Substitution as a Government Strategy: Social Assistance and Radical Rural Movements in Brazil and India

by

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For those who fight for the world's vulnerable

ABSTRACT

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This study delves into how governments strategically respond to social movements, with a specific focus on Brazil and India, and whether their strategies are effective. The study analyzes the Brazilian government's use of the flagship social assistance program, Bolsa Familia, and the Indian government's use of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act to contain rural unrest led by radical social movements like the Landless Workers' Movement and the Maoist Naxalites. The analysis introduces a third systematic government response, referred to as "substitution," which involves delivering government policy that addresses grievances but is not demanded by the movement. The study also examines how the impact of the substitution strategy on movements' mobilization depends on their claim-making. Using two novel databases and quasi-experimental empirical designs, the study finds that both governments aimed to use these programs as a counter-insurgency measure by substituting the land rights of the rural poor. However, this strategy led to the demobilization of rural mobilization in Brazil, while the Maoists were able to gain new mobilization advantages via the program. Additional qualitative analysis indicates that the Maoists effectively framed the program as a collective action demand, transforming substitution into "concession" and reversing the program's demobilizing impact. Overall, this study sheds light on the intricate relationship between social movements and government policies in two of the world's largest democracies.

ÖZETÇE

Bir Hükümet Stratejisi Olarak İkame: Brezilya ve Hindistan'da Sosyal Yardım ve Radikal Kırsal Hareketler

Mehmet Fuat Kına

Sosyoloji, Doktora

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Bu çalışma, Brezilya ve Hindistan hükümetlerinin radikal toplumsal hareketlere yönelik demobilizasyon hedefli stratejilerini, ve bu stratejilerin işe yararlılığını inceliyor. Daha özelde, sosyal yardım programları ile radikal hareketlerin önderliğindeki kırsal mobilizasyon arasındaki ilişkiyi toprak meselesi bağlamında araştırıyor. Çalışmada, hükümetlerin toplumsal hareketler tarafından doğrudan talep edilmeyen belli politikaları kullanarak, bu hareketlerin tabanlarını içermek ve sindirmek gayesiyle, "ikame" isimli yeni bir strateji geliştirdiğini iddia ediyor. İkame stratejisi tabandaki şikayetleri giderirken aynı zamanda hareketler ile taban arasındaki mesafeyi açmayı hedefliyor. Yarı-deneysel bir araştırma tasarımıyla ve bu kapsamda yaratılan iki yeni veritabanı üzerinden elde edilen istatistiksel bulgulara göre, ikame stratejisi Brezilya'daki kırsal mobilizasyonun tasfiyesine yol açarken, Hindistan'da tam tersi yönde bir etkiye sebep oldu. İki vakıa arasındaki farkı yorumlamak için gerçekleştirilen niteliksel araştırma ise, Hindistan'daki toplumsal hareketin Brezilya'daki hareketten farklı olarak yardım programına karşı talepkar bir şekilde yaklaştığını; böylece hükümetin ikame olarak uygulamaya koyduğu sosyal yardım programını, mobilizasyonun sonucunda elde edilmiş bir kazanıma dönüştürdüğünü; ve bu şekilde yeni mobilizasyon avantajları elde edebildiğini gösteriyor. Genel olarak çalışma, dünyanın en büyük iki demokrasisindeki toplumsal hareketler ve hükümet politikaları arasındaki karmaşık ilişkiye ışık tutuyor.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	Asian Development Bank
AIALA	All India Agricultural Labor Association
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
CONTAG	National Confederation of Workers in Agriculture
CPI	Communist Party of India
CPIML	Communst Party of India - Marxist Leninist
CPT	Comissão Pastoral da Terra
CUT	Unified Workers Central
DATALUTA	Banco de Dados da Luta pela Terra
DATASUS	Database of Brazilian Unified Health System
EMW	Emerging Markets Welfare
FUNRURAL	Rural Assistance Fund
GLOCON	Global Contentious Political Events
GLOW	Global Welfare Database
IBGE	Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
ICRISAT	International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
ILO	International Labor Organization
INC	Indian National Congress Party
INCRA	Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária
IPEADATA	Institute for Applied Economic Research
IV-2SLS	Instrumental Variable - Two Stage Least Square
MCC	Maoist Communist Center
MP-nexus	Mobilization-policy nexus
MSSD	Most-similar-systems-design
MST	Landless Workers' Movements
NREGA	National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
PCB	Communist Party of Brazil
PMDB	Brazilian Democratic Movement
PP	Progressive Party
PRORURAL	Rural Extension and Technical Assistance Program
PT	Labor Party (Brazil)
PU	Party Unity
PWG	People's War Group
SEZ	Special Economic Zone
SHRUG	Socioeconomic High-resolution Rural-Urban Geographic Platform for India
UPA	United Progressive Alliance
USD	United States Dollar

Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION[1]

Land inequality and its associated implications have presented significant social, economic, and political challenges, particularly in emerging nations such as Brazil and India (Griffin et al. 2002). While the roots of land inequality can be traced back to colonial agricultural production relations (Frankame 2010), its persistence throughout the latter half of the 20th century has given rise to radical rural movements that mobilize the landless and impoverished masses against entrenched land tenure systems and the dispossession of land for various purposes such as development projects and the expansion of industries including agribusiness, mining, manufacturing, and transportation (Motta and Nilsen 2011; Fernandes 2009; Kennedy et al. 2012). Consequently, an ongoing "land war" continues to dominate the agendas of governmental decision-makers, private sector investors, and landowner elites in these emerging markets (Levien 2013; Fernandes et al. 2012). Within this context, the Landless Workers' Movement (MST) in Brazil and the Maoist Naxalites in India have emerged as two radical rural movements championing the cause of the rural poor and leading the struggle for land rights. The pressure exerted by these grassroots movements has compelled governments to undertake varying degrees of redistributive land reforms in response to the intensifying land conflict (Robles 2018; INCRA 2011; Besley and Burgess 2000).

In more recent times, however, there has been a systematic downsizing of land reforms, accompanied by an increase in development-driven displacements, which has emerged as a new socioeconomic trend in many countries of the Global South. This shift can be attributed to the adoption of neoliberal economic policies by governments, which has accelerated the capitalist phenomenon of "accumulation by dispossession" (Harvey 2003; Borras and Franco 2012; Levien 2013; Schock 2015). Simultaneously, governments have implemented extensive social assistance programs to mitigate the impact on the livelihoods of the poor. Particularly in the mid-2000s, there was a significant expansion in the scope and coverage of these programs, with a specific focus on the inner peripheries of countries

[1] This dissertation incorporates elements from two distinct articles that were co-authored by myself, my thesis advisors Burak Gürel and Erdem Yörük, and Ali Bargu. While one of these articles is currently under review, the other has already been published. With the consent of my co-authors, thesis advisors, and the institute, I have directly incorporated relevant sections from these articles into my thesis. These studies are Yörük, Kına and Bargu (2022) and Yörük, Gürel and Kına (under review).

(World Bank 2020; ILO 2014; ADB 2013). The increased inclusion of the rural poor through these social welfare schemes during this period marked a transition from employment-based to income-based provisions (Brooks and Manza 2006; Goldberg and Rosenthal 2002; Saraceno 2002). Brazil's Bolsa Familia conditional cash transfer program and India's Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) stand out as the flagship social assistance programs in their respective countries. While Bolsa Familia is the largest conditional cash transfer program, covering nearly a quarter of the Brazilian population, the NREGA provided provisions to 193 million poor rural individuals in 2014 (World Bank 2020).[2] Bolsa Familia benefits are allocated based on the family unit and require beneficiaries to fulfill two conditions: ensuring the education and vaccination of their children. In contrast, the NREGA directly targets rural poverty by guaranteeing 100 days of unskilled manual labor for unemployed adult members of rural households.

The welfare transformation that commenced in the early 2000s, particularly in the Global South, raised concerns in the public sphere regarding potential program misuse and the politicization of resource allocation. However, studies on Bolsa Familia and NREGA programs, similar to the global welfare literature, predominantly focus on structural factors while overlooking the increasingly evident political dynamics in the distribution of social assistance. The literature primarily comprises descriptive, impact-oriented, and structuralist accounts that highlight demographic and economic factors but underestimate the influence of contentious politics. Despite the significant expansion of both the Bolsa Familia and NREGA programs during the 2000s, the existing literature in sociology, political science, social policy, and anthropology fails to adequately address the political dynamics of these programs. Furthermore, among the limited number of studies that do consider political dynamics, the majority focus on party-level formal politics, such as partisan or electoral politics, and largely neglect the pivotal role of contentious politics.

While few studies examine the correlation between political factors and the distribution of social assistance, they leave a significant gap in understanding the causal relationship implied by this correlation (Gutner 2002; Seekings 2007; Yörük 2012; Calvo and Moscovich 2017). Thus, the question of why and through which mechanisms social assistance programs correlate with contentious political factors remains unanswered, despite

[2] Bolsa Familia benefits are allocated as family-based, and beneficiaries have to provide two conditions, as schooling and vaccination of children. Unlike Bolsa Familia, the NREGA is directly targeted to rural poverty, guaranteeing 100 days manual unskilled work for unemployed adult members of rural households.

the expectation that such programs would be allocated based on poverty, unemployment, and low living standards.

Another but related crucial issue concerning the relationship between social movements and social assistance pertains to the potentially demobilizing effect of these programs on radical movements. The existing literature investigating the effect size of social assistance programs to extinguish radicalism among the impoverished population, analyzing the reverse relationship, does not consider the most important dynamics of contentious politics as well (Dasgupta et al. 2017; Hoelscher et al. 2012; Fetzer 2014; Gawande et al. 2017). This literature can be broadly categorized as studies in terrorism and security. Although these studies often include mobilization as a quantitative variable in their models, they make false generalizations due to the misconceptualization of contentious politics and thus the misoperationalization of radical movements. Consequently, there is a need to address the following question as a starting point: Is it inevitable for assistance programs to demobilize radical movements? Any answer to this question without considering the dynamics of social movement mobilization would be incomplete. Do these programs diminish the need for radicalism by reducing the underlying needs primarily observed in rural areas? In other words, can mobilization be solely reduced to addressing basic needs or material grievances? Examining the impact of NREGA on the Naxalite movement in India reveals that this assumption does not hold, while social assistance demobilizes the MST in the Brazilian case. Contrary to what the existing literature on terrorism/security suggests, NREGA enhances the social mobilization of the Naxalites. The empirical causality, mechanisms, processes, and reasons behind this phenomenon warrant detailed, in-depth, qualitative, and quantitative examination of contentious politics and mobilizational dynamics in rural India.

Accordingly, this research's theoretical framework mainly considers two pieces of literature on social movements/contentious politics and social assistance programs. It constructs conceptual and empirical bridges between the two pieces of literature by analyzing the dynamic interplay between social movements and government policies. The research makes two contributions to the social movements/contentious politics literature. First, it adds a novel type of government response to social unrest (i.e., substitution) to the repression-concession dichotomy that has been theorized in detail in the existing literature (Lichbach 1987; Rasler 1996; Moore 2000; Pierskalla 2010; Sullivan 2016). I argue that concession/accommodation has an unstable (positive, negative, or null) effect on

demobilization, while substitution is a more profitable government strategy used to contain social unrest. Accordingly, I construct an original theoretical model of the mobilization-policy (MP) nexus to clarify the difference between the mobilizational impacts of concession and substitution.

The MP nexus presents the analytical framework of the question of how a movement may reverse the demobilizing effect of a substitution scenario. The model considers the continuum from concession to substitution, taking into account the ascending and descending nature of claim-making. It elucidates how a social movement can counteract the demobilizing effect of substitution by strategically framing policies as collective demands. The MP nexus primarily hinges on the extent to which the movement asserts its claims for a particular policy. Therefore, according to the MP nexus, whether a policy is considered a substitute, or a concession depends on the extent to which the movement asserts its claims for that policy. This determination influences how participants in the social movement perceive the outcome, interpreting it either as a government offering or as an achievement resulting from the movement's struggle. Consequently, the mobilizational impact of government policies is shaped through an interactive process involving decisions made by actors on both sides.

Second, in addition to the well-studied biographical and cultural unintended consequences, I demonstrate the centrality of the unintended political outcomes of social unrest (in this case, social welfare programs). Although previous scholars rarely study unintended political outcomes of social movements, I claim they are ubiquitous in that governments use them to suppress social movement mobilization. The existing literature also lacks a conceptual difference between unintended and “intended” outcomes, for which I suggest considering the framing approach (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, Benford 1997, Benford and Snow 2000; Snow 2004; Snow et al. 2014). My explanation for the divergence in the demobilizing effects of concession and substitution is based on the claim-making dynamics of social movements. While justifying their opposition, social movement organizers often describe social problems they declare to tackle and make strategic claims for possible political changes. They make incredible efforts to shape and reshape collective action frames that are expected to help them to recruit new members and escalate the mobilization. In that vein, political outcomes are unintended only if they are not yet framed in the movement’s political discourse. Regarding collective action frames as a conceptual toolkit to analyze and understand the difference between concession and

substitution scenarios, I illustrate how claim-making can dismantle the demobilizing impact of unintended political outcomes.

The social welfare/social policy literature also expands the growing global scholarship on social assistance programs. In order to demonstrate the significant gap in the literature on the impact of contentious politics on welfare provisions, my research reviews social assistance analyses, with a particular emphasis on political dynamics and contentious politics. My systematic review of social assistance programs illustrates that out of a total of 3,263 scholarly analyses, a mere 267 studies delve into the underlying causes of social assistance programs. Notably, the majority of these publications predominantly concentrate on structural aspects encompassing demographic and economic factors, while the intricate realm of political dynamics remains significantly overlooked. Within this subset of 267 studies, only 54 of them specifically investigate the influence of political factors as determinants of social assistance programs. Remarkably, a mere 10 studies within this subgroup extend their analysis to explore the impact of contentious politics on these programs. Based on the empirical investigation of the Brazilian and Indian governments' use of social assistance as a tool to undermine the movements and simultaneously avoid land-based claims of the radical rural opposition, this research advances the global literature on welfare provision by showing that welfare programs become instruments of demobilization, especially when the movements do not make claims for such programs.

Based on the aforementioned considerations, this study argues that the likelihood of demobilization is heightened in a scenario where the social movement fails to acknowledge crucial policies such as social assistance, which hold immense significance in shaping the material reality of the poor. This necessitates significant flexibility in claim-making for social movements. Instead, if the movement organizers persistently adhere to their historical tendencies and disregard the potential impact of such policies, the positive outcomes of these policies in the daily practices of the poor benefit the government's credit among the poor, rather than the movement. It is crucial to recognize that the efficacy of any government policy is not detached from how the movement or the government portrays it. These policies wield their primary and most influential influence both on the material plane and within the realm of cultural interaction. Therefore, the framing of a government-implemented policy by the movement assumes utmost importance, specifically in terms of how it aligns with the movement's existing ideological trajectory and day-to-day practices. This framing ultimately determines the policy's mobilizational impact.

Accordingly, this research examines the dynamics between welfare programs and radical rural social movements, specifically analyzing the impact of these movements on flagship programs in Brazil and India, with a focus on land-based claims. The research seeks to answer two main questions:

1. Why did the Brazilian and Indian governments respond to the radical rural opposition led by the MST and the Naxalites through social assistance programs, and how did they do so?

Rather than directly addressing the demands of the rural poor, I argue that the Brazilian and Indian governments utilized the Bolsa Familia and NREGA programs as a means of politically containing the radical rural opposition by providing increased welfare provisions. The aim was to demobilize the movements and substitute their land-based claims with social assistance. Therefore, I anticipate a negative association between social assistance and the land-based concessions of the governments. I propose the substitution strategy as a new governmental response to mobilization, surpassing the scenario of concession. Substitution, therefore, inherently has a demobilizing effect on social movements.

2. What impact does claim-making have on the government's use of social assistance as a counter-insurgency strategy (framing social assistance programs as a collective action demand), and does it reverse the demobilizing effect of these programs?

I contend that framing social assistance as a collective action demand positively influences the mobilization of movements as it challenges the governmental narrative on rural poverty. Thus, I expect to observe a less demobilizing (or even mobilizing) effect of social assistance in the Indian context, as the Naxalites have made new claims for the program and framed the NREGA as a demand, shifting it away from an unintended outcome. Consequently, the substitution strategy has proven unsuccessful in India while effectively demobilizing the MST in Brazil.

1.1 Unveiling the Significance of Brazilian and Indian Cases

The history of Brazil is marked by social and political turmoil caused by unequal land distribution, which has persisted since colonial times. Land reform has been a significant issue in Brazilian politics since the establishment of the Communist Party of Brazil (PCB) in

1922 (Fernandes et al. 2012). Agrarian reforms were initiated by the federal government, particularly during the Vargas regime in the 1930s and 1940s, aiming to empower small-scale farmers, limit the power of landowners, and increase land productivity. However, communist rural activism continued to grow, leading to the formation of the Farmers and Agricultural Workers Union of Brazil in 1954 and the Peasant Leagues demanding land reform in 1959. The legislation of the Rural Worker Statute in 1963 and the establishment of the National Confederation of Workers in Agriculture (CONTAG) were significant milestones in the land reform movement. However, the democratic government of João Goulart was overthrown by a military coup in 1964, resulting in a shift in the approach to land issues (Oliveira 2016). During the military dictatorship, the regime suppressed rural radicalism, but selectively addressed some agrarian reform demands through organizations like CONTAG. Land invasions became a form of poor people's movement, and the MST emerged in 1984 as a significant force advocating for land reform through direct action tactics (Vergara-Camus 2014; Rangel 2010; Kim 2008).

Similarly, land conflict has been a major source of contention in Indian history, involving the rural poor, official authorities, and the elites, such as landowners and market-oriented individuals. This conflict, which originated during colonial times, escalated throughout rural India during periods of social and political unrest in the latter half of the 20th century (Levien 2013; 2018; Verghese and Teitelbaum 2019). To understand the recent phases of this conflict, it is important to consider the material conditions that have influenced political dynamics in rural India. During British colonialism, land-based grievances in rural India emerged due to the administration's reliance on existing landlords to collect land taxes. This led to the establishment of the Zamindari land tenure system, where a single landlord had the authority to collect land revenue from a group of villages (Mukherjee 2021). This system granted significant control to local zamindars over the peasants, resulting in exploitation and manipulation. These inequalities and class divisions persisted from the 19th to the mid-20th century, creating a chain of land-based inequalities in rural India. In the second half of the 20th century, then, the Indian government attempted land reforms to address these inequalities, but these reforms fell short of satisfying the rural poor and balancing the resistance from landholding elites. Development projects, such as dams, mines, and industrial initiatives, further intensified land conflicts by causing land dispossession and displacement. These projects posed significant risks to the well-being of the rural poor, including landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, food insecurity, and violations of human

rights (Negi and Ganguly 2011). The impact of land grievances is particularly severe for lower-caste individuals, such as Adivasis and Dalits, who have faced long-term deprivation of a healthy environment due to large-scale land acquisitions and displacements (Toppo 2020). The lower castes have not only suffered material deprivations but also experienced social and legal discrimination, facing moral isolation and systematic humiliation.

In the Brazilian case, the PT government, under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, formed an alliance that included various interest groups, including industrial workers, landowners, and right-wing politicians. Despite being closely tied to the MST, the PT prioritized agribusiness interests and adopted a developmental and inclusive version of neoliberalism (Petras 2008; Robles and Veltmeyer 2015; Saad-Filho 2020). Coalition politics and limited options for land reform constrained the PT government's efforts. While the MST and other organizations continued to engage in land invasions, the number of established agrarian reform settlements declined during the PT era.

For India, in the early 21st century, Special Economic Zone (SEZ) projects became the focal point of land conflict in rural areas (Levien 2013; Jenkins et al. 2015). The SEZ Act of 2005 provided opportunities for market-oriented initiatives to acquire land at low prices, leading to a new phase of land conflict. While officials justified SEZ projects as catalysts for export-oriented growth, they resulted in development-led dispossessions and became a national phenomenon. The establishment of SEZs often required the acquisition of productive land used by rural villagers, further exacerbating conflicts.

The Naxalite movement, which emerged in 1967, originated from a land conflict event and was influenced by splits within the mainstream communist block in the 1950s (Mohanty 2006; Kennedy and Purushotham 2012; Mukherjee 2021). The Naxalites, led by Charu Mazumdar, advocated a Maoist political line during rural uprisings in the Naxalbari village of West Bengal. They aimed to address land reforms by occupying lands, redistributing them, and challenging oppressive landlords. The movement faced violent suppression by the state but re-emerged after the end of the Emergency period in 1977. Over time, ideological divisions and conflicts within the movement led to the formation of various factions, such as the Maoist Communist Center (MCC), People's War Group (PWG), Party Unity (PU), and CPIML-Liberation. In 2004, the CPIML-People's War and MCC merged to form the Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist), the most prominent faction of the Naxalites.

Therefore, the Brazilian and Indian cases show remarkable similarities in the structure of their institutional politics and the economic growth experienced in the last few decades. Both countries have a federal administrational system and a competitive electoral tradition. They share a similar global financial role as leading powers of emerging economies. Further, India and Brazil have had dynamic contentious politics in rural areas, experiencing vast numbers of conflictual events. During the long history of rural conflict, the violence embedded in the contention left deep traces in the lives of the rural poor and even escalated the contention continuously. In both cases, against the systematic attacks of rent-seeking elites and the official authorities, the rural poor have fought for their land rights through the rooted radical traditions of opposition and mobilization.

Additionally, Brazil and India underwent a similar welfare expansion in the early 2000s, employing excellent welfare state apparatuses. Belonging to a similar welfare regime family, Brazil and India implemented flagship social assistance programs, which still compensate the rural poor to a substantial extent. Figure 1.1 shows the rise of the Bolsa Familia program expenditure, while Figure 1.2 presents a similar increasing trend for the total labor expenditure under the NREGA. On the other basis, the figures also illustrate another similarity, which seems very challenging for academic inquiry. The fluctuations of the mobilization of the two massive radical rural movements show a decreasing trend for India's Naxalite-related incidents and the MST's land invasions in Brazil. Movements' mobilization was advancing before the implementation of the programs and started to deescalate in the upcoming years.

Figure 1.1: Brazil / Land Invasions of the MST and Bolsa Familia expenditure (USD)

Figure 1.2: India / Naxalite-related incidents and the NREGA expenditure

While the MST's primary claim in land invasions is known as redistributive land reforms (Fernandes 2009), the Naxalite movement fights for various rights to mobilize the rural poor and focuses on preventing land dispossessions. However, after the central government announced the setting up the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) as a part of the newly implemented Export Policy (2000) in India, the Naxalites directed their attention toward these predefined areas (Kujur 2016). The SEZs Act (2005) was introduced to attract international capital flow and facilitate investors to tax exemptions and other capital-friendly laws, including the easier displacement of the rural poor (Levien 2013; Negi and Ganguly 2011). According to Fernandes (2004; 2008), 60 million people were displaced by India's development projects between 1947 and 2004. The number of displacements has increased significantly in the era of liberalization since the early 1990s, which confirmed Naxalites' historical claims. The Naxalites described the SEZs as a part of the neo-colonial project and declared an insistent war against the displacement of peasants in the upcoming years.

While the motivations behind land reforms and SEZ-led dispossessions may differ, both are key issues that drive radical rural mobilization in Brazil and India. Land reforms are often perceived as offensive actions, while opposition to SEZ-led dispossessions depends on defensive claims made by the rural poor. Despite their distinct origins, these two issues serve as primary focal points for the mobilization of radical rural movements in both countries. During the same period, the land-based rights of the rural poor regressed, identical to the rise of the flagship social assistance programs and the decline of the movements. Figure 1.3 presents the steady increase in the total area of SEZ projects in India since 2006 and the

stable decrease in the number of land reforms in Brazil, which constitutes another but non-negligible similarity between the two countries.

Figure 1.3: Land reforms and total area of SEZs

In addition to these similarities, this study is motivated by a notable difference between the two cases. While the MST was demobilized soon after the implementation of Bolsa Familia, the Naxalites continued to escalate rural conflicts intensely for an additional five years (from 2005 to 2010, as depicted in Figure 1.3), and they continued to remain at higher levels than before 2005 even after 2014. Moreover, the two movements differ in their approaches to claim-making. The Naxalites, with their various factions, made claims across different aspects of the land-based conflict, from organized intimidation of landowner elites to declaring free, liberated compact territories. In contrast, the MST has largely remained a single-demand movement, which was perceived as a socio-political advantage by justifying its legitimacy. This historical difference in claim-making approaches between the two movements is significant for this research, as it also aligns with the conceptual difference between concession and substitution scenarios, providing an excellent opportunity to compare the Brazilian and Indian cases.

Therefore, this study places great importance on analyzing the potential differences between the demobilizing impacts of the Brazilian and Indian governments' policies and the claim-making dynamics of radical rural movements. There are related differences in depth between these two cases, comprising either case-specific parameters in the countries or potential fields of comparison. For instance, the Brazilian government has responded to

MST's land invasions with more defensive policies, while the Indian governments have more aggressively carried out land dispossessions in the name of development projects. On the other hand, there is also a difference between the defensive character of the Naxalites' land-based political program and the more targeted, aggressive fight of the MST, which continuously claims new lands. However, despite the different characters of their land-based targets, the MST has strategically rejected the use of arms and preferred to employ a limited level of violence. Both movements have taken the opportunity to engage in physical conflicts with their class enemies and have adopted an exceptional level of ideological radicalism. Still, they represent two distinct phases of the land conflict: land invasion and armed militancy.

Despite several land-invading movements directly targeting redistributive reforms in Brazil (e.g., Comissão Pastoral da Terra) and anti-SEZ activities in India (Jenkins et al. 2015), I selectively focus on these two movements as they are the most radical, organized, and established rural actions. Similarly, the MST and the Naxalites make bold claims and employ disruptive tactics that are expected to garner greater attention from official decision-makers compared to moderate movements. In other words, this study prioritizes the levels of political threat and tension between the movement and the official authorities. Accordingly, their activism becomes a target for governments employing an innovative substitution strategy. Table 1.1 presents the three components of substitution for the two cases.

Table 1.1: The Three Components of Substitution for Brazil and India

	Rural radicalism	**Land-based claims**	**Social assistance**
Brazil	Land invasions of the MST	Land reforms	Bolsa Familia
India	Naxalites' mobilization	Preventing land dispossessions (SEZs)	The NREGA

2.1 Questions, Research Design, and Methodology

2.1.1 Questions

In order to clarify and solve these intriguing and nested problems in the contentious politics of the two giant emerging markets in the Global South, I raise operational research questions and relevant hypotheses for the empirical investigation as follows:

Social assistance models

Q1*: What is the impact of radical rural mobilization of social movements on*

social assistance?

***H1**: I expect to find that governments give more social assistance to the places that experienced more mobilization, which means that movements positively impact social assistance.*

Substitution models

***Q2**: What is the relationship between rural peasants' land rights (the intended outcome of movements) and social assistance programs (the unintended political outcome of movements)?*

***H2:** I expect to find a negative relationship between social assistance programs and land rights for the government. This is because of my expectation that the governments have employed social assistance as a substitute for the social movement claims.*

Mobilization models

***Q3:** What is the impact of social assistance programs on the movements' mobilization?*

***H3:** I expect to find that the social assistance program in Brazil has demobilized the MST, while the Naxalite movement has reversed this demobilizing effect.*

Case-oriented comparison

***Q4:** If there is a difference between the mobilizational impacts of social assistance programs, what is the reason for the difference?*

***H4:** The reason behind the difference is related to the movements' diverging responses to the implementation of social assistance programs, whether they framed social assistance as demand, or to the extent that the programs have been re-interpreted as a movement claim. While the MST did never frame Bolsa Familia as a demand, the Naxalites, in the name of rural peasants, claimed for a more just, well-qualified, longer-term distribution of provisions.*

In order to establish the association of social assistance programs with the radical rural movements and their land-based claims, the empirical models in this research utilize advanced-level econometric models and novel databases. The analytical framework is based on the instrumental variable approach within a semi-experimental structure, controlling for case-specific political, economic, developmental, and demographic factors. For both cases,

relevant sections first present the social assistance models, which regress Bolsa Familia and the NREGA in the two-stages-least-square models (IV-2SLS) and test for the impact of radical rural mobilization. These models examine whether the government disproportionately targeted the mobilization and, therefore, try to confirm the political containment thesis of Piven-Cloward (1971). The second group of models then regress social assistance and land-based claims on each other, using relevant control variables, to understand if they are negatively associated. These models look at the impact of land reform on Bolsa Familia to present their negative association. Further, they illustrate whether the capability of land invasions to obtain land reforms decreased after the introduction of Bolsa Familia in 2004. They follow a similar structure for India, testing for the effects of the NREGA and SEZ projects on each other. Substitution models in India also demonstrate the effect of SEZ denotifications on the NREGA provision. Therefore, these models do not examine one-way causal direction but rather aim to provide empirical evidence for an expectedly negative correlation between land-based concessions of the governments and social assistance. These models thus aim to validate the substitution thesis, first raised in this research and inspired by the political containment thesis. Third, to test the substitution strategy's effectiveness, mobilization models analyze the impact of social assistance on the mobilization, regressing land invasions of the MST in Brazil, and the Naxalite-related activities in India. Mobilization models examine the third hypothesis, expecting to find diverging mobilizational impacts for Bolsa Familia and the NREGA.

2.1.2 Data and Methods

I construct two separate yearly panel datasets for Brazil and India for the series of empirical models in this research. For Brazil, the municipal level data ranges from the first visibility of land invasions in the late 1980s to the most recent period with the available data in 2013, and the baseline analysis starts in 2004, with the introduction of Bolsa Familia. For India, the empirical models are based on a district-level dating from the first implementation of the NREGA provision (2006) to the most recent period containing available data (2014). The total sample sizes of the baseline models are respectively 49,175 and 4,270. I prioritize the coverage form of social assistance data for both cases and use the expenditure versions for robustness checks. Therefore, the Bolsa Familia variable illustrates the number of beneficiary families in each municipality, downloaded from the website of the Ministry of Social Development of Brazil. In order to ensure the accuracy of measures, the data are cross-checked with another governmental source: IPEADATA (online data office of the Institute

for Applied Economic Research). The NREGA variable measures the number of distributed person-days in rural parts of Indian districts and is taken from the Ministry of Rural Development.

Although researchers access social assistance data more easily, it is usually challenging to collect or find similar data for social movement mobilization. For mobilization data, I followed different strategies for the countries. For Brazil, the land invasion variable is taken from the replication data provided by Albertus et al. (2018), who analyzed the DATALUTA database (Girardi 2014) maintained by the Pastoral Land Commission (Comissão Pastoral da Terra, CPT 2014), which publishes annual reports on land invasions. The CPT gathers the data through social movements, government agencies, political parties, and trade unions. I obtained the land invasion data directly from the CPT in order to double-check its quality. For India, relevant data counts Naxalite mobilization and includes all Naxal-related events in a district year. It is extracted from a newly released original database, GLOCON (Global Contentious Political Events), constructed by state-of-the-art automated event extraction techniques to collect data from different countries' newspaper articles.[3] The utilization of GLOCON represents a standout and distinctive contribution to my research, constituting, at the same time, one of its most remarkable contributions to the empirical literature on social movement mobilization.

GLOCON database is an automated dataset of contentious political events across multiple countries, developed under the Emerging Markets Welfare (EMW) Project,[4] which explores the impact of such politics on welfare state programs in Global South countries such as Argentina, Brazil, China, India, South Africa, and Turkey. The primary goal of GLOCON is to support EMW research by providing a comparative perspective on the dynamics of social contention, considering both global aspects and country-specific characteristics of contentious politics. With its flexibility and applicability beyond the original focus countries, GLOCON serves as a reliable research tool for any project studying contentious politics or its influence on other social and political phenomena. The GLOCON Project builds a protest event database, encompassing various collective action forms, aimed at criticizing or opposing political, economic, or social order and voicing societal or political demands. The database identifies five major types of protests, including demonstrations, industrial actions, group clashes, armed militancy, and electoral politics, covering a wide range of events such

[3] https://glocon.ku.edu.tr/
[4] https://emw.ku.edu.tr/

as marches, strikes, riots, and more. The actors associated with protests, including organizers, participants, and targets, are classified into different categories, providing detailed definitions in their annotation manual.

More specifically, GLOCON defines a protest event as follows: “a collective public action by a non-governmental actor who expresses criticism or dissent and articulates a societal or political demand.” Instead of considering only violent events, GLOCON looks for “strikes, rallies, boycotts, protests, riots, and demonstrations.” The data extraction process depends on a human-annotated gold standard corpus, compiling information from more than 17,000 documents using either random or active learning-based sampling in English, Spanish, and Portuguese. The database contains all contentious political events and detailed information extracted at document, sentence, and token levels. Events are classified according to event types, event trigger co-reference, and the event’s place, time, and actors (participants, organizers, and targets) in all countries. Further, for the Indian case, developers modeled relevant classification tools for divisions of rural/urban and violent/non-violent events.

My research then regards land-based targets of the movements (land reforms and SEZ projects) as another key variable. For the Brazilian case, the data on land reform is also taken from Albertus et al. (2018), which originated from the Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (The Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária - INCRA). The INCRA is the official responsible institution for land reforms in Brazil, attached to the Ministry of Agrarian Development. For the Indian case, the project-level SEZ data is taken from the Ministry of Commerce & Industry (publicly available in the official documents). I manually extracted the officially notified SEZ area for each district and year by subtracting the de-notified area. The final list includes the total notified SEZ area measured in hectares. I also consider the SEZ denotifications, a binary variable indicating any occurrences of denotification in the district during any given year. The operational use of the key variables, relevant hypotheses for the empirical models, and the expected directions of effects are presented in Table 1.2, and Table 1.3 demonstrates data sources of the six key variables in this research.

Although the social assistance models control for case-specific political, economic, developmental, and demographic factors with a large set of control variables, the analytical approach nevertheless poses two significant challenges related to the well-known sample

selection bias since social assistance and movements mobilization could be endogenous to each other for two reasons.

Table 1.2: Operationalization for the key variables and the expected direction of impacts in the case-specific quantitative models

	Dependent variable	**Independent variable of interest and the expected direction of impact**
A.1. Social assistance models for Brazil	Bolsa Familia provisions per 1000 people (coverage)	**H1:** Number of land invasions of the MST (+)
B.1. Social assistance models for India	NREGA person-days per 1000 rural people (coverage)	**H1:** Number of Naxalite-related events (+)
A.2. Substitution models for Brazil	Number of land reforms	**H2:** Bolsa Familia provisions per 1000 people (coverage) (-)
B.2. Substitution models for India	Area of SEZ projects	**H2:** NREGA person-days per 1000 rural people (coverage) (+)
A.3. Mobilization models for Brazil	Number of land invasions of the MST	**H3:** Bolsa Familia provisions per 1000 people (coverage) (-)
B.3. Mobilization models for India	Number of Naxalite-related events	**H3:** NREGA person-days per 1000 rural people (coverage) (+)

Table 1.3: Data sources for key variables

Factor	**Data source**
Bolsa Familia	Ministry of Social Development - Brazil, IPEADATA
The NREGA	Public data portal of the Indian governments
Land invasions of the MST	DATALUTA
Naxalites' mobilization	GLOCON
Land reforms	INCRA
The Special Economic Zones	Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Department of Commerce – India

First, there could be reverse causality in that the movement mobilization is affected by the program. Regarding the fact that the effects of government policies on the mobilization and consequences of the movements are the dynamics of the same contentious political space, social movement scholars often suggest considering the two-opposite direction of the analysis

in a sequential manner (Moore 2000; Pierskalla 2010) and framing the contention as an ongoing interaction between the two sides actors (Jasper 2015; Shultziner and Goldberg 2019; Tilly 1999). More importantly, reverse causality is a natural consequence of this study's theoretical framework. The MP nexus depends on the idea that political contention is never a one-way relationship. Instead, it is an ongoing interaction between the two side's actors. Therefore, the dynamic interplay between the governments and the movements constitutes a sample selection bias that manipulates the causal impact. Further, the empirical analyses in the mobilization models prove a reverse causality. For this reason, the co-existence of movement mobilization and social assistance is a non-random selection under the ongoing effect of the previous mobilization and allocated social assistance provisions. The existing social movement scholarship that considers movement mobilization the starting point of the empirical analysis (as in this paper) shares this reverse causality problem.

Second, social assistance and movement mobilization may be higher in poorer (or more rural) municipalities, bringing into question the effect of poverty as an overlooked dimension, widely known as the omitted variable bias. The omitted variable could be correlated with independent or dependent variables, which may manipulate the causal effect. Therefore, the zero conditional mean assumption could be violated, and an endogeneity problem may exist. In response to the non-random selection risk here, the instrumental variable approach reveals an unbiased causal effect of movement mobilization on social assistance. Exogenous and relevant instrumental variables must firmly predict movement mobilization while assumed orthogonal to social assistance's unobserved determinants. In response to the non-random selection risk here, the instrumental variable approach reveals an unbiased causal effect of movement mobilization on social assistance. Relevant models in this research utilize an exogenous instrument, a movement- and case-specific factor that eases or justifies movements' fight. The instruments support empirical models to dissociate the impact of the movements' existing activism from an opportunity that increases the movements' mobilizational capacity.

Accordingly, the first stage analytical models that regress mobilization on the instrumental variables and other control variables adjust the intent-to-treat effect on the treated ($ITTE_t$). If said with binary terms, this represents the impact of being assigned to the treatment group on the actual treatment status. In the second stage—regressing social assistance variables on the estimated coefficients—I estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE), which introduces the impact that applies "not to the entire population of those

actually treated but rather to those whose treatment status is changed by the instrument" (Harding et al. 2018, p. 67). This constitutes the quasi-experimental design of this research. Figure 1.4 presents the analytical framework of IV-2SLS models in this research. Arrows in the figure numbered (1) and (2) represent the first and second stages of the IV-2SLS models. Further details of the data operationalizations, model specification choices, exclusion restrictions for the IV-2SLS models, necessary information for the control variables, and case-specific challenges are presented in the relevant sections of Chapters 3 and 4.

Figure 1.4: The analytical framework of IV-2SLS models

2.1.3 The Most-Similar-Systems-Design Approach

In addition to variable-oriented quantitative analyses in the research, I run a qualitative and comparative analysis of the empirical findings and additional sources, following a most-similar-systems-design (MSSD) approach. The fourth hypothesis in this research concentrates on explaining the diverging mobilizational impacts of Bolsa Familia and the NREGA. The case-oriented comparative analysis, in this sense, asks why and how questions for the empirical findings and uncovers their mechanisms. Therefore, deepening the mechanisms of the first three hypotheses, and the core differences of interest reveal that the claim-making flexibility of the Naxalites provided them with much room to maneuver.

The MSSD framework, introduced by Przeworski and Teune (1970), is based on the comparison of the two cases to analyze and understand the impact of a binary explanatory factor—India as a positive and Brazil as a negative case in this research. Depending on Mill's method of difference, the MSSD considers the similarities between more than one case and focuses on two meaningful differences between them: the explanatory factor and the explained phenomenon. Compared to the alternatives, the analytical framework of the MSSD better provides internal validity for the argument of interest (Berg-Schlosser 2015). Further, "[w]orking with similar systems (for example, similar countries) facilitates the ceteris paribus

rule – that is, it reduces the number of 'disturbing' variables to be kept under control" (Della Porta 2008, p. 214). Accordingly, I claim significant similarities between the Brazilian and Indian contexts.

Despite the geographically considerable distance between them, India and Brazil, as two Southern countries, resemble each other in many respects. As briefly mentioned above, this research raises four fields of similarities that are the most relevant to the research interests. First, contentious political events, from long-term social movements—e.g., the Homeless Workers Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Teto) in Brazil and Ekta Parishad in India—to pop-up riots—e.g., vast demonstrations against the PT rule in 2013 and upcoming years in Brazil, and massive protests of Indian farmers against the farm acts in 2020/2021—, have historically been high on the political agenda in both countries. Although this research focuses on the countries' most prominent and influential rural movements, extra-institutional tools have been pervasive for the poor when there is no room to raise their voice through institutional channels. Further, the rural poor in both countries have an extreme land inequality—and, accordingly, land conflict—memory rooted in the colonial pasts of the territories (Frankema 2010; Verghese and Teitelbaum 2019). As described in the third and fourth chapters, although the implementation of land reforms has failed at varying degrees, the grassroots demand for land in both cases continuously brought landless and nearly landless poor into a confrontation with the landowner elites and the official decision-makers. The rural conflict in both cases frequently escalated as an inevitable next step of either the official or the landowners' violence.

Two significant incidents, for instance, marked the turning point of the MST in Brazil. First, the police killed 12 land-invading peasants in the northern state of Rondônia on 9 August 1995. Second, on 17 April 1996, 19 land-invading peasants were killed by the police in Eldorado das Carajás in the northern state of Pará (Ondetti 2010, p. 17-18, 150-154). On the first anniversary of the Eldorado das Carajás massacre, the MST organized a march of 100,000 people to the nation's capital, Brasilia. The movement later reached its first peak of 3,845 land invasions between 1995 and 2002 (Robles 2018, p. 13). In the history of various Naxalite factions, on the other hand, the violence against the rural poor has been much more common, which is fed by the rooted discrimination against people from lower castes (Toppo 2020). Most uprisings organized by the Naxalites have found the chance to mobilize masses after—and because of—the humiliation or killing of the villagers by the police forces or paramilitary groups hired by the landowners (Shapiro et al. 2017; Shah 2019). Therefore,

both cases have an exceptional level of land conflict, which still determines the face of contentious politics.

Second, considering India and Brazil have implemented state-of-the-art social policy tools and enlarged the scope of the welfare state in the early 2000s, they have often been put into the same welfare state regime cluster. Yörük, Öker, and Tafoya (2022) classify this group of countries under the "populist welfare regime," which depends on "extensive social assistance and healthcare policies were built during the neoliberal era" (p. 11). The first stage of welfare state populism in these countries was carried out by Vargas in Brazil in the early 1950s and Indira Gandhi in India in the late 1960s. This was a developmental populism employed to contain working-class radicalism, extending social security benefits to a privileged minority belonging to the formal sector (ibid). The second stage of populism in the early 2000s, however, was directed at the radical opposition of the rural poor. Reaching superior numbers of beneficiaries (Bolsa Familia and the NREGA as the two flagship programs), the second phase of populism in both countries, therefore, seems to have a higher capability of containing the unrest, even in the sense of their structural designs.

Moreover, the use of newly implemented social policy tools in the 2000s required two significant conditions: a strong state capacity and a solid mobilization of the poor, both of which exist in the Indian and Brazilian cases for the relevant periods, compared to the other developing countries as noted by Yörük and Gençer (2022). However, in addition to the broader welfare transformation, there are two more similarities between the flagship social assistance programs. In both countries, "[l]ocal/sub-national governments initially provide social assistance and later national governments extend them;" and there is a "high level of autonomy for [the] lower level of administration," which shapes the design of the programs in a similar manner (Barrientos and Pellisery 2012, p. 21). These show that welfare policies in both countries are very much resembling each other.

Third, institutional politics have similar characteristics in both countries. Although federalism is not an undifferentiated variable, its availability has a noticeable impact on the structure of political competition and welfare expansion. Multiplication of institutional veto points, political fragmentation, and competition between levels of government may introduce substantial obstacles to new policy implementations (Pierson 1995). However, having a lower degree of party system nationalization could also exacerbate the electoral competition, which probably mitigates or even reverses these obstacles' impact. In other words, federalism might

increase the significance of coordination and democratic benefits of competition in implementing nationwide social welfare programs. For both Indian and Brazilian politics, federalization is an essential component of local and federal political institutions, especially in the sense of political fragmentation in formal politics. Party system nationalization is low, and elections are highly competitive in both countries, despite significant variation in depth (Tillin and Perreira 2017). Indian state elections have a robust basis for regional parties, while participation of new parties in formal politics is structurally encouraged in Brazil. As a result, both countries have multiple political parties and fragmented oppositions (Barrientos and Pellisery 2012). The positive impact of electoral competition on welfare programs will be discussed in Chapter 2.

Fourth, India and Brazil have experienced comparable economic growth, particularly in the late 1990s and early 2000s. While the causes of this growth have been the subject of ongoing debate, it can be argued that a significant contributing factor was the increased integration of these two major economies into the global market. Foreign direct investment ratios and the number of exports of goods and services in these countries are depicted in Figures 1.5 and 1.6. Notably, attracting foreign investments in the commercial services sector, particularly in computer and information services, has become a crucial aspect of the Indian economy (Gryczka 2010, p. 97). In contrast, Brazil has focused on expanding markets for its agricultural exports, with the most exported products being soybeans, crude oil or bituminous mineral oils, iron ore and its concentrates, cellulose, corn, and others (Hopewell, 2015, p. 320).

Furthermore, these two emerging powers joined forces with other influential developing economies in the early 2000s to establish their political-economic organization, BRICS. Brazil and India emerged as the two leading powers of this group of developing economies in the World Trade Organization (Hopewell 2014, p. 321). These economic and political developments have significant implications for global trade and investment, and they have contributed to the rise of these two countries as influential actors in the global economy. By attracting foreign investments and expanding their markets, India and Brazil have positioned themselves as key players in the global market, while their participation in BRICS has strengthened their position in international negotiations and decision-making processes.

Figure 1.5: Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)[5]

In addition, the expected directions of the empirical analyses' findings constitute an essential component of this MSSD framework. The outputs of variable-oriented analyses run separately in the two countries align with each other, and the answers to the first two research questions are expected to be positive in both cases. Both Brazilian and Indian governments are expected to employ social assistance as a counter-insurgency and as a substitute for land rights. As well as similarities in the first and second hypotheses, my country-level variable-oriented analyses reveal an essential difference between the mobilizational impacts of social assistance programs, which validates the third hypothesis. In that vein, this research pinpoints a significant difference between the two cases as the primary explanation behind the difference in the diverging mobilizational impacts of social assistance programs. This explanation depends on the claim-making dynamics in social movement mobilization. While the MST in Brazil has not presented a demanding discourse for the Bolsa Familia provision, the Naxalites in India have continuously made proactive claims for the NREGA, which constitutes the main explanatory disparity between the two cases for the comparative framework of this research. Therefore, depending on the approval of the three hypotheses and macro-level similarities, this research answers the fourth research question of the research, which asks why social assistance's mobilizational impact diverges in India and Brazil.

[5] Foreign direct investment is a term used to describe the net inflows of investment made by an entity to acquire a lasting management interest (10% or more of voting stock) in a company that operates in an economy other than the investor's own. This figure is the aggregate of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital, as shown in the balance of payments. The series depicts the net inflows (new investment inflows minus disinvestment) into the reporting economy from foreign investors and is calculated by dividing the resulting figure by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the economy. Source: https://data.worldbank.org/

Figure 1.6: Exports of goods and services (BoP, current US$)[6]

After case-specific empirical analyses, I will elaborate on the similarities that my variable-oriented analyses reveal. Since they are vital for the contentious politics of the two countries, I will also present country-specific mechanisms for the first and second hypotheses of the research. Therefore, my research also answers "why" and "how" questions for each hypothesis and provides qualitative evidence. Then, I will do the same for the third hypothesis, which corresponds to the main difference of interest. Finally, the mechanism of the third hypothesis will constitute the contextual explanatory factor in the research, which depends on the expectation that various factions of the Naxalites converted the NREGA from a gift to a right by creating a counternarrative. To ensure the claims of the Naxalites on the NREGA, I review previous anthropological research and two of the largest factions' publicly available journals (CPIML-Liberation and CPI-Maoist). According to the expectations of this research, the Naxalites started to draw attention to the insufficient implementation of the program in their political discourse just after its introduction by the federal government of India. For Brazil, on the other hand, the MST leadership did (or could) not make such claims on Bolsa Familia. Instead, the MST leadership held firm to their well-focused historical claims on land reform. This difference between the movements brings out the diverging outcomes in the two cases. The methodological framework that the MSSD of my research is summarized in Table 1.4.

[6] The phrase "exports of goods and services" refers to all transactions that occur between residents of a given country and non-residents, resulting in a transfer of ownership of general merchandise, net exports of goods under merchanting, nonmonetary gold, and services. The data for this metric is presented in U.S. dollars and reflects the current value of these transactions. Source: https://data.worldbank.org/

Through qualitative and quantitative analyses, this study provides empirical evidence that supports its four hypotheses. Specifically, the Brazilian and Indian governments utilized flagship social assistance programs as a substitute for land-based claims of mobilized rural poor to demobilize massive radical rural opposition. However, the Naxalites in India were able to transform the substitute policy into a concession by framing social assistance as a collective action demand and making claims on its insufficient implementation. In contrast, Bolsa Familia demobilized the MST's land invasions.

Table 1.4: The Most-Similar-Systems-Design in the research

	Brazil	**India**
Macrolevel similarities		
○ *Contentious politics*	dense historical land conflict in both countries	
○ *Welfare state*	...has expanded since the early 2000s in both countries	
○ *Federalism*	...provided political fragmentation in both countries	
○ *Economic pattern*	increasing integration into the international market since the early 2000s in both countries	
From case-specific empirical models		
○ *First hypothesis: whether social assistance is employed to demobilize the movement*	Yes	Yes
○ *Second hypothesis: whether social assistance is employed as a substitute for the land rights*	Yes	Yes
○ *Independent variable of interest - Framing social assistance as a demand*	No	Yes
○ *Dependent variable - Third hypothesis: whether social assistance demobilizes the movement*	Yes	No

The second chapter, titled "Theoretical Framework," establishes the theoretical contribution of this research by critically examining existing literature on contentious politics, social movement outcomes, and social assistance. Within the contentious politics literature, I define Substitution as the third systematic government response, following repression and concession. Furthermore, I extensively describe political outcomes, particularly unintended

political outcomes, among the movement outcomes, elucidating the position of substitution within the literature. In the proposed framework of the MP nexus, I put forth an analytical-theoretical model that encompasses government policies, mobilization, and movement demands.

Subsequently, I analyze the literature on social assistance and welfare policies, asserting that the dynamics underlying the provision of these aids, i.e., the reasons behind their implementation, have not been adequately examined. When they are examined, scholars predominantly focus on structural factors while neglecting political factors. Within the realm of political factors, studies pertaining to contentious politics occupy minimal space. In this context, I propose a bridge between the literature on social movements and social assistance. In the concluding section of this chapter, I present academic inquiries regarding Bolsa Familia and the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), for which I demonstrate similar gaps and needs with the global literature.

The third and fourth chapters contain case-specific content. These chapters focus on land conflict and grievances related to land, providing historical backgrounds for the mobilization of movements in both countries. Additionally, these sections include methodological details followed for case-specific quantitative models. Furthermore, these two chapters illustrate empirical evidence for the first three hypotheses concerning Brazil and India. Social assistance models, substitution models, and mobilization models are presented separately. The relevant sources and operationalization for each variable used in the study are thoroughly described in these sections.

The fifth chapter, titled "Substitution, Mobilization, and Claim-making" conducts a comparative analysis to test the fourth hypothesis. It also presents case-specific mechanisms that explore the relationships between social assistance, mobilization, and land-based targets. This chapter utilizes a case-oriented approach (Della Porta 2008; Anckar 2008) to enhance the validity of the contextual explanation. While previous chapters include empirical analyses of the two countries, which reveal that the Bolsa Familia and NREGA programs were disproportionately directed towards radical rural mobilizations and used as substitutes for land-based claims by the governments, the fifth chapter extracts relevant mechanisms for those relationships. Decision-makers in both countries aim to demobilize radical movements addressing land conflicts among the landless or nearly landless poor. However, the results indicate divergent impacts of social assistance programs. While the Bolsa Familia reduces

land invasions by the MST, the NREGA intensifies mobilization among the Naxalites. To understand the underlying reasons, this fifth chapter presents a case-oriented comparison of the two contexts and examines the associated mechanisms behind each hypothesis.

Overall, this study contributes to the academic literature by shedding light on the relationship between social assistance policies and rural mobilization in two of the world's largest democracies - Brazil and India. It contributes to the field by providing insights into the relationships between social assistance programs, mobilization, and claim-making dynamics. Through empirical analyses in Brazil and India, it demonstrates that these programs are strategically used by governments as substitutes for land-related demands of rural unrest mobilized by radical movements. However, the mobilizational impact of this strategy is conditional on the movement's ability to create a rightful discourse about the program and transform it into a demand.

Chapter 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

To delve into the relationship between social movements and social assistance, it is crucial to meticulously delineate the shared gaps inherent in both realms of scholarly discourse. The theoretical underpinnings of government-implemented substitution strategy, dating back to the early 2000s, can be traced back to two interconnected theoretical gaps. As previously mentioned, studies on social assistance programs inadequately address the political and contentious political dynamics underlying these welfare policies, while investigations into social movements similarly leave a pertinent question unanswered: are systematic government responses to movements solely limited to repression and concession? When we peruse studies on social welfare during the 1970s and 1980s, it becomes evident that social movements are more extensively discussed. A prime exemplification of this is the political containment thesis put forth by Piven and Cloward (1971), positing that social assistance is employed as a means to regulate the poor. As astute strategists, states have formulated, refined, and continue to develop strategies that transcend the dichotomy of repression and concession to placate social unrest.

Further, the shortcomings within the social movement literature are not solely confined to inquiries examining the strategic maneuvers of states. Social movements can yield both intended and unintended outcomes. Particularly since the 2000s, there has been a relative surge in studies examining the cultural repercussions of movements. Correspondingly, interest in unintended outcomes has increased. However, the unintended consequences of movements were predominantly believed to be confined to the cultural and biographical domains, with the relationship between these effects and the political institution remaining incomplete.

In this section, I will explicate the gaps addressed by the theoretical contributions of my research. I will elucidate that government responses are not strictly binary but encompass a third alternative: substitution. Furthermore, I will emphasize the necessity of incorporating political influences into the purview of studies exploring the unintended outcomes of social movement mobilization, which often predominantly focus on cultural and biographical influences. Moreover, it is vital to recognize that political influences do not invariably manifest as intended outcomes, and there is room for “unintended political outcomes.”

Creating a theoretical space to accommodate unintended political outcomes within the social movement literature holds significant importance for the main contribution of this study, the substitution thesis. Under the theoretical framework of this research, social assistance programs—specifically, the strategic implementation of the substitution strategy by the state—can be perceived as an unintended political outcome for social movements. The term "substitution" is utilized precisely because it is unintended from the perspective of the movement, although it is a strategic move for the government. Nonetheless, whether an outcome is truly unintended or not is revealed through the detailed examination of framing practices that I will undertake below. Therefore, it remains dynamic and subject to cultural processes, rather than being fixed or unchanging. An unintended political outcome (e.g., social assistance) can transform into a highly "intended" outcome once effectively framed by the movement. This dynamic nature stands as the mirror image of the continuum between substitution and concession from the perspective of the government. In other words, the policy presented by the government as a substitution can be reframed by the movement and transformed into a concession. This encapsulates the essence of the analytical model I have developed, referred to as the mobilization-policy nexus. In this chapter, I will also introduce the mobilization-policy nexus, which scrutinizes the relevance of a hypothetical government policy that addresses the social movement and the grievances it encompasses.

Subsequently, I will present an exhaustive systematic review of studies examining the determinants, political determinants, and contentious political determinants of social assistance programs, with the aim of mapping the equivalent of this gap in the social assistance literature. Furthermore, I will demonstrate the universality of this gap by showcasing its prevalence in India and Brazil, in addition to the global literature. Therefore, this section respectively reviews existing pieces of literature on government responses to social movements, political outcomes of social movements, unintended political outcomes of social movements, determinants of social assistance, political determinants of social assistance, contentious political determinants of social assistance, and relevant gaps on Bolsa Familia and the NREGA.

2.1 Government Responses to Social Movements and Substitution Strategy

How do the governments respond to social movement mobilization? Existing literature on contentious politics considers governmental responses to social movement mobilization as two-fold—either as repression or concession (Lichbach 1987; Rasler 1996; Moore 2000; Pierskalla 2010; Sullivan 2016). In the existing scholarly discourse, concession

is commonly understood as the positive political achievements resulting from social movements, while repression is typically depicted as the state's actions to suppress or control individuals through institutional or physical force (Demeritt 2016, p. 1), and as the opposite of facilitation (Tilly 1978). In addition, the literature considers more unsystematic alternatives, such as the exacerbation of countermovements, the sustainment of elite cohesion, and the misguidance of public opinion (Yuen and Cheng 2017). All of these strategies aimed to demobilize opposition raised by the movement. However, any interaction between the movement and the government can escalate mobilization in many ways (Goldstone and Tilly 2001, p. 193; Francisco 1995; Zwerman and Steinhoff 2005).

Whether they are escalating or deescalating the mobilization, repression, and concession are often considered as substitutes for each other (Lichbach 1987; Moore 2000; Goldstone and Tilly 2001), which was called the “choice-theoretic model” (Pierskalla 2010). The study of Shellman (2006), for instance, retrospectively assumes that governments make decisions on a unidimensional numerical axis, from hostility (the most violent) to cooperation (the most cooperative). Pierskalla (2010) employs game theory models to tackle this retrospectively. His model, too, is based on two governmental responses to mobilization: the official decision-makers either repress or accommodate the demand, and then the movement responds by either escalating or acquiescing in his theoretical framework. The baseline assumptions of game theory models are the imperfect knowledge of both sides and the effectiveness of expectations. Pierskalla’s findings provide significant evidence for the “More Murder in the Middle” theory (Lian 2023; Stacher 2015) that claims more people die in transitional regimes rather than autocracy because of uncertainty about the opponent’s next move. Accordingly, scholars seem to agree that consistency increases the possibility of demobilization (Lichbach 1987; Rasler 1996; Demeritt 2016). According to these studies, decision-makers should be consistent in their responses, independent of their choices to repress or accommodate. Otherwise, the government might seem weak, and the uncertainty may be considered a political opportunity for the change on which movements make claims.

However, despite the government's consistent responses, any interaction between the two sides can potentially lead to mobilization. Surprisingly, repression, which is intended to suppress mobilization, can sometimes have the opposite effect, leading to an escalation of protest, a phenomenon referred to as the "backlash hypothesis" (Francisco 1995). State repression may inadvertently generate public support for a particular movement, shifting public opinion from negative or dismissive to supportive. The primary reason for employing

repression is the government's desire to maintain its hold on power (Ritter 2014), which often involves not only repressing existing mobilization but also preemptively addressing potential future challenges (Sullivan 2016). Scholars have identified similar determinants for both repression and social movement mobilization, including political opportunities (such as the disruptive nature of mobilization, the effectiveness of democratic institutions, and elite cohesion), resources (such as financial, land, media access, and elite networks), as well as framing processes encompassing strategic calculations, discursive structures, and partisan ideologies of the government (Davenport 2005).

It is worth noting that repressed radical movements may adapt and continue to mobilize in new arenas of resistance, such as the courts, prisons, underground activities, and even exile (Zwerman and Steinhoff 2005). According to Lichbach (1987), although repression may reduce nonviolent protest activities in the short term, it can ultimately increase the level of violent activities over time. One potential mechanism through which repression can spur further mobilization is the emergence of divisions among the ruling elites, as they withdraw support from the incumbent government due to its harsh tactics (Tilly 2005). However, empirical findings suggest that the outcomes of repression are mixed and contingent upon various contextual factors (Demeritt 2016), and its effects can be immediate or delayed (Rasler 1996). For instance, Sullivan, Loyle, and Davenport (2012) arrived at an intriguing conclusion that repression decreases mobilization when protest activity has been increasing recently, while it increases mobilization when protest activity has been decreasing.

The concession, on the other hand, may also fuel further mobilization by popularizing the idea that mobilization is the solution and can also reinforce movement adherents' expectation that "gain leads to more gain." By expanding favorable conditions, decreasing the risk of repression, and fueling inter-elite conflict (due to disagreements over whether and to what extent concessions should be given), concessions reshape political opportunity structures as well. Potential mobilizing impacts of both concession and repression can be conceptualized as an "interaction effect." Goldstone and Tilly (2001) imply this interaction effect in their analysis of the repression-concession nexus: "An increase in repression or concessions is often followed by more protest, rather than less. This can only be explained by realizing that opportunity is always in interaction with current and repressive threats and that this interaction gives rise to varied dynamic patterns of protest and contention." (p. 193). Moreover, the concession could burden further resource-based costs for the decision-makers since it often requires economic resources and therefore risks important allies with elites, just

as in the scenario of repression. There are multiple reasons to anticipate that repression and concession, when considered separately, can enhance mobilization. However, one crucial mechanism is particularly associated with concession. Concession serves to validate the ideological discourse propagated by radical anti-systemic movements, in opposition to the state and the prevailing socio-cultural system. In other words, it affirms the collective action frames employed by the movement to mobilize its support base. While the government aims to alleviate material grievances, it faces the challenging task of not alienating the support of the elites responsible for these grievances. Movement organizers harness these frames to galvanize the desire for change and the transformation of the existing system. The endorsement of collective action frames reinforces this desire primarily, but it also carries the risk of reinforcing the determination to challenge both the state and the elites. I will delve into a more comprehensive discussion on the relationship between political outcomes and collective action frames below.

In order to better understand the government's response to ongoing conflicts, scholars have introduced the concept of "ignoring" or toleration as an alternative to the dichotomy of concession and repression (Luders 2006; Lorentzen 2013; Yuen and Cheng 2017). Luders argues that the decision to employ repression is driven by a cost-assessment perspective, where both making concessions and confronting disruptive mobilization entail high costs for decision-makers. In contrast, when concession costs are high and disruption costs are low, the government may choose to ignore the movement. He also suggests that these costs may vary throughout the protest cycles, depending on changing interpretations. More recently, Yuen and Cheng reconceptualize ignoring as "attrition," which involves tolerating protests on the surface while employing proactive tactics to discredit, exhaust, and increase the costs of mobilization. They emphasize that toleration is not merely a negative response, but rather entails specific strategies such as maintaining elite cohesion, mobilizing public discontent and counter-movements, and utilizing legal intervention. However, despite these valuable efforts to go beyond the conventional repression-concession dichotomy, scholars have struggled to identify a systematic and alternative response. Instead, they have often focused on a combination of unsystematic political maneuvers or adhered to the traditional dichotomy itself.

Consequently, it is important to recognize that governmental strategy-making extends beyond this binary framework. It is necessary to delve into the reasons and mechanisms through which the substitution strategy emerges as a viable alternative to concession for

governments. Substitution basically allows governments to avoid this interaction effect and provides more chances to demobilize the movement. Substitute policies provide public benefits (in my case, welfare programs) to the constituencies of movements that are both politically less controversial and fiscally more conservative than meeting the core demands of movements, policies that often necessitate fundamental socio-economic changes and redistribution of resources and income. This response substitutes movements' core demands with government policies not demanded by the movements while undermining the mass support of such movements. Therefore, I conceptualize this third governmental strategy as "substitution."

In the substitution scenario, the government directs a policy to the mobilization while undermining its claims. In this manner, the government expects to avoid the risks of concession and repression by dismantling collective action frames and the narratives circulated by the movement. In both substitution and concession scenarios, official authorities direct a policy addressing the grievances on which the movement bases its mobilization. However, there is a significant difference between the two. In the substitution, the movement does not make any claim about the directed policy and may not even be aware of the targeting, while concession justifies the strength of claim-making by default due to the availability of existing structured and circulated collective action frames. Therefore, by employing a substitution strategy, decision-makers aim to benefit in two ways. First, instead of meeting the movement's claims, which may unintendedly escalate the mobilization, authorities might downscale the movement's mobilization capacity by presenting the government as the real solution for the material grievances of the movement's base. Second, by not meeting the movement's claims, they avoid the risk of losing allies from higher classes targeted by the action. Substitution decreases the risk of elite division and provides credit for the government, while concession might strengthen the movement's mobilization and risk class-based alliances. As such, substitution appears to be an effective strategy for containing unrest with minimal economic and political costs. Note that the substitution strategy's scope can be extended to the effect that the movement raises negative (or protective) claims. In this more specific scenario, the movement fights for the removal of a government policy (like the SEZs in India). It creates grievance-based costs to the potential adherents of the movement, and the government compensates for the grievance by employing another policy.

Before presenting the MP nexus, which suggests an analytical understanding of claim-making and the difference between mobilizational dynamics of substitution and concession as

alternative choices of governments, I will first dig into social movements literature by reviewing existing approaches to movement outcomes, emphasizing political and unintended types. Although I will critique the categorization proposed by Bosi, Giugni, and Uba (2016), I have chosen to utilize their triple classification in order to effectively organize the pertinent literature in this study. In their framework, Bosi et al. divide the outcomes of social movements into three distinct groups: political, cultural, and biographical.

2.2 Political Outcomes of Social Movements

Referring to the political outcomes of social movements, scholars mainly investigate the determinants of successful outcomes, which means achieving the stated goal. In fact, this investigation requires a scholarly agreement on the concept of "success." Instead, scholars agree that movement outcomes might be very complicated (Tilly 1999; Burnstein 2019), and binary consideration of those as "success or failure" is one way among many alternatives (Suh 2014, p. 6). Nevertheless, scholars often conceptualize the political outcome as the achievement of the declared targets and fulfilling the claims (Bosi et al. 2016; Amenta and Polletta 2019), which can be conceptualized as "intended outcomes" as well. During the expansion of the social movements literature in the late 20th century, determinants of movements' achievement are regarded in a wide range of rational, cultural, and structural factors, such as organizational characteristics, tactics, framing, public support, democratic institutions, party politics, and so on (Gamson 1975; Giugni 1998; Fording 1997; Uba 2009). This subsection reviews the existing literature focusing on political outcomes, according to the explanatory variables of interest.

However, let me first present the two founding studies in the 1970s that later paved the way for many fruitful debates on the political outcomes of social movements. William Gamson is the first scholar who studied the concept of success for social movements and the enabling conditions in an analytical manner. In his seminal work, "The Strategies of Social Protest," Gamson (1975) investigates whether external or internal factors are more critical for success, the role played by specific tactics, and especially the question of violence's effectiveness. In this work, he claims that external context does not matter as much as movement-related factors. Further, he introduces two-fold potential mobilization outcomes: first, achieving the claims, and second, gaining new mobilization advantages. Movements are more likely to achieve the claims or escalate the mobilization if they follow well-structured narrow goals, use unruly methods, exploit selective incentives for participants, have predetermined roles in the organization (less informality), and employ a division of labor.

Another seminal work by Piven and Cloward (1977) claims the opposite, saying that permanent organizations are counterproductive and demobilize poor people's movement. To derive their gains, the poor rational agents have only protests and violent tactics as productive resources to mobilize. For Piven and Cloward, violence works since the poor have no institutional political instruments. They assert that "[a] placid poor get nothing, but a turbulent poor sometimes get something" (1971, p. 338). Despite these two founding works of Gamson and Piven-Cloward on the movement outcomes disagree on the credibility of informality, they come to a similar conclusion on the positive impact of disruptive tactics. Furthermore, both studies focus on resources that the movements can mobilize (resource mobilization approach) and argue that political opportunities also matter. While Gamson emphasizes the importance of making claims in times of socio-political crises, Piven and Cloward assert that the effectiveness of mass disruption depends on electoral vulnerability. However, empirical studies in the following years on the questions of violence and comparing the internal vs. external factors revealed various supportive and non-supportive evidence (Giugni et al. 1999). More importantly, scholars started to add cultural factors to resources and political opportunities, investigating the roles of collective action frames and public opinion. Hence, these four categories seem to be useful to review existing literature on political outcomes, which respectively employ varying approaches to explain the movement's success, and these correspond with the three clusters of mobilization dynamics (rational, structural, and cultural). While resources and political opportunities belong to rational and structural factors, collective action frames and public opinion are evaluated under the cultural dynamics in the social movement literature. Before reviewing those, it is important to note that this research puts special emphasis on collective action frames that will be discussed later on.

The first group looks at the impact of the resources and emphasizes the significance of organizational characteristics (Olzak and Ryo 2007) and the usefulness of specific tactics (Andrews and Edwards 2004; Fassiotto and Soule 2017). Carrying out cost-benefit calculations and making strategies, movement organizers try to maximize the effectiveness of available resources to gain. These scholars further investigate the effect of size (how many people participated in protests), frequency (how often protests happened), informality (how much movement institutionalized), and disruptiveness (how much protestors employed violent tactics) (Jenkins 1983; Suh 2014; Olzak and Soule 2009; Arens and Kaufman 2012; Fassiotto and Soule 2017; Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012). However, the findings' direction

for the effect of unruly resources changed over time. The earlier studies investigating the question of violence argue for its positive impact on the conduciveness of movement mobilization (Fording 1997; Giugni 1998), while more recent inquiries favor peaceful tactics as more likely (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013; Arens and Kaufman 2012; Wasow 2017; Stoddard 2013), and rarely found a positive impact of the violence (for exceptions, see Bailey 2015; Huang and Sun 2019).

The second group examines enabling and disabling political opportunities. How does the political context of social movement mobilization determine the outcome? From context to context, scholars exploit numerous different political opportunities that raise (or downsize) the voice of protestors, such as state capacity, political regimes, political stability, availability and disruptiveness of countermovement, and government ideology (Olzak and Soule 2009; Schumaker 1978; Soule and Olzak 2004; Uba 2009; Parris and Scheuermann 2015; Biggs and Andrews 2015). For example, the alignment of the movement's claim with the ideology of governing political parties increases the possibility of success. Further, the political mediation thesis emphasizes the interactional effectiveness of social movement mobilization and institutional politics, arguing that social movements become successful when their voice is mediated by the political parties (Amenta et al. 1992; Amenta et al. 2010). For example, Martin (2013) shows the effectiveness of anti-tax campaigns only if supported by the number of conservatives in the U.S. political system.

The third group of scholars focuses on the impact of frame alignment processes. This research puts a particular emphasis on the framing approach since the difference between concession and substitution fundamentally occurs during the frame alignment processes. Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina (1982) show that movements utilize "injustice frames" to recruit new members. Therefore, political outcomes are a function of movement organizers' capacity to frame an existing condition as "unjust." The research claims that mobilization is not a mechanistic consequence of the grievance but an interpretation. A few years later, in 1986, borrowing the "frame analysis" of Erwin Goffman, David Snow, and his collaborators constructed a more systematic framing theory (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988, Benford 1997, Benford and Snow 2000; Snow 2004; Snow et al. 2014). According to framing theory, while collective action frames are defined as "modes of interpretation that are socially/culturally constructed" (Benford 1997, p. 420), frame alignment is perceived as the necessary condition for mobilization, meaning that a "discursive alignment of individual and

group understandings or interpretations" (Snow et al. 2014, p. 24). Snow and colleagues highlight three core framing tasks for the movements to perform: diagnostic (who is to blame), prognostic (what is the remedy), and motivational framings. In this vein, the three functions of frames are to attract public attention, articulate a proposed solution, and transform "the way in which some objects of attention are seen or understood" (Snow, Vliegenthart, and Ketelaars 2019, p. 393). When they are successful, collective action frames resonate, and the resonance "resembles 'Aha!' moments, heightening emotions and enabling actors to transcend what was previously taken for granted." (McDonnell, Bail, and Tavory 2017, p. 4). Nevertheless, rather than a binary variable, resonation is a matter of extent (Opp 2009; Ketelaars et al. 2014). Further, frames contain strategy-making but are irreducible to it. They "are both strategic and set the terms of strategic action" (Polletta and Ho 2006, p. 3). As frames often interact with cultural contexts and political opportunity structures (McCammon et al. 2007; Cornfield and Fletcher 1998), they are also determined by cultural themes, political opportunities, and ideological stances (Snow et al. 2014). Thus, the effectiveness of frames is a function of the alignment of those with existing discursive opportunities (Ferree 2003).

The studies that consider the roles of collective action frames claim that frames' resonation with the audience is essential for the movement's success (Mika 2006; Ketelaars et al. 2014; Clayton 2018; Zaman 2018; Dioun 2017; Bloemraad et al. 2016). For this approach, framing is not static, but an ongoing process, and movements continuously bridge, amplify, extend, and transform them (Benford 1997; Snow et al. 1986; Dioun 2017). Cress and Snow (2000) showed that articulate and focused frames are more functional, and framing in more particular issues increases the possibility of success. "Some social issues," furthermore, "are easier to frame in an attractive way" (Ketelaars 2016, p. 343). Frames better resonate when they are credible and salient for potential targets (Benford and Snow 2000), and they should be congruent with people's everyday experiences; that is what Benford and Snow call "experiential commensurability." Framing, thus, should not be too abstract and distant from the daily habits of the potential adherents. Also, Ketelaars (2016) argues that attributing blame to particular organizations (people or institutions) increases the possibility of frame alignment. Scholars often find diagnostic frames better aligned than prognostic and motivational (Ketelaars et al. 2014). Most Muslim people in the Middle East blame the U.S. as an imperialist evil, as aligned with the diagnostic framing of the Al-Qaida. However, significantly fewer approve of the suggested solution of the movement (Sedgwick 2010).

The fourth factor shaping political outcomes is public opinion. Despite resembling the framing approach, public opinion towards a movement has many determinants other than frames (e.g., the use of violence). Public opinion is a part of the movement's broader cultural environment. However, many scholars acknowledged its role (e.g., political process theory) much before cultural factors started to be commonly used. While Tilly (1999) defines three actors of social movement challenge as power, participants, and the public, Burnstein and Linton (2002) believe that the movement's success is the most central to public opinion. Jenkins (1983) argues that violent tools' impact interacts with public opinion, which is also approved by Uba's (2009) meta-analysis. Accordingly, more recent research show finding a place in media is a significant channel for successful movement outcomes (Vasi et al. 2015; Huang and Sun 2019; Feinberg et al. 2020). Since it creates a necessary condition for decision-makers' re-election in democracies, the scholarly emphasis on public opinion has increased, especially after the 2000s. This is also related to a general trend of scholars increasingly believing in the role of cultural dynamics (Amenta and Polletta 2019). Comparing the findings of Uba (2009) and Burnstein and Linton (2002) shows that the proportion of papers investigating the impact of public opinion on political outcomes had doubled from 2000 to 2007.

Although they investigate the impact of different factors, the four groups of scholars are similar in that they all studied the political outcomes as the declared/stated/claimed/intended target of the movement. Accordingly, the existing body of literature concerning the political outcomes of social movements has been shaped by various rational, structural, and cultural factors, as evident in the review conducted earlier. Notably, cultural factors, particularly studies on framing and public opinion, have gained prominence in recent years. However, the conventional triple distinction (rational, structural, and cultural), often employed to demarcate the existing literature and referred to as a facilitator, can be somewhat misleading. It fails to adequately capture the intricate interplay between cultural factors and the underlying structural and rational considerations. Cultural factors are intricately intertwined with the rational and strategic calculations formulated by movements, just as structural factors are intimately connected to their cultural resonance.

The original contribution of this study lies in the examination of the substitution strategy and the MP nexus analytic model, which centers on the resonance of collective action frames within the cultural realm during an ongoing conflict. It evaluates this phenomenon within the framework of mutual strategic maneuvers and the underlying

structural processes that delineate the domains of these maneuvers. The categorization presented by Bosi et al. (2016), which I adopted above as well, is also problematic when examined through this lens. In their edited volume, the authors classified cultural and biographical outcomes as unintended, while designating political outcomes as intended. This classification can be misleading, fails to capture the complex interplay between these dimensions, and underscores the existing gap in the literature. Below I will delve into the literature on unintended outcomes for social movements, illuminating a meaningful gap in knowledge. In doing so, I will argue that certain outcomes may be both unintended and political while emphasizing that these categories are not fixed or immutable. Furthermore, I will examine the strategic processes that elicit responses within the conflict between the state and the movement, encompassing both the cultural and rational domains.

While the state may perceive the distinction between substitution and concession as highly strategic, social movement literature often categorizes them as apolitical/unintended and political/intended, respectively. However, the reality is quite the opposite. From the perspective of the movements, the outcomes of social movements can be either intended and apolitical or unintended and political. Understanding this distinction requires a nuanced understanding of the interaction between cultural and non-cultural realms, which will then provide significant insights to draw the lines between substitution and concession scenarios, and the continuum between those.

2.3 Unintended Outcomes and Collective Action Demands

While the declared objectives and success/failure dynamics of social movements have attracted much attention in the social movement literature, scholars have empirically underexplored the unintended consequences of social movements, although many sociologists have hinted at their significance (Bosi and Giugni 2011; Tilly 1996; Tilly 1999; Giugni 1998). Giugni and Bosi argued, "…movements often have the greatest effect… not by meeting their stated goals, but by bringing about other unintended outcomes" (2012, p. 23). Tilly (1996), from a philosophical perspective, describes unintended outcomes as errors that the systematic explanations of social scientists could not frame. Further, studying the problem of identifying social movement outcomes, he opens a conceptual space for the "joint effects of movement actions and outside influences that do not bear on movement claims" (1999, p. 269), which is elaborated as "unintended consequences" by Giugni (1998).

The existing literature focuses on biographical and culturally unintended consequences while mostly ignoring unintended impacts in a political sense. Analyses on

biographical outcomes mainly examine how movements leave an influence on individual life courses as long-term—even intergenerational—impacts on participants (Hasso 2001; Masclet 2016), changes in individual attitudes belonged to the out-of-movement public (McAdam 1999; Gran and Hein 2005), and transnational diffusion of movement activism (Zhao 2020). For cultural outcomes of movements, second, scholars trace movements' impact on the changes in the social norms (Inglehart and Norris 2003) or the political culture (Della Porta 1999; also see Amenta and Polletta 2019). Not only Bosi et al. (2016) but most of these scholars explicitly conceptualize the biographical and cultural types of outcomes in their studies as unintended for social movements (except for Hasso 2001 and Inglehart and Norris 2003). In this sense, the most common unit of analysis for the unintended outcomes in the literature appears as the "attitudes" (Weisskircher 2020; Zhao 2020).

However, unintended outcomes may be highly political for the government side, as well as political outcomes could be very unintended for the movement. More importantly, cultural and biographical outcomes are not "by default" unintended. Altering the cultural environment, for instance, movement organizers often desire to circulate ideas and expectations of the public related to their broader agenda. The movement organizers usually aim to change the political contexts and transform the existing norms (Amenta and Polletta 2019). Further, biographical outcomes could not automatically take place as the unintended regarding the movement organizers' effort for the attitudinal changes of individuals for the recruitment of new members (McVeigh et al. 2004; Mika 2006), long-term survival of existing mobilization (Zwerman and Steinhoff 2005), and demobilization of countermovements (Zaman 2018). I suggest using the term "secondarily intended" outcomes for those biographical and cultural advantages, rather than unintended. Even sometimes, biographical and cultural impacts could be prior to the policy changes, especially for long-term massive radical movements.

Although political consequences have primarily been conceptualized as success or failure regarding movements' declared objectives (Amenta et al. 2010; Bosi et al. 2016), decision-makers might respond with policies that were not demanded by a movement or that do not fundamentally address the popular grievances that contributed to the rise of an action. For example, social assistance programs in Mexico are disproportionately directed to indigenous populations constituting the mass base of the Zapatista insurgency, leading to diminished protest participation and, in turn, yielding substantive support in arguing that the Mexican government uses social assistance (not demanded by the movement) to contain

indigenous unrest (Yörük, Öker, and Şarlak 2019). As another example from Turkey, Yörük (2012) conducted an extensive analysis of the Turkish free healthcare program, revealing a notable disparity in the allocation of social assistance favoring the Kurdish minority. This deliberate distribution of resources exemplifies a calculated maneuver implemented by the government to effectively manage and suppress the ongoing Kurdish unrest. Further, when we look at South Africa, the distribution of the Child Support Grant (CSG) is influenced by political dynamics as well, with higher rates of CSG receipt observed among individuals aligned with the incumbent and those involved in contentious or violent protests (Yörük and Gençer 2019).

Despite this empirical evidence, a possible reason for the lack of unintended political outcomes in the existing literature is that scholars might be more likely to employ the concept of unintended when it is unintended for both the government and the movement. For instance, Deng (1997) conceptualizes the death of many demonstrators in a confrontation between protestors and the Chinese Liberation Army as an unintended outcome that resulted from imperfect information, where demonstrators believed that the army would not attack, and the army did not expect that they would protest. However, unintended outcomes of social movements do not require, by default, to be unintended for the governmental decision-makers.

Therefore, the social movements literature has not established criteria to distinguish between intended and unintended political outcomes. For example, researchers have often implied that state repression has an unintentional character. Although some scholars analyzing the repressive responses of the state have identified repression as an unintended consequence (Deng 1997; Munoz and Anduiza 2019), other studies, including unintended movement outcomes as their main research interest, have rarely mentioned repression. Conversely, the concession is more commonly conceptualized as an intended outcome. To distinguish between intended and unintended movement outcomes, I suggest utilizing the abovementioned framing approach of the social movement literature. Suh (2014) asserts that unintended outcomes could “devitalize or strengthen future movement dynamics, depending on” whether the movement frames such outcomes as its core demands. Although this approach does not cover political outcomes, extending the centrality of demands, claims, and frames to the political outcomes might be very conducive.

Hence, I propose to define unintended political consequences as policies that are not initially demanded, claimed, or framed by social movements. In addition to cultural and biographical outcomes, movements can also generate unintended political consequences, referring to government responses that are not sought, demanded, or framed by the movement itself. Recognizing the existence of unintended political outcomes provides a valuable theoretical linkage, primarily bridging the cultural and rational factors influencing mobilization processes, as well as connecting framing and strategy formulation.

The extent to which a movement frames a policy as appealing to its base determines whether that policy is unintended for the movement. However, it does not necessarily imply that the policy is unintended from the state's perspective. On the contrary, it may be a highly strategic maneuver by the government. Similarly, a policy that is initially unintended can evolve into a central demand over time as the movement develops an accusatory and assertive discourse, thereby justifying its ideological stance. This dynamic process, highly relevant to framing and strategy formulation, further elucidates the distinction between substitution and concession. Substitution is deemed as such because it represents an unintended political outcome for the movement, while policies enacted as concessions are labeled as such due to their framing by the movement. Within the proposed analytical framework of the MP-nexus, a novel perspective emerges regarding the impact of these two types of outcomes on mobilization processes.

2.4 Mobilization - Policy Nexus

I contend that whether a government policy has a demobilizing effect on the movement depends on how (and to what extent) the concerned social movement makes a claim for the policy or frames it as a demand. Therefore, claim-making is the bottom line for the mobilizational impact of a government policy. I conceptually associate claim-making with collective action frames (Snow et al. 2014) and refer to claim-making as framing the policy as a demand, building a political narrative (Meyer 2006), and converging dispersed ideas with ideologies (Oliver and Johnston 2000). I present a novel analytical/theoretical model of the mobilization-policy (MP) nexus based on these claim-making dynamics. The distinguishing characteristic of the MP nexus model lies in its dynamic interplay between the framing issue and government responses, which sets apart the unintended political outcomes examined thus far from other outcomes. This model sheds light on the relationship between framing and government responses, emphasizing their dynamic nature. The model mainly assumes a conceptual continuity from concession to substitution, considering claim-making

ascending and descending. The degree to which a social movement formulates demands related to favorable, desirable, benevolent government policies is not a static magnitude, mirroring the changeable nature of unintended movement outcomes. As a result of the emergence of new collective action frames developed by the movement, a policy that was previously implemented by the state as a substitution can transform into an intended outcome, an accomplishment, or a concession from the government's perspective.

Referring back to the bottom line of the MP nexus, I argue that favorable, desirable, benevolent policies implemented by the governments have a default capability to demobilize radical movements, when applied as a substitution strategy, meaning that they are not demanded/framed by the movement organizers. These policies serve to gain support from the masses, who form the base or potential future base of the movement, by favoring the state and the unequal system that the movement challenges within its ideological discourse. However, more significantly, it undermines the notion that the solution lies in mobilization and resistance, as it concurrently diminishes grievances.

Although grievances play a significant role, it is the element of uncertainty conveyed through the challenge that primarily influences potential adherences. This is because it is not the result of collective struggle that enhances material conditions, but rather a favor or grace bestowed within the government-individual relationship. However, based on the dynamic nature of movement outcomes, there are also rooms for the movements to reverse this demobilizing effect of the substitution strategy. The movement’s success in integrating the desired policy into its realm of demands, by making new claims, determines the transformation of a policy initially employed as a substitution into a concession that works against the government’s interests. Therefore, the MP nexus depends on the extent to which the movement claims for this policy. For the nexus, I model a line equation as presented in Equation 2.1. It is important to note that the mathematical expressions used in the equation do not directly represent numerical values, but rather serve as a hypothetical model.

Here in this equation y refers to the mobilization of the movement, while x stands for the government-implemented policy that deals with material grievances. C, as a hypothetical magnitude, measures the extent that the movement makes claims on that policy, creating collective action frames, such as organizing marches for the insufficient implementation of the policy.

$$y = y_o + x * C \quad (2.1)$$

While,

y = Mobilization

x = Government policy

C = Claim-making

y_o= Other factors affecting mobilization (resources, political opportunities, cultural opportunities, etc.)

As illustrated in Figure 2.1, when C is less than zero, the additional amount of that policy decreases the mobilization level of the movement. On the contrary, if the movement frames a policy as a demand, C becomes higher than zero, and the movement gains new mobilization advantages. These two conditions respectively represent substitution and concession scenarios, where the magnitude of C determines the continuum between substitution and concession. Therefore, the latter scenario is what the literature refers to as the impact of concession (C_c), and I conceptualize the former as the impact of a substitute policy (C_s), which will be exemplified in the third chapter on Brazil in detail and conceptualized as a case of "demobilization by substitution." I will illustrate that the Bolsa Familia program, as a substitute policy implemented by the government, demobilized the land invasions of the MST.

Accordingly, whether a policy is a substitute or concession depends on to what extent the movement makes claims for it. That determines if the social movement's participants will evaluate the outcome as an offering from the government or as an achievement of the movement's struggle, revealing the government policy's mobilizational impact. In other words, mobilization is not the outcome of the government's isolated strategy but an interaction involving decisions made by both sides' actors. It is important to remind that the MP nexus assumes the substitute policy still addresses grievances, as does a concession. For the movements, claim-making on a government policy increases the chance of further mobilization by transforming the negative slope of the MP nexus into a positive one, as shown in Figure 2.1. The movement can frame a substitute policy as a collective demand during an ongoing contention, which might reverse the policy's expected impact (expected by the government). This scenario is exemplified in the fourth chapter through the Indian case. I will demonstrate that the NREGA could not decrease the mobilization of the Naxalites (and

even increased it). Further in the fifth chapter, providing qualitative evidence, I will show that by creating a demanding discourse and making claims on the program after a few years of its implementation, the Naxalites successfully converted the substitution scenario to the concession.

Figure 2.1: Linear model of the mobilization-policy nexus

2.5 The Rise of Social Assistance Programs

I argue that welfare policies, and especially social assistance programs, are key examples of such unintended political outcomes of social movements used by governments as tools to contain social movements. Over the last three decades, many governments in the Global South have rapidly expanded social assistance programs by increasing coverage and expenditure and relaxing the terms and conditions of eligibility (Gao 2006; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Jawad 2009; Brooks 2014; Brooks and Manza 2006; World Bank 2018; ILO 2014; ADB 2013). In particular, the so-called emerging market economies, including Brazil and India, have introduced a vast number of expansive and generous social assistance programs providing in-cash and in-kind support for the poor (including conditional cash transfers, free healthcare, food aid, and public works programs). The literature on social assistance programs in Brazil, India, and other countries has undergone an expansion parallel to this social assistance boom. Yet, the global literature consists mostly of descriptive accounts and impact evaluations of these programs, leaving only limited space for the determinants of the programs, and more specifically the political factors behind social assistance expansion. In a recently published systematic literature review, my colleagues and I demonstrate that among all international studies about social assistance programs, 73% focus on the effects rather than the causes of these programs, and 13% provide a descriptive

account of them (Yörük, Kına, and Bargu 2022). Only another 13% of scholarly analyses investigate the causes of social assistance programs, while these publications focus mainly on the structural (both demographic and economic) factors, and largely neglect political dynamics. Unlike the older generation of scholars who closely analyze the contentious political dynamics of social policies (Fording 1997; Isaac and Kelly 1981; Jennings 1983; Piven and Cloward 1971; Schram and Turbett 1983; Welch 1975), most contemporary scholars argue that social assistance expansion essentially results from structural processes.

The literature review classifies the studies on social assistance into three main categories: descriptive, impact analysis, and determinants analysis. Within the determinants group, it further identifies four distinct approaches, each having a different representation: structural factors (140 observations), institutional factors (60 observations), ideational factors (13 observations), and political factors (54 observations). Subsequently, within the political factors category, three distinct subgroups were discerned. The first subgroup, party politics, received significant attention with 29 observations, highlighting the role of political parties and their activities. The second subgroup, governmentality, was represented by 15 observations, emphasizing the significance of governance practices, policies, and strategies. Lastly, contentious politics, with 10 observations, underscored the influence of social movements, protests, and collective action in driving transformative changes related to the phenomenon.

The first major finding in that research is that only 8.2 percent of publications in the sample (267 out of 3263) examine the causes/determinants of social assistance (when the publications without abstracts are considered, this ratio increases to about 13.4 percent). This is because the vast majority of the literature on social assistance that we analyzed either carries out impact evaluations or describes programs without arguing for any analytical or causal relationships. While analyzing this 267 research that examine determinants/causes, we first observed that structural factors had the lion’s share among determinants of social assistance. More than half, i.e., 52 percent, of all studies that we examined underline structural explanations (140 out of 267 publications that examine determinants/causes). Structural factors mainly consist of economic conditions (opportunities or constraints), demography (aging, number of household members, marital status), labor market conditions (e.g., unemployment), human capital (educational status), state capacity, globalization (e.g., international trade) and poverty (Gustafsson 1984; Coe and Hill 1998; Gupta, Schiller, Ma,

and Tiongson 2001; DePolt, Moffitt, and Ribar 2009; Fernandez 2013; Gutjahr and Heeb 2016; Bichir 2016; Arza 2018; van Vliet and Wang 2019).

These publications presented social assistance programs as governments' systemic responses to these structural developments in a way that either individual-level eligibility criteria or country-level decision-making of political authorities are shaped according to new economic or demographic exigencies. Many scholars perceive the economic capacity of governments and economic crises as sufficient conditions to make decisions on expansion and distribution (Barrientos and Santibáñez 2009). What is more, not only the determinants of expansion but also program retrenchment are considered in this vein (Heinesen, Husted, and Rosholm 2013). Also, many scholars focus on the demographic characteristics of citizens that increase or decrease their probability of benefiting from social assistance programs (Kauppinen et al. 2014; Wong, Chen, and Zeng 2014; Smith-Carrier 2017; Reininger, Wyman, and Villalobos 2018). Some structuralist scholars examine the social assistance receipt as the dependent variable to test the targeting accuracy (Bruckmeier and Wiemers 2011). In short, the structuralist approaches argue that the shift in welfare provision was essentially a natural result of demographic and economic changes.

Second, the institutionalist strand of scholarship examines social assistance programs by referring to the capacity and structure of welfare institutions. Scholars in this tradition analyze the extent to which the distribution of social assistance is centralized or localized in a government, the veto points in the political system, how social assistance policies (from caseworkers to welfare ministries) are structured, or how international institutions (such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, International Labor Organization, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) cooperate with the national governments (Bianculli and Jordana 2013; Smith and Urpelainen 2017; Béland and Lecours 2018; Jordan 2018; Varjonen 2020). One of the most cited political institutional variables in the analyses of social assistance is the level and form of democracy in the country (Kwon and Kim 2015; Hessami and Uebelmesser 2016). Researchers argue that well-structured programs require advanced democratic contexts since democracy is the only tool that could mediate the interests of civil actors, which would enhance the qualifications of these programs.

The third group in the publications on the determinants/causes of social assistance addresses ideational factors—most importantly, the diffusion of ideas. They are interested in how professional norms and epistemic communities are created to shape social policy agenda, and how the bureaucrats and program implementers learn ideas that inform social

policy-making in other geographies (Means and Smith 1983; Sugiyama 2011; Fenwick 2013; Tomazini 2019). Hence, these scholars frequently refer to the mechanisms of transnational policy exchange. Policy diffusion and policy learning can occur through a global-to-local as well as local-to-global sequence. As for the conditional cash transfer program in Brazil, there is a path from the policy designs of local governments to a nationwide implementation (Velázquez Leyer 2018). Decision-makers follow this path because of the professional learning processes and the affinity of ideas between local and central policy implementers (Gritter 2016).

Having discussed the scholarly content of the publications on determinants/causes of social assistance that we studied, we now illustrate their temporal trajectories in Figure 2.2. The total number of publications on the determinants of social assistance has significantly increased by following the general trend in social sciences. However, the number of publications that examined political factors has experienced the least growth. This is also reflected by the fact that the percentage of politics-based publications in the total number of publications in our dataset on determinants/causes has significantly declined compared to the 1970s when the entire set of publications on determinants/causes in our sample focused on politics (Figure 2.3). On the contrary, since the 1990s, the main expansion of the number of publications in our dataset has stemmed from the structuralist paradigm. Since the mid-2010s, institutionalist and ideationalist approaches have expanded compared to structuralist and political approaches.

2.5.1 Political Determinants of Social Assistance

Our review reveals that political explanations of social assistance programs examine electoral competition, the political ideology of incumbent parties, shares in cabinets or parliaments, social movements, protest events, ethnic conflicts, and governmental logic of discipline that influence the provision, distribution, and expansion of social assistance programs. We identified 54 publications that provided a political explanation and we classified them into three groups: party politics, governmentality, and contentious politics (please see below for our definition of these categories). Within the data set that we collected, while studies on party politics constitute more than half of the publications on political determinants/causes (28 out of 53 publications), contentious politics is the least popular theme (10 publications).

Figure 2.2: Yearly changes in the number of publications that focus on different categories of explanatory factors[7]

Figure 2.3: Yearly changes in the percentage of studies that examine the political determinants of social assistance[8]

Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 present the number of papers in each sub-category, their geographical interest, and methodological preferences. Methodologically, the number of qualitative analyses is much higher than the quantitative ones in our sample. While almost half of the publications on party politics conduct quantitative analysis, only two quantitative analyses are observed for contentious politics (no quantitative analysis for governmentality studies, this is very much in line with the methodological nature of this scholarship). Scholars

[7] Source: Authors' own calculations
[8] Source: Authors' own calculations

have employed diverse methodologies, including process tracing, document analysis, in-depth interviews, cluster analysis, and regression models.

Table 2.1: Methodology of papers for the sub-categories[9]

	Contentious Politics		Governmentality		Party politics		Total
Qualitative	8	80.0	15	100.0	15	51.7	38
Quantitative	2	20.0	0	0.0	13	44.8	15
Mixed	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	3.4	1
Total	10	100	15	100	29	100	54

Table 2.2: Geographical interest of publication across the sub-categories of political explanations[10]

	Contentious Politics		Governmentality		Party politics		Total
Global North	2	20.0	7	46.7	16	57.1	25
Global South	8	80.0	8	53.3	12	42.8	28
Total	10	100	15	100	28	100	53

Observations from the dataset of publications suggest that the publications on the social assistance programs in the Global South are more likely to analyze contentious political factors, whereas the publications in the Global North are more inclined towards party politics. There are two possible explanations for this contrast: First, it may be related to scholarly bias to prioritize party politics over contentious politics in the case of the Global North and vice versa in the Global South. Second, contentious politics may be a more fundamental driver of social assistance policies in the Global South than in the Global North. In another analysis by Author 1 and co-author, the causal effect of violent civil unrest on social assistance is found to be more prominent in the Global South, as opposed to the Global North, by giving a more structured picture to an already emerging pattern of counter-insurgency use of anti-poverty programs in the Global South.

[9] Source: Authors' own calculations.
[10] One paper on party politics does not fit any side of this geographical division. Source: Authors' own calculations.

Figure 2.4 presents the temporal transformation of the geographical distribution of political analyses. This figure suggests a shift in the focus of political analyses from the Global North to the Global South since the 1970s. By the late 2010s, political analyses have focused mainly on the Global South with a recent pickup in studies in the Global North.

Figure 2.4: Timely transformation of geographical interests[11]

Regarding the country and continent focus of the publications, South American countries, and especially Brazil, account for the most significant share in the Global South. The most frequently analyzed countries in the Global South are Brazil, Turkey, China, Peru, and Argentina. Studies dealing with social assistance programs in the Global North focus most frequently on the U.S. Moreover, independent of the geographical choice, central or federal-level analyses are preferred over the ones on the local level. Furthermore, spatial and temporal variations in social assistance programs (i.e., expansion/contraction vs. geographical distribution) have similar weights within the scope of political analyses. I will now examine the three sub-categories of political explanations—party politics, governmentality, and contentious politics.

2.5.2 Party Politics

Most of the publications in our dataset that investigate the political determinants/causes of social assistance programs focus on party politics (29 out of 54 publications). We identify four types of studies on the effect of party politics on social assistance: partisan politics, electoral politics, female political participation, and elite politics.

[11] Source: Authors' own calculations.

First, the publications that we analyzed considered partisan politics as the main trigger for political actors' decisions on the extent and generosity of social assistance programs. The effect of left-wing political ideology on the social assistance policy-making processes is widely examined (Pampel and Adams 1992; Wennemo 1992; Montanari 2000; Noy 2009; Carnes and Mares 2013; Borges 2018). In addition to the influence of the political left, other ideological positionings in different contexts are also studied, such as the relative power of liberal and conservative blocks (Wallerstein 1976; Skitka and Tetlock 1993; Pierson and Humpage 2016), and religion-based ideologies like Islamism, (Göçmen 2014) and Catholicism (Pampel et al. 1992; Wennemo 1992), leading to a diverging set of conclusions regarding the effect of ideology on social assistance programs.

Second, scholars examine the causal effect of electoral politics on social assistance programs, focusing on the level of competition among political parties, turnout rates and vote shares at the district or country levels, and individual voting behaviors (Carrell and Hauge 2009; Fried 2012; Hall 2012; Aytaç 2014; Lin 2017; Silvestre 2017). These scholars are generally interested in whether incumbent political parties provide social assistance to win upcoming elections by buying the votes of the supporters of the incumbent or the opposition parties. In this sense, electoral politics might be both reward and punishment for potential recipients, i.e., voters.

The third group under the banner of party politics concentrates on the effect of female political participation in formal decision-making for social assistance policies. These publications investigate the impact of female legislators or ministers (Ennser-Jedenastik 2017), the proportion of female parliamentarians (Özdamar 2017), or the effect of women's place in intra-party politics (Bianculli and Jordana 2013) on social assistance programs. The dependent variable of these studies—the programs that they explain—are usually the gendered aspects of social assistance programs, frequently focusing on family allowances and child benefits.

Finally, the fourth group scrutinizes the effects of elites in formal politics on social assistance policies, referred to as elite politics. These studies consider political elites as interest groups holding power within social policy-making, focusing on elite compromise (Coyle and Wildavsky 1987), elites' strategic decision-making (Solinger 2015), or pragmatic rent-seeking (DeLorme, Kamerschen, and Redman 1992).

2.5.3 Governmentality

Foucault (1991, p. 2) uses the term governmentality to refer to "the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security." Governmentality scholars of social assistance programs examine how these programs, as a form of biopolitics, create the effect of self-government and discipline, by shaping and limiting the poor people's subjectivities and dispositions. In this sense, these scholars are interested in the "how" questions, rather than "why": how subjects are crafted, how certain practices and desires are encouraged, and how self-government is ensured. For social assistance scholars, who take on a governmentality-centered analysis, social assistance aims to produce more governable, highly consuming, and modernized subjects (Zhaxi 2019). Policy-makers focus on the disciplinary inclusion of individuals in work-life, social space, and family life. It is also found that by governing the demographic structure and maintaining the political status quo, authorities make decisions on social assistance that would discriminate against certain groups, such as ethnic minorities (King 2001). Scholars also investigate how authorities target women as part of a governmental strategy to protect the normative family structure and to sustain traditional patriarchal roles (Daly 1994; Tabbush 2010; Falconer 2018; Jenson and Nagels 2018). For some scholars, a neoliberal logic is embedded in such programs that impose individualization, aiming to make market citizenship desirable for poor subjects from different cultural backgrounds. While a large number of studies on governmentality illustrate that the fundamental motivation is neoliberal political-economical governance (Luccisano 2004; Parker and Fopp 2004; Ferguson 2007; Ruckert 2010), social assistance is also considered a modernizing instrument of colonial settlers in their 'civilizing mission' of indigenous people (Burnett, Hay and Chambers 2015). Moreover, the instrument of governance might be the program itself or the conditionalities that come alongside it. The conditions required for people to benefit from the social assistance program can act as a reward or punishment instrument. Within local-level clientelist relationships, this mechanism serves for social control and regulation (Li and Walker 2018).

2.6 The Contentious Politics of Social Assistance

Contentious politics/social movements are the least studied determinant/cause of social assistance. Tarrow (2013, p. 1) defines contentious politics as "episodic, public,

collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when: (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims, and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants or objects of claims." Therefore, it represents the dynamic interplay between the actors of non-institutionalized politics and the power holders such as "elites, opponents and the state" (1996, p. 874).

There are two different approaches to explaining social assistance programs with contentious politics. First, scholars argue that social assistance provisions come from negotiations and bargaining between grassroots actors and decision-makers. In this setting, grassroots actors demand the initiation or expansion of a particular program or benefit, and governments deliver this program due to the pressures from below. Therefore, social assistance emerges as an achievement gained by the grassroots movement. In a sense, it is an intended consequence of a social movement. Misra (1998), for example, compares family allowance policies in France and the United Kingdom concerning the mobilization capacity and strength of the feminist movements and shows that women's demands are more likely to become family policies when there is a suitable ideological environment that values women as both mothers and workers. Investigating "clever tricks of the weak," Garmany (2017) explains how poor people negotiate program conditionalities to raise demands on the government.

Second, several other scholars show that governments use social assistance programs for the political containment of social unrest (Gutner 2002; Seekings 2007; Yörük 2012; Calvo and Moscovich 2017). Political containment refers to governmental efforts to absorb grassroots radicalism. In this scenario, grassroots groups struggle with demand or due to a grievance that is not related to social assistance but results from other economic, ideological, ethnic, or religious issues. Nevertheless, governments respond by initiating or expanding social assistance, although the movements did not make claims for it. Such policy responses occur because governments consider these social assistance programs as effective measures to ease the tension and pacify the movement. Therefore, social assistance appears to be an unintended consequence of the social movement: people receive a benefit while struggling for something else. In his individual-level quantitative analysis of the Turkish free healthcare program, Yörük (2012) revealed that social assistance is disproportionately directed to the Kurdish minority as part of a political strategy to contain the Kurdish unrest. Scholars also found that governments punish some grassroots groups by negatively discriminating against them in social assistance provisions to contain political activism—a negative political

containment. In Argentina, for example, Tabbush argues that "In an effort to weaken social movements and enhance the social outcomes of the national administration, community work and job training for women were cut down." (2010, p. 17). When considering contentious politics, therefore, the crucial step in understanding whether social assistance is an achievement of the movement or a tool for the containment of the movement is to look at the claims made by the movement. One can speak of achievement to the extent that the movement's claims and the government's social assistance response overlap; otherwise, it is more likely a containment strategy.

For social assistance literature, the analysis of 3267 publications on the programs that my colleagues and I reviewed indicates two trends: (i) descriptive accounts and impact analysis are much more prevalent than analytical studies that examine the causes/determinants of social assistance programs and (ii) within the latter, political (end especially contentious political) accounts are much less prevalent than structuralist, institutionalist and ideational accounts.

Figure 2.5 presents a literature tree that summarizes the share of each group. This illustrates that less than one percent of social assistance studies have considered contentious political dynamics. This finding hints at a gap in the literature, especially when it is compared to literature on the rise of the modern welfare state in the post-war period in which scholars paid serious attention to the effect of contentious politics. Naturally, the relative absence of contentious politics as an explanatory variable in and of itself does not necessarily constitute a scholarly gap. But the insights from the earlier literature on post-war welfare development indicate a well-grounded relationship between contentious politics and welfare policies. These scholars oriented toward political explanations of the post-war welfare state development illustrated that demographic and economic exigencies did not automatically lead to changes in welfare policies and that welfare policies did not simply follow the trajectory dictated by structural trends. Rather, socio-structural factors were translated into policies through political conflict and struggles, interest, and balance of power. A large number of scholars considered contentious politics as a central element, and they conceptualized the post-war welfare systems as part of a strategy to contain political disorder and mobilize popular support.

The structuralist approach, the most common explanatory approach, in contemporary social assistance scholarship focuses on economic or demographic factors to explain the

origins and transformations of these programs. I acknowledge that governments are concerned, enabled, and restricted by structural factors like the GDP, inequality, dependency ratios, and unemployment. However, the form, content, and trajectory of social assistance programs vary even under similar structural conditions and, hence, structural factors cannot dictate the form of social assistance automatically. Instead, structural factors are mediated by political dynamics like electoral competition, partisan ideology, neoliberal governance, social movements, and radical protests.

Within the domain of political factors, scholars overwhelmingly examine the impact of party politics. Formal political processes and institutional politics are indispensable to understanding social assistance programs, but they may be insufficient without considering the effect of contentious politics. Subsequent studies should examine how the interaction between party politics and contentious politics affects social assistance programs. This is because the form and extent of the effect of electoral politics on social assistance depend largely on the scope of contentious political dynamics that characterize a certain period or geography. Previous theoretical work suggests that this impact may be more than a simple linear addition of independent effects of both party politics and contentious politics (for example Garay 2016). This is because social unrest may function as a moderator that determines how party politics influences social assistance programs. Conversely, social unrest in times of electoral competition may create different incentive structures for incumbents to enact reform.

A similar problem exists in the governmentality approach to social assistance. A closer look at the contentious aspects of the disciplinary processes within the governmental logic of social assistance policymaking may reveal a more nuanced picture of how resistance to such disciplinary techniques emerges and how collective grassroots challenges shape the governmental logic behind such policymaking. This is particularly important because when it comes to contentious politics, the relationship between the demands of movements and social assistance outcomes takes two forms intended and unintended consequences. Social assistance is expanded/contracted and distributed in specific ways to pacify a grassroots movement that raises demands unrelated to social assistance, or the grassroots actors negotiate with the authorities by demanding and obtaining social assistance.

Figure 2.5: The tree of social assistance literature[12]

2.7 Theoretical Contribution

In examining contentious politics, it is vital to assess the movement's assertions in order to determine whether social assistance is viewed as an accomplishment or a mechanism for suppressing the movement. The extent to which the movement's demands align with the government's provision of social assistance can determine whether it is perceived as an achievement. Conversely, if there is a lack of alignment between the movement's claims and the government's response, it is more likely to be interpreted as a strategy of containment. While the former (negotiation) extremely resembles the scenario of "concession" in the contentious politics literature, the latter (political containment) corresponds to substitution. In other words, substitution as a governmental response to the social movement mobilization—that this research adds to the repression-concession dichotomy—is an excellent exercise of the traditional political containment thesis of Piven and Cloward (1971), which argues that the modern state employs welfare services to contain and control the racial or class-based unrest of the poor. The approach provides a significant conceptual basis for this research.

Therefore, the lack of scholarly interest in contentious politics in relation to determinants of social assistance is closely connected to the MP nexus analytical model and the substitution thesis proposed in this study on social movements. There exists a significant correlation between these gaps in the literature and the theoretical framework presented here.

[12] Source: Authors' own calculations.

The prevailing trend in social assistance studies has been to overlook the thesis that such programs are strategically employed to suppress and control social movements. Conversely, within the social movement literature, there has been a notable absence of discussion regarding this particular realm of government strategy. For this reason, this study introduces a novel domain for the substitution thesis by redefining the distinction between unintended and intended effects in the literature on the outcomes of social movements, specifically through an analysis of framing practices.

The dynamic conflict between the social movement and the government regarding the social assistance program is rooted in the notion that governments primarily employ these programs as a means to contain social unrest and as a substitution for the policies demanded by the movement. According to the MP nexus analytical model, the government refrains from fulfilling the actual demands put forth by the movement due to two reasons. Firstly, fulfilling these demands may undermine the interests of the elites with whom the government has alliances in most cases. Secondly, meeting the demands may further mobilize radical movements and pose a greater threat in the future. Consequently, as pinpointed by Piven and Cloward much earlier, governments opt to substitute the movement's demands with social assistance, addressing the material grievances that the movement struggles with while avoiding an interaction effect that could potentially mobilize the movement.

When social assistance programs are utilized in this manner by the governments, they can be perceived as unintended political outcomes for social movements. However, it is worth noting that political containment is not the sole means through which the impact of social mobilization on the programs occurs, as indicated by studies examining the influence of contentious politics on outreach. In some cases, social movements may actively demand these programs. Nonetheless, while this possibility exists in theory, it is unlikely to materialize in practice. Radical movements often view these programs as emblematic of neoliberal governance and critique them within their anti-systemic discourse. Consequently, radical movements typically do not advocate for the implementation of assistance programs. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that a certain level of continuity between substitution and concession exists, as certain movements may exhibit flexibility in their claims-making processes, and certain assistance programs may inherently allow greater scope for negotiation.

I will now present case-specific scholarship on the two social assistance programs and their associations with the two radical rural movements.

2.8 Social Assistance Programs in Brazil and India

2.8.1 Bolsa Familia

As part of the abovementioned global trend, Brazil has undergone social assistance expansion since the 2000s. The flagship Bolsa Família was established in 2003 and has expanded exponentially ever since, reaching 41.2 million people by 2015, corresponding to one-fifth of the Brazilian population (Global Welfare Dataset Version 2019). *The Economist* described Bolsa Família as an "anti-poverty scheme invented in Latin America" that "is winning converts worldwide" (The Economist 2008).[13]

The program operates at the federal level and is executed in partnership with state and municipal governments to ensure nationwide coverage. The official authorities declare that Bolsa Família targets low-income families, especially those living in poverty or extreme poverty, offering them financial support to meet their basic needs and improve their overall well-being.[14] One of the program's key design features is its focus on women's and children's empowerment. By providing monetary benefits directly to women, Bolsa Família is announced as aiming to enhance gender equity and decision-making within households, while conditional cash transfers promote better health and education outcomes for children. The design of Bolsa Família also involves a system of conditionalities, under which families must meet certain requirements, such as ensuring their children attend school regularly and receive necessary vaccinations and health check-ups. By linking these conditions to cash transfers, the program aims to encourage education and health-seeking behaviors, thereby breaking the cycle of intergenerational poverty and promoting human capital development.

However, a similar gap exists in the literature on Brazilian social assistance programs, particularly on Bolsa Família. While some of the social assistance studies are descriptive, not arguing for a causal relationship (Vyasulu 2010; Coutinho 2007; Barrientos 2013; Santos et al. 2015), the literature on the program, for the most part, focuses on its effects. Typically, a significant part of the literature on Bolsa Família's effects investigates how it alleviates

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[13] Successive Brazilian administrations have introduced four other social assistance programs since the 1990sthat have also expanded dramatically. They included a conditional cash transfer program for poor families with laboring children (started in 1999, with 866.000 beneficiaries per year), another demanding school attendance of children (started in 2001, with 5 million households), one means-tested but unconditional program providing $55 for individuals aged over 65 (started in 1993, with 0.7 million beneficiaries), and a cash transfer program giving $55 to informal rural workers aged over 55 (started in 1991, with 4.6 million beneficiaries). In addition, four million poor, elderly, and disabled people, unable to work and formally with no right to support for not having contributed to social security, were granted pensions under the Continuous Benefit Program (*Benefício de Prestação Continuada*, BPC) equivalent to one legal minimum wage (Barrientos and Holmes 2007).

[14] https://mds.gov.br/

poverty (Lloyd-Sherlock et al. 2012; Bither-Terry 2014; Pereira 2015; Bagolin 2017). Many papers evaluate the effectiveness of the program by examining its effects on healthcare (Rasella et al. 2013; Guanais 2015; Shei et al. 2014; Torrens et al. 2016; Durovni et al. 2018; Oliosi et al. 2019; Olson et al. 2019; Carter et al. 2019) and educational attainment (Glewwe and Kassouf 2012; Peruffo and Ferreira 2017; De Brauw et al. 2015). Other scholars analyze its effects on the labor market (Dourado et al. 2017; Warby 2018), nutritional quality (Martins and Monteiro 2016), crime rates (Chioda et al. 2016), and women's decision-making power within households (De Brauw et al. 2014; Arza 2017; Morton 2019).

In addition to the scholars who evaluate the impacts of the program in order to make policy recommendations and papers that describe the program, some analytical studies focus on the causal dynamics of Bolsa Família. However, the scholarship on the determinants of Bolsa Família primarily considers only structural factors and overlooks contentious political dynamics. Most of these studies think structural poverty, informatization, and rural-urban migration are the main drivers of the Bolsa Família program expansion (Das Neves et al. 2017; Sánchez-Ancochea & Mattei 2011; Velázquez Leyer 2018). Another group of scholars focuses on policy learning, emphasizing the diffusion of ideas and professional norms through international or intra-country policy exchange mechanisms (Sugiyama 2011; Velázquez Leyer 2018; Tomazini 2019).

A few studies on Bolsa Família focus on political factors, but they are mostly concerned with electoral competition, vote-buying, partisan politics, and democratization (Bohn 2011; Zucco 2008, 2013; Fried 2012; Pavao 2016; Silvestre 2017; Borges 2018; Frey 2019; Brooks 2015; Fenwick 2015; Sugiyama 2016; Badue and Ribeiro 2018). Scholars argue that the Bolsa Família program has led to large electoral support for the PT, especially for Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula), the leader of the PT and former president of Brazil (2003-2010), who used the program as a highly effective tool to garner support from the poor. Nevertheless, the discussion on political dynamics has not extended to contentious politics. No studies have examined (in a systematic and empirical manner) whether Bolsa Família has been used to contain social movements.

I have noted that the agrarian studies and social policy literature on Brazil lack systematic empirical (and quantitative) analyses of the relationship between the expansion of the Bolsa Família program, the stagnation of land reform in the PT era, and the decline of land invasions. Despite this gap, an amalgamation of academic and journalistic accounts supports the demobilization idea that has circulated in academic and political circles for some

time. According to this idea, Bolsa Família functions to demobilize rural unrest in both general and MST land invasions, so much so that the PT could avoid serious land reforms that could have alienated entrenched agribusiness interests from the PT. Based on his "conversations with peasant leaders," Fernandes (2009, p. 96) argues that by reducing "the potential power of organized movements," Bolsa Família helped the Lula administration avoid "expropriation of new lands for the creation of new agrarian reform settlements." Similarly, Vergara-Camus (2014, p. 250) argues that "by significantly expanding cash transfers to families living in extreme poverty," the policies of the PT government "have drastically reduced the number of people willing to join an MST encampment." Some of the MST activist interviewees of Lundström (2017, p. 55) suggest that the PT's welfare programs, like Bolsa Família, are "packages to the poor so they won't revolt."[15] It is the most perverse effect of the program" (Folha de São Paulo 2007). Finally, Tomás Balduino, ex-president of the CPT, argues that "social assistance is an easier solution, and it is a fact that Bolsa Família cooled down the struggle of the landless" (Folha de São Paulo 2007). However, some scholars have also noted that such claims are based on anecdotal evidence. For instance, Fernandes (2009, p. 96) noted that "although there are investigations into this matter, we do not yet have numerical results." Sauer and Mészáros (2017, p. 408) similarly remark that the existing literature has not been able "to account for the precise mechanics of this correlation."

2.8.2 The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act

The Indian national parliament legislated the NREGA in 2005 and implemented the program in 200 districts in 2006.[16] Soon after, it expanded across India, becoming the most extensive global workfare program. One hundred twenty-six million people worked under the program in 2021.[17] Unlike Bolsa Família, NREGA does not involve conditional cash transfers. Instead, it offers a legal guarantee of up to constant days of wage employment per year to adult members of rural households willing to engage in unskilled manual labor. It guarantees 100 days of employment in public works for the rural unemployed and provides an income higher or equal to the minimum wage. While Bolsa Família focuses on targeted conditional cash transfers with a specific emphasis on women's and children's welfare, NREGA guarantees wage employment opportunities for rural households. Therefore, the

[15] For further accounts of the demobilization idea, also see the investigations of Gilbert (2015, p. 76), Navarro (2010, p. 213), and Robles and Veltmeyer (2015, p. 135).
[16] https://nrega.nic.in/
[17] Ministry of Rural Development - MGNREGA Data Portal: https://nregarep2.nic.in/netnrega/dynamic2/dynamicreport_new4.aspx

program's declared objective is to address rural unemployment, create productive assets, and provide income support during times of economic distress in rural areas. NREGA operates at the district level in India and is a centrally sponsored scheme.

However, as well as the abovementioned global trend, previous research on the NREGA provision examines its effectiveness, to a large extent. Scholars often seek to answer question of how successful the program has been in improving wages and living standards (Muralidharan 2017; National Social Watch India 2011; Breitkreuz et al. 2018), to what extent the NREGA enhances household consumption (Bose 2017; Deininger and Liu 2013; Jha et al. 2011), and whether it empowers women (Datta and Singh 2012) and benefits the elderly and widows (Dutta et al. 2010). In addition, they analyze the accessibility and adequacy of the program (Ehmke 2016), its effects on inflation (Gaiha et al. 2010), and private employment (Imbert and Papp 2015).

On the other hand, the program's political dynamics have not received similar attention. Further, researchers investigating the politics of the NREGA frequently neglect to consider contentious politics (social movements or social unrest), often focusing instead on electoral dynamics (Gulzar and Pasquale 2017; Chowdhury 2014; Jenkins and Manor 2017). However, the electoral dynamics behind social policies in the Indian context are as complex as the design of social policies since decision-making acts as an interplay among local, state-level, and federal authorities (Mooij 2007; Tillin and Pereira 2017). In the case of the NREGA, the central government mainly provides funds, while the elected village councils (the *gram panchayats*) are responsible for its implementation and project proposals. On the other hand, state governments channel resources between the local and federal layers, paying the cost if the assignment of workers to the projects is delayed. In his recent analysis, Bargu (working paper) argues that the administrative arrangement provides an opportunity for governments at every tier to take credit for the program and strive to allocate it to advance their individual political interests. Although the program was first implemented by the Indian National Congress Party (INC) (and their political coalition, the United Progressive Alliance: UPA), all political blocks of India—running either state- or federal-level elections—developed various strategies to gain some credit from the program. Such strategies included changing the program's name or adding employees' faces to job cards (ibid.).

While contentious politics-based explanations of social welfare policies (particularly quantitative ones) are rare, many political scientists in conflict analysis examine contentious politics as a dependent variable and welfare provision as an independent variable. This

political science literature on the political economy of insurgency (most notably the so-called "welfare-terrorism nexus" scholarship) uses highly quantitative methods, especially for the Indian case. These researchers consider the NREGA an independent variable of interest and evaluate its effectiveness in downsizing the Naxalites (Dasgupta et al. 2017; Hoelscher et al. 2012; Fetzer 2014; Gawande et al. 2017). They argue that welfare programs can diminish incentives to commit to, support, or tolerate radicalism, as they reduce poverty, inequality, and socio-economic insecurity while at the same time undermining radical groups' imperfect substitute for economic security and equality. Hence, they are bringing about legitimacy for the welfare policies of governments (Albertus and Kaplan 2013; Adams 2014; Berman et al. 2011; Burgoon 2006; Krieger and Meierrieks 2011; Paxson 2002; Taydas and Peksen 2012; also see Berman and Matanock 2015 for a review of this literature). Indian counterpart of this global literature employs advanced econometric models on the causal inference to test this hypothesis, often using SATP (South Asian Terrorism Portal) data to detect violent events of the Naxalites. Fetzer (2014, p. 1) claims that the mechanism behind the demobilizing impact of the NREGA is based on its success in removing "the income dependence of insurgency violence." For Hoelscher et al. (2012), the NREGA increases the opportunity cost of engaging in violence for the rural poor. Dasgupta et al. (2017) find a sizeable long-run reduction in the number of violent events due to the NREGA, claiming that higher state capacity increases this effect. As an exception in the literature, Khanna and Zimmerman (2017) find a short-term escalation in violence after the introduction of the NREGA, arguing that civilians share more information with the police after the NREGA, thereby intensifying the conflict. Yet, they also claim that their findings are not inconsistent with decreased Naxalite mobilization in the long run. This literature, thus, seems to concur on the negative effect of the NREGA on Naxalite mobilization.

However, they contain two significant flaws. First, they disregard social movement dynamics and reduce the Naxalites' mobilization to a single violent terrorist group that uses untargeted violence, often referring to the most prominent faction, the CPI-Maoist, while ignoring others. Various factions of the movement seem to be very dynamic in creating close relationships with the poor and the youth, demanding new policies and revising collective action frames and political discourse (Shah 2013; 2019; Sundar 2016). Accordingly, in recent quantitative research on Naxalite mobilization, there has been a growing recognition that "armed groups strategically employ civil resistance alongside violent methods" (Krtsch, 2021, p. 1253). Scholars have argued that new studies should incorporate civil activism, such

as general strikes, to gain a more comprehensive understanding of Naxalite mobilization. However, second, it should be noted that even Krtsch's analysis does not fully consider the involvement of front organizations associated with Naxalite groups. The Naxalites have many front organizations responsible for both violent and non-violent acts in rural and urban areas of Indian districts. For this reason, I use a new database to identify Naxalite events, GLOCON (Global Contentious Political Events). According to GLOCON, a protest event is a collective public action by a non-governmental actor that involves expressing criticism or dissent and articulating societal or political demands. As described earlier, instead of considering only violent events, GLOCON looks for "strikes, rallies, boycotts, protests, riots, and demonstrations."

Like Bolsa Familia, analysis of the determinants of the NREGA as part of contentious politics in rural India constitutes a significant gap in the existing literature. A few studies consider the association of the program with the counter-insurgency efforts of the Indian government (Koyuncu, Yörük, and Gürel 2023; Jenkins and Manor 2017, p. 215). However, they do not provide empirical evidence or conceptualize the dynamic interaction between governmental strategy and mobilization. For the Indian case, Chatterjee (2008) applied the substitution thesis by analyzing the compensational efforts made by the Indian government. His study argues that welfare policies had served to rehabilitate land-based grievances, "offering only a token compensation." He claims that to reverse the effects of primitive accumulation, government agencies had to provide alternative means of livelihood for the dispossessed rural poor. Levien (2013, p. 379) also describes material compensation as the only option for decision-makers. This approach seems to fit my theoretical framework to a significant extent. However, a considerable gap in empirical evidence and a lack of an analytical model of substitution as part of mobilizational dynamics within contentious politics still exist.

2.9 Conclusion

To better understand the relationship between social movements and social assistance, this chapter addressed the gaps present in both areas of scholarly research. There is a theoretical gap in the understanding of government strategies towards social movements, as studies on social assistance programs often overlook the political dynamics involved, while research on social movements fails to fully explore the range of government responses beyond repression and concession. Previous studies on social welfare have discussed social movements more extensively, exemplified by the political containment thesis proposed by

Piven and Cloward. However, governments have developed strategies that go beyond repression and concession to manage social unrest, and these strategies, including the concept of substitution, are often not adequately examined.

The limitations in the social movement literature also extend to the exploration of unintended outcomes. Although there has been an increased interest in studying the cultural consequences of movements and unintended outcomes, the relationship between these effects and the political realm remains incomplete. This research aims to fill these gaps by introducing the concept of substitution as an unintended political outcome for social movements within the theoretical framework. Substitution refers to social assistance programs implemented by the government, which may be strategic moves for the government but unintended from the perspective of the movement. The dynamic nature of unintended political outcomes is emphasized, as they can transform into intended outcomes through framing practices.

The analytical model developed in this study, MP nexus, explores the continuum between substitution and concession from the government's perspective, as well as the reframing of policies by the movement. It highlights the importance of examining framing practices and cultural processes to determine the intentionality of political outcomes. I also presented my comprehensive systematic review of existing literature on the determinants and political determinants of social assistance programs, covering global studies as well as specific examples from India and Brazil, such as Bolsa Familia and the NREGA. By mapping the gaps in the social assistance literature, this chapter established a theoretical foundation for understanding unintended political outcomes and the substitution thesis within the context of social movements.

The existing scholarship on the mobilization and demobilization of social movements focuses on repression and concession as primary government responses and overlooks systematic government efforts to use un-demanded social policies in order to demobilize social movements, especially those raising radical redistribution demands like the MST and employing disruptive tools to prevent development-led-dispossessions like the Naxalites. This research contributes to bridging this important gap in political sociology. In addition, it provides a novel analytical model on the relationship between the claim-making in the social movement mobilization and the effectiveness of governmental responses to the mobilization. As the two flagships social assistance programs in Brazil and India, Bolsa Família and the NREGA are perhaps the most well-known programs in the world. Based on rigorous

quantitative analysis of the association of the programs with the land-based claims of the movements (land reform and preventing the SEZs) and the movements' mobilization, supplemented by qualitative evidence, I argue that social assistance is a shared substitution strategy of the Brazilian and Indian governments. And accordingly, the impact of these two programs on the movements' further mobilization depends on the claim-making practices of the movements.

Chapter 3: BRAZIL

This chapter presents an overview of the historical background that underpins the "demobilization by substitution" thesis in the Brazilian case, providing a comprehensive examination of the factors contributing to the phenomenon. It includes a detailed description of the data utilized in the empirical models, shedding light on the quantitative analysis undertaken to substantiate the findings. Within the context of Brazil, a country characterized by one of the largest unequal land distributions in the world, it becomes crucial to delve into the dynamics of the MST, the most salient social movement in rural Brazil. The MST, with its longstanding history, has consistently emerged as a grassroots force championing land reforms to address the plight of the landless poor.

Through an in-depth case study of Brazil, this chapter demonstrates that while concession as the implementation of land reforms often serves as a catalyst for further mobilization of the MST, substitution emerges as a distinct strategy leading to its demobilization. Substitution, referring to the employment of the Bolsa Familia program instead of meeting the main demand of the landless poor, aims to detach the MST from its base, or in other words, increases the distance of the movement from the landless poor. I designate the Brazilian case as a pertinent scenario illustrating the phenomenon of "demobilization by substitution." This designation prompts a deeper exploration of the unstable nature of concession's effects on mobilization, which may range from positive to negative or even null. Conversely, substitution emerges as an alternative and robust government strategy employed to contain social unrest, offering a viable approach for addressing the complex contentious political dynamics at hand.

3.1 Land Inequality in Brazil

Social and political turmoil in Brazilian history has been fueled by unequal land distribution, which has been prevalent since colonial times. Land reform has been a vital component of the country's political discourse since the inception of the Communist Party of Brazil (PCB) in 1922. The party's efforts to promote land reform gained momentum in the 1930s (Fernandes et al. 2012, p. 31-32). The federal government, especially during the Vargas regime between 1937 and 1945, implemented a series of agrarian reforms aimed at empowering small-scale farmers, limiting the power of landowners, increasing land productivity by settling small farmers on previously underutilized large estates, and curbing the communist threat in rural areas. The Vargas regime established corporatist rural

associations and unions for small peasants and landlords and monitored land use by reallocating underutilized land to small farmers. Despite these efforts, communist rural activism surged in the 1950s and early 1960s, resulting in the founding of the Farmers and Agricultural Workers Union of Brazil in 1954 and a network of Peasant Leagues demanding land reform from 1959 onwards.

This bottom-up pressure was instrumental in the legislation of the Rural Worker Statute in June 1963, which led to the establishment of the National Confederation of Workers in Agriculture (CONTAG) in December 1963. CONTAG became the representative of peasant interests within the country's corporatist structure, with progressive factions of the Catholic Church and PCB playing prominent roles (Fernandes et al. 2012, p. 32-33). On April 13, 1964, the democratically elected president João Goulart announced a new agrarian reform plan, which was met with resistance from big landowners. Eighteen days later, Goulart was overthrown by a military coup (Oliveira 2016, p. 352). Brazil's land distribution problem persists as evidenced by the fact that family farms, despite comprising 84.4% of agricultural establishments and employing 74% of the agricultural workforce, occupy only 24% of total farmland, while agribusinesses, which constitute 15.6% of agricultural establishments and employ 26% of the agricultural workforce, use 76% of farmland (Fernandes et al. 2012, p. 11). [18]

During the military dictatorship in Brazil between 1964 and 1985, the government adopted a “carrot and stick” strategy toward the peasantry. The regime swiftly suppressed communists who organized peasant guerillas in Araguaia in central Brazil in the late 1960s, progressive segments of the Catholic Church, and Peasant Leagues associated with these forces. This suppression of rural radicalism created political stability in the countryside, which facilitated the implementation of the green revolution that favored agribusiness interests. However, the regime sustained the National Confederation of Workers in Agriculture (CONTAG) as an organization to address some of the agrarian reform demands selectively. To this end, the Land Statute was enacted in November 1964 at the onset of the military regime, with the alleged purpose of promoting improved land distribution through modification of land tenure systems in light of principles of social justice and enhanced productivity (Fernandes et al. 2012, p. 21). Additionally, the military regime launched the

[18] Law No. 11326 that was passed in 2006 defines a family farm as a farm that depends primarily on family labor and can support the livelihood of five people. The size for a family farm is not fixed at the national level and varies in each municipality. The 2006 census classified agricultural establishments as family and agribusiness farms for the first time in Brazilian history (Fernandes et al. 2012, p. 37).

Rural Extension and Technical Assistance Program (PRORURAL) in 1971, which included the Rural Assistance Fund (FUNRURAL) providing medical services, old-age pensions, and funeral aid to peasants and farmworkers. The number of union members associated with CONTAG who were entitled to these welfare benefits increased from one million in 1971 to six million in 1978, marking the first significant expansion of welfare provision to the Brazilian countryside (Malloy 1977, p. 201). As a result, the rural support base of the military regime remained stable in the 1960s and early 1970s (Fernandes et al. 2012, p. 33).

3.2 The Landless Workers' Movement and Land Invasions

The military regime in Brazil began to unravel in the late 1970s, coinciding with the end of the economic boom. This period saw the emergence of opposition forces, including previously suppressed groups and new movements. In 1975, the more radical factions of the Catholic Church founded the CPT, while opposition from within CONTAG demanded land reform and a return to democracy. The Unified Workers Central (CUT) was established in 1983 and created a national department to organize peasants and farmworkers. However, the most significant development during this period was the establishment of the MST in 1984 by individuals from diverse political backgrounds, including the CPT and numerous left-wing groups. The PT, Brazil's most influential leftist party since its founding in 1980 by various social movements and leftist organizations led by former auto union leader Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, became a strong ally of the MST (Fernandes et al. 2012, p. 33).

Since gaining momentum, the MST has utilized direct action tactics to achieve its land reform goals. By invoking principles of social justice and Brazilian laws that enable the distribution of underutilized tracts of land to those hoping to farm it, the MST mobilizes landless people to occupy land registered under large landowners but left underdeveloped. An essential tenet of the MST is encouraging anyone seeking to make a living through agriculture to join the movement, regardless of where they reside. Hence, the movement appeals to both rural and urban poor people. Whereas most landless families involved in land occupations in the 1980s originally came from rural areas, the proportion of urban residents in invading communities substantially increased during the 2000s, constituting over half of the population in some encampments according to research by Fernandes and Welch (2008, p. 11).

The process of successful land invasions in Brazil, which involve resisting security forces and landlord-sponsored armed groups, typically involves two main stages. The first stage involves establishing encampments, while the second stage involves registering these

areas as settlements with the local administration. However, only the most organized and sustained land invasions are able to pass through these stages, which usually take several years of intense struggle (Kim 2008, p. 27). After a property is occupied and an encampment set up, the Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) categorizes it as an "area in conflict" to assess its level of productivity.[19] If INCRA officials find the property unproductive, they submit a report to the federal government capital in Brasilia, which has the final authority to expropriate the land (Rangel 2010, p. 286).

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, land invasion became a form of poor people's movement organized by various organizations, including farmworker unions affiliated with the left-wing CUT and even the corporatist-conservative CONTAG (Vergara-Camus 2014, p. 236). The number of reported land invasions increased significantly during this period, from 454 between 1990-1994 to 3,845 between 1995-2002 (Robles 2018, p. 13). As shown in Figure 3.1, land invasions peaked in the mid-2000s. Between 1995 and 1999, the Brazilian government formally approved the settlement of 299,323 families in 2,750 land reform settlements. Of the settled families, 85% (256,467 families) had previously carried out 1,853 land invasions. Thus, land invasion appears to be the driving force behind the land reforms, which are essentially the formal titling of the encampments established by land-invading people (Fernandes 2005, p. 334).

The MST, under its growing influence in the late 1980s and early 1990s, not only engaged in the land invasion but also built a broad network of grassroots organizations in education, healthcare, and media, involving many urban and rural activists. Consequently, the MST became one of the most vital leftist organizations in Brazilian history (Tarlau 2019; Wolford 2003). Furthermore, the MST became one of the social movement pillars of the PT, which finally managed to get Lula elected to the presidency in 2003. Although Lula's PT deradicalized in the 1990s to comply with the interests of Brazilian elites, the close cooperation between the two organizations raised expectations for comprehensive land reform. However, these expectations failed to materialize.

3.3 Under the Rule of Labor Party (PT)

The PT government, like those before it, gave priority to agribusiness interests, despite being closely tied to the MST (Petras 2008, p. 491-3; Robles and Veltmeyer 2015).

[19] The settlers have three basic options in terms of land tenure that include "1) family possession under a 'use concession title' granted by the state; 2) family ownership through a private property title; 3) collective ownership through a collective cooperative' organized in the form of a kibbutz" (Vergara-Camus 2014, p. 172).

This was due to the PT's transformation from a leftist party to a center-left party advocating a developmental and inclusive version of neoliberalism (Saad-Filho 2020, p. 16-21). By the early 2000s, the PT had formed an alliance that included industrial workers, informal workers, national capitalists, right-wing oligarchs, landowners, and local politicians from poor regions of Brazil, all of whom were unhappy with the Cardoso era's prolonged economic stagnation and the increasing power of transnational corporations (Morais and Saad-Filho 2003, p. 7). Lula continued this alliance during his presidency (Morais and Saad-Filho 2011, p. 37).

Furthermore, the PT coalition with other parties, such as the pro-agribusiness Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) and the Progressive Party (PP), influenced its mainstream direction. More than 60% of the coalition's deputies were associated with the Parliamentary Front for Agriculture, a pro-agribusiness legislative bloc (Bruera 2013, p. 159), limiting Lula's options for land reform. The appointment of Roberto Rodrigues, a former president of the Brazilian Agribusiness Association, as the Minister of Agriculture between 2003 and 2006 confirmed the PT government's stance on land reform. According to Wolford (2016, p. 36), coalition politics hindered the PT government under Lula from implementing land reform in a concise manner.

> "I was interviewing a top official in the Ministry of Agrarian Development, and I asked him why Lula had not lifted the provisional decree (medida provisoria, MP) put in place by Cardoso to prohibit any property occupied by squatters from being evaluated for the purposes of agrarian reform for two years after the occupation. Social movement activists had demanded that Lula overturn this decree when he took office in 2003. The official suggested that Lula did not withdraw the MP because if he had, the conservative rural block in Congress (the bancada rural) would have attacked him, so he left it in place but let everyone know that it was no longer necessary to enforce it. INCRA's lawyers would clearly disagree that the law is so malleable. The end result that 'anything goes [for the rural elite], but [for the poor] a strict interpretation of the law' arguably puts agrarian reform and the landless at a considerable disadvantage."

Figure 3.1: Land Invasions[20]

[20] Spatial distribution of land invasions in Brazil, 1988 to 2013. Data on land invasions are from the CPT.

As a result, land reform slowed during the PT era and the number of established agrarian reform settlements fell from 4,310 between 1995-2002 to 3,976 between 2003-2013 (Robles 2018, p. 19), and large landowners continued to dominate land distribution patterns, with the proportion of large properties in total rural property areas increasing from 51.6% in 2003 to 56.1% in 2010 (Andrade 2019, p. 17).[21]

As described earlier, the current body of literature on agrarian studies in Brazil lacks comprehensive empirical investigation into the interplay between the expansion of the Bolsa Família program, the stalling of land reform during the PT era, and the decrease in land invasions. However, numerous academic and journalistic sources support the demobilization theory associated with Bolsa Família. This hypothesis suggests that the program acts to quell rural unrest and land invasions, enabling the PT to avoid implementing substantial land reforms that might challenge influential agribusiness interests. Scholars argue that Bolsa Família weakens the potential influence of organized movements and reduces the willingness of individuals to participate in land occupation movements led by organizations like MST.

The following analysis aims to fill this gap by providing a detailed examination of the demobilizing impact of Bolsa Família. I argue that the PT government strategically used the program to contain the MST-led landless movement. By delivering more assistance in municipalities with a higher incidence of land invasions, the government aimed to prevent further invasions by those who had already occupied land. I demonstrate that while land reform efforts triggered more invasions, the provision of Bolsa Família reduced the likelihood of future invasions between 2004 and 2013. In essence, the PT government demobilized the landless movement by substituting land reform with social assistance.

3.4 Data

The analysis includes three key variables as two of which are the governmental responses (Bolsa Familia, and land reforms) and the last one is the number of land invasions. The first key variable is based on the total number of families in each municipality covered by the Bolsa Família program.[22] I downloaded the data of the number of Bolsa Familia beneficiary families from the website of the Ministry of Social Development of Brazil. In order to ensure the accuracy of measures, the data are cross-checked with another governmental source: IPEADATA (online data office of the Institute for Applied Economic

[21] The DATALUTA database does not have records for the period between 1985 and 1987.

[22] In addition to coverage, I also utilize the total nominal value of the cash transfers in U.S. dollars in robustness check models (both in December of each year). Although they are extremely correlated, I present key results also for the expenditure variable in Appendix A, Table A.2, in order to show the robustness of the impact.

Research). To eliminate the impact of populational variation, the Bolsa Familia variable is used as their proportion of overpopulation.[23] Therefore, the main Bolsa Familia variable is the number of beneficiary households per individual citizen.

The second key variable is the number of land reforms. These variables respectively correspond with concession in the count format. The final and third key variable in this research is the land invasions, which I use as a cumulative count since 1988 (total land invasions). Each data point shows the number of land invasions that occurred in the selected municipality between 1988 and each year. I used the count version for each year and the number of families who participated (families in invasions, also available in the dataset) for robustness checks. The two key variables (the land reform and land invasion variables) are taken from the replication data provided by Albertus et al. (2018), who analyzed the DATALUTA database (Girardi 2014) maintained by the CPT (2014). While the data on land reform is from INCRA (2011), which is attached to the Ministry of Agrarian Development, INCRA also collects its data on rural assassinations from the CPT.

The first-order spatial lag of the land invasions (weighted number of land invasions in neighboring municipalities) is added to the Bolsa Família models in order to account for the spatial correlation and control for spillover effects. As Figure 3.1 shows, the diffusion of land invasions seems highly dependent on previous land invasions in municipalities and neighboring invasions. This leads us to assume that the central government would more likely take the historical tendency of municipalities to host land invasions into consideration than the number of land invasions occurring in the previous year. Hence, I preferred the cumulative version of land invasion data, which provides much more variation across municipalities, compared to the non-cumulative invasion count.

To effectively control the Bolsa Família models, I used common predictors of social assistance ranging from developmental to political factors. To control for poverty and healthcare, I included income per capita and infant mortality as proxies because there is no direct measure of poverty at the municipal level. The data on income per capita was taken from the replication data of Albertus et al. (2018), “measured in thousands of constant log 2000 Reais” and originating from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE 2014). The data on infant mortality was obtained by the number of child deaths (0-4 years)

[23] The population variable is also taken from the IPEADATA for all available years and imputed as the means of the year before and the year after in case of missing data points between 2007 and 2010, which are the census years.

and number of live births in each municipality. These numbers are based on the Mortality Tables of the Ministry of Health and calculated as number of child deaths per 1,000 live births (DATASUS 2019). Assuming its strong association with the economic well-being of rural municipalities with the higher potentiality of land invasions, I also control for agricultural productivity, taken from the same replication data and representing "agricultural production in millions of constant log 2000 Reais from IBGE (2014)." To control for the possibility of electoral dynamics behind Bolsa Família, I included vote shares of the PT provided by another replication dataset (Zucco 2013).

I incorporated three additional control variables (taken from the IPEADATA) that represent state capacity; these include institutional development, the human development index (HDI), and tax revenues. However, these are not included in the main Bolsa Família models, as the data were unavailable for half of the specified time range. Nevertheless, because they are also efficient proxies for the regional capacity of the federal government and social development, I include them in further models as robustness checks. Tax revenue data show the federal government's (per capita) tax revenues from municipalities. The HDI is a widely used measure for the social and economic well-being of individuals in a region. Institutional development data was taken from the FIRJAN Municipal Development Index (*Índice FIRJAN de Desenvolvimento Municipal*, IFDM) and refers to the health, employment, and educational facilities in each municipality. Note that education (schooling) and healthcare (vaccination) correspond to two conditionalities of Bolsa Família.

For the other government strategies models investigating the impact of land invasions on the other two governmental responses (land reform and assassinations) and the demobilization models regressing land invasions on the three governmental strategies, I incorporated a few more control variables, also taken from the replication data of Albertus et al. (2018), IPEADATA and IBGE. While the land inequality variable stands for the landholding Gini, the rural percent shows the percentage of the rural population in municipalities, both originally coming from the IBGE. Land inequality is an interpolated variable by two available years (1995 and 2006). Another variable used as a binary measure displays whether the landowners had a political connection with a member of parliament (political connection). Further, since municipalities with very different geographical characteristics are being compared in analytical models, I also consider population density. I divided the population by the surface area of municipalities, which is extracted via the shapefiles, shared by IBGE. The variables of land inequality, rural population percent, and

population density are controlled also in the Bolsa Familia models, in order to capture municipal-level differences.

The descriptive statistics for all variables for relevant time ranges are presented in Table 1. I used logarithmic or proportional measures for the numeric variables, except for the count variables and when the measure is already an index (HDI, institutional development, and land inequality). If there was a widely employed denominator for the relevant factor (such as infant mortality and the vote share of PT), I used the proportional version. If this was not the case, I used the logarithmic version of the variable. However, for the two variables (agricultural productivity and income per capita), I preferred the original versions found in the replication data of Albertus et al. (2018) that are operationalized as the logarithm, although they are already proportional due to their skewed distributions. To maintain consistency, I used the logarithm of the proportional measure for the tax revenues, since the proportional version is even right-skewed like the other two variables. Further, the two key variables of the analysis (land invasions, and land reforms) were originally in the count format. However, I used the logarithm of the land invasion variable in the government strategies models, since these phenomena were naturally rare, meaning that even a single change in the count is essential. To avoid hard-to-read coefficients, I standardized all variables except for the count variables and the weighted spatial lags.

Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics (Brazil)

Variable list	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Bolsa Familia	61,182	-0.0269	0.9627	-1.6821	10.3168
land invasions	55,680	0.0773	0.5095	0	22
land reforms	55,680	0.0656	0.4578	0	22
log(total land invasions)	55,680	0.4032	0.7541	0	5.1648
log(income)	60,615	5.8851	0.5176	4.2130	7.6287
rural percent	60,613	-0.2614	0.8974	-1.7433	2.1546
population density	61,231	-0.0004	0.9989	-0.1883	22.7429
land inequality	60,250	0.0613	0.9510	-5.1388	2.0756
Infant mortality	61,189	-0.0502	0.0737	-0.1344	1.8244
log(agricultural productivity)	61,096	0.2269	0.7409	-2.7757	3.1006
PT vote share	55,631	0.1693	1.0382	-1.0862	6.7191
uncultivated private lands	61,556	-0.0128	0.8886	-2.7648	16.5217

Data in the table is limited to a time range between 2004 and 2014. The difference in the number of observations stems from the unavailability of the data for some variables in 2014. The specific time range of each model is described in the relevant tables. All variables in the table are standardized except for the three key variables which are count-based.

3.5 Empirical Models

In response to the nonrandom selection risk here, the instrumental variable approach reveals an unbiased causal effect of land invasions on Bolsa Família. An exogenous and relevant instrumental variable must firmly predict the MST's land invasions while assumed orthogonal to Bolsa Família's unobserved determinants. Land invasions in rural Brazil are widely assumed to be a reaction to high levels of land inequality and are dependent on the MST's organizational capacity. To dissociate organizational capacity from economic factors and rule out the latter's impact on the sample selection, I derived the instrumental variable from a very movement-specific dynamic. Hence, I utilize the MST's strategic intent. Since the early years of its struggle, the MST has effectively justified land invasions by referring to the 1964 Brazilian land law that states that "private property can be confiscated when it is not cultivated or where there are conflicts between the owner and workers or environmental damage" (Martins 2000, p. 37). Therefore, extracting the exclusion restriction criteria from the 1964 land law and the MST's strategic intent, I employ the size of private agricultural lands and land-in-use (in hectares), provided by the IPEADATA. However, since there is no directly available data on uncultivated private lands, I subtract the size of lands-in-use from the size of private property lands in order to calculate the size of uncultivated lands. Further, the data is available only for 1995, 2006, and 2017. Data in the rest of these years are fulfilled by a linear imputation. The measure then becomes a function of private agricultural lands (positively) and lands-in-use (negatively). As a result, the instrumental variable (the total amount of available lands for land invasions) represents the MST's capability of justifying its mobilization and the lands demanded on behalf of the landless peasants—in other words, its strategic intent.

Further, I provide two additional pieces of support for the exclusion restriction. First, I provide a ten-year time lag between the outcome of interest and the instrumental variable eases their unrelatedness, considering that Bolsa Família was first introduced much later than the uncultivated private lands' association with land invasions. For the Bolsa Familia analysis between 2004 to 2014, I use the uncultivated private lands from 1994 to 2004. Second, to prove that the amount of uncultivated private lands in municipalities is independent of the provisions even without the time lag, I offer evidence for a hypothetical scenario. If Bolsa Família were available for the rural poor in the 1990s, income level, and agricultural productivity would be two risk factors that might have induced an association between Bolsa Família and the instrumental variable. The presence of uncultivated private lands could

present the risk of bringing lower income per capita and lower agricultural productivity, which may have led to an increase in the number of Bolsa Família provisions. Therefore, I tested this potential association for 1995, the first year with the actual available data on uncultivated private lands, and found that the size of uncultivated private lands' distributions on the income per capita and agricultural productivity measures are approximately normal (see two scatterplots in Appendix A). Uncultivated private lands have triggered land invasions but are not associated with Bolsa Família except through being part of the MST's political strategy.

Brazilian land invasions take place over very large rural areas, which sometimes exceed the borders of municipalities. The borders are often created to separate urban centers, while rural areas are continuous over fairly long distances without any interruption. Municipality borders do not matter also for the landownership in rural Brazil and a single landowner can hold huge areas belonging to multiple municipalities. These raise serious doubts about the correlation of errors across Brazilian municipalities in the analytical models, especially for the neighboring ones. Since controlling fixed effects require uncorrelatedness of errors across units, I do not control municipal-fixed effects in the baseline, as in line with Albertus et al. (2018). Instead, I employ state-fixed effects to control for state-idiosyncratic (time-invariant) factors.[24] Further, analytical models follow two different econometric structures. While the Bolsa Familia models examine the IV-2SLS approach, models regressing land reforms, and land invasions, meaning all other analytical models in for the Brazilian case testing the rest of hypotheses, depend on zero-inflated poisson regression with count-based outcome variables.

For the Bolsa Familia models, the first and second stages of the IV-2SLS models are presented below (Equations 3.1 and 3.2). The model first regresses endogenous land invasions on the control variables and exogenous instrumental variable in the first stage. Then in the second stage, the model uses the estimated errors to regress Bolsa Familia provisions on the same control variables and these predicted value of land invasions, which is produced in the first stage.

First stage: $log(X^1_{i,t-1}) = \pi^0 + \pi^1 Z_{i,t-10} + \sum_{j=2}^{n} \pi^j X^j_{i,t-1} + \eta_k + t + t^2 + t^3 + \upsilon_{i,t}$ (3. 1)

Second stage: $Y_{i,t} = \beta^0 + \beta^1 \widehat{log(X^1_{i,t-1})} + \sum_{j=2}^{n} \beta^j X^j_{i,t-1} + \eta_k + t + t^2 + t^3 + u_{i,t}$ (3. 2)

[24] Nevertheless I checked robustness of my major finding in the Bolsa Familia models at different levels of fixed effects, please see Appendix A, Table A.1.

$Y_{i,t}$ is Bolsa Família in a given ith municipality and tth year. $log(X^1_{i,t-1})$ is the number of total (cumulative) land invasions in a given ith municipality and t-1th year, while $log(\widehat{X^1_{i,t-1}})$ stands for the predicted values of the first-stage regression. $X^j_{i,t-1}$'s are n-1 number control variables (from second to nth) for a given ith municipality and t-1th year, and $Z_{i,t-10}$ is the instrumental variable: the size of uncultivated private lands (hectare) in a given ith municipality and t-10th year. Further, β_1 is the causal effect of land invasions on Bolsa Familia and π_1 is the effect of the instrumental variable on land invasions. π^j and β^j 's are regression coefficients of the jth control variable, π^0 and β^0 are the constants and $\upsilon_{i,t}$ and $u_{i,t}$ are the error terms of the first and second stages of 2SLS, respectively, where η_k is year-invariant, state-specific factors, and t, t^2, and t^3 parameters control for the non-linear time trend in the model. Although I prioritize controlling for the non-linear time trend and state-fixed effects separately, I also test for the interaction of state-fixed effects and year dummies, so as to make sure that the models could handle the linear addition of the two-way fixed effects (Bai 2009).[25]

Further, a possible asymmetric distribution of Bolsa Familia provisions to different geographical units brings out a spatial autocorrelation risk, while social policy implementations in a broader sense usually depend on some other unobservable static factors in municipalities—such as previous institutionalization or local casework' bureaucratic capacity—and this may induce a stationarity problem in the analytical models. For this reason, some of the models control for temporal and spatial dependence in the data as dynamic spatial Durbin models employing one-year temporal and first-order spatial lags of Bolsa Familia, in addition to the first-order spatial lag of the land invasion variable.[26] I do not control any fixed effects in these models since then coefficients would be downward biased, which is traditionally called Nickell bias (Nickell 1981).[27] Yet the Durbin terms in these models provide an important compensation for the lack of cross-sectional fixed effects.

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[25] The results for the Bolsa Família models are obtained by using the "ivreghdfe" command in STATA, which is developed for instrumental variable analyses with high dimensional fixed effects. It also gives the results for identification tests. Year and state-fixed effects are controlled (if they are) with the "absorb" option of the command.

[26] Econometrics scholarship that investigates temporal and spatial autocorrelation together often agreed on the relative efficiency of the dynamic spatial Durbin models that cover the spatial lag of the outcome variable and the spatial lags of the explanatory variables in addition to the temporal lag of the outcome variable (LaSage and Pace 2009, Elhorst 2012, Lee and Yu 2016). For a more detailed explanation for the choices on spatial and temporal lags, please see Appendix A.2.

[27] However, I also run these models with state-fixed effects, presented as a robustness check in the Appendix A.

Second, the other two key factors (land invasions and land reforms) are very rare phenomena and hence these variables contain excessive amounts of zeros. For the variables of invasions, reforms, and assassinations, 95.5, and 96 percent of data points are zero between 2003 and 2014. In order to tackle this unbalanced distribution of data, the zero-inflated poisson model employs two nested analyses. The logistic component of the model predicts excess zeros in the data, while the poisson model predicts a full range of counts (Lambert 1992; Hilbe 2014). This way the zero-inflated model prevents the high number of zeros in the data and manipulates the regressors' coefficients. In the poisson component of the models, the same (state) level fixed effects and nonlinear time trends (with quadratic and cubic parameters) as the Bolsa Familia models are controlled. In the logistic component, I consider a few more structural determinants of the phenomena (e.g. the temporal lag of the outcome variable), to dissociate them from the impact of interested regressors. The variables on the right-hand sides of all models of the research are included with a one-year lag.[28]

3.6 Results

3.6.1 Results for the Bolsa Familia Models

Table 3.2 shows results for the Bolsa Familia models from 2003 to 2014. While the first five models test the first hypothesis, the remaining two examine the second and third hypotheses respectively. The Bolsa Familia models follow different specifications from Model 1 to Model 5. While Model 1 presents a baseline, Model 2 replaces nonlinear time trends with year dummies, and further controls for their interaction with state-fixed effects. Model 3 and Model 5 focus on dealing with the spatial and temporal autocorrelation. The former controls for the temporally lagged Bolsa Familia, while the latter regresses the first-differenced outcome variable, and both include the weighted Bolsa Familia measure in neighboring municipalities as a spatial lag. These models, except for Model 4, share the similar econometric frame as IV-2SLS. Model 4, however, tests findings' robustness without using instrumental variable, controlling for both temporal and spatial lags of the outcome variable. Accordingly, Model 3 and Model 4 perform as dynamic spatial Durbin models[29] with and without the instrument.

As seen in Table 3.2, total land invasions consistently have a positive effect on all models (from 1 to 5). The size of the coefficient is 0.113 (with a highly significant p-value, at

[28] All results for zero-inflated poisson models in the research are obtained by "zip" command in Stata. Predictors of the excess zeros in logistic component of the models are selected according to the outcome variable.

[29] The Dynamic spatial Durbin model includes the spatiotemporal and temporal lags of the dependent variable and spatiotemporal lag of the independent variable of interest.

0.01 significance level) in the first model, the magnitude slightly changes from model to model, and the level of significance remains the same through the fifth model. Therefore, one percent increase in the total number of land invasions approximately leads to 0.1 standard deviation increase in the Bolsa Familia variable. Among proxy variables of poverty, although the impact of infant mortality is found insignificant, income per capita and agricultural productivity continuously have negative and statistically significant coefficients. Unsurprisingly, the negative coefficients confirm the common expectation that social assistance targets municipalities containing more poor people. However, the coefficients of the PT's vote share and population density are inconsistent during the models in Table 3.2. Party alignment between municipal and central governments decreases the possibility of having more beneficiary ratios of social assistance in four models and increases in one, which challenge the findings of major studies that explain the expansion of Bolsa Família with respect to electoral competition (Zucco 2008; 2013).

Therefore, the first hypothesis is valid for alternative model specifications. However, I also replicated these analyses with four alternative conditions. I used an alternative outcome variable (measuring the expenditure per capita), investigated the impact of two different land invasion variables (a non-cumulative version invasion variable and the number of families participated in the invasions), controlled for additional variables, and for different levels of cross-sectional fixed effects (see Part A for details). The results of the first stage regressions and post-estimations tests for the IV-2SLS models support the empirical findings' reliability (see Part B for details).

The effective implementation of welfare programs and targeted strategies for social movements requires a strong state capacity to collect mobilization data and allocate resources appropriately. In the case of Brazil, institutions such as INCRA, the Police Division of Agrarian Conflicts, and DATALUTA gather micro-level data on land invasions, providing the government with detailed information to address rural unrest. This access to granular data enables the Brazilian government to implement welfare programs in a way that contains social unrest.

Table 3.2: Bolsa Familia Models

Outcome:	Bolsa Familia				First-differenced BF
	1	2	3	4	5
log (total land invasions$_{t-1}$)	0.113***	0.109***	0.051***	0.010***	0.263***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.025)
log (income$_{t-1}$)	-0.918***	-0.962***	-0.275***	-0.267***	-0.764***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.017)
population density$_{t-1}$	-0.030***	-0.022***	0.007***	0.006***	0.036***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)
rural percent$_{t-1}$	0.037***	0.026***	0.002	0.001	-0.024***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)
land inequality$_{t-1}$	-0.003	0.004	-0.004**	0.002*	-0.018***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.006)
infant mortality$_{t-1}$	-0.035	0.044	-0.001	0.008	0.011
	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.062)
log (agricultural productivity$_{t-1}$)	-0.106***	-0.100***	-0.017***	-0.016***	-0.038***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.007)
PT vote share$_{t-1}$	0.021***	-0.008*	-0.006***	-0.004***	-0.026***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
log (land invasions in neighbors$_{t-1}$)	-0.054***	-0.043***	-0.035***	-0.006	-0.193***
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.026)
Bolsa Familia$_{t-1}$			0.798***	0.797***	
			(0.006)	(0.006)	
Bolsa Familia in neighbors$_{t-1}$			0.001***	0.001***	-0.006***
			(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time range	2003-2014	2003-2014	2004-2014	2004-2014	2004-2014
Instrumental variable	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Zero-inflated poisson	No	No	No	No	No
Nonlinear time trends	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Year dummies and year-state interactions	No	Yes	No	No	No
Constant			0.763***	0.763***	3.957***
			(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.055)
Observations	59,693	59,693	54,269	54,269	54,269

The outcome variable for the models is the number of Bolsa Familia beneficiary families per 1,000 people. Results for the four models are derived by instrumental variable analysis (IV-2SLS). Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). State-fixed effects and relevant time trends are presented in the table. Nonlinear time trends are controlled with both quadratic and cubic terms. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Time lags and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Researchers argue that Bolsa Familia program had a temporary nature (Eiró 2019). Eligibility for program benefits must be reviewed every two years, and the federal government has the final decision in determining the number of quotas distributed to municipalities based on an estimate of the number of poor families. This introduces discretion at two levels: municipal caseworkers have the freedom to select who qualifies for benefits, often without clear criteria, and the federal government can prioritize towns based on the occurrence of land invasions, adjusting the number of welfare offices, funding, and qualifying requirements. The quantity and location of welfare offices, known as CRAS, play a significant role in determining the accessibility and distribution of benefits, directly

affecting disadvantaged individuals' ability to access the program. The further details of the mechanism of targeting will be presented in the fifth chapter.

3.6.2 Results for the Substitution and Land Invasion Models: Demobilization by Substitution

I utilized a combination of quantitative and qualitative data from Brazil and illustrated the existence of "demobilization by substitution" as a new governmental strategy. The demobilization section explains how Bolsa Família demobilized rural unrest, while land reform led to further mobilization. I analyze the major explanatory factors of mobilization in land invasions and compare the (de)mobilizing effects of concession and substitution. However, mobilizations are not independent events and cannot be analyzed outside of their spatial and temporal contexts (Koopmans 2004). As single events are never isolated cases, contention itself is highly unequally distributed across time and space. Movement activism often exists as a function of mobilization in past, and in neigboring places. If the government does not respond to mobilization, it tends to escalate. As shown in Figure 3.1, land invasions in Brazil exhibit a wave-like distribution. Therefore, to better estimate the reversal impacts of alternative governmental responses towards the movement, I first control for the number of land invasions occurring in the previous year and in neighboring municipalities. Table 3.3 presents different zero-inflated poisson models, in which the temporal and spatiotemporal lags of land invasions, and uncultivated private lands predict excessive amounts of zero values in the land invasion data, while I control for the well-known determinants of land invasions (such as mobilizing resources and political opportunities) in the poisson component. The models then sequentially investigate the effects of land reform as a government concession, and the Bolsa Família provision on future land invasions, as measured by the number of land invasions in a municipality. To make sure whether the Brazilian government's substitution strategy via Bolsa Familia downsizes the diffusion of invasions, I look for both the direct effect and moderating effect that I measure by its multiplicative interaction with one-year lagged invasions. Within this interaction term, I consider Bolsa Familia as the moderator of the previous mobilization's effect on future mobilization.[30]

[30] I used the software developed by Hainmuller et al. (2019) to determine whether the multiplicative interaction effect is linear and I found strong evidence for a linear interaction effect. Test results are presented in the Appendix B.

Table 3.3: Land invasion models

Outcome:	Land invasions		
	6	7	8
Poisson model:			
land inequality$_{t-1}$	0.238***	0.237***	0.219***
	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.059)
rural percent$_{t-1}$	-0.153**	-0.168***	-0.153***
	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.055)
log (agricultural productivity$_{t-1}$)	-0.099	-0.087	-0.060
	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.061)
PT vote share$_{t-1}$	0.135***	0.131***	0.128***
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
population density$_{t-1}$	-0.161*	-0.152*	-0.125
	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.091)
land reforms$_{t-1}$	0.084**		
	(0.034)		
Bolsa Familia$_{t-1}$		0.074	0.178**
		(0.072)	(0.070)
land invasions$_{t-1}$			0.024
			(0.017)
Bolsa Familia$_{t-1}$ $*$ land invasions$_{t-1}$			-0.120***
			(0.022)
Constant	-0.125	-0.004	-0.202
	(0.252)	(0.277)	(0.280)
Logistic model:			
land invasions$_{t-1}$	-1.900***	-1.904***	-1.889***
	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.194)
land invasions in neighbors$_{t-1}$	-1.202***	-1.191***	-1.232***
	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.129)
uncultivated private lands$_{t-1}$	-0.460***	-0.468***	-0.499***
	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.083)
Constant	2.776***	2.782***	2.725***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.067)
Observations	48,858	48,831	48,831

The outcome variable is the number of land invasions, and all models in the table are based on zero-inflated poisson. Both logistic and poisson components are presented in the table. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). Time range is 2004-2013. State-fixed effects and nonlinear time trends with both quadratic and cubic terms are controlled. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Time lags and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Models in Table 3.3 show that land invasions in Brazil have a substantial spatial and temporal diffusion, as expected. The coefficients of temporal and spatiotemporal lags of land invasions remain strong for all models. However, they predict excess zeros instead of positive counts, and therefore, their coefficients are negative (and significant at 0.01 p-value). It is the same as uncultivated private lands, meaning that the three factors are positively associated with the outcome variable.[31] Among other explanatory variables, land inequality, and vote

[31] Negative significant coefficient of uncultivated private lands in the logistic component of zero-inflated poisson models also validates an important first stage assumption of the IV-2SLS analysis in the previous

share of the PT have positive and strongly significant coefficients, while the rural percentage has a negative coefficient, meaning that land invasions have been more common in more urbanized rural places, which is also confirmed by the weakly significant negative coefficient of population density.

Further, Models 6 demonstrates that concessions have mobilizing effects on land invasions. A land reform implemented in a municipality triggered land invasions that would occur in the following year in the same municipality. One more land reform is associated with 0.084 unit increase in the number of future land invasions. On the other hand, while the coefficient of Bolsa Familia in Model 7, which tests a direct demobilizing effect, is insignificant even at 0.1 p-value, the joint impact of Bolsa Família and one year lagged land invasions has a negative coefficient in Model 8 that is statistically significant at 0.05 p-value.

Figure 3.2: Number of families participating in invasions and number of invasions, by year

Therefore, findings imply that Bolsa Família demobilized future land invasions as the moderator of previous invasions, instead of having an autonomous impact. The moderating demobilizing effect signifies that increasing Bolsa Familia coverage reverses the temporal diffusion of land invasions, which also seems compatible with descriptive evidence. Data on the extent of land invasions demonstrate that the number of land invasions, the total number of families participating in invasions, and the number of families per invasion significantly declined after 2004 (Figures 3.2 and 3.3) when Bolsa Família was introduced. Robustness

section. It provides additional support for my argument that the instrument is a good predictor of the endogenous regressor.

models in the Appendix that replicate analyses in Table 3.3 with the zero-inflated negative binomial regression validate the moderating demobilizing effect of Bolsa Familia and direct mobilizing effects of land reforms on future land invasions (see Appendix B).

Figure 3.3: Number of families per invasion, by year[32]

The bottom line is that although land reform triggers more land invasions, Bolsa Família has a moderating demobilizing effect. To support this claim, I collected qualitative data from reports and interviews published in popular and academic literature. The existing literature shows that many families frustrated with delayed land reforms left the MST camps, with Bolsa Família helping them make the transition (Fernandes 2008). Individual testimonies vividly illustrate this process. In a 2007 interview, one participant in a 2004 land invasion in the village of Caruaru (136 km from Recife) explained why they left with reference to Bolsa Família: “It is a little money, but it is possible (to purchase) flour and milk [...] I decided to quiet down. I have two small children to raise; it is better to secure this money than risk it. [...] If I didn’t have these government programs, I would already be battling for land out there” (Folha de São Paulo 2007, own translation). An ex-member of the MST in the same district similarly remarked that Bolsa Família assistance “is little but good. The invasion has no future for me” (Folha de São Paulo 2007, own translation).

The MST leadership in Brazil acknowledged Bolsa Família's negative effect on the movement. For instance, José Batista de Oliveira, a member of the national coordination of the MST, stated that “Bolsa Família will not solve the problems of the campers, who are aware and do not want to live on government aid,” but “there is no denying that our ability to

[32] Data on land invasions and the number of families participating in invasions (for Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.2) are from Albertus et al. (2018).

mobilize has been hampered by this program" (Estadão 2008, own translation). In an interview, Eduardo Girardi, a professor at São Paulo State University, argued that Bolsa Família was one of the main reasons for fewer land invasions in the country (RBA 2013). In another interview published in 2007, João Jurandi da Silva, a dedicated land invasion activist, provides perhaps the most striking historical interpretation of the PT's containment strategy: "Lula achieved with this Bolsa Família what Fernando Henrique tried, tried, and failed to do, which is to remove people from the invasions" (CONTAG 2007, own translation).

According to the evidence presented, when invasions gained concession as land reforms, it led to further land invasions. The source of this mobilizing effect is the interaction between the two sides of contention, which strengthens the motivation of movement actors to impact the government's decisions. Land reforms can be framed by the movement to collect more support from the rural poor and to circulate the movement's prognostic frames. As land reforms produce direct mobilizing effects and accelerate the diffusion of MST's mobilization, Bolsa Família does the opposite presenting a moderating effect and demobilizing land invasions.

I argue that the demobilizing impact of Bolsa familia is a part of the Brazilian government's substitution strategy, and in case of land invasion, the government delivered more Bolsa Família provisions following less land reform. According to the demobilization by substitution argument here, the Brazilian government was concerned with political stability and the containment of the landless movement and therefore substituted land reform with Bolsa Família, as the latter helped demobilize the movement. Therefore, I argue that the government preferred Bolsa Família over land reform because Bolsa Família reduces land invasions while land reform triggers land invasions. To support this argument, I run an additional group of econometric models, which regress Bolsa Familia on land reforms and compare the impact of land invasions on reforms before and after the implementation of the program. The results of these "substitution" models are presented in Table 3.4. In empirical terms, my analysis illustrates that the number of land reforms is negatively associated with Bolsa Família, and after Bolsa Família, the success of the MST movement in forcing land reforms significantly declined—the coefficient of land invasions decreased from 0.22 to 0.11 (see Model 10 and Model 11). These findings suggest that the government gives more social assistance while providing minor land reform, despite land invasions that demanded significant land reform. In other words, the government uses Bolsa Família to compensate for the absence of land reforms and to contain the grievances emanating from the lack of land

reforms (also see Figure 1.2 and 1.3 in Chapter 1, which showed descriptive evidence that the PT government decreased the aggregate number of land reforms while rapidly expanding the BF program).

Table 3.4: Substitution models (Brazil)

Outcome:	Bolsa Familia	Land reforms	
	9	10	11
land invasions$_{t-1}$	0.015***	0.216***	0.108***
	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.027)
land reforms$_t$	-0.025***		
	(0.007)		
land reforms in neighbors$_t$	-0.177***		
	(0.013)		
Time range	2003-2014	1993-2004	2003-2014
Zero-inflated poisson	No	Yes	Yes
Nonlinear time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.753***	0.265	-29.161***
	(0.012)	(0.206)	(6.082)
Observations	54,237	54,278	54,290

The outcome variable for the first model is the number of Bolsa Familia beneficiary families per 1,000 people, and for the remaining two it is the number of land reforms. IV-2SLS is not used in the first model since I mainly consider the impact of land reform. The latter two models are based on zero-inflated poisson. Land inequality and the temporal lag of the dependent variable predicts excess zeros of the land reform variable. Only the poisson models are presented in the table. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). State-fixed effects and non-linear time trends (with both quadratic and cubic terms) are controlled. List of unpresented explanatory variables in the first model is as follows: land inequality, rural percent, population density, income, infant mortality, PT vote share and agricultural productivity. List of unpresented explanatory variables in the latter two models is as follows: land inequality, rural percent, income, and agricultural productivity. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year, except for land reforms in the first model. Time lags and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Empirical findings in this subsection show that the second and third hypotheses of this research are valid as well. The implementation of the substitution strategy in Brazil involved concrete policy changes, with the PT government prioritizing the Bolsa Familia program over initiatives that would have strengthened the MST. While previous research suggests that land reform is a more effective long-term poverty reduction strategy compared to Bolsa Familia, the latter met the immediate needs of the poor. Land reform empowered the landless to become independent laborers and escape precarious labor conditions, whereas Bolsa Familia's impact on poverty reduction has been more limited. This positioning of substitution as a political containment tool constrained the MST's ability to recruit landless individuals in camps to varying degrees.

Chapter 4: INDIA

In this chapter, I delve into the historical context that serves as the foundation for my research on the Indian case, offering a comprehensive examination of the factors shaping the dynamics of this complex scenario. By examining the Indian case, this chapter contributes to a nuanced understanding of the complexities surrounding the demobilization efforts, examining the interplay between government strategies, social movements, and their claims. Additionally, I provide a detailed description of the data utilized in the study, illustrating the outputs of the extensive empirical analysis conducted to derive meaningful insights.

Historical background of land issue in rural India highlights the prominence of the Naxalites, a highly effective and disruptive movement in rural India. Over the past few decades, the Naxalites have focused their efforts on preventing land dispossessions, demonstrating their adeptness at developing effective strategies to challenge various stakeholders, including official authorities, landlords, and counter-movements. The Indian case also brings to the forefront the significance of the NREGA, which stands as one of the largest social assistance programs in the world, directly targeting the rural unemployed. Employed by Indian governments, the NREGA operates as a substitution policy, aiming to address material grievances and at the same time the demobilization of rural radicalism. However, despite its implementation, the NREGA has proven ineffective in demobilizing the Naxalites, highlighting the complex nature of rural radicalism and the challenges posed by the counter-strategies.

The Indian case thus reveals two noteworthy aspects. Firstly, it showcases the widespread adoption of the substitution strategy by the official authorities, underscoring its significance as a government response to social unrest. Secondly, it emphasizes the potential for the failure of such a strategy in effectively demobilizing the rural poor.

4.1 Land Issues in Rural India

Contention over land between the rural poor, official authorities, and the elites—either landowners or market-oriented elites—has been an essential source of conflict in Indian history. While land conflict is rooted in colonial times, it has proliferated throughout rural India during long periods of social and political unrest in the second half of the 20th century (Levien 2013; 2018; Verghese and Teitelbaum 2019; Mukherjee 2021). To

understand the recent phases of the conflict, it is essential to start with material conditions that have shaped political dynamics in rural India.

Land-based grievances in rural India date back to the times of British colonialism. Due to limited resources and personnel, the colonial administration opted to rely on existing landlords to collect land taxes. This resulted in the creation of the zamindari land tenure system, in which a single landlord was given the authority and responsibility to collect land revenue from a group of villages in a specific area. The landlord had the power to determine the revenue rates for the villages, collect the taxes, pay a portion to the British as rent, and keep the rest for themselves. As a result, local zamindars gained significant control over the peasants in their villages, often subjecting them to exploitation and manipulation. This situation, which lasted from the early 19th century to the mid-20th century, created a massive chain of land-based inequalities and class cleavage in rural India. (Mukherjee 2021, p. 65). While the zamindar was entrusted with the duty of collecting rent directly from the tenants in the zamindari system, there was another land tenure system, called the ryotwari, in which the responsibility of paying rent rested directly with the British officers, who collected it from the peasants or Ryots without the involvement of intermediaries.

According to Mukherjee (2017), the zamindari land tenure system led to conditions of land/caste inequality and lower levels of development. Additionally, princely states often experienced lower levels of bureaucratic and state capacity, and certain tribes were excluded from the process of modern nation-state formation. These effects became entrenched and persisted into the postcolonial period, resulting in structural conditions of weak state capacity and ethnic inequalities. Mukherjee argues that the Maoists were able to successfully mobilize in the 1990s to early 2000s by exploiting these conditions. In contrast, areas under direct British rule and direct land revenue systems (ryotwari) had both de facto and de jure direct rule, leading to higher levels of development and lower levels of interethnic and land inequalities, where the Maoists did not achieve success (Mukherjee, 2017, p. 4).

At the very beginning of the second half of the 20th century, shortly after the Indian Independence Act was passed in 1947, significant land reforms were attempted by the new administration to reverse such inequalities in rural, such as the 1950 Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Land. Although the implementation of land reforms has been high on the agenda of both local and central authorities since then, this could neither satisfy the rural poor nor balance the resistance of landholding elites. Land reforms have either been described as an “unfinished agenda of governance” in the official documents (Government of India 2008) or

found to be very limited and ineffective (Besley et al. 2016; Schock 2015; Kennedy and Purushotham 2012). While the land reform struggle could not succeed, land dispossessions and displacements left their mark on the following period, caused mainly by the development projects that intensified land conflict in rural (Kumbabu 2019; Harriss 2011). During the second half of the 20th century, around 60 million rural people were displaced because of development projects (Fernandes 2004). Most of those projects were dams, mines, and industrial projects, which have historically induced severe risks for the well-being of the rural poor; these risks include "landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property, social disintegration, loss of access to community services," and "violation of human rights" (Negi and Ganguly 2011).

The negative impact of such grievances on landless increases exponentially when they are directed to people from lower castes. Especially Adivasi and Dalit castes in rural India have been known for their long-term deprivation of a healthy and sustainable environment because of large-scale land acquisitions and massive displacements (Toppo 2020). The devastating effects of development-led displacements for the lower caste individuals were also acknowledged by the Planning Commission Report (Government of India 2008). More importantly, it would be misleading to reduce caste-based inequality to mere material deprivations. As previous research shows, people in the lower castes have been subjected to severe moral isolation and systematic humiliation, both socially and legally. The Dalits have been, for example, labeled as impure, polluted, and untouchables, and they "…were not allowed to touch the food of higher castes, drink water from their wells, walk across the thresholds of their houses or pray in their temples." (Shah 2019, p. 22).

In the early few years of the 21st century, the epicenters of land conflict in rural India become the SEZ projects (Levien 2013). In 2005, when the SEZ Act opened a massive opportunity for market-based initiatives to acquire land cheaply, it initiated a new phase of land conflict. The SEZ Act has been justified by the officials because it results in rapid export-oriented growth (Banerjee-Guha 2013). Jenkins et al. (2015, p. 2-3) notes that: "Section 5 of the Act says that the central government will be guided by the following principles while notifying any area as an SEZ, namely: '(a) generation of additional economic activity, (b) promotion of exports of goods and services, (c) promotion of investment from domestic and foreign sources, (d) creation of employment opportunities, [and] (e) development of infrastructure facilities'." However, as with previous development projects,

the SEZ projects have vastly accelerated development-led dispossessions by transforming those into a national phenomenon (ibid.). Due to the inherent need for a large contiguous area, the establishment of SEZs often requires the acquisition of productive land actively used by rural villagers. Again, in the Planning Commission Report (Government of India 2008, p. 12), SEZs are defined as requiring "a single huge block of land, and therefore it is impossible to avoid acquiring productive land if SEZs are to be established at all. Thus, the notion of an SEZ, irrespective of whether it is established in multi-cropped land or not, is an assault on a major livelihood resource." Potter (2020), moreover, finds statistical evidence for the political allocation of the SEZ projects in which incumbents calculate the social and economic costs of the projects and select areas in which their expected votes are low in order to minimize a potential electoral loss. His research shows that the implementation of the SEZs is a political process in which "no party opposed" the SEZs, "but no one wanted to be associated with it either" (Potter 2020, p. 32).

4.2 The Naxalite Movement(s), Communist Party of India - Marxist Leninist

Although the first emergence of the Naxalite movement in 1967 depended on a land conflict event (Hoelscher et al. 2012), the splits with the mainstream communist block (Communist Party of India - CPI) in the 1950s, which advocated a democratic transition to socialism and had close relations with the Congress party, played an essential role in the formation of the movement as well (Kennedy and Purushotham 2012). Especially in the 60s, a smaller group in CPI who proposed to follow the model of the Chinese revolution began to distinguish themselves from the party. This group of communists—later became known as CPIML (Communist Party of India – Marxist Leninist)—was led by the charismatic leadership of Charu Mazumdar and started propagating a totally Maoist political line during the rural uprisings in the Naxalbari village in the state of West Bengal, where the sharecroppers[33] and agricultural laborers in the village raised a collective grassroots demand for land reforms.

This new group, collaborating with the sharecroppers and agricultural laborers, "…occupied lands, harvested crops, burnt land records, cancelled debts, and passed death sentences on oppressive landlords." (Kennedy and Purushotham 2012, p. 846). After a very short time, the All-India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) was established to unite those who supported the revolutionary approach inspired by the Naxalbari movement. Eventually, on May 1, 1969, the AICCCR officially transformed into

[33] People who pay the rent of the land with the product they produce.

CPIML (ibid.), and in the following years, the Naxalites "…killed several of the most oppressive landlords, chased others away to the cities, seized their land and redistributed it among the landless and small farmers." (Shah 2019, p. 24).

This first attempt by the Naxalite movement was violently suppressed by the state. However, After the end of Indira Gandhi's Emergency period in 1977, and the release of Maoist leaders from prison, the movement started to rear up, and the conflict had risen again. After re-intensifying armed conflicts of the movement cadres with regime forces and the landholding elites, ideological rethinking and self-criticism increased, and this bought out that the Naxalites were divided into different factions because of diverging ideas on the use of violence, participation in elections, and expansion of the movement to urban areas (Mohanty 2006; Kennedy and Purushotham 2012). New divisions accordingly led to the formation of the four main factions of the movement: the Maoist Communist Center (MCC, also known as the Dakshin Desh for that period), People's War Group (PWG), Party Unity (PU), and CPIML-Liberation (Mukherjee 2021).

In the early 1980s, while CPIML-Liberation decided to expand the struggle through legal means, agreed on a Leninist line, and dropped Mazumdar's "annihilation line of class enemies," the other three groups ultimately rejected parliamentary democracy and insisted on armed struggle. In 1989, CPIML-Liberation achieved its first victory in the Lok Sabha elections by securing a seat in the Ara district of Bihar. This success was accomplished through the support of its affiliated organization, the Indian People's Front (Mukherjee 2021, p. 91). However, the rural landscape and its associated armed conflicts emerged as the predominant focal point within the broader context of the Naxalite movement during the 1980s, as in the previous period. During the preceding period, the locus of insurgent activities was primarily concentrated within the states of Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal, with Bihar subsequently joining this trajectory in the early 1980s. Commencing in the 1990s, the insurgency progressively advanced toward central India. Starting from Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, it expanded its reach to encompass the adjoining regions of the central tribal belt, including Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, and the areas that later became Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand in 2001, where geographical conditions were more conducive to guerrilla warfare with a wide range of mountains, hills, forests, and other favorable terrains (Kennedy and Purushotham 2012).

In the year 1998, a significant development took place as the PU joined forces with the PWG—the largest Maoist group of that time according to Mohanty (2006)—to establish

the Communist Party of India - Marxist Leninist (CPIML-People's War). This merger proved advantageous for the PWG, allowing them to extend their sphere of influence into regions such as Bihar, Jharkhand, and other areas where the PU previously held sway. Over time, the CPIML-Liberation experienced a gradual erosion of its control over districts in Bihar, as the CPIML-People's War gained dominance by actively targeting and eliminating Liberation cadres (Mukherjee 2021, p. 91). The occurrence of fatal assaults on peasant groups associated with CPIML-Liberation by the PWG (Jauol 2011, p. 358-9) underscores the intricate dynamics existing within the Naxalite movement. Further, the consolidation of the PWG and the PU yielded another significant outcome, namely the eruption of clashes between the PWG and the MCC in the regions where they operated together in Bihar. This particular phase, often referred to as the "black chapter" by the two largest Maoist factions, witnessed intense confrontations and internal strife (ibid.). These incidents emphasize the ideological divisions and conflicts that exist within the movement. Understanding the multifaceted nature of these encounters is crucial for gaining insight into this context. Subsequently, efforts toward reconciliation between the MCC and the CPIML-People's War commenced in 2001, eventually resulting in their unification in 2004.

In 2004, these two powerful Naxalite factions of that time—the CPIML-People's War and MCC—merged to create the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist), the most prominent faction of the Naxalites. Since then, two prominent factions of the Naxalites, namely CPI-Maoist and CPIML-Liberation, have sustained, pursuing contrasting strategies. However, in addition to these significant factions, there have been several more minor factions within the Naxalites, divided on similar issues mentioned earlier, all of which have been identified as either Naxalites or Maoists. These smaller factions have commonly used the original name of the movement, CPIML, with minor identifying extensions.

Contrary to the prevailing narrative propagated by mainstream media and government authorities, which tends to portray the Naxalite movement as a unified, violent, and terrorist organization, it is important to acknowledge the existence of various influential factions and front organizations within the Naxalites, some of which explicitly reject armed struggle, as exemplified by CPIML-Liberation. In this study, the term "Naxalites" encompasses all factions associated with the movement. Consequently, it draws upon publications and documents from different factions and also considers the involvement of front organizations affiliated with the primary factions, such as local communities, student associations, sector-specific trade unions, and thematic movements.

4.3 Mobilizing Rural India

Early scholarship on the Naxalites was based on the traditional dichotomy of greed versus grievance approaches (Harriss 2011), which examines whether mobilization is either a strategy used to obtain new resources from rich minerals and forest areas or a natural consequence of existing material deprivation and discrimination, especially amongst tribal people. More recent studies seek to move beyond this dichotomy by investigating how the Naxalites formed close relationships with the local people (Shah 2013; 2019), as well as how they at least became a second-best option for the rural poor; since when there was no countervailing power to confront exploitation, land-based grievances made life unlivable for them (Sundar 2016).

While the CPI-Maoist formal acceptance of the "people's protracted war" ideology and their goal of establishing an independent communist state in India (Harriss 2011), the reason for their success in mobilizing rural communities until the early 2010s[34] can be attributed to their adept utilization of two key strategies: addressing everyday grievances and fostering emotional connections with the populace. Following the deliberate programming of the CPI-Maoist's agenda, they strategically consolidated extensive forested and hilly territories in central India, collectively referred to as the "Red Corridor," into a "Compact Revolutionary Zone." They "carefully choose villages according to whether they (1) are underdeveloped, (2) have tribal populations that do not consider themselves to be part of mainstream India, (3) have inaccessible terrain (mountain, forest, or river), and (4) are near district or state borders." (Mukherjee 2021, p. 99). The Maoists referred to the state-like structure they established in these regions under their control as the "Jungle Sarkar," meaning the "Forest State" (Shah 2019).

Over the years, the Maoists functioned akin to a governing body in these regions, utilizing their accumulated expertise to establish judicial systems, address community issues, set up medical facilities, redistribute lands, protect the landless or nearly landless against development-led dispossessions and landowner elites, and organize and encourage welfare-oriented initiatives. Shah in her more recent field research observes that "After getting rid of the forest officials, police, thieves and contractors, and establishing their own schools and mobile camps, the Naxalites took up redistributive measures." (2019, p. 145). Furthermore, they exerted pressure on contractors to increase the wages of agricultural laborers and allocated excess land to those who lacked it, specifically landless individuals and marginal

[34] See Figure 1.2

farmers. “Jan Adalats,” also known as People's Courts, served as a means to publicly hold accountable forest guards, contractors, and moneylenders whose actions infringed upon the autonomy of Adivasis (Kennedy and Purushotham 2012). Shah (2019) states that the “Naxalite people’s courts gained the reputation of delivering justice fast and at no cost.” She further argued that examining the social histories of households within the guerrilla zone reveals that the distinction between the Maoists and the people is primarily blurred (2013, p. 494). This does not imply that every individual was a Maoist supporter, but rather that nearly every family had a connection to someone involved as an armed cadre, worker, sympathizer, or someone who had engaged with the Maoist courts to resolve disputes. Many individuals spent a few months living with the Maoist underground forces before departing, yet a significant number of those who left maintained a solid attachment to the movement (ibid.).

Therefore, the central capability of the Naxalites is related to their continuous efforts and success in making potential adherents believe that “the Naxalites had tried much harder to serve them than the state.” (Shah 2019, p. 139). Their accomplishments under Jungle Sankar have positioned them firmly within the local community, surpassing the Indian government in terms of acceptance and influence (Shah 2011, p. 346). This appears to be a highly programmatic and strategic maneuver. Shah provides further insights into this phenomenon by drawing parallels with Mao and even Che: “Like so many guerrilla insurgencies, the Naxalites aimed to follow Mao’s proposal, made famous by Che Guevara: ‘the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.’” (p. 135), which is also implied by Kennedy and Purushotham (2012) as in their argument that “insurgency cannot be reduced to guerrilla warfare.”

Caste-based social and economic inequalities, for example, have played a significant role in mobilizing the Naxalites, with some critics arguing that the movement has transformed into an Adivasi-focused movement, shifting its emphasis from class to caste. Particularly, the marginalized rural poor from lower castes have been the most severely affected social group in terms of land-related deprivation. Their integration within various factions of the Naxalite movement has been so extensive that Adivasi youth often joined and left the guerrilla armies as if they were visiting relatives, indicating a strong sense of familiarity, and belonging (Shah 2019). However, this attraction of the Naxalites for the rural poor from lower castes was not solely driven by material benefits. The existence of counter-movements serving the landlords, such as Salwa Judum, has also played a significant role in shaping these dynamics. Salwa Judum stands out as a notable example, characterized by

egregious acts of violence including the plundering and burning of entire villages, killings of pregnant women, rapes, mutilations, and murders, ultimately displacing more than 350,000 people from their homes, according to human rights activists (Shah 2019, p. 38). Additionally, the Ranvir Sena, a militia predominantly composed of landlords in Bihar, has been consistently involved in perpetrating acts of violence, resulting in the loss of lives (Jauol 2011).

In response to the actions of counter-movements in 2006/2007, the CPI-Maoist launched a forceful retaliation, causing significant casualties with seventy-five killed in a single operation. Consequently, Operation Green Hunt, a government military operation against the Maoists, experienced a slowdown following media criticism and public outcry over the state's failure to address the situation effectively (Mukherjee 2021, p. 96-7). These dynamics highlight the complex interplay between caste-based inequalities, counter-movements, and state responses within the context of the Naxalite insurgency in India. The ongoing struggle continues to pose significant challenges and has far-reaching implications for social and political dynamics in the affected regions.

4.4 The Naxalites and the Special Economic Zones

In addition to various aspects of mobilization, the Naxalites derive their legitimacy primarily from advocating for the redistribution of land to agricultural workers, encapsulated in their slogan "land to the tillers." This constitutes a fundamental aspect of their struggle. Hence, since their inception, the Special Economic Zones (SEZs), which have resulted in widespread displacements, have remained a significant concern for all factions within the movement. Dispossessions within the SEZ projects have triggered not only the Naxalites' struggle but a new phase of land conflict, a wide range of opposition from local communities, sometimes turning into organized struggle and resulting in the deaths of many rural people as they defended their lands (Shapiro et al. 2017, p. 75) or successful denotification of previously approved projects (Levien 2013, p. 353). In Goa, for instance, all of the seven approved SEZs were denotified because of strong anti-SEZ movements (Solano 2014).

Counter-insurgency strategies, including forced relocation and displacement, have been used to demobilize and control the movement. Sundar (2016) highlights the consequences of displacement, such as looting, burning of villages, murders, rapes, widespread arrests, and the establishment of camps or "model villages" under surveillance to isolate insurgents and break civilian support. These practices, referred to as "grouping" or strategic hamletting, aim to disrupt the social fabric and create alienation. Kennedy and

Purushotham (2012) identify this "forced relocation" as a component of a systematic counter-insurgency strategy. Kumbabu (2019), further emphasizes the use of displacement to undermine radical mobilization. This strategy, drawing from earlier practices in Malaysia and Vietnam, separates the population from their familiar environment, weakening support for revolutionaries. Weil (2011) describes this strategy as an effort to separate the "fish" from the "sea" in which they "swam."

However, the relationship between the SEZs and the Naxalites exhibited a bidirectional tension. Pyasi (2010) highlights the Maoists' interest in identifying new operational areas, particularly in industrial belts where the SEZs are planned, which are seen as potential targets for their agitation. The adverse social consequences resulting from the establishment of SEZs served as a significant catalyst for mobilization within the Naxalite movement. As a significant element of the countrywide anti-SEZ struggles, the Naxalites have been taking advantage of SEZ-led grievances in order to justify their long-term fight. Ganapathy, the early general secretary of CPI-Maoist, noted in 2007 that, "The Congress has decided to take up struggles against the SEZs which are nothing but neo-colonial enclaves on Indian territory."[35] The Liberation Journal, the central organ of the CPIML-Liberation, has consistently issued land dispossessions within the SEZs and has associated the projects with the needs of neoliberal capitalism and the regime's desire to grow an Indian bourgeoisie.[36] In rural areas, especially, different Naxalite groups found an opportunity to mobilize the poor against the SEZs by providing meaningful protection, serving as a countervailing power, and forming close relationships.

Furthermore, the accusation of being labeled as a Naxalite while engaging in land struggles (Shah 2011, p. 344) highlights the effective framing employed by the organization, particularly in the context of SEZs. Harriss (2011) notes that many movements of organized resistance against the enclosures and displacement caused by projects such as the Bodh Ghat dam construction and privatization of mines and river water resources are often branded as Naxalite or Maoist by authorities and compliant media. Even if one is not a Naxalite, engaging in anti-SEZ struggles can lead to being portrayed as a Naxalite.

Based on the insights gleaned from historical materials, it becomes evident that the Naxalites pose a significant threat to the Indian government as a formidable political

[35] https://www.bannedthought.net/India/CPI-Maoist-Docs/Interviews/Ganapathy2007W11.pdf accessed on May 27, 2022.
[36] https://cpiml.net/liberation accessed on May 27, 2022.

adversary in rural areas, thereby presenting a major hindrance to ongoing development initiatives and state power in a broader sense. As a result, it is plausible to assume that the NREGA program, designed to provide rural welfare, has specifically targeted the various factions within the Naxalite movement. Further, it would also have been reasonable to expect the state to address critical territorial conflicts around the SEZs, while implementing the program. Finally, an essential question arises regarding the ramifications of the government's strategy on a movement like the Naxalites, known for forging strong bonds with the populace and employing highly strategic political maneuvers. Following analysis shows that the Indian government employed the NREGA to contain radical opposition raised by the Naxalites, as a substitute land rights of the rural poor. However, in contrast to the intended and frequently claimed purpose in the literature, the NREGA actually led to an increase in social movement mobilization that the Naxalites relied upon, unlike the relationship between land invasions of the MST and Bolsa Familia social assistance program in Brazil.

4.5 Data

The district-level data was mainly collected from the following sources: the Ministry of Rural Development, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, GLOCON, SHRUG, and ICRISAT. The first key variable, the NREGA provision, was selected from the Ministry of Rural Development and measured the total amount of person-days distributed in a district. To avoid enormous demographic variation amongst Indian communities, I divided the number of NREGA persondays by the total rural population. To obtain more readable coefficients, I multiplied the result by 1000, with the dependent variable becoming the number of person-days distributed per 1,000 rural people. I also considered the total NREGA expenditure data for the robustness check (also divided by rural population).

The second critical variable measures Naxalite mobilization and includes all Naxal-related events in a district year, the most crucial data in the study, taken from GLOCON. The data is collected from four Indian newspapers: *The Times of India*, *The Hindu*, *The Indian Express*, and *The New Indian Express*. However, to maintain inner consistency of the data, I only included events extracted from *The Hindu* since it covers more events than the other three for the relevant time range (see Figure 4.1); also, the events extracted from *The Hindu* have fewer missing values in the participant and organizer categories in the raw data. Because the data from *The Hindu* begins with 2006, I used *The Times of India*, the second-best source, for 2005 and earlier, if needed. I filtered out Naxal-related events by searching for Naxal-related keywords, beginning with 'Naxal' and 'Maoist,' including different Naxal

factions and various front organizations associated with the movement. I mainly searched for keywords in the participant and organizer categories. However, I also searched for event sentences for the extended versions of front organizations (see Appendix D for the detailed list of front organizations).

Figure 4.1: Number of Naxal-related events according to the four sources[37]

Further, I included a broad list of control variables that previous researchers have widely used to account for developmental, economic, and demographic factors that might affect the dependent variables in the empirical models. To represent the development and economic level of the districts for the NREGA models, I included the number of literate people, calibrated night lights, and the number of rural people belonging to scheduled castes and tribes. Moreover, since the provision is constructed as a rural employment program, I also considered rural and actively employed populations. To capture income shocks, I added the water deficit (in terms of millimeters), which is measured by the cumulative difference between the potential evapotranspiration and precipitation occurring during any given year in a district. Climatology Lab calculates this number, and the data was accessed via ICRISAT. It appears as an efficient indicator for the spatial and temporal variation in the well-being of people living in rural India, as rainfalls have been used by previous research to control for the income level (Dasgupta et al. 2017).

For the same reason, the models also control for the ratio of the cropped area. I divided the net sown area by the total size of the districts. Further, the models include two additional variables to control rural poverty: per capita current prices (rupees in millions) and

[37] Data are taken from the GLOCON Database.

the share of the primary sector (as a percentage), representing the agriculture and allied sectors. However, because these two variables are unavailable for the program's first two years (2006 and 2007) and bring an additional multicollinearity burden, they are used for the robustness check for a smaller time range (2008-2014).

The Naxalite models also include the ratio of forest area, as the availability of agricultural alternatives for local people may have affected the mobilization.[38] Finally, I created a pseudo land Gini index, considering that the movement has gained a significant historic legacy because of land inequality in rural India. I used operational landholding data, initially divided into five hierarchical groups based on the number of people with different landholdings. This data is from the agricultural census carried out in 2001, 2005, and 2010. Following the original mathematical formula of the Gini index, I calculated an aggregate measure for the districts. Moreover, in parallel with the previous research, these models control for the effects of income shocks (water deficit), demographic structure (scheduled castes and tribes), agricultural opportunities (the ratio of cropped area), mobilizational opportunities (the ratio of forest area), and the development level of the districts (literates and night lights).

However, data were available only for a few demographics for census years (2001 and 2011). These variables are the total size of the population (also taken from ICRISAT); the numbers of rural, literate, and working people; and people belonging to scheduled castes and tribes. Nevertheless, because there is no reason to expect significant shocks for the temporal variation of these numbers, and because the numbers are primarily functions of the demographic structure, I linearly imputed numbers for the unavailable years to account for spatial variation. The land Gini index was also imputed.[39]

The descriptive statistics and the source of each variable are presented in Table 4.1. I divided all demographic variables by the population size and geographical variables by the total area of the districts. I preferred to use the logarithmic version of the Naxalite variable, which was initially count-based since the variation in smaller numbers is expected to be more critical than in higher numbers. I did not transform already formatted variables, shared initially as percentages or standardized by the developers. Significant effort was put into

[38] The numbers of literates and the water deficit are not included in these models because of two reasons. First, I do not want to cause another multicollinearity problem, and accordingly avoid from high degrees of freedom problem. Second, they seem less relevant when compared to the other control variables.

[39] Linear imputation caused negative values for a few observations of the two variables: land inequality and scheduled tribes ratio, resulting in the negative values in Table 4.1. However, I decided to leave them as they were in order not to cause any further confusion.

standardizing the district lists, one of the most challenging data collection tasks. After observing that the district lists of different sources vary, I constructed an initial list including the most recent district names. I matched the district's alternative (and older) names by cross-checking unmatched districts in the original list and the spatial map of the data source (if shared). I also conducted a Google search of districts to find alternative district names. I ran the analysis using the highest number of matched districts, which varies from 485 to 518 across the empirical models.

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics and Sources (India)

Variable list	*Obs.*	*Mean*	*Std. Dev.*	*Min*	*Max*	*Source*
2006-2014						
NREGA persondays	4,444	1.15	2.18	0.00	20.99	Ministry of Rural Development
NREGA expenditure	4,444	2.63	2.90	0.00	27.34	Ministry of Rural Development
log (Naxalite events)	6,246	0.35	0.78	0.00	4.99	GLOCON
any Naxalite event	6,246	0.23	0.42	0	1	GLOCON
literacy ratio	4,576	0.61	0.10	0.29	0.90	ICRISAT
rural ratio	4,576	0.75	0.18	0.00	1.07	ICRISAT
scheduled tribe ratio	4,568	0.11	0.18	-0.08	0.95	ICRISAT
scheduled tribe ratio	4,568	0.17	0.08	0.00	0.50	ICRISAT
nightlights	4,952	66,121.81	56,522.68	185.57	429,797.90	SHRUG
workers ratio	4,576	0.84	0.07	0.56	1.00	ICRISAT
water deficit	4,932	681.05	269.02	30.70	1,635.38	ICRISAT
SEZ area	6,246	56.07	533.53	0.00	17,820.39	Ministry of Commerce and Industry
SEZ denotification	6,246	0.00	0.06	0	1	Ministry of Commerce and Industry
forest area	4,767	0.17	0.18	0	1	SHRUG
cropped area	4,730	0.52	0.21	0.00	0.94	ICRISAT
land inequality	4,470	0.42	0.15	-0.03	3.38	ICRISAT, own calculation
log (rural violent protests)	6,246	0.99	1.18	0.00	5.28	GLOCON
2008-2014						
primary sector share	3,210	56.09	40.55	7.00	472.00	ICRISAT
current prices	3,210	27.12	12.60	0.09	81.38	ICRISAT

4.6 Empirical Models

The results are presented in two groups of models. The first group, namely the NREGA models, tests the first hypothesis of this study. In these models, the NREGA provisions are the dependent variable, and the Naxalite mobilization is the independent variable of interest. Although these models control for the well-known predictors of the outcome, there is still a significant risk of endogeneity due to the reverse causality regarding previous empirical analyses on the impact of the NREGA on the Naxalites. Furthermore, reverse causality is a natural consequence of this study's theoretical framework. The dynamic interaction between the two parties depends on the idea that political contention is not a one-

way relationship but an ongoing interplay that constitutes a sample selection bias that manipulates the causal impact.

Based on a semi-experimental framework, the IV-2SLS analysis helps control this endogeneity problem within the observational data. As a structural equation modeling, the IV-2SLS contains two stages. In a generic IV-2SLS model, control variables and the exogenous instrument predicts the endogenous variable—the independent variable of interest—in the first stage, while the second stage regresses the dependent variable on the same controls and the predicted value of the endogenous variable. However, scholars do not often use the IV-2SLS since it is hard to find a valid exogenous instrument that should be a good predictor of the endogenous independent variable, and uncorrelated with the dependent variable. To create a proper instrument, this research exploits an excellent empirical opportunity that GLOCON provides. The exogenous instrument in the NREGA models is a movement-specific factor that eases Naxalite mobilization and is assumed to be orthogonal to the program's unobserved determinants. This instrument is used to reveal the unbiased causal impact of the Naxalites on the distribution of the NREGA. The Naxalites have historically found more opportunities to mobilize the rural poor if the district is prone to radical rural activism and higher numbers of pre-existing violent protest events. Depending on the raw data of GLOCON, these models use the total counts of protest events occurring in districts classified as rural and violent. Therefore, the IV-2SLS analysis here assumes that the empirical model can dissociate the impact of the movement's existing activism from an opportunity that increases the movement's mobilizational capacity.

I provide two pieces of support for the exclusion restriction. Exclusion restriction is necessary for the IV-2SLS analysis and depends on providing conceptual and empirical support for the uncorrelated-ness of the instrument with the dependent variable (the NREGA). First, the time lag between the dependent variable and the instrument eases their unrelatedness. I use the four-year lag of the variable to support its unrelatedness to the NREGA. Second, to prove that the number of rural-violent protest events in the districts is independent of the provisions (even without the time lag), I present a scatterplot showing the instrument's association with a potential predictor of the NREGA. According to the risk that needs to be eliminated, the number of rural-violent protest events should be positively associated with the annual adverse income shocks measured by the water deficit. However, I found their association to be fragile and in a negative direction (see Appendix D). For the years of the primary analysis, one can safely argue that the instrument does not positively

correlate with water deficits. Higher rural-violent events have triggered Naxalite mobilization but are only associated with the NREGA by its effect on increased Naxalite mobilizational capacity.

The second group of models regresses the Naxalite mobilization. They have a relatively simple layout and employ logistic regression where the dependent variable is a binary variable of Naxalite events—whether any event is detected—and the independent variables of interest are the two different NREGA measures—the same NREGA person-days variable and the NREGA expenditure per rural people. These models also test the impact of NREGA provisions in neighboring districts. Even though the baseline analysis does not depend on a semi-experimental framework, regarding the reverse causality again, Appendix E presents a brief replication of the models with an IV-2SLS analysis, in which a very NREGA-specific factor is exploited as an exogenous instrument—the number of beneficiary households from non-scheduled castes and tribes.

Both groups of models control for the year-fixed effect for temporal (district invariant) shocks. They do not control for district-fixed effects because of two reasons. First, 76 per cent of all data points for the Naxal-related events are zero, and more than half of the districts have never experienced an event for the relevant time range. Controlling the district-fixed effects immensely reduces the number of observations in the Naxalite models, which means a severe loss of information. Second, fixed effects assume uncorrelated errors across controlled geographical units, which looks pretty unrealistic at the district level for the case of the Naxalites-NREGA association since both variables contain a significant level of spatial dependence. Thus the analytical models take the next level and consider the state-fixed effects to control for state-idiosyncratic (time-invariant) factors. However, the district-fixed effects are also checked for robustness in the NREGA models. All predictor variables in models are included with a one-year lag. Considering the dynamic spatial models have the risk of spatial and temporal autocorrelations (or stationarity), few models for the NREGA, and all for the Naxalites, control for the first-order spatial lag (a weighted average in the neighboring districts) and one-year temporal lag of the dependent variables.

4.7 Results

4.7.1 Results for the NREGA Models

Table 4.2 shows the results of the NREGA models for 495 districts between 2006 and 2014. In addition to a baseline model (Model 12), the table contains four more models in which additional variables (primary sector share and per capita current prices), the spatial and

temporal lags of the NREGA, the spatial lag of the Naxalite mobilization are respectively controlled. The baseline model examines the impact of the Naxalite events, and subsequent models further investigate the robustness of the coefficient's direction. The table illustrates that the Naxalite events consistently have a positive coefficient in the five models. Except for the third model, the coefficient of the Naxalite mobilization is a highly significant p-value at a 0.01 significance level. According to the baseline model, a 10 per cent increase in the number of Naxalite events leads to an approximate 0.1 unit increase in the number of person-days distributed per 1,000 rural people.

Table 4.2: The NREGA models

Outcome variable:	NREGA persondays$_t$			
	12	13	14	15
log (Naxalite events$_{t-1}$)	1.179***	0.855***	0.564***	0.721***
	(0.311)	(0.286)	(0.166)	(0.219)
rural ratio$_{t-1}$	0.142	0.411	0.142	0.145
	(0.441)	(0.504)	(0.196)	(0.213)
literacy ratio$_{t-1}$	0.905	0.750	0.463	0.160
	(0.798)	(0.866)	(0.385)	(0.387)
scheduled tribe ratio$_{t-1}$	0.228	0.561	-0.008	0.028
	(0.453)	(0.528)	(0.215)	(0.227)
scheduled cast ratio$_{t-1}$	-1.859*	-1.733*	-0.595	-0.597
	(0.961)	(1.027)	(0.465)	(0.493)
nightlights$_{t-1}$	-0.000**	-0.000***	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
workers ratio$_{t-1}$	4.196***	5.071***	1.883***	1.904***
	(1.185)	(1.562)	(0.537)	(0.575)
cropped area$_{t-1}$	0.170	-0.093	0.106	0.142
	(0.376)	(0.404)	(0.202)	(0.220)
water deficit$_{t-1}$	0.000	0.001**	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
NREGA persondays$_{t-1}$			0.806***	0.809***
			(0.020)	(0.021)
NREGA persondays in neighbors$_{t-1}$			-0.066**	-0.072**
			(0.031)	(0.032)
current prices$_{t-1}$		0.001		
		(0.003)		
primary sector share$_{t-1}$		-0.009**		
		(0.004)		
Naxalite events in neighbors$_{t-1}$				-0.042**
				(0.020)
Fixed effects	State	State	State	State
Time range	2006-2014	2008-2014	2007-2014	2007-2014
Observations	4,270	3,304	3,781	3,781

All results are derived by instrumental variable analysis (IV-2SLS) with the logarithm of rural violent protests. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). Year-fixed effects are controlled for all models. Time range and cross-sectional fixed effects are shown in the table. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Time lags and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Among control variables, the coefficient of the ratio of workers has a positive value with a strongly significant p-value. In the first two models, the total amount of night lights is found to be significant with a negative coefficient, and the impact of the ratio of people from scheduled castes appears weakly significant in a negative direction. While water deficit has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in Model 13, the literacy ratio does not have a statistically significant coefficient in models.

Post-estimation results for the baseline IV-2SLS model support the reliability of the analysis. According to the traditional thresholds, they pass under-identification, weak identification, and over-identification tests (see Appendix D). Further, these results are robust for the alternative model specifications. I test models with the expenditure-based version of the NREGA, the logarithmic version of person-days data, and alternative Naxalite variables such as violent, non-violent, rural, and urban Naxalite-related events, finally replicating the analysis with the alternative time lags of the instrument (from one to three).[40] These models illustrate that the Naxalite events consistently and positively impact the NREGA provision, which shows that first hypothesis is valid for the Indian case as well.

The implementation of social assistance programs, such as Bolsa Familia and NREGA, promotes an individualistic narrative instead of addressing the collective demands of rural mobilization. These findings align with similar discretion in implementing social programs in other developing countries, supporting the World Bank's policy recommendations for containing social unrest through social assistance programs (Van Gils and Yörük 2017).

4.7.2 Results for the Substitution Models

In order to provide empirical evidence for the substitution thesis, I replicate the baseline analyses for the NREGA models and further test the opposite direction. The models include one policy as the predictor of the other. I argue that while allocating the provision, the Indian governments aimed to compensate for material deprivation caused by land dispossession resulting from the projects. In this manner, they aimed to substitute the land-based claims of the rural poor with the provision. Therefore, Model 16 tests whether the decision makers distributed more NREGA provisions to districts with larger SEZ areas. Accordingly, Model 17 further examines whether they revoked this generosity when the SEZ project was de-notified. Finally, Model 18 tests whether the Indian governments increased the SEZ areas in districts that were allocated more NREGA provisions.

[40] They are all presented in the Appendix E.

Table 4.3: Substitution models (India)

Outcome variable:	NREGA persondays$_t$		SEZ area$_t$
	16	17	18
NREGA persondays$_{t-1}$			0.153***
			(0.042)
SEZ area$_{t-1}$	0.000***		
	(0.000)		
SEZ denotification$_{t-1}$		-1.445***	
		(0.394)	
log (Naxalite events$_{t-1}$)	1.167***	1.154***	0.296**
	(0.333)	(0.332)	(0.149)
Control variables	Same as Model 12	Same as Model 12	rural ratio, forest_area, workers ratio, scheduled tribes, scheduled castes, cropped area, nightlights
lnalpha			2.920***
			(0.132)
Constant			30.180***
			(3.658)
Observations	3,787	3,787	3,849

The first two models in the table share exactly the same structure as Model 12. While model 16 and model 17 are based on IV-2SLS analysis, Model 18 depends on negative binomial regression. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). State-level fixed effects and year fixed-effecs are controlled for all models. The time range for all models is 2007-2014. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Time lags and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

The three coefficients obtained in the three models are all strongly significant (with a p-value of 0.01). However, the coefficient of the SEZ area is very low in Model 16. Ten thousand hectares of additional SEZ area results in two additional NREGA person-days, distributed per 1,000 rural people. Nevertheless, its small standard error supports its effectiveness in the positive direction, as in the negative impact of the SEZ denotifications in Model 17. Model 18 provides further evidence for the reverse order of the same relationship with the positive coefficient of the NREGA provision. According to the results of these three models, one can safely argue that the implementation of the SEZ projects and the distribution of the NREGA provisions are positively associated; therefore, the NREGA and land rights are negatively related. This result is intriguing, as this association occurs despite the diverging impacts of the NREGA and the SEZs on Naxalite mobilization. I replicate these three models with the expenditure version of the NREGA variable in order to prove the robustness of the findings (see Appendix E).

According to the empirical findings, the second hypothesis is valid in the Indian case as well. The allocation of NREGA provisions seemed to take into account grievances related to the SEZs. The rural poor faced land-based grievances due to alliances between decision-makers and market-oriented elites, driven by the pressure to accumulate through land dispossession in the neoliberal regime. The growth envisioned in SEZs, particularly in real estate and infrastructure, increased land values and exacerbated land scarcity in India

(Banerjee-Guha 2013). Despite negative perceptions, the number of SEZs increased to meet international market demands, leading to labor displacement and exploitation within these zones (Sen and Dasgupta 2008). The central government favored an export-oriented growth model that relied on providing cheap land and labor to attract foreign investors. While decision-makers considered land dispossessions in SEZs as a justifiable cost for economic growth, the demands of rural unrest for land protection needed to be substituted to address the resulting damage.

4.7.3 Results for the Naxalite Models

The models in Table 4.4 test the reversal impact of the NREGA on Naxalite mobilization. Model 20 regresses Naxalite mobilization on all predictor variables except the NREGA variables. Since the spatial and temporal correlation of Naxalite mobilization is expected to be very large (meaning that mobilization has a wave-like distribution). The yearly volume of mobilization in a district is also a function of mobilization in neighboring districts and mobilization during the preceding year, and each model controls for the spatial and temporal lags of the dependent variable. Model 20 and Model 21 test for the effect of the NREGA person-days in the target district and the neighboring districts, while Model 22 and Model 23 run the same models for the NREGA expenditure.

Models show that the NREGA—as both persondays and expenditure—positively affect Naxalite mobilization, with a strongly significant p-value (0.01). Further, these variables have the same effect also from the neighboring districts. The higher number of NREGA provisions distributed in a neighboring district in the previous year, the higher probability of any Naxalite event observed in the district in question. Accordingly, a one-unit increase in the NREGA person-days distributed per 1,000 rural people results in an almost 9 per cent increase in the probability of observing a Naxalite event in that district next year. Among control variables, previous Naxalite events, neighboring Naxalite events, the ratio of forest area, night lights, and the literacy ratio have a positive, consistent, and strongly significant impact on the Naxalite mobilization. The rural ratio has a similarly significant but negative effect. The IV-2SLS analysis (presented in Appendix E) ensures that reverse causality does not violate the positive direction of the NREGA provision's coefficient but decreases the effect size from 0.08 to 0.05. Results provide strong evidence that the NREGA mobilizes the Naxalites, in contrast to previous findings, which also validates the third hypothesis in the Indian case.

Table 4.4: The Naxalite models

Outcome variable:	any Naxalite event$_t$				
	19	20	21	22	23
Naxalite events in neighbors$_{t-1}$	0.047**	0.048**	0.048**	0.049**	0.048**
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
log (Naxalite events$_{t-1}$)	0.436***	0.424***	0.421***	0.424***	0.423***
	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.072)
water deficit$_{t-1}$	0.001*	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
land inequality$_{t-1}$	0.423	0.482	0.406	0.513	0.395
	(0.842)	(0.851)	(0.857)	(0.862)	(0.868)
rural ratio$_{t-1}$	-1.183**	-1.167**	-1.211**	-1.193**	-1.160**
	(0.524)	(0.535)	(0.526)	(0.536)	(0.522)
literacy ratio$_{t-1}$	2.739**	2.642**	2.646**	2.744**	2.744**
	(1.144)	(1.160)	(1.156)	(1.157)	(1.164)
scheduled tribe ratio$_{t-1}$	0.392	0.201	0.312	-0.025	0.149
	(0.577)	(0.623)	(0.616)	(0.645)	(0.633)
scheduled cast ratio$_{t-1}$	-0.359	-0.327	-0.256	-0.516	-0.428
	(1.557)	(1.594)	(1.587)	(1.595)	(1.624)
cropped area$_{t-1}$	-0.375	-0.284	-0.289	-0.201	-0.229
	(0.592)	(0.607)	(0.603)	(0.604)	(0.604)
forest area$_{t-1}$	1.765***	1.938***	1.851***	1.947***	1.775***
	(0.622)	(0.666)	(0.659)	(0.657)	(0.666)
nightlights$_{t-1}$	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
NREGA persondays$_{t-1}$		0.082***			
		(0.026)			
NREGA persondays in neighbors$_{t-1}$			0.111**		
			(0.045)		
NREGA expenditure$_{t-1}$				0.061**	
				(0.024)	
NREGA expenditure in neighbors$_{t-1}$					0.088***
					(0.032)
Constant	-1.330	-1.432	-1.190	-1.538	-1.349
	(1.251)	(1.281)	(1.278)	(1.282)	(1.294)
Observations	3,715	3,627	3,627	3,627	3,627

Logistic regression is used for all models. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). State-level fixed effects and year-fixed effects are controlled. The time range for all models is 2007-2014. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Time lags and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Both Brazilian and Indian governments employed the strategy of substitution to disconnect grievances from mobilization by introducing uncertainty and framing a solution separate from the movement's existing frames. However, while both the intended and unintended political outcomes of social movements (respectively corresponding with the scenarios of concession and substitution) aim to contain grievances, they have different effects on mobilization because they generate collective or individualized narratives. Social assistance programs, such as Bolsa Família in Brazil, and the NREGA in India, hinder movements by framing them as collective action demands. For example, the MST did not demand Bolsa Família because it did not align with their goals of radical change. However, the Indian government's attempt to demobilize the Naxalites through the NREGA had the opposite effect. The Naxalites started framing the NREGA as a demand, emphasizing its

shortcomings and corruption. They merged the needs of the rural poor with a class-based discourse, highlighting the government's pro-corporate policies. The Naxalites' mobilization efforts resulted in successful campaigns and the program being seen as a concession from the government.

For example, the CPI-Maoist faction viewed the NREGA as a tool of the government to counter their insurgency while acknowledging its importance for the rural poor. They criticized the program for its insufficiency in addressing structural inequalities and condemned it as a mere carrot-stick policy. Despite this criticism, the faction recognized the program as a new field for mobilization and demanded its implementation in more districts. Their discourse on the NREGA coexisted with their land-based political discourse, particularly regarding the SEZs. The faction highlighted the government's priorities in allocating funds for propaganda rather than addressing land-related issues. Although the CPI-Maoist faction showed more reservation towards the program compared to the CPIML-Liberation, they strategically incorporated it into their mobilizational efforts to strengthen their base and challenge the government's class-based policies. The next chapter presents the details of mechanisms behind each hypothesis and findings that validate those.

Chapter 5: SUBSTITUTION, MOBILIZATION AND CLAIM-MAKING

This research applies both variable- and case-oriented approaches in the comparative research literature (Della Porta 2008; Anckar 2008). While the large-N quantitative analyses throughout the districts of India (~500) and the municipalities of Brazil (~5000) depend on the former and strengthen the generalizability of the findings, comparing cross-cases within a case-oriented approach is expected to provide significant validity for the contextual explanation. In the previous two chapters, I presented the results of empirical analyses for the two countries. Two groups of empirical models in Brazil and India illustrate that both the Bolsa Familia and the NREGA programs were disproportionately targeted to radical rural mobilizations and, more importantly, employed by the governments as a substitute for the land-based claims of the movement mobilization. Decision-makers in both countries aimed to demobilize radical movements that raised land conflict on behalf of the landless or nearly landless poor. However, the results also show that social assistance programs' impacts have diverged. While the Bolsa Familia decreased the number of land invasions of the MST, the NREGA escalated the mobilization of the Naxalites. In order to understand the reason behind this, this chapter presents a case-oriented comparison of the two contexts and the results of the empirical analyses by investigating the associated mechanism behind each hypothesis.

5.1 Mechanisms of Targeting and Substitution

In addition to these macro-level similarities that counted in the introduction chapter, my variable-oriented analyses in the two countries revealed two additional similarities: the research's first and second hypotheses. First, the empirical study in the previous sections shows that both governments have targeted the movements in allocating social assistance. Second, while targeting places with higher levels of movement mobilization, both governments aimed to substitute land-based claims with social assistance. Here I will present case-specific mechanisms in depth for these two hypotheses.

5.1.1 Why and how do the governments give more social assistance to the mobilization?

Not only expanding welfare state but also effective geographical targeting strategy needs adequate state capacity in order to collect movement mobilization data and distribute resources accordingly. For the Brazilian case, as previously noted, INCRA is responsible for classifying each settlement established after a land invasion as an "area in conflict" in order to examine its productivity level. Hence, INCRA systematically collects micro-level data on land invasions. The Police Division of Agrarian Conflicts (Delegacia de Conflitos Agrários),

established by the Cardoso Administration, also collects similar data. In addition, DATALUTA is maintained by various progressive institutions whose researchers periodically report detailed data on land invasions. In short, the Brazilian government has access to sufficiently granular data on land invasions, allowing them to implement welfare programs in a manner that will contain rural unrest.

The PT government promoted the program as a 'social right' in 2008, while researchers claim that it had a transient nature and did not constitute an acquired right (Eiró 2019). "The eligibility of families to receive such benefits should be mandatorily reviewed every two years" (Article 21 of Presidential Decree 6392, referenced in Eiró 2019, p. 388). Furthermore, the federal government has the last say in deciding how many quotas would be distributed to municipalities "based on an estimated number of poor families" (2019, p. 389). Accordingly, the distribution of program benefits is subject to discretion at two levels. First, municipal caseworkers have room to move to select who is poor and deserving of program benefits, and they frequently include/exclude people without utilizing any concrete criterion (ibid). Second, because the federal government has the last say in benefit distribution, it can give towns a higher priority based on the location of land invasions by altering the number of welfare offices (called Centros de Referência da Assistência Social, CRAS), the funding provided for these offices, and the application of qualifying requirements. The quantity and location of welfare offices where people can apply for Bolsa Familia substantially impact the distribution of benefits. The accessibility and closeness of CRAS offices directly impact disadvantaged individuals taking advantage of the program.

Likewise, the provisions are immediately allocated when local officials report any public demand, according to the official claims in India. The gram panchayats reported the demand for the NREGA provision. Although the difference between the demand for the program and the number of distributed provisions in the official data portal is almost zero for most Indian districts, numerous studies claim the opposite (Chopra 2014; Ravi and Engler 2009; Dasgupta 2016; Maiorano et al. 2018). If supply-side issues arise or local-level implementers manipulate the demand, political targeting may occur when allocating provisions. Unlike Brazil, however, the disproportionate targeting of areas of rural unrest in India has not been a hidden governmental agenda. Government officials have often justified their political containment strategy by highlighting Naxalite violence. In the first stage of implementing the NREGA provision, officials claimed that their algorithm used poverty levels and numbers of low-caste individuals to determine which districts were more likely to

need the provision. Khanna and Zimmermann (2017, p. 124) noted that 32 districts were manually added to the initial list, justified by the fact that these districts had been heavily affected by Naxalite violence. Moreover, the Planning Commission's report (Government of India 2008, p. 58) titled "Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas" suggested consideration of the NREGA as an ameliorative measure for Naxalite violence. It is important to note that the report was written by several official experts assigned by the central government. Even though the officials have rationalized their disproportionate targeting by the violence of rural unrest, I empirically found a robust positive effect even for non-violent Naxalite events—including events organized by the urban front organizations and factions of Maoist organizations that do not wage armed struggle such as the Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (Liberation)—which is shared as a robustness check in the Appendix E, as abovementioned. Therefore, the primary motivation behind this political targeting is to demobilize the Naxalites as part of a counterinsurgency strategy.

Social assistance is employed to dismantle collective action frames of movements that continuously describe and narrate social problems and their solutions. The Bolsa Familia and the NREGA are assigned to address the material grievances of the rural poor while promoting an individualistic narrative instead of collective demands of rural mobilization. This is in line with the literature that documents a significant level of discretion (both at the local and national levels) in the implementation of national flagship social programs in other developing countries, including China (Chen, Pan and Xu 2016), Mexico (Ramírez 2017; Yörük et al. 2019), South Africa (Yörük and Gençer 2019), and Turkey (Aytaç 2014; Yoltar 2009; Yörük 2012). Accordingly, the findings of Van Gils and Yörük's study (2017) present that governments' use of social assistance to contain social unrest also aligns with the World Bank's policy recommendations for emerging countries.

5.1.2 Why and how do the governments substitute land-based claims with social assistance?

The substitution strategy was materialized in the field through concrete policy changes. The PT government prioritized the Bolsa Familia program in Brazil over other initiatives that would have strengthened the MST (Andrade 2019, p. 18). In 2009, it stopped providing food baskets to the MST camps and introduced Bolsa Familia as its substitute. The economic justification for the policy change was given by Lúcia Modesto, who was at the time the Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Alleviation's Secretary of Citizenship Income. She claimed that "the basket does not stimulate the development of local commerce" (Nsc-Total 2009, Terra 2009, own translation). Modesto suggests that substituting the

existing program with Bolsa Família cash payments would have a positive impact on local economic growth. However, the changes in local power relations that ensued were more substantial than the implications for local commerce. The MST had previously distributed food baskets to families residing in the camps. In contrast, the government deposited Bolsa Família cash assistance directly into individual bank accounts, thereby circumventing the MST's involvement and eroding its organizational power. Further, Bolsa Família was a low-cost substitute for land reform. According to the study carried out in 2004–2005 by the Ministry of Agrarian Development, the average cost of settling a family in Brazil is estimated between US$10,000 and US$14,000, "or more than double Brazil's per capita GDP at the time," and another report noted that this amount was "enough to provide a family with three children access to Bolsa Familia for 27 years." (Ondetti 2016, p. 35).

However, previous research shows that land reform is a more effective long-term poverty reduction strategy than Bolsa Familia. With the help of land reforms, the landless in Brazil were able to "become independent laborers, free from any controls by their employer" (Sigaud 2015, p. 191), and "leave behind a life trajectory beset by continual migration, precarious and underpaid labor, and poor and unreliable housing conditions" (Bergamasco and Norder 2015, p. 284). The impact of Bolsa Familia on reducing poverty has been far more mitigated. On the other hand, Bolsa Familia met the immediate demands of the poor, whereas land reform involved a protracted struggle with an unpredictable outcome. This made substitution a political containment tool par excellence and allowed the PT administration to contain land-invading groups more quickly and effectively. According to Carter (2015), the MST's potential to recruit landless in the camps was narrowed by these circumstances in various ways and to diverse degrees.

Regarding the Indian case, in addition to many other poverty-related measures, officials seemed to consider SEZ-led grievances in allocating the NREGA provisions. Land-based grievances of the rural poor mainly resulted from decision-makers' alliances with market-oriented elites and the economic model they follow. Banerjee-Guha claims that the primary motivation behind the neoliberal regime of land dispossession is capitalist pressure to accumulate by dispossession. Further, "a major part of the growth envisaged in the SEZs is real estate and infrastructure" (Banerjee-Guha 2013, p. 175). Even though the amount of notified SEZs is minimal, the presence of luxury real estate projects vastly increases land value (Levien 2011; 2013). Land scarcity is a severe problem in India due to high rural

populational density, and landlessness is an inevitable outcome of SEZ projects for the rural poor, even though their land is not directly grabbed through violent means.

Moreover, despite their negative reputation in rural India, the number of SEZs increased due to international market demands. FDI "inflows have affected the structure of the Indian industries, which tried to cope with the challenges of competitive pressure in the market by opting for labour-displacing and productivity enhancing technologies" (Sen and Dasgupta 2008, p. 65). As part of the international division of labor, the central government favored an export-oriented growth model—as noted above—that required the attainment of foreign investors to provide cheap land and labor since the SEZs involve more precarious regulations in the senses of working hours, wage levels, and union membership. "Labour in SEZs is exploited to an extent, which is only comparable to the experiences of industrial labour in England in the beginning of industrial revolution in the 18th century" (Sen and Dasgupta 2008, p. 71). On the one hand, decision-makers have regarded land dispossessions within the SEZs as an excusable cost of economic growth. On the other, the damage resulting from the SEZs required compensation; in other words, the demand of rural unrest to prevent land dispossessions had to be substituted.

Finally, decisions concerning the SEZs and the NREGA in India have been made at similar levels like the Brazilian government's substitution strategy. The central government proposed and implemented these two policies within a few years. However, the state governments were responsible for the implementation and execution of both. It is important to note that the three main political actors of India—the INC, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),[41] and the Communist Party of India Marxist (CPI-M)[42]—shared similar stances on both policies. All agreed to implement the SEZs, although they avoided association with SEZ-led grievances (Potter 2020) while trying to claim credit for the NREGA (Tillin and Pereira 2017).[43] For this reason, I argue that substitution is a strategy invented by the central government of the UPA and congruently executed by the state governments of the three blocks in India. While discussion of the state-level variations is beyond the scope of this

[41] BJP: Coming to power in 2014, they are the largest nationalist political group in India and the main rival to the INC.
[42] CPI-M: The largest communist political group in India, they had been in power for more than 30 years in the states of West Bengal and Kerala.
[43] Tillin and Pereira (2017, p. 330) further argue that: "Although the Congress Party at the national level sought to derive electoral mileage from new social policies, state governments (including opposition-ruled states) were relatively successful in claiming a significant degree of credit for federal policies."

research, one may argue that this strategy has been typical in both countries since the empirical models in both control for this variation as state-idiosyncratic factors.

I argue that substitution represents the most effective approach to circumvent the ineffective and unstable outcomes associated with repression and concession, two seminal government responses to land invasions. To assess the effectiveness of substitution, I conducted a comparative analysis of the Brazilian case, examining the impact of the Bolsa Família program in relation to repression and concession as mechanisms for demobilizing land invasions. Prior to delving into the analysis, it is crucial to investigate the effects of land occupations on repression and concession, drawing parallels with our previous examination of the Bolsa Família program's impact in the baseline study. Specifically, we will explore the relationship between land occupations and two key outcomes: repression, measured by rural assassinations, and concession, evaluated through land reform initiatives. Through this comprehensive examination of diverse dimensions, our aim is to develop a thorough understanding of the multifaceted implications of land occupations.

As demonstrated in the empirical models presented in Chapter three, the Bolsa Família program effectively demobilized land invasions through substitution strategies. Data on rural assassinations were obtained from Albertus et al. (2018), revealing that assassinations targeting landless individuals involved in land invasions were made possible due to strong alliances between landowners and local officials, including judges and members of the police force. In some instances, landowners resorted to bribing jurors or directly hiring police officers for these assassinations (Hammond 2009, Albertus et al. 2018, p. 585). Consequently, the variations in rural assassinations reflect the extent to which government decision-makers allowed landowners to orchestrate attacks.

For these models investigating the impact of land invasions, I incorporated a few more control variables. While the land inequality variable stands for the landholding Gini, the rural percent shows the percentage of the rural population in municipalities, both originally coming from the IBGE. Land inequality is an interpolated variable by two available years (1995 and 2006). Another variable used as a binary measure displays whether the landowners had a political connection with a member of parliament (political connection). Further, since municipalities with very different geographical characteristics are being compared in the analytical models, we also consider the population density. We divided population by the surface area of municipalities, that is extracted via the shapefiles, shared by IBGE. The variables of land inequality, rural population percent, and population density are controlled

also in the Bolsa Familia models, in order to capture municipal-level differences. Finally, to employ security measures as control variables for repression models, our data includes additional variables. The first represents security spending of the federal government security spending, taken from IPEADATA and divided by the municipality's population. The other two were available in the replication data, respectively representing whether a municipal police guard exists (municipal guard) and the number of homicides, which are not land-related (other murders).

Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 present the impact of land invasions on the number of rural assassinations and land reforms in the subsequent year, as well as the mobilizational effects of rural assassinations and land reforms on the number of land invasions in the following year. According to Table 5.1, both land invasions exhibit a positive coefficient with statistically significant p-values regarding rural assassinations and land reforms. Results reveal that a one percent increase in the total number of land invasions corresponds to approximately 0.42 percent and 0.32 percent increases, respectively, in the number of land reforms and rural assassinations (with a significance level of 0.01). These findings indicate that the three government strategies—provision of Bolsa Família, implementation of land reforms, and repression of the landless poor—are associated with similar patterns of land invasions. Specifically, the government allocated a higher number of Bolsa Família provisions, implemented more land reforms, and exhibited a greater tendency to repress the landless poor in municipalities where land invasions occurred.

In Table 5.2, both variables demonstrate a positive impact with statistically significant p-values on invasions, indicating that suppressing land invasions of the landless poor or addressing their demands through land reforms triggers and further increases land invasions. Models 26 and Model 27 demonstrate that repression and concession have mobilizing effects on land invasions. A rural assassination and land reform implemented in a municipality triggered land invasions that would occur in the following year in the same municipality. One more rural assassination and one more land reform are associated with respectively 0.043 and 0.084 unit increase in the number of future land invasions.

Consequently, while the alleviation of poverty through programs such as Bolsa Família and the NREGA may improve the lives of the poor, it also leads to increased mobilization. Concession offers material improvements for the poor but maintains the potential for further mobilization. On the other hand, substitution narrows the scope of material well-being. However, governments have reasons to employ the substitution strategy

in their conflicts with radical movements, opting for it over repression and concession, as the latter two provide new political opportunities for further mobilization, while substitution is expected to have a more stable de-escalating effect and offer compensatory/minimal material benefits for the poor.

Table 5.1: The Impact of Land Invasions on Repression and Concession

Outcome:	Land reforms	Rural assassinations
	24	25
log (total land invasions$_{t-1}$)	0.423***	0.323***
	(0.050)	(0.056)
log (income$_{t-1}$)	-0.578***	-0.054
	(0.137)	(0.233)
population density$_{t-1}$	-0.214*	-0.073
	(0.120)	(0.073)
rural percent$_{t-1}$	-0.026	-0.033
	(0.056)	(0.098)
land inequality$_{t-1}$	-0.021	-0.043
	(0.074)	(0.073)
infant mortality$_{t-1}$		
log (agricultural productivity$_{t-1}$)	-0.027	0.039
	(0.069)	(0.065)
political connection$_{t-1}$	-0.015	
	(0.023)	
log (security spending percapita$_{t-1}$)		-0.117
		(0.095)
municipal guard$_{t-1}$		-0.011
		(0.033)
log (other murders$_{t-1}$)		0.061**
		(0.026)
Time range	2003-2013	2003-2013
Zero-inflated poisson	Yes	Yes
Nonlinear time trends	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.402	0.767***
	(0.318)	(0.233)
Observations	54,291	53,522

The outcome variable for the two model respectively is the number of land reforms and rural assassinations. Results are based on zero-inflated poisson. Land inequality and the temporal lag of the dependent variable predicts excess zeros of the land reform variable in Model 24. Security spending percapita, municipal guard dummy and the temporal lag of the dependent variable predict excess zeros in the rural assassination variable in Model 25. Only the poisson models are presented in the table due to space limitation. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). State-fixed effects and relevant time trends are presented in the table. Nonlinear time trends are controlled with both quadratic and cubic terms. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Time lags and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 5.2: The Mobilizational Impacts of Repression and Concession

Outcome:	Land invasions	
	26	27
Poisson model:		
land inequality$_{t-1}$	0.228***	0.238***
	(0.061)	(0.062)
rural percent$_{t-1}$	-0.139**	-0.153**
	(0.059)	(0.060)
log (agricultural productivity$_{t-1}$)	-0.092	-0.099
	(0.060)	(0.061)
PT vote share$_{t-1}$	0.130***	0.135***
	(0.034)	(0.033)
population density$_{t-1}$	-0.157*	-0.161*
	(0.091)	(0.092)
rural assassinations$_{t-1}$	0.043***	
	(0.014)	
land reforms$_{t-1}$		0.084**
		(0.034)
Constant	-0.249	-0.125
	(0.241)	(0.252)
Logistic model:		
land invasions$_{t-1}$	-1.925***	-1.900***
	(0.158)	(0.158)
land invasions in neighbors$_{t-1}$	-1.201***	-1.202***
	(0.120)	(0.120)
uncultivated private lands$_{t-1}$	-0.488***	-0.460***
	(0.088)	(0.077)
Constant	2.764***	2.776***
	(0.067)	(0.065)
Observations	48,858	48,858

The outcome variable is the number of land invasions, and models in the table are based on zero-inflated poisson. Both logistic and poisson components are presented in the table. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). Time range is 2004-2013. State-fixed effects and nonlinear time trends with both quadratic and cubic terms are controlled. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Time lags and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

5.2 Diverging mobilizational impacts of social assistance programs

In addition to these similarities between the Brazilian and Indian cases, the findings also validate the third hypothesis of the research, which pinpoints a very significant difference between these two contexts. While Bolsa Familia has a substantial negative impact on the land invasions of the MST, the NREGA has escalated the number of Naxalite-related events, meaning that the government policy—the substitution strategy—was successful only in Brazil. The following section asks the same question for the third hypothesis.

5.2.1 Why and how does the NREGA mobilize the Naxalites while the Bolsa Familia demobilizes the MST?

The primary function of substitution as a government strategy is to terminate any grievances' association with mobilization. In other words, creating a sufficient level of

uncertainty detaches the "solution" from the movement's existing (prognostic) frames. Therefore, the unintended political outcome is a form of counter-framing by the government for a specific grievance. Although both the intended and unintended political outcomes are oriented to contain grievances, they have divergent effects on mobilization because they circulate respectively collectivized and individualized narratives of solutions. In general terms, it is difficult for movements to transform the individualized, un-demanded character of unintended political outcomes into a collectivized character, which is why employing such tools for the decision-makers is very useful to downsize the contention. The literature on social assistance programs' ideological design as the exercise of neoliberal governmentality[44] (Ruckert 2010; Morton 2014; Jenson and Nagels 2018; Zhaxi 2019; Li and Walker 2018) also illustrates that such programs inherently introduce serious obstacles that limit movements in order to frame social assistance as a collective action demand.

Regarding the relationship between the MST and Bolsa Família, more specifically, Morton (2014) found that the program was never demanded by the movement and could not be since it does not fit the movement's "productivist rhetoric" and "utopian vision of radical change." More importantly, "it directly links individual recipients to the federal bureaucracy, which leaves little room for the movement to affect program implementation" (p. 1287). However, despite the Indian government's aim to demobilize the Naxalites, this study's findings illustrate that the opposite came true. To clarify the reason behind the mobilizing effect of the provision, I provide additional qualitative evidence. In order to understand how the Naxalites frame the NREGA, I qualitatively analyzed the *Liberation* Journal of CPIML-Liberation, the *People's March* Journal of the CPI-Maoist, and additional secondary sources. I found substantial clues that the Naxalites began to frame the NREGA as a demand a few years after its introduction by drawing attention to its insufficient capacity, unmet needs, and corruption under its implementation. During their marches, they demanded an increase of 100 days of employment guarantee to 180, 200, or 365 days, as well as the extension of the program's geographical scope and a rise in wage levels.

In this regard, the outputs of AIALA's (All India Agricultural Labor Association, a front organization of CPIML-Liberation) annual conference in 2008 are intriguing. In the meetings, village activists shared their reports on the NREGA, highlighting the program's significance for the rural poor. Participants then decided to boost efforts of a fight for the program and organize a campaign to "focus on the pressing demands of the rural poor and the

[44] The thesis of governmentality is described in detail in Chapter 2.

aggrieved peasantry concerning NREGA" and additional political issues.[45] Not only the strategic framing of the NREGA as a demand but also corruption under the scheme was issued in the *Liberation.*[46] The CPIML-Liberation faction demands the extension of the NREGA's scope to urban areas,[47] and increase the number of days and wage levels under the provision.[48] In July of 2008, for example, the faction decided to organize a nationwide campaign "to intensify the struggle for agricultural Minimum Wage to be raised to Rs. 100 and NREGA wages to Rs. 200 a day."[49]

The tremendous efforts to build a counter-narrative of the faction resulted from conscious strategy-making, and movement organizers were aware of governmental intentions as political containment of the rural unrest and compensation of the land-based grievances by the NREGA. In their criticism against the government policies, the CPIML-Liberation faction pinpointed that the government crossed all limits of constitutional propriety and laws to brutally implement the pro-corporate SEZ Act 2005, while the just demands of the rural poor cannot be met due to the inadequacy of NREGA. They succeed in merging the workfare needs of the rural poor and the class-based discourse in their anti-systemic political narrative:

> "In all discussions and debates going on in view of the completion of two years of NREGA's implementation and the CAG Report, there is a mysterious silence on the question of why Governments crossed all limits of constitutional propriety and laws to brutally implement the pro-corporate SEZ Act 2005 while the NREG Act meant to serve the poor has been left to die a silent death... It is in this light that AIALA has demanded an allocation of Rs. 50000 crore for NREGA in the coming budget. Further AIALA has demanded that the DM and DDC should be made accountable for NREGA implementation and there must be statutory provisions for regulating them in this respect. Only by confronting the power structure, by an offensive against its pro-rich policies, can the rights of the poor be protected and NREGA saved.... It is not necessary to talk about the neo-liberal anti-NREGA lobby because their class character is well-known. But those intellectuals, leaders and parties among NREGA supporters who want to conceal its failure or want to limit it to administrative apathy or weakness of infrastructure etc, are actually trying to conceal the real face of the anti-poor system in the country. The failure of NREGA should be understood not in terms of neo-liberal policies alone but should be situated in the history of failure of pro-poor laws and schemes in the country. In fact, left to

[45] https://cpiml.net/liberation/2008/10/towards-all-india-conference-aiala accessed on May 28, 2022.
[46] https://cpiml.net/liberation/2009/10/jharkhand-diary and https://cpiml.net/liberation/2010/04/draconian-laws-against-cpiml-activists-ghazipur accessed on May 28, 2022.
[47] https://cpiml.net/liberation/2011/05/aicctus-may-day-call accessed on May 28, 2022.
[48] https://cpiml.net/liberation/2008/03/draft-political-resolution-cpims-19th-congress accessed on May 28, 2022.
[49] https://cpiml.net/liberation/2008/09/nationwide-campaign-23-july-20-august accessed on May 28, 2022.

> the ruling classes and governments are concerned, NREGA is all set to meet the same fate as that of zamindari abolition, land reform, garibi hatao, 20-point programme, mass education campaigns etc.'[50]

In addition, another essential part of the Naxalites' discourse on the NREGA is the reporting gains from various districts. This was highly crucial for the transformation of the program into a concession from the government to the mobilization. For this reason, the *Liberation* continuously reported successful outcomes for the rural poor via the various articles published in the journal, when more person-days or higher wage levels were gained after the mobilization of the rural poor. For instance, after the uprisings during the food movement in 2007 in West Bengal state, officials were forced to increase the NREGA persondays distributed to the rural poor: "In Dhanekhali-Belmudi area more than 700 agriculture labourers closed the panchayat office and then blocked the main road for several hours. The BDO-SDO and police officials came to the spot and asked our comrades to open the panchayat office and clear the road-block. The police and the administration had to beat a retreat seeing the mood of the agitating masses. The Panchayat Pradhan was forced to declare 100 days work to 8000 people under NREGA."[51]

Besides other rural welfare schemes, the NREGA remained one of the most important tool for many years to escalate the mobilization for the faction. Even in 2013, the *Liberation* framed the NREGA as "the world's biggest employment guarantee programme," and at the same time still declared that it "clearly failed to make any major dent in rural poverty and unemployment."[52] Claimimgn credits for the movements previous efforts, the organizers reported that the movement "had taken impressive initiatives in the initial phase when NREGA was being launched, and it is important to sustain the momentum with planned and systematic intervention to take up NREGA-related struggles." (ibid.)[53]

When it comes to the CPI-Maoist faction, we observe a similar stance regarding the government's intention for the substitution strategy and the NREGA provision. A few months after the NREGA program was first announced by the Congress government in 2005, the *People's March* published an investigation into the program.[54] The author of the article evaluated the program as a part of the "neoliberal policies of the imperialists" and never enough for the poor, insisting on the CPI-Maoist's harsh criticisms of the Indian state's

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[50] https://cpiml.net/liberation/2008/03/two-years-nrega-great-betrayal-poor accessed on May 28, 2022.
[51] https://cpiml.net/liberation/2007/11/food-movement-2007-west-bengal accessed on May 28, 2022.
[52] https://cpiml.net/liberation/2013/03/draft-9th-party-congress-agrarian-and-other-rural-struggles accessed on May 28, 2022.
[53] To see more evidence fom the *Liberation* journal, please see Appendix F.
[54] https://www.bannedthought.net/India/PeoplesMarch/2005/PM2005-03.pdf accessed on May 28, 2022.

bourgeoisie character. However, the article further carried out a very detailed examination of the material needs of the rural poor that would not be met under the program. During the article, the NREGA has been criticized as providing no universality for all the unemployed, only targeting the extremely poor, being highly arbitrary, and condemning the poor to insecure wage levels. Although the author recalls the ideological opposition of the movement against the neoliberal welfare implementations, the content explicitly implies that even before the initiation of the program, the faction started to raise proactive claims through the NREGA, highlighting the need for collective action to demand more: "The people of the country must vehemently oppose this new EGS scheme and demand universal employment guarantee at a living wage."

Accordingly, the CPI-Maoist has not denied the importance of the program for the poor but viewed it as "a carrot stick policy." Even if the Maoists decided to stop the NREGA program from time to time in areas where the armed conflict was intense, they had to justify this decision by claiming that the masses boycotted the program: "In guerrilla zone areas health, schools and family welfare programmes were allowed by the Maoists. But in those areas where Base Areas are being formed all the government machinery with its programmes, projects have been facing a boycott from the masses."[55] In 2006, then, after the program's first initialization in one-hundred-fifty districts, the movement addressed its vitality for the rural poor, referring to the unknown rights that the NREGA provided: "If an applicant for employment is not provided employment within fifteen days of his application, he shall be entitled to a daily unemployment allowance." [56] Further, in the same article, CPI-Maoist sustained to emphasize the program's deep insufficiency to compensate for structural inequalities in rural India: "The first question that needs to be asked is whether this Act can even claim to eradicate poverty. According to the provisions of this Act, the beneficiaries would get a wage of Rs. 60 for a minimum of 100 days i.e. Rs. 6000 per year. Taking an average household size of 5 people this amounts to a paltry sum of Rs. 3.28 per person per day! Can this kind of additional income even be called dignified employment, leave alone attempting to remove poverty?" (ibid.) The further deficiencies in the program counted in the *People's March* can be examplified as follows: "…But the number of districts has not been increased. Implementation is another dimension, which never takes place.";[57] "…100-day NREGRA performance (which is not for rural job guarantee for the whole year) has so far

[55] https://www.bannedthought.net/India/PeoplesMarch/2005/PM2005-06.pdf accessed on May 28, 2022.
[56] https://www.bannedthought.net/India/PeoplesMarch/2006/PM2006-01.pdf accessed on May 28, 2022.
[57] https://www.bannedthought.net/India/PeoplesMarch/2006/PM2006-4.pdf accessed on May 28, 2022.

been a miserable failure.";[58] "…the NREGA involved only the 32.6% households in Tripura.";[59] "Overwhelming majority do not possess BPL cards and while they have Job Cards under NREGA they have not been provided any work under the scheme…"[60]

The CPI-Maoist declared that they were very aware of the political containment strategy of the official authorities. This declaration seems quite interesting even for social movement literature since the movement organizers revaled this in 2006, just after the programs practical introduction in a small numbers of districts as pilot areas. They claimed that the government disproportionately targeted the Naxalites under the program and the officials aimed to use it as a counter-insurgency tool. According to the Maoists, the first one-hundred-fifty districts that the program initiated consisted of the most revolutionary districts, and this strategy was implemented by the three mainstream political blocks in India.

> "If one looks at the initial 150 districts to be covered by this Act [these were the districts chosen by the National Food for Work Programme which was a pilot programme for the present Act] it would be quite clear that those selected are either already areas of intense class struggle for example, Adilabad , Khammam, Warangal (AP); Bastar, Dantewada, Kanker (Chattisgarh); Gumla, Chatra Garhwah, Palamau, Latehar (Jharkhand); Koraput, Malkangiri (Orissa); Midnapur (West Bengal) are areas where revolutionary struggle is quite strong. [The NREGA seeks to cover these 150 and an additional 50 districts in the first phase and extend to all six hundred districts of the country within a period of five years.] This is not really surprising and as both the UPA and the CPM have been talking about naxalism being the main threat for internal security and about socio economic backwardness being an important factor for breeding naxalism. Undoubtedly, this then, is an important underlying concern for the passage of the present act. Actually after US faced defeat at hands of Vietnam, such reform measures were made part of the low intensity conflict strategy of the imperialists in order to counter insurgency. The Indian government is not doing any thing different. And in this regard there is no controversy between the UPA, NDA, CPI or CPM. There is sufficient reason to suspect the intentions of the government as regards the present employment guarantee act. Unless employment generation is linked to the entire path of development, attempts like the NREGA not only become meaningless but are actually meant to blunt the class struggle which is a natural consequence of the government's development strategy." (ibid.)

More importantly, while criticizing its political character and framing the program as a counter-insurgency tool, the Maoists have not stopped criticizing the inadequacy of the program in practice since the very first phases of its implementation. They continued to organize a grassroots demand for its implementation in much more numbers of districts. At

[58] https://www.bannedthought.net/India/PeoplesMarch/2009/PM2009-10.pdf accessed on May 28, 2022.
[59] https://www.bannedthought.net/India/PeoplesMarch/2011/PM2011-01.pdf accessed on May 28, 2022.
[60] https://www.bannedthought.net/India/PeoplesMarch/2011/PM2011-02.pdf accessed on May 28, 2022.

first glance, this might be seen as a contradiction within the organization. However, note that the apparent contradiction here in these two collective action frames for the program, a counter-insurgency tool and a new political field to negotiate for the masses, are in harmony together. These two frames can easily be found side by side in many articles of the *People's March*. Therefore, the two-sided discourse of the CPI-Maoist faction was a consequence of the their conscious choice of mobilizational dynamics, and can be evaluated as a practical must for the movement to strengthen its mobilizational base.

Framing the NREGA as a collective action demand, building a demanding discourse on the program, the CPI-Maoist faction integrated this new field of contention into its land-based political discourse as the CPIML-Liberation did. The SEZ projects, for example, have been one of the most cited land-related topics in the journal. The May/June issue in 2007 was entirely devoted to the projects. The SEZs are described as "Slave Economy Zones" and "Special Exploitation Zones" by the authors.[61] The faction either criticized the government's allocation of funds for the black propaganda of the Naxalites, instead of land-related issues or implied the contradictory class position of the government and the leading parties: "Yet the SEZ Act (2005) was passed relatively quickly and with minimal debate, especially when compared to the repeated delays, expressions of outrage and watering down that besieged the enactment of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) and other measures of social security for the poor."[62]

Nevertheless, the CPI-Maoist faction seems to be more reserved against the program, compared to CPIML-Liberation, considering the former has rarely referred to the grassroots demand in the public declarations of the central committee. Despite anthropological evidence from secondary sources showing that the Maoists organized marches and protests in their everyday relationship with the rural poor (Shah 2013), they officially didn't go much beyond pointing out deficiencies in the program in the journal. This variation seems to stem from the ideological difference between the two factions. These two factions have harshly ciriticized each other for many decades. While the CPIML-Liberation faction has labeled the executive cadres of the CPI-Maoist as left adventurists—since the first creation of the CPI-Maoist as the merger of the three armed factions in 2004—the CPI-Maoist described the CPIML-Liberation line as revisionist and did not hesitate to use pejorative expressions in public, such

[61] https://www.bannedthought.net/India/PeoplesMarch/2007/PM2007-04.pdf accessed on May 28, 2022.
[62] https://www.bannedthought.net/India/PeoplesMarch/2011/PM2011-03.pdf accessed on May 28, 2022.

that: "Let the liberation swim in its own cesspool of parliamentarianism."[63] CPIML-Liberation considered the faction of PWG (People's War Group, one component of CPI-Maoist) as its "chief ideological adversary within the Naxalite movement."[64]

Although the CPI-Maoist and CPIML-Liberation factions historically did not follow similar strategies and tactics, and present significant level of ideological variation, they both share similar counter framing strategy against the substitution move of the Indian government. They insistently mobilized the rural poor by building a demanding discourse, making claims, and producing collective action frames for the NREGA. In this discourse, the Naxalites did never approve the existing policies of the government. On the contrary, they emphasized the inadequacy of the program and the bourgeoisie character of the government. They continued to judge government policies and consider the NREGA as a new field of contention to deepen the existing ideological conflict between the government and the poor. They framed the NREGA as both a counter-insurgency tool and at the same time as an insufficient but necessary right for the rural poor. Without inducing any contradiction, their criticisms in their publications and proactive claim-making in their everyday relationships with the rural poor served together for the Naxalites to gain mobilizational credits from the program.

This move of the Naxalites is also acknowledged by Jaoul (2011, p. 345) as "the strategic focus" of the Naxalites "on politicisation of state welfare programmes like the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) for their contribution to the emergence of the rural poor as a salient category of public discourse." Shah (2013, p. 482) described a CPI-Maoist-led march she participated in a village under the control of the faction, as follows: "On the day of the protest, two lines of people marched from one village to the next throwing up a haze of dust, shouting slogans against rising prices and corruption in the PDS, while demanding 365 days of employment—not just 100—to be guaranteed by the NREGA." Daily protests, marches, banners, slogans, and rallies are quite crucial for the Naxalites to train and mobilize the rural poor for their short and long-term rights, as identified with the name and goals of the movement. In her more recent field research, Shah (2019, p. 184-185) describes a rural villager boy painting the following slogans together as graffiti on the walls of the houses: "'Long live the Maoists!', and 'National Rural Employment Guarantee Act to deliver 365 days of employment, not just 100.'" According to Shah (2019, p. 148), "[t]he

[63] https://www.bannedthought.net/India/PeoplesMarch/2005/PM2005-08.pdf accessed on May 28, 2022.
[64] http://www.archive.cpiml.org/liberation/year_2004/November/commentary_merger_truce.htm accessed on May 28, 2022.

guerrillas expended the most energy on their protests and rallies. Daytime marches, torch-lit processions and road blocks; the villagers participated in all of them… Under banners protesting against privatisation, liberalisation and globalisation, they demonstrated against inflation, agitated for employment under the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act and picketed against the corruption in the Public Distribution System of food for the poor." Further, one of Shah's respondents, Mangra, states that the movement organizers continuously educated the rural poor teaching them to deal with the government as well as their rights under the welfare schemes. She says that "Before the Naxalites arrived, many of us weren't even aware what a "minister" was. We didn't know that the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act was to ensure us work. We had no idea that we were entitled to Below Poverty Line cards to get subsidised rations. Most of us had never left the region to even venture to Ranchi city, let alone Delhi. The Naxalites educated us on what was due to us from the state; in fact, on what the state was supposed to be." (2019, p. 149).

Wherever welfare schemes were deemed essential to the rural poor, the Maoists pioneered the delivery, rather than hindering, of these programs. The fieldnotes of Toppo (2020, p. 171-2) clarified this point as follows:

> "During my fieldwork, in conversation with an administrative official posted in a LWE-affected[65] district in Jharkhand, the author was given a similar account of the fluidity of relations between the three entities.[66] The following is an excerpt from the conversation:
>
> > *Q. What kind of relationship do the Maoists have with the police and administrative officials? What kind of problems do the state officials face in implementing government programs like MGNREGA or PDS [Public Distribution System]?*
> >
> > A: Maoists would target the police officials irrespective of their individual background [Adivasi or non-Adivasi]. However, it's not the same with administrative officials. A dedicated officer, in my knowledge, faces no problem from the Maoists. It is rather easier to implement MGNREGA and other government programs in affected areas. On PDS, the Maoist interaction is not with the officials, but the local PDS dealer. They collect their food supplies directly from the local PDS dealers.
>
> Another high-ranking administrative official, from the Madhya Pradesh cadre, who was primarily tasked with the functioning of MGNREGA in Jharkhand, made similar observations:
>
> > MGNREGA is not something that is wholly run by the government; the projects are planned and implemented by the villagers themselves – the government only supervises and pays for the work done. In rural villages, mostly in tribal areas, people are ignorant about the

[65] Left-wing extremism
[66] The author meant the state, the Naxalites and the rural poor.

> functioning of MGNREGA or how it is to be implemented. Especially works that involve paper-work or gathering of raw materials for construction works. Maoists help to smoothen up the process. They can easily get the raw materials and provide help in several other things."

The findings also align with the research of Banerjee and Saha (2010), who claim that the Naxalites strategically did not oppose the NREGA. Note that as well as CPIML-Liberation that follows parliamentary politics, even the CPI (Maoist) faction—often associated with the armed clashes—demanded allocation of the NREGA, raising similar topics at grassroots levels. Accordingly, the Naxalites blamed the government as the MST did in the Brazilian case. The MST criticized the implementation of Bolsa Familia by the PT government, instead of giving land reforms. However, the Naxalites blamed the UPA government not for the implementation of the program, but instead, for the insufficient implementation of the program. Therefore, the benefits from the program provided credits for the PT government in the Brazilian case, while the Naxalites claimed credits for their mobilizational bases in the Indian case, and the NREGA failed to demobilize rural radicalism. Therefore, the demand raised by the Naxalites and addressed to the NREGA was an effective maneuver for the movement that revealed the strategic failure of the government.

Although the government received significant credit after implementing the program, the state (in a broader sense) was more likely to be blamed for existing inequalities than were landholding and market-oriented elites, as Chatterjee (2008) states. Hence, the government invented a new fruitful field of contention, albeit unintendedly. With all of its factions, the Naxalite movement appeared to be aware of this, as they made proactive claims, strategically framed the NREGA as a collective action demand, and benefited from the new field of contention by blaming the government for the ineffective implementation of the program and reversed its demobilizing effect. After the Naxalites successfully transformed the NREGA from a substitute policy to a concession, the upcoming NREGA provisions confirmed and reinforced the movement's collective action frames, introducing new mobilization advantages.

Therefore, the empirical difference between the two cases stems from the difference between the claim-making performances of the movements for social assistance. As shown in Figure 2.1, regarding claim-making as a non-static process, like the dynamic interaction between the social movement mobilization and the official authorities, this research defined concession and substitution as the two sides of a continuum of claim-making. Figure 2.1 further illustrates the casewise difference. In the first implementation of social assistance

programs in Brazil and India, the MP lines of both movements were like C_s with a negative slope, meaning that social assistance, as a substitute policy, was a demobilizing factor by default. Then, constructing an effective demanding discourse on the NREGA, making proactive claims, the Naxalites changed the game's rules. The Naxalites' move has increased the slope to positive and converted the MP nexus from C_s to C_c, but the MST could not. This is how the Naxalites started to gain new mobilization advantages from the NREGA while Bolsa Familia continued to demobilize the MST.

5.3 Behind Claim-making

Although this research considers strategic moves of the movements as the primary explanation behind the case-wise difference, it also acknowledges that some additional differences did not allow the MST to make compelling claims for Bolsa Familia while providing practical flexibility for the Naxalites. These differences are in the political culture of the movements, ideological distance from the ruling elites, the design of social assistance programs, and the intensity of the land conflict.

First, the MST has been a single-demand movement for a long time, making claims for land reforms. On the other hand, the Naxalites have developed and insisted on the idea of an independent communist state since its first emergence—to varying degrees through factions. However, the radical doctrines of the Naxalites have been accompanied by practical flexibility through everyday relationships with the rural poor. Shah (2013, p. 489-90) points out that "the Maoists have been more flexible than directed by their *Strategy and tactics*" and have routinely organized rallies "to mobilize the villagers to protest about their everyday struggles." Although it is tough to argue for the opposite in the case of the MST, being a single-demand movement still introduced an essential disadvantage in its claim-making flexibility. Indeed, focusing on a well-narrated narrow goal has contributed a tremendous social rightfulness to the fight of landless peasants against the landowner class during its long history. Students of social movements have appreciated narrow goals since Gamson's outstanding research on "the Strategy of Social Protest" (1975). Broadly speaking, however, this historical advantage turned into a severe disadvantage for the social movements—like the MST—after the invention of the substitution strategy as a counterinsurgency.

Second, the period that this study investigates was a challenging time for the MST to maintain its distance from the ruling elites since the PT and the MST have been known as political allies. Further, in addition to the substitution, the PT government strategically utilized government jobs and state subsidies to maintain the MST leadership's support.

"[T]he criticisms of the MST towards the Lula administration were always carefully weighted" primarily "because the organisation became more dependent than ever before on state resources for its own survival" (Bruera 2013, p. 147). The close relationship of the MST leadership with the Lula administration, thus, became an obstacle for the movement to construct a blaming narrative over the insufficiency of newly implemented benevolent policies.

Third, this research also stresses crucial differences between the two social assistance programs. Negi describes the most significant difference between the NREGA and the other programs as "it provides the rural worker with The Right to Work." (2010, p. 5). Despite many insecurities that the NREGA induces, the program's employment-based structure has left room for negotiation between different political actors on various topics, such as the number of employment days or the wage limits under the program (Jenkins and Manor 2017). Unlike many other means-tested social assistance programs, the NREGA has brought out a new field of debate that escalated a public demand at the grassroots level. Further, the NREGA operates entirely in a rural context, while Bolsa Familia functions in the loopholes of the social security system throughout the whole country, meaning that the NREGA introduces more potentiality as the target of rural mobilization. Hence, the Naxalites had a richer ground for confrontation with the target because of not only the contentious political factors but also the inherent weaknesses of the target.

Fourth, these two cases slightly differ in the sense of land conflict intensity. Many redistributive land reforms have been implemented in Brazil (INCRA 2011), while the history of land reforms in India has been perceived as a total failure, except for the rule of two Communist state governments in West Bengal and Kerala. Despite the implementation of land reforms is still a hot topic among the Indian political actors, as in the Brazilian case (Philips 2020), there is a vast literature on the ineffectiveness of reforms in India (Besley et al. 2016, p. 73), which is even appreciated in 2009 in the report of Ministry of Rural Development (CSLR 2009). This difference is probably because of some other differences such as more availability of idle agricultural lands, much higher Land Gini measure[67] (unequal land distribution), lower rural population density in Brazil, and, accordingly, a higher cost of making land reforms in India (Schock 2015, p. 508). Subsequently, the PT government's response to the grassroots demand in the 2000s (decreasing land reforms) was

[67] Historical Land Gini measures for Brazil and India, respectively fluctuate around 0.8, and 0.5 (Frankema 2010).

a more defensive strategic position compared to the Indian governments' land dispossessions that were aggressively carried out in the name of development projects. This is the mirror image of the difference between movements' land-based claims, regarding the defensive character of the Naxalites' land-based claims (preventing dispossessions) and offensive land invasions of the MST. Making claims for the new lands have been easier for the MST. This also induced the difference between the level of conflict in the two cases. The higher intensity of land conflict in India enabled Naxalite groups to find more chances to escalate the conflict while being less likely to stick to the land making them more open to making claims for the new fields of contention.

At this point, it is also important to note that these four differences function via providing—or limiting—the claim-making flexibility of the movements. The explanatory difference between the two cases, which appeared in the movements' claim-making, is a consequence of these four factors that shaped the diverging mobilizational impact of the programs. In other words, the MST could not raise proactive claims for Bolsa Familia because of these four reasons. Being historically a single demand movement, having allies in the PT government, non-negotiability of the program and lower levels of land-based grievances in rural Brazil have dictated the MST to insist on existing collective action frames, and prevent to demand more provisions for the rural poor.

To sum up, the case-oriented comparison in the research considers the functional similarities between the two cases and explains the divergence that mainly occurred in the Indian case. These similarities are presented in two groups: similarities observed at the macro-level and revealed by the empirical analyses of this study. For the former, four groups of factors are sorted in the introduction chapter. First, both countries have a highly rooted land conflict history and a dynamic contentious political space. Second, they belong to a similar welfare regime family and have overweighted assistance-based social policy tools since the early 2000s. Third, they have a federal administrative system and competitive democratic elections. And finally, both experienced accelerated economic growth in the last two-three decades, sharing a similar financial role in the international market. Then, utilizing secondary sources and additional qualitative analyses, the research illustrated that the mechanisms behind the first and second hypotheses are incredibly similar for the two cases. The Indian and Brazilian governments have reasons and tools to substitute land-based claims of the movements. This also proves that the substitution strategy as a counterinsurgency

transcends the borders of a single country and may be very relevant for many other contexts. It has a global character, at least in the context of emerging markets.

On the other side of these similarities, the difference in the claim-making performances of the targeted movements is the reason for the difference in the success of the Brazilian and Indian governments' substitution strategies, despite not being reduced to it. The diverging results are probably associated with other reasons like the differences in the movements' political culture, ideological stance, program design, or land conflict intensity. Yet the claim-making difference mediated the impact of these other differences. Framing social assistance as a collective action demand, the Naxalites have transformed substitution into a concession and reversed the demobilizing effect of the Indian government's substitution strategy. Unlike India, the Brazilian government effectively operated and achieved the substitution strategy.

It is also crucial to note that substitution is not the only counterinsurgency strategy of the governments (e.g., repression). The activity of the Naxalite groups has slightly decreased in India, especially after its historical peak in 2010/2011, while it continues at higher levels than in the early 2000s. The findings of this study show that the de-escalation of the Naxalites' mobilization is not the result of Indian welfare expansion to the countryside. Although the examination of the reasons for this limited demobilization after the 2010s stands beyond the scope of this research, the general trends of the SEZs and the NREGA program for the same period have an implication for this. As shown in Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3, the total amount of the SEZ areas and the NREGA person-days did not change much after the early 2010s. However, forty-nine SEZ projects have been denotified by the state governments between 2015 and 2019, which was twenty in total from 2006 to 2014. Therefore, the Naxalites' limited demobilization apparently did not stem from a condition that the rural poor in India were less likely to suffer from material grievances or the Naxalites' incapability to prevent land dispossessions. Instead, it might be a natural outcome of the relative stabilization of the movement's targets.

In the Brazilian context, particularly after the early 2010s, the MST appears to have adopted a more flexible approach to its claim-making dynamics. This shift has involved expanding the movement's focus beyond its historical single-issue demand, which has come at the cost of losing its traditional advantage. Despite the MST and the PT renewing their alliance after the PT lost power in 2016, the executive cadres of the MST are increasingly interested in pursuing an independent mobilizational path through the contentious political

dynamics in rural Brazil. This includes exploring new claimable targets and expanding the movement's reach. This shift in the MST's claim-making strategy reflects the changing political landscape in Brazil and the movement's desire to remain relevant and effective in the face of new challenges. By broadening its focus and exploring new targets, the MST aims to maintain its position as a key player in rural politics and to continue advocating for the rights of landless workers and other marginalized groups.

> "The MST's high expectations soon crashed when Lula da Silva failed to make agrarian reform a policy priority (Robles 2018a). Instead, he gave priority to a poverty reduction cash-transfer conditional program, the Bolsa Família, or Family Allowance Program. Lula da Silva also expanded agribusiness in response to the high demand for soybean, corn, and sugar in Asia. These new developments brought about old and new challenges. In order to confront these challenges, the MST retooled its modus operandi. The MST substituted the *Sistema Cooperativista dos Assentados*, or Settlers' Cooperative System for the *Setor de Produção, Cooperação e Meio Ambiente*, or Production, Cooperation and Environmental Division. It also reinforced its *Setor Internacional*, or International Division, and *Setor de Mobilização*, or Mobilization Division. At the same time, the MST strengthened its partnerships with the Feder*ação dos Estudantes de Agronomia do Bras*il, or Brazilian Federation of Agronomy Students (FEAB), the CPT, the *Coordinadora Latinoamericana de Organizaciones del Campo*, or Coordinator of Latin-American Countryside Organizations (CLOC), and the *Vía Campesina*. All of these efforts assisted the MST to transition from the sustainable agriculture approach to the more comprehensive and integrated approach of agroecology." (Robles 2019, p. 22).

Chapter 6: CONCLUDING REMARKS

This research employed econometric models, novel databases and an additional qualitative analysis to investigate the relationship between social assistance programs and radical rural movements comparatively in Brazil and India. I explored why the Brazilian and Indian governments responded to the radical rural opposition led by the MST and the Naxalites by implementing social assistance programs such as Bolsa Familia and NREGA, respectively. I argued that the governments used these programs to politically contain the movements by providing welfare provisions, aiming to demobilize them and substitute their land-based claims with social assistance. Then, I examined the impact of claim-making on the government's use of social assistance as a counter-insurgency strategy. Framing social assistance programs as collective action demands has a positive influence on the mobilization of movements, challenging the governmental narrative on rural poverty. Accordingly, I observed a less demobilizing or even mobilizing effect of social assistance in the Indian context, where the Naxalites have made new claims for the program, shifting it away from an unintended outcome. On the other hand, the substitution strategy appears to have effectively demobilized the MST in Brazil. Through this research, I aimed to shed light on how welfare programs and social movements interact, offering insights into governmental responses to mobilization and the potential for counter-insurgency strategies to affect movement dynamics.

The quantitative models utilized an instrumental variable approach within a quasi-experimental structure, accounting for specific political, economic, developmental, and demographic factors, and sub-state level yearly-based databases that empirical models utilized are originally developed for this research. Social movement data for the India database further exploits the outputs of an AI-based automated data extraction process for the first time (namely the GLOCON database). Additionally, qualitative analysis is based on examination of mouthpieces of two giant movement factions in the Indian case.

My research first examined the impact of radical rural mobilization on social assistance programs, employing IV-2SLS models, and, as its first hypothesis, tested whether the government specifically targets mobilization as part of a political containment strategy. The next set of models analyzed the association between social assistance and land-based claims, controlling for relevant variables. It investigated whether there is a negative

relationship between the two. These models tested the second hypothesis, which is based on the argument that the disproportionate targeting in Brazil and India is indeed a substitution strategy employed by the official authorities. The study followed a similar analytical structure for both Brazil (Bolsa Família and land reform) and India (the NREGA and the SEZ projects), aiming to validate the proposed substitution thesis. Lastly, as the third hypothesis in the research, mobilization models assessed the effectiveness of the substitution strategy by examining the impact of social assistance on mobilization, looking at land invasions by the MST in Brazil and Naxalite-related activities in India. These models tested whether Bolsa Família and the NREGA demobilized the movements. Finally, it exercised a case-oriented comparison for the diverging results in demobilizing impacts of the programs and exploited movements' claim-making dynamics to explain the case-wise difference, which constitutes the fourth hypothesis.

The empirical findings of this study provided compelling evidence to support the proposed hypotheses. Specifically, the analysis of the Brazilian context revealed a significant relationship between the land invasions carried out by the MST movement and the subsequent increase in the implementation of Bolsa Familia provisions. Notably, the PT government, which was in power during the study period, strategically employed the Bolsa Familia program as a substitute for the land reforms demanded by the movement. Consequently, this substitution strategy effectively quelled the momentum of the land invasions. In contrast, the examination of the Indian case demonstrated that the NREGA program, initiated in 2006 under the UPA government, exhibited a pattern of preferential allocation to districts characterized by a higher concentration of Naxalites, who belong to various factions and front organizations. This parallel between Brazil and India illustrates a similar strategic approach in which multiple political blocs embraced the NREGA program as a means to address the grievances stemming from SEZ-led land dispossessions, a primary concern of the Naxalite movement since 2005. Consequently, NREGA served as a compensatory mechanism for the detrimental effects of SEZs. However, unlike the Brazilian context, where such government outreach efforts contributed to the demobilization of radical rural mobilization, the findings in India indicate an exacerbation of Naxalite events as a result of the NREGA program's implementation.

The divergence observed between the Brazilian and Indian contexts serves as a significant and insightful focal point for this research. Grounded in the substitution thesis, which forms the theoretical foundation of this study, the argument posits that social

assistance programs have a demobilizing effect when they are not actively demanded by the targeted social movement. However, a meticulous examination of secondary sources pertaining to the Indian context, along with an analysis of journals affiliated with the two major factions of the Naxalite movement (CPI-Maoist and CPIML-Liberation), revealed a distinct departure from the anticipated substitution strategy in India. Extensive content, particularly in mouthpieces, unveiled how the Naxalites framed the NREGA program as a domain of demand, effectively transforming it into a legitimate claim rather than outright rejection. Employing a repertoire of protests, marches, slogans, and banners, the Naxalites systematically highlighted the shortcomings of NREGA, seamlessly integrating this critique into their daily practices and ideological discourse. Consequently, social assistance ceased to function as an unintended political outcome, as the Naxalites redefined it within their framework of collective action. Rather than serving as a tool for the government, NREGA functioned as a concession granted to the Naxalites and the marginalized rural population, reaffirming the existing structures of the Naxalite movement and fostering stronger ties with its grassroots base. Hence, NREGA did not provided benefits to the government, in contrast, served as a source of empowerment for the Naxalites.

Accordingly, the research contributes to two significant factions of literature in sociology—those concerned with contentious politics/social movements and social welfare. First, I argue that the government exploits social assistance as a substitute for the movement's demand and that this governmental strategy has a default demobilizing effect when compared to the concession. The study enhances the existing literature by introducing the concept of substitution as a governmental response to social unrest, alongside the previously studied repression and concession. As for the mobilizational impacts of this substitution strategy, the programs offer an individualistic solution to poverty and have a downsizing/negative effect on the motivation of the rural poor to take part in collective action. However, scholars studying contentious politics often overlook the fact that governments have a range of options available to them when responding to social movements. It is not simply a matter of either repressing the participants or granting concessions. The government's response can be more nuanced and complex than a binary approach. The research, therefore, develops a theoretical model to understand the mobilization-policy nexus and explores how social movements can counteract the demobilizing effects of substitution.

The distinction between substitution and concession challenges the conventional categorization of unintended and political outcomes proposed by social movement scholars.

Within the framework of the MP nexus analytic model, which emphasizes the continuum between substitution and concession, this categorization appears to be flawed and misleading. This study asserted that movement outcomes might possess dual characteristics of unintendedness and political. Accordingly, I have illustrated that social welfare policies aimed at political containment should be regarded as unintended political outcomes of social movements.

Further, the substitution thesis and the MP nexus also imply that if the movement can effectively frame a substitute policy, it can boost mobilization; if not, the movement runs the risk of demobilization. Briefly put, demands matter. Because Bolsa Família and the NREGA provided meaningful compensation to the rural poor and circulated an individualistic narrative for the solution, both aimed to downsize the attachment of the poor with mobilization. However, the Naxalites have developed a right-based discourse—directed toward the NREGA—by framing the program as a collective action demand and empowering its organizational mobility by transforming the contention phase—from the substitution to the concession. The mobilizing effect of the NREGA that my findings validate starkly contrasts the consensus in the existing quantitative literature on the program. The findings of my analysis pose a significant challenge to the existing literature on the demobilizing effect of the NREGA, as they highlight the importance of adopting a social movement perspective. The difference in theoretical approaches between my research and the existing literature is a key factor that contributed to this challenging result. By conceptualizing the Naxalites as a collection of strategy-making radical social movements, rather than a single terrorist or violent group, this study provides a more nuanced understanding of the impact of the NREGA on the demobilization of Naxalite movements. This approach allowed for a more comprehensive and accurate assessment of the NREGA's impact on the Naxalite movements' mobilization. The use of the novel database GLOCON facilitated a deeper analysis of the data, which, in turn, helped to uncover previously overlooked factors that contributed to the movement's dynamics. By adopting a social movement perspective, this study identified the Naxalite movements' strategic decision-making processes and how they responded to the NREGA.

Second, by focusing on political actors and struggles, my analysis challenges the existing social assistance literature dominated by structuralist arguments. The results suggest that structural factors do not automatically dictate the form, content, and trajectory of welfare policies. Governments consider structural factors to the extent that they lead to the

politicization of grassroots groups and threaten political stability. Therefore, social assistance is used as a tool of political containment. In this sense, the upsurge of social assistance in Brazil and India after the 2000s appears to be an affordable cost of deradicalizing the poor. While ignoring contentious politics as an explanation for expanding social assistance programs, researchers are missing a fundamental socio-political phenomenon for which this research used the term MP nexus. By examining the Brazilian and Indian contexts, the MP nexus model provides valuable insights into the interplay between Bolsa Familia and the MST, as well as NREGA and the Naxalites. The government's initial approach of substituting social assistance programs for addressing mobilizations eventually transforms into concession in the Indian case. In this regard, the MP nexus framework offers a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics between social assistance and radical movements. As exemplified in the MP nexus in this research, by integrating the social assistance literature with the scholarship on social movements, numerous additional benefits can be derived.

There is no reason to believe that the substitution strategy is exclusive to Brazil and India; the political containment has been observed in other emerging markets such as Mexico, China, South Africa, and Turkey since the early 2000s (Chen, Pan and Xu 2016; Ramírez 2017; Yörük et al. 2019; Yörük and Gençer 2019; Yoltar 2009; Yörük 2012). The work of Van Gils and Yörük (2017) support this claim, presenting empirical evidence by analyzing 447 World Bank policy recommendation documents published from 1980 to 2013. According to their findings, "…despite the Bank's denial of having any political agenda, many WB documents explicitly refer to social assistance as a possible instrument for governments to contain social unrest and mobilize political support." Hence, the substitution mechanism can be seen as a common strategy transcending the limits of few cases. However, unlike political containment, the substitution thesis encompasses demands that have been shaped and framed by social movements over extended periods. By examining major radical movements in these countries (e.g., indigenous movement in Mexico and Kurdish movement in Turkey) and their primary areas of demands, scholars can uncover the universal nature of the governments' substitution strategy in social assistance programs.

Similar traces of this strategy can also be found in the Global North. Although the level of radical and disruptive conflict may not be as pronounced as in the Global South, there are always room for governmental strategy making as long as governments continue to perceive risks from social movements, and the official authorities' interest in substitution and

similar strategies will persist. Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore recent events such as the yellow vest protests in France, the “Black Lives Matter” protests in the United States, the institutionalized labor movement of the working class, and the impactful women's movements that have emerged in recent years. Women's movements, in particular, hold great importance for the MP nexus due to their specific demands (e.g., on law making processes). However, it is crucial to distinguish between concession and substitution, i.e., intended and unintended outcomes. In many of these countries, social assistance programs have been implemented directly in response to the demands of women's movements. Misra's work (1998) serves as well fitting example of this phenomenon. This suggests the possibility of negotiation rather than political containment.

According to the findings of the systematic review that I presented in Chapter 2, the emphasis on political factors is particularly evident in the South European welfare regime. On the other hand, studies on the Social Democratic welfare regime seem to downplay the role of politics. A recent global classification of welfare regimes into Institutional, Populist, Neoliberal, and Residual categories (Yörük, Öker and Tafoya 2022) sheds light on the distribution of scholarly focus on the different determinants. The Populist welfare state regime stands out as the most dominant in terms of analyzing political factors in social assistance programs, with formal and informal working-class mobilizations being significant drivers of welfare programs in these countries. Programs especially established during the post-war period are more likely to be studied in the context of structural and institutional factors, while those established during the neoliberal period receive more attention concerning political and ideational factors. Accordingly, the political factors are most critically considered in the Global South, particularly in Populist welfare state regime countries, during the neoliberal era, where welfare state development has significantly accelerated. This phenomenon may be attributed to countries belonged to the Populist welfare cluster using social assistance programs to establish political hegemony and manage social unrest. Therefore, it is important to note that Brazil, India, and perhaps other governments in the cluster implement and expand anti-poverty programs not when or where people are poor but rather when or where the poor become politicized (Yörük 2012, p. 517). In order to bridge the gap between the social movement and social policy literature, this research points to the need to examine the mutual relationship between mobilization dynamics of social movements and the expansion of welfare provisions in other countries that are part of the Populist Welfare Regime.

The theoretical foundations of this study also have broader conceptual implications. It is essential to examine in detail how cultural elements interact with rational and structural factors within the three domains that shape social movement mobilization and its outcomes. Understanding the resonance of movement frames within the cultural realm, as well as the constraints imposed by structural and rational factors, is crucial. Furthermore, public opinion, while not directly constituting the basis of the movement, can have a significant impact, especially in democratic contexts where independent media play a role. Both the movement and the state seek to influence public opinion through their respective actions. This becomes a meaningful endeavour for the movement, particularly concerning long-term mobilization goals. However, it is important to acknowledge that governments also need to generate consent, regardless of the democratic or undemocratic nature of the context. In this regard, the MP nexus highlights the importance of public opinion as a mechanism. The reception of movement demands or frames by the general public emerges as a significant factor in the movement's success. Similarly, the long-term effects of movements on political culture are noteworthy. While movement outcomes are typically studied in the short term, cultural elements offer easier measurements, suggesting the potential for a reverse causality. This study implies that mobilization, through framing practices and political interactions with the existing cultural field, can lead to substantial transformations.

This study focused on the strategic moves and counter moves of governments and radical movements up until the mid-2010s. However, future research could investigate similar questions in the context of more recent political environments, such as the BJP-led government in India or the Bolsonaro-led government in Brazil. Additionally, this study did not explore the significance of state-level variations in governmental decision-making across political parties, which could provide substantial insights into strategy-making practices. Furthermore, one of the limitations of this study is the absence of a quantitative measure of collective action demand. The literature currently lacks a robust metric for assessing the extent to which a movement frames a policy as a demand. Although the GLOCON database contributes to empirical scholarship on social movements, it does not provide a quantitative measure of "demanding," which is appears as an essential task for future research on contentious political events. Addressing these gaps in the literature presents both a challenging and promising task for future research. By exploring these areas, researchers can gain a more comprehensive understanding of the complex dynamics between governments and social movements.

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Appendix A

A.1 Bolsa Familia Models in Brazil

A.1.1 Alternative Variables and Model Specifications for the Bolsa Familia Models

Table A.1 and Table A.2 present the results of Bolsa Familia models for the two alternative invasion variables, additional controls, another Bolsa Familia measure (expenditure per capita), and varying levels of fixed effects. Alternative independent variables in the dataset are the number of land invasions in a year, the non-cumulative version, and the number of households in these invasions. Models in the tables also control an alternative set of variables available for a smaller time range from 2005 to 2010. I do not include these models in the baseline for two reasons. First, institutional development and the HDI variables seemed highly correlated with the major poverty proxy variables, and second, I prefer not to decrease the time range and the total number of observations.

Then, I regress Bolsa Familia expenditure per capita instead of the Bolsa Familia coverage variable. For each group of robustness tests until this point, I exactly replicated four IV-2SLS models in the baseline (Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, and Model 5). Remaining models test the scenario of random effects and fixed effects at two different geographical levels, as municipality and microregion.[68] However, I did not use the IV-2SLS specification for these models, since the post-estimation tests of "ivreghdfe" command failed. I still preferred to share their results without using an instrument, to claim for the robustness of the baseline models. As an important indicator of my findings' robustness, the coefficient of the relevant invasion variable is positive and statistically significant at 0.01 p-value in all models in the tables.

[68] Microregion is an administrational level between state and municipality. Boundaries of microregions in Brazil are defined by IBGE, including group of municipalities and exceeding borders of states. There are sixty-six microregions in Brazil.

Table A.1: Replication of Bolsa Familia models with alternative invasion variables and with additional controls

Outcome:	Bolsa Familia			First-differenced BF	Bolsa Familia			First-differenced BF	Bolsa Familia			First-differenced BF
	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39
log (land invasions$_{t-1}$)	0.820***	0.781***	0.498***	2.564***								
	(0.213)	(0.208)	(0.096)	(0.384)								
log (families in invasions$_{t-1}$)					0.179***	0.171***	0.105***	0.541***				
					(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.019)	(0.077)				
log (total land invasions$_{t-1}$)									0.195***	0.178***	0.035***	0.108***
									(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.012)	(0.039)
Bolsa Familia$_{t-1}$			0.800***				0.801***				0.723***	
			(0.007)				(0.007)				(0.010)	
Bolsa Familia in neighbors$_{t-1}$			0.001***	-0.006***			0.001***	-0.006***			0.002***	-0.006***
			(0.000)	(0.000)			(0.000)	(0.000)			(0.000)	(0.000)
Additional controls (HDI, institutional development and tax revenues)	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time range	2003-2014	2003-2014	2004-2014	2005-2011	2003-2014	2003-2014	2004-2014	2005-2011	2003-2014	2003-2014	2004-2014	2005-2011
Nonlinear time trends	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No
Year dummies and year-state interactions	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Constant			0.760***	3.929***			0.755***	3.897***			4.259***	18.107***
			(0.015)	(0.061)			(0.015)	(0.062)			(0.063)	(0.307)
Observations	59,693	59,693	54,269	54,269	59,693	59,693	54,269	54,269	30,190	30,190	30,190	30,190

The outcome variable for all models is the number of Bolsa Familia beneficiary families per 1,000 people. Results are derived by instrumental variable analysis (IV-2SLS). Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). State-level fixed effects and relevant time trends are presented in the table. Nonlinear time trends are controlled with both quadratic and cubic terms. List of unpresented explanatory variables is as follows: land inequality, rural percent, population density, income, infant mortality, PT vote share and agricultural productivity. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Time lags and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.2: Replication of Bolsa Familia models with the expenditure variable and with different levels of fixed-effects

Outcome:	Bolsa Familia (expenditure)			First-differenced BF (expenditure)	Bolsa Familia	First-differenced BF	Bolsa Familia		
	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48
log (total land invasions$_{t-1}$)	0.079***	0.071***	0.021***	0.091***	0.018**	0.117***	0.087***	0.034***	0.038***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.004)	(0.023)	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Bolsa Familia expenditure$_{t-1}$			1.103***						
			(0.005)						
Bolsa Familia expenditure in neighbors$_{t-1}$			0.000***	0.006***					
			(0.000)	(0.000)					
Bolsa Familia$_{t-1}$					0.793***				
					(0.007)				
Bolsa Familia in neighbors$_{t-1}$					0.001***	-0.008***			
					(0.000)	(0.000)			
Time range	2003-2014	2003-2014	2004-2014	2004-2014	2004-2014	2004-2014	2003-2014	2003-2014	2003-2014
Instrumental variable	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Nonlinear time trends	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects	State	State	No	No	State	State	Municipality	Microregion	No
Year dummies and year-state interactions	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Constant			0.574***	1.940***			-1.020***	-0.708***	-0.708***
			(0.008)	(0.034)			(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Observations	59,693	59,693	54,269	54,269	54,269	54,269	59,682	59,693	59,693

The first four models regress Bolsa Familia expenditure percapita replicating baseline models. Remaining models in the table regress the number of Bolsa Familia beneficiary families per 1,000 people. Results are derived by instrumental variable analysis (IV-2SLS) except for the last three models. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). Model 36 and Model 37 replicate dynamic spatial models with state-fixed effects, while other models controls different level of fixed effects. Nonlinear time trends are controlled with both quadratic and cubic terms. List of unpresented explanatory variables is as follows: land inequality, rural percent, population density, income, infant mortality, PT vote share and agricultural productivity. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Time lags and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

A.2. Further explanations for the Bolsa Familia Dynamic Spatial Models

As Anselin, Le Gallo, and Jayet (2008) stated, dynamic spatial models frequently suffer from the risk of identification because of the interaction between the temporal and spatial dependences. Moreover, the spatially lagged independent variable or the temporally lagged dependent variable could impact the spatially lagged dependent variable or could be affected by the major dependent variable, which doubles the endogeneity problem in the dynamic spatial models. On the other hand, Lee and Yu (2016) found that an additional Durbin term does not cause a notable loss of efficiency, despite it being irrelevant. Considering the controversy, I replicate IV-2SLS models in the paper by controlling alternative spatial lag terms separately and together to demonstrate the consistently positive impact of my major independent variable. Following LaSage and Pace (2009, p. 190), I include the dependent variable's spatiotemporal lag instead of the contemporaneous spatial lag, which is also expected to downsize the endogeneity risk between the dependent variable and its contemporaneous spatial lag. the case includes a larger risk of spatial dependence by the land invasions, rather than Bolsa Familia, as shown in Figure 3.1. That is why I did not prefer to build IV-GMM model (Generalized Methods of Moments with the Instrumental Variable). The usual habit of scholars has been to employ the spatiotemporally lagged independent variable as the instrument for the spatially (or spatiotemporally) lagged dependent variable in the models. However, existing spillover of land invasions in rural Brazil transforms the potential instrument in my case into another endogenous variable since last year's invasions in neighbors are expectedly correlated with the Bolsa Familia through the last year's invasions in that municipality. Instead, I decided to continue to utilize the robustness of the original IV-2SLS models, but also deliberately controlling for the relevant temporal and spatial lags through the frequently suggested analytical models in the literature.

Then the three Durbin terms of the models are as follows:

$$\Lambda^0 Y_{i,t-1} + \Lambda^1 W_i Y_{i,t-1}, + \Lambda^2 W_i X_{i,t-1} \quad \text{(A.2.1)}$$

- W_i stands for the first order standardized weighting matrix,
- $Y_{i,t-1}$ is Bolsa Familia in a given i^{th} municipality and $t\text{-}1^{th}$ year,
- $W_iY_{i,t-1}$ is the weighted Bolsa Familia in the neighboring municipalities of the given i^{th} municipality and $t\text{-}1^{th}$ year,
- $W_iX_{i,t-1}$ is the weighted number of land invasions in the neighboring municipalities of the given i^{th} municipality and $t\text{-}1^{th}$ year,
- $\Lambda^0, \Lambda^1, \Lambda^2$ are coefficients of Durbin terms in the dynamic spatial models.

A.3 Instrumental Variable Approach in Brazil

A.3.1 Results of First Stage Regressions and Post-Estimation Tests

The results for the first stage regressions increase empirical validity and justify the theoretical argument on the instrument. As a solid IV-2SLS analysis, the instrument is valid for empirical consistency. Uncultivated private lands have a consistently positive impact on cumulative land invasions at 0.01 significance level, which means that the more uncultivated private lands, the higher the number of land invasions as I expected. I also share other relevant post-estimation results in Table A.3. All models passed with strong p-value under-identification tests, which reject a null hypothesis that the (excluded) instrument is not correlated with the endogenous regressor. The results for over-identification tests are all "exactly-identified" since I have only one instrument. Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistics are much greater than Stock Yogo critical values with %10 IV-Maximal size (the traditional threshold: 16.38) for the weak-identification test.

Table A.3: Validity of Instrumental variable analysis in Brazil

	Underidentification test		**Weak identification test**	
	Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic	P-value	Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic	Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic
Model 1	132.756	0.0000	2931.724	87.245
Model 2	132.138	0.0000	2911.618	86.662
Model 3	155.462	0.0000	2878.575	124.252
Model 5	154.935	0.0000	2894.047	124.46

All results for the under-identification and weak identification tests are obtained by "ivreghdfe" command. The instrument's coefficient in the first stage regression is approximately 0.18 and statistically significant at 0.01 p-value in all models.

A.3.2 Empirical Support for the Exclusion Restriction

Figure A.6: The association of uncultivated private lands with the agricultural productivity and income per capita in 1995

In addition to these two plots, to ensure that the instrumental variable's quasi-normal distributions on these two factors are not determined by the population, I present the instrumental variable's distribution on the population measure in Figure A.2. I use the earliest year for the population data, which is 2002. The figure shows that neither population covaries with the instrumental variable.

Figure A.7: The association of uncultivated private lands with population in 2002

Appendix B

B.1 Robustness of Land Invasion Models in Brazil

Table B.1: Replication of demobilization models with zero-inflated negative binomial

Outcome:	Land invasions		
	49	50	51
Negative binomial model:			
land inequality$_{t-1}$	0.314***	0.313***	0.292***
	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.052)
rural percent$_{t-1}$	-0.200***	-0.214***	-0.207***
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.052)
log (agricultural productivity$_{t-1}$)	-0.077	-0.058	0.005
	(0.062)	(0.065)	(0.059)
PT vote share$_{t-1}$	0.189***	0.187***	0.174***
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.033)
population density$_{t-1}$	-0.090	-0.083	-0.037
	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.056)
land reforms$_{t-1}$	0.158***		
	(0.038)		
Bolsa Familia$_{t-1}$		0.074	0.188***
		(0.072)	(0.067)
land invasions$_{t-1}$			0.224***
			(0.028)
Bolsa Familia$_{t-1}$ $*$ land invasions$_{t-1}$			-0.204***
			(0.030)
Constant	-1.001***	-0.845***	-1.346***
	(0.290)	(0.319)	(0.294)
lnalpha	0.620***	0.615***	0.765***
Logistic model:	(0.102)	(0.104)	(0.099)
land invasions$_{t-1}$	-3.454***	-3.395***	-3.780***
	(0.346)	(0.326)	(0.575)
land invasions in neighbors$_{t-1}$	-2.280***	-2.223***	-2.821***
	(0.272)	(0.262)	(0.352)
uncultivated private lands$_{t-1}$	-0.897***	-0.909***	-1.126***
	(0.163)	(0.165)	(0.191)
Constant	2.092***	2.104***	1.772***
	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.116)
Observations	48,858	48,831	48,831

Models in the table replicates exactly the same specifications in Table 3.3, except they run zero-inflated negative binomial regressions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

B.2 Interaction Effect in Model 11

To decide whether the interaction model is linear, I utilize the software developed by Hainmuller et al. (2019), who criticized the assumption of linearity for the interaction terms in the analytical models and productively suggested functional tests and alternative pathways. However, the authors' interflex command does not run the Wald test when there is a lack of common support in the distribution of the moderator variable. When the observations are distributed very skewed, three levels of interaction in the Binning plots (as low, medium, and high) do not separate from each other enough. For this reason, estimations suggested by the authors did not work at the first step. The problem is derived from the afore-mentioned distribution of land invasions and reforms that are rarely seen phenomena, unlike some other measures that I either control or explain in the analytical models. Therefore, to diminish the pressure on the model, I only used non-zero data points (for land invasions). The optimal bandwidth for the Kernel estimation is 16.7. This implies a linear interaction, which is presented in the Figure B.1, as both Binning and Kernel estimation plots.

Figure B.1: Binning (left) and Kernel (right) estimation plots for the interaction term in Model 11

Appendix C

C.1 Substitution Models in Brazil

Table C.1: Substitution models

Outcome:	Bolsa Familia	Land reforms	
	52	53	54
land invasions$_{t-1}$	0.015***	0.216***	0.108***
	(0.005)	(0.015)	(0.027)
land reforms$_t$	-0.025***		
	(0.007)		
land reforms in neighbors$_t$	-0.177***		
	(0.013)		
Time range	2003-2014	1993-2004	2003-2014
Zero-inflated poisson	No	Yes	Yes
Nonlinear time trends	Yes	Yes	Yes
State-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.753***	0.265	-29.161***
	(0.012)	(0.206)	(6.082)
Observations	54,237	54,278	54,290

The outcome variable for the first model is the number of Bolsa Familia beneficiary families per 1,000 people, and for the remaining two it is the number of land reforms. IV-2SLS is not used in the first model since I mainly consider the impact of land reform. The latter two models are based on zero-inflated poisson. Land inequality and the temporal lag of the dependent variable predicts excess zeros of the land reform variable. Only the poisson models are presented in the table. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). State-fixed effects and non-linear time trends (with both quadratic and cubic terms) are controlled. List of unpresented explanatory variables in the first model is as follows: land inequality, rural percent, population density, income, infant mortality, PT vote share and agricultural productivity. List of unpresented explanatory variables in the latter two models is as follows: land inequality, rural percent, income, and agricultural productivity. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year, except for land reforms in the first model. Time lags and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix D

D.1 Front Organizations and Keyword Selection in India

The list of front organizations of different Naxalite factions, collected from official documents, newspaper articles, and movements' declarations:

> Revolutionary Writers Association, Jana Natya Mandali, Telangana Praja Front, Democratic Students Union, Krantikari Kisan Committee, Krantikari Buddhijivi Sangh, Mazdoor Kisan Sangram Samiti, Nari Mukti Sangh, Revolutionary Democratic Front, Indian Association of People's Lawyers, Adivasi Bal Sangham, Chetana Natya Mandali, Dandakaranya Adivasi Kisan Mazdoor Sangh, Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sangh, Delhi General Mazdoor Front, Vikalp , Forum Against War on People, Committee for Release of Political Prisoners, People's Democratic Front of India, Mehanatkash Mazdoor Morcha, Gujarat Working Class Wing, Krantikari Kamdar Sanghthan, Naujawan Bharat Sabha, Jagrook Chhatra Morcha, Mahila Mukti Morcha, Bharat Naujawan Sabha, Jharkhand Avon, Jharkhand Mukti Manch, Jharkhand Liberation Front, Krantikari Budhijivi Sangh, Mazdoor Sangathan Samiti, Operation Green Hunt Virodhi Nagrik Manch, Visthapan Virodhi Jan Vikas Andolan, Karnataka Komu Sauharda Vedike, Revolutionary People's Front, Dandakaranya Adivasi Kisan Majdoor Sanghatana, Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sanghatana, Virodhi Sanskritik Chalwal, Vidarbha, Indian Association of People's Lawyer, Committee Against Violence on Women, Kabir Kala Manch, Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangh, Daman Pratirodh Manch, Lok Sangram Manch, Operation Green Hunt Virodhi Jamhoori Manch, Bharatiya Kisan Union/E- Krantikari, Krantikari Pendu Mazdoor Union, Nari Mukti Manch, Anti-Imperialist Movement, Indian Association for People's Lawyers, Students Uprising Movement for Social Welfare, Federation against Internal Repression, Committee for the Release of Political Prisoners, Progressive Students Forum, Gan Pratirodh Manch, Mazdoor Krishak Sangram Samity, Revolutionary Youth League, Matangini Mahila Samiti, Police-e-Santrash Birodhi Janasadharaner Committee, United Students Democratic Front, Revolutionary Youth Association, Telangana Asanghatitha Karmika Samkhya, Telangana Vidyarthi Vedika, Telangana Vidyarthi Sangham, Adivasi Students Union, Telangana Raithanga Samithi, Tudum Debba, Praja Kala Mandali, Telangana Democratic Front, Forum Against Hindu Fascism Offensive, Civil Liberties Committee, Amarula Bandhu Mithrula Sangham, Chaitanya Mahila Sangham, Radical Youth League, Rythu Coolie Sangham, Radical Students Union, Singareni Karmika Samakya, Viplava Karmika Samakhya, Porattam Kerala, Ayyankali pada Kerala, Njattuvela Kerala, All India Revolutionary Students Federation, Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Sangathan, Chetna Natya Manch, Niyamgiri Suraksha Samiti, All India Students Association, All India Agricultural and Rural Labour Association, All India Peasants' Coordination Committee, All India Central Council of Trade Unions, All India Progressive Women's Association, Autonomous State Demand Committee, All India Construction Workers Federation, All India Kisan Mahasabha, All Bengal Student Association, All India Agricultural Labourers Association, All India Kisan Sanghars Samiti

The keyword list also covers 'Peoples War' and 'MCC' groups.

D.2 Instrumental Variable Analysis in the NREGA Models

D.2.1 Empirical Support for the Exclusion Restriction in India

Figure D.1 Association of the water deficit with the instrument for the relevant time range

D.2.2 Post-estimation Results of IV-2SLS Models in India

Post-estimation results for Model 1 in the baseline are as follows. Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic is 35.289, with strongly significant Chi-square test results (0.000), showing that the model is not under-identified. For the weak identification test, the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 400.490, and the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic (59.188) is much higher than the threshold of 10% maximal IV size for the Stock-Yogo weak ID test (16.38). The Hansen J statistic is another metric testing over-identification, and one can safely reject this risk with a strongly significant p-value (0.000). The equation is exactly identified. Further, in the first stage of regression, the instrument predicts the independent variable of interest with a strongly significant p-value at 0.01 and has a positive coefficient, in support of the theoretical justification in this study.

Appendix E

E.1 Robustness Checks for the NREGA Models in India

Table E.1 Robustness checks for the NREGA models

Outcome variable:	NREGA expenditure$_t$	log (NREGA persondays$_t$)				NREGA persondays$_t$			
	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63
log (Naxalite events$_{t-1}$)	1.159***	0.401**							
	(0.380)	(0.162)							
log (violent Naxalite events$_{t-1}$)			1,300.487***						
			(359.893)						
log (nonviolent Naxalite events$_{t-1}$)				2,912.772***					
				(793.022)					
log (rural Naxalite events$_{t-1}$)					1,622.420***				
					(487.784)				
log (urban Naxalite events$_{t-1}$)						1,611.178***			
						(416.567)			
log (Naxalite events$_{t-1}$)							757.276***	418.169***	195.600**
							(231.819)	(153.218)	(97.613)
Time lag of the instrument	Four years	Four years	Four years	Four years	Four years	Four years	Three years	Two years	One year
Observations	4,270	4,270	4,270	4,270	4,270	4,270	4,270	4,270	4,270

All results are derived by instrumental variable analysis (IV-2SLS) with the logarithm of rural violent protests. Dependent and independent variables are presented in the table. First model regresses the expenditure-based NREGA variable, the second model regresses the logarithmic version of the baseline dependent variable, and the remaining ones regress the same dependent variable as the baseline. All control variables in the main document are included in the models. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). State-level fixed effects and year-fixed effects are controlled for all models. The time range for all models is 2006-2014. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Time lags and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

E.2 Naxalite Models - Instrumental Variable Analysis

I employed another IV-2SLS analysis for the mobilization models. As the instrumental variable, the model exploits another NREGA-related factor—the number of beneficiary households from non-scheduled castes and tribes (divided by population)—since the Naxalites have often been associated with scheduled castes and tribes due to discrimination-like grievances of people from the lower castes in rural India. Therefore, the instrument is programmatically associated with the NREGA and expected to be exogenous to the Naxalites' mobilization. Although the coefficients shrink within the IV-2SLS model, it is still consistent with the second hypothesis of this research—that the NREGA has a mobilizing effect on the Naxalites.

Table E.2 Instrumental variable analysis for the Naxalite models

Outcome variable:	any Naxalite event$_t$
	64
NREGA persondays$_{t-1}$	0.053**
	(0.022)
Constant	1.471***
	(0.529)
Observations	3,634

All control variables in the main document are included in the models. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). State-level fixed effects and year-fixed effects are controlled. The time range for all models is 2007-2014. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Time lags and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

E.3 Substitution

Table E.3 Robustness checks for substitution models

Outcome variable:	NREGA expenditure$_t$		SEZ area$_t$
	65	66	67
NREGA expenditure$_{t-1}$			0.187***
			(0.041)
SEZ area$_{t-1}$	0.000**		
	(0.000)		
SEZ denotification$_{t-1}$		-1.434***	
		(0.442)	
log (Naxalite events$_{t-1}$)	1.050***	1.028***	0.201
	(0.393)	(0.390)	(0.138)
Control variables	Same as Model 1	Same as Model 1	rural ratio, forest_area, workers ratio, scheduled tribes, scheduled castes, cropped area, nightlights
lnalpha			2.906***
			(0.133)
Constant			30.973***
			(3.528)
Observations	3,787	3,787	3,849

Models in the table share exactly the same structure as the baseline models. While Model 65 and Model 66 are based on IV-2SLS analysis, Model 67 depends on negative binomial regression. Standard errors are clustered by municipality (in parentheses). State-level fixed effects and year-fixed effects are controlled for all models. The time range for all models is 2007-2014. All independent variables are lagged by one year. Time lags and logarithmic transformations are shown in front of variable names. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Appendix F

F.1 Analysis of Liberation Journal

Using the keywords 'NREGA' and 'protest,' I conducted a search on the webpage of the Liberation journal and listed the relevant contents of the most related articles. The 'Type' column indicates whether the article presents the content as a raised demand, simply reports a demand, or directs criticism.

Type	Content
Demand	Extend NREGA to urban areas. Bring a separate legislation for agricultural labour. https://cpiml.net/liberation/2011/05/aicctus-may-day-call
Report	Hundreds of agricultural workers and peasants from Punjab were participating in the March, who were jailed in large numbers last year for agitating for homestead land and NREGA jobs. https://cpiml.net/liberation/2011/05/country-wide-peoples-rights-rallies-demand-check-prices-give-us-jobs-carry-out
Report	CPI(ML) held a large rally which marched from Bhubaneswar Railway Station to the State Assembly on 27 March. People from 22 districts of Odisha were present in the rally. Apart from highlighting mass concerns like price rise, BPL, PDS and NREGA, the rally called for an immediate end to Operation Green Hunt, release of all political prisoners, withdrawal of concessions granted to big companies like Posco, Vedanta, Tata and nationalization of the entire mineral sector. https://cpiml.net/liberation/2020/05/initiatives-in-tamil-nadu-during-lockdown
Report	The days to come call for militant mobilisations (as AIALA has launched for implementation of the NREGA) to demand that Governments in question deliver on the question of unorganised workers' rights – from registration of Delhi construction workers in the Welfare Fund to implementation of the Bima Yojana scheme to cover all BPL households. https://cpiml.net/liberation/2008/04/contemporary-working-class-issues-and-struggles
Criticism	For the last four years the CPI(M) has been actively associated with a government at the Centre. How does the CPI(M) describe its association? The CPI(M) is a signatory to the Common Minimum Programme which is the ruling UPA's commonly drafted and commonly monitored manifesto of governance. Yet the CPI(M) would have us believe that its association with the government is only selective. In fact while it claims credit for legislations on rural employment guarantee (will the CPI(M) tell us if it has been instrumental for the NREGA, why the rural poor in CPI(M)-ruled states have not even got ten days' employment a year instead of the assured 100 days?), right to information and prevention of domestic violence, and for the presumed slowing down of reforms, it blames the Congress for everything neo-liberal and pro-imperialist in UPA policies! Whatever may be the CPI(M)'s formula for apportioning credit and blame, the fact remains that the CPI(M) cannot hide its actual status as a participant and major stakeholder in the UPA government. https://cpiml.net/liberation/2008/03/draft-political-resolution-cpims-19th-congress
Report	The major demands are to institute a CBI inquiry into the rampant corruption and huge misappropriation of funds under the NREGA in the light of recent CAG draft report and to allocate at least Rs. 50,000 Crores for the NREGA in the budget proposals to be presented in Parliament. https://cpiml.net/liberation/2008/03/aiala-nation-wide-protest
Report and criticism	In all discussions and debates going on in view of the completion of two years of NREGA's implementation and the CAG Report, there is a mysterious silence on the question of why Governments crossed all limits of constitutional propriety and laws to brutally implement the pro-corporate SEZ Act 2005 while the NREG Act meant to serve the poor has been left to die a silent death... It is in this light that AIALA has demanded an allocation of Rs. 50000 crore for NREGA in the coming budget. Further AIALA has demanded that the DM and DDC should be made accountable for NREGA implementation and there must be statutory provisions for regulating them in this respect. Only by confronting the power structure, by an offensive against its pro-rich policies, can the rights of the poor be protected and NREGA saved.... It is not necessary to talk about the neo-liberal anti-NREGA lobby because their class character is well-known. But those intellectuals, leaders and parties among NREGA supporters who want to conceal its failure or want to limit it to administrative apathy or weakness of infrastructure etc, are actually trying to conceal the real face of the anti-poor system in the country. The failure of NREGA should be understood not in terms of neo-liberal policies alone but should be situated in the history of failure of pro-poor laws and schemes in the country. In fact, left to the ruling classes and governments are concerned, NREGA is all set to meet the same fate as that of zamindari abolition, land reform, garibi hatao, 20-point programme, mass education campaigns etc.

	https://cpiml.net/liberation/2008/03/two-years-nrega-great-betrayal-poor
Report	Similar block-level agitations were organised by our party in Baburhat in Jalpaiguri, Naihati (Rural), Habra Block-2 and Gaighata of North 24 Parganas. In Dhanekhali-Belmudi area more than 700 agriculture labourers closed the panchayat office and then blocked the main road for several hours. The BDO-SDO and police officials came to the spot and asked our comrades to open the panchayat office and clear the road-block. The police and the administration had to beat a retreat seeing the mood of the agitating masses. The Panchayat Pradhan was forced to declare 100 days work to 8000 people under NREGA. Ration-rage got intermingled with the movements for 100 days work under NREGA. https://cpiml.net/liberation/2007/11/food-movement-2007-west-bengal
Report	Resolutions were passed to intensify the struggle for agricultural Minimum Wage to be raised to Rs. 100 and NREGA wages to Rs. 200 a day. https://cpiml.net/liberation/2008/09/nationwide-campaign-23-july-20-august
Report	It was a completely unusual scene for Chikka Panakal Panchayat office in Gangavati taluk which was otherwise calm and serene. In spite of having prior information, panchayat officials were taken aback seeing unexpectedly large number of people numbering more than 250 picketing the office on various issues related to implementation of NREGA. The people gathered in large numbers under the banner of AIALA and CPIML in spite of attempts by various power groups of various parties to sabotage the mobilization. In fact, other parties and local power brokers did not want a revolutionary force to emerge at panchayat level to challenge them. But, the demo on 11 July was successful and the panchayat officials have promised to fulfill the demands of the people. The demo was addressed by Comrades Bharadwaj, SCM, Uma Shankar, Taluk Secretary of CPI(ML), Mallikarjuna of AIALA and Lingan Gowda Patil, the local organizer. https://cpiml.net/liberation/2008/08/panchayat-level-protest-nrega
Report	The CPI(ML) team demanded that work be provided under NREGA for the workers, measures be taken to curb the pollution, arrested villagers be released, and local villagers too be provided employment in the factory. https://cpiml.net/liberation/2009/06/reports-chhattisgarh
Demand	...round the year employment and Rs.200/- daily wage to all poor under NREGA… https://cpiml.net/liberation/2009/03/nitishs-vikas-yatra-gimmick
Report	In particular, there have been sustained and militant struggles against the widespread corruption in schemes like PDS and NREGA. https://cpiml.net/liberation/2009/10/jharkhand-diary
Demand	Intensify local struggles on basic issues like land, wages (including cases of non-payment/delayed/partial payment under NREGA), social dignity, development (fulfilment of people's basic development needs and aspirations)… https://cpiml.net/liberation/2009/10/implementation-ccs-july-28-call
Report	In Orissa, more than CPI(ML) activists rallied in front of Orissa Assembly on CM Martyrdom Day, July 28, demanding to withdraw Vedanta University Bill which would give precious agricultural land to the MNC Vedanta at the cost of peasants' livelihoods. A protest meeting was also held on the same day in front of Rayagada District Collector office on the issue of land and NREGA which was attended by around 1000 activists. https://cpiml.net/liberation/2009/09/protest-against-vedanta-university-bill
Report	A protest against poor implementation of NREGA was organised on 12 August in Vadipatti block of Madhurai district. AIALA and AIPWA carried out signature campaign in 10 villages in the area demanding segregation of rural areas from the town panchayat and demanding implementation of NREGA and welfare schemes in Town panchayats too. The panchayats tried to bribe or threaten workers from participating: one panchayat hiked wages from about Rs. 40 to Rs. 75 urging the people not to protest, another declared compulsory work on the day of protest threatening people with loss of jobs if they fail to turn up. More than 200 people, mainly women, participated and marched from the BDO to the Revenue Inspector's office. https://cpiml.net/liberation/2009/09/madurai-protest-against-illegalities-nrega
Report	A campaign and people's hearing was conducted on the issues of corruption in NREGA and Rs 1.19 lakh bribe taken by the Birni BDO and JE, after which an FIR was filed. https://cpiml.net/liberation/2016/12/resisting-assaults-its-basic-character
Report	These incidents show that there is an undeclared emergency in Ghazipur district. The CPI(ML) here has taken up issues of corruption in NREGA and mid-day meal schemes… https://cpiml.net/liberation/2010/04/draconian-laws-against-cpiml-activists-ghazipur

Demand	NREGA cards for all labourers and extension of NREGA to 200 days, as well as compulsory work under NREGA for at least one woman from every family… https://cpiml.net/liberation/2009/07/protests-against-punjab-crackdown-0
Report	MGNREGA, though touted as the world's biggest employment guarantee programme, has clearly failed to make any major dent in rural poverty and unemployment, let alone create any positive push to raise the low level of rural wages. AIALA had taken impressive initiatives in the initial phase when NREGA was being launched, and it is important to sustain the momentum with planned and systematic intervention to take up NREGA-related struggles. https://cpiml.net/liberation/2013/03/draft-9th-party-congress-agrarian-and-other-rural-struggles
Report	All India Agricultural Labourers' Association (AIALA) organized a panchayat-level demonstration in Tamil Nadu (March 5-15) demanding inclusion in BPL list, work under MGNREGA, Rs.200 daily wages under MGNREGA, homestead land and patta. https://cpiml.net/liberation/2010/04/update-aiala-demo-tamilnadu
Report	Later an AIPWA delegation also met the CM Ashok Gahlaut and presented their list of demands which include extending NREGA to all the districts and guaranteeing 50 per cent employment for women with minimum wage at Rs.200/8hr, NREGA to be extended to town areas and urban centres also with 50 per cent jobs for women... https://cpiml.net/liberation/2010/04/international-womens-day-centenary-events