with the pro-Enosis activities of the Greek-American lobby. Lacking a comparable ethnic pressure group in the US, the Turks resorted to the Jewish lobby whose services had been utilised on previous occasions, such as loan raising and the Turkish bid for NATO membership. This sort of tactics paid off. When Greece eventually raised the Cyprus question at the UN the Turkish government would earnestly seek assistance from the Israeli government in mobilising Jewish American support against the Greek case.⁴⁷⁸ They were violently determined against Enosis. There is also a considerable population of Turkish Cypriots in Turkey itself, which place its part in moulding Turkish opinion. According to Eden, they number a quarter of a million or more. The United States government was not yet prepared to accept the importance and reality of the Turkish interest. An American official commented ironically, in reply to our explanations that his governments were well aware of the Turkish interest, but there was no Turkish lobby in the United States.⁴⁷⁹

From 1950 onwards the Turkish Foreign Ministry had seen the way the wind was blowing over Cyprus, but the Turkish government made no move because it trusted Britain to stay in control of the island. This was a situation, which was acceptable to Turkey and to the Turkish Cypriots.⁴⁸⁰ The desire not to offend Turkey merged imperceptibly into the more positive recognition that Turkish objection to Greek control of Cyprus could be used to preserve the British position. It is scarcely surprising that, so constantly assured by London that Turkey was indispensable, Ankara should have

⁴⁷⁷ **Stefanidis**, p. 213

⁴⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 212

⁴⁷⁹ **Eden**, p. 414

begun to put up the political and economic price of its support. Nonetheless, although it is sometimes very doubtful to find proven record as such, senior Turkish officials regarded this period of history as Britain did not create Turkey's interest in Cyprus nor was it only a result of British stimulation. According to those officials Britain stressed Turkish interest for her own purposes. But this interest already existed independently from Britain. The Turkish newspapers had hitherto been more outspoken than the Turkish government, which had behaved with restraint."⁴⁸¹

After the Balkan Pact in 1954 Turkey remained his position of silence about Cyprus. But with the open intentions from Greece to submit the matter to the United Nations, Turkish press and opposition began to lay the question on the agenda of the country. Meanwhile, Cypriot Turks sent a delegation named "Cyprus Turkish Associations Federation (Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu) in order to activate Turkish Government. The then Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü assured them that Greece could not achieve the goal to put the issue to the UN General Assembly meetings. He then added that Britain would never have the idea to withdraw from there. And the successor of Köprülü, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu supported the Foreign Minister as he had the opinion that Greece will not submit the matter to the UN, and even if so happened it would not be discussed officially.⁴⁸²

The year 1954 was an important year for Turkey's Cyprus Policy. Turkey was forced to deal with the matter at a time when Greece was trying for recourse to the United Nations. Meanwhile general elections had to be held on May 1954 in Turkey. In order to prevent the opposition to use the subject as an election propaganda matter, Menderes government with the advice of the then representative to NATO, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, started to follow a more active and at least vocal role. Zorlu was arguing that it was necessary to pay more attention to the issue both for internal and certainly for the external politics.⁴⁸³ For the governments pursuing a policy to gradually becoming an interested party, Zorlu's warnings and advices were to be placed an important role.⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸⁰ Stephens, p. 140

⁴⁸¹ Eden, p. 400.

⁴⁸² Kaymak, Faiz; *Kıbrıs Türkleri Bu Duruma Nasıl Düştü*, Alpay Basımevi, İstanbul, 1968, p. 23

⁴⁸³ Esenbel, Melih; *Kıbrıs I: Ayağa Kalkan Adam*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara, 1993, p.15

⁴⁸⁴ Armaoğlu, Fahir; "Türkiye'nin Kıbrıs Politikası (1954-1959)", *Yeni Kıbrıs Dergisi*, Cilt V. Sayı:3 Aralık 1987, p.33

From 1954 onwards Greece was encouraged by the Turkish government's policy. Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos, for instance, said that Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister sent messages to them that "a minor issue like Cyprus can not damage Greek-Turkish friendship."⁴⁸⁵ The British withdrawal from India in 1947 and from Palestine 1948 attracted the mainland and Cypriot Greeks for a union or annexation. However, the common goal of NATO prevented Greek government to pay much attention to the Cyprus question despite the pressures from the public opinion in Greece and of the Greek Cypriots.⁴⁸⁶ A letter from Acting Secretary of State Smith to the Embassy in Turkey on 6 September 1954 claimed that: "This (Turkish) government regrets the action of the Greek government in proposing that Cyprus be included on the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly." The discussion there can, according to the US opinion "lead to no early solution and will on the other hand jeopardise the close relationship existing among the NATO members and concern particularly between Greece and Turkey and Greece and the UK".

Köprülü had no intention to deal with such a potentially immense and difficult subject with a prospect of foggy and cloudy outcome.⁴⁸⁷ Köprülü's (we have to keep in mind that to Köprülü there was no Cyprus problem in the beginning of the 1950's) conduct of foreign policy on Cyprus did not change in 1954 either. His indifferent and overcautious manner was still continuing.⁴⁸⁸ A slight move from this better to say, Turkey's position would be represented by the above example. The Turkish Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü, said to the Greek Foreign Minister (Jean) Politis, that why they were creating such a problem in Cyprus and added him that he knew Cyprus belongs to Turkey. He warned his counterpart that is not true to act as such in an era that Turkey and Greece had wonderful relations. But he replied by Politis that they still want to have Cyprus. Fuad Köprülü then said "you have no choice but to understand that we will never give up Cyprus and Cyprus will never love you. We will fight for this."⁴⁸⁹ This conversation clarified that if their anxiety about their future has put them in to a highly

⁴⁸⁵ Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1870-1960)*, p. 24.

⁴⁸⁶ Armaoğlu Fahir, "1955 Yılında...", p. 58

⁴⁸⁷ Günver, Semih, *Fatin Rüşri Zorlu'nun Öyküsü*, Bilgi Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1985, p. 47

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 48.

⁴⁸⁹ Bağcı, *Demokrat Parti...*, p. 89

excitable state though the Turks say less than the Greeks it does not mean that they feel less.

From another perspective of a Turkish diplomat who witnessed the meeting, something should be added to above mentioned conversation between two foreign ministers : Köprülü stated that Marshal Papagos would be remembered in Greek history as a heroic-commander and a great statesman thus he was in no need to add a ‘Cyprus Pearl’ on his crown of honour. Turkish Foreign Minister insisted that this would not provide any benefit to Papagos. He followed ‘I implore you not to create a Cyprus problem in the name of Turkish-Greek friendship and peace established by Atatürk and Venizelos, suffering from enormous pains and facing great confrontations, against history’. Otherwise, he added ‘you will face with Turkey uprised altogether against this. This will be the end of Turkish-Greek friendship. Do not’ said Köprülü. After Politis’ unsatisfactory answer, Köprülü again “presumably I could not explain our view. You can not achieve your desires in Cyprus, which we can not understand or we do not want to understand its reasons. Turkey will never give the permission for this. Turkey will prevent. Think carefully. We will be patient with the hope that your excitement will come to an end one day. In our official announcement we will continue to say that ‘there is no Cyprus problem for Turkey.’ However, this is not a limitless patience...” he said.⁴⁹⁰

Britain which considered by many as the state that put Turkey into the game⁴⁹¹ considered the Cyprus question in terms of his Foreign Minister Eden as mentioned before “*in geography and in tactical considerations the Turks have a stronger claim in Cyprus; in race and language, the Greeks; in strategy the British... Greece and Turkey could be associated with the British in the control of the island, or the island could be partitioned*”.⁴⁹²

Until August 1954 the Turks wished to see the status quo preserved in Cyprus. They had always made it plain that they could not contemplate union of the island with Greece. Eden argued that they regarded Cyprus as the last of their off-shore islands and

⁴⁹⁰ **Vergin, Nurettin**, “Perde Arkasından Zürih”, ed. by Prof. Dr. Derviş Manizade, *Kıbrıs, Dün, Bugün, Yarın*, Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği, İstanbul, 1975, pp. 102-103.

⁴⁹¹ **Papandreou**, p. 163.

⁴⁹² **Eden**, p. 415. , *Bugün, Yarın*, Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği, İstanbul, 1975, pp. 102-103.

⁴⁹² **Papandreou**, p. 163.

were convinced that its ownership by Greece would menace their safety. This was quite apart from the position of the Turkish community in Cyprus. Collaboration between Turkey and Greece was important to NATO and could not be maintained if Enosis was granted.⁴⁹³ Denktaş argued that even if Turkey had declared herself as a party on the Cyprus issue she had no power to hinder Britain in case of the latter would have decided to ‘solve’ the problem in favour of Greek side.⁴⁹⁴ On the other hand some prominent scholars viewed the subject in Gürün’s words “After the years passed, any word softer than “uninitiated” to evaluate Turkish governments’ mode can not be found.”⁴⁹⁵

Conclusion

When we began this work we came across one of those myths that each state, namely Britain, the USA and Greece, tackled the Cyprus problem through their own measures of fundamentally set vision and policy, except Turkey. We have demonstrated that although there is a kernel of truth in this myth, the reality is different. Britain, in general, considered the problem as a colonial affair with the aim of preventing further territorial loss in an era of decolonisation and self-determination. However, Britain itself had no common vision on the question as to whether Cyprus was to be kept or left behind. The Colonial Office, the Foreign Office and the Chief of Staff had different perspectives on the issue. They had conflicting views, even within their own offices, as we have seen in the example that the Foreign Office changed its position from “keeping” to “passing over” and “keeping” again. The US, on the other hand, was not in a better position. They regarded the Enosis in congruence with the Wilsonian Principles, which set the ground for the principle of self-determination. But after the British and Turkish warnings on the sensitivity of NATO alliance, they started to convert their policy to a non-interventionist one. Particularly after the Soviet threat started to grow they first preferred to appease the Greeks, and later pressurised them not to put forward the issue to the international agenda. Greece’s foreign policy also was not in a better

⁴⁹³ **Eden,**

⁴⁹⁴ **Ateşin,** p.174 .

⁴⁹⁵ **Gürün,** p. 386.

shape. Despite the overwhelming support of the Greek public opinion on Enosis, the civil war, the political turbulence, the emerging Cold War, and the need for American and British assistance prevented the Greek governments from internationalising the issue. They kept their official silence until Eden, the British foreign minister, refused the Greek prime minister Papagos' demand for Enosis very arrogantly.

The misunderstanding that there was not a coherent Turkish foreign policy on the problem was based on those statements given by two Turkish foreign ministers, Necmettin Sadak and Fuat Köprülü. Although the former was from the RPP which ruled Turkey single-handedly from 1923 to 1950 and the latter was from the Democrat Party which was the first multi-party system government, both were adamant to keep their position summarised as "there is no Cyprus Problem for Turkey". The primary concern of Turkey was merely on the basis of a possible Greek irredentism towards Cyprus. Unless there was no Greek sovereignty on the island to be replaced from the British, the above mentioned position of Turkey was stagnant. Thus the British sovereignty on Cyprus was accepted by Turkey with the Treaty of Lausanne and was not objected on the official level up until the end of the decade long period.

Besides the Turkish position, we became eligible to claim that none of those mentioned three countries had that kind of long-ranged, clear-cut policy on Cyprus. This was mostly because of the extremely volatile status of world politics and its regional impacts. We should remember that such factors as the emergence of Cold War and bi-polarity on the global level, and decolonisation and self-determination on the regional level had paramount importance on the period in question. Within that period each country faced those obstacles that prevented them from acting on a purely nationalistic way but to pursue a line of cautiousness.

Starting from Turkey; although we argued that to keep it within the same group countries which had not acted freely, we have to tackle on the reasons of the limitations. As a country which just escaped from entering the Second World War, Turkey found herself alienated from some countries such as Russia, Greece and the winners of the war. Each had different claims to condemn Turkey. The so called Turkish "active neutrality" which meant a kind of a pro-Axis inclination gave a reason to those countries to ask from Turkey the moral price of their casualties of life and financial damages. Thus it was very difficult for Turkey to formulate a policy of intervention for

Cyprus both legally and morally. But what Turkey did and did not can not be understood without outlining some basic perspectives and circumstances.

First of all Turkey's reliance on historic reasoning in order to deal with the matter was fruitful in terms of the protection of Turkish Cypriots from a Greek rule. Turkey pointed out that Cyprus had never belonged to Greece whereas it was held by Turks for four centuries and then voluntarily turned over to British protection as precaution against Russian attack in 1878. Turkey also stressed that by the Treaty of Lausanne the island was ceded with the understanding that it should remain British unless returned to Turkey. Secondly, the prime importance was strategically given to the prevention of Greek sovereignty which would destruct the balance produced by the Treaty of Lausanne in the Aegean and the Mediterranean. Handing over the Dodecanese (although demilitarised) had already damaged that balance in the Aegean. A Greek sovereignty on Cyprus would only help Turkey's encirclement by the surrounding seas. Thirdly, the Cyprus question was understood in terms of national prestige and honour for Turkey which had experienced bad consequences from the cession of Island of Crete to Greece. It was impossible for any Turkish government to accept the surrender of Cyprus to Greece because it would be inconsistent to Turkish self-esteem. It was no more a diplomatic issue behind the closed doors; it rather appeared as a popular issue – even though it was not clear whether there was a genuine public opinion strong enough to influence the policies of the governments. Nevertheless, press coverage and public opinion were more concentrated on the issues of NATO and Soviet Union than Cyprus. This was basically because of the popular understanding of Cyprus as identical with the Greek-Turkish antagonism. If there was no kind of such antagonism there would be no place for Cyprus to be considered as a problem. Fourthly, the communist awakening on the island characterised by the rise of AKEL party and the volatile and unstable political life of Greece alarmed Turkey. Soviet threats and territorial demands were never forgotten. It was regarded in Turkey that in the case of Enosis the communists would easily grab the power with the Soviet support also in Greece which would led to the pulverisation of the Atlantic alliance. Turkish press and later Turkish governments openly asked Britain and the USA to act against the communist threat on the island represented by the Enosis demands. Lastly, it was focused that by Enosis, the Turkish community would fall into the position of a minority group, a situation that would lead

to the Greek rule over Turks. Despite the ongoing good relations with Greece Turkey would never trust those Greeks on the island who had strong communist inclinations. Naturally Turkey also benefited from that threat by asking the USA and Britain not to let the Greeks endanger NATO solidarity.

Besides those issues of NATO alliance, Soviet threat, island's status as a British territory and Turkish-Greek friendship, there are two more reasons for Turkey to be late to act for Cyprus. One was the lack of effectiveness of the Turkish Cypriots on the governmental circles of Ankara. As said, a rudimentary and fragmented small island community had very few chances to attract the mainland's attention to their problems. In contrast, the Greek Cypriots were very much effective to change the agenda of Greece (if not the governments) on Cyprus as a national issue. The difference appeared from some practical points such as the proportion of each communities in respect to their mother countries, and the importance of the Church having the tool of the religion which had never been used in Turkish side. The other point was the lack of a real public opinion which was aware of the Cyprus question with its all dimensions from geopolitics to its international status-quo and from Turkish kinship to Greek Turkish friendship.

On this ground, claiming that the Turkish government was so indifferent until the pressures from the press and the public opinion forced it to deal with the matter which directly related with the national security of the country, could just be a *prima facie* explanation. Rather we have demonstrated that sometimes governments use the press to tell some foreign policy matter that they can not speak about officially to their public, and in this case to Greece. The silence of the government(s), despite the vocal pursuance of the subject by the press, can only be explained by this way. The demonstrations and emotional campaigns of the youth, particularly the university students, would also be linked with that policy. It is believed that mostly the Democrat Party governments relied heavily on press coverage to send warnings to Greece. The newspapers such as *Hürriyet* and *Yeni Sabah* sometimes went far beyond the governments' expectations, even by asking the return of the island to Turkey and attacking Greece without giving any consideration to the Greek and Turkish mutual friendship that was "overvalued" by the Menderes government.

Annex I: Demographic Structure of Cyprus

POPULATION OF CYPRUS⁴⁹⁶

YEAR	TURKISH	GREEK	TOTAL
1881	45,458	137,631	185,630
1891	48,044	158,585	209,291
1901	51,309	182,739	237,022
1911	56,428	214,480	274,108
1921	61,422	244,887	310,798
1925	62,000	249,000	315,000
1931	64,238	276,573	347,959
1946	81,137	361,932	462,536
1949	85,660	381,166	475,886
1954	92,000	408,000	515,000
1956	95,580	424,800	531,000

⁴⁹⁶ This table is prepared by us. We used many figures and knowledge from wide range of books. For further information please see.; **Panteli, Stavros**, *A New History of Cyprus from the Earliest Time to the Present Day*, East-West Publications, London, 1984; **Öksüzoğlu, Oktay**, *Dünüyle Bugünüyle Kıbrıs Türkleri*, Hamle Basım Yayın, İstanbul, 2003; **Alastos, Doros**, *Cyprus in History: A Survey of 5.000 Years*, Zeno Publisher, London, 1976; **Hill, Sir George**, *A History of Cyprus*, Cambridge University Pres,

1960	104,350	448,857	577,615
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Annex II Turkish Governments

PRESIDENTS

MUSTAFA ISMET INONU - 11 NOVEMBER 1938 - 22 MAY 1950

CELAL BAYAR - 22 MAY 1950 - 27 MAY 1960

GOVERNMENTS

2nd ŞUKRU SARACOĞLU GOVERNMENT – CHP - 09 MARCH 1943 - 07 AUGUST 1946

RECEP PEKER GOVERNMENT – CHP - 07 AUGUST 1947 - 10 SEPTEMBER 1947

1st HASAN SAKA GOVERNMENT – CHP - 10 SEPTEMBER 1947 - 10 JUNE 1948

2nd SAKA GOVERNMENT – CHP - 10 JUNE 1948 - 16 JANUARY 1949

SEMSETTİN GUNALTAY GOVERNMENT – CHP - 16 JANUARY 1949 - 22 MAY 1950

1st ADNAN MENDERES GOVERNMENT – DP - 22 MAY 1950 - 09 MARCH 1951

2nd MENDERES GOVERNMENT – DP - 09 MARCH 1951 - 17 MAY 1954

3rd MENDERES GOVERNMENT – DP - 17 MAY 1954 - 09 DECEMBER 1955

FOREIGN MINISTERS

HASAN SAKA - 13 SEPTEMBER 1944 - 10 OCTOBER 1947

Cambridge, 1972; **Gürel, Şükrü Sina**, *Kıbrıs Tarihi (1870-1960): Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve*

NECMETTİN SADAĞ - 10 OCTOBER 1947 - 22 MAY 1950

FUAT KOPRULU - 22 MAY 1950 - 20 JUNE 1956

FOREIGN MINISTRY GENERAL SECRETARIES

CEVAT ACIKALIN - 16 AUGUST 1943 - 15 OCTOBER 1945

FERİDUN CEMAL ERKİN - 15 OCTOBER 1945 - 25 AUGUST 1947

FUAT CARİM - 25 AUGUST 1947 - 16 JULY 1949

FAİK ZİHNİ AKDUR - 16 JULY 1949 - 26 AUGUST 1954

MUĞARREM NURİ BİRGİ - 26 AUGUST 1954 - 02 APRIL 1957

Annex III Governors of Cyprus

GOVERNORS OF CYPRUS

1925 - MALCOLM STEVENSON
1926 - RONALD STORRS
1932 - REGINALD STUBBS
1933 - HERBERT PALMER
1939 - WILLIAM BATTERSHILL
1941 - JAMES WOOLLEY
1946 - REGINALD FLETCHER, LORD WINSTER
1949 - ANDREW WRIGHT
1954 - ROBERT ARMITAGE
1955 - JOHN HARDING
1957 - HUGH FOOT, LATER LORD CARADON

Annex IV Greek Monarchs

GREEK MONARCHS

1833-1862 OTTO, PRINCE OTTO OF BAVARIA
1863-1913 GEORGE I, PRINCE WILLIAM OF DENMARK
1913-1917 CONSTANTINE I
1917-1920 ALEXANDER
1920-1922 CONSTANTINE I
1922-1923 GEORGE II
1924-1935 "REPUBLIC"
1935-1944 GEORGE II
1944-1946 "REGENCY" (DAMASKINOS)
1946-1947 GEORGE II
1947-1964 PAUL I
1964-1967 CONSTANTINE II

Annex V Orthodox Archbishop of Cyprus

ORTHODOX ARCHBISHOPS OF CYPRUS

1810-1821 KYPRIANOS

1821-1824 JOAKIM

1824-1827 DAMASKINOS

1827-1840 PANARETOS

1840-1849 JOANNIKOS II

1849-1854 KYRILLOS I

1854-1865 MAKARIOS I

1865-1900 SOFRONIOS II

1909-1916 KYRILLOS II, PAPADOPOULOS

1916-1933 KYRILLOS III, VSILIOU

1933-1947 "VACANCY" (LEONTIOS LEONTIOU OF PAPHOS 'TOPOTERETES' OR 'LOCUM TENENS')

1947 (JUNE-JULY) LEONTIOS LEONTIOU

1947-1950 MAKARIOS II, MYRIANTHEUS

1950-1977 MAKARIOS III, MIHAEL MOUSKOU

1977 CHRYSOSTOMOS I

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